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League of nations

to-day

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THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO-DAY

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO-DAY

ITS GROWTH, RECORD
AND RELATION TO
BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY

BY

ROTH WILLIAMS



NEW YORK
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1923

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PREFACE

THE LEADERS OF THE GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION PARTIES ON THE LEAGUE.

“During the war—you all remember it—there was no feeling nearer our hearts than that as a result of victory we should secure not only peace now but peace in time to come. We surely have not forgotten that feeling. Now that the war is over an attempt to realise it is found in the League of Nations. I think it is growing in usefulness, and I say that so far as I and the Government of which I am the head are concerned, we shall do everything in our power to make it more useful and more efficient.”

*Mr. Bonar Law at the Glasgow
Unionist Association, October 26,
1922.*

“Labour is working for an all-inclusive League of Nations with power to deal with international disputes by methods of judicial arbitration and conciliation. Through the League of Nations an agreement can be reached for a limitation of armaments, with general disarmament as the goal.”

*Labour Party Manifesto (issued
October 25, 1922).*

“We have insisted ever since the Armistice upon the supreme necessity of giving the League of Nations real and governing authority. We have protested time after time against its supersession by a small

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oligarchical body of the Great Powers which goes by the name of the Supreme Council.

"Before the war the great aim of our foreign policy, as pursued by Sir Edward Grey and myself, was to secure such a balance of power in Europe as would preserve peace, and for the best part of ten years that policy was pursued with success. It is obsolete now, and I am very glad that it is. But it is obsolete because an instrument which did not then exist has been put into the hands of the nations, in the League of Nations, an instrument meant not for ornament, but for constant and practical use."

*Mr. Asquith at Peterborough,
October 27, 1922.*

"On the League of Nations I have never changed my mind. . . . I am for the League of Nations. I am in favour of all the countries of Europe being enrolled amongst its members. I am in favour of making every reasonable concession in order to induce the United States of America to associate itself with that great body, if it can be accomplished, for until you get all the nations of Europe in—and I still think until you get the United States of America there—the League of Nations will be crippled, it will not have the necessary authority, the necessary power.

"Therefore the object of any government in this country ought to be to get a League of Nations in which the great nations of the earth as well as the small will be enrolled for the purpose of achieving an enduring guarantee for peace on earth and goodwill among men."

*Mr. Lloyd George, at a meeting of
National Liberal Party Mem-
bers of Parliament and Parli-
amentary candidates, at the Hotel
Victoria, October 25, 1922.*

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INTRODUCTION

THE aim of this book is to enable any reader who has vague ideas about the League, and is ordinarily interested in politics, to exclaim after finishing it: "Now I know what the League is and what we ought to do about it." For this reason the first chapter briefly outlines the factors in the post-war world that make the League system and idea necessary; the second attempts to describe precisely what the League of Nations is and how it works; then follows an account of how the League machinery is constructed and the relation of the parts to each other; some of the things accomplished or attempted by the League since its foundation; the process of constitutional evolution that the League has undergone during the three years of its existence; the present attitude to the League of the three great states—Germany, Russia and the U.S.A.—that are not yet members; and finally a number of suggestions for equipping our own country to take the lead in getting all countries into the League and transacting all international questions through the League system, as part of a bold and consistent peace policy in Europe and the world.

Throughout I have endeavoured to present the League, not as an agglomeration of opaque and inert facts, but as the resultant of living forces which are still in operation, and of which the public opinion and consequent policy of England is one of the greatest. The point of view from

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which I have written is that the League of Nations is a method or way of conducting foreign affairs to which a certain number of states have pledged themselves. In order that this system or way of doing things should become the only method used it is necessary first that all nations should pledge themselves to use it ; second, that public opinion in all nations should develop a belief in the method compelling adherence to these pledges in the letter and the spirit ; and third, that the method itself—that is, the provisions of the Covenant and the procedure and organisations based on those provisions—should be perfected.

Consequently, facts are approached in the following pages primarily with a view to finding out what is to be done about them : the discussion on the constitutional evolution of the League points the way to helping on this evolution in desirable directions ; the discussion on the attitude of ~~Germany~~, Russia and the U.S.A. leads up to proposals for getting those countries into the League, and so on. Notably the chapters on what the League has done give a selection of activities—both failures and successes—intended to show how the League system works in practice and what sort of difficulties have to be overcome to make it supreme. Little or nothing has been said about the administration of the Saar, the work of the Danzig High Commissioner, or the mandates system, since all these are special and subsidiary international activities that are bound to work well once the general League system of co-operation and peaceful settlement of disputes is consistently and vigorously applied, but which are not directly germane to the development of these major, essential activities. On the other hand, the work of the International Labour Office has not been described, partly because it would illustrate no new principle, but merely show a special application of League methods to international labour prob-

lems, just as the transit and health organisations of the League show their application to international transit and health problems, and partly because the complete autonomy of the Labour Office and the volume of its activities would require a separate book to do it justice—it is almost a League of Nations in itself.

In order to emphasise the fact that this book has been shaped from the flux of day-to-day politics, not elaborated in a study, and is bent to the severely practical task of showing how the League, as it exists to-day, might be utilised as the vehicle for a vigorous and sustained attempt on the part of Great Britain to lead the world out of the morass in which we have all been floundering since the war, and in so doing might be forged into an instrument of greater power and precision, I have refrained from consulting the numerous admirable books that have been written on the League, and instead based myself throughout on the material supplied by the Information Section of the League Secretariat, as well as the official documents sold by the Secretariat. The most useful single publication is undoubtedly the *Monthly Summary of the League of Nations*, a bulletin sold by the League Secretariat and giving a compact and strictly objective official account of the current activities of all League organisations and conferences. The knowledge gained from these sources has been supplemented by several protracted visits to Geneva, including all three Assemblies and many of the Council meetings, and by a fair amount of travel up and down our war-stricken Continent.

The League was our chief aim in the war, and both during and after the Peace Conference the British Government, bad as its record is in the light of any but the most modest standards, has done relatively better than any other government—has proved less niggardly in financing League

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activities, less unready to refer questions to the League for settlement, and less dilatory in carrying out League decisions. Public opinion in England, too, has been less ignorant and apathetic about the League than in any other country. There is no counterpart in the world to the League of Nations Union, nor to the fine and continuous support of the League by a part of the British Press. Finally, there is no parallel elsewhere to the way all parties at the last general election pledged themselves up to the hilt to the League, and many candidates made the League one of their main planks.

The general election is over now, and there is a Conservative Government with a strong Labour-Liberal Opposition. The Government has some tremendous problems of foreign policy to solve, the leeway of four years to make up, and it is going to be met with the League of Nations at almost every step it takes: in proportion as present methods of dealing with the Near Eastern and reparations problems succeed, the question of getting Turkey, Russia and Germany into the League becomes an immediate political issue, while in proportion as these methods fail the demand grows stronger that the Third Assembly's resolutions should be acted on and these matters referred to the League. Every time the Allies meet, the question of Supreme Council *versus* League methods will be raised by the Opposition in Parliament and Press. Foreign politics must take first place for some time to come, and there will be few debates on foreign politics that do not include a discussion of how to use the League. The League of Nations has come into politics, and come to stay. It is now a first-class live issue.

Meanwhile the League itself has been through many vicissitudes since its birth, has slowly thrust its way up and along through a thousand diffi-

culties, in the murk of obscurity, and emerged at last, battered, but tough, alive and growing. Only the League that has survived is something widely different from what either its friends had hoped or its enemies feared in the days of the Peace Conference.

Clearly at this juncture of the world's affairs there should be a book to describe what the League is to-day, and a book so written as to be a practical guide to those who in Parliament and Press and up and down the land want concrete proposals—preferably right, but as a next best clearly and specifically wrong—on how we must tackle the problems that lie before us in this year and the next.

Such is the aim of this book.

ROTH WILLIAMS.

LONDON,

December 1922.

SECTION ONE

OUR CIVILISATION, THE WORLD WAR
AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

CHAPTER I

WHY THE LEAGUE IS NECESSARY

THE most striking characteristic of our civilisation is the extent to which material development has outrun social and political organisation. London and New York are nearer each other to-day in point of travel than London and Liverpool one hundred years ago, and infinitely nearer as regards communication of information; to-day the Stock Exchanges of London and New York know all about each other's dealings a few minutes after they have taken place, whereas one hundred years ago it took days for London and Liverpool to learn about one another's transactions. Nevertheless, inhabitants of New York and London to-day, although infinitely more fully and promptly informed of each other's doings than the citizens of London and Liverpool one hundred years ago, and far nearer in point of ease, frequency and swiftness of travel, have no such ordered political and juridical relations as obtained between Liverpool and London a century ago, but live in a state of mutual anarchy, tempered by a number of customs and traditions known as international law.

The reason for this anomalous state of affairs is that the industrial and mechanical revolutions of the nineteenth century that brought the railway, steamship and telegraph, and so made possible in Europe a vast increase of population, based on manufacture and trade with other countries, co-

incided with the rise of modern nationalism, a sentiment based on the natural and eternal feeling of love of country, but in its extremer form including metaphysical doctrines postulating a belief in international anarchy, a perversion of Darwin's theory of natural selection that would make that sage turn in his grave, and the corollary of these doctrines—the inevitability and Providential nature of war. Thus the years immediately preceding the war saw in Central and Western Europe, on the one hand, largely a cultural and economic unit, supporting gigantic industries and teeming populations by means of raw products and foodstuffs drawn from East Europe, Africa and America, in exchange for capital and manufactured goods ; on the other hand, the great nations comprising most of this area, practically unconscious of their own interdependence, vehemently maintaining the state of international anarchy in which they lived, dividing into two great camps, arming to the teeth and finally plunging into the greatest and most fearful war ever known.

The first result of this war is that, in terms of national welfare, there are no victors—only powers that have suffered more than others, and powers that have more power of inflicting suffering than others. In all the ex-belligerent countries life is harder and darker than it was before the war, and civilisation is felt to have gone backward since 1914. A second result is the accentuation of those factors of material development that before the war were rapidly weaving a network of interdependent interests and needs throughout human society. To the steam and coal, railway, steamship, telegraph and telephone of pre-war days have been added oil-fuel, motor transport, wireless, radiotelephony, the airship and aeroplane. The war has not abolished the factors making internationalism obligatory, but developed them still further. This conclusion is strengthened by the

consideration that by the end of the war both sides had been forced to a degree of internationalisation that would have been thought inconceivable before and certainly can be paralleled in no previous war. Among the Allies pooling of shipping, coal, natural resources and manufactured goods had been achieved, and were followed by centralised military and naval control. Among the Central Powers unification had been pushed even further and gave rise to the grandiose project of "Mittel Europa." Since the war the Allies have floundered in a tangle of mutual indebtedness, until at last politicians are being forced to recognise publicly what financiers have long been agreed on in private, namely, that the question of German reparations will never be settled until a large part of Germany's liabilities are set off against Allied indebtedness, and then an international loan floated (chiefly among the ex-Allies, but also among the ex-neutrals) for Germany's benefit. So we shall have the paradox of the Allies lending Germany money in order to enable that country to pay themselves. This is sound modern finance, but it is also a startling illustration of the lengths to which compulsory internationalism is going in our day!

But the third result of the war appears paradoxical, a sheer reversal of the process which can be traced throughout the war and for very many years before: The war shattered three great Empires and brought to life as sovereign states a number of small nations, some of whom had never been independent before, and most of whom had been submerged for centuries. Now it was no accident that ordained the disappearance of these small states, and, indeed, of all small states in Europe, except on the fringes (the Scandinavian, Balkan and Iberian Peninsulas, Holland and Belgium) or on inaccessible mountains (Switzerland). The swallowing up of small states was due to that very combination of intransigent national-

ism and economic development that led to Europe being divided into a few great states, to their separation into two vast camps, to the armed peace, and finally to the world war.¹ What is to happen to these small states that have arisen from the dead? What is to prevent the process beginning again? What is to prevent Germany and Russia coming together in one camp, France with the Baltic States, Poland and the Little Entente forming another, and Great Britain holding aloof? If the old ideas and the old system continue, there is not only nothing to prevent this consummation, but every reason why it should come about. And if it does, the lot of such of the resurrected states as are allowed to remain neutral is scarcely enviable, as the neutrals surviving the late war can testify. Only as the next war, if it takes place, will be fought largely in the air, and accompanied by even profounder social and economic disturbances than the last, the lot of the would-be neutral will be even more difficult and uncertain.

It is true there are powerful forces working against a return to the old ways. In the first place the Balance of Power idea is dead in England—no political party could advocate it and survive at the polls, and no political party does advocate it. Government and Opposition both stand for a foreign policy based on reconstruction and co-

¹ Incidentally, it was the intransigent nationalism of the great states that led to their undoing—Austria-Hungary stumbled into war and ultimately broke up owing to her failure to conciliate the Slav races within her borders. The Poles and the Alsace-Lorrainers were weak spots in the German body corporate, and the oppression of the Alsace-Lorrainers was also one of the fundamental causes of the war. The very trade rivalry between England and Germany could lead to naval rivalry and ultimately to war only for the same reason. The exactly similar trade rivalry between the United States of America and Great Britain has never led to hostility between the two countries, and naval competition was put a stop to almost before it began, for the simple but profound reason that Englishmen and Americans do not quite regard each other as foreigners, and consequently kept the United States-Canadian frontier unguarded and so acquired the habit of settling their differences by arbitration.

operation in Europe. This change is partly due to a realisation of Great Britain's inextricable and inevitable economic dependence on the Continent of Europe. It comes partly from recognition of the fact that the aeroplane and airship have wiped out the English Channel, and that the next war, if it comes, will find Great Britain without her old geographical advantage. But not least this change is due to a genuine political and moral evolution, to wide views and a pacific civilisation, a belief in the possibility of lasting peace, and a longing to achieve it. The idea of co-operation is also held by strong elements in all countries, while even those who do not embrace it freely admit that a return to the old system—or rather lack of system, for the old order of things was anarchy tempered by alliances—means the inevitability of war.

Moreover, before Germany can regain her freedom and power of action the reparations problem must be settled, and that problem can only be settled, as is now generally recognised, by, amongst other measures, cancelling of debts against reparations and an international loan to Germany, a loan in which the chief sums would be raised in France, Great Britain and the U.S.A. Similarly, before Russia can become a first-class power again, she must undergo a long period of reconstruction involving foreign investments, undertakings, and commitments of all kinds in Russia on a gigantic scale. The natural and obvious scheme for a large proportion of these developments will be the association of German technical skill, expert knowledge and old connections in Russia with Western capital. The first result of an adjustment of the relations between the Allies on the one hand and Germany and Russia on the other will therefore, in all human probability, be the creation of a double set of mutual interests—financial interests and business interests—between all these powers. Thus there is a powerful combination of economic

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ties and political forces militating against a return to the pre-war condition of Europe.

Nevertheless, a new method is needed, an alternative system for conducting foreign affairs that will make remote and wildly improbable a return to the old system of a few great competing Empires, and will allow Europe, while made up of many separate national states, each contributing its own colour and texture to the common fabric, to develop its cultural and economic solidarity, and so to strengthen and enrich the stuff of our civilisation. For the new states, in particular, it is vital that such a system should be found, and, when found, should be made a success, for they would be the first to suffer, and to suffer most grievously, from a return to the old ways. For us, too, it is hardly less obviously a vital interest in the literal sense to consolidate the world's peace, for we are an industrial nation, doomed by fate to live by trade with foreigners, and we are also members of a far-flung community of nations and dependencies that is already too large and unwieldy, and so has no conceivable interest in war, and every reason for keeping the peace. But the late war and its aftermath have surely made it clear to all nations that without the temper of peace we cannot have the works of peace, the groundwork of goods and services no less than the higher things connoted by "arts and sciences," for most of these things are prostituted or destroyed by war. And so without the temper of peace, what we know as civilisation will first grow rotten and then crumble.

This new system, the necessary alternative to self-destroying, imperialist anarchy, must clearly, when found, satisfy certain fundamental conditions. While based on and most explicitly and fully recognising the principle of national sovereignty, it must provide for co-operation in all subjects of international concern. It must provide for

peaceful settlement of disputes, but while also furnishing collective deterrents against any infringement of this obligation, must finally not only *not* stereotype the *status quo*, but explicitly recognise and allow for the necessity of from time to time revising treaties and in other ways peacefully changing international conditions when the existing state of things becomes a burden and a menace to world peace. The Covenant of the League, with the interpretations and amendments it has since undergone, and the system of conferences and international organisations built on the Covenant—in a word, the League of Nations—do broadly satisfy these conditions. The League of Nations is an elastic system, and an association of states whose membership is not complete. There have already been changes and adjustments, and there will no doubt be many more and more important changes and adjustments. But in its general idea and fundamental principles the League of Nations does represent just that way of doing things which the analysis just given of the European situation showed was necessary. The League is in essence an attempt to meet real needs in a common-sense way.

Whether the attempt will succeed is, of course, a matter that only the future can show. In the opinion of cool observers it is a race between organisation for peace and preparation for war, between salvation and destruction, and which will win is a matter that depends entirely on our own efforts, and that will not become apparent for at least five or ten years after the end of the war. It will take at least five years for public opinion to be demobilised, the khaki parliaments¹ replaced by legislatures elected on peace issues, and for the effects of these changes to be decisively felt. It will also take at least five years after the end

¹ The British Parliament has been re-elected; the French general election must take place not later than May, 1924.

of the war for the European situation to "crystal-lise out," for the new states to find their feet and establish their relations with each other and the rest of the world; for the great outstanding questions of inter-allied debts and reparations to be finally settled—settled so as to be reduced to accepted schemes of annual payments that cannot give rise to political crises—and for the relations between victors and vanquished to be established on a peace basis; at least five years to get Russia back into the comity of nations. Within those five years all that can reasonably be expected of the League system is that the powers pledged to work it shall not kill it, but will keep it alive. On the other hand, if in ten or fifteen years after the end of the war the world has not set into the League of Nations mould, there is every reason to fear a return to the old anarchy of rival alliances.

Meanwhile, not quite three years after the end of the war, the League is doing considerably better than this forecast would allow, for it has not only kept alive, it has gone ahead slowly but surely, and is steadily gaining ground. In proportion as Entente dictatorship and Supreme Council improvisations are becoming discredited both inside and outside the Allied countries, the League alternative is rising in the esteem of all Europe. This is reflected inside the League organisations by a feeling of confidence and permanence, of knowing what to do and how to do it—relations have been worked out between all the technical organisations, advisory commissions, Council, Assembly, and corresponding sections of the Secretariat-General, as well as between all these and the Governments Members of the League. All the cogs fit, all the wheels turn smoothly, and the whole machinery is solidly set and well tempered. And as the League organisations intensify their inner cohesion, so their working spreads ever more extensively over the world:

Germany has taken part in all the technical conferences of any importance (c.g. the Paris Passports Conference, the Brussels Financial Conference, the Barcelona Transit Conference, the Warsaw Health Conference, etc.), is represented on the Opium Commission, the Traffic in Women and Children Commission, and about to be represented on the Health and Transit Committees: Russia took part in the Warsaw Health Conference, and the League Health Organisation is about to extend its work into West Russia, for which purpose it has established close relations with the Soviet health authorities and set up offices in Moscow and Kiev. Even the attitude of the United States is changing: an official American representative takes part in the work on standardisation of sera, official representatives are to take part in the Traffic in Women and Children Commission and the discussions on anthrax in the International Labour Office Committee; co-operation with the Hoover Relief Organisation and the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation is in full blast, an American judge sits in the International Court and an American doctor in the Health Committee.

Besides the general need of the new states for some such system as that embodied in the League, the League, as organised at present, is part and parcel of the settlement of East Europe. In the Baltic the minority rights of the Aaland Islanders and the neutralisation of the islands themselves are under League auspices, i.e. may be made the subject of appeal to the League in cases of alleged infraction; in the same way the Upper Silesian settlement and the minority treaties that bind Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Yugo-Slavia and Roumania mean that these states, if they get into trouble on nationality questions with their great neighbours, have clearly defined rights and duties, and are entitled to claim the protection of the

members of the League so long as they can satisfy the Council that they are fulfilling their duties and not exceeding their rights. Were the League system to break down, there would at once be trouble between Finland and Sweden over the status of the Aaland Islanders, and general trouble in the Baltic over the neutralisation of the islands ; as for Poland and the succession states, they would immediately find that if they got into conflict with their neighbours over the Russian, German or Hungarian minorities within their borders, they would no longer have any clearly defined system of rights and duties, with a court of appeal and protection contingent on good behaviour. They would have nothing, in fact, between themselves and trouble, but whatever measure of physical force and moral authority they possess themselves, and these would not go very far with Great Powers as their opponents and the traditions of nationalism against them. Again, the new states are concluding health and transit conventions between themselves, in which the League Health and Transit organisations respectively figure as mediators in case of disputes—always with the Council, Court or Assembly in the background as courts of appeal. Albania and Austria are, in different ways, the wards of the League. The Health Organisation is helping Poland and is to help Latvia and Russia against epidemics ; it is also to take a hand in revising the Paris Sanitary Convention of 1912 and in co-ordinating the work of port sanitary authorities in the Eastern Mediterranean. Lastly, the neutralisation of the Straits, like that of the Aaland Islands, is to be put under League auspices.

The League, in fact, is solidly dug in in Europe—both by being designated in many of the peace treaties as interpreter or arbiter of disputed clauses, and by being assigned the same functions in treaties and conventions concluded since the

war. Each Assembly, too, has seen increasing recognition of this fact, as well as a steady rise in the magnitude of past achievements and importance of tasks to be dealt with. The Third Assembly showed greater boldness and independence on the part of the small powers and a more chastened mood in the great, and this was reflected in the election of Uruguay and Sweden to the Council, in the strong push for having the Near East settlement dealt with through the League, and in the resolution on reparations and debts—this sacred subject hitherto taboo to all but the Supreme Council. In short, it is beginning to be realised on all hands that there can be no new League, because there are no new nations, that attempts to carry on on the old lines are breaking down disastrously, and that consequently the only thing to do is to get the remaining states into the present League, take hold of the League system as it is to-day, work it for all it is worth, and in so doing to test and ultimately transform it into a world-wide instrument flexible enough to meet the needs of every nation and authoritative enough to ennoble the motives and policies of all.

But if civilisation is to win in the race with destruction we must put into the fight for peace the same spirit of grim determination and sense of "if we don't hang together we will hang separately" that was brought to bear in the war, but with greater clear-headedness and with a common hatred of war in place of the sundering hatreds between nations.

CHAPTER II

WHAT THE LEAGUE IS

THE League of Nations is nothing more nor less than the nations of the League. In other words, the League of Nations is an association of fifty-two states which, while maintaining their sovereignty unimpaired, have signed a treaty—called the Covenant—pledging themselves (1) to submit their disputes to peaceful settlement and to take joint action against any power infringing this fundamental obligation, and (2) to co-operate positively over a series of non-political questions, such as questions of public health, economic and financial matters, transit and communications, suppression of the traffic in opium, suppression of the traffic in women and children, etc.

In order to carry out the purposes to which they are pledged, the Powers Members of the League have undertaken, through signing the Covenant and in subsequent conferences, to create and maintain a series of administrative, advisory and executive organs, such as the Secretariat-General, technical organisations and various advisory commissions; and one judicial organ, namely, the Permanent Court of International Justice. Lastly, the contracting powers, in order to discuss and decide on the policies which these administrative and executive organs are to carry out, have undertaken to meet once a year in the so-called General Assembly of the League, some of them meet every two months in the Council of

the League, and all of them meet from time to time in special conferences for special purposes, such as the Brussels Financial Conference, the Barcelona Transit Conference, and the Warsaw Health Conference. At all these conferences, and in fact in any League conference whatsoever, the delegates to the conference are government delegates sent by the nations they represent and responsible to the governments of those nations. On the other hand, the members of the Secretariat are appointed by the Secretary-General, and members of some of the advisory commissions by the Council of the League, that is, by a certain number of the governments of the League meeting together for certain purposes, and are not looked upon as representatives of their countries or in any way responsible to the governments whose nationals they are.

The League, that is, differs from the international conferences that used to take place before and during the war, principally in that it provides permanent machinery to carry on from conference to conference the work decided upon at these gatherings, and includes the obligation to hold general conferences at regular intervals, as well as facilitates the summoning of special conferences as occasion may demand. In other words, the Governments Members of the League have attempted to organise on permanent lines and co-ordinate systematically the methods of international conference and co-operation that had grown up in a sporadic *ad hoc* manner before the war, in response to the growing interdependence of modern nations, and the consequent increasing frequency and complexity of international contacts.

All this, it might be thought, must be sufficiently elementary to be obvious and generally realised in the third year of the League's existence. Unhappily, however, this is not the case. Not only is knowledge of the very nature of the League

usually absent to-day, but in many quarters definite misconceptions are to be met, while even where these misconceptions would be repudiated in words there is a vague general attitude that implies the same beliefs.

Thus one review writes that small and obscure bodies "like the Friends' Relief Committee, the 'Save the Children Fund,' and the League of Nations" have done more to influence men's minds and to guide events than Prime Ministers or Field-Marshals; while another scornfully refers to the League as "the organisation housed at Geneva" and berates it for not solving any of Britain's problems, such as those of India, Egypt and Ireland. Recently an American Senator enthusiastically declared that "the members of the League are men of such high character that Americans could not possibly incur any danger in helping them in their sane efforts to bring order out of chaos," while as a sort of feminine counterblast a woman delegate to the Third Assembly voiced her belief to that startled body that the League of Nations must become a "league of mothers"!

Most people will, of course, consider these utterances merely funny, and will realise that the League of Nations is an association of states, a system through which governments can, when they wish to apply it, get things done by open and fair methods on a truly international basis. It is easy to see, when the issue is baldly stated, how absurd it is to talk of the League of Nations as though it were an independent committee of individuals chosen for their personal merits—maternity appears to be the criterion suggested in one case—and planted at Geneva with a roving brief to set the world straight after the war and do jobs for tired statesmen. If, e.g., the British Government wishes to bring the problems of Ireland, India or Egypt before the League, all it has to do is to

instruct its representative on the Council in this sense. And if any other Government Member of the League cares to risk a rebuff—for a British Government might hold that these are matters of domestic, not international, concern—it can, under Article XI of the Covenant, bring the matter before the Council or Assembly. Failing these alternatives, it is simply fatuous to reproach the "League" for not "settling" these problems. The League is a system to be applied by states, not an entity that acts on its own.

But the serious thing is that people who see the absurdity of this misconception when it is crudely stated, habitually think and behave as though it were true. Thus a great Liberal paper argued the other day that, since Roumania and Yugo-Slavia were being invited to attend the Near East Conference, the League of Nations too, which had much wider interests, should be invited to send representatives. And the plea is constantly being made by adherents of the go-slow school that the League must be allowed to grow and acquire prestige, that it has only moral authority and cannot move a man or a gun, and so is not capable of tackling important problems; while ardent believers in the League argue on the other hand that it must be given an army and so be able to impose its decisions.

How can there be a representative, in the sense suggested, of fifty-two sovereign states, even though these states have agreed to co-operate for certain purposes? In the Near East conference most of the states concerned are members of the League. If they had chosen to deal with the matter through the League system—i.e. by bringing it before the Council (of which France, Italy and Great Britain are members) with the representation thereon of all the other states concerned, including, in accordance with Article XVII of the Covenant, the two non-members of the League,

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Russia and Turkey—they could have done so. They did not, and no other Member State has cared to insist upon doing so, as it would have a right to do under Articles III and XI of the Covenant. These were the two lines on which action could be taken. But suggesting that “the League” should send “a representative” is not a possible line of action; it is merely a fresh instance of the old anthropomorphic illusion that the League of Nations is some kind of independent entity. The League is not an institution or young superstate that must be left to grow—or given an army to play with, as the case may be—but a system that must be applied by states.

The only way for the League of Nations to acquire prestige is for the States Members of the League to honour their pledges, by dealing with all international problems through the League, by faithfully carrying out decisions arrived at in this way, and by sending their best men with full powers to the Council, Assembly and other League conferences. The way to give League decisions authority is for the States Members of the League chiefly concerned to pledge themselves beforehand to back up these decisions. This is what Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan (as members of the Supreme Council) actually did when they asked the League Council to recommend a solution of the Upper Silesian problem and pledged themselves beforehand to accept and enforce this solution. The League of Nations can move as many men and guns, in any given case, as any or all of the States Members of the League are willing to mobilise and pay for to carry out the League's decision in this case. If Great Britain, France, Sweden and the other ten present members of the Council are not willing to use any of their own troops to enforce a decision which they, as members of the Council, have taken, are they likely to go to war in a less efficient way by paying

for the operations of a "League army" to enforce the same decision? And if not, who will? And where, how and at whose expense is the army to be commanded, recruited, equipped and kept when off duty?

The two chief mistakes arising out of the illusion that the League is some kind of independent entity, a committee of individuals with vague semi-judicial functions, a sort of areopagus or world-tribunal, are embodied in the demands that (1) the League of Nations should be transformed from a "League of Governments" into a "League of Peoples," and (2) the League of Nations should be freed from all connection with the Peace Treaties.

Let us start with the idea very firmly and clearly in mind that the League of Nations is an association of states founded for the purpose of international co-operation, and test these two demands in the light of that conception. In order to co-operate, the States Members of the League meet from time to time in conferences—either conferences for dealing with all subjects within the range of the League (i.e. the Assembly and the Council) or technical conferences to deal with special subjects (i.e. the Brussels Financial Conference, the Barcelona Transit Conference, the Paris Passports Conference, the Warsaw Health Conference, etc.).

So long as the States Members of the League retain their sovereignty unimpaired, these conferences must be conferences of government representatives, for otherwise the conferences will not be able to take decisions. So long, that is, as the constitution of the League remains the Covenant, the only result of sending elected instead of government representatives to the Council or Assembly would be to bring the League to an abrupt end. An Assembly composed in this way could not even vote the credits necessary for carry-

ing on the work of the League organisations or to hold its own meetings, since it could pledge no government to pay any money. Similarly, the work of the Council would simply not be possible if the members of the Council were not in a position to pledge their respective governments to action. The same is the case with the technical organisations, and in fact with any international conference, whether within the League or not. What would the Washington Conference have accomplished if Mr. Balfour, Mr. Hughes and the rest of its members had been simply distinguished private individuals instead of being, as they were, representatives of their respective governments, with power to bind those governments? What is the League of Nations but a series of government conferences kept in touch with one another and with the Governments Members of the League by the Secretariat-General and standing organisations, which are also responsible for carrying out the decisions of the conferences?

All this does not mean that the fact should be overlooked that a most important element in international co-operation is and must increasingly be direct contact between men and women from the different nations. Therefore, all international conference and discussion is good, and it is particularly good that in the League technical organisations and advisory commissions, in the Labour Office conferences, etc., men and women from every walk of life meet, confer and work together in matters where they can begin with the patent economic and cultural interdependence of all nations and so help to dissipate the dogma of political sovereignty and the traditions of diplomatic chicane. It is also good that an increasing number of governments have got into the habit of composing their Assembly delegations with a view to making them representative of all political parties in their respective countries. But

unless decisions taken at international conferences are in the last resort taken by government representatives—unless, e.g., the head and the one vote of each Assembly delegation is a government representative casting a government vote—they will not be decisions at all, for no government will act on them.

To secure a "League of Peoples" in the sense of investing elected representatives to an inter-state body with powers binding the governments of the states whose nationals they are, it would be necessary for the states concerned to give up part of their sovereignty and to create a federation in which, like in all federal constitutions, there would be one chamber of elected representatives based on population and one chamber of representatives of each of the federated states. That is, to get a "League of Peoples" it would first be necessary to create the "United States of the World," and this again could only come about by persuading the States Members of the present League to revise the Covenant in this sense; it would not come about by sending elected representatives to the Council and Assembly of the League of sovereign Nations that we have to-day. Even sovereign nations can co-operate, to the exclusion of war, as the Scandinavian nations have long shown, and as the League gives promise of showing in time. But this co-operation must be inter-governmental, must take forms different from those obtaining within one state or within a federation of states.

