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The Kremlin

vs.

The People

The Story of the Cold Civil War

in Stalin's Russia

by Robert Magidoff

Doubleday & Company, Inc.
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AUTHOR'S NOTE

This book was on the presses at the time of Stalin's death and it was not possible to bring it up to date without a complete revision.

The accession to power of Georgi Maximillianovich Malenkov came as a surprise to no one, since the fifty-one-year-old Malenkov delivered the main address at the last Party Congress, an honor hitherto reserved only for Lenin and Stalin.

CHAPTER 1

The Battle Takes Shape

> The celebrated wall raised by the Chinese against Tartar attacks . . . is small and less thick than the shadowy atmosphere that protects Russia and separates it from other peoples.
>
> HASSAN DE BLAMONT, *Mémoires secrets sur la Russie,* 1804

The separation of Russia from the rest of the world has plagued her people throughout history. The reasons for such a separation have been many and varied. Some of them have always existed, and others have been added in each new period.

There has always been the endless, desolate steppe, buried in snow half the time, offering no natural obstacles in the path of the foreign invader and furnishing the population with but wretchedly limited means of transportation and communication for their normal pursuits. There has always been the harsh climate with its unceasing pressures upon men and women not equipped with modern techniques to fight the summer's heat and drought, the winter's cold and snow. There has always been bottomless poverty, breeding envy and sapping energy, aggravated by countless wars, in the making of which the people have had no say. Finally, there has always been the rule from above, the dictatorship by the men in the Kremlin, whether tsars or commissars, themselves haunted by insecurity and jealous of their hold on the souls and services of their subjects.

For centuries troops have guarded the frontiers of Russia; complicated entry and exit regulations have controlled travel; and censorship has been wielded as an instrument both for enforcing silence and for disseminating lies.

The unhappiness of the people has been as deep and widespread as their distrust of aliens, a distrust blended with a limit-

less curiosity about the outside world, not untinged with envy and admiration.

With the one exception of Peter the Great—and even in his case many qualifications are necessary—Russia's rulers have tried to keep their subjects isolated from the rest of the world. Not one of Stalin's predecessors, however, matched the ruthless determination and multiplicity of means that have gone into the forging of the Iron Curtain and the attempts to keep it impenetrable.

The intensity of Stalin's efforts cannot be explained solely by the age-old factors of climate, geography, and history. Nor does this intensity seem justified by the Communist cry of hostile "capitalist encirclement." Other considerations came into being during World War II and the years immediately following its victorious conclusion. These new elements proved to be of a nature so compelling as to outweigh, in the calculations of the Kremlin, all the advantages of converting the wartime alliance with the Western powers into peacetime collaboration.

The Soviet people, it might be added here, wanted such a collaboration with a desperation born of the need to rebuild life in their devastated country, a desire to enjoy lasting peace, and a haunting fear that their wartime foreign friends might be lost to them. Throughout the hostilities the people of Russia were more grateful for the aid of their Allies, particularly the United States, than were their rulers, who consistently tried to conceal the extent of that aid, and to minimize it when concealment proved impossible.

The new internal factors that emerged, when seen through the eyes of the men in the Kremlin—and decision has rested exclusively with them—were, as already stated, so compelling as to move the Politburo to rule against peacetime collaboration.

The present study is devoted to a description and analysis of these factors and Stalin's methods of dealing with them. First, however, it is necessary to examine the Communist assertions regarding capitalist encirclement.

The most important single fact about present-day Russia is that it is ruled by the Communist Party. The fundamental concept of the Party is that the world is predestined by the march of history to shift from capitalism to Communism. In the words of deputy Prime Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, speaking on Novem-

ber 6, 1947: "We are living in an age in which all roads lead to Communism."

Moreover, the Bolsheviks are convinced that one country, namely Russia, is destined to lead the world along the path of victorious Communism, a conviction which, incidentally, is a distorted but revealing echo of the boast a St. Petersburg newspaper, *Novoye Vremya* (*New Times*), made in 1895: "The Twentieth Century belongs to us!"[1] In pursuance of its conviction, the Kremlin is perpetually seeking to expand its domain. This expansion is disquietingly reminiscent of tsarist strategy. But the Kremlin's is more ruthless, ambitious, and successful.

The self-justification of the new Russian imperialism is that it is not imperialism at all but the blessed result of an inevitable historical process, which is liberating peoples and nations from capitalism and reducing the strength and territorial limits of capitalist countries that encircle the world's first socialist state. The process will continue until the "encirclers" themselves are trapped in a "socialist encirclement" and destroyed.

It was this theory that led the founder of the Soviet Union, Vladimir Lenin, to insist that a state of war, or at least a partial state of war, between the forces of capitalism and Communism must inexorably continue until the issue is decided once and for all by the complete victory of the Revolution the world over.

The "state of war" was suspended during the life-and-death struggle against Hitler Germany, when Russia and the Soviet regime were fighting for very survival; and it found effective Allies in the capitalist countries of the West, led by the United States and Great Britain. The Soviet leaders must have been tempted to extend collaboration into the postwar period. Their country would have continued to be on the receiving end of the alliance, and it would no longer have had to sustain the terrible wartime losses.

The Kremlin, however, resisted all temptation. To yield to it would inevitably have led to the abandonment of the theory that capitalist encirclement is a deadly menace that necessitates a continuation of dictatorship and the maintenance of organs of suppression, a Soviet euphemism for the secret police. The truth is that the Kremlin could not have hoped to cope with the problems and tensions that had come into the open during the war without preserving and strengthening the controls and power

of its secret police. The existence of a real or alleged hostile force gives the Soviet leaders the excuse for intensifying regimentation and oiling the wheels of their propaganda machine. Thus the Kremlin actually has a vested interest in an antagonistic capitalist world. It was the realization of this stark truth that compelled Winston Churchill to exclaim with exasperation that Russian officialdom fears the friendship of the West more than its hostility.

To yield to the temptations of friendly postwar co-existence with the capitalist world would likewise have meant an abandonment of efforts to extend Communist domination into countries lying within easy Soviet reach, for the war had created a "revolutionary situation" most favorable to such expansion.

Germany, defeated, lay in ruins. Great Britain and liberated continental Europe were in an almost equal state of prostration, armed with little more than the exaltation of victory. The United States had evacuated the greater part of its army and destroyed its magnificent war machine with truly American speed and efficiency. Economically, Europe was a waste, presided over by chaos and hopelessness. Militarily, it was a vacuum into which the Red Army could have moved almost at will, and over which it could exert pressure in whatever direction it chose, synchronizing its moves with the activity of Soviet diplomacy.

For the whole world to hear, the Kremlin paid tribute to liberty, democracy, and the sovereignty of nations, but in actuality it was steadily expanding its influence to the point of domination. The Soviet government kept signing agreements, making promises, violating them, claiming innocence with self-righteous indignation, signing new agreements, making fresh promises, ever obscuring its actual intentions and camouflaging its next moves. To a bewildered and despairing world, Soviet diplomacy began to seem as invincible as the Red Army.

Writing over one hundred years ago about tsarist diplomatic practice, the French journalist, Marquis Astolphe de Custine, threw an illuminating light on the notorious success of postwar Soviet diplomacy:

"If better diplomats are found among the Russians than among highly civilised peoples, it is because our papers warn them of everything that happens and everything that is contemplated in our countries. Instead of disguising our weaknesses with pru-

dence, we reveal them with vehemence every morning; whereas the Russians' Byzantine policy, working in the shadow, carefully conceals from us all that is thought, done and feared in their country. We proceed in broad daylight; they advance under cover: the game is one-sided."[2]

Playing this "one-sided game," Soviet diplomatic pressure, bolstered by the presence of the Red Army in the heart of Europe and by Communist fifth columns, succeeded in converting practically all the countries of central and southeastern Europe into satellites masquerading as "new democracies." The area of capitalist encirclement was pushed back far beyond the borders of the USSR by Communist-dominated regimes. In the process the wartime alliance was destroyed, the dream of One World shattered, and the Iron Curtain drawn.

Much against its own will, the United States became the leading force in the free world's effort to block further Soviet aggression. The reason for this was simple: the Kremlin can be deterred by superior force only, and America alone possesses such strength. By "strength" I do not mean merely the naked power of atomic bombs and an overwhelming war potential but a combination of that power and the vast moral prestige of the United States among the peoples of the world, including those of Russia. This is why the Soviet leaders not only maintain political pressure and try to surpass the United States in their capacity to wage war but have simultaneously set out to undermine United States influence throughout the world, primarily among the people of the USSR.

No one realizes the enormity of the task better than Stalin himself. In reporting to President Roosevelt his conversation with the Soviet leader during the crucial month of July 1941, Harry Hopkins wrote:

"Stalin said Hitler's greatest weakness was found in the vast numbers of oppressed people who hated Hitler and the immoral ways of his Government. He believed those people and countless other millions in nations still unconquered could receive the kind of encouragement and moral strength they needed to resist Hitler from one source, and that was the United States. He stated that the world influence of the President and the Government of the United States was enormous."[3]

And again, later in the report: "He [Stalin] repeatedly said

that the President and the United States had more influence with the common people of the world than any other force."[4]

The words "than any other force" merit emphasis, for Stalin made no exception of the Soviet Union.

With the war over, his desire to weaken American and other Western influences among the Soviet and satellite peoples played a major role in making the Iron Curtain inevitable. Only if shielded by the Curtain could Stalin hope to destroy the influence of the USA, a task of such magnitude that organs of suppression had to be called upon to enhance the effectiveness of anti-American propaganda. The propaganda itself rose to a pitch and violence not manifested even in the wartime Soviet denunciations of Nazi Germany. Thus were simultaneously set in motion the weapons of coercion and the machinery of persuasion, the twin servants of the modern totalitarian state.

The Kremlin's disappointment over its own miscalculations of postwar developments in the USA only added fuel to the hate-America campaign. The Politburo had expected far-reaching economic and social upheavals to follow the abolition, in the United States, of wartime economic planning and controls. It had expected strikes, unemployment, suicides, and riots. In a word, a repetition of the terrible depression crisis of the late twenties.

The Kremlin had also hoped that "capitalist contradictions" would work havoc with the wartime friendship and co-operation of the Western democracies and force them to turn against each other in capitalistic rivalry.

Such developments would inevitably have aggravated the "revolutionary situation" in postwar Europe; the situation could have been profitably exploited by the various Communist parties, with the direct and indirect crushing aid of Russia itself, the "fatherland of the world proletariat."

Nothing of this sort happened. In an unprecedented gesture of generosity and enlightened self-interest, the United States assumed leadership over the economic recovery of the free world, cementing it and helping it stage a comeback to comparative normalcy and health. Inside the United States, production soared and the number of gainfully employed citizens reached an all-time high.

So also did the vehemence of Stalin's hate-America campaign, and the iron in the Curtain was tempered into steel.

The many grave disadvantages of an Iron Curtain to the national interests of the Soviet Union and to the well-being of its population would unquestionably have outweighed the reasons for forging the Curtain, at least for some years to come, had those reasons been rooted principally in Communist dogma and the Russian character. Given the will, Stalin could easily have ignored national traits, many of which, incidentally, underwent radical changes during the war years. More easily still, he could have rationalized deviations from the basic Marxist thesis of implacable rivalry between capitalism and socialism.

The will was not there because wartime developments which revealed to the outside world the patriotism, self-sacrifice, and strength of the Soviet peoples had simultaneously bared to the Kremlin the many fundamental weaknesses of the Bolshevik regime. These weaknesses demonstrated with stark finality the fact that the citizens of the USSR had not embraced the Soviet system as wholeheartedly as the Kremlin claimed. These weaknesses showed that the people of the USSR had not outlived "psychological survivals of the capitalist past" and that the "New Soviet Man" was still a distant goal.

On the contrary, throughout the years of the supreme test, the outcome of which spelled survival or annihilation, the Soviet people actually fell back on the instincts, faith, thinking, and ways that had taken root and matured during the centuries preceding the Bolshevik era. The people of the Soviet Union fell back on nationalism, the "capitalist" incentives for improving one's own lot, religious faith, and a spirit of liberalism in the arts and sciences.

Although leaderless and unorganized in manifesting these tendencies, the men and women of Russia subjected the regime to such strains and stresses that the Soviet leadership had to take refuge in tolerance. The Kremlin went so far in its retreat as to encourage and even anticipate some of these trends, such as Russian nationalism, but watched them all with a wary eye, knowing full well that their continuation under conditions of peace and normalcy would inexorably tend to modify, if not completely undermine, the Soviet regime. Since friendly relations with the West could not but lend strength to the trends, a cold war against

the free world became inevitable: it was an act of self-preservation on the part of the Kremlin.

Thus came into being Stalin's dual postwar course—a policy of aggressive participation in world affairs, seeking expansion and aggrandizement; and an internal policy of isolation, the Iron Curtain. Behind it the Soviet leadership launched the most massive psychological offensive any nation has ever been subjected to by its own rulers. This battle for the minds, souls, and services of the people of the USSR has been the most significant phenomenon in postwar Russia, a veritable Cold Civil War affecting every man, woman, and child.

CHAPTER 2

The Defection Front

Great Russia has cemented for ever
The Inviolable Union of Free Republics.
From the new Soviet national anthem
which replaced the "Internationale" in December 1943

Stalin's most boasted achievement, the "unshaken solidarity" of the Soviet peoples, not only shook but began to fall apart virtually at the moment German troops came within sight.

The mass surrenders of Red Army soldiers during the first months of the Nazi invasion caused astonishment and grief among all free men, although they did not know at the time the full scope of the capitulations. It was only after the war, when the secret files of the German armies became available and the historic Nuremberg trials were held, that the truth came to light in all its gruesomeness. The complete facts on Red Army surrenders may never be established, but it is beyond doubt that millions of Soviet soldiers capitulated or submitted to easy capture during the first four months of the war.[1] A "top secret" letter by Alfred Rosenberg claimed that by November 1, 1941, two million fifty-three thousand Red Army men had surrendered, while by March 1, 1942, the total soared to three million six hundred thousand.[2]

Red Army men—Russians and, particularly, non-Russians—did more than surrender. They volunteered by the tens of thousands to serve the foreign invader. Suspect, they were at first used as repair men in military establishments and as kitchen helpers and drivers of horse carts in the supply services. Later many Soviet war prisoners were organized into special units attached to German divisions, to carry ammunition and machine guns.

Then special "eastern" legions were organized, made up of non-Russian volunteers belonging to Soviet minority peoples: Armenians, Georgians, Tartars, and Turkomen.

Professional German military leaders worked out elaborate and ambitious plans for forming vast armies of Soviet war prisoners to fight Stalin's troops. But the military counted without Hitler, who vetoed the plans in the face of repeated pleas by his own General Staff. Confident that the Wehrmacht was capable of achieving decisive victory on its own, and wanting to be under no obligation to "second-class" races, the Fuehrer issued orders forbidding the formation of additional military units made up of Soviet war prisoners. But so convinced were his generals of the futility of their efforts without the latter's help that they took advantage of Hitler's oversight in also failing to forbid attaching volunteers to purely German divisions, and ordered all invading armies on the eastern front to bolster their numerical strength ten to fifteen per cent by accepting volunteers from among Soviet war prisoners.

According to captured German documents, about two hundred thousand such volunteers were serving in the Reichswehr by the spring of 1942. When the Nazis were advancing on Stalingrad at the end of that summer, the number of volunteers had jumped to half a million.[3]

Simultaneously with the mass surrender of Red Army troops, the population of enemy-occupied areas was "capitulating" in its own manner: greeting the invader with the traditional welcoming bread and salt. No doubt many did it out of sheer fear, but to many others even the Nazi invader, of whose rapacious nature they had no inkling at the time, seemed a liberator from a regime of purges, arrests, destruction of churches, collectivization, and the deification of a remote and cruel Georgian—Stalin.

The Germans were thus welcomed in many cities and villages of Byelorussia, the Ukraine, and Russia proper, as well as by practically the entire population of the Crimea and the Cossack and Moslem areas of the northern Caucasus. The Mohammedans went further still, as I learned during my visit as war correspondent to the just liberated Tartar Crimea. They declared *gazavat*—holy war—against the Bolshevik infidels. The sacred saddle of Bakhchisarai was sent to Hitler, along with a magnificent horse, as a token of allegiance of the Crimean Tartars, and young men

were sent by the thousand to join his armies. Communists hiding in mountain villages were hunted down and turned over to the Gestapo; the guerrilla movement never became a vital force in the Nazi-occupied areas of the Soviet Union populated by Moslems.

The Soviet authorities inaugurated punitive measures as soon as the Germans were driven out of the defected regions. The Bolsheviks acted with swiftness and finality. Entire districts incorporated in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the Constitution of 1936 as autonomous units were obliterated in violation of Stalin's own Constitution. The word "obliterated" is used here in its most direct and literal sense: the entire population of the affected regions was rounded up and transferred to the vastness of Siberia and Central Asia.

Altogether, six areas were liquidated, including the Volga German Republic, whose population was removed, in September 1941, as a precautionary measure and in retaliation, according to the official decree, for harboring German spies and storing weapons and ammunition for Nazi paratroops.[4] The five regions liquidated after "liberation" by the Red Army were the Chechen-Ingush and the Kalmyk Autonomous republics, in 1943; the Balkar half of the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic, on March 8, 1944; the Karachayev Autonomous Province, at about the same time; and, finally, the Crimean Tartar Autonomous Republic, during the second half of May 1944.

Altogether at least a million and a half, and probably as many as two million, Soviet citizens were thus forcibly resettled. Characteristic of these deportations was the fact that *entire* communities were uprooted, each in one sweeping operation which embraced the guilty and the innocent, the high and the low, the suspected and the completely trusted. Some important local Communists committed suicide in a fit of despair and impotent rage. Others, with high contacts in Moscow, appealed by phone in a desperate last-minute attempt to escape evacuation but were told to go. The men in the Kremlin were particularly anxious that the local hierarchy accompany the evacuated population, in order to organize and channel the new life in Soviet Asia along approved Communist lines. Each national group, with the exception of the Volga Germans, who were scattered over the vast

timber areas of northern Siberia, was resettled as a homogeneous community.

The evictions were carried out with the precision, speed and thoroughness of a military operation.

In May 1944, I came across a Russian friend who had worked in Nalchik, the capital of the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic in the Caucasus, and who had been there on the day of the eviction of the Balkars, two months earlier. Here is his eyewitness account, as I wrote it down in my diary:

"It happened on March the eighth. There was restlessness in the city and rumors were flying thick, all caused by the appearance during the last few days of masses of Red Army men. There were no Caucasians among them—only Russians and Ukrainians.

"Most frightening of all, there were abnormally large numbers of army trucks. Dark, empty, they were parked everywhere: on the hilly roads, in the suburbs, in city streets and squares. Peasants coming into Nalchik said that trucks were nestling on the approaches to villages. The Red Army men were friendly and didn't look upset or excited. They probably had no idea of the job ahead of them.

"Many people decided that the concentration was merely for some military maneuvers, or that training grounds were to be established in the recently liberated region. But rumors persisted that the Balkars, who were Moslems and who, unlike the Christian Kabardinians, collaborated en masse with the enemy, were to be evacuated. I looked up a high local government official I knew, a Balkar, and mentioned the rumors. He got red in the face and shouted: 'Who is spreading those enemy-bred lies? I'll have him arrested!' Fortunately, at this point we were interrupted and I slipped out of his office.

"During that same night, in the early hours of March eighth, all the Balkars throughout the Republic were rounded up and taken by truck to railway stations where trains bound for Central Asia were held in readiness. The entire operation must have taken not more than three hours, probably less, for the Balkars lived in villages. Unlike the Kabardinians, who are hunters and breeders of cattle, they are tillers of the soil.

"Thanks to the passport and compulsory police registration in all of the USSR, the NKVD, which was in charge of the operation, had complete lists of names and addresses. All property was to

be left intact, and people could take along with them only as much as they could carry. Their first concern was food, and many killed a calf and took the meat along. Some slaughtered every head of cattle they owned. A few men and at least two women were executed for disobeying orders not to destroy livestock. Three or four high Balkar government officials, including my friend, committed suicide. Later I learned in Moscow that all who ended their lives to escape eviction were considered traitors and saboteurs, and their relatives suffered accordingly. As a rule, families were kept together."

This was the story my Moscow friend told me early in May. Later in the month a group of foreign correspondents, myself included, was flown to Crimea, the scene of the latest German disaster amid the ruins of heroic Sebastopol. Nazi defeat here had been swift and total. At every turn we could see traces of panicky flight as the enemy was pushed toward the Black Sea. The only escape was by water, but German transport facilities were paralyzed by the Soviet air force. Bodies of German officers and men were still strewn all over the beaches. Here and there I saw heads and shoulders of the dead floating in the water, with the lower parts of the bodies lying rigidly on the beach.

The correspondents had been promised a five-day stay in Crimea, with extensive trips to various parts of the peninsula. But, strangely, at the end of the third day we were told to be ready to fly back to Moscow at dawn. We asked for an explanation but received none. We protested, argued, and pleaded with the Foreign Office censor who accompanied us. He agreed to telephone to the Soviet capital and convey our desire to stay on. A half hour later he told us that something big had come up in Moscow and Molotov himself wanted to hold a press conference with us. This did the trick and we left voluntarily. On the way to the airport we saw many empty trucks, traveling in convoys or parked on the approaches to villages. There were no tanks, no artillery, and relatively few soldiers. I recalled the story of the Balkar evacuation and my heart sank. A Foreign Office representative met us at the Moscow airport with the news that, after all, Molotov had decided not to hold a press conference.

A sinister hint of the subsequent fate of the small, non-Slavic nations deported to Siberia is contained in the failure of the 1948 edition of the *Small Soviet Encyclopaedia* even to mention the

existence of the Kalmyk, Karachai, Chechen, Ingush, and Crimean Tartar peoples.

The Kremlin could not very well liquidate also the Russian, Byelorussian, and Ukrainian republics, the largest and most densely populated in the USSR, though there, too, a significant part of the population had greeted the Germans as liberators. This was particularly true of the Ukrainians, the largest Soviet minority group—some forty million strong—proudly conscious of their history, language, culture, as well as the beauty and richness of their land.

Hitler's racial theories and his fear that a large army of Soviet citizens, even if they served under him, might interfere with his plans for converting European Russia into a German "India" had driven him to veto the plans of his generals to organize a Russian arm of the Wehrmacht. And the cruel, shortsighted arrogance of the Nazis had gradually converted the initial welcome into burning hatred.

In the Ukraine, for instance, when the Germans made their first request for volunteers to work in the Third Reich, fully 80 per cent of the initial quota was filled by persons who hoped thus to contribute to a speedy victory over Moscow and bring nearer the day of an independent Ukraine. But when news of the inhuman treatment accorded the laborers inside Germany, and of the starvation and flogging of Soviet war prisoners, had trickled back, all volunteering ceased. To meet their growing manpower needs, the Nazis now began to resort to man hunts, and the young men and women of the "second-class" race went into hiding. The reprisals that followed served only to increase resentments which found release in sabotage and assassination, crystallizing finally in a relentless guerrilla warfare in the Ukraine. Armed bands operated also in other sections of enemy-occupied USSR.

The partisans performed miracles of valor, destroying Nazi military airports, cutting off supplies, wiping out isolated detachments, and ceaselessly harassing small garrisons.

The Soviet government took swift and skillful advantage of the wrath of the population at the Nazi policy of *Schrecklichkeit,* ignoring for the time being the initial mass collaboration. With every means at its disposal, Moscow publicized hair-raising details of German atrocities (exaggeration was hardly necessary) and gave full-throated praise to the heroism of the partisans.

Guerrilla warfare was glorified in front-line dispatches and official communiqués, depicted in plays and fiction, and sung about from the stage and over the radio. Hatred of the enemy spread throughout the land, and admiration of the guerrillas served to inspire the population to ever greater self-sacrificing toil. Moscow parachuted to the partisans food, arms, and ammunition, radio and surgical equipment, along with trained and trusted Red Army officers who took charge of operations. The Kremlin thus actively aided the underground resistance, gave leadership and co-ordination to the movement, and in the end usurped most of the credit. The resistance was cited as another example of the Kremlin's farsighted preparations for a total showdown with a mighty enemy, and as a glorious instance of the people's devotion to the Soviet fatherland and the Bolshevik regime.

The stark fact remains, however, that, to the very end of Russia's Second Patriotic War, many hundreds of thousands, probably millions, of Soviet citizens voluntarily fought their own country's government either as civilian collaborators or in the auxiliary units of the enemy's armed forces. Desertions continued to the last possible moment. That veteran student of the Soviet Union, Louis Fischer, reports that "there is documentary evidence to prove that as late as 1944 and even in 1945 when the Wehrmacht was in headlong retreat before the Russians, whole Soviet units went over to the enemy."[5] Significantly, there was no defection either among civilians or in the army during Russia's First Patriotic War, waged against Napoleon in 1812.

The major weaknesses of the dissidents during the Soviet-German conflict were political disorganization and moral disorientation. Defection lacked the leadership around which to rally because it was fed on the resentments of millions of isolated individuals instead of being organized by a political movement.

In addition, the morale of most of the dissidents suffered because they realized that their action against tyranny at home served to give succor and comfort to the foreign invader, an action that bordered dangerously on treason, no matter how self-righteously such action might be rationalized.

The Germans, in their turn, did nothing to alleviate the mental agony of their potential allies, nor did they encourage defection by giving it some status and organization. On the contrary, fearing and distrusting all Soviet citizens, and desiring to convert the

entire population of the occupied areas into slaves serving the master race, rather than into allies, the Nazi leadership consistently blocked any use of them except for propaganda directed at the Red Army. This ran contrary to the advice of German diplomats with long experience in Russia and with profound insight into Soviet realities. Outstanding among such diplomats was Count Friedrich von der Schulenburg, Germany's last Ambassador to Moscow.[6]

Hitler not only forbade all discussion of a postwar organization of Russia—or any of its component parts—as a semi-independent state: he had also banned, as already mentioned, the formation of separate military units composed of volunteers from among Soviet war prisoners. This frustrated the plans of some Reichswehr generals and diplomats for turning the invasion into a civil war inside the Soviet Union. In the words of Field Marshal von Kleist, "Hopes of victory were largely built on the prospect that the invasion would produce a political upheaval in Russia."[7] Hitler, on the other hand, was confident that the might of his Third Reich alone was sufficient to bring victory.

It is therefore the more remarkable and significant that, despite Nazi-made obstacles and despite the political disorientation and moral weakness of the dissidents, two dynamic anti-Soviet movements actually emerged and were active in German-occupied areas, armed with a program, an organization, and leadership.

One was the nationalistic movement of Ukrainian separatists, which had started even before Hitler's invasion. An underground force inside the USSR, it sought to organize the Ukraine as an independent sovereign state. The movement was fed on the eternal national aspirations of the Ukrainians, on the widespread opposition to Stalin's Russia-first policy, and on the bitter resentments over his collectivization program. This program had destroyed the well-to-do class of peasants, which in the rich-soiled Ukraine was larger than in any other part of the Soviet Union.

With the rout of the Red Army and the subsequent German occupation of the Ukraine, the underground movement directed its knives and guns against the Nazi police and SS units guilty of atrocities against the population, but avoided action against the regular army, whose leaders favored some sort of a semi-independent Ukrainian state.

The moving force of the underground organization was the

Union of Ukrainian Nationalists and its military arm, the Ukrainian Insurrection Army. They outlasted the occupation and resumed guerrilla action against the Red Army immediately after "liberation," resorting to wrecking, sabotage, armed attacks on small units, and assassination of key military and political figures. Soviet punitive expeditions against the insurrectionists lasted at least through the year 1947, when simultaneous large-scale purges were undertaken in an effort to weed out nationalists and terrorize the remaining Ukrainian patriots into inactivity. After that the organs of suppression retired into comparative obscurity ("comparative" is the key word), and organs of propaganda moved to the foreground. An active Ukrainian resistance force existed, according to some reports, even in 1951,[8] and may not have been completely liquidated to this day.

The other dissident force, the so-called Vlasov Movement, was led primarily by Russians but embraced members of many Soviet nationalities, including Ukrainians, and its official program aimed to win the support of all citizens of the USSR in German-occupied and Soviet-held multinational Russia.

The program was formulated in two statements which are of real significance to the present day, even though the Vlasov Movement is dead, because they reveal fundamental grievances and aspirations. The first statement was issued by the leader of the movement, General Andrei A. Vlasov, in December 1942, and the second by Vlasov's Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, in the so-called Prague Manifesto of November 15, 1944.

The four major points of Vlasov's program were:

1. Abolition of collective farms and the restoration of private ownership of land.
2. Re-establishment of private trade and handicrafts.
3. Elimination of the system of forced labor and repression.
4. Freedom of religion, conscience, speech, and assembly.[9]

The Prague Manifesto went further. Its four major points were as follows:

1. The overthrow of the "Stalin tyranny."
2. A return to the liberties granted by the "people's" Revolution of February 1917.
3. Immediate and honorable peace with Germany.
4. The creation of a new, free Russian state "without Bolsheviks and exploiters."[10]

General Vlasov was born in a village near Gorky on the Volga in 1900, in a peasant family, and studied for the Orthodox priesthood. However, when the Revolution broke out in 1917 he joined the Red Army and became one of its promising young officers. The purge of 1936-38 did not affect his fortune, and in 1938, already a colonel, Vlasov was sent to China as military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek. A year later he returned to take command of the 99th Infantry Division in the Kiev Military District, where the war found him. Vlasov was one of the few Soviet military commanders to succeed in breaking out of the German encirclements in the Ukraine.

When I visited his headquarters and talked to him at the end of 1941 on the northwestern approaches to Moscow, Vlasov was in charge of the counterattacking Twentieth Army, hailed as a hero of the defense of the Soviet capital. Stalin himself decorated him, promoted him to the rank of lieutenant general, and later placed him in command of the Second Assault Army. In August 1942, Vlasov was once more trapped in an encirclement, and this time he could not break out, though he resisted to the end. The army was destroyed, and Vlasov and his staff surrendered and offered the Germans his services as organizer and leader of a volunteer army to be recruited from among Soviet war prisoners, for the purpose of fighting the Kremlin. It was during this, Vlasov's last battle with the Germans as a Red Army general, that he "reached the decision that it was [his] duty to call upon the Russian people to destroy the Bolshevik system."[11]

Lanky, tall, slightly stooped, his eyes searching and attentive behind large, rimmed glasses, Andrei Vlasov looked more like a patient schoolteacher than the battle-seasoned general who was to become one of the most controversial and tragic figures of World War II. He became the leader of a movement seeking to bring freedom to his unhappy fatherland, and was at the same time a traitor to it in its darkest hour. For the sake of his vision of a reborn Russia he offered his aid to the enemy of his people, stooping to flattery of Hitler ("a leader of great genius"), who did not trust him, scorned him, and at one time even placed him under house arrest.

The reasons for Nazi distrust of the Vlasov Movement were succinctly outlined in a memorandum by Dr. Taubert, of the German Propaganda Ministry, dated December 31, 1944:

"The Vlasov movement does not consider itself linked with Germany to the bitter end. It has strong Anglophile sympathies and entertains the idea of some day changing its course. . . . [It] is a diluted fusion of liberal and Bolshevik ideologies. The essential fact is that they do not fight the Jews; they fail to consider the Jewish question at all. The Vlasov movement thinks it can laugh off the National Socialist ideology. It does not represent a great Russian national renaissance, like fascism in Italy and National Socialism in Germany."[12]

Although the wartime Vlasovite organ, *Dobrovolets* (*Volunteer*), particularly the issues of February 2 and April 23, 1944, did print Jew-baiting articles (this was done, the Vlasovites now insist, under harsh German pressure), Dr. Taubert's memorandum and statements by Hitler and Himmler[13] leave little doubt that Vlasov had actually sought a degree of political and ideological independence that might enable him to return to his country as a liberator.

The Germans were so hard pressed that they allowed him in the end to recruit two divisions, though furnishing equipment for only one. In 1945 the Nazi command sent the Vlasovites to one of the most dangerous sectors of the front, where they sustained heavy losses. Then, violating German orders, the Vlasov divisions marched into Czechoslovakia, reaching Prague on the eve of its heroic uprising against the Nazis. The Vlasovites quickly switched sides and helped the Czech patriots liberate their capital just as Red Army tanks were reaching its outskirts. In the hope of enlisting Allied support against the Soviets, or at least finding refuge, Vlasov and his troops retreated westward and surrendered to US units.

The Americans were bound by the Yalta agreement, made to assure the speedy repatriation of US and other Allied war prisoners liberated by the Russians, and turned over to the Red Army many Vlasovites. The general himself was not formally transferred to the Russians by US authorities but was allowed to fall into Soviet hands under circumstances that are not clear to this day.

On August 2, 1946, the Soviet press announced that Vlasov had been executed as a traitor to his country. With him eleven of his collaborators went to their inglorious deaths, all ex-Red Army generals and officers.

The rope that ended Vlasov's life could not, however, strangle

the revelation, made by the immense size of his following, that a large section of Russia's population resented the Communist regime to the fatal point of collaboration with the enemy. The dominating element among Vlasov's supporters consisted of young men who had grown up under the Soviet regime.

An even more telling disclosure of dissatisfaction was provided by the multitudes of Soviet citizens liberated from Nazi concentration camps who refused to go back to Stalin's Russia. The bulk of them consisted of war prisoners, men and women deported to Germany as slave laborers, and persons who voluntarily fled with the retreating German army, either because they collaborated with the enemy or were anti-Stalinists, or both. The Germans themselves seem to have been unable to ascertain the exact number of war prisoners and slave laborers in their hands. The estimates vary between eight and eleven million.

By far the larger half of this mass of humanity found itself in the hands of the Red Army, as the latter pursued the defeated Reichswehr. Of the millions who were liberated by the Western Powers, the majority were turned over to the Soviet repatriation officials, as agreed at the Yalta Conference. Louis Fischer states in *Thirteen Who Fled* that, according to the official US figures released to him in Germany in July 1948, the total number of Soviet citizens repatriated from the American Zone by September 1945 was 1,060,000; from all three Allied zones, 2,031,000. He was also told that it was impossible to determine how many of them were returned to their homeland voluntarily and how many by force. "But it is important to note," adds Fischer, "that the Soviet authorities were permitted by the Western powers to use force in repatriations and that force was often employed."[14]

Repatriations on a smaller scale continued until early 1947, when the US military commander, General McNarney, announced that compulsory deportations would no longer be allowed.

The reasons for the change in our policy were most urgent. The Yalta agreement for the exchange of liberated war prisoners and slave laborers had been made in the sincere belief that they would all be impatient to return to their native countries, their homes, relatives, friends, and jobs. We were anxious to speed up the repatriation of the Allied war prisoners liberated by the Soviet armed forces. We were also eager to eliminate as quickly as possible the serious administrative, psychological, and financial prob-

lems created by the DPs. These problems, moreover, contributed to the tensions in Allied-Soviet relationships that were beginning to strain the unity of the victors.

Soviet repatriation officers were therefore given a free hand in visiting DP camps under Allied jurisdiction, to talk to the recalcitrants and urge them to return home. Allied officials themselves pleaded with the DPs, and even high-pressured and threatened them. In France, Soviet secret service agents organized a veritable man hunt, with the aid of the local Communists, resorting to kidnaping and murder on sovereign French soil. US authorities themselves obliged the Soviet government with forced repatriation operations inside this country. A restrained account of this episode appeared in *U. S. News and World Report* for June 6, 1952:

"Some of the Russians liberated after D-Day in Normandy were brought to the United States, taken to camps in Idaho. Few wanted to return, but most were soon put aboard Russian ships in Seattle and Portland. The remaining 118, who resisted forcibly, were taken to a camp in New Jersey while their fate was decided. Finally, these, too, were handed over to Russian authorities, but they had to be gotten out of their barracks with tear gas."

According to unofficial estimates in the same report, tens of thousands of Russians took their own lives during forced repatriation operations, some by flinging themselves from the windows of speeding trains, others by drowning themselves, still others by hanging. The atmosphere of heartbreak, courage, fear, and violence in which the non-returnees lived and died at the time has been vividly re-created in *Green Boundary,* a novel by the gifted young Russian-American author, Boris Ilyin.

The US authorities finally woke up to the gravity of the situation and discontinued their practice of returning Soviet refugees by force. The mistakes made in 1945 have been decisive in shaping the American determination not to use force against prisoners of war in Korea who may be unwilling to return to their Communist-ruled homelands. But for hundreds of thousands of Soviet citizens trapped after World War II this determination came too late.

Even at the time when Allied repatriation officers were still cooperating with the Russians, the latter kept accusing them of violating the Yalta agreement. Charges flew thick and fast: the Allies were preventing Soviet repatriation officers from visiting

refugee camps and talking to the inmates; the Allies were unlawfully keeping the homesick DPs from returning to their loving and all-forgiving fatherland; and, rather inconsistently, the Allies were shielding the refugees who were war criminals and fascist hirelings. Vishinsky even had the impudence to file official charges with the United Nations, charges which subsequently boomeranged, for they were proven untrue.

Inside the Soviet Union, where, with a few exceptions carried out for propaganda purposes, the repatriates were treated as criminals and traitors, Vishinsky's charges were printed in toto. The denials and the solidly supported countercharges were completely ignored, and the facts about mass refusals to return were sternly suppressed. At first the Soviet press talked of the non-returnees as of war criminals, Nazi hirelings who "preferred a life of ease abroad to working for the reconstruction of the fatherland." Later, when the Allies began to unload the DP camps, the propaganda line changed. These men and women were now depicted as unhappy innocents terrorized by capitalists into becoming "serfs" and "white slaves."

During a recent coast-to-coast lecture tour I met a score or so of the fifty-odd thousand "serfs" and "white slaves" who have settled in the United States. I talked to them in their homes and at their places of work in North Dakota, Kentucky, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, and can bear witness to their happiness and well-being. The initial difficulties of adjustment to a bewildering unfamiliar environment were at times pathetic, at times hilarious. As with all mortals, some of these men and women have fared better and are happier than others, but not one of those I talked to has expressed regret over the fateful decision not to return to Russia until it is free from tyranny. Some of the young men were eager to join any force that would fight the Soviet army, but most of the DPs said they'd like to forget it all and become part of their new homeland. Their happiness would be complete if they could bring their families over, and—from the sublime to the ridiculous—if real Russian black bread were available in the otherwise magic supermarkets!

These fifty thousand ex-Soviet citizens in the United States are but a fraction of the two hundred and fifty thousand to half million non-returnees.[15] The difficulty of ascertaining their actual number lies in the fear of many refugees that they will be repatri-

ated, kidnaped by Moscow agents, or will subject their relatives in the USSR to arrest and exile. There are still many thousands of Soviet DPs stranded in Europe, primarily in Germany, who pose as Swedes, Frenchmen, Yugoslavs, Poles, even as Germans.

Among the Soviet non-returnees one may come across Great Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Armenians, Caucasians, and peoples from Central Asia. There are Christians among them, and Jews and Moslems, and Buddhists and non-believers. There are kulaks (well-to-do peasants), and sons of kulaks, and just plain peasants. There are workers, teachers, writers, scientists, generals, soldiers, secret service men, monarchists, Communists, socialists, believers in democracy and in the capitalist system. In the freedom of the Western world they have broken up into some forty or fifty rival or antagonistic groups, the more violently vociferous because they were deprived of a voice for so many bitter years. Still, rent asunder as they are by national and political hatreds, and attack each other savagely as they do, they all have one thing in common: enmity for the Stalin regime. The enmity compels a large proportion of the refugee organizations to bury the hatchet from time to time and unite for joint effort in a limited field or for some specific action. Most of these organizations, for instance, sponsor Radio Liberation, which is financed and managed by the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, headed by former Ambassador to Moscow Alan G. Kirk.

The refugees constitute an invaluable source of information to intelligence services, political scientists, sociologists, and historians of the Western world. They are an even more concrete source of danger to the Kremlin because of the part they might play should World War III break out. Above all, they are a terrible symbol—and a symptom of the tensions, weaknesses, and discontent inside the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER 3

The Patriotic Front: I

Workers have no fatherland.

MARX AND ENGELS,
The Communist Manifesto, 1848

Defense of the fatherland is the supreme law of life. . . . For the fatherland! For its honor, glory, might and prosperity.

Pravda, the central organ
of the Soviet Communist Party

The gigantic scope of wartime defections among Soviet civilians and, as we shall soon see, in the Red Army, became clear to the outside world only after the end of hostilities. The defections failed to produce results fatal to the Kremlin chiefly because of the moral and political disorganization and disorientation of the dissidents, and because of the suicidally negative attitude toward them on the part of the Nazi leaders. At the same time Hitler's racial theories about the inferiority of the Slavs, and the barbaric sadism of his invading troops, had fanned Russian nationalism to the point of frenzy.

The major part of the population fought to the death, but as Russian patriots defending "Mother Russia," rather than as Soviet citizens shielding the socialist fatherland.

"Verily," exclaimed the writer Alexei Tolstoi, "the Russian soul opened wide in the war!"

And the eloquence of Ilya Ehrenburg swept its way across the endless spaces of the country:

"Soldier, together with you marches Russia! She is beside you. Listen to her winged step. In the moment of battle, she will cheer you with a glad word. If you waver, she will uphold you. If you conquer, she will embrace you."

The people responded in an upsurge of anger and pride, finding release in miracles of valor and toil.

Everything Russian was exalted with pathos, with tears and

pride. I saw men and women weep as they sat in the Moscow Art Theater listening to a Chekov hero exclaim: "All of Russia is a cherry orchard." That was during those terrible days when German hordes were reducing the orchard that was Russia to ruins and ashes.

And I saw fists clench and eyes grow hard on the faces of people crowded in front of newspapers pasted on walls and fences all over the Soviet capital. They were reading a *Pravda* editorial which was really a prose poem to the Russian rifle and the Russian bayonet, "those unconquerable weapons" and "faithful friends." Or they were reading a young soldier's open letter to his girl: "If I had a hundred lives, I'd be happy to offer them for my beloved Russia!"

The calculating men in the Kremlin were not slow to harness Mother Russia to the war effort: they had prepared the harness. Long before the Nazi attack, Stalin had begun to rediscover for the Russian people their greatness as a nation and the majesty of their past. With Hitler's rise to power it was clear to Stalin, as it was to many others, that a total showdown was inevitable. It was also clear to him that, even though he was prepared to go to any lengths to forestall it, all he could really hope for was a postponement of the deadly duel.

He also knew that the military advantages of the country's new and growing heavy industry and the collective organization of agriculture could not be depended upon as the sole decisive factors in Russia's favor.

Nor could he, Stalin knew, rouse his people to a total effort by reviving the slogans and symbols of revolutionary internationalism. The hope for a world revolution was deader than dead among Communists everywhere, while in the Soviet Union the exponents of world revolution had been deprived of power and were soon to be destroyed as "enemies of the people" in the monstrous purge which paralleled the mounting nationalistic revival.

The purge itself made it imperative for Stalin to accent the rebirth of patriotism and, through it, strengthen the wasting moral fiber of the people over whom he ruled.

Moreover, the nationalistic revival was to give the nation a sense of historical continuity. It was to identify the Soviet regime as the most recent link in the long and glorious chain of Russian history, and Stalin himself became one in the line of Russia's

mighty builders, along with Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great.

It was imperative for Stalin to achieve this, for the purge had hurled the entire country into an abyss of confusion, universal distrust, fear, and anxiety. The famous, and infamous, trials and their aftermath destroyed practically all faith in the Communist Party and the Soviet government at a time when danger signals pointing to the external enemy were clear and insistent. Indeed, if one believed that the leaders of yesterday, the comrades in arms of Lenin himself, were, by the Kremlin's accusations and their own confessions, traitors, spies, and enemies of the people, then who was not? If, on the other hand, one doubted the truthfulness of the confessions, and thought the trials staged by the accusers, then how could the fate of the country be allowed to remain in the hands of cold-blooded murderers?

It was in these severe and complex circumstances that Stalin relied upon the revival of nationalism to silence doubts, heal wounds, and prepare the country for the showdown with the foreign enemy. Nationalism was the solid foundation upon which the physical and moral preparedness of the nation was to be built, and its strength and unity forged.

Russia's past, which had hitherto been presented as an inferno of darkness and oppression, devoid of national heroes except Lenin and the halfheartedly praised peasant rebels, Stenka Razin and Yemelyan Pugachev,[1] was now bathed in glory. The founders of Muscovy and the military leaders of yesteryear were placed on pedestals of greatness and dignity. History textbooks were rewritten. New historical novels were published, and films and plays were produced by the score, depicting tsars and their generals as men of vision, the very embodiment of Russia's indomitable spirit.

The first reaction of the people was that of bewilderment, reflected in the question an eight-year-old boy asked his father, an actor I knew in Moscow. After seeing a movie on Peter the Great, the child said: "Tell me, Daddy, were all tsars Bolsheviks?"

Whatever the father had to say in reply, Stalin's answer was an almost unqualified "Yes," as the names of more and ever more ancestors, tsars, generals, and admirals were added to the truly fascinating and fantastic list of national heroes to be revered in the Soviet Union. It included men such as St. Vladimir, the prince under whom Russia was Christianized in the year of our Lord

989; St. Alexander Nevsky, who in the thirteenth century defeated the superior forces of the Teutonic Knights; the Grand Duke Dmitri Donskoi, whose victory over the Tartars in 1380 signaled the beginning of Russia's liberation from the centuries-old Tartar yoke; Ivan the Terrible, whose merciless will and inexhaustible ambition make him a blood brother of Joseph Stalin; Minin and Pozharsky, the leaders of the Popular Army, which liberated Moscow from the Poles early in the seventeenth century; Russia's greatest general, Alexander Suvorov, who, under Catherine the Great, led Russian soldiers deep into the heart of Europe for the first time in history; and Field Marshal Illarion Kutuzov, the man who defeated Napoleon in Russia.

When in 1936 the Moscow Kamerny Theater, slow to read the signs of the times, produced a musical comedy, *The Knights*, satirizing Russia's conversion to Christianity and ridiculing Prince Vladimir, who was responsible for that history-making act, everyone concerned with the production was chastised. The play was withdrawn in great haste. The producer, Alexander Tairov, and the author of the libretto, Demyan Byedni, hitherto a favorite of the Kremlin, barely escaped with their skins. Their error, in the eyes of the Communist authorities, was not so much that the production was "anti-Marxist." Worse than that, it revealed "a frivolous attitude towards history and a cheapening of the history of our people."[2] The Christianization of Russia, ran the argument contradicting the previous atheistic view, had been a tremendous step forward for pagan Russia, as it brought that backward country into close contact with the more advanced outside world, particularly with the higher civilization of Byzantium.

By 1939 this reversal had resulted in the first performance of a somewhat revised version of Glinka's famous opera, *Life for the Tsar*, which had been used for generations to instill devotion to the House of the Romanovs.

As I watched Stalin's box on that memorable première at Moscow's Bolshoi Opera House, I saw the Soviet leader applaud the final chorus, "Glory, glory to the fatherland," substituted for the original "Glory, glory to the Tsar." The entire audience, which, like myself, was at this point watching Stalin more closely than the doings on the stage, broke into frenzied applause.

This revived nationalism asserted itself in literary output, in newspaper and magazine editorials, in popular songs, and in text-

books. Historical exhibitions in museums were widely advertised and visited daily by countless organized groups of adults and school children. Trips to the great monuments of Russia's past, and to the scenes of celebrated victories of Russian arms, were very popular at the time, and were facilitated by the authorities in every way.

Included in the pilgrimages were also such hitherto neglected monuments of Russian culture as the Academy of Sciences in Leningrad, the resplendent Peterhof palaces, Leo Tolstoi's estate, Yasnaya Polyana, and Pushkin museums. In 1937 the centennial of this greatest of all Russian poets was turned into a veritable festival of Russian culture and a tribute to the people and the language of Great Russia.

The language itself became more Russian than ever. Many of the foreign words that had invaded it were now discarded and proudly replaced by new words derived from Russian roots. The ugly abbreviations of governmental departments, ushered in by the Revolution, were purged, and post offices were officially forbidden, on September 1, 1938, to distribute mail on which the address was designated by an abbreviation.

The country's ever lively interest in folk art, folk songs and dances was encouraged, and works by the great classical writers and poets of Russia were printed in millions of copies and sold at attractively low prices.

The press constantly praised the achievements of the Russian genius—the writers, composers, scientists, and inventors—and never tired of describing the gigantic growth of Soviet industry, no part of which, it was emphasized again and again, belonged to a foreign country or person. Indeed, nowhere else in the world has economic ownership been so fiercely nationalistic as in the USSR. A completely incidental by-product of Bolshevik distrust of the capitalist world, this ownership was now depicted as a manifestation of the greatness and independence of the Russian people and contributed in no small measure to the rise of Russian nationalism.

The all-but-forgotten word *"rodina,"* or birthland, reasserted itself in the vocabulary of the spoken and written language, evoking memories of ancient glory, of song and fairy-tale heroes, and a new awareness of the quiet loveliness of the Russian countryside.

Patriotism was particularly rampant in the Soviet armed forces.

A long series of reforms was launched in the middle thirties and completed nearly ten years later, during World War II. These reforms, most of which were merely a return to the attributes of Russia's prerevolutionary army, were designed to bolster the morale of the Red soldiers, strengthen their discipline, and multiply their fighting capacity.

Old tsarist ranks were reintroduced in both army and navy. Saluting was made obligatory and all violators were subjected to swift and strict punishment. Officers' insignia and epaulettes for generals came back, and exclusive officers' clubs with separate messes for junior and senior ranks were instituted.

Cossack detachments, which had been done away with because of Cossack participation in suppressing the revolutionary movement, had now come into being once more—black caracul hats, long flowing capes, and all! Now they were glorified in song and legend and in the supreme commander's Orders of the Day.

Guards regiments and Guards divisions, originally formed by Peter the Great and abolished after the Revolution, were revived to honor the units that distinguished themselves in battle.

The Orders of Suvorov, Kutuzov, and Alexander Nevsky, the most revered of Russia's traditional military heroes, were established as the highest awards for the display of courage and skill in the art of warfare.

These changes, serving a concrete and vital purpose of their own, were most significant as symbols of far-reaching spiritual transformations. Soon changes of a more concrete nature followed. The oath, for instance.

The old Red Army oath, opening with the words "I, son of the toiling masses," had the recruit solemnly pledge that he would "direct [his] every act and thought toward the great aim of emancipation of the toilers." The new oath, adopted in January 1936, opens with the words "I, a citizen of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics," and makes the recruit vow that he would fight to the last drop of blood "for my people, my Soviet fatherland, and the workers' and peasants' government."

The most significant of all Red Army reforms came in October 1942, when an extraordinary decree abolished the system of political commissars in the Soviet armed forces. The system had been done away with following the Soviet-Finnish War of

1939–40, but was reintroduced soon after Hitler's invasion of Russia. Now it was liquidated, apparently forever, as a supreme gesture of confidence in the commanding officers, whose effectiveness had suffered because they had been forced to share authority with the commissars. The latter, as a matter of fact, had wielded much greater power than the commanding officers, for, in the army, they were the eyes and ears of the ruling Communist Party, and worked hand in glove with its organs of suppression. Their present-day counterparts, the so-called Assistant Commanders for Political Affairs (dubbed by the Soviet GIs "Zampolit"), still have a great say in the day-to-day running of affairs (there is a Zampolit in every military unit down to, and through, the battalion), but with a big difference: they are outranked by and subordinated to the military commander.

