

# U.S. POLICY

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**in the  
Near East,  
South Asia,  
and Africa - 1955**



**Department of State**

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**South Asia,**

**and Africa - 1955**

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# **U.S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa—1955**

The year 1955 witnessed no lessening of American interest in the countries and peoples of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, and it brought no end to the difficult and complicated problems which have come to the United States from this vital part of the world.<sup>1</sup> On the contrary, the old, basic issues, involving the resurgent and often strident nationalism of the peoples of the area, the problem of self-determination or "colonialism," and questions of the economic development of underdeveloped countries still persisted 10 years after the end of the Second World War. In addition, important individual problems such as the Arab-Israel controversy, Cyprus, and French North Africa have also remained as a matter of American concern, whether directly or otherwise, because of the position of the United States as one of the leaders of the free world.

Toward the end of the year, the United States, together with other nations, was faced with a renewed and dynamic manifestation of Soviet interest in the general area of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. In line with an old imperial Russian tradition and in accord with Leninist-Stalinist Communist doctrine, the Soviet Union sought to take advantage of the "relaxation of tensions" in Europe and pressed toward the achievement of its secular interests. The Soviets exploited every weakness and every problem and employed every art, artifice, and instrument at their disposal, including their satellites and the international Communist apparatus. There seemed little doubt that they were seeking a dominant influence in the so-called uncommitted areas of South Asia and the Middle East.<sup>2</sup> Because of the seriousness of the situation, the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, meeting at Paris on December 15–16, 1955, reviewed the "provocative moves and declarations by the Soviet Union regarding the

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See footnotes on pp. 56–63.

Middle East and Asia" and recognized that Soviet tactics, "coupled with a continued increase in Soviet military capability, created new problems and a new challenge to the Free World."<sup>3</sup>

As in years past, in his report on the work of the United Nations for 1954-1955<sup>4</sup> Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold touched on a number of basic problems involving the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. Among other things, he referred to the Bandung conference (April 18-24, 1955), in which the nations of this area played a prominent part, and noted the great upheaval in the relations of nations and peoples which was under way, the direction of which, at least in some respects, seemed "clear enough." He noted that:

The peoples of Asia today, of Africa tomorrow, are moving towards a new relationship with what history calls the West. The world organization is the place where this emerging new relationship in world affairs can most creatively be forged.

The Secretary-General also dealt at some length with the troublesome issue of Palestine. He thought that too little attention had been given to meet "the emerging problems of the continent of Africa in a spirit consonant with the aims of the Charter," although the United Nations had been concerned with these problems "on a piece-meal basis." The issues, he said, were partly social and economic, partly political, and partly they belonged to the realm of trusteeship arrangements. In the Secretary-General's considered view:

The great changes that are under way in Africa present a challenge to the rest of the world—a challenge to give aid in guiding the course of events in orderly and constructive channels. It is apparent that in the next ten years the peace and stability of the world will be strongly affected by the evolution in Africa, by the national awakening of its people, by the course of race relations and by the manner in which the economic and social advancement of the African peoples is assisted by the rest of the world.

The Tenth Session of the U.N. General Assembly devoted considerable attention to problems of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa and especially to the type of problems outlined above. Representatives of the nations of this area particularly emphasized the political, social, and economic problems confronting their peoples, but they were not alone in discussing them. Secretary Dulles laid special stress on the Arab-Israel conflict in his address of September 22,<sup>5</sup> and both British Foreign Secretary Harold Mac-

millan and French Foreign Minister Antoine Pinay pointed toward the Middle East as an area of tension and controversy. In line with recent Soviet policy, in his address of September 23 Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov gave the distinct impression that the Soviet Union, now more than ever, was engaged in an attempt to win over the states of Asia and Africa to the side of the Soviet Union.<sup>6</sup> Molotov reiterated Soviet opposition to "aggressive military blocs and coalitions" in general, and to such arrangements in the Middle East in particular.

## **Significant Political Issues**

As already noted, the United States was confronted during 1955 with a number of difficult political issues, some of which came to it through the United Nations and some more directly. Of special, although by no means exclusive, interest were those of French North Africa, Cyprus, and Palestine. Some of these problems became even more intense during the course of the year, although others appeared to be on the road toward possible solution as the year drew to a close.

### **FRENCH NORTH AFRICA**

The United States had an interest in the issues involving Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria not merely because of certain bases in Morocco or because of its politico-strategic interest in the entire Mediterranean region but also because it was interested in the stability of France as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the development and welfare of the peoples of this area. The problems of French North Africa had been discussed, it may be noted, at the Bandung conference in April 1955, and the 29 Asian-African nations represented there adopted a resolution supporting the "rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence" and urged the French Government "to bring about a peaceful solution without delay."<sup>7</sup>

*Morocco*—The problem of Morocco, which proved very troublesome during the first part of 1955, appeared on the road to solution



by the year's end. Fifteen Arab, Asian, and African states on July 26 requested the inclusion of the problems of both Morocco and Algeria on the agenda of the Tenth General Assembly, charging that the situation in Morocco had suddenly deteriorated.<sup>8</sup> Although the item was inscribed on the agenda of the General Assembly, there was no immediate discussion. On November 5, 1955, the former Sultan of Morocco, Mohammed Ben Yousef, once more was formally recognized as the Sultan, and the country's political and constitutional problems appeared to be moving toward solution. On his return to Rabat on November 18 as Sultan Mohammed V, the new ruler proclaimed the end of the French protectorate and looked toward a "new era of freedom and independence," although this was not to mean the end of all Franco-Moroccan ties. President Eisenhower sent a special message to the Sultan, recalling the relations which had existed between the United States and Morocco since the earliest days of the United States and expressing the hope that the reign would "open new vistas for that community of purposes which had contributed so much to the greatness of Morocco, and restore the peace and prosperity which the United States so deeply desires" for the people of Morocco. At the same time the United States indicated that the return of Mohammed V marked a significant step in the development of Franco-Moroccan cooperation, and it was felt that the already demonstrated friendly spirit augured well "for success in working out the mutually satisfactory arrangements" which, it was hoped, would "lead to the peace and prosperity of the Moroccan community."<sup>9</sup>

Thanks to these favorable developments, virtually no discussion of the Moroccan issue took place at the General Assembly. Instead, on December 3, 1955, the Assembly agreed unanimously to postpone further consideration of the item. There was, indeed, much commendation of France for the statesmanlike way in which the problem had been handled. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the United States Representative, declared in the Political Committee that the constructive developments which had taken place since 1954 had given great satisfaction to the United States. He extended the American people's "best wishes" to Sultan Mohammed V and the Moroccan people. In view of the Franco-Moroccan agreement Ambassador Lodge felt it incumbent on the General Assembly to do everything possible "to contribute to an atmosphere

in which the parties directly concerned can work out the outstanding problems between them," the solution of which would require "the utmost good will, patience, and restraint on both sides." Ambassador Lodge expressed the hope that the pending negotiations would "strengthen the links of friendship between the people of France and Morocco."<sup>10</sup>

*Algeria*—In distinction to Morocco, Algeria is a part of metropolitan France, and a crisis developed in the United Nations with regard to inscription of the Algerian item. The United States opposed inscription because of the constitutional position of Algeria. The question was inscribed on September 30 by a vote of 28-27-5, despite the threat of the French delegation to boycott the General Assembly. French Foreign Minister Pinay advised the General Assembly to "weigh the consequences, all the consequences" of such a decision; the "whole future of our organization" was at stake, he warned. Mr. Pinay's basic argument was that Algeria had been an integral part of France for over a century, and he declared that the Algerians were citizens of France, with far more rights than the citizens of some states whose representatives were voting for inscription.<sup>11</sup> Because of the action of the General Assembly, the French delegation withdrew entirely from the General Assembly on September 30 and did not return until November 29 when, by unanimous action, the Assembly removed the Algerian item from its agenda.<sup>12</sup>

*Tunisia*—The problem of Tunisia was not placed upon the agenda of the Tenth General Assembly for the primary reason that on June 3, 1955, the French Government and the Tunisian leaders had reached an agreement whereby Tunisia was granted internal autonomy. The agreement provided for a monetary and customs union, with France retaining control over defense, internal security, and finance and the exclusive right to extend technical and financial assistance. A French High Commissioner was to exercise all powers remaining to France and to be responsible for the protection of French interests; the French commanding general was to be responsible, as Minister of Defense, for the naval and air bases at Bizerte and other military installations.

Following approval of the agreement, Secretary Dulles on August 10 expressed U.S. satisfaction that a new framework for close Franco-Tunisian cooperation had been established.<sup>13</sup> He

considered it significant that agreement had been reached "through negotiations on a basis of equality between the parties directly concerned" and declared that France and Tunisia could "take real satisfaction and pride in the achievement of this agreement." The negotiations, in his view, demonstrated that "mutually satisfactory progress can be made on such difficult problems if they are dealt with in time by the parties concerned with determination, realism, and good will." On August 27, the Bey of Tunis, Sidi Mohammed el Amin, ratified and sealed the convention restoring internal autonomy to Tunisia, and the documents were exchanged and deposited in Paris on August 31.

## THE PROBLEM OF CYPRUS

A troublesome issue of special concern to the United Kingdom, Greece, and Turkey, involving the problem of self-determination, was that of Cyprus. It had been before the General Assembly during 1954, but, after 2 days of discussion, that body decided against further consideration at the time.<sup>14</sup> During 1955, however, the problem became more intense, with growing violence on the Island of Cyprus. On May 9, the Greek Government advised the Secretary-General of the United Nations that developments in Cyprus were "unfortunately assuming a particularly alarming character" and reserved "the right to consider such action" as might be necessary.

With a view to a possible solution, the United Kingdom on June 30 announced invitations to the Greek and Turkish Governments to a conference at London for discussion of "political and defense questions which affect the eastern Mediterranean, including Cyprus."<sup>15</sup> Both Greece and Turkey accepted the invitation early in July; the former, on July 23, requested inscription of the problem of self-determination for Cyprus on the agenda of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly.

When the London conference convened on August 29, three essential elements appeared to be involved: (1) the Greek position concerning self-determination, (2) the Turkish position regarding the protection of the rights of the Turkish minority and Turkish security, and (3) the British position that common security interests in the eastern Mediterranean should be considered. The con-

ference ended on September 7, without having achieved substantial result.<sup>16</sup> Foreign Minister Stephanos Stephanopoulos, who presented the Greek case on August 31, called for self-determination within a reasonable time, pledging that Greece would give the United Kingdom unlimited use of military bases on Cyprus and offering other base rights on the Greek mainland, but indicating that Greece would regard the discussions as a failure unless the right of self-determination were recognized.<sup>17</sup> Essentially the Turkish view was that the agitation concerning self-determination was largely artificial, that the right of the large Turkish minority must be protected, and that, for reasons of Turkish security, the island should remain in British hands.<sup>18</sup> The United Kingdom, which had stressed the security aspects of the problem, on September 6 offered Cyprus a new constitution giving island residents more self-rule and a prospect of ultimate self-determination. But it was obvious by September 7 that no agreement was possible, and the final communique of the conference indicated that Foreign Secretary Macmillan would study the Greek and Turkish statements.

The failure of the London conference to achieve anything more substantial, and the subsequent intensification of the problem, appeared not only to weaken the Greek-Turkish-Yugoslav treaty which had been signed on February 28, 1953, but also to sap the strength of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the vital eastern Mediterranean—matters in which the United States was very much concerned. Moreover, it now seemed clear that Greece would make every effort to have the problem inscribed on the agenda of the Tenth Session of the General Assembly.

The riots in Istanbul and Izmir on September 6-7, and the vast damage which they wrought, were also most disturbing to the United States, although it did not comment publicly at once. On September 18, the Department of State announced that Secretary Dulles had sent personal messages to the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers.<sup>19</sup> The announcement characterized

as most regrettable recent evidences of tension between the Governments of Greece and Turkey. Present differences between these two countries resulted in widespread violence in the cities of Istanbul and Izmir. We have expressed to the Turkish Government our deep concern over these disorders, which have not only caused extensive physical damage but have also exerted

an adverse influence on Turkish-Greek friendship at a time when these two allies are in great need of mutual understanding.

In his identical communications to Prime Minister Papagos and Prime Minister Menderes, Secretary Dulles stressed the importance which the United States attached to "continued close cooperation between Greece and Turkey." He could not believe that, in the light of their record of common achievement, any problem would "long disrupt the course of Greek-Turkish friendship," nor that "the unhappy events of the past two weeks" would reverse policies of cooperation initiated under the leadership of Eleftherios Venizelos and Kemal Atatürk. Mr. Dulles recalled the assistance which the United States had rendered to Greece and Turkey since 1947 because of its belief that the Greco-Turkish partnership constituted "a strong bulwark of the free world in a critical area." But if the bulwark were "materially weakened, the consequences could be grave indeed," and he urged that every effort be made that the partnership not be impaired "by present disagreements." He was confident, however, that the spirit of cooperation which the two countries had so often demonstrated as members of the United Nations, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the Balkan Alliance would enable them "to transcend immediate differences in the interests of free world unity."

The Greek and Turkish replies to the Dulles communication were made public on September 21. Premier Papagos expressed appreciation of the message and noted the necessity of NATO unity, but he felt that it did not take account of the fact that Greece was an injured party, and he complained concerning Turkish "hostility against Greece." He said that he expected moral and material reparation from Turkey and held that the latter should take the initiative in the renewal of mutual confidence. On the other hand, Prime Minister Menderes of Turkey warmly thanked Secretary Dulles for his message; he expressed regret for the events of September 6-7 and concern for continued Greek-Turkish friendship, within the framework of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Balkan Alliance.