Remains the demand that the League should be freed from all connection with the Peace Treaties. If the League were a committee of wise and good men whose pronouncements were to commend themselves to the powers that be solely owing to their ideal value, it would, of course, be obviously right that these men should not only be elected by whole nations, to give them moral

weight, but also free to deliver themselves on all issues as their consciences dictated. But the League of Nations is not the spiritual adviser of mankind; it is not a sort of collective political Pope shorn of temporal powers, and it would not have much of a future in this wicked world if it were. The League is a system of co-operation that fifty-two nations are pledged to apply. Some of these fifty-two nations are signatories of certain treaties, known as the Peace Treaties, and constituting the foundation of post-war Europe. Certain—generally minor—matters, these Treaties expressly state shall be dealt with through the League system (i.e. the administration of the Saar, the status of Danzig, the interpretation and surveillance of the working of certain clauses by the Court or Council, etc.) and the Covenant, which is itself part of the peace treaties, expressly stipulates that the States Members of the League meeting in the Assembly may, in certain circumstances, recommend the revision of treaties. But except when specifically bound by the treaties themselves, the chief signatories have hitherto refused to deal with issues arising out of the peace treaties through the League system, and have preferred to set up organs of their own, known as the Supreme Council, the Conference of Ambassadors and the Reparations Commission. Through these organs solutions are dictated by one group of powers to the other parties concerned, as well as to the rest of the world, whose well-being is profoundly affected by the settlement of those issues. This procedure is generally explained by the statement that the League system could not successfully be applied to solve the problems involved in making peace, and should come into full operation only when this has been accomplished; it has been justified by the head of the French Government by the statement that the League is not the proper body to deal with

peace treaty or reparation issues, since its membership includes neutrals and may include Germany—in other words, because applying the League system to these questions would mean the substitution for dictation by a few powers of equal co-operation and all-round discussion by all nations.

These are the facts of the matter, and they have gradually led to the dropping of the demand (except in French nationalist circles) that the League should be freed from all connection with the Peace Treaties, and instead to the exactly contrary demand that the Supreme Council and Conference of Ambassadors should be scrapped, the Reparations Commission made responsible to the League Council, and, in order to make the League system a reality in application to these questions, Germany and Russia admitted to the League. This demand will become more insistent as it grows increasingly clear that the methods of dictation by one group of powers are proving as unsuccessful in practice as they are unalluring in theory.

The illusion that the League is some sort of independent institution or committee has one more result, perhaps the most persistent and baneful of all, and that is the feeling of lack of responsibility. The only people who can consistently oppose or remain indifferent to the League are Revolutionary Communists and their spiritual twins, the doctrinaire nationalists and militarists who believe in international anarchy and war as ends in themselves, or at least as inevitable and eternal. All those in between who believe that the civilisation we know to-day is not the last word, but that step by step something finer and higher can be built on its foundations; all those, too, who realise that there is no standing still or drifting—we must either organise for peace or prepare for war, and if we prepare for war we shall surely get war, and

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another European war will surely mean the relapse into barbarism of the human remnants that survive ; all these have no reason and no excuse for not supporting the only organised attempt to bring order and justice into international relations. But instead of this there are a great many convinced supporters of international co-operation and constitutional progress who are lukewarm or even hostile to the League and declare they want a new League of Nations.

But there can be no new League of Nations, except through the present League, for there are no new nations. The League of Nations is an association of fifty-two states, which it took a world war to shake out of the old ruts to the extent of agreeing to co-operate and to work out the terms of their association. Those terms have been fixed (through the Covenant and subsequent amendments, interpretations, and other resolutions) in accordance with the will of these fifty-two states and cannot be changed until that will changes. After that they can be changed by further revision of the Covenant. Thus some of the leading members of the fifty-two states cannot yet be induced to contemplate working together with two of the three great states still outside the League, and the third of the outside states (the U.S.A.) cannot yet be induced to contemplate permanent and organised co-operation with any other country under any circumstances. In order to perfect the methods of the League system and enlarge its membership, to give the Assembly and technical organisations wider powers, to set up regional groups within the League, to make the League universal, a League of Free Trade Nations, a League of Socialist Nations, a Federation of Nations (i.e. "League of Peoples"), or anything whatever, it is necessary to change public opinion in the states concerned so as to produce governments that will effect the changes desired. These

governments will then take hold of the present system, of what exists already, and make it over to their will. But talk of a new League of Nations—in the sense of a fresh start outside the existing League—is meaningless, and indifference or hostility to the present attempt to put international relations on a new basis is little short of criminal.

The war has exacerbated nationalism all over Europe to a point where international relations are thought of almost exclusively in terms of hatred, fear, suspicion and force. In such an atmosphere, of course, any system of international co-operation simply is not allowed to function. Gradually, slowly—too slowly hitherto to keep pace with its own destructiveness—the war mind has been giving place to a sense of the terrible realities and urgent needs of Europe, and to a recognition of the basic fact that economically, financially and culturally the nations of Europe are so interwoven that the work of reconstruction in any one nation cannot progress beyond a certain point without the co-operation of all nations.

Meanwhile the agony and confusion of the last four years have at least brought us to a point where it is beginning to be realised (1) that the next step in European reconstruction is a settlement of the problem of German reparations and an agreement with Russia: (2) that when that step has been taken the present League of Nations must be widened into a universal league and become the medium through which the affairs of Europe will be conducted, since the alternative policy, that of dividing Europe into two camps, and so returning to the balance of power and preparation for war, will prove as difficult, owing to the economic and financial interdependence of all the nations concerned, as it is discredited in advance by the political thought of Europe.

SECTION TWO

HOW THE LEAGUE IS ORGANISED

CHAPTER III

THE ASSEMBLY, COUNCIL AND COURT

THE primary organs of the League are the Assembly, Council, International Court and Secretariat-General. In the Assembly each State Member of the League is represented by a delegation of not more than three members. In the Council the four Great Powers—France, Great Britain, Italy and Japan—are permanently represented by one delegate each, while the Assembly, by majority vote, elects six additional members from time to time (the present suggestion is that the term of office is to be three years, and that two of the total six shall retire every year, and after this be ineligible for a period of three years). At present the six members are Belgium, Brazil, China, Spain, Sweden and Uruguay. The Council can decide, with the consent of the majority of the Assembly, to increase the number of powers permanently or temporarily represented. As in all League conferences, the delegations to the Assembly and the Council are government delegations, appointed by and responsible to the governments of the states they represent. Each delegation has one vote, and all questions of procedure, including the formation of committees, the matters to be dealt with by each committee, and the way in which these matters are to be taken up and discussed by the committees, are settled by majority vote—a point which, as the experience of the Genoa Conference has shown, is of utmost

importance for all the small states. On the other hand, as a further safeguard of sovereignty, all decisions of substance, as distinguished from questions of form or procedure, require unanimity, for no government will allow itself to be committed to any policy it does not like by a majority vote of foreign powers. To avoid a deadlock arising out of the unanimity rule the Assembly or Council frequently turns its decision into a "recommendation," which can be passed by a majority vote. This is not so very different in practice from an Assembly or Council "decision" as might appear, for on the one hand neither the decision nor the "recommendation" of a government delegate at a League or any other international conference becomes binding on his government until ratified by that government, involving in most cases the approval of the legislature concerned, while on the other hand the very fact of a government delegate giving his vote for a measure presupposes that his government has given him instructions accordingly and will consequently ratify.

Both the Council and the Assembly are empowered to deal with any matter within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the peace of the world, but each in addition has certain specified powers. Thus it is the Council that in any case of threat of war brought to the notice of the League by a member state is to meet and recommend to the members of the League what action it thinks desirable, and unless a member of the League specifically prefers the Assembly, the Council is the organ designated to inquire or arbitrate in cases of international disputes involving a member of the League. It is also the Council which supervises the working of the mandates system, the administrative and advisory commissions, and the technical organisations. In general, the composition of the Council and the fact that it meets every two months, whereas the

Assembly meets but once a year, has made of it to a great extent the executive and initiatory organ of the League of Nations.

On the other hand, the Assembly, because it contains all the members of the League on a footing of equality, has become the general forum of the League, where League action in the past is discussed and criticised and general lines of policy laid down for the future. Thus the first part of the Assembly's sittings are devoted to debates on the Secretary-General's report on the work of the Council, technical organisations, advisory commissions and Secretariat-General during the previous year, and the second part to the discussion of the agenda put down by the various members of the League or arising out of the Secretary-General's report. In addition the Assembly has two specific and very important powers: it is solely responsible for the admission of new members to the League, who are admitted if they obtain the votes of two-thirds of the members present at the Assembly; it is also responsible for voting the budget of the League for the ensuing year. Estimates are made of how much money will be needed by the Council, the Secretariat-General and other League organisations to hold conferences, pay salaries and allowances and carry out executive work during the next budget year. These sums are then allotted for payment among the Governments Members of the League according to a scale fixed by the Assembly (but not yet in force, as it has not been ratified by a sufficient number of governments; the present scale is that laid down in the Covenant). With this money the League organisations then carry out the work decided upon by the Assembly and render an account of their stewardship through the Secretary-General's report to the succeeding Assembly. This point is worth dwelling upon, for when once thoroughly grasped it will show the

irrelevance—nay, utter meaninglessness—of the cries often raised that the “League of Nations” should produce large sums on short notice from unknown sources for the purpose of carrying out some enterprise proposed by some enthusiast writing to the newspapers or giving a lecture on a cause dear to his heart. The only way any organisation of the League can dispose of money is by a direct grant from a government or private body, or upon the vote of the Assembly, in which all the fifty-two governments of the League are represented, and where questions of policies and the credits to be assigned for these policies are threshed out and decided. The League is not an international committee with King Midas’ touch or alchemic powers, and does not offer a short way of obtaining money without going through the tedious process of convincing governments and taxpayers of the necessity for providing this money.

The permanent Court of International Justice consists of eleven judges and four deputy judges. Its constitution was worked out by a conference of jurists summoned by the Council and was subsequently approved by the Council and Assembly. According to this constitution the judges were elected for nine years by majorities in the Council and Assembly, sitting separately, from a panel of nominees submitted by the national delegations to The Hague Court of Arbitration or by bodies composed in a similar manner. The need for a purely judicial mode of settling international disputes, particularly such as are concerned with questions of fact, treaty interpretation, etc., had long been felt, but it had always hitherto proved impossible to get the nations to agree upon the method of appointing a small permanent body of judges. The constitution of the Court was therefore in itself a considerable achievement on the part of the League. The jurists’ conference had recommended that the

Court should have compulsory powers ; that is, if one party to a dispute wished to bring it before the Court, the other should be bound to appear. The Council, however, struck out this clause and the Assembly, after prolonged debates, substituted a compromise by which an optional paragraph providing for compulsory jurisdiction was added to the constitution of the Court. So far nineteen states¹ have signed this paragraph, all on the basis of reciprocity. By a recent decision of the Council non-members have access to the Court on the same terms as members. Besides the powers conferred upon it by the additional clause concerning compulsory jurisdiction, the Court has power to deal with all cases brought before it by the parties concerned or referred to it for an opinion by the Council or Assembly, or put under its jurisdiction by clauses in treaties, such as, e.g., the Minorities Treaties, the Upper Silesian Convention, the Aaland Islands Convention, the Lama Agreement between Czecho-Slovakia and Austria, etc. In addition to its purely judicial and regular procedure, the Court can, in cases where both parties so desire, apply an extraordinary procedure involving the nomination of *ad hoc* judges and in other ways approximating to the semi-political methods of arbitration. In cases concerning labour or involving technical questions such as transit, finance, or economics, the Court will be assisted by the advice of a panel of experts on the subject concerned.

The Court, the Council and the Assembly are the three organs of the League used for the peaceful settlement of disputes, the Assembly and the Council combining these functions with those already described of respectively general international forum and chief executive body.

¹ Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, Haiti, Holland, Liberia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Norway, Panama, Portugal, San Salvador, Sweden, Switzerland, Uruguay. The adherence of Brazil is conditional upon at least two Great Powers accepting this clause, and so far none has done so.

CHAPTER IV

THE SECRETARIAT-GENERAL, TECHNICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANISATIONS, ADVISORY COMMISSIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE

THE previous chapter gave an account of the organisations (the Assembly, the Council and the International Court) set up by the association of states known as the League of Nations to fulfil the former of the two general purposes to which this association is pledged, namely the submission of disputes to peaceful settlement. In this chapter a description will be given of the second group of organisations (the technical and advisory organisations) maintained by the governments of the League, namely, those whose purpose it is to promote international co-operation in non-political fields.

But before doing so it is necessary to describe the Secretariat-General, which acts as a link between both sets of organisations, and is also the channel of communication between all League organisations and the Governments Members of the League. The Secretariat prepares the agenda of all League bodies, organises all League conferences, keeps the archives, and generally acts as clearing-house for international data concerning the League. It supplies that element of continuity, centralisation, impartiality and expert knowledge that has always been felt

to be a necessity if international co-operation is ever to be a living reality. Through the Secretariat subjects for League conferences are thoroughly prepared on a common and completely international basis by experts who do nothing else and can draw upon their accumulated experience of previous conferences—a method which experience has proved to be more effective than that of a number of improvised, separate and national preparations.

The Secretariat-General is a body of permanent officials, at present drawn from some thirty nationalities, appointed by the Secretary-General and responsible solely to him and the Council and Assembly of the League. That is, the Secretariat is a sort of international civil service, responsible collectively to the governments of the League when meeting in the Assembly or Council; not a body of national representatives, responsible to their respective governments. As there is persistent misunderstanding on this point, and a widespread tendency to confuse the Secretariat of the League with the League itself—that is, to confuse the men and women working in offices in the Hotel National at Geneva with the association of fifty-two states whose servants for certain purposes they are—it is worth while dwelling on the question: The Secretariat in Geneva is no more the “League of Nations” than the State Department in Washington D.C. is the “United States of America.” Indeed, the confounding of the two is in the latter case more plausible than in the former, for the State Department is the foreign ministry of forty-eight united states which, to unite, have given up many of their powers of sovereignty to a Federal Government, whereas the Secretariat of the League is, as its name implies, the secretariat of an association of states which maintain their sovereignty unimpaired, and that are striving to realise, not federal government, but

something more limited in scope and different in kind, namely, international co-operation.

The Secretariat-General consists of a Secretary-General, three Under-Secretaries-General, seven Directors of Section, forty-one Members of Section and a large number of subordinate staff such as translators, secretaries, library staff, etc. This personnel is divided into (1) the Secretary-General, the Under-Secretaries-General and their personal assistants; (2) the Legal Section, Political Section, the Information Section and departments for more or less purely mechanical, although exacting, work, such as the Translation Section, the Distribution Section, Establishment Office, Library, Registry, Publications, Roneo and Typing Departments, etc. These sections are all for the general purposes of the League. In addition, the Secretariat-General comprises (3) the Health Section, the Transit Section, the Economic and Financial Section, the Mandates and Administrative Sections, and departments concerned with such subjects as the trade in opium, the traffic in women and children, etc.

The Sections under (3), while part of the Secretariat-General, also constitute the secretariats of the technical, administrative and advisory organisations of the League, most of which are modelled on the general plan of the League—that is, consist of (1) a standing Committee (corresponding to the Council); (2) a general conference (corresponding to the Assembly); and (3) a secretariat (corresponding to the Secretariat-General). The head of, e.g., the Transit Section of the Secretariat acts as the Secretary-General of the Transit Organisation; the director of the Health Section is *ipso facto* Secretary-General of the Health Organisation, and so forth.

The technical organisations are three in number: (1) The Transit Organisation, whose standing committee is composed of sixteen

members, twelve of whom are elected by a general transit conference of all the members of the organisation, and four of whom are representatives of the four permanent members of the Council. A general conference of the Transit Organisation can be summoned either by the Council acting on the request of the Transit Committee or by the Secretary-General of the League acting at the request of one half of the members of the League. Partial conferences can be convened in a similar way. Resolutions are passed and agenda adopted by a two-thirds majority, which is also sufficient to ensure powers not members of the League being admitted to the Transit Organisation on terms of equality. The Transit Organisation draws up, prepares and passes on its own agenda, but the Council, if unanimous, can delay or veto any action contemplated by the Transit Organisation.

(2) The Health Organisation is modelled on similar lines, but owing to the fact that many members of the League were already members of the Office International d'Hygiène Publique, with headquarters at Paris, it was suggested by the First Assembly that the projected League Health Organisation should be amalgamated with the existing organisation. This plan failed owing to the opposition of the United States, which is a member of the Office International. Instead, a working compromise was reached by which the Health Committee is appointed by the Council, and includes members of the head office of the Office International, and the Office International, in its turn, undertakes to co-operate with the Health Committee and, in fact, to act in practice as the general conference of the League Health Organisation. In addition, the Health Organisation includes the Epidemic Commission, an international committee of three members attached to the Health Section of the Secretariat-General, but working in East Europe.

(3) The Financial and Economic Organisation is still in what may be called the larval stage of its development ; that is, consists of a committee appointed by the Council and a secretariat which forms a section of the Secretariat-General. When a general conference is held the constitution of the body will be drawn up—presumably on similar lines to that of the Transit Organisation.

The Advisory Commissions—that is, the opium commission, the commission on the traffic in women and children, and the committee on intellectual co-operation[†]—are modelled on similar lines to the technical organisations, but the question of their constitution, their agenda, and the summoning of conferences depends wholly on and is decided by the Council of the League.

Besides the direct importance of their work, the technical and advisory organisations are valuable in that they form a link on the one hand between the League and countries still outside that association of states, and on the other between the League and the economic organisation and specialist interests of society. Thus the Baltic States were members of the League technical organisations a year before entering the League, while Germany took part in the Brussels Financial Conference, the Barcelona Transit Conference, the Paris Passport Conference, and the Warsaw Health Conference, is being invited to appoint representatives to the Transit Commission, the Health Committee and the Opium Commission, and has all along been a member of the International Labour

[†] To these must be added the Permanent Advisory Commission on Military, Naval and Air questions, and the Temporary Mixed Commission for the reduction of armaments. The former body consists of military, naval and air officers appointed by the individual Governments Members of the Council, and furnishes technical criticisms of the work on disarmament performed by the latter, which was set up by the Council at the initiative of the Assembly, and consists, besides officers, of politicians, economists and financiers, and representatives of labour and employers. Lord Robert Cecil is a member of the T.M.C.

Office. The work of these organisations, too, brings together men actively engaged in industry, commerce, banking, railway transport and shipping, members of trade unions and co-operatives, doctors and public health officials—all men whose work is of first-rate importance to the daily life of modern society and makes them familiar with the technical and economic interdependence of modern nations. The establishment of international co-operation is facilitated by bringing to bear this point of view, which is rarely represented at old-fashioned diplomatic conferences, where international problems are often made needlessly difficult by being approached wholly from the standpoint of political sovereignty.

The League contains three organisations created to discharge certain duties laid upon it by the peace treaties. These organisations, the Mandates Commission, the Saar Governing Commission and the Danzig High Commissioner, are represented in the Secretariat-General by respectively the Mandates and Administrative Sections.

The Mandates Commission is an advisory body appointed by the Council in order to advise it in connection with the duties entrusted to it by the Covenant of watching over the execution of the mandates system. The majority of the members of this commission must be nationals of countries that are not mandatory powers, and none of the members can hold any official position in the country of which he or she is a national.

It will be remembered that the Allied and Associated Powers at the Peace Conference divided up among themselves certain of the African and Pacific possessions of Germany and Asiatic territories of the Ottoman Empire. The administration of the territories thus taken over is, however, to be based on certain broad principles laid down by Article XXII of the Covenant, and providing that the administering or mandatory nation exercises

its powers on behalf of the League, is to render an annual report to the Council on the territories committed to its charge, and should regard the people under its tutelage as wards, whose well-being and development form a "sacred trust of civilisation." Article XXII distinguishes between "A" and "B" and "C" mandates, according to the degree of civilisation, geographical position, etc., of the populations concerned, and lays down different rules for each. It is this introduction of the principle of trusteeship into colonial government, and the attempts to carry out this principle by means of basing colonial rule in the territories concerned on certain conditions, and subjecting the whole to a measure of international supervision and collective responsibility, that constitute what is called the mandates system.

Under the Versailles Treaty (1) the League's High Commissioner at Danzig is the arbiter, subject to appeals to the Council, of disputes between the Free City and Poland; the Council, moreover, guarantees the rights and constitution of the Free City. (2) The Council appoints a Governing Commission of five in the Saar Basin. This Commission is responsible to the Council for the government of the Saar for a period of fifteen years, after which the inhabitants will decide whether they wish to retain their present status, become French or return to Germany. By the terms of the Versailles Treaty, the French Government has large powers in connection with the exploitation of the mines and the incorporation of the Saar within the French customs system; and the Governing Commission, which must contain one Saar inhabitant, and the appointment of whose members is annually renewable, cannot change the existing legislation of the district without consulting the inhabitants.

Finally, the League of Nations includes one organisation whose peculiar constitution entitles it

to a place apart, although the nature of its work classes it with the technical organisations. This organisation is the International Labour Office, whose membership includes Germany as well as the members of the League, which is controlled by a Governing Body of twenty-four members, namely, eight government representatives from the eight chief industrial states; four government representatives elected by the government delegates of the remaining states; six employers' and six labour representatives, elected respectively by the employer and labour delegates to the International Labour Office Conference. The International Labour Office has its own constitution, based on Article XIII of the Versailles Treaty, its own secretariat, draws up its own agenda, and summons its own conferences. The purpose of the International Labour Office is to establish contact between employers, governments and labour, and co-operation between nations in the field of labour and social legislation, where the need for simultaneous action in all countries, if disadvantages owing to competition are going to be avoided, is often very much felt. For this purpose annual conferences are held, at which international conventions are drawn up regulating the hours and conditions of labour.

This, then, is the machinery of the League of Nations—machinery whose fashioning and assembling is perhaps the greatest achievement that could be expected of the League during the first two and a half years of its existence. Nevertheless, we shall examine in succeeding chapters what work the association of governments called the League of Nations have been able to accomplish through this machinery, even in the war-racked and peace-embittered Europe of 1920-22, and what possibilities for the future this work and this machinery reveal.

SECTION THREE

WHAT THE LEAGUE HAS DONE

CHAPTER V

THE CASE OF VILNA AND THE UPPER SILESIAN SETTLEMENT

IN the following four chapters it is proposed to examine a few of the chief tasks attempted or accomplished by the League during the two and a half years of its existence, in order thereby to gain an idea of the way the League of Nations machinery works and how it is affected by the policies of the states that constitute the League. In this connection it should first of all be noted that it has hitherto been the policy of the chief of these states—namely, the leading Entente Powers—to settle the greatest European questions in an *ad hoc* organ of their own, called the Supreme Council, and to submit to settlement by League procedure and through League machinery only questions of secondary importance or on which they had been unable to agree.

One such question was the dispute between Poland and Lithuania over Vilna. At the Peace Conference the Chief Allied Powers fixed Poland's frontiers in the west, but left her eastern frontier undetermined. As a result Poland and Lithuania found themselves on the brink of war over the question of their respective rights to the town and territory of Vilna. Thereupon, Poland, in September 1920, appealed to the Council of the League.

The first care of the Council was to get both parties to accept a provisional line of demarcation.

A military commission, appointed by the Council, was therefore sent to the spot, succeeded in getting both parties to withdraw respectively east and west of the so-called Curzon line, and established an armistice. On October 8, 1920, however, the Polish General, Zeligowski, broke the armistice agreement, entered Vilna at the head of a division, and set up his famous administration of rebel patriots, which the Polish Government disavowed, but on which it declared itself incapable of exerting pressure.

After this the Council directed its efforts to two points: (1) to settling the fate of the disputed territory by a plebiscite, and failing this, (2) to bring about an agreement between the two parties by means of direct negotiations presided over by a member of the Council. As in the opinion of the Council a plebiscite would ascertain the real wishes of the population concerned only in case General Zeligowski's *de facto* regime were replaced by a "neutral" administration and police force, the Council attempted to secure the evacuation of the territory by General Zeligowski, and had one battalion each put at their service by the British, Danish, French, Norwegian, Spanish and Swedish Governments, in order to form an international force which, under the command of the League's military commissioner in Vilna, was to constitute a neutral force for maintaining order and guaranteeing the impartiality of the plebiscite. The Council, however, failed to arrive at an agreement with General Zeligowski and the Polish Government that it could regard as satisfactory.

The alternative course of direct negotiation between the Polish and Lithuanian Governments under the chairmanship of M. Hymans, the President of the Council, was then tried. These negotiations were based on the idea that the Vilna dispute could be settled if it were treated as part of a general settlement of Poland's and Lithuania's

mutual relations, and were conducted with the intention of creating an association between the two states that may briefly be described as a cross between federation and a standing alliance, somewhat on the lines of the *Ausgleich* between Austria and Hungary in the late Austro-Hungarian Empire. But no solution could be found satisfactory to both parties, and the combined moral authority of the Council and Second Assembly failed to move either from their positions. When neither party accepts a League award the Covenant does not warrant any further action within the League system. In the meantime the Polish Government has since the Second Assembly organised a plebiscite on its own conditions and declares that the result has regularised the position and finally confirmed its claim to Vilna town and territory. This claim is not accepted by the Lithuanian Government.

One school of critics declares that the League's failure to reach a settlement—although it did prevent war—in this case is due to the fact that the League Council, being composed of the chief Allied Powers and a few small powers dependent on them, was throughout biassed in favour of one party to the dispute; this bias prevented it showing the necessary firmness toward the Zeligowski episode, and made the terms of its proposed association between Lithuania and Poland so unfavourable to the former as to ensure rejection. Another school asserts that the League system was never intended to cope with such a task as marking out the frontiers of a new state created by a world war, and the Covenant provides no sufficient powers to enable the Council to ensure compliance with its decision in a matter of this sort. The chief Allied States should either have carried out themselves the task of laying down Poland's eastern frontier, as they had the power to do under the peace treaties, or else put these

additional powers at the service of the League ; in other words, the principal Allied Powers should have asked the Council of the League to give its decision in the question of Vilna and pledged themselves beforehand to ensure compliance with that decision, under the special powers for this purpose granted them by the peace treaties.

In the case of Upper Silesia, too, the chief Entente Powers were unable to settle through their own organ, the Supreme Council, a question of frontiers arising out of the peace treaties, and referred the matter to the League Council in order to break a deadlock. Under the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, the district known as Upper Silesia was to be partitioned between Germany and Poland by the principal Allied and Associated Powers in accordance with a plebiscite taken by communes under the auspices of these powers and with due regard to the economic and geographical nature of the region. After the plebiscite—which gave a little over 60 per cent. of votes for Germany and a little less than 40 per cent. for Poland—the Supreme Council found itself unable to agree as to how the area was to be partitioned.

Accordingly, on August 12, 1921, it asked the Council of the League to examine the question and give a recommendation as quickly as possible on how the new frontier line in Upper Silesia should be traced, unanimously undertaking to adopt the recommendation thus made. The League Council accepted this task, and after two months of hard work, involving consultation of all elements of the Upper Silesian population and the co-operation of a Czech and a Swiss industrial and railway expert, produced a unanimous recommendation, which was transmitted to the Supreme Council.

The recommendation declared that owing to the intermixture of Polish and German elements and the economic interdependence of the whole

district, it was impossible to trace a single dividing line that would not do serious injustice either to the economic needs of the country or to the wishes of the population as expressed by the plebiscite. Consequently, the Council recommended that there should be a political line so traced as to put where possible those who voted for Poland under Polish sovereignty, and leave those who voted for Germany under that country, with the unsatisfied minorities left on each side so far as possible balancing one another. It was claimed that the frontier recommended by the Council fulfilled this condition, since it left within one per cent. as many Poles on the German side of the frontier as Germans on the Polish side. In order, however, to prevent this new political frontier causing economic disturbance, the Council proposed a series of economic, technical and cultural guarantees, to run for fifteen years and intended (1) to preserve for the industries of the territory, separated from Germany their former markets and to ensure the supplies of raw materials and manufactured products necessary for these industries ; (2) to avoid the economic disturbance which would be caused by the immediate substitution of the Polish mark as the sole legal currency in the territory assigned to Poland ; (3) to prevent the working of the railways serving Upper Silesia from being affected by the shifting of the political frontier ; (4) to regulate the supplies of water and electricity ; (5) to maintain freedom of movement ; (6) to guarantee respect for private property ; (7) to ensure that the workers in the territory assigned to Poland should not lose the advantages which were secured to them by German social legislation and by their Trades Union organisation ; and (8) to ensure the protection of minorities on the basis of an equitable reciprocity.

The Supreme Council accepted this recom-

mentation and asked the Council of the League to supervise the negotiations between Germany and Poland for the conclusion of a convention embodying its provisions. For this purpose the Council appointed M. Calonder, former President of the Swiss Federal Council, to act as President of the Germano-Polish Conference, with powers to give an arbitral decision in case of a deadlock between the German and Polish delegations. The negotiations, which lasted over nine months, were concluded at Geneva. Rough draft agreements based on the various clauses of the League recommendation were first worked out on the spot in Upper Silesia by the two delegations divided into several mixed Germano-Polish sub-committees, and in close touch with President Calonder. Afterwards, at Geneva, with the help of technical and juridical experts from the League Secretariat, these agreements were drafted in their final form and incorporated into a convention. At Geneva, too, the questions of guarantees for national minorities and the liquidation of German property in the part of Upper Silesia ceded to Poland were solved by agreement between the two delegations. Thus the Upper Silesian Convention was concluded without President Calonder even once being called upon to exercise his arbitral powers.

The Convention, which is probably the longest diplomatic document on record, certainly longer than the Versailles Treaty, contains 606 articles and establishes a very full and elaborate system of cultural, economic, social and technical guarantees. The guarantees for national minorities, although modelled on the minorities treaties drawn up at the Peace Conference, go considerably further in providing safeguards for the populations concerned, while the Versailles Treaty clauses concerning liquidation of German property are made applicable only to industries employing six hundred workmen, or estates (exclusive of forest land, which is

inalienable) containing more than one hundred hectares, and even the liquidation of these, which cannot take place for fifteen years, is surrounded by safeguards and guarantees intended, as far as possible, to secure German rights.

A mixed Commission, whose chairman is M. Calonder, will watch over the administration of this system and an arbitral tribunal, whose president is M. Kaeckenbeek, a former member of the Legal Section of the Secretariat-General, will adjudicate cases of dispute between Poland and Germany as to the interpretation or application of clauses of the Convention. The Convention furthermore provides for the Permanent Court of International Justice being used as a court of appeal in certain cases. Both M. Calonder and M. Kaeckenbeek were appointed to their positions by the Council at the request of both the German and Polish delegations.

The system inaugurated by the Upper Silesian Convention is coming into operation now, and only the future can show whether it will prove successful. But it is at least a good sign that both the German and Polish delegates to the Upper Silesian Conference declared their belief that the guarantees laid down and the system devised in the Convention were as good as human ingenuity could devise, and would prove workable in case both countries continued to show the same spirit of conciliation and desire for co-operation that they had displayed in the drafting of the Convention.

No decision of the League has been more acrimoniously contested than that made in Upper Silesia. One school of critics—and a very large one; it includes practically all Germans—goes so far as to declare that since Upper Silesia not only gave a 60 per cent. plébiscité majority for Germany but is an economic and geographical unit and an area that has been German for seven

hundred years, whose immense natural riches have been made available entirely by German science and capital and are an integral and essential part of Germany's economic system, Upper Silesia should never have been divided at all, but should have remained *in toto* German. Handing over part of this territory to Poland is, in the opinion of these critics, as politically unjust as it is economically disastrous.

More moderate critics hold that the League never had the choice of whether to divide Upper Silesia or not. By the terms of the Versailles Treaty, runs their argument, there was never any question of not dividing Upper Silesia; the only question was where the new frontier line should be drawn, and this was the only point on which the Supreme Council asked the Council of the League for an opinion. But, continues this school of critics, although the League was bound by the terms of reference to itself and the provisions of the Versailles Treaty to recommend some sort of division, it might have recommended the line supported by certain powers in the Supreme Council, notably England, that would have left the whole industrial triangle with Germany. The fact that it recommended dividing the industrial triangle was a compromise that showed once more the Council's inability to be impartial in any issue disputed between a power favoured by the Entente and a power not so favoured. Had the organisation of the League been complete—that is, had Germany been a member of the Council and had the Permanent Court been in existence—there is no doubt that the Council would have been strong enough to refer the whole matter to the Permanent Court, which is specially designed to deal with questions of fact (in this case geographical and economic facts and the results of the plebiscite,) and questions of treaty interpretation (in this case the clauses of the Versailles Treaty referring to

the Upper Silesian plebiscite by communes). Instead of this, the Council, because of its one-sided composition and because the Court did not exist at the time the Upper Silesian case had to be dealt with, adopted the procedure of leaving the decision in the hands of the minor powers on the Council, who were for the most part minor allies or diplomats dependent on the favour of the leading Entente Powers that composed the rest of the Council.

A third school of commentators, while perfectly ready to accept the conclusion of the second group that the League, to perform its office and fulfil the purposes for which it was created, must include Germany, and include that country in her rightful place as a Great Power with a permanent seat on the Council, incline to the view that in the Upper Silesian question the Council did as well as was possible, considering the terms of the Versailles Treaty. By this Treaty, they say, a division of Upper Silesia was inevitable, and owing to the geographical and economic facts of the case any division, if it were made absolute, would cause very great economic distress. On the other hand, as a result of the plebiscite agitation, the plebiscite itself and the various subsequent incidents, including Korfanty's unsuccessful coup, all of which took place before the League had anything to do with the matter, nationalist feelings in Upper Silesia had been raised to such a pitch that any division of the territory leaving a large minority of either country under the suzerainty of the other would have involved incalculable dangers, not excluding rebellion and wholesale destruction of factories, mines, etc.

