AR 7043 5/3
Leopold Schwarzschild; I-x-1-III,e,2

FRAGILE

5/3

L.S. Lawrence Mfg. Co.
III e) 2

Mabel Hunt
Wood

0 0 7

Chronik Syrt

Sturm 14 Juli

18 Aug. Abermals Kriegserklärung a Rußl. Kr. St. Erkl. Frankr.

Bayer Ministerium Hertling Juli-Aug. in Berlin preßte: „die deutsche Presse wird dazu dienen, im Inland die kriegerische Stimmung zu erhalten." Legationsrat in Athen. Keine militär. Attaché abkommandiert.

16 Sept. Abschließende Genehmigung der Handels- u. Zollvereinbarungen, allen Rechte zu Entschädigung alle Kriegs- u. persönlich Verluste der Staatsangehörigen

16. Sept. Zweite Note Englands, inwieweit Fr. in Belgien befreit sein könne, den Engländern im Falle eines Rückzugs der Verbündeten und einer Gewalt-Anwendung auch in Europa für die sofortige u. wirksame Anwendung alle der Landkriegsmittel, die der KR. 16 d. Sept. in Aussicht nimmt.

446

26. Sept. Neue Note: Es gelte, gegenüber der Gewalt der Kriegführung Bild u. d. Augusts". d. Takt ist „mit Klugheit" aufzutreten u. Unterhandlungspunkte, „daß die Welt nicht Recht sei".

Deutsch: nicht im Falle Österreich (Times)

3 Okt. Ausfahrt, 7 Okt. Rückkehr des Königs

am 9. Tag Ausfahrt des Königs und Kaiserin Elisabeth nach Italien

12 " Kabinett-Krise ausgebrochen.

17 " Große Sitzung d. Abgeordnetenhauses, wird Krise, Rücktritt des Kanzlers

29. " Rücktritt d. Kanzlers u. Entlassung.

Attlee Commons 11.Maerz

Warum wird nicht von Frankreich gesprochen?Warum ist Frankreich keine Drohung?

1935

Labor,Lib.und Bischoefe empfehlen Neuverteilung de Kolonieen

Nicht-Sanktionen :Oestreich Schweiz Ungarn Deutschland
Usa,Japan,Brasielien,Argentinien

31.August Neutralitaetsgesetz in ~~Japan~~USA

8 December HoareLaval Plan

19.Dec.Unterhaus Hoa e:Von allen Seiten erhielten wir Berichte ueber die keineverantwortliche Regierung achtlos hinweggehen konnte:dass Italien die Oel-Sanktion als eine militaerische Sanktion, oder als ~~mit~~ einen mit Krieg gleichbedeutenden Akt gegen sich auffassen wuerde.

Mobilisation der franzoesischen Flotte "Militaerische Massnahmen haben bisher nur wir ergiffen...lebenswichtig, dass wir durch Handlungen der in Frage kommenden Mitgliedstaaten tatsaechliche Beweise erhalten. Auch Baldwin so

Am 26.Okt.hatte Laval die Teilnahme der franz.Flotte zugesagt

Engl. Luft-Rüstg 37 / 196 Churchill etc. 1114/36
489/38 109/37
443/38

Frkr 37 / 152 36/867 Cot 37/1237

36/ 147 C ü 36 Lansbury beantragt Japanische Zusammenarbeit eines Commando
neuen internationalen Vorgehens, die sich mit den für die
weltweite Kriegsvorbereitungen verantwortlichen Ursachen befassen
soll, sowie den Zugang zu den Rohstoffen.
Viscount Cranborne, Unterstaatssekr. Foreign Office
Völkerbundsrat ansprechen.
Lloyd George spricht von den neuen Colonien
Hollands, Belgiens, Portugal

36 603 U.S. wie wird wegen Österreich
627.65 Labour leitet sich an Duff Cooper wegen Frankreich-Franz Nikolaus
365 Churchill über die „gegen Frankreich gerichtete Befestigungsanlagen"
(Siegfriedgraben-Riegel)
638 Baldwin und sie mit Last-Schätzung „gründlich getäuscht"
635 Churchill über Sanktionen

684 Churchill: Im Frühjahr 1934 ist mit der Abrüstungs-Politik nicht
viel mehr. Sie wurde abgelöst durch eine Politik der
größten Kürze und der tollen Maßnahmen ... Baldwin appellierte an
das Land, Flugzeuge anzuschaffen, aber gleichzeitig sagte er für
Luftschutz, das nicht für Empfangung aufgewendet werden.

699 Churchill fragt 500 Mill. St. Rüstungsplan. Chamberlain: kann Gründ, der
für übertrieben zu halten.

725 Austen Chamberlain über Deutschland Ausweisung:
Soldaten gegen Versailler Vertrag
7. März 350 Mill Pfund

803 1911 36 Abrüstung Belgien vor Krieg (Spaak) Königsberg 14. Okt.
874 36 Russland – Genf
Lloyd George bei H. in Berchtesgaden 895–
891 36 Titulescu ausgeschieden
963 Engl. beabsichtigt bei Volkerbund Kommission über spanische Flugzeuge zu Kontrollen.
970 Devaluation Frankr. v. Italien
975 Parsonby Debatte im Haag
Locarno ff
Englisch-Französisch i. Haag.
1084 U Boot-Krieg-Vertrag
1156 Jap. Deutsch. Anti-Komintern Pakt 25. Nov.

37

95 Mussolini sagt Dollfuss — Deutschl. gegen Tschechoslowakei
221 Aufstellen. in Italien
268 Rüstungen 1937 Engl. v. Frankr. M/.
381 Ernennung des Führer
584 Tschetschewski Hinrichtung Juni 1937

1078 ~~Kommunisten~~ Kameradschaft 1936
Kom 8.6
Soz. 25.4
Dö. Demin 6.3

1101 Halifax in Berlin
1108 Englandbesuch des Brüsseler Kons. in Tokyo Japan-China
1160 Die Lord – Amateure

37 / 418	Joseph Barthélemy Temps

Peace, philosophically & General

After the terrible loss of blood France has suffered it appears that she has reacted less ~~virily~~ virilely in peace than in the great days of her military trial. Her rulers seem to have forgotten, all nearly in the same degree, that so less persistion is needed to live through peace than war. Perhaps even more, at certain moments. Georges Clemenceau
Francais and History of a victory p.25

The play of our civilization is that it enables us - occasionally - to live an almost normal life
Clem. Francais 105

The fact is that it is not sufficient, in peace-time, to be a mere talking-machine. You must first of all have courage enough to face responsibilities and strain every nerve to action; our people, however, when they get to the bottom of their own minds, find mere velleities, not wills.
Clemenceau, Francais
p. 199

History will pass a stern verdict on the Terms [illegible] etc.
"Francais" Clem. p. 110
Never did talkers talk so much.

When the Treaty was rejected by a majority of six votes in the American Senate Great Britain and France each gave the other the spectacle of the wild rout of armed victors before the disarmed vanquished. Never before had there been such a collapse of the paramount Powers of the day before a defeated nation, which, simply by the recovery of its energy, threw confusion anew on its suddenly paralyzed conquerors.

Clemenceau Grandeur
p. 199

General remarks

Every one knows that ex post facto critics have the great advantage of putting us in a position to foresee the thing that has happened.

Clem. Grandeur 257

I call a retrograde peace a peace by which the victor, trough whatever shortcomings, surrenders to the vanquished part of the advantages purchased with blood on the battlefields.

Clemen. Grandeur 379

Text of Treaty Versailles
Congressional Record
66. Congress
1. Session
p. 885-889

Treaty of Versailles

signed 28 June 1919
Submitted to Cong. July 18 1919
Guarantee Pact submitted to Cong. July 29 1919
Senate Committee Hearings Aug & Sept. 4
Senate reading Sept 15 to Oct 20 &
Amendments: Nov. 6
14 reservations of Lodge
separate peace House accepts 242 to 150 peace resolution Apr. 9 20
Senate " 43 to 38 " " May 5 20

Congress May 15 20 declares cessation of war US-Germany
Wilson May 27 20 refuses to sign Congress resolution

Begin Jan 15
Signature June 28

Begin of Peace Conference Jan 15, 1919
Treaty agreed upon Apr. 28 1919
Handed over to Germ. Delegation May 7 1919

Apr. 10 370 Members of the House of Commons signed a telegram to Lloyd George demanding a quick and hard peace

Apr. 16 334 to 166 Vote of Confidence for Clemenceau's Diktat

Each of us lives encased in his own past. Auguste Comte said that we live dead men's lives and it is true. We are encased by the past which holds us in its grip, and spurs us forward to new efforts. Neither an Englishman, nor I, nor anyone will cast off his historical way of seeing things and of thinking because he has contracted a temporary alliance with a foreign country.... How can a man be expected to renounce his past when he is sacrificing the blood of its countrymen to uphold it? Men retain their virtues and their faults together. You must take them as they are. They are what they are. They have a past as we have a past.... Sometimes it is true, they make me suffer cruelly.

Clemenceau, quoted by Tardieu 96

3 days before landing in Brest W. called together a group of the delegation for a conference

Bolshevism is "a protest against the way in which the world has worked."

He would fight in Paris "for a new order," agreeably if we can, disagreeably if we must."

necessary to "follow the opinion of mankind and to express the will of the people rather than that of their leaders at the Conference."

Tell me what is right, and I'll fight for it; give me a guaranteed position."

Report of D. Isaiah Bowman
Ray St. Baker World Settlement
I 19

Wilson: These great objects can be put in a single sentence. What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind, July 4, 1918

B

Date of 14 points: Jan 8, 18 adress to Congres. It was in the darkest period of the war, after Bolshevism had risen, Italy defeated. The Allies had not been asked.

Oct 23, 18: Wilson communicates to allies his correspondence with Germany and asks them to accept 14 points. If they don't, House hints to the probability of separate peace USA-Germany (Birdsall, 24) Allies accept with one reservation: freedom of the seas; and a second: that Germany should make „compensation for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies"

Germany in her turn accepts this.

After Conference began, Jan 15, 1919, Wilsons first defeat was in re „open covenants, openly arrived at". The principle was rejected, - and rightly. A typical idealistic emptiness.

Already defeated before the armistice was „freedom of the seas", - namely free traffic of Neutrals in war-times. England could not concede and the USA themselves had exercised the Blockade.

The reactionaries act because of liberal feelings, revolt against capitalism etc.

" The fact that interests me profoundly in the situation is to find that certain plutocrats, certain members of the Republican Old Guard, are measurably shocked at the ~~mighty~~ outrightness of the imperialism that has transpired in Paris ... I have heard many fists banged on tables this week, and many times the explosive denunciation:, This League of Nations is the most dangerous piece of machinery in the interests of financial imperialism that the world ever saw'.... ~~Perhaps I am optimistic~~ — an index to illusions as to the liberalism of the reactionary Republican; but even a reactionary Republican is more liberal than a Bourbon Democrat. ...

Nation, May 31 1919

, The world is henceforth divided into two camps, radicals and plutocrats' . Nation May 1919

Declaration Confédération Générale du Travail, a mixture of Anti-Versailles and Pro-Soviet

Humanité, April 18 1919

Published May 31, 1919 „ Nation"

„ Our diplomats offer us a plan of a League of Nations which is not the Society of Nations described in the Fourteen Points of President Wilson ... Faithful against its conception of „ war against war", rises against the sabotage of peace.

„ financial imperialism"

„ Existence upon the Treaty of London plus Fiume would mean, as between Italy and Jugoslavia, another irreconcilable vindetta. "

T. L. Garvin in „ Observer"

May 11 1919

A very good instance. The Italians did not get Fiume, - and now their not-getting was the cause of an irreconcilable vendetta.

Disapproval of ~~French~~ Socialists

(quoted Nation p. 960 June 14, 1919)

Populaire, Berner Tagwacht

Necessity of ~~[illegible]~~ Revolution and Socialism proved by the Treaty. And also ~~struggle~~ socialistic victory brought nearer by treaty

Bases of the Armistice
Wilsons 14 points, Congress, Jan. 8, 18

Wilson's ~~14 points~~ 4 Principles
Congress, Febr. 11, 18

Wilson's 4 ~~points~~ Ends
Mount Vernon July 4, 18

Wilsons 5 "particulars"
New York Times, Sept. 27, 18

~~Wilson's 5 points~~

~~Sept. 27, 18~~

All of which in The History of the Peace Conference of Paris
Vol. I p 430 ff.

For ourselves, we can see nothing terrifying in the situation which would ensue if our Senate should veto the whole treaty, as it ought to.... on moral grounds, because the treaty as it stands violates our national honor and makes a mockery of every high-sounding phrase with which we went into the war. Congress could at any time by simple resolution declare the state of war at an end... Appeals not to leave the Allies in the lurch now move us not at all...

Nation May 31 1919

Nov. 5 W. Gov's Note to Germany : Forh authorized to receive representatives

Nov. 6~/ midnight. Germ. Governm. to Forh that representatives are ready to leave. Forh replies, they should present them to advanced posts by the Road Chimay-Fourmies - La Chapelle - Suize.

Evening Nov. 7th midnight German representatives, with the help of road menders, arrive at Flench advanced posts

Nov. 8 9 o'clock morning Germans in Forh car

Nov. 9 Flight of Kaiser

Nov. 10 evening : Berlin tells Germ. Representatives to sign

Nov. 11 Signature

C

Clemenceau on Wilson

On the 4 points (July 18). There are probably few examples of such a misreading and disregarding of political experience in the maelstrom of abstract thought

Mr. Wilson did not understand Europe, and his obstinate resistance to the insignificant concessions that were asked from him at Washington show his knowledge

lem of America to be insufficient. He was a ~~man~~ doctrinarian in the first sense of the word; a man with excellent intentions, but with rigidly fixed and crystallized notions.

Clemenceau, Grandeur
p 199

Wilson:
Harold Nicolson: Peacemaking 1919

Wilsons belief that Lloyd George, Clemenceau etc. „do not represent their own people" (Birdsall, 41)

The „German Colonies should be declared the common property of the League of Nations and administered by small nations" (Ibid)

His error that „we will be the only disinterested people at the Peace conference" (Birdsall 41) In fact American interest was not to have any share in the spoil. England wanted to offer her part of German Colonies (Birdsall 44) They were interested not to take it.

Clemenceau on Lloyd George: „Never have too men in critical debates looked more like fowls down on one anothers throats."
Clemenceau Grandeur p. 100

After this
See some remarks in 7, page 1

C

On my return from India... Lloyd George asked me to come and see him at the House of Commons. His first words were to ask me if I had anything to say to him.

"Yes, indeed!" I replied. "I have to tell you that from the very day after the Armistice I found you an enemy to France."

"Well", he rejoined, "was it not always our traditional policy?"

Clemenceau, "Grandeur"
p. 121

Wilson had not expected the German collapse in Nov. 18. He hadn't expected it but in Summer 19. Until then he had expected to work out a detailed peace program. Now he was unready Dodd, Wilson 279/80

Wilson leaves Paris Febr. 14, 19
Wilson ~~returns~~ leaves again for Paris March 5, 19
" returns to Paris March 14, 19

After the Clemenceau-Wilson break of March 28, 1919, House asks Wickham Steed to influence Clemenceau. Steed suggested to Clem. to talk with Wilson. Clem. answers: "Talk to Wilson! How can I talk to a fellow who thinks himself the first man in two thousand years to know anything about peace on earth?" Birdsall 233

(in colonial question

~~–father to C~~
Wilsons main adversary not a
„European", but the Australian
prime minister Hughes. Birdall 53/54

Wilson entirely fantastic about
nature of men – men in general,
not „Europeans". About the nature
of his own American people as well!

Wilson address in
French Chamber
Febr 3 19

Clemenceau (2) against Wilson's
peace Dec. 30 1918
Wilsons answer some days
later in Manchester

Futility of Wilsons fight for „reparation" and against „idemnity."
History has shown that the „reparations" were already too „high to be
paid.

As futile his fight in re colonies. There was in real difference, at
not worth while at least, between his mandate conception and the
more annexationist wishes of the Dominions etc. This question had
had no meaning in the entire further development of the world. Once
the con-petition of colonies to Germany had been decided – by Wilson
too! – every possible influence of the whole battle of the Colonies on
the development of the coming twenty years must be denied.

– The fight was, if all German colonies should be mandated, or if
some should be annexed by Dominions and Japan. (Birdall 62 ct)
Pirst Mr. Hughes in this discussion utterly wild against Wilson (Birdall 65/66/69

Wilsons break with Secretary of State Lansing
Dodd p. 408

Death of Pres. Roosevelt Jan 1919

Bitter quarrel Clemenceau - Lloyd George March 25 - April 2
Clemenceau abruptly leaves Wilson's room March 28 (Birdsall 249) on face
Wilson orders F.F. George Washington to come to Brest Apr. 7

Lloyd George explains Wilson's agreement with Clemenceau on Rhineland after bitter fight: it was purchased by a French promise to stop pro attacks upon him.!! Lloyd George I 280

Lloyd George, even now, 1938, declares Wilson's assent to Rhineland occupation as criminal ibid

Wilsons idea of justice
égale for the friendly and
unfriendly nations, and that
only this can be a base
for peace
point 1. or 2. of
Speech of Sept. 27 41

Wilson „un avoué devenu
clergyman", selon un Français.

Wilson describes himself to
House: „a democrat like
Jefferson, with aristocratic tastes".
„Intellectually, he said, he was
„entirely democratic, which in his
opinion was unfortunate, for the
reason that his mind
led him where his taste
rebelled."
R. St. Baker, Wilson,
Life & Letters 266 / VII

On Nov: 1 1918

„Will you tell us, M le Maréchal," said House, „solely from the military point of view, apart from any other consideration, whether you would prefer the Germans to reject or to sign the armistice as outlined here?"

„Fighting", replied Foch, „means struggling for certain results (Or le fait la guerre que pour les résultats). If the Germans now sign an armistice under the general conditions we have just determined, those results are in our possession. This being achieved, no man has the right to cause another drop of blood to be shed."

Intimate Papers 91/IV

Nov. 4 Allies accept Wilsons „program" with two reservations

Deutsche Revolutionäre Kommen am 3. Nov.

Oct 29, House sends to Wilson a commentary of the 14 points, prepared at his request by Frank I Cobb, editor of the New York World, and Walter Lippmann, Secretary of The Inquiry. Text in Foreign Relations, 1918 Suppl. 1, p. 405

House: Special Representative

Nov. 4 German Constitutional Amendments passed Reichst.

IV/13. Intimate papers Lansing to House Apr. 8 18

Intimate papers 65/IV
House to Wilson Sept. 3 18

„As the Allies succeed, your influence will diminish. This is inevitable. By the time of the Peace Conference you will be reaching the end of your second term, and this too will be something of a challenge to those, both at home and abroad, who have the will to oppose you. Therefore I believe that you should commit the Allies now to as much of your programme as possible.... Could not a plan be thought out by which the Entente would be committed to certain things for which we stand and which are essential, from our point of view, to the reconstruction of the world?"

The price is impartial justice in every item of the settlement, to nation whose interest is crossed...
First, The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several people concerned.

Wilson, Sept 27 1918

Armistice
Home Telgr. to the President Oct 6.

I would suggest making no direct reply to the German note. A statement from the White House saying, "The President will at once confer with the Allies regarding the communication received from the German Government," should be sufficient. I would advise that you ask the Allies to confer with me in Paris at the earliest opportunity...

Intimate papers IV/75

Public feeling: victory, not armistice!

I want to save the army, so that we can use it as a means of pressure during the peace negotiations.

Col. Heye
Preliminary History of the Armistice

Haig ... does not consider
the German military situation
warrants their complete
surrender (Herm, on Oct 26
after arrival in Paris)

Intimate papers IV/93

Clemenceau expressed his
belief, which was also that
of Marshall Foch, that Germany
was so thoroughly beaten
she would accept any terms
offered. Haig does not agree
with this conclusion ...

Ibid.

Schwäger Hölderlin

Mtg of military Commanders
Senlis, 25 Oct.
Oct 30 Foch sent his
Memorandum against armistice.

In Senlis: Hig: evacuation,
incl. Alsace-Lorraine, but not
delivery of arms. Hig is
"sufficient to seal the victory".
"If more is demanded, there
is a risk of prolonging the
war." Pétain: evacuation,
occupation incl. Rhineland. "the
German army should return to
Germany without a cannon
or a tank." ~~Pétain~~ Foch
agrees with Pétain. ~~Blis~~
Intimate papers
D/113

Foch plan asks for one third of the German artillery and half of their machine guns D/113

Bliss finds Fork-Horns unsufficient. He demands complete disarmament.

Holtzwski asks Wilson, if Bucharest and Balk shall be stopped. He cooles (Aug 27th) Baker Life & Letters VIII (362) as he has earlier cooled a question of Otto H. Kahn on German wagers in Metropolitan Opera.

Wilson's error of the people behind him and the governments against him aggravated by reports of people like Ray Stannard Baker, read his letter of Aug. 19, 18, in Wilson Life & Letters VIII 377

House to Wilson Oct 28

Things are moving so rapidly that the question of a place for the Peace Conference is upon us. The French are urging Paris, the Belgians, Brussels.... Will you not advise me as to your preference.

Wilson to House Oct 28

Much as I should enjoy Paris I think neutral place of meeting much wiser

Reparations

The Allies refer to Wilsons „points" that the invaded territories must be „restored". „By it they understand that compensation will be made by Germany for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies and their property by the aggression of Germany by land, by sea, and from the air."

Lansing Mr. 11 18, „There shall be no annexations, no contributions, no punitive damages."

That body exactly what Italy, France, and Great Britain were fighting for and to place the responsibility upon Congress for the further continuation of the war by the United States in behalf of the aims of the Allies. As soon as I had said this George and Clemenceau looked at each other significantly.

Foreign Rel., 1918, Suppl. 1, Vol. I., 420/426

Wenn annonnes 31.) that 14 point will be accepted ~~by~~ Nov. 1

Nov. 4 Acceptation ist Vorbehalt.

Armistice because of 14 points

Nov. Conference à 6.
„My statement had a very exciting effect."

30. p.m. cables to President:
„My intention is to tell Prime Ministers to-day" and „I suggest to quickly cut down ..."

30. Lloyd George, Clem. + House met: „I promptly pointed out ... that if the Allied Governments felt constrained to submit an elaborate answer to the President containing many objections to his program it would be doubtless necessary for the President to go to Congress and to place before

31 Oct. 1918

Lloyd George in the Armistice-talks

As the Admiralty that the greater part of the German surface fleet must be surrendered, Lloyd George express fear that the demands of the naval experts may prolong the war. He fears German refusal to sign — as later in the case of the Peace-Treaty.

Taddien 69

Lloyd George agrees to Armistice in Upper-Silesia because of his fear that Germany refuse to sign. Hilton impatient with that argument

Birdsall 189

Ludendorff resigns Oct 26 1918

Karl of Austria asks for an armistice Oct 30 1918

How Lloyd George behaved on March 27, 1919, when Wilson wanted to present the Monroe-Doctrine-reservation in the Covenant, and when he used this to a blackmail with regards to a ratio between the British and American navy Birdsall 141

"Hang the Kaiser", Lisbon
"Minister C.N. Barnes, Nov. 30. 1918
Member of Versailles Conf.

Lloyd Georges programm
in one exposé of March 1919

Fools on Lloyd George

He changes his mind as easily as he changes his shirt. More often, if anything.

Recouly Foch 246

American, " to a separate peace between the United States and the Central Powers."

"It might" replied Colonel House.

"My Statement," he telegraphed the President, "had a very exciting effect on those present." Intimate papers 165

Veröffentlichen Intimate papers p. 162/ I

Intimate papers

~~House~~ Conference
House - Allies Oct. 29 1918
On Fourteen points.
Ouai d'Orsay, Clemenau, Pichon, Lloyd George, Balfour.

If the Allies persisted in their refusal to accept the Fourteen point, upon which Germany based her request for an armistice, there could be only one result: the negotiations with Germany would have to be wiped off the slate. President Wilson would have no alternative but to tell the enemy that the conditions were not accepted by the allies. the question would then arise whether America would not have to take those matters up directly with Germany as Austria.

"That would amount," said

Point 1 of 14 points
"Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understanding of any kind."

---

do not accept
saying, that if these conditions Wilson "would probably feel obliged to go before Congress and state the new conditions and ask their advice as to whether the U.S shall continue to fight.."

Foreign relations of the U.S.A, 1918
Supplement I, Vol. I, p. 423

House, diary Oct 28, 18

"It seems to me of the utmost importance to have the Allies accept the Fourteen points and the subsequent terms of the Presidents. If this is done the basis of a peace will already have been made.

14 points Foreign Relations, 1918
Suppl. 1, Vol. I p 15

Feb. 11 4F principles p. 112
July 4 4 ends p. 270

(2) The settlement of every question ... upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation.."

July 27 5 particulars 319

(whether of territory, or sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship)

("the great game, now forever discredited, of the balance of power." Wilson, Feb. 11

---

23 Oct.

President in third note to Germany

"it does not appear that the principle of a government responsible to the German people has yet been fully worked out"

"the alterations of principle and practice" have only be "partially effected upon" and may not be permanent. "the determining initiative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany."

"If it (the U SA) must deal with the military masters and the monarchical autocrats of Germany ... it must demand not peace negotiations, but surrender.

Open Covenants, openly arrived at:

"In the very moment the decision was to be made, every one of the great parties to the covenants negotiations was involved in secret diplomacy. The President... knew that the Japanese would be thrown in a tumult if his purposes in regard to China were made known... Lloyd George... Every other chief at the table was in a similar plight. ... But that was not the worst of it. The greater papers of the United States were opposed to Wilson's mission altogether, opposed to the fourteen points and in sympathy with the social philosophy and purposes of Premier Clemenceau rather than those of the President of their own country. If every

Photostat

Marshall Fork, Memorandum
Jan 10. 1919
in Tardion 145

BTZE

Maximilian, prince of Baden
The memoirs of Prince Max

Germany, Reichskanzlei
Preliminary history of the armistice. Official documents published by the German Chancellory
New York 1924

BTZE

William E. Dodd
Woodrow Wilson and his work

AN
(Wilson, W.)

pugnacity, every remark of every member of the Conference were to be made in public, as speeches are made in the Parliament of Great Britain, the members simply would not have talked. Dodd, 308

Photostating

Intimate papers IV / p. 162
Conference of Oct 29 1918
at Quai d'Orsay.

p. 162, 163, till "the power of blockade goes"

165. but beginning with the words:

"The French and the Italians ... had their own objections etc.

He repeats the same things on Oct 30. On the same day he advises W[illson]: "I would suggest that you quickly diminish the transport of troops giving as an excuse the prevalence of influenza or any other reason but the real one. I would also suggest a little later that you begin to

gently shut down upon
money, food and raw material.
I feel confident that we
should play a strong hand."
Foreign Relations of the U.S.A,
1918, Suppl. 1, Vol. I p. 424

Wilson to House, Oct 31 18
"I am proud of the way
you are handling things."
Foreign Relations of the U.S.A
1918, Suppl 1, Vol I 429

I saw Clemenceau this morning. If all Frenchmen were like him how easy our business would be

Letter Robert Cecil to House March 8 1919

House Collection

Clemenceau - letter in 1922 to Marsh:

„We are marching to catastrophe so complete that it is impossible for us to find a way out of it. The worst of it is that these puppets who have brought us to this point are only in part responsible. They have given themselves away. The country has tolerated everything. Even today all it can do is to wring its hands. The defeat of Germany was crushing. You see how she rebounded. Amongst us I only see the lowest kind of ambition in the midst of a complete collapse into apathy." Marsh, Leaves Clemenceau p. 20

Clemenceau: „It's because the Americans are still too near their beginnings; they need a bit of past. It takes a country a thousand years to come to the point of understanding that a man is a man.

Marsh, 85

„... Wanting colonies without colonists. The French don't want to leave Paris, Bordeaux, Marseille. The French don't want to have children. What', all this fuss about colonies then?

Marsh, 275

"The Old World was tough in wickedness"
"The Old World's heart of stone."
"

But Keynes hates Clemenceau

"very old and tired, surveying the scene with a cynical and almost impish air. (32)

He has "one disillusion-mark":
He believes that "you must never negotiate with a German or conciliate him; you must dictate him" (32)

He believes: "The politics of power are inevitable, and there is nothing very new to learn about this war or the end it was fought for. (33)

"The belief that essentially the old order does not change, being based on human nature which is always the same (35

Keynes on Clemenceau

"The policy of an old man, whose most vivid impressions and most lively imagination are of the past and not of the future"
He does not see "humanity and European civilization struggling forward to a new order... he neither expects nor hopes that we are at the threshold of a new age.

Keynes

"Clemenceau was by [illegible] the most eminent member of the Council of Four, and he had taken the measure of his colleagues [illegible] both. No one had an idea [illegible] penetrated it in all its consequences. His age, his character, his wit, and his appearance joined to give him objectivity and a defined outline in an environment of confusion. One [illegible] not despise Clemenceau or [illegible] him, but only take a different [illegible] as to the nature of civilized [illegible], or indulge, at least, [illegible] different hope.

29

Clemenceau née 1841 (77 ans)

maire de Montmartre 70

Jefes Ferry + Colonies 85

88 Boulangisme

95 condamn.
97 (13.I Zola 3 ans)
06 Dreyfus (Affaire)

" Bloc des gauches)

Separation de l'Eglise

Entente Cordiale

Constituante 1906 - 09 Président du Conseil
16. Nov. 17 Président du Conseil

Poincaré, Guillaume

Jan. 1920 démissionne comme Président de la République

to Nice Elu à l'Académie Française en 1918, mais il n'y vint jamais.

Appointé Amman + Torlino 84
Turin 81

1865 America - 69

Leader in Hartford, Conn. for Temp + Relig

married 69 Miss Mary Plummer of Springfield, Mass.

Clemenceau Sept. 27 to Nuorteva

"M. Briand believes in peace, so that's all right. Here is a man who believes in it perhaps a little less: I mean President Hindenburg. Mark well what I'm telling you: in six months, in a year, five years, ten years, when they like, as they like, the Boches will invade us.

Georges Clemenceau, By Jean Martet

p. 20

Jean Martet Le Tigre 20. VII. 924

Martet: Vous avez travaillé?

Clemenceau: Je suis très fatigué, Martet. Et je vais vous dire une chose qui vous surprendra: je suis très vieux. Je voudrais tout mettre dans ce livre. Ça arrive à flot; il y en a trop. Finalement je me demande si je pourrai y mettre l'indispensable. Je prie

283/84

"The greatest danger that I see in the present situation is that Germany may throw in her lot with Bolshevism and place her resources, her brains, her vast organizing power at the disposal of the revolutionary fanatics whose dream is to conquer the world for Bolshevism by force of arms. Lloyd George, "Some Considerations etc." in his "Memoirs of the Peace Conference" I 266, quoted by Birdsall 184

E

D

Redlist

4

I left (Paris) for Russia on the 22d of February (1919)

"You are hereby directed to proceed to Russia, for the purpose of studying conditions, political and economic, therein, for the benefit of the American commissioners plenipotentiary to negotiate peace." Lansing's order.

Jan 21 1919 Council of Ten Secret Notes ~~Finlaising~~ Wilson shall draft a proclamation inviting all organized parties in Russia to attend a meeting to be held at some selected place such as Kalonica and Lemnos, in order to discuss with the representatives of the allied and associated great powers the means of restoring order and peace in Russia. Participation in the meeting should be conditional on a cessation of hostilities."

Time for that Conference set at Feb. 15
Up to then all moves of the Russian Parties cruel or repulsive.

Lincoln Colcord of 'Philadelphia Public Ledger' declares in a letter to Wilson, that there would be at Petrograd, within a short time a strong coalition government, fully representative of Russia." Wilson answers Dec. 6, 17: "Your interpretation of what is going on over there corresponds with so much that has come to me in one way or another, directly and indirectly, that I have been very much impressed by it." R. S. Baker Woodr. Wil. Life & Letters VII/396

Bullitt

Stn — were you in Russia?

— or only one week

Bullitt p. 38

Photostat

His final report end of March 1919
addressed to President Wilson and the
American Commissioners Plenipotentiary to
Negotiate Peace

Return:

1. day many hours talk with House

2. " Breakfast with Lloyd G. General Smuts, Mr. Phil. Kerr.

Lloyd G. to Smuts: General, this is of the utmost importance and interest, and you ought to read it right away.

Ll. George: Of course, all the reports we get from people we sent there are in this general direction, but we have got to send in somebody who is known to the whole world as a complete conservative, in order to have the world believe that the report he brings out is not simply the utterance of a radical

by.

.. [illegible] urged me to make public my report. He said it was absolutely necessary to have publicity given to the actual conditions in Russia, which he recognized & were as he presented.

Bullit 66/67

.. Although when Lloyd George got back to London he intended to make a statement very favorable to peace with Russia, he found that Lord Northcliffe, acting through Mr. Wickham Steed, the editor of The Times, and Mr. Winston Churchill, British secretary of war, had pissed the conservative majority of the House of Commons against him, and that they were ready to lay him then and there if he attempted to speak what was his own opinion...

Bullit p 95

Wilson sent them (Lenine & Trotzki) a message, too, hoping to keep them within the great family of nations that resisted Germany. He was conciliatory. Lenins reply was: „First break the power of the capitalists in America, put a score of your financial grandees in prison, and we shall be willing to treat with you as an ally."

William E. Dodd
Woodrow Wilson and His Work
p. 237

Wilson and Lloyd George want to invite Russia to peace Conference (Dodd 310 ff. Bullitt in Literary Digest Sept 21, 1919, Also in Lept. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations)

Wilson then proposes the Prinkipo Conference.

„William C. Bullit, a clever and apparently very vain Correspondent of the Philadelphia Ledger, headed the mission" (which had been sent to Russia by House and Lloyd George, as perceived one or two days after Wilson had left Paris) Dodd, „Wilson", page 335

Bullitt in Hearing of Senate Committee on Foreign Relation
His vituperative letter to Wilson (The New York Nation May 31, 19) Sept 12, 1919

France's stake in Russia: 7½ Billion Dollars pre-war-loans
Dodd „Wilson", p 303

Anti-Wilson unity of pre-Bolshev.-radicals and Tories
Dodd 337

C

Council of 10
Preliminary Discussion regarding Russia
Jan 16 1919
Published Bullitt Hearing p. 6

"It is true that the Bolsheviki movement is as dangerous to civilization as German militarism, but as to putting it down by the sword, who proposes it?...
If he was proposed to send a thousand British troops to Russia for that purpose, the armies would mutiny. The same applies to U.S. troops in Siberia; also to Canadians and French as well. The mere idea of crushing Bolshevism by a military force is pure madness.

Wilson explains sympathy with Soviet Russia with "the fact of the domination of large vested interests in the political and economical world."
"British and American troops would not be ready to enter Russia to fight the Bolsheviki. The great powers would be playing against the principle of the free spirit of the world," if they intervened in Russia.

Jan. 21 1919

Lansing the only one asking for intervention. Lloyd George repeats, that there would be mutiny if the necessary 150 000 additional men would be sent. Lansing suggested volunteers. Lloyd George said, they could not be found. And who would pay for them? Wilson and Clemenceau answered they would not.

Russie

A Mourmansk et a Archangelsk où plus de 20.000 hommes se trouvent réunis sous le commandement d'un général Anglais... nous vivons en bonne intelligence avec un Gouvernement socialiste qu'on raillait tout a l'heure, mais qui n'en existe pas moins

Pichon
29 décembre 1918

Pichon : Je sais maintenant qu'on est plein de tendresse, d'un certain côté de cette Chambre, pour le Gouvernement bolchevique.... (Applaudissements)
André Lebey Non! non! Nous protestons avec énergie.
Marius Valette Nous sommes des Républicains.
Magéras : Il vaut bien le Vôtre!
(Exclamations sur un grand nombre de bancs)

Marcel Cachin : Pas de divisions!
C'en est une.
Le Ministre : Ce n'est pas une division, vous allez le voir
Emile Laloux : Nous ne sommes pas obligés de dire amen à tout ce que vous dites
Ministre etc. Chambre 4e. 29 18

Albert Thomas
Chambre 29.12.18

Je suis partisan de ne pas laisser la Russie dans l'état d'abandon où elle peut se trouver.... Je suis partisan de ne dis pas d'une intervention militaire, mais d'une action soutenue en Russie....

—

Kerensky, en décembre 1918, appelle l'expédition en Russie "un coup de poignard dans le dos de la Russie."

July 20, 1918 Thomas G Masaryk to Wilson: "I am obliged to ask for the help of the US and the other Allies for our ~~the~~ army in Russia"
Baker, Wilson Life & Letters VIII/288

Czechoslovak Army in Russia. For short history: Baker, Life & Letters VIII/321

Aug 2, 1918 Japanese Government agree to send expeditionary corps to Vladivostok, according to Allied wishes, in order to make safe the rear of the Czechoslovaks. (about 12000 troops) Commander (also of Allied forces) General Kikuzo Otani
Same day British troops occupy Archangelsk. (Expedition General Poole
in Moscow & exiting, Bolsheviks part. Baker Life & Letters VIII 312

Aug 3. British expe. force pris Gales in Vladivostok Also French

Aug 7. Announced that Amer. Exp. Corps to Vladivostok would be commanded by Maj. Gen. William S. Graves. 4800 men arrive Archangelsk Sept 4.

July 30, 1918 Attempt on Lenins life by Dora Kaplan, Social Revolutionary, is taken as pretext for the terror.

Oct 10, 1918 Americ. Ambassador in Russia Reports on terror and says indignantly: My conclusion is that the only way to end this disgrace to civilization is for the Allies immediately to take Petrograd and Moscow.

Foreign Relations 1918, Russia, Vol II. 535-536

English, incurably fearful, continously inquires about military armistice terms

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Russia

Letter Clemenceau to House, Nov. 9, 18

~~Letter Clemenceau~~

Their (the German delegate's) line is to say that they will be overwhelmed by Bolshevism if we do not help them resist it, and that afterward we shall be invaded by the same plague.

Intimate Papers

IV/139

Russia

General Bliss to Col. House, Oct. 28, 1918, after some talks. 18

On Armistice terms:

Lord Milner is disposed to object to [German] demobilization (thinking that Germany may have to be the bulwark against Russian Bolshevism)

Intimate papers

With regard to another talk on the same Oct 28 18 with Milner and Sir Henry Wilson: IV/116

"As to the idea of not demobilizing the Germans on account of Bolshevism", I could not get from either of them anything definite as to the force they would allow the Germans to retain or the amount and character of their equipment. It looked to me as though they would leave the Germans practically fully armed and outfitted, with no assurance whatever ..." Intimate papers

117

Russia :

American Consul General in Moscow
favors intervention

Foreign Relations, 1918
Suppl. Russia Vol I. 339

Danger of Bolsherism.

In talk Clemenceau-Horne:
"Clemenceau refused to recognize that there was any danger of Bolsherism in France."

Private papers IV/119

Als am 11. November 1918 world war no.1 beendigt war, fand der Waffen stillstand keine Anwendung auf diejenigen Entente-Truppen, die bei Murmansk, Archangelsk, in Suedrussland und Sibirien standen. Sie standen dort den Truppen der bolschewistischen Regierung gegenueber.

"Were they at war with Soviet Russia? Certainly not; but they shot Soviet Russians at sight. They armed the enemies of the Soviet Government. They blockaded its ports and sunk its battleships. They earnestly desired and schemed its downfall. But war is shocking! Interference--shame! It was, they repeated, a matter of indifference to them how Russians settled their own internal affairs. They were impartial Bang." Churchill, The Aftermath, p. 235.

Dieser Zustand ist spaeter durch die Art der "Nichtintervention" im spanischen Buergerkrieg und durch den "shooting war" in world war no.2 naeher erlaeuter worden.

Ein grosser Teil der Welt erwartete, dass die Entente, nachdem ihre Kraefte durch den Sieg ueber Deutschland frei geworden, auch den Sowjets den Rest geben wuerde. Dieses Regime machte aus seiner Feindschaft gegen die "Buergerlich-kapitalistischen" Regierungen kein Hehl. Es hatte unter Vertragsbruch Frieden mit Deutschland geschlossen und dadurch die Transport riesiger deutscher Truppenmassen an die Westfront ermoeglicht. Es hatte die russischen oeffentlichen Schulden refuesisert. Es hatte die Geheimvertraege zwischen Russland und der Entente veroeffentlich. Lenin hatte die Entente als die Kriegsschuldigen angeprangert, Trotzky und Radeck hatten die Entente-Maechte oeffentlich verhoehnt. Die diplomatischen Missionen der Entente in Petrograd waren durchsucht worden, zahlreich Buerger der Entente-Staaten unrechtmaessig verhaftet usw. (Es war schon der Anfang jener Eigentums Konfiskation) die Drohung mit der Weltrevolution durch Umtriebe in den Ententelaendern in die Tat umzusetzen.

William Henry Chamberlin: The Russian Revolution. 1935 I, 150 ff

Aber die "big four" in Paris taten alles, um die Feindschaft

des Sowjet-Regimes

zu ignorieren und die existente Intervention zu liquidieren. Sie blieben Russland gegenueber "unparteiisch".

Wie war es ueberhaupt zu der "Intervention" gekommen?

Als die Bolschewiken mit den Mittelmaechten Frieden schlossen, lagerten ungeheure Kriegsvorraete der Alliierten auf russischem Territorium. Die Armeen der Mittelmaechte drohten sich ihrer zu bemaechtigen. Sie drohten ferner ,auf russischem Boden,wo ihnen von seiten der Sowjets kein faktischer Widerstand geboten wurde, eine riesige Kriegswirtschaft zu organisieren. Sie waren von der"zweiten Front" entlastet.

Fuer die Alliierten begannen unmittelbar nach der Kapitulation der Sowjets anti-bolschewistischen Scharen zu kaempfen. Vor allem stand auf russischem Boden ein bedeutendes Kontingent tschecho-slowakischen Truppen,das aus ehemaligen Kriegsgefangenen und Ueberlaeufern bestand. Die Entente hatte ein dringendes Interesse daran,dass dieser Widerstand nicht erstickt wurde,vielmehr womoeglich zu einer neuen Front ausgebaut wuerde.

Aber selbst dieses Interesse war langsam erkannt und gewahrt worden.

Die erste Aeusserung scheint im Pariser Journal des Débats vom 14.Dezember 1917 erfolgt zu sein,wo die Kontrolle der transsibirischen Bahn durch amerikanische und japanische Streitkraefte gefordert wurde. (George Stewart, The white armies of Russia,1933,p. 126).

Nachdem Moskau am 12.Februar 1918 erklaert hatte; "The war is over" , wurde zwei Tage spaeter ein Interview mit General Foch veroeffentlicht,in dem dieser sagte; "If America will look ahead I am sure she will see another field in which she can render immense service without relaxing the efforts on the Western front. She should give her attention to the Orient.*- Germany is walking through Russia. America and

3 Japan who are in a posotion to do so, should go meet her in Siberia. Both, for the war and after, America and Japan, must furnish military and economic resitance to German penetration. There should be immedia te steps in this important matter. Don't wake up after it is too late Don't wait until the enemy has too much of a start." G.G.O. (Stewart)

(C) Am 23. Dezember 1917 empfahlen die militaerischen Vertreter des Obersten Kriegsrats "That all possible support should be given to Russians who were resolved to continue the war against Germany". (Stewart p.136) X 3a

1 Am 31. Dezember 1917 warf Downing Street die Frage der zweiten Front gegenueber Wilson auf. (Stewart p. 133) Wilson erwiderte "that the United States opposed intervention either by Japan alone or by both in Concert." Stewart p.133.

"President Wilson, however remained unconvinced. For four precious months a see-saw process between Japan and America continued in which one or the other successively demurred to every variant proposed by the French and British. However, the terrible conflict in France and Belgium and the increasing German exploitation of Russia presented arguments of inexorable force. Churchill, Aftermath p.38.

8/1/18 Wilson glaubte, mit seinen 14 Punkten die Bolschewiken fur die Sache der Alliierten gewinnen zu koennen. Seine spaeteren Aeusserungen lassen auch die Annahme zu, dass ihm das Sowjet-Regime nicht 100 prozentig zuwider war. Vielmehr glaubte er hier moeglicherweise eine (C) Unterstuetzung zu finden, wenn es galt, den Alliierten den idealen Frieden aufzuzwingen. **Jedenfalls behandelte Wilson in seinen 14 Punkte-Proklamation die Sowjet-regierung als den berufenen Sprecher des russischen Volkes und setzte sich damit in krassen Widerspruch nicht nur zu den Alliierten, sondern auch zu seinem eigenen State Department** das am 9, November 1917 den bisherigen russischen Botschafter

Die Haltung der Alliierten den Sowjets gegenueber wurde ifestgelegt in einem

> Memorandum prepared for Lord Milner and Lord Cecil on suggested policy in Russia and accepted by M. Clemenceau and M. Pichon on December 22,1917.

Es ist verfasst von Balfour,gedruckt American Papers I,330 f.

"We should represent to the Bolsheviks that we have no desire to take part in any way in the internal politics of Russia and that any idea that we favour a counter-revolution is a profound mistake.... But we feel it necessary to keep the touch as far as we can with the Ukraine,the Cossaks,Finland,Siberia,the Caucasus &c..

As for the war,we should carefully refrain from any word or act counter (sic) to condoning the treachery of the Russians in opening peace negociations with our enemies but we should continually repeat our readiness to accept the principle of self-deternation and this includes that of no annexation and indemnties."

Weiter wird die Bereitschaft erklärt,die Bolschewisten mit Ratschlaegen fuer ihr Verhalten zu den deutschen Unterhaendlern zu versehen.

Also keine Feindseligkeit gegen das Regime.

Man hoffte, das spaeter beruehmtgewordene Selbstbestimmungsrecht zur Eingrezung der Bolschewisten-Herrschaft benutzen zu koennen.

Bakhmeteff weiter als diplomatischen Vertreter Russlands anerkannt und ihm am 24 gleichen Monats erklaert hatte, U.S. A. wuerden fortfahren die Sowjet-Regierung zu ignorieren.(Frederick Lewis Schuman, American Policy towards Russia,1928, p.56) Am 11. Maerz 1918 schickte Wilson,der sich am 5. gleichen Monats nochmals gegen Intervention erklaert hatte, eine Botschaft an den Allrussischen Sowjet-Kongress in der er seine Sympathie und Freundschaft fuer Russland beteuerte. Die Antwort,die er erhielt,war allerdings "a slap in the face" (Schuman p.76).

Aber Wilsons starre Opposition gegen Intervention wurde nierand anders erschuettert als durch-Trotzky.

Im Gegensatz zu Lenin,der um jeden Preis mit Deutschland einig werden wollte, hatte Trotzky kurz vor Brest-Litowsk Fuehler ausgestreckt,ob die Sowjets im Falle eines Konflikts mit den Mittelmaechte auf Unterstutzung der Entente rechnen koennten. (Note Trotzkys an Colonel Robin,den unoffiziellen Vertreter der U.S.vorgelegt im Congressional Record vom 29.Juni 1919,zitiert von Graves p.22),und auch nach Brest-Litowsk liess Trotzky die Verhandlungen darueber nicht abbrechen. Am 5. Maerz 1918 ,zwei Tage nach Brest-Litowsk schlug Trotzky vor, die Ratification zu hintertreiben und forderte dafuer Entente-Streitkreafte zur Hilfe. (Schuman p.76).

Trotzky wünscht militärische Hilfe gegen Deutschland
5. März 1918
20. März 1918
Amerikan. Papers, 1918, Bd. I, 392.396.398.
418.483.500.

Trotzkys Haltung war dem amerikanischen Botschafter so guenstig erschienen,dass er hoffte,Trotzky wuerde selbst um Intervention offiziell nachsuchen,und deswegen seine (Francis) eigene Forderung nach Intervention hinausschob. Am 2. Mai 1918 telgraphierte Francis nach Washington; "Time has come to intervention". Der deutsche Botschafter Mirbach sei der eigentliche Diktator in Russland geworden (David R. Francis, Russia from the American Embassy,1921,p. 296) "Finally I doubt the policy of the Allies longer temporizing with a

Government advocating the principles of Bolshevism and guilty of the outrages the Soviet Government has practized". Francis blieb vier Wochen ohne jede Antwort. Er blieb aber bis zuletzt ein entschiedener Anwalt des entschiedenen Einschreitens gegen den Bolschewismus. Er hielt die Intervention fuer noetig und fuer moeglich und -1919- durchfuehrbar mit etwa 120 000 Mann (Je 50 000 Amerikaner, Englaender und Franzosen und 20 000 Italiener).

Am 3. April 1918 hatte eine Konferenz der Franzoesischen, britischen amerikanischen und italienischen Botschafter in Petrograd folgende Resolution gefasst:

" 1) L'intervention japonaise est plus que jamais nécessaire pour combattre l'Allemagne.

2) Elle n'aura son plein effet que si elle revêt le caractère d'une intervention interalliée et si on amène le gouvernement bolché-vik a l'accepter...

3) Des personalites alliées qui approchent Trotski ont l'impression qu'il pourrait être probablement amené à accepter l'intervention japonaise." (Joseph Noulens, Mon Ambassade en Russie, 1933, II,,57)

Dem war folgendes vorausgegangen:

Auf Trotzkys Anfrage, ob er auf franzoesische Unterstuetzung gegen die deutschen Armeen rechnen koenne, hatte der franzoesische General Niessel einen Verteidigunsplan ausgearbeitet, den der Quay d'Orsay gebilligt hatte. Noulens hatte Trotzky alle verlangten Zusicherungen gegeben (I,217,224) Trotzkys Anfrage 21. Febr. Niessels Plan 24, Fevr. ueberreicht. Trotzky wagte nicht ,gegen Lenin, der auf Kapitulation bestand, den Niessel'schen Plan auszufuehren, verhandelte aber weiter ueber concours technique et financière (I,224) Er verlangte 500 frnzoesische Offiziere, 300 englische Marine-Offiziere und amerikanische Techniker. (Noulens II,55).

Am 25. April 1918 schlaegt Foreign Office

Balfour Wilson vor ,mit Zustimmung der Sowjets eine Expedition zu unternehmen.

Bevor aber Wilson sich entscheiden konnte,hatte der blutige Zusammenstoss zwischen den Tschech-Slowaken und Sowjet-Truppen die Frage der Intervention in ein neues Licht gestellt. Die tschechische Legion hielt strategisch wichtige Punkte der sibirischen Bahn besetz

Die Rettung der Tschechoslovaken erschien nun auch Wilson als ein Grund,eine begrenzte Intervention zu rechtfertigen. Er bemuehte sich aber sofort, die Limitierung so eng wie moeglich zu halten. Das Uebereinkommen ueber die Expedition wurde am 2. Juli 1918 getroffen. (Churchill Aftermath 188, Stewart 133) Am 6. Juli 1918 wurde ein Proklamation erlassen,nach der Wladiwostok "under provisional protection of the Allied Powers" genommen wurde... "in a spirit of friendship and sympathy for the Russian people,and not in support of any political faction or party."

Wilson hatte nicht allein mit seiner Opposition gegen die Intervention gestanden. Sein Kriegs-Sekretaer Baker war noch entschiedner dagegen. Er hatte seit Fruehjahr 1918 Wilson in interventi feindlichem Sinne bearbeitet. (Vorrede zu Graves p. VIII-IX) Aber das amerikanische Kriegs-Departement scheint die europaeischen Motive gar nicht begriffen zu haben. Am 20. Februar 1918 hatte Gener Bliss dem Stabschef General March geschrieben; "The British and French are convinced that the proposed intervention is the only way of consolidating a strong sentiment in Russia favorable to the Allie ... The advantage which our Allies count on is the politico-military advantage that would result-if it should be realized- from a consolidation of sentiment among the anti-Bolsheviks which could be friendly to the Allies." (March, The nation at war,1932,p. 114-115). Das hatte eine feindliche Einstellung der amerikanischen Militaers

zur Folge,die die ganze Intervention als politische Angelegenheit ansahen. Und das machte sich spaeter verhaegnisvoll fuer die Kriegfuehrung Koltschaks bemerkbar. March " took the opportunity to urge upon the Secretary that we keep out of Siberia." p.115.

General Graves,der Kommandeur des amerikanischen Expeditionskorps (7000 Mann) erhielt als Instruktion ein Memorandum,dessen Wortlaut er in seinem Buch America's Siberian adventure (1931) mitteilt:

"It is the clear and fixed judgment of the Government of the United States,arrived after repeated and very searching reconsiderations of the whole situation in Russia,that military intervention there would add to the present sad confusion in Russia rather than cure it,injure her rather than help her,and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design,to win the war against Germany. It cannot ,therefore,take part in such intervention or sanction it in principle. Military intervention would,in its judgment,even supposing it to be efficacious in its immediate avowed object of delivering an attack upon Germany from the East,be merely a method of making use of Russia,not a method of serving her. Her people could not profit by it,if they profitted by it at all,in time to save them from their present distresser,and their substance would be used to maintain foreign armies,not to reconstitute their own. Military action is admissible in Russia ,as the Government of the United States sees the circumstances,only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts of self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance....

For helping the Czecho-Slovaks there is immediate necessity and sufficient justification. Recent developments have made it evident that that is in the interest of what the Russian people themselves desire,

the Government of the United States is glad to contribute the small force at the disposal for that purpose. .... But it owes to frank counsel to say that it can go not further than those modest and experimental plans. " p. 5-lo.

Verstaendlich ist,dass Graves mit dieser Instruktion nicht gleich zu rande kam.

" After carefully reading the document and feeling that I understood the policy,I went to bed,but I could not sleep and I kept wondering what other nations were doing and why I was not given some informations about what was going in Siberia. The following day, I read the document several times and tried to analyse and get the meaning of each and every sentence. " p.64-65.

General March urteilt ueber diese Instruktion; "Considered purely as a military proposition it is neither practical nor practicable....It would not divert a single German from the Western front." The nation at war,p. 118.

"No other foreign representatives were hold to such definite instruction as were the American forces. From the standpoint of active intervention in Russian affairs in which the mood and enthusiasm of the moment carried the French,the British,and the Japanese a long way, General Graves ' instructions were a handicap." Stewart p.138.

Graves kam nicht nur in dauernde Spannung zu Koltschak,sondern zu den franzoesischen und britischen Offizieren. Das amerikanische Expeditionskorps war fuer die Bolschewisten kein Hemmnis,eher eine Erleichterung.

Saemtliche amerikanische Konsulatsbeamten wurden von Wilson angewiesen , "in no way to interfere,recognize or become mixed up with any faction or partisan strife in Russia or Siberia." Graves p. 48.

Von einer Unterstuetzung der russischen Streitkraefte,die fuer die All.

Januar 18

die Alliierten kaempften, konnte also keine Liebe sein.

Indessen auch in London war von Anfang an der Eifer, die Bolschewisten zu bekaempfen, durch Gegenkraefte gehemmt. Zunaechst wurde der Botschafter Buchanan abberufen, offiziell aus Gesundheitsruecksichten, in Wirklichkeit "because his long residence in Petrograd has indelibly associated him in the mind of the Bolsheviki with the policy of the Cadets." (Papers relating to the Foreign ralations of the United States (1931) No. 222 I Russia 1918, p.330) Aber in London wurden seine Ratschlaege nicht beachtet, seine Erfahrungen dauernd ignoriert. Dabei war er nicht s weniger als intransigent gewesen. Er hatte geraten bonne mine à mauvais jeu au machen und Russland von seiner Verpflichtung, weiter Krieg zu fuehren, ausdruecklich zu befreien. (My mission to Russia, 1923, II, 225-226). Er hatte bei seiner ersten Unterredung mit Balfour von einem Bruch mit den Sowjets abgeraten, weil dies den Deutschen voellig freies Feld lassen wuerde (II,255), aber er hatte Balfour und Lloyd George erklaert, Lenin und Trotsky "though very big men, represented a destructive and not a constructive force" und sie wuerden niemals ehrlich mit "kapitalistischen Imperialisten" zusammenarbeiten. Spaeter war er fuer offenen Bruch, weil er die Aussichten Denikins und Koltschaks guenstiger beurteilen zu koennen glaubte und beantragte ihr Stiffening. Er war ueberzeugt, dass ein geringes Truppenaufgebot mit modernen Waffen genuegen wuerde, um Petersburg einzunehmen. Der gleich Ansicht war der britische Militaerbevollmaechtigte General Knox. p. 256-257.

Lloyd George verliess sich mehr auf seinen inoffiziellen Agenten Bruce Lockhart, einen frueheren Konsul in Russland, der wegen Unregelmaessigkeiten von Buchanan aus dem Dienst entlassen, aber diskret behandelt worden war. Dieser blieb lange in der Illusion befangen, eine Einigung mit Lenin und Tr

trotzky fertig zu bringen. Aehnlich arbeitenen die inoffiziellen Hauptmann Agenten Frankreichs Sadoul, der spaeter zu den Bolschewisten ueberging und der amerikanische Oberst Robins, Vertreter des Roten Kreuzes. Diese drei Personen sind an der schlechten Information der entscheidenden Maenner mitschuldig.

Nach dem Urteil Buchanans, das durch Churchill bestaetigt wird, litt die alliierte Intervention in allen ihren Stadien an mangelnder Energie. "Carried out, as it was in a half-hearted spirit it was undoubtly a mistake, and the money spent of it was wasted." II.253. Aber nicht die Intervention an sich, sondern die Begünstigung der autonomen Separatismen schadete den Alliierten und nuetzte den Bolschewisten. "It was the fear that the Allies were interested in the dismemberment of Russia and not intervention that reinforced the ranks of the Red Army." p. 259.

Lloyd George aber wollte die Zerstueckelung Russlands. Um diesen Preis war er bereit, den Bolschewismus in Grossrussland zu tolerieren. Im uebrigen war Lloyd George ueberzeugt, dass er Lenin bloss einmal Auge in Auge gegenueberzustehen brauche, um ihn einzuwickeln. Die gleiche Ansicht von solcher Faehigkeit hegte Arthur Henderson. B.H. Bruce Lockhart, British agent, 1933, p.196.

Henderson stimmte Lockhart sofort zu, als dieser erklaerte, "that it was madness not to establish some contact with the men who at that moment were controlling Russia's destinies." p.195.

"Lloyd George was very impressed .. by Colonel Thompson of the American Red Cross who was just returned from Russia and who had denounced in blunt language the folly of the Allies in not opening up negociations with the Bolshevikis." p.198.

Henderson hatte Konferenzplaene, die selbst Lockhart gefaehrlich erschienen. p.196. Das einzige Kabinettsmitglied, das wenigstens

oberflaechliche Kenntnisse von Russland hatte,war Lord Milner. Edward Carson wollte sich von Lockhart ernsthaft den Unterschied zwischen einem Maximalisten und einem Bolschewisten erklaeren lassen p. 197.

Deutschlands Kollaps entzog den Alliierten den Grund,den sie bisher fuer ihre Intervention in Russland angefuehrt hatten.

Sollte die Intervention fortgesetzt oder noch verstaerkt werden, so musste politisch-ideologisch Farbe bekannt werden.

Fuer Beseitigung der Bolschewiken mit Waffengewalt war ein grosser Teil der englischen Konservativen,die sich aber parlamentarisch in der Miderheit befanden, war Churchill,der erst am 14. Januar 1919 das War Office uebernahm,waren Buchanan und der amerikanische Botschafter Francis.

Clemenceau war politisch und moralisch unversoehnlich. Aber er wollte keinen Angriff,sondern einen "cordon sanitaire" und erwartete von der Durchfuehrung dieses bewaffenten Boykotts einen raschen Zusammenbruch des bolschewistischen Regimes.

Gegen Intervention,fuer moeglichst rasche Verstaendigung mit den Sowjets war Wilson, die Mehrheit der englischen Liberalen und fast die ganze englische Arbeiterpartei,vor allem Henderson und Barnes die im Kabinett sassen,schliesslich auch Lloyd George,obwohl er schwankte. Trotzky charakterisierte ihn in einem Gespraech mit Lockhart; "Your Lloyd George is like a man playing roulette and scattering chips on every number." Lockhart p. 229.

Lloyd George stand wohl schon November 1918 auf dem Standpunkt, den er genau ein Jahr spaeter dem amerikanischen Diplomaten Polk schilderte. "He strongly feels that Europe will be menaced by a unified Russia. On this account he thinks that Georgia,Azerbaijan,

Bessarabia,the Ukraine,the Baltic provinces,and possibly Siberia, should be independent." (Papers II,126) Deswegen war Lloyd George gegen Kolschak und Denikin eingestellt,die gegen Russlands Zerstueckelung kaempften.

"L'Angleterre a commis une autre erreur. Hypnotisée par le souci de maintenir sa suprématie dans l'Inde et les États voisins, elle n'a envisagé dans la crise russe que l'affaiblissement probable de sa rivale et s'est figuré que L'internationalisme professé par les nouveaux maîtres de la Russie leur interdirait tout esprit de conquête." Die englische Regierung "acceptait la revolution russe comme un mal local dont le Royaume Uni pouvait tirer quelque avantage. .. Ce point de vue égoïste lui a fait méconnaitre la gravité de la menace... et la force expansive de cette doctrine."

Diese beiden Bemerkungen des franzoesischen Botschafters Noulens(Preface p.IV) gruenden sich auf persoenliche Eindruecke auf der Friedenskonferenz. Lloyd George tat dort alles,um Noulens als Autoritaet fuer Russland zu diskre itieren. (Memoirs of the Peace Conference I,207-251).

Fuer alle Staatsmaenner der Entente gilt Noulens a.a.O "Ils ont cru que,par la force des choses,le régime communiste évoluerait et s'adapterait aux conditions des États capitalists."

Der officielle Standpunkt der britischen Regierung wird von Lord Milner in einer Zuschrift an die Times vom 19. Dezember 1918 umschrieben:

"The reason why Allied,not merely British forces-indeed the British are only a small proportion of the total Allied troops-were sent to Russia,is that the Bolsheviks,whatever their ultimate object,were in fact assisting our enemies in every possible way... This intervention was successful... and contributed materially to the

defeat of Germany. I say nothing of the fact that a vast portion of the earth's surface,and millions of people friendly to the Allies have been spared the unspeakable horrors of Bolshevist rule.

But in the course of the Allied intervention thousands of Russians have taken arms and fought on the side of the Allies. How can we,simply because our own immediate purposes have been served, come away and leave them to the tender mercies of their and our enemies,before they have had time to arm,train,and organize so as to be strong enough to defend themselves? It would be an abominable betrayal,contrary to every British instinct of honour and humanity."

Diese Argumentierung machte keinen Eindruck auf die liberale Opposition. Der "Daily Telegraph" schrieb am 19. 12.18

"The country is entitled to more information than that. Iy ought to be told what prospect there is of these 'protegés' of the Alliance, arming,training and organizing so themselves. We ought to hear something reliable about the mutual differences of the various anti-Bolshevik elements with whom the Allied are co-operating,and whether there is any ground for the allegation that the intervention is turning to the advantage mainly of the partisans of the regime which the revolution overthrow. We have at present a war on our hands in Russia such as would have filled the newspapers at any normal time, and the nation is entitled to know that was is going,and what end to it is contemplated by the Government. "

Lloyd hielt offiziell an dem von Milner fixierten Standpunkt noch in einer Rede vom 16.April 1919 fest (House of Commons):

"Bolshevism threatened to impose by force of arms its domination on those populations that had revolted against it and that were organized at our request. If we,as soon as they had served our purpose and as soon as they had taken all the risks,had said: 'Thank you,we a

are exceedingly obliged to you,you have served our purpose. We need you no longer. Now let the Bolshevists cut your throats',we should have been mean."

Innerlich aber war Lloyd George zu schleunigster Liquidation entschlossen,schon um Labor fuer sich zu gewinnen.

"I was desirous that we should withdraw our forces from this intervention struggle,but that before doing so we should exert our influence to make peace between the warring sections." Also keine Bundesgenossen,sonders factions. (Memoirs of the Peace Conference I,207)

" Our honourable obligation to the remnants of the Russian army which,disregarding the Treaty of Brest-Litiwsk,remained in the field to fight the Germans,put us in the embarassing position of being under the obligation to help one of the parties in the Russian Civil War. We were thus drifting without any definite aim of purpose into a war against the rulers of at least two-thirds of that vast and unconquerable country." p. 208.

Er glaubte nicht an einen Erfolg der anti-bolschewistischen Armeen, die"had been called into existence by an Allied appeal". Aber er zog nicht die Folgerung,dass dann das ganze Russland wehrlos den Bolschewiken verfallen sei.

Am 16. Februar 1919 sagte Lloyd Gorge zu seinem Helfer Philipp Kerr; 'There is only one justification for interfering in Russia-that Russia want it. If she does,then Kolchak,Krasnov and Denikin ought to be able to raise much larger forces than the Bolsheviks. This force we can eqip,and a well-equipped force of willing men would soon overthrow Bolshevik army of unwilling conscripts especially if whole population against them." Churchill,Aftermath 177.

Lloyd George glaubte nicht an eine allgemeine Opposition des russischen Volkes gegen die Bolschewiken.

"The evidence that came home from our own most trusted and best informed agents in Russia convinced me that although the vast rajority of the people were not Communists, they preferred Bolshevik rule to that of the supporters of the old regime." Memoirs 214.

Er war "defintely opposed to military intervention in any shape." 215 ,und ,wie Wilson, bereit zur de facto Anerkennung. p.213

Diese sollte erolgen mit der Einberufung einer Konferenz von Vertretern aller russischer Lager auf der Prinkipo -Insel bei Konstantinopel.

Der Vater dieser Idee ist nach Lloyd George p.214 der Labor Minister Barnes. Henderson griff sie sofort begeistert auf. Wilson akzeptierte sie und setzte sich auf der Friedenskonferenz fuer sie ein. Clemenceau war dagegen, aeusserte aber ,nachdem offenbar geheime Auseinandersetzungen zwischen ihm, Lloyd George und Wilson vorangegangen waren, keinen Widerspruch auf der Konferenz.

Diese Einberufung der Prinkipo-Konferenz ist die entscheidende Sabotierung nicht nur der Intervention, sondern auch des inner-russischen Widerstandes gegen die Bolschewiken.

1) Wilsons letzte Rede

Auf seiner grossen Agitationstour,um die Annahme des Vertrags einschliesslich Voelkerbund populär zu machen,fuehrte Wilson am

9.September 1919 in Kansas City

aus;. Herrschaft der Minoritaet ueber die Majoritaet sei ueberall zu bekaempfen.

"The men who now are measurably in control of the affairs of Russia represent nobody but themselves.....they have no mandate from everybody.

... There is a closer monopoly of power in Petrograd and Moscow than ever was in Berlin,and the thing that is intolerable is not that the Russian people are having their way but that another group of men more cruel that the Czar himself is controlling the destinies of that great people."

Zwei Tage nach dieser Rede brach Wilson zusammen und musste seine Tour abbrechen.

Am 4.Dezember 1919 stellte Staatssecretaer Lansing in Schreiben an Davis die Nutzlosigkeit einer Verstaendigung mit den Sowjets fest;

"The ultimate aims of the Bolshevists are hostile to all existing governments,and any apparent compromise which they may make with these governments is vitiated by their avowed opportunism."

(Am. Papers,Suppl. 1919).

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2) Hoehepunkt der anti-bolschewistischen Aktion

Augusr 1919.

Obwhl Kolschak im Zurueckweichen war,hielt er noch die Wolga-Front. Gleichzeitig bedohte Denikin Moskau,Judenitsch Petrograd, . Die englische Flotte hatte zwei grosse russische Panzerschiffe versenkt. Denikin und Kolschak hatten bereits eine lose Verbindung ihrer Armeen hergestellt,die bald wieder abbrach. Haette sie gehalten werden koennen

werden koennen,dann waere die Situation der Sowjets,die bereits kritisch war,verzweifelt geworden.

Eine zusammenfassende Darstellung der militaerischen Operationen gibt es nicht. Leicht reproduzierbare Karte,in der die Fortschritte Denikins eingezeichnet sind; Royal United Service Institution Journal voL 67,p. 603 (1922) .

Der Machtbereich der Sowjets erstreckt sich,roh gesprochen,auf das alte Grossfuerstentum Moskau des 16.Jahrhunderts zuzueglich Petrograd als der Weltkrieg no.1 endet.

Denikin hatte;

Februar 1918	3500 Mann
Juni 1918	11ooo "
November 18	50 000 "
Juni 1919	200 000 "

Schliesslich wurden evakuiert ; 100 000 offiziere und Soldaten, 50 000 Zivilisten,darunter 30 000 Frauen und 17000 Kinder.

General Wrangel in English Review,vol. 45,382.

"On paper it looked like the Great War on the Eastern and Western Front; in fact it was only its ghost." 'Raids,no battles." Churchill, Aftermath p.240.

Churchill an Lloyd George,29.Februar 1919; "The lack of any 'will to win' communicates itself to our troops and affects their morale: it communicates itself to our Russian allies and retards their organization." Aftermath p.179.

Churchill an Lloyd George 14.Maerz 1919; " The four months which have passed since the armistice was signed have been disastrous almost without relief for the anti-Bolshevik strength. This is not due to any great increase of Bolshevik strength,though there has been a certain augmentation. It is due to the lack of any policy on the part of the Allies; or of any genuine or effective support into the

operations which are going on against the Bolsheviks at different pointsx in Russia." Aftermath 180.

"The French checked Denikin's every step." Louis Fischer, Sowiets in World Affairs, p.232.

Nach Miljukoff, Russia to-day and to-morrow p. 122ff. der sich auf den russischen Oberst Lebedev beruft, wurden die Alliierten von den russischen General "accused ... of having tied them up to a scheme of campaign based on consciously unrealizable promises." Lebedev sagte, wenn die Russen gewusst haetten, dass die Amerikamer nicht kaempfen wuerden, dann haette man sich auf die Wolgafront konzentriert, anstatt die Truppen auf tausende von Quadratmeilen zu verzetteln, um die Verbindung mit den Amerikanern zu erlangen.

Miljukoff hielt die Intervention bis 1919 fuer aussichtsreich. "What was possible then has become impossible since."

Auch Louis Fischer glaubt, dass 10000 Mann alliierte Soldaten genuegt haetten, um den Bolschewismus zu beseitigen. p.236.

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3) Prinkipo

Lloyd George und Wilson waren einig, sobald als moeglich die Bolschewiki de facto anzuerkennen. Memoirs of the Peace Conference p. 218.

British Labor und ein grosser Teil der englischen Liberalen einverstanden, oder sogar draengend.

Die Bolschewisten waren L. G. deswegen sympathisch weil er ueberzeugt war, sie wuerden sich mit Separatisten abfinden und anderseits Separatismus provozieren. (s. Guildhall Rede unter 5) S. 9 unten.

L.G. wollte lose Konfoederation oder vollstaendige Autonomie verschiedenen russischen Nachfolgestaaten. Diese sollten so rasch als moeglich aufhoeren sich zu bekriegen. Der Plan einer gesamtrussischen Friedenskonferenz stammt nach L.G. p.214 von Barnes. Henderson setzte sich sofort fuer ihn ein.

3.Januar 1919 Memorandum der britischen Regierung an die alliierten Maechte und Einladung an Moskau,Kolschak,DenikinmTschaikowsky und die Randstaaten zu einer allrussischen Konferenz. Zuerst ist Paris dann Prinkipo als Verhandlungsort vorgesehen.

Franzoesische Regierung schroff gegen den Vorschlag. Aber Clemenceau gibt nach. Lloyd George spricht von "Intriguen" Fochs .

Dagegen sind,ausser den Militaers, die Botschafter Francis,Buchanan, Noulens und der daenische Gesandte Scavenius,der vordem oft als Sachverstaendiger fuer Russland gehoert worden war. Die Sachverstaendigen werden von Lloyd George und Wilson entweder gar nicht angehoert oder missachtet. Lloyd George Memoirs 215. Francis bemueht sich vergablich um Audienz bei Wilson. (p. 305)

Auf der Friedenskonferenz nahm Wilson den Prinkipo-Vorschlag engerzig auf. Am 16. Januar 1919 verteidigt zunaechst Lloyd George den Prinkipo-Vorschlag. (Supplement p.11-13). Ueber Russland herrsche allgemeine Unkenntnis. Nur eine Tatsache steht fest: "our hopes that the Bolshevik Government would collapse had certainly been disappointed. Bolshevism appears to be stronger than ever. " Russland ist nicht mit Gewalt in Ordnung zu bringen. Der von Clemenceau vorgeschlagene cordon sanitaire sei inhuman. Also gebe es keinen anderen Weg als Annahme des britischen Vorschlags.

Wilson; "no possible answer to Lloyd George correspond exactly with informations received from Russia by the U.S.Government."

Wilsons Gewaehrsmann war kein Mitglied der amerikanischen diplomatischen Vertretung sondern ein inoffizieller Agent,namens William H. Buckler,dessen Berichte Wilson so hoch einschaetzte,dass er sie der Konferenz vorlegte. Buckler schrieb an House am 19. Januar 1919;

" If the Allied boldly say ' we are now convinced that the Sowiet Government has a firm hold on the Russian people and wil recognize it upon conditions,but we shall not drive a Brest-Litowsk bargain

we contemplate generous treatment and expect the same in return' such an attitude will pay both in the long ~~run~~ run at once by strengthening the moderate like Tschitcherine and Litwinoff,it will drag the Soviet mpvement to the right,and keep in power men who see that foreign capital and industry must be fairly treated."

Einen Tag vorher,18.Januar hatte er an Lansing geschrieben:

"The Soviet Government is prepared to compromise on all points,including the Russian foreign debt,protection to existing foreign enterpris es and the granting of new concessions....

If peace were once made,Russian Bolshevist propaganda in foreign countries would cease at once. The warm declared on Russia by the Allies called forth that revolutionary propaganda as a measure of retaliation.

(Supplement p.14-16. Andere Berichte Bucklers sind in dieser Publikation nicht gedruckt. Aber es sind augenscheinlich nicht die ersten gewesen die Wilson durch House oder Lansing erhalten hat.)

Ausserdem war Wilson durch ein Schreiben Litvinoffs(an ihn direkt) tief beeindruckt: "... The dictatorship of the workers and producers is not an end in itself,but a means for the building up a new social system under which equal rights will be granted to all citizens regardless of the class to which they formerly belonged," 24.Dezember 19-18 Chamberlin p.156.

So fuhr Wilson auf der Konfenrenz fort: "There was throughout the world a feeling of revolt against the large vested interests which influenced the world both in the economic and in the politic sphere. The way to cure this domination was,in his (Wilsons) opinion , a constant discussion and a slow process ~~xxxxxxxx~~ of reform;but the world at large had grown impatient of delay. There were man in the United States of the finest temper,if not the finest judgment,who were in sympathy with Bolshevism,because it appeared to them to offer that régime

of opportunity to the individual which they desired to bring about. ... British and American troops were unwilling to fight in Russia, because they feared their efforts might lead to the restoration of the old order,which was even more disastrous that the present one... We should be fighting against the current of the times if we tried to prevent Russia from finding her own path in freedom.....

If the Bolsheviks refrained from invading Lithuania,Poland,Finland &c., he (Wilson) thought we should be well advised to allow as many groups as desired to do so to send representatives to Paris. We should then try to reconcile them,both mutually and with the rest of the world." Suppl. p.13-14.

Llyyd George und sein Anhang waren bereit "to meet at Prinkipo or anywhere else the Sowiet representatives,even if no other Russian representative should accept the recent Peace Conferrence invitation." Philipp Kerr zu Buckler,Suppl. p.38.

Auch Wilson "was willing,if necessary ,to meet the Bolsheviks alone at Prinkipo." Churchill Aftermath p.174.

Aber Prinkipo kam nicht zustande. Die Anti-Bolschewisten lehnten am 31.Januar 1919 entrueststst ab. Tschitscherin nahm durch Funkspruch vom 4.,ebruar 1919 an. Aber die Zusage enthielt zwar alles,was Buckler angekuendigt hatte,nur das nicht,worauf es Wilson zunaechst vor allem ankam;Waffenstillstand.

Clemenceau hatte am 21.Januar vor der Falle gewarnt; "When the Bolshevik first came to power,a breach was made with the Capitalistic Governments on questions of principle,but now they offered funds and concessions as a basis for treating with them. We need not say how valueless their promises were,but if they were listened to, the Bolsheviks would go back to their people and say: 'We offered them great principles of justice,and the Allied would have nothing to do

with us. Now we offer money,and they are ready to make peace."
Damit machte Clemenceau Eindruck auf Wilson. der von der russischen dann auch
Antwort auf die Einladung nicht befriedigt war und am 14.Februar
1919 erklaerte: " In their reply the Bolsheviks offered a number
of things which had not been asked for,such as repayment of debts,
concessions and territorial compensations. This answer was not only
uncalled for,but might be thought insulting." Suppl. 57.
Clemenceau erklärte Prinkipo für beendigt.
Trotzdem liessen Wilson und Lloyd George nicht ab, eine Verstaendigun
mit Moskau zu suchen. Der naechste Schritt wurde durch Bullitts Missio
on getan. Dann Nansen-Hoovers Food action.

Prinkipo war nicht nur ein Fehlschlag. Die Wirkung war katastrophal.
Sie nahm den russischen Anti-Bolschewisten den Glauben an den Ernst
der Alliierten. Wilsons Diplomaten waren entsetzt. Polk,der Lansing
in Washington vertrat,schrieb an diesen --1.Februar 1919-- "The call
for a conference will probably destroy morale of all parties opposing
Bolsheviks." Suppl.38. Reinsch,amerikanischer Gesandter in China,
schrieb "It seemed at first the abandonment of Russia",und beklagt
"lack of comprehension of the character of the civil war in Russia."
Suppl. 44. Am schaerfsten aeusserte sich,naechst Francis, dessen
Nachfolger Poole,chargé d'affaires in Petrograd,am 5.Februar. Er
sei "perplex". Er habe daraufhin Wilsons saemtliche Kundgebungen seit
1913 noch einmal gelesen,wo immer betont werde, "That we dare not
turn from the principle that morality and no expediancy is the thing
that must guide us". Er sei "not a stubborn advocat of any specific
course of action against Bolshevik Government",aber das koenne er
nicht mitmachen,er bitte um seine Entlassung.
Darauf weicht Lansing einen Schritt zurueck. "The purpose of the meet-
ing is rather that of investigation in order that this Government may
be in a position intelligently to direct its future policy in regard

to all parties factions in Russia. It is not the intention of the American Government in agreeing the meeting to barter in matters of principle with the Bolshevist Government. 1o.Februar,Suppl. 51.

Churchill betonte am 14.Februar auf der Friedenskonferenz ,die Konsequenz der Einladung "would be the destruction of all non-Bolshevik armies in Russia." Worauf Wilson erwiderte; "At present our soldiers were been killed in Russia,if theyxkkxx were removed many Russians might lose their lives." Suppl.58.

Churchill sucht am gleichen Tage (an dessen Abend Wilson nach Amerika wurueckreist) die Einsetzung eines Allied Council for Russian Affairs durchzusetzen. U.S. opponieren. Wilson bleibt beunruhigt ueber Churchills Absichten,wird aber von Lansing telegraphisch beruhigt, Churchills Vorschlag sei tot. Suppl. 68-73.

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4) Streit zwischen Interventionisten und Nichtinterventionisten. Argumente gegen die Intervention:

Mindestens 150000 Mann seien noetig. Die Truppen wollten nicht mehr weiter kaempfen,nachdem der grosse Krieg zu Ende ist. Llyod George. Wilson.

Siegder Anti-Bolschewisten bedeute Reaktion,Rueckkehr zum Zarismus. Labor und Liberals. Lloyd George, Wilson.

Clemenceau: cordon sanitaire: Durchbruch mit Gewalt, aber die geringsten Anstrengungen

"Allied expeditions,were they possible,would constitute a clear intervention in purely Russian affairs." Times 22.Januar 1919. Fuer Intervention; "I personally believe that such a policy (cordon sanitaire) will in the end cost us more and be less effective than were we to strike boldly at the heart of the disease and eradicate the cancer that is sapping Russia's vital energies. Though we cannot employ conscripted troops for this purpose,volunteers for service in Russia might be forthcoming ...Were we to supply Admiral Kolchak's and Gene

and General Denikin's armies with all the military equipment which they require, a complementary small force would suffice to give them the necessary stiffening.

The task is not so gigantic a one as is generally supposed;for the capture of Moscow and Petrograd would suffice to sound the death-knell of Bolshevism as a political force..... Buchanan,"ational Review" May 1919,p.351. Ebenso Churchill. s. Schluss Seite 11.
Anhang S.12.

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5) Abbruch der Intervention.

Am 27.Mai 1919 hatte der Oberste Rat von Kolschak liberale Zusicherungen gefordert. Kolschak antwortete umgehend,und seine Antwort war nach Inhalt und Ton so befriedigend,dass am 12.Juni beschlossen wurde, ihn weiter zu unterstuetzen, Anfang August wurde Einstellung der Hilfe beschlossen, Churchill,Aftermath,180 ff. 248. 269.

Am 8. November 1919 machte Lloyd George in einer Guild Hall Rede der Oeffentlichkeit Mitteilung von dem Abruecken der Entente von den Anti-Bolschewisten. Er konstatierte die De facto Herrschaft der Bolschwiken. "You must not imagine that I am reading from the present situation any sort of prediction that the Bolshevists are going to conquer the whole of Russia. I do not believe that. (Cheer) The free peasantry of the South have in their heart a detestation of Bolshevism and I do not believe that the Bolshevists will conquer that aversion. ... Lord Beaconsfield,remember,regarded a great,big, colossal,growing Russia,rolling onwards like a glacier towards Persia and the borders of Afghanistan and India,as the greatest menace the British Empire could be confronted with. And that is directly what Denikin is fighting for." Fischer,p.248, René Kraus,Churchill,p.243.

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6) Die russischen Regierungen im Jahre 1918 (Sommer).

nach Bunyan

nach Bunyan , Intervention, Civil War and Communism in Russia, 1936, p. 277

I In the Volga region, Siberia and Northern Russia

1) The Samara Committee of Members of the Constituant Assembly
2) " Kama " " " " " " "
3) The Bashkir Autonomous Government
4) The Ural Cossak Voisko "
5) " " Regional " " (Ekaterinborg)
6) " Provisional " of Western Siberia
7) " Siberian Cossaks "
8) " Transbaikal Voisko "
9) General Horvath's "
10) " Provisional " of Autonomous Siberia (Derber's group)
11) " Autonomous " of the Yakut Region
12 " National Administration of Turko-Tatars of the Interior of Russia.
13) The Provisional Administration of the North (Archangel)

In der Interventions-Zone

II In the region of the German occupation

1) The Ukrainian Government
2) " Crimean "
3) " White Russian "
4) " Latvian "
5) " Lithuanian "
6 " Esthonian "

III In the region not occupied by foreign armies

1) The Soviet Government R.S.F.S.R.
2) " Kuban Voisko "
3) " Don " "
4) " Autonomous " of Turkestan
5) " regional " " North Caucasus

6) The political Administration of the Volunteer Army

IV In the former Russian Empire but with a status of independendent Government

XXXX Finland,Poland,Georgia,Armenia,Azerbaijan.

---

7) Meuterei Odessa.

Die franzosen landeten __6000 Mann in Odessa ,Anfang 1919. Dazu kamen 2000 Griechen und 4000 Polen. . Kommunistische Propaganda bearbeitete die Truppen,und die Expedition endete mit voelligem Fiasco.
Chamberlin II,165,151.

Churchills Memoranden

14.Februar 1919 ueber die Einrichtung eines Council for Russian Affairs. Aftermath 174.

X 15.September 1919 ueber die Inaktivitaet der Intervention . Aftermath 256-259.

22.September Survey to the Cabinet Aftermath 251.

Erwiderung auf Lloyd Georges Guildhall-Rede 20.Januar 1920 Rede in Sunderham. Kraus,Churchill p.243 kurz erwaehnt.

Nachtrag zum Streit ueber Intervention

Zuschrift des Colonel Sherwood-Kelly Daily Express 6.September 1919

"I have just returned from North Russia under circumstances which compel me to seek the earliest possible opportunity of making known in England certain facts in connection with North Russia which otherwise might never come to light.

.... I know that my action will render me liable to professional penalties,and will prejudice my future in the army....

The troops of the Relief Forces which we were told had been sent out purely for defense purposes,were being used for offensive purposes,on a large scale and far in the interior,in furtherance of some ambitious plan of campaign the nature of which we were not allowed to know. My personal experiance of those operations was that they were not even well conducted and that they were not calculated to benefit in a military or any other sense a sound and practical British policy of Russia. "

Der Oberst sandte eine message an den Trade Unions Congress,der am 8. September in Glasgow eroeffnet wurde; "They must get our men out of Russia". Am 9.September wurde Kellys Aufruf im Daily Herald abgedruckt. Am 11. Resolution (einstimmig) die Regierung solle alle britischen Truppen aus Russland zurueckziehen. Am 12. September macht General Rawlinson bekannt,dass weitere Truppensendungen nicht mehr noetig erscheinen. Coates (bolschewisant) p. 171.

Occupation of Rhineland

I fought to the bitter end for the strategic position that Marshall Foch judged to be best... On the very day on which I was going to lay the Treaty before the Chamber, Mr. Lloyd George suddenly turned on me and told me that he would withdraw if I did not consent to the occupation of the Rhineland for two years, instead of fifteen.... Without the stalwart support of Mr. Wilson, the treaty on that day would have been a mangled corpse.

Clemenceau, Souvenirs
p. 234

F

On Nov. 23, 1923, Poincaré, as Prime Minister, in the Chamber, revives hopes of separation of Rhineland.
But follows the murder of 30-40 separatists at Pirmasens on Feb. 12, 24, and the subject is abandoned

Clemenceau, Souvenirs ch. 225 ff.

Story of separatism (Dorten) up to declaration of "Rhenish Republic within the German system" up to 9 June 1919

Clemenceau, Souvenirs ch.
p. 210

Rhineland, Lettre of Jan. 1919 of Briand to Paul Cambon
See Tardieu, and see Memoirs
76

Stephen Pichon Nov. 1918 harsh opinions on peace. Quoted
"Literary Digest" Nov 16, 1918

French chamber elections Nov 19 "overwhelming
victory of reactionaries"

Marshall Foch, chairman of the Commission to draft the
military terms, proposes that the preliminary treaty
Seymour IV 345-346 shall specify: "under no circumstances will the
german Reich extend beyond the Rhine" Birdsall 154

On Nov. 30 1918 Foch interview with Lloyd George in London
gives him Memorandum on Rhineland Lloyd George I 78-80
His second memorandum Jan 10, 19 Mermeix Le Combat
Birdsall March 31 (Mermeix 219-221) des Trois, 205-10

19.11.19 Tardieu adds the necessary touch of "self-determination"
- a plebiscite after a period of some years. House sympathetic, twists
the plan a little. Balfour too sympathetic, twists still more.
(Birdsall 200)

Clemenceau suppresses intervention of Cabinet (April 17) Cabinet
Meeting with Poincaré & Foch & Weygand 25. Apr. He forbids Poincaré to speak
Clemenceau's speech (Mermeix 226-231)

Lloyd George again, the first days of June, struggles against
Rhineland occupation (Birdsall 222)

Guarantee Pact / Date wrong, must be March 14

In a conversation of Apr. 14, 1919, Mr Lloyd George stated, that, in exchange for the occupation and the independence of the left bank of the Rhine, he would offer a military guarantee on the part of Great Britain against unprovoked Germ. aggression. He even added that he would use all his influence with Mr. Wilson to obtain the same engagement from the American Government.

Clem: „Grandeur" p 235

House of Commons accept it in July 19 unanimously

When refused by Lloyd? Without debate, by 6 votes majority.

France's main point: the 1918 regulations, not the Eternal regulations of the covenant. But even so she wants the League as strong as possible.

Soviet-Russians reveal end of 1917 a correspondence between French and Czarist Government, according to which France intends to take after war the Saar-Valley, and to transform the Rhineland in an autonomous Republic with French army-occupation. (Birdsall 29)

In this sense Foch memorandum of Nov 27, 18 (Birdsall 31)

Repeats its claims in conference at London, Dec 1, 18, with Lloyd George, Balfour + Sir Henry Wilson, but Clemenceau absent. (Birdsall 33)

Lloyd George's question, how this ~~could~~ (e.g. Rhineland Republic) could fit to „self-determination."

March 12, Lloyd George speaks of ~~the~~ his intention to give France a military guarantee, instead of Rhineland. He says this to House, but House has been forbidden by the absent President to continue negotiations on Rhineland etc. Birdsall 205

March 14 He speaks on the same point with the returned Wilson and he agrees Birdsall 207 They offer it same day jointly to Clemenceau

Guaranty-pact and Rhineland

We had given up the Rhineland because an offer had been made us to replace the German sentry on the Rhine by an English and American soldier, side by side with the French soldier. Now they were taking away from us all this military comradeship, deliberately, without even troubling to tell us why. What alternative had we but to lay the onus of explaining it upon America...~~when the Armistice~~? Did ~~occurred~~ to me to demand a new basis of agreement. ... Everything had to be started again ab initio .....

Clemenceau, Grandeur & 320

Mrs League: Saar

On March 28 - over the Rhineland question (and Guaranty-pact) - crisis between Clemenceau and Wilson. Wilson gives this account: "I do not know whether I shall see M. Clemenceau again. I do not know whether he will return to the meeting this afternoon. In fact, I do not know whether the Peace Conference will

Clemenceau
p. 228

Ey Alliance, dit Jules Cambon, vous y croyez. Il y eut ruine par vous. Si on n'aurait pas signé de A l'aurait dit. Mais on ne m'a pas demandé.

Mr Lansing at the end of the Council of 25 and the Fourteen had already left Mr Wilson

The disarmement idea (abolishment of conscription)
Birdsall 120

After settlement of League

March 3 Foch presents his report of the Military Commission: Germany shall have an army of 200000 men, conscripted, 1-year service

March 6 Argument ~~of~~ between Foch and Lloyd George. Conscription must disappear

March 10 Balfour uneasy because 100.000 seems not enough.

March 17 Wilson strong against permanent military control, because that would be Allied „domination" (Birdsall 165)

No ~~state~~ right to inspect after German disarmement has been declared is accorded, neither in treaty nor covenant.

The General Disarmement Clause, invented by England, presented by Wilson Apr. 26: „In order to render possible the initiation of general limitation of the armements of all nations Germany undertakes strictly to observe the military, naval and air clauses which follow."

Eastern Frontiers

Clemenceau's „General Observations on Mr. Lloyd George's Note of March 26" probably in Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference I about 270
Quoted Birdsall 186

Here the word „appeasement" appears for the first time

Danzig, solved by Britain + America. Supreme Council accepts it Apr. 22

The German delegation said it „must reject the intended national oppression of Danzig..." Birdsall 188

Upper Silesia, the insertion of the Plebiscite after the Treaty had been handed to the Germans, see Birdsall When in May 21 the partition according to ~~that~~ the result of plebiscite was executed, Germany screamed + Betray.

Saar

Wilson completely isolated ~~[illegible]~~ in the peace conference as well as in the American delegation, fight for continuation of Gam. sovereignty Riviera 231

America, wodijnously enriched by the War..
Same

Drüsen Forks in Abbeville, May 2, 18, nach amerikanischen Truppen. Es verlangt pl 120000 monatlich in May, June + July. Minimum (Mindestzahl)
Damals gerade 9 English divisions suppressed
English Infantery Depots empty, French empty till August

Clemenceau 69
61 Divisions englis in March 1918 – vermindert auf 52
May 1918

Elections Nov. 1918 Republicans acquire majority in both House and Senate. Henry Cabot Lodge Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. His speech in Senate Dec 2i 18 (a week after Wilsons (Dec. 13 arrival in Paris): Advice to Europe to make drastic peace with Germany, not to listen to Wilson.

Bitter Senate Debate Dec 4 1918

Wilson Message Dec. 2 1918

A year ago we had sent 145 918 men overseas. Since then we have sent 1.950.573
.. In all this movement only 758 men were lost by enemy attack

The opposition to Wilson did not want an unselfish peace. They fought Wilson distinctly on that ground and on the ground of his „new international order".

Dodd „U.Gov" 266

Roosevelt-Lodge slogan
in the election to a limit the sermons
in the wars, put them in a
Dodd 354 etc.

Before the election took place ... Colonel Roosevelt and Senator Lodge made up and announced a Republican foreign programme in which Wilson's ideas were flaunted. The Roosevelt-Lodge terms were frankly imperialistic. They asserted the doctrine of might and hate which the Germans had exhausted. Dodd, "Wilson" 281/82

A poll of the press of the country during the latter days of November, 1918, would reveal an unprecedented disposition to thwart the only man who could constitutionally speak for the country. Revenge, indemnities, and drastic economic repression were the common talk. Same.

Two of the most eminent lawyers of the East gave out studied opinions that, if ~~Roosevelt~~ Wilson left the shores of the U.S., he would ipso facto cease to be the head of the Nation Same

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Statesmen of Roosevelt-Lodge
is J.F. Illum, "The Great Game" 17-35

"Boston Transcript" Jan 1919 hopes that ~~desires~~ European statesmen "have learned what the Majority of the United States think and... prefer to be in harmony with that majority than with a repudiated president."

Dodd, Wilson 294

Senator Lodge in Senate, Aug. 23 1918 "No peace that satisfies Germany in any degree can ever satisfy us. It can not be a negotiated peace. It must be a dictated peace, and we and our allies must dictate it..."

'11 WILLFUL MEN' BLOCKED WILSON

Senate Filibuster Against 1917 Move to Arm Ships Led to Strong Denunciation

HE CLAIMED FULL POWER

But Preferred Legislative Approval Which Never Came—War Declaration Ended Fight

President Wilson's attempt to arm American merchant ships in the past World War arose out of Germany's resumption of unrestricted submarine warfare in the Atlantic in February, 1917, after a previous pledge to desist, and ended, just a month before the declaration of war by the United States, in what was probably the most celebrated filibuster in the history of the Senate.

It was that filibuster—the use of the Senate rule permitting unlimited debate to block a decision—that moved President Wilson to issue his "Statement to the Public" charging that "a little group of wilful men, representing no opinion but their own, have rendered the great government of the United States helpless and contemptible." The group, he said, consisted of eleven Senators.

That statement was issued on March 5, 1917. On the night of March 4, the term of Congress had expired without a vote on the bill to arm American merchantmen and other legislation which the President required. The House had passed the arms bill by a vote of 403 to 13 and seventy-five Senators had indicated, in a manifesto read into the record, that they would support the measure, if a vote could be obtained.

The President's decision to place guns on American shipping followed long negotiations with the government of Imperial Germany.

Lusitania Turned Sentiment

The sinking of the Lusitania, with the loss of more than 100 American lives in 1915, already had turned sentiment in the United States strongly against the German submarine warfare. President Wilson, however, had used his authority to defeat resolutions forbidding Americans to travel on belligerent ships, declaring his opposition to "any abridgement to the rights of American citizens in any

American elections Nov. 5 18

—

Senator Borah returns Aug 1919 to speak with Wilson on the Treaty, and threatens the Republ. Party that in case of their acceptance of the Treaty he would form a new party

Dodd 370

Wilson discusses with Senate Foreign Committee Aug 19, 1919

(Hearings Senate Documents No 76, 66th Congs. 1st session)

—

Physical collapse of Wilson a speech-making tour through the country in Wichita, Kansas, Sept 25 1919

—

Agitation of Wilsons 'internationalism' and of Englands rule over him Dodd 387 ff

—

Apr 6 17 American declaration of war

respect."

When the attacks continued the President, in what was called a virtual ultimatum, demanded German abandonment of the unrestricted warfare and the German reply in April, 1916, in effect complied.

However, President Wilson's attempt to bring Germany and the Allies together on some acceptable peace terms failed, and on Jan. 31, 1917, the German Ambassador, von Bernsdorff, informed the United States that the submarine attacks on shipping would be resumed.

The Ambassador received his papers four days later and on Feb. 26 President Wilson appeared before a joint session of the House and Senate to make an appeal for a bill arming merchant shipping.

In his message the President called attention to the violation of the previous German pledge, specifically by the sinking of two American vessels since the resumpton of tihe campaign. They were the Housatonic, bound to London with food stuffs, and the Lyman M. Law, for Palermo, with lemon-box staves. In addition, even while the President spoke, the Senate received word of the sinking of the Cunard liner Laconia, with American passengers.

Wilson Cited His Powers

In his appeal the President discussed his power to arm shipping vessels.

"No doubt I already possess that authority without special warrant of law," he said, "by the plain implication of my constitutional duties and powers; but I prefer, in the present circumstances, not to act upon general implication.

"I wish to feel the authority and power of Congress behind me in whatever it may become necessary for me to do. We are jointly the servants of the people and must act together and in their spirit so far as we can divine and interpret it."

A bill to give effect to the President's wishes was introduced in the House by Chairman Flood of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. It called for an appropriation of $100,000,000 to be used by the President to supply "defensive arms" to American owned ships, under American registry, "should it in his judgment's become necessary for him to do so."

The bill also authorized the Executive to "employ such other instrumentalities and methods as may in his judgment and discretion seem necessary"—a clause which, presumably, would have covered the authority to order naval convoys.

In the Senate, opposition to what was called a grant of "blanket powers" to the President arose at once, and the Foreign Relations Committee reported a bill similar to that before the House, only with the opposition of four of its members, three of them Democrats, and one of them the Democratic chairman of the body, Senator Stone.

Filibuster Called Unparalleled

The filibuster got under way when the bill reached the Senate floor and, although no roll-call was reached, the President charged in his public statement that only eleven members had succeeded in blocking passage.

"A situation unparalleled in the country and perhaps unparalleled in the history of any modern government," was his description of the situation.

"In the iminent presence of a crisis fraught with more subtle and far-reaching possibilities of national danger than any other government has known within the whole history of international relations, the Congress has been unable to act either to safeguard the country or to vindicate the elementary rights of its citizens.

"The House of Representatives acted by an overwhelming majority but the Senate was unable to act, because a little group of eleven Senators had determined that it should not."

The situation, however, did not long remain static. On April 2, 1917, the President asked the declaration of war granted by the Senate on April 4 and two days later by the House.

We are provincials no longer
Wilson, March 4, 1917
taking oath for his second term

On his trip to America Wilson explains League 1919,
Febr. 26 to Senators + Representatives. But already by Febr. 18
debate in the Senate, and Febr. 14 Borah calls it
„pronunciation of the Monroe Doctrine".

Febr. 28, 1918 Telegram of Pershing complaining about
„bombastic claims" in the American Press on American troops
sent to Europe .. „As a matter of fact there is not to-day
a single American-made plane in Europe." R. St. Baker, Wilson Life + Letters
VII / 372

~~19 Feb~~

19 Sept. 2 d'Annunzio seizes Fiume

20 Apr. 26 San Remo, Cedes Albania. F. to Italy & Yugoslavia
Nov. 12 Fiume to be independent State (Treaty of Rapallo)
Dec. 1 d'Ann. declares war to Italy
Dec. 27 Italy bombards F. and d'Annunzio evacuates

22 Nov 3. Fascist coup in F. Italian troop occupy March 17
Oct 23 Treaty Santa Margherita Yug-Italy. Reaffirms independence F
Oct 27 March on Rome

24 Jan 27 Yugoslavia cedes F. to Italy

Wilson finally recognises Czechoslovakia on Sept 2, 18

1918, Oct 18 Emperor Charles proclaims Austria as a „Confederate State" in which each nationality shall form on the territory which it occupies its own local autonomy.

1919 Oct 19 Wilson announces that the „autonomy" solution could not be recognised.

Sept 19 1919 d'Annunzio enters Fiume

Principe des Nationalités

Napoleons dream in the Cameries de Sainte Hélène, „après cette simplification pénuriaire, il se serait plus chimeriques d'espérer l'unité" etc.

Mermeix (Terrail) p. 45

Lansing (after his arrival in Paris) in his diary

„The more I think about the Presidents declaration as to the right of, self-determination', the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands on the peace Conference and create trouble in many lands ... The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite .... What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered! What misery it will cause!"

R. Lansing The Peace Negotiations p. 97

July 20, 1917, French Ambassador Jusserand tells Wilson on behalf of Ribot, that the French people are "particularly impressed with the desire manifested by Mr. Wilson that a society of nations be constituted." Mr. Ribot would like to convene a commission to examine the question and desired any suggestions which President Wilson might have to offer

Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson
Life and Letters VII/176

August 3, 1917 Acting Secretary Polk sends an ~~extract~~ answer to Jusserand, the text of which has been written by Wilson. He refuses to take part in a commission or to other ideas. This would be premature and

unnecessarily introduce new subjects of discussion and perhaps of difference of views among the nations associated against Germany." He says his idea to be that "a Regularly constituted and employed Concert of nations" would not be a sudden "Creation by formal convention", but would be the evolutionary ~~result~~ effect "in the end" of practical cooperation.

"To begin with a discussion of how such a Concert or society should be constituted... would be likely to produce jealousies and difficulties which need not to be faced now."

Same p. 203

Sept 3 1917, Robert Cecil makes a proposition, identic to the French, to House

Same 255

March 1917 Lord Bryce suggests American participation in his Committee to study ~~conditi~~ a plan for League. Wilson ~~thinks it~~ answers it would not be wise to discuss it now. Hopes to be afraid of details R. St. Baker Life + Letters VIII / 17

TRAFALGAR 7-2000

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NEW YORK

March 20 1918/ Letter to House. Wilson speaking of Taft and his League to Enforce Peace says he was glad to have presented the particular thing I feared, that they would insist upon a discussion now of the precise constitution of the league of nations.

R. S. Baker, Life & Letters VIII / 38

July 11 1918/ Wilson, hopes very sincerely, that the League to Enforce Peace will not study the League-Problem in connection with Committees abroad and not establish international connections Same VIII 277

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 19, 1941

New York W

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Fair Enough

By Westbrook Pegler

Yes, they apparently were caught with their hands in their pockets at Pearl Harbor, with a known thug and a notorious sneak-puncher, at that, lurking near, but weren't we all?

Our present view of the campaign to remilitarize dates only from May, 1940, and even our arguments on that phase of the problem are confused, for there were very few among the isolationists who opposed this program. Those few, incidentally, and lest we forget, were mainly Communists and Nazis, not Americans. Most of the patriotic Americans who were isolationists up to that hour of war believed in militarizing the country but opposed President Roosevelt's foreign policy which they thought provocative and dangerous. They did not counsel unarmed surrender to anyone. They were for armed and mighty isolation.

But, before May, 1940, and especially before Hitler started this war deliberately and wantonly and in violation of every assurance that he could give to lull the suspicions of trusting, peaceful people, we all were guilty and the entire nation was still off guard when Japan struck.

* * *

Not to prettify the case, we had been for a dozen years the drunkenest people on earth. Gin was our obsession, money and luxury and pleasure were our consuming popular interests and we made gods of trashy individuals who photographed well in the movies or shocked us with obscene books which had no other appeal but filth. We even made a god of Al Capone, who pandered to our vices and sneered at our hypocritical pretense of respectability.

For many years, the Protestant clergy was concerned with one issue to the almost total neglect of the mission of religion and that was prohibition which was a constant provocation to drink and a source of crime and political corruption. In New York, New Jersey, Albany, Chicago and Boston political corruption thrived so monstrously under Catholic bosses as to impair the people's confidence in the American way of government and, finally, as to evoke the famous but too little read and almost unheeded open letter to a boss by Father Lord, S. J., which recognized this enormity as a special concern of the members of the church. Irreligious Jews abandoned their faith and a police commissioner of New York who served during the era of wonderful nonsense observed that the young Jewish criminals were ashamed of the old-fashioned piety of their old-country parents and spat at them when the old people came to weep over them in jail.

We were not thinking of our liberties then or the duties of citizenship or any need to be prepared to fight a mad enemy. Profits, high wages, speculation and liquor were our interests and, in New York, at least, the papers assigned specialists to glamorize people who were tearing up money in dives run openly by criminals under political protection. In one of our cities, the Mayor collected a dollar a barrel from the bootleggers for permitting them to dig in the public streets and lay a pipe line from their brewery to the outlet and nobody even thought of sending him to prison.

* * *

Long ago, Woodrow Wilson, a dying man, preached a warning that if we rejected the League of Nations this country would have to go armed to the teeth forever in a world of hungry and wolfish predators. We rejected the league and refused to arm even after travelers from Europe brought back descriptions of the rising might of the Fuehrer's dictatorship and of a Russian army of ten million men. We were too busy having a good time until the crash of 1929 after which we were too busy with a number of other interests, all selfish or political.

At all events, none recognized any danger until Hitler made his war and even then few Americans were willing to admit that he might one day attack us. Or if it was possible, then it would be up to "the government," that rich, impersonal power in Washington, and not up to the individual to get us out of the jam, the same "government" which Congressmen and Senators preyed upon for cash gifts to their constituencies so that they could be re-elected.

Only since May, 1940, have any appreciable number realized that Woodrow Wilson was right and, as a nation, we were no more alert when the blow fell than the commanders at Pearl Harbor.

Security

By Raymond Clapper

WASHINGTON, Dec. 19.—Something tells me I am going to chase a tired rabbit today. It's that dreary subject of rubber again, rubber from the East Indies.



We are afraid rubber may be cut off, and the government is forbidding the sale of automobile tires. That's what the Japanese threat to Singapore ing.

Months ago, when th was being pointed out swer often made wa should start growing Brazil, the original rubber tree, and th supply against b hostile nation. was argued, we could isolate c independent.

* * *

But that answer was made the map. We think of Brazi our protection from the natio of the Atlantic. If the Ger from Dakar they will be c our Caribbean fleet. If you

naval and air force under control. Our coasts and outposts can never be safe from attack again so long as naval and air strength is left in the hands of outlaw butcher regimes. This has become for us not some idealistic question of world peace but a practical and necessary method of our own defense.

This defense requires international action, the ling together of nations that trust each other hat can play the game together. The British rselves have a running sart on the controll- e now. After victory is won we can, to- with Russia, China, the Latin-American d any other nations who wish to pro- elves against aggression, hold and main- trol which will be won during the war. only kind of defense we can be sure of defense that brings all the naval he airpowe ntrol of be

Although battleships the U. S. Navy are easiest riding ships of fleet, turbulent seas th tons of water upon bows in stormy wea The battlewagon ab following the lir neuver formati The tremer stren

Wilson London Guildhall
Dec. 28 18 /

„The key to the peace is the guarantee of the peace, not the terms of ~~the peace~~ it."

Wilson Peace Conference
Feb. 14 19

The covenant is „a definite guarantee of peace. It is a definite guarantee by word against aggression."

... President Wilson, the upholder of an ideology that aimed at nothing less than the establishment of a system of international law ... alas, could we be satisfied with vain discussions of this law when we were faced with the unsolvable problem of making it a living thing without investing it with any executive power? ... a parliament of super-parliamentarians without any instrument of authority, that is the talisman we received in order to give full play to our weakness

Clemenceau
Grandeur p. 199

Leaving Berlin to Legue-idea

Wilson, because of his Senate, must avoid giving the League any appearance of super-sovereignty. He must also save the appearance of the Monroe Doctrine.

Upon his arrival in Paris, Dec 13, 18, Wilson declares to Clemenceau, the making of the League be „the center of the whole program." While Clemenceau answers, that the League „should be attempted, but he was not confident of success, either of forming it or of its being workable after it was formed" (Birdsall 45)
- At the same time Chamber of Deputies, Clemenceau Speech, very sceptic (About 29. Dec.)

Lloyd George much more positive - Birdsall 47/48

1

If there is to be a league of nations
in order to enforce peace, or thing is clear.
It must be either a mere assemblage of
words, an exposition of vague ideals and
encouraging hopes, or it must be a
practical system. If such a league is to be
practical and effective, it can not possibly
be either unless it has authority to issue
decrees and force to sustain them. It is at this
point that the questions of great moment
arise.

Senator Lodge, Dec 21 1918

The attempt to form now a league of
nations - and I mean an effective league,
with a power to enforce its decrees - no other
is worth discussing - can tend at this moment
only to embarrass the peace that we ought
to make at once with Germany

Same.

Ex-President Taft and the
League to Enforce Peace elucidate
the League-idea from the beginning of
the War (Dodd 247)

Clemenceau against League Dec 30 1918 Chamber

Concession of Clemenceau to the League by House
Jan 7, 19 (Birdsall, 56)

Supreme Council accepts principle of League on
Jan 25, 19 and appointed the League of Nations Committee,
Chairman Wilson, "to work out the details of the constitution
and functions of the League."

Jan 27

Peace conditions prior to Wilson
Briand in the Name of all Allies
to America Dec. 18 1916
ditto on Jan 10 1917 (8 points)
Chamber resolution of June 5, 17,
by 467 to 52 asks for a League of Nations.

February 3 1919 First meeting of the League of Nations Committee
the French members, Bourgeois & Larnaude, presented
a complete Constitution for the league. It was never
discussed
Feb. 14 Plenary Meeting of peace delegates accepts the Covenant
April 11 1919 Committee completes its labors
April 28 1919 Final adoption of ~~Treaty~~ ~~covenant~~ by conference
The English-American draft, called Hurst-Miller-draft,
by majority of members declared basis of discussion
See Noble, Politics and opinions at Paris, p. 113

Committee recommended
because of Senate
and sits
March 22, 24, 26
Apr. 10 & 11

"Everyone got very tired of Bourgeois before the end." Birdsall 125

Treat of Rob. Cecil: if France insists, the US and British will make an alliance of their own

Birdsall 129

"Foreign to all thought of conquest or enslavement of foreign nations, the Chamber trusts that the efforts of the Army of the Republic and her Allies will permit, after Prussian militarism is overthrown, the security of lasting guarantees of peace and independence from great and small nations alike by association in a League of Nations, already in preparation

Resolution French Chamber
467 to 52 votes
June 5 1917

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27 Allied powers } Peace Conference
4 Enemy Powers }

July 5 1918
Ray St.Baker, W.W. Life and Letters
VIII 235

Oscar T.Crosby (Assistant Secr. of the Treasury) recently home from Eur Europe,called in the evening. "Mr. Presindent,"he said,"perhaps it is known to you already,but i f not ,may I say that your League of Nations plans are not taken seriously by the Heads of State in Europe? Mr.Lloyd George has laughed at the proposed League in my presence,and M.Clemenceau has sneered at it."

"Yes,"replied the President, "I know that Europe is still governed by the same reactionary forces which controlled this country until a few years ago.But I am satisfied that if necessary I can reach the peoples of Europe over the heads of their Rulers,"

Foolows a new sneering at the idea,that a plan for the League can be drafted now."All that the nations can do os to covenant with each other mutually to defend their territories and their institutions ag against aggression"

The "voluntarism" of the League of Nations. Nothing but pledges. "High-sounding phrases devoid of content and reality – vague, theoretical. Birdsall 121

Bullitt testimony

Do you know... wether the other nations were anxious to have article 10 in the covenant for the League?

Bullitt The French were not only anxious for it, but I believe were anxious greatly to strengthen it. They desired immediately a League army to be established, and I believe also to be stationed in Alsace-Lorraine and along the Rhine, in addition to article 10.

Wilson: If the League shall be successful, force must be created, force to stipulate that no nation etc. ... Birdsall 126

"No nation will consent to control...." Wilson Birdsall 127

Letter to House, July 8, 1918

Asks him to rewrite the enclosed Constitution of a League of Nations [the Phillimore report] as "you think it ought to be rewritten."

Baker, R.S. Life & Letters VIII 262

July 16, 18. House forwards to W. his draft (Document in Baker, Wilson & World Settlement, Vol III. Doc. 9.)

July 2 → more

Letter to House, March 22 1918

"Constitution of the League must grow and not be made...."

"The United States would never ratify any treaty which put the force of the U.S. at the disposal of such group or body..." Whole Letter important. Baker Life & Letters, VIII 43 (Disagreement with that Apr. 11, 18. of Taft etc. p. 87 ibid)

Aug 15, 1918 Wilson reads to House his own draft of a League of Nations Covenant. For instance he has cut out the Court's Discussion on small nations and their right of vote etc. House: „ There are fifty-odd nations, and of these there are not more than twelve at the outside that would do any serious fighting in the event of a great war, or be of service in financing it, & and yet the forty, under the plan we have drawn up and to which we both agree, could overrule and direct the twelve." House calls this „ an idealistic dream that could not be made practical." This discussion with House: „Private Papers" Vol IV pp. 48-50. Wilsons draft: Baker: Wilson and World settlement, Vol III, 88-93

Aug 18: Wilson to Wiseman , criticizing Phillimore-Report: „... There must be a League of Nations and it must be virile... I gather that the Pres. does not altogether agree with Phil. Rep. He thinks it is too indefinite and lacking that virility which is needed..." Private Papers, Vol IV 52-54

None of the horrible obstructions of the League's foundation which were imagined and predicted, ever occurred.' Look for instance Lord Robert Cecils gloomy predictions, Sept. 13, 1918, R. S. Baker, Wilson Life & Letters VIII 399 In fact there was only one opposition against the League in Versailles: the French wishes to make the League stronger. There was only one, reiterated, damping down: Wilson's.

Early Wilson - ideas on League of Nations: Sir Edward Greys letters to House 1914-16
The Intimate papers 3

Leaning on League of Nations
Oct 27
in a Memorandum

'From the little I know of the President's plan I am sure that it is impracticable. There is in it too much altruistic coöperation. No account is taken of national selfishness and the mutual suspicions which control international relations. It may be noble thinking, but it is not true thinking....'

Lansing, The Peace Negotiations
p. 43

Versailler Vertrag

Part vii

Article 227. The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.

A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defense. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by the following powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.

In its decision the tribunal will be guided by the highest motives of international policy, with a view to vindicating the solemn obligations of international undertakings and the validity of international morality. It will be its duty to fix the punishment which it considers to be imposed.

The Allied and Associated Powers will address a request to the Government of the Netherlands for the surrender to them of the Ex-Emperor in order that he may be put in trial.

Article 228. The German Government recognizes the right of the Allied and Associated Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of having committed acts in violation of the laws and customs of war. Such persons shall, if found guilty, be sentenced to punishments laid down by law. This provision will apply, notwithstanding any proceedings or prosecution before a tribunal in Germany or in the territory of her Allies.

The German Government shall hand over to the All. and Ass. Power or to one of them as shall so request, all persons accused of having committed an act in violation of the laws and customs of war, who are specificied either by name or by the rank and office or employment which they held under German authorities.

Article 228. Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals one of the All. and Ass. Powers will be brought before the military tribunals of that Power.

Persons guilty of criminal acts against the nationals of more than one of the All. and Ass. Powers will be brought before military tribunals composed of members of the military tribunals of the Powers concerned.

In every case the accused will be entitled to name his own counsel.

Article 230 The German Government undertakes to furnish all documents and information of every kind, the production of which may be considered necessary to ensure the full knowledge of the incriminating acts, the discovery of offenders and the just appreciation of responsibility."

Temperley, A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, vol. III, p. 212.

Unmittelbar darauf folgt der beruehmte Artikel 231 ueber die "Kriegsschuld".

Artikel 227 involviert keinerlei Stellungnahme der deutschen Regierung, stipuliert keinerlei "Bedingung", sondern ist eine Mitteilung ueber Massnahmen gegen eine Person, die sich im Ausland befindet, bezw. gegen die Regierung, in deren Gebiet der Kaiser sich aufhaelt. Der Artikel sieht auch nicht eine ev. Rueckkehr Wilhelms nach Deutschland und entsprechende Massnahmen dagegen vor.

Das Recht einer Macht, Angehoerige einer andern Wehrmacht vor Gericht zu ziehen und zu strafen, ist in der voelkerrechtlichen Literatur zwar nicht unumstritten, aber die grosse Mehrheit der Juristen, auch der Deutschen vor 1918, bejaht es. Voraussetzung dabei war, dass die angeklagten Personen sich im Machtbereich der anklagenden Macht be-

finden. Die Frage der Auslieferung steht auf einem ganz andern Blatt. Sie wird in diesem Zusammenhang gar nicht erwaehnt. Unter Berufung auf Calvo (Droit International, sechste Ausg. 949) sagt The Yale Law Journal (Bd. 29 p. 81, 1920): „Holland has a legal right to surrender him." x

x Ebenso The American Law Review (Bd. 65, 538, 1921): „The Dutch government, under the circumstances, is not entitled, legally or morally, to refuse the demand."

Vorgeschichte der Art. 227-230.

Die Aufnahme der "penalties" in den Vertrag scheint nicht von langer Hand vorbereitet worden zu sein. Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference I, 54 nennt Lord Curzon den Vater der Idee. xx Lloyd George selbst nennt auch Clemenceau, bringt aber dafuer keinen zwingenden Beweis. Curzon habe an Lloyd George aus Paris einen Brief unbekannten Datums -wohl unmittelbar nach dem Waffenstillstand, jedenfall nach der militarischen Bankrotterklaerung Deutschlands geschrieben, in dem er ueber ein Gespraech mit Clemenceau berichtet. Clemenceau "thought that (Bestrafung der Kriegsverbrecher) as an act of international justice, of world retribution, it would be one of the most imposing events in history and that the conception was well worth of being pursued." Wer auch nur einigermassen Clemenceaus Sprache kennt, ja nur die allgemeinen franzoesischen Sprachgewohnheiten, wird sofort bemerken, dass Clemenceau diese Worte nicht gebraucht haette, wenn er einen eigenen oder bereits von ihm angeeigneten Vorschlag empfehlen wollte, wohl aber, wenn er einen Vorschlag seines Gespraechspartners aufgriff und akzeptierte. Evident wird, dass Clemenceau nicht der Initiator ist, durch die anschliessenden Worte Curzons: He (Clemenceau) "prayed me to communicate with my government on the matter and to let him have any papers or reports on the subject that we might prepare." Curzon fuhr fort: "I pray you to consider it seriously. Public opinion will not willingly consent to let this arch-criminal escape by a final act of cowardice. The supreme and colossal nature of his crime seems to call for some supreme and unprecedented condemnation. Execution, imprisonment, these are not or may not be necessary. But continued life, an inglorious and ignoble exile, under the weight of

xx So auch Churchill, Aftermath p. 42.

such a sentence as has never before been given in the history of mankind,would be a penance worse than death."

L.George informierte Curzon "that it was a matter worthy of considera tion by the Imperial Cabinet." p.55.

Weder ~~Petrie~~,Life and letters of Curzon,noch Harald Nicolson ,The last phase, erwaehnen etwas hierueber. Die Sache wird noch dunkler durch das Faktum,dass zu dieser Zeit Balfour in Paris war und Curzon ihn staendig in London vertrat. Moeglich ist immerhin,dass Curzon voruebergehend in Paris war,aber nicht wahrscheinlich.

Die britische Kabinettssitzung fand am 20. November 1918 statt,die erste nach dem Waffenstillstand.

"After a general discussion upon a variety of topics,Lord Curzon raised the specific issue of the trial of the Kaiser. This is the first occasion upon which any allusion ~~thatx~~ had been made to this matter at any Ministrial consultation,and in ~~timx~~ view of the personal responsibility which has been attached to me for this proposal and the electioneering motive imputed to me as the investigation of my action I must call attention to the fact that the subject was first introduced by Lord Curzon,and that he definitelyx states that he was doing so as a result of a conversation in Paris with M.Clemenceau at which I was not present.x I am not desirous of disclaiming my full share of responsibility in the matter. But in view of the reiterated sneers as to the origin and authorship of the idea which are constantly repeated in political speeches and articles of the cheaper and more repetive kind,it is necessary that I should quote textually the statements made by those who inaugurated the discussion and first proposed the course of action adopted by the Allies." p.54.

Nach L.George p.56 sagte Curzon im Cabinet: "In my view the Kaiser is the arch-Criminal of the world... When I spoke to Clemenceau about the matter he said that,as far as the Kaiser,the French jurists had

not looked at it...but he said public opinion in France... was strongly in favor of steps being taken for the trial of the Kaiser and that he himself shared that view,although he would be very glad to hear from our Government what our ideas were on the subject."

Lloyd George ueber seine eigene Haltung p.57: "I followed and strongly supported M.Clemenceaus proposal with reservations...I do not think it is sufficient punishment to this man that he should get away with 20 millions of money....I think he ought to stand his trial....If he was not responsible,he can make his case....Germany ought to be invited to join in it,and I have no doubt she will send men,in her present state,who will judge the ex-Kaiser very impartially..."

Die Sachverstaendigen empfahlen einstimmig "a prosecution of the ~~xmix~~ rulers". p.58. In einer spaeteren Kabinettssitzung sagt Lord Birkenhead: "Prime Minister,in my judgment,if this man escapes,common people will say everywhere that he escaped because he is an Emperor." p60

Auch Churchill dagegen. Aftermath 158 Wilhelm selbst nicht grösser als die seine Ratgeber u. der deutsche Reichstag und Volker.

Kabinett billigt Prosecutionsvorschlag des Attorney general 65.

Dagegen ist Balfour gegen einen Prozess. Er befuerwortet "administratives Verfahren" wie seinerzeit gegen Napoleon I. p.84. Wilson mit Prozess einverstanden. p.86.

Vor dem 9.Dezember 1918 erfuhr die Oeffentlichkeit hiervon nichts.

Am 10.12.18 haelt Lloyd George seine beruehmte Rede. Er verwahrt sich dagegen, gesagt zu haben "hang the Kaiser". p.109. Er sagte: XXX

" The Kaiser must be prosecuted.The war was a crime. He was a crime in the way it was planned,in the deliberate wantonness with which it was provoked. It was also a crime in the action....in the invasion ... The men responsible for this outrage on the human race must not be let off because their ~~xxxxx~~ heads were crowned when they perpetrated the deed."

XXX Nach Churchill Aftermath 42 ist Barnes der Urheber dieses Wortes.

Am 14.12.18 sagt Poincaré in seiner Begruessungsrede zu Wilson in Paris

" In your turn,Mr.President.you will be able to measure with your own

eyes the extent of these disasters,and the French Government will make known to you the authentic documents in which the German general staff developed,with astonishing cynicism, its program of pillage and industrial annihilation. Your noble conscience will pronounce a verdict on these facts. Should this guilt remain unpunished,could it be nenewed,the most splendid victories would be in vain."

Mac Master,The United States in the World War,1932, II,256-7

Wilson erwidert; (p.258) "I am sure that I shall look upon the ruin wrought by the armies of the Central Empires with the same repulsion and deep indignation that they stir in the hearts of men of France and Belgium,and I appreciate,as you do,Sir, the necessity of such action in the final settlement of the issues of the war as will not only rebuke such acts of terror and spoliation,but make men everywhere aware that they cannot be ventured upon without the certainty of just punishment."

Sprachen Poincare und Wilson die gleiche Sprache? Verstand Poincaré unter Bestrafung die Abstrafung einzelner Individuen,wie Wilson anscheinend tat?

Jedenfalls wird von der Pariser Friedenskonferenz eine Kommission zur Pruefung der "Responsibility for War and Guarantees" geschaffen. Ihr Praesident ist Lansing. Sie gliedert sich in drei Subkommissionen 1) Criminal Acts, Vors. W.F.Massley (New Zealand),2) Responsibility for War,Vors. Sir E.Pollock,3) Violation of laws and customs of war, Vors.Lansing. Temperley,Hist.of Peace Conference,I,500.

Abweichend spricht Austen Chamberlain in der Birmingham Daily Post 29,Dezember 18(Petrie,Letters and life of A.Chamberlain II,228):

Bestreitet sofort deutsche Alleinschuld und Alleinverfehlungen im Krieg Handelsblad,Amsterdam,veroeffentlicht offizioesen hollaendischen Artikel gegen Auslieferung Wilhelms. Stosch p.29.

Auf der Sitzung der Pariser Friedenskonferenz vom 25.Januar 1919 werden die Gutachten zweier hervorragender franzoesischer Juristen, Larnaude u Lapradelle, verlesen, die Konferenz beschliesst demgemaess Verfolgung der Kriegsverbrecher, besonders des Kaisers.

Dagegen erfolgt der erste deutsche Protest. Einer Erklaerung deutscher Staats- und Voelkerrechtslehrer, unter ihnen Anschuetz, Binding, Gierke, Kahl, Kohlrausch, Liszt, Schuecking, Zorn, wird am 19. Febr.19 in fast allen deutschen Zeitungen veroeffentlicht. Einspruch gegen Verfolgung des Kaisers, der 1) nicht verantwortlich war, 2) als deutscher Volksgenosse nur von Deutschen gerichtet werden duerfe.

22. April 19 Bericht der Lansing-Kommission (Stosch, die Kriegsbeschuldigtenfrage p.29). Meinungsverschiedenheit, ob ein Staatschef fremden Rechten verantwortlich sei. U.S.A. und Japan verneinen, die uebrigen bejahen. Aber alle sind einig, dass Wilhelm II, als Anstifter von Kriegsverbrechen, d.h. als Oberster Kriegsherr vor Gericht gezogen werden koenne. Lansing hat sich spaeter vor dem Kongress (6. August 1919) dahin geaeussert, dass er persoenlich fuer "administrative" behandlung analog der Napoleons gewesen sei.

Die Verhandlungen ueber die Strafbestimmungen

(Mai/Juni 1919)

2.Mai 19 Ueberreichung der Friedensbedingungen. Brockdorf-Rantzau bestreitet sofort deutsche Alleinschuld und Alleinverfehlungen im Krieg. Handelsblad, Amsterdam, veroeffentlicht (holländisches) offizioesen Artikel gegen Auslieferung Wilhelms. Stosch p.29.

12.Mai 19. Protest der Nationalversammlung gegen die Friedensbedingungen ignoriert die penalties. Ebenso der Protest der Reichsregierung.

13.Mai 19. Im preussischen Abgeordnetenhause protestieren die Rechtsparteien gegen Auslieferungsbegehren,u. die andern penalties.

Vorher hatte,am 11.Mai ,Graf Westarp in der Kreuzzeitung die penalties eine "Demuetigung,wie siex noch keinem Kulturvolk in der Weltgeschichte angetan worden ist." genannt.

29.Mai 19 deutscher Gegenvorschlag; Internationales Tribunal,in dem auch deutsche Vertreter sitzen,fuer Vergehen aller Parteien.

Temperley II,304.

16. Juni 19 Zurueckweisung dieses Vorschlags durch die Alliierten.

Die Alliierten vertreten tatsaechlich die grosse Mehrheit der Kulturwelt. Weder Neutrale noch Zentrale seien faehig ,ein unbefangenes Urteil abzugeben. Temperley 306." They wish to make it clear that the public arraignment under Article 227 framed against the German ex-Emperor has not a juridical character as regards the substance but only in its form. The ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ German ex-Emperor is arraigned as a matter of high international policy,as the minimum of what is demanded for a supreme offence against international morality,the sanctity of the treaties,and the essential rules of justice. The Allied and Associated Powers have desired that judicial forms,a judicial procedure,and a regularly constituted tribunal should be set up in order to assure to the accused full rights and liberties in regard to his defense and in order that the judgment should be of the most solemn character." vgl. auch Bilau S. 17-18 dieses Manuskripts.

In der deutschen Presse sind die sozialdemokratischen Blaetter,einschl. Vorwaerts an den penalties desinteressiert. Stosch,Kriegsbeschuldigtenfragep. p.30ff. Scheidemann und Brockdorff-Rantzau treten zurueck.

Der neue Kanzler Bauer erklaert im Reichstag 22.Juni 19; "Die Regierung der deutschen Republik ist bereit,den Friedensvertrag zu unterze

nen,ohne jedoch damit anzuerkennen,dass das deutsche Volk der Urheber des Krieges sei,und ohne eine Verpflichtung nach Artikel 227-230 zu uebernehmen." In derselben Sitzung Kahl: "Nicht auf die Person des Kaisers kommt es dabei an,sondern darauf dass ein Deutscher ausgeliefert werden soll. Das ist eine Schamlosigkeit,die wir zurueckweisen." Dagegen Haase: "Wegen der zwei Punkte,der Schuld am Kriege und der Auslieferung der Schuldigen, darf der Vertrag nicht scheitern."

Am gleichen Tage sendet Brockdorffs Nachfolger in der Delegation, Hamel von Haimhausen, " a communication in which he intimated that Germany would sign,if the Allies would not insist upon Article 227-230 and 231. The Four met at Lloyd George's house in the Rue Nitot,and on the same evening dispatched a reply rejecting both demands and insisting on immediate compliance." Temperley II,17.

Darauf deutsche Einwilligung am 23.Juni 5,20 p.m. ' Ablauf der Frist 7 p.m.)

Die Abstimmung des Reichstages erfolgte nicht ueber Aufhebung der Vorbehalte. Diese waere nicht durchgegangen. Man stimmte ab,ob die Regierung Bauer ermaechtigt sei zu unterzeichnen.

24. Juni 19. General v.Luettwitz an seine Truppen; "Die Reichsregierung hat die Friedensbedingungen angenommen. Die Reichswehr hat der Regierung durch ihre berufenen Vertreter rechtzeitig erklaert,dass die Annahme der Deutschland entehrenden Paragraphen welche die Auslieferung deutscher Staatsbuerger und das Anerkenntniss der alleinigen Schuld Deutschlands am Kriege enthalten,mit ihrer und des Vaterlandes Ehre unvereinbar ist. Ich halte an diesem Standpunkt fest und werde ihn dem Reichswehrminister und dem preussischen Kriegsminister gegenueber erneut aufrechtzuerhalten wissen."

Am gleichen Tag tritt Hindenburg zurueck.

25,juni 19. Bethmann-Hollweg schreibt an Clemenceau. B-H. stellt sich

Der Prozess gegen den Kaiser

als verantwortlichen Minister anstelle Wilhelms zur Verfuegung. Einen aehnlichen Brief schreibt Hindenburg am 25. Juni,aber nicht an Clemenceau,sondern an Ebert. Am 3.Juli 19 appelli ert Hindenburg an das "militaerische Ehrgefuehl" von Foch zugunsten des Kaisers. Bethmann-Hollweg ist der einzige,der wirklich den Versuch machte, sich den Alliierten zu stellen.

Ende Juni protestiert eine grosse Anzahl ehemaliger Offiziere der preussischen Armee und der Marine gegen die penalties. Militaerwochen blatt nr.152.

28.Juni Unterzeichnung in Versailles.

Die Durchfuehrung der Bestimmungen

A. Allgemeine Haltung nach der Unterzeichnung.

2.juli 19. Lloyd George verteidigt den Vertrag vor den Commons,einschliesslich der penalties. Sitz des Gerichts soll London sein. Lord Curzon hält ,im Oberhaus, London nicht fuer geeignet. (Curzon spricht als Vertreter der Regierung).

21.Juli 19. Sir Donald Mac Clean in den Commons. Der Friede sei zu hart fuer Deutschland. "He supported the proposal to bring the Kaiser to justice,but was against a trial taking place in London. Annual Register p.94,1919.

Lord Robert Cecil; "As to the ex-Kaiser,he had been condemned by the public opinion of the world,and it was not clear that we should add to the certainty of that condemnation by bringing him formally to trial."

2.August 19 Rupprecht von Bayern fordert Staatsgerichtshof,um Unschuld zu erweisen. Prinz Heinrich von Preussen schreibt an Georg V. einen Brief ,der Koenig solle gegen den Prozess arbeiten. veroeff. Hamburger Nachrichten,Stosch p.60.

B Der Prozess gegen den Kaiser

Nach Lloyd George, Memoirs i, 60f. hat in den ersten Kabinettssitzungen ueber die Kaiserfrage Lord Birkenhead Bericht erstattet. Er referiert dass die franzoesischen Juristen die Moeglichkeit der Auslieferung anerkennen, die englischen sie bezweifeln. Aber seiner Meinung nach sei die Rechtsfrage ganz unwesentlich. Man habe Holland gegenueber soviel Trumpfe in der Hand dass The diffuculty will not be an insuperable one". p.61. Ein Teil der Minister will die Angelegenheit nach dem Muster von 1815 regeln, die andern sind fuer trial.

Am 10. Januar 1920 trat der Versailler Vertrag in Kraft.

Am 15. Januar 20 richten die Alliierten, gezeichnet Clemenceau eine Not an die Hollaendische Regierung und fordern Wilhelms Auslieferung.

21. Januar 20 holland lehnt ab unter Berufung auf das Asylrecht.

14. Februar 20. zweites Auslieferungsersuchen an Holland, unterzeichnet von Lloyd George.

2. Maerz 20. Zweite hollaendische Ablehnung.

30. Maerz 20 Schreiben Lloyd Georges an die Hollaendische Regierung. Dieser wird die exklusive Verantwortung fuer alle aus der Anwesenheit des ehemaligen deutschen Kaisers sich etwa ergebenden Folgen zugewiesen. Hollaendische Orgngebuch.

5. Maerz 1921. Lloyd George beantwortet Anfrage der Commons. Man koenne nicht Wilhelms wegen gegen Holland Krieg fuehren. Die franzoesische Regierung sei entschieden gegen feindselige Akte gegen Holland.

Wilhelm II. ueber die Frage: Brief an Hindenburg 5. April 1921 (Ereignisse und Gestalten p.256)

"Ein Gerichtshof, in dem der Feindbund gleichzeitig Ankkaeger und Richter waere, wuerde nicht ein Organ des Rechtes, sondern ein Instrument politischer Willkuer sein und nur dazu dienen, durch meine selbstverstaendliche Verurteilung die uns auferlegten unerhoerten Friedensbedingungen nachtraeglich zu rechtfertigen. Natuerlich war daher das

feindliche Ansinnen meinerseits zurueckzuweisen. Aber auch meine Gestellung vor ein wie immer zusammengesetztes neutrales ~ericht kann fuer mich nicht in Frage kommen. Ich erkenne wegen der Anordnungen,die ich als Kaiser und Koenig,also als verfassungsmaessig unverantwortlicher Repraesentant der deutschen ~ation,nach bestem ~issen und ~ewissen getroffen habe,das strafrechtliche ~rteil irgendwelchen irdischen Richters,wie hoch er auch immer gestellt sein mag,nicht an,da ich dadurch die Ehre und ~uerde des von mir vertretenen deutschen Volkes preisgeben wuerde." Nach p. 249 hat ~ilhelm sofort Selbststellung erwogen. ~enn er damit das Schicksal Deutschlands erleichtert haette, dann haette er sich gestellt. "Nicht ~~xxxxxx~~ an einen Akt unpolitischer S entimentalitaet war gedacht,sondern im Gegenteil an eine Tat,die fuer mich viel Bestechendes hatte." Formelle Ruecksicht auf konstitutionelle Unverantwortlichkeit haette ihn nicht gestoert. 258. "Die Moeglichkeit,dem deutschen Volk durch eine solche Tat zu helfen,bestand aber nicht." Deutschland haette sich durch Auslieferung auf ewig buendnisunfaehig gemacht,und er,~ilhelm wollte nicht die Rolle von ~ercingetorix spielen,der von Caesar spaeter doch hingerichtet worden ~~waere~~. 251.

C Die Frage der Kriegsverbrecher

November 1919 Note der ~eichsregierung an die Alliierten.

Diese Note ist grundlegend fuer die deutsche Note vom 25. Januar 20. Ihr sind zweifellos unoffizielle und unformelle Fuehler gefolgt, von denen nichts in den Akten steht. Sie bereitet anderseits vor auf das am 13. Dezember 1919 einstimmig von der Nationalversammlung angenommene Gesetz zur Verfolgung von Kriegsverbrechern und Kriegsvergehen. Die Promotoren dieses Gesetzes sind die volksparteilichen Abgeordneten Mahl und Graf Dohna. Das Gesetz macht das Reichsgericht zur ersten und letzten Instanz.

2. Januar 1920 General Graf Montgelas appelliert im Berliner Tageblatt an alle, die es angeht, sich freiwillig den Alliierten zu stellen, um dem Vaterlande Verlgenheiten zu ersparen.

Darauf erklaeren am 7. Januar die Generale von Heeringen, Kluck, Boehn, Eberhardt und Falkenhayn: "Wir sind der Auffassung, dass es nicht gegen die Ehre eines deutschen Offiziers geht, sich dem Zugriff der deutschen Regierung oder Entente zu entziehen.... Wir duerfen uns keinesfalls freiwillig stellen." Folgen Verhaltungsmassregeln. "Wir duerfen der deutschen Regierung das Odium nicht ersparen."

9. Januar 1920 Kronprinz will sich stellen, aber sein Vater verbietet es ihm. Am selben Tage appelliert Otto Landsberg SPD im Vorwaerts an die Alliierten, sie sollten aus den Kriegsverbrechern "Keine Maertyrer machen."

20. Januar 20. Graf Westarp bestreitet in der Kreuzzeitung die Rechtsgueltigkeit des Gesetzes vom 18.12.19.

25. Januar Die Generale erklaeren sich mit der Prozessfuehrung vor dem Reichsgericht einverstanden. Am gleichen Tage geht die deutsche Note an die Alliierten, die aus der "Andeutung" vom November 19 einen formellen Vorschlag macht.

16. Februar 1920 Antwort der Alliierten. Sie stellen zwar fest, dass Deutschland sich ausser stande erklaert, eine Bestimmung des Friedensvertrags auszufuehren, ergreifen aber keine Sanktionen, vielmehr nehme sie das Gesetz von 18. 12.19 zur Kenntnis, behalten sich nur ihre

Rechte und weitere Schritte im Falle nicht befriedigenden Funktionierens vor.

4.Maerz 20 Ergaenzungsgesetz zum Gesetz vom 18.12.20. Kahl stimmt dafuer "nur mit aeusserstem Widerstreben". Aber des Reichsgerichts "unbestechlicher Wahrheitssinn wird aus der Katastrophe retten,was heutzutage noch an Gerechtigkeit gerettet werden kann."

Nach dem Kapp-Putsch kommt es zur Konferenz von Spa. (Reichskanzler Fehrenbach,Justizminister Heinze). Lloyd George anfangs sehr scharf, faellt dann um und aeussert Vertrauen zum Reichsgericht. Stosch 114. 5.Juli 1920 WTB amtlich: "Am raschesten ist das Problem geloest worden,das noch vor kurzer Zeit die Gemueter am heftigsten bewegte,naemlich die Bestrafung der Deutschen,welche wegen Vergehen gegen die Kriegsregeln angeschuldigt worden waren. Hier ist es einer gemischten Kommission von Sachverstaendigen in kuerzester Zeit gelungen,eine Verstaendigung ueber die einschlaegigen Methoden zu erzielen."

3.Februar 20. Millerand uebergibt Frhrn von Lersner,dem Praesidenten der deutschen Friedensdelegation, eine Liste von Namen,deren Auslieferung verlangt wurde. Lersner schickt am gleichen Tage die Liste zurueck,mit Hinweis auf die Note vom November 19,verlaesst Paris und reicht seinen Abschied ein. Die Liste wird am 7.Februar durch den franzoesischen Geschaeftstraeger in Berlin der Reichskanzlei uebergeben,nachem am 5. Februar die deutsche Regierung ihr Bedauern ueber Lersner ausgesprochen hatte. Lucian-Brun,Histoire des violations du Traité de Paix,1921,I,346,271. Millerand erklaert; "Les gouvernments n'ont pas douté que l'acte de M. de Lersner ne fût pas une manifestation personnelle dont le gouvernement allemand ne porte pas les responsabilité. En effet,elles n'ont pu admettre que le gouvernement allemand cherchât à se derober aux engagements qu'il a souscrit par sa signature du traité de Versailles et qu' un mois après l'entrée en vigueur du traité,il se refusât intentionellement à executer une disposition essentielle de ce traité." Lucian-Brun,I,346.

Inzwischen war es zu dem ersten oeffentlichen englisch-franzoesischen Konflikt gekommen, wegen der franzoesischen Besetzung des Maingaus 6.April 1920.

Nach Spa herrscht eine Weile Ruhe ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxx~~. Dem Reichsgericht wird Zeit gelassen.

Erst als die Reparationsfrage zu neuen Konflikten fuehrt, wird die Frage der Kriegsverbrecher als weiteres Moment fuer den schlechten Willen Deutschlands wieder aufgeworfen.

3. Maerz 1921 kommt Lloyd George auf die Kriegsverbrecher zurueck. Sein Vertrauen zum Reichsgericht sei auf die Probe gestellt. (Rede im Parlament ueber Deutschlands Verfehlungen).

19. Maerz 1921. Attorney general Sir George Hewart berichtet ueber die Lage im Parlament.

29.April 21. Fehrenbach-Heinze holen zum Gegenstoss aus. Sie geben der Entente die Schuld, die kein Material liefere. Reichstag beschliesst Gesetz, dass der Oberreichsanwalt Hauptverhandlung beantragen kann, auch wenn er keine Anklageschrift einreicht. Zweck; "Alle Welt ueber den Tatbestand unschuldig Verdaechtigter aufzuklaeren."

5. Mai 1921 Londoner Ultimatum wegen der ~~xxxxxxxx~~ Reparationen erwaehnt auch die Kriegsverbrecher.

11. Mai 21. Annahme des Ultimatums nach Ruecktritt Fehrenbachs. Der neue Kanzler Wirth : "Die deutsche Regierung ist entschlossen, 4) ohne Vorbehalt und Verzug die Aburteilung der Kriegsbeschuldigten ~~xxx~~ durchzufuehren." (Weisung von Lloyd George)

23. Mai 21 erster Prozess in Leipzig. Sergeant Heynen zu 10Monaten Gefaengnis verurteilt.

26, Mai 21 Besprechung des Prozesses und Urteils im Unterhaus.

30. Mai 21. General Attorney Hewart: Alle Entruestung ist voreilig. Nicht nach Zeitungsberichten urteilen.

13.Juni 21. Sir Ernest Pollock berichtet im Unterhaus ueber Leipzig. Heynens Verurteilung bedeute eine schwere Demuetigung der deutschen

Militaristen. Hewart; Nach Ende der Prozesse werde man sich entscheiden, 7.Juli 21. Nach Freispruch des Generals Stenger ruft Briand die franzoesischen Zuhoerer zurueck. Aber Pollock bleibt in Leipzig.

20.Juli 21. Daily Telegraph; Englische Kommission ist nicht befriedigt, aber kein Grund, Leipzig zu verlassen.

August 21, Pariser Konferenz beschliesst Einsetzung einer inter-alliierten Kommission zur Pruefung der Kriegsverbrecherfrage. Hewart sieht drei Moeglichkeiten: 1) Fortsetzung des Leipziger Verfahrens. 2) Kontumaz-prozesse. 3) stilles Begraebnis.

4. Oktober 21. Deputierter J.L.Bonnet kuendigt Interpellation ueber Leipzig an. Briand ist sehr geniert. Die Regierung habe Wichtigeres zu tun. Das Publikum fange an sich zu desinteressieren. Lucian-Franx III 318.

6.Januar 1922 Frankreich stellt erneut Auslieferungsbegehren.

16. Januar heftige Opposition dagegen durch Daily Express, Daily Mail, Chronicle.

27, Januar Wirth erklaert Auslieferung fuer unmoeglich.

1. Mai 1922 Englische Regierung lehnt im Parlament ab, sich zur Kriegsverbrecherfrage zu aeussern.

7.August 1922 Nach Freispruch Michelsohn zweite Sitzung der inter-alliierten Kommission. Beschluss, Kontumaz-Prozesse zu fuehren.

Die Frage wird noch einmal aufgeworfen im November 1923, anlaesslich der Rueckkehr des Kronprinzen nach Deutschland. Poincare sieht darin (18.November) neue Vertragsverletzung, da der Kronprinz an der Spitze der Kriegsverbrecherliste stehe. Vorher, 15.November, heftiger Streit darueber zwischen Lord Crewe und Jules Cambon. Diplomatische Niederlage Frankreichs.

In der Note vom 16. Juni 1919 hatte die Alliierten den deutschen Vorschlag mit der Begruendung zurueckgewiesen: "The present treaty is intended as a departure from the traditions and practices of earlier

INTERNATIONALISM. Since the beginning of the Diaspora the Jews have maintained international relationship between each other

Scapa Flow

Am 21.Juni 1919,eine Woche vor Unterzeichnung des Versailler Vertrags, liess Admiral von Reuter die deutsche Flotte versenken;

5 grosse Kreuzer (Derfflinger-Klasse)

11 Linienschiffe (Friedrich der Grosse,Kaiser etc)

5 kleine Kreuzer (Koeln-Klasse)

48 Torpedo-Boote ;

die Versenkung misslang bei dem Linienschiff Baden,den kleinen Kreuzern Emden,Frankfurt,Nuernberg und zwei Torpedo-Booten,die alle von den Englaendern in mehr oder weniger beschaedigtem Zustand an Land geschleppt worden.

Die Englaender schossen auf die deutschen Matrosen,die auf Booten von den sinkenden Schiffen abfuhren,und nahmen sie dann gefangen. Admiral von Reuter wurde in ein Offiziersgefangenenlager gebracht, es wurde aber kein gerichtliches Verfahren gegen ihn eroeffnet,und er wurde,wie alle andern deutschen Kriegsgefangenen,nach Inkrafttreten des Friedensvertrags nach Deutschland entlassen.

Englisches Parlament und Ministerium zur Kriegsverbrecherfrage .

12.Februar 1920 Debatte im Parlament (einen Tag vor der Absendung der alliierten Note,die den deutschen Vorschlag,in Leipzig zu verhandeln,annimmt).

Maclean; I endorse the term....But I will say at once that I was astonished and alarmed at the long list of names what was published the otherday. It seemed to me to take the whole question out of the region of practicability... First there should be a competent tribunal;secondly,it should act with reasonable speed,and,thirdly,it should be fair." Die Erledigung der 900 Faelle kann Jahre dauern.

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"I share the grave doubts of others,whether,after waiting for 18 months after the armistice,you should demand 900 Germans to be delivered statesmen,generals,I do not know who,men whose direct responsibility is,at any rate,somewhat dubious,and a demand for whose delivery must arouse every spark of national feeling that is left in Germany. I am afraid that if you succeed in your demand you will run the risk od producing revolution in Germany,and if you fail you will have presented a quite unnecessary piece of victory and prestige to the military party in that country. Hansart 25,p.286.

Balfour erwidert im Namen der Regierung,die Liste sei sehr sorgfaeltig zusammengestellt. etwa 100 Faelle seien Britisch,die andern franzoesisch und belgisch. Die Opposition duerfe sich nicht wundern dass die Franzosen und Belgier mehr Faelle angemeldet haetten. Das kaeme daher,dass diese Gebiete von den Deutschen besetzt gewesen waeren.

Wedgwood: auch fuer Bestrafung der Kriegsberbrecher."But we might remember that the military criminals are not at all to be found in Germany." Er halte es fuer unmoeglich,die Beschuldigten in Deutschland einzufangen. Man moege sich mit einer brandmarkenden Erklaerung begnuegen.

John Butcher konstatiert,dass das Haus prinzipiell einstimmig die Bestrafung der Kriegsverbrecher verlange. p352.

Samuel Hoare ; Die Liste sei revisionsbeduerftig. So stehe z.B. Lima von Sanders darauf, der sich tadellos benommen habe. "By an impartial trial I mean not only a trial that would appear to be impartial to the citizens of this country,but that would be manifestly impartial to the whole world." Sein Vorschlag zielt auf International Court of the League of Nations. Auch alliierte Kriegsverbrecher muessten bestraft werden. p.325.

Butcher protestiert gegen Hoares ganz ueberfluessige,unangebrachte

und mischievous Anschuldigungen der Alliierten.

Sir J.D.Reeds Diese Liste von 900 Namen bringt die gegenwaertige deutsche "egierung,and deren Bestand England interessiert ist, in groesste Verlegenheit, verursacht vielleicht sogar ihren Sturz. Das Verfahren schafft Maertyrer. 332.

Lieutnant-Commander Kenworthy; fordert neutral court. Britische "arine-Offiziere nicht einverstanden mit Auslieferungsbegehren von 4 deutschen Admiralen. Was wuerde man in England sagen,wenn Jellicoe und Beatty ausgeliefert werden sollten?

Sitzung von 1.maerz 1920

Lloyd George teilt mit,dass die Prozesse in Leipzig stattfinden wuerden. 'erweist auf Note der Alliierten vom 13.Februar 1920. "eantwortet juristisch-technische Anfragen.

Sitzung vom 12.April 1920

Viscount Curzon fragt,was in der Kriegsverbrecher-Angelegenheit geschehen sei. Bonar Law; "Nichts Neues zu berichten".

Sitzung vom 15.April 1920

Lyle erhaelt von Bonar Law die gleiche Antwort.

Sitzung vom 19.April 1920

Kaiserfrage. Kenworthy wundert sich,dass die Alliierten jetzt Holland gegenueber so machtlos sind,nachdem sie waehrend des Krieges alles hatten durchsetzen koennen. Bonar Law; Man duerfe keine Gewalt anwenden. Billing; Wozu dann Voelkerbund ? Bonar Law ; Auch Voelkerbund wendet nur im aeussersten Notfall Gewalt an.

Sitzung vom 22.April

Mills; Auch die Russland-Interventionisten muessen auf die Kriegsverbrecher-Liste.

Sitzung von 1.Juli .

Verschiedene Anfragen,was mit den Kriegsverbrechern geschehe,die in

englischem Gewahrsam sind. Bonar Law. Vorlaeufig nichts. Man muss erst die Leipziger Prozesse abwarten. Anfragen; Warum nicht gegen diese Leute prozessieren? Bonar Law; Die Vereinbarung lautet,dass die ersten Prozesse in Leipzig stattfinden. Wir muessenx abwarten.

Es folgen nun zahlreiche Sitzungen,auf denen Bonar Law woertlich den Anfragern wiederholt,dass er seit dem 13.April nichts Neues zu berichten haette.

Am 21.Juli 1921 wird ein Amendement Bottomley, welches eine Ruege der Regierung wgen ihrer Passivitaet in der Kaiser-und Kriegsverbecherfrage involviert, mit 95 gegen 27 Stimmen abgelehnt.

Am 15 August 1921 provoziert Bottomley eine laengere Aussprache ueber die Leipziger Prozesse,nachdem die Regierung dem Verlangen nach einer tagesordnungsmaessigen Debatte darueber ausgewichen,bez. sie fuer verfrueht erklaert hatte. In dieser Aussprache erklaert Solicitor general Pollock,der anstelle des Premierministers spricht; das Leipziger Verfahren sei ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ zwar heftig kritisiert worden,aber der Zeitpunkt fuer eine kritische Stellungnahme sei noch nicht gekommen. Eines stehe immerhin jetzt schon fest: Das Leipziger Verfahren leiste,was kein Gericht ausserhalb Deutschlands leisten koenne. Seine Entscheidungen koennten von den Deutschen nicht als parteiisch zu ungunsten Deutschlands abgelehnt werden. Die Leipziger Urteile muessten auch in Deutschland,gerade in Deutschland tiefen Eindruck machen. Daher seien die Leipziger Prozesse "a new milestone in the course of international justice.." Diese Aeusserung Pollocks,der sicher im Einverstaendnis mit dem Kabinett sprach, wurden vom Parlament ohne Zurufe angehoert.

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Pollock hat sich nicht mit dieser einen Ausfuehrung begnuegt. Er erklaerte im Vorwort zu dem Buch The Leipzig Trials von Claud Mullins einem englischen Anwalt,der als Interpreter die englische Mission nac

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Leipzig begleitet hatte , die Urteile des Reichsgerichts bedeuteten "no vengeance but justice" . p.11

"These sentences were,to our estimate, far too light,but ..they must be estimated according to their value in Germany." p.10.

Pollock weist darauf hin,dass der Vorsitzende Rechsgerichtsrat Schmidt,mehrmals seine Missbilligung ueber das Verhalten der Angeklagten ausgesprochen habe. "These and similar incidents had their effects on the Germans who attended the trials in Court and upon the Germans throughout the country."

Mullins fuehrt in seinem Buch weiter aus:

"The Leipzig trials may not have fulfilled the expectation of the public which demanded them when the Armistice came;but they were of very real importance and value none the less. They have made history."p17-18.

"Popular passion must abate if justice is to be done." 29.

"Dr. Schmidt and his Court were fair. ... I am convinced they performed their difficult task without fear or favour." 44.

"To believe that the German Court was throughout endeavouring to be fair and impartial is not by any means to say that in all respects the findings of the Court were satisfactory." 196

Mullins fuehrt vorher und nachher aus,warum die deutschen Urteile dem englischen Rechtsempfinden nicht entsprechen konnten. Hauptsaechlich weil nach englischem Recht der Beamte bei Ausfuehrung einer unrechtmaessigen Handlung nicht durch den Befehl seines Vorgesetzten entlastet wird,nach deutschem Recht aber weitgehendx gedeckt wird. Die englische Liste fuer Leipzig habe-im Gegensatz zu der franzoesischen- fast nur untergeordnete Organe genannt,nicht diejenigen,die letzten Endes fuer die Massnahmen verantwortlich waren. Ferner hatten die deutschen Beschuldigten fast alle ihnen zur Last gelegten Akte vorgenommen,um die Unbotmaessigkeit der Gefangenen zu brechen. Unbotmaessigkeit wird in Deutschland viel schwerer genommen

als in England,daher gelte in Deutschland Vorgehen gegen Unbotmaessigkeit als mildernder Umstand ersten Ranges.usw.

Die Reichsgerichtsraete hatten einen sehr schweren Stand gegenueber den militaerischen Sachverstaendigen -General von Fransecky und Admiral Trotha- sowie -mit einer Ausnahme-den Verteidigern gehabt die alle einen sehr rueden nationalistischen Ton angestimmt haetten. Mullins gibt folgende Statistik:

	British	Belg.	French
Prosecutions	6	1	5
Convictions	5	0	1

Verurteilt wurden: Sergeant Heynen wegen Gefangenenmisshandlung zu 10 Monaten Gefaengnis; Hauptmann E.Mueller wgen gleichen Vergehens zu 6Monaten Gefaengnis, Soldat Robert Neumann desgleichen zu 6Monaten Gefaengnis. ¾ Die U boot-Offiziere Dithmar und Boldt wgen Versenkung eines Hospitalsschiffs zu je 4 Jahren Gefaengnis. Pollock und Mullins aeusserten sich sehr befriedigt,dass auf Gefaengnis und nicht auf Festung erkannt worden war. Freigesprochen wurde Kapitaen-Leutn. Carl Neumann.

Wegen Misshandlung belgischer Kinder angeklagt,wird Max Ramdohr freigesprochen. Wegen Misshandlung franzoesischer Gefangener angekl. wird Oberleutnant Laule freigesprochen. Ebenso Generalleutnant v. Schack und Generalmajor Kruska. In dem Prozess gegen General Stenger und Maj. Crusius wegen Misshandlung von Franzosen wird Stenger freigesprochen, Crusius wgen fahrlaessiger Toetung zu 2 Jahren Gefaengnis verurteilt.

Die Kapitaenleutnants Patzig und Werner,sowie Soldat Trinke waren ins Ausland geflohen. Ihr Vermoegen würde beschlagnahmt.

Dithmar und Boldt standen nicht auf der Liste, hatten aber analog wie Patzig gefehlt. (Hospitalschiff versenkt)

Mullins meint,die Franzosen und Belgier seien schlechter behandelt worden als die Englaender,weil jene "animos" und "hassvoll" vor Gericht

auftraten, die Englaender dagegen "Unbefangen " und"fair" .

Die englische Regierung fand das statistische Ergebnis befriedigend
es, soweit es englische Fälle betrifft
und teilt ~~sie~~ mitsamt dem Wortlaut der Urteile dem Parlament mit:
"German War Trials. Report of Proceedings before the Supreme Court in
Leipzig. Presented to Parliament by Command of his Majesty." 1921.

At Spa, when Mr. Millerand decided to lend money to the Germans in order to obtain supplies of coal from them, he opened the door with a vengeance to those exhibitions of the Treaty which soon filled up

"Evening News" Clemenceau 107

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Kapp-Putsch

Bereits am ersten Jahrestag der "deutschen Revolution", am 9. November 1919, zeigte sich deutlich, dass das republikanische Regime schwach war, dass rein zahlenmaessig die Gegner erstarkt waren, dass die Gegner in ihrem Auftreten Tag fuer Tag an Selbstbewusstsein gewannen, die Vertreter des republikanischen Regimes dagegen unsicher und ungeschickt verfuhren und die entschiedenen Verteidiger der Republik im Stich liessen oder jedenfalls nicht mit ihnen planmaessig zusammen arbeiteten. Als Hindenburg am 12. November 1919 nach Berlin kam, um vor dem Untersuchungsausschuss auszusagen, wurden die Strassen Berlins von den Anhaengern der Schwarzweissroten Reaktion beherrscht. Am 14. November 1919 wurden Hindenburg und Ludendorff riesige Demonstrationen gebracht. Die Verhandlungen des Untersuchungsausschusses wurden zu einem Triumpf der Reaktion. Die republikanischen Mitglieder des Ausschusses waren nicht imstande, den Gang der Verhandlungen zu lenken. Ihre Arbeit wurde als Propaganda-Material gegen die Republik ausgenutzt.

Im Laufe des Januars 1920 wurde die Schwaeche der Republik allen offenbar. Die Regierung und die hinter ihr stehenden Parteien ~~glaubte nicht~~ mussten mit einer katastrophalen Niederlage rechnen, wenn nach der Aufloesung der Nationalversammlung, die ihre Arbeit getan hatte, Reichstagswahlen vorgenommen wuerden. Sie versuchten zu temporisieren. Am 20. Januar 1920 wurde der Antrag Westarp-~~Stresemann~~ Heinze sofortige auf Reichstagswahlen abgelehnt und die Tagung der Nationalversammlung verlaengert. Das war, wenn auch nicht "Verfassungsbruch" wie die Rechtsparteien der Regierung vorwarfen, so doch ein kaum ueberbietbares Schwaechezeichen. Im Februar wurde das Regime noch mehr kompromittiert durch den Prozess Erzberger-Helfferich. Erzberger galt dem Buergertum als erledigt. Der andere Minister, der dem Kabinett den Stempel aufdrueckte, Noske, hatte sich den Hass des Proletariats zugezogen. Das west-

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deutsche Industrie-ebiet war unruhig,Sachsen und Berlin in Gaerung, Obwohl Mehrheitssozialisten und Unabhaengige angesichts des Erstarkens der eaktion Verhandlungen wegen einer Einigung begonnen worden hatten, konnte die egierung nicht auf Unterstutzung durch die linksradikale Arbeiterschaft rechnen. Sie wurde vielmehr aeusserst heftig von dieser bekaempft. Die linksradikale Agitation, die sich in politischen Streiks und Aufruhrversuchen aeusserte, erschien als mindestens ebenso grosse efahr fuer das bestehende System wie die Agitation der echten.

Innerhalb der radikalen Linken gab es einen Gegensatz zwischen Vertretern gewaltsamen Umsturzes und anderen, die sich auf die politische und gewerkschaftliche Agitation verliessen, weil sie glaubten, auf diesem ege das System beseitigen zu koennen.

Innerhalb der echten gab es eine analoge Differenz. Die Fuehrer der raktionen und die Leiter der Industrie glaubten, ihre Frucht bald ernten zu koennen, da die allgemeine Stimmung der aehler ausserhalb des Proletariats unzweifelhaft zugunsten der eaktion umgeschlagen war, resp. viele fruehere Anhaenger der epublik enttaeuscht oder gleichgueltig geworden waren. Diesen Fuehrern kam es in erster Linie auf die Regierungsgewalt an. Ob diese dann den Kaiser zuruckrufen oder zunaechst einen monarchistischen Platzhalter einsetzen sollte, war eine rage zweiter ordnung. In der Hauptsache kam es ihnen auf Verdraengung der Sozialisten aus der egierung an, und diese schien durch die kommenden eichstagswahlen, die einmal trotz der Verschleppung kommen mussten, gesichert zu sein. Der weitaus groessere und einflussreichere eil der echten war fuer diese Politik, die im ahmen der Verfassung durchgefuehrt werden konnte. Es gab aber auch ungeduldige Elemente, die nicht mit dem Stimmzettel arbeiten wollten. Ihr hervorragender ertreter war Ludendorff. Um ihn grupp-

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ierte sich die im Herbst 1918 gegruendete "Nationale Vereinigung" geleitet von Hauptmann Pabst, Kapp, der fruehere Unterstaatssekretaer Siegfried von Falkenhausen u.a. gehörten ihr als Mitglieder an

Pabst, Stabs-Chef der Garde-Kavallerie-Schuetzendivision, hatte schon Ende 1919 einen Putsch vorbereitet, war aber von General von Luettwitz, dem Oberbefehlshaber der Wehrmacht, davon abgebracht worden. Luettwitz selbst bezeichnet die Schuetzendivision als "reaktionaer". (Im Kampf gegen die November-Revolution, 1934, p.84).

Die Fuehrer der "Nationalen Vereinigung" konferierten in Ludendorffs Hotelraeumen. (Margarete Ludendorff, Als ich Ludendorffs Frau war, 1929, p. 271.) Ludendorff weihte seine Frau nicht ein. "Ich duerfe von dem, was jetzt geschehe, nichts wissen, denn, was man plane und vorhabe, sei ein gefaehrliches Spiel. Es koenne misslingen, und da muesste ich unter allen Umstaenden mit reinem Gewissen dastehen und vor jedem Richterkollegium aussagen koennen, dass ich an den politischen Bestrebungen in unserem Hause keinen Anteil hatte." p.271. Aus den Berichten aller Hauptbeteiligten geht hervor, dass Kapp keine fuehrende Rolle spielte. Er wurde zum "Reichskanzler" ausersehen, weil dieses Amt den Verschwoerern von minderer Wichtigkeit erschien. Neben Ludendorff waren bei der Vorbereitung des Putsches vor allem Oberst Bauer und Hauptmann Pabst taetig.

General von Luettwitz, der Hindenburg im Oberkommando nachgefolgt war, operierte isoliert. Er glaubte lange Zeit, mit Ebert und Noske zusammenarbeiten zu koennen. Aber er war von dem Treiben der "Nationalen Vereinigung" unterrichtet. Ebenso waren die Fuehrer der Deutschnationalen und der Volkspartei im Bilde. Sie warnten die Verschwoerer vor bewaffnetem Vorgehen, und haben wohl auch die Hohenzollern gewarnt, sich mit der Nat. Ver. einzulassen. Der Gegensatz zwischen den "Parlamentarischen" Monarchisten und den Putschisten war bald offen, bald versteckt, und machte sich bei verschiedenen Anlaessen geltend Die "R

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"Parlamentarier" glaubten die Putschisten fuer ihre Zwecke benutzen ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ und sie nach getaner Arbeit beiseite schieben zu koennen aehnlich wie spaeter im Falle der Nazis.

Die Verschwoerer, ebenso wie Luettwitz, und wie die "parlamentarischen" Monarchisten waren sich klar, dass sie sich nach der Machtuebernahme mit den auswaertigen Maechten auseinanderzusetzen haetten, und sie rechneten vor allem mit dem Wohlwollen Englands. ~~Ihr~~ Hauptagent der "Nationalen Vereinigung" fuer auswaertige Verhandlungen war der fruehere britische Parlamentarier Trebitsch-Lincoln. Sie verhandelten aber auch direkt mit englischen Offizieren.

Lincoln Trebitsch hat in seinen Erinnerungen The autobiography of an adventurer 1931 ausfuehrlich ueber den Kapp-Putsch und seine Vorbereitungen gehandelt. Sein Buch deckt sich grossenteils mit einer Denkschrift, die er bereits im Jahre 1921 der Regierung eines mit Frankreich verbuendeten Staates verkauft hat. Sie wurde in der Europe nouvelle, April-Mai 1921 abgedruckt. Da Lincoln-Trebitsch hier Namen nennt, die erst spaeter in der Oeffentlichkeit bekannt wurden, und ihre Traeger richtig charakterisiert, so ist wenigstens teilweise seine Zuverlaessigkeit gesichert.

Im Sommer 1919 fuhr er im Auftrag der Nationalen Vereinigung nach Amerongen und verhandelte dort mit dem Kaiser und dem Kronprinzen. Die Entente-Presse erfuhr davon. p.148. 151. Er bemerkte, dass eine einflussreiche Gruppe der deutschen Monarchisten gegen den Putsch und besonders gegen Ludendorff und seine Gruppe war. Europe nouvelle 1921 p. 501. "The chief thing was British neutrality." p.158. Sein Mittelsmann war ein Direktor Seegebart in Koeln, ueber den nichts Naeheres zu ermitteln war. Er fuehrte Lincoln mit einem Major Ryan zusammen. Dieser "did not care anything about the Entente. What mattered to him was the British Empire, and nothing else. Least of all the Peace of Versailles. He was prepared to see that scrap of paper what

Quelle: Major Ryan-Allen-Keller nicht der englische Offizier

brought nothing but trouble, torn to pieces. But nevertheless, the Englishman had some misgivings. He was particularly opposed to the restauration of Wilhelm. Bauer replied that there was no thought of that. The major seemed satisfied. ' But Ludendorff' he asked next. 'He will be in command.' The major looked straight at Bauer and thought for a moment or two. He inhaled a couple of whiffs from his cigarette. 'Good--beyond question the right man in the right place, as you Germans are so fond of saying now--but so far as the outside world is concerned he must stay rather in the background. Will you promise me that?' Colonel Bauer promised." p.159.

Luettwitz seinerseits hatte Fuehlung mit dem englischen General Malcolm. Er sagt nicht, dass er mit diesem wegen des Putsches verhandelt habe. Aber er hatte an ihn appelliert, als von der Auslieferung der Kriegsverbrecher die Rede war, und glaubte Verstaendnis gefunden zu haben. Und er hatte den gleichen Eindruck von Malcolm, als er ihn bat, die Verringerung der deutschen Armee von 200000 auf 100000 hinauszuschieben. Luettwitz p. 76. Diese Verringerung aber war ein Hauptgrund fuer Luettwitz' Beteiligung am Putsch. Luettwitz war von der Idee besessen, dass die Bolschewisten im Sommer 1920 nach Niederwerfung Polens in Deutschland einfallen wuerden. Er war entschlossen, die Verringerung des Heeres mit allen Mitteln zu verhindern, und deswegen schon im Oktober 1919 von Seeckt und Heye bei Noske denunziert worden. p.101.

Die Nationale Vereinigung verhandelte aber nicht nur mit englischen Offizieren(und wohl auch mit englischen Politikern) sondern auch mit Victor Kopp, dem bolschewistischen Botschafter in Berlin, und mit der deutschen Zentrale. Lincoln 156. National review April 1920, p. 156, sagt, Kapp "was simultaneously intriguing with the Russian Soviets and the local Spartaciists." Das trifft nicht fuer Kapp persoenlich

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zurueckzuhalten. Sie richteten nichts aus, nahmen ein Ultimatum Ehrhardts mit, das vom Kabinett abgelehnt wurde. Ebert und das Kabinett gingen nach Dresden. Vice-Kanzler Schiffer blieb zurueck. Er wurde in Schutzhaft genommen, aber bald freigelassen. Ebenso ging es der preussischen Regierung. Noske, General Reinhardt und Oberst Heye wollten gegen Ehrhardt kaempfen. Aber Seeckt erklaerte Widerstand fuer aussichtslos. Nach dem Einmarsch verweigern Seeckt, Oven und Oldershausen den Kappisten den Dienst. Sie werden abgesetzt. Seeckt wurde "die Seele des Widerstandes gegen mich". Luettwitz p. 121. Die Behoerden, sowie die Unterstaatssekretaere verweigern Kapp den Gehorsam, auch fast alle Offiziere des Reichswehrministeriums. Der kappistische Wehrminister Arisberg scheitert. Die Reichsbank verweigert Zahlungen. In Muenchen setzt General Moehl die sozialistische Regierung ab, distanziert sich aber, ebenso wie der als Staatskommissar eingesetzte Kahr von den Kappisten.

Die Deutsch-Nationalen erlassen eine Kundgebung, die Kein Wort gegen Kapp sagt, aber baldige Ueberleitung zu einer verfassungsmaessigen Regierung fordert. Die deutsche Volkspaertei ist noch mehr zurueckhaltend in der Anerkennung Kapps, unterlaesst gleichfalls irgendwelchen Protest und fordert gleichfalls eine verfassungsmaessige Regierung. Zahlreiche deutsch-nationale und volksparteiliche Fuehrer sind[1] aber entschieden gegen den Staatsstreich. Heinze, der mit Regierungsmitgliedern im gleichen Zug nach Dresden faehrt, veranlasst dendortigen Reichswehr-General Maercker, sich der alten Regierung zur Verfuegung zu halten. Reichswehrkommando 2 (Kassel) erklaert sich gegen Kapp, waehrend Koenigsberg und der ganze Nordosten fuer Kapp ist.

SPD und Gewerkschaften rufen zum Generalstreik gegen Kapp auf. Die Ebert-regierung akzeptiert die Streikparole.

Die Linksradikalen sind am 13. Maerz zurueckhaltend. Erst am 14. Maerz

[1] Vor allem Hergt und Helfferich, sowie Heinze, beide, Kahl, Stresemann soll von den Kappisten bedroht worden sein. (?)

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erklaeren sie sich gegen Kapp,vermutlich auf Einwirkung Moskaus,das von dem Einverstaendnis der Weissrussen mit den Kappisten Wind bekommen hatte. Das Rundschreiben der KPD Zentrale vom 14.Maerz drueckt sich etwas verlegen aus: (Internationale Nr. 23)

"Nach kurzem Zoegern ist die Arbeiterschaft in Berlin, im Rheinland und in vielen andern Orten in den Generalstreik getreten.....

Gestern schien es hier in Berlin,als ob die Arbeiterschaft passiv bleiben wuerde,und wir glaubten,falls die Arbeiterschaft nicht aktionsbereit sei, eine Aufforderung zum Generalstreik nicht sofort geben zu koennen,sondern weitere Aktionen der Militaerdiktatur,die die Arbeiter in Harnisch bringen,erst abwarten zu muessen....

Die propagandistische Hauptaufgabe unserer Genossen besteht darin,mit der Kritik der Militaerdiktatur,die kurz abzumachen sein wird,die Regierung Ebert-Noske,die Mehrheits-SPD und die Gewerkschaftsbürokratie einer unerbittlichen Kritik zu unterziehen."

14.Maerz. Kapp verspricht Neuwahlen. Ihm misslingt jeder Versuch einer Kabinettsbildung. Noske und Koch erklaeren alle Handlungen und Verfuegungen Kapps fuer ungueltig. Durch Flieger in Berlin zu verbreiten.Luettwitz sieht ein,dass die militaerische Aktion ihr Ziel nicht erreicht hat. Kapp aeussert Ruecktrittsgedanken.

15. Maerz. General Maercker kommt auf eigne Verantwortung nach Berlin,um mit Luettwitz zu verhandeln. Kapp uebergibt ihm Forderung an die alte Regierung,die von dieser zurueckgewiesen werden. Kapp nimmt seine Behauptung,die alte Regierung habe ihn um Verhandlungen ersucht,oeffentlich zurueck. Die Reichsregierung,die nach Stuttgart gegangen ist,beruft den Reichstag dorthin fuer den 18.Maerz.

16. Maerz. Vertreter der Regierungsparteien verhandeln im Reichstag,in Gegenwart von Schiffer,mit Vertretern der Rechtsparteien. Stre-

Seeman

semann teilt mit, dass Kapp zum Ruecktritt bereit sei. Dueringer (DN) und Heinze wollen Aussprache Schiffer-Oberst Bauer. Schiffer: erst 4 Punkte zu erledigen: 1) Ruecktritt Kapp, 2) Ruecktritt Luettwitz 3) sofortige Einstellung der Mobilisierung der "Eisernen Division", 4) sofortiger Abzug der Kapp-Truppen aus Berlin. Oberst Bauer bittet um Bedenkzeit.

17. Maerz. Auf Druck der Rechtsparteien tritt Kapp zurueck. Luettwitz will noch 14 Tage bleiben, tritt aber ebenfalls zurueck auf Druck der Reichswehrgenerale. Besprechung aller Parteien excl. USP. Es werden zwei Kommuniqués herausgegeben; 1) Seeckt als neuer Oberbefehlshaber macht bekannt:

"Generallandschaftsdirektor Kapp ist, um den innern Frieden herbeizufuehren, zurueckgetreten. Aus dem gleichen Grund hat General von Luettwitz sein Abschiedsgesuch eingereicht. Der Stellvertreter der Reichsregierung hat im Namen des Reichspraesidenten den Abschied bewilligt und mit der einstweiligen Wahrnehmung der Geschaefte den General-Major von Seeckt beauftragt. Zwischen den fuehrenden Mitgliedern der Mehrheitsparteien, der DNVP und der DVP besteht Uebereinstimmung ueber folgende Punkte: 1) Die Wahlen zum Reichstag sollen spaetestens im Juni d.J. stattfinden. 2) Die Wahl des Reichspraesidenten erfolgt nach Massgabe der Reichsverfassung durch das Volk. 3) Eine alsbaldige Umbildung der Regierung wird fuer erforderlich gehalten."

2) Schiffer ~~macht bekannt~~ erlaesst eine Bekanntmachung, die mit den Worten beginnt:

Zwischen Schiffer einerseits und den Volksparteilern Stresemann und Leidig anderseits wurde eine lange Debatte gefuehrt 1) ueber die Haltung der Rechtsparteien 2) ueber Schiffers Zusagen und ihre Verbindlichkeit. Die genaue Wahrheit ist zur Zeit nicht zu ermitteln. Fuer die historische Beurteilung des Putsches und seiner Unterdrueckung ist folgendes wichtig;

1) Mehrere Deutsch-Nationale und volksparteiliche Fuehrer haben entschieden gegen die Kappisten Stellung genommen.

2) Sie haben verstanden, diese Stellungnahme bei der Reichsregierung fuer ihre Parteien auszuwerten.

3) Schiffer ist im Recht, wenn er behauptet, von den Kappisten keinerlei Bedingung angenommen zu haben. Aber wahrscheinlich hat er sich auf Bedingungen der loyal gebliebenen Rechtsparteiler eingelassen.