On September 29, President Eisenhower assured King Paul that he remained convinced of "the paramount importance of the ties of strong friendship which unite Greece and the United States." Even if there were "differences of opinion over how the Cyprus

question should be handled," that one issue would not be permitted to "trouble our deep friendship and sympathy for Greece."<sup>20</sup>

Meanwhile, on September 21 the Greek request for inscription of the Cyprus issue on the agenda of the Tenth General Assembly was considered in the General Committee. At the outset, Anthony Nutting, the United Kingdom representative, expressed regret that the London conference had produced no solution. He declared that the United Kingdom devoutly hoped that consultations would be renewed and was ready to consider "amendments or counterproposals" to its recent "constructive and far-reaching" suggestions concerning Cyprus, which were "designed to lead to the fullest measure of internal self-government compatible with the strategic requirements of the present international situation." But he felt that extended discussion in the United Nations would not prove helpful. He observed that the Greek purpose was to acquire sovereignty over Cyprus and warned that debate might generate heat which would "light flames elsewhere."<sup>21</sup>

On the other hand, Ambassador George V. Melas not only maintained that Greece was sponsoring a legitimate petition of a distinct national entity but rejected "with contempt" the charge that Greece was a "troublemaker." He asserted that the British proposals concerning Cyprus were a "denial of democracy." He presented the case for self-determination, pointing out that the principle was enshrined both in the Atlantic Charter and in the United Nations Charter, and recalled the "very sad and depressing things" which had happened in Turkey. In turn, Ambassador Selim Sarper of Turkey took exception to the remarks of the Greek representative, to whom he had listened with a feeling of "almost physical pain." Ambassador Sarper declared that Turkey still attached "importance to friendship and alliance with Greece," which was a necessity for the maintenance of stability in the eastern Mediterranean, but he warned against the effects of the self-determination argument for Cyprus and noted that Greece itself was a "mosaic" of minorities.<sup>22</sup>

Ambassador Lodge, who did not enter into the substance of the issue, expressed the view that such problems should be included if there were reason to suppose that discussion would "promote the purposes of the charter."<sup>23</sup> The U.S. decision to oppose inscription was a "painful" one because it was contrary to Greek

desires, especially in the light of the "tragic events" which had just occurred in Turkey. Nevertheless, the United States took what seemed "the course of true friendship" in an effort to avoid what might prove in reality to be "a disservice to our charter goals, both those relating to non-self-governing territories and those relating to the development of friendly relations among nations."

In the end, by a vote of 474, the General Committee recommended against inscription. The General Assembly upheld the recommendation on September 23 by a vote of 28-22-10.

During the Assembly's discussion on inscription, Foreign Minister Stephanopoulos contended that, under the charter, the United Nations had both the right and the duty to offer an opportunity for self-determination to the Cyprian people, and he repeated that Greece had turned to the United Nations because of the failure of diplomatic negotiations. Mr. Nutting, however, declared that the "real aim" of the Greek Government was "acquisition of Cyprus and not constitutional self-government in the island." He closed with a solemn pledge on behalf of the United Kingdom, through an unremitting endeavor "to work out a solution to this tangled, difficult and delicate issue." Ambassador Sarper declared that discussion would serve no useful purpose but would inflame relations, and he challenged the competence of the United Nations to deal with the status of Cyprus, which, he contended, had been settled in the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

Ambassador Lodge reiterated the position which he had taken in the General Committee, noting that a decision against inscription "would not mean that nothing will happen." Rather it meant that the matter could and would be dealt with "under different and more auspicious conditions," in which "quiet diplomacy" might prove more effective, and he pledged that the United States would "continue an active interest in the Cyprus situation." V. K. Krishna Menon of India, who abstained, favored independence for Cyprus; he remarked:

But we do not think in the present circumstances, when negotiations have been proceeding, and when there is violence in the area, and when this undertaking has been given to carry on negotiations and bring about a settlement in a peaceful manner, that the purposes of the Charter and the prospects of a settlement would be advanced by public debate in this Assembly.<sup>24</sup>

At the close of the discussion, Mr. Nutting issued a statement expressing British satisfaction with the "clear-cut decision by the Assembly that inscription and discusson" of the Cyprus question would be unwise. He was glad that the General Assembly had "heeded our warning about the consequences of a debate which could only be bitter and further arouse passions between friends" and repeated that the United Kingdom would "now make unremitting endeavors to find an acceptable solution to this problem," which affected "three friendly countries."<sup>25</sup>

## **PROBLEMS IN THE ARAB-ISRAEL CONTROVERSY**

As in years past, both the United States and the United Nations faced many troublesome problems in connection with the Israel-Arab controversy. The U.N. Secretary-General, in his annual report, declared "with great regret" that the "lack of any improvement in the political situation in the Middle East has continued to prevent the United Nations from assisting countries in that region in the way in which it should do so." The Secretary-General pointed out that economic and social problems in this area were accumulating and that, under existing conditions, some of the means of economic and social development which had "proved most effective in other regions" were denied to the Middle East. The catalog of problems included the broad, perennial issue of attempting to bring about some peaceful settlement of the specific problems involved; the question of armed incidents along the demarcation lines; restrictions on shipping within the Suez Canal and Gulf of Aqaba; the need for equitable distribution of the waters of the Jordan River for irrigation and hydroelectric purposes; and the problem of the Arab refugees from Palestine. The additional nuance of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms arrangement further complicated the picture during the latter part of 1955.

### **The U.S. Program**

Secretary Dulles expressed the basic concern of the United States for peace and security in the Middle East in an address before the Council on Foreign Relations at New York on August 26, when he

outlined American policy with regard to Palestine issues and Arab-Israel relations.<sup>26</sup> He pointed to the progress which had been made toward settling such Middle Eastern issues as that of the Suez Base since May 1953, when he visited the area, but drew attention to outstanding issues. He noted that Ambassador Eric Johnston was then on his fourth visit to the Middle East in connection with the Jordan River project. According to Secretary Dulles, there were three basic problems which had been left unsolved by the Armistice Agreements of 1949: (1) the tragic plight of 900,000 refugees who formerly lived on the territory now occupied by Israel; (2) the pall of fear hanging alike over Arabs and Israelis; and (3) the lack of fixed permanent boundaries between Israel and its neighbors.

Solution of the refugee problem, in the Secretary's view, required that these "uprooted people" be enabled to resume a life of dignity and self-respect through resettlement and, where feasible, repatriation. The need for more arable land could be met by practical projects for water development. Compensation to the refugees was due from Israel; if necessary, an international loan might be made "to enable Israel to pay the compensation which would enable many of the refugees to find for themselves a better way of life." President Eisenhower would recommend substantial American participation in such a loan, as well as an American contribution "to the realization of water development and irrigation projects which would, directly or indirectly, facilitate the resettlement of the refugees."

Projects to aid refugee resettlement would do more than enable people to enjoy a better life; they would also assist in eliminating the problem of "recurrent incidents" which had plagued and embittered life on both sides of the armistice lines. But security could be assured "only by collective measures which commit decisive power to the deterring of aggression." President Eisenhower had authorized Secretary Dulles to state that,

given a solution of the other related problems, he [the President] would recommend that the United States join in formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors.

Secretary Dulles hoped that other countries would be willing to support such a security guaranty and that the United Nations would sponsor it. Under such collective security measures the

# ISRAEL

— International boundary, prior to 1948  
— Armistice line  
— District boundary  
○ District administrative center  
0 10 20 30 40  
Statute Miles



Where the international boundary and armistice line coincide only the former is shown

Boundaries are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government

fears could be resolved and political leadership in the Middle East could "devote itself to constructive tasks."

Since the Armistice Agreements of 1949 had not determined permanent frontiers, agreement concerning borders should precede a boundary guaranty. The overall advantages to be gained by such a guaranty were well worth the adjustments required to convert "armistice lines of danger into boundary lines of safety," and Secretary Dulles believed it "possible to find a way of reconciling the vital interests of all the parties." The United States was willing to assist in finding a solution to this problem, and, if agreement could be reached on the basic problems of refugees, security, and boundaries, it was thought possible to solve other issues, largely economic, and also to reach an agreement concerning the status of Jerusalem. The United States was ready to support a review of the latter problem by the United Nations.

Secretary Dülles said that the purpose of his statement was to demonstrate the possibility for improvement and make clear that the United States was disposed to encourage that possibility by contributions of its own, if desired. He concluded:

At a time when a great effort is being made to ease the tension which has long prevailed between the Soviet and Western worlds, can we not hope that a similar spirit should prevail in the Middle East? That is our plea. The spirit of conciliation and of the good neighbor brings rich rewards to the people and to the nations. If doing that involves some burdens, they are burdens which the United States would share, just as we would share the satisfaction which would result to all peoples if happiness, contentment, and good will could drive hatred and misery away from peoples whom we hold in high respect and honor.

U.N. Secretary-General Hammarskjold immediately welcomed the Secretary's address and declared that American willingness to participate substantially in an international loan to assist the Arab refugees "might well prove to be an approach to this humanitarian problem which would mark the beginning of a general stabilization of conditions in the area." Similarly the United Kingdom, on August 27, endorsed the proposals as "an important contribution toward the solution of the most critical problem in the Middle East." The United Kingdom was ready to play its full part "in an effort to bring about more settled relations" and declared, as had already been stated on April 4, that it was ready to guarantee "by treaty or treaties with the parties concerned any territorial

settlement so agreed." The United Kingdom welcomed American willingness to participate both in security guaranties and in an international loan and hoped that the governments concerned might be disposed to examine the possibilities of settlement. The French Government also substantially endorsed the proposals. Sir John Kotelawala, Prime Minister of Ceylon, declared on August 28 that the suggested program would "provide a useful starting point" for a "further sincere and determined effort" to settle outstanding Israel-Arab differences; Ceylon, too, was ready to assist "in the search for a peaceful solution."

At his news conference on August 30, Secretary Dulles declared that his address had been "a very carefully considered statement" and he did not desire to elaborate on it "in terms of substance" until there had been responsible comment from Middle Eastern Governments.

Although there was no official Arab comment concerning the Dulles suggestions, unofficial comment was critical. The Israel Government, on the other hand, appeared rather favorably impressed but desired more information with regard both to frontier guaranties and to frontier adjustments. In an address on September 11, Abba Eban, Israel's Ambassador to the United States, declared that, while Israel was "ready in the proper context for mutual adjustments of the boundary lines," it would "accept no unilateral territorial concessions."

Secretary Dulles again discussed the problem of peace in the Near East in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on September 22.<sup>27</sup> He noted that the situation in that area remained troubled, repeated his proposals, indicated that the United Kingdom and a number of other governments had expressed their support, and added that, if there was a favorable response from the Near East, "many aspects of this problem would eventually come to the United Nations for its action at some future session."

## **Problem of Arms Shipments**

Closely related to the maintenance of peace in the Middle East was the problem of arms shipments to that area. Secretary Dulles indicated on August 30 that, although he had no direct proof as yet, the Department of State had received unofficial reports that the Soviet Union had offered to supply arms to some Arab States.

Premier Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt announced an Egyptian-Czechoslovak arms arrangement on September 27.

On the same date Secretary Dulles and Foreign Secretary Macmillan discussed the problem in New York.<sup>28</sup> They declared that the policies of the United States and the United Kingdom were based on the desire, on the one hand, to enable the countries of the Middle East to provide for internal security and defense and, on the other, "to avoid an arms race which would inevitably increase the tensions in the area." They hoped that other governments would also be guided by these principles. The Department of State sent Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen to Cairo on September 28 to look into the problem.

The Israel Government indicated that it would have to study the implications of the report that Egypt was making arrangements for the purchase of arms. Meanwhile, the Egyptian Government insisted on its sovereign rights in the matter and declared that it had sought unsuccessfully to purchase arms from the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. The French Government alined itself with the Anglo-American position, but the Soviet Government, as was to have been expected, held that each state had the right to look after its defenses and to purchase weapons for defense requirements on the "usual commercial terms," a position which was echoed by the Czechoslovak Government on October 3. Meanwhile, the Council of the Arab League supported the Egyptian position, and Saudi Arabia and Syria indicated their willingness to make similar arrangements.

Secretary Dulles commented on the Egyptian-Czechoslovak arrangement on October 4,<sup>29</sup> noting that as a result of Assistant Secretary Allen's visit to Cairo there was a better understanding of the problem, although he had no reason to believe that the arrangement would not be implemented. Recalling his statement of August 30 that the Arab countries were independent governments and free to do whatever they wished in the matter, Mr. Dulles declared that, from the standpoint of Soviet-American relations, "such deliveries of arms would not contribute to relaxing tensions," and he added:

It is difficult to be critical of countries which, feeling themselves endangered, seek the arms which they sincerely believe they need for defense. On the other hand, I doubt very much that, under the conditions which prevail in the area, it is possible for any country to get security through

an arms race. Also it is not easy or pleasant to speculate on the probable motives of the Soviet-bloc leaders.

The Secretary of State referred to his address of August 26 and repeated his proposal for a security guaranty under the United Nations, which, he believed, "would relieve the acute fears which both sides now profess." Since he did not know the precise character or extent of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arrangement, or whether it might "seriously upset the balance of power" in the Middle East, Mr. Dulles could not say whether the United States might ship arms to Israel. In the main, he pointed out, it had been American policy "to avoid participating in what might become an arms race," and he still hoped that it would be possible "to avoid getting into that situation."

Prime Minister Eden expressed similar views in an address at Bournemouth on October 8, noting the "grave risks" of the "crudest form of arms race" and declaring that, if an outside great power stepped in to supply arms "on an infinitely larger scale," the risks inevitably would be intensified.