Consequently, the Council did the only thing it could do, and that was to draw a boundary line that was nationally as little unsatisfactory as possible, and, at any rate, gave each side the same number of hostages for the good behaviour of the

other, and then insisted upon as stringent and elaborate a system of cultural, technical, economic and social guarantees as it was possible to devise, thereby retaining the economic unity of Upper Silesia for fifteen years—before the expiration of which time it is not unreasonable to hope that Germany and Poland will come to some permanent economic and minorities arrangement over Upper Silesia equally satisfactory to both, and to which the present settlement is such a strong inducement. This system of guarantees was almost entirely a creation of the Council's, although based on a clause in the Versailles Treaty providing for the free export of coal from the ceded portion of Upper Silesia to Germany for a certain period, and in devising it the League Council is held to have made the best of a very bad job imposed upon it by the Versailles Treaty and the dissensions of the Supreme Council, as well as to have vindicated the superiority of League methods over any alternative within the field of practical politics.

CHAPTER VI

THE AALAND ISLANDS, ALBANIA, AUSTRIA, AND REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS

THE Aaland Islands form the westernmost group of the Finnish archipelago, and are situated about midway between the Swedish and Finnish mainland. Soon after the Russian Revolution resulted in the separation of Finland from Russia, the inhabitants of these islands manifested an all but unanimous desire to become Swedish, and Sweden supported their claim to settle the matter by a plebiscite. The ensuing quarrel was embittering the relations between the two countries when the British Government drew the attention of the Council to the matter. In doing so Great Britain was exercising her "friendly right," under Article XI of the Covenant, which reads as follows:—

Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency should arise the Secretary-General shall, on the request of any member of the League, forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.

It is also declared to be the friendly right of each member of the League to bring to the attention of the Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting international relations which threatens to disturb international peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends.

Finland claimed that the League could not intervene, as this was a matter for internal jurisdiction. That question would nowadays presumably be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice for an opinion, but as the Court did not then exist, the Council, after hearing the representatives of both Finland and Sweden, appointed a Committee of Jurists, who decided that the matter was of international concern and hence within the Council's compétence. The Council then appointed a committee consisting of one American, one Belgian and one Swiss (the very M. Calonder who has since been playing such a prominent part in the Upper Silesian settlement), to make a report on the whole question. This committee, after exhaustive study and a visit to the spot, reported that the Aaland Islands were indisputably under Finnish sovereignty and belonged to Finland on historical and geographical grounds, also that the Aaland Islanders were racially no more than a minority, although a special minority, of the Swedish minority within the Finnish State. The Committee's report, which was passed by the Council, further recommended additional guarantees for the autonomy of the islanders that were subsequently made the subject of legislation in the Finnish Parliament. Finally, the Council summoned a diplomatic conference, at which the neutrality of the Aaland Islands was put on an international contractual basis, and guaranteed by Denmark, Esthonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Latvia, Poland and Sweden. The League itself was made sponsor in the last resort for the guarantee of neutrality, as well as in some sort for the whole Aaland Islands settlement.

The outstanding fact of the League's handling of this question was its complete success and the justice of its decision—a justice perceived from the first in Finland and countries not parties to

the dispute, and now tacitly acknowledged by Sweden's growing friendliness to her old daughter-country. It is especially noteworthy that the concession voluntarily granted by the Government of Finland which made the settlement possible could, in Mr. Balfour's words, "never have been obtained at the instance of any external power other than a League of which Finland, in common with most civilised powers, was itself a member." Moreover, Sweden's loyal acceptance of a decision which went against her set an example to all the States Members of the League.

Equally successful was the League's handling of the dispute between the Serb-Croat-Slovene State and Albania. During 1921 the Albanian Government made several appeals to the Council against the threat of an invasion by Yugo-Slav troops. The Albanian Government furthermore appealed to the Second Assembly to fix the frontiers of Albania. The Council decided that the question of an alleged violation of Albania's frontiers was so clearly connected with the actual definition of those frontiers as to make it desirable that the same body should deal with both questions. It therefore referred Albania's complaint against Yugo-Slavia to the Assembly.

The Second Assembly took note of the fact that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers were on the point of fixing Albania's frontiers and urged that they should do so as speedily as possible. It further recommended, in view of the conflicting statements of the Yugo-Slav and Albanian representatives, that a Commission of three should be sent to Albania in order to report on the true state of affairs.

On November 9, 1921, the Conference of Ambassadors fixed Albania's frontiers and communicated copies of their decision to the Secretary-General of the League. In this decision the powers furthermore recognised the Govern-

ment of Albania. Meanwhile, Yugo-Slav armies had invaded Northern Albania, in spite of the stout resistance put up by the Albanians. According to the report of the British Consul at Durazzo, the invaders burned 157 villages. The Belgrade papers were rejoicing over the success of the invasion and the manner in which prisoners were coming in; one paper expressed the prevailing mood in an article headed "Which is stronger, the Serbian Army or the League of Nations?" Then a question was asked in the British House of Commons on November 7th, and the British Government replied by announcing that the Secretary-General of the League had been requested to call a meeting of the Council of the League to consider the situation and to agree upon measures to be taken under Article XVI (providing for the isolation and blockade of a Covenant-breaking State) in the event of the Serb-Croat-Slovene Government refusing or failing to execute their obligations under the Covenant. Immediately Serbian efforts to float a loan in London fell through and Serbian currency depreciated. The Council of the League met in Paris nine days later and was attended by representatives of the Serb-Croat-Slovene and Albanian Governments. The sittings of the Council were held in public, and ended in an undertaking by the Serb-Croat-Slovene and Albanian representatives to withdraw their troops on each side of a neutral zone, and to cultivate good neighbourly relations henceforth. The Conference of Ambassadors was due to send a frontier demarcation Commission to draw the frontier between Albania and Yugo-Slavia, and the Commission of three sent by the League was requested to keep in touch with this Commission, as well as keep the Council informed of how the undertakings of the two states were being carried out. The League's Commission consisted of

Colonel Schaeffer (Luxembourg), Major Meinich (Norway) and Professor J. J. Sederholm (Finland).

Colonel Schaeffer, unhappily, died in Geneva, but Professor Sederholm and Major Meinich were able to proceed to Albania in the latter half of November, and thence reported that the Serb-Croat-Slovene troops had withdrawn behind the frontier line laid down by the Ambassadors' Conference, and that there was no movement of disaffection of any importance against the Albanian Central Government. The Commission, and especially its leading member, Professor Sederholm, who made repeated and protracted visits to the country, were subsequently able to render the Albanian Government valuable services, not only in their official capacity of a committee of observers sent to report on the true condition of Albania, but as a body of distinguished and absolutely disinterested foreigners, representing an organ as authoritative, international and collectively impartial as the Council of the League. In this capacity the members of the committee were able to do much good work in the way of wise counsel, unofficial mediation between the Yugo-Slav and Albanian Governments, and between certain parties within the latter country. In a word, the committee was the incarnation of Western civilisation sent to the Balkans with a watching brief, and so much did the Albanian Government appreciate the value of this arrangement that they asked the Council to appoint technical advisers to help the government build up a modern constitutional state on sound economic and financial foundations.

In compliance with this request the Council once more sent Professor Sederholm and a secretary, the Danish Count von Moltke, to Albania to make a general report on the question of appointing advisers, and is shortly sending members of the Economic and Financial Committee

to make an inquiry and report on the purely financial and economic aspects of the question, with special reference to the means of attracting foreign capital to Albania. The Albanian Government has addressed a further request to the Council, asking if it can arrange a foreign loan for Albania and promising to submit to any control and give any guarantees considered necessary for this purpose.

As Earl Balfour put it at the Eighteenth Council Meeting, no power or organisation in Europe could have done what the League has done for Albania—and been able to do, he might have added, simply because as an association of states pledged to the purposes and methods of the Covenant the League could intervene with a disinterestedness that an individual state would find it difficult to display, coupled with an authority that no other organisation could emulate. The League, in fact, not only promptly stopped what was on the verge of becoming a new Balkan war, but got Albania's frontiers fixed and her government recognised, and has ever since lent a helping hand to that small and still weak, though promising, young state.

The Austrian affair first came before the League in March 1921, owing to the decision of the major Allies to raise the liens they held on Austria in the Reparations Clauses of the Treaty of Trianon as part of a general scheme by which Austria should be enabled to raise credits on the security of her state assets—such as the tobacco monopoly and customs revenue—and effect certain financial and administrative reforms. The whole scheme of internal reforms, raising of liens and credits, was worked out by the Financial Committee of the League and was to take effect under the auspices of the League. At that time Austria was not in such a state of political instability as to warrant the belief that there would be any difficulty in securing the necessary credits, once the liens

were raised and the financial and administrative reforms carried out, as well as League financial control accepted.

The Council of the League then proceeded, during the next few months, to try to obtain the raising of the liens. This proved successful in the case of fifteen out of Austria's seventeen creditors—the United States causing considerable delay—but failed in the case of Roumania and Yugo-Slavia, which declared that unless and until they were themselves released from certain obligations to the major Allies for the repayment of "liberation loans" and indemnification for former Austro-Hungarian State property on their territories, they would not in their turn release Austria from her reparations obligations to them.

In the meantime Austria's condition became so grave by February 1922 as to cause fears of imminent collapse—that is, failure of the currency to buy anything, even within Austria, consequent starvation and social upheavals, etc. This induced Great Britain, France, Italy and Czecho-Slovakia to come to the rescue by securing the raising of the remaining liens and advancing loans from public funds. Great Britain paid £1,250,000, France prepared to advance 55,000,000 francs, Italy 70,000,000 lire and Czecho-Slovakia 500,000,000 crowns. Of these sums the British advance has been wholly spent, but considerable proportions of the French and Italian grants and a smaller proportion of the Czecho-Slovakian loan still remain available. These monies, however, Austria was in too bad shape to use for putting her finances on a sound basis and instead merely consumed them in current expenditure to keep the wolf from the door a little longer.

By August 1922 the situation was once more desperate, and Austria made a last appeal to the Supreme Council meeting in London, while

Chancellor Seipel travelled to Prague, Berlin and Rome to try, as it were, to sell Austria to anyone putting up the necessary money. Berlin did not see its way to doing anything with this offer, while neither the Little Entente nor Italy was willing to see the other gain control of Austria, although each was not averse from the idea for its own account. The result was to create a political situation of the very gravest sort—on the one hand the approaching dissolution of Austria, on the other the prospect of the Little Entente and Italy becoming embroiled over the remains. The Supreme Council did not think it could do anything in this matter, and referred it back to the League with the statement that no credits would be forthcoming unless as part of a general scheme that made it certain that Austria would this time get on her legs once and for all. The difficulty was that Austria's political situation was so bad, owing to the imminent danger of social upheavals, that no financiers would advance any money, however good from the purely financial point of view were the securities offered.

The Council was thus faced by a problem far more complex and desperately difficult than in March 1921. The way it met this problem was first of all to invite Austria and Czecho-Slovakia, under Article XV of the Covenant, to take their seats in the Council with the same rights as the regular members while this subject was discussed, and secondly to form a Committee of the Council consisting of the representatives of these two powers—i.e. Chancellor Seipel and Dr. Benes—as well as of the three members of the Council, Great Britain (represented by Lord Balfour), France (M. Hanotaux) and Italy (Marquis Imperiali) to discuss the political aspects of the problem. In addition, the League Financial Committee was called upon to produce a comprehensive scheme of financial assistance

and administrative reform, while the Economic Committee considered what immediate economic measures—restarting of industries, utilisation of water-power, etc.—could usefully be recommended. At the same time a Legal Committee, drawn partly from the permanent staff of the secretariat and partly from the legal experts of the several delegations, was constituted to advise on all legal questions arising from this problem. The secretarial work was, of course, discharged by the officials of the Secretariat-General.

In this way, by bringing all the interested powers together round a table with ample expert assistance from impartial officials, a complete scheme was evolved, based on the political integrity and economic independence of Austria, which are solemnly guaranteed by a protocol signed by all the powers concerned. Aided by the confidence which it is hoped this declaration will create, Austria is to begin a programme of reforms which will ensure the balancing of her budget by the end of 1924. Meanwhile her excess of expenditure over revenue will be met by the proceeds of loans of which the guaranteeing powers—Great Britain, France, Italy and Czecho-Slovakia—undertake to cover 80 per cent. The remaining 20 per cent. is to be covered by advances from all the other countries. Switzerland has already signified her willingness to take up part of the remaining sum. The total sum to be raised will amount to some 650 million gold crowns (£30,000,000), which will be paid out in instalments during the next two years. The successful accomplishment of the reforms will be a difficult and painful task and will for a time mean even greater hardship for Austria than at present. But after going through this period Austria will become self-supporting, while without it she would go straight to starvation and revolution.

For the purpose of ensuring the successful accomplishment of the reforms a Commissioner-General will be appointed by the Council in order to control the disposal of the loans and thereby to supervise the execution of the reforms in collaboration with the Austrian Government. The Austrian Parliament is to be requested to pass a bill giving the Austrian Government full powers during these two years to carry out the programme of reforms. The Commissioner-General, to be appointed by and responsible to the Council, must not be drawn from any of the principal guaranteeing countries nor from any country bordering upon Austria;—it is expected that he will be either a Swede or a Dutchman, and in any case a completely impartial official, whose one interest is the success of the scheme in the permanent interests of the Austrian people. He will live in Vienna and report monthly to the Council of the League. His functions will end so soon as the Council judge that the financial stability of Austria is assured. In addition, as a concession to the Italian Government, which at first wished the functions of the Commissioner to be vested in a committee appointed by and responsible to the guaranteeing governments, a committee of control is to be appointed by the guaranteeing powers with an Italian chairman and Czecho-Slovakian vice-chairman, with votes proportionate to the sums advanced. This committee will meet from time to time, normally at the seat of the League, and its approval by a two-thirds majority is required to the main conditions under which the joint loan, whose interest and amortisation are guaranteed, is to be subscribed. The committee, in addition, receives copies of the monthly reports presented by the Commissioner-General to the Council, may ask him for information as to the progress of the reforms, and may make representations to him with regard to safeguarding the interests of the guarantors. The

committee, in exercising these functions, communicates, not with the Austrian Government, but with the Commissioner-General, and has the right of appeal to the Council.

The great difficulty about this scheme is its bearing on the internal politics of Austria, since the Austrian socialists undoubtedly look upon it as an attack on the progress achieved by labour and socialism in Austria, and since the dismissal of a great number of state officials will aggravate the grave problem of unemployment. On the other hand, as Austria, with six million inhabitants, has at present more civil servants, and those appointed on a political basis, than the whole former Austro-Hungarian Empire of fifty million; and since, while Austrian railway employees' wages have risen with the cost of living, railway tariffs are only one-fifth of what they should be on this basis, it is obviously essential to carry out drastic reforms. The attempt will be made as far as possible to dismiss employees only *pari passu* with the restarting of industry as a result of the loans, so that the ex-employees can find productive employment. Moreover, since Germany is not at present in a condition to help Austria on her feet—quite apart from France's political veto against Austria joining Germany—and since an attempt at union with Italy or the Little Entente means a war with the other party, Austria must continue, for the next two years at least, on an independent basis. She can only do so by accepting this scheme, however bitter some of its conditions, for the alternative is starvation and anarchy.¹

The question of reduction of armaments has made considerable progress during the last year. On the one hand a mass of data on armaments, armament budgets, etc., have been collected, that form the necessary background for a scheme of all-round proportionate reduction of armaments,

¹ See Appendix C, Note 1.

while on the other the principles have been drawn up of a guarantee treaty by which states that have reduced their armaments to the accepted standard would agree to come to the rescue of such of their number as may be attacked. This obligation, in the form originally proposed by Lord Robert Cecil, should be general—i.e. embrace all states, whether members of the League or not, in one continent—and come into force only on behalf of states that had conformed to the reduced standard of armaments. Such a state could appeal to the Council if its territory were invaded on any pretext whatever by the forces of another state, and the Council would then have to ascertain, by a three-quarters majority and within four days, whether invasion had actually taken place, in which case the Treaty would automatically come into force. In response to French objections the Third Assembly passed a compromise resolution by which treaties between smaller than continental groups of states were allowed, provided they were open to the adherence of all states, and by which reduction of armaments would be proportionate to the number and strength of the states composing the group. Mr. Fisher made it fairly clear that Great Britain was very distrustful of partial agreements, since they might so easily degenerate into rival alliances of the pre-war type, and the Assembly as a whole put on record its opinion that the moral and political atmosphere of Europe must be cleansed by a settlement of the debts and reparations problem before reduction of armaments was feasible. The Scandinavian nations, while rallying to the principle of a guarantee pact, put forward the view that it should be accompanied by some sort of assurance that the foreign policy of the guaranteed states did not get them gratuitously into trouble and so involve their guarantors in a war. The Assembly requested the Council to instruct the Temporary Mixed Commission for

reduction of armaments to produce a draft treaty on the lines of the guarantee pact, in time for presentation to the Fourth Assembly in September 1923.

The Temporary Mixed Commission will therefore have to deal exhaustively with this question during the coming year. In this connection it has been suggested that to meet British and neutral objections a clause should be inserted in the guarantee pact stipulating that it could be invoked only by a state which had referred to the Council, Court or Assembly the political issues involved in the alleged invasion, or by a state which, when the League had given its final award, accepted that award. A provision of this sort would take all the sting out of a partial pact, for it would mean that such a pact could become operative only on behalf of the principle that (1) a state whose case is *sub judice* in the League must be defended; (2) a state which has accepted the League's award in the case at issue must be defended. By the same token, the objection of the neutral states is met, for obviously this provision would mean that a state, in order to enjoy the protection of the guarantee treaty, must submit its case to the League and must subsequently accept the League's award, i.e. must conduct its foreign policy in such a way as to deserve the support of the community of nations. At the same time this provision would put a premium on referring disputes to the League as soon as there was the slightest hitch, and so getting them settled by peaceful means before the contingency of war ever arose; i.e. the guarantee pact would become in the highest degree preventive in character, and would greatly reduce the very possibility of war.

The whole question of disarmament is little beyond the stage of general ideas and a mass of data as yet, and obviously final success can come only as the ultimate step in a process that

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includes political settlement, moral appeasement and economic co-operation in Europe. But what has been done and is being done through the League gives all men and women of good will common lines to work on and a common ideal to work toward. It remains for public opinion in each country to hammer out a national policy that will enable us all together to converge on the goal of disarmament.

CHAPTER VII

REPATRIATION OF WAR PRISONERS; RELIEF OF REFUGEES; THE WORK OF THE HEALTH ORGANISATION

THE two preceding chapters have sketched some of the League's activities in the settlement of political disputes. A cursory examination of a few of the chief pieces of work accomplished or attempted by the League on the non-political side will be the object of the next two chapters.

One of the first tasks that confronted the League on its formation was the urgent necessity for repatriating the hundreds of thousands of war prisoners that found themselves, at the end of the war, thousands of miles away from their homes and in countries which through war and revolution in a position to take any steps themselves. The had been reduced to a state where they were not bulk of these men were Russian prisoners in Germany and Austria-Hungary and Austro-Hungarian and German prisoners in East Russia, West Siberia and Turkestan. The plight of the latter was particularly terrible, owing to the disorder following upon the Russian Revolution. The death-rate in the prison camps of Siberia and Turkestan from cold, typhus, overcrowding and lack of food was awful. The Council appointed Dr. Nansen as its High Commissioner, and he, backed by the organisation of the League, raised some £500,000 from government, Red Cross and private sources, negotiated with the German,

Austrian, Hungarian and Russian Soviet Governments, chartered shipping and organised repatriation routes over the Baltic, the Black Sea and via Vladivostok. At the Second Assembly Dr. Nansen was able to report that his work was practically finished, and that altogether some half a million men had been returned to their homes.

The question of the 800,000 Russian emigrés and refugees scattered over Europe also came before the League, on the ground that the relief of their situation was both a question of international concern and a matter with which only governments could deal. Dr. Nansen was appointed High Commissioner by the Council to deal with the question of Russian refugees, and has since been trying to arrive at agreements with the various governments concerned by which refugees concentrated in countries where they can find no work would be allowed to travel to other countries where there is work. The great difficulty has been the finding of money to finance these movements of refugees and to set them up in such countries as, e.g., South America and the British Dominions, that might be disposed to receive them and grant them land. In this connection the American Relief Administration, whose head is Mr. Hoover, offered to contribute a sum equivalent to £30,000 sterling, provided the Governments Members of the League raised an equal amount for the transport and finding of relief for the Russian refugees in and around Constantinople. In response to this offer, Great Britain promised to pay £10,000 and Japan £3,000, provided the remaining sum was raised. Various other governments contributing, the sum was raised to £17,000 and then the American Red Cross stepped in and by a generous last-minute donation of £13,000 brought up the total to the required £30,000. Work has in consequence begun on behalf of the refugees.

In the middle of the Third Assembly, owing to the Turkish victory over Greece, an urgent telegram was received by Dr. Nansen from his representative in Constantinople to the effect that hundreds of thousands of Greek and Armenian refugees were pouring into Constantinople and the environs from Asia Minor and were in imminent danger of starvation. The Assembly applied extraordinary procedure to the discussion of this matter and within twenty-four hours had put it on the agenda, pushed it through a committee and referred it to the Council, which voted 100,000 francs from the item devoted to Unforeseen Expenses on the League's present budget, to cover additional administrative charges up to the end of the year. The British Government thereupon offered £50,000, to be paid in proportion as the remaining members of the League raised an equal amount. Sums amounting to £16,000 were promised by other governments—Canada and Greece £5,000 each, Spain £2,000, and Sweden, Norway, Denmark, New Zealand £1,000 each—before the end of the Assembly, and the British Government has consequently already paid in the sum of £16,000. New Zealand has paid her £1,000, and other sums will, it is hoped, be quickly forthcoming.¹

In the field of health work the League has already been able to accomplish a good deal. The Council of the League has been instrumental in bringing together the League of Red Cross Societies and the International Committee of the Red Cross in a Joint Council in order to prevent overlapping and confusion and the more effectively to conduct their work of succouring the underfed and disease-stricken populations in Central and Eastern Europe. The Council furthermore succeeded in effecting a series of agreements between the governments and the Joint Council

¹ See Appendix C, Note 2.

facilitating the work of the latter and making certain forms of government aid available in the various countries where the Red Cross is working, or in which it purchases its stores.

The Council also in May 1920 set up the temporary Epidemic Commission, a small committee attached to the Health Section of the League Secretariat, for the purpose of co-operating with the health authorities of Russia and the new states of East Europe in their campaign against epidemics. For epidemiological reasons a beginning was made in Poland. The work of this Commission, which is still being actively pursued, is a first experiment in international sanitary co-operation on a large scale and has been a conspicuous success. Through appeals to the Governments Members of the League, made by the Council and endorsed by the government delegates assembled at the First, Second and Third Assemblies, some £205,000 have up to date been raised for the work of this Commission. This sum has been used by the Commission for delivering to the health authorities of the East European states, chiefly Poland, the motor-transport, soap, clothing, medical stores, etc., most needed for the anti-epidemic campaign, as well as providing funds for the repair and equipment of bathing and disinfecting establishments, quarantine stations hospitals, etc. The Commission also delivered fifty complete fifty-bed hospital units.

As the epidemic situation, however, became worse again in the winter of 1921-22, owing to the effect of the Russian famine on the health of the population, and the consequent pressure on Russia's neighbours, the Polish Government, with the approval of the League Council and in reliance on the support of the League Health Organisation and Secretariat, summoned an All-European Sanitary Conference in Warsaw, March 20th-28th, 1922. This conference was attended by, in addition

to the European members of the League, Germany, Hungary (at that time not yet a member of the League), Soviet Russia, Soviet Ukraine and Turkey. It made a full and authoritative report on the epidemic condition of Russia according to the latest data, and worked out a plan of campaign for the fighting of epidemics both inside Russia and along the border. The plan and the report were both submitted to the Genoa Conference by the Council, on the ground that an anti-epidemic campaign in East Europe was an essential preliminary to the task of European financial and economic reconstruction, which was the object of the Genoa Conference's discussions. At the last plenary meeting of the Genoa Conference a resolution was passed by which the assembled delegates pledged themselves to put the matter before their respective parliaments and demand the funds (estimated at £1,500,000) necessary to undertake the campaign. It seems likely, however, that the plea of the interdependence of reconstruction and a great anti-epidemic campaign is going to be interpreted to mean that until the work of reconstruction is begun no serious attempt will be made to launch the campaign—in other words, that the fighting of disease in East Europe on a large scale is being made to attend on the reaching of a general agreement with Soviet Russia.

Meanwhile the British Government has offered to contribute 50 per cent. of the sums raised by the remaining members of the League up to a maximum of £100,000; that is, the British Government will pay up to £100,000 if the other members of the League between them contribute up to £200,000.¹ This sum is to be used for extending the work of the Epidemic Commission northward into Latvia and eastward into the

¹ Czecho-Slovakia has since contributed 1,000,000 Czech crowns (about £8,000), Belgium may pay 50,000 francs, and Switzerland a smaller sum.

western marches of Russia and the Ukraine ; in other words, the necessity for carrying out one part of the Warsaw Conference programme immediately is recognised.

Some time ago the League Health Organisation sent out a small commission, made up of members of the League Health Committee and the Office International d'Hygiène Publique, for the purpose of inquiring into the whole question of public health regulation in the Near East, with special reference to the need for revising, in view of the altered conditions now obtaining, the International Health Convention concluded at Paris in 1912. A revised draft of the first part of this Convention has already been prepared by the Office International, with the object of including typhus and relapsing fever in the Convention and of providing more thoroughly for the application of sanitary measures to land traffic (the Paris Convention of 1912 deals almost entirely with tropical diseases and seaborne traffic). The Committee of Inquiry, after a thorough investigation, presented a report to the Council suggesting a revised text for Parts II, III and IV of the Paris Convention, and a number of special measures designed to unify and improve health control in the areas of (1) Egypt and the Suez Canal, (2) the Arabian Peninsula, Palestine and Syria, (3) Constantinople and the Black Sea ports. The report furthermore urges the necessity for an international Sanitary Committee to co-ordinate the work of the public health authorities throughout the Near East and welcomes the expressed intention of the French Government to summon an international conference of the Office International d'Hygiène Publique for drawing up a new Paris Convention, based on the present one and the revised texts proposed by the Office International and the Committee of Inquiry.¹ The Council approved this report

¹ It will be remembered (see Chapter IV) that the Office International d'Hygiène Publique acts as the " general assembly "

and has placed the services of the League Health Organisation and Secretariat at the disposal of the French Government, for the purposes of the proposed conference.

In December 1921 the Health Organisation held a conference in London on the standardisation of sera and serological tests, as the starting-point of a general inquiry undertaken conjointly with the Office International. Hitherto the various systems for measuring and testing the strength of anti-toxins have been evolved independently of one another within different nations and even by different doctors of the same nationality, thus causing much confusion and many difficulties. In present conditions a doctor of one country often cannot diagnose or prescribe for a patient who has begun his treatment in another country. Similarly, results of research work cannot be made available outside their country of origin, since other institutes use methods built up on different principles. The creation of a uniform system of nomenclature and units of measurement is thus evidently a necessary piece of international medical co-operation, involving prolonged and co-ordinated research work in many different laboratories. The State Health and Serological Institutes of Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, Switzerland and the U.S.A. took part in the preliminary conference which elaborated a programme of inquiry and research to be carried out by the different laboratories and centralised in the Copenhagen Institute, acting as a clearing-house for all the work.

On September 25th to 27th a small interim conference was held at Geneva, attended by repre-

of the League Health Organisation, while remaining an independent body. In particular, it is the Office International that holds conferences to draw up conventions. But the seat of the Office International is Paris, and its constitution provides that it is the French Government which summons its conferences.

representatives of the state epidemiological laboratories of Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Soviet Russia and the U.S.A., which adopted a uniform international standard for each of the two anti-toxins—diphtheria and tetanus—on which the preliminary work had been completed. Results of the work on anti-pneumococcus, anti-meningococcus and anti-dysentery sera, as well as the sero-diagnosis of syphilis, were examined and a further programme of research work adopted at a second general conference held at the Pasteur Institute in Paris from November 20th to 26th. This conference not only marked a fresh and highly successful stage in the slow, cumulative process which all research work entails, but showed how the basis of this work is widening as it proceeds. At the second conference there were not only more countries represented—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Poland, Roumania, Russia, Switzerland and the U.S.A.—but the delegations were more numerous and contained bigger men representing more weighty institutions. French, British and German medical science was particularly strongly represented. The British delegation consisted of three doctors from the Ministry of Health, three from the Medical Research Council and two from the Oxford Pathological Institute.

At the Council Meeting in London in July 1922 the agreement was approved in principle which the Health Committee, at its subsequent meeting in August, concluded with the International Health Board of the Rockefeller Foundation. By this agreement the Foundation endows two special branches of the League's work—epidemiological intelligence and the interchange of sanitary staff—to the extent of \$30,000 a year for five years for the former and \$60,000 a year for three years for the latter. By the latter arrangement the Health Committee will be able to organise a system

of exchange courses—both lectures and practical work—for health officers from different countries as well as travelling medical scholarships for health officers wishing to study some particular subject connected with their work and able to satisfy the conditions laid down by the Health Committee. Moreover, the committee will be able to extend and perfect the epidemiological intelligence service which it has organised since the end of last year, in order to inform all national health authorities rapidly and effectively of the incidence of epidemic diseases and to study the best methods of collecting and distributing epidemiological data. The need of some clearing-house for epidemiological information has long been felt and is particularly acute in view of the present disease conditions in East Europe. At present information is sent out by the Health Section of the League Secretariat at least twice in three weeks. In order further to complete the information thus sent out, a periodical epidemiological Intelligence Bulletin is also being issued by the Health Section. This bulletin contains month-to-month statistics and charts on the incidence all over the world of Asiatic cholera, typhus, relapsing fever, dysentery, small-pox, anthrax, scurvy, etc.

The first essay in interchange of sanitary staff consisted of a two-months'—October 9th to December 17th—course in Belgium and Italy for a selected number of health officials, followed by a stay of a few days at Geneva. In both Belgium and Italy the public health officials taking the course were given a course of lectures in the capital of the country, by the heads of its health service, supplemented by visits to hospitals, asylums, crèches, reservoirs, aqueducts, drainage and sewage systems, bacteriological laboratories, local and central administrations—in a word, a first-hand view of all the machinery for preserving health and combating disease in a modern state. This

theoretical course of study and observation was followed by a period of actual apprenticeship to the health services of the countries concerned, and for this purpose the officials taking the course were scattered all over the country they were visiting.

Thus these twenty odd officials—two from Austria, two from Belgium, one from Bulgaria, two from Czecho-Slovakia, four from Italy, five from Poland, five from Soviet Russia and the Ukraine, two from the Serb-Croat-Slovene State—gained a pretty good working knowledge of the sanitary administration of two West European countries, and forged a number of enduring personal links, both with each other and with important members of the health services of the countries they visited. During the final few days of the course these officials assembled at Geneva, where they each had to give a lecture, followed by discussion, on what they had seen and what practical bearing they thought their experiences could be made to have. They were also taken over the League Secretariat, brought into touch with its leading members, and then given a series of lectures on the nature, organisation and work of the League, with special reference to the Health Organisation, its history, how it was constituted, what it had done, its relations to governments and national health services, to the rest of the League machinery, and so forth.

The value of a course of this sort for the new states, by helping them gain knowledge and build up their traditions and health systems, for all states, by cultivating the international spirit and making possible far-reaching international co-operation, is too obvious to need comment. It is hoped that the first course will serve as a first experiment in the light of which a system of regularly recurring and ever more effective courses can be arranged among the various countries. Most of the money for this purpose

has been found for the next three years by the splendid generosity of the Rockefeller Foundation, and it is hoped that after this period of time the Governments Members of the League will be sufficiently impressed by the value of the work to finance it wholly themselves.

On November 3rd the Health Committee, in view of the increase of sleeping-sickness and tuberculosis in Africa since the war, appointed a small expert committee from the three countries—Belgium, France, Great Britain—having colonial interests in tropical Africa. The findings of this committee, which sat in London, will serve as the basis of the action recommended by the Health Committee on the subject. The action will probably take the form of approaching the states concerned through the League Council, and so getting an international conference summoned, at which draft sanitary conventions will be drawn up, providing for common action in preventing the spread of the disease, reporting its incidence promptly and accurately, quarantining and surveying infected or suspected persons, etc. Presumably the Health Organisation might prove useful for the purposes of this conference and the connecting link in the campaign of common action.