This reform tightened discipline and created a unity of command that precluded even the possibility of contradictory orders, one of the evils of the old system. The reform completed in the eyes of the people the transformation of the Red Army into a national army. Instead of being the arm of a political party, it now became in their eyes the glorious shield of the whole nation.

To crown the glorification of the armed forces (and for other good reasons, as we shall subsequently see), Stalin himself joined its ranks by having the title of Marshal of the Soviet Union bestowed upon him after the magnificent victory at Stalingrad. On November 6, 1943, on the eve of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution, he made a public appearance in military garb for the first time in his life. Standing on the enormous stage of Moscow's Bolshoi Theater of the Opera and Ballet, he wore the resplendent uniform of a Soviet marshal, the epaulettes embroidered with gold, and the marshal's star gleaming with enormous jewels.

His two other wartime public appearances, designed to evoke the Russian military tradition and to identify himself with it, had also taken place in Moscow.

The first occurred on November 6, 1941, following four and a half months of disastrous defeats on the field of battle, incessant withdrawals, and the most enormous losses any army has ever known. For fear of air raids, the traditional preanniversary meeting of the Moscow City Soviet assembled deep underground, on the huge platform of the Mayakovsky subway station. Most of the

audience consisted of volunteer units of the People's Guards who were under orders to march the next day to the front, which had moved to the outskirts of the capital.

Facing the men, most of whom were to lay down their lives in the next few days, Stalin evoked names embedded deeply in the memory of the entire nation, the names of traditional heroes and warriors of tsarist Russia:

"Let the manly images of our great ancestors—Alexander Nevsky, Dmitri Donskoi, Kuzma Minin, Dmitri Pozharsky, Alexander Suvorov, and Mikhail Kutuzov—inspire you in this war."

The one touch that was missing to complete the picture at this point was the traditional prebattle high mass. However, the mass was faithfully reproduced on the stage in a wartime dramatization of Leo Tolstoi's *War and Peace,* with an actor in the part of Kutuzov kneeling before the ikon, kissing it, and accepting a priest's blessing for victory against Napoleon.

The second occasion when Stalin personally participated in the revival of Russia's military tradition took place on June 24, 1945, four years, almost to the day, after Hitler precipitated Russia's Second Patriotic War. Celebrating the most costly triumph in the history of warfare, Stalin reviewed a mighty victory parade from the top of the Lenin Mausoleum on Red Square. At his side were the great generals and marshals who led his troops on the battlefields. At his feet on that rainy day were thrown the banners and standards of Hitler's army, bullet-ridden and covered with wet mud. Many of us watching the solemn ceremony, Russians and foreigners alike, recalled the fact that Napoleon's banners and standards had been similarly hurled at the feet of Alexander I.

The finishing touch came two days later when Stalin assumed the title of Generalissimo, as once had Alexander Suvorov, the country's only general who never knew defeat.

There was, however, an additional and more tangible significance to Stalin's assumption of the title: he now outranked the Zhukovs, the Rokossovskys, the Konevs, the Vasilevskys, and all his other renowned and wildly acclaimed marshals. But during those triumphant days the significance of this had escaped most of us, who were celebrating victory over the common enemy.

The wholehearted response of the Russian people to the revival of nationalism was in itself sufficient reward for Stalin's wartime abandonment of revolutionary internationalism. There were other

reasons and other rewards. The most important was the attitude of the Western Allies.

The Soviet hope, and later the reality, of collaboration with them had made the promulgation of world revolution unthinkable. The rather anemic child of a shotgun marriage, the Soviet-Allied coalition could not have survived in the chilly, suspicion-ridden atmosphere that would inevitably have been created by agitation for revolutionary internationalism. As it was, suspicions plagued both sides. These were engendered by memories of foreign intervention in Russia, by Comintern activities inside the Allied countries, by Munich, by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, and by the Soviet-Finnish War. Each side distrusted the other, and each feared that the other might conclude a separate peace with Hitler's Germany. Military realities compelled both sides to make the coalition a going concern.

Following the Allied lead, the Kremlin took step after step in this direction. The revival of nationalism which inspired the Russians to unity and determination also appealed to the new friends of the USSR, who saw in it a welcome retreat from world revolution, as well as a promise of speedier victory over the common enemy. In addition to rallying the people around the Kremlin, Stalin's peace with the Church appealed tremendously to the West, particularly the United States and President Roosevelt.

Going further still, all Soviet propaganda, concentrating as it was on anti-fascist slogans and appeals, ceased to distinguish between classes in the countries of Russia's enemies and friends. No longer were "the masses of the people exploited and militarized against their will" by their "capitalist masters." The Germans—all of them, not merely "the Nazi clique"—were bloodthirsty beasts, and the Japanese—all of them—were traitorous. The English, the French, the Americans—all of them—were no longer split into camps of "imperialists" and "toilers." All were now democratic and freedom-loving, united and led by the great "progressive" leaders, President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill.

Stalin seemed eager to forget the threats he had made in the thirties, when he claimed that an attack on the USSR would "lead to revolution in a number of countries in Europe and in Asia (and to the destruction of the bourgeois-landlord governments in those countries)." On May 22, 1943, he made the supreme gesture of liquidating the Comintern. By accident or clever design, the

gesture was followed by a long and friendly Kremlin interview between Stalin and the actual head of the Russian Orthodox Church, Acting Patriarch Sergius. This resulted in the restoration of the Holy Synod and the election of Sergius as Patriarch of Moscow and All the Russias.

Later in the year, on December 20, a new "Hymn of the Soviet Union" replaced the "Internationale" as the official Soviet anthem. Composed by a French Communard, the "Internationale" had become the hymn of Communists the world over, but, in the words of the Soviet cabinet decree announcing the new hymn, the "Internationale" no longer expressed "the basic changes that have taken place in our country as a result of the victories of the Soviet system." A national anthem glorifying Russia presumably did express those changes.

CHAPTER 4

The Patriotic Front: II

The Soviet Army

What were Stalin's two biggest wartime mistakes?
He permitted Europe to see the Red Army, and he permitted the Red Army to see Europe.

A contemporary witticism

It was a disciplined, glorified, self-confident Red Army that crushed Hitler's invading hordes and pursued them to and beyond the western frontiers of Russia. On Stalin's orders and under his generalship, Soviet troops completed the liberation of the fatherland, but in their westward pursuit of the enemy they also accomplished something else. They swept over the iron fence behind which they had lived, along with the rest of the Soviet population, ever since the Revolution of 1917.

These youngsters had entered Europe with very definite ideas about the conditions under which men live in bourgeois society. Since childhood they had been taught—in schools, at meetings, by the press, by films and literature—that life was hard, bleak, and hungry for the people living under capitalism. Indeed, it didn't begin to compare to the joyous existence of the Soviet citizen. His life was not only freer, fuller, and more abundant but was getting ever better, ever gayer, as Stalin had said in 1935, originating the most buoyant official slogan of prewar Russia. Didn't that song one always heard on the stage, over the radio, and in films go: "I know of no other land where man breathes so freely"?

What those magnificent, smug, victory-drunk Red Army soldiers actually saw in the countries lying west of the USSR brought them the greatest shock of their young lives. For even in war-ravaged capitalist Europe there was greater abundance, life was more "cultured," and freedom was a thing more tangible than in

their homeland. There was also something else, something vague and indefinable, and at the same time as real as a reproach or a pang of conscience, to cite a Soviet writer turned war correspondent, whom I had known for years. That something was dignity, the inner dignity of the individual, which in capitalist Europe survived years of the Nazi nightmare. This dignity seems to have awakened in many a Russian soldier the memory of the most precious thing the Soviet people have lost under Stalin. Maxim Gorky called it "the pride of being Man."

There was nothing vague, however, about the temptations of the comparative abundance the Russian soldiers saw all around them. Almost overnight the heroic and disciplined Red Army became an army of looters and plunderers in the lands of the Allies it liberated, as well as in the occupied enemy countries. In all conquering armies are men who succumb to the temptations of easy loot and rape, but with the Russians it was a mass epidemic, an orgy. Few were the objects beneath their attention, revealing more about the standard of living back home in the USSR than scores of volumes by critical observers. A special word was coined by the Soviet soldiers to describe the indiscriminate looting: *barakholstvo* or, roughly, junk collecting. The action *barakholstvo* described was so widespread that the term came to be used in official army orders.

There was a sidelight to the looting, which made it looting with a difference, as exemplified by a tale I heard in Berlin, Budapest, Bucharest, Moscow, and Kiev. A Red Army man holds up a German and demands a watch from him. "But I have no watch," says the man. "I am a poor worker and never could afford one." Whereupon the Russian warrior takes a watch out of his bulging pocket and gives it to the man, saying: "Take it, victim of capitalism, and thank the Soviet regime."

Another story, in a bitterer vein, tells of the Russian soldier who tries to force a German girl to go to bed with him. When she realizes that she is fighting a losing battle she resorts to what seems to her the final, irrefutable argument. "But I am Jewish," she exclaims. "You certainly would have nothing to do with a filthy Jewess." The soldier gives her a stern and lengthy lecture on how the Stalinist Constitution recognizes all races and nationalities as equal and provides punishment for racial discrimination. Then he rapes the girl.

Shaken by their exposure to the West, with its more "cultured" and opulent standard of living for the common people, the Red Army soldiers could not but become conscious of the great lie that had been foisted on them. They were beset by questions and doubts raised in their minds by incident after incident, such as the one I heard from a Russian soldier during my visit to Berlin, soon after the fall of the German capital in the spring of 1945:

"When my unit entered the suburbs of Berlin," he recounted, "we saw beautiful homes and well-tended gardens. We decided that it was a suburb occupied by rich capitalists, and started to loot and to burn. But we soon learned that it was a working-class district."

I asked him whether the discovery put an end to the plunder. He scratched his head, said slowly, "*Nyet,*" and then added, "But I've had a lot of thinking to do since then."

As soon as the Kremlin became aware of this thinking and the discontent it generated, steps were taken to soften the shock and counter its effects on the troops. The army organ, *Red Star,* led off with a propaganda attack against the "false glitter" of life under capitalism:

"We must pass through foreign countries. A lot of gaudy tinsel will blind your eyes. Comrades, do not believe the deceitful nightmares of a pseudo-civilization!" The *Red Star* then proceeded to warn the troops against the powdered, painted faces and the sinful, lipsticked mouths of short-skirted women sporting open-toed, open-heeled shoes.

Pravda, the official organ of the Communist Party, followed in a more somber style, unwittingly corroborating the unsavory facts of Red Army behavior in those days:

"Crossing the frontier of his country, the Soviet citizen often finds himself in an atmosphere of private profit, speculation, predatory instincts, prostitution, insulting disrespect to human beings. Not one particle of this dirt must stick to a Soviet citizen.

"In many places abroad a Soviet citizen finds himself in strange complicated conditions. The enemy lurks, acts in a malicious, wicked way. Underneath his mask of kindness gleam the teeth of a wolf.

"Every citizen abroad has a responsible and important task.

The entire world is watching him. And everywhere he must repeat the words of the great Russian poet and patriot:

"Read and envy,
I am a citizen
Of the Soviet Union!"

These are lines from Vladimir Mayakovsky's poem eulogizing the possessor of a Soviet passport. The *Pravda* writer carelessly overlooked the fact that the reference to Mayakovsky might remind the reader that the poet, hounded and desperate, committed suicide two years after Stalin had secured his grip on the Soviet Union.

Not only did Bolshevik propaganda fail to erase the doubts of the soldiers, confronted as they were by all too persuasive reality, but it soon found itself compelled to fight the influence of those doubts at home. Letters were coming in from the occupation troops to all parts of the USSR, followed by hundreds of thousands of demobilized soldiers and officers, who were dispersed throughout vast Russia. They brought with them wondrous stories of life under capitalism, and tangible proof by way of looted objects which the people sarcastically dubbed "trophies."

The sarcasm is symptomatic of the people's reaction. Yet, bitter as it was, it could not, under Soviet conditions, lead toward any form of spontaneous or organized protest. Action of any kind was impossible, but there was a great deal of resentful talk, and there was a veritable flood of jokes making game of the Soviet paradise, its inequalities and low standard of living, and mocking the country's nouveaux riches, the generals and their wives. The wives were particularly vulnerable targets because they succumbed to "bourgeois influences" with greater ease than their busy husbands, and were more voluble in their admiration of the customs, comforts, and fashions of the capitalist West. The enthusiasm they were pouring into long chatty letters to their eager and envious female friends back in the Soviet "sticks" was effectively cut short by a few arrests and other "corrective" measures. Letter writing stopped, but rumors and gossip continued to wing their way to all parts of Russia. The issue is kept alive to the present day, for the luxurious lives of the occupation generals and their families arouse the envy of the junior officers and their wives.

A more significant repercussion of discontent may be found

in the sharp drop, in 1945, in the enrollment of new members by the Communist Youth Organization, the Komsomol. This despite the fact that membership in the Komsomol enhances career opportunities in Stalin's Russia. The contagiously resentful attitudes of many returning war veterans no doubt contributed to the drop.

To dissipate discontent, the alarmed authorities set up schools for the reindoctrination of professional Communist agitators and propagandists. Theirs is an extremely valuable function, from the Kremlin point of view, for they reinforce the press and radio propaganda, and carry the word to the "deaf" corners of the USSR where newspapers and radios are seldom seen. These men and women, in their unpublicized, face-to-face contact with groups and individuals, can handle questions and problems without the whole world listening in. The Bolshevik Party learned to appreciate and make wide use of the art of oral agitation during the years of illegal underground activity in tsarist Russia and the first critical period of the Soviet regime. By now, oral agitation has become a major weapon of Soviet propaganda. Normally the Party maintains a force of some two million full-time agitators, or one propagandist per one hundred members of the population. The agitators are scattered throughout the country, with emphasis on the most densely populated and the most troubled areas. Whenever the occasion arises, such as a hate-America campaign, or an abrupt shift in major policy is to be conveyed and sold to the people, the army of propagandists is boosted to three million. In addition, many more persons, whose numbers are difficult to gauge, are drawn into the effort on a short-term, part-time basis.[1]

The agitators—whose task it is to cement "the moral-political unity of the Soviet people"—tried to convince their postwar audiences that it was merely the false glitter of a pseudo civilization that the Soviet soldiers had seen in the West. The agitators were reinforced by all other propaganda means available: the press, radio, lecture platform, theater, films, and even posters. The United States Ambassador to Russia from 1946 to 1949, General Walter Bedell Smith, reported that posters were put up in the countryside, warning the population: "Do not believe all the returning soldiers!" The posters "went on to explain that, after all the blood and hardships that the troops had undergone, their judgments were lopsided, that they were nervous and dazed, and that some even would try to claim that the cities and villages of

capitalist countries provide everyone with a mansion filled with luxuries."[2]

However, the more than two million war prisoners and slave laborers repatriated between 1945 and 1947 brought tales of their own which tallied with the stories of the returning soldiers. The repatriated men and women were cautious in their statements, for they had been subjected to intensive interrogation and reindoctrination. Many of them were arrested or exiled on suspicion of voluntary surrender or willing enrollment in Hitler's labor corps. Furthermore, all these people had seen the West at its worst, held in concentration camps or barracks, and living in constant threat of bombs, which were reducing the population to poverty and homelessness. And yet, in heart-to-heart talks with friends and relatives, they painted a picture of the West that was substantially the same as the one drawn by the veterans, inviting comparisons unfavorable to the USSR.

Even more eloquent was the silent testimony of the hundreds of thousands who, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, refused to return, preferring the precarious existence of DPs to life under Stalin.

Still further evidence is provided by the disaffection among the Red Army troops of occupation. Desertions started in 1945 and are continuing to the present time. Soldiers and officers are making their way daily to the Allied zones in Germany and Austria, despite the knowledge that they will be shot if caught, and that their families will suffer imprisonment and exile. At one time, in 1946, according to an ex-Red Army major, desertions reached such proportions that military tribunals hesitated to impose the death sentence required by the law, and penalized the captured deserters by prison terms. When the commanding officer, Marshal Konev, heard of the practice, he issued a special order condemning "moderation" and instructing the courts to treat the guilty men as traitors and sentence them to death.[3]

At first more Red Army men deserted to the British than to the US zone because of a bilateral Soviet-American agreement on the exchange of deserters, an agreement which the Russians exploited with grim purposefulness. The previously cited ex-Red Army major recorded "the case of a soldier who fled to the American zone and was returned. The court sentenced him to be shot and in addition ordered his family to be deported to a concentration

camp. The verdict was read to every unit, with the following passage: 'He fled to the Americans but was returned to us in accordance with international custom.'"

Fortunately for the escapees, the United States ceased to honor the "custom" sometime in the middle of 1947, and within twelve months our military authorities had some thirteen thousand new escapees on their hands.[4] The British and French may not have received so many Soviet army deserters during that particular year, but their average for the entire postwar period has been greater than ours. According to one source, our share has been no more than fifteen per cent of all Russian escapees who managed to escape to the West.[5]

Of the thirteen thousand who deserted to the Americans between the middle of 1947 and 1948, about three thousand were civilian personnel, including plain workers; about six thousand were enlisted men; and four thousand were officers, including three generals, one of whom was on the staff of Marshal Sokolovsky, then in charge of the Soviet occupation forces.[6]

All the screws of the Soviet control machinery have since been tightened with merciless precision, in order to stem the tide of desertions. The soldiers' families have been sent home, so they can be kept as hostages. Over-all discipline demands have become more rigorous. Furloughs are granted only under extraordinary circumstances, and absence without permission is a major violation. Troops off duty have been confined to their compounds, which are surrounded by barbed wire. When taken to a cinema, a soccer game, or some other form of recreational activity, Soviet occupation soldiers have to march in columns, escorted by armed guards. Troops are given rifles and ammunition only when essential to assigned tasks, and are forbidden to carry arms when off duty. No advance announcement of impending shipment back to Russia is ever made, to avoid hastily improvised last-minute flights.

Professor Merle Fainsod of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, who interviewed a large number of escapees, has come to the conclusion that "the Soviet occupation army leads what amounts to a concentration camp existence. . . . At the first sign of disaffection, the soldier is arrested and sent home. New recruits are a carefully screened and thoroughly propagandized group. They are not ordinarily sent on occupation duty

if there is a record of repression in the family or any indication of anti-Soviet attitudes. Screening obviously does not work perfectly (witness the continuing escapes), but it is much more careful than earlier."[7]

The fateful disclosures of loyalty weaknesses in the Soviet Union—made by wartime surrenders of Red Army troops, by mass collaboration of civilians with the enemy, by the ease with which both Soviet soldiers and civilians succumbed to the "corrupting" influences of ways of life in the capitalist West, by the refusal of multitudes to be repatriated, by desertions from the army—combined to provide the Kremlin with most compelling reasons to drop the Iron Curtain and launch the Cold Civil War. The overriding objective was to re-establish the supremacy of the Communist Party in the Soviet Union, and first of all in the armed forces. As a prerequisite to success it was necessary to reduce the importance of the Red Army, strip it of the power and glamor it had gained during the war, and cut the officers' corps to size, in the eyes of the people.

The army had been lionized from the day the first shot was fired in the Soviet-Nazi war. What was even more vital, the officers' corps was rapidly becoming invested with power and a growing measure of independence. The urgencies of the war had compelled the Kremlin to endow professional soldiers with an authority that had a way of expanding and becoming entrenched. This no doubt multiplied the fighting effectiveness of the troops but relegated political control in the army to the background and kept it there. Top German generals, who were fuming over their futile efforts to wrest similar freedom from Hitler and his political advisers, later confessed their envy of their Russian colleagues who, the German generals believed, "were allowed to exercise their own judgment and could safely insist on doing things in their own way."[8]

The celebrated Russian marshals had so fired the imagination of the Soviet nation as to eclipse in popularity all the Politburo members, with the sole exception of Stalin, the commander in chief. In fact it was my impression in Russia at the time, an impression shared by most foreign observers, that Marshal Zhukov —the savior of Moscow, the victor at Stalingrad, and the captor of Berlin—had surpassed even Stalin in the affections of the people.

The wartime period, by the way, was the only stage in the entire long span of Stalin's rule during which the people displayed affection for the man. Never before or after did they take him to their hearts.

The Soviet propaganda machine and the Party's direction of the secret police have seen to it that no one ever approached, however remotely, Stalin's stature as *vozhd,* the leader. But there was something in the quality of Zhukov's wartime popularity that gave the Kremlin cause for alarm. The marshal's name evoked a spontaneous, warm response among the Russian people, who saw in him a contemporary image of their traditional national heroes. Zhukov also commanded the devotion and admiration of the army.

Besides their misgivings about the growing power of the officers' corps and the possibility of the emergence of a "Red Napoleon," the men in the Kremlin were disturbed by another possible source of danger to their prerogatives of control. The memory of the effect that contact with the West had on tsarist officers following the defeat of Napoleon has always been fresh in Russia. At that time the officers were fired by the ideas of the great French and American revolutions, and returned to their homeland clamoring for reforms, organizing secret societies, and finally staging an uprising in December 1825. The "Decembrists," as they are remembered in Russian history, were crushed, but their activity marked the beginning of the revolutionary struggle which culminated in the epochal events of 1917.

The manifestations of the impact caused by the Red Army's contact with the West were, as we have seen, of a much more mundane and vulgar nature than those connected with the activity of the Decembrists. No military-political conspiracies were formed or uncovered, so far as is known. But the mass scale of non-returnism and the beginning of desertions were symptomatic enough, so that the spontaneous fraternization of Soviet and Allied troops who met on German soil was abruptly stopped by the Kremlin, although both sides continued for some time to collaborate effectively at the higher levels.

The final salvos of World War II had not yet been fired when the victorious Red Army and its celebrated generals and marshals were being returned to obscurity. The process was gradual. The

first indication, as casual as a straw in the wind, appeared at the end of April 1944. The war was to go on for another year, but its outcome was no longer a matter of doubt. The Soviet people, who have become by necessity the world's shrewdest readers-between-the-lines, noticed the absence among the front-paged May Day slogans of the usual paragraphs singing the glory of the Red Army and the health of its commanding officers. The army, to be sure, was mentioned, and the adjective "heroic" was applied to it (after all, the war was still being fought), but the mention itself comprised merely a part of the slogan celebrating "the great Soviet people." The invocation of previous years to the "commanders" of the Red Army was completely abandoned.

The May Day slogans a year later, in 1945, repeated the paragraph about the great Soviet people, mentioned the army, but left out the adjective "heroic" and again ignored the commanders.

Attention to such details could easily be dismissed as quibbling anywhere in the world except in Stalin's Russia, where there is nothing trivial or accidental about such things. They reflect shifts and emphasis. They forewarn, and they serve as clues for the orientation of Party functionaries, professional agitators, and newspaper editors. These men were now waiting for further developments—and so were we, the foreign correspondents stationed in Moscow.

The wait was not long. Late in June 1945, Stalin, now bearing the title of Generalissimo, gathered his generals and marshals in the Kremlin, ostensibly to honor them with a resplendent reception. It was resplendent but—raising his glass to Russia's military leaders and heroes, Stalin lectured them on the virtues of a shrewd foreign policy, which, he said, was worth at least two or three army corps. The moral was clear: not only did he, the Generalissimo, outrank them all, but the very victory on which they were being congratulated was to be credited not to the military leaders alone.

When Stalin subsequently resigned as Minister of the Armed Forces the post was taken over by fellow Politburo member Nikolai Bulganin, former political adviser to Marshal Zhukov. Two years hence, when the professional soldier, Marshal Vasilevsky, replaced Bulganin as minister, the latter retained political control over all Soviet armed forces.

The logical man for the ministerial post, Marshal Zhukov, was

not only by-passed, he was demoted. At first he was withdrawn from Germany, where he had been supreme commander of the Soviet occupation forces, and appointed chief of staff. Then, after a brief period, he was made commander of the comparatively insignificant Odessa Military District and disappeared from the public eye for several years. Soviet newspapers and magazines commemorating the anniversaries of Red Army victories over the Germans mentioned his name less and less frequently, and eventually dropped it even out of the accounts of those decisive triumphs of which he was the chief architect: at Moscow, Stalingrad, Leningrad, and Berlin. All the credit was given to none other than Comrade Stalin, the greatest military genius of all time.

The esteem in which Marshal Zhukov was held by the American generals who had direct dealings with him may actually have contributed to his downfall. As commander of the Soviet zone in Germany, the marshal was in frequent contact with the US high command, including Generals Dwight Eisenhower and Walter Bedell Smith. The nature of the relationship between both sides, undoubtedly fully reported to Stalin at the time, was described by General Smith as follows:

". . . our principal contacts were with Marshal Zhukov and General Sokolovsky, both of whom we admired very much, and who, I felt, would be great men in any country. . . . We believed that we had reached with them an honest basis of mutual confidence and understanding.

"Marshal Zhukov was obviously sincere in his statement that world peace depended entirely upon the ability of the Russians and Americans to continue and to perpetuate the cooperation and understanding which they had reached during the course of the war. However, despite the warm feelings which we entertained toward Marshal Zhukov and General Sokolovsky, and which we felt were reciprocated, there was still an arm's length between us in our dealings."[9]

When General Eisenhower visited Moscow in August 1945, at Stalin's invitation, the American said to the Generalissimo with disarming sincerity: "Marshal Zhukov and I get along splendidly."[10]

But Stalin would not be disarmed. He spoke approvingly of Zhukov and his relationships with the Americans, but the acts

that followed spoke louder than words. Zhukov's enthusiastic acceptance of an invitation to pay a return visit to the USA was vetoed. Soon afterward he was recalled from Berlin and demoted.

It took Marshal Zhukov fully four years to emerge from his eclipse. On July 21, 1951, he participated with Molotov in a Warsaw celebration devoted to the seventh anniversary of the Polish Committee for National Liberation, the forerunner of the present Communist government in Poland. Zhukov's speech at the ceremony was published prominently in the Soviet press, alongside the speech by Molotov. The marshal bluntly reminded his audience that Poland had been liberated by the Red Army with the aid of Polish troops trained in the USSR. He pointedly stressed that "the guarantee of Poland's military might lay in its links with the Soviet Army."[11]

No official reason for Zhukov's return from obscurity was given. It is logical to assume that the appearance of Russia's most formidable soldier in the most important—and most restive—Soviet satellite was intended to emphasize the uselessness of any attempt that may have been contemplated in that country to follow in the footsteps of the rebel Tito. Zhukov's return to public life was also indicative of a renewed self-confidence in the Kremlin, which must have felt that the Party had reasserted its supremacy in the army. Apparently Stalin no longer feared the possibility of a Red Napoleon usurping power.

And, indeed, the Soviet army was completely tamed by that time.

The most decisive link in the chain of measures that has led to the postwar taming of Russia's armed forces and the re-establishment of Communist control over it took place in July 1945. At that time the Politburo member in charge of all Soviet organs of security and suppression, Stalin's fellow Georgian Lavrenti Beria, was given the rank of marshal, and the organizations he headed were granted all rights and privileges of the Red Army.

This forged the last of the triple chains of control over the army. The first was the USSR Ministry of the Armed Forces, responsible for the administration, training, and combat readiness of the troops, and answerable to the Soviet cabinet headed by Stalin. The second was the Main Political Administration of the ministry, which is actually directly responsible to the Politburo. The Administration is the Kremlin's arm within the army, answer-

able for the political education, morale, and loyalty of the military personnel. The third chain of control was the Ministry of State Security, or MGB. It operates special sections in armies, corps, and divisions, and appoints special emissaries to smaller units, down to and including the battalion. The sections and the emissaries are outside the jurisdiction of normal military procedures. The job of the MGB men is to keep their eyes and ears open, and their files up to date.

Essentially, this system is a replica of the general pattern of control in all basic Soviet organizations, such as factories, collective farms, offices, and educational institutions. The percentage of Party membership in the general hierarchy of Soviet officialdom and military personnel increases with each ascending step, but the men of the special sections, as well as the emissaries, must all be Communist Party or Komsomol members.

The three separate chains of command may have made the armed forces more dependable from the Kremlin point of view, but they have certainly not contributed to efficiency or esprit de corps. The separate controls are cumbersome and bureaucracy-bound, fraught with misunderstandings, jealousies, and friction. The fact that the army is spy-ridden has been one of the most frequently mentioned reasons for desertion by Soviet escapees.

The separate chains of command, and the lack of absolute clarity about where one man's functions and authority end and another's begin, serve to complicate matters for the persons directly responsible for the day-to-day training, political education, and the exercise of vigilance. This provides a fertile field for jealousies and mutual distrust, which is characteristic of Stalin's way of managing men.

The most delicate and difficult work to be performed at the lower level is that of the assistant commander for political affairs, the Zampolit, the man once known to the world as Commissar. He has once more become the keystone of the army structure, but he has to be more resourceful than ever. In fact the performance of his daily duties requires of him veritable miracles of tact. On the one hand, he is outranked by the military commander invested with single authority. On the other, the Zampolit has to be forever heedful of secret service emissaries, whose identity he does not always know, and who report through a separate chain of command to an organization that acts swiftly and decisively.

The Zampolit's direct duties are simple enough. He conducts discussions and arranges lectures, film showings, and theatrical performances. He runs his unit's newspaper and the library. He sees to it that barracks and clubrooms are adorned with portraits of Stalin and sometimes also of Lenin and the marshals currently in favor. The decorations usually include maps and the texts of the national anthem and the military oath.

Such routine duties could make for a soft and easy job, were it not for the fact that the Zampolit is held responsible also for such intangibles as the political mood in his unit, its loyalty, morale, and morals, all crucial components of the Soviet conception of "fighting preparedness." Moreover, the Zampolit is answerable also for the combat qualities of his unit. This blurs the line of responsibility between him and the commanding officer, who outranks the Zampolit. He is harassed to an even greater extent by orders to keep his reports on the political mood and morale of his unit factual and concrete, naming names and giving facts and dates. This entails the hazard of transgressing into the ever expanding sphere of the secret police, the MGB.

According to reports by Soviet army deserters, both the military commanders and the Zampolits have been exerting pressure in an effort to strengthen their respective statuses versus the MGB, but the latter has shown no signs of yielding. True to its principle of "divide and rule," the Kremlin deliberately ignores the dilemmas of the Red Army officers: it has a stake in those dilemmas.[12]

The expansion of secret service activity in the army, and the continuing desertions by Russian occupation troops, unquestionably point to weaknesses and tensions inside the Soviet Union and the armed forces themselves. The realization of this should not, however, detract or distract from the Kremlin's far-reaching success in reasserting its supremacy over the army. Through Bulganin and Beria, who exercise all supervision over, respectively, the armed forces and the secret police, the Communist Party's high command is now more than ever the army's supreme command and the final authority is the secret police.

As for nationalism—that is, the kind of nationalism which was in vogue just before and during the war—it outlived its usefulness to the Kremlin at about the time victory came within sight. Nationalism had served its purpose in arousing the Russian

people to self-sacrifice and toil, and the army to heroic fighting. Mother Russia was saved, and the Soviet regime along with it. In the process it was revealed for the whole world to see that penetration of Soviet ideology into the masses of the people was only skin-deep, and the Kremlin publicly admitted it by falling back, in its hour of peril, on Russian nationalism.

The pill was bitter to swallow, but bitterer yet must have been the realization that nationalism, a mighty shield against a foreign invader, was no protection against the "corrupting" influences of Western bourgeois ways. Nationalism does not necessarily stand in uncompromising hostility to other nationalisms and other social orders. The Soviet regime does. But nationalism had proved too valuable a means of commanding loyalty to be discarded altogether. Hence the whole concept of nationalism was reinterpreted step by step, blending Russian patriotism with Soviet ideology. Such was the background for the Kremlin's postwar continuation of the Great Russian nationalistic line and the simultaneous revival of Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism, which preached the inevitability of capitalist decay and Communist triumph. Out of this incongruous marriage came the current conception of Soviet patriotism.

The phrase "Mother Russia" gradually began to disappear from the pages of the Soviet press, to be replaced by the "glorious Socialist fatherland." It was no longer fashionable to evoke the names of Nevsky, Kutuzov, or Suvorov. Even Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, whose methods bear such a frightening resemblance to Stalin's, have been shoved into obscurity. The era of "loose" Russian nationalism has ended, but its life-giving vitality has not been allowed to lie dormant. The Soviet propaganda machine, particularly in literature and the arts, is attempting to force an even greater identification, in the minds of the people, of Russia with the Soviet Union. The Russians, it is being repeated over and over again, are "the first among equals," with the emphasis on the "first." The greatness of the Russian spirit, character, language, and traditions is extolled as without parallel in the history of nations, the more unique and unchallengeable now because Russia is paving the way to a higher stage of progress for all mankind.

This is no return to the primitive and uncompromising attitudes of the revolutionary internationalism of bygone years. What has

evolved is something more complicated, subtle, and hypocritical. Soviet patriotism is a shrewd, dangerous blend of Russian patriotism and Stalin's brand of Communism, both themes played simultaneously, with the accent on one or the other, depending on a given situation in the outside world and inside Russia.

CHAPTER 5

The Religious Front: I

Have we crushed the reactionary clergy? Yes, but the unfortunate thing is that it has not been completely liquidated.

STALIN, September 9, 1927

Amidst all his many cares, Joseph Vissarionovich [Stalin], who has long given us many proofs of his attentive and paternal interest in all the needs and desires of the Orthodox Church . . . promised to continue to aid us in the future.

Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, May 1945

Soviet Steps Up Fight on Religion. New Efforts Are Being Made to Limit Churches and to Help Cause of Atheism.

New York *Times* headline, August 14, 1949

The story of the revival and subsequent decline of Russian nationalism has been parallelled by official encouragement of religion, later replaced by grudging tolerance.

On the whole, religion has had a tougher time of it in the Cold Civil War because, unlike nationalism, it cannot be twisted to blend with and give vitality to the postwar concept of Soviet patriotism. Stalin's original compromise with religion, dating back to 1936, revealed to an even greater extent than his appeasement of nationalistic sentiments in Russia the tremendous distance he is prepared to go in a tactical retreat. He knows well that, at the very best, religion can offer him nothing beyond temporary opportunities for limited political exploitation. In the battle for the souls and minds of people, religion stands diametrically opposed to Communism.

Ever since Marx and Engels branded religion as the "opium of the people," Communists the world over have battled all organized faiths. Prior to the Revolution of 1917, the Lenin-led Bolsheviks confined their struggle to anti-religious propaganda. Once in power, they unleashed unrestricted war against all religious tenets and authority, particularly against the political and economic power of the dominant Russian Orthodox Church.[1]

Church lands, schools, convents, monasteries, and other Orthodox properties were confiscated, and thousands of clergymen were persecuted as enemies of the Soviet regime. Many of them

had, in fact, fought it with might and main. Many others had given help to the anti-Bolshevik forces. In this they had the blessings of Patriarch Tikhon, who excommunicated the Communists on January 19, 1918, and urged all Orthodox faithful "not to enter into any kind of association with these monsters of the human race." He invoked Isaiah's wrathful words against them: "Their feet run to evil, and they make haste to shed innocent blood: their thoughts are thoughts of iniquity; wasting and destruction are in their paths."

The physical battle against the Church was won by the Soviets —with the aid of confiscations, executions, imprisonment, exile, and hard labor in concentration camps: at least 117 Russian Orthodox bishops and many thousands of priests, as well as a large but unknown number of Catholic, Moslem, Hebrew, and Protestant clergy, perished in the unequal struggle.

Rival Orthodox Church groups were organized, encouraged by the atheist Bolshevik government, splitting the ranks of the bewildered believers. Patriarch Tikhon was compelled to suspend his duties. In 1923 he was deposed by a packed Congress of the Clergy, following which he was to have been placed on trial, with all the cards stacked against him.[2] Protests in Russia and abroad, a threat by the British to recall their mission, and a public recantation by the Patriarch spared him the humiliation of a trial. The rival groups disintegrated and Tikhon remained Patriarch until his death on April 7, 1925. The enormous, all-day mass demonstrations of grief and devotion by his followers indicated that religion was still a vital force in Russia.

The Soviet government forbade the election of a new Patriarch and further intensified its ideological offensive against the Church. The onslaught was led by the League of Militant Atheists, formed on February 7, 1925, and headed by Yemelyan Yaroslavsky, an old Bolshevik and a lifelong friend of Stalin. The League, whose membership rose from 123,000 in 1928 to 10,000,000 in 1932, disseminated atheist propaganda, organized anti-religious carnivals and spectacles, and ran thousands of anti-religious museums, many of them in confiscated church buildings. The League published two atheist magazines and printed scientific literature, including translations of such books as Sir James Frazer's *The Golden Bough.*

Collectivization of agriculture, launched in 1928, intensified

anti-religious activity. Much of the peasant opposition to the violent land revolution decreed from above tended to rally around local church leaders. Priests kept warning their parishioners that God would destroy the crops harvested by the collectives. Peasant resentments grew as Soviet authorities retaliated by burning ikons, religious books, and vestments, and by converting churches into granaries or clubhouses for the newly formed *kolkhozes.*

And in Moscow the government ordered the demolition of the deeply revered House of the God-Mother, the Chapel of the Iberian Virgin, standing at the Iversky entrance to Red Square. The authorities had promised at the time (July 1929) to return to the Russian Orthodox Church the precious ikon housed in the chapel, but redeemed its pledge only fifteen years later, during the Soviet-German war.

A slow turn toward tolerance of religion came during the second half of the thirties, and for the same reasons of national security that had driven Stalin openly to embrace Russian nationalism. His fear of an attack by Nazi Germany was great, while religion, he knew, continued to remain a potent force in the USSR. As a matter of fact the leading atheist, Yaroslavsky, admitted publicly at the time that one third of the adult city population and two thirds of villagers of Russia were still believers.[3] A large section of the youth, he said, retained the faith of their fathers, and an even larger proportion, including sworn atheists, were addicted to crude superstition. Religious persecution seems to have misfired: it provoked resentments even among those who objected or were indifferent to religion, while fanatics were only hardened by their ordeal.

Unexpected confirmation came from the enemy camp. In preparing for war against the Soviet Union, Hitler courted the Russian Orthodox Church in Germany, patronizing it to the extent of helping to finance the erection in Berlin of a Russian Orthodox cathedral, and of helping to repair nineteen Orthodox churches elsewhere in the Third Reich.

As early as 1936 the new Soviet Constitution reflected in a most unequivocal way the shifting attitudes of the Kremlin toward religion. Article 124 stated: "In order to insure the citizen's freedom of conscience, the church in the USSR is separated from the state, and the school from the church. Freedom of worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all

citizens." The reader will note that no provision was made for freedom of religious propaganda.

Anti-religious persecution did not die all at once. The clergy and other persons connected with the Church were victimized during the Great Purge (1936–37), and at the end of 1937 an open effort was made to prevent the nomination and election of clergymen as deputies to the Supreme Soviet. Still the big fact remained that freedom of worship was now guaranteed. The status of clergy as second-rate citizens was abolished. They were given the right to vote and at least the nominal right to be elected to office. Their children were no longer barred from institutions of higher learning. The right to enroll in grade schools was granted on December 29, 1936, by a decree abolishing discrimination against children of non-workers.

All direct attacks on religion were abandoned, and atheist propaganda was restrained from ridiculing, or in any other way offending, religious sentiments. These were treated as survivals of the dark past, rather than as offenses against the socialist present, doomed to extinction by the advance of education and enlightenment among the people.

Churches in many a community were cleared of the grain that had been stored in them and were turned over to their congregations for worship. On June 26, 1940, the six-day week gave way to the universally accepted seven-day week, with Sunday as the day of rest, a significant concession to the sentiments of the population, for the League of Militant Atheists had insisted on Monday or Wednesday.

This was merely one of the blows dealt the League at the time. The blow that really hurt was contained in the Politburo directive which instructed the League, with grim and unintended humor, to make certain that the new benevolent Party line toward the Church was effectively carried out. Whether or not the directive had sought to cripple the League, this is exactly what happened. Its membership declined to 7,000,000 by 1937, and to 3,000,000 by 1940.

The Russian Orthodox Church was not slow to show its appreciation of the new religious policy. Most significant was the statement by Acting Patriarch Sergius to the effect that Christianity was compatible with any secular organization of society. The statement helped to dispel the fear of the government that

the Church might prove hostile in the event of a war. The Kremlin lost no time in ordering the entire press to front-page a stirring appeal issued by the Orthodox Church immediately following Hitler's attack. The appeal called on the faithful to resist the enemy. The following Sunday, in a message to all churches, the Acting Patriarch urged support of the Soviet government in its struggle with the foreign invader. He wrote in part: "The Orthodox Church has always shared the nation's fate. It always has carried its burdens and cherished its successes. We will not desert the nation now. Christ's Church blesses all Orthodox members defending the Fatherland's sacred borders. God will grant victory."[4]

Throughout August and September 1941 the various churches of Russia offered prayers for the victory of the Red Army and took up collections for the Defense Fund. In a pastoral letter Sergius condemned collaboration with Hitler. The Acting Patriarch also denounced the leading church quisling, Bishop Polycarp, and placed him on trial by proxy.

For the first time, on November 7, 1942, the Russian Orthodox Church congratulated the government on the anniversary of the Revolution. In a message of greeting to Stalin, the Church assured him that its members "heartily and prayerfully greet in your person the God-chosen leader of our military and cultural forces." The spokesman of the Moslem clergy rhapsodied: "The Mohammedan world knows you as a fighter for the liberation of the oppressed people. May Allah help you to bring to a victorious conclusion your glorious efforts in behalf of the redemption of these people. Amen!" Both messages were printed in full in *Pravda.*

The sweeping measures adopted by the Soviet government, in response to the let-bygones-be-bygones attitude of the Church, were more than an expression of appreciation. They were, above all, an admission by the atheist state that religion was still a great force in the land; a recognition of the fact that in the hour of tragedy and death the hearts and souls of millions of Soviet citizens turned toward religion for the solace, patience, and strength they could not draw from Communism.

The growing influence of the Church was manifest with particular impact in the countryside, making itself felt in the army, which embraced millions of young villagers. There were no army

chaplains, but priests were on hand, so individual soldiers could have the blessing before leaving for the battlefield. In many villages, church services were held on the eve of recruit departures for the army.

The wartime measures strengthening the friendly relations between the Kremlin and the Church paralleled the growth of the military peril. The profound impression which the reopening of the "liquidated" churches in enemy-occupied territory had made on the Soviet population, and President Roosevelt's persistent warm interest in religious freedom for the people of the USSR,[5] likewise contributed to the adoption of the measures.

These changes were many and sweeping. Taxes on church property were reduced and later abolished. Many churches were reopened.[6] At least ninety convents and monasteries were returned to the Church, with permission for monks and nuns to lead the lives prescribed by their own religious rules.

During the precarious springs of 1942 and 1943 curfew was lifted in Moscow for Easter night. Church marriages became more frequent, and were not discouraged by the civil authorities.

Anti-religious museums were closed, the League of Militant Atheists was dissolved and its publications suspended "for lack of paper." This "lack" was indeed a fact. The entire paper stock of the League, along with printing presses, was turned over to the Orthodox Church by government decree, as the solemn, long-haired editor of the church monthly had told me, with a none too Christian gleam of triumph in his eyes.

The Church's first publishing venture was on a grand scale: fifty thousand copies of a de luxe volume called *The Truth About Religion in Russia,* written with something less than a religious regard for truth (for it glossed over the persecution to which the Church had been subjected in the past) and with meticulous attention to the quality of type, paper, binding, and illustrations. The book was generously distributed among foreigners in Moscow, and thousands of copies were exported to England and the United States.

On November 10, 1942, Metropolitan Nicholas of Kiev was appointed by the Soviet government to membership in the Extraordinary State Commission for the investigation of German war crimes. The big, handsome, poetry-loving Metropolitan thus be-

came the first church dignitary to be named by the Bolsheviks to an official government body.

On September 4, 1943, the Kremlin permitted the re-establishment of the Patriarchate—the most important and far-reaching single item in Stalin's concordat with the Russian Orthodox Church. The Soviet leader himself took an active part in the resurrection of the Patriarchate. He knew well the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church, for in his youth he had studied for the priesthood at the Orthodox Theological Seminary in Tiflis. He was also fully aware of the great significance the faithful would attach to the re-establishment of the Church's highest body.

In the solemn atmosphere of the Kremlin he received the most exalted dignitaries of the Orthodox Church: Acting Patriarch, Metropolitan Sergius of Moscow, Metropolitan Alexei of Leningrad, and Metropolitan Nicholas of Kiev. Stalin assured them that he was in sympathy with the intentions of the leading circles of the Russian Orthodox Church to call a Council of Bishops (Sobor) for the purpose of electing a Patriarch and re-establishing the Holy Synod of the Patriarchate. He said, furthermore, that the government would not place any obstacles in their way.[7]

The Patriarchate, originally instituted in 1589, had been abolished by Peter the Great, who replaced it with a council of church hierarchs. Re-established by the democratic provisional government after the February 1917 Revolution, the Patriarchate died one more death with the passing away of Patriarch Tikhon in 1925. The government prohibited the election of a new supreme head of the Orthodox Church and Metropolitan Sergius became "Guardian of the Patriarchal See" or Acting Patriarch.

Within a few days following the Kremlin reception, a convocation of nineteen Russian Orthodox bishops unanimously elected Sergius Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. The official installation took place on September 12, 1943.

The new Patriarch established his offices and private quarters in the spacious former residence of the German ambassador, turned over to the Church by the Soviet government, which also gave Sergius a luxurious car for his personal use. An illustrated monthly, *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate,* was launched with a circulation of ten thousand, and seven other church periodicals were inaugurated in quick succession. The Patriarchate also be-

gan to publish the Bible and prayer books for the first time since the establishment of the Soviet regime.

In addition the Church organized the manufacture and distribution of vestments for priests and monks, of ikons, candles, and other items essential to religious rites.

The Church was also permitted to open theological institutes for the training of priests. Within a short period two theological academies and ten seminaries were functioning. The curriculum was substantially the same as in prerevolutionary times, except for additional courses on the Soviet Constitution and laws.

Parents were now free to give religious instruction to their children at home or in church, or to invite a priest to do so, without fear of direct or indirect reprisals.

When Patriarch Sergius died on May 15, 1944, a high-ranking official represented the Soviet government at the funeral. The same official also addressed the grand conclave which elected Alexei, Metropolitan of Moscow, the new Patriarch.[8]

The name of the official was Georgi Karpov. His position: chairman of the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs, which the Soviet government set up just about a month after the Patriarchate was allowed to come back to life.[9] Its official duties are to facilitate the work of the Church in bureaucracy-ridden USSR, and to serve as liaison between the Church and the Soviet cabinet. Its unofficial tasks are not unlike those of the office of the *Ober-Procuror* whom Peter the Great attached to the Holy Synod for the purpose of acting as the "tsar's eye." This is exactly what Karpov is: a sort of exalted political commissar assigned to the Patriarchate, to keep an eagle eye on the activities of the Most Holy One and the other dignitaries of the Orthodox Church. The Soviet people have dubbed Karpov "Narkombog," or People's Commissar for God. They also sometimes speak of him as "Narkomop," or People's Commissar for Opium, a reference to Karl Marx's much-quoted definition of religion as "opium of the people." The irony of the Narkombog title is most appropriate, for all through the years of Church-State hostility Karpov was in charge of the secret police efforts to liquidate the Church.

The Kremlin keeps its eye on the other religious groups in the Soviet Union through the separate Council for Religious Cults, the establishment of which was announced by *Pravda* on July 1,

1944. It is headed by I. V. Polyansky and is responsible directly to the Soviet cabinet.

Under Karpov and Polyansky are scores of council representatives, scattered all over Russia, who function as "Stalin's eyes" and as contact men between local Soviet officials and local religious groups. These representatives frequently helped reopen churches and organize the manufacture of candles, vestments, and other objects needed for worship.

Stalin and his colleagues have been instrumental in elevating the Church to a position of respectability in the Soviet scheme of things. They have helped to re-establish the traditional structure of the Russian Orthodox Church and to revitalize its activities. Still the basic antagonisms and incompatibility between religion and Communism remain. The Kremlin's benevolence was not a manifestation of a change of heart. It was an admission of weakness, of failure in its unceasing struggle for the minds and souls of the people.

It was not surprising, therefore, that the end of the war marked also the beginning of the renewal of rivalry. Religion once more became a major battlefield in the struggle for men's souls.

Atheist propaganda, almost nil during hostilities, has emerged once more, its big guns blasting away at "religion and religious prejudices" that have no place in our age of reason and science. The Soviet government insists on a strict adherence to the letter of the law that guarantees for religion solely the freedom of worship, at the same time providing militant atheists with the freedom and means necessary to carry on anti-religious propaganda. Thus deprived of means of persuasion, not to speak of the direct and indirect methods of pressure in the hands of the all-powerful atheist state, the Church is compelled to let go unchallenged the steady postwar barrage of anti-religious propaganda in the press, on the radio, on the lecture platform, and above all in the schools.

It goes without saying that all Communists and Komsomol members suspected of harboring religious feelings or of hindering anti-religious propaganda are summarily expelled, with all the dire consequences this implies. Also, teachers are now required to take part in the struggle. In the official view, it is not sufficient for the teacher "to be guided by the principle of the party-spirit in science; he must not only be a disbeliever himself, he must be

an active propagandist of godlessness amongst others."[10] Religious believers are sternly warned against attempts to meet the challenge, but the warning is ignored on such a scale as to force open admission of opposition to the official Soviet policy. The *Teachers' Gazette,* for instance, wrote on June 10, 1948: "Churchgoers, as well as all kinds of sectarians, try to influence our children and our youth. The school cannot disregard this. It is quite obvious that we must fight this."

One of the primary factors in the new anti-religious activity is the Kremlin's realization that religion constitutes a strong bond linking believers the world over, irrespective of their citizenship or of the economic and political systems under which they live. In its fight against religion the Soviet Union seeks, among other things, to eliminate in the consciousness of Christians, Moslems, Jews, and others an awareness of community with their coreligionists the world over. Communist efforts are therefore concentrated on instilling a "Bolshevik consciousness," on achieving the ideological supremacy of the ruling Communist Party. Hence free and unrestrained contact between Soviet citizens and those of the democratic capitalist West, with its deeply rooted traditions of genuine benevolence toward religion, represents a real danger, and the rulers of today's Russia fear it. It is a real fear and it haunts the Kremlin. This fear is spelled out in many an anti-religious passage in capital letters, despite the peculiar Soviet jargon.

For example: "A certain part of Soviet society continues to believe in, and is still unable to part with, religious convictions. This is to be explained by the fact that our Socialist society arose from capitalism and has not yet fully freed itself of capitalist vestiges, including religious convictions. . . . The ruling classes in capitalist countries are employing every means to strengthen religious prejudices."[11]

A strikingly significant feature of the current Soviet struggle against religion is the fact that the Bolsheviks do not resort to the fire-and-sword methods of earlier years. The battlefields of the anti-religious front are not strewn with dead and crippled bodies, nor are they soaked with blood. Only words are being wielded and only ink is being spilled. The means of coercion used do not as a rule go beyond expulsions from the Communist Party or the Komsomol, or making religious convictions and tolerance

toward religion obstacles to a career in government or in the teaching profession.

The reasons for treading softly are manifold. Experience has shown that religion is capable of surviving persecution, and even of feeding on it, for persecution breeds resentment and fanaticism. A policy of brutal hostility would be certain to drive into active opposition millions of believers, and to arouse the indignation of millions of others. And this at a time when the war-shocked and dead-tired nation is being mobilized for new superhuman toil in industry, when drastic changes are again shaking the entire Soviet countryside to its very foundations, and when the possibility of another world war looms dark on the horizon.