The problem soon was complicated further by Soviet promises of extended economic and technical assistance, and the situation became more tense. Secretary Dulles touched upon the matter again on October 18,<sup>30</sup> indicating that there might be some informal discussion of it with Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov at the Geneva conference. He did not consider that "very certain conclusions" could be drawn from the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, which was based on the broad concept of avoiding both a serious imbalance of power and an armaments race in the Middle East. Nor could he yet judge the military significance of the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arrangement, since the "business of secondhand arms" was "very difficult to appraise accurately" and the value of the discards was not always easy to judge.

Israel Prime Minister Moshe Sharett also spoke at length on the possible arms race in an address before the Israel Knesset on October 18, accusing Egypt of misdeeds along the Israel demarcation lines and expressing approval of Mr. Dulles' address of August 26, although he declared there could be "no unilateral territorial concessions on the part of Israel." Mr. Sharett considered the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms arrangement a danger to Israel, along with the British shipment of arms to Iraq and other Arab States.

But because arms were a "prime necessity" for its defense, Israel would "not refuse arms from any possible source." At the same time, Mr. Sharett contended that no power was justified in withholding a security pact from Israel and attached "particular importance" to one with the United States, to which Israel had considered itself "entitled" for a long time.<sup>31</sup>

Prime Minister Sharett later journeyed to Paris and Geneva in order to present Israel's position to the Foreign Ministers of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union. He visited the United States during November-December in the interest of arms and a security guaranty.

## The President's Position

Meanwhile, from Denver, Colo., President Eisenhower issued a statement concerning peace in the Middle East on November 9.<sup>32</sup> He said he felt that nothing which had happened since 1954 had invalidated "our fundamental policies . . . based on friendship for all of the peoples of that area." In the President's view, true security "must be based upon a just and reasonable settlement," and he recalled the U.S. offer of August 26 to join in "formal treaty engagements to prevent or thwart any effort by either side to alter by force the boundaries between Israel and its Arab neighbors." Recent developments had made a settlement all the more imperative, and the President declared that the United States would continue to play its full part and would "support firmly the United Nations," which had "already contributed so markedly to minimize violence in the area." He hoped that other nations of the world would cooperate in this endeavor, "thereby contributing significantly to world peace."

Prime Minister Eden also discussed Middle Eastern problems on November 9, referring both to the U.S. proposals of August 26 and to the "new element of danger" brought into the picture through the Czechoslovak-Egyptian arms arrangement.<sup>33</sup> He paid tribute to the work of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (Untso), regretted that the Jordan River Valley project had not yet been approved, and said that the powers "must somehow attempt to deal with the root causes of the trouble." Because of its "long tradition of friendship with the Middle East," the United Kingdom had "a special responsibility" in the area.

The United Kingdom was aware of the respective Israel and Arab positions concerning terms of peace, the resolutions of the United Nations in 1947 and afterward, and the Armistice Agreements of 1949, and he felt that the only solution was some kind of compromise on territorial claims, in the interest of which the good offices of the United Kingdom would be available. If there could be some accepted agreement about boundaries, the Prime Minister believed the United Kingdom, the United States, and perhaps other powers would be prepared to give a formal guaranty to both sides. This might, at last, bring "real confidence and security," and there would also be financial and other assistance "over this tragic problem of the refugees."

On November 15, in a message read at a rally in New York City, President Eisenhower repeated the American willingness to sign a Middle Eastern security guaranty, provided agreement was reached between Israel and the Arab States concerning boundaries, and stressed the view that current problems were capable of pacific settlement.<sup>34</sup> He considered a threat to Middle Eastern peace as a threat to world peace and indicated that the United States would continue to be guided by the policies of the 1950 Tripartite Declaration, which, he thought, best promoted "the interest and security of the peoples of the area." In the President's view:

The need for a peaceful settlement becomes daily more imperative. The United States will play its full part in working toward such a settlement and will support firmly the United Nations in its efforts to prevent violence in the area. By firm friendship towards Israel and all other Nations in the Near East, we shall continue to contribute to the peace of the world.

The Department of State indicated on November 16, following visits of the Israel and Egyptian Ambassadors, that the United States "would view with grave disapproval anything which would lead to hostilities in the Middle East."<sup>35</sup> Two days later, the Department declared that the United States and the United Kingdom were "working closely together in their common interest in the settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute." The two governments saw "eye to eye" on the imperative necessity of an early settlement, as had been clearly indicated by the President on November 9 and by the Secretary of State on August 26.

Toward the end of November, Prime Minister Eden clarified the British position before the House of Commons. On November 22, he reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration of 1950, and on

November 24 he declared that (1) there was nothing in his address of November 9 involving "very substantial" concessions of territory by Israel, (2) Israel should cooperate in solving the problem of the 900,000 Arab refugees, and (3) there could be no real settlement without Arab recognition of the right of Israel to exist. He had not attempted to specify any details concerning a compromise but was convinced that a settlement would be so valuable that both sides would find concessions "more than worthwhile." The Prime Minister added that, although he did not want to bind his American friends to every word he had spoken, it was a fact that the United Kingdom and the United States were in "close agreement in this difficult business."

On December 6 Secretary Dulles, who had had a discussion with the Israel Foreign Minister on the previous day, declared that the United States continued "to feel very strongly that there should be a solution" of the Israel-Arab problem.<sup>36</sup> He held the need for a solution to be imperative and hoped that both sides would see the advantages of a settlement, but he would not say that there were any "concrete developments which could be adduced as proof that they have been so convinced as yet"; the possibilities, in his view, still existed.

### Tension Along Borders

But despite these efforts 1955 did not bring a settlement in the Arab-Israel controversy. Tension along the demarcation lines<sup>37</sup> continued unabated, with the Israel-Egyptian and Israel-Syrian demarcation lines the major center of conflict, rather than the Israel-Jordan boundary as in years past.<sup>38</sup>

Israel-Egyptian relations worsened during 1955, with the continuance of Egyptian restrictions against Israel shipping in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba<sup>39</sup> and numerous infiltrating raids across the demarcation lines in the Gaza region. The first serious incident of the year was Israel's "retaliatory" raid in the Gaza strip on February 28, in which 39 Egyptians and 8 Israelis were killed and 30 Egyptians and 13 Israelis wounded, an act for which the United Nations Security Council censured Israel on March 29, 1955.<sup>40</sup>

In line with the suggestions of Maj. Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, the Security Council on March 30 called upon the parties to co-operate in (1) establishment of joint patrols along sensitive portions of the demarcation line, (2) negotiation of a local commanders' agreement, (3) erection of a barbed-wire obstacle along sections of the line, and (4) manning of all outposts and patrols by regular forces.<sup>41</sup> The difficulties continued, however, and on April 13 General Burns declared that the significant element in the increased tension had been the mining of tracks used by Israel army trucks—an action which might have been in retaliation for the Gaza incident.<sup>42</sup> The increasing seriousness of the situation prompted Ambassador Lodge, as President of the Security Council, to express his concern to Council members on June 7; his letter (copies of which were sent to the Egyptian and Israel representatives to the U.N.) noted that, if General Burns did not receive the necessary cooperation of the parties, another meeting of the Security Council might be necessary.<sup>43</sup>

Nevertheless, incidents continued, and the discussions under General Burns did not go well. Incidents which resulted in heavy casualties and sundry claims and counterclaims had seriously inflamed the situation by the end of August. A cease-fire was accepted by September 4, but General Burns was convinced that a repetition could be avoided only if the opposing forces were separated by a physical barrier and kept 500 meters on each side of the line.<sup>44</sup> The Security Council met on September 8 and unanimously adopted a resolution (1) noting the cease-fire, (2) calling on Israel and Egypt to bring about peace and order in the Gaza region and particularly "to desist from further acts of violence and to continue the cease-fire in full force and effect," (3) endorsing the Burns proposals concerning separation of the opposing forces, (4) calling for freedom of movement of United Nations observers (some of whom had been detained in Israel), (5) calling for full cooperation with General Burns, and (6) requesting the latter to report to the Security Council on implementation of the resolution.<sup>45</sup>

Although both Egypt and Israel conditionally agreed on September 27 to the UNTSO request to withdraw from the demilitarized zone, the situation did not improve and shooting incidents continued, with provocations on both sides. On November 2,

following a statement of Prime Minister Ben-Gurion that Israel was ready for peace with Egypt, Israel forces struck at Egyptian positions which were beyond the old border in the demilitarized zone, with the result that 50 Egyptians were killed and 40 wounded, and 4 Israelis killed. United Nations observers were not permitted to go to the scene. On November 3, the U.N. Secretary-General proposed a peace plan calling for clear delineation of the demarcation lines and the withdrawal of armed forces. At the same time he protested the detention of United Nations observers and expressed "grave concern" over the incident in a protest to the Israel representative at the United Nations.<sup>46</sup> Two days later the Department of State also issued a statement<sup>47</sup> following a conference of Assistant Secretary Allen with Ambassador Eban and Egyptian Ambassador Ahmed Hussein; it noted with concern the "increasing tempo" of Israel-Egyptian hostilities and violations of the Armistice Agreement by both sides. It strongly supported the efforts of the United Nations to achieve a settlement by peaceful methods, particularly those proposed by General Burns, and declared that United Nations observers should have "full liberty to perform their peaceful functions."<sup>48</sup>

In contrast to the situation on the Egyptian-Israel demarcation lines and to that which had generally obtained in the period of 1949-54, the Israel-Jordan line was relatively quiet. On April 18, a local commanders' agreement, designed to minimize incidents and other hostile acts in the Jerusalem area, was accepted on an informal basis.<sup>49</sup> But the situation along the Israel-Syrian line, always tense, flared into open conflict. There were occasional Syrian forays across the Israel line and numerous charges and countercharges, with mutual recriminations. On October 22 an Israel force killed 3 Syrian soldiers, wounded 6, and took at least 5 prisoners, in what the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization termed a "well-planned" operation.<sup>50</sup> On December 11 a much more serious incident developed when Israel forces, estimated at some 600 men, attacked Syrian outposts overlooking Lake Tiberias (the Sea of Galilee), killing 56 Syrians and taking 29 prisoners, with at least 6 Israelis among the dead. The Israel Government charged that Syrian troops had fired at Israel fishermen on the Sea of Galilee, but the UNTSO held that there had been violations of the Armistice Agreement by both sides, pointed to the increase in tension, and noted Syria's resentment at the denial

of fishing rights. There was, moreover, mutual embitterment because of failure to return prisoners. But the report of the UNTSO held:

The Israeli action on the night of 11/12 December was a deliberate violation of the provisions of the general armistice agreement, including those relating to the demilitarized zone, which was crossed by the Israel forces which entered Syria.

Like the Kibya and Gaza incidents with which the Security Council has had to deal, the Tiberias incident has been explained by Israel as a retaliatory action on a large scale. In these three cases, Israel forces have acted by surprise and after striking a heavy blow, they have returned to their base. There is, however, a risk in such retaliatory action, viz that the attacker may not be able to limit the extent of the operation to that planned. Such actions may well produce a violent reaction by the forces of the attacked country and what had been conceived as a limited raid develops into full-scale hostilities. In the present atmosphere of tensions and military activity, this possibility must be faced.<sup>51</sup>

### Action in U.N. Security Council

There was some justification for the fears expressed by the UNTSO. On December 15, the eve of the discussion of the problem by the Security Council, the Egyptian Government advised the Secretary-General that, in view of the Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defense Treaty of October 20, 1955, Egypt considered the attack against Syrian forces "an aggression against Egypt" and felt compelled "to treat force with force."<sup>52</sup>

During the discussions in the Security Council, Israel was unanimously condemned for the action against Syria.<sup>53</sup> The resolution of January 19, 1956,<sup>54</sup> held that interference by Syrian authorities with Israeli activities on Lake Tiberias in no way justified the Israel action. It reminded Israel that the Security Council had already condemned the raid against the Jordanian village of Kibya (October 14-15, 1953) and the retaliatory attack in the Gaza region (February 28, 1955).<sup>55</sup>

The attack of December 11-12, 1955, was condemned as a "flagrant violation" of the cease-fire provisions in the Security Council resolution of July 15, 1948, and of the Syrian-Israel Armistice Agreement of 1949. The Security Council also expressed "its grave concern at the failure of the Government of Israel to comply with its obligations" and called upon Israel to do so in the future; otherwise the Council would have to consider "what further

measures under the Charter are required to maintain or restore the peace." The resolution called upon the parties to comply with their obligations under the General Armistice Agreement to respect the demarcation line and the demilitarized zone and requested the Chief of Staff of the UNTSO to pursue his suggestions for improving the situation in the area of Lake Tiberias "without prejudice to the rights, claims and positions of the parties and to report to the Council as appropriate on the success of his efforts." Both parties were called upon to arrange with the Chief of Staff to implement the provisions of the Armistice Agreement in good faith, and especially "to make full use of the Mixed Armistice Commission's machinery in the interpretation and application of its provisions."