On November 3rd the Health Committee, at the suggestion of its Japanese member and with the approval of the governments concerned, sent a small mission of two members on a six-months' tour of investigation of the chief ports in the Far East, for the purpose of studying the different methods in force for sanitary, anti-epidemic and quarantine regulation, with particular attention to the necessity for preventing the spread of diseases by seaborne traffic. The object of collecting this information is partly that this is useful in itself and partly that it may serve as the basis for a conference between the powers concerned for co-ordinating and tightening up sanitary and anti-

epidemic measures throughout the Far East. This is important, for—although temporarily eclipsed by the fresh giant source of landborne infection in Russia—seaborne tropical diseases coming from the Far East have been the main enemy of port sanitary authorities all over the world.

In short, the war has, in the domain of public health as elsewhere, lowered standards, relaxed efforts, and at the same time made the need for continuous international action doubly clear; and the League has, here as elsewhere, evolved into an attempt to meet this situation on the only possible lines. Through the League Health Organisation the necessary officials have been set up, knowledge and experience gained, contacts established between the governments concerned and methods worked out by which they can co-operate—the whole machinery is ready, and all that is needed is an intelligent will in governments and public opinion to set it doing the work of reconstruction, for which it was created and that must be done.[†]

[†] See Appendix C, Note 3.

CHAPTER VIII

OPIUM, THE TRAFFIC IN WOMEN AND CHILDREN, FINANCE, TRANSIT

UNDER Article XXIII of the Covenant, the League of Nations is charged with the duty of securing international co-operation in the fight against the traffic in women and children and in the control of the traffic in opium and dangerous drugs. Both these matters were the subject of international action before the war, but in both the need for some continuous central body, watching over and stimulating action in this matter in all the countries concerned, has been badly felt. That is, in both cases international conferences had been held and conventions adopted, but after this point there was no means of urging the various governments to ratify and enact the conventions that had been adopted, to collect information on their working in practice, and to suggest ways of increasing their efficacy. The League system supplies these deficiencies—it provides advisory committees that are bodies of experts who, in conjunction with the corresponding sections of the Secretariat-General, are exclusively and *permanently* occupied with gathering full information on the existing situation in their respective subjects, and for this purpose in constant communication with all the Governments Members of the League, as well as with governments such as the German, which, although not yet in the League, is represented on the Opium and Traffic in Women and Children Committees ;

it provides regular conferences of government representatives, i.e. the Council and the Assembly, which give opportunities for discussing and taking action on the reports and suggestions of the advisory committees; the League system and machinery also facilitate the holding of special conferences when the time is ripe for drafting fresh conventions; and finally, through the League Secretariat and advisory committees, governments and private organisations working on these subjects are brought into contact, the Press is informed and public opinion focused on the question at issue.

The Hague Opium Convention, concluded in 1912, but not generally ratified until January 1920, and then only by its incorporation in the Peace Treaties, is the only convention controlling the traffic in opium and dangerous drugs. The League Council, at the suggestion of the Opium Committee and by the request of the First and Second Assemblies, is (1) securing information from all governments on the enactment and working in practice of the convention. (2) Urging ratification on such states as have not yet done so. (3) Recommending a system of government import and export licences, the better to control trade in opium and dangerous drugs. (4) Making an inquiry as to the average quantities of these substances needed in all countries for legitimate purposes, with a view to (5) summoning an international conference empowered to discuss the cutting down of opium cultivation to the amounts strictly necessary for legitimate purposes. The difficulties in the way of the last project are, however, at present probably insuperable, since three of the four chief producing countries, namely China, Persia and Turkey, are not to-day, as regards opium growing, controlled or controllable by their own governments, and the fourth—India—is inclined to take a very elastic view of "legitimate requirements." Drastic

control of imports is probably, therefore, the only feasible method at present.

Lastly, a system of control at the source has been suggested by the Opium Committee for the manufacture and sale of cocaine. By this system every step of the process, from the coca leaf to the dose in the hypodermic syringe of the dentist's cabinet, would be controlled by government licences—government licence and control for the manufacturer, for the wholesaler, the retailer and the consumer. Only in this way, it is contended, is it possible to stop the abuse of this drug, which, owing to its extreme potency and the fact that it is made as a powder, can easily be smuggled in minute quantities and in ways that defy detection.

In the matter of the Traffic in Women and Children, too, the first action of the League Council was to send a *questionnaire* to all states parties to the conventions of 1904 and 1910, and to ask states not yet parties to these conventions to adhere to them. Furthermore, the Council summoned a conference which met at Geneva on June 30, 1921, and included thirty-four states. Representatives of the International Women's Organisation, the International Catholic and the Jewish Associations for the Protection of Girls, and the Federation of National Unions for the Protection of Girls were also present. (These organisations are represented, in a technical capacity, on the advisory committee concerned with this subject.) The resolutions of this conference were cast by the Second Assembly into the form of a draft convention, including, but designed to bring up to date and strengthen, the 1904 and 1910 conventions. This draft convention has now been ratified by some thirty powers. It provides notably for (1) making not only offences, but also attempts to commit offences, punishable. (2) Facilitating the extradition of accused persons. (3) Raising the age of consent from twenty to

twenty-one years. (4) Protecting women and children seeking employment in foreign countries by means of the supervision of employment agencies and notices at ports and railway stations, warning against the traffic and indicating places where accommodation and assistance could be obtained. (5) Setting up central authorities in each country for dealing with the enforcement of the convention.

The work done through the League in the questions of transit, finance and economics was made the basis for the deliberations on these subjects of the Genoa Conference, which did little more than approve what had been done and urge that this work be continued. In addition, the Transit and Economic and Financial Committees act as the advisers of the Council, the latter notably having been of great use in this respect in the settlement of the questions of Albania and Austria.

As regards transit and communications, the League has been instrumental, through the Paris Passports Conference, in securing a simplification and relaxation of the system of passports and *visas*, which was very rigid and complicated after the war, and the League Transit Organisation is now conducting an inquiry into the question of unification of the system of tonnage measurement and of port and harbour rules for the waterways of Europe. But the main work of the League in this field was accomplished in the Barcelona Transit Conference, which was held in March-April 1921, and in which forty-three states, including Germany and Hungary (at that time not a member of the League) took part. This conference drew up: (1) A convention on the general principles which should govern the freedom of transit for persons and goods. (2) A convention relating to waterways of international concern. This convention, which is an elaboration and adaptation to modern conditions of principles laid

down by the Congress of Vienna more than one hundred years ago, guarantees absolute liberty of navigation in all waterways common to several states, with equal treatment for all flags, and with the prohibition of any special customs duties or vexatious taxes or demands. Arrangements are made for the maintenance and improvement of the fairway, and river ports are put at the disposal of foreigners as well as nationals. (3) A recommendation and resolutions regarding the use of railways and international ports, based on the same principles as the two conventions. The Conference, furthermore, made provisions for future plenary or partial meetings and in particular for another general conference in the spring of 1923, at which the recommendations and resolutions regarding railways will be cast into the form of a convention.

The Genoa Conference based its discussions on the findings of the Barcelona Conference, urged that the conventions drawn up there should be ratified without delay, and recommended that the work done in this field should be continued on the same lines.

In September 1920 the Council of the League summoned the Brussels Financial Conference, which was attended by thirty-seven countries, including Germany and the United States, and which provided the first comprehensive and authoritative survey of the financial and economic condition of post-war Europe. The report and recommendations of the Brussels Conference formed the substance of the Genoa Conference's resolutions on finance and economics. These resolutions are, however, likely to remain Platonic until the question of reparations is solved, before which, as the Third Assembly pointed out, there is no hope of sound finance or sound politics in Europe. Meanwhile the findings of the Brussels Conference have helped in the process of sobering up public opinion.

Lastly, the Economic and Financial Commission is conducting inquiries into such questions as double taxation, the flight of capital, the reciprocal treatment of foreign banks, an international understanding on the subject of lost, stolen or destroyed securities and the unification of legislation regarding Bills of Exchange. Exhaustive investigation, the collection of full information, and careful preparation of the questions in consultation with the governments interested will be followed, according to the already established method of dealing with these matters, by the summoning of an international conference, where draft conventions will be drawn up, to be submitted for ratification, and further progress watched by the League machinery established for these purposes.

This, then, is an outline of what the League has done or attempted in the three years of its existence—an outline not pretending to be complete, and sure to be out of date before it appears in print, but sufficient to base certain conclusions on. The first conclusion is that the League organisation and methods have shown themselves elastic and comprehensive enough to cope with the many and varied and sometimes wholly unexpected problems they have had to face; that, indeed, the League machinery has developed a certain smooth accuracy and certainty in its handling of the matters with which it has to deal that tend to inspire confidence in the correctness of the general idea and principles on which the League system is based.

On the other hand—and this is the second conclusion—the League as an association of states betrays a certain onesidedness in its handling of political problems where the interests of an ex-Ally are concerned. This applies in a less degree to the Assembly than to the Council, but it applies to both, for in neither, any more than at Genoa or in any post-war European Conference,

is there a power or group of powers that balances the Allied group. This is an evil greater in theory than in fact, for the Allies hardly ever are in agreement with each other politically. Nevertheless, the evil is a real one. The remedy is clear, and consists in the universalising of the League. The next step, in the present condition of world affairs, is equally clear—it consists in Germany's adherence. This would of itself cure two other evils—the tendency to make the League a rag-bag for minor or thankless tasks, reserving all important decisions for a special Allied organ, and slackness in ratifying decisions taken at League conferences. Germany's inclusion would make the League the centre of the political stage; first-class questions would be dealt with in League conferences; consequently governments would send their most important statesmen to these conferences. This would arouse the interest of public opinion and the attention of governments; the League's authority would gain and there would be no question of not promptly ratifying decisions taken at League conferences. But the very importance of the step and the very nature of the League—which is an association of states—makes Germany's entry into the League depend on her relation to the Allies. As a German writer has put it, the question of Germany and the League is only one aspect of the question "Germany and France." Germany's entry into the League on the only terms on which she wishes to enter—namely with a permanent seat on the Council—will itself be a sign of a new relationship of recognised equality between her and the chief Allies. The moment for this change has not come yet, but it must come soon, and when it comes the League will almost automatically become the system by means of which the affairs of Europe are conducted.

SECTION FOUR

THE POSITION TO-DAY

CHAPTER IX

THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEAGUE

THE constitution of the League was drawn up at the Peace Conference, in an atmosphere of war solidarity, and by men—such as General Smuts and Lord Robert Cecil—a good deal further advanced in their ideas than the bulk of their fellow-men. Hence the provisions of the Covenant are in some respects bolder and go further in postulating international solidarity with corresponding international obligations than most post-armistice governments have hitherto been ready to follow, for the war has aggravated nationalism all over the world and added a host of fresh fears and hatreds. The constitutional evolution of the League during the first three years of its existence, although based on the Covenant, has therefore been conditioned by the atmosphere of suspicious nationalism with which the post-war world reeks, and has often taken the form of a conflict between the stipulations of the Covenant and the views of reactionary or timid governments.

The first and worst effect of this atmosphere has been the reversion of the United States to their traditional policy of isolation, and their traditional view of Europe as a polyglot, crowded little continent addicted to effete monarchs, blood-feuds, and wild-cat finance. As for the Allies, they have given expression to their war-inflated

nationalism by refusing to deal with any important decision through the League system on a variety of grounds that may be summed up as a general disinclination to practise methods of equal co-operation and all-round discussion, and a general preference for dictation by two or three leading Allies to the rest of the world. As a corollary, the Allies refused to entertain Germany's application at the Peace Conference to be admitted to the League. In this spirit, too, the Covenant's stipulations concerning mandates were stretched—not to say twisted—to mean that the Allies should allocate the mandates among themselves and then each mandatory power draw up the terms of its own mandate as it saw fit. The rôle of the League Council was confined to approving and ratifying the result.¹ One consequence of this attitude is that the provisions for a phosphates monopoly in the British Nauru mandate and the French arrangements for drawing black armies from their mandated territories are dead against the spirit, if not the letter, of the Covenant. In this connection, however, the proceedings of the Mandates Commission with regard to Nauru and the resolution of the Third Assembly on the massacre of Hottentots in South-West Africa, show that the League system serves to focus public opinion and is capable of exerting a cumulative and very powerful moral pressure on recalcitrant governments so soon as this roused public opinion bestirs itself.

In the matter of Article XVIII, too—prescribing that all treaties and international agreements must be registered with the Secretariat and are not binding until so registered—a good many of the Governments Members of the League have shown a strong inclination to wriggle out of uncomfortable obligations imposed by the Covenant. Thus a Committee was appointed by the Council, at

¹ Which, incidentally, it has not yet done in the case of the Mesopotamia mandate.

the request of the First Assembly, to inquire into the exact scope and meaning of this Article. The Committee, after prolonged and exhaustive study, found that the Article meant precisely what it said, but thereupon took upon itself to recommend an amendment to the Article, by which the latter should be rendered innocuous. The amendment proposed that technical conventions might be exempted from registration, and that the non-registration of treaties should not mean that they were not binding, but simply that no appeal to the League could be based on them. The former proposal would, of course, have sanctioned secret military agreements, and the latter would mean that large sections of international life were withdrawn from the cognisance and sphere of action of the League, i.e. could never be dealt with through the League system. The result would have been a stultification of this system only one degree less than what would ensue were the League to be similarly made taboo in questions arising out of the peace treaties. The reasoning of the Committee was even more interesting than its proposals, for it argued quite frankly that Article XVIII, as it stands, imposed a higher standard than current international morality can rise to, and should consequently be revised in conformity with this morality, such as it is.

Meanwhile several military agreements have been concluded, e.g. between France and Belgium, Poland and Roumania, and probably Poland and France, and not registered with the Secretariat. It is true France notified the existence of her agreement with Belgium to the Secretariat, and explained that it was—like all such agreements, without exception—purely defensive and pacific in purpose, but this cannot be counted as registration. The Second Assembly refused to sanction the proposed amendment, and adjourned it to the Third, which has adjourned it to the Fourth. Until the

question is finally settled the Assembly has sanctioned states interpreting this amendment as they please. It should clearly be a prime object of British foreign policy to insist upon a rigid interpretation of League obligations under Article XVIII, to resist any modification of its terms, and thereby to ensure that existing secret treaties will carry with them a moral stigma, and that it will be the duty as well as the opportunity of the opposition in all countries signatories to these treaties to denounce them as invalid under the terms of Article XVIII.

But the most important and lasting result of the conflict between post-war nationalism and the Covenant is the interpretation of Article X given by the first Committee of the Second Assembly, and the revision of Article XVI voted by the Second Assembly. Article X declares that members of the League are bound to defend the territorial integrity and political independence of a Member State against external aggression, while Article XVI lays it down that any state going to war against a member of the League without observing the stipulations regarding delay and submission to peaceful settlement contained in Articles XII to XV of the Covenant is, *ipso facto*, in a state of war with all the members of the League, which should employ their military, naval and air forces against it, as well as prohibit all intercourse between the inhabitants of their state and the inhabitants of the outlawed state. In deference to the objections of Canada, which argued that Article X amounted to an obligation to uphold the *status quo*, the first Committee of the Second Assembly passed a resolution stating that Article X did not involve any obligation to uphold the *status quo*, or indeed to prevent it being changed by war, but merely to prevent any such change being attempted by a war declared in defiance of the Covenant's provisions for mediation and

delay. When such a war was threatened, Article X merely conferred upon the Council the right to recommend what measures should be taken under Article XVI to stop the aggressor.¹ Meanwhile several smaller states, chiefly the ex-neutrals, pointed out that Article XVI laid very drastic obligations upon them that might well prove fatal if the state against whom they were to apply the provisions of Article XVI should be a great neighbour. Consequently, they pleaded that the Article should be rendered less severe and more elastic. In conformity with this demand the Second Assembly revised Article XVI from top to bottom, cut out all reference to military action, declared the Council to be the body which should announce whether conditions warranting the enforcement of this Article had arisen, and further laid it down that in recommending measures to be taken under Article XVI the Council should take account of the special situation and needs of the members of the League affected.

The effect of the interpretation and amendment described above is clear: Articles X and XVI together now merely give the Council the power, in case of war declared in defiance of League procedure, to recommend against the aggressor certain measures, not exceeding blockade, and taking full account of the exigencies of any member of the League that might be particularly affected by the enforcement of the recommendation. In other words, the Covenant lays upon the members of the Council an obligation similar to that contained in the Washington Four-Power Convention, namely to confer, in case of trouble threatened to any signatory or signatories of the treaty (in this case of the Covenant), with the added presumption that the discussion will take the form of recommending measures of economic pressure against the trouble-maker. The result is to make the

¹ See Appendix C, Note 4.

League a very loose association for conference and co-operation without any rigid general obligation, embedded in the constitution of the League and so semi-automatic, constraining Member States to come to one another's defence.

The logical corollary of this evolution has been a movement in favour of voluntary *ad hoc* regional understandings between States Members of the League which, for one reason or another, wish to be more closely bound to each other than is entailed by simple membership under the revised Covenant. A further development consists in according facilities for states not members of the League to join in this system of conference and co-operation when they wish and for such purposes as they wish. The starting point of this evolution was the action of the Second Assembly in regard to Article XXI. The Assembly interpreted this Article—which declares that nothing in the Covenant is to be taken as incompatible with such regional understandings for the maintenance of peace as, e.g., the Monroe Doctrine—as sanctioning the conclusion between members of the League of agreements “tending to define or complete the engagements contained in the Covenant for the maintenance of peace or the promotion of international co-operation.” The resolution, furthermore, declared that such agreements may be negotiated “under the auspices of the League of Nations, for example, in special conferences with its assistance.” The first example of the way this resolution can be interpreted in practice was given by the Warsaw Health Conference of March 1922. This Conference was summoned by the Polish Government, and attended by the European members of the League (i.e. overseas members, except Japan, were not invited), as well as Germany, Soviet Russia, Soviet Ukraine, Turkey, and Hungary (which at that time was not a member of the League). But before summoning

the Conference the Polish Government discussed the matter with the Council, and obtained an offer from the Council of the services of the League Secretariat and Health Organisation for the purposes of the Conference. Accordingly, the organising and preparatory work of the Conference was undertaken by the League Secretariat, and the Conference itself, in a resolution, entrusted the carrying out of its decisions to the League Health Committee, with the proviso that the Committee should include members of all the powers chiefly interested (Germany and Russia were the two powers whose representation was demanded by this resolution).

This is an illustration of how League methods and League machinery can be utilised, for such purposes as they wish, by powers not members of the League. A further instance is the constitution of the Transit Organisation, which must be taken as the type for the technical organisations. The Transit Organisation conference can by a two-thirds vote admit any power to full membership on the same terms as members of the League. The constitutional development thus illustrated by the Warsaw Conference and the Transit Organisation is interesting, for it coincides exactly with what a great many influential people in the United States, who are opposed to America's full entry, declare would enable the United States to co-operate in certain matters with the Powers Members of the League through the League system.

In the matter of regional agreements, the Third Assembly's proposal for a guarantee pact on behalf of states reducing their armaments to a certain level, and Uruguay's proposal for a League of American nations, to be discussed at the Pan-American Conference at Santiago in March 1923, are of great interest. The Assembly's resolution, it will be remembered, provided for the conclusion of defensive pacts, if possible Continental (i.e.

general) in scope, becoming operative on behalf of states which had reduced their armaments to an agreed standard, and which could satisfy the Council that their territory had been violated (the Council's decision on this point should be given by a three-fourths majority and within four days). The fact that agreements between smaller than Continental groups are allowed by this resolution was a compromise between the British and neutral view on the one side and the views of France and the new states on the other. The British and neutrals were obsessed by the fear respectively of slipping back once more to the old condition of rival alliances that breed war, and of undertaking too far-reaching international responsibilities. Thus Great Britain made clear her preference for a general pact, including Germany and Russia, while the neutrals desired some form of control over foreign policy of the states to be guaranteed, in order to ensure that this foreign policy, relying on the protection of the pact, should not be wantonly provocative. The French and new state point of view, on the other hand, was put very succinctly by a Polish newspaper, which declared that if Poland were given a guarantee by all the states of the world, she would feel it necessary to arm to the teeth, whereas if she concluded a pact with a few states that she knew to be friends and vitally interested in her integrity and independence, Poland would feel really protected. In other words, these states simply do not believe that remote countries undertaking a "blanket" obligation on paper to defend Poland would ever honour their obligations if it really came to the point. To these states a general pact is not a binding pact on the principle that what is everybody's job is notoriously nobody's job.

The practical problem raised by this conflict of views is that of finding a compromise form of agreement, which will sufficiently satisfy the desire

of France and the new states for local groupings, while by its form avoiding the dangers of separate alliances and affording some guarantee that no state can appeal to this pact unless it is conducting its foreign policy in such a way as to deserve protection. Such a compromise would seem to be afforded by the proposal discussed in Chapter VIII, that any states could conclude regional agreements, but that these could become operative only by a decision of the Council, and then only on behalf of a state whose case was *sub judice* in the League or which had accepted the League's final award in the dispute at issue (for a further discussion on this point see Chapter XII).

In America, too, there has been a very decided movement toward regional understandings. This movement, in fact, precedes the League, and is in some measure the prototype of the League. What the League attempts to do for the whole world, the Pan-American Union, in many ways, has for a long time been attempting to do for North and South America. The object of the Pan-American Union is co-operation in economic, financial, health, humanitarian, intellectual and transit questions, and it sets about this object by much the same methods as the League of Nations. It is consequently not surprising that the Secretary-General of the Pan-American Union should be in close touch with the League Secretariat, and that the services of the League Secretariat were put by the Third Assembly at the disposal of the Pan-American Conference at Santiago. On the other hand, as regards the peaceful settlement of disputes, the Monroe Doctrine has developed tendencies closely similar to the provisions of the Covenant. The Monroe Doctrine, which was originally declared for the purpose of keeping European states from conquest in North or South America, has developed in practice into meaning that any European state having a quarrel with

a South American state must settle that quarrel by methods of arbitration or mediation on pain of trouble with the United States. President Wilson further developed this doctrine by inviting the so-called A.B.C. powers (Argentine, Brazil and Chili) to collaborate with the United States Government in settling outstanding differences with Mexico by peaceful pressure and mediation. Now Uruguay has proposed a further advance along this path by a draft scheme to be submitted to the Santiago Conference, declaring that any act by a non-American state, derogatory to the rights of an American state, should be considered by all other American states as concerning them all equally directly and requiring joint action. Furthermore, a League of American nations should be constituted on the basis of the complete equality of all the states concerned, and without prejudice to their right of membership of the League of Nations. Any difference arising between American states should be submitted to the arbitral judgment of the American League, if it cannot be settled by direct negotiations or informal friendly mediation.

The bearing of this proposal is obvious. It is not clear, however, to what extent the great states of South America, such as Brazil or Argentine, will consent to be placed on a footing of perfect equality with smaller South American states, not to mention the minute and turbulent republics of Central America. And it is quite certain that the United States would never consent to equality in this sense. Moreover, some South American states have more important relations with Europe and European countries than they have with their Continental neighbours. In any case, South American states are anxious to strengthen their relations with Europe, and glad of their membership in a World League, in order to protect themselves against what they regard as the menace

of United States hegemony. But, in spite of these limitations, the proposal is obviously in the direct line of advance of events, and therefore has every chance of being realised in the shape of a League of American nations, independent of the World League, but acting in practice as a regional association within the League of Nations.

The proposal of Norway and Sweden to provide, in the Covenant, for the setting up of commissions of arbitration and conciliation is a further outcome of the preference for local informal understandings as contrasted with stiffer and more unwieldy general obligations. The Second Assembly decided it was not necessary to revise the Covenant for this purpose, and set up a committee of jurists to study the question and recommend some other way of satisfying Norway's and Sweden's demand. The committee of jurists laid before the Third Assembly a scheme whereby States Members or not of the League might conclude conventions among themselves, setting up small permanent conciliation commissions, whose members would be appointed by mutual agreement between the contracting states. These conventions should contain articles defining the relations between the system of conciliation commissions and the machinery for the settlement of international disputes (i.e. the Council, Court and Assembly) contained in the Covenant. In drawing up the conventions the states concerned can avail themselves of the Secretariat and other League organisations, as can also the members of the conciliation commissions themselves. A spontaneous development of the same sort was contained in the abortive convention between Poland, Finland and the Baltic States, which contained a solemn undertaking by the contracting powers to settle all disputes among themselves by mediation, arbitration, or by reference to the International Court. Similar provisions

are contained in the Lama Agreement between Czecho-Slovakia and Austria. The new states, too, are including clauses in the health and transit conventions they are concluding that provide for mediation of disputes arising out of these agreements by, respectively, the League Health and Transit Committees. Furthermore, the Minorities Agreements signed by the new states, the Aaland Island Convention, signed by ten powers, and the Upper Silesian Convention between Germany and Poland, provide for reference of disputes to the Council or Court.

States that cannot solve a dispute by what is known as "the resources of diplomacy" will, therefore, find it easy and natural—are in fact obliged, as members of the League—to refer their dispute for arbitration or mediation either to a strictly local (i.e. bi- or tri-lateral, *ad hoc* or permanent, as the case may be) commission of arbitration or mediation, or may carry the matter further to some regional organisation (such as it is proposed should be constituted by the American nations). Finally, there would remain the course of purely judicial settlement in the World Court, political mediation by the Council, representing all the Great Powers and a contingent of smaller powers elected by all the nations of the world, or, as a court of last appeal, there would be the Plenary Assembly, representing the nations of the whole world, and thereby possessing a tremendous moral authority. Not only would states be expected to avail themselves of these facilities and considered as behaving in an uncivilised manner if they failed to do so,¹ but under the

¹ An interesting instance of the effect on national behaviour of these facilities is afforded by the dispute between France and Great Britain over the status of certain categories of persons in Tunis and Morocco. Great Britain contended that these persons were British subjects and that consequently the French Government had no right to conscript them. The French Government, on the other hand, contended they were French subjects. The

system of regional agreements and by Articles X and XVI a state abiding by these methods of settlement would be protected by the political authority and economic power of all the members of the League, particularly the members of the Council, and specifically protected to the extent of armed action by those states which had signed the regional agreement to which it was a party.

Thus the League is developing into an instrument that is at once very flexible and available for the purposes of states not members of the League, while able to exert great pressure at the particular time and place where it is most needed. That the system is, in its essentials, good, there can be no doubt. That it can be made greatly better is also undoubted. But that its successful working to-day depends less upon constitutional

whole question was extremely intricate and turned on the meaning and validity of various treaties and decrees as well as on the difference between French territory and French-protected territory. The French Government refused to submit the matter to arbitration on the ground that it was of entirely domestic concern, and the British Government consequently referred the question to the Council. The French and British representatives on the Council, who, of course, were old comrades, having sat on that body innumerable times during the last two years and been through some fairly awkward situations together, thereupon quickly agreed upon a common policy in the Council, which accordingly unanimously referred the matter to the International Court for an advisory opinion as to whether or not it was a matter of domestic concern. France furthermore agreed through her representative on the Council to refer the matter to arbitration or judicial settlement if the Court decided it was not a question of purely domestic concern. The Court, at an extraordinary meeting summoned on January 8th, decided that the matter was one of international concern, whereupon the British and French Governments referred the whole question to the Court for settlement.

Thus, owing to the machinery and obligations comprised in the League system, we find a state agreeing to peaceful settlement of a dispute in order not to lose prestige and put itself in an unfavourable light before the rest of the world; whereas before the League existed, the same situation would probably have led to exactly the contrary behaviour out of precisely the same desire not to lose prestige. And if relations were already none too good between the countries concerned, a dispute of this sort might easily have degenerated into a quarrel that would embitter and excite public opinion to the danger-point.

improvements than on a certain minimum of international solidarity—or enlightened self-interest and sense of realities, if the term be preferred—among the States Members of the League is most certain of all. An encouraging sign that the members of the League realise the system must develop and be improved was given by the first Committee of the Second Assembly, which put on record its opinion that the Covenant, like all new constitutions, is essentially a provisional document, to be thoroughly revised at the first opportunity. This opportunity would come when more experience had been gained of the actual working of the League in practice under the present constitution, and when the membership of the League was complete. This brings us face to face with the real difficulty, which is to get the Great Powers in Western Europe to co-operate on equal terms with the Great Powers in Central and East Europe, and to get the U.S.A. to co-operate regularly and whole-heartedly with any or all of them. These, again, are problems that our foreign policy should consciously set itself to solve. When they are solved, the enlargement of the League will follow as a matter of course, as part, indeed, of the solution.

CHAPTER X

THE ATTITUDE OF GERMANY, RUSSIA, AND THE U.S.A.

THE attitude of the three great states—Germany, Russia, and the United States—still outside the League of Nations to that system of international co-operation and peaceful settlement of disputes, is obviously a matter of the greatest interest and importance. It is not, however, a matter easy to write on lucidly and briefly, for not only does the attitude vary with each state, but it is somewhat confused and contradictory in all, changes continually and is dependent on a whole series of factors only remotely or not at all connected with the League. The following notes are therefore to be taken as merely rough indications.

In Germany public opinion is largely influenced by the illusion of the League as an advisory committee of free sages, legislating for mankind out of the fulness of their hearts, and is rooted in a state of mind that from persecution mania is rapidly approaching the apathy of despair. Touching the former point the excellently informed Berlin correspondent of the *Manchester Guardian*, so long ago as September 1921, wrote :—

It must not be forgotten that the constitution of the League when first formulated meant a tremendous disappointment to Germany, who towards the end of the war had declared herself ready to become a member of Mr. Wilson's projected League of Nations. The idea—no very clear one—existing in the country at the time was of an international court of arbitration that stood aloof from the

daily affairs of nations, a form of higher administration and at the same time a final adjudicator. This idealisation of its fundamental principles made of the League a tribunal of justice in its purest form, above and beyond merely national interests. . . . The fact that the League of Nations Covenant was drawn up at Versailles and incorporated in the Peace Treaty is regarded in Germany to-day as a mockery of the original principles underlying the idea.

This general statement of the German attitude still holds good to-day. It may be traced in continual protestations that Germany, while a firm believer in the League idea, will never enter *this* League of Nations, which has proved itself so anti-German in all decisions touching Germany's interests. The Upper Silesian decision is particularly keenly resented, and taken as proof that the present League is hopeless from the German point of view. A dawning realisation may, however, be discerned among clearer-headed politicians that since it is quite impossible for Germany to create a League of Nations out of thin air, or with the United States and Russia, and since she has certain definite interests to safeguard by entering the League of existing Nations, she had better do so on such terms and in such a way as seems best calculated to promote those interests. The only way to prevent any League from being anti-German is for Germany to come in and so help counterbalance the group of Allied states that are still more or less anti-German, until the day when the terms "pro-Ally" and "anti-German" cease to have any meaning.

As regards the second point, however, there is no doubt that public opinion in Germany is rapidly reaching the same state of despairing indifference that had been attained in Austria. With the prospect of starvation and revolution this winter staring them in the face, Germans are in no mood to contemplate joining in any scheme for co-operation and peaceful settlement of disputes. The proposal, indeed, sounds to them rather like plans

for installing improved plumbing in a house whose foundations are being undermined by maniacs. In other words, the maniacs—that is, the Allies—must come to a settlement with Germany on the outstanding question of debts and reparations before the question of Germany's admission can become an immediate practical issue. A settlement would change Germany's mood, infuse fresh life and hope, and rekindle the desire for a *rapprochement* with the Western Powers and an active European peace policy. The first result of this would be a desire to take a worthy part in the only existing attempt to organise international co-operation on permanent lines, particularly as such participation would enable Germany more effectively to protect her interests and assert her rights.

Meanwhile, Centre and Left opinion in Germany are agreed on demanding as a condition for Germany's candidature that Germany be assured beforehand of admission and a permanent seat on the Council. This feeling has been strengthened since the Allies' invitation to Turkey to apply, coupled with an assurance of support for her candidature if she does. Germans argue that in view of the Turks' record in general, and the way they have dealt with their Peace Treaty in particular, the plea must now be abandoned that Germany is only fit to enter the League cap in hand and take a back seat, provided she can pass a searching test as to her orthodoxy in the Versailles Gospel. Germany, too, they say, must be publicly assured by all the principal Allied Powers that if she applies they will not only support her candidature, but also vote for granting her an immediate permanent place on the Council. A place in the Assembly only would, in the German view, bring no practical advantages, and would give up Germany's claim to rank as a Great Power owing to her size, population and economic and cultural importance. Moreover, runs the German

argument, admission into the League in the teeth of French opposition would stultify the main object of entering—namely better relations and closer co-operation with the Western Powers—and leave Germany in a worse position than ever. This is one reason why the consent of France must be gained before the German Government is likely to apply for membership. The second reason is that whereas to become a member of the League a two-thirds vote of the Assembly only is necessary, the unanimous vote of the Council as well as the approval of the majority of the Assembly must be obtained in order to become a permanent member of the Council. But France is on the Council, and certainly will not vote for Germany's admission to that body unless a settlement of the question of reparations is attained. The French argue that Turkey was not invited except as part of a settlement of all outstanding questions with that country, and that the same procedure should be followed with Germany.