Therefore Stalin has been playing both ends against the middle. Instead of buttressing religion by persecution, the Soviet authorities have been battering away at it with propaganda in the hope that religion would wither and die. The Kremlin would be happy to bury it and then revere it as a monument of Russia's glorious past.

In the meantime the organized churches functioning under the Soviet system offer fascinating possibilities to Stalin in the field of foreign affairs. The last war demonstrated this conclusively. The Russian branch of the Orthodox Church successfully appealed to millions of Orthodox Christians in the Balkans and the Near East to fight the German enemy. The Russian church dignitaries vigorously supported Stalin's anti-Vatican maneuvers and echoed his demands for a second front in such a way as to lend veracity to his claims that the Western Allies were unwilling, rather than unprepared, to meet their wartime obligations.

In the postwar period the Russian Church reasserted its authority over the great Orthodox communities in the Balkans with the aid of such local Communist leaders as Tito in Yugoslavia (at that time still Stalin's friend and follower) and Dimitrov in Bulgaria. In its turn the Church facilitated the sovietization of the Balkans.

Likewise the Russian Orthodox Church established its influence in the Near East, as a result of Patriarch Alexei's trip to Orthodox communities there, from May 29 to June 26, 1946. On occasion, such as happened in Egypt, the anti-British demonstrations connected with his visit made the Patriarch seem more an emissary of Stalin than of the Church. The temporary mu-

tuality of interests between the Russian Orthodox Church, seeking aggrandizement, and the Soviet regime, dreaming of world domination, found its most striking expression in the appointment of an avowed Russian Orthodox believer as ambassador to the Orthodox state of Abyssinia. No less fantastic has been the regular church attendance every Sunday by the Soviet ambassador to Israel, accompanied by his staff. The Russian Palestine Society has been re-created by Moscow and, backed by the Soviet government, has been laying claim to extensive properties in the Jerusalem area.[12]

Alexei's emissaries travel to the many parts of the free world that contain large Orthodox communities, adding more and more spiritual subjects to the Patriarchate in Moscow and, through their fulsome praise of the Soviet regime, attracting potential followers of the men in the Kremlin.

In the global cold war the Russian Orthodox leaders, headed by Patriarch Alexei, have played the Kremlin game with lamentable consistency. The reasons for it are many and involved, including but going far beyond the crucial fact that the Patriarchate owes its existence to the Politburo. In the case of the Patriarch, with whom I had contact over a period of many months (see the next chapter), the difficulty, I am convinced, lies in weakness of character rather than in strength of devotion to the Kremlin. Handsome, urbane, spineless Patriarch Alexei is wedged between two mighty forces—the Communist fanatics who are determined to sovietize the world, utilizing the Church as a tool, and the fanatics among the church hierarchy who accommodate themselves to the Soviet regime in the hope of outliving it and making Moscow a "Third Rome." With but little editing, they can easily sign and address to Stalin the message written by Abbot Philotheus of Pskov Monastery to Ivan the Great in 1475, three years after the Grand Duke of All Russia assumed the Byzantine title of Autocrat:

"The church of ancient Rome fell because of the Apollinarian heresy; as to the Second Rome—the Church of Constantinople—it has been hewn by the axes of the Ishmaelites, but this Third new Rome—the Holy Apostolic Church, under thy mighty rule, shines throughout the entire world more brightly than the sun. All the Orthodox Christian realms have converged in thine own.

Thou art the sole Autocrat of the Universe, the only Caesar of the Christians. . . . Two Romes have fallen, but the Third stands, and no fourth can ever be. . . ."[13]

With whatever profit for itself, the Moscow Patriarchate has spared no effort in merging the Orthodox Christian realms with Stalin's own, carrying his influence into many communities which would otherwise have repudiated him with abhorrence. When the Vatican excommunicated Catholics belonging to, or sympathetic with, the Communist Party Patriarch Alexei hastened to issue a solemn message to all Orthodox Christians, asserting that there is no conflict between allegiance to the Soviet state and loyalty to the Church. Likewise the organ of the Moscow Patriarchate has consistently defended the Kremlin's foreign policy to the point of echoing its virulent attacks on the United States as a country of warmongers dominated by Wall Street imperialism.

Despite their loquacity, no Russian Orthodox dignitary has yet uttered a word of protest against the Iron Curtain that Communist anti-religious propaganda is erecting between the Church and the people, particularly the coming generation; or against the larger and even more impenetrable curtain that prevents free contact between the Orthodox Christians of Russia and their brethren in other lands.

Whether Patriarch Alexei acts under pressure, or is a willing puppet, he has been leading the Russian Orthodox Church along the road of a spiritual Calvary from which there may be no resurrection.

The Russian Orthodox Church is the dominant but by no means the only church in the Soviet Union. There are ten major religious groups in the country, and at least as many minor ones. Moslems and Jews will be discussed in subsequent chapters. Here we shall briefly narrate the fate of Christian groups other than Orthodox.

The one aspect that sets the latter apart from the other Christians in the USSR is the favoritism which the Soviet government, like the tsarist regime, has consistently shown the dominant church, in violation of a solemn promise contained in the decree of January 23, 1918. The reasons for the favoritism, apart from the matter of sheer weight of numbers, are not far to seek. The

Orthodox Church of Russia has, as a rule, been ready to compromise and render unto Caesar. The other churches have not been so compliant; they have been toughened by centuries of persecution from lay authorities and the Orthodox Church itself. The Orthodox Church has always been suspicious of sectarian groups within it and intolerant of creeds outside it. The insistence of the Church on discipline, dominance, and indivisibility has sounded through the centuries, and is the more resonant now because it fits in so perfectly with Stalin's own concept of centralism.

It was, therefore, natural that the USSR's military aggression, which made Soviet citizens out of some four million Uniats, or Greek Catholics, should be followed by religious aggression on the part of the Moscow Patriarchate. It suppressed the Uniat Church and absorbed its membership. The unification was accomplished with the aid of the Soviet secret police, which for additional reasons of its own arrested, purged, and exiled recalcitrant bishops and other members of the Uniat clergy. This violence bred a large number of newly embittered and resolute enemies of the Soviet regime, steeling opposition to the Kremlin and adding heat to the Cold Civil War. In the western Ukraine, for instance, the man who engineered the liquidation, in March 1946, of the local Uniat Church, was assassinated two years later.

The Uniat movement took shape in 1596 among Orthodox believers of the Polish-Lithuanian empire. The dissidents accepted the spiritual leadership of the Pope, who in turn promised to tolerate their use of the Slavonic language in church services, as well as their adherence to the ancient Eastern ritual. The resultant bitterness between the Orthodox Church and the Uniats, or Greek Catholics, was so intense that the two religious bodies excommunicated each other. The tsars were alarmed by the allegiance of the Uniats to the Vatican, and helped the Orthodox Church suppress them as fast as territories containing them could be annexed. Following in the footsteps of Catherine the Great and Nicholas II, under whom many Uniats were absorbed, Stalin helped the Moscow Patriarchate to engulf the four million Uniats in the western Ukraine, Bukovina, Bessarabia, and Transcarpathia, all of which he annexed to the USSR.

Also the million and a half Uniats of Rumania, where the Greek Catholic Church was founded in 1698 and played a lead-

ing role in the national and cultural life of the country, were compelled to dissolve their organization and reunite with the Orthodox Church. This took place on October 1, 1948, about a year after Patriarch Alexei visited Rumania. Resistance was so great that the return of the Greek Catholic Church to the bosom of Orthodoxy was accomplished only after the organs of suppression of this satellite state brutally crushed all opposition. On the eve of the congress of Uniat dignitaries, at which the fate of their church was to be decided, the police arrested all bishops and some four hundred priests. The thirty-eight priests who, for obvious reasons, were not molested gathered at Cluj and voted to liquidate their church.

The taming of the Roman Catholic Church in the Soviet Union presented a much more formidable problem than the absorption of the Uniats by the Russian Orthodox Church. The Catholics could not be used by Stalin as a front and an excuse, for they owe allegiance to the Vatican, a realm beyond the reach of the Moscow Patriarchate or the Kremlin and its secret police. Moreover, most Soviet citizens who were also Catholics did not belong to the Slav race, and appeals to Pan-Slavism would have fallen on deaf ears. Most of the Poles had either been transferred to Poland or were languishing in Siberian exile. This left practically no Catholics in the USSR outside of Lithuania, which is overwhelmingly Roman Catholic (85.7 per cent), and Latvia, a predominantly Protestant country (56.13 per cent) with a large Catholic minority (about 25 per cent).

Because of the loyalty commanded by the Vatican from Catholics the world over, Communism regards the Roman Catholic Church as its archenemy. The Spanish Civil War and, later, Russia's partition of Catholic Poland with Hitler, followed by the annexation of Latvia and Lithuania, combined to intensify the mutual enmity to a boiling point. In 1944, prompted by political expediency, Stalin made a ridiculously awkward attempt at a reconciliation with the Pope via the sincere but muddled and inexperienced Stanislaus Orlemansky, an obscure parish priest of Springfield, Massachusetts. Through him, Stalin pledged not to persecute or coerce Roman Catholics in any manner, and offered to seek ways toward joint understanding and co-operation. Pius XII ignored the move, while Father Orlemansky suffered

a nervous breakdown after his bishop charged him with a breach of ecclesiastical discipline and threatened excommunication.[14]

What followed was open warfare inside the USSR and, later, in the satellite countries.[15] Particularly harsh were the Soviet methods in Catholic Lithuania. The first step was to drop an Iron Curtain between the country's Roman Catholic clergy and the Vatican. (The apostolic nuncio, Archbishop Antonio Arrata, had been expelled in 1940, the Year of Terror. That same year the Latvian Ambassador to the Holy See, Professor Hermanis Albats, was exiled to Siberia.) The upper clergy and the more obstinate priests were gradually and systematically eliminated in a series of Moscow-style trials, with the defendants convicted and sentenced for alleged sabotage, terror, treason, and counter-revolution.

Figures can be dull, but there are figures that speak with the tormented eloquence of a Dante, as do the following statistics on the Catholic Church in Soviet Lithuania[16]:

SOURCE:	Official stat. 1940	Tass, 1947 Bulletin	Lithuanian underground '48
Archbishops and bishops	14	2	1
Clergy	1646	1332	400
Monastic order members	1586	0	0
Churches	1202	711	600
Parishioners	2,776,422	"thousands"	most of those who survived
Theological seminaries	4	1	0
Catholic faculty in universities	1	0	0
State assistance	1,383,278 Lt.	0	0
Church taxation	0	?	ruinous taxation
Divinity students	470	ca. 150	0
Killed or exiled clergymen	0	silence	75%
Catholic press (1935)			
number	52	silence	0
circulation	7,030,200	silence	0

By September 1951, according to Monsignor Joseph B. Koncius, president of the United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America, all of the eleven Roman Catholic bishops in Lithuania had been liquidated, and only two hundred priests were still performing their spiritual duties.[17]

Moscow's only church serving the small Catholic community

of the Soviet capital (foreigners and Soviet citizens) has been transferred from its French priest to one brought in from Soviet-ruled Lithuania, although this church—St. Louis des Français—has been traditionally run by the French community. The Frenchman is permitted to hold one mass for the foreign colony, but he is completely cut off from its Soviet congregation.

The traditional anti-Catholicism of Russian Orthodoxy has kept pace with the Kremlin's enmity toward the papal see. The special issue of the *Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate* (July 1948), devoted to the five hundredth anniversary of the independence of the Russian Orthodox Church, reflected this attitude in a most unchristian spirit.

In connection with Catholicism, the civil war waged by the Kremlin inside the Soviet Union has long since ceased to be cold. Unable to win the battle through persuasion, the Communists are resorting to fire and sword. And still Catholic opposition remains firm and unyielding, demonstrating again and again the incompatibility between Catholicism and the Bolshevik creed.

At the other extreme of the religious front, the Stalinists are battling the Evangelists, Baptists, and Seventh-Day Adventists precisely because they preach the compatibility of Communism and Christianity. These numerically small religious groups, which took root in Russia at the end of the nineteenth century, transplanted from the United States and western Europe, have never understood Communism's irrevocable challenge to all religion. Nor have they grasped the validity of such cynical, contemptuous statements as the one made by *Pravda* on May 5, 1923: "Christians may bless Communism—good enough—but please remember that it does not mean that Communism blesses Christianity."

Still these sects persist in seeking points of contact between the two. A Baptist pronouncement maintained categorically:

". . . according to the Gospel, Jesus Christ was of proletarian origin, the son of a petty tradesman, the carpenter Joseph, and his mother was a simple working woman. Therefore, the Saviour of the world stands close to the proletariat and peasantry in his social status. Jesus Christ was a great socialist, a Communist, the spiritual father and precursor of the Communist Party."[18]

This fantastic assertion, capable of inciting a true Baptist to riot and a true Communist to murder, was made during World

War II when the Soviet government was treading softly. When, however, the Russian Baptists came out in 1947 with the declaration that they "fully share the social-economic principles of communism as not being contrary to the teachings of Our Lord, Jesus Christ," they brought down upon themselves the wrath of the gods sitting in the Kremlin. The Baptist claims, as well as similar claims by other Christian sects, have been rejected as a cloak covering their true reactionary substance.

Even appeals by the leaders of those sects to their followers, urging them to love their country and be staunch in its defense, and to labor conscientiously in its fields and factories, are insufficient to appease the Communists. They demand undivided loyalty. But undivided loyalty, they affirm, is impossible as long as there is belief in a heavenly home, and as long as there is belief that God is love and that love embraces all humanity. This is how the Bolsheviks phrase it, linking the Cold Civil War inside Russia with the conflict raging on a global scale:

"The preaching of 'love for all people' amid the acute struggle between the old, rotting world of capitalism and the new, growing world of communism, amid the feverish preparations by the Anglo-American imperialists for a new war is nothing but lulling the vigilance of the Soviet people."

CHAPTER 6

The Religious Front: II

Negotiating with the Russian Patriarch

> You can successfully negotiate with the Soviet Union if your ultimate aims and theirs are the same. . . . They have a genius for obstruction when they desire to use it.
>
> SIDNEY S. ALDERMAN

As NBC's Moscow correspondent, I regularly reported on the wartime friendship and co-operation between the Soviet state and the Russian Orthodox Church. The American public was actively interested in these developments. I was, therefore, not surprised when one day, soon after the installation of Sergius as Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, I received cabled instructions from my home office to invite the head of the Russian Orthodox Church to broadcast a message of greeting and friendship to the people of the United States at any time during the forthcoming Christmas holidays, preferably on Christmas Day. The idea of the broadcast originated with Max Jordan, then in charge of a popular non-sponsored religious news program on the NBC network, and now an ordained Catholic priest.

The request seemed simple enough, but the negotiations that followed actually turned it into the most complex, frustrating, and revealing single assignment in all my seven years of work as Moscow representative for NBC. Altogether the negotiations dragged on for a year and a half.

As a US correspondent accredited to the Press Department of the Soviet Foreign Office, I would normally apply to the department with a request to help me meet whatever Soviet official or organization I might wish to approach. Ever since the State Secrets Act of 1947, such procedure has been enforced with the utmost rigidity, for, should a foreign correspondent be received

by a Soviet official without the helping and controlling hand of the Press Department, the latter thereby violates the law and is liable to prosecution and severe punishment, while the correspondent exposes himself to the danger of possible espionage charges.

No such written laws existed prior to 1947, and foreign newsmen frequently applied to the Press Department for the simple reason that the department was of real assistance whenever it chose to intervene on behalf of a correspondent. But it seemed to me that I would be creating unnecessary trouble for myself if I worked through the Press Department, which, for all I knew, might not wish to go out of its way to help put the Russian Orthodox Church on the air for the first time in history. On the contrary, I thought, the Patriarch's consent, should it be given to me, might later help me obtain radio facilities which were owned and controlled by the state, and for which I would have had to apply via the Press Department.

Two other reasons prompted me to approach the Patriarch directly: one, the complete official separation between church and state in the Soviet Union; two, apprehension that the Patriarch might be offended by my failure to approach him directly on a matter which actually concerned him alone. He might interpret my turning to the Foreign Office as an attempt at indirect pressure, and this I wished to avoid.

For similar reasons I also refrained from approaching the Patriarch through the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs.

I therefore wrote a letter to the Patriarch, transmitting the invitation and requesting the privilege of an audience. The letter was delivered to the Patriarchate by messenger, but there was no reply. A follow-up note likewise yielded no results. I then drove up the Patriarchate, where I was received by Archpriest Kolchitsky, a man of tremendous bulk, furtive eyes, and sweet voice. This voice had a remarkable facility for acquiring instant roaring harshness whenever the archpriest chose to interrupt our conversation to speak to one or another of the Patriarchate employees who kept coming to his office with various inquiries. I gathered that they had no authority to act on the simplest matter without referring it to Kolchitsky, the manager of the Moscow Patriarchate and secretary to the Patriarch.

The Most Holy One was indisposed, he said, and could not see me. Yes, the Most Holy One had read my letters, but he was indisposed. For how long? We are all in the hands of the Almighty. Besides, there was still plenty of time to Christmas. Why did not the respected American journalist, in the meantime, clear the matter with Gospodin* Karpov of the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs? His Most Holy One did not insist, but since he was indisposed and there was time . . .

I thanked Archpriest Kolchitsky, returned to my office, and telephoned Georgi Karpov. His secretary would not connect me with him, nor would she make an appointment, unless I told her what I wished to talk to him about. I explained the matter to her and she said she would call me back. After two days of waiting I called her. Oh yes, of course, she had a message for me, why had I not called earlier? Gospodin Karpov said that I must take up my request with the Press Department of the Foreign Office.

All through the war, accredited foreign correspondents had easy access to the chief of the Press Department. Even though the Russians were at the time clamoring for the opening of a second front in Europe and Soviet-Allied relationships were quite strained, I had no difficulty in arranging an appointment with the chief. He listened attentively, made notes, asked me to write an official request, and promised to let me know. The same day I handed to his secretary my letter requesting the Press Department to support NBC's invitation to the Patriarch, arrange an audience with the Most Holy One, and place radio facilities at our disposal, should the head of the Russian Orthodox Church agree to broadcast a message of friendship to the people of the USA.

A week passed, two weeks, three weeks. New York was prodding me. I wrote a reminder and applied for another appointment with the chief of the Press Department. He finally received me . . . the day *after* Christmas. The chief told me that the state has monopoly on all radio facilities and cannot place them at the disposal of the Church, since the two are completely separate in the USSR.

I reported this to NBC in New York, but the indomitable Max Jordan cabled again in the early spring, requesting me to ar-

*The Russian word for Mr.

range a similar broadcast for Easter. This time the reply came through fast enough: the same refusal and for the same reasons.

Here the matter seemed to rest. The refusal was unequivocal, the reasons for it had an iron logic of their own, and my home office accepted with good grace my failure to carry out the assignment.

Then came the opening of the second front.

The second front wrought a miraculous change of atmosphere in Moscow, particularly in the Russian attitude toward Great Britain and the United States. The Grand Alliance seemed destined to stand proud and indestructible for many years to come. The Western Allies were no longer suspect, and the certainty of victory in the foreseeable future seemed to mellow the hearts of even the staunchest Bolsheviks toward their capitalist Allies. Correspondents were taken on exciting trips to the front. Requests for various interviews were granted ungrudgingly and with comparative speed. Eric Johnston, then president of the US Chamber of Commerce, managed to take four American correspondents, this writer among them, along with him on his fabulous, never-to-be-forgotten trip to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia.

Upon my return from the trip at the end of July 1944, I found the atmosphere in Moscow so warm, and Soviet-American relations so cordial, that I thought I had a fighting chance of arranging an Orthodox Church greeting to the USA by the next Christmas. The aged and ailing Patriarch Sergius had passed away on May 15 of that year, and Metropolitan Alexei of Leningrad was Acting Patriarch. He was a much younger man, and more of a man of the world, I had heard, and this further enhanced my hopes of finally fulfilling Max Jordan's request. I queried New York, was given the green light, and the negotiations started all over again.

I purposely started them some five months ahead of time, for I expected long bureaucratic delays, even though Soviet-American relations were at the time more cordial than at any period since the Revolution. But to my surprise things moved with lightning speed. A telephone call to the chief of the Press Department secured me an appointment on the same day. The chief was all smiles and listened to my request as if he knew all about what had brought me to him. Moreover, he complimented me on my

patience and perseverance, and ended by saying that my virtues were rewarded: the facilities of the Moscow Radio Center were at my disposal for a broadcast by the Patriarch. Never before or after, during the twelve years of my work in Moscow as a foreign correspondent, did I receive a direct, on-the-spot reply from the Press Department, even on trifling or purely technical matters. I was taken aback for one brief second, but then recalled the exchange of cabled messages between me and New York. The Foreign Office had learned what was in the wind and had met me more than halfway.

"The radio facilities are at your service," the chief repeated, "provided, of course, that the Acting Patriarch agrees to broadcast."

"Can you possibly intercede on my behalf?" I inquired.

"This I cannot do, but I suggest that you contact Gospodin Karpov."

The voice of Karpov's secretary was wrapped in velvet when I telephoned for an appointment. Gospodin Karpov would be happy to see at my earliest convenience. Tomorrow morning? Very well. Would ten-thirty do?

A man of middle height, white-haired and benign-looking, Karpov was the soul of friendliness. Certainly, certainly, he said, a message of greetings by the head of the Russian Orthodox Church to the great people of America was a most felicitous idea, and he was happy to learn from me that the Soviet government in its generosity had decided to lend its radio facilities for so noble a purpose. He would consider it his duty and an honor to convey my request to the Acting Patriarch, and he would try to arrange an audience for me with the Most Holy One. He could not, of course, guarantee that I would be received, still—would tomorrow morning, ten-thirty, be convenient for me? Might his secretary telephone me to confirm the appointment?

By the time I had reached my office after the meeting with Karpov, a matter of fifteen minutes, there was a message from him waiting for me: the interview would take place tomorrow morning as agreed.

Acting Patriarch and Metropolitan of Leningrad Alexei came from an old aristocratic Russian family. As a young man, brilliant and handsome, he had led a gay life in Paris for years, then turned to religion and moved quickly up the ladder of Orthodox Church

hierarchy. He displayed great courage and patriotism during the siege of Leningrad, and was decorated by the Soviet government. The last wish of dying Patriarch Sergius made Alexei "Guardian of the Patriarchal See," or Acting Patriarch.[1] It was persistently rumored in Moscow that he was Stalin's choice for the next Patriarch, to be elected within several weeks after the Christmas holidays.

Archpriest Kolchitsky led me into the private office of the Acting Patriarch, refused to take his several hints that we be left alone, and departed only upon direct request from his superior. The Acting Patriarch's official, somewhat bored attitude disappeared forthwith. His large black eyes began to sparkle, and very soon I found myself in the presence of one of the most charming, urbane men it has ever been my privilege to meet. The entire conversation was in Russian, but every now and then my host would throw in a most exquisitely pronounced French word or phrase. On his desk I noticed an open French Bible.

Yes, the Acting Patriarch would be happy to avail himself of the opportunity to greet the Christians of that great country beyond the ocean. He would write his message in English, and would read it himself, but since he was not completely at home in that magnificent, difficult language, he hoped that I would edit the script for him. Furthermore, he hoped that I would find time to rehearse with him, so as to help him eliminate some of the crudest aspects of his impossible pronunciation of English words. The Acting Patriarch responded readily when I asked him to say something in English, and blushed with pleasure upon hearing me say that American radio listeners would understand him perfectly. What I did not tell him was that his accent had a quaint charm about it, something like Maurice Chevalier's years ago, and that many a foreign actor in Hollywood would give his right arm for so bewitching an accent.

The Acting Patriarch then invited me to call on him again within a week or so, to go over his manuscript with him. When I called, however, Kolchitsky told me, in the harsh tone I had heard him use in addressing the employees of the Patriarchate, that the Most Holy One was busy and would not see me, but that he, Kolchitsky, had been authorized by the Acting Patriarch to inquire of me what right I had to try to exploit the Holy

Russian Orthodox Church in the interests of a private commercial firm that was seeking to make a fortune on the broadcast.

The attack took me by surprise. I had assumed that the broadcast was to be presented by NBC on a non-sponsored program, as a public service feature, and had not thought it necessary to check. Was it possible that Kolchitsky's vehemence stemmed from a knowledge of certain facts unknown to me? What reasons, I asked, did the Archpriest have for suspecting NBC of seeking to exploit the good will of the Patriarch for its own selfish interests?

"The burden of proof rests upon you," he answered, showing me to the door.

Next morning I came back, armed with a cable from New York, stating unequivocally that the broadcast was planned as part of NBC's public service program, and that no commercial considerations of any kind were involved. But Kolchitsky hardly glanced at the copy of the cable I asked him to present to the Acting Patriarch, and he never again referred to the profit angle. Instead, the Archpriest inquired with an air of indignation as to what right I had, a private United States citizen acting for NBC, a private commercial firm, to approach the Most Holy One. The Acting Patriarch would broadcast a message of greetings only upon invitation by religious leaders in the USA of a stature comparable to his.

I reported to New York, and within a fortnight several Protestant bishops, including Bishop Oxnam, cabled the Acting Patriarch, extending him most cordial invitations to broadcast a Christmas message of good will to the people of America. My home office tipped me off about these cables, and I was sitting tight, waiting for a phone call from the Patriarchate. But there was no call. An inquiry from New York prompted me to act, and I made one more pilgrimage to the headquarters of the Russian Orthodox Church.

"The Most Holy One has been waiting for you," Kolchitsky greeted me, speaking softly, yet making me feel that I had fallen down on the job. As previously, he tried to stay on, but the Acting Patriarch requested him to leave. And, as previously, Alexei's exaggerated politeness gave way to a friendly exuberance the moment the Archpriest closed the door behind him. The Patriarch was delighted with the swift liquidation of the delay (he actu-

ally used the phrase "swift liquidation") and showed me his message of greetings. The English was somewhat bookish but correct, and required practically no editing on my part.

"Now let me read it to you," said the Acting Patriarch, hardly concealing his delight over the prospect of broadcasting in English to "that great country beyond the ocean."

"I am going to read the way Churchill reads his speeches," he announced, lowering his voice and making it boom. Alexei had apparently been listening to the BBC, but he did not sound like Churchill at all. Not that it mattered. The voice was rich, the message sincere and simple, and the accent possessed a fascination all its own.

We agreed that a week or two before Christmas I was to call again for a final rehearsal, and to inform the Acting Patriarch of the exact time the broadcast was to take place. I offered to call for him in my car, but Alexei insisted with all the flourish of Russian hospitality that I do him the honor of coming to the Patriarchate and driving up to the Moscow Radio Center in his limousine.

I was now in a position to cable New York that everything was set, and NBC announced in the American press and over its network that Acting Patriarch Alexei would broadcast a Christmas message of greetings to the people of the United States, linking the free world and the Russian Orthodox Church by air for the first time.

The days were passing quickly during that period of victorious onslaughts against the enemy on both fronts. Christmas was approaching, and some of the Orthodox Church leaders who were to gather in Moscow in January for the election of a new Patriarch had begun to arrive. The first of the dignitaries to reach the Soviet capital from a foreign country was Benjamin, Metropolitan of North America and the Aleutian Islands, who came ahead of time so as to celebrate the end of his long exile from Russia.

Shortly after Benjamin's arrival, I telephoned the Patriarchate to inform Kolchitsky of the exact time that had been set for the broadcast, and to say that I was ready to call on the Acting Patriarch for the final rehearsal.

"The Most Holy One has asked me to inform you that no message will be broadcast and that you need not come to see him."

And he hung up.

My cable saying that the whole thing was off must have caused my home office no end of embarrassment, what with the invitations by the Protestant bishops cabled to the Patriarchate on NBC's initiative, the advance publicity, and the scheduling during the busiest time of the year. But my superior in New York kept control of his temper, and all I received in reply was a message thanking me for my efforts and wishing me a very Merry Christmas. It was far from merry, though, even if I did go to several Christmas parties. At one of them I heard a story making the rounds that some American radio network had invited the Acting Patriarch to broadcast a Christmas message to the United States, that Alexei had been ready to do so, but that Metropolitan Benjamin of North America and the Aleutians had learned about it, nearly fainted with anxiety, and told the Most Holy One that he would be helping to publicize Coca-Cola over the air.

At this point it was I who nearly fainted.

Although Christmas Day had passed and the scheduled broadcast had been canceled, I wrote a letter to Metropolitan Benjamin, explaining the matter and stating for the record that the broadcast was to have had no sponsor and had not been offered to Coca-Cola or any other business firm, but was to have been part of the NBC public service program. I also referred to the invitations by the Protestant bishops. The whole thing was off, I said, but I hoped that in all justice he would explain to the Acting Patriarch that there had been no misrepresentation, and that I had acted in good faith.

My letter was delivered by messenger to the Moskva Hotel where Metropolitan Benjamin was staying. This hotel is usually reserved for high Soviet officials from out of town and for extremely friendly VIPs from foreign countries.

The very next day a telephone call came through for me from the Moskva Hotel: the Metropolitan was inviting me to dinner. It took place in his suite, luxurious by any standards. The mountains of black caviar and meats, and the stacks of vodka and Causasian wines on the table set for just the two of us, bordered on the indecent in semistarved wartime Moscow. The Metropolitan, a large, gay, gray-bearded man who ate and drank heartily, cheerfully admitted the veracity of the story about his interference, and just as cheerfully expressed his regrets. Between

bottoms-up toasts to victory, postwar friendship, and the health of the Acting Patriarch, the Metropolitan promised to speak to him and see if the damage could be undone.

The gay leader of the Orthodox Church of North America and the Aleutian Islands was as good as his word. Once more I was invited to the Patriarchate, and once more I was alone with the man who was hoping to be elected Patriarch within two short weeks. What he said to me amazed me to the point of disbelief, but there it was.

He apologized for the anxiety he realized he must have caused me, and inquired solicitously whether I would lose my job because of it. I said no, I would not lose my job, but it was terribly embarrassing to me that my assurances regarding the nature of the broadcast had been doubted. The Acting Patriarch smiled and said that he had never suspected bad faith. He had had other reasons for canceling the broadcast, and only seized the opportunity provided by Metropolitan Benjamin's Coca-Cola reaction. He went on speaking now in carefully chosen words, devious and indirect, which nevertheless conveyed to me the following information:

The election of a new Patriarch was soon to take place in Moscow, and he, Metropolitan Alexei of Leningrad and Acting Patriarch, was a candidate. After he had agreed to broadcast Christmas greetings to the USA, he had learned that certain church groups were planning to use it against him. They would accuse him of immodesty in speaking in the name of the Russian Orthodox Church. This was the prerogative of a duly elected Patriarch.

Alexei was not expressing himself as bluntly as I am putting it down here, but this is exactly what he was saying. I saw the logic of his position, but the frankness of the man surprised and disturbed me to the point of compelling me to inquire about the reasons for it. The Acting Patriarch smiled again.

"You Americans are too direct, and you are too enterprising. You are too much on the job, to use your own idiom. You have been studying me, but I have also watched you. You have taken in your stride the formidable obstacles that have been placed in your way. The radio facilities, for instance, and this man Kolchitsky, and the invitations from the bishops, and Metropolitan

Benjamin. Frankly, I fear you might take further steps, and they might somehow affect unfavorably the results of the election."

And after a pause: "I trust you will not betray my confidence."

The Acting Patriarch then proceeded to impress upon me the fact that he very much favored the idea of a message to the American people. If elected, he would actually deliver such a message the next Easter, provided I was discreet and patient.

The frankness that permitted me to take a peep at behind-the-scenes pre-election intrigues quite disarmed me, yet I hesitated to start all over again. I had burned my fingers badly and they were still raw. Besides, I was somehow beginning to get directly involved in something that was no concern of any working journalist in a foreign country. Finally, how could I be sure that nothing else would come up to strangle the projected broadcast? No, I would have no more of it, and started to say so, but Alexei interrupted me, suggesting that, to make the broadcast more memorable, he would have his cathedral choir sing a group of liturgical songs on the same program.

That did it. I had heard the choir several times, and it was magnificent. In case there was another hitch with the Patriarch, the choir alone would pull the program through. I agreed but said that I would do nothing about arranging the broadcast with New York until after the election.

The Great Assembly (Sobor) of the Russian Orthodox Church met on January 31, 1945. The election took place on February 2, and the new Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, the unanimously elected Metropolitan Alexei, was installed on February 4. Participating in the assembly were forty-four Metropolitans, bishops and archbishops, and representatives of the clergy and laity of the forty-four dioceses within the USSR. Among the participants were also the Catholicos Patriarch of Georgia (USSR), the Patriarchs of Constantinople and Jerusalem, and leading representatives of the Orthodox Churches of Rumania, Bulgaria, and Serbia. Also Benjamin, Metropolitan of North America and the Aleutian Islands, came to the conclave.

The Soviet government was represented by Georgi Karpov, who addressed the Assembly, emphasizing the great role of the Orthodox Church in Russia's wartime effort and assuring the

conclave that the Soviet government "would take every measure in the future to eliminate the obstacles in the way of the exercise by Soviet citizens of the freedom of conscience proclaimed by the Constitution."[2]

The setting of the ceremony in the Resurrection Cathedral was full of contrasts: weird, beautiful, pompous, and humble. The cathedral itself is a sprawling, ancient edifice in the outskirts of Moscow, as shabby as the clothes on the throng that surrounded it, standing knee-deep in the snow and held back by solid lines of militiamen. It was almost as cold inside as it was outdoors, and the assembled Patriarchs, Metropolitans, and bishops had to wear bulging galoshes that kept them warm but marred the splendor of their bejeweled vestments. Bells pealed triumphantly and the choir sang its inspired hymns with perfection and abandon.

The joy of the church dignitaries and the crowd inside the cathedral was enhanced by the sight of the celebrated ikon of God-Mother. The ikon had been taken away by the Soviet government on July 30, 1929, from the Chapel of the Iberian Virgin, and returned only in August 1943, some three weeks before the momentous Kremlin reception at which Stalin agreed to the restoration of the Patriarchate and the Holy Synod. The sight of the ikon brought with it memories of Ivan the Terrible begging forgiveness in the Iberian Chapel for the murder of his own son, memories of Alexander I kneeling in gratitude for victory over Napoleon, of Nicholas II, who kneeled in front of the ikon and pleaded for heavenly aid, and of the last of them all, White General Kaledin, vainly praying in the chapel for the salvation of Holy Russia from the godless Bolsheviks.

There were also reminders of another conflict, still raging—the war against Nazi Germany. Moscow and Leningrad Defense Medals were prominently displayed on the gorgeous robes of some of the dignitaries, vying for attention with the diamond-studded crosses worn by them. There were uniformed Red Army men and even officers in the Russian crowd, while some of the Serbian delegates were laymen wearing uniforms of Tito's Army of Liberation.

In the best traditions of Soviet meetings, the majestic gathering of the Orthodox faithful unanimously adopted a message of greeting to Joseph Stalin, whereupon the choir burst forth with

the stirring "*Mnogiya Lyeta* [Many Years of Life]," which had been traditionally sung to the rulers of tsarist Russia.

My negotiations were now resumed once more. I waited until the visiting dignitaries had left and Patriarch Alexei had settled down to his routine work. I then called on him to offer my felicitations upon the great honor bestowed upon him by the Orthodox Church, and to obtain confirmation of his promise to broadcast an Easter message of greetings to the people of the United States. The Patriarch confirmed his promise with a confidence never before displayed in the presence of Archpriest Kolchitsky. The latter was given instructions that the choir was to be included in the program and that I was to be permitted to attend rehearsals. The choir leader was to consult me on the selection of liturgical songs for the program. Those rehearsals which I attended for the next few weeks will remain among the most cherished experiences of my entire life. The members of the choir were volunteers, men and women of varying ages who worked in factories and offices of the Soviet capital, and rehearsed two or three evenings a week. On Sundays and holidays they sang in the cathedral where the Patriarch himself officiated.

As soon as New York set the exact time of the broadcast, I confirmed it with the choir leader. The Patriarch had given me a free hand in fixing the time, but I obtained his confirmation as well. Everything was set.

Three days before the broadcast was to take place Archpriest Kolchitsky telephoned, inviting me to call on him at the Patriarchate.

"Will the respected journalist kindly tell me where the broadcast is scheduled to take place?" he asked in the saccharine manner he had adopted in addressing me ever since the election of Alexei.

"Why, at the Moscow Radio Center. The Patriarch knows about it, and has invited me to accompany him in his car."

"The Most Holy One will not demean himself by going to the Radio Center," said Kolchitsky. "The microphone must be installed in the Patriarchate for the occasion."

"It cannot be done at this late hour," I groaned. "And you know it."

Kolchitsky did not reply. He just looked at me, gloating.

"Whose decision is it?" I inquired. "Does the Patriarch know about it?"

"The Most Holy One will not demean himself by going to the Radio Center," the Archpriest repeated, evading a direct answer.

"May I speak to the Patriarch?"

"The Most Holy One will not see you until and unless you arrange for the microphone to be installed at the Patriarchate."

Running slightly ahead of my story, I might add that from that day on I never got to see the Patriarch. I was certain of his good faith, and believe to this day that he had every intention of doing the broadcast. It had significance to him as a symbol of the tie between his Church and the Christians of the United States. Also the idea of the message flattered his vanity, and he was eager to have his rich voice boom in English all over "that great country beyond the ocean." Something must have happened once more, but what was it?

I knew that Karpov was the man to see, but I suspected that he knew all about the matter, and I was not even sure that he would receive me. I decided to take no chances and returned to the original starting point—I called on the chief of the Press Department. He expressed his sympathy with my dilemma and arranged for me to see Karpov. That seemed to indicate that the Foreign Office still had no objections to the broadcast—unless I was to be given the run-around. It did not take me long to find out.

The "Commissar for God" was polite, but said that he could do nothing for me. The Patriarchate was church property which the state had no right to trespass.

"But the Patriarch, I am sure, would not object."

"What makes you so sure? Have you seen the Most Holy One?"

"No, I have not. But Kolchitsky said that the Patriarch wanted the microphone installed."

Karpov smiled.

"Of course," he said. "You are right. But I am afraid that the technical obstacles are too great."

"It is done night after night for your theatrical performances and music concerts."

"You forget," Karpov replied coldly, "that the theaters and concert halls are state property. So is the radio. But not the

Patriarchate. The best I can do for you is to arrange for Kolchitsky to read the Patriarch's message at the Moscow Radio Center."

There was still the choir to carry the program over, and I said: "The broadcast has been announced and must take place. We'll have to cut somewhat the time devoted to the choir, because Kolchitsky does not know English and I'll have to read a translation of the message."

"There will be no choir. We have no transportation for all the members to and from the studio."

"I'll place my car and chauffeur at their disposal, and I'll get at least two more automobiles from my colleagues."

"That will not help. These people are factory workers and cannot be released from their jobs at the time of the broadcast."

"But it has all been worked out. They said they could do it."

"Their working hours have been changed."

It was no use sparring any more. The matter had been settled on grounds unknown to me, and Karpov had no desire or power to change the decision. It was either Kolchitsky reading the message, or nothing at all. Karpov seemed to want me to give up the idea of the broadcast altogether, but how could I? There had been too many cancellations already. New York agreed with me, and Archpriest Kolchitsky read the Patriarch's message, all the circumstances of the broadcast belying the piety of his words.[3]

To this day I do not know who or what threw a monkey wrench into the arrangements. But I am inclined to believe that the Patriarch had to bow before the will of the Kremlin. By now it was spring of 1945 and the Politburo had already arrived at its momentous decision not to convert wartime co-operation with Russia's Western Allies into postwar co-operation. Neither the free world nor the Soviet people knew it at the time, but the Iron Curtain was already being forged.

A broadcast by the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia was too significant an event, symbolic of the world's oneness, to be allowed to take place, for it ran contrary to the Two World line adopted by the Politburo. Also the role it allotted to the Orthodox Church in the subsequent Cold War ran contrary to the spirit in which the idea of the Patriarch's message was con-

ceived. The installation of the microphone was a minor technical matter but one which provided the Patriarch with a face-saving excuse for breaking a solemn promise, and the Soviet leaders with an opportunity for crucifying the hope for friendship that lay behind the idea of the broadcast.

CHAPTER 7

The National Minorities Front

> Nowhere is there a country with such a diversity of races, of religion or mentality as in Russia. The differences are basic, the uniformity superficial, and unity is only apparent.
>
> NICHOLAS I, 1839

> The survivals of capitalist mores in the people's minds are much stronger and more alive in the field of national questions than in any other field.
>
> *Pravda*, 1951

Great Russian nationalism, merged with and reinforced by the conception of Soviet patriotism, has been mobilized by Stalin to help him win the struggle on the national minorities front. It is one of the most crucial and gigantic fronts of the Cold Civil War, seething and ever active. Now, for the first time in the history of the USSR, the Great Russian race is outnumbered in the empire dominated by its national spirit. Because of the Soviet Union's territorial expansion during and after World War II, the Russians comprise no more than about 46 per cent of the country's total population. Its larger half is composed of more than one hundred so-called minor nationalities. Some of these, notably the Ukrainian, are great nations in their own right, with rich cultures and proud pasts.

The last war demonstrated conclusively that, despite the large number of dissidents in its midst, the Great Russian race was on the whole more faithful to the Soviet state than any other nation of the Soviet Union. This fact presented no surprise to the student of Russia, for it is a matter of historical record that the Russian people have displayed throughout the ages great courage and will in resisting foreign domination while remaining weak and docile in the face of internal tyranny. The Great Russians formed the backbone of resistance to the Germans, although they all suffered at the hands of the brutal enemy. As a nation they identified themselves with the Soviet

state to a degree not approached by any other national unit in the USSR. To the Russians, even the Soviet state whose many features they resented was *their* state, *their* Mother Russia.

The other enemy-overrun peoples of the USSR, however, were solid in their disaffection, with the partial exception of the Byelorussians, who are closer to the Great Russians historically and linguistically than any other Soviet minority nation.

The refusal of the non-Russian peoples to identify their national interests and their future with the Soviet state must have been a particularly bitter pill for Stalin to swallow, and probably cut deeper than any other single wartime wound. Communist policy toward national minorities is the only major Soviet policy of which he has been the chief architect ever since the inception of the Bolshevik state. He was appointed People's Commissar for Nationalities in Lenin's first cabinet, formed on October 26, 1917 (Old Style), while his theoretical preoccupation with national minority problems dates all the way back to the year 1912.

These problems arrested and held his attention for many reasons, not the least of which were personal. The son of a poor Georgian cobbler, he spent his childhood and youth amidst the many nationalities of the Caucasus, where racial strife was encouraged by the tsarist government, on the principle of "divide and rule." To this day he speaks Russian with a marked Georgian accent. He joined the revolutionary movement in the Caucasus, and by 1917 knew more intimately than the other leaders of the Revolution the customs, blood feuds, problems, and aspirations of the 65,000,000 non-Russians in the country's total population (at that time) of 140,000,000.

Together with Lenin, Stalin fathered the Soviet policy that granted limited political autonomy and complete social and cultural equality to the national minorities, but it was he alone who implemented that policy. This fact, incidentally, has paid him off a hundredfold. Since it was he, Stalin, who selected and elevated to positions of authority energetic young men from the Soviet Union's growingly important outlying districts, he commanded the support of these men during the struggle for power that followed Lenin's death.

The Soviet policy toward national minorities amounted to a veritable social, economic, and cultural revolution. The inequalities and discriminations that made old Russia a "prison of nations"

were abolished. Active hostility traced to national or racial bias was persecuted by law, and rapidly diminished. Tolerance and a degree of civilization were brought to most backward areas, with schools, hospitals, factories, and railroads transforming life in a miraculous way. Local resources were developed where they were found, putting an end to the near monopoly of the Great Russians on economic growth.

The most spectacular progress was made in the cultural fields, where the tsarist policies of forcible Russification had been rejected. National cultures and literatures were fostered—a stupendous task in itself, for the Bolsheviks inherited a country with some 175 distinct nations and peoples, including Slavs, Mongols, Jews, Turco-Tartars, and even a racial group related to the American Indian, the Oirots.

Some of them had no written language, no grammar or literature, and the Bolsheviks assigned philologists to work out Latinized alphabets for them. The plan had been to introduce sometime in the future a Latinized alphabet for the entire country. The national costumes, literature, theater, and folklore of all minorities were vigorously encouraged. Later festivals of national art were regularly held in the capitals of the various republics and autonomous districts. The best writers, actors, singers, dancers were sent to Moscow to recite or perform in the resplendent Bolshoi Theater of the Opera and Ballet for Stalin himself.

All this helped to civilize and enrich life in the multinational Soviet state. And most of the credit is due to Stalin. But here all credit ends, for every other change he has brought to the national minorities is a fraud and an illusion.

The Soviet Constitution defines the USSR as "a federal state formed on the basis of the voluntary association of Soviet Socialist Republics having equal rights." The Constitution further guarantees the right of each of the sixteen Union republics freely to secede from the USSR. In theory this means that any time the Ukraine, let us say, or Latvia decides to break away from the Soviet Union it can do so without hindrance and without invoking reprisals. In practice this is an impossibility. When the principles of self-determination and the right to secession were proclaimed following the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, most of the larger minor nationalities of the tsarist empire attempted to establish independent states of their own, and it looked for a

moment as if only Russia proper would remain. But the Communists made hollow mockery of their own Constitution by thwarting the movement for national independence. Stalin took a leading role in this, by virtue of his position in the ruling Communist Party and because he was People's Commissar for Nationalities in the Soviet government.

At the Third All-Russian Congress of the Soviets (January 1918) he put an end to all hopes of independence for the national minorities by making it clear that the Communists were interested in social, not national revolutions. The principal of self-determination, he said, "ought to be understood as the right of self-determination not of the bourgeoisie but of the toiling masses of a given nation. The principle of self-determination ought to be used as a means in the struggle for socialism and it ought to be subordinated to the principles of socialism."[1]

Were Stalin less hypocritical, he would have substituted "centralism" for the word "socialism." Subordination to the principles of centralism is the pivot around which the entire Soviet state revolves. Once this is understood, it becomes clear that all the outward trappings of self-government granted to the component parts of the USSR—i.e., constitutions, legislatures, cabinets, courts, etc.—are but illusions, a façade behind which the central government in Moscow holds all Soviet areas in an implacable grip.

In his own humorless way Stalin pays lip service to the principle of voluntary association of free nations and their right to self-determination. When a proposal was made in 1936 that all autonomous Soviet republics be raised to the status of Union republics upon meeting certain standards of economic and cultural development, he said *nyet*. And the very first reason, which he gave without a flicker of a smile, was as follows: "The republic concerned must be a border republic, not surrounded on all sides by USSR territory. Why? Because, since the Union republics have a right to secede from the USSR, a republic, on becoming a Union republic, must be in a position logically and actually to raise the question of secession from the USSR. And this question can be raised only by a republic which, say, borders on some foreign state, and consequently is not surrounded on all sides by USSR territory. Of course, none of our republics would actually raise the question of seceding from the USSR."[2]

The reasons for Stalin's confidence on this point are not far to seek. The central government seated in Moscow can overrule the decisions of local authorities on any question, and possesses the means to enforce its decision. But making use of these means would be a last resort, for it would reveal the Stalinist Constitution for what it really is—just a scrap of paper. Stalin's confidence stems from the fact that all political control and initiative in the entire country are vested in the Communist Party. No vital decision, and particularly one as far-reaching as secession, is thinkable without its participation. The Communist Party, however, is organized, unlike the government, on an all-Union scale, cutting across geographical and racial boundaries. The Communist Party within each republic is but a part of the All-Union Party, subservient to its Central Committee officially as well as in fact.

Since the local government organs are dominated by the local Party organization, no vital decision such as secession can be adopted by it. But not even the protection of this ironclad arrangement has lulled the Kremlin into taking chances with its troubled and resentful national minorities, and it has been indefatigably consolidating its sources of real power.

First of all, the Kremlin has been making sure of the local Communist parties, which, by the Kremlin's own admission, have been infiltrated by "elements contaminated with nationalistic ideas." Neither the Great Purge nor the periodic purges thereafter seem to have helped much. They have served only to populate Siberia's numerous concentration camps with millions of non-Russians seething with resentments, which has tended to weaken rather than strengthen this citadel of national defense.

Great Russians have been moved steadily into the national republics, most of which border on non-Soviet states and are therefore strategically of crucial importance. The membership of the local Communist parties, which, it must be emphasized again and again, are the source of power and initiative, has been so manipulated that the native population is never in the majority. This is a most extraordinary precaution, revealing the full extent of the tensions. The Kremlin is distrustful even of non-Russian Communists, although strict adherence to Party discipline is the first law for all its members. As a result of this precautionary measure, Byelorussians comprise only 45 per cent of the Com-

munist Party in their republic; similarly in Uzbekistan, Central Asia; in the neighboring Kazakhstan, the Kazakhs make up only 28 per cent of the membership; in the Tartar Republic on the Volga, about one third; much less in the Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia.

Another powerful source of control is the strangle hold of the central authorities over the economy of the national republics. All their major industrial enterprises and the exploitation of all their vital natural resources are managed by organizations set up by and directly responsible to Moscow, which has granted them complete independence of local authorities. This has led to jealousies and grievances so grave that they occasionally have to be aired in the press. In such cases the Kremlin assumes the role of a wise and just father who admonishes his scrapping children, and sometimes even punishes its too zealous representatives, who have transgressed the right of local authorities. But the Kremlin never yields on the principle of central control. And to this day the water and coal resources of the Ukraine, the oil wells of Baku, the manganese ore of Georgia, the "white gold" (cotton) and the life-giving waters of Central Aisa are all managed, developed, and exploited under the control of central agencies run by Moscow.

Discrimination in local administration, industry, and education, as revealed by the Soviet press itself,[3] has led to a situation where most managerial and white collar positions, as well as most of the jobs requiring industrial skill, are occupied by Russians. If there are not enough local Russians to fill all the jobs they are brought in.

This brings us to one of the most outstanding phenomena in Soviet postwar policy toward national minorities: Russification. Some of its aspects are strikingly and shockingly reminiscent of Russification methods employed by the tsars. The most direct device Stalin inherited from them is colonization.

The settling of people of Russian origin in non-Russian sections of the country never completely disappeared after the Revolution, although until recently it was not a planned undertaking. Thus Red Army soldiers of Russian origin have been scattered all over the country in various garrisons and training centers. Many of them have intermarried and, upon discharge from the armed forces, settled in national minority areas, dis-

seminating Russian culture, language, and ways. Likewise unplanned as a colonization project was the deportation to these areas of Russian *kulaks* and the victims of the Great Purge. The agents of Russification were not so much the condemned men (for they were as a rule confined to concentration camps and were not allowed to have contact with the local population) as their families, which were uprooted from their homes and ordered to settle in faraway areas of the USSR.

The wartime evacuation was another landmark of unplanned colonization. There was the chaotic, spontaneous flight of untold multitudes from enemy-threatened regions, primarily to Central Asia, and there was the awe-inspiring removal of 1300 plants and factories from the Ukraine and Russia proper to the Urals, Siberia, and Central Asia, embracing millions of workers and their families. After the war the government followed a policy of discouraging the return of the evacuees. In the case of factory workers and their families, the authorities insisted that they remain with the many plants not earmarked for return to their original sites. In addition, Russian managers, engineers, bookkeepers, factory foremen are constantly being sent to the border republics to develop new industries.