On January 24, 1956, during his visit to the Middle East, Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold announced that Egypt had accepted the proposals with regard to the easing of tensions in the vicinity of the demilitarized zone at El Auja (Nitsana), which had been originally set forth on November 4 and which Israel had accepted on January 4. These proposals dealt with border markings and withdrawal of troops from the demilitarized zone. At the end of his visit the Secretary-General indicated that he was somewhat hopeful concerning the possibility of peace, although he did not minimize the difficulties.<sup>56</sup> Both Arab and Israel leaders, he indicated, had reaffirmed their faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, had expressed their determination, "in accordance with their obligations under the Charter and under the General Armistice Agreement, to abstain from any acts of hostility or aggression and above all to settle conflicts, when they may arise, by peaceful means." The Secretary-General was convinced that such an attitude was essential for a lessening of tensions and the development of that calm in which alone it would "be possible to make a constructive approach toward the solution of outstanding problems."<sup>57</sup>

## OTHER ISSUES

There were many other issues, not always of direct concern to the United States, but nevertheless matters of interest which bore promise of one sort or another for the future. Thus, for example

the Sudanese Parliament, on December 19, 1955, adopted a unanimous resolution for independence, which was duly proclaimed on January 1, 1956.<sup>58</sup> The United States extended recognition on the same date, and on January 2 President Eisenhower sent a message declaring that the United States looked forward to friendly relations with the Government of the Sudan and wished it "every success in establishing a stable, prosperous and happy nation."<sup>59</sup> The United States also endorsed the application of the Sudan for U.N. membership, which the Security Council unanimously recommended to the General Assembly on February 6.<sup>60</sup>

Another long-smoldering issue was that between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia over Buraimi. Attempts at arbitration had failed by the fall of 1955, and forces of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat, supported by the Trucial Oman levies, entered the area on October 26. The Saudi Government informed the Security Council in October that it reserved the right to bring the matter before the Council; no further action has been taken, however, and the possibility exists that Saudi Arabia will discuss the matter directly with the British.<sup>61</sup>

Still a third problem was that of Goa, involving India and Portugal, which had broken relations concerning the question. Secretary Dulles on August 2 stated that the United States was concerned with tension in that area as in any other. He noted that it had

always been our policy to favor the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. That is, of course, a principle which is expressed in the charter of the United Nations. That applies to Goa as well as to any other place in the world. We are pleased to note that, as I recall, Prime Minister Nehru affirmed that principle for his own Government, and I am confident that that is also the view that will be taken by the Government of Portugal.<sup>62</sup>

Subsequently, during the visit of the Portuguese Foreign Minister to the United States on December 2, a joint communique referred among other things to allegations concerning "the Portuguese provinces in the Far East," in view of various statements made during the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to India.<sup>63</sup> In a statement of December 6, Secretary Dulles pointed to the context of the statement, which had been directed against the introduction of hate and prejudice into a situation calling for calmness but which had not taken "any position on the merits of the matter." The United States believed that such problems should not be

settled by force—a general approach which, he felt, Prime Minister Nehru shared.<sup>64</sup> On December 29 the United States sent a note to the Indian Government to this effect.

## Problems of Regional Security

Since the end of World War II the United States has been very much interested in the defense of the Middle East and has expressed that interest in a wide variety of ways, including assistance to Greece and Turkey (1947) and support for the entry of those countries into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (1952). Together with France, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, the United States during 1951–1952 sought the establishment of a Middle East Command or Middle East Defense Organization; this concept failed to materialize, however, largely because of the Middle Eastern preoccupation with local quarrels and with disputes with the Western states.

Following his visit to the area in May 1953, Secretary Dulles concluded that any sound regional defense arrangement would have to rest on the desires of the peoples and governments in the Middle East. Mr. Dulles found that the states of the Northern Tier, more exposed to external danger, were more likely than the others to find a solution of the problem and also were so situated as to provide the greatest measure of protection to the area. He therefore concluded that it should be the policy of the United States to assist in strengthening the defenses of those countries which desired such assistance in order to resist the common threat. It was hoped that the states directly concerned would recognize the common danger and would cooperate for collective regional defense. The United States could encourage efforts which were consistent with its own security goals and could help to fill gaps in the evolving defense arrangement. But the countries of the area should take the lead in establishing this arrangement; they should also determine whether it should take the form of a single structure or of separate but related units and whether the arrangement should be restricted to states in the area or should include Western states interested in the defense of the area.<sup>65</sup>



## THE TURCO-IRAQI PACT, FEBRUARY 24, 1955

It was within the framework of this general policy and of article 51 of the United Nations Charter that the United States looked with approval upon the Turco-Pakistani treaty of April 2, 1954, and signed mutual defense assistance agreements with Iraq (April 21, 1954) and Pakistan (May 19, 1954).<sup>66</sup> Pakistan, which thus became linked by treaty in a Middle Eastern arrangement, was in addition a signatory of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty on September 8, 1954, together with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand.

The United States also looked with approval on the Pact of Mutual Cooperation which Iraq and Turkey signed at Baghdad on February 24, 1955, despite the misgivings of certain other Arab States, notably Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, and despite Soviet strictures concerning the pact.<sup>67</sup> The Turco-Iraqi treaty, in its preamble, referred to the treaty signed by the two countries on March 29, 1946, which had recognized that the peace and security of Turkey and Iraq were an integral part of the peace and security of the Middle East as a whole. It also noted that article 2 of the Arab Collective Security Treaty had specified that that treaty did not affect rights and obligations under the United Nations. Under article 1, "consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter," Turkey and Iraq were to "cooperate for their security and defense" and the specific measures to be taken in this connection were to be the subject of "special agreements." The parties agreed not to interfere in each other's domestic affairs and to settle disputes by peaceful means, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The new treaty was not in contradiction with any of their international obligations, and the parties undertook to assume no incompatible obligations. It was open to accession to any member of the Arab League<sup>68</sup> and to any other state actively concerned with the "peace and security" of the Middle East, "fully recognized by both the High Contracting Parties." A permanent council of ministerial rank was to be established under the treaty. The pact would remain in force for a 5-year period, subject to denunciation within 6 months prior to expiry. Attached to the treaty was an

exchange of notes in which the parties placed on record their understanding that it would enable Turkey and Iraq

to cooperate in resisting any aggression directed against either of them and that in order to ensure the maintenance of peace and security in the region, we have agreed to work in close cooperation for effecting the carrying out of the United Nations resolutions concerning Palestine.

Despite certain gaps in both the Turco-Pakistani and the Turco-Iraqi treaties, the United States held that the association of Middle Eastern states under such defense arrangements, directed against potential external aggression, was a safeguard also against their involvement in possible aggression within the area. The willingness of states to enter into such regional arrangements was an earnest that their attention was directed toward the common threat.

### Soviet Opposition

The Soviet Government bitterly denounced the Turco-Iraqi Pact and, during the discussions of the Gaza incident in the Security Council in March 1955, held the policy of "forming military blocs" responsible for the tension in the Middle East. In turn, U.S. Representative Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., and others pointed to the purely defensive character of the arrangement. Turkish Ambassador Selim Sarper noted that the Soviet-Communist Chinese treaty of 1950 had led to aggression in Korea, while NATO and similar instruments looked only toward security.<sup>69</sup>

On April 15, 1955, the Soviet Union published a statement, which was subsequently repeated on February 13, 1956, warning against the development of a Middle East defense system and denying any threat of aggression on its part—this, despite the fact that the Soviet Union itself since 1943 had built a formidable bloc of states dominated by the Communist system. (The bloc was formally consolidated in the Treaty of Warsaw on May 14, 1955.) The Soviet Government said it thoroughly approved of the "neutralist" stand of Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia and of those countries' opposition to the Turco-Iraqi treaty and declared it could not be "indifferent to the situation" in the Middle East, since the creation of "military blocs" and the establishment of "foreign military bases" in the area were "directly related to the security of the U.S.S.R."

## Expansion of Pact

Despite the Soviet position, however, on April 4 the United Kingdom had adhered to the treaty. By a special agreement the U.K. at the same time terminated the Anglo-Iraqi alliance of June 30, 1930, and gave up its bases at Habbaniya, Shaiba, and Margil; Iraq hereafter was to assume full responsibility for its own defense. When Pakistan adhered to the Baghdad Pact on September 23, the United States expressed "sympathy with the desire of these nations to provide for their legitimate self-defense through a collective arrangement within the framework of the United Nations."<sup>70</sup> Such an arrangement, especially between "the 'Northern Tier' nations of the Middle East," contained "the elements needed for an effective area defense structure." The United States, therefore, welcomed Pakistan's adherence to the Baghdad Pact, since it would "facilitate the cooperation of these nations for their mutual benefit and common defense."

When Iran announced its intention to adhere to the Baghdad Pact on October 11, the Soviet Foreign Minister summoned the Iranian Chargé d'Affaires, once more denounced the treaty, declared it to be an instrument of Western colonialism and aggression, and charged that the action was inconsistent with the Soviet-Iranian treaties of February 26, 1921, and October 1, 1927. In contrast, the United States welcomed Iran's adherence; a statement issued on October 12 declared that Iran's decision was "further evidence of the desire and ability of nations of the Middle East to develop regional arrangements for collective self-defense within the framework of the charter of the United Nations."<sup>71</sup> Moreover, the drawing together of the Northern Tier nations "should promote peace, stability, and well-being in the area." In no respect could "this natural association be deemed hostile or threatening or directed against any other nation." The statement continued:

The United States has had a longstanding interest in the territorial integrity and sovereign independence of Iran. That has been amply demonstrated in the past. That interest remains a cardinal feature of U.S. policy and assures that the United States will not waver in its demonstrated purpose to assist Iran and other free nations which are making their own determined efforts to achieve defensive strength and economic and social progress.

Ratification by the Shah was completed on October 26, 1955.

Partly as a counterweight to the pact, Syria and Egypt, on Octo-

ber 20, and Egypt and Saudi Arabia, on October 27, 1955, signed defense pacts. On November 29, Syria and Egypt established a joint command; Egypt and Saudi Arabia took a similar step on December 26.

On November 21 and 22, an organizational meeting of the Council of the Baghdad Pact was held at Baghdad. The United States was represented by Ambassador Waldemar Gallman and Adm. John H. Cassady in the capacity of observers. During the session on November 21, Ambassador Gallman reiterated U.S. approval of the treaty, indicating that the presence of observers and the intention to establish permanent political and military liaison constituted "still further evidence of the continuing interest of the U.S. in the pact and its objectives."<sup>72</sup>

### **Baghdad Pact Communiqué**

The Council welcomed the intention of the United States to establish liaison with it and to have an observer present at the organizational meeting of the economic committee. Its final communiqué also expressed appreciation of the "generous and valuable help" which the United States had extended to its members "in the provision of arms and other military equipment to enable them to strengthen their defence against aggression, and of the support and encouragement" of the United States "in their efforts to cooperate for peace." Appreciation was also expressed "for the extensive economic assistance" which had been "freely accorded by the Government of the United States." The five members of the Council reaffirmed their intention, under the Baghdad Pact and in consonance with article 51 of the United Nations Charter, "to work in full partnership with united purpose for peace and security in the Middle East, to defend their territories against aggression or subversion, and to promote the welfare and prosperity of the peoples in that region." Provision was made for a permanent organization at Baghdad.<sup>73</sup> The members agreed to appoint deputy representatives, with ambassadorial rank, to the Council, which would be in continuous session; the Foreign Ministers would meet at least once a year. A special session of the Council would be held at Tehran during April 1956.

The Council set up an economic committee "to develop and strengthen the economic and financial resources of the region."

The committee would consider the sharing of experience in the field of development and discuss problems on a regional basis with the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the World Health Organization, UNICEF, and other specialized agencies. The Council noted a British statement that the United Kingdom was ready to use its experience in the atomic energy field to assist other signatories with their projects for the peaceful application of atomic energy.<sup>74</sup>

The members of the Baghdad Pact appear to be laying a solid foundation for the development of a new regional security arrangement in the Middle East, based not merely upon military and political considerations but also upon broad economic cooperation. Shortly after their first session, Secretary Dulles noted the achievement as among the collective security arrangements forming a "worldwide political warning system," and, in his state of the Union message, President Eisenhower included the Baghdad Pact as one of the "major gains for the system of collective security" scored by the free world during 1955.<sup>75</sup>

## **Mutual Security Programs and U.S. Technical and Economic Assistance**

There was continued recognition, during the course of 1955, of the positive necessity of technical and economic assistance, especially in such underdeveloped areas as those of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. Although the Soviet Government spoke much of technical and economic assistance, particularly during 1955, it had not participated in the United Nations Technical Assistance Program, hitherto condemned as a design for colonial exploitation, until 1953 and then under restrictions and with a very small contribution.<sup>76</sup> On the contrary, the United States has long engaged, both directly and through the United Nations, its specialized agencies, and regional organizations, in constructive programs of assistance. U.S. participation is based on the realization that the maintenance of international peace and security, the preservation of the political independence and territorial integrity of states, the promotion of political stability, and the processes of orderly change are all interconnected.