The truth is, Germany's membership of the League Council would mean a tremendous change in the relations of Germany and the Allies. Quite apart from the unanimity rule, Germany would be in a position to state her case authoritatively and in such a manner as to be heard by all the world. She would have the power to insist on dealing with any question through League procedure instead of being forced to swallow whatever the Supreme Council threw at her. She would be in a position to recruit a following among the other States Members of the League and generally to deal with the Allies on equal terms. Specifically she would be able to make her views felt on the questions of the administration of the Saar Basin, the status of Danzig, the Upper Silesian regime, German minorities in Czecho-Slovakia and Poland. Germany would become a subject in, instead of an object of, League policy,

and League policy would include every big international issue, whether arising from the Peace Treaties or not. Once public opinion had become accustomed to seeing these issues dealt with by methods that gave Germany and the neutrals an equal voice with the Allies—and surely this development must be supported by any British Government that means business with its professions of making the League a real thing—and once the guarantees afforded to national minorities had been galvanised into effective existence by the same process, it would be an easy transition for Germany—or for that matter, Great Britain—under Article XIX of the Covenant, to force a public debate in the Assembly on the revision of parts of the Peace Treaties, and so bring moral pressure to bear. In a word, Germany's membership of the League Council would mean the closing of the armistice era and the beginning of real peace. It would mean the end of Supreme Council dictatorship and the beginning of Germany's return to world councils as a Great Power.

But France is afraid of Germany, and France wants reparations. She will oppose Germany's return to power and prosperity, and cling to the Versailles Treaty—not because she particularly likes or admires that document, but as her only sheet anchor—until she receives satisfaction on the two heads of security and reparations. This obviously can come about—so far as it is possible at all after the gigantic blunders committed by the Allies since the armistice—only as part of an all-round settlement between Great Britain, France and Germany, in which we make French support of Germany's admission to the League as a permanent member of the Council part of our bargain. Getting Germany into the League Council is the shortest and readiest way to inaugurate the policy of conciliation and co-operation in Europe that is vital to our own peace and

prosperity. It should, therefore, be a cardinal point in our foreign policy.

Russia's attitude of vague but ardent hostility to the League is most puzzling and difficult to understand. It seems to be largely a product of the ill-informedness of Russia's rulers. Thus the Russians, when attending the Warsaw Health Conference, stipulated that they must be allowed to deal directly with the national delegations present and not through the intermediary of the "League of Nations delegation." By this was presumably meant the members of the League Secretariat, who were there to do the secretarial and clerical work of the Conference. This absurd demand seems to argue not only general ignorance, but to indicate that the Bolsheviks, too, share the delusion that the League purports to be a kind of budding super-state which sends delegations about and gives orders to Nations Members of the League or attending League conferences.

The Bolshevik attitude would seem to be partly also a reflex of the cavalier way the Allies themselves have treated the League hitherto. Thus Trotsky, a year ago, declared that "the League does not concern us. It is the shadow of a shadow. The Supreme Council we can recognise and deal with. It is a fact. The capitalist world is a fact. England is a fact—sometimes a hard fact, but recognisable as a fact which exists and must be reckoned with. Any fact which exists is an important thing. But this League is neither a fact nor does it exist. It is a mere phantom. How can we even recognise a phantom?" (Interview in the *Daily Herald* of January 19, 1922). In the beginning of February 1922 a Riga paper—the *Sevodnya*—published the text of one of Trotsky's numerous speeches to the Red Army, in which he compared the League to the Chinese Imperial dragon that used to be painted on silk,

one side of the painting symbolising justice and the other strength; and wound up by calling the League "the shadow of the fist of the Supreme Council." A great deal of water has flowed under many bridges since Trotsky made these speeches, and it is doubtful whether any leading Bolshevik would now express the same sentiments with quite such verve. Nevertheless, all things considered, it is hardly surprising, in view of the way its creators have treated the League, that the Bolsheviks—single-minded men with a taste for brass tacks and strong language—should take this view.

Another possibility is the state of mind vulgarly described as "sour grapes"—this would explain the frequent statements that Soviet Russia will not recognise the League so long as she is not a member. There may also be a general dislike to seeing capitalist states learn to co-operate and a general preference that they should fail in this as in everything else; a fear, too, lest the League should develop into an anti-Russian League; and a specific preference for dealing with other states one by one and separately, instead of collectively in League conferences.

Propaganda considerations, no doubt, also play a considerable part. Thus Chicherin, at Genoa, publicly declared that Soviet Russia was willing to help establish a true League of Peoples wherein Assembly delegates should all be elected representatives, and the members of the Council all elected by the Assembly. The practical difficulties these claims would raise have already been discussed, but the point here is that the Bolsheviks are the very last persons whom one would suspect of this unseasonable enthusiasm for the ways of parliamentarism and democracy, for their whole theory of government is based on the belief that these things are anathema, and that a spirited minority should seize power by force and keep it by any means until it is satisfied that the majority

will agree with it permanently. It is, therefore, more than likely that M. Chicherin spoke with his tongue in his cheek and one eye on the utterances of Western left wing intellectuals, who have always been very strong on the democratisation of the League without apparently any very clear conception of what this implies.

Another example of this attitude is contained in an interview given by Lenin and published in the *Observer* of October 29, 1922. In this interview M. Lenin stated that Russia was anxious to cooperate with the Western Powers and needed their help, but that the League was too enmeshed in the Peace Treaties for Russia to be able to approve of that body. Now there are only two ways to free the League from the Peace Treaties. One is to limit the membership of the League to countries that have not signed the Peace Treaties. This would greatly curtail its overseas membership and reduce European membership to Russia and the ex-neutrals. The other way is, while admitting states signatories to the Peace Treaties, to stipulate that no questions arising out of the Peace Treaties should be dealt with through the League system. This would elevate present practice to the dignity of an eternal principle, and mean that all Treaty questions—in other words, nearly all the important questions and many of the less important—would continue for ever to be dealt with by the principal Allies through the Supreme Council. This is, in fact, the policy of French nationalists, but it can hardly be what M. Lenin intended. It is legitimate to infer that M. Lenin spoke, like so many lesser mortals, without knowing very clearly what he was talking about, but in the pious hope that what he said would go down well with the audience to which he was appealing, namely Western labour circles. At that he was, characteristically enough, acting on information out of date by about six months or a year, for it is all of that since Labour

and Progressives generally began to wake to the fact that the cry about freeing the League from the Peace Treaties is meaningless, and that the only sound policy is embodied in the exactly contrary demand that the Supreme Council be scrapped and that the whole business of Peace Treaties and reparations should be turned over to the League. There is, therefore, hope for M. Lenin yet.

Meanwhile, it should be clearly explained to the Russians—and the lesson might not be lost in certain German circles—that they cannot have it both ways: they cannot in one and the same breath express a desire for co-operation with the Western Powers and refuse to recognise the system which these powers have established in order to co-operate. American aversion to the League is at least consistent, for it is rooted in a fixed disinclination to co-operate regularly with any nation in any circumstances. But Russia wants to co-operate, wants help, wants to come back into the society of nations, and yet professes to reject the system and methods built up by the society of nations for the express purpose of co-operating and helping. It is obvious that Russia is a Great Power and should have a permanent place on the League Council. Once there, she would be in a position to win a respectful hearing for any reasoned proposal to change the constitution or working of the League. No doubt, too, the process of getting her there could be arranged so as to save as much Bolshevik face as was necessary for the purpose. But we are not going to return to international anarchy to please Russia, nor could we help her as she wants if we did; neither is there the slightest chance that the rest of the world would consent to scrap what has been gradually and painfully built up by three years' hard work, in order to build it all up again—even if that were possible, which it is not—

under a different name, *pour les beaux yeux de M. Lenin*.

Soviet Russia has had one pretty object-lesson already in the difficulties involved by her attitude: the Bolsheviki were induced to attend the Warsaw Health Conference after a great display of coyness, the removal from the Conference building of all placards bearing the tabooed name of "League of Nations," and an assurance that they would not have to deal with the non-existent "League of Nations delegation." At this Conference a complete scheme was worked out for an anti-epidemic campaign in the Donetz Basin, along the main railway lines of Russia, and on the western frontier of Russia and the Ukraine. The Conference passed a resolution entrusting the League Health Organisation with the execution of this programme, once the necessary funds were raised by the governments concerned, and provided representatives of all the chiefly interested governments were included in the Health Organisation. The only two interested governments not already represented were Germany and Russia, and the Conference passed this resolution for the specific purpose of getting a German and a Russian health official on to the League Health Committee. The Bolsheviki, however, presented a minority resolution of their own (the Germans having voted with the rest of the Conference) demanding that a special international commission should be established to supervise the anti-epidemic campaign.

At Genoa there were informal discussions between the Bolshevik representatives and some members of the League Secretariat and Health Organisation, resulting in the adoption of a "formula." According to this formula the Bolsheviki agreed to send a representative to sit on the Health Committee (which it had by that time been decided was to include a German member), and to call the result a special inter-

national commission, sitting at the same time and in the same place as the League Health Committee. The result, of course, is precisely the same as that contemplated by the resolution of the Warsaw Conference, but presumably the same arrangement under a different name smells sweeter and saves Bolshevik face.¹

At Genoa, too, a convention was signed by the Bolshevik delegation recognising the League Epidemic Commission as the executive body in Russia of the anti-epidemic campaign decided upon at Warsaw. In consequence the agents of the Epidemic Commission have diplomatic privileges in Russia, the Commission has set up offices at Kiev and Moscow, and its work will be extended into Western Russia so soon as the necessary money is forthcoming. Close contact has also been established between the Health Organisation and the Soviet health authorities, who send regularly full health data and abundant medical literature from Moscow. Professor Tarassevich, the head of the Scientific Institute for Public Health at Moscow, also attended the Health Organisation conferences on the standardisation of sera and serological tests, held at Geneva in September and at Paris in November, and Soviet health officials are taking the course in Belgium and Italy conducted by the Health Organisation as a first experiment in the interchange of sanitary staff. But the *de facto* situation is very delicate, and may easily be upset if there should be any conflict between Russia's genuine desire for help and re-establishment of relations with the outside world and Bolshevik belief in the possibility of making political capital by flouting the League. If there is any expansion of international government health and relief work in Russia, all these questions of name will become acute. Similarly, the problem of Russian participation in the control of the Straits

¹ See Appendix C, Note 5.

will involve the knotty question of whether Russia can consent to meet the other powers concerned regularly in the League Council—whether by calling it a special international commission meeting in the same place and at the same time as the Council, or by any other means that suggest themselves to Bolshevik statecraft—or whether she would insist on meeting the same powers outside at gatherings specially arranged each time. The latter way is more roundabout, and means more trouble for all concerned than the former, and it covers only the question of the Straits. Entry into the Council, on the other hand, would mean opening the door to permanent co-operation on all matters that Russia cared to deal with through that body. The Bolsheviks must, of course, choose for themselves, but they ought to be told plainly what they are choosing : if they want to co-operate with the rest of the world, they must enter the League ; if they wish to remain as they are, they are at liberty to stay out. That will hurt Europe, but it will hurt Russia more. Here, too, the course British policy should follow is clear.

In order even approximately to understand the attitude of the United States, it must be remembered that they were founded by people who had fled from Europe and most of whose history has consisted of the colonisation of the vast empty continent that lay to the west of the original seaboard states, with Europe deliberately kept at arm's length by the Monroe Doctrine. This history has left a tremendously strong tradition of isolation and hostility to Europe. Now that America is a Great—potentially the greatest—Power in the world, isolation is out of date, and does not correspond to modern America's economic and political interests ; indeed, since the Spanish-American War and the annexation of the Philippines, the United States have taken an active part

in world politics in the Far East, while Pan-Americanism has always been the corollary of the Monroe Doctrine in its application to South America. But the attitude towards Europe persists, and America's entry into the war was a political *tour de force*, a revolutionary break with an ancient and powerful tradition that gave a final demonstration of the fact that any war between Great Powers in the modern world must almost inevitably spread to them all. Participation in the war was accompanied by the nationalist exaltation that the war raised in all belligerent countries. After the cessation of hostilities exaltation soured for want of an outlet, and America has ever since suffered from what might be termed "ingrowing war mind." This led to an orgy of political heresy-hunting, the exploits of the American Legion and other zealots of patriotism in harrying "radicals" and humble foreigners generally, industrial espionage, a campaign against trade unionism, the revival of the Ku Klux Klan, and other forms of reaction. It also led to a violent reversion to the tradition of isolation, which was greatly exaggerated and rendered more malevolent by the Republican party as a weapon in the campaign to oust the Democrats. Since President Wilson considered the League his main achievement in foreign politics most of the animus against foreign commitments was directed into this channel by the party managers. The result was a brilliant success from the electoral point of view, and incidentally secured America's abstention from the League, and an attitude toward Europe that is expressed by the insistent demand that not only Great Britain, but half-bankrupt France and Italy, and the other Allies as well, should pay back the money lent them as the main contribution to the war of the United States, which are already suffering from a plethora of gold and have put up a Chinese wall of a customs tariff to avoid

being paid back in goods. Americans argue that the Allies gained riches and power at the Peace Conference by the territories they annexed,¹ and made a bad peace anyway. Consequently, America, which got nothing out of the war, is entitled to her money back, and in any case means to go on claiming every cent of it so long as the European nations maintain huge armies and show no sign of an attempt to balance their budgets and stop cutting each other's throats. Otherwise, letting them off their debts would be simply indirectly subsidising these amiable pastimes. European nations, said one of the American delegates to the Brussels Financial Conference of September 1920 (i.e. toward the end of the Wilson Administration), must drop their feuds and learn to pull together and keep the peace before America can regard Europe as a good business proposition. It seems insane to Americans that such a small and crowded continent as Europe should be divided into so many separate quarrelling nations.

Curiously enough, this extreme political distaste for Europe and the ways of Europe is accompanied by a magnificent generosity in relieving distress that can only bring a blush to the cheeks of us Europeans, who can find money to raise armies and fight each other, but not to succour the victims of our obsession. An extreme instance of this contrast between American politics and American charity is shown by the case of Russia. Politically, America looks upon Soviet Russia much as the village boy regarded the villain in

* According to this argument we, e.g., gained "the rich oil-fields of Mosul" by acquiring the Mesopotamia mandate. The argument, of course, ignores the fact that the mandatory power must respect equality of commercial opportunity for all countries, and assumes that having to keep troops in Mesopotamia, suppress occasional rebellions, and risk trouble with Turks and Kurds, all to the tune of several million sterling a year, means an increase in wealth and strength. If only enough Americans thought like this, it might be possible to induce them to take Mesopotamia—and Palestine as well—off our hands!

the melodrama. Nevertheless, the American Congress voted twenty million dollars for sending corn to Russia, which has enabled the Hoover Relief Organisation to save eight million lives. In addition the Hoover Organisation has distributed some eight or nine million dollars' worth of medical stores in Russia that alone have kept the Russian health service from collapsing utterly. The American Red Cross, too, and smaller private organisations are doing wonderful work in all the stricken countries of Eastern and Central Europe. Actually the United States is spending more money on relief work in Europe than all the other countries of the world put together. Another curious feature of America's attitude is the fact that it is the Republican party which has now made itself the exponent of the gospel of isolation, whereas in American history the Republican party has always been the party in favour of an active foreign policy. The Republican party, too, is the party of big business and high finance, but big business and high finance are now as ever in favour of closer relations with Europe and a positive policy in the question of debts, reparations, and economic reconstruction generally. In other words, the Republican party managers at the Presidential election were simply forced to adapt themselves to a wave of elemental feeling that emanated from the real heart of modern America—the Middle West, with its farmers and inhabitants of "Main Street." It is the little people in the United States that are dictating American foreign policy to-day, the simple folk whose hearts are better than their heads. This explains why political stand-offishness has been accompanied by unique generosity in all charitable works. It also explains why the present attack of acute provincialism is regarded as abnormal—as essentially a wave of war idealism, transformed by disappointment into fierce nationalism—which is

not expected to last, but to ebb away gradually and steadily in proportion as the lapse of time and hard facts show it to be impractical. Americans are normally very responsive to idealistic appeals—even to the point of romantic sentimentality—and highly gregarious. They are natural believers in joining things. The Washington Conference and the campaign that led up to it are signs that a reversion to the normal mood is beginning.

But America's attitude to the League is part of her attitude to Europe. United States public opinion indeed, so far as it has any conceptions on this subject at all, habitually, confuses the Supreme Council with the Council of the League, and identifies the League with Europe. This last is not surprising, for most grave international problems centre in Europe at present, while so long as America is not in the League it is, owing to the Monroe Doctrine, not easy to deal through the League with any question primarily affecting South America. Similarly, the League system can be applied to the solution of Far Eastern problems only if the United States and Russia become members of the League or consent to sit on the League Council for the purpose. In American eyes the weakness and incompleteness of the League is the outward and visible expression of the rancour and discord that still gnaw at the heart of Europe. Conversely, the completion of the League's European membership and its dominance in the transaction of European affairs would furnish the strongest argument for American participation. This point is important, for there is a noticeable tendency in Germany to argue that Germany should not enter the League for fear of offending the United States, but should wait until a joint entry could be effected. The truth is that to Americans Germany is just part of Europe, and Germany's absence from the

League merely clear proof that Europe is still so divided that the United States had best keep clear of that distressful continent. The point was put with all possible clearness by a prominent American attending the Third Assembly, whose remarks to a French delegate were reported as follows by the special correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor* (September 12th): "If you want Germany out of the League more than America in, then persist in the course of obstruction. If, however, you want America in more than Germany out, then let Germany in."

In view of the identification of both subjects in the American mind, it is not surprising that the League attitude of the United States has varied with its attitude to Europe. During their participation in the war the League was the main war aim of the United States. After the armistice both the "irreconcilables" and a group of so-called reservationists appeared in the Senate; the latter desired that the United States should adhere to the League, but with Article X dropped out. This Article was looked upon as stereotyping the *status quo* and infringing sovereignty by taking out of the hands of the American Congress the decision as to when and in what contingencies America should declare war. Throughout the election campaign there was an element in the Republican party in favour of America's entering the League in some form or other. It was this fraction that put forward the famous election manifesto of the Thirty-one (prominent Republicans, including Mr. Hughes, the present Secretary of State), urging the electorate to vote for Mr. Harding as the best way of assuring effective American participation in an "association of nations." Throughout the campaign, too, Mr. Harding "pussyfooted on the League issue," that is, varied his utterances on the subject to suit the exigencies of the moment and the moods of

his audiences. There was, however, no doubt at any time that the Republican party on the whole was for isolation, and this tendency grew stronger as the election proceeded. After the election President Harding delivered a speech in which he said the League was dead, and triumphant processions burned the League in effigy and buried it. Shortly after, Colonel Harvey, the new American Ambassador to London, delivered a speech, much commented on at the time, in which he said: "There still seems to linger in the minds of many here, as indeed of a few at home, the impression that in some way or other, by hook or by crook, unwittingly and surely unwillingly, the United States may be beguiled into the League of Nations. Now let me show you how utterly absurd any such notion is. . . . The American people decided against it by a majority of seven million out of a total vote of twenty-five million. . . . Anybody could see that it follows then, inevitably and irresistibly, that our present Government could not, without betrayal of its creators and masters, and will not, I can assure you, have anything whatsoever to do with the League or with any commission or committee appointed by it or responsible to it, directly or indirectly, openly or furtively. . . ." In consonance with this attitude the Administration maintained a haughty silence when any correspondence was addressed to it by any League body through the Secretariat.

However, time passed, and the United States found, in the shape of unemployment and industrial troubles, that they too were affected by the forlorn condition of Europe. The Washington Conference, held with such great hopes, accomplished excellent work indeed, but proved a mere flash in the pan and not the beginning of some form of permanent or at least regularly recurring international discussion and action. Isolation was

proving less desirable and infinitely more difficult in practice than had been apparent to the dervishes of 100 per cent. Americanism during the halcyon days of the election. Meanwhile the League of Nations itself had passed from the realms of theory and bogeydom to the plane of workaday reality, and in the grey light of day appeared a far less fearsome thing than the dread images conjured up by the fevered minds of the stump-orators. Its bitterest enemy could not plausibly accuse the League of being a menace to sovereignty. On the other hand, the League as a system of permanent organised co-operation was producing surprisingly good results wherever it was applied to international disputes, and was branching out in many lines of social and humanitarian endeavour that ran parallel to the activities and traditions of the United States. The setting up of the Court, too, was the realisation by others of a long-cherished dream of American thinkers, lawyers and statesmen. Indeed, one of the most distinguished of living Americans, Mr. Elihu Root, had played a prominent part in the Jurists' Conference which drew up the constitution of the Court, and the Court included an eminent American judge. Lastly, it soon became obvious that through the League things were being done that specifically affected American interests.

The first point on which this fact became evident was on the question of mandates, when the United States, after prolonged negotiations rendered complex by the fact that while the United States recognised Great Britain, France, Italy and so forth, as sovereign states having certain treaty obligations, she would not recognise the existence of the same states when sitting together and calling themselves the League Council supervising their treaty obligations under the name of mandates, concluded half a dozen separate treaties assuring America equal rights with all the members

of the League in the territories under mandates. The Senate, in fact, included in the treaty recognising Japan's mandate over the North Pacific Islands the whole text of the mandate as approved by the League Council.

Meanwhile public opinion was changing, and the Administration's policy of massive silence when correspondence was received from the League Secretary-General led to some lively Press polemics, which in turn stimulated a change for the better—silence was followed by curt refusals, and this again by full and courteous correspondence whenever the occasion seemed to make this necessary. The State Department expressed its willingness to take any steps within its power to secure evidence in the United States that might be needed by the International Court. Dr. G. W. McCoy, of the State Hygiene Laboratory, Washington, D.C., has been taking part in the Health Organisation's work on the standardisation of sera, although officially he has merely been sent over to sit on the Office International d'Hygiène Publique (which, it will be remembered from the account given in Chapter IV, acts in close co-operation with the League Health Organisation, but is an independent institution, founded before the League existed). Similarly, a prominent American health official¹ is shortly coming over, on a year's leave without loss of seniority, to take charge of certain branches of the Health Organisation's work. In practice this means, of course, that a member of the United States Civil Service has been seconded to League service for a time, just as is frequently done from the Civil Services of other members of the League. At the invitation of the Council, the Washington

¹ Mr. Edgar Sydenstricker, Statistician in Charge of the United States Public Health Service Statistical Office, Washington, D.C. Mr. Sydenstricker is to be the head of the Epidemiological Intelligence branch of the Health Section in the League Secretariat.

Administration has appointed Dr. Lyman Grace Abbott to sit on the League Commission for Prevention of the Traffic in Women and Children. Dr. Dorset, of the Bio-Chemical Laboratory of the Department of Agriculture, has likewise been appointed by the Secretary of State to sit on the Anthrax Commission of the International Labour Office. Assistant Surgeon-General Rupert Blue has been appointed American member of the League Opium Commission, and the head of the U.S. Public Health Service, Surgeon-General Cumming, has been appointed as a member of the League Health Committee.

But the most important change that has occurred in America's attitude toward the League concerns the International Court. The idea of an International Court of Justice has long been a cherished dream of American statesmen and lawyers. The very Republicans who opposed America's joining the League as at present constituted spoke vaguely of an alternative which should consist of a Court and occasional *ad hoc* conferences. When the present Court was founded comment in American anti-League circles stressed its independence and the slightness of its connection with the League, and hinted that some day, when the League was no more, America might use the Court as a nucleus for her alternative scheme. This state of mind in America was fully appreciated by the Jurists' Conference that drew up the protocol of the Court, and at the instance of Mr. Elihu Root inserted a clause stating that the protocol could be signed by all states mentioned in the annex to the Covenant. The only state not a member of the League mentioned in the annex to the Covenant was the United States, which were accordingly given the opportunity to join the Court without joining the League. Moreover, the United States national delegation to The Hague Court of Arbitration was invited, as were those of

the members of the League, to submit a list of four nominees as candidates for the election of judges to the Court. The United States Administration did not, however, avail itself of this invitation. Subsequently, Secretary of State Hughes has declared publicly that the United States will join the Court if they are given a voice in the election of judges. The method favoured in the United States is a change in the statute of the Court permitting participation by the United States in the election of judges. The practical difficulty in the way of this course is that since the statute of the Court contains no provision for amendment, it will be necessary for all the forty or more states which have ratified to consent to altering the statute in this sense. This might easily be a matter of a couple of years.

For this reason an alternative scheme has been suggested by which the United States should sit in the Assembly and Council when judges are elected. In order to avoid the various legal and constitutional difficulties involved, the upholders of this suggestion point out that the Assembly and Council, when sitting for this purpose, do so merely as the electoral bodies mentioned in the protocol of the Court, and not as the Council and Assembly of the League. Consequently, America's participation in this special session would not involve her membership of the League. The difficulty, it will be seen, is purely of a technical nature, but Americans, owing to the fact of their own national life being based on a written constitution, take difficulties of this sort very seriously. It is to be hoped, however, that a satisfactory settlement will be reached by the time this book appears in print.

The change in the official attitude that these developments denote has been largely dictated by a change in popular feeling. The extent of this change it is, of course, impossible to gauge from

outside the United States. But it is at least certain that the cock-a-hoop mood of the Presidential election has gone. Tub-thumping is as out of date as crusading. The Democratic turnover at the Congressional and Senatorial elections, while not directly concerned with foreign policy, at least revealed dissatisfaction with the existing state of things, and meant that the Administration must henceforward keep its ear to the ground and its finger on the pulse of public opinion. When it does indulge in this exercise it will not long be able to avoid noticing the significance of the fact that such immense organisations as the Hoover Relief Administration, the American Red Cross, and the Rockefeller Foundation are all co-operating in their several ways with certain activities of the League that have been mentioned in a previous chapter. There is, too, an American judge in the Court, and there are Americans in several League commissions and the League Secretariat. Another significant event is the resignation of Chief Justice Clark from the Bench of the United States Supreme Court, in order to head a campaign for the entry of the United States into the League. Anyone knowing the position held in the United States by judges of the Supreme Court will appreciate what a sensational event this is. Then, too, the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ—an organisation numbering some twenty million members and representing all the Protestant Churches of the United States—have long been agitating in favour of United States participation in the Court, and generally of America's re-entry into world councils, in order to make some positive contribution to the progress of mankind in practical internationalism. It was this organisation which was the head and front of the agitation leading up to the Washington Conference. Another recent development of great importance

was the formation of the American Foreign Policy Association, which is working for a "liberal and constructive American foreign policy," and whose membership includes some extremely weighty names. Former Attorney-General Wickersham (one of the thirty-one Republicans) has published a pamphlet under the auspices of this Association, urging the United States to enter the Court and to work with such branches of the League's activities as are in conformity with the traditions and efforts of the United States. A similar tendency was displayed in a pronouncement made by a prominent American attending the Third Assembly, and quoted in the *Christian Science Monitor* of September 12th. This American declared that in order to get America into the League it was necessary first to complete the League's European membership, primarily by the inclusion of Ireland and Germany; secondly, to arrange for United States participation in the election of judges to the Court; and thirdly, to develop regional understandings in such a way as to turn American opposition to Article X. In short, there is a growing realisation of the fact that any new "association of nations" can come only through the development of the present League, and a consequent recrudescence of the League of Nations movement in the United States, but taking the form that the United States should become, not so much a full member as something which has been termed a "non-resident associate" of the League, i.e. a member for certain purposes, and on a basis of limited liability.¹

To sum up the foregoing discussion, it may be said that the United States have decisively repudiated the rôle of *Deus ex machina* that Europe would fain have thrust upon them. Americans simply have not, and in the nature of things cannot have, any such conception of their

¹ See Appendix C, Note 6.

relation to the old world. Apart from the specific prejudice against Europe, American society is still an essentially pioneer society, and believes in self-help and personal charity; it has small understanding for the more recondite virtues of citizenship. America has no great and bold traditions in foreign policy, for she has been in the happy position of never having much need for a foreign policy—at least as concerns Europe. The American attitude in these matters is therefore generally negative. Thus it never apparently occurred to the Wilson Administration to drive a hard bargain with the Allies, by requiring the abrogation of the secret treaties and the acceptance in writing of the Fourteen Points as the price of America's entry into the war, and then by appearing at the Peace Conference with a draft treaty instead of a few copybook maxims. And so our Great Statesmen at the Conference left it to President Wilson to be good, and showed themselves infernally clever at proving that the Fourteen Points meant the Versailles and other Peace Treaties, which between them are largely responsible for our present beatitude and for making Americans feel that they would rather have nothing to do with Europe. Similarly, it never occurs to the Harding Administration—and, if it did, American public opinion would not for an instant tolerate such a revolutionary innovation—to use *positively* the enormous material power accruing from America's position as Europe's creditor, i.e. to tell the European nations that it is willing to strike a bargain with them by cancelling most of the debts in return for a wiping out of most European debts, and such political and economic arrangements as will stabilise peace and lead to a recrudescence of prosperity. Americans simply do not see it like that—they repudiate all responsibility for their share in the war and the Peace Conference, and

all interest in what happens to Europe. They prefer to "sit tight" on what Europe owes them and say they would not think of cancelling a penny so long as European nations do not balance their budgets and reduce their armies. But it is difficult for Great Britain to let France off her debt without some corresponding reduction on America's part, while France, on the other hand, fails to balance her budget and keeps up an enormous army in order to extract reparations from Germany, so long as her Allies do not cancel *her* debts. The whole thing works in a vicious circle.

The practical conclusion to be drawn is that we must take the United States as they are—a nation of ordinary people, the creatures of their history and geography like the rest of us, and not a race of altruistic supermen with a mission to save Europe in spite of itself. The one thing we must avoid doing is, through the mouths of our statesmen, to keep appealing to the United States how hard up we are and how helpless and incapable of doing anything without them. The only effect is to produce an impression in the mind of the ordinary unsophisticated American that the wily foreigner is trying to "put one over on him" again, and this merely serves to stir the dying embers of isolationist 100 per cent. nationalism and delay the slow tentative movement toward getting the United States to pull their weight in the galley of humanity. The one thing we—in Great Britain at least—must do is to arrange about paying our debt to America as fast as the Americans themselves will let us,¹ and meanwhile to strike out a bold and consistent peace policy in Europe, whose visible fruit would be the completion of the League's European membership by the inclusion of Germany and Russia in the Council, and making the League

¹ This has now been done.

system supreme in the transaction of foreign affairs. At the same time we should do everything possible to facilitate American adhesion to the International Court and participation in such League activities as may interest her. If we do these things, it is as certain as anything can be that in three or four years at most the United States will be putting at the service of the League all the immense prestige conferred upon them by their size and power, by their disinterestedness and consequent impartiality, by their high and honourable record in striving for the rule of law in international relations, and by the American character—that strange blend of robust simplicity, shrewdness and sentimentality, horse-sense, immense good nature, impatience of forms and technicalities, generosity, and boundless energy and enthusiasm—that makes of the United States such a tremendous driving force in any enterprise with which they associate themselves.

SECTION FIVE

HOW TO USE THE LEAGUE

CHAPTER XI

THE NEED FOR A BRITISH LEAD; HOW TO EQUIP OURSELVES TO GIVE THE LEAD

THERE is a danger of public opinion failing to realise how much work must be done in the field of foreign affairs during the next generation. The aftermath of all wars involves readjustment and renovation in the conduct of foreign affairs. In the case of the late war this readjustment has gone to the extent of an attempt to put international relations on a new basis; that is, to substitute permanent organised co-operation and peaceful settlement of disputes for the rule-of-thumb methods and general anarchy prevailing before the war.

The late war made it quite clear that man's destructive powers are soaring out of sight of his defensive appliances or the resistant qualities of the highly complex and artificial society he has built up. Frederick the Great's maxim that victory depends on not letting the civil population know there is a war on is hopelessly out of date. The distinction between combatant armies and non-combatant populations has now almost entirely disappeared, and we have instead whole belligerent nations.

The truth is that civilisation as it develops is becoming more specialised. We must either specialise in organising peace or in preparing for war. And if we prepare for war we shall get war, and war will dissolve what we know as civilisation by bringing in its train famine, pestilence,

revolution and anarchy. That is the dilemma, and that is why it is a fatal error to believe that we can in international relations return to anything approximating pre-war conditions or simply stand still where we are ; things must either get very much worse or change radically. We have got a great deal nearer the edge this time than anyone can imagine who has not travelled in post-war East Europe or glimpsed the awful destitution of Austria and Germany. And we are still tottering on the edge.

For Great Britain particularly, the problem of how to organise peace is of immense importance. There is first the trading problem—this island lives, and is bound to live, by trade with foreign nations. But the war has well-nigh ruined the Continental markets on which we mainly depend, and must depend. The three hundred odd millions of Europeans at our doors are destined for a long time to come to be of greater importance for our trade than the fifteen millions in the Dominions, or the almost self-sufficing populations of India and China. South America is a promising future market, but no substitute for Europe and Northern Asia (Siberia and Asiatic Russia).

