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# THE LESSON OF TURKEY



by

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*Reprinted from*  
THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL  
Vol. 5, No. 4 · Autumn 1951

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*Richard D. Robinson*

THE STARTLING SUCCESS of American aid to Turkey is not generally understood in this country. We are prone to assume that Turkey's determined anti-Soviet, pro-Western orientation is somehow anchored in the rather substantial military, economic, and moral support we have provided it. To the indignation of not a few Turks, some of us even attribute exclusively to this American involvement the recent appearance of democratic political institutions in Turkey. Not only does this claim strip Turkey of any pride in self-accomplishment, it is patently false. While it is certainly true that American aid has constituted a critical move in the Turkish buildup, it has been only one among even more vital forces.

Turkey is moving rapidly along the path of Western technological, scientific, and liberal evolution. It does so by reason of its own free choice. Recent American aid may have accelerated the pace somewhat, but Turkey's orientation to the West — and specifically toward the United States — is a thing of Turkish design; it is not a matter of temporary political expediency. Turkey's Western-oriented development was well under way at least a generation before either the Marshall Plan or the Truman Doctrine was conceived.

In claiming too much for our dollars we not only wound friends but blind ourselves to invaluable insights which could contribute materially to our own defenses. Of all the "underdeveloped" and "backward" nations<sup>1</sup> with which we are actively

<sup>1</sup> Frequently these words are used loosely and interchangeably. Here, "underdeveloped" refers to an area possessed of the possibility for development, and "backward" refers to a state of mind — attitudes — which have arrested the technical and scientific development of the people living within the area concerned. Turkey is both.

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concerned, Turkey has perhaps registered the greatest progress in terms of economic advance and developing democratic political institutions. The "why" of that progress merits sober reflection.

Geographically, the important thing about Turkey is that it enjoys no real degree of isolation. It faces continuous external pressures which threaten its very existence. Thirteen times, for instance, over the past three centuries it has been involved in violent conflict with the Russians.<sup>2</sup> For the Turk, the Cold War is of several centuries' duration. Of even greater importance, perhaps, has been Turkey's contiguity with Europe, a position lending itself to greater cultural exchange with the West than would have been the case were Turkey hedged on all sides by Asiatic peoples.

Despite considerable progress over the near past, the economy of the country — if judged by Western standards — is still cast essentially in a mold of semi-primitive, peasant agriculture of very low efficiency. The industrial revolution is only now permeating to the village level where the mass of people (at least 75%) live. The new machines and techniques will doubtless send wave after wave of social restlessness washing across Anatolia as they force major shifts in population distribution (both geographical and occupational), in social institutions, and in moral codes. Technological change is always a powerful subversive element in respect to status quo. But inasmuch as there appears to be no throttling population pressure as measured against existing national resources, the possibility for further economic development would seem great.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup> In 1677-81, 1696-1702, 1710-11, 1736-39, 1768-74, 1783, 1787-92, 1806-12, 1826, 1828-29, 1854-56, 1877-78, and 1914-15.

<sup>3</sup> Best available data indicates, for instance, that potential agricultural land per capita in Turkey is possibly over 5 acres. (United Nations Economic and Social Council, *Review of Economic Conditions in the Middle East* [January 31, 1951], p. 69.) One should note, however, that no adequate land, soil, or mineral survey has yet been made in Turkey. It should also be pointed out that even though no over-all population pressure is apparent in Turkey, the pressure in certain areas is critical. This situation has been noted by the writer in the Gaziantep, Adana, and Black Sea regions; by Paul Sterling, British anthropologist, in the Kayseri area; and recognized officially in a statement prepared for the writer by the Director-General of the Office of Land Affairs (Ankara, June 13, 1950). For a recent study of development possibilities in Turkey see *The Economy of Turkey: An Analysis and Recommendations for a Development Program; Summary of the Report of a Mission Sponsored by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in Collaboration with the Government of Turkey* (Washington, D.C., 1951).