4) Die Stellungnahme der Regierung und der Weimarer Koalition wurde beeinflusst durch die Entwicklung des Generalstreiks im Ruhrgebiet und in Sachsen. Conrad Haussmann (Streiflichter p. 306): "Der Wagen erhielt nach dem Stoss von rechts einen Erdstoss von links und drohte umzufallen." Die Streikbewegung wurde durch die Niederlage Kapps nicht eingedaemmt. Besonders im Ruhrgebiet wurden die loyalen Kaempfer gegen Kapp von den Kaempfern ~~fuer~~ der "roten Armee" ueberflutet. Der Kapp-Putsch loeste den offenen Aufstand aus, der umso gefaehrlicher wurde, als die Erbitterung ueber die Ausschreitungen der Reichswehr und der ihr unterstellten Freiwilligenformationen, sowie ueber die ausbleibenden Repressalien der Republik viele Sozialisten radikalisierte. Selbst ein Teil der Mehrheitssozialistischen Abgeordneten und die Leitung der Gewerkschaften waren um den 20. Maerz herum

gewillt,nur eine "rein-sozialistische "Regierung zu tolerieren. Fuer den Kreis um Ebert,die Demokraten und das Zentrum stellt sich der Sachverhalt so dar,wie Haussmann ihn formuliert: "Die Erpressung von rechts hat den Appetit zur Erpressung von links her geweckt." Die Arbeiter seien berauscht vom Erfolge des Generalstreiks.

Diesr Rausch war eine Illusion. Nicht der Generalstreik hatte gesiegt,sondern, der Friede mit den Putschisten war durch ein Diktat der Rechtsparteilichen Vermittler hergestellt worden. Nicht "die"monarchistische Reaktion war unterlegen,sondern nur ein radikaler Fluegel dieser Reaktion. Die Substanz der Rechten war nicht tangiert. Ihre Fuehrer warteten auf den parlamentarischen Sieg,den ihnen die Reichstagswahlen auch bringen sollten. Ihr Erfolg fiel in Folge des Putsches geringer aus und reichte nicht hin zur Regierungsuebernahme durch die Rechte allein. Aber die Weimarer Koalition wurde geschlagen und hat sich von dieser Niederlage nicht mehr erholt.

Die Sozialistischen Gewerkschaften stellten ein Programm von 9 Punkten auf,um"der Arbeiterschaft Genugtuung zu verschaffen." Es verlangt die Kontrolle der Gewerkschaften ueber Regierungsbildung,Verwaltung und Gesetzgebung. Ausserdem sofortigen Beginn der Sozialisierung. Beides war fuer Demokraten und Zentrum unannehmbar, Legien droht mit verschaerftem Generalstreik(20.Maerz) ,erreicht aber nichts.

Der angebliche "Sieg der Demokratie" wurde in der Reichtagssitzung vom 19.Maerz in Stuttgart gefeiert. Reichskanzler Bauer brandmarkte Ludendorff als Hauptanstifter des Putsches. Diese Rede und seine vorherige Feststellung an die amerikanische Presse "The most serious condition laid by von Luettwitz before the Berlin Cabinett was that the demobilization of the Imperial army and the destruction of war material in accordance with the terms of the treaty must not take place,and the Empire ought to prepare itself for a new war" (National Review, April 1920 p.155) machten Bauer "Untragbar". Er war ein ungeschickter Politiker und subalterner wohl vom allen am aufrichtigsten bemueht, den Versailler Vertrag auszufuehren.

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In der gleichen Sitzung trat Scheidemann so scharf gegen Noske auf, dass dieser zurueecktrat.

Am 19.Maerz gratulierten die englischen,italienischen und belgischen geschaeftstraeger Schiffer zum Siege der Reichsregierung. Am 22. gratulierte der amerikanische Geschaeftstraeger.

Am 23. gratulierte General Nollet dem nach Berlin zurueckgekehrten Kanzler Bauer . "Il m'exprima l'espoir que les gouvermements alliés se départiraient de la méfiance (Misstrauen) qu'ils avaient temoigné jusque là au gouvernement allemand. La défaite complète et rapide de la réaction militaire leur était une gage de l'attachement de L'Allemagne aux institutions républicaines. Je lui répondis que cette méfiance puisqu'il avait prononcé le mot,je trouvais justifiée dans le passé par les évènements mêmes qui venaient de se dérouler. Je formulais l'espoir qu'à l'avenir,le gouvernement allemand,maintenant informé, ne manquerait pas de faciliter la tâche de la commission interrompue par le coup d'État." Une expérience de désarmementp. 128.

Am 24,Maerz beschliesst der Oberste Rat,eine abwartende Haltung einzunehmen und von Massnahmen gegen Deutschland vorlaeufig abzusehen. Mit diesem Beschluss kollidiert die franzoesische Sanktion wegen des Eindringens der Reichswehr in das Ruhrgebiet.

26. Maerz Ruecktritt Bauers. Hermann Mueller Reichskanzler.
29. Maerz Verabschiedung der Generale von Estorff, Maercker, Lettow-Vorbeck, von Ledebur. Luettwitz, gegen den am 18, Haftbefehl erlassen, "unauffindbar." [1] Voruntersuchung gegen Kapp, (Polizeipräsident) Jagow, Pabst, Oberst Bauer, Schiele, Falkenhausen, Bredereck, Doye, Admiral von Levetzow, Major von Winterfeld, Reg, Rat Pauli, Landrat von Loew. Reichstagssitzung. Hermann Mueller verspricht purge, polemisiert scharf gegen DNVP und DVP. Der neue Reichswehrminister Gessler: "Reichswehr muss auf breitester demokratischer Grundlage aufgebaut werden.

Trend Vermögensbesitzzuwachsbesteuerung des Reichsgesetz

30 Mai Treugeloebnis der Berliner Garnison. 3, Juni Treugeloebnis der Reichswehrkommandeure auf Verfassung.

6. Juni 1920. Reichstagswahl. Niederlage der Weimarer Koalition.

[1] Er erhielt 1925 Straffreiheit, verlor aber seine Pension.

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Reichstagswahl vom 6.Juni 1920

Partei	Nationalvers.1919 Sitze	Stimmen (Millionen)	Wahl 1920 Sitze	Stimmen
SPD	163	11,1	112	5,6
USP	22	2,1	81	4,9
Zentr.	88	5,3	68	3,5
Bayr.Vp.			21	1,7
DemokrX	75	5,5	45	2,2
Deutschn.	42	2,7	66	3,9
Volksp.	21	1,1	62	3,7
Komm.			2	0,4

1.6

Die Niederschlagung des Kapp-Putsches wurde vom gesamten Ausland ohne Unterschied der Parteirichtung und des Verhaeltnisses zu Deutschland, uebereinstimmend mit der offiziellen deutschen Lesart und der Auffassung der gesamten deutschen Linken einschliesslich des Zentrums, dem "unwiderstehlichen" Generalstreik zugeschrieben. Die deutsche Demokratie wurde kreditiert mit dem Besitz einer unfehlbaren Defensivwaffe fuer den aeussersten Notfall, wenn sie auch der politischen Offensiv-Waffen ermangelte.

Diese Auffassung fuehrte innerhalb und ausserhalb Deutschlands zu der Illusion, dass die Republik im Notfall wieder erfolgreichen Gebrauch dieser Defensiv-Waffe machen koenne und werde.

Diese Auffassung der Vorgaenge ist falsch, mindestens schief.

Das Schicksal des Kapp-Putsches ist bereits am 13.Marz entschieden worden, als die Industrie vormittags 11 Uhr durch ihren Beschluss, nach wie vor mit den in den Generalstreik getretenen Gewerkschaften zusammenzuarbeiten, von dem die Generalkommission der Gewerkschaften sofort in Kenntnis gesetzt wurde, sich von Kapp distanzierte, als die Rechtsparteien ihre Mitwirkung versagten, Hindenburg abwinkte, die Ministerien den Dienst

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verweigerten und die Kabinettsbildung Kapps misslang. Am 13. Marz war dar Erfolg des Generalstreiks noch ganz unsicher. Die radikale Linke entschloss sich ja erst am 14. zur Teilnahme. Trotzdem machte das Gros der "echten nicht mit Kapp gemeinsame Sache,tat vielmehr alles,um den Putsch so schnell wie moeglich zu liquidieren. Die Rechte versagte Kapp die Mittel,den Generalstreik zu bekaempfen. Der Generalstreik wirkte sich aus,ohne dass ueberhaupt ein ennsthafter Versuch gemacht wurde, ihm praktisch zu begegnen. Dass Kapp ihm unterlag,war nicht nur Folge seiner persoenlichen Unfaehigkeit. Er war zur Ohnmacht gegenueber dem Streik verurteilt,weil er abgesehen von seinen Truppen gar kein Organ zur Verfuegung hatte,um etwas zur Aufrechterhaltung der Arbeit zu unternehmen. Haette die Industrie und die Politiker ihm Geld und Personal zur Verfuegung gestellt,dann haette der Streik einen ganz anderen Verlauf genommen,wie spaetere Generalstreikbewegungen zeigen. Kapp aber wurde im Stich gelassen, bevor das Funktionieren des Streiks durch Teilnahme der radikalen Linken ueberhaupt ermoeglicht,geschweige denn gesichert war.

Die Rechte hatte alles Interesse,den Kapp-Putsch so schnell wie moeglich zu liquidieren, damit keine Schwankung in dem Umschwung der Volksstimmung eintraete. Tatsaechlich hat die Rechte durch den Kapp-Putsch Stimmen-Verluste erlitten. Wahlpolitisch brachte der misslungene Putsch der Weimarer Koalition einigen Auftrieb. Ohne ihn waere ihre Wahlniederlage noch viel groesser gewesen.

Der Sinn der Wahl,die voellige Verdraengung der SPD aus der Regierung, das Zusammengehen der unsicher gewordenen beiden andern Koalitionsparteien mit der Volkspartei, war das Aufgeben des--bisher wenn auch unentschieden betaetigten--republikanischen Kurses. Die Volkspartei machte keine Konzession hinsichtlich ihres monarchisch-schwarz-weiss-roten Bekenntnisses. Dagegen gewann im Zentrum die Rechts-elemente die Oberhand,und die Demokraten lavier-

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ten. Erst das Londoner Ultimatum vom Mai 1921 staerkte wieder die linken Elemente in den beiden Parteien. Aber inzwischen war der Eindruck der republikanischen Niederlage in der deutschen Beamtenschaft und Reichswehr ungeheuer gross und dauernd geworden. Eine zuverlaessige Sicherung schien seit dem 6. Juni 1920 nur im Anschluss nach rechts gegeben, Alle spaeteren Wahlerfolge der Linken erschienen von nun an temporaer, nachdem die deutschen Wähler unmittelbar nach dem Scheitern des Rechtsputsches den Ausschlag fuer die monarchistischen Parteien gegeben hatten. Anschluss nach rechts sichterte von nun an die Patronage offenbar ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~.

Das Ausland het diesen Sinn der Wahl vom 6. Juni verkannt. Es erging sich in Betrachtungen darueber, dass die beiden staerksten Fraktionen von der Regierungsbildung ausgeschlossen waren, und dass keine stabile Regierungsbildung moeglich erschien. Dass das deutsche Volk ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ 149 offene Monarchisten--neben zahlreichen monarchistischen Zentrumsabgeordneten und einigen rechts orientierten Demokraten wie Siemens--in den Reichstag schickte und damit eine Saeuberung der Beamtenschaft im republikanischen Sinne desavouierte, wurde nicht beachtet, jedenfalls nicht zu erklaeren versucht. London Times brachte am 7. Juni 1920 den Bericht eines anonymen Korrespondenten (Ich vermute Oberst Repington) New German danger. In ihm wird die Deutsche Volkspartei angegriffen. Sie gehe "more covertly and more cunningly" zu Werk als die Deutsch-Nationalen. In der gleichen Nummer Betrachtung ueber das Ergebnis der Reichstagswahlen. Der Leitartikel zitiert den Korrespondenten und kommt am 10. Juni nochmals darauf zurueck, dass die Volkspartei "the most immediate danger to the peace of Germany and the peace of Europe" sei. Er meint, "no government under their influence could maintain relations with the Entente for a week." Eine Woche darauf kommt Lord D'Abernon in Berlin an. Die Times aeussert groesste Befriedigung ueber die Niederlage der Demokraten, die Partei Bernstorff-Brockdorff-Rantzau. Das Kabinett Fehrenbach-Hertz wird nicht fuer gefaehrlich angesehen. Es verhandelte -- als erstes Kabinett der deutschen Republik -- in Spa (5.-16. Juli 1920) die Zeit der "einseitigen Diktate" ab.

B

Englische Presse und Kapp-Putsch

1) erste Reaktion:

Observer -14.Maerz- fuer schaerfsten militaerischen und wirtschaftlichen Druck auf das reaktionaere Deutschland.

Daily Chronicle Hindenburg als Praesident waere fuer England untragbar.

Manchester Guardian -15.Maerz- Wenn der Kaiser zurueckkaeme, dann Auslieferung verlangen.

Daily News fuer Intervention, wenn Deutschland nicht allein mit den Kappisten fertig werden kann.

2) Nach dem Scheitern des Putsches.

Times s. Anlage

Observer sehr besorgt wegen der Ruhrbewegung. Der Kapp-Putsch war paradox. Sein ~~Zweck~~ Programm: sofortige Reichstagswahl und Praesidentenwahl durch allgemeines Stimmrecht-- demokratischer als das republikanische Regime. Kappisten hatten vorher mit USP Fuehlung genommen. Demokraten intriguierten gegen Zentrum und SPD. Jetzt bedenkliche Konzessionen an die Linke. Vorige Regierung markiert durch Erzberger und Noske. Observer zweifelt, aber wuenscht, dass Ebert Herr der Lage bleibe. 28.Maerz gegen Barthou. Wenn Bruch, dann lieber jetzt als spaeter.

New Statesman; 20. März 1920 "The abortive and almost farcical proceedings which have taken place in Berlin during past week reveal more clearly than any other event since the armistice the extraordinary political weakness of Germany. It is a land of officers and officials. ... How long it will take the Ebert government to restore order remains to be seen, but we fancy that those who are acquainted with the real po-

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litical situation in Germany will be the slowest to credit alarmist statements concerning the strength and danger of the Spartacist movement. The Spartacists are dangerous of course because of their readiness to resort to violence and bloodshed at any moment, but in numbers they are so insignificant that there is probably not a single town where they could seize and retain power for more than a few days. At all events, when order has been restored, it will probably be found that the Kapp-Luettwitz revolution has done more good than harm. For after such a fiasco the danger of another military coup d'état can scarcely be held to exist, and, with that fear removed, the government should acquire a much greater degree of self-confidence and consequently of efficiency. And if ever a country needed a strong government it is surely the case in Germany of 1920."

10. April 1920: "The truth is that Paris is still in a state of almost hysterical apprehension concerning the possible revival of German military power."

17. April: "There seems to be not the slightest doubt that the new, mainly Socialist and strongly anti-militarist German government represents the views of an overwhelming majority of the German people; but the scarcely less doubtful fact remains that it has very little control over the organized forces of that republic. The Reichswehr troops in the Ruhr district acknowledge only formally the authority of Berlin, and are pervaded by the military spirit in the worst form. A new coup d'etat is seriously feared and the supporters of the government in spite of their numbers, have no weapon save that of the general strike. We have no doubt that in the long run that weapon will afford German democracy the protection it needs, but for the moment the situation is extremely difficult."

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Die franzoesische Presse zum Kapp-Putsch

Viele Zeitungen waren durch einen Druckerstreik am Erscheinen verhindert.

Poincaré in der Revue des deux mondes 1.April 1920:

"Dès le mois de novembre dernier, Lauffenberg et Wolffheim, tout en prônant la dictature du prolétariat et l'alliance avec les Soviets russes, protestaient violemment, au nom des communists de Hambourg, contre les conditions de la paix et demandaient au peuple de déclarer à l'Entente une guerre implacable. Lorsque Ludendorff et Kapp, avec leur état-major de barons baltes et de reîtres prussiens, essayaient de mettre la main sur l'empire, leur program de politique extérieure ne diffère pas de celui des spartacistes. Et entre ces extrêmes qui se touchent sur tant de points, les syndicats chrétiens et social-démocrates ne se lèvent à leur tour, que pour mêler leur voix au choeur de l'Allemagne monarchiste, républicaine et socialiste. De toutes les parties du Reich monte le même cri: À bas le traité! Des concessions! "

L'Europe nouvelle, 1.April 1920:

" La grêve général seul a vaincu."...

"Le succès de la grêve générale, brutalement dechaîné, ne signifie pas que les masses allemandes soient gagnées aux idées démocratiques. L'évènement a prouvé que l'Allemagne ne veut pas d'une aventure militaire; il ne prouve pas davantage."

Le Temps : Das Reich ist falsch konstruiert. Intervention noetig, um ein dezentralisiertes Gebilde zu schaffen, das Bestand hat.

D

Lloyd Georges Reaktion auf den Kapp-Putsch

"The telephone bell rang, the Secretary of Downing Street to speak L.G.

L.G.(returning); A revolution has broken out in Germany. That may change everything. It is a military rising and may be royalist. Strangely the Bolsheviki in Russia sent us warning that a revolution would take place in Germany. They were asked to assist the revolutionary party but declined, as they said it was no part of their game to help to re-establish a monarchy in Germany.

L.G. said the French had ~~xxxx~~ helped to bring about the revolution by making and enforcing demands which had made the position of the German government impossible.

I inquired whether he would make his speech to the Coalition Liberals this week as arranged. He said 'This revolution changes everything. No one can say what will happen. I may have to postpone my speech." Lord Riddell' Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and after, 1918-1923 (1933) p.177.

L.G. hielt indessen, wie vorgesehen seine Rede in Westminster Hall am 18. Maerz. Sie war ausschliesslich innenpolitischen Inhalts, gegen Asquith gerichtet, und erwaehnte das Ausland ueberhaupt nicht.

Am 25. Maerz aeussert L.G. sich im Parlament auf eine Anfrage von Asquith:

"The situation is not clearly defined. The only thing that is perfectly apparent is that the Militarist party in Germany attempted a coup d'Etat that is failed, and that it has the usual effect of driving the people into another, I will not say extreme, but in a direction which was far more removed from the Militarist position than ~~every~~ they went before. The government who has been set up is a government which, so far as I can see, leans much more to the left than the last ~~government~~ the news

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than the late government. The news so far as the Spartacist rising are concerned, is, I think, on the whole reassuring, but we have no definite information. ...

But in so far as we are able to judge events there, it seems to me that order is being restored, that the counter-revolution has been a complete failure, and that so far as the Spartacist movement is concerned, the government have been able to make terms....

There is nothing very clear; but it is a matter of congratulation, not mere for Germany but for the whole of Europe, that the militarist plot has failed. This is very satisfactory but what will happen next, is very difficult to conjecture. I would not like to say." (Times)

Die folgenden Tage bringen eine Debatte zwischen englischen und franzoesischen Blaettern ueber die Gefaehrlichkeit des Ruhr-Aufstandes und ueber die von der deutschen Regierung behaupteten Notwendigkeit, Truppen ins Ruhrgebiet zu schicken. Die offizielle englische Presse neigt dazu, den deutschen Standpunkt zu unterstuetzen. Die franzoesischen Blaetter erklaeren die Ruhr-kaempfer fur Demokraten, die nicht von der Reichswehr zerstampft werden duerfen, und erklaeren sich gegen einen deutschen Einmarsch. Die deutsche Regierung wartet nicht auf Bescheid auf ihren Antrag, sondern laesst am 2. April 20 000 Mann ins Ruhrgebiet einruecken. Darauf besetzt Frankreich Frankfurt und Umgebung als Sanktion. Das britische Kabinett protestiert durch scharfe Noten, (8-12. April).

Am gleichen Tage wie L.G. zu den Commons, hatte Barthou in der Deputiertenkammer sehr scharf gegen die englische Deutschland-Politik polemisiert und von einer "crise des alliances" gesprochen. Millerand erklaerte Barthou fuer "trop fort" und ermoeglichte dadurch die Konferenz von San Remo (Vorsitz Nitti). Sie war ursprueglich fuer die tuerkische Frage bestimmt. Nun wurde auch das deutsche Problem dort behandelt. L.G. kam nach San Remo, sehr aufgebracht gegen Frankreich.

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San Remo Apr 19-26

"The French regard the Germans as a beaten enemy who should be xx treated as such. The official British point of view is that the German nation was not responsible for the war, that the Junkers have xx been ejected, that the German Government should be supported, the German industry should be revived, and that, generally, the Germans should not be regarded with suspicion." Riddell p.188 xxxxxxxxxx.

In diese Situation platzt die deutsche Note vom 20.Maerz, in der Gessler einen Bestand von 200 000 Mann fuer die Reichswehr fordert. Darauf erfolgt Einigung L.G.-Millerand, die nun Arm in Arm im Garten lustwandeln. Am 26. Maerz wird der deutsche Antrag abgelehnt und Leutschlands Verfehlung in der Abruestungsfrage festgestellt. Anderseits verwahren sich die Alliierten gegen Annexionsplaene. Dieser Passus war der Preis, den Millerand zu zahlen hatte.

Millerand berichtet der Kammer am 27. April, L.G. den Commons am 29. April. "Kein neues Elsass-Lothringen" (3. Anlage).

L.G. hatte in San Remo beantragt, die deutsche Regierung zur Konferenz hinzuzuziehen. Millerand lehnte das ab. Das Kompromiss war Einladung der deutschen Regierung nach Spa, der ersten Konfenenz, auf der deutsche Regierungsvertreter mit alliierten verhandeln sollten, und vorherige Konferenz in Hythe, um gemeinsames Auftreten der Alliierten in Spa sicherzustellen.

L.G. blieb nicht lange im Einvernehmen mit Millerand. Im Mai unterhielt sich L.G. mit General Malcolm, Austen Chamberlain u. a. in Gegenwart Riddells. L.G. zu Malcolm;

"You had better let the Germans know what our view is. They must disarm, and they must pay. But subject to that we are in favour of rehabilitating Germany. In fact, Germany must be rehabilitated, if she is going to pay. What is the French attitide to the Germans?

Malcolm: It varies, but in many respects the French are unnecess-

arily harsh and objectionable. For example, the other day, a French officer refused to take his hat off in the church which contains the tomb of Frederick the Great. That caused a good deal of ill-feeling.

L G., Bonar Law and Chamberlain all disapproved of the action of the Frenchman.

L.G.: There is no doubt that the French have strong military aspirations. They want to revive the Napoleonic ideal.

. Chamberlain: In my opinion the French are not acting from malevolence. Their action is dictated by funk. They think that if the Germans once get their heads up, they will advance at a much greater rate than the French, and will become a new menace to France.

L.G. did not agree with this, but Chamberlain kept to this point."

Riddell p. 196.

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Rapallo -- 16. April 1922.

I.Vorgeschichte

1921 ,November: Rathenau wird von der Reichsregierung gebeten, nach London zu fahren, "um fuer Deutschlands Lage dort bei dem englischen Premierminister Lloyd George und den Finanzleuten der City Verstaendnis zu erwecken."

Kessler, Rathenau p. 316.

In diesen Besprechungen in London entwickelt Rathenau seinen Plan zum Wiederaufbau Europas: Redressement Sowjetrusslands durch ein Consortium, in dem Russland Deutschland und die Westmaechte vertreten sind. Russland gibt die Konzessionen, Deutschland stellt die Techniker und die Westmaechte das Kapital. Kessler 319. Diese Idee Rathenaus gab Lloyd Georges Plaenen neuen Auftrieb. Rathenau fuhr nach Berlin zurueck mit der Ueberzeugung die britische Regierung und Finanz fuer Deutschland gewonnen zu haben.

14. Dezember 1921: Wirth kuendigt an,dass die naechstfaelligen Reparationen nicht geleistet werden koennen und beantragt ein Moratorium.

Die Reichsregierung hatte weder mit der franzoesischen Regierung noch mit der Reparationskommission Fuehlung genommen. Scharfe Auseinandersetzung mit der Repko.

Lloyd George und Briand besprechen sich in Chequers.

1922,Januar: Sitzung des Obersten Rats der Alliierten in Cannes.

Lloyd George setzt bei Briand durch: 1) Einberufung einer allgemeinen Wirtschaftskonferenz in Genua unter gleichberechtigter Teilnahme Deutschlands und Russlands, 2) Einladung deutscher Unterhaendler nach Cannes (was einen Bruch des Herkommens bedeutet, nach dem die Allix-

erten zu ihren Besprechungen keine Vertreter ehemals feindlicher Maechte zuliessen. Dieser Bruch hat Briands Sturz zu folge.)

11. Januar 1922: Rathenau mit Stab in Cannes.

12. " " Besprechungen zwischen Rathenau, Bergmann, Loucheur, Sir Robert Horne, ferner Besprechungen zwischen Rathenau, Bergmann und der Repko, die Rathenau nicht fuer voll nimmt, da sie gleichfalls Gast in Cannes ist. Rathenau glaubt mit den Regierungschefs ohne Repko weiterzukommen. Abends lange Unterredung Rathenau-Lloyd George ueber das russische Projekt. Kessler 347

Bergmann, Der Weg der Reparation, 1926, kritisiert Rathenau wohl mit Recht, dass er einen Kompromissvorschlag der Repko, der ein einjaehriges Moratorium nach Zahlung von 750 Millionen vorsah, ablehnte. Dessen Annahme haette wahrscheinlich den ganzen Ruhrkonflikt vermieden. Mitten in Rathenaus grosse Rede vor dem Obersten Rat platzt die Nachricht von Briands Sturz und Poincarés Nachfolgerschaft. Nach halbstuendiger Pause fuehrt Rathenau seine Rede zu Ende, an deren Schluss er auf das russische Projekt hinweist und Deutschlands Bereitschaft zur Mitwirkung erklaert. Aber der Oberste Rat ist beschlussunfaehig, und der Zeitpunkt fuer das Eingehen auf den Kompromissvorschlag der Repko ist verpasst.

Rathenau glaubt, Lloyd George ganz fuer sich gewonnen zu haben. Er rechnet auch mit scharfer Opposition Brians, Loucheurs, Francois-Poncets gegen Poincaré.

31. Januar 1922: Rathenau uebernimmt das Aussenministerium, das er zu "aktivieren" verspricht. Eine Woche vorher hatte er "Widerstand" gepredigt, falls Poincare das Ruhrgebiet be-

setzen sollte. Der Ton seiner Ministerrreden wird aggressiv gegen die Repko und gegen Poincaré. Unter seinem Einfluss verschaerft auch Wirth seine Haltung. "Aus den beiden Maenner der Erfuellungspolitik waren Maenner geworden, die der Reparationskommission offene Fehde ansagten." Bergmann 155.

31. Maerz 1922; Rathenau haelt eine besonders scharfe Rede gegen Poncare im Hauptausschuss des Reichstags. Er spottet ueber den "Hagel von Noten" den die Repko auf Anstiften Poincares ueber die Reichsregierung ergehen lasse und der sie am positiver Arbeit hindere. Poincaré treten England ueberall entgegen und nicht ohne Erfolg, wie die Besprechung Poincare-Lloyd George in Boulogne gezeigt habe.
Diese Bemerkung wurde ihm von Lloyd George sehr uebel genommen. Sie hatte zur Folge, dass L.G. Rathenau in Genua schnitt.

1.April 1922: Die russische Delegation trifft auf ihrer Reise nach Genua in Berlin ein und wird sehr gefeiert.

3. April 1922: Rathenau veranstaltet zu Ehren der Russen ein grosses Diner.
Am gleichen Tage spannt Lloyd George vor den Commons die Erwartungen der Welt auf Genua; "The Conference has been called to consider the problem of the reconstruction of economic Europe."

10. April 1922: Eroeffnung der Konfenenz in Genua. Lenin, der noch am den 28. Maerz seine Teilnahme angekuendigt hatte, ~~Maxxnicht~~ liess sich durch Attentatsfurcht zurueckhalten. Die russisch Delegation wurde von Tschitscherin gefuehrt. Ihm standen Rakowsky, Krassin, Litvinoff und Joffe zur Seite. Poincaré

blieb ebenfalls fern,weil der Praesident Millerand in Nordafrika war. Sonst waren alle verantwortlichen Staatsmaenner Europas erschienen,begruesst von dem italienischen Ministerpraesidenten Facta, dem letzten des konstitutionellen Italiens.

Die deutsche Delegation machte bereits am

11. April einen Vorstoss.

Den Anlass dazu bot das Memorandum, das englische und franzoesische Experten ausgearbeitet hatten,--als Grundlage fuer die Verhandlungen mit Russland wegen der Vorkriegsschulden. Die Deutschen nahmen daran Anstoss,dass Art. 6. dieses Memorandums Russland auf Grund von Art. 116 des Versailler Vertrags Reparations-Ansprueche freistelle und deutsche Reparationsansprueche an Russland ausschliesse.

Obwohl das Memorandum keine der alliierten Regierungen festlegte sondern eher eine Privatarbeit der Sachverstaendigen war, geriet Maltzan in heftige Aufregung. Er sah darin fuer Deutschland die Gefahr neuer Anhaeufung von Reparationsverpflichtungen ins Unendliche. Er erklaerte zu Gregory, dem Russlandsachverstaendigen des Foreign Office, dass Deutschland von Art. 6 des Memorandums hoechst unangenehm beruehrt sei. Ausserdem nehme er an Art. 11 und 15 , Annex 2 Anstoss. Gregory erwiderte, "er habe dem Artikel nicht die von ihm (Maltzan) gegebene Tragweite beigemessen, muesse aber nach Maltzans Darstellung gestehen, dass der Wortlaut diese Tragweite zulasse. Es sei selbstverstaendlich, dass man einen Selbstmord Deutschlands nicht verlangen koenne." Kessler 335. = D'Abernon I, 298

Maltzan gab sich damit nicht zufrieden. Am

12. April wurde er sehr scharf zu Wise, dem britischen ~~Bearbeiter~~ Vertreter des Handelsdepartements, den die Deutschen als Vertrauensmann Llo Georges betrachteten, und erklaerte Deutschland sei "zu groesster

Vorsicht gezwungen". Wise versprach, Lloyd George darueber zu berichten. Kessler 336. = D'Abernon I, 299.

Vor Einsetzung der Unterkommission ueber die russischen Angelegenheiten hielten es die Alliierten fuer zweckmaessig, sich mit den Russen allein zu unterhalten. Das schien ihnen notwendig, weil die Vertreter der kleinen Neutralen Schwierigkeiten wegen der Zusammensetzung der Unterkommission gemacht hatten.

13. April; erste entente-russische Besprechung bei Lloyd George.

Rathenau laesst sich wiederholt bei Lloyd George melden, erhaelt aber keinen Zutritt. Nach Kessler 337 "verdichtete sich am D'Abernon I 301

14. April das Geruecht, dass in der Villa de Albertis die Franzosen gerade den Artikel 116 und die daraus abzuleitenden neuen Reparations-lasten Deutschlands als Handelsobjekt gegenueber den Russen benutzten." Abends 11 Uhr sei der Commendatore Giannini im Auftrage des italienischen Aussenministers Schanzer bei Wirth erschienen und habe mitgeteilt, die Verhandlungen naghmen einen "guenstigen Verlauf" und Deutschland "wuerde die Sache wohl billigen". Wirth fuehrt-- immer nach Kessler 337-- Giannini zu Rathenau. Giannini entwickelt ihnen den "Barthou-Plan", dem zufolge Russland seine Reprationsansprueche an Frankreich als a conto-Zahlung fuer die franzoesischen Vorkriegsglaeubiger Russlands zedieren solle. Einer Diskussion wich Giannini aus mit der Erklaerung: "Mein Auftrag ging lediglich dahin, das eben Gesagte zur Kenntnis der deutschen Delegation zu bringen." Rathenau habe darauf hin erklaert, Deutschland wuerde seine Handlungsfreiheit wahrnehmen. Kessler 338.

Kessler resuemiert(338) "Die deutsche Delegation gewann aus dieser Unterredung die Ueberzeugung:

1) dass die Verhandlungen der Westmaechte mit Russland nahe am Abschluss standen.

2) dass die bevorstehende Verstaendigung zwischen den Westmaechten und Russland die aus dem Londoner Memorandum in 3 Punkten sich ergebenden schweren Nachteile fuer Deutschland nicht beseitigen werde und

3) Dass die Information durch Giannini lediglich eine Aufforderung zum Beitritt Deutschlands zu einem Abkommen darstelle, auf das Deutschland keinen Einfluss mehr nehmen koenne."

Diese ganze Darstellung wird von Schanzer, Il Mondo fra il Pace e la Guerra, 1932, p. 134/5 rundweg bestritten. Italien sei von Rapallo genau so ueberrascht worden wie die anderen.

Gegen die Glaubwuerdigkeit der Kesslerschen Darstellung spricht auch die Tatsache, dass Rathenau, Wirth und Maltzan in ihrer Auseinandersetzung mit Lloyd George zur Rechtfertigung von Rapallo Giannini ueberhaupt nicht erwaehnen. Sie haetten sich damit laecherlich gemacht. Denn Giannini war nichts weiter als Leiter des Presse-Amts der Konferenz. Maltzan wurde schon von Lloyd George scharf zurueckgewiesen, als er sich auf Wise berief, dem er Andeutungen wegen eigener Schritte Deutschlands gemacht haben wolle. „Who is Mr. Wise?" fragte Lloyd George Maltzan.

Will Schanzer Privatsekretär, wie D'Abernon [illegible] angibt

Tatsaechlich waren die Verhandlungen der Entente mit Russland auf einen toten Punkt gelangt. Die Geruechte waren ganz grundlos. Die Deutschen mussten das wissen bevor sie nach Rapallo gingen.

15. April, abends 11 Uhr ruft Wise bei Maltzan an, er habe Lloyd George wegen der beanstandeten Artikel Vortrag gehalten. Der Premier bitte um genaue Angaben. In der gleichen Nacht,

16. April, 1 1/2 Uhr morgens ruft Joffe bei Maltzan an. Die Russen seien zum ~~Unterhandlux~~ Abschluss mit Deutschland bereit.

Woraus jeder Verstaendige entnehmen konnte, dass die Verhandlungen mit der andern Seite ergebnislos geblieben waren.

Maltzan musste erwarten, dass Lloyd George auf seine Beanstandunge des Memorandums einzugehen bereit sei. Nach Kessler und Bergmann hat er Rathneau den Anruf Wises ~~unax~~ verschwiegen, was er wohl einem diplomate de carrière gegenueber nicht riskiert haette.

Aber auch Rathenau, selbst wenn er nichts von Wises Anruf wusste, haette, ~~gerade nach den~~ Mitteilungen Gianninis ~~annehmen muessen~~, ~~dass~~ die Verstaenddigung zwischen den Alliierten Und Russland nicht ~~so dringlich sein koennen~~, wenn Joffe in der Nacht anrief, man sei jetzt zum Abschluss bereit.

Die Deutschen fuhren am Vormittag des 16. Aprils nach Rapallo zur Unterzeichnung, und Lloyd George konnte Maltzan nicht erreichen, als er wiederholt anlaeuten liess, um die Sache wgen des Memorandums zu besprechen.

II. Der Vertrag

16. April 1922 Unterzeichung durch Tschitcherin und Rathenau.

Inhalt: Art. 1-2: Gegenseitiger Verzicht auf Ersatz von Kriegskosten und anderer Schaeden.

Art. 3: Wiederaufnahme der diplomatischen und konsularischen Beziehungen.

Art. 4: Meistbeguenstigung.

" 5: "Die beiden Regierungen werden den wirschaftlichen Beduerfnissen der beiden Laender im wohlwollenden Geiste wechselseitig entgegenkommen. Bei einer grundsaetzlichen Regelung dieser Fragen werden sie in vorherigen Gedankenaustausch treten".

Art. 6: Mit Ausnahme von Art 1 b und 4, die ers nach Ratifikation in Kraft treten, treten alle Bestimmungen sofort in Kraft.

Inhalt und sprachliche Formulierung des Abkommens lassen auf eilige Improvisierung schliessen. Es ist unwahrscheinlich, dass dieses Abkommen von Moskau bezw. Berlin nach Genua mitgeschleppt worden ist. Moeglich ist, dass man sich in Rapallo ueber keinen der etwa vorher ausgearbeiteten Entwuerfe einigen konnte und, um der Welt etwas Greifbares zu bieten, das vorliegende Abkommen verfasste.

Die Voranstellung des Verzichts auf Kriegsschadensersatz -- sogar vor die Regelung der diplomatischen Beziehungen, die logisch und traditionell vorauszugehen haette-- ~~xxix~~ betont die Frontstellung gegen das Experten-Memorandum.

Direkte deutsche Zeugnisse ueber die Vorgaenge in Rapallo selbst sind nicht zugaenglich. Von russischer Seite hat sich geaeussert:

E. Preobraschenko, Die Ergebnisse der Genueser Konferenz, 1922:

"Der Vertrag wurde waehrend der entscheidenden ~~xxxx~~ privaten

Besprechungen der Sowjet-Delegation mit Lloyd George unterzeichnet. Daraus ergeben sich die naheliegenden Beweggruende, die die Deutschen zur Eile gezwungen haben. Die deutsche Delegation fuerchtete offenbar, dass im Falle einer Verstaendigung mit der Entente der Vertrag auf Kosten Deutschlands erreicht wuerde, anderseits wollten sie fuer den Fall eines Bruchs die deutschen Interessen sicherstellen. Vom kaufmaennischen Standpunkt war diese Berechnung richtig. Wenn man sich aber vergegenwaertigt, welche Motive zur Unterzeichnung des Vertrages fuehrten, der eine neue Aera in der europaeischen Geschichte eroeffnen soll, so muss man schon sagen, dass der Vertrag klueger ist als seine deutschen Unterzeichner.... Ich weiss nicht, was der Reichskanzler Wirth und der Aussenminister Rathenau in ihrem Lande berichten werden ueber die Rolle der deutschen Delegation bei der Unterzeichnung und nach der Unterzeichnung des Vertrags, als die Urheber des Versailler Vertrags die deutschen Vertreter aufforderten, das mit Russland geschlossene Abkommen zu annullieren. Werden der Reichskanzler Wirth und Rathenau vom Mut der deutschen Delegation sprechen, so werden sie offenbar uebertreiben." p. 47.

Diese Darstellung stuetzt, trotz der Ironisierung der deutschen Delegation deren eigene Darstellung. Sie ist offenbar ebenso irrefuehrend wie die deutschen Angaben, dass eine begruendete Besorgnis vor einer Isolierung Deutschlands und vor einer ententerussischen Einigung auf Kosten Deutschlands bestand. Sie zeigt nur, dass das deutsch-russische Zusammenspiel weiterging. Das gleiche gilt von Rakowskys Angabe, der Vertrag sei "rein zufaellig" gerade waehrend der Genueser Konferenz geschlossen worden (Saxon Mills, The Genoa Confenence, 1922, p. 91), was uebrigens der Erzaehlung Preobraschenskis widerspricht.

Was die deutsche Delegation betrifft, so ist klar, dass sie

sie einerseits den Russen gegenueber unsagbar ungeschickt verfuhr und anderseits Maltzan seine Vorgesetzten uebertoelpelt hat. Rathenau hat urspruenglich ein deutsch-englisch-russisches Zusammenspiel geplant und wahrscheinlich geglaubt, als er sich auf Verhandlungen mit den Russen einliess, der Zustimmung Lloyd Georges sicher zu sein. Den Russen konnte nichts daran liegen, in diesem Zusammenspiel die Minoritaetsrolle des Dritten zu agieren. Sie haben Rathenau das Konzept verdorben, und dadurch ~~sich selbst~~ den groessten Teil des Odiums auf die Deutschen abgelenkt, das ganz auf sie gefallen waere, wenn sie allein haetten Farbe bekennen und die in Cannes gefassten Plaene von sich aus ablehnen muessen.

Rathenau hat mit Rapallo seine "europaeische Wiederaufbau-Politik" ruiniert, da er sich hinsichtlich der allgemeinen Reaktion auf Rapallo verkalkuliert hat. Indessen hat er sich nicht voellig hinsichtlich Lloyd Georges geirrt, der die Idee einer englisch-deutsch-russischen Cooperation auch nach Rapallo nicht aufgab. Er war sich nur einen Moment lang darueber klar, dass Rapallo der Anfang vom Ende seiner Ministerschaft war, und glaubte, den Riss flicken zu koennen.

III. Reaktion

In Genua

Bergmann p. 163: "Wer es nicht erlebt hat, kann sich kei-

Sir Edward Grigg (Lloyd Georges Privatsecretaer): "We have never yet understood the motives which led German statesmen to conclude the bilateral agreement at a moment when all the Powers met together for the first time to discuss their problems and their difficulties in common. ..... I do not remember, even in the war itself, a sadder ending to an Easter Day." The greatest experiment in history,1924, p.131.

Eugene Pequignat (Secretaire de la delegation Suisse) Lloyd George "particulierement vexe." La Conference de Genes,1926,p.34.

Kessler p. 346:"Lloyd George tobte malerisch,aber nicht sehr ueberx zeugend."

Lloyd George forderte in der ersten Aufregung Annullierung des Rapallo-Abkommens,liess sich aber durch Schanzer fuer ein Kompromiss gewinnen. Die Franzosen wollten Genua verlassen, was muehsam verhindert wurde, brachen aber die Verhandlungen mit den deutschen Vertretern ab. Seydoux erklaerte Bergmann,mit dem er sehr gut stand, dass auch gesellschaftliche Beziehungen nicht moeglich waeren.

„Bathseba" (Weib des Uias, David schlicht)

Die Deutschen suchten sich damit herauszureden, dass sie erklaerten; 1) sie haetten ihre Absicht,mit den Russen abzuschliessen,gar nicht verheimlicht; 2) sie waeren nicht dazu gekommen,sich deutlicher zu erklaeren; 3) sie haetten handeln muessen,um einer Schaedigung,wie sie aus dem Experten-Memorandum zu befuerchten war, zuvorzukommen. All das wurde heftig von Lloyd George, und besonders heftig von Barthou zurueckgewiesen .

Waehrend des 17. Aprils fanden dauernd Besprechungen zwischen den Entente-Vertretern und den Neutralen ueber Schritte statt, die gegen die Unterzeichner des Rapallo-Abkommens zu unternehmen waeren. Lloyd George dringt mit einem Trick durch, der seine Position temporaer wiederherstellt und eine ernsthafte Aktion gegen die Rapallo-Maechte erstickt. Der Trick besteht darin, dass vorgeschlagen wird, Deutschland schaerfer anzufassen als Russland. Russland sei gar nicht zu tadeln. Es habe den Versailler Vertrag nicht unterzeichnet, koenne ihn also auch nicht verletzt haben. Es sei auch bisher gar nicht voelkerrechtlich anerkannt, sei daher nicht an die voelkerrechtlichen Konventionen gebunden. Daher "a distinction must be made." Mills p. 91-93.

Mit diesem Schachzug gewann Lloyd George die Zustimmung der Franzosen, die nicht sehen wollten, dass die Schonung der Russen auch derem Partner zugute kommen muesse.

Deutschlands Bestrafung bestand-- ausser in harten Worten-- darin, dass es nicht zur Vertretung in der Unterkommission fuer die Russlandfragen zugelassen wurde.

Der deutschen Delegation wurde am 18. April eine Note ueberreicht, in der sie scharf verurteilt wurde, weil sie "hinter dem Ruecken" der andern Konferenzteilnehmer ein Sonderabkommen abgeschlossen habe, und die dahin muendete: "Under these circumstances the undersigned do not consider it fair or equitable that Germany, having effected her own arrangement with Russia, should enter into the discussion of the conditions of an arrangement between their countries and Russia." Papers relating the International Economic Conference of Genoa.

Diese Note wurde am 21. April von den Deutschen beantwortet, worauf am 23. April eine Zurueckweisung dieser Antwort erfolgte.

Am 19. April hatte Lloyd George eine Besprechung mit Wirth und Rathenau, in der er die deutschen Rechtfertigungsversuche zurueckwies, aber zufuegte er wolle nicht "aggravate the situation". Mills p. 94.

Die Konferenz von Genua schleppte sich noch ~~in den~~ Mai ~~hinein~~ und endete damit, dass alle ihre Probleme, von denen kein einziges geloest worden war, einer Sachverstaendigen-Konferenz ueberwiesen wurden, die fuer den 26. Juni 1922 nach dem Haag einberufen wurde

Ausserhalb Genuas

24. April: Rede Poincares in Bar-le-Duc. Deutschland hat den Versailler Vertrag verletzt (Art. 236 und 260).

" " Henri de Jouvenel im Matin: Genua vollendet Lloyd Georges Bankrott.

" " Poincare ist sich seiner Verantwortung nicht bewusst. Er sieht nicht, dass die Konferenz von Genua scheitern kann.

-22.

Gauvain Journal des Debats 20. April; Das deutsch-bolschewistische Zusammenspiel ist eine alte Sache. Die Gefahr liegt nicht in einer deutsch-russischen Einigung. Die Gefahr liegt ganz wo anders; "Es handelt sich um den Anfang einer Erpressungskampagne." Die Deutschen und die Russen sind ueberzeugt, dass die Alliierten es nicht auf einen Bruch ankommen lassen werden.

Manchester Guardian 21. April: " No one, so far we are aware, has suggested that the treaty is in itself a bad thing; its offence lies solely in the methods of its production and presentation. To those methods very serious objections have been taken. They were not merely tactless and provocatives, but definitely opposed to the spirit of this or any other conference..... Unless the Germans can show that the Russo-German treaty was not intended to stab the Conference in the back it will be much longer before they are invited

to another." Aber der Vertrag ~~ist~~ sch nicht schlecht.

25. Mai 1922 Lloyd George im Unterhaus:

"The largest gathering of nations that has ever met in the history of this world.....

(Rapallo) It was a mistake undoubtly for Germany. I am not going to dwell upon the silly forgeries of military conventions which take no one in. It is not necessary. The effect of this agreement is in itself a portent. Consider for a moment what it means. Here you have two of the greatest nations of the world... Each having done something which has discredited it with the other nations of the world. Not quite received into the full society of nations, peace signed, a nominal equality, but there was the sense of the superior nations and the inferior nations..... There was a community of debasement, There was a community of what they regarded as mala fides. There was a difficulty as ~~xxxxxxx~~ to getting them into commissions. Pariahs are more gregarious than paragons..."

Von dieser Entschuldigung der "Paria-Nationen" schritt Lloyd George fort zur Aufrichtung einer gemeinsamen Front England-Deutschland-Russland, als der Vertreter des neuen Geistes gegen die reaktionären Maechte, d. i. Frankreich und seine Gefolgschaft. Das geschah im Vorwort zu Saxon Mills Buch ueber die Genua-Konferenz, das ausschliesslich zur Verherrlichung Lloyd Georges geschrieben ist, und deshalb auch die Deutschen guenstig behandelt. L.G. sagt;

"Genoa showed the conflict between two great forces, two currents of feeling, two states of mind. I must almost say two worlds, the old and new. The old world is that of national blindness, national suspicion, national prejudice... The new believes in nationalism no less firmly than the old, for nationalism is the individual force, the genius the salt in every varied impulse which makes up ~~xxx~~ Western Civ-

ilization as a Whole. But it also believes with its whole heart that ... the welfare of every nation depends upon peace, co-operation, a helping hand from the strong to the weak, a regard for the welfare of all. The British delegation stood for that faith in Genoa... The campaign for peace is only beginning. We have won positions from which we must press forward again. We are bivouacked in the field. We must not rest till we have won."

Dies in der Vorrede zu einer Darstellung, die behauptet, dass die deutsche Rechtfertigung "to the British this seemed fairly satisfactory and conclusive" , und dass der boese Barthou den Frieden stoerte, in dem er die deutsche Antwort mendacious schalt. ... " The quiet and dignified patience with which the Germans have faced a condemnation at the bar of world opinion havier than any nation ever incurred in the course of history " wird hier als Zeugnis fuer Deutschlands Wert gefeiert. p.102.

15A

Zur Reparationskrise

Rathenaus Versaeumnis in Cannes, sich mit der Repko zu verstaendigen, fuehrte zu der fortgesetzten Reparationskrise von 1922, die nach seiner Ermordung und nach Wirths Ruecktritt in die Ruhrkrise ueberging.

Nach Sir Andrew McFadyean (Generalsekretaer der Repko) Reparation Reviewed 1930, p8 waren Englaender und Franzosen gleich stark an den Reparationen interessiert. Aber "Britain was prepared to treat reparation as a gigantic business proposition; in France it has been regarded as a political problem. "

Die Repko war, ebensowenig wie Poincaré grundsaetzlich gegen ein Moratorium, aber sie verlangte finanzielle Reformen in Deutschland. "There is no single paragraph in the Dawes Report which could not have been produced by the (Reparations) Commission itself ..

15 A

Brockdorff-Rantzau, Ansprache bei Uebergabe der Akkreditive

Moskau 6. November 1922:

" Mit meinem Koennen und meiner Person werde ich mich dafuer einsetzen, zu beweisen, dass der Vertrag von Rapallo eine neue Aera eingeleitet hat fuer das deutsche und fuer das russische Volk und damit nicht nur fuer Europa, sondern fuer die ganze Welt.

Der Vertrag von Rapallo hat einen Strich gemacht unter die Vergangenheit, aber nur soweit sie traurig war... In dem unerschuetterlichen Glauben an die Zukunft des deutschen und des russischen Volkes ohne die auch die Welt nicht gesunden kann, gehe ich an diese friedliche Arbeit, die uns niemand stoeren soll." Dokumente und Gedanken um Versailles p. 208.

Kalinin antwortet:

"Durch den Abschluss des Rapallo-Vertrags, der dem Geist und den Forderungen der Zeit und den Interessen beider Staaten entspri geben das deutsche und das russische Volk der ganzen Welt ein Zeugnis uneingeschraenkten Vertrauens." WTB 7/11/22.

Boris Stein, Iswestija 11.Nov. ~~xxxx~~ 1928:

"Zu den 'Schluessen' aus Versailles gehoerte auch die Folgerung, dass Deutschland notwendig ein maechtiges Gegengewicht haben muesse, das ihm die Moeglichkeit gaebe, fernerhin dem Druck der Sieger von Versilles Widerstand zu leisten. Dieses Gegengewicht war im Osten vorhanden. Seine Notwendigkeit sah Russland viel frueher ein als die erst in Jahre 1922 zum Abschluss des Vertrages mit SSSR gelangte

(Nachruf auf Brockdorff-Rantzau)

The Commission lacked the necessary authority p.33 Mac Fadyen
The gravest blow to the authority of the Commission was struck when the U.S. failed to ratify the Treaty... The U.S. negociators had taken a prominent part in the framing of the Reparation Chapter of the Treaty, and in important points their views had prevailed. " p 37.

Poincare, den der Verfasser politisch ablehnt, hat nicht die Hauptschwierigkeiten verursacht. Er bekaempfte vor allem einen Starren Begriff der "Zahlungsfaehigkeit".

Lloyd George "Created an atmosphere of dishonesty and chicane when he was really striving to be fair and honest."

Rathenau und Wirth lehnten alle Vorschlaege ab, die auf Einschraenkung der souverainen Finanzhoheit des Reichs hinausliefen oder zu laufen schienen (und die der Dawesplan durchsetzte).

Ende Mai 1922 schien ein Ausweg gefunden zu werden, der eine Aufsicht der Repko unter formeller Wahrung der Souverainitaet des Reichs ermoeglichte, als die Ermordung Rathenaus die Situation verschaerfte. Im Herbst d.J. erweiterten sich die Divergenz zwischen Barthou, der eine Verfehlung des Reichs feststellen wollte, und Bradbury, der das vermeiden will, ohne Barthous Recht anzweifeln zu koennenp.264. 14. Novemb Lloyd George Rücktritt

Lloyd Georges Nachfolger Bonar Law opponiert dem fr anzoesischen Kurs der Reparationspolitik. 17. Okt. Wirth Rücktritt.

In Frankreich hat Poincare die ueberwaeltigende Mehrheit hinter sich.

17. November 1922 erklaert sich der radikalsozialistische Parteitag in Marseille fuer schaerferen Druck auf Deutschland.

29. November Kammersitzung. Alle Parteien mit Ausnehme der Sozialisten und Kommunisten sehen Frankreichs Sicherheit bedroht.

Im Jahre 1922 war der christliche Demokrat Marc Sangnier der parlamentarische Hauptgegner Poincares in Sachen Deutschland. Journalistisch wurde die versoehnliche Note im Oeuvre betont 1923 wird Quotidien neu gegruendet und Hauptorgan der Versoehnung. Die Sozialisten richten erst allmaehlich ihre Opposition auch auf die Reparationspolitik. Sie sind lange Zeit antimilitaristisch, ohne die Deutschlandpolitik der Regierung konkret zu bekaempfen. Erst in der Wahlkampagne 1924 wird Poincaré getadelt, weil er keinen Unterschied zwischen deutschen Pazifisten und Alldeutschen mache. Diese Note von Blum betont.

Blum bis 1920 akademisches parteimitglied. Ende 1919 Deputé.

Erstes Auftreten auf dem Parteitag in Tours 1920.

Situation: Die Parteimehrheit, die waehrend des Kriegs sich für défense nationale erklaert hatte, war nach dem Krieg in eine Minderheit gewandelt. Ihre alten Fuehrer Guesde und Sembat waren erschoepft und krank, hielten aber an dem nationalen Kurs fest. Die neue antimilitaristische Mehrheit, gefuehrt von Longuet, Cachin bemaechtigte sich der Humanité und des Parteiorganismus und erklaerte sich fuer Anschluss an die III. Internationale. Blum war zwar auch fuer défense nationale gewesen, aber fuer die Partei-Oeffentlichkeit ein neuer Mann. Er legte sein Amt im Conseil d'Etat nieder, wurde Anwalt und versuchte als Parteifuehrer erfolgreich, die Reste der alten Partei in eine neue Mehrheit zu verwandeln, indem er den Kommunisten, der neuen Partei, moeglichst viel Wind aus den Segeln nahm. Guesde und Sembat legten den Parteivorsitz 1921 nieder.

Rapallo

Vorspiel

L e n i n gibt eine Erklaerung ab,die nach dem Temps vom 28.Maerz 1922 lautet:

"Nous n'avons pas l'intention de soulever des problèmes politiques à Gênes; nous envisageons cette conférence comme une réunion d'hommes d'affaires,convoqués pour discuter des questions commerciales. Nous irons donc a Gênes en commerçants,sachant ce que les Etats bourgeois attendent de nous et sachant également ce que nous attendons d'eux. L'état de choses actuel ne peut durer;il est détestable pour la Russie et pour le reste du monde. Il faut que nous fassions du commerce avec les Etats bourgeois qui de leur côté,ont besoin de commercer avec nous;autrement la reconstruction de l'Europe est chose impossible.

Je désire surtout rencontrer M. Lloyd George qui a montré de facon répetée qu'il est un peu réaliste; il ne permettra pas que ce que l'on pourrait appeler le snobisme politique vienne contrecarrer la réalisation de buts pratiques. Je sens comme lui qu'une entente est possible. Encore une fois, je n'attends pas une entente politique qui est impossible entre des États bourgeois et une République soviétique.

On nous dit que toute une serie de conditions,encore mal définies seront posées a la Russie avant que la Conférence aborde le programme pratique de son ordre du jour. Ces manoeuvres ne nous impressionnent pas. Si les gens s'imaginent nous surprendre, ils se trompent; dans tous les marchandages il y a un element de bluff; nous savons bluffer nous aussi; de même nous sommes habitués aux menaces et nous avons connu de plus terribles que celles qui nous seront faites à Gênes."

Berliner Korrespondent des Temps meldet 24. März "la collusion des partis extrêmes préoccupe bien plus M.Wirth que les exigences de l'Entente.. .. La propagande bolchéviste a pénetré les services publics." Rote Fahne

kuendige an, dass das "eparationsproblem mit einem Schlage geloest werden werde durch Vermoegensbeschlagnahme und Annullierung der Kriegsanleihen. Die Genossen des Westens werden dann die Revision der uebrigen Vertragsbestimmungen durchfuehren. Radek und Rakowsky seien fieberhaft taetig.

Lord D'Abernon Berlin March 9, 1922- Rathenau discussed Genoa with me this morning. He is impressed by what he has heard from Wiedfeldt who had an hour's talk with Lloyd George. The Prime Minister said: ' I have no definite programme for Genoa. They say Russia is my pet child: well, Russia will be the feature at Genoa.' Rathenau says the Soviets are mainly characterized by ' a grandiose unreliability'. It will be easy for the French or anybody else who want to upset the Confenence to put questions to the Russians which will make them break out or boil over." I, 269.

"Lloyd George is further reported to have said to Wiedfeldt: ' England cannot help you alone. You must get other people to assist us in the task. You must make further friends." Rathenau ist ratlos. Wen meint L.G.? Frankrxeich unmoeglich. Russland zu unzuverlaessig. I.270.

3.7 2/3

Ruhrkrise

Seit der Konferenz von Cannes waren die Beziehungen zwischen Reichsregierung und Reparationskommission gespannt. Trotzdem verschiedene Abmachungen zur Erleichterung der deutschen Verpflichtungen. Bergmann, Weg der Reparation 101-105.

14. November 1922 : Reichskanzler Wirth fordert Aufschub der Bar-und Sachlieferungen fuer 3-4 Jahre. Am gleichen Tage Ruecktritt Wirths.

Der Ruecktritt erfolgte aus innerpolitischen Gruenden, Wirth betrieb die Bildung der grossen Koalition, die von der Sozialdemokratie vorlaeufig abgelehnt wurde, da sie erst kurz vorher (24. September 1922) sich mit den Unabhaengigen vereinigt hatte und eine Koalition mit der Volkspartei als gefaehrlich fuer ihren Bestand ansah. Wirths Nachfolger Wilhelm Cuno (21. November 1922). Dessen Aussenminister Frhr. von Rosenberg, entschlossen den Rapallo-Kurs zu liquidieren. (Laesst aber Maltzan und Brockdorff-Rantzau auf ihren Posten). Cuno und Rosenberg haben sehr gute Presse in England und USA.

Der deutsche Regierungswechsel folgte in kurzem Abstand dem Regimewechsel in Italien (Mussolini 30. Oktober 1922) und dem Ende der Koalitionspolitik in England (Bonar Law 19. Oktober 1922).

Cuno adoptiert Wirths Stundungsantrag.

Darauf Konferenz in London 9. Dezember 1922, an der Bonar Law, Poincaré, Mussolini teilnehmen.

Poincarés Ankunft in London wird von Lloyd George mit einer Artikelserie begruesst, die 1923 in Buchform unter dem Titel Is it peace? erscheint. L.G. "enthuellt", Poincaré habe britisch-franzoesischen Beistandspakt sabotiert, weil er Briand den Triumpf nicht goennte und vor allem weil dieser Pakt ihm jeden Vorwand genommen haette, das linke Rheinufer zu annektieren.

In der ersten Sitzung der Konferenz verwahrt sich Poincaré gegen

L.G.s Behauptungen: " C'est là une idée qui ne saurait pas entrer dans une cervelle française, et il ne peut pas être le moins du monde question d'un désir d'annexer la Rhenanie ou de l'incorporer au territoire français." Livre Jaune. Demande de moratorium du Gouvernement allemand 1923 p.27. Bonar Law macht seinerseits das statement: "If an earthquake took place which swallowed up Germany, and the rest of the world remained as before, Great Britain would be the gainer for the reason that Germany was so formidable a rival in trade and industry. This is a fact not realized in France." Blue Book 3/1923, p.77. Da aber Deutschland vorhanden ist und seine Krise die Welt bedrohen kann, ist England fuer Bewilligung eines Moratoriums.

Den Streit ueber das Moratorium hat Bonar Law spaeter (Commons, 13. Februar 1923) so dargestellt: "There was a general feeling which I should have thought the financial condition of Germany had made inevitable, that a moratorium of some kind was necessary. It was supposed that that feeling was almost universal. I thought it was true of the French also, but I found when we came to negociate that by a moratorium they meant to obtain during the period of the moratorium the same reparations as our experts hoped to obtain after that period. In other words they were willing to take the name of a moratorium, but not the reality."

Die deutsche Regierung unterbreitet ein Projekt, dessen Urheber nach Bergmann, Weg der Reparation, p.199, der Direktor der Deutschen Bank Wassermann war. Es schlaegt vor: Internationale Anleihe an Deutschland zur Leistung der Reparationen, und währenddessen Stabilisierung der Reichsmark. Deutsches Weissbuch "Die den Alliierten seit Waffenstillstand uebermittelten Angebote", Juli 1923.

Bonar Law sieht in dem Projekt eine verbesserungsfaehige Grundlage fuer Verhandlungen. Poincaré lehnt ab, weil es keine Garantien biete. Ihm stimmen Theunis (Belgien) und Mussolini bei. Mussolini: " Poincaré a

replacé la question dans le domaine des réalités. Il n'ya pas de temps à perdre, parce que la machine à imprimer les billets fonctionne activement en Allemagne." Livre Jaune p. 31.

Poincaré fordert daraufhin Ruhrbesetzung bis zur Reorganisierung der deutschen Finanzen. Bonar Law erwidert, Poincaré spreche wie von einem "Pique-nique militaire pour les soldats francais". Die Besetzung sei ein sehr gefaehrliches Unternehmen.

Die Sitzung wird unterbrochen, damit das britische Kabinett beraten kann. Dann private Unterredung Bonar Law-Poincaré.

Nach Georges Suarez, Edouard Herriot, p. 219, hat Bonar Law zu Poincaré gesagt, Englands Teilnahme an der Ruhrbesetzung wuerde den ohnehin wahrscheinlichen Sieg der Labor Party bei den naechsten Wahlen zur Gewissheit machen und noch dazu die Wahlen beschleunigen.

Die Rechtsfrage wurde nicht gestellt.

Part VIII. (Reparations) Annex II, Art. 18 des Versailler Vertrags:

"The measures which the Allied and Associated Powers shall have the right to take, in case of voluntary default by Germany, and which Germany agrees not to regard as facts of war, may include economic and financial prohibitions and reprisals and in general such other measures as the respective governments may determine to be necessary in the circumstances."

Aus dem Ausdruck " respective governments" haben die franzoesischen Juristen gefolgert, dass auch eine einzelne Regierung Sanktionen verhaengen koenne. Englische Juristen sind spaeter mit der Meinung hervorgetreten, nur die Gesamtheit der alliierten Regierungen sei dazu berechtigt. In der Unterhausdebatte vom 13. Februar 1923 vertraten Sir Robert Horne und die Mehrheit den franzoesischen Rechtsstandpunkt, Lloyd George den andern. An der Ruhrbesetzung von 1921 hatte England sich beteiligt.

Nach der Unterredung Bonar Law-Poincaré wird die Konferenz ergebnislos

abgebrochen. Bonar Law sieht keinen Ausweg, wenn USA nicht intervenieren. D'Abernon II, 139.

Bonar Law leitete die englische Aussenpolitik seit Beginn seiner Administration, da sein Aussenminister Curzon sofort nach der Kabinettsbildung nach Lausanne gefahren war, um den Frieden mit den Tuerken zustandezubringen. Solange diese Verhandlungen gingen, hatte England alles Interesse, die Entente mit Frankreich zu betonen. Curzon kam erst am 4. Februar 1923 nach London zurueck, als die Ruhraktion schon in vollem Gange war.

Bonar Law hatte im August 1914 Asquith der Zustimmung der Konservativen zur Kriegserklaerung versichert. Er war unter Lloyd George Schatzkanzler gewesen, und neigte dazu, auch die Aussenpolitik ausschliesslich als Economist zu betrachten. Er war ein Schueler und Verehrer von Adolf Wagner, aber ein ueberzeugter Anhaenger der Entente, wenn er auch kurz vor seinem Regierungsbildung isolationistische Gesichtspunkte vertreten hatte.

26. Dezember 1922: Repko stellt mit allen gegen eine (englische) Stimme Deutschlands Verfahlung in den Holzlieferungen fest.

Inzwischen hatten Cuno und Rosenberg den deutschen Botschafter in Washington, Wiedfeldt, beauftragt, eine demarche bei Hughes, secretary of State, zu unternehmen. Deutschland sei bereit, sich fuer "ein Menschenalter" zu x verpflichten, keinen Krieg ohne vorherige Volksabstimmung zu erklaeren, wenn die andern interessierten Maechte das gleiche tun. Hughes teilt das an dem franzoesischen Botschafter Jusserand mit, der Poincare unterrichtet. Dieser lehnt das "Manoeuvre grossiere" ab. Livre Jaune 76/7

Am 29. Dezember gibt Hughes seinen eigenen Vorschlag inoffiziell (in einem wissenschaftlichen Vortrag) bekannt: Unpolitische Sachverstaendige sollen Hoehe und Zahlungsme-

thoden der deutschen Reparationsverpflichtungen feststellen. Poincare lehnt ab.

2. Januar 1923 : Pariser Konfenenz. Mussolini laesst sich durch den Londoner Botschafter Torretta vertreten.

Alle bringen neue Vorschlaege vor. Auch Bergmann war beauftragt, einen deutschen Plan zu unterbreiten, behielt ihn aber fuer sich; "um keine gemeinsame Bestrafung gegen Deutschland zu veranlassen." 213.

Bonar Law schlaegt vor: Herabsetzung der Reparationen auf 25 Milliarden Goldmark. Statt Repko internationale Kommission mit Sitz in Berlin unter Vorsitz des deutschen Reichsfinanzministers.

England voellig isoliert. Italien und Belgien protestieren so heftig, dass Poincare im Hintergrund bleiben kann.

Der franzoesische und italienische Vorschlag beruehren sich nahe. Beide fordern produktive Pfaender ohne militaerische Besetzung.

4. Januar 1923 ; Ergebnisloser Abbruch der Pariser Konferenz.

9. Januar 1923 Repko stellt neue Verfehlung Deutschlands in Kohlenlieferung fest. Frankreich zeigt England ~~zeigt England~~ den bevorstehenden Einmarsch ins Ruhrgebiet an. (Times 10. Jan. 23). Englische Beteiligung wurde nicht verlangt. Bonar Law, Commons 13/1/23.

11. Januar 1923 : Franzoesisch-belgischer Einmarsch.

Am gleichen Tage franzoesische Kammersitzung. Poincare erhaelt Vertrauensvotum 452 gegen 72 bei 47 Enthaltungen (darunter: Painleve, Herriot, Chautemps, Daladier, Paul Boncour)

Leon Blum (mit allen Sozialisten und Kommunisten Gegner):

Auf die Nachricht vom Ruhreinmarsch werden die amerikanischen Besatzungstruppen heimberufen. 10. Januar. Am gleichen Tage fallen einige franzoesische Soldaten bei der Abwehr eines litauischen

Putsches in Memel.

Ebenfalls am 10. Januar war das rheinisch-westfaelische Kohlensyndikat mit saemtlichen Geschaeftsbuechern nach Hamburg uebersiedelt.

12. Januar 1923: Reichsregierung lehnt jede Zusammenarbeit mit dem von Truppen begleiteten Ingenieurkomite ab. Sie verbietet jede Kohlenlieferung an die Laender der Ruhr-Okkupationsmaechte, auch solche gegen Bezahlung.

Cuno erhaelt ein ueberwaeltigendes Vertrauensvotum wie kein anderer Kanzler seit 4. August 1914. "Nationale Welle". Auch "Rote Fahne" vom 11. Januar 1923 fuer Abwehr.

In Italien die fascistische Presse fuer Frankreich, die katholische fuer Deutschland, aber gedaempft. Nitti scharf gegen Ruhrbesetzung.

Nach Baron Beyens, Quatre ans à Rome, p. 153, ueberschaetzte Mussolini erheblich die wirtschaftlichen Konsequenzen des Ruhrkonflikts Er sah bereits Deutschland in ein Agrarland zurueckverwandelt. Mussolini wollte nichts versaeumen, um an den Vorteilen der Besetzung zu partizipieren, bei moeglichst geringem Risiko.

In England war die Entwicklung mit grosser Besorgnis verfolgt worden. Das Scheitern der beiden Konferenzen, die der Ruhrbesetzung vorbeugen sollten, gab Anlass zu grossen Debatten in beiden Haeusern.

Edward Grey hielt am 13. Februar eine sehr wichtige, aber, wie die meisten Oberhausreden, wenig beachtete Rede: Die Reparationsfrage duerfe nicht isoliert betrachtet werden. Sie sei ein Teil des Sicherheitsproblems. "You will not really get economic recovery in Europe unless you also get greater political security. " Bestes Mittel; Staerkung des Voelkerbundes. Deutschland soll nach Regelung des Reparationsproblems Aufnahme in den Voelkerbund beantragen und zugelassen werden. "In my opinion one of the chief causes of all the political trouble, the difficulty of making any political progress since the Armi-

istice, has been the fact that there were two Treaties most important to France included in the Peace Settlement--not parts of the Treaty of Versailles itself-- I mean the Franco-British and the Franco-American Treaties which guaranteed to France that, should there in the future be German aggression against her, she would have for her support the whole strength of the Britain Empire and of the USA. Those Treaties were as much part of the Peace Settlement as the Versailles Treaty itself.

Those treaties have absolutely disappeared; they are gone, and I would ask people in this country who are very apt to criticise France as having been restless or aggressive or contemplating strong separate action in these last years, perhaps even at the present moment--I would ask them to bear in mind what would be their own feelings had they been Frenchmen... What must have been the feelings of Frenchmen when, after a Peace was concluded which they regarded as a whole, those two Treaties which did far more for the future security than the Versailles Treaty itself disappeared?...

I am sure that if those Treaties had remained and we three had been partners in policy, the Reparation question would have been taken in hand in the very earliest year after the war... If the Government find the French Government too easily disposed to take strong measures of Reparation, and to occupy more German territory, I believe the real reason, although perhaps the French Government may not admit it themselves, is not so much that they are anxious to get cash fron Germany in payment of the Reparations. I do not believe that those strong measures will produce the cash. They are much likely to produce the collapse of Germany which will be a disaster to Europe... I do not believe that security is to be gained in that way.... I am sure that what (Frenchmen) they want most of all is security in Europe. As long as you deal with these questions of Reparations solely by themselves, and deal with them as if they were purely economic things, without facing the facts, I do not believe progress can be made."

Aber Bonar Law behandelt ~~die Reparationsfrage~~ in den Commons am 14. Febr.

die Reparationsfrage ausschliesslich unter wirtschaftlichen Gesichtspunkten, was der allgemeinen englischen Auffassung entsprach. Er ging aus und endete bei der Feststellung, Deutschland sei zahlungsunfaehig., fuegt aber am Schluss hinzu, die englisch-franzoesischen Beziehungen duerften unter dieser Meinungsverschiedenheit nicht leiden. Danach hat er auch gehandelt, solange er am Ruder war.

Macdonald am gleichen Tage: "The great point is time. Settle now, fix now, and then begin a scheme which will enable Germany to meet her obligations, and which, I hope, she will accept." Das Reparationsproblem ist "very simple: we can have no reparations until Germany has begun to trade." Macdonald erklaert sich gegen jeden militaerischen Schritt. Die britische Regierung sei fuer den gegenwaertigen Zustand Deutschland mitverantwortlich.

16. Februar: Snowden spricht scharf gegen Frankreich und gegen die Entente mit Frankreich. Behauptet, der Versailler Vertrag habe 20 Millionen Menschen wie Vieh verhandelt und fremden Souverainen unterworfen.

Asquith spricht aehnlich wie Edward Grey, aber die Ruhrbesetzung sei nicht der Weg, Sicherheit zu erlangen. England solle Frankreich und Deutschland unter Druck setzen, damit beide sich der Instanz des Voelkerbundes unterwerfen. Die Labor-Abgeordneten, Morel, Buxton, Henderson sprechen fuer Deutschland. Lloyd George: Die Ruhraktion wachse Frankreich ueber den Kopf. Er selbst spreche fuer "I will not say anti-Treaty people (Zwischenrufe Pro-German) No, not Pro-German, but an anti-extreme reparation view." General Spears: Die britischen Vermittlungsvorschlaege haben alle Franzosen hinter Poincaré geeinigt. Sie sind "an error in psychology that may cost Europe very dear indeed." Die Franzosen seien unnoetig gereizt worden. "Whatever plan is formulated must give the French security... The demilitarization of the Rhinelande would be acceptable to France." Die Opposition beantragt Amendemant zur Antwort auf King's speech, das den Voelkerbund anruft. Bonar Law bekaempft es entschieden.

Es wird mit 305 gegen 196 abgelehnt.

Fuer Frankreichs Recht zur Ruhrbesetzung erklaeren sich der britische Handelsminister Lloyd-Greames, Daily Mail und die Diehards.

Gegen Frankreich: Times, Daily Telegraph, Asquith, die gesamte Labor Party. Macdonald uebermittelt, 17. Januar Labor's Gruesse an das Ruhrarbeiter

18. Januar: Poincaré spricht vom "cauchemar des réparations" den die Welt endlich los sein muesse.

19. Januar : Reichsregierung ordnet an, dass keine Verfuegung der Besatzungsmaechte befolgt werden duerfe. Passiver Widerstand.

20. Januar: Verhaftung der Bergwerksleiter.

Reichsregierung verhindert franzoesisch-tschechische Koks-Kohlenzuege und Zugverbindung Paris-Bukarest und Paris-Prag.

24. Januar: Labor Party beschliesst Solidaritaet mit den Ruhrarbeitern.

1. Februar: Hoetzsch fordert in der Kreuzzeitung sofortige Raeumung des Ruhrgebiets und Schadensersatz.

4. Februar: Graf Westarp ebenda: Raeumung des ganzen Rheinlands.

Reichsregierung befolgt nicht Helfferichs Forderung nach Abbruch der diplomatischen Beziehungen, ruft aber den Botschafter Mayer zurueck. Nachdem die Repko am 26. Januar Deutschlands "Manquement général" festgestellt hat, wird am 1. Februar jede Kohlenlieferung ins unbesetzte Gebiet verboten, und am 12. Febr. ein Zollguertel gelegt.

4. Febr. Poincaré in der Kammer: Der passive Widerstand bestaetigt und verstaerkt Frankreichs Rechtstitel. Frankreichs Ziele bleiben unveraendert: " être dedommagés de nos ruines et n'être plus attaqués." Er sei jederzeit zu Verhandlungen bereit, aber Raeumung auf blosse Versprechungen komme nicht in Frage.

Aussenminister Rosenberg erwidert, 6. Febr: Keine Verhandlung, bevor das Ruhrgebiet geraeumt ist.

13. Febr. Parlament. Bonar Law in den Commons, Curzon im Oberhaus verlesen Thronrede: Keine Zustimmung, keine Teilnahme, aber "wohlwollende Neutralitaet" in der Ruhrfrage.× Schlechte Presse in Deutschland. Bonar Law wird

× Diese Ausdrucksweise findet sich nicht in der Thronrede. Es scheint vielmehr Absicht, die damit eine Umschreibung der Thronrede charakterisiert.

Pontius Pilatus genannt. D'Abernon II,160.

Die grosse Mehrheit der ~~Parlamentsredner~~ Liberalen und die gesamte Arbeitspartei unbefriedigt. Fordern Intervention des Voelkerbunds. Bonar Law lehnt ab, weil ein solches Vorgehen Frankreich verstimmen wuerde.

Sidney Webb: Frankreich hat den Versailler Vertrag verletzt. Das war auch die Ansicht britischer Kronjuristen. Das britische Kabinet hielt die Gutachten geheim bis zur Note Curzons vom 11. August 23.

Die Fuehrung der liberalen Opposition gegen Bonar Laws Neutralitaetspolitik wird von John Simon uebrnommen, der am 13. Maerz 23 erklaert, Abwarten habe keinen Sinn, da Frankreich das Ruhrgebiet auf unbestimmte Zeit besetzt halten will.

14. Marz: Times konstatiert Anwachsen der englischen Volksstimmung gegen Neutralitaet.

18. Maerz: Curzon im Oberhaus: Neutralitaet kann nicht ad infinitum geduldet werden.

Am 16. Maerz hatte der deutsche Botschafter Sthamer der britischen Regierung vertraulich einen Reparationsvorschlag uebergeben, der selbst von Curzon als ganz unzulaenglich abgelehnt wurde.

Am 22. Maer leugnet Cuno in einer Rede im Muenchener Rathaus diesen Schritt ab.

18. Maerz : D' Abernon regt an, Bonar Laws Vorschlag (s. Pariser Konferenz) als Grundlage fuer einen neuen deutschen Vorschlag zu benutzen. Rosenberg lehnt glatt ab. D'Abernon II,184.

April 4. April: Die deutschen Gewerkschaften an die Arbeiter der Welt.

23. ~~März~~: Loucheur in London. Sondiert wegen eines Plans, der aus dem Rheinland einen ~~xxxxxxx~~ Bundesstaat innerhalb des Reichs, aber unter Voelkerbundskontrolle schaffen will. ~~Einzigen Zweck dafuer~~: D'Abernon, II,186f. Nach D'Abernon a.a.O. soll Loucheur von Lloyd George mit der Erklaerung ueberrascht worden sein, er, L.G. haette an Stelle Poincares genau so gehandelt.

20. April: Curzon im Oberhaus: 1) Deutschland soll ein neues Angebot

machen. 2) Sicherheit muss gegenseitig sein. 3) Keine Zerstueckelung Deutschlands.

23. April Poincaré antwortet in Bar-le-Duc: "Sans aucun intermédiaire".

2. Mai: Deutscher Vorschlag (unter Protest Bayerns): 20 Millarden Goldmark Reprationszahlungen.

Curzon schwer enttaeuscht. Schlechte englische Presse. Mussolini protestiert "con senzo di legitimo stupore".

26. Mai 1923: Bonar Law tritt zurueck wegen unheilbaren Kehlkopfleidens. Ihm folgt als Premierminister Stanley Baldwin.(25. Mai)

19. Mai: Poincaré macht Aufhoeren des passiven Widerstandes zur Vorbedingung fuer jede weitere Verhandlung.

29. Mai: Poincaré erklaert in der Kammer, der passive Widerstand koenne nicht mehr lange fortgesetzt werden. Er wird heftig von Tardieu angegriffen, der Poincarés Politik im Reparationsgebiet schwaechlich nennt. Herriot: (unter Hinweis auf Napoleon I): Das deutsche Problem kann nicht ohne Mitwirkung Englands und Russlands geloest werden.

24. Juni : Poincaré erklaert seinen Ruecktritt wegen eines innerpolitischen Zwischenfalls, der in gar keinem Zusammenhang mit seiner Reparationspolitik steht. Praesident Millerand lehnt den Ruecktritt ab. Die Kammer hinter Poincaré, um ein Kabinett Tardieu zu vermeiden.

7. Juni 1923: Deutsches Memorandum (unter intensiver Mitarbeit D'Abernons und des englischen Kabinetts. 1) Konkrete Garantie durch die Reichsbahn. 2) Unparteiische internationale Instanz zur Festellung der Reparationspflicht. 3) Grundsaetzliche Anerkennung der Reparationspflicht 4) Internationale Konferenz.

Zustimmung der englischen und italienischen Presse. Frankreich: Keinerlei Verhandlung vor Beendigung des passiven Widerstands.

Poincaré stellt eine Liste deutscher Einnahmequellen auf, die fuer

Sicherung der Reparationsleistungen in Betracht kommen. Livre jaune Documents relatives aux notes allemandes 1923. No. 23.

St. Aulaire, der die Liste Curzon ~~mexghx~~ uebergibt, teilt Poincaré mit: " Contrairement a notre avis, -dit-il (Curzon)-- le Gouvernement Britannique continue a penser que notre action dans la Ruhr est contraire au Traité de Versailles."

Langer Notenwechsel ueber die Rechtslage.

Poincaré instruiert die franzoesischen Missionen, gegen die Annahme, Frankreich verfolge Annexionspolitik zu protestieren. An St. Aulaire, 29. Juni:

14. Juni: Mussolini fordert collective Aktion, um Beendigung des passiven Widerstandes durchzusetzen. Aber keine Aenderung der Landkarte.

Am 11. Juni hatte Curzon einen Fragebogen nach Paris und Bruessel geschickt, der feststellen sollte, welche Leistungen der deutschen Regierung als Entgelt fuer das Aufhoeren des passiven Widerstandes geboten werden koennten. Poincare laesst ihn unbeantwortet. Darauf 1. Juli 1923 Oberver amtlich: Wenn Frankreich den Fragebogen nicht beantwortet, wird die britische Regierung oeffentlich erklaeren, dass

die derzeitige Politik Frankreichs zum Riun Europas fuehrt, und wird Verhandlungen mit Deutschland auf der Grundlage des deutschen Memorandums vom 7. Juni 23 einleiten. Sie sieht auch eine Konferenz neutraler Staaten zur Einigung mit Deutschland ohne Frankreich vor.

Dieses Kommuniqué wird von der ganzen englischen Presse gebracht.

Poincaré verlangt Dementi des Obervers. Curzon erklaesst ein Dementi, das die Mitteilung des Observer als ~~prematur~~ "premature" erklaert.

Am 30. Juni hatten New Statesman und Saturday Review darauf hingewiesen, dass die neuen englischen Luftruestungen gegen Frankreich gerichtet seien.

12. Juli: Parlament in beiden Haeusern wird erklaert, das deutsche Memorandum duerfe nicht unbeachtet gelassen werden.

14. Juli: Poincaré antwortet: Englands Hilfe erwuenscht, aber entbehrlich.

23. Juli: Stresemann an Kronprinz: England und USA planen Massnahmen zur "Senkung des Franken".

~~Ende~~ 20. Juli neuer Entwurf Curzons: Aufhoeren des passiven Widerstand wird gefordert als Vorbedingung fuer Einigungsverhandlungen. Frankreich soll sich geheim verpflichten, das Ruhrgebiet zu raeumen. Die englische Regierung wird diese Verpflichtung nicht vor Beginn der Raeumung bekannt geben, Stresemann v. d. Ostsee.

2. August: Curzon im Oberhaus unbefriedigt ueber Frankreichs Antwort auf seinen Vorschlag. City, Labor, die ganze liberale Partei und ein grosser Teil der Konservativen gegen Poincaré. Agitation englischer Arbeiterdelegationen, die von der Ruhr heimkehren, gegen Besatzungsgraeuel. "Schwarze Schmach".

Die Versteifung der englischen Politik erklaert sich daher, das sie nach Abschluss des Friedensvertrags von Lausanne mit den Tuerken

nicht mehr so dringend auf franzoesische Unterstuetzung im Orient angewiesen war. 2. August Birkenhead und Grey greifen im Oberhaus Baldwin-Cabinet an, weil die Regierung den Kurs Bonar Laws geändert habe. Frankreichs Freiheit

11. August : grosse Note Curzons an Frankreich. 55 Paragraphen.

33: "The highest legal authorities in Great Britain have advised His Majesty's government that the contention of the German government is well founded.

35: Die Reparationskommission ist ein Werkzeug franzoesisch-belgischer Politik. England wird dauernd ueberstimmt.

Deutschland habe mehr geleistet als Frankreich nach dem Frankfurter Frieden. Die Bestzung koenne 36 Jahre oder ewig dauern.

Diese Note, die nach Curzon von Sir Eyre Crowe verfasst sein soll, schlaegt einen verdriesslichen Ton an. Die franzoesische Erwiderung, die in einem besonderen Gelbbuch Punkt fuer Punkt neben dem Wortlaut der englischen Note veroeffentlicht wurde, wirkt schon deshalb sehr schlagkraeftig, weil sie viel knapper gehalten ist. (20. August)

Poincare erwidert: Wenn Frankreich politische und militaerische Ziele verfolgte, dann haette es nicht die Ruhr, sondern das Maintal besetzt, um einen Keil zwischen Preussen und Bayern zu treiben. Der passive Widerstand koste Deutschland viel mehr als die Erfuellung.

Nach der Veroeffentlcichung der englischen Note schrieb die Times am 13. August: Im Jahre 1913 haette England eine solche Note an Frankreich nicht abgeschickt, ohne vorher das War Office und die Admiralitaet gewarnt zu haben. Aber der scharfe Ton sei berechtigt.

Die englische Note kam in Berlin einige Stunden nach dem Sturz der Regierung Cuno an. Sie wurde infolgedessen von der deutschen Presse kaum beachtet und an belanglosen Stellen wiedergegeben. Waere sie einen Tag frueher erlassen worden, dann haette sie vielleicht den Ruecktritt Cunos verzoegert.

XX ungegriffen. Zum Frankreich sei bisher Poincaré. Seine Aktion „is based as strongly upon a desire for security as upon a desire for money." (Birkenhead). Neville Chamberlain wird gegebenenfalls ausgreifen

Cunos letzte Regierungshandlung war die Einstellung der deutschen Sachleistungen an England gewesen. Unterstaatssekretaer Lord Tyrrell, der die Mitteilung Sthamers in Abwesenheit Curzons entgegennahm. spottete: Da die englisch-franzoesische Einheitsfront in die Brueche gegangen sei, beeile sich Cuno, den Riss wieder zu stopfen. Times 14. August.

Dem Sturz Cunos war folgendes vorausgegangen:

18. April: Zusammenbruch der Markstuetzungsaktion

27. Juli Germania: "Das Vertrauen zu der Reichsregierung ist vollstaendig erschuettert." Es herrsche 9. November-Stimmung.

9. August Lebensmittelkrise. Gaenzliches Ausbleiben von Kartoffellieferungen. "Elendspolonaisen." vor den Laeden. Pluenderungen.

11. August: Buchdruckerstreik. Unterbrechung des Notendrucks. Zahlungsmittelkrise. Gewerkschaften und Sozialdemokratie fordern Cunos Ruecktritt.

12. August : Cunos Ruecktritt.

13. August Stresemann Reichskanzler. Grosse Koalition.

14. August Regierungserklaerung Stresemanns, der noch nicht Zeit hatte, die Note Curzons zu lesen, und sich darueber sehr vorsichtig ausdrueckte. D'Abernon II, 236.

Stresemann ging von der Ansicht aus, England bemuehe sich Frankreich zu isolieren, aber Deutschland koenne sich nicht dem franzoesischen Druck gaenzlich entziehen, auch wenn England ihm beistehe. Eine Einigung mit Frankreich muss erzielt werden, wobei die beiden Maechte gegen einander auszuspielen seien. Der passive Widerstand koenne nicht den Winter ueberdauern. Daher muesse das Volk auf ein Kompromiss vorbereitet werden. Stresemann hoffte, die Einstellung des passiven Widerstand als Tauschobjekt verwerten zu koennen.. Stresemann, Vermaechtnis I,98; D'Abernon II, 236ff. In der Reichstagsrede beschraenkt Stresemann sich darauf, "Aufrechterhaltung der Souverainitaet" zu fordern.

Die Deutsch-Nationalen treten in Opposition zu Stresemann.

1. September 1923: Zwischenfall in Korfu. Italienische Demonstration. Daraufhin Annaeherung Englands an Frankreich.

3. September: Geheime Unterredung Stresemann-Margerie ueber Pfaender und passiven Widerstand. Vermaechtnis I,102; D'Abernon II,247.

6. September: Stresemann schraenkt die Ruhr-Kredite ein.

10. September · Zweite Unterredung Stresenmann-Margerie. Poincaré unnachgibig. Stresemann schwer enttaeuscht. Er nimmt den englischen Vorschlag vom 20. Juli auf: 1) Aufgeben des passiven Widerstandes. 2) progressive Raeumung und Herstellung der deutschen Verwaltung. 3) unparteiische Sachverstaendige, die 4) die Repko beraten. 5-6) Pfaender, Garantien, internationale Kontrolle.

15. September: Otto Braun fuer unbedingten Verzicht auf passiven Widerstand. Stresemann haelt das fuer untragbar. Hofft auf Baldwin, der am 19. Sept. mit Poincaré zusammentreffen will.

19. Septembe : Entrevue Poincaré-Baldwin in Paris. " Voellige Uebereinstimmung". Curzon entsetzt ueber Baldwins Umfall. D'Abernon II, 262. Stresemann gesteht, dass seine Hoffnung auf "ehrenvollen Rueckzug" in der Frage des passiven Widerstands gescheitert ist.

26
~~24~~. September 1923: Ende des passiven Widerstandes. (Bayrischer Protest). Mussolini: "vittoria morale" Frankreichs und Italiens. Rassegna Italiana, October 1923. Poincaré wird in Frankreich als Parlamentsbeschluss: 'Poincaré a bien mérité de la patrie" zweiter Richelieu gefeiert, erklaert aber in seinem Discours "La politique francaise"; " Nous sommes loin d'en avoir fini avec les difficulties". Times: Pyrrussieg (27. Sept.)

Kahr verhaengt Ausnahmezustand ueber Bayern (26. Sept.)

27. Sept. Ausnahmezustand im ganzen Reich.

25. Sept. Hitler politischer Leiter des "Kampfbundes" (Oberland, Reichsflagge, NSDAP).

30. September: "Rheinischer Tag" der Separatisten in Duesseldorf. Polizei zersprengt den separatistischen Umzug, bevor die franzö"sische

Besatzung eingreifen kann.

1. Oktober: Putsch-versuch Buchruckers in Kuestrin. Offizielle Meldung bezeichnet ihn als "Nationalbolschewistisch".

3. Oktober Ruecktritt Stresemanns. Zweites (Rumpf-)Kabinett Stresemann. Opposition der Sozialdemokratie wegen des Vorgehens der Reichsregierung gegen Sachsen (Zeigner) und Thueringen bei gleichzeitiger Schwaeche gegen Bayern.

15. Oktober: Rentenbank. Beginn der Stabilisierungsaktion.

21. Oktober Proklamation der "Rheinischen Republik" in Aachen. General v. Lossow versagt den Gehorsam und wird von Kahr vereidigt. Englische Intervention gegen Separatismus.

Ende Oktober erklaert Poincaré seine Zustimmung unter Vorbehalten zu einem Vorschlag Coolidges, der am 12. August den alten Vorschlag von Hughes wieder aufgenommen hatte. USA gehen auf die franzoesischen Vorbehalte nicht ein.

2. November 1923: Ende der grossen Koalition.

9. November: Hitlerputsch

23. Nov. Sturz des Rumpfkabinetts Stresemann.

30. November: Marx Reichskanzler.

19. November. Botschafterkonferenz in Paris beraet ueber Rueckkehr des Kronprinzen und Wiederaufnahme der Militaerkontrolle. Frankreich isoliert.

12. Dezember: ~~Karthauserklaert xx~~ Sachverstaenigenkonferenz in Washington, (der Frankreich am 13. Nov. zugestimmt hatte).

22. Januar 1924: Macdonald Premierminister.

11. Mai 1924. Niederlage Poincarés und des nationalen Blocks bei den Kammerwahlen. Diese gingen nicht um die Aussenpolitik, sondern um die von Poincaré geplante Erhoehung der direkten Steuern. Sie bringen aber die Gegner von Poncarés Ruhrpolitik ans Ruder, aehnlich wie der Wahlsieg der Republikanischen Partei in USA im November 1918 der unpopulaeren Taxbill und nicht der Opposi-

des amerikanischen Volkes gegen Wilsons Kriegspolitik zu danken war. Das Ergebnis war in beiden Faellen eine Schwenkung der Aussenpolitik, die bei den Wahlen gar nicht zur Debatte stand.

Am 24. April 1924 hatte die Repko unter Zustimmung Poincarés die von den Experten ~~gefordert~~ in Washington einstimmig gefasste Resolution akzeptiert, die die fiskalische und wirtschaftliche Einheit des Reichs forderte. Poincaré billigt, "sans promettre l'évacuation de la Ruhr que personne, d'ailleurs ne nous demandait plus". Récit historique p. 226.

5. August 1924. Zusammenkunft Herriot, Stresemann, Marx, Macdonald in London.

1. Oktober 1924: Ende der Ruhrbesetzung.

Stresemann vor der Kanzlerschaft

7. Maerz 1923, Reichstag: Kein Gerede ueber Verhandlungen. "Noetig ist vielmehr, dass wir durch einstimmigen Widerstand Frankreich zwingen, seinen Widerstand gegen die internationalen Verhandlungen aufzugeben,"

17. April 23, Reichstag: "Deutschlands Leistungsfaehigkeit und Kredit muss der Ausgangspunkt fuer die Entscheidung der Reparationsfragen sein... Ganz entschieden muss ich mich aber dagegen wenden, wenn heute die Deutsche Zeitung erklaert 'Wir wollen nicht zahlen'".

Locarno

Die von Macdonald und Herriot seit Sommer 1924 betriebene Vorbereitung des Genfer Protokolls machte der Reichsregierung schwere Sorge. Sie suchte aber ein Mittel, um den Zusammenschluss gegen einen eventuellen Friedensstoerer, wie ihn Macdonald und Herriot beabsichtigten, durch ein harmloseres Rezept, made in Germany, zu ersetzen. Hierbei war ihr der britische Botschafter Lord D'Abernon behilflich. Seit Oktober 1924 hatte D'Abernon haeufige Besprechungen mit Unterstaatssekretaer von Schubert ueber einen Sicherheitspakt, der keine bedrohliche Spitze gegen Deutschland trug. (D'Abernon III, 124 und 152) Sie nannten diesen Plan ihr "Kind", "regarding it more or less as a joint production and watching over its early life with quasi-parential care."

Die Nachricht, dass das Kabinett Baldwin und dessen Aussenminister Austen Chamberlain das Genfer Protokoll ablehnen wuerden, brachte der Reichsregierung nur fuer wenige Tage Beruhigung. Denn sie erfahr sehr bald, dass Chamberlain beabsichtigte, das Genfer Protokol durch einen englische-franzoesisch-belgischen Pakt zu ersetzen, der fuer Deutschland noch unangenehmer war. "Soon after Austen's return to London (von der Ratssitzung in Rom, Anfang Dezember 1924) he and his colleagues were coming to the conclusion that the Protocol must be discarded but the only substitute which they could think of to put in its place was the defensive alliance with France." Petrie, Life and letters of Austen Chamberlain II, 254. Hierfuer trat das Foreign Office geschlossen ein. Die oeffentliche Meinung Englands war in ihrer Mehrheit einer solchen Verpflichtung abgeneigt. a.a.O.

Stresemann hat in einem Interview der Koelnischen Zeitung am 13. Maerz 1925 erklaert, dass die "drohende Eventualitaet des Abschlusses eines Dreierpaktes gegen Deutschland" die Reichsregierung veranlaast habe, mit dem Vorschlag eines gegenseitigen Sicherheitspaktes hervorzutreten.

Stresemanns Auffassung der Situation geht aus folgenden Aeusserungen hervor:

Am 7. Maerz 1925 erklaerte er in einer Pressekonferenz, der Voelkerbund haette gewisse Beschluesse gefasst, "die sich auf vage Artikel des Versailler Vertrages stuetzen, in bezug auf die Abtrennung der demilitarisierten Zone. Die groesste Gefahr lag darin, denn dahinter standen die alt vertrauten Gestalten, die Ideen einer Neutralisierung des Rheinlandes mit allem, was das innen-und aussenpolitisch fuer uns bedeuten konnte. Dass diese Frage aufgeworfen wuerde in einem Augenblick, wo andere grosse aussenpolitische Entscheidungen in England vorlagen, namentlich bei einer Regierung, die weit mehr ententistisch war und mehr eingestellt war auf das Zusammengehen mit Frankreich als die vorige, lag auf der Hand." Vermaechtnis II, 66.

"Wir erorterten zunaechst private Diskussionen mit dem englischen Botschafter, ob nicht die Moeglichkeit waere, zwei Laender von einer Schwierigkeit herunterzubringen, die ihnen als Schwierigkeit erschien, um den deutschen Wuenschen in der Besatzungsfrage entgegenzukommen. Die Schwierigkeit fuer England war, dass es von der Genfer Politik abkommen wollte und eine andere Befriedigung der franzoesischen Wuensche gern sah." II, 67. So kam es zu "diesem sich Hineinschieben in die internationalen Verhandlungen". II, 70.

2) In einem anonymen Artikel, der am 10. April 1925 im Hamburger Fremdenblatt erschien sagt Stresemann:

"Der Uebergang der Regierung aus den Haenden der Labor Party in die Haende der Unionistischen Regierung war unzweifelhaft eine Verschlechterung unserer Lage. Chamberlain war nicht unser Freund.... Seine ersten Taten bestanden...in einem Versuch der Wiederaufrichtung der alten Entente durch ein Drei-Maechte-Buendnis England, Frankreich, Belgien gegen Deutschland,... um Frankreich fuer die Ablehnung des Genfer Protokolls... zu versoehnen. Die Situation war fuer die deutsche Politik in Dezember v. J. geradezu katastrophal..... Wenn irgendetwas unverstaendlich ist, so ist es die Aufregung eines Teils der deutschen Presse ueber diese Erklaerung (die Ostgrenze nur auf fried-

lichem Wege aendern zu wollen). Denn einen derartigen Mangel an Diplomatie wird man hoffentlich der deutschen Aussenpolitik nicht zutrauen, dass sie etwa eine mit kriegerischen Mitteln anzustrebende Aenderung der Ostgrenze der Entente notifiziert haette." II,91.

Es zeigte sich, dass saemtliche Staatsmaener der Entente der deutschen Aussenpolitik doch zutrauten, so undiplomatisch verfahren zu wollen, wenn sie eine Kriegerische Auseinandersetzung fuer moeglich hielt.

Ausser D'Abernon hat kein englischer, auch kein franzoesischer Politiker, das deutsche Angebot als den Versuch, ein englisch-franzoesisches Zusammenhehen auch um einen hohen Preis zu verhindern, erkannt. Sie glaubten entweder, Stresemann sei wirklich von dem Neuen Geist erfasst, oder sie nahmen an, Deutschland sei zu einer Versohnungsaktion gezwungen, um eine amerikanische Anleihe zu erhalten.

Eine etwas abweichende Darstellung, die nur inx einem Nebenpunkt unrichtig informiert, gab der Matin am 18. Maerz 1925:

"Le ministre des Affaires Etrangères Britanniques avait promis à M. Herriot, lors de son premier entretien avec ce dernier que si le protocole était rejeté, il aurait quelque chose à lui proposer en remplacement. Cette proposition, M. Chamberlain qui est un veritable ami de notre pays, le trouva dans l'Idée même du pacte de sécurité de 1919 dont la non-ratification a été la cause de toutes les inquiétudes françaises jusqu'à ce jour. Le 13 février dernier, M. Chamberlain, dans un memorandum, exposa ce point de vue au cabinet et proposa le renouvellement de l'entente basée sur une garantie britannique des frontières françaises. Baldwin und die Mehrheit des Kabinetts seien fuer diesen Vorschlag gewesen, aber Churchill und Amery haetten ihn bekaempft, und danach waere Curzon ebenfalls in die Opposition getreten. Am 6. und 7. Maerz sei Chamberlain in Paris gewesen und habe seine Niederlage eingestanden. Ohne Wissen des Kabinetts, aber im Einverstaendnis mit Lloyd George habe Lord D'Abernon die Reichsregierung gedraengt, dem franzoesisch-englischen-belgischen Pakt-Projekt ein Paroli zu bieten.

Diese Darstellung wirft zwei britische Kabinettsberatungen zusammen und gibt ein unrichtiges Bild von der Haltung Churchills und Amerys (und Lord Birkenheads-der die gleiche Position einnahm). Am 16. Februar war Chamberlain bereits bekehrt und setzte sich fuer das deutsche Projekt ein. Churchill, Amery und Birkenhead dagegen befuerworteten die Erneuerung der Garantie von 1919. (Ihre Opposition war nicht von Dauer, und Churchill hat noch 1929 in the Aftermath Locarno gebilligt.) Das's die franzoesische Presse Lord D'Abernons Rolle stark unterstrich und den deutschen Vorschlag als "Stresemann-D'Abernon-Memorandum" bezeichnete, ist von diesem selbst ohne Widerspruch III,151, notiert worden.

Bestehen bleibt die Tatsache, das um die Jahreswende 1924/5 das britische

Kabinett keinex andere Loesung des Sicherheitsproblems sah als in der nachtraeglichen Erneuerung des Garantiepaktes von 1919, aber den Widerstand der oeffentlichen Meinung fuerchtete.

Inzwischen setzte D'Abernon seine Bemuehungen um ein deutsches Gegenprojekt fort. Er notiert am 14. Februar: "To-day I discussed the question of security with Schubert. He appears inclined to formulate some proposal along the Cuno lines, eliminating from that proposal the words regarding a plebiscite, and adding to it an engagement that all questions which cannot be arranged diplomatically between the Powers signing the pact should be submitted to arbitration, either to The Hague or to some other tribunal... Schubert prepared to enter into an engagement to respect the territorial possessions of all countries interested in the Rhine, but declined to do so as regards the Polish frontiers. I pointed out that it might create a bad impression if Germany specifically excluded the Polish frontier from such a guarantee."

Am 15. Januar 1925 wurde das Kabinett Luther-Stresemann unter Beteiligung der Deutsch-Nationalen gebildet. Am 20. Januar gab Luther seine Regierungserklaerung vor dem Reichstag ab. D'Abernon bemerkt am 21. Januar, das aussenpolitische Programm dieser Rechtsregierung habe viele ueberrascht wegen seiner Maessigung. Die Ueberraschung wuerde aber noch viel groesser sein, "did the public know the content of the memorandum Pact of Mutual Security which I forwarded to London last night. In readiness to meet Allied demands in the matter of security, and in general conciliatoriness of tone, this document goes far beyond anything which the public of Germany expect. It is to be noted particularly that the idea of bringing America in as a 'Treuhaender' or as Trustee which I have always thought rather impractical, is not stated as an essential condition. The German Government are prepared to negociate Security on any reasonable basis. In my view, whether the precise proposals made are immediately practical or not, it is important to have

them on record officially,and to base discussion upon them. They constitute an immense step forward in the direction of pacification."

Am 25. Februar bemerkt D'Abernon, dass nur der Kanzler Luther und das Auswaertige Amt Kenntnis von dem Memorandum haben,nicht die uebrigen Minister.

D'Abernon rechnete damit,dass der deutsche Vorschlag dem britischen Kabinett als willkommener Ausweg aus der Schwierigkeit erscheinen wuerde. Aber die Reichsregierung beging den Fehler, von Austen Chamberlain zu verlangen,dass erx die Verhandlungen vor Paris geheim halten solle

Petrie II,255. "The result was that Austen at first saw nothing in the propositions but a somewhat clumsy German attempt to drive a wedge between Great Britain and France. Accordingly,when the German Ambassador Dr. Sthamer came to see him on January 30th,Austen said that he"could not receive any confidential communications from the German Government on the footing that I was not at liberty to mention them to our French Allied. Any appearance of negotiations between Germany and this country behind the back of France would arouse suspicion and destroy any influence which the British Government might have with the Government of France."

Bis zu diesem Tage ahnte Stresemann nicht,welchen Blunder er gemacht hatte. Er aeusserte zu D'Abernon steigende Ungeduld ueber das Ausbleiben jeder Antwort von Chamberlain. Am 31. zeigt Stresemann grosse Enttaeuschung ueber Sthamers Bericht und will das Projekt ganz zurueckziehen. Solche Absichten aeusserte er oefter zu D'Abernon,und es dauerte einige Zeit,bis D'Abernon das als Bluff erkannte. Zunaechst war er ernstlich beunruhigt, Stresemann koenne das Projekt wirklich zurueckziehen. ~~xxxxxx~~ Dass die Reichsregierung alles Interesse hatte,die Verhandlungen in Gang zu bringen, zeigte die Auseinadersetzung Luthers mit Herriot, die am gleichen Tage stattfand,an dem Stresemann gegenueber D'Abernon mit der Zurueckziehung des Projekts drohte.

m 27. Januar sprach Herriot in der Deputiertenkammer. Er hatte bereits durch Chamberlain Kenntnis von dem deutschen Memorandum erhalten, erwaehnte aber nichts davon, gab sich vielmehr den Anschein, noch mit der Realisierung des Genfer Prokolls zu rechnen. "Jamais il n'a été mieux entendu de part et d'autre que la paix générale ne saurait s'instituer en dehors de l'accord de la France et de la Grande Bretagne. Et je me réjouis que M. Chamberlain ait bien voulu convenir avec moi que des instructions seraient données aux représentants des deux pays afin que, reserve faite des intérêts particuliers, ils puissent agir en commun sur tous les points.... La France a accepté le régime du Rhin qu'en considérations de ces pacts de garanties. C'est l'evidence." . Herriot verteidigt dann den Beschluss der Alliiertenmdie erste Rheinlandzone nicht zu dem vorgesehenen Termin (10. Januar 1925) zu raeumen, da die Abruestungsbedingungen von Deutschland nicht erfuellt worden sind und die Nationalisten, Hindenburg, der Kronprinz usw. Oberhand gewinnen. In Ermanglung der Garantiepakte, die 1919 nicht ratifiziert worden sind, sei die Rheinlandbesetzung, Frankreichs letzte Sicherheitsmassregel. Auf Herriot antwortet 30. Januar 1925 Reichskanzler Luther beim Empfang der Auslandspresse:

"Der franzoesische Ministerpraesident hat seine ganze Politik vorgestern zusammengefasst in die drei Worte: Schiedsgericht, Sicherheit, Abruestung. Dieses Programm kann ich fuer Deutschland akzeptieren. Die Reichsregierung ist bereit, sich dafuer einzusetzen, dass der Schiedsgerichtsgedanke, dessen Verwirklichungs vielleicht den wertvollsten Teil der Londoner Vereinbarungen darstellt, im internationalen Leben immer allgemeiner zur Geltung kommt. Sie hat Hinsichtlich der Abruestung hat sie eine gewaltige Vorleistung bewirkt und kann nur hoffen, dass der im Versailler Vertrag angegebene Grund fuer diese Vorleistung, die allgemeine Abruestung, bald in die Tat umgesetzt wird. Es liegt auf der Hand, dass das von stark geruesteten Nachbarn umgebene entwaffnete Deutschland das Beduerfnis nach Sicherheit selbst stark empfindet. Die Reichsregierung steht deshalb dem Sicherheitsgedanken nicht nur sympathisch gegenueber,

sondern hat an seiner Verwirklichung auch ein reales Interesse. Im Grunde konkretisiert sich in diesem Verlangen nach Sicherheit das Beduerfnis, der wirtschaftlichen Verstaendigung von London nunmehr auch eine grundsaetzliche Auseinandersetzung ueber die noch offenen politischen Probleme folgen zu lassen. Die Sicherheitsfrage ist der Kern dieser politischen Probleme. Sobald fuer die Sicherheitsfrage eine Loesung gefunden ist, ergibt sich somit die Loesung der meisten uebrigen Fragen nahezu von selbst. Wenn so, wie es den Anschein hat, die politischen Wuensche zweier Laender von der gleichen Tendenz getragen werden, sollte es, m.E., auch moeglich sein, diese Wuensche zu verwirklichen."

Die Reichsregierung schickte sich also an, sich zum Vorkaempfer des Sicherheitsgedankens aufzuwerfen, wie sie den Vorkaempfer des Selbstbestimmungsrechts und des Abruestungsgedankens spielte.

3. Februar 1925: Chamberlain an D'Abernon: "These overtures were premature and that the moment was not opportune for their successful prosecution." Petrie II, 256. Er habe Sthamer empfohlen, das Memorandum dem Voelkerbund zu unterbreiten. Stresemann und Luther sind entsetzt. Luther haelt Chamberlain fuer so antideutsch, dass keine Zusammenarbeit moeglich ist. D'Abernon 3. Febr. "In my view it was a great mistake not to have responded to this advance at once in an encouraging sense.". In diesem Sinne telegraphiert er nach London. Er bemerkt weiter, London sei argwoehnisch. "It is held that a discussion on the question of a Pact of Mutual Security cannot be usefully entered into until the attitude of Great Britain to the question of French security is defined. I hope this does not mean that the Bilateral Pact, guaranteeing both France and Germany, is going to be coldshouldered in favor of an Anglo-French and anti-German agreement. Such a result would be deplorable."

7. Februar: D'Abernon: "I have now ascertained that the German proposal for reciprocal security is not in any way dependent upon the evacuation

of the whole of the occupied territory. This ought to help things forward in London."

9. Februar: D'Abernon: "There is another condition necessary to success, namely to abandon the view that Germans are such congenital liars that there is no practical advantage in obtaining from them any engagement or declaration. On this assumption progress is impossible. Personally, I regard the Germans as more reliable and more bound to written engagements than many other nations."

Am gleichen Tage ueberreicht Hoesch das Memorandum Herriot. Es ist nur in der Einleitung verschieden von dem an England uebergebenen.

"En considérant les différentes possibilités qui se présentent actuellement en faveur d'un réglement de la question de la sécurité l'on pourrait s'inspirer d'une idée analogue à celle qui a fait l'objet de la proposition formulée, en décembre 1922, par M. Cuno, chancelier du Reich à cette epoque. L'Allemagne pourrait par exemple donner son adhésion à un pacte par lequel les puissances interessées au Rhin, notamment L'Angleterre, la France, l'Italie et l'Allemagne s'engageraient solennellement et devant le gouvernment des États-Unis pour une période prolongée et qui serait encore à déterminer, a ne point faire la guerre l'une contre l'autre. Avec un tel pacte, un traité d'arbitrage étendu entre L'Allemagne et la France pourrait se combiner, tel qu'il a été conclu au cours des dernières annees entre différentes puissances européennes. L'Allemagne est disposée à conclure avec toutes les autres puissances de pareils traités d'arbitrage, qui garantiraient une décision paisible aux conflits juridiques et politiques.

D'autre part, L'Allemagne estimerait comme acceptable un pacte qui garantirait formellement le <u>statu quo</u> territorial actuel sur le Rhin. Un tel pacte pourrait être conclu en ces termes que les Etats interesses au

Rhin s'engageraient réciproquement à observer rigoureusement le statu quo territorial sur le Rhin et qu'ils se garantiraient,non seulement conjointement,mais aussi tout Etat séparément,l'observation de cet engagement et qu'ils considéraient tout acte dérogatoire à cet engagement comme une cause commune,et comme leur propre cause.

Dans le même ordre d'idées,les Etats contractants pourraient garantir dans ce pacte l'exécution de l'obligation visant la démilitarisation des territoires rhénanes,à laquelle L'Allemagne s'est engagée,dans les articles 42 et 43 du traité de Versailles, A un tel pacte pourraient également être jointes ces conventions d'arbitrages du genre surmentionné entre L'Allemagne et tous les Etats qui seraient prêts,eux aussi, a conclure de telles conventions.

Aux exemples mentionnés on pourrait ajouter encore d'autres possibilités de résoudre cette question. De meme,il serait possible de combiner de maniere et d'autre les idees sur lesquelles ont été fondés ces exemples. On devra examiner,en outre,s'il ne serait pas a recommander de formuler le pacte de securité de telle maniere qu'il préparerait une convention mondiale comprenant tous les Etats dans le genre du protocole pour le reglement pacifique des différents internationaux établi par la Société des Nations,de sorte qu'il serait absorbé par une telle convention mondiale ou incorporé a celle-ci dans le cas ou cette convention serait realisée."

Das Memorandum war "ein Laboratoriumsprodukt,an dem viel herumgedoktort worden war." Wolf von Dewall,Der Kampf um den Frieden,p.122. Der Pferdefuss, die Verweigerung der Anerkennung des Status quo im Osten war geschickt verborgen.

Inzwischen war es D'Abernon gelungen,Chamberlain zu einer guenstigen Beurteilung des deutschen Vorschlags zu bewegen. Am 16. Februar schreibt Chamberlain an Lord Crewe,,Botschafter in Paris: "What amazing people these same Germans are! First they hand a copy of their secret memorandum

serve? As to the memorandum itself and the spirit which it discloses, I think that they are most helpful sign that I have yet seen... I am firmly convinced that the true line of progress is to proceed from the particular to the general, and not, as has hitherto been embodied in Covenant and Protocol, to reverse the process and attempt to eliminate the particular by the general. A form of guarantee which is so general that we undertake exactly the same obligations, in defense, shall I say of the Polish Corridor (for which no British Government ever will or ever can risk the bones of a British grenadier) as we extend to those international arrangements or conditions on which, as our history shows, our national existence depends, is a guarantee so wide and general that it carries no conviction whatever and gives no sense of security to those who are concerned in our action. If then, we are to relieve the tension of Europe in the only way in which it can be done, namely, by relieving French fear, a more particular and specified guarantee is in my opinion necessary. I am not sure that in 1919, of even a little later, public opinion would have been prepared to admit the signature of Germany, so lately and so flagrantly dishonored, to any pact of that character, but I am disposed to think that in the circumstances of to-day a guarantee of the Eastern frontiers of France and Belgium by Great Britain would be rendered a much more practical policy if Germany was associated with it. For this reason I attach immense importance to this move on the part of the Luther Government.

...More particularly because Stresemann intimated to D'Abernon that a similar local arrangement might be possible with the Powers on the Eastern frontiers of Germany, and because, as I have ascertained through private corresponding with D'Abernon, the German Government did not make their proposal conditional on the shortening of the 15 years period of the Allied occupation of German territory." Petrie II, 256-60. D'Abernon erhielt eine Kopie dieses Briefes.

20. Februar: Herriot antwortet auf das deutsche Memorandum:

" Le gouvernment français a examiné le mémorandum qui lui a été remis le 9 février par les soins de son Excellence l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, avec intérêt et avec la volonté de ne rien négliger de ce qui peut contribuer à la paix de l'Europe et du monde. Le gouvernement Allemand comprendra que l'examen de cette suggestion ne peut être poursuivi sans que la France en ait saisi ses Alliés et se soit mise avec eux d'accord pour parvenir, dans le cadre du Traité de Versailles, a l'établissement d'un régime de sécurité."

18. Februar: D'Abernon: "London, happily, is coming to recognize the vast importance of the German proposal... It is clear that while a certain guarantee may be entered into by England regarding the Franco-German frontier, a similar obligation for the defense of the Polish corridor is out of question."

26. Februar: De Margerie sagt zu dem italienischen Botschafter in Berlin, Bosdari: "sobald die Sicherheitsfrage auftaucht, muesste auch die ganze Frage der Ostgrenzen geregelt werden." Stresemann II, 64.

6.-7. Maerz: Besprechung Chamberlain-Herriot in Paris.

9.-10. Maerz: Besprechungen D'Abernon-Luther-Stresemann- Schubert.

16. Maerz: De Margerie zu Stresemann, der Weltkrieg sei in Belgrad entstanden. Man befuerchte, "dass ein neuer Weltkrieg abermals seinen Ausgangspunkt von einem Konflikt im Osten her nehmen wuerde." Stresemann bittet De Margerie, "er solle mir doch einen Rat geben, was man eigentlich tun solle, um Polen zu beruhigen, da er doch einsehe, dass eine erneute Garantie der Ostgrenze unmoeglich sei. Der Botschafter zuckte die Achseln und meinte, er sehe auch keinen Ausweg." Stresemann II, 34.

Chamberlain fordert Deutschlands Eintritt in den Voelkerbund.

11. März formuliert Stresemann in seiner Presse-Erklärung den „deutschen Verzicht, durch einen Angriffskrieg Elsass-Lothringen wiederzuerobern..." „Für den Osten ist eine solche Festlegung nicht möglich." II, 76

24. Maerz: Chamberlain im Unterhaus.

Ablehnung des Genfer Protokolls. "We have an interest in the eastern boundary of France and Belgium which is more direct, more vital, and to which we are more closely pledged by our signed word than to the general obligation common to every signatory of the Covenant and member of the League of Nations... The need of security for France is great. Her right to expect something from us in that respect is recognized. Our interest and our duty to contribute to provide that security is recognized. It is the common policy of us all." Bericht ueber Art. 42-44 des Versailler Vertrag und ueber das deutsche Memorandum.

Lloyd George: "I am sorry to interrupt the right honorable gentleman, but this is really so very important, and this is the first time that we have had any officiel account of this significant offer. I should like to ask, am I to understand that Germany is prepared to accept voluntarily

the boundaries in the West, that she does not demand any reconsideration or revision of those boundaries? Do I understand that she makes the same declaration with regard to the East, or is that subject to arbitration?"

Chamberlain: "My right honorable friend rightly understands, that is, if I rightly understand, what Germany is prepared to do in regard to the West. ... In suggesting arbitration to the East, she does not propose or suggest that the Eastern frontiers should become the subject of such treaties of arbitration. She is prepared to say that she renounces the idea of recourse to war to change the frontiers in the East, but she is not prepared to say, in regard to those frontiers, that she renounces the hope some day of their provisions by friendly negociations, by diplomatic procedure, or, it may be, for aught I know, by the good offices of the League of Nations." ... The House, I think, will agree with His Majesty's government that this is a signal advance that such proposals should have reached us even in a vague form and on her own motion from Germany." Er habe auf der Durchreise nach Genf am 11. März Herriot und Briand erklaert, das Genfer Protokoll ablehnen zu muessen. "But I told them, and I told others, that we attached the highest importance to these German suggestions, that we thought they should be examined most carefully in order to see whether they did not, in fact, open the door to a new and better state of things, and close the door not merely on actual military operations, but on that war-like atmosphere which has endured ever since the Peace of Versailles."

Inzwischen hatte bereits eine englische Campagne zur Revision der Ostgrenze begonnen. Anfang Maerz veroeffentlichte die Times einen Artikel, der Polen ermahnte, freiwillig auf den Korridor zu verzichten und durch solch eine grosse Geste Deutschland zu versoehnen. Dieser Artikel erschien selbst Stresemann voreilig, und er rueckte in seiner Presse-Erklaerung

von ihm ab,-- vielleicht,um ihn noch staerker wirken zu lassen. II,66. D'Abernon, der gleichfalls den Korridor fuer untragbar haelt (unbearable, 20.Maerz 1925), notiertam 18.Maerz,dass Philipp Kerr (spaeter Lord Lothian) gegen den Korridor und das Danziger Statut agitiere.

Chamberlain hielt in einem Brief an D'Abernon (erhalten 18.Maerz) die Ost-Schwierigkeiten fuer loesbar,wenn Deutschland in den Voelkerbund eintritt. Er war auch besonders beruhigt ueber Stresemanns Erklaerung: " Was wir nicht koennen,das ist eine offizielle Garantie der Grenzen im Osten zu uebernehmen,denn wir muessen uns die Moeglichkeit vorbehalten,diese Dinge auf friedlichem Wege zu loesen. Wir haben irgendwelche Erklaerungen,dass wir jetzt diese Grenzen geaendert wissen wollen,nicht abgegeben." Stresemann II,69. D'Abernon 2. April 1925.

28.Maerz: Herriot im Senat:

Die franzoesische Regierung koenne niemals an einen Sicherheitspakt denken, der nur im enteferntesten die Interessen Polens und der andern befreundeten Ostlaender ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ antaste, Frankreich sei bereit, den dauernden Frieden in Europa zu sichern,aber nur unter restloser Achtung der Vertraege.

Zwischen Herriot und Chamberlain entsteht eine Meinungsverschiedenheit ueber die Prozedur. Herriot will,dass Deutschland zuerst in den Voelkerbund eintrete und dann die Verhandlungen ueber den Pakt beginnen. Chamberlain betrachtet Deutschlands Eintritt in den Voelkerbund "not a necessary,preliminary,but an essential condition." An D'Abernon (erhalten ".April 1925) Er will moeglichst wenig vom Osten sprechen: " I do not expect Germany in any circumstances to renounce formally all hope that time and diplomacy may lead to some modification of the arrangement in the Last,but for the moment I think the less that is said about the Last the better it will be." a.a.O. Selbst in seinen 1935,nach Hitler Machtantritt veroeffentlichten Erinnerunge Down the Years, p.164,Verharrt Chamberlain bei seiner Ansicht: "It would

have been unreasonable to expect Germany to renounce all desire for change in her Eastern frontiers, as fixed by the Treaty of Versailles, as unreasonable as it would have been, say in 1875 to expect France to renounce all hope that she might some day recover her lost provinces." Dieser Vergleich stimmt nicht. Denn die franzoesische Regierung hat offiziell den Frankfurter Frieden niemals angezweifelt. Ebenso ist die Parallele Elsass-Korridor ~~fuerxeinen~~ irrig.

10. April: Sturz des Kabinetts Herriot

17. April: Kabinett Painleve mit Briand als Aussenminister.

Stresemann ist ueber den Gang der Verhandlungen sehr befriedigt. In dem am 10. April erschienen Artikel schreibt er:

"Heute ist der drei Maechte-Pakt gegen Deutschland erledigt.... . Die Entente des Jahres 1914 ist tatsaechlich im Jahre 1925 zu Grabe getragen worden... Der Anspruch Deutschlands, seine Grenze im Osten zu revidieren, war nicht nur von Chamberlain, sondern auch von Baldwin als eine zu Recht bestehender anerkannt, ohne dass gegen dieses Revisionsbeduerfnis Einspruch erhoben wurde." II/40

Chamberlain und Baldwin (Unterhaus 24. Maerz 1924) hatten zwar Deutschlands Revisionswuensche nur als "Verstaendlich" nicht aber als berechtigt anerkannt. Aber Stresemann durfte sehr wohl sagen, dass diese Nuancen nicht ins Gewicht fielen, und dass die englischen Staatsmaenner faktische auch Deutschlands "Recht" zur Revision anerkannt hatten.

Die Wahl Hindenburgs zum Reichspraesidenten im April 1925 gefaehrdete die Paktverhandlungen nur ganz voruebergehend. Waehrend Herriot gebremst hatte, begann Briand den Gang zu beschleunigen. Er entwarf eine Antwort auf das deutsche Memorandum und sandte den Entwurf an Chamberlain. Darueber entspann sich ein laengerer Meinungsaustausch. Briands Entwurf wollte ein zusammenhaengendes System von Vertraegen, das faktisch auf einen allgemeinen, Ost wie West umfassenden Sicherheitspakt hinauslief. Chamberlain dagegen suchte England aus dem Osten herauszuhalten. Er schickte Briand am 28. Mai ein Memorandum, das darin gipfelte: The British Govern-

ment could not support the French proposal that all such arbitration treaties and the Rhineland Pact should form an indivisible whole and be coordinated in one general convention.",nachdem er in einem langem Schreiben vom 19. Mai fuer zahlreiche praezise Einzelpositionen des franzoesischen Entwurfs mildere und unbestimmte Formulierangen vorgeschlagen hatte.

Am 29. Mai empfing Briand das Memorandum Chamberlains und musste festellen, dass sein Plan, die Schiedsvertraege zwischen Deutschland und den Oststaaten mit dem Rheinpalt so zu koordinieren,dass tatsaechlich ein allgemeiner Sicherheitspakt zustande kam,gescheitert war. Er hatte die Wahl zwischen Abbruch der Verhandlungen und dem,was spaeter in Locarno effektuiert wurde: einem gleichzeitigen Abschluss aller Vertraege,der aber faktisch keine Bindung des Rheinpaktes mit den oestlichen Schiedsvertraegen erzielte. Briand entschloss sich fuer die zweite Moeglichkeit. Er rief am gleichen Tage die franzoesische Presse zu einer vertraulichen Besprechung zusammen,erklaerte,dass keine englische Regierung fuer einen allgemeinen Sicherheitspakt zu haben waere,und dass Frankreich sich in einer Zwangslage befaende. Wenn es auf seinem Standpunkt beharrte und die Verhandlungen abbraeche,wuerde es vom der Welt als alleinschuldig an dem Scheitern der Befriedungsaktion verurteilt werden. Er,Briand muesse also Ost und West als Verhandlungsobjekt trennen und richte einen patriotischen Appell an die Presse aller Parteien, seine Kompromissverhandlungen nicht zu stoeren. Dieser Appel wurde befolgt. Auch die Rechtspresse schwieg. Glasgow: From Dawes to Locarno p 151.

Als Entschaedigung fuer Frankreichs Nachgeben und zur Verschleierung des englisch-franzoesischen Gegensatzes wurde am

1. Juni 1925 eine Entwaffnungsnote an Deutschland geschickt,die ausführte, erst nach Behebung der Verstoesse gegen die militaerischen Bestimmungen koenne die erste Rheinlandszone geraeumt werden.

Am gleichen Tage schrieb Briand an Chamberlain: "The French government considered that its anxiety to maintain the general peace and the liberty of all the nations of Europe as well as the exigencies of its own defense

precluded it from limiting its preoccupations to solicitude for its own security alone. Its view was that any attempt to modify by force the state of affairs created by the treatise would constitute a menace to peace to which France could not remain indifferent. That was why, in the draft reply to the German proposals, it considered it essential to preserve the liberty to go to the assistance of states to which it deemed it necessary to grant its guarantee without the provisions of the proposed Rhineland Pact being able to block its way and thus be turned against it." Dieser Kapitalpunkt (der Haupteinwand ~~XXXX~~ Poincarés gegen Cunos Vorschlag von 1922) duerfe nicht verschwiegen, sondern muesse ausdruecklich betont werden.

Darauf antwortete Chamberlain am 8. Juni: "The French Government are right in assuming that His Majesty's Government recognize that the proposed Rhineland Pact cannot operate as a barrier to prevent France from taking action in conformity with such guarantees as she may have given to arbitration treaties between Germany and Germany's neighbours.... The Pact and its cognate agreements must necessarily be so drafted that, on the one hand, they will give the fullest possible security to all of the Powers concerned so long as they abide by their treaty undertakings, and that, on the other hand, they cannot be invoked by a guilty power to protect it from the consequences of a wilful ~~XXX~~ breach of its treaty obligations."

16. Juni 1925: Franzoesische Antwort auf das deutsche Memorandum.

"Le gouvernement français et ses allies ont vu dans la démarche du gouvernement Allemand la manifestation de préoccupations pacifiques qui s'accordent avec les leurs." Gewisse Punkte sind aber noch aufzuklaeren.

1) Das Memorandum erwaehnt den Voelkerbund nur beilaeufig. Die andern ~~XX~~ eventuellen Vertragspartner sind aber Mitglieder des Voelkerbunds und verpflichtet, konform den Satzungen des Bundes zu handeln. Deutschlands Eintritt in den Bund notwendig.

2) Von vornherein auszuschliessen ist jede Revision des Versailler Vertrages, auch von Stipulationen des Vertrags, die Frankreich nicht betreffen.

3) Belgien ist nicht genannt, es muss aber Vertragspartner sein.

4) Arbitration muss sich auf alle Fragen erstrecken. Jede Gewalt muss ausgeschlossen sein. (Franzoesischer Entwurf: compulsory arbitration)

5) Der Rheinvertrag kann nur effektiv werden, wenn Schiedsvertraege mit den Ostlaendern zustandekommen. (Franzoesischer Entwurf: Rheinpakt und Ostvertraege bilden ein unteilbares Ganzes).

6) Nichts darf beschlossen werden, was gegen den Voelkerbund verstoesst.

Stresemann hatte die franzoesische Antwort mit grosser Nervositaet erwartet, obwohl er von D'Abernon ueber den Gang der franzoesisch-englischen Vorbesprechungen orientiert war. Am 11. Juni wollte er noch einen Nachtrag stellen, der Abkuerzung der Besetzung und Mandate forderte. D'Abernon :"I at once said that in my opinion it would be extremely unwise to mention either subject." Stresemann: Hindenburg will Greifbares. Am 26. Juni notiert Stresemann in seinem Tagebuch: "Nachdem die von dem franzoesischen Botschafter uebergebene Note vom 16. Juni konkrete Vorschlaege gemacht hat, die die deutscherseits bezeichneten Loesungsmoeglchkeiten teils aendern oder miteinander verbinden und ihnen neue Vertragskonstruktionen hinzufuegen, ist nunmehr das Kabinett... Ueberreinstimmend zu dem Ergebnis gelangt, dass die in der Note vorgeschlagenen Eroerterungen zur Vorbereitung der endgueltigen Stellungnahme alsbald aufzunehmen sind." und am

1. Juli: "Der Hauptpunkt der Briandschen Note ist darin zu sehen, dass sie versucht, die Idee des polnisch-franzoesischen Buendnisses in den Westpakt hineinzuarbeiten,... Sie ist eine Verzerrung dessen, was unser deutsches Memorandum als Westpakt bot, um die Sicherheitsfrage <u>mit</u> Deutschland und nicht <u>gegen</u> Deutschland loesen zu lassen.... Was wir nicht annehmen koennen, ist jenes Garantiesystem, das sich damit begnuegt, nicht einmal die Idee des Voelkerbundes (zu respektieren?) und ((dafuer unternimmt?) die Idee von

von Spezialbeduerffnissen in die Dabatte zu werfen und durchzufuehren." II,111-16.

Anfang Juli bricht eine deutsche Regierungskrise aus. Die Deutschnationalen versteifen ihre Opposition,und Luther wird schwach. Er behauptet, von dem Memorandum vom 9.Febr. nichts gewusst zu haben,und wird der Unwahrheit ueberfuehrt. Stresemanns Ruecktritt wird eroertert. Er will als Parteifuehrer in die Opposition gegen Luther gehen. Luther bietet ihm den Londoner Botschaftsposten an. Schliesslich einigen sich Luther und Stresemann. Reichsinnenminister Schiele aber erklaert am 8.Juli, dass er den Wortlaut den Memorandums auch jetzt noch nicht kenne. Gleichzeitig setzt eine starke russische Agitation gegen die deutsch-alliierten Verhandlungen ein. (Von Stresemann und D'Abernon notiert) ~~aufgezeichnet~~

25. Juni : Ueberreichung der deutschen Antwort auf die franzoesische Note. Sie ist sehr verbindlich in der Einleitung,wird aber bei der Antwort auf die einzelnen Punkte schaerfer. Ein Kommunique der deutsche Regierung vom 26. Juni ist wesentlich schaerfer gehalten und umschreibt Stresemanns obige Notizen vom 26. Juni und 1.Juli. Am 30. Juni notiert D'Abernon: "The Wilhelmstrasse is still convinced that Briand intends to kill the pact",und er setzt hinzu, die Deutschen sollten nur selber auf richtig sein. D'Abernon billigt Briands Note. Aber er ist gegen Genf als Verhandlungsort. Zuviel polnische Parfuem dort. Er ist fuer Ostende. ~~24.August gleichlautende Antworten der franzoesischen englischen~~ (7. August). 10-13 August Beratung Briand-Chamberlain in London über Pakt-Entwurf.

24. August gleichlautende franzoesische, englische und belgische Antworten auf die deutsche Note vom 25.Juni.

"Le gouvernement français se plait à constater la communauté des vues." Ueber Detailfragen werde man sich verstaendigen. Die deutsche Regierung wird zu einer Konferenz eingeladen. Zuerst sollen die Juristen dann die Aussenminister zusammenkommen.

Die Juristen kommen in London zusammen(1-15.September),bevor die Reichsregierung offiziell die Einladung angenommen hat. Dies geschieht

am 15. September 1925. Gleichzeitig uebergibt die Reichsregierung den beteiligten Maechten eine Erklaerung, in der sie die Kriegsschuld erneut bestreitet. Die belgische Regierung antwortet darauf, die Frage der Kriegsschuld sei nicht nur durch den Versailler Vertrag, sondern auch durch den deutschen Kanzler Bethmann-Hollweg (4.August) entschieden. Die andern bemerken, dass sie auf ihrem Standpunkt verharren, aber dass die Frage nichts mit dem Pakt zu tun habe.

14. September: Mussolini erklaert seine Absicht, der Konferenz beizuwohnen. Daher wird Locarno als Verhandlungsort gewaehlt, wohin der Duce von italienischem Gebiet aus zu Schiff fahren kann.

4. Oktober Beginn der Konferenz von Locarno.

Der deutschen Delegation waren folgende Instruktionen mitgegeben worden:

1) Aenderung des Besatzungs-Regimes

2) Der Londoner Juristen-Entwurf sieht in der Praeambel eine Befestigung des status quo vor. Entweder ist diese Praeambel ganz zu beseitigen oder wenigstens die status quo-Formel durch eine allgemeine Verdammung des Krieges zu ersetzen.

3) Forderung der allgemeinen Abruestung.

4) Abschaffung der Kontroll-Organe

5) Herabsetzung der Frist fuer die zweite und dritte Rheinlandszon

6) Keine Garantien im Osten

7) Artikel 16 des Voelkerbunds

Teilnehmer: Luther, Stresemann, von Schubert, Kempner, Gaus.

Briand, Fromageot (Jurist), Berthelot, Massigli (Delegierter fuer Genf)

Chamberlain, Hurst (Jurist)

Scialoja (Voelkerbundsdelegierter) Grandi (14-16.Oktober) sporadisch Mussolini.

Vandervelde, Skrzynski, Benesch.

Atmosphaere der Verhandlungen nach Stresemann II,138 "Hoeflich und mit gewisser, sich steigernder Waerme". Briand: "Nous avons parlé Européen."

5. Oktober Juristenbesprechung wegen der Praeambel. Gaus beschwert sich bei Stresemann, er sei sehr in die Enge getrieben worden, und verwahrt sich dagegen, Dinge vertreten zu muessen, gegen die sich sein juristisches Gewissen straeube." II,138

6. Oktober: Ostfragen und Artikel 16.

Briand sagt, es waere unehrenhaft fuer Frankreich, sich den Buendnisverpflichtungen entziehen zu wollen. Er koenne dem Pakt nur zustimmen, wenn er die Moeglichkeit habe, Verpflichtungen zu erfuellen. Stresemann antwortet, Frankreich habe im Osten zwei starke Garantien. Warum noch ein dritte? Chamberlain: England koenne im Osten keine Garantie uebernehmen.

Zu Artikel 16 des Voelkerbundes erklaert Briand, dieser Artikel binde nur moralisch.

Schliesslich sagt Briand, wenn er wuesste, dass die gegenwaertigen Regierungen und ihre Aussenminister bleiben wuerden, koenne er auf Garantien verzichten. Chamberlain schlaegt vor, einen Artikel aufzunehmen, dass Briand Stresemann und er selbst auf Lebenszeit Aussenminister bleiben muessten.

12. Oktober: die deutschen Forderungen. (1,3,4,5 der Instruktionen)

Chamberlain und Berthelot opponieren. "Briand waere beinahe vom Sofa gefallen, (Stresemann) mals er meine Ausfuehrungen hoerte." Aber Briand hat nichts dagegen einzuwenden, "dass die Vertreage sich nach dieser Richtung auswirkten." Nur keine sofortige Bezahlung der Rakte. Stresemann II,194.

Chamberlain zu Zugestaendnissen wegen der Koelner Zone bereit.

Zu Stresemanns Forderung nach allgemeiner Abruestung bemerkt Briand, "gewisse Maechte muessten geruestet bleiben, da andere zu schwach sind, um sich selbst zu schuetzen." Die Abruestungsfrage wird ausgeschieden.

In der Kriegsschuldfrage macht Vandervelde so leidenschaftliche Opposition dass Chamberlain nervoes wird. Briand erkennt Deutschlands moralisches Recht auf Mandate an. Chamberlain schweigt dazu.

16. Oktober: Schlussitzung.

Schlussprotokoll:

"Die Vertreter der Deutschen, Belgischen, Britischen, Franzoesischen, Italienischen, Polnischen und Tschechoslowakischen Regierungen, die vom 5. bis zum 16. Oktober 1925 in Locarno versammelt waren, um gemeinsam die Mittel zum Schutze der Voelker vor der Geissel des Krieges zu suchen und fuer die friedliche Regelung von Streitigkeiten jeglicher Art, die etwa zwischen ihnen entstehen koennten, zu sorgen, haben ihre Zustimmung zu den Entwuerfen der sie betreffenden Vertraege und Abkommen gegeben, die im Laufe der gegenwaertigen Konferenz ausgearbeitet worden sind und sich aufeinander beziehen:

Vertrag zwischen Deutschland, Belgien, Frankreich, Grossbritannien und Italien. -- Anlage A

Schiedsabkommen zwischen Deutschland und Belgien-- Anl.B

" " " 2. Frankreich " C

Schiedsvertrag zwischen Deutschland un Polen " D

" " " "Tschechoslowakei -- Anl.E

Diese Urkunden, die schon jetzt 'ne varietur' paraphiert werden, sollen das heutige Datum tragen. Die Vertreter der beteiligten Parteien kommen darueberein, am 1. Dezember d. J. in London zusammenzutreten und in einer Sitzung die foermliche Unterzeichnung der sie betreffenden Urkunden vorzunehmen.

Der franzoesische Minister der auswaertigen Angelegenheiten macht Mitteilung davon, dass im Anschluss an die obenerwaehnten Entwuerfe von Schiedsvertraegen Frankreich, Polen und die Tschechoslowakei gleichfalls Entwuerfe von Abkommen aufgestellt haben, um sich gegenseitig den Nutzen der Vertraege zu sichern. Diese Abkommen werden regelrecht beim Voelkerbund hinterlegt werden. Herr Briand haelt aber schon jetzt Abschriften davon zur Verfuegung der hier vertretenen Maechte.

Der Grossbritannische Staatssekretaer fuer auswaertige Angelegenheiten

schlaegt vor, dass XXX eantwortung gewisser, vom deutschen eichskamzler und Aussenminister gestellter Forderungen nach Aufklaerungen ueber den Artikel 16 der Voelkerbundssatzung das im Entwurf hier gleichfalls beigeschlossene Schreiben (Anlage F) gleichzeitig mit der foermlichen Unterzeinung der obenwerwaehnten rkunden an sie gerichtet wird. Diesr Vorschlag x wird angenommen.

Die Vertreter der hier vertretenen egierungen erklaeren ihre feste Ueberzeugung, dass die Inkraftsetzung dieser Vertraege und Abkommen in hohem Masse dazu beitragen wird, eine moralische Entspannung zwischen den ationen herbeizufuehren, dass durch die Loesung vieler politischer und wirtschaftlicher Probleme gemaess den Interessen und Empfindungen der Voelker stark erleichtert wird, und dass sie so, indem sie Frieden und Sicherheit in Europa festigen, das geeignete Mittel sein werden, in wirksamer Weise die im Artikel 8 der Voelkerbundsatzung vorgesehene Entwaffnung zu beschleunigen.

Sie verpflichten sich, an den vom Voelkerbund bereits aufgenommenen Arbeiten hinsichtlich der Entwaffnung aufrichtig mitzuwirken und die Verwirklichung der Entwaffnung in einer allgemeinen Verstaendigung anzustreben."

Anlage A

"Art.1: Die Hohen vertragschliessenden Teile garantieren, jeder fuer sich und insgesamt, in der in den folgenden Artikeln bestimmten Weise die Aufrechterhaltung des sich aus den Grenzen zwischen Deutschland und Belgien und zwischen Deutschland und Frankreich ergebenden status quo, die Unverletzlichkeit dieser Grenzen, wie sie durch den in Versailles am 28. Juni 1919 unterzeichneten Friedensvertrag oder in dessen Ausfuehrung festgesetzt sind, sowie die Beachtung der Bestimmungen der Artikel 42 und 43 des bezeichneten Vertrages ueber die demilitarisierte Zone.

Art. 2: Deutschland und Belgien und ebenso Deutschland und Frankreich verpflichten sich gegenseitig, in keinem Fall zu einem Angriff oder zu einem Einfall oder zu einem Krieg gegeneinander zu schreiten. Diese Bestimmung findet jedoch keine Anwendung, wenn es sich handelt,

1) um die Ausuebung des Rechtes zur Selbstverteidigung, d.h. um den Widerstand gegen eine Verletzung der Verpflichtung des vorstehenden Absatzes oder gegen einen flagranten Verstoss gegen die Art.42 und 43 des Vertrages von Versailles, sofern ein solcher Verstoss eine nicht provozierte Angriffshandlung darstellt und wegen der Zusammenziehung von Streitkraeften in der demilitarisierten Zone notwendig ist,

2) um eine Aktion auf Grund des Art.16 der Voelkerbundssatzung,

3) um eine Aktion, die auf Grund der Entscheidung der Versammlung oder des Rates des Voelkerbundes oder auf Grund des Art.15, Absatz 7 der Voelkerbundssatzung erfolgt, vorausgesetzt, dass sich die Aktion in diesem letzten Falle gegen einen Staat richtet, der zuerst zum Angriff geschritten ist."

Art.3: Jede Streitfrage ist einer Vergleichskommission zu unterbreiten.

Art.4: Bei Vertragsverletzung ist der Voelkerbund anzurufen. Falls der Voelkerbund auch seinerseits Vertragsverletzung feststellt, zeigt er dies den Signatarmaechten an, die dann zum Beistand des Verletzten verpflichtet sind.

Im Fall flagranter Verletzung von Art. 2 des Locarno-Vertrages oder Art. 42 und 43 des Versailler Vertrages haben die Signatarmaechte zu sofortigen Massnahmen zu schreiten.

Art. 5: Falls ein Vertragspartner Art. 3 zuwiderhandelt, findet Art.4 Anwendung.

Art. 6: Der Versailler Vertrag bleibt unberuehrt.

Art. 7. Der Voelkerbund wird in keiner Weise durch das gegenwaertige Abkommen beschraenkt.

Art. 8: Der Vertrag bleibt gueltig, bis der Voelkerbund hinreichende Garantien bietet, die ihn ueberfluessig machen. In diesem Fall kann ein Antrag auf Ersatz dieses Abkommens durch die Voelkerbundgarantie gestellt werden.

Art. 9: Der Vertrag verpflichtet nicht die Dominions des British Empire.

Art. 10 bezieht sich die Ratifizierung.

Anlagen B und C regeln die Formalitaeten der Schiedsgerichte. Ebenso

" D- " E.

Anlage F:

" Die deutschex Delegation hat gewisse Klarstellungen hinsichtlich des Art.16 der Voelkerbundssatung verlangt.

Wir sind nicht zustaendig,im Namen des Voelkerbundes zu sprechen. Wir zoegern aber nicht,nach den in der Versammlung und der Kommission des Voelkerbundes bereits gepflogenen Beratungen und nach den zwischen uns ausgetauschte Eroerterungen Ihnen die Auslegung zu geben,die wir unsererseits dem Art.16 geben.

Nach dieser Auslegung sind die sich fuer die Bundesmitglieder aus dem Art. ergebenden Verpflichtungen so zu verstehen,dass jeder der Mitgliedstaaten des Bundes gehalten ist,loyal und wirksam mitzuarbeiten,um der Satzung Achtung zu verschaffen und jeder Angriffshandlung entgegenzutreten,in einem Masse,das mit seiner militaerischen Lage vertraeglich ist und das seiner geographischen Lage Rechnung traegt. "

In der Schluss-Sitzung sagte Stresemann:

" Wir haben die Verantwortung fuer die Paraphierung der Vertraege uebernommen,weil wir des Glaubens sind,dass nur auf dem Wege friedlichen Nebeneinanderlebens der Staaten und Voelker jene Entwicklung gesichert werden kann,die fuer keinen Erdteil so wichtig ist wie fuer das grosse europaeische Kulturland, dessen Voelker in den Jahren,die hinter uns liegen,so unendlich gelitten haben. Wir haben sie insbesondere uebernommen,weil wir zu dem Vertrauen berechtigt sind,dass politische Auswirkungen der geschlossenen Vertraege insbesondere auch dem deutschen Volke in der Form der Erleichterung seiner Bedingungen des politischen Lebens zugute kommen werden So gross die Bedeutung der Abmachungen ist, die hier ihre Fassung erhalten haben,so werden die Vertraege von Locarno doch nur dann ihre tiefe Bedeutung in der Entwicklung der Nationen haben,wenn Locarno nicht das Ende,sondern der Anfang einer Periode vertrauensvollen Zusammenlebens der Nationen sein wird." II.202 f.

Nach Stresemann sprach Briand:

"Comme représentant de la France, je tiens m'associer de plein cœur aux sentiments exprimés par le délégué de l'Allemagne, et je manquerais à l'esprit de justice si je ne voyais pas et si je ne saluais pas le geste courageux qui est à l'origine de cette conférence.

Je n'oublie pas le mémorandum adressé le 9 février par le gouvernement allemand, sur l'initiative de M. Stresemann, au gouvernement français. Ce fut le point de départ de nos efforts, et c'est le résultat de ce geste auquel je veux rendre hommage que nous enregistrons aujourd'hui.

Je viens de parapher le traité et les conventions qui ont été préparés à Locarno. Mon mandat est ainsi terminé. C'est donc en mon nom personnel que je parle maintenant, mais avec la certitude de refléter le sentiment, non seulement de mon gouvernement, mais encore de la grande majorité de mes compatriotes.

Si nous n'avions fait ici que négocier les termes d'un traité et si, ensuite, nous rentrions chacun dans notre pays, nous en remettant à des hasards heureux du soin de réaliser les promesses qu'il contient, nous n'aurions accompli qu'un geste vain. Si ce geste ne correspond pas à un esprit nouveau, s'il ne marque pas le début d'une ère de confiance et de collaboration, il ne produira pas les grands effets que nous en attendons.

M. Luther et M. Stresemann, avec qui j'ai eu, hors de cette conférence, de conversations officieuses dans lesquelles nous nous sommes expliqués franchement, m'ont dit avec quel espoir ils envisageaient l'œuvre qu'ils accomplissaient ici. Je leur ai répondu avec une complète loyauté. Entre nos deux pays, il reste des surfaces de friction. Il y a des points douloureux. Il faut que le pacte signé ici soit un baume sur ces plaies, il faut que les difficultés qui existent soient aplanies. M. Stresemann, avec une discrétion dont je lui sais gré, a fait allusion à certaines régions de notre pays dont vous n'avez pas le droit de vous désintéresser. Moi non plus, je n'ai pas le droit de m'en

désinteresser. Je suis certain que la France comprendra toute la portée de ce pacte, et qu'elle voudra faire ce qui sera en son pouvoir pour qu'il en result entre nous un sentiment d'apaisement et de détente. Ceux qui la représentent auront a coeur de faire aussitot qu'ils le pourront, ce qui dépendra d'eux pour que soient réalisés, en ce qui nous concerne, les conditions qui permettront, entre nos deux pays, une politique de détente profonde et, je l'espère, de collaboration confiante. Cela fait, quand auront ete reglées les questions qui restent à résoudre, nous pourrons travailler en commun, dans tous les domaines, aux réalisations de cette idée qui est la nôtre: une Europe accomplissant son destin en restant fidele à tout son passé de civilisation et de noblesse. C'est dans cetx esprit que les uns et les autres, nous sommes venus ici. J'espère que nos deux pays éprouveront bientôt les bienfaits de cette politique, et qu'il ne se passera longtemps avant que nous puissons enregistrer les heureux effets de l'acte que nous venons de parapher." (La societe des nations, November 1925)

Stresemann geht auf Briand zu und dankt ihm. Briand: "Nein, sprechen Sie nicht von Worten. Ich werde Ihnen den Beweis erbringen, dass das nicht Worte waren, sondern Taten sind." Stresemann II, 196

19. November 1925 House of Commons.

Chamberlain: "I had not met representatives of the German Empire until I met them at that conference. I very soon was able to satisfy myself that they came there animated by the same sincere desire for peace and reconciliation that animated the Western Nations, and that they would work with us in the same whole-hearted spirit to secure an end so essential for the prosperity of all our peoples.....

A turning point in the history of Europe, and it may be in the history of the world.... an omen of the new international spirit.

The question of the réaction of the French treaties and of the relations of France with Poland and Czechoslovakia was found on examination to be far less difficult than any of us had supposed, and I must say that some injustice

was done to Poland and the distinguished representative of Poland in that conference because when even there was thought to be a hitch in our proceedings the Press representatives.... assumed that Poland would be the obstacle in our path. It was not so. The greatest obstacle was the entrance of Germany into the League of Nations....

In the first place, it is a treaty which is aimed at nobody, pointed out at no one, threating no one and menacing no one. In the second place, it is a Treaty of Mutual Guarantee. The obligations of France to Germany are the same as the obligations of Germany to France.... and the obligations of the guaranteeing powers, Italy and Great Britain, are the same to Germany as they are to France, as they are to Belgium. This is not, then, a treaty, directed by one group of Powers against any Power or group of Powers.... The third point... is that all the agreements.... conform strictly to the spirit of the Covenant.

What is the obligation that we undertake? There is no case in which we can be called upon to take military action except in pursuance of the Covenant and the action of the League or where action is taken by one of the parties in breach of its obligations which leads to such an immediate danger that you cannot wait even the few days that may be necessary for a meeting of the Court. In that case, the British Government of the day remains the judge, and the only judge of whether that case of imminant danger has arisen.

Macdonald betrachet den Pact "with one eye very sympathetic and the other eye which is equally critical... I have never known Coueism carried on on such a large scale, and with such a mass effect... It was that extraordinary psychological effect that attained to a power far greater than armies or force, that smashed down barriers of the mind which had kept the peoples separated...But we must remember this that a psychological effect is always a passing one. It comes: it goes...Unless the opportunity is taken swiftly, unless you use every opportunity that that change in mind has opened up, then the harvest will never ripen." Daher begruesst M. die Raeumung Koelns und fordert Abschaffung der Botschafterkonferenz, "a remnant of war machinery."

..."Locarno does not deal with any of the small and more intimate causes, like racial conflicts, in the Middle and East of Europe, which may burst into war... You can have agreements about arbitration and all that, but unless the feeling is removed and cooled down, unless the problem is faced and some better agreements ~~xxx~~ come to than that which exist now, we are going to have war..." Daher fordert M. Revision des Versailler Vertrags und warnt vor Isolierung Russlands. ... "There is nobody in Europe to-day who believes that a war can arise over a quarrel in the Rhine valley. It is impossible. There have been no wars between France and Germany on a direct issue as to whether the Rhine or something else than the Rhine is going to be the frontier between the two countries. That problem, if a war does arise, may probably prolong the war, as it prolonged the last war, probably for years, but where the war will arise is nearer the Danube than the Rhine... Therefore, when we look at the map of Europe and see what areas and what problems are covered by the Locarno Pact, we see how x very thin and narrow they are and what a tremendous hinterland of war risks is still left untouched." Indessen "the psychological effect of that Pact is going to advance us substancially."

Auf Macdonalds Haupteinwand ist kein britischer Politiker eingegangen. Macdonald hat seine Stellungnahme praezisiert im Vorwort zu George Glasgows Buch "From Dawes to Locarno" (1925): "Locarno does not face any of the problems that could be, in the widest stretch of imagination, an immediate cause of an European war. I have never met anybody yet--and I think I know much of them--who sits in a European Foreign Office and who believes that in our lifetime, or in any body's lifetime, there is going to be a war between Germany and France directly and specifically caused over the Rhine frontier. That is not how the war will be in Europe. If anybody thinks that by getting agreement on the Rhine frontier we have made European war impossible, he should think again. If there should be another European war, it is perfectly true that the Rhine frontier will be an element in its but it will be raised only after war had broken out. There-

fore it is true from one point of view that the Locarno Treaty, by settling the Rhine frontier, has dealt with something that never could become a prime cause of a European war. Moreover, if war breaks out, and if the conditions have been prepared for Germany to have her revenge.... than the Locarno Treaty will not prevent Germany from fighting France over other peoples' quarrels, and, when that has begun, from fighting it over its own." (Aber diese richtige Einsicht hat Macdonald nicht dazu gefuehrt, das deutsche Angebot des Rheinpakts und das Bemuehen der deutschen Regierung, sich auf den Rheinpakt zu beschraenken, richtig zu kennzeichnen.)

In der Unterhausdebatte sagte Lloyd George:

"We should acknowledge the high courage which inspired that offer on the part of Germany... The introduction of Germany to the League alters in a very large measure the character of that body.... How difficult it was to be always standing there alone pleading for fair play and conciliation." L.G. meint dass Art. 6. des Rheinpaktes zwar den Versailler Vertrag anerkennt, aber dass dieser durch die Schiedssprueche revidiert werden kann. "I consider that to be an enormous achievement." Chamberlain weist diese Auffassung zurueck: "The interpretation of Treaties, including the Treaty of Versailles, is referable to judicial determination. The treaties themselves are part of the public law of Europe."

Duff Cooper: "The Treaty of Locarno will prove in the future to be part of the foundation of a peaceful Europe."

Die Debatte dreht sich im uebrigen um Russland, Entwaffnung und obligatorisches Schiedsgericht. Der Antrag der Opposition, in diesen drei Punkten Sicherheiten zu verschaffen, wird mit 332 zu 130 abgelehnt.

Edward Grey sprach (Manchester Guardian 22. Oktober) greatest satisfaction aus. "It is really a case of applying the policy of the League of Nations and of stengthening the League of Nations. Something has been planted at Locarno which has in it the possibility of growing into a great tree under the shelter

of which in future years all the nations who have become partners to these trea-ties may find a refuge and assured security." Im uebrigen sei der spirit of Locarno mehr wert als das Abkommen.

Robert Cecil sprach dagegen am 23. Oktober in Aberdeen (Manchester Guardian 23.Okt.) "Nobody regards it as complete or final."

In Genf war die allgemeine Tendenz gegen Locarno. (Times 10. September) Der litauische Vertreter Voldemaras und Paul-Boncaur setzten sich fuer das Genfer Protokoll ein. Alle Erwaehnungen des Protolls wurden stuermisch applaudiert.

Edward Grey sprach nochmals ueber Locarno am 11. November (Manchester Guardian 12.November) : "The Locarno treatise had settled something much more than the Rhineland frontier... If,in consequence of the Locarno treatise,this country were ever engaged in a war in which it had allies on one side and an enemy on the other,it would be not because it had given a pledge to any particular nation against any other,but simply because it had given a pledge to uphold the principle of arbitration,which,though it might cover a frontier,was a much greater thing than any frontier."(Diese gegen Macdonaldx gerichtete Erklaerung Greys bestreitet Macdonalds These nicht)

In Frankreich war die Kritik zunaechst zurueckhaltend. Ein begeisterter Lobredner war Henri de Jouvenel, der Locarno als das groesste historische Ereignis der Nachkriegsgeschichte bezeichnete (Temps 18. Oktober)

Georges Mandel (Revue Hebdomadaire, Novembre 1925): Deutschlands einfacher Beitritt zum Voelkerbund wuerde genuegt haben,um alle als positiv betrachteten Ergebnisse zu erzielen. "N'est-il pas une belle habilité de la part de la Wilhelmstrasse d'être ainsi parvenue à se faire demander comme un sacrifice,ce qu'elle avait le plus grand intérêt à solliciter." ... Au désir de paix,on aura sacrifié les garanties les plus certaines de la paix. Les Allemands n'ont été que plus encouragés dans leur effort de destructionx des traités. Au lieu de désarmer,ils se sont mis en quête de nous désarmer. Et à l'instigation de Lord D'Abernon qui a souvent paru plus occupé des intérêts ger-

maniques que de ceux des Alliés, M. Stresemann a fait cette proposition du 9 février par laquelle M. Briand a eu le courage de le féliciter dans son discours de clôture de la conférence de Locarno..... Que nous servirait dès lors la promesse britannique au sujet de la frontière du Rhin? Pourrions nous laisser écraser la Pologne et la Tchecoslovaquie?.... Locarno l'a tout à la fois engagée et liberée. En lui imposant des devoirs précis, le pacte rhénan qui est le seul auquel elle ait consenti d'adhérer, a nettement delimité les très rares circonstances dans lesquelles elle faudrait intervenir... Il n'est pas possible de concilier plus habilement les avantages de la politique du splendide isolement avec les garanties de la politique de l'entente cordiale."

Georges Scelle (L'Information 24.Nov.): "MM. Luther et Stresemann, repris par l'ambiance méphitique des luttes interfractionelles, influencés par la violente opposition des nationalistes, ont perdu, à Berlin, une partie de la sérénité que leur avait inspiré le ciel entrevu de Locarno... En Allemagne, il faut le constater avec regret, ce que l'on envisage, ce n'est pas le jeu bienfaisant des accords eux-mêmes; c'est la repercussion qu'on en attend. Ce qui prouve, que le souci de pacification générale est moins puissant que celui de la libération des entraves du traité de Versailles."

Tatsaechlich legte die Reichsregierung in der Reichstagsdebatte ueber die Ratification von Locarno (23-27.November) das Hauptgewicht auf die -- nicht im Vertrag fixierten, aber von Briand und Chamberlain gespr aechsweise versprochenen "Rueckwirkungen" und brachte damit Briand in grosse Verlegenheit. Den deutschen Standpunkt in der Locarno-Frage drueckte der Volksparteiler Scholz am besten aus mit seiner Befuerwortung der Ratification: "Die Waffe des Starken ist der Krieg, der Schutz des Schwachen ist der Friede."

Die franzoesische Kammer nahm erst im Februar 1926 zu Locarno Stellung

s.u. S. 361

1. Dezember 1925: Unterzeichnung des Locarno-Vertraege in London. (Times 2.12)
~~Ihrerxx~~ Luther: "I welcome from my whole heart His Majesty's conviction that Locarno will be a work of pacification and reconciliation as the foundation

of a real friendship between the nations represented here, that furthermore it will assure that peace which all peoples so urgently need as a basis of their recovery. We earnestly hope, moreover, that the wishes expressed by the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs may be fulfilled, more specially as regards the relations between my country and the nations represented here...All peoples must unite to relegate their prejudices and their mistrust to the past in order to open the way to a future development in which we must all collaborate.... Even more important than the contents of the treaty which denotes new relationship in the world, must be the unity of purpose to work peacefully together, which finds expression in the work of Locarno. Germany to-day gladly once more identifies herself with this work in harmony with her previous attitude and her own initiative."

Briand: " It is not without emotion that I shall sign the great Treaties which are destined to draw the nations of Europe closer together and to mark the inauguration of an era of peace which corresponds to the most profound feelings and to the desires of all the nations who suffered so terribly in the War."

Benesch: "In the name of the Government of the Czechoslovakian Republic I associate myself with the noble words spoken by the Chancellor, Herr Luther and the President of Council M. Briand...I have come with the conviction that by our signature to-day we shall inaugurate a long period of peace." Benesch auch sonst sehr enthusiastisch ueber Locarno.

Nach Unterzeichnung Bankett beim Lord Mayor.

Briand: "The spirit of solidarity takes the place of that of distrust and suspicion. It is not by an accumulation of strength that is hoped to render war impossible but by the bonds of mutual assistance and human solidarity.

Stresemann: "Together with the convulsions of the world war emerged the one fact that a community of fate binds us to one another. If we go under, we go under together; if we would rise we cannot do so in conflict with each other, but only by working together. Accordingly we cannot afford, if we believe at all in the future of our nations, to live in discord and enmity with each other, but we must join hands in a work of general cooperation. Only then will it be possible to lay the foundations for a future of which you said, M. Briand, in words which I can only endorse, that it must proceed from rivalry to cultural development. The great majority of the German people are in favor of this peace. Supported by this will for peace we affix our signature to this treaty. It will usher in a new era of cooperation between nations."

Schon am 9. November 1925 waren die in Locarno offizioes bewilligten Erleichterungen fuer das besetzte Gebiet in Kraft getreten.

Ein deutscher Reichskommissar fuer das besetzte Gebiet (Langwerth von Simmern) funktionierte mit franzoesich-englischer Anerkennung seit 7. November .

31. Januar 1926: Raeuming der ersten Zone.

Luther hatte am 11.November 1925 im Verein Berliner Kaufleute und Industrieller gesagt: (FrankfurterZeitung 1.Nov.):

would be called a business proposition." p.23.

26.Februar -3.März; Locarno-Debatte in der franzoesischen Kammer.

Paul-Boncour (rapporteur): "Le mérite des accords de Locarno est de constituer une application partielle des principes dux protocole à certaines hypothèses géographiques; et le mérite de M.Briand a été de vaincre la résistance de l'Angleterre à des engagements universels pamr l'amener à des engagements limités,et de conditionner la signature des accords rhénans à la signature du traité d'arbitrage concernant les frontières orientales....L'agresseur eventuel contre lequel sont tournées les forces,est anonyme. La valeur incomparable du pacte rhénan,c'est qu'il a comblé la lacune de l'article 15....J'en arrive à la question des frontieres orientales. Ici,les traités sont moins nets que le pacte rhénan.... Si je vous demande cependant de voter la ratification c'est parce qu'il ne faut pas considérer les faits seuls,mais qu'il convient de rechercher quelles garanties nous avions auparavant... Les traités orientaux representent deux caractères de faiblesse relative (Keine deutsche Garantie, keine demilitarisierte Zone). Mais je répète: qu'avions-nous auparavant? "

Jean Fabry: " Qu'avions-nous auparavant? Nous avions le traité de Versailles et en particulier les articles 42 et 43..... Les accords établissent une classification entre les dangers de guerre,dangers lointains... et dangers immédiats.... en dernier ressort,tout dépend du jugement que portera l'Angleterre sur la situation."

Marcel Plaisant: " Les accords de Locarno ont été l'objet d'interprétation différentes dans les divers pays. Les uns s'en referent surtout à l'esprit de Locarno,les autres à la lettre du traité.

Joseph Barthélemy: " Si un jour les armées allemandes se dirigent à marches forcées nach Paris,il faut que nous ayons autre chose à faire entendre que le simple affirmation 'L'acte est nul de par Locarno'.... La paix est à l'ombre de l'epée. "

Briand: "C'est une maitresse exigeante que la paix,plus exigeante que la guerre.

Je n'exagère pas la portée de l'acte de Locarno. Je connais ses limites, je dirai toute-à-l'heure ses lacunes; mais je sais aussi ce que il contient de rassurantes. Ce qu'il y a de meilleur, m'entendez-vous? c'est qu'il a donné la confiance aux peuples... À Locarno nous avons parlé Européen. C'est la langue nouvelle qu'il faut bien que l'on l'apprenne. Locarno c'est une barrière contre l'irréflexion. Locarno c'est la nécessité de discuter. C'est pour les peuples la possibilité de se donner une raison de ne pas tomber aveuglement les uns sur les autres."

Franklin-Bouillon (président de la commission des affaires étrangeres):

" Locarno est une experience; il faut la tenter... Locarno ne peut vivre qu' avec la bonne foi entière et la bonne volonté de l'Allemagne, et je croirai que les Allemands sont prêts a réaliser votre oeuvre, M. le President de Conseil, le lendemain du jour ou j'aurais connaissance qu'on a prononcé, a la tribune du Reichstag, un discours comme le vôtre. "

Briand ist ueber diesen Stich sehr aufgebracht. Aber Franklin-Bouillon, wie alle Vorredner, sind fuer Ratifikation.

Maginot verkuendet Enthaltung seiner Gruppe. Die Opposition kommt mit Louis Marin zu Wort, der dessen Rede im Temps fast vollstaendig unterschlagen wird.

Annahme der Ratifikation 413 gegen 71.

Maechte, dass wir in den Voelkerbund eintreten moechten, muessen wir ein Zeichen begruessen fuer die Erkenntnis der fremden Regierungen, dass eine Gesundung Europas ohne ein gleichberechtigtes Deutschland undenkbar ist."

The Farmers Loan and Trust Company, New York veranstaltete eine Umfrage ueber Locarno.

Briand antwortete: "One is never sure of having eliminated all the risks of war: and no doubt, also, causes of conflicts remain in other parts of Europe. But what these treaties offer us is the certainty that the very idea of War is condemned by all Powers who are partners to the signature." p. 12.

Stresemann: "The most important politico-economic result is foreshadowed in the final protocol of Locarno itself: universal disarmament. It would be undoubtedly self-deceptive to assume that a magic formula had been discovered at Locarno which should solve, at one stroke, and to everyone's satisfaction, this knotty problem which dominates the whole political and econimic development of the day." Amerika sei an der Entwaffnung interessiert. p. 19

Mussolini: "It is a political instrument of the sort that in the United States

Abschluss des Ruhrkonflikts

Nach dem bedingungslosen Abblasen des passiven Widerstandes schien der Ruhrkonflikt mit einem Siege Frankreichs und der eindeutigen Niederlage Deutschlands zu endigen. Daran aenderte zunaechst die mit Frankreich zustimmung erfolgte Einsetzung einer Sachverstaendigenkonferenz nichts.

Am 7. Januar 1924 trafen Dawes und Young, die amerikanischen Sachverstaendigen, in Paris ein.

11. Januar 24: Franzoesisch-belgische Note ueber einen Modus vivendi unter Aufrechterhaltung der Pfaender.

14. Januar: Sitzung des 1. Sachverstaendigenausschusses (zur Herstell des Budgetgleichgewichts). Dawes haelt eine provokante Rede, in der er den "nationalen Hochmut" fuer die Krise verantwortlich macht. Aber die Arbeiten des Ausschusses gehen in der von Poincaré gewiesenen Richtung, die Zahlungsfaehigkeit Deutschlands festzustellen, ohne die politisch-militaerischen Fragen zu behandeln.

21. Januar. Sitzung des zweiten Ausschusses unter Vorsitz von Mac Kenna (Bekaempfung der Kapitalflucht). Dieser Ausschuss leistet die positive Arbeit. Sein Bericht, vom 1. Ausschuss uebernommen und leicht korrigiert, bildet den eigentlichen "Dawesplan".

29. Januar: beide Ausschuesse in Berlin.

5. Maerz Botschafterkonferenz ueber Militaerkontrolle. Deutschlands Verfehlungen und irrtuemliche Auffassungen werden festgestellt, dabei aber Vereinfachungen und Einschraenkungen der Kontrolle vorgeschlagen. Reichsregierung einverstanden.

Nachdem Macdonald die Regierung uebernommen hat, ist er bemueht sich mit Poincaré moeglichst freundlich zu stellen.

8. Maerz: Macdonald erklaert im Unterhaus, sein Ziel sei "to stabilize Europe and to assure that the just demands of France

will be satisfied."

27. Maerz: Macdonald weigert sich, die MICUM Vertraege zu missbilligen.

9. April 1924: Gutachten der beiden Ausschuesse. "Questions of military occupation are not within our terms of reference. Our plane is based upon the assumption that existing measures, in so far as they hamper that activity (des Dawesplams) will be withdrawn or sufficiently modified,... and that they will not be reimposed except in the case of flagrant failure." Der Dawesplan forderte also keineswegs Raeumung des Ruhrgebiets und sah auch wiederholte militaerische Sanktionen vor. Poincaré ist daher sehr befriedigt. Er schreibt am 14. April an Macdonald, England und Frankreich seien darueber einig, dass die Ruhr nur geraeumt werde"à mesure des paiements" , und er faehrt fort: "Vous avez bien voulu dire à MM Theunis et Hymans que, dans l'éventualité d'une rupture des engagements contractés par l'Allemagne, celle-ci trouverait devant elle inflexiblement unies, comme elles le furent pendant la guerre, l'Angleterre, le Belgique et la France." Temps 29. Mai 24. Diese Erkla rung hatte Macdonald tatsaechlich den belgischen Ministern abgegeben, wie er am 23. Mai bestaetigte.

15. April: Poincaré feiert auf einem Bankett der Tonnart-Partei das Sachverstaendigengutachten, das beweise, dass Deutschland seine Zahlungsunfaehigkeit betruegerischerweise herbeigefuehrt habe und sehr wohl in der Lage sei zu zahlen. Eine franzoesische Regierungserklaerung vom 25. April ruehmt das Gutachten als "unparteiisch und realistisch". Sie begruesst die Zustimmung der Repko, die am 11. April grundsaetzlich und, nach der Zustimmung der Reichsregierung vom 16 April, am 17. April faktisch erfolgt war. Die andern alliierten Regierungen stimmen ebenfalls am 25. April zu.

[Mai Französische Wahlen.

1. Juni 1924 Ruecktritt Poincarés. 11. Juni Beseitigung Millerands. 13. Juni Doumergue zum Praesifenten der Republik gewaehlt. (Nicht Painlevé, der Kandidat Herriots).

Inzwischen hatten am 4.Mai Reichstagswahlen stattgefunden, die nach der Times vom 6.Mai "nicht ermutigend" ausgefallen waren. (Deutsch-Nationale 96 statt 66, Sozialisten 100 statt 174, Demokraten 28 statt 39, Volkspartei 32 statt 43,Kommunisten 62 statt 15)

22. Mai Herriot empfaengt Vertreter des Vorwaerts und kuendigt "neue Politik der Versoehnung" an.

21-22. Juni. Zusammenkunft Herriot-Macdonald in Chequers. Nach Reuter "freundliche und intime Aussprache". Macdonald betont "unbeugsame Einigkeit", fordert aber Zugestaendnisse an ein pazifistisches Deutschland (nachdem Deutschland am 4. Mai gewaehlt hatte). Von Chequers aus wird am

22. Juni eine englisch-franzoesische Note an Reichskanzler Marx geschickt, die Beunruhigung ueber die Aktivitaet militaerischer und nationalistischer Organisationen in Deutschland ausspricht.

30. Juni Reichsregierung antwortet, es handle sich nur um Organisationen zur "koerperlichen Ertuechtigung". Indessen sei die Erbitterung ueber die Ruhrbesetzung in Deutschland allgemein und nicht auf Nationalisten beschraenkt.

26. Juni: Herriot berichtet in der Kammer ueber Chequers. "Il fallait choisir entre le rétablissement de l'Entente interalliée et le maintien d'une action isolée." In Chequers sei ueber die interalliierten Schulden, Reparation und Sicherheit verhandelt worden. Die Ausfuehrung des Dawsplans sei an die Ruhr-Raeumung geknuepft. Diese letzte Enthuellung erregt Sensation und gefaehrdet Herriots Kabinett. Auf seinen Hilferuf kommt Macdonald am 8. Juli nach Paris, um auf einige Politiker einzuwirken und einige Punkte zu berichtigen. Seydoux repariert einige Schaeden des Abkommens von Chequers. Am

9. Juli englisch-franzoesisches Abkommen ueber Durchfuehrung des Daws-

plans,das die eventuellen Geldgeber beruhigen soll,indem es ein"Regime des Vertrauens"schafft. "Eine gewollte Nichterfuellung wichtigerer Art wuerde indessen sofoert die Frage der Aufrichtigkeit Deutschlands aufrollen."

Herriot erwartete Englands Gegenleistung zu seinen Zugestaendnissen von Macdonalds Versprechen,das dann im "Genfer Protokoll" Gestalt annahm, aber nicht zur Ausfuehrung gelangte. s. u. p. 5 Schluss.

16. Juli-16. August Konferenz in London

Anwesend: Macdonald,Snowden,J.-H.Thomas,Sir Eyrie Crowe (England)
Herriot,Clementel, General Nollet, Peretti della Rocca (France)
De Stefani,Nava,Della Torretta, Pirelli (Italien)
Theunis,Hymans, Baron Moncheur (Belgien)
Hayachi, Ishii (Japan) ,sowie je ein Vertreter Portugals, Rumaeniens, Griechenlands und Jugoslawiens.

Kurz vor Beginn der Konferenz war Hughes in Europa eingetroffen, um auf Herriot staerksten Druck in der Raeumungsfrage auszuueben. D'Abernon II,83.

In der Eroeffungsansprache fordert Macdonald "que l'unité économique et fiscale de l'Allemagne soit rétablie" und "une garantie adéquate puisse être donnée aux créanciers (der Dawes-Anleihe). Belgisches Graubuch La Conference de Londres.

Herriot: "Il s'agit de concilier des interets des peuples qui ont souffert profondément et longuement d'une guerre atroce avec les nécessités de rétablir la paix."

25. Juli Macdonald an Herriot: Die Natur der von den Banken geforderten Garantien lassen die Raeumung wuenschenswert erscheinen.

27. Juli: Herriot erhebt keine grundsaetzlichen Bedenken, wenn die Fragen der interalliierten Schulden und der Sicherheit mit dem Plan verbunden werden. Macdonald damit einverstanden.

5. August: Eintreffen der deutschen Vertreter Marx, Stresemann, Luther, von Schubert.

11. August: deutsch-franzoesischer Meinungsaustausch.

13. August: Herriot erklaert, das Ruhrgebiet werde hoechstens ein Jahr nach Anwendung des Gutachtens ~~exfakx~~ geraeumt werden. Luther besteht auf Abkuerzung der Frist. Kampf um unmittelbare Raeumung. Kellog (U.S.Botschafter in London) und Macdonald unterstuetzen Herriot. (14. August). Herriot: aeusserstes Zugestaendnis: Beginn der Raeumung ein Jahr nach Unterzeichung des Schlussprotokolls der Londoner Konferenz statt nach Anwendung des Plans.

15. August: Macdonald fuer Abkuerzung der Raeumungsfrist~~xxfxxlxxexxxx lxndxxinxxexxtxndxnxixtx~~. Herriot gibt nicht weiter nach, und in der Nacht vom 15. zum 16. August erklaeren sich die Deutschen mit Herriots Termin einverstanden.

16. August: Macdonald an Herriot: Die britische Regierung hat niemals die Rechtmaessigkeit der Ruhrbesetzung anerkannt. Sie nimmt bloss Kenntnis von der deutsch-franzoesischen Einigung. Unterzeichnung des Schlussprotokolls.

Voraussetzung fuer die Anwendung der Gutschten sind, nach Franzoesisch-Britischem Memorandum vom 9. Juli 24:

Reichstagsbeschluesse und Promulgation der notwendigen Gesetze.

Installierung der Kontroll-und Ausfuehrungsorgane

Definive Konstituierung der Reichsbank und Reichsbahn

Uebergabe der Zertifikate und Obligationen

Abschluss ueber 800 Millionen Goldmark Anleihe.

1. September - 2. Oktober Voelkerbunds-Verhandlungen ueber Macdonalds Plan kollektiver Sicherheit (Genfer Protokoll).

10. Oktober 24: Ruecktritt Macdonalds. 15. November: Austen Chamberlain gegen das Genfer Protokoll . 18. Februar 1926 : Britisches Kabinett lehnt das Protokoll ab.

Deutschlands Eintritt in den Voelkerbund

Zu den deutschen Gegenvorschlaegen gegen das Versailler Vertragsinstrum hatte auch ein Antrag auf sofortige Aufnahme in den Voelkerbund gehoer Nach dessen Ablehnung kam keine deutsche Regierung auf einen derartig Antrag zurueck. (Wilson hatte Deutschland sofort aufnehmen wollen. Lansi The Peace Negociations p. 28-47)

Im September 1920 stellte Motta den Antrag auf Deutschlands Aufnahme. D widersprach Viviani heftig und brachte den Antrag zum Scheitern.