Furthermore, the late war has had the effect of hastening the development of the Dominions into fully fledged independent states, and has stimulated nationalism not only in Ireland but throughout the Near, Middle and Far East, thus causing some very difficult problems in the adjustment of imperial relations. It is doubtful whether the Empire would survive another great war.

Lastly, there is the military problem, and that is the most serious of all. This small island has been able to develop a fundamentally pacific and free civilisation because it was separated from the Continent of Europe by the Channel and the North Sea. But with the development of airships and

aeroplanes, it is quite plain that in the next war this geographical advantage will disappear, and may indeed, by the concurrent perfection of submarines, be turned into a death-trap. At the end of the war the biggest bombs that an aeroplane could carry weighed 800 lbs. Since then planes carrying 2-ton bombs have been flown, as well as 20-ton armoured planes carrying field guns, and pilotless bombing planes, steered from afar by wireless—flying projectiles, that can be hurled on their target by an enemy 200 or 300 miles away. Plans are complete for 50-ton 1,000 horsepower two mile a minute flying warships, with gun-turrets and torpedo tubes complete. The development of poison gas has flourished apace and a liquid been produced in America of which three drops on the skin will kill a man, and that when released volatilises into a heavier-than-air gas which can make whole regions uninhabitable for weeks.

There is no doubt that in the next war the objective of each side will be, not the front line, but the brain and nerve centres of the enemy community; that is, the seat of government and the chief towns and railway centres. Victory will be measured in terms of social dissolution. It is already considered perfectly possible for a third of London to be wiped out by one air raid. The most sinister feature of all is that military science sees no adequate means of defence against aerial fleets. Consequently, military men are now arguing that the only course is to build an air fleet formidable enough to demolish the enemy's cities, on the principle that the best defence is offence. War would therefore become a series of gigantic reprisals, in which the belligerent countries would try which could destroy the other's national life first. The result would probably be that both sides would emerge victors in this race against civilisation, and both pay a price for their victory

as incredible to us now as the present state of Russia would have appeared to us all in 1914.

The vitally important fact which it is so easy unduly to minimise or even to overlook entirely is the rapidity and ease with which the mass of men become used to new situations. Civilisation is at the cross-roads to-day. In a few years either the League of Nations system with the whole mentality—habits of thought, feeling and action—that attaches to it will finally have taken the upper hand, or we shall begin to base our national outlook on the premises implied by the developments just described in the art of slaughter. To show what that outlook will be it is necessary only to glance at that remarkable book *Les Guerres d'Enfer*, by Alphonse S  ch   (Payot et Cie), first published in 1915, and now in its tenth thousand. A great many of M. S  ch  's predictions as to the development of military science have come true since his book appeared. And the logical deductions based on these developments are irrefutable, once M. S  ch  's fundamental axiom—the inevitability of war—is admitted. But what picture does M. S  ch   draw of our future world? Not the frontiers alone, but the whole face of a country fortified against aircraft and gas; the principle of the belligerent nation carried through completely—capital and labour conscripted, men and women trained in their various parts in war from childhood to extreme old age, science and art, too, enrolled (the best artists and poets, says M. S  ch  , should be employed by the state to hymn victory, to immortalise the heroes, to exalt the soul of the nation), the whole mind and resources of the nation bent to the one great end. And what is the end? M. S  ch  , with splendid courage, reduces it to nonsense, in the literal meaning of the word, as all militarists must who apply their dogmas consistently. To sum up, he writes: "The State should demand, and unhesitatingly carry out,

everything it considers should be done, everything it thinks should be required of the disinterestedness and patriotic devotion of individuals, in order to strengthen its organisation for war, the sum of the nation's power. On principle it will always go to the extreme limit of what is possible. That is the condition of success. If by any chance democracy—I speak here for France—should not understand this, should refuse to see the situation in its true light, if, in a word, it should become an obstacle to the maximum preparation of the armed nation, it must be got rid of at any cost, if we are not to prefer invasion and slavery.”

This vision may seem insane, and its message is certainly the flattest of paradoxes. But it is only the logical working out in the light of modern science of beliefs held by the majority of mankind. If in a few years the League system is not unchallenged and supreme, we shall have all the respectable papers in all countries saying that if you want peace you must prepare for war, that idealism is a fine and beautiful thing, but we are living in a world of stern reality, and so forth and so on until by degrees what seems the distempered fantasy of a madman will become the normal outlook of all but a few unpatriotic extremists. If national feeling does not become humanist, based primarily on our own human group but ultimately on a sense of its membership of all mankind, it will shortly evolve into mystic worship of the God-State, and develop a *credo quia absurdum* canon of its own. Who in 1914 would have thought the world of to-day credible? Who during the war, when we execrated the Germans for their air raids, would have thought that shortly afterwards we should have been bombing natives, whose welfare formed a sacred charge for which we were trustees before humanity, in order to collect arrears of taxes? Yet aeroplanes have been used thus in the mandated area of Iraq. Is

there any folly or bestiality to which men will not descend if brought to it by degrees along channels dug by their prejudices and passions?

Not only is Great Britain more obviously interested than any other country in turning civilisation from the path of preparation for suicide into that of organising peace, but we are the sole power that can give a lead to Europe in pulling the world out of its present plight. The United States must be discounted at their own request. The South American nations, although not to be underrated, are obviously auxiliary. The ex-neutrals can always be relied on for sound criticism, but they have small resources, and so are scarcely in a position, even when they have the courage, to submit any positive proposals or incur any responsibility. They will follow if given a strong lead, but will do nothing until then. Meanwhile they are at least quiet and relatively prosperous oases in an otherwise turbulent and poverty-stricken continent. The new states are for the most part small and financially weak, and all their political thoughts and energies are at present devoted to avenging their pasts and consolidating their present; the statesmen they have hitherto thrown up are, with a few honourable exceptions, nonentities where they are not disasters. Italy will become of great importance if the Fascist experiment is a success, but it is as yet too early to risk a prediction on this head. France sees little but Germany in the shape of a (receding) source of reparations and a potential menace to her security. Germany is down and going out, and Russia down and, although slowly and uncertainly beginning to pick herself up, fearfully exhausted—according to the best available estimates,¹ depopulated to the extent of 20 to 25 per

¹ Professor Tarassevich's report, published as No. 5 (October 1922) of the series of Epidemiological Intelligence Bulletins issued by the Health Section of the League Secretariat.

cent.—and unable to play an active part in the world for decades. All these nations are immersed in their immediate problems, and see at most their relations to one or two neighbouring countries. They have no conception of the world or even of Europe as a whole.

Great Britain alone, in financial strength approximating to America, but part of Europe in virtue of geographical propinquity and historic, political and economic ties, is in a position to give a lead. Our world-wide interests and commitments almost force us to take long views, to consider civilisation as a whole. Our two gravest and most pressing distresses—unemployment and the load of taxation—urge us to look for salvation to the revival of trade, and the revival of trade causes us to look abroad, for well we know by this time that it must wait upon the restoration and establishment of peace in Europe. The problem of the economic restoration of the Continent, and so a revival of trade, can be approached only through weaning Europe from the ways of force and anarchy, and securing the triumph of methods of co-operation and peaceful settlement of disputes. The second great problem to be solved is how to give expression to the achieved independence of the Dominions and Ireland, and how to canalise the new currents of nationalism in the Oriental nations under British protection so as to allow of their peaceful evolution into statehood within—or at least on friendly terms with—the Empire. The purpose of the following chapters is to indicate how the League system might be utilised to promote these aims, and thus incidentally give practical expression to the election pledges of all parties that they would seek to develop and strengthen the League of Nations to the utmost.

But the first requisite for transacting important affairs through the League is that the British Government should provide itself with adequate

machinery for studying League questions and being represented in League conferences. Under the Coalition Government the preparation of Britain's share in League work lay in the hands of one man in the Cabinet Secretariat. Anyone who realises the scope and variety of the League's activities, if only from the outline given in these pages, and even under the present dispensation, when the League is a sort of political Cinderella, must be convinced of the hopelessness of running any active League policy with so little fuel, and of the necessity for our following the example of France and equipping ourselves adequately for the purpose. A step in the right direction has already been taken by Mr. Bonar Law, through transferring to the Foreign Office the official on the Cabinet Secretariat, namely the Hon. C. Tufton, who has been dealing with League affairs. Presumably there will be a special section formed in the Foreign Office, with Mr. Tufton at its head. But League affairs cover the whole field of international relations, and so often include matters that concern, e.g., the Home Office, Colonial Office, Ministry of Health, Ministry of Labour, Board of Trade, and, of course, the Treasury (since everything that costs money touches the Treasury), quite as closely as they do the Foreign Office. It would therefore seem desirable to form an interdepartmental committee from all these departments, composed, so far as possible, from the members of the departments who actually sit in League advisory commissions and technical organisations.¹ The Secretariat of this committee would be the League Section in the Foreign Office, and its function would be to collate information on all aspects of Great Britain's share in League

¹ Thus, e.g., Sir George Buchanan, from the Ministry of Health, sits in the League Health Committee; Sir Malcolm Delevingne, Home Office, sits in the Opium Commission; Mr. J. Harris, also Home Office, is a member of the Commission on Suppression of Traffic in Women and Children, etc.

activities, and so to furnish the Foreign Secretary with all the material necessary for hammering out a well-thought-out, detailed, steady, long-term British League policy. If we are to pull our full weight, and make our influence felt as it should be in the League, there must be patient study, careful preparation, the bringing to bear of many minds, and cool, persistent pressure.

So far the machinery suggested parallels that already set up by the French and other Governments Members of the League.¹ But in one respect it seems desirable to go even further by appointing what might be called a permanent expert delegate to the Council and Assembly. A great deal of the Assembly's agenda is taken up with a review of the work of the previous year and proposals for continuing this work during the year to come. Similarly, the Council, which meets every two months, often has as much as thirty to forty unrelated agenda to deal with, and is snowed under with reports on the work of the technical, advisory and administrative commissions, settlement of minor disputes, appointment of League officials, etc. Most of these matters affect the interests of the Great Powers to a certain extent—for instance, France has an axe to grind in questions of the Saar and Dantzig, Italy in the question of appointing a financial adviser to Albania, and so forth—but none to a great extent, and some not at all. While, of course, there is no hard or fast dividing line, and while it is not always easy to foretell whether a question is going to develop important complications or not, nevertheless it is in practice feasible to divide the work of the Council into two or three important political or general questions

¹ And would cost nothing more than is already being paid, for the League Section in the Foreign Office already exists, and the members of the proposed committee are already in government employ. They would merely be required to meet together from time to time and take counsel—a proceeding that involves no additional outlay.

that vitally affect the interests of some or all the powers on the Council, and a great deal of technical and detailed work in which Great Britain, at any rate, has no special interest, but only the general interest of seeing that this work is carried on efficiently. Hitherto, except for the particular member with an axe to grind—who always has precise instructions—the Council, as a rule, knows little or nothing about these questions, and swallows whole the recommendations of the Secretariat. This, perhaps, is not a bad thing, for the officials of the Secretariat have developed a pretty strong League spirit, but it would, nevertheless, be obviously desirable to have for these purposes a government representative who, while, of course, bound by general instructions, and reporting all developments home, would have a fairly free hand and be chosen solely for ability, impartiality, and above all, for exact and profound knowledge of all the questions at issue. This delegate should spend half or more of the year in Geneva, and attend not only all Council and Assembly meetings, but spend some time before and after each meeting at Geneva in order to study all the agenda thoroughly, get into personal touch with the leading members of the Secretariat, the permanent officials for liaison with the League Secretariat that various governments maintain in Geneva, and so forth.

When any big question directly affecting England came before the Council, this delegate would be replaced by the Prime or Foreign Minister, who likewise would attend certain parts of the Assembly meeting. In this case the "permanent delegate" would become respectively the expert adviser of the British representative on the Council and the second delegate in the Assembly delegation. Otherwise he would be the first British delegate at the Assembly and the British Council representative. He should be the chairman

of the interdepartmental committee previously suggested, and while responsible directly to the Foreign Office, should have Cabinet rank, and so be enabled to report on the whole situation before all the members of the government and take part in all discussions on League policy. Some such arrangement is necessary if Great Britain is really to give effect to the election pledges of all parties, that no effort will be spared to use the League as much as possible, and thereby strengthen and develop it to the fullest extent. One obvious candidate for this post would be Lord Robert Cecil.

So much for the Council delegate and one delegate to the Assembly. The further question arises as to how the rest of the British delegation to the Assembly should be composed. The reason why the chief delegate with the one vote of the delegation must be a government representative has already been explained. But by the terms of the Covenant the delegation may consist of three delegates, and by the practice since established there are in addition three vice-delegates. The latter may in certain circumstances speak in the Assembly, and are of great importance, for they sit as the representatives of their countries in the Committees of the Assembly, that hitherto have always been six in number, and in which all the real work is done. Therefore a regular Assembly delegation should consist, besides the permanent expert delegate already mentioned, of five delegates and vice-delegates. While the Prime or Foreign Minister, or both, attended an Assembly, one or two of these delegates or vice-delegates would for the time being go to swell the indefinite number of technical advisers attached to the delegation. But for most of the session the permanent expert delegate would be the head of the delegation, and there would, in addition, be two Assembly delegates and three vice-delegates.

Now, while it is important that the head of the delegation should be a government representative, it is equally important that the delegation as a whole should be, so far as possible, representative of all the chief shades of opinion in our public life. In this connection the precedent set by, e.g., Sweden, Denmark and Norway, is of great interest. Sweden and Denmark regularly send, as the head of their delegation, a leader of the governing party (usually the Prime Minister himself), and make up the rest of the delegation from leaders of all the other chief parties. These leaders are nominated by the parties concerned, and given a rank in the delegation corresponding to the importance of the party. Norway follows the same practice in principle, but slightly varies it by appointing its greatest national figure—Dr. Nansen—as the head of the delegation, although he is not in politics, and including as a vice-delegate Dr. Lange, an eminent Norwegian, who is Secretary-General of the Inter-Parliamentary Union and resident at Geneva. It should be noted, however, that in the Scandinavian legislatures the so-called “committee system” obtains; that is, all important matters, including foreign affairs, are dealt with by committees made up of all parties, and with power to alter or even reject government proposals without this necessarily entailing the resignation of the government; that is, there is no such clear dominance of the Cabinet over Parliament as in Great Britain, and the principle that it is the first duty of an Opposition to oppose is not pushed nearly to the same lengths. Therefore it is much easier to compose a delegation from all parties, both Government and Opposition, without running the risk that the activities of all six delegates and vice-delegates on the Assembly Committees should be uncorrelated to the extent of being contradictory.

It may possibly be considered desirable to start a new tradition in these matters in our own Parliament. A great deal is being said to-day about the necessity for foreign policy being above party. If this means a return to the Mandarin tradition, with foreign policy as a sacred preserve into which the public must not look until the activities of the Mandarins have landed us in a war, it is, of course, an evil tradition to be combated at any cost. But it may mean what might be more happily expressed by saying that we should have an all-party foreign policy; that is, that foreign policy should represent a course of action on which all parties were agreed as concerns general principles and main lines of action, although there might be debate on the details of execution. Such a foreign policy would be thoroughly thrashed out in Parliament and in the Press before being applied, and the part of such a policy which was conducted through the League system might very well be transacted through a delegation representing all parties. At any rate, the elements of the problem are clear, and they are—how to reconcile the necessity for a truly representative delegation with the need for a sufficient measure of agreement to ensure the members of the delegation working harmoniously, each in his own committee, but all on an agreed basis of broad principles and general policy. This is, in fact, not so difficult as may appear, for the work of each Assembly Committee is very largely independent of that of the others. Thus a delegate may, for instance, work in the committee that deals with health, transit, economics, social and humanitarian problems, and be in perfect agreement with the policy of his government in all these questions, while yet holding widely different opinions about and making independent speeches in the Assembly on the relation between the Council and Assembly, the report summing up the activities of the League in the previous

year, disarmament, or any other question dealt with elsewhere. The fact of a delegate holding independent views on questions that do not come up in his committee, and so on which he is not asked to vote, need not in any way interfere with the working efficacy of the delegation at the Assembly, and may, indeed, be helpful in reaching a compromise with other delegations. Besides this, it would be valuable for the education of public opinion both at home and abroad. What is needed here, as elsewhere, is an intelligent and active public opinion among all parties, both in Parliament and outside, a public opinion well informed on facts, knowing what it wants and determined to get it. In such an atmosphere there would be no difficulty in composing a perfectly satisfactory delegation to the Assembly, adequately supported by expert and clerical assistance, and armed with a full programme and bold instructions.

The question of delegates to special League conferences, such as those held at the instance of the Labour Office, technical organisations and advisory commissions, also needs attention. The delegates sent to such conferences need coaching about the League, fuller instructions and wider, better defined powers. Hitherto the difficulty has been that delegates appear at a gathering of this sort without, to use a now famous phrase, "knowing where they are," nor just what they are supposed to do; and when they do learn, they have to wire for instructions. After all this preliminary trouble it often happens that the decisions arrived at are not ratified by the government whose representative has signed them. The non-ratification of treaties and agreements arrived at in League conferences is a grave scandal. The non-ratification of labour conventions is a fairly well-known example, but it is not known, for instance, that for a long time the only power

which had ratified the Barcelona Transit Conventions and Agreements was Albania, which has no waterways and not a single mile of railway! The most flagrant instance at present is that of the amendments to the Covenant passed by the Second Assembly. Hitherto these amendments as a whole have been ratified only by Bulgaria, Denmark, Norway and Sweden. Siam has ratified several, and Italy bears the honourable distinction of being the only Great Power which has ratified any (Italy has ratified eleven out of the fifteen amendments). Great Britain has not even signed several of the most important.¹ It is to be hoped that our disgraceful record in this matter will speedily be improved, since it was Lord Balfour who moved a resolution, adopted by the Third Assembly, declaring that it was of the utmost importance that the amendments already voted should be ratified, and requesting the Council to take all proper measures to secure this result. Perhaps the most important and urgent amendment is that to Article IV, declaring that the Assembly has the right to fix by a two-thirds majority the rules dealing with the election of the non-permanent members of the Council, particularly with regard to their term of office and the conditions of re-eligibility. Unless this amendment is ratified by a sufficient number of governments before the Fourth Assembly, there may be difficulty about getting some of the temporary members on the Council to accept the recommendation that they shall be ineligible for a certain period after holding a term of office.

The experience of the Third Assembly has shown that, without a hard-and-fast rule disqualifying temporary members for a certain period after holding office, these members take it as a matter of prestige that they should go on being re-elected indefinitely, and threaten to resign from the League

¹ See Appendix C, Note 7.

if they are not. This practical difficulty disposes of the desire in certain quarters that all the members of the Council should be elected by the Assembly, for it is obviously impossible compulsorily to retire a Great Power from the Council for fixed periods, and without such a stipulation the existing distinction between great and lesser powers would simply be perpetuated under a different name. This is, of course, displeasing to upholders of that apotheosis of sovereignty known as "international democracy" who hold that states should be looked upon as entities in the same way as individuals. But it can only seem logical to those who consider that states are aggregations of human beings, bound by common political ties, and that consequently a highly civilised aggregation of forty odd millions, whose interests touch the whole world, should not be put on the same voting basis as a dusky handful constituting some unknown and insignificant state in Central America or the West Indian Isles. This, indeed, would be a denial of democracy in the name of the *reductio ad absurdum* of a dogma—that of sovereignty—which in any case has little to recommend it in the modern world.

CHAPTER XII

A LEAGUE POLICY FOR ADJUSTING RELATIONS WITH THE DOMINIONS AND WITH EASTERN NATIONS; FOR BRINGING AMERICA AND EUROPE TOGETHER; FOR A SETTLEMENT IN WEST AND EAST EUROPE; FOR DISARMAMENT. A WORLD AT PEACE

THE League might be of use in connection with solving the question of the effective participation of the Dominions in the foreign policy of the Mother-country, and generally in confirming their status as independent nations. Membership of the League has, indeed, been the first step in this direction, only it implies as a corollary that the British Government should take its obligations seriously, and transact all important business through the League.

Thus the Third Assembly witnessed the instructive spectacle of the Dominions strongly pleading that the Near East crisis should be dealt with through the League Council. "Why," asked Sir Joseph Cook (Australia) in a powerful and noteworthy speech that was the feature of the Third Assembly's debates on this subject, "should states send fully accredited representatives to Geneva and do the real work elsewhere?" The reason for the Dominions' insistence is, of course, plain: by the rules of procedure laid down in the Covenant they would have had the right to claim seats in the Council during the deliberations on this subject so

soon as there was the slightest prospect of the outcome involving them in war. But Mr. Fisher, for the British Government, joined the French and Italian representatives in opposing the reference of this matter to the League. Thus the Dominions found the question of the Near East was considered by the Imperial Government to concern them when it came to appeals to furnish troops, but was treated as a matter between the greater Allies and their clients in Europe—with, of course, the conquering Turk—for the purpose of negotiating a settlement. The unfortunate effect of this attitude upon the Dominions, and the necessity for the British Government in similar cases in future adhering scrupulously to League methods if serious trouble is to be avoided, are so plain as to require no comment.

The first requisite, then, for a successful use of the League system in the adjustment of the relations between the Dominions and the Mother-country is that the latter should deal with all important questions through the League, and generally take its duties as a member of the League a great deal more seriously than has been the case under the Coalition Government. The second requisite is that the Dominions should strengthen their representation both in League conferences and in London. In this connection some extraordinarily interesting views have been put forward by the Hon. Newton W. Rowell, one of the most distinguished delegates at the First Assembly and one of Canada's premier statesmen, in his book, *The British Empire and World Peace.*¹ Mr. Rowell suggests that the office of Canadian High Commissioner, at present a survival from the days when Canada was a self-governing colony, should be transformed, and this functionary, from being a combination of social figure and trade representative with no political responsibility, become an

¹ Quoted in the *New Statesman*, November 4th.

intermediary empowered to act as the communicating channel between the Imperial Cabinet and his home government in matters concerning international relations. He should also act as Canada's representative at League conferences. Mr. Rowell presses home his argument in the following terms :—

It is important in the interests of Canada and her place in the League of Nations that there should be a measure of continuity in her representation at the Assembly and other international gatherings or conferences held under the auspices of the League. It would be of real value to Canada if one, at least, of her representatives knew and understood the point of view of the other nations represented in the League. The personal equation is an important factor. . . . Does not Canada's position now entitle her to request that her High Commissioner should deal directly with the Prime Minister or the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs? The accredited representative of any foreign state in London has the right to discuss a matter affecting his state with the Secretary of State. How much more should the accredited representative of one of the Dominions possess the right?

Clearly there are possibilities in these ideas very well worth investigating; they might, indeed, go a long way to solve the problem of the new relations between the Dominions and the Mother-country, if made the basis for discussions between all the governments concerned.

Emigration is also conceivably a subject where the overseas countries—the Dominions and the South American States—that want men, might co-operate through the League system with the European countries that since the war are not in a position to support all their population. It is obvious that if emigration is to be successful, there must be the closest possible co-ordination between the sending and receiving countries.

The Treaty with Irak, promising support for her becoming a member of the League, after a certain period and on certain conditions, is

an illustration of how the existence of the League may be used to effect a compromise with the new phenomenon of Oriental nationalism by granting sufficient of not only the substance but the form and pomp of statehood to satisfy nationalist feeling, while retaining such specific guarantees as will protect essential British interests. It is too early to say as yet whether this particular experiment will be a success,¹ whether, indeed, Mesopotamia possesses the necessary elements without which a state cannot be built, but the idea is obviously sound and fruitful. In the case of Egypt, for instance, the trouble has been that while the nationalists will agree to British troops guarding the Suez Canal, they will not contemplate the stationing of British garrisons in Egyptian cities. On the other hand, the British Government's view is that unless there are tangible guarantees for the safety of foreign subjects and property some such measure is necessary. Why should it not be possible to institute an international gendarmerie in the towns, paid for by Great Britain, France, Italy and Egypt, and run by a Commissioner appointed by and responsible to the Council, with Egypt sitting in the Council when this matter comes up for discussion? Similarly, in the case of India, the moment may come in the evolution of that country toward independence when the conflict between nationalist

¹ One thing is certain—unless substantial independence is achieved before League membership is applied for, other states will object. The "six votes to one" cry was already raised when the Dominions came in, and only stilled when it became obvious to the world at large that the Dominions are, in fact, independent nations, and that their delegations to the Assembly take their own line on all questions. But India is still looked at askance as a member of the League for the same reason. It must also be remembered that unless we are careful about the tests for statehood that must be passed before a country can become a member of the League, we may create a precedent that will lead to, e.g., Soviet Russia's claiming League membership for the Ukraine, Soviet Georgia, Azerbaidjan, Armenia, the Bashkir Republic, the Kirghiz Republic, the Far Eastern Republic, and a number of other dubiously autonomous republics on Soviet territory.

opinion and the British Government might turn on the question of guarantees for foreign subjects and foreign property as expressed in the jurisdiction of the law courts, tariffs, police, etc. The desired guarantees might be embodied in a treaty between India and Great Britain providing for an appeal to the Council or Court, and even for control on certain points by agents appointed by the Council. In general, India and other countries growing into full statehood might well accept greater temporary restrictions of their sovereignty in this way than otherwise, considering it less wounding to national dignity to be in some respects in tutelage for a time to the whole of humanity, than to be in the same relation to Great Britain. They might, too, consider that the League offered better guarantees of impartiality and disinterestedness than the power which nationalists look upon as their conqueror and would-be oppressor. Lastly, membership of the League always gives them the right to discuss all issues affecting themselves on equal terms with any other power, and this must prove an additional attraction. As India is already a member of the League, this evolution might, indeed, seem natural and prove not very difficult in her case.

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In order to gain a free hand in Europe it is necessary first to arrange for the mode of payment of our debt to the United States; in this connection it seems not unreasonable to suggest that the Americans themselves should actively take part in drawing up plans for payment that will get over their apparent disinclination to be paid in goods—they have most of the gold already. So far as the League goes, we should make every effort to facilitate American adhesion on the "limited liability" basis she desires. In this connection it is to be expected that the United

States, once they begin participating in the work of the advisory commissions and other subsidiary organizations, will find out the desirability of sitting in the Council and Assembly when these bodies lay down the policy and determine the budgets of the organizations mentioned. Our government should be on the alert to note when this moment comes, and when it does, take the initiative in proposing an arrangement by which the members of the League would agree to amend the Covenant so as to allow the Assembly and Council to admit non-members by majority votes to a seat and a vote, for such occasions and on such terms as may be agreed between the power concerned and the Assembly or Council—provided the United States, in their turn, signified their willingness beforehand to take advantage of this arrangement when it was made.

Considering the extent to which the United States are already semi-officially co-operating with the League Health Organisation, the British Government might perhaps informally sound the Washington Administration as to whether it would not be willing to withdraw its veto on amalgamating the Office International d'Hygiène Publique with the Health Organisation, and to co-operate in making one autonomous organisation out of the two. In a previous chapter it has been explained how the United States alone prevented the carrying out of the First Assembly proposal that the Office International d'Hygiène Publique should be incorporated in the League Health Organisation. Consequently the Organisation was given a temporary form, and a working compromise arranged with the Office International. But, of course, so long as there are two organisations existing for more or less the same purpose there is bound to be overlapping, friction and waste. Therefore the present arrangement is looked upon as temporary, pending a change of

mood in the United States. But the Third Assembly passed a resolution that allows of a draft for the final constitution of the Health Organisation being drawn up by an international conference summoned for the purpose during 1923, and submitted for approval to the Fourth Assembly next September. In view of these facts it would seem desirable that the British Government should sound United States official circles, study the situation carefully, and, when it judged the moment propitious, take the initiative in summoning a conference to which not only the members of the League, but also the United States, Germany, and, if possible, Russia, should send their medical representatives. The conference would then draw up a constitution fusing the Office International and the Provisional Health Organisation, on the same lines as that of the Transit Organisation, but *mutatis mutandis*, and with the further differences suggested by the fact that the bodies ultimately controlling the policies and voting the credits of the organisation would be, not the Council and Assembly, but the Council and Assembly "plus the power or Powers Members of the organisation that are not members of the League." This would mean that, e.g., the United States could sit in the Council or Assembly when health matters were dealt with, although not a member of the League. And once the United States, Germany and Russia became members of the League, the constitution of the Health Organisation would approximate to that of the Transit Organisation, i.e. revert to the normal type of League technical organisation.

Again, adherence by the United States to the International Court might be used to propose a treaty between the British and American Governments, accepting, as regards each other, the terms of the optional clause concerning compulsory jurisdiction that was added to the protocol of the Court by the Assembly. It is not a thing to be proud

of that no Great Power has yet signed this clause. The political reasons for this reserve are, however, although not creditable, at least intelligible. But they would obviously be far more than outweighed, so far as we and the United States were concerned, by the great political advantage of thus solemnly sealing the immense fact that the whole English-speaking world had once for all accepted law as the final arbiter in its affairs. And once we get to this point with our American kinsmen, it is to be hoped that the wisdom and decency of signing the optional clause with other countries too, on the basis of reciprocity, will quickly become apparent. Lastly, the United States have always striven to extend and consolidate the reign of international law, and so might, once they had become members of the Court, be willing to associate themselves with us and the South American countries in a move for entrusting the Court with the elucidation and codification of existing international law, as suggested by the International Law Association Conference in Buenos Aires last summer.

These, then, are ways in which the League system might be used for the adjustment of intra-Imperial relations and the establishment of co-operation with the U.S.A. and other overseas countries. But all this is subsidiary to the burning problems of how to reach a settlement with Germany, Russia and Turkey. The latter is being attempted while this is written, so that comment seems idle—except for the remark that if France, Italy and Great Britain can agree on a common policy, there should be no difficulty in what to do with the Turks—the elements of the problem are simple enough—whereas if concession-hunting and chicane continue to hold the field the prospects do not seem bright of achieving a settlement short of either war or a surrender to the victory-drunk

Kemalists involving the massacre and expulsion from Turkey of Christian minorities, as well as the refortification of the Straits.

The question of German reparations and inter-Allied debts is more complex, but it, too, must be settled within the next few months, for if it is not, Germany will go the same way as Austria, with the added complications of revolution and counter-revolution, Bavarian attempts to proclaim a monarchy and annex Austria, etc. The only way to settle this question is obviously in conjunction with France and Italy. It is too early at the time of writing to know Italy's policy. France, however, has got to the point where she is publicly willing to reduce the indemnity in exchange for a cancellation of her debts, and the British Government is now apparently willing to let the Balfour Note be bygones and treat the matter on that basis. The immediate question is whether France is willing to reduce the indemnity sufficiently to make its payment feasible in present circumstances, also whether she is willing to grant the two or three years' moratorium that is now necessary, without imposing a degree of control too much like economic slavery ever to be accepted by Germany. Behind this lies the further question whether she is willing drastically to reduce the enormous armies of occupation in the Rhineland that at present are eating up whatever indemnities Germany can pay, and creating a state of mind in the subject population that helps to keep Europe in a ferment and bodes no good for the future. Behind this, again, looms the larger question of whether the French Government has made up its mind as to which of two policies—making Germany pay or destroying Germany—it wishes to adopt. The Dariac report is merely the culminating fact in a long series of acts in the Rhineland, and discussions in the French Press and political circles that point to a fixed resolve on the part of at least

influential people close to the French Government to detach the Rhineland and make it a German Alsace-Lorraine.

Behind, and at the root of all these questions, lies a state of mind that may be defined as a well-nigh universal belief that France is not only omnipotent on the Continent, but invulnerable. Whereas Great Britain, runs the argument, depends on foreign trade, and so is driven to a peace and reconstruction policy in Europe in order to build up her markets, France is independent of the rest of the world, and so can, without injury to herself, invade the Ruhr and shatter the economic fabric of Europe east of the Rhine, thereby dealing England's efforts at recovery a mortal blow. Reactionaries and extreme nationalists are all for adopting this policy at once, apparently on the good old principle that what hurts others must be good for France ; Germany's ruin in this case being considered the chief blessing, with Great Britain's consequent troubles as an accessory benefit. More moderate Frenchmen are opposed to "upsetting the apple-cart"—except as a last resort. But the serious thing is that practically everyone who counts in France is firmly convinced that this policy is feasible, and that an attempt to smash Germany, as an alternative to reparations is quite justifiable.

Obviously, it is not possible to lay the foundations for a new understanding with France until the idea of destroying Germany—which means assassinating Europe, for all the half-derelict new states lean on the staggering German colossus and would be drawn down in its fall—as the alternative to a successful collection of debts is put aside for ever, and until the illusion has been dissipated that we are lost without France, while France can, if necessary, play a lone hand triumphantly. If there are to be fruitful negotiations leading to real partnership, there must be equality between the would-be partners, and there is no equality, if one

partner believes he is invulnerable while able at any moment to make life impossible for the other.