Politically, modern republican Turkey has evolved rapidly. In World War I, Turkey — then in control of what remained of the Ottoman Empire — sided with the Central Powers, was defeated, and was abruptly relieved of almost all of its non-Turkish territories. Out of the dust of conflict and crumbling Ottoman authority arose a Turkish leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. At first, Atatürk was merely a military hero who led a successful and brilliantly-manuevered revolt against the Allied occupying powers, reorganizing the Turkish forces vanquished in World War I literally under the noses of the Allies. So embarrassing became the situation engineered by Atatürk that a favorable treaty of peace was gained for the new Turkey, and the Allies were forced to withdraw from the Anatolian Peninsula and ultimately from Istanbul and European Turkey.

Atatürk, assuming the stature of a national hero by reason of these events, seized dictatorial powers. Maneuvering with great adroitness and care, he succeeded in destroying the Sultanate, the seat of power in Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. He then forced the dissolution of the Caliphate, office of the spiritual head of Islam. Authoritarian and ruthless as Atatürk might have been, there existed a fundamental difference between this man and the Hitlers and Mussolinis — his motives.

Using the helpful insight of hindsight, one feels that Atatürk was sincerely intent upon raising the standard of living of his people, upon shaking Turkish civilization free from its long lethargy and injecting into it more of a dynamic, progressive, and liberal quality. Doubtless he felt that such was essential if Turkey were to remain a nation, that in the absence of political and economic development a power vacuum would inevitably follow and foreign masters be drawn in. The entire physical and human resources of the nation were needed in a superhuman effort to make up for the decades of stagnation and neglect.

Atatürk undertook to launch the move toward these goals through a series of forced reforms, particularly a studied de-emphasis of everything smacking of the old reactionary Islam to which the masses adhered. In this, he was only partially successful. But into the area thus cleared, there was thrust the propaganda of nationalism and the makings of an education system

more liberal and scientific than that which had existed previously. Technical development was pushed with vigor. Modern State-operated factories and mines came into existence to lead the way in Turkey's industrial revolution, for that is precisely what it was. Those who dared oppose these moves were suppressed ruthlessly, perhaps even summarily executed if occasion warranted. The regime may have been unduly ruthless, but a great many of the reforms and projects thus created are dynamic realities today.<sup>4</sup>

In those early years of the Turkish Revolution it was feared that liberalism and democracy would mean simply license to resist the reforms forced by the top leadership. Hence personal freedom was sharply curtailed and liberal political institutions forbidden. Even so, the legal framework for a political democracy was created with the adoption of a republican constitution, although for many years its guarantees of personal freedom meant little. It became increasingly apparent, nonetheless, that Atatürk and his colleagues believed in a truly representative government, but only at such time when the cultural level of the people was adequate to support it.

During his lifetime, Atatürk made one attempt to establish a two-party parliamentary government: in 1930 he deliberately created a political opposition. It soon developed, however, that the more reactionary elements were exploiting the new freedom in an attempt to destroy the whole fabric and philosophy of the revolution. Consequently, Atatürk — acting with typical ruthlessness — jettisoned the experiment and crushed the very opposition which he had encouraged.<sup>5</sup>

In 1938, Atatürk died, and İsmet İnönü — president in name,

<sup>4</sup> Some may feel that this analysis runs roughshod over the Period of Reform (the so-called Tanzimat of the mid 1800's), of the Young Turk Movement of the early 1900's, and of the influence of the nationalistic thought expounded by Ziya Gökalp and others. The author feels, however, that many Western writers and scholars have exaggerated the impact of these movements upon the life and thought of the common people of Turkey. Nationalistic writers, the Tanzimat, and the Young Turk Revolt no doubt prepared that small group of Turkish intellectuals congregated in Istanbul for the Atatürk reforms — a process which was an indispensable element in making possible a new leadership when it appeared — but had little if any effect in smoothing the way for such reforms in Turkey's 40,000 village communities.