Im Juni 1922 nahm das britische Kabinett den Plan auf. "Regarding the League of Nations,Lloyd George was decidedly of opinion that Germany ou to be brought in. It was essential that the world should learn to treat Germany again as an equal." D'Abernon II,45.- 12.Juni1922

21 .Juni 22 notiert D'Abernon in London: "The question of Germany's entry into the League of Nations is becoming urgent,and is being much d cussed here in Government circles. II,46. Lloyd George ist auch dafuer, Deutschland sofort einen staendigen Ratssitz zu geben.

13. Juli 22: D'Abernon sondiert Wirth und andere massgebende Politiker Wirth ist persoenlich fuer Beitritt, aber die meisten andern aeussern Misstrauen.

24. Juli 22. D'Abernon klagt,dass die Deutschen nicht die Vorteile sehe die ihnen aus der Mitgliedschaft im Voelkerbund erwachsen.

25, Juli. Brief Wirths an D'Abernon. Der Voelkerbund sei in Deutschland hoest unpopulaer. Seine bisherigen Entscheidungen haetten den Ver dacht bestaerkt,er sei nur ein Instrument der Sieger. Er werde mit Versailles identifiziert. Keine deutsche Regierung koenne einer Organisation beitreten,die so eng mit dem Versailler Vertrag verbunden ist. Sie wuerde damit den Vertrag nochmals, und diesmal frei willig anerkennen.

5. August. Poincare, der erst jetzt von den englischen Schritten durch Robert Cecil unterrichtet wird,erklaert sich gegen Deutschlands Zulassung. D'Abernon II,75.

21. Mai 1923: Maltzan aeussert sich zu D'Abernon ablehnend ueber Englands Eintritt in den Bund.

Dann ist eine Weile keine Rede mehr von dem britischen Projekt. Erst waehrend der Londoner Konferenz im August 1924 wird der Pakt zwischen Marx, Macdonald und Herriot besprochen.

4. September 1924: Macdonald sagt in Genf: " Deutschland kann nicht ausserhalb des Voelkerbundes bleiben. Wenn ich eine Formel gebrauchen kann, die man hoffentlich nicht missverstehen wird, so moechte ich sagen, dass wir ihm nicht gestatten duerfen, draussen zu bleiben. Es gibt nicht eine einzige Debatte ueber Abruestung, ueber Friedensbedingungen, ueber Sicherheit, Sicherung der Existenz der kleinen Nationalitaeten, nicht eine einzige grosse Frage, ueber die wir diskutieren koennen with the menacing vacant chair in our midst."

5. September: Herriot: In London hat Deutschland aus freien Stuecken sich bereit erklaert, seinen Reparationsverpflichtungen nachzukommen. ... Fuer unseren Bund soll es keine Ausnahmen und Vorrechte geben.

15. September : Frithjof Nansen verhandelt mit Marx. 22:Sept. Stresemann-D'A
29. September 1924: Deutsches Memorandum.

"Unter den gegebenen Verhaeltnissen" sieht die Reichsregierung im Voelkerbund "das aussichtsreichste Mittel, die Sicherung des Friedens und der internationalen Solidaritaet zu verwirklichen." Nachdem die Londoner Konferenz ein "gedeihliches Zusammenwirken" geschaffen hat, ist die Reichsregierung bereit zum Eintritt. Sie kann aber nicht ohne weiteres Zulassung beantragen, da wichtige Bedenken entgegenstehen, die sie freimuetig eroertern will.

1) "Es liegt der deutschen Regierung fern, fuer Deutschland besondere Vorrechte Verguenstigungen zu verlangen. Sie ist der Ansicht, dass das Ziel der Entwicklung des Voelkerbundes nur die voellige Gleichstellung aller in ihm vereinigten Staaten sein kann." Da aber nun einmal eine Unterscheidung gemacht wird, muss Deutschland einen staendigen Ratssitz fordern.

2) Artikel 16 der Voelkerbundsakte fordert Beteiligung an Zwangsmas
gegen Friedensbrecher. Deutschland ist infolge der Beschraenkung
Wehrmacht ausser stande, an solchen Schritten teilzunehmen.
3) Artikel 1 der Voelkerbundsakte macht Aufnahme von Erfuellung int
naler Verpflichtungen abhaengig. . Die deutsche Regierung ist ber
(6) Abgabe einer entsprechenden Erklaerung."Diese darf aber nicht so
standen werden, als ob Behauptungen anerkannt wuerden,die eine mor
sche Belastung des deutschen Volkes in sich schliessen." Ausserde
seien die Verpflichtungen Deutschlands so gross,dass ihre Erfuellu
allein vom guten Willen Deutschlands abhaengt.
4) Deutschland erwartet,dass ihm Mandate zugesprochen werden.

6. Oktober 1924: Frankreich erklaert sich mit einem staendigen Ratssitz
Deutschland einverstanden. Der deutsche Antrag muss aber ohne Vorbe
gestellt werden.

10. Oktober. Die englische Regierung begruesst das deutsche Vorhaben, leh
aber Vorbehalte ab. Sie ist mit Deutschlands staendigem Ratssitz einv
standen. Die Zuteilung ist aber Sache des Voelkerbundes,nicht der Sta
regierungen.

12. Dezember 1924: Zweite deutsche Note.

Genugtuung ueber Aufnahme des Memorandums. Aber die Bedenken
betr. Art. 16 nocht nicht beschwichtigt. "Dem deutschen Reich muss
fuer den Fall internationaler Konflikte die Moeglichkeit belassen
werden, das Mass seiner aktiven Teilnahme selbst zu bestimmen."

(1) 17. Februar 1925: Gustav Stresemann im Reichstag: Die deutsche Noten formulieren keine Bedingungen,sondern
nur Einwaende gegen Art.16.

14. Maerz 1925: Antwort des Voelkerbundsrates. Als Ratsmitglied wird
Deutschland Einfluss auf die Entscheidungen des Bundes haben. Vorbe-
halte sind unzulaessig,da sie die Grundlage des Bundes unterminieren
wuerden. Auch andere Staaten,denen Ruestungsbeschraenkungen auferlegt
sind,haben vorbehaltlos ihren Eintritt beantragt.

28. Maerz 1925 Herriot in der Ka
Deutschlands Eintritt in den Voe
ist die Vorbedingung fuer jedes L

Inzwischen hatten am 9. Februar 1925 die Verhandlungen begonnen, d
zum Locarno-Pakt fuehrten.

16. Juni 1925: Frankreich erklaert, der Beitritt Deutschlands zum Voelkerbund sei Vorbedingung fuer den Sicherheitspakt.

20. Juli 1925: Die deutsche Regierung sieht kein Bedenken, die bei
Fragen zusammenhaengend zu behandeln.

7. September 1925 Stresemann an den frueheren Kronprinzen (Vermacch
II,553

" Zu der Frage des Eintritts in den Voelkerbund moechte ich fo
gendes bemerken.

Die deutsche Aussenpolitik hat nach meiner Auffassung fuer d
naechste absehbare Zeit drei grosse Aufgaben.

Einmal die Loesung der Reparationsfrage in einem fuer Deutsc
land ertraeglichen Sinne und die Sicherung des Friedens, die die Voraus
setzung fuer eine Wiedererstarkung Deutschlands ist.

Zweitens rechne ich dazu den Schutz der Auslandsdeutschen, jen
10-12 Millionen Stammesgenossen, die jetzt unter fremdem Joch in fremd
Laendern leben.

Die dritte grosse Aufgabe ist die Korrektur der Ostgrenzen: di
Wiedergewinnung Danzigs, des polnischen Korridors und eine Korrektur
der Grenze in Ober schlesien.

Im Hintergrund steht der Anschluss Deutsch-Oesterreichs, obwohl
ich mir sehr klar darueber bin, dass dieser Anschluss nicht nur Vor-
teile fuer Deutschland bringt, sondern das Problem des Deutschen Reichs
sehr kompliziert.

Wollen wir diese Ziele erreichen, so muessen wir uns aber auf diese
Aufgaben konzentrieren. Daher der Sicherheitspakt, der uns einmal den
Frieden garantieren und England sowie, wenn Mussolini mitmacht, Italien
als Garanten der deutschen Westgrenze festlegen soll. Der Sicherheits-
pakt birgt anderseits in sich den Verzicht auf eine kriegerische Aus-

einandersetzung mit Frankreich wegen der Rueckgewinnung Elsass-Lo ringens, einen deutschen Verzicht, der aber insoweit nur theoretisc Charakter hat, als keine Moeglichkeit eines Krieges gegen Frankre besteht. Die Reparationslasten, die der Dawesplan uns auferlegt, wer voraussichtlich schon 1927 untragbar sein. Wir muessen dann eine r Konferenz verlangen zur Neufeststellung der deutschen Zahlungsfaeh keit....

Die Sorge fuer die Auslandsdeutschen spricht fuer den Eintritt in den Voelkerbund. Auch das Saarland... ist fuer den Eintritt. Wir werd in Genf der Wortfuehrer der ganzen deutschen Kulturgemeinschaft sein ... Die Bedenken, dass wir im Voelkerbunde ueberstimmt werden koennen, gehen von der falschen Voraussetzung aus, dass es in dem Voelkerbundsrat, der die Entscheidung hat, eine Ueberstimmung gibt. Die Beschluesse des Voelkerbundsrates muessen einstimmig gefasst werden. Deutschlands staendiger Ratssitz ist ihm zugesichert. Wenn wir jetzt im Voelkerbundsrat waeren, wuerde Polen in Danzig in der Frage der Post nicht durchkommen, weil der Einspruch des deutschen Vertreters genuegen wuerde, um dieser Anspruch zurueckzuweisen. Polen, die Tschechoslowakei, Jugoslawien und Rumaenien, die saemtlich durch internationale Vertraege gebunden sind, fuer ihre Minderheiten, d.h. speziell fuer die deutschen Minderheiten zu sorgen, werden sich nicht so straeflich ueber ihre Verpflichtungen hinwegsetzen koennen, wenn sie wissen, dass Deutschland alle diese Verfehlungen vor den Voelkerbund bringen kann. Zudem sind alle diese Fragen, die dem deutschen Volk auf dem Herzen brennen, z.B. Fragen der Kriegsschuld, allgemeine Abruestung, Danzig, Saargebiet u.S.w. Angelegenheiten des Voelkerbundes, die durch einen geschickten Redner im Plenum des Voelkerbundes zu ebenso vielen Unannehmlichkeiten fuer die Entente werden koennen. Frankreich ist von dem Gedanken des Eintritts Deutschlands in den Voelkerbund durchaus nicht entzueckt, waehrend England ihn herbeiwuenscht, um Frankreichs ueber-

ragenden Einfluss im Voelkerbund entgegentreten zu koennen. "

Keine Option zwischen Ost und West.

"Die grosse Bewegung,die jetzt durch die Naturvoelker geht,die sich ge die koloniale Beherrschung grosser Voelker wendet,wird,glaube ich, durch unseren Eintritt in den Voelkerbund in keiner Weise zum Schaden dieser Vo ker beeinflusst. Das Wichtigste ist fuer die unter 1 beruehrte Frage der deutschen Politik das Freiwerden deutschen Landes von fremder Besetzung. Wir muessen den Burger erst vom Halse haben. Deshalb wird die deutsche Po tik,wie Metternich von Oesterreich wohl nach 1809 sagte, in dieser Bezie hung zunaechst darin bestehen muessen,zu finassieren und den grossen Ent- scheidungen auszuweichen."

1. Dezember 1925. Abschluss des Sicherheitspaktes von Locarno,der aber ungueltig wird,wenn Deutschland dem Voelkerbunde nicht beitritt. Anlage F enthaelt Praezisionen uebr Art 16. des Voelkerbundsakte.

3. Februar 1926: Der Auswaertige Ausschuss des Reichstags ermaechtigt die Reichsregierung, den Beitritt zum Voelkerbund zu vollziehen. Bayern erhebt im Reichsrat Bedenken,wird aber ueberstimmt.

8. Februar. Die Reichsregierung beschliesst einstimmig Absendung einer Note,die den Eintritt ankuendigt.

Nachdem die Note abgeschickt war, erfolgte aber eine unterwarte- te Komplikation:

16. Februar : Hergt erklaert im Auswaertigen Ausschuss, saemtliche Parteien,mit Ausnahme der Voelkischen und der Kommunisten, seien bei ihrer Zustimmung zum Eintritt Deutschlands in den Voelkerbund von der Voraussetzung ausgegangen, dass Deutschland einen staendigen Ratssitz erhaelt,ohne dass dabei weitere Veraenderungen in der Zusammensetzung des Rates erfolgen.

Diese Entschliessung,die bestimmt nicht aus der Intitiative der Par- teien hervorgegangen ist,sondern von der Reichsregierung inspiriert wur-

de, richtete ihre Spitze gegen Frankreich, das gleichzeitig mit Deutschland einen staendigen Ratssitz an Polen geben wollte. Austen Chamberlain hatte Briand seine Unterstuetzung zu dem Antrag zugesag wurde aber nach der deutschen Erklaerung vom Kabinett im Stich gel sen. Robert Cecil , A great experiment,1940,p. 176-180.

Der ~~staendige~~ Rat" des Voelkerbundes war eine Schoepfung Ceci die einem praktischen Bedeuerfnis entsprang, da das Plenum ein Execu Organ dringend brauchte. Seit 1922 war der Rat so konstituiert,da England, Frankreich, Italien und Belgien je einen staendigen Vertrete im Rat hatten, zu denen 6 andere Vertreter kamen, fuer deren Turnus keine Vorschriften bestanden, so dass mehrere von ihnen semipermanent waren, d.h. immer wieder gewaehlt wurden. Zu diesen gehoerten der spanische, brasilianische und polnische Vertreter. Da nun die Befuer tung entstand, dass Deutschland als staendiges Ratsmitglied diesen permanenten Wiederwahlen Schwierigkeiten machen wuerde, stellten die drei Staaten den Antrag auf Erteilung eines wirklichen staendig Ratssitzes. Sie wollten also aus einem Gewohnheitsrecht ein formale Recht machen. Das deutsche Vorgehen richtete sich in erster Linie ge den polnischen Ratssitz.

1. Maerz 26: Louis Marin in der Deputierten kammer: Deutschlands Triumpf in der Voelkerbundfrage zeigt seine erste Auswirkung in der Behandlung Polens.

2. März 26. Reichskanzler Luther in Hamburg: "Der Locarno-Pakt wird erst wirksam durch den Eintritt Deutschlands in den Voelkerbund. Die Reichsregierung hat deswegen den Aufnahmeantrag gestellt, nachdem der Anspruch auf Raeumung der ersten Rheinlandzone endlich erfuellt wurde." L. protestiert gegen Erweiterung des Rates. "Wer auf Grund bestimmter Abreden seine Aufnahme in eine Organisation beantragt.darf erwarten, diese Organisation bei seinem Eintritt in unveraenderter Gestalt vorzufinden....

Deutschland muss die Frage,ob es in den Voelkerbund eintreten soll,einfach von der Entscheidung darueber abhaengig machen,ob es glaubt, innerausserhalb des Voelkerbundes den deutschen Interessen besser dienen zu k nen. Wird die Frage des Eintritts aber bejaht,so bedeutet das, dass Deutland die grossen Gedanken des Voelkerbundesgemeinschaft sich zu eigen ma Fuer seine besonderen Interessen erwartet Deutschland im Rahmen der Voel bundsgemeinschaft in gleicher Weise Beruecksichtigung und Verstandnis,wi es sie selbst den Interessen der andern Voelker entgegenbringt."

5. Maerz Abreise der deutschen Delegation nach Genf.

8. Maerz Ausserordentliche Tagung des Voelkerbundes.

9-16. Maerz Verhandlungen ueber Ratserweiterung. Die deutsche Delegation beharrt auf ihrem "Rechtsstandpunkt" und verweigert jedes Versprechen,in Zukunft der Schaffung eines neuen staendigen Ratssitzes zuzustimm

17. Marz Veto Brasiliens. Briand beantragt eine Resolution des Bedauerns,Deutschland noch nicht als Bundesmitglied begruessen zu koennen. Die Deutschen reisen ab. In Genf hatten die "Locarnomaechte" zusammengearbeitet. Briand sagte: Genf hat sich nicht bewaehrt,Locarno hat sich bewaehrt. Chamberlain zu Stresemann: "Whenever we make a co to you instead of acknowledging it you ask for m Briand: "By no means a bad system." D'Abernon III,

23. Maerz : Austen Chamberlain im Unterhaus, Stresemann im Reichstag.

Chamberlain : Deutschlands Forderung,in den unveraenderten Rat einzutreten, hat eine neue Lage geschaffen. Weder vor noch in Locarno war von solchen Bedingungen die Rede. Es war kein schlechter Wille Deutschlands, aber mangelnde Voraussicht. Es seien neue Instruktionen an den britischen Vertreter gegeben worden, keinen Wechsel im Rate zu dulden,der Deutschlands spaeteren Beitritt unmoeglich machen wuerde. (Cecil p.179, er sei instruiert worden, auf Deutschlands Zulassung zum Rat zu bestehen,keinen anderen neuen Ratssitze zu tolerieren, aber to do what I could to satisfy Spain and Brasil.)

Stresemann: Deutschland hat sich nicht zum Voelkerbund gedraengt. Es hat seiner Wuerde nichts vergeben. "Im Auswaertigen Ausschuss hat einer der

Herren Abgeordneten darauf hingewiesen,wie demuetigend es fuer Deutschland sein wuerde,nunmehr vor einer Aufnahmekommission zu stehen,einen Fragebogen auszufuellen zu muessen, um gewissermassen darzutun,dass es wert sei,in den Voelkerbund aufgenommen zu werden,und hat sehr starken Zweifel geaeussert,als ich erklaerte,das werde man Deutschland nicht zu muten./ Die Kommission ist nach den Satzungen des Voelkerbundes verpflichtet,Fragen an diejenigen Nationen zu stellen,die sich um Aufnahme an den Voelkerbund wenden. Die erste Kommission hat beschlossen,nicht nur von dem Fragebogen abzusehen,sondern von jeder Befragung,und einstimmig zu erklaeren,dass Deutschland seine internationalen Verpflichtungen erfuellt habe. Auf diesen Satz lege ich aus aussenpolitischen Gruenden ein sehr grosses Gewicht. Jahrelang ist unser Kampf in der Welt darum gegangen, die Welt davon zu ueberzeugen, dass Deutschland seine internationalen Verpflichtungen nach Recht und Billigkeit erfuellt habe,und immer wieder ist dieser Erklaerung der angeblich schlechte Wille Deutschlands entgegengesetzt worden. Fuer viele Fragen,die gegenwaertig schweben, Fragen,die sich nicht nur auf die Reparationsleistungen beziehen,ist diese einmuetige Erklaerung aller Maechte,darunter doch fast aller Gegner, von groesster Bedeutung,dass sie ohne jede Befragung Deutschlands,ob es sich selbst auf diesen Standpunkt stellt, vor der Welt erklaeren, Deutschland habe seine internationalen Verpflichtungen erfuellt."

31. Maerz : Deutschland,obwohl nicht Bundesmitglied wird in die Studienkommission fuer Ratsreform gewaehlt. Seine Vertreter sind Koesch und Gaus.

15. April. Beginn der Arbeit der Stdienkommssion.

4. September Ratsreform beschlossen (15 Mitglieder,davon 6 staendige,3 dreijaehrige mit Wiederwaehlbarkeit, 3 zweijaehrige und 3 einjaehrige).

8. September Deutschlands Aufnahme beschlossen.

10. September Deutschlands Eintritt. Reden Stresemanns und Briands.

. Sept. Locarno ratifiziert.

General Mordacq

Der militärische Adjutant
Clemenceaus beschreibt, ~~den letzten~~
~~Kampf~~ die Sorgen militärischer
Befugnissen für die deutsche
Armee schließlich durchgesetzt
wurden.

C'est seulement une fois ce délai écoulé et les conditions remplies, que le ravitaillement de l'ennemi pourra être autorisé, suivant les accords spéciaux qui le régleront ;

7° Les prisonniers alliés seront rendus, dans le plus bref délai possible, dans des conditions dont le détail sera réglé ultérieurement.

***

Le 29 octobre commencèrent les conférences alliées pour l'examen des conditions de l'armistice à imposer aux Allemands, lorsqu'ils en adresseraient la demande. Elles eurent lieu, tantôt au Quai d'Orsay, tantôt au ministère de la Guerre, tantôt chez le colonel House, et enfin à Versailles, siège du Conseil supérieur de guerre.

La première eut lieu au Quai d'Orsay. M. Lloyd George, arrivé la veille de Londres, y assistait, ainsi que le colonel House (1), qui repré-

(1) Quand on avait un peu « pratiqué » le colonel House on se rendait très bien compte des raisons qui avaient incité Wilson à lui accorder sa confiance et même son amitié.

Le colonel House est un homme très cultivé, particulièrement fin, doué d'une intelligence des plus vives, courtois, distingué, qui a retiré de ses voyages à travers le monde, et surtout en Europe, non seulement une profonde connaissance des hommes et des choses, mais encore des idées générales très développées. Enfin, il représente le type de l'honnête homme par excellence, profondément estimé de tous ceux qui l'ont approché. Wilson s'était très bien rendu compte que le colonel avait tout pour réussir auprès des hommes d'État français et anglais, et surtout qu'il possédait ce qui manquait surtout à lui, Wilson : la connaissance de l'Europe.

Il aurait dû, par conséquent, s'en remettre à lui en toutes

sentait Wilson et par conséquent l'Amérique.

La séance fut assez orageuse. Clemenceau en sortit très énervé, exaspéré même, et le soir, quand il m'en relata les principaux incidents, il en était encore pâle d'émotion.

Dès que la lecture du projet établi par le maréchal Foch fut terminé, M. Lloyd George et le colonel House demandèrent la parole et l'on put voir alors, nettement, qu'ils étaient bien décidés à ne pas laisser imposer à l'Allemagne les conditions proposées par la France. M. Lloyd George, en particulier, reprit presque tous les arguments exposés, à Senlis, le 25 octobre, par le maréchal Haig : les armées allemandes étaient loin d'être détruites, elles se battaient encore très bravement ; enfin, les armées anglaises et françaises étaient très fatiguées, combattant sans relâche depuis quatre mois. Quant à l'armée américaine, elle n'était pas encore en état de voler de ses propres ailes. Il ne fallait donc pas pousser les Allemands à bout, mais, au contraire, leur imposer des conditions acceptables, donc raisonnables. En conséquence, vouloir occuper la rive gauche du Rhin, avec des têtes de pont sur la rive droite et réclamer la livraison du matériel de guerre

circonstances et jusqu'au bout. Il ne le fit pas. Pourquoi? Nous l'ignorons. D'ailleurs, dès que l'on poussait le colonel House à fond, on constatait souvent, chez lui, certaines hésitations, certains scrupules, contraires cependant à sa nature d'abord, à ses opinions ensuite, qui étaient très nettes. On voyait bien, dès lors, combien il avait de peine à adapter les rêveries de Wilson aux réalités des vieux États européens, réalités que lui, colonel House, connaissait mieux que personne.

presque tout entier, lui semblait vraiment exagéré.

Le colonel House, sans être aussi absolu, fit, de son côté, de nombreuses réserves qui étonnèrent d'autant plus Clemenceau que le général Bliss, représentant des États-Unis au Conseil des délégués militaires, dans les discussions qui venaient d'avoir lieu au sujet des conditions de l'armistice, s'était montré particulièrement dur pour les Allemands. Dès que l'on avait parlé de l'armistice, il n'avait pas hésité à déclarer qu'à son avis « le moment n'était pas encore venu de le conclure, et qu'il n'y aurait lieu de le signer que lorsque les Alliés seraient à Berlin ».

En tout cas, le général estimait que le texte présenté par le maréchal Foch était beaucoup trop long et que les conditions de l'armistice prévues par les Alliés pouvaient se résumer en deux lignes : désarmement total et démobilisation complète.

J'ajoute que je partageais complètement les idées du général Bliss et ne manquais jamais l'occasion de le clamer *urbi et orbi*, surtout auprès du président du Conseil.

En vain, Clemenceau déploya-t-il toute son éloquence, toute son ardeur patriotique à essayer de convaincre ses partenaires. Il n'y réussit pas et vit bien que, ce jour-là, il s'adressait à des gens absolument irréductibles. Il demanda donc à remettre la séance au lendemain et l'on se donna rendez-vous au ministère de la Guerre.

Je vis rarement le Président aussi triste, aussi soucieux, aussi nerveux que ce soir-là, et le lendemain matin, en effet, quand je lui demandai comment il avait passé la nuit, il me répondit « qu'il n'avait pas fermé l'œil mais qu'il en avait profité

pour réfléchir longuement et que, quoi qu'il arrive, *il ne laisserait pas saboter la victoire* ».

***

Le lendemain, 30 octobre, à 10 h. 30, M. Lloyd George et le colonel House étaient réunis rue Saint-Dominique. Le colonel House, sur la demande de Clemenceau, je crois, était arrivé vers 10 heures et put ainsi, avant la conférence, causer longuement et seul à seul, avec le Président. Cette conversation eut une influence considérable sur les décisions qui furent ensuite prises. Clemenceau qui, ainsi qu'il venait de me le dire, avait beaucoup réfléchi à la question pendant son insomnie de la nuit, avait sans doute trouvé des arguments nouveaux et très puissants, car il finit par obtenir de M. Lloyd George et du colonel que l'on occuperait la rive gauche du Rhin et des têtes de pont sur la rive droite. Quant au matériel à exiger des Allemands, les représentants de l'Angleterre et de l'Amérique semblèrent y attacher beaucoup moins d'importance que la veille. Clemenceau n'insista donc pas, voyant bien que l'on arriverait assez facilement à les faire céder sur ce point.

Par contre, quand on aborda la question de savoir quelle ville serait choisie comme siège des négociations pour le traité de paix et que l'on se fut mis d'accord pour une ville située sur le continent même, M. Lloyd George proposa immédiatement Genève. Il fut facile de démontrer que l'on ne pouvait réserver un tel honneur à la capitale d'un pays qui était resté neutre. M. Lloyd George proposa alors Nice. Clemenceau déclara que la France,

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Mordacq, « L'armistice du 11 novembre 1918 », p. 163

Colonel House

Der Herausgeber der „Intimate Papers" des Colonels bestreitet die Sitzung ~~[illegible]~~ vom 29. Oktober 1919, in welcher House (Lansing) ~~[illegible]~~ das Aufgeben der 14 Punkte ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~.

zu exekutieren

Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. IV, p. 162

ANNA MARIA DAVIS, *b.* M
29 1856 *m.* June 29 1886

The French and the Italians... had their own objections to the)

Wilsonian programme, and neither Clemenceau nor Sonnino was pleased by the prospect. All three seemed entirely disinclined to accept the Wilsonian programme as a whole.

'If we agree upon the terms of an armistice,' said the British Prime Minister, 'do we not assume that we accept the Fourteen Points as stated by President Wilson? Germany has asked for an armistice on condition of President Wilson's Fourteen Points being the terms of peace. If we send conditions across, it would appear that we accept those terms. Therefore we should consider whether we are prepared to accept the Fourteen Points.... I ask Colonel House whether the German Government is accepting terms of an armistice on the President's conditions of peace. The question is: Do we or do we not accept the whole of President Wilson's Fourteen Points? I am going to put quite clearly the points which I do not accept. Should we not make it clear to the German Government that we are not going in on the Fourteen Points of peace?'

Clemenceau at once stated that he was not inclined to commit himself and France blindly. 'Have you ever been asked by President Wilson,' he said to Lloyd George, 'whether you accept the Fourteen Points? I have never been asked.'

'I have not been asked either,' replied the British Prime Minister; and, turning to Colonel House: 'What is your view? Do you think that if we agree to an armistice we accept the President's peace terms?'

'That is my view,' replied Colonel House.

Pichon believed the matter could be pushed to one side. 'We can say to Germany that we are only stating terms of an armistice, not terms of peace.'

But the British pointed out that it was impossible to separate the different portions of the correspondence that had been passed with Germany, since the request for the

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But the British pointed out that it was impossible to separate the different portions of the correspondence that had been passed with Germany, since the request for the

Armistice was conditioned upon the Fourteen Points. 'What we are afraid of,' added Mr. Balfour, 'is that we cannot say that we are merely interested in the terms of an armistice. For the moment, unquestionably, we are not bound by President Wilson's terms; but if we assent to an armistice without making our position clear, we shall certainly be so bound.'

'Then,' said Clemenceau, 'I want to hear the Fourteen Points.'

'Yes,' said Sonnino, none too well pleased, 'and the five more and the others.'

Thus began the discussion, which at the start seemed most inauspicious for House's hope of winning acceptance of the Wilsonian programme. The first point was read aloud: 'Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at . . .'

Clemenceau's reaction was not for a moment a matter of doubt. 'I cannot agree,' he said, 'never to make a private or secret diplomatic agreement of any kind.' To which Mr. Lloyd George added, with equal brevity and decision: 'I do not think it possible so to limit oneself.'

Colonel House, however, produced the commentary on the point, illustrated by a speech of Wilson to the Senate, showing that the proposal did not mean open conferences but merely publicity of results. He was supported by Mr. Balfour, who argued that the intent was to prohibit secret treaties.

The discussion passed to the second point, regarding the Freedom of the Seas, which Mr. Lloyd George interpreted as the abolition of the right of blockade and against which he inveighed with force.

'This point,' he insisted, 'we cannot accept under any conditions; it means that the power of blockade goes; Germany has been broken almost as much by the blockade as by military methods; if this power is to be handed over to

the League of Nations and Great Britain were fighting for her life, no league of nations would prevent her from defending herself. This power has prevented Germany from getting rubber, cotton, and food through Holland and the Scandinavian countries. Therefore my view is that I should like to see this League of Nations established first before I let this power go. If the League of Nations is a reality, I am willing to discuss the matter.'

Colonel House did not interpret the term 'Freedom of the Seas' to mean the abolition of the principle of blockade; for him it signified merely a codification of maritime usage that would sanctify the doctrine of the immunity of private property at sea in time of war. Unless the British recognized the demand of the United States that their trade with neutrals be allowed to go unhampered on the high seas, it was certain that British control of the seas would be resented; inevitably the United States would feel the need of building a navy capable of protecting its trade. House did not conceal his fear that, apart from the perils of naval competition, in case of another war British interference with American trade would throw the United States into the arms of Great Britain's enemy, whoever that might be.

'Great Britain,' he said, 'might find itself at war with some other Power, possibly France; in the past war the sympathy of the United States had been with the Allies, because of Germany's abominable naval practices; in a future war if France did not resort to any of these practices and was the weaker naval power, the sympathy of the United States might be with France.'

The French and the Italians were not impressed by the dangers to Anglo-American amity that might proceed from British control of the sea unless regulated by a revision of

maritime law. Furthermore, they had their own objections to the Fourteen Points, and they readily joined with Mr. Lloyd George in opposition to a general endorsement of them. The Italian Foreign Secretary demanded that the President be informed categorically that at this time the Allies could give him no assurance that his Points would be acceptable. It was impossible, said Sonnino, to agree upon a peace programme at the moment of making the Armistice. As regards British use of naval power, 'it had to be remembered that nations, like animals, had different weapons; one animal had teeth, another tusks, another claws, and so it was with nations.' All that could be done at the moment, he felt, was to settle the military and naval terms of the Armistice; the bases of peace must be left until later.

Such postponement of an agreement upon principles was, of course, exactly what House desired to avoid. So long as Germany was still in the field and the Allies were uncertain of her acceptance of the Armistice, the influence of the United States remained very strong; once Germany had surrendered, it might prove easier for the Allies to disregard that influence and make any sort of peace they pleased. Colonel House, accordingly, maintained inflexibly the position which he had assumed. If the Allies persisted in their refusal to accept the Fourteen Points, upon which Germany based her request for an armistice, there could be only one result: the negotiations with Germany would have to be wiped off the slate; President Wilson would have no alternative but to tell the enemy that his conditions were not accepted by the Allies. The question would then arise whether America would not have to take these matters up directly with Germany and Austria.

'That would amount,' said Clemenceau, 'to a separate peace between the United States and the Central Powers.'

'It might,' replied Colonel House.

'My statement,' he telegraphed the President, 'had a very exciting effect on those present.'

INTENTIONAL SECOND EXPOSURE

[The French and the Italians...

maritime law. Furthermore, they had their own objections to the Fourteen Points, and they readily joined with Mr. Lloyd George in opposition to a general endorsement of them. The Italian Foreign Secretary demanded that the President be informed categorically that at this time the Allies could give him no assurance that his Points would be acceptable. It was impossible, said Sonnino, to agree upon a peace programme at the moment of making the Armistice. As regards British use of naval power, 'it had to be remembered that nations, like animals, had different weapons; one animal had teeth, another tusks, another claws, and so it was with nations.' All that could be done at the moment, he felt, was to settle the military and naval terms of the Armistice; the bases of peace must be left until later.

Such postponement of an agreement upon principles was, of course, exactly what House desired to avoid. So long as Germany was still in the field and the Allies were uncertain of her acceptance of the Armistice, the influence of the United States remained very strong; once Germany had surrendered, it might prove easier for the Allies to disregard that influence and make any sort of peace they pleased. Colonel House, accordingly, maintained inflexibly the position which he had assumed. If the Allies persisted in their refusal to accept the Fourteen Points, upon which Germany based her request for an armistice, there could be only one result: the negotiations with Germany would have to be wiped off the slate; President Wilson would have no alternative but to tell the enemy that his conditions were not accepted by the Allies. The question would then arise whether America would not have to take these matters up directly with Germany and Austria.

'That would amount,' said Clemenceau, 'to a separate peace between the United States and the Central Powers.'

'It might,' replied Colonel House.

'My statement,' he telegraphed the President, 'had a very exciting effect on those present.'

Marshall Foch

Der Generalissimus begruendet in einer Sitzung

Vom 1.November 1918 zum letzten mal seine gemaessigteren Bedingungen fuer die deutsche Waffenstillstands-Armee. Er begruendet,warum er die weitergehenden Forderungen der amerikanischen Generale fuer ueberfluessig haelt.

"Will you tell us,M.le Maréchal," said House,"solely from the military point of view,apart from any other consideration,whether you would prefer the Germans to reject or to sign the armistice as outlined here?"

"Fighting",replied Foch,"means struggling for certain results.(On ne fait la guerre que pour ses résultats).If the Germans now sign an armistice under the general conditions we have just determined,those results are in our possession. This beeing achieved,no man has the right to cause another drop of blood to be shed."

Seymour:The Intimate
Papers of Col.House,Vol.IV,p.91

President Wilson

In einer Rede im House vom
21. July 1917 spricht Wilson [illegible] Friedenszeitpunkt
[illegible] davon, daß seine Friedens-Bedingungen
eines Tages den Alliierten aufgezwungen.
[illegible] Er deutet
die Mittel [illegible] an, mit denen
das aufgezwungen geschehen könne.

Saturday, July 21st 1917

Wilson to House

.. England and France have not the same views with regard to peace that we have by any means. When the war is over we can force them ~~out~~ to our way of thinking, because by that time they will, among other things, be financially in our hands; but we cannot force them now, and any attempt to speak for them or to speak our common mind would bring on disagreements which would inevitably come to the surface in public and rob the whole thing of its effects.... Our real peace terms — those upon which we shall undoubtedly insist, — are not now acceptable to either France or Italy (leaving Great Britain for the moment out of consideration) ....

Ray S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson Life and Letters VII / 180

General Pershing

Der amerikanische Oberkommandierende ~~[illegible]~~ verlangt am 30. Oktober 1918 ~~[illegible]~~ klipp und klare Bedingungen für die deutsche Armee als sich vorbehaltlose Waffenstillstands-Bedingungen. Er verlangt absolute Übergabe der Waffen, Material, Flugzeuge, Heer, Marine, Offiziere, Soldaten, Waffenstillstand überhaupt, ~~absolute Entwaffnung~~.

prepared, and in view of the first paragraph of the message I also cabled the substance of the letter to Washington:

"Paris, October 30, 1918.

"To the Allied Supreme War Council,
"Paris.

"GENTLEMEN:

"In considering the question of whether or not Germany's request for an armistice should be granted, the following expresses my opinion from the military point of view:

"1. Judging by their excellent conduct during the past three months, the British, French, Belgian and American Armies appear capable of continuing the offensive indefinitely. Their morale is high and the prospects of certain victory should keep it so.

"2. The American Army is constantly increasing in strength and experience, and should be able to take an increasingly important part in the Allied offensive. Its growth both in personnel and matériel, with such reserves as the Allies may furnish, not counting the Italian Army, should be more than equal to the combined losses of the Allied armies.

"3. German manpower is constantly diminishing and her armies have lost over 300,000 prisoners and over one-third of their artillery during the past three months in their effort to extricate themselves from a difficult situation and avoid disaster.

"4. The estimated strength of the Allies on the Western Front, not counting Italy, and of Germany, in rifles is:

Allies	1,563,000
Germany	1,134,000
An advantage in favor of the Allies of 37 per cent.	

"In guns:

Allies	22,413
Germany	16,495
An advantage of 35 per cent in favor of the Allies.	

"If Italy's forces should be added to the Western Front we should have a still greater advantage.

"5. Germany's morale is undoubtedly low, her Allies have deserted her one by one and she can no longer hope to win. Therefore

we should take full advantage of the situation and continue the offensive until we compel her unconditional surrender.

"6. An armistice would revivify the low spirits of the German Army and enable it to reorganize and resist later on, and would deprive the Allies of the full measure of victory by failing to press their present advantage to its complete military end.

"7. As the apparent humility of German leaders in talking of peace may be feigned, the Allies should distrust their sincerity and their motives. The appeal for an armistice is undoubtedly to enable the withdrawal from a critical situation to one more advantageous.

"8. On the other hand, the internal political conditions of Germany, if correctly reported, are such that she is practically forced to ask for an armistice to save the overthrow of her present Government, a consummation which should be sought by the Allies as precedent to permanent peace.

"9. A cessation of hostilities short of capitulation postpones, if it does not render impossible, the imposition of satisfactory peace terms, because it would allow Germany to withdraw her army with its present strength, ready to resume hostilities if terms were not satisfactory to her.

"10. An armistice would lead the Allied armies to believe this the end of fighting and it would be difficult, if not impossible, to resume hostilities with our present advantage in morale in the event of failure to secure at a peace conference what we have fought for.

"11. By agreeing to an armistice under the present favorable military situation of the Allies and accepting the principle of a negotiated peace rather than a dictated peace the Allies would jeopardize the moral position they now hold and possibly lose the chance actually to secure world peace on terms that would insure its permanence.

"12. It is the experience of history that victorious armies are prone to overestimate the enemy's strength and too eagerly seek an opportunity for peace. This mistake is likely to be made now on account of the reputation Germany has gained through her victories of the last four years.

"13. Finally, I believe the complete victory can only be obtained by continuing the war until we force unconditional surrender from Germany, but if the Allied Governments decide to grant an armistice, the terms should be so rigid that under no circumstances could Germany again take up arms.

"Respectfully submitted:

"JOHN J. PERSHING,
"Commander-in-Chief, A.E.F."

Pershing, My Experiences in the World War
Vol. 366

367

INTENTIONAL SECOND EXPOSURE

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268

Philipp Scheidemann

Der sozialdemokratische Minister fordert am 29. Oktober 1918 in einem Brief an den Reichskanzler eine Aussprache im Kabinett über die Kaiser-Frage. ~~Sein Vorschlag müsse vorbereitet werden,~~ Im Interesse besserer Friedens-Bedingungen ~~abzuwenden, müsse dem~~ Monarchen nahegelegt werden, abzudanken.

4 .....

"When publicity has been robbed of the possibility of elucidating by discussion a question that is a burning topic of fateful import to the German people, the necessity of debating on it inside the Cabinet and of coming to some decision becomes doubly important. For this reason I find myself forced to lay before the Cabinet the demand that cannot be published in the Press, and it is, namely, this: The Secretaries of State ~~would like to~~ ask the Imperial Chancellor to advise His Majesty to retire of his own free will.

R.....

"There is no doubt that the great majority of the inhabitants of the German Empire are convinced that the prospects of getting tolerable terms for the Armistice and the Peace are being ruined by the Emperor's remaining in his exalted office. Were an unfavourable peace concluded while the Emperor remains in office, both he and the Government would be reproached for having preferred inflicting heavy trials on the people, to taking a course, entailed by circumstances, for the good of the common weal.

"It cannot be doubted, either, that the peace negotiations would present more favourable prospects if the reforms of the Constitution in the German Empire were made clear at home and abroad by a change in the highest position of the Empire. The present crisis leads us to suppose that the step here proposed can only be postponed, but not avoided. It is therefore better if the Emperor now takes the step entailed by existing circumstances—which is thought the only one possible by many German statesmen—as soon as possible.

"I am your Grand Ducal Highness' most
obedient servant,
"(*Signed*) PH. SCHEIDEMANN."

Scheidemann, [illegible] of the Empire, Vol. I, p. 214

INTENTIONAL SECOND EXPOSURE

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Scheidemann, The making of New Germany, Vol. II, p. 214

would they take an official step which could no longer be kept from the public? This question was like a nightmare robbing me of sleep. I resolved if it were anyhow possible to bind Scheidemann before the Cabinet not to exert any further pressure upon me—in the feeling that he had only taken back his letter out of a sympathetic consideration for me in my personal situation.

The meeting of 31st October was the first at which I was again present. I opened it with the following declaration:

'I have been considering the question of His Majesty the Kaiser's abdication without intermission for days. Confidants of His Majesty have been with me and I have discussed the question thoroughly with them. I have given them such material as would enable them to inform His Majesty as to the situation at home and abroad. I shall see that this process of information goes on.

But I declare expressly that any abdication of His Majesty the Kaiser can only and ought only to take place of his own free will. Only so can damage to Empire and army be avoided, only so can Germany's dignity be preserved. I can only take action in the matter if my freedom is not impaired and if all attempts to exert pressure on me are avoided.'

Herr Scheidemann was visibly taken aback; he declared that the mention of the Kaiser question had taken him by surprise and that anything he might say on it would therefore

'The situation has got considerably worse in about the last fourteen days,—especially the morale of the army. This gets worse and worse the further back from the front the troops are stationed. Then there is the desertion of our allies. The world is looking around to find a scapegoat for all the mischief that has been done.

utterances which the Kaiser made in former days and which have stuck in the public memory. The effect of these utterances on opinion at home is universal, and leads to attacks on His Majesty's person which are growing more and more violent. It would be true to say that among the middle classes and the peasants not a single person has been found to champion the Kaiser; while our workers are convinced that we shall not get any peace such as will allow our people the chance of

INTENTIONAL SECOND EXPOSURE

Am 31. Oktober begründet er die Forderung in der Sitzung des Kabinetts: ~~Laut Protokoll wie folgt:~~

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further development, until Kaiserism is done with once and for all.

We have always tried to read into Wilson's notes our view that the President is not demanding the Kaiser's abdication. But the Foreign Office will corroborate me when I say that all foreign countries interpret them otherwise. They believe that Wilson intends to say : " You will get a better peace when once the Kaiser has been got rid of." Should the conditions be such that we cannot accept them and so must defend ourselves to the uttermost, then too, we can only carry on such a desperate struggle if the Kaiser is out of the way.

Thus it is an imperative duty for us to suggest to the Kaiser that he should take the step voluntarily. I should not like the Kaiser to be forced into playing an undignified part. It would for instance have been undignified had the Kaiser published the Order which was to have been laid before him on the occasion of the constitutional reforms. Its language was fine enough in itself but did not correspond to the Kaiser's real nature. Nor was it dignified of us to let ourselves be driven under Wilson's lash to make constitutional changes which we ought to have long ago made of our own free will. It would be equally undignified for the Kaiser to abdicate because the people through strikes and riots has driven him to do so. All that will come... ~~Our Press has been very good; the~~ exception only proves the rule—I refer to the *Magdeburger Volksblatt*. It cannot now be kept in hand any longer. The *Vorwaerts* of to-day has published an article which is already clear enough although keeping within the four corners of the censorship regulations. A clever journalist can always manage, without making any definite demand, to let people see what he wants.

I am entirely in agreement with what the Chancellor has said. We ought not to exert any pressure on the Kaiser—even the Cabinet ought not—but we ought to see that he is advised... ~~We must not let the Cabinet go to pieces.~~

In declaring it historically necessary that the Kaiser should go I do not intend to threaten my resignation if he does not. Before saying anything of the kind I should have to discuss the matter with my friends of the party which I here represent.

But let us make no mistake, this demand did not originate among the workers but in middle-class circles, especially in South Germany, where the particularist movement is growing. In Bavaria the cry is : " Cut loose from Prussia ! Join up with German-Austria ! Leave the Empire ! " That would be the

worst fate which could befall us. The Empire must be maintained in all its greatness and power with a united people who realize what their country means to them....

~~The peasants, too, especially in South Germany, are for the Kaiser's abdication; all the news to the contrary is false.~~ And the most surprising thing for me has been the attitude of the officials. I had never thought it possible for these people to change round so easily.

Quite a number of officers even have been with me and have expressed the same opinion. They were officers of all ranks up to and including that of Colonel. It was very disagreeable to them all to have to say so but they felt themselves bound to declare that the Country was more to them than the Kaiser.

And they were right. If the interests of the Country and of the people require it, one must be prepared to override feelings for which I have the greatest respect. This is also to act in the interest of the Kaiser himself and of his name in history. He must draw the consequences of defeat and withdraw voluntarily.'

Protokoll in Prince Max of Baden: Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 240/42

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[1] Cf. Payer, *op. cit.* pp. 140 ff.

INTENTIONAL SECOND EXPOSURE

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General Wilhelm Groener

Der Nachfolger des Generals Ludendorff beschreibt als Zeuge in einem Prozess unter seinem Eid, wie er im November 1918 versucht hatte, den Kaiser zu einem heroischen Ende zu bewegen.

(am 1. November)

".... Unmittelbar nachher habe ich mich mit den beiden Generaladjutanten des Kaisers,dem diensttuenden und dem vortragenden,im Garten unterhalten.Ich sagte den beiden, die Stellung des Kaisers sei unhaltbar,es sei unmoeglich ,die Sache so weiterzumachen....Es heisse nun,einen ganzen Enschluss zu fassen.Da ich persoenlich gegen die Abdankung die allergroesste Abneigung hatte -- aus Gruenden der Psychologie,besonders der Offizierspasychologie,--habe ich bei diesem Gespraech den beiden Generaladjutantan vorgeschlagen,dass Seine Majestaet unverzueglich an die Front gehen solle, und zwar nicht etwa zu Paraden ,Besichtigung ,Verleihung von Eisernen Kreuzen,sondern in den Kampf,-- nicht etwa in der Form,dass der Kaiser sich an die Spitze einer Truppe stellen sollte,um einen Todesritt oder Todesangriff zu machen,sondern einfach an die Front,in den Schuetzengraben,dorthin,wo viele ~~Hunderte~~ Hunderttausende deutscher Soldaten und Offiziere auch standen.Dort solle es der Kaiser darauf ankommen lassen,ob eine Kugel ihn treffe.

Wenn der Kaiser falle,gaebe es kein schoeners Ende fuer ihn,und wenn er verwundet wuerde,so sei nach meiner persoenlichen Uberzeugung mit demselben Moment ein Umschlag

~~in der~~ ~~stim~~

in der Stimmung des deutschen Volkes zu erwarten;das deutsche Volk neige ja zu einer gewissen sentimentalen Einstellung.

Die beiden Herren Generaladjutanten erwiderten nichts Rechtes.Es ginge nicht an, sie waeren mit der Sache nicht einverstanden.Es gehe nicht,den Kaiser dahin zu bringen. Ich ging dann weg, und fuhr mit dem Feldmarschall (von Hindenburg) von der Villa in den Generalstab zurueck.Waehrend der Fahrt habe ich auch dem Feldmarschall meinen Vorschlag gemacht,aber er billigte ihn ebenfalls nicht.....

Es haben aber meinen Vorschlag auch andere Offiziere der Obersten Heeres-Leitung wieder aufgenommen und haben bis zum 8.daran festgehalten,der Kaiser moege sich an die Front begeben und eine Kugel suchen.Am 8.wurde dieser Vorschlag endgueltig abgelehnt..."

"Eine Ehrenrettung des deutschen Volkes".Der Dolchstoss-Prozess in Muenchen,Oktober-November 1925.Zeugen-und Sachverstaendigen-Aussagen. Verlag G.Birk & Co.,Muenchen, p.214-18

Vernehmung vom 29.Oktober 1925

Philipp Scheidemann
(zweiter Führer der Sozialdemokratie) in einer Ansprache,
der am 9. November 1918 vom Fenster
des Reichstags die Republik in Deutschland proklamierte,
beschreibt, wie das zugegangen war.

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VII

THE REPUBLIC PROCLAIMED

ON the morning of 9th November, 1918, the Reichstag was like an armed camp. Working men and soldiers were going in and out. Many bore arms. With Ebert, who had come from the Chancery to the Reichstag, and other friends, I sat hungry in the dining-hall. Thin, watery soup was the only thing to be had. . . . Then a crowd of workers and soldiers rushed into the hall and made straight for our table.

Fifty of them yelled out at the same time, "Scheidemann, come along with us at once. Philip, you must come out and speak."

I refused; how many times had I not already spoken!

"You must, you must, if trouble is to be avoided. There are thousands upon thousands outside shouting for you to speak. Come along, quick, Scheidemann! Liebknecht is already speaking from the balcony of the Schloss."

"Well, if I must."

"Come along now. You must."

Dozens urged it upon me, till I went off with them. . . .

The main lobby presented a dramatic spectacle. Guns were piled up in stacks. From the courtyard the trampling and neighing of horses could be heard. In the hall thousands of hustling men seemed to be talking and shouting at the same time. We hurried away towards the reading-room. I intended to speak to the crowd from a window.

INTENTIONAL SECOND EXPOSURE

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~~and especially supporting the scandalous electoral system of Prussia. These foes are, it is to be hoped, gone for good~~ The Emperor has abdicated. He and his friends have decamped. The people have triumphed over them all along the line. Prince Max of Baden has handed over his office as Chancellor to Ebert. Our friend will form a Labour Government to which all Socialist Parties will belong. The new Government must not be hampered in their work for peace or their efforts for supplying food and work.

"Workmen and soldiers realize the historic importance of to-day. Miracles have happened. Long and incessant toil is before us. Everything for the people; everything by the people! Nothing must be done that brings dishonour to the Labour movement. Stand united and loyal, and be conscious of your duty. The old and the rotten—the monarchy—has broken down. Long live the new! Long live the German Republic!"

Endless cheering broke out. Then the crowds began to move towards the Schloss. The Bolshevist wave that threatened to engulf Germany had spent its force. The German Republic had become a thing of life in the brains and heart of the masses.

~~Five Minutes Later~~

Directly after my speech I went back to the dining-hall of the Reichstag to rescue my "skilly." The scene that then took place I have never mentioned, ~~and would have left unmentioned now had not the Rev. Felden described it in his book.~~ A few working men and soldiers, who had come with me into the hall that was now only partially full, were all agog to speak with Prince Max, and bawled into the hall: "Scheidemann has proclaimed the Republic.". ~~Let us see what Felden,~~

who can only have been informed by Ebert or one of his intimate friends, writes on the subject:

"Ebert is horrified and calls out to his friend: 'This is all wrong. The Constituent Assembly must settle the future form of Government.'"

~~Thing did not pass off so quietly and amicably as that.~~ Ebert's face turned livid with wrath when he heard what I had done. He banged his fist on the table and yelled at me, "Is it true?" On my replying it was not only true but a matter of course, he made a scene which passed my understanding. "You have no right to proclaim the Republic. What becomes of Germany—whether she becomes a republic or something else—a Constituent Assembly must decide." How could so wise a man judge so grossly the signs of the times as to talk on 9th November of a regency, a substitute, an administrator for the Empire, and such old monarchist rubbish that had been totally scrapped! Now, many years after this critical day, I understand Ebert's conduct better, for now we have various books and reports, from which it can be gathered that these private conversations about monarchy, republic, a substitute for the Kaiser, about which I knew nothing, actually took place. Ebert to a certain extent was not a free agent.... ~~Social Democrats and myself were not thus hampered.~~

Prince Max says that he was urgently requested by Ebert between five and six to remain in Berlin. On the Prince's asking him why, Ebert answered, "I should like you to remain as an administrator of the Empire." Prince Max as an Imperial administrator! Who could fail to think of the resolution of the National Assembly of 1848, about abstaining from using revolutionary power and electing an Imperial administrator? Archduke Johann was then chosen, and this time he was to be a Prince of Baden! It seems to me that Prince Max

Those with me, right and left, pressed me to look at what was going on in the street. Between the Schloss and the Reichstag, so they said, masses of people were moving up and down.

"Liebknecht intends to proclaim the Soviet Republic!"

Now I clearly saw what was afoot. I knew his slogan—supreme authority for the Workers' and Soldiers' Councils. Germany to be therefore a Russian province, a branch of the Soviet? No, no, a thousand times no!

There was no doubt at all. The man who could bring along the "Bolshies" from the Schloss to the Reichstag or the Social Democrats from the Reichstag to the Schloss had won the day.

I saw the Russian folly staring me in the face—the Bolshevist tyranny, the substitute for the tyranny of the Czars! No, no, Germany should not have that on the top of all her other miseries.

I was already standing at the window. Many thousands of poor folk were trying to wave their hats and caps. The shouts of the crowds sounded like a mighty chorus. Then there was silence. I only said a few words, which were received with tremendous cheering.

"Workers and soldiers, frightful were those four years of war, ghastly the sacrifices the people made in blood and treasure. The cursed War is at an end.—~~Murder has ceased~~ ~~The fruits of war, want and misery, will burden us for years.~~ The catastrophe we tried our best to avoid has not been spared us, because our proposals for peace by consent were rejected and we ourselves scorned and despised. The foes of an industrious people, the real foes in our midst, that have caused Germany's downfall, are silent and invisible. These were the warriors who stopped at home, promoting their demands for annexation, bitterly opposing any reform of the Constitution,

Friedrich Ebert

Prince Max of Baden berichtet von dem Bündnis, das er am 7. November 1918 mit dem ersten Führer der Sozialdemokraten schloss, - ein Bündnis gegen die soziale Revolution und für die Erhaltung der Monarchie.

Nov. 7

(Nov. 7, 1918)

„In the early morning I spoke to Ebert in the Garden alone. First of all I told him of my intended journey.

‚You know my plans', I said. ‚If I succeed in convincing the Kaiser, can I count on your support in fighting the Social Revolution?'

Ebert's answer was unhesitating and unequivocal:

‚Unless the Kaiser abdicates, the Social Revolution is inevitable. But I will have none of it; I hate it like sin.'

After the Kaiser's abdication he hoped to bring round party and masses to the side of the Government.

We touched on the question of the Regency. I named Prince Eitel Friedrich, as the Regent for Prussia and the Reich Empire indicated by the Constitution. Ebert declared on behalf of himself and his party that on these constitutional points no difficulties would be put in the Government's way.

Prince Max / II / 312-13

of Baden: Memoirs, Vol.

Prince Max of Baden berichtet, ~~wie~~ vie ~~der Verzicht~~ der erste Führers der Sozialdemokratie noch nach der Ausrufung der Republic am 9. November 1918 ~~sich Rat der Minister~~ eine Uebereinkunft zu einer neuen Monarchie zu erhalten suchte.

Between five and six (Nov. 9, 1918) I went to say good-bye to Ebert. His words to me were: ‚I should very much like you to stay.'

I asked what I could do.

Ebert: ‚I should like you to remain as Reichsverweser.'

The same request had repeatedly been made to me by my former colleagues in the course of the last few hours. My answer to Herr Ebert was:

‚I know that you are on the point of concluding an agreement with the Independents, and I cannot work with the Independents.'

At the door I turned back: ‚Herr Ebert, I commit the German Empire to your keeping.'

He answered: ‚I have lost two sons for this Empire.'

Maximilian, Prince of Baden:

Memoirs, Vol. II. / 362

Entwaffnungskonferenz 1932

I. Vorgeschichte.

Sofort nach dem Abschluss der Locarno-Vertraege nahm Stresemann die Parole der allgemeinen Abruestung auf. Sie blieb der Grundstein seiner Aussenpolitik und wurde von Bruening, Papen, Schleicher, Hitler uebernommen.

Mit ihr gewann die deutsche Aussenpolitik ausserordentliche Sympathien in der angelsaechsischen Welt, wo der Ruf nach Abruestung sofort nach dem Ende des Weltkriegs No. I allgemein geworden war.

Wilson hatte in seiner Rede an den Senat am 22. Januar 1917 gesagt:

" There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations if great preponderating armaments are henceforth to continue here and there to be built and maintained. The statesmen of the world must plan for peace and nations must adjust and accommodate their policy to it as they planned for war and made ready for pitiless conquest and armament. The question of armaments, whether on land or sea, is the most immediately and intensively practical question connected with the future fortunes of nations and of mankind."

Punkt 4 der 14 Punkte: "Adequate guarantee given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety."

Versailler Vertrag, Praeambel zu Teil V:

" En vue de rendre possible la préparation d'une limitation générale des armements de toutes les nations, L'Allemagne s'engage a observer strictement les clauses militaires, navales et aériennes ci-après stipulées."

Damit war nicht gesagt, dass die in Aussicht genommene Einschraenkung die anderen Heere auf den gleichen Fuss mit der deutschen Reichswehr setzen muesse. Aber die populaere Agitation in England und Amerika machte unbesehen diese Folgerung.

In den Vorverhandlungen zum Versailler Vertrag hatte Brockdorff-Rantzau am 29. Mai 1919 die Abruestungsvorschriften fuer Deutschland annehmen wollen, wenn die Alliierten sich verpflichteten, spaetestens zwei Jahre nach Friedensschluss dad Gleiche zu tun.

Die Antwortnote der Alliierten, unterzeichnet von Clemenceau, 16. Juni 1919, lehnte das ab, mit der Bemerkung:

"The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear that their requirements in regard to German armaments are not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first step towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most preventives of war, and which it will be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote.

They must point out, however, that the colossal growth in armaments of the last four decades was forced upon the nations of Europe by Germany. As Germany increased in power, the neighbours had to follow suit unless they were to become impotent to resist German dictation or the German sword. It is, therefore, right as it is necessary, that the process of limitation of armaments should begin with the nation which has been responsible for their expansion. It is not until the aggressor has led the way that the attacked in safety afford to follow suit.

Germany must consent unconditionally to disarm in advance of the Allied and Associated Powers... No deviation from the organization in armament laid down in the present Treaty can be permitted until Germany is admitted to the League of Nations which may then agree to such modification as may seem desirable."

Art. VIII der Voelkerbundsakte:

"The members of the League recognize that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations.

The Council taking account of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reductions for the consideration and action of the several Governments."

Art. 9 sieht Schaffung einer "permanent advisory commission" vor.

Auf der Ratssitzung vom 19. Mai 1920 wird eine solche Kommission geschaffen. Auf Antrag von Léon Bourgeois soll diese "Permanent Commission on Military, Naval, and Air Questions" aus Fachleuten der drei Waffengattun-

gen bestehen. Diese Kommssion erstattet am 20. November 1920 auf der ersten Vollsitzung des Voelkerbundes in Genf einen Bericht,der im Wesentlichen negativ war.

Darauf wird eine "Temporary Mixed Commission" gebildet,die 1922 zu arbeiten anfaengt. Sie besteht aus Zivilisten,die nicht als "egierungs-vertreter zu betrachten sind und vom Voelkerbund gewaehlt werden.

Ihr werden beigeordnet: 6 Militaers (je 2 army,navy, air), 2 wirtsehaftliche und 2 finanzielle Experten und je 3 Vertreter der Arbeiter und Angestellten, delegiert vom Internationalen Arbeitsbureau.

Vorsitzender dieser Kommission wird Lord Robert Cecil,der von dann an leitenden Einfluss hat.

Die Kommission beraet zuerst Lord Eshers "first general plan for the reduction of armament",kommt aber Ende 1922 zu dem Entschluss,Entwaffnung und Sicherheit zusammen zu behandeln.

1924 nimmt die Kommission Macdonald-Herriots Parole "Arbitration-Security-Disarmament" auf, und beteiligt sich an den Vorarbeiten zum "enfer Protokoll. Das konservative "ritische Kabinett lehnt das Protokoll ab, und im Zuge der Locarno-"erhandlungen geht auch die Kommission (1924-25 Coordinate Commission genannt) vom den allgemeinen Plaenen zu Spezialabmachungen ueber.

18. Mai 1926 Wiederaufnahme der allgemeinen Plaene durch Bildung der Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

Sie unfasst Vertreter der Mitgliedstaaten des Voelkerbundes und Vertreter anderer Staaten, die aus geographischen oder andern "ruenden an der allgemeinen Abruestung interessiert sind. Ihr Praesident ist (nachdem Paul-Boncour die Wahl abgelehnt hat) der Hollaender Loudon.

Sie arbeitet auf der ersten Sitzung einen Fragebogen aus.

1) Definition von "armament" und seiner verschiedenen Funktionen.
2) " " "limitation". Soll Kriegs-oder Friedensstaerke zu Grundegelegt werden?

Toynbee, Survey of International affairs, Jahrg.

3) Welcher Masstab ist anzulegen?

4) Offensive und defensive Waffen.

5) Bevoelkerungsziffern, Bodenschaetze, geographische Lage, Seeverbindungen, Eisenbahnnetze.

6) Verwundbarkeit der Grenzen und Lebenszentren.

7) Verschiedenheit der Mobilmachungsgeschwindigkeiten.

8) Zivil und Militaer-Luftfahrt und Seeschiffe.

9) Security

21. Maerz 1927 Beratung von Cecils Entwurf.

22. " " " " Paul-Boncours Entwurf, der vom potentiel de guerre und der Interdependenz von Land-See-und Luft-ruestg ausgeht und die budgetaeren Ausgaben als Grundlage angesehen wissen will. Er fordert ferner internationale Komtrolle.

In der Diskussion sagt der deutsche Vertreter Graf Bernstorff: "The states which have been disarmed by international Treaties are perfectly entitled to demand that general disarmament should be achieved." Dann wird die Frage der ausgebildeten Reservisten verhandelt.

Der amerikanische Vertreter Gibson erklaert, dass USA sich niemals einer internationalen Kontrolle unterwerfen wuerden. Paul-Boncour: Dann sollen nur Voelkerbundsmitglieder der Kontrolle unterworfen sein.

April 1929: zweite Debatte ueber den Entwurf.

Gibson: Nur die Grossmaechte sollen reduzieren.. "It is not limitation we need no exact balance of ships and guns--what is really wanted is a common sense agreement, based on the idea that we are going to be friends and settle our problems by peaceful means.... genuine disarmament will follow only from a change of attitude towards the use of force." Allgemeiner Beifall. (Kellogg-pakt liegt voraus.)

Gibson polemisiert weiter gegen Paul-Boncour. USA koenne sich keine Budget-Reduktion vorschreiben lassen.

Die Frage der geschulten Reserven wird von der Tagesordnung abgesetzt, unter Protest Deutschlands und Russlands.

Fuer qualitative Limitation: Deutschland, Russland, Holland, Schweden.
Dagegen: Frankreich, Italien, Japan, Kleine Entente.

Bernstorff: "The Commission has lost sight of its task at any rate as far as land forces are concerned... My government has never left it for a moment in doubt that it could not accept, even as a first stage, a ~~xxxxx~~ solution which would not include all the forms of armaments, and which would not bring about an appreciable reduction in the excessive arma-

ments of the present."

3. Oktober 1929: Tod Stresemanns. 30. Mai 1930: Briand fordert US Europe September 1930. Reichstagswahl. Nazis 107 Abgeordnete.

29. Oktober: Auswaertiger Ausschuss des Reichstages fordert Gleichberechtigung. Mussolini wird Wortfuehrer der Revisionisten.

12. 13. 14. November 1930. Debatte in der franzoesischen Kammer.

Franklin-Boullion:

Die franzoesische Dienstpflicht ist 1923 von 2 Jahren auf 18 Monate herabgesetzt worden, 1928 auf 12 Monate. Warum schweigt die franzoesische Regierung darueber in Genf?

Deutschland gibt fuer seine 100 000 Mann Reichswher aus:

1924	2700 Millionen	Francs
1926	4032	" "
1930	4728	" "

Fuer die Flotte 600 Millionen Francs 1924, 1200 Millionen 1930.

Briand: Ein Umstossen seiner Politik sei unmoeglich. 60 Millionen seien nur durch Verstaendigung zu gewinnen.

Tardieu (Briands Ministerpraesident): Frankreich und Deutschland seien in der Ruestungsfrage "in a confliet both of doctrine and of faet"X. Er weist den deutschen Anspruch auf vertragsmaessiges Recht, Reduction zu verlangen,scharf zurueck und droht mit investigations.

Aber in Genf bleibt jeder Widerspruch aus,als Bruening erklaert: "The German Government and people ask their own disarmament should be followed by general disarmament. This is Germany's legal and moral right which no one can contest." Fordert equal rights.

In der Novembertagung 1930 aendert die deutsche Delegation ihre Taktik und ging zur Obstruktion ueber. (Bruening,Curtius,Bernstorff).

Das war dem Auswaertigen Ausschuss nicht genug. Er nahm am 2. Dezember einen nationalsozialistischen Antrag auf Abberufung Bernstorffs an.

Am 20. November 1930 erreichte Curtius in einer Besprechung mit dem USA und USSR Vertreter, dass die beiden Deutschlands equal rights und die Verpflichtung der andern zur Abruestung anerkannten.

Deutschland,Italien und USA suchen gemeinsam die Reservenfrage aufs Tapet zu bringen. Deutschland und USA stimmen gegen Budgetbeschraenkungen;

England dagegen ist durch das Taschenpanzerschiff "Deutschland" scheu geworden. Cecil erklaert, nicht Tonnage, sondern Budget sei ausschlaggebend. Deutschland fordert spaeter (11. April 1931), alle Kriegsschiffe ueber 10 000 tons sollten abgeschafft werden. Italien und USA ueberbieten sich im Fordern von Abschaffungen: Aircraftcarriers, Tanks, schwere Geschuetze. Litwinoff fordert 11. Februar 1931 totale Entwaffnung als "only infallible remedy ".

21. Juli 1931: Tardieu-Memorandum.

"Reduction of armaments implies confidence... Should any attempt be made, for instance, in the name of a theoretical principle of equality, to modify the relative situation created by the provisions of Part V of the Peace Treaties, it would be impossible to maintain the reductions already accomplished, and still less practicable would become the general limitation of armament." Er fordert: 1) security, 2) status quo der Waffenrelation.

24. August 1931: Sturz des 2. Kabinetts Macdonald.

September 1931: 12 Voelkerbundstagung. Grandi fordert Ruestungsfeierzeit bis Schluss der Konferenz. Beifall Englands, Deutschlands, USA.

25. Oktober 1931: Heftiger Ausfall Borahs im US Senat gegen Frankreich. Borah fuer Revision des Versailler Vertrags. Mussolini, der am gleichen Tage in Neapel spricht, begruesst Borahs Rede.

II. Die Entwaffnungskonferenz

Praesident: Arthur Henderson.

Beginn 2. Februar 1932. Am gleichen Tage Beschiessung Schanghais durch die Japaner.

Henderson. Aufgabe 1) To arrive at a collective agreement on an effective programme of practical proposals speeding to secure a substancial reduction and limitation of all national armaments.

2) To determine that no armaments should be maintained outside the scope of the treaty by which all nations represented at the Conference would make the achievement of universal disarmament their common claim.

3) To ensure continuity of advance in disarmament, without detracting in any ~~fxrmx~~ way from the fullest measure of success of the immediate effort of the Conference, by arranging for similar conferences to meet at reasonably short intervals of time."

~~Tardieu~~

Tardieu greift auf den Plan einer internationalen Polizeimacht von 1919 und das Genfer Protokoll von 1924 zurueck.

Grandi (10. Februar): "To go on arguing whether security produced disarmament or vice versa is just the kind of sophistry that we must leave behind us."

Dagegen hatte Madariaga, ein langjaehriger Funktionaer der Voelkerbundskommission in seinem Buch "Disarmament" (1929) geschrieben:

"The problem of disarmament is not the problem of disarmament. It really is the problem of the organization of the World Community". p.60.

Vorschauend hatte er gesagt: "Every delegation goes to the conferance determined to secure an increase in the relative armaments of its own nation, even though the conference might lead to an all-round reduction of absolute armaments." p.61.

26. April 1932: Besprechung Stimson-Macdonald-Bruening in Genf. Einigung auf den Plan, die Dienstzeit der Reichswehr auf 5 Jahre herabzusetzen und dafuer daneben 100000 Mann Miliz zuzulassen, unter Aufhebung jeder Materialbeschraenkung. Dieser Plan wird durch Schleicher sabotiert, der durch François-Poncet Tardieu mitteilen laesst, Bruening stehe vor dem Sturz.
Wheeler-Bennett, The Disarmament Deadlock, 1934 p. 34.

30. Mai 1932: Sturz Bruenings. Tardieus Wahlniederlage.

Juni 1932. England und USA erklaeren, capitalships seien keine Angriffswaffen. Sie dienen nur zur Verteidigung von Konvois.

Grandi: "The Naval Powers wanted land disarmament, the Land Powers wanted naval disarmament, and the delegates at Geneva wanted a new mentality." Wheeler-Bennett p. 38.

13. Mai 1932 Churchill im Unterhaus:

The disarmament Conference merely encouraged friction and exaggerated claims to arm, and had in fact, weakened one great factor in preserving peace -- the British navy. He would very much regret to see any approximation in military strength between France and Germany, and to those who wished for it,

he would say: Do you wish war? He was sure that the theory that they should be placed on an equal military footing was one wish, if it emerged in practice, would bring them all within practical distance of almost immeasurable calamity."

Mit dieser Stellungnahme war Churchill voellig isoliert.

Die Agitation fuer Abruestung hatte im Jahre 1931 riesige Dimensionen angenommen. Im April 1931 hatte die Conference of the Christian Churches beschlossen, ihre Gefolgschaft aufzufordern, jeden einzelnen Abgeordneten durch Zuschriften oder muendliche Agitation im Sinne der Abruestung zu bearbeiten. Zahllose andere religioese Organisationen, Frauenvereine, Gesellschaften fuer Voelkerbund usw. schlugen die gleichen Taktik ein. Die Aufzaehlung der Resolutionen allein des Jahres 1931 wuerde mehrere Seiten fuellen. In Frankreich hatte Léon Blum schon am 27. Oktober 1930, knapp zwei Monate nach Hitlers erstem grossen Wahlsieg, die Parole ausgegeben: "La France doit prendre l'initiative du désarmement qui est le plus sûr, et peut-être le seul moyen de parer au danger. La preuve est faite maintenant que l'augmentation des armements crée un état d'esprit favorable a la guerre.... Je ne crois pas que l'Allemagne veut la guerre. Si le danger devenait imminent, le peuple allemand réagirait contre cette folie. Il faut avoir confiance dans les forces ouvrières, organisées dans le syndicalisme et dans le socialisme ennemi de la guerre." In diesem Sinne wurden die Resolutionen des Parteitags der franzoesischen Sozialisten besch lossen.

Temps 28. Dezember 1931

In der Entwicklung des englischen Pazifismus lassen sich drei Saadien erkennen: Zuerst ist die Mehrheit gewillt, die Arbeit der Vorbereitenden Kommission in Genf anzuerkennen und sogar gegen deutsche Angriffe zu verteidigen. Am 24. Januar 1931 veroeffentlicht Prof. P.Noel Baker im Manchester Guardian einen Artikel "Germany and the Draft Conference on Disarmament", in dem er die Kritik der deutschen Pazifisten abwehrt. Die Arbeit der Kommission sei gut, wenn sie auch nur, was die deutschen

Pazifisten nicht einsaehen, nur den Rahmen schaffe, den die Konferenz mit Inhalt auszufuellen habe.

Am 5. Mai 1931 zeigt sich eine Differenz unter den Labor Lords. Ponsonby greift die Kommission an, weil sie unzulaenglich sei, Lord Allen und Lord Parmoor verteidigen sie. Im Unterhaus spricht Lansbury gegen die Kommission, die Mehrheit der Labor-Abgeordneten setzt weiter ihre Hoffnung auf die Arbeit der Kommission.

2. Stadium: die Agitation der Ligen fuer totale Abruestung beginnt sich auszuwirken. Die Unzufriedenheit mit der Kommission waechst, und die natuerliche Konsequenz ist, dass die deutsche Agitation fuer Abruestung der andern auf Sympathie stoesst.

16. Juni 1932 : Beginn der Reparationsverhandlungen in Lausanne mit Herriot, Macdonald und Papen. Die Folge ist eine englisch-franzoesische Annaeherung im Sinne einer dilatorischen Taktik. Herriot und Macdonald versuchen, die Abruestungsverhandlungen hinauszuziehen, bis die Weltwirtschaftkonferenz vorueber ist. Da erfolgt Grandi tritt zurueck.

22. Juni 1932 Intervention Hoovers, der Verminderung aller Reustungen um 1/3 fordert, "increasing the comparative power of defense through decreases in the power of the attack." Der Kelloggpakt muesse von einer Reduktion aller Waffen begleitet werden. (Botschaft an den Kongress

7. Juli: Baldwin lehnt im Unterhaus Hoovers Verlangen hoeflich ab.

23 Juli: Die Entwaffnungskonferenz nimmt eine Resolution an, die den chemisch-bakteriologischen Krieg in den Bann tut, aber alle andern Fragen in der Schwebe laesst. Deutschland, Italien und Russland unterzeichnen nicht, protestieren, bleiben aber zur weiteren Mitarbeit bereit.

26. Juli: Rundfunkrede des detuschen Wehrministers Schleicher. Er habe bei seinem Amtsantritt versprochen, Deutschland eine kampffaehige Armee zu schaffen, und werde sein Versprechen halten. Deutschland muesse moderne Waffen haben.

29. Juli: Pertinax im Echo de Paris: "Deutschland wird jetzt im vollen

Tageslicht ausfuehren, was es die letzten 10 Jahre hindurch im Geheimen getan hat."

2. August: Robert Cecil in Oxford (Manchester Guardian 3. 8):

"When Germans ask for equality of status in disarmament I think they are on strong, indeed on unassailable grounds. " The Question how to allay French fears. Intelligente Franzosen saehen ein, dass es auf die Dauer unmoeglich sei, die Versailler Bestimmungen fuer die deutsche Entwaffnung aufrechtzuerhalten.

22. August: News Chronicle (Lloyd George's Blatte): "About the justice of Germany's claim there is nothing new to be said... The plain fact is that Herr von Papen has made a claim which all responsible British spokesmen have admitted to be reasonable, and the British Government has issued a disarmament programme which leaves that claim unsatisfied."

29. August: Neurath uebergibt François-Poncet ein aide-memoire

1) Anerkennung des Prinzips der Gleichberechtigung.
2) Sechsjaehrige Dienstzeit der Reichswehr.
3) Eine Reserve von Freiwilligen

11. September : Franzoesische Antwort.

Keine Klausel des Versailler Vertrags erlaubt laps of the permanent obligations. With this reservation, France is ready to take part on the same terms as all the accepted parties in the examination of this problem." Die deutschen Forderungen koennten nicht auf der Konferenz erledigt werden, weil 1) deren Zweck Abruestung nicht Aufruestung sei, 2) weil auf der Konferenz auch Nichtunterzeichner des Versailler Vertrags vertreten seien.

14. September: Neurath protestiert bei Henderson wegen Nichterfuellung des Ansruchs auf Gleichberechtigung.

18. September: Henderson verteidigt die Resolution von 23. Juli gegen Neurath. Darauf erfolgt Deutschlands erster Austritt aus der Konferenz.

Mussolini war von Deutschlands bevorstehendem Ruecktritt unterrichtet Er hatte am 11. September einen Artikel in der Sunday Times veroeffentlicht: "In order to avoid Germany's absence from the Conference her right to juridical equality in the matter of armaments must inevitably be recognized."

Deutschlands Ruecktritt verursachte in England grosse Bestuerzung. Die britische Regierung veroeffentlichte am 18 September ein Statement of policy:

Deutschlands Forderung nach Gleichberechtigung sei angesichts der wirtschaftlichen Situation ebenso unzeitgemaess wie angesichts der grossen Konzessionen in der Reparationsfrage. Sie sei auch juristisch nicht legitimiert, rather an appeal for adjustment."

Dagegen erhob sich scharfe Opposition. Das Kabinett blieb indessen zunaechst fest.

25. September 32: Herriot in Gramat: "Nous constatons avec plaisir que nous n'avons pas été les seuls en déclarant que un réarmement de l'Allemagne serait le début d'un retour aux anciennes folies. Il est bien vrai que les Alliés de la dernière guerre ont promis de reduire leurs armement." Frankreich hat abgeruestet und wird weiter abruesten dans la sécurité. (Temps 26.9.)

23. Oktober: Mussolini in Mailand: Deutschlands Anspruch auf Gleichberechtigung ist voellig gerechtfertigt. Es soll aber nicht sofort seine Ansprueche in vollem Masse realisieren.

20. Oktober : Eine Deputation englischer Kirchenmaenner unter Fuehrung des Erzbischofs von Canterbury spricht bei John Simon and Macdonald vor. "The promise given by the Allied Powers after the war should be fulfilled. The Government would have their enthusiastic support in fulfilling their declared willingness to give Germany a place of equality among other nations, and to make disarmament and not rearmament the key-stone of their policy." John Simon antwortet mit Anerkennung von Deutschlands moralischem Anspruch. Macdonald mahnt zur Geduld.

3. November: Die britischen Gewerkschaften unternehmen den gleichen Schritt wie die Kirchenmaenner. Attlee stellt im Unterhaus Antrag auf Abschaffung der militaerischen Klauseln des Versailler Vertrags und fordert Deutschlands Gleichberechtigung. (Unterhaus)

10. November: John Simon akzeptiert Deutschlands Anspruch auf Gleichberechtigung... "What is the object of the Disarmament Conference? Its object is to bring about the maximum of positive disarmament that can generally agreed upon, and not to authorize, in the name of equality increase of armed strength."

Simon kommentiert in dieser Rede ein Britisches Weissbuch (Cmd. 4189) 17. November 1932. In diesem heisst es : ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Die Limitationen des Versailler Vertrags were intended to, and expressed to be, the precursor of the general limitation of armaments... Great Britain effected immense reductions ... Any hesitation which might arise in any quarter would not proceed from a desire to inflict upon Germany a permanent inferiority of status. It would spring from anxiety as to the use which might be made of the new situation and from fear of the resulting dangers which might threat the tranquillity of Europe." Diese Furcht koenne durch feierlichen Verzicht auf Gewalt beschworen werden.

Inzwischen hatten Herriot und Paul-Boncour ein neues Projekt ausgearbeitet, das am 4. November dem britischen Kabinett mitgeteilt worden war. Es sah vor:

1) Alle Kontinentalstaaten sollen Armeen mit kurzer Dienstpflicht und eingeschraenkten Reservistenbestaenden einfuehren.

2) Alle anderen Formationen sollen aufgeloest werden.

3) Internationale Kontrolle und obligatorisches Schiedsgericht.

Dieses Projekt sagte der britischen Regierung sehr zu. Sie knuepfte Verhandlungen mit Deutschland an.

3. Dezember 1932: Herriot, Macdonald, Aloisi, Norman Davis kommen in

Genf zusammen. Neurath trifft incognito ein und nimmt(zunaechst inoffiziell) an den Besprechungen teil.

11. Dezember Abkommen.

2) On the basis of this Declaration, Germany has signified its willingness to resume its place at the Disarmament Conference.

3) The Governments of the United Kingdom, France, Germany and Italy are ready to join in a solemn reaffirmation to be made by all European States that they will not in any circumstances attempt to reserve any present or future differences between the signatories by resort to force This shall be done without prejudice to fuller discussions of the question of security."

Mit dem letzten Absatz wurde Frankreich abgespeist. Die Forderungen des Herriot-Boncourschen Entwurfs wurden spaeter von Deutschland bruesk abgelehnt. Deutschland gewann die Anerkennung der Gleichberechtigung und die Zusicherung, dass etwaige praktische Beschraenkungen seiner Ruestungen nicht mehr aus dem Versailler Vertrag abgeleitet wuerden, sondern in der neuen Konvention selbst umschrieben werden sollten. Das kam in dem englischen Plan vom 23. Januar 1933 zum Ausdruck.

23. Januar 1933: neuer englischer Plan.

Kammer,1o.Nov.,33

Georges Mandel : Er verlangt,dass die Regierung eine Untersuchung des deutschen Ruestungsstandes im Vielkerbund beanrtrage. "Verha ren

Sie in Genf nicht aenger als Angeklagte,ve wandeln Sie sich dort unten im Gegenteil in oeffentliche Anklaeger."
Aussenmin.Paul-Boncour,14.Nov,erklaert,dass ein Antrag auf Untersuchung der deutschen Ruestungen keine Mehrheit mehr im VB.finden werde. NTB ,33,488

Polen 14,Nov,33

Stunden langes Gespraech des neuen Botschafters Lipski mit Hitler und Ne u ath. Gemeinsame Deklaration:Absicht,Wirtschaftspakt zu schliessen.Beschluss,sich nicht mit Krieg zu ueberziehen,

Ende Nov.33.

An der oesterreischischen Grenze wird der Reichswehrsoldat Schumacher erschossen.Hitler haelt an seinem Grab eine Rede voll von Drihungen gegen Oesterreich, dessen Regierung er "Moerder "nennt,und fordert kar zum Umsturz her aus NTB,33 536

Louis Thomas,Midi,gegen Ruestungsindustrie, NTB 33 ØØ 560

Dez.33 Pilsudski erklaert Voelkerbund als tot. NTB 33 584

Jan.34 Begruendung des ital.Marineminist.f.d.Budget 1933/34
"Der Ja aner sieht im Kriege nicht dasselbe wie der weisse Mann.Seine Vorstellungswelt kreist um seine geschichtliche Missi n, den Triumph un d die Herrschaft seine Rasse.Da bereitet sich die Tragoedie von morgen vor.Dieses Volk stoesst mit de Macht seiner Waffen vorwaerts,und noch staerker mit der Macht einer Psychologie, die in der Lehre von einer historischen Berufung wurzelt.Heute faellt es in China ein und organisiert es.Morgen,vom Rassenfanatismus voewaertsgetrieben, wird es den Kam f gegen den weissen Mann aufnehmen. NTB,34,I,27

Kriegsteilnehmer NTB 102,34 I

Polnisches Goebbels-Interview

Es ist eine tiefbedauerliche Erscheinung,dass die Entscheidung der Schicksalsfrage eines Volkes,der Frage ueber Krieg und Frieden, in den meisten Laendern in der Macht von Schichten oder Persoenlichkeiten ruht,die den Krieg aus eigener Erfahrung ueberhaupt nicht kennen oder nur teilweise kennen... Wenn der Gedanke des Reichskanzlers,dass in allen Laendern vor allem den ehemaligen Kriegsteilnehmern ein vorzugsweises Mitbestimmungsrecht an der Entscheidung ueber Krieg und Frieden einzuraeumen ist,verwirklicht werden wuerde,so wuerde hierin die sicherste Garantie gegen jeden Krieg zu erblicken sein.

Deutschpolnischer Pakt,ebenso Oesterreich NTB 34 I 105

Aufruestung Forschritte NTB 34 I 112 ,Lager-Anhaeufung 113

Bluttag in Oesterreich waehrend eines 24stuendigen Generalstrieks in Frankrecih NTB 34 147

Daladier gelobhudelt im Voelkischen Beobachter 6.Februar 34,dem selben Tag,an dem er gestuerzt wurde. Seine "Kuehnheit und Enhschluss kraft" wird gefieret .Der "Frontsoldat,der uz handeln gelernt hat". "Schnell" "geschickt" und "ruecksichtslos". Er besitzt "die Gunst des Volkes und der jungen Kraefte". Er will "autoritaer" regieren. Er will sich "auf Ausserparlamentarisches stuetzen,auf neuaufbrechende,f eie ,volkstuemliche Kraefte." 34,I 155

"Puse des Sozialismus" 34,I,156-57

Abruestung.Rede Sir j.Simons in Brighton,16.Februar :"not the remotest possibility" auf Abruestung.Deshalb muesse man eine "regulierte Aufreustung" anstreben, eine "limitierte" 34 I 171

Oesterreich,Labor wuenscht Ende seiner Unterstuetzung 34 I 176
Barthous Kampf um volonte und garantir 196
Heeres
Frankreich Militaer-Etat 1383 5.7 Millia den Francs
Deutscher " 2.9 " " (485 Millionen Mark)
Franz. Luft-Etat 33 1.8 Milliarden Francs
Plan einer Erhoehung des Luftetats um je 980 Millionen Francs in den folgenden 3 Jahren (Intrans 24 II 34) 34 I 229
Oesterreich :Benesch in einem amerik.Interview:"Ich fuer mein Teil bin vollkommen bereit,der Richtung zu folgen,die Signor Mussolini zeigen wird." 34 I 234

Ba thou empfeangt Benesch,Titulesco,reist nach Bruessel,im April nach Warschau und Prag 34 I 364

Rolls oyce Motoren fuer Deutschl. 34 I 436

Offener (amer. offenes) Heeres- u Luft-Edikt 1934
1440 Bill dl pgm 1260 Stanley
34 I 517

Times Amerikafrage stagfos too early ch. 532 34 I

Mussolini Flugblätter 34 I 536

Hull Englund Frankreich in Gauf 34 I 538 (Klein Fragen im engl. Kabinett

Rochus will in die Aufsichtsr 551 34 I

Mussolini sympathisiert gegen Deutschland 34 I 556

~~Kanada Depression~~

Deutsche Gefandte 14. Juni Scharfe Rede

34 Juni Léon Blum plaidiert gegen Cagoia 1. Weltkr. Militär-Ausgaben
34 I 583

Cagoia Südtirol amerik. Druckpl. 2. Halby. 1933 70% ausfuhr
1934 3x "
Eisen 1934 5 Mrd. Lohn ab 1929
Morgan ausführl
34 I 584

Kanadaanwalt 34 Juni 34 I 609

1934 II

13.7 Italien + Lybien gründen Abwehrstelle + Ausbau Chamberlain
Litwin Rußland willkommen. 768

Franko. Juli Lausanne Abschluß Meerengenvertrag. Laßt sie in Kraft vor 13. Juli

Oesterr. „Oesterreichische Legion" wandert in Bayern, Schwenke Richtg

in Polit Journal

Lyst. Lloyds erklärt auf die Frage: „Wird wird Krieg sein?" er sei bereit, sich alle Versicherungsgesellschaften zu stabilisieren und „auf Grund alle Völker eine Police gegen Kriegsrisiken zu zeichnen." 749

Lyst. „die wichtigste Garantie d. 751

Oesterr Englische Kampfflugzeuge der deutschen Presse

Italien Am 20. Jahrestag d Kriegsausbruch: „In Italien herrscht der begeisterte Patriotismus, der erst vor wenigen Tagen während der nationalistischen Putsches in Oesterreich dort dazu war, einen Krieg zu entfesseln. Die alten Kriegsbeile in Europa sind nicht ausgegraben ... 774

Lyst. Kurd. Eindruck in der Völkerbund 843

" Polizeichef der Saar-Regierung spricht VB Volksbund über „gewerkschaftliche Arbeit im Saargebiet." 843 Frankreich will intervenieren 940

Saar Lyst. Abstimmung Saar Ergebnis über bilaterale Pakte, und ohne Militär-Sanktionen. 868

Polen Einigung Lyst. über Nichteinmischung des Covenant 891

Amerika Lyst. Unterschrift über die „marchands de canons" in Amerika 892

Deutschl. „Metallplan"

Rumänien Titulescu demissioniert -- Konflikt mit Tatarescu 941

Saar Abstimmung über Saar-Statuts ~~1935~~ in VB 946

Deutschland Berlin sieht eine konkrete Lösung 946

Luftkrieg Englan Times schätzt Deutschland 1000 Flugzeuge + 3 000 Mann Reichswehr in 969

Marseille Goering stellen Ergebnis 1011 1048

Bruch Interview 1089

1934 4

Russ. Luftflotte 1600 Pass. Stärke 1000 Typen 1095

Franz. Jagd u. Bomber Hilfs-Interessen 1140 1140

Italien Jean Fabry, „Alle Kommentare übertroffen. 1135

" Balbo für die Heimlichkeit Deutschland Lehrgang 1155

Frankreich Caserne für 1 Bataillon u. 1 Flug in Paris 1156

Luftflotte Stärke Zahlen 28, Nov. 34 1159

Frankreich Rudolf Hess, „Die Franzosen werden nicht auf die verfügbaren Diplomaten 1169

Bochum 1182 Berlin 1189

Russische Luftflotte 1236

Ausg. ital. Takt 35
Saar-Abstimmung 57
Treue der Regierung Badoglio zum Entschuldigungsschreiben - Abessinienkrieg - 76
Beginn der Rüstungen etc. Propaganda Times - Zitate 83
Lord Allen Rennt in Berlin 111 Lothian 323 372 421
Fl. Jan. Daily Herald 131 Luft-Locarno
Italien endgültig 1/35 2 Div. bei Abessinien 147
Rumpf Note Februar 202
Engl. Weißbuch - Rede Sir J Simon 219 240
Schwerpunkt im Volk. Beob. 222
Vorschlag Berlin Zusätze Simpsons ab 1936 p. 231 Blum dagegen 268
Goering über Luftwaffe Abkommen p. 243
Engl. Stellungnahme zu Rüstung im Weißbuch 244 364
Die Labour-Kampagne 279
Deutsche Aufrüstung und engl. Reaktion 291 297 Daily Telegr. 363
Ethn. Aufstand der Kolonialfrage 316
Simon 1914 322 343
Hesse 348
Vogt-Daily Herald 265
Frankreich: Scapini! 388 Herriot 412
Jacobs über Hitlers Ansprache 388
Paris-Moskau 393
U-Boot-Krieg begonnen 411

13 Aug. 32 Hitlerjug weist Hitler öffentl. u. Kundgebungsverbot ab

Osthilfe-Skandal, enthüllt von Ludendorff. Hitlerjug erhält Hitlerjugendpreis von Ludendorff zusammen mit Stahlhelm, O.-J. erhält Osthilfe-Millionen mit Ausschaltung Hitlerjug.

Hauptbeispiele: Pfalz v. Tillessen, Erbhofgesetz, Mittelgebirge u. Hitler
Pflegeeltern Neubauern 33/225 33/273
16. Sept. 33 Neues Ehrenzeichen Hitlers, das auf Spindlerei hinausläuft 33/302
14. Okt. 33 Hitlerrede Friedensrede an Frankreich
24. Nov. 33 Berufs über die französischen Agenten Hitlers 33/401
Fand-il causer avec Hitler? 33/537
Midi des Herrn Thomas sur marchands de canons p. 560/33
Dez. 33 Hitler liest Kriegsgefangenenpaket mit Frankreich die vierte Lieferung 33/583
Dez 33 Schmitz erklärt: Völkerbund ist tot.
Mussolini dasselbe
" " Ehren-Mitgliedschaft Austausch 33/608
Deutsche Propag. in der USA 33/620

Amerika

1933 29. Dez. Roosevelt Kundgebungsrede: für Abrüstung (NTB 34, S. 4)
" Kriegsgefahr. Dauer in Europa angeordnet: Erklärung
des Kl. Staat.

---

33 Okt. Hitlers Angebot an Frankreich 53/604
" " Abkehr von Völkerbund

14. Nov. 1933 Mussolini vor dem Rat der Korporationen: Der Völkerbund
ist tot und wird nie wieder zum Leben erwachen.

April 1933 Der Vierer-Pakt „le drame des Dardanelles"

Astrid Tardieu NTB 34/ - / 13

Neville Chamberlain NTB 33 / 64

Juli 33 Heberson fährt z. Hitler. Auf dem
Münchener Flughafen empfängt ihn SA 33/103

" Deutschland sucht Flugzeuge in Lübeck zu
bestellen (Comm. 26. Juli) NTB/33/127

Lord Rothmere: Alles in Deutschland normal
NTB/33/134

Eisenhüttenleute Essen 3 mal höher in 1. Halbjahr 33 als im
Monatsdurchschnitt 1932. Kupfer doppelt. (Monatsdurchschnitt)
Allgemeine Handelsblatt-
Deutsche Rüstungsindustrie NTB/33/180

Juli 33 Der Preis Kilogr. männl. Angestellten
der Berufsgenossenschaften Bergbau Eisen u. 33/252

Blomberg, Rede, „Wir verdanken ihm viel" Sept.
NTB 33/27

33 Sept. Daily Herald meint Frankreich den
wichtigsten Bündnispartner in Europa 33/296

Sept 18 33 Lt Col Myers verlangt, dass dem „tollen Hund"
Einhalt geboten werde 33/p. 300

Baumwoll-Einfuhr Meldung 33/324

Sept Die Arbeitszeit-Verkürzung 33/373
Die Versammlungen [illegible] 33/398/-

Frankreich - Hitler
Balkan
Ostpakt - etc.
Rom
Österreich / Mussolini
Baltikum - Nord
Saar

1) Feierlicher Kriegsverzicht aller europaeischer Staaten.

2) Sofortiges Studium fuer Arrangements politischer Streitfragen in Europa.

3) Deutsche und andere Ruestungsbeschraenkungen sollen in ein und demselben Vertrag festgelegt werden, als Ersatz fuer Teil V des Versailler Vertrags.

4) Gleiche Laufzeit fuer alle Beschraenkungen.
5) Gleicher allgemeiner Typ der Heeresorganisation.

In der Debatte erklaert sich der deutsche Vertreter Nadolny fuer 3-5. Punkt 1 und 2 sollen spaeter eroertert werden, Paul-Boncaur dagegen besteht darauf, dass zuerst punkt 1 und 2 erledigt werden.

Nadolny: Abruestung hat mit Sicherung des Friedens nichts zu tun.

30. Januar 1933: Hitler Reichskanzler.

3. Februar: Eden im Unterhaus: Die vorhendenen Friedensgarantien sind " real and substancial."

8. Februar: Paul-Boncour: Ohne security keine Abruestung.

Maerz 1933. Abermals neuer englischer Plan.

1) die Konvention soll fuer vorlaeufig 5 Jahre gelten.
2) Keine Aufruestung
3) Internationale Kontrolle.
4) Politische Studienkommission
5) Herstellung allgemeinen Vertrauens.

In Punkt 2 und 3 die franzoesischen Vorschlaege hineingearbeitet.

Nadolny opponiert heftig. Die SA seien keine militaerischen Effektivs.

23. Maerz Macdonald im Unterhaus: "ridiculous to think that any nation could remain bound by obligations which are considered inconsistent with its honour." Freiwillige Verpflichtungen sind allein etwas wert.

Churchill: "Macdonald's plan had come at the worst possible time. It was a foolish moment to press on France when there was a tumultuous insurgence of ferocity in Germany. " Eden: Churchill ist der einzige unproduktive Kritiker im Parlament.

20. Maerz: 8 Millionen ehemalige Frontkaempfer treten bei Henderson fuer Gleichberechtigung ein. Fordern g

gleichzeitig obligatorisches Schiedsgericht und seelische Abruestung.

27. Maerz: Japans Austritt aus dem Voelkerbund.

~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ 30. Maerz 1933. Judendebatte im Unterhaus. Kriegsminister Lord Hailsham warnt vor Einmischung in die innern Verhaeltnisse Deutschlands und Verletzung des deutschen Selbstgefuehls.

31. Maerz Viermaechte-Pakt.

13. April : Austen Chamberlain im Unterhaus: "Events in Germany made the moment inopportune for talking of treaty revision." / John Simon verurteilt die deutschen Judenmassnahmen.

15. April Deutscher Protest gegen die Parlamentsdebatten.

11. Mai: Neurath kuendigt in der Leipziger Illustrierten Zeitung Deutschlands Aufruestung an.

12. Mai : Papen haelt in Muenchen eine Rede, in der er den Strotod verhoehnt. Hailsham droht mit Sanktionen. Cecil: Keine Zeit fuer Grenzveraenderungen, aber Deutschlands Anspruch auf Gleichberechtigung bleibt bestehen.

16. Mai Roosevelts Rede to the rulers of the world. Spricht fuer Macdinalds Plan und fuer Nichtangriffpakte. Droht dem Friedensstoerer.

17. Mai Hitlers Reichstagsrede. "Kein neuer Krieg". Will Macdonalds Plan annehmen, wenn 1) qualitative Gleichberechtigung anerkannt wird, 2) wenn die Umwandlung der Reichswehr parallel zu der Abruestung anderer Staaten erfolgen kann. Bereit zu allen Nichtangriffspakten. Grosser aussenpolitischer Erfolg.

18. Maerz: Lippmann in New York Herald Tribune: Hitler ein grosser Staatsmann.

Die Beratungen ueber Macdonalds Entwurf, die Americas Mitwirkung im Falle einer Verletzung des Kelloggpaktes zur Voraussetzung hatten, werden torpediert durch den amerikanischen Senatsausschuss (Borah), der am 27. Mai 1933 einen Antrag Johnson-Vandenberg annimmt. im Kriegsfalle das Embargo fuer alle Kriegfuehrenden Laender ohne Ruecksicht auf die Frage des Angreifers durchzufuehren. (Inspiriert von Prof. John Bassett Moore). Der Antrag wird am 28. Februar 1934 debattelos angenommen.

Unter dem Eindruck von Hitlers Friedensbeteuerungen erklaerte Macdonald am 23. Mai 1933 im Unterhaus: "We are pledged to give equality to Germany. The time is gone by when by a combination of any Powers any European peoples can be kept down by obligations which it regards as being inconsistent with self-respect and its honor, and now we have made it perfectly clear that the obligations that are to be placed upon the nations of Europe are to be obligations of honor and moral responsibility."

Churchill widersprach sofort dieser Rede, die auch Naurath oder Hitler selbst haette halten koennen.

John Simon (Unterhaus) lobte am 26. Mai Hitlers Rede, wuenscht aber, dass den gemaessigten Worten auch Taten folgen werden. "But I am the more disquieted that there has been no direct repudiation by anyone in authority in Germany of some other statements recently made by colleagues of the Chancellor. If I may take the Chamcellor's declaration as meaning the withdrawal of the German Foreign Minister's written word that if certain things did not happen as Germany wished she would rearm in spite of her treaty obligations; if I may take it as the repudiation of that terrible speech of Vice Chancellor Von Papen, in which he said warfare must be to men what child bearing was to woman; if I may take it as a repudiation of those utterances, I welcome it more heatily, and I would go as far as I can to meet the newer and wiser spirit which the Chancellor seems to indicate."

Lanbury lobt am 5. Juli (Unterhaus) 1933 the reassuring speech of Herr Hitler, obwohl er den Kriegsgeist in Deutschland nicht ignorieren will. "The opposition wanted Germany to have fair play, but they were none of them going to sit by and, without protest, see Germany rearm."

Austen Chamberlain: " While something is refused to Germany, it is vital. If you say 'Well, we will give it to you, and now our relations will

of course be on a satisfactory footing', it loses all value for the moment that they obtain it,and it is taken by them merely as a stepping off place for a further demand.

As long as every speech made in Germany, as long as every bit of their propaganda is menacing,inflammatory,biased,one-sided,how can they expect that those whom by this propaganda they menace should disarm in order that Germany may be in a better position to attack them?"

Am Vortage von Hitlers Reichstagsrede, hatte Lloyd George in Scarborough rueckhaltlos die Partei Deutschlands ergriffen: (Manchester Guardian 17/5)

" There are two questions arising out of the German position,and it is a fatal error to mix them up. One is the abominable treatment of the Jews in Germany,and the other is the abominable treatment of Germany by the Allies over the question of disarmament... But when you come to disarmament,I feel a special personal responsibility in this matter. I was one of the four who drafted the disarmament clauses of the Peace Treaty. If ever there were clauses of the Treaty that were just,the disarmament clauses were just. Those clauses provided that Germany should dismantle that tremendous powerful armament that precipitated the war and came very near to accomplishing its nefarious purposes. The promoters of the treaty said:

' Before we begin to disarm we do not feel safe to do so until that great army is disintegrated,but,we said,the moment that is done,we will all follow.' We did not merely put that as a promise in writing,we set up a special machinery in the League of Nations to carry out that pledge. In two years Germany was disarmed to the limit fixed by that treaty. I took my just part in insisting that that should be done. What have the Signatories to the Treaty done? What have the nations done that compelled Germany to sign that Treaty?

Not only have they failed to carry out their pledge but they have increased armaments and made them more powerful. Year by year Germany has been pleading for a fulfilment of that pledge--not for a revision of the treaty but for the execution of the treaty. France,Poland,Czecho-Slovakia have thousands of heavy guns,tanks and heavy bombing aeroplans. Germany is allowed none. Are you surprised that after waiting for 14 years the Germans

have got angry?

We ought to have noticed in the swelling number of the Nazis that the young men of the nation were resenting it. It is ill provoking to a brave people by the flagrant imposition of wrong;we drive them to frency by injustice,and then we make that an excuse for not redressing the wrong. That is not British fair play.

I do not like some of the things that are been said just now by people in very high places. That was a foolish speech that was ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ delivered by the Secretary of War the other day when he talked about sanctions against Germany.... Let us before we rush into another blunder,think and appeal for caution and good counsel, Let us talk to Germany in the League of Nations on the basis of insisting on a just level of fair play. Allround fair play for the 600000 Jews in Germany, fair play for the 60 000 000 Germans.-- If each party is called to carry out its promise,if not only Germany is called upon to carry out the treaty,but if the others are prepared to carry out their part,then what seems to me to be a situation which grows more and more alarming and more reminiscent of 1914,when war came with~~xxxx~~ no one wanting it, may be escaped."

Lloyd Georges Ausfall kam fuer Hitlers Reichstagsrede zu spaet, wurde aber von der deutschen Propaganda intensiv ausgebeutet. Im Unterhaus zur Rede gestellt, behaptete ~~er~~ Lloyd George England von seinen Anklagen ausgenommen zu haben, wurde aber von John Simon der Unwahrheit (in diesem Punkte) ueberfuehrt.

In Frankreich protestierte Léon Blum gegen energisches Auftreten. ist fuer automatische und permanente Kontrolle.

konkrete Bedingungen fuer die Abruestung formulieren.

Dieser Vorschlag wird Neurath am 24. September mitgeteilt.

24.-28. September Beratung dieses Vorschlags in Genf mit Neurath.

6. Oktober Deutsches Aide-Memoire an ~~Frankreich~~ England und USA ,nicht an Frankreich.

30. Juni 1933 Vertagung der Abruestungskonferenz im allgemeinen Einverstaendnis.

Am 24. Juni 33 hatte die deutsche Presse gemeldet, dass angeblich frmede Flieger Flugblaetter auf Berlin abgeworfen haetten. Gefunden wurden zolche Fliugblaetter nur in der Wilhelmstrasse). Darauf kuendigt Goering die Schaffung einer Polizeifliegertruppe an.

12. Juni 1933 Beginnder Weltwirtschaftskonferenz in London.

15. Juli Unterzeichnung des 4 Maechte-Pakts. Mussolinis Entwurf Art. ## 3:

"France, Great Britain and Italy declare that in case the Disarmament Conference attains only partial results, the equality of rights recognized for Germany shall have an effective meaning and Germany undertakes to realize this equality of rights by stages which will be determined by successive agreements among the 4 Powers through the usual diplomatic channels." Von Frankreich und England abgelehnt.

Im Laufe des Sommers wurde das franzoesische Kabinett durch die deutschen Ruestungen mehr und mehr beunruhigt. Daladier teilt der englischen Regierung mit, dass er nicht mehr den Macdonaldschen Entwurf annehmen koenne. 18-22. September Besprechungen Edens mit Daladier u Paul-Boncour in Paris.

22. September 1933 Frankreich, England und USA einigen sich auf den Vorschlag, die Abruestung in zwei Stadien erfolgen zu lassen:

1) Stadium soll 3-4 Jahre dauern. Waehrenddessen soll die Reichswehr in eine Armee mit kurzer Dienstpflicht umgewandelt werden.

2) Stadium soll ebenfalls 3-4 Jahre dauern. Waehrenddessen soll eine allgemeine Abruestung unter internationaler Kontrolle erfolgen. Ueber die Kontrolle entstehen Meinungsverschiedenheiten. Frankreich ist fuer automatische und permanente Kontrolle. England will lieber konkrete Bedingungen fuer die Abruestung formulieren.

Dieser Vorschlag wird Neurath am 24. September mitgeteilt.

24.-28. September Beratung dieses Vorschlags in Genf mit Neurath.

6. Oktober Deutsches Aide-Memoire an England und USA, nicht an Frankreich.

Es nimmt grundsaetzlich Macdonalds Entwurf an, lehnt aber jede Probezeit ab. Deutschland sei zu allen Beschraenkungen bereit, die auch den andern auferlegt wuerden. Das wird ein Hauptschlagwort der deutschen Agitation. Hitler sagt am 20, Oktober, er werde das letzte deutsche Maschinengewehr zerschlagen, wenn die andern das gleiche taeten, und erzielt damit in England grossen Eindruck.

9-11. Oktober: Beratung ueber das Memorandum vom 6. 10. und ueber Milderungen der Bedingungen vom 22. 9. Nadolny sehr steif.

11. Oktober abends: Nadolny erhaelt die endgueltigen Vorschlaege, in denen wieder die Probezeit vorgesehen ist.

13. Oktober: deutsche Kabinettsberatung.

14. Oktober 1933: Hitler erklaert Deutschlands Ruecktritt von der Entwaffnungskonferenz und seinen Austritt aus dem Voelkerbund.

Plebiszit zur Stellungnahme des deutschen Volkes vorbereitet. In der hierfuer entfachten Agitation, ebensowie in der Bearbeitung des Auslandes wird Deutschlands Friedenswille betont. Es gaebe bessere Wege der Friedenssicherung als den ueber Genf.

England empfindet Deutschlands Austritt aus dem Voelkerbund als schwere Kalamitaet, die aber nicht endgueltig sei. Es hofft Deutschland zurueckzubringen und vertraut auf Hitlers Friedensbeteuerungen.

Henderson sagt in einer Rundfunkrede vom 16. Oktober: "Withdrawal seemed to me premature and infortunate because the General Commission has not finally formulated its concrete proposals.

John Simon in Radioansprache vom 17. Oktober: "You may be sure that no word coming from me will be chosen to aggravate the situation. I am going to occupy these few minutes not in a discussion of what must be done next, but in a plain statement of recent events... The British Government are quite unable to accept the reasons which Germany has given..."

Henderson, Manchester Guardian 21. Oktober: England muss jetzt ein Beispiel internationaler Loyalitaet geben, indem es die allgemeine Abruestung beschleunigt.

Macdonald (Unterhaus) 24.Oktober: "This country can look Germany in the face without any blush or without any apology...The British Government is not going to give up its attempt to secure an agreed scheme of disarmament."

In Frankreich folgen sich waehrenddessen die Ministerkrisen,die zur Revolte vom 6. Februar 1934 fuehren.Die Aussenpolitik, von Paul-Boncour geleitet, haelt fest,dass ausserhalb des Voelkerbunds keine Verstaendigung erzielt werden kann. Deutschland muesse nach Genf zurueckkehren bevor weiterverhandelt wird. Das ist weder der Standpunkt der englischen noch der deutschen Regierung.

Der amerikanische Delegierte Norman Davis erklaert am 16. Oktober: " We are not interested in the political demands of the purely European aspect of the question. We emphasize once more again that we are in no wise politically allied to any European Power. "

24. Oktober Hitler im Sportpalast. Bereit zur Versoehnung mit Frankreich.

6. November: Neurath schlaegt europaeische Zusammenarbeit ausserhalb Genfs in neuer Friedensgesinnung mit neuen Ideen vor.

7. November: John Simon (Unterhaus): "We must earnestly trust that these statements (Hitlers und Neuraths) may lead in some form or other to the renival of contact." So auch Macdonald am 9. November im Unterhaus.

Austen Chamberlain fuer Fortsetzung der Entwaffnungskonferenz.

Lloyd George: Ausser England hat kein Alliierter seine Verpflichtungen erfuellt. Deutschland wolle Macdonalds Plan ausfuehren.

12. November: Deutsches Plebiszit.

13. November: Macdonald: "We ask Germany to come in."

14. November: Albert Sarraut, Ministerpraesident: "Gardons notre sang froid. Egalite sans contre-partie? Non."

15. November : Deutsch-Polnische Verstaendigung.

16. November: De Brinon veroeffentlicht im "Matin" sein Interview mit Hitler,in dem dieser seine Loyalitaet gegenueber Frankreich beteuert.

21. November: John Simon findet dieses Interview "remarkable" . Er wuerde jede deutsch-franzoesische Verstaendigung begruessen und unter-

Tage

stuetzen. (Unterhaus) Am xxx gleichen xxxxxx erklaert Macdonald im Oberhaus, er hoffe auf eine Verstaendigung mit Deutschland.

Ende November 1933 verhandelt Hitler mit dem britischen und amerikanischen Botschafter ueber Wiederaufnahme der Entwaffnungsverhandlungen.

18. Dezember : Deutsches Aide-Memoire an Frankreich.

Zehnjaehriger Nichtangriffspakt mit Frankreich, Belgien, Polen, Tschechoslovakei. Dafuer Aufhebung der Rheinlandbeschraenkungen und Freiheit, die deutsche Ostgrenze zu befestigen. Reichswehr soll 300 000 Mann mit einjaehriger Dienstpflicht unfassen. Kontrolle erst nachdem Deutschland Ruestungsgleichheit realisiert hat. Sofortige Rueckkehr des Saargebiets. Eine franzoesische Anfrage an die britische Regierung wegen Sanktionen bei eigenmaechtiger Aufruestung Deutschlands wird ausweichend beantwortet. Wheeler -Bennett, p. 195.

1. Januar 1934: Franzoesische Antwort an Deutschland.

Die deutschen Vorschlaege bieten weniger Garantien als Locarno und Kellogg-Pakt. Keine Revision des Versailler Vertrages. Keine Aufruestung ueber Macdonalds Vorschlag hinaus. Einverstanden mit 300000 kurdienender Reichswehr, wenn paramilitaerische Verbaende aufgeloest werden. Kontrolle der Zivil-Luftfahrt. Dafuer will Frankreich 50 % seiner schweren Bomber zerstoeren. Deutschland duerfe nur Defensiv-Waffen fuehren.

8. Januar 1934: Eden: "The first need of the world is for an agreement upon disarmament, not only on account of the importnace of that issue itself but owing to their greater political significance which it now embodies. The conversations through diplomatic channels and which otherwise have recently been proceeding have been solely for that purpose. They are no substitute for Geneva. They are an interlude to enable the work of Geneva to proceed with better prospects of success at their conclusion."

19. Januar. Deutsche Note an Frankreich: Entweder Bewilligung der Forderungen vom 18.12.33 oder allgemeine Einschränkung auf Verabredung Bestimmungen.

26. Januar: Deutsch-Polnischer Pakt.

Die Tschechoslovakei hatte ein aehnliches deutsches Angebot

abgelehnt.

29. Januar Britishes Memorandum on Disarmament.

"Even thxough increase of armed strength may be actuated by reasons of defense,it is an index of fear of attack from another quarter,and a measure of the alarm and disquiet existing between peoples.

Conversely a general agreement securing the limitation of armaments at the lowest practicable level would be the most effective and significant proof of international appeasement and an encouragement of the mutual confidence which springs from good neighbourly relations. Consequently His Majesty's Government regard agreement about armaments not as an end itself but rather a concomitant of world peace and as an outcome of political amelioration." Das Kabinett bleibt bei Macdonalds Entwurf. "No agreement is no solution at all,and the world will be thrown back upon unrestricted competition the end of which no man can see."

Die hochgeruesteten Maechte sollen nicht weiter ruesten,wenn sie nicht abruesten wollen. Hitlers Pakte werden begruesst. "His Majesty's Government are glad to understand that Chancellor Hitler has declared that Germany voluntarily renounces any claim to possess 'offensive8 weapons and limits herself to normal 'defanse' armaments. A positive contribution by the heavily armed Powers will help to bring the scale down all round and should reduce the demands which Germany might otherwise be disposed to put forward." Reichswehr soll aus 300000 Mann bestehen. "Agreements as to this figure will enable all European Continental armies to be reduced. " Das Britische Kabinett freut sich,von Hitler den Beweis zu erhalten,dass SA and SS keinen militaerischen Character haben. Ausser Flugzeugen soll Deutschland alle Waffen -- 6tons tanks usw erhalten, aber es muss dann nach Genf zurueckkehren.

30. Januar 1934. Hitler im Reichstag: Als aufrichtiger Anhaenger einer Politik der Versoehnung" sei er fuer Deutschlands Gleichberechtigung eingetreten und habe damit den groessten Beitrag zum Frieden Europas geliefert. Beziehungen zu Polen und Russland seien gebessert. Kein Deutscher bedrohe Frankreich.

5. Februar. Attlee im Unterhaus unzufrieden mit dem britischen Memorandum. "This paper is in the main a proposal for the rearmament of Germany." Labor Cheers. Austen Chamberlain: "I never did admit the right of Germany to parity of armaments with the Powers to whom the provisions

of the Treaty did not apply." Sonst aber mit Memorandum einverstanden. Stafford Cripps: Alle muessen disarm to Germany's level."

7. Februar Churchill im Unterhaus: Bald wird Deutschland auch gleiche Rechte fuer Flotte und Kolonien fordern.

14. Februar 1934: Barthou, neuer Aussenminister im Kabinett Doumergue an Auswaertiges Amt. Er vermisst deutsches Eingehen auf franzoesischen Kontroll-Vorschlag. SA, SS und andere paramilitaerische Verbaende seien in die Effektivbestaende der Reichswehr einzubeziehen. Deutschland soll mit Zweideutigkeiten aufhoeren. Damit finden die deutsch-franzoesischen Verhandlungen ihr Ende. Die englische Regierung schickt am 16. Februar Eden nach Paris, um die Fortfuehrung der Verhandlungen zu befuerworten. Barthou fordert Sanktionen (Wheeler-Bennettp. 211)

Eden faehrt dann Berlin. Hitler fordert

1) mindestens 1000 Kampf-Flugzeuge

2) Aufhoeren der Versuche, Deutschlands Rueckkehr nach Genf zu verlangen. (So auch Deutsches Memorandum vom 16. April 1934).

19. Februar: Daily Mail veroeffentlicht Interview Goering-Ward Price. Goering fordert deutsche Defensiv-Luftwaffe.

8. Maerz: Baldwin im Unterhaus: "I agree with Mr. Churchill that the European situation has changed in the last 12 months.owing to various circumstances in various parts of the world with which I need not deal tonight. But I am convinced that whatever be the ultimate motive that makes Germany at this moment so anxious for her air force--it may be from ~~xxxxxxxxx~~ militaristic ideas alone and from a feeling of national pride-- there is the same feeling of apprehension of the people which my right honorable friend showed and which we all feel about London."

23. Maerz: Frankreich lehnt das britische Memorandum ab.

17. April: Barthous Note an John Simon. Weist auf das deutsche Militaerbudget hin, das am gleichen Tage veroeffentlicht wurde, als das britische Memorandum ueberreicht wurde. Deutschland verachte alle Vertraege. Ces faits "prouvent que le gouvernement du Reich a, de propos délibéré ou non, rendu impossible des négociations dont son histoire a ruiné les bases." Verhandlungen koennten nur erfolgen, nachdem Deutschland seien Austritt aus dem Voelkerbund rueckgaengig

gemacht haben wird;aber Edens Besuch in Berlin habe erwiesen,dass Deutschland gar nicht an Rueckkehr nach Genf denkt.

Diese Note erregt in Deutschland ungeheure Aufregung. Neurath protestiert vor der Berliner Presse am 27. April: "Die seit mehr als 6 Monaten gefuehrten Verhandlungen zwischen den hauptsaechlich beteiligten Grossmaechten sind von Frankreich bruesk abgebrochen worden,und zwar mit einer Begruendung,die die schwersten Beschuldigungen gegen Deutschland in sich schliesst."

16. Mai: Besprechung Barthou-Liwinow ueber Ost-Pakt.

29. Mai: Wiederaufnahme der Entwaffnungskonferenz in Genf.

Litwinow schlaegt vor,sie solle sich in Permanenz erklaeren,um Sicherheit und Frieden zu schuetzen.

John Simon tritt fuer deutsch-franzoesische Verstaendigung und Macdonalds Entwurf ein.

Barthou polemisiert gegen das britische Memorandum.

Die Konferenz teilt sich in zwei Lager.

Das eine unter Fuehrung Englands,von Italien aktiv unterstuetzt, will Konzessionen an Deutschland,um irgenein Abkommen zu erreichen.

Das andere,Frankreich,Russland,Kleine Entente, will Vertagung,bis befriedigende Abkommen ueber Sekuritaet erzielt sind.

Hendersons Kompromissvorschlaege von Barthou abgelehnt.

8. Juni Kompromissresolution angenommen:

Alle Arbeiten,die auf Sekuritaet, Flugwesen,Waffenhandel usw zielen,sollen dem Bureau ueberlassen werden.

11. Juni 1934: Vertagung sine die.

Lloyd George

29.April 1920

Triumphiert,dass San Remo alle befriedigt habe.

"In Paris,I find , they are pleased with the decision to enforce the treaty. In Germany,I see that they are equally pleased that we have departed for the first time from the militarist policy of Paris."

Frankreich muss auf das Rheinland verzichten.

" We cannot bequeath to our children another Alsace-Lorraine."

.... " The German Government have no authority in their own land. I do not want to say anything that is harsh,but this government does not command the authority which would enable it to make its decrees respected. Soldiers defy it. States defy it, So I understand. That is the greatest difficulty of all. You are dealing with a ~~xxxhxxxxx~~ broken-back creature which has not got the command of its limbs and its muscles. Its actions are convulsive. It has the command of speech,and that is about all.....

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that there is famine in the land. I have had reports from British officers in districts where the population are not getting more than between one-third and one-half of the calories that enable life to be effectively maintained. They are living wholly upon sloshy vegetables with no vitality. That is the trouble in Germany. It is suffering from that kind of shell-shock where it has not recovered the use of its muscles and its limbs, and it is half-paralysed. This I get from British officers. I have taken the trouble to see them and to talk to them and they are quite frank about it. One I sent for from Berlin tells me quite frankly what the position is.

That is the difficulty. When you come to order disarmament you may get a perfectly willing Government which issues decrees hoping that they will be obeyed, but there is no one at the present moment in that country who seems to me to have the power to enforce the decrees, and that is one of the greatest troubles with which we are confronted. If the German Government say, "We can issue orders, but we can get no one to obey them," then we shall know what to do, but it will be action of a totally different sort. You may take one kind of action against a Government which you know threatens you. But you may take another form of action against a Government which you know is perfectly helpless. The action you take depends very largely upon the diagnosis of the facts, and therefore it is vital that we should ascertain exactly what the position is. That is one of the advantages of meeting the people who are, at any rate nominally, in authority, and have established more than nominal authority for the time being in Berlin.

The officers gave me a description of the march of the troops into Berlin. There were only 3,000 or 4,000 of them, and they expected to be hailed as deliverers. The population were simply stunned and stupefied. They looked like a stupefied people, not knowing what the thing meant. So far from being friendly, they were deeply hostile. The troops never realised till they got there that Germany is not merely sick and tired of militarism, but that it will have nothing whatever to do with it. This is what was told me by British officers who were there. These are the facts which have been given to me about the position. In a very short time these wretched creatures, who had hoped to carry out a *coup d'etat*, found that nobody wanted it, and that the whole of the population were set against them; not merely the workmen, but the middle classes, and also many of the higher classes who had fought, and, as they thought, had made this sort of thing impossible. That is the position, then, in regard to disarmament. The guns we must get. The aeroplanes we must get. That is essential. We cannot allow these terrific weapons of war to be left lying about in Germany, where there is nobody in real authority to deal with them. It is too dangerous. You can never tell what may happen. Someone may arise who may know what use to make of these weapons. They must, therefore, be cleared out. The rifles are infinitely more difficult to get at; but rifles without guns, machine guns, and aeroplanes are not very formidable as weapons of invasion, though they may be very dangerous as weapons of disorder. We shall, however, have to do our best to secure them.

I come now to reparation. In regard to this two or three questions arise. As I pointed out in the discussion here some few weeks ago, it is no use pointing to the present condition of Germany and saying, "How can Germany pay reparation when she is starving?" Germany will not always be starving. She has a population of 60,000,000 or 70,000,000. It is an intelligent population. It is a highly skilled one. It is a population of craftsmen, a population having all the arts of wealth production. She will recover! What we want to know is, what steps Germany is taking to estimate her liabilities, to assess her liabilities; what proposals she is going to make for liquidating her liabilities. We know perfectly well that in her present condition she cannot pay. She cannot maintain life decently. We want to see that Germany really acknowledges her liability, and is thinking about the best method of liquidating it. To meet a debtor who owes you a large sum of money which he has not paid, who is not paying interest upon it, and, who, when he meets you, talks about everything else except about that debt, is exasperating. The Germans must be got to take steps to assess their liability, and to make some proposals to pay.

Criticisms have been levelled at me from two sides in respect to this debt.

Reparations: first expert comittee: Birdsall 35/38 „a wild and fantastic chimera"

December elections 1918 in England. „We shall squeeze the orange until the pips squeak"

Privately Lloyd George mentions as early as Nov. 26, 18, the inevitability for Germany to pay by means of exporting goods, and the dilemma for the recievers to buy these goods (Birdsall 36 ff)

Reparations

1920 May 15/16 Hythe Conference. Resolved to fix the Reparat. Amount

1921 May 5th London Conference
132 Milliards Schmark

1922 January Cannes

1922 April Genua
End discussions Eglen-Franc. England inclined to grant 4 years moratorium

1923 Ruhr

1924 Dawes

1929 Young

—

Already in Paris: idea that all costs of war should be pooled, perhaps within the league (Dodd, 321)

T

Keynes, Experts till June 9, 1919
But the peace was entirely ready
long before.

English and French experts in the reparation commission decisively for "Indemnity plus reparations". Also Lloyd George. Then March 10 council decision: no war costs, an indemnity, only reparation. Clemenceau + Lloyd George for this solution.

Rpr. 2 Attack in House of Commons that U.S. did abandon his election pledges in re reparation Bittner 257

Committee on Reparation

First Meeting Febr. 10
all powers for all costs. U.S.
alone for reparations exclusively
Hughes of Australia

Repr.
May 29 19
Brockdorff-Rantzau makes a
german offr: 100 Billions Goldmark,
of which 20 till 1926, rests
in 30 or 60 years installments.
No interests. „Actual value" of
this at 6% about 30 Bill. Goldm.
Tardieu 298

Lord Cunliffe, Governor of
the Bank of England

Commission on Reparation

USA
Bernard M Baruch,
Norman H Davis
Vance C. McCormick

British Empire
W. M. Hughes — Prime Minister of Australia
Lord Sumner — Lord of Appeal in Ordinary
Lord Cunliffe, — Former Governor of the Bank of England

France — L.L. Klotz — Minister of Finance
Loucheur — " — "
Albert Lebrun — " — "
Liberaled Dibidats

First Meeting Feb. 3 1919

For war costs, as opposed to civilian damage, were:
Hughes, Sumner, Cunliffe

Lloyd George had promised the collect from Germany the costs of war, shilling for shilling and ton for ton.

If war costs	France	43 %
	Empire	19 %
If civilian damage	France	24 %
	Empire	40 %

Pensions in the
Why to include Reparation

Memorandum Smuts
March 31, 19
Quoted Baruch 32

"present value" and arithmetical sum of annuities

25 annuities à 10 Millions = 250 Mill.
but their "present value"
at a rate of 5% are only 140

50 annuities a 5 Million = 250 Mill.
present value 91 "

100 annuities a 1 Mill. = 250 "
present value 49.5 "

Briand, seen by Clemenceau
Sanders 367

Tragedy of Peace
Clemenceau " Defeatism "
p 371
" Sanders "

V

Rhineland evacuation: April 29 Wilson had conceded Clemenceau, that evacuation might be delayed at the end of fifteen years if guarantee treaty would not be adopted in U.S.' Birdsall 214

X

Kellogg-Briand-Pakt

Sehr bald nach dem Abschluss der Locarno-Vertraege nahm die Agitation fuer Entwaffnung einen starken Aufschwung. Sie wurde der franzoesischen Regierung unbequem. Im Fruehjahr 1927 sah Frankreich sich in die unangenehme Situation versetzt, bei der Flottenkonferenz in Genf, wo eine Beschraenkung der See-Ruestungen verhandelt wurde, offen in den Streik zu treten. Die Konferenz war ein vollkommener Fehlschlag, und der Hauptteil des Odiums für ihr Scheitern fiel auf Frankreich.

Locarno bedeutete fuer Frankreich eine grosse Enttäuschung, der deutsche Nationalismus wuchs immer bedrohlicher an, und der "neue Geist" der deutschen Regierung bekundete sich hauptsaechlich darin, dass sie mit gesteigerter Intensitaet die allgemeine -- d.h. vor allem die franzoesische --Abruestung offiziell forderte.

Briand seinerseits, von der franzoesischen Rechten dauernd mit Hinweisen auf den deutschen Nationalismus bedraengt, konnte nicht daran denken in der Abruestungsfrage der internationalen Agitation nachzugeben. Auf der gleichen Ministerbank wie er sass im Jahre 1927 Poincaré. Er glaubte, mit seinem oratorischen Friedenskult das Abruestungsverlangen ablenken zu koennen. Er bezeichnete seinen Friedenskult wiederholt als Mystik, als diejenige Art von Mystik, die der Menschheit des 20. Jahrhunderts eine neue Religion bedeuten sollte, und beteuerte, dass der Galaube an den Frieden die Vorbedingung fuer die Befriedung der Menschheit sei. Briands Spekulation schlug fehl. Die "Mystik" des Nationalismus erwies sich in Deutschland als die staerkere, und mit dem Bemuehen, die "Abruestung der Geister" zu propagieren, um von der technischen Abruestungsfrage abzulenken, manövrierte Briand Frankreich auch in der technischen Abruestungpolitik in eine immer schlechtere Situation. So erging es ihm auch mit seinem Anggebot an Amerika, den Krieg zu "aechten".

Briand hatte erfahren, dass in den Vereinigten Staaten seit 1918 eine

Bewegung erstarkt war, die "outlawry of war" forderte. Ihr erster Verkünder war Salmon O. Levinson, ein attorney in Chicago, der 1918 in der " New Republic" einen Artikel "Outlawry of war" veroeffentlicht hatte. Levinson war von einflussreichen Persoenlichkeiten, wie der Philosoph John Dewey, applaudiert worden. 1919 arbeitete Levinson gemeinsam mit Senator Knox einen Plan zur Aechtung des Krieges aus, der im Dezember 1921 in der Zeitschrift Unity veroeffentlicht wurde. "The Christian Century" uebernahm diesen Plan, und der Leiter dieser Zeitschrift, Dr. Morrison wurde fuer die Kriegsaechtungbewegung ebenso einflussreich wie Levinson, vielleicht noch mehr, denn er gewann weite kirchliche Kreise fuer die outlawry of war. 1923 brachte Borah im Senat einen Antrag auf outlawry of war ein, den er 1927 wiederaufnahm.

Neben der Levinson-Morrison-Borah-Bewegung entwickelte sich in Amerika eine zweite Bewegung zur Ausschaltung des Krieges. Ihr Hauptsprecher war der Historiker Professor James T. Shotwell. Dieser warf der outlawry-Bewegung vor, einzeitig moralisch-juristisch orientiert zu sein und die politische Realitaet zu verkennen.

Shotwell war 1927 Carnegie-Professor an der Berliner Hochschule fuer Politik. Dort hielt er in Anwesenheit der deutschen Kabinettsmitglieder einen Vortrag "Are we at a turning point in the history of the world?", in dem er ausfuehrte, die traditionelle Neutralitaet sei ueberlebt. "The definition of aggressor war must be developed and applied so that automatically the machinery of international justice as a substitute for war would be enhanced and at the same time all war but defense would be outlawed.. .. The conviction that the institution of war--that is war practized as a means of policy-- has become substancially an international crime, is just as strongly rooted in the conscience of America as it ever was."

Am 22. Maerz 1927 hat Shotwell in Paris eine Unterredung mit Briand.

Shotwell regt eine franzoesische Intitiative an. Wozu? Darueber gehen die Meinungen auseinander. Shotwell, On the rim of the Abyss,p.132,sagt von Briand: "What he had in mind,as was clear from our conversation,was to use the proposed agreement to outlaw war in the way in which the United States itself has used it subsequently,namely,as the basis for action in the most serious problem which had yet confronted the League of Nations,that of disarmament.XX.. The proposal to outlaw war was viewed by him,according to his own statement,as the extension to the United States of the principle which France had already accepted in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Locarno. It was clear from this statement that he did not think of it in exactly the same terms as those who had advocated the outlawry of war in the United States." Aber aus der unten folgenden Botschaft Briands an das amerikanische Volk geht durchaus nicht hervor,dass Briand den von ihm vorgeschlagenen Pakt als Ausgangspunkt der allgemeinen Entwaffnungsaktion ansah. Im Gegenteil,er sagt ziemlich deutlich, dass er die technische Entwaffnung nicht wolle. Nach Bryn-Jones Biographie von Kellogg, die Kellogs Nachlass verwertet, steht fest,dass Shotwell den Wortlaut der Botschaft Briands im wesentlichen entworfen hat.Shotwell selbst hat darueber geschwiegen,es aber in seinen spaeteren Veroeffentlichungen auch nicht bestritten. Hinsichtlich der Entwaffnungsaktion muss Briand ihn also irregefuehrt haben. Briand und Shotwell waren sich in dem Punkte einig,dass die oeffentliche Meinung Amerikas durch ein Manifest von der Verstimmung gegen Frankreich geheilt werden muesse, die wegen Frankreichs Haltung in der Flottenabruestungsfrage entstanden war.

Am 6. April 1927, dem 20.Jahrestage des Eintritts der Vereinigten Staaten in den Weltkrieg, erliess Briand eine Botschaft an das amerikanische Volk (nicht an die Regierung).

Frankreich wuenscht Abruestung. Frankreich und USA sind einig im

Ziel,wenn sie auch in Fragen der Prozedur abweichen. Die neuen Wehrgesetze Frankreich beweisen,dass seine Ruestung rein defensiv sei.

Briand schlagt Organisation eines "état-major général de la paix"vor. Frankreich und USA "moralement solidaires... S'il en etait besoin,entre ces deux grandes démocraties,pour témoigner encore plus hautement en faveur de la paix et proposer aux peuples un exemple plus solennel,la France serait prête à souscrire publiquement evec les Etats-Unis tout engagement mutuel tendant à mettre en ces deux pays,suivant l'expression americaine, "la guerre hors la loi". Schon die Locarno-Vertraege haetten den Verzicht auf Krieg ausgesprochen. "Tout engegement souscrit dans le même esprit,par les Etats Unis envers une autre nation comme la France,contribuerait grandement,aux yeux du monde,à élargir et fortifier la base sur laquelle s'édifie une politique internationale de la paix. Ainsi deux grandes nations amies, également dévouées à la cause de la paix,auraient fourni au monde la meilleure illustration de cette vérité que la réalisation la plus immédiate a atteindre n'est pas tant le désarmement que la pratique de la paix."

Diese Botschaft Briands blieb in Europa fast unbeachtet,und als Shotwell nach Amerika zurueckkam,war sie dort voellig vergessen. Bryn-Jones 225 Shotwell, War as an instrument of natinal policy 42.

Shotwell begann zu arbeiten. Er gewann Nicholas Murray Butler fuer die Sache, der am 25. April 1927 einen Brief an den Editor der New York Times schrieb. Butler Brief hatte einen grossen Widerhall. Es regnete Zuschriften, und andere Blaetter nahmen die Deabtte auf.

Anders war die Wirkung dieses Angebots eines Kriegsverzichts zwischen Freunden,die an keinen Krieg gegeneinander dachten, auf das State Department. Kellogg notierte (p. 231) "I did not make any formal answer to it at once. It did not seem to me that a treaty between France and the United States,that these two countries would never go to war,would have any practical effect in the world at large. Furthermore,it quite likely would do more

harm than good,as the other nations of Europe would wonder why the United States was entering into such a treaty with France and not with the other Powers. This was borne out by the fact that immediately it was known that M.Briand had addressed such a communication to me,the Ambassadors of Great Britain,Germany,Italy,and the diplomatic representatives of other countries in the United States made inquiries of me as to what I intended to do. I informed them that I had not come to any conclusion but that they ~~mayxkx~~ might be reassured that the United States would not make any treaty with France that it was not willing to make with any other nation in the world."

Praesident Coolidge und der Senat waren in Ferien.

"When the Senate met,in December 1926, I had a conversation with Senator Borah,chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee,and with other members of the Committee,and I came to the conclusion,that they would not approve a bilateral treaty between France and the United States;but I was led to believe ... that they would approve a multilateral treaty,such as I had in mind,with all the nations of the world."

Indessen war die Schulter,die Kellog nach seiner eigenen Darstellung Briand ~~xxxx

Briand sein Projekt eines "Pacte d'amitié perpétuelle entre la France et les États Unis" dem amerikanischen Botschafter. Das bilaterale Projekt kann also anfangs von Kellogg nicht ganz so unguenstig aufgenommen worden sein, sonst haette Kellogg es nicht zu Briands zweitem Schritt kommen lassen. Auch ueber dieses Projekt muss ernsthaft verhandelt worden sein. Daneben gingen Verhandlungen ueber einen franzoesisch-amerikanischen Schiedsvertrag, der den erloeschenden Pakt von 1908 ersetzen sollte; die beiden Pakte wurden getrennt verhandelt, aber gelegentlich machte Briand den Versuch, sie zu verschmelzen. Zwischen Kellogg und dem franzoesischen Botschafter in Washington, Paul Claudel, muss auch ein Gedankenaustausch ueber den "Freundschaftspakt" stattgefunden haben. Kellogg sagt p. 232: "I was under the impression that the French Government had received some information of what was in my mind about a treaty renouncing war, because the French Ambassador made informal suggestions to me that I place in the preamble of the arbitration treaty a general statement about the relations between France and the United States, however making it not a part of the treaty."

Am 28. Dezember 1927, sagt Kellogg, sei seine Antwortnote auf den franzoesischen Vorschlag eines bilateralen Paktes, d.H. Kelloggs Vorschlag eines multilateralen Paktes, fertig gestellt worden. Da habe Claudel bei ihm angerufen, er habe eben eine wichtige Note von Briand erhalten, die gerade dechiffriert werde. Er wuerde um 4 Uhr nachmittags zu Kellogg kommen und ihm die Note bringen. Darauf schickt Kellogg seine eigene, eben fertiggestellte Note nach schleunigst eingeholter Genehmigung Coolidges, ungehend nach Paris und sendet Claudel Abschrift davon, ehe Claudel sich auf den Weg zu Kellogg machen konnte. Infolgedessen unterblieb Claudels Besuch, und Kellogg hat nie erfahren, welche Vorschlaege Briand ihm am 28. Dezember machen vollte.

Kellogs Note vom 28. Dezember sagt: "...In view of the traditional friendship between France and the United States, a friendship which happily is not dependent upon the existence of a

dependent upon the existence of any formal engagement, ...it has occurred to me that the two ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ governments, instead of contending themselves with a bilateral declaration...might make a more signal contribution to world peace by joining in an effort to obtain the adherence of all the principal powers of the world to a declaration renouncing war as an instrument of national policy."

"War as an instrument of national policy" das war Shotwells Formel, die nicht Kriegshandlungen als solche infamieren wollte, sondern den Krieg als Mittel des nationalen Egoismus.

Am 5. Januar 1928 ueberreicht Claudel Briands Antwort an Kellogg. Frankreich sei durchaus damit einverstanden, dass auch andere Maechte dem franzoesisch-amerianischen Pakt beitreten sollen.

Am 11. Januar 1928 antortet Kellogg Claudel. Er, Kellogg, sei im allgemeinen sehr befriedigt von Briands Eingehen auf die Idee des multilateralen Paktes. Aber Briand scheine zu meinen, dass erst Frankreich und USA den Pakt schliessen und dann die andern zum Beitritt eingeladen werden sollen. Das halte er fuer nicht zulaessig. Es muessten sofort die wichtigsten andern Maechte an den Verhandlungen teilnehmen.

21. Februar Claudel zu Kellogg: Ueber die Einzelheiten der Prozedur werde man sich einigen. Nur muessten die Verpflichtungen, die aus Art. 16 des Voelkerbundes und den Locarno-Vertraegen erwachsen koennten, beruecksichtigt werden. Briand schlaegt eine allgemeine Konferenz vor, was Kellogg ablehnt. Kellogg will keine Belastung des Paktes mit juristischer Maschinerie, Bestimmung des Angreifers, Sanktionen usw. "The only thing to do was to state an absolute, broad principle and marshall world opinion in its favor and against the recurrence of war." 234.

27. Februar Kellogg zu Claudel: Wenn die Genfer Verpflichtungen hineinspielen, dann hat die ganze Verhandlung keinen Zweck. Umgekehrt aber foerdert

die Verpflichtung der gesamten Voelkerfamilie zum Kriegsverzicht die Ziele des Voelkerbundes. Jede Einschraenkung der allgemeinen Formel der Kriegsaechtung wuerde eine Abschwaechung sein.

30. Maerz Claudel zu Kellogg: "Without in any way losing sight of its international obligations, both as a member of the League of Nations and as a party to the Treaties of Locarno or treaties guaranteeing neutrality, France, for the purpose of finding a common basis for initial negociations, is wholly disposed, after a new examination of the proposals formulated by your excellency, to suggest immediately to the German, British, Italian and Japanese Governments that they join in seeking, in the spirit and in the letter of the last American note, any adjustments which in the last analysis may be forthcoming with respect to the possibility of reconciling previous obligations with the terms of the contemplated new treaty... At the same time it is clear that in order not to turn an instrument of progress into a means of oppression, if one of the signatory states should fail to keep his word, the other signatories should be released from their engagement with respect to the offending state."

Damit, d.h. mit der Ueberlassung der knotigen Probleme an die Mitwirkung der andern Maechte, ist die Einigung zwischen Briand und Kellogg erzielt.

13. April 1928: amerikanische Note an Great Britain, Deutschland, Italien und Japan, mit gleichzeitiger Mitteilung des bisherigen franzoesisch-amerikanischen Notenwechsels.

Die Verhandlungen zwischen USA und Frankreich wegen des allgemeinen Kriegverzichts seien soweit gediehen, dass die andern Regierungen ihrerseits die Moeglichkeit erhalten muessen, ueber ihre Teilnahme und das Mass der zu uebernehmenden Verpflichtungen sich zu aeussern. Eine weitere Anlage enthaelt den amerikanischen Paktentwurf und einen franzoesischen, (der 6 Artikel umfasst mit Vorbehalten hinsichtlich Genf und Locarno).

27.April: deutsche Zustimmung,(die erste der andern Maechte). Deutschlands Verpflichtungen aus Genf und Locarno muessen unverletzlich bleiben,aber Konflikte zwischen diesen Verpflichtungen und dem allgemeinen Kriegsverzicht seien unwahrscheinlich. "The German Government proceeds on the belief that a pact after the pattern submitted by the Government of the United States would not put in question the sovereign right of any state to defend itself."

1.Mai;Zustimmung Mussolinis.

19.Mai : englische Antwort (A.Chamberlain). sympathetic consideration. Selbstverteidigung werde nicht ausgeschlossen. Konflikte zwischen diesem Pakt und Voelkerbund oder Locarno seien moeglich. Genf und Locarno duerften nicht unterminiert werden. Punkt 10 der britischen Antwort: "There are certain regions of the world the welfare and integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety."

23. Juni 1928 amerikanische Note an die antwortenden Maechte.

1) Selbstverteidigung duerfe nicht beschraenkt werden.

2) The Covenant imposes no affirmative primary obligation to go to war...The Covenant can,it is true,be constructed as authorizing war in certain circumstances,but it is an authorization and not a positive requirement."

3) The US is entirely willing that all parties to the Locarno treaties become parties to its proposed anti-war treaty."

4) Kein Paktunterzeichner kann die garantierte Neutralitaet der betreffenden Staaten verletzen,ohne den Pakt zu verletzen, gegen Nichtunterzeichner besteht keine Bindung hinsichtlich des Verzichts auf Krieg.

5) Der Paktbrecher hat selbstverstaendlich keinen Anspruch auf Schutz durch den Pakt.

11-20.Juli Zustimmung der Maechte zu dieser Note.

27. August 1928 Unterzeichnung des Paktes in Paris.

Briand: "For the first time in the face of the whole world through a sol-

emn covenant involving the honor of great nations,all of which have behind them a heavy past of political conflict, war is renounced unreservedly as an instrument of national politicy,that is to say,in its most specific and dreaded form--selfish and wilful war." Auf Sanktionen koene verzichtet werden,die Interdependenz der Staaten sei die sicherste Garantie.

Der Pakt wurde von 15 Staaten anerkannt. Ende 1930 von 61 Staaten. Brasilien,Argentinien,Bolivia lehnten den Beitritt ab. Unaufgefordert blieben Hedjaz und Yemen.

In seiner endgueltigen Fassung lautet er:

.... Deeply sensible of their solemn duty to promote the welfare of mankind;

Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renubciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between the peoples may be perpetuated;

Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process,and that any signatory Power which hereafter seeks to promote its national interests by resort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by the treaty;

Hopeful that,encouraged by their example,all the other nations of the world will join in this humane endeavor and by adhering to the present treaty as soon as it comes into force bring their peoples within the scope of its beneficant provisions,thus uniting the civilized nations of the world in a common renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, (the High contracting Powers) have decided to conclude a treaty ...

Art.1: The High contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies,and renounce it as an instrument of national

policy in their relations with one another.

Art.2: The High contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise, shall never be sought except by pacific means."

Art. 3 bezieht sich auf Ratifikation und Beitritte.

Was ist "War as an instrument of national policy"?

"Exactly what these words mean nobody knows although they are generally undeystood to refer to unprovoked wars of conquest or aggression."

D.Allen, The fight for peace, 1930, p. 188.

Selbstvereidigung war ausdruecklich als berechtigt anerkannt. Selbst Levinson und Morrison akzeptierten den Ausspruch des amerikanischen Staatsrechtslehrers John Basset Moore, der 1920 an Levinson schrieb: "The right of self-defense is inherent and must be preserved, but is no war." Moore hatte deshalb empfohlen, in der Kriegsaechtungsformel das Wort "war" durch ein anderes zu ersetzen. Allenp.186.

Morrison ging so weit zu erklaeren: "Outlawry abolutely has no point of contact with the question of the right of self-defense." Allen p.187

Im Hintergrund der Levinson-Morrison-Borah-schen Outlawry-Bewegung stand etwas anderes: Praktisch richtete sich ihre Polemik

gegen

1) Uebernahme der Verantwortung fuer den status quo
2) militaerische Sanktionen
3) die Auffassung, der Krieg sei die ultima ratio.

Die Bewegung war also vor allem anti-interventionistisch. Sie vertrat gewissermassen den Isolationismus als Weltteinrichtung.

Shotwell, der auf die Formulierung des Paktes massgebenden Einfluss ausgeu14 hat, sagt nicht, wrin sich "war as an instrument of national policy" von erlaubten Kriegen unterscheidet. Er ist kein Isolationist. Dagegen gibt

er,wenn auch keine Definition,so doch eine Umschreibung dessen,was er "friedliche Mittel" nennt. Es ist dies die alte Diplomatie: mediation reconciliation.

Shotwell hatte im Fruejahr 1927 zusammen mit Professor John Chamberlain einen inoffiziellen Paktentwurf ausgearbeitet. Darin war die Selbstverteidigung ausdruecklich vom Verbot ausgenommen,ebenso militaerische Intervention in Verfoidigung der Monroe-Doktrin-- "acts as by the US in pursuance of the traditional policy with reference to the American continents". Kellogg hat die Monroe-Doktrin unerwaehnt gelassen. Nichts berechtigt aber zu der Annahme,USA hatte in diesem Punkte nach Unterzeichnung des Paktes ihre Politik beaendert. Schliesslich verboten Shotwell und Chamberlain in ihrem Entwurf auch jede Unterstuetzung des Friedensbrechers.

"The Draft Treaty was written from an distinvt American angle." Shotwell,War as an instrument of national policy.Er hatte eine schlechte Presse in Frankreich,eine gute in Deutschland, und England verharrte in totaler Indifferenz. p. 68-69.

Kellogg urteilte ueber sein Werk: "I make no claim to perfection. All the steps which have been taken to prevent war,to improve the conditions of the world are of course subject to the errors of judgment and the frailties of humanity.. I do not say that this treaty will immediately accomplish all that peoples have struggled for throughout age,but I do say that I would not change one word--No agreement could be more simple,unconditional and better understood." Bryn-Jones 230.

Briand in der Ratifikationsdebatte der Kammer (1-2.Maerz 1929):

"Il leur(France et États Unis) eût été impossible de mener à bon

terme la conclusion d'un contrat aussi parfait que vous le pourriez souhaiter, contre la guerre, avec une organisation arbitrale et des sanctions. Si une pareille tentative, je le répète, avait été poursuivie par les deux gouvernements, elle aurait avorté."

In der Ratifikationsdebatte des US Senats brachten Reed und Moses eine Resolution ein.

" 1) That the treaty imposes no obligations on the US to resort to coercive or punitives measures against any offending nation.

2) That the treaty does not impair or abridge the right of the US to defend its territory or vital other interests in accordance with traditional American policies."

Monroe-Doktrin und Tardieu-Plan durch den Pakt gestützt.

Kellogg erklaerte diese Resolution fuer ueberfluessig. Der erste Staat, der den Pakt ratifizierte war Sowjetrussland, das bis dahin heftig gegen die Verhandlungen polemisiert hatte. Es ratifizierte schon am 31. August 1928, vier Tage nach dessen Zustandekommen. Frankreich ratifizierte im Maerz 1929, USA am 17. Januar 1929.

Botschaft an den Kongress (4. Dezember 1929)

Hoover in seiner ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~: "Under the Kellogg pact we have undertaken never to use war as an instrument of national policy. We have therefore undertaken by covenant to use these equipments solely for defensive purpose."..

in seiner Inauguraladresse (4. Maerz 1929)

Er unterstrich Stimsons Urteil: "In the pact of Paris, then, the US helped to establish a universal system of minimal obligations for the maintenance of peace everywhere--a system whose duties must be more precisely defined in the future."

Hoover und Macdonald sagten in ihrer gemeinsamen Einladung zur Londoner Flottenkonferenz (Oktober 1929):

'Both our governments resolved to accept the Peace Pact not only as a declaration of good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with this pledge.... The Paris Pact is

based on the force of public opinion which is great, but its methodical application has not yet been organized."

Die Anschauung, der Kellogg-Pakt muesse ergaenzt werden, erstarkte in USA so, dass bei der Praesidentenwahl 1932 beide Parteien eine solche Forderung nach Ergaenzung in ihr Programm aufnahmen. Shotwell, On the rim of the abyss, p. 130. Die Konsequenz war aber nicht, "war as a means of international policy", sondern die Forderung wirtschaftlicher Sanktionen.

Zur Anwendung kam der Pakt ein einziges Mal: in dem russisch-chinesischen Konflikt wegen der Chinese Eastern Railway 1929.

Japan nahm 1932 das Recht der Selbstverteidigung in Anspruch, was von der Lytton-Kommission bestritten wurde, ohne dass praktische Folgen zum Nachteil des Angreifers entstanden.

Deutschland folgerte:

" Die neue Friedensgarantie muss der Durchfuehrung der allgemeinen Abruestung einen wirksamen Impuls geben." Stresemann im Reichstag 1. Februar 1929.

Disarmament
Collaboration with Russia
according to Schreibmann,
Weltbühne, Dec 16, 26

quoted Clemenceau
„Grandeur", 341

Flotten-Konferenzen

I. Conference on Limitation of Armaments 11. Dezember 1921 - 6. 2. 22

Das Programm dieser Konferenz sah urspruenglich eine allgemeine Einschraenkung der Bewaffnung voraus. Es wurde aber waehrend der Sitzungen infolge der Haltung der franzoesischen Delegation auf die See-Ruestungen eingeschraenkt.

Anderseits wurde das Programm dieser Konferanz schon vor ihrer Einberufung auf den Plan einer Beilegung allgemein-politischer Streitfragen des Fernen Ostens und des Pazific ausgedehnt. Die Fuehrung der Verhandlungen ergab ein Ineinandergreifen beider Problemkreise.

Intellektueller Urheber dieser Konferenz ist die von Lodge und Borah gefuehrte Gruppe isolationistischer U.S. Senatoren, die sofort nach dem Amtsantritt des Praesidenten Harding die Leitung der amerikanischen Aussenpolitik uebernahm. Harding folgte ihrer Fuehrung freiwillig; sein Staatssekretaer Hughes uebernahm ihre Direktiven, suchte aber auch seine eigenen Ideen, die auf internationale Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit zielten, geltend zu machen.

Hauptziele der Senatsgruppe waren:

1) Kampf gegen den Voelkerbund
2) Abschaffung der Allianzen, insbesondere des Britisch-Japanischen Buendnisses.

21. Februar 1921: Annahme einer Resolution Borah durch den Senat, die den Praesidenten auffordert, eine Flottenkonferenz einzuberufen. (Gelegentlich der US Flotten Bill)

6. Juni 1921: Harding billigt die Resolution.

7. Juli 1921: Hughes fragt vertraulich bei Grossbritannien, Frankreich, Italien und Japan an, ob sie bereit waeren, an einer Konferenz zur Einschraenkung der Bewaffnung teilzunahmen. Hughes fuegt hinzu, dass die Limitation of armaments in engem Zusammenhange mit wichtigen Problemen des Fernen Ostens und des

Pacific stehe.

11. August 1921: Formelle Einladung zur Konferenz in Washington.
Zur Beteiligung an den Ostfragen werden auch Holland, Belgien, Portugal, China eingeladen.

11. Dezember 1922: Eroeffnung der Konferenz durch Harding. Auf Antrag Balfours wird Hughes zum Chairman gewaehlt.
Die Verhandlungen werden durch das Gebet eines Geistlichen um goettliche Erleuchtung der Teilnahmer eingeleitet und durch ein Dankgebet beschlossen.

Es werden zwei Kommissionen gebildet, eine fuer die Entwaffnung, die andere fuer die Ostfragen.
21 Vollsitzungen und 31 Kommissionssitzungen, bis am 6. Februar 1922 die Vertraege unterzeichnet werden.

In der ersten Sitzung ueberraschte Hughes die auslaendischen Teilnehmer, besonders die englischen, durch Aufstellung der amerikanischen Prinzipien, die sorgfaeltig geheim gehalten worden waren:

"1) That all capital ship building programmes, either actual or projected, should be abandoned. (Capital ship: a vessel of war, not an aircraft carrier, whose displacement exceeds 10000 tons, or which carries a gun with a calibre exceeding 8 inches; p. 26

2) That further reductions should be made through the scraping of certain of the older ships.

3) That in general, regard should be had to the existing naval strength of the Powers concerned.

4) That the capital ship tonnage should be used as the measurement of strength for navies, and a proportionned allowance of auxiliary combatant craft presented."

Conference of Limitation of Armaments. Senate Documents 1922 NO 125.

Hughes fuerrte aus, dass der Schiffsbau-Wettlauf gestoppt werden muesste. "These sacrifices could, however, be reasonably expected of the U.S. the British Empire and Japan, and these were the powers actually engaged in the competitive building of warships"; indessen sei ein Uebereinkommen unmoeglich oder unwirksam, wenn nicht Frankreich und Italien einbezogen wuerden. p.53. Die U.S. seien bereit, ihr Programm von 1916 zu zerstoeren, d.h. "16 capitalships, 2 battleships and cruisrs under construction." Ferner "to scrap all the older battleships up to but not including the Delaware and North-Dakota" -- insgesamt 845'40 tons einschliesslich der noch im Bau befindlichen Schiffe. Hughes erwartet, dass "Great Britain and Japan should be fairly commensurate". Grosbritannien hactte 583375 tons, Japan 448923 tons zu zerstoeren. Dann wuerden uebrig bleiben:

Grosbritannien 22 -- U.S. 18 -- Japan 10 captalships.

Anzustreben sei die Rebation :

Gr. Br.	US	Japan
5	5	3

"The inclusion of the proposal for the discussion of the Pacific and Far Eastern questions was not for the purpose of embarrassing or delaying an agreement for limitation of armament, but to support that undertaking by availing ourselves of this meeting to endeavor to reach a common understanding as to the principles and policies to be followed in the Far East and thus greatly to diminish and, if possible, wholly toxremove, discernibles sources of controversy." Hughes erinnert mit ruehmenden Worten an den Abruestungsvorschlag des Zaren Nikolaus II und an Deutschlands Widerstand auf der Haager Konferenz. "But if we are warned by the inadequacy of earlier endeavors for limitation of armament, we cannot fail to recognize the extraordinary opportunity now presented. We not only have the lessons of ~~the past~~

the past to guide us,not only ~~ih~~ do we have the reaction from the disillusioning experiences of war,but we must meet the challenge of imperative economic demands..... Enormous sums will be released to aid the progress of civilization. Preparation for offensive naval war will stop now.

Damit nahm Hughes das Leitmotiv aus Hardings Eroeffnungsrede wieder auf. Harding hatte gesagt: "..Out of the cataclysm of the World War came new fellowship,new convictions,new aspirations.It is ours to make the most of them... Contemplating the measureless cost of War and the continuing burden of armament,all thoughtful peoples ~~which~~ wish for real limitation of armament and would like War outlawed. In soberest reflection the world's hundreds of millions who pay in peace and die in war wish their statesmen to turn the expenditures for destruction into means of construction."

Hughes hatte in seiner ersten Ansprache zu verstehen gegeben,dass US nicht an einer Landabruestung, sondern in erster Linie an einer Flotten-abruestung interessiert seien. Das wirkte sehr verschieden auf die englischen und franzoesischen Vertretungen.

Briand (durch Zurufe zum Sprechen aufgefordert): "Having won the War together,we could not turn a deaf ear to a summons to contribute our efforts to an endeavor to secure a lasting peace."

Prince Tokugawa: "We mean seriously to promote true and honest friendship among nations,not to impair it. We propose not to prescribe terms or to dictate a constitution to a doubting world,but to carry out the plain dictates of common sense, The world needs peace."

Balfour: Beginnt mit leicht ironischer Anerkennung der Magic Hughes' der das Geheimnis seiner Vorschlaege glaenzend gewahrt habe.. Statesmen of all countries are beginning to discover that the labors and difficulties of peace are almost as arduous and require almost as great qualities as those which are demanded for the conduct of a successful War....The British Empire and Great Britain,the two togethermare more profoundly

concerned with all that touches the matters naval than is it possible for any other nation to be,and this not,believe me,for any reason of ambition...but for the hard brutal necessities of plain and obvious facts." Nach eingehender Darstellung der geographischen Bedingungen: "You will understand why it is that every citizen of the British Empire never can forget that it is by sea communication that he lives and that without sea communication he and the Empire to which he belongs would perish." Stellt "whole hearted cooperation" in Aussicht.

Lloyd Georges Instruktionen verpflichteten Balfour, auf der Landabruestung zu bestehen. Darauf entgegnete Briand:

"It is only an economic problem that is being discussed in this Conference? Are we concerned only with figures and budgets?-- In reality,the question is to ascertain whether the nations can avoid the atrocities of war.-- I am convinced that,with the spirit of justice which inspires you all,you will understand for what reasons of security it is necessary for France to maintain an adequate army... It takes two to make peace: yourself and your neighbour.-- A nation must also be surrounded by an atmosphere of peace.-- I readily admit that a citizen of the U.S. might say: 'This war has been won;peace is signed;Germany now has but an limited army;[1] why does France still maintain a considerable army?' France has no right to relax! Es gaebe in Deutschland friedliebende Menschen,aber die kriegslustigen Militaers seien nicht einflusslos. Zitiert Ludendorff. "Well France looks on. She does not exaggerate the danger;she is watching it."

Briands Intervention hatte vollen Erfolg. Er erreichte die Ausschaltung der Landabruestung. Leon Archimbaud,La Conférence de Washington p.95.

Balfour war von Briand hingerissen. Er erwiderte:

"In the language of Mr. Briand,there has been,in matters maritime

a moral disarmament,and it is on the basis of this moral disarmament that the physical and material disarmament is going to be built. " England ver lor im Kriege beinahe eine Million Menschen. "We grieve over the sacrifice we do not repent it. And if the cause of international liberty was worthy of this immense sacrifice,--if the lust of domination --should again threaten the peace, how should it be possible that we who had done so much for the great cause of international liberty should see that cause perish before our eyes rather than to make further sacrifices for its defense?"

Hughes: "That brilliant,eloquent, comprehensive and instructive address stating the position and policy of France.... There is no moral isolation for the defenders of liberty and justice."

Lloyd George war wuetend ueber Balfours Haltung. Archimbaud 96. Er drahtete Balfour neue Instruktionen, und Balfour war gezwungen, die Landabruestungsfrage nochmals vorzubringen, am 23.Dezember,gerade als Briand seine Abschiedsrede gehalten hatte. Briand,der im Begriff war, abzureisen,erwiderte sehr erregt p.431 ff und setzte die endgueltige Ausschliessung der Landabruestung durch.

Wenn Frankreich in der Frage der Landabruestung die Interessen der U.S. nicht verletzte,so lag die Sache anders bei Frankreichs Opposition gegen die Quote der Kapitalschiffe und besonders der andern Kriegsschiffe. Die Kommissionen kamen zu dem Festsetzung der Kapitalschiffsquoten:

U.S.	Gr. Br.	Japan	Frankreich	Italien
		Tons		
500 000	500 000	300 000	175 000	175 000

Sarraut,Briands Nachfolger in der Leitung der franzoesischen Delegation, protestierte sehr scharf gegen diese Festsetzung,unterstuetzt von Admiral De Bon ,der in der Kommissionssitzung ausfuehrte:

"Une marine ne construit pas de bâteaux pour avoir des bâteaux; il y a

une unité tactique minimum au dessous de laquelle on ne peut pas descendre . 175000 tonnes ne donnent même pas une escadre. Si la France reste avec 5 navires seulement, elle est pratiquement desarmée au point de vue naval. Avec 6 batiments, elle est faible mais elle peut cependant réaliser une organisation ayant la vie."

Hughes erwidert: " It had not been stated in the American proposal that the reduction to 175000 tons for France and Italy would limit them to 5 ships. That conclusion was a deduction by the French and Italian delegations. Using 35000 tons as the necessary size of a capital ship, it was evident that the result would be 5 ships, but no country was required to build vessels of that tonnage. The French navy had at present 7 capital ships totaling 161000 tons."

De Bon: " Je ne croyais pas possible qu'on put supposer la France assez légère pour construire des capital ships de petite taille. Elle devrait construire des bâtiments d'une puissance egale a celle des autres marines."

Hughes wusste keinen andern Ausweg als an Briand zu telegraphieren und ihn zu bitten, Jarraut zum Einlenken zu bewegen. Briand gab tatsaechlich hinsichtlich der capitalships nach, blieb aber hinsichtlich der Kreuzer, Zerstoerer und U Boote fest. Archimbaud p. 122.

Die Zustimmung Japans zu der Kapitalschiffsquote war schwieriger zu erlangen. Zu diesem Zweck war Hughes genoetigt , die Methoden der Geheimdiplomatie, die er verdammte, wieder in Anwendung zu bringen. Am 2. Dezember 1921 war die neue oeffentliche Diplomatie beim Bankrott angelangt, und die Konferenz haette ergebnislos abgebrochen werden muessen, wenn Hughes (und Balfour) sich auf die "neue Methode" beschraenkt haetten. Sie begannen aber Geheimverhandlungen mit dem Japaner Kato (Archimbaud p. 122, Buell The Washington Conference 152 ff,

174), die mit folgendem verhaengnisvollem Kompromiss endeten:

US und Gr. Br. 525000 tons capitalships, Japan 315000 tons, Italien und Frankreich unveraendert je 175000 tons. Japans Zustimmung zu dieser Relation wurde aber erkauft mit dem Verzicht der US auf Befestigung weiterer Flottenstuetzpunkte im Pacific. . Vor allem verpflichtete US sich, die Insel Guam nicht zu befestigen, ebenso Manila-Cavite nicht auszubauen. Von dem Status quo der naval bases im Pacific wurden nur ausgenommen: Alaska, Panamakanal, Pearl Harbour fuer US. und Australien und Canada fuer Gr. Br. Die Folgen dieses Abkommens machten sich im gegenwaertigen Krieg sofort bemerkbar.

In der Frage der andern Kriegsschiffe drangen US und Gr. Br. mit ihrem Standpunkt nicht durch.

Die britische Admiralitaet trat fuer Abschaffung aller U Boote ein und musste sich vor der geschlossenen Opposition Frankreichs, Italiens und Japans zurueckziehen.

US wollte fuer die andern Kriegsschiffe die gleiche Relation durchfuehren wie fuer die Kapitalschiffe. Das haette zur Folge gehabt, das US ihre U bootflotte um 90000 tons, Japan die seinige um 54000 tons vermehren konnten, waehrend Frankreich gar keine neuen U.Boote haette bauen koennen. Frankreich konnte in der Frage der kleineren Schiffe seine Absicht durchfuehren, weil die britische Admiralitaet die U boote fuer erledigt ansah, ihnen gar keinen Kampfwert gegenueber Kriegsschiffen zusprach und sie ausschliesslich als Waffe im Handelskrieg betrachtete.

Das war wenigstens der Standpunkt des zur Zeit amtierenden Admiralitaet: Lord Lee of Fareham, eines gluehenden Verehrers von Lloyd George. Ihm opponierte auf der Konferenz der britische Admiral Beatty, Befehlshaber des britischen Kreuzergeschwaders in der Skagerak-Schlacht, Ferner sprachen gegen Lee die Admirale Sims, Lord Fisher, der Vater der

Dreadnoughts, Sir Percy Scott, Herbert Hyvater, General Mitchell, Assistant Chief of the U.S. Air Service. Auch der deutsche Admiral Scheer hielt Lee's Standpunkt fuer verfehlt. Balfour weigerte sich indessen, andere Sachverstaendige anzuhoeren. ~~Ruhl~~ Riddell, Diaries p. 344. Buell 235.

Das papierene Ergebnis der Konferenz waren 9 Vertraege und 15 Resolutionen.

6 II 22

1) Naval Treaty

Art. 1: The contracting powers agree to limit their respective naval armament.

Art. 2: setzt fest, welche Kapitalschiffe sie behalten duerfen.

" 3 The contracting Powers shall abandon their respective capital ship building programs.

" 4 Tonnage: US und Gr. Br. 525000 tons. Japan 315000 tons. Frankreich und Italien 175000 tons.

" 5 Maximum displacement of capitalships 35000 tons.

" 6 " calibre - 16 inches.

" 7 The total tonnage for aircraft carriers shall not exceed

135000 Tons US and Gr. Br.
81000 " Japan
60000 " France and Italy

8-9 regelt Maximum (27000 tons) und Ersatz der Aircraft carriers

10: No aircraft carrier shall carry a gun with a calibre in excess of 8 inches.

11: Kein Kriegschiff ausserhalb der Klasse der capitalships darf groesser sein als 10 000 tons.

12 Kein Kriegsschiff ausserhalb der capitalships darf Geschuetze mit groesserem Kaliber als 8 inches fuehren.

13-21 regeln Einzelheiten bez. Ersatz und verbleibende Einheiten.

Art. 22 : Falls einer der vertragschliessenden Staaten in einen Krieg verwickelt werden sollte, so ist er fuer die Dauer des Kriegs von den Beschraenkungen des Abkommens dispensiert.

Art. 23: Das Abkommen erlischt am 31. Dezember 1936.

2) U Bott-Abkommen.

Art. 1: "A merchant vessel must be ordered to submit to visit and search to determine its character before it can be seized.

" 2: " ... must not be attacked before it refuses to submit to visit.

" 3: "...must not be destroyed unless the crew and the passengers have been first placed in safety."

" 4 Wenn ein kriegfuehrendes U Boot nicht konform Art 1-3 handeln kann, muss es auf Angriffe verzichten.

Die folgenden Bestimmungen suchen den Gebrauch von Kampf-Gas zu regeln.

3-5 Abkommen ueber den pacifischen Inselbesitz.

6) Neun Maechte Pakt ueber China

7) Chinesischer Zoll-Pakt.

Resolutionen

1) Schaffung eines Juristenkomitees zur Neu-Regelung der Kriegsgesetze.

2) Einschraenkung der Kompetenz dieses Komitees.

3) Ueber Verkauf von Kriegschiffen

4) Schaffung eines Konsultativ-Komitees fuer Far East

5-13 betr. China.

Statt der ueberschwaenglichen und durchwegs ganz banalen Reden der an der Konferenz beteiligten Staatsmaenner sei nur das Urteil des britischen Ersten Lords der Admiralitaet zitiert. Lord Lee sprach am 9. Mai 1922 im

Royal Colonial Institute ueber die Konferenz (United Empire 1922 p. 371 ff): " I can only say that the reality has surpassed one's highest expectations. I am confident history will record that the results of that Conference amply vindicated the vision, foresight and statemanship of its originators-- President Harding and Secretary of State Hughes--. There was much more accomplished than the material results enshrined in the Naval treaty. The Conference produced a complete change in the attitude of mind of the nations there assembled.... As a result of xxt. the Naval Treaty, a bloodthirsty combatant of the future will find it exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to get at the enemy for whose blood he is thirsting. "

Lee schliesst mit einem Hymnus auf Harding, dessen Idealismus zum Himmel rage, dessen Horse-sense aber ebenso fein sei wie der von Lloyd George.

In der Debatte sagte Sir James Allen, High Commissioner of New Zealand:

" I enterily agree with Lord Lee. Every one of us xx rejoiced in the new feeling which has been created as the result of the Washington Conference." Er bedauere nur, dass nicht auch ueber die andern Schiffseinheiten ein Akkord zustandegekommen sei. p. 384.

Der britische Flottensachverstaendige Archibald Hurd erklaerte xxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Fortnightly Review 1921, p. 106ff) die U Boote als Kampfmittel fuer erledigt.

Kritiker:

Norman H. Davis (Council of foreign relations 17. Febr. 1922) :

"The cessation of naval competition is a wise economic move and also has a tendency to dispel fear and suspicion, but it will not prevent war."

Eintritt der US in den Voelkerbund wuerde mehr kriegverhindernd wirken.

" We refuse to give any guarantee to France, or better still, to enter

the League of Nations and make it such a factor that France would not require further assurance,but we have asked France to join with us in the Four Power treaty to guarantee Peace in the Pacific and tranquillity to Japan." Dieser Pakt sei "unnecessary and indesirable," er duerfe aber nicht abgelehnt werden, weil die Welt nicht zum zweiten Male sehen duerfe, dass der Kongress den Praesidenten der US desavouiert. Dr, Davis,trete nach wie vor fuer Ratifikation des Versailler Vertrags ein.

Lancelot Lawton (Verfasser mehrerer Buecher ueber Japan und Sovjetrussland) The evasions of Washington, Fortnightly Review 1922,xx??fxx

" The success is only spectacular and superficial." Japan habe den Hauptvorteil. Es ist durch die Abkommen unangreifbar geworden. " In view of these geographical realities, the rationing of battleships was not so important to Japan as many of us believe."p. 222. " So long as she possesses an adequate fleet of submarines and supply of aeroplanes,her position is as near to being impregnable as any position could well be."

" Washington has not even grasped what the Pacific problem really is." p. 223.

F. Buell, The Washington Conference,1922:

"As a result of the Washington Conference,the intervention of foreign powers in the progress of Japanese imperialism on the continent of Asia is more impossible than ever.... Japanese imperialism must be peacefully overthrown." Das sei Aufgabe der japanischen Liberalen und Demokraten.

Leon Archimbaud, La conference de Washington,1922;

Hughes) 'procedure facile,mais fausse et injuste:solution simpliste d'une question complexe." p.120.

Colonel Repington : Hughes versenkte mit einer Rede mehr Schiffe als irgend ein Admiral in einer Grosschlacht. Ruddy Archimbaud 121.

Philip Kerr (Lord Lothian): Konferenz gab "The U.S. control of the Eastern Pacific,Japan control of Far Eastern Waters,and the British Empire control of the Indian Ocean." Preface to Hugh Latimer, Naval Disarmament (1930)

England war durch die Abkommen von Washington gezwungen, den Bau der Hoodklasse einzustellen und das Buendnis mit Japan ~~aufzugeben~~ nicht mehr zu erneuern, das 1921 erlosch. Die Erneuerung haette Schwierigkeiten gemacht. Auf der Imperial Conference 20. Juni-5.August 1921 hatten Canada, Australien und Suedafrika sich gegen die Erneuerung der anglo-japanischen Allianz ausgesprochen.

Lloyd George war entschlossen, sie entweder gegen den Willen der grossen Dominien durchzusetzen oder durch einen Pakt, der das britische Empire, US und Japan band, zu ersetzen. Nach Washington gab er sich den Anschein, als haette er die zweite Moeglichkeit verwirklicht. Balfour sagte auf der Schlussitzung, die englisch-japanische Allianz sei "replaced by something new, something effective which should embrace all the Powers concerned in the vast area of the Pacific."

Frankreich war benachteiligt durch die Chaotisierung, die den augenblicklichen Stand der Seeruestungen zum Ausgangspunkt nahm. Sein Flottenprogramm war am empfindlichsten getroffen. Die Gleichstellung mit Italien bedeutete Frankreichs Inferioritaet im Mittelmeer. Die franzoesische Politik der folgenden Jahre war darauf eingestellt, diese Paritaet rueckgaengig zu machen. England hatte in Washington Italien auf jede Art beguenstigt und fast in jeder Frage die franzoesischen Interessen bekaempft. Frankreich galt als der grosse Stoerenfried. " The whole French policy at Washington injured the success of the Conference and unmistakably harmed the standing of France throughout the world. Ungenerous from beginning to end, this policy prevented any action in the matter of land armament and it prohibited the limitation--let alone the abolition-- of the submarines, and consequently of anti-submarine aircraft." Buell 233.

Nach Washington, besonders nach dem Sturz Lloyd Georges wurde die oeffentliche Meinung Englands gewahr, dass die ~~Paritaet der Flotten~~ die Flottenparitaet mit

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US fuer die britische Flotte, die 7 Ozeane zu verteidigen hatte, Inferioritaet bedeutete und dass die Verteidigung des Empires in Frage gestellt war. Austen Chamberlain suchte wenigstens in der Frage der kleinen Kreuzer jede weitere Einschraenkung zu verhindern, waehrend die Politik Hardings und seines Nachfolgers Coolidge bemueht war, die Abkommen von Washington moeglichst bald auf alle andern Kriegschiff-Kategorien auszudehnen.

So kam das englische Kabinett zu einer Annaeherung zu Frankreich auch in der Flottenfrage.

14.-25 Februar 1924 Flottenkonferenz auf der Sitzung des Voelkerbundrates in Rom unter Beteiligung Sowjetrusslands. Resultat Null infolge radikaler Opposition des Sowjetadmirals.

13. Mai 1926 Beginn der Arbeit der Preparatory Commission for Disarament Conference. Die Arbeiten endeten am 9. Dezember 1930. Russland nahm nicht teil. Die US waren vertreten.

Coolidge hatte in seiner Botschaft an den Kongress vom 4. Januar 1926 erklaert: " The general policy of this Government in favor of disarmament and limitation of armament cannot be emphasized too frequently and too strongly."

Am 10. Februar 1927 lud Coolidge zu einer Flottenkonferenz ein, die im Rahmen der Arbeiten der Preparatory Commission stattfinden sollte.

"The American Government and people are convinced that competive armaments constitute one of the most dangerous and contributing causes of international suspicion and discord and are calculated eventually to lead to war.... The Washington Conference provided a specific tonnage limitation upon capital ships and aircraft carriers with certain restrictions as to size and maximum calibre of guns for other vessels. Every nation has been at complete liberty to build a number of cruisers, destroyers and submarines. Only size and armament of cruisers were limited." Das alles sei von allen

loyal ausgefuehrt worden.trotzdem bleibe aber competition bestehen. Daher muessen alle Kategorien limitiert werden.

Coolidge fuegte seiner Einladung ein Memorandim bei:

"The American Government has followed with close attention the proceedings of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference,and after the most careful deliberation,has concluded that it can helpfully make certain observations at this time,which,it hopes,may contribute materially to the success of that commission--a success earnestly desired by the governmenr and people of the U.S, The very complexities and difficulties as brought out in the Preparatory Commission,have clearly pointed out that a final solution for the problem of armament may not be immediately practicable. Admitting reluctantly that the existing political situations in certain parts of the world may render the problem of universal limitation incapable of immediate solution as a whole,the American Government believes that it is entirely practicable for the nations of the world to proceed at once to the isolation and separate solution of such problems as may appear susceptible of such treatment. The problem of the limitation of naval armament, while not regional in character,can be dealt with as a practical matter by measures affecting the navies of a limited group of Powers."

Dieser Schritt Coolidges wurde in Frankreich als Versuch,das beginnende franzoesisch-englische Einvernehmen zu stoeren,aufgefasst. Aber auch rein sachlich erschien der Vorschlag anfechtbar.

15.Febr. 1927 : Frankreich lehnt die Beteiligung an der von Coolidge vorheschlagenen Konferenz ab,mit der Begruendung,sie sei geeignet ,den Voelkerbund zu schwaechen.

21. Februar ;927: Italien lehnt gleichfalls ab, weil seine geographischen Bedingungen keine weitere naval limitation erlauben.