The reasons for this migration of Great Russians go beyond purely economic expediency. There is no doubt that wartime defections among minor nationalities moved the Kremlin to adopt a policy of colonization and Russification that surpasses the wildest dreams of the tsars. This involves the forced migration of peoples on a scale not imagined even by Hitler.

As already described in an earlier chapter, six autonomous national republics and districts were completely wiped out of existence, their entire population removed under guard, and their lands and homes resettled by Russians. The Bolsheviks, incidentally, had experience with such forced migration, although on a much smaller scale, during the early years of the Soviet regime. Between 1921 and 1923, for instance, the four hundred thousand Ingrians, of Scandinavian stock and culture, who inhabited Ingermanland (the area on which Peter the Great built St. Petersburg), were uprooted lock, stock, and barrel to make possible the Russification of the area around Leningrad. And, to take another example, tens of thousands of Don and Kuban Cossacks and their families were deported in two waves—the first

comprised of those who fought the Bolshevik Revolution; the second of those who opposed collectivization. Their rich lands were resettled by poor and docile peasants from central Russia.

With the end of hostilities, the process of uprooting has been applied to practically all border areas, ostensibly as a precautionary security measure. The indigenous population is not as a rule forced to migrate, but the non-Russian national minorities within that population are removed by force. All persons of Greek, Turkish, Iranian, Jewish, and Armenian extraction living along the Black Sea coast in Stalin's own Georgia, as well as in the entire Caucasus and Crimea, have been evacuated, except for the native population of the Armenian Union Republic. Practically all the Jews have been cleared out of the Ukraine and Byelorussia in several waves of mass deportations. Their homes have been occupied not by Byelorussians or Ukrainians but by Great Russians. Likewise the homes of the Germans who lived in the northern section of East Prussia that is now annexed to the Soviet Union have been given over to settlers from Russia. It is significant that this section was added to the RSFSR (Russia proper), the nearest point of which lies some three hundred miles away, and not to the Lithuanian Union Republic, which borders on East Prussia. This is a striking deviation from the Soviet practice of having each of the sixteen Union republics occupy contiguous territory.

The deviation would probably not have taken place were not Lithuania, along with the two other strategically located Baltic States, such a danger spot in the Cold Civil War. The conflict, in fact, rages there with such intensity as to make the Baltic countries a real battlefield. The suppression of their resistance to sovietization has been written in blood. It is one of the cruelest chapters in the history of the USSR. The word for it is genocide.

Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia are tiny countries on the Baltic coast, inhabited by non-Slavic peoples with a long and proud history. Conquered and annexed by Peter the Great in his quest of a sea outlet for Russia, the Balts regained their independence in 1918, following the collapse of the Russian Empire and the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. They led a comparatively prosperous and free existence between 1918 and 1939, the year of the Hitler-Stalin Pact. That year also marked the beginning

of the ordeal of the Baltic States, the end of which is not yet in sight.

Between September 29 and October 10 the USSR regained the naval bases of these three countries, which Russia had possessed in 1914, by the simple expedient of presenting each of them with an ultimatum. Hitler obligingly transferred the German population of Latvia, Lithuania, and Esthonia to the Polish Corridor near Danzig, following which the Red Army occupied the three Baltic countries, which were then incorporated into the Soviet Union.

All in all, Stalin violated thirty-two treaties, pacts, and agreements which he had solemnly signed when Latvia, Lithuania, and Esthonia were soverign states.

There is no denying the cold logic in the Soviet argument that the USSR needed the Baltic States to prepare for the inevitable war with Hitler Germany, but the subsequent twelve months, which will forever remain engraved in the memory of the Baltic nations as the Year of Terror, belied that logic. Pursuing a policy of forcible sovietization, Moscow resorted to purges, arrests, and deportations, creating unbearable tensions and hatreds. When the Nazis struck at Russia, most of the Latvians, Lithuanians, and Esthonians drafted by the Red Army turned their guns against it. With the retreat of the Soviet armed forces, the Latvians and Lithuanians set up their own provisional governments, but the Germans suppressed them. Esthonians formed partisan bands and harassed the retreating Red Army until the Reichswehr caught up with them and they had to disperse. Unwilling to fight side by side with the Nazis, thousands of able-bodied Esthonians fled to Finland, where they continued their death struggle with the Russians.

The years of German occupation were also years of terror. As the war was coming to an end, about five hundred thousand Balts, half of them Latvians, found their way to the Allied countries, and subsequently settled in the United States, Sweden, and other Western democratic countries.

The Red Army returned to the Baltic States during the summer and fall of 1944, and the Soviet authorities returned to their project of depopulating Lithuania, Latvia, and Esthonia. It is estimated that during that one Year of Terror the Russians de-

ported to Siberia a total of 137,000 Balts, while the Germans killed or sent to Germany for slave labor about 575,000, in addition to destroying practically the entire Jewish population in the three countries. In Lithuania alone, some 200,000 out of 240,000 Jews were murdered, as were almost all of Latvia's 88,000 Jews.[4]

The Soviet "liberation" of the Baltic States has brought the number of killed or exiled since 1939 to a total of two and a half million out of a population of six million. In 1949 this stark fact moved the British delegate to the United Nations to accuse the Soviet Union of "genocidal terror."[5]

The population of the Baltic States has been one of resisting to the point of guerrilla warfare. According to information received by Mr. Kalme from underground sources, there were at one time some twenty thousand active partisans in the Baltic States. In Lithuania a quarter of a million Red Army men were hunting down guerrillas at the height of the campaign. The partisans are excellent soldiers, hardened and well armed, and they fight to the death, but their numbers are dwindling, owing to heavy losses, betrayals by quislings, mass deportations of "untrustworthy" elements, and the collectivization of agriculture. Under the watchful eye of *kolkhoz* officials, the peasants are unable to supply the partisans with food and forage. And yet, as late as November 1949, the Communist paper, *Soviet Lithuania,* complained of "bourgeois nationalist bands" roaming the countryside, "killing peasants who collaborated in collectivization, burning homes and warehouses filled with farm products, destroying cattle and wrecking farm equipment."[6]

The Soviet answer to the stubborn Balts has been a harsh military rule, deportations, sovietization, and colonization. Deportations have been incessant, usually undertaken on some transparent pretext. Tens of thousands of young Balts have been rounded up, ostensibly for service in the Red Army, and then shipped to concentration camps in the Arctic region. Under the pretext that no fish were left in the Baltic, the Russians resettled most of the fishermen in lake regions deep in the Eurasian heartland. Less hypocritically, the Communists have cleared the port cities of their non-Russian residents for security reasons.

Despite the tragic loss of life and the deportations ever since 1939, the population statistics of the Baltic countries have re-

mained basically unchanged. The true explanation is Russian colonization. In the case of Esthonia, as a matter of fact, a substantial growth of population has been recorded: two million instead of the prewar million and a half residents. Apparently a steady stream of new settlers keeps coming from the war-ravaged areas of Russia and Byelorussia. Many of them are volunteers in search of better living conditions, primarily housing. Others are drafted by the Soviet government. Edmund Stevens, the former *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent in Moscow, who knows the Baltics as few foreigners do, and who revisited Riga in 1948, reported that its population had reached its prewar mark of four hundred thousand, but that four fifths of the inhabitants were Slavs. Once the glamorous capital of Latvia, the "Paris of the North," Riga looked poor and shabby like any provincial Russian city. Its gay, well-dressed crowds were gone, along with its fashionable shops and attractive cafés and restaurants.

"I have seen many wasted cities," wrote Stevens, "but none, even those razed to the ground, produced such a feeling of final and irrevocable ruin as Riga, where actual damage, save in the old town near the waterfront, was small. What had been destroyed in Riga was not the buildings, which are replaceable, but the soul of the city, its character, atmosphere and personality."[7]

Confirming Stevens' report, Albert Kalme wrote: "What most strikes the eye in Riga is the incredibly small number of Latvians, particularly the intelligentsia, living there. The town itself is grown shabby. The Latvians have forgotten how to smile. There are strangers everywhere, in uniform or in civilian clothes, and one hears only Russian spoken."[8]

A major method of accomplishing the sovietization of the territories newly acquired by the USSR is the collectivization of agriculture. Most of these new territories lie to the west of Russia, where the individual farmer has been for centuries the backbone of national life. Because of this, collectivization has been more than an economic measure and an agricultural reform. It is a veritable revolution which, if it remains in effect for a lengthy period, will herald the victory of the dictatorial state over the individual and his freedom. This is why the Kremlin has been pushing collectivization in all territories under its control, including the satellite countries, ignoring the considerable

losses in production sustained in the initial stages.[9] They are thought to be only temporary setbacks.

The collectivization figures for the Baltic States are indicative of the tempo in all other areas annexed by the USSR. On February 28, 1950, *Pravda* reported that the collectivization of peasant farms in Latvia "was basically completed. More than four thousand kolkhozes have been created." A similar process has gone on in Lithuania, which has seen the formation of fifty-five hundred collective farms. No figures have been released for Esthonia, but its Communist Party chief reported in the spring of 1951 that "the collectivization of peasant holdings has been largely completed."[10]

During 1951 the number of collective farms in the Baltic States was reduced by some 50 per cent through the process of amalgamation that swept the Soviet countryside (see Chapter 9).

Another major instrument of sovietization is Communist propaganda, using all modern techniques, controlled and directed by the Central Committee in Moscow, although officially each area has its own paraphernalia for cultural autonomy. In the schools it is obligatory for all teachers to infuse in the children atheism, Soviet patriotism, and devotion to the all-wise Father, Teacher, Leader, and Genius, Joseph Stalin.

As in the original Soviet republics, there is an intense preoccupation with the Russian language and literature, to which more and more school hours are being devoted. In part, this meets the needs of the ever growing number of Russians in the republics of minor nationalities. Even more important, it is in part a deliberate Kremlin policy of Russification, of dissemination of the Russian language and culture among all the peoples of the USSR. Cultural and linguistic assimilation tends to strengthen centralized control. Through it the Soviet leaders hope to rechannel native nationalism, particularly among the intelligentsia, into Soviet patriotism that has been firmly wedded to Great Russian nationalism.

By fighting native nationalism, Stalin has sought to undo the "damage" caused in the original Union republics by the early enlightened Soviet policies toward national minorities, and to prevent similar trouble from arising in the newly acquired territories. What was that "damage"? The industrialization of the backward areas, and the spread of literacy and culture there,

produced results not unlike those which the development of capitalism created in, let us say, the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. It gave rise to a native intelligentsia imbued with the "national idea." The teachers, writers, journalists, doctors, agronomists, and other members of the native intelligentsia in Soviet minority republics became imbued with a new pride in their own national culture, which they were now helping to uncover and develop. And they were imbued with a new pride in their own past, which they were resurrecting. Since all of those nations had suffered for generations under the tyranny of the tsars, the quality of their nationalism was quite anti-Russian, and it was eloquently reflected in their literature and history texts. The anti-Russianism was further reinforced by the recollection of the strong historical and ethnic ties many of these minorities had with nations outside the tsarist, and later Soviet, realms.

In the meantime, the years immediately preceding World War II and the years of hostilities had brought about the already described resurgence of Great Russian nationalism. And in Stalin, the Georgian, these years brought to a climax his paradoxical but powerful lifelong campaign for Russianism, which had caused a number of Bolshevik leaders in his own birthland to accuse him of "Great Russian chauvinism" as early as 1921 when he was People's Commissar for Nationalities.[11] Lenin, a Russian by race, but politically an internationalist to the marrow of his bones, had cautioned his followers time and again that "the Great Russian chauvinist dwells in many of us, and we have to fight him."[12] He detected the tendency in Stalin and scathingly remarked after the latter's difficulties in Georgia (where he acted with the support of Sergo Ordzhonikidze, a Georgian, and the head of the secret police, Felix Dzherzhinsky, a Pole): "A Russified non-Russian always shoots beyond the mark in his true-Russian moods."[13]

Stalin claims to be Lenin's truest disciple but he has persisted in his "Russian moods," which fit in so well with his even stronger tendencies toward centralized authority. He held his "moods" in check with characteristic shrewdness all through the long struggle for power with his rival, the brilliant internationalist Trotsky, because the generation that was to decide between the two of them had been inculcated with the spirit of internationalism. But no sooner did he become entrenched than he sub-

ordinated the interests of the world Communist movement to the national interests of his land. He did that under the slogan of socialism in one country. Not that he ceased to believe, or at least to profess faith, in the ideals of world Communism. He blended them with the idea of the messianic mission of the Russian people. Above all, he used both the ideals and the idea to bolster up his own power.

Whether accidentally or not, he discovered, at about the same time as the Nazis and the Italian Fascists, that the idea of nationalism has a far greater hold on the popular imagination than does Communism, and he learned to appeal in time of strain and stress to the nationalist sentiments lingering in the hearts of the Russians.

This appeal rang loud and clear in his February 1931 speech to industrial managers during the unbearable strains of the first Five-Year Plan. Stalin lashed out against those who sought to slow down Russia's industrialization because of the great sacrifices it entailed and because of the almost unsurmountable difficulties. Not only must the pace not be slackened, he said, but it had to be quickened to the very limit of endurance. "This is dictated to us by our obligations to the workers and peasants of the USSR. This is dictated by our obligations to the working class of the whole world."

Having thus paid lip service to internationalism, Stalin proceeded with an eloquent and emotional appeal on behalf of Russia: "Russia was ceaselessly beaten for her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. They all beat her—for her backwardness: for military backwardness, for cultural backwardness, for political backwardness, for industrial backwardness, for agricultural backwardness. She was beaten because to do so was profitable and could be done with impunity. Do you remember the words of the prerevolutionary poet: 'You are poor and abundant, mighty and impotent, Mother Russia'?

". . . We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or they crush us."[14]

Ten years later, almost to the day, the Nazis struck and were themselves crushed. Stalin's appeal to nationalism plus the ruthlessness of his drive for industrialization paid off a hundredfold. All through the war he kept the clarion call of Russian nationalism resounding throughout the country, reaching the highest note on May 24, 1945, when he proposed in the Kremlin a toast to the victorious Russian people: "I drink in the first place to the health of the Russian people because they are the most important nation of nations forming the Soviet Union. . . . They are the leading force in the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our country."

This was a momentous declaration, for with it Stalin unleashed the offensive of the Cold Civil War on the national minorities front. The front is as vast as the Soviet Union itself, and the action on its many battlefields rages to this day. There is the battle of separatist tendencies versus centralization; of local nationalism versus Soviet patriotism; of "ideological deviations" versus Stalinism; of the Russian versus the foreign and native tongues. Then there is the battle that merges with the religious front. As a matter of fact most of the battlefields mentioned invade one another's territory, so that it is sometimes difficult to tell where one ends and the other begins. But they all point to one thing—Stalin's failure to solve the minority problem, and the ensuing unrest, tension, and witch hunts. This has brought on a wave of escapism and gloom among the writers and poets of the national minorities, and the Kremlin's efforts to stem the wave have created a pathetic battlefield all its own. Men of letters are castigated for failure to sing the "glorious deeds of today" and for escaping, instead, into the unreal world of fantasy or of the past with its fairy-tale knights and beautiful maidens. At a time when the Soviet Union is "triumphantly marching toward Communism," the poets sing songs as plaintive as a weeping willow and as melancholy as the autumn rain. Worst of all, they sing of their native countries—the Ukraine, Byelorussia, Moldavia, Uzbekistan, and the others—rejoicing in their mountains, rivers, meadows, and their lovely girls, but not (as *Pravda* bemoaned in its editorial of September 7, 1951) in their heroic working class, industrial might, and *kolkhoz* prosperity.

In this campaign the Ukrainian men of letters have been singled out as the objects of most concentrated assault. The rich-

est, most populous and advanced of all Soviet minorities, with a culture and literature more ancient than the Russian, the Ukraine has always been a source of trouble to the Kremlin because of its people's undying dream of setting up a sovereign state of their own. In 1944 one of the leading Ukrainian poets, Vladimir Sosyura, wrote a lyrical hymn to his native land, *Love the Ukraine.* That was still a year of hostilities, and the sentiments of the Ukrainians had to be respected. The poem was printed and reprinted by the Soviet State Publishing House of the Union republic, and was accorded highest official tribute—the much-coveted Stalin Prize. Fatally misjudging the changing signs of the times, the Leningrad literary monthly, *Zvezda* (*Star*), published a Russian translation of *Love the Ukraine* in its May 1951 issue. Then all hell broke loose, on the poem, the poet, the translator, the editors of *Zvezda,* and on Ukrainian literature in general, which was branded as "vice-ridden," nationalistic, heretical, ideologically perversive, escapist.

Then the attack spread to the men of letters of various other Soviet national republics, finding them guilty of similar vice-ridden tendencies.

Love the Ukraine is so revealing a poem and illustrates the nature of the "vices" so eloquently that I am quoting it in full:

Love Ukraine like unto sun-shining,
Like wind and like grasses and waters,
Like hours so happy, in moments rejoicing
And even keep love in misfortune.

Love Ukraine in dream and awakening
Thy cherry-blossom Ukraine!
Ever-living and new in her beauty
And speech as of nightingale singing.

She resembles a leafy orchard
And, like one, she shines over the ages
Among fraternal nations.
Love Ukraine with all your heart
And with all your deeds.

For us she is the one in the world,
One in the expanse of her sweet charm.

She dwells in the stars and the willows,
She lives in each heart-beat,
In flowers, in birds, in electric fire,
In every song, in every thought,
In the smile of a child, in a maiden's eyes,
In the crimson shimmering of battle-banners.

As in the Burning Bush, never extinguished,
She lives in lone paths and in woodland,
In the blare of factory whistles
And in the billows of the Dnieper.
And in those purple clouds.

She lives in the cannon's blasts, in dust dispersing
The foreigners in green uniforms,—like dust!
She lives in the bayonets which in the darkness
Hacked out for us a Road to springs bright and evident.

O youth! Let thy laughter belong to her,
Thy laughter and tears, and all things whatsoever
Unto the bitter end.
Thou mayest not love other nations
If thou lovest not the Ukraine.

O Girlhood! As thou lovest her blue sky,
Love Her in every moment.
Thy beloved would not love thee
If thou lovest not thy Ukraine.

Love Her in toil, courtship and battle;
Love Her like the Song which glides
With the Morning Star . . .
Love Ukraine with all thy heart,
And we will forever be with her!"[15]

The Ukrainian poet was careful to mention "fraternal nations" and "crimson banners." The Russian translator, the famous Leningrad poet, Alexander Prokofiev, added on his own initiative "the Soviet fatherland," "the stars of the Kremlin," and even the river Volga so symbolic of Mother Russia, but to no avail. A *Pravda*

editorial of July 1, 1951, roared its "disappointment and protest" over the poet's failure to sing the theme of love for socialism and Soviet fatherland. Instead he had produced a nationalistic poem in praise of a timeless Ukraine bearing no relation to the other nationalities of the USSR. This, *Pravda* insisted, was symptomatic of nationalism, whose "essence consists in the aspiration to isolate and lock oneself in one's own national shell." Then followed an admission which underscored the significance of the national minorities front in the Cold Civil War raging inside Stalin's Russia:

"The survivals of capitalist mores in the people's minds are *much stronger and more alive in the field of national questions than in any other field* [italics supplied]."

Following *Pravda's* lead, the *Literary Gazette, Izvestia,* and other Soviet publications widened the front of the attack to include intellectuals of practically every significant minority group. The charges run the whole gamut from indulgence in separatist tendencies to idealization of national heroes who fought tsarist Russia's domination; to failure even to struggle against "bourgeois nationalism"; to "groveling before the West"; to escapism and gloom.

The poet Sosyura and everyone else connected with the publication of his poem were trapped by the avalanche of criticism, and publicly recanted, promising never to sin again.

When poets imitate Stalin in singing hymns to Russia, no apologies are demanded of them. If anything, they are reproached for not being ardent and nationalistic enough, for being too "cosmopolitan."

Just as the Russian nation itself was officially declared the most important nation in the USSR, so also was the Russian language and culture given top position. Not content with having made the Russian language a compulsory subject in all non-Russian republics and regions, the authorities have ordered that alphabets based on the "archaic" Latin must be replaced by the Cyrillic characters of the Russian language. Even Outer Mongolia, which is officially a sovereign state, has reformed its alphabet accordingly. Furthermore, pressure has been exerted to orient the future growth and development of the languages of all Soviet nationalities toward the Russian tongue, no matter how alien its spirit might be.

That this is not merely a matter of hairsplitting in the narrow, academic field of philology, but a thesis with far-reaching political overtones, may be gathered from the way it is being elaborated by the Soviet press:

"It has been characteristic of bourgeois nationalists to attempt to orient the development of languages of the peoples of the USSR not upon Russian but foreign languages. Thus, the nationalists of the eastern republics were oriented toward Persian, Turkic and Arabic languages, etc. They sought in this manner to estrange the languages of the peoples of the USSR from the Russian language and from Soviet culture, and to strengthen the influence of foreign bourgeois culture. Bourgeois culture is closely linked with bourgeois cosmopolitanism. It is deeply hostile to the genuine interests of all peoples of our country."[16]

The rule that Russians living and working in a given national minority republic must learn its language is being increasingly ignored. Instead, the local population must learn Russian, which by now has become the second mother language of the younger generation and the common means of communication among the peoples of the USSR, their interracial language. Similarly, Russian has also become the intersatellite language. When Bolsheviks speak of the forthcoming era of universal Communism, and nations, in the words of Stalin, "become convinced through practical experience of the advantages of a common language over national languages,"[17] they do not leave the choice of that language to chance. Stalin modestly refrains from naming the language (and he carefully qualifies his statement), but the Soviet press does not: "The future belongs to the Russian language as the language of Socialism. . . . The democratic peoples are learning the Russian language, the world language of internationalism."[18]

The Russification of the national minority groups and the glorification of the Russian people have wrought radical changes in the writing and teaching of history in the USSR, particularly the history of the former tsarist colonies. Old Russia is no longer referred to by the Communists as the "prison of nations." The tsarist annexations and the plunder and oppression that followed are now presented as a small cloud with a supercolossal silver lining of contact and integration with the superior Russian culture. The relationship between the smaller nations and Russia is depicted as a younger-older brother relationship that has profoundly

and happily affected the economic, cultural, and political development of the backward peoples.

The campaign rhapsodizing the big-brotherliness of the Russians is particularly active among the Asian peoples of the USSR, seeking to isolate them from their spiritual and blood brothers of the Islamic world. History textbooks are being rewritten so as to present the story of the Moslem people of Soviet Central Asia and the Caucasus as a struggle, hand in hand with the Russians, against the predatory interests of reactionary Turkey and imperialist Britain, against Pan-Islamism and other "counterrevolutionary" tendencies. Books that had been hailed as masterpieces are being withdrawn, and their authors severely reprimanded, in some cases purged. Histories that had been honored with the Stalin Prize have been disgraced by a public announcement that the award was withdrawn. A typical example is provided by *From the History of Social and Philosophical Thought in Azerbaidzhan in the XIX Century* by Geidar Guseinov. This Caucasian historian was hauled over the coals for having presented the struggles of the Caucasian mountaineers led by the legendary Shamil against the tsarist armies as "progressive, democratic movements of national liberation." On the contrary, according to the current Pan-Russian line in the field of history, "muridism actually oriented itself toward Turkey and Britain, and aimed at making the mountaineers' movement headed by Shamil subservient to the predatory interests of Turkey and Britain." Therefore, "Guseinov's idealisation of muridism is in essence a reflection of bourgeois-nationalist deviation and should be strongly condemned."[19]

Similarly a two-volume history of Kazakhstan was found deficient and was hastily rewritten so as not to show Russia's annexation of Kazakhstan as "an absolute evil."

And thus all the way down the line.

The reasons for the Kremlin preoccupation with the Moslems are self-evident. There are about twenty-three million of them in the Soviet Union, populating strategically important territories —Russia's real soft underbelly—in proximity to Mohammedan countries outside the Soviet orbit. These territories, moreover, enjoy a monopoly over practically the entire oil and cotton production in the USSR. Last but not least, the twenty-three million Moslems of the Soviet Union constitute the second largest re-

ligious group in the land, and the world's third largest concentration of Mohammedans.

The Kremlin's wartime concessions, designed to keep the fabric of Soviet society from falling apart, included permission to build ten new mosques and repair old houses of worship; to create four regional boards as a step toward the unification of all Moslem religious bodies; to resume pilgrimages to Mecca, a privilege that had been denied for eighteen years; and permission to print the Koran and the Mohammedan code of laws, called the Sharia. The latter guides the criminal courts, governs the mode of life of the faithful, and regulates marriage, divorce, and inheritance.

The case of the Sharia is truly a case of resurrection. On November 13, 1920, Stalin declared that "the Soviet government considers the Sharia the same kind of authoritative customary law as that of other peoples inhabiting the USSR." But this authoritative law was ruthlessly suppressed in the thirties. The *Soviet Political Dictionary,* published in 1940, described the Sharia as "a means for keeping the workers in economic and political subordination by the rich. It legalizes domination, exploitation and slavery of the workers, the enslavement of women and polygamy. . . . The Sharia is still applied among the Moslems in capitalist and colonial countries. In the USSR, the Sharia is eradicated."

Its resurrection and the other concessions would tend to decrease, the Kremlin hoped, the disaffection among Moslem soldiers in the Red Army and among the Moslem population in enemy-occupied areas, as well as increase the production effort in the Mohammedan republics which were safe from invasion.

The Soviet leaders were due for a disappointment, as already described, and the punishment was swift and ruthless. In addition to liquidating several Moslem autonomous republics and regions, the Kremlin evacuated all members of Turkish groups living on the Black Sea coast, in the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and other Soviet areas. Moscow also ordered the evacuation of similar groups from the satellite countries of Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria. The latter was the most merciful, for it dumped its 250,000 citizens of Turkish descent on Turkey, instead of dooming them to certain extinction in the depths of Siberia.

The Iron Curtain fell between Soviet Moslems and Moslems in the rest of the world. The pilgrimages to Mecca were discon-

tinued in 1947. No Soviet citizens were allowed to attend the Karachi World Moslem Conference in 1948.

But the Kremlin does not consider a physical Iron Curtain alone sufficient to disrupt the spirit of Islamic fraternity which transcends political, racial, and geographic boundaries, or to throttle the nationalism of the Moslem peoples of the USSR. The Moslem clergy of Turkey and Iran have been declared hirelings "now serving the interests of American imperialists who are preparing a new war."[20] Inside the USSR, Islamism, like all other religions, is being attacked once more as opium of the people. When I visited Tashkent in the summer of 1944, local officials boasted to me with self-conscious pride that there was not a single anti-religious museum in that capital of Uzbekistan. Five years later, however, a large museum for anti-religious propaganda was opened amid great fanfare.

The condemnation of Islam resounds once again throughout the Soviet Moslem world. Typical is a statement by the Party boss of Azerbaidzhan, Mir Dzhafar Bagirov, who, like Beria, climbed to political power via the secret police:

"As is known, Islam originated in Arabia in the Seventh Century. Its founder was Mohammed—a representative of the feudal-mercantile aristocracy, which utilized Islam for the unification of the Arab tribes and for the maintenance of its own power.

"Just as every other religion, Islam, being a tool in the hands of the exploiting classes, demands from the faithful absolute submission to their lot, to their fate, to their oppressors."[21]

The campaign against Islamism is carefully restricted to the level of propaganda. The organs of suppression are held in check and at a respectful distance. One never knows. Like the Russian Orthodox Church, Islam might still, somehow, sometime, help the Kremlin extend its influence into the restless countries of the Near and Middle East. Because of this, the Soviet Moslems have fared better than the Jews of the USSR, for the only Jewish state in existence, Israel, has been given up by the Kremlin as "a tool and lackey of Anglo-American imperialism."

CHAPTER 8

The Anti-Semitic Front

> Equality of rights of citizens of USSR, irrespective of their nationality or race, in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social and political life, is an indefeasible law.
>
> And direct or indirect restriction of the rights of, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial or national exclusiveness or hatred or contempt, is punishable by law.
>
> Article 123 of the Constitution of the USSR

Early in the summer of 1947, I was taking a sun bath at the solarium in Moscow's Sokolniki Park. It was in the middle of the week and there were very few sun enthusiasts in the men's section, but the chatter in the solarium for women, separated from us by a tall wooden fence, was loud and incessant.

Among my several companions were three actors, a writer or two, and a handful of professional athletes. The men rarely spoke to me or to each other, lying in the sun with their eyes closed, daydreaming, thinking, or running away from thoughts.

The tall, skinny man lying nearest to me that morning was a newcomer. Everyone looked up at him as he came in, watched him undress for a moment or two, and then, one by one, closed their eyes, indifferent and silent. But I kept looking at the man, for there was something familiar about him, familiar and vague, as if I had known him in a dream. He, too, looked at me more intently than at any of the other sun bathers, and chose a place a few feet away from me.

"We have met before," he said in a low voice. "You are the American interested in folklore. Do you remember the Jewish legend about Lenin I once gave you?"

Of course I did. It all came back to me: the meeting of the Folklore Section of the Writers' Union in 1936; the secretary of the Union and later Politburo member, Alexander Shcherbakov; the dean of Soviet folklorists, the late Yuri Matveyevich Sokolov,

who had befriended me in my work of gathering fairy tales and legends of the Russian Revolution.[1]

After the meeting Sokolov had introduced me to a number of Soviet folklorists, among them Benjamin Meltzer, as I shall call him here. He had just returned from the Caucasus, where he had recorded folk songs and legends among the strange, fascinating tribe of mountain Jews called Tahts, who had clung to their national identity all through the long years of Moslem and, later, tsarist persecution.[2]

Meltzer had given me a copy of a Taht legend about Lenin, which I quote here because it reflected the happiness of the tribe at being liberated by the Revolution from racial oppression and because, more significantly, it voiced the joy and hopes of most of Russia's Jewry. The legend illustrates the naïve and poetic blending, characteristic in all early Soviet folklore, of traditional mythological images and symbols with those of the new life under the Soviets. The title of the legend is "Lenin and Ashmedai" (Ashmedai is the Hebrew word for Satan).

"When man, made of dust, emerged on earth, there also came forth the invisible, mighty and evil spirit, the Ashmedai, friend of the rich and vile enemy of the poor. He caused them grief and misery, delivering them into the hands of the oppressors.

"Countless hordes of evil spirits, the *shegadoo,* bore obedience to Ashmedai, and harassed the poor and tormented them. There was no needy man but bemoaned his lot, no woman but sobbed her anguish, no child but cried over the misery of his kin.

"And the mountains and the steppes complained to the sun, complained to the stars about Ashmedai, about the tyranny of his servants, the *shegadoo,* and the avarice of the rich. The trees and the grasses abandoned their nightly festivals, stifled their songs and let their dances die away. And they pleaded with the sun and the stars to come to the aid of the people.

"And the sun and the stars, beholding the grief of man, broke off parts of their flaming bodies and created out of them a mighty and fiery avenger. To cool the scorching heat of his fire, they sent him on a dark night to a cold land in the far north, where snow gleams white all year round as on Mt. Elbrus [the highest mountain in the Caucasus]. They named him Lenin and bade him avenge every drop of blood shed by the poor.

"The earth sighed in relief and the trees danced their joy. Birds passed on to each other the happy tidings of the mighty giant who was come to avenge the poor. Ashmedai overheard their glee and forthwith brought it to the ears of the rich. They called a council and charged the accursed one with the task of doing away with Lenin. They said:

" 'You have helped us to rule the world. Along with us, you have drunk the blood of the poor, and feasted on their misery. Help us slay Lenin and we shall reward you.'

"Ashmedai summoned his aid, Ser-Ovi, the spirit of waters, and ordered him to drown Lenin. Disguised as a maiden, Ser-Ovi flew northward one bright night to destroy Lenin. But the accursed spirit of waters nearly froze to death along the way and turned back without even reaching Lenin's city.

"In his wrath, Ashmedai himself took off for the coldest city in the north where Lenin made his home, and from where he sent out disciples to liberate cities and villages from the tyranny of the rich. Ashmedai came to the city and heard Lenin speak about happiness and freedom to the poor, and such a light flamed forth from Lenin's words that terror overcame Ashmedai, and he flew back in impotent rage.

"And he told the rich of Lenin's men who were coming to wage war against them, and they groaned in horror, foreseeing their doom. And again they called a council and commanded that the hearts of the true believers be filled with hatred against the Tahts, the Mountain Jews of Daghestan.

"Lured by gold and deceived by the rich, the people of Daghestan shed the innocent blood of the Tahts, but mountain eagles winged their way to the north and told Lenin of the merciless cruelty of the rich. And Lenin mounted an eagle and flew to Daghestan. Disguised as a poor man, he rallied all the injured and all the oppressed against the tyrants. And he tore off a part of his fiery body and lit the flame of war against the rich, and then flew back to his cold land in the north, to write books of truth for the people.

"And the followers of Lenin brought freedom to many lands of the world. Ashmedai saw that it was beyond his power to defeat Lenin, and he fled to the countries not yet freed by him. But the day is near when Lenin will forever vanquish Ashmedai."[3]

Far from being vanquished, Ashmedai came back to the Mountain Jews, more cruel and vengeful than ever, in the guise of Lenin's pupil and fellow Caucasian, Joseph Stalin.

This is what the folklorist Meltzer told me at a prearranged meeting following the chance encounter at the park:

During the Great Purge the few Communists among the Tahts were rounded up and exiled as Trotskyists. Some of them were executed. Then came wholesale charges of Zionism, not entirely unfounded, resulting in the banishment of the entire tribe. Family by family, the Tahts were uprooted and scattered throughout the vastness of Central Asia. The life of the few who miraculously escaped exile was made so miserable by their Moslem neighbors that they fled Daghestan of their own accord.

Meltzer told me what happened to the Tahts only by way of introduction.

"I've just returned after more than a year of wandering over European Russia in search of wartime folklore," he said, "and I have everywhere seen signs of a new anti-Semitism, something far greater and more significant even than the criminal annihilation of a small tribe. This anti-Semitism is directed against all Jews in our country, and its source is the Kremlin itself. I can see by your face that you don't believe me, but you must listen to me. My knowledge is a burden I am afraid to share with anyone, even my closest friends, but I can talk to an American, without fear of betrayal.

"Of course," he continued, "there are no anti-Jewish laws, but there are secret directives, throughout the Communist Party apparatus, that are making second-class citizens out of the Soviet Jews. You are probably aware of the fact that we are barred from diplomatic service abroad and from jobs inside the Foreign Office, even technical jobs, such as those of translators or secretaries. There are no high-ranking Jews left in the army, and there are none among our military attachés. This is where it all started, in the army and the foreign service. But now—and I have seen these secret directives in operation at many a place—Jews may not hold important Party jobs in any provincial city, no matter how large or small. They cannot be secretaries of Communist Party district and city committees, or of factories or collective farms. They cannot be appointed as editors of provincial newspapers, or secretaries of their editorial offices. This rule applies to employment in

local radio stations, as oral agitators, as teachers in social sciences, history, and literature."[4]

I found it hard to believe Meltzer's story, but he sounded so convincing, and his details were so concrete, that I spent the next few weeks discreetly checking the story and found that it was all too true. Moscow was not as bad as the rest of the country, including the great cultural center of Leningrad, presumably because all foreigners were concentrated in the capital, and the Kremlin prefers to keep malodorous facts from the attention of the world. But foreign diplomats gradually became aware of the growing Soviet anti-Semitisim and its source. *My Three Years in Moscow* by Walter Bedell Smith, the US ambassador at the time, contains the following paragraph:

"We in the Embassy were reluctant for a long time to accept the recent manifestations in the Moscow press and elsewhere as evidence of a clearly anti-Jewish line."[5]

The reasons for the ambassador's skepticism were the same as those that moved all of us to doubt the symptoms: "The record of the Soviet Government in suppressing historic anti-Semitism of the Russian people was a very good one for nearly thirty years."[6] Practically everyone, including many of the bitterest foes of the Kremlin, continued to believe to the last in the legend created by the Soviet regime's unequivocal stand against anti-Semitism at the time of the regime's inception.

In adopting its enlightened policies toward the Jews, the Communists merely followed in the footsteps of the democratic Provisional Government, which all too rarely receives the credit due it in this field. With one stroke of the pen on March 21, 1917, the Provisional Government destroyed the discriminatory laws against Jews. The Soviets continued from there on, and on July 27, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree placing pogromists outside the law and appealing to the laboring people to combat anti-Semitism because "national enmity weakens our revolutionary ranks, disunites the labor front joined together regardless of nationality, and helps our enemies only."[7] During the civil war years from 1918 to 1921, some seventy-five to a hundred thousand Jews were killed in the most brutal wave of pogroms perpetrated by the peoples of Russia.[8]

Believing that anti-Semitism was rooted in the economic ills of the country as a whole and of its Jewish citizens in particular, the

Bolsheviks attempted to destroy it at its very base. The Jews, whose economic activity had been artificially limited to commerce and trade, were now urged to become farmers and industrial workers.

The program of colonization of some 150,000 Jews in western and southern areas of the Soviet Union was an epic in itself, destroying the widespread belief that Jews were unfit for work on the land. American Jewry supported the colonization program to the extent of twenty million dollars. The results, though inspiring, were on a comparatively modest scale and had no effect on the economy of the country as a whole. The flocking of hundreds of thousands of Jews into the factories, however, proved a sad and painful matter. Until the inauguration of the first Five-Year Plan in 1928, unemployment had plagued Russian workers, and the pressure of Jewish competition for jobs tended to foster anti-Semitism among them.

Likewise, Russian engineers, doctors, lawyers, administrators, and other members of the intelligentsia, many of whom had refused to participate in the reconstruction of their country as a socialist power, resented the Jews' invasion of their fields. Especially noticeable were the Jews in administration, for which no lengthy period of training was necessary, but this irked not only the intelligentsia but also the general Soviet population, especially the peasants. The Communist Party was being identified in their eyes as a party of and by the Jews.

Nothing could have been further from the truth, because politically the Jews were en masse inimical to Bolsheviks, and Lenin fought the Jewish mass labor organization, the Bund, tooth and nail. As early as 1907, Stalin wrote in his report on the London Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (which then contained two warring factions: the moderates, who were in a minority, and were therefore called Mensheviks, and the extremist faction, called Bolsheviks because they were in a majority):

"Statistical analysis has shown that among the Menshevik faction the majority were Jews. . . . Conversely, the overwhelming majority of the Bolshevik faction were Russians. . . . Commenting on this, one of the Bolsheviks (Comrade Alexinsky, I think) jestingly remarked that the Mensheviks were a Jewish faction while the Bolsheviks were a truly Russian one, and hence

it might be a good idea for us Bolsheviks to start a pogrom within the Party."[9]

During the civil war the author of the anti-Semitic jibe cited by Stalin, Grigory Alexinsky, actually joined the reactionary groups that were responsible for the pogroms of the time. And yet, in 1946, Stalin permitted the reprinting of the entire passage quoted above. In view of the rebirth of the new anti-Semitism in Russia, which started at about that time, Stalin's permission might have been no accident at all. In his biography of Stalin, Leon Trotsky makes several references to the former's readiness to make use of anti-Semitism for political purposes.[10] On the other hand, in January 1931, Stalin branded anti-Semitism as a protective device of capitalism and a crime punishable by death in the USSR.[11] However, this unequivocal statement (made in reply to a query by the Jewish Telegraphic Agency in New York) was not made public in the Soviet Union until 1936 and, to my knowledge, has never been referred to since.

In the twenties, when a considerable part of the Soviet population was nursing resentment toward the Jews as Bolshevik "rulers" of their country, the Communists and many workers were likewise hostile to them because of the energy and skill with which a large number of Jews had taken advantage of the New Economic Policy inaugurated by Lenin to revive the country's economy. Under that policy, which lasted from 1921 to 1928, private trade flourished in the inimical and unnatural atmosphere of a Communist state, creating a kind of bastard bourgeoisie that consisted of speculators and profiteers as well as legitimate businessmen. Jews were numerous in all three categories, and were on the whole more successful than their Gentile competitors. The animosity of the latter paralleled the hostile distrust toward Jews on the part of zealous adherents to the theory of class struggle.

All these varied and frequently contradictory sources of anti-Semitism in the Russia of the twenties combined to create a minor trend of Jew-baiting in Russian literature of the period.[12]

Anti-Semitism declined sharply during the early thirties as a result of the liquidation of NEP and all private enterprise and, even more important, the inauguration of the first Five-Year Plan. The term "NEP profiteer," which was synonymous in many minds with the term "Jew," disappeared overnight, along with thousands of NEP men who only yesterday had sported flashy clothes

and ridden in shining new cars. The Five-Year Plan created innumerable new jobs for all professions and industrial skills, eliminating competition and taking the economic ground from under anti-Semitism.

The official Communist Party press, which had kept silent for a whole decade, now spoke up. As usual, *Pravda* led the way with a front-page editorial:

"More and more frequently, reports on manifestations of anti-Semitism find reflection in the press. . . . When plants where anti-Semitic acts occurred are being investigated, we are invariably faced with the one dangerous fact that there is connivance on the part of the local party, the trade union and the Komsomol organizations. This alone makes it possible for the anti-Semitic persecution campaign to go on unpunished for months and years. The tortured worker finds no protection; anti-Semitic slang becomes current in the shops; and the officers of the [Communist] cells, work councils and the Komsomol—they prefer not to 'meddle' in an unpleasant business, prefer not to 'start trouble,' etc."[13]

The unequivocal stand of the ruling party, the letter of the law, and the unprecedented job opportunities created by the Five-Year Plan conspired to make the first seven years of the thirties the best years the Jews enjoyed in all the centuries they lived on Russian-controlled soil. The new Soviet Constitution of 1936 seemed to perpetuate the freedom, equality, and peace of which they were now generously partaking.

The one sinister incident that beclouded the state of contentment of the Jews during those seven years was the so-called "valuta-torture." That was a system whereby the government, hard pressed for foreign currency with which to import machinery for its ambitious industrial program, resorted to blackmail, arrests, and torture for the purpose of extracting from its citizens whatever valuta, gold, or jewels they might have in their possession. The secret police were given the green light on any and all methods, as long as they produced results. The methods ranged from extracting ransom money—that is, payment in foreign currency for permission to emigrate from the Soviet Union—all the way to the most sadistic forms of torture. I first went to the USSR in the middle of 1935, when most, if not all, the valuta and gold in the possession of Soviet citizens had been extracted from them,

and the "gold mining in torture chambers," to borrow a phrase from Eugene Lyons,[14] had been discontinued, but I heard many a tale about it from its victims, their friends and families.

The Jews suffered from valuta-torture on a scale completely out of proportion to their numbers, yet even they themselves did not attribute it to anti-Semitism. The Jews explained that the Soviet government was in dire need of hard currency and extracted it from those whom it suspected of possessing it, or of means to obtain it from friends or relatives abroad. It was merely a terrible accident of history that a greater proportion of Jews than other Soviet citizens had family or business ties abroad. The non-Jews with similar ties, or those with connections in foreign lands, were given the same treatment. Thus, without condoning the methods employed in valuta-torture, the Jews themselves explained it away as a sad but minor incident without any racial overtones.

Even the vast number of Jews who fell victim to the Great Purge was written off by most Jews and Gentiles alike as a matter of coincidence rather than a manifestation of anti-Semitism on the part of Stalin and his colleagues. Whether it was or not, the destruction of the left international wing of the Communist Party was carried out in such a way that to be a Jew became synonymous with being a Trotskyite, a member of the opposition, an "enemy of the people." It is well remembered that practically all outstanding Jewish Communists were purged, giving rise to a bitter joke in the late thirties: "Why is Stalin the Moses of our times?" "Moses led the Jews out of Egypt; Stalin caused their exodus out of the Politburo and the Central Committee."

The truth is that the purge went very much further than that. The liquidation of the "Old Guard"—Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Radek, and the other Jews who took a leading part in the Revolutionary movement and in the Bolshevik state during its early years —eliminated Jewish influence on a national scale. At the same time the ranks of Communists active in Jewish affairs within the USSR were reduced so drastically that an entire generation of Jewish political leadership was destroyed. The author of the latest and most authoritative work on the subject, Solomon M. Schwarz, goes so far as to assert that "the Great Purge virtually terminated the organized life of the Jewish group as a recognized cultural and ethnic minority."[15]

Yet the very fact that the Jews continued to be protected by

a law that made open anti-Semitism a crime against the state led most of the Soviet Jews and even such critical and informed observers abroad as Mr. Schwarz to believe that the elimination of Jews from positions of prominence "may not have represented direct anti-semitic discrimination, but rather a tacit attempt to deprive anti-semitic resentments of a visible object."

The Soviet law contrasted so favorably with Hitler's Nuremberg Laws that the Jews living under Stalin's rule were thankful for their lot. They knew about Nazi persecutions from the Communist press salvos at the "anti-Semitic bestiality" and "cannibalism" of the Nazis. With the Hitler-Stalin Pact of August 1939 the ideological battle between Communism and fascism came to a halt. "Hitlerism," I heard Molotov declare in his address to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on October 31, 1939, "is a matter of taste," thus reducing the entire history-making struggle between fascism and human dignity to the status of an indecent joke.

Because the Soviet press was silent, the Soviet Jews were fatally ignorant of the vastness and concreteness of Hitler's program for the extermination of the whole race. A comparatively small number of Jews did manage to evacuate, chiefly to Uzbekistan in Central Asia, before the Reichswehr overran the Ukraine, Byelorussia, and then Russia proper. But most of them remained in the soon-to-be-occupied areas, oblivious of the fate in store for them. Almost to a man, they were destroyed. Seeking to arouse all Soviet citizens to a holy war against the invader, the press described Nazi brutality in all its nakedness, but the impression created was that the "death factories" of the Germans fed on Russians, Ukrainains, and Jews alike. The widely publicized official Soviet documents on German atrocities strengthened that impression by the simple expedient of not mentioning that in most cases the majority of the victims were Jews. More than that, when the Yiddish-language newspaper in Moscow, *Einigkeit*, started a series of articles by the writer Vassily Grossman, titled "Ukraine without Jews," the series was suppressed after the first two stories appeared in the November 25 and December 2, 1943, issues. Grossman had written: "Hitler killed all the Jews he met in the Ukraine, every one without exception. No less than a million." The only other reference to Jews as the major victims of Nazism was contained in an obscure Yiddish-language Communist paper in Lodz (Poland) on November 12, 1945:

"According to the 1939 census, there were 3,020,000 Jews in the USSR. This was increased to 5,000,000 at the outbreak of the war with Hitler's Germany in 1941, by the addition of the Jews in the Baltic countries, Bessarabia and Soviet-occupied Poland. Now it is believed that there are 2,500,000 Jews alive in the Soviet Union."[16]

The admission that half of the five million Jews under Soviet control had been massacred has not appeared in any publication in the USSR.

The Nazis left behind them a strong wave of anti-Semitism in all the liberated territories of Soviet Russia, where they authorized the publication of some seventy Jew-baiting newspapers and magazines. These were suppressed after the victories of the Red Army, but the Soviet authorities ignored manifestations of the lingering anti-Semitism.

With the dropping of the Iron Curtain, an official anti-Semitism has come into being for the first time in the history of the Soviet state.

It might be worth restating at this point that, until the current trend, official Soviet policy condemned anti-Semitism in a most concrete and vigorous fashion. At the very worst, the Soviet government could be accused of Asemitism—that is, a cold indifference to the fate and sufferings of the Jews. Their tragedy in the Great Purge and in the Nazi massacres was to the Kremlin merely an accidental by-product of a much vaster drama.

This same element of Asemitism is evident now, but in a form so intense as to make it indistinguishable from anti-Semitism. The Jews are being discriminated against not so much on racial grounds, but as a non-conformist, intellectually restless people whose ways and thinking are "cosmopolitan" and therefore alien to the concept of Soviet patriotism. The contacts of Jews with the West and their affinity with it, both conscious and subconscious, are viewed by the men in the Kremlin as a threat to the impenetrability of the Iron Curtain. The purpose of the new anti-Semitism is to seal a crack in the Curtain.

Two incidents, one occurring soon after the end of hostilities, when the global cold war was beginning to take shape, and the other when it was already going full blast, served to add fuel to the smoldering fires of official anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union

and caused it to break out into bright flames that the whole world could see.

The first incident involved the fate of the half million Polish Jews who had sought refuge in the USSR from the invading Germans. The second incident was connected with the birth of the state of Israel in 1948.

Practically all the Polish Jews had been evacuated to Siberia and Central Asia under the most horrible conditions imaginable. The local population resented the very presence of these alien people from the alien "bourgeois" world, whose manners, clothes, and hygienic habits only served to emphasize the wretchedness of provincial Soviet life. They may not have lost their manners, but life's realities soon made them forget their hygienic habits, and failure to obtain employment soon compelled them to exchange their clothes for food. When the war ended they were given the choice of remaining in the USSR or returning to Poland, then not completely a satellite. Practically all chose the latter.

The bitterly stung Soviet authorities announced to the world that only between 150,000 and 160,000 had chosen to go back to Poland. The rest had found peace and security in the Soviet Union. But a study of the life of the Polish-Jewish refugees by the Joint Distribution Committee, an American-Jewish organization, throws a much more sinister light on the reasons for the majority's failure to cast their vote in favor of a return to Poland: most of them had died of starvation. The *Bulletin* of the Joint Distribution Committee for June 1943 described their slow death:

"From a fifth to a third of the number of refugees died. . . . Whoever did not see the thousands of graves, mostly of children, cannot understand. . . . The government gives each refugee from a half to one pound of bread each day. . . . Food can only be bought with things. Money has lost its value."

This was in 1943. Death had three more years in which to reap its harvest, for the exodus did not start until late in 1946.

The exposé by the Joint Distribution Committee is no doubt responsible to some degree for the subsequent attempt of the Kremlin to identify the Joint as an intelligence agency of "US warmongers."

The Polish Jews rejected the Communist Eden in the most unequivocal fashion. What about their two million Soviet

brothers-in-blood? Possibly as many as twenty-five thousand escaped in the guise of Polish citizens. A considerable number were intercepted by the secret police. Many Soviet Jews who found themselves on VE-Day in central and western Europe refused to go back to the USSR. The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 provided the occasion for an open manifestation inside Russia of the actual sentiments of the Jews.

For reasons of high policy, chiefly because of the Kremlin's distaste for the British Empire and the Soviet hopes of gaining a foothold in the Middle East, Moscow hastily recognized the Israeli government. The latter promptly dispatched a legation staff to the Soviet capital headed by Russian-born Mrs. Golda Meyerson. Soon after her arrival she was invited, along with other members of the mission, to attend the services at the Moscow synagogue on Rosh Hashana, the Jewish New Year. There a deeply moving demonstration took place. Large crowds of Jews who had packed the synagogue and overflowed into the street kept crying, with tears in their eyes: "On the morrow to Jerusalem!"

A similar demonstration took place a few days later within a stone's throw of the Kremlin, in front of the Hotel Metropole, the temporary quarters of Mrs. Meyerson and her staff. A rumor had spread that Jews would be allowed to emigrate to Israel, and the legation of the infant state was flooded with applications for visas.

The Kremlin's reaction was swift. The alleged ringleaders of the demonstration were arrested and imprisoned. Many others were interrogated with great severity. The Israel legation and its staff were cut off from all contact with the Soviet population. The incident was not referred to in the Soviet press, but its readers have been fed on a steady anti-Israel diet ever since: the government of Israel was, after all, bourgeois nationalist, and its head, Prime Minister David Ben Gurion, was a Wall Street lackey.