<sup>5</sup> This account may be an erroneously simplified version of the shortlived *Serbest Fırkası* (Liberal Party), but it seems the only plausible one given the currently known facts.

but in fact, dictator — carried on. As the years slid by, the face of Turkey began to change. Law and order was established in all regions of the country under a secular government. Education began to have its impact at the grass-roots level. An improved system of roads and communications drew more and more of the Anatolian village population into the stream of national and world consciousness. State industry — located as much for its educational and developmental impact as for economic consideration — drew significant numbers of villagers into direct contact with the machine age. Age-old attitudes and superstitions began to give way. These processes were slow to take form, but form they did under constant pressure applied by Turkish leaders.

After World War II, perhaps somewhat encouraged by the victory of the more liberal nations over the totalitarian and sensing a new security in the flow of American aid, the Turkish rulers permitted the growth of political opposition. In 1945 a political opposition developed within the single, all-powerful Republican People's Party, splintered off from the parent organizational stem and set to work to fire national opinion on its behalf. Slowly İnönü's administration gave ground; free speech, free press, free assembly became facts. In permitting this development, İsmet İnönü no doubt realized that the national interest clearly required ideological identification with the Western democracies. But this does not detract from the credit due him, for few men consciously encourage the conditions leading to their own political demise even in the national interest. The opposition thus launched, bolstered by two years of intense campaigning on the village level, rode into power in May 1950 in Turkey's first honest and contested general election. President İnönü stepped down without quarrel to lead the loyal opposition. Such has been the recent political revolution in Turkey.

Looking at Turkey geographically, economically, and politically, one can make four general observations of primary importance:

First, Turkey's geographical position is such that the country faces continuing external pressures, thereby forcing on it the necessity for main-

taining substantial defenses, both military and moral. Its position also makes for direct cultural contact with Europe.

Second, Turkey's underdeveloped economy is such that the industrial revolution is only now hitting the semi-primitive, village community level with perceivable impact.

Third, the Turkish Revolution (including the recent appearance of liberal political institutions) has come about through deliberate maneuvers on the part of certain top Turkish leaders, not via any compelling popular demand. This statement does not mean that if the political freedoms now existent were suddenly abrogated the people would not now react violently, for already the common folk have come to have a conscious vested interest in their new freedoms.

Fourth, further political and economic development of Turkey is not only possible but imperative if creation of a power vacuum is to be prevented and adequate defenses maintained.

As for Turkish society, it tends traditionally toward the illiberal and is weak in personal incentive and responsibility — at least, when mirrored against Western society. One may question the value of this criterion, but the Turks themselves have chosen it by deliberately orienting the economic and political development of their country to that of the West and in recent years, specifically to that of the United States. The writer has been called upon an uncounted number of times by individual Turks — townfolk and villagers — to contrast this or that feature of Turkish life with the American. These requests were motivated out of something deeper than mere curiosity; there was evident almost a hunger to make a good showing by American standards. Any number of times the writer has had occasion to remark in Turkish company that a particular thing in Turkey surpassed a comparable article or skill in America. Invariably, the Turks were pleased. The goals they have set for themselves — mechanization and democratization — are those of the West. It is for this reason that developments in Turkey must be analyzed on the basis of Western experience and that comparison of things Turkish to Western is valid. Simultaneously, of course, one must recognize clearly the impact on Western practices implanted by Turkey's rich cultural heritage, and the necessity for modifying those practices when transplanted to that culture. The distinction between principle and practice here is important.

There are distinct reasons why Turkish society has tended

toward the illiberal.<sup>6</sup> First and foremost is the matter of early childhood conditioning. From his first days of self-consciousness, the Turkish child is taught unquestioning obedience to the word and command of his father. This disciplined subservience to recognized authority is further strengthened by the child's relationship with the village community, the type of community in which the vast majority of Turks find themselves. Such a community is essentially a family group, whose activities are closely controlled by the family-village elders. In these semi-isolated, compact village clusters, there is no such thing as personal privacy; every act of every individual is known to the community. Under such circumstance, substantial social pressure forces the individual into the traditional patterns of behavior.