14. Maerz 1927: amerikanisches Memorandum an Frankreich und Italien,

das die beiden geaeusserten Bedenken zu beseitigen sucht. Frankreich und Italien bleiben bei ihrer Ablehnung. Franzoesische Note vom 2.April, italienische vom 16.Mai 1927.

II. Three Power Conference, Geneva (June 20 - August 4,1927)

Hauptgegenstand der Debatten ist die britisch-amerikanische Differenz wegen des Kreuzerbaus. Japan bleibt im Wesentlichen Zuhoerer.

Bridgeman, erster Lord der Admiralitaet im Kabinett Baldwin, ist zu weiteren Beschraenkungen der capital ships bereit, verlangt aber Zugestaendnisse in der Frage der kleinen Kreuzer. Strikte Zahlen seien keine Loesung des Problems. "Tonnage is like a pie. It may be a very good thing, but it all depends on what is inside it."

"It is not parity with America that is troubling us. Nor are we troubled by the proportion to which Japan would be entitled. It is our own security with which we are concerned, and our power in future to protect our sea communications against hostile raids."

Admiral Jellicoe haelt ein grosses Referat ueber den deutschen Kreuzerkrieg.

Hugh Gibson, Fuehrer der amerikanischen Delegation: "I confess, however, that the American delegation entertains very serious misgivings in regard to the effort to prepare in time of peace for all possible contingencies of this character in time of war... It is difficult for us to accept the idea of absolute naval needs. We feel that the conception of relative naval needs alone makes international agreements for limitation of navies possible. If we assume that naval needs are absolute, each country must be the sole judge of the naval needs, which cannot then be a subject to reduction by agreement with other Powers".

Bridgeman: " A number of small cruisers are of vital necessity to our Empire." Er statuiert zwei Klassen von Kreuzern: 1) grosse (10000 tons)

Das seien Offensivwaffen,und die muessten limitiert werden. Er schlaegt vor: Je 12 fuer Gr. Br. und U.S.,und 8 fuer Japan. 2) kleine Kreuzer, die ausschliesslich fuer die Defensive geeignet waeren. England braucht ~~xxxx~~ 70.einschliesslich der 12 grossen Kreuzer.

4. August. Gibson erklaert,dass er hoffnungslos geworden sei.

U.S. koenne sich nicht in den grossen Kreuzern beschraenken,da sie nicht soviele Flottenstuetzpunkte draussen in der Welt besitzen wie England. "The American Delegation cannot but feel that every warship possesses essential offensive characteristics and that no ship is built for the sole purpose of defending itself against attack. We are told that they will police trade routes and protect British commerce on the sea. But in order to afford effective defense to British commerce upon the seas these cruisers must ~~be~~ in time of war effectively deny the sea to others. "

Mit dieser Feststellung grundlegender Differenzen wird die Konferenz beendet (formell vertagt). (Records of the Three Power Conference)

Churchill sagt in einer Rede vom 7. August 1927 (Times 8/8):

"The fundamental cause which prevented agreement lay in the different views taken of what constitutes naval equality by the Americans and ourselves. We are in favor of broad principles...but the Americans hold that equality, or as they call it parity, must be measured by equal tonnage and should be expressed in exact mathematical parity. We hold,on the contrary,that the principle of naval equality must be based not on mere numbers of tonnage,but must take into consideration the quite different conditions of these two communities."

U.S.,sehr verstimmt gegen England wegen des Scheiterns der Konferenz, planen im November 1927 grosse Flottenaufruestung: 25 grosse Kreuzer, 9 Zerstoerer,5 Aircraft carriers, 32 U Boote, Nachdem der Aerger verraucht ist,werden nur 15 Grosse Kreuzer und 1 Aircraft carrier gebaut.

III. Englisch-franzoesisches Flottenkompromiss

April 1928.

Hearst erhaelt durch Bestechung Kenntnis von dem Entwurf und veroeffentlicht ihn im New York American. Darauf wird das State Department offiziell unterrichtet und um Zustimmung ersucht, die verweigert wird.

Im Rahmen der Arbeiten der Preparatory Commission einigen sich Chamberlain und Briand(Tardieus Aussenminister) ueber folgende Punkte :

1) Keine Beschraenkung in leichten Kreuzern und U Booten.

2) England verpflichtet sich, Frankreich zu unterstuetzen, wenn es bei den naechsten Verhandlungen ueber limitation Paritaet mit Gr. und U.S. in den etwa neu zu limitierenden Schiffskategorien fordert.

Punkt 3) geht ueber die Flottenfrage hinaus und verpflichtet England, den franzoesischen Standpunkt in der Frage der "trained reserves" bei den Landabruestungen zu unterstuetzen.

Die franzoesische Presse hoffte und ein Teil der englischen Presse fuerchtete, dass diese Abmachungen von anderen (Zusammenarbeit der Admiralstaebe, Verteilung der Seestreitkraefte im gegenseitigem Einvernehmen, Aufteilung der Verteidigungsgebiete) begleitet sein wuerden.

U.S. erklaeren am 28. September 1928 "they cannot consent to proposals which would leave the door open to unlimited building of certain types of ships of a highly combatant value and impose ~~limitatix~~ restrictions only on types peculiarly suitable to American needs."

Damit war das Kompromiss tot. Es war aber wichtig als Anfang neuer Zusammenarbeit Englands mit Frankreich. Die deutsche Regierung wurde nervoes, und der englische Botschafter telegraphierte am 5. August an Chamberlain, er bitte um Ermaechtigung, zu versichern, "there is nothing in the Compromise inconsistent with the Locarno Treaty." Chamberlain erteilte diese Ermaechtigung umgehend.

Fuer das Kompromiss traten Times und Morning Post ein. Daily Telegra Daily Express und Daily Herald bekaempften es.

Daily Herald: "Tragicomic document of sentimental Francophile servility."

Macdonald: " a residue of the old pre-war politics"

Lloyd George: "In signing that Pact we antagonized two of the greatest friendly Powers of the world, America and Italy. To antagonize Italy is the height of folly, but to antagonize America is sheer madness."

Engely, The Politics of Naval Disarmament, p. 57.

IV. Londoner Konferenz 21. Januar -22. April 1930

In den Verhandlungen der Preparatory Commission war es Paul-Boncour gelungen, den amerikanischen Delegierten Gibson fuer seinen Vorschlag zu gewinnen, dass jede Macht innerhalb einer festzusetzenden Gesamttonnage die Verteilung ihrer See-Streitkraefte innerhalb der verschiedenen Kategorien nach eigenem Ermessen bestimmen duerfe.

4. Maerz 1929 Hoover in seiner Inaugural-Address:

"I covet for this administration a record of having further contributed to advance the cause of peace."

22. April: Gibsons Intervention in Genf zugunsten des franzoesischen Vorschlags (limitation of total tonnage bei freier Bestimmung der Kategorien).

30. Mai 1929 Hoover, Memorial Day Speech: Die bisherigen Massstaebe waren verfehlt.

"So far the world has failed to find such a yard-stick. To say that such a measure cannot be found is the counsel of dispair. It is a challenge to the naval authorities of the world, it is the condemnation of the world to the Sisyphean toil of competive armaments.

The present Administration of the U.S. has undertaken to approach this vital problem with a new programme. We feel that it is useless for

us to talk of the limitation of arms if such limitations are to be set so high as virtually to be an incitement to increase armament."

Juni 1929 bildet Macdonald sein zweites Labor Kabinett mit dem kons. Robert Cecil als Vertreter fuer Genf und Entwaffnungs-Experten.

14. Juni 1929: der neue U.S.Botschafter Dawes trifft in London ein.

15-16. Juni. Besprechung Dawes-Macdonald "most satisfactory". Beide geben am 18. Juni Erklaerungen ab, in denen sie auf das Finden eines neuen Yardstick hinweisen. Das gleiche tut die britische Thronrede am 1.Juli. Dann Besprechungen Dawes-Gibson-Macdonald.

23. Juli: Hoover erklaert, der Kellogg-Pakt habe die ganze Situation veraendert, Disarmament zu beschleunigen.

24. Juli: Macdonald erklaert vor den Commons. er habe den Bau der geplanten 2 10000Kreuzer und mehrerer U Boot-Mutterschiffe einstellen lassen. Am gleichen Tage verkuendet Hoover Abstriche am US Flottenbauprogramm. "Mr. Macdonald has introduced the principle of parity, which we have now adopted, and its consummation means that Great Britain and the U.S. hence forth are not to compete in armaments as potential opponents, but to co-operate as friends in their reduction."

25X Juli Stimson, secretary of State,:"The British Government's decision a tremendous step forward an accord between the two nations.

4-15. Oktober: Macdonald in Washington.. Von dort ergeht seine Einladung zur Konferenz--am 10. Oktober an U.S., am 15.Oktober an die andern Maechte.

18. Dezember 1929: Memorandum Tardieu.

Jeder technische Akkord muesse einen politischen Akkord zur Voraussetzung haben. Der Kellogg-Pakt sei keine geeignete Grundlage. Tardieu wuerde Art. 8 der Voelkerbund-Satzung vorziehen, der nicht auf mathematische Proportionen zielt. Frankreich muesse die Seewege zu zeinem Kolonialreich verteidigen. Paritaet mit Italien bedeute Frankreichs Inferioritaet im Mittelmeer. T. fordert fuer Frankreich eine Gesamt-Tonnage von 725000 bis 1936.

Tardieus Skepsis gegen den Kellogg-Pakt wurde ihm sehr veruebelt.

Daily Herald, 15. Febr. 1930: " a heavy blow both at the prospectus and the very concept of the naval conference."

Manchester Guardiam, gleiches Datum: "Tardieu caused serious misgivings."

21. Januar -22. April Londoner Konferenz.

Sie soll die Abkommen von Washington ergaenzen, kommt aber im wesentlichen nur zur Beratung europaeischer Marine-Fragen. Das Projekt eines Mittelmeerpakts scheitert.

England ist durch Macdonald, Henderson und den Seelord Alexander vertreten Frankreich durch Tardieu, Briand, Pietri. Aber von 17. Februar bis am

7.Maerz ist Frankreich politisch unvertreten,da Tardieu am 17. 2. 30 gestuerzt wurde und erst am 2. Maerz ein neues Kabinett bildete. U.S. vertreten durch Stimson.Dawes,Gibson. Joseph T. Robinson, Charles F. Adams.

Die Fragenkomplexe zerfielen in einen anglo-amerikanischen,einen japanisch-amerikanischen,einen franco-italienischen und anglo-kontinentalen.

Die Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Gr. Br, und U.S. betrafen hauptsaechlich die Groesse der Kapitalschiffe. U.S. hielten an 35 000 t fest,waehrend die Englaender eine niedere Hoechstgrenze wollten. Am 6. Maerz musste Stimson sich gegen den Anschein verwahren: "There seems to be an impression that the work of the American delegation at this Conference is likely to result in an increase instead of a reduction of the navies of the war."

London Naval Treaty 1930

Art. 1: "The High contracting Parties agree not to exercise their right to lay down the keels of capital ships replacement tonnage during the years 1931-36. France and Italy may,however, build the replacement tonnage which they are entitled to lay down.

Art. 2: Great Britain scraps 5,U.S. 3, Japan 1 capital ships.
" 3-5 betreffen Aircraft Carriers
" 6-7 Maximum fuer U Boote 2000 tons und 5,1 inches Kaliber.
Aber Frankreich kann seine groesseren und staerker bestueckten U Boote behalten.
" 8 Ausserhalb der capital ships werden fuer U.S. Gr. Br. und Japan folgende Maxima statuiert:

Grosse Kreuzer: U.S. 180000 tons (13 Schiffe)
Gr. Br.-146000 t. (15 ")
Japan 108 000 " 12 "

Kleine Kreuzer: U.S. 143000 t.
Gr. Br. 192000 t.
Japan 100450 t.

Zerstoerer: U.S. und Gr. Br. 150000 t.; Japan 105000 t.

Die Bestimmungen ueber den Gebrauch von U Booten lauten aehnlich wie im Abkommen von Washington. Der Vertrag soll gueltig sein bis 31. 12.36.

Frankreich und Italien unterzeichneten nicht Part III des Abkommens (Art. 8). Sie waren auch von den Beschraenkungen des Art. 1 ausgenommen. Die franzoesische und italienische Presse war mit den Ergebnissen zufrieden. Dagegen war die englische Presse mit Frankreichs Haltung nicht zufrieden. "The London Naval Treaty should never have been signed until and unless some form of control have been placed upon the strength of France and Italy in cruisrs,destroyers and submarines." The Navy ,November 1930,p. 331.

Obwohl die franzoesische und italienische Delegation auf der Kon-

ferenz meist gleich stimmten, trat doch der politische Gegensatz beider Maechte offen zutage. Italien wurde von den Englaender in jeder Weise beguenstigt. Der fascistische Historiker Engely stellt mit Genugtuung fest, dass die Labor Politiker und die Radikalen Liberalen ihre prinzipielle Stellungnahme gegen den Fascismus voellig in den Hintergrund draengten oder ganz vergassen, vor allem Daily Herald und Machester Guardian, aber auch im persoenlichen Verkehr. The Politics of Naval Disarmament p. 163.

2. Maerz 1931: Italienisch-Franzoesisches Abkommen, vermittelt durch Henderson und Alexander. Capitalships 23333 tons, guns 12 inches.

V. London Naval Conference 1935-36 (Dezember - Maerz)

~~Herbst 1934 Beginn der Vorbereitungen.~~

24. Dezember 1934: Japan kuendigt das Abkommen von Washington.

18. Juni 1935 Englisch-Deutsches Flottenabkommen.

Als die Konferenz begann, hatte Europa Sorgen, die den Gegenstand der Konferenz voellig ueberschatteten. Das drueckte sich auch darin aus, dass Frankreich nur durch den Londoner Botschafter und Marine-Fachleute, nicht durch ein Regierungsmitglied vertreten wurde. Baldwins Eroeffnungsansprache war sehr nuechtern. Foreign secrary Eden nahm erst spaeter an der Konferenz teil. U.S. War durch Norman Davis vertreten.. Der Voelkerbund war offiziell eingeladen und hatte zwei "Beobachter" entsandt.

Gleich auf der ersten Sitzung legte der japanische Vertreter, Admiral Nagano das Projekt eines "common upper limit" vor, einer Maximaltonnage fuer Japan, U.S. und das British Empire, und unterstrich Japans dringendes Interesse an zahlenmaessiger Gleichheit mit den andern Maechten. Das Abkommen von Washington sei unter abnormen Umstaenden geschlossen worden und muesse rektifiziert werden. Die Debatte ueber den japanischen Vorschlag nahm ein halbes Dutzend Sitzungen in Anspruch.

Nagano: " I am aware that there may well be differences between nations as regards the degree of vulnerability...I firmly believe, however, that the greatest factor to which a nation's vulnerability may be attributed is the fixing of different levels for the armed forces to be possi-

eased by the different Powers." Foreign Office ,Documents of the London Naval Conference p. 710.

Viscount Monsell, Chairman (First Lord of the Admiralty):

"I would point out that equilibrium of defense has not meant equality of navies and does not mean equality of navies. But I am very much afraid that the "common upper limit" does mean equality of navies. If we have equality of navies, I am very much afraid that that entirely upsets that equality of security we all so much wish to keep." 312

Norman Davis: "We submit that this proposal which takes no account of varying needs,will not give each nation that sense of security which comes from the ability to protect its vital interests and which is an essential condition precedent to naval limitation." 334

Nagano: "It is absolutely impossible for Japan to accept an agreement which gives rise to a situation whereby one country is allowed to possess a superior force." 339. "In view of the ease and speed with which naval forces can be moved,it is impossible for Japan to share the British view that naval forces located in different waters are separate entities 364

Davis: "While the Japanese have recognized that there are different degrees of needs and vulnerability,they have not recognized how very difficu it would be to establish on the basis of a common upper limit a standard of measure by which the vital questions may be solved." 368.
Nagano: "In our opinion the prime cause of differences in vulnerability is difference in the strength of armaments. Therefore if armaments can be made equal,the chief cause of the differences in vulnerability can be removed." 395.

Dezember 1935.

17. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~: Britischer Vorschlag "For the limitation of Naval Construction over a period of years." 419ff.

Nagano: Die Beratung dieses Vorschlags ist zwecklos,bevor ein common upper limit festgesetzt ist.

8. Januar 1936: Franzoesisch-Italienisch-Britischer Vorschlag Ueber regelmaessigen Austausch von Informationen.

Nagano wiederholt seine Ausfuehrungen vom 17. 12. 35.

~~Dxxixx~~ 15. Januar 36: Davis: Equality of security can mean only superiority of defense in each country's own waters."

Japan verlaesst die Konferenz. Laesst 2 Beobachter zurueck.

Die Konferenz beschliesst,ihre Arbeit trotzdem fortzusetzen.

Die Beratungen drehen sich nunmehr um "qualitative disarmament". England schlaegt 25000 als Hoechstmass fuer capital ships vor. U.S. bleibt hartnaeckig bei 35000 t.

27. Februar. Grandi,Vertreter Italiens, erklaert, dass die Sanktionen es seinem Lande unmoeglich machen, einen neuen Pakt zu unterzeichnen. Italien bleibe aber bereit zur Weiterberatung.

25. Maerz 1935 : Unterzeichnung des Paktes. Italien, Irland und Suedafrika unterzeichnen nicht.

Viscount Monsell: " The treaty which we are on the point of signing to-day,differs from its predecessors in that there are no provisions for the direct quantitative limitation of naval armament."Aber die grosse Neuerung,die Verpflichtung, Informationen auszutauschen,biete einen Ersatz. Auch Norman Davis bedauert das Fehlen der limitation quantitative, ist aber mit der qualitativen zufrieden. Italiens "Konstruktiver Anteil" wird von Monsell anerkannt.

Der Vertrag fuellt 43 Seiten ,ein ganzes Heft der Miscellaneous des Foreign Office (1.1936).

Part I enthaelt Definitionen, Part 2:Limitations (35000 tons, 14 inches Part III: Advance Notification and Exchange of Informations. Jede Regierung ist verpflichtet,jaehrlich ihr Flottenbauprogramm und alle etwaige Aenderungen den andern Unterzeichener mitzuteilen. Part IV: General and Safeguarding Clauses. Verbot des Verkaufs von Kriegsschiffen an fremde Marinen. Verluste duerfen ersetzt werden. Art. 25; Wenn ein Nichtunterzeichner Typen baut,die die vorgesehene qualitative limitation verletzen, dann sind die Unterzeichner berechtigt,auch ihrerseits, die limits zu ueberschreiten. Das gleich gilt fuer den Kriegsfall.

Part 5: Final Clauses. Gueltigkeit bis 31.Dezember 1942 .

Der Pakt wurde von der Oeffentlichkeit so gut wie unbeachtet gelassen. Abessinien und die Besetzung der Rheinlandzone nahmen das Interesse in Anspruch. Die deutschen pocket ships erwiesen die Nutzlosigkeit der qualitative limitation. U.S. war genoetigt,in London die Argumentezu gebrauchen,die es in Washington bekaempft hatte. Japan nahm den Standpunkt ein,den U.S. in Washington den andern aufgedraengt hatte.

Anweisung für die Waffenstillstands-Kommission

Bedingungen, die unsre Zukunft zerstören ... ließen vollständig außer in der Absicht des Präsidenten Wilson. Eher ist von Frankreich und England zu erwarten, daß diese Staaten den Krieg zur Durchführung unerfüllbarer Bedingungen fortsetzen. Es ist dann nicht auszudenken, daß die Vereinigten Staaten sich einer Weiterführung des Krieges enthalten. Der Kampf gegen das französisch-englische Heer allein ist durchaus nicht aussichtslos, besonders, wenn Belgien sich ebenfalls verpflegt ....

Stg. v. Hindenburg
Entworfen 23. Okt. 18

No 76 [redacted] aus

Amtliche Urkunden zur Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstands 1918. Herausgegeben vom Auswärtigen Amt (BTZE)

Later on, when at Versailles Count Brockdorff-Rantzau addressed me in the language of the bearer of a challenge, I was forced to realize that the German Revolution was mere window dressing, and that, with the assassin of 1914 not a whit cured of his insane folly, we should continue without respite to be subjected, in a new setting, to the same attack from the same enemy.

Clem. 106

For the catastrophe of 1914 the Germans are responsible. Only a professional liar would deny this

Clem Jenkins 105

Ludendorffs peace terms 1916:
Official German documents Relating to the World War (New York)
II / No 78-90 1059-73

Also:
Die Eingabe der 6
Vertraute

Germany's characteristic [illegible] to the [illegible]
Clem.

D

C

We are not enemies of the German people and they are not our enemies. They did not originate or desire this hideous war .. and we are ~~vaguely~~ vaguely conscious that we are fighting their cause, as they will some day see it themselves etc.

Wilson June 14 17
Dodd, Wilson p 232

Bevölkerung

Deutschland	1871	41 Mill.
	1900	56.3 "
	1913	66.9 "

Be same opponent, who joins to his wealth of intellectual culture a fundamental lack of moral culture, who, with rare impudence, asks us to found the new peace upon the prodigious pie of Germany's immolate.

Clemenceau Grandeur
154

Oct. 3 Hindenburg, presses in his request ... urging the immediate dispatch of the peace proposal. .. the situation is daily growing more acute No 33

Col. Heye Oct. 9 Confirms .. I want to save the army, so that we can use it as a means of pressure during the peace negotiations. Army needs rest. If it gets it and receives fresh recruits, it will be able to show fresh achievements. No 38

Manifesto of the 93 Intellectuals, Oct. 1914

It is not true that we criminally violated Belgian neutrality. It can be proved that France and England had made up their minds to violate it. It can be proved that Belgium was willing. It would have been suicide not to forestall them.

Clem., Souvenirs, 277

War guilt denied by Hindenburg, Sept 17, 1927 Text quoted by Clemenceau, Souvenirs 285

Analogy to 1870 Thiers against Napoleon's war, but during the war patriotic. Dec, 1871, he could say: "We had to part with Napoleon III; we do not defend what had been done in the name of our country." The representatives of the German Republic could not say that and did not

Wilson to Sir Cecil Spring Rice, retiring British Ambassador (not publicly):
"The German people had been worked upon by their Government, which had persuaded them they were fighting not for conquest but for defence and that the object of the Allies was to crush and disrupt the German Empire and place German peoples under foreign rule." R. S. Baker Woodr. Wilson Life & Letters VII 1448

Armistice

Oct 1 18 Hindenb. Ludendorff ask for peace
Oct 5 18 First German Note to Wilson
Oct 8 18 Wilson replies I
" 12 18 Second German note
" 14 18 Wilson replies II
" 21 18 Third German note
" 23 18 Wilson replies III

Oct 25 Lenin Marshall Haig for any mild armistice conditions. Only evacuation of France & Belgium & Alsace Lorraine. Only restitution of the French-Belgian rolling stock. If stipulations are harder, danger that Germany does continue the fighting Tardieu 61

Oct 26 18 Foch communicates Clemenceau his armistice-conditions.
Oct 7 18 Fourth German note
Nov. ... 18 Allies ~~agree~~ inform Wilson of their readiness to conclude armistice
Nov 5 Wilson replies IV to their plenipotentiaries

Monday July 29th 1918

Vice Consul at Zurich cables text of a German peace move to Washington, handed to his son-in-law by Hertling personally. Text:

"German Chancellor fully agrees to the four conditions in President Wilsons speech at Mount Vernon on the Fourth of July, 1918, and he too considers them as a good basis for peace negotiations. He agrees to these four conditions in the belief that the first generally is not intended to apply to any one stated government but is directed against all autocracies generally."

Baker, Wilson Life & Letters, VIII 303

a telegram announcing the acceptance of Count Hertlings resignation as requested by him... The new Cabinet should unite all the forces of the people... The new Government thus formed will approach President Wilson...

Preliminary History of the Armistice N° 12

Ludendorff to Lersner Oct 1. his urgent request that our peace proposal shall be issued at once. Today the troops are holding their own; what may happen tomorrow can not be foreseen. N° 21

Ludendorff's proposal must be forwarded immediately... The Army could not wait forty-eight hours longer N° 27

Sept. 28. ~~Armistice~~ 1918

Memorandum prepared at
the Foreign Office, Berlin

"The most important
prerequisite for the institution of
peace is the formation, upon the
free initiative of His Majesty
the Emperor, of a new Government
on a broad national basis. For this
purpose it would be desirable that
there should arrive at Berlin as
early as tomorrow evening

Parliamentarism in Germany

Decree of Emperor to Count Hertling

Your Excellency has reported to me that you no longer feel able to remain at the head of the Government. I can not be insensible to your reasons..... I wish to have the German people cooperate more effectively than heretofore in determination of destiny of Fatherland. It is therefore my will that men supported by confidence of the people shall participate to large extent in rights and duties of government. I request you to ~~Prussia~~ in conclude your work by

continuing in office and
preparing the measures wished
by me until I have found
your successor....

William I.

Papers Relating to the Foreign
Affairs of the USA. 1918,
Supplement 1, p. 355

4 next day
German Press according to
American Chargé in the Netherlands
Telgram to Washington: (same
date)
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung
(Governmental) Crisis is over; thanks
to Emperor's noble decision to
permit people to share more
effectively in determination of fate
of country, our internal front
can be made as solid as possible.

Kölnische Volkszeitung (catholic)
~~This decree is act not only~~
~~of constitutional Monarch.~~
We register this fact without
expressing regret or approval.
There is not slightest doubt
that this means change to
parliamentary government.
Vorwärts (Socialist) Decisive
day in the history of our
people and our party has dawned.
Berliner Tageblatt (Liberal) Emperor
has cleared road for a new
Germany. Only coming generations
will be able fully to appreciate
what he has done.
Berliner Börsenzeitung (conservative):
Emperor's decree is turning point
in the life of our nation. The
old autocracy has come to an
end and parliamentarism enters
Germany.

Text of Speech of Prince
Max von Baden, Reichstag,
Oct 5 1918
as reported by Chargé in Netherlands

In pursuance of the Imperial
rescript of Sept. 30 the German
Empire has undergone a
fundamental change of its
political direction... The day of
the rescript is the beginning of a
new epoch in Germany's internal
history."

Foreign Relations of the
U.S.A., 1918, Suppl. 1,
p 349

He does not once use the
word democracy or parliamentarism.

Also not in the German record
note

Germany owes the Rhineland to Wilson, - amongst other things. Yet she started immediately, and continues to, fulminate against Wilson. Here again Hitler is in agreement with the foreign radicals and liberals, and can simply use their words and texts.

May 14th 1918. After categorical Austrian declaration that peace must be concluded in 1918, the Kaiser etc. decide that peace-feelers must be thrown out at appropriate time, best after the next success in the west.

The Revolution from above: „The most important prerequisite for the institution of peace is the formation, upon the free initiative of His Majesty the Emperor, of a new Government on a broad national basis... The new Government thus formed will approach President Wilson at the opportune moment with the request that he undertake the the Restoration of peace..." Preliminary history of the Armistice

Memorandum of Germ. Foreign Office
Sept. 28.

Hindenburg and Ludendorff decided that armistice has to be asked for immediately Sept. 28.

Sept. 28 Wilhelm II signs a document on parliamentary Government, „a new epoch in Germany's internal policy."

Sept. 30 Hertling resigns

Oct 1 Prinz Max v. Baden entrusted with forming new Government. Hindenb. + Ludendorff still, they can not exist further 48 h

Oct 3 Hindenb. urges asap the Armistice demand. „The situation is daily growing more acute."

11

on armistice request

Oct 4. Prince Max announces peace offer[s] in Reichstag
Oct. 6 Note received in Wash.
" 7 Presented by Swiss Embassy

Oct. 6 House: „I would suggest making no direct reply to the German Note." He suggests „at once to confer with the Allies." Interesting that his whole tone is anti-Ally!

Baker Life & Letters VIII 457

House: „The president's first draft of a reply to Germany was mild in tone and did not emphasize the need of guarantees providing for thorough-going acceptance of Wilson's peace conditions."
„I expressed a decided disapproval of P.'s

Intimate papers IV 77

Senate Oct. 7 vigorous speeches urge unequivocal rejection of Germ. overture.

Memorandum des AA: „The most important prerequisite for the institution of peace is the formation, upon the free initiative of His Majesty the Emperor, of a new Government with a broad national basis.... The new Government thus formed will approach President Wilson at the ~~opportune~~ opportune moment.

Preliminary History of the Armistice, p. 34

Eberl Langenrahe 11. Dec. 1918
„Ueberrest von Schlagfeld"

Jun. Klitz

Memorandum Foch to the
Allies, Jan 10, 19

La crise est aujourd
terminé, mais elle pa
pénible.
Pour en éviter le re
etc. Très important
Mermeix 216/17

He writes three memo

27 novembre 1918
10 janvier 1919
31 mars 1919
all in Mermeix 205-

The Frankf. Ztg
demands abdication
Oct. 25 „ as the democratic
guarantee which Wilson was demanding,
and which alone would satisfy him."
[Vorwärts 31. oct.

Scheidemanns Rede
Reichskabinett 31. Okt.
Prince Max II/p. 240

Hans die Sybille Revolution
ibid 311

Poppe to Nordau 16 oct 1918

Si vous voulez qu'ils
n'écoutent désormais le démon
et que, dès maintenant, il ne
se battent pas à pousser à la
roumaine, il faut agir et
vite.... J'attends pour ce
attaque une très grande puissa
de l'Allemagne, au moins
jusqu'à l'hiver. L'Histoire ne
le pourra montrer que les Allemands
se comportaient que la force;
leur mentalité ne va pas changer
en jour au lendemain. Ils ne
croiront donc vraiment que
s'ils voient les Alliés leur
fermer dans les principales régions
de l'Allemagne et cela jusqu'à ce
que les conditions du Traité de
Paix aient été exécutées."

THE
CAPITOL
METAL FILE

AR 7043 6/
Legrand Schwarzschild Collection, ~~5~~ - III, e, 3 - i

6/1

Cutting from issue dated..... 14 August

THE PERIOD OF THE ARMISTICE, 1918-1939.

"WORLD IN TRANCE": By LEOPOLD SCHWARZSCHILD.*

An appreciation by SIR JOHN SQUIRE.

N.B.—The illustration on this page is not from the book.

"TWENTY years of folly" is a phrase that Herr Schwarzschild, a refugee, uses towards the end of his calamitous commentary on the uneasy period between the two wars. And how fully he describes those years! He has done a remarkable thing; he has written a history crowded with facts and references, and at the same time not allowed his intense zeal for the truth, as he sees it, and the welfare of mankind, to be smothered under the dust of his researches.

"Twenty years of folly"—described by a man "*au-dessus de la mêlée.*" Professor Brogan summarises the thing in a preface; a preface all the more powerful because Professor Brogan, in youth, was deluded. He has grown up and sees now that his dreams could not be fulfilled. "The dominant German state in the modern world, Prussia, has been from its first appearance as a leading actor on the [illegible] military state, an army possessing a state, rather than a state possessing an army. It is unnecessary to go back to Tacitus. Mirabeau is quite far enough away." I am not quite sure. But it was Mirabeau or another who said in the French National Assembly that "The Prussian is a military animal, and to him war is a national industry." Adam Smith, Ricardo and John Stuart Mill, those plaster-cast men, would not have believed it. But it is true. And to fight armed Dragons we must be armed St. Georges.

Nonsense is still talked, by people who want to dodge the facts of breed and tradition and the human vices of pride and ambition, about all wars originating from "economic causes." Even in the British Government there were traces of this theory in the era during which the British Government simply would not say point-blank that the former German Colonies (which would have been of vast naval and military advantage to Germany during this war, and any future wars) would never be restored to Germany. I remember that, very early in this war, I was walking home at midnight in the black-out, and heard at the corner of Park Lane and Piccadilly thin young men whispering to every passing soldier: "All wars are made by capitalists, all wars are made by capitalists"—the said young men probably believing what they said (though they may have changed their tune after Russia was attacked), while every boy one knew was donning uniform to do, and perhaps to die, not for dividends, but for decency. The whole doctrine derives from the early professors of "the dismal science" who thought that man was actuated by greed alone, leaving out of account all the other vices, and, incidentally, the virtues, which still prevail in some hundreds of millions of souls. And the theory that, provided everybody is given a sufficiency of food, bathrooms, refrigerators, motor-cars, big roads and wireless sets, and votes, everybody will settle down and be happy (including the Prussians, the Japanese and the Pathans of the North-West Frontier) is made up by men in libraries. Plato had the notion that we should be all all-right if the philosophers were kings. It seems to me that, during the last 150 years, the philosophers *have* been kings—with the most disastrous results. Think of the influence of Rousseau, who couldn't have shot a haystack at ten yards and left his numerous illegitimate children on other people's doorsteps—all in the name of human perfectibility. Think of the influence of that sour, sardonic Karl Marx, who mugged away in the British Museum, knowing nothing of humanity as it is, and produced theories which led Lenin (a much more amiable and sensible man) to say that he didn't care if nine-tenths of the Russian population were exterminated provided that he got his way about the future of Russia—living people, to these men who are always thinking of Utopias on earth rather than Paradises in heaven, never counting at all as against the unborn, who are presumed to agree with the theorists. And think of Nietzsche. You can derive almost anything from him; for instance (possibly he was of Polish extraction), he warned the Italians against the eternally stupid and military Germans. But the half-baked egomaniac Hitler is full of him (imperfectly digested, for he has imperfectly digested everything) and is reported in the Press to have sent Mussolini a complete bound set of Nietzsche's works for his sixtieth birthday—inadvertently it was in the nature of a p.p.c. card.

"Myths" are the trouble; myths and shibboleths like "democracy." Kindness as against cruelty means something, and justice against injustice, and free law-courts. But political forms are misleading. The Germans voted Hitler in and he was nominated Chancellor; his party had the largest vote and he was as entitled to consider himself a "democratically-elected Prime Minister" as ever was Ramsay MacDonald. As soon as he was in the saddle, Prussia-infected Germany backed him in all his misdeeds (even his cold-blooded murder of thousands of untried men in one night) so long as he was successful. When he fails (and this is one of our author's themes) the army will take control, discard him as they discarded the Kaiser, produce a "democratic" façade, do a good death-bed whimper, and, unless we are careful, rearm. Not for economic reasons, but for historic "glory."

"Never again," says Herr Schwarzschild, "must we succumb to the myth that power and armaments and compulsion are of themselves sinful and evil as such. They can be the opposite as well. All order, all civilisation, all law and dignity rest on the existence of weapons and power." The chivalry of the Middle Ages knew it, and Sir Thomas Mallory knew it; there were good knights and evil knights, and if the good knights, believing that some Great Dawn had come, disarmed themselves, so much the worse for the good knights.

This whole book is a chronicle of mistakes made by the good about the wicked. There are also mistakes made by America about veteran Europe; President Wilson reduced the Italian Prime Minister to despair by saying that he knew more about the Italians than the Italian knew. But we mustn't throw up the sponge, and we must learn by our mistakes. And if there is one thing dead certain to be derived from this book and the facts, it is that the "democracies" must segregate foreign affairs and defence measures from the control of an electorate which is voting about coal-miners' wages, widows' pensions, or whatever, at the moment, may be pinching the shoe.

Over and over again, in the last hundred years, the franchise has been extended. Every time there has been domestic justification; for the rich, not through beastliness, but through ignorance, do not know how the poor live. But every time (and when the women, interested in husbands, children, cooking and hats, came in, this was truer than ever) the electoral roll has been diluted by one person who knew something about history and geography and racial and religious passions to nineteen who knew nothing about such things.

I think it was Lord Cranborne who, in the House of Lords a year or two ago, put out a tentative suggestion that in future there should be a Committee in Cape Town running our Foreign Affairs and Defences, independent of such things as the Fulham Bye-Election, which prevented Mr. Baldwin from telling us the whole truth about German Rearmament. That is a good, and a practicable, dream. The ordinary English voter doesn't even know what 's in the Empire (except for Australia, which sends over Test Teams) and is content to do his day's work and play darts or shove-ha'penny (Shakespeare called it "push-shilling") in the evening. And he wouldn't mind in the least, provided he had the vote as a protection against sweating, if Uncle Anthony Eden and All ran the foreign affairs and prevented his grandchildren having to die against the Germans, without consulting him.

"Czechoslovakia, Czechoslovakia—does that belong to us?" I quoted that on this page long years ago from a gallant sergeant of the last war who knew I was taking a 'plane to Prague to apologise for Munich.

THE NATIONAL GALLERY PICTURE OF THE MONTH: "THE EMBARKATION OF S. URSULA"; BY CLAUDE (1600-1682). CANVAS, 44 IN. HIGH BY 59 IN. WIDE.

The specially selected picture now on view at the National Gallery is a seaport scene, "The Embarkation of S. Ursula." In it, the artist shows the Saint, with a long train of Virgins, descending steps leading from a porticoed building to a waiting boat. Ships ride at anchor in the port, whilst seamen swarm the rigging, and porters, laden with bales, add movement to an intensely active scene. Claude Gellée, called Claude le Lorrain, artist of the French School, was born in France, but went to Rome about 1613 and became a pupil of Agostino Tassi, the landscape painter. He revisited France in 1625, but soon returned to Italy, and died there in 1682. The above picture was painted for Cardinal Barberini in 1646.

* "World in Trance." By Leopold Schwarzschild. With a Foreword by D. W. Brogan. (Hamish Hamilton; 12s. 6d.)

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Two pictures transmitted by wireless from Algiers of the operations in the Fifth
are facing an enemy strongly entrenched in advantageous positions. They show
and British infantry going into action



AN 8,000 LB. BOMB.—One of the first photographs to be released of an 8,000 lb. bomb. These huge bombs have been used with devastating effect by the R.A.F. recently.



NEW COTTAGES.—
cottages for farm w
which are to be bu

Observer
Raleigh N c

MAY 23 1943

"World in Trance: From Versailles to Pearl Harbor," by Leopold Schwarzchild. (New York, L. B. Fi her.) A careful and detailed account of international indecisions and vacillations, which the author believes led to Germany's renewed belligerency.

Copy to: Mr. Landshoff

Mr. Schwarzschild

University of California

Department of History
Berkeley, California

December 20, 1942 (until
Febr. 15; later on: 131
East 93d Street, New York)

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Thanks for Schwarzschild's WORLD IN TRANCE. Giving here, during this semester, a series of lectures on Contemporary Diplomacy I have quoted and recommended the book more than once.

I made only, about it, one critical remark: that, in my opinion, the hidden complicity of the French and British Cabinets with Mussolini from the Ethiopian war until 1939 had not been stressed enough. But I have always added that in spite of this lacuna the book is one of the best recent contributions to the origins of the War.

Truly yours,

(Sgd) Sforza

(Count Sforza)

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(Count Sforza)

to 80,000 families, aggregating more than $100,000,000. "The security has been solely the family's earnest intention to repay. These families have been called the country's worst credit risks, yet repayments have amounted to 90 per cent of the sums due." Hundreds of thousands of families, needy and eligible for aid, have gone unassisted because of lack of funds.

Only a few samples of insightful observations can be given here. Professional code-making (of which the author has made a special study) "is an expression of vague idealism, not of the brass tacks of a strategy for the good society." In striking a balance between voluntary and governmental enterprise, the "common sense of the common man is the final arbiter, unless the common man is confused by overwhelming crisis, or his own political leaders." Yet "experience seems to indicate that the people can only control what they own." And finally, the current emphasis on "independence" as expressive of the genius of American democracy "overlooks the evidence that the individual in business for himself was the bulwark of an *individualistic* democracy, but that for some decades we have been evolving a relatively *social* democracy. Many socially minded persons hope there will always be self-employed people, and that we will always have a society in which a person may enter many types of business 'for himself.' The very term independent appeals to most of us. We like to think of free, dignified, responsible individuals. Yet for many of these individuals, the most satisfactory life does not lie in 'going it alone.' The fullest economic life, the greatest freedom, lies in free association with one's fellows."

F. E. J.

World In Trance: From Versailles to Pearl Harbor. By Leopold Schwarzschild. New York, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation, 1942. $3.50.

A German anti-Nazi journalist and historian reinterprets the period between the two world wars. The book is important and challenging, distinguished, forceful and ably documented.

The year 1914, says Mr. Schwarzschild, opened a thirty years' war in which the 1918 armistice was a German strategic retreat for regrouping of forces, mending of defenses, reconnaissance and infiltration of the enemy. The Weimar Republic (its proclamation a "slip") was the unpopular price paid for an easy peace, and was dominated by the Army Officers Corps as an instrument toward the reopening of the military offensive.

The basis of the peace treaty was a misreading of the situation by the Allies which greatly aided German plans. British and American leaders presupposed a strong France and a weak Germany. Clemenceau, Poincaré and Austen Chamberlain realized the terrifying weakness of devastated and decimated France vis à vis an intact Germany with a mounting population. Tardieu predicted that the overrunning of France "in a few days" would see the Allies deprived of bases from which to mount land operations, and so reduced to naval and economic action. (Today the United Nations air forces strive to retrieve that loss.) Clemenceau early felt the division of viewpoint which culminated in the defection of his allies through fear of French "intransigeance" and he fought despairingly to hold them through *Allied* occupation of the Rhineland. The purpose of his Rhineland project was "to establish not a French, but a collective military power." The treaty actually written could be maintained only if America and Britain should back up France. They supported Germany.

President Wilson's dealing with emissaries of the Kaiser and his omission of discussion with his "anxious and uneasy" allies are recounted. Mr. Schwarzschild finds him arbitrary and illogical in action. "He had called German democracy inadequate; he treated it as adequate." He fought for a strong German armistice army, as his telegram to Colonel House said, "because it is certain that too much success or security on the part of the Allies will make a genuine peace settlement exceedingly difficult, if not impossible." It was to be "insecurity guaranteed by the enemy army," hardly "compatible" with his own solemn ban on the "balance of power." He had "never ceased to waver in an insoluble dilemma," that "the League of Nations needed effective power over its members—yet the League of Nations must not have effective power over them." He was unprepared for the logical consequence of his own proposition, a surrender to some extent of "the free will and the military power of the individual states" to the League.

Hitler's dramatic propensities have obscured the fact that he has, in the main, developed a course whose lines had been already well laid. "Whatever novelties Hitler brought about in every other political field, in the field of foreign policy it was only the continuation of previous German policy." That policy will not change over night.

"Never again," says Mr. Schwarzschild, "must we succumb to the myth that power and armaments and compulsion are of themselves sinful and evil as such. . . . The 'moral' value of power and weapons and compulsions is determined exclusively by the purpose they serve. . . .

". . . The voice of twenty years warns us that in the business of enforcing peace and order there is no substitute for our own will and our own power."

E. T.

It's Your Souls We Want. By Stewart W. Herman, Jr. New York, Harper & Brothers, 1943. $2.50.

In this volume the pastor of the American Church in Berlin from 1936 to December, 1941, summarizes the church-state struggle in Germany from 1933 through 1941. He describes the Nazi effort to provide an *ersatz* religion and draws two major conclusions: (1) "the Nazi government has no real sympathy for the Christian cause which it at first pretended to espouse"; (2) "the Nazi state itself had either started from or arrived at the viewpoint that a new religion must be sponsored by the New Germany." The Nazis who wanted "a purely Nazi church" have been able to impose "their will upon the nation." The church's support of the war has been "largely physical and ethical, rather than spiritual." Even during the war many special restrictions have been imposed on the churches. In June, 1941, all religious publications were banned. Churches were ordered to celebrate secondary feast days on the Sunday following them, rather than on the appropriate weekday. Services could not be held before ten o'clock in the morning following an air raid—which meant that workers could not attend early mass. A "deliberate attempt" was made to wean Christian children evacuated from bombed areas away from the church. In 1941 pastors were allowed to visit patients in hospitals and clinics only under rigid restrictions. A number of the smaller Christian sects were "suppressed without warning or announcement." The book, *Gott und Volk,* which called on "all Germans to decide between Christ and country" was distributed "throughout army and party." There was a new "epidemic of confiscations of Protestant and Catholic property." Certain Nazi policies are "irreconcilable with the Christian ethic."

Saul D Schwartzchild ⇐

to 80,000 families, aggregating more than $100,000,000. "The security has been solely the family's earnest intention to repay. These families have been called the country's worst credit risks, yet repayments have amounted to 90 per cent of the sums due." Hundreds of thousands of families, needy and eligible for aid, have gone unassisted because of lack of funds.

Only a few samples of insightful observations can be given here. Professional code-making (of which the author has made a special study) "is an expression of vague idealism, not of the brass tacks of a strategy for the good society." In striking a balance between voluntary and governmental enterprise, the "common sense of the common man is the final arbiter, unless the common man is confused by overwhelming crisis, or his own political leaders." Yet "experience seems to indicate that the people can only control what they own." And finally, the current emphasis on "independence" as expressive of the genius of American democracy "overlooks the evidence that the individual in business for himself was the bulwark of an *individualistic* democracy, but that for some decades we have been evolving a relatively *social* democracy. Many socially minded persons hope there will always be self-employed people, and that we will always have a society in which a person may enter many types of business 'for himself.' The very term independent appeals to most of us. We like to think of free, dignified, responsible individuals. Yet for many of these individuals, the most satisfactory life does not lie in 'going it alone.' The fullest economic life, the greatest freedom, lies in free association with one's fellows."

F. E. J.

World In Trance: From Versailles to Pearl Harbor. By Leopold Schwarzschild. New York, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation, 1942. $3.50.

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MAY

CUMULATIVE INDEX

(Series III, January-May 1942)

The index, now appearing as separate section with each monthly issue of the Supplement, is fully cumulative to the first of the year. The new index each month supplants all preceding indexes for the year, which may be discarded and the new index used in referring to or looking up sketches published at any time during the current year.

(The Roman numerals refer to Series - one calendar year - the Arabic to pages.)

Abbott, Charles E., coll. prof. . . III-42
Abend, Hallett, author III-73
Abrahamson, Harold A., physician . III-65
Abul Kalam Azad, pres. of All-India Congress. III-93
Achelis, Elizabeth, pres. World Calendar Assn., Inc. III-73
Adamic, Louis, author III-51
Adams, Charles F., physician . . III-65
Adams, Elmer W., chemist III-109
Adams, Francis J., elec. engr. . III-89
Adams, William R., forester . . . III-89
Adamson, Hans C., author III-73
Adel, Arthur, physicist III-89
Aguinaldo, Emilio, Philippine politician III-73
Ahlquist, Raymond P., pharmacist . III-89
Aicher, Louis C., agriculturist . . III-89
Aiken, Charles B., cons. engr. . . III-42
Aikman, John M., botanist III-109
Albers, Vernon M., physicist . . . III-89
Albi, Joseph A., lawyer III-74
Albright, John (G.), physicist . . . III-42
Albritton, Claude C., Jr., geologist. III-89
Alcock, Gudrun, editor III-27
Alderfer, Harold F., univ. prof. . . III-74
Aldous, Shaler E., bioecologist . .III-109
Aldrich, Loyal B., observatory dir. III-89
Alexander, A.E., mineralogist . . III-65
Alexander, Ben, pres. Masonite corp., govt. offl. III-93
Alexander, Gordon, biologist . . .III-110
Alexander, Harold R.L.G., British army officer III-74
Alexander, Lloyd E., biologist . . III-89
Alexander, Shirley, writer III-51
Alford, Leon P., engineer III-27
Alger, Philip L., elec. engr. . . . III-43
Algren, Nelson, journalist III-74
Allen, Adam (pseudonym); see Epstein, Samuel, Williams, Beryl . III-74
Allen, Arthur E., physician III-74
Allen, Glover M., naturalist III-74
Allen, Jay, author III-74
Allen, Nathaniel N., univ. prof. . . III-89
Allen, Paul W., research chemist . III-43
Allen, Winfred E., oceanographer . III-89
Allison, James B., Jr., biochemist . III-89
Allison, John H., forester III-110
Alt, Howard L., physician III-110
Alvarado, Alfonso M., chemist . . III-89
Amberg, Charles R., prof. III-43
Ambrose, Anthony M., biochemist . III-65
Ananda Mahidol, King of Thailand . III-1
Anderegg, F.O., cons. specialist . III-43
Andersen, Paul, structural engr. . III-89
Anderson, Alexander P., educator . III-43
Anderson, Alfred C., soil scientist . III-43
Anderson, Arthur, agronomist . . III-110
Anderson, Arthur von K., chemist .III-110
Anderson, Edwin J.A., entomologist.III-89
Anderson, Ernest, chemist III-65
Anderson, Jacob Peter, botanist . . III-43
Anderson, Sir John, Brit. govt. offl. III-74
Anderson, Oscar G., horticulturist . III-89
Anderson, Robert J., metallurgist . III-65
Andress, James M., psychologist . III-51
Andrews, Albert L., philologist . . III-89
Andrews, Andrew Irving, engr. . . III-89
Andrews, Frank L., hotel exec. . . III-74
Andrews, F.M., U.S. army offr. . . III-27
Angly, Edward., newspaper corr. . III-74
Annand, P.N., entomologist III-110
Antevs, Ernest V., geologist . . . III-43
Anthony, Edgar W., research artist III-65
Aosta, Duke of, Italian govt. offl. . III-74
Aranha, Oswaldo, Brazilian diplomat III-1
Arias, Arnulfo, ex-President Panama III-1
Ark, Peter A., phytopathologist . . III-90
Arkin, Aaron, physician III-110
Armour, Norman, U.S. ambassador. III-2
Armstrong, George M., plant pathologist III-110
Arnold, Bion J., engineer III-51
Arnold, George S., lawyer III-51
Arnold, H.H., U.S. army officer . III-2
Arnold, Thurman W., author . . . III-93
Arroyo del Rio, Carlos, President Ecuador III-2
Asmundson, Vigfus S., poultry husbandry III-110
Atherton, John C., artist III-93
Attlee, Sir Clement Richard, Brit. govt. official III-74
Aubel, Cliff E., coll. prof. III-90
Auchinleck, Sir Claude John Eyre, British army officer III-2
Auchy, George, chemist III-43
Austin, Albert E., ex-congressman. III-51
Avila Camacho, Manuel; see Camacho, Manuel Avila III-3
Ayer, Leslie J., lawyer III-65
Ayres, Samuel Jr., physician . . . III-65
Azoy, Anastasio C.M., U.S. army officer III-93

Baade, Paul W., U.S. army offr. . .III-27
Babcock, Donald E., chemist . . . III-43
Bacon, Franklin J., botanist III-65
Badertscher, A. Edison, horticulturist III-90
Bagley, David W., U.S. naval offr. III-93
Bahrt, George M., soil chemist . . III-43
Bailey, Austin, engr. III-90
Bailey, Ethel H., mech. engr. . . .III-110
Bailey, John H., bacteriologist . . .III-65
Baillieu, Clive L., Australian industrialist III-51
Bair, George J., technician III-65
Bajpai, Sir Girja Shankar, diplomat of India III-27
Baker, Charles L., geologist . . . III-110
Baker, Donald M., cons. engr. . . III-65
Baker, Edwin M., chem. engr. . . III-90
Baker, Ellis Crain, engr. III-90
Baker, Horace G., biologist III-110
Baker, Nina B., author III-93
Baker, Roger D., pathologist . . . III-110
Bakken, Herman E., chemist . . . III-43
Baldomir, Alfredo, President Uruguay III-2
Baldwin, Hanson W., author III-94
Balk, Robert, geologist III-110
Ball, Charles O., food technologist. III-43
Ball, Harriet, author III-74
Ballou, W.A., mathematician . . . III-65
Bancroft, George R., chemist . . . III-66
Bane, Frank, govt. offl. III-27
Banning, Margaret Culkin, author . III-74
Barber, George W., entomologist .III-110
Barber, Harry G., entomologist . . III-90
Barclay, Hartley Wade, author . . III-94
Bargeron, Carlisle, newspaperman III-51
Barker, George E., chemist III-11
Barker, Horace A., biochemist . . III-111
Barker, Lewellys F., physician . . III-94
Barker, Maurice E., chemist . . . III-90
Barker, Prince P., physician . . . III-111
Barkley, John F., fuel engr. III-90
Barlow, Wayne B., composer . . . III-94
Barne, Kitty, author III-27
Barnes, John L., radio engr. . . . III-90
Barnes, Ralph M., indsl. engr. . . III-66
Barnhart, John H., physician . . . III-66
Barnum, Malvern-Hill, U.S. army officer III-74
Barr, William M., engineer III-66
Barrett, Elliott P., phys. chemist . III-66
Barrett, Leslie B., botanist III-90
Barrows, Marjorie, compiler . . . III-51
Bartimeus (nom de plume); see Ritchie, Lewis III-38
Bartizal, John R., C.P.A. III-90
Bartlett, Frederick B., bishop . . III-27
Bartley, S.Howard, psychologist. III-90
Bartusek, Libushka, author III-27
Barwick, Arthur R., geologist . . III-111
Basore, Cleburne A., chem. engr. . III-66
Bast, Theodore H., histologist . . III-111
Bateman, George M., chemist . . III-111
Bates, Blanche, actress III-28
Bates, John R., chemist III-90
Bates, Philip K., bacteriologist . .III-111
Bates, Robert W., chemist III-111
Batista, Fulgencio, Pres. Cuba . . III-2
Batt, William L., mem. W.P.B. . . III-28
Battles, Marietta, executive . . . III-111
Baum, Vicki, author III-51
Baumeister, Theodore, engr. . . . III-90
Bayles, Burton B., agronomist . . III-111
Baylis, John R., chemist III-66
Beaber, Nathaniel J., chemist . . .III-111
Beach, Robin, elec. engr. III-111
Bean, Howard S., mech. engr. . . III-111
Beardall, John R., U.S. naval offr. III-28
Beaverbrook, Lord (Sir W.M. Aitken), Brit. cabinet minister . III-2
Beck, Warren, author III-51
Beck, William A., biologist III-111
Becker, Carl L., author III-74
Becker, Maurice, artist III-52
Becker, May L., editor III-52
Beckington, Alice, painter III-28
Beebe, William, author III-74
Begg, John, artist III-74
Belloc, Hilaire, author III-74
Bemis, Harold M., U.S. army offr. III-2
Benchley, Robert, author III-52
Bender, Lauretta, psychiatrist . . III-111
Bennett, Henry G., Australian army officer III-28
Benrimo, Joseph H., playwright . . III-94
Benson, Sally, author III-52
Berggrav, Eivind, bishop III-74
Berckman, Evelyn, composer . . . III-94
Berrey, Lester V., philologist . . III-94
Berry, Martha M., philanthropist . III-75
Bess, Demaree C., journalist . . III-28
Bessie, Alvah, author III-28
Beuf, Carlo M.L., author III-75
Bevin, Alice Conklin, artist . . . III-75
Bevin, Ernest, British govt. offl. . III-75
Biala, Janice, artist III-52
Bierman, Bernie, football coach . III-94
Bill, Virginia, artist III-28
Binder, Abraham W., composer . . III-94
Birney, Hoffman, author III-94
Bishop, Claire H., author III-28
Blackall, Clarence H., architect . III-75
Blake, William (real name William J. Blech), author III-28
Blakely, John R.Y., U.S. naval offr. III-94
Blakley, Chas. A., U.S. naval offr. III-2
Blamey, Sir Thomas Albert, Australian army officer III-94
Blanco, Juan Carlos, Uruguayan statesman III-94
Blatas, Arbit, artist III-94
Blease, Coleman L., ex-congressman III-52

Bliss, Eleanor A., bacteriologist . III-91
Bliven, Bruce, editor, author . . . III-94
Bloch, Claude Charles, U.S. naval officer III-2
Bluemel, Clifford, U.S. army offr. III-28
Blum, Leon, former premier of France III-75
Blumer, Herbert G., psychologist . III-91
Boal, Pierre de Lagarde, U. S. govt. official III-75
Boggs, S. Whittemore, geographer III-28
Bohrod, Aaron, artist III-28
Bolton, Guy, playwright III-75
Bolton, Reginald P., engr. III-75
Bonesteel, C.H., U.S. army officer. III-3
Bonnet, Harriet H., author III-75
Bormann, Martin L., Nazi govt. official III-94
Borovsky, Alexander K., pianist . III-75
Borst, Beatrice, author III-75
Boschen, Frederick W., U. S. army officer III-94
Bose, Subhas Chandra, politician of India III-94
Bostwick, Arthur E., librarian . . III-75
Boucher, Hiram A., U.S. fgn. service III-29
Boudin, Eleanor, sculptor III-75
Bourne, Geoffrey, author III-52
Bowler, Harold, artist III-75
Bowron, Fletcher, mayor III-3
Boyce, Burke, writer III-75
Boyce, Wm. H., ex-congressman . III-52
Boyden, Edward A., anatomist . . III-66
Bradbrook, Muriel C., author . . III-75
Braden, Spruille, U.S. govt. offl. . III-75
Bradley, James L., U.S. army offr. III-28
Brady, Austin C., U.S. consul . . . III-3
Brant, Gerald C., U.S. army offr. . III-29
Brauchitsch, H.A.H. Walther von, German army officer III-3
Brecher, Samuel, artist III-75
Breckinridge, James C., U. S. marine officer III-75
Brehm, George, artist III-52
Brenner, Anita, author III-94
Brett, George H., U.S. army offr. III-29
Brewer, Earl LeRoy, ex-gov. . . . III-94
Brewster, Andre W., U.S. army offr III-94
Brewster, William R., educator . . III-75
Bricken, Carl E., musician III-94
Briggs, Ellis O., U.S. fgn. offr. . III-29
Briggs, J. Emmons, surgeon . . . III-29
Britt, Steuart H., psychologist . . III-95
Brodrick, James, clergyman . . . III-29
Brodsky, George, author III-52
Bromfield, Louis, author III-52
Brooke, Sir Charles Vyner, Rajah of Sarawak III-3
Brooke-Popham, Sir Robert, Brit. army officer III-3
Brookes, Jean Ingram, author . . . III-29
Brooks, Howard L., clergyman . . III-75
Brougher, Wm.E., U.S. army offr. III-29
Brown, Benjamin C., artist III-52
Brown, Dee, librarian III-76
Brown, Dugald E.S., scientist . . . III-52
Brown, Edwy R., corp exec. III-52
Brown, Gertrude G., water-colorist III-29
Brown, John M., author, critic . . . III-95
Brown, Marel, writer III-29
Brown, Robert C., author III-95
Brown, Rose, author III-95
Bruch, Hilde, physician III-111
Bryan, Robert C., surgeon III-29
Bryson, John G., Jr., author III-76
Buck, Pearl, author III-52
Buckner, Simon B., Jr. U.S. army officer III-29
Bulliet, Clarence J., critic III-29
Bullitt, William C., U.S. fgn. service officer III-29
Burchett, Wilfred G., author . . . III-95
Burchfield, Albert H., merchant . . III-76
Burgin, Henry T., U.S. army offr. III-29
Burns, James H., U.S. army offr. . III-95
Busch, Fritz, conductor III-29
Byoir, Carl, pub. relations counsel III-95

Cabot, Philip, univ. prof. III-29
Caffrey, Jefferson, U.S. ambassador III-3
Caldecott, Sir Andrew, gov. of Ceylon III-3
Calderón Guardia, Rafael Ángel, President of Costa Rica III-52
Caldwell, Erskine, writer III-76
Camacho, Manuel Avila, Pres. of Mexico III-3
Campbell, Dan H., immunologist . III-95
Campbell, Edna Fay, author III-52
Cannon, LeGrand, Jr., author . . . III-95
Cantilo, José María, Argentine diplomat III-4
Cantor, Nathaniel, sociologist . . . III-91
Caperton, Wm.B., U.S. naval offr. . III-29
Cardenas, Lazaro, ex-President Mexico III-4
Carey, Harry, actor III-29
Carías Andino, Tiburcio, President Honduras III-4
Carlisle, Donald T., cartoonist . . III-76
Carpenter, Bruce, writer III-29
Carr, Philip V.C., journalist . . . III-29
Carter, Wm. H., Jr., newspaperman. III-95
Cassidy, Claudia, music editor . . III-29
Castiglioni, Arturo, prof. III-43
Castillo, Ramon S., acting Pres. Argentina III-4
Catledge, Wm. T., newspaperman . III-29
Cavallero, Count Ugo, Italian army officer III-4
Chagall, Marc, artist III-30
Chalmers, Frederick R., adminstr. Nauru, Central Pacific . . III-5
Chambers, Dana (pseudonym); see Leffingwell, Albert III-76
Chaney, James E., U.S. army offr. III-52
Charlot, Jean, artist III-52
Chase, Florence Meier (Mrs.) plant physiologist III-91
Chase, Gilbert, music critic III-30
Chase, Mary Ellen, author III-52
Chavez, Carlos, musician III-95
Chen Cheng, Chinese army offr. . III-95
Chennault, C. L., U.S. army offr. . III-52
Cherne, Leo M., author III-76
Chevalier, Elizabeth P., scenarist. III-30
Chiang Kai-shek, generalissimo of Chinese forces III-5
Chickering, William H., author . . III-76
Child, Nellise, author III-30
Childs, Harwood L., author III-95
Childs, Marquis W., author III-76
Chute, Mary Grace, writer III-76
Chu Teh, Chinese army officer . . III-95
Ciano, Count Galeazzo, Italian fgn. minister III-5
Citron, Minna, artist III-52
Clagett, Henry B., U.S. air force officer III-30
Claire, Marion, singer III-76
Claney, Howard M., artist III-76

Clapp, Sir Harold W., Australian govt. official III-5
Clark, Thomas Blake, author . . . III-76
Clarke, William H.C., lawyer . . . III-53
Clement, Frederick W., physician . III-91
Coffin, Robert P.T., poet III-96
Cohen, Bella; see Spewack, Bella . III-76
Colby, Elbridge, author III-96
Colby, Frances B., author III-96
Cole, Frank R., entomologist . . . III-66
Cole, Gordon E., advertising exec. III-53
Coleman, Laurence Vail, author . . III-53
Coningham, Arthur, Brit. air vice marshal III-5
Cook, Thomas I., polit. scientist . III-91
Cooper, Alfred Duff-, Brit. govt. official III-6
Cooper, Gary, movie actor III-30
Cooper, Louise Field, author . . . III-96
Copenhaver, Wilfred M., prof. . . III-91
Corning, Erastus, 2d, mayor . . . III-53
Cornyn, John H., newspaperman . III-30
Cosper, Lloyd C., author III-76
Cotlow, Lewis N., explorer III-66
Cottler, Joseph, author III-96
Cowden, Dudley J., economist . . . III-91
Cowham, June Provines; see Provines, June III-76
Cowles, Edward S., author III-30
Cox, Herald R., bacteriologist . . III-30
Cox, Raymond E., U.S. consul gen. III-5
Craigie, Sir Robert (Leslie), Brit. ambassador to Japan III-5
Cranborne, Lord (Robert Arthur James C.), Brit. govt. offl. III-76
Crandall, Bradshaw, artist III-30
Crawford, Cheryl, producer . . . III-76
Cripps, Sir Stafford, Brit. lord . . III-53
Criss, Mildred, author III-30
Crowell, Chester T., writer III-30
Cuff, Samuel H., writer III-76
Cuming, Beatrice, artist III-76
Cunningham, Lt. Gen. Alan G., Brit. army officer III-6
Cunningham, J.H., U.S. army offr. III-30
Curtin, John, premier of Australia . III-6
Curtis, Heber D., astronomer . . . III-30
Curtis, Leland, artist III-53
Cutter, William D., educator . . . III-53

Dabney, Virginius, editor III-96
Dahnke, Marye, home econ. dir. . III-53
Dalton, Hugh, Brit. govt. offl. . . . III-96
Damonte Taborda, Raúl, Argentine politican III-53
Daniel, Hawthorne, author III-76
Daniel, Lewis C., artist III-30
Danis, Anthony L., U.S. naval offr. . III-76
Dark, Eleanor, author III-76
Darlan, Jean Francois, French (Vichy) vice premier III-6
Davies, Raymond A., journalist . . III-77
Davin, Tom, editor, author III-77
Davis, Boothe C., educator III-53
Davis, Fitzroy, author III-30
Davis, Forrest, author III-30
Davis, Julia (M.), author III-96
Davis, Phil, artist, designer III-53
Davis, Shelby C., author III-53
Davis, Wm. H., U.S. govt. offl. . . III-30
Davison, Charles, surgeon III-53
Dawson, Alden B., biologist III-43
Deal, Joseph T., ex-congressman . III-77
Dean, Vera Micheles, researcher . III-30
Dean, Sidney W., author III-96
de Brinon, Count Fernand, French (Vichy) envoy to Paris & Germans . III-6

DeCou, Branson, lecturer III-31
de Forest, Lee, author III-53
DeGaris, Charles F., physician . . III-66
de Gaulle, Charles, leader Free French forces III-6
Degen, Ida Day, sculptor III-96
Degenhard, William, author III-96
Dehn, Adolf, water colorist III-31
DeLee, Joseph Bolivar, obstet. . . III-96
Delehanty, Elizabeth; see O'Connor, Elizabeth Delehanty III-83
Deming, Dorothy, author III-31
Denby, Howard, newspaper editor . III-77
DeRouen, Rene L., congressman . III-96
deRoussy de Sales, Raoul, author . III-77
Dery, Desiderius G., silk mfr. . . III-77
de Souza Costa, Arthur, Brazilian govt. official III-53
Deuel, Wallace R., author III-53
De Witt, John L., U.S. army offr. . III-6
DeWitt, Josephine, artist, writer . .III-96
Diamond, David L., composer . . . III-96
Diat, Louis (Felix), hotel chef . . . III-31
Dickson, Cecil B., corr. III-77
Dill, Sir John, Brit. army officer . III-53
Doenitz, Karl, German naval offr. . III-53
Doherty, Edward J., editorial writer III-53
Doihara, Kenji, Japanese chief of air forces III-7
Doman, Nicholas, prof., author . . III-96
Donaldson, John M., architect . . . III-31
Donato, Louis, artist III-53
Donovan, Howard, U.S. consul . . . III-7
Donovan, Col. Wm. J., U.S. govt. official III-7
Dorman-Smith, Reginald Hugh, gov. Burma III-7
Dorsey, Florence L., author III-31
Douglas, Bruce (pseudonym); see Douglas, Theodore W. III-53
Douglas, Frederic H., anthropologist III-66
Douglas, Theodore W., author . . . III-54
Downey, Fairfax, author III-31
Downs, Cornelia M., bacteriologist. III-91
Drake, Chas. C., U.S. army offr. . III-31
Drakeford, Arthur, Australian govt. official III-54
Dreher, Carl, author III-77
Drum, Hugh A., U.S. army officer. III-7
Duling, John F., geologist III-91
du Maurier, Daphne, author III-54
Duncan, Sir Andrew, Brit. govt. official III-54
Dunham, Katherine, dancer III-54
Dunn, Matthew A., ex-congressman III-77
Dunnington, Lewis L., clergyman . III-77
Durfee, William P., coll. dean . . III-31
Dustin, Agnes B., author III-77
Dyer, John P., author III-31
Dyer, Nancy A., artist, lecturer . . III-77

Eastman, Jos. B., U.S. govt. offl. . III-31
Eaton, John W., univ. prof. III-77
Eberhart, Richard, poet III-96
Eberle, Abastenia St. Leger, sculptor III-77
Eberstadt, Ferdinand, investments III-77
Eden, Anthony, Brit. govt. offl. . . III-77
Edgerton, Glen E., gov. Panama Canal III-31
Edmunds, Albert J., librarian . . . III-31
Egri, Lajos N., dramatist III-77
Eilshemius, Louis M., artist . . . III-31
Eisenhower, D.D., U.S. army offr. ... III-77
Elkins, Frank, newspaperman . . III-91
Elwell, Herbert, composer III-96
Embick, Stanley D., U.S. army officer III-31
Emmons, Delos C., U.S. army offr. III-7
Emrys-Evans, Paul V., Brit. govt. official III-77
Engel, A. Lehman, composer . . . III-97
Epstein, Samuel, writer III-77
Essary, Jesse F., newspaperman . III-97
Essex, Hiram E., physiologist . . III-67
Etnier, Stephen, artist III-54
Eubank, Eugene L., U.S. army offr. III-97
Eurich, Alvin C., psychologist . . III-67
Evatt, Herbert V., Australian govt. official III-77

Farago, Ladislas, writer III-78
Farley, Jas. A., U.S. govt. offl. . . III-31
Fast, Howard, author III-97
Faulkner, William, author III-54
Faville, Katherine, dir. nursing service III-54
Fedorova, Nina, author III-97
Fellows, George E., univ. prof. . . III-54
Fenner, Phyllis Reid, librarian . . III-54
Ferguson, Erna, author III-78
Fernandez-Artucio, Hugo, prof. . III-97
Fiedler, Reginald H., govt. offl. . III-54
Field, Medora, author III-78
Field, Rachel, author III-97
Field, Robert D., writer III-31
Finkelstein, J.Joe, anthropologist . III-111
Firestone, Clark B., author III-31
Fisher, George J.B., govt. offl. . . III-54
Fisher, M.F.K., writer III-31
Fiske, Bradley A., U.S. naval offr. III-97
Fiske, Charles, bishop III-54
Flannery, Vaughn, painter III-97
Fleek, John S., investment banker . III-54
Fleisher, Wilfrid, author III-78
Fleury, Barbara F., librarian . . . III-97
Flint, Margaret, author III-78
Flint, Wesley P., entomologist . . III-91
Foote, Walter A., U.S. consul gen. . III-7
Forbes, W.T.M., entomologist . . III-91
Ford, John, movie director III-31
Forde, Francis M., Australian govt. official III-97
Foreman, Grant, author III-97
Forester, C.S., author III-78
Fortune, William, corp. exec. . . III-54
Foscue, Edwin J., geographer . . . III-91
Foster, Joseph O., author III-78
Foster, Paul D., physician III-67
Foster, Marcellus E., editor . . . III-97
Fox, Herbert, pathologist III-78
France, Harry C., financial writer. III-97
Franco Bahamonde, Francisco, dictator of Spain III-31
Fraser, Peter, prime minister New Zealand III-7
Fredenthal, David, artist III-54
Freedley, George, librarian III-91
Freeman, Charles S., U.S. naval officer III-7
French, Herbert E., author III-78
Freund, Philip, author III-78
Frick, William J., surgeon III-97
Friedlander, Frieda R., artist . . III-55
Friedman, W.F., cryptologist . . . III-31
Frost, Robert, poet III-78
Frost, Wesley, U.S. ambassador . III-78
Fulmer, Silas C., physician . . . III-112
Furniss, Henry D., physician . . . III-55
Fyfe, David P.M., solicitor gen. . III-78

Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand, Hindu religious and social leader .III-97
Galarza, Ernesto, economist . . . III-91
Galtsoff, Paul S., zoologist III-67
Gamelin, Maurice-Gustave, former generalissimo of Allied Forces . III-78
Garnett, David, Brit. author. . . . III-31
Garrett, Garet, writer III-97
Gasser, L.D., U.S. army offr. . . . III-31
Gauss, Clarence E., U. S. ambassador to China III-7
Gayda, Virginio, Italian editor . . . III-7
Gelber, Lionel (Morris), author . . III-32
Geoffrey, Theodate, writer III-44
Gerbrandy, Pieter S., premier Netherlands govt. in exile III-78
Germann, Frank E. E., prof. . . . III-44
Gervasi, Frank (H.), fgn. corr. . . III-97
Gessler, Clifford, author III-32
Geyer, Harold C., author III-97
Gianella, Vincent P., geologist . . III-44
Gibbons, Stella, author III-54
Giddings, Thaddeus P., music supervisor III-98
Gifford, Robert L., cons. engr. . . III-44
Gilfillan, S. Colum, sociologist . . III-44
Gill, Frederick C., Brit. clergyman. III-78
Gill, Wm. H., U. S. army offr. . . . III-55
Gillespie, Robert D., psychiatrist . III-98
Gillet, Joseph E., prof. Spanish . . III-44
Gilmour, Margaret, author III-32
Ginsberg, Eli, economist III-98
Ginsburgh, A. Robert, U.S. army officer III-98
Gisborne, Harry T., forester . . . III-67
Glass, James M., educator III-44
Glassford, William A.,II, U.S. naval officer III-55
Glenn, Leonidas C., geologist . . . III-44
Glenn, Mabelle, musician III-44
Godard, Mary, artist III-55
Godfrey, Albert E., Canadian air service comdr. III-7
Godfrey, James L., prof. III-32
Goebbels, Paul Joseph, Nazi minister of propaganda III-8
Goering, Hermann, Nazi offl. III-8
Gogarty, Oliver St. John, author . . III-55
Goldman, Hetty, archaeologist . . III-44
Golubov, Maurice, artist III-78
Gonzales, Irma, soprano III-55
Gooden, Arthur H., author III-55
Gordon, Caroline, author III-32
Gordon, Paul H., manufacturer . III-112
Gordon, William, lawyer III-55
Gore, Herbert C., chemist III-44
Gorman, James E., ry. pres. . . . III-98
Gould, Charles N., geologist . . . III-44
Grady, Henry F., head U.S. War Mission to China III-78
Graf, Herbert, stage dir. III-98
Graham, Frank D., economist . . . III-98
Grant, Joseph D., merchant III-79
Gras, Norman S.B., coll. prof. . . III-44
Grattan, C. Hartley, author III-79
Gravatt, William Loyall, bishop . III-79
Graves, Bibb, ex-gov. III-98
Graves, William W., physician . . III-45
Gray, George W., author III-55
Gray, Henry David, author III-32
Green, Alan B., author III-98
Green, Joseph A., U.S. army offr. III-32
Greenslade, John W., U.S. naval officer III-8
Greenwood, Arthur, Brit. govt. official III-79

Gregory, Col. Wm.E., supt. Culver Military Academy III-98
Grenfell, Russell, off. Brit. navy . III-32
Grew, Joseph C., U.S. ambassador . III-8
Griffis, Elliot, composer III-98
Grigg, Sir (Percy) James, Brit. govt. official III-79
Gross, Milt, artist III-98
Grover, Beatrice B., illustrator . III-98
Gruening, Ernest, gov. Alaska . . . III-8
Guani, Alberto, Uruguayan govt. official III-79
Guedalla, Philip, Brit. author . . . III-79
Gunther, Franklin Mott, diplomatic officer III-32
Gutheim, Frederick A., writer . . III-32
Guthrie, Robert R., merchant . . . III-98
Guyton, Boone T., aviator, author . III-55
Gwatkin, Frederick, Brit. army officer III-8
Gwenn, Edmund, Brit. actor III-32

Hack, Morton, U.S. army officer . III-79
Hackett, Charles, tenor III-32
Hackney, Louise W., orientalist . III-112
Haden, Beatrice S., artist III-79
Halifax, Viscount, Brit. ambassador to U. S. III-8
Hall, Norris F., chemist III-92
Halpert, Edith G. (Mrs.), art. dir. III-112
Halsey, Wm. F.,Jr.,U.S. naval offr. III-79
Hamar, Irene, sculptor III-98
Hamblen, Stewart B., writer . . . III-98
Hamill, James A., ex-congressman III-32
Hamilton, Edith, author III-79
Hamilton, Edward P., publisher . . III-99
Hamilton, W.J., Jr., zoologist . . . III-67
Hamm, Beth C. (Mrs.), painter . . III-32
Hampel, Elizabeth, author III-79
Hanc, Josef, author III-99
Hanley, James, novelist III-32
Hanna, Willard A., teacher, author. III-32
Hannah, Evelyn I., writer III-79
Hannah, John Alfred, coll. pres. . . III-55
Hanus, Paul H., univ. prof. III-32
Harder, Charles M., designer . . III-92
Harding, Robert, Jr., engineer . . III-79
Hardy, David P.,U.S. army offr. . III-55
Hardy, William G., author III-99
Harmon, Millard F., U.S. army officer III-55
Harris, Arthur T., Brit. air marshal III-55
Harris, Katherine, food economist . III-55
Harrison, Harold C., chemist . . III-112
Harrison, Wm. H., mem. W.P.B. . III-32
Hart, Alan L., physician III-99
Hart, Albert G., economist III-99
Hart, Thos. C., U.S. naval offr. . . III-8
Hartigan, John J., clergyman . . . III-55
Hartle, Russell P., U.S. army offr. III-56
Hartley, Alan F., Brit. army offr. III-56
Hartshorne, Edward Y., author . . III-56
Harwood, Chas., gov. Virgin Islands III-8
Hastings, John R., editor III-99
Hata, Gen. Shunroku, comdr. in chief, Jap. forces in China III-99
Hathaway, Cynthia, author III-32
Hauck, Louise Platt, author III-56
Hauser, Heinrich, author III-79
Haushofer, Karl, Nazi prof. III-8
Hawes, Elizabeth, author III-99
Hawley, Lee F., chemist III-112
Hayden, Joseph R., author III-56
Hayes, Carlton J.H., ambassador to Spain III-99
Haynes, Williams, author III-79
Haystead, Ladd, author III-79
Hayworth, Rita (real name Margarita C. Cansino), actress III-33
Healy, George Wm., Jr., editor . . III-79
Heath, Frank M., author III-79
Heath, Louis M., Brit. naval offr. . III-8
Heflin, Alma G., aviator III-99
Hegner, Robert Wm., zoologist . . III-99
Heiden, Konrad, author III-33
Helfer, Walter, musician III-99
Helfrich, C.E.L., Dutch admiral . III-79
Hellman, Geoffrey T., writer . . . III-99
Helseth, Henry E., author III-99
Henderson, Kenneth A., mountain climber III-80
Henderson, Lawrence J., chemist . III-56
Henderson, Leon, mem. W.P.B. . . III-33
Henry, Gene (pseudonym); see Sheldon, Jean Pendleton III-99
Hepburn, Arthur J., U.S. naval officer III-8
Hepner, Harry W., psychologist . . III-67
Hernandez Martinez, Gen. Maximilliano, Pres. El Salvador . . . III-8
Hero, Andrew, Jr., U.S. army offr. .III-56
Herrera, Luis Alberto de, Uruguayan politician III-80
Herring, (Edward) Pendleton, teacher, author III-33
Hershey, Lewis B., U. S. army officer III-56
Hess, Walther Richard Rudolph, former Nazi official III-9
Hewes, Agnes D., author III-33
Hewes, Margaret (Mrs. Ambrose T. Gosling), playwright III-99
Heyliger, William, author III-99
Hibbard, Hall L., engineer III-56
Hibbs, Ben, editor III-99
Hickerson, Clyde V., clergyman . III-80
Hile, Henry L, surgeon III-56
Hill, Helen, author III-33
Hillary, Richard, author III-56
Hillman, Sidney, mem. W.P.B. . . III-33
Himmler, Heinrich, chief German Gestapo III-33
Hinchman, Walter S., author . . . III-33
Hindus, Maurice, author III-56
Hiner, L.D., pharmacognocist . . III-112
Hinman, Dale D., U.S. army offr. . III-56
Hinton, Harold B., author,editor . . III-56
Hirons, Frederic C., architect . . III-56
Hirsch, Isaac S., X-ray expert . . III-99
Hiss, Philip H., photographer . . . III-33
Hitchcock, Henry-Russell, educator III-80
Hodges, Courtney H., U.S. army officer III-33
Hofmann, Jeane (Margaret Jeane-Marie H.), sports reporter . . . III-99
Hogue, Alexandre, artist III-100
Holcomb, Thos., U.S. Marine offr. III-9
Holden, Paul E., univ. prof. III-56
Holdridge, Elizabeth, author . . . III-80
Hollander, Lester, physician . . . III-112
Hollis, Christopher, Brit. author . III-33
Holmboe, Frithjof, botanist III-67
Holt, Isabella, author III-80
Hoover, Herbert, ex-Pres. U.S. . III-33
Hopkins, Harry, mem. W,P.B. . . III-33
Horn, Paul V., cons. fgn. trade . . III-92
Horn, Thomas S., U.S. consul . . . III-9
Horney, Karen, psychiatrist . . . III-80
Horvitz, Leo, geochemist III-92
Howard, Charles G., lawyer . . . III-112
Howe, Gertrude H., artist III-33
Ho Ying-Chin, Chinese war minister III-100
Hsiung Shi-Hui, Chinese govt. offl. III-100
Hubbard, Elizabeth V., educator . III-80
Hubbard, Lucien, writer, producer. III-100
Hughes, Charles Evans, ex-chief justice Supreme Court III-33
Hughes, W.M., Australian govt. official III-9
Hughes, Langston, poet III-80
Hughes, William M., Australian minister of Navy III-9
Huie, William B., author III-80
Hull, Cordell, U.S. sec. of State . . III-9
Hull, Roger B., lawyer III-56
Humphries, George R., educator . III-80
Hungerford, Herbert B., prof. . . . III-92
Hurst, Fannie, author III-33
Hurst, Vida, author III-100
Huseini, Haj Amin Effendi El, Arab statesman III-33
Hu Shih, Chinese ambassador to U.S. III-9
Hussey, Ruth, actress III-100
Hutcheson, Ernest, musician . . . III-100
Hutchins, John G.B., economist . . III-33
Hutton, Thos. J., Brit. army offr. . III-56
Hylander, Clarence John, biologist. III-34

Ibáñez del Campo, Carlos, Chilean politican III-56
Iida, Shojiro, Jap. army officer . . III-80
Infeld, Leopold, physicist, author . III-80
Ingersoll, Ralph, author III-56
Ingersoll, Royal E., U.S. naval offr. III-34
Inönu, Ismet, President Turkey . . III-9
Irwin, Malcolm R., physiologist . . III-67
Ishii, Ko, Japanese statesman . . . III-9
Itagaki, Seishiro, Japanese general . III-80
Ittner, Martin H., chemist III-81

Jackson, Giles (pseudonym); see Leffingwell, Albert III-81
Jacob, Naomi, novelist III-34
James, Preston E., geographer . . III-100
James, Will, artist, author III-100
Janis, Sidney, art critic III-100
Jaynes, Clare (pseudonym); see Spiegel, Clara G., & Mayer, Jane III-100
Jefferson, Howard B., prof. III-34
Jenkins, W. S., artist III-34
Jinnah, Mohammed Ali, pres. All-India Moslem League III-100
Johl, Janet P., author III-34
Johns, Bessie W., teacher III-81
Johnson, Edith C., coll. prof. . . . III-81
Johnson, Frank H., bacteriologist . III-56
Johnson, Gerald W., author III-34
Johnson, Helen L, writer III-100
Johnson, Gen. Hugh S., columnist and former head N.R.A. III-100
Johnson, Loren B.T., psychiatrist . III-34
Johnson, Louis A.,U.S. govt. offl. . III-100
Johnson, Margaret S., writer . . . III-100
Johnson, Nelson T., U.S. minister . III-9
Johnson, Tom L., mural painter . . III-34
Johnstone, William C., author . . . III-81
Jónasson, Hermann, premier Iceland III-9
Jones, Albert M., U.S. army offr. . III-34
Jones, Harry S.V., univ. prof. . . . III-34
Jones, Jesse, mem. W.P.B. III-34
Jones, Thomas H., U.S. army offr. III-34
Jones, Volney H., ethnologist . . . III-92
Jordan, Emil, author III-57
Jordanoff, Assen, author III-57
Jowitt, Sir William Allen, Brit. govt. official III-81
Jules, Mervin, artist III-34

Kadner, Carl G., biologist III-92
Kaldis, Aristodimos, artist III-57
Kallay (de Nagy Kallo), Nicolas, Hungarian premier III-101
Kane, Harnett T., newspaperman . III-34
Kanzler. Ernest C., mem. W.P.B. III-34

Kapell, William, pianist III-101
Kathé, Betty, artist III-57
Kato, Sotomatsu, Jap. ambassador . III-9
Kauffmann, Stanley, writer III-34
Kaufman, Schima, musician . . . III-57
Kaufman, Wolfe, drama critic . . III-57
Kawai, Tatsuo, Japanese minister to Australia III-10
Kean, Hamilton Fish, ex-Senator . III-34
Keitel, Gen. Wilhelm, German army officer III-10
Keithley, Maud M.(Mrs.), writer . III-34
Kelland, Clarence Budington, publicity dir., Rep. Nat. Com. III-34
Kelley, Douglas M., psychiatrist . III-34
Kelly, Wallace McElroy, author . . III-35
Kennan, Kent W., composer III-101
Kennerly, Byron F., flying instr. . III-101
Kent, Sidney R., pres. 20th Century-Fox. III-101
Keppel, Harold, artist III-57
Kerner, Robert J., author III-101
Kesselring, Albert, German air force officer III-57
Keyes, Frances P., author III-81
Kielstra, Johannes C., gov. Dutch Guiana (Surinam) III-10
Kilvert (Benjamin Sayre) Cory artist III-81
Kimball, George C., steel mfr. . . III-57
Kimmel, Husband E., U.S. naval officer III-10
King, Dorothy N. (Mrs. James Werblow), author III-35
King, Edward Postell, Jr., U.S. army officer III-35
King, Ernest J., U.S. naval offr. . . III-35
Kingman, Eugene, artist III-112
Kiplinger, W. M., author III-81
Kirchwey, George W., lawyer . . . III-81
Kirk, Grayson L., prof., author . . III-35
Kirkpatrick, Ralph, harpsichordist III-81
Kisch, Egon E., reporter, author . III-57
Kiser, Samuel E., author III-57
Kiss, Joseph A., author III-101
Klem, Grace, author, illustrator . III-35
Knickerbocker, H.R., newspaperman III-35
Knight, Eric, author III-81
Knight, Ralph T., anesthetist . . . III-92
Knowlson, J.S., mem. W.P.B. . . . III-35
Knox, Frank., U.S. sec. of Navy . III-35
Knudsen, William S., dir. W.P.B. . III-35
Kobak, Edgar, radio exec. III-35
Kobayashi, Seizo, gov.-gen. Taiwan III-10
Koenigsberg, Moses, founder news syndicate, author III-101
Koeves, Tibor, author III-35
Koga, Mineichi, Jap. naval offr. . . III-10
Kolachov, Paul J., scientist III-101
Kolbe, Parke R., coll. pres. . . . III-81
Kondo, Nobutake, Jap. naval offr. . III-10
Koneff, Ivan S., Russian army offr. III-101
Konoye, Prince Fuminaro, ex-premier Japan III-10
Koo, Dr. Vi Kyuin Wellington, Chinese ambassador to England. III-11
Kopac, M.J., biologist III-67
Koyre, Alexandre, prof. III-101
Kreider, Carl, educator III-101
Kronenberger, Louis, author . . . III-81
Krzesinski, Andrew J., prof. . . . III-81
Kubik, Gail T., composer III-101
Kung, Dr. H.H., v.p. China III-11
Kuo, Helena (Gin-Chiu), author . . III-81
Kurusu, Saburo, Jap. diplomat . . . III-11

Ladd, Maynard, pediatrician . . III-101
La Guardia, Fiorello H., mayor . . III-11
Lahey, Edwin A., columnist III-81
Lamb, Charles R., architect . . . III-81
Lambert, Clara, writer III-81
Lambert, Samuel W., physician . . III-57
LaMore, Chet, artist III-35
Lamotte, Bernard, artist III-57
Land, Emory S., U.S. govt. offl. . III-11
Landis, James M., law dean, govt. official III-35
Landry, Robert J., editor, critic . III-81
Landsberg, Helmut, geophysicist . III-92
Lane, Arthur B., U.S. ambassador. III-81
Lane, Wheaton J., historian III-81
Lange, Otto F., U.S. army officer . III-57
Langham, James R., writer III-81
Lanks, Herbert C., teacher III-81
Larmon, Sigurd S., advt. exec. . . III-57
Larrimore, Lida (Lida Larrimore Thomas), author III-35
La Rue, George R., biologist . . . III-92
Latham, Natalie W., war worker . III-101
Lauferty, Lilian, author III-101
Lauterbach, Albert T., educator . III-101
Laval, Pierre, French (Vichy) statesman III-102
Lawrence, Henry W., coll. prof. . III-57
Lawrence, Jacob A., artist III-35
Lawther, William, Brit. labor official III-35
Layton, Sir Geoffrey, Brit. naval officer III-11
Leahy, Wm. D., U.S. ambassador . III-11
Leary, H.F., U.S. naval offr. . . . III-57
Leathers, Frederick J.; see Leathers of Purfleet, Baron . . . III-57
Leathers of Purfleet, Baron, Brit. govt. official III-57
Lee, Dwight E., univ. prof. III-82
Leeming, Joseph, writer III-35
Leffingwell, Albert, author III-82
Lefft, Harold H., X-ray specialist. III-57
LeMaitre, Georges, professor . . III-35
Levin, Abraham, artist III-35
Levinson, Abraham F., artist . . . III-82
Lewis, Essington, Australian govt. official III-11
Lewis, Herbert C., author III-82
Lewis, Lloyd, author III-102
Lewisohn, Ludwig, author III-58
Leyburn, James G., sociologist . . III-82
Liebling, A.J., writer III-58
Limbach, Russell T., artist, author III-35
Lindahl, Martin L., economist . . III-92
Lindbergh, Charles A., aviation expert III-102
Lindquist, H.L., philatelist III-67
Lindsay, Maxwell H.A., elec. engr. III-58
Linlithgow, 2d Marquess of (Victor Alexander John Hope), viceroy India III-12
Lipman, Jean H., editor III-102
Litten, Frederic N., engineer . . . III-36
Little, Chas. J.C., Brit. naval offr. III-58
Little, Philip, artist III-102
Litvinov, Maxim (real name, Moysheev Vallakh), Russian ambassador to U.S. III-12
Llewellin, John J., pres. Brit. Bd. Trade III-58
Lobell, Milton J., biologist III-58
Lockwood, K.F., newspaperman . III-45
Lockwood, Myna, artist, writer . . III-36
Lofberg, Lila, author III-36
Lohrke, Eugene W., author III-36
Lombard, Carole, actress III-58
Lombard, Helen, author III-36
Long, Boaz, U.S. ambassador . . . III-82
Longino, Andrew H., ex-gov. . . . III-82
Loomis, H.F., U.S. army officer . III-58
Lorant, Stefan, author III-58
Lord, F. Townley, author, clergyman III-82
Louderback, Harold, judge III-36
Loudon, Dr. A., minister from Netherlands to U.S. III-102
Lowenstein, Solomon, social worker III-58
Lowrey, Janette S., author III-102
Luke, Sir Harry (Charles), Brit. govt. official III-12
Lutes, LeRoy, U.S. army officer . III-58
Luyet, Basile J., biologist, prof. . III-67

Mabon, Mary Frost, writer III-82
MacArthur, Douglas, U.S. army officer III-12
MacCormac, John, author III-82
MacCurdy, Hattie, artist III-58
MacDonald, Jeanette, soprano . . . III-36
MacInnes, Helen (Mrs. Gilbert Highet), author III-36
Mack, William, editor III-36
Mackay, Iven Giffard, Australian army officer III-13
MacKeachie, Douglas C., mem. War Prodn. Bd. III-36
MacLean, John A., Jr., neurosurgeon III-102
Macmillan, Harold, Brit. polit. . . III-58
MacMinn, George R., educator . . III-36
MacPherson, Marie M, painter . . III-36
Maganini, Quinto, composer . . . III-102
Mahin, Frank C., U.S. army offr. . III-58
Mahler, Rebecca, artist III-102
Mallett, Wilbert Grant, educator . III-58
Maluf, N.S. Rustum, physiologist . III-68
Mann, Horace L., pub. utilities exec. III-58
Mannerheim, Baron Carl Gustav Emil, Finnish army officer . . . III-13
Marder, Arthur P., historian . . . III-92
Markan, Maria, singer. III-36
Markwardt, L. Joseph, engr. III-92
Marquand, John P., author III-82
Marshall, Gen. George C., chief of staff, U.S. Army III-13
Marsland, Douglas A., prof. III-82
Martin, F. L., U.S. army officer . . III-58
Mason, F. Van Wyck, author . . . III-82
Matsuoka, Yosuke, ex-foreign minister Japan III-13
Matthews, Blayney F., director personnel III-102
Maurer, Irving, coll. pres. III-82
Maurois, Andre, author III-82
May, Stacy, mem. W.P.B. III-36
May, Stella (Mrs. Earl C. May), writer III-36
Mayer, Albert I., Jr., author . . . III-102
Mayer, Jane R., author III-102
McBride, Katharine E., coll. pres. III-36
McBride, Mary M., radio speaker, author III-82
McCorquodale, Malcolm S., Brit. govt. official III-102
McCrea, John L., U.S. naval offr. . III-58
McCue, Charles A., educator . . . III-59
McCune, George S., educator . . . III-36
McDonald, Angus H., soil conservationist III-36
McDonald, Jesse F., ex-gov. Colo. III-82
McEwen, John, Australian air forces minister III-13
McGrath, Dan, writer III-36
McGuire, Dominic P., corr. III-82
McIndoo, Norman E., entomologist. III-68
McIntire, Mrs. Glenn, author . . . III-36
McKay, George F., composer . . . III-102
McKee, Samuel, Jr., historian . . . III-92
McMeekin, Clark (co-pseudonym), author III-82

McMillan, George J., gov. Guam . III-13
McNair, Leslie J., U.S. army offr. . III-82
McNaughton, A.G.L., Can. army offr. III-102
McNicoll, Sir Walter Ramsay, administrator New Guinea III-13
McNutt, Paul V., U.S. govt. offl. . III-36
McPharlin, Paul, publisher III-112
McSherry, Frank J., U.S. govt. offl. III-102
McWilliams, Carey, lawyer III-82
Mears, Helen, writer III-103
Medina Agarita, Gen. Isais, President Venezuela III-14
Meeker, Arthur, Jr., author III-59
Meighen, Arthur, Canadian govt. official III-36
Mellett, Lowell, U.S. govt. offl. . . III-37
Melvin, Frank W., lawyer III-82
Menken, Arthur von Briesen, news photographer III-37
Menotti, Gian Carlo, composer . . III-103
Merriam, Carroll B., banker . . . III-37
Merrick, Elliott, teacher, writer . III-82
Merson, Lillian J., home economist. III-83
Messersmith, George S., U. S. ambassador III-37
Meyer, Vincent, U.S. army offr. . . III-59
Miers, Earl S., author, editor .. . III-83
Mignone, Francisco, Brazilian composer III-83
Mihailovitch, Dragolub ("Draja"), Jugo-Slav army officer III-103
Mikell, Henry Judah, bishop III-83
Miller, Henry, author III-83
Miller, Lehman W., U.S. military attache III-37
Miller, Robert C., biologist III-92
Milton, William H., ex-senator . . III-37
Mitchell, Charles B., bishop . . . III-83
Mitchell, Kate Louise, author . . . III-83
Mitchell, Susanna V., author . . . III-103
Mizwa, Stephen P., exec. dir. Kosciuszko Foundation III-83
Moffat, (Jay) Pierrepont, U.S. minister to Canada III-14
Mohaupt, Richard E.E., composer III-103
Molotov, Vyacheslav, Russian foreign minister III-14
Montgomery, Bernard L., Brit. army officer III-37
Montilla, Gil, speaker of Assembly of Philippines III-14
Mooney, James D., U.S. naval offl. III-37
Moore, George F., U.S. army offr. III-59
Moore, Ward, writer III-103
Moore, William E., editor III-37
Moore-Brabazon, John T.C., Brit. govt. official III-83
Morris, Ira N., diplomat III-59
Morton, H.V., Brit. writer III-103
Moschowitz, Paul, artist III-37
Moss, Sanford A., aviation engr. . III-37
Mower, Charles D., naval architect III-59
Moyne, Lord Walter Edward Guiness, Brit. govt. official . . . III-83
Mueller, Paul J., U.S. army offr. . III-83
Munger, Thomas C., judge III-37
Muret, Charlotte, author III-37
Murray, Chalmer S., author III-83
Murray, Hubert L., administrator of Papua III-14
Murray, W.S. engr. III-37
Muselier, Emile Henry, Free French naval officer III-37

Nabokov, Vladimir, author III-59
Nagano, Osami, Jap. naval offr. . . III-14
Nash, Walter, New Zealand minister to U.S. III-59
Nehru, Jawaharlal, Pandit, politician of India III-14
Nelson, Donald M., chmn. W.P.B. . III-37
Nelson, Julius, artist III-68
Nettleton, Bertha, home econ. . . III-59
Neumann, Alfred, author III-103
Newall, Sir Cyril Louis Norton, gov.-gen. New Zealand III-14
Newcomb, Covelle, author III-37
Newman, Harry, publisher III-37
Nichols, Beverley, author III-103
Niimi, Masaichi, Jap. naval offr. . III-83
Niles, Walter L., physician III-37
Nimitz, Chester W., U.S. naval offr. III-15
Nissley, Chas. H., horticulturist . III-83
Noel Baker, Philip J., Brit. Labor politician III-59
Nolte, Lewis G., surgeon III-83
Nomura, Kichisaburo, Japanese ambassador to U.S. III-15
Norgren, Paul H., labor econ. . . III-59
Norlin, George, univ. pres. III-103
Norval, Theophilus L., judge III-83
Novin, Serge, artist III-83
Nuhn, Ferner R., author III-103
Nye, Archibald E., Brit. army offr. III-15

O'Brian, John L., mem. W.P.B. . . III-37
O'Brien, Maurice N., writer . . . III-37
O'Casey, Sean, author III-103
O'Connor, Elizabeth D., author . . III-83
Odlum, Jerome, novelist III-103
O'Hara, Eliot, water colorist . . . III-37
O'Hare, Edward H., U.S. ace. . . III-103
Ogden, Samuel R., author III-103
Oldham, Etta B., author III-37
Oliver, Wade W., bacteriologist . . III-83
Olmstead, Dawson, U.S. army offr. III-37
Orr, Elliot, artist III-84
Ortiz, Roberto M., President Argentina III-15
Osaka, Prince Yasuhiko, Jap. gov. of Philippine Islands III-103
Osborn, Frederick, corp. exec., U.S. army officer III-37
Osburn, Raymond C., entomologist. III-68
Oshima, Hiroshi, Japanese ambassador to Germany III-15
Osmeña, Sergio, v.p. Philippine Islands III-15
Ott, Lester, aviation authority . . III-103
Oukrainsky, Serge (Leonide Orlay de Carva), choreographer III-45
Overstreet, Bonaro W., author . . III-37
Owens, James F., public utility operator III-84

Packard, Frank L., author III-84
Padilla, Ezequiel, Mexican fgn. minister III-59
Page, Irvine H., physician III-45
Pai Chung-hsi, Chinese army offr. III-104
Palmer, Courtlandt, pianist . . . III-104
Palmer, Ely J., U.S. govt. offl. . . . III-15
Palmer, Harold D., physician . . . III-104
Palmer, John M., author III-38
Papen, Franz von, Nazi ambassador to Turkey III-15
Pardue, Austin, dean, author . . . III-104
Parker, George M., U.S. army offr. III-38
Parra Pérez, Caracciolo, Venezuelan fgn. minister III-59
Paton, Stewart, psychiatrist III-38
Pattison, Abbott L., sculptor . . . III-104
Patton, Kenneth S., U.S. consul gen. at Singapore III-16
Paul, Elliot, author III-59
Payne, Elisabeth S., author III-38
Pease, Josephine vanD., author . . III-104
Peat, Charles U., Brit. govt. offl. III-84
Peattie, Donald Culross, author . III-104
Peck, Willys R., U.S. govt. offl. . . III-16
Peirse, Sir Richard E.C., comdr. R.A.F. in India III-104
Pendleton, Jos. H., U.S. army offr. III-59
Percival, Arthur E., Brit. army officer III-59
Percy, William A., author III-59
Petain, Marshal (Henri) Philippe, Premier of France III-16
Peters, LeRoy S., physician III-38
Petersen, William J., writer III-59
Petry, Ray C., prof. III-84
Pettengill, Geo. G., U.S. naval offr. III-16
Pfanstiehl, Carl, engr. III-84
Phillips, Arthur G., author III-104
Phillips, Sir Tom S. V., Brit. adm. III-38
Philoon, Wallace C., U.S. army offr. III-38
Pick, Albert, hotel exec. III-104
Pierson, Eleanor S., author III-84
Pilkington, Capt. Richard Antony, Brit. govt. official III-84
Pine, Geri, painter III-38
Planck, Charles E., aviation writer III-104
Pleak, Frances A., Spanish instr. III-104
Pleissner, Ogden M., artist III-84
Poindexter, Joseph B., gov. of Hawaii III-16
Pope, Francis, pilot, author III-84
Portal, Sir. Chas., R.A.F. offr. . . III-16
Portal, Lord, Brit. govt. offl. . . . III-84
Porter, Katherine A., writer . . . III-104
Porter, Wm. N., U.S. army offr. . III-38
Porterfield, Lewis B., U.S. naval officer. III-104
Posadas, Juan, mayor of Manila . . III-16
Pound, Admiral Sir A(lfred) Dudley, Brit. 1st Sea Lord III-16
Powell, Louis H., museum dir. . . . III-59
Pownall, H.N., Brit. army offr. . . . III-38
Pozner, Vladimir, author III-104
Prado Ugarteche, Manuel, Pres. Peru III-17
Pramoj, Mom Rajowonge Seni, Thai minister to U.S. III-17
Prendergast, Charles, artist . . . III-104
Prentice, George G., mfr. III-38
Price, Byron, wartime censor U.S. III-17
Price, Lita, author III-84
Prosser, W.E., U.S. army offr. . . . III-38
Provines, June, newspaper columnist III-84
Puleston, William D., U.S.N., author III-17
Putnam, George P., publisher . . III-104
Puttick, Edward, New Zealand army officer III-17
Pu-Yi, Henry, emperor of Manchukuo III-17
Pye, William S., U.S. naval offr. . III-17

Quezon y Molina, Don Manuel Luis, Pres. Philippines III-17
Quirt, Walter, artist III-84
Quisling, Vidkun A., Norwegian premiew III-60
Quo Tai-chi, Dr., Chinese fgn. minister III-18

Raborg, Paul C., military analyst. III-104
Raeder, Grand Admiral Erich, Nazi naval officer III-18
Ragan, Leslie, artist III-60
Ramond, Albert, indsl. engr. . . . III-104
Ramsey, Robert, novelist III-84
Rand, Ellen E., artist III-38
Randau, Carl, newspaperman . . . III-84

Randolph, Marion (pseudonym); see Rodell, Marie F. III-84
Raskin, Joseph, artist III-38
Raskin, Saul, artist III-60
Rath, Virginia, author III-104
Rawlings, Marjorie K., author . . . III-84
Raymond, Margaret T., author . . III-60
Redington, Paul G., scientist . . . III-60
Reid, Albert C., prof. III-84
Reiffel, Chas., landscape painter . III-104
Reighard, Jacob E., zoologist . . . III-84
Reinebeck, Otto, Nazi minister to Central America III-18
Reiner, Anna, author III-60
Reith, Lord, Brit. govt. offl. III-85
Reybold, Eugene, U.S. army offr. . III-38
Reynolds, Quentin, corr., author . III-85
Rhonie, Aline, artist, aviatrix . . III-38
Ribbentrop, Joachim von, Nazi foreign minister III-19
Riccardi, Arturo, Italian naval offr. III-19
Rice, Alice C. Hegan, author . . . III-60
Rich, Louise D., author III-60
Richmond, Winifred V., psychologist III-104
Riddle, John W., diplomat III-38
Ríos, Juan A., President of Chile . III-60
Ripley, Clements, author III-105
Ritchie, Lewis (pseudonym, Bartimeus), Brit. naval officer. . III-38
Ritchie, Neil M., Brit. army offr. III-19
Roberts, Owen J., U.S. Supreme Court justice III-19
Roberts, W. Adolphe, author . . . III-85
Robinson, Mabel L., author III-60
Rockefeller, Nelson A., dir. international relations III-19
Rockwell, F.W., U.S. naval offr. . . III-85
Rodell, Marie F., author, editor . . III-85
Rodyenko, Peter, U.S. army offr. . III-85
Rogers, Agnes, author III-85
Rolo, Charles J., writer III-60
Romains, Jules, author III-85
Ronald, James, novelist III-105
Rooney, Mickey, movie actor . . . III-38
Roosevelt, Theodore, U.S. army officer III-39
Rosaire, Esme E., geochemist . . III-45
Rosalia (of Maryknoll), Sister Mary, author, missionary III-39
Rosenberg, Alfred, Nazi minister to Russia III-19
Rosenborg, Ralph, artist III-105
Rosensteel, George, factory worker, author III-85
Rosinski, Herbert (Fritz Bernard Heinrich), lecturer III-105
Ross, Murray, economist, writer . III-39
Rossi, Angelo J., mayor III-19
Rovenstine, E.A., physician III-68
Rowell, Ross E., U.S. marine officer III-60
Royce, Ralph, U.S. army offr. . . . III-105
Royle, Edwin M., dramatist III-85
Royle, Sir Guy, Australian naval officer III-105
Rozeboom, Lloyd E., entomologist. III-39
Rubinstein, Beryl, composer . . . III-105
Ruiz Guiñazú, Enrique, Argentine fgn. minister III-19
Runbeck, Margaret L., author . . . III-60
Russell, Sir Andrew H., New Zealand military officer III-20
Russell, William L., geologist . . III-60
Ryan, Wm. Ord., U.S. army offr. . III-20
Ryder, Marion Crowell, author . . III-39

Sadler, Frank H., U.S. naval offr. . III-20
Sagendorph, Kent, author III-105
Saito, Jiro, Japanese agent III-20
Salamanca, Lucy (N.) writer . . . III-105
Sampson, George, writer III-85
Santa Cruz Wilson, Domingo, Chilean composer III-105
Santos, Eduardo, Pres. Colombia . III-20
Saracoglu, Shukru, Turkish fgn. minister III-20
Sarawak, Rajah of; see Brooke, Sir Charles Vyner III-3
Sarg, Tony, puppeteer, artist . . . III-85
Saylor, Parry D., corp. exec. . . . III-85
Sayre, Francis B., U.S. govt. offl. III-105
Scatterthwait, Alfred F., entomologist III-92
Schanfarber, Tobias, rabbi III-85
Scheinfeld, Amram, author III-105
Schell, Frank C., artist III-85
Schlytter, Leslie E., author III-39
Schmitt, Gladys, editor, author . . III-85
Schnabel, Artur, musician III-85
Schofield, Frank H., U.S. naval officer III-85
Schurz, William Lytle, author . . . III-39
Schwartz, Leon, physician III-45
Schwartz, Herbert F., research entomologist III-45
Schwarzschild, Leopold, author . . III-105
Scott, Henri D., basso III-106
Scott, M. Gladys, phys. educator . III-85
Scotten, Robert M., U.S. govt. offl. III-106
Scruggs, Philip L., writer III-85
Seifert, Elizabeth, author III-85
Seltzer, Charles A., author III-60
Seymour, Sir Horace J., Brit. ambassador to China III-60
Shaposhnikov, Boris M., Russian army officer III-20
Sharp, Margery, Brit. author . . . III-39
Sharp, Wm. F., U.S. army officer . III-39
Shaub, B.M., mineralogist III-68
Shaw, Archer H., author III-60
Shedd, Wm.E., Jr., U.S. army offr. . III-39
Shelby, Lila, artist III-39
Sheldon, Jean P. (pseudonym, Gene Henry), author III-106
Shelton, Alphonse J., artist III-85
Shields, Wilmer, office of Civilian Defense official III-39
Shigemitsu, Mamoru, Japanese ambassador to England III-20
Shimada, Shigetaro, Japanese minister of Navy III-21
Shiras, George, naturalist III-106
Short, Walter C., U.S. army offr. . III-21
Shuman, Edwin L., author III-39
Shute, Nevil, author III-106
Sihler, Ernest G., univ. prof. . . . III-39
Sikorski, Wladyslaw, Polish prime minister III-106
Simmons, Thomas J., coll. pres. . III-106
Simon, Robert E., Jr., writer . . . III-39
Sirin, Vladimir; see Nabokov, Vladimir III-60
Sitton, John M., artist III-60
Skillin, Marjorie E., proofreader . III-85
Skinner, Otis, actor III-39
Slaughter, Frank G., surgeon . . . III-85
Sleyster, Rock, psychiatrist III-85
Sloane, Eric, artist, aviator, author III-85
Small, Edward, movie producer . . III-39
Smart, Charles A., author III-61
Smith, Arthur St. Clair, U.S. naval officer III-106
Smith, C. Aubrey, actor III-61
Smith, Charles R., gov. North Borneo. III-21
Smith, Frank, zoologist III-61
Smith, Henry Ladd, author III-85
Smith, Katherine R., home economist III-85
Smith, Thomas L., corp. offl. . . . III-39
Smuts, Jan C., prime minister Union South Africa III-61
Socha, John M., artist III-61
Solf y Muro, Alfredo, Peruvian fgn. minister III-61
Somers, Mrs. Ethel, home econ. editor III-61
Somervell, Brehon D., U.S. army officer III-86
Somoza, Anastasio, President Nicaragua III-21
Soong, T.V., Chinese govt. offl. . . III-106
Sorensen, Virginia E., author . . . III-86
Soule, George, author III-106
Southard, Addison E., U.S. consul gen. at Hongkong III-21
Sowers, Phyllis A., author III-86
Spaatz, Carl, U.S. army officer . . III-61
Spaulding, Rolland H., ex-gov. . . . III-106
Specht, Paul L., musician III-39
Spender, Percy C., Australian minister III-21
Spewack, Bella, playwright, scenarist III-86
Spewack, Samuel, playwright, scenarist III-86
Spiegal, Clara G., author III-106
Spruance, Raymond A., U.S. naval officer III-21
Spykman, Nicholas John, author . . III-106
St. John, Robert, newspaperman . . III-61
Stace, W. T., author III-40
Staehle, Henry C., chemist III-86
Standen, Anthony, chemist III-61
Standley, Wm.H., U.S. ambassador. III-61
Stark, Harold R., U.S. naval offr. . III-21
Starrett, Vincent, author III-61
Stefansson, Viljalmur, author . . . III-86
Stein, Annie, artist III-61
Steinbeck, John, author III-86
Steinhard, Laurence A., U.S. ambassador III-40
Steinman, David B., co-author . . . III-61
Stern, Madeleine B., biographer . . III-86
Stetson, Willis K., librarian III-40
Stevens, Will Henry, artist III-40
Stevens, William O., author III-40
Stevenson, Donald F., R.A.F. offr. III-61
Stevenson, William F., ex-congressman III-86
Stewart, James B., U.S. minister to Nicaragua III-106
Stewart, James C., engineer III-61
Stewart, Russell C., lawyer III-61
Stieger, Andrew J., fgn. corr. . . . III-106
Still, Dorris S., author III-106
Stillians, Arthur W., physician . . III-112
Stilwell, Joseph W., Chiang Kai-shek's Am. chief of staff III-86
Stimson, Henry L., U.S. sec. of War III-40
Stockton, Edward A., Jr., U.S. army officer III-40
Stokley, James, sci. writer III-106
Stone, Judson F., corp. official . . . III-40
Stone, Mrs. Meryl, food consultant III-61
Stone, William L., author III-86
Story, Russell M., coll. pres. . . . III-106
Stouman, Knud, pub. health offl. . . III-40
Stout, Wesley W., former editor. . III-106
Strabel, Thelma, writer III-61
Strasser, Alfred C., art. dir., publisher III-40
Stringham, Edwin J., composer . . III-106
Strunsky, Manya Gordon, writer . III-45
Stryker, Perrin, writer, author . . III-40
Stuckey, Jasper L., geologist . . . III-68
Sugiyama, Gen. Hajime, Japanese army officer III-21

Suma, Yakichiro, Japanese minister to Spain III-21
Sumiyama, Tokutaro, Japanese marine officer III-21
Surles, Alexander D., U.S. govt. official III-86
Sutherland, R.K., U.S. army offr. . III-61
Sweezy, Maxine Y., economist . . . III-61

Talbert, Ansel E., aviation writer. III-40
Tatekawa, Yoshitsugu, Japanese ambassador to Russia III-21
Tavenner, C.H., ex-congressman . III-61
Taylor, Alfred S., surgeon III-61
Taylor, Anna H., artist III-61
Taylor, Florence W., author . . . III-86
Taylor, George W., v. chmn. War Labor Board III-62
Taylor, Marion S., radio performer. III-62
Taylor, R(ichard D.), cartoonist . III-106
Temple, Shirley, movie actress . . III-40
Temple, William, archbishop of Canterbury III-86
Terauchi, Count, Japanese gen. . . III-86
Terhune, Albert Payson, author . . III-86
ter Poorten, Hein, Netherlands East Indian army officer III-21
Thielens, Mrs. Carrie O., author .III-106
Thirkell, Angela, author III-62
Thomas, Roland J., labor exec. . . III-62
Thomas, Sir (Thomas) Shenton, Brit. gov. of Malaya III-22
Thomas, William S., physician . . III-40
Thompson, Charles M., author . . III-40
Thompson, James M., writer . . . III-106
Thompson, Jim (pseudonym, see Thompson, James M.), writer . .III-106
Thompson, (John) Edward, newspaperman III-40
Tilton, Frederic A., govt. offl. . . III-86
Timoshenko, Semion, Russian army officer III-22
Tinker, Clarence I., U.S. air force official III-22
Tinker, Miles A., psychologist . . III-106
Tobin, Maurice J., mayor III-22
Togo, Shigenori, Japanese fgn. minister III-22
Tojo, Eiki, Japanese premier . . III-22
Tolegian, Manuel J., artist III-40
Tolstoy, (Countess) Alexandra, lecturer III-40
Tomita, Kojiro, art authority . . . III-68
Toner, Helen L., theologian III-86
Torchio, Philip, engineer III-62
Torrey, Emily G., war worker . . III-107
Tower, Harry B., tech. educator . III-40
Towers, John H., U.S. naval offr. . III-22
Townsend, Edward W., author . . III-107
Treat, Ida, writer III-107
Trippe, Juan T., president Pan-American Airways III-22
Truex, Van Day, artist III-40
Tsao, W.Y., Chinese consular service III-86
Tugwell, Rexford G., governor Puerto Rico III-22
Tupper, Ernest A., researcher . . III-40

Ubico, Gen. Jorge, Dictator Guatemala III-22
Underwood, Frederick D., pres. ry. III-86
Undset, Sigrid, author III-86
Updike, Daniel B., printer, publisher III-40
Utley, Freda, writer III-86

Van Delden, Maria, soprano III-40
Vanderbilt, Cornelius, III, capitalist III-86
Van der Flier, Hendricks, artist . III-62
Van Der Veer, Stewart, author . . III-40
Van Doren, Carl, author III-62
van Kleffens, Dr. Eelco Nicolaas, Netherlands (Govt. in Exile) minister of fgn. affairs III-22
van Mook, Hubertus J., Dutch East Indian official III-23
van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, A. W.L. Tjarda, gov.-gen. of Netherlands East Indies III-23
Van Voorhis, Cornelius W., Jr., radio commentator III-41
Vargas, Getulio, Dr., President Brazil III-23
Varnay, Astrid, singer III-62
Vezin, Charles, artist III-107
von Bock, Fedor, Nazi army offr. . III-23
von Brauchitsch, Heinrich A.H. Walther, Nazi army officer III-3
von Leeb, Wilhelm Joseph Franz, Nazi army officer III-23
von Papen, Franz, German ambassador to Turkey III-15
von Ribbentrop, Joachim, German govt. official III-19

Wainright, Jonathan M., U.S. army officer III-41
Waknitz, Frederick Wm., surgeon . III-87
Waldeck, Rosie G., (Countess), author III-107
Wallace, Henry A., v.p. U.S., mem. War Prodn. Bd. III-41
Wallis, James H., author III-107
Walsh, James J., physician III-87
Walsh, J. Raymond, prof. econ. . . III-62
Wang, Chi-Chen, teacher III-107
Wang, Ching-wei, President Nanking (China) govt. III-41
Warren, Avra M., U.S. minister to Dominican Republic III-107
Warriner, Samuel D., corp. exec. .III-107
Washburn, Ruth W., psychologist . III-107
Watson, Samuel N., clergyman . . III-107
Wavell, Sir Archibald Percival, Brit. army officer III-23
Weaver, Walter R., U.S. army offr. III-41
Webber, Malcolm, writer III-41
Webster, Robert L., entomologist . III-68
Weddell, Alexander W., former U.S. ambassador to Spain III-107
Weiss, Harry B(ischoff), research entomologist III-45
Welles, Orson, movie actor and producer III-41
Welles, Sumner, U.S. under-sec. of State III-41
Wells, Carolyn, author III-107
Welty, Eudora, author III-62
Wemyss, Henry C., Brit. army officer III-62
Wenstrom, Wm. H., aerologist, author III-62
Werfel, Franz, co-editor III-108
Werner, Nat, sculptor III-62
Wesley, Charles H., dean III-108
Wessel, Mark, composer III-108
Weyr, Hugo S. artist III-63
Whale, J.S., coll. pres. III-63
Wheeler, Blanche, author III-87
White, Chas. H., U.S. army offr. . III-41
White, Katharine S., editor III-63
White, Stewart E., author III-63
Whitman, Cedric H., poet III-108
Whitton, John B., author III-108
Wilcox, John W., U.S. naval officer III-108
Wild, Laurence, U.S. naval offr. . III-24
Wilder, Laura I., author III-63
Willcox, Oswin W., chemist III-108
Williams, Beryl, writer III-87
Williams, Edwin M., newspaperman III-108
Williams, Thomas A., radio commentator III-108
Willkie, Wendell L., lawyer III-41
Willson, Dixie, author III-41
Willson, Russell, U.S. naval offl. . III-41
Wilman, Allan A., composer . . . III-108
Wilson, Charles M., author III-108
Wilson, Thomas M., U.S. consul-gen. at Calcutta, India III-24
Winant, John Gilbert, U. S. ambassador to Great Britain III-24
Winkelman, Barnie F., lawyer, author III-87
Winter, Keith, Brit. playwright . . III-87
Wittlin, Joseph, author III-41
Wolceske, R.W., etcher III-63
Wolmer, Lord (Roundell Cecil Palmer), Brit. govt. offl. III-87
Wood, Casey A., physician III-63
Wood, Grant, artist III-63
Wood, Sir Kingsley, Brit. government official III-87
Woolley, Monty, actor III-108
Wright, David M., author III-108
Wrong, H. Hume, Canadian govt. representative III-108

Yamada, Otozo, Jap. army offr. . . III-24
Yamamoto, Isoroku, Jap. army offr. III-24
Yamashita, Tomoyuki, Japanese army officer III-87
Yenni, Julia Truitt, author III-87
Yonai, Mitsumasa, former premier of Japan III-24
Yoshizawa, Kenkichi, Japanese ambassador to Indo-China III-24
Young, Sir Mark Aitchison, gov. of Hongkong III-24
Yount, Barton K., U.S. army offr. . III-63

Zentmyer, George A., Jr. pathologist III-63
Zhukov, Gregory, Russian army officer III-24
Zimmerman, Godfrey F., writer . III-108
Zingg, Robert M., anthropologist . III-45
Zobell, Claude E., bacteriologist. III-68
Zweig, Stefan, author III-87
Zylstra, Freida, author, photographer III-63

NEW WAR BOOKS

Where We Went Wrong With Germany Last Time

BY WILLSON WOODSIDE

WORLD IN TRANCE, by Leopold Schwarzschild. (Fischer, $4.50.)
WE CANNOT ESCAPE HISTORY, by John T. Whitaker. (Macmillans, $3.00.)
THIS AGE OF CONFLICT, by Chambers, Grant and Bayley. (Norton, $3.00.)
VICTORY IS NOT ENOUGH, by E. Ranshofen-Wertheimer. (Norton, $3.00.)

ONE afternoon in the late summer of 1934 I made my way through a courtyard behind the rue de la Faubourg St. Honoré, up two flights and along a twisting passageway, to rap on a nameless door. Inside I met Leopold Schwarzschild, editor of the German emigre weekly *Das Neue Tagebuch*. In this, our first conversation he predicted that Nazism would last for ten years, and invited me to contribute an article.

This brought me the great pleasure and pride of appearing in the same paper as Winston Churchill, who was a frequent contributor to the *Tagebuch* in those days, and an admirer of Schwarzschild's journalism and judgment. As far as I know I never missed reading a number, and never destroyed one, right up until the German invasion threw a curtain of silence over the *Tagebuch*. Although I asked many people who had escaped from France, the first news I ever had of him was the arrival of this new book of his on my desk.

The news was worth waiting for, for *World In Trance*, the story of what happened to all of us after the last peace and how we went wrong in dealing with Germany is, I believe, one of the most brilliant and valuable books of our time. The reason I have been so late with this review is because of the feeling of inadequacy which overtakes me each time I pick it up.

One reads almost incredibly now of how President Wilson and Colonel House forced down the throats of the Allies their idea of an armistice, and an easy peace granted to a "democratized" Germany and secured by an untried League of Nations. What folly shrieks out of the telegrams exchanged between the two Americans while they were achieving this, threatening in October 1918 to negotiate a separate peace with Germany, talking of cutting down "gently" on troop transports, money, food and material until the Allies saw reason, and exulting "Autocracy is dead; long live democracy and its immortal leader!" (House to Wilson) when the German republic was proclaimed.

Clemenceau and Wilson

Clemenceau, in dealing with this sort of mentality, was nearly beside himself. By the end of March 1919 the Peace Conference was headed for a break-up and Wilson for home. Would not Clemenceau just talk things over once more with Wilson? "How can I talk to a fellow who thinks himself the first man in two thousand years to know anything about peace on earth?"

To Clemenceau the war had revealed the terrifying fact that Germany was many times stronger than anyone had dreamed. It had required half of mankind to subdue her. She stood as a colossus alongside a weakening France. Strong measures were needed to deal with this menace. And how wise do Clemenceau's judgments on what to do with Germany, and on what is politically possible considering the nature of man, seem today.

Another notable episode in the handling of Germany after the last war, which appears very different in Schwarzschild's presentation from the popular conception at the time and long afterwards, is the Ruhr occupation. What diatribes we heard then against the French "arch-militarists", kicking around a man who was down! The British Labor Party hastened to declare its solemn solidarity with "the German workers." Actually, the "spontaneous resistance of the German population" was, as in later Nazi days, a carefully-directed effort of the Berlin Government to break the Treaty, using the pacifist sympathies of the British and Americans against the realist Poincaré.

But Poincaré resisted the tremendous pressure brought against him and fought the thing through to the "unconditional surrender" which he had demanded all along from the Germans. Result: the effect of this unconditional surrender on the Germans was greater than even the defeat of 1918. After five years of patting Germany on the back by humanitarians and progressives and recommending that she be treated kindly, one man had seized her by the throat.

"As if by magic six years of reasonableness followed"; the murderous and self-destroying *furor teutonicus* which drove Germany from one extremist move to another was contained for that period while German leaders moved more warily. This seems a good augury for our present policy of demanding unconditional surrender from Germany, especially as the proposal was made by President Roosevelt in a complete reversal of American policy of 1918-19.

"The relatively Golden Age that began immediately after Germany's capitulation in the Ruhr and lasted for six years, might have lasted for sixty." Suddenly, in the terror and chaos of unprecedented impoverishment, it became possible for the Germans to stabilize the mark, as they had been "unable" to do before. Political order was stabilized as quickly and easily. But unfortunately "Poincaré's successors spoiled the cure." Schwarzschild dates the end of France's role as a great power from June 1, 1924, when Poincaré was overthrown.

"Magic House of Paper"

Now came the era of the "Magic House of Paper", from Locarno through two hundred other pacts and agreements, to disarmament. Stresemann discovered that "the most passionate desire of his era was the need to find the world beautiful at any price and to avoid all unpleasantness. . . He became king among the one-eyed men of politics."

To the Crown Prince he wrote that "German policy must be subtle and avoid great decisions" for the present. Locarno had a hypnotic effect on the British and French, and reduced them to a somnambulistic state. But not on Germany: she proceeded to elect the chief of the "war criminals" as president.

From here the story becomes ever more painful. In the interests of "peace" and the precious "spirit of Locarno" the report of the Inter-Allied Military Commission showing that German disarmament was not being carried out satisfactorily and there were even signs of rearmament, was suppressed by the British and French Governments. A British member of the Commission, General Morgan, could not swallow this, and made the truth public. But the Allies preferred to bolster peace with the Kellogg-Briand Pact. And—final folly—with the disarmament of the victors, especially those fanatical French militarists and reactionaries, who wouldn't treat Germany "fairly".

Breaking the Treaty

Perhaps Schwarzschild's most valuable contribution is his account of how the insatiable German nationalists set to work to break the Treaty and the Republic, starting the movement which Hitler later took hold of. Once they had gained from the Disarmament Conference the concession of German "equality in principle", the only difficulty remaining in their path was to get by the period of danger in their rearmament with the maximum speed. To develop and control the full energy of the country for this purpose the German schemers needed Hitler's fanatical following. So they made him chancellor.

Here, as Schwarzschild says, was the Allies' last chance. "It was as though fate said: 'Listen, I am going to do my best for you. I will show you German reality in all its bare ugliness. I will put it under your very nose. I will hit you over the head with it. You shall not be led to a miserable doom by politicians who look like honest burghers, or by generals who look like distinguished cavaliers. . . Once you see Hitler, you will no longer be able to make mistakes—or will you?'"

We did, and I shan't go all through that nightmare of 1933-39 here. Suffice it to say that the account is sustained with brilliance to the end. By the time we had got as far as sanctions against Italy, the whole game, as in chess, had already been lost by the early moves. In Spain Russia's obvious purpose in intervening, the author suggests, was to induce France to intervene as well. At Munich, once again no good move was possible.

Finally, in France in a few weeks of 1940, "a destiny was accomplished in which all the evil of two accursed decades was focussed." No French faction had the right to point at another. No country could accuse crushed France. All of them, in the course of 20 years, had contributed their share. But France's collapse marked the end of this epoch. Britain revived, and America awakened, to such effect that Schwarzschild now declares that "rarely has mankind been better prepared for a tremendous task than it is for the next peace settlement."

It is ours to profit from the terrible fact that we are experiencing the same thing for the second time within a generation. Dispelled forever must be "the dream of 1918, that once this powerful, energetic and highly gifted nation is freed from its bad rulers it will be saved and be as other nations. It will not." Its spirit and instincts have been molded by an age-long tradition, and the process of reform will take generations.

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43

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WHO'S WHO
MONTHLY SUPPLEMENT

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May, 1942 — **Series III, Number 5**

INTERNATIONAL - CUMULATIVE INDEX - STANDARD PRONUNCIATION

IMPORTANT: It is vital to keep in mind that the MONTHLY SUPPLEMENT and the current volume of WHO'S WHO IN AMERICA are a *unit; together* they should care for a high percentage of the normal type of biographical inquiries serviced by libraries, or occurring in the class-room. A recent checking by library specialists proves this to be so in actual practice. No other combination can possibly give this adequacy of practical coverage—and the SUPPLEMENT and WHO'S WHO are intended for use in combination. It is for that reason that the SUPPLEMENT is available *only* to reference users of WHO'S WHO. The SUPPLEMENT is keyed to make the *combination* an outstanding reference tool—and that it succeeds, expert investigation proves. On the other hand it is not intended to *alone* provide adequacy for practical reference use—expert checking indicates no *current* service could undertake such a task successfully.

See Page 107 for Keys to Reference Citations and Pronunciation.
See Page 109 for "Who Knows—The Index to Authorities."

WHO'S WHO IN THE NEWS—AND WHY

314 NAMES-IN-THE-NEWS IN THIS ISSUE

Names in the news which already appear in "Who's Who" are given a one line listing keyed (†) to indicate that full biographical details may be found in "Who's Who." Necrology listings are run in the same alphabetical sequence as sketches of the living and are keyed (*) to indicate death, or (*†) to indicate the subject's sketch may also be found in "Who's Who."

ABUL Kalam Azad (ä-bo͞ol'kä'läm ä'zäd), pres. All-India Congress; b. Mecca, Arabia, 1888; student at Moslem Al Azhar U., Cairo, becoming a scholar in Persian and Arabic. Began career in Calcutta; pub. weekly paper advocating modernizing reforms for Moslems and spreading Moslem culture; suppressed by Brit. and jailed, 1916; released and started another newspaper, failed; upon release joined Gandhi, working for Congress, 1920; became youngest elected pres. Congress, 1923, since pres. several times including, 1941. Travels extensively and speaks, for Rightists; is closer to Gandhi than Bose (see this issue, this Supplement) or Nehru (see this Supplement, III-14) and supports Nationalist India and Dominion status from Great Britain. Author: Commentary on the Koran.

References: NSW, Mar. 9, 1942, p. 33; **Asia,** Apr. 1940, p. 198; J. Gunther, **Inside Asia.**

†**ALEXANDER, Ben,** pres. Masonite Corp.; apptd. acting chief of textile, clothing and leather goods branch of Bureau of Industry Branches, succeeding Robert R. Guthrie (see this issue, this Supplement).

†**ARNOLD, Thurman W.,** asst. U.S. atty. gen. who has cracked down on both capital and labor for violation of anti-trust laws; author: Democracy and Free Enterprise (U. of Okla. Press; $1.50), 1942.

ATHERTON, John C., artist; b. Brainerd, Minn., June 7, 1900; s. James C. and Carrie (Martin) A.; ed. in pub. schs., Spokane, Wash., Coll. of the Pacific, San Jose, Calif., and Calif. Sch. of Fine Arts, San Francisco; m. Maxine Breese, Nov. 6, 1926; 1 dau., Mary. Joined navy, 1918; worked in mines, shipyards, as sign painter, clerk, musician, etc., 1919-25; advt. artist, on Pacific Coast and N.Y. City, since 1926; has painted in spare time since art study, 1923. Has exhbtd. paintings at Julien Levy Gallery (N.Y. City), 1939-1942; museums in N. Am. and Latin Am. have exhibited his work; represented in collections of Museum of Modern Art, Wadsworth Athenaeum (Hartford, Conn.), and Whitney Museum of American Art (New York). Served in U.S. Navy as seaman 2d class, June 1918-March 1919. Winner, competition in war posters sponsored by Museum of Modern Art, 1941, poster competition for World's Fair, New York. Club: Angler's of New York. Address: Ridgefield, Conn.

AZOY, Anastasio C. M. (ä-thoi'), army officer; b. Merida, Yucatan, Mexico (parents U.S. citizens), Nov. 9, 1891; s. Anastasio C. M. and Mary L. (Bolton) A.; grad. Carteret Acad., Orange, N.J., 1910; Litt.B., Princeton U., 1914; m. Margaret Field Groves, June 12, 1918; 1 son, Philip Livingston. Copy writer for Street Railways Advertising Co., N.Y. City, 1914-17; advertising with Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn, 1920-23; advertising mgr. Rogers Peet Co., 1923-31; merchandise mgr. Best & Co., N.Y. City, 1932-34; promotion mgr. Town and Country and House Beautiful, 1934-40; occasional lecturer on advertising, Columbia U. and Katherine Gibbs Sch. Served as 2d lt. Coast Arty. Corps, U.S. Army, 1917-18, 1st lt., 1918-19; advanced through the grades of the Reserve to lt. col.; recalled to active duty with 2d Corps Area Staff, N.Y. City, Sept. 1940; now assigned to Hdqrs. Staff, West Point, N.Y., 1942; was one of 4 Reserve officers chosen by War Dept. to assist in establishment 1st C.M.T.C., Plattsburg, N.Y., 1920; same work at Ft. Hancock, N.J., 1921; asst. chief artillery umpire, 1st Army maneuvers, 1939; asst. to chief of Pub. Relations Div., G.H.Q., 1st Army maneuvers, 1941; chief induction sect., 2d Corps Area, 1940-41. Mem. Soc. Colonial Wars, Colonial Lords of the Manor, Am. Legion. Republican. Episcopalian. Club: Princeton (N.Y. City). Author: Goal Lines, 1922; A Curious Catalog, 1924; A Princeton Almanac, 1932 (foregoing with F. D. Halsey); The Reserve Officer's Handbook, 1929; A Primer of Advertising, 1930; They Were Not Afraid to Die, 1939. Editor and compiler: The Army Officer's Manual (Appleton-Century; $2.50), 1942. Contbr. to Am. Legion Mag., Town and Country, Coast Artillery Jour., Infantry Journal, Saturday Evening Post, The New Yorker, N.Y. Times. Address: U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y.

†**BAGLEY, Rear Adm. David W.,** apptd. naval commandant of Hawaiian dist. succeeding Rear Adm. Bloch (see this Supplement, III-2).

BAKER, Nina Brown, author; b. Galena, Kan., Dec. 31, 1888; d. Frank and Belle (Warren) Brown; ed. Kansas pub. schs.; student U. of Colo., 1910-11;

Pages are numbered consecutively from month to month and each issue contains, as a separate unit on colored paper, an index fully cumulative to the first of the year. This index is printed separately so that each month when the new cumulative index arrives, the old index may be discarded.

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m. Sidney Jacques Baker, June 27, 1915; children—Bernice (Mrs. Leslie Bennett), Nina. Teacher elementary schs., 2 yrs.; teacher, Allison, Colo., 1 yr.; stenographer, 1911-15; first short story pub. in Argosy, 1923; editor trade mags. pub. by Smart Pub. Co., Chicago, 1925-26; wrote and edited first 2 numbers of Gentleman's Quarterly (forerunner of Esquire); traveled in South America and Mexico; interested in building of inter-Am. good will by making heroes of other Americas known to young people of U.S. Awarded gold medal, La Sociedad inter-Am. good feeling, 1941. Author: Secret of para Las Americas, for outstanding contribution to inter-Am. good feeling, 1941. Author: Secret of Hallam House, 1931; Chinese Riddle, 1932; Ranee's Ruby, 1934; Cinderella Secret, 1938; Mystery at Four Chimneys, 1939; Luck of the Salabars, 1938; Inca Gold, 1940; He Wouldn't be King: The Story of Simón Bolivar (Jr. Lit. Guild selection) (Vanguard; $2.50), 1941. Home: 49 Garden Pl., Brooklyn, N.Y.

†BALDWIN, Hanson W., author: Strategy for Victory (Norton; $2), 1942.

†BARCLAY, Hartley Wade, author: How Your Business Can Help Win the War (Simon & Schuster; $1), 1942.

†BARKER, Lewellys F., physician; author: Time and the Physician (Putnam's; $3.50), 1942.

BARLOW, Wayne Brewster, composer, teacher; b. Elyria, O., Sept. 6, 1912; s. Edmund Brewster and Josephine (Muenscher) B.; B.M., Eastman Sch. of Music, 1934, M.M., 1935, Ph.D. in Composition, 1937; m. Helen Hutzen, Aug. 7, 1937; 1 son, Robert Wayne. Instr. in musical theory and composition, Eastman Sch. of Music, Rochester, N.Y. Awarded Lillian Fairchild Memorial award for outstanding achievement in the arts, 1936. Mem. Phi Mu Alpha Sinfonia. Baptist. Rotarian. Compositions: Sinfonietta for Chamber Orchestra, 1936; Zion in Exile (cantata), 1937; Songs from The Silence of Amor (for soprano and small orchestra), 1937; The Winter's Past—Appalachian Mountain Folk Songs (rhapsody for oboe and strings), 1938; Three Moods for Dancing (choreographic suite), 1940; The Black Madonna (ballet), 1942. Works performed at Am. Composers' Concerts, Tacoma Philharmonic Orchestra, and NBC String Symphony. Co-editor and compiler: The American Orchestral Repertory (now in preparation). Contbr. to N.Y. Times. Home: 170 Elmcroft Rd. Office: Eastman School of Music, Rochester, N.Y.

Reference: J. T. Howard, Our Contemporary Composers.

***†BENRIMO, Joseph Henry,** playwright (Mar. 26, 1942) (†Vol. 12).

Reference: NYT, Mar. 27, 1942.

BERCKMAN, Evelyn, composer, pianist; b. Philadelphia, Pa., Oct. 18, 1900; d. Aaron and Anne (Besman) Berckman; ed. in pub. schs. and by private teachers; student Columbia U.; unmarried. Compositions have been performed by Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra, Rochester Symphony, Pro Arte Quartet, La Scala Quartet, Bennington Coll., Yaddo, and over radio stations WEAF, WOR, and others. Address: New Hope, Pa.

Reference: J. T. Howard, Our Contemporary Composers.

BERREY, Lester V., philologist, lexicographer; b. Davenport, Okla., May 2, 1904; s. William Vergil and Katie (Gregg) B.; B.A., U. of Calif. at Los Angeles, 1928; m. Viola Roine, Jan. 12, 1929; 1 son, Norman Lydell. Book clerk, Jones Book Store, Los Angeles, 1923; student, writer, 1924-31; research on Am. colloquial speech, aided by faculty and students, Los Angeles City Coll. and U. of Nebr., 1931-42; language consultant, R.K.O. and Samuel Goldwyn Motion Picture Studios; N.B.C. and C.B.S. radio broadcasting on Am. colloquial speech, 1942; Mem. Am. Dialect Soc. Democrat. Author: (with Melvin Van den Bark) The American Thesaurus of Slang (Crowell; $5), 1942. Contbr. on Am. dialect, colloquial speech to Esquire, American Speech, Nation, Current History, Forum. Address: 3055 Landa St., Los Angeles, Calif.

†BIERMAN, Bernie, football coach; becomes head athletic activities in air training station at U. of Iowa.

BINDER, Abraham Wolfe, composer, conductor and educator; b. Jan. 13, 1895; s. Shalom and Leah (Wittes) B.; student Columbia U., 1917-20, Mosenthal fellow; Mus.B., New York Coll. of Music, 1922; m. Priscilla Dreyer, Dec. 24, 1937; children—Leah, Hadassah. Dir. of music Y.M.H.A., N.Y. City, since 1918; condr. Jewish Choral Soc. since 1918; instr. in Jewish liturgical music, Jewish Inst. of Religion, N.Y. City, since 1922, prof. since 1937; gave concert of original compositions, Town Hall, 1929; guest condr. Manhattan Symphony Orchestra, 1931, Palestine Symphonic Ensemble, 1931; organized conf. on "The Status of Synagogue Music in America," 1941; works have been performed by Palestine Symphonic Ensemble, Manhattan Symphony Orchestra, Detroit Symphony Orchestra, and radio stations WABC and WOR. Composer: (overture) Ha-Chalutsim, Holy Land Impressions, Concertante for String Orchestra. Author: Hibbath Shabbath, 1928; Rinnath Shabbath, 1933; Palestinian Song Suite, 1935; Evening Service for the New Year, 1940; Kabbalath Shabbeth, 1941. Editor or compiler: New Palestinian Folk Songs, Book I, 1925, Book II, 1932; Palestine in Song, 1937; Pioneer Songs of Palestine, 1942. Mem. Am. Soc. Composers and Publishers, Jewish Music Forum (founder), Am. Guild of Organists, Jewish Acad. of Arts and Sciences (bd. govs.). Appt. music editor 3d edit. of Union Hymnal by Central Conf. of Am. Rabbis, 1929. Home: 865 West End Av. Address: 1303 Lexington Av., New York, N.Y.

References: Baker, Biog. Dictionary of Musicians; J. T. Howard, Our Contemporary Composers.

†BIRNEY, Hoffman, author: Brothers of Doom: The Story of the Pizarros of Peru (Putnam's Sons; $3.50), 1942.

***†BLAKELY, John Russell Young,** U.S. Naval officer (Mar. 28, 1942).

References: NYT, Mar. 29, 1942; Navy Register.

BLAMEY, Lt. Gen. Sir Thomas Albert (blā'mĭ), Australian Army officer; b. Wagga, New South Wales, Australia, Jan. 24, 1884; m. Minnie Millard, Sept. 8, 1908 (died 1935); 1 son. Began with Commonwealth Mil. Forces, 1906; served in World War I, 1914-18; served as chief of staff, Australian Corps, 1918, Australian Imperial Force, 1919; became dep. chief of gen. staff, Australia, 1920; Australian defense rep. in London, attached to War Office, 1922-24; became 2d chief of gen. staff, Commonwealth Mil. Forces, 1923-25; served as chief commr. of police, Victoria, 1925-37; comdr. 3d Australian Div., 1931-37; controller-gen. of Recruiting Secretariat, Australia, 1938-39; became comdr. Australian Army Corps, 1940; apptd. comdr. Australian Forces in Middle East, 1940; apptd. dept. comdr.-in-chief Brit. Forces in Middle East, 1941; returned to Australia to take command of Australian Forces in war against Japanese, and to serve under Gen. MacArthur, Mar. 1942. Awarded Distinguished Service Order; mentioned in 7 dispatches, World War I; Companion of Bath, 1919; Companion of St. Michael and St. George.

Reference: TM, May 5, 1941, p. 28.

BLANCO, Juan Carlos (blän'kō, hwän kär'lōs), statesman and diplomat; b. Montevideo, Uruguay; s. Juan Carlos Blanco and Luisa (Acevedo) B.; ed. in law, Univ. of Montevideo; m. Margarita Borda, 1923; children—Margarita, Juan Carlos. Began as sec. of the Port Bd., Montevideo; became successively dep. minister of pub. works, minister of the interior and sec. of state (minister of foreign relations); nine years plenipotentiary minister, Paris; then became successively first ambassador to Argentina, first ambassador to Brazil; now first ambassador to U.S. Decorated Grand Cross of Legion of Honor; Grand Cross of the British Empire; Grand Cross of Brazil; Grand Cross of Simon Bolivar the Liberator, Venezuela, etc. Address: 1010 Vermont Av., Washington, D.C.

Reference: Bull. Pan Am. Union, Nov. 1941, p. 642.

BLATAS, Arbit (blä'tăs), artist; b. Kaunas, Lithuania, Nov. 19, 1908; s. Ilya Arbit and Ida (Neercik) B.; ed. elementary and high schs., Russia and Lithuania; painted and studied in Germany, 1924-25; student Acad. Julien, Paris, and by self, 1925; m. Sylvia Satenstein, July 13, 1933; 1 dau., Dorothée Renée. Came to U.S., 1939. Exhibited in Lithuania, 1926; Galerie Van Leer, Paris, 1933; Pierre Matisse Gallery, N.Y. City, 1934; Galerie de l'Elysee, Paris, 1937; Galerie Mouradian and Vallotton, Paris, 1939; French Art Galleries, N.Y. City, 1940, 41 and 42; Robert C. Vose Gallery, Boston, 1941; annually at Salon des Tuileries and Salon d'Automne, Paris, 1929-39; World's Fair Expn., Paris, 1937; Galerie Bernheim Jeune, for the Prix Paul Guillaume, 1938. Rep. in Musee National du Jeu-de-Paume, Paris; Museum of Grenoble, France; Nat. Museum of Lithuania; Museum of Modern Art, N.Y. City; also various private collections in France, England and America. Home: 56 W. 56th St., New York, N.Y.

†BLIVEN, Bruce, editor; author: The Men Who Make the Future (Duell; $3), 1942.

BORMANN, Martin Ludwig (bôr'măn), Nazi deputy fuehrer No. 3; b. Halberstadt, Germany, June 17, 1900. Became mem. polit. propaganda group, representing Mechlenburg dist. in Rossbach Orgn., 1923; imprisoned for murder, 1923-24; joined Nazis, 1925; apptd. Nazi press chief, Thuringia dist., 1926, to staff of Nazi investigation bd., 1928; mem. highest governing body of Nazi party since 1933; mem. Reichstag since 1933; chief of staff of former dep. fuehrer, Rudolf Hess (see this Supplement, II-83), since 1933; following flight of Hess to Scotland, May 1941, Hitler apptd. Bormann dep. fuehrer No. 3, Mar. 1942.

References: TM, Mar. 2, 1942, p. 30; NSW, Mar. 2, 1942, p. 37.

***†BOSCHEN, Frederick W.,** U.S. army officer (Apr. 1, 1942).

References: NYT, Apr. 3, 1942; Army Register.

BOSE, Subhas Chandra (bōs, sōōb-häsh' chŭn'drä), politician of India; b. Cuttack, Bengal, 1897; student, Protestant European Sch. at Cuttack, Presidency Coll. at Calcutta. Went to England, passed Civil Service exam., ranking 4th, and entered Service; retired to join Gandhi's movement, 1921; worked with great Bengalese leader, C. R. Das; aspired to succeed him until Gandhi chose his opponent whereupon Bose, unlike Nehru (see this Supplement, III-14), disagreed openly with Gandhi; Bose advocated formation of Independence League seeking Dominion status from Brit., and opposed to Gandhi tactics, 1928; Bose disagreed over Trade Union Movement, 1929-31; elected mayor of Calcutta, while in jail, 1930 (altogether imprisoned 12 times, from 1926 to 1941, after which he secured an apology and 2,000 rupees). Most active of the British-haters; English openly name Bose India's terrorist leader; although elected pres., Indian National Congress, 1938, was defeated by Brit. influences in 1939; fled to Germany, 1941. Bose calls Gandhi insipid and admires strong-man tactics of Hitler, but lacks enough general popularity to attempt dictator methods. During recent Indian-Brit. negotiations he broadcast frequently, usually over German and Japanese stations, against the British and is considered a potential Nazi Quisling for India. Author: the Indian Struggle. Editor of Bengalese newspaper, "Forward."

References: NSW, Mar. 16, 1942, p. 34; TM, Feb. 10, 1941, p. 34; Mar. 7, 1938, p. 19; SCH, Apr. 8, 1940, p. 9; J. Gunther, Inside Asia.

BRENNER, Anita, author: The Boy Who Could Do Anything and Other Mexican Folk Tales (Scott, Inc.; $2.50), 1942 (see this Supplement, II-132[Q]).

***†BREWER, Earl LeRoy,** ex-gov. (Mar. 10, 1942).

Reference: NYHT, Mar. 11, 1942.

***†BREWSTER, Andre Walker,** U.S. army officer (Mar. 27, 1942).

References: NYT, Mar. 29, 1942; Army Register.

BRICKEN, Carl Ernest, prof. music; b. Shelbyville, Ky., Dec. 28, 1898; s. Bird E. and Lillie M. (Martin) B.; A.B., Yale U., 1922; studied composition under Scalero and piano under Leopold and Bert, David Mannes Sch.; studied under Cortot (Paris) and Weisse (Vienna); m. Dorothy Moran, Dec. 17, 1927; children—Anne, Alexander. Teacher of piano, David Mannes Sch., 1925-29; teacher theory, Inst. of Musical Art, 1929-30; chmn. music dept., U. of Chicago, 1931-38; dir. Sch. of Music, U. of Wis., since 1938; Awarded Pulitzer Prize, 1929; Guggenheim fellowship, 1930-31. Mem. Am. Assn. Univ. Profs., Am. Musicological Soc., Am. Composers Alliance. Methodist. Club: Elizabethan. Composer: Symphony No. 1, D minor; Symphony No. 2, F major; Suite for Orchestra, E Flat major; Variations for Two Pianos; String Quartet, C minor;

Key to indicators: † see "Who's Who in America"; * died (date of death in parentheses); *† died, full biographical details may be found in "Who's Who in America." (References after sketches and listings are restricted to biographical material considered sufficiently comprehensive to be of permanent value.)

miscellaneous songs. Home: Blackhawk Av., Madison, Wis.

Reference: J. T. Howard, Our Contemporary Composers.

BRITT, Steuart Henderson, psychologist, lawyer; b. Fulton, Mo., June 16, 1907; s. Aylett Treville and Katherine Birch (Henderson) B.; student Junior Coll. of Kansas City, Mo., 1924-26; Washington U., 1926-27, Sch. of Law, same, 1927-28; A.B., Washington U., 1931, A.M. in psychology, 1932; Ph.D. in psychology, Yale U., 1935; student Columbia U. Sch. of Law, 1935-36 and summers, 1935, 37 and 38; m. Marian May Hansell, June 1, 1936. Asso. with law firm Proctor and Phillips, 1928-29; admitted to Mo. bar, 1929; legal work for Joint Stock Land Bank System, 1929-30; fellow Inst. of Human Relations, Yale U., 1932-35; asst. in psychology, Yale U., 1933-35; research asst. div. of psychology, Inst. of Edtnl. Research, Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ., 1935-36; admitted to N.Y. bar, 1936; asst. prof. psychology, George Washington U., since 1936; admitted U.S. Supreme Court, 1936; mem. U.S. Court of Appeals for Dist. of Columbia, 1937; lecturer in psychology, Mt. Vernon Sem., since 1938; chmn. subcom. on Listing of Personnel in Psychology of Nat. Research Council since 1941; visiting lecturer in psychology, U. of Va., summer, 1941; consultant Nat. Roster of Scientific and Specialized Personnel since 1941; exec. sec. Com. on Wartime Requirements for Specialized Personnel, 1932; mem. Emergency Com. in Psychology since 1942; exec. dir. Office of Psychological Personnel since 1942. Fellow A.A.A.S., Am. Assn. Applied Psychology (sec. bd. of affiliates since 1941); mem. Am. Psychol. Assn. (asst. sec. 1942), Am. Bar Assn., Am. Sociol. Soc., Eastern Psychol. Assn., Eastern Sociol. Soc., Southern Soc. for Philosophy and Psychology, Soc. for Psychol. Study of Social Issues, Washington-Baltimore Branch of Am. Psychol. Assn. (sec. 1938-39, v.p. 1939-40, pres. 1940-41), Sigma Xi, Phi Delta Phi, Delta Sigma Rho, Kappa Alpha. Author: Sections in Educational Broadcasting 1936 (C. S. Marsh, editor), U. of Chicago, 1937; Social Psychology of Modern Life, 1941. Editor (with Isaeque Graeber): Jews in a Gentile World: The Problem of Anti-Semitism (Macmillan; $4), 1942. Contbr. to numerous psychol., sociol., edtnl., and law jours. Editor spl. sect. Psychology and the War (Psychol. Bull.) since 1942. Home: 2910 Dumbarton Av. N.W., Washington, D.C.

Reference: MS.

†BROWN, John Mason, critic; author: Accustomed As I Am (Norton; $2), 1942.

BROWN, Robert Carlton (Bob Brown), author; b. Chicago, Ill., June 14, 1886; s. Robert Carlton and Cora Lovisa (Brackett) B.; student U. of Wis., 1904-05; m. Rose Johnston, 1918; children—Robert Carlton, Cornelia (dec.). Began Latin-American goodwill work with U.S. Com. of Public Information in Santiago, Chile, 1918; after signing of armistice, crossed the Andes to Buenos Aires, spending 1 yr. writing for local English press, also assisted in organizing The American Weekly in Buenos Aires; founded (with wife) Brazilian American, 1919, running it for 10 yrs.; also pubs. of Mexican American (Mexico City) and British (London); known as Latin-Am. specialist; rare book and bibelot collector with exhibits in Library of Congress, Field Museum (Chicago) and Los Angeles Museum. Mem. Psi Upsilon. Clubs: American (London); Jockey, Country, Gavea Golf (Rio de Janeiro). Author: The Remarkable Adventures of Christopher Poe, 1913; What Happened to Mary, 1913; My Marjonary, 1916; 1450-1950, 1929; The Readies, 1930; Globe-Gifding, 1930; Gems, 1931; Nomadness, 1931; Words, 1931; Demonics, 1931; Readies for Bob Brown's Machine, 1931; Let There Be Beer!, 1932; You Gotta Live, 1932; Can We Cooperate?, 1940; also several booklets and more than one thousand short stories, articles, poems, etc. Co-author: (with Cora Brown, Rose Brown) The Wine Cookbook, 1934; America Cooks, 1940; Look Before You Cook, 1941; (with Rose Brown) Amazing Amazon (Modern Age; $3), 1942. Home: 2416 Argosy Way, Hollywood, Calif.

BROWN, Rose, author; b. Middletown, O., Jan. 6, 1883; d. Robert Edgar and Sarah (Rose) Johnston; A.B., Barnard Coll., 1904; B.E., Teachers College, Columbia U.; m. Robert Carlton Brown, 1918. Journalist in South America, beginning with Compub, Chile, during World War I, then went to Argentina; founded and pub. with husband, Brazilian American, Rio de Janeiro; published, wrote and edited (with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro) mags. in Mexico, South America and London; has lived abroad, including Europe and the Orient, most of the time since 1918; traveled 8,000 miles with husband on Amazon rivers and revisited Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, 1940-41. Mem. Delta Delta Delta. Author: Two Children of Brazil, 1940 (Jr. Lit. Guild selection, 1941); (with Robert Carlton Brown) Amazing Amazon (Modern Age; $3), 1942; Amazon Adventures of Two Children and American Emperor, Dom Pedro II, in preparation. Co-author (with Cora Brown and Bob Brown) of 14 books about food and cooking. Home: 2416 Argosy Way, Hollywood, Calif.

BURCHETT, Wilfred G., Australian author; b. Poowong, Victoria, Australia, Sept. 16, 1911; s. George Harold Burchett; m. Erna Hammar, Feb. 5, 1938. Left home at an early age to see Australia on foot; went to England and became mem. staff of Thomas Cook & Sons; reorganized and managed Intourist (Soviet Tourist Bureau) in London; shortly before the war broke out was engaged in arranging the emigration of political and Jewish refugees from Germany; in Australia when World War II broke out and he was apptd. rep. to New Caledonia for the Australian Associated Press; then special rep. to Far East and covered the war in Singapore, Burma and Thailand. Author: Pacific Treasure Island—New Caledonia (F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, Australia; $2.50), 1942. Contbr. to various Australian mags. Broadcasts for Dept. of Information, Commonwealth of Australia. Address: care F. W. Cheshire Pty. Ltd., 338 Little Collins St., Melbourne, Victoria, Australia.

†BURNS, Maj. Gen. James H.; apptd. chief of army ordnance, April 1942.

†BYOIR, Carl (bī'oir), pub. relations counsel; b. Des Moines, Ia., June 24, 1888; s. Benjamin and Minna (Gunyan) B.; A.B., U. of Ia., LL.B., Columbia; m. Grace Lancaster, Dec. 7, 1921. Reporter, Iowa State Register, 1903-05; city editor Waterloo (Ia.) Times-Tribune, 1905-06; largely instrumental in introducing the Montessori System in America, 1912; pres. House of Childhood, Inc., 1912; with Morgan Shepard founded John Martin's Book for Children, 1913; circulation mgr. The Cosmopolitan (mag.), 1916; asso. chmn. Committee U.S. Govt. on Public Information, 1917-18; chmn. bd. American Gear Co. of Ill., 1918-26; now pres. American Gear Co. of Portland, Me.; chmn. bd. Am. Gear Co. of Mass., 1926-27; pres. Carl Byoir and Associates, Inc. since 1930. Director of orgn. United Action Campaign for Am. Legion, A.F.L., and Assn. of Nat. Advertisers, 1932. Gen. dir. of the birthday ball for the president, 1934, 35, 36, 37. Lt. col. U.S. Army Reserve. Decorated Chevalier Order of the Crown of Italy. Democrat. Clubs: Advertising, Westchester Country (New York); La Gorce Golf (Miami). In 1941 the Byoir Associates, several grocery chains, two labor unions, and others had conspired to fix bread prices illegally. On coming to trial recently these charges were summarily thrown out of court, the judge observing: "I have never in all my forty years' experience seen tried a case that was as absolutely devoid of evidence as this." Home: 3 E. 77th St. Office: 10 E. 40th St., New York, N.Y.

Reference: BW, Jan. 17, 1942, p. 45.

CAMPBELL, Dan Hampton, research in immunology; b. Frement, O., Jan. 18, 1907; s. Ralph C. and Edna Catherine (Moses) C.; A.B., Wabash Coll., 1930; M.S., Washington U., 1932; Ph.D., U. of Chicago, 1935; m. Margaret Kathryn Dorr, May 12, 1930; 1 son, John Hampton. Logan research fellow, U. of Chicago, 1935-37, instr. in bacteriology and immunology, 1937-39, asst. prof. of immunology, 1939-42; fellow of Rockefeller Foundation Edtnl. Bd. at Calif. Inst. Tech., 1940; asst. prof. immunology, Calif. Inst. Tech. after June 1942. Began research on mechanics of immunity to infectious agents at Washington U. and continued at U. of Chicago, where he continued immunochemical studies of polysaccharides and the significance of antibodies produced against chemical portions of infectious agents; also studied role of inflammation in immune responses and significance of sex hormones in natural immunity; recently in the news for a method of modification of protein molecules to produce antibody properties. Received the Howard Taylor Ricketts award, U. of Chicago, 1936. Mem. Am. Soc. Immunologists, A.A.A.S., Sigma Xi, Phi Chi, Tau Kappa Epsilon. Methodist. Contbr. to scientific jours. Home: 5514 Blackstone Av., Chicago, Ill.

Reference: MS.

CANNON, LeGrand, Jr., author; b. New Haven, Conn., Dec. 1, 1899; s. LeGrand and Florence (Pond) C.; Ph.B., Yale U., 1920; M.B.A., Harvard U., 1922; m. Jeannette Peabody, Dec. 30, 1922; children—Jeannette, LeGrand, 3d, Winthrop, Margaret. Author: A Mighty Fortress, 1937; The Kents, 1938; Look to the Mountain (Henry Holt; $2.75), 1942. Home: 56 Laurel Rd., New Haven, Conn.

CARTER, William Hodding, Jr., newspaper publisher, author; b. Hammond, La., Feb. 3, 1907; s. William Hodding and Irma (Dutarte) C.; A.B., Bowdoin Coll., 1927; grad. student in journalism, Columbia, 1927-28; teaching fellow, Tulane, 1928-29; Nieman fellow, Harvard, 1940; m. Betty Brunhilde Werlein, Oct. 14, 1931; children—William Hodding III, Philip Dutarte. Reporter New Orleans Item, 1929; United Press corr., 1929-31; Associated Press corr. and bureau mgr., 1931-32; published Hammond (La.) Courier, 1932-36; began publishing Delta Star, daily, Greenville, Miss., 1936, acquired Democrat-Times, merging both papers into Delta Democrat-Times (daily and Sunday), 1938; (on leave) organized Nat. Cotton Council (toured 15 states), 1939; press editor Newspaper PM, 1940. Enlisted in 114 F.A., Miss. Nat. Guard, Nov. 1938; entered active service as 2d lt., Nov. 25, 1940; duty Camp Blanding, Fla., to Apr. 1941; Mil. Intelligence, War Dept., Washington, D.C., since Apr. 1941. Mem. Miss. Press Assn. (v.p.), S. La. Press Assn. (past pres.), Alpha Delta Phi, Pi Delta Epsilon. Independent Democrat. Episcopalian. Author: (with Col. R. Ernest Dupuy) Civilian Defense of the United States (Farrar & Rinehart; $2.50), 1942; The Lower Mississippi (Rivers of America series; now in preparation). Contbr. to mags. Home: Greenville, Miss.

†CHAVEZ, Carlos, musician; author: Toward a New Music (Norton; $2.25), 1942.

CHEN CHENG (chĕn chĕng), mil. heir to Chiang Kai-shek; b. Chekiang, 1900; student Paoting Mil. Officers Coll.; m. (through introduction of Chiang Kai-shek), Tan Chang, dau. of late pres. of Exec. Yuan, 1932. Became instr., Whampoa Mil. Cadets Acad.; advanced to field comdr., arty. of Nationalist Revolutionary Forces; chief of mil. edn. of Mil. Council; dir. of Canton Mil. govt.; comdr. of 18th Nationalist Army, 1930; field comdr. of Northern Route of Communist Suppression Forces, 1934; chief mil. dir. of Mil. Affairs Commn.; participated in Northern Punitive Expdns.; comd. Chinese armies on Shanghai Front since 1937. Chen Cheng is the leader of Whampoa group, soldiers trained under Chiang Kai-shek, and is his mil. heir. In World War II has a high place among the group directing Chinese future plans; throughout his career has variously studied and taught polit. science and economics.

References: TM, June 16, 1941, p. 25; July 17, 1939, p. 21; J. Gunther, Inside Asia.

CHILDS, Harwood Lawrence, author; b. Gray, Me., May 1, 1898; s. Herman Andrew and Eudora Frances (Whittemore) C.; A.B., Dartmouth, 1919; M.A., 1921; Ph.D., U. of Chicago, 1928; m. Willa Patricia Whitson, June 28, 1922; children—Elizabeth Ann, Margaret Frances, Martha Louise. Instr. pub. speaking, Dartmouth Coll., 1919-20, instr. economics, 1920-21; asst. prof. economics, Syracuse U., 1922-24; asso. prof. govt., Coll. of William and Mary, 1925-27; prof. govt. and head dept. polit. science, Bucknell U., 1928-31; asso. prof. politics, Princeton U., since 1932. Research asst. Nat. Industrial Conf. Bd., N.Y. City, 1924; Social Science Research Council fellow for study in Germany, 1931-32; Guggenheim fellow for study in Germany, 1937-38; founder and editor Public Opinion Quarterly, pub. by Princeton U., since 1937. Mem. Am. Assn. Univ. Profs., Am. Polit. Science Assn., Alpha Chi Rho, Delta Sigma Rho. Served in U.S. Naval Res., 1918. Author: Labor and Capital in National Politics, 1930; Reference Guide to the Study of Public Opinion, 1934; An Introduction to Public Opinion, 1940; Propaganda by Short Wave (Princeton U. Press; $3.75), 1942. Translator: The Nazi Primer, 1938. Editor: Propaganda and Dictatorship, 1936; also May 1935 issue of Annals of Am. Acad. Polit. and Social Science on Pressure Groups and Propaganda. Contbr. to Am. Polit. Science Review, Am. Jour. of Sociology, Annals of Am. Acad. Polit. and Social Science, Atlantic Monthly, etc. Home: 106 Broadmead. Address: Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J.

CHU TEH (jōō tă), Chinese army officer; b. Szechwan, 1892; student in Germany and France. Served as govt. official in Yunnan, until Revolution, 1927; went to Russia to study Marxism, joined Communists; elected comdr. in chief of the Red Army by first Chinese Soviet Cong., 1931; organized Communist revolt against Chiang, showed pro-Jap tendencies, 1927-37; made peace with Chiang at Jap

invasion; appointed head of famous Eighth Route Army. Besides being a linguist, sportsman and philosopher, he stands among the first of China's mil. tacticians.

Reference: J. Gunther, Inside Asia.

†COFFIN, Robert P. T., poet; author: There Will Be Bread and Love (Macmillan; $2), 1942.

†COLBY, Elbridge, author: Army Talk (Princeton U. Press; $2), 1942.

COLBY, Frances Bainbridge, author; b. New York, N.Y., Dec. 31, 1907; d. Bainbridge and Nathalie (Sedgwick) Colby; ed. private schools and Barnard Coll.; m. Robert Cameron Rogers, June 16, 1925 (now divorced). Roman Catholic. Author: The Black Winds Blow, 1939; Crazy Like a Fox (Smith & Durrell; $2.50), May 1942. Contbr. to mags. Home: 169 E. 78th St., New York, N.Y.

COOPER, Louise Field, author; b. Hartford, Conn., Mar. 8, 1905; d. Francis Elliott and Anna (Dunning) Field; student Miss Porter's Sch., Farmington, 1921-24; m. James Wayne Cooper, June 26, 1929; children—Field, James Nicoll, Peter Brintnal. After leaving school worked on a newspaper and later in a bookshop. Author: The Lighted Box (Duell, Sloan & Pearce; $2.50), 1942. Home: Clark Road, Woodbridge, Conn.

COTTLER, Joseph, author; b. near Kiev, Russia, Oct. 26, 1899; s. David and Gertrude (Meltzer) C.; brought to U.S., 1901; B.S. in Economics, U. of Pa., 1921; m. Elizabeth Steinbrook, Dec. 27, 1927. Worked as violinist in Italy, July 1921—Mar. 1922; teacher of English, Franklin High Sch., Phila., since 1922; lived in Mexico City, May 1938-Jan. 1939. Enlisted in Naval R.O.T.C., Oct. 1918; hon. discharged, 1921. Vice pres. Local 3, Am. Federation of Teachers. Author: Heroes of Civilization (with Haym Jaffe), 1931; Careers Ahead (with Harold Brecht), 1933; Mapmakers (with Haym Jaffe), 1935; Champions of Democracy, 1936; Man with Wings (Little, Brown; $2.50), 1942. Contbr. musical criticism to trade jours. and to RCA-Victor Record Review. Home: Gladstone Hotel, Philadelphia, Pa.

†DABNEY, Virginius, editor Richmond Times; author: Below the Potomac (Appleton; $3), 1942.

DALTON, Hugh, British Labor party leader; b. 1887; s. Rev. John Neale D.; student Eton Coll.; M.A. (with honors) King's Coll. Cambridge U., Eng.; student London School of Economics and Polit. Science, U. of London; D.Sc., London U. and U. of Sydney (Australia); m. Ruth Fox, former mem. Brit. House of Commons (Labor party), 1940. Qualified as lawyer (Middle Temple London), senior Brit. ranking, 1914. Served as lieut. in Brit. Army Service Corps and Arty., 1914-19; on both French and Italian fronts (decorated with Italian Mil. Medal of Valor, 1917). Special investigation work for Brit. Ministry of Labor, 1919; lecturer on Economics, U. of London, 1919-36; mem. Brit. House of Commons at various times since 1924, and currently; under sec. of state for foreign affairs, 1929-31; chmn. nat. organization of Brit. Labor party, 1936-37 (called one of the most brilliant of Brit. Labor party leaders); minister of economic warfare in Churchill Cabinet, 1940-42; pres. Brit. Bd. of Trade since Feb. 1942. Mem. Statutory Commn. of Cambridge U. since 1923. Mem. Council of Brit. Royal Statis. Soc., 1923-25. Author: Unbalanced Budgets; A Study of the Financial Crisis in Fifteen Countries, 1934; Practical Socialism for Britain, 1935; Principles of Public Finance, 1936.

References: CSM, Aug. 16, 1941, p. 3; New Republic, June 28, 1939, p. 206.

DAVIS, Julia (Macdonald), author; b. Clarksburg, W. Va., July 23, 1900; d. John W. and Julia T. (Macdonald) Davis; student Shipley Sch., Bryn Mawr, Pa., Wellesley Coll.; B.A., Barnard Coll., 1922; m. Paul West, July 29, 1934. Lived in England, 1919-20, Denmark, 1923-25; worked for Associated Press, 1926; children's agent, Child Placing Bureau, State Charities Aid Assn., 1933-37. Presbyterian. Club: Cosmopolitan. Author: Sword of the Vikings, 1926; Vaino, 1927; Mountains Are Free, 1928; Stonewall, 1929; Remember and Forget, 1930; No Other White Men, 1936; Peter Hale, 1940; The Sun Climbs Slow (Dutton; $2.50), 1942. Contbr. short stories to Atlantic Monthly, Story Magazine, Woman's Home Companion. Address: Bedford Village, N.Y.

DEAN, Sidney Walter, author; b. Warren, R.I.; s. Sidney and Annie (Eddy) D.; ed. high sch., Warren R.I., and under private tutors; m. Marguerite Mooers Marshall, June 3, 1916; children—Sidney W., Warren K., Dorothy (Mrs. T. W. Satterthwaite, dec.). Editor Brookline (Mass.) Chronicle and Suburban, Boston Journal, Boston Record, Advertiser and Boston Herald, 1898-1906; mng. editor Boston Herald, 1906-09, Journal, 1909-11; editor class and tech. publs. (Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter, Pharmaceutical Era, Soda Fountain, Chemicals, Groceries, all of N.Y. City), 1911-38; now writer of biography for boys. Mem. press-publicity Mass. State Dem. Com.; mem. Good Govt. Assn., Boston, Brookline (Mass.) Dem. Town Com., Brookline Edn. Soc. Independent Democrat. Clubs: Nat. Press (Washington, D.C.); Rockaway Point Yacht (Queens, N.Y.). Author: He Fought for Freedom (boys' life of Ethan Allen), 1940; Knight of the Revolution (Francis Marion) (Macrae-Smith; $2.50), 1941. Contbr. to Forum, Commentator, Motor Boating, Better Homes & Gardens, etc.; also to newspapers and mags. on Am. cookery. Spl. editorial work Nat. Foreign Trade Council, New York, 3 yrs. Address: 148 E. 34th St., New York, N.Y.

DEGEN, Ida Day, sculptor; b. San Francisco, Calif., Oct. 10, 1888; d. George Franklin and Maude Angie (Cole) Day; grad. Girls High Sch., San Francisco; student Mark Hopkins Inst. of Art, 1906-07, Calif. Sch. Fine Arts, 1935-38; studied under Ralph Stackpole and Maurice Stern; also student Cogswell Polytechnic Coll. and extension courses at U. of Calif.; m. Walter Degen, Aug. 14, 1909; 1 son, Wallace Donald. Exhibited at San Francisco Museum of Art; Calif. Palace of Legion of Honor; Oakland Art Gallery Nat. Sculpture shows; Golden Gate Internat. Expn.; Crocker Art Gallery, Sacramento; Pomona Nat. Sculpture Show; Ebell Gallery, Los Angeles; Denver Art Museum; Fine Arts Gallery, New York; Corcoran Gallery of Art; Pa. Acad. Fine Arts; Isaac Delgado Museum, New Orleans; small sculptures at San Francisco Museum of Art, Mar. 1941; one-man show of sculpture and mosaic at Argent Galleries, N.Y. City, Feb. 1942. Demonstrated lime stone sculpture daily for 3 months, Golden Gate Expn., 1940. Represented at Calif. Palace of Legion of Honor; Gothic stone figure erected on Grace Cathedral, San Francisco (1st person to do this). Hon. mention Calif. Sch. Fine Arts, 1938; hon. mention for stone carving Marin Artists annual, Drake Auditorium, San Anselmo, 1940, 1st prize in sculpture 1941. Served on juries of selection for sculpture at Marin Artists annual show, San Anselmo, Calif., 1940, 1941; San Francisco Soc. Women Artists annual, Museum of Art, Nov. 1940, 1941; Alumni of Calif. Sch. Fine Arts, San Francisco Museum, 1941; mem. jury of awards (sculpture) Calif. Sch. Fine Arts, 1941. Mem. Nat. Assn. Women Artists, San Francisco Art Assn., San Francisco Soc. Women Artists (exec. sec., mem. bd. dirs., artists council, 1940, 1941), Marin Soc. of Artists, New Orleans Art Assn. Conglist. Joined stock company Fulton Theatre, Oakland, 1927; mem. Actors Equity, 2 yrs. Home: 2717 Greenwich St. Studio: 802 Montgomery St., San Francisco, Calif.

DEGENHARD, William, author; b. San Francisco, Calif., Dec. 23, 1910; A.B., Fordham U., 1933; unmarried. Author: The Regulators (Dial Press; $2.75), 1942. Contbr. mystery and detective fiction to mags. Home: 1110 Neill Av., New York, N.Y.

***†DeLEE, Joseph Bolivar,** obstetrician (Apr. 2, 1942).

References: Chicago Tribune, Apr. 3, 1942; MS; TM, Apr. 20, 1942, p. 65.

***†DeROUEN, René L.,** congressman (Mar. 27, 1942).

Reference: NYT, Mar. 28, 1942.

De WITT, Josephine, artist, writer; b. New York City, Apr. 27, 1907; d. Ernest David and Eugenie (Schnürer) De Witt; grad. Washington Irving High Sch., N.Y. City; grad. N.Y. Sch. Fine and Applied Arts, 1925; student Art Students League, 1927-29; studied illustrating under Lewis C. Daniel, painting under Hayley Lever; m. Thomas Benjamin Lipton, Jan. 18, 1930; children—Kenneth De Witt, Ernest Jeffrey. Commercial artist, H. Stanley Rogers Studio, N.Y. City, 1925-36; began writing children's stories, 1936; conducts art classes for children at her home. Author and illustrator: The Fisherman and His Cat, 1937; The Milkman's Baby, 1938; The Whale and the Ferryboat, 1939; Felicia, the Curious Cow, 1940; Michael Sebastian McKinley Smith (Thomas Nelson; $1.25), 1942, a sequel to The Fisherman and His Cat. Has also illustrated (under name of Jane Linton) Jock Barefoot, by Maude Lindsay; Denny, the Boy We Always Knew, by Sonia Daugherty. Home: 4411 Sherwood Road, Philadelphia, Pa.

DIAMOND, David Lee, composer; b. Rochester, N.Y., July 9, 1915; s. Osias and Anna (Schildhaus) D.; student Eastman Sch. of Music (U. of Rochester), 1930-34; Cleveland Inst. of Music, 1928-30; Am. Conservatory, Fontainebleau, France, summers, 1937 and 1938, New Music and Dalcroze Inst., N.Y. City, 1934-36. Composer: Symphony No. 1 for orchestra; Concerto for Chamber orchestra; Elegy in Memory of Ravel for brass, harps and percussion; Overture for orchestra; Psalm for orchestra; Concerto for String Quartet; Concerto for Violin and Orchestra; Sonata for 'Cello and Piano; Quintet (flute, string trio and piano); Aria and Hymn for Orchestra; String Quartet No. 1; Concerto for 'Cello and Orchestra. Works have been performed by N.Y. Philharmonic Symphony-Society, Philadelphia Orchestra, C.B.S. Symphony, Orchestra of Radio-Zürich, Rochester Philharmonic, St. Louis Symphony, Nat. Orchestral Assn., Barrère-Britt Ensemble and N.B.C. Symphony. Recipient Elfrida Whiteman fellowship, 1935; League of Composers Commn., 1937; Guggenheim fellowship, 1938 and 1941; Juilliard Publication award, 1937; Ballet Guild comm. to compose musical score for Glenway Wescott's ballet scenario "The Dream of Audubon." Contbr. to Modern Music, Decision. Home: 249 Edgerton St., Rochester, N.Y.

Reference: Baker, Biog. Dictionary of Musicians.