The record of the United States in this field is an impressive one. Between July 1, 1945, and September 30, 1955, the total of United States grants and credits to other nations reached \$52,287,000,000, of which no less than \$41,340,000,000 was in net grants. Some \$17,248,000,000 went for economic and technical assistance, famine relief, and other urgent relief. Of these amounts, grants and credits in the Near East and Africa totaled \$4,466,000,000 the net grants reaching \$3,934,000,000 and credits \$532,000,000. In South Asia, grants and credits totaled \$548,000,000, with the net grants standing at \$280,000,000. A more detailed picture of the situation in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa as a whole may be seen from the accompanying table.<sup>77</sup>

A potentially important phase of the broad U.S. program was the initialing of a series of atoms-for-peace agreements with Turkey (May 3), Lebanon (June 2), Israel (June 3), Pakistan (June 15), and Greece (June 22). Under these agreements, the governments concerned were to receive information concerning the de-

*Summary of Net U.S. Grants and Credits in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa (1945-1955)*<sup>78</sup>

	Net Grants	Net Credits	Net Total
Greece . . . . .	\$1, 208, 000, 000	\$81, 100, 000	\$1, 289, 000, 000
Turkey . . . . .	226, 000, 000	94, 000, 000	320, 000, 000
Iran . . . . .	147, 000, 000	54, 000, 000	201, 000, 000
Egypt . . . . .	26, 000, 000	4, 000, 000	30, 000, 000
Israel . . . . .	233, 000, 000	137, 000, 000	370, 000, 000
Jordan . . . . .	25, 000, 000	. . . . .	25, 000, 000
Liberia . . . . .	6, 000, 000	19, 000, 000	25, 000, 000
Unspecified (Near East and Africa) . . . . .	189, 000, 000	-7, 000, 000	182, 000, 000
Afghanistan . . . . .	3, 000, 000	26, 000, 000	29, 000, 000
India . . . . .	116, 000, 000	228, 000, 000	344, 000, 000
Pakistan . . . . .	142, 000, 000	15, 000, 000	157, 000, 000
Unspecified (South Asia) . . . . .	19, 000, 000	. . . . .	19, 000, 000
<b>Totals by Area</b>			
Near East and Africa . . . . .	\$1, 967, 000, 000	\$532, 000, 000	\$2, 499, 000, 000
South Asia . . . . .	280, 000, 000	268, 000, 000	548, 000, 000
Near East, South Asia and Africa . . . . .	\$2, 247, 000, 000	\$800, 000, 000	\$3, 047, 000, 000

sign, construction, and operation of research reactors and their use as research, development, and engineering tools; the United States Atomic Energy Commission was to lease up to 6 kilograms (13.2 pounds) of contained U-235 in uranium enriched up to a maximum of 20 percent U-235. The agreements also provided for exchange of unclassified information in the research reactor field, and on the use of radioactive isotopes in physical and biological research, medical therapy, agriculture, and industry. The agreements would enable the countries involved to acquire valuable training and experience in nuclear science and engineering for the development of peaceful uses of atomic energy, including civilian nuclear power.<sup>79</sup>

## ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS DURING 1955

The programs of economic and technical assistance during 1955 were within the broad framework which had been elaborated over the years. As President Eisenhower explained in his foreign economic policy message to the Congress on January 10, the self-interest of the United States required "economic strength among our allies" and "economic growth in underdeveloped areas" in order to "lessen international instability growing out of the vulnerability of such areas to Communist penetration and subversion."<sup>80</sup>

President Eisenhower's theme was carried forward in his recommendations for the 1956 mutual security program, transmitted to the Congress on April 20, in which there was considerable stress on the problems of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa.<sup>81</sup> All told, the President recommended that Congress approve funds totaling \$3,530,000,000 for the mutual security program, of which \$712,500,000 was for economic programs, including \$172,000,000 for a continuation of technical cooperation programs, \$175,500,000 for special programs, and \$165,000,000 for development assistance; \$179,000,000 was to be allocated to the Middle East. In all, about \$812,500,000, or about 25 percent, was requested for nonmilitary programs. In a statement of May 5 before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Secretary Dulles declared:

International communism is pressing hard to extend its influence in Asian countries which lack the economic strength to support an adequate defense

establishment and to provide the necessary foundation of political stability and steadily improving living standards.<sup>82</sup>

Mr. Dulles was convinced that a continuation of this "investment of strength" under the mutual security program could meet the Soviet challenge.

In the end, the Congress appropriated some \$2,700,000,000 for fiscal year 1956, including \$1,700,000,000 for defense support, development assistance, technical assistance, and other programs. It may be observed that, of these funds, some \$113,700,000 was designed for defense support in the Near East and Africa, \$73,000,000 was to go for development assistance in that area, and the general authorization for technical cooperation amounted to \$127,500,000. Other items of interest were the appropriations of \$14,500,000 for the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF), some \$62,000,000 for the U.N. Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), and \$100,000,000 for the President's Fund for Asian Economic Development. For all purposes except direct military assistance, approximately \$317,000,000 was allocated to the Near East, South Asia, and Africa during 1955.<sup>83</sup>

### **Assistance to Greece, Turkey, and Iran**

Greece and Turkey had been the subject of special American assistance, designed to strengthen their defensive positions and to preserve their political independence and territorial integrity. Despite serious difficulties between Greece and Turkey concerning Cyprus, Greek and Turkish armed forces continued to constitute an essential element in the Western defense system. Both were members of NATO and the Balkan Alliance, and Turkey was a signatory of the Baghdad Pact (1955).

Among the noteworthy undertakings for strengthening the Greek economy was an electric power project, which provided Greece for the first time with a unified electric power generating and grid system, more than doubling the prewar output.<sup>84</sup> It was announced on June 24 that new aid totaling \$19,200,000, partly in the form of a loan, had been made available to Greece to help meet the economic pressures arising from earthquake damage.<sup>85</sup>

The United States also continued to assist Turkey during 1955. Under an agreement of November 1954, supplemented on April

28, 1955,<sup>86</sup> \$29 million worth of American surplus agricultural products was to be shipped to Turkey, in view of a crop failure and diminished foreign exchange, the effects of which were felt during 1955. In order not to jeopardize either Turkey's military position or its achievements under the program since 1950, the United States agreed in June to increase the defense-support program in fiscal 1955 from \$70 million to \$100 million, the additional \$30 million to assist Turkey during the emergency period and to provide for imports of raw materials, basic commodities, and spare parts for its industrial establishment.

It was announced on January 17, 1956, that, at the request of the United States and the Republic of Turkey, Clarence B. Randall, the eminent industrialist and special consultant to President Eisenhower on foreign economic policy, had agreed to visit Turkey late in January to discuss economic problems of interest to both countries. It was expected that Mr. Randall's visit would greatly contribute to the further development of American-Turkish economic relations and to the advancement of mutual understanding in this realm.<sup>87</sup>

Although the oil settlement of October 1954 had started the flow of substantial oil revenues to Iran by 1955, financial assistance was still necessary to meet urgent needs. The Foreign Operations Administration (now the International Cooperation Administration), for example, made a loan of \$32 million for defense purposes, government employee payrolls, and other expenses. There was increasing evidence of the success of technical assistance in Iran during 1955. A program for the control of malaria had been launched 4 years before by U.S. health technicians; by 1955, the Iranians themselves were carrying on most of the work. Similarly, U.S. technicians had taught the techniques of livestock cross-breeding to Ministry of Agriculture employees, who in turn were spreading the knowledge to rural areas. A teacher-training program was now being carried out by the Ministry of Education, involving some 12,000 teachers, or about 40 percent of the Iranian teaching staff. There was also progress in the field of public administration, and an Institute of Administrative Affairs was opened at the University of Tehran in January 1955.<sup>88</sup>

## Assistance to the Middle East

The United States has also engaged in significant development projects in the Middle East. In the case of Egypt, which had initiated a comprehensive 10-year economic development program, for example, the United States made available a total of \$40 million in development assistance during fiscal year 1955, and, in addition, \$2 million was allocated for technical cooperation. The American program stressed, among other things, railway and highway improvement. A loan agreement provided for repayment of \$7 million of the \$40 million, and, as its share of the cost of the projects, Egypt was to spend the equivalent of \$43 million from its resources.

In addition, the United States, together with the United Kingdom and other countries, was much interested in the project for the construction of the High Aswan Dam on the Nile River, both for hydroelectric and for irrigation purposes, the total cost of which, over a 20-year period, was estimated at some \$1 billion. During a visit to the United States by the Egyptian Minister of Finance, Abdel Moneim El Kaisouni, the problem of the dam was discussed, and on December 17, 1955, it was announced that the United States and the United Kingdom had assured the Egyptian Government of their support of the project, "which would be of inestimable importance in the development of the Egyptian economy and in the improvement of the welfare of the Egyptian people." The assistance was to take the form of grants toward defraying foreign exchange costs of the initial stages of the construction, involving the coffer dam, the foundations for the primary dam, and auxiliary work. Assurance was also given, subject to legislative authority, that the United States and the United Kingdom were prepared "to consider sympathetically in the light of then existing circumstances further support toward financing the later stages to supplement World Bank financing."<sup>29</sup>

The problem of assistance to Iraq differed from that of aid to Egypt both because of the former's signature of the Baghdad Pact and because of its oil revenues of about \$140 million a year. However, the United States has assisted in developing Iraqi military potential under the mutual defense agreement of 1954.

The primary key to Iraqi development lies in harnessing the waters of the Tigris-Euphrates river system; construction is now

under way on a series of dams. Iraq initiated its second Five-Year Plan on April 1, 1955, and the Iraqi Development Board proposed that the equivalent of some \$800 million be made available from petroleum to finance the program, much of the emphasis of which was on projects to raise living standards. Under the technical cooperation program in Iraq an agricultural college was established at Abu Ghraib with the assistance of technicians from the University of Arizona, while the Technical Institute at Baghdad was established with similar assistance from the Bradley Institute of Technology.

With its limited resources and the presence of some 450,000 Arab refugees from Palestine, Jordan continued to be confronted with serious economic problems. During 1955 the United States made \$5 million available to the Jordanian development program, \$3.6 million of it in the form of local currency purchased with pounds sterling generated from the sale of American coal to the United Kingdom. The assistance took the form of road construction, afforestation, and waterspreading activities; some 50 miles of roads were completed, about 5,000 acres of formerly unproductive land were brought under cultivation, and many thousands of new trees were planted. Some \$2,200,000 was provided for technical cooperation, with projects in agriculture, natural resources, health, and education. Nineteen agricultural centers serving 300 villages are now in operation in Jordan. Sound beginnings have been made in education, and about 100 Jordanian trainees in the field of education have been sent abroad.<sup>99</sup>

During 1955, a large part of the program in Lebanon was designed to assist in improving the Lebanese road system, in view of its importance to the country's economic development. An agreement in June 1955 provided for \$5,700,000 to help finance construction of a modern highway from Beirut to the Syrian border, connecting with the road to Damascus, one of the important highways in the Middle East. While the Lebanese Government was to pay the major cost, \$5 million of American assistance was to be in the form of a 15-year loan at 3 percent, which the Lebanese Government has not yet taken up. The remaining \$700,000 was to be used to purchase American road-building equipment and to finance an engineering survey by an American firm. Other forms of assistance included provision of \$1.4 million for improved agricultural equipment, the establishment of 30 agricultural extension

offices under the guidance of American extension specialists, the establishment of the Lebanon Industry Institute, and the setting up of the National Litani Board for the development of the Litani River.<sup>91</sup>

The United States also continued to support the program of assistance to Arab refugees under UNRWA. Some 900,000 refugees were involved, about 300,000 of whom were completely supported by UNRWA in camps, while the rest received both food rations and basic medical services, at an average cost of \$28 per annum.<sup>92</sup> It is partly in connection with the refugee problem that the United States has sought to promote the development of the Jordan River Valley, which would permit the irrigation of some 225,000 acres of land in Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Israel and make possible eventual settlement of some 200,000 refugees.

At the same time, the United States continued its assistance to Israel, with special attention to programs for orderly industrial development. The program for 1955 centered on projects designed to make maximum use of local raw materials, without neglecting agriculture.<sup>93</sup> On April 29 an agreement was signed with Israel providing for the sale of \$8.3 million worth of surplus commodities, including 50,000 metric tons of wheat and 40,000 metric tons of feed grains. The Israeli pounds derived from the purchase of these commodities were to be used for various purposes, including American expenditures in Israel; some were to be loaned for the purpose of economic development in Israel.<sup>94</sup>

Neither Yemen nor Saudi Arabia received economic or technical assistance during 1955 from the United States. By 1954, however, Saudi Arabia was receiving royalties from the Arabian American Oil Company at the rate of about \$260 million annually. As President Eisenhower declared on August 11, 1955, when receiving the credentials of Saudi Arabian Ambassador Sheikh Abdullah al-Khayall, "from the earliest years of our country, traders, doctors, and educators have gone [to the Middle East] to contribute, through their careers, to the growth and development of the area."<sup>95</sup>

On November 22, it was announced that Yemen had granted a concession to the Yemen Development Corporation, the first oil and mineral concession in the history of the country. The 30-year agreement provided for exclusive exploration and development rights over 40,000 square miles, or the northern two-thirds

of the country, with the exception of the narrow coastal strip (Tihana). All net profits were to be divided equally, but the agreement could be voided if commercial quantities either of petroleum or minerals were not found within 6 years.

## Assistance in Africa

Among the projects of economic and technical assistance in Africa, examples may be cited from Liberia, Ethiopia, and Libya. Classes began in the new Booker T. Washington Institute in Liberia during August 1955. The project was launched under a contract with Prairie View (Texas) Agricultural and Mechanical College, which provided assistance in improving teaching methods and planning an educational curriculum. A project for demonstrating the techniques of growing swamp rice was completed in 1955, with the results disseminated in many parts of Liberia through an agricultural extension system organized with American assistance.

A joint Ethiopian-American educational commission made a thorough examination of Ethiopian educational needs, through the technical assistance program. The educational program in agriculture and the mechanical arts was already showing results in Ethiopia. The 3-year-old Jimma Agricultural Secondary School and the Handicraft School at Addis Ababa, were financed entirely by the Ethiopian Government, except for the cost of American technicians. In addition, an apprentice trade school was established at Addis Ababa by technicians from the Oklahoma Agricultural and Mechanical College, as part of a program for developing agricultural and mechanical training. On October 3 the Export-Import Bank announced that it would establish a \$24 million credit in Ethiopia's favor for the development of commercial airfields and aviation facilities throughout the country.<sup>95</sup>

On presenting his credentials as Ambassador, Sayyid Siddiq Muntasser, on May 6, 1955, noted that the Libyan people had placed much trust in the friendship of the United States and recalled the role which the United States had played during the consideration of the future of Libya in the United Nations. Ambassador Muntasser also noted that the decision to recognize the legitimate right of self-determination had been made on American soil.