One such pattern prevents half the population — the female half — from realizing to any appreciable degree its human potential, a further illiberal feature. From all areas of rural Turkey competent observers agree that the status of village women has altered very little from the traditional. In the towns and cities, of course, startling changes have been wrought on this score over the past two decades, but not so in most village communities. One highly qualified observer writes confidentially, "Within the family, the young man is next to his father in authority in the house, and while there is often affection between brother and sister, he is master and she servant." Another competent observer writes, "Authority in the unit [household] rests firmly in the male head of the household. A man can and does give abrupt orders to any of the women and children of the household. . . . Socially, the gulf between men and women is striking. . . . Most husbands treat their wives as conveniences, and only show concern when they are too ill to work." Even the word for "woman" in village vernacular is *eksik*, meaning something deficient and incomplete. An accelerating change in the status of village women can be expected, however, to arise out of the ever-increasing number of girls going into the village schools (both as teachers and students), the employment of

<sup>6</sup> At the same time, one should take note that there do exist within the Turkish cultural framework certain traditions upon which a liberal social philosophy could be erected. Two such are the traditions of social mobility and the Islamic brotherhood of man; also the implications of the constitutional principle of *halkçılık* (populism).

women in industry at wages equal to those of men, the awarding of equal political rights for women, and the rapid improvement in town-village communication. The upgrading of women's status in urban communities will also have an indirect effect.

A concept of modern sociology is that of "role conflict," having to do with the conflicting obligations of an individual self-identified with more than one "reference group," each group perhaps possessing different moral codes. Thus, the individual American becomes responsible to many different moral codes — those of family, church, community, business, Rotary Club, nation, Chamber of Commerce, etc. — many of which may conflict at important points. It would seem to follow that as the number of codes to which an individual feels responsible increases, the more variable (or, in a sense, liberal, anti-traditional, individual) does his behavior become. Under such circumstances, the pull of any particular moral code on the individual is probably weaker than if he were subject to the pull of only one, for he has a wider range of choice, must weigh alternative actions and consequences, and in many cases resolve the conflict by individual (nontraditional) action.

In the case of the Anatolian villager, the individual generally belongs to no organization other than the family-village community,<sup>7</sup> the village mosque (around which are organized no social groupings), and the Nation. No others compete for his allegiance. Although more true of the relatively isolated and internally-related village community, the paucity of organizational affiliations even in Turkish cities is novel to the American. For example, in Gaziantep, a town of 70,000 in south central Turkey, there was in 1949 not a single strictly private social organization other than the two political parties. There existed several government-sponsored or quasi-government organizations, but even their membership was limited to very few individuals. In the mosques, one found no evidence of informal social groupings demanding an individual's allegiance. Service clubs — in the American sense — were nonexistent. Degree of social organization appears to be an important sociological difference

<sup>7</sup> The family and village community are considered here as having identical moral codes. In most village communities the recognized interests, and hence demands, of family and village seem to be almost indistinguishable.

between Turkish and American societies. One would thus expect the villager's tie to any one of his few allegiances to be remarkably strong, and such is indeed the case. In fact, the strength of traditional codes is so great that little room remains for individualization, the essence of liberal society.

The religion of the Turkish villager, a type of arrested Islam, still further shores up this subservience to tradition and authority. His is a religion of dogmatic fatalism<sup>8</sup> and of detailed ritual which governs the most intimate personal behavior habits. One does not alter his lot in life; he tends to accept it as ordained by Allah. Poverty is almost held to be a virtue. Islam need not be this type of religion at all; it can well be a dynamic, progressive force. That is what it becomes in Turkey's new village schools. But in the mind of the Turkish peasant-villager, Islam still adheres to the traditional. The Anatolian's Islam may be, in final analysis, merely an unconscious rationalization of his relative inability to control the physical environment. In this way, perhaps, the Islam of the Turkish villager may be likened to the Christianity of the medieval European villager.

Subservience to tradition and authority is further bolstered by the customary method of education, the emphasis in which even yet is almost entirely upon the rote memory of fact at the expense of liberal discussion or instruction as to methods of thought.<sup>9</sup> This situation remains the rule even though a more progressive education may now be on its way in.