DOMAN, Nicholas, prof., author, lecturer; b. Budapest, Hungary, April 10, 1913; s. Edmund and Irene Doman; student London Sch. of Economics, 1932; Dr. Jurisprudence and Polit. Science, U. of Budapest, 1934; student U. of Milan, 1934; M.A., U. of Colo., 1935; student Geneva Sch. of Internat. Studies, 1937, unmarried. Sec., Danube League, 1933-34; with fgn. exchange div., Hungarian General Creditbank, Budapest, 1936-38; asso. with Review of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 1936-39; lecturer, U. of Colo., 1939; on research faculty, U. of Chicago, 1939-40; lecturer, Rotary Internat. Inst., and Adult Edn. Council, 1940-41; asst. prof. govt. and economics, Coll. of William and Mary, 1941-42; radio commentator on internat. affairs, lecturer, since 1939. Mem. Am. Soc. Internat. Law; Am. Acad. Polit. and Social Sci.; Am. Polit. Sci. Assn.; Cath. Assn. for Internat. Peace. Author: The Foreign Policy of the New Deal, 1937; The Conflict of the Great Powers in the Mediterranean, 1939; The Coming Age of World Control (Harpers; $3), 1942. Address: Duke of Gloucester Street, Williamsburg, Virginia.

EBERHART, Richard, poet; b. Austin, Minn., Apr. 5, 1904; student U. of Minn., 1922-23; A.B., Dartmouth Coll., 1926; Cambridge U., 1929; student Grad. Sch. of Arts and Sciences, Harvard U., 1932-33; M.A., Cambridge U., 1933; m. Helen Elizabeth Butcher, Aug. 29, 1941. Master in English, St. Mark's Sch., Southborough, Mass., 1933-41; reader of English, Coll. Entrance Examination Bd., Columbia U., annually since 1934; teacher of English, Cambridge Sch., Kendal Green, Mass., since 1941. Author: A Bravery of Earth (London and New York), 1930; Reading the Spirit (London and New York), 1936, 37; Song and Idea (London), 1940, (Oxford U. Press, N.Y.), 1942. Poems and criticism have appeared in The Southern Review, The Kenyon Review, The New Republic, Partisan Review, The Atlantic Monthly, The Virginia Quarterly Review, Poetry, The New York Times, The New Yorker, Decision, Modern Quarterly, The Harvard Advocate, The Listener (London), The Spectator (London), and others; also in anthologies as The Faber Book of Modern Verse, New Directions, Vertical, The Lyric Psalter, etc. Address: care Oxford University Press, New York, N.Y.

ELWELL, Herbert, composer, teacher critic; b. Minneapolis, Minn., May 10, 1898; s. George H. and Belle (Horn) E.; student U. of Minn., 1916-18; studied music with Ernest Bloch, N.Y. City, 1919-21, with Nadia Boulanger, Paris, 1921-24; fellow Am. Acad. in Rome, Italy, 1924-27, m. Maria

Key to indicators: † see "Who's Who in America"; * died (date of death in parentheses); *† died, full biographical details may be found in "Who's Who in America." (References after sketches and listings are restricted to biographical material considered sufficiently comprehensive to be of permanent value.)

Cecchini, July 27, 1927. Teacher of advanced theory and composition, Cleveland Inst. of Music since 1928, asst. dir., 1935; program note editor for Cleveland Orchestra, 1929-34; music critic on Cleveland Plain Dealer since 1932. Fellow Am. Acad. in Rome; mem. League of Composers, Am. Composers Alliance, Pi Kappa Lambda. Compositions: Quintet for Piano and Strings; Piano Sonata; The Happy Hypocrite (ballet); Suite from The Happy Hypocrite; Sonata for Violin and Piano; String Quartet in E Minor (Cleveland, 1940); also songs and piano pieces. Home: 2863 E. Derbyshire Road, Cleveland, O.

References: Baker, Biog. Dictionary of Musicians; J. T. Howard, Our Contemp. Composers.

ENGEL, A. Lehman, composer, conductor, author, lecturer; b. Jackson, Miss., Sept. 14, 1910; s. Ellis and Juliette (Lehman) E.; music student, Cincinnati Conservatory of Music, 1926-27, U. of Cincinnati, 1926-28, Cincinnati Coll. of Music, 1927-29; student, composition, Julliard Grad. Sch., N.Y. City, 1930-34; unmarried. Organizer, condr., Madrigal Singers, in 1000 concerts, broadcasts, recordings; writer, condr., music for 33 Broadway productions, including Within the Gates, Murder in the Cathedral, Shoemaker's Holiday, Hamlet, Midsummer Night's Dream, The Time of Your Life; condr. opera premières, Der Jasager, Second Hurricane, Cradle Will Rock, Johnny Johnson; composer, condr. music, Texaco broadcasts, 1939-40; condr. orchestra, Gene Autry broadcasts; condr. (also staged), Beggar's Opera, Carnegie Inst., Pittsburgh, and Bucks County Playhouse (New Hope, Pa.), 1941; founder, pres. Arrow Music Press, Inc., non-profit corp. for publ. of contemporary music; lecturer at universities, colleges, schools; composer of 2 operas (including Pierrot of the Minute, prod. in Cincinnati, 1929), 1 symbony, quartet, choral pieces, piano sonata, etc. Author: (4 vols.) Renaissance to Baroque: Three Centuries of Choral Music (Harold Flammer), 1938-42. Also ed. and compiled Strange Fruit and Love Songs of Henry VIII. Contbr. to New York Times, New York Herald-Tribune, Modern Music, Southern Literary Messenger, Theatre Arts, Music Leader, Musical America. Address: 56 Seventh Av., New York, N.Y.

References: Baker, Biog. Dictionary of Musicians; J. T. Howard, Our Contemp. Composers.

***†ESSARY, Jesse Frederick,** newspaperman (Mar. 11, 1942).

Reference: Chicago Tribune, Mar. 12, 1942.

EUBANK, Eugene L. (yōō-băngk), U.S. army officer; b. Okla., Dec. 2, 1892; joined Army from Tex. as pvt.; with aviation sect., Signal Corps, 1917-18; became 2d lt. mechanics sch., aviation sect., July 1920; promoted capt. 1941, maj. (temp), 1935; grad., Command. and Gen. Staff Sch., 1938 and rated pilot, combat observer; became full maj., June 1939. Active in World War II in Australia with U.S. Air Force; announced that Am. bombers had accounted for 46 Jap transports and 16 warships within war's first 11 weeks.

Reference: Army Register.

FAST, Howard, author: Goethals and the Panama Canal (Messner; $2.50), 1942 (see this Supplement, II-143[Q]).

FEDOROVA, Nina, author: The Children (Little, Brown; $2.50), 1942 (see this Supplement, I-335[Q]).

FERNANDEZ-ARTUCIO, Hugo, (fĕr-năn'dĕs-är-tōō'cĭo, ōō'go), prof. of philosophy, U. of Montevideo; b. Montevideo, Uruguay, Mar. 30, 1912; s. Alberto Fernandez and Maria Artucio; student Liceo Jose Enrique Rodo, Montevideo, and U. of Montevideo; unmarried. Became prof. of philosophy, U. of Montevideo, 1935; has lectured at Univs. of Santiago (Chile), Mexico, Columbia, 1938-42. Exposed Nazi plot to overthrow the Govt. of Republic of Uruguay and directed the first Congressional investigation of subversive activities in S. America; appeared as witness for U.S. in Tranocean News Agency Trial; invited by Brit. Council to visit England to witness the war efforts of Great Britain; lectured at Chatham House and Oxford; pres. Internat. Commn. to study religious and philos. bases for peace, 2d World Youth Congress, 1938; sec. Socialist party of Uruguay, 1933; now dir. for Latin America of Free World Movement. Acquitted in charge of libel preferred by Nat. Socialist agents in Uruguay. Author: The Nazi Underground in South America (Farrar & Rinehart; $3), 1942; also books pub. in Uruguay. Contbr. to mags. in S. America, U.S. and Eng. Home: 18 de Julio 1465, Montevideo, Uruguay. Address: 55 W. 42nd St., New York, N.Y.

***†FIELD, Rachel,** author (Mar. 15, 1942).

References: NYT, Mar. 16, 1942; TM, Oct. 24, 1938, p. 69; CSM, Nov. 2, 1938, p. 11; SRL, Oct. 22, 1938, p. 10, Oct. 15, 1938, p. 1; Millett, Contemp. Am. Authors.

***†FISKE, Bradley Allen,** U.S. naval officer (Apr. 7, 1942).

References: NYT, Apr. 8, 1942; NYr, Feb. 7, 1942, p. 10; Navy Register.

FLANNERY, Vaughn, painter; b. Louisville, Ky., Oct. 6, 1898; s. James Benjamin and Nancy Kent (Maddox) F.; student Art Inst., Chicago, and private study; m. Elizabeth Anderson Ettinger, June 14, 1926; children—Kent Vaughn, Liza Maddox. Represented in Carnegie Museum, Pittsburgh; Baltimore Museum; Phillips Memorial, Washington, D.C.; Kraushaar Galleries, N.Y. City; and private collections of John Hay Whitney, Gerald Lauch, etc. Now serving as chief, Graphic Div., Office of Facts and Figures, Office of Emergency Management, Washington, D.C. Dir. Md. Horsebreeders Assn.; life mem. Md. Aberdon-Angus Breeder Assn. Club: Maryland Jockey (dir.) Home: Cockade Farms, Darlington, Md.

FLEURY, Barbara Frances, librarian, author; b. Detroit, Mich., Nov. 20, 1907; d. George Thomas (dec.) and Edith Mary (Jacobs) Fleury; student U. of Detroit, 1926-27; A.B., in Library Science, U. of Mich., 1930, A.M., Aug. 1942; unmarried. Has been school librarian, Detroit public schools, since 1930, now at Wilson Intermediate Sch.; staff mem. in charge writing for children and young people, Bread Loaf (Vt.) Writers Conf. since 1940. Now serving as teacher of air raid wardens. Mem. Am. Library Assn., Mich. Library Assn., Authors League, Nat. League Am. Penwomen, Black Quill (hon. lit. soc., U. of Mich.). Roman Catholic. Author: Luckypiece, 1936; Runaway Deer, 1938; Faith the Root (Dutton; $2.50), 1942. Home: 800 Longfellow Av., Detroit, Mich.

FORDE, Francis Michael, Australian army minister; b. Mitchell, Queensland, July 18, 1890; student Christian Bros. Sch., Toowoomba; m. Veronica C. O'Reilly; 1 son, 3 daus. Became teacher elec. engring.; mem. from Queensland, Legislative Assembly, 1917-22; mem. House of Reps. since 1922, of Royal Commn. of Motion Picture Industry, 1927-28, of Pub. Accounts Com., 1929; asst. minister of Trade and Customs in Scullin Govt., 1929-30, then minister, 1930-31; acting minister of markets and transport, 1930-31; dep. leader of Fed. Labor party since 1932; Australian army minister since 1942.

†FOREMAN, Grant, author: A History of Oklahoma (U. of Okla. Press; $3.50), 1942.

***†FOSTER, Marcellus Elliott,** editor (April 1, 1942).

Reference: NYHT, Apr. 2, 1942.

FRANCE, Harry Clinton, financial writer, lecturer; b. Richmondville, N.Y., July 17, 1890; s. Julius Henry and Ellen Rocelia (Leonard) F.; A.B., Wesleyan U., 1913; grad. student U. of Pa., 1915-17, Columbia, 1923-25; grad. Sch. of Oratory, Northwestern U., 1918; m. Beulah Sanford Osborn, Mar. 26, 1927; 1 step-daughter, Winifred Osborn. Rural school teacher, Seward, N.Y., 1908-09; head English dept., Banks Business Coll., Phila., 1915-17; dir. Y.M.C.A. public-speaking courses, Chicago, 1917-18; public relations successively with Govt. Loan Orgn. of U.S. Treasury, Guaranty Trust Co., Hamilton Nat. Bank, N.Y. City, 1919-26; sec.-treas. Holmes-France Security Corp., Detroit, 1926-30; financial writer, lecturer, adviser since 1931; lecturer at various times at Columbia, New York U., Wayne U. since 1919; writer of weekly syndicated column on finance and investments since 1933; lecturer before clubs and socs., bankers' groups, etc. Lecturer (rank of 1st lt.), O.T.C., Camp Joseph E. Johnston, Jacksonville, Fla., June-Dec. 1918. Treas. N.Y. Deaconess Assn.; trustee 18th St. Methodist Church. Mem. Beta Theta. Clubs: Faculty (Columbia); Quill (N.Y. City). Home: 258 Riverside Drive. Office: 347 Madison Av., New York, N.Y.

***†FRICK, William Jacob,** surgeon (Apr. 1, 1942).

Reference: NYHT, Apr. 3, 1942.

GANDHI, Mohandas Karamchand (gän'dē, mō-hän'dŭs kä-räm'chănd), Hindu religious and social leader; b. Porbander, India, Oct. 2, 1869, the son and grandson of two local prime ministers; mother was devoutly religious and given to frequent fasts; student, U. of Ahmedabad, and law sch., London, 1888-91; m. Kasturbai, 1882; 4 children. Began practice of law, Bombay, 1891; removed practice to large Indian S. African colony, where he prospered; founded newspaper "Indian Opinion"; wrote as his first book "Indian Independence"; helped Brit. organize med. corps, Boer War, 1899; going personally to London, 1914, volunteered to establish Indian ambulance corps, World War I; returned to India at 45, beginning his great work, the hermitage for Untouchables—now grown to modern problem of Indian-British relations; Gandhi worked in cause of Untouchables but himself believes steadfastly in Hinduism; achieved Indian acceptance of internal civil obedience but kept it an unarmed state; originated Indian effort for escape from Britain, yet since 1939 has been Britain's best friend in India; now a non-mem. Indian Congress, yet India's most important living citizen who leads 350,000,000 people, a fifth of human race. Following the tragedy of Amritsar 1919 (by a Brit. general's orders, hundreds of unarmed Indians unable to escape, were killed), Gandhi proclaimed "Satyagraha," his theory of passive-resistance: that Indians endure every violence without resistance or complaint under threat of his undertaking a fast to avenge their failure. Formally broke with Gt. Brit. and returned several medals received for S. African work; suggested Britain cooperate with India, 1921; was arrested by Brit. and sentenced to 6 yrs., released in 2; gained increasing support for anti-Brit. movement, 1923-34; resigned from Indian Nat. Cong., 1934, retiring to remote Segaon in the midst of Untouchables colony, to work prodigiously but behind the scenes; sees thousands of visitors, polit. and relig., working on rural reconstruction but also on India's ambition for dominion status which was negotiated, Mar. 1942 (during negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps took stand that, though he opposed Japs, India should not become further involved in the war). Arrested several times since 1921, ending each with unique fasts done in the name of Indian polit. progress and the social progress of Untouchables (essentially weapon to which Brit. submits, refusing to take responsibility for his death from starvation); gains support and popularity with his 5-point program: for village welfare, support of home spinning for which he invented the method, provision in villages for vocational edn., better sanitation, inclusion of Untouchables in community life, and increased village industrial life. Author: Indian Home Rule; Universal Dawn; Young India; Story of My Experiments with Truth; Autbiography (pub. India); Self Indulgence vs. Self Control; Guide to Health.

References: Rotarian, Feb. 1942, p. 14; Christian Century, Nov. 5, 1941, p. 1358; July 24, 1940, p. 921; July 12, 1939, p. 867; Apr. 19, 1939, p. 520; Dec. 14, 1938, p. 1552; Mar. 2, 1938, p. 269; Education, Mar. 1940, p. 391; Commonweal, Apr. 5, 1940, p. 508; Current History, Dec. 1939, p. 25; May, 1941, p. 44; TM, Apr. 1, 1940, p. 29; Mar. 13, 1939, p. 24; Asia, Sept. 1941, p. 467; Oct. 1939, p. 555; Oct. 1938, p. 579; NA, May 4, 1940, p. 564; LI, May 12, 1941, p. 92; NYT, Sept. 15, 1940, p. 20; CSM, Mar. 1, 1941, p. 7; Sept. 14, 1938, p. 5; COL, July 20, 1940, p. 13; School and Society, Nov. 27, 1937, p. 694; RD, Dec. 1938, p. 111; NA, May 27, 1939, p. 617; J. Gunther, Inside Asia.

†GARRETT, Garet; resigns as chief editorial writer Saturday Evening Post, March, 1942.

GERVASI, Frank (Henry) (gēr-vä'sĭ), foreign corr.; b. Baltimore, Md., Feb. 5, 1906; s. Eugene Leone and Therèse (Guarner) G.; grad. South Philadelphia High Sch., 1926; student Drexel Inst. of Technology, 1927-28, U. of Pa., 1928-29; m. Kathryn Elizabeth McGuigan, Jan. 6, 1930; 2 sons, Sean David, Eugene Michael. Reporter, Philadelphia Record, 1929-30, Associated Press, N.Y. City, 1930-34; Washington corr. covering diplomatic beat, Universal Service, Jan.-Aug. 1934; Madrid corr., Hearst Newspapers, Aug. 1934-Jan. 1935, London bureau of same, Jan. 1935-May 1935; chief Rome bureau of Internat. News Service, May 1935-April 1939; roving corr., Collier's Weekly, since 1939; has covered Europe, Asia, Middle East, Africa, India, Singapore, Siam, Philippines; has interviewed many important world figures of today. Mem. Am. Acad. Polit. and Social Science. Club: Overseas Press. Author: War Has Seven Faces (Doubleday, Doran; $2.50), 1942. Home: 79 Sagamore Rd., Bronxville, N.Y. Office: 250 Park Av., New York, N.Y.

GEYER, Harold Carl, author, artist; b. Cold Spring, N.Y., Aug. 16, 1905; s. Harold Carl and

Mary Brinsmaid (de Camp) G.; A.B., Yale, 1926; B.F.A., Yale Sch. of Architecture, 1930; student Fontainebleau-Ecole Americaine des Beaux Arts, 1930. Lived in France, 1930-33 and summer of 1935. Has exhibited at Acad. of Design, 1941, and exhibition of Am. Etchers Soc., 1942 (prints in each acquired through Pennell Fund for Library of Congress). Mem. Phi Beta Kappa. Democrat. Mem. Dutch Reformed Ch. Author: All Men Have Loved Thee: A Song of France (Richard R. Smith; $3.75), 1941. Home: Boonton, N.J. Studio: 37 W. 14th St., New York, N.Y.

GIDDINGS, Thaddeus Philander, music supervisor, writer; b. Anoka, Minn., Feb. 19, 1869; s. Aurora W. and Mary Eleanor (Simons) G.; grad. Anoka High Sch.; Master Public Sch. Music, MacPhail Sch. of Music, Minneapolis; unmarried. Supervisor of music, Anoka, 1886-88; taught country sch., 1889-90; supervisor of music, Moline (Ill.) schs., 1891-94, Oak Park (Ill.), 1894-1910, Minneapolis, since 1910-42 (retiring); taught pub. sch. music methods, U. of Minn., 14 yrs., MacPhail Sch. of Music, 22 yrs. Founder (with J. E. Maddy) and vice pres., Nat. Music Camp, Interlochen, Mich. Author: Grade School Music Teaching, 1912; High School Music Teaching, 1920; Music Education, 1920-25; Universal Teacher, 1926; Willis Graded Orchestra Series (3 vols.), 1924-26; Instrumental Technic, 1928; Fun in Music (25 vols.), 1938. Home: Anoka, Minn.

References: Etude, Feb. 1942, p. 89; **Nat. Edn. Assn. Jour.,** Sept. 1940, p. 181; **CSM,** Aug. 31, 1939, p. 3.

GILLESPIE, Robert D., psychiatrist; b. Glasgow, Scotland, Dec. 15, 1896; s. Campbell and Eleanor (Chalmers) G.; student Glasgow U., 1915-24 (M.B., 1920, M.D. with honors, 1924); Diploma in Psychol. Medicine, U. of London, 1922; Pinsent-Darwin research student, Cambridge U., 1926-29; m. Audrey Margaret Mary Howard, Aug. 8, 1930; 1 dau., Christina Audrey. Asst. resident psychiatrist, John Hopkins Hosp., Baltimore, 1923-25; physician in psychol. medicine, Guy's Hosp., London, since 1926; examiner in psychol. medicine, London U., 1934-39; McNeil lecturer in psychopathology, Aberdeen U., 1935; Salmon lecturer N.Y. City, 1941. Psychiatric specialist Royal Air Force Vol. Reserve (wing comdr.) since 1939. Fellow Royal Coll. Physicians, London; fellow Royal Soc. Medicine; corr. mem. Am. Psychiatric Assn. Mem. Ch. of England. Club: Athenaeum (London). Author: Text Book of Psychiatry (with D. K. Henderson), 5th edit., 1940: Sleep, 1929; Mind in Daily Life, 1933; Psychological Effects of War on Citizen and Soldier (Norton; $3), 1942. Contbr. to med. jours. Home: Brown's Copse, Heyshott, Midhurst, Sussex, England. Office: Nuffield House, Guy's Hospital, London, S.E.1, England.

GINSBERG, Eli, economist, author; b. N.Y. City, Apr. 30, 1911; s. Louis and Adele (Katzenstein) G.; A.B., Columbia, 1931, A.M., 1932, Ph.D., 1933; student Heidelberg U., 1928-29, Grenoble U., summer 1929; unmarried. Research associate, Columbia U. Council for Research in Social Sciences, 1934-35; instr. of economics, Sch. of Business, Columbia, since 1935; dir. of research in economics and group behavior, Columbia U. Council for Research in Social Sciences, 1939-41; dir. of research, Allotment Com., United Jewish Appeal, 1941-42; dir. of research in determinants of occupational choice and adjustment under Rockefeller grant, 1941-42. Mem. com. on war time requirements for specialized personnel, Nat. Resources Planning Bd. Mem. A.A.A.S., Acad. Polit. Science, Am. Econ. Assn., Beta Gamma Sigma, Phi Beta Kappa. Author: Economics of the Bible, 1932; The House of Adam Smith, 1934; The Illusion of Economic Stability, 1939; Report to American Jews on Overseas Relief, Palestine, and Refugees in the U.S., 1942; Grass on the Slag Heaps —The Story of the Welsh Miner (Harper; $2.50), 1942; What Unemployment Does to People (2 vols.) and Patterns of Labor Leadership (in preparation). Contbr. to Sat. Review Lit., Am. Econ. Review, Polit. Science Quarterly, etc. Home: 435 W. 119th St., New York, N.Y.

GINSBURGH, A. Robert (ginz'bürg), army officer, dir. public relations and information, Services of Supply, War Dept.; b. Russia, May 30, 1895; s. David and Anne (Ellion) G.; brought to U.S., 1904; A.B., magna cum laude, Harvard U., 1917, LL.B., 1920; M.A. in history, U. of Louisville, 1922; M.A. in journalism, U. of Mo., 1931; grad. Field Artillery Sch., 1922, Army Industrial Coll., 1938; m. Elsie Bullitt Pinney, Dec. 29, 1922; children—Robert, Anne and Martha (twins). Commd. 2d lt., Regular Army, 1917, now col.; served as pub. relations officer for Sec. of War Patrick J. Hurley, 1931-33; admitted to D.C. bar, 1936; press relations officer for Asst. Sec. of War Johnson, and Under Sec. of War Patterson, 1937-42; dir. public relations and information, Services of Supply, War Dept., since 1942. Author of miscellaneous Army Articles for current mags. Mem. Phi Beta Kappa, Delta Sigma Rho. Unitarian. Home: 13 E. Underwood, Chevy Chase, Md. Office: Munitions Bldg., Washington, D.C.

References: Army Register; Am. Mercury, Oct. 1940, p. 223.

***†GORMAN, James Edward,** ry. pres. (Mar. 25, 1942).

Reference: Chicago Tribune, Mar. 26, 1942.

GRAF, Herbert, stage dir.; b. Vienna, Austria, Apr. 10, 1903; s. Max and Olga (Hoenig) G.; ed. State Acad. of Music, Vienna, 1921-25; Ph.D. and Mus.D., U. of Vienna, 1925; m. Liselotte Austerlitz, Feb. 28, 1927; 1 son, Werner. Came to U.S., 1934. Singer and stage dir., Muenster, Westphalia, Germany, 1925-26; head stage dir. Municipal Opera House, Breslau, 1926-29; head stage dir. Municipal Opera House, Frankfurt, Germany, and head opera dept. Music Academy, 1929-33; stage dir. Basel, Switzerland, with Felix Weingartner, and in Prague, Czechoslovakia, of productions of Handel's "Josua," 1933-34; stage dir. Phila. Orchestra Assn., 1934-35, Salzburg Festivals, 1935, 36, 37, Florence May Festival (with Arturo Toscanini, and Bruno Walter), 1935-38, Metropolitan Opera, N.Y. City, since 1936; guest stage dir. San Francisco Opera since 1937; head opera dept. Berkshire Music Center since 1940; was also guest stage dir. Central City, Cleveland, Rome, Vienna, Paris, etc. Lectures at Leland Stanford U., U. of Southern Calif. and Harvard U. Mem. bd. govs. American Guild of Musical Artists. Author: The Opera and Its Future in America (Norton; $4.75), 1941. Contbr. to mags. Home: Bedford, N.Y. Address: Metropolitan Opera House, 39th St. and Broadway, New York, N.Y.

Reference: Theatre Arts, June 1938, p. 393.

†GRAHAM, Frank D., economist; author: Design for Democracy (Princeton U. Press; $3.50), 1942.

***†GRAVES, Bibb,** ex-gov. (Mar. 14, 1942).

References: NYT, Mar. 15, 1942; **TM,** Aug. 30, 1937, p. 15.

GREEN, Alan Baer, advertising, author: b. Pittsburgh, Pa., Oct. 30, 1906; s. Morris A. and Josephine (Baer) G.; student Berkeley Irving Prep. Sch., N.Y. City, 1922-24; special courses Columbia, 1924-26; m. Gladys Elizabeth Blun, June 16, 1931; children—Christopher, Stephen, Thomas. Founded Green-Brodie, Inc., advertising, N.Y. City, 1928; also author and contbr. to mags. Author: (mysteries under co-pseudonyms of Roger Denbie and Glen Burne) Death on the Limited (with Julian Brodie), 1934; Death Cruises South (with Julian Brodie), 1935; Murder to Music (with Gladys E. Blun Green), 1935; (with Jack Goodman) How to Do Practically Anything (Simon & Schuster; $1.75), 1942; also (with Julian Brodie) Love on the Run, full-length novel published in Cosmopolitan and later produced as motion picture, 1937. Contbr. to mags. Home: 430 E. 80th St. Office: 485 Madison Av., New York, N.Y.

†GREGORY, Col. William Edward, supt. Culver Mil. Acad.; ordered to active duty in 5th Armored Div., beginning May 1, and granted leave of absence for duration.

GRIFFIS, Elliot, composer, pianist, teacher; b. Boston, Mass., Jan. 28, 1893; s. Rev. William Elliot and Katharine Lyra (Stanton) G.; student Ithaca (N.Y.) High Sch., and Ithaca Coll. (music), 1909-13, Yale Sch. of Music, 1913-15 (studied under Horatio Parker), Yale Sch. of Fine Arts, 1915-16, New England Conservatory of Music, 1917-18 (studied under G. W. Chadwick, Stuart Mason, Lee Pattison); also study in London, Paris, Vienna; hon. Mus.D., N.Y. Coll. Music, 1937; unmarried. Instr. in piano playing, Grinnell (Ia.) Coll., 1920-22, Brooklyn (N.Y.) Settlement Sch., 1923-24; head theory dept. St. Louis Inst. of Music, 1935-36; teacher of piano and theory; lecturer, lecture recitalist; radio appearances as pianist and accompanist. Composer: (for orchestra) First Symphony; A Persian Fable (ballade); Montevallo Suite; Paul Bunyan, Colossus (symphonic poem); Variations for Strings; symphony for strings, Fantastic Pursuit (performed under Sevitzky, Phila., 1941); (chamber music) 3 String Quartets; Quintet; Suite for Trio; Sonata for Violin and Piano; (for piano) Sonata; Letters from a Maine Farm; A Set of Eight; Rousseau Variations; (for voice) Song Cycle: Sunlight and Shadow; A Caravan from China Comes; Men Are the Devil; El Dorado, etc.; (some 60 published compositions). Awarded Juilliard scholarship, 1922; Pulitzer traveling fellowship, 1931. Served with Chem. Warfare Service, U.S. Army, 1918-19. Mem. A.S.C.A.P., Am. Soc. Composers and Condrs., League of Composers, Phi Mu Alpha Sinfonia. Episcopalian. Club: Bohemians (N.Y. City). Author: Rain in May, 1918. Contbr. to jours. Address: New Canaan, Conn.

References: Musician, Sept. 1939, p. 159; **J. T. Howard, Our Contemp. Composers.**

†GROSS, Milt; has one-man show of paintings of western scenes, Perls Gallery, Hollywood, 1942.

GROVER, Beatrice Beard, illustrator, author; b. Brooklyn, N.Y., Dec. 29, 1901; d. Jeremiah Robinson and Grace Piermont (Benedict) Beard; grad. Miss Spence's Sch., N.Y. City, 1919; studied painting under Alon Bement, Mabel Welch, Luis Mora; anatomy and sculpture under Solon Borglum; student Art Students League; m. Allen Grover, Jan. 24, 1929; children—Loraine, Robinson Allen. Exhibited at Nat. Acad., Nat. Assn. Women Painters and Sculptors, Nat. Water Color Soc., did portrait sketches for N.Y. Herald Tribune. Mem. Nat. Assn. Women Artists. Episcopalian. Author and illustrator: Broad Stripes and Bright Stars (Greystone Press; $1), 1941, juvenile book. Home: Clover Farm, South Kent, Conn.

GUTHRIE, Robert Rivers, former chief textile, leather, clothing branch of O.P.M. and W.P.B., merchant; b. Paducah, Ky., Jan. 22, 1890; s. Elbridge and Mary (McElroy) G.; grad. Paducah High Sch., 1906, Centre Coll., Danville, Ky., 1910; m. Julann Caffrey, Jan. 6, 1938; 1 dau. (by previous marriage), Demia (Mrs. Joshua Macdonald). Owner E. Guthrie Co. Dept. Store, Paducah, 1911-38; asso. with Goodbody & Co. (mems. N.Y. Stock Exchange), 1930-35; partner Engel & Co. (mems. N.Y. Stock Exchange), 1936-38; owned seats on N.Y. Cotton Exchange, N.Y. Coffee and Sugar Exchange, Commodity Exchange, 1936-38; consultant to Sec. of War on Post exchange matters, 1941-42; chief textile, leather, clothing branch of O.P.M. and W.P.B., Aug. 1941-Mar. 1942 (resigned); asst. chief Bur. of Industry Branches, W.P.B., Feb.-Mar. 1942; dir. Interstate Dept. Stores, 1936-37, Allied Stores Corp. since 1937, White Sewing Machine Corp. since 1935, Childs Co. since 1940. Past pres. Paducah (Ky.) Rotary Club, Board of Trade, Retail Merchants Assn.; past v.p. and dir. Nat. Retail Dry Goods Assn. Democrat. Mason (all degrees). Clubs: Delta Kappa Epsilon (pres.), Yale (New York). Home: 417 Park Av., New York, N.Y.

HAMAR, Irene (ä-mär'), South Am. sculptor; b. Brazil, 1912; daughter of Brazilian coffee planter; studied in Paris and worked under an asst. of the French sculptor, Bourdelle; represented in numerous South Am. art museums including Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes, Buenos Aires, Academia de Bellas Artes, Rio de Janeiro; now in U.S. by special arrangement of the co-ordinator of Inter-Am. Affairs as part of the good neighbor policy and during March held a one-man show at Acquavella Galleries, N.Y. City. Miss Hamar prefers direct carving on stone and uses white and rose marble, Brazilian alabaster and granite; she also has work in bronze in her U.S. exhibit of 20 sculptures. Address: care Nicholas M. Acquavella Galleries, 38 E. 57th St., New York, N.Y.

HAMBLEN, Stewart Belknap, teacher, writer; b. Gorham, Me., Oct. 26, 1905; s. Lewis Arch and Jessie Pamela (Belknap) H.; B.S., Teachers Coll., Columbia U., 1930, M.A., 1938; m. Elizabeth Belle Kater, Oct. 10, 1931. Teacher, Wilson's Mills, Me., 1924-25, Milton, N.H., 1925-26, Westfield, N.J., 1927, Sharon, Conn., 1927-29, Westwood, N.J., 1930-32; sales mgr., Cumulative Sales Corp., N.Y. City, 1932-34; teacher, Cranford, N.J., since 1934. Mem. Nat. Edn. Assn.; Columbia Chapter, Acacia Frat., A.F. and A.M. Mem. N.J. State Com. on Consumer Edn. Democrat. Congregationalist. Author (with G. F. Zimmerman): Wise Spending: An Introduction to Consumer Economics, 1941; How to Spend Wisely (Harpers; $2.50), 1942. Home: 1 University Pl., New York, N.Y. Office: Cranford High School, Cranford, N.J.

HAMILTON, Edward Parmalee, publisher; b. East Orange, N.J., Oct. 3, 1883; s. Edward P. and Alice (Wiley) H.; student Hill Sch., Pottstown, Pa., 1899-1903, Rensselaer Poly. Inst., Troy, N.Y., 1903-07; unmarried. Began in civil engring. work, 1907; with Cuban Engring. & Contracting Co., building sewer in Havana, 2 years; with Snare & Triest Co., constrn. of Catskill aqueduct, 1½ years; with New England Power Co., design and constrn. of water power plants in Mass., 2 years; with John Wiley & Sons, pubs. of scientific and tech. books, N.Y. City, since Jan. 1, 1914, sec., 1916-25, v.p. and treas., 1925-41, pres. since Sept. 1941. Served with Troop D, Squadron A, N.Y. Nat. Guard (6 months on Mexican border), 1914-17; commd. 2d lt., Field Arty., U.S. Army, 1917, 1st lt., 1918; with A.E.F. in France at Oise-Aisne and Meuse-Argonne; capt. F.A. Reserves for several years. Pres. bd. trustees Kips Bay Boys Club, N.Y. City. Mem. Am. Inst. Mining and Metall. Engrs., Soc. for Promotion Engring. Edn., A.A.A.S., Theta Xi (past pres.), Sigma Xi; associate mem. Am. Soc. C.E. Clubs: University, Engineers (N.Y. City); Bedford (N.Y.) Golf and Tennis. Home: Pea Pond Rd., Katonah, N.Y. Office: 440 Fourth Av., New York, N.Y.

Reference: PW, Sept. 20, 1941, p. 1121.

HANC, Josef (hänch), lecturer, author; b. Libstat, Czechoslovakia, June 20, 1895; s. Jan and Marie (Dejmek) H.; student Teachers Coll., Hradec Kralove, Czechoslovakia, 1910-14, Inst. of Technology, Prague, 1920-24; m. Marie Fiala, Nov. 22, 1924; children—Jan, Jiri. Entered Czechoslovak diplomatic service, 1920; sec. Czechoslovak Legation, London, 1925-29; in charge of research, Dept. of State, Prague, 1929-34; consul, N.Y. City, 1934-39; lecturer Fletcher Sch. of Law and Diplomacy since 1939. Mobilized in Austro-Hungarian Army, 1915; joined Czechoslovak Legions in Russia, 1916; served as capt. Czechoslovak Army in Russia and Siberia, 1916-20. Decorated Czechoslovak War Cross; Military Order of Sokol. Author: Far East, 1932; Central Europe, 1933; Tornado across Eastern Europe (Greystone Press; $3), 1942. Contbr. articles on internat. problems to mags. Home: 11 Clewley Rd., Medford, Mass.

HARDY, William George, educator, author; b. Oakwood, Ont., Canada, Feb. 3, 1896; s. George William and Anne (White) H.; B.A., U. of Toronto, 1917 (also received Gov.-Gen's. gold medal, gold medal and class medal in English), M.A., 1920, Ph.D., U. of Chicago, 1922. Lecturer in classics and ancient history, U. of Toronto, 1918-20; asst. prof., U. of Alberta, 1920-24, asso. prof., 1925-31, prof. since 1932, head dept. of classics since 1938; has traveled in U.S., Caribbean, and Europe with particular attention to Mediterranean area; special interest in archeology and anthropology with research articles on classical history and literature. Served 14 months in World War I; now officer Canadian Army (Res.) assisting in training U. of Alberta C.O.T.C. Pres. Canadian Amateur Hockey Assn., 1938-40; now pres. Internat. Ice Hockey Assn.; pres. Edmonton Little Theatre, 1931-32, producer of its plays, 4 yrs. Mem. Am. Philol. Assn., British Sch. of Archeology, Delta Upsilon, etc. Mason. Author: Father Abraham, 1935 (Abraham, Prince of Ur. in U.S.); Turn Back the River, 1938; All the Trumpets Sounded (Coward-McCann; $2.75), 1942. Contbr. articles and fiction to MacLean's Mag., Canadian Home Journal, Collier's, etc. Has given about 40 lectures for Canadian Broadcasting Corp. Home: 10828 79th Av., Edmonton, Alberta, Can.

HART, Alan L., physician, author; b. Halls Summit, Kans., Oct. 4, 1890; s. Albert Lawrence and Edna (Bamford) H.; A.B., Albany Coll. (Albany, Ore.), Stanford U., 1912; M.D., U. of Ore. Med. Sch., 1917; M.Sc. (Medicine), Grad. Sch. of Medicine, U. of Pa., 1930. Private practice of medicine, 1918-21; staff, tuberculosis instns., 1921-26; roentgenologist, Sacred Heart Hosp., Spokane, Wash., 1926-28; student Grad. Sch. of Medicine, U. of Pa., 1928-29; research fellow, Henry Phipps Inst., Philadelphia, 1929-30; roentgenologist, Tacoma (Wash.) General Hosp., 1930-33; consultant in tuberculosis, Idaho Tuberculosis Assn., Idaho State Dept. of Public Health, since 1938. Mem. various med. and specialist assns., Am. Pub. Health Assn., Authors League of Am. Author: Dr. Mallory, 1935; The Undaunted, 1936; In the Lives of Men, 1937; Dr. Finlay Sees it Through (Harpers; $2.50), 1942. Address: 307 Capital Securities Bldg., Boise, Idaho.

HART, Albert Gailord, economist; b. Oak Park, Ill., Mar. 9, 1909; s. Hastings Hornell and Josephine (Newton) H.; B.A. in economics, summa cum laude, Harvard U., 1930; grad. study, U. of Chicago, 1931-36, Ph.D., 1936; studied in Vienna and Germany, 1930-31, London, 1934-35; m. Ann Elizabeth Webster, July 27, 1936; children—Josephine Webster, Mary Gailord. Sheldon traveling fellow, Harvard U., 1930-31; teaching asst., U. of Chicago, 1932-34, instr., 1934-39; econ. analyst, U.S. Treasury, summer, 1934; lecturer in economics, U. of Calif., Berkeley, autumn, 1936; dir. research Com. on Debt Adjustment, 20th Century Fund, 1937-38; asso. prof. economics, Iowa State Coll., since 1939; was draftsman for revenue proposals placed before Ways and Means Com., May 1941, by 178 economists; presented proposals for the group (in conjunction with S. E. Harris); these proposals advocate taxing at source; presented further developed version of these proposals on behalf of research economists in War Finance Study, Iowa State Coll., Mar. 1942. Chmn. advisory com. Story County Defense Council. Mem. Am. Econ. Assn., Am. Assn. Univ. Profs., Conf. on Research in Nat. Income and Wealth, Phi Beta Kappa. Author: Debts and Recovery, 1929-37, 1938; Anticipations, Uncertainty and Dynamic Planning, 1940; Paying for Defense (with E. D. Allen and others), 1941; also several pamphlets. Contbr. articles and reviews to professional jours. and to several symposium volumes; also popular articles to mags. Mem. editorial bd. Am. Econ. Assn.; mem. exec. com. Conf. on Research in Nat. Income and Wealth. Home: 1011 Burnett St., Ames, Iowa.

***†HASTINGS, John Russell,** editor (Apr. 2, 1942).

Reference: NYT, Apr. 4, 1942.

HATA, Gen. Shunroku, (hä-tä, shün-rō-kōo), comdr. in chief Jap forces in China; b. Hokkaido July 1879; grad. Mil. Acad., 1901; m. Chiyo Ikebe; 3 sons. Promoted to arty., 2d lt., 1901; mem. Gen. Staff Office Staff of Naval Staff Bd.; various posts in arty. to lt. gen., 1931; comdr. of 14th div., 1933; chief of Aviation Dept., 1935-36; comdr. of Taiwan Army, 1936-37; insp.-gen. of Mil. Training Dept. and supreme war councillor, 1937; comdr. in chief, Shanghai forces in China, 1938; Jap minister of war, 1939, and former chief a.d.c. to Emperor; following Japan's entrance into World War II, apptd. comdr. in chief of Jap forces in China.

†HAWES, Elizabeth, author: Why Is A Dress? (Viking; $2), 1942.

†HAYES, Carlton J. H.; apptd. ambassador to Spain, April 1942.

HEFLIN, Alma Goldia (Sally), aviator, author; b. Winona, Mo.; d. Irvin Elgin and Nora Edith (Kelley) Heflin; A.B. in Edn., Coll. of Edn. of Eastern Wash., Cheney, Wash., 1936; student Bigelow-Johnson Aviation Sch., Spokane, 1935, Dallas Aviation Sch., 1937; unmarried. Teacher in elementary schools, Spokane, 1929-36; factory apprentice, Piper Aircraft Corp., Lock Haven, Pa., 1937, asst. in sales promotion, 1938, dir. sales promotion and publicity, 1938-40; test pilot for Piper Aircraft Corp. since 1941, now testing the Cubs (light plane being used by U.S. Army for reconnaisance, artillery spotting, etc.). Directed Cub Calvacade of 226 civilian planes gathered from all U.S. to meeting at Miami, 1938; exec. chmn. of com. leading 578 planes to St. Petersburg, Fla., in Lightplane Calvacade, 1939. Toured Alaska by air, 1940, probably first pilot to make Juneau-Fairbanks flight over Yukon Territory in a light plane; has flown over 44 states, 2 Canadian provinces and 1 Mexican province. Author: Adventure Was the Compass (Little, Brown; $2.75), 1942 (the story of her flight over Alaska). Contbr. to Air Trails, Popular Aviation, etc. Will lecture during April on her aviation career and observations on Alaska as involved in military vulnerability. Home: 2024 E. Sharp Av., Spokane, Wash. Address: Piper Aircraft Corp., Lock Haven, Pa.

Reference: AM, Apr. 1942, p. 84.

***†HEGNER, Robert William,** zoologist (Mar. 11, 1942).

References: Chicago Tribune, Mar. 12, 1942; **Leaders in Edn.; M.S.**

HELFER, Walter, prof. music; b. Lawrence, Mass., Sept. 30, 1896; s. Michael and Margaret (Naumann) H.; A.B., Harvard U., 1919; M.A., Columbia U., 1934; m. Dorothy Sutcliffe, July 28, 1927; children—Walter, Michael. Teacher of Latin and French, Mitchell Mil. Sch., Lowell, Mass., 1922-24; dir. of music, Deane Sch., Santa Barbara, 1924-25; fellow in music composition, Am. Acad. in Rome (pupil of Respighi), 1925-28; asst. prof. music, Hunter Coll., 1929-39, asso. prof. music and chmn. dept. since 1939. Served as wireless operator, 34th Baloon Co., A.E.F., 1917-19. Awarded Endicott prize, Boston, 1922; Rome prize in 1925 competition; Paderewski prize, 1930; Fellow of American Academy in Rome (in perpetuity), 1929. Mem. Am. Assn. Univ. Profs., Am. Soc. Composers, Authors and Publishers, Phi Beta Kappa. Composer: Elegiac Sonata for Piano, 1932; Quartet in G for Strings, 1928; Appassionata for Violin and Piano, 1929; works for male, female, mixed choir and orchestra, 1940-42; also symphony and chamber orchestra works. Home: New Rochelle, N.Y.

Reference: Baker, Biog. Dictionary of Musicians.

HELLMAN, Geoffrey Theodore, writer; b. N.Y. City, Feb. 13, 1907; s. George S. and Hilda E. (Josephthal) H.; grad. Taft Sch., Watertown, Conn., 1924; A.B., Yale, 1928; m. Daphne van Beuren Bayne, Aug. 12, 1941. Reporter, later associate editor, The New Yorker, 1929-31; associate editor, Fortune, 1931-32; staff writer, The New Yorker, 1932-38; associate editor, Life, 1936-38; staff writer The New Yorker since 1938 (has written many "Profiles" and "Reporter at Large" pieces, several hundred "Talk-of-the-Town" pieces, also 30-40 satirical pieces). Mem. Chi Delta Theta. Clubs: Yale, Dutch Treat, Coffee House (N.Y. City); Elizabethan (Yale; mem. bd. govs. 1926-27). Writings have appeared in several anthologies; he is now writing a book on the lecture business of America. Home: 38 E. 85th St. Office: The New Yorker, 25 W. 43d St., New York, N.Y.

HELSETH, Henry Edward, author; b. Minneapolis, Minn., Jan. 10, 1912; s. Edward Gustave and Leone Harda Bertina (Hansen) H.; ed. Minneapolis grammar sch.; m. Margaret Lorraine Camden, Sept. 1940; 1 son, Kyrie. Held various positions as laborer, clerk, shipyard worker and many other jobs. Author: The Yellow Angels, 1940; The Devil's Behind You (Harpers; $2), 1942. Home: 1500 Park Av., Minneapolis, Minn.

HENRY, Gene (pseudonym); see Sheldon, Jean Pendleton.

HEWES, Margaret (Mrs. Ambrose T. Gosling), playwright, producer; b. Canada, June 7, 1898; d. H. Havelock and Mary (Orr) Warman; ed. in pub. schs., private tutors; grad., Jacqueline Mellor Sch. of Dalcroze Eurythmics, and Leland Powers Sch., Boston, Mass.; m. Dr. Henry Fox Hewes, 1925 (died 1926); m. 2d, Lt. Col. the Hon. Ambrose T. Gosling, Feb. 11, 1937; 1 son, Henry Fox Hewes; came to U.S., 1915, naturalized, 1915. Owned, managed, The Wharf Theatre and The Wharf Players of Provincetown, 1929-36; producer on Broadway, Ray & Hewes, 1931-32; co-producer, Wild Waves, Times Square Theatre, 1931 (prod. as "The Big Broadcast" by Paramount Pictures Corp., 1931 and later); producer, Nine Pine Street, Longacre Theatre, 1933, Alley Cat, Forty-eighth Street Theatre, and Roll, Sweet Chariot, Cort Theatre, 1934; head of editorial dept., The Independent Producers Co. (motion pictures), Elstree, England, 1935-38; producer (for Warner Bros.), The Woman Brown, Biltmore Theatre, 1939, First Stop to Heaven, Windsor Theatre, 1941. Mem., N.Y. League of Theater Mgrs. Author: Dollars Want You (M. S. Mill Co.; $1), 1942. Home: Strawberry Hill, Paget, Bermuda. Office: 1331 Madison Av., New York, N.Y.

†HEYLIGER, William, author: SOS Radio Patrol (Dodd, Mead; $2), 1942.

†HIBBS, Ben; becomes editor Saturday Evening Post.

***†HIRSCH, Isaac Seth,** X-ray expert (Mar. 24, 1942).

Reference: NYT, Mar. 25, 1942.

HOFMANN, Jeane (Margaret Jeane-Marie Hofmann), sports reporter and cartoonist; b. Los Angeles, Calif., Apr. 24, 1919; d. Henry Peter and Ada May (Leu) Hofmann; grad. Los Angeles High Sch., 1937; student U. of Calif. Night Sch., 6 months; studied cartooning after school but attended no art school; unmarried. At the age of 15 decided on career of sports writing and cartooning as something different for girls; began covering boys' sports at Los Angeles High Sch., 1935; started contributing sport cartoons to Hollywood Citizen-News, 1936; as reporter cartoonist for Citizen-News

covered Coast League baseball, Loyola U. football and hockey, wrestling, boxing and basketball, 1937-40, also Chicago Cubs spring training camp at Catalina, Mar. 1940; drew cover for Tenn.-S.C. Rose Bowl game, 1939 (first girl to do so); press agent for Jim Murphy, Stanford football player, for movies, 1940; sports cartoonist with Phila. Evening Bulletin since Sept. 1940; as cartoonist covered hockey, squash, tennis, U. of Pa. football, basketball, golf, soccer, lacrosse, and all major league baseball at Shibe Park (first girl admitted to press box); began writing sports, Nov. 1941, doing a column of humorous features on U. of Pa. football; then column with cartoons; covered 10 spring baseball training camps, Fla., Feb.-Mar. 1942. Has not participated actively in any sport; likes to watch baseball games, also fond of watching football and hockey games; prefers men's sports to women's; would like to travel with the Phillies this summer as first girl reporter to do straight coverage. Home: Y.W.C.A., 1421 Arch St. Office: Evening Bulletin, Philadelphia, Pa.

References: NSW, Mar. 9, 1942, p. 55; TM, Mar. 9, 1942, p. 55.

HOGUE, Alexandre, artist; b. Memphis, Mo., Feb. 22, 1898; s. Rev. Charles Lehman and Martha Amelia (Hoover) H.; ed. Dallas High Sch., Minneapolis Inst. of Art and by private instruction under Frank Reaugh; m. Maggie Joe Watson, July 16, 1938. Head art dept. Hockaday Jr. Coll., Dallas, since 1936; mem. summer art faculty, Tex. State Coll. for Women, Denton, since 1932. Painted murals Dallas City Hall (in collaboration with Jerry Bywaters), Graham (Tex.) Post Office, Houston (Tex.) Parcel Post Annex. Exhibited Internat. Exhbn., Paris, France, 1938, Venice (Italy) Biennial, 1940, Museum of Modern Art, Nat. Acad., Whitney Museum, Rockefeller Center (New York), Carnegie Internat. (Pittsburgh), 1938, 39, Corcoran Biennial (Washington), Chicago Art Inst., Colorado Springs Fine Arts Center, Am. Fedn. of Art Circuits, Nat. Com. of Engraving Circuit of 100 Am. Lithographs, 1941, New York World's Fair, Texas Centennial, both Golden Gate Expns.; also at museums at Havana, Cuba, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Montevideo, Uruguay, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Santiago, Chile, Lima, Peru, Quito, Ecuador, Bogota, Colombia, Caracas, Venezuela, and Mexico City, Mex. Rep. in Carl Milles Collection, Cranbrook, Mich., Phila. Museum of Art, Dallas Museum of Fine Arts, Internat. Business Machines, N.Y. City, Jeu de Paume Museum, Paris, and John Glen Sample Collection, Chicago, also many others. Paintings have been reproduced in various mags. and books on art. Awarded Kiest Purchase prize, 1930; Lawrence Pollock prize, 1936; four 1st awards, 1930-33, Dallas Allied Arts; N.O. Garden Soc. prize, Southern States Art League, 1932; Dallas Print Soc. purchase prize, 1937; Printmakers Guild prize, Dallas, 1941. Mem. Dallas Art Assn., Lone Star Printmakers, Dallas Artists Tribe. Home: 912 Moreland St. Studio: 3312 Reagan St., Dallas, Tex.

Reference: LI, Feb. 10, 1941, p. 40.

HO YING-CHIN (hō ying-jin), Chinese war minister; b. Kweichow, China, 1889; grad. Kweichow and Wuchang jr. mil. schs., Tokyo Mil. Acad., 1909. Active in 1911 Revolution; sent to Japan for further study; returned to China; apptd. prin. Kweichow Mil. Inst.; became chief of Kweiyang Police Dept.; chief instr. and dean, Whampoa Mil. Cadets Acad., 1924; suppressed certain N. China insurrentionists in cooperation with Chiang Kai-shek, appearing at times pro-Jap; took part in several mil. expdns.; in charge of various provincial police forces; mem. Central Polit. Council and State Council of the nat. govt., Nanking, 1927; became chief of staff of Generalissimo's Hdqrs., 1927; dir.-gen. mil. training, 1929; chief of staff and minister of mil. affairs since 1930; apptd. acting chmn. Peiping Branch Natl. Mil. Affairs Commn., dir. gen. for Govt. of Inner Mongolia, 1934; resident rep. of Exec. Yuan at Peiping, 1935; negotiated Ho-Umedzu Agreement complying with Jap demands in N. China, 1935.

Reference: J. Gunther, Inside Asia.

HSIUNG SHI-HUI (shi-ūng shi-hōō-i), head Chinese mission to U.S., general; b. Anyi Hsien, Kiangsi, 1892; grad. Paoting Mil. Acad. (China), Jap. Imperial Mil. Acad., Tokyo. Assisted Dr. Sun Yat-sen in 1st Revolution, 1911; apptd. dir. edn., Mil. Acad. of 3d Nationalist Army Corps; comdr. of 1st div. and chief of polit. bureau of 14th Army Corps when Kiangsi was occupied; mem. Kiangsi Provincial Party Hdqrs.; comdr. of 13th Nationalist Army Corps, 1927, comdr. of 37th Div. and associate comdr. of 13th Nationalist Army Corps; acting garrison comdr. of Shanghai and Woosung Area, 1928; resigned to participate in Northern Punitive Expdn., Mar. 1928; re-apptd. garrison comdr. of Shanghai-Woosung Area, 1929-31; chmn., Kiangsi Provincial Govt., 1931-42; apptd. head Chinese mission to U.S., March 1942.

HUBBARD, Lucien, writer, motion picture producer; b. Cincinnati, O., Dec. 21, 1888; s. Frank Gilbert and Rose Ann (Swingle) H.; student Bellevue High School, Bellevue, Ky.; m. Alice Helen Bender, Oct. 22, 1910; 2 daus., Janet (Mrs. George B. Seitz, Jr.), Betty Ann. Reporter, Cincinnati Times-Star, 1907-09, Chicago Daily News, New Orleans Item, 1910, Cincinnati Post, 1911; reporter, night city editor, New York Press, 1912-14; night city editor, New York Tribune, 1915-16; free lance screen writer, 1918; scenario writer, Vitagraph Co., 1919; scenario editor, producer, Universal, Paramount, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Warner Bros., Twentieth-Century Fox studios, 1920-41. Among pictures produced were "Wings" and "Vanishing American." Plays polo; owns B-Bar-H Guest Ranch, Palm Springs, Calif. Author: Rivers to the Sea (Simon & Schuster; $2.50), 1942. Address: 628 N. Hillcrest Rd., Beverly Hills, Calif.

HURST, Vida, author; b. Tarkio, Mo., Aug. 28, 1890; d. Henry Warder and Anna (Davidson) Hurst; B.A., Tarkio (Mo.) Coll., 1912; student (short story), Drake U., 1913-14, Egan's Little Theater (Los Angeles), 1921, Columbia U., 1922; m. Carl G. Osterstrom, Oct. 1, 1914 (divorced, 1932); 1 dau., Ann (Mrs. George E. Allison). Started writing early, winning two short story prizes from Des Moines Register Tribune, 1920, 1921; sold to pulps, 1920-25; wrote for San Francisco News, Bell Syndicate, 1925-31; under contract to Register and Tribune Syndicate, 1931-43. Spent 1 mo. in Argentina, 1939; lived in Buenos Aires, March-July, 1941. Mem. Authors League (N.Y. City). Republican. Club: Am. Woman's (Buenos Aires, Argentina). Author: 35 novels first pub. as syndicated newspaper serials, 1925-41; mag. serial "Diana," McClures, 1927; (moving pictures), Tarnished (sold to Warner Bros., not released), 1932; Blind Date (Columbia Pictures), 1934, Honeymoon Limited (Monogram Films), 1934; Tango (Invincible Pictures), 1935; (novels) The Greater Love (translated into Swedish); Strangers Married (translated into Norwegian); Single Ladies (Gramercy Press; $2), 1941. Home: 3675 Fillmore St., San Francisco, Calif. Office: care of Register and Tribune Syndicate, Des Moines, Ia.

HUSSEY, Ruth, actress; b. Providence, R.I.; d. George R. and Julia (Corbett) Hussey; Ph.B., Pembroke; grad. work at U. of Mich.; unmarried. Began as radio artist on Station WPRO; then had part in Dead End (stage show); now with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer; played in H. M. Pulham, Esq. Roman Catholic. Address: 4116 Franklin Av., Los Angeles, Calif.

References: COL, Dec. 21, 1940, p. 12; AM, July 1941, p. 82; MPAI.

†HUTCHESON, Ernest, musician; founder of "Victory" concerts; now announces regular Sunday series and America's greatest musicians offer services.

†JAMES, Preston E., geographer, author: Latin America (Lothrop, Lee; $6), 1942.

JAMES, Will, artist, author: The American Cowboy (Scribner's; $2.50), 1942.

JANIS, Sidney, art critic, author, collector; b. Buffalo, N.Y., July 8, 1897; s. Isaac and Celia (Cohen) J.; grad. Tech. High Sch., Buffalo, 1915; enrolled at U. of Buffalo but left to enter Naval Aviation, 1918; m. Harriet Grossman, Sept. 2, 1925; children—Conrad Marius, Carroll Lott. Dancer on stage, Buffalo, 1916-18; advertising and furniture design, Buffalo, 1919-23; executive, founder and pres., M'Lord Shirt Co., Inc., N.Y. City, 1924-40; mem. advisory com. Museum of Modern Art, N.Y. City, since 1934, and arranged several exhibitions including "Visual Analysis of Seated Man by Picasso "—1911" (1940) which is now on tour. Enlisted in U.S. Naval Res. Force, Naval Aviation Div., May 1918; grad. Aeronautical Sch., Great Lakes, Ill., 1919, with rating of 1st class petty officer; hon. discharged, 1919, with rating of 1st class petty officer; hon. discharged, 1919. Club: Hillcrest Tennis (New York) since 1925. Author: They Taught Themselves (Dial Press; $3.50), 1942. Contbr. art articles to Decision, View, Art News (N.Y. City), Pacific (San Francisco) Review Minotaure (Lausanne) and catalogs of Museum of Modern Art, N.Y. City. Art talks over WABC, KYA and CBS television; also at Art Institute, Chicago, and Marie Harriman Gallery. Now engaged in writing 2 books on Amemrican art.; Four Centuries of American Primitive Painting, and American Abstract and Subrealist Art (both scheduled for fall publication, 1942). Home: 1 W. 85th St., New York, N.Y.

JAYNES, Clare (co-pseudonym); see Spiegel, Clara Gatzert, and Mayer, Jane Rothschild.

JINNAH, Mohammed Ali (jin'nä), pres. All-India Moslem League; b. India, Dec. 25, 1876; studied law; married; 1 dau. Began as lawyer and attained highly successful practice, Bombay; became private sec. to Dadabhoy Naoroji, a founding father of Indian Nat. Congress, 1906; as mem. Imperial Legislative Council gained mass popularity in successful opposition to building statue of Lord Willingdon for which polit. coup Bombay students and citizens honored him in erecting Peoples' Jinnah Hall; resigned from Congress, 1921; in protest traveled in Europe to escape Gandhi's passive-resistance policy; elected pres., All-India Moslem League, 1934; publicly presented "Pakistan" plan (plan of gaining a divided nation of Hindu India and Moslem India) at Annual Session of Moslem League at Lahore, 1938; together with 25 colleagues was absent from Legislative Assembly meeting, New Delhi, refusing full Indian support to British in World War II until British satisfied Indian polit. demands; now engaged in negotiations with Sir Stafford Cripps for Indian freedom and participation in the war. His brilliant personality creates both friends and enemies; some believe he honestly works for Moslem independence and to save them from tyranny of the Hindus who outnumber them 4 to 1; others believe that his goal is the "Pakistan"; but Hindus claim he prevents India's winning dominion status by following each demand with another demand as soon as Brit. satisfies one, thereby aiding Brit. by dividing India.

References: TM, Nov. 10, 1941, p. 30; Dec. 4, 1939, p. 32; J. Gunther, Inside Asia.

JOHNSON, Helen Lossing, writer, illustrator; b. Poughkeepsie, N.Y., May 31, 1865; d. Benson J. and Helen (Sweet) Lossing; ed. by tutor and private sch., N.Y. City; student, Nat. Acad. of Design, N.Y. City, Pratt Inst. Art Sch., Brooklyn, N.Y.; m. Frank Edgar Johnson, Nov. 17, 1892 (deceased); 2 daus., Margaret S., Eleanor L. (deceased). Illustrator of books, including 1888 edit. of John Gilpin and several books written by her father, 1886-1889; co-illustrator and co-author with dau., Margaret Sweet Johnson (see this issue of Service), of several juvenile books. Mem. Am. Artists Professional League, Westchester County Hist. Soc., Authors Guild, Yonkers Art Assn. Republican. Episcopal. Club: Fortnightly Literary. Co-author and co-illustrator: Tally-Ho, 1936; A Spaniel of Old Plymouth, 1937; Black Bruce, 1938; The Story of Rickey, Barney of the North, 1939; The Smallest Puppy, Tim, a Dog of the Mountains, 1940; Carlo, the Hound Who Thought He Was a Calf; Rolf, an Elk-hound of Norway, 1941; Runaway Puppy (Harcourt Brace; $1.75), 1942. Address: 16 Gilbert Place, Yonkers, N.Y.

***†JOHNSON, Gen. Hugh S.,** columnist and former head NRA (April 15, 1942).

References: NYHT, Apr. 15, 1942; TM, July 8, 1940, p. 53; Mar. 17, 1941, p. 38; May 12, 1941, p. 14; Sept. 1, 1937, p. 32; NA, June 24, 1939, p. 718; Mar. 12, 1938, p. 297; LI, Jan. 20, 1941, p. 27; Literary Digest, Sept. 2, 1937, p. 7.

†JOHNSON, Louis A., U.S. govt. official; heads U.S. advisory mission to India.

JOHNSON, Margaret Sweet, writer, illustrator; b. Brooklyn, N.Y., Nov. 1, 1893; d. Frank Edgar and Helen (Lossing) Johnson; ed. in Yonkers pub. schs.; student, Nat. Acad. of Design, Art Students League; unmarried. Illustrator, St. Nicholas, Boys' Life, etc., 1925, various books, 1926-30; did oil paintings of wild animals for N.Y. Zoological Soc., dog portraits for Field and Stream mag., etc. Exhibited paintings at Yonkers Art Assn., N.Y. art galleries, specializing in sporting pictures. Mem. Yonkers Art Assn., Authors Guild. Republican. Episcopal. Club: Fort-

nightly (Yonkers). Co-author and co-illustrator of series of dog stories, for which see Helen Lossing Johnson (this issue this Service). Address: 16 Gilbert Place, Yonkers, N.Y.

KALLAY (de Nagy Kálló), Nicolas (kä-lä'é), Hungarian premier; b. 1887. Served as county lord lt., 1921-29; parliamentary del. to trade confs. in Rio de Janeiro and Rome and mem. Ministry of Trade, 1929; minister of agriculture in late Premier Gombos' pro-Nazi Cabinet, 1929, until he resigned in protest, 1935; became privy councillor, 1936, pres. National Irrigation Bd., 1937; life mem. nat. governing bd. since 1937; pres. agricultural Internat. Tech. and Chem. Cong., since 1939; Regent Horthy appointed Kallay Hungarian premier, 1942, to succeed retiring Ladislas de Bardossy, successor of late Count Teleki. (Recent Hungarian rumors include suicide of Teleki, April 1941, when Nazis needed assistance against the Yugo-Slavs, and de Bardossy's resignation because of ill health following Nazi request for 20 more divs. for their Eastern front, Mar. 1942).

KAPELL, William, pianist; b. N.Y. City, Sept. 20, 1922; s. Harry and Edith (Wolfson) K.; ed. New York pub. schs., Columbia Grammar Sch.; studied piano since age of 10; also studied under Olga Samaroff-Stokowski; received scholarship Phila. Conservatory of Music and fellowship Juilliard Sch. of Music, 1940. Won Youth Piano Contest at age of 17 and appeared with Phila. Orchestra, also Naumburg award recital, Oct. 28, 1941; awarded Town Hall Endowment award, 1942; has appeared in many concerts in New York and Calif., also on radio. Home: 3535 203d St., Bayside, L.I., N.Y. Address: 1144 Lexington Av., New York, N.Y.

KENNAN, Kent Wheeler, composer, music teacher; b. Milwaukee, Wis., Apr. 18, 1913; s. Kossuth Kent and Sara Louise (Wheeler) K.; student U. of Mich., 1930-32; B.Mus. in composition and theory, Eastman Sch. of Music (U. of Rochester), 1934, M.Mus. in composition, 1936; student Royal Acad. of Santa Cecilia, Rome, 1938. Teacher Kent (Ohio) State U., 1939-40; teacher composition, orchestration, counterpoint and theory, U. of Tex., since 1940. Recipient Hopwood award ($250) for short story writing, U. of Mich., 1932; 2d prize, Whiteman contest for orchestral work, 1935; Prix de Rome in Music, 1936. Mem. Delta Tau Delta. Presbyterian. Composer: Symphony; Night Soliloquy; Promenade; Air de Ballet; Lament; Jig; Il Campo di Fiori; Nocturne; Andante; Quintet; Sea Sonata; Blessed Are They; Piano Sonata; Three Songs; Three Preludes; Piano Concertino. Works have been performed by Rochester Philharmonic and Civic Orchestras, N.B.C. Symphony, Detroit Symphony, Wis. Symphony, Phila. Little Symphony, Rochester Little Symphony, N.Y. Civic, Milwaukee Young People's orchestras, Orchestra di Santa Cecilia (Rome), Nat. Orchestral Assn., Kraueter Quartet, Station WQXR, etc. Home: Kalamazoo, Mich. Address: Music Dept., University of Texas, Austin, Tex.

References: Baker, Biog. Dictionary of Musicians; J. T. Howard, Our Contemp. Composers.

KENNERLY, Byron Fees, flying instr., author; b. Robinson, Kan., Sept. 30, 1908; s. Orlie Alden and Ethel (Cloe) K.; student Klamath Falls (Ore.) High Sch., 1925-29, Frank Wiggins Sch. of Aeronautics, Los Angeles, Feb.-June 1939; m. Dorothy Collins, 1941. On active duty as officer fighter pilot in Royal Air Force, England, Aug. 1940-Mar. 1941; one of 1st eight pilots to join Royal Air Force, World War II, and one of 1st members of now famous "Eagle Squadron"; upon return from England, became tech. adviser to Warner Bros. for production of "International Squadron." Baptist. Author: The Eagles Roar (Harper; $3), 1942. Wrote mag. article, "Squadron 71, Scramble," for Harper's mag. Home: 507 San Clemente, Ventura, Calif.

***†KENT, Sidney R.,** pres. 20th Century-Fox (Mar. 19, 1942).

References: NYT, Mar. 24, 1942; MPAI.

†KERNER, Robert J., author: The Urge to the Sea: The Course of Russian History (U. of Calif. Press; $2.50), 1942.

KISS, Joseph Archer (kish), author, teacher; lecturer on advt.; b. Chicago, Ill., Feb. 17, 1896; s. Isador and Anna (Wittkower) K. Entered advertising field, Chicago, 1918; advertising writer Chicago Tribune, 1918-23; H. W. Kastor & Sons, 1923-25; deptl. advt. mgr. Montgomery Ward & Co., 1925-29; pres. Joseph Archer Kiss Advertising Agency since 1929; dir. Ray Sch. of Advertising, 1929-39; dir. Croydon Inst. of Advertising since 1939; teacher advertising, salesmanship, human relations, Chicago Pub. Schs., since 1939; contbr. Printers' Ink, Inland Printer, etc., and to European periodicals; lecturer on personality problems, Chicago Park Dist. Community Centers; lecturer on human relations and psychology before clubs, schools, chambers of commerce, etc.; lecturer for Civilian Defense Commn., Chicago Area; vocational counselor. Author: It's All in Your Mind—How to Get What You Want Out of Life (Reilly & Lee; $2), 1941; Principles of Advertising and Marketing (Henry Holt & Co.), 1942; How to Live and Like It (in preparation). Address: 30 W. Washington St., Chicago, Ill.

†KOENIGSBERG, Moses, founder of news syndicate; author: King News (Stokes; $3.50), 1942.

KOLACHOV, Paul John (kō-lä'chōf), dir. of research and development; b. Atamanskaja, Don, Russia, June 28, 1899; s. John and Anna (Kolesov) K.; B.S., Teachers Inst., Russia, 1918; Engr. of Tech., Prague Polytechnic Inst., 1926, M.S., 1928, D.Sc., 1937; grad. work Prague Distilling Inst., Brunn Polytechnic Inst.; m. Eugenie de Glazoff, Feb. 22, 1925; 1 son, Sergei. Came to U.S., 1929, naturalized, 1936. Instr. in high sch., Russia, 1918-20; research chemist, French Nat. Sch. Agr., 1923-26; dir. of distillery and brewing firm, Prague, 1926-29; instr., Columbia U., 1929-30; in charge research and control labs. for dairy company, Lincoln, Neb., 1930-33; brewmaster in charge of research for brewing company, York, Neb., 1933-34; research chemist Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., since 1937, now as dir. of research and development, Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., Louisville, Ky.; lecturer at Prague Poly. Inst., U. of Louisville. Mem. Russian Emigrant Student Congress of Prague; pres. Russian Cossack Univ. Grads. Assn.; active in Cossack Emigrant Agrl. Assn. while in Europe; active in Chemurgic movement in this country and recently in the news for stating that a plant used in Russia as a source of rubber could be grown in U.S.; also advocate of other new crops, such as drugs, spices, essential oils, etc. Mem. Am. Chem. Soc., A.A.A.S., Soc. Am. Bacteriologists, N.Y. Acad. Science, Ky. Acad. Science, Inst. Food Technologists. Episcopalian. Author: Domestic Production of Essential Oils from Aromatic Plants (with H. F. Willkie), 1940; U.S. Imports as Possible New Crops (with R. T. Willkie), 1941; Kok-sagyz, as a Practical Source of Natural Rubber, 1942; also 60 publs. on fermentation, particularly in brewing, distilling, and yeast industry. Home: 1808 Alfresco Place. Office: Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., Louisville, Ky.

Reference: MS.

KONEFF, Ivan S., (kō-nēf'), Russian comdr. on Central Front; b. Archangel region, Russia; student only until 12 yrs. old; much later returned to sch. and grad. Frunze Acad., the mil. sch. becoming famous in World War II as training sch. of young Russian officers. Joined Russian Army, 1913, served in Revolution and Sino-Jap. war; given divisional rank in Army, 1934; became active in World War II, Sept. 1941, and as successful head Russian counteroffensive in the central sector was sent to southern sector for similar command; returned to central sector comdg. under Zhukov (see this Supplement, III-24) in the Tula section; outwitted the Germans on Kalinin front capturing 34 towns along with tremendous quantites of supplies, Apr. 1942.

KOYRÉ, Alexandre (kwä-rā'), univ. prof.; b. Taganrog, France, Aug. 29, 1892; s. Vladimir and Catherine (Lseven) K.; student of Univ. of Paris, and Göttingen, 1909-14, at the Univ. of Paris, 1909-14 (diploma, 1913; doctor's degree, 1923; doctor of lit., 1929); m. Dora (Reyberman) Feb. 27, 1922. Came to U.S., 1941. Lecturer, Ecole des Hautes Etudes and the Institut d'Etudes Slaves, 1922-30; lecturer, Sorbonne, 1929-30; asso. prof., Univ. of Montpelier, 1930-31; became prof., Ecole des Hautes Etudes (Sorbonne), 1931; was prof. at Univ. of Cairo, 1936, 37, 38; visiting lecturer at Univs. of Prague, Amsterdam, Groningen, Damascus, at Institut de Hautes Etudes at Brussells, at Centre d'Histoire des Sciences of Belgium, etc. Mem. French Soc. of Philosophy, Soc. of Psychology; mem. Institute of History of Sciences of Univ. of Paris (advisory dir.) and Center of History of the Sciences of Brussels, etc., now asso. prof. New School for Social Research, N.Y. City. Editor: Recherches Philosophiques; co-editor: Revue d'Histoire et de Philosophie Religieuses. Awarded prizes La Dissez de Peñarun, 1923, Prix Gegner, 1927, 1929, by the Académie des Sciences Morales et Politiques. Served as volunteer in World War I, 1914-19; awarded Croix de Guerre, Croix de Saint Georges. Home: 532 W. 114th St., New York, N.Y.

KREIDER, Carl, educator, author; b. Wadsworth, O., Sept. 26, 1914; s. Lloyd and Adelia (Stover) Kreider; B.A., Goshen Coll., 1936; M.A., Princeton U., 1938, Ph.D., 1941; student London Sch. of Economics, 1938-39; m. Evelyn Burkholder, June 8, 1939; 1 son, Alan Fetter. Field research fellow and research asst., Brookings Instn., 1939-40; instr. economics, Goshen Coll., since 1940; extension lecturer (part time), Indiana U., since 1941. Awarded Mary Campbell Memorial traveling fellowship. Mem. Am. Econ. Assn. Independent Democrat. Mennonite. Author: The Anglo-American Trade Agreement (Princeton U.), 1942. Contbr. to mags. Home: 1612 S. 8th, Goshen, Ind.

KUBIK, Gail Thompson, composer; b. South Coffeyville, Okla., Sept. 5, 1914; s. Henry H. and Eva O. (Thompson) K.; Mus.B., Eastman Sch., U. of Rochester, 1934; Mus.M., Am. Conservatory of Music, Chicago, 1935; student Grad. Sch. Arts and Sciences (Div. of Music), Harvard U., 1937-38; m. Jessie Louise Maver, April 5, 1939. Mem. music faculty, Monmouth Coll. (Monmouth, Ill.), 1934-36, Dakota Wesleyan U. (Mitchell, S.D.), 1936-37; music critic, Chicago Musical Leader, 1934-38; instr. music history, advanced composition and orchestration, Teachers Coll., Columbia U., 1938-40; staff composer, mus. program adviser, National Broadcasting Co., 1940-41; guest condr., N.B.C. Symphony, summer, 1941; writer for radio, films, theater; commissioned works for Columbia Broadcasting Co., Am. Recorder Soc., G. Schirmer Pub. Co., Mercury Music Corp., U.S. Maritime Commission, etc. Mem. Am. Composers Alliance; Phi Mu Alpha Sinfonia. Awards: 1st in 4 nat. competitions: Sinfonia, 1934, MacDowell fellowships, 1937-38, Chicago Symphony Golden Jubilee, 1941, Jascha Heifetz Violin Concerto, 1941. Clubs: Harvard; Bohemian (N.Y. City). Composer: Solace (song), 1938; Daniel Drew (for chorus), 1939; Suite for Three Recorders, 1941; Sonatina for Piano, Dance Soliloquy (for piano), 1942; concerto for violin and orchestra, 1940; sonatina for violin and piano, 1941; cantata: In Praise of Johnny Appleseed, 1938; "Stewball": Variations for band, 1942; film scores for film "Men and Ships," 1940, and "World War No. II," 1942. Editor: American Music for Piano (series), 1942. Home: 204 E. 18th St. Office: 115 W. 63rd St., New York, N.Y.

Reference: J. T. Howard, Our Contemp. Composers.

***†LADD, Maynard,** pediatrician (Mar. 9, 1942).

Reference: NYT, Mar. 11, 1942.

LATHAM, Natalie Wales, pres. Bundles for America, Inc.; b. Cohasset, Mass., Aug. 8, 1900; d. Nathaniel Brackett and Enid (Scarritt) Wales; ed. Miss Spence's Sch. and Nightingale Bamford Sch., N.Y. City; hon. Dr. Humanity, Rollins Coll., Winter Park, Fla., 1942; m. Kenehn Winslow, April 27, 1929 (divorced); children—Natalie Wales, Mary Chilton; m. 2d Edward Mathews Latham, June 2, 1937 (divorced). Founder, 1940, and hon. pres. Bundles for Britain, Inc.; pres. Bundles for America, Inc., and (naval div.) Bundles for Bluejackets since 1942; these orgns. are dedicated to men of U.S. Armed Forces and their families and to all citizens adversely affected by war. Member of staff, New York Times, since 1941. Episcopalian. Home: 141 E. 88th St. Address: 475 5th Av., New York, N.Y.

References: LI, May 19, 1941, p. 132; NYr, Apr. 19, 1941, p. 21.

LAUFERTY, Lilian (law'fēr-ti), author; b. Fort Wayne, Ind., d. Alexander and Minnie (Eliel) Laufery; B.A., Smith Coll., Northampton, Mass.; m. James Wolfe, Oct. 15, 1924. Began as "The Girl Reporter," New York Evening Journal, 1917, dramatic interviewer, 1918-19; left newspaper work, 1924; originated radio script show "Big Sister," 1936; wrote "Your Family and Mine" (original program) which was produced, 1938-40; also appeared on several other programs; on lecture tours with husband, 1926; lecturer Summer conference, Olivet (Mich.) Coll., 1941. Mem. Authors League Advance (former mem. council Radio Guild). Club: Shore and Country (Norwalk). Author: The Street of Chains, 1929; A Pair of Sixes; The Crimson Thread (Simon & Schuster; $2), 1942. Contbr. to Liberty, Red Book, Cosmopolitan, Collier's, Harper's, etc. Engaged in publicity for husband, James Wolfe (basso with Met. Opera Co., 19 yrs.). Home: Wolfe-Den, Silvermine Av., Norwalk, Conn.

LAUTERBACH, Albert T. (lou'tēr-bäk), educator, author; b. Austria, June 24, 1904; s. Dr. Isidor and Augusta (Wiesenberg) L.; student Commerce Coll., Vienna, 1922-23; Dr. rer. pol. (Ph.D.), U. of

Vienna, 1925; m. Tilly Lauterbach, Aug. 17, 1929. With Escompte-Gesellschaft (bank), Vienna, 3 yrs., 1926-29; Central European corr. Financial News (London), Reynolds News (London) and regular contbr. to various German, Swedish, Dutch and Czechoslovak periodicals, 1927-38; lecturer on economics, sociology and internat. relations, Extension Colls. (Volkshochschulen), Vienna, 1926-34, also lectured in Switzerland, France, England, Czechoslovakia and Germany and radio commentator on Austrian and German stations; asso. with Social and Econ. Museum of City of Vienna, 1930-34; translator Internat. Labor Office (League of Nations), 1937; went to London after German invasion of Austria and wrote series of feature articles for Financial News; came to U.S., 1938; research asso., Inst. of Social Research, Columbia U., 1939-40; instr. economics, Brooklyn Coll., 1940; with Inst. for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J., Sept. 1941; asst. prof. economics, U. of Denver, since Sept. 1941; now also engaged in research work on internat. aspects of post-war economics under grant-in-aid from Carnegie Corp., in connection with Trade Relations Project at U. of Calif. Mem. Am. Econ. Assn. Club: Denver Economics. Author: Modern War — Its Economic and Social Aspects (bibliography), 1941; (co-author, with Grayson Kirk, Richard P. Stebbins and others); War and National Defense, 1942; Military Economy and Social Structure (Princeton U. Press; $3), 1942. Contbr. articles to periodicals. Address: U. of Denver, Denver, Colo.

LAVAL, Pierre, French (Vichy) politician; born, 1883. Attorney qualified to practice before the highest French courts; mem. Chamber of Deputies (French socialist party), Paris dist., 1914; under sec. of State, French council of ministers and Fgn. Affairs ministry (Briand govt.), 1925; mem. French senate (Independent) Paris dist., Dept. of Puy-de-Dôme, 1926; successively minister of Public Works (Painlevé govt.), 1925, of Justice (Briand govts.), 1926, of Labor (Tardieu govt.), 1930 and 1932, of Foreign Affairs (Doumergue and Flandin govts.), 1934-35, of Colonies, 1934; French prime minister and minister of Fgn. Affairs, 1931-32, 1935-36; mayor of Aubervilliers, France, a mfg. dist. of met. Paris; became vice premier and fgn. minister in Pétain govt. after fall of France, 1940; ousted from govt., Dec. 1940, on charge of scheming to wrest greater power from govt.; detained under guard until Otto Abetz (see this Service, II-2[Q]) appeared in Occupied France as Nazi delegate; remained in background during 1941, repeatedly scheming for further collaboration with Germany, during which time at least one attempt was made on his life; named Premier April 1942; with full control of govt., though Marshall Pétain (see this Supplement, III-16) still nominal head and Adm. Darlin (III-6) remains successor to Pétain and Comdr.-in-chief armed forces; return of Laval, leading collaborationist with Nazis, said to be move to prevent Hitler setting up French gauleiter in Paris; has asked for complete collaboration with Nazis. Member council, League of Nations, Geneva, Switzerland, 1934-35.

References: TM, Sept. 8, 1941, p. 15; Dec. 23, 1940, p. 26; **NSW,** Sept. 8, 1941, p. 21; Dec. 23, 1940, p. 18; Nov. 11, 1940, p. 29; **NA,** Sept. 13, 1941, p. 223; **SEP,** Nov. 23, 1940, p. 18; **LI,** Sept. 23, 1940, p. 74; **Aug.** 26, 1940, p. 69; **Current History,** Jan. 10, 1941, p. 7.

†LEWIS, Lloyd, author: Wright, Prophet of the Prairies (Farmer; $2.50), 1942.

†LINDBERGH, Charles A.; accepts position with Ford Motor Co., at Willow Run bombing plant.

LIPMAN, Jean H., editor, writer; b. New York, N.Y., Aug. 31, 1900; B.A., Wellesley Coll.; M.A., N.Y. Univ.; m. Howard Lipman, 1932; 1 son, Peter. Asso. editor Art in America and publisher New England Antiques, Atlantic States Antiques (maps), 1939; editor, Art in America, since 1940. Mem. Phi Beta Kappa. Author: Appendix to F. F. Sherman's Richard Jennys, 1941; American Primitive Painting (Oxford Press; $5), 1942. Contbr. to Art in America, Antiques, Parnassus, Art Bulletin, etc. Address: Weston Rd., Cannondale, Conn.

***†LITTLE, Philip,** artist (Mar. 31, 1942).
Reference: NYHT, Apr. 1, 1942.

LOUDON, Dr. A., minister from Netherlands to U.S.; named to Pacific war council by Pres. Roosevelt.

LOWREY, Janette Sebring (lō'rē), author; b. Orange, Tex., Mar. 2, 1892; d. Ruluph and Janette (Scurry) Sebring; B.A., U. of Texas, 1929; m. Fred V. Lowrey, Aug. 3, 1922; 1 son, Alfred Sebring. Teacher high school English, 1913-22. Democrat. Episcopalian. Author: Annunciata and the Shepherds, 1938; The Silver Dollar, 1940; Rings on Her Fingers, 1941; Tap-A-Tan (Harper; $1.50), 1942. Has contributed several short stories and an essay to mags. Home: 211 E. Magnolia, San Antonio, Tex.

***MacLEAN, John Arthur, Jr.,** neurosurgeon; b. Auburndale, Mass.; s. John Arthur and L. E. (Hopkins) M.; studied at Butler U., U. of Mich. Med. Sch.; m. G. Marion Green, 1930; 1 son, James Arthur. Asst. attending surgeon, N.Y. Univ. Med. Sch., 1935-41; dir. neurosurgical div., Post-Graduate Med. Sch. and Hosp., N.Y. City, since 1939; cons. neurosurgeon, St. Agnes Hosp., White Plains, N.Y., and Memorial Hosp., N.Y. City. Reported to N.Y. Acad. of Medicine new method of X-raying brain, Jan. 1942. Now on active duty in U.S. Navy as lt. med. corps V(S). Mem. Phi Chi, Galens. Republican. Unitarian. Clubs: Western Univ. (N.Y. City), Bayside Yacht. Address: New York Graduate Hospital, 330 E. 20th St., New York, N.Y.

MAGANINI, Quinto (mä-gä-nē'nē), composer, condr.; b. Fairfield, Calif., Nov. 30, 1897; s. Joseph Francis and Mary (Cereghino) M.; ed. in Calif. pub. schs. and privately in Europe; student Conservatoire Americain, Fontainebleau, France, 1925-26; m. Margaretta Mason Kingsbury, May 28, 1927; 1 dau., Margaretta Mason. Member San Francisco Symphony Orchestra, 1918-19, New York Symphony Orchestra, 1919-28; guest condr. San Francisco Symphony, 1930, N.Y. Philharmonic Symphony, 1938; condr. Maganini Chamber Symphony, since 1932, Norwalk Symphony, since 1940; editor Edition Musicus (New York) since 1936; prof. counterpoint and orchestration, Teachers Coll., Columbia U., summers, since 1939. Mem. Greenwich (Conn.) Library Assn. and Recreation Bd.; Am. Composers Alliance; A.S.C.A.P.; Nat. Assn. of Am. Composers and Condrs. Awards: Pulitzer (music), 1927; Guggenheim fellowship, 1928, 1929; David Bispham Memorial medal, 1942. Republican. Congregationalist. Club: Faculty (Columbia U.). Composer: Tuolumne, 1st performed by N.Y. Philharmonic Symphony Orchestra, 1925; The Argonauts (A Californian Tetralogy of four operas); and more than 200 pub. works in standard concert, ednl., radio repertoire. Home: Greenwich, Conn. Office: 23 W. 47th St., New York, N.Y.

References: Baker, Biog. Dictionary of Musicians; J. T. Howard, Our Contemp. Composers.

MAHLER, Rebecca (mä'lēr), artist; b. New York, N.Y., Jan. 16, 1877; d. Moritz and Eva Loebenthal Mahler; student Hunter Coll. and N.Y. Sch. of Art; studied under William M. Chase. Interested in drawing as a child; began portrait and flower painting after college. First exhibit in Acad. Fine Arts, N.Y. City, 1905; has exhibited in Chicago, Phila., Washington, Brooklyn; one-man show recently in Morton Galleries, N.Y. City. Represented in the A. W. Davis collection, N. J. Miller collection and Barnard Sch., New Rochelle, N.Y.; Gardner Sch., N.Y. City. Mem. Am. Artists Professional League. Jewish religion (reformed). Home: 145 W. 86th St., New York, N.Y.

MATTHEWS, Blayney F., personnel supt., author; b. Dubuque, Ia., June 30, 1894; student U. of Ia., Northwestern U. Law Sch., U. of Southern Calif. Law Sch. Enlisted in U.S. Army, 1917, commd. and served until 1919. Apptd. to Fed. Bureau of Investigation, 1926; chief investigator, Dist. Attorney's Office, Los Angeles, 1929; dir. of plant protection and supt. of personnel, Warner Bros. Pictures, West Coast Studios, since 1935. Mem. Beta Theta Pi, Phi Alpha Delta, Alpha Eta Rho, Soc. of Former Special Agents of the F.B.I. Author: The Specter of Sabotage, (Lymanhouse; $3), 1941. Address: care Lymanhouse, 624 S. Arden Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif.

MAYER, Albert Ignace, Jr., novelist; b. Cincinnati, O., June 9, 1906; s. Albert Ignace and Katherine (Delmuth) M.; A.B., U. of Cincinnati, 1928; m. Marguerite Barbara Ebert, June 11, 1938. Entered business, 1928; spent leisure time in writing, especially sport stories which were published in boys' mags.; spent several years in hist. research for background of first novel, Defense of the Castle (Central Europe in 10th century); next novel dealt with early Greek games; now engaged in research in history of Northwest Territory, City of Cincinnati. Mem. Ohio State Archeol. and Hist. Soc., Hist. and Philos. Soc. of Ohio, Beta Theta Pi. Republican. Conglist. Author: Defense of the Castle, 1937; Olympiad, 1938; Falconer's Son (Westminster Press; $2.50), 1941, the sport of falconry of the 10th century against a background of political intrigue. Now engaged on novel to be titled, Follow the River (early history of Cincinnati). Contbr. to mags. Home: 22 8th Av., Seaside Park, N.J.

MAYER, Jane Rothschild, author; b. Kansas City, Mo., Dec. 30, 1903; d. Louis P. and Nora (Westheimer) Rothschild; B.A., Vassar Coll., 1925; m. David Mayer, Jr., Dec. 28, 1927; 3 children—David III, Mary Jane, Philip. Mem. The Arts Club of Chicago. Co-author (with Clara Spiegel under pen name of Clare Jaynes): Instruct My Sorrows (Random House; $2.50), 1942. Contbr. fiction to mags. and periodicals. Address: 614 Sheridan Rd., Glencoe, Ill.

McCORQUODALE, Malcolm S. (mäk-kôr'kwō-dāl), Brit. parliamentary sec. of labor and national service; b. Eng., 1901; student Harrow; M.A., Christ Church, Oxford; m. Winifred Clark; 2 daus. Started business career in printing and stationery firms; now dir., Blades, East and Blades, Ltd., Liverpool Printing and Stationery Co., Ltd., McCorquodale and Co., Ltd.; Conservative mem. of Parliament from Yorkshire since 1931; in World War II served in Royal Air Force Volunteer Res., 1939-40; apptd. parliamentary sec. of labor and nat. service, 1942.

McKAY, George Frederick, composer, educator; b. Harrington, Wash., June 11, 1899; s. Frederick Harrison and Ila Diantha (Pangborn) McK.; B.Mus., Eastman Sch. of Music (U. of Rochester), 1924; m. Frances Martha Greene, Aug. 15, 1923; children—Georgianne, Richard, Annette, Harrison. Teacher pub. schs., Greensboro, N.C., and Lead, S.D., 3 yrs., teachers coll., Kirksville, Mo., 1 yr.; teacher music composition, U. of Washington, since 1928, asso. prof. music since 1927; Alchin prof. music composition, U. of Southern Calif., Los Angeles, summers, 1938, 39. Has published about 50 pieces in all types of music, with particular emphasis on orchestral composition. Enlisted in World War I (2 mos. service). Awarded 1st prize American Guild of Organists competition, 1939; won performances in 1st Am. Concert, Rochester, 1925; hon. mention Nat. Broadcasting Co. competition, 1937, Heifetz award, 1940. Author: The Technique of Modern Harmony, 1941. Editor: Foster Songs for Treble Voices, 1942. Home: 5248 16th St. N.E., Seattle, Wash.

Reference: J. T. Howard, Our Contemp. Composers.

McNAUGHTON, Andrew George Latta, comdr. Canadian Army in England; b. Moosomin, Saskatchewan, 1887; s. R. D. McNaughton; B.S., M.S., McGill U.; hon. LL.D., McGill, 1920; hon. D.C.L., Bishops U., 1937; grad. Royal Staff Coll., Camberley, and Imperial Defense Coll., London; m. Mabel Clara Stuart, d. Godfrey Weir, 1914; 5 children. Served in World War, 1914-19 (wounded twice); chief Canadian Gen. Staff, 1929-35; then pres. Nat. Research Council of Can.; became comdr. Canadian Army in France, World War II; now comdr. Canadian Corps in Britain. Decorated Companion of the Bath; Companion St. Michael and St. George; Companion Distinguished Service Order.

References: TM, Jan. 1, 1940, p. 28; NB, May 1941, p. 44; Canadian Geography, July 1941, p. 8; KHbk.

McSHERRY, Frank J., dep. dir. in charge of labor supply, Office of Production Management; b. Eldorado Springs, Mo., Oct. 18, 1892; s. J. S. and Euka (Mitchell) M.; B.S. in Mathematics, U. of Ariz., 1916, B.S. in Mining and Metallurgy, 1917; post-grad. student, Mass. Inst. Tech., 1923-24; grad. Coast Artillery Sch., 1923, grad. advanced gunnery course, 1928; grad., Command and Gen. Staff Sch., Ft. Leavenworth, 1934; grad. Army War Coll., 1937; m. Elizabeth Jones, Sept. 28, 1925; children—James Michael, Millicent, Elizabeth Melissa. Comd. 2d lt., U.S. Army, 1917; now brig. gen.; served in France with 62d Coast Arty., World War I; Office Chief of Coast Arty., 4 yrs.; Gen. Staff Corps, War Dept., 1937; War Dept. liaison officer, Nat. Youth Administrn., and Fed. Security Administrn., and exec. sec. President's Interdepartmental Com. on Mechanics Training for Aircraft Industry, 1938-40; War Dept. liaison officer with Labor Div., Advisory Comm. to Council of Nat. Defense, since July 1, 1940; administrative asst., Labor Div., Advisory Comm. to Council of Nat. Defense, 1940; dir. of Defense Training, Fed. Security Agency and chief Defense Training Branch, O.P.M., 1941; dep. dir. for labor supply and training, Labor Div., W.P.B., 1942. Mem. Sigma Epsilon; Mason (32°, Shriner). Presbyterian. Club: Army-Navy Country (Washington). Home: 3232 Garfield St., N.W. Office: War Production Board, Washington, D.C.

MEARS, Helen, writer, editor; b. N.Y. City, Nov. 1, 1900; d. Henry and Elizabeth Salsbury (Owen) Mears; A.B., Goucher Coll., 1922. With Survey Associates, pubs. of The Survey and Survey Graphic, as asst. editor, 1929-35; reader and commentator for Japan issue of Fortune (pub. Sept. 1936). Has traveled around the world twice; spent one year in China, 1925-26; spent 8 months in Japan, 1935; has also traveled extensively in Europe, and elsewhere. Author: Year of the Wild Boar (Lippincott); 1942, an account of her visit in Japan. Contbr. to periodicals. Home: 26 Locust St., Towanda, Pa.

Reference: CSM, May 27, 1939, p. 12.

MENOTTI, Gian Carlo (mā-nōt'tī), composer; b. Cadegliano, Italy, July 7, 1911; s. Alfonso and Ines (Pellini) M.; studied composition Curtis Inst. of Music (grad. 1933). Came to U.S., 1928. Writer of chamber music, songs and 3 operas; teacher Curtis Inst. of Music since 1941. Composer (operas) Amelia Goes to the Ball (premiere Acad. of Music, Phila., 1936, later performed at Mt. Opera House and in many European cities); The Old Maid and the Thief (written for Nat. Broadcasting Co., later performed with Phila. Opera Co.); The Island God (premiere Met. Opera House, Feb. 20, 1942). Writer of own libretti. Home: 166 E. 96th St., New York, N.Y.

References: TM, May 1, 1939, p. 56; **Baker, Biog. Dictionary of Musicians; Howard, Our Contemp. Composers.**

MIHAILOVITCH, Dragoljub ("Draja") M. (mē-hāl'ō-vich), leader of Jugo-Slavian anti-Nazi revolt; b. Pozarevac, Serbia (now Yugo-Slavia), 1893; student public grade and high schs.; entered Serbian Mil. Acad., Belgrade, 1910; married; 4 children. With other cadets mustered into Army, 1912, for Balkan War with Turkey and Bulgaria; promoted to 2d lt.; returned to sch.; mustered into World War I, 1914; became prof., Belgrade Mil. Acad.; mil. attaché at Sofia, 1934-36, at Prague, Czechoslovakia, 1936-37; had been promoted through ranks to col. by 1940, time of Nazi occupation. Has fought continuously for his country's freedom since its surrender to Hitler; when King Peter and his govt. were forced to flee into exile, Mihailovitch finally obtained royal permission to organize a force for continued resistance to Nazi occupation; now has armed force (no longer only guerrilla fighters) rounded up from over the mountains, and wages full scale war against Nazis; reported to his Govt. in Exile via Cairo that Yugo-Slav forces of 80,000 held their positions south of Belgrade, Dec. 1941; improved his strength whenever possible by coordinating with Greek and Albanian guerrilla forces; recognized by his Govt. in Exile for outstanding work by promotion to full gen., Dec. 1941; when Nazis threatened, April 1942, to take his family hostage, and families of his officers, if he did not surrender, replied would continue fight to the death for liberation. Awarded gold medal for bravery (Serbia), Military Order of the White Eagle with Swords, and highest mil. decoration of Yugo-Slavia.

References: TM, Mar. 9, 1942, p. 24; Jan. 26, 1942, p. 32; NSW, Jan. 26, 1942, p. 37.

MITCHELL, Susanna Valentine, author; b. Philadelphia, Pa.; d. Langdon Elwyn and Marion (Lea) Mitchell; grand daughter of Dr. S. Weir Mitchell, neurologist and writer; m. William Gammell, Jr., Feb. 24, 1923; 3 children — Helena Hope, Mary Langdon, Arthur Middleton. Author: Journey Taken by a Woman, 1935; No Second Spring (Harper; $2.50), 1942. Address: The Meadows, Warwick, R.I.

MOHAUPT, Richard Ernst Eduard, composer; b. Breslau, Germany, Sept. 14, 1904; s. Richard and Marie (Kühnel) M.; student U. of Breslau; studied music with Julius Pruever and Rudolph Bilke; m. Rosa Gottlieb, Nov. 18, 1930. Came to U.S., 1939. Began as condr. of opera in Aachen, Breslau and Weimar; tour as condr. of symphony concerts, Eastern Europe, 1931-32; first notable success as composer was with ballet "Die Gaunerstreiche der Courache" performed at German Opera House, Berlin, Aug. 5, 1936; first performance of "Die Wirtin von Pinsk" at State Opera in Dresden, Feb. 10, 1938; then at Zurich, Switzerland, April 3, 1938; first performance "Concerto for Piano, Strings, Brass and Percussion" under Fitelberg, at Warsaw, Poland, Oct. 3, 1938 (played piano solo himself); first performance "Drei Episoden" with Concertgebouw Orchestra, Amsterdam, under Mengeberg, Nov. 27, 1938; asked by Nazi Govt. to divorce his "non-Aryan" wife and when he refused his works were forbidden in Germany; came to U.S. Mar. 4, 1939; orchestral work "Townpiper Music" first performed over Station WJZ, Dec. 7, 1941; "Symphony" first performed by N.Y. Philharmonic Orchestra under Goossens, Mar. 5, 1942; has also written ednl. music. Home: 321 W. 105th St., New York, N.Y.

Reference: Baker, Biog. Dictionary of Musicians.

MOORE, Ward, writer; b. Madison, N.J., Aug. 10, 1903; s. Samuel Ward and Stella (Lemlein) M.; education largely unacademic; m. Dorothy Terry, 1922; children—Fredrica, Charlotte; m.. 2d, Viola Stroud, 1927; dau., Rebekah (died 1937). Has worked in department stores, steel foundries, farms, sheet metal works, book stores and as laborer and research worker. Author: Breathe the Air Again (Harper; $2.75), 1942, novel dealing with the triple conflict between business, finance and labor, first of 3 covering aspects of American life. Home: 2247½ Clifford St., Los Angeles, Calif.

MORTON, H. V., Brit. writer; b. Ashton-under-Lyne, Lancashire, Eng., July 25, 1892; m. Violet M. Greig. Became asst. editor Birmingham Express, 1912, sub-editor Daily Mail, 1913-14; served with Navy in World War I, 1914-18; became mem. editorial staff Evening Standard, 1919-21, of Daily Express, 1921-31; special writer for Daily Herald, since 1931. Awarded Knight Commander, Order of the Phoenix (Greece). Author: The Heart of London, 1925; The London Year, 1926; London, 1926; The Spell of London, 1926; The Nights of London, 1926; In Search of England, 1927; The Call of England, 1928; In Search of Scotland, 1929; In Search of Ireland, 1930; In Search of Wales, 1932; Blue Days at Sea, 1932; In Scotland Again, 1933; In the Steps of The Master, 1934; Our Fellow Men, 1936; In the Steps of St. Paul, 1936; Through Lands of the Bible, 1938; Ghosts of London, 1939; In Search of the Northern Isles, 1940; Middle East (Dodd Mead; $3), 1942.

NEUMANN, Alfred, author, scenarist, playwright; b. Lautenburg, Germany, Oct. 15, 1895; s. Wolff and Malvina (Joseph) N.; student univs. of Berlin, Munich, Genevia; Ph.D.; m. Katharina Schatzberger, June 23, 1924; came to U.S., 1941, received 1st papers, 1941. Left Germany, 1933, since which time all his books have been burned and banished, house and property confiscated, citizenship withdrawn; lived in exile in Italy, France; came to U.S. on emergency visa granted by State Dept. under auspices of the President's Advisory Com. on Polit. Refugees, 1941; screen writer, Warner Bros., Burbank, Calif., 1941-42. Mem. PEN Club; Authors Guild of the Authors League of Am.; Screen Writers Guild. Awarded: Kleist Prize, (annual German literature prize), 1926, for his novel, The Devil. Author: (biographies) Alfred de Musset (doctor's thesis), 1920; Queen Christine of Sweden, 1934; (novels) The Patriot, 1924 (also prod. as play in Europe, S.A., 1926, U.S., 1928, and as motion picture by Paramount, 1928, by F.C.L., Paris, 1937); King Haber, 1925; The Devil, 1926 (motion picture rights purchased by Universal Pictures); Rebels, 1927; Guerra, 1928; The Hero, 1930; Mirror of Fools, 1932; The New Caesar, 1934; The Gaudy Empire, 1936; Die Goldquelle (pub. in German only), 1937; The Friends of the People, tranl. by Countess Nora Wydenbruck and the author (Macmillan; $2.50), 1942. Most of the above works pub. in several languages. Also author of three plays—Koenigsmaske, 1927, Frauenschuh, 1930, Haus Daniele, 1931 (prod. in Germany, Austria, Switzerland), War and Peace, dramatization of Tolstoi's novel (in collaboration with Erwin Piscator) for Gilbert Miller; motion picture scenarios—D'Isola (for Italian film co.), Rinaldo Rinaldini (for Carl Laemmle, Sr.), La Tragedie Imperiale (Rasputine) prod. by Arcadia-Film, Paris, 1st shown in New York, 1940. Home: 1527 N. Stanley Av., Hollywood, Calif. Office: care Macmillan Co., New York, N.Y.

†NICHOLS, Beverley, author: Men Do Not Weep (Harcourt, Brace; $2.59), 1942.

***†NORLIN, George,** univ. pres. (Mar. 30, 1942).
References: NYHT, Apr. 1, 1942; **Leaders in Edn.**

NUHN, Ferner Rall (nūn), author; b. Cedar Falls, Ia., July 25, 1903; s. William C. and Anna (Rall) N.; B.A., North Central Coll., Naperville, Ill., 1924; M.A., U. of Ill., 1925; studied Grad. Sch., Columbia U.; m. Ruth Suckow, Mar. 11, 1929. Instr. in rhetoric, U. of Ill., 1925-26; reviewer and contbr. to mags., 1928-34; asso. with Information Div. Agri. Adjustment Administrn., Washington, 1934-36. Assisted in orgn. of Cedar Falls Art Assn., 1940. Author: The Wind Blew from the East: A Study in the Orientation of American Culture (Harper; $3), 1942. Contbr. articles to mags. Home: 2215 Grand Blvd., Cedar Falls, Ia.

†O'CASEY, Sean, author: Pictures in the Hallway (Macmillan; $2.75), 1942.

ODLUM, Jerome, novelist; b. Minneapolis, Minn., Aug. 26, 1905; s. George and Maude (Kurtzman) O.; ed. in pub. schs., Minneapolis, U. of Minn.; m. 2d Shirley Elaine Booker. Office clerk, accountant, salesman, telegraph operator, etc., 1920-31; mng. editor, columnist, feature writer, cameraman, reporter, make-up editor for various Minneapolis and St. Paul newspapers; scenarist, Warner Brothers, 1938-39, Paramount Pictures, since 1938. Mem. Screen Writers Guild. Author: Each Dawn I Die, 1938; Nine Lives Are Not Enough, 1940; Lady Sourdough, 1941; Dust Be My Destiny, 1942; Night and No Moon (Howell, Soskin; $2), 1942. Each Dawn I Die, Dust Be My Destiny, Nine Lives Are Not Enough prod. as motion pictures by Warner Brothers. Contbr. fiction, articles, to Esquire, Golfer and Sportsman (Minneapolis). Home: Stony Brook, N.Y.

OGDEN, Samuel Robinson, conservation, author; b. Elizabeth, N.J., July 19, 1896; s. Samuel R. and Ella (Loney) O.; A.B., Swarthmore Coll., 1920; attended U. of Grenoble, 3 months while with A.E.F.; m. Mary Campbell, Jan. 1921; children—Jane Campbell (dec.), Samuel Robinson, III, Duncan Grant. Purchased deserted village in Landgrove, Vt., and rehabilitated bldgs. and built up a summer colony, 1929; also continued in reconstruction of Vt. farmhouses in Bennington and Windham counties; developed interest in conservation, and after serving in town offices was elected to State Legislature, 1935, re-elected, 1937 and 1939 (chmn. Com. on Conservation and Development last 2 yrs.); apptd. mem. State Planning Bd., 1939, State Bd. of Conservation and Development, 1940. Sailed with A.E.F., Aug. 1917 with rank of private; returned as 1st lt., 142d Inf., July 1919. Mem. Vt. Symphony Assn. (mem. bd. 1938; pres. 1939); mem. bd. Burr and Burton Sem., Manchester, Vt., 1939; mem. bd. dirs. New England Council; mem. Delta Upsilon. Republican. Presbyterian. Author: How to Grow Food for Your Family (Barnes & Co.; $2.50), 1942. Home: Landgrove, Vt., R.D., Londonderry, Vt.

O'HARE, Edward Henry, U.S. Navy air ace; b. Ill., 1914; student Mil. Acad., Alton, Ill.; grad. Annapolis Naval Acad., 1937, Pensacola air school with wings, 1939; married. Became instr. Pensacola station; later joined a fighter squadron, San Diego; was promoted to lt. (j.g.), sent to Pacific zone, Dec. 1941. U.S. Navy announced he not only qualified as ace, but exceeded record for 1 plane by shooting down 6 Jap planes in one day in fighting near Gilbert Islands, Mar. 1942; returned to U.S., April, promoted to lt. comdr. and given Congl. Medal of Honor.

References: TM, Mar. 16, 1942, p. 22; NSW, Mar. 16, 1942, p. 22; LI, Mar. 16, 1942, p. 39.

OSAKA, Prince Yasuhiko (ō-sä-kä, yä-sōō-hī-kō), Jap. gov. of Philippine Islands; b. Japan, Oct. 2, 1887; m. Princess Nobuko, 8th dau. of late Emperor Meiji. Apptd. gen. and supreme war councillor; was comdr. of Japanese forces after fall of Nanking, China; reported apptd. gov. of Philippine Islands, Mar. 1942. Belongs to 3d class of Jap nobility (which compares with Brit. peerage from viscount to prince) created after the Meiji Restoration as a polit. move to resist old feudal-baron monopoly; Prince Osaka's title was first in House of Osaka, created 1905.

OTT, Lester, aviation authority; b. Baltimore, Md., Dec. 8, 1910; s. Lewis and Clara (Bussey) O.; student business administrn., John Hopkins U., 1928-30, fine arts, Md. Inst. of Art, 1930-27; m. Mary Marshall, Feb. 17, 1940. Free lance advertising and advertising mgr. retail stores, 1931-36; owner and operator The Lester Ott Co., advertising agency, N.Y.

Key to indicators: † see "Who's Who in America"; * died (date of death in parentheses); *† died, full biographical details may be found in "Who's Who in America." (References after sketches and listings are restricted to biographical material considered sufficiently comprehensive to be of permanent value.)

City, 1936-37; asso. editor Aircraft Publs., a year-book used by govt. and industry; spent much time visiting aircraft factories throughout U.S. gathering material. Writer of syndicated daily feature, "How to Spot Planes." Mem. Aviation Writers Assn. Author: Aircraft Spotter (1st American reference on aircraft identification; in use by Army Air Corps, U.S. Navy Bur. of Aeronautics and Civilian Defense agencies), 1941, rev. edit. (Harcourt, Brace; $1), 1942. Contbr. occasional articles to aviation sect. New York Sunday Times. Home: 130 E. 39th St. Office: 370 Lexington Av., New York, N.Y.

PAI CHUNG-HSI (bī jo͝ong-shē), Chinese vice chief of staff and one of "two Kwangsi war lords"; b. Kwangsi 1893; student Paoting Mil Acad. Joined Revolution, 1911; though an anti-Communist, he opposed Red-opposition of Chiang Kai-shek, and favored preservation of U.S.S.R. supply route through N. China, 1926-27; joined Li Tsung-jen (2d of the Kwangsi war lords) in Nanking Punitive Expedition; became his vice comdr. in chief, Nationalist 4th Army, 1927-28; accomplishing capture of 4 leading northern cities, uniting China provisionally; became mem. Wuhan Div., Central Polit. Council, 1928; mem. Polit. Council of South West, 1930; dept. comdr. Kwangsi Provincial Army, 1935; upon Jap invasion of China joined Chiang Kai-shek, 1935; vice chief of staff of National Chinese Army since 1935. Works for reforms of training soldiers politically, abolishing scorched-earth policy; considered Chinese Army's first strategist; is 1st asst. to U.S. Gen. Stilwell, China's Am. chief of staff, for drafting war plans.

Reference: J. Gunther, Inside Asia.

PALMER, Courtlandt, pianist, composer; b. New York, N.Y., Dec. 17, 1872; s. Courtlandt and Catharine Amory (Bennett) P.; prep. edn. at Berkeley Sch., New York; student music under Leschetizky, Paderewski, Sgambati (Rome), Schreyer (Dresden), Marechale (Paris), Waddington (London), Denereaz (Switzerland); unmarried. Has spent most of his life in Europe; has lived in Italy, Egypt, France, Switzerland, England, during past 18 yrs.; has toured as pianist-composer with Kneisel Quartet; has played with Boston Symphony (under Gericke), New York Symphony (under Damrosch), Philharmonic (under Anton Seidl), with Colonne Orchestra, Paris, Santa Cecilia Orchestra, Rome; played his own piano concerto with Philadelphia Symphony Orchestra (Sir Thomas Beacham conducting) in Washington, D.C., Baltimore, Carnegie Hall, New York. Clubs: The Bohemians (N.Y. City); MacDowell. Composer: In Memoriam (for orchestra); also songs (many orchestrated), choral works, quintetts, quartetts, fugues for organ, sonatas, etc. Home: The Stanhope, 995 Fifth Av. Office: care Bank of New York, 48 Wall St., New York, N.Y.

PALMER, Harold Dean, physician, psychiatrist; b. Fairmont, Minn., June 12, 1901; s. John Earl and Winifred Ann (Ibertson) P.; grad. Culver Mil. Acad., 1920; B.S., U. of Minn., 1924, M.D., 1928; m. Margaret Almira Adams, 1928; children—Margaret Ann, Harold Dean. Prof. of psychiatry, Woman's Med. Coll. of Pa., since 1940; associate prof. of psychiatry, Med. Sch., U. of Pa., since 1933; visiting chief physician to psychiatric dept., Phila. Gen. Hosp.; psychiatrist to student health service, U. of Pa.; cons. psychiatrist to dept. of mental and nervous diseases, Pa. Hosp.; formerly psychiatrist to Juvenile Court, Wilmington, Del. Fellow Am. Coll. Physicians, Am. Neurol. Assn., Am. Psychiatric Assn., Coll. of Physicians of Phila.; mem. Alpha Kappa Kappa. Certified by Am. Bd. Neurology and Psychiatry, 1937. Club: Union League. Contbr. sect. Neurology and Psychiatry to Hughes' Practice of Medicine, 1933; also to Oxford Medicine and Davis' Cyclopedia of Medicine. Special contributions on prolonged sleep in treatment in psychiatry, the evaluation and treatment of involutional melancholia; recently in the news for his report on treatment of migraine headache with vitamin B_1. Home: 612 Ballytore Rd., Wynnewood, Pa. Office: 111 N. 49th St., Philadelphia, Pa.

†PARDUE, Austin, dean; author: Your Morale (Scribner; $2), 1942.

PATTISON, Abbott Lawrence, sculptor; b. Chicago, Ill., May 15, 1916; s. William L. and Bonnie (Abbott) P.; grad. Francis W. Parker Sch., 1933; B.A., Yale, 1937, B.F.A., 1939. English traveling fellowship, Yale U., 1939; travelled in Orient, Japan and China, 1940. Has exhibited at 6 important shows throughout country, and recently at Phila. and Cincinnati. Winner Logan prize for sculpture, "Kneeling Women," 1942. Apptd. midshipman, U.S. Navy, Mar. 1942. Presbyterian. Home: 419 Belmont Av., Chicago, Ill. Address: Navy Dept., Washington, D.C.

PEASE, Josephine van Dolzen, author; b. Au Sable, Mich.; d. Max L. and Helen (Hewitt) Pease; student Mich. Normal Coll. (Ypsilanti), Chicago Sch. Commercial Art, Hollins Sch. (Va.). Began as teacher in pub. schools, Poplar Bluff, Mo.; then teacher primary grades and special classes for maladjusted children, pub. schools, Gary, Ind. Has done volunteer social work at Hull House and Traveller's Aid, Chicago. Author: Nimbo, the story of an African Boy, 1934; The Story of Houses, 1938; The Story of Food, 1938; The Story of Clothes, 1938; The Story of Heat and Light, 1938; Safe All Day with the Happies, 1939; We Love America, 1941; The Happy Book (Rand, McNally; $2), 1942. Contbr. to encyclopedias; also verse and stories to children's mags. Home: 647 Sheridan Road, Chicago, Ill.

†PEATTIE, Donald Culross, author: Forward the Nation (Putnam's; $2.50), 1942.

PEIRSE, Air Marshal Sir Richard E. C.; comdr. R.A.F. in India, which has now been augmented by a force of new Am. planes (see this Service, II-171[Q]).

PHILLIPS, Arthur Gordon, author; b. Pawtucket, R.I., Sept. 24, 1916; s. Arthur H. and Elizabeth (Camac) P.; A.B., U. of Ala., 1940, A.M., 1942; m. Helen Korman, Oct. 21, 1940. Taught English at U. of Ala.; wrote 1st novel, story centering about race track, 1940-41. Won Lippincott award ($1,000), May 1941; won 1st prize in contest at R.I. State Coll. with play, Sketch in Africa, 1938. Author: Victory in the Dust (Lippincott; $2.50), 1942. Home: Tuscaloosa, Ala.

PICK, Albert, chmn. Pick Hotels Corp.; b. Chicago, Ill., May 17, 1869; s. Charles and Jeanette (Chladek) P.; ed. Chicago Pub. Schools and Notre Dame U.; m. Gertrude Frank, Dec. 27, 1892; children—Pauline (Mrs. Charles L. Staiger, now dec.), Albert, Laurence Mercer (dec.), Dorothy Gertrude. Began as merchant, 1893; pres. Albert Pick & Co., Chicago, to Jan. 5, 1929; pres. Pick Hotels Corp. to 1930, chmn. bd. since Dec. 4, 1930. Mem. Chicago Hist. Soc., Art Inst. Chicago. Clubs: Illinois Athletic (Chicago); Committee of One Hundred (Miami Beach, Fla.). Home: 5800 La Gorce Drive, Miami Beach, Fla. Office: 20 N. Wacker Drive, Chicago, Ill.

PLANCK, Charles Evans, aviation writer; b. Mt. Sterling, Ky., Oct. 21, 1896; s. Robert F. and Emma L. (Evans) P.; A.B. in Journalism, U. of Ky., 1919; m. Carolyn Heine, 1935; children—Patricia, Charles Robert. Started aviation column, "Sky Traffic," in Detroit Free Press, 1925; public relations man for aviation business since 1927; has worked for flying schools, airlines and aircraft mfg. companies. Served as private, U.S. Marine Corps, World War I. Mem. Christian Church. Author: Women with Wings (Harper; $2.75), 1942. Home: 3234 N. Pershing Drive, Arlington, Va. Office: Civil Aeronautics Administration, Washington, D.C.

PLEAK, Frances Avery, instr. in Spanish; b. St. Paul, Ind., July 4, 1912; d. Raymond Lucas and Josephine Hill (Howard) Pleak; stuent Milwaukee-Downer Coll., 1929-30; A.B., U. of Wis., 1934, A.M., 1935, Ph.D., 1940; unmarried. Asst. instr. of Spanish, U. of Wis., 1935-39, fellow in Spanish and Portuguese, 1939-39, instr. in Spanish, 1939-40; head of Spanish dept., Phoenix (Ariz.) Jr. Coll., since 1940. Mem. Sigma Delta Pi (Spanish honor soc.). Author: The Poetry of Jorge Guillén (Princeton U. Press; $2.50), 1942, critical analysis and selected translations of the contemporary Spanish poet, now a visiting lecturer at Wellesley Coll. Home: 723 W. Culver St., Phoenix, Ariz.

†PORTER, Katherine Anne, writer, translator; translated the 125-year old classic of Mexican literature, The Itching Parrot (Doubleday; $2.50), 1942.

***†PORTERFIELD, Lewis Broughton,** U.S. Naval officer (Apr. 5, 1942).

References: NYT, Apr. 7, 1942; Navy Register.

POZNER, Vladimir, author; b. Paris, France, Jan. 5, 1905; married; 2 children; came to U.S., 1941. Served in French Army as pvt., Aug. 27, 1939-July 16, 1940. Author: Bloody Baron, 1938; Deuil en 24 Heures (in French), 1942; The Edge of the Sword (Modern Age; $2.50), 1942. Also author of other books pub. in France but not translated into English. Contbr. of articles and fiction to mags. Address: care Maxim Lieber, 545 Fifth Av., New York, N.Y.

PRENDERGAST, Charles, artist; b. Boston, Mass. Began as carver in wood. Represented in Addison Gallery Am. Art; Phillips Acad., Andover, Mass.; Barnes Foundation, Merion, Pa.; Phillips Memorial, Washington, D.C.; Rhode Island Sch. of Design, Providence; Newark (N.J.) Museum; Museum Modern Art, Whitney Museum, Internat. House, N.Y. City; also many private collections. Associate mem. Nat. Acad. Design (A.N.A.). Home: Westport, Conn.

†PUTNAM, George Palmer, publisher; author: Wide Margins (Harcourt, Brace; $3), 1942.

RABORG, Paul Christopher (Maj. Paul C.) (rā'bôrg), military analyst; b. New York, N.Y.; s. Samuel Owen and Cora Belwood (Larned) R.; grad., Peekskill Mil. Acad.; student Columbia U. Sch. of Mines; divorced; 2 daus., Patricia, Dora Mae. Enlisted in U.S. Army as private; served with 2d U.S. Cav. (commd. 2d lt., Regular Cavalry, and served as such on the Mexican border; appointed aide-de-camp to Gen. Tasker H. Bliss, outstanding student of mil. history and strategy, later to Gen. James Parker while both were successively in command of the Southern Dept.; sent to France for duty with French and British armies in 1917; later served as machine gun officer with 3 Am. front line divisions; was wounded, and twice cited; holder of eight medals and decorations from U.S. and France; served with Allied Army of Occupation in Germany; resigned commission. Has traveled widely, continued his extensive studies of latest developments in strategy and weapons of modern warfare; now radio commentator, newspaper columnist on mil. and polit. developments throughout world. Mem. Alpha Chap. of Delta Psi, St. Anthony Club (New York). Author: Mechanized Might (Whittlesey House; $2.50), 1942. Address: care St. Anthony Club, N.Y.

RAMOND, Albert, industrial engr.; b. Nevers, France, June 1894; s. Armand and Marguerite Marie (deGauthier) R.; grad. mech. engr., Arts and Trades Nat. Coll., Cluny, France, 1913; m. Marguerite Marie Davis, 1920; children — Adeline, Renée. Came to U.S., 1919; naturalized citizen, 1927. Engring. student Schneider & Co., Diesel div., Le-Creusot, 1913-14, tech. rep. with French Navy, same co., Diesel submarine div., 1914-15; on French tech. mission to U.S. in New York, 1918-19; field engr. The Charles E. Bedaux Co., 1919-21, chief engr. New England dist., 1921-23, chief engr. Chicago dist., 1923-24, pres. since 1924; pres. The Bedaux Co. since 1937. Contbr. to tech. mags. and trade publs. Home: 1069 Moseley Rd., Ravinia, Ill. Office: 435 N. Michigan Av., Chicago, Ill.

Reference: TM, Jan. 19, 1942, p. 69.

RATH, Virginia, author; b. Colusa, Calif., Sept. 1, 1905; d. Willie Nelson and Mamie Grace (Rawlins) McVay; B.A., with honors in History, U. of Calif., 1925, also grad. student, 1925-26; m. Carl Henry Rath, Jan. 12, 1929. Mem. Civil Air Patrol. Mem. Eastern Star. Democrat. Author: Death at Dayton's Folly, 1935; Murder on the Day of Judgment, 1936; Ferryman, Take Him Across, 1936; Anger of the Bells, 1937; An Excellent Night for Murder, 1937; The Dark Cavalier, 1938; Murder with a Theme Song, 1939; Death of a Lucky Lady, 1940; Death Breaks the Ring, 1941; Epitaph for Lydia (Doubleday, Doran; $2), 1942. Home: 1843 Leavenworth, San Francisco, Calif.

***†REIFFEL, Charles,** landscape painter (Mar. 14, 1942).

Reference: Chicago Tribune, Mar. 16, 1942.

RICHMOND, Winifred V., psychologist; b. Elizabeth, W.Va., July 30, 1876; d. Caleb and Lucy (Patterson) Richmond; B.S., Ohio U., 1910; M.A., Clark U., 1915, Ph.D., 1919; unmarried. Instr. psychology, State Normal Sch., Gorham, Me., 1916-17; psychologist Walter E. Fernald State Sch., Waverly, Mass., 1917-19; asso. psycho-clinician, Bur. of Juvenile Research, Columbus, O., 1919-20; psychologist, State Training Sch., Lander, Wyo., 1920-21, St. Elizabeth's Hosp., Washington, D.C., since 1921; instructor in psychology, U.S. Navy Med. Sch., since 1926; clin. instr. in psychiatry, George Washington U. Med. Sch., 1932-39; instr. in mental hygiene, U. of Calif. at Berkeley, summers, 1929, 30, 31, 37, 38, 39. One of founders, 1929, Wash. Inst. for Mental Hygiene, mem. bd., 1929-37; mem. bd. dirs., Juvenile Protective Assn., 1926-33, Social Hygiene Soc. of Wash., 1925-32. Mem. A.A.A.S., Am. Psychol. Assn., Assn. for Applied Psychology, Am. Psychopathological Assn., Orthopsychiatric Assn., Soc. for Psychol. Study of Social Issues, Am. Museum of Natural History, Am. Assn. Univ. Women, Phi Beta Kappa. Presbyterian. Contributor to psychol. and educational journals. Author: The Adolescent Girl, 1926; The Adolescent Boy, 1933; An Introduction to Sex Education, 1934; Personality: Its Development and Hygiene, 1937; Psychological Studies in Dementia Praecox (with I. Kendig), 1940; Making the Most of Your Personality (Farrar & Rinehart; $1.75), 1942. Home: 1303 Maple View Pl. S.E. Office: St. Elizabeth's Hosp., Washington, D.C.

†RIPLEY, Clements, author: Mississippi Belle (Appleton; $2.50), 1942.

RONALD, James (Jack), novelist; b. Glasgow, Scotland, May 11, 1905; s. James Jack and Katherine Hamilton (Spaulding) R.; ed. in elementary and secondary schs. of Glasgow until age of 14; unmarried; 1 adopted son, John Richard Ronald (now with Brit. army). Worked on newspapers, at taxi-driving, road-making, dishwashing, theater-managing, dance-hall promoting, etc., 1919-1927; fiction writer, since 1928; pub. speaker, mainly in England and Scotland, on behalf of the Liberal parliamentary party and such urgent causes as slum clearance; was capt. in charge of ambulance post in London at beginning of war until collapse brought on by overwork. Has visited U.S. many times since 1922, last time, May 1940. Author: They Can't Hang Me!; Murder in the Family, 1940; This Way Out, 1941; She Got What She Asked For, 1941; Old Soldiers Never Die (Lippincott; $2.50), 1942. Also other novels pub. in Eng. Contbr. fiction to Cosmopolitan mag. Address: Fairfield, Conn.

ROSENBORG, Ralph, artist; b. New York, N.Y., June 9, 1911; s. Mozart and Helen (Frederickson) R.; studied art privately with Henerietta Reiss 7 yrs.; unmarried. Has exhibited in fine and graphic arts since 1932. Has had one-man shows at Artists' Gallery, 1939; Lincoln Sch., N.Y. City, 1940; Phillips Memorial Gallery, Washington, D.C., 1941; Willard Gallery, N.Y. City., Feb. 17-Mar. 8, Nov. 9-22 (gouaches), 1941. Paintings have been shown in the following galleries: Morton, 1936; East River, 1937-38; Boyer, 1937-38; Passadoit, 1938; Nierendorf, 1938-41; J. B. Neumann-Willard, 1938-40; Bonestell, 1939-40; Artists, 1938-41; Willard, 1940-41. Work represented in collections of Duncan Phillips, Katherine Dreier (Societe Anonyme), Jere Abbott (Smith Coll.), Marion G. Willard, Ernest Weyhe, Ralph Barton Perry, Jr., I. N. P. Stokes, 2d, and many others. Participant in circuit exhbns. of Phila. Art Alliance, 1936; Phila. Soc. of Etchers, 1937; Wichita Art Assn., 1936; Printmakers' Soc. of Calif., 1937; Am. Artists Congress, 1939-41; Am. Abstract Artists, 1937-40; in museum annuals of Chicago Art Inst., San Francisco Museum, Los Angeles Museum, Denver Museum, Detroit Art Inst., Portland Museum, City Art Museum (St. Louis, Mo.) Mem. Am. Artists Congress, 1938-40; Am. Abstract Artists, 1937-40; the "Ten," 1938-40; Fedn. of Modern Painters and Sculptors, 1940; Swedish-American Artists (Chicago), 1937-38; Southern Printmakers (Birmingham, Ala.), 1937; N.W. Printmakers (Seattle), 1938. Home: 1151 Broadway. Office: Willard Gallery, 32 E. 57th St., New York, N.Y.

ROSINSKI, Herbert (Fritz Bernhard Heinrich) (rō-zin'skĭ), lecturer on mil. and naval affairs; b. Koenigsberg, East Prussia, Jan. 30, 1903; s. Prof. Bernhard and Sophie (Leo) R.; U. of Tubingen, 1921, U. of Koenigsberg, 1922, 1923-24, U. of Halle, 1924, U. of Berlin, 1925-32 (Japanese diploma, Oriental Seminar, 1927; Ph.D., 1930); m. Maria Luise Trip, June 2, 1934. Came to U.S., 1940. Chief lecturer in mil. and naval theory, German Naval Acad. (Staff Coll.), 1932-36; writer on mil. and naval affairs, London, 1936-40; lecturer on development of Clausewitz' theory of war, Oxford U., Eng., Oct.-Nov. 1937; mem. Inst. of Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J., 1940-41; lectures on command of the sea, Lowell Inst., Boston, 1941; lecturer in mil. and naval affairs, Fletcher Sch., Tufts Coll., Boston, since 1941. Founding mem. Deutsche Gesellschaft für Wehrpolitik und Wehrwissenschaften, 1933. Mem. Am. Mil. Inst. Author: The German Army (Harcourt, Brace; $3), 1940; also author of mil. books published in Germany. Contbr. to Inf. Jour., The Nation, Atlantic Monthly. Home: 19 Everett St., Cambridge, Mass.

†ROYCE, Brig. Gen. Ralph, comdr. U.S. bomber squadron which flew from Australia to attack Japs in Phillipines and evacuated 25 persons from Islands.

ROYLE, Sir Guy, Australian naval officer; b. Surrey, Eng., 1885; m. Ellis Gilmer. Served in World War, 1914-19, including Battle of Jutland, 1916, gunnery officer of Marlborough, staff mem. of 2d in command of Grand Fleet, 1917-20; apptd. exec. officer of flagship of Mediterranean Fleet, 1920-22; asst. to dir. of naval ordnance, 1923; naval attaché to Brit. embassy in Tokyo, 1924-26; comdg. ships, 1928-34; naval sec. 1st lord of Admiralty, 1934-37; vice adm. of aircraft carriers, 1937-39; lord commr. of Admiralty and chief of naval air services, 1939-41; 1st mem. Australian naval bd. since 1941; apptd. 2d in command to U.S. Vice Admiral Leary, head of Navy Sect. of Australian-Am. staff in Pacific zone of World War II, 1942. Awarded Knight Commander of the Bath, Companion of the Bath, Commander of St. Michael and St. George.

RUBINSTEIN, Beryl, composer; b. Athens, Ga., Oct. 26, 1898; s. Isaac and Matilda (Abrahams) R.; studied under father and Alexander Lambert, in Europe with José Vianna da Motta and Ferrucio Busoni, 1913-14; hon. Mus.D., Western Reserve U., 1931; m. Elsa Landesman, Dec. 29, 1925; children—Ellen, David. Toured America as child pianist, 1905-11; made debut with Metropolitan Opera Orchestra, 1911, professional debut, N.Y. City, 1916; joined faculty Cleveland Inst. of Music, 1921, head piano dept., 1925-29, dean of faculty, 1929-32, dir. since 1932; dir. Singers Club of Cleveland, 1930-36; soloist with New York Philharmonic, Cleveland, Detroit, Philadelphia, San Francisco and London symphony orchestras; première of second Piano Concerto with Dr. Rodzinski and Cleveland Orchestra, Nov. 1936. Hon. mem. Phi Mu Alpha; nat. patron Delta Omicron. Composer: (for orchestra) Scherzo Suite; (opera) The Sleeping Beauty; (for piano) Sonatina in C Sharp Minor; Two Studies, Four Fantastic Pieces, Suite Ronmantique, Musical Fancies, Thirty-two piano studies, A Day in the Country (5 impromptus), Gavotte, Sarabande, Gigue, Arabesque, Nocturne, Caprice, Concerto in C for piano and orchestra, Suite for Two Pianos; (for violin) Scherzo Serenade, Plainte de Pierrot; (for string quartet) Passepied; (for voice) Three Songs, Prayer of Praise (for male chorus). Author: Outline of Piano Pedagogy. Has made several recordings. Home: 2105 St. James Parkway, Cleveland Heights, Address: 3411 Euclid Av., Cleveland, 0.

References: Baker, Biog. Dictionary of Musicians; Howard, Our Contemp. Composers.

SAGENDORPH, Kent (sā'gĕn-dŏrf), author, lecturer; b. Jackson, Mich., Apr. 23, 1902; s. William Kent and Ethel (Abbott) S.; grad. Jackson High Sch., 1920; student U. of Mich. and U.S. Army Tech. Sch., 1922; m. Ruth D. Howard, Nov. 11, 1933; children—Mary Lou, Wallace Kent. Aerial photographer, U.S. Army Air Service, Clark Field and Nichols Field, Philippine Islands, 1922-24; travel in China, Siberia, Japan, summer and fall, 1924; commercial aerial photographer, Los Angeles, 1925, Mexico, 1926; mem. staff Fairchild Aerial Surveys, preparing tech. manuals and trade mag. summaries, to 1929; contbg. editor Aero Digest, 1929-31; free lancing, aviation and allied lines, since 1931; author of 300 mag. articles; now writing a Sunday aviation feature syndicated by Chicago Times and Toronto Star Weekly; lecturing on military aviation since 1939. Has had close relations and co-operation with the Air Corps in preparation of mag. articles and lectures; has flown in army planes and lived with air pilots. Mem. Nat. Aeronautic Assn. Conglist. Club: Aeronautic (Omaha); Box 14 (Jackson). Author: Radium Island, 1937; Beyond the Amazon, 1937; Sin Kiang Castle, 1938; Thunder Aloft (Reilly & Lee; $2.50), 1942. Compiler: Flying and Popular Aviation, 1941. Contbr. to Coronet, Esquire, etc. Made appearances in 19 states during lecture season, 1941-42. Home: 333 W. Mason St., Jackson, Mich.

SALAMANCA, Lucy (Nuttall), writer, research librarian; b. London, Eng.; d. Joseph and Anne (Robinson) Nuttall; ed. privately in U.S., South America and Europe; m. Dr. Raoul Irâm Salamanca y Torres (divorced); 2 sons, Raoul Joseph, Jack Richard; m. 2d, Robert Havens Morey, scientist, Mar. 21, 1942. Began career as writer fiction, spl. articles pub. in mags., newspapers, news syndicates in U.S. and London, many translated into Scandinavian languages; signed feature articles on pub. affairs, literature, interviews with Cabinet members, foreign dignitaries, visiting royalty, etc., pub. leading newspapers, mags.; traveled through W.I., Panama, Colombia and other South American countries, living for yr. among Indians of Boyacá, Colombia, collecting data for writing; apptd. Chief Research Counsel, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, Feb. 1940, Chief of Inquiry Sect., July 1, 1940, in charge of adminstrn. of professional staff preparing manuscripts, surveys, gen. research studies for members of Senate and House of Representatives to be used as basis for legislation or for publication as Senate or House documents. Author: Fortress of Freedom (Lippincott; $4), 1942, which is first complete history of Library of Congress, from first Congress meeting in New York to present. Also author short stories, 2 of which included in Fifty Famous Short Stories of 1932. Contbr. to mags., newspapers. Home: The Diplomat, 2420 16th St. Office: Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

SANTA CRUZ WILSON, Domingo (sän'tä krōōs wĕl-sōn') Chilean composer; b. La Cruz, July 5, 1899; bachelor's degree in humanities, Coll. of Sacred Heart, 1916; LL.B., U. of Chile, 1918; studied music under Enrique Soro of Chile and Conrado del Campo of Madrid; m. Wanda Morla Lynch; 1 son. Admitted to bar, 1921; dir. (and founder) of Bach Soc., 1919-32; sec., Chilean Embassy in Spain, 1921-24; decoding official for Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1924-27; prof. of musical history and composition, Nat. Conservatory, since 1928, dean of faculty of fine arts, since 1932. Counsellor of U. of Chile; editor of Art Review; mem. and dir. of Nat. Assn. of Symphony Concerts; v.p. of Nat. Assn. of Composers. Founded Inst. of Music Extension of U. of Chile, 1940. Came to U.S. as guest of State Dept., 1941, as guest of Pan-Am. Union, 1942 and with Francisco Mignone (see this Supplement III-83), was guest at Music Educators Nat. Conf., Milwaukee, Feb. 1942. Composed: sonatas, etudes and symphonic poems for piano; songs, pieces for piano and violin, choral music, chamber music and orchestral selections. Contbr. musical mags. Address: Facultad de Bellas Artes, Universidad de Chile, Santiago, Chile.

Reference: Baker, Biog. Dictionary of Musicians.

†SAYRE, Francis B., high commr. to Philippines; arrives in Washington, Mar. 23, 1942.

SCHEINFELD, Amram, author, lecturer; b. Louisville, Ky., June 1, 1897; s. Solomon I. and Sanna (Sachs) S.; grad. North Division High Sch., Milwaukee, 1914; student U. of Wis., New York U., New Sch. of Social Research (N.Y. City) and private study; studied art at Chicago Acad. Fine Arts, N.Y. Art Students League, Ecole de la Grande Chaumlere, Académie Colarossi, Paris; unmarried. Variously employed as reporter, feature writer, cartoonist, editorial writer, editor, with Milwaukee Free Press, Wis. News, Milwaukee Telegram, 1915-22; with Baltimore American, 1923-24, N.Y. American and King Features Syndicate, 1925-29, McNaught Syndicate, 1930-34; contbr. to nat. mags., writing and lecturing on social sciences since 1930. Mem. Authors League, Genetics Soc. of America, A.A.A.S. Author: You and Heredity, 1939; The Sexes (scheduled for fall, 1942); All That We Are: A Study of the American Public (in preparation, with Merle Colby). Home: 24 W. 8th St., New York, N.Y.

SCHWARZSCHILD, Leopold (shwärts'shĭlt), author; b. Frankfort, Germany, Dec. 8, 1891; s. Aron M. and Sarah (Lewis) S.; student U. of Frankfort, 1909-12; m. Valerie Gerstl, Apr. 11, 1927. Wrote 1st newspaper article, 1912; mem. editorial staff Frankfurter Zeitung and Frankfurter Generalanzeiger, 1919-21; became founder and editor Das Tage-Buch, 1920, Der Montag Morgen, 1923, Magazin der Wirtschaft (all in Berlin), 1924; left Germany, 1933; papers were destroyed and property confiscated; was one of 33 prominent anti-Hitlerlites whose German citizenship was declared void by 1st degree of this kind, summer 1933; established Das Neue Tage-Buch, weekly newspaper, Paris and Amsterdam, 1933, which continued to appear until invasion by Germany, May 1940; came to U.S., 1940. Author: (drama) Sumpf (produced in Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany), 1920; Das Ende der Illusionen, 1934; End to Illusion, 1934; World in Trance (L. B. Fischer; $3.50), 1942. Home: 225 E. 57th St., New York, N.Y.

Key to indicators: † see "Who's Who in America"; * died (date of death in parentheses); *† died, full biographical details may be found in "Who's Who in America." (References after sketches and listings are restricted to biographical material considered sufficiently comprehensive to be of permanent value.)

*†**SCOTT, Henri D.,** basso (Apr. 2, 1942) (†Vol. 21).
Reference: NYT, Apr. 6, 1942.

†**SCOTTEN, Robert M.;** apptd. minister to Costa Rica.

SHELDON, Jean Pendleton (pseudonym, Gene Henry), author; b. Hazelwood, Pa., Oct. 27, 1889; d. Huntington King and Martha Wellman (Paxton) Pendleton; 1st ancestor arrived in Virginia, 17th Century; ed. pub. and private schs.; m. Henry Hargrave Sheldon, Feb. 1, 1933. Writer of advertising copy and publicity for some years. Served in Polyclinic Hosp., N.Y. City, preparing to go overseas as surg. nurse with neurol. unit, World War; due to sail just as Armistice was signed. Republican. Episcopalian. Author: Miss Bronska (Dodd, Mead; $2), 1942. Home: 637 Drake Road, Bend, Oregon.

*†**SHIRAS, George,** naturalist (Mar. 24, 1942).
References: NYT, Mar. 25, 1942; MS.

SHUTE, Nevil, author: Pied Piper (Morrow; $2.50), 1942. (See this Service, I-368[Q]).

SIKORSKI, Wladyslaw, (sē-kôr'skē, vlä-dĭs'läf), Polish prime minister; b. 1881; grad. U. Tech. Coll., 1908; m. Helena Zubczewska; 1 dau. Became chief organizer of Pre-War Polish Mil. Orgns., 1909, lt.-gen. Polish Legions, 1914-18; active in defense of Lwow dist. against Ukrainians, 1919; served as comdr. 5th and 3d Army Corps in war against Bolsheviks; chief of gen. staff, 1921-22; prime minister, 1922-23; minister of mil. affairs, 1923-25; comdr. Lwow Army Region, 1926-28; comdr. in chief Polish Army and prime minister (now in exile) since 1939; now visiting in U.S.
References: CSM, Oct. 25, 1941, p. 3; TM, Dec. 4, 1939, p. 29; Sept. 11, 1939, p. 30; Contemporary Review, Aug., 1940, p. 177; Living Age, June 1940, p. 348.

*†**SIMMONS, Thomas Jackson,** coll. pres (Mar. 17, 1942).
References: Chicago Tribune, Mar. 18, 1942; Leaders in Edn.

*†**SMITH, Arthur St. Clair,** U.S. naval officer (Mar. 26, 1942).
References: NYT, Mar. 28, 1942; Navy Register.

SOONG, T. V. (Sung, Tse-ven) (sōōng), pres. Bank of China, minister of finance for China, pres. Exec. Yuan; b. 1891; s. Charles Jones (Charlie) Soong; member of Soong family ruling China today; brother of Madame Chiang Kai-shek; student St. John's, Shanghai; A.B., Harvard, 1915; Ph.D., Columbia. Sec. Canton Govt., 1923; pres. Canton Central Bank, then Shanghai Central Bank, 1924; state councilor Nat. Chinese Govt., 1928; minister of finance of Nat. Govt., 1928-33 (resigned); vice pres. Exec. Yuan, later acting pres., 1930, pres. since 1939; mem. Nat. Econ. Council of China since 1932; founder Bank of China and chmn. since 1936; chmn. of bd. Bank of Canton since 1936; minister of finance since 1939; recently negotiated large U.S. loan to China; became China's rep. on Pacific War Council, Mar. 1942. Considered "best financier ever produced by China" (John Gunther); established Chinese finance on Western system, and world-renowned as a financier.
References: TM, Jan. 5, 1942, p. 28; June 26, 1939, p. 31; LI, Mar. 24, 1941, p. 90; Horn Bk., Sept. 1939, p. 306; New Republic, Jan. 26, 1942, p. 111; J. Gunther, Inside Asia.

†**SOULE, George,** author: The Health of Nations (Macmillan; $2), 1942.

*†**SPAULDING, Rolland Harty,** ex-gov. (Mar. 14, 1942).
Reference: NYT, Mar. 15, 1942.

SPIEGAL, Clara Gatzert, author; b. Chicago, Ill., Dec. 6, 1904; d. August and Isabel (Florsheim) Gatzert; student Vassar Coll., 1922-23; m. Frederick Spiegal, Dec. 1, 1923; 2 sons, Frederick W., Jr., Andrew G. Mem. The Arts Club of Chicago. Co-author (with Jane Rothschild Mayer under pen name Clare Jaynes): Instruct My Sorrows (Random House; $2.50), 1942. Contbr. fiction to mags. and periodicals. Address: 2300 S. Green Bay Rd., Highland Park, Ill.

†**SPYKMAN, Nicholas John,** author: America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power (Harcourt Brace; $3.75), 1942.

†**STEWART, James B.;** apptd. minister to Nicaragua, Feb. 1942.

STIEGER, Andrew J. (stē'gĕr), foreign corr., author; b. Pittsburgh, Pa., July 1, 1900; s. August Jacob and Mary Margaret (Brethauer) S.; grad. Elmhurst Jr. Coll., 1926; student Chicago U., 1926-29; M.A., Columbia U., 1931; m. Alexandra Mikhailovna, 1939. Began at 13 yrs. as farm worker, later mechanic, mech. draftsman; began edn., 1921; English teacher, lit. translator, newspaper writer; Germany, France, Finland, Soviet Union, 1931-40; office sec., New York Times Moscow Bureau, Associated Press, Moscow, 1938; returned to U.S. via Siberia, Japan, 1940; free lance writer, 1940-41; foreign news reporter, Columbia Broadcasting System's short-wave listening station, covering foreign broadcasts, since July 1941. Served in A.E.F., France, 1918-19. Mem. Alumni of Columbia U.; League of Am. Writers. Author (with R. A. Davies): Soviet Asia (Dial Press; $3), 1942. Translator (from Russian): The Quiet Don (opera), 1937; Songs (collection), 1939; Life on an Ice Floe, 1939. Contbr. to Asia, Amerasia, Free World, Pacific Affairs, Travel, Nation, Books Abroad, International Literature, Soviet Russia Today. Home: 49 Claremont Av. Office: care Columbia Broadcasting System, 485 Madison Av., New York, N.Y.

STILL, Dorris Shelton, author, lecturer; b. of Am. parents at Ta Chienlu, West China, Aug. 25, 1905; d. Albert LeRoy and Flora Flavia (Beal) Shelton; received early edn. from parents; grad. Pomona (Calif.) High Sch., 1923; A.B., Pomona Coll., Claremont, Calif., 1927; A.M., Tex. Christian U., 1929; also grad. student at U. of Southern Calif. and U. of Hawaii; m. Dr. Charles E. Still, Jr., 1936; 1 son, Charles Shelton. Asst. dean of girls, Tex. Christian U., 1928; edni. dir. of orphans home, Dallas, Tex., 1929; vice prin. for girls Redondo Union High Sch., Redondo Beach, Calif., 1932-34; dean at a private school for girls, Los Angeles, 1935; teacher of public speaking and drama for junior high school, Honolulu, 1935-36. Mem. Christian Ch. Republican. Author: Sue in Tibet (Day; $2), 1942, story based on her 16 years in Tibet, where her father was a med. missionary. Editor: Chants from Shangri-la (Tibetan chants translated by her mother). Home: Kirksville, Missouri.

†**STOKLEY, James,** scientific writer; author: Science Re-makes Our World (Ives Washburn; $3), 1942.

*†**STORY, Russell McCulloch,** coll. pres. (Mar. 26, 1942).
References: NYT, Mar. 28, 1942; Leaders in Edn.

†**STOUT, Wesley W.;** resigns as editor of Saturday Evening Post.

STRINGHAM, Edwin John, composer, teacher, editor; b. Kenosha, Wis., July 11, 1890; s. Frank Dillingham and Anna (Jorgensen) S.; Mus.B., Northwestern U., 1914; Dr. Pedagogy, Cincinnati Conservatory, 1922; Dr. Music, honoris causa, Denver Coll. of Music, 1928; certificate in composition under Respighi, Royal Acad. of Music, Rome, Italy, 1929; m. Alta Morrill Potts, Aug. 26, 1916; 1 son, Edward MacDowell. Teacher of violin, North Shore Sch. of Music, Chicago, 1910-14; dir. Grand Forks Sch. of Music, 1914-15; lived in New Mexico, 1916-19; mem. staff music dept., U. of Colo., 1919; organizer and dean Denver Coll. of Music, 1920-29; chmn. music bd. Colo. State Bd. of Edn., 1922-29; music critic Denver News and Denver Post, 1919-29; asso. with Union Theol. Sch. of Sacred Music (teacher of composition), Juilliard Sch. of Music and Dept. of Music and Teachers Coll., Columbia U., 1930-38; chmn. music dept., Queens Coll., N.Y. City, since 1938; music editor Carl Fischer, Inc., 1930-31; Am. Book Co. since 1932; mem. bd. dirs. and general music editor, Music Press, Inc., since 1939. Organizer and chmn. 1st music festival of combined music depts. of 4 City Colls. of the City of New York, 1941. Awarded Cromwell traveling fellowship to Germany, 1936; scholarship to Royal Acad. of Music, Rome, Italy, 1929. Mem. Am. Musicol. Soc., Accoustical Soc. of America, Phi Mu Alpha, Pi Gamma Mu, Phi Delta Kappa. Episcopalian. Club: Bohemians (New York). Composer: (for orchestra) The Phantom, Symphonic Poem; Three Pastels; Visions; Ancient Mariner; Overture: Springtime; Dances Exotiques; Symphony No. 1 B flat Minor; Nocturne No. 1; Symphonic Suite; Nocturne No. 2; Nocturne for Woodwinds, Horns and Harp; Phantasy on American Folk Tune for Violin Solo and Orchestra; (chamber music) String Quartet in F Minor; (for chorus) Pilgrim Fathers for Mixed Voices; Dream Song, Women's Voices; Ave Maria, Mixed Voices A Cappella; (for piano) Three Pastels; also many shorter works and songs. Contributed to, and/or edited and wrote prefaces to Music in Education; Fundamental Counterpoint; Schematic Modulation; Discovering Music; Chorus Book for Male Voices; Symphonic Band Books (2 vols.); Pep Band Book; Fun in Music; Ear Tests in Harmony; Philosophies of Music History; Come and Sing (Rural Music Book); Singing Through the Ages (2 vols.); Music Education in the High School; Rhythmic Games and Dances; Norwegian Nights (operetta). Author: Instruments of Modern Orchestra and Band. Co-author: Modern Graded Orchestra Series (3 vols.); Instrumentation Work-Book for Orchestra and Band; America Sings (Carl and Betty Carmer); The Lookout (history of music of Colo.). Contbr. to Internat. Cyclopedia of Music and Musicians, also to mags. Works copied for and by Phila. Free Library, Fleischer Collection. Home: 46-08 245th St., Douglaston, L.I., N.Y.
References: Baker, Biog. Dictionary of Musicians; J. T. Howard, Our Contemp. Composers.

TAYLOR, R(ichard Denison), cartoonist; b. Fort William, Ont., Can.; s. Richard Denison Lippincott and Christine Elizabeth (Young) T.; student Central Tech. Sch., Ontario Coll. of Art (Toronto), Los Angeles Sch. of Art and Design; m. Maxine MacTavish, July 6, 1936. Began career by coloring lantern slides for Sunday schs.; cartoonist, Goblin mag., Toronto, 1927; free lance commercial artist, 1932; cartoonist, New Yorker mag., since 1935; cartoons also appear in Collier's, Saturday Evening Post, and various advt. campaigns. Has had one-man shows of unpublished watercolors at Walker Galleries (N.Y. City), Butler Art Institute (Youngstown, Ohio), Addison Gallery (Andover, Mass.), Roullier Galleries (Chicago), Hudson Gallery (Detroit), Valentine Gallery (N.Y. City), 1941. Also exhibited at Internat. Watercolor Exhibit, Chicago Art Inst., Internat. Watercolor Exhibit, Brooklyn Museum, The Modern Art Soc., Cincinnati, 1941; Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1942. Represented in collections of Museum of Modern Art, Boston Museum of Fine Art, The Albright Art Gallery (Buffalo), Wichita (Kans.) Museum, and several private collections. Address: Putnam Park Rd., Bethel, Conn.
Reference: COL, Sept. 28, 1940, p. 66.

THIELENS, Mrs. Carrie Ollier (thē'lĕnz), author; b. Detroit, Mich., Dec. 10, 1909; d. Louis Joseph and Mae (Lutton) Ollier; student Château Mont Choisi, Lausanne, Switzerland, 1922-24, Crandon Hall, Rome, Italy, 1924-26, 133 Queens' Gate, London, 1926-28; studied privately in Berlin and Paris, 1928-30; m. Wagner Perrin Thielens, Dec. 31, 1932; children—Wagner Perrin, Jr. (step-son), Alexis Ollier, Anne Hale. Christian Scientist. Author: Awake! My Heart, 1940; The Moon Lies Fair (Harper; $2.50), 1942. Contbr. fiction to mags. Home: 1600 Dearing Pl., Tuscaloosa, Ala.

THOMPSON, Jim (pen name of James Myers Thompson), writer, editor; b. Anadarko, Okla., Sept. 27, 1906; s. James Sherman and Birdie Edith (Myers) T.; ed. pub. schs. of Okla., Texas, Neb., and by tutor; student Coll. of Agr., U. of Neb., 1929-31; m. Alberta Elizabeth (Hesse), Sept. 16, 1931; children—Patricia, Sharon, Michael. Began writing at 15 yrs.; editor, Fed. Writers Project of Okla., 1936, editor-in-chief, 1937; dir., 1938-39; on research fellowship in building-industry problems for Rockefeller Foundation, U. of N.C. Press, 1940; worker in aircraft, free lance writer, since 1940. Mem. Alpha Gamma Rho, Sigma Upsilon. Democrat. Author: Now and on Earth (Modern Age; $2.50), 1942. Contbr. articles, fiction to trade, class, general mags. Address: care Modern Age Books, 245 Fifth Av., New York, N.Y.

TINKER, Miles Albert, psychologist; b. Huntington, Mass., Aug. 22, 1893; s. Benjamin Franklin and Katie Matilda (Hoag) T.; student Ohio Northern U., 1917-18; A.B., Clark U., 1921, A.M., 1922, also grad. student, same 1922-23; Ph.D., Stanford U., 1927; m. Eva Llewella Carter, 1925; children—Milton Elliott, Gordon Edwin, Karen Jane. Teaching fellow, Clark U., 1921-23, Stanford U., 1925-27; instr. in edn., Stanford U., summer 1926, asst. prof. in edn., summer, 1927; asst. prof. of psychology, U. of Minn., 1927-35, asso. prof. since 1935. Served as hosp. apprentice, 2d class, U.S. Naval Reserve, 1918-19. Fellow in Distinguished Service Foundation of Optometry. Fellow A.A.A.A., Am. Psychol. Assn., Am. Edni. Research Assn.; mem. Am. Legion, Alpha Epsilon Upsilon, Sigma Xi, Delta Mu, Psi Chi. Episcopalian. Mason. Author: Experiments in Psychology (with W. S. Foster), 1929; Introduction to Methods in Experimental Psychology, 1938; How to Make Type Readable, 1940. Contbr. numerous articles to Jour. Edni. Psychology, Jour. Edni. Research, Jour. Applied Psychology, etc. Research in visual perception and reading. Home: 2291 Folwell St., St. Paul, Minn.
References: Leaders in Edn.; MS.

TORREY, Emily Gertrude, exec. v.p. Bundles for America; b. Evanston, Ill., May 10, 1890; d. Thomas Dewar and Emily Gertrude (Hayward) McChesney; grad. Horace Mann Sch., 1907, Mount Ida Sch., Newton, Mass., 1908; extension course in journalism, Columbia U., 1911-13; m. Owen Cates Torrey, Mar. 4, 1910; children—Thomas Hayward McChesney, Emily Dickson (Mrs. John Price Cuddeback), Owen Cates. Exec. Am. Red Cross, 1914-18; mem. League of Nations Assn., 1928-30; Westchester County chmn. Bundles for Britain, 1939-41; exec. v.p. Bundles for America, Inc., since 1942, an orgn. dedicated to men of U.S. Armed Forces and their families and to all citizens adversely affected by war. Republican. Episcopalian. Mem. Metropolitan Museum Assn. Clubs: Manursing Island; Noroton Yacht. Home: 8 Heathcote Rd., Scarsdale, N.Y. Address: 475 5th Av., New York, N.Y.

*†**TOWNSEND, Edward Waterman,** author, ex-congressman (Mar. 16, 1942) (†Vol. 15).
Reference: NYT, Mar. 17, 1942.

TREAT, Ida, writer, paleontologist; b. Joliet, Ill.; d. Francis Henry and Ida May (Johnson) Treat; A.B., Coll. for Women, Western Reserve U.; Docteur es Lettres, Sorbonne, Paris, 1913; m. Andre Bergeret (Lt. de Vaisseau, Free French Navy), Sept. 30, 1939. Instr., asst. prof. of Romance lang., Coll. for Women, Western Reserve U., 1913-19; excavated prehistoric sites in Pyrenees Mts. for Inst. de Paleontologie Humaine (Paris), 1924-28; scientific and journalistic assignments in Europe, East Africa, China, South Seas, The Hebrides, New Caledonia, Australia, 1928-36; living in France when World War II broke out, remained in occupied France until Dec., 1940, when she came to N.Y. (husband, an officer in the French merchant marine, is fighting with the de Gaulle forces.) Episcopal. Author: (with Ruth Sawtell) Primitive Hearths in the Pyrenees, 1924; Pearls, Arms and Hashish, 1930; La Croisiere Secrète, 1931; The Anchored Heart (Harcourt, Brace; $2.50), 1941. Contbr. to Nat. Geographic, Scientific American, Asia, Travel, and French scientific publs. Home: Ile de Bréhat, Côtes du Nord, France. Address: 121 E. 82d St., New York, N.Y.

*†**VEZIN, Charles,** landscape artist (Mar. 13, 1942).
Reference: NYT, Mar. 15, 1942.

WALDECK, Rosie G. (Countess), author, journalist; b. Mannheim, Germany, July 24, 1898; d. Max and Johanna (Staadecker) Goldschmidt; student U. of Munich, 1917-19, Heidelberg U., 1919-21 (Ph.D., 1921). Came to U.S., 1931, naturalized citizen, 1938. Foreign correspondent in Paris, Geneva, Soviet Russia, the French African Empire, the Far East. Author: Prelude to the Past, 1934; Athene Palace (McBride & Co.; $2.75), 1942; various articles in Foreign Affairs, The American Mercury, etc. Home: 114 E. 52d St., New York, N.Y.
Reference: TM, Feb. 16, 1942, p. 90.

WALLIS, James Harold, author; b. Dubuque, Ia., Jan. 23, 1885; s. John William and Mary (Burton) W.; B.A., Yale Coll., 1906; m. Sara Francis O'Neil, Oct. 18, 1910; children—Jane O'Neil (Mrs. David Hamlin Burrell, III), John Herod, Mary-Burton. Editor Dubuque Times-Journal, 1917-1919; editor Dubuque Daily News, 1919-1921. Served as alderman, Dubuque, 1912-18. Mem. Phi Beta Kappa, Zeta Psi, Elihu Club. Democrat. Mason. Author: Youth (verse), 1907; The Testament of William Windune (verse), 1916; Laughter of Omnipotence (verse), 1927; Murder by Formula, 1931; The Capital City Mystery, 1932; The Servant of Death, 1932; The Mystery of Vaucluse, 1933; Cries in the Night, 1933; Murder Mansion, 1934; The Woman He Chose, 1934; The Politician: His Habits, Outcries and Protective Coloring (polit. satire), 1935; Once Off Guard (Dutton; $2.50), 1942. Home: 94 Old Army Rd., Scarsdale, N.Y.

WANG, Chi-Chen, teacher, writer; b. Huantai, Shantung, China, Feb. 24, 1899; s. Kung-Chen and Shu-Wen (Tien) W.; student Tsing Hua Coll., Peking, China, 1913-21; A.B., U. of Wis., 1924; student Columbia U., 1924-27; m. 2d, Bliss Kao, June 28, 1937; 1 son, Ching-Lin Wang; came to U.S., 1922. Research asst., Dept. of Far Eastern Art, Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1928-36; lecturer in Chinese, Columbia U., since 1929, and curator of the Chinese collection, Columbia U. Library, since 1937. Author: Dream of the Red Chamber (translated from Chinese), 1929; The Technique of Chinese Rubbings, 1938; (translator) Ah Q and Others: Selected Stories of Lusin (Columbia U. Press; $2.50), 1941. Home: 21 Claremont Av. Office: care Columbia University, New York, N.Y.

†**WARREN, Avra M.;** apptd. minister to Dominican Republic.

*†**WARRINER, Samuel Dexter,** corp. exec. (Apr. 3, 1942).
Reference: NYT, Apr. 4, 1942.

WASHBURN, Ruth Wendell, psychologist; b. Northampton, Mass., Jan. 19, 1890; d. Philip and Miriam Phillips (Storrs) Washburn; B.A., Vassar Coll., 1913; M.A., Radcliffe Coll., 1922; Ph.D., Yale, 1929. In training, London University, London, England, 1919-1920; Judge Baker Foundation, Boston, Mar.-July 1921; studied under Prof. Jean Piaget, Institut Jean Jacques Rousseau, Geneva, Oct.-Jan. 1938; unmarried. Visitor Associated Charities, Colorado Springs, Colo., 1915-18; asst. sec. Charity Orgn. Soc., N.Y. City, spring of 1918; with Social Service Dept. Dispensary for French and Belgian Children, Am. Red Cross, Le Havre, France, 1918-19; research asso., Child Welfare Research Station, U. of Iowa, 1922-23; instr., later asst. prof., Clinic of Child Development, Yale, 1923-38; don, dept. of psychology, Sarah Lawrence Coll., Bronxville, N.Y., 1938-39; cons. in child development, Milton (Mass.) Prep. Sch., Park Sch. (Brookline, Mass.) and Brooks Sch. (Concord, Mass.) since 1938. Mem. Am. Psychol. Assn., A.A.A.S.; asso. mem. Sigma Xi. Republican. Episcopalian. Author: Children Have Their Reasons (Appleton-Century; $2), 1942; also many articles on child study. Home: 5 Acorn St., Boston, Mass.
References: Leaders in Edn.; MS.

*†**WATSON, Samuel Newell,** clergyman (Mar. 27, 1942).
References: NYT, Mar. 29, 1942.

†**WEDDELL, Alexander W.;** resigns as U.S. ambassador to Spain.

*†**WELLS, Carolyn,** author (Mar. 26, 1942).
References: NYT, Mar. 28, 1942; SCH, Apr. 15, 1940, p. 23; CSM, Oct. 21, 1939, p. 6.

Key to indicators: † see "Who's Who in America"; * died (date of death in parentheses); *† died, full biographical details may be found in "Who's Who in America." (References after sketches and listings are restricted to biographical material considered sufficiently comprehensive to be of permanent value.)

Key to Reference Citations

Below is an explanation of the reference citations found at the end of the biographical sketches in the Supplement. Where no symbol is used in the citation, the full name, or a clear abbreviation thereof, appears.

AM—American Magazine
AT—Atlantic Monthly
BP—Burke's Peerage
BW—Business Week
CBRS—Current Biographical Reference Service (issues of Series I and II, 1940, 1941).
COL—Collier's
CSM—Christian Science Monitor
HA—Harper's Magazine
KHbk—Kelly's Handbook of Distinguished People
LI—Life
ME—American Mercury
MPAI—Motion Picture Almanac
MS—American Men of Science
NA—The Nation
NB—Nation's Business
NR—The New Republic
NSW—Newsweek
NYr—New Yorker
NYHT—New York Herald-Tribune
NYHTB—New York Herald-Tribune Book Section
NYT—New York Times
NYTB—New York Times Book Section
PM—PM (N. Y. City newspaper)
PW—Publishers' Weekly
RD—Reader's Digest
SCH—Scholastic
SEP—Saturday Evening Post
SRL—Saturday Review of Literature
TM—Time
WWC&I—Who's Who in Commerce and Industry

Key to Pronunciation

ā.....as in āle.
â.....as in senâte.
â.....as in câre.
ă.....as in ăm.
ä.....as in ärm.
à.....as in sofà.
ē.....as in ēve.
ê.....as in êvent.
ĕ.....as in ĕnd.
ē.....as in makēr.
ī.....as in īce.
ĭ.....as in ĭll.
ō.....as in ōld.
ô.....as in ôbey.
ô.....as in ôrb.
ŏ.....as in ŏdd.
ū.....as in ūse.
û.....as in ûnite.
û.....as in ûrn.
ŭ.....as in ŭp.
ü.....as in menü.

The vowel sound in a few syllables is indicated, as in fo͝od, fo͝ot; ′ indicates accented syllable.

Note—The small capital G or K at the end of a syllable indicates the German sound, which has no exact equivalent in English. The small capital N at the end of a syllable represents the French sound, as in "bon ton."

†**WERFEL, Franz,** co-editor with Paul Stefan: Verdi (Fischer; $3.50), 1942.

WESLEY, Charles Harris, dean; b. Louisville, Ky., Dec. 2, 1891; s. Charles Snowden and Matilda (Harris) W.; B.A., Fisk U., 1911; M.A., Yale U., 1913; student Guilde Internationale, Paris, 1914; Howard U. Law Sch., 1915-16; Ph.D., Harvard U., 1925; D.D., Wilberforce U., 1928; m. Louise Johnson, Nov. 25, 1915; children — Louise Johnson, Charlotte Harris. Instr. in teaching of history, Howard U., 1913, instr. history, 1914-18, asst. prof., 1918-19, asso. prof., 1919-20, prof. history and head of dept. since 1921, dir. Summer Sch., 1937, acting dean Coll. of Liberal Arts, 1937-38, dean since 1938; pastor and presiding elder African M.E.Ch., 1918-37. Ednl. sec. Army Y.M.C.A., Camp Meade, Md., 1918; sec. for overseas work, Colored Men's Dept., Nat. War Work Council, Y.M.C.A., 1919. Guggenheim Fellow, London, 1930-31; grant-in-aid Social Science Research Council, 1936-37. Sec. bd. trustees Fisk U.; trustee Kittrell Coll. (N.C.). Mem. Assn. for Study of Negro Life and History (exec. council), Am. Hist. Assn., Nat. Council Social Studies, N.E.A., Am. Assn. Sch. Administrs., Soc. for Advancement of Edn., Am. Assn. Univ. Profs., Alpha Phi Alpha (gen. pres. 1931-40; past gen. pres. and historian since 1940). Mason, Odd Fellow. Author: Negro Labor in the United States, 1850-1925, 1927; Richard Allen: Apostle of Freedom, 1935; The Collapse of the Confederacy, 1938; A Manual of Research and Thesis Writing for Graduate Students, 1941. Editor: The Negro in the Americas, 1940. Home: 731 Fairmont St. N.W., Washington, D.C.

References: Christian Century, Jan. 15, 1941, p. 81; **Leaders in Edn.**

WESSEL, Mark, composer, pianist, teacher; b. Coldwater, Mich., Mar. 26, 1894; s. Perry B. and Eunice Luella (Smead) W.; M.M., Northwestern U., 1918. Lived abroad, mostly in Vienna, composing and concertizing, 1928-32; head of piano dept. and prof. of composition, U. of Colo., since 1934. Mem. Nat. Assn. Am. Composers and Condrs. Awarded Guggenheim fellowship, 1931-33; Pulitzer traveling scholarship, 1930. Compositions: Scherzo Burlesque (piano, orchestra); Concertino (flute, orchestra); Symphony Concertante (horn, piano, orchestra); Symphony (orchestra); Ballade (violin, oboe, orchestra); The King of Babylon (opera, pantomime); Concerto (piano, orchestra); Variations on a Mountain Tune (small orchestra); Trio (piano, violin, cello); Plains and Mountains (trio); Quartette (strings); Sextette (woodwinds); Lento Fantasia e Funebre (horn, piano); (for piano) Promenade of Respectable People, Feminine Conversation, Isle of Death, Study in Lydian, etc. Home: 900 13th St., Boulder, Colo.

References: Baker, **Biog. Dictionary of Musicians; J. T. Howard, Our Contemp. Composers.**

WHITMAN, Cedric Hubbell, poet; b. Providence, R.I., Dec. 1, 1916; s. George Alfred and Muriel Augusta (Hubbell) W.; grad. Rogers High Sch., Newport, R.I., 1932; student Harvard U., 1934-35 and since 1940; m. Ruth Adele Bashein, Oct. 13, 1941. Left college, 1935, and devoted most of time to writing verse; held various positions such as shoe salesman, oil salesman, bookkeeper, private tutor in English, French or Latin, also taught fencing; established class at Rogers High Sch., Newport, and helped establish Little Theatre Group in Newport, producing several of his own plays; three of his plays have been broadcast over Eastern networks; returned to coll., 1940; taught verse writing for short time at Boston Centre for Adult Edn.; rep. Harvard U. at Glasgock Poetry Contest at Mt. Holyoke Coll., winning with "Orpheus and the Moon Craters." Awarded high sch. prizes for Greek and Latin, also various scholarships; Elinor Frost scholarship, Bread Loaf, 1941. Author: Orpheus and the Moon Craters and Other Poems (Middlebury Coll. Press, $1), 1941. Home: 49 Sparks St., Cambridge, Mass.

†**WHITTON, John B.,** author: Propaganda by Short Wave (Princeton Univ.; $3.75), 1942.

*†**WILCOX, John Walter,** U.S. naval officer (Apr. 1942—lost overboard).

References: NYT, Apr. 7, 1942.

WILLCOX, Oswin William, chemist, author, editor; b. Austin, Tex., Oct. 11, 1870; s. Oswin and Philippina (Bothmer) W.; B.S., U. of Tex., 1901; Ph.D., U. of Chicago (Lowenthal fellow), 1904; m. Margaret Kostenbauder, Oct. 25, 1906; children—Isabel, Ortrude, Oswin Burr. Farmer, country sch. teacher and newspaper reporter, 1889-99; instr. chemistry, U. of Utah, 1901-02; asst. in soils, Ia. State Coll., 1904; chemist Ordnance Dept., U.S. Army, 1905-08; cons. and mfg. chemist, 1909-22; tech. editor Sugar (trade jour.), consulting agrobiologist and writer on agrobiologic and social econ. subjects, since 1923. Mem. Am. Soc. Agronomy, Am. Soc. Sugar Beet Technologists. Mason. Author: Principles of Agrobiology, 1930; Reshaping Agriculture, 1934; Nations Can Live at Home, 1935; Can Industry Govern Itself?, 1936; A B C of Agrobiology 1937; Working Models of a Different World (in preparation). Translator (from Dutch): Studies on Sugar Boiling, by J. G. Thieme, 1933. Home: 197 Union St., Ridgewood, N.J.

Reference: MS.

WILLIAMS, Edwin Hess, v.p. United Press Assns.; b. Columbia, Mo., Sept. 12, 1903; s. Walter and Hulda (Harned) W.; grad. Culver Mil. Acad., 1918-22; B.J., U. of Mo., 1925; m. Evelyn Branch, Sept. 29, 1931; 1 son, Edwin Moss. Business mgr. Gulf Coast Guide, Gulfport, Miss., 1925; sec. Press Congress of the World, Geneva, Switzerland, 1925; pub. Marfa (Tex.) Sentinel, 1926, Border Times, Presidio, Tex., 1926; southwestern rep. United Press Assns., Kansas City, Mo., 1927-29, mgr. southern dir., Atlanta, Ga., 1929-35, gen. sales mgr., New York, since 1935, v.p. since 1938; dir. British United Press. Mem. Phi Delta Theta, Sigma Delta Chi. Clubs: Cloud (New York); Quaker Hill Rod and Gun (Pawling, N.Y.). Home: 223 E. 49th St. Office: 220 E. 42d St., New York, N.Y.

WILLIAMS, Thomas Anthony, radio garden commentator; b. Nashville, Tenn., July 12, 1891; s. Henry Franklin and Ella Dora (Maultsby) W.; ed. Hume-Fogg High Sch., Nashville; m. Edna Earle Welch, Sept. 6, 1925; 1 dau., Peggy Jean. Began career as designer, show-card writer, Nashville, Tenn., 1910-14; field sec. Nat. Highways Assn., Washington, D.C., 1915-16; artist, designer, Williams Printing Co., Nashville, since 1919; art dir., N.Y. City, 1921-24; mem. plan bd., Sales Guild, N.Y. City, 1924-28; radio garden commentator, "The Old Dirt Dobber," WLAC, Nashville, since 1934. Columbia Broadcasting System, since 1940. Created "The Order of the Green Thumb," club of gardeners nominated for having special knack of making everything grow. Served as acting sergt., training cooks and mess sergts., U.S. Army, 1917-18. Awarded silver medal, Am. Iris Soc., 1935; accredited judge, of same society. Mem. Am. Hort. Soc., Washington, D.C. Mem. Church of Christ. Author: The Old Dirt Dobber's Garden Book (McBride; $2.75), 1942; also several booklets on gardening. Contbr. to mags. Home: Hill Rd., Brentwood, Tenn. Office: care WLAC, Nashville, Tenn.

WILMAN, Allan Arthur, composer, pianist; b. Hinckley, Ill., May 11, 1909; s. Arthur Burton and Louise (Wilman) Simpkins; Mus.B., Knox Coll., Galesburg, Ill., 1928; Mus.M., Chicago Musical Coll., 1930; private study of composition with Albert Noelte and Thorvald Otterstrom, of piano with Alexander Raab and Rudolph Ganz; unmarried. Teacher in a Chicago conservatory, also professional accompanist and arranger, and appearances in recital as composer-pianist, 1931-34; travel in Europe with study in Paris, with Nadia Boulanger and Thomas de Hartmann, 1935-36; asso. prof. of music, U. of Wyoming, since 1936, acting chmn. of div. of music since 1941; accompanist for artists on tours since 1939. Residence at MacDowell Colony (for creative artists), Peterboro, N.H., summer, 1940. Received Paderewski award ($1,000) for original orchestral work, 1935. Mem. Am. Composers Alliance, Nat. Assn. for Am. Composers and Condrs. Compositions include: (for orchestra) Solitude; Symphonic Overture; Idyl; (chamber music) A Ballade of the Night (voice and string quartet); (miscellaneous) Two Sonatas (piano); various shorter pieces for piano; songs, etc. Compositions have been played by Boston Symphony Orchestra under Koussevitzky and at Am. Music Festivals of Eastman Sch. of Music; compositions have been played over radio systems of U.S., Sweden, Australia. Home: 1316 Ivinson Av. Office: Division of Music, University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyo.

Reference: Howard, Our Contemp. Composers.

†**WILSON, Charles Morrow,** author: Ambassadors in White (Holt; $3.50), 1942.

WOOLLEY, Monty (Edgar Montillion Wolley), actor; b. N.Y. City, Aug. 17, 1888; s. William Edgar and Jessie (Arms) W.; prep. edn. Mackenzie Sch., Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 1902-07; A.B., Yale, 1911, A.M., 1912; grad. work, Harvard. Left Harvard for practical stage work, N.Y. City; dramatic coach, Yale, 1914-17 (produced Troilius and Cressida, Tamburlaine, The Frogs, for the first time in U.S.); enlisted in Conn. Nat. Guard, 1916, 1st O.T.C., Ft. Sheridan, Ill., 1917; commd. lt. and sent as mem. intelligence dept. Gen. Staff, France, 1918; discharged Mar. 1919; returned to Yale as asst. prof. of drama, later became asst. dir. of exptl. theater, Yale; resigned and began directing plays in N.Y. City, 1927; directed Fifty Million Frenchmen, 1929, The New Yorkers, 1930, Jubilee, 1935; directed Second Little Show, Jubilee; went to Hollywood, 1937, and appeared in several motion pictures including Nothing Sacred, Arsene Lupin Returns, Girl of the Golden West, Man about Town, Dancing Co-Ed; appeared as actor in stage plays On Your Toes and Knights of Song; created role of Sheridan Whiteside in the play The Man Who Came to Dinner, which enjoyed a 2-year run in N.Y. City; also plays Whiteside in the film version (Paramount) of the famous play. Mem. Alpha Delta Phi. Clubs: Players (N.Y. City); Elizabethan (New Haven, Conn.). Address: 718 N. Broadway, Saratoga Springs, N.Y.

References: House and Garden, Mar. 1942, p. 37; **MPAI.**

WRIGHT, David McCord, author, educator, lawyer; b. Savannah, Ga., Aug. 1, 1909; s. Anton Pope and Hannah McCord (Smythe) W.; student The Citadel, 1926-27, U. of Pa., 1927-30; LL.B., U. of Va., 1935; M.A., Harvard U., 1939, Ph.D., 1940; m. Caroline Noble Jones, June 27, 1940. Admitted to Ga. bar, 1935; atty. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 1936-37; lecturer on trade regulation, U. of Va. Law Sch., 1940; asst. prof. economics, U. of Va., since 1939. Mem. R.O.T.C., 1926-27. Mem. Am. Econ. Assn., Phi Delta Phi, Alpha Kappa Psi, Delta Psi; hon. mem. Royal Econ. Soc. Awarded David A. Wells prize, Harvard, 1941. Episcopalian. Club: Colonnade. Author: The Creation of Purchasing Power (Harvard U. Press; $3), 1942. Notes editor Va. Law Review. Contbr. articles to econ. and legal jours. Home: 3 Dawson's Row, U. of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va.

WRONG, H. Hume, Can. mem. Pacific War Council; b. Toronto, Ont., Sept. 10, 1894; student Upper Can. Coll., Toronto, Ridley Coll., St. Catharines, Ont.; B.A., U. of Toronto, 1915; M.A., B. Litt., Oxford U., 1921; m. Joyce Hutton; 1 son, 1 dau. Became lecturer, asst. prof. history, U. of Toronto, 1921-27; apptd. 1st sec. Can. Legation in Washington D.C., 1927-42; named to Pacific War Council, 1942. Served in Inf. and Air Force World War I, 1915-19, commd. capt. on demobilization. Author: The Government of the West Indies; Sir Alexander Mackenzie, Explorer and Fur Trader.