But independence had not solved all problems, and Libya still counted on the assistance of the United States to overcome some of its difficulties to insure its complete independence in all fields. President Eisenhower replied that he was aware of the complex problems facing Libya and indicated that the United States was "deeply sympathetic" with the efforts which were being made to raise Libyan standards of living.<sup>97</sup>

The Libyan-American Reconstruction Commission, with an American as executive director, was established to help supervise American economic assistance. Under a revised technical assistance agreement, projects were being integrated within Libyan government departments to pave the way for Libya to assume greater responsibility for project activities. Preventive and other public health services were introduced by the Libyan-American Joint Service in Public Health.

The International Cooperation Administration announced on August 1 that it would ship 6,800 tons of surplus American wheat to Libya in an emergency move to relieve distress occasioned by a poor grain harvest, and on September 2 a further agreement was signed covering an additional grant of 6,000 tons and bringing to 45,000 tons the total of wheat shipments authorized over a period of some 20 months.<sup>98</sup>

## Assistance in South Asia

In South Asia, where the Soviet Union made considerable propaganda with large offers of assistance during the fall of 1955, the United States had long been active under the United Nations and its own bilateral programs.

Both military and economic assistance has been rendered to Pakistan, which has taken a firm position on the side of the free world, within the framework both of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the Baghdad Pact. In the 6 years ending on June 30, 1955, the United States provided Pakistan with some \$361,850,000 in economic assistance. Because of its urgent need for assistance, some \$71.8 million—\$20 million on a loan basis—was provided during fiscal year 1955, of which \$40 million was for commodity imports. The program also included \$20 million for defense support, \$5.5 million for flood relief, \$5.3 million for tech-

nical assistance projects, and \$1 million for freight costs in ocean transport of surplus agricultural commodities.

The technical assistance program in Pakistan during 1955 included projects directed toward improvement of transportation and industry. Among other things, Pakistan International Airlines and Pan American World Airways signed an agreement in May providing for American technical assistance in expanding Pakistan's air transportation system, and a group of American technicians assisted in this work. American technicians also cooperated in agricultural production, land reclamation, public health, vocational education, and the community development program. The United States assisted in designing a multipurpose hydroelectric dam to be constructed on the Karnaphuli River in East Pakistan, electric power from which will stimulate industrial development and also contribute to flood control and irrigation. In May the United States and Pakistan signed an agreement making possible guaranties for private investments in Pakistan, designed to encourage private industry.<sup>99</sup>

During the latter part of 1955, India was visited by Premier Nikolai Bulganin and Party Secretary Nikita Khrushchev and also received tantalizing offers of Soviet economic and technical assistance.<sup>100</sup> The United States, for its part, had long engaged in programs of economic and technical assistance in India. Indeed, since 1951, the United States had provided India with gross assistance totaling more than \$500 million, divided almost equally between grants and loans. In all there were more than 50 joint projects, toward the completion of which India was contributing about \$400 million. In addition, American foundations and voluntary agencies have contributed some \$48 million to various projects in India.

While the problems with regard to India were complicated, results were already evident in a number of fields, involving both agriculture and industry. During fiscal year 1955, the United States allocated \$84.3 million to Indian projects, of which \$45 million was on a loan basis. Of \$69.1 million in development assistance funds made available during 1955, \$30 million was programmed for cotton and wheat purchases in the United States; the rupees acquired by the United States from these purchases were part of the \$45 million loan and were to be utilized for the development of power, river valley projects, and other joint projects.

Technical assistance projects continued to stress community development and increased agricultural production. Contracts were negotiated with five American universities and colleges for technical support to several Indian states and agricultural institutions. A village water supply and sanitation system was inaugurated and attention given to small irrigation projects, soil conservation, and farm management. The University of Tennessee was to assist Indian women's colleges in home economics; the University of Texas was to cooperate in the establishment of teacher-training institutions in the field of secondary education.

There were also other forms of assistance. Up to June 1955, for example, some \$38,875,000 had been earmarked for the purchase of railway rolling stock and locomotives, and early in September 450 freight cars were received under the American aid program. On October 4 the United States and India announced an exchange of notes covering the extension of emergency assistance totaling \$4.7 million in the form of 10,000 tons of wheat and 10,000 tons of rice from the stocks of the Commodity Credit Corporation to help relieve victims of flood disaster in northeast India.<sup>101</sup> On January 5, 1956, the fourth anniversary of the assistance program in India, a new agreement was signed, providing \$10 million for importation of 100,000 tons of steel and 6,000 tons of DDT for malaria control.<sup>102</sup>

During the Bulganin-Khrushchev visit to Afghanistan in December 1955, much was made of the announcement of a \$100-million Soviet loan to Afghanistan and of the reaffirmation of Afghanistan's "neutral" policy.<sup>103</sup> On the other hand, the United States has endeavored over the years, although on a relatively small scale, to assist Afghanistan in a variety of ways. Through the Export-Import Bank, loans totaling \$39,500,000 were made for the multipurpose Helmand Valley project for irrigation, flood control, and power development. In addition, some \$4 million had been granted in the form of technical assistance.

During 1955 stress continued to be placed on the Helmand River project, and a group of American experts assisted in such technical projects as engineering, agriculture, health and sanitation, community development, and public administration. Moreover, under contract with the Foreign Operations Administration, Columbia University Teachers College sent a group of four specialists to Kabul to assist the Ministry of Education in teacher training and general education. The University of Wyoming sent 23 specialists

to assist in technical education and agriculture; helped in the establishment of the Afghanistan Institute of Applied Science, with two subsidiary schools, the Afghan Institute of Technology and the Vocational Agricultural School; and aided the Ministry of Agriculture in research and demonstration. The Near East Foundation, long experienced in such matters, assisted in a project for community development in Afghan villages.

Work in Nepal during 1955 looked primarily toward reparation of flood devastation, and a project for reclamation in the Rapti Valley, where an area of some 130,000 acres was to be opened for resettlement, was undertaken. The village improvement program involved six development centers, which have trained more than 175 Nepalese to demonstrate more effective use of insecticides, fertilizers, and farm implements. Assistance was also given in the field of public health. The University of Oregon assisted in an educational project, under which more than 100 villagers were trained as teachers to work in schools throughout Nepal. Since 1951 approximately \$6 million in U.S. aid has gone to Nepal, including \$1.5 million in flood relief.

## **EXPORT-IMPORT BANK LOANS**

Even before the inauguration of the American program for technical and economic assistance, the Export-Import Bank of Washington had authorized a number of loans in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa for the economic development of countries in that area. By July 1, 1955, these loans were substantially as shown in the accompanying table.

*Export-Import Bank Loans, 1945-1955* <sup>104</sup>

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Country	Date	Authorized Credit	Purpose
Egypt			
Fertilizer and Chemical Industries of Egypt.	7/16/47	\$7, 250, 000	Construction of fertilizer plant
Egyptian Spinners (Barclays Bank D. C. O.).	5/6/55	60, 000	Textile equipment (Whitin Machine Works)
United Spinning and Weaving Co., S. A. E.	6/13/55	25, 000	Textile equipment (Whitin Machine Works)
Total . . . . .		\$7, 335, 000	
Greece			
Kingdom of Greece . . . . .	1/9/46	\$25, 000, 000	U. S. products and services. Some \$10,436,- 687.39 cancelled
Kingdom of Greece . . . . .	6/13/55	300, 000	Crawler tractors with angle-dozers and motor graders
Piraiki-Patraiki Industrie de Coton, S. A.	12/16/54	625, 000	Textile machinery
Total . . . . .		\$25, 925, 000	
Iran			
Government of Iran . . . . .	11/11/54	\$53, 000, 000	Economic development

## Israel

State of Israel . . . . .	1/19/49	\$70,000,000	Agricultural production
State of Israel . . . . .	3/9/49	9,535,243	Transportation. Some \$544.52 cancelled
State of Israel . . . . .	3/16/49	25,000,000	Housing materials
State of Israel . . . . .	3/23/49	5,000,000	Telecommunications equipment. Some \$1,256.10 cancelled
State of Israel . . . . .	9/7/49	5,464,757	Development of ports
State of Israel . . . . .	10/26/49	20,000,000	
Total . . . . .		\$135,000,000	

## Saudi Arabia

Kingdom of Saudi Arabia . . . . .	1/3/46	\$25,000,000	Raw materials and equipment. Some \$15,000,000 cancelled
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia . . . . .	7/20/50	15,000,000	Public works and development projects. Some \$10,232,483.60 cancelled
Total . . . . .		\$40,000,000	

## Turkey

Sumer Bank (Republic of Turkey) . . .	10/13/48	\$417,584.33	(International General Electric Co.)
Republic of Turkey . . . . .	1/26/46	431,263.64	State seaways and harbors
Etibank (Republic of Turkey) . . . . .	3/16/49	104,000	Ingersoll Rand Co.
Republic of Turkey . . . . .	5/25/49	3,750,000	State railways. Some \$37,155.58 cancelled
Republic of Turkey . . . . .	5/25/49	4,250,000	State seaways and harbors
Republic of Turkey . . . . .	11/19/54	500,000	State seaways and harbors
Republic of Turkey . . . . .	8/31/49	999,524.92	U.S. rails and accessories

*Export-Import Bank Loans, 1945-1955* <sup>104</sup>—Continued

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Country	Date	Authorized Credit	Purpose
Turkey—Continued			
Etibank (Republic of Turkey). . . . .	9/28/49	\$500,000	Earth-moving equipment
Etibank (Republic of Turkey). . . . .	3/17/55	785,000	Materials, equipment and service for coal washing plant (McNally Pittsburg Mfg. Corp.)
Republic of Turkey. . . . .	11/26/47	8,000,000	Reconversion of vessels. Some \$819.74 cancelled
Republic of Turkey. . . . .	11/4/54	4,235,000	Equipment, storage and handling of grain (Colombian Steel Tank Co.)
Cukurova Itholat ve Ithracat, T. A. O. .	1/6/55	1,020,000	Spare parts for tractors (Caterpillar Tractor Co.). Some \$1,020,000 cancelled
Total. . . . .		\$24,992,372.89	
Afghanistan			
Royal Government of Afghanistan. . . . .	11/23/49	\$21,000,000	Construction of dam and canal
Royal Government of Afghanistan. . . . .	4/29/54	18,500,000	Helmand River Valley Development
Total. . . . .		\$39,500,000	
Ethiopia			
Ethiopian Empire . . . . .	6/22/50	\$1,000,000	Aircraft and spare parts. Some \$27,731.82 cancelled

Ethiopian Empire . . . . .	7/10/46	2,000,000	Communication equipment and industrial machinery. Some \$250,027.57 cancelled
Total. . . . .		\$3,000,000	
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Liberia			
Republic of Liberia. . . . .	1/11/51	\$5,000,000	Highway improvement and construction
Republic of Liberia. . . . .	6/14/51	1,350,000	Water supply and sewerage system
Republic of Liberia. . . . .	1/20/55	15,000,000	Highway construction projects
Total. . . . .		\$21,350,000	

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*Loans of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1949-1955* <sup>110</sup>

Country	Date	Original Amount	Purpose
Ceylon . . . . .	7/9/54	\$19,110,000	Electrical power development
India . . . . .	8/18/49	34,000,000	Railway rehabilitation. Some \$1,200,000 cancelled or refunded
	9/29/49	10,000,000	Agricultural development. Some \$2,796,187 cancelled or refunded
	4/18/50	18,500,000	Electric power development. Some \$690,000 cancelled or refunded
	1/23/53	19,500,000	Electric power development, flood control and irrigation. Some \$9,000,000 cancelled or refunded
India (Guarantor)			
Indian Iron & Steel Company . . .	12/18/52	31,500,000	Expansion of iron and steel production facilities
Tata Hydro, Andhra and Tata Power Companies	11/19/54	16,200,000	Electric power development
India (Guarantor)			
Industrial Credit and Investment Corp. of India	3/14/55	10,000,000	Foreign exchange for development of private industry
Iraq . . . . .	6/15/50	12,800,000	Construction of a flood control project. Some \$6,506,054 cancelled or refunded
Lebanon (Guarantor)			
Litani River Authority . . . . .	8/25/55	27,000,000	Electric power development and irrigation

Pakistan (Guarantor)				
Sui Gas Transmission Co . . . . .	6/2/54	14,000,000	Construction of natural gas transmission line	
Karachi Electric Supply Corporation, Ltd	6/20/55	13,800,000	Electric power development	
Karnaphuli Paper Mills, Ltd . . . . .	8/4/55	4,200,000	Construction of paper and pulp mill	
Trustees of the Port of Karachi . . . . .	8/4/55	14,800,000	Port construction and development	
Turkey . . . . .	7/7/50	3,900,000	Construction of grain storage facilities	
First Tranche . . . . .	7/7/50	12,500,000	Port construction and development	
Second Tranche . . . . .	2/26/54	3,800,000	Port construction and development	
	6/18/52	25,200,000	Electric power development, irrigation and flood control. Some \$2,356,000 cancelled or refunded	
Turkey (Guarantor)				
Industrial Development Bank of Turkey .	10/19/50	9,000,000	Foreign exchange for development of private industry	
Industrial Development Bank of Turkey .	9/10/53	9,000,000	Foreign exchange for development of private industry	
Ethiopia . . . . .	9/13/50	5,000,000	Highway rehabilitation	
	9/13/50	2,000,000	Foreign exchange for Development Bank	
	2/19/51	1,500,000	Rehabilitation and extension of telephone and telegraph systems	
Total . . . . .		\$317,310,000		

## **U.S. SUPPORT FOR U.N. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS**

The United States continued during 1955 to contribute in major degree to United Nations programs of technical assistance, many of which were concentrated in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa.<sup>105</sup> It also maintained its contributions to various United Nations agencies such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and UNICEF which have given basic assistance to underdeveloped areas in a wide variety of ways.<sup>106</sup>