The Turk's experience in the army makes even stronger this conditioned response of disciplined subservience to authority, for the Turkish Army has been until very recently constructed along rigid, Prussian-like caste lines. Top-ranking American military officials in Turkey indicate an acute awareness on their part of the problems arising out of this rigidity in Turkish military organization. Major General William H. Arnold, Chief

<sup>8</sup> For instance, a powerful motif of fatalism (or perhaps, more accurately, predestinationism) pervades *Bixim Köy* [*Our Village*], a depressing but realistic account penned by a young Anatolian village school teacher which gained unexpected popularity when it appeared in the spring of 1950. There is little doubt as to the book's authenticity; the writer has both visited "Our Village" (Çardak on the shore of the Salt Lake) and talked with Mahmut Makal, the school teacher-author.

<sup>9</sup> This tendency in Turkish education is noted in the Report of the International Bank's Mission to Turkey, pp. 49-51, also in a recent statement by the Turkish Minister of Education (*Hürses*, June 11, 1951).

of the American Military Mission for Aid to Turkey, told the writer in a September 1950 interview that the most pressing need in the Turkish Army was for junior officers and noncommissioned personnel adequately trained as small unit leaders, men willing and able to assume personal responsibility and initiative in small unit operations. Substantial improvement on this score is now being reported.

The head of the Turkish State seems to be regarded by the peasant as somewhat analogous to the Father of the Tribe, albeit decreasingly so. Vocal Turks have long been decrying this "great leader mentality." The old Sultan-Caliph was looked upon as a supreme patriarch, his relationship to the ordinary folk being almost that of father to son. And to that father, one owed absolute obedience. Likewise, the relationship of government official to ordinary citizen has traditionally been that of master to servant — definitely not one founded on mutual confidence and equality.

These attitudes are changing, but it takes time, effort, and patience. The significant thing about Turkey is that they are, in fact, giving way to more progressive, liberal concepts — and giving way with ever-increasing speed. For close on thirty years now, effective Turkish leadership has deliberately planned and molded the development of the country — a development aimed at ultimately evolving a more productive economy and liberal political institutions. That these developments were forced on a society fundamentally illiberal and weak in personal incentive makes the whole development even more amazing. The process of change was necessarily slow and faltering during the earlier years; only now is it being speeded up. Roughly, the step-by-step development of Turkey's unique evolution has been thus:

First, an attempt to destroy by the force of authoritarian government many of the symbols and continuity of traditions which had arrested the development of Turkish civilization (Forceful change was required by reason of national urgency and the fundamentally static and illiberal nature of Turkish society.);

Second, the expansion of education and the preaching of nationalism in an attempt to bring about a rapid increase in literacy and national consciousness;

Third, a forced economic development of the country by regimenting all possible resources in an all-out effort to industrialize and mechanize (but

in such a way as to produce peaceful change and not destroy the social organization of the nation);

Fourth, establishment of liberal political institutions — tolerance of opposition, free press, free speech, honest and contested elections, peaceful transference of political power.

Admittedly many mistakes have been made along the way. Force has no doubt been employed where peaceful persuasion would have proven more effective. Undue inefficiency and high-handedness in administration may have been tolerated. But be that as it may, substantial progress has been registered toward those Turkish goals listed above.<sup>10</sup>

At the same time, very real dangers beset the Turkish nation. Has it liberalized politically so rapidly that its free institutions will be undermined by reactionary religious, economic, and political elements which would exploit the new freedom to regain their lost power? The transition from authoritarianism to liberalism has been rapid. Those authoritarian moves necessary to create conditions under which a democracy might flower in themselves give rise to an antiliberal psychological environment. Is the process self-defeating?