ZIMMERMAN, Godfrey Frank, teacher, writer; b. Millville, N.J., July 24, 1909; s. Godfrey Roe and Amy Mary (Bullock) Z. B.A., Bucknell U., 1930; student U. of Pa., 1932; M.A., Teachers Coll., Columbia U., 1933-35; student U. of Calif. at Los Angeles, summer, 1937; m. Ida Frances Barber, Aug. 15, 1935. Teacher of social studies, Millville (N.J.) High Sch., 1930-35, Cranford (N.J.) High Sch., since 1935. Mem. N.J. State Com. on Consumer Edn. Mem. Nat. Edn. Assn., Kappa Delta Rho (Iota Chap.) Baptist. Author (with S. B. Hamblen): Wise Spending: An Introduction to Consumer Economics, 1941; How to Spend Wisely (Harpers; $2.50), 1942. Home: 529 Wells St., Westfield, N.J. Office: care High School, Cranford, N.J.

Appearance of a sketch in this SUPPLEMENT does not necessarily mean it will later be included in WHO'S WHO; however, all sketches appearing in the SUPPLEMENT, and not later included in WHO'S WHO, will be listed in that volume in a special index to the SUPPLEMENT.

WHO KNOWS—*The Index to Authorities*

The following sketches are from the files compiled for WHO KNOWS—The Book of Authorities, current publication of which has been rescheduled because of the inadvisability, in the public interest, of circulating certain of the groupings involved during war time. The following sketches are selective in so far as each biographee is definitely a specialist, but they are not, of course, the only outstanding specialists in their respective fields, nor are they necessarily the most outstanding—they are merely some of many specialists selected for eventual inclusion in WHO KNOWS, sketches of whom are available now for publication in the MONTHLY SUPPLEMENT in the hope they will be of interest and value to its users. Similar sketches will be published periodically.

INDEX BY SPECIALISMS

AGRL. PLANNING (Econ.) Anderson, Arthur
ARCHAEOLOGY Finkelstein, J. Joe
ARCHERY Gordon, Paul H.
ARGYRIA Stillians, Arthur W.
BEHAVIOR ASPECTS Bruch, Hilde
BIOCHEMISTRY Anderson, Arthur von K.
BIRDS Aldous, Shaler E.
BONES (Growth and Repair) Bast, Theodore H.
BUSINESS LAW Howard, Charles G.
CARDIOLOGY Arkin, Aaron
CHEMISTRY (Agrl.) Bateman, George M.
CHEMISTRY (Indsl.) Beaber, Nathaniel J.
CHEMISTRY (Physiol.) Bates, Robert W.
CHILD PSYCHIATRY Bender, Lauretta; Bruch, Hilde
CHINESE PAINTING Hackney, Louise W.
COTTON Armstrong, George M.
DERMATOLOGY Hollander, Lester; Stillians, Arthur W.
DRUG MANUFACTURING Bates, Philip K.
ECOLOGY Aikman, John M.; Alexander, Gordon
ECOLOGY (of Birds) Barber, George W.
ETHNOHISTORY Finkelstein, J. Joe
FLUIDS (Measurement of) Bean, Howard S.
FOLK ART (American) Halpert, Edith Gregor (Mrs.)
FOREST MANAGEMENT Allison, John H.
FUNGUS DISEASES Baker, Roger D.
GENETICS (Human) Baker, Horace G.
GEOLOGY (Structural) Balk, Robert
GEOLOGY (Structural and Physiographical) Baker, Charles L.
HEMATOLOGY Alt, Howard L.
INDIAN LORE Gordon, Paul H.
INSECTICIDES Adams, Elmer W.
INSECT PEST CONTROL Barber, George W.
INSECT PESTS Annand, P. N.
INTERNAL MEDICINE Arkin, Aaron; Fulmer, Silas C.
LIBRARIES (Application of Engring. Principles to) Bailey, Ethel H.
MAMMALS Aldous, Shaler E.
METABOLISM (Fungus) Anderson, Arthur von K.
MEXICO (Geology of) Baker, Charles L.
MICROBIOLOGY Barker, Horace A.
NEEDLEWORK Battles, Marietta
NEGRO PSYCHOPATHOLOGY Barker, Prince P.
NEUROLOGY Barker, Prince P.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY Bender, Lauretta
PALEONTOLOGY Barwick, Arthur R.
PATHOLOGY (Ear) Bast, Theodore H.
PEDIATRICS Bruch, Hilde
PETROLEUM PRODUCTS Adams, Elmer W.
PLANT DRUGS (Crude) Hiner, Lovell David
PLANT PHYSIOLOGY Beck, William A.
POULTRY GENETICS Asmundson, Vigfus S.
POWER ENGRING. Beach, Robin
PRE-HISTORY (Portrayal of) Kingman, Eugene
PSYCHIATRY Barker, Prince P.
PUPPETRY McPharlin, Paul
SOUTH AMERICA (Geology of) Baker, Charles L.
SOY BEANS Beaber, Nathaniel J.
SPECTROSCOPY (Applied to Ceramics) Harrison, Harold C.
SYPHILOLOGY Hollander, Lester; Stillians, Arthur W.
TRANSMISSION ENGRING. Beach, Robin
WEAVING Baker, Horace G.
WHEAT Bayles, Burton B.
WOOD CHEMISTRY Hawley, Lee F.
WOOD DISTILLATION Hawley, Lee F.
ZOOLOGY Alexander, Gordon

ADAMS, Elmer Wade, research chemist. **Petroleum Products and By-Products.** Home: 7443 Olcott Av., Hammond, Ind.; office: Standard Oil Co., Whiting, Ind. Chemist Standard Oil Co. since 1925; specialist in petroleum greases, gen. and spl. lubricants, polishes, waxes and spl. applications of petroleum products and by-products. Contbr. tech. articles to professional and sci. jours. Mem. Am. Chem. Soc., Chem. Arts Forum, Sigma Xi. Also indexed under **Insecticides** (animal, household and agrl.) B. Oct. 7, 1897, Deer Park, Tex.; B.S., M.S., U. of Ill. (1919-20); Ph.D., U. of Wis. (1922-24).

AIKMAN, John Mulvaney, botanist. **Ecology (Native and Crop Plants).** Home: 3213 Oakland Av.; office: Botany Hall, Ia. State Coll., Ames, Ia. Supt. sch., Hickman, Neb., 1917-18, Whitman, Neb., 1919-20; asso. prof. biology, Neb. Wesleyan Univ., 1921-27; asso. prof. botany, Ia. State Coll. since 1927; sr. botanist, in charge bot. research western shelterbelt, U.S. Forest Service, 1934-35; project supervisor, Soil Conservation Service, part time since 1937; made special study of the interactions of plants and their environment with special emphasis on rate of growth, yield, soil building and soil protecting properties of native and crop plants under variations in environmental conditions. Regular contbr. to jours. of ecology since 1925. Mem. editorial bd. Ecology, 1937-40. Developed spl. techniques for quantitative determination of vegetative cover; developed radiometer for radiant energy determinations. Mem. Sigma Xi; sec., Grassland Research Foundation. B. Mar. 24, 1893, Mason City, Neb.; B.A., M.A., Neb. Wesleyan U. (1910-12, 1915-17; Grad. Sch., 1920-21); student U. of Chicago, 1922; Ph.D., U. of Neb. (1923-28).

ALDOUS, Shaler Eugene, forest bioecologist. (1) **Mammals;** (2) **Birds.** Home: 1494 Grantham St.; office: Lake States Forest Expt. Sta., University Farm, St. Paul, Minn. Instr. zoology, U. of Utah, 1924-26; ranger naturalist, Yosemite Nat. Park, 1927; instr. biology and physiology, hig sch., Tooele, Utah, 1927-28; engaged in control methods research

on rodents and predators on forest and range, U.S. Biol. Survey, 1928-31, food habits research and econ. mammalogy and ornithology, 1931-36, forest wildlife research since 1936; has done 5 yrs. field and lab. work on the white-necked raven; has given special attention to beavers, deer and small rodents. Frequent contbr. to tech. and sci. jours. Mem. Sigma Xi. B. Apr. 19, 1900, Huntsville, Utah; B.A., U. of Utah (1920-24); M.A., U. of Calif. (Grad. Sch., 1926-27).

ALEXANDER, Gordon, biologist. **Ecology.** Home: 765 14th St.; office: Univ. of Colo., Boulder, Colo. Asst. prof. biology, Central Coll., Fayette, Mo., 1926-28; visiting prof. biology, Chulalongkorn U., Bangkok, Siam, 1928-30 (engaged in study of fauna of Siam); asso. prof. biology, U. of Colo., 1931-39, prof. and head dept. since 1939. Now engaged in research study of relation of altitude to distbn. of birds and grasshoppers in Rocky Mts. Author: An Outline of General Biology, 1935; An Outline of General Zoology, 1940. Mem. Am. Soc. Zoologists, Ecol. Soc. of America, Entomol. Soc. of America, Am. Soc. Ichthyologists and Herpetologists, Am. Ornithol. Union, A.A.A.S. Also indexed under **Zoology.** B. Aug. 18, 1901, Rich Hill, Mo.; B.A., Central Coll. (1919-23); M.A., Ph.D., Princeton (1923-26, 1930-31).

ALLISON, John Howard, forester. **Forest Management.** Home: 1509 Hythe St.; office: Univ. Farm, St. Paul, Minn. Jr. forester, U.S. Forest Service, 1906-09, forest examiner, 1910-13; prof. forestry, U. of Minn. since 1913; forestry fellow, Am.-Scandinavian Foundation (Sweden), 1923-24. Made study of history of govtl. forestry in U.S.; authority on forest taxation and appraisal. Contbr. to jours. of forestry and to bulletins of U. of Minn. Agrl. Sta. Sr. mem. Soc. Am. Foresters. B. Sept. 25, 1883, East Granby, Conn.; Ph.B. M.F., Yale (1902-05; Sch. Forestry, 1905-06); grad. student U. of Minn. (1921-25).

ALT, Howard Lang, physician. **Hematology.** Home: 1144 Michigan Avenue, Evanston, Illinois, office: 720 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. House officer medicine and surgery, Wesley Memorial Hosp., 1923-25; asst. resident, later resident medicine, Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 1925-29; teaching fellow medicine, Harvard Med. Sch., 1927-29; asst., Kaiser Wilhelm Inst., Berlin-Dahlem (Germany), 1929-30; asst., Medizinische Klinik, Wurzburg, 1930; asso. medicine, Northwestern Med. Sch., 1930-36, dir. hematology clinic since 1936, dir. labs. and in charge clin. pathology, 1935-39; instr. in chemistry since 1931; asst. prof. of medicine since 1936. Frequent contbr. to med. jours. on hematology and nutrition. Made discoveries concerned with pathologic physiology of anemias. Mem. Central Soc. for Clin. Research, Inst. Medicine of Chicago, Chicago Society of Internal Medicine, Sigma Xi. B. July 28, 1900, Chicago, Ill.; B.S., M.D., M.S., Ph.D., Northwestern U. (1917-24; grad. sch., 1930-34).

ANDERSON, Arthur, agronomist. **Agri. Planning (Econ.).** Home: 1140 S. 52nd St.; office: Coll. of Agr., U. of Neb., Lincoln, Neb. Asst. in agronomy, later asst. agronomist, Coll. of Agr., U. of Neb., 1917-18 and 1919-34, asso. prof. since 1934; also successively since 1934, cons. land planning, specialist land use, state rep., Bur. of Agl. Economics, U.S. Dept. of Agr., to develop coop. land utilization program with Coll. of Agr., U. of Neb. Authority on production of forage crops, especially alfalfa, and of grains, and in field of land use. Regular contbr. to agrl. jours. Fellow A.A.A.S.; mem. Am. Soc. Agronomy, Sigma Xi, Gamma Sigma Delta, Alpha Zeta. B. June 29, 1889, Butler County, Neb.; B.S., M.S., Coll. of Agr., U. of Neb. (1912-16; Grad. Sch., 1923); Ph.D., Ohio State U. (1930-32).

ANDERSON, Arthur von Krogh, physiol. chemist. **Biochemistry.** Home: 123 S. Sparks St.; office: Pa. State Coll., State College, Pa. Prof. chemistry, St. Olaf Coll., Northfield, Minn., 1916-18; instr. chemistry, U. of Minn., 1919-20, instr. agrl. biochemistry, 1920-23; prof. physiol. chemistry, Pa. State Coll. since 1923. Author: Essentials of Physiological Chemistry, 1935, 2d edit., 1939; Laboratory Experiments in Physiological Chemistry, 1936; contbr. to sci. jours. Has developed several new methods of analysis. Fellow A.A.A.S.; mem. Am. Chem. Soc. (past chmn. Central Pa. Sect.), Pa. Acad. of Science, Pa. Chem. Soc. (founder), Sigma Xi. Also indexed under **Metabolism (Fungus).** B. Feb. 27, 1890, Montevideo, Minn.; B.S., M.S., Ph.D., U. of Minn. (1909-13; Grad. Sch., 1913-16, 1919-23).

ANNAND, P(ercy) N(icol), entomologist. **Insect Pests.** Home: 4247 Vacation Lane, Arlington, Va.; office: Dept. of Agr., Washington, D.C. Asst. entomologist, Great Western Sugar Co., 1920-21; asst. instr. biology, Stanford U., 1921-22; head dept. of biol. science, San Mateo (Calif.) Junior Coll., 1922-29; asso. entomologist, Bur. Entomology and Plant Quarantine, U.S. Dept. of Agr., 1929-30, in charge sugar beet insect investigation, 1931-34, chief cereal and forage insect investigation, 1934-36, asst. chief of bur. in charge of research, 1937-41, chief of bur. since 1941. Contbr. to entomol. and agrl. jours. Fellow Am. Entomol. Soc., A.A.A.S., Mem. Am. Assn. Econ. Entomologists, Sigma Xi. B. Nov. 16, 1898, Telluride, Colo.; B.S., Colo. State Coll. (1917-20); M.A., Ph.D., Stanford U. (1921-22, 1926-28).

ARKIN, Aaron, physician. **Cardiology.** Home: 200 E. Chestnut St.; office: 25 E. Washington St., Chicago, Ill. Instr. in pharmacology, U. of Wis., 1909-1910; prof. pathology and bacteriology, U. of W. Va., 1914-1922; research fellow and asst. in medicine and cardiology for tech. and sci. jours. First to demonstrate spirocheta pallida in acquired syphilitic ulcers of bowel, 1909; discovered new clinical and x-ray picture of persistent right aortic arch with stenosis of left aortic arch, new clinical picture of histologically healed periarteritis nodosa, etc. Certificate from Am. Bd. of Internal Medicine. Fellow Am. Coll. Physicians: mem. Am. Heart Assn., Am. Soc. of Clinical Pathology, Am. Assn. of Pathologists and Bacteriologists, Am. Physiol. Soc., Am. Pharmacol. Soc., Inst. of Medicine. Received L.C.P. Freer Medal and first prize for research at Rush Med. Coll., 1912. Also indexed under **Internal Medicine** (considerable study and research in renal diseases, vascular diseases, bronchogenic carcinoma, and Hodgkins disease). B. Sept. 6, 1888, Libau, Latvia; B.S., U. of Chicago (1905-09); M.A., U. of Wis., (1909 to 1910); M.D., Ph.D., U. of Chicago (Rush Med. Coll., 1910-12, Grad. Sch., 1912-13).

ARMSTRONG, George Miller, plant pathologist. **Cotton.** Home: 122 S. Palmetto Blvd.; office: Long Agrl. Hall, Clemson, S.C. Grad. asst., Clemson Coll., 1914-15, instr., 1917-18, head dept. of botany and bacteriology since 1928; grad. asst., U. of Wis., 1915-17; extension plant pathologist, Ala., 1918-19; instr., Washington U., 1921-24; head cotton research div., Pee Dee Expt. Sta., 1924-28. Has specialized in cotton diseases, physiology and fibers; collaborator cotton projects, U.S. Dept. Agr. Frequent contbr. to tech. and sci. jours. Mem. A.A.A.S., Am. Phytopath. Soc., Am. Soc. Plant Physiology, S.C. Acad. Science. B. Nov. 13, 1893, Appleton, S.C.; B.S., Clemson Agrl. and Mech. Coll. (1910-14); M.A., U. of Wis. (1915-17); Ph.D., Washington U., St. Louis (1919-21).

ASMUNDSON, Vigfus Samundur, poultry husbandry. **Poultry Genetics.** Home: 503 E St.; office: Div. of Poultry Husbandry, U. of Calif., Davis, Calif. Asst. prof. poultry husbandry, U. of B.C., Can., 1921, asso. prof. 1927-32; asso. poultry husbandry, U. of Calif., 1932-33, asst. prof., 1933-38, asso. prof. since 1938; visiting prof., A. and M. Coll. of Tex., 1941. Frequent contbr. to agrl. publs. Made discoveries on inheritance of skeletal abnormalities of domestic fowl and turkeys; inheritance of egg production of turkeys; formation of the avian egg. Mem. Genetic Soc. of America, Am. Genetic Assn., Soc. of Exptl. Biology and Medicine, Poultry Science Assn., A.A.A.S., Sigma Xi. Received Poultry Science Research Prize 1931. B. Sept. 24, 1895, Reykjavik, Iceland; B.S.A., U. of Saskatchewan, Can., (1912-18); M.S.A., Cornell U. (1919-20); Ph.D., U. of Wis. (1929-30).

BAILEY, Ethel H., mech. engr. **Application of Engring. Principles to Library Field.** Home: 17 Montclair Av.; office: Montclair Pub. Library, Montclair, N.J. Insp. airplanes and airplane engines, S.C., 1917-18; asso. with aircraft div., Bur. of Construction and Repair, Washington, D.C., 1919-22; aero material engr., L.W.F. Engring. Co., College Pt., N.Y., 1922-23; engr. research dept., Soc. Automotive Engrs., N.Y. City, 1924-26; mech. engr., Art Metal Works, Newark, N.J., 1927-29; mech. engr. and sec. suggestion com., Gen. Electric Co., Bloomfield, 1929-32; mech. engr., E.R.A., State of N.J., 1933-35; mech. engr., Montclair Pub. Library, since 1936. Was instrumental in introducing various practices used in mfg. into library work, including scheduling, use of mech. equipment, keeping of records; assisted in inauguration of cost study of pub. libraries, microphotography and I.B.M. equipment. Fellow A.A.A.S.; mem. Am. Soc. Mech. Engrs., Nat. Assn. Professional Engrs., Soc. Am. Mil. Engrs., Am. Library Assn., Am. Assn. U. Women, Womens Engring. Soc., London. Awarded scholarship in microphotography, Columbia U. Sch. of Library Service, 1939. B. Aug. 18, 1896, Houlton, Me.; student Rutgers U., 1928-29, 1931-32, Montclair State Teachers Coll., 1933-39, Columbia U., 1939, U. of Newark (N.J.), 1939-40, Internat. Business Machines, Customer Administrative Sch., Endicott, N.Y., 1942

BAKER, Charles Laurence, geologist. **Geology (Structural and Physiographical).** Address: Tex. Agrl. & Mech. Coll., College Sta., Texas. Field asst., U.S. Geol. Survey, 1908, 1910; instr. geology, U. of Calif., 1911; geologist, S.P.R.R. Co., 1912-31; with Bur. of Econ. Geol., U. of Tex., 1914-35; instr. geology, U. of Tex., 1916; with Standard Oil Co. of Calif., 1921-22, Indian Ter. Illuminating Oil Co., 1922-23; professorial lecturer, Northwestern U., 1932; head dept. geology, Tex. Agrl. & Mech. Coll., since 1935. Author about 50 books and papers dealing with various phases of pure and applied geology of western U.S., Mexico and South America. Specialized in origin of red beds and saline residues; ancient Lake Cabeza de Vaca; peneplanation and westward overthrusting of central Rockies; geology of southwestern U.S. and northeastern Mexico, of River Plate basin of South America and Isthmus of Tehuantepec, Mexico. Fellow Geol. Soc. of America, Royal Scottish Geog. Soc.; v.p. Tex. Acad. of Science. Also indexed under (1) **Mexico (Geology of)**; (2) **South America (Geology of).** B. Oct. 10, 1887, Cordova, Ill.; student Monmouth College, 1903-05, Oberlin Coll., 1905-07; S.B., U. of Chicago, (grad. sch. 1907-10); M.A., U. of Calif. (1910-12).

BAKER, Horace Greeley, biologist, publisher. **Genetics (Human).** Address: 1716 S. Tacoma Av., Tacoma, Wash. Corr. sec., 1890-1907; mfr. 1907-20; asso. prof. biology, Southwestern Coll., 1925-29; prof. and head dept. biology, Dakota Wesleyan Univ., 1929-31; owner and mgr., Economy Publishers, Tacoma (Wash.), 1932-40; research biologist, human genetics, since 1931. Author: Dictionary of Eugenical and Genetical Terms, 1930; New Road to Civilization, 1932; also ten biol. text books, book reviews and newspaper articles; frequent contbr. to social science mags. Mem. Kan. Acad. of Science, A.A.A.S., Phi Beta Kappa. Awarded Demorest Medal of Oratory, 1893. Also indexed under **Weaving** (holds patents relating to weaving machines, accessories to rug and loom making). B. Mar. 5, 1873, Altoona, Kan.; B.A., M.A., U. of Ia. (1920-24; Grad. Sch., 1924-25 and 1930).

BAKER, Roger Denio, pathologist. **Fungous Diseases.** Home: 1111 Watts St.; office: Duke Hosp., Durham, N.C. Asst. resident pathology, John Hopkins Hosp., 1928-30; asst. later instr. pathology, Johns Hopkins U., 1928-30; instr. anatomy, Duke U., 1930-32, instr. pathology, 1932-34, asst. prof. since 1934; asst. pathologist, Duke Hosp. since 1934. Made study of path. features, using morphological and exptl. methods, of the fungous diseases of man, notably blastomycocis. Frequent contbr. to med. and sci. jours. on gen. path. subjects. Demonstrated that mouse is preeminently suited to exptl. prodn. of blastomycosis; that thread-like and yeast forms of causative fungus are equally infectious; emphasized dissimilarities between human blastomycosis and human tuberculosis. Mem. A.M.A., Am. Assn. Pathologists and Bacteriologists, Soc. Exptl. Pathology, A.A.A.S., Nu Sigma Nu, Alpha Omega Alpha, Sigma Xi. Received accessory financial support for research from John and Mary R. Markle Foundation and from Duke Univ. Research Fund. B. Apr. 10, 1902, East Lansing, Mich.; B.A., U. of Wis. (1920-24); M.D., Harvard (Med. Sch., 1924-28).

BALK, Robert, geologist. **Geology (Structural).** Home: 5 Wright Pl.; office: Mt. Holyoke Coll., S. Hadley, Mass. Independent field work since 1923 in Italy, Germany, Norway, U.S.A.; geologist, N.Y. State Mus., 1925-26, Minn. Geol. Survey, 1930, U.S. Geol. Survey since 1938; instr. Hunter Coll., 1925-28, asso. prof. 1928-35; visiting prof., Stanford U., 1934; asso. prof., 1935-37, head dept. geol. and geography, since 1935, prof. since 1937, Mt. Holyoke Coll. Author: Structural Behavior of Igneous Rocks, 1937, Mem. Geol. Society of America, Am. Geophys. Union, Soc. Rheology, Norsk Geol. Forening. B. May 31, 1899, Reval, Estonia; Ph.D., U. Greifswald, Göttingen, Breslau, German (1919-24).

BARBER, George W(are), entomologist. **Insect Pest Control.** Home: 274 Dwight St.; office: 56 Hillhouse Av., New Haven, Conn. Research entomologist in various parts of U.S., Bur. Entomology and Plant Quarantine, U.S. Dept. Agr., since 1914; specialist on habits and control of European corn borer and corn ear worm since 1919. Author many reports and bulls., frequent contbr. to sci. jours. Holds 3 U.S. patents on insect control. Fellow A.A.A.S.; mem. Entomol. Soc. of America, Am. Assn. Econ. Entomologists, Entomol. Soc. of Washington, N.Y. Entomol. Soc., Agrl. History Soc. Also indexed under **Ecology (of Birds)** (mem. Am. Ornithologists Union). B. Aug. 3, 1890, Hyde Park, Mass.; B.Sc., Mass. State Coll. (1909-13); M.Sc., D.Sc., Harvard (1925-27).

BARKER, Horace Albert, biochemist. **Microbiology.** Home: 992 Ventura Av.; office: Plant Nutrition Dept., U. of Calif., Berkeley, Calif. National research council fellow biological sciences, Hopkins Marine Sta., Pacific Grove (Calif.), 1933-35; gen. edn. bd. fellow, microbiology lab., Delft (Holland), 1935-36; instr. and asst. prof. soil microbiology, U. of Calif. since 1936; Guggenheim fellow, Yale. Mass. Gen. Hospital, U. of Wis., 1941-42. Contbr. numerous scl. papers to tech. jours. Conducted research on biological methane formation, anaerobic decomposition of nitrogenous compounds, microbial physiology. Mem. Soc. Am. Bacteriologists, Phi Lambda Upsilon, Gamma Alpha, Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi. B. Nov. 29, 1907, Oakland, Calif.; B.A., Ph.D., Stanford U. (1925-29; Grad. Sch., 1929-33); student U. of Chicago (1930-31).

BARKER, Prince Patanilla, physician. (1) **Neurology;** (2) **Psychiatry.** Address: Vets. Adminstrn. Facility, Tuskegee, Ala. Asso. editor, Jour. Nat. Med. Assn., since 1930; chief acute mental service, Vets. Adminstrn. Facility, since 1939. Fellow Am. Psychiat. Assn.; diplomate Nat. Bd. of Psychiatry and Neurology; mem. Nat. Med. Assn., A.A.A.S., Assn. Mil Surgeons of U.S. Also indexed under **Negro Psychopathology** (has done research work on neuroses and insulin shock therapy in negro ex-service men. Frequent contbr. to tech. and sci. jours. Propounded hypothesis: Qualitative alterations in functional psychoses in negroes are traceable and due to certain special aspects in their psychopathology and normal psychology which are environmentally conditioned). B. Dec. 15, 1897, Barbadoes, B.W.I.; B.A., Coll. City of N.Y. (1915-18); M.D., Howard U., Wash. (Coll. of Medicine, 1919-23).

BARWICK, Arthur Richardson, geologist, economic geologist; **Paleontology.** Home: 10 Wessex Rd., Sligo Park Hills, Silver Spring, Md.; office: Non-ferrous Metal Div., Office of Price Administration, Washington, D.C. Control chemist, Secaw Chem. Co., Irvington (N.J.), 1919-21; instr. geology, N.Y. Univ., 1922-29; asso. prof. geology, Cath. Univ. of America, 1929-32, acting head dept., 1932-38, chmn. dept. geology and geography, 1938-1941. Has done research work in econ. geology and paleontology with more recent papers principally on fossil whales of Chesapeake Bay Region. Mem. Paleontological Soc., Paleontological Soc. of Washington (D.C.), Geol. Soc. of Washington, Biol. Soc. of Washington, Am. Inst. of Mining and Metall. Engrs., Am. Assn. Univ. Profs., A.A.A.S. Received Ward Medal in geology, Coll. City of New York, 1917. B. Mar. 9, 1896, New York, N.Y.; B.S., Coll. of City of New York (1913-17); M.S., Ph.D., New York U. (1921-26).

BAST, Theodore Hieromymus, histologist. **Bones (Growth and Repair).** Home: Shorewood Hills; office: Science Hall, U. of Wis., Madison, Wis. Instr. anatomy, U. of Chicago, 1919-20; asst. prof. anatomy, U. of Wis., 1920-25, asso. prof., 1925-32, prof. since 1932. Author: The Life and Time of Adolf Kussmaul, 1926; frequent contbr. to sci. jours. Discovered "The Utriculo-endolymphatic Valve." Fellow A.A.A.S.; mem. Am. Assn. Anatomists, Soc. Exptl. Biology and Medicine, Phi Beta Pi, Sigma Xi. Also indexed under **Pathology (Ear)** (research work on development of otic capsule in relation to otosclerosis). B. Sept. 1, 1890, Rockfield, Wis.; B.A., Ripon Coll., 1912; Ph.D., Rush Med. Sch., U. of Chicago, 1922.

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BATTLES, Marietta, executive. **Needlework.** Home: 201 E. 35th St.; office: 11 E. 26th St., N.Y. City. Needlework advisor, Hobby Guild of America, since 1939; sales promotion and publicity mgr., Heirloom Needlework Guild Inc., since 1939, advt. mgr. since 1939; has trained salespeople in art needlework depts., and been lecturer, contest judge; designs needlepoint. Author: Needlepoint Questions and Answers, 1939; Romance of Needlepoint, 1939; Tapestries Throughout The Ages, 1939; Needlepoint Rug Instruction Booklet, 1940. Mem. Advt. Women of N.Y., Hobby Guild of America, Advt. Club of N.Y. (asso.) B. Methuen, Mass. Student George Sch. of Design, Boston, (1928-30) and Designers Sch. of Art, Boston, (1930-32).

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BECK, William A., biologist. **Plant Physiology.** Address: Univ. of Dayton, Dayton, O. Teaching, lab. direction and research, Univ. of Dayton since 1912; has made survey of flora of Switzerland, France, Italy, Germany and eastern U.S.; specialized in solution of problems of plant physiology; ascent of sap in plants, plant cancer, osmotic quantities, suctiontension, production of solutes and pigments in plants and effect of environmental factors. Contbr. to bot. jours. Holds patent on illuminating device for microscope, used for microscopic examination of opaque materials, invented 1923. Fellow A.A.A.S.; mem. Am. Plant Physiologists, Am. Micros. Soc., Soc. of Mary; staff Mem. Institution Divi Thomae since 1935. B. Dec. 17, 1883, Pittsburgh, Pa.; B.Sc., Univ. of Dayton (1908); M.Sc. Univ. Fribourg (Switzerland), 1912, Ph.D. (1926).

BENDER, Lauretta, psychiatrist. **Child Psychiatry.** Home: 325 E. 41st St.; office: Bellevue Hosp., New York, N.Y. Psychiatrist since 1926; traveling fellow, Rockefeller Foundation, Holland, 1926-27; neurological resident, U. of Chicago Clinics, 1927-28; mem. staff, Boston Psychopathic Hosp., 1928-29; mem. staff, Phipps Clinic, Johns Hopkins Hosp., 1929; Bellevue Hosp. since 1930; asso. prof. psychiatry, N.Y. (City) U., Med. Sch., since 1941. Frequent contbr. to med. and psychol. jours. Mem. A.M.A., Am. Psychiat. Assn., Am. Neurol. Assn., Sigma Xi. Also indexed under **Orthopsychiatry.** B. Aug. 9, 1897, Butte, Mont.; student Leland Stanford U. 1916-18; B.S., M.A., U. of Chicago (1918-23); M.D., State U. of Ia. (Med. Sch., 1923-26).

BRUCH, Hilde, physician. **Pediatrics; Child Psychiatry.** New York, N.Y.; and Baltimore, Maryland. Engaged in practice of medicine since 1929; pediatrician, Babies Hosp., N.Y. City, since 1934; instr. pediatrics, Coll. of Physicians and Surgeons, Columbia U.; instr. Child Psychiatry, Johns Hopkins Hosp., Baltimore. Frequent contbr. to med. jours. Specialized in endocrine disorders; disturbances of growth and development; childhood & adolescent obesity; abnormal puberty. Also indexed under **Behavior Aspects** (made study of physiol. and psychol. aspects of developmental disturbances, including growth retardation and acceleration, hypo- and hyperthyroidism and other endocrine disturbances). B. Mar. 11, 1904, Dulken, Germany; M.D., U. of Freiburg (Germany), and student U. of Munich, U. of Cologne and U. of Wursburg (1923-29).

FINKELSTEIN, J. Joe, anthropologist. **Ethnehistory.** Home: 10 Maplehurst Park, Apt. #1; office: Div. Anthropology, U. of Tenn., Knoxville, Tenn. Supervisor archaeol. excavations. Wagoner, Wagoner County (Okla.), U. of Okla., 1934-36, Spiro, LeFlore County, 1936-37, Grove, Delaware County, 1937; ethno-historian, div. anthropology, U. of Tenn. since 1938; asst. supervisor archaeol., excavation Kincaid site, Pope County (Ill.), U. of Ill., summer 1938. Contbr. to encys., American

Antiquity, 1937; Oklahoma Prehistorian, 1940. Mem. Am. Anthropol. Assn., Soc. Am. Archaeology, Okla. Archaeol. Soc. (hon.); chmn., 4th Southeastern Archaeol. Conf., 1939; fellow Lab. of Anthropology, Santa Fe, (N.M.), 1933; fellow Dept. Anthropology, U. of Chicago, 1938. Also indexed under **Archaeology.** B. Sept. 9, 1910, Oklahoma City, Okla.; B.A., U. of Okla. (1928-32); student U. of Okla., 1932-33; student U. of Chicago, 1937-38.

FULMER, Silas Crume, physician. **Internal Medicine.** Home: 2018 Wolfe St., office: 701 Main St., Little Rock, Ark. Prof. medicine U. of Ark. Sch. of Medicine since 1936, asst. dean since 1941. Mem. Am. Heart Assn., Am. Bd. Internal Medicine (diplomate). B. Jan. 26, 1891, Harmontown, Miss.; B.A., Hendrix Coll. (1911-15); B.S. in Medicine, U. of Ark. Sch. of Medicine, 1920; M.D., Tulane U. (Med. Sch. 1920-22).

GORDON, Paul H., manufacturer and author. **Archery.** Home: 43 E. Main St.; office: 15 Tioronda Av., Beacon, N.Y. Archery counselor (and scout-craft dir.), Camp Ranachqua, 1923-24; professional maker archery equipment since 1925; dir. Beacon Hill Craftsmen (makers archery equipment) since 1933; dir. outdoor crafts, Maple Lake Camp, summer 1933; adviser on archery, Advisory Bd., Hobby Guild of America, since 1941; merit badge examiner archery, Dutchess County Council, B.S.A.; special inst. to staff, Ten Mile River Scout Camps, 1940-41. Co-author: Making Bows and Arrows, 1926; The Archery Workshop, 1929; author: The New Archery —Hobby, Sport, Craft, 1939. Eagle Scout. Mem. Nat. Archery Assn., Nat. Field Archery Assn. Also indexed under **Indian Lore.** B. June 15, 1902, Newport News, Va.; B.A., Columbia U., (1921-25).

HACKNEY, Louise Wallace, orientalist. **Chinese Painting.** Address: 10 Park Av., New York, N.Y. Has lectured at Columbia U., U. of Chicago, Baltimore (Md.) Art Museum, Detroit (Mich.) Art Inst., Internat. Congress of Orientalists, Oxford (Eng.) U., etc.; was engaged in research work in Europe and Asia, 1928-38. Author: Guideposts to Chinese Painting, 1927; A Study of Chinese Paintings in the Collection of Ada Small Moore, 1941. Mem. Am. Oriental Soc., Royal Asiatic Soc. of Great Britain and Ireland, P.E.N. Club, Poetry Soc. of America, Soc. Women Geographers, Cosmopolitan Club of N.Y. City. B. Chicago, Ill.; student Columbia U. (Chinese dept., 1924, 1926); did spl. work in China

HALPERT, Edith Gregor (Mrs.), art dir. **Am. Folk Art.** Address: 43 E. 51st St., New York, N.Y. Dir., Downtown Gallery, specializing in contemporary Am. art, N.Y. City, since 1926; dir. Am. Folk Art Gallery, specializing in Am. art of 1720-1860 by little known and anonymous painters and sculptors, since 1929. Author various art catalogs. Organized Contemporary Am. Art Exhbn., Municipal Art Gallery, Atlantic City, N.J., 1929; 1st Municipal Art Exhbn., Radio City, 1934. B. Apr. 25, 1899, Odessa, Ukraine; student Columbia U., Nat. Acad. and Art Students League.

HARRISON, Harold C., chemist, spectroscopist. **Spectroscopy (applied to Ceramics and Mining).** Address: 102 Woodlark Bldg., Portland, Ore. Asst. prof. chemistry, N.Y. State Coll. of Ceramics, 1936-41; chief chemist and spectroscopist, research worker on spectroscopy as applied to ceramics and mining, Ore. State Dept. Geology and Mineral Industries, since 1941; consultant, cos. mfg. abrasives, whitewares, refractories, glass, heavy clay products, cements, vitreous enamels and pottery; consultant on application of spectroscopy to criminology and forensic investigations. Mem. Am. Chem. Soc., Am. Assn. U. of Profs. B. Feb. 10, 1907, Rutland, Vt.; B.S., Washington and Lee U. (1927-31); Ph.D. Cornell U. (Grad. Sch., 1931-36).

HAWLEY, Lee Fred, chemist. (1) **Wood Chemistry;** (2) **Wood Distillation.** Home: 237 Langdon St.; office: Forest Products Lab., Madison, Wis. Research in wood distillation, U.S. Forest Service, 1907-13, research in wood chemistry, Forest Products Lab., 1916-19, supervisor, 1920-29, gen. supervision research in wood utilization since 1930; research in wood distillation, Arthur D. Little, Inc. 1914-15. Author: Wood Distillation, 1923; also govt. bulls. and numerous articles in chem. jours.; co-author: Wood Chemistry, 1926. Holds U.S. patents on refining wood alcohol, increasing yield of wood distillation products, artificially dense charcoal for gas masks, medicinal ("beechwood") creosote from hardwood tar. Mem. Am. Chem. Soc., Am. Foresters. B. Feb. 12, 1882, Steamburg, N.Y.; B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Cornell U. (1899-1903; Grad. Sch., 1903-07).

HINER, Lovell David, pharmacognocist, pharmacologist. **Crude Plant Drugs.** Home: 2666 Kent Road; office: Coll. of Pharmacy, O. State Univ., Columbus, O. Grad. asst. pharmacognosy, U. of Fla., 1929, instr. pharmacognosy and pharmacology and dir. medicinal plant garden, 1931-33; instr. pharmacognosy and dir. medicinal plant garden, S.D. State Coll. 1933-35, asst. prof. pharmacognosy and pharmacology, 1935-37, prof. and head of dept., 1937-39; prof. pharmacognosy, O. State Univ. since 1940; especially interested in cultivation of medicinal plants; dir. O. State Medicinal Plant Garden now in process of development, dir. of grad. research in pharmacognosy. Contbr. articles and monographs to jours. of pharmacy. Invented Hiner Heart Chamber for demonstrating action of cardiac drugs. Mem. Central Ohio Acad. of Pharmacy, Am. Pharm. Assn., Sigma Xi. Awarded honorarium for research completed on "Ephedra sinica Cultivation", 1935. B. May 6, 1905, Platte, S.D.; B.S., Ph.C., S.D. State Coll. (1924-29); M.S., Ph.D., U. of Fla. (Coll. of Pharmacy, 1929-31, 1938).

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HOWARD, Charles Gerard, lawyer. **Business Law.** Home: 2243 Potter St.; office: Sch. of Law, U. of Ore., Eugene, Ore. Practitioner comm. law, 1922-28; asst. prof. business law and comm. subjects, U. of Ill., 1924-28; prof. law, U. of Ore., since 1928. Author: Oregon Annotations of the Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 1934. Editor-in-chief: Ore. Law Review; co-author: Principles of Business Law, 1928, rev. edit., 1935, 40. Admitted to Ill. bar, 1922. Order of the Coif, 1922. B. Mar. 13, 1892, Oakwood, Ill.; B.A., J.D., U. of Ill. (1914-17, 1919-20; Sch. of Law, 1919-22).

KINGMAN, Eugene, artist. **Pre-history (portrayal of).** Home: 2727 S. Rockford Rd.; office: Philbrook Art Museum, Tulsa, Okla. Seven paintings for Nat. Park Service Exhibit in Paris exposition, 1931; painting of aerial view, Medicine Bow Range, Colo., during Pleistocene period, 1934; seven paintings, the Geol. Story of Yosemite Valley, 1935; six paintings, geol. story of Crater Lake, Ore., 1935; block diagrams of type topography, 1937; four mural paintings of Geology of Glacier Nat. Park, for museum, 1938; mural decorations depicting prehistoric Wyo. in P.O. at Kemmerer, Wyo., 1938; three dioramas and paintings depicting stages in development of plains country, its geology and archeology, in preparation. Contbr. to tech. jours. Mem. Nat. Soc. of Mural Painters, Okla. Hist. Soc., Okla. Archeol. Soc. B. Nov. 10, 1909. Providence, R.I.; A.B., B.F.A., Yale U. (1928-32, Sch. of Fine Arts, 1933-35).

McPHARLIN, Paul, publisher. **Puppetry.** Address: 155 Wimbleton Dr., Birmingham, Mich. Columbia Coll. Marionette Players, 1922; founded Marionette fellowship, Evanston, Ill., 1928; instr. in puppetry, Wayne U., Detroit, since 1932; produced Fielding's Tragedy of Tragedies, Shakespeare's Taming of the Shrew, etc., with puppets; organizer Nat. puppetry exhibition, Chicago Fair, 1933; organized first Am. Puppetry Festival and Conf., Detroit, 1936; co-founder Puppeteers of Am., 1937; toured sixty European puppet theatres in 1938; collected 2,000 puppet books and many old puppets. Author: A Repertory of Marionette Plays, 1929; Puppet Heads, Hands, and Feet and Their Making, 1932; Animal Marionettes, 1935; Puppets in America, 1739 to Today, 1936; editor of Puppetry, 1930-41; publisher: The Puppetry Imprints. Mem. Puppeteers of America (first hon. pres.). Experimentation and performances with string puppets, rod puppets, hand puppets, hand-and-rod puppets, and shadow figures; design and construction, manipulation, and direction of puppet plays. B. Dec. 22, 1903, Detroit, Mich.; A.B., Columbia Coll. (1921-24); M.A., Wayne U., (1937-38); Ph.D., U. of Mich. (Inst. of Fine Arts, 1938-40).

STILLIANS, Arthur William, physician. (1) **Dermatology;** (2) **Syphilology.** Home: 1373 Hudson Av.; office: 104 S. Michigan Av., Chicago, Ill. Prof. dermatology and syphilology, Northwestern U. of Med. Sch., 1919-40, now prof. emeritus; has done research work on treatment of syphilis. Author: Introduction to Dermatology and Syphilology, 1936. Mem. Am. Dermatol. Assn., Soc. for Investigative Dermatology, Chicago Med. Soc., Chicago Dermatol. Soc., Chicago Inst. Medicine. Also indexed under **Argyria** (has done research work; discovered successful treatment in collaboration with T.K. Lawless.). B. Dec. 24, 1871, Chicago, Ill.; M.D., U. of Ill., 1899; post-grad. work in Vienna, 1910, Freiburg, and Heidelberg, 1914.

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Oscar & Maud Leng

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CONTENTS

LEADING ARTICLE : THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY ... 115
A SPECTATOR'S NOTEBOOK (Janus) 116
MIDDLES :
THE NETTUNO MYSTERY (Strategicus) 117
CANADA AND THE WORLD (Basil Wright) 118
STALINGRAD SYMBOLS (E. Taborsky) 119
COVENTRY PROGRESS (J. R. Glorney Bolton) 120
IS ENGLISH DOOMED? (C. S. Lewis) 121
MARGINAL COMMENT (Harold Nicolson) 122
THEATRE, CINEMA, GRAMOPHONE NOTES ... 123
LETTERS TO THE EDITOR 124
From Professor D. W. Brogan, Norman Sheldon, Rose Macaulay, &c.
COUNTRY LIFE (Sir William Beach Thomas) 126
BOOKS OF THE DAY 128
Reviews by Kenneth Lindsay, M.P., C. Henry Warren, Captain S. H. F. Johnston, Sir Henry Bashford, John Hampson, &c.

NEWS OF THE WEEK

SPECULATIONS regarding the precise significance of the constitutional changes in Russia announced last week are to some extent satisfied by examination of the full text of M. Molotov's address, which makes it clear that the projected decentralisation is to be of a limited character. It would probably be correct, indeed, to say that whenever Moscow thinks centralised action desirable, either in the military or the diplomatic sphere, centralised action will be taken. Meanwhile the first application of the new enactment is a development of considerable interest. The Ukrainian Socialist Soviet Republic, in which considerable Polish territories were incorporated in 1939, has appointed as its Commissar for Foreign Affairs M. Alexander Korneichuk, the dramatist, who has resigned his position as Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs at Moscow to take up his new post. M. Korneichuk is an ardent Ukrainian Nationalist who has in the past assumed a markedly antagonistic attitude towards Poland. His wife is Wanda Wasilewska, who has organised at Moscow the Union of Polish Patriots, which the Russians appear to regard as a possible alternative Polish Government to the administration of M. Mikolaiczyk in London. What M. Korneichuk's appointment portends, if it portends anything at all, will no doubt be revealed as events unfold themselves. Meanwhile, the Moscow paper, *War and the Working Classes*, ridicules the idea that the constitutional changes point in any way to the inclusion of other countries in the Soviet Union. If the journal had said any part of other countries it would have been more reassuring.

Britain and the French Committee

The Chancellor of the Exchequer announced on Tuesday that two agreements had been signed between the French Committee of National Liberation and the British Government, one fixing the rate of exchange with sterling for all countries controlled by the Committee, the other providing that each party shall supply the other with all possible military assistance free of cost. Sir John Anderson spoke of these agreements as a happy augury for our future financial and economic relations with France. They are that and more. Such negotiations with the French Committee presuppose that it is qualified to undertake certain responsibilities in the name of France, and that it is entitled to sign an agreement which confers obligations on us in relation to France. No more could have been done between the two parties if the Committee had been a fully recognised provisional Government. This demonstration of confidence at this moment was desirable for more reasons than one. The Committee has gained prestige in North Africa not only by its executive conduct of affairs but by the regard it has shown to the deliberations of the Consultative Assembly, and by its readiness to respond to criticism. Anything that could prudently be done to enhance its prestige in external relations was worth doing. In addition the Committee is in control of increasingly powerful armed forces which will soon be called upon to take their part in the liberation of France, and it is peculiarly fitting that at such a moment its authority should have full support. There cannot, till a large portion of France has been freed from the enemy, be a fully established French Government; but at the present stage there is no authority so well qualified to act in its place as the French Committee of National Liberation.

Ambiguous Turkey

Recent news from Turkey is not satisfactory. That country's attitude as an ally has always provoked a little perplexity, for Turkey has been receiving large deliveries both of war-material and of ordinary consumers' goods from both Great Britain and the United States and has been granted by the latter the benefits of Lend-Lease. She insists on the importance she attaches to regarding herself as an ally of Great Britain but gives rather too frequent indications of a desire to make the best of both worlds. So far Turkey, with the full agreement of the Allies, has maintained an attitude of strict non-belligerency. She has a treaty of friendship with Germany, and the German legation at Ankara, under the unwearying von Papen, is the scene of ceaseless, if not highly productive, diplomatic activity. Through the good offices of Britain and America cordial relations between Turkey and the Soviet Union have been re-established, and while there is no thought of urging Turkey to take any step that would seriously jeopardise her own security it has always been assumed that she would so interpret her alliance as at least to grant the United Nations, when the opportune moment came, certain facilities on and around her soil. That would involve her in little risk today, with the German armies in South Russia in full retreat and the whole German position in the Balkans threatened. Turkey can hardly interpret her treaty contract with Great Britain as meaning that she should act only when she can act without any modicum of risk at all. It was announced on Wednesday both that a British military mission which has been in Turkey for some time has left Turkey and that Herr Fritsche, Goebbels' second in command, has arrived there. There may be no connexion between the two events; there probably is none. But a rather clearer definition of Turkey's conception of her position seems to be called for.

Latin American Friendship

The elevation of the British Legations at Mexico City and Lima to the rank of Embassies, with the prospect of similar action being taken in one or two other Latin American capitals, is a sign of the recognition being rightly accorded, with a view not only to the purposes of war but to the longer and more beneficent purposes of peace, to that great and still developing continent. Few of the South or Central American Republics have hesitated about their choice between the Allies and the Axis Powers. Bolivia is still maintaining an equivocal attitude, and neither this country nor the United States has seen fit to recognise the new government recently established by a *coup d'état* at La Paz. In Argentina on the other hand the situation is improving. Thanks largely to evidence provided by British agents President Ramirez' government appears to realise fully at last how active and extensive is the system of espionage which both Germany and Japan, with no doubt a little dubious assistance from Italy, have created in Buenos Aires and other Argentine cities. With the realisation has come resolve. The Argentine Republic has broken relations not only with Germany but with all her satellites, including Vichy, and on Wednesday it was announced that a German general and a Japanese admiral, attachés at their respective countries' embassies, had been placed under open arrest. These steps are decisive. Argentina has made her choice, and it is a choice as wise from her own point of view as it is satisfactory from the Allies'. Bolivia is now the only South American Republic from which the Allied Powers need withhold co-operation, and it will not be surprising if there too a retreat from isolation is sought and achieved.

American Oil in the Middle East

The decision of the United States Government, announced by the Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Harold Ickes, to construct an oil pipe-line from the Persian Gulf refineries to the Mediterranean, is a new departure of considerable significance. It marks the conclusion of long negotiations with the American oil companies owning interests in the Persian Gulf and involves a contract for a limited partnership between the Government and the companies, the former constructing the pipe-line, the latter keeping in their hands the business of producing or refining. The decision should be judged in the light both of present and permanent world needs of oil. The quantity of oil in the world is limited and diminishing, and as a fuel it is a necessity for both military and industrial purposes. The British Government already owns a controlling interest in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. There has been much concern in America about the heavy calls on American oil during the war period, and also close consideration of new naval and military needs of the United States in distant parts of the world. Mr. Ickes also speaks of future naval and military needs "in view of the obligations which this country [the U.S.A.] must assume for the maintenance of collective security." The new departure, therefore, should be regarded less as a new enterprise by which the American Government enters business in the Middle East, than as a means of controlling the use of oil for the purposes of American policy. Under the agreement petroleum will not be sold to Governments or individuals where such sales would be deemed unwise by the State Department in the light of United States foreign policy. It is a measure which indicates the Government's sense of the necessity not only of increasing its share of control of the world's oil, but also of increasing the means by which its influence abroad can be exercised.

Mr. Butler's Bill

The opening of the Committee stage of the Education Bill in the House of Commons, on Tuesday, revealed the interest which the House generally takes in this vitally important subject. At the same time, unless eloquence is a little curbed either the time allotted to the Committee stage will have to be extended or some of the principal provisions of the Bill will go undebated. On Tuesday Mr. Butler successfully allayed anxiety lest there should be too much centralised control of local education authorities, and then so far bowed to a predominant desire that he and his successors should bear the title Minister of Education, not President of the Board of Education, as to withdraw the clause in question for further consideration. With the semi-mythical Board now finally abolished the retention of an obsolete title can hardly be defended. In discussion on the Advisory Councils by which the Board (as for the moment it must still be called) is to be assisted the appeal that they should be widely representative, with special regard to the interests of technical education, was met sympathetically by Mr. Butler, who made it clear that there was no question of confining membership of the councils to persons with some professional connexion with education. The discussion on rural schools on Wednesday elicited a number of speeches from Members with special knowledge of village schools, and a lively consciousness of the deficiencies of many of them. Mr. Butler made it clear that he was as conscious of the situation as anyone, and mentioned that he hoped to work out with the Minister of Agriculture a plan for developing rural education on practical lines. Many of the village schools are of the "non-provided" class, and a large proportion of them will no doubt be handed over to the local education authority owing to the inability of their trustees to finance the necessary reconditioning and reconstruction. The dual system unquestionably handicaps rural education.

Short-term Housing

The Minister of Works, Lord Portal, made a reassuring statement on Tuesday about that side of the housing problem with which his department is concerned. Its most striking feature was the declaration of the Government's intention to erect immediately after the war large numbers of "pre-fabricated" houses which would be publicly owned and have an estimated life-time of ten years. Only so can the clamant need for housing be met while the long term programme, which has to provide some four million houses, is being carried out. To build ten-year houses and then scrap them is obviously wasteful, but it is as obviously the most effective way of meeting an urgent and insistent need. Lord Portal is to be congratulated on his foresight and decision, but local authorities are still left completely in the dark about major issues of Government policy, regarding the powers that are to be entrusted to them, the financial help that will be given, the location of population to be housed and many other matters which must be settled before they can complete their plans.

Back to Employment

Though the second reading of the Reinstatement in Civil Employment Bill was carried in the House of Commons without a division, the measure evoked no conspicuous enthusiasm. That is natural enough, for while much of the Bill is just and right, it is almost impossible to draft it in such a way as to obviate constant controversy. A succession of employees may have held a particular post as one after another was called up for service. Yet it is clear that only one of them can be reinstated (for a minimum of 26 weeks) in that particular post after the war. That difficulty is to be solved under the Bill by giving the post to the senior returning service-man who applies to it. The others must be found more or less similar work, so far as that is "reasonable and practicable," and it was admitted by the Parliamentary Secretary of the Ministry of Labour that over the interpretation of those words almost endless dispute might arise; to meet this difficulty, reinstatement committees are to be appointed, with an appeal from them in certain circumstances to some tribunal not specified. It is too much to hope that their findings will give general satisfaction. The fault, if the Bill works only indifferently well, is not the Government's; the circumstances are such that no more than partial success is possible. But it is essential that the men in the Forces should be given whatever assurance is possible about their future employment, and the Bill goes a considerable way in that direction. In one respect it remedies a manifest injustice. The 1939 Act on similar lines dealt only with conscribed men; this covers the case of volunteers.

THE MACHINERY OF DEMOCRACY

THE Brighton by-election is to be followed by contests in West Derbyshire and at Bury St. Edmunds; but the political restiveness which comes to light in these skirmishes has not deeply touched the life of the House of Commons. There, at least, ever since Mr. Churchill became Prime Minister, the political truce has governed the situation. It is well that it has been so, for it has enabled Parliament to stand 100 per cent. behind the Government in the prosecution of the war, a statement which is not stultified by the fact that from time to time members, actuated by the desire for greater efficiency, have severely criticised the Government's conduct in this or that particular. The more serious differences that have latterly arisen do not concern the prosecution of the war or the domestic measures which it demands, but matters relating to the future, such as social security, planning, post-war reconstruction in general. In this sphere, to which belongs preparation for the first years of peace, it is natural that Labour Members, Liberals and Left-wing Conservatives should sometimes feel aggrieved at the conditions of the political truce, which, in ruling out all change that is controversial, goes wholly in favour of the vast Conservative majority. They feel compelled in some degree to sacrifice the future and let their cause go by default because of the more imperative need to preserve unity in face of the enemy.

That imperative need is still the overriding consideration, and never more so than at this moment when, as Mr. Churchill said in his much-criticised message to Brighton, we "stand on the threshold of world events." In this crucial period it is especially necessary that all criticisms of the Government which might be likely to weaken it should be in minor key. None the less this attitude must not be strained beyond the realities of the situation, and we cannot be blind to the fact that there are many politicians who whole-heartedly support the war effort as conducted by the Prime Minister but are as whole-heartedly dissatisfied with the planning of the domestic future of this country in accordance with the heart's desire of the Conservative majority in Parliament. It is because of this dissatisfaction that candidates, honestly intending to support the war policy of Mr. Churchill, stand in constituencies to oppose the nominees of the Conservative Party, and that large numbers of electors give them their votes.

There may be no complete remedy for this embarrassing situation during the life of the present Parliament, but two steps might and ought to be taken which would go far to mitigate it. In the first place, an assurance should be given in unequivocal terms that the General Election, when it comes, will not be a coupon election—that Conservatives, Liberals and Labour men in the constituencies, and the local party organisations, will be free to work for the return of candidates of their own choice to the House of Commons. That is one thing. The second is that the Speaker's Conference on Electoral Reform should result in a real reform of the machinery of representative government, such that we may be sure of having a House of Commons whose majority is really chosen by a majority of the people, and one in which minorities get adequate representation. The present House of Commons is in the ninth year of its existence. It was elected in a time of apparently profound peace when as yet Mr. Baldwin, then Prime Minister, did not feel the necessity of informing the country that Garmany was far advanced in re-armament. Mr. Baldwin won at that time what was regarded as a great victory at the polls, and indeed it was a great victory in the House of Commons, for his majority was no less than 247 for his supporters over all other parties. But in fact his majority, if it had been reckoned in terms of votes given in the country as a whole, would have been, not 247, but only 41. He secured 190 more seats than he would have had if every vote had carried the same weight. If the present House of Commons did not adequately represent the country then, how much less so today.

It falls to the Speaker's Conference, then, to prepare the way for carrying out an essential part of our professed war aims, that is, for creating an electoral machinery without which democracy must be incomplete. In the debate last week on electoral reform there were a good many members, Labour as well as Conservatives, who professed themselves as quite satisfied with the rough justice of our present methods. The former especially are advised to look back on the results achieved by our present system of voting from 1918 to 1935. They would do well to study some figures adduced by Mr. R. W. G. Mackay in a little book entitled *Coupon or Free?** From these they will learn that in 1918 the Coalition had a majority of 347 among contested seats, but would only have had 75 if all votes had counted equally. The results in 1922 were more striking still. The Conservatives were returned to power. But if the contested seats had been distributed in accordance with the total number of votes recorded, the Labour and Liberal Parties together would have had a majority of 118. Again in 1924, instead of a Conservative majority of 206 among contested seats, there would have been a Labour-Liberal majority of 36. In the four elections, then, from 1922 to 1929, which put the Conservatives into power for more than eight years, the whole balance of power would have been altered if the votes had been equitably distributed, and in 1922 the decision of the majority was actually reversed. There is no rough justice here. The method of holding elections and distributing seats was such as to defeat the desires of a majority of the electorate. That is not representative government.

This is a question which the Speaker's Conference must tackle seriously. The theoretically perfect solution is that of Proportional Representation. The second best is that of the Alternative Vote. On this question some very extraordinary doctrines were enunciated in the House last week in quarters from which we should not have expected them. The most remarkable of these came from none other than Mr. Greenwood. His desire that there should be only two parties in politics is easily intelligible, but his statement that those outside "should make up their minds under which umbrella they were going to shelter"—in other words that the electoral machinery should provide for the extinction of the Liberal Party—is unadulterated Nazism. It is only necessary to go one step further in a *reductio ad absurdum* and obliterate, in Hitler's manner, all parties but one. Hitler justified his procedure exactly as Mr. Greenwood does—that he was making his "political system as effective as possible."

Another doctrine opposed to all the principles of democracy that have been traditionally held in this country was enunciated by another member of the Labour Party, Mr. Woodburn, who said that the purpose of a general election was not to elect people to give voice to minority opinion in the House of Commons but to decide what Government was going to conduct the affairs of this country. That is directly opposed to his own statement that "if the majority is simply to club the minority, that is not democracy." Both his speech and Mr. Greenwood's should be remembered as urging that the machinery they favour should be used to club minorities. In fact we have seen that in the last twenty-five years the present machinery does not even empower a majority to decide what Government shall come into office;

* Allen & Unwin. 5s.

on one occasion a Government of opposite complexion to that of the majority was returned. This is contrary to the most elementary conceptions of democracy.

These are questions to which it must be hoped the Speaker's Conference will give its consideration in a spirit as far as possible of detachment from party interests. There are undoubtedly some drawbacks to Proportional Representation. It requires large constituencies, and makes the personal relationship between members and those whom they represent less intimate. But the growth in the size of constituencies has already gone far to weaken this intimate relationship. It is also likely to produce smaller majorities for the ruling party, and the Government of the day willl have less assurance of strong party support in the House. These are matters to be considered and weighed. But it will be a grave reproach to our system if we cannot devise a machinery which will make impossible the situation that arose in 1922, or which deprives large minorities of any adequate representation in the House of Commons.

A SPECTATOR'S NOTEBOOK

IN reprinting a letter cabled to *The Times* from Moscow by the commanders of the Lithuanian and Estonian Divisions in the Red Army *The Daily Worker* describes the document as "remarkable." It is. It purports to give the facts about the union of the three Baltic Republics with Soviet Russia in 1940, and declares that the Baltic peoples will never abandon "the path they have freely selected." I have been refreshing my memory regarding this freedom of selection, by reference to that objective record of contemporary history, *The Annual Register*, checked by other similar publications. In 1939 Russia demanded from each of the three republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, naval and other bases, and got them. In May each republic was required by Moscow to set up a government more favourable to Moscow. All three complied, establishing Socialist administrations, which at once legalised the Communist parties and created workers' soviets and collective farms. In July a general election was held in each State. Only candidates of one party, the newly-formed Working People's Union, were put forward; voting was compulsory and it was not secret, every elector's vote being stamped on his passport. In such circumstances the Working People's Union secured over 90 per cent. of the possible votes. The new Parliaments, thus elected, voted at their first meetings a week later for incorporation in the Soviet Union. I am not criticising this procedure. Russia had her own security to think of. And I take it for granted that the Baltic States will continue to be incorporated in the Soviet Union. But inaccurate history is a treacherous basis for arguments and conclusions, so it is as well to recall the facts about the declaration of the Baltic States for the Soviet Union.

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The controversy between Mr. H. G. Wells and Professor Brogan in the *Sunday Express* has certain points of interest. Mr. Wells, apropos, apparently of nothing, launched—I will not say a violent, but a petulant—attack on that striking book, Leopold Schwarzschild's *World in Trance*, which he described as "superficially intelligent and massively stupid," and on a preface to the book by Professor Brogan. Why Professor Brogan has irritated Mr. Wells so much is hard to say, nor does the column or so of denigration by a Wells who wields a strangely spluttering pen compared with the author of *Mankind in the Making* and *Ann Veronica* and *Mr. Britling Sees It Through*, provide any answer to that question. But it was not really prudent to draw Professor Brogan into the lists. One sentence in his rejoinder goes deep through the joints of Mr. Wells's armour: "It is an error to assume that if you are not being listened to enough the first time it is necessarily wise to scream." Mr. Wells, I am afraid, is suffering from the conviction that he is not being listened to enough. As for *World in Trance*, some of the best judges both of literature and of politics in this country have declared themselves profoundly impressed by it. They may all be wrong and Mr. Wells right, but I think it unlikely.

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I doubt whether the average citizen realises quite how zealous the Government is to increase his knowledge about its manifold activities. For that purpose it employs—that is to say its various administrative departments do—Public Relations Officers to tell the public, mainly through the Press. This is an admirable departure when pursued with moderation. How far moderation is being observed the average citizen can decide for himself on the basis of a reply to a question in Parliament last week. Unfortunately, the statistician who drafted the reply omitted to add up the items, and the calculation is beyond my limited capacity. It is a pity, for the total would be impressive. The Admiralty has a Public Relations Staff of 115, the War Office of 530, the Air Ministry of 371; but in the two latter cases a lot of people are for some reason included who are not doing what normally ranks as Public Relations work at all. The only other department to reach three figures is the Ministry of Supply, with 136, but the National Savings Committee comes near it with 98. The other end of the scale is interesting. The Treasury runs to one, and he, I fancy, is not concerned with ordinary Treasury business as such. Inland Revenue, with two, practises 'almost equal reticence, and so, surprisingly, does the Ministry of Pensions, also with a mere brace. Here is the one case where I should have thought an increase might be justified. Could not the Minister of Supply spare Sir Walter Womersley, say, a pair of brace—or is it braces?

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The death of Raymond Clapper in an aeroplane accident in the Pacific has deprived American journalism and American radio of one of its most remarkable servants. Servants, not ornaments. For first among Clapper's qualities was the complete absence in him of the *prima donna* temperament. He did not become a great national figure by any short cut, by any cultivation of personality, by any parade of discretion or of indiscretion. He rose steadily because he was a reporter, quick, acute, accurate and honest. More and more people came to read him, not because they agreed with what he said all the time or even most of the time, but because there must be something in it if Clapper saw it that way. In his syndicated column and on the air he spent a lot of time making-up and changing his own mind. He was a most genuinely modest man and under-estimated the value of his own untutored judgement. But he was right in avoiding the snap verdicts affected by many of his colleagues, for in his career as an informer and maker of American opinion he did nothing more useful than teach by example that this is not a simple world to be set right by simple formulas—and that if you are on the side of the angels, as Clapper most certainly was, there is all the more reason for seeing what the other side have in the way of ideas, prejudices, resources.

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Cornwall, to my great personal regret, is as good as obliterated. It is become as Latvia, it is even as Estonia. The author of *Tudor Cornwall* and *A Cornish Childhood* has cast it off for ever (with a slight loophole for subsequent recantation). Invited recently to give an address before the Youth Club at St. Austell, where he was born and brought up, Mr. A. L. Rowse has thus replied:

> "When I gave up being a political candidate in Cornwall, I made up my mind not to waste my time speaking to people in Cornwall who failed to take their opportunity in the past 10 years. It is just as well that that should be generally known—that I have a general principle against speaking in Cornwall (though I may occasionally make an exception) since it will save me a good deal of trouble in replying to people. I am sorry for you—since it is not the fault of you young men. I should have quite liked to have come and spoken to you. But as things are I only do that kind of thing outside Cornwall nowadays. You may communicate that to the Press."

So that—with great finality—is that.

> Thebes did his green, unknowing youth engage
> He stamps upon it in his riper age.

JANUS.

THE NETTUNO MYSTERY

By STRATEGICUS

IN Washington and in Italy there have been comments on the Nettuno beach-head that wear the appearance of authority. It was perhaps high time, since no one can pretend that the landing has fitted into any recognised pattern. It was not necessarily any the worse for that; and, writing immediately after it occurred, I suggested that it was *sui generis*. Neither I nor anyone else, however, could have imagined that the operation would follow the extraordinary rhythm that has characterised this most promising initiative.

It is well to be perfectly clear about what remains mysterious in the operation. There is already a tendency to mark the contrast between the Italian and the Russian campaigns. That would be as ridiculous as to contrast the Lovat river front with the Kiev sector. The sector which looks towards Pskov and Ostrov at the moment appears as if it were forgotten and useless. So one might have regarded the Leningrad sector but a short while ago. So it will probably be with many sectors of the European front at some time. They do not all burst into flame at the same time; some may always move at a depressingly slow pace. Much will depend upon the nature of the ground, the balance of forces deployed upon it and the communications that supply it. This is a characteristic of all wars. Nevertheless the sectors upon which considerable forces are pinned down, whether by actual operations or by the threat of them, play their part in the general plan.

There is, therefore, no need to be excessively apologetic about the pace of the Italian campaign. The ground is to the last degree forbidding; the weather is appalling. There is hardly any chance of manoeuvre. In default of an initiative based upon the superior mobility which sea-power gives us, and a supreme air-power assures and increases, "inching" seems almost inevitable. But let us not make the mistake of thinking the Russian operations majestic and these, in comparison, absurd. It has been said that there are about twenty-five German divisions in Italy; and, according to a recent report, one has been brought down to the beach-head from the south of France. It is while this force is detained in Italy that the Russians have isolated some ten divisions below Kanev and flung a noose about another five in the neighbourhood of Nikopol. When we begin to ask why it is that fifteen enemy divisions are now marked for annihilation we are driven to conclude that it is because of a shortage of reserves. We may more readily agree that Manstein blundered in holding on too long; but that is a more obvious than ultimate conclusion. Hitler has determined to live dangerously, to make the Allies fight all the way; and this entails taking risks that skate along the edge of disaster.

But in order that they should end in blunders it is necessary that the available reserves should be pinned down away from the critical point; and this Stalin ensures by the development of his offensive in depth operating upon an area-shortage created by the campaign in Italy and the threats and operations in the west. Would Manstein have been unable to make any impression on the Vinnitsa sector of Vatutin's troops if he had had at his disposal the divisions detained in Italy? He was allowed to batter away there even while Vatutin and Koniev were making their preparations to join hands below Kanev. This simply means that he had not the force to effect anything more than small local penetrations. But, if he had had another twenty-five divisions, there might have been a very different result both there and north of Lemberg. It is unjust, and indeed not a little ridiculous to ignore the part that the Italian campaign plays in the Russian victories.

It is some little time since I pointed out that the Germans were paying more attention to the south and west. They cannot, of course, permit many repetitions of the encirclement below Kanev aad about Nikopol without danger of collapse. Neither dare they ignore the danger which the descent upon Lemberg involves. They are determined to keep the Allies out of the Balkans; but they must withdraw through Rumania if the Lemberg junction is captured; and complete success in Italy would threaten to open the way into the Balkans from the west. But it is against the Allies of Russia that the Germans think they have a better chance of success. They have nothing to lose if they attempt to multiply over the south and west of Europe a series of "Dunkirks"; but their gain would be enormous. We have to remember that now, and increasingly in the future, the moral and political repercussions of what the Allies do will be of prime importance.

The landing about Nettuno took place against that background. It seemed at first that we were at length beginning to make use of the advantages of our sea and air power, though it was evident that an unopposed landing was not expected. The preliminary preparation was almost as perfect as one could wish; and then came the landing, as it were, in a vacuum. The enemy surprise was complete; and what the force landed did was simply a matter for the Allied decision. But what followed was a period of ten days given over to consolidation. The golden period, when the enemy command had no force to resist any sort of exploitation which the expedition might desire, was frittered away; and even when at last a move was made it was merely a matter of patrols, who never advanced more than some six or eight miles. In so leisurely a spirit did the advance take place that Kesselring was able to bring back divisions from the main Fifth Army front and apparently summon one from the south of France.

In the two explanatory statements that have been made the tone of apology is obvious. The Washington statement says "the original plan" was to cut the Appian Way "*and divide the German Army*," and that this was impossible because "the Germans were in considerable strength in this area." As far as one can judge from the reports, they were in such inconsiderable strength that the Allies were taken almost as completely by surprise as Kesselring. The Italian statement maintains that the reason why the forces of the beach-head "did not push on 30 to 40 miles inland will be given when all the facts are known." Neither of these statements can be described as very happily phrased. The second went on to say the time may come when we shall "have to show the ability not to criticise generals when they take risks for a very great advantage even if they come to grief."

That is an ominous remark; and, moreover, it completely misreads the "criticism," *which is directed not at taking risks, but at not taking them*. It is obvious that every landing in hostile territory entails some risk; but, in the event, the risk was negligible. Indeed, how happy should we be if we were certain that the Allied landing in the west would meet no greater opposition for ten days; but candour impels us to reflect that if no better use is made of so long a respite we are extremely unlikely to harvest the "very great advantages." The mystery about this operation has been explained by the faulty execution of a sound plan. The two statements sufficiently admit that something went astray; but, as far as the facts can be verified, it was not due to faulty execution. Another explanation has been found in the rigidity of the plan; and there is certainly some truth here. It appears to be established that the failure to exploit the original success while the golden opportunity beckoned was entirely deliberate.

But even the over-perfect application of a cast-iron plan does not wholly explain the mystery. It is, of course, true that when conditions different from those provided for in the plan were encountered the officer in immediate command should have seized his chance. But the plan seems to have been deliberately shaped to rule out all chances. Its governing idea was to play safe; and in warfare those who are obsessed with the notion of safety first commonly run into deadly peril.

The consequences of this handling of the Nettuno operation remain. The beach-head seems to have been narrowed to a depth of about eight miles. Long-range enemy guns are now beginning to cast their shells into the port of Anzio. The position shows a tendency

give Poland access to the sea, would be to perpetuate friction and hostility indefinitely. If the Russian armies sweep over East Prussia, as they well may, most of its inhabitants will flee before them and the problem of a transfer of population will be solved. There is much to be said for and against such a solution, but it is not for Britain or America to protest against it. But one thing is plain and it would be folly to ignore it. Russia has made it clear that a settlement on these lines is possible only at the price of the surrender of considerable territory which Poland held till 1939 to the east of the Curzon Line. It is for M. Mikolaiczyk and his colleagues to consider whether they can assent to that—knowing that whether they assent or not they will suffer it. To do so might cost the Prime Minister the resignation of some members of Cabinet, but that fate has befallen other Prime Ministers before in history. Time manifestly presses. The question who shall administer the liberated regions of Poland is becoming urgent. The Polish Government will deserve, and can count on, the sympathy of all its Allies in its crisis of decision.

A SPECTATOR'S NOTEBOOK

I AM not surprised that American correspondents are protesting with the vigour of which they are habitually capable at the appointment of a retired Ambassador and a retired Minister, Sir Robert Hodgson and Sir Reginald Hoare, to censor outgoing Press messages from London. For this is quite undisguisedly a censorship of opinion, applied not on grounds of security, but because the new censors or advisers think, as one of them has frankly put it, that a particular story "is likely to stir up discord between the Allies." On that it may be said that, so far at least as Britain and America are concerned, the average American correspondent is much more likely to know what is likely to "stir up discord" than a retired Ambassador to Russia or a retired Minister to Rumania, neither of whom appears to have served in the United States, at any rate at any recent date. Furthermore, the likeliest of all things to stir up discord in America is the knowledge that American correspondents' messages to their own country are being placed under this new surveillance. If an additional censorship, over and above the ordinary machinery, is needed, which I doubt, why not have messages to America censored by competent Americans? They would know much better than any Englishman can what effect a particular message would have in their own country.

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I had something to say last week about a widely-read book called *World in Trance*, in connexion with an ill-conditioned attack by Mr. H. G. Wells on Professor D. W. Brogan, who wrote a preface to it. I expressed no opinion on the book itself, for the good reason that I had not read it, but I observed that some of the best judges of literature and politics were profoundly impressed by it, and that it was possible, but unlikely, that they were all wrong in praising and Mr. Wells right in condemning it. Since then someone has lent me the book, and my conscience, almost atrophied though it is, compels me to affirm that I differ from the best judges—without, however, agreeing with Mr. Wells. He describes *World in Trance* as "superficially clever and massively stupid." Superficially clever, if you will—for it is written in that peculiarly irritating, superiorly cynical, style so characteristic of much modern German and some modern English literature. But stupid it most certainly is not. I should prefer to call it astutely tendentious—a thesis being adopted, and the facts carefully selected (or ignored) to give body to it. The first section of the book, on the last Peace Conference, designed to depreciate President Wilson and denigrate the League of Nations in every way possible, deals with a subject of which I have some knowledge. The author's treatment of that makes me profoundly distrustful of his conclusions on other matters, such as Germany's internal politics, which are less familiar ground.

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In writing recently of the working of E.P.T. I said that though there was a strong case for amending the present enactment, some measure of the kind was necessary because "the spectacle of anyone making and retaining far larger profits out of war-trading than he can make out of peace-trading would have the worst effect on national morale." What, a very much respected correspondent asks me, do I think about the spectacle of thousands of workers who are earning far higher wages under war-conditions than they ever earned in peace-time? It is a fair challenge, and though the subject is far too large to be dealt with in a note, I can state my general opinion quite briefly. Broadly speaking, there is as little to be said for war-profiteering in the one case as in the other (assuming hours and conditions of work in peace and war to be substantially the same), and the pressure some unions are exerting for perpetual rises of wages is grossly unsocial and might easily become financially disastrous. To say that increases are needed to meet the rising cost of living is equivalent to claiming that large classes of the population (whose brothers and sons are exposing themselves to be killed for a few shillings a week) should bear no part of the war-burden which rising prices impose. The case of the lowest-paid workers, who might be driven by rising prices below a reasonable subsistence-level, stands by itself, but some of the claims advanced in the higher-paid quarters are blatantly unpatriotic. The claims usually have to be conceded, because in the national emergency the work is indispensable. The reason the effect on national morale is not more serious is that the vast total of the increases is never so presented as to strike the public eye as a company balance-sheet does.

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I was very glad to read the tribute Mr. Eden paid in the House of Commons to the success Mr. Malcolm MacDonald is achieving as High Commissioner in Ottawa, for it confirms what I have heard repeatedly from various unofficial and very reliable sources in the past year. I imagine that Mr. MacDonald accepted rather as a public duty than as "a thing to be grasped at" the translation from an administrative office and a House of Commons career at home to the post he at present holds. But he is still young enough to regain the ear of the House quickly, and meanwhile he is beyond question doing invaluable service where he is. There have been plenty of opportunities for misunderstanding and friction between the United Kingdom and Canada in the last year or two, and though credit for avoiding or minimising those evils is shared by Mr. Mackenzie King and successive Dominion Secretaries here, the major part of it, from all I can hear, should go to Malcolm MacDonald. He has presented Great Britain at its best to Canadians, and it will be remembered how effectively he placed the facts about Canada's war effort before this country when he came home recently on short leave. Some of his most valuable services must be left unrecounted, but it can be well understood that Canadians regard him as the best High Commissioner they have ever had.

* * * *

It is a little disturbing to learn that the B.B.C. in its French transmissions is accustomed, in the course of a feature called "Au Pilori," to denounce individual Frenchmen now in France as "collaborationists," with the obvious effect, and presumably the intention, of exposing them to attack by patriotic partisans. I have no softness in my heart for collaborationists, but their names are clearly supplied by agents or informers of some kind, and it is easy to conceive how private hostility or animus may in individual cases be the cause of denunciation; in Germany that is a commonplace. The B.B.C., of course, is only an agent in the matter, acting for higher authorities, French or British. But surely this kind of thing could be left to the Algiers radio, which is controlled by the French themselves. Incidentally, by what freak of mismanagement does it happen that the only Algiers paper obtainable in London (so I am told) is the *Marseillaise*, whose publication here was banned last July on account of its violent and extreme attitude? There are three or four more important and responsible Algiers weeklies, but they, it appears, fail to reach London.

JANUS.

GERMANY'S OBJECTIVES

By STRATEGICUS

IT is perhaps a good thing that we cannot read the immediate future and are discouraged from speculating too particularly about the Allies' intended use of it. What we can see, however, is a certain shift of emphasis in the German plans that make time, ever golden, now vital. This has received endorsement from Hitler in a recent Order to the troops in Italy to "hold *to the last man* because of the political repercussions." The gist of the plan is to drag out the dangerous winter months until the spring pause arrives without admitting the Russians into the Balkans and as far as possible without allowing the Allies any spectacular success in Italy that might have some effect in stimulating restive States to overt action. It is in this light that the whole of the European battlefield must be considered today; it is in this light that the battle in the bridgehead must be assessed.

It can hardly be questioned now that a great chance was lost when the Germans were so completely taken by surprise by the Anzio landing. They claim so to have weakened a Guards brigade that it has had to be filled up by heavy fresh drafts, and, although there has been falsification of the news in order to reflect the shift in policy, some notice must be taken of the claim. Ground has been given. That seems obvious, in spite of the statement of a correspondent that the size of the bridgehead remains much the same as it was on February 3rd. German communications have not been interrupted as was possible and intended, though the *Navy* are now said to have cut the Appian Way. The relief afforded the main body of the Fifth Army seems to have been inappreciable, and is certainly not effective. The enemy has not even been cleared from the positions that command the beaches.

What then has been accomplished? Have reserves been drawn in from other sectors or from a central pool? Even that cannot be affirmed, since the division brought from the south of France was probably part of the force available for the whole southern area. It has apparently been roughly handled; and we can be certain that all the divisions which have figured in Italy have suffered a drastic attrition. But have they fared very distinctly worse than our own? The terrain suits the defence. It might even seem to have been designed for it. But, in holding the Allied armies down to an advance by "inching," the Germans have carried out their present role, which by Hitler's admission has now a distinctly political flavour. In the beachhead this is particularly obvious. We can, of course, claim to have established a base on the flank of the German troops facing the main bodies of the Fifth and Eighth armies; and when the weather improves the leaden fetters that act as a brake on their progress may be removed. But on the whole, so far as the plan has now been disclosed, it seems that we have made a poor bargain where we were on the verge of a brilliant success.

At one point in the Tunisian campaign a German prisoner gloomily made the comment, "We began too well." That might well reflect a general view of this new initiative. But the difficulty is that, so far, we have played into the enemy's hands. It is his purpose to show up the Allies as poor tacticians, as frittering away the admitted and obvious advantages of their superior mobility and supreme air-power; and, although it is clear that we must attempt to accelerate the pace of our advance by the use of these advantages, up to the present we have shown little sign that we know more than how to open the door upon a great opportunity. We have not shown that we know how to pass through and seize the chance that we create with unmistakable ability.

There would be no point whatever in emphasising these conclusions if it were not that almost the whole of Hitler's hopes are based on the possibility of demonstrating that they are of general application and not merely special to this particular operation. Clearly anything that could be represented as a real Allied defeat would be of the greatest importance to the Germans at this moment, even if it were only of a local character. But the lesson that seems to be exemplified by the Anzio operation is that we may as easily blunder by excess of caution as by daring. No one expected the Allies to venture too much; but everyone waited to see them do some damage before settling down, since it was realised that they would endanger themselves as much by too much caution as by deliberate risk. This at least could be measured and controlled; the shape of the alternative we have seen. If the outlook seems fairer at present, it is obvious that we are not yet entirely out of the wood. We are certainly engaging more troops from an allocation which is strictly limited, because it already makes as great inroads on the German resources as can be afforded.

It is well over a year ago since I wrote that it was not the German offensive that was so much to be feared as the Germans on the defensive. Hitler said on a notorious occasion, "what we have we hold." He has lost thousands of square miles since then, lost hundreds of thousands of men who are of much greater value than miles; but, on the whole, even in Russia, my suggestion appears to be most strikingly borne out. He reels from one crisis to another, and ever seems to escape from disaster by a hair's breadth. In the Ukraine he still holds on to parts of the Dnieper in spite of blows that have driven him from one position after another. He is now fighting with tactics that are at least as old as war to cut through to the beleaguered Kanev divisions. They can no longer number ten. They must have been worn down to something like half; but, here again, in pursuit of purposes that are not immediately or wholly military, he compels them to hold out. It would be foolish to conclude that their stubborn defence confers no benefit upon his armies, as foolish as to ignore the service of the unfortunate Von Paulus. Manstein has his hands full at present with a battlefront for some hundreds of miles facing a vital railway and tending ever to involve the use of more troops in mere maintenance. He cannot afford to see Lwow fall into the Russian grasp, and, at the moment, it is between Rovno and that junction that the pressure of Vatutin appears to be greatest. But the rescue of the beleagured divisions can be no longer a direct military issue. Worn down and dazed by a constant storm of artillery and air-bombardment, they cannot be of much value to him as troops. But as a demonstration of the continued German power to bring an Allied project to nothing, as a *reductio ad absurdum*, their relief would be valuable. Would it seem to justify putting his neck into a noose? The correct answer to that question would give us a better reading of the present German strength than anything. At least we can realise that by driving his wedge into the Russian outer encircling lines he is taking a risk, and the Russians are weighing the chances with a cold, calculating air that bodes little good for him.

By striking this blow, of course, Manstein is encouraging the surrounded Germans to resist in a way that he could not otherwise accomplish. The surrounded men are trying to strike towards the south-west as Manstein thrusts up towards them. But is not the local success too late? And have not the Russians shown a hundred times that they know how to deal with this wedge attack? Vatutin is meeting the German armour at present with his abundant artillery, used, as is now the Russian practice, in divisions and corps. But he has armour at his disposal, too; and, when he is satisfied with the situation, he may launch it either here or towards Lwow. Manstein's risks grow; but, for some time, the Germans have had to live on risks. They cannot permit the Russians to enter Rumania, and this prolonged defensive battle sees the Germans at their best. But they fight for time. One of the reasons they cannot allow the Russians to enter the Balkans is the certainty that the Allies would receive a strong reinforcement there. They cannot contemplate an offensive in Russia while they are defending themselves against the full power of the Allies in the Balkans, in Italy and in the west. So they must spin out the time to the spring lull—if there is one.

The questions are can they do it and will it be effective? The

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

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NEW YORK, N. Y.

American Foreign Service Journal
June 1943

to be done on the basis of hoopla and "free offers." The fact is plain from our own national experience, that nobody treasures a freedom he does not have to struggle for, or honors a cause which does not demand sacrifice. Our good neighbors, many of them, are making serious sacrifices and many are at war: the tone of our presentation of our own cause (and theirs) ought more consistently to meet the level of expression suitable to such a state of affairs. In many ways it does, but it has too often failed to do so. There is a danger in this—a danger that it should come to be thought (quite mistakenly) that we as a nation and a government prefer to acquire support by offering "inducements" rather than by offering aggressive leadership to the democratically-minded. But—the reader is referred to Mr. Bradford.

JOHN TOOP.

WORLD IN TRANCE—FROM VERSAILLES TO PEARL HARBOR, by Leopold Schwarzschild. L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation, New York, 1942.

This book, although only one of a long series on the resurgence of Germany following the defeat of 1918, takes high rank in that series by reason of the clarity and compactness of the argument, the able use of a wide range of published quotations, and the author's original testimony as a former resident of the Rhineland. It is one of the three books with which this reviewer happens to be acquainted that he would choose for reading and re-reading, if he could have only three as sources of information on Europe between the wars. (The other two: CAN EUROPE KEEP THE PEACE? by Frank Simonds, and TWENTY YEARS' CRISIS, by Edward H. Carr).

It is Clemencaeu that has influenced the author most, and he is many times quoted with approval: e.g. his 1919 size-up of the German republic as "mere window dressing"; his view that the world must be either a directorate of the great powers or anarchy; his admonition to the Chamber in presenting the Treaty of Versailles, "If you go to peace resolutely, as our men went to war, you will give it life . . . if you waste time you will have given our country a thing of death instead of a thing of life"; his 1922 pre-vision of 1940, "We are marching toward a catastrophe so complete that I find it impossible to see any way out of it. Among us I see only the lowest kind of ambition and a lapse into total apathy." And his collaborator Tardieu and his opponent Foch are quoted, both from 1919, in equally prophetic statements.

The central theme is a record of what Germany did between 1919 and 1935 to turn the defeat of 1918 into the victories of 1938-41; and the author holds that the military caste ruled always (quoting Mirabeau's definition of the old Reich: "Not a country with an army, but an army with a country"), and that never at any time did it change by a hair's breadth its aim of rebuilding German military power and resuming the war. And that applied to Ebert and his Republic, to Stresemann and his Locarno. By 1935 the rearmament was beyond stopping, and the author prophesied in 1933 and 1934 that it would soon be too late.

But the villain of the piece is not vengeance-bent Germany, but the misguided statesmanship of the ex-Allies: Lloyd George, looking at a gravely weakened France and thinking that the Rhineland occupation pointed to renewed Napoleonic ambitions; Stanley Baldwin, solemnly assuring the House of Commons in 1934 that Germany had 260 first-line planes to Britain's 560; Austen Chamberlain and Briand, thinking that Germany's joining the League (at the price of Brazil's defection, and of suppressing evidence of Germany's failure to disarm) meant the dawn of a new day in Europe, while Stresemann was saying privately to the Crown Prince that now Germany's preoccupations "can be transformed into as many vexations for the Entente by a skillful orator before the League of Nations." And Ramsey MacDonald and his pressure upon France to accept German equality in arms. And Frank Kellogg and his renunciation-of-war pact. And Clement Atlee and his 1935 statement that "From the danger of war one cannot protect one's self by weapons."

Lumping together the efforts of "the perfectionists"—i.e. those people in the sick world who strove for prefection by ignoring the quicksands,—the author speaks of the "euphoria" mood in which the world drifted to catastrophe. (The word means "The state of feeling well, especially when occurring in a diseased person.")

He pleads for a different attitude towards the use of force, and holds that "The 'moral' value of power and weapons and compulsions is determined exclusively by the purpose they serve . . . The voice of twenty years warns us to defend peace and justice and freedom with pride and assurance; to accumulate weapons; to build up superiority; and to cultivate and use these instruments of freedom with wisdom and resolution."

One may differ from his conclusions, but one can scarcely think clearly about the problems he discusses without awareness of the facts which he recites so well.

WALTON C. FERRIS.

(*Continued on page* 314)

Tuesday, May 9, 1944

"Evening Standard"

Mr. Wells sticks to his guns

By MICHAEL FOOT

H. G. WELLS'S new book,* published to-day, is described on the front as "a contemporary memoir upon human behaviour during the crisis of the world revolution." Nothing in this phrase gives a true idea of its quality except the word "revolution."

In fact, Wells has produced a book rich with the flavour of Paris in the hey-day of the Terror. It might even have been written by the immortal Marat, whom Wells himself, in his Outline of History, has rescued from the clutches of defamation.

One by one the victims are led out from their cells, all to be placed in the same tumbril: Ministers and ex-Ministers, Lord Vansittart and General de Gaulle, Sir Richard Acland and Palme Dutt, Mr. Arthur Bryant and Sir Oswald Mosley, all these and a host of others. The reader is invited to do little more than sit comfortably beside the guillotine and count the heads as they fall into the basket.

Altogether, therefore, this is a most agreeable book. From cover to cover it is angry, explosive and morally indignant. It revives all that is best in the great tradition of English invective, and even if you yourself might have preferred a slightly different or less extensive selection (or even a few additions here and there), you have hardly the heart to complain.

A few innocents must always suffer in any such holocaust. The tears you may feel prompted to shed for them should not diminish the overflowing sense of gratitude to this brave old man, who in this age of prevalent servility and literary impotence, rather than bend his knee to one human God or suffer one fool gladly, prefers to march towards his grave with the execrations of his increasing number of enemies sounding in his ears. Like Cato, he would rather people should ask why he had not a monument erected to him than why he had.

IT is a wonderful performance, and this review will be wholly laudatory. However, lest anyone buying the book should claim to have been deceived, it must be admitted that this reviewer has a strong, unshakable prejudice in favour of H. G. Wells.

For me, Tono Bungay is still just about the finest novel of the century, and Mr. Polly the best in English humour; each were first read on a strict rationing system of 50 pages a day for fear that the pleasure should pass too soon. The Outline of History brought new planets swimming into my ken. For me, his Experiment in Autobiography has all the excitement of David with his sling and pebbles going forth to meet Goliath. And these are but four items in the long record of debt.

I remember the debt and remember also against what odds he performed his chosen task. The Gods under whom and the social system in which he was born took every precaution to stunt and smother this child who would seek to overthrow them. They kept him poor and weak and spitting blood at every crisis of his life. They blocked his road to a career seven times and more. They made him learn everything he did learn by the light of wretched candles, in precarious garrets and through harsh experience

THESE circumstances do not make him a greater writer, but just as the knowledge of the bleeding, chilblained hands with which Michelet wrote his French Revolution enhance the wonder of every page, so the fact that Wells might easily have stayed a draper's assistant in Bromley should make us treasure his achievements the more.

At the age of 20 he still weighed no more than seven and a half stone and yet what mountains have been moved and what landscapes have been cleared by that compact embodiment of energy! And to-day when his old competitor, Bernard Shaw, has settled down to a silly and interminable quarrel with the Inland Revenue Department Wells is not content; he girds up his ancient loins for new strife and sets out to educate the peoples of the world—all 3000 million of them—in the principles of his Rights of Man.

The new book is described as a continuation of Wells's Experiment in Autobiography. It is not quite that. It turns aside too often to slice off another head or pulverise another prejudice. Yet it will serve the excellent purpose of consolidating the doctrines which he has preached and of fixing his place among the prophets. The ideas have poured forth from him in such a flood that no one could accept them all. Here he makes and substantiates the claim to have been all his life, first and foremost, a propagandist for world Socialism.

His prophecy has always been "World Socialism or Catastrophe," with a heavy list towards the side of optimism. He is still an optimist. "With the awakening self-respect of the common people, a new state of affairs began which I believe must lead us ultimately to a new and infinitely happier world. . . . You may murder world socialism now and hide it in the cellar, and when you go upstairs again you will find it astraddle your hearth."

THIS is his conclusion, superbly proclaimed in defiance of all that has happened to cloud the hopes of his early Socialist days. The book is dedicated to the eternal memory of John Ball, the peasant leader who first raised the standard of Socialism in Kent. Richard II. cheated him and his followers, and all over the world the struggle has continued ever since.

Richard, says Wells, is still at work at his subterfuges, revealing the "deep resentment of the needy, half-educated, pretentious, incompetent middle-class at the growing insolence and intractability of the lower orders."

Indeed, Richard now appears in a fouler, more brutal guise than ever before. Wells does not shirk the challenge of the Fascist counter-revolution and the indescribable cruelties which it has unleashed. A chief part of the book consists in an analysis of Fascism in terms of the fight for a classless society.

Some weeks ago Wells was in trouble for a slashing attack which he delivered on a popular book of the moment called World in Trance by Leopold Schwarzschild. It is a facile, scintillating treatise which seeks to explain the modern crisis as a purely German problem, which indicts the Utopians and idealists as the real provokers of calamity, which recommends as a remedy that the world should reverse its engines and turn back to a system modelled on the principles of Metternich. The book (which incidentally omits to mention the Russian Revolution and several kindred social phenomena) has received widespread applause from those weary brains, who prefer the dismal past to an adventurous future and do not wish to worry their heads about the internal stresses of our society.

Let them read Wells's new book before they continue recommending World in Trance to their companions at the club with sniggers of complacency. They will find something here to answer and a better remedy than pitiable resort to a new Holy Alliance.

They will find also a theory of history which dismisses World in Trance for the slipshod half-truth defeatism that it is. "We fight," says Wells, "to preserve the fruits of two great international revolutions, the great French Revolution, which offered mankind liberty, equality and fraternity, and the still mightier effort of Russia to reorganise society upon a basis that would abolish the economic enslavement of the masses of humanity. Both these great thrusts trace their beginning to older revolutionary drives in Britain and America; each has betrayed the weaknesses of experiment, and it is the plain task of all right-minded men to defend all that has been gained by these great upheavals, and carry us to that complete world-wide reconstruction modern conditions have made necessary."

THE author of the Outline of History has not renounced the bursting eloquence and glorious hopes with which that great book concludes. His detractors and traducers cannot make him budge. The gospel of internationalism still stands as the creed which sane and decent men should strive for and foster; the division between master and man remains as the profound cause of the world's misery. After all the turmoil of his life and the horror of our present times he is still able to proclaim with all the assurance of one of his heroes, Tom Paine: "It is not true that God made men rich and poor; he made them male and female and gave them the whole earth for their inheritance."

England and London should be proud to have produced so fearless and towering a prophet. They should have in him the same kind of pride which he has in the true achievements of his native country, a pride which makes all the strident claims of the narrow nationalists appear tawdry and worthless.

He sings an anthem made up of the great names in English history, from John Ball forwards to the present age. It is the story of a mighty throng of rebels unsurpassed in any land, and to-day H. G. Wells, the great educator of these generations, has established the title to see his name also set down upon that scroll.

* '42 to '44, *by H. G. Wells. Secker and Warburg, £2 2s.*

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I remember the debt and remember also against what odds he performed his chosen task. The Gods under whom and the social system in which he was born took every precaution to stunt and smother this child who would seek to overthrow them. They kept him poor and weak and spitting blood at every crisis of his life. They blocked his road to a career seven times and more. They made him learn everything he did learn by the light of wretched candles, in precarious garrets and through harsh experience

THESE circumstances do not make him a greater writer, but just as the knowledge of the bleeding, chilblained hands with which Michelet wrote his French Revolution enhance the wonder of every page, so the fact that Wells might easily have stayed a draper's assistant in Bromley should make us treasure his achievements the more.

At the age of 20 he still weighed no more than seven and a half stone and yet what mountains have been moved and what landscapes have been cleared by that compact embodiment of energy! And to-day when his old competitor, Bernard Shaw, has settled down to a silly and interminable quarrel with the Inland Revenue Department Wells is not content; he girds up his ancient loins for new strife and sets out to educate the peoples of the world—all 3000 million of them—in the principles of his Rights of Man.

The new book is described as a continuation of Wells's Experiment in Autobiography. It is not quite that. It turns aside too often to slice off another head or pulverise another prejudice. Yet it will serve the excellent purpose of consolidating the doctrines which he has preached and of fixing his place among the prophets. The ideas have poured forth from him in such a flood that no one could accept them all. Here he makes and substantiates the claim to have been all his life, first and foremost, a propagandist for world Socialism.

His prophecy has always been "World Socialism or Catastrophe," with a heavy list towards the side of optimism. He is still an optimist. "With the awakening self-respect of the common people, a new state of affairs began which I believe must lead us ultimately to a new and infinitely happier world. . . . You may murder world socialism now and hide it in the cellar, and when you go upstairs again you will find it astraddle your hearth."

THIS is his conclusion, superbly proclaimed in defiance of all that has happened to cloud the hopes of his early Socialist days. The book is dedicated to the eternal memory of John Ball, the peasant leader who first raised the standard of Socialism in Kent. Richard II. cheated him and his followers, and all over the world the struggle has continued ever since.

Richard, says Wells, is still at work at his subterfuges, revealing the "deep resentment of the needy, half-educated, pretentious, incompetent middle-class at the growing insolence and intractability of the lower orders."

Indeed, Richard now appears in a fouler, more brutal guise than ever before. Wells does not shirk the challenge of the Fascist counter-revolution and the indescribable cruelties which it has unleashed. A chief part of the book consists in an analysis of Fascism in terms of the fight for a classless society.

Some weeks ago Wells was in trouble for a slashing attack which he delivered on a popular book of the moment called World in Trance by Leopold Schwarzschild. It is a facile, scintillating treatise which seeks to explain the modern crisis as a purely German problem, which indicts the Utopians and idealists as the real provokers of calamity, which recommends as a remedy that the world should reverse its engines and turn back to a system modelled on the principles of Metternich. The book (which incidentally omits to mention the Russian Revolution and several kindred social phenomena) has received widespread applause from those weary brains, who prefer the dismal past to an adventurous future and do not wish to worry their heads about the internal stresses of our society.

Let them read Wells's new book before they continue recommending World in Trance to their companions at the club with sniggers of complacency. They will find something here to answer and a better remedy than pitiable resort to a new Holy Alliance.

They will find also a theory of history which dismisses World in Trance for the slipshod half-truth defeatism that it is. "We fight," says Wells, "to preserve the fruits of two great international revolutions, the great French Revolution, which offered mankind liberty, equality and fraternity, and the still mightier effort of Russia to reorganise society upon a basis that would abolish the economic enslavement of the masses of humanity. Both these great thrusts trace their beginning to older revolutionary drives in Britain and America; each has betrayed the weaknesses of experiment, and it is the plain task of all right-minded men to defend all that has been gained by these great upheavals, and carry us to that complete world-wide reconstruction modern conditions have made necessary."

THE author of the Outline of History has not renounced the bursting eloquence and glorious hopes with which that great book concludes. His detractors and traducers cannot make him budge. The gospel of internationalism still stands as the creed which sane and decent men should strive for and foster; the division between master and man remains as the profound cause of the world's misery. After all the turmoil of his life and the horror of our present times he is still able to proclaim with all the assurance of one of his heroes. Tom Paine: "It is not true that God made men rich and poor; he made them male and female and gave them the whole earth for their inheritance."

England and London should be proud to have produced so fearless and towering a prophet. They should have in him the same kind of pride which he has in the true achievements of his native country, a pride which makes all the strident claims of the narrow nationalists appear tawdry and worthless.

He sings an anthem made up of the great names in English history, from John Ball forwards to the present age. It is the story of a mighty throng of rebels unsurpassed in any land, and to-day H. G. Wells, the great educator of these generations, has established the title to see his name also set down upon that scroll.

* '42 *to* '44, *by H. G. Wells. Secker and Warburg*, £2 2*s*.

of world affairs and of America's place in the community of nations may incidentally bulk larger in the light of history than the early achievements of his administration in domestic policy.

There are undeniable elements of greatness in this man. But nothing will avail to maintain his political authority after the conclusion of the war. His various reluctant supporters are bound to fall out amongst themselves between the end of the war and the end of the fourth term; and even Roosevelt's political dexterity will not be able to cope with the anticipated frictions. The fact is that his uncanny dexterity would long since have been subject to the law of diminishing returns had not the war intervened. A certain young Democratic Congressman, personally devoted to Roosevelt, declared some months ago that if Mr. Willkie were nominated he would inform his constituency that he intended to vote for the Republican candidate, despite Mr. Roosevelt's great achievements. He would justify this action by the fear of the chaos which might occur in Washington between the close of the war and the end of the fourth term. The Republican rejection of Mr. Willkie has undoubtedly prompted a revision in the young Congressman's plans. But his fears are fairly typical of the apprehensions with which many will cast their votes for Mr. Roosevelt. These apprehensions are naturally mixed with gratitude for his real achievements in both domestic and foreign policy.

"UNITED" NATIONS?

By DAVID THOMSON

THE meeting of British, Russian and United States representatives at Dumbarton Oaks, the rapidity of Allied advance towards the German Reich from east and west, and the imminent climax of the war, make it timely to define clearly and in concrete terms the concept of "the United Nations." In what sense and for what purpose are they "united"? As the destined makers of the next peace, the degree, terms and purpose of their unity is of supreme importance. Yet, as is natural in time of war, their community of spirit is too often taken for granted, their qualifications as peacemakers are left unquestioned, and the phrase "the United Nations" is allowed to become a thoughtless slogan—even an anodyne for the painful process of analysis—much as the "Concert of Europe," "the League of Nations," and "Federal Union" have been in previous times.

In origin its purpose is simple enough. It is what Mr. Churchill has at times called it—a Grand Alliance—historically the grandest of all alliances, forged in the heat of battle to resist the aggressions or threatened attacks of three expansionist dictatorships. It therefore naturally focusses around the "Big Four," the super-Powers whose leaders have made all the crucial strategic and political decisions at Casablanca, Moscow, Cairo and Teheran. Its origin is further expressed in its shape as well as in its structure: it excludes the three chief enemy States, all of them large in territory and population: it excludes the satellite enemy States—Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Roumania: it excludes the neutrals—Turkey, Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, Argentina, and the rest. Even so, the *bloc* of "United Nations" represents 44 sovereign States and their dependencies, and over 85 per cent. of the whole population of the world. At the moment of victory the economic, military, naval and air power of this "Grand Alliance" will be overwhelming, and so long as it takes concerted action it will be able to make any arrangements in the world which economic and military power can impose.

Here, then, is an alliance rich in potential good for the world. But it is also rich in potential futility and even in potential danger; and as an agency of peacemaking its limitations are no less important than its capacities. It has liabilities as great as its assets. It has developed just far enough in solidarity and in concerted action to encourage optimism, but not yet far enough to justify optimism. There is danger in being over-impressed by the number forty-four, when this number is attained by counting Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, Liberia and Luxembourg alongside Soviet Russia, the United States, China and India. There remains fundamentally the problem of achieving, and continuing to achieve when the common danger is removed, concerted action among States so diverse in character and so divergent in political interests as China and Chile, Iceland and India, Poland and Peru. And nothing is gained by ignoring or underestimating this problem, which is shelved rather than solved by such principles as "the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States," produced in the Moscow Declaration and repeated so persistently ever since. There is, equally fundamentally, the problem of establishing workable relationships between the forty and the four, and between the four themselves—the "Big Four" which still have to resolve into two threes at Dumbarton Oaks, because Russia is not at war with Japan. Until all these problems of inter-relations are firmly settled, there is ground for hope but not for undue optimism.

Success in preserving and extending war-time collaboration depends on satisfying the highest general level of interests common to all the United Nations. And although these common interests include national security and some assured measure of national independence, they cannot be stated either inclusively or exclusively in terms of political security and independence. The "freedom of nations" as an international aim is something of a will-o'-the-wisp, since it is difficult to restrict the principle to the point where it ceases to include the freedom of one nation to prepare for war against another, or of one government to tyrannise over its subjects, as did the Nazi Government under the guise of asserting the German right to "national self-determination." A purpose more truly universal, and more capable of genuine international effort and achievement, is the freedom of men and women, the conditions of work and standard of living of individuals, the health, welfare and social security of human beings whatever their nationality. Security from aggression there must be, and it can scarcely be assured without international provision: but United Nations collaboration which stopped short at guarantees of order alone would be doomed to sterility. There is no historical evidence that a *status quo*, however admirable, or stagnation, however orderly, will be for long approved or maintained by new generations.

It would scarcely be necessary to assert this truism were it not ignored or denied in so many influential quarters, and were not the opposite conclusion so plausibly drawn from experience of the inter-war years. Thus Mr. Leopold Schwarzschild, in his much-discussed *World in Trance*, propounds a thesis which would be fatal if applied to twentieth-century peace-making:

> "The connection between economic progress and war or peace is a mythical one. . . . The preservation of peace consists in securing our house from external attacks. Social progress consists in improving its internal organisation. There is no relation between the two tasks."

Based on the double fallacy that peace is mere absence of war, and that it is something which future generations will want for its own sake above all other desires, this thesis is but applying to the twentieth-century international order the nineteenth-century idea of the "police State," negative and repressive, and ignoring the revolution in human affairs which has come about with the growth of the modern "social service" State. An international order in the twentieth century can have deep and durable roots only if it is a "social service" order, concerned as much with the welfare of individuals as are the most advanced national States. And already the United Nations have recognised and acted upon this principle, and have found therein their highest common measure of agreement.

On three occasions delegates from all forty-four United Nations have met in conference and have reached agreement on plans for organising just such a social service machine. At Hot Springs in May, 1943, at Atlantic City in November, 1943, and at Bretton Woods in July, 1944, they have drafted plans for the international organisation of agricultural production and food supplies, relief and rehabilitation with the far-reaching control of economic resources, shipping and repatriation which this involves, and the setting up of an International Monetary Fund and a Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The first two conferences have already resulted in machinery being created to do these jobs; the proposals of the third are still under consideration by each government concerned. In addition, the intricate mechanism of Lend-Lease and Mutual Aid has so thoroughly "mixed up together" the economies of the United Nations that failure to develop their existing relations would cause

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
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

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November 4, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York City.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

It was very good of you to forward me a copy of World in Trance by Leopold Schwarzschild. My work has been so heavy since the adjournment of our annual convention that I have not had opportunity to read the book. I shall certainly do so, however, as soon as my duties permit. In the meantime thank you again for bringing the publication to my attention.

Very truly yours,

Wm Green

President,
American Federation of Labor

RmP

Review Offices of the special division

Mr. Theodore Jaffin

c.o. Greenbaum, Wolff & Ernst

285 Madison Avenue

(B)

*

Dr. F. Hoellering

c.o. Office of War Information

224 West 57th str.

"World in Trance"

October 14, 1942

Mr. Clark M. Eichelberger, Director
League of Nations Assn.
6 West 40th St.
New York, N.Y.

Dear Clark:

I have asked the publisher of Leopold Schwarzschild's new book, WORLD IN TRANCE, to send you a copy of the special issue before its publication October 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers. I am sending it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it.

If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, will you be so kind as to let its publisher know that you think of it? These are the same people who are publishing my book called MIKES DON'T BITE on January 1, 1943.

I should like to talk with you about this letter as if you like it I may ask you to take a copy to Sumner Welles and Vice-President Wallace. Maybe we could lunch together some time this week.

My best regards as always,

Cordially yours,

HJS:G

October 14, 1942

Honorable Francis Biddle
Attorney-General of United States
Dept. of Justice
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Attorney-General:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

My kindest personal regards and sincere congratulations for the excellent work you have been doing during these extremely trying times.

Most sincerely,

EJS:C

163-[illegible]-3

October 14, 1942

Mr. H. V. Kaltenborn
9 Garden Place
Brooklyn, N.Y.

Dear Hans:

Under separate cover I have sent you a copy of the special issue of the forthcoming book by Leopold Schwarzschild entitled WORLD IN TRANCE.

I sent it to you because I thing it is a book that you'll enjoy reading. It is to be published by the L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp October 22. Do read it before that date and send your comments to the publisher. I shall be very grateful and you shall have had some real reading enjoyment.

You were a sweetie to send me the autograph of Kaltenborn's édits "The War News". Although I do not deserve the inscription, it has made me very happy to have it. Lots and lots of success with your splendid book.

Love to you and Olga.

Fondly,

RJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mr. Stanley High
c/o Readers' Digest
Pleasantville, N.Y.

Dear Stanley:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publishers, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to send your comments to the publisher.

My kindest personal regards.

Cordially yours,

EJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mrs. Dorothy Canfield Fisher
Arlington
Vermont

Dear Mrs. Fisher:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd. would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

I suppose you know I have given up my weekly television program. In view of the war, that is the reason I have not invited you to be my guest more often.

My kindest regards and best wishes.

Cordially yours,

HJS:G

October 14, 1942

Dr. Frank Kingdon, Pres.
Union for Democratic Action
New York, N.Y.

Dear Dr. Kingdon:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

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My kindest personal regards.

Cordially yours,

EJS:C

October 14, 1942

Mr. C.D. Jackson, Vice-Pres.
Time, Life & Fortune
Time & Life Bldg.
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Jackson:

The new book by Leopold Schwarzschild entitled WORLD IN TRANCE I find so interesting that I asked the publisher to send you a copy of the special issue before formal publication. It is being published by L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp. on October 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to send your comments to the publisher. I really thinkkthat you will enjoy reading this well written historical document.

I was at Stanwood Menken's last Thursday Evening and had the pleasure of meeting Henry Luce. Unfortunately I did not have the pleasure of seeing you there again.

My best wishes.

Cordially yours,

EJS:C

October 14, 1942

Mr. Thomas J. Watson, President
International Business Machines Corp.
Madison Avenue & 57th St.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Watson:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

You may be interested to know that we finally did have Queen Wilhelmina speak for us before she returned to London.

My kindest personal regards.

Cordially yours,

HJS:G

October 14, 1942

Prof. James T. Shotwell
Advising Capacity on State Dept.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Professor Shotwell:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

Please accept my belated congratulations for your important new job. I want you to know, however, that I miss seeing you in New York and I always get news about you from Clark whenever I see him.

My kindest personal regards to you and Mrs. Shotwell.

Cordially yours,

EJS:G

October 14, 1942

Prof. James T. Shotwell
Advising Capacity at State Dept.

October 14, 1942

Miss Clare Booth
Time, Life & Fortune
Time & Life Bldg.
New York, N.Y.

Dear Miss Booth:

Under separate cover I have sent you a copy of a special issue of the forthcoming book by Leopold Schwarzschild entitled WORLD IN TRANCE. It is to be published by L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp on October 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I am sending it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to do so before the 22, would you be so kind as to send your comments to the publisher. I should be most grateful and I am sure that your time will not have been wasted.

My kindest personal regards.

Cordially yours,

HJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mrs. Clare Booth
Time, Life & Fortune
Time & Life Bldg.
New York, N.Y.

Dear

October 14, 1942

Mr. William Allen White
Emporia
Kansas

My dear Mr. White:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 361 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22n, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

My kindest regards to you and Mrs. White.

Most sincerely,

HJS:C

October 14, 1942

Mr. Edward L. Bernays
163 East 63rd. St.
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Bernays:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

Kindest personal regards and best wishes.

Cordially yours,

HJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mr. Herbert Agar, President
Freedom House
32 East 51st Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Agar:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, N.Y., N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

My kindest personal regards and best wishes for the success of your excellent new book.

Cordially yours,

RJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mr. Rex Stout
c/o Freedom House
32 East 51st Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Stout:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. P. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschil gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

"Our Secret Weapon" is excellent. I hear complimentary remarks about it on all sides. As for the gem of yours that I took from "Report From The Nation" in the October issue of "Talks", sufficiently adequate words of praise fail me.

My kindest regards to you and Mrs. Stout.

Most sincerely,

HJS:G

October 14, 1942

Honorable Alfred E. Smith
Empire State Building
New York, N.Y.

My dear Governor:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

As usual I am deep in confusion of political broadcasts and shall be glad when November 3 is over.

My kindest personal regards to you and Mrs. Smith.

Most sincerely,

HJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mr. Bernard M. Baruch
1055 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Baruch:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

My kindest personal regards and sincere congratulations for the excellent work you have been doing during these extremely trying times.

Most sincerely,

HJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mr. Bernard M. Baruch

1055 Fifth Aven

October 14, 1942

Senator Robert F. Wagner
Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Senator:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE By Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

I was distressed to hear of Ruth Tennant's illness. They told me at the Social Security Office in New York that she was too sick to be contacted.

My kindest personal regards.

Most sincerely,

EJS:G

October 14, 1942

Honorable Herbert Hoover
Palo Alto
California

My dear Mr. Hoover:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

I suppose before long you will be coming east for the winter. I shall look forward to seeing you with a lot of pleasure. I hope Miss Miller will come with you.

Warm regards for you and your family.

Most sincerely,

HJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mr. James P. Warburg
34 East 70th Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Warburg:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

I am so anxious to hear of your trip to London. Please let me know if at any time you should like to make a broadcast. I miss having you on the air.

My kindest personal regards to you and Mrs. Warburg.

Cordially yours,

EJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mr. Quincy Howe
17th Floor - News Dept.
CBS - 485 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Quincy:

I have asked the publisher of Leopold Schwarzschild's new book, WORLD IN TRANCE, to send you a copy of the special issue before its publication October 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers. I am sending it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it.

If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, will you be so kind as to let its publisher know what you think of it? These are the same people who are publishing my book called MIKES DON'T BITE on January 1, 1943.

Best best regards as always.

Cordially yours,

HVS:G

October 14, 1942

Major George Fielding Eliot
c/o Hotel New Yorker
8th Avenue & 34th St.
New York, N.Y.

Dear George:

I have asked the publisher of Leopold Schwarzschild's new book, WORLD IN TRANCE, to send you a copy of the special issue before its publication October 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers. I am sending it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it.

If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, will you be so kind as to let its publisher know what you think of it? These are the same people who are publishing my book called MIKES DON'T BITE on January 1, 1943.

My best regards as always.

Cordially yours,

WJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mr. Beardsley Ruml, Treas.
R.H. Macy & Co.
34th St. & Bdway.
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Ruml:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication On Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

My kindest regards.

Cordially yours,

HJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mr. Elmer Davis, Director
Office of War Information
Washington, D.C.

Dear Elmer:

I have asked the publisher of Leopold Schwarzschild's new book, WORLD IN TRANCE, to send you a copy of the special issue before its publication October 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers. I am sending it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it.

If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, will you be so kind as to let its publisher know what you think of it? These are the same people who are publishing my book called MIKES DON'T BITE on January 1, 1943.

My bestest to you as always and please let me know when you have a few spare moments in New York. I still miss you very much.

Sincerely,

HJS:G

October 14, 1942

Honorable Harold L. Ickes
Sect. of Interior
Dept. of Interior
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

Kindest personal regards and best wishes.

Most sincerely,

RJS:G

October 14, 1942

Dr. John W. Studebaker
U. S. Commissioner of Education
Dept. of Interior
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Commissioner:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

Kindest personal regards and best wishes.

Most sincerely,

EJS:G

October 14, 1942

Honorable Herbert H. Lehman
Governor of State of New York
Executive Mansion
Albany, New York

My dear Mr. Governor:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. E. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I went to your broadcast Monday at the Metropolitan Opera house.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so k

... ... me. You may be sure a small

never forget either of you.

Warm regards.

Most sincerely,

HJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mr. Henry Luce
Publisher - Time, Life & Fortune
TTme & Life Bldg.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Luce:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

I enjoyed so much our little talk at Stanwood Menkken's the other night. We were all sorry that you had to leave so soon. Quite an interesting discussion of India insued after your departure.

Kindest personal regards.

Cordially yours,

HJS:C

October 14, 1942

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already gone forward to you from the publisher, L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp., 381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. It is due for publication on Oct. 22. In it Schwarzschild gives a dramatic account of the war from 1918 to 1939 with a complete documentation of memoirs and state papers.

I sent it to you because I believe that you may be interested in reading it. If you have an opportunity to read it before the 22nd, would you be so kind as to let the publisher have your comments.

My kindest regards.

Most sincerely,

WJS:G

October 14, 1942

Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt
White House
Washington, D.C.

My dear Mrs. Roosevelt:

A copy of the special issue of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild has already t

THE INNER SANCTUM
OF SIMON AND SCHUSTER
PUBLISHERS · 1230 SIXTH AVENUE
ROCKEFELLER CENTER · NEW YORK CITY

October 15, 1942

Dear Mr.Wallach:

Thanks ever so much for sending me a copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwartschild. It seems so important, I am taking it home for careful reading.

Sincerely yours,

M Lincoln Schuster

MLS:HLJ

Sidney Wallach, Esq.
L.B. Fischer Publishing Corporation
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION
590 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

OFFICE OF
THE PRESIDENT

October 7, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Wallach:

In Mr. Watson's absence from the city, I wish to acknowledge your letter of October 2, and to thank you for your thoughtfulness in sending him a copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild. Mr. Watson will appreciate this very much.

Yours very truly,

Secretary to Mr. Thomas J. Watson

BBWaters:EF

EDWARD L. BERNAYS
9 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK
TELEPHONE CIRCLE 6-5075

October 10, 1942

My dear Mr. Wallach,

Thank you so much for sending me a copy of WORLD IN TRANCE.

After I have had a chance to read this book, I shall be glad to let you have my thoughts on it.

Sincerely yours,

Edward L. Bernays

EDWARD L. BERNAYS

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

L. B. FISCHER PUBLISHING CORP.

381 FOURTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. MURRAY HILL 3-0893

Mr. Wallace

The world is still in a trance. It will help to jerk people out of it if they will read WORLD IN TRANCE. It is high time they did something—if only to read a book—and this is certainly the book.

Rex Stout

FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY
U. S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON

November 11, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Doctor Studebaker has asked me to tell you, in answer to your letter of November 3, he is sorry he has not as yet had the time to read the book, "World In Trance," which you so kindly sent him.



Sincerely yours,

(Mrs.) Marjorie S. Scatt
Secretary to the Commissioner.

November third
1942

Dr. J. W. Studebaker
U. S. Office of Education
Washington, D. C.

Dear Dr. Studebaker:

I am wondering whether by this time you have had a chance to read "World In Trance" and could send me your views on it.

I hope to have the pleasure of seeing you again. When you get to New York won't you be good enough to call me.

Cordially yours,

Sidney Wallach

SW:jg

FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY
U. S. OFFICE OF EDUCATION
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
c/o L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

My dear Sidney:

I appreciate so much your thoughtfulness in sending me a copy of WORLD IN TRANCE. I shall read it at my earliest opportunity. I am glad to know that you are engaged in such interesting work.

As always,

Cordially yours,

J. W. Studebaker

Commissioner.



October 21, 1942

Mr. Herbert Bayard Swope
745 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Swope:

Many thanks for your statement on WORLD IN TRANCE.

I look forward to seeing you some time at your convenience.

Cordially yours,

Sidney Wallach
L. B. FISCHER PUBLISHING CORP.

SW:g

TIME
INCORPORATED

TIME & LIFE BUILDING
ROCKEFELLER CENTER
NEW YORK

EXECUTIVE OFFICES

October 8, 1942

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Your letter and copy of WORLD IN TRANCE arrived in Mr. Jackson's absence. This is to acknowledge receipt and tell you that he will see them immediately upon his return.

Very truly yours,

E. C.Schultz
Secretary to C.D. Jackson

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York,N.Y.

U.O.5

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World in Trance

"The history of our generation . . . ."

—*N. Y. Times*, WALLACE R. DEUEL

"Should be read by all of us with humility, with prayer and with a rising resolution that these things shall not be again."

—MAJOR GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT

"A challenging work . . . ."—*The New Yorker*

World in Trance

From Versailles to Pearl Harbor

by LEOPOLD SCHWARZSCHILD

"Essential background for the understanding of the war and of the sort of peace that must be made." —HERBERT BAYARD SWOPE

"His struggle was the first Commando raid against Nazism." —FRANZ WERFEL

"The world is still in a trance. It will help to jerk people out of it if they will read

UNIVERSITY OF MAINE
ORONO, MAINE

COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
DEAN'S OFFICE

October 21, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

L

Dear Sir:

Thank you for your letter of October 20 concerning Mr. Leopold Schwarzschild's book WORLD IN TRANCE. I have already heard of the book from a friend of Mr. Schwarzschild, who had heard my lectures on the period with which the book deals. I am told that my position is in substantial agreement with that taken by Mr. Schwarzschild. I am naturally very much interested in seeing the book, and I shall be glad to state my opinion of it when I have had the opportunity of reading it. I have no doubt that we shall want it in our College library, and I shall probably add it to the reading list for one of my classes.

Very truly yours,

Rising L. Morrow

Rising L. Morrow
Acting Dean

RLM:M

THE UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA
CONSOLIDATED OFFICES
CHAPEL HILL

FRANK P. GRAHAM, PRESIDENT
WILLIAM D. CARMICHAEL, JR., CONTROLLER
AND CONSOLIDATED BUSINESS MANAGER

UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA
AT CHAPEL HILL
NORTH CAROLINA STATE COLLEGE
OF AGRICULTURE AND ENGINEERING
AT RALEIGH
THE WOMAN'S COLLEGE
AT GREENSBORO

October 12, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Co.
381 Fourth Ave.
New York City

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I wish to thank you for your thoughtfulness and generosity in sending me a copy of World in Trance by Leopold Schwarzschild. I am looking forward to reading this timely book with a great deal of interest. I am placing it in the library at the War Information Center where it will be available to students, faculty, and other members of our University community.

With all good wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

Frank P. Graham

Frank P. Graham
President

JERRY VOORHIS
12TH DIST. CALIFORNIA

HOME ADDRESS:
R. F. D. No. 1
SAN DIMAS, CALIFORNIA

COMMITTEES:
FLOOD CONTROL
WORLD WAR VETERANS' LEGISLATION
PUBLIC LANDS
RIVERS AND HARBORS

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

SECRETARIES:
V. R. LONG
HAROLD HERIN
DUANE DESCHAINE

ADDRESS:
501 HOUSE OFFICE BLDG.
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 9, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in mailing to me an advance copy of "World In Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild.

As soon as I have the opportunity to read this book, I shall, and I shall be glad to comment on it.

Sincerely yours,

JERRY VOORHIS

WHITEHALL 3-6437

MAX M. WARBURG
52 WILLIAM STREET
NEW YORK

October 9th, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fisher Publishing Company
381 Fourth Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Wallach,

I just received a copy of the "World in Trance" which you were kind enough to send me. Thank you very much. I shall read the book with pleasure.

Sincerely yours

Max M. Warburg

Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.
WEST COAST STUDIOS
BURBANK, CALIF.

OFFICE OF PRESIDENT

October 19th, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you for your letter of the 2nd and copy of WORLD IN TRANCE which I have just received.

I am anxious to read the book and as soon as I have completed same I will be happy to give you my opinion.

Sincerely yours,

Harry M. Warner

HMW:sls

Harry M. Warner

YALE UNIVERSITY
INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT

October 20, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I have received the pre-publication copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzchild which you were kind enough to send me. I am looking forward to reading it with great interest.

Yours truly,

Nicholas J. Spykman

Nicholas J. Spykman

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 13, 1942

My dear Mr. Wallach:

I have received your letter of October 2 and the copy of "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild which you were good enough to send me. I appreciate your kindness in bringing this book to my attention and I am looking forward to the opportunity of reading it.

Believe me

Yours very sincerely,



Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, New York.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
WASHINGTON

October 10, 1942

L

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you for your letter of October 2, 1942, advising me that you were sending me a copy of a special advanced edition of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild. It has now been received and I shall take advantage of the very first opportunity to read it.

Your thoughtfulness in sending this book to me is greatly appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Knox

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

SCRIPPS-HOWARD NEWSPAPERS

BEN FOSTER, JR.
EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT TO MR. HOWARD
230 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK

October 10, 1942.

L

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Thanks for your note of October 2nd and the copy of Mr. Schwarzschild's WORLD IN TRANCE, which have come to me in Mr. Howard's absence from the office, and which will be given him on his return.

Very sincerely yours,

Ben Foster Jr.

Sidney Wallach, Esq.,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

BF:K

44-05

HENRY MORGENTHAU
1133 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY

L

October 9, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation
381 Fourth Avenue, New York

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you for sending me "World in Trance". I hope that I shall soon find the time to read it as I am at present absorbed in reading several books which I am trying to complete.

Sincerely yours,

HMorgenthau

Congress of Industrial Organizations

CIO

718 Jackson Place, N. W. • Washington, D. C.

Office of
THE PRESIDENT

EXECUTIVE 5581

October 9, 1942

L

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Wallach:

In the absence of Mr. Philip Murray I acknowledge receipt of your letter to him of October 2.

I will be glad to bring your communication and the prepublication edition of "World in Trance", to Mr. Murray's attention upon his return.

Sincerely yours,

Mercedes Daugherty

Mercedes Daugherty
Secretary to Philip Murray

THE METHODIST CHURCH
G. BROMLEY OXNAM, RESIDENT BISHOP
THE BOSTON AREA
581 BOYLSTON STREET, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

October 10th, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Bishop Oxnam has asked me to write you, acknowledging your letter of October 5th. He will be glad to look over WORLD IN TRANCE when it arrives.

Very truly yours,

Christine Knudsen

Secretary to Bishop Oxnam.

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS

October 9, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York City.

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you so much for your letter of October 7, 1942, in reference to the special advance copy of "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild, which I have received and which I shall take pleasure in reading and if possible will write you a brief review of the book.

With assurances of my esteem, I am

Sincerely yours,

Robert R. Reynolds, U. S. S.

RRR/mw

Case Wld.

J. H. R. CROMWELL
60 E. 42nd St.,
New York City.

October
seventh
19 42

(C)

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L.B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York City, N.Y.

Dear Sir:

Your letter of October 2nd, in which you advise me that a copy of "WORLD IN TRANCE" by Mr. Leopold Schwarzschild has been mailed to me under separate cover, has been received. Thank you for your courtesy in this matter and when I find the time it will give me great pleasure to read this book which I feel sure I shall find most interesting and enlightening. If there is any word that I can send you after reading Mr. Schwarzschild's work it will give me great pleasure to write to you.

Again thanking you, I am,

Sincerely yours,

J. H. R. Cromwell

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150 BROADWAY, NEW YORK
CORTLANDT 7-6130

CABLE RETTARB, NEW YORK

October 8, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
Care L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue, New York City.

Dear Sidney:

I thank you for your letter of October 2nd and for the copy of WORLD IN TRANCE, which I shall read with interest.

I also thank you for your comments on my manuscript.

Cordially yours,

JM-N

The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America

INCORPORATED

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297 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

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October 21, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Pub. Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you very much for sending me a copy of WORLD IN TRANCE. I am reading it now and will be glad to write you concerning it when I have finished.

Sincerely yours,

F. E. Johnson

FEJ.N

TELEPHONE MURRAY HILL 3-6700

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(c)

October 21, 1942.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I appreciate very much your kindness in sending me a copy of Schwarzschild's "World In Trance". Knowing Mr. Schwarzschild's reputation I ~~I~~ look forward with keen pleasure to reading it and if, as I confidently expect, the work is an illuminating contribution on the international politics of the past quarter century, I shall do what I can to bring it to the attention of my friends and acquaintances, as well as through book reviews and through channels available to me to the public.

Sincerely yours,

Morris D. Waldman

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue, New York, N. Y.
MDW

AMERICAN JEWISH CONGRESS

330 WEST 42nd STREET NEW YORK CITY

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CABLE ADDRESS 'CONGRESS'
TELEPHONE LONGACRE 5-2600

(C)

Office of Dr. Wise
40 West 68 Street,
October 8, 1942.

Mr.Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Wallach:

I am glad indeed to know of the WORLD IN TRANCE by Schwarzschild, whom, of course, I know. It will be very interesting to me to study the book and perhaps send you some word of comment upon it.

With appreciation of the courtesy of the Fischer Publishing Corp.,

Faithfully yours,

Stephen S. Wise

SSW:S PRESIDENT

P.S. I have read enough at, rather than of, the book WORLD IN TRANCE to learn that I am far from being in accord with its basic pessimism. But I shall study it carefully and perhaps have something to say about it.

SSW

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For parallel action to win the war and the peace by federating the Democracies completely in a Union Now; and at the same time federating as far as practicable all the United Nations. *For complete policy statement see the back of this letterhead.*

October 16th
1942

C

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation
381 Fourth Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Wallach,

This is to acknowledge receipt of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwartzschild which you were kind enough to send Mr. Streit. He is now away on a speaking tour in the Middle West but the book will be sent him and called to his attention upon his return to his home in Washington.

He is going to be exceedingly busy then working on his forthcoming book which is already much behind schedule. But I am sure, however, that he will be much interested in WORLD IN TRANCE and will let you have a statement if he possibly can.

Sincerely,

Mary Clark

Mary Clark
Secretary

"Now it is proposed to form a Government for men and not for Societies of men or States."
—GEORGE MASON in the Constitutional Convention of American Union, 1787.

490

TO WIN THIS WAR FOR GOOD AND ALL

Living as we do in a period of swift and violent transition, exceeding in opportunity and danger even the days of the American, English, and French Revolutions, and believing that Man holds within himself, through mind and soul, the power of growth and promise of development, and that by cooperative effort he can and must extend the areas controlled by reason:

WE, Federal Unionists, propose action on the following parallel lines as a realistic program to win this revolutionary war for the freedom, prosperity, and peace, of the common man:

1. We believe that we can best preserve and extend those basic freedoms which are the great heritage of Western civilization by forming NOW behind the strongest possible Bill of Rights, and within the framework of the broadest possible international organization, a Federal Union of those peoples with whom we have compelling natural ties, opposing imperialism in all its forms, and extending the pledge of statehood in this Union to all other peoples who are prepared to give the guarantees of individual freedom which all its members grant to one another, including in this pledge those people now under Axis dictatorship who aid in the common victory by overthrowing their dictators.

2. We believe that the world imperatively needs an all-inclusive international organization in which the United States, the British Commonwealth, China, Russia, India, and the other powers known as the United Nations should take the lead; that this association should be organized immediately; that it should include in its membership as many countries as can be induced to join; that it must be predicated upon a limitation of national sovereignty; and that it should contain such elements of federalism as are found to be practicable.

We appeal to all Americans who cherish these principles to unite with us in Federal Union, Inc., to secure the execution of this program. We assure every member freedom to work for either point, so long as he gives at least his moral support to the program as a whole. We have nothing easy to offer. We have something great to do, something we can do only if we each do our best together.

—*Statement of Policy adopted by the Board of Directors of Federal Union, April 27, 1942.*

• •

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√

THE COMMUNITY CHURCH

OF NEW YORK

MINISTER
JOHN HAYNES HOLMES

(c)

STUDY
TEN PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK CITY

October 9, 1942.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Your letter and the pre-publication copy of "World in Trance," have been received. The book would seem to be an impressive one, and I hope that I shall find the time to read it. If I succeed, I will write you.

Very sincerely yours,

John Haynes Holmes

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York City.

JAMES W. GERARD
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELLOR AT LAW
40 WALL STREET
NEW YORK CITY
TELEPHONE WHITEHALL 4-0010

October 8, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York City.

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Mr. Gerard has received your letter of October second and wishes me to thank you for sending to him the book "World in Trance" and to advise you that when he has received it he will read it and write to you.

Yours very sincerely,

Secretary to Mr. Gerard.

VTH:MT

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WEL

October 13, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L.B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you very much for sending me a copy of WORLD IN TRANCE.

I will read it just as soon as I can find the time.

Sincerely,

Rex Stout

RS ba

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October 23, 1942

Miss Helen J. Sioussat
C.B.S.
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Helen Sioussat:

Thank you for having that copy of WORLD IN TRANCE sent to me. I am hoping to be able to find time to finish reading it tonight.

I blush with pleasure at your remarks about OUR SECRET WEAPON and that little jigger from REPORT FROM THE NATION.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Rex Stout

RS:SLS

WAR DEPARTMENT
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, New York.

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Mr. Stimson has asked me to acknowledge and thank you for your kindness in sending to him the copy of "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild which he hopes to have an opportunity to read in the near future.

Very truly yours,

Elizabeth C. Neary

Personal Secretary to
the Secretary of War.

ARCHBISHOP'S HOUSE
452 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK

October 22, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

His Excellency Archbishop Spellman wishes me to thank you for your courtesy in sending him a copy of your recent publication, "World in a Trance", by Leopold Schwarzschild. His Excellency will be pleased to read this book at the first opportunity.

Very truly yours,

John J Casey

Secretary to the Archbishop

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON INTERSTATE COMMERCE

October 9, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Pub. Corp.
381 Fourth Ave.
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Wallach:-

I am just in receipt of your letter of October 2nd, together with the book entitled"World in Trance," and want to thank you for the same.

mm

Yours very truly,

B K Wheeler

DAVID I. WALSH, MASS., CHAIRMAN
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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS

10 October 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L.B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you for sending me a special advance copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild.

I shall seek an early opportunity to peruse its contents which I know I shall find informative and interesting.

Sincerely yours,

David I. Walsh

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United States Senate

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October 12, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you for your letter of October 2nd and for the copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarschild. I greatly appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending me this copy.

Very sincerely yours,

Robert F. Wagner

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2.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FINANCE

L

October 10, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, New York.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I have your letter of October second, and I have also received a copy of Mr. Leopold Schwarzschild's book, WORLD IN TRANCE.

I appreciate greatly your courtesy in sending this volume to me, and I shall read it with a great deal of interest at the first opportunity.

With best wishes, I am,

Sincerely yours,

Robert L. Taft

GEORGE W. NORRIS
NEBRASKA

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

M

October 7, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. FISCHER PUBLISHING CORP,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York City.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I desire to acknowledge receipt of your letter of October second, to Senator Norris, in which you state you are sending him a copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopole Schwarzschild.

When this book is received, I shall be very glad to bring it, together with your letter, to the Senator's attention and I know he will sincerely appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending it to him.

With kind regards, I am

Very truly yours,

John P. Robertson,
Secretary.

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United States Senate

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October 9, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
c/o L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, New York.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I am very appreciate of your thoughtfulness in sending me a copy of Leopold Schwarzschild's book, "World In Trance".

Many thanks.

Sincerely yours,

Jas. M. Mead

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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

October 10, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you very much for your recent letter and for sending me a copy of "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild, which I shall certainly read at the earliest opportunity.

Very sincerely yours,

H. C. Lodge, jr.

H. C. Lodge, jr.

h

October 21, 1942

Senator Hiram D Johnson
United States Senate
Committe of Foreign Relations
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Senator:

Thank you for your letter acknowledging receipt of the advanced copy of WORLD IN TRANCE. Because of its pertinent material to the past and present war, I look forward to receiving comment from you.

Cordially yours,

Sidney Wallach
L. B. FISCHER PUBLISHING CORP.

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ROLAND YOUNG, CLERK

8

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

October 16, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I acknowledge due receipt of your letter of October 2d, advising me that you were sending under separate cover a special advance copy of WORLD IN TRANCE.

When the opportunity presents itself, I shall read the book, and in the meantime, please accept my thanks for your kindness in sending it to me.

Sincerely yours,

Hiram W. Johnson

/W

October 21, 1942

Senator W. Warren Barbour
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Senator:

Thank you for your letter of the 10th acknowledging receipt of the advance copy of WORLD IN TRANCE. I sent it to you at the suggestion of George Fredman who felt that you would be willing to send a word of comment on it.

May I hope to hear from you?

Cordially yours,

Sidney Wallach
L. B. FISCHER PUBLISHING CORP.

SW:G

W. WARREN BARBOUR
NEW JERSEY

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

COMMITTEES:
COMMERCE
MANUFACTURES
NAVAL AFFAIRS
PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS
RULES

(9)

October 10, 1942

My dear Mr. Wallach :

I am very grateful indeed to you for your thoughtfulness in sending me the copy of "World in Trance" which has just come to hand and, while I have not as yet had an opportunity to read it, I am looking forward to doing so in the very near future and at my earliest opportunity.

I am sure that I will find this book very interesting and informative and want to thank you again for having forwarded it to me.

With kind regards

Sincerely yours,

W. Warren Barbour

Sidney Wallach Esq.
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York City

WWB
11

W. WARREN BARBOUR
NEW JERSEY

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D. C.

COMMITTEES:
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NAVAL AFFAIRS
PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND GROUNDS
RULES

November 3,1942

Dear Mr. Wallach :

While I have not as yet had an opportunity to complete "World in Trance" for it is the sort of book one has to read slowly and thoughtfully, nevertheless I have found it so far to be most enlightening, and certainly the revealing light it throws upon all that has happened between World War No. 1 and World War No. 2 is indicative of not only the keenest insight but intimate knowledge of all that has actually transpired.

I want to thank you again for having sent this splendid book to me.

With kind regards

Sincerely yours,

W. Warren Barbour

Sidney Wallach Esq.
L.B.Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York.

WWB
11

1. Times quotation:

2. Library quotation:

3. F ranz Werfel quotation:

4. Professor R ay Lyman Wilbur, Chancellor, Stanford University:

"I have now had a chance to look over that book, 'World In Trance' by Leopold Schwarzschild. I think that it is a very effective presentation of what has been going on in recent years. For one who has lived through the same period, reading the book is a good deal like stripping off the various leaves from an artichoke. No matter from what side the leaves come off, you get nearer and nearer the heart of a deplorable world situation which now has to be fought out to a finish."

5. Herbert Bayard Swope quotation:

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

STANFORD UNIVERSITY, CALIFORNIA

October 22, 1942.

OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR

Dear Mr. Wallach:

With further reference to your letter of October 7th and my reply of the 20th:-

I have now had a chance to look over that book, WORLD IN TRANCE, by Leopold Schwar z schild. I think that it is a very effective presentation of what has been going on in recent years. For one who has lived through the same period, reading the book is a good deal like stripping off the various leaves from an artichoke. No matter from what side the leaves come off, you get nearer and nearer the heart of a deplorable world situation which now has to be fought out to a finish.

Thank you for giving me the opportunity to see this book.

Sincerely yours,

Ray Lyman Wilbur

R.L.Wilbur/ELF

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York City.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

STANFORD UNIVERSITY, CALIFORNIA

OFFICE OF THE CHANCELLOR

October 20, 1942

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I have your letter of October 7th, and note that you are sending me a pre-publication copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild, which you consider an outstanding book. I will be glad to read this and write you later if I have anything worth while to say in comment on it. Thank you for bringing the book to my attention.

Very truly yours,

Ray Lyman Wilbur

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. R. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York City

R.L.Wilbur/CR

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
224 WEST 57TH STREET
NEW YORK CITY

October 20, 1942

Mr. Leopold Schwarzschild
L. B. Fischer Publishing Co.
New York City

Dear Mr. Schwarzschild:

I want to thank you for the copy of your new book WORLD IN TRANCE which Dr. Hoellering brought to me the other evening.

I have just finished reading it and liked it very much. I was completely interested in your discussions of the Allies' negotiations and the Treaty of Versailles. We have a lot to learn from your discussions of these matters and the book ought to be particularly useful to us in the time which lies ahead.

I agree most completely with your last few pages where you object to the belief too common in this country that all we have to do to the German people is to get rid of their evil government and they will join us in securing a better world. A great deal of effort will have to be expended in bringing the true picture to the attention of the American people, and your book will certainly provoke serious thought along this line.

With best wishes for the well-deserved success of your book,

Sincerely yours,

Douglas Miller

Douglas Miller

SCANDRETT, TUTTLE & CHALAIRE

CABLE ADDRESS: "WALIMIR"

RICHARD B. SCANDRETT, JR.
MINER WORTHINGTON TUTTLE
WALTER CHALAIRE

TAX COUNSEL
RAYMOND B. GOODELL

30 PINE STREET
NEW YORK

October 21, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I acknowledge receipt of and thank you for your letter of October 7 and the copy of "World in Trance" which came under separate cover.

I have read Mr. Schwarzschild's book with great interest. It is very timely and should be carefully read by everyone who is likely to have anything to do with shaping the plans at the conclusion of the war.

Very truly yours,



The
GREATER NEW YORK FEDERATION of CHURCHES
GRAMERCY 5-2073
71 WEST 23RD STREET
NEW YORK CITY

October 30, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Wallach:

I have read "World in Trance" and found it a tremendously disturbing book. Undoubtedly Mr. Schwarzschild's interpretation of the affairs of the last twenty years needed to be made, and particularly in such a well-documented manner.

I cannot help feeling, though, that the author must be deeply cynical, for cynicism seems to dominate and to distort, and to leave the reader at the end with a sense of hopelessness. On the other hand, again I say the sequence of facts and opinions need stating and certainly must be taken into consideration in any realistic approach to the problems of the post-war world. It is a book that I will advise reading, although not indiscriminately.

Thank you for it.

Very sincerely yours,

Robert W. Searle

General Secretary

RWS/W

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November 16, 1942.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Pressure of work delayed my reading of "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild. Having finished it, I again want to thank you for your kindness in having sent me a copy, especially as I found it absorbing reading. Though its objectivity is somewhat marred by the fact that it is in a sense a brief for Clemenceau and an attack upon Woodrow Wilson, there can be no question with respect to the soundness of his general thesis, to wit, the duplicity of succeeding German governments during the period covered, and the naivité of the British and American governments.

In producing this volume, Schwarzschild has made a striking contribution, in my opinion, to the history of the last quarter century.

Sincerely yours,

Morris D Waldman

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.
MDW

TELEPHONE MURRAY HILL 3-6700

CABLE ADDRESS "WISHCOM, NEW YORK"

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ELI FRANK	Baltimore, Md.	LOUIS B. MAYER	Culver City, Cal.				

November 16, 1942

Dear Sidney:

May I assume that you are informed of every review of Schwarzschild's book "World In Trance"? Adverse as well as favorable? Anyhow, I call your attention to the Neue Volks-Zeitung of November 14 in which the reviewer, Siegfried Bernfeld, deals with Mr. Schwarzschild in a rather unfriendly way.

Sincerely yours,

Leo Stein

Leo Stein

Mr. Sidney Wallach
S. Fischer Publishing Company
361 Fourth Avenue
New York City

LS/AG

577

MAX ASCOLI

23 Gramercy Park South
New York, N.Y.

October 19, 1942.

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you for sending me a copy of Leopold Schwarzschild's WORLD IN TRANCE. I am looking forward to reading it.

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L.B. Fischer Publishing Corporation
New York, N.Y.

ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you for the copy of "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzchild which I have just received. I am sure it is an interesting book and hope to have an opportunity to read it before too long. I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending it to me.

Sincerely yours,

Thurman Arnold

THURMAN ARNOLD
Assistant Attorney General

5-744

EDWARD L. BERNAYS
9 ROCKEFELLER PLAZA
NEW YORK
TELEPHONE CIRCLE 6-5075

October 15, 1942

My dear Miss Sioussat,

I wondered who had sent me WORLD IN TRANCE and now I know. Thanks a lot.

I shall read it and comment on it if there is anything for me to say.

Thank you again for thinking of me.

Sincerely yours,

EDWARD L. BERNAYS

Miss Helen J. Siossat
Department of Radio Talks
Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
485 Madison Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D.C.

October 8, 1942

Dear Mr. Wallach:

It was very nice of you to send me WORLD IN TRANCE. At the first opportunity, I shall read it with much interest.

I have been compelled to make it a rule not to comment on books. I am sure you will understand the reason therefor.

Sincerely yours,

Francis Biddle

Sidney Wallach, Esq.

L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.

381 Fourth Avenue

New York, N. Y.

EMANUEL CELLER
10TH DISTRICT NEW YORK

MEMBER OF
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

NEW YORK OFFICE:
1450 BROADWAY
NEW YORK CITY

1524 NEW HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON

New York, Jan. 4, 1943

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I wish to thank you for sending me WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild. I have not as yet had an opportunity to read same, but I shall be glad to send you my comments which I have done so.

Sincerely yours,

Celler

EC:MAD

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LOUISE DREISONSTOK, ASST. CLERK

Congress of the United States
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington

October 9, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York City

My dear Mr. Wallach:

I want to take this opportunity to acknowledge and thank you for your kind thoughtfulness in sending me an advance copy of "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild.

With best wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

Sol Bloom

SB:Cv

Columbia University
in the City of New York
PRESIDENT'S ROOM

October 19, 1942

President Butler acknowledges with thanks receipt of a copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Mr. Leopold Schwarzschild sent him with the kindly compliments of the publishers.

Sidney Wallach, Esq.
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

MC

TEACHERS COLLEGE
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY
NEW YORK

DIVISION OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF EDUCATION
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

October 17, 1942

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I appreciate your sending me a copy of WORLD IN TRANCE. I shall read it at the first opportunity.

Sincerely yours,
George S. Counts
GEORGE S. COUNTS

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp
381 Fourth Avenue, New York

Chicago Tribune

THE WORLD'S GREATEST NEWSPAPER

TRIBUNE TOWER • CHICAGO

October 7, 1942

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Your letter has been received during Colonel McCormick's absence from the city.

It will be brought to his attention when he returns.

Sincerely

D A Murray

Assistant Secretary

c

Richmond Times-Dispatch

PUBLISHED MORNING AND SUNDAY

RICHMOND, VIRGINIA

October 8, 1942.

VIRGINIUS DABNEY
EDITOR

TELEPHONE 3-4242

L

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Wallach:—

I appreciate your sending me a copy of "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild. I look forward to reading it.

I followed Mr. Schwarzschild's writings when I was in Europe for six months in 1934, and felt him to be extremely well-informed concerning the goings-on inside Germany. He was writing from Paris at that time, I believe.

Sincerely yours,

Virginius Dabney

Virginius Dabney,
Editor.

VD/M

POLISH INFORMATION CENTER
151 EAST 67TH STREET, NEW YORK
RHINELANDER 4-2506

October 27, 1942
(W-6)

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L.B.Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I have just finished reading the book THE WORLD IN TRANCE and I wish to express my deep appreciation of its contents. Mr. Schwarzschild has brought to the task not only a mass of unpublished detail but also has created a most constructive background for German disarmament after the war. His penetrating argument should be before the eyes of all those who claim that once Nazidom is crushed, Germany would become the examplary democracy of Europe. I hope that for this reason Mr. Schwarzschild's book will be in the hands of every statesman in this country, and will receive the widest possible distribution.

Yours very sincerely,

Stefan de Kopp,
Director.

SR:nlm

POLISH INFORMATION CENTER
151 EAST 67TH STREET, NEW YORK
RHINELANDER 4-2506

October 8, 1942
(W-6)

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L.B.FISCHER PUBLISHING CORP
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you for your letter of October 2, regarding the book WORLD IN TRANCE. Unfortunately, the book has not arrived as yet, but as soon as it comes, I shall be delighted to write my appreciation.

I am waiting with much expectation for the text you are preparing for the group, which we discussed at our last most enjoyable dinner.

Yours cordially,

Stefan de Kopp,
Director.

SR:nlm

THOMAS E. DEWEY
20 EXCHANGE PLACE
NEW YORK

October 8, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Since Mr. Dewey is out of the City, I want to thank you for your letter to him of October 2.

When the book arrives it will be held for him and I know he will not only appreciate your courtesy in sending it, but will enjoy reading it very much indeed.

With many thanks,

Sincerely yours,

L. G. Rosse
Secretary to Mr. Dewey

LGR/k

October twenty-sixth
1942

Major George Fielding Eliot
230 West 41st Street
New York, N. Y.

Dear Major Eliot:

Thank you very much for your comment on the Schwarzschild book. We should like to use it in some of our promotion. As it stands it's somewhat difficult to use and I'm wondering whether I may have your permission to paraphase the statement you sent us so that it may read as follows:

"I'm immensely impressed by 'World In Trance.' This tragic history of the twenty years following the last World War, the accursed decades, as the author calls them, should be read by all of us, with humility, with prayer and with a rising resolution that these things shall not be again.

"The lesson which this book teaches is that eternal vigilance is still the price of liberty. If the free nations of the world wish to remain free, they must see to it, by timely action, that no new Hitler arises in their midst, or that if he does, he has no chance to grow strong.

"If this lesson can be learned and applied, this war will not have been fought and won in vain."

I'd appreciate hearing from you and I hope that you may find an opportunity to comment on the book in your own writings.

Yours cordially,

Sidney Wallach

SW:jg

GEORGE FIELDING ELIOT
SUITE 1402
230 WEST 41ST STREET
NEW YORK

October 23, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Wallach:

My friend, Miss Helen Sioussat of Columbia Broadcasting System, has particularly recommended WORLD IN TRANCE to me and I have now had a chance to give the book a very hasty reading, which has immensely impressed me as to its value.

The lesson which this book teaches is that eternal vigilance is still the price of liberty. If the free nations of the world wish to remain free, they must see to it, by timely action, that no new Hitler arises in their midst, or that if he does, he has no chance to grow strong.

If this lesson can be learned and applied, this war will not have been fought and won in vain.

The tragic history of the twenty years following the last World War, the accursed decades, as the author calls them, should be read by all of us, with humility, with prayer, and with a rising resolution that these things shall not be again.

You are, of course, at full liberty to quote me to the above effect.

With best wishes and my thanks for the opportunity of reading this excellent book, I am

Sincerely yours,

George Fielding Eliot

GFE/a

October 21, 1942

Mr. Douglas Auchincloss
Assistant to Henry R. Luce
Time & Life Magazine -
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Auchincloss:

Thank you for your letter acknowledging for Mr. Luce the book, WORLD IN TRANCE. I would like to urge you to remind him to read it. I really believe that this is one of the most important books that has come out this year and one having great significance to all those who think of the past war world.

I would be awfully grateful if I could hear further from you and Mr. Luce.

Best regards.

Cordially yours,

Sidney Wallach
L. B. FISCHER PUBLISHING CORP.

SW:G

P. S. . .I have long wanted to talk with you. Any chance of our having lunch or dinner together?

The Towers of
THE WALDORF-ASTORIA
NEW YORK

November 4, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Sir:

Thank you for your letter of October 7 and for the pre-publication edition of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild. The book has been sent up to Mr. Gibson who is in the country, and I know he will greatly appreciate it.

Very sincerely yours,

L. F. Camp

Secretary to Mr. Gibson

TIME
INCORPORATED

TIME & LIFE BUILDING
ROCKEFELLER CENTER
NEW YORK

EXECUTIVE OFFICES

October 20, 1942

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Mr. Luce has asked me to thank you very much for your thought in sending him a copy of "World In Trance" and to tell you how much he regrets not have acknowledged it sooner.

I know he had expected to read it through before writing you, but his schedule has been so crowded lately that this has been impossible.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

Douglas Auchincloss
Assistant to Henry R. Luce

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Arlington, Vermont,
October 29, 1942.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I found the WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild, which you sent me, a very complete and scholarly statement of a most complicated situation. Its complete documentation makes it valuable more for scholars than for the general public, I think, and I imagine that you felt so yourself. After reading it, I sent it on to Bennington College, the librarian of which has just returned me very hearty thanks for it. She says it will be most useful for their classes on modern history.

With thanks for your thought of me, and hopes for the success of this fine, serious work,

I am

Faithfully yours,

Dorothy Canfield Fisher

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

October 16, 1942

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I appreciate very much your courtesy in sending me an advance copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild.

A dozen or more recent books are awaiting me and just at present I fear it is going to be a long process in getting through them but I shall look forward with pleasure to reading WORLD IN TRANCE in due course.

Sincerely yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Joseph C. Grew

N. N.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, New York.

65 STOCKTON STREET PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY PHONE 219

October 26, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I am very grateful for your sending me WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild. I have found the book of the most absorbing interest and can only wish that it should be read by every woman and man who tries in any way to influence public opinion concerning international relations. The book is a rich well of information and written with a passionate conviction. If we desire that the post-war settlement shall not be a peace to end peace the faults of the two decades between Versailles to Pearl Harbor must not be made over again, and world politics be based on facts and principles and not on dripping and false sentimentality, intellectual evasion, factual ignorance and moral dishonesty.

In this respect Schwarzschild's book will be of great value.

Sincerely,

C. J. Hambro

CJH/E

C. J. Hambro

HARVARD UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

C. J. FRIEDRICH
Professor of Government

M-31 LITTAUER CENTER
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

October 14, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L.B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York City

Dear Sidney:

I appreciate very much your sending me the advance copy of WORLD IN TRANCE. I shall look forward to reading it with great interest and hope to send you a word or two about it later.

Sincerely yours,

C. J. Friedrich

NEW YORK
Herald Tribune

1525 35th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
November 16, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York City

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you for sending Mr. Lippmann a copy of WORLD IN FRANCE.

Please note that Mr. Lippmann's address is the one shown above.

Sincerely,

Frances L. Van Schaick
Research Assistant to Mr. Lippmann

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 12, 1942

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Permit me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of October second to Mr. Hopkins. You may be sure that he will appreciate your courtesy in forwarding the publication to which you refer.

Very sincerely yours,

Lois M. Bewley

Secretary to Mr. Hopkins.

Sidney Wallach, Esq.,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

SEVENTY-SEVENTH

Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D. C.

CHARLES KRAMER
LOS ANGELES
CALIFORNIA

GRAYCE A. KILROY
SECRETARY

COMMITTEES:
PATENTS, CHAIRMAN
ACCOUNTS
CENSUS
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
IRRIGATION AND RECLAMATION

October 10, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L.B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N.Y.

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you very much for your thoughtfulness in sending me an advance copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild. Your generosity is greatly appreciated and I am sure I will find the book of extreme interest.

With kindest wishes, I am,

Cordially yours,

CHARLES KRAMER, M.C.

C
K
:
g
c

October 21, 1942

Mr. Herbert S. Houston
The Institute for Advancement of Visual
Ed. and Vocational Training, Inc.
70 Fifth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Houston:

Thank you for your kind letter of the 15th acknowledging the advance copy of WORLD IN TRANCE. May I urge you to read it at your earliest convenience and to send us a statement?

Cordially yours,

Sidney Wallach
L. B. FISCHER PUBLISHING CORP.

SW:G

Chairman
HERBERT S. HOUSTON, PH.B., M.A., LL.D.
Member of Motion Picture Research Council

MARION M. SHIELDS
Secretary

(11)

THE INSTITUTE

For The Advancement of

VISUAL EDUCATION AND VOCATIONAL TRAINING, Inc.

Educational Building
70 — Fifth Avenue, New York

October 15, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L.B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York City.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you very much for your kindness in sending me the copy of "WORLD IN TRANCE" which I find on returning from Washington. I shall certainly go over it at the earliest opportunity and it certainly has the appearance of being a book of great interest and of real constructive value.

Believe me to be

Yours faithfully,

Herbert S. Houston

HSH:AM

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR

WASHINGTON

October 21, 1942.

My dear Mr. Wallach:

I appreciate your courtesy in sending me an advance copy of "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild. Apparently, through some hitch in my office, this book has just reached me and I have had no chance at it except to glance at it very cursorily. In any event, I regret to say that I would not be able to send you a comment upon it. I have so many similar requests that I have had to adopt the uniform rule of declining, much as I would like to do so in such a case as this.

Thanking you again, I am

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
WASHINGTON

October 9, 1942.

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you for your letter of October 2, with which you sent me a special advanced edition of Leopold Schwarzschild's THE WORLD IN TRANCE.

I know that it will prove to be both interesting and profitable reading, and I am looking forward to enjoying it at the first opportunity that I can find.

Sincerely yours,

Harold L. Ickes

Secretary of the Interior.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, New York.

ASSOCIATED WITH
M. S. & I. S. ISAACS

LAW OFFICES
STANLEY M. ISAACS
475 FIFTH AVENUE
NEW YORK

TELEPHONE
ASHLAND 4-0476

October 29, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I have read with interest Mr. Schwarzchild's "WORLD IN TRANCE" which you sent me. It is an important book in many ways because it points out clearly the errors made during the post-war period that led directly to the present conflict. Errors that should not be repeated.

It makes clear the fact that despite President Wilson's good intentions, his somewhat unreal idealism failed to meet the practical problems of tremendous importance that had to be solved properly if peace were to endure. His faith in democracy was genuine and vital, but his own sincerity made it hard for him to realize that a country like Germany, even if it adopted the forms of democracy, was never really controlled by the people. The tenuous basis of the German republic, and the deception its leaders practiced on the rest of the world is set forth most clearly.

Further, the persistence of the German resolve to dominate the world despite defeat in the first world war is made clear. The Germans never conceded defeat, never admitted responsibility for the first world war, started without a moment's delay to prepare for a new conflict. In developing the League of Nations, President Wilson closed his eyes to practical conditions and it was quite impossible for the League, as he conceived it, really to control the forces gathering to undermine world peace. He ignored the far more practical views of Clemenceau and the sound program voiced earlier by Theodore Roosevelt in this country. That great President recognized from the outset that any world organization, to be effective, had to have sufficient armed strength to police the world against aggressor leaders.

Step by step, Mr. Schwarzschild shows how appeasement failed and was foredoomed to failure; from the earliest days when the scuttling of the German fleet was condoned by the allies; when the other nations shut their eyes to Germany's constant breaches of the Treaty of Versailles. The financial magnates of England, France

October 29, 1942

and America did their share of appeasing by pouring money into Germany, used in turn to develop German mines, factories and other resources, and ultimately to build the most powerful war machine in the world's history. The nations of the world closed their eyes to Germany's failure to disarm -- later to the rapid increase in her trained forces and her production of every variety of military machine. This was deliberate -- although Schwarzchild does not say whether it should be traced to the profiteers in the armament industry of other nations; the pacifist who wished to avoid any cause of conflict; or the appeasers who trusted to delay. No matter what the origin of the policy, we all allowed vicious and shrewd leaders who controlled Germany to prepare and to arm until now they threaten our very existence.

After this war is won, we cannot again permit such leadership to govern our conduct. Idealism must be fortified by sound practical judgment. Appeasement of vicious forces must never again tolerate their growth. We cannot again watch and wait while the power of evil gathers strength. We must make this a righteous world, and sound ideals must control its destiny -- but we must be prepared to fight to make it so and to be eternally vigilant to see that it remains so. That seems to me to be the conclusion to which "WORLD IN TRANCE" leads.

Sincerely yours,

Stanley M. Isaacs

November tenth
1942

Mr. Jacob Landau
Overseas News Agency, Inc.
101 Park Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Landau:

Thanks loads for your wery nice letter about the Schwarzschild book. I hope you can find an opportunity to write about it in your syndicated material. I could further suggest an interview with Schwarzschild and, perhaps, a story on the Fischer firm relating to the old Bermann-Fischer-Verlag, A. B.

Anyway, it was swell of you to write and I appreciate it. I hope you will give me the pleasure of welcoming you to my new office.

Cordially yours,

Sidney Wallach

SW:jg

Overseas News Agency, Inc.

101 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y.

MURRAY HILL 3-2997

NOVEMBER 6, 1942

MR. SIDNEY WALLACH
L.B. FISCHER PUBLISHING CORP.
381 FOURTH AVENUE
NEW YORK, N. Y.

DEAR MR. WALLACH:

SCHWARZSCHILD'S BOOK IS AN EYE-OPENER. HIS THESIS IS IRREFUTABLE. HIS PENETRATING STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENTS OF THE LAST TWO DECADES IS INDISPENSABLE TO ALL THOSE WHO ARE SERIOUSLY CONCERNED WITH THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO WIN THE PEACE.

IN PRESENTING THIS BOOK TO THE PUBLIC, THE L.B. FISCHER PUBLISHING CORPORATION HAS MADE AN INVALUABLE CONTRIBUTION TO THE PROMOTION OF A MORE COMPREHENSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE MOST VITAL PROBLEM WITH WHICH THE WORLD IS CONFRONTED.

ONE CONLUSION IS INESCAPABLE: AS DIFFICULT AS THIS WAR IS, IT WILL BE STILL MORE DIFFICULT TO WIN THE PEACE.

VERY SINCERELY YOURS,

JL:GG

Jacob Landau

JACOB LANDAU,
MANAGING DIRECTOR

file LBL

July 26, 1943

Dr. Joseph Jastrow
Foundation Inn
Stockbridge, Mass.

Dear Dr. Jastrow:

Thank you very much for your heartening letter of the 21st. We felt that the book was of great importance, and indeed had hoped that public spirited individuals and organizations would make possible its distribution on a larger scale. Unfortunately, that hope never materialized. The book perforce is making way on its own and doing so rather slowly.

We have published no other book by Leopold Schwarzschild but we hope to do so in the future. His address is: 225 East 57th Street, New York City.

Thank you again for writing to us.

Cordially yours,

Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.

SW:ap

P.S.: I take it that you are the same Dr. Joseph Jastrow whom I was taught in my youth to look upon with special admiration and, indeed, reverence. Under such circumstances, it is most gratifying to receive a communication from you.

S.W.

Folder

From Joseph Jastrow.

FOUNDATION INN
STOCKBRIDGE
MASSACHUSETTS

July 21st.

Dear Sir:

I have read with great interest World in Trance by Leopold Schwarzschild. It is a book of unusual consequence, indeed, the only one in my opinion that tells the true story. It deserves the widest circulation, which I fear it is not receiving. Can you tell me more of the author, and perhaps send me his address, so that I can express my appreciations.

I have in hand a book on The Nazi Mind, and shall wish to cite him frequently. Did you publish his other book on The End of an Illusion ? I should like to see it.

The passage at th top of p.322 is a classic.

I trust I may hear from you.
Truly yours, Joseph Jastrow.

KAUFMANN DEPARTMENT STORES
INCORPORATED
PITTSBURGH, PENNSYLVANIA

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Oct. 10th, 1942

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Mr. Kaufmann has asked me to acknowledge receipt of "World In Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild with many thanks. He has not as yet had an opportunity to read it but I wil am quite sure he will enjoy it.

Sincerely,

Secretary to Mr. Edgar J. Kaufmann

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Ave.,
New York, N. Y.

October 14, 1942

Mr. Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr.
Assistant to the Secretary
Treasury Department
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Kuhn:

Thank you very much for your kind words of my last and the copy of [illegible]. I hope that the Secretary will have an opportunity to read it before long. And I would be enormously pleased to you if you could remind him of our desire to have a statement.

You may not be familiar with my name, but Eddie Greenbaum and I have often spoken about you.

Best regards,

Yours sincerely

Sidney Vallach

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

WASHINGTON

October 9, 1942

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Secretary Morgenthau has asked me to thank you very much for sending him an advance copy of "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild.

The Secretary looks forward with much interest to reading this book, and he appreciates your courtesy in sending him a copy.

Sincerely,

Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr.

Ferdinand Kuhn, Jr.,
Assistant to the Secretary.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

CITY OF NEW YORK
OFFICE OF THE MAYOR

November 6, 1942

My dear Mr. Wallach:

Many thanks for your thoughtfulness in sending me a copy of the book WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzchild. I am hoping for an opportunity to look through it and am sure it will prove interesting.

With every good wish, believe me

Sincerely yours,

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L.B.Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York City

FOUNDATION INN STOCKBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

July 28.

Dear Mr Wallach: I indeed appreciate your kind letter, and shall write toMr Schwarzschild. Who published his other book on the End of an Illusion? He will doubtless tell me what he has in mind for future publication. I have only a Lib copy of the World in Trance. I found it here where I am attempting to regain health after six monthsin a hospital. Let me add my commendatio of the translation,- a signal performance, almost better than the German, I surmise.

Once more my regards, Truly yours,

Joseph Jastrow.

PRIVATE MAILING CARD

Mr Sidney Wallach
L.B.Fischer Pub Corp
381 Fourth Ave
New York N.Y.

23 Wall Street
New York

October 26, 1942

Personal

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you again for sending me a copy of "World in Trance." As I said to you in my letter of October 9th, I must adhere to my practice of refraining from public comment upon the output of my various publishing friends. Certainly you have done a useful piece of work in bringing out Mr. Schwarschild's volume, and it will be helpful to have had made clear again the subversive doctrines which have for so long been inculcated in the people of Germany. I shouldn't be able to agree with the author in much that he says in regard to the Peace Treaty negotiations. I happened to be there and had some first-hand experience with them. To be sure, however, the pros and cons of many phases of that fateful conference will be debated for years yet to come.

Thank you for giving me a chance at this vivid and readable volume, but please respect the personal caution that I expressed in regard to quotation.

Sincerely yours,

Sidney Wallach, Esq.,
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

23 Wall Street
New York

October 9, 1942

Sidney Wallach, Esq.,
L.B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N. Y.

Dear Sir:

It is good of you to send me copy of "World in Trance" and I will go into it at the first possible moment. Long ago, however, I established an unwritten rule that led me to refrain from public comment on these various volumes dealing with international affairs. But I will let you know privately at any rate what I think is the result of your courtesy to me.

Yours very truly,

Thomas W. Lamont

DAVID LAWRENCE

2201 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C.
October 16, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Your letter of October 14 at hand. I haven't yet had a chance to read "World In Trance." I am swamped with a daily flow of news material.

Sincerely yours,

David Lawrence

DL:JS

October 14, 1942

Mr. David Lawrence
2201 M Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Lawrence:

I have your acknowledgement of my letter on the book, WORLD IN TRANCE. I look forward to hearing from you about it. In particular, I would like to call to your attention a section which deals with the trial of the so-called war criminals of the first World War. This section begins on page 147 and extends to page 158, and throws considerable light on the practical applications of a popular ideal. I think its approximates to the recent announcements of our own government about a trial of the war criminals will suggest itself to you.

Cordially yours

Sidney Hellman

DAVID LAWRENCE

2201 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C.
October 8, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I have your letter of October 2nd and appreciate your sending me a copy of "World in Trance", which I will read with interest.

With all good wishes,

Sincerely yours,

DL:IPS

October 21, 1942

Mr. Maurice Leon
44 Wall Street
New York, N.Y.

Dear Mr. Leon:

Thank you very much for your cordial letter of the 15th.

We are grateful for your interest and useful statement. I hope that you will do what you can to encourage the wider distribution of the book. If you have any suggestions on that score, I should be very happy to meet with you to discuss them.

Cordially yours,

Sidney Wallach
L. B. FISCHER PUBLISHING CORP.

SW:G

5-70

(1)

MAURICE LÉON
44 WALL STREET

NEW YORK. October 15th, 1942.

L.B. Fischer Publishing Corp.,
381 Fourth Avenue,
New York, N.Y.

Dear Sirs:

Your letter of the 7th reaches me today. Meanwhile I have received the book "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild.

I have examined this book and consider it an outstanding contribution to the enlightnment of the American people on a matter vital to its welfare and to its very survival in that it answers truthfully and adequately the question: What is Germany?

A true answer to that question cannot be given without studying the record of what Germany has been not only under Hitler but throughout the existence of the so-called Second Reich. That record is admirably reviewed in this book and the reviewer has had the integrity and the courage to give concerning what is to be done about Germany, if and when we win this second Pan-German war, the conclusion which the facts dictate, namely: Put not your trust in Germany no matter by whom the German people choose to be represented, for the people itself for generations has put its faith in brute force and its aspiration has been conquest.

The only serious omission I found in this book is that there is no reference in it to the Geo-Politik Institut and its mastermind, Karl Haushofer, who as the agent of the great German General Staff, provided Hitler with the features of "Mein Kampf" which are derived from the Pan-German plan of world conquest.

I welcome the appearance of this book all the more that it constitutes a bill of particulars in support of the conclusion of my own book "How many World Wars?" published last July, as set forth in its last nine pages (107 to 115).

The author's own conclusion upon the evidence he has marshalled is admirably set forth in the last five pages of his book. As he states:

> "The voice of twenty years warns us that for a long time to come we cannot risk leaving Germany to her own devices." (P. 413)

He might have said "the voice of ninety-six years" because the course of events in Germany has been unbroken since the Revolution of 1848 was crushed by the Prussian Army.

As the author states:

> "There is no hope of really and effectively demilitarizing Germany as long as she is left with nuclei in which her militaristic traditions can be continued and rebuilt at the first opportunity.....There must be no room for any ideas of 'equality' or 'equal rights' on this point. The voice of twenty years warns us that the idea of German equality must not have the slightest bearing upon military questions.
>
> "Never again must we succumb to the myth that power and armaments and compulsion are of themselves sinful and evil as such. They can be the opposite as well. All order, all civilization, all law and dignity, rest on the existence of weapons and power." (P. 413)
>
> .....
>
> "The voice of twenty years warns us that in the business of enforcing peace and order there is no substitute for our own will and our own power." (P. 416)

On September 6, 1918, I heard the late Theodore Roosevelt in the course of an address at City Hall, New York, make virtually the same statements. Four months later his great voice was stilled by death. The world has not yet realized what a great calamity the loss of this one man proved to be. Had he lived another six months, it is reasonably certain that his support of the Foch Plan of permanent international military control of the Rhine bridgeheads and supervision of Germany's armament industry would have frustrated all attempts to inflict upon the world this second Pan-German war. Theodore Roosevelt's position was forecast by his address to which I have referred above in which he called for action to make forever impossible the repetition of Germany's colossal wrongdoing.

Please convey to Mr. Leopold Schwarzschild my heartiest congratulations upon the service he has rendered the cause of freedom and justice by writing this book and please share these congratulations for having published it.

Sincerely yours,

Maurice Léon

MORNING AND SUNDAY

THE BOSTON HERALD

BY THE BOSTON HERALD TRAVELER CORPORATION

EVENING

Boston Traveler

IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

January 4, 1942

Dear Mr Levy

Before Mr Cunningham left for Miami on assignment, he asked me to acknowledge your letter of November twelfth and to thank you for the information on Schwarzschild's book, "World in Trance". It is most valuable and interesting information indeed and Mr Cunningham sincerely appreciated your courtesy and kindness in writing of it.

He was sorry that he could not write you personally, but his appreciation is none the less sincere.

Very truly

Genevieve M Beck

Genevieve M Beck, Secretary to
Bill Cunningham

Mr Henry W Levy
44 School Street
Boston Massachusetts

LIFE

TIME & LIFE BUILDING
ROCKEFELLER CENTER
NEW YORK

EDITORIAL OFFICES

August 10th
1 9 4 2

AUG 11 1942

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Thank you very much for letting us see this most interesting chapter of Leopold Schwarzschild's "WORLD IN TRANCE" .

We agree that this is a most thoughtful analysis, with a great deal of timely significance; but I am afraid at the moment it will not quite fit into LIFE's program.

With thanks again for your interest, -

Sincerely yours,

NOEL F. BUSCH

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L.B. Fischer Publishing Company
381 Fourth Avenue
New York City

encl. 1 chapter (#111)
of above book.

LIFE
TIME & LIFE BUILDING
ROCKEFELLER CENTER
NEW YORK

EDITORIAL OFFICES

October 8th
1 9 4 2

Dear Mr. Wallach:

In Mr. Busch's absence, the book which you have so kindly sent him - WORLD IN TRANCE, by Leopold Schwarzschild - has been referred to our book editor, for his possible interest.

May I thank you, in Mr. Busch's behalf, for your thoughtfulness in seeing that this copy was sent to him.

Very truly yours,

Assistant to
NOEL F. BUSCH

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L.B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York City

HOTEL STATLER ST. LOUIS

Washington Ave. at Ninth and St. Charles

STAY *Hotels* STATLER *in* BOSTON BUFFALO CLEVELAND DETROIT
NEW YORK Hotel Pennsylvania PITTSBURGH Hotel William Penn

October 17, 1942

L.B. Fischer Publishing Company,
New York City.
Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter of October 7. If and when the book you mention catches up with me ~~&~~ I am constantly on the go as lecturer -- I shall read it with interest, for I know Mr. Schwarzschild personally.

I'll see then what I can do about commenting on the volume. I only hope it doesn't get lost in the shuffle somewhere along the route!

Very sincerely yours,

Louis P. Lochner

Louis P. Lochner.

JAMES MARSHALL
HAROLD P. SELIGSON
EDWARD M. BRATTER
SIMON GROSS
SEYMOUR M. KLEIN

HARRY L. OSTERWEIS
FRANK G. OPTON
HARRY L. WECHSLER
R. F. ROSENTHAL
HERBERT E. WALTERS

LAW OFFICES
MARSHALL, BRATTER & SELIGSON
150 BROADWAY, NEW YORK
CORTLANDT 7-6130

CABLE RETTARB, NEW YORK

November 2, 1942.

Mr. Sidney Wallach,
Care L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation,
381 Fourth Avenue, New York City.

Dear Sidney:

As far as I have read Leopold Schwarzschild's WORLD IN TRANCE it is a fascinating book.

Cordially yours,

JM-N

THE FEDERAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATOR

WASHINGTON

October 8, 1942

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I wish to acknowledge your letter of October 2 and the copy of an advanced edition of "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild.

Your thoughtfulness in sending this book is indeed appreciated and I want to take this opportunity to thank you.

With kindest regards and every good wish, I am

Very cordially yours,

Paul V. McNutt

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corporation
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

FIVE SEVENTY LEXINGTON AVENUE
NEW YORK

OWEN D. YOUNG

October 12, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Sir:

The copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzchild which you were kind enough to send to Mr. Young has come during his absence from the city. It looks now as if Mr. Young's engagements will keep him away for some ten days and so meantime permit me to send you this acknowledgment in his behalf.

Very truly yours,

R. Harrison

THE NEWS AND OBSERVER
JOSEPHUS DANIELS, PRESIDENT
RALEIGH, N. C.

October 8, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, New York

Dear Mr. Wallach:

I am in receipt of your esteemed favor, and I shall look forward to seeing the advanced copy of WORLD IN TRANCE. I shall particularly wish to read the section touching upon the attitudes of Woodrow Wilson and Senator Lodge. Wilson was an angel of light, and Lodge on the matter of the League of Nations was the opposite.

Sincerely yours,

Josephus Daniels

JD:mw

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
OFFICE OF FACTS AND FIGURES
WASHINGTON

October 13, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Mr. Davis has asked me to thank you for sending him an advance copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild. The subject is, of course, of especial interest to this Office.

Now I must tell you that it is not possible for any official of the OWI to comment for publication on any particular book. This is a policy to which we have adhered strictly and I am sure you will understand why it is necessary.

Yours very sincerely,

Chester Kerr
Chief, Book Section

EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE FOR EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

WASHINGTON, D.C.

OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION

October 8, 1942

Mr. G. B. Fischer
L. B. Fischer Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Fischer:

A copy of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild arrived this morning. We are very glad to have this book in our library.

Yours sincerely,

Chester Kerr
Chief, Book Section

L. B. FISCHER PUBLISHING CORP.

381 FOURTH AVENUE, NEW YORK, N. Y. MURRAY HILL 3-0893

October 7, 1942

Mr. Fulton Oursler
c/o W. Colston Leigh Inc.
521 Fifth Avenue
New York City

Dear Mr. Oursler:

Under separate cover we are sending you a copy of a pre-publication edition of WORLD IN TRANCE by Leopold Schwarzschild. We are sending you this book in the confidence that as an influential American and leader of public opinion you will want to read this book and make your views about it known.