The over-all Soviet change in policy toward Israel must have matured somewhat earlier. The demonstration took place on October 24, 1948. A month prior to that, on September 21, *Pravda* carried an article by Ilya Ehrenburg, a Jew, attacking Zionism as a reactionary movement, and Zionists as nationalists and mystics. Shortly thereafter Ehrenburg publicly offended the Israel ambassador at an official reception.[17] The demonstration in the syna-

gogue and in front of Mrs. Meyerson's mission only intensified the violence of the attack on Zionism.

By now the Jews have been removed, almost to a man, from the political, administrative, and educational apparatus of the entire country. The same applies to a lesser degree to members of other minor nationalities. As in tsarist times, Great Russians are now firmly entrenched at all levels of Soviet bureaucracy. While most of the non-Jewish minorities still have their autonomous republics with multitudes of non-key jobs available to the natives, the Jews have been definitely relegated to the status of second-class citizens. The exceptions provided by Politburo member Kaganovich and the two ace journalists, Ilya Ehrenburg and David Zaslavsky, only serve to prove the rule.

Organized activity of the Jews as a distinct cultural and ethnic unit, which had emerged out of the ashes left by the Great Purge, was now crushed for the second time, crushed with a methodical thoroughness reminiscent of the Nazis. All Jewish organizations, newspapers, schools, theaters, clubs were closed down. Political leaders active among Jewish masses were arrested and liquidated. And so were all the prominent authors and poets writing in the Yiddish language. In the words of the editors of *Zamlbikher*, a Jewish literary periodical published in New York, "[In the Soviet Union] there no longer exists our Yiddish as a living creative language; there no longer exists a Yiddish literature, no longer a Yiddish theatre, newspaper, or the smallest school for children. A wilderness has grown over what was once a whole culture and a literature."[18]

In terms of the existence of the Jews as a distinct national group, the Cold Civil War has actually turned into a pogrom.

Along with the destruction of Jewish culture, members of the race have been eliminated, with rare exceptions, from the main stream of Soviet political, literary, educational, and scientific life. Ever fewer Jews are admitted to medical or law schools, employed in newspapers or radio stations, given the Stalin Prize.

The Kremlin campaign against "cosmopolitanism," ever since 1949, has proved to be the stone that kills two birds in one throw. It has hardened the Iron Curtain by weakening Western influences, by stressing the genius of the Russian people through attributing to it mankind's greatest inventions; and it has accelerated the process of weeding Jews out of cultural, creative,

and scientific activity in the Soviet Union. This was achieved by the simple, time-tested process of identifying the word "Jew" with the word that currently spells anathema. The call names stigmatizing cosmopolitanism have been carefully selected to achieve the identification: "passportless wanderers," "without kith or kin," "rootless cosmopolites."

Here is an illustration of the technique, as practiced by *Pravda,* the official mouthpiece of the Communist Party:

"Homeless cosmopolites who know nothing of creative labor, of truth and honor, have crept into our editorial offices, scientific institutions and universities. They are people who feel no duty toward the nation, the state or the party. It is our urgent task, therefore, to smoke these bourgeois cosmopolites out of their holes."

They are not being merely smoked out. They are being hounded, fired, arrested, purged.

Lest an alleged cosmopolite not be persecuted because of his Russian-sounding name, the Soviet press has adopted the procedure of inserting in brackets the real name of the person under attack, if he writes under a pseudonym. This practice is not applied to Great Russians who happen to use pen names.

Like the rest of the Soviet people, the Jews have been cut off from the outside world. Unlike the rest, they have been singled out for hostility as a race. The reasons for it, unlike those that motivated Hitler, are not biological but political and intellectual. The results are almost equally tragic.

The Soviet anti-Jewishism is not marked by the cannibalistic aspects of Nazism, but is only one step removed from it. The Jews are relentlessly pressed into extinction through assimilation. Their very existence as a separate nationality is denied by official publications.[19] They are used as scapegoats for the release of hatreds and resentments inside the country. They are pawns in Moscow's opportunistic political game in the Arab world and elsewhere.

The new Soviet anti-Semitism has been adopted by the satellite countries, and has manifested itself even in Communist activities inside the democratic countries of Europe, in the Western Hemisphere, and in the Middle East.

The Stalinist version of anti-Semitism is masquerading in the satellite countries as a struggle against an alleged international "Zionist conspiracy." The fostering of anti-Jewish sentiments

among the members of the Soviet bloc was stepped up during the great spy trial held in Prague in November 1952. Rudolf Slansky, Vladimir Clementis, and other former Communist leaders of Czechoslovakia "confessed" to having participated in a global Zionist conspiracy against the Soviet Union, organized with the aid of leading American, British, and Titoist figures, such as John Foster Dulles, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, the former Communist boss of Poland, Wladyslaw Gomulka, and Madame Ana Pauker, the former Foreign Minister of Rumania.

The testimony of Rudolf Slansky and his codefendants was so worded as to perform the same service for the Stalinist anti-Semites as the infamous Protocols of the Elders of Zion performed for tsarist and fascist Jew-baiters. This testimony has made it possible for the Communists to brand any person combating anti-Semitism as one in league with "Zionist spies and conspirators."

In the subsequent stage of official Soviet anti-Semitism, Judaism itself has been placed by the Stalinists on the same level as espionage, sabotage, and similar crimes against the Soviet state.

CHAPTER 9

The Peasant Front

"Tell me," I asked [Marshal Stalin], "have the stresses of this war been as bad to you personally as carrying through the policy of the Collective Farms?"

The subject immediately aroused the Marshal.

"Oh, no," he said, "the Collective Farm policy was a terrible struggle. . . . It was fearful. . . . It was all very bad and difficult—but necessary."

WINSTON CHURCHILL, *The Hinge of Fate*

Chase nature out the door, and she'll come creeping back through the window.

Old Russian proverb

Stalin's most massive undertaking—the collectivization of agriculture—was unfinished business at the time of the Nazi invasion in 1941. A return to the peasant problem after the end of hostilities was bound, irrespective of all other struggles, to provoke a state of civil war in the country—cold or otherwise.

The peasant problem was on Stalin's mind not only because the sovietization of the countryside in the USSR had not been completed but also because wartime developments in rural areas threatened to undo much of what Stalin had achieved between 1928 and 1941. Taking advantage of the relaxation of Communist controls during the conflict, the peasants increased enormously the sale of private surpluses on the open market, at prices regulated by the time-honored "capitalist" law of supply and demand. They also stepped up the prewar rate of illegal extensions of land allotments for private cultivation, at the expense of communal land.

The permission to establish markets for uncontrolled sale of surplus foodstuffs was granted by the government during the terrible famine of 1932. This concession was followed in December 1933 by a commitment to the peasants of the Far East, giving them the right to own small houses and a limited amount of livestock. Some fifteen months later all collective farm members received the same privilege. Each household was permitted to own and till a plot of land varying from one to 2.2 acres, and to have

from one cow plus two calves up to ten cows and all their calves, depending on the character of the local agricultural economy. In addition each family was permitted to own one hog, ten sheep, and poultry.

Betraying what Bolsheviks brand as deeply rooted "survivals of private property psychology," the peasants concentrated on their private lots, unmindful of the resulting decline in the quantity and quality of production on the *kolkhoz* (collective farm) fields. Similarly the peasants took infinitely better care of their own animals and poultry than of the collectively owned livestock. What was even worse, from the point of view of the Soviet authorities, they indulged in a modest but increasing encroachment on communal land. The process began long before World War II, and by 1939 illegal poaching embraced some 50 per cent, or slightly over 6,000,000 acres, of the entire area under private cultivation.[1]

The same year the Communist Party began to take measures to prevent the private allotments from becoming the major source of income for so large a number of collective farmers as to threaten to undermine the entire *kolkhoz* system. True, the actual immediate danger was not great, if one recalls that the entire sown area of the collective farms had risen to nearly 293,000,000 acres, but the psychological dangers were enormous. Poaching bore eloquent testimony to the lingering "unsocialistic attitude" on the part of the Soviet peasant. No sooner was a struggle against this attitude launched than the war broke out. Faced by military perils and shortages of food for the army, the Bolsheviks had to discontinue the struggle and even encourage the intensive cultivation of private allotments. The Communist grip on the peasantry was slackened to a degree which made it appear that some kind of a new agricultural NEP had come into being.

Open markets where prices were uncontrolled flourished not only in the special out-of-the-way places reserved for them in cities and villages. I saw them during my wartime trips as far east as Novosibirsk, in the heart of Siberia, and Tashkent in Central Asia. They overflowed into city squares and railway stations—wherever potential consumers were likely to gather. Illegal poaching kept spreading, and the authorities closed their eyes even to the practice of building and renting out houses on private allot-

ments. The peasants' opulence and insatiable land hunger strained the entire *kolkhoz* system to the limit.

It was Stalin's good luck that, just as Napoleon had failed to liberate the Russian serfs, so did Hitler refuse to abolish the collective farm system, which he, like the Soviet leader, found a useful means of extracting food and raw material from the peasants. But the peasants, as we now know from captured reports to the German high command and the Foreign Office, repudiated the *kolkhoz* system, and kept asking the Nazis to liberate them from it.[2] Moreover, despite Hitler's objections to the abolition of collective farms, two former German attachés in Moscow experimented in the summer of 1942 with a restoration of private landownership, combining it with a co-operative effort. The results exceeded the highest expectations of the attachés: the peasants met German requisition quotas in full and on time. There was no sabotage in the area and no guerrilla warfare.[3] Similar experiments were later tried in other regions as well, but their results are not known. The German military situation was deteriorating rapidly, while Hitler's veto put an end to similar ventures where they were still possible.

If the Fuehrer's action relieved Stalin of a great worry, the attitudes and behavior of the peasants in uninvaded areas served notice on him that his battle with the individualistic, property-loving Soviet peasant was far from over. And Stalin was determined to stop short of nothing but complete victory. For the time being he would have to lie low, because of wartime pressures and because his temporary ties with the Western Allies made repressive measures inadvisable. The ties gave encouragement, however unspoken and indirect, to the natural tendencies of the peasantry, and therein lay another reason for severing them as soon as the war was over.

Stalin's unyielding opposition to the "petty commodity economy" of the peasants was based on the theory he inherited from Lenin that, left alone, individual farms would tend to destroy the socialist foundation of a country's entire economy. "Small production," said Lenin, "*gives birth* to capitalism and to the bourgeoisie, constantly, daily, hourly, spontaneously and on a large scale."[4]

Lenin rode on to victory by helping the "petty commodity

economy" of the peasants. He encouraged the distribution of land. The breakup of large estates helped to boost the number of individual peasant households from sixteen to nearly twenty-five million. The peasants gloried in the possession of the land which they and their forefathers had tilled from time immemorial, and found a new dignity and a new sense of power. Many of them even dreamed of a peasant paradise that was to come into being, and their dreams were reflected in the works of several poets, the most outstanding and original among them being Nikolai Klyuyev and Sergei Yessenin.

But the peasants, along with their poets, counted without the Bolsheviks, who had their own conceptions of utopia: a socialist state under the dictatorship of the proletariat, with the interests of the peasants subordinated to the demands of socialist industry. True, there was practically no industry left in Russia by the end of the civil war. It had to be built anew before the proletariat could begin to manufacture the consumers' goods without which the peasants refused to feed the urban population. The Soviet government resorted to confiscation of food, primarily grain, provoking resistance to the point of open rebellion. Communist punitive expeditions showed no mercy and often would not leave enough grain even for seed. The drought that came on top of peasant sabotage and lack of seed brought about the terrible famine of 1921, in which some two million people died of starvation. The timely generosity of the American people saved at least ten million lives through the work of the American Relief Administration headed by Herbert Hoover.

The savage but unsystematic peasant resistance was accompanied by two outbreaks of organized rebellion: the Kronstadt Uprising and the Tambov Mutiny.

Most of the sailors and members of the garrison at Kronstadt, the fortress that guards Leningrad, came from villages. (Leningrad, then called Petrograd, was the capital of Soviet Russia.) The tragic reports coming from their homes roused them to mutiny and to demand an end of requisitioning, as well as freedom of speech, press, and assembly. They summed up their program in one phrase: "Soviets without Communists!" The Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party was then in session, and Trotsky assembled the cream of the Bolsheviks to lead the troops in the storming of Kronstadt. The rebellion was drowned

in blood. (This, incidentally, did not prevent Stalin from later accusing Trotsky of being the instigator of the mutiny.)

The Tambov rebellion against grain requisitions was more difficult to put down. The initial Red Army detachments, sent to crush it, refused to fire at their "peasant brothers." The revolt, led by Antonov, the experienced and cruel guerrilla chieftain of the civil war period, kept spreading, and was finally liquidated with the greatest effort. No quarter was given by either side.

It was against this background of peasant opposition that Lenin was compelled to retreat to the safety of the New Economic Policy, as he explained with amazing frankness on October 21, 1921:

"Our defeat in the economic field, whose problems resemble those of strategy, though even graver and more difficult, is more serious than any we have suffered from the armies of Denikin and Kolchak. We thought the peasants would give us sufficient food to insure the support of the industrial workers, and we should be able to distribute it. We were wrong, and so we have begun to retreat. Before we are utterly smashed, let us retrace our steps and begin to build on a new foundation."[5]

With these words ended the era of war Communism, and the NEP was ushered in. Indiscriminate requisitions were abolished and replaced by fixed taxes in kind, with the surplus grain and other produce free to be sold at the re-established open markets, where prices were uncontrolled. The return of other "capitalist" institutions followed, such as the stock exchange, private trade in the cities, and the right of inheritance.

In its retreat, the state jealously retained complete control over the decisive "commanding heights" of the country's economy: means of communication and transportation, heavy industry, banking, and foreign trade. The state also refused to yield an inch of its monopoly on military and political power, the press and other forms of propaganda. With their aid, the Bolsheviks were able to silence and ameliorate opposition to the NEP on the part of uncompromising partisans of "class struggle." These precautions enabled the Communists to launch, seven years later, an all-out offensive for a socialized USSR: abolition of the NEP, which spelled the end of private trade, intensive industrialization, and, above all, the collectivization of agriculture.

By 1928, Russia's industrial output had returned to the 1913

level, as had the annual grain crop. The cultivated area was now about as great as in the earlier years, but the population had grown. Livestock had reached an all-time high never since attained. By this time Stalin had entrenched himself in his position of power after his drawn-out struggle with the Trotsky opposition, and his theory of "socialism in one country" had crystallized. Also crystallized was a new struggle with the peasants. The most diligent and enterprising among them had assumed the lead in the peasants' eternal wrangling with the government over prices. In the fall of 1927 and 1928 the villages actually withheld grain from the cities. As during the period of war Communism, requisitions by the government gave rise to widespread sabotage. Thus, in 1928, Stalin faced the same alternatives as had Lenin in 1921: that of yielding to the peasants via some variation of an NEP, or of forcing a showdown with the peasantry. Backed by a revived economy, Stalin chose the latter, as possibly Lenin also would have done. Because Stalin was not endowed with the latter's genius for analysis and his gift for persuasion and tactical maneuver, he precipitated one of the major disasters in the entire history of Russia.

The first stage of collectivization "by example and persuasion," as Stalin had hoped it would be, was terminated abruptly in the face of determined opposition. During that stage the collective farms, which were in theory voluntary democratic co-operatives of peasants pooling their land, livestock, and equipment, and sharing the proceeds, had attracted only a small number of the very poor, who had little or nothing to contribute in the way of land or capital. Since the richer, labor-employing farmers, called *kulaks,* formed the core of resistance, Stalin declared total war against them. He ordered "a determined offensive against the *kulaks,* to break their resistance, to eliminate them as a class. . . . You do not lament the loss of the hair of one who has been beheaded. There is another question which seems no less ridiculous: whether the *kulak* should be permitted to join the collective farms. Of course not, for he is a sworn enemy of the collective farm movement. Clear, one would think."[6]

It was as clear as a death sentence. This directive, spoken on December 17, 1929, was given legality in official government decrees of January 6 and February 1, 1930. Authorities at various levels were instructed to use force in their struggle against the

kulaks, to confiscate their property and exile them to distant areas.

Peasant resistance was fierce and widespread, for it was not confined to the *kulaks* alone. The peasants had no organization or leadership, but used strikingly similar methods in various sections of the country, as if their orders came from a highly effective headquarters. There were bloody, short-lived uprisings. There were assassination and murder of "village correspondents" who reported on recalcitrant peasants. Many of the militant city Communists ("the levy of the 25,000") sent to help collectivize the countryside were also killed.

There was sabotage. Even peasants joining *kolkhozes* would destroy their agricultural machinery or sell it for scrap iron. Millions of farmers refused to sow or to gather in the harvest. Cattle and horses were slaughtered on a scale the world had never known, and the *kulaks,* who owned most of Russia's livestock, were not the only ones to destroy their animals. Many so-called middle peasants were doing the same thing before joining the *kolkhozes.* The resultant blow to Soviet economy[7] was so great and lasting as to contribute to the state of near famine that was Russia's lot throughout the last war. In addition to sabotaging field work, peasants burned the crops that had been gathered and set fire to *kolkhoz* barns and stables.

In reprisal, the government sent punitive expeditions that razed whole communities. The battle was at its fiercest in the Ukraine, where the rich soil and the industriousness of the population accounted for greater numbers of well-to-do farmers than in any other Soviet area. It was here that separatist aspirations frequently made the struggle against the *kolkhoz* system indistinguishable from the struggle for national liberation from the entire Soviet system.

When I toured the Ukrainian countryside in 1936, I saw village after village that was merely a collection of burned houses, their charred, naked smokestacks standing as a reminder of the fate of those who dared to oppose Stalin's will. The men, women, and children who had once inhabited those homes were part of the army of millions of *kulak* families (according to some sources, fully five million[8]) who had been sent to Siberia under convoy. There, Soviet authorities forced them to fell trees, dig canals, and build highways and railways, initiating the practice of put-

ting slave labor on a "business footing," a practice that has since become a distinct and permanent feature of Soviet economy.

Despite his anger at peasant opposition, Stalin discerned signs of a coming famine. He attempted to call a halt to collectivization by terror, in his famous "Dizzy with Success" article in *Pravda* for March 2, 1930. But it was too late. The damage had been done, and its terrible consequences are felt in the USSR to this day. Tensions were eased and in 1930 the rationing of bread and other food products was reintroduced in the cities. Still a famine was unavoidable. When it struck it was more harmful than the great famine of 1921–22. Unlike Lenin, who at the time had permitted an appeal for aid to reach the United States, Stalin denied the very existence of starvation and used the famine itself as a means of pressure on the peasantry. For pressures continued, even though the blood-and-thunder methods of the fateful first year of the collectivization drive were never revived. Pressure now took the form of state aid to the *kolkhozes*, exemption from taxation, loans of money, machinery, and seed, while the still recalcitrant farmers were being gradually eliminated by increasing taxation. The precipitous drop in the number of collectivized households that followed the "Dizzy with Success" article (from 110,200 on March 1, 1930, to 82,300 two months later) was checked; then the offensive was renewed. By July 1, 1931, "there were 211,100 collective farms, including over half of all peasant households and embracing two-thirds of the peasant-sown acreage. Two years later, 64.4% of the peasantry and over 83% of the peasant-sown area had been collectivized."[9] Stalin was now firmly on the road to victory over all opposition. By 1940, actually 94.1 per cent of all peasant homesteads belonged in the *kolkhozes*.[10] But there were many thorns along the way.

Some of the thorns were plaguing Stalin even while he was achieving success on his two most ambitious projects: the Five-Year Plan for industry and the collectivization process itself. While the expansion of industry failed to bring the abundance of commodities which would have gone a long way toward appeasing the peasants starved for consumer goods, it was effective enough to attract from the villages some eight million young men and women who were at an age most susceptible to Communist propaganda. Instead of helping collectivization efforts, these young peasants joined the city workers. Most of the older genera-

tion remained on the land and, on the whole, continued to oppose collectivization.

The effectiveness of the opposition was enhanced, paradoxically enough, by the very expansion of the *kolkhoz* system. The collective farms became a new version of the ancient Russian village assembly, the *mir*, which had been destroyed by the Revolution. Like the *mir*, the *kolkhoz* tended to consolidate the disunited peasants, giving them voice and the opportunity for joint action as a mass organization. In other words, the *kolkhoz* became a political force. Stalin recognized the danger and warned the Communist Party about it in his momentous "We Are to Blame" speech of January 11, 1933.[11] In it he declared that anti-Soviet elements, despairing of success in a frontal attack, had penetrated the collective farms "to create within them nests of counter-revolutionary activity." They had adopted, he said, the tactics of boring from within and were sabotaging grain deliveries, indulging in illegal trading in grain, and undermining the idea of collectivization by stealthily advocating the principle of *"kolkhozes*, yes, but without Communists."

Instead of evolving into "fortresses of socialism," the collective farms, by his own admission, were becoming instruments of anti-socialization pressure in the hands of the still individualistic, still land- and property-loving peasants. The guns of the "fortresses" were being turned against their creator. Stalin's answer was aggressive reassertion of Communist leadership throughout the countryside. "There is not, nor has there ever been in the world such a powerful and authoritative party as our Communist Party," were his proud words.[12] Stalin said that effective on-the-spot assistance to the Communist Party in the exercise of its leadership was expected of the Political Sections of the Machine-Tractor Stations. Owned and run by the government, the MTS had exclusive monopoly on a technique, hitherto completely unknown in Russia—the application of tractors and combines on a mass scale. Produced in the Soviet Union during the first Five-Year Plan, which had been launched simultaneously with the collectivization of agriculture, this new technique played a decisive role in carrying out Stalin's revolution in the countryside. With it, the country's agriculture was transferred from the age of wood into the age of steel—and old rural Russia disappeared forever.

According to the census of 1910, there were 10,000,000 wooden plows in the country, 17,700,000 wooden harrows that had to be stone-weighted in harrowing, and only 4,200,000 iron and steel plows. In 1940 the Soviet Union had 523,000 tractors, 182,000 combines, and a corresponding number of other modern agricultural machinery, deployed in 7069 Machine-Tractor Stations. The MTS worked that year 94 per cent of all the acreage sown by the collective farms. The mechanization of agriculture no doubt increased productivity and eliminated much of the drudgery and backbreaking toil of the peasant. But at the same time it tightened the state's control over him into a strangle hold. Practically all the plowing, and a great part of the cultivating and harvesting, is now done by the MTS. Directed by the Communist Party through their Political Sections, the MTS are using their monopoly status both to strengthen Kremlin control over the *kolkhozes* and to exploit them in the interests of the state.

Control over the *kolkhozes* is further strengthened by the practice of having chairmen and other farm officials appointed by local Communist bosses, instead of having them elected by the meeting of the farm membership, according to the much-praised Stalinist Model Charter.

Not since the days of serfdom, abolished in 1861, has the Russian peasant been harnessed so securely and exploited so thoroughly as he has been by the *kolkhoz* system. By being compelled to accept the nominal price set by the state for obligatory deliveries of grain and other agricultural products, he is financing the lion's share of Soviet industrialization. By having no choice but to employ the services of the MTS, for which the peasant pays through the nose, he is releasing annually millions of young men and women to work in industry. He is, at the same time, hounded on toward increasing production to supply industrial communities with ever greater quantities of agricultural products.

By being deprived of the major part of his productive effort via the complex system of compulsory deliveries of grain, taxation, payments to the MTS, and capital investment in *kolkhoz* property, the peasant has a purchasing capacity much smaller than that of the industrial worker. The result is that, though the rural population is still larger than that of the Soviet cities, it is able to buy a proportionately smaller share of the scarce consumer goods available in the USSR.

Finally, the peasant is exposed to the never ending propaganda barrage emanating from the press, radio, schools, libraries, the MTS, and all the other "ideological fortresses" which seek to pulverize his individualistic psychology and recast it in the spirit of socialism.

Stalin has succeeded in driving the rural population into the collectives, and in exploiting the latter in the interests of industrialization, but to this day he has failed to achieve his most far-reaching aim—to change the psychology of the peasant in such a way that he would voluntarily submit to Communist dictates. On the contrary, crushed as he was by punitive expeditions, and strait-jacketed by the *kolkhoz* system, the peasant succeeded in pressuring the Kremlin into compromises which by 1935 added up to a limited agricultural NEP: collective farm members were granted individual lots and were permitted to sell on the open market what they grew on them.

The peasants took the utmost advantage of the concessions. As we have seen, they encroached upon *kolkhoz* land, thereby increasing their private allotments. They also neglected the collective farms, concentrating on their individual lots, giving them the most meticulous care, the maximum time, and all the manure and fertilizers obtainable. When the government decreed, on May 27, 1939, that every *kolkhoz* member must work a minimum of sixty to one hundred days on his collective farm, depending on local conditions, many peasants resorted to a cynical expedient. They paid the farm the equivalent of what they would have earned had they put in those workdays—and merrily returned to their private allotments. The same decree took the precaution of ordering the management of the farms to reduce the size of those individual lots to their legal limits. But the local officials, subjected to daily, hourly pressures on the part of the villagers, showed no haste in carrying out the order. Then came the war, and its urgencies compelled the government to refrain from following up the matter.

The war, it will be recalled, drove the Kremlin to still greater leniency in the matter of private allotments. On March 7, 1947, for instance, the Politburo member in charge of agricultural matters, A. A. Andreyev, reported in *Pravda* that 2225 cases of illegal poaching were uncovered by an investigation of 90 per cent of all the collective farms in the country.

At the end of the war Stalin resumed his offensive against the peasants with measures so far-reaching as to constitute a new agricultural revolution. This created a new major front in the current Cold Civil War.

The big offensive, the heavy guns of which are blasting away to this day, did not start rolling until 1950. The years immediately preceding that date were devoted to preliminary skirmishes, the deployment of organizational and propaganda forces, the testing of opposition, and the preparation of ground for retreat, if necessary. Taught by the bitter lesson of the earlier agricultural revolution (collectivization), Stalin moved cautiously this time.

Among the first measures was the matter of illegal poaching. All encroachment on collective farm land was put to a stop, and earlier violators were forced to return land illegally taken from *kolkhozes,* which by September 1947 totaled some fourteen million acres.[13]

The maximum area of individual plots was now reduced to 1.2 acres. The plots, moreover, were made non-transferable, and the free sale of agricultural products was greatly curtailed.

The curtailment of privately owned livestock was even more drastic. Whereas individuals owned the bulk of all productive livestock in 1939, their share has by now dwindled to only a third of the total. The average farmer now owns 50 per cent less livestock and cattle than before the war. This is due in part to great wartime losses, but primarily to the strict Kremlin policy of promoting the recovery of collective farms, and not the farms of individuals. The Soviet leadership has been insistent on this point because the cattle owned by individuals was to the Communists the most offensive manifestation of private ownership in the country. Cattle beget cattle and enrich the owner.

Another Stalin move in the preliminary skirmishes was the perpetuation of what was to have been a temporary wartime measure. On April 13, 1942, the required minimum of workdays given by each member to the collective farm was raised from a hundred to a hundred and fifty. This measure remains in force to the present day.

The revaluation of the ruble at the end of 1947 deprived the peasants of most of their savings. The simultaneous abolition of rationing, along with substantial price cuts in government-owned

food shops, drastically reduced the opportunities for the rural population to recover from this blow.

A series of purges in the countryside completed the preparations for the big offensive.

The purges, which were carried out under the direct supervision of Politburo member A. A. Andreyev, as chairman of the special Council on Collective Farm Affairs created in September 1946, started with a general shake-up of the Political Sections of the Machine-Tractor Stations. All "doubtful" elements uncovered in the MTS were replaced by tried and trusted militant city Communists and professional agitators retained for the purpose. With their help Andreyev descended upon the collective farms. By February 1947 some six hundred thousand members had been expelled. Disregarding the Model Charter, which specifies that farm chairmen are subject to election and recall by the *kolkhoz* assembly, Andreyev and his assistants fired so many heads of farms that only 28 per cent of those who were chairmen in 1945 still held their jobs in February 1947.

The stage was thus set for what is probably destined to be Stalin's last great offensive against Russia's peasantry, for the Soviet dictator was seventy-three on December 21, 1952.

The long-range aims are breath-taking in their scope. They envisage the amalgamation of groups of collective farms into huge units centered around *agrogorods* (agricultural cities). All work processes are to be completely mechanized along the lines of industrial mass production, and are to be carried out by large brigades instead of, as hitherto, by smaller groups of a dozen workers or so, each called a *zveno* (link).

The original plans include the wholesale transfer of human beings, cattle, barns, and all, from the doomed small villages into the larger ones that are to serve as the nuclei for the agricultural cities of the future. The sweeping program is to change the face of the USSR, resettle a large proportion of its rural population, and alter radically the working habits, daily life, and, ultimately, psychology of the entire peasantry. The over-all aim is to complete the destruction of the prerevolutionary social and economic structure in the village, to eliminate the peasantry as a class, converting it into a new kind of working class of the fields, an agricultural proletariat.

This is Stalin's grand design for solving the peasant problem

once and for all. The plan, if and when carried out, will sever the close ties between the individual farmer and the land he tills. He will be working in huge mechanized brigades in which there is no room for the age-old intimacy between the peasant and the soil. The plan for the merger of farms provides new excuses and new possibilities for limiting individual allotments and for making their exploitation unprofitable and unfeasible. Above all, Stalin's plan provides hitherto undreamed-of opportunities for the strengthening of controls over collective farms and their membership.

The new revolution in the Soviet countryside consists of two sets of operations which, though they overlap at many vital points, are distinct from each other and may be carried out simultaneously or not, depending on various factors. One of the operations is the merging of the farms and the reorganization of labor processes. Its main aim is to tighten controls and raise productivity. The other operation, the resettlement of *kolkhozniks* into agro-cities, seeks to achieve the more far-reaching goal of making the peasant's way of life approximate as much as possible that of the industrial proletariat.

The second operation, dooming to destruction at least one million, and possibly as many as a million and a half, villages and hamlets, started with the urgency of a typical Soviet campaign. The official government paper *Izvestia* said on November 22, 1950: "The immediate task of all local Soviets and their rural organizations, *kolkhoz* administrations, is to complete during the winter months [of 1950–51] all necessary preparations for evacuating the smaller villages so that rapid construction for the accommodation of their inhabitants at the new centers of the enlarged collectives may be started with the arrival of spring."

The *Literary Gazette* of January 11, 1951, reported the destruction of one such village in the following fashion:

"The little village of Chelashikha with its eleven homesteads stood at the edge of a deep forest in the Vladimir Province, east of Moscow, in the heart of Russia. Now it has disappeared from the face of the earth." Not a word about the men, women, and children who lived, played, and suffered there. They were not even consulted, and were removed to the village of Boriso-Gleb, the center of the consolidated *kolkhoz*, now boasting four hundred families, or a population of approximately two thousand

persons. Altogether the initial stage of resettlement destroyed some four hundred small villages in the Vladimir Province alone.

When the patriarchal life of rural Russia was beginning to be disturbed by the first timid Soviet efforts at electrification and industrialization after the civil war, the Russian poet Sergi Yessenin immortalized the "deserted village," not unlike a twentieth-century Oliver Goldsmith with a Slavic soul. In verse wild with grief and, more often, resigned and sad, he sang of Mother Earth being choked by telephone poles, and of young colts outraced by the "iron horse," the train. Now the bell tolls for the whole of the village life, for the very village itself, but no new Yessenin is allowed to mourn over it. Nor is a Maurice Hindus permitted to witness the new revolution and chronicle it for the foreign world.[14] Now, there is only a dry newspaper report: "The village of Chelashikha has disappeared from the face of the earth."

Hundreds, probably thousands, of Russian villages had been obliterated along with Chelashikha when, in the spring of 1951, something happened—and the campaign of resettlement was brought to a halt. Most of what took place in the countryside and at the Politburo sessions remains cloaked in secrecy to this day. But the sequence of events which took place does explain a good deal.

To begin with, A. A. Andreyev, who had championed the "link" as the basic form of labor organization, was castigated by *Pravda* (February 19, 1950). Despite the humble letter, printed by the paper nine days later, in which he admitted his errors, Andreyev was replaced by Nikita Khrushchev as the Politburo member in charge of agricultural matters. From that time on, and for the next twelve months, Khrushchev was a most vociferous spokesman of amalgamation and resettlement. He insisted that "the process of eliminating the antitheses between city and countryside is making gradual progress."[15] In order to accelerate it, he asserted that new large rural centers must be created, that villages must merge or be completely evacuated, their population and buildings removed to the agro-cities. Khrushchev also stressed the advantages of multiple-family dwellings in the villages, as opposed to one-family homes, and he stressed the necessity of reducing private allotments of land. Furthermore, Khrushchev

suggested that the allotments be divorced from the peasant homes and placed outside the village limits.

The last such speech by Khrushchev was printed in *Pravda* for March 4, 1951, although it had been delivered on January 18.

On March 5, *Pravda* came out with a most extraordinary editorial note saying that the speech had been printed "for the purposes of discussion" only. In other words, Politburo member Khrushchev was bold enough to express a personal opinion, and not reflect a Kremlin decision. From that time on, neither the resettlement issue nor the question of reducing the private allotments and removing them outside village limits has been favorably discussed in the Soviet press. On the contrary, some minor Communist leaders actually criticized Khrushchev's proposals.

Then came a long spell of silence. On September 29, 1952, *Pravda* printed the text of a speech by Khrushchev in which he acknowledged his advocacy of the creation of agro-cities and the resettlement of collective farmers as an error. Instead, he said, he should have stressed increased farm production.

As already stated, the secrecy surrounding the entire matter renders it impossible to know exactly what had taken place. One can only hazard a guess on the basis of one's knowledge of the fundamental factors involved and of the actual conditions inside the Soviet Union.

It seems not unreasonable to suppose that there has been considerable peasant resistance to the new revolution. It is quite possible that, as villages were leveled to the ground, granaries and barns of the new agricultural centers were burned, for arson has always been a favorite method of sabotage by the Russian peasant. Or, possibly, the bullet-ridden bodies of zealous agitators or MTS political instructors were found rotting in the fields.

It is beyond doubt that there were other restraining factors involved, less violent but of even greater impact. The resettlement project, if carried out as outlined by Khrushchev, would inevitably have absorbed manpower and building material on such a vast scale as to neglect to some degree farm production and the many large-scale rural projects that have been given top priority by the Kremlin. Among them are hydroelectric stations, reforestation, and irrigation, including the spectacular plan for draining the Pripet Marshes, an area equal in size to the combined territory of Delaware, Connecticut, and Massachusetts.

Whatever forms the opposition assumed, the fact remains that the Kremlin has beat a retreat. It may be safely assumed that for the time being there will be no forced resettlement; that the peasant will not be divorced from his private allotment; that the free market where surplus food products are sold at non-controlled prices will not be immediately abolished.

It may be assumed with even greater confidence that the retreat is a temporary one, and that the Kremlin has adopted the strategy of a creeping offensive that is calculated to carry out Stalin's program for the countryside without causing too much bloodshed or too much harm to Russia's rural economy. One makes this assumption on the strength of two phenomena.

The first, seemingly superficial, fact, but one that is never without significance in the Soviet Union, is the fact that the alleged deviator, Khrushchev, has remained unpunished. On the contrary, he has been elected to the Presidium of the Communist Party, which has replaced the Politburo. He was, moreover, entrusted with the delivery of a key speech at the Nineteenth Party Congress, a prestige task implying Stalin's continued confidence in the man. Khrushchev, it appears, was indulging not in deviation but in sending out trial balloons. Such a conclusion is justified also by the fact that Khrushchev's predecessor as the tsar of Soviet agriculture, Andreyev, has paid dearly for the error of championing the "link" vs. the brigade system on the farms and has lost his place among the top leadership.

The second factor pointing toward the temporary aspect of the retreat is much more fundamental, and it has been spelled out by Stalin himself. In his fifty-page thesis, which came out on the eve of the Congress, and which is being hailed in the USSR as Stalin's most important contribution to Communist theory, he blueprinted the strategy of the creeping offensive against the peasants.[16] It is to proceed slowly, cautiously, stage by stage, yet "steadily, unwaveringly, without hesitation."

The over-all aim is "to raise collective farm property to the level of property of the public as a whole . . . and to replace commodity turnover with a system of exchange of goods—likewise by gradual changes—so that the central authority [the government] or some other social-economic central agency might control the entire output of social production in the interests of society."[17]

In other words, agricultural production is to become subject to complete government control and planning. Although the abolition or at least the curtailment of private allotments is implicit in this scheme, Stalin made no mention of it. Instead he outlined a sweeping change in the marketing system of agricultural products raised by collective farms, which, if successful, will tend to diminish the stake of the individual peasant in his private lot. Whereas hitherto the government has paid cash for the bulk of the agricultural produce acquired from the farms, this produce will now be exchanged for consumer goods.

The system, defined by Stalin as "replacing commodity turnover by product exchange," is to be introduced gradually. It has already been tried on a limited scale in areas growing cotton, sugar beets, flax, and other industrial crops, and has proved successful. It cannot fail, as a matter of fact, for it is fairer to the peasants. The consumer goods given in exchange for farm produce are calculated at prices lower than those prevailing in retail shops, whereas the grain delivered in exchange for money is calculated at prices considerably lower than those prevailing on the open market. The real income of the peasant is thus boosted, for the government will be unable to adjust prices to its advantage too radically.

The change in the marketing system represents a great concession to the peasants, acknowledging the success of their resistance and implying an apology for the violence that undoubtedly accompanied the abortive attempt at wholesale resettlement. The change also carries the promise of a great increase in the production of consumer goods and an assurance that textiles, footwear, sugar, household goods, and other finished products will from now on be substantially diverted from the urban areas to the countryside.

The incentives are further enhanced by the forthcoming change in the distribution of *kolkhoz* income among its members. Up to now the net income has been divided among collective farmers in proportion to the number of "workdays" credited to each of them. This enabled the slackers to profit by the labor of the more efficient peasants. Now the income of each individual will depend on the output of the brigade to which he or she belongs, instead of on the income of the entire *kolkhoz*.[18] This is calculated so that

the brigade members, who work as a unit in close proximity, will keep an eye on each other. This also enhances differentiation in income among agricultural laborers, a process that has reached monstrous proportions in industry.

If the shift from commodity turnover will have to be gradual, conditional as it is on the expansion of the consumer-goods industry, the merger of farms has been going full steam ahead. Also the reorganization of labor processes in the new supercollectives has already been achieved in large measure.

When the project of amalgamation began early in 1950, there were 254,000 collective farms in the Soviet Union. Now there are only 97,000 supercollectives, a reduction by nearly two thirds.[19]

The reasons for amalgamation, as they emerge from a close study of official statements and of Soviet reality, are many and various. They all point toward more diversified farm production made possible by large-scale utilization of mechanized equipment. Soviet industry, it is claimed, has made feasible the application of mechanized energy per collective farm on a level approaching that of the industrial worker. The superfarms can use economically and efficiently the most modern agricultural machinery, including electrically driven equipment, a matter of vital strategic importance at a time when increasing amounts of oil products are being diverted for military purposes.[20]

The application of the latest scientific methods, the use of fertilizer, and the proper organization of labor on a scale unthinkable in units smaller than the supercollectives, are said to result in harvest yields and animal productivity unprecedented in Russia. The figures cited for the Moscow Province, for instance, claim that the larger farms yield six and a half times as much cash revenue as the earlier collectives, although the ratio in area is only four to one.

The possibilities of cutting down the overstaffed *kolkhoz* administrations are enormous. One typical merger of six farms, for example, allowed the release of fourteen "non-productive" village bureaucrats. On the all-Russian scale, such releases have probably supplied the labor-short industry, the Machine-Tractor Stations, and the communal livestock farms with more than a million additional hands.

Likewise the switch from the small "link" as the basic work team to the brigade, comprised of fifty to one hundred and more farmers, is justified on the grounds of greater efficiency. The brigade is large enough to warrant the setting aside of equipment exclusively for its own use. Also it can be responsible for a huge, continuous tract of land. Thus the brigade theory approximates the principle of mass production that has been found so rewarding in industry.

However, the overriding motive behind the farm mergers and the switch from the "link" to the brigade is rather the Kremlin's desire to tighten political controls than a search for economy, efficiency, and more systematic planning. Actually the two objectives are not mutually contradictory but, wherever they are, tighter controls take precedence.

Controls in the merged farms are rapidly becoming as ironclad as in industry. At no time have the peasants been so dependent on the government-owned Machine-Tractor Stations as now, for the vast tracts of land tilled by the supercollectives can be worked efficiently only with the aid of mechanized equipment. This dependence is further strengthened by the latest measure spelled out by Malenkov at the Nineteenth Party Congress: the liquidation of the subsidiary workshops hitherto maintained by practically every *kolkhoz*. The farmers must concentrate on agricultural production alone, he said, and turn to the government and to co-operatives for building materials, small tools, and similar products.

The most effective tightening of controls has been achieved through a more efficient deployment of Communist Party membership, made possible by the mergers. Whereas previously there were too few Communists in rural USSR to form a Party cell in every *kolkhoz*, each superfarm has such a cell, as do many individual brigades.

Similarly the secret police now finds it easier to deploy its emissaries in Soviet rural areas.

Also the state apparatus can exercise its control over the countryside with less effort, particularly in matters of education and indoctrination, and in the collection of compulsory grain deliveries.

Stalin is inexorably pushing his offensive on the agricultural front even if at a slower pace and more cautiously. His new revo-

lution in the countryside has already scored successes that are probably the most momentous of the entire Cold Civil War raging in the Soviet Union. They threaten to subdue the only major force in the country that has ever openly dared to challenge the Kremlin.[21]

CHAPTER 10

The Labor Front

> Our present government is such that the proletariat, organized to the last man, must protect itself against it. And we must use the workers' organizations for the protection of the workers against their government.
>
> LENIN

The labor front is the "coldest" of all fronts in Russia's Cold Civil War. The least purged class in the Soviet Union is the working class, and pressures on it are transmitted chiefly through methods of persuasion. There is compulsion, too, and a great deal of it, as we shall soon see, but it is kept in the background and explained away as something temporary, due to the hostile capitalist encirclement and other "objective circumstances."

The working class is never censured, never openly threatened, but is appealed to, each appeal containing flattery and promises of glory and well-being in the not too distant future. The Soviet worker is constantly being told that he belongs to the greatest and noblest of all classes, that he is the fountain of all creativeness, and that the factories and the whole great fatherland are his. The Communist Party is nothing but the "general staff" of the working class, as Lenin said, and the Party's sole object is to direct the efforts of this class toward creating an ideal world without coercion or exploitation, in which everyone will work according to his ability and consume according to his needs.

The inequalities and compulsions of the present, the Soviet worker is told, are passing phenomena made necessary by the survivals of the accursed past in the psychology of people and by the capitalist encirclement of the workers' island of socialism. It is a huge and mighty island, to be sure, but the accursed enemies of mankind—currently symbolized by "Wall Street imperial-

ism"—are conspiring daily and hourly to crush the haven of the victorious working class. Its only hope for escaping slavery and annihilation is to rally around the "general staff" and follow its lead.

The Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 rode to victory on words such as these. The workers responded—and put an end to old Russia. They gave their blood on the barricades, which stretched from the swamps of Byelorussia to the shores of the Pacific, and from the Arctic wastes to the mountains and waters of the Caucasus. With the slogan, "All Power to the Soviets," they rallied behind Lenin and Trotsky, and defeated the armies of White generals, Ukrainian nationalists, and the interventionist forces of fourteen powers.

The Russian worker believed that the Revolution was his, along with the factories and the whole country, yes, even the Communist Party. The vague new values that were emerging out of the chaos of the civil war derived their inspiration from him, the worker. "Proletarian morality," "proletarian art," "proletarian culture," workers' control of production, of courts, of justice—that was the order of the day.

On the still smoldering ruins of their country the Soviet workers began to build life anew in 1920. The industrial production of poor, backward, almost totally agricultural Russia had dropped to 15 per cent of its 1914 level, while steel, the very lifeblood of industry, had been reduced to 4.6 per cent of the 1913 output. Now the toil of the workers has made the USSR an industrial power second only to the United States, has created new and mighty cities, changed the course of rivers, and brought electricity to the "dark" and "deaf" corners of the sprawling land.

But in the process the worker has been dethroned. Once hailed as the master of the Communist Party and the Soviet state, he has become their servant. His factories, the erstwhile source of his pride and power, have become cages in which he is confined even as the serf is harnessed to the soil. It transpired that the social services provided for him were merely designed to keep him fit for production. And his very own organization, the trade union, set up solely to defend his rights, has become an instrument of suppression.

The process that dethroned the worker was a long one, spread over the life span of an entire generation, a life span replete with

anxiety, hope, and herculean labor. Ironically enough, the process started in 1920, the same year that the Soviet worker, fresh from his victories in the civil war, proud of his sense of ownership of country and factory, plunged into the creation of a workers' paradise.

The management of industry, as it crystallized during the years of war Communism, was carried out by collegia, or boards, completely dominated by workers. Two thirds of the board members belonged to the proletariat. The rest were experienced managers, engineers, and technicians, each and every one of whom could be appointed only by trade-union approval. This was genuine worker control, but it had one serious drawback—it did not work. The proletarians were unable to make up in enthusiasm and class consciousness what they lacked in knowledge and experience. The argument of trade-union leaders that, given time, the workers would master the art of management had no validity whatsoever. There was no time. Industry was in a state of collapse, the peasants refused to feed the urban population while the proletariat learned how to run factories, and the outside world was hostile.

Lenin himself took the lead in the fight against the collegiate system—which, incidentally, had its origin in the collegia which were originally set up by Peter the Great, who created state administration in Russia through ministries, and collegia to control the ministers. Attacking the idea that factories were to be used as schools of government for the workers, Lenin declared: "You cannot stay forever in the preparatory class of a school. That will not do. We are now grown up, and we shall be beaten and beaten again and again, if we behave like school children."[1]

These words, spoken at the Ninth Party Congress in the spring of 1920, resulted in decisions that gave the individual managers a free hand in executing policy. On the other hand, the Congress rejected the extreme measures dictated by Lenin's implacable logic. Factory committees made up of workers were still in a position to exert pressure on management, but they lost the right to control it or to interfere with its operations. By the end of 1920 some 85 per cent of Soviet industrial enterprises were under individual management. The fact that the Party encouraged the trade unions to give technical and professional training to workers earmarked for managerial posts could not make up for the

elimination of the proletariat from its position of domination in industry. The workers graduating into management would automatically join the ranks of bureaucracy and would inexorably tend to identify themselves and their interests with the mushrooming new Soviet elite.

Lenin's keen eye quickly spotted the rapid bureaucratization of government administration and government management in the republic he had founded, and he voiced his alarm at the Tenth Party Congress in March 1921: "Ours is a workers' government with a bureaucratic twist. Our present government is such that the proletariat, organized to the last man, must protect itself against it. And we must use the workers' organizations for the protection of the workers against their government."[2]

But even Lenin could not have it both ways. In the light of what followed, his words proved to be nothing but hypocrisy and sham.

The Tenth Congress passed a resolution drafted by Lenin himself, which stressed the role of the trade unions as a "school of Communism." A year later, in 1922, the trade unions gave up the right of equal participation in the selection of management.

With every year that followed, the trade unions yielded more and more of their rights and duties to protect the interests of their members until, by 1933, they were so completely controlled by the Party and the state that the People's Commissariat of Labor was abolished and its official functions as a government agency were transferred to the trade unions. A Soviet textbook on administrative law published in 1940 defined the situation with admirable precision: "Formally, the trade unions are not a party organization but, in fact, they are carrying out the directives of the Party. All leading organs of the trade unions consist primarily of Communists who execute the Party line in the entire work of the trade unions."[3]

The trade unions have thus been reduced to the status of an arm of the Communist Party and an organ of the Soviet government. This was a major victory for the Kremlin because trade-union membership in the USSR embraces practically all workers and employees. Those who do not join are deprived of social security benefits and, what is even worse, are suspected of opposition to the regime.

The subjugation of the trade unions did not proceed with com-

plete smoothness. Their head, Mikhail Tomsky, a trade unionist in the traditional Western sense of the word, fought all through the twenties for the independence of his organization from the employer (the state), for retention of board management, and for no differentials in wages. It was a losing battle. Tomsky's men were fired one after the other, and he himself was replaced by a Stalin man, N. M. Shvernik, now the titular head of the Soviet Union. In 1936, Tomsky committed suicide.

Some measure of worker participation in the running of individual factories was retained through the so-called "triangle." Composed of the factory director, secretary of the local Communist cell, and a trade-union representative, the triangle made all the decisions that were allowed to originate in the plant. Needless to say, the policy directives and the production plan were handed down from above.

The position of the workers' representative was the weakest in the essentially weak triangle. Behind the Party secretary was the prestige of the Kremlin; he was frequently also the local agent of the secret police. Behind the director was The Plan with all its frenzied urgencies. Behind the workers' representative was the trade union, itself an instrument of the state and the Party, whose main functions were openly defined as "mobilizing workers for the building up of socialism" and as a "school of Communism."

The triangle was allowed to linger on during the crucial years of the first two Five-Year Plans, which decided the fate of Russia's industrialization. These were the years of unbelievable toil and self-sacrifice, and the triangle helped to exact the needed effort from the workers, by giving them some sense of participation in control as well as in work. Those years of the battle for industrialization had their moments of romantic idealism, fostered by writers, poets, composers, and artists, all of them mobilized for the task.[4] Millions of workers, especially of the younger generation, responded to the "pathos of construction," even as the participants in the civil war had responded to the "pathos of the Revolution." The effects of the effort on the health of the nation were appalling, but the results astounded the entire world, marking the emergence of a new industrial giant in the international arena.

Both urban and rural Russia were transformed beyond recog-

nition and beyond reversal. The 523,000 tractors and 182,000 combines produced by Soviet factories had made collectivization a reality and allowed the villages to release millions of men and women for factory work. Industrial production increased nine times, as compared with 1913, and the number of workers also multiplied. There were 2,885,000 workers in 1913. The number dropped to 1,601,700 in 1922, rose to 11,530,000 in 1928, and skyrocketed to 31,200,000 by 1940. There was a temporary setback during the last war when, in 1943 for instance, the labor force in the Soviet national economy dropped to 19,300,000. That was the lowest point. By 1948 the number had risen to 33,400,000, and at the time of this writing the non-agricultural labor force of the Soviet Union embraces at least 34,000,000 persons.[5]

Along with the number of industrial workers have grown the effectiveness and multiplicity of measures which the Soviet government has devised to protect its interests as employer. These interests are manifold and, though official Soviet propaganda has tried to identify them with the interests of the "toiling masses," the cumulative effect of the protective measures undertaken by the government has been to strait-jacket these same masses.

The Kremlin has achieved results by applying what the Russians call the rule by "whips and cookies."

The whips were introduced stage by stage, some of which, such as the strangulation of board management, we have already recorded. The triangle had begun to wither away at the time of the inauguration of the Five-Year Plan, and all authority and responsibility were placed in the management. The trade unions were the chief victims, for the Kremlin protected itself by retaining all powers of control and policy decisions, and by pressuring practically the entire managerial personnel into joining the Communist Party and thus subjecting themselves to its discipline.