Of the peasants, perhaps 80 percent<sup>11</sup> are still illiterate in any meaningful sense, and many are still isolated from the general stream of national life. Under such circumstances, old attitudes and superstitions smolder for many generations and can be fanned into flame easily by chauvinistic demagogues to consume the progress of the past three decades. Even now reactionary

<sup>10</sup> Although expressing great admiration for Turkish accomplishments, historian Arnold Toynbee issued a word of caution in this regard after a 1949 visit to Turkey. He pointed out, in a BBC broadcast, that Turkey was in danger of losing contact with its rich culture of the past. How to maintain such contact and still move ahead is one of Turkey's three really pressing problems. The other two are keeping rural Turkey apace the modernization of Ankara and Istanbul, and transforming the government to a fully constitutional system. This last seems to have been solved, at least for the present.

<sup>11</sup> The official literacy rate is 36.6% of those above 7 years of age. (Statement by the Turkish Minister of Education, December 21, 1948.) It is felt that the definition of literacy used here (a simple "yes" answer to the question, "Can you read and write?") is unduly loose. Careful estimates would indicate that not more than 25% of the population over the age of 7 (and probably not over 20% of the villagers) are literate to a degree which means anything politically, socially, or economically. And it is a moot question whether or not even a graduate of the 5-year village school who does not continue his education and reads nothing after graduation (as seems to be overwhelmingly the case) can be called literate. Many educators doubt it.

religious groups appear to be gnawing on the vitals of the Turkish Republic.<sup>12</sup>

The potential dangers in these internal conflicts appear to be well understood by Turkey's political leadership. Vigorous effort is being made to avoid the upheavals which were so evident in Western social evolution — the struggle between labor and capital, farm and city, education and superstition, church and state, men and women. On the Turkish statute books are some of the most advanced pieces of social legislation. They have been placed there in an attempt to legislate out of existence the causes for some of the conflicts which made early Western social evolution such a slow and uneven process. This advanced legislation — having to do with labor relations, hours and wages, social security, health insurance, land reform, child labor, women in industry, public health, equality of women, progressive income taxation, and the like — was not enacted in answer to any compelling popular demand. Rather, it represents a planned attempt to skip some of the more dangerous rungs in the ladder of Western evolution.

At the same time, one should not assume that all of these laws are being enforced in a wholly satisfactory manner. Some apply only to very limited sectors of the economy (e.g., labor laws and social insurance legislation). Others have unfortunate shortcomings (e.g., the exemption of all farm income from the income tax). And still others have not been applied generally. For instance, the Land Law of 1945 specifically limited private holdings to something like 1,200 acres, the balance to be purchased by the government and distributed to peasants on easy credit terms. But, in fact, exhaustive personal inquiry from one end of Turkey to the other has failed to produce a single case in which private land actually had been distributed in this fashion. State-owned properties, on the other hand, are in the process of being portioned out to landless or near landless peasants in a highly commendable program.

<sup>12</sup> A number of politically conscious Turks seem to be increasingly convinced that what appears to be a rising tide of religious reaction in Turkey is not strictly indigenous. Charges have been made that the Soviet Union is using reactionary Islam as a political weapon to create social unrest. The charge has yet to be documented publicly, but coincidental religious activity of this nature in Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan — all apparently aimed at upsetting the status quo — at least arouses suspicion.

Political leadership in Turkey realizes that the country's lack of geographical isolation brings such international pressures to bear upon it that internal disunity must be avoided if national autonomy is to be maintained. For the same reason, Turkey does not have the time to go through a slow evolution stretched out over several centuries. It must close the gap between itself and the West and do so fairly rapidly. Yet Turkish society remains fundamentally illiberal and tradition-bound, although it is now changing rapidly.

The problem of Turkey is thus posed. It consists of equal parts urgency and difficulty. The resolution of this dilemma has been — whether by accident or design — a well-ordered one, so much so that the Turk has abdicated his position as the degenerate of Europe to become one of the more respected and robust members of the world community. These six policies may be suggested as the basis for this remarkable Turkish development:

First, establishment of security for the individual (e.g., law and order, continuity of law, and common expectation of justice) by a well-intentioned, progressively-minded (although until recently, undemocratic) government which desired — and now seems to be gaining — the relative confidence of the mass of people;

Second, an expanded program of technical and increasingly liberal education to challenge the superstition and dogmatic fatalism of village society;