The book is essentially the story of Germany's war against the world from 1918 to 1939. It is completely documented and throws a revealing light on the political and economic developments of the past 25 years. We regard it as a book that must be read by all of those who want to understand the recent past and to help plan intelligently for a better future.

If you share this view, we would be grateful if you sent us a statement of your opinion and, in such other ways as may suggest themselves to you, encouraged a wider knowledge of the contents of this book.

Cordially yours,

Dear Mr Sidney Wallach :

Sidney Wallach
L. B. FISCHER PUBLISHING CORP.

SW.JAB

Shall be glad to read the book when I get back. I am due in N.Y. the middle of November. Fred Oursler

Room 5600
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York

October 8, 1942

Dear Sir:

Permit me to acknowledge, on behalf of Mr. John D. Rockefeller,Jr., receipt of the copy of "World In Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild.

Mr. Rockefeller will, I know, appreciate your courtesy in sending him this book.

Sincerely yours,

Janet M. Woofield

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue, New York City

ROSENBERG, GOLDMARK & COLIN

165 BROADWAY

NEW YORK

JAMES N. ROSENBERG
GODFREY GOLDMARK
RALPH F. COLIN
SYDNEY M. KAYE
GEORGE K. HOURWICH
MILTON M. BERGERMAN
WALTER J. PETSCHEK
MAX FREUND

CABLE ADDRESS
ROSENBALL

October 13, 1942

Mr. Sidney Wallach
L. B. Fischer Publishing Corp.
381 Fourth Avenue
New York, N. Y.

Dear Mr. Wallach:

Many thanks for your letter of October 2, and for copy of "World in Trance" by Leopold Schwarzschild.

I am taking the book home with me and shall try to read it over the weekend.

Sincerely yours,

JNR

JNR:rr

Schwarzschild, Leopold

World in Trance

Every thinking individual and especially every statesman should read this and be warned thereby. Careful and detailed account of international meanderings and indecisions from November, 1918, through Pearl Harbor. Shows steady pace with which Germany advanced, the sympathy she gained as a supposedly downtrodden, and the ease with which she broke down all restrictions. Author sets up a guide for the next peace settlement. Briefly, his thesis is:" if one lost World War did not suffice to cure the Germans, a second lost war will not, in all human probability, suffice either. Never again must we believe that, in the work of securing peace, can power and compulsion be replaced by any economic and social magic." Translated by Norbert Guterman. Fischer, $3.50. (11/4)

-- Lena Ruppert, Library Journal

Ln., Freeport, N.Y., Memorial Lib.

Dear Mr. Landshoff:

This will be in the Nov. 1 issue of the Library Journal.

Cordially

J. Kelly

AR 7043 6/3
Leopold Schwarzschild Collection, 1945 - III, e, 3-ii

Fragile

Fragile Material!
Do not use!
! Do not Filim !

6/3

AR 7043 6/4
Leopold Schwarzschild Collection; Box 5-II, e) 3-iv

6/4

FILMED IN SECTIONS

S. Express Feb 6, 44

THE PROFESSOR SAYS:

Mr. Wells fell into his own trap

In the Sunday Express last week Mr. H. G. Wells violently attacked as "superficially intelligent and massively stupid" a new best-seller called "World in Trance," by Leopold Schwarzschild. He also vigorously assailed Professor D. W. Brogan, of the Chair of Political Science at Cambridge, for his preface to the book. Here is the professor's reply.

By Professor D. W. Brogan

IT is a long time since the controversial habits of Mr. H. G. Wells became part of the folk-lore of the intelligentsia.

Mr. Shaw, in one of his happiest pieces of contemporary biography, has described with great gusto Mr. Wells's attempted blitzkrieg on the Fabian Society, and London is full of victims of these assaults, victims in the sense that they were attacked, not in the sense that they were any the worse for it.

Indeed, they might well be the better for it, since Mr. Wells was, and to some extent still is, a great contemporary figure whose attack in normal times, if not an honour, is at least an occasion of profit.

'The turbid tide'

But these are not normal times and I have not the usual motives for grateful silence, since both my book and Herr Schwarzschild's book are out of print. So I am not tempted to take the goods Mr. Wells provides in the form of free and unsolicited advertising.

The readers of the Sunday Express will not get a clear or just idea either of "World in Trance" or of "The English People" from the turbid tide of Mr. Wells's eloquence. For Mr. Wells falls again into the trap he insists on digging, the trap into which so many opponents of his have had the gleeful experience of seeing him hurl himself; he writes himself down.

It is an error to assume that if you are not being listened to the first time, it is necessarily wise to scream; the result may be that you become even less listened to for reasons that any good music teacher can explain to Mr. Wells if he doesn't know them already.

The analogy with controversy is obvious, and I am always being surprised that so warm an admirer of Swift should still have to learn the elements of the trade of controversy. I am also surprised that a pupil of T. H. Huxley should not have grasped the importance of formal good manners in controversy.

But indeed it is not necessary to go back to Huxley. There must be few men who have not at some time in their lives been forced to say to some woman that repetition of abuse was subject to rapidly diminishing returns. So I won't waste time in confuting Mr. Wells's untrue, offensive and, I hope, ludicrous charges that I am a Fascist, an anti-Semite, an anti-intellectual, etc.

What does concern me is the travesty of my ideas and of the position of Herr Schwarzschild which Mr. Wells has spluttered on to the pages of the Sunday Express. I have never said or implied that I believed in "Power and to the devil with ideas."

I have repeatedly argued that power, organised military power, was a force in the world whose importance the intellectual tended to neglect. I have repeatedly remarked or, if you like, complained that the average British (or American) publicist disliked thinking seriously about the problems of military power, of military technique, of the relationship between the general cultural level of a country and its power of military action.

Power in Germany

It has long been a habit of mine to exempt from these criticisms the author of "The War in the Air," "Bealby," a score of admirable books and stories, the prophet of the tank, the inventor of a good war game, Mr. H. G. Wells. It will continue to be my habit.

On the general question of the place of power in politics, I am delighted to be able to refer your readers to a book of mine which is still in print ("Is Innocence Enough?"). What I should like to do here is to take up the special case of power in Germany. It was because "World in Trance" was about that problem and about a side of that problem neglected in Britain, that I wrote an introduction for it. (I say Britain rather than England in deference to Mr. Wells's fierce English patriotism which would resent my use of the word England as a good Nazi resents references to Germany made by German Jews.)

It is very difficult to make plain to the people of this island that other countries differ from Britain in significant ways; that, for example, it is worth noting that smart German students instead of playing cricket, fight duels with sabres, cutting each other's faces and producing, with much effort, an effect I often produce by merely shaving

The turbid tide

But these are not normal times and I have not the usual motives for grateful silence, since both my book and Herr Schwarzschild's book are out of print. So I am not tempted to take the goods Mr. Wells provides in the form of free and unsolicited advertising.

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It is very difficult to make plain to the people of this island that other countries differ from Britain in significant ways; that, for example, it is worth noting that smart German students instead of playing cricket, fight duels with sabres, cutting each other's faces and producing, with much effort, an effect I often produce by merely shaving.

It is worth noting that Germany is a country in which it requires special courage and independence to be sceptical about the military virtues, while Britain is a country in which such sceptical views are not merely tolerated but applauded and paid for.

A great problem

To think of Germany as a country really like Britain is to be foolish. Those Germans who have thought seriously on the problems of how to get the German people out of the grip of the ruling coalition of big business, the higher bureaucracy and the military class, have rightly concentrated on the problem of military power.

Bismarck's Germany *was* made by blood and iron, and the average German was not terribly blameworthy for thinking that there was a great deal to be said for this recipe for national unity and glory. But whether he was blameworthy or not, his attitude was a godsend to people like Hitler and to the forces behind Hitler. The old Social-Democratic party once knew this; a new Social-Democratic party will have to remember it.

How to persuade the representative "German in the street" that Bismarck's solution was no real solution, was and is a great problem to which I have no ready solution. All I suggest is that until a solution is found, the disarmament of Germany is a necessary condition of world peace.

I should like to conclude by one retort to Mr. Wells's innuendoes and dogmatic assertions. For the reasons I have given, I don't propose to answer childish gibes about myself out of "Who's Who." But when Mr. Wells takes on himself to impute motives and to sneer at Herr Schwarzschild from the peace and plenty of Matching's Easy or wherever Mr. Wells now lives, I think a protest is called for.

Ran serious risk

I have never spoken to or seen or exchanged a line with Herr Schwarzschild. But I do know what he was doing in Germany before 1933, and what he did in Paris after it. At serious risk to his person and to his fortunes, he opposed a policy of connivance at German rearmament that was defended or palliated by far more eminent and generally respected German refugees.

It is possible that, in a bitter and unpopular fight, Herr Schwarzschild became too much a man of one idea. He did not become an anti-Semite (he is a Jew) or a Nazi or a Fascist.

When I contemplate Herr Schwarzschild's career, I am quite certain that I am in no position to throw any stones at him.

And as a constant reader of Mr. Wells's writings since I was aged ten, I may say that Mr. Wells in his long and versatile career has not made on me the impression that he is now behaving with due moral modesty when he slanders Herr Schwarzschild.

And Mr. Wells sees it through

Mr. H. G. Wells, after reading the above article, replies:

PROFESSOR BROGAN says

by blood and iron, and the average German was not terribly blameworthy for thinking that there was a great deal to be said for this recipe for national unity and glory. But whether he was blameworthy or not, his attitude was a godsend to people like Hitler and to the forces behind Hitler. The old Social-Democratic party once knew this; a new Social-Democratic party will have to remember it.

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And Mr. Wells sees it through

Mr. H. G. Wells, after reading the above article, replies:

PROFESSOR BROGAN says that I "slander" Herr Schwarzschild. I have "slandered" him to the extent of quoting his "conclusions" in full to the extent of 431 words in an article of 1,662 words. I refrained from any speculation why Herr Schwarzschild transferred his ultra-Teutonic activities to Paris in 1933.

In the article to which the professor is replying there are 532 words of quotation out of a total of 1,662 words.

My ideas of honourable controversy differ widely from the professor's. I admit I have the ugly habit of calling a spade a spade, and sometimes descending to the vernacular.

His suggestion that I live in the "peace and plenty of Matching's Easy" flies wide. I have stood the blitz in London since I returned from America at the end of 1940, with the exception of a short spell of work in the academic security of Oxford and a summertime visit or so to Welwyn Garden City—where for a while I had a grandson in hospital—for fresh air.

At any rate I must thank the professor for admitting that his version of my controversial methods is largely folklore.

Whom does he mean by 'We'?

NOW let me blow the whole of this Brogan - Schwarzschild stuff to atoms with one simple question. *Who are "we"?*

Manifestly this "we" is not the existing Governments, peoples, intelligent men, new movements or anything else that exists. They have all been judged and found wanting—by Herr Schwarzschild and Professor Brogan. Is "we" a duumvirate, then?

There are, of course, the good gentlemen saying "Hear, hear!" in the Senior Blimps' Club. They may follow, but will they stick?

One other figure comes to my mind. It was just such violent, indignant, incoherent stuff as this that Oswald Mosley used to pour out in the great Albert Hall days. Maybe he may pick up from his phlebitis at the Brogan-Schwarzschild clarion call.

But beyond these three voices, where is the rest of this strong, implacable "We" that is going to take a cowering world by the throat?

It's a bit Wee, I submit, for the heroic role it contemplates.

I have a friendly unfastidious disposition, but rather than be included in one political "we" with Brogan and Schwarzschild, I would die fighting in a ditch beside almost any decent human being, white, black, red or yellow. I *do* believe in the scientific analysis of operating social causes and the possibility of remoulding human relationships nearer to man's heart's desire.

I have no use for pseudo-English professors who shirk the scientific analysis of operating social causes and take to Fascist rant. I believe that men of intelligence and good will throughout the world *can* yet be brought together into effective co-operation for the reshaping of human life.

I believe that a great reconstruction of mental forces is going on now, that an immense response to that work is possible. The world has to be policed, yes—but against the return of Power Politics. To co-operate in that policing is life and self-respect. It is real living.

The bully's way is, as Herr Schwarzschild admits, "neither easy nor inexpensive." Moreover, it is damnably evil and hopelessly silly.

Copyright by H. G. Wells. Translation Rights Reserved.

FILMED IN TWO SECTIONS

London Sunday Express January 30, 1944

H. G. WELLS

discusses a new best-seller called "World in Trance" and says

This book is massively stupid

I believe in the reshaping of human life

A VERY remarkable and ominous book, "World In Trance," by Leopold Schwarzschild, has been put into my hands. It is superficially intelligent and massively stupid.

It may find a heavy and abundant response in what we may best call the "lumpen intelligentzia." It is a plain indication of the route to pseudo-victory and hell for all human decency.

It is prefaced, I regret to remark, by Professor D. W. Brogan. He opens in this style: "Power, military power, is as important in world history as it has ever been; it has not been, and will not be, abolished by pious opinions, by moral boycotts, by sermons and resolutions." Fierce stuff that—to come from a professional intellectual. Power, and to the devil with ideas.

The professor is Glaswegian of mixed Scotch and Irish origin. He boasts he has not a drop of English blood in his veins. His education began in a school devoted to some unheard-of Saint Columcille, and went on by way of Rutherglen Academy and Glasgow University to higher things.

He is now a Fellow of Peterhouse and Professor of Political Science at Cambridge.

In a book, "The English People," he has undertaken to tell the world about us. It is the loose gatherings of a not very intelligent and highly antipathetic alien, about our obsession by cricket, our lack of humour, the Church of England, and our manners and mannerisms, as they appear to a natural born outsider.

It is hard to guess at the mental atmosphere he breathes. He seems never to have heard of such typically English figures as Roger and Francis Bacon, John Ball, Wycliffe, Newton, Cromwell, Raffles, Cobden, Blake, Darwin, Huxley.

lems at once; insist not merely that nothing but the best is good enough for you, but that nothing but the perfect solution is good enough for you. . . . Do this by manifestoes and meetings." As though a world problem could be solved by a piecemeal solution!

So, in 1942, he works himself up to the outspoken hostility of his Foreword to Leopold Schwarzschild in April 1943, wherein early pustules of the anti-Jewish complex appear. Discussing the German repudiation of war guilt he says: "They had been well trained in such sophistries by left-wing intellectuals—many of them Jews."

So runs the introduction to Herr Schwarzschild's "World In Trance."

Absurd and laughable ideas

NO doubt this sort of thing gives a certain satisfaction to many troubled minds in these days of stress, a temporary surcease at least to their gnawing sense of urgency. They may dismiss these difficult questionings about strange things, and novel dangers and opportunities, that are rushing upon us all.

These new ideas that a world may be either organised on a basis of abundance, security and peace, or destroyed, are—Well, they are as absurd and laughable as land ironclads were in 1903 and war in the air in 1908. No need, was there, in those days, to adjust men's minds to such absurdities! So they

that Brogan is becoming. He despises everything but force, he rails at intellectuals, he sneers at Jews, he is blood brother of Goering when it comes to the things of the mind.

I do not know what he was up to, but he was in Germany until 1933. Then either something offended him or a great light shone upon him, and he established *Das Neue Tagebuch* in Paris. There he began to warn a world already afraid of Germany of the terrible war Germany was preparing for them.

Everybody is wrong

I WILL not speculate about his aims and his motives. Everybody is wrong, everybody is rotten, except some obscurely conceived "we." I will simply quote his concluding exhortation. It is, I submit, a plain appeal to us to make ourselves like unto Germany while there is still a chance for us to do so. The italics are mine:—

"There are good reasons why the millennium has never materialised. Mankind and human communities change their essential nature in the course of thousands of years as little as the wolf and the pack of wolves, or the sheep and the herd of sheep, change theirs. The task has always been the same.

"Against the eternally lurking jungle, weapons and compulsion are always the only defence, and nothing liberates us from the duty of doing the utmost for ourselves. New attempts may be made to create a sort of League of Nations.

"In truth, the prospects of ever creating a reliable league of sovereign States are as good as non-existent. No human brain has ever been able to show how the collective will of mankind can be made compatible with the continued existence of individual sovereign States wielding individual sovereign power. *But even the existence of such a league must never distract us from developing our own power and will to the maximum.*

A VERY remarkable and ominous book, "World In Trance," by Leopold Schwarzschild, has been put into my hands. It is superficially intelligent and massively stupid.

It may find a heavy and abundant response in what we may best call the "lumpen intelligentzia." It is a plain indication of the route to pseudo-victory and hell for all human decency.

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'Such ignorance' comes ill from him

SUCH ignorance, permissible in a smart young journalist, comes ill from a man speaking from the English Chair of Political Science to which it has pleased God so unaccountably to call him. His position might easily be misunderstood by the overseas reader.

This *olla podrida* has a preface which seems to have been slapped together rather hastily. He is anticipating adverse criticism and struggling against some infiltration of reality into his own mind. He is very fierce and scornful about the "new quack doctors of political medicine," that is to say, the people who want to see the whole world at peace (instead of an armed peace in preparation for a new war).

"Get the problem *big* enough," he sneers, "tackle all the problems at once; insist not merely that nothing but the best is good enough for you, but that nothing but the perfect solution is good enough for you. . . . Do this by manifestoes and meetings." As though a world problem could be solved by a piecemeal solution!

So, in 1942, he works himself up to the outspoken hostility of his Foreword to Leopold Schwarzschild in April 1943, wherein early pustules of the anti-Jewish complex appear. Discussing the German repudiation of war guilt he says: "They had been well trained in such sophistries by left-wing intellectuals—many of them Jews."

So runs the introduction to Herr Schwarzschild's "World In Trance."

Absurd and laughable ideas

NO doubt this sort of thing gives a certain satisfaction to many troubled minds in these days of stress, a temporary surcease at least to their gnawing sense of urgency. They may dismiss these difficult questionings about strange things, and novel dangers and opportunities, that are rushing upon us all.

These new ideas that a world may be either organised on a basis of abundance, security and peace, or destroyed, are—— Well, they are as absurd and laughable as land ironclads were in 1903 and war in the air in 1908. No need, was there, in those days, to adjust men's minds to such absurdities! So they haven't adjusted, and the new things have developed.

No need now to listen to these silly mind-distressing "intellectuals" who point out that the conditions of life have been completely revolutionised in a score of years. Tell them to *shut up*, say it loudly, hamper their publications, and stick to the wonderful time-honoured Power Politics that have brought us to our present pass and are taking us to the abyss.

That will be an enormous relief—for the moment anyhow—for endless minds which have been fearing they must awaken and stand up. Let them dismiss such fears.

So the professor, with his eyes to the past, invokes this heavily erudite volume by a thoroughgoing German, Herr Leopold Schwarzschild, which has been translated by Mr. Norbert Guterman and is already in its second impression.

Schwarzschild is already all things of the mind.

I do not know what he was up to, but he was in Germany until 1933. Then either something offended him or a great light shone upon him, and he established *Das Neue Tagebuch* in Paris. There he began to warn a world already afraid of Germany of the terrible war Germany was preparing for them.

Everybody is wrong

I WILL not speculate about his aims and his motives. Everybody is wrong, everybody is rotten, except some obscurely conceived "we." I will simply quote his concluding exhortation. It is, I submit, a plain appeal to us to make ourselves like unto Germany while there is still a chance for us to do so. The italics are mine:—

"There are good reasons why the millennium has never materialised. Mankind and human communities change their essential nature in the course of thousands of years as little as the wolf and the pack of wolves, or the sheep and the herd of sheep, change theirs. The task has always been the same.

"Against the eternally lurking jungle, weapons and compulsion are always the only defence, and nothing liberates us from the duty of doing the utmost for ourselves. New attempts may be made to create a sort of League of Nations.

"In truth, the prospects of ever creating a reliable league of sovereign States are as good as non-existent. No human brain has ever been able to show how the collective will of mankind can be made compatible with the continued existence of individual sovereign States wielding individual sovereign power. *But even the existence of such a league must never distract us from developing our own power and will to the maximum.*

The voice of twenty years

"EVEN such a league in point of fact lives only on the will, power and strength of the great Powers belonging to it. All the other Powers, the middle and the small ones, impressive as their abstract sum may be, are only satellites which gravitate around the great Powers.

"And if the great Powers have a common will, everything is well. If not, there is no collectivity and once again we are alone; with our nearest friends we are thrown back on our resources.

"We must always be prepared for that eventuality. The voice of 20 years warns us that in the business of enforcing peace and order there is no substitute for our own will and our own power.

"And never again must we believe that the unpleasantness, sacrifices and responsibilities that all this implies are too heavy and too great to be borne. They are heavy and they are serious.

"It is a burden to police the world—at least in its most dangerous quarters. It demands work and energy to see that no weapons are accumulated in dangerous hands. It demands toil and effort to prevent the establishment of dictatorships, those definitely intolerable neighbours for democracies. It is neither easy nor inexpensive.

"But it is a thousand times easier and less expensive than any of its alternatives. And it is incomparably more pleasant than the consequences of hesitation and belief in Utopian experiments. And it is practical. The voice of 20 years tells us not to be afraid. There is nothing under the sun that cannot be paid for with toil and labour of the proper kind."

DIGEST and REVIEW

Contents of This Issue

War and the Children . . . . . *Free World* 3

Can Germany Be Reformed? . . *New York Times Magazine* 10

Of Course You Can Make a Speech! . . . *Household Magazine* 15

Stamps Are Big Business . . . . . *Extension* 18

Rheumatic Fever — New Data on Treatment . . *Montreal Standard* 22

"This Is David Ross Speaking" . . . . . *The Red Barrel* 25

Inside the Lublin Murder Camp . . . . . *Time* 27

Postwar Jobs in Home Building . . . . . *Leland Hall* 30

Can We Survive the National Debt? . . . . . *Extension* 33

What Readers Write . . . . . *Our Readers* 38

Who Will Be Japan's Postwar Leaders? . . . . . *Amerasia* 41

Hi, Mom! . . . . . *American Legion Magazine* 43

Intolerance — Enemy of Peace . . . *Preservation of the Faith* 44

Millions Tune In on Britain's Brains Trust . . . *Free World* 48

India — Key to Our Economic Future . . . . . *Amerasia* 53

The Man Who Keeps Hitler Alive . . . . *Eugene Tillinger* 55

Opinions on Racial Intolerance . . . . . *Our Readers* 59

"Born Out of Wedlock—" . . . . . *Hygeia* 65

The Layman's Legal Quiz . . . . *Harry Hibschman, LL.D.* 68

Weather in the War . . . . . *Kiwanis Magazine* 69

The Japs Deal in Death . . . *Official Joint Army & Navy Report* 89

Book Digest Feature — THE PEOPLE vs. ABE LATHAN, COLORED *from the book* — STORIES *by Erskine Caldwell* 73

Six Delusions About Germany

By Leopold Schwarzschild

Condensed from THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE

EVEN while the first battle of Germany moves to a climax the second battle is developing—the political battle. Probably this second battle is still far from its crisis but the fronts are becoming clearer.

In recent weeks this political offensive has been concentrated on one point. Strong attacks have been made against the idea that Germany after defeat should be subjected to some sort of Allied control. It is declared that a protracted control is not only unnecessary but that it also holds great danger for the future. We are assured that the establishment of democracy in Germany, based on the many democrats in that country, would be the best protection for peace. And we are warned that the very purpose of victory will be defeated if we irritate the German democrats by abnormal foreign control or compulsion, not to speak of occupation.

This far-reaching thesis deserves close examination. In what follows I have extracted six main arguments from the various pronouncements and undertaken to answer each.

MR. SCHWARZSCHILD *is the author of* World in Trance *and* Primer of the Coming World. *He is a recognized authority on Germany.*

I

THE ARGUMENT

Fundamentally the Germans are not different from the people of other nations. No mysterious properties of "race" are involved. At times Germany has behaved badly, but other nations too have gone through periods of bad behavior. Achievements in many domains prove incontestably the worth of the German nation.

THE ANSWER

NATIONS as well as individuals, worthy in some ways, can be intolerable in others. Nations do not have invariable properties because of "race"; but as a consequence of traditions, ideas and upbringing, they may have deeply rooted characteristics all their own. With regard to the crucial problem of today—aggression and war—the Germans definitely show a unique trait. It is their very special kind of nationalism.

Every nation, in some vague way, believes it is better than other nations. But no Frenchman or Englishman or American has ever felt in earnest that out of the presumed superiority of his own nation arises the right—more, the duty—to dominate other nations, even all of them.

This is an exclusively German conception.

The doctrine of German superiority was invented around 1800 by ecstatic philosophers. In the beginning it was stated with relative moderation and reached only a small audience. But gradually the idea trickled through wider circles and became more virulent.

In the following decades the Germanic doctrine took on more radical shades. Its apostles at the universities, in the schools, in meetings and organizations increased constantly. The number of books and newspapers, to some degree inspired by it, grew steadily. Gradually fragments and dilutions of the doctrine penetrated all heads. This was the main reason for Germany's behavior in past decades—and this spirit is the decisive difference between Germany and other nations today.

II

THE ARGUMENT

The master-race idea did not infect the common man in Germany. It infected only the ruling class. At the worst, it can be said that a limited number of ordinary Germans have been led astray by the ruling class. When real democracy is established, the ghost will be laid.

THE ANSWER

STRANGE as it may seem, the contrary is true. The master-race idea did not originate in the ruling class but was wedded to the democratic tendencies of the period. For a long time the pioneers of democracy were also the pioneers of germanomania. The philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who may be considered the first full-fledged germanomaniac, was also the first and most ardent preacher of democracy, and so it was with his successors and adherents.

On the other hand, the ruling classes—the princes, the aristocracy, "society"—were hostile both to Germanic and democratic doctrines. The very word "German" was considered subversive. The German world then was divided into sovereign states, and the people were supposed to be Prussian, Hessian or Saxon—not "German"; to have Prussian or Bavarian, not German, ideas.

"German" doctrines were called insane, plebeian and revolutionary—as much so as the democratic principles connected with them. Protagonists of these ideas were persecuted, punished and chased out of their offices. The policy of the governments — especially the international policy—was entirely unaffected by the germanomania of the lower strata. Bismarck despised

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the whole nonsense. He waged his wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870 only for the sake of strictly old-fashioned and limited aims: to acquire some provinces and to found the "little-German" Reich. As soon as these goals were reached, he declared Germany "saturated." And in the remaining 20 years of his government, he adhered to this statement. His lack of interest in new-fangled "greater-German," or "pan-Germanic" enterprises was complete, let alone the fabulous German "world mission." He even declared "criminal" aspirations for the "Anschluss" of a German-speaking country such as Austria. He used to say: "If Austria did not exist, it would have to be invented."

Then the picture changed. At the end of Bismarck's era, the insanity began to spread, slowly and gradually, among the ruling classes as well. The number of aristocrats, officers, high civil servants, big landowners and business men. Junkers and industrialists, who caught the infection grew. At last the government itself was infected in the person of the muddlehead, Wilhelm II, and thus the stage was set for all the calamities which followed. But it is important not to forget that the ruling class supplied only converts and that comparatively late. Readiness to accept such ideas showed up first in "the people."

III

THE ARGUMENT

The German workmen and their leaders, at least, were not infected by the German doctrines. They were chiefly Socialist—that is, anti-nationalist. And they were strong. The trade unions had nine million members. In a true democratic Reich therefore the workmen will be the most reliable guardians of peace.

THE ANSWER

UNFORTUNATELY, this is a romantic idealization of the German workman. It is true that the official Socialist program contained planks in favor of peace and the brotherhood of the nations. But it is wrong to think of the trade-union members, or of the electors of a Socialist candidate, as standing solidly on all the planks of the Socialist program. Far from it! The Social Democrats and the trade unions promoted the workers' wage interests, and that is why the workmen became members. But by no stretch of the imagination can it be asserted that each member was permeated with the ideologies which the Socialists professed in the remote regions of high politics. Many of them had no interest whatever in such questions. In these matters millions of workmen, including many of their leaders, had the average German mentality.

The case of the genuine and informed Socialists was even more complicated. For, contrary to a widespread error, true, orthodox Socialist doctrine is anything but pacifist. Karl Marx condemned pacifism as "the most trivial political twaddle." He taught that there are "progressive" wars which demand the full approval and support of the masses.

Thus there is no guarantee that convinced Socialists must, of necessity, be against war and in favor of peace. They are free to approve war whole-heartedly, if only they are convinced that it is a war of "progress." And whether they are convinced of this or not depends, in the final analysis, upon their sentiments, instincts and spirit. On the day of mobilization in 1914 the German Socialists persuaded themselves that the war then beginning actually was a progressive war.

IV

THE ARGUMENT

Hitler never commanded, in a free election, the majority of the votes. His spirit was alien to that of the majority.

THE ANSWER

IT IS only in countries with a two-party system that one of them carries the majority of votes. In countries with many parties, conditions are different. There the party polling the biggest vote is entitled to political leadership and the government. In the last free elections Hitler won 44 per cent of the votes, more than double the number which the Socialists, the party next in strength, received. If ever a German party had been "called upon to govern by the people's will" it was this one. And even more important: to the 44 per cent which represents the Hitler vote more millions should be added. Other parties and candidates represented other varieties and gradations of germanomania.

V

THE ARGUMENT

Reactionary forces created Hitler. With their money and their intrigues they falsified the democratic process. If the Junkers, the big landowners, the monopolists of industry and banking are dispossessed and liquidated, then democracy in Germany will come into its own and everything will will be well.

THE ANSWER

OPINIONS of the Junkers, the industrialists and the bankers about Hitler were as much divided as those of people in general. The percentage of Hitlerites among them was not higher than in the rest of the nation. It is wrong also to ascribe the growth of the Nazi movement, preponderately, to the money of wealthy Hitlerites. The millions of small payments "from below," the contributions, the gifts, the admission fees, the newspaper subscriptions and the like, undoubtedly amounted to more than the bigger contributions. Moreover, the rest of the parties and organizations also disposed of funds and money; taken altogether, even more, certainly than did the Nazis. If in the competition for favor Hitler was successful it was simply because the people preferred him. The democratic process was not falsified. It worked actually in Hitler's favor.

VI

THE ARGUMENT

The Germans ran amok because of the cruelties and blunders imposed by the Versailles Treaty. If this time a peace permeated with justice and wisdom is granted to them their inclination to violence and lawlessness will disappear.

THE ANSWER

THERE was no Versailles in 1914. Nevertheless the Reich ran amok. This alone should prove that German madness can break forth without any Versailles, and that this madness is induced by entirely different and deeper causes. Moreover, we must realize that the coming settlement for Germany will be much harder than the last one—and this unavoidably. The Reich, undoubtedly, will not only lose again the provinces it lost last time—provinces of foreign or mixed languages. In addition, it will now have to give away, at least, the purely German province of East Prussia. Once more reparations in kind or money will be claimed and these will rest much more heavily on a devastated country than those imposed after the last war on an undamaged country. In addition, it seems an incomparably harder kind of reparations will be imposed in the form of labor battalions or, as the Germans put it, "slave export." Those who consider the German furor a product of the previous settlement should find it difficult to expect the next, inescapably harder settlement to produce German pacifism.

It was not ill-treatment that produced germanomania; but germanomania had produced the belief in ill-treatment.

ALL this deals only with the past. We do not know the German spirit of the future. If anybody should make prophecies about transformations to come he may be right or he may be wrong; prophecies are beyond argument. It may be that the experiences of this war—so much more terrible than those of the last one—will kill completely and forever the bacilli of the Germanic doctrine. It may be that the Germans will become the most peaceful occupants of the earth, and that in their sovereign democracy they will never again give the world cause for worry. Miracles can happen on this planet. But it seems more prudent to oppose the whims of germanomania for some time to come with robust ramparts and controls.

A LADY swept into a bank with such a commanding air the president of the bank thought he should ask her if there was something he could do. There was—he signed for a telegram.

· A DESCRIPTIVE CATALOGUE ·

BORZOI BOOKS

FOR SPRING 1944

ALFRED · A · KNOPF · PUBLISHER

501 MADISON AVENUE · NEW YORK

THE ABC OF A BETTER WORLD

by Leopold Schwarzschild

Translated from the German by NORBERT GUTERMAN

OUT OF the welter of postwar plans and counter-plans comes this hard-headed, hard-hitting challenge to idealists and visionaries everywhere. Arguing that all the hellish periods of history have resulted from the failure of heaven-storming hopes, the author calls upon all peacemakers and peace-wishers to recognize the elementary lessons of history and the limitations of human nature and lay their plans accordingly. Specifically he asserts that only drastic measures can wipe out Germany's military tradition; that the will of the United States, Soviet Russia, and Great Britain must be accepted as the chief bulwark of peace; that nations do nothing out of altruistic motives and that any world authority must be backed by force; that we can't expect to establish our kind of democracy in each liberated state; that regional unions won't be unmitigated blessings; and that returning to open frontiers is the best way to raise international living-standards.

These, we are aware, are controversial and perhaps fighting words. If so, they are the fighting words of a distinguished European editor who believes that only if we strain our hopes through the sieve of harsh actualities can we avoid failing all over again. Mr. Schwarzschild may not always be right, but if he doesn't make every reader with a theory about the postwar world sit up and think twice, we are hugely mistaken.

Details to be announced

THEY SHALL NOT SLEEP

by Leland Stowe

THIS is great war reporting, based not only on acute personal observation but also on serious thought—and written out of profound emotion. Since 1939 Stowe, a former winner of the Pulitzer Prize in Journalism and of other distinguished journalistic awards, has worked and traveled in 39 countries and colonies, covering almost every major war front. Two years ago he published, in his very successful book *No Other Road to Freedom,* a flaming report of the war in Europe. Now he tells us

INFORMATION BOOKLETS

"SOVEREIGNTY"
(PART I)

Contributions by

DOUGLAS REED
Author of "LEST WE REGRET," published by JONATHAN CAPE, "SOVEREIGNTY!"

ERIC KEMPSON
"PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND EDUCATION"

B. M. PALMER
"SHADOWS WE IGNORED"

PUBLISHED by the "NEVER AGAIN" ASSOCIATION

PRICE 6d.

INFORMATION AND REPORT ON

THE NeVER AGAIN ASSOCIATION

BROMLEY KENT

FOREWORD

The Chairman and Committee of the "NeVer Again" Association think it necessary to place before the British public a reasoned statement of the considerations which are implicit in and led to the framing of their objectives. The rapidly changing political situation has led them to the conclusion that this can best be done in a series of short booklets, of which this is the first. When completed the booklets may be bound into one volume.

Wartime difficulties make it impossible to state when the second booklet will be ready, but any undue delay in its appearance will be quite unavoidable.

V.B-L. and M.S.S.

AIMS AND OBJECTS

1. Victory. To assist in the vigorous prosecution of the war by all available means.
2. Peace and Security. To ensure that the terms of peace are such that will. once and for all, prevent the organisation of the German people for war. With this in view, to oppose the entering into any pact or the signing of any treaty with any German Government until the German people have proved that they can and will behave as good neighbours.
3. The Retention of Complete Sovereignty for the British Isles and the Empire, and the maintenance of strong armed forces under the complete control of our own nation as a post-war policy.
4. Punishment for War Guilt. To obtain information that will permit the identification and punishment of individuals primarily responsible for the emasculation of British Military power, and the financing of National Socialist Germany, in the years from 1915 to 1940, and under all Governments.

N.B.—To this Association the letter "V" is the 22nd letter of the alphabet, standing for Victory and Vigilance—nothing else.



CONTENTS

	PAGE
SOVEREIGNTY (PART I). By Douglas Reed	5
PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND EDUCATION. By Eric Kempson	12
SHADOWS WE IGNORED. By B. M. Palmer	15
PUBLISHERS' NOTE	22

SOVEREIGNTY!

(Part I)

By DOUGLAS REED

author of " Lest We Regret "

(JONATHAN CAPE)

ONCE, IN THIS ISLAND, WE PAID AND WERE PAID IN COINS called sovereigns, good golden disks with the King's head on them. I dare swear that no man in this country who remembers them is glad they are gone, or welcomes their paper substitutes, from which the King's head has been banished in favour of the signatures of bank officials, the employees of a State-within-the-State, of a kind of financial Vatican, whose Cardinals we are not even allowed to know, and of whose Pope we know merely the name. The sovereign was taken from us, with much else, after the last war; in place of gold which never could lose its value, we were given paper which can be made worthless at any moment, and this was done by men who know better than all others the value of gold. Sufficient reason for the change was never given; in my opinion, none can be openly avowed. It was one of those contemptuous back-handed blows to national interests which the people of this British island to-day have come to expect, and, seemingly, almost to like. The King might yet *reign,* in England: but the Bank *ruled*; this was one of the ways in which the King's subjects were informed of the fact.

From "sovereign" to "sovereignty" is but a span of two consonants. In this war, they (or, if you prefer, "They"; we are entitled to use this pronoun, since so much power over us is wielded by hidden and nameless men, nowadays) wish to take our Sovereignty from us.

My work brings me in touch with associations and societies, councils and coteries, all over England: bodies of men and women, great and small, well-meaning (and sometimes, I suspect, ill-meaning), wealthy and poor, which all have this much in common, that they are concerned (or profess to be concerned) for the future of this country, after the war, and make various proposals to ensure its safety and happiness. From great organisations, such as Federal Union (in which unity, as I opine, would lie Britain's weakness and

enslavement) and Common Wealth (which to me is a euphemism for common poverty in this island), to the Women's Institute of Nether Backscratch they range, these forward-looking, debating, planning leagues and groups. To me they are a source of dejection; for the majority are lost in words and have no clear notion of what they aspire after; the others are those which I suspect of working for our downfall, while claiming that they wish to save us.

In all this vast clamour, I was glad (albeit surprised) to find, tucked away among the four "Aims" of an association in Bromley, one clause which seemed to show that its organisers actually saw what was really going on behind the smoke-screen of a war which is *supposed* to be "against Hitlerist Germany, against totalitarian dictatorships, against military despotism, and for democracy." This clause, I say, seemed to prove that in Bromley somebody perceived that the War Effort of very many people, in this country and outside it, is not directed against these things, but against this island and its future. I mean, Clause Number Three, which sets out as the third aim of this Bromley Association, "The retention of complete sovereignty for the British Isles and the Empire, and the maintenance of strong armed forces under the complete control of our own nation as a post-war policy." I read this with astonished satisfaction, and in the faint hope that what Bromley sees to-day, the British Island may yet perceive to-morrow.

For it is time that those who love this island should awaken to the fact that the war, gradually and stealthily, is being turned into the opposite of the war which began in 1939, and that this must inevitably make of it, in the final outcome, a war against this country, the Empire, and the freedom which was born here. People become so much the slaves of the sifted, distilled and flavoured information which is served to them by Ministry of Information, radio and Press, that they do not see even that which happens beneath their noses. If they did, they would remember that the abandonment of Czechoslovakia, in 1939, though they were told that it did not concern them and could be perpetrated without ill-consequences to themselves, immediately brought down a second world war on them. If they remembered that, they would look with different feelings at the picture which the war now offers to them, a picture entirely unrecognisable in the light of the pledges and noble words which were uttered in September 1939.

Is it a war against "Hitlerism"? Then why are the penalties of defeat (the annexation of territory) to be visited first upon

the first country which resisted Hitler, the country which has resisted Hitler longest: Poland? Is it a war against "aggression"? Then why are similar penalties threatened against a country which resisted *two* aggressions, and at the first was promised British succour: Finland? Is it a war "for the rights of small nations"? Then why are British arms being supplied to the domestic enemies of the Kings of Yugoslavia and Greece, who roused and rallied their peoples to fight at our side? Why are British arms being used, not to "liberate" Poland, but to transfer Polish territory from one foreign conqueror to another? Why do our leading statesmen agree, at Moscow, that Germany's invasion of Austria, in 1938, is null and void, if Russia's invasion of Poland, in 1939, is to hold good?

There is no end to these questions: these are only a few of those which can be asked. They are enough to show that the war is losing resemblance to the war which was begun in 1939 as one against all "aggression," against Hitlerism, against *any* totalitarian dictatorship. It is leading to new conquests, to new enslavements, not to the liberation of those who fought at our side. New aggressions are being declared respectable, while we still lift holy hands in horror at the old ones.

General Giraud, who by a most heroic escape from Germany, and a hazardous voyage to Africa, made possible our only land triumph in this war (the reconquest of North Africa and the expulsion of our enemy from one Continent) has been sacked like a defaulting office boy: not he, but men whose names are as unfamiliar to us as their aims are obscure, will now direct the use of those vast quantities of British arms which are being supplied to the aspiring rulers of to-morrow's France. Why? What goes on behind this scene, and to what end is the British taxpayers' money being put, without any word to him?

As a result of the encouragement given, in our Government-supervised Press, to the enemies of the King of Greece, there has been a Communist mutiny (on the eve of invasion!) in the British-supplied ships of the Greek Navy, which had to be put down by ships of the *British* Navy, and by loyal Greeks, at cost of life. Why? What interest of ours is served by supporting the forces of subversion and sabotage?

The King of Yugoslavia (whose enthronement in the face of a German invasion in 1941 was one of the greatest examples

of popular acclamation in history) has to announce sadly, in London, that not enough arms to equip even one battalion have been sent by us to the army, now ragged, barefoot, deserted and almost desperate, which he brought to our side in 1941; but unstinted supplies of arms (and even the means to form an Air Force in Egypt) are being sent by us to his enemies, who wear the Communist Red Star. Why? What interest of ours is served by this abhorrent act of betrayal, committed without any word of explanation to the people of this country?

M. Benes of Czechoslovakia, who resigned the Presidency in 1938, in response to irresistible public demand, when the Agreement of Munich revealed to the Czechs the complete collapse of his policy, has now re-elected himself President, without any reference to his people, and is recognised as the head of his State by our Government. But the Kings of Greece and Yugoslavia, whose restoration (in the one case) and enthronement (in the other) were the most convincing proofs of popular loyalty ever given to two Kings, are told by us (their friends and allies) that they must submit themselves to a public referendum when victory is won; they, that is (and not our enemies) must accept the penalties of defeat!

The picture of the war in 1944, as I have thus sketched it in broad outline, is so crazily different from the picture of the war which began in 1939, that it is unrecognisable. But one thing is obvious; if the war can be turned into its opposite before our very eyes, while it is still in progress, then the prospect of any of the noble ideals for which it was ostensibly begun being realised, is small. At this rate, it is clear that if a Communist dictatorship were to arise in Germany tomorrow, one indistinguishable from the Nazi dictatorship in anything but name, many of our newspapers (if not all) and a large proportion of our Members of Parliament, would promptly cry that Germany (being now *"democratic"*!) must have the second half of Poland (Russia having annexed the first), Austria, and so on.

But when such monstrous somersaults and right-about-turns can be performed, without protest from an apathetic public opinion, in the midst of the very war itself, those who care about their country will do well to try and find out what is being brewed for Britain in all this confusion.

What is the *ultimate* aim of it all, what is really being planned or plotted? When such things are happening

to our *friends*, not to our enemies, in the heat of war, those who remember the years before the war, and the way each new aggression (though we strove to ignore them) led to and aggravated our own misfortunes, will realise that the time is come to look out for new threats to and attacks on ourselves. Who is really to be overthrown by this war? "Under cover of war" (to quote a phrase which more and more people should study) things may and can be done which would be quite inconceivable in peace. What is being brewed for the British people in all this chaotic tumult?

One of the most alarming and sinister pieces of evidence which I have found as I study the pandemoniac debate is the popularity of the phrase which was thrown into currency, about the time this war began: "The surrender of national sovereignty." Since the rise of the great modern instruments of misinformation and delusion, the Press and radio, people have become fantastically susceptible to phrase-hypnotism. A few resounding words, strung together, will set them cavorting madly, like any dancing dervishes. The words may be meaningless, in which case no great harm is done. But they may be of the most sinister purport; nevertheless, the gullible will grab for the bottle of poison which is offered to them as a medicine to cure all ills. This is the case with the phrase: "The abolition of national sovereignty." Only in a world gone quite mad could people be induced to seize a bottle plainly *marked* Poison, and drink it as medicine. Yet this is what they do, those who rise to the glad cry of "Abolish national sovereignty," for the words are clear, and their meaning becomes plain at the slightest examination.

They mean that, when we have won victory on the battlefield, we should accept the greatest penalty of defeat; we should hand over control of our vital affairs to some anonymous body (something rather like the Bank of England, but international and supra-national; the Bank only took our golden sovereign, the new World Court, or whatever it would be called, would take the last of our sovereignty, namely, our right to defend ourselves and the means to do so).

It is incredible, even in these times, that any should allow their enthusiasm to be aroused for such a suicidal end. In everyday life, men are only deprived of control over their affairs when they have been certified insane or bankrupt;

this proposal means that we should be treated, and even ask to be treated, as insolvents or idiots, at the moment of victory!

When we have sacrificed enough life, liberty and treasure to gain victory in the fighting, are we to *request* that, as the first-fruits of our victory, others shall take our last liberty from us: the liberty to fight, if need be? Shall we, by this means (when our men have defeated the enemy) achieve what Hitler could have achieved in 1940 if he had known a way to drain the Channel dry, or to destroy our Air Force: our own defencelessness? Shall we, by this means (when our sailors, soldiers and airmen have won the war) inflict on ourselves that which has been known as the supreme penalty of defeat since the world began: the surrender of our arms and our citadel, the acceptance of tutelage and slavery?

Shall we, indeed (by handing over our National Sovereignty to some anonymous tribunal when our fighting-men have overcome the foe) put ourselves even further back than we were in 1939, when this war overtly began, and make quite certain that such of our island freedom and our imperial unity as remains to us from this war, will be destroyed in another that will very soon be begun against us?

If there are any who try to see what actually goes on "under cover of the war," they should reflect that this war was not made in Germany alone. It was made also by the two greatest political parties in this country, the one of which supported "reconstruction loans for Germany" (these were used to make Germany strong in arms), while the other clamoured for "disarmament" (which achieved the weakness of this country). A strong Germany; a weak Britain; these were the main ingredients of this war, the British share in which the same two parties have now joined in coalition to conduct. From Peace Effort to War Effort; such is their record.

Who inspire and control such parties, we may not know, any more than we may know what men make the decisions of the Bank of England. But we know what they did, and may well fear what they will do again. They would find it difficult, however, to arouse the enthusiasm of the British people, after this war, either for loans (to make Germany strong in arms) or for disarmament (to make Britain weak). How, then, could the same end be reached?

Why, by the surrender of National Sovereignty! That would produce the same result at a stroke of the pen. Britain's weakness. Britain would have arms, yes, but not the power of command over them. Britain would be unready, defenceless; a bridge over the Channel would have been built.

The British people, clamouring in the moment of their triumph, "Give us, oh, give us, the Abolition of National Sovereignty!" would have reached out greedy hands for the immemorial penalties of defeat!

What a farce it is, and how gruesome, that patriotic and adult British islanders can be hoodwinked by the use of a few words of more than one syllable.

Those who have patiently followed me thus far, will discern that I loathe and deeply distrust all clamour for the Abolition of National Sovereignty; that I see behind it the prompting of those who desire, not the destruction of Hitler, or Hitlerism, or Germany, or German militarism, or dictatorship, or totalitarianism, but the subjugation of the British island and its people and the disruption of its Empire; and that I was extremely glad to find, even in so limited a locality as Bromley, a clear perception of the most evil nigger who lurks behind this woodpile.

I would demolish those who would abolish our national sovereignty; and I hope that a few who read this will do likewise when next they hear such treacherous words.

DOUGLAS REED.

APRIL 23, 1944.

Author of "Lest We Regret," published by Jonathan Cape, 1943, 12s. 6d., latest of a cycle of remarkably outspoken books, including "Insanity Fair," "Disgrace Abounding," "All Our Tomorrows" and "A Prophet at Home." These books deal with the most urgent problems of today—the vital need to awaken the British Public to the fact that the control of policy is rapidly passing entirely beyond their grasp, and when lost can never return. Too few have responded to avert the second world war. Yet there are now welcome signs that the will of the people is stirring, and when once awake will not fail through weakness. But correct information is needed all along the line. The "NeVer Again" Association sincerely thanks Mr. Reed and welcomes his generous assistance towards this end.

PERSONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND EDUCATION

By ERIC KEMPSON
late Head, Dartmouth Naval College

THE LIMITED SPACE OF THIS ARTICLE PREVENTS ME DOING more than indicate where the roots of our educational problem are and what are the first things to be done. I assume our readers have read the Norwood Report and the White Paper.

Education to-day is a process of selection and re-selection. The better your brains, the longer the tighter are you tied to books and the more strictly are you barred from making or doing anything. You have classes in 'appreciation' taught mostly by people who don't know good work from bad, you play at manual hobbies as relaxation from the serious study of text-books. You never learn the meaning of good work, and though you may later come to direct and administer the work of others, you will be quite unfit to do it. Small wonder that the rise of this 'education' has been contemporary with the fall of pretty well every art and craft known to man. This system, if it goes on, will fix us in two classes; the class of administrators, teachers, government officials, men chosen for their native ability, overstuffed with text-books and starved of all practical knowledge; and the worker class, those who are left over, knowing enough to despise their directors' incapacity but unable to take over the direction. The end of this system is bad work and bad direction.

Education to-morrow is to go on full-time for all to the end of the Secondary School period, which means to 18 in the Secondary Grammar Schools, to 16 in the Secondary Technical and Modern Schools. All eyes will be on the Secondary Grammar School, for this is to be the gateway to the Universities, and they in turn the gateway to professional, administrative and business advancement. The Secondary Grammar School will hold first place in public esteem and in the esteem of the Primary School teachers (themselves Grammar School taught), who will have the chief say in the selection of pupils to enter the Secondary Grammar Schools. So the Secondary Grammar School will be the chief factor in determining the character of the whole course from six years upwards.

The ninth recommendation of the Norwood Report is that the School Certificate Examination (by which up to now the

Universities have kept a stranglehold on the Secondary Grammar Schools) shall be conducted by the teachers at the schools on syllabuses and papers framed by themselves. This looks like freedom! True, the schools are to serve seven more years for the promised freedom, but when it comes the way will be open for revolution. The Norwood Committee saw this; so having offered freedom with one hand they take it away with the other, for by their 12th recommendation they provide a School Leaving Examination at 18 (i.e., for all Secondary Grammar School pupils), to be conducted by the University. The stranglehold is merely to be shifted from the body to the neck.

So the School Leaving Examination is to become the gateway to the learned professions, to the higher administrative and business posts, and to the civil service. It will be for this reason, not because they desire learning for its own sake (as the Norwood Committee profess to believe) that parents and pupils and Primary School teachers will esteem the Grammar School first.

The Norwood Committee, all ultra-academic, intend that the best brains of this country shall be kept to a strictly academic course, and they make fitness for an academic course the test of best brains! Those who are (academically) second and third-rate are to go to Secondary Technical and Modern Schools.

What the Norwood Committee do *not* realise is the extreme poverty of the so-called intellectual mind whose education comes solely from books and mainly from text-books. To put practical arts and crafts in a position of dignity and equality with other subjects is essential if our best brains are to grow to full strength.

There is a good deal of talk about raising the status of the school teacher—more money, less work, more holidays, etc. The one thing which must be done if school teachers are to have their own and others' respect is to put the control of the schools into the hands of the schools.

At present the control is in the hands of the Board of Education, Inspectors, Education Committees, Directors of Education, Universities, Training Colleges; and to these must soon be added, if they get their way, the Trade Unions.

It should not be the function of the Board, of Education Committees, or Directors of Education to run the schools, but rather to make it as easy as possible for the schools to run themselves. Universities are pretty free to mind their

own business and had better not butt in on that of the schools. Inspectors can be useful when they come to schools by invitation, and can speak freely without the hampering fear that their advice may be looked on as compulsory. The schools should train their own teachers. Trade Unions have shown no interest whatever in good workmanship, and had better stick to their job of securing less work and more pay for their members.

Unless and until the Schools *do* manage their own affairs schoolmasters and mistresses will not be respected by themselves or anyone else, nor will many of the best sort of men and women enter the teaching profession.

To sum up:—

First the Schools must be set free.

Many, perhaps most, will not use this freedom, preferring to jog along the old academic text-book grind. "Let the dead bury their dead."

Some will respond and will try experiments in which real skill in arts and crafts will grow along with literary, scientific and mathematical abilities.

Some will fail, but their failures will help towards the general growth, and they can begin again.

Some will succeed and will lay the foundations of a new learning.

ERIC KEMPSON.

Mr. Eric Kempson, the contributor of "Personal Sovereignty and Education," was formerly Headmaster of Dartmouth Naval College, and H.M. Inspector of Secondary Schools. Mr. Kempson has also held the position of Assistant Master at Rugby.

SHADOWS WE IGNORED

By B. M. PALMER

THE FOUR AIMS OF THE "NEVER AGAIN" ASSOCIATION HAVE met with varied criticism. There is the man who says: "Yes, of course, we all want victory and freedom from 'aggression,' but surely what we want can be most readily secured by a scheme for World Federation." The man who says that has, in general, paid no serious attention to our third and fourth points. For, if he had done so, he would have seen clearly that they cut right across Federal Unionism.

What is this Federal Unionism, concerning which, at the moment, we are hearing a little less than usual?

Some weeks ago, in an address given in Bromley, Mr. F. S. Sheridan told us what we may expect should we consent, as a nation, to support and eventually to form a member of this organisation for world union. The dominating note of his address was that wars are made by nations, and therefore the best way to abolish war is to abolish nations. He thought the League of Nations failed because delegates to the Assembly were too enthusiastic about their own national point of view. The British supported British interests, and the French had their own nation's well-being close to their hearts. This, according to Mr. Sheridan, was all wrong. Delegates should be elected "by a general vote of the peoples."

This means, presumably, that some sort of party system would supersede national interests. No longer would Mr. Thomas Brown represent the English. Instead, we should have Ivan Ivanovitch putting up on a programme, say, of "liquid labour," and representing a mixed fry, consisting of Sandy Macduff, Hans Glover, and Jacques Bonhomme. We don't know how the B.B.C. would get over the language difficulty, though no doubt among the large staff of foreign experts whom they retain, there are plans already prepared for such an eventuality. As for the size of the card vote, well, a mere quarter of a million in these days, what is that?

We have often noticed that the bigger things are, the better; wars, for instance, or taxation.

Mr. Sheridan said that under Federal Union each nation would relinquish all control over its own armaments, currency, tariffs, colonies, social welfare, and "migration." These small matters aside, every nation would be "free" to develop its own national life.

Take a good look at that list. What *is* the life of a nation? Surely it involves a certain measure of resonsibility, just as no man can properly be called a free man unless he has some control over his powers to feel, think, and act. But we may console ourselves with the reflection that, if there were any nations still in existence, no one would interfere with their folk dances, or fashions, under the arrangements advocated by Mr. Sheridan.

It provides a certain amount of relief to our feelings to be flippant about these things, provided that we do not for one moment create the impression that we do not consider them of the most vital importance. The spheres of action over which we are to relinquish all control cover the most vital aspects of British culture. We are not among those who underestimate its value; we consider that its loss would be a world disaster. The best traditions of the British army and navy have been built up in the past on the principle of the voluntary system; though for the time being this may be in abeyance, there is little doubt that in time we shall come to see that it is the way that suits us best. Our way of dealing with our colonies and Empire, though not immune from criticism, has hitherto been the soundest in the history of civilisation. What of our educational system? And there is another word on the list, which must not be overlooked. "Migration." The only meaning that can be attached to our surrender of control in this matter is almost fantastic in its implications. *We should have no control over the immigration of aliens into our territory, or the emigration of our own nationals.*

The point of view put forward by Mr. Sheridan was widely advertised in 1939 and 1940, after the publication of Clarence Kirshman Streit's book: "Union Now," when strenuous efforts were made by the organisation known as "Federal Union," largely financed by American money, to get the British public to support this scheme. The sound common sense of the nation refused to be entirely deceived, and "Federal Union" as such steadily lost ground. But we should be making a grave mistake to imagine that the idea has been abandoned by those who wish to undermine and finally to destroy British National Sovereignty. They will adopt other means to get their way. On November 15, 1943, there was an unsigned article in the *Daily Mirror* suggesting that one of the terms of the coming armistice should be: "Germany

to keep on manufacturing armaments under United Nations Guard, and deliver them to an International Police Force."

The terrible dangers lurking in such a scheme must be apparent to anyone who faces facts. Who is to control the Police Force? It is difficult enough to run our own borough satisfactorily, when the Councillors live on the spot, and we can see and speak to them and even vote against them with some prospect that in a fairly small area our vote will carry some weight. What possible control could we have over our own destinies with delegates hundreds of miles away, and representing perhaps a quarter of a million people apiece? Machinery exists in this country whereby individual electors may band themselves together and present a demand at the bar of the House of Commons, although the four million old-age pensioners who recently attempted to avail themselves of this right were told it had "fallen into abeyance"—but that right may be revived if we wish. It is not generally known that no means exist by which private individuals may bring any matter before the League of Nations. This may be done by Government delegates alone.

Who is to control this International Police Force advocated by the *Daily Mirror* and other sections of the Press? Suppose it to come under the power of some super-Hitler, himself the tool of power-maniacs working behind the scenes?

A study of the list of shareholders of the *Daily Mirror* is most instructive. It was supplied to the House of Commons by the Home Secretary, in answer to a Question, on April 16, 1942, and shows that of the big shareholders (those holding 1,245,000 ordinary shares in batches of 15,000 or more), more than half (holding 763,000 shares) conceal their identity behind such pseudonyms as "C.O.Nominees, Ltd." A very large share in the control of this newspaper, therefore (if not the preponderant control) is held by persons who remain secret and anonymous; and the newspaper currently and habitually gives publicity to (and frequently recommends) courses and policies of the gravest importance to every individual inhabitant of this island.

The mystery surrounding the control of the *Daily Mirror* aroused some comment in the years before the present war was thrust upon us. In October, 1938, the *Evening Standard* columnist, writing on "anonymity," remarked:—

"Where a newspaper, however, is concerned, this system of anonymous shareholding is open to objection. The public

should be able to ascertain—especially in times of national crisis—who is the chief proprietor of every newspaper."

Although they have found many well-meaning and idealistic people to support them, we do not hesitate to express our firm conviction that all schemes for world federation and international police forces have their origin in interests which are inimical to this country, to the British Empire, and to the exercise of the sanctions of democracy, which, properly understood, is one of the main contributions made by the British people to world culture. And we are determined that anonymity must go.

This Association states as a fundamental that the armed forces of the Crown exist in order that the will of the people shall prevail. Until this principle is thoroughly understood and acted upon, not only in our own country, but throughout the world, no world leagues can possibly improve the situation. We do not say that a League of Free Peoples is not possible; but we do say that it lies nearer the end of the road than the beginning.

It is as true as ever that a *strong* and *enlightened* Britain can save herself by her exertions, and the world by her example.

For the above considerations, which are the logical outcome of the aims of our Association, and which it has been necessary to set out at some length, Herr Leopold Schwarzschild's recent book, "World in Trance," may be recommended to our readers. It is a straightforward account, quite uncoloured by "internationalist" propaganda, of the major political events in Europe between the two wars.

Such a book is rare.

Herr Schwarzschild left Germany in 1933 to establish the review *Das Neue Tagebuch* in Paris. Month after month he gave warning of German rearmament, and pointed out the frivolity of the idealism which believed, or pretended to believe, that a mere wish for peace, or a solemn declaration outlawing war, could save Europe from a second agony. He gave warning that the Prussian General Staff had continued to exist under cover ever since November 11, 1918; that it would soon be stronger than ever; that the militarists had been biding their time for twenty years, and had never once relaxed in their determination to wipe out the Armistice by a complete and final conquest of Europe as a preliminary to world dictatorship.

Do the British people understand this clearly even to-day? Do they realise that Hitler was the pupil of Ludendorf? One of a line of militarists trained for the sole purpose of waging war for at least two hundred years? And most of our British statesmen have been distinguished, for the last twenty years, by their apparent failure to see what was coming, let alone making any attempts to save us.

Trouble began immediately after the signing of the Armistice, when that abstractionist and dreamer, President Wilson, made a deliberate move to destroy the balance of power in Europe, and substitute for it a League of Nations armed only with moral precepts. The French were more realistic. They knew that disarmament was "ersatz." The only effective way, they said, to curb German military power, was to decentralise the German Empire. Clemenceau fought savagely at the Peace Conference for the retention of an effective sanction for the Allies. He wanted to amputate from the Reich all the territories on the left bank of the Rhine. And the Rhineland was quite willing to leave the Reich, even expected the change. Clemenceau failed. Labour, Liberals and the new Bolshevik Government opposed him. The same political powers have always opposed decentralisation, no matter in what sphere.

Herr Schwarzschild tells the grim story of the "entrancement" of England during the next twenty years. The keynote was given when Mr. Lloyd George said: "The official British point of view is that the German nation was not responsible for the war, that the Junkers have been ejected, that the German government should be supported . . . and, that generally, the Germans should not be regarded with suspicion."

This was in 1920.

In 1923 and '24 the German government deliberately encouraged the inflation of the mark in order to sabotage the reparations payments. An incidental effect was completely to ruin the economically independent classes in Germany, and to assist the social establishment of war profiteers and black marketeers. When the inflation had gone far enough, the government called in the banker, Dr. Schacht, "the most oleaginous scoundrel I ever knew" (Lord Vansittart), and the mark was stabilised within a few weeks.

Poincaré, the "insultingly incorruptible," the man who could have saved France in 1924, was turned out by Leftist propaganda, and after General Charles G. Dawes and Owen D. Young had published their findings, the Americans sent Mr. Hughes from Washington to persuade M. Herriot, the new

French premier, to evacuate the Ruhr. From that time on France's rôle as a great power came to an end.

We agree with Herr Schwarzschild that it was the deliberate exploitation by propagandists of the passionate desire to find the world beautiful at any price, and to avoid all unpleasantness that came near to ruin England. Meanwhile, in the five years after Locarno, every new German issue went more quickly than hot cakes in London, Paris, Amsterdam, and particularly New York. The banks competed for German stocks, and at least £1,500,000,000 was invested in them. The pound was raised abroad, and the machine tools, plant and equipment which the Germans bought were used for the systematic modernisation, expansion and "americanisation" of German industry. With its help Hitler would re-arm and wage war against the citizens of those countries whose financial "experts" were responsible for this programme for the second world war. For this is what it amounted to. The members of this Association are of the opinion that those who encouraged these German investments knew very well what was likely to happen, and should be held responsible for the consequences. Among them are public men in England, France, and U.S.A. . . . An omission from Herr Scharzschild's otherwise excellent book is of all mention of the names of those responsible for financial policy; such people as the brother bankers, Max Warburg, who was a close associate of the Kaiser, and Paul Warburg, the director of Kuhn, Loeb and Co., one of the leading financial houses of the United States, who continued to hold their posts on opposite sides during the First World War, exerted their influence during the making of the treaty of Versailles, and were active during the post-war period.

It is a pitiful story, that of the British Armament Busters, Ramsay Macdonald and Arthur Henderson. "Both seriously believed that the best way of securing world peace was to turn as many battleships into scrap as possible." And in the pillory beside them should stand Baldwin (now rewarded for his services with an Earldom), who, in order to win an election stooped to oppose Labour with its own fantastic "Peace" propaganda. After 1934 the outbreak of war was only a question of dates. Yet Britain remained unarmed. By how small a margin we were saved in 1941 most of us will never know.

It may not be long now before the "cease fire" in Europe. In the Association's second object we have said that we will oppose the entering into any pact or the signing of any treaty

with any German government until the German people have proved that they can and will behave as good neighbours.

What does this mean?

It means that "compulsory vows are worthless." Whatever terms are signed by a defeated enemy will not be kept unless the victors are strong enough to see that they are kept. Compulsory vows "can never last longer than the compulsion. If one is able to exert this compulsion only for what, in history, amounts to a fraction of a second, the enterprise is not worth while. . . .

"Never again must we succumb to the myth that power and armaments and compulsion are of themselves sinful and evil as such. They can be the opposite as well. All order, all civilisation, all law and dignity rest on the existence of weapons and power. . . . The preservation of peace consists in securing our house from external attacks. . . . Social progress does not insure mankind against new wars. . . . The prospects of ever creating a reliable league of sovereign states are as good as non-existent. . . . The voice of twenty years warns us that in the business of enforcing peace and order there is no substitute for our own will and our own power."

These words appear in the closing pages of "World in Trance."

They deserve careful consideration.

This Association is opposed to the farce of asking the Germans to sign their agreement to a Peace Treaty. Terms must be dictated and enforced. Agreements can only be considered between free and trusted allies, each strong enough to defend their own sovereignty, and to maintain the balance of power.

Facts must be faced. It will be many years before the Germans can take their place as a respected sovereign power, and until that day comes, Britain's path is clear. If she fails yet a second time, she will drag the whole civilised world in her downfall.

B. M. PALMER.

APRIL 13, 1944.

"World in Trance," by Leopold Schwarzschild, price 12s. 6d., published by Hamish Hamilton, London.

PUBLISHERS' NOTE

CERTAIN DEFINITE CONSIDERATIONS LED US TO MAKE THIS selection from among the contributions we received for our first booklet. We have reached the position in which little open opposition is encountered in regard to our first two aims, since most British people believe that provided there is no slackening in effort military victory in the present phase of the World War is reasonably secure for the Allies. It is hoped that by this time they also recognise the futility of a negotiated peace. It is, unfortunately, apparent that the meaning of our third aim is not only far from understood, but in some quarters it is even regarded as being undesirable that we should exert control over our own destiny as a nation.

"Sovereignty" is an all-embracing term, and "National Sovereignty" is indivisible. It concerns every aspect of every individual life from the cradle to the grave. Properly understood, a "Sovereign Nation" must be composed of individuals who are in process of increasing their own sovereignty, or it becomes a meaningless term.

Thus while our leading article deals with the vital need to world peace of a Sovereign Britain in full control of her own affairs, it is fitting that it should also be clearly demonstrated that the personal sovereignty of individuals cannot be maintained under a faulty system of education; and thirdly, that no sovereignty can be exercised without the correct use on the part of individual electors of such sanctions as are his or hers by inalienable right.

These are the considerations which led to our first selection. Before the short series of booklets is complete, we hope to cover in outline the remainder of the field.

ANYONE interested in this booklet and desiring further information see below,

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The "NeVer Again" Association says :

"V" *for Vigilance after Victory*

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All enquiries concerning Membership to :

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THE MAN WHO SET AMERICA TO MUSIC



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

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Raymond Nathan

The Demobilizing of Ideas

Leopold Schwarzschild

Full Employment and the Atom

Abba P. Lerner

BEGINNING A SERIES ON RADIO NEWS COMMENTATORS:

★ America's Sixty Voices

Norbert Muhlen

b23

THE DEMOBILIZING OF IDEAS

By LEOPOLD SCHWARZSCHILD

IT IS NOT LIKELY that widespread military demobilization will follow the end of the war in Europe. However, a fair amount of intellectual demobilization will fortunately be possible at once. There will be no need for some of our intellectual war production. In fact, some of it has lost all plausible justification even now. May we indulge in fantasy and imagine what the historians of, let us say, 1990 A.D. will write about the intellectual demobilization or reconversion of 1945 A.D.?

It would be good if they could write that the first concepts to be discarded were those of *anti-fascist* and *anti-nazi.* The historians of 1990 will see more clearly than we do; they will not overlook the fact that these were the first concepts which public opinion no longer considered useful.

As good teachers, the historians of 1990 will not fail to criticize the characterization of an eminently positive cause by a negative term. A man, they will say, is a Catholic or a Presbyterian, not an anti-atheist. His productive motive forces are forces "for," not "against."

The American, Russian and British armies were in a coalition against the same enemy, yet no attempt was made to replace the American, Russian and British flags by a synthetic *anti-fascist* flag. Such an exchange would have resulted in the replacement of powerful symbols by a much weaker symbol. Nor was there really any need for a synthetic political flag. The best way for a democrat to fight in the political coalition against Hitler was to fight for his democracy; a conservative, for his conservatism; a socialist, for his socialism and a religious man, for his religion.

Furthermore, the chronicles will relate, the artificially uniform concept led to the development of an artificially uniform morality. Moral rules for good *anti-fascists* were invented. They were morally bound to praise and morally forbidden to disapprove this or that. They were supposed to forget, for instance, that they had become *anti-fascist* under the influence of their liberal or conservative consciences; once *anti-fascist* they were expected to put their liberal or conservative consciences into storage.

A supreme *anti-fascist* authority set itself up and, invisible, but eminently active, decreed what kind of ideas were allowed and what kind were forbidden. Those who disobeyed were dishonored, branded as "splitters" and traitors. And this terrorism was effective. The fear of being branded a splitter or a traitor intimidated people. Certain principles and opinions were carefully hidden, although to defend them in a changing world was more necessary than ever before.

The terrorist morality that was distilled from the concept of *anti-fascism* actually led to the loss of "freedom of speech," one of the declared objectives of this war, in a large area of very important problems. As a result, there was sad confusion in men's minds and, what is worse, unfortunate events took place.

But one day, the historians will relate, public opinion was struck by the fact that *fascism* had lost three quarters of its physical, and thereby also its spiritual, power. Gone with the agony of the real nazism was the remotest logical justification for an intellectually uniform, regimented, synthetic anti-nazism. The various tendencies of the coalition again insisted upon thinking and speaking each in its own manner, according to its own conscience. They rebelled against the fetters of dictated monocratic *anti-fascist* morality. All the attempts to keep them in the same fetters under various pretexts foundered against general opposition. The reconversion of the uniform *anti-fascist* morality into diverse democratic, conservative, religious, and humanistic moralities took place rapidly to the relief of all concerned. Surely the chronicles will relate this—or will they?

WHAT ELSE WILL they relate? To our wide-ranging fantasy it seems inescapable that this rapid demobilization will engulf another idea. It came from France, and for some time was even more successful in the world than French perfumes and wines had ever been. This was the concept of *collaborationism,* a quite serious matter!

With respect to *collaborationism,* our future historians will state with especial emphasis that the demobilization had begun even before the end of the war. Barely six months after the Germans had been driven out the French themselves—both the government and the people—began to throw the war product of *collaborationism* on the junk pile, at least 90 per cent of it. Whether they did this because of a praiseworthy instinct for truth or because they still had in their blood their experience with the *rasoir national,* Robespierre's raging guillotine, the fact is that the French soon realized (1) that during the occupation almost every Frenchman had *collaborated,* and (2) that the essence of any defeat is precisely this compulsion to *collaborate.*

No historian of the future will differentiate between the miner who extracted coal for the Germans in M. Peyerimoff's mines, and his boss. Both collaborated, and both did it under the same compulsion: in order to avoid losing their lives or liberty by execution, imprisonment or starvation. The peasant who delivered grain collaborated. The railroadmen who kept the trains going collaborated. The typesetters on the newspapers, the workers in the paper factories, the copy-readers, the telegraphists, the newsboys—all collaborated.

Only a very small minority resolved to resist, above and beyond the call of duty. But on the whole, even these heroes were compelled to pay for every hour of resistance with a hundred hours of collaboration. And obviously this very resistance of the relatively few was possible only on the basis of the collaboration of the many. Obviously resistance could only be practiced in a land from which the terrorist oppressor drew enough advantage to make it worth his while to refrain from unbridled savagery and to spare that land from total destruction, murder and starvation.

Towards the end of the war, the implications of large-scale non-collaboration under effective enemy occupation were tragically demonstrated in one European country. During the unsuccessful Arnhem operation the Dutch railroadmen, in answer to an appeal from Allied Headquarters, unanimously quit their jobs. The Germans revenged themselves by preventing the trains from ever running again. As a result, not only gas and electricity vanished, not only heating, lighting and cooking became a thing of the past, but all transports of food were stopped. From the fall of 1944 until the end of the war the population of the large cities could live only on the few crumbs that were brought in on pushcarts from the immediate vicinity: a few leaves of cabbage and a potato, at best one slice of bread, per day.

The resulting catastrophe had no parallel even in this barbarous war. The inhabitants of Amsterdam and Rotterdam became ghosts. They hardly had the strength to walk. Huge numbers of them died. It is quite certain that the end of this one aspect of collaboration destroyed even the remotest possibility of any useful future resistance. The bare physical survival of half the population of Holland became doubtful.

Yes, when a nation is effectively defeated and occupied it is confronted with the choice between survival by obedience and death by rebellion. And the historians of 1990 will insist that in such situations, from time immemorial, every individual has had the recognized right to choose survival, and that this choice has always been the normal one. Thus the French behaved when Hitler occupied their country, and thus the Germans behaved when Napoleon occupied theirs. Some individuals chose a more heroic course of action. But the overwhelming majority did not, and never was the normal choice considered a crime.

There are certain inalienable rights of the individual—some call them their fundamental natural rights. Even the soldier has the right to recall his existence as an individual in completely hopeless situations, to think of his own chances of survival and to surrender. The civilian has the same inalienable natural right.

Civilization is characterized by its respect for the fundamental natural rights of the individual. Is it not clear that future generations will condemn our epoch as one of relapse into barbarism? And will they not do so for the very reason that in all countries respect for the inalienable rights of the individual became defective, although of course in very different degrees?

1st Lt. Rudolph C. Von Ripper, CE. Courtesy War Department

Therefore the French will be credited with having been the first to draw a sharp line between *collaboration* and other kinds of activity. Different from collaboration after defeat were, of course, those traitorous activities that perhaps caused the defeat; and different too the case of those who, far from stopping at the absolutely inevitable collaboration, worked for the Germans with frantic zeal of their own free will. Crushing indictments were drawn up against Laval, Darnand and their like, and a number of crushing sentences were passed—so will the future chronicles relate.

But French public opinion soon refused to accept the noisy slogan of *collaborationism* as meaning all actions. It became definitely hostile to those who tried to exploit this slogan in order to gratify their political, social or even sexual resentments. A wave of popular disgust deterred those who had set out to deprive of their property and position tens and hundreds of thousands of people whose only crime was that they exerted their natural right to survive.

In the year 1990 the fact that in other countries there was a less happy period will no longer be passed over in silence. Repulsive things took place in a number of liberated countries. There the term *collaborationist* occasionally sufficed as a justification for mass murders and imprisonments and for the extermination of entire classes of the population. And even in the great Allied democracies the moral reaction to these aberrations was unfortunately delayed. The historians of 1990 will not fail to point out the ease with which democratic public opinion let itself be misled for a long time by the pharisaic slogan. Only later did the natural question arise in the public conscience: "How would I myself have behaved under the same conditions?"

Finally, however, this key question did arise in everyone's mind. There is no doubt that it arose and that it had its effect. And furthermore, the advance of the Allies in Germany had an instructive influence. There the Allies *themselves* sought and demanded *collaboration.* There they hammered into the Schmidts and Mullers the fact that collaboration was not only demanded of them, but was perfectly normal, moral and decent. This destroyed the possibility of applying a different standard for the Przebiczeviczs, Szatmaris and Polopoulopolouses of Bulgaria, Hungary and Greece. The time for the reconversion of the much-abused concept of *collaborationism* had come. The concept was discharged and not even honorably—or is it possible that the future textbooks of history will tell the story differently?

WE WILL LEARN THAT still another war gadget came into discredit at about the same time. This was the gadget by means of which every individual who aroused someone else's

dislike could quickly be transformed into a *Hitlerite,* a *Fascist* or a *Nazi.*

It goes without saying that the future historians will devote a chapter to the Fascists in the democratic countries. There were some. Since the beginning of the world, power and success—in every disguise and color—have acted magnetically on minds of low taste and high corruptibility. But in 1990 there will be no question that most of the Americans, for instance, who in the yellowed newspapers of 1945 were branded as *Fascists* were actually far from being Fascists.

In 1990 it will be definitely established what constituted a Fascist or a Nazi. Fascists and Nazis were people who wanted to set up a world of complete regimentation, uniformity and state control, without any right to opposition, with total civilian espionage, without the right of habeas corpus, with absolute police; a world in which free employers would be transformed into majors and colonels of an economic army, in which production, prices and wages would be imposed from above, in which the government would have unlimited power over all the cash reserves and sources of credit and unlimited power to spend and tax. As a rule, the people who were branded Fascists were the most irreconcilable enemies of these fascist ideals; they were conservatives or good liberals in the classic meaning of this term.

Patient, scrupulous scholars will reconstruct the technical tricks by which irreconcilable enemies of fascism were misrepresented as supporters of fascism.

The most popular method, we shall read, was the utilization of sentences once uttered by Goebbels. "Is not what this gentleman has said exactly the same thing that Goebbels said a month ago? Aha!" But actually, these scholars of the future will observe, everything that could be said at that time had been said by Goebbels, everything and also its opposite. Not a single sentence could be uttered, of which the counterpart could not be discovered somewhere in Goebbels' collected works. The liar Goebbels even used the truth. At all times the art of superior lying has consisted in lying with the help of the truth—in distorting completely indisputable facts by some sort of trick. The fact that a man said something that Goebbels had said before him, never proved that he had not said something perfectly true or that he was infected by nazism.

Among all the techniques of defamation, scholars will remind us, the simplest has always been to classify a man in whatever category happens to be particularly feared or hated at the moment. If there is such a category, label the rival who bars your way with its name without any scruples whatsoever. This technique was naturally always most effective when applied against little known people. Thus in Bulgaria a man was branded a *Fascist*—and who in America knew that all his life he had been a stubborn and militant liberal? He was arrested, deported, liquidated as a *Fascist*—and who in America would dirty his hands by defending a Fascist? The effect of this magic word was somewhat less sure when it was hurled against a man in his own country—in a free country, naturally—a man whose record could be checked.

Unfortunately, the technicians of defamation have an important advantage in that few people take the pains to check the records. Voltaire once said: "If tomorrow I am accused of having stolen the towers of Notre Dame, the first thing I will do is to flee from France." And the Romans said: "Audacter calumniare, semper aliquid haeret"—"Slander boldly, something always sticks."

But everything comes to an end. In order for the invention of pseudo-Fascists to be a lucrative political trade, powerful and dangerous genuine Fascists had to exist. In 1945, when Hitler grew gradually more impotent and helpless, the prosperity of the manufacturers of pseudo-Fascists began to decline. Public interest subsided. Besides it was hard to make anyone believe that a political personality would throw himself into the arms of a decaying corpse, of all things. There is no doubt that the historians of 1990 will say that from then on public opinion increasingly resented the mass production of pseudo-Fascists till it became utterly impossible to continue it. This production had to stop and demobilize itself—is any end other than this happy one conceivable?

Such approximately will be the first stages of the approaching intellectual reconversion. Only a little imagination is required to realize that the sharp eyes of the historians of 1990 will be absolutely unable—is it not now clear?—to state that the course of history was different from the one described here. And if anyone wanted to read further in their still unwritten books, he could read how beneficent the reconversion of 1945 was, what a cleansing of thought and action it inaugurated, what a rebirth of tolerance, decency, justice and civil peace resulted from it—or is our fantasy beginning to be too extravagant?

SIBYL

There was a woman worshipped by the light
For beauteous youth, whom the resplendent god
Promised whatever gift, and by his sight
Swore to immortalize upon a nod.

And she, grasping a fist of running sand,
"O golden lord, grant me as many years
As grains of dust I hold upon my hand!
Grant me the tongue of wisdom of the seers!"

The offended Sun in majesty withdrawn
Turned from the mortal child for evermore.
And neither ray of moon nor gleam of dawn

Lightens the shadows of Avernus' shore
Where the great crone, more hideous than wise
Sees into hell and calls our destinies.

KARL SHAPIRO

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VOL. 33 — DECEMBER, 1945 — NO. 12

Battle Royal for Union Members — Carlisle Bargeron — 21
Organized labor, like industry, has a marketing problem

Don't Make American Youth Pay Twice — Sen. Thomas C. Hart — 23
The present generation should not mortgage the next one

The Old Familiar Faces . . . Where Are They Now? — Walter Trohan — 25
Ex-New Dealers embrace the abundant life

Russia Cannot Equal American Production — Leopold Schwarzschild — 28
Red tape and paper work are top-heavy in Soviet system

The Midwest Dusts Out Its Voting Booths — Junius B. Wood — 31
Outstanding issues for '46 are already shaping up

Where Farm and Factory Meet — J. Gilbert Hill — 33
How one town gave itself the business

The Soldier Becomes a Veteran — Donn Layne — 34
A 60-year look at ex-service men's needs

Serving You Costs Him Money — Gerald Movius — 38
Your congressman has a case for higher pay

Drama Behind the Match — Lawrence Galton — 42
From lucifer to Leyte—for a light

For Sale—1,300 Plants — Edwin Ware Hullinger — 48
What to do if you want to buy a war plant

Thou Canst Not Then Be False to Any Man — Herbert M. Baus — 62
Shakespeare had a word for public relations

Why Bureaus Have Nine Lives — Lawrence Sullivan — 102
Federal bureaus change their names, but seldom die

Good Dinners Are No Accident — Florence Brobeck — 114
Business had a hand in wartime eating habits

Defense Without Militarism — Henry J. Reilly — 123
Conscription for "training," not "service," is one way

REGULAR FEATURES:

N. B. Notebook 7 — Management's Washington Letter 17
About Our Authors 133 — Capital Scenes 135

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

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RUSSIA Cannot Equal American Production

THE SOVIET'S political and social philosophies, it has been demonstrated, do not mesh with her dreams of becoming an economic rival of Uncle Sam

By LEOPOLD SCHWARZSCHILD

AS WE begin hesitatingly to take stock amidst the helter-skelter of the postwar world, certain changes are appearing which were neither desired nor expected, but which, nevertheless, will influence the shape of things to come more than many other factors.

For instance, toward the end of the war it seemed evident that the United States had become the most powerful country in the world. This has been said and written thousands of times. But now the public is learning that, almost overnight, this assumption has become questionable. It appears that at least in regard to one element of power the United States has suddenly been badly—perhaps irretrievably—outstripped.

The Soviet Union which before the war comprised 170,000,000 people suddenly confronts us as a mass of 315,000,000 people. It has openly annexed three Baltic states and portions of Finland, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Rumania. It is about to annex, by other methods, but no less irrevocably, other regions—the new Poland, the remains of Rumania and Czechoslovakia, eastern Germany, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary and several other bits which, in every internationally important respect, must now be regarded as parts of Russia. All this amounts to an increase of Russia's population by no less than 145,000,000 people. It is an increase achieved within a few months, and it exceeds the total population of the United States. And we are referring here only to European annexations and "satellites." We may soon learn that just as much has been added to Russia in Asia.

These figures do not tell the whole story. Statisticians have also drawn attention to the probable population figures of the near future. It is a fact that in Russia children are being born in great numbers, while in America, as in all well-to-do countries, the number of births is not anything like as great, and is progressively declining. The balance of cradles and graves shows that, in the course of every year, every 1,000 Russians increase to 1,016, while every 1,000 Americans, at the present rate, increase to only 1,006 and, at the rates that will prevail 25 years hence, only to 1,001. Within the next 25 years, the American population will increase to only 150,000,000, that of the Soviet Empire to roughly 430,000,000. By 1970 Russia will rule over a population approximately three times greater than that of the United States. Once again we must note: the inevitable Russian expansions in Asia are not taken into account in these figures.

More people and resources

THE military significance of these facts is obvious. More people mean more soldiers and more workers. Furthermore, Russia's increase in population is complemented by her increase in strategic territories, raw materials, factories, farm acreage, cattle, forests, hydraulic power, scientists and engineers. With regard to many factors of military might the Russian position has been strengthened. But with regard to population, it has been strengthened to a colossal extent. From now on it will be strengthened every year.

Now, the world being what it is, this inevitably implies an enormous and progressive strengthening of Russia's political position as well.

Before the war the Russian system took seven workers to make what, under our system, can be made by one

Suddenly, unexpectedly, the United States sees herself confronted with a competitor whose international weight and influence threaten to grow much greater than her own in the course of time. None of the political consequences that this fact implies for America is welcome, and several of the political perspectives are gloomy. It would be childish to gloss over this upheaval in the political structure of the world.

The question arises whether similar consequences are to be feared in the economic field, too. Is it conceivable that the United States can be demoted to a second rank power not only in the political field, but also in the industrial and commercial markets?

In 1939, Mr. Molotov, then President of the Council of People's Commissars, made a speech about the third Five Year Plan. He characterized the general goal of this plan as "catching up with, and overtaking, the United States." At that time, this goal sounded frankly ridiculous—and it was ridiculous. But is it not a serious possibility now when the ratio of the two populations is no longer 130 to 170, but 135 to 315—and will it not be even more so in the future, when the ratio has gradually been transformed to 150 to 430?

I have heard intelligent people raise this question and indulge in astonishingly pessimistic forecasts. Fortunately it can be said quite definitely that in this respect no anxiety is justified. It is just as absurd to conjure up the specter of Soviet Rus-



sia's economic preponderance, as it is childish to shut one's eyes to the specter of her political preponderance. If anything is certain in this world, it is that, even with a population three times as great as ours, Russia will not economically "overtake" this country; not in ten, or in 25 or even in 50 years.

It is clear why so many people overestimate Russia's economic potentialities at present. Her successes in the war against Germany have confused them.

Was not Germany a country of extraordinary industrial strength? Very well, then, Russian industry must have been approximately as strong. Otherwise, according to the current line of argument, she would not have been able to hold out and, in the end, to win.

Fought on despite handicaps

IT IS time to correct this completely false picture. The truth is that, in this war, Russia's industry was clearly inferior to Germany's. Once again, as has so often happened in history, it has been proved that in war even gigantic economic inferiority can be compensated by superiority of another kind.

War is not a purely industrial contest. In 1812, thanks to assets of a quite non-economic nature, the tsar defeated Napoleon who was economically far stronger.

Likewise, in the war of 1941-'45, assets of a quite non-economic nature gradually swung the balance of the scales in favor of Russia. Russia had inexhaustible masses of people; she had immense expanses of territory, an almost Arctic climate, the morale of a victim of aggression, the extraordinary capacity of her people to subsist on very little. Those were the assets which helped Russia to cancel out her tremendous economic inferiority to Germany—and later the power of the Allies was added to these.

There can be no doubt about that inferiority. American reporters saw the Russian Army enter Berlin. They were astonished to see division after division pass by, which technically seemed to belong to 1812 rather than to 1945.

Nine-tenths of the artillery was not motorized, but drawn by horses, and even oxen and cows. The transport columns were a conglomeration of primitive vehicles of all types, from peasant carts to old cabs. There was no resemblance between the equipment of these victorious divisions and the equipment of the defeated Germans, let alone the Americans.

Most decidedly, Russia's victory does not prove that the victor has attained anything remotely resembling the industrial level even of the vanquished. Far from it! And Russia's military victory does not in the least shake our conviction that she will not, within any foreseeable period, attain the amount, variety and quality of American peacetime production.

More labor needed

THE most elementary reason for this is that in Russia every manufactured article requires incomparably more labor power than in America, and that there is little prospect of fundamentally narrowing this gap. Before the war, the Russian system required an average of 700 men to produce an object which, under the American system, requires an average of 100 men. Without doubt, this prewar gap will be widened in the first postwar years. But let us regard the prewar state of affairs as that of today. Then we can express it numerically by the equation: one American worker = seven Russians.

This equation is obtained when one takes into account the production of both countries, agricultural plus industrial, before the war—when one takes into account the different size of each population—when one considers that every grown-up Russian was on some kind of pay roll, while roughly one-half of grown-up Americans were engaged in no "gainful occupation"—and when one allows for the fact that Russian working hours are longer. All these factors are included in our equation: Seven Russians were required to produce as much as one American.

The implications of this are evident. How great would Russia's population have to be to reach the volume of American production? Seven times greater than that of laboring America (which is one half of our total population) or 470,000,000. With her present 315,000,000 Russia will achieve only approximately two-thirds of America's production; with her future 430,000,000 she will still fall below it. In any event the fruits of this production will have to be distributed to twice and three times more people than in America.

The question is whether the present productivity of Russian labor will improve in the future. Well, first of all, why is it so low?

One cause is, of course, that Russia is still inadequately equipped with machines. There is no doubt that the Soviets will push on with mechanization and there is no doubt that an improvement will result. But how much improvement? So far, it has been consistently proved that a machine in Soviet Russia is not nearly as effective as the same machine in other countries.

Big factories with the most modern American equipment were built in Russia—and then they required twice, three times and four times the staff required by the same factories in America. This phenomenon was confirmed by all the experts who were able to study Russian plants. Equally confirmed is the further phenomenon that in Russia a machine goes out of order and is discarded much earlier than the same machine in a western country. It is hard to believe that the tractors with which an agricultural district had been equipped amidst great enthusiasm, three years later lay about, all of them, in repair shops; but this fact was reported in a Moscow industrial newspaper.

What all this amounts to is that the productivity of Russian labor cannot soon be brought up to the American level even by the most extensive mechanization.

Not mechanically minded

NEXT to the lack of machines, there is the incompetence of the people who operate them. This incompetence is in turn explained either by the temperament of the Russian race, which is supposedly antipathetic to western or Nordic efficiency; or by the technological inexperience of a nation which till only recently was a nation of peasants. Then the familiar illustrations are usually adduced, like that of the stopped-up wash basin in a Moscow hotel, which is tinkered at every few days by a new worker, and which nevertheless remains out of order.

I do not attach much importance to the argument of race. The Russians who two and three generations ago came in masses to America performed their tasks in the mines and factories not very differently from the immigrants of other nations. There have always been highly talented Russian scientists and technicians. But it is obvious that the more truth there is in the race argument the less likely it is that great changes will take place in the near future. National traits are stubborn. Inefficiencies deriving from the Russian national character and still present as late as

(Continued on page 110)

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Russia Cannot Equal American Production

(Continued from page 30)

1940 will hardly vanish in 1950 or 1960.

As for technological inexperience—it is late in the day for this explanation. The more modern a technique, the simpler, as a rule, are the manipulations of the workers and the easier to learn. At present enough time has passed for every Soviet Russian to learn what he had to learn. A new generation has grown up. The equation: seven Russians = one American, can no longer be basically explained by inexperience, and it is hardly likely that it will be changed to any considerable extent by the experience of the coming years.

What then forces the productivity of Russian labor so much below that of American labor? If the lack of machines only partly accounts for this fact, and the inadequacies of human nature are hardly any explanation at all, only one cause remains possible:

The system under which both men and machines work must be the main cause of the disproportion between labor and its product.

That is true in various ways.

Many excess workers

A MONSTROUS superstructure of paper work is piled on top of the real work of the factories and field. The paper work takes place in the factory itself—there is frequently one clerk for each worker, sometimes more than one. It takes place a second, third and fourth time at each next stage of the economic apparatus.

The same process takes place in the no less colossal hierarchy of the general administration. It takes place again in the party hierarchy. Paper and paper; red tape and red tape; clerks, clerks and clerks again; and police, this must not be forgotten, police everywhere in large numbers. This is an essential feature of a system which is not only dictatorial, but in which every kind of activity is initiated, directed and controlled from a single central spot. Under these circumstances an exorbitantly high percentage of unproductive labor power inevitably burdens the productive labor power.

This is not all. In such a system, there is no life and death competition, and no enterprise can ever go bankrupt. This necessarily creates the tendency to employ four and six hands for every function which could have been performed by two hands. Russia's bureaucratic apparatus is still being extended. The separation from abroad is increasingly rigorous and compulsive. The generation that still knew something about the outside world and had yardsticks for comparisons is disappearing.

One chance for efficiency

OF the three causes of the equation: seven Russians = one American, thus only one seems to some extent susceptible of weakening. The progress of mechanization will to some extent increase the productivity of labor and consequently the production *per capita*. But the people will not undergo epochal transformations, nor will the system lose its dominant characteristics. This is outside all probability and logic. Therefore it seems out of the question that the productivity of Russian labor should in our own day even approximate the level of American productivity. And America herself is not standing still.

It may be objected that we are not interested in the extent to which Russia will be able to supply her own population. What we are concerned with is her position on the world market. Even if the individual Russian remains poorly provided, Russia may go out for international trade. She can undersell our goods in foreign countries and even in this country. The amount of goods required for this can always be spared from the production of 430,000,000 people, if necessary at the expense of the domestic living standards. It is asserted that, through that kind of "economic strength," an excessively enlarged Russia will inflict painful blows upon us.

Such fears are partially justified. At the beginning of the '30's we experienced a sample of what this may lead to. At that time Russia was seriously suffering from hunger. But the Government urgently needed foreign currency to buy foreign machines, and so, despite the famine at home, it dumped grain on the international market and sold large quantities of it, forcibly, at ruinously low rates.

But characteristically enough, the goods involved here was grain—a natural product, a raw material. Raw materials are approximately equal to each other, wherever they may come from. But manufactured products are far from equal. With them, the question is whether their quality and taste satisfies the customer, and whether he can choose from an abundant selection with a wide variation. So far the Russian industrial

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products, from machines to kitchenware, have neither the quality, the taste nor the variety that would enable them to compete on foreign markets.

Small choice of goods

OF the goods that are produced in Russia there are not hundreds of various types for each nuance of purpose and taste, but only one, two or three types, and none of their manufactured products can withstand the slightest comparison with western products as to elegance, solidity, trimness or artistry. They are pathetic. The Russian soldiers who entered Bucharest were warned not to let themselves be made dizzy by the "glittering bourgeois splendors in the showcases and shops."

Will these conditions be changed in the Russia of tomorrow? This question is answered by the fact that quality, taste and variety are the most typical fruit of competition. Only under the pressure of mutual competition must the manufacturers try to surpass one another by putting out ever newer, better, more practical, more attractive and more differentiated articles. A manager of a government watch factory, for instance, has no reason for replacing his current production by new models, let alone for doubling the number of his models. The public takes what it gets.

Since neither the public nor the officials of the watch industry themselves are ever allowed to see anything else, their taste and instinct for quality and demand for variety remain at the point at which they are. The connection with the world that moves and changes has been lost. And if this has been the case for ten, 20 and 25 years, how can Russia produce for export?

Even in a country like Czechoslovakia, where the nationalization of industry and its amalgamation with the Russian system are beginning today, this inevitable process is setting in at the same time. True, in the past, Czechoslovakian industry produced attractive articles for export, although in small quantities. Most of it was supplied by the Sudeten region which is now being destroyed by the mass expulsion of the Germans. But even what remains has no international future. In its new marriage, the Czechoslovakian industry will not improve Russia's connections with the outside world. On the contrary, under the influence of the Russian system, it will necessarily lose its contact with the world.

Every exporter and industrialist knows the basic fact that production for export is possible only as an offspring of production for the domestic market, only on the basis and within the framework of the experiences, traditions, instincts and standards which have arisen and continue to arise from production for the domestic public and its demands. On the basis of primitive production for one's own country no perfected production can arise for foreign countries. Therefore Soviet Russia will achieve no triumphs as an industrial exporter in the capitalist world. Under a system without competition no goods are produced which can satisfy the demands of a competitive world.

True, the conquest of markets today no longer necessarily depends upon economic performance and capacity. Political power is used instead of economic means. It is possible that America will never again be admitted to the markets of the eastern European countries on which Russia has now laid her hands. It is also possible that the Soviets will occasionally try to secure economic privileges for themselves in other countries through political pressure, that they will export at the point of a gun.

But these would be accomplishments of political, not economic, strength. No one should underestimate the political strength, today and tomorrow, of the Russian colossus. No one should forget that in the economic arena victories can be won by political action. It will be the task of American policy, in fact of western policy, to prevent this kind of "overtaking." But a "catching up with and overtaking" through economic means and achievements?

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

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

TRICOLOR

VOLUME I, NUMBER 4

JULY, 1944

CONTENTS

Letters to TRICOLOR 13-15

Unconditional Freedom by André Labarthe 16-19

Will Paris Be the Same? by Henry Bellamann 20-41
Photographs by Henle

GI Joe Goes to France by Bart Keith Winer 42-52
Illustrations by Allela Cornell

A Date with Marianne by Jacques Deval 53-59

The Gestapo Hell of Compiègne by Victor Stalcom 60-75
Illustrated by Pierre Arvier

14th of July by G. B. Stern 76-78

It Happened Next Door 79-86

Penelope '44 by Gregor E. Carmichael 87-94
Illustrated by Ruth Krebs

Ballet Over Broadway by Alicia Markova 95-104
Illustrated by Vertès

Typhoon by Jean Bresou 105-113

Trust the "Other Germany"? by Leopold Schwarzschild 114-121

Here Lies by Edward Noyes 122-123

Tricolorful 124-125

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Trust the "Other Germany"?

by Leopold Schwarzschild

One day, in World War I, Mr. Leopold Stokowski addressed a troubled letter to President Wilson. What made the conductor worry was German music. Concert organizations no longer permitted compositions of German masters to be put on their programs. Attempts that had been made had caused public riots. But what remains of music if Bach and Haydn, Mozart and Beethoven, Schubert, Mendelssohn, and Schumann, Wagner and Brahms, are eliminated? Mr. Stokowski appealed to President Wilson's authority as President and as a humanist, and asked him to condemn the boycott on German music. The President hesitated for some days. Then he answered—evasively. Popular feeling was running too high. He preferred not to oppose it.

This was in 1917. The episode recalls the fact that the average American was then even more ardently "anti-German" than his European allies—and that aversion did not stop at dead and famous Germans. It hardly stopped at American citizens of German descent. Little differentiation was made between the Germans in politics and in other spheres; between the German rulers and the German people; between militaristic Germany and the "other Germany." The average American bitterly resented practically everything that tasted German.

The sudden change that happened later—it started during the war—led public opinion, within two years, from one indiscriminate extreme to the opposite extreme. Around 1920, not only were Bach's and Beethoven's unalienable positions restored; by then it was also clear that, except for the Kaiser and his clique, everything had been all right in Germany. And, thank God, the Kaiser and his clique had now been replaced by Herr

Friedrich Ebert and the "Weimar parties": good, trustworthy people. Dangerous Germany had been replaced by the "other Germany," a good, trustworthy nation. From then on the U. S. A. became Germany's strongest psychological and even political sponsor. True, a similar development began later in the other allied countries, too. Even in France the gospel of "trust the other Germany" took hold of the minds and everything German became chic and fashionable. But nowhere else did pro-Germanism reach the peak it did in America. And nowhere else had it climbed from such a pit of anti-Germanism as in America. Here was a particularly memorable example of the capriciousness of public opinion.

Where will public opinion veer at the end of World War II? The temper of the people today can be considered, somewhat optimistically, more constant than it was in World War I. World War II did not start with excessively indiscriminate hatred; therefore, it may be presumed that no excessively indiscriminate enthusiasms will follow. Emotion will perhaps prove more stabilized in this respect.

Meanwhile, vigorous efforts are nevertheless being made to push public opinion into the tracks of 1918. A few hundred German refugees who dubbed themselves the "Council for a Democratic Germany" and who claim to be historical experts have recently issued a manifesto peremptorily demanding a peace of the most absolute "trust in Germany." The document guarantees with apodictic certainty that a decided, powerful "other Germany," amply sufficient for all needs, is waiting within the boundaries of the Reich. The manifesto demands that the defeated Reich be unconditionally handed over to this "other Germany" so that it may govern the Reich in free and sovereign self-determination, undisturbed by foreign interference and undiminished by foreign control. Perfect peace and perfect democracy were promised if these conditions were heeded. If not, terrible disasters were predicted. True, anyone in a democracy can write a manifesto. That does not mean much. Less insignificant, however, was the fact that this manifesto was immediately endorsed by numerous Americans, some of them famous. And since that time, discussions on the "other Germany" have gained momentum in newspapers and on lecture platforms.

Obviously, the German problem cannot be solved according to transitory emotions. The disgust and indignation bred by present war crimes will

ebb sooner or later. The capriciousness of public opinion has been demonstrated. Therefore, things have to be considered as coldly and with as much detachment as they may appear in ten to twenty years. As one who, for twenty years, has served as a combatant in the struggle against the German folly and who went through all the emotions, I can testify to the coldness, detachment, and dry matter-of-factness to which emotions are inevitably reduced.

But to a great extent the usual discussions about the "other Germany" are neither cold nor detached. On the whole, they are romantic; sometimes disarmingly trivial.

This applies, for instance, to the now customary method of quoting the statements of some great and some small men proving that the "other Germany" exists. But who has ever denied that it exists? How, for God's sake, could it fail to exist? There is something of everything in every country. There is a Pelley-America, a McCormick-America, a *New York Times*, a Henry Wallace, and an Earl Browder-America. The existence of admirable and reliable humane, tolerant and peaceful elements in Germany is such a self-evident triviality that its discovery proves as little as its denial would be foolish. The question is not whether there exists an "other Germany." The question is: how powerful is it?

As far as this is concerned, the favorite method is to split the Germans into two supposedly opposed camps: the Nazis and the rest. And, it is asked, did the Nazis ever obtain the majority in a free election? Never. Consequently, the rest, the "other Germany," was stronger! Unfortunately, though, the Nazis came very close to majority in the last free elections. They obtained first 37, than 44 per cent of the votes—overwhelmingly more than any other party. Even more unfortunately, the Nazis were by no means the only carriers of the evil. There were other parties and groups, no less antidemocratic, nationalistic, or militaristic. And millions voted for them, too. Actually, all the parties advocating authoritarianism and violence together gained the majority, even before 1933. The parties which, benevolently seen, could count as the representatives of the "other Germany" were for a long time a definite minority. It will always remain unclear why a person votes for a party—but this is valid for parties of any color and is beyond statistics. The statistical picture is clear. However extensive the

notion of the "other Germany" may be stretched, it has been, in any case, inferior numerically even long before the rise of Hitler.

Furthermore, what is numerical strength? Many votes have a powerful effect when a democracy functions securely. But many votes alone do not force a democracy to function. Large numbers alone are not identical with political effectiveness. The lack of other potentialities can lead to the neutralization, elimination, and liquidation of the greatest numbers. Well, the sad fact remains that the "other Germany" was always neutralized, eliminated, or crushed in every critical situation. This is proved by the results—rather by the lack of results! However strong or weak the "other Germany" might be numerically estimated, at decisive moments it was always the contrary powers who ruled the waves. They succeeded in turning the "other Germany" into their partner, as in 1914. Or they succeeded in paralyzing it by a combination of methods, as from 1919 to Hitler. Or they succeeded in knocking it down and chaining it, as in 1933. However it happened, in no respect did the "other Germany" ever lastingly accomplish anything. And we had better refrain from formulating the historical and psychological explanations of this fact. Every explanation is disputable. The fact itself is undisputable: the fact that the practical accomplishments of the "other Germany" in all great German and international crises have, to this day, remained approximately nil. Such is its deplorable historical record. It is the only concrete established fact—and at the same time, the only important one—on the power of the "other Germany." The greater the "other Germany" is estimated numerically, the gloomier a light falls on its other potentialities.

If the achievements of the "other Germany" amount to nothing, no single group within it can possibly have achieved more than nothing. This syllogism must be mentioned because of the existence of something which may be called "the legend of the German worker." "The German workers," says the legend, "are carved out of different material than are their compatriots. All — well, at least an enormous majority — are for democracy, peace, and freedom, and are opposed to nationalism and militarism. And all—at least, their vast majority—are resolute and undeceivable fighters." It is clear that nearly all of those now renewing the theory of the "other

Germany" have the German worker in mind.

The origin of this attracive picture of the worker is familiar. It stems from Marx's idea of the "contrariety in every respect" between the worker and the rest of human society. It originates from the phantasmagoric concepts of Marx and Engels regarding the instincts of the worker in general and of the German worker in particular. Decade after decade these sanctified illusions created error after error. The deceptions were sometimes only grotesque, as in 1866, when on the eve of Bismarck's war against Austria, Engels predicted the inescapable defeat of Prussia. "There is no doubt," he wrote, "that when the reserves are drafted into the army, they will mutiny while mobilization is going on." One of the most crushing Prussian victories, without the slightest sign of mutiny, followed. But the deceptions did not remain merely grotesque. Sometimes, alas, they became tragic. Previous to Hitler, for example, this fantasy induced the unfortunate Léon Blum to the following prognosis: "I do not think that Germany wants war. The German people would react against this folly. We must have confidence in the German working class, organized in the trade unions and the socialist party, which is an enemy of war." Never, in any crucial situation of a century, has the German worker justified the attractive picture dreamed up of him.

It is true that, until the advent of Hitler, the majority of German workers were organized under the socialist banner. It is true that these organizations were not limited to their interests in wages and working conditions. Their banner was also inscribed with those general principles now roughly taken into account with the concept of the "other Germany." But in spite of these principles, in the decisive test cases the bulk of voters, members and leaders, demonstrated by no means that mythical "contrariety in every respect" to their nation. Far from that, their behavior approximated that of the entire German nation. The German workers did not prove more refractory in matters of war and nationalism, nor less submissive than their compatriots in matters of democracy and freedom.

On July 31, 1914, the Socialist party broke all the pledges it had made up to July 30. It not only embraced the Kaiser's war, but actually became its strongest pillar. Patriotically, the workers rushed to their regiments and fought as exemplary soldiers till the last moment before the armistice. This

is in brief the German worker's record in World War I.

As to the period of the Weimar Republic, the workers and their leaders did not even attempt to build up a new army. They were never interested in any legal procedings against those responsible for the war; on the contrary, they joined the general opposition against punishing the "war criminals." They were equally articulate in opposing and sabotaging any part of the treaty of Versailles. Workers and unions collaborated in concealing munitions arsenals and munitions plants. Minister-workers collaborated in founding and concealing the "Black Reichswehr." When the star of Hitler began to rise, the influx of the workers to his party equaled the percentage of his followers from any other social stratum. And when the destruction of democracy progressed from politics into violence, no workers' union lifted a hand. One year before Hitler's seizure of power, Chancellor von Papen carried out his *coup d'etat* in socialistic Prussia—the greatest German state, with the strongest police force. A lieutenant and two men escorted the minister-workers out of their offices with less resistance than Mr. Avery showed when he left the offices of Montgomery Ward; throughout the country, no shot was fired, no strike proclaimed. Neither was a shot fired or a strike proclaimed when Hitler came to power, when he tore the constitution to shreds, smashed the workers' organizations, and seized the unions as his booty. No attempt at resistance came from the workers, neither from the "masses," nor from their leaders. In fact, in no other country did the workers capitulate so passively, so hypnotized by their domestic totalitarianism, as in Germany. This is the German worker's record in the drama of the republic and democracy.

Then war started again—World War II. And though there are, of course, concentration camps and executions and recently even some beginnings of a rudimentary "underground," the far more significant fact remains that the German worker in uniform is again fighting as an exemplary soldier. While the fifth year of this war is drawing to its close, not only has no mutiny occurred, but there has been neither desertion nor simple running away in any important degree.

Naturally, a good many workers and Socialist leaders were overwhelmed with shame and despair about these failures, and here again these failures are explained in many ways. But here again not the explana-

tions but the facts are decisive. In actual fact the German workers in any fatal hour never revealed themselves to be "other Germans," but just Germans. It is immaterial how many of them were German by instinct and desire and how many by obedience and discipline. The result for the world —and for themselves—remains the same.

Such is the record of the past. In the past, the "other Germany" was evidently something chronically and distressingly futile. A mourner walking behind coffins. It promised a great deal before every catastrophe. It remained invisible in every catastrophe. It emerged whiningly after every catastrophe—and began promising anew until the next catastrophe. If past experiences mean anything, then the unfortunate "other Germany" is about the last of all trustworthy factors. The idea of handing over to this "other Germany" the defeated Reich, unimpaired in its sovereignty and self-determination, undisturbed by foreign interference, undiminished by foreign control, lacks even the charm of originality. It was the 1918 plan, and even then it was vehemently attacked. Where it led, the world knows well by now. What began with trusting the "other Germany" ended with Hitler and war. It is scarcely advisable to conclude a series of disasters with repeating precisely the thing which started the series.

There are those who protest that the future "other Germany" will no longer be comparable with the past one. We are told that it will have learned much; that the whole German people will have learned much. For the first time, we are told, this people has seen the devastations of war on their own soil, and that will remain an ineffaceable lesson. Furthermore, it is said, this time the country will be swept clear of its evil forces. Not only will hundreds of thousands of Nazis be eliminated, even physically liquidated. Also the Junkers, the industrialists, the bankers, and others will be prevented by dispossession, expropriation, extermination from continuing their intrigues and crimes. So the "other Germany" will become incomparably stronger and more effective than it ever was. It will encompass all of Germany's common men with their consolidated will for freedom and peace undisturbed by intrigue or temptation.

Possible. A man who has seen much becomes cautious in uttering as well as in spurning predictions. The future consequences of things that until

today have never existed are difficult to foresee. In some respects I happen to be doubtful. For example, it is most uncertain whether in matters of war and peace, the mentality of the German common men is really fundamentally different from that of the German industrialists and whether the dispossession of the industrialists would change very much in this respect. It seems rather unlikely. Also, would a campaign of mass expropriation and extermination benefit the development of democracy? But let us refrain from discussing the incalculable effects resulting from untested future procedures and unprecedented future conditions. Perhaps they will make the "other Germany" more powerful; perhaps not. The point is that it remains pure guesswork, and no world policies can be based on such vague suppositions. The future of the world cannot be gambled away. To restore the Reich to its former sovereignty, relying not even on the "other Germany" but on the future formation of a better and stronger "other Germany," would be a gamble beyond conception.

It is a different question how a regime without sovereignty and with limited self-determination, controlled and coerced, can be practically organized. Anybody is free to make his own plan. Roughly summarized, mine amounts to a close garrisoning of the entire Reich by Allied troops for no less than fifty or sixty years—and under this supervision, a permanent demilitarization, so total that not a shotgun remains and no cartridge can be manufactured—and besides this simple but complete protection against any military renaissance practically no interference in internal German affairs. And perhaps this simple and complete protection will have a secondary happy result. If the Germans will have clearly been shown the utter futility of all further power fantasies, and if after fifty or sixty years their military traditions and military experiences will have been interrupted for two generations, then a genuine "other Germany," a really trustworthy and reliable one, may have come into being by the year 2000.

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

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VOLUME I, NUMBER 3 JUNE, 1944

CONTENTS

ZERO HOUR by André Labarthe 15

EXCERPTS FROM TEN YEARS IN JAPAN by Joseph C. Grew 19

ESCAPE FROM BRITTANY by Georges Roubault 45
Illustrated by Lucien Ribard

AN ETCHING OF CHINON by Raymond Sauret 61

VERSAILLES: SILVER ANNIVERSARY by Leopold Schwarzschild 62

REBLITZING EUROPE by S. T. S. 71

BASIC FRENCH? by Hugh Walpole 75

A LOVE LETTER ABOUT FRANCE by Janice Biala 81
Illustrated by the author

TRICOLORFUL 84

PARISIAN COMICS by André Girard 85
Illustrated by the author

THE WORLD WE ARE GOING TO LIVE IN
by Martin Gumpert, M.D. 91

DEMOCRACY A-BORNING by Jacques Legendre 96

THE TOO-BIG TOP by Gregor E. Carmichael 101
Illustrated by John Erdna

TRICOLORFUL 114

LOOKING BACKWARD THROUGH FILMS by Iris Barry 115

ABOUT SILENCE 125

A YEAR AGO 127

TRICOLORFUL 128

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

Versailles: Silver Anniversary

by Leopold Schwarzschild

The picture is familiar. The hall of mirrors in Versailles. Huge embrasures, pompous chandeliers. Before a wall of diplomats and secretaries the long table of the Allied chiefs. In the center seats, the "Big Four." Opposite, the small table with the three Germans. The heavy volume of the Treaty lies before them. Count Brockdorff-Rantzau has seized the penholder. A chief of protocol shows him where to sign. It is June 28, 1919—25 years ago to the month.

Had the hopes of those days been transformed to realities, this silver anniversary day would be celebrated with ceremonies, public worship, parades — mankind's thanksgiving. But no ceremonies, no services are planned. Regiments are marching, but not to parades.

Whether the Treaty of Versailles plunged the world into misery or simply failed to deliver it from misery may be argued. In any case, few human enterprises have so completely vanished and so completely been turned into nothingness as this one. What has remained of the tragic-grandiose episode are solely experiences, lessons, warnings. And even these have to be correctly understood.

* * *

For the first time the New World had actively interfered with the fate of the Old. Up to that time, the United States had had neither the need nor the occasion to take part in European battles and peace settlements. They were inexperienced in both fields. Not only that: to take part in those battles and treaties absolutely contradicted American traditions and ideology. For an integral part of United States national mentality was its contempt for Europe's supposed specialty: repugnant "power politics." America's alleged unconcern constituted part of its national pride. And now, nevertheless, America had suddenly become involved.

This produced a strange psychological phenomenon. The American people, and with them the American government, misinterpreted their role in the event. Why had America gone to war? The historian does not doubt why. It was the same sober reason which had mobilized England: the domination of the entire European continent by one single power had to be prevented. For that

continent contains two-thirds of the white race, at least as much of the world's economic, and more of its military, potential. As soon as this overwhelming power should be concentrated in a single hand, even the peoples overseas would no longer be able to live securely. The eternal striving for mastery over Europe and the eternal urge to obstruct this mastery represent humanity's classic conflict. To prevent such mastery England, for the third time in two centuries, was forced into a world war (first, against Louis XIV; second, against Napoleon; third, against Wilhelm II).

Exactly this same motive, and none other, now also operated for the United States. Self-preservation, the most inescapable and justified of all egotistic instincts, forced Americans to take part in power politics on an alien continent. First, they played the role of an arsenal; then, after the collapse of Russia, when that role no longer sufficed, they became combatants — the same procession that would hold true later, when Adolf Hitler strove for mastery.

But American sentiments were opposed to a greedy war, a war for "power politics," a war concerning "European affairs." So the motives began to be transformed. The war to obstruct an insupportable redistribution of European power was metamorphosed into a crusade "to end wars," "to make the world safe for democracy," and other altruistic and all-inclusive goals. The real motives that had forced America into the war crept into the background. And in their place, idealized motives, which had not played an actual role in the decisions, came into the foreground. A wide discrepancy grew between what could roughly be considered the Continental and the American picture of war and war aims. The Continental picture was dominated by the concrete figure of Germany and the realistic questions of power relationships — "There is nothing very new to learn about this war," as Clemenceau put it. While the American picture was mainly composed of visions of future world perfection — "Mankind desires an entirely new course of action," Woodrow Wilson insisted.

* * *

Previous to the armistice nothing had been done to bridge over

this discrepancy and to formulate common war aims. On the contrary, President Wilson consistently refused to discuss peace problems with the Allies for the duration of the war. As a matter of fact, he considered all the Allies—especially the Allied governments — hopelessly "cynical," "selfish," "reactionary"; he thought it useless even to discuss such problems with them. The real peace, so he believed, could not be suggested to them; it had to be imposed upon them. "When the war is over," so he wrote to Colonel House, "we can force them into our way of thinking, because by that time they will, among other things, be financially in our hands; but we cannot force them now."

Nothing had more unfortunate consequences than this conception of the European Allies' moral inferiority and of the need ultimately to "force them." In particular, three fateful events resulted from these ideas.

The first was the proclamation, in January, 1918, of the so-called Fourteen Points. They represented a peace program on which the President had not conferred with the Allies; for which he had neither asked nor obtained their consent; which, he even knew, contradicted many of their ideas. "Have you ever been asked by President Wilson whether you accept the Fourteen Points?" Clemenceau asked Lloyd George ten months later at a meeting; "I have never been asked!" "I haven't been asked either," Lloyd George replied. However, the European Allies could not publicly and officially contradict this one-sided program for a peace to be concluded by a coalition. It could have caused incalculable disruptions. The Allies had to remain silent. And the Fourteen Points, which expressed the opinion of only one of the Allied nations, became a liability for all.

Then, in October, 1918, the Germans seized the brilliant idea of turning to Wilson personally and offering their capitulation provided, only, a peace should be guaranteed them according to his own Fourteen Points. Again the President acted on his own. Without consulting the Allies and without their consent, he effected the "pre-armistice agreement" with Germany. As far as America was concerned, he had accepted the proposed barter: Germany's surrender for the guarantee of the Fourteen Points. The President

promised to obtain the Allies' consent. Thus, he became, in a way, the solicitor for what Germany wanted but the Allies dreaded.

Then followed "forcing them to our way of thinking." The Allies were in no position to reject conditions America found satisfactory and which promised to end the slaughter. But even so they fought desperately against the acceptance of the Fourteen Points, which were not theirs, as the basis for peace. And at that point the strongest possible pressure had been used. America threatened to sign a separate peace with Germany — with "very exciting effect," Colonel House reported to the President. And the European Allies, under this extreme pressure, had yielded. They had committed themselves to formulate a peace based on principles they did not believe in and from which they did not expect good results.

Certainly the President—and with him a number of his contemporaries—considered his principles strongly superior, ethically and practically, to any other. But even had this been so, experience should have taught the inadvisability and frailty of settlements which satisfy only one of the involved parties.

* * *

The peace treaty achieved in the following seven months was drawn along the lines of the Fourteen Points. Germany was cheated, people have maintained. Instead of the idealistic peace a brutal peace, they say, was imposed. In continuous and ominous conformity the agitating German nationalists and the debating post-Wilsonians asserted that this had infected the world. But the honest historian must deny such an accusation. No important point in the Treaty of Versailles differed essentially from Wilson's conception—at least, no point which played a prominent part in later developments. Least of all did those rulings later most sharply and widely criticized differ—the Polish corridor, for example. Here, in particular, the Fourteen Points had been most scrupulously followed.

But although the spirit of both President and Fourteen Points prevailed during the Peace Conference, it often did so only after

violent fights. The discussions at such occasions often read like anticipatory commentaries to what the world would live through in the following decades. They seem full of prophetic announcements. The heaviest weight of those debates rested on Clemenceau's shoulders and on the French; soon after the conference began, Lloyd George turned to an opportunistic politician's policy having no profound principles whatsoever and no consistent line. Today it is hard to deny that the French theories then were, on the whole, stronger and wiser than the opposing ones.

In short, two great debates developed.

The center of one was Germany. What could be expected of the "New Germany"? Incompatible beliefs opposed each other. For Wilson, the problem seemed essentially solved with the deposition of the Kaiser and the establishment of the Republic. Always and everywhere he belived in "the people"—consequently, the German people were no exception. "We are not enemies of the German people and they are not our enemies. They did not originate or desire this hideous war. We are fighting their cause." So, their country had to be returned to the German people as little reduced as possible and with no lasting curtailment of their self-determination—above all, no permanent occupation; no permanent agencies of foreign supervision. This conception and the French were irrevocably asunder. Innumerable times and in innumerable ways, Clemenceau warned his colleagues "to realize that the German revolution was mere window dressing, and that, with the aggressor of 1914 not a whit cured of his insane folly, we will continue without respite to be subjected, in a new setting, to the same attack from the same enemy."

There even existed that strange memorandum of Marshal Foch predicting the transformation of the German Republic into a dictatorship worse than any preceding German government. "Institutions, republican in appearance, might evolve endowed with all the strength of an absolute government. We shall not witness such an evolution before some time elapses, no doubt much time. But what then?" Unfortunately, it is now clear which of the two opinions was correct.

The other great conflict centered around the question to what

degree the world peace association to be founded could be considered a safe, reliable guardian. Never was there any argument about the necessity of a League of Nations. But could it be more than an experiment? Could the fruits of victory be entrusted exclusively to the guardianship of this untried and, in fact, very doubtful institution? The weakness of the League was obvious—lack of power. True, it had power against the evildoer, provided the members of the League remained united and, above all, ever ready to fulfill their duties. But what power had the League to force its members to be united and to fulfill their obligations? None whatever. Everything depended on the members' good will and on their faithfulness to a given signature. "A thing without any executive power . . . a parliament of super-parliamentarians without any instrument of authority," Clemenceau described the League. How could it be trusted? It could, Wilson answered, because there exists a power stronger than any other, "international morality." International morality will force League members to carry out their contractual duty, their duty to resist any aggressor. Wilson held on to his belief in the reliability and power of international morality.

The sad fact remains that the events of the following decades did not confirm that morality. However the influence of morality may be reckoned, there has never been such a thing as an internationally uniform morality. Morality has always varied according to countries. While public opinion in one country considered Hitler's occupation of the Rhineland immoral, another country considered it moral. While morality in one country required participation in a war, in another country it required keeping out of it.

* * *

From the discrepant views on Germany and on the reliability of the League the really decisive conflict arose—the conflict about the "guarantees of another nature," which the French delegation had demanded, "the frontier guarantees." They proposed supplementing the undependable power of the League of Nations by resorting to a second, dependable kind of power. The highly industrialized western frontier provinces of Germany—the Rhineland

—should be occupied for fifty years by a mixed American-British-French-Belgian police force.

This proposal, far-reaching and unorthodox, sprang from the conviction that France alone could no longer watch a Germany twice her size. A remarkable memorandum signed by André Tardieu spoke of the constant danger of France's being "overrun in a few days" by a recuperated Germany. And this danger, the memorandum continued, concerns not only France but all countries. For when this danger will become real, not only the French army will be eliminated. The democratic world will have lost something far more indispensable and irreplaceable: the territory of France. "Should not enough French ports remain for overseas armies to debark their troops and war supplies, should not enough French territory remain for them to concentrate and to operate from their bases, the overseas democracies would be debarred from waging a Continental war against any power seeking to dominate the Continent. They would be deprived of their nearest and most natural battleground. Nothing would be left to them but naval and economic warfare." That is why a permanent international power will have to be organized for the first time in Europe. British and Americans must join in mounting guard behind the mutual wall—"the common barriers of security necessary to the League of Democratic Nations," according to Foch.

The proposal was refused. Today it can flatly be stated that its acceptance might have spared the world this war. The refusal deprived the Treaty of Versailles of that backbone of power which might have kept it alive. After a few transitional years the entire task of enforcing order rested exclusively on the League of Nations. And while every nation, with no exception, may be blamed for its behavior within the League, nevertheless they all acted merely according to ordinary human shortsightedness, selfishness, and weakness—as could be and was foreseen. Perhaps things might have worked better had not the additional calamity of America's finally rejecting the treaty, and not joining the League, happened. But the importance of this is probably widely overestimated. America's "vacant seat" in Geneva was not so vacant as it seemed. The United States was present whenever important decisions were

taken—not in the assembly hall, but in the background. Whether the United States would have taken an essentially different course as a member than it did as a non-member is open to question. It is equally doubtful whether their course of action as a member would have changed the course of the other members.

As the anniversary of Versailles approaches, the world breathlessly awaits invasion. But the invasion has no other end than the recapture of precisely that "nearest and most natural battleground," the possible loss of which had been warned against with such prescience 25 years ago. The sacrifices needed for this recapture caution us with particular gravity to remember the lessons of the old Versailles peace in the approaching new one. Hope and faith in a transformed enemy, in international morality, peace covenants, and peace associations, however noble and useful, do not render superfluous their supplementation with concrete, ready, organized, and adequate power. Only by such a supplement of power, if ever, can this hope and faith be realized.

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SOMMAIRE

	PAGE
Rêve ou réalité? par André Labarthe	1
Le 25ème anniversaire de la Tchécoslovaquie, par le Professeur E. Vermeil	4
Processionnal de la force anglaise	7
Pardonnez-nous notre victoire, par Charles Morgan	12
Les cent jours	15
Deux automnes, par Douglas Cooper	23
Du renouvellement des élites (I), par Raymond Aron	30
Réflexions d'une Européenne, par Odette Keun	39
L'exécution, par Joseph Kessel	44
Le sourire de Grini, par Leif Borthen	51
Les goums	55
Souvenirs d'un homme traqué, par J. R.	59
Légende	64
Chronique de France: Note sur l'avenir du franc	66
Les succédanés dans la guerre et dans la paix, par E. M. Friedwald	73
Revue des livres, par le Rt. Hon. A. Duff Cooper	78

DANS LES PROCHAINS NUMÉROS

Camille Rougeron: *Places fortes et lignes fortifiées.*

Sadi de Gorter: *La presse clandestine hollandaise à la recherche d'un ordre meilleur.*

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Le chimiste veille sur nos troupeaux



LA race britannique est amie des animaux. La maladie d'une bête cause de vives anxiétés. En Grande-Bretagne la guerre a brutalement rappelé à chacun combien les rapports entre un animal sain et un homme en bonne santé sont étroits. Le bien-être de tous: homme, femme ou enfant, dépend en partie de l'état de santé de notre bétail. Un bétail sain signifie: plus de viande, de lait, de beurre, et de meilleure qualité; des moutons et des agneaux sains: plus de laine et de nourriture; des porcs sains, plus de bacon; de belle volaille, plus d'œufs; et des chevaux aux membres robustes, au souffle long, promettent un meilleur rendement à la ferme. Ainsi, il est vital de maintenir un bon état sanitaire chez les animaux de la ferme et de prévenir les maladies. Eperonnée par la nécessité, la médecine vétérinaire britannique joue un rôle essentiel dans l'économie nationale. Bien que, sur le continent, la science vétérinaire ait été étudiée au XVème siècle dans les écoles de cavalerie, la fondation d'un collège vétérinaire à Londres ne remonte qu'à 1790. Les grands progrès accomplis par la médecine préventive au XIXème siècle incitèrent à mener une offensive analogue contre les fléaux auxquels les animaux sont sujets. On voit aujourd'hui les résultats par la manière dont de nombreuses maladies ont été éliminées ou maîtrisées. A l'heure actuelle, la peste bovine, qui tue des millions de bêtes en Europe et en Afrique, a disparu des Iles britanniques. La morve du cheval est rare. La rage meurtrière, si souvent transmise à l'homme par la morsure d'un chien enragé, appartient au passé. Le charbon n'est plus le cauchemar du fermier. On peut prévenir et guérir les maladies dues aux bacilles de la gangrène gazeuse qui décimaient les troupeaux de moutons et les agneaux. La fièvre aphteuse fait, ici, moins de ravages que dans aucun autre pays d'Europe. Mais ces résultats, si importants soient-ils en eux-mêmes, ne sont qu'un début. La lutte doit continuer: contre la tuberculose, contre les avortements infectieux, contre la mastite, la stérilité et le mauvais état sanitaire dû aux vers parasites—maladies qu'on estime coûter aux fermiers 20 millions de livres sterling par an. Les produits de la chimie organique, d'origine synthétique, joueront un rôle décisif dans l'ère qui s'ouvre maintenant à la médecine vétérinaire: l'ère de la prévention. Le travailleur dans son laboratoire de recherches biologiques et le chimiste à l'usine sont en train de s'unir pour aider les vétérinaires à maîtriser les maladies et à maintenir, par ce moyen, la santé du pays.

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Revue des livres

LÉOPOLD SCHWARZSCHILD
World in Trance

(*Hamish Hamilton, Londres*, 1943)

Ce livre paraît à son heure, et il faut espérer qu'il aura beaucoup de lecteurs. Il paraît à son heure parce que le monde approche rapidement d'une situation comparable à celle dans laquelle il s'est trouvé après l'autre guerre, et où il lui faudra prendre des décisions lourdes de conséquences pour l'avenir de l'humanité.

La première impression qu'on retire des pages initiales de ce livre, c'est que les hommes à qui incombèrent de si graves responsabilités étaient bien mal préparés à une telle tâche. Le président Wilson était un homme d'une probité inattaquable, mais il n'avait aucune expérience politique et il abordait tous les problèmes d'un point de vue purement idéaliste, sans s'appuyer sur aucune connaissance pratique; et la méfiance que tous les Américains ont de l'Europe et des Européens prenait chez lui de folles proportions. Il croyait que tous les hommes d'Etat européens étaient à la fois malhonnêtes et réactionnaires, et les rapports qu'il eut avec Clemenceau, Orlando et Lloyd George confirmèrent ses pires soupçons. Alors qu'il était depuis trois jours en Italie, il dit à Orlando que lui, Wilson, connaissait mieux les sentiments du peuple italien qu'Orlando lui-même. Sur Lloyd George, il partageait l'opinion de Foch, à savoir que le Premier Ministre britannique changeait d'avis plus facilement que de chemise. Il estimait que Clemenceau était plein de méchanceté et aspirait à se venger des «pauvres Allemands», précipités, par la trahison de leurs gouvernants, dans une guerre qu'ils n'avaient jamais voulue. Il fut malheureusement confirmé dans cette illusion, la plus dangereuse de toutes, par Lloyd George, qui disait que les Français avaient tort de «considérer les Allemands comme un ennemi battu qu'il convenait de traiter comme tel». Au contraire, l'opinion officielle britannique, c'était que «la nation allemande n'était pas responsable de la guerre, que les *Junker* étaient évincés, qu'il fallait soutenir le gouvernement allemand...et ne pas traiter les Allemands avec suspicion». Si telles étaient les opinions des représentants des deux nations les plus puissantes (qui avaient toutes deux subi des pertes bien moins considérables que la France et sortaient, par suite, de la guerre, beaucoup plus fortes qu'elle) il y avait peu d'espoir pour que l'opinion de Clemenceau, soutenu par Foch—opinion que les événements postérieurs devaient prouver la seule raisonnable—pût triompher. Clemenceau résista vaillamment, mais il était très vieux et très fatigué, et il finit par céder. Foch, qui voyait l'avenir encore plus clairement que Clemenceau, ne céda jamais. Le 10 janvier 1919, il disait: «La crise peut revenir. La transformation du gouvernement allemand ne suffira certainement pas à l'empêcher. Une république fondée sur les mêmes principes de centralisation et de militarisme que le vieil empire présentera des dangers plus graves encore... Qui plus est, une Allemagne républicaine, débarrassée une fois pour toutes des entraves qu'imposait à l'Empire l'existence des petites principautés, risque de se fortifier. Des institutions d'apparence républicaines peuvent se révéler à l'expérience tout aussi fortes qu' un gouvernement absolutiste.»

World in Trance montre que, même après la défaite qu'ils subirent au cours des négociations de Paris, des hommes d'Etat français, tels que Poincaré, s'efforcèrent de préserver la puissance et le prestige de la France; et il montre combien Poincaré eut raison d'occuper la Ruhr. M. Schwarzschild estime que lorsque cette occupation cessa, et lorsque Poincaré fut battu, la France cessa d'être une grande puissance. Cela se passait le 1er juin 1924. L'aveuglement qui avait empêché les hommes d'Etat britanniques et américains de voir clair lorsqu'ils étaient à Paris, ne fit que s'aggraver lorsqu'ils rentrèrent dans leur pays, et gagna de proche en proche, sans distinction de parti. Lord d'Abernon, que l'on considère comme l'un des hommes d'Etat britanniques les plus pénétrants, et qui fut notre premier ambassadeur à Berlin après la guerre, écrit dans son journal: «Personnellement, je considère les Allemands comme plus dignes de confiance, et plus liés par leurs engagements écrits, que beaucoup d'autres nations.»

Et pourtant les Allemands, en coulant la flotte qu'ils s'étaient engagés à livrer, avaient violé les clauses du traité de paix, avant même que ce traité n'eût été signé, et ils continuèrent ensuite pendant dix ans—bien avant que

les nazis n'eussent aucune influence—à violer systématiquement toutes les autres clauses du traité, tout en protestant contre sa cruauté, et contre les souffrances qu'il leur imposait. Mais Lord d'Abernon n'était pas le seul homme d'Etat britannique à voir les Allemands sous un jour aussi favorable. Ses concitoyens, pour la plupart, partageaient son opinion, et tous les partis politiques—travailliste, libéral et même conservateur—étaient infectés du même virus. Le parti travailliste dénonçait la France en termes particulièrement véhéments, et le défunt vicomte Snowden était à cet égard le plus violent des travaillistes.

Le parti libéral venait bon second, et bien que beaucoup de conservateurs, notamment l'actuel Premier Ministre, ne soient jamais tombés dans cette erreur, un courant de plus en plus fort portait les conservateurs vers l'Allemagne. Beaucoup de lecteurs seront choqués d'apprendre, par exemple, qu'à l'époque de Locarno, Sir Austen Chamberlain, qui s'est toujours considéré comme un sincère ami de la France, s'opposa avec Briand à ce qu'on publiât le rapport de la Commission qui avait enquêté sur le désarmement de l'Allemagne. Ce rapport, si on l'avait publié, aurait prouvé que l'Allemagne n'avait jamais désarmé, ni eu l'intention de désarmer, ce qui, du coup, eût ôté à Locarno beaucoup de ses fausses splendeurs. Ce traité, qui fit à l'époque l'objet de si grands éloges, était comme tous les documents que signa jamais diplomate allemand—il ne valait pas le papier sur lequel il était écrit. Ce que Stresemann, l'un des pseudo-libéraux allemands, pensait de Locarno, on le verra en lisant, dans *World in Trance* une lettre qu'il adressait au *Kronprinz*. Tout ce réarmement, toute cette duplicité, tous ces manquements aux traités et tous ces préparatifs de guerre, se poursuivirent pendant douze ans, avant que les nazis n'eussent leur mot à dire. Ce livre souligne cette vérité, dont on n'a pas encore pleine conscience, que la politique étrangère de l'Allemagne a toujours été la même, qu'elle ait été menée par des Hohenzollern, des *Junker*, des libéraux, des social-démocrates ou des nazis.

The Rt. Hon. A. Duff Cooper

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PREVENT WORLD WAR III

MONTHLY BULLETIN

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THE STARS AND STRIPES Wednesday, Sept. 27, 1944

An Editorial

What Do You Do With This Kid?

AMONG the 20,000 Germans who surrendered at Beaugency the other day was a 17-year-old kid like this. He was cute as a bug, with flaxen hair, blue eyes and a peaches and cream skin that had never been nicked by a razor. He was shy and soft-spoken and he blushed as he talked, like any nice youngster with a grownup stranger. This is how the conversation went:

* * *

Question How long have you been in the army?

Answer: 36 weeks. 32 weeks in France. 4 weeks in Germany.

* * *

Q: Are you a Nazi?

A: Yes.

* * *

Q: Were you in the Hitler Youth and the Nazi Children's organization (Pimpf)?

A: Yes.

* * *

Q: Will Germany win the war?

A: Yes. If the civil population of Germany can stick it, then we'll win the war.

* * *

Q: If Germany wins the war, will you punish the United States?

A: We want living space.

* * *

Q: If Germany doesn't win the war, will you fight again for lebensraum?

A: I cannot reply.

* * *

Q: Do you think the Germans are the master race?

A: If the Fuehrer says so, it is true.

* * *

Q: Where would you like to be sent?

A: To the United States.

* * *

Q: The U.S. has many kinds of people—Czechs, Poles, Negroes, Democrats, Jews.

A: After the war, it will be otherwise in the United States.

* *

Q: There won't be those people any more?

A: They will disappear.

What do you do with a kid like that?

Anybody got any ideas?

CONTENTS

AN EDITORIAL
by Rex Stout 3
"GERMANY-POOR, BLAMELESS, INNOCENT"
by Professor W. J. Luyten 4
"THEY ARE ALL PAN-GERMANS AND PRO-GERMANS" 5
AN IDEA FOR TOTAL PUNISHMENT
by Emery Reves 8
ORCHIDS TO RKO 10
GERMAN BLUEPRINT FOR DEFEAT
by Eugene Tillinger 11
THE TOUGHEST JOB IN GERMANY
by Mark Van Doren 16
THE GREAT GERMAN ALIBI IN THE MAKING
by Drew Middleton 19
"DON'T GET CHUMMY WITH JERRY" 22
YES, THEY CHEERED 24
WHAT ABOUT GERMAN INTELLECTUALS?
by G. A. Boon 26
HERR HAUSHOFER'S NEW PICTURE OF THE WORLD
by Paul Wohl 30
WHITEWASHING THE GERMANS
by Allan Nevins 33
GERMAN DIAGNOSIS
by Richard M. Brickner 36

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GERMAN TRUTH

The following is an editorial published on September 1, 1944 by a newspaper in the town of Stettin, Germany:

'We have never given false slogans to any nation; our struggle has been honest from the very outset since we did not cross our frontiers in order to subjugate other peoples in blind madness for conquest, but, forced to leave our frontiers behind us, we came as the heralds of the New Order and a new justice. We have never used slogans preaching hatred like our enemies: no German dreamt of annihilating the British, of punishing the French, of enslaving the Dutch or any other people and of feeding on the blood and sweat of other nations. On the contrary, the symbols of social justice and continental appeasement emanated from our victories. The fact that large parts of Europe failed and still fail to understand us does not alter the honesty of our intentions. The fact that the meaning of the concepts which we used was distorted, and that German wickedness and lust for power were suspected behind everything, has nothing to do with our intentions.'

THE GERMAN-JAPANESE CONSPIRACY

Most people in this country seem to accept the fanatical Japanese program of conquest. It is very clear in their minds. They do not question it. However, few have been conscious of the German menace.

They have been befuddled and bewildered by the clever cloudiness of Pan-German propaganda which has filtered through all mediums of expression from without and within the country.

For this reason the Society has concentrated its main effort on the clarification of the continuous German conspiracy to conquer and dominate the world. However, our research on the Japanese menace has disclosed many vital and interesting facts which will be revealed in the January issue of the bulletin.

Important points which will be covered are:

The German General Staff's participation in the plans of the Japanese attack on the United States.

The fifty-year history of German-Japanese military collaboration.

DO NOT FAIL TO READ THE NEXT ISSUE OF THIS BULLETIN

AN EDITORIAL

by

REX STOUT

It is beginning to be widely understood that the problem of handling the Germans so as to prevent them from starting another world war is not primarily a military or political problem, but an economic and industrial one. That fact was fully realized by the Sub-Committee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee headed by Senator Kilgore -- as evidenced by the report made on November 12th.

Doubtless there will be efforts to re-educate the Germans, especially the youth; efforts to prevent assumption of office or authority by Nazis or Nazi sympathizers; efforts to canalize the channels of the spoken and written word in Germany into the paths of democracy and international decency; and other similar efforts. These may do good and they may not, depending on the amount of resistance to them among the German masses. If the resistance is great, they will probably fail, and may even do more harm than good.

The only line of action which the United Nations can pursue that will give definite assurance of the continued impotence of the Germans' inability to start another war is, in my opinion, the line advocated by the Kilgore Sub-Committee: the removal of the equipment of the German chemical and metallurgical industries, in toto, to the devastated countries. That would be an eminently just action, since it would restore to Germany's victims at least a portion of that which has been stolen from them; and it would be eminently sensible, since it would offer the rest of us the best possible insurance against any future operations of the German will-to-aggression.

Add to that the equitable distribution, under international control, of Europe's raw materials -- especially coal and iron-among all of the peoples of Europe who need them and know how to use them, and we shall have all the security we can get and probably all we need -- without, it may be hoped, any necessity for such intolerable headaches as would result, for instance, from any attempt at international supervision of all German industry for an extended period.

"...the German people, while admitting defeat, are still unaware of the moral, or the political, or the strategic considerations that have caused their defeat...They merely blame Hitler for having made "mistakes" in the execution of a plan which they still approve. UNLESS THAT ATTITUDE, HARKING BACK TO THE "HOLY ROMAN EMPIRE OF GERMAN NATIONALITY", IS THOROUGHLY ERADICATED, IT WILL FORM FERTILE SOIL FOR THE NEXT WORLD WAR..."

(From an editorial in the New York Times)

"A great deal of the present troubles of the world have arisen from the fact that Germany has been greatly over-industrialized... The backbone of both the German world wars has been the German chemical industry, because it has made all the explosives. My simple proposition is that Germany shall make no more explosives of any kind. That should cause no pain, even to those most tender to Germany. It would mean only that there would no longer be open to the Germans the choice between guns and butter."

(Lord Vansittart)

"GERMANY - POOR, BLAMELESS, INNOCENT..."

The following is an excerpt from a lecture by Prof. W.J. Luyten, member of the faculty of the University of Minnesota.

"Recently there was published a book, "Germany - A Short History", by George N. Shuster and Arnold Bergstrasser. Since there is no other up-to-date short history of Germany in English, this book may well be widely read, may well be widely used in schools and colleges, and will widely influence people by laying a firm foundation of misinformation, favorable to Germany.

"Thus we are told that Nazism has its roots in the past, but before 1916 no details are given. Evil entered Germany with the Reformation, the authors imply, and most of it was foreign: The devastations wrought by the French and the Swedes in the Thirty Years War are played up - but what about the frightful massacres by Tilly and Wallenstein, both Teutons, and the sack of the city of Marburg?

"The authors explain that German labor supported the Kaiser in his war because they hated the Czar of Russia so - but German labor also wholeheartedly supported the 1940 attacks on Norway, Holland, Belgium and France and the 1941 attack on Soviet Russia. But maybe the authors would explain this too by saying that the German people are so romantic and naive -- rather useful words of which the authors seem to be very fond. One wonders if perhaps the Germans slaughtered five million Poles merely because they, the German people, are such incurable romantics. The Treaty of Versailles is called harsh - now the facts are that Germany made a handsome profit out of it and the reparations. We, the United States, paid for it all, and Germany borrowed from us some six billion goldmarks more than she ever paid out.

"As one reviewer of the book puts it: "This book is a defense of Germany - by inference and innuendo the authors have almost achieved creating the impression that no defense is necessary". In other words - there she stands, Germany, poor, blameless, innocent Germany, the victim only of circumstances. A greater distortion of historical facts is hardly imaginable.

"It is quite in line with what a columnist in the Twin City papers wrote a short while ago: "The way to a lasting peace is not in singling out Germany for revenge but in treating the whole continent of Europe as one problem". So apparently the Poles, who for more than five years have undergone the horrors and brutality of German torturers and butchers, are to be treated the same way as the German criminals themselves. Wouldn't it be terrible, Mr. Sokolsky seems to suggest, to make Germany the scapegoat. Maybe all the nations of Europe are equally guilty. If such talk isn't nazi propaganda, what is?..."

P.S.: From Walter Winchell's column of September 10, 1944: "...The co-author of a new book on Germany has been arrested twice as a dangerous enemy alien..."

THEY ARE ALL PAN-GERMANS AND PRO-GERMANS!

There is a German-language "anti-Nazi" weekly in New York, called "Neue Volkszeitung". It is the official paper of the German Social Democrats. Its editor is Mr. Gerhart H. Seger, a former Reichstag deputy, now an American citizen. Mr. Seger is lecturing from coast to coast preaching the gospel of the "poor" and "misguided" German people. He and his collaborators at the paper, Mr. Friedrich Stampfer and Rudolf Katz, have but one goal: to salvage Germany. Those who don't agree with them are called "Vansittartists". Messrs. Seger, Stampfer and Katz are more interested now in fighting Vansittart and Morgenthau than they are interested in exposing the dangers of a soft peace. They are concerned with the fate of Germany but not with the fate of the victims of German aggression.

On November 4, the "Neue Volkszeitung" published an editorial about the extermination camp of Majdanek. The editorial refers to the brilliant article written by Edgar Snow in a recent issue of the "Saturday Evening Post" and has this to say:

'Majdanek will go down in the history of Europe and Germany as one of the awful spots of dishonor of our era. No one can deny German CO-GUILT (deutsche Mitschuld) in this...'

That is the editorial comment of a so-called "anti-Nazi". It is the first attempt to put the blame for one of the biggest crimes in the history of mankind on somebody else's shoulders - at least partially...

Who are the other guilty ones? Maybe the Poles or the French or the Dutch?

But the editors of the "Neue Volkzeitung" are not the only ones who are fighting to excuse the German people. Take for instance the case of Professor Paul Tillich. He is Chairman of the "Council for a Democratic Germany" founded recently in New York by a group of German political refugees. The editor of the German language monthly "Freies Deutschland" published in Mexico City had asked Professor Tillich this question: "What do you think of the co-responsibility of the German people for Hitler's war...?

And here is the answer of Professor Tillich:

'It is inherent in fascism and nazism to set up a rule of the minority by dictatorial power: thus, in contrast to democracy THE GERMAN PEOPLE CANNOT BE HELD COLLECTIVELY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEEDS AND THE MISDEEDS OF THE HITLER GOVERNMENT ...'

The chairman for the "Council for a Democratic Germany" seems to forget the figures of the last free elections in Germany held on November 6, 1932 during the so-called Weimar Republic. In that free election before Hitler came to power the Nazi party got 11,737,000 votes, while the Social Democratic Party, the next strongest, got 7,248,000 votes. For some time now German political exiles and Pro-German elements have been trying to convince American public opinion that Hitler and the Nazis imposed themselves upon the German people. It is a fact, however, that the Nazi party in a free election received the most votes. The argument that they didn't get the majority is simply ridiculous because a majority vote is only possible in a country with two major parties like the United States, and not in a country like Germany with so many different parties.

Professor Tillich, who calls himself a German liberal, denies the collective responsibility of the German people. It is therefore worth remembering what a British Labor Leader, Mr. William Gillis, Secretary of the International Department of the British Labor Party, has to say about the responsibility of the German people:

'The doctrine that in these days peoples are not responsible for their governments had dangerous implications. To assert that the highly educated Germans, in particular, are not responsible for the acts of their Government, and embody the principle in the frame-work of an international policy, is very dangerous.

'It invites the Germans to deny their duties and obligations as citizens and relieves them of their responsibilities to one another and to the world, it implies that the Germans are not guilty for the war and absolves them from any necessity for that self-examination of conscience which should inspire a social and political revolution in Germany.

'It is a principle which can be interpreted by the Germans to mean that, by a mere change of government overnight, they may escape the consequences of defeat or even defeat itself, when they have lost hope of victory; and that such a change of government would be atonement sufficient for the massacre of millions, armed and unarmed, and a sufficient discharge of German responsibility for the war, devastation, plunder and massacre.

'In peace the collective responsibility of a nation for the acts of its government, even past governments, is the basis of law, morals and politics in inter-State relations. To abrogate that principle in favor of an avowed and foul agressor is to condone aggression and appear to make war a lawful instrument of international policy.

'The doctrine is an invitation to a Third German World War...'

The united front of apologists for Germany comprises a lot of German language papers from coast to coast. To give only one example, here is a front page story from the "Siebenbuergisch-Amerikanisches Volksblatt", published in Cleveland, Ohio . On October 26 this paper printed a dispatch from New York entitled "25 years of occupation of the Reich planned?" The story says that Dr. George N. Shuster, president of Hunter College, predicted in a lecture that "Germany might be occupied by about ten thousand British and American troops for 25 years after the war ..." This item seemed to be so shocking to the editor of the German-language newspaper that he added the following editorial comment:

'We print this news only because it is amusing to read and because this is Halloween; we have a hunch that Herr Dr. Shuster must have been to a party the day before the speech.'

It is too bad that Professor Shuster is being ridiculed by that German weekly; evidently its editor overlooked the fact that the president of Hunter College is one of the foremost apologists for the "poor" Germans.

"The German American", published in New York and sponsored by the so-called German American Emergency Conference, in its issue of October 1st, called the proposals for de-industrialization of Germany *'insane plans'* which *'after the annihilation of Hitler would transform the Germans into a nation of rag-proletarians, mercenaries for any new reactionary venture and deprive of its base and possibility for democratic government of the Germans.'* Mr. Morgenthau's plan is called a *'reactionary utopia'*.

And falling in with the recent very obvious propaganda line the "German American", which calls itself a liberal paper, continues:

'All such senseless plans are only weapons in the hands of Nazi propaganda serving systematically to drive the German people into the suicide of continued resistance against the Allies. The soldiers of the Allies must pay with their blood for such and similar stupidities of plan-making...

It is not only in this country that German refugees are fighting for a soft peace; they are agitating in England, too. The German newspaper "Freie Tribuene" published in London recently quoted the following from a speech by Mr. Hans Vogel, leading representative of the German Social-Democrats in Britain:

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'In spite of the fact that the Atlantic Charter does not apply to Germany, we German Social-Democrats still (!!) desire the destruction of the Third Reich... We are only in favor of the unconditional capitulation of the Nazis and their generals. But we are opposed to the unconditional capitulation of the German people. The representatives of German democracy, Social-Democracy, and the trade unions cannot possibly capitulate. If the plans for dealing with Germany, now being drawn up in the Allied camp, are to be put into practice, then it is hard to see how Germany's fate could differ from the grim picture designed by the Nazis. We will fight against this even if, as at present, the whole world seems to be against us.' Germans never change...always aggressive, always threatening.

Cartoon by Cussel.- Courtesy American Legion Magazine.

THEY APPLAUDED AND CHEERED GERMAN FRIGHTFULNESS.
AND THEY STILL SUPPORT IT WITH FANATICAL ZEAL...

AN IDEA FOR TOTAL PUNISHMENT

by

EMERY REVES

Emery Reves is the author of "A Democratic Manifesto" and founder of the European Co-Operation Press Service, which had among its authors such men as Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Count Sforza and others. - The following is reprinted from Mr. Reves' article "How to Civilize Germany", published in the November 1944 "American Mercury."

The ... task must be to mete out just retribution and punishment for the crimes committed by the German Reich in the past years. There is one policy, both just and effective, to achieve this aim: Let the German people realize what they did to other peoples and let them endure the same humiliation and tortures they imposed on the people they conquered. Let them live under their own rule. Not merely for the sake of punishment or vengeance, but for the sake of their education - in order to solve the German problem once and for all.

Germans have a strange inclination toward all that is metaphysical and symbolic. German literature is unique in its symbolism. Germans would therefore understand the causes of their own sufferings much better if they realized that every single one of the thousands of measures we shall have to apply in occupied Germany is nothing but the mirror-image of a measure invented by them and already applied by them to others. We should condemn Germany to a period of total punishment equal to the number of years and days between September 1, 1939, and the day of their capitulation. During this period we should impose on Germany not one single measure of Allied origin. We should impose on Germany each and every military, administrative and economic measure Germans imposed on Poland, Russia, France, Belgium, Yugoslavia and the other occupied countries. But obviously we should not go to the extent of torturing them and we should not establish Lublin murder factories.

The various governments-in-exile and the underground organizations have complete files of the orders and decrees of the German military and police organizations. Every one of them should be enforced by us in Germany. On every street corner of the cities and in all the village squares we should paste up posters, day after day, posters divided into two parts. On the left side there should be the exact copy of a specific Nazi decree, indicating its date and the country in which it was first enforced. On the right side of the poster should be the United Nations' decree, the exact copy of the original Nazi ordinance, merely replacing the word "Pole" or "Norwegian" or "Frenchman" with the word "German."

We should not ask for financial reparations because we know that in twenty or thirty years they will no longer be collected. But we should exact, as the Germans did in the countries they occupied, daily payments to cover the expenses of our occupation forces, which should be, as were their demands, three times higher than actual expenses. As they did in the countries they conquered, we should use two-thirds of the money to buy up German stocks, real estate, machinery and other valuables. They should be made to understand that these payments are imposed upon them only because such payments were imposed by Germany upon other nations.

We should put into print and let every single German read the German decrees of forced labor recruiting and apply the same method in Germany so that they should know they must go to rebuild devastated territories in foreign lands, not because the

United Nations invented such a cruel method of separating families but because they, the Germans, invented this measure and enforced it upon other people.

We should print on the left side of an order the German decree that every Pole must take off his hat and step down from the pavement when he meets a German soldier, and on the right side that this is now what the German must do when he meets an Allied soldier.

We should issue to Germans ration cards allocating about half as much food as the other European nations will receive and tell them that they have to endure malnutrition because this is how they treated the other European nations.

Against any resistance to such measures announced by the Allied military command, we should apply in every German city and in every German village the hostage system, making it quite clear that the reason for this injustice is that they, the Germans, invented and carried out this barbarous practice. We should select in advance, and in every German community, a certain number of hostages, former members of the Nazi party, former army officers and Nazi government officials, holding them personally responsible for any violation of our decrees, even if they are personally not connected with any specific act of violation.

It is certain that the United Nations could devise no more severe punishment, no more iron-handed occupation regime than that which the Germans devised when they occupied other countries. Nothing inhumane or uncivilized should originate with us. But we should impose on Germany the most uncivilized and inhumane devices they themselves used when they were the conquerors.

Such punishment of Germany, for a period of 2,000 days, would be the strongest retribution and, if properly applied, it would concentrate the hatred of the Germans on their own defeated leaders and not on us. The occupation with all its hardships, I repeat, should be a German regime, not an Allied regime.

Whenever the Allies announce a measure to be imposed on Germany as retribution for their crimes or as prevention of another German aggression, the Goebbels propaganda machine immediately diffuses such news through all its loud-speakers, warning the German people that the Allies are going to destroy and exterminate them, and thus arousing their will to resist and fight. This psychological weapon can be taken away from the German government by declaring as our policy the establishment in Germany after the war of a purely German method of rule, announcing that we have no intention to impose on Germany any measure of Allied origin, but that we shall introduce in Germany every single measure they themselves invented and applied in conquered countries. Such a policy, vigorously brought home to the German masses, could not possibly strengthen their will to resist the Allied armies. It may well induce them to turn their guns on their own officers and leaders.

It appears that the Allies have decided that, after occupation of Germany, we shall "outlaw" the Nazi Party and prohibit displaying of swastika and other Nazi insignia. This is an absolutely infallible way to drive the Nazis underground, to

"No decent person can nowadays believe that the majority of the German people are still human beings."

(Eduard Benes, Prime Minister of Czechoslovakia)

secure protection of the Nazi underground organization by the overwhelming majority of the German people and to make the swastika a sacred symbol for generations of Germans to worship. Mass psychology works like a jet-propulsion engine. One has to let off steam in the direction opposite to that toward which one wants to move. There is one way alone to destroy the swastika as a respected symbol in Germany and this is for the Allied occupational forces to compel the Germans to wear it. The only way to make the Germans hate the swastika is for the Allied occupational authorities to issue a decree that on certain occasions, certain dates or whenever Germans are traveling outside their home town, they must wear the Nazi arm band as a sign of recognition. Such a measure would make the swastika a sign of shame for the Germans and make them long for the moment when we allow them to throw their swastikas into the garbage heap. But if we, the Allies, prohibit wearing and displaying the Nazi emblems, we can be absolutely certain that millions of Germans will hide and cherish them, and their worship will be carried on from generation to generation.

Rigorous application of German methods of conquest in Germany itself means not only just retribution, but it also means the only possible method of re-educating the German people. It is a childish illusion to believe that we can change the character of a nation by teaching sound history and sociology in universities or by enforcing the use of school books written by us. The one educational method which can be effective must be more primitive and more emotional in nature. Obviously we cannot and should not apply to the Germans the horrors they inflicted on millions of innocent people. We cannot torture and murder them in gas chambers and death camps. But even these facts - unknown to the German people - must somehow be brought home to them. Perhaps the best method would be to rebuild in the major German cities replicas of these death factories and to make it compulsory for Germans, particularly school children, to visit them with guides capable of giving the necessary explanations. Such institutions, maintained for a number of years, until every single German has visited them, might fill the German people with shame and produce the necessary educational effect.

This is not a tooth-for-a-tooth policy. These measures suggested here not as a long-term policy but as a short-term punishment, a radical method of mass re-education which chould be applied by us without any sense of vengeance, without any hatred or passion, but with the cold and scientific detachment of an operating surgeon.

O R C H I D S T O R K O

"THE MASTER RACE", produced by Robert S. Golden for RKO RADIO PICTURES, INC., is a courageous and effective presentation of the problem which will confront the United Nations when Germany capitulates. This imaginative picture also highlights the fact that Germany will carry on her plans for World War III, plans already far advanced, right under the noses of Allied Occupation Forces.

Some will label the picture as a "fantasy". But the fact remains that it is more of a documentary film than anything else. Anne Froelick and Rowland Leigh have worked with Herbert J. Biberman upon the adaptation from a story by Mr. Biberman and Mr. Biberman has directed the picture. This is no place for a discussion of the artistic merit of the production, but we cannot refrain from congratulating RKO RADIO PICTURES, the actors and the whole production staff upon the efficient and imaginative handling of the gravest problem ever faced by the civilized world.

Every American should see "THE MASTER RACE".

GERMAN BLUEPRINT FOR DEFEAT

by

EUGENE TILLINGER

"We are too few!" is the new German slogan. One hears it over the German radio, beginning to talk about the "great numerical superiority of the Allies." One reads it in the German newspapers, where the blame is being laid at the door of the one-and-a-half million German women who remained unmarried and childless after the last war. If each of these had had but two children - half of whom would surely have been boys - then Germany would have had one-and-a-half million more soldiers in this war! A million and a half soldiers! That means one hundred divisions, and in that case the war would have been over long ago!

The old funny business of finding justifications and excuses for defeat is beginning to make itself heard again. This time the line comes straight out of the bio-political school. In a speech in Hindenburg Hall in Lubeck recently, a Nazi leader shrieked: "And WHY haven't we won this war yet? Because there was a steep decline in the birth-rate after 1870, and we therefore have 19 million people too few."

That speaks for itself. But even stronger evidence is to be found in a recent front-page story from "Das Schwarze Korps." The story starts with a supposed conversation between a poor old mother of five sons and the rich father of one daughter, both of whom have lost all their possessions in an air raid. They are commiserating with each other when they are interrupted by a wounded soldier, who turns on the rich man with the following tirade:

"You must admit that the old woman's five sons made up a machine gun crew. If you had five sons too, Germany would have had another machine gun crew and they might have succeeded in repulsing an enemy attack which had been able to break through our lines just because one machine gun crew was missing...

"If our parents' generation had not succumbed to the madness of the doctrine of restriction of population we might have been able to mobilize a million more men. Do you realize what that means? Do you know how many more machine gun crews, battalions, regiments and divisions this would mean? Do you know what effect this would have had on our armament? Do you know how many able-bodied men we could leave at home to produce more arms and ammunition and that the war WOULD HAVE BEEN WON A LONG TIME AGO...

"Because our parents deprived themselves and the nation of so many souls, we now have to sacrifice so many lives. Because our parents gambled with material security, great material insecurity has come upon us. You see how silly it was of some parents to say: 'What is the good of having a lot of children if new wars only kill them?' I say to you: 'There is no greater security against being killed than having many children'"...

And he goes on:

"Large population figures mean many soldiers and many soldiers mean short wars. In a short war waged by many the risk for the individual is certainly less than in a long war waged by a few. The greater the population figures, the smaller the prospect

of a war breaking out at all. If our great grandparents' and our grandparents' joy in having children had been shared by our parents, the center of Europe would today be inhabited by 120 million Germans, and who would dare to get into trouble with such a nation?"

That the Germans are planning a third World War, and that - thanks to their outrageous biological methods - they think they have a good chance of winning it, is evidenced by the German newspapers themselves. This writer has made an exhaustive study of the leading German newspapers and magazines of recent months. They leave no doubt that a propaganda campaign verging on hysteria has been put into play, with the intention of making the weapons of bio-political warfare popular.

The slight recession in the German birth-rate between 1939 and 1942 has been brought to a halt. The curve hit its low in the first half of 1942, when births were recorded at 952,913, as against 1,164,400 for the same period in the previous year. But 1943 saw an increase in births of 5.4 per cent over 1942, and since then the rate has continued to rise. Stalingrad was the turning point. The huge losses, coupled with the large numbers put out of the running by confinement in prison camps, led to a renewed home-front propaganda for "more children."

It is not surprising that "Das Schwarze Korps" should be the most persistent organ in the campaign for raising the birth-rate, for Heinrich Himmler himself in his capacity of "Commissioner for the Consolidation of the German Race," has consistently spread the good word that *"Germany must produce enough births to compensate for war losses."* To achieve this, anything goes. "Das Schwarze Korps" calls upon German women and girls *"not to allow a soldier's furlough to go by 'unprofitably' ... Since not all soldiers are on leave at the same time, and since the individual soldier is in a position to help numerous women to fulfill their 'national duty' in the interest of the fatherland, a German woman should never say 'No' to a German soldier, even if he is not her husband, fiance, or even acquaintance."* Himmler's public speeches follow the same line. In a recent "message to German womanhood," he said: *"A young girl who shirks her highest duty is just as much a traitor as a soldier who abandons the flag. For pure-blooded girls there is a war duty beyond marriage: to become mothers by soldiers leaving for the front."*

But don't think for a moment that it is only Party spokesmen who plug this tune. Eminent Nazi "scientists" are following it up with their own variations. The respected philosopher, Professor Ernst Bergman of Leipzig, announces that *"there are plenty of willing and qualified German youths ready to mate with available women and girls. Fortunately, one boy of good race suffices for twenty girls."* And Professor Friedrich Burgdoerfer, a population statistician, addressing himself to married couples, says: *"Every marriage capable and worthy of propagating the race must produce at least four or five children. In the case of marriage partners of higher capacity, particularly peasants and craftsmen, six, seven, or even more children are required."* But for tops in impertinence we quote from a speech of Gauleiter Simon before a group of girl workers: *"You will be gratified to hear that you will be per-*

'The peoples of Europe have but one wish and this is to be given a chance to remove for all time the differences in their low standard of life and Germany's high.'

(Dr. Jan Papanek, Czechoslovak Minister to the U. S.)

mitted to serve for six months in a German labor camp, and proud to learn that you will have the honor of returning as prospective German mothers."

To us this may sound pretty barbaric. But it is a sorry fact - and one too generally neglected - that German morality in the last few years has sunk well below the civilized level. The perverted standards of the inner circle of the Nazi hierarchy have become the standards of the whole German people. In the movies and on the stage, in books and painting, the elemental aspects of sex are played up with typical German thoroughness. What the Germans used to decry in "decadent" France, they have exaggerated a hundred-fold at home - all in the interests of their "biological" plan.

The point to which depravity has been popularized is witnessed by the following story which has been gloated over in several German newspapers:

A marriage of long standing had been childless. The couple wanted children, but though the woman consulted many doctors, none had been able to help her. Nevertheless, being a "German woman," she had to have a child. So they found a way out: The wife had a sister, a youngish widow, who proceeded to come and live with them. Between her and the husband there was consummated not an "affaire de coeur," but "an open and honorable arrangement," whereby the sister "made up for the wife's deficiency." As reported, the story ends with the words, "And now, flying in the face of destiny, a German baby kicks and coos in his cradle."

Propaganda for marriage has kept pace with the promotion of illegitimate births. All over Germany "Correspondence Centers" have been instituted for the purpose of helping young people make one anothers' acquaintance, with a view to marriage. The Centers are under the supervision of the Office of Racial Policy. Nobody who is "unfit" for marriage under the terms of the Reich marriage laws is accepted. An applicant received descriptions of a number of persons, without names attached. He (or she) decided by correspondence whether there is a suitable partner among them.

Besides the Correspondence Centers, official marriage bureaus have been established in every German city. Under their auspices, men and girls are brought together at "Canteens". But, unlike our Stage Door Canteens, whose only idea is to give the boys a good time, these parties have the purpose of throwing the girls into the men's arms. Only those who want to get married are admitted. Music and dancing are merely means to an end. Whereas our canteen hostesses have to measure up to certain conventional moral standards, the German girls are subjected to rigorous medical examinations to establish their racial purity.

Invalided soldiers are to be sent to special marriage bureaus, the first of which has just been opened in Leipzig. According to the authorities, there are enough marriageable girls in Germany to provide all the crippled and blinded soldiers with wives and children.

A further detail of bio-political strategy is the loosening up of divorce regulations. Unwillingness or inability to have a child is now good cause for divorce. A man who has been married to his wife for fifteen or twenty years has a right to divorce her, because, according to a clause in the new regulations, "such long-standing marriages have no further worth, since the women, for the most part, are no longer fertile, while the men, in many cases, could produce children in a new marriage."

The moral decline which this sort of thing leads to is illustrated by an incident reported in the Munich Medical Weekly: A peasant, whose wife was ill and unable to bear children, appeared before a physician to obtain a medical statement certifying his wife's condition, so that he could institute divorce proceedings. The physician apparently told him that such action was faithless and indecent, and refused to give the certificate. In his letter of refusal he was indiscreet enough to write that "a man who deserts his spouse when she is in need is committing an act of disloyalty to his country", and that "the State could hardly be interested in the children of such a man." As a result of his letter, the physician was arrested, and sentenced to three months in prison. At the trial the judge pronounced: "The first duty of a German physician is to care for the healthy. The opinion of the physician in this case is scandalous, because the desire to have children is a sign of loyalty to one's blood."

The net result of all these rules and regulations which aim by hook or crook to raise the German birth-rate, is still incalculable. German soldiers have been urged in the past few years to have children by Norwegian, Dutch, Greek and French women, but under no circumstances to marry them. The children are sent to Germany where the father's family must care for them. If the father is married, the wife is obliged to take the child into her home. Where this is impossible, the children are turned over to public nurseries and brought up as children of the State. We have no actual statistics, but it is safe to assume that there are today hundreds of thousands of such half-German children, whom the German State will officially regard as its own.

As Germany's chances of winning the war militarily grow dimmer and dimmer, her prospects for coming out ahead in her other, subsidiary, war loom brighter. Few people in this country are aware that alongside of her regular war, fought with the usual weapons, Germany is waging a second, invisible war, on a somewhat different plane. This "bio-political war," as she calls it, consists in the building up of her own population and the cutting down of her neighbors', in the hope of dominating the continent in spite of military defeat.

People here are all too prone to look at the German atrocities as the work of the Gestapo, or the SS, or even individual army corps. But the fact is that the mass slaughters, the lethal chambers, the systematic starving of children, and the transportation of millions of Europeans as slave workers to Germany is part of an intricate plan, computed to the last figure, and in operation ever since the first days of the war.

With defeat in sight, Germany is leaving nothing undone to secure demographic superiority over the rest of Europe. Hand in hand with the child-bearing campaign on the home-front, the extermination of the fit in the occupied countries goes forward with mounting fury. The Germans have seen to it that after this war France will be weakened as never before; they have seen to it that Poland, which in the decades before the war had a rising birth-rate comparable to Germany's own, will be so decimated as to be no longer a rival; they have seen to it that the systematic annihilation of Czechs, Yugoslavs, Greeks, etc., will leave its mark for decades to come.

It can be said with certainty that after this ostensibly lost war, Germany will have achieved her demographic superiority over her neighbors. That she intends at the eleventh hour to make of all Europe an unimaginable inferno, she has herself announced: "We will turn the continent into a maelstrom of destruction where only one cry is heard - the cry of blood!" And no one in Europe has any doubt but that before her final surrender she will do just that. She will slaughter countless millions of all nations, in order to insure her own numerical position in the future.

In spite of defeat, Germany will grow stronger with each passing year. Neither treaties nor sanctions, destruction of German industries nor reparations, will restore the maimed and starving children of non-German Europe; nor will they bring to life the dead and unborn. War or no war, Germany looks out for her future.

That is how things will stand in Europe at the end of the war. And the question remains, "What can still be done to shatter Germany's hideous plans?"

Ernest Hemingway has suggested the sterilization of all Nazi Party members. Obviously, our sentiments on that score will make that impossible. But what could be done?

There has been considerable discussion of the Russian plan to transport five, six or even ten million German soldiers, Gestapo agents, SS men and others, to Russia to rebuild the towns and cities wantonly destroyed by the German armies. In this way millions of German men and women between 18 and 36 years of age would be kept out of Germany for five, six, eight, ten years. Whatever the political implications of such a measure might be, one thing is sure: it is the sanest and simplest way to offset the consequences of the German bio-political war. These millions of Germans would not be able to add to the count of German births. In addition, the hundreds of thousand of illegitimate "children of the State" must be brought out of Germany and returned to the countries of their birth.

Unfortunately, our sentimentalists will protest against most of these ideas on the grounds of short-sighted humanitarian principles. But it is to be hoped that this time the realists will not allow themselves to be overruled. And the men who dictate the peace would do well to remember the words of Georges Clemenceau, that great man of prophetic vision: *"There are 20 million Germans too many."*



Cartoon by Illingworth - Courtesy London Daily Mail.

THE TOUGHEST JOB IN GERMANY

by

MARK van DOREN

The political chaos that will come in Germany when the thing we call its government is gone, with no makings of another government in sight, naturally gives us the shivers. But a worse case of shivers can be had by anyone who tries to think through the problem of German education. For there is nothing in Germany now that deserves to be called education. There is only the training of animals. Education is for men and Germany has not been trying to make men. Chaos is already there -- has been there for eleven years -- and anything that is going to be built in its place will have to be built from the ground up, with or without the aid of a people whose younger generation has broken contact with everything that is valuable in the European tradition. European and American education could be better than it is, but it is as good as it is because a great tradition has continued to be available. The young German of our time has been trained as a tiger cub -- or is it as some kind of rodent that snarls? The job of restoring him to his human bearings is so tough as to suggest despair at the very start. Yet we must not despair. For the German people have been trained to be dreadful. If it is possible to educate them so that we can live with them we should see that this is done. We shall not live otherwise.

The first step is being taken now, and I have no doubt that it will be taken to the end. The first step in the education of Germany is military defeat -- the worst defeat any German ever heard of or imagined. A defeat that no German will ever be able to minimize, in the beer hall, the family parlor, or the class room. The notion that Germany is superior to the rest of the world because she likes war better than the rest of the world, and because in the last analysis it always wins its wars, must literally be beaten to death. We cannot afford to let any German enjoy the memory of World War II, or cherish the illusion that the rest of the world in this war did not prove its military superiority in every particular, and to the hilt. We already have a great teacher in the field. He is Professor Eisenhower, and he will finish the first step.

Everything else depends upon this being done. Nazi "education" succeeded in the 1930's because there were so many diplomatic and military triumphs as texts for the lesson. Germany would conquer the rest of the world because she was already doing so. The bogus philosophy of National Socialism made relatively little headway by itself. The seventeen-year-old graduate of the Hitler Youth and the Nazi Children's Organization who was captured at Beaugency the other day, and whose picture appeared in "Stars and Stripes", thold his interviewer that Germany would win the war. The basis of his belief was his memory of how it already was being done when he was a child; and his ignorance of the fact that the series of victories had ceased. When he answered a certain question with the words: "If the Fuehrer says so, it is true," he was remembering a Hitler in whose way nobody used to stand. When he predicted that with a German victory the United States would find that its Czechs, its Poles, its Negroes, its Jews, its democrats had disappeared, he was still fresh from hearing about the populations of Europe with which Hitler had actually played a game of shuffleboard. He was "educated" on success, as for that matter every German has been -- or on the expectation of success -- during several generations. The prospect must disappear. The thought must become possible for Germans that their only hope lies in peace and responsible behavior. And their only superiority -- if they can prove it.

The boy in question may have heard that we plan to exterminate the Nazis as soon as we get where we can do so, and he may think that there is no difference between that plan and his Fuehrer's plan to exterminate the democrats in America -- that is to say, most of us. The difference is enormous, as any citizen of the United Nations knows. We exterminate in the name of peace, the Germans exterminate in the name of war. But we must not overlook a certain point in passing. Some of us may suppose that whereas the Germans plan to do away with most of us we shall have to do away with only a few of them -- i.e., a few hundred thousand Nazis. But it is all the Germans who have been trained as wolves or rodents. Or we must assume so in the absence of evidence to the contrary; and no such evidence has appeared since 1939.

In other words, our own safety demands that we exterminate whatever must be exterminated among the whole German people. Nobody seriously recommends that this be that whole people itself. Therefore it must be the fallacies in which all Germans have been trained. It must be not merely Nazism but Germanism. That must not sursurvive.

But how can its survival be prevented? I do not pretend to know all the answers, but I am sure it is a question of education -- the real thing this time and no ersatz with a base of conditioned responses. The real thing works with consciousness and perfects the individual in the use of his reason. It asks him to practice the art of making his own decisions, his own choices. It encourages him to listen to others, but it tells him that his own brains are the only ones he can really use, and it gives him every opportunity to exercise them in freedom. It is not education "for" anything. It is education. It is not even education "for" democracy. Democracy cannot be taught in ten or a thousand easy lessons. It is what we have when as many of us as possible think for ourselves. It is most flourishing when the greatest number of its citizens do so; and when they enjoy doing so to the extent that they will fight to keep the privilege.

All of the good results of education are indirect, and many of them depend upon the health of the surrounding society, upon its aims and assumptions, upon its unwritten laws, upon a great many things that everybody knows, whether he is educated or not. Hence again the importance of a defeat that every German will recognize and remember. He cannot be forced to believe in one if he does not already do so. Education cannot be forced.

This is why at first blush it seems difficult to arbitrate between those who say that Germany must be left to reeducate herself and those who say that we must take over the job. But the difficulty is only apparent. The job we must take over is the job of seeing to it that education in Germany is never again a forced education. If Germany can satisfy us that she can see to this, then I suppose we shall happily

"The only suspicion of a "soft peace" that might prevail would be on the diplomatic or political front, which has not kept pace with the progress of our arms. There undoubtedly are some who would temporize in order to shorten the war, a method that would invite and make possible the Third World War; but the overwhelming sentiment, this newspaper believes, is for a "hard peace". This means neither the wholesale destruction of Germany and everything German, nor wiping out of the population, which would be senseless. A "hard peace" means the annihilation of German militarism and therefore the tedious task of rubbing out the Germany psychology of war.."

(From an editorial in the News-Bulletin, Bristol, Va)

leave the responsibility to her. The political case is parallel. As soon as Germany proves to us that she is competent to democratize herself, we shall want to let her do it. We have enough to do at home, in both education and democracy -- which singularly are the same thing. Until we are sure of both things, however, we must force upon Germany the decision to behave as much as possible in the human manner. In education this means that we must force her to stop forcing. We cannot afford to fail in this any more than we can afford to fail in our determination to prevent her from rearming. We must not take her mere word for it. During the long occupation which I take to be inevitable we must pulp all of her present textbooks; we must deny any Nazi or near-Nazi, or any softhead who has no more to say for himself than that the Nazis made him an unwilling slave, the right to teach in any German school or university; and to remedy the teacher shortage consequent upon such a policy -- for relatively few Germans of any kidney will pass the test -- we must be ready with teachers from the United Nations. German teachers would be better, but we must not assume that they exist until their existence is proved to the satisfaction of whatever body we set up for the purpose.