Labor has had to increase its productivity and work longer hours without, at the same time, getting more for its effort. The seven-hour workday guaranteed by the 1936 Constitution was lengthened on June 26, 1940, to eight hours, and the six-day week (with each sixth day as a day of rest) was replaced by the seven-day week, with Sunday as a day of rest, and Saturday a

full workday. Salaries and wages paid on a monthly basis were retained, but piecework rates were lowered.

The state also acted to cut down the rate of labor turnover, slackness on the job, absenteeism, malingering, and other manifestations of poor labor discipline, caused primarily by nightmarish living and housing conditions.

The first timid steps toward strengthening labor discipline were taken in the early thirties, when workers refusing jobs offered them were deprived of unemployment insurance benefits (1930), when managers were forbidden to "pirate" workers from each other, and laborers deserting their jobs were deprived of living quarters (1932). The real compulsory acts began coming in the late thirties. The trade unions had been completely tamed, and the Soviet industry was in the throes of an acute labor shortage. The reasons for the shortage are so revelatory of the workings of the Soviet state mechanism as to make a brief discussion of them mandatory.

By that time, the reader will recall, the peasants had won some concessions from the Kremlin in terms of private allotments and opportunities to sell their surplus products on the "free" markets. The lot of the rural population had improved, but the standard of living of the city workers had deteriorated and their real wages had declined. The differences between the real income of the city workers and the farmers, in favor of the latter, destroyed the economic incentives to move from villages to industrial centers.

The government could have used its dictatorial powers to lower rural standards, but the energies and resources that would have been wasted by the almost certain peasant opposition and the efforts to crush it would have adversely affected industrial production and military preparations. Nor was it feasible at that time to improve urban living conditions, which could have been done only at the expense of the peasants. The government chose not to coerce the peasant for the time being. Instead, it tightened all disciplinary screws to the point of freezing the workers to their jobs. City housewives and children were manipulated into jobs in practically every branch of industry. The government also inaugurated a far-reaching program of drafting boys and girls, primarily from agricultural areas, into

industrial training schools for the purpose of creating a gigantic army of State Labor Reserves.

The influx of women into industry, which started on a large scale in the late twenties and early thirties, was heralded as a symptom of the emancipation and independence of the weaker sex, rather than as a significant factor in the solution of the labor shortage. The rapid rise of the number of women wage earners, however, pointed to other and much more important reasons for the utilization of female labor. Working women increased a family's income, thereby slowing down the decline in the standard of living made inevitable by mammoth capital investments and ever growing military expenditures. Women have proved more disciplined and more stable in holding onto their jobs than men, and have influenced members of their families in the same direction, thereby acting as a brake on labor turnover. They have strengthened labor discipline in numerous ways. Finally, the extensive employment of women had a military advantage: men could be released for training in peacetime, and for fighting in time of war, without paralyzing industry.

The number of employed women rose from 3,100,000 in 1927–28 to 6,000,000 in 1932, to 9,400,000 in 1937, to 12,900,000 (Plan estimate) in 1942.[6] More recent statistics are unavailable, but the now purged Politburo member, N. A. Voznesensky, disclosed in 1947 that the proportion of employed women had risen from 38 per cent in 1940 to 53 per cent in 1942.[7] *Pravda* of March 8, 1948, indicated that this proportion had dropped somewhat in 1947, a natural phenomenon caused by the end of the war.

The women now make up about half of the total Soviet employed population. There are many engineers among them, as well as doctors, teachers, and administrators. They also constitute a basic source of manpower in all branches of Soviet economy, including the steel, coal, and oil industries.

The increase in juvenile labor kept pace with that of female labor. The shortage of manpower created by the ambitious Five-Year Plans led the Soviet government to repeal its own strict child labor laws, and more and more young people were absorbed by industry and by training and vocational schools. This was done on the principle of voluntary enrollment, and the graduates of factory trade schools were expected, but not com-

pelled, to work for three years wherever assigned by the organizations which had given them their training.

On October 2, 1940, however, all that changed. On that day the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet decreed the annual draft of eight hundred thousand to one million boys between fourteen and seventeen years of age for training in trade and railroad schools and in special factory schools for mining, building, and metalworks. During the war the draft was extended to girls, a measure reinforced by a subsequent edict of June 19, 1947.

On the day that the first decree was announced the Soviet government introduced tuition fees in the upper grades of high schools and in all higher educational institutions. This drastically curtailed educational opportunities for the children of the majority of workers and peasants, but did not affect the children of the highly paid elite. The sons and daughters of the lower classes are almost compelled, therefore, to remain laborers for the rest of their lives. Upon completion of compulsory training they are required to work for four years wherever assigned by the Central Administration for State Labor Reserves.

During the war a total of 2,460,000 children of both sexes actually completed their vocational training,[8] and the fourth Five-Year Plan (1946–50) provided for an additional 4,500,000 to be trained. Thus it may be reasonably expected that by 1960 a workers' army 20,000,000 strong will reinforce the labor ranks. It will be a young people's army, coached not only in industrial skills but also in the art of warfare. The draftees lead the life of military recruits. They wear uniforms and live under a regime similar to that in the army and navy cadet schools. The curriculum, furthermore, provides for two hours a week to be devoted to political indoctrination, though there is no specific number of hours assigned to general subjects. These millions of young people are shielded during their formative years from practically every conceivable outside influence, including that of the family. They will theoretically provide the Kremlin with a large hard core of labor reserves trained for industrial jobs, semimilitarized and indoctrinated in blind obedience to the state. The state should not find them difficult to control and should not have to resort to the methods now used in keeping discipline among the workers of the USSR.

Among the first timid steps toward compulsions already referred to was an attempt to introduce the so-called workbook for all job holders, as a form of identification and control. Opposition to the workbooks proved so great that the government was compelled to fall back on substitutes in its efforts to curb labor turnover, absenteeism, and other violations of labor discipline. With the strengthening of the Stalin regime and the growing manpower shortage, the Kremlin finally introduced the workbooks on December 20, 1938. Every job holder in the USSR is required to have one and must leave it with the management for the duration of his employment. The workbook is withheld from the laborer leaving without authorization, and he cannot obtain another job without first presenting his workbook. It contains the man's full employment record, including any disciplinary action ever taken against him and the reasons for such action.

Eight days after the introduction of workbooks, the government issued a decree further stiffening all rules pertaining to labor discipline. Management was now compelled to impose strict penalties. Every breach of discipline was to be followed by loss of a job or housing or curtailment of social insurance benefits.

Even more far-reaching was the labor "reform" of June 26, 1940.[9] For the first time in the history of the Soviet Union the Politburo openly introduced coercion into labor relationships, making them subject to the Criminal Code. Once a worker accepted a job, he was frozen in it. Such things as the unauthorized change of job, absenteeism, and lateness in getting to work were now declared crimes punishable by law. This measure, incidentally, provided indirect legislation against strikes. Whereas hitherto strikes had not been legally outlawed—they were simply forbidden by an unwritten code that no one dared violate—they now became criminal offenses. They could be dealt with as unauthorized absence from a job. Such absence is punishable by six months of corrective labor—that is, labor in the plant without loss of liberty, but with a 25 per cent reduction of wages.

Even such minor offenses as loafing on the job, coming to work in a state of intoxication, being twenty minutes late, and even refusal to work overtime are dealt with as crimes against the state.

To make the law more effective, court action is taken against managers who fail to press criminal proceedings against offenders

or authorize absence from work on such "trivial" grounds as moving to new living quarters, meeting one's wife at the railroad station, or taking a sick member of the family to a place where he or she might be better taken care of.

Court action is also taken against doctors who are too liberal in issuing sick certificates, the only foolproof method of escaping punishment. The Soviet physician is constantly deluged by requests for medical dispensation on medical as well as nonmedical grounds. People frequently turn to him in desperation as the last hope, especially if they are repeat offenders and are therefore threatened with a prison sentence. Some of them try to fool the doctor by simulating sickness. Others come out in the open and beg for assistance. The physician is thus faced with ethical as well as medical problems. He is, furthermore, placed in a most delicate and dangerous position, for he can never know who among his patients is an *agent provocateur*. The responsibility of the medical profession in Russia is great and complex. In the words of a young American sociologist who has made a thorough study of the problem, the doctors are "under pressure to assure an adequate level of health while preventing abuses of the medical system."[10]

The economic reasons for the sternness of the state toward doctors may be gleaned from an item in the trade-union organ, *Trud* (*Labor*) for February 5, 1949. Rejoicing over the eleven per cent decrease in the number of working days lost due to illness and accidents during the first nine months of 1948, as compared with the same period in 1947, the paper stated: "This saved millions of workdays for industry . . . the incorrect and unjustified granting of sick leaves leads to the loss of many workdays, causes the illegal spending of the social insurance funds."

Not content with subjecting the workers, managers, and physicians to criminal prosecution for failure to obey or enforce the new labor law, the government has subjected the courts themselves to pressures so extraordinary that they violate articles of Stalin's own Constitution. Disciplinary action, including prosecution, has been taken against judges found guilty of meting out punishment short of the maximum provided by the decree of 1940, thus destroying even the nominal independence of the courts guaranteed by Article 112 of the Constitution ("Judges

are independent and subject only to the law"). To make the judges directly responsible and subject to punishment for "liberalism," the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet further violated the Constitution (Article 102) by issuing a decree, on August 10, 1940, preventing cases dealing with labor discipline from being tried before "people's assessors" (laymen who assist the judge in hearing the case).

The measures described, as well as a number of others too numerous and detailed to discuss here, have resulted in chaining the workers to their jobs, in compelling them to work longer hours, and in reducing absenteeism, malingering, and general loafing during work hours. But all this was insufficient to guarantee greater output. Production per worker had to be raised, and raised substantially, in order to approximate even faintly the productivity of labor in the capitalist countries which the USSR has been determined "to overtake and surpass."

The problems involved were staggering. New equipment had to be introduced on a mass scale, techniques and organization had to be streamlined, and millions of workers straight from the fields had to be trained and integrated into the industrial labor force. The waste, the wreckage of valuable machinery, and the accidental mutilation of workers have been enormous, but so also were the pressures, both economic and political. From the date of the inauguration of the first Five-Year Plan in 1928 to 1940, labor productivity was more than tripled, according to official Soviet claims. The Russians likewise contend that, whereas the average productivity of Soviet workers in 1928 amounted to 16.2 per cent of US workers, it rose to 40.5 per cent in 1940. Comparisons with British and German labor productivity made by Soviet statisticians show even greater Soviet progress.[11] These claims are no doubt exaggerated, but they give some indication of the progress made.[12]

The economic pressures exerted to increase labor productivity are effected through the universal application of the piecework system in Soviet industry. The principle upon which this system rests is that the income of the workers can rise only with increased labor productivity. But that is not all. The piecework norms are so adjusted—and periodically readjusted—as to keep the rise in wages behind the rate at which labor productivity climbs upward. To begin with, the norms are based on the

performance of the best workers, the so-called Stakhanovites. They achieve their output records partially because their work is better organized and partially because of the favorable conditions created for them by the management. The run-of-the-mill worker is then compelled to attain the same results under normal working conditions; first, because he will not make a living wage if he fails to do so and, second, because he will be penalized if his output is too far under the established norm. No sooner does he make a step upward on the ladder of productivity than the piecework rates are readjusted once more. The trade-union movement in the free world has a name for this process—the speed-up—and has been fighting it relentlessly. But the Soviet trade unions, far from opposing the government's wage policy, are in effect the chief instruments for carrying it out. The unions organize competitions between individual workers, between teams, factories, and entire industries. The extraordinary performances achieved during such campaigns then become the standard norms, with rates carefully readjusted to keep the rise in wages lagging behind the increase in productivity.

It is clear from the above that there is great inequality of income among Soviet workers. The pay spread in the USSR is, as a matter of fact, substantially wider than in capitalistic America, according to a survey by the United States Department of Labor.[13] The differentiation in wages is further aggravated by the vast and complex system of rewards calculated to spur the Soviet labor force to ever greater effort. Bonuses, better housing, vacations in the Caucasus and Crimea, honors and medals go to those who have achieved distinction by virtue of greater output. But these are the very people who have automatically boosted their incomes. Hence the incentive system tends to intensify group stratification.

Despite the inequalities and resentments inherent in the Soviet incentive system, it is definitely one of the "cookies" in the Kremlin "whips and cookies" methods of dealing with the labor force. Every worker is made to feel that by diligence, ingenuity, and devotion he can join the higher income bracket, get better housing, or even become the envied recipient of a 100,000- or 200,000-ruble Stalin Prize.

Among the other "cookies" are the blessings of full employment, free medical service, and state social insurance. This

insurance includes old-age pensions, sanatoria and rest homes, children's camps, disability payments, etc. Social insurance is administered by trade unions with funds provided by membership fees and government grants. Thus, according to *Pravda* for April 21, 1949, the trade unions ran that year some eight thousand workers' clubs, including the truly magnificent Palaces of Culture which are always shown to visiting foreigners, more than eight thousand libraries, five thousand moving picture theaters, four thousand stadiums and other sport centers.

These and other aspects of the social insurance and welfare program are no doubt relieving the poverty-ridden daily life of the Soviet worker, whose standard of living is among the lowest in the world. The program is presented as one of the greatest achievements of the Soviet regime in pursuit of noble, humane policies designed to protect the worker against insecurity. When the Soviet press admits on rare occasions that workers in some capitalist countries receive good wages and even social services, it explains these achievements away either by saying that they are the result of the militant fight of workers or the sinister methods of employers who recognize the necessity of keeping their enslaved workers in good shape.

However, the pressures for greater output that began with the inauguration of the Five-Year Plan in 1928 forced the Soviet authorities to let the cat out of the bag. In the words of their own organ, *Problems of Labor* (May–June 1931): "The task of social insurance lies in the many-sided, relentless daily struggle for the increase of labor output. . . . This is the foremost duty of the social insurance agencies, and their performance is to be judged by the way they discharge this duty."

Just as the medical profession has been consciously forged into an instrument for keeping the labor force at a level adequate to perform its production tasks, so has the entire social insurance and recreational program in the USSR been directed toward the same aim. The goal is fitness for work and military service, not welfare or happiness.

Soviet propaganda stresses welfare and happiness, and this stress is but part of what constitutes the major aspect of internal Soviet propaganda: to lead the working class to accept through persuasion what has been forced upon it through coercion. Just as in the early days of the Bolshevik Revolution, the worker is

extolled, flattered, appealed to. Everything is done in his name and allegedly on his initiative. He, the worker, is the best representative of the New Soviet Man (see Chapter 13), the prototype of the man of the future, the demigod.

That this line is not altogether successful, that there is dissatisfaction among the Soviet workers, may be seen from the nature of the grievances aired in the Soviet press, grievances that are reiterated in much sharper and more outspoken form by Soviet refugees.[14] The tensions may be discerned also from the care with which the Kremlin perpetually feeds its system of scapegoats. These whipping boys come and go, depending on the internal and international situation, but one of them—the Soviet bureaucrat—is always there to take the punishment. The bureaucratic front is always in action.

CHAPTER 11

The Bureaucratic Front

Bureaucracy is a parasite created by the inherent antagonisms which rend society.

LENIN

The task is to smash bureaucracy.

STALIN

The Stalin age in Russia is the age of bureaucracy.

The Revolution envisaged by Lenin was to have created a republic in which bureaucrats were few in numbers and weak in power, doomed to extinction by the withering away of the state. Factories were to be run by the workers themselves, and agriculture was to be organized into a network of large co-operative farms. Free discussion and experimentation in every field of human endeavor, including industrial production, science, education, and the arts, was to be the universal law.

These dreams collapsed even during Lenin's lifetime, and their resurrection was made impossible by the emergence of the Stalinist superstate. There is no point in blaming Stalin alone. The measures which his master and predecessor, Lenin, had taken to safeguard the Bolshevik Revolution actually precluded the slightest chance of doing away with the bureaucrat. For in safeguarding the Revolution Lenin established a dictatorship, which invariably breeds bureaucracy. A dictatorship means centralization of power, functioning through a chain of delegated authority. The greater the centralization the longer and more complex the chain. Under Stalin, dictatorship became total and the state supreme. Thus the original fragile structure of Soviet bureaucracy evolved into a total bureaucracy.

Because Stalin lacked Lenin's intellectual gifts, and because he was possessed by a passion for personal power, Stalin discarded the

one weapon on which Lenin had relied for curbing the growth of bureaucracy—democracy inside the ruling Communist Party.

Had Lenin lived longer, he, too, would inevitably have discarded this weapon, for it seems humanly impossible to retain genuine intraparty democracy in a society functioning under an ironclad dictatorship by that same party. Either the dictatorship is weakened under the impact of free and open discussion, and is gradually done away with, or democracy is strangled. Possibly Lenin actually envisaged the disintegration of the iron rule he established. And he sensed a deadly threat to intraparty democracy in Stalin's tendencies toward centralization. "Comrade Stalin," he wrote in his last will and testament, "having become Secretary-General, has concentrated an enormous power in his hands, and I am not sure that he always knows how to use that power with sufficient caution."[1]

This was written on December 25, 1922. Ten days later the ailing founder of the Soviet republic wrote a postscript to his will, suggesting that Stalin be removed from his strategic position. He followed this up on March 5, 1923, with a brief letter to Stalin, breaking off all personal relations with him.[2]

But Lenin was too late. Within four days he suffered a severe stroke from which he never recovered. Stalin continued to entrench himself. With his victory over Leon Trotsky, the fragile intraparty democracy was completely obliterated, and the Soviet state became the most centralized the world has known. Its chain of delegated authority was now the longest and most complex in existence. Russia had entered the age of bureaucracy.

The term "bureaucracy," when applied to any state which controls all means of production and distribution, all instruments of coercion and persuasion, and all scientific investigation and creative art, is not confined to officialdom alone. The term, as used here, includes, of course, all state servants wielding any degree of authority, and embraces all functionaries of the ruling Communist Party. They are known as the *apparat*, and constitute the cream of the bureaucratic class in the USSR. The term embraces the entire managerial personnel of industry and agriculture, trade, transportation, communications, and even trade unions. Finally, included in this class are the members of the legal and medical professions, of scientific, educational, and artistic organizations, and all officers of the police and the

armed forces. Bureaucracy in Stalin's Russia includes everyone outside the great masses of industrial workers. manual laborers, peasants, and white-collar employees who have no responsibility. Translating this into American terms, Soviet bureaucracy is roughly equivalent to our middle class.

Starting with a handful in 1917, under a regime which proclaimed its undying hostility to bureaucrats, their number grew to two and a half million in 1926[3] and had reached the astronomical figure of ten million by 1939, according to Molotov's report to the Eighteenth Party Congress in March of that year. By 1940, together with their families, the bureaucrats accounted for about 17 per cent of the entire Soviet population,[4] and during the war their ranks were swelled still further. The end of hostilities did not substantially decrease the number of bureaucrats in the USSR because of several factors. One of these was the enormous standing army with its necessary complement of officers. Another was the necessity of maintaining tremendous security organizations and the great propaganda networks employed in the Kremlin's cold war against the democratic West and the Soviet people. Finally, the expansion of industry and construction resulted in mushrooming cadres of technical and administrative personnel.

There is a great deal of difference in the authority Soviet bureaucrats wield and the privileges they enjoy, but as a class they have a monopoly on the *exercise* of all power in the country. But they do not, at least not yet, *control* its source in the Kremlin.

The bureaucrats also divide among themselves the lion's share of the good things that make up a high standard of living—high only in comparison to the standard of living of the average Soviet worker, peasant, or white-collar employee. In addition, the bureaucrats enjoy the protection of the Kremlin from *excessive* resentment on the part of the underprivileged masses. The protection is both physical and ideological. The first is provided by the secret police controlled by the Kremlin; the second by Communist theorists, headed by Stalin himself, who have abandoned the equality basis of the Revolution's first period as anti-Bolshevik distortions and now denounce it. Depending on the expediencies of the moment, the "distortions" are sometimes branded as rightist, sometimes as leftist.

In return, the bureaucrats serve the top Communist leadership by translating directives from above into concrete action, by following unquestioningly the tortuous Party line, and by "selling" it to the masses. The devotion behind that service ranges all the way from blind fanaticism to empty lip service. The quality of their work varies accordingly.

But Soviet bureaucrats share more than long hours, the exercise of authority, and the enjoyment of privileges. They all have an ever present feeling of insecurity and fear, a feeling implanted and nourished by the shrewd, calculating men in the Kremlin. Irrevocably dependent on bureaucracy, and, therefore protecting it from excessive resentments, these men are at the same time wary of its monstrous growth and its unorganized but persisting drive for increased authority. Hence the Kremlin for its own protection keeps the bureaucrats in the grip of fear and insecurity.

The Kremlin has a real and complex problem on its hands. The centralization of the regime has fostered the growth of the bureaucratic class. Its proportions are now so massive that it is a force to be reckoned with, if only because of the sheer weight of its numbers. At the same time the harsh demands of the Five-Year Plans for greater productivity have made bureaucracy's clamor for additional authority a challenge to the Kremlin control.

To safeguard its prerogatives, the Kremlin has contrived a system of protective measures so complicated that some of them tend to cancel each other out. In their effect, however, they constitute a miracle of expediency that has made it possible for the Communist leadership to expand the Soviet production effort and to channel it in the desired general direction, without weakening controls over the bureaucrats and the other strata of Soviet society.

In general these measures adhere to the favorite Communist tactics of infiltration, terror, and reward.

Infiltration is the only one of these methods that has been used consistently and systematically for over a quarter of a century. Stalin formulated the policy way back in 1925 when he recognized "the possibility of the state apparatus breaking loose from Party control, the possibility of the Party losing its position of leadership in respect of the state apparatus." The

solution he prescribed was phrased no less clumsily. He proposed "to assign Party members to the nodal points in the state apparatus and to see to it that the apparatus of the state is then subjected to the Party leadership."[5] In other words, he proposed to make bureaucrats out of Communist Party members.

At first the policy could not be carried out because there were not enough trained and qualified Communist Party members. Stalin's answer was to draft bureaucrats into the Party. The conversion of Communists into bureaucrats, and the absorption of bureaucrats by the Party, has served to reinforce the normal control machinery at the disposal of the Soviet state.

The Communist Party made a real effort to attract to its ranks the most capable and energetic men and women in all fields. The March 1939 Congress of the Party annulled the previous rule, giving preference to factory workers for Party membership. This change of policy occurred because the Great Purge of 1936–38 had swept through the Communist ranks with the destructiveness of a tornado. The membership of the ruling party was reduced by January 1938 to less than two million (1,920,002).

By that time a new type of bureaucrat had come into being, created by the intensive industrialization and collectivization that have been changing Russia ever since 1928. Factory executives and engineers, farm chairmen and agronomists, and the Stakhanovites, those masters of the speed-up, were growing in numbers and influence. They were all young men, practical, enterprising, and motivated by ambition rather than ideological considerations. By opening the Party's doors to them, the Kremlin was trying both to keep them under tighter control and to use them as a blood transfusion for the Party itself. Membership had risen to 2,306,933 by January 1, 1939, and to 3,399,975 one year later. Most of the neophites were from the new elite. They were the source of most of the achievements, innovations, and inventions, and the official press could now, with greater truth, identify the Communist Party and its leadership with progress in all fields of endeavor.

There was also another, and much less desirable, effect—from the point of view of the Communists: the Soviet people were coming to regard the Bolshevik party not as a mass organization of the proletariat but as the organization of the new elite, the bureaucrats.

Stalin's method of saturating the ranks of bureaucrats with

Communists, and of absorbing factory managers, *kolkhoz* chairmen, scientists, writers, and others of the new elite into the Party, was reflected in the composition of the delegates to the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party in 1939. Fully 1166 out of 1569 delegates, or 74.5 per cent, belonged to the Soviet bureaucracy. Another indication of the success of this policy of infiltration lies in the fact that in 1923 only 29 per cent of factory directors held Party cards, whereas by 1936 the percentage of card holders had risen to nearly 100.[6] No comparable figures have been given for subsequent years but there is every indication that the trend remains unchanged. In the armed forces, Marshal Vasilevsky reported to the Nineteenth Party Congress, 86 per cent of the generals and officers are members of the Party or Young Communist League.

Members of the managerial class, whether they are holders of Party cards or not, are makers of things and not ideological practitioners. Their lifework is administration and production, and they will deliver, if given a free hand. But a free hand is the one thing the men in the Kremlin are most reluctant to give, unless driven to the wall. And this was exactly what happened during the war.

In the army, the principle of *yedinonachaliye* (single authority) gave military commanders ascendency over political commissars. Likewise the same policy of single command and responsibility in the industrial plants put managers and foremen over those factory officials whose main function was to uphold the Party line.

The principle of *yedinonachaliye* in industry had been established as a government policy as early as 1925 but had never been fully implemented because of the Kremlin's deeply rooted suspicion of any group demanding authority. The war compelled the Soviet leadership to relax its grip on industrial management, which lost no time in taking advantage of its greater freedom of action. As a result, wartime Russia achieved miracles of production which helped it emerge victorious from the most perilous ordeal in its history.

To meet quotas, factory managers and foremen not only exercised to the limit the authority invested in them but frequently exceeded it and even indulged in corrupt practices, in graft, or, to use the popular Russian slang word for it, in *blat*.

Corruption is the inevitable shark preying upon every wartime

economy, but in Russia *blat* reached monstrous proportions because of the terrible shortages. Shortages are a chronic disease of Soviet economy to this day, but during the war they were nearly disastrous. There were critical shortages of manpower, raw materials, equipment, factory sites, food and dwellings for the workers. Production managers responsible for carrying out the rigidly set, and often arbitrary, plans worked out in Moscow operated under the most hazardous and desperate conditions. They were always aware that underfulfillment meant disgrace and demotion, and sometimes arrest and exile to a concentration camp. Therefore competition for personnel and materials involved a fight with no holds barred. Graft, fraud, and the falsification of records became commonplace.

The Soviet wartime control machinery, strained to the breaking point by the demands upon it, was helpless in the face of the avalanche of corruption. Appeals to "Bolshevik consciousness" fell on deaf ears.

Even when they are Party members, most Soviet managers and foremen are first of all engineers, technicians, and executives. They are also driven by personal ambition, avarice, and the implacable demands of the Soviet industrial plan. During the war they had to resort to the "capitalist" practice of appealing to man's craving for private gain and personal well-being, and they do so to this day. More often than not they are themselves possessed by such cravings, and succumb easily to the temptations of the bonuses with which the Soviet government lavishly rewards the slightest achievements in industry. These bonuses often equal or exceed the salaries.

To understand the scope and complexity of the problems involved, one must bear in mind that many transactions which in our economy are considered legitimate business deals—and, moreover, deals usually left to the discretion of lower-echelon executives—constitute in the Soviet Union crimes against the state and encroachments upon the prerogatives of leadership. The Kremlin sees in such encroachments a challenge to its authority and its power of control. Hence the check and double-check system in the USSR, which has grown to such proportions that it has given birth to a bureaucracy all its own.

Take, for example, the network of controls over the director of a large industrial plant. The ministry to which the plant belongs

controls the director through the Glavk, or a subdivision of the ministry in charge of the manufacture of a given type of products, or the running of plants in a given area. The ministry also cracks the whip over the director through its department of inspection and control.

The State Planning Commission never takes its eyes off him through its check on fulfillment of plans.

The Ministry of Finance has a two-pronged check over the head of the plant: the accounts are supervised by the State Bank; the investment grant is controlled through the Industrial Bank.

The Ministry of State Control keeps a careful watch on the director, as does the Ministry of State Security, or the secret police.

The Communist Party also keeps its eye on the director through its "apparatus" in the district where the factory is located, and through the latter's Party cell.

Control inside the factory is carried out not only by the Communists. The trade union has some say, as we have seen. And there is the chief accountant, who is more independent of his boss than any other factory employee. The director has the right to name a person for the job of chief accountant, but has no right to hire or fire him.

The accumulated weight of these forms of control seem crushing enough, but it is nowhere sufficient to hold in complete check the ambitious, resourceful captains of Soviet industry upon whom the Kremlin must depend.[7] The Soviet leadership has, therefore, supplemented the formal system of check and double-check with a spectacular and highly effective informal control mechanism, the name of which is *samokritika*, or self-criticism.

The definition of self-criticism, as given by the official Soviet *Political Dictionary*, presents it as a great national institution reflecting the spirit of genuine democracy allegedly prevailing in the Soviet Union. Self-criticism is called upon to "expose the deficiencies and errors in the work of particular persons, organizations and institutions on the basis of a free, businesslike discussion by the toiling masses of all problems of economic-political life." Self-criticism is also expected to achieve one more thing—and a significant thing it is: "to develop the ability to see, uncover, acknowledge one's mistakes, and to learn from them."[8]

Everyone is invited to take part in self-criticism—as long as the

rules are observed. Therein lies the catch, for neither the *Political Dictionary* nor any other Soviet source has spelled out all the rules. The most important one of them, as a matter of fact, has never even been mentioned publicly, although the entire machinery of coercion is geared for the detection and punishment of anyone daring to violate that rule. It provides for the criticism of local leadership but never of the national leadership; for criticism of the execution of plans and policies but never of the directives which outlined them, or of the over-all results.

One must be extremely cautious in interpreting statements made in the heat of a self-criticism campaign. The exaggerated charges and accusations which seem to be corroborated by voluntary, or involuntary, admissions of failure by the lesser bureaucrats, often create the impression of total chaos, a near collapse of Soviet economy and administration. The student of Soviet affairs must never lose sight of the fact that self-criticism, as manipulated by the Kremlin, is above all a propaganda instrument. It is, as a matter of fact, Stalin's most effective weapon on the bureaucratic front, capable of killing a dozen birds with one stone.

Self-criticism cuts the elite down to size, directs resentments away from the leadership, and keeps administrators, executives, and all the men working under them at an angry distance from each other. The improvements which occasionally result from self-criticism are usually credited to the wise, all-seeing Teacher, Leader, and Genius, and are made, more often than not, at the expense of some one sector of the bureaucracy, serving as a warning to the rest. The purse strings are controlled from Moscow, and rarely are additional sums allotted for improvement of living conditions as a result of a public airing of grievances. The airing, however, does create an illusion of active mass participation by the "toilers" in the running of things, and provides for an opportunity to "let off steam."

Unlike the American practice of concentrating the heat of criticism on the Chief Executive and his right-hand men, Soviet self-criticism pulverizes the small fry. The leadership, the over-all policies, the Party line are all sacred and may not be questioned. The standards are double with a vengeance. Stalin, the most inaccessible leader in modern history, publicly chides local officials for inaccessibility, encouraging the people to attack them. He, who has demanded repeatedly that lesser officials be exposed to

public criticism, has seen to it that his own infallibility should never be questioned.

By welcoming criticism of functionaries and institutions at public meetings, by printing in the press articles and letters expressing grievances, by airing complaints over the radio, the men in the Kremlin have made self-criticism serve them in many other ways. It creates the illusion among the people that not all is lost, that there is a power, namely, the leadership, which is ready to listen to them and to protect them from the local tyrants. Self-criticism enables the central authorities to hold their ears close to the ground and gauge the temper of the people, without being exposed to their judgment. Policies may be discreetly modified before a major calamity forces an open retreat. Through an analysis of local complaints, the Kremlin can hear the ominous creaks in the bureaucratic machine and take timely measures to check abuses, punish the guilty ones, and, above all, tighten controls where necessary.

Every aspect of self-criticism spells danger for the bureaucrat —danger and fear. There is even the fear of not criticizing, for this might be interpreted as symptomatic of a lack of vigilance, as failure to stand guard over the interests of the great fatherland. Then there is the fear of criticizing, for the tables might be turned against you, easily and with lightning speed. There is also the fear of being criticized, for punishment is swift and merciless. And likewise there is the fear of not being criticized, for you might be accused of stifling criticism, or of having bribed your way out of it.

Above all, you must acknowledge the correctness of criticism, once it is leveled at you, for such failure is interpreted as defiance of the great national institution of witch-hunting, approved by Stalin himself. And if you do not acknowledge it, the dangers are only too obvious.

The Kremlin has made sure that the people do not have it in their power to punish bureaucrats. The meting out of all punishment is the prerogative of the men at the top. There have been no wholesale massacres of bureaucratic elements in the Soviet Union ever since the Great Purge, which destroyed several million men and women, but the memory of it haunts the nation to the present day. The current gamut of punishment, which runs all the way from reprimands and criticism to slave labor and execution, is

sufficient to force state functionaries to toe the line and demonstrate miracles of ingenuity in executing directives.

However, the Kremlin is even worried about the authority invested in the bureaucrats for the day-to-day execution of directives. But, without such authority, administrators and managerial personnel become bogged down in the quagmire of rigid centralization.

Caught on the horns of this dilemma, the Kremlin blows hot and cold, depending on many factors, some as clear as day—such as the demands of a national emergency like the last war—and others buried in secrecy which may involve preparations for a change in the Party line, or struggles within the walls of the Kremlin.

These self-contradictory factors are frequently at work at one and the same time, so that on the heels of a curb on initiative and authority comes a demand for more initiative and greater authority. This helps explain why Stalin, the archsuppressor of independent action and decision-making at lower levels, warns against "swimming with the current"; why he who has transformed criticism into an inquisition insists that "self-criticism must not weaken leadership, but is, on the contrary, necessary to strengthen it."

Such strengthening of the authority of the bureaucrats is one of the means employed by the Soviet oligarchy to prevent them from becoming demoralized. The bureaucrats are set above the men they supervise—by virtue of authority, social standing, and the standard of living.

The bureaucrats are the leading members in all Soviet communities, and form the majority in various committees and Soviets. The bureaucratic class receives more honorary titles and more medals than any other group, and the uniforms its members wear are more resplendent. They work in rooms with more air and sunshine, receive higher incomes, dine and play in swankier clubs than those open to people in lower groups. The bureaucrats participate in more official and social functions, including the fabulous Kremlin receptions, and have first choice of tickets to theatrical premieres, sports events, and various national shows, such as the November Seventh and May First parades in the Red Square, the Sport and Air shows, or the colorful Festivals of National Arts.

In times of rationing, the rations of bureaucrats are higher than

those of wage earners, and the stores set aside for the elite are better stocked. The clinics, hospitals, and vacation spots reserved for them are inferior only to those serving the top leadership and its entourage.

Taxation on income, which never goes beyond 13 per cent, favors the new elite.

The social standing and the material rewards that go with bureaucratic jobs, the hard work and study that go into training for the jobs, the risks involved in the daily discharge of duties, compel the bureaucrats to seek entrenchment in their positions, just as the real rulers of Russia are entrenched. While the latter bask in the sun of infallibility and are protected by the army and the secret police, the former are constantly badgered by the gods above and are pitted against the worms below and against each other.

In self-defense, the bureaucrats have evolved a number of protective mechanisms that are veritable masterpieces of ingenuity, the more remarkable because these mechanisms must of necessity remain intangible, camouflaged—and at the same time effective and capable of surviving the public condemnation to which they are from time to time subjected.

The most widespread and effective of these mechanisms is the one which the Russians call *semeystvennost'*, a word stemming from the noun *semya*, family. Threatened by the same dangers and moved by the same overpowering instinct for self-preservation, the Soviet bureaucrats have inevitably fallen back on the mutually protective attitude toward each other that is characteristic of family relations. Hence, *semeystvennost'*, "familyness."

In a sense Soviet bureaucracy is one enormous mutual protection society. Its members tend to cover up for each other, to gloss over each other's deficiencies and sins, or at least close their eyes to them in a distorted kind of group solidarity. Its members exchange gifts and favors, recommend each other for promotions, and confine their social life to their own circle. The numerous Communist Party members among them are, as a rule, "corrupted" by the atmosphere of *semeystvennost'* and indulge in its practices.

The "corruption" is easily spread because the bureaucratic stratum in Russia has a virtual monopoly on the brains of the country and on the creative life within it. This group also enjoys

a near monopoly on fine clothes and food, attractive women, brilliant conversation, and everything else that goes with the good life. The bureaucrats certainly have a monopoly on travel abroad —the secret dream of most Soviet citizens—because travel abroad for personal reasons is not permitted, while foreign assignments are given to diplomats, engineers and managers purchasing machinery, or scientists and men of art sent on propaganda missions.

The privilege of travel abroad is not an unmixed blessing, to be sure. Its recipients are the most likely victims of the Kremlin's periodic campaigns which seek to drive home to Soviet citizens the dangers of contact with the foreign world. That is why this privilege is never openly sought, and bureaucrats who are ordered to go abroad go through the motions of resistance. As a rule the persons sent on foreign assignments are not allowed to take their families along. They remain as hostages and are imprisoned or sent to concentration camps in case of defection. The only legal punishment for the defector is execution.

Judging by the frequency, scope, and ferocity of the criticism of *semeystvennost'*, it is widespread and effective, and is under constant attack by the Bolshevik leaders, the press, radio, and cartoonists. Local Party officials and newspaper editors are frequently taken to task for working hand in glove with other bureaucrats, or for silencing criticism of them. Such leniency is caused by fear of spoiling friendly relations, or fear that criticism might boomerang. It is frequently also caused by bribes.

The far-reaching measure undertaken by the Kremlin in its offensive against the bureaucrats has been the postwar removal from actual production of many high-up factory Communists, so that they can devote more time and energy to political control. The measure has tended to give the Communists something of the status of factory commissars, and to drive a wedge between the doer and the controller. At the same time, for the sake of efficiency, the principle of single authority has been retained. It is still vested in the director. But the self-contradictory aspects of the two measures have not been slow in asserting themselves. Wherever political and managerial leaders are in open conflict, *semeystvennost'* weakens but production tends to slow down. Wherever relations are smooth, output indices shoot upward, but the Kremlin becomes suspicious of the lack of rivalry among its underlings.

When the shell of *semeystvennost'* cracks and the heat is on full blast, the bureaucrats crawl into the shelter of inertia, another favorite mechanism of self-defense which they have devised. Things simply do not get done—out of spite and, chiefly, out of fear. Such fear cripples production and paralyzes initiative. Whatever calculated risks are involved are taken only on orders from above, which would seem to imply that failure would not result in punishment. It frequently does, just the same.

Inertia is an ancient Russian technique perfected through centuries of arbitrary rule, but it has reached a high art only in Stalinland. It is a very effective method of resistance, hitting where it hurts most: production. The moment the Kremlin senses that inertia is reaching an acute stage it relaxes the controls—for the time being. Attacks on *semeystvennost'* are explained away almost apologetically as a deplorable necessity designed to strengthen the authority of the bureaucrats among the people working under them. The elite are flattered, honored, and bemedaled, and new privileges are decreed for them. They may even get a big juicy bone, such as legislation which gives their children greater opportunities than the children of the working and peasant classes.

The Soviet bureaucrats are not yet able to safeguard completely their children's future. Neither jobs nor the social standing that goes with them may be inherited. But the children of the Soviet elite are placed advantageously in respect to education and training. From birth they mingle with the "right" people, invaluable contacts for good jobs and promotions in the future. The bureaucrats have savings, country homes, clothes, books, and other belongings that may be inherited. Their children do not have to work after school hours. They are well fed and clothed. Incidentally, to a larger degree than any other strata of the Soviet population, the children of the bureaucrats have the leisure and the vitality to develop a sensitivity to the indignities inherent in Stalinism, and to indulge in heretical thoughts and conversations.

It is my conviction that when a revolution becomes possible in the Soviet Union the middle class will provide, as it did in the February and October revolutions of 1917, the leadership, the ideas, the oratory, the fervor, and the organizational skill.

The constantly recurring purges, both the bloody and the bloodless ones, show that the Kremlin scents the danger. The

Soviet press has kept up a perpetual lament that the possessors of Russia's brains and skills are apolitical, especially the young people, and has been campaigning to herd them into organizations run by the Communist Party. The Party's counterpart for young men and girls, the Komsomol, has actually been built up into a necessary steppingstone for a brilliant career.

The Soviet practice of scattering graduates from schools of higher learning throughout the far-flung areas of the country has some very practical aspects. The security-minded central authorities realize that this is one good way of stalemating the opposition groups which may have been formed by young people during their years of study. The young people have no way of evading these assignments, for the law requires every college graduate to work for three to five years wherever sent. Punishment for refusal is a prison sentence, and also a ruined career.

The tug of war between the Kremlin and the bureaucracy forms an important and curious front in the Cold Civil War raging in the USSR. The Kremlin has at its disposal all the weapons of coercion and persuasion. The elite rely on the mutuality of interests cementing the members of Russia's middle class, and on the Kremlin's dependence on it.

One often hears the statement in Russia that, unless socialism succeeds in destroying bureaucracy, bureaucracy will destroy socialism. But this implies that the two forces are locked in a battle to the death. There is a struggle, as we have seen, strange and fascinating, but there is nothing conclusive about it. It is full of sound and fury which remain suspended in mid-air. It abounds in knockout blows, aimed but not delivered. Despite the bloodletting—and the blood of bureaucrats does flow—the struggle is a sly and dangerous game of the cat-and-mouse variety. The Kremlin, playing the cat, is careful not to smother the mouse, for it produces a lot of little mice to feed on, while the mouse is not putting up a fight to the finish because that would be suicide; and the mouse is not running away because it is confident that it can outlast the cat.

For the time being at least, all the advantages are on the Kremlin's side, and it keeps playing the game because the bureaucrat is indispensable. His functions as a scapegoat endear him to the leadership, relieving many of the tensions and resentments that

harass the regime, and channeling the wrath of the people away from the Kremlin.

His genius for procrastination, born of insecurity and fear, has made him the perfect target of the ruler and the ruled alike. He is the lightning rod of total dictatorship, the victim of suppressed hatreds, the darling of satirists and cartoonists chafing under the unbearable necessity of depicting Soviet reality as sweetness and light.

Trained by the stick and carrot, the bureaucrat has developed a vested interest in the existing regime and has come to regard the wrath of the gods the way one regards the ravages of drought, flood, or an epidemic.

He is no martyr, no spellbinder, no crusader, and he lacks the daring and the resourcefulness of a maker of revolutions, an empire builder, or an industrial tycoon.

The indispensable and the expendable, the purger and the purged, the doer and the procrastinator, the bulwark of order and the master of confusion, the Soviet bureaucrat is a creature unique in the history of man, a product of Stalin's Russia.

The Communist leaders and the bureaucrats will not destroy each other, but they will be destroyed together. Among their gravediggers will be the sons and daughters of the bureaucrats of today.

CHAPTER 12

The Communist Party Front

> Show me another party like that. You will not be able to do so, as another such party does not yet exist in nature. . . . Where then can one find a better party? I am afraid that one would have to jump over to Mars in his search of a better party.
>
> JOSEPH STALIN

> Nowhere else in the world have so many Communists been killed as in Russia.
>
> MANÈS SPERBER

Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union subjected the ruling Communist Party and the leadership to their severest test. The men in the Kremlin had to put to use all their experience, ruthlessness, and maneuverability in order to make the necessary crucial compromises, without at the same time depriving the Party of its grip on the country. This grip has been the most important single fact about Russia ever since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. Even the Constitution of 1936, which was drafted so as to appear genuinely democratic, admits the supremacy of the Party. Article 126 defines it as the "leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state."

The terrible Red Army defeats early in the war, and the despair of the population, jeopardized the dominant position of the Party. It was further weakened by the upsurge of Rusian nationalism and religious faith, and by the yearning of the people for release from regimentation. This was the blackest hour in the history of Stalin's rule, and it brought forth his highest qualities of leadership. He was firm and fearless, and never left the Soviet capital even when the enemy was knocking at its gates. He assumed personal responsibility for the conduct of the war, and re-equipped and reorganized the army while it was sustaining blow after disastrous blow. He channeled the seething emotions of the Soviet people so as to direct their wrath at the enemy and make them identify their hopes for the future with the Soviet regime.

The methods employed by Stalin and his colleagues to achieve a close identification of the people with the Party were somewhat the same as those adopted during another period of grave national crisis—Lenin's death.

As at that time, the Party relaxed its severe standards of admission and accepted into its ranks multitudes of new members. Admission was made particularly easy for those in the army, where the normal twelve-month probation period was reduced to three months. In the course of my work as war correspondent in Moscow, I remember coming across countless front-line dispatches reporting how whole detachments were enrolled in the Party on the eve of battle, under the slogan: "If I must die, let me die a Communist!"

Such indiscriminate methods of enrollment made it possible for the Party membership to mushroom despite the high wartime mortality among Communists due to front-line casualties and to overwork in industry and agriculture. The first year of the war, 1941, brought to the Party three times as many new members as had the year before. Whereas at the time of the Eighteenth Party Congress in March 1939 there were 2,477,666 Communist Party members in the USSR, their number had skyrocketed to 6,882,145 by the eve of the Nineteenth Party Congress, which opened on October 4, 1952.[1] In 1942 alone, 1,340,000 men and women joined.

Slightly more than half of the present membership joined the Party during or after the war, and about two thirds of the new members are under thirty-five years of age. Like the rank and file, the top echelons of the Party are composed of comparatively young persons. Of the 1192 delegates to the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress, picked from the most important functionaries in all sections of the country, 24.6 per cent were under forty, and 84.7 per cent were under fifty years of age.[2]

The enormous growth of the Party and the youth of its membership have given it a vitality and a wider base than at any time since Stalin came to power, but this growth has simultaneously confronted the leadership with problems of ideological deterioration and of control.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has become an organization of men and women most of whom never participated in the struggle against the tsarist regime or the civil war which followed the Revolution. To the great majority, membership in

the ruling political party has meant no sacrifice but, on the contrary, a sure-fire steppingstone to a successful career. Or to put it in different words, the number of idealists and fanatics who joined the revolutionary movement because of their faith in it has been reduced to practically nothing by the ravages of time and by Stalin's annihilation of the Old Bolsheviks during the Great Purge. In their stead have come men and women whose thinking and behavior have been conditioned by the Stalin era, who are in the Party not to champion the cause of the underdog but to further their own social and careerist ambitions.

Also the major functions of the Party have been altered. On the one hand, it has become a gigantic pool for bureaucrats, the managerial personnel of industry, agriculture, the army, the secret police, education, diplomacy, health services, etc. On the other hand, the Party is the Kremlin's one great weapon in the struggle for the minds, souls, allegiance, and services of the Soviet people. Only by controlling and channeling the energies of the Party—through which the Kremlin controls and channels the efforts of the entire nation—can the Soviet leaders hope to win the Cold Civil War in Russia. Simultaneously with directing this war, they have had to wage a struggle within the Party itself, a struggle against corruption and ideological deterioration, without losing the prerogatives of supreme control.

Judging by the endless laments in the Soviet press, and by the amazingly frank and pained disclosures made by the Party luminaries at the Congress, corruption is an integral, poisonous element in the very life stream of Soviet life. The chief offenders are bureaucrats, most of whom are Communist Party members. At this recent Congress the speakers, led by Malenkov, hurled fire and thunder against corrupt Party members, threatened them with severe punishment, and appealed to their Communist morality.

And yet the Soviet leadership is unable to wage a struggle to the death against corruption, for to do so would mean the alienation of the one large class in the country that has a stake in the regime—the managerial class. The vast expansion of Soviet industry, the amalgamation of the collective farms, and the expanded machinery of coercion and persuasion call for ever greater numbers of bureaucrats. These are recruited mainly among the Communist Party membership. And, as I noted in the previous

chapter, most of the new bureaucrats who have risen from the ranks of workers or farmers find it easy to identify their interests with those of their newly adopted class.

Unable to cut corruption at its roots, the best the Kremlin can hope for is to contain it within limits this side of moral, political, and economic disintegration. Even the effort to contain it consumes time and energies and makes the Kremlin more and more dependent on the secret police. Meanwhile the Communist Party remains a hotbed of corruption.

Of four basic weaknesses and "disease-ridden phenomena" within the Communist Party, enumerated by Malenkov at the Nineteenth Congress, the first three involve various manifestations of corruption. He attacked the suppression of criticism and self-criticism; the persecution of persons who uncover the evil doings of their superiors; the weakness of Party discipline, which manifests itself in "hiding the truth from the Party"; and, finally, *semeystvennost'* (familyness), which has converted Soviet bureaucracy into one gigantic mutual protection society.

The last basic weakness stressed by Malenkov concerned the ideological deterioration of the Communist Party. "The neglect of ideological work in many Party organizations," he said, ". . . can cause irreparable damage to the interests of the Party and the state."

Ideological deterioration has been made inevitable by wholesale admissions of careerists, political illiterates, and people indifferent to political ideologies. Above all, deterioration resulted from Stalin's rule, which is based on fear and on the principle of his infallibility. The intellectual vacuum thus created has severed whatever spiritual links existed between the Party members and their leaders.

During the war the vacuum was filled by the patriotism and anger aroused by Nazi aggression. Along with a major part of the Soviet nation, the rank-and-file Communists were united with their leadership in a common effort. Their hopes for a better and freer life after victory were encouraged by the Kremlin with a calculated vagueness. Postwar realities, however, gradually destroyed that unity. The Party grew away from the masses of the people and became separated from them by the iron curtain of bureaucratic authority and privileges. The leadership is now more than ever divorced from the Communist rank and file and from

the masses by the Kremlin's implacable exercise of control, its immunity from criticism, and its claims to infallibility.

What has remained to hold together the leaders and the Party membership is their mutual stake in the Stalin regime and their common fear, masquerading as Party discipline. The Kremlin well realizes the dangers of this situation. Party solidarity depends on the confidence and self-reliance of the three million-odd men and women who joined the Party during the war, and won their spurs on the battlefield or in the field of production. Hence ideological reindoctrination became a life-and-death necessity for the group in control. In a fashion characteristic of Stalin's Russia, the delicate, complex process of remolding attitudes and insuring loyalties began with purges.

A nationwide weeding-out campaign was set in motion after the end of the war. Hundreds of thousands of persons were expelled from the Party on charges of corruption, lack of discipline, or ignorance of Marxist theory. The "cleansing" sessions, held by all Communist Party cells, were not blood-and-thunder affairs. No mass arrests, trials, exiles, or executions were involved, as during the purges of the late thirties. People were simply dropped from the Party or placed on probation and given a chance to get rid of their incompetence, deviations, and ignorance of the Stalinist version of Communist theory.

No sterner measures were necessary, for the awesome specter of the Great Purge still stalks the Soviet Union. The "cleansings" alone were sufficient to knock self-reliance out of all Party members, and to insure an unquestioning adherence to the Party line. Blind obedience alone, however, is far from sufficient for the men in the Kremlin. The great strategic aim they are pursuing on the Communist Party front is achievement of maximum cohesion within the organization that rules the USSR. This implies an automatic response to the rigorous demands of its discipline, an understanding of the current major policies, and a willingness to "sell" them to the two hundred million citizens of Soviet Russia.

Automatic response to Party discipline has been comparatively easy to achieve. As we have seen, most of the present-day members have been conditioned to it. They grew up under the Stalin regime and they owe to it their social and economic position. This very fact, as well as the nature of the privileges most of these men and women enjoy, tends to make them identify their inter-

ests with those of the Kremlin. Moreover, the various projects launched after the war—reconstruction, industrial expansion, and bold efforts to harness nature—have served to release their energies and to sublimate their quests for leadership, awakened during the war.

Although most of them have responded automatically to Party discipline, it has been much more difficult to make members understand the Party line, absorb it, and sell it to the masses. The entire Party membership was sent for intensive ideological reindoctrination to the countless thousands of schools created for the purpose after the war's end. The results, however, were far from satisfactory, judging by the complaints of the Soviet press and of the speakers at the Nineteenth Party Congress.