Third, a deliberate program of encouraging economic incentive by stating the rewards for increased personal effort in terms of the felt needs of the people (The felt needs in a semi-primitive village society such as Turkey's are the basic necessities of life and those which the culture dictates, not necessarily free enterprise capitalism and political democracy.);

Fourth, the delayed introduction of democratic political institutions until basic social, educational, and economic reforms could be securely launched (An authoritarian government can play a valuable — if not, necessary — role, as in Turkey. It all depends on methods, motivation and objectives.);

Fifth, the fitting of modern machines and industry to the social structure of the country in such a way as to minimize dislocation and unrest but still spread their benefits over the entire population (State economic planning and activity have been important in Turkey and probably necessarily so, advice to the contrary by professional Western economists notwithstanding. Considerations other than the purely economic have rated high priority in the Turkish industrialization and mechanization process.);

Sixth, substantial American and European aid — both economic and military — in support of a progressive, well-intentioned, and relatively popular ruling group.

By reason of this sixfold process, even though imperfectly applied at times, Turkey has become the Western bulwark in the Middle East. Its military strength and anti-Soviet alignment are, in reality, but corollary to these developments. In their absence it is doubtful that Turkey could now withstand the possible onslaught of Soviet power and ideology, despite its long hostility toward things Russian. Mere hostility through habit is no longer adequate defense against Russian imperialism, because since the days of Czarist Russia and the Ottoman Empire at least four important factors have been changed or added. First, the power relationship between Turkey and Russia has been overwhelmingly weighted on the Russian side. Second, Russian power has been coupled with an ideology claiming universal truth and which seemingly possesses a considerable measure of attraction for the peoples of the more backward and underdeveloped areas where ruling groups block fundamental reform. Third, there has been a development by the USSR of highly effective mass propaganda techniques and media which, for reasons as yet undisclosed, have not yet been fully unleashed in Turkey. Fourth, the mechanization and urbanization of Turkish society has begun, a process which will possibly generate greater social mobility and individual insecurity, and thus greater susceptibility to extremist propaganda. In other words, the anti-Russian policy of today's Turkey must rest on much sounder stuff than that of yesterday's. The potential challenge to its autonomy is infinitely more subtle and powerful.

It is readily admitted that the six factors enumerated above beg a very large question: "How was it that these Western-oriented policies were in fact conceived and executed in Turkey and not elsewhere?" To attribute the process simply to the genius of Atatürk implies the further query, "Why the existence and character of Atatürk?" His existence was clearly unpredictable. As for his character, one can mention his lower class origin, orientation to the military, participation in and growing disgust with the Young Turk movement, contact with the German military and with French thought, and his frustrating experience with the inept government of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire. The personality of Atatürk is certainly part of the Turkish

story. But another part of that same story is the long process of historical conditioning which provided the indispensable minimum in terms of leadership, intellectual environment, and susceptibility to change upon which a revolutionary program must be founded. Doubtless a third factor in the story was Turkey's geographical proximity to the main stream of European civilization, thereby making possible close cultural contact. For the fourth part of the Turkish story one must concede very liberal quantities of fortuitous circumstance, urgency, and chance combination.

The view expressed here should not, however, be taken to imply that similar events elsewhere need be externally indeterministic or historically conditioned to this same degree. Existence of a climate favorable to economic and political development need not be left entirely to chance. We can desist from consciously or unconsciously thrusting obstacles before potential Atatürks, obstacles such as the insistence that they conform to our political and economic forms and values or that the status quo must at all times be maintained. Further, the historical continuity of national cultures is now being bent before the attack of Soviet and American ideologies (both of which claim universal truths), modern communications, and technical invention. And mass communications media have rendered possible rapid and large-scale cultural assimilation even in the absence of geographical proximity to the source of that culture. For these reasons, the Turkish story need not be an exception.

It may be, therefore, that within the Turkish experience is a lesson of general application. It may be that those six conditions which we have found implicit in the evolution of modern Turkey constitute principles upon which successful Western-sponsored developmental programs in the underdeveloped-backward areas must rest.