What we must make clear that we want is an atmosphere in which students can think and talk freely -- in groups democratically disciplined. The typical German prisoner of war these days has nothing in his head beyond techniques and slogans. Germany must understand that for her own good, let alone ours, her youth must have ideas. Democracy is not a subject to be taught but a habit to be formed. A good, hard habit, with its inexorable disciplines. If Germany can show that she understands this, well and fine. Until she does understand it we must keep on telling her.

Our best chance of telling her so that she will understand will follow upon the defeat I began by describing. Nothing is more important than that. Nor should we hesitate to help her comprehend all that it implies. We should see to it that all of her citizens know all about the atrocities of the past five years, in Poland, Russia, Greece, Holland, and England. We should do this even if it means rubbing their noses in newsreels, over and over again. We should let them know who their real heroes are -- the martyrs whom they tortured and shot between 1932 and now. We should make it easy for them to learn what they need to learn, from cheap books containing the information we know they have lacked for a decade. We should remind her that talk and thought were our greatest strength, not the weakness she once supposed it was. Whatever is necessary we must do. For the atmosphere in which education can occur is what Germany at the moment does not even know she misses. First she must know that it is absent; then that it is desirable; and at last that it exists. The education will follow. We cannot force the education, but we can force the atmosphere. As a matter of fact, we had better.

THE GOOD GERMANS

The following is a verbatim report by the German News Agency, DNB, dated October 2, 1944:

'The letter of an infantryman to his mother quoted as typical of the spirit of the German people says in part: 'This terrible menace to the German existence was necessary for the spiritual development of the Reich. The menace has to increase up to the verge of annihilation to complete the purifying process (of the German spirit) ... War is the supreme law of life: perhaps this war will bring us nearer to the ideal of Nietzsche's superman. I am convinced that this war has carried mankind further than a hundred years of peace.'

THE GREAT GERMAN ALIBI IN THE MAKING

by

DREW MIDDLETON

The author, war correspondent for the New York Times at Supreme Allied Headquarters, has given us a clear and realistic picture about the reaction of the German people to Hitler, Nazism and Allied occupation. His dispatches tell us the story for which we have been waiting.

But certain pan-German apologists for the "poor" and "innocent" German people don't like Mr. Middleton. The so-called "Council for a Democratic Germany" founded in New York by German political refugees and sponsored by Dorothy Thompson, Reinhold Niebuhr, Dean Christian Gauss, etc. tries to minimize Mr. Middleton's articles. It is true, however, that Middleton's dispatches debunk all the wishful thinking of those who are propagandizing the fairy tale of the "other Germany".

We consider the article of Mr. Middleton published by the New Times Magazine on November 5, so important that we reprint part of it by special permission of the New York Times.

The people of captured cities and towns of the western Rhineland are in process of an ideological rearmament, in which the outlines of Germany's post-war case for leniency on the part of the western Allies is discernible. Germans have found excuse for their excesses in Europe, they have thriving national grievances and they are doing their best to spread these doctrines among all the Allies with whom they come in contact.

It is too early to know whether these beliefs represent a definite program on the part of the Nazi party to enable Germany to salvage something from the peace. There are many Allied interrogation officers who after talking with hundreds of German soldiers and civilians, believe that some such plan does exist.

This correspondent, in a month during which he talked to scores of Germans and read over a hundred reports of interrogation of prisoners, can only say that there are certain ideas which recur constantly. They reveal as much as anything else the moral proverty of the German nation.

One idea is that the Germans themselves are not responsible for any of the brutality and calculated cruelty which have marked the path of the "New Order" in Europe, because the Germans, the soldiers, SS men, industrial looters and commercial brigands were ordered to do these acts. In other words, burning, looting and torture can be excused because they were done as a result of orders. The Germans believe that

none of the blame attaches itself to them, only to those who gave the orders.

Their attitude toward the Nazi party and especially the SS, the people who gave the orders, is revealing. Many of the soldiers and the bulk of the civilians say they are anti-Hitler and anti-Nazi. This, of course, is to be expected, since the Germans are anxious to ingratiate themselves with the Americans and they think that this is one of the best methods of doing it.

This correspondent is satisfied that today in this German "winter of discontent" thousands of Germans are against Hitler and the Nazis. But not because Hitler and his party are evil. They are anti-Nazi now because the Nazis have lost the war for Germany. They curse Hitler for taking their young men, for allowing their cities to be bombed. But they could endure this so long as they believed that victory could still be won. Now, with American and British guns and planes knocking their armies and cities apart, with the Russians on the move in East Prussia, the Germans know the war is lost and Hitler has lost it for them. They are anti-Nazis now just as they were anti-Monarchists in 1918, when they perceived that the Kaiser's attempt to conquer Europe had failed.

A great German grievance was first encountered among German prisoners, usually officers, last summer when the German defensive position in Normandy had been smashed. It was this: "Yes, we've been beaten," an officer prisoner would say. "Yet a million Germans have died to save the world from bolshevism."

Since then the writer has heard the same sentiments in prison cages in Belgium and Germany and from German civilians. The Germans are hurt when anyone doubts the holiness of their crusade in the East or their protestations that in the summer of 1941 the Red Army was preparing to invade East Prussia.

The Germans also have a pat excuse for their defeats in the West. It is that they were beaten not by the skill and courage of the American and British soldiers and airmen but by the overwhelming weight of equipment. More than once I have heard Germans attribute their own inadequacies in tanks and guns to corruption of the great German industrialists and members of the Nazi party. They refuse to admit the tremendous effect which Anglo-American bombing has had on their production. This attitude probably is stronger in the west Rhineland than in the

THE "GOOD" GERMANS

Congressmen who were in England and France are for a tough peace. In one hospital ten Congressmen saw a French boy, 9, hairless, head covered with scar tissue, arms and most of his body bandaged.

Chet Holifield, Calif. Democrat, was told the boy was from a nearby village. "When the Nazis left," a nurse said, "they rounded up townspeople, locked them in houses, boarded up windows, poured petrol on and set the houses afire. Most victims were burned to death, we got this boy and some others in time."

(Drew Pearson)

Ruhr, where the Germans have seen at first hand what scientific bombing can do to industrial plants.

These are the four principal themes which constitute German thoughts on the war as exemplified by the interrogation of civilians as refugees and soldiers as prisoners. Thus far they have been notably unsuccessful in convincing their conquerors of the validity of these ideas. For the first German effort at convincing Americans that they were not responsible for the war has been made on front-line troops, Americans who have seen their friends killed by Germans in Africa, Sicily, Italy, France and Belgium. To men of a rifle company or a field battery committed to battle, to soldiers who have been in the line for weeks, even months, there are only two things to do with a German - shoot him or, if he surrenders, send him pack to the prisoners-of-war cages.

The spectacle of civilians evacuating Aachen left front-line doughboys unmoved. They may have felt for the old women carrying heavy bundles or the little children carrying their toys, but they didn't show it. The Germans have taught them to feel somewhat differently about things from the way they felt when first they boarded ship for the war.

Studies In Pessimism . . . .

"The geese look wise and they attend,
But do they really comprehend
What Schopenhauer is driving at?"

Cartoon by Yardley - Courtesy Baltimore Sun.

"DON'T GET CHUMMY WITH JERRY"

An editorial from the Army newspaper "The Stars and Stripes" which every American should read.

This is a total war - a war of entire peoples. The men, women and children of Germany against the men, women and children of the United Nations. Who made it a total war? The Germans. Every resource in Germany is part of the Nazi war machine. Every man, woman and child. Every German factory and every German farm.

But at Aachen we may lose this war. Because here's what's going on around Aachen:

1. German civilians are giving the Yanks the V sign, the glad hand, free beer, big smiles, plenty of talk about not being Nazis at heart, and hurray for Democracy.

2. Some GIs and plenty of officers are returning the smiles, flirting with the fraulеins, drinking the beer and starting to think what nice folks the Germans really are.

3. German civilians are being removed from Aachen and driven two miles in U.S. Army trucks to Lutzow barracks in Brand - a suburb of Aachen.

To move them out of the city is a matter of strict military necessity. But these Nazis are being quartered in the best buildings outside Aachen. They are being brought there in Army vehicles. There are canvas covers over them to keep off the rain.

They have already received 20 tons of Army food. Army authorities found two large cooking vats and brought them to the Nazis in U. S. Army trucks. These Germans are eating hot chow - soup, meat, vegetables, coffee, cake. They are sleeping in warm, dry rooms. They are being cared for by American and British authorities, as solicitous about these poor German civilians as a mother hen over her chicks.

General Ike spoke his piece on non-fraternization in no uncertain terms. He did so with full knowledge of the consequences of pampering the Germans, who regard kindness as weakness and who are already taking full advantage of the kindly, sentimental American sap.

GI Joe will obey the order not to fraternize with the Germans. It will be a tough order to obey. By nature he's friendly. He's also lonely. He's also thirsty and curious. When his arm isn't hugging an MI, it aches to hug a girl. When he's not bent on killing, he's intent on kissing. But, to repeat, GI Joe will obey it, just the same as he's obeyed every other order he's been given so far.

But the order will be tougher to obey because of what is going on around Aachen.

If an open field in the rain is OK for GI Joe, how about open fields for able bodied Nazis?

If cold chow is good enough for GI Joe, how about K-rations for Hans and Fritz?

If there are trucks enough to bring up 20 tons of food for the Germans, why are combat troops getting along on a half pack of cigarettes a day - when they get them?

If replacements can ride from the beach to the front in uncovered trucks, how about a little fresh air for the Nazis?

Yes, GI Joe will obey the non-fraternization order. He knows Joe Goebbels has told the Germans

our Army is sloppy, undisciplined and over-friendly. He doesn't want to be a stooge for Nazi propaganda. So if the order is: don't cuddle up with the Germans, cuddling is out.

But if Nazi-cuddling is out for GI Joe, how about putting Nazis off limits for everyone else too? HOW ABOUT LETTING THE GERMAN MEN, WOMEN AND KIDS KNOW THAT THEIR SUPPORT OF HITLER AND HIS CROWD, THEIR RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE, THEIR AGGRESSIONS, THROUGHOUT THE WORLD, DON'T MAKE US LOVE THEM TO THE POINT OF TREATING THEM SO MUCH BETTER THAN OUR OWN BOYS WHO ARE BEING KILLED BY NAZI GUNS AND GRENADES?

How about carrying out the true spirit of General Ike's proclamation - that "we come as conquerors" - and not as over-friendly saps?

We're not for copying the Nazis. We're not for budging an inch from the Geneva Convention. We're not for bombing or machine-gunning civilians. We're not for concentration camps, Nazi style. We're not for kicking around babies, pregnant women, the aged and sick. We're not for being rough, aggressive, insolent or overbearing.

WE ARE FOR MAKING THE GERMANS REALIZE WHAT IT'S LIKE TO BE ON THE OTHER END OF A TOTAL WAR. WE ARE FOR LETTING THEM TASTE THE MISERY THEIR KIND OF WAR HAS CAUSED OTHERS. WE ARE FOR STARTING THE PROCESS OF GERMAN RE-EDUCATION RIGHT NOW - IN AACHEN, IN COLOGNE, IN EVERY OTHER GERMAN CITY UNTIL WE MEET UP WITH THE RUSSIANS COMING THE OTHER WAY.

WE'RE FOR CUDDLING NAZIS LESS.

WE'RE FOR CUDDLING GI JOE MORE.

Cartoon by Butterworth - Courtesy Manchester Daily Dispatch.

THE "POOR" GERMANS

YES, THEY CHEERED...

The Bulletin of the "Council for a Democratic Germany" in its issue of Oct. 25, under the challenging title "How do you know, Mr. Middleton?" attacks the brilliant war correspondent of the New York Times. In his dispatch of Oct. 14, Mr. Middleton has referred to the people of Aachen, "caught at last in the war whose start they cheered so lustily a little more than five years ago."

The Bulletin of the "Council" has this comment to make:

'All reports of 1939 did agree that there was no cheering at all among the German people.'

William L. Shirer in a dispatch to the New York Herald Tribune, dated Aachen, Germany, November 11:

'...Bent and broken Germans of all ages but mostly old, dig in the debris...pityful specimen of humanity you think, and yet I SAW THEM IN THIS SAME HISTORIC TOWN EXACTLY FOUR YEARS AGO.

'They were not bent or broken or shell shocked then.

'They did not curse the 'brown pest' then.

'THEY CHEERED IT.'

FOR THE RECORD

"Adolf Hitler is blamed by the German people not so much for starting the war as for losing it.

"That quirk of German reasoning, reported by others as a casual observation, has been confirmed by United States Army interrogators interviewing a cross section of the small town of Roetgen, whose normal population of 2,400 has been increased recently the influx of refugees from Aachen, fifteen miles to the north. The main source of information was a group of thirty men and women of all ages and income groups.

"Hitler is generally held responsible for the war, the interrogators discovered, but the majority of those interrogated do not condemn him for starting the war as such but only for starting something that he could not finish successfully. He should have known better, they say, than to become involved with the Western Allies and Russia at the same time..."

(From a dispatch by Clifton Daniel in the New York Times, dateline 'With the U.S. First Army')

"The fact is that we waited a long time for the German people to act but there has been no large scale organized resistance since the advent of Hitlerism. You cannot acquit the German people of the consequences of the acts of their Government."

(Walter Citrine, British Labor Leader)

TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF THE MASTER RACE...

Typical German faces when they have surrendered. Surrendered? ... Yes - but that only means a delay in their plans for world conquest. Unless -- that's up to you and me...

(Photo French Press. and Information)

WHAT ABOUT GERMAN INTELLECTUALS?

by

G. A. BOON

The author is a former prominent member of the Netherlands Parliament.

We are quite aware that German professors have always proved themselves to be weak and have little courage. We remembered 1914, when 93 of the best-known ones answered the protest of the entire civilized world against German outrages in Belgium with the lamentable proclamation "Es is nichtwahr" ("It is not true"). So we felt the opinion regarding German professors expressed by the King of Hanover in 1838 still was true: "I can pick up harlots and professors at every corner of the street." Later, many of them received appointments under the Weimar Republic and appeared to be real democrats. Once again we had fooled ourselves into thinking that you could find, among the German intellectuals, men who were truly Europeans and who were prepared to cooperate in creating a peaceful world.

How did those of these men who were left act? They disappeared at times, only to reappear frequently as defenders of the Nazi regime, in spite of the fact that, in the case of many of them, their whole former life and work was in conflict with the Nazi teaching.

Although I know many resigned, and others were maltreated in concentration camps or had fled the country, in the majority of these cases it was because of a "skeleton in the cupboard" in the shape of a Jewish grandmother, or a Jewish son-in-law, or because they had played a prominent role in a Freemason or pacifist organization, and so they had become unacceptable to the new masters. Those who could prove they had Aryan blood, remained as Hitler's intellectual collaborators.

And as for any protest by German professors similar to the one made at a later date by their colleagues of the Dutch University of Leiden, none ever was forthcoming.

As with the professors, so it was with the judges and the lawyers. They became lackeys, calmly accepting the statement of the Minister of Justice in 1935 that "Whatever our Fuehrer wills, gentlemen of the legal profession, whether you be judges, court officials, department of justice specialists or attorneys, you must carry it out."

Artists acted in the same way, too. They let themselves be told that "the artist, like everybody else in Germany, must fit himself into the disciplined pattern of National Socialism; the time for individualism is over." Here are a few examples.

Richard Strauss, the most famous of living German composers, accepted a post from Goebbels as head of the Nazi Reichsmusikkamer. In this post he had to forbid the appearance of many old friends and the performance of the works of others.

Wilhelm Furtwaengler, the best of all German conductors, resigned, mockingly, when he was forbidden to give performances of the works of his friend Hindemith. Only a few short months later he gave in and became once again the conductor of the Berlin Philharmonic.

Gerhart Hauptmann, an author whose works have been translated into many languages and who, in the old days, showed great sympathy for the oppressed, as witness his play Die Weber, accepted the ovation of the Nazi mob and allowed them to name him the leading poet of the regime.

There is the case of Professor Ferdinand Sauerbruch, a surgeon with an international reputation, who was human enough in 1933 to help some of his Jewish assistants get out of the country. By the time 1935 came around, he issued a statement addressed to the world's medical profession which had been shocked by the fettering of science in Germany and by the atrocities of the Nazis. In this he wrote: "I am convinced of the peaceful intentions of the National Socialist Movement. The Hitler Government believes in peace and considers the maintenance of peace as its highest obligation. Therefore, we of the medical profession wish for peace, as long as it is consistent with the dignity of our country." Was Sauerbruch already lying at this date? It cannot be proved but, certainly by 1938, he must have been aware that Hitler's expressions of peaceful intentions were mere pretenses. And yet he spoke no protest. On the contrary, he was content to be the man who for four years was sent by Hitler to attend his most important followers whenever they needed a surgical operation.

That stormy petrel of German finance, Reichsbankpresident Schacht, who had gained one victory after another on the question of nonpayment of reparations and who was the man of the "Vertragszerstoerung in Etappen", who had been a pre-World War liberal, a World War super-patriot and annexationist, a post-war member of the democratic party and finally president of the Reichsbank in the Weimar Republic. What did he do? First, he withdrew temporarily from the public eye because he wanted to make sure that there would be a place for him in a future government in the eventuality of a collapse of the Nazi regime. Then he immediately offered his services to the Nazis when Hitler came into power and became the financial organizer of the attack by National Socialism on Europe.

Then there is Secretary of State Meissner who served under the Kaiser, and held the same post under Ebert and Bruening. He was the confidant of Hindenburg, whom he influenced to the advantage of Hitler, and still as Secretary of State, carried on as an efficient accessory in Hitler's misdeeds.

Dr. Gauss, the son of an internationally known mathematician, was the Wilhelmstrasse's greatest jurist and acquainted with every diplomat in Geneva. It was he who drew up the Locarno Pact, under Streseman, and was considered by everyone at Geneva to be a democrat and pacifist. However, under Hitler he drafted the Axis Pact and the treaty with Russia, and then, later on, the declaration of war on Russia. He had become a Nazi and a warmonger. If Hitler had won the war, he would have drafted, with the same precision and efficiency, an edict for the ruling of the world. Now, instead, he will be the worthy and unassuming worker who will do his level best to soften the terms that the Allies will impose on a beaten Germany.

All these men had the versatility and unscrupulousness of Simon Sinae, about whom a 16th Century author wrote a book entitled "The Ultimate Profession of Simon Sinae of Lucca, first Roman Catholic, then Calvinist, then Lutheran, then again Catholic, but Always an Atheist."

Those Germans were all monarchists, then democrats and pacifists, then Nazis -

"I was always a great admirer of Dorothy Thompson....But lately her mind is occupied with one thing - to acquit the Germans of their terrible crimes at any cost, even at the expense of her clear mind, perfect logic and the facts...."

(From a letter-to-the-editor of the Boston Globe by E. Bagus)

and they will be in the future whatever form of government may be in power - yet always remaining Pan-Germans.

Next we come to the ambassadors, who served under the Kaiser, under the Republic and then under Hitler. Those who resigned voluntarily when Hitler came into power and requested them to turn their legations into an office for criminal activities can be counted on the fingers of one hand. I am not, of course, speaking of a man like von Papen.

No, I am thinking of those who were considered respectable diplomats by their fellow ambassadors. Men such as von Dirksen, von Rheinhaben and a hundred others, who served first under the Kaiser, then under the Republic, and then under Hitler. I shall only mention here the case of their representatives in two small, peace-loving countries: Dr. Brauer, formerly in Paris, became ambassador in Oslo before the invasion, and after it had plenary powers in the Quisling organization. Under him served both the military attache in Oslo (who was the head of the motorized division which was commissioned to seize the Norwegian King) and the German consul in Narvik. The latter, up to 1939, had been consul in Le Havre, from where he disappeared following grave suspicions that he had been the instigator of the serious fire on the new, enormous French liner, Paris. In Narvik, he became the leader of the Quislings...

Maybe all these von Zechs, von Dirksens, von Rheinhabens, Brauers and von Weiszaeckers were decent men according to international diplomatic standards. But I, personally, am convinced a Gallup Poll would show that almost all ordinary people would call them gutless cowards.

Never did it occur to one of them to withdraw in disgust from his gang or to resign his post as ambassador or as a member of the Legation. Conviction? Sentiment? Conscience? Honesty? Decency? Oh, no, these men must not be bothered with such imponderables!

Then, after their easy victories over Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Denmark, Norway, Belgium, Holland, France, world conquest seemed within their grasp. Only the invasion of England remained. No sooner was a country occupied than a grammar in its language was published. Books entitled "Dutch, Norwegian, etc. in three months" appeared. Youth had only to choose where, in administrative posts, in industry or in commerce, it would like to make its fortune after the war. With the invasion of Russia the expectations soared to new heights and all the bookshops filled their windows with new sets of Russian grammars and simple readers for beginners. Everywhere there was a great eagerness to get a job in the new, rich colonies and Dr. Walter Funk, the Minister of Economic affairs, wrote a booklet on Germany's colonial mission in the occupied countries. In those days all Nazis were going to be rich and every German "Aryan" a millionaire. This dream has come to an end. And soon, when the war has finished, those very same intellectuals will pose as anti-Nazis.

All these men resemble Joseph Fouche, the master of liars, of whom Heinrich Heine wrote, "He carried his falseness to such a pitch he published false memoirs after his death. He took five oaths of fealty; the first to the Republic, the second to the Directory, the third to the Consulate, the fourth to the Empire, and the fifth to the Bourbons." If these Germans get a chance (and, alas, I am not so certain they will not) they will be able to match Fouche's five oaths of fealty. Because for all of them - diplomats, professors, judges, high officials and big industrialists, there is but one motto: "At all costs stay on top - no matter whom I serve." ("Um jeden Preis oben bleiben, ich dien' egal wem.")

The world at present is amused to see the opposition offered by certain important Germans. A diplomat in Ankara, who saw the end approaching, gave himself up to the Allies in Iraq, and is full of complaints about the Nazi regime. In Moscow, Field Marshal von Paulus, General von Seydlitz, a grandson of Bismarck's, and other men who belonged to old families of generals, have joined together to form a Free German Committee, which sends out daily broadcasts advising the people to overthrow Hitler and end the war.

They have known for a long time their cause was lost. Like all the rest of the German people they backed Hitler when he was winning and they would gladly have picked out for themselves and their children the best of the loot and the fattest posts in the conquered countries. They were enthusiastic when everything went well. But now they are beginning to suffer pathologically from the old German malady of self-pity. They throw the blame on Hitler and his self-conceived strategy and blame him for not following the advice of the generals of the Reichswehr with their superior strategy. They thunder against Himmler and his S.S. and against all other possible scapegoats. Defeat has not taught them the tragedy of war itself, nor the consequences of aggression; it signifies only the end of a second episode that went wrong.

Have they ever broadcast to Germany that the Germans are hated by the whole civilized world because they have behaved so monstrously? They cannot get away with the excuse they do not know everything, because in Moscow they have had an opportunity to learn of all the crimes that have been committed. Did they ever broadcast as follows:

'Comrades of the Reichswehr, fellow-countrymen, Germany is detested by the whole civilized world! Why? Because we intended to conquer the world! Because we invaded peace-loving countries! Because we murdered the inhabitants of Lidice, Oradour-sur-Glane, and of other villages to the last man! Because we have slaughtered millions of Poles! Because we murdered millions of Russian citizens - men, women and children! Because we transported twelve million peaceful citizens from other countries to Germany to work as slaves! Because we have taken tens of thousands of citizens from France and Belgium and Holland and Norway and Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and Greece as hostages, to be tortured and put to death by us! Because we have devastated great tracts of these countries, rendering them unproductive for many years! Because we have stolen billions of goldmarks from these lands! Because we, insanely believing we were a master race, have oppressed and trodden underfoot their populations! We beg our victims to forgive us. For all of us who have fed the Nazi monster, we have our share of guilt in its misdeeds. We are prepared to work hard in order that we may, by means of reparations, make good a little of the suffering we have caused.... If in this spirit we throw out Hitler and his clique and sue for peace for the world and for ourselves - then, perhaps it may be that the Germany of our children can be counted once again among the civilized states of the world.'

But words like these have not been heard either from the Free German Committee, nor from any other group of Germans. And until this is the spirit of the new Germany, there will be a reccurrence of what happened after the last war, when for most of the German people, the post-war world was in reality a pre-war period. And since the post-1944 period is nothing more nor less than another pre-war period for a new world war, why should the United Nations not continue to work together for many years to avoid another catastrophe?

Nowhere is there any sign of a feeling of guilt, nor a willingness to atone. This is the great tragedy for Germany and for the world.

(Courtesy "Knickerbocker Weekly")

HERR HAUSHOFER'S NEW PICTURE OF THE WORLD

by

PAUL WOHL

The author, a former director of the International Chamber of Commerce, a man of broad European experience, shows how the Dean of German Geopoliticians has mapped out Germany's postwar propaganda line.

"Do you know why the Germans lost the war?" a Russian philosopher remarked caustically in 1919: "They were so full of the importance of their military machine and organized every detail of it so methodically that they no longer had any time to think." Another student of Germany psychology, Sir Halford Mackinder, the real father of geopolitics, spoke of the German "ways and means mentality," their inability to consider ultimate ends.

In 1919 no one read Sir Halford more thoroughly than the man who claimed to have raised geopolitics to the rank of a special German science - General Professor Dr. Karl Haushofer of Munich, self-appointed "brain truster" of German big business and of the officially disbanded Great General Staff.

As long as victory followed Hitler's arms, Haushofer and his Geopolitical Institute in Munich were fully occupied elaborating magnificient schemes for the organization of Greater Germany's large space economy, and determining the structure of a world dominated by the Reich and by Japan.

Now that defeat has cast its shadow over the Fatherland, the General once again has found time to meditate over the principles of geopolitics. His studies have resulted in a new essay published in a recent issue of his magazine, containing an almost complete reversal of his former theories and a severe indictment of Adolf Hitler's foreign policy.

Carefully shrouded in the pseudo-scientific lingo of the German geopolitical school, it is entitled: "Geopolitical Latitudinal and Longitudinal Dynamics." Haushofer's ponderous vocabulary, picked from cryptic passages of Goethe's Faust and specialized handbooks of strategy, geography, and logistics, always has served to confine the meaning of his writings to those familiar with his style.

His affected aloofness and scholarly objectivity, and the way in which he manages to present his thesis against an imposing background of world historical, economic, and geographical facts have given him the reputation of an oracle. The attention focussed upon his writings is justified by his influence upon German political leaders and German university graduates of the last 20 years.

In the eyes of many of the Germans who will try to take over after the defeat, General Haushofer has this to his credit, that he tried to keep Hitler from invading the U.S.S.R. Haushofer's thinking was predicated upon Mackinder's contention that the power in command of the "heartland" of Asia, from the Arctic Ocean to the mountains of Iran - the so-called pivotal area of history - holds the key to world domination.

Instead of conquering Russia by military might, Haushofer advised Hitler to proceed by indirect means. Once central and western Europe with its African possessions

were firmly under control, the Reich's superiority would be so great that the heartland would fall to Germany quasi-automatically as the result of economic and political penetration.

Today, after the disaster of the German invasion of Russia has become evident, Haushofer has changed his theory. World domination no longer is bound to fall to those in control of Russia and Siberia. The danger of world domination looms elsewhere: in America.

Professor Haushofer has discovered a new law of geopolitics: empires no longer grow from west to east or from east to west, like the Roman, the Napoleonic, the British and the Russian empires, but from north to south. The three inevitable north-south developments of our time are: (1) American rule over the entire western hemisphere, from the Arctic Ocean to Cape Horn; (2) The Eurafrican sphere of interests, from Scandinavia to the Congo basin, and (3) a great East Asiatic empire, from Manchuria to New Guinea. These three new empire tendencies are graphically described on a map, with American imperialism shown as the most powerful and dynamic of the three.

"Compared to the elementary dynamic force of the American imperialism," sighs the venerable Karl Haushofer, "the Eurafrica idea and the attempts of the Soviet Union to push southward to the warm ocean drop into the background. While in greater East Asia the north-south development has a natural tendency to limit itself to its own sphere, America already extends rapacious hands to tropical Africa, Iran, India, and Australia. By using its Pan-American supremacy as a jumping-off point for further expansion east and west, the United States seeks to establish the basis for its world empire and to threaten future opponents with a third world war. This American north-south empire represents the only real danger of imperialistic world domination."

Against the background of this danger, General Haushofer concludes with reference to Hitler, "the blood-soaked Caspian and Black Sea plains have become secondary theaters of war."

At the same time, he suggests, with an eye to his English readers, that the creation of a north-south empire in East Asia is an inexorable geopolitical necessity, whatever the outcome of the present fighting in the Pacific. "A long breath, much time, much money, and much blood will be needed to settle the geopolitical conflict in the Pacific sphere," he warns, ... "more than Iran, India, and the Netherlands East Indies may be worth."

The implications of Haushofer's new theories are clear. After having made a

"From today on no more prisoners are to be taken. All prisoners, wounded and not wounded, are to be killed. We must not leave a single living enemy behind us." This is part of an order of the day issued by the German General Stenger on August 16, 1914 to his troops. This German general was one of the war criminals of the first world war whose punishment the Allies have demanded. On June 29, 1921 General Stenger appeared before the so-called war-criminal court of Leipzig. Despite the fact that the order was completely authenticated at the trial, the court of the Weimar Republic exonerated General Stenger on the legalistic grounds that the written order was not filed in the records of the trial!!!!!

case for an understanding between Russia and Germany and written off the Nazi adventure, which, inconsiderate of geopolitical laws (model 1944), vainly sacrificed the flower of German manhood on the Caspian and Black Sea plains, he hints (1) that Britain's future is in Europe and Africa, because America will not limit herself to the western hemisphere, and (2) that in any case European possessions between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans are doomed and not worth the cost of a long-drawn-out campaign against a greater East Asia which by nature is "centripetal" and self-contained.

Haushofer's new line, devised months before the landings in Normandy, can change nothing in the outcome of the war, but it probably already has fashioned the political thinking of the small circle of men who, sooner or later, will try again to win the peace for Germany.

(Courtesy The Christian Science Monitor)

WHO WILL BE ABLE TO RE-EDUCATE THESE BOYS?

This picture debunks all the wishful thinking about the "poor" and "oppressed" German people waiting eagerly to be liberated by the Allies from the Nazi "yoke". It shows four German youngsters, caught sniping at American Troops in the Aachen area. According to the rules of war, civilian snipers, regardless of age, may be shot. These kids are, left to right: Willy Etschenburg, 14, a member of the Hitler Youth Movement; Bernhard Etschenburg, 10; Hubert Heinrichs, 10; and Hubert Etschenburg... Will these youngsters become soldiers for their fatherland 20 years hence?... Will we ever be able to re-educate them?

(Photo Acme)

WHITEWASHING THE GERMANS

by

ALLAN NEVINS

The author, a noted American historian and Pulitzer Prize winner, is a member of the Advisory Board of the Society for the Prevention of World War III.

Seated at a corner of the fireplace, the Old Veteran was talking. "After all," he said, "even while our main battle is being won, two new enemies are springing up. Their names are Fatigue and Disillusionment. Fatigue is temporary, but Disillusionment is a tough customer." He ruminated a moment. "And who helps Disillusionment the most? The fools who say, 'After all, the enemy did have his side. They were not really so much to blame. Did they actually start the war? Wasn't the story that they started it a trick to get our blood up?' They're the folks who help Disillusionment get in his dirty work. And then comes Division."

The Old Veteran waved his hand at a bookcase. "See that History of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay by Thomas Hutchinson?" he asked. "He was a Tory who proves that the Americans were really all to blame for the Revolution. See that book by George Lunt? He was a Copperhead who proves that the Abolitionists and Free-soilers were all to blame for the Civil War. See that shelf of books on the First World War? They prove that the Russians, or else the French, or else the British, or maybe even the Americans, were to blame for the First World War - but never the innocent Germans." His voice grew sharper. "Just wait. There'll be a new crop to prove that the Nazis were white as driven snow, that the Poles attacked them and the Russians menaced them. Already I hear hints of this campaign. Already typewriters are being tuned up."

The Old Veteran was right. Already the campaign is beginning. Its foundations were laid long ago. One of the ardent revisionists who maintained that Germany, after all, was no more to blame for World War I than France or Britain, wrote in the "NEW REPUBLIC" in 1936: "Despite all our knowledge of the events of 1914, the aggressor remains unsolved ... So it may be in the case of another outbreak in Europe. Events taking place behind the scenes will be closed to the American Government and public as they were in 1914." Another revisionist, who asserted that in 1917 the United States was "dragged into a European War it did not understand," wrote in "Current History" in 1934 that in any future war the same thing would happen again. It was a delusion," he declared, to believe that America could exercise any "independent judgment." If a European group called some nation an aggressor, "the pressure on the United States to bring about concurrence may again prove irresistible," and we would enter the war in a fit of "hysteria." Such articles laid the groundwork for a new campaign of "revision." Already it is getting under way. Any reader of "The Progressive," issued in Madison, Wis., will see writers in that journal waving the first whitewash brushes at the war-guilt of the Nazis.

Such a campaign can be defeated at the outset if the Americans are vigilantly on guard, and meet every assertion of error, every distortion of fact, with the simple truth. We need not here reopen the old question of German guilt for the First World War. It is sufficient to say that any man who wishes an authoritative survey of all the evidence, and a clear statement of the irrefutable proofs that the German Army, the German Navy, and the German Kaiser wished for that war, that they had made care-

ful preparations for opening it in 1914, and that they and their Austro-German tools expertly utilized the opportunity offered by the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand, will find them in one recent book. Such a reader need only turn to the masterly survey of British and European history 1870-1914 by R. K. Ensor of Oxford. But our concern is with this war. The silly sentimentalists who are already whining, "Oh, the Nazis were as much sinned against as sinning;" the sly propagandists who are already whispering, "Oh, this story of Nazi guilt is a pack of mingled lies and truths - don't believe half of it;" the super-duper realists who are prepared to prove that black is white, dull-gray, or speckled - they all can be refuted with a few firm convictions and crystal truths.

First of all it is important to keep in mind the fact that this war, of all the wars in history, is a conflict permeated by a vital moral principle. The "revisionists" will be asserting once more that it is mainly a struggle between two rival power-systems, a repetition of the age-old European contest for wealth and domination. They will revive Lindbergh's statement that it is a war of "haves" and "have-nots." This materialistic view is not merely false, but wickedly false. The vital fact has been put in one sentence by an observer thoroughly acquainted with the Nazi system and Nazi ideals. Mr. Otto D. Tolischus, long the New York Times' correspondent in Berlin, has correctly said that this war is "a life-and-death struggle between two cultures, two ways of living and dying, two moral concepts, and two systems of social, political, and economic organization." He correctly wrote that this is a conflict to determine the religious, moral, political, and social shape of all human society for centuries to come.

Those who established the Nazi system established a fearful menace to every ideal the democratic world holds dear. They elevated the principle of the authoritarian government, and the absolute supremacy of the state over every act and thought of the individual. They set up the principle of the German master-race, the Herrenvolk, whose destiny was to put other nations in harness and other races in servile subjection. They extolled the principle of brutality toward every individual and group who did not fit into a German system, for the only morality was that which served the Herrenvolk's power and pride. All this was announced with a fanfare of aggressive slogans: "Blood against gold," "national socialism against democracy," "Germanism against degeneracy." The Nazi system was a declaration of moral war against the rest of the world.

If this elementary and vital fact is properly impressed on the American people, no post-war effort to absolve the Nazis of their blood-guilt can succeed. It is clear that this Nazi system of an authoritarian super-race, controlled by an elite of supermen, and working through instruments of super-brutality, was of necessity an aggressive system. It had to be dynamic. It employed a great part of the Nazi population in armies and navies trained for war, in munitions plants pouring out war tools, and in locust-swarm bureaucracies panting to suck the life out of conquered states.

If the Nazi machine halted in its career of conquest, all these groups would lose their occupations; peace would mean ruin for them. Like a bicycle, the system

> "Let's quit talking about 'law' or its absence. For nothing must stand in the way of preventing the greatest gang of human monsters in all the worlds' history from paying the utmost penalty for their unspeakable crimes."
>
> **(From an editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer)**

had to keep moving or topple. Hence it was that one aggression simply led to another, on the blue-print plan impudently published to the world in Hitler's Mein Kampf.

Once such a contest between two great moral, social, and political systems began, it could know neither truce nor geographical limit until one side won. Any country which negotiated a peace with Nazi Germany (as Lindbergh in 1940 thought the United States could negotiate) would have had to accept the revolutionary world order that Germany meant to erect. Our turn would have to come in due time. The Nazis, drunk with their early triumphs, used Austria to conquer Czechoslovakia; they used Czechoslovakia to conquer Poland; they used Denmark to conquer Norway; they used Belgium to conquer France; they used Rumania and Bulgaria to conquer Greece. If they could, they would have used Britain to try to conquer the United States, just as they did use Poland to try to conquer Russia. Every consideration of prudence, of national safety (to say nothing of regard for civilization), demanded that we lend moral support and material aid to both Britain and Russia. And when we did, we were treacherously attacked.

This is a record which, rightly understood and clearly presented, will arm the American people against all "revisionist" lies in the years to come. The Nazi blood-guilt is too red and glaring to take a coat of whitewash. First of all the moral foundations of our type of civilization - democracy, political liberty, decent human rights, humanitarian ideals, faith in peaceful enterprise as the mainspring of progress - were wantonly assailed. Then came the physical assaults, leading by inevitable steps to Pearl Harbor and the harrying of our coasts by fleets of Nazi submarines. American unity has been far greater in this war than in any previous conflict. It has been complete because Americans realize that they, and their whole code of moral values, were recklessly and foully attacked. Let us keep that unity, and deal with any apologists for the attackers as the moral vermin they are.

(Copyright American Legion Magazine)

"Already we are encountering the friendly, wheedling, smiling Nazi prisoner of war; or the peasant or burgher who never was a Nazi at heart - oh, no - and greets the American GI with hearty handshakes and snacks.

"Americans in Germany, or those over here, should beware of Nazi love at first sight. In fact we should have no part of it. Stars and Stripes, the 'American Army newspaper, warns there is dynamite in 'a smiling, hand-shaking, cigarette-mooching, baby-faced Kraut' prisoner. As like as not he was planting a Teller mine or squeezing the trigger of a rifle - to kill Americans - an hour before.

"American correspondents, though they have met with scowls enough, have also been surprised to find so many German civilians 'so friendly.' They rustle up the ersatz coffee and cognac for 'der Amerikaners'. And, they insist, not 10 percent of the Germans were Nazis after all.

"It's all ersatz, we may be sure. The snarling sort fit better into the picture imprinted on millions of minds of suffering human beings. Scowling or grinning, our best bet is to deal with them at arms' length."

(Editorial in the Philadelphia Inquirer)

GERMAN DIAGNOSIS

by

RICHARD N. BRICKNER

Richard M. Brickner is an M.D. and associate neurologist for the Neurogical Institute; he is consulting psychitarist for the New York Selective Service and assistant professor of Clinical Neurology at the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Columbia University. - He is author of the book, "Is Germany Incurable?"

Most discussions of our dealings with post-war Germany are couched in familiar and old categories - economic changes, political changes, establishment of new organizations. These are all categories in which we have had experience - centuries of it. And all of this experience, employed without the addition of newer techniques, has led us to think away from man himself.

It is characteristic of man to think away from himself; that is, to absolve himself of responsibility for events and to attribute everything to the external environment. Therefore, he does not readily consider his own internal nature and how to modify it, but wants to gain alleviation from his troubles by modifying his environment. Part of that environment is the system of political and economic categories; we are so familiar with them by now that we regard them as immutable features of the environment, largely responsible for our fate. We think that if we could only get them set right, life would be close to perfect. When we do give attention to community affairs in terms of our own internal workings, we are usually pretty well restricted to broad generalities. At best, we can bring into consideration only our experience, and that is likely to be limited to economics, politics and organization, thus continuing the vicious circle. Hence man's estimates of himself in the community are likely to be short-circuited and to end up confused, compressed within the circle around which he has been chasing himself. This is not to deny the obvious importance of economics and other well tried modes of thought. But without something else, they are not enough. It is to man himself that we must look, and not alone to harbors, coins, arithmetical systems and political parties, for the causes of human behavior.

In neurology, and in psychiatry in particular, many conditions which are within the boundries of normal and average call for the doctor's help. There are countless problems of adjustment to other people, for example, in which nothing pathological is involved, and in which the doctor can be especially helpful. The doctor must be able to detect the varieties of normal emotion which, when expressed by two individuals, can clash. He must be a thermometer of the friction produced by an active young brain, rubbing against older brains, in its process of growing up. He has to know the major forms into which the human personality tends to fall, as it develops and congeals in our society; and what kinds of reaction can usually be expected from personalities of one sort or another, none of which necessarily involves abnormality. The tracing of the emotional origins of behavior is the way in which neuropsychiatrists can help in comprehending affairs larger than those of the individual.

Psychiatry and anthropology can thus contribute to our understanding of Germany and of those peculiarities of German conduct which have been so dangerous for the world. Sentiments of extreme nationalism, of racial superiority, of the mission of Germany to dominate the world for the sake of civilization, did not begin with Hitler; neither did their widespread support among the people. These are extremely important facts to grasp. My own research covers the period from 1810. At least since that

date, inflammatory speeches, poems and comments based upon those concepts, have been common utterances in Germany; more than that: they have been made, not by insignificant figures in the community, or officials making 4th of July speeches, but by highly influential leaders of German thought and action. These include men like Vater Jahn, founder of the Turnverein and known as a great aspirant for German freedom; the famous poet and historian, Ernst Arndt; Julius Langbehn, one of whose books had 62 editions; Haeckel, the famous biologist, and many others who are mentioned in Is Germany Incurable? A much larger list can be found in Thus Speaks Germany, by W. W. Coole and M. F. Potter.

Many historical events, long antedating the Versailles Treaty and Hitler, also reveal that Germany has long shown a behavior trend strung on the thread of hostility to other nations, a desire to dominate the world and a truculence which has made dealings with Germany impossible on a rational, give and take, dependable basis. Omitting the Bismarckian wars, we can refer to the behavior of Germany at the first international and at the Hague disarmament conventions, the aims of the Pan-German League now nearly 70 years old, the truculent, dominating, superior attitudes of German minorities in non-German countries.

In the Weimar days, the trend was shown again, this time attributed to the Versailles Treaty. There was never any serious intention to disarm, and whatever adherence there may have been to the disarmament clauses of the Treaty, was gone by the time of Locarno. The General Staff remained in existence, under various disguises. The old Army traditions, including the almost sacred place of the Army in the community, remained in full flower. The Pan-German League went on developing. The idea that Germany was a persecuted nation surrounded by enemies remained a national policy, just as it had been before the Treaty.

Many German institutions and ways of thinking, unchanged by setting up the forms of a republic, revealed the same trends of behavior within Germany. The lordly position of the father and the lowly one of the mother in the household; the worship of Frederick the Great's father for the brutal way in which young Frederick was nurtured, based upon the idea that such treatment produced greatness; the extremely technical hierarchical system of social titles and of uniforms; the superiority-inferiority anxiety as manifested everywhere and in the universities in particular, culminating in the dueling system for which only certain people were eligible; the high prestige of any and every government official; the high standing of mystic, world-embracing philosophical concepts, are some instances.

All of these are examples of ways of thinking, combined with action, which have seemed "typically German." What does it mean to call something typically German, or English, or French? Who is it who is acting "typically?" Must we adopt extreme alternates and call it either the leaders, or the people at large? Is there such a thing as a typical way of thinking, shared by most members of a group?

There is, and for that matter it cannot be otherwise or there would be no group at all. In every group, from a bridge club to a whole culture, certain attitudes, frames of mind, ideas, and feelings become more acceptable than others. Most people

THE "GOOD" GERMANS

"The notorious Majdanek extermination camp near Lublin had a torture staff that included German women whose speciality was torturing women prisoners..."

(A.P. dispatch from London dated Sept. 16, 1944)

adhere,although some rebel; conformity is easier. These attitudes become crystallized as customs or institutions which tend to perpetuate the attitudes. New babies born into the group find themselves surrounded by these institutions, and tending to adopt the feelings and ideas they express, become ready to die for them as they grow older. Yet in reality they are no "righter" than the notions of a culture 10,000 miles away, where the people are just as ready to die for their own, totally different ideas. They only seem right because mother and father, and for that matter, everybody who was a respectable person, practiced them. All this material is amply portrayed in anthropological works - particularly those of Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict.

Any kind of constellation of attitudes can develop in this way. Aggressiveness as well as passivity can become the cultural desideratum. It can be a paranoid way of looking at life, with the aggrandizement of the group as the central theme, but with traces of it shown within the culture itself. This, in my opinion, is what has happened in Germany. Some of the evidences of the paranoid theme have already been presented in ordinary terms of behavior. Psychiatrically they can be restated as megalomania, intense anxiety about superiority and inferiority under the guise of "equality," sense of mission, suspiciousness amounting to a feeling of persecution, great interest in mystic concepts, and in addition, remarkable use of rationalization and projection of responsibility for misfortune onto others.

Obviously this does not mean that there are more psychotically paranoid people in Germany than anywhere else. Nor that the same thing has not happened elsewhere in the past and cannot happen again. But it does mean that a cultural desideratum of paranoid thinking has developed and reached a high state of hypertrophy in Germany within the last few generations; that many of the population adhere to it and that some do not. It means that paranoid individuals (not necessarily psychotic) are likely to be thrown to the top as leaders, where they serve to emphasize and perpetuate the cultural values still further. This is the precise opposite of the customary groundless dogma that "the German people" have repeatedly found themselves the helpless victims of ruthless leaders who have been saddled upon them without any participation by them. It would be contrary to all history for leaders to differ consistently from the real aims of a good proportion of the population and still remain in office.

It is worth remembering, too, that a paranoid way of thinking is bound to dominate over everything else in the community, being the most aggressive and driven by boundless energy.

This is the diagnosis of a dominant phase of German culture. It was brought not about by Hitler; Hitler was the consequence of it. Unless these facts are seriously heeded in our future approaches to the immediate problem of Germany and of any other group to which they may apply at later times, there is no possibility of peace, nor indeed of rational living in the world.

(Courtesy "New Europe")

"The main European problem is not an economic problem, it is a problem in human relationship. The peoples of Europe, East and West, have been invaded, robbed, tortured, starved by Germany. Starvation, robbery, death are all, in one sense of the term, economic problems. The economic man ceases to be an economic man when he is dead and if you want to describe massacres as economic problems, you can. THE FIRST EUROPEAN PROBLEM IS TO REASSURE THESE PEOPLES THAT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO BE MURDERED AGAIN..."

(Professor D. W. Brogan in the London Sunday Chronicle)

GERMAN AGENTS IN ARGENTINA

The following is a report of the ONA from Montevideo, dated November 15:

German agents are still at work in Argentina, undermining the continent's war effort and conserving at least part of their influence as a foothold in this hemisphere.

Evidence, is cited in the case of Mario Amadeo, who was on the German payroll when he was a member of the Argentine Embassy in Chile. Amadeo was suspended from that post only to be re-appointed as Chief of the Political Section of the Foreign Ministry, a post which he still occupies.

Another example is Heinrich Vollberg, former director of the German railroads, in Argentina, who was exiled to the province of Cordoba along with other Nazis. But he soon came back to Buenos Aires where he is acting as an adviser to several government agencies.

Another German, Heinrich Trottgen, recently prepared a financial scheme for the Argentine Ministry of Finance, at its request.

Furthermore it is asserted that the only German spies arrested in Argentina are the small fry, while the important ones are still at large. Thilo Martens, owner of a shipping agency, is said to be one of the real heads of the German espionage system, who is living comfortably in the Argentine capital.

It is further charged that the most important German agents in Argentina are a group of White Russians, who have not been bothered at all.

Those Germans who have been imprisoned, however, are enjoying special privileges which make a mockery of their detention, it was revealed by a person who had been jailed for political reasons.

Many of these Germans have been declared sick and are living in private hospitals; to those who stay in prison, the normal prison regulations have not been applied, he said. The Germans are permitted to leave the prison as often as they wish. They are now said to be calling the prison the "Hotel Velasco". (Velasco is the name of the Buenos Aires police chief.)

They can receive visitors at any hour of the day, while Argentine political prisoners are allowed visitors only twice a week. The Germans live together on one floor of the prison in which they "rule" unopposed. Their chief, the former Director of the German Transocean News Agency, Walter Von Simons, decides who is to be admitted to their floor.

The person who made these revelations also stated that the Germans were apparently carrying on their activities from the prison. The most striking feature of the situation, in his opinion, was the frequent regular visits the Nazis received from Dr. Von Der Becke, former physician of the German Embassy and brother of Gen. Carlos Von Der Becke, Chief of the Argentine General Staff.

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Yes, Experience Is a Great Teacher

Copyright, 1944, New York Tribune Inc.

(Courtesy N.Y. Herald Tribune)

You cannot cure mad dogs with kindness.

In 1941 the Germans locked hundreds of Jews in their synagogues and burned them to death.

In 1942 occurred the rape of Lidice.

In the Normandy invasion German soldiers bayoneted to death 30 wounded, helpless soldiers and the chaplain who was tending them.

And now rocket bombing "solidifies Hitler's position" with the German people.

Are we going to forget these facts,

Or will they influence our decisions at the peace table?

(Henry J. Taylor in Cosmopolitan Magazine)

TIME

THE WEEKLY NEWSMAGAZINE



SIDNEY HILLMAN

Labor has political ambitions of its own.

(U.S. at War)

VOLUME XLIV

INTERNATIONAL

The Old Adam

It had happened before, and it was happening again last week. An obscure man whose only tools were his brain and his pen was shaping the minds of men who shape the world. Winston Churchill had made one of this man's books "must" reading for the British War Cabinet and for Dominion Premiers who visited London last May. British liberals, scorned and derided by this man, had risen against him. A later book by the same man had just begun to make a stir in the U.S.

The man is Leopold Schwarzschild, a German Jew who once was also a German idealist and democrat. The book that gripped Winston Churchill is *World in Trance,* a burning, raging indictment of the Versailles era—"years of lofty dreaming and low demagogy . . . the era of the empty phrase . . . the age of complacency . . . the years of self-destruction." When the book was published in 1943, it got almost no notice. But the book and its current sequel, *Primer of the Coming World* (Knopf; $3), were news last week because:

¶ The Allied attitudes and beliefs which these books examine are still alive in the world, and must soon be put again to the test of peace.

¶ The German formula for recovery and reaggression after World War I, also examined by these books, is still the German formula, as no less an authority than Joseph Goebbels made clear last week when he asked the world to believe that the Germans are decent and worthy people who mean well.

The Myth. Author Schwarzschild left Germany in 1933, moved from Paris to New York in 1940. At root, his thesis is simple: the Old Adam is, always has been and always will be uppermost in mankind. People have not improved much in the past, they are not improving now, and only fools assume the contrary. Woodrow Wilson and all those caught with him in the perfectionist dream of the Versailles years did assume the contrary, and led the world into chaos.

"Never again," says Schwarzschild, "must we succumb to the myth that power and armaments and compulsion are of themselves sinful. . . . All order, all civilization, all law and dignity, rest on the existence of weapons and power."

The Illusion. Author Schwarzschild's No. 2 thesis is that Germans have more than their share of the Old Adam in them. Woodrow Wilson, believing that the postwar Germans of the new republic would be good and deserving democrats; the British, playing balance-of-power politics and encouraging a strong, pre-Hitler Germany; the assorted liberals, radicals, plain men of good will who trusted the Weimar Republic—all these, says Schwarzschild, were members of Germany's "foreign legions," and their illusion was part of the era's tragic foolery.

U.S. Army Signal Corps

ORLANDO, LLOYD GEORGE, CLEMENCEAU, WILSON . . .
After them, "the era of the empty phrase."

Of Versailles' Big Four—Wilson, Lloyd George, Orlando, Clemenceau—only Clemenceau really impressed Schwarzschild. The old Frenchman's attitude, denounced the world over as a fatally stupid and selfish policy, was actually, says Schwarzschild, the only sensible policy. Only the Tiger understood that Germany was a jungle to be controlled for France's sake and the world's. Says Schwarzschild:

"For those who knew the German people, their longing for democracy was always extremely doubtful. . . . In the field of foreign policy [Hitlerism] was only the continuation of previous German policy. . . . Even if the Officers' corps and their hangers-on had not made an alliance with Hitler . . . Germany would have inevitably steered her course toward the restoration of her overwhelming military power and eventually toward war."

© Bachrach

LEOPOLD SCHWARZSCHILD
By A.D. 2000, decent Germans?

The Remedy. Schwarzschild's remedy is armed internationalism—total, indefinite occupation of Germany by U.S., British and Russian troops (600,000 would do the job, he thinks). Furthermore, Germany must be deprived of every means of making war, of preparing for war, or of teaching war. Says Schwarzschild:

"Nothing, positively nothing [must] survive which can materially or spiritually become the nucleus of a new military renaissance . . . not just for a few years, but for a minimum of 50 to 60. . . . By A.D. 2,000, the last Germans who have ever led or trained troops or manufactured weapons will have died."

The Rebuttal. H. G. Wells last spring called Schwarzschild "superficially intelligent and massively stupid." Journalist Michael Foot, until lately one of Lord Beaverbrook's bright colts, called *Trance* "a facile, scintillating treatise which . . . has received applause from those weary brains which prefer the dismal past to the adventurous future. . . ."

Leopold Schwarzschild's appeal to ordinary folks is about as simple as The Old Adam. To them he sounds like a man telling them what they already know, deep down: that they aren't really as noble, great and good as their Fourth of July orators make out. And that is at least half the story.

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Leopold Schwarzschild Collection, III, e 4 i Work in France - Part 1

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Book I

STATUS NASCENDI

1918-1920

Chapter I; Der Geist der ersten Stunde

6

Der Schweizerische Chargé, ein Brieftraeger der Weltgeschichte, verliess das Weisse Haus am 7. Oktober 1918 gegen Mittag. Er liess die Note aus Berlin zurueck. Sie hatte den Inhalt, den die Welt seit zwei Tage erwartete. Der Praesident las, dass Deutschland Frieden wolle.

Das las man nicht zum ersten Mal in diesem Krieg. Deutsche Einladungen zum Friedensschluss hatte es schon frueher gegeben. Eine nach der anderen war abgelehnt worden. Wilson selbst --obwohl er Pacifist war, oder gerade weil er Pacifist war,-- hatte einen Frieden verworfen, der nicht "sincerely purposed" sei. Vorerst (10) hatte er noch im Fruehjahr proklamiert, there is "but one response possible for us: Force, Force to the utmost, Force without stint and limit." x)

Waren die Umstaende diesmal anders?

x) Woodrow Wilson, Address in Baltimore, Apr. 6, 1918.

Der Praesident hatte schon zwei Tage lang nachgedacht. Er war mit dem Nachdenken ~~schon~~ nahezu fertig. ~~Ohne Zweifel~~ Ja, diesmal waren die Umstaende ~~diesmal~~ anders, (ohne Zweifel. Hoechst wahrscheinlich war es diesmal sincerely purposed.

Diesmal war die kaiserliche Armee nicht mehr, (wie früher, in der Rolle des Siegers, ~~sondern im Verlieren~~. In Schlacht auf Schlacht waren/~~wurden~~ sie seit Juli geschlagen und ~~wieder~~ geschlagen worden, hatten/~~mussten~~ weichen und muessen. Dementsprechend wurde (von Berlin nicht mehr nur weichen, ~~Nicht nur Verhandlungen ueber den~~ Frieden ~~wurden~~ vorgeschlagen, ~~verlangt~~, sondern vorher schon "the immediate conclusion of an armistice". Das war ~~kein Vorschlag mehr, es war eine Bitte.~~ (Kaum noch, ~~Es war nicht einmal mehr~~ die Pose eines/~~dem~~ Gleich zu Gleich.

Es war das Eingestaendnis der Unterlegenheit, eine Bitte.

Diesmal (bekannten sich ~~schlugen~~ die Deutschen auch nicht nur einfach zum/Frieden, ~~von~~, sondern zu einem Frieden ganz besonderer Art. Sie schlugen den "Wilson*Frieden" vor, den sie bisher verlacht und verworfen hatten,- und den ungluecklicherweise noch so viele (offen oder heimlich in der Welt verlachten und verwarfen. "The German Government accepts, as a basis for the peace negotia-

tions, the Program laid down by the President of the

United States in his Message to Congress of January 8, 1918,

(Diese Message waren die berühmten 14 Punkte. Die subsequent pronouncements waren Ideen "4 principles" vom Februar, die "4 ends" vom Juli, die "5 particulars" vom September. Dieser ganze Kodex von in summa 27 Regeln war nun plötzlich, en bloc, gerade vom Gegner anerkannt. Als erste von allen Regierungen der Welt unterwarf die deutsche sich Wilsons

spirituelle Fuehrerschaft. Als erste von allen

verpflichtete sie sich zur Neuordnung der Welt nach seinen sehr persönlichen

(Principien. War es nicht, als ob der Feind im Feld zum ersten Verbuendeten am Friedens-

tisch werden wollte?

Nicht undenkbar! Denn noch etwas war diesmal verändert. (--und glücklicherweise ganz)

Umwaelzungen sich

waren in Deutschland vorgegangen, in

diesen Tagen der Friedens-Bitte. Noch unabsehbare

Umwaelzungen waren vor sich gegangen.

Die siegreiche Kraft der Demokratie schien auf

dem Wege, sich endlich auch dort durchzusetzen, (Nach dem Telegramm an das Haus, das Wilson vorlag, hatte

ein Imperial rescript erlassen, proklamiert:

"I wish to have the German people cooperate more effectively

than heretofore in determination of destiny of Fatherland.

It is therefore My will that men supported by confidence of

people shall participate to large extent in rights and duties of government."x/ Das Wort Demokratie oder parlamentarisches System war ~~in dem rescript~~ vermieden. Aber die deutsche Presse ~~Stimmen die der Geschaeftstraeger in Holland nach Washington telegraphiert hatte und die auf dem Tisch des Praesidenten lagen~~ war einhellig in ihrem Commentar: ~~Selbst die stockkonservative "Berliner Boersenzeitung" hatte~~ ~~tiefe~~ ~~auffallender~~ (Konstatierte) ~~mit etwas merkwuerdiger~~ Befriedigung: "The old autocracy has come to an end and parliamentarism enters Germany."x/

[Dann war ein neuer Reichskanzler ~~war~~ ernannt worden: der Thronfolger des Grossherzogtums Baden, Prinz Max. Er hatte sich ~~und sein Kabinett~~ am 5.Oktober -- ~~am Tage nach Absendung~~ während die Friedensbitte nach Washington unterwegs war, -- ~~dem~~ ~~bitte im~~ Reichstag mit einer Rede vorgestellt. Die Worte Demokratie oder parlamentarisches System waren wiederum nicht vorkam. Aber er hatte deutlich gesagt, ~~vor~~, dass "the German Empire has undergone a fundamental change", Er hatte gesagt, ~~und~~ dass es "the beginning of a new epoch in Germany's internal history"sei.xx ~~Er, Wilson, hatte immer als~~ ~~einen der hauptsaechlichen Zwecke des~~ heiligsten Ziels dieses Kriegs sei die Zerstoerung der absoluten Monarchien. ~~betrachtet. Der ..... von seinen~~ Als wichtigstes seiner „4 ends" vom July habe sie ~~selbst~~ bezeichnet.

x Papers relating to the Foreign affairs of the U.S.A. 1918, Supplement 1, p. 355
xx ibid, p. 349

→ Es konnte ein Manöver sein. Aber wer ihnen
hatte, hörte den schweren Tritt der Geschichte!
Die Geschichte, - sie ist, mit allen ~~ihren~~
Umwegen und Unterbrechungen, der ewige Aufstieg
der Menschheit von niederen Stufen zu höheren
Stufen. Der Fortschritt hat seine Gezeiten - und
zu hören und sehen fähig war, wusste diesen neuen
Fortschritt seit langem reif zum Durchbruch. Präsident
Wilson hatte deutlich ausgesprochen, eines der

„ The distruction of every ~~arbitrary~~ arbitrary power anywhere that can ~~14 Punkten hatte gelautet:~~ separately, secretly and of its single choice disturbs the peace of the world; or, if it can not be presently destroyed, at least its reduction to virtual impotence." Es war die Art des Präsidenten, sich nicht praktisch-banal auszudrücken. Sein Stil liebte feierlich-abstrakte Umschreibungen. Oft blieb er dadurch vage für andre; oft sogar vage im eignen Geist. Aber hier gab es keine Unklarheit. Gemeint war die Zerstörung der absoluten (Monarchien. Und) War das nun nicht schon ~~angedeutet~~ im Gang? (mit Kapp-Putsch, Hitlerchen)

War es nicht ein Grund mehr, die Bitte um Frieden mit groesster Sympathie zu behandeln?

~~"Fourteen~~

Die Reaktion in Amerika, wie in Europa, war freilich feindselig. Man war fed up mit den Deutschen. Man wollte den Sieg, nicht Verhandlungen und Kompromiss. Man wollte sie schlagen, bis der Waffenstillstand ~~als Symbol eines~~ daraus bestünde, dass sie die ~~von selbst~~ Waffen forbrüfen; ~~"unconditional surrender" kommen wuerde; und~~ bis man ihnen den Frieden (ohne den Schein einer „Verhandlung") wuerde diktieren koennen. Was jetzt vor sich ging, war nichts als ein (ihrer) Manoever, ~~und~~ Es war eine Heuchelei, um im letzten Augenblick noch billig davon zu kommen. So sprachen die meisten Zeitungen, die meisten Mitglieder der Parlamente und Kongresse.

Nicht so der Praesident. In ihm, dem Demokraten, war die Faehigkeit, ~~Staerke gerade~~ notfalls auch Staerke aus dem Bewusstsein zu ~~verlieren~~ verscheuchen, ~~dass~~ dass er ~~dem Allgemeinen~~ die Meinung der Meisten gegen sich habe. "A democrat ~~must~~ with aristocratic tastes[2], hatte er sich genannt.** Und in ihm war die auesserste Sensibilitaet

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**R.St.Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol 7, p. 266

6. ~~Fuer~~ die doppelte Verantwortung ~~fuer~~ um fuer seine Verantwortung ~~gegenueber~~ ~~dem~~ ~~der~~ Abwendung alles vermeidbaren Leides und ~~der Verantwortung~~ erreichbaren Gluecks. Die Note lag vor ihm auf dem Schreibtisch. Vielleicht war dieses Stueck Papier die Wasserscheide zwischen zwei Zeitaltern.

Bis dahin hatte er in das Buch des Krieges ~~zu beschreiben~~ schreiben müssen, das ein Buch der Menschheit ist, wie sie war, ~~geschrieb~~ mochte sein, Jetzt ~~war~~ die Gelegenheit gekommen, die ersten Schriftzeichen in das Buch des Friedens einzutragen, ~~Umsomehr~~ ja, die Selbstherrlichkeit mochte ~~sie~~ gekommen sein, ~~als er das Gluück hatte, zunaechst~~ sie ausschliesslich in seiner persönlichen Handschrift einzutragen. ~~einmal allein handeln zu koennen.~~ An ihn, nicht an die Alliierten, war der Appell gerichtet. Er allein war aufgefordert, "to take steps", "to bring about". ~~Es hatte die Frei-~~ Ihm konnte das Glück zufallen ~~war es, die Dinge~~ sein, die ~~weiterzu~~ Dinge jetzt ~~heit, den Fortgang~~ auf ~~gewisse~~ Schienen zu setzen, von denen sie schwer wieder herunterzubringen sein wuerden. Der Praesident ~~stand auf~~. erhob sich. Er war fertig mit ~~seinem~~ dem Nachdenken, ~~fertig~~. Er konnte handeln, und wird ~~es~~ in wenigen Stunden handeln. Der naechste Besucher nach dem Schweizer Chargé wurde eingelassen. Es war ~~dann~~ ~~Sir Eric Geddes, de-~~ der Erste Lord der Britischen Admiralitaet, Winston Churchills Nachfolger ~~und Vorgaenger~~ Eric Geddes. Er hoerte den Praesidenten bereits von den Bedingungen des ~~vermutlichen~~ Waffenstillstands reden.

Am Abend zuvor war vom Weissen Haus an Colonel House in New York telefoniert worden,-- dem Einzigen,dem Wilson ganz vertraute,den er ganz ein Herz und eine Seele mit sich glaubte.House sollte raten,was zu tun sei. Der Colonel gehoerte zu denen, die am tiefsten ueberzeugt waren,dass dem Praesidenten eine ganz besondere Mission in der Weltgeschichte zugefallen sei; und dass er seine Rolle betraechtlich distanziert von allen anderen Regierungschefs spielen muesse, Er gehoerte zu denen,die den Praesidenten am meisten in dem Vorurteil bestaerkten,die Staatsmaenner der europaeischen Demokratieen seien weniger edel und ethisch als die ~~der amerikanischen Demokratie.~~ Trotzdem hatte House fuer dieses Mal nach einigem Nachdenken an Wilson depeschiert: "I would suggest making no direct reply to the German note.A statement from the White House saying ,The President will at once confer with the Allies...' should be sufficient.I would advise that you ask the Allies to confer with me in Paris at the earliest oppotunity..."* Keine private Correspondenz

*Seymour:The Intimate Papers of Col.House,Vol.IV,p.75

mit den Deutschen!Zunaechst nur Beratung mit den Alliierten!

Aber der Praesident hatte seinen Entschluss schon gefasst.Er hatte einen Plan konzipiert.Oder besser,er hatte zwei Plaene konzipiert;einen Plan den Deutschen gegenueber, und einen Plan den Alliierten gegenueber. Seine beiden Plaene erforderten, dass er das genaue Gegenteil dessen tat,was Freund House ihm empfohlen hatte.Keine Beratung mit den Alliierten! Zunaechst nur Privatkorrespondenz mit den Deutschen!

Er litt an diesem Tag an Influenza.Trotzdem blieb er bis ein Uhr Nachts an seinem Schreibtisch, und arbeitete an der Antwort nach Berlin, ~~die am naechsten Tage abgehen wird.~~

Sein Plan gegenueber den Deutschen war einfach. (in der Natur der Dinge selbst vorgezeichnet.) Er musste ihnen (wohlwollend milde in dieser Hinsicht, und schneidend hart in anderer Sein. Er musste) ~~er~~ sagen-- nicht mit diesen Worten,aber dem Sinn nach-- dass er bereit sei,ihren Wunsch zu erfuellen.Ja, ich bin bereit,Euch den Wilson-Frieden und einen ertraeglichen Waffenstillstand zu verschaffen! Ja,ich bin bereit, bei den Alliierten meinen ganzen Einfluss einzusetzen,dass Euch beides gewahrt wird! Aber ehe ich mich daran machen kann,

muesst Ihr ~~Eurerseits~~ eine strenge Vorbedingung erfuellen. Ihr muesst Euren Kaiser fortjagen, ~~und~~ die Republik proklamieren. (Zum) Allermindestens muesst Ihr mich ueberzeugen, dass Ihr/eine wirklich ehrliche demokratische, konstitutionelle Monarchie geworden seid. ~~Mein~~ ("If the United States must ~~fuer~~ deal with the military and the monarchical autocrats of Germany, it must demand not peace negotiations, but surrender." x) ~~Versprechen, Euch zu tun, was Ihr wuenscht, tritt in Kraft, wenn Ihr getan habt, was ich wuensche.~~

Das ~~wuerde~~ wuerde er ihnen schreiben; (Und wenn die Korrespondenz sich hinziehen sollte, werde er es ihnen mit gleichender Hoeflichkeit schreiben.) Was die Deutschen anbelangte, war dies in seinem Kopf die Essenz aller Probleme.

fuer den Augenblick: die Republik, ~~oder~~ mindestens die konstitutionelle ~~Demokratie~~ Demokratie. Um dieses Zentrum (Dass dies das Zentrum ist, sah er ohne Umschweife. Den Deutschen selbst ~~sah er~~ erklaeren: "The President feels bound to say that the whole process of peace will, in his judgement, depend upon the definitiveness and the satisfactory character of the guarantees which can be given in this fundamental matter." xx) ~~kreiste~~ das Privat-Gespraech, das er von nun ab, ~~genau drei~~ (Wochen, / ~~Wochen~~) lang, in drei Noten hin und drei Noten zurueck, mit der Berliner Regierung fuehren wird.

Nichts davon ~~zeigte er ihnen vorher~~ besprach er mit den Alliierten. Keine Zeile, die er zu schreiben vorhatte, zeigte er ihnen vorher. Ueber keinen Punkt erbat er vorher auch nur ihre Meinung, ~~geschweige ihre Zustimmung~~. Ausgeschaltet sassen sie nebendran, -- nicht so sehr eifersuechtig und gekraenkt, wie Wilson es sich ~~deutete~~ (später) deutete, als vielmehr

x 3. Note to Germany, Oct. 23, 1918 xx 2. Note to Germany, Oct 14, 1918

unruhig und besorgt.

Ihre Besorgnis war, dass sich aus diesem Privat-Gespraech ein Privat-Abkommen entwickeln werde. Eines Tages drohte ihnen ein deutsch-amerikanisches Privat-Abkommen mit ~~"Einverstanden~~ „Wollt Ihr oder nicht?" vorgewiesen zu werden. Dann in Einzelheiten noch Nein zu sagen, wuerde praktisch unmoeglich sein. Die Voelker Europas und Heere wuerden nicht ertragen, ~~dass~~ den Krieg ~~fortzusetzen~~, wegen Bedingungen, die ~~weitergehe, obwohl~~ Amerika ausreichend zum Friedensschluss fand. ~~fand, dass er beendet werden koenne.~~

Die Regierungen der Alliierten waren ueberwaeltigend interessiert, dass Wilson ~~mit den Deutschen~~ allein nicht einmal ~~nicht einmal~~ bedingt, abhaengig von ihrer nachtraeglichen Zustimmung, etwas mit den Deutschen abmache. In der Tat war Lansing sie ahnten richtig, worauf er hinauswolle. ~~Wilson~~ dies sein zweiter Plan, sein Plan den Alliierten gegenueber.

Aber sie hatten keine Stimme. Sie konnten, wenn er eine Note nach Berlin gesandt hatte, aus dem Zuschauer-Parkett nachtraeglich ~~gegen dies und das~~ protestieren; sich gegen diesen und jenen Punkt verwahren. Er liess sie nicht zur Mitwirkung zu.

Als er an diesem 7. Oktober den Entwurf zu seiner

ersten Antwort auf der gewohnten Schreibmaschine geschrieben hatte,zeigte er ihn House,der eilig nach Washington zurueckgekommen war. "He seemed much disturbed",notierte der Colonel, "when I expressed a decided disapproval of it.I did not believe the country would approve of what he had written."*

2.

The country did not approve,-selbst nachdem Wilson den Ton noch etwas strenger gemacht hatte. ~~Die oeffentliche Reaktion war unfreundlich.~~ Es herrschte im Land ein "nearly unanimous sentiment against anything but unconditional surrender."** ~~Besonders~~ ein Punkt in der Note konsternierte besonders. Der Praesident hatte den Deutschen angedeutet, was ihm militaerisch fuer den Waffenstillstand vorschwebe. ~~Er hatte es angekuendigt in Worten,die darauf schliessen liessen,dass er seine Bdingung schon fuer ziemlich hart halte.~~ "ThePresident

*Seymour:The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,Vol.IV,p.77.

** ibid. p. 78

~~Hindenburg (Reaktion)~~ ~~zum größten Teil~~

Die ~~Reaktion~~ war verständlich. Es herrschte im Land ein „nearly unanimous sentiment against anything but unconditional surrender".* Besonders ein Punkt ~~der Note~~ erregte ~~(auf Wilson)~~ Missbilligung ~~und Ungeduld~~. Der Präsident hatte den Deutschen angedroht ~~(deutsche Delegierte)~~ solle ~~den~~ (Waffenstillstand ihnen vorspiele. ~~Er~~ ~~(ausdrücklich, seinen Ton auf zu überlegen~~ ~~Er hatte ihnen etwas gesagt, was sie offenbar für~~ ~~ihnen Ton~~ es ausdrücklich in Wilsons, ~~die darauf~~ Ausdrucksweise, ~~sich zu~~ schließen, offenbar für ~~falsch~~ (hart hielt. Er hatte ~~gesagt~~ (hier, dass er ~~die Delegierten~~ (äußerst

~~Präsident~~ felt bound to say with regard to the suggestion of an armistice that he would not feel at liberty to propose a cessation of arms", ~~(falls die Deutschen sich nicht bereit erklärten~~ ausser unter der Bedingung, dass die ~~Deutschen~~ deutsche Armee auf den besetzten Gebieten die Waffen abliefe!

Und das war alles? Nicht weiter als das? Die deutsche Armee soll, wenn sie in guter Position (als intakte Macht bestehen bleiben? [Wie es um die stand, wusste man auf der anderen Seite nicht ganz genau. Man wusste nicht, dass Ludendorff am (widersprüchlich, hysterisch verlangte hatte, 1. Oktober) ~~(auf den~~ ~~verlangten~~ Waffenstillstand ~~(hatte ihn bereits gefordert hatte~~ ~~(weil~~ ~~(müsse über~~ ~~Deutschland~~ (zustande gebracht werden, the army could not resist forty-eight hours longer. xx Man wusste nicht, dass Hindenburg am 3. (nach Berlin telegraphiert hatte: „... the situation is (daily growing more acute ... it is imperative to bring the struggle to an end in order to spare the German people and their allies useless sacrifices. xxx [Aber man wusste, dass die ~~die~~ strategische Lage (– endlich, nach mehr als vier Jahren! – (dieser Armee) – katastrophal war; ~~und~~ dass die (sich) auf wochenlangen, erbarmungslosen Rückzug (angelegten in einem Zustand (ihrer Erschöpfung befand. Und aus alledem

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~~* Seymour: Intimate Papers IV, 78~~

xx Preliminary History of the Armistice, ~~p. 111 ff~~ No 12, 21, 27

xxx ibid. ~~p. 116~~ No 33

sollte sie einfach losgelassen werden? Sie sollte unaufhaltsam abmarschieren hinter die Grenze? Sie dort wiederum von einer Kapitulation wollen? Mit jener Existenz auf die Friedens-Verhandlungen (Präliminar) und Möglicherweise auf einigen Monaten (friedlosen Vorgeplänkels) den Kampf nochmals aufnehmen? ~~Was war das gemeint?~~ Was ging in Wilsons Köpfe vor? ~~Wie sah das Vorgehen aus?~~ [Hier begann die erste Episode.

Hier begann der Kampf um den Fortbestand der deutschen Armee, -- um ihren (temporären/vorläufigen) Fortbestand, wohlgemerkt, ~~waehrend einer historischen Episode.~~ Was endgueltig aus der deutschen Armee werden wuerde, war selbstverstaendlich (erst spaeter) im Friedensvertrag zu bestimmen, -- und er bestimmte dann, wie man weiss, alles moegliche. Fuer jetzt handelte es sich nur um die Zwischenzeit bis dahin. Soll die deutsche Armee ~~waehrend~~ der Waffenstillstand (intakt) als kampffaehige Macht erhalten bleiben, ~~zum Friedensvertrag existent bleiben~~, im wesentlichen intakt, Gewehr ~~bei Fuss~~? Oder soll Waffenstillstand nur unter der Bedingung gewaehrt werden, dass die ~~deutsche Armee zerbrochen wird~~ (als kampffähige Macht vernichtet)?

[Viele sentimentale und romantische Worte werden um diesen Kern gewoben werden. Man wird von "harten" und "milden" Bedingungen reden hoeren, von "humiliation" und "magnanimity".

Die wahre Frage war nicht sentimental. ~~Sollte das Instru-~~

~~ment der~~ Die deutsche ~~Macht aus dem~~ Armee war von einem eisernen Schraubstock ~~der es schon~~

gepackt. ~~hatte, wieder~~ (Man konnte sie wieder halbwegs heil daraus entlassen, ~~worden oder nicht?~~ oder konnte sie zerbrechen. Angesichts

der Toten und der Lebenden war ~~darauf mit Ja und Nein zu~~ das zu entscheiden. Kanonen sind kein geeignetes Objekt für Sentimentalität.

~~antworten.~~

Wilson schien ~~mit Ja zu antworten.~~ für sich entschieden zu haben. Schon zu Sir

Eric Geddes, ~~der~~ er seltsam ueber die (voraussichtlichen militaerischen Bedingungen

gesprochen. Er hatte gesagt, sie duerften der deutschen

Armee nicht gestatten, wieder staerker zu werden (als sie jetzt sei). Er hatte

nicht gesagt, ~~sie muessten~~ sie müssten dazu dienen, die deutsche Armee

schwaecher zu machen als sie jetzt sei. (Im Gegenteil: "Undue humiliation would be inexcusable."* Nun hatte er seine

Note geschickt. Als einzige Bedingung sprach sie vom Rueck-

marsch hinter die Reichsgrenzen. ~~Das wurde überlegt [illegible]~~ Worauf wollte er hinaus?

Das konnte nicht ungestraft sein.

* Lloyd George: War memoirs, Vol. VI, p260

im ersten Augenblick kaum bemerkt wurde, und dass Wilson sich wenige Tage spaeter schon ganz anders ausdrueckte. Aber was in Amerika der Aufmerksamkeit entging, erregte in dem militaerisch erfahreneren Europa wahren Alarm. Wie, die deutsche Armee soll bestehen bleiben? Sie soll nur das invadierte ~~ein~~ Gelaende und mehr freigeben, das ihr ohne hin von Tag zu Tag mehr verloren ging? Sie soll faehig bleiben, jeden Tag wieder neu anzufangen ? Was ~~geht in Wilson vor, den Deutschen das in Aussicht zu stellen?~~

Die Presse in London, Paris und Rom remonstrierte. Die diplo~~matischen Vertreter meldeten Befremden und Unzufriedenheit.~~

~~Und~~ In Paris sassen am folgenden Tag, im Parkett des Zuschauers, ~~, ausgeschlossen von jeder Mitwirkung an dem schicksalvollen Gespraech zwischen Washington und Berlin,~~ die Prime-Ministers ~~Frankreichs, Englands und Italiens~~ der Alliierten bestimmen, Clemenceau, Lloyd George und Sonnino. Sie ~~lasen~~, und as erfuhr sie Reine ~~Ete~~ Befürchtung. Worauf wollte er hinaus? ~~sehrige Lesung~~. War das denkbar? Sie zitierten ~~konsterniert, und mehr als das. Sie zitierten Foch~~ den Generalissimus, Marschall Foch. Dann sehten sie sich hin, und ~~kommandierenden, zu sich, Und dann~~ schrieben ~~sie~~ ein gemeinsames Kabel an Wilson. "With greatest interest", sagten sie ihm, haetten die Allied Governments seine Antwort an die Deutsche ~~Regierung~~

~~Instruktion der zwei Generale fort,~~ " dass die Vereinigten Staaten sich einer Weiterfuehrung des Krieges enthalten. Der Kampf gegen das englisch-franzoesische Heer allein ist durchaus nicht aussichtslos."Das war ihre Vorstellung vom Waffenstillstand,-und die erste Vorstellung Wilsons kam ihr weit entgegen.

Aber die oeffentliche Meinung der Welt, sogar diejenige Amerikas, zeigte sich beunruhigt ueber diese Note. ~~Sein~~ Wilsons eigner,intimster Berater ,Oberst House, "expressed a decided disapproval of it .I did not believe the country would approve of what he had written." Und am Tage danach kabelten ~~die Prime-Ministers von England,Frankreich und Italien einen Protest nach Washington~~ gelesen. "They recognize the elevated sentiments which have inspired this reply", ~~befragt und informiert werden sind~~ Aber sie seien verpflichtet, ihn darauf aufmerksam zu machen, ~~ueber die sie nicht befragt und informiert werden sind.~~ Aber ~~sie machten darauf aufmerksam~~ dass die evacuation of all invaded territory allein ,"while necessary,would not be sufficient." ~~Und~~ Sie erklaerten:"The conditions of an armistice cannot be fixed until after consultation with military experts." Marschall Foch habe considerations ausgearbeitet, die of "equal interest" fuer alle associiierten Regierungen sein muessten, "To

these considerations the Allied Governments draw the entire attention of President Wilson."[1] Der Ton ~~seiner~~ ~~diplomatischen~~ war nicht gewoehnlich,-~~und~~ besonders nicht,da er gegen einen Mann angeschlagen wurde,auf den sonst alle Courtoisie verwendet zu werden pflegte. ~~Die Besorgnis ueber den Weg, den seine Ideen einschlagen schienen,~~ und die Gereiztheit ueber die Eigenmaechtigkeit,mit der er gemeinsame Lebensfragen allein zu traetieren und zu praejudizieren unternahm,waren manifest und sollten es sein. ~~manifest werden. Man war am zweiten Tag des neuen Zeitalters.~~

Wilson's Meinung blieb unbekannt,--und man wird seine Meinung kennen lernen. Aber er spürte, dass er mit dem Thema deutsche Linie vorsichtiger sein müsse als mit allen.

[Mit ~~Z~~ diesem ~~Partei~~ Thema verstand auch sein eigenes Volk keinen Spass mehr. Es war Kriegsbeginn ~~Schicksal~~ gewesen, --"war-mad" [1]) in, ~~Ausdrucksweise~~ Und schon begann ein Wahlkampf, der ~~Wilson~~ Im November war der Kongress neu zu wählen, --der Kongress, denn über den Frieden zu entscheiden haben wird! Die Agitation hatte begonnen, --und die Opposition fühlte sich stark auf einer einzigen Platform: Wilson ist zu schwächlich für den Krieg und für den Frieden, er jagt Phantomen nach. Man muss die Deutschen willenlos behandeln.

Ausgang ~~Wahlkampf~~ Wahl für Wilson war.

Ray Stannard Baker:

[1]) (Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. VIII, p. 466

xx Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Col. House, Vol IV, p. 78

in den Slogan Theodore Roosevelts. „ No peace that satisfies Germany is possible. 18 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge

männliche republikanische Führer formulierte, „can ever satisfy us. It can not be a negotiated peace. It must be a dictated peace, and we and our allies must dictate it..." xx

in den Slogan Theodore Roosevelts.

put them

„ put them behind the bars, (in a padded cell," x)

Die Opposition gegen Wilson war überzeugt, daß die (der) amerikanischen Stimmung, (Brennpunkt der

Kern - und sie sollte Recht darin behalten! Der Augenblick war jedenfalls schlecht gewählt, dieser Agitation den Nährboden (Brennstoff) zu liefern.

Die Republikaner Führer, und mit ihnen die Vereinigten Staaten Presse, stürzten sich, möglichst (darauf) ab, dass er seine Ideen (gerade über das Thema) deutlich Armee, etwas undeutlicher und elastischer (der Roman, die) werden liess.

Auch versprach sich Anwender, dass das Thema, (in dem) die Stimme der einzelnen

x William E. Dodd: Woodrow Wilson and his Work, p. 354.

xx Congressional Record, Senate, Aug. 23, 1918

~~Der Praesident las es und sah,dass er in diesem~~

Punkt auf ~~unuberwindbaren~~ unbesiegbaren Widerstand stossen

wuerde. Sein eignes Land missbilligte seine Vorstellung, und

~~ganz sicher war das militaerische Gebiet dasjenige,auf dem~~

~~die Stimme der Europaer~~ Verbündeten von Natur aus unterlegenen das ~~meiste~~ stärkste Gewicht ~~hatte.~~ haben musste. Sie waren es,

~~die~~ , die ~~der~~ Ansturm der deutschen Armee in der Hauptsache ~~aufhielten~~ abzuwehren hatten,

~~sie waren es,die in der Hauptsache die Buerde des Kampfs~~

~~getragen hatten.~~ Frankreich hatte um diese Zeit schon ueber

1,300.000 Tote auf den Schlachtfeldern verloren,und ueber

4,000,000 waren verwundet worden. Die entsprechenden englischen

Ziffern waren 900,000 und 2,000,000.Gemessen mit diesem

grausigen, aber ~~nur allzu realistischen~~ wirklichen Masstab hatte Amerikas

~~Beitrag zum gemeinsamen Sieg~~ Tribut an den Moloch dieser Armee noch nicht zwei Prozent (des gesamten ausgemacht.) ~~gewesen.~~

Von seinen Soehnen waren bis zu diesem Tag kaum mehr als

30 000 im Kampf gefallen,und hoechstens 150 000 waren ver-

wundet worden. [Und merke das anders waren, wenn nach ~~Schluss~~ tatsächlich

~~Nun,das war nicht das ganze Bild.Was Amerika~~ stattfindenden Verhandlungen der Kampf mit der intakten Stärke Amerikas

~~beizumessen~~ auf den Schlachtfeldern beizusteuern gehabt hatte,

~~Ursache~~ noch einmal begännen würden? Nicht wesentlich. Selbst die

~~war~~ schon 1918,obwohl noch relativ (wurde) ~~klein,~~ gerade das gewesen, was

~~notwendig war,um der einen Partei das Uebergewicht zu geben.~~

~~Noch mehr wuerde das 1919 so sein, falls der Krieg sich bis noch so lange hinziehen sollte, 80 bis 100 komplett ausgeruest~~

~~etc~~ 80 amerikanische Divisionen, ~~waren~~ die fuer die naechstjaehrige Kampagne vorgesehen. ~~Ausserdem hatten die Vereinigten Staaten enormes an~~ Geld, Lebensmitteln, Rohstoffen; ~~dem absolut vitalen~~ Schiffsraum und einigen ~~einigen~~ Arten von munitions ~~beigetragen.~~ Aber der Praesident wusste - er wusste es besser als die amerikanische Oeffentlichkeit, -dass es ~~gerade mit einigen der~~ entscheidendsten ~~implements of war bis zum heutigen Tage nicht geklappt hatte.~~ Er wusste von der failure in Sachen planes und tanks. Protestierend gegen "bombastic claims " in der Presse hatte General Pershing ihm im Februar gekabelt: "As a matter of fact there is not to-day a single American-made plane in Europe."*) ~~Man hoffte~~ dann, dass die ersten Maschinen im May verschifft werden koennten, und dass bis zum Oktober eine monatliche Lieferungs Ziffer von 600 erreicht werde.** Aber auch das war Papier geblieben. Nicht nur war Amerika ~~nie~~ bisher nicht imstande gewesen, seinen

*) Ray Stannard Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol VII, p. 572
** Pershing: My experiences in the World war, Vol. I, p. 390

~~Verbuendeten~~ Freunden eine einzige Maschine zu liefern. Es hatte seine eigne Armee bis zu diesem Tag fast nur mit Flugzeugen ~~Maschinnen ausruesten~~ aus der französischen Produktion von monatlich an die 3000 ausgestatten Loewen, ~~koennen, die Frankreich, mit seiner Monats-Produktion von zwischen 2500 und 3000, an sie abtrat.~~ [Unguenstiger noch stand es um die ~~Tanks, diese~~ neue, offenbar entscheidende Waffe, ~~des~~ deren Idee ~~Tank, die~~ in den ersten Monaten des Kriegs dem fruchtbaren Kopf Winston Churchills entsrungen war.

~~sprungen war.~~ Noch im April ~~1918~~ war der Tank in Amerika eine Curiositaet gewesen. Ein englisches Exemplar war in Washington zur oeffentlichen Besichtigung ausgestellt worden. Der Praesident persoenlich war angefahren, um die rare

Maschine sich anzusehen,-- und hatte sich, als er sie bestieg, die Hand so arg und "very painful" an einer heissen Roehre verbrannt, dass sie drei Wochen verbunden bleiben musste.×

× Ray Stannard Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. VIII, p. 96

Ende Juli ~~antwortete wies Genosse~~ hatte Marshall Foch seinen Kollegen Pershing erneut auf die ~~Wichtig~~dringlich(keit) der Tank-Waffe ~~hin~~ (hingewiesen. "But we ~~had~~ were without tanks...The proposal that we should develop our own tanks at home had come to naught."x/ Ende August ~~ver~~ war es ihm gelungen, von ~~sprach ihm~~ Foch ein Versprechen auf ~~fuenf~~ Bataillone des leichten ~~Tanks~~ Typs zu erhalten, drei davon mit franzoesischer Bemannung,- und da hatte vorerst die ~~endete bis zu diesem~~ Geschichte des Tanks ~~Augenblick die~~/in der amerikanischen Armee und Industrie geendet.

Sicherlich, mit allen diesen Defekten und Luecken war die Kriegsmacht Amerikas ~~ein~~ voellig unentbehrlich ~~s Glied~~ in der gemeinsamen Front geworden. Aber nicht ~~das~~ auf dem militaerischen Feld ~~war es, auf dem~~ konnte Wilson sich am staerksten und sichersten fuehlen. Er ~~gab den Protesten~~ sah ein, dass er der Stimmung in seinem Land und den Protesten ~~aus~~ aus Europa und dem eignen aus dem europäischen Zuffauer-Parkett rasch, ohne sie sich verhärten, Regierung ~~Lande nach, und vorschaerfte in den~~ zwei folgenden Noten an Deutschland, seine Andeutungen ueber die Zukunft der ~~Waffenstillstands-~~ ~~Bedingungen~~ wird man (~~hinsichtlich~~ deutlicher und grimmiger werden sehen. In der letzten, am 23. Oktober, ~~Am 14. Oktober schrieb er, es wuerden verlangt~~

~~werden "absolute satisfactory safeguards and guarantees~~

~~of the maintenance of the present military supremacy of the~~

x Scheer: My Experiences in the World War, Vol. II, p. 174

~~of the armies of the US and them of the Allies." Am 25.~~

Oktober ~~ging~~ er um eine ~~Nuance~~ Nuance weiter .Er ~~kuendigte~~

~~Bedingungen an, die die Alliierten in die Lage versetzen wuerd~~

~~den "to enforce any arrangements that may be entered into",~~

~~und die Ausreichen~~ wuerden "to make a renewal of hostilities

on the part of Germany impossible." Aber er schrieb es ~~mit~~

~~ungern. Er hoffte,~~ wie sich zeigen wird, dass selbst diese

~~harten Worte noch vage genug seien, um eine praktische~~

~~Konkretisierung zu gestatten, die~~ eine ~~wesentliche~~ deutsche

Armee bestehan ~~lassen wuerde.~~ ~~House, der am 27.Oktober als~~

~~sein Bevollmaechtigter Vertreter~~ in Paris eintraf, unter-

richtete ihn, dass nur Foch die Deutschen fuer "absolutely

beaten"halte . "Haig and Bliss disagree with him on this

point and advise a reasonable armistice". So versprach sich

~~der Praesident~~ etwas sogar ~~von den Generaelen.~~

Die Generale trafen sich am 25.Oktober in Sen-l

lis.Fuer die Englaender war anwesend Sir Douglas Haig,

fuer die Franzosen Petain, fuer die Amerikaner Pershing und

Tasker H.Bliss. Der Oberkommandierende Marshall Foch prae-

Note vom

Am diesem 13. Oktober beendete der Präsident seine
(den)
sechzehntägiges Privat-Gespräch mit den Abgesandten. Es
(wurde)
Gericht den Alliierten zu, und (es bezog)
(ein zwölftägiges Pele à Pele mit ihnen.

Was auf der deutschen (die deutsche Seite) für ihn
~~aus dem Fiasko~~ herauszuholen war, wäre
gewesen zu sagen. [Der Kaiser war nicht
festgesetzt, die Republik war nicht erklärt. Der Kaiser
(die Deutschen)
abdankte am 9. November festgesetzt.
(Seine Bedingungen)
~~Spätestens~~ Tage vor dem Waffenstillstand,
~~die~~ am 11. unterschrieben waren,
~~Bedingungen, die~~ von den Alliierten ~~waren~~ sie am
~~4. November~~ ~~diese~~ Tage ~~vorher~~ festgesetzt, alle
(in der Tat)
~~waren~~ ~~Punkte~~ der Bedingungen ~~waren~~ in Deutschland
~~und~~ ~~der~~ Kaiser ~~gegeben~~!

[Was die (so mercilos hereingebrochene) Demokratisierung
(den Sturz des Kaisers)
~~des~~ Heeres anbelangt, die
~~am 4. Oktober so mercilos begonnen hatte, war durch Wilsons~~
Privat-Correspondenz war, ist das Wichtigste heute ~~bekannt~~ zuletzt schon
(oftmals)
~~wiederholt~~ worden. Die Deutschen (Alten) hatten nur ~~zu oft~~ ~~behauptet~~ (betheuert), ja,
~~sie hätten~~ Deutschland sei jetzt demokratisch.
~~Darauf hätten sie~~ Das (Wort Demokratie oder parlamentarisches
~~Recht~~ ~~das~~
Regime) (sie verlangten). ~~im~~ ~~Sie~~ ~~wurden~~ ~~nicht~~ Sie (setzten) (ein Gesetz
(nur)
Bezug) verändern ~~Sie~~ ~~wurden~~ ~~nicht~~
~~Sie wurden nicht~~ -- „in a
Aufforderung, ~~die~~ ~~sie~~ wollen clear and unequivocal manner" --
die neue Regierung sei „supported by the approval of the
overwhelming majority of the German people." ~~Wenn der Präsident~~
~~Sie~~ ~~hatten~~ ~~von~~ Belgien ~~aufgefordert hatten~~, für ein
~~wahrhaft~~ demokratisches ~~und~~ Deutschland ~~zu~~ ~~sprechen~~ andere als ihren undemokratischen
für
Gesandten zu ernennen. Bevor (verlangt), mit
E hatte am 7. Oktober ~~Belgien~~, daß es ihm ~~wahrhaft~~ ~~mit~~
~~welche~~ ~~er~~ von Deutschland ~~nun~~ ~~zu~~ dem ~~jetzt~~ ~~zu~~ ~~tun~~ hatte. Die
vor sich
~~sein~~ hoffte, ~~es~~ ~~war~~ ~~aber~~ ~~der~~ Präsident habe nun genaue Antwort
einmal
~~seiner~~ ~~Forderung~~ ~~habe~~ ~~nochmals~~ ~~gesprochen~~ ~~werden~~ ~~sollen~~.

Auf diesem Teil werden die Delegierten die Bedingungen des Waffenstillstands für in der Hand halten. Alle Verfügungen werden fixiert sowie für in der Anfassung, dass man es endlich dem Kaiser zu tun habe.

Zum Schluss war es [illegible] guarantee democratization satisfactory character

~~Es war nur eine Wiederholung schon gesprochener Worte,~~

antwortete
~~und~~ Wilson selbst ~~sagte~~ ihnen ~~schroff~~ schroff, er sei ~~unueber-~~
unbefriedigt. ~~Was geschehen sei, sei nur~~ partial, ~~und vielleicht nicht~~ "It does not appear that the principle of a Government responsible to the people has yet fully worked out...." ~~permanent.~~ The determinating initiative still remains with

those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany."*

~~von~~ Aber irgendwie musste den Praesident ~~tiefer~~ sehr ~~brennende~~ ~~unmass~~ Begierde beherrscht haben, ~~gewesen sein, die deutsche~~ Demokratie ~~in Ordnung~~ zu glauben. Denn ~~ohne dass noch etwas weiteres~~ erhandelte, anders als er ~~sprach~~, sofort ~~Tun~~ In seinem ~~Handeln~~ ~~behandelte er das~~ als zureichend, was seine Worte unzureichend ~~genannt~~ hatten. Noch am Vorabend ~~des~~ des 23. Oktober ~~wogten~~ haben in ihm und um ihn herum die Zweifel ~~und~~ Stunden lang bestuermt von ~~den~~ Meinungen und Gegenmeinungen, ~~seiner Naechsten~~, ~~gestand~~ er an diesem Nachmittag ~~toetlich~~ ~~ermuedet~~, er sei "unable to think longer."** Am naechsten Morgen ~~setzte er das ins Werk,~~ ~~Morgen~~ was er ~~ausdruecklich nur einer~~

~~deutschen Demokratie vorbehalten hatte.~~ Er ~~begann~~ die ~~Alliierten~~ bei den Alliierten ~~zu bearbeiten, den Deutschen~~ um Gewährung jener ~~idealen~~ Bedingungen ~~fuer den Armistice und den Frieden~~, die er gesagt hatte, dass ~~sie nur eine~~ die Alliierten ~~gut~~ Deutschland ~~vorbehalten sein sollten.~~ Er wird ~~die~~ so

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* 3. Note to Germany, Oct. 23, 1918
** Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol. VIII, p. 500

~~Verpflichtung dazu~~
~~Tatsächlich gültigen Tatsachen~~ ~~schreibt~~ 25

~~weit haben~~ am 4.November. Noch immer wird an diesem Tag

(Abgesandten haben. Nichts weiteres sind sie selbst in Russland gewesen sein.

der Zustand der deutschen Demokratisierung eben der sein,

den er selber als so ~~defekt~~ odios charakterisiert hatte. The

determinating influence remained auch noch an diesem Tag

with those who had hitherto been the masters of Germany. ~~Nicht für eine Demokratie, die er selbst mindestens einmündlich gebilligt hätte, sondern für~~ ~~die von ihm mündlichste Pseudo-Demokratie~~

~~Nichtsdestoweniger~~ wird Wilson an diesem Tag ~~fuer eben diese die ihm~~ ~~mündlichste Pseudo-Demokratie, und nicht eben für eine Demokratie~~ ~~diese, nicht fuer ein anderes~~ Deutschland den Frieden der

(bei den Alliierten

14 Punkte durchgesetzt ~~haben~~, die Alliierten ~~werden~~ festge-

~~tatsächlichen für die~~ ~~legt sein und die Nachricht an die Deutschen wird abgeschickt~~ ~~Den es ist für diese Zeit fast wie in andern Ländern~~ ~~werden. Die Tatsache wird in der Wirklichkeit spurlos~~ ~~vorwehen~~ ~~Nachträglich~~ ~~weil am Donnerstag~~ noch die Republik

(in Russland aufspringt, und

die makers von hister werden (wenigstens auffassen), verschwinden.

Aber es bleibt ~~eine~~ die bemerkenswerte Tatsache, ~~Prinzipien~~

das alles, was dieser Republik im Waffenstillstand versprochen

~~koennen mit allem moeglichen kollidieren~~, zuweilen sogar mit

In diesem Zusammenprall scheinen ~~die~~ Prinzipien die hindernden ~~zu biegen oder bei~~

~~anderen Prinzipien. Die Neigung ist immer gross, zu Gunsten~~

~~Prinzipien meist schlecht gegen die locken~~

~~zu bestehen.~~

Aber das ist vorgegriffen. ~~Kehren wir zurueck zu dem~~ Die Phase

(Alle erst beginnen. Der Briefwechsel

~~beginnenden Zwiegespraech~~ mit den Alliierten. ~~Die Scene~~

~~die ihm~~ (zugegangen waren, hatten am
~~einzigen~~ Beweise, ~~die~~ für diesen 23. Oktober) ~~waren~~ einigen Sätzen
~~mit Bestimmtheit~~ bestärkenden
~~gesprochen~~. Das das Gegenteil dieser Erinnerungen stark
~~wurde, war sicher nicht zu bestreiten gewesen~~

~~bereit gewesen sein, die Absicht~~ Aber irgendwie musste der Präsident ~~nicht~~ ~~übergangen haben~~,
~~fundamental~~ ~~dass~~ dass diese konstitutionelle Monarchie wirklich in seine Ordnung
~~Wilson~~ ~~hatte~~ ~~Absicht~~ musste sich ~~offen~~ Klarheit
~~auf~~ Erklärungen von der Regierung, seinem Kabinett als Absicht in
~~Klar~~ ~~sicht~~ ~~haben~~, Noch am Vormittag des 23. Oktober, ~~in dem~~
~~er~~ ~~in~~ die Mitteilung machte, dass es ~~gut~~ mit der Alliierten
~~Absicht~~ ~~wurde~~, wogten in ihm und um ihn herum die Zweifel.
~~Stimmungen~~ der Meinungen und Gegenmeinungen seiner Ratgeber,
~~Stundenlang~~ ~~Gespräche~~ mit seinen Beratern hatte er ~~schließlich~~
~~Stand~~ to be relieved as he was unable to
stand or ~~öffentlich~~ an diesem Nachmittag, tödlich ermüdet,
~~öffentlich~~, er sei „unable to think longer“.*) Am
nächsten Morgen ~~nahm~~ akzeptierte er implizite die Blanko Demokratie; ~~akzeptierte~~ ~~er~~ setzte er
implicite seine Zusage) in Kraft (nach aller Möglichkeit,
~~dass er~~ ihr den Widerstand, der den Alliierten
~~zu erwarten~~ die Lage
vorderen Vorderhand ~~offen~~ offen wieder ~~die war wegen Charlie~~ die Bedingungen
~~dessen~~ ~~Bonn~~ Hauptstadt die Führer der
die militärische ~~die Stelle Armee~~. Marschall Foch wurde aufgefordert, Vorschläge ~~zu machen~~.
Frage ~~Alliierten~~ sie versammelten und auf seinen Vorrat am 25. Oktober
Colonel House für die militärischen Erklärungen zu übermitteln.
~~der Special Representative des Präsidenten~~ sandte.
„ 25. Oktober
[Am versammelte
~~diesem selben Tag traten in Sandis, bei Paris die~~
in Sylis
Der Generalissimus ~~Foch~~ die Führer der nationalen Heere um sich.
Er forderte sie auf, ihre Meinung über
~~gemeinsam zu fassen~~ festen

* Ray Stannard Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol. VIII, p. 500

war die seine schon fertig.)

~~Lediglich der Gesandte erhielt, und dann seinen eigenen Vorschlag ausarbeitete. Daraufhin hatte er ihn schon fertig in der Tasche,~~

(Und Groß war wenig in die Debatte ein. Er griff nur ein, um sowohl seinen Landsmann, General Pétain, wie den Engländer Sir Douglas Haig zu widersprechen. Die beiden (nationalen Kommandeure) bezweifelten, daß die Deutschen ~~schon~~ Bedingungen akzeptieren würden, ~~die das deutsche Heer als Kampftruppe zerbrächen~~. Die Gefahr stehe es auch jetzt noch nicht mit ihnen. (Marschall Foch, der Generalissimus!, dessen Urteil in vielen Monaten nie geirrt hatte, war) ~~schon~~ (ganz wenig ~~dafür~~ ~~eingenommen~~) (ganz entschieden) ~~dagegen~~ Übergangsfrieden. Er stützte sich einigen Sätzen aus „that Germany was so thoroughly beaten she would accept any terms offered."* Im übrigen war es seine Absicht, ~~die~~ nicht jetzt zu reden, sondern die Herren jeden zu lesen.

Was der Engländer sagen würde war ihm schon bekannt. Es ~~war~~ war bekannt, daß) ~~die englische Delegation~~ wünschte, daß er ~~sie~~ ihnen den Vorschlag vorlese würde, den der deutschen ~~Armee nicht~~ (sämtliche) Engländer, militärische, Zivile oder politische, an ihrer Spitze Lloyd George, plötzlich gerade (der verkrachte, wogegen der Kabel mit ~~drei Premiers~~ an Wilson, ~~mit der Unterschrift Lloyd George, als~~ „not sufficient" protestiert Gerlaubt hatte. Last das deutsche Heer hinter die Reichsgrenze zurück marschieren, und damit Schluß! Das ist „sufficient to seal the victory... .. If more is demanded, there is a risk of prolonging the war."** [Der Marschall wußte, daß die deutsche Flotte etwas damit zu tun hatte. Die Engländer versuchten, (schon im Waffenstillstand radikal Schluß mit der deutschen Flotte zu machen), und wollten ~~deshalb~~ ~~die Lage~~ dafür die Landmacht billiger davonlassen. „ Lloyd George ~~drängte~~

* Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. IV, p. 93

** ibid, p. 113

~~mit der Unterschrift~~ Lloyd George~~s~~ als "insufficient" bezeichnet hatte. Es war der erste der von nun an unablaessig einander folgenden Lloyd George'schen Meinungswechsel ~~von heute auf morgen und von morgen auf uebermorgen.~~ "He changes his mind ~~mmmm~~ as easily as he changes his shirt. More often, if anything", wird Foch ~~von ihm~~ sagen. Das Urteil mag an diesem Tag begonnen haben. [~~Die~~ Ueberraschungen waren die Amerikaner. Während Haig in militärischer Verbrämung nur seine Resignation widerspiegelte, wichen die ~~Aber nicht dies war die Sensation von Senlis,~~ General Pershing ~~so weit~~ und Bliss ~~sensationell~~ ~~in offenbar~~ ~~ihre alliierten Ueberraschung wichen, die wollte~~, von ihren Präsidenten ab. ~~sondern die Sensation waren die Amerikaner, deren Bedingungen~~ Sie erklaerten, ~~das die deutsche Armee nicht~~ nur hätte die Waffen ~~(es sei völlig unerheblich) gingen weit~~ ~~mit~~ denen Pétains --- ueber die Foch'schon weit hinaus- zurückgehe, ~~sondern~~ sondern, dass es ~~absolutamerlich~~ für die Alliierten ~~ging~~ müssten. ~~Pétain, der fast während des ganzen Kriegs nie an den~~ ~~offensive~~ Teile von Deutschland ~~zu~~ okkupieren. Mehr noch: die deutsche Armee ~~Sieg und oft an die Niederlage~~ dem ~~geglaubt~~ hatte, wollte jetzt diese Waffen, ausser ~~Infanterie~~ Handfeuerwaffen, behalten. ~~Sie wäre~~ ~~das aeusserste an Sicherungen. Er wollte den Deutschen~~ Jede Kanone, jedes ~~Tank~~ Maschinengewehr müsse sie abgeben. ~~demobilisiert werden.~~ [Das ging ~~Wilson~~ weiter als der Entwurf, den ~~ueberhaupt keine Waffe lassen. "The German army should~~ Foch ~~schon~~ in der Tasche hatte. Sein Entwurf sah ebenfalls die Besetzung linksrheinischen deutschen Gebietes vor, nämlich bis zum Rhein. Aber er verlangte nur ein Drittel ~~return to Germany without a cannon or a tank."~~ Pershing der deutschen Kanonen, ~~und~~ etwas mehr als die Hälfte der Maschinengewehre, ~~sie~~ war Fochs Entwurf nur mittlerer Vorschlag gewesen, ~~die~~ gemässigste Lösung, ~~erklaerte, dass er dieser~~ Ansicht teile. ~~Diese~~ gleiche ~~schon~~ welche die Amerikaner (zu) ~~polemisieren~~ begannen. Am 28. Oktober wandte sich ~~Ansicht vertrat~~ General Bliss in einem Memorandum gegen das Foch'sche "partial disarmement." "Complete disarmement and demobilization" sei zu fordern.xx) ~~Und~~ Und am 30. Oktober ~~aber~~ ~~hatte~~ ~~am ausgearbeitete~~. Und Pershing ~~di~~ schrieb fuenf Tage ~~spaeter~~ ging Pershing noch weiter. ~~An diesem Tage~~ sandte er ein Schreiben, in dem er ~~spaeter ein Dokument, in dem er~~ ~~selbst~~ sogar ~~noch ueber das hinausging,~~ das complete disarmement und all das andere nur als äußerstes Notbehelf ~~was er in Senlis gesagt hatte.~~ Als seine eigentliche

[sofort]

Frist seiner mächtigen Intrigue.

und fand mit Hilfe der Flugzeuge.

Raymond Recouly: My conversations with Marshal Foch, p. 246

xx Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. IV, p. 145

Meinung erklaerte er jetzt, dass ueberhaupt kein Waffenstillstand gewaehrt werden sollte. ~~Man moege~~ Richtig sei es, den Krieg fortzusetzen, bis die Deutschen zu ~~einem~~ "unconditional surrender" genoetigt seien. Nur das ~~machte~~ garantiere die "imposition of satisfactory peace terms", ~~absolut gewiss~~.x)

Unter Wilsons Gästen löste die Stellungnahme der amerikanischen Generale ~~Amazement and~~ „frank expressions of distress" aus. „It is really tragic!" stöhnte der Kriegssekretär Newton D. Baker.xx Die Folgen waren ~~klar~~ voraussehbar. Statt die ~~harten~~ Bedingungen ~~Bedingungen~~ durch die Tatsache, dass Foch jetzt ~~die~~ mittlere, gemässigte, ~~Bedingungen~~ machte sie ~~es noch aussichtsloser~~ fast immun. [Colonel House war als „Special Representative" in Paris angekommen. Er erhielt (am 28. Oktober) telegraphisch die Instruktion die Diskussion des Präsidenten, ~~die Bedingungen~~ so weit wie möglich ~~hinauszuschieben~~ (zu) für schwächere Bedingungen als die des Generalissimus zu kämpfen. [Es war erfolgreich möglich gewesen, wenn Foch ~~es~~ als der Mann des Maximums dagestanden hätte, ~~blieb~~ tatsächlich. Aber Foch (stand) dank den amerikanischen Generalen nicht als (Mann) des Maximums da, sondern des Medicums. ~~Es wurde sich als unmöglich für~~ Colonel House stellte auf eine Manier ~~wie sie noch von der deutschen Armee zu hören~~ schon fast ihr Leben vorgeführt wurde. [Er (Oberst) Kämpfte in seinem Auftrag gegen. Er Kämpfte lang mit Clemenceau (in einer dreistündigen Konferenz, am 29. Oktober) ~~auf~~ aus welcher ~~Unterredung~~ der alte Tiger, ~~so benommen, so gequält, so verwirrt wie sie alle von~~ (nach der Erzählung des Adjutanten) General Mordacq,

x Pershing: My experiences in the World War, Vol. II, p. 166
xx Ray Stannard Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. VIII, p. 536
~~xx General Mordacq: L'Armistice du 11 novembre 1918~~

„très énervé, exaspéré même" berichtet, „et le soir, quand il m'en relata les principaux incidents, il en était encore pâle d'émotion."

Mordacq fragte ihn, wie er geschlafen habe. „Ich habe nicht ein Auge zugetan," antwortete er. „Aber ich habe die Zeit benutzt, um nachzudenken. Und ich habe mich entschlossen, den Sieg nicht sabotieren zu lassen," was ich immer geschehe, ×

Der Kampf begann aufs neue an diesem selben Morgen - und die schlaflose Nacht hatte den Preis nicht geschwächt. Colonel House trat um 10 Uhr morgens bei ihm ein, - und als er das Zimmer wieder verließ, hatte er es aufgegeben! Er hatte sich abgefunden mit den Foch'schen Bedingungen. Er hatte sich abgefunden damit, die Instruktion des Präsidenten nicht verwirklichen zu können. Die militärischen Bedingungen des Waffenstillstands werden an diesem Tag von den drei Haupt-Mächten acceptiert werden. Aber es wird eine Armee hier bleiben müssen. Es wird eine dritte Armee von ernstlichem Gewicht sein, die wird den Waffenstillstand nicht sabotieren.

[- und als sie ein Gewicht hat, die Bedingungen abschwächen zu können.]

[Das Wilsons Absicht anders war, als sie zu erreichen wollen, während der Friedensverhandlungen eine dritte Armee von einem Gewicht sein sollte, das er das Gewicht hatte, das er auch aufbringen wollte) ist das - und sehr wichtige - Geheimnis, aus dem er sein Telegramm an House vom 28. Oktober

historischen Episode, das bisher gehütet wurde, der Grund ist klar)

× General Mordacq: L'Armistice du 11 novembre 1918, p. 164-166

~~Aber zu tun mit vielem, was spaeter wurde, hat die Mentalitaet des amerikanischen Praesidenten~~ ~~gespannt hatte~~ sandte, ~~-~~ den Telegramm, das die Oberste Heeresleitung ~~die Forderungen~~ während der Liquidation ~~der Bedingungen~~ auf Abschwächung der Foch'schen Bedingungen zu drängen. ~~tion des Kriegs und dem Friedensschluss. In diese Mentalitaet gibt die Waffenstillstands-Episode einen guten Einblick.~~

Armee ?

~~Am 28.Oktober~~ sandte er an House, ~~in dem nur fuer sie beide~~ geltenden Code, seine definitive Richtlinie fuer die militaerische Frage ??It? "My deliberate jeddgment is that our whole weight should be thrown for an armistice which will prevent a renewal of hostilities by Germany but which will be as ~~moderate and reasonable as possible within those limits~~ lage die Rekruten, because it is certain that too much success or security on the part of the Allies will make a genuine peace settlement exeedingly difficult, if not impossible..." x

~~Und er fuegte hinzu, er sei gegen die Foch- und fuerdie~~ Haig-Bedingungen . Nun, das ist ein etwas dunkler Satz. Wenn die deutsche Armee so schwach ist, dass sie die hostilities nicht mehr erneueren kann, haben die Allies ~~jede~~ die vollste security. Wann sie nicht too much security haben

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x Ray Stannard Baker; Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. VIII, p. 523

Not too much security on the part of the Allies?

Not too much security,damit die Alliierten sich seinem genuine peace weniger leicht widersetzen koennen ? Not too much security,verwirklicht durch die Armme des Feindes?

Welch intrikates ~~Spiel von~~ "balance of powers"-Kalkulation! Wie befremdlich in dem Geist des Mannes, der in ~~einer seiner~~ den feierlichsten ~~Proklamation den grossen~~ Bann ~~ausgesprochen~~ verhaengt hatte ~~wider~~ über "the great game,now forever discredited,of the balance of power"!*

Vor allem,welch rapider Prozess innerer Losloesung von aller bisherigen Wirklichkeit,welche Drehung der bisherigen Begriffe! Man

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* Address of Febr.11,1918

(in Wilson) nicht verstanden die lebendige ~~Gemeinsamkeit~~ von bisher, die konkrete Wirklichkeit, die Gemeinsamkeit des Kriegs und des konkrete Ziel des Kriegs. Man setzt sich an ihre Stelle schieben die abstrakte Vision der neuen Welt-Ordnung. ~~Zwischen~~ der Verbündete als Gegner und der Gegner als Verbündeter. Es verwandeln sich die Demokratien von gestern in gefahrdrohende Reaktionäre, und der Reaktionär von gestern in eine vertrauenswürdige Demokratie. Der Feind wird der, vor dem man sich hüten muss, und die Armee, die bis gestern zu verhindern war, wird zu einem hilfreichen Faktor, der nicht abzuschaffen ist.

Als Wilson den Gedanken dachte, dass eine fortzusetzende ~~ein Verbot für~~ als vertrauenswürdiger Helfer bei bereits eingetretenen Konflikten mit den Alliierten ~~einzusetzen~~ wurde, musste er sich, was für Hilfe der Hindenburg (und Ludendorff) dachte. Um Hindenburg (und Ludendorff) dachten, ~~dachte~~ ~~im~~ ~~Hintergrund~~ ~~seiner~~ ~~Gedanken~~. Er dachte, dass die vorausgehenden Konflikten Wilsons mit den Alliierten ~~für~~ als einzusetzender Helfer empfangen werde, für die fortzusetzende deutsche Armee ~~einzusetzen~~ wäre. Genau in diesen Tagen arbeiteten Hindenburg und Ludendorff Instruktionen aus, (präzisierten deutschen Friedens-) Instruktionen für die Unterhändler.

(etwas, was zu Wilsons Gedanken so genau passte, wie das Negativ und Positiv desselben Bildes zueinander.)

In der Konkreten Welt bleibt Deutschland (für sie,) was es war: der Urheber des Kriegs und all des Übels. Als die Franzosen ihm einige Wochen später zum Waffenstillstand die verwüsteten Gebiete zeigen wollten, wird er unterrichtet: „I could not despise the Germans more than I do already?“ x Aber in der Abstraktion besteht, noch ehe der Krieg beendet ist,

x Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Col. House, Vol. IV, p. 243

Es steckte ein praezise~~r Kern~~ Mathematik in Wilsons "balance of power~~s~~"-Idee. Die deutsche Armee sollte ~~sicher~~ genau zu schwach ~~sein~~ werden, um ~~den~~ ihnen vereinigten Gegnern nochmals Stand halten zu koennen. Aber sie sollte stark genug bleiben, um die Alliierten allein, ohne Amerika, noch zu beunruhigen.

Bei der Verwirklichung der neuen Welt-Ordnung wuerden Konflikte zwischen Wilson und den ~~Alliierten~~ andern entstehen. Die Alliierten sollten da gebaendigt ~~werden~~ sein durch die Gefahr, dass Amerika sich von der gemeinsamen Sache zurueckzoege; ~~und~~ dass sie ~~dann~~ es dann mit ~~Deutschen~~ den immer noch gefaehrlichen deutschen Waffen/ (gebaendigt durch die Gefahr, ~~dass~~ sie allein, ohne Amerika, nicht aufnehmen ~~konfrontiert waeren~~ müssten.

Als Wilson so dachte, wusste er nicht, was im gleichen Augenblick Hindenburg und Ludendorff dachten. Aber ihre Gedanken ~~passen~~ entsprachen den seinen so genau, wie das Negativ eines Photos ~~zu~~ dem Positiv. In eben diesen Tagen arbeiteten auch Hindenburg und Ludendorff Instruktionen aus, - Instruktionen fuer die praesumptiven deutschen Unterhaendler. Sie setzten voraus, dass eine wesentliche deutsche Armee den Waffenstillstand ueberdauern werde. Die Hoffnung sei nun, ~~dann~~, sagte die Instruktion, dass zwischen Wilson

~~deutschen Friedens-Unterhaendler aus.~~ Sie ~~fuehrten~~ setzten ganz selbstverständlich ebenfalls

~~auf der Idee~~ davon aus, dass ~~die~~ eine deutsche Armee ~~Gewehr bei Fuss~~

fortexistieren werde. ~~Waehrend den Verhandlungen wuerden~~ Da komme nun alles darauf an, sagte die Reaktion, die Hoffnung sei,

~~wahrscheinlich, hoffentlich, Konflikte~~ dass dann zwischen Wilson

und den Alliierten (ernsthafte Konflikte wegen der neuen Welt-Ordnung) entstünden. "Es ist dann nicht ausge-

schlossen~~,~~ ~~fuhr das Schriftstueck fort,~~ dass die Vereinig-

ten Staaten sich einer Weiterfuehrung des Krieges enthalten. Der Kampf gegen das franzoesisch-englische Heer allein ist durchaus nicht aussichtslos, beosnders wenn Belgien sich ebenfalls versagt."x) Es war die deutsche Version von

~~Das war~~ Wilsons "not too much security"~~ on the part of the Allies~~, in deutscher Version. Man ~~sollte~~ wird es nicht zum letzten Mal erleben, dass die Ideen gerade des ~~entschlos-~~ (Man wird nicht alle zum letzten Mal erleben, wie das Positive mit dem Negativen, mit

~~sensten~~ integralsten Idealismus haargenau, ~~mit~~ den Ideen des ~~entschlossen-~~

~~sten~~ integralsten Macchiavellismus ~~harmonieren~~ koinzidieren!.

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x Amtliche Urkunden zur Vorgeschichte des Waffenstillstands 1918. Herausgegeben vom Auswärtigen Amt, Berlin. ~~Dokument~~ No 76a.

3.

~~Aber das Ringen um die Erhaltung einer~~ Die deutsche Armistice-Armee hatte nur Wichtigkeit für einige Monate. ~~deutschen Armee waehrend des Waffenstillstands, stark genug,~~ Für alle Politik war nur ~~die security der Alliiereten zu bedrohen, war nur die~~

kleinere Sorge waehrend dieser Wochen. Die groessere

~~Sorge des Praesidenten war ganz klar jenes~~ beruehmte

~~program laid down by~~ the President of

the United States". Die Deutschen hatten ~~dieses~~ Programm, ~~das~~ 14 Punkte, ~~das nach Wilsons tiefer Ueberzeugung endlich, nach all~~

~~den Jahrtausenden~~ finsteren ~~"the Reign of Law" in der Welt begruenden~~ wurde, ~~in toto als Basis~~ fuer den Friedensvertrag

acceptiert. Um vor zu erreichen, dass auf die Alliierten es taten. ~~Der Praesident empfand es als nicht nur als~~

ueberwaeltigenden persoenlichen Triumph. Er empfand es als

die Haelfte dessen, was notwendig sei, damit sein Zeitalter

des Reign of Law tatsaechlich beginnen koenne. Die noch

uebrige andere Haelfte war die ~~Acceptation dieses seines~~ ~~Programms~~ auch durch die ~~Alliierten.~~ [Und vor dem Waffen-

stillstand, (war es zu erreichen!) ~~so lange noch Krieg war, mussten sie es~~

~~acceptieren,~~ (Wilson und Amerika) (nötig haben) spaeter wuerden sie ~~es~~ nicht mehr ~~tun~~ und

nicht mehr ~~noetig~~ haben ~~Schon zugleich mit den Bedingungen~~ ~~des Waffenstillstands mussten sie auch die Bedingung unter-~~ ~~schreiben, dass der Frieden ein Frieden nach seinem Pro-~~ ~~gramm wwerden wuerde. Spaeter wuerde es zu spaet sein. Jetzt muss es geschehen.~~ Vor einigen ~~Wochen~~ schon, als noch niemand an die deutsche Waffenstillstandsbitte dachte, hatte House ~~ihm~~ gewarnt: "As the Allies succeed, your influence will diminish. This is inevitable.... Therefore I believe that you should commit the Allies now to as much of your programme as possible... Could not a plan be thought out by which the Entente would be committed ...?" ~~Das war im September gewesen. Es hatte sich keine Gelegenheit ergeben.~~ Jetzt war ~~man im Oktober~~ der success der Allies ~~war~~ im Begriff, definitiv zu werden. ~~Dies~~ war der letzte Augenblick. To commit them to his program, ~~Weit mehr als von allem andern war sein Denken von diesem Gedanken erfuellt. Diesmal hatte er den Plan, den er im September, als House ihm~~ ~~anregte, noch nicht hatte haben koennen.~~ Die ganze Art, wie er

× Seymour, The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, Vol. IV, p. 65

Er bezweifelte nicht, dass es schwer sein wuerde.

Er hatte die 14 Punkte, und dann die Nachtraege von 4 und 4 und 5 weiteren Punkten, ganz aus eigenem aufgestellt.

Er hatte die Ziele eines Koalitions-Kriegs der proklamiert, ohne irgend einen Koalierten zu fragen. Bei diesem Verfahren haette es unter allen Umstaenden seltsam zugehen muessen, wenn Alle mit allem haetten einverstanden sein sollen.

Mehr noch: er selbst hatte nie geglaubt, dass seine Koalierten einverstanden seien. Im Gegenteil, ihm war es ganz sicher, dass Ideen, Ethik, Philosophie und Willen sich von den wie die Verschiedenheit in der Suende vom Streben nach Tugend. Ja, die schwarz. Die Voelker, die, inartikulierte Masse der Millionen, glaubte er in allen Laendern innig mit sich einig. Aber die Staatsmaenner, Politiker, die Massgebenden ueberall -- das eigne Land im grossen Ganzen nicht ausgenommen, --"have not the same views with regard to peace that we have by any means".* Sie alle

* Ray Stannard Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol. VII, 180

wurden als"Cynisch","reaktionaer","unmoralisch","selfish"

von ihm beurteilt.Mit noblem Kummer,aber auch mit ~~stummgamm~~ theologischer Strenge ~~Selbstgewissheit~~ rangierte er sie in eine andre Kategorie ~~Gattung~~ in der Gesellschaft gegen Deutschland Rand nie/wenig ~~Gattung~~ Positivem ~~Gattung~~ als seine eigne. ("I must say I am afraid of any (underlined) expression of policy ~~framed jointly von~~ framed jointly" von diesen Koalierten, hatte er kurz nach Amerikas Eintritt in den Krieg geschrieben. ~~Koalierten~~ "There has been none yet that seemed to me even touched with wisdom."* [Es gab um ihn herum ein Kreis von Anhaengern, hauptsaechlich juengere Radikale, die das ihrige dazu taten, diesen moralischen Klassen-Instinkt in ihm zu verschaerfen.Man muss sagen,dass die Phantasie,die einige von ihnen im Missdeuten und Verdaechtigen der Koalierten entfalteten,unerschoepflich und unermuedlich war. Es war die Zeit der ersten Anfaenge jener Woge von Messianismus, vage, ~~unwissend,~~ simplistisch,phraseologisch, aber hochmuetig,besserwisserisch,~~haemisch,intolerant,~~ die bald ~~schauemend~~ ueber die ganze ~~Welt~~ Erde brausen wird.Man wird sie waehrend der naechsten Jahre in alle Zentren sickern

* Ray St.Baker: Woodrow Wilson,Life & Letters,Vol.VII,p.561

sehen, in denen Welt-Geschichte gemacht wird. In der Umgebung Wilsons ist sie am fruehesten wahrnehmbar. Die bizarren Informationen und Interpretationen, die dem Chef von diesen Mitarbeitern zugingen, moegen in gewissem Grade ~~gerade~~ dazu beigetragen haben, in seinem Geist die ~~Unterschiede~~ Tugend-Suende-Distanz zwischen sich und seinen Cobelligerenten zu verbreitern. Auf jeden Fall war diese Distanz ein staendiger Inhalt seiner Vorstellungen. Schon als er seine Prinzipien fuer die neue Welt, die 14 Punkte und die Ergaenzungen, proklamierte, hat er es nicht in der Meinung, das Sprachrohr auch der andren Regierungen zu sein. Keineswegs! Er war ganz sicher: ~~zweifelte er nicht, dass~~ diese Ziele des Koalitions-Krieges nicht die Ziele ~~der~~ der uebrigen Alliierten, ~~seien.~~

Wie also sie dennoch zur Annahme ~~bringen~~ bewegen? Und wie sie zur Annahme ~~bringen jetzt, sofort, im Verlauf einiger~~ bewegen im Handumdrehen, binnen der fünf historischen auf der Stelle ~~Tage~~ Minuten bis zum Waffenstillstand? Er hatte seit jeher nicht daran ~~niemals~~ gezweifelt, dass es mit Zwang eines Tages einfach ~~geradewegs~~ geschehen muesse, ~~mit Zwang in einem richtigen Augenblick.~~ So frueh wie Mitte 1917 hatte er in einem Schreiben an House den Plan entwickelt, ~~wie~~ in einem bestimmten Augenblick, ~~moeglich sein werde~~ "to force them" *

* Ray Stannard Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, Vol. VII, p. 180

"They need to be coerced"*,sagte er ~~in den Stunden in denen~~ ~~er das Privatgespraech mit den Deutschen abbrach.~~ "We should play a strong hand"**, ~~drahtet ihm~~ House ~~aus Paris~~ ~~an dem kritischen 30.Oktober, an dem er ihren Widerstand bricht.~~ Colonel/

~~So fruch wie Mitte 1917 hatte er auch schon vorgesehen, welche~~ Mittel, zum Zwang ~~er im richtigen Moment~~ verwendet wuerde, ~~und es war~~ ~~ziemlich realistisches Mittel, vergleichbar mit~~ der Zweck, die ~~Inauguri~~erung einer idealen ~~neuen~~ Welt, "England and France", schrieb er ~~damals~~ an House, "have not the same views with regard to peace that we have by any means.When the war is over,we can force them to our way of thinking,because by that time they will,among other things,be financially in our hands; but we cannot force them now."Und wiederum ~~fast anderthalb Jahre spaeter, an dem die Daumenschrauben anzusetzen beginnt, die Bank in Paris~~ ~~kritischen 30.Oktober an dem er die Daumschrauben ansetzt~~, ~~wird Colonel House den Gedanken zurueckgegeben~~:"I would suggest that you quietly diminish the transport of troops

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* Ray Stannard Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol. VIII, p. 500

** Foreign Relations of the USA, 1918, Suppl. 1, Vol. I, p. 424

*** ibid Ray Stann. Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol. VII, p. 180

giving as an excuse the prevalence of influenza or any other reason but the real one.I would also suggest a little later that you begin to gently shut down upon money,food and raw material.I feel confident that we should play a strong hand..."* Die Ausfuehrung des Vorschlags wird nicht notwendig sein, da die Alliierten sich schon vorher beugen werden. Aber es ist nicht belanglos, dass es sich nach Wilsons Worten darum handelte, of thinking". Dass eine Kapitulation unter auesserstem Druck himmelweit davon entfernt, ist, das geringste an dem way of thinking zu aendern, scheint eine der einfachsten Wahrheiten des wirklichen Lebens. Die Verwechslung, zu den Geburtsfehlern des neuen Zeitalters gehoeren.

*Foreign Relations of the USA,1918,Suppl.1,Vol.I,p.424

Draussen gingen die Schlachten. Die Deutschen blieben zaeh und wirksam, kaempften vor immer wie sie es vier Jahre lang getan hatten. Sie kaempften an der Seine gegen die Engländer, an der ~~Oise und dem~~ Somme und Aisne gegen die Franzosen, in den Argonnen gegen die Amerikaner. An der Front

Aber Colonel House sass in Paris, und sollte zwingen, wollte zwingen. ~~Ihm gegenueber~~ in dem Conferenzzimmer am Quay d'Orsay, in dem an diesem 29. Oktober der Gewaltstoss ~~der Unterwerfung unter das Ideal~~ des Generals gegenüber einem Amerikaner beginnen sollte, sassen zwei Franzosen, zwei Englaender und ein Italiener, einem Amerikaner gegenueber. Bisher waren ~~die~~ man ~~paar Tage~~ seit Praesident Wilson das Gesicht ihnen zugewandt hatte, mit den militaerischen Klauseln beschaeftigt ~~ausgefuellt~~ gewesen. Ob das richtig sei, fragte ~~Lloyd George, dass Deutschland von dem Praesidenten ein Frieden gemaess den 14 Punkten vorsprochen worden sei. Ob das wahr sei, dass man infolgedessen~~, wenn man ~~ihnen~~ den Deutschen jetzt ~~den~~ Waffenstillstand gewaehre, damit zugleich auch die Verpflichtung uebernehme, den Frieden der 14 Punkte mit ihnen zu schliessen? Ja, antwortete House, das sei ~~die amerikanische Meinung~~ richtig. Waffenstillstand schliessen heisse, sich gegenueber dem Praesidenten und den Deutschen auf den Frieden der 14 Punkte verpflichten. Dann, sagte Lloyd George, muesse er erklaeren, dass England das nicht koenne. Vieles in den 14 Punkten sei ~~gaenzlich inakzeptabel~~ ganz unmöglich für sein Land.

Clemenceau lehnte sich zu ihm hinueber und ~~fragte~~ formulierte alles, was er dachte, in die Kurzform einer einzigen Frage: ~~ihn anzuoglich~~ ("Have you ever been asked by President Wilson, whether you accept the Fourteen Points? I have never been asked."

"I have not been asked either", replied the British Prime Minister.

" Then I want to hear the Fourteen Points,"sagte Clemenceau.

" Yes,and the five more and the others",ergaenzte Sonnino.x

Der Wunsch Sonninos, auch die five more and the others erlauetert zu bekommen, ~~sie~~ wird sich nie erfuellen.

Diese in Summa 13 "subsequent pronouncements" ~~sind~~ gehoeren ebenso zu der ~~xx~~ ~~acceptierenden~~ präsentierten Basis wie die ~~14 ersten. Sie sind~~ werden ~~heute~~ auf der Friedenskonferenz, und spaeter in zwanzig Jahren Debatte, nicht seltener zitiert werden, als die 14 ersten. Sie ~~sind~~ waren nicht weniger wichtig, keineswegs. Im Gegenteil, sie ~~sind~~ waren ~~bedeutend~~ wichtiger. ~~Denn waeh-~~

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x Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Col. House, Vol. IV, p. 162/163

Die Serie der 14 war einzelnen konkreten Fragen gewidmet

~~rend jamm immerhin (einzelnen konkreten Fragen, und mehr oder minder konkrete Meinungen darueber gaben, war~~ die Serie der 13 war ein allgemeiner, alles ueberwoelbender Katechismus. Sie enthielt ~~imhamm~~ au Wilsons gesamte Friedens-Philsophie, oder -Theologie, oder *Mythologie. Die 13 subsequent rules sings in Wahrheit über die Person ihres Autors hinaus. Sie [illegible] wollen das Idyllbat der ganzen perfektionistischen Strömung, die vorerst noch sabbierend, später messianisch, an allen Punkten der Welt Ende bereitzumachen.

Unter ~~ihnen~~ den 13 befanden sich ~~die~~ entweder ~~voellig nichtssagenden, oder voellig umwaelzenden~~ Postulate wie dieses:

~~erste in den 5 particulars~~ :"The impartial justice meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that plays no favorites (and knows no standards but the equal rights of the several peoples concerned!" X ~~" Welche Forsch~~

Was war Das? Präsident Wilson hielt Deutschland für den Urheber ~~und Verantwortlichkeit~~ ~~war gemeint? Diejenige der menschlichen Gerichte,~~ berechtigterweise dieses Krieges, ~~die Verantwortlichkeit~~ für die Verwüstungen und Mißern dieses Krieges. Die Zeit, in der selbst diese Prämisse geleugnet wurde, war ~~Strafflichkeit~~ ~~die zwischen Schuld und Unrecht der Parteien, ihren Maßstab~~ noch nicht gekommen, und wird für die nie kommen. Nun, Gerechtigkeit hieß, ~~hieße~~ so lange die Welt steht: unequal ~~gelten~~ für den Täter und das Opfer. Gerade ~~Jetzt~~ ~~die Welt steht~~: discrimination ~~und ihren Ansprüchen differenziert und wägt? Oder eine~~ zwischen Klägern und Beklagten. Das ist die Gerechtigkeit in allen Gesetzbüchern. Das ist die Gerechtigkeit in allen Religionen. ~~Selbst diese einzige bekannte~~ ~~artig visionaere, vielleicht hoellische, die~~ ~~alle andere war nicht die erdachte, sie gedachte, sie sprach selbst von Gerechtigkeit~~ ~~wollte hier eingeführt werden?~~ ~~Unterschiede negiert und alle Verantwortungen abschafft?~~ Soll die Gerechtigkeit der Zustand sein plötzlich von einem auf den Kopf gestellt werden erscheint werden von einer ungeheuren, sie exportiert?

Oder ~~das zweite~~ jenes andre Postulat, in dem ~~enthielt, worin~~ gefordert war "the settlement of every question, whether of territory, ~~it upon the~~

X Address of Sept. 27, 1918, „5 particulars".

or sovereignty, of economic arrangement, or of political relationship, upon the basis of the free acceptance of that settlement by the people immediately concerned, and not upon the basis of the material interest or advantage of any other nation.... "x" Was

der Gemeint? Wird der Frieden Deutschland nicht entbehren müssen,
was im Interesse of any other Nation läge? Wird er nur das enthalten dürfen, was die
Deutschen ihren eigenen Interessen gemäss findet und akzeptiert? So
lange die Welt steht, hatte die Sieger einen grossen Einfluss auf den
Friedensschluss. Wenn der Wolf mit dem Lamm, wird schliesslich
(immediately concerned people rule)
(Er schrieb) Er diktierte die Bedingungen, unter denen er selber
diktieren, indem er schrieb (entschied) konnte, was ihm passt und
ihm
was (nicht) passt, (diktiert die Bedingungen, unter denen er selber diktieren kann) Niemand hielt die Praxis der Selbstgerechtigkeit,
sogar wenn sie (Diktiert die Bedingungen, unter denen er selber diktieren kann) Niemand hielt die Praxis der Selbstgerechtigkeit,
sogar wenn sie sich verkleidete, wie sie es gewohnt war, zu verbergen,
über die einzig [illegible] sich empfehlen könnte.
[Die Welt] dass die Störung der Welt [illegible] Ende [illegible]
heute nicht [illegible] werden würde.

Aber ueber die 13 ganz umfassenden Postulate auch nur

reden, blieb nicht schliesslich nicht die Zeit. Man blieb in

den 14 engeren stecken. Colonel House begann sich vorzulesen. machte sich daran Vorlesen.

Vorschlag

[Die Welt, dass das Mittel zur Störung der Welt Ende Erbe heraus
stehe, die [illegible] (alle) Geschichte [illegible] Tatsache einfach (in ihr) Gefüge,
(aber der [illegible] (wichtigsten) Norman)

ihre Verletzung, ihr Negativ zu proklamieren und zu applizieren, —
die Überzeugung, dass das (möglich sei [illegible] und dass die einzelnen Normen
und [illegible] Grundsätze
und funktionieren würden: das war die Illusion der ganzen
politischen Strömung. Die Illusion der Illusion war Wilsons 13
umfassende Postulate.

Aber über die auch nur zu reden,

~~alle~~ saemtliche uebrigen menschlischen Geschaefte so gefuehrt werden,

dass jede Unterhaltung von allen Nachbarn und Konkurrenten mit gehoert wird? ~~Wird es der Ruhe~~ in dieser komplizierten Welt ~~die~~ ~~dienen, wenn Antagonismen zwischen den Laendern und innerhalb der Laender~~ nicht mehr nur durch halbwegs gereifte Tatsachen, sondern schon durch die Embryonalstadien von Gespraechs-Ideen gegen einander in Bewegung gestzt werden? Ernstlich gesprochen, wo steckt die Weisheit von "openly arrived at"?

Colonel House hatte es in diesem Punkt leichter als in anderen. ~~Er konnte sagen: Kuemmern Sie sich nicht um das "openly arrived at"! Betrachten Sie es als inexistent!~~ Er hatte in seiner Tasche eine Anzahl Schreibmaschinen-Blaetter. Es war ein Kommentar zu den 14 Punkten, den er ~~sich, in Paris angekommen, als diese Auseinandersetzung naeher rueckte~~ von zwei intelligenten Schriftstellern hatte schreiben lassen. ~~Praesident Wilson war nun ausgelegt von~~ Nun, Mr.Frank J.Cobb von der New York World, und Mr.Walter Lippmann, augenblicklich im Staatsdienst, ~~Nun, die beiden Anderen~~

~~Kommentatoren~~ hatten diese ~~Reform-Idee~~ ~~unter den Tisch~~ mit sanfter Hand ~~in die Ecke geschoben~~. "The phrase, openly arrived at' need not cause difficulty".* ~~Der Punkt~~ ~~gestrichen durch Kommentar. Praesident Wilson wird ihn nicht wieder hervorholen.~~ Er wird der erste sein, der sich spaeter, waehrend der Friedenskonferenz, von gewissen leaks in der Presse so belaestigt fuehlen wird, dass er foermlich ~~gegen sie protestieren wird.~~

Umso stuermischer wird es beim zweiten Punkt: " Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas, ouside territorial waters, alike in peace and in war.." Lloyd George ~~sagte klar und buendig~~: Nein, ~~um keinen Preis!~~ Was das ~~heissen~~ ~~sollte, lag auf der Hand, und~~ war durch keine Kommentar-Kunst zu ~~faerben~~. Eine Flotte sollte kuenftig ~~nicht mehr das Recht haben~~ eine Blockade auszuueben. Noch stand man im Krieg, und Wenn England ~~[illegible]~~ nicht in ihm zugrundege-

* Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Col. House, Vol IV, p.193

--England und die andren!--
gangen war, dankte es das zum grossen Teil der Blockade. ~~War~~ Und

~~es je in der Welt erlebt worden, dass in einem solchen~~ just in diesem Augen-

~~verlangte~~ was die Sehnsucht (darauf seriftet, dass ~~Aufstand~~ verbrüderlich
blick der eigene Verbuendete und Mit-Nutzniesser

~~und verlangte dass diesem erprobten Mittel der Verteidung~~
~~Waffe~~ in die Acht zu erklären!
~~fuer alle kuenftigen Zeiten entsagt werden~~ Die Blockade

war der halbe Wert der englischen Flotte, ~~und~~ die Flotte

war Englands ganze Existenz. Und dies Erbe von Generationen und Generationen sollte jetzt

~~hatten an ihr gebaut, eine ganze Geschichte war auf ihrem~~

~~Fundament aufgerichtet.~~ Und Mr.Wilson stellte sich vor, dass
dieses Substrat einer jahrhundertelangen nationalen Existenz
~~dieser Kern~~ Essenz ~~von Jahrhunderten von Tradition~~ jetzt

in einem Handumdrehen preis ~~auf~~gegeben werden, ~~werden~~ nur weil ~~im~~ eine
eines Mannes ~~Augenblicks~~ Idee sich in sein Hirn gesetzt hatte,
~~seinem Kopf die Blase oder~~ und ~~Ein~~ weil
dass das Bestehende zu ändern sei durch das Gesetz der Logik!
~~er eine Privatkorrespondenz mit den Deutschen gefuehrt hatte?~~

Nein, er konnte
[Lloyd George verlor fast die ~~Tuenche der~~ Hoeflichkeit. ~~Alles~~
nicht zugeben, dass ~~die Welt monatelang~~ unter den Ungaben
der Welt-Miseren die Blockade-Waffe besonders ~~Kriegs~~ prominent sei. So sah die
~~hat schliesslich seine Grenze. Nein, Nimm die Waffe der Blockade~~
wirkliche Welt nicht aus. Die wirkliche Welt hat von der Existenz dieser Waffe, ob sie ~~wird er~~ oder angewandt wurde, nicht sehr profitiert. Sie wird wieder von ihr
~~nicht auf dem Altar der Wilson'schen Fiktionen niederlegen.~~
profitieren können. Wie dem auch sei: er wird ~~hier zwischen Lappe und Tisch, so wenig~~
nicht zugeben, dass hier England, statt Deutschland Bedingungen zu stellen sind. Er wird ~~Wilson~~
Es war sehr ehrenvoll fuer ihn und sein Land, dass Wilson vertrau-
Lappe und Tisch, über das Blockade-Recht, ein Fundament der britischen Existenz, verfügen, wie
(so wenig Wilson über die Monroe-Doktrin) verfügen würde. Täte er es, so wäre es übrigens
te, ihr Wort in dieser Sache, wenn sie es jetzt ~~gebrochen~~ gegeben,
(ein Freund der amerikanischen,

~~wuerde spaeter wirklich~~ gehalten werden. ~~Aber er wird in dieser Sache nicht einmal~~ ein Wort geben, am wenigsten unter diesen ~~Umstaendon. Wenn er es taete, wuerde~~ sein Parlament und sein Volk ~~ihn binnen einer Woche zum Teufel jagen.~~

Colonel House argumentierte. Die Zeit der Kriege wird ja zu Ende sein. Der Voelkerbund, den wir jetzt gruenden werden, wird England auch ohne Blockaderecht sichern. Wenn der Voelkerbund so effektiv werden wird, antwortete Lloyd George, dass er wirklich Kriege verhindern wird, ~~so~~ wird ~~eben-~~ infolgedessen ~~dasmanch auch~~ keine Blockade mehr stattfinden. Wenn der ~~Voelker-bund~~ so effektiv werden wird, wird ausserdem er selbst ~~das~~ ~~Blockaderecht abschaffen koennen. Aber~~ bisher ~~weiss~~ noch niemand, wie der Voelkerbund funktionieren wird. ~~Man kann nicht in~~ der Hoffnung, dass ein Zustand ~~eingetreten~~ erreicht ~~werden wird~~, ~~sich so verhalten, als sei er schon erreicht.~~

Colonel House ~~warnte~~ drohend. Wenn England auf die Blockade in Kriegszeiten nicht verzichte, ~~werde~~ ~~Amerika~~ Vor-

kehrungen treffen muessen, um seine Schiffahrt in Kriegszeiten zu schuetzen. Die Vereinigten Staaten wuerden dann eine Kriegs-
muessen
Flotte bauen, wie noch nie, und er koenne England diesen Wett-

bewerb nicht empfehlen. [Es wuerde ein sehr schmerzlicher
Wettbewerb werden, sagte Lloyd George, aber wenn Amerika es
nicht anders wolle, muesse England selbst das tragen, und
werde es tragen.] Das Britische Reich werde den letzten Farthing
opfern, muessen, um zur See so stark zu bleiben, wie die Vereinigten
Statten. Aber selbst diese Perspektive koenne ihn nicht
veranlassen, die Selbst-Kastration des Verzichts auf die
Blockade zu begehen.

Das Gespraech war festgelaufen. Ein andrer Punkt tauchte auf. [Aber wieso? Nun, was war der ethische Unterschied zwischen diesen Arten von Schaeden und anderen? Warum sollte es gerechter sein,

die fuer einen in Nordfrankreich zerschossene Fabrik

verantwortlich zu halten, aber nicht fuer ein im Atlantic versenktes Schiff? Warum sollte es moralisch sein,

den Wiederaufbau eines zernichteten polnischen Bauernhauses

von ihnen zu fordern, aber nicht den Unterhalt eines zum Krueppel geschossenen polnischen Bauern? ~~Was war in der Tat der~~ Wäre eigentlicher ideale Unterschied zwischen irgend welchen ~~einem~~ Bestandteil der ~~vielen Hunderte von Billionen Dollar~~ Kriegskosten und ~~Kriegs~~schaeden,--da doch alle herruehrten aus der gleichen Ursache, und da doch alle hinfuehrten zu dem gleichen Steuerzahler? Es mochte wohl sein, dass die Deutschen ausserstande waren, die ganze astronomische Rechnung ~~der Kriegsschad~~ zu zahlen. ~~Aber~~ Das war ein rein praktischer Gesichtspunkt, dem eine praktische Rechnung zu tragen sein würde. Ganz etwas andres war es, irgend welche speziellen Schadenskategorien herauszugreifen, ~~und von ihnen~~ diese ~~ganz~~ willkuerlich ~~zu sagen die sind~~ (zu nennen) moralisch, und ~~von~~ die uebrigen ~~ganz~~ willkuerlich ~~zu sagen die sind~~ unmoralisch. Die Differnzierung ~~die~~

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dem Praesidenten beliebte, war philosophisch haltlos. Ihr ~~Effekt~~ Praktisch würde ~~musste sein, dass die Deutschen, statt ueber ihre Zahlkraft taxiert zu~~ ~~werden, definitiv weit unter ihrer Zahlkraft taxiert würden,~~ ~~kennten. Ein anderer Effekt musste sein, dass Staaten wie die~~ des British Empire, ~~auf~~ deren Boden nicht gekaempft worden war,

die fuer einen in Nordfrankreich zerschossene Fabrik

verantwortlich zu halten, aber nicht fuer ein im

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schied zwischen irgend ~~einem~~ Bestandteil der ~~vielen Hunderte von~~

~~Billionen Dollar~~ Kriegskosten und ~~Kriegs~~schaeden,--da doch alle

herruehrten aus der gleichen Ursache, und da doch alle hinfuehrten

zu dem gleichen Steuerzahler? Es mochte wohl sein, dass die

Deutschen ausserstande waren, die ganze astronomische Rechnung

zu zahlen. ~~Aber~~ Das war ein rein praktischer Gesichtspunkt,

Ganz etwas andres war es, irgend welche speziellen Schadens-

kategorien herauszugreifen, ~~und von ihnen~~ willkuerlich

~~zu sagen die sind~~ moralisch, und ~~von~~ den uebrigen ~~ganz~~ will-

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~~kennten. Ein anderer Effekt musste sein, dass Staaten wie die~~

des British Empire, ~~auf~~ deren Boden nicht gekaempft worden war,

war philosophisch Luft,-aber die Konsequenzen hatten reales Gewicht.

Die Deutschen würden auf diese Weise nicht etwa nur vor

Unmoeglichem geschützt sein; tatsaechlich wuerde ihnen

definitiv garantiert sein, nicht einmal entfernt das

Moegliche leisten zu muessen, (nicht entfernt.) Ausserdem wuerden die Voelker

des British Empire, da ihr Boden nicht bestzt gewesen war,

von vornherein nicht einen (einzigen) penny

ihrer Schaeden und Buerden wieder hereinbringen können.

Das Gespräch schlich weiter von Punkt zu Punkt. Ein

Unterton von Ungeduld machte sich bemerkbar. ~~Vorstimmung zog sich durch das Gespraech~~. Colonel

House

(war irritiert durch so viel Irdischkeit, die andren durch so

viel Himmlichkeit. Es war Sonnino, der Italiener, der die Bombe

zum Platzen brachte. Er verlangte, "that the President be

informed categorically that at this time the Allies could

give him no assurance that his Points would be

acceptable."*

*Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Col. House, Vol. IV, p. 165

Der Augenblick,auf den House gewartet hatte,war gekommen. ~~Er war ueberzeugt,dass~~ ~~vorausgesehen,~~ dass ~~Wilson-Programm~~ den ~~Alliierten~~ ~~heftig widerstrebenden~~ ~~mit Zwang~~ aufzuoktroyieren sein werde, ~~Er hatte fast eine Nacht damit~~ zugedacht bracht,sich die

wirksamste Prozedur des Zwanges zurechtzulegen.Jetzt schoss er seine Kanone ab.Gut,sagte er,wenn die ~~Alliierten die~~ Herren die 14 Punkte nicht ~~annehmen~~ dann ~~sind~~ die Verhandlungen mit Deutschland, ~~ueberhaupt~~ gescheitert ~~sind~~ "would have to be wiped off the slate." Aber dann wuerde eine ganz neue Frage sich erheben."The question would then arise whether America would not have to take up these matters up directly with Germany."×

[Wie? Was bedeutete die ~~studierte~~ offenbar wohl vorbereitete Wendung ? Was wollte er sagen? Wollte er drohen,dass Amerika,falls die 14 Punkte nicht angenommen wuerden,aus dem Krieg wegbrechen und separat mit Deutschland Frieden schliessen wuerde? Ging er so weit? War man so weit?

Clemenceau stellte die Frage nackt.
Er ~~sagte~~ sondierte: "That would amount to a separate peace between

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× Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Col. House, Vol. IV, p. 165

the United States and the Central Powers."

"It might", xxxxx xplied House.*

Das Geschoss war aus dem Rohr. In seinem telegraphischen Bericht an Wilson bemerkte House:"My statement had a very exciting effect on those present."** In dem excitement starb die Unterhaltung ~~xxx~~ weg. Man ging nach Hause. Pfarrer ~~Trotz des allgemeinen excitement raffte Lloyd George~~ sich zusammen und ~~e~~rklaerte:"If the United States made a separate ~~peace, we would be sorry; but as far as the English~~ als diese exorbitante Forderung war, (ganz Krieg noch nicht zu erwägen sprachen. (Colonel House (falls sie ernst genommen werden musste!

~~Dann~~ wachte ~~er~~ ~~machte~~ (machte) um drei Uhr auf. ~~und waelzte sich~~ Er konnte nicht mehr einschlafen. Hatten sie es ernst genug genommen? hier ~~in seinem Bett. Er hatte das Gefuehl, dass~~ das excitement ~~noch immer nicht xxxx~~ heftig genug, die Wirkung (endlich) ~~noch immer~~ ~~nicht tief~~ genug gewesen? ~~sei. Er beschloss, die Medizin noch~~ bis zum Morgengrauen dieses 30. Oktober überlegte er, ob und wie er die Prozedur des Zwangs noch einmal verstärkt wiederholen solle. Er kam zu einem Resultat, (bis er noch vor der Sitzung dieses Morgens Wilson telegraphisch informierte.

~~Am Morgen~~ dieses ~~Tages, dem 30. Oktober,~~ (Sitzung) ~~fuegte~~ (wiederholte) er ~~nur~~ noch (In) ausführlicher und ausgesprochener als gestern, (und er fügte die Drohung mit einem öffentlichen historischen Skandal) die Drohung mit dem Sonderfrieden ~~diejenige mit einem Welt Skandal~~ hinzu. Falls die Alliierten die 14 Punkte nicht annaehmen, "it

*Seymour :The Intimate Paers of Col.House, Vol IV, p.165
** Ibid

would be doubtless necessary for the President to go to Congress and place before that body exactly what Italy, France, and Great Britain were fighting for." Der Congress werde dann zu entscheiden haben, ob es Amerika gekommen, den Krieg fortzusetzen ~~ueber "the further continuation of the war"~~ in behalf of the aims of the Allies."

"As soon as I had said this", berichtete sein Kabel, "George and Clemenceau looked at each other significantly."*

Es war an diesem Tag, dass er dem Praesidenten die Suggestion ~~Vorschlag zwecks weiteren strengthening~~ drahtete, zur Verstärkung der "strong hand" ~~sofort~~ die Truppentransporte einzuschraenken, and "to gently cut down upon money, food and raw material."

Es war an diesem Tag, dass Wilson ihm antwortete: "I am proud of the way you are handling things."**

~~In der Tat, die Medizin, die verabreicht worden war,~~ Aber es war nicht schwierig, die Basis der neuen Welt-Ordnung noch mit weiterem Mittel des Zwangs zu fördern. Die ~~wirkte magisch. Der Zwang, der in der~~ Drohung mit dem amerikani-

*Foreign Relations of the USA, 1918, Suppl. 1, Vol. I, p. 425/26
** Ibid. p. 424

schen Sonderfrieden ~~lag~~ ~~unüberwindlich~~. Unter dem ~~Druck dieses aeussersten Zwangs gaben die Alliierten es auf, dem Welt Programm~~ der ~~14~~ plus ~~13~~ Punkte ~~noch laenger~~ ~~Opposition zu machen.~~ ~~Sie konzentrierten sich auf zwei~~ ~~letzte Schanzen.~~ ~~Lloyd George fuhr fort,~~ ~~unerbittlichen~~ Wider-

stand gegen die ~~"absolute freedom of navigation, alike in peace and in war" zu leisten~~. Colonel House ~~konzedierte,~~ dass ~~die~~ fuer den Augenblick offen ~~gelassen werden~~ ~~und dass man~~ spaeter ~~einmal~~ ~~darueber reden~~ werde. ~~Der~~ spaeter ~~wird~~ nie kommen. ~~Alle gemeinsam fuhren fort,~~ ~~heftigen~~ Widerstand gegen ~~Wilsonsche~~ Schadensersatz ~~Formel zu leisten~~. Colonel House konzedierte, ~~eine neue Fassung, die die Beschraenkung auf Schaden~~ an Objekten, ~~und dies nur~~ in den okkupierten Gebieten. ~~aufhob. Die Fassung, die er annahm, fuehrte statt dessen die Beschraenkung des~~ "civilen Schadens", zum Unterschied vom militaerischen oder staatlichen, ~~Schaden~~: "Compensation by Germany

for all damage done to the civilian population of the Allies

x) Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Col. House, Vol. IV, p. 174

and their property."

Aber mit ~~dieser einen Reservation und einen Aenderung~~ war das Gespraech versickert. Die Alliierten ~~gestern noch eklatant von der Ueberzeugung durchdrungen, dass nun sehr vieles in dieser ganzen Mathematik von Principien leere, gefaehrliche Phantastik sei~~ widersprachen nicht mehr. Kommen wir zum Ende, ~~sagten~~ drängten sie.

Am 4. November war alles zu Ende. Das Armistice-Dokument war geschrieben, und die Deutschen wurden zur Unterschrift eingeladen. In dem Dokument ~~stand~~, das ihnen garantierte, dass nun nach dem Armistice ein Frieden geschlossen und eine Weltordnung begruendet werden wuerde auf Basis der 27 Wilsonschen Regeln, ~~davon~~ mit ~~noch~~ Reservation und einer Aenderung. ~~Sobald das Dokument unterschrieben sein wird, werden~~ Rechtskraeftig verpflichtete das Dokument die Deutschen, ~~und~~ die Alliierten und ~~vertraglich und rechtskraeftig verpflichtet sein, von nun ab voellig neuartig zu denken und zu handeln. Sie waren festgelegt auf eine eine Ordnung~~ werden die Amerikaner zu einem Geist und einer Moral, die eine neue Menschaheit verbuergten. ~~Viele hatten diese Ordnung, diesen Geist u~~

~~Moral für unerreichbar in dieser Welt gehalten und eine wirksame Verpflichtung~~

und diese Moral fuer unerreichbar ~~in dieser Welt gehalten,und~~

eine wirksame Verpflichtung darauf fuer undenkbar. Jetzt lag

~~die Verpflichtung fertig zur Siegelung,auf dem Tisch.~~

"I consider"kabelte House ~~an~~ dem Presidenten,

"that we have won a great diplomatic victory in getting the

Allies to accept the principles..." Ja,ihm erschien der Sieg fuer

die neue Welt-Ordnung noch groesser,als die ~~geschlagenen~~ überwachsten

Vertreter der ~~alten~~ bisherigen es ahnten. "I doubt whether any other head of

the governments with whom we have been dealing realize how far

they are now committed to the American peace programme."* Es war

~~keines wegs~~ nicht das American programme,wie ~~sich zeigen wird.Aber dies~~ sofort an diesem selben Tag klärte

beisetzte gelassen,muss die Vorstellung in ihm geherrscht haben,

dass die Vertreter der alten Ordnung ~~halb~~ blind, in eine Art

Falle von Tugend gelaufen seien,und dass sie erst spaeter merken

wuerden,wie tief und fest sie darin saessen.Das Festsitzen war

repraesentiert durch ihre Unterschrift.

*Ray St.Baker:Woodrow Wilson,Life and Letters,Vol.VIII,554

Es war ein ~~grosses~~ überraschendes Kompliment fuer die Unterschrift der Allierten.Hier war eine Bekehrung zu extremer Tugend nur unter extremer duress unterschrieben worden.Die es getan hatten, galten den Vorkaempfern der ~~Anhaenger~~ als der kommenden Gegenteils-Welt arge Cyniker.

Es war viel,einer solchen Unterschrift dennoch die solideste Haltbarkeit zuzuschreiben,-- und es wird mehr sein,dass sie fuer die Dauer einiger Monate im grossen Ganzen sogar ~~wirklich~~ solide bleiben wird.Der Friedensvertrag wird in den naechsten Monaten,was immer die Kritiker spaeter sagen moegen, tatsaechlich gemaess den ~~14~~ 27 Punkten geschrieben werden! Es wird ihnen nur unter ~~staendigem~~ Straeuben (und Krisen und Kompromissen) treu gefolgt werden, ~~bleiben,und vielleicht~~ weniger wegen der Unterschrift als wegen des fortdauernden ~~fortdauernden~~ Zwangs ~~Situation~~. Aber es wird ihnen in der Hauptsache treu ~~bleiben~~ gefolgt werden.

Nur kam es darauf an, dass diese Unterschrift laenger ~~waehre~~ wirke als einige Monate, ~~Unter dem Zwang waren~~ Ethische Principien ~~angenommen~~ waren worden.Es genuegte nicht,dass diesen Prinzipien nur jetzt bei der Abfassung des Friedensvertrags, gefolgt ~~worden~~ wuerde. ~~Es~~ Vor allem musste ihnen ~~auch~~ gefolgt werden in den ~~unab-~~ ferneren

Jahren und ~~sehbaren~~ Jahrzehnten, in welchen die ~~Bestimmungen~~ Philosophie und die Institutionen des Vertrags sich (recht eigentlich erst) zu bewaehren haben wuerden. Gerade das war der springende Punkt. Den Friedens-Vertrag zu schreiben ~~nach dem~~ im Geist der neuen Gegenteils-Principien war wertlos, wenn (nicht einmal jene die Wahrscheinlichkeit) ~~keine Aussicht darauf bestand~~ (festen Bestand hatte), dass diese Prinzipien ~~ernstlich und~~ mit einiger ~~nicht nur~~ ~~als einen Augenblick~~ (echter Überzeugung) acceptiert seien.

Nun, die Alliierten hatten nicht ~~den~~ im geringsten ~~Hehl~~ Rehehlt, ~~daraus gemacht~~, dass sie an die Gegenteils-Ethik der 27 Regeln absolut und dezidiert nicht glaubteh. Sie hatten klar genug gemacht, dass ihnen das (meiste) als eine Ethik fuer eine ~~nicht existierende~~ Welt erschiene, die weder bei ihnen, noch in Deutschland, noch in Amerika, noch irgendwo sonst ~~existierte~~ tatsächlich existierte, — eine chimaerisch solange sie Gedanken ~~war, und verderbliche~~ (Konstruktion, (Blick, eine reine Konstruktion, sobald sie angewandt ~~worden~~ wuerde. ~~Das mochte~~ Das mochte so sein wegen ihrer unheilbaren wickedness. Das mochte so sein wegen ihrer ~~nuechternoren Welt~~ besseren Kenntnis. Auf jeden Fall war es so. Dieser Geist war nicht der ihre, ~~er konnte es durch keine erzwungene Unterschrift werden~~ von anderen ganz zu schweigen. Was war gewonnen, (wenn man sie zwang,) sich diesem Geist fuer einen kurzen Augenblick zu unterwerfen? Die Geschichte wird nicht durch das determiniert, was im Laufe einiger (einiger) Monate

geschieht,und sogar der Friede wird nicht dadurch determiniert, was in einen Vertragstext hineingeschrieben wird. Sie sind beide eine creation perpetuelle,mit taeglich neuen Situationen, und taeglich neuen Notwendigkeiten zu Entschluessen. Wann wird in dieser creation perpetuelle die aufgezwungene Faerbung des Geistes abgeblaettert sein,wann wird ~~sich~~ unabwendbar ~~die wahre~~ die natürliche wieder ~~durchgedrungen~~ hervortreten? ~~zeigen?~~

Das war in der schmerzlichen Laufbahn des messianischen ~~Prohibitionsgesetzes~~ ~~14-Punkte~~-Unternehmens von 1918 der Bruch von allem Anfang an :die ~~Prozedur~~ und ~~die~~ Idee des Aufzwingens. Was immer die 27 Punkte wert waren, der Historiker,der Wilson war, ~~missverstand unbegreiflich, was~~ hielt die Aussen schon Geschlossen vor dem primärsten ~~Hindernis~~ Obstacle für seine Reine der Wahrheit, das ~~es mit~~ erzwungenen Geloebnissen ~~auf sich hat~~ Sie halten keines- nichts taugen. falls laenger als der Zwang selbst ~~haelt~~. Wenn sie lange halten sollen,muss man gewillt und imstande sein,den Zwang selber lange halten zu lassen. ~~Wenn~~ Ist man zum Zwang nur fuer den Bruchteil einer historischen Sekunde befaehigt, ~~ist~~ 20 lohnt es gar nicht erst,ihn auszunuetzen, zum Erzwingen. ~~Unter allen Illusionen der Perfektionisten von 1918 war vielleicht die illusionaerste~~

~~die,dass die ephemere Macht eines einzigen Augenblicks~~ dazu benutzt werden koenne,Unglauebigen auf die Dauer einen Glauben aufzuzwingen,- einen edleren Glauben,oder einen ~~absurderen Glauben,auf jeden Fall einen fremden Glauben.~~ ungeglaubten

Und wo ~~war~~ bei ~~alledem~~ (der ganzen Operation war) Deutschland,dieses andere Mitglied der neuen Welt-Ordnung, dieser andere Unterzeichner der neuen Ethik ?

Es war ihm gesagt worden, dass es den (Wilson-) Frieden ~~der 14 Punkte~~ nur erhalten koenne,wenn es die Herrschaft seiner ~~old~~ military masters ~~voellig~~ (und monarchical autocrats bis zur „virtual impotence" (wurde) gebrochen habe. Es war ihm am 23.Oktober gesagt worden, seine (unpöfliche) kaiserliche (~~Hohenzollern~~ Herbst-) Demokratie ~~juengsten Datums~~ erfuelle ~~das noch nicht keineswegs~~ (diese Bedingung nicht).

"The determinating iniative still remains with those who have hitherto been the masters of Germany." Und ~~dann war~~ am naechsten Tag (war trotzdem begonnen worden,) ihm ~~trotzdem~~ den Frieden der 14 Punkte zu sichern,- und am 4. November war es unter Dach und Fach. Nichts hatte sich ~~bis dahin~~ (inzwischen) noch in Deutschland geaendert. Es war dieselbe (~~missbilligte~~ verabscheute) ~~Pseudo~~ (kaiserliche ~~Hohenzollern~~ Herbst-) demokratie, ~~wie zwoelf Tage zuvor~~. Es wird noch ~~dieselbe~~ eine Delegation

~~Heimtückischen~~ ~~40-Tage-~~
~~Heimtückischen Pakt~~ ~~missbilligte Pseudo~~demokratie sein, ~~wenn den deutschen~~

~~Waffenstillstands Delegation~~ der am 8.November im Salonwagen

Fochs das Dokument, das ihnen den 27-Punkte-Frieden ~~zusicherte~~ lobte,

zur Unterschrift ueberreicht werden wird. ~~Die Tatsache wird~~ ~~unbemerkt und ohne praktische Bedeutung bleiben, weil die Off-~~ ~~entlichkeit den Text erst am 11., an dem die Deutschen ihn~~ ~~unterschreiben, kennen lernen wird, und weil inzwischen, am 9.,~~

der Kaiser und der Kronprinz ~~verschwunden sein werden und in~~

Berlin die Republik ausgerufen ~~w~~erden, ~~sein wird, die Republik,~~

~~die nun freilich Gewissheit zu geben scheint, dass die old masters jetzt tatsaechlich verschwunden sind.~~ So wird ~~es~~ un-

bemerkt und praktisch folgenlos bleiben, dass ~~Wilson den Frieden der 14 Punkte~~ tatsaechlich fuer das ~~Deutschland~~ der

old masters erzwungen hatte, das von ihm missbilligte

Auch dieses
Deutschland, das Deutschland, ~~dammm~~ von dem er gesagt hatte,

das es keinen Wilson-Frieden zugesichert bekommen koenne, haette

ihn tatsaechlich zugesichert bekommen. Es war am 4.November von

Wilson durcgesetzt und verbrieft und gesiegelt worden. Die

~~Tatsache ~~ ~~ging unter~~ in der Woge ~~von~~ der Ereignisse, ~~die~~

~~sie unbmerkbar machte. Aber~~ ~~die~~ trotzdem ist nicht unwichtig, ~~als~~ sie zeigt,

~~Illustration~~ bis zu welchem Grad die Aufgabe ~~des~~ Praesident ~~wenn es sich~~ ~~selbst~~

~~sich gegen jeden~~ ~~um die Verwirklichung~~ seines ~~grossen~~ Traumes ~~handelte, an~~ grosses Vorhaben schliessen konnte,

gegen Fakten ~~hinderlichen~~ Fakten der ~~Wirklichkeit~~ geschickt wie der Gegenwart, ~~vorbeischen konnte,~~

sogar gegen Fakten, die gerade er ~~noch~~ wenige Tage ~~zuvor seiner eignen Meinung~~ zuvor noch selbst

~~und seinen Worten nach vor~~ als erstrangig ~~wichtig~~ keit ~~gewesen waren~~ begrenzt gesamt hatte.

~~Aber~~ Die deutsche Republik ~~kam dazwischen und~~ verbrachte die Spur. Sie deutete

~~dockte es zu.Die~~ Kommission, ~~mit Erzberger an der Spitze,~~ die Republik zeigte den Armistice. An jenem Vormittag um 11 Uhr schwiegen

~~das Waffenstillstands Dokument als Delegation des Kaiserreichs~~ plötzlich die Geschütze, die einundfünfzig Monate lang den Leib der Erde

~~empfangen hatte, zeichnete es als Delegation der Republik. Die~~ gemartert hatten. Aus der Ferne Umgebung der Gräben stiegen die Menschen aus

~~Waffen schwiegen. Ein Vulkan von Jubel brauste ueber die~~ Licht. Im Weissen Haus saß gebeugt in dämmrigen Erfindungen.

~~Er nahm den Bleistift, und Tränen~~ gemarterte Erde. Wilson nahm den Bleistift und ~~schrieb : "The~~ schrieb er an sein Volk diese) Announcement: ~~Der Krieg ist zu Ende~~ : " The

armistice was signed this morning. Everything for which America

fought has been accomplished. It will now be our fortunate duty

to assist by example, by sober, friendly counsel and by material

aid in the establishment of just democracy throughout the

world."

[redacted] ein Kabel aus Paris über ihn gebracht. Es war von Frau House:

„Autocracy is dead. Long live democracy and its immortal leader. In this great hour my heart goes out to you in pride, admiration and love." ×

× Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Col. House, Vol. IV, p. 143

Chapter 2: Der Kodex der neuen Welt

4.

Long live democracy hoerte man in denselben Tagen auch in dem Chaos, das Deutschland hiess. ~~Viele Zeitungen riefen es,~~ ~~zwei Redner~~ ~~ein Zehntausendes von~~ ~~tri~~ ~~morgens und abends. Viele Redner variierten es alle Tage des~~ ~~Meetings und Strassen-Aufmarsches.~~ ~~Woche.~~

Aber in Deutschland war es kein Triumphschrei. Es war kein Ausdruck der Begeisterung darueber, dass ein ~~begehrtes~~ geliebtes Ziel jetzt erreicht sei. Es war eher die flehentliche Beschwoerung, von nun ab dies erreichte Ziel zu ~~begehren~~ lieben. Es war, ~~mit einem Wort~~, der Versuch, die ~~Ereignisse, die stattgefunden~~ faits accomplis ~~hatten~~, nachtraeglich ~~mit~~ dem Sinn Demokratie zu erfuellen.

Die Ereignisse hatten wenig ~~oder nichts~~ mit Demokratie zu tun gehabt. Wer etwas anderes glaubte -- und das taten ~~geb~~ sogar Deutsche, ~~die etwas anderes glaubten~~ -- ~~befand sich~~ irre gründlich, ~~in folgenschwerem Irrtum~~

Die Ereignisse hatten drei Stufen gehabt. ~~Nacheinander~~ Innerhalb sechs Wochen hatten sich abgespielt, die "Demokratisierung"; dann die Ausschiffung des Kaisers als Person; dann die Abschaffung des Monarchismus als System. Wie war das ~~alles~~ alles vor sich gegangen?

Gegen Ende September hatten ~~Deutschlands Kriegs Diktatoren~~ ~~die~~ Generale, Hindenburg und Ludendorff, die Hauptleute, endlich den Mut zu dem Eingestaendnis gefunden, dass der Krieg ~~hoffnungslos~~ ~~verloren~~ verloren sei. Am 28. September hatten sie ~~sogar~~ ~~eingestehen muessen~~, dass sofort, auf der Stelle, ~~ein~~ Waffenstillstand ~~beschafft~~ ~~werden muesse.~~ brauchten.

Normalerweise ~~war~~ musste das, ~~unter diesen Umstaenden, sicher gleichbedeutend mit dem absoluten~~ das Ende. Aber da war doch dieser Dingsda in Amerika, dieser kuriose Heilige namens Wilson. Der ~~Hier~~ lebte doch in den Wolken. Ihn konnte man wahrscheinlich noch

exploitieren.Noch am 24.September hatte der Reichskanzler GrafHertling den Heiligen wie ueblich angeschwaerzt. ~~In wohlaufgesetzter Reichstagsrede~~ Er hatte ihn den "frueheren Ideologen und Friedensfreund Wilson" genannt,der sich jetzt " in das Haupt der amerikanischen Imperialisten umgewandelt" habe.* Vier Tge spaeter hatten die Generale gedraengt,die Bankerrott-Anzeige herzlich und verehrungsvoll an diesen "Imperialisten" zu addressieren.

Sehr gut, hatte der Chef des Auswaertigen Amtes gesagt, der ein Kollege von der See war,ein Admiral von Hintze.Nur koennen wir zu diesem ~~kuriosen Heiligen~~ Mann nicht als absolute Monarchie kommen,als "arbitrary power." Bei ihm ist alles aussichtslos,was nicht in demokratischer Frisur erscheint.

Frisieren Sie das, wie es notwendig ist,hatten die Generale geantwortet.Aber frisieren Sie es rapid.In vierundzwanzig Stunden,laengstens in achtundvierzig.

Und das Auswaertige Amt hatte rapid gearbeitet. Erbat sich mit fliegender Hand

* Schulthess' Europaeischer Geschichtskalender,1918,Vol.I,305

Hand ein Memorandum an den Reichskanzler und datiert von diesem 28.September." "The most important prerequisite for the institution of peace is the formation, upon the free initiative of His Majesty the Emperor, of a new Government on a broad national basis. For this purpose it would be desirable that there should arrive at Berlin as early as tomorrow evening a telegram announcing the acceptance of Count Hertlings resignation as requested by him....The new Cabinet should unite all the forces of the people... The new Government thus formed will approach President Wilson..."*

[Und so geschah es. Prompt wie gewünscht kam als early as the next evening aus dem Hauptquartier die Annahme des Rücktritts Count Hertlings resignation as requested by him. Es folgte verkündet Und dann der Wille des Kaisers, to have the German people cooperate more

*Preliminary History of the Armistice, No 12.

effectively than heretofore in the determination of the destiny of the Fatherland."~~Deshalb werde jetzt~~ ein neues Kabinett ~~gebildet worden~~ "supported by the confidence of the people." Und ~~das war die~~ Demokratisierung. Der ~~mmmm~~ Prinz von Baden, der ~~sie~~ ~~als neuer Reichskanzler~~ zu ~~vorkoerpern~~ hatte, war ein netter Mann. Nur hatte ihn bisher noch niemand als Demokraten kennen gelernt, ~~und peinlicherweise konnte eine Schweizerische~~ ~~Zeitung wenige Tage spaeter~~ einen ~~mmmmmmmmm~~ Brief ~~mmmmmmmmm~~ ~~mmmmmmmmm~~ den er in diesem Jahr 1918 an einen Vetter in der Schweiz geschickt hatte. Es war ein Brief mit feindseligen Bemerkungen nicht nur ueber Demokratie und Parlamentarismus, ~~sondern sogar~~ ueber Pacifismus, "Verstaendigungsfrieden" und ~~dergleichen Wilsonismen.~~* Dieser Reichskanzler der Demokratie, der ~~nie~~ Demokrat ~~gewesen~~ war, ~~stuetzte~~ sich ~~auf~~ eine parlamentarische Mehrheit, von der die Haelfte es ebenfalls nie ~~gewesen~~

*Schulthess' Europaeischer Geschichtskalender, 1918, Vol. I, p. 338

war. ~~Man nannte den~~ Block, der sich im Reichstag ~~bildete,~~ gebildet hatte,

um den "suppot by the confidence of the people" zu repraesentieren, ~~die~~ (hatte den Namen) "Mehrheitsparteien" (empfangen). Aber unter ~~diesen~~ vier "Mehrheitsparteien" befanden sich ~~zwei~~, die ~~bis zum Tage vorher seit Jahrzehnten und Jahrzehnten strictissime gegen Demokratie und Parlamentarismus~~ (bis zum Tage vorher immer) gewesen waren. Es war die ~~Partei des katholischen "Centrums", zu der auch der eben [illegible] in die Wueste geschickte Graf Hertling~~