The United States on December 5, 1955, completed the action required for membership in the International Finance Corporation, established under Resolution 823 (IX) of the General Assembly.<sup>107</sup> This country, as in the past, made a large contribution to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which assisted in a number of development programs in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. By June 30, 1955, out of an authorized capital of \$10,000,000,000, some \$9,028,000,000 had been subscribed.<sup>108</sup> The United States had subscribed \$635,000,000, with 31,750 shares in the amount of \$3,175,000,000. By September 30, 1955, effective loans reached \$1,837,262,494, of which \$317,310,000, as illustrated in the table above, were for development purposes in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa. A development survey was completed in Syria during 1955 and one was organized in Jordan.<sup>109</sup>

## **REFLECTIONS OF UNITED STATES POLICY**

That the United States continued to look upon the problems of stability and security in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa from a broadly based point of view, and that it was prepared to meet the new challenges which had arisen, was indicated by a number of developments toward the end of 1955 and the beginning of 1956. The American attitude was reflected in the unanimous view of the United States delegation to the Tenth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations that economic and social questions were "assuming increasing importance on the

international scene" and had moved to the forefront in "the struggle between Communism and freedom," particularly since the Soviet Union was using "economic and social collaboration as a means for jumping military as well as political barriers," as in India, Egypt, and Burma, for example. The delegation believed that the United States should counter the Soviet efforts, not by outbidding it in sheer amounts of economic assistance but "by making newly independent and newly articulate peoples feel that they can best satisfy their wants by becoming and remaining part of the community of free nations." The delegation warned that the United States was "in a contest in the field of economic development of underdeveloped countries which is bitterly competitive" and that defeat in this contest "could be as disastrous as defeat in an armaments race."<sup>111</sup>

President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles endorsed these views. Mr. Dulles had already declared, on December 20, that the United States sought no monopoly in the field of economic assistance and welcomed "any grant of economic aid" which invigorated less developed countries and made them more independent, as had been the aim of American policy since the Second World War. Not one country had "lost any particle of freedom or independence" as a result of American assistance. Mr. Dulles hoped that Soviet assistance was "not offered as a Trojan horse to penetrate, and then take over, independent countries"; he felt that the experienced statesmen of the areas concerned were well aware of the dangers.<sup>112</sup>

President Eisenhower sounded a similar note in his state of the Union message on January 5, 1956, declaring that the mutual security program must be sustained and fortified and noting that "because the conditions of poverty and unrest in less developed areas make their people a special target of international communism, there is a need to help them achieve the economic growth and stability necessary to preserve their independence against Communist threats and enticements."<sup>113</sup>

## The Outlook in United States Policy

Such were the major developments in United States policy during 1955. As the year drew to a close and another dawned, it

was clear that the problems were as manifold, complex, and persistent as they had been in the past and that there were no simple or easy solutions to any of them. There was a recognition of the basic elements in the situation in the discussions between Prime Minister Eden and President Eisenhower, January 30 to February 1, 1956, in which the problems of the Near East, South Asia, and Africa were both broadly and specifically discussed.

It was agreed that every effort should be made to reduce the sources of misunderstanding between the Middle Eastern nations, whose peoples should be helped to achieve "their legitimate aspirations." Similarly, an Arab-Israel settlement was considered urgent, but possible only if both sides were "willing to reconcile the positions" hitherto taken. The United States and the United Kingdom reiterated their willingness to contribute to a settlement through financial assistance on the Arab refugee problem and guaranties of "agreed frontiers," reaffirmed the Tripartite Declaration of May 25, 1950, and announced arrangements for discussions, with French participation, as to "the nature of the action" to be taken in the event of violence. It was also clear that security in the Middle East could not rest upon arms alone but must be based on the establishment of good neighborly relations. Soviet policy in arms supplies to Middle Eastern countries was viewed as adding to the tensions and increasing the risk of war—a risk which the United States and the United Kingdom desired to mitigate. In that interest they fully supported the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization and were ready favorably to consider "recommendations for any necessary enlargement . . . and improvement of its capabilities." They were also agreed concerning the significance of the Baghdad Pact, and the United States indicated that it would "continue to give solid support to the purposes . . . of the Pact" and that its observers would "play a constructive part in the work of its committees." The belief was expressed that difficulties in Arabia and the region of the Persian Gulf could be solved through "friendly discussions."

The Declaration of Washington, which emanated from these discussions, reaffirmed the goal of self-government and independence of "all countries whose people desire and are capable of sustaining an independent existence" and noted that, in striking contrast to the Soviet record in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, 600 million people "in nearly a score of lands" had attained nation-

hood since World War II with American and British assistance and that many more millions were "being helped surely and steadily toward self-government." Since political independence alone was insufficient, the need for technical and economic assistance was recognized, and it was stressed, again in contrast to Soviet aggrandizement, that the United Kingdom and the United States had "not sought nor desired extension of either economic or political power." It was also pointed out that Soviet aims had not changed, that "military and political force" had been used in the past, and that now "economic inducements" had been added to the "methods of penetration." There were a warning lest under-developed nations lose their independence through "threat, promise or enticement" and a notice that some 50 nations which cherished their freedom had "drawn together in voluntary associations for their collective security."<sup>114</sup>

The policy of the United States was reconfirmed both generally and specifically on a number of occasions in the period immediately following the Anglo-American discussions, whether with regard to North Africa, Middle East security and the shipment of arms, South Asia, the Soviet challenge in the area, or the problems of economic development. Secretary Dulles suggested to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 24, 1956, that Israel's security could be better assured, in the long run, through measures—including reliance on the United Nations—other than the acquisition of additional arms in circumstances which might "exacerbate the situation." He did not exclude the possibility, however, of arms shipments, either to Israel or to the Arab States, at a time when it would "preserve the peace."<sup>115</sup>

President Eisenhower reiterated this position at his news conferences on March 7 and 15, emphasizing that the United States was trying to avoid the initiation of an arms race in the Middle East, stressing the need for action under the United Nations and for the avoidance of incidents, and noting continued adherence to the Tripartite Declaration of May 1950. At the same time, the President indicated that the conflict between the Communist and the free worlds was now undergoing a "very great broadening" into the economic and political fields, a very serious development which demanded "flexibility" in the American foreign assistance program.<sup>116</sup>

## FOOTNOTES

<sup>1</sup> For background, see Harry N. Howard, "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, 1945-1951," BULLETIN of Nov. 19, 1951, p. 809, and Nov. 26, 1951, p. 839; "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa, 1951-1952," *ibid.*, Dec. 8, 1952, p. 891, and Dec. 15, 1952, p. 936 (also available as Department of State publication 4851); "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1953," *ibid.*, Feb. 22, 1954, p. 274, Mar. 1, 1954, p. 328, and Mar. 8, 1954, p. 365; and "The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1954," *ibid.*, Feb. 14, 1955, p. 256, Feb. 21, 1955, p. 301, and Feb. 28, 1955, p. 338 (also available as Department of State publication 5801).

<sup>2</sup> Recent Soviet actions called to mind the position of the Soviet Union in November 1940 that "the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf" be "recognized as the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." See *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941* (Department of State publication 3023), pp. 217-258; also, H. N. Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union and Turkey During World War II," BULLETIN of July 18, 1948, pp. 63-78.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1047.

<sup>4</sup> U.N. doc. A/2911, *Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 1 July 1954-15 June 1955*, pp. xi-xvi.

<sup>5</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 523.

<sup>6</sup> U.N. doc. A/PV. 520, pp. 44-52.

<sup>7</sup> For text, see Embassy of Indonesia, Washington, D. C., *Report on Indonesia*, Vol. VI, No. 9 (June 1955), p. 30.

<sup>8</sup> U.N. docs. A/2923/Add. 1, A/2924/Add. 1, and S/3414.

<sup>9</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 28, 1955, p. 894.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1040.

On Jan. 26, 1956, the Department of State announced its intention to request congressional action to end U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction in Morocco. The rights had been accorded in 1787 and renewed in 1836. In the light of progress being made by France and Morocco "in working out their future relationships," the United States considered it appropriate to modernize its own treaty relationship with Morocco with regard to extraterritorial rights (BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 204).

On Mar. 2, 1956, France and Morocco signed an agreement virtually ending the 1912 protectorate, and France confirmed its recognition of Moroccan independence; see BULLETIN of Mar. 19, 1956, p. 466.

<sup>11</sup> U.N. doc. A/PV. 530, pp. 193-6. For "Basic Factors on Algeria," see *Ambassade de France, Service de Presse et d'Information*, No. 24 (November 1955). For Ambassador Lodge's statement of Sept. 22 in the General Committee, see *BULLETIN* of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 546.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 992.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Aug. 22, 1955, p. 301.

<sup>14</sup> For brief background, see H. N. Howard, *The Development of United States Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa During 1954*.

<sup>15</sup> See British Information Services, *Eastern Mediterranean: Proposed Conference*, T. 23 (July 1, 1955); *Cyprus—A New British Initiative* (August 1955), pp. 8-10.

<sup>16</sup> See the United Kingdom, *The Tripartite Conference on the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus held by the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Greece and Turkey, London, August 29-September 7, 1955*. Cmd. 9596.

<sup>17</sup> For certain aspects of the Greek case, see Royal Greek Embassy Information Services (Washington), *Cyprus Demands Self-Determination* (1954) and *British Views on Cyprus* (1955).

<sup>18</sup> Turkish Information Office (New York), *Turkish Views on Cyprus* (1955).

<sup>19</sup> *BULLETIN* of Sept. 26, 1955, p. 496.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1955, p. 560.

<sup>21</sup> U.N. doc. A/BUR/SR. 102, pp. 2-3.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

<sup>23</sup> *BULLETIN* of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 545.

<sup>24</sup> For the discussion as a whole, see U.N. doc. A/PV. 521, pp. 53-65.

<sup>25</sup> See also the statements of Foreign Secretary Macmillan on Dec. 5, 1955, and of Field Marshal Sir John Harding, the Governor of Cyprus, Jan. 1, 1956, in British Information Services, T. 53 (Dec. 6, 1955) and T. 1 (Jan. 10, 1956).

After 5 months of direct negotiation with the Cypriots, the British Government announced on Mar. 3, 1956, that it had failed to reach agreement on the character of an amnesty, the responsibility for public security, and the composition of an elected majority in the Assembly; the principle of self-determination had not been under discussion.

<sup>26</sup> *BULLETIN* of Sept. 5, 1955, p. 378.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 3, 1955, p. 523. See also the remarks of Ambassador Eban in the General Assembly on Oct. 3 in U.N. doc. A/PV. 532, pp. 215-19.

<sup>28</sup> *BULLETIN* of Oct. 10, 1955, p. 560.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 17, 1955, p. 604.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 31, 1955, p. 688. See also the address of Assistant Secretary Allen before the New York *Herald Tribune* Forum on Oct. 17, 1955, *ibid.*, p. 683.

<sup>31</sup> On Oct. 24 the Knesset approved a resolution expressing its anxiety concerning the arms shipment to Egypt and the continued arming of Iraq and other Arab States.

<sup>32</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1955, p. 845.

<sup>33</sup> For text of this address, made at the Lord Mayor's banquet, see British Information Services, T. 48 (Nov. 10, 1955).

<sup>34</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 28, 1955, p. 894.

<sup>35</sup> On Nov. 10 the Department announced that it had "let it be known that we would be strongly opposed to the side which starts a war and would be very favorably disposed to the side which convinces us that it desires to maintain peace."

<sup>36</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1009. Foreign Secretary Macmillan told the House of Commons on Dec. 12 that the Soviet Union was doing everything possible to make the problems of the Middle East "utterly insoluble."

<sup>37</sup> For a map of Israel showing boundary and demarcation lines, see *ibid.*, Feb. 21, 1955, p. 303.

<sup>38</sup> One serious incident occurred on the Israel-Lebanese demarcation line on Sept. 22; an armed gang attacked a bus, killing three persons and wounding nine, one of whom was an American citizen.

<sup>39</sup> See, for example, the Israel complaint of Sept. 27, 1955 (U.N. doc. S/3442).

<sup>40</sup> For U.S. statement and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Apr. 18, 1955, p. 659 and p. 661.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 662; U.N. docs. S/3373 and S/PV. 693.

<sup>42</sup> U.N. doc. S/3990.

<sup>43</sup> BULLETIN of June 20, 1955, p. 1016.

<sup>44</sup> See U.N. docs. S/3425, 3426, 3427, 3428, 3430, 3431, 3433.

<sup>45</sup> For U.S. statement and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 458.

<sup>46</sup> See also Israel protests of Nov. 1 and 8, 1955, and Mar. 13, 1956. (U.N. docs. S/3454, 3456, 3559).

<sup>47</sup> BULLETIN of Nov. 14, 1955, p. 786.

<sup>48</sup> Of the disturbances during the first 10 months of 1955 for which responsibility has so far been determined, Egypt was held responsible by the UNTSO for some 30 incidents, in which 4 Egyptians and 16 Israelis were killed and 4 Egyptians and 59 Israelis were wounded, while Israel was held responsible for 21 incidents, in which 47 Egyptians and 9 Israelis were killed and 45 Egyptians and 13 Israelis wounded.

<sup>49</sup> During the first 10 months of 1955 there appear to have been 12 incidents for which Israel was held responsible, in which 4 Jordanians and 3 Israelis were wounded. Jordan was held responsible for 18 incidents, in which 8 Jordanians and 6 Israelis were killed and 1 Jordanian and 13 Israelis wounded.

<sup>50</sup> See also U.N. docs. S/3448 and 3451.