Therefore, while the question of reparations and debts is overwhelmingly important and brooks no delay, and while it cannot be solved except by France, Great Britain and Italy in unison, it may be solved successfully only after the formidable psychological obstacle just mentioned has been cleared away. For this reason we must make full peace with Russia immediately and independently. This is intrinsically well worth doing and long overdue. Moreover, since the period of delay, specified by the Genoa Conference has lapsed, we are expressly entitled to take separate action without this being considered a breach of the Entente. On our side, we should offer political recognition, support for Russia's candidature to membership of the League with a permanent seat on the Council, credits not only to British traders in Russia, but limited credits (charged against the Russian Government) for League relief and health work in Russia, and association with the policy of neutralisation of the Baltic and Black Sea areas, as well as non-fortification of and freedom of commerce through the Straits. On Russia's side there should be a settlement of the question of debts and British property in Russia, a willingness to adjust relations with the border states and an agreement as to the policy to be pursued toward Turkey and in the Middle East. In embarking on this policy we should make a special effort to enlist the co-operation of Poland and Czecho-Slovakia. Both these states are very apprehensive about the results to themselves of a policy that would cause the collapse of Germany and are anxious for recognition of and peace and trade with Russia—this last for the simple reason that a reviving Russia on whom the rest of Europe has a hold spells security and prosperity, whereas a lean and hungry outlaw Russia is a danger. Czecho-

Slovakia and Poland—as well as the other border states—made no secret of these views both before and after the Genoa and Hague Conferences. These considerations, too, are not lost on Roumania and Yugo-Slavia, which are also alarmed at the complacency with which Turkish demands are being met in certain quarters. It should not, therefore, be difficult to establish working relations with the Little Entente, the Balkan group and the new states of East Europe generally in carrying out a policy of peace with Russia. Signor Mussolini, too, has made clear Italy's desire to settle with Russia, and we should do everything to help in the achievement of that desire (Italy is mainly interested in the coalfields and raw materials of South Russia). We should also, of course, do everything to use the position which our policy would gain for us in Russia to help France settle her outstanding differences with that country, for clearly, without the co-operation of France and Italy we could not get Russia into the League Council nor carry the movement of settlement and reconstruction further West than the eastern frontier of Germany. In regard to Germany our hands are tied by common treaty obligations with France and Italy. It is true France has set a precedent in the case of Turkey by concluding the Angora agreement regardless of previous treaty obligations, but it is hardly likely that anyone would suggest our doing the same, or that we could make such a policy effective for good if we did.

On the other hand, the policy of full peace with Russia would dissipate the French illusion already mentioned, and show the situation in its true light, which is, that wrecking Germany would not "finish" things but merely mean creating a temporary belt of chaos east of the Rhine, narrower or wider as the case may be, and engulfing perhaps some, perhaps all, of the new states. Beyond that belt we should be helping Russia on to her feet

and slowly building up Europe again from the East to the West. The more the intervening chaos involved revolution and war, as it very likely would, the surer it would be that the Europe which ultimately emerged would be a very different Europe from that which was so carefully carved out and shored up at the Peace Conference. "Upsetting the apple-cart" means upsetting the Peace settlement. But the Peace settlement was based on the temporary dictatorship of the Allies, on the temporary prostration of Germany and Russia, and on the temporary prevalence of nationalist illusions, such as that, for instance, which led the Croats to fly into the arms of the Serbs, and led all the Succession States to adopt a policy destructive to the economic unity which had obtained under the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Clearly a reorganisation of Europe that began from Russia would be a reorganisation on very different lines from the present settlement. It is, indeed, still very much an open question whether even under the most favourable circumstances it is possible to make the present settlement of Europe stable by constitutional means—whether the little new states will treat their German, Hungarian, Russian, etc., minorities in such a way as to avoid trouble with their great neighbours, and whether they will moderate their protectionist ardour sufficiently to make economic life possible. In short, the plain fact is that while peace and reconstruction in Europe is not at the first remove so obviously a bread-and-butter question for France as it is for us, it is at the second remove a life-and-death issue for her no less than for us. Germany and Russia cannot be destroyed or kept down and apart for ever; they must be conciliated, or they will come together, and if together they are stronger than any other Continental combination.

Supposing, then, that the proper atmosphere of mutual respect had been established, how should

the negotiations be conducted? The reason that France is reluctant to let Germany revive economically and politically to the point where she can pay, and still toys with the idea of breaking up her great neighbour, is that Germany has an increasing population, already nearly twice the size of that of France, whose population is stationary, and that in industrial and technical organisation Germany is far ahead of France. And these things mean immense potential military power in the modern world. The French report to the Third Assembly on the reasons dictating French armaments points out these facts very forcibly and concludes that France's only guarantee in a future war is the time factor—the ability to strike first. If Germany could overcome that, it is tacitly admitted that France would be beaten. This, needless to say, is rather a slight foundation on which to build national security, for a small development in military science would suffice to upset it, and the idea of breaking up Germany is, as has been already shown, a chimera, for the break-up cannot be permanent.

Bearing in mind all the facts and considerations set forth above, we should in an all-round settlement ask for a reduction of the Rhine army from the present 150,000 or so to a mere corporal's guard of 10,000, coupled with withdrawal to the legal limits laid down by the Versailles Treaty. The period of fifteen years' occupation should be made to run from the date of coming into force of the Versailles Treaty (i.e. three years are already up). This would make clear that the idea of destroying Germany had been given up absolutely and for ever. As for reparations, they should be based entirely on what Germany can pay within five or ten years and should be accompanied by only so much control and such a moratorium as would enable these sums to be produced by yearly payments in cash and kind, as well as by an

international loan on which Germany would pay the interest and sinking fund. We, on our side, should be willing to give up all our claims on France and Italy and our share in the indemnity, thereby raising the proportion of the other Allies. We should also offer a guarantee of security through the League.

It is obvious that a policy of this sort entails heavy sacrifices, for it means giving up all our claims in Europe while paying America to the full. In addition, the idea of commitments to Continental Powers is at present repugnant to a great part of British public opinion. However, as we shall have to pay the United States in any case, and will not get any money from Germany or our late Allies in any case either, there is nothing for it but to make a virtue of necessity. Moreover, France herself will have to make very considerable sacrifices to accept this policy: she will not only have to face a very difficult financial situation at home, but will have drastically to revise her foreign policy, will have, in fact, as Senator de Jouvenel said, to choose between force and the League of Nations.¹ But if we push our policy skilfully and boldly, she will have to eschew force, as it will too obviously leave her alone in Europe, without disposing of her enemies.

The only question that remains, then, is how to embody the idea of security through the League in a concrete policy? When the Covenant was drawn up, it was thought that Article X alone would offer sufficient security and that all more restricted groupings should be disallowed. Even at that time, however, the Monroe Doctrine was made an

¹ Recently Senator de Jouvenel publicly declared that if the Brussels Conference on Reparations failed there were only two alternatives left—force or the League of Nations. In this dilemma, said the Senator, he would unhesitatingly choose the League. Senator de Jouvenel was the French representative to the Third Assembly who, together with Lord Robert Cecil, hammered out the compromise resolution on a guarantee treaty and reduction of armaments.

exception and opened the way to further exceptions. Lord Robert Cecil's proposed pact, referred by the Temporary Mixed Commission to the Third Assembly, was a confession that Article X had been conceived on too wide a scale ; that it was too much to expect of overseas nations that they should automatically come to the aid of a European member of the League that was attacked. Consequently Lord Robert proposed to limit his pact to nations on the same continent. But this, too, has proved too great a strain on the existing degree of international solidarity. After prolonged debates, the Third Assembly passed a compromise resolution which, while admitting the desirability of a Continental pact, opens the door wide to local understandings. Clearly, then, the attempt to keep away from the system of rival alliances by general understandings has broken down ; the very catholicity of basis which was supposed to constitute the capital difference from old-style alliances has imported an element of unreality that causes States simply to refuse to take the project seriously. The way to make the distinction is, then, to start from the other end and try to bring about not so much a difference in partners as a difference in the terms of partnership. One proposal is to register agreements with the League. This ought to go without saying, but it is not enough. A public alliance may be only one degree less objectionable than a secret alliance—indeed, secret alliances never do remain very secret, so that the difference is largely one of words. Another way, originally proposed by Lord Robert Cecil and embodied in the Assembly resolution, is that League agreements, while they may be local in scope, should become operative only by a resolution of the Council. This is better, for it means that treaty obligations are interpreted not by the Contracting Powers, but by an authoritative and impartial body which, while it may include these powers, is not identical with

them. But as it stands the proposal is incomplete, for while affording unconditional protection to any power whose territory is violated by the forces of another, it enjoins no corresponding obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means. It is true that powers signing this pact are also supposed to be signatories to the Covenant and so presumably morally obliged as members of the League to submit their disputes to the Council, Court or Assembly. But in form the proposed pact is entirely independent of the Covenant, and it would be quite possible for a State signing the pact to rely on the automatic and unconditional guarantee it affords, while refusing to carry out its duties as a member of the League and submit its dispute with another power to arbitration or mediation. This is a hardly likely contingency, but if it occurred the situation would be extremely awkward, for the recalcitrant state would undoubtedly have the right to appeal to the pact—in its present form—to protect it from the consequences of its obstinacy.

It is in order to get over this last difficulty that the suggestion was made, soon after the Third Assembly, to insert an additional clause in the pact proposed by Lord Robert Cecil and recommended in modified form by the Assembly: In order to be able to invoke the pact a state should not only have to satisfy the Council that it had been invaded, but the dispute out of which the alleged invasion arose should be *sub judice* in some League body (i.e. the Council, Court or Assembly), or the State concerned should have accepted the League's final award (that is, the award of the Assembly) in the case at issue. In other words, any state which refused to have its case dealt with through the League, or any state which refused to accept the final opinion of the community of nations in the matter, would, by the terms of the agreement itself, be unable to invoke

its protection. Thus, while members of the League would be allowed under this interpretation of the term "regional understanding" to conclude agreements on as restricted a basis as they pleased, they could do so only on terms that would make it impossible for these agreements to be interpreted as a menace or an act of separatism by any outside power. On the other hand, since this form of agreement would be merely a logical development of the terms of the Covenant to which they are already pledged—that is, an absolute guarantee of security as opposed to the relative guarantee afforded by Articles X and XVI, in exchange for an absolute obligation to settle disputes by peaceful means instead of the partial obligation to mediate and delay laid down in the Covenant—members of the League would find great difficulty in refusing this form of pact without putting themselves in the position of apparently preferring anarchy and force to law and mutual aid; without, that is, going back on the spirit and the letter of their duties and professions as members of the League.

Giving a guarantee through the League to France, Italy and Belgium¹ might then be interpreted as concluding a regional understanding with these countries, stipulating that if one of the Contracting Powers (1) was willing to submit a dispute with an outside power to settlement through the League and the outside power nevertheless refused and took up arms against the Contracting Power, or (2) if a dispute between a Contracting Power and an outside power were *sub judice* in the League, or the Contracting Power had accepted the Assembly's award in the dispute at issue and the outside power nevertheless took up arms against the Contracting Power, the latter would be held to be attacked under the terms of

¹ To emphasise the difference from the old form of alliance, Holland might be asked to join, although she would almost certainly refuse; Spain, too, should be asked, although her assent is more than doubtful.

the agreement and the other Contracting Powers obliged to come to its aid with every means at their disposal. The Council should by a three-quarters majority and within a delay of four days be the organ designated to decide whether the outside power had in fact "taken up arms" against the Contracting Power. It would be desirable that as a corollary, to an agreement of this sort the Contracting Powers should sign among themselves the optional clause concerning compulsory jurisdiction contained in the protocol of the International Court. This would emphasise their intention to settle all their differences by peaceful means. Moreover, all our major disagreements, with France at any rate, during the next few years are almost certain to turn upon treaty interpretations or questions of fact (for instance, France's right to take separate action under the Versailles Treaty; how much Germany can pay and on what terms). It would obviously be a direct practical advantage for all of us to be bound to resort to an impartial judicial organ to settle the question. In this way it could be settled promptly without waste of time and temper or the loss of prestige (what the Chinese call "face") on either side. Moreover, the settlement arrived at in this way would be just and impartial and not the temporary resultant of conflicting interests.

The conclusion of a pact of this sort should be proposed as the last term of an all-round settlement between the Allies and Germany, including as one factor an agreement by all the Contracting Powers to vote for Germany's admission to the League and permanent membership of the League Council, the moment she applied. It would, of course, be theoretically possible immediately to make a regional understanding with Germany on the same terms as that proposed with the Allies. This would, however, create the same opposition in France that was

raised by the suggested tripartite agreement between Germany, France and England, and simply cause her to consider the whole proposed agreement as no real guarantee and mere make-believe. That is the hard psychological fact that we must take account of and give full weight to in all our calculations. In order to get over the difficulty this fact presents, it might be stipulated that the agreement should run for twenty years, but that we reserved ourselves the right any time after the lapse of five years to conclude a similar agreement with Germany. In the meantime Germany's membership of the Council, coupled with the existence of Articles X and XVI, even in their present weakened form, would give her ample opportunity to hold her own and ourselves full warrant for backing her claims to any extent that public opinion in England during the next five years at least is likely to contemplate.

A settlement on these lines would clear up West and Central Europe and open the way to tackling the problem of Russia. It has already been shown why there is small hope of settlement in the West unless we simultaneously open negotiations with Russia in the East. Conversely, although we take separate action in Russia, the purpose of our action must unwaveringly be to establish good relations between Russia and *all* other countries, particularly between Russia and our Allies, France and Italy. Everywhere and always the supreme object of our policy must be to prevent Europe splitting up into rival camps that will become hostile alliances and end in Armageddon. We must never forget this object, even if, paradoxically enough, we have, in order to attain it, to act for a time independently of our Allies.

Genoa and The Hague broke down largely because the Bolsheviks wanted political recogni-

* See Appendix C, Note 8.

tion and credits in exchange for the desired settlement on debts and foreign property. In any all-round settlement we should, of course, not only grant full political recognition but undertake to support Russia's candidature for the League and for permanent membership in the Council. As to credits, it will be remembered that the British Government was willing to give credits to the extent of thirty or forty million pounds to British traders operating in Russia, while the Soviet Government wanted much larger credits granted directly to itself. This last is obviously impossible, but, as a practical and not very costly compromise, we might consent to grant a couple of million pounds to the League Health Organisation for carrying out and enlarging the full programme decided upon at the Warsaw Anti-Epidemic Conference.¹ The sum thus expended could be charged up against the Russian Government, just as the Argentine has made a grant of over 5,000,000 pesos to the work of Russian famine relief and charged the sum up against the Russian Government. In this way we should be certain that the administration of these funds would be in hands we could fully trust, while dependent for their ultimate repayment—just as we would be dependent for not losing on the trade credits—on the Soviet Government. Moreover, even a superficial acquaintance with disease conditions in Russia should make it pretty clear that a preliminary health campaign is necessary to make Russia safe for business. How can British traders go back, restart their factories and collect large numbers of workmen, if devastating epidemics are at any moment likely to break out the moment they do so, and if medicines are unobtainable? For the same reason it might be good policy for the British Government to advocate placing the Nansen Relief Organisations under the Council, at least for the

¹ For the details of this programme see Chapter VII.

expenditure of another million or so of credits that the British Government would advance for the purposes not only of famine relief but of reconstruction. Russia is, after all, predominantly agricultural, and even in order to restore the industries owned by British subjects it is necessary to be sure that there will be a minimum of food and comfort for the workers who have to be collected for this purpose. Sums spent on repairs to railway transport and on providing the peasants, through their co-operative organisations and similar agencies, with tools and agricultural implements of every description, as well as clothes and boots, would very quickly more than pay for themselves in direct and indirect benefits. To begin with, they would mean productive work for many of our unemployed—a preferable alternative to spending the same money on doles. Here, again, the sum spent could be charged against the Russian Government in lieu of direct credits, as a compromise by which they would get the chief benefit of what had been done, but we should be sure that the money would really be well expended and would help to make work in England.

A point on which our and Russian interests might well meet would be the question of neutralising the Baltic and Black Sea. The Soviet Government, at the time of the Aaland Islands settlement, and since, made clear its desire to have an agreement between all the states bordering on the Baltic, by which none would keep more than a specified number of small men-of-war (gunboats, destroyers, light cruisers) of limited tonnage and armament in these waters, and by which no men-of-war from outside would be allowed to enter. This clearly would be a policy worth supporting, only with the proviso that a power acting on behalf of the League Council should be allowed to introduce warships into the Baltic. This proviso would become effective when Russia became

a permanent member of the League Council. A similar proposal for the neutralisation of the Black Sea and freedom of commerce through the Straits has been made by the Soviet Government and might well be taken up by us, again with the proviso that this neutrality would not hold in case of a power acting with the approval of the League Council, which should include Russia.

On the other hand, the Bolsheviki would have to undertake to settle the question of debts and property in a manner satisfactory to ourselves, and should, moreover, agree to settle with France, Italy, and Belgium on terms at least as favourable to these countries so soon as they were willing to support Russia's membership of the League Council. Russia should also agree to a common policy with us in the Near and Middle East and settle all outstanding questions with the border States, as well as apply for membership to the League so soon as a pledge had been obtained from the members of the Council to admit her to membership of that body. The advantage of Russia's friendship is so obvious as hardly to need emphasising: Russia is one of the richest in undeveloped natural resources of all countries in the world, as well as one of the largest. Moreover, terrible as is the condition of Russia to-day, there can be no doubt that she will once again become one of the greatest powers in the world. And it is to the interest of us, as well as of civilisation at large, that we should lay the foundations of friendship deep and strong to-day in Russia's hour of distress and so draw her close to the West and Western ideas, instead of forcing her through isolation to become a sort of demagogic Muscovy with Pan-Oriental leanings.

These are the lines of a possible settlement in East Europe that, together with the settlement already suggested in the West, should find its completion

in bringing Germany and Russia into the Council of the League. This, again, would open the way to a reduction of armaments concurrently with the development of a system of regional understandings like that foreshadowed in the Third Assembly's resolution, but with the additional clause concerning peaceful settlement of disputes that has already been mentioned. The aim would be to build up a number of groups *pari passu* with the reduction of armaments, and overlapping as much as possible. Thus, suppose the formation of a West European group consisting of Italy, France, Belgium, ourselves and possibly Holland and Spain, and a German-Russian group. By the time these were formed we should have a similar agreement with Germany, and so the West European and the Russo-German groups would overlap in us. This does not mean that we should be bound to intervene on the side of Germany if she went to war to help Russia. Our agreement with Germany could come into force only if that Power were willing to abide by the League's decision in a dispute with another power, which nevertheless attacked Germany. But it does mean that it would be impossible for the West European and German-Russian groups to drift into becoming rival and hostile alliances. This apart from the fact that all the Great Powers would be members of the League Council and all of us members of the League and so, whatever group we belong to, have the right under Article XI of the Covenant to call the attention of the Council to any circumstance threatening to disturb the peace of the world.

Finland is another state that might be suitable as a member of two or more different groups, for the Finns are the only one of the new states on excellent terms with Germany and the neutrals as well as with the Allies and the other border states.¹

¹ This is what has led to Finland being elected a member of the governing board of the International Labour Office, and may

Thus, Finland might conclude a League agreement with Germany, another with the Baltic States and Poland, and another with Sweden. Poland and the Little Entente, and those countries with France, would form further groups.

The truth is we must take account of the psychology of existing nations as they are at present, the state of mind that leads them to associate themselves with certain states whom they regard as allies and distrust others whom they regard as enemies. Of course, the sooner these war-time lines of division are replaced by the formation of other and larger groups the better, but trying to do too much and go too fast simply results in the states concerned refusing to act, as has been shown by the fate of Article X and the Continental Agreement. Until we get a new and better psychology, we must force the existing minds of these nations into new moulds, in the shape of the new and improved form of agreements that has been suggested. At the same time, we must block the channels to the old by insisting on the most rigid interpretation of Article XVIII of the Covenant (rendering invalid all treaties not registered with the Secretariat), and of Article XX, which declares that the States Members of the League may not conclude any treaties incompatible with the purposes of the Covenant. We should interpret this Article as meaning that only the form of regional understanding sketched above is permissible under it, and that if States choose to conclude others they are breaking the Covenant and, whether they register their separate treaties or not, cannot appeal under them to the League if they get into trouble.

in six or eight years' time lead to her becoming a temporary member of the Council. In this connection it may be remarked that Finland is, in point of size, population, history, finances, political affiliations and civilisation generally, to be regarded as more nearly a fourth Scandinavian state than a northern equivalent to the Baltic States—Latvia, Esthonia, and Lithuania. This is a point of some political importance.

In proportion as the settlements with Germany and Russia begin to be felt in the revival of European prosperity and intercourse, and as the entry of Germany and Russia into the Council increases the power and authority of the League, and in proportion as the system of overlapping uniform local groups develops, it should be possible to fuse smaller groups into larger, until finally we arrive at one general Continental agreement, as nationalism gets educated to the degree of solidarity necessary for this purpose. At the same time, perhaps, the element of sanctions and readiness for instant action in case of war will gradually be reduced in rigour as the doctrine of force in international relations loses its hold on men's minds. This whole process may well take eight or ten years, but it need not take longer if methodically and energetically pushed by our government and what other partners in this enterprise we can secure on the Continent.

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Our ultimate object must be to secure the abolition of air fleets, submarines and conscription, in exchange for a reduction by the United States, Japan, Italy, France and ourselves of our navies to some five or six light cruisers and a few destroyers and gunboats each, with corresponding reductions by all other countries. With these few ships we should obviously not be in a position to fight each other—they would be used only for suppressing smugglers and pirates, and for executing decrees of the Council, in accordance with whose decision alone any country could exercise the right of blockade and search. All straits and coaling stations would be neutralised and put under the League. Of course this consummation cannot become an object of policy until all the states of the world have for many years been members of the League ; until we are certain that we ourselves

would never go to war in defiance of a decision of the Council, of which we are a permanent member ; until we are convinced that the League will never break up owing to conflict between the leading members ; until, in fact, war between the Great Powers no longer enters into the day-to-day calculations of practical politicians, though, like revolution and civil war, it would always remain a possibility. To reach this point may sound Utopian to-day, but it is perfectly possible to reach it before the generation which has been through the war dies. The whole material basis of our civilisation, indeed, constrains us to effect the change of thought and habit that this requires, on pain of seeing it break up. All that is needed is will, animated by a purpose in the light of which the problems of to-day and to-morrow can be tackled intelligently and with confidence.

In this connection the question arises of how to give practical effect to the need for educating public opinion on international affairs and their bearing on the League system. The readiest and most obvious method is to join the League of Nations' Union. This all-party organisation, numbering already some 200,000 members, is nationwide, with headquarters in London. It exists for the express purpose of disseminating information about the League and foreign affairs generally, and for focussing the energies of people interested in such questions. It publishes literature, organises lectures, conferences, summer-schools, study and discussion groups—in a word, is doing precisely the work that must be done if public opinion is to be educated. Clearly, the more members and the more money the Union gets, the greater will be its power for good.

Another powerful educative influence are the international congresses held by the Co-operative and Labour (both the industrial and political wings) movements. The more discussion and con-

ference there is between representative private persons, whose views carry weight among large numbers of their countrymen, the stronger will grow the international tradition.

For this reason it would seem eminently desirable to utilise to the full that admirable institution the Inter-Parliamentary Union. The national groups belonging to this organisation, and numbering most countries in the world (Germany and the United States included) must be recruited from M.P.'s of their respective countries. Each group sends a delegation to the annual conference of the organisation, and each delegation has, in proportion to the population of the country concerned, as well as of the group it represents, from five to thirty votes. The conferences discuss and pass resolutions on current international questions, and are, of course, purely private affairs with no official status whatever. Something like 50 per cent. of the late Parliament belonged to the British group of the Inter-Parliamentary Union. Why should not most or all of the M.P.'s in the present Parliament constitute themselves the new British group, and do so with the deliberate resolve of making the Inter-Parliamentary Union a sort of international Parliament?

The first step in this process would be the appointment of a really weighty and representative delegation, made up of two or three of the most influential and able M.P.'s each party in Parliament could produce. The next would be to get into touch with the Parliaments of other countries having national groups, and try to persuade them to do likewise. The third step would be to try to secure that the conferences of the Union be held a month or so before the League Assembly, and discuss all the important points on the latter's agenda, as well as any other questions that might be put down by one or other national group. In proportion as the delegations to these con-

ferences were truly and authoritatively representative of all parties in their countries, the debates of the conferences would play a big part in shaping the public opinion and influencing the policy of these countries when they met in the Assembly. No more valuable training in internationalism and no better preparation for debates on League questions could be imagined for the M.P.'s who took part in these conferences.

At first, of course, the funds for these activities would have to be raised by the M.P.'s of the national group among themselves and their supporters. But it should not be impossible eventually to persuade the government to make a small grant for the purpose, once its value had been established. Eventually, when national groups embraced all the members of the Parliaments from which they were drawn, when the delegations were chosen by proportional representation, and when the governments had got into the habit of supporting this enterprise financially, we should have in the conferences of the Inter-Parliamentary Union what all who have thought at all deeply on the subject realise is a necessary complement to the machinery of the League of Nations—a true international consultative Parliament, where voting and discussion would go on party and not national lines—Conservatives, Liberals, Radicals and Socialists flocking with their kind and not their countrymen. This would be the most effective way to cure the illusion that modern states are water-tight entities, and bring home to men's minds a vivid sense of the complexity of a modern community and the inextricable way it ramifies into and intertwines with the other communities all round. Modern societies are rather like those corals that scientists puzzle over whether to classify as one highly subdivided animal or a number of intimately connected animals. The movement toward an international Parliament would, too, be the most effective way.

to civilise patriotism to the point where war ceases to be considered an ever-present possibility, if not the normal way to settle big differences.

It is an interesting and significant fact that this evolution of patriotism has very largely occurred as regards the relations of Great Britain and the United States, and still more so as regards the relations of Sweden, Norway and Denmark to each other. There has been peace for more than a century between the United States and Great Britain. The Canadian-United States border is unarmed and unguarded, and it is taken almost as a matter of course that differences between ourselves and the United States, however serious, should be settled by arbitration and mediation. In the case of Sweden, Norway and Denmark, whose history is strewn with internecine and other wars, the evolution has gone much further. These nations, while very jealous of their political individualism, to the extent that they highly dislike being called "Scandinavia" or "Scandinavian nations," have developed a highly interesting system of co-operation, as a result of which whole sections of the code of laws in each country are identical. From time to time jurists appointed by the three Governments meet and draw up a series of recommendations consisting of identical draft laws. It is now a tradition that, although this Committee has nothing but advisory powers, the three Parliaments pass the recommendations *in toto* and without discussion. This is interesting, for it foreshadows the way in which, through international conventions worked out in conferences and regulating questions such as transit, finance, health, labour, etc., with the League Council or Court designated as arbiter, we might gradually build up a body of common law among the members of the League and get into the habit of settling all the resultant differences by peaceful means; we might, in fact, evolve an organisation

of the world, "not as a federation in which all the individuals within the federal territories would be in the direct relation of subjects to a common Federal Government, but as a community or society of independent states, each exercising sovereignty within its own territories, subject to the limitations and responsibilities necessary to secure the common peace, the common welfare and the reasonable freedom of all the other states comprised in the community."¹

On the intellectual side, this evolution requires some such conception as a code of international rights—we must get into the habit of thinking that beyond a certain point such questions as tariffs, regulation of immigration, control of raw materials, etc., cease to be purely national and become matters of concern to other nations. There must, too, be respect for the reign of law and a getting away from the *code duello*, the code which is extinct in private life, but which still exists among nations. In other words, it is still considered a point of honour by states to be judge and jury in their own case and settle their disputes by ordeal of battle. The extravagance of the claim made by small nations—i.e. of small groups of humanity—to have the same voting power as large nations—i.e. big groups of humanity—has already been mentioned. This claim, although it covers itself with a high-sounding phrase—"international democracy"—is really rooted in a metaphysical dogma that may be formulated something like this: "all States are sovereign and equal." But the attitude of the great states in refusing to allow the Court compulsory jurisdiction, on the ground that it would be dishonouring for them to be summoned before the Court by a small power, means a claim on the part of large human groups not to be

¹ *The Duties of Nations*, being a lecture delivered by Mr. F. N. Keen, LL.B., to the Grotius Society, published by Sweet and Maxwell.

equal before the law with small human groups, and to be free to use force instead. But equality before the law for all individuals, corporations and groups within a society, high or low, big or small, is fundamental, and this denial of it a far more dangerous and anti-social act than the claim of the small states. It, indeed, is rooted in a conception that may be expressed by "my country's Government, right or wrong."

But below the need for new intellectual conceptions is the deeper necessity for a humanisation of nationalism similar to the humanisation of religion that put a stop to religious wars. Religion used to be the centre round which men's greeds, hates, fears, and lusts clustered and were sanctified, To-day it is patriotism which is the last refuge of a scoundrel, in the sense of allowing habits of thought and behaviour which if expressed in any other connection would be regarded as too barbarous to be tolerable. To-day religion is either distinctly humanistic or a mere supernatural annexe to patriotism, and so it is the reformation of patriotism that is most needed. Patriotism, as well as religion, must be inspired by a sense of human values. A patriot must no longer be definable as a man who loves his country but not his countrymen, just as religious excellence no longer consists in burning heretics "*ad majorem Dei gloriam.*" The sense of moral obligation must no longer stop at political frontiers. Patriotism and religion both must be founded on morality, and morality must be founded on human welfare—including not only material prosperity, but all that goes to make a keen mind and a gracious heart—in this world, and not on soul-saving or honour-avenging in the next. During the war a prominent British statesman made a much-applauded distinction between German nature and human nature, and a very famous and able book attempted to prove that the souls of German human beings were

biologically and radically different from the souls of human beings in allied countries, as the psychology of a ravening wolf-pack differs totally from that of a hive of busy bees. Lucubrations of this sort and the jungle spirit that informs them must come to be instinctively regarded as not only pitifully silly, but sheerly blasphemous. Mankind is of one species, not several ; or, in old-fashioned terminology, we are members one of another. That is the old lesson we must somehow reabsorb into our civilisation, or it will perish. The growth of spiritual stature that this implies is not only not impossible—it is essential. It is the root of the matter.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

THE publications sold by the Publications Section of the League Secretariat have formed the basis for this book. The most useful single publication is the *Monthly Summary of the League of Nations* (3s. 6d. a year).

The Secretary-General's reports to and the resolutions and records of the First, Second and Third Assemblies, the final act of the Barcelona Transit Conference, the Warsaw Health Conference and the Brussels Financial Conference all denote landmarks in the League's history. The Official Journal is exhaustive but expensive.

Lastly, copies of the Covenant, as amended by the Second Assembly, of the constitution of the Labour Office (i.e. Part XIII of the Versailles Treaty), the statute of the Court and the constitution of the Transit Organisation, may be obtained from the League Secretariat, as may all other information bearing on the constitution and working of the League since its foundation. The League of Nations Union, too, publishes practically all this information in a series of admirably compact and lucid pamphlets.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

MEMBERSHIP OF THE LEAGUE AFTER THE THIRD MEETING OF THE ASSEMBLY

The following twenty-nine states became original members of the League owing to ratification of one or other of the Peace Treaties :—

AUSTRALIA	January 10, 1920
BELGIUM	January 10, 1920
BOLIVIA	January 10, 1920
BRAZIL	January 10, 1920
CANADA	January 10, 1920
CHINA	July 16, 1920
CUBA	March 8, 1920
CZECHO-SLOVAKIA	January 10, 1920
FRANCE	January 10, 1920
GREECE	March 30, 1920
GUATEMALA	January 10, 1920
HAITI	June 30, 1920
HONDURAS	November 3, 1920
INDIA	January 10, 1920
ITALY	January 10, 1920
JAPAN	January 10, 1920
LIBERIA	June 30, 1920
NEW ZEALAND	January 10, 1920
NICARAGUA	November 3, 1920
PANAMA	January 9, 1920
PERU	January 10, 1920
POLAND	January 10, 1920
PORTUGAL	April 8, 1920
ROUMANIA	September, 1920
SERB-CROAT-SLOVENE STATE	February 10, 1920
SIAM	January 10, 1910
SOUTH AFRICA	January 10, 1920
UNITED KINGDOM	January 10, 1920
URUGUAY	January 10, 1920

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The following thirteen states became original members through accession to the Covenant under the invitation contained in the annex to the Covenant:—

ARGENTINE REPUBLIC	July 18, 1919
CHILE	November 4, 1919
COLOMBIA	February 16, 1920
DENMARK	March 8, 1920
HOLLAND	March 9, 1920
NORWAY	March 5, 1920
PARAGUAY	December 26, 1919
PERSIA	November 21, 1919
SAN SALVADOR	March 10, 1920
SPAIN	January 10, 1920
SWEDEN	March 9, 1920
SWITZERLAND	March 8, 1920
VENEZUELA	March 3, 1920

On December 16, 1920, the First Assembly admitted the following six states to membership of the League:—

ALBANIA	COSTA RICA
AUSTRIA	FINLAND
BULGARIA	LUXEMBURG

On September 22, 1921, the Second Assembly admitted the following three states to membership of the League:—

ESTHONIA
LATVIA
LITHUANIA

On September 18, 1922, the Third Assembly admitted Hungary to membership of the League.