A major reason for the ideological backwardness of many Communist Party members is the low level of general education in the USSR. After all, only one out of every twenty-five Soviet students ever gets through the tenth grade. The country's compulsory seven-year program of schooling is enforced without adequate educational facilities—such as buildings, teachers, and textbooks. In the field of higher education, there are about 975,000 students enrolled in Soviet colleges, as compared to 2,150,000 college students in the USA.

The Party's own network of schools is not equipped to cope with the cultural backwardness of a great number of its members. These schools do not even attempt to contribute to the general education of their students. Hence they are not given a foundation for genuine political literacy.

The basic textbook used in all the Party schools is Joseph Stalin's *A Short History of the Communist Party,* that Soviet Bible which defines the Communist faith, outlines Soviet methods, and describes historical events. Since all these things have to be taught in accordance with the prevailing Party line, each major shift in the Kremlin's policies is followed by a new, carefully revised edition. As of now, the *History* has been translated into some two hundred languages and dialects, and the number of copies sold is estimated at some fifty million, or more than any book in history except the Bible.

Judging by the official praise for Stalin's latest work, a fifty-page pamphlet on "Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR,"

published on the eve of the Nineteenth Party Congress, it is destined to become a companion piece to the *History*.

The classic works of Marx and Lenin are, as a rule, ignored in the Party schools, for a great deal of what they contain is subject to varying interpretations not always in accord with the prevailing line. In fact some of their statements have the impertinence to contradict assertions in Stalin's *History*.

The ideas and facts drilled into the men and women at the Party schools are often absorbed mechanically, which defeats their very purpose. Such superficial students do not make convincing agitators for spreading the Stalinist truth among the vast, inert Soviet masses. The organ of the Ministry of Education provides telling examples of what happens when mechanical absorption of ideas is wedded to ignorance. In its issue of June 29, 1949, the *Teachers' Gazette* cited some of the twists given to Marxism-Leninism by Party school students answering comparatively simple questions contained in examination papers:

"To the question, 'What is the purpose of economic planning?', the answer was: 'Planning is necessary to guarantee the Marxist-Leninist principle: to each according to his abilities, and from each according to his work.'

"When asked 'to contrast the right to work in the Soviet Union with the lack of this right in capitalist countries,' a student stated: 'Only the capitalists can get work there.'"

The citing of these examples is in no way intended to imply that the Soviet educational system is a complete failure. On the contrary, judging by what it had to start with, it has performed miracles by transforming a nation of almost complete illiteracy into a nation of almost complete literacy. In the last fifteen years alone, the number of graduates of higher educational institutions, employed in industry, agriculture, and health agencies, has more than doubled.[3] In the scientific and technological fields, the Soviet Union is beyond the fear of humiliating comparisons with the most advanced countries of the West, including the United States.[4]

This progress was reflected in the educational background of the 1192 delegates to the recent Party Congress. Nearly three quarters of them were either graduates of higher educational institutions (709 persons) or had an incomplete higher education

(84 persons). Fully 282 of these leading Communist Party members were practicing engineers, with 68 agriculturists and 98 pedagogues.[5] There were also, no doubt, a considerable number of factory directors and administrators among the delegates.

In the course of the years of Stalin's rule the Communist Party has been transformed from a comparatively small, closely knit group of fanatics and idealists into a large organization of key people. They have education and training, primarily in technological and administrative fields, but in many cases are ignorant of, or indifferent to, political ideas. At the same time they are expected to absorb these ideas and pass them on to the broad masses, of whom they are disdainful to a degree unbelievable to anyone who has had no opportunity to visit Russia recently.

The major aim of the continuing postwar reindoctrination campaign is to evoke in Communist Party members an understanding of and devotion to the current Stalinist version of Marxism-Leninism, and to train them in the art of disseminating this ideology among the people of the USSR. The minds and souls of the people are the one great target of the Soviet persuasion machine, the most massive ever devised by man. A close look at it, however brief, will further one's understanding of present-day Russia.

The outstanding fact about the Soviet propaganda machine is that it has a complete monopoly over the molding of public opinion, and that it is controlled by the Kremlin.

In the words of a leading US expert on Soviet methods of mass persuasion, Alex Inkeles of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, "all of the media of communication, including the personal address in face-to-face contact with small audiences, are part of a political monopoly, precisely controlled, backed by force of state and law, geared in directly with broader political purposes, and oriented in a specific and centrally determined direction which dictates a high degree of uniformity and content."[6]

The "centrally determined direction" emanates from the Department of Propaganda and Agitation of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, known for short as the Agitprop. The administrative head of the Agitprop is guided by and is directly responsible to one of the top Soviet leaders. Until

his death in 1948, Andrei Zhdanov gave over-all supervision to the Agitprop. Since 1947, its director has been Mikhail A. Suslov, member of the recently formed Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, which has replaced the Politburo as the "supercabinet" of the USSR. Suslov, it is understood, reports to Malenkov, the Soviet heir apparent.

The main function of the Agitprop is to act as a transmission belt for informing the Soviet people of basic policy decisions and popularizing them. Translated by the Agitprop into parallel sets of terms, understandable to different strata of the population, these decisions are passed on through the various channels of mass communication. Meticulous plans are made for all propaganda activity; they include precise directives and slogans to explain the major policies, the so-called Party line. They suggest ways in which popular support for these policies can be achieved.

As the Agitprop is not an operational agency, it bears no direct responsibility for the daily application of its instructions. Yet its monopoly on ideological guidance is unchallengeable. No realm of intellectual activity in the USSR—be it the village reading hut, the Moscow Art Theater, or the philosopher's study—can escape its scrutiny and dictation.

The various branches of the Agitprop maintain a virtual dictatorship over the educational and cultural activities in the country, including schools and theaters, libraries and museums, film studios and radio stations, publishing houses and editorial offices of newspapers and magazines. Operationally, the branches may be run by a ministry, by a trade union, or by an organization of writers or musicians. But ideologically, they are the blind instruments of the Department of Propaganda and Education. The Department, in turn, is the servant of the Kremlin.

The Agitprop's major effort ever since the end of the war has been directed toward the reindoctrination of the Communist Party membership. The very vehemence with which the objective has been pursued is indicative of the weakening of the ideological forces within the Party. The reindoctrination drive has sought to revive the study of Marxism-Leninism; to bring into force once more the beliefs and ideals that made the Revolution; to revitalize the starved political life of the country; and to reassert Party ideology and extend it into all the far-flung fields of intellectual endeavor. Last but not least, the reindoctrination drive is trying

to strengthen the control of the leadership upon the country, and to deify Stalin.

The calling of a Communist Party Congress after an interval of twelve and a half years came as an indication of the Kremlin's belief that it has achieved, or at least made notable progress toward the achievement of, its objectives. A study of the proceedings of the Congress certainly points to unquestionable success in at least two of the objectives: the strengthening of the Kremlin's powers of control, and the reaffirmation of the Stalin cult.

As to the other objectives, there is every reason to believe that the great ideological offensive on the Party front has been a dismal failure. Stripped of their flowery tributes to the monolithic purity and ideological glory attained by the Party, the speeches by Malenkov and others reflect an alarmed uneasiness over the indifference of the membership to the Communist faith. Obviously they are also worried about lack of discipline, selfish ambitions, ignorance, and corruption. The speeches read more like an indictment of the Communist Party than like songs in praise of its thirty-five years of rule.

There have been achievements of course. And all the superlatives possessed by the Russian language were exhausted in describing the Party's leading role in making the achievements possible. But these achievements all lie in military and economic fields. They cannot offset the fact that an iron curtain separates the leadership from the rank and file, and that another curtain stands between the masses and the membership of the Communist Party.

This may well have been Stalin's last Congress, but it definitely was the first in which he laid claim to theoretical greatness and wisdom, on a par with Lenin, Marx, and Engels. And it is a true and bitter irony of fate that in this, his supreme moment, he finds himself at the head of a Party that is little more than a gigantic club of timeservers. If his power is total, so also is his failure, for it is he who has traded kinship of spirit for obedience. Therein lies his monumental deficiency as a leader.

Basically, he has no faith in the free spirit of man or in the people. He trusts no one, not even his closest comrades in arms. Spiritually, he is the most isolated dictator man has known. Physically, he is the most elaborately guarded of all mortals.

The unity of the Party under Stalin is superficial, fundamentally

insincere. It is imposed from above, symbolized and eulogized in the image of the *vozhd,* the omnipotent, omniscient, infallible leader. By working ceaselessly over a quarter of a century, the all-pervading Soviet propaganda machine has converted Stalin into a demigod and the source of all inspiration and bliss. His name has been forced upon the consciousness of his subjects, from the children trained to chant in unison their "thanks to Comrade Stalin for a happy childhood" to those unfortunate women in Soviet insane asylums who believe themselves to be "Stalin's wives." In a sense the entire propaganda effort in the USSR is concentrated on converting the country into one gigantic ward peopled by "Stalin's children."

The deification of the *vozhd* has made the question of succession the most crucial problem Russia will face in the not too distant future. Not one of his colleagues has been allowed even to approach the stature of Stalin. At the same time there seems to be little doubt as to the identity of the heir apparent. He is Georgi Malenkov, who, in the hierarchy of the Party, occupies a place second only to Stalin.

There are three other possible contenders to the throne after Stalin is removed by death or ill-health.

One is Vyacheslav Molotov, first deputy Premier, who has charge over the entire Soviet governmental machinery. The second is Lavrenti Beria, who lords it over the Bolshevik system of security and repression. The third is Nikolai Bulganin, who controls and supervises the armed forces of the USSR.

Given ambition and fortuitous circumstances, each of these three men will be able to put up a tremendous fight for the top place after Stalin disappears from the scene. The nature of the Soviet setup is such that the man in charge of the Party is most likely to inherit Stalin's mantle. The governmental machinery, the security system, and the military forces are each but an arm of the Communist Party. Whoever controls the latter retains an iron grip on everything else.

This is why Andrei Zhdanov was the heir apparent until his sudden death in 1948. Next to Stalin, he was the dominant figure in the Politburo. He was the chief strategist in Russia's Cold Civil War, which he unleashed in 1946 with a series of erudite and fanatic speeches. His death served to clear the stage for Georgi Malenkov.

The careers and personalities of Stalin and Malenkov are strikingly similar. Like Stalin, Malenkov is reserved, aloof, and impersonal. Like Stalin, he prefers to rely on control of the Party machine rather than on the outward trappings of power. Throughout his fabulous career, while performing various tasks in industry and administration, Malenkov held onto the one job that mattered —personnel manager of the Party. In this post he controls patronage, and the majority of the big Soviet bureaucrats owe their jobs to him. Malenkov learned from Stalin this technique of exacting support and allegiance. That was during the years of Malenkov's apprenticeship, when he was the Soviet leader's private secretary.

Stalin, who has been tirelessly molding the leading cadres of the Soviet Union according to his own image, finds that image most faithfully reflected in Malenkov. The latter's personal qualities, training, experience, and proximity to the *vozhd* hold the promise of a continuity of the Stalin regime.

The son of a Ural Cossack, Georgi Maximillianovich Malenkov was born on January 8, 1902, in Orenburg, now renamed Chkalov in honor of the Soviet ace who flew across the North Pole to the USA in 1937. Malenkov is a big fat man with a pale face, heavy jowl, and sharp, evil eyes. His personal life, like that of all the other leaders, is considered in the USSR a private affair, and very little is known about it. The very anonymity in which he has lived will make it possible for the Communist propaganda machine to build him up over a period of years into a *vozhd* worthy of Stalin's mantle. The machine will no doubt have to work overtime, for, judging by all available data, Malenkov is primarily a first-rate administrator and executive, a superbureaucrat lacking the intellectual qualities for leadership. In this respect, however, Malenkov suffers less by comparison with Stalin than the latter does by comparison with Lenin. Unlimited power and a competent, cynical handling of the massive Soviet propaganda machine are capable of raising any mortal to the stature of a living legend.

As far as Malenkov is concerned, however, this is still a thing of the future, although the Nineteenth Party Congress was followed by a mild Malenkov boom in the Soviet press. Stalin is jealous of his position as *vozhd* and will hold onto it as long as there is a spark of life left in him. And Malenkov knows his boss

well enough to tread softly. Having been accorded the honor of delivering the major report at the Nineteenth Party Congress—an honor hitherto reserved for only Lenin and Stalin—Malenkov prudently echoed Stalin's latest theoretical pronouncements and paid servile tribute to the leader.

For the time being, the Soviet propaganda machine is concentrated primarily on singing Stalin's glory and on winning the Cold Civil War.

CHAPTER 13

The New Soviet Man Front

> The real power, the power we have to fight for night and day, is not power over things, but over men. . . . Power is in tearing human minds to pieces and putting them together again, in new shapes of your own choosing.
>
> GEORGE ORWELL, in *1984*

> Soviet writers and all ideological workers are now in the front line of the battle.
>
> ANDREI ZHDANOV

The major aim pursued by the Soviet leadership in its Cold Civil War against the people of the USSR is to lead them toward a spontaneous and voluntary support of the Kremlin and its policies.

Once this objective is achieved, the terrible strains within Soviet society would tend to resolve themselves. Social controls would be handled automatically by the individual within himself. The coercion resorted to by the state—itself a major cause of strain—would gradually diminish.

In their pursuit of this major objective, the Soviet leaders have relied, as always, on the carefully co-ordinated mechanisms of coercion and persuasion, with the emphasis on the latter. It is true that force has been applied but on a modest scale—modest for Stalin's Russia—and with a minimum of publicity. The chief victims have been intellectuals too skeptical or sophisticated to participate wholeheartedly in the reshaping of attitudes and of human nature itself, without which the program cannot be successful. The purge of "unreliable" elements has been effected gradually, with the general public only vaguely aware that methods more forceful than criticism and reprimand were being used against "cosmopolites," "bourgeois nationalists," and similarly wayward intellectuals.

The public, however, does realize that all of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has been converted into one vast arena for a full-throated propaganda drive to create the New Soviet

Man. He is the only answer to the Kremlin quest for total control. All means of agitation, education, and art have been revamped so as to inculcate in the individual the feeling that his personal needs, desires, hopes, and dreams are identical with those of the regime. The Kremlin is trying also to develop within him a sense of responsibility to the state and a personal responsibility not only for his own actions but also for his character and thoughts.

According to the top leadership, there cannot be any real conflicts between the New Soviet Man and the society of which he is a part. If such conflicts exist they are the reflection of strife within the society itself, and of course there is none in the USSR. Whereas such conflicts are a natural and inevitable phenomenon in capitalist society torn by class struggle, they are impossible within a socialist society. Like the capitalist system itself, they are doomed to destruction.[1]

This kind of thinking is not new to Marxists and Soviet theoreticians. What is new is the shift in emphasis. Their theories about the individual and society used to give precedence to the individual. Now the reverse is true. Moreover, the individual must now be responsible for his own subservience to the state.

Soviet psychologists have, therefore, added to inheritance and environment, the two universally accepted basic factors that determine personality, the factors of training and self-training. Attention in Russia to these new factors, particularly self-training, has been steadily increasing. Their significance has been stressed to the point where they have been made to dominate the entire field of Soviet psychology.

The reasons for this are obvious. The Communists who have ruled Russia for over thirty-five years cannot very well admit the great influence of environment. As one American student of Soviet psychology has pointed out, such a view has turned out to be "embarrassing to the regime, which was becoming responsible for the environment."[2]

Furthermore, once the principle is established that man is capable of change and improvement not only as a child but also in his adult life, he may be held directly responsible for the shaping of his own character, for his actions, mode of living, even his thoughts. Hence his failure to eliminate within himself "vestiges of capitalist mentality," and develop a "Communist

morality," makes him subject to public censure and punishment. In plain English, his every failing from the point of view of the political and psychological demands of the Party line is considered a sin and a crime for which he is held accountable.

The establishment of the principle of the individual's responsibility for his *Weltanschauung* and his behavior at home, at work, and among friends serves a number of other purposes as well. It helps the Soviet regime to rationalize the inequalities in rewards and the harshness of punishment prevalent today in the USSR but contrary to the ideals that inspired mass support for the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917.

The principle of the individual's responsibility also helps to mobilize public opinion as a means of pressure on "wayward" persons. Nothing can be further from the truth than the widespread conception throughout the free world that the Kremlin is unconcerned with public opinion in areas it rules or controls. True, the Soviet leadership manipulates public opinion with unspeakable cynicism, but never ignores it.[3]

As one studies official Soviet statements, newspaper editorials, and works of art and literature, one gradually perceives a composite portrait of the New Soviet Man. It is this ideal whom every citizen of the USSR is to emulate, and before whom all other mortals are to stand in awe and admiration. In the shape of this image children are to be trained, and young people and adults are to be self-trained. The superimage is, of course, Stalin himself.

The New Soviet Man, according to this composite portrait, is, above all, an ardent believer in Communism, a self-sacrificing builder of socialism. He is a responsible member of society who places its needs and requirements above his own. Be he a poet, composer, mason, or farmer, he must avoid isolation. His watchword is the welfare and the monolithic unity of the collective. He reacts *automatically* in the "right" direction. Of his *own free will* he conforms to the letter and spirit of the directives emanating from the Communist Party.

The New Soviet Man is an ardent patriot. He realizes that he owes everything to his fatherland, and his devotion to it is boundless. He is happy to work for it and to lay down his life for its greater glory. He is disdainful of the capitalist world surrounding the fatherland, and is immune to the influences of bourgeois

civilization, shining with the phosphorescence of decay. His hatred and scorn are focused primarily on the United States, "the last citadel of doomed imperialism."

If he is a Great Russian, he is proud of belonging to the chosen race that has made possible the creation of a new and glorious world and the emergence of humanity's crowning achievement—himself, the New Soviet Man. If he is a non-Russian citizen of the USSR, his people were lucky to have been subjugated in the past by the Great Russian nation, and thus given the opportunity to participate in the building of the ideal society.

The New Soviet Man, according to this composite portrait, is the heir to the greatest achievements of mankind, primarily those of the Russians. He believes that they made all the major inventions and discoveries, that they evoked the world-changing philosophies and sciences, and that they attained the highest standards of living for the masses. Above all, they, the Russians, brought about the Bolshevik Revolution which has ushered in the final stage of human progress.

The New Soviet Man is purposeful and single-minded, intelligent and hard-working, punctual and practical. He is completely innocent of any longing for knowledge for its own sake or for art's sake. He is a dreamer, too, but not of the stargazing kind. His dreams are concrete, down to earth, capable of being realized. He dreams not of ivory towers but of dams—the largest in the world—and power stations—the greatest ever. He dreams of draining marshy areas so vast as to dwarf the average capitalist state.

The New Soviet Man is possessed of an inner discipline and an inner drive that enable him to be in a perpetual state of self-mobilization. He is creatively restless, forever unable and unwilling to repose on his laurels, and his potentiality for improvement is limitless. He is constantly struggling with his own shortcomings: weakness of character, overconfidence, ignorance, self-indulgence, complacency, and ideological backwardness. These defects are invariably attributed to "survivals of the capitalist past" in the mentality and mode of life of many Soviet citizens. A mortal struggle against them is urged upon every individual. Dissatisfaction with himself is carefully nourished in the New Soviet Man because it helps to build up a sense of personal responsibility, and thus provides internal controls to supplement

the normal control methods of a police state. The advantage of internal controls lies in the magic fact that they are omnipresent. They are built in and do not involve the expense and energies inherent in the system of external controls.

The New Soviet Man is responsive to the social command with a self-imposed obedience that is superior, from the point of view of the dictatorship, to the resigned, meek submission of the slave. Self-imposed obedience is preferable because it is a voluntary and active compliance. It is an act of faith and devotion, a conscious acceptance of the Soviet regime and of the principle of Stalin's infallibility and goodness.

This attempt to convert masses of Soviet citizenry into dynamic, intelligent, submissive superrobots, called the New Soviet Man, threatens the very existence of civilization as it has emerged out of the ruins of feudalism and out of the French, American, and Industrial revolutions.

The creation of this modern Frankenstein, although theoretically not impossible, given sufficient time, is a long way from accomplishment. The very scope and vehemence of the Kremlin offensive on the New Soviet Man front bear witness to the opposition on the part of the Soviet people, passive, silent, and unorganized though it is. Enraged human dignity, the wretchedness of daily existence in the USSR, resentments at inequalities and at the unlimited powers of the secret police, all conspire to feed this opposition.

But already the Kremlin is in a position to claim the capture of some psychological "commanding heights." A young anti-Stalinist refugee, a girl who grew up under the Soviet system but chose to flee from it in hatred, was recently asked what, in her opinion, were a citizen's responsibility to his state. She said:

"It must consist in readiness to defend one's state when it is necessary, and in following the laws and rules of communal life. The most difficult manifestation is the ability in some instances to subordinate oneself to the purposes of the state *without any application of external pressure.* For instance, if it is necessary for a physician to work in the village, *he should see that this is necessary for his country,* and consequently do it."[4]

Soviet fiction and drama provide numerous examples of similar attitudes, but the quotation cited assumes greater significance because it came from a person free to speak her mind.

The citizens of the USSR cannot acquire and consistently adhere to the traits that characterize the New Soviet Man without making a constant personal effort. To help them along, to guide and prod them, the Kremlin has mobilized and deployed the intellectual and creative resources of the country, those men and women who work in the fields of ideology and human values, who mold character and thought—the teachers, novelists, playwrights, poets, composers, scientists, psychologists, journalists, actors, and painters. They are all, to use a phrase applied by Stalin to writers, "engineers of the human soul." They are the lever with which the Kremlin hopes to raise the Soviet citizen to the "heights" occupied by the New Soviet Man.

To fulfill its functions properly, the lever itself must be conditioned to respond obediently to the hand manipulating it. Therefore the "engineers of the human soul" in the USSR command an attention on the part of the Soviet leadership completely out of proportion to their numbers. They are eternally supervised, appealed to, pampered, purged, muzzled, and rewarded. The system of baits and tributes, controls and pressures, as applied to the "engineers," is even more complex than the one applied to the bureaucrats. It certainly is more subtle, for in dealing with such intangibles as the "soul" one must be subtle.

There is certainly little subtlety in the field of rewards. The standard of living of the "engineers" (with the exception of the teachers, who are underpaid in the USSR as they are everywhere else, including the USA), as compared with that of the Soviet laborer, peasant, or white-collar worker, is so high as to constitute a bribe. When contrasted with Western standards, the conditions under which most Soviet intellectuals live seem drab enough. But the living space they occupy, the food they consume, the servants they have, and the spas they frequent, all conspire to set them apart from the masses of the people, who lead bleak, pauperized existences.

The rewards showered upon the intellectuals are not limited to material well-being. They are praised and honored, awarded titles, decorations, and medals. High dignitaries of the state and the Party pay honey-lipped tribute to them, and the people hold them in great reverence.

Not content to let the instincts of self-interest and self-preservation keep the intellectuals in line, the Soviet authorities

have evolved an elaborate and rigorous control system. The various organizations embracing scientists, teachers, and people in the creative fields have been infiltrated by Party men and secret service functionaries. It should be borne in mind that, like everyone else in the country, Soviet intellectuals must belong to some organization, if only to be assured of work, housing (within some limits), and the benefits of the social insurance system. The scientists belong to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and its affiliates in the Union republics; the authors belong to the Writers' Union; and so on, profession by profession. As in the trade unions, the key posts in all these associations are held by Communists responsible to the Party, first and foremost.

The supplementary control apparatus is as formidable as it is complex. We shall concentrate on the fields of literature and music, which are representative, and which I happen to know intimately.

To begin with, there is the official censorship office, called the Central Administration on Literacy and Publishing Matters, and commonly known as Glavlit. Without its approval, nothing may be published in the Soviet Union. The Glavlit is responsible directly to the Agitprop, discussed in a preceding chapter. The heads of the censorship office, the manager and editor in chief of each publishing house, and the editor and secretary of every literary publication are all held responsible for the ideological content of the material published with their approval. Woe to them if they are found lacking in Bolshevik vigilance.

Failure to obtain approval deprives an author of every opportunity to make a living by writing.[5] Some men of letters have actually been reduced to silence, either by voluntary withdrawal from creative writing or because their work was not approved. At the time of this writing the greatest living Russian poet, Boris Pasternak, had not published a single poem in years. He is making a living by translating Shakespeare and other Western poets. Likewise, the most gifted Soviet writer of fiction, Mikhail Sholokhov, has printed nothing for a very long time. He is living off royalties from his civil-war epic, *And Quiet Flows the Don,* and his novel about collectivization, *Virgin Soil Upturned.*

These two men are outstanding representatives of the small group of non-purged Soviet authors who have found refuge in silence and have gotten away with it. As a rule, such refuge is

denied to writers in Russia. Their silence is interpreted as "inner emigration" (*Pravda*), as a symptom of deviation and opposition, all very dangerous sins. The pressures on the "keepers of silence" to end their "work stoppage" are almost unbearable. These pressures are usually exerted by the regime through the co-operation of other authors. At a meeting of the writers and poets of Moscow[6] the poet Alexei Surkov bemoaned the fact that "some noted Soviet writers are in a state of prolonged creative inactivity. The time has come," said Surkov with the delicate Stalinist touch, "to destroy the conspiracy of bashful silence which surrounds writers who have produced nothing for a long time. We must help those who have fallen into creative sterility by showing them the true path."

Owing to the periodic shifts in the Party line, this "true path" has had the habit of swerving, sometimes without warning and in unexpected directions. Many writers and other Soviet intellectuals have been martyred for inability to adapt their art to the demands of a changed policy. Some of them have even suffered for failure to anticipate the change.

Chastisement, however, is carried out on a comparatively modest scale, serving as a prod to the slow or the unwilling. Usually the "engineers of the human soul" are given sufficient notice to make the necessary psychological and creative readjustments.

At times the notice takes the form of a decree signed by the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Or there may be a speech or written statement by one of the top leaders. These are usually followed by a host of editorials and learned articles, with suitable quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. The new line is spelled out and adapted to various fields, with pointers as to how to absorb and transmit the latest revelation emanating from the Kremlin. Then come more concrete measures. Works extolling the now abolished line are purged from the libraries, bookshops, and schoolrooms, and new tomes are published. These may be either revised editions of old books or completely new texts.

A wave of meetings is initiated in appropriate organizations. The meetings begin with the "engineers"—at the Academy of Sciences, and the unions of teachers, writers, painters, theatrical and cinema workers. Similar gatherings follow in factories, of-

fices, and collective farms, frequently with the participation of intellectuals. Speeches of recantation are recited at the professional meetings by the culprits singled out by the Kremlin. Promises to mend ways are voiced with varying degrees of eloquence, sincerity, and hypocrisy, adding up to a pathetic document of the calvary of the Soviet intellectuals.

Typical is the statement made by Dmitri Shostakovich at the conference of musicians held in January 1948 under the chairmanship of the late Politburo member, Andrei Zhdanov. One of the greatest composers of our century, Shostakovich was a major target of the discussion. He said:

"I have always listened to criticism, and have always tried to work harder and better. I am listening to criticism now, and shall continue to listen to it, and shall accept critical instruction. . . . I think that our three days' discussion will be of the greatest value, especially if we closely study Comrade Zhdanov's speech."[7]

The laying down of the line, the purges of the works involved, and the recantations and pledgings are followed as soon as possible by an outpouring of books, plays, films, paintings, and musical compositions that are supposed to reflect the new line. In this way the message is spread to the far-flung corners of the USSR, and sinks into the consciousness of every last Soviet citizen.

The dependence of the Kremlin on people of talent for a translation of dry directives into terms that sway the human soul and fire man's imagination is responsible for the comparative mildness of the regime toward the "engineers." Unless their errors and deviations are found to be intentional or particularly "harmful," they are, as a rule, given another chance. Most of them are eager to take advantage of the opportunity to recant, if only because of the certain knowledge that public disgrace, financial ruin, prison doors, and concentration camps are the lot of the recalcitrant.

The policy of "giving a chance" has paid back the Kremlin a hundredfold in terms of lip service. No one is more eloquent than the remorseful sinner moved by fear. But the fear-inspired eloquence is powerless to wing its way to the heights of genuine art. The creative output in Stalin's Russia has been flattened into mediocrity by the dead weight of fear and servility.

On occasion a man's extraordinary resilience conspires with genuine talent to bring a great work of art out of the agony of public castigation. The Stalin regime is quick to usurp the credit.

The typical example is provided by Shostakovich's magnificent Fifth Symphony, created in 1937, one year after the composer was bitterly assailed by *Pravda.* The Kremlin claimed after his pitiful recantation that the symphony resulted from the criticism. Shostakovich was again taken to task in 1948, at the meeting with Zhdanov, again recanted in his pathetic way, and then composed works which have earned him a comeback. They were the Cantata of the Forests, singing glory to the postwar reforestation program in Russia, and the theme music for the films, *The Fall of Berlin* and *The Young Guard.*

The latter film, it might be added parenthetically, is based on a similarly titled novel by Alexander Fadeyev, politically the most important writer in the country. The author of many books, Fadeyev is a member of the Central Committee, and secretary general of the Union of Soviet Writers. Despite his exalted position, Fadeyev was taken to task by the Party for alleged deviations and errors in *The Young Guard.* He saved his neck by a hasty public acknowledgment of his "errors" and by a revision of the novel in accordance with the purely political criticism leveled at him.

All cases of public recantation by prominent personages are given publicity in the Soviet Union, but no one has received so much of it as Shostakovich. His case is a classical example of a creative artist acknowledging the limitless wisdom of the Party in its criticism, and then coming forth with new significant works which are allegedly the fruitful results of interference from above. The effectiveness of the Shostakovich case as an example to others has been multiplied by a play based on it and produced by the Moscow Art Theater, one of the world's finest. The play, *Ilya Golovin,* was written by Sergei Mikhalkov, lanky, soft-spoken children's poet and co-author of the new national anthem of the USSR.

The government attached so much significance to the moral of the play—as a work of art it is mediocre—that in 1949 it awarded Mikhalkov a Stalin Prize of one hundred thousand rubles. Soviet critics flooded the press with articles chanting the praises of the play.

The hero, Ilya Golovin (Shostakovich), is shown living in a country estate outside Moscow, surrounded by luxury and flattery. His wife, like most Russian ladies married to the elite, is

preoccupied with clothes. His friends are busy flattering him, supporting their statements by quoting articles printed in the USA. A copy of *Pravda* is brought in and it explodes like a bombshell with bitter criticism of the composer. His admirers forsake him, the wife leaves for the Caucasus to soothe her shattered nerves, his daughter, a singer and a Communist, sides with the Party, and the great man remains alone with his conscience. Only the Voice of America comes to his defense.

Fortunately Golovin has true friends who help him see the light, particularly his own daughter and a Red Army general. The general has an inspiration. He brings onto the stage his military band, which plays for the wretched man a piece he had once composed, a simple, lovely melody which the Soviet masses can understand and hum. Golovin, his eyes filled with tears, sees the light and composes an inspired non-formalist, non-cosmopolite, non-atonal piano concerto. He also repents, recants, and is forgiven. He is even sent to Paris as a delegate to a congress of "fighters for peace" (the reader will recall that Shostakovich was sent to New York on a similar mission in March 1949). What impressed Golovin in Paris most of all was a mass demonstration, with "five hundred thousand men and women cheering Stalin."

An unintended ironic twist is supplied by the fact that the music for the play was written by Aram Khachaturian. The latter had been raked over the coals by Zhdanov at the same conference which so severely criticized Shostakovich. Khachaturian's public recantation was powerless to save his job as secretary general of the Composers' Union, but did keep him in circulation.

The Leningrad poet, Nikolai Zabolotsky, provides a different sort of example, because he was unable to stage a comeback despite the apparent sincerity of his effort to "reform." Zabolotsky acquired fame in the middle thirties with a long poem celebrating Stalin's birthplace, the village of Gori in the Caucasus. The poem is remarkable for its original, daring imagery, and for the absence in it of the indecent flattery so characteristic of Soviet writings about the *vozhd*. Despite the poem, Zabolotsky shared the fate of millions of Soviet citizens during the Great Purge. He disappeared one night and, as I learned later, was sentenced to hard labor in the Far East. All that he left behind to keep his memory alive was a slender volume of poetry, in manuscript form. The poems, dealing with eternal problems of love, life, and death,

were making the rounds among poetry lovers of Moscow and Leningrad who were fascinated by Zabolotsky's original imagery and his strange, primordial preoccupation with animal, plant, and insect life.

The poet was released sometime toward the end of the last war, and staged a comeback. He translated into modern Russian *The Saga of Prince Igor,* the greatest monument of early Russian literature. In 1947 he published *Makers of Highways,* a long poem in which he attempted to re-create his experience at cutting a road through the Siberian *taiga* with his fellow prisoners—in such a way as to celebrate the Stalinist era of transforming nature. Although he made no reference to the involuntary nature of the undertaking, and, on the contrary, attempted to describe it as a thing of valor, joy, and dignity, he was severely criticized for *Makers of Highways.* Nothing by Nikolai Zabolotsky has appeared since, and his whereabouts are not known.[8]

To survive and enjoy his privileges the Soviet intellectual must prove to the satisfaction of the regime that he is instrumental in the creation of the New Soviet Man. The one unfailing method of doing so is to adhere in his work to the spirit of *partyinost'.* Stemming from the word "Party," *partyinost'* requires that all phenomena be treated as seen through the prism of Bolshevik philosophy and its current interpretation and application. Only under such conditions can literature and other fields of intellectual endeavor become "perfect" propaganda instruments in the eyes of the Kremlin. Just as the New Soviet Man is to respond obediently and voluntarily, so must the "engineers of the human soul" react automatically and correctly to every social command. This is the essence of *partyinost'.*

Here is how it functions in the day-to-day practice of the writing profession.

Throughout the war, and for several brief months after it, the people of Russia toiled and fought in the hope that the future would bring with it a new life, Life Beautiful, that their daily existence and relations with people would acquire richness and dignity. Soviet writers eloquently reflected this hope, and the government, worried about the morale of the embattled nation, seemed to encourage it, even if ever so cautiously and ambiguously.

The best literary work reflecting this mood was a long short

story by Valentin Ovechkin, "With Greetings from the Front," which was published on the eve of victory in May 1945. The "greetings" took the form of a letter that the hero, Captain Spivak, and his friend wrote to the people back home, voicing their dreams and hopes. Then, on February 9, 1946, Stalin made his crucial speech informing the whole world that even joint victory over the common enemy had not abolished the inevitability of a final deadly showdown between the free world and the world of Communism. He did not phrase it that bluntly, but the Soviet people have learned how to read between the lines. They knew that the global cold war was on, that more backbreaking toil and more conformity were now expected of them.

Also the Soviet writers knew it. They responded with poems, stories, novels, and plays depicting the drama of the Captain Spivaks and other war veterans returning to their factories and villages with the intention of resting on their laurels and leading private lives full of peace and bliss, but then finding out that all their dreams were but sinful mirages. They now realized that they did not really want any private utopia. Their happiness and personal fulfillment actually lay in inspired collective work and in relentless struggle against those who continued to cling to the sentiments expressed in "Greetings from the Front."[9]

The skeptical reader is cautioned against believing that this new line of propaganda was so transparent that it repelled all except the most unsophisticated Soviet readers. Literature has always had a most intensely personal meaning to the Russians. Postwar Party-line literature not only gave the reader an official version of Soviet life; it also dealt with drama and conflict, which stirred the hearts of almost every person in the USSR. This was especially true of the younger generation, exposed solely to Kremlin-censored books.

The rapid and automatic shift in emphasis from the aspirations voiced in "Greetings from the Front" to the post-1946 literary works illustrates the effectiveness of *partyinost'*. Sometimes, however, the unprecedented literary controls inherent in *partyinost'* misfire, showing that total obedience and conformity may sometimes be too much of a good thing. This point was proved with particular force by the controversy raging to this day around the theory of the "conflictless play" in Soviet drama.

As already recorded earlier in the chapter, a basic point on

which the leadership insists is that genuine conflicts between society and the emerging New Soviet Man are but remnants of Russia's buried capitalist past. Hence sharp, bitter conflicts are not permitted in plays or theatrical productions depicting life in the USSR. At the worst, there might be clashes between "good" and "better," but not between "good" and "evil," for the forces of evil have been vanquished in the land of Stalinism. But collisions between the "good" and the "better," Soviet theorists agree, are so non-explosive as to reduce the conflict to "non-antagonistic contradictions," to "bloodless contradictions."[10] Out of such reasoning arose the theory of the conflictless play, or the play of non-antagonistic contradictions.

This theory came as an answer to the prayers of Soviet critics, censors, and the bureaucrats in charge of the arts. The regime holds them equally responsible with the author for the "errors" and "deviations" that may be discovered after the play has been approved, produced, and praised. The author, impelled by his imagination and creative urge, may be willing to take the risk, but not the censor, critic, or bureaucrat. The theory of the conflictless play gave these men a club to wield against the too adventuresome playwright. All they have to do upon coming across a conflict involving even a mild exposure of wounds on the body of Soviet reality is to cry: "Seeker after sensational clashes!" or "Slander," or "You are giving a platform to the enemy." Or they ask the indignant rhetorical question: "Are you trying to say that the shortcomings you have depicted are actually typical of our glorious Soviet society?" The offending opus is then withdrawn with murmured apologies, or rewritten so as to reduce the conflict to the consistency of molasses.

The resultant catastrophic decline of the Soviet theater has compelled the alarmed leadership to permit a closer look at the theory of the conflictless play. The official organ of the Union of Soviet Writers, the *Literary Gazette,* led off on April 5, 1952, with a cautious but enlightening editorial: "Playwrights are not giving the theaters even half the number of plays necessary for active creative work. Such is the 'quantitative' aspect of the matter. However, this is not the only trouble; dramaturgy is now the most backward sector in literature from the standpoint of artistic quality. . . . The poverty of language and characterization, the sketchiness of plot, the absence of keen, vital conflicts *reduces the*

power of influencing spectators [italics supplied] even in plays which are written on topical themes of our times."

Three weeks later one of the most successful and most official of all Soviet playwrights, Nikolai Virta, gave the subject the full treatment in an article headlined "Let Us Speak Frankly." Virta described in all its gruesome detail "the road to Calvary traversed by the plays in which the authors sharply raised various problems of conflict between the honest and the dishonest"; the barbed-wire obstacles which the agencies in charge of repertoire place before such plays; the fate of the many dramatic works destroyed "by lack of principle" or "by frenzied, rabbitlike fear of the hypothetical possibility of a mistake, mortal fear of taking any risk or responsibility for the risk."

A number of playwrights, said Virta, became "keepers of silence." Others have found refuge in non-Soviet themes, diverting their attention to other lands, or to the Russia of bygone days. Virta himself spent two years gathering material for a play about a Soviet village of today, but was compelled to sublimate the material into a drama about peasant life in a satellite country. To add insult to injury, Virta was forced to embrace and champion the theory of the conflictless play. There was no other way to remain a professional playwright. Here is Virta's own story:

"I must tell frankly just how the 'theory' of the conflictless drama arose in me and certain of my comrades. It arose as a consequence of 'cold observations of the mind' on the manner in which those of our plays which contain sharp life conflicts passed through the barbed-wire obstacles of the agencies in charge of the repertoire. As I have already said, everything living, true to life, sharp, fresh, and unstereotyped was combed out and smoothed out to the point where it was no longer recognizable. Every bold, unstereotyped word in a play had to be defended at the cost of the playwright's nerves and the play's quality.

"Realizing that any play taken from our life, in which there is a sharp conflict, would encounter resolute resistance, reflecting on all this, paying heed to the voices of others, and not desiring to consider myself infallible, I sought for a creative way out for an agonizingly long time. Like every one of my comrades, I understood that the theater cannot live without dramaturgy, that sooner or later we playwrights would have to answer to the people for the absence of good plays in the theater. I thought a great deal

about new forms and methods of depicting all manifestations of Soviet life in plays. This road of complicated and long reflection was what led me finally to the thought that perhaps a play without conflicts in drama was really possible; perhaps the time of sharp conflicts in drama had passed. No, this stupid and spurious theory did not arise because 'everything was fine!' "

Now, encouraged by Stalin himself,[11] Virta renounced the theory: "There can be no conflict between two good Soviet people, but—do we not have along with good Soviet people also bad and backward ones in the grip of survivals of capitalism, bureaucrats, careerists, toadies, sharp operators, and people who are amoral in daily life?"

Toward the end of the article Virta returned to the side of the angels by declaring that Soviet dramaturgy "must become a mighty tool in the hands of the Party and the people."

Emboldened by Virta's example, the poet-playwright Ilya Selvinsky came out with a complaint of his own: "All these torments of the dramatists are as roses and forget-me-nots by comparison with the thorns which have been the lot of the poet if he had the boldness to put the muse on the stage."

The confessions of the two men rang out like a protest in the fear-ridden atmosphere of the Soviet art world. Bitter experience had lent their words a conviction and force that apparently went beyond the limits of what the Kremlin was prepared to allow in order to prevent Soviet dramaturgy from further deterioration. *Pravda* itself stepped in with an editorial. It mildly rebuked the impetuous Virta and Selvinsky for "leading the reader away from consideration of genuine creative effort," but admitted the truth contained in their grievances. And *Pravda* appealed for the emergence of new, present-day "Gogols and Shchedrins [great Russian satirists of the nineteenth century] to expose and mercilessly scourge all that is vulgar and backward and hinders the progress of Soviet society."

In the next breath, however, the strait jacket was on again. *Pravda* outlined, with the precision of a military order, the limits beyond which the new Gogols and Shchedrins may not venture:

"While truthfully portraying the shortcomings and contradictions that exist in life, the writer must actively affirm the positive basis of our socialist reality, must help the new to triumph. One cannot tolerate plays in which the negative characters dominate

everything and, moreover, are portrayed more vividly and expressively than the heroes."[12]

The New Soviet Man is to occupy the center of the stage—and not in the theater alone. He will remain the focal point of all Kremlin efforts on the fronts of ideology and human values until the day when the Soviet citizen *en masse* is at last molded according to specifications. That day, if it comes, will mark total victory for the Kremlin in Russia's Cold Civil War—one of the blackest days in the history of the world.

CHAPTER 14

Soviet Strengths and Weaknesses and the Challenge to Us

> The Policy of Russia is changeless—its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the polar star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star.
>
> KARL MARX, 1867

> Long, too long America,
> Traveling roads all even and peaceful you learned from joys and prosperity only,
> But now, ah now, to learn from crises of anguish, advancing, grappling with direst fate and recoiling not.
> And now to conceive and show the world what your children en masse really are.
>
> WALT WHITMAN

The task of determining what constitutes a point of strength or weakness in a given country is tremendously complicated and baffling. A certain factor may in one state, or in one country, contribute substantially to strength, and at another time or in a different place it may be a source of weakness.

The difficulties of assessing the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet Union are magnified a hundredfold by the vastness of the country, the diversity of its peoples, the secrecy surrounding a great many pertinent facts, and the element of unpredictability inherent in a situation where a handful of men can make the most drastic changes, without any regard to public opinion.

The difficulties are further complicated by the fact that some fundamental aspects of Soviet reality carry within them the seeds of both strengths and weaknesses at one and the same time. Joseph Stalin, for instance. He is one of the great personalities among the rulers of Russia, along with Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Vladimir Lenin. If Stalin has caused more bloodshed and more suffering than any of his predecessors, he has also built more cities, factories, dams, and power plants. He seized a poor and backward nation by the scruff of its neck and whipped it into becoming the world's second greatest industrial and military power. Through sheer will and ruthlessness he kept his country fighting and winning the most perilous of all wars, in the course of which even a man like General MacArthur felt impelled

to exclaim: "The hopes of civilization rest on the worthy banners of the Russian Army."

Stalin's relentless will has driven the Soviet nation to military, industrial, and scientific accomplishments that have shaken the world and released the creative energies of the people.

Stalin has jolted a nation of illiterates into producing armies of engineers and technicians, scientists and inventors, strategists and masters of military tactics. He murdered old, backward Russia and buried it forever.

Finally, he has made himself, the son of a poor, ignorant Georgian cobbler, the central unifying force of a multinational empire covering more than a sixth of the globe, and a symbol of the power and glory of that empire.

Therein lies Stalin's strength, and thereby he represents a frightening source of might.

The very qualities that have made Stalin's unprecedented feats possible—his thirst for power, single-mindedness, and disregard for the pain and suffering of others—have combined to make him also a grave source of Soviet weakness.

Jealous of the real, fancied, or alleged rivalry of men of talent and ambition, he has caused the liquidation of most of the original leaders of the Bolshevik Revolution, and has surrounded himself with second-raters. It is an old story. In *The Republic*, Plato says that the purge by a dictator is "not the sort of purgation which the physicians make of the body, for they take away the worst and leave the better part, but he does the reverse."[1]

Beginning with Molotov and Malenkov, and ending with Beria, Mikoyan, and Kaganovich, Stalin has chosen as his comrades in arms able executives and administrators, rather than men qualified for leadership by spiritual and mental strength.

The hatreds released by Stalin's disregard for man's suffering, and his disdain for human dignity, keep surging around the fortress Kremlin, threatening to engulf the future heir to the Soviet throne, for not one of the known aspirants to it can support his ambitions by the unique combination of gifts and circumstances that are Stalin's. He alone has the massive will power, organizational genius, ruthlessness, and identification with the Revolution of 1917 and with the glory of the victory over Nazi Germany.

Stalin's severe limitations as a leader are bared by the terrible legacy he is handing down to his heir or heirs, a legacy of hatred and resentments inside the Soviet Union and hatred and suspicion abroad. He has achieved absolute power but in the process he has destroyed human dignity and intellectual courage. This made it impossible for him to resolve the resentments tearing at the fabric of Soviet society. He has merely driven them underground. The nearly perfect police state which he has created and is bequeathing to his heirs can continue to keep the problem in abeyance for some time, but it is powerless to solve them without resurrecting human dignity and courage. To do so would be to commit suicide, and no police state has ever done away with itself. The inevitable revulsion that is bound to come might conceivably take on more or less peaceful forms and be limited to the confines of the USSR. It might also go hand in hand with explosions caused by a continued policy of expansion, Stalin's other sinister legacy.

The Soviet policy of expansion has converted practically all of central and southeastern Europe into a Russian province.[2] Yet the satellite nations, like Joseph Stalin, are a source of weakness as well as strength to the USSR.

The military and economic advantages inherent in the Soviet hegemony over the satellite countries are so obvious as to require no detailed exposition here. Suffice it to say that all human and natural resources of eastern Europe, except those of Titoist Yugoslavia, are strategically integrated with those of the USSR. Armies, police, transportation and communication systems, industrial and agricultural production are all at the beck and call of the Soviet leadership. It can use and deploy them at will—for invasion of foreign territory, for the suppression of internal disorders, or for the intimidation of neighboring states or the local population.

The political and psychological advantages of hegemony are equally great, making it possible for the Soviet leaders to try to re-educate the people of the satellite countries along the lines attempted in the USSR—to replace mere submission by an active and voluntary obedience.

A mammoth preliminary job in this direction has already been accomplished. The destinies, liberty, careers, work, and leisure of

the ninety million men and women in the satellite countries have been placed under complete control of the masters and their timeservers. As in the Soviet Union, the machinery of coercion and persuasion is going full steam ahead, complete with printing presses, theatrical plays, musical compositions, prisons, and concentration camps. Political opposition has been liquidated or rendered impotent, and the churches have been stripped of independence. The rewriting of history and the sovietization and Russification of schools, literature, and the arts are already doing their deadly work of shaping a satellite model of the New Soviet Man.

All this is true but, as in Russia itself, Soviet tyranny in eastern Europe has gone the way of all tyrannies—it has sown the seeds of its own destruction. The widespread opposition to the programs and policies carried out by the local quislings is intensified by hatred of foreign domination. The favorite Kremlin device of diverting resentments toward scapegoats has spread bewilderment and cynicism even among the Communist faithful. But neither the sacrifice of a number of quislings, nor the wholesale liquidation of the upper and middle classes, nor hymns to Stalin, nor the hate-America campaign, has succeeded to this day in freeing the Soviet leadership from what Leland Stowe calls "the conqueror's nightmares." Mr. Stowe has estimated that the satellite countries contain the "greatest potential fifth column on earth," consisting of at least 50,000,000 "unconvertibles."[3] To this day, peasants sabotage the collectivization program and grain deliveries; workers engage in absenteeism and slow-downs; intellectuals commit ideological "mistakes"; bands of partisans perform daring feats of incendiarism and assassination.

Moscow's European satellites are indeed the weakest link in the Soviet chain of military preparedness.

The one unalloyed factor of Soviet weakness has been the Kremlin's inability to provide the people with a standard of living anywhere commensurate with the pace at which they have been compelled to produce.

Capital investment, military preparations, and the bureaucratic machine have been swallowing too much. The result is that the rate of improvement in the standard of living has always lagged behind the rate of productivity. Similarly, the rate of increase

in the production of consumer goods has always lagged behind that of the heavy industrial output. The latest data, released by Georgi Malenkov at the 1952 Communist Party Congress in Moscow, illustrates this point most convincingly. Taking the output in 1940 as 100, the percentages for the consequent years are expressed in the following indexes:[4]

	Total Industrial Output	*Heavy Industrial Output*	*Consumer Goods Output*
1944	Not available	136	54
1945	92	112	59
1946	77	82*	67
1947	93	101	82
1948	118	130	99
1949	141	163	107
1950	173	205	123
1951	202	239	143
1952	223	270	156

*The drop in heavy industrial output during the years 1945–46 was caused by postwar reconversion.

In the United States the living standards have kept abreast of economic growth. Not so in the Soviet Union—now or ever. On the basis of Soviet statistics, an American economist has figured out that per capita national income in the USSR in 1937 was comparable to that of the United States during the decade of 1869–78.[5] This at a time when Soviet production of basic industrial raw materials (in 1937) roughly equaled that of the USA between 1900 and 1910. This thirty-year lag in the well-being of the Soviet vs. the American consumer has not been reduced during the last fifteen years, although there is no way of denying that the standard of living in the USSR has improved since World War II.

A telling Kremlin admission that it does not intend to do anything about this lag is implied by the fact that neither Communist policies nor propaganda promise a reduction in the foreseeable future of the appalling discrepancy between effort and reward in terms of higher living standards. It is significant that when Stalin suggested in October 1952 that the Soviet laborer would work only six, and then five, hours, that his real wages would be doubled, prices would be reduced, and housing radically improved, the Soviet leader failed to say when and how this would

be accomplished. Intended or not, there was mockery in the statement, for the very goals set by Stalin for Soviet industry, to be reached by 1955 and then by 1960, make any substantial reduction of work hours or appreciable increase in real wages an impossibility.

The colossal amount of additional capital investment necessitated by the Kremlin's avowed aim of catching up with and surpassing United States industrial production will not allow radical improvement in Soviet living standards for at least another generation. Assuming that the targets of the current Five-Year Plan are met, the Soviet Union of 1955 will be only about half as productive as the United States was in 1951. Even as he boasted before the Nineteenth Party Congress about the invincible might of his glorious fatherland, Georgi Malenkov released statistics that showed Soviet industrial output for 1952 to be only about 40 per cent of the 1951 US output. Here are the comparative figures:[6]

USSR–1952		*USA–1951*
25	Pig iron (million tons)	64.0
35	Steel (million tons)	95.5
47	Oil (million tons)	307.5
300	Coal (million tons)	523.0
117	Electric power (billions of kilowatt-hours)	482.3
250	Leather shoes (million pairs)	471.1
5	Cotton (billion yards)	9.02

These figures are even more telling if one remembers that the US productive forces serving a population of 155,000,000 are not working at full capacity, whereas the Soviet factories, running at top speed, must meet the needs of more than 200,000,000 people and a much larger military machine than the one supported by this country.