<sup>51</sup> U.N. doc. S/3516 and Add. 1, Corr. 1. According to official Israel estimates, during the first 6 months of 1954 Israel casualties in clashes on the Sea of Galilee totaled 2 killed and 7 wounded. At least 25 incidents were reported in the first 10 months of 1955 "causing loss of life and property," but without specification. Most of the clashes occurred when Syrian

military outposts dominating the corner of the sea opened fire to defend Arab fishermen threatened by Israel police patrols or to interfere with Israel shipping. On the other hand, according to the UNTSO, Israel complaints concerning incidents in 1954 reached 14, involving 2 killed and 8 wounded, while there were 24 complaints in 1955, with no casualties. Again according to UNTSO, there were 14 Syrian complaints during 1954, involving 5 killed and 6 wounded; in 1955 there were 26 complaints involving two wounded.

On Mar. 4 there was an incident on the Sea of Galilee involving Syrian forces and Israel police; 4 of the latter were killed (U.N. docs. S/3554, 3555, and 3558).

<sup>52</sup> U.N. doc. S/3514.

<sup>53</sup> Ambassador Eban made a spirited defense of Israel on Jan. 17, among other things charging that, as a result of "acts of aggression organized on the responsibility of Arab Governments," some 884 Israelis had been killed or maimed since 1951 (U.N. doc. S/PV. 713, p. 36).

<sup>54</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 183.

<sup>55</sup> For the discussions, see U.N. docs. S/PV. 707-715; for various drafts of the resolution, see U.N. docs. S/3519, 3528, 3530 and Revs. 1-2, S/3532, S/3536, and S/3537. See also the Israel memoranda of Dec. 21 and 29, 1955 (U.N. docs. S/3518, 3524). Although the Council recognized some provocation, all members felt that Israel's action was out of all proportion to the provocation; as Ambassador Lodge declared on Jan. 12, 1956, it could not "be accurately described as a retaliatory raid." Ambassador Lodge added, "The Security Council must do more than condemn. It must warn the Government of Israel that another transgression will compel it to consider what further measures under the charter are required to maintain or restore the peace" (BULLETIN of Jan. 30, 1956, p. 182).

Meanwhile, it may be noted that the UNTSO did not accept the Israel charges that Egypt had sabotaged General Burns' attempt to ease the situation in the Gaza region. The primary difficulty continued to lie in the fact that the Egyptians desired to demarcate all three sides of the demilitarized zone triangle, whereas the Secretary-General had proposed demarcation of only the side which constituted the old Palestinian-Sinai frontier. Despite Israel's charge that Egypt had rejected the proposals, the UNTSO for the third time denied the Israel charge and stated that "disturbance of public opinion in Arab countries," following Israel's retaliatory action in the Sea of Galilee, had made further progress in negotiations impossible. There had been no serious clashes in the El Auja area since Nov. 2. It may be noted that the UNTSO denied a similar Israel charge on Nov. 18.

<sup>56</sup> U.N. press release SG/464, Jan. 30, 1956.

<sup>57</sup> See also U.N. doc. S/3539 (Jan. 24, 1956) for Israel memorandum.

<sup>58</sup> The Anglo-Egyptian controversy concerning the Sudan, in the settlement of which the United States was much interested, ended formally with the agreement of Feb. 12, 1953.

<sup>59</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 16, 1956, p. 85.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1956, p. 354.

<sup>61</sup> For the British and Saudi positions concerning the matter, see U.N. docs. S/3450, 3452, 3465.

<sup>62</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 15, 1955, p. 263.

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 12, 1955, p. 966.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1007.

<sup>65</sup> See John D. Jernegan, "Middle East Defense," BULLETIN of Apr. 4, 1955, p. 564.

<sup>66</sup> For a brief background, see Harry N. Howard, *U.S. Policy in the Near East, South Asia, and Africa—1954* (Department of State publication 5801), pp. 36-42.

<sup>67</sup> For partial text and exchange of notes, see *Embassy of Iraq* (Washington, D. C.), *Bulletin*, vol. II, No. 3 (March 1955).

<sup>68</sup> At the time of the signing of the Baghdad Pact the League included Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Yemen; the Sudan joined on Jan. 19, 1956.

<sup>69</sup> See especially U.N. docs. S/PV. 693, 695, and 696.

<sup>70</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 3, 1955, p. 534.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, Oct. 24, 1955, p. 653.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 5, 1955, p. 926.

<sup>73</sup> Awni Khalidy of Iraq became Secretary General.

<sup>74</sup> For text of communique, see BULLETIN of Jan. 2, 1956, p. 16.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, Dec. 19, 1955, p. 1003, and Jan. 16, 1956, p. 81.

Riots occurred in Jordan during December 1955 and January 1956 in connection with the possibility that Jordan might adhere to the Baghdad Pact. Secretary Dulles on Jan. 8 expressed to the Jordanian Chargé d'Affaires his deep concern at reports of mob violence at Amman on Jan. 7 and in the Jordan-occupied sector of Jerusalem, where American property was damaged and American lives endangered (*ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1956, p. 85).

<sup>76</sup> For a U.S. statement on Soviet participation, see BULLETIN of Mar. 5, 1956, p. 395.

<sup>77</sup> This article does not cover the contribution of the Department of State International Educational Exchange Service in this area. For a brief account of activities under this program, see *The International Exchange Program, 15th Semiannual Report to Congress* (Department of State publication 6293, 1956).

<sup>78</sup> Department of Commerce, *Foreign Grants and Credits by the United States Government*, September 1955 quarter, tables 1 and 2. Net figures cited here differ from certain of the individual country figures cited below because they are computed on another basis.

<sup>79</sup> For text of the agreement with Turkey, which entered into force on June 10, see BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p. 55. The agreement with Lebanon entered into force on July 18; that with Israel on July 12; Pakistan on Aug. 11; and Greece on Aug. 4, 1955.

<sup>80</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 119.

<sup>81</sup> *Ibid.*, May 2, 1955, p. 711.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, May 23, 1955, p. 855. See also the Secretary's statement of May 25 before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *ibid.*, June 6, 1955, p. 911, and that of Harold E. Stassen before the House Committee on June 8, 1955, *ibid.*, July 4, 1955, p. 29.

<sup>83</sup> For a summary of the uses to which mutual security funds were put in individual countries during the first half of 1955, see *Report to Congress on the Mutual Security Program for the Six Months Ended June 30, 1955*, H. Doc. 266, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 20 (Pakistan), p. 21 (India), p. 22 (Afghanistan and Nepal), p. 25 (Greece and Turkey), p. 26 (Iran), p. 27 (Arab States and Israel), and p. 32 (Africa).

<sup>84</sup> Direct American participation in the project ended on July 15, 1955. On June 10 Greece signed an agreement with the United States for defense use of technology, designed to foster the exchange of technology for defense purposes (BULLETIN of July 11, 1955, p. 84).

<sup>85</sup> BULLETIN of July 18, 1955, p. 100.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.*, May 16, 1955, p. 814.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 171. Since the beginning of 1948 Turkey has received \$463 million in economic assistance from the United States for development assistance related to the upkeep of its armed forces and for technical assistance. During the same period, Turkey has borrowed some \$25 million from the Export-Import Bank and about \$63 million from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, while short-term government and commercial debts in Europe were estimated at about \$150 million.

<sup>88</sup> For text of a U.S.-Iranian agreement signed on Feb. 20, 1956, on surplus agricultural commodities, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3506. On Feb. 26, 1956, the Export-Import Bank signed a \$14 million credit agreement with Iran for railroad improvement.

<sup>89</sup> BULLETIN of Dec. 26, 1955, p. 1050. For the agricultural commodities agreement with Egypt signed Dec. 14, 1955, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3439.

<sup>90</sup> On Oct. 30, 1955, the Jordanian Parliament approved an agreement permitting Edwin W. Pauley, an independent American petroleum producer, to explore Jordan for oil. It provided for 50 percent sharing after payment of exploration expenditures and for cancellation after 8 months if oil was not found; all oil wells were to become the exclusive property of Jordan after 55 years.

<sup>91</sup> It was announced on Mar. 2, 1956, that an Export-Import Bank loan of \$105,000 to Syria would assure the beginning of a program to bring a dependable supply of drinking water to various parts of Syria.

<sup>92</sup> See also U.N. docs. A/2978 and Add. 1, A/2989, A/3057.

<sup>93</sup> Israel also receives large-scale assistance from unofficial sources in the United States. During 1955, for example, some \$42,318,500 was subscribed in Israel bonds, bringing the total sold since 1951 to \$216,594,450.

<sup>94</sup> BULLETIN of May 16, 1955, p. 815.

<sup>95</sup> Department of State press release 486, Aug. 11, 1955 (not printed).

<sup>96</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 617.

<sup>97</sup> Department of State press release 244, May 6, 1955 (not printed).

<sup>98</sup> BULLETIN of Aug. 15, 1955, p. 263, and Sept. 12, 1955, p. 427. For a U.S.-Libyan agreement on relief supplies and equipment, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3480.

<sup>99</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 24, 1955, p. 157, and June 20, 1955, p. 1018. Greece, Israel, and Turkey have signed similar agreements with respect to the protection of private investments.

For a U.S.-Pakistan agreement on mutual security signed Jan. 11, 1955, see Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3183; for an agreement on surplus agricultural commodities signed Jan. 18, 1955, see TIAS 3184; for a technical cooperation agreement signed Jan. 18, 1955, see TIAS 3185.

<sup>100</sup> India and the Soviet Union had signed a loan agreement on Feb. 2, 1955, for the construction of a 1-million-ton steel plant in central India at a cost of some \$91 million to be completed by 1960.

<sup>101</sup> BULLETIN of Oct. 17, 1955, p. 617.

<sup>102</sup> The steel import brought to 700,000 tons the total which India had obtained from the United States. The first 4 of 100 locomotives arrived at Bombay on Jan. 3, 1956; for an address by Ambassador John Sherman Cooper on that occasion, see BULLETIN of Feb. 6, 1956, p. 205. For text of air transport agreement signed with India on Feb. 3, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1956, p. 264.

<sup>103</sup> Since 1954 the Soviet Union had loaned some \$14 million to Afghanistan for road construction, storage tanks, flour mills, etc.

<sup>104</sup> Export-Import Bank of Washington, *Twentieth Semiannual Report to Congress for the Period January-June 1955*, appendix C. Loans in Africa as a whole totaled \$198,669,661.60 and in Asia \$632,676,462.89.

<sup>105</sup> See *U.S. Participation in the U.N.: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1954* (Department of State publication 5769), pp. 235-39, for tables of contributions.

<sup>106</sup> In general see U.N. docs. A/2943: *Report of the Economic and Social Council covering the period from 7 August 1954 to 5 August 1955, passim*; E/2740 (ST/ECA/32): *Economic Developments in the Middle East, 1945-1954, passim*; ST/TAA/SER.C/21: *Fourth United Nations Social Welfare Seminar for Arab States in the Middle East* (Baghdad, 6-21 March 1954); ST/TAA/K/Israel/4: *United Nations Technical Assistance Programme, Revenue Administration and Policy in Israel* (Second Report); *Seeds of Progress: Stories of Technical Assistance* (1955); E/CN.5/303/Rev. 1/ST/SOA/26: *Social Progress Through Community Development* (1955).

<sup>107</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 9, 1956, p. 54. The charter of the International Finance Corporation requires a subscription of \$75,000,000 before the corporation can come into being; by Jan. 10, 1956, \$56,761,000 had been subscribed. Egypt was the first Middle Eastern country to complete action for membership (Dec. 16, 1955).

<sup>108</sup> Afghanistan and Israel became members of the IBRD during 1955.

<sup>109</sup> See also U.N. docs. A/2906 and A/3065 for material on the proposed Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development.

<sup>110</sup> International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, *Tenth Annual Report 1954-1955*, appendix F. See also International Bank for Reconstruction and Development press release 427 (Nov. 3, 1955), Financial Statements for First Quarter ending September 30, 1955. In addition to the above, the IBRD on Aug. 26, 1955, made a loan of \$10 million for electric power in Algeria and on Mar. 5, 1956, announced that it was sending a survey mission to the Trust Territory of Somaliland.

<sup>111</sup> BULLETIN of Jan. 23, 1956, p. 117.

<sup>112</sup> For transcripts of the Secretary's news conferences of Dec. 20, 1955, and Jan. 11, 1956, see *ibid.*, Jan. 2, 1956, p. 8, and Jan. 23, 1956, p. 118. Mr. Dulles indicated that mutual security requests for the next fiscal year would total about \$4,900,000,000, of which about \$1,900,000,000 would be for the economic part of the program. See also the transcript of the Secretary's press conference of Jan. 17, 1956, *ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 155.

<sup>113</sup> *Ibid.*, Jan. 16, 1956, p. 79. See also excerpts from the President's budget message, *ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1956, p. 147, and his message transmitting the 1957 mutual security program, *ibid.*, Apr. 2, 1956, p. 545.

<sup>114</sup> For texts of communique and Declaration, see *ibid.*, Feb. 13, 1956, p. 231.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, Mar. 5, 1956, p. 368. See also the Secretary's statements of Feb. 7, *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 279, and of Feb. 28, *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 409. See also the correspondence of Secretary Dulles with certain members of Congress, *ibid.*, Feb. 20, 1956, p. 285. For the Department's statement of Feb. 18, concerning the shipment of 18 tanks to Saudi Arabia under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949 and the Mutual Security Act of 1954, see *ibid.*, Feb. 27, 1956, p. 325.

<sup>116</sup> See also Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, "First Annual Report of the Council Representatives, March 1956," *ibid.*, Mar. 12, 1956, p. 403, and the final communique of the SEATO Council meeting at Karachi, Mar. 8, 1956, *ibid.*, Mar. 19, 1956, p. 447.