The League, therefore, now numbers fifty-two states. Of these states, one, Switzerland, occupies a peculiar position in virtue of the League Council's resolution of March 1920, according to which:—

“The Council of the League of Nations, while affirming that the conception of neutrality of the members of the League is incompatible with the principle that all members will be obliged to co-operate in enforcing respect for their engagements, recognises that Switzerland is in a unique situation, based on a tradition of several centuries which has been explicitly incorporated in the Law of Nations; and that the members of the League of Nations, signatories of the Treaty of Versailles, have rightly recognised by Article 435 that the guarantees stipulated in favour of Switzerland by the Treaties of 1815, and especially by the Act of November 20, 1815, constitute international obligations for the maintenance of peace. The members of the League of Nations are

entitled to expect that the Swiss people will not stand aside when the high principles of the League have to be defended. It is in this sense that the Council of the League has taken note of the declaration made by the Swiss Government in its message to the Federal Assembly of August 4, 1919, and in its Memorandum of January 13, 1920, which declarations have been confirmed by the Swiss delegates at the meeting of the Council and in accordance with which Switzerland recognises and proclaims the duties of solidarity which membership of the League of Nations imposes upon her, including therein the duty of co-operating in such economic and financial measures as may be demanded by the League of Nations against a Covenant-breaking State, and is prepared to make every sacrifice to defend her own territory under every circumstance, even during operations undertaken by the League of Nations, but will not be obliged to take part in any military action or to allow the passage of foreign troops or the preparations of military operations within her territory.

In accepting these declarations, the Council recognises that the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and the guarantee of the inviolability of her territory as incorporated in the Law of Nations, particularly in the treaties and in the Act of 1815, are justified by the interests of general peace, and as such are compatible with the Covenant."

The delegation of the Argentine Republic did not attend the Second or Third Assembly, and withdrew from the First upon the latter's decision to refer the amendment to Article I of the Covenant proposed by Argentine, for study by a committee that was to report to the Second Assembly. The Argentine Government has not given notice of an intention to leave the League, and appears to regard itself as in a state of suspended or passive membership, to continue until some measure regarded as a satisfactory equivalent to the amendment proposed by the Argentine has been adopted by the League. The amendment proposed that any sovereign state might become a member of the League by simply declaring its wish to do so.

Peru and Bolivia refused to sit in the Third Assembly owing to the chairmanship of Chile, with which state they have an unsettled quarrel. They will, however, presumably appear at the Fourth Assembly. San Salvador complains that League membership is too expensive and that in any case, not having signed the Versailles Treaty, she is not liable for the budget of the Labour Office.

Albania, Esthonia, Finland, Latvia and Lithuania agreed to satisfy the Council that their national minorities were enjoying a measure of protection equivalent to that contained in the Minorities Treaties, as a condition of their entry into the League. Upon examining Finnish legislation on this point, the Council declared itself satisfied, but the issue is still open as regards Esthonia, Latvia and Lithuania.

APPENDIX B

THE SIZE AND METHOD OF ALLOCATION OF THE LEAGUE'S BUDGET

WHENEVER combined action involving expenditure requires to be undertaken, a necessary prerequisite is a clear understanding on how the cost shall be divided among the participants, whether these be individuals or states. This subject, however, received very little attention when the Covenant of the League was drawn up, and as a result the apportionment of League expenses among the members was at the last moment simply borrowed from the Universal Postal Union and an article inserted (Article VI) in the Covenant, declaring that expenses should be apportioned in accordance with the system that obtained in the Union. This system provides for seven classes of states, of which the first class has to pay 25 units, the second class 20 units, and so on, the sixth class having 3 units and the seventh 1 unit. In order to determine the proportion of the expenses payable by a member state, the total is obtained by adding together the unit rating of all the members. Then the ratio which the number of units of a given state bears to the total number of units determines the proportion of the total expenses which that state shall pay.

The general principle followed in classifying the states under this and similar schemes in existence before the war was based on such factors as population, territory, shipping or import and export figures, net revenue, and so forth. But as in most of these associations, and particularly in the Universal Postal Union, the sums involved were very small, a great many states, in order to gain dignity and a position at trifling cost, would get themselves put in as high a class as possible. The League system, however, called for budgets running into millions of gold francs and increasing from year to year as the number and importance of matters dealt with through the League increased, and so it became apparent from the first that the Universal Postal Union scale was not satisfactory. Under this scale, for instance, not only Great Britain, but Canada, Australia and South Africa, all ranked as first-class powers paying 25 units. This was obviously inequitable as between Great Britain and the Dominions. Similarly, Liberia would have to pay one unit—that is, one-twenty-fifth of the sum paid by Great Britain—whereas the population of Great Britain is fifty times greater than that of Liberia, and the revenue of Great Britain at least 4,250 times as great as that of Liberia. As most states after the war are in great financial straits, the difficulty was felt all the more acutely.

Consequently, from the very beginning of the League's

existence this question has been under discussion in the Council, in all three Assemblies, and by various expert committees sitting throughout the year. The first decision arrived at in the Second Assembly was to revise Article VI of the Covenant and insert a clause declaring that "the expenses of the League shall be borne by the members of the League in the proportion decided by the Assembly." This revision has not yet been ratified by a sufficient number of governments, but it is hoped it will come into force before the Fourth Assembly. Meanwhile, a "gentlemen's agreement" was arrived at in the Third Assembly with the unanimous consent of all but the Cuban delegation, which, however, agreed to urge upon its government the necessity for approving the new arrangement. This agreement establishes a system in which the differences between the sums paid by small and large states are increased and a greater number of distinctions established, such as taking account of the effects of invasion and monetary depreciation in temporarily reducing the financial power of certain states, etc. It should be mentioned that it was possible to put the new rating into force largely owing to the magnanimous action of Poland, who freely offered to increase the amount at which she was assessed from 15 to 25 units.

The scale as adopted by the Third Assembly is as follows:—

	Units,		Units,
Albania	1	Japan	73
Argentina	(35)	Latvia, 5 - 2 = ..	3
Australia	26	Liberia	1
Belgium, 20 - 5 = ..	15	Lithuania, 5 - 1 = ..	4
Austria	1	Luxembourg	1
Bolivia	5	Netherlands	20
Brazil	35	New Zealand	10
Bulgaria	7	Nicaragua	1
Canada	35	Norway	11
Chile	15	Panama	1
China	65	Paraguay	1
Colombia	7	Persia	6
Costa Rica	1	Peru	10
Cuba	9	Poland	25
Czecho-Slovakia	35	Portugal	10
Denmark	12	Roumania, 40 - 9 = ..	31
Estonia, 5 - 2 = ..	3	Salvador	1
Finland	10	Serb-Croat-Slovene State,	
France, 95 - 17 = ..	78	35 - 9 = ..	26
Great Britain	95	Siam	10
Greece	10	South Africa	15
Guatemala	1	Spain	40
Haiti	2	Sweden	18
Honduras	1	Switzerland	15
Hungary	4	Uruguay	7
India	65	Venezuela	5
Italy, 73 - 12 = ..	61		
		Total	994

SUMMARY
OF THE
BUDGET OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS FOR THE FINANCIAL YEAR
JANUARY 1, 1923—DECEMBER 31, 1923.

EXPENDITURE.	Gold Francs.	INCOME.	Gold Francs.
A. Secretariat and Special Organisations.			
1. Sessions of the Assembly and Council	700,000	(a) Towards normal upkeep	13,407,770
2. General Services of the Secretariat	6,784,945	(b) Towards upkeep of Permanent Court of International Justice	1,880,000
3. Special Organisations of the League	5,722,825	(c) Towards upkeep of International Labour Organisation	8,200,462
4. Refund of Expenses (Vilna Plebiscite)	422,260		
5. Profit and Loss on Exchange	200,000		
6. Buildings, Permanent Equipment, etc.	1,263,016		
7. Working Capital	500,000		
B. Other Organisations.			
1. Permanent Court of International Justice	1,880,000		
2. International Labour Organisation	8,200,462		
	25,673,508		25,673,508

As regards the British Empire it will be seen that while the total contribution has been but slightly reduced (it still represents 26 per cent. of the entire amount), its distribution among the several parts is now much fairer, Great Britain assuming 95 units, India 65, Canada 35, Australia 26, South Africa 15, and New Zealand 10. Belgium, Esthonia, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Roumania, and the Serb-Croat-Slovene State have their contributions temporarily reduced by the number of points indicated in the scale, since they all suffered invasion during the war.

Opposite is given a summary of the budget for the financial year January 1, 1923, to December 31, 1923, as well as the amount of this budget payable by Great Britain.

As the Swiss franc is counted at par, this means the 1923 budget is equal to 25,673,508 Swiss francs, or, at the higher than current rate of 25 Swiss francs to the pound, totals £1,026,940.

Of this sum Great Britain pays 2,583,668 francs, or £103,307.

APPENDIX C

LEAGUE DEVELOPMENTS, DECEMBER 1922 TO FEBRUARY 1923

THIS Appendix records some of the developments concerning the League that have occurred between the finishing of the book and the correction of proofs.

NOTE 1.—*The Reconstruction of Austria.* The Commissioner-General for Austria has been appointed by the Council. He is Dr. Zimmermann, formerly Burgomaster of Rotterdam and a man eminent in Dutch administrative and banking circles. Dr. Zimmermann has been at work in Vienna since December 15th.

The Austrian Government has ratified all the protocols, set up the Extraordinary State Council invested with the plenary powers required under the scheme, has drafted, passed and made good progress with putting into practice a comprehensive plan for reforming the finances of the State, economising in the public services, and getting the budget balanced in two years. The new Bank of Issue required under the scheme has been set up and the 30 million gold crowns necessary to start it been raised by an internal loan, as has also a national loan in short-term bonds quotable in dollars. Most important of all, inflation has been stopped since November 18th, when the whole reconstruction scheme formally came into action, and since that day the Austrian crown has remained stable. The Austrian population have shown their confidence in the new state of things by beginning once more to keep their money in the banks, whose deposits have increased no less than eightfold since the scheme was put into force. Meanwhile, the cost of living has decreased by 17 per cent. in two months. The purely financial scheme is being supplemented by a policy on the part of the Austrian Government of concluding and developing a series of commercial agreements and treaties with its neighbours. The initiative to this policy was given by a resolution of the Austrian Committee of the Council. To become economically self-supporting and eventually prosperous one essential is, of course, sound and stable finances, and this is what the League scheme aims to produce. But whether Austria as an independent state is ultimately viable depends on the people of Austria and on their neighbours.

NOTE 2.—*Contributions for Relief of Refugees.* In January the total monies paid or promised as the result of the appeal of the Third Assembly were as follows:—

Great Britain, £19,208; Canada, £5,000; Greece, Dr. 1,000,000; Japan, Yen 10,000; Brazil, Denmark, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, each £1,000; Switzerland, £625; and Spain has promised £2,000.

The number of refugees in Greece now equals about one-fifth of the

total population and the situation has been rendered very grave by outbreaks of typhus, cholera, plague, smallpox, and other epidemics. Agents of the League Epidemic Commission have been rendering what help is possible in view of the limited funds at the Commission's disposal. The Greek Government has asked the Council to give its moral support to a loan of £10,000,000 that the Greek Government is anxious to float for the care of the refugees.

NOTE 3.—*The Work of the Health Organisation.* The Health Organisation has followed up its first international course for Medical Officers of Health by a second course organised in Great Britain and Austria (seven weeks in the former, five in the latter) that began on February 25th. In this course Medical Officers from sixteen countries are taking part, including France, Great Britain, the United States, Italy, Japan, Soviet Russia. A further course is being arranged in the United States and will be patronised chiefly by North and South Americans, possibly also by Japanese. A third course for specialists in the combating of malaria will take place in Italy between May and July. In Italy, the technique of malaria fighting has been highly developed, and this course is of special interest to, e.g., Russia and Albania, as malaria is a scourge in both these countries. It is expected that a fourth course will be held this year as well. The Health Organisation has also organised courses in Warsaw, Moscow and Kharkov for the training of Public Health officials in the fighting of epidemics, as the shortage of trained doctors is very seriously felt in East Europe. Permanent sanitary museums are also being opened at these three centres. Lastly, as already mentioned, the Epidemic Commission has extended its activities to Greece.

NOTE 4.—*Canada's Proposed Amendment to Article X.* At the Third Assembly the Canadian delegation withdrew the proposal they had made at the First Assembly to abolish Article X of the Covenant, which reads as follows:—

“The members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.”

Instead, the Canadian delegation proposed two amendments. The first specifies that the Council, when advising on the action to be taken under Article X, should take into account the geographic position and political exigencies of the states to which their recommendation was addressed. The second proposes to add the following paragraph to Article X:—

“The opinion given by the Council in such cases shall be regarded as a matter of the highest importance and shall be taken into consideration by all the members of the League, who shall use their utmost endeavours to

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conform to the conclusions of the Council ; but no member shall be under the obligation to engage in any act of war without the consent of its parliament, legislature or other representative body."

The Third Assembly, in view of the divergence of opinion that still exists about Article X, and in view too of "the connection that exists between the principle of universal guarantee contained in Article X and the proposed guarantees by special conventions considered in relation to the problem of disarmament," decided to adjourn the matter for further consideration and report to the Fourth Assembly. The Council, at its January 1923 meeting, decided to circularise all the Governments Members of the League and ask them to send in their opinions on the whole question of Article X and the proposed Canadian amendment, three months before the next Assembly, so that a report can be prepared for that body embodying the fullest and most authoritative information on the subject.

Meanwhile, two conclusions stand out on even a cursory examination of the Canadian proposal. The first is that it would be very difficult to reject, except on the ground that the present text already implies what the Canadians wish stated—in which case the text might as well be made explicit—for otherwise objectors would put themselves in the position of maintaining that the Council should not, in making its recommendations, pay any attention to the geographic or political circumstances of the various States Members, and that these states should, in acting on the Council's recommendations, be obliged to engage in acts of war without the consent of their legislatures. Both these things are, of course, absurdities, and no one would maintain for a moment that they are implied in Article X. The second conclusion is that if the Canadian amendment is adopted Article X will be watered down to the vanishing point and the evolution of the League toward becoming a loose association of states for conference and co-operation will have taken a long step forward.

The wisest policy would seem to be to push on as rapidly as possible with the system of overlapping guarantee treaties that would satisfy those states which still cling to Article X—not because they think it is much of a bulwark, but because they hope it is better than nothing—and then to adopt the Canadian amendment and thereby remove all ambiguity as to what the Covenant does mean, give satisfaction to the overseas states and neutrals, and incidentally facilitate America's future adherence to the League.

NOTE 5.—*The Attitude of Russia to the League.* The January meeting of the Health Committee, so far as it dealt with the Health Organisation's work in Russia, was attended by Dr. Siemashko, Soviet Russian Commissar of Health, as the Russian delegate to the "special international commission" into which the Health Committee constituted itself for the purpose, in accordance with the "formula" agreed upon at Genoa. Dr. Siemashko and his

fellow-Commissar at Lausanne, M. Chicherin, made the event the occasion for identical declarations to the Press to the effect that this participation in certain of the League's technical and humanitarian activities meant no change in their political attitude to the League. In fact, however, it means an advance from the simple "tabu" and "bogey" attitude to admission of the fact that there are certain international activities of direct interest to Russia that can be conducted only through the machinery of the League. And taking part in the work of the League technical organisations and advisory commissions must end by raising in an acute form the advisability of sitting in the bodies—i.e. the Assembly and Council—that lay down the policies, determine the budgets, and supervise the work of these organisations. Indeed, precisely the same reasoning that leads the Bolsheviks to desire representation in conferences such as that of Genoa, The Hague, and Lausanne must lead them to desire representation in the Council, Assembly and special conferences of the League, so soon as they realise that these gatherings are just like any other international conferences, except that they recur regularly and their object is to work a permanent system of international co-operation. Lately information has come to hand, in the shape of reports of private pronouncements by leading Bolsheviks, both at Genoa and elsewhere, that would seem to indicate that the Bolsheviks realise these facts very well, that in fact they take for granted Russia's entry into the League as part of a general settlement with the West, and that contrary-wise their ostentatious hostility to the League to-day is only part of a general policy of making themselves as disagreeable as possible to the West until the West is thereby forced to take account of their claims and necessities.

NOTE 6.—*The U.S.A. and Europe.* Since the notes on the attitude of the U.S.A. to the League were written, point has been given to their conclusion—that there is a recrudescence of the movement to bring the U.S.A. into this League, but on a basis of "limited liability"—by the formation of the American League of Nations Non-Partisan Association, whose purpose it is to work for the entry of the United States into the League as quickly as possible, "on terms consonant with the dignity, the moral responsibility and the power of our great republic." The conversion of Senator Borah to internationalism too means that the farmers are at last waking up to the fact that not even they, remote as they seem from the Old World, can remain indifferent to Europe's plight, for it destroys the market for their corn. And as they hitherto have been the mainstay of the irreconcilables and anti-Europeans, there is some hope of American opinion moving faster. Moreover, the funding of our debt would seem to clear the way for closer co-operation between the United States and Great Britain in putting Europe on its legs again.

But the first effect of the Ruhr invasion has been to increase

American distaste of Europe and the ways of Europe, just as its first effect here was a longing to execute a dignified retirement into our shell only checked by the reflection that we have no shell—at least none that is unemployment and aeroplane-proof. Moreover, France and Italy are in debt to the U.S.A. as well as to us, and the only effect of the funding of the British debt on Congress has been to strengthen the determination of that body to collect from the other Allies as well. There is not the faintest sign of Congress contemplating any suggestion of cancelling debts in exchange for peace and political stability in Europe. And until there are such signs America can exert neither moral nor material influence for moderation in Europe. Therefore, so far from being helped in a policy of exchanging debts for decent behaviour, we may count ourselves lucky if our efforts in this direction are not hamstrung by American attempts to collect their debts *unconditionally*.

NOTE 7.—*Ratifications to the Covenant.* Great Britain has now ratified the amendments to Articles IV and VI of the Covenant, enabling the Assembly to determine how temporary members of the Council shall hold office and how the League's budget is to be apportioned among the States Members. Great Britain has also ratified amendments to Articles IV, XIII, XV, and XXVI, recognising the Court as one of the organs of the League and determining how amendments to the Covenant are to be passed. It is noteworthy that so far no Great Power and very few other states have ratified the amendments to Article XVI, which, as was shown in Chapter IX, have greatly weakened the force of this Article. It appears to be the deliberate policy of the States that objected to any change in the Article not to ratify the amendments passed by the Second Assembly. On the other hand, obviously the states that *have* ratified the amendments will never heed any recommendations of the Council based on the original, unamended text. The resulting confusion emphasises the desirability, pointed out in the discussion of Canada's draft amendment to Article X, of thoroughly overhauling the security clauses of the Covenant—i.e. Articles X and XVI—in the light of the work that has been done on guarantee treaties.

NOTE 8.—*The League and the Ruhr.* Since the section on a settlement in Europe was written France has plunged into the Ruhr. In essentials the settlement outlined and the active foreign policy both inside and outside the League needed to achieve it still hold good. But in detail our policy must be tightened up to fit the new and graver situation.

The situation is briefly that with whatever objects they went into the Ruhr the French can now get nothing out of it except the unconditional surrender of Germany, leading to the imposition of terms that will grant them "security." Officially the French declare that they will accept nothing short of the unconditional

capitulation of Germany and will treat all offers of mediation as unfriendly acts. Officially, too, M. Poincaré has declared that the fifteen years of occupation in the Rhineland have not yet begun to run and that the French propose to stay in the Ruhr at least five years. Semi-officially the French Press is ringing with talk about a Rhineland Republic and France's right to maintain her troops in Germany so long as she considers herself threatened by that country. The facts point to one conclusion—a conclusion terrible but irresistible, and that is that by the "success" of their Rhineland policy the French mean the creation of a vast German Irredenta.

Hitherto the British Government has done nothing in face of this situation, apparently in the hope that the French will lose heart before the increasing magnitude and difficulty of their task and be glad of mediation as a way out. This view seems first of all to place too much reliance on the staying power of the unarmed population of Germany. Even unarmed men can put up a stout resistance, can strike and sabotage and let themselves be beaten, jailed and shot when they are defending the existence of their country. But it is doubtful whether they can bear indefinitely to see their wives and children starve. The second practical flaw in the policy of benevolent neutrality is that it takes no account of how deeply engaged the French are in this business, which is the last card of the politicians responsible for the plunge and whose failure means the loss of their political lives and for some may mean the guillotine. Money has been poured out like water and the end of the enterprise is almost certain bankruptcy, which could be condoned only if the end meant also a crushed Germany. In brief, it is war, and French public opinion has been brought to believe passionately that mediation or any end short of the capitulation of the "enemy" means victory for Germany and the end of France.

If we remain neutral while the French administer a knock-out blow to the unarmed enemy, at great cost to themselves and in circumstances that have fanned the national temper to white-heat, we shall be treated when the time comes for dictating the new "peace" with precisely the amount of respect that our humble indifference alike to British interests and international morality will deserve. Since the British Government found it impossible to arrive at an agreement with M. Poincaré *before* he went into the Ruhr and propose to remain neutral while he is waging his economic Verdun there, what do they think the chances are of arriving at a satisfactory compromise with him after he has brought Germany to her knees? And is there such a thing as a satisfactory compromise—are we willing, for instance, to let the French stay indefinitely on the Rhine provided they give up the Ruhr? Or to substitute inter-Allied for French occupation by prostituting the name of the League? Is it not obvious that unless we are content to let the war that was to end war culminate in a crime the like of which has not been seen since the partition of Poland, and which for

sheer political madness could only be equalled if Poland had attempted to partition Russia, we must sooner or later oppose root and branch the French policy of creating a German Irredenta. And the sooner and more heartily we oppose it, the quicker we shall stop it. Indeed, if the truth be told, many Frenchmen would be glad of the opportunity to escape from the dilemma of either admitting defeat at the hands of unarmed Germany alone or of pushing their policy through to the bitter and disastrous end. If they were defeated because most of the world, rallied by Great Britain, opposed them, they could at least say that everything was lost but honour, and could not continue to say even that with much conviction if our implacable opposition to the dismemberment of Germany were accompanied by the fullest and most generous offer to guarantee France's security, to join in enforcing any reasonable reparations programme, to cancel France's debt, intercede for her with the U.S.A. so far as we can, and to give up our share of reparations.

How should we oppose successfully? First of all by gaining partners in the enterprise. Next to its failure to break with France the moment the Ruhr action was proposed, the Government's biggest blunder has been the failure to keep in close agreement with Italy. Italy is no less deeply interested than we in the economic revival of Europe, and has no interest whatever in the break-up of Germany. On the contrary, the idea of French military hegemony on the Continent is viewed at Rome with the reverse of enthusiasm. Let us cancel Italy's debt, conclude a League guarantee treaty with her, and together make peace with Russia. The Czechs too view with the gravest alarm the shattering of Germany and its repercussions on the peace settlement, and have ever since the return of their legionaries from Russia been planning for the day when they can turn their unrivalled knowledge of that country to account for trade purposes. There have of late been several tentative moves toward *rapprochement* between Germany and Poland (Germany, it is not generally realised, has half boycotted the Poles ever since the signing of peace). If we mediated, we could soon bring about full peace between the two, and the Poles also are anxious for stable peace and trade with Russia. This particularly in view of French overtures to Russia, which incidentally we should welcome, and which should serve as an additional inducement to us to push on with the same policy. Only whereas the French object is to discard Poland in favour of a stronger Ally against Germany—a thing that the initiated always knew would happen sooner or later—our object is and must be to bring all these states together and those still outside into the comity of nations. The Dutch and the Swiss are already suffering a coal famine as a result of the French blockade, and their rail connections with the rest of the Continent are much interrupted. Opinion in the Scandinavian countries and Finland is bitterly hostile to the French occupation. There is a great deal of discussion in the Press of the South American countries and Spain as

to whether the Hispano-American nations should not as a block bring the whole question before the Council. There is no doubt that a British Government which took the lead in putting an end to the war in peace that is killing Europe would soon have plenty of support.

If the United States could be induced to join us in pressing France for payment of her debts, coupled with an offer to cancel debts if she in return agrees to a decent settlement, so much the better. But as has already been explained, the most we can prudently hope for is that the United States will content themselves with being passively unhelpful instead of actively disastrous.

So soon, then, as we knew that we had, with or without America, sufficient partners to act effectively, we and the Italians should approach the French Government privately, insist upon a clear statement of the objects of its Rhineland policy, failing which we should draw our own conclusions, and explain that we were anxious to fall in with any plan whereby the French Government could without loss of prestige accept our friendly mediation for negotiating a settlement on the lines already suggested—security through the League, cancellation of debts, League control of German finances in exchange for a reduction of the indemnity to a reasonable figure, the end of the occupation and the admission of Germany to membership of the League Council. Evacuation of the Ruhr should follow immediately on an agreement in principle being reached, and the detailed settlement be worked out through the League Council with Germany sitting on it for the purpose, as provided in Article XVII of the Covenant.

If the French Government refused to deal with this matter jointly with the Italians and ourselves, who are as much interested and have as much right as the French in the whole question of the settlement with Germany, we should begin to oppose the Ruhr occupation actively. First of all we should warn the French Government that neither Italy nor Great Britain would recognise any separate treaty imposed on Germany by France and Belgium. Furthermore, we should declare that in any future war arising out of the French occupation of German soil France could not count on more than our neutrality. Next we should associate ourselves with as many States as possible in bringing the whole matter before the Council under Article XI of the Covenant as a matter disturbing the peace of the world. In the Council we should ask to submit to the International Court for an advisory opinion the question of whether the French policy in the Ruhr was not a violation of the Versailles Treaty. The Council could decide to refer the matter to the Court by a majority vote. Failing this, we would claim an equal right with the French in interpreting the treaty by our own lights and should act on our claim by declaring that the Versailles Treaty had been violated and was consequently null and void, and begin to negotiate a new treaty with Germany. This treaty should repeat textually all the provisions of the Versailles Treaty

that affect Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, Lithuania, Denmark, and Germany's other neighbours to the north, south, and east, including Belgium. This for the double reason that otherwise the disturbance of Europe that would ensue from this upheaval of its foundations would create bigger evils than the one averted, and because we should immediately incur the hostility of all the states thus affected and so lose what support we had on the Continent. Moreover, these parts of the Versailles Treaty are roughly and on the whole not unjust, and once Germany enters the League she will be able to see to it that they are fairly applied. It is the parts of the treaty which govern the relations between Germany and the Principal Allied Powers that have proved impossibly onerous, namely, the economic, financial, reparations, occupational and separate action clauses, as well as the one-sided dictatorial régime of the Supreme Council and the various inter-Allied Commissions. Consequently the new treaty should also recognise the cession of Alsace-Lorraine and should repeat the stipulations as to disarmament and the demilitarisation of the Rhineland. But the Supreme Council, the Reparations Commission, the Rhineland Commission, the inter-Allied Military Commissions and all other Allied organisations in Germany, should be abolished and their functions vested in the League Council, plus Germany, for that body to delegate to such agents as it considered suitable. A lump sum for reparations—including armies of occupation and all other counts—should be fixed and the method of payment determined by a body on which American, neutral, and German as well as Allied financial experts should be represented and that would be appointed by and responsible to the Council plus Germany. If possible, methods of control and guarantees for the service of the reparations debt should be devised that would put an end to Allied occupation altogether. In general the Council alone should be able to decide what action should be taken to execute the treaty, the new treaty should be clear and unequivocal in its language and the International Court be expressly designated as the organisation to which any signatory could appeal for interpretation of any disputed clause. As this negotiation would be a lengthy process, the British Government should declare that it would continue to abide by the Versailles Treaty until the new treaty was completed. Meanwhile the French would have ample time to reflect whether after all it pays to insist on their right to interpret and apply the Versailles Treaty single-handed, since this confers on us the same right. We should be fortifying our position by creating a new situation in law that would enable us to deal on equal terms with the French Government when it began to negotiate on the basis of the new situation in fact created by the occupation of the Ruhr and the hypothetical surrender of Germany. It is to be hoped for the same reason that the British troops in the Rhineland will not be withdrawn, for so long as we hold Cologne we can make impossible any scheme for a Rhineland Republic or perpetual French military occupation.

If at any stage in these proceedings the French Government should announce its withdrawal from the League, the matter need not be taken too tragically, for according to the Covenant a state must give two years' notice before it can cease to become a member of the League—until that date it simply counts as a Member State which is not paying its dues nor being represented at League gatherings. But there must be a general election in France by May 1924, and if M. Poincaré's policy of violence fails completely by then, owing to the mobilisation of an outraged world opinion, the best observers of French public life are agreed that the new government will represent a drastic change of régime for the better. Meanwhile we must rally all the partners we can, both on the Continent and overseas, for an *active* policy of (1) no more Alsace-Lorraines; (2) security for France and Germany and preparation for disarmament by guarantee treaties through the League; (3) cancellation of European debts, the fixing of reparations, mobilisation of Germany's resources by means of an international loan, League control for the stabilisation of German finances, on the analogy of the Austrian scheme; (4) admission of Germany and Russia to the League as permanent members of the Council, and facilities for the United States to adhere for certain purposes; (5) the strengthening of the League's authority by making it the medium through which all peace treaty issues should be settled. If for the working out of this programme and the mobilisation of opinion an extraordinary meeting of the Assembly were considered necessary, it must be remembered that an extraordinary meeting can be called by a majority vote of the Council, which we should be able easily to obtain, and that by Article XVII of the Covenant Germany could be invited to attend this meeting.

It is not easy to conceive of the present Conservative Government adopting a policy of the kind just outlined. Apart from the specific prejudice against Russia and general disinclination for any active policy, and apart from the views of the Die-Hards, Conservative mentality is still largely the Balance of Power mentality. Conservatives are prone to regard nations as individuals, and so either as friends or enemies. They believe in allying themselves with their friends in order to fight their enemies. Just at present they still regard Germans as "Huns," and so the papers who a decade or two ago were "rolling France in mud and blood" are now lavishing the resources of a rich vocabulary and a not over-fastidious imagination in support of the French peace-time invasion of Germany. The "enemy," in other words, is still Germany, and justice is defined as hitting one's enemy when he is down. Meanwhile a race in aerial armaments between ourselves and the French is already well under weigh, as everyone knows although few care to face the fact, while the ambitious French programme for submarines, destroyers and light cruisers—but particularly submarines—has given rise to ugly talk. In these circumstances the idea apparently current among Frenchmen that

partnership in the late war confers upon them a sort of perpetual plenary absolution for whatever injury they may do to British interests, while natural in view of the British Government's attitude, is really a fatal mistake. In proportion as France succeeds in gaining permanent control over the Rhineland and establishing a military hegemony based on a practical monopoly of coal and iron on the Continent, and in proportion as she succeeds in keeping Germany prostrate, it becomes certain that the people who to-day regard Germany as an enemy and yesterday regarded France as an enemy will to-morrow swing over once more to hostility to France, and the whole vile, wicked, senseless game begin over again until the children of those who fought shoulder to shoulder in this war will be fighting face to face in the next. If England continues to drift to-day and France "succeeds" in her present venture, that is what will happen. That will be the end of the Ruhr policy encouraged by our benevolent neutrality and desire not to "add difficulties" in the way of France's committing political *hara-kiri* on our doorstep.

Therefore the people who feel in their bones the whole stupefying irrelevance of this "enemy" and "friend" anthropomorphism as applied to nations, who know that "England" and "France" and "Germany" are not entities but communities made up of millions and millions of human beings of all classes and all shades of opinion, so different as to make it a wildly romantic business to generalise about their politics and yet so alike as to be all made of the same flesh and blood and the same soul-stuff—the people who realise these things must somehow contrive to make their view felt. Instead of the Balance of Power conception, based on the illusion that nations are fatally hostile and rival units, we now have the League of Nations idea, springing from recognition of the fact that modern nations are simply overlapping, interdependent human communities. Consequently, instead of preparing for war in order to fight an "enemy," we must prepare for peace by fighting certain moods and policies. We must make the creation of a German Irredenta impossible so far as it is in our power to do so, but at the same time we must frame our policy so as to give the French nation the security they so sorely need, to lighten their financial burdens and to assure the building up of their devastated regions.

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