Slave labor is another major source and symptom of Soviet weakness.

Moscow does not deny the existence of "camps of correctional labor," and Foreign Minister Vishinsky even referred to "concentration camps" in the USSR, when his tongue slipped as he was addressing the UN General Assembly in October 1947.

The voluminous literature on Soviet slave labor[7] leaves no

doubt on two points: first, that the number of inmates in the concentration camps is counted by the million, the various estimates ranging from two to twenty million; and second, that slave labor has become an integral feature of economic life and economic planning in the USSR.

Both points were proved conclusively in 1945 by the secret Soviet economic plan for 1941, which fell into the hands of US authorities in Germany. According to this official document,[8] more than 14 per cent of all capital construction planned in the USSR in 1941 was to have been accomplished by forced labor. The total amount of rubles involved was 6,800,000,000 to be used in connection with prison labor for the construction of railways and highways, houses and military installations, and for timber operations and the mining of gold, chromium, and coal. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, which operates the concentration camps, is thus the world's largest "employer." The ministry, moreover, has a completely free hand in deploying its workers at will, in farming them out to other Soviet enterprises, and in setting production targets for them. The conditions under which the prisoners live and work are such as to warrant the branding of the Soviet leaders as criminals who resort to slave labor and cause the slow death of millions of people through inhuman work, malnutrition, and exposure.

Slave labor has long since transcended its original role as solely an instrument of terror and suppression. It became also a key factor in the solution of the chronic shortage of manpower in the USSR. The Soviet organs of suppression have become the suppliers of cheap and expendable labor in the wastes of the Russian North, in the primeval Siberian *taiga*, in the desert lands of Central Asia and other areas where even the strait-jacketed Soviet workers cannot be coerced into going.

Having made forced labor an essential part of the planned Soviet economy, the Kremlin has become dependent on its concentration camps for the achievement of many key targets. The Kremlin has become, in a sense, a slave of its own slave system, compelled by the urgencies of the plan to provide the system with more and more fresh manpower.

The Soviet leaders have been meeting this problem with characteristic Stalinist resoluteness: the supply of manpower has been coming in a steady stream. There were the *kulak* victims

of the collectivization drive; the millions arrested during the Great Purge; the deportees from eastern Poland and the Baltic States in 1939–41; the populations of the national minorities republics liquidated during the war; German and Japanese war prisoners; Soviet war prisoners and slave laborers liberated by the enemy; cosmopolites and other "erring" intellectuals; national minority groups deported from border areas.

When the supply of manpower dries up the Ministry of Internal Affairs finds ways of filling the gap. The simplest expedient it employs is lengthening the sentence of as many people as are needed in a given area. Displaying a flexibility that is indeed exceptional for the Soviet way of running things, Moscow allows time extensions to be made by the ministry itself, by any of its several administrations of corrective labor camps, and by the head of each individual camp.

Another way of keeping up the supply of manpower in the camps is for the secret police to dip into its special files for potential victims. The files contain the names of people not guilty of any untoward act or utterance, but earmarked for eventual arrest on the principle of "prophylactics." They may be relations or intimate friends of purged persons. They may have relatives or other contacts abroad. Or they may be guilty of nothing more tangible than the crime of having minds of their own.

The economic contribution of the forced labor system to the production effort cannot be disputed. Yet the very magnitude of that contribution and the plan's dependence on it bespeak the rottenness of the Soviet regime. Because of the low productivity inherent in the institution of slave labor, it constitutes a terrible waste of talent, skill, and manpower. Dallin and Nicolayevsky have concluded on the basis of careful study that the efficiency of a concentration camp laborer is less than 50 per cent of that of a free Soviet worker.[8] The political and moral deterioration of the camp inmates is almost as appalling as the high mortality rate among them. The heartbreaks caused by the slave system are such that, for every mile of railway constructed and every plant built, there are thousands of fists clenched in hatred.

All the vociferous Kremlin claims about the loyalty of Soviet citizens sound hollow in face of the fact that after nearly two-score years of the Communist regime the rulers are afraid of the people and the people fear their rulers.

To no country is the following passage from Plato's *Dialogues* so applicable as to Stalin's Russia:

"And is the city which is under a tyrant rich or poor?
"Poor.
"And the tyrannical soul must always be poor and insatiable?
"True.
"And must not such a state and such a man be always full of fear?
"Yes, indeed.
"Is there any state in which you will find more of lamentation and sorrow and groaning and pain?
"Certainly not."

Like all dictators throughout history, the men in the Kremlin have been relying on increasingly rigid regimentation to resolve their fears. In regimentation the Soviet leadership has found a source of reassurance, which contributes to the stability of the regime and makes all organized opposition a virtual impossibility. The terror generated by total regimentation has made Soviet security the most ironclad in the world. It has enabled the Communists to eliminate all social bonds and organizational units that are beyond its control, and therefore constitute a potential source of danger. The necessity, for the worker, farmer, teacher, scientist, and artist, of obeying the social command has made it possible for the government to extract from the population a maximum of effort for a minimum of return.

Regimentation has also given the Kremlin a freedom of action and a maneuverability beyond the capacity of even the most enthusiastically supported democratic government. All the physical and psychological resources of the USSR are kept in a state of constant mobilization, ready to be deployed with a speed and effectiveness unattainable by any free state.

These factors contributing to strength and stability are real and powerful, but are important for a comparatively short term. The weaknesses contained in the total-control system take more time to assert themselves but are no doubt of far longer duration. Regimentation spawns resentments and necessitates the upkeep of a machinery of coercion that in itself aggravates the strains while preventing them from bursting the dam. The cost of maintaining this machinery is terribly high, as is the cost of keeping the Soviet nation in a constant state of preparedness. The wear and tear on the nerves of the individual and on national produc-

tion cannot be kept up indefinitely even by a great country and a submissive people.

The most far-reaching weakness of regimentation is the demoralization of human relationships, the crucifixion of the dignity of man. Far from achieving the beauty and happiness in human relationships promised by the Revolution, Stalin's subjects live in a world of suspicion, fear, and betrayal. Every person is surrounded by an iron curtain of his own, separated by it from normal human contact with his fellow men. The individual Soviet citizen is forever on guard even against the members of his own family and his most intimate friends. This is so contrary to the normal pattern of relationships among men that the resultant strain is reflected in the faces of the people and in their behavior at work and during leisure hours. There is a pathological alertness in the eyes of the men one talks to, and there is a great deal of companionless drinking in Russia. Most of the cases of mental disorders that came to my attention during the years I worked in Moscow as a foreign correspondent were, in one way or another, connected with this strain.

In comparison with the regimented Soviet citizen, the man of the democratic world is more self-reliant and self-sufficient. His are the incomparable inner resources of a free citizen, which assert themselves in times of crisis, revealing the full power of voluntary compulsions and of an enthusiasm and discipline that are innocent of fear. All the praise of the New Soviet Man is powerless to conceal the fact that the inner resources of the Soviet nation have been largely dissipated by anxiety and fatigue.

Exposed to constant pressures, the Soviet citizen has been withdrawing into individual and family life, into music and the theater, into picking mushrooms and berries and working his small garden plot. When postwar foreign observers in the Soviet Union first noticed the way Russians were seeking refuge in non-political activity and in sheer apathy, we were originally inclined to attribute it to a natural reaction after the strain of the conflict. But the process has not disappeared with time. On the contrary, recent arrivals from Russia speak of an even more marked "inner emigration" of the Soviet people.

The leaders do not fear indifference as long as it is applied to the outside world and ideologies other than Communism, but the indifference they fear is the lack of response to the Party

line. The citizens of the USSR are therefore constantly being appealed to, glorified, pressured and threatened. Every day in Russia is a campaign day, a day of assault, each hour a battle and each minute a skirmish, with all their attendant pressures.

At the root of this state of siege is the obvious desire on the part of the leadership to exact a maximum effort in all fields of production. But there is also another factor—the mortal fear of the ruling minority of losing contact with the masses, or of being swamped by them. The Kremlin sees a great danger in these possibilities, and therefore regards relaxation as a major enemy and interprets all tendencies toward normalcy as sluggishness, weariness, apathy, and indifference. The Kremlin is trying to awake in the people a maximum alertness, but one which they completely control.

Each and every manifestation of "inner emigration" is combated by the Communist Party, and no means it has devised is more potent than the method based on Lenin's theory of the "main link."

The whole of the political life and productive effort of a nation, Lenin asserted, is an endless chain consisting of an infinite number of links. "Some one main slogan," says Stalin, "is always brought forward as the central one, so that in grasping it the whole chain may be pulled along. Lenin thus taught us: Find the main link in the chain of our work, pull it so that the whole chain is drawn along, and thus go forward."[10]

Each historical moment, according to this theory as practiced by Stalin, has some one specific link that is decisive for the occasion. The leadership must have the vision and the shrewdness to find the link, concentrate on it, and build it up until it becomes a source of strength. The link might be the Five-Year Plan, or Russian patriotism, or the deification of Stalin, or "peace." When established, the link is glorified, is identified with the greatness of the fatherland and with the well-being of each individual Soviet citizen. It becomes a slogan, the inspiration of poets and the theme of songs.

Or the link might be something stark and horrible that chills the heart and incites anger and indignation, as well as an acceptance of greater controls, harder work, and insufficient living standards. Over the years the Communist leadership has created a veritable demonology, dangling before the eyes of the Soviet

people the monstrous images of real or invented "bogeymen" which threaten their peace, prosperity, and very existence. In a sense the entire history of the Soviet regime is the story of the bogeymen and the struggle against them. The long list includes tsarist generals, foreign interventionists, peasant *kulaks*, Trotskyite-Bukharinite agents, fascists, Nazis, Soviet bureaucrats, Jewish bourgeois nationalists, etc.

The strongest and biggest bogeyman of them all, the deadliest menace to the peoples of the USSR and all progressive mankind, is none other than the USA. It is described as a country dominated by Wall Street, "the last citadel of dying imperialism," the enslaver of the world and the destroyer of cultural treasures. This is the image of the United States which the Kremlin has been forcing upon the Russians who for generations had looked reverently to America as "that great republic beyond the ocean."

The distorted image of America is the current "main link" that helps the Soviet leaders hold the people in check and drive them at top speed. US imperialists, runs the Party line, are preparing to attack the USSR, which alone among the major powers is defending peace and the sovereignty of nations. Therefore Soviet industrial and military might must grow, and all slackers, loafers, and other violators of labor discipline are in league with the enemy. This enemy is sly and resourceful and is pressing every advantage out of the "capitalist survivals" in the minds of many backward Soviet citizens. Therefore controls must not be relaxed, nor can there be a weakening of the regimentation that keeps in line all the "engineers of the human soul." In fact the pace must be quickened.

This pace is keeping the Party in the forefront and in control, but it is bound in the long run to smother vitality and lower efficiency. The people of the Soviet Union are dead tired of the hate-America campaign, and also just dead tired.

The many Kremlin devices of "selling" its criminally distorted image of the USA to all who will listen—and eight hundred million people have no choice but to listen—add up to the most massive propaganda effort ever directed by one country against another.[11] The crucial challenge which this effort has created for us goes far beyond the present scope of our counterpropaganda organizations.

Communism has subjected to devastating criticism all the spiritual and intellectual values, as well as the economic order, of the Western democratic world. In boastful words the Communists are offering a substitute for capitalism. They are promising a glorious future to all the underprivileged, claiming to have the answer to their quest for self-respect, independence, and a life of abundance. Led by the Soviet Union, the Communists have given voice and direction to the world's oppressed and dispossessed, thereby usurping the right to leadership in a perilously large part of the globe. The fact that Communism's claims are fraudulent is neither here nor there, as long as the have-nots of the world do not know it. Unless and until we lift the Curtain hiding this fact, Communist claims will remain a frightful source of strength to Stalin's Russia and a threat to world peace. The lifting of the Curtain is a task of the first magnitude, making psychological warfare a major factor in the planning and execution of our national policy.

The psychological warfare I speak of is not simply a propaganda counterpart of the policy of containment but a creative challenge to Communist ideology and claims. Denunciation of Soviet imperialism and the unmasking of Kremlin hypocrisy are but two of the functions of our psychological warfare strategy. Far more important is the fight for a global program consistent with our time-tested ideals of liberty, equality, and pursuit of happiness.

Upon reading the Declaration of Independence soon after it was signed, the Russian poet Alexander Radishchev exclaimed:

My soul is aflame with yearning
Toward thee, oh, famed land
Where once, pressed down by the yoke,
Freedom lay prostrate.
Thou art rejoicing now,
Yet, we still suffer, still striving
To follow in your path.[12]

The psychological warfare I speak of must have the power to persuade millions the world over to make Radishchev's sentiments their own. This is said not in the belief that we ought to seek the conversion of everyone to our way of life. Each nation has its own destiny and its own contribution to the heritage of

mankind. It is the multiplicity of cultures that makes for the richness of life on this planet, and no country has absorbed so much from the various nations of the world as has the USA. What I have in mind is a reaffirmation, for the whole world to see and hear, of those American ideals and traditions which inspired the Russian poet over a century and a half ago.

Such a reaffirmation is necessary because, in the frustrations and confusions of the cold war, there has been in this country a deterioration of respect for civil liberties. An open season on government employees, members of the teaching professions, and liberal artists and writers has become in the eyes of millions of people synonymous with the successful pursuit of security. Enemy agents must be fought wherever and whenever they appear, but the exposure and prosecution of these agents ought not to be conditional upon the subjection of artistic and intellectual life in the United States to suspicion and regimentation, as many people, some of them in a position of power, have tried to do. President Eisenhower has done this country and the whole free world a great service by branding such practice as "violent vigilantism."

A strong USA, standing guard over democracy at home and abroad, aiding in the rehabilitation of the underprivileged countries, and pursuing a firm, dynamic, enlightened and patient foreign policy, can force the Russian bear to retreat to its own lair. Inside the lair the chasm between Communist promises and ugly reality, the festering human relations, the cruelty that runs through the entire fabric of Soviet life, will gradually take their toll. The Kremlin will have no choice but to liberalize its regime or face an explosion.

It would be a dangerous illusion to expect an early overthrowal of the Soviet system, giving birth to a Russia that could take an honorable place among the free nations of the world. Unless a major war breaks out, the USSR may be expected to be with us for some years to come, irrespective of whether Stalin is dead or alive. The Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, and all other means of psychological warfare at the service of the USA and its Allies cannot be relied upon as instruments to incite the Soviet people to revolt—at least not in time of peace. But these means can and must serve as constant reminders to the peoples behind the Iron Curtain that they have not been forgotten by the

free world, that there exists another scheme of things in life, capable of bringing greater happiness and fulfillment to man. These channels must keep on exposing the Kremlin lies about life on both sides of the Iron Curtain, and serve as a substitute for the conscience of the captive peoples.

In conducting its psychological offensive, the Stalin regime is devoting to it energy, resources, and talent on a scale that makes our own effort seem puny and amateurish by comparison. The Soviet leaders are themselves the general staff of the psychological warfare army, using every resource at their command. Unfortunately we have not, even at this late hour, completely outgrown the naïve conception that a few techniques of salesmanship and advertising can move emotional and ideological mountains.

The importance of psychological warfare in the global conflict of ideas, in the making and unmaking of peace, and in the winning or losing of wars, warrants the use of men of vision, talent, and knowledge. Experts in political and social sciences, historians, anthropologists, journalists, humorists, composers, and writers—they must all take part in the battle. Yes, and public relations men, too, for they can help acquaint the American people with our global propaganda effort, and mobilize their support. The cause of freedom has little chance, without the vitality, ingenuity, and free spirit of the American people themselves.

In this respect the men in the Kremlin have advantages beyond the dreams or wishes of democratic leadership. Stalin and his colleagues are not bound by a free and sovereign public opinion. They have unlimited power over the resources, skills, and talents of their country and the lands they rule, and they know nothing of the soul-searching that goes into the shaping of our policies, or of the difficulties in getting the co-operation of different government branches and achieving the co-ordination of all propaganda mechanisms.

Nor do the men in the Kremlin know anything of the problems connected with our determination not to "go it alone." The United States, which until recently rejected even the thought of "entangling alliances," is now a leading member of a great corporation (which Stalin would give his right hand to disrupt), obliged to act in unison with the other partners.

Our answer to the Soviet challenge has been most astutely summed up by former Governor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois:

"To meet the crisis of our day, we must have affirmative values and clear-cut objectives. The challenge to all of us is to prove that a free society can remain free, humane and creative, even when it is under heavy and ruthless fire; that it can combat poverty, injustice and intolerance in its own midst, even while resisting a monstrous foreign despotism; and that it can mean a glimpse of serenity and hope, even while calling on them for sacrifice."

NOTES

CHAPTER 1. *The Battle Takes Shape,* pages 7 to 16

1. Cited by Thomas A. Bailey, *America Faces Russia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1950), p. 136.
2. Marquis de Custine, *Journey for Our Time* (New York: Pellegrini & Cudahy, 1951), p. 181. First published in France in 1843.
3. Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), p. 342.
4. Ibid., p. 343.

CHAPTER 2. *The Defection Front,* pages 17 to 33

1. Wallace Carroll, "It Takes a Russian to Beat a Russian," *Life,* December 19, 1949, p. 81; Lowell M. Clucas, Jr., "Piercing the Iron Curtain," *Yale Review,* Summer 1950, p. 616.
2. *Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression* (Washington, D.C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1946–48), III, 127.
3. Carroll, op. cit., p. 82.
4. For the full text of the dramatic decree on the abolition of the Volga German Autonomous Republic, see the New York *Times* (henceforth referred to as NYT) for September 25, 1941.

   All news of the decree was suppressed within several minutes after the correspondents of the Associated Press and NYT had filed their stories about it.
5. Louis Fischer (ed.), *Thirteen Who Fled* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 6 of the Introduction.
6. For a brief account of Schulenburg's program, see Carroll, op. cit., p. 82.
7. Cited by B. H. Liddell Hart, *The Other Side of the Hill* (London: Cassell & Co., 1948), p. 182.
8. Editorial, *Ukrainian Quarterly* (published by the Ukrainian Congress Committee, Mahwah, N.J.), Winter 1942, p. 7.
9. George Fischer, "Vlasov and Hitler," *Journal of Modern History,* March 1951, p. 59.
10. Ibid.

11. Ibid. The full text of Vlasov's statements, as well as other valuable material on the subject, is contained in B. Dvinov's *Vlasovskoye dvizheniye v svete dokumentov* (*The Vlasov Movement in the Light of Documents*) (New York: 1950), pp. 79–81, and W. Wladimirow's *Dokumente und Material des Kommittees zur Befreiung der Voelker Russlands* (*Documents and Materials of the Committee on the Liberation of Russia's Peoples*) (Berlin: 1944), pp. 47–53.
12. From an unpublished document, "*Querschnitt durch die Tätigkeit des Arbeitsgebietes Dr. Taubert,*" cited by David J. Dallin in *The New Soviet Empire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951), p. 67.
13. International Military Tribunal, *Trial of the Major War Criminals* (Nuremberg: 1948), XXIX, 117–22.
14. L. Fischer, op. cit., p. 14.
15. Writing in the New York *Times* of June 4, 1951, Harry Schwartz spoke of "the more than 250,000 anti-Soviet refugees from the Soviet Union living outside the Iron Curtain."

    L. Fischer (op. cit., p. 15) wrote: "Several hundred thousand, probably at least half a million, Soviet prisoners of war and slave laborers . . . managed to this day to avoid returning to Russia."

CHAPTER 3. *The Patriotic Front:* I, pages 35 to 46

1. Don Cossack leaders of peasant rebellions of the second half of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries respectively.
2. NYT, November 10, 1936.

CHAPTER 4. *The Patriotic Front:* II, pages 47 to 64

1. Alex Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia: A Study in Mass Persuasion* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 68.
2. Lieutenant General Walter Bedell Smith, *My Three Years in Moscow* (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1949), p. 287.
3. S.T., "The Morale of the Red Army in Germany," *Partisan Review,* March 1948, p. 302.
4. Joseph and Stewart Alsop, "Russian Soldiers Now Deserting in Steady Flow," New York *Herald Tribune,* September 5, 1948.
5. Marguerite Higgins, "Now the Russians Are Fleeing Russia," *Saturday Evening Post,* June 4, 1949, p. 15.
6. J. and S. Alsop, op. cit.

7. Merle Fainsod, "Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System," *American Political Science Review,* XLIV (June 1950), 272.
8. Liddell Hart, op. cit., p. 323.
9. Smith, op. cit., pp. 22–23.
10. General Dwight Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1948), p. 463.
11. NYT, July 23, 1951.
12. The discussion of the separate chains of command is based on the findings of Merle Fainsod, op. cit., pp. 280–81.

CHAPTER 5. *The Religious Front:* I, pages 65 to 84.

1. For details of the unequal battle between the Church and the Bolsheviks, see F. MacCullagh, *The Bolshevik Persecution of Christianity* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1924); J. F. Hecker, *Religion Under the Soviets* (New York: Vanguard Press, 1927); Nicholas S. Timasheff, *Religion in Soviet Russia* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1942).
2. For an incomplete but fascinating on-the-scene account of the intra-Orthodox Church struggle, see Walter Duranty, *Walter Duranty Reports Russia* (New York: Viking Press, 1934), pp. 61–70 and 74–81.
3. This estimate by the head of the League of Militant Atheists was apparently based on the census of January 6, 1937. The results of the census were never published, on the official pretext that they had been tampered with by Trotskyites and other "counterrevolutionary elements." The question on religious convictions was omitted from the subsequent census, taken on January 17, 1939.
4. NYT, June 30, 1941.
5. Sherwood, op. cit., pp. 388 and 391–93.
6. Frederick L. Schuman, *Soviet Politics at Home and Abroad* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), p. 331; Henry Shapiro, "Religion Returns to Russia," *Look,* August 5, 1947, p. 38.
7. *Izvestia,* September 5, 1943.
8. For details of the election see next chapter.
9. The exact date of the establishment of the Council for Russian Orthodox Church Affairs has not been disclosed. Timasheff records it as October 9, 1943 (op. cit., p. 232); S. Labin registers it as September 8, 1943 (*Stalin's Russia* [London: Victor Gollancz, Ltd., 1950], p. 246); while Julian Towster states that the Council was created on October 7, 1943 (*Political Power in the USSR* [New York: Oxford University Press,

1948], p. 366). All that is definitely known is that *Pravda* announced the formation of the Council in its issue of October 8, 1943. The paper, however, did not specify the date of the actual formation.

10. *Teachers' Gazette,* Moscow, November 26, 1949.
11. *Kulturno-rosvetitelnaya rabota* (*Cultural Enlightment Work*), Moscow, 1949.
12. NYT, August 22, 1952.
13. As quoted by Schuman, op. cit., p. 501.
14. For a detailed report on this fantastic episode see *Russia on the Way* by Harrison Salisbury (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946), pp. 298–309.
15. The Communist offensive against the Roman Catholic Church in the satellite countries is described by Leland Stowe in *Conquest by Terror* (New York: Random House, 1952), Chapter XI. See also Ernest O. Hauser, "What Stalin Has in Mind for Catholics," *Saturday Evening Post,* September 22, 1951.
16. Albert Kalme, *Total Terror* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1951), p. 183.
17. NYT, September 9, 1951.
18. This and the following quotations are from the Soviet magazine *Nauka i Zhizn* (*Science and Life*), September 1950, pp. 42–46, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Vol. II, No. 44, pp. 8–10.

CHAPTER 6. *The Religious Front:* II, pages 85 to 102

1. N. S. Timasheff, *The Great Retreat* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1946), p. 234.
2. As recorded by me in the cathedral at the time.
3. My only copy of the Easter message as read by Archpriest Kolchitsky was confiscated by Soviet customs officials at the time of my expulsion from Russia in April 1948. In December 1944, however, I had mailed to New York the text of the Christmas message which I had rehearsed with the then Acting Patriarch Alexei, and which had been cleared by the censor. The spirit of both messages was more or less identical, and I am therefore citing the full text of the Christmas greeting:

"Today, the Christians of America are celebrating Christmas Day, the day of the Nativity of our Saviour. The Russian Orthodox Church, according to its rules, is on the eve of this great holiday of the whole Christian world, but, moved by the warm feeling of fraternal love and communion, it is send-

ing its ardent greetings to the Christians of the friendly country —the great United States of America.

"Both you and we are meeting the holiday of peace amidst the anxieties and tempests of war that are still raging. But we already see clearly the end of the war—victorious for our peoples. The words of God: 'They that conquer by the sword, shall perish by the sword' shall come true for the enemy of humanity—fascist Germany. We firmly believe that the Lord who has given us His heavenly help throughout the war will help us finish it victoriously.

"The guarantee to this is the self-denial of the courageous fighters of our Red Army as well as the valiant warriors of the Allied armies, both of America and Great Britain, and likewise all the nations acting with us against our common foe.

"We cannot know when God will choose to bestow peace on our peoples, but, being Christians, we have no doubt that our Lord, born for the sake of our salvation, will by His mercy grant this peace to His children.

"And on the day of this celebration of peace, supported by bright hope, we are singing, our hearts and voices united, the Chant of Angels: 'Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will toward men.'"

CHAPTER 7. *The National Minorities Front*, pages 103 to 126

1. J. Stalin, *Collected Works* (in Russian) (Moscow), IV, 31–32.

Stalin's practical application of this approach is strikingly illustrated by the story of the Bashkir Republic. For details see Richard E. Pipes, "The First Experiment in Soviet National Policy," *Russian Review*, October 1950, pp. 303–19.

Stalin applies the same Machiavellian approach to the national problem on a world scale. Speaking at Sverdlov University in April 1924, he discussed among other things the question of whether the proletariat should support the national liberation movement of the oppressed and dependent peoples. His answer: "Support must be given to such national movements as tend to weaken, to overthrow imperialism, and not to strengthen and preserve it. Cases occur when the national movements in certain oppressed countries come into conflict with the interests of the development of the proletarian movement. In such cases support is, of course, entirely out of the question. The question of the rights of nations is not an isolated, self-sufficient question; it is a part of the general problem of the proletarian

revolution, subordinate to the whole, and must be considered from the point of view of the whole." J. Stalin, *Problems of Leninsim,* Foreign Languages Publishing House, Moscow, 1940, p. 52.

2. Cited by Schuman, op. cit., p. 311.
3. The interested reader will find fully documented data on Soviet discrimination against national groups in "Tensions within the Soviet Union," 82nd Congress (First Session) Document No. 41 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1951), pp. 32–34.
4. Kalme, op. cit., p. 83.
5. NYT, October 16, 1949.
6. Cited by the New York *Herald Tribune,* November 10, 1949.
7. Edmund Stevens, *This Is Russia—Uncensored* (New York: Didier, 1950), p. 170.
8. Kalme, op. cit., pp. 127–28.
9. For example, Mr. Kalme reports (p. 163) that before the war ten hectares of land were handled by 1.7 Latvian farm workers. When collectives were organized, no fewer than 4.6 men were needed to work the same acreage.
10. *Pravda,* April 16, 1951.
11. For details of the Georgian controversy, see Isaac Deutsch, *Stalin* (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 1949), pp. 236–40. The phrase "Great Russian chauvinism" is cited on p. 240.
12. N. Lenin, *Collected Works* (3rd Russian ed.), XXIV, 155.
13. Cited by Dallin, op. cit., p. 108.
14. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism,* pp. 365–66.
15. English version by Florence Randal Livesay, based upon the literal translation by Paul Crath. The following permission to reprint was granted: "The poem *Love Ukraine* by the Ukrainian poet W. Sosyura was written during World War II when the Bolsheviks, hard pressed by military events, made cultural concessions to Ukrainian writers in the USSR. After the war this poem was condemned by the Communist Party, and the author was forced to retract it. The text of the poem is reprinted from the *Ukrainian Quarterly* (Summer 1951 issue, pp. 253–54), New York, N.Y."
16. *Voprosy filosofii* (*Problems of Philosophy*), No. 3, 1950, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* Vol. III, No. 10, p. 3.
17. Stalin made this statement in the course of the linguistic controversy that attracted world attention in 1950 not so much because of the purely linguistic problems involved as because

in the course of it he pronounced the relativity of Marxism. "Marxism does not recognize immutable conclusions and formulae, binding for all epochs and periods. Marxism is the enemy of all dogmatism." This is a most significant statement, for it leaves Stalin and his followers free to interpret and reinterpret Marxism and Leninism at will. For details see *The Soviet Linguistic Controversy,* Ernest J. Simmons, ed., John V. Murra, Robert A. Hankin, Fred Hollins, translators (New York: King's Crown Press, 1951).

An analysis of this policy may be found in Edward Crankshaw's *Cracks in the Kremlin Wall* (New York: Viking Press, 1951), pp. 133–43; in an article by Clarence A. Manning, "Soviet Linguistics and Russian Imperialism," in the Winter 1952 issue of the *Ukrainian Quarterly;* and in Dallin op. cit., pp. 123–28.

18. *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* November 8, 1952, p. 41. This excellent weekly, published by the Joint Committee on Slavic Studies and edited by Leo Gruliow, is invaluable to all students of the Soviet Union and foreign affairs.
19. Ibid., p. 5.
20. The leading newspaper of Soviet Tadzhikistan, as cited by the NYT, June 13, 1949.
21. *Baku Worker,* July 18, 1950.

CHAPTER 8. *The Anti-Semitic Front,* pages 127 to 144

1. A brief account of the meeting is contained in my *In Anger and Pity* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1949), pp. 151–54.
2. According to the census of 1926, there were altogether 25,866 Tahts living in the Caucasian Autonomous Republic of Daghestan, where Moslems made up the bulk of the population. The life of the Jews prior to the conquest of the Caucasus by the Russians (begun late in the eighteenth century and completed in 1859) was described as follows in 1728: "In addition to the regular taxes, the Jews are compelled to pay also a head tax, and they are used for all sorts of jobs that are considered too hard or dirty for a Moslem to perform. The Moslems are making sure that Jews do not accumulate more property than is necessary to keep them from dying of starvation. If a Jew travels on horseback and meets a Moslem, he must step aside and dismantle, should the Moslem so demand. If the Jew refuses, the Moslem has it within his rights to strike him and keep beating him in any manner he sees fit,

as long as he does not cause his death, and the Jew has no right to complain." (Gerber, as cited in *Sovetsky folklor,* [USSR Academy of Sciences, 1935], II–III, 102).

The tsarist conquest of the Caucasus, far from liberating the Tahts from these indignities, added another source of persecution: the Russian anti-Jewish Laws.

3. At the time of my expulsion from the USSR in 1948, the Soviet customs officers confiscated Meltzer's version of the legend along with other papers in my possession. I have, therefore, cited an only slightly different version of "Lenin and Ashmedai," published in *Sovetsky folklor,* II–III, 102–3.
4. For a case history of discrimination against a Jew holding a Master's degree in the field of history see Stevens, op. cit., pp. 160–61.
5. Smith, op. cit., p. 273.
6. Ibid.
7. *Izvestia,* July 28, 1918.
8. Former member of the Moscow City Soviet, and now a resident of the USA, Gregor Aronson estimated that 2500 pogroms took place in 900 communities during that period. At the same time, "military Communism wiped out the property of most of the Jews because they belonged to the bourgeoisie." Gregor Aronson, *Soviet Russia and the Jews* (New York: American Jewish League against Communism, Inc., 1949), p. 24.
9. Stalin, *Collected Works,* II, 50f.
10. Leon Trotsky, *Stalin* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1941), pp. 152, 172, 399.
11. NYT, January 15, 1931.
12. Cf. Joshua Kunitz, *Russian Literature and the Jew* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929), pp. 175–82.
13. *Pravda,* February 19, 1929.
14. *Assignment in Utopia* by Eugene Lyons containing hair-raising details of "gold mining in torture chambers" (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1937), pp. 447–64.
15. Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1951), p. 298.
16. I am indebted for this reference and the one to *Einigkeit* to Gregor Aronson, op. cit., pp. 17 and 13 respectively.

As to the actual number of Jews, a survey by the World Jewish Congress found that only some 2,000,000, out of a total of 11,672,000, live in the Soviet Union. The other three countries with large Jewish populations are the United States (about 5,000,000), Israel (1,450,000), and China (1,200,000). (As reported by the NYT, October 19, 1952.)

17. Smith, op. cit., pp. 274–75.
18. *Zamlbikher,* I. Opatoshu, H. Leivik, eds., VIII (1952), 5.
19. NYT, February 7, 1953.

CHAPTER 9. *The Peasant Front,* pages 145 to 167

1. Alexander Baykov, *The Development of the Soviet Economic* System (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1946), pp. 314 and 327.
2. Carroll, op. cit., pp. 81–85.
3. Ibid.
4. Lenin, *Collected Works* (3rd Russian ed.), XXV, 173.
5. Cited by Duranty, op. cit., p. 82.
6. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism,* pp. 325–26.
7. Russia's 30,000,000 horses of 1928 were reduced to 15,000,000 by 1933; 70,000,000 horned cattle, including 31,000,000 cows, were reduced to 38,000,000 and 20,000,000 respectively; 147,000,000 sheep and goats to 50,000,000; 20,000,000 hogs to 12,000,000.
8. L. E. Hubbard, *The Economics of Soviet Agriculture* (London: The Macmillan Co., 1939). Cf. pp. 117–19 for details of the damage caused by the collectivization drive.
9. Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951), p. 109.
10. Alexander Baykov, "Industry and Agriculture in the USSR," *Political Quarterly,* January–March 1952, p. 76.

    In the course of a lecture at Columbia University in the spring of 1952, Professor Abram Bergson cited official Soviet statistics for 1938: 86 per cent of the sown area belonged to collective farms; 4 per cent to individual *kolkhozniks;* 9 per cent to state farms; 2 per cent to industrial workers and independent farmers. Professor Bergson's comment on the total of 101 per cent was: "one more evidence of Socialist abundance."
11. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism,* pp. 448–53.
12. Ibid., p. 452. For a vivid portrayal in fiction of the struggle during the collectivization drive, read *Virgin Soil Upturned,* a novel by Mikhail Sholokhov.
13. *Pravda,* September 19, 1947.
14. Maurice Hindus, *Red Bread* (New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1931); *Humanity Uprooted* (Chapter 10) (New York: Jonathan Cape and Harrison Smith, 1929); and *The Great Offensive* (Chapters 5, 6, and 7) (New York: Harrison Smith and Robert Haas, 1933).

15. *Pravda,* March 4, 1951. For excellent translations of the full texts of Khrushchev's most important speeches on the subject, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* June 10, 1950, and March 31, 1951.
16. Ibid. Special supplement, October 18, 1952.
17. Ibid, p. 14.
18. As outlined by Georgi Malenkov at the Nineteenth Party Congress, ibid, November, 8 1952, p. 41.
19. Ibid, p. 5.
20. It seems highly improbable that the electrically driven equipment will do more than make up for the blow dealt to Soviet agriculture by the current concentration of the USSR on military preparedness. Oil products are being diverted from tractors to the mechanized army and jet-propelled aviation. Similarly fertilizers are diverted from fields to the factories supplying chemicals for munitions.
21. For additional literature on the new revolution in Soviet agriculture, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* for April 14 and 28, 1951; Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy,* pp. 266–84; Abram Bergson, James Horton Blackman, and Alexander Ehrlich, "Postwar Economic Reconstruction and Development in the USSR," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,* May 1949, pp. 62-66; Baykov, see note 10, pp. 73–83; Boris I. Nicolaevsky, "The New Soviet Campaign Against the Peasants," *Russian Review,* April 1951, pp. 81–98; Lazar Volin, "The Turn of the Screw in Soviet Agriculture," *Foreign Affairs,* January 1952, pp. 278–88.

CHAPTER 10. *The Labor Front,* pages 169 to 185

1. Lenin, *Selected Works* (New York: International Publishers, 1937), VIII, 92.
2. Lenin, *Collected Works* (3rd Russian ed.), XXVI, 104.
3. A. Denisov, *Soviet Administrative Law* (in Russian; Moscow: 1940), p. 60.
4. The mobilization of the arts was more than part of the campaign to meet the targets of the Five-Year Plans. This mobilization laid down the groundwork for what has by now evolved into total regimentation of the Soviet art world. For details, see Chapter 13, "The New Soviet Man Front."

   The "pathos of construction" is reflected in a number of novels of varying literary quality, but all of them significant in their depiction of the moods and tempo of the times. Outstanding among these novels are *The Volga Flows into the Caspian*

Sea by Boris Pilnyak (who disappeared during the Great Purge); *Cement* by Fyodor Gladkov; *Sot'* and *Skutarevksy* by Leonid Leonov; *Time, Forward!* by Valentin Katayev; and *Second Breath* by Ilya Ehrenburg.

5. Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, pp. 440–41, and, by the same author, "Soviet Labor Policy," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, May 1949, p. 75.
6. Solomon M. Schwarz, *Labor in the Soviet Union* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1952), p. 72.
7. N. A. Voznesensky, *The War Economy of the USSR During the War for the Fatherland* (in Russian; Moscow: 1947), p. 111.
8. P. G. Moskatov, head of the Central Administration for Labor Reserves, *Izvestia*, March 23, 1946.
9. For text, see *Izvestia*, June 27, 1940.
10. Mark G. Field, *Structured Strain in the Role of the Soviet Physician*, a manuscript prepared under the auspices of the Russian Research Center at Harvard University, p. 3.
11. As reported by Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy*, pp. 469–71.
12. Most Western economists take a much dimmer view of the Soviet progress in efficiency, although they all agree that some progress has been made. The Australian economist, Colin Clark, for instance, has estimated that the productivity of the postwar United States economy is eight and one half times that of the Soviet Union; the national productivity of Great Britain and France is, respectively, four and two and one half times greater. NYT, August 21, 1949.
13. NYT, Sept. 22, 1952.
14. Merle Fainsod, op. cit., p. 273, summed up the complaints of the workers among the Soviet refugees as follows: "The workers complained generally of inadequate pay, food shortages, and bad housing conditions. There was grumbling about the number of compulsory deductions from pay—the obligatory state loans, trade union dues, the special subscriptions to this organization or that. There was resentment expressed against the inflation of administrative staffs in the factories, the supernumeraries who held down soft office jobs. Complaints were reiterated against the Stakhanovite movement. It was described as a form of speed-up, a device for raising norms and extracting extra work for the same pay. Workers, it was said, had no real freedom to express their grievances. MGB informers were everywhere. The trade unions, which should have expressed the interests of the workers, were the creatures of the party and the factory managements. They did not help the

worker to improve his position. There were complaints about discipline and the excessively severe penalties for tardiness and absence from work. Those interviewed asserted that they were practically chained to their job."

CHAPTER 11. *The Bureaucratic Front,* pages 187 to 204

1. Quoted by Deutsch, op. cit., p. 248.
2. Ibid., pp. 250 and 252
3. *Bolshaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopaedia) (Moscow), VIII, 488.
4. Barrington Moore, Jr., *Soviet Politics–the Dilemma of Power* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 282. For a detailed discussion of the composition of the bureaucratic stratum, see pp. 277–83.
5. J. Stalin, *Leninism* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.), pp. 338–39.
6. Moore, op. cit., p. 258.
7. An article by David Granick ("Initiative and Independence of Soviet Plant Management," *American Slavic and Eastern European Review,* October 1951, pp. 191–201) presents material which leads the author to conclude that the Soviet managerial personnel is given a "considerable degree of independent decision making." Although I think that Mr. Granick is somewhat carried away by the purely formal aspects of that independence and of intra-ministerial "democracy," the article is highly illuminating and informative.
8. *Political Dictionary* (*Politicheskii slovar'*) (Moscow: State Publishing House for Political Literature, 1940), p. 497.

CHAPTER 12. *The Communist Party Front,* pages 205 to 219

1. Georgi Malenkov, "Report to the Nineteenth Party Congress," *Komsomolskaya Pravda,* October 8, 1952.
   The following figures indicate the growth of the Communist Party membership since 1939:
   March 1939–2,477,666
   January 1940–3,399,975
   January 1945–5,760,369
   September 1947–6,300,000
   October 1952–6,882,145
   Sources: Malenkov's Report and *Annals,* op. cit., p 22.
2. *Pravda,* October 9, 1952. Report by Pegov, chairman of the Credentials Committee, Nineteenth Party Congress.

3. Demitri Shimkin of the Harvard University Russian Research Center, as cited by the New York *Herald Tribune,* November 9, 1952.
4. To augment its report of Mr. Shimkin's study, the New York *Herald Tribune* (ibid.) obtained the following comparative statistics: there are in the USA about 450,000 engineers; 250,000 natural scientists, including agricultural scientists; about 400,000 doctors, dentists, and pharmacists; and about 110,000 college faculty members.

   In the USSR there are 475,000 engineers and natural scientists, including physicists, chemists and biologists; 145,000 agriculturalists; 240,000 doctors, dentists and pharmacists; 80,000 professors and college instructors.
5. *Pravda,* op. cit.
6. Inkeles, *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia,* p. 6.

CHAPTER 13. *The New Soviet Man Front,* pages 221 to 239

1. In the words of the Soviet psychologist, L. A. Gordon: "At certain stages of the development of productive forces and of the social relationships conditioned by those forces, there occur conflicts between personal and social interests. But this conflict is a characteristic of class society and it cannot be concluded that this is inherent in the relationship of personal and social interests. With the destruction of capitalist society and its replacement [by socialism] this conflict disappears." "Needs and Interests," *Sovietskaya Pedagogika,* Nos. 8–9, 1939, p. 135.
2. R. A. Bauer, *The New Man in Soviet Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952), p. 144.
3. Alex Inkeles of the Harvard Research Center has pioneered in this field with his scholarly *Public Opinion in Soviet Russia; A Study in Mass Persuasion* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1950). See also a series of six articles by Anthony Leviero in the New York *Times,* beginning with the issue of December 10, 1951. In the second article, printed December 11, Mr. Leviero cites an "official estimate" that the Soviet Union and its satellites are spending nearly $1,500,000,000 a year on propaganda ($1,409,000,000 in 1950, including $840,000,000 by the USSR alone).
4. Quoted by Bauer, op. cit., p. 183.
5. For additional details on controls in Soviet literature and other fields of art, see Juri Yelagin, *Taming of the Arts* (New York:

E. P. Dutton & Co., 1951), a simple yet immensely revealing story of the author's life as a musician in the Soviet Union; Ernest Simmons, "Controls in Soviet Literature," an authoritative historical survey in the January–March 1952 issue of *Political Quarterly* (London); Alexander Werth, *Musical Uproar in Moscow* (London: Turnstile Press, 1949); Robert Magidoff, op. cit., pp. 185–220.

6. *Literary Gazette,* August 23, 1951.
7. Werth, op. cit., p. 86.
8. Not a single work by Nikolai Zabolotsky has yet been rendered into English, and I have, therefore, translated fragments from *Makers of Highways* which, I hope, will give the reader some conception of the poet's power and originality, as well as an insight into man's extraordinary resilience. To understand the full pathos of the poem, one must remember that the men cutting the highway through the wilderness are inmates of concentration camps. The action takes place in the Soviet Far East, as is easily recognizable from references to the *taiga,* to the rivers Amur and Amgun, the Sea of Okhotsk, and Bering Strait, that narrow strip of water which separates Russia from Alaska. This translation first appeared in *The Reporter,* August 16, 1949.

I

The horn lifts up its sounds, monotonous and droning,
Reverberating gaily in my heart.
While lazily the sun takes time to waken,
Our TNT prepares to do its part.

Above the cliffs, precipitous and ancient,
Resounds the crackle of the Bickford fuse.
The blast goes off and thunders, birch trees shudder,
Earth's rocky bowels groan—and hell breaks loose.

Under the force of atmospheric pressures
The shattered rocks spit out a brief white flame,
And howl and sing and chase it to the clouds.
The quarry, filled with smoke, will never be the same.

Awakened by the even roar of landslides,
All nature groans in ancient woods, and cries.
All nature, shaken, moans its mortal terror.
The moan grows weak and brittle, and it dies.

The horn is singing over distant mountains.
The sun is crawling out of sleep's deep mire.
With crowbars raised, ranks madly broken,
We run to cut the path of thunder and of fire.

When sunlight banishes all fears and terrors,
And ghosts and shadows disappear with groans,
We scan the violated, phosphorescent,
The subterranean world of glowing stones.

With every moment blacker grow and fairer
Their moist, deformed, their sadly tortured rings.
O stones—gigantic, graceful bowls burst open!
O stars in segments, nursing broken wings!

Rectangles, diamonds, cubes and squares and circles,
And thunders hardened into silences again:
You lie before me helpless, rent asunder
By one slight effort of man's lucid brain.

The ancient chill still lingers in the quarry,
The dust still hovers over ravaged rocks,
But excavators are already busy
Discarding them into impatient trucks.

II

The jealous north kept frowning in resentment.
But, growing swifter with each day and breeze,
On towards the icepacks of the Straits of Bering
Came racing currents of the tropic seas.

To constant blasts of TNT explosions,
Lit up bewitchingly by rays of spring,
A butterfly, enormous as a rocket,
Soared on the full expanse of dazzling wings.

Imperious and pompous, the impostor,
The self-styled luminary, swam and soared,
And hosts of tiny creatures trailed behind him,
Each shining body like a wingèd sword.

The grasshopper, charged by the warmth of sunshine,
Kept ticking off the seconds like a clock.
The heavy beetle, leaping into sideslips,
Dragged its mustachios over grass and rock.

A million living creatures, singing, chirping,
Their music blending in one steady choir,
Were flying, jumping, crawling, eating, drinking,
Kept back from you by smoke alone and fire.

Beyond the multitudes of sun-crazed insects,
Defying swamps, their evil, mossy ban,
Surged to the tops of heat-cracked hills and mountains
A world of flowers yet unseen by man.

Competing with the blaze of dawns and sunsets,
Among abyss and rock and swamp and crest,
Here nature seems to have unleashed at heaven
The fury of all colors it possessed.

Above the mad confusions of the foliage,
Above delirious riots of the green,
Here blossomed forth the very soul of plant life
In giving birth to flowers yet unseen.

No man can hear the flower choir recitals:
The voice of lilies, tulips, is so slight
That maybe only butterflies and beetles
Can hear its fragrant magic in the night.

On such a night the sound-swept mountains revel.
Each crag and gorge keeps bursting with a song.
All living things are leaping with the music
As it erupts and storms and sweeps along

Until it drops to rest in caves primeval,
Repeating sleepily through time's vast span
The melodies which rare and ever rarer
Brings back to memory inconstant man.

III

The horn droned on amid the changing mountains.
Along the river, railway whistles swirled.
A likeness of cyclopean transformation
Has overwhelmed the ancient taiga *world.*

Here, in the temple of primeval nature,
Through thickets, woods resisting night and day,
Collapsing in the swamps, in waters sinking,
And losing hold of cliffs, we carved our way.

The winds of Amgun and Amur harassed us,
Moose crossed our path, wolves hunted us by night,
But all that hitherto lay dead and buried
We found, unlocked, and proudly brought to light.

The waves of Okhotsk Sea welled out to meet us.
The frightened birds took wing from cool green blades.
At highway's edge we stood erect, triumphant,
All pointing at the sky our blazing spades.

9. Outstanding among these works are *Happiness,* a novel by Pyotr Pavlenko; *Beneath the Sky of the Fatherland,* a novel by Vsevolod Kochetkov; *Flag over the Village Soviet,* a narrative poem by Alexei Nedogonov; *Our Daily Bread,* a play by Nikolai Virta; and *Cavalier of the Golden Star,* a novel by Semyon Babayevsky. In responding to the demands of the current Party line, Babayevsky employs the device of having his hero, the former tank driver Sergei Tutarinov, polemize with Captain Spivak of "Greetings from the Front." Tutarinov had read Spivak's letter and was tremendously impressed. But later, "If the letter had come my way at that time, I would gladly have signed it. But now the war is over. . . . That means the situation is different. It's no longer enough to give sensible advice; you have to roll up your sleeves and pitch in. What I would say now is this: 'Hey, you front-line fighters who write letters to the people in the rear and taught them how to live and work! Come closer, take your places in the front ranks and give an example in real life of how things are done!' "
10. See, for instance, *Sovetskoye Iskusstvo* (*Soviet Art*), March 12, 1952, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* April 5, 1952, p. 10.
11. Stalin's role in the controversy became known to the public only on October 8, 1952, when *Pravda* printed Alexander Fadeyev's speech at the Nineteenth Communist Party Congress, containing the following passage: "It took Comrade Stalin's interference to unmask this theory on the pages of the press and in the Writers' Union."
12. *Pravda,* April 7, 1952.

CHAPTER 14. *Soviet Strengths and Weaknesses,* pages 241 to 258

1. Book VIII, Sec. 567.
2. The scope of this book does not allow for a detailed discussion of the Soviet satellites—Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czecho-

slovakia, Poland, and Albania. The reader's attention is drawn to the extensive and easily accessible literature on the subject. Some of the outstanding volumes are: *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences* for September 1950, entitled "Moscow's European Satellites"; Hugh Seton-Watson, *The East European Revolution* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1951); John Gunther, *Behind the Iron Curtain* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949); Stowe, op. cit. For information on Tito's Yugoslavia, see Hamilton Fish Armstrong, *Tito and Goliath* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1951); *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute,* containing the text of the correspondence exchanged between Tito on the one hand and the Soviet Communist Party and the Cominform on the other, published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1948; Louis Adamic, *The Eagle and the Roots* (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1952).

3. Stowe, op. cit., p. 259.
4. NYT, October 7, 1952.
5. Professor Abram Bergson, "Soviet National Income and Product," *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* August 1950, p. 440.
6. NYT, October 7, 1952.
7. D. J. Dallin and B. I. Nicolaevsky have pioneered with their study, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia* (New York: Yale University Press, 1947); Albert Konrad Herlin, *The Soviet Slave Empire* (New York: Wilfred Funk, 1951); *Slave Labor in Russia,* The Case Presented by the American Federation of Labor to the United Nations, 1949. Outstanding among accounts by ex-slave laborers are: Gustav Herling, *A World Apart* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1952); Vladimir Petrov, *Soviet Gold* (New York: Farrar, Strauss & Co., 1949); Elinor Lipper, *11 Years in Soviet Prison Camps* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1951); Nicholas Prychodko, *One of the Fifteen Million* (New York: Little, Brown & Co., 1952).
8. The United States deputy representative to the Economic and Social Council of the UN, Walter Kotsching, discussed this document at some length in a statement to the ECOSOC on March 15, 1951, on forced labor conditions in the USSR and the satellite countries. The statement has been reprinted in full, in the *Department of State Bulletin,* Vol. XXIV, No. 613, for April 2, 1951, pp. 544–53. The discussion of the role of slave labor in Soviet economy is on pp. 547–48.
9. Dallin and Nicolaevsky, op. cit., p. 105.
10. W. P. and Z. K. Coates (comp.), *The Moscow Trials and Two*

Speeches by J. Stalin (London: Anglo-Russian Parliamentary Committee, 1937), p. 261.

11. For details of the hate-America campaign, see Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Image of America. A Study in Distortion* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950); Michel Gordey, *Visa to Moscow* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), Chapter XIX; Don Dallas, *Dateline Moscow* (London: William Heinemann, Ltd., 1952), Chapter IX; Robert Magidoff, op. cit., pp. 69–78.
12. A. N. Radishchev, *Collected Works* (in Russian; St. Petersburg: 1907), I, 328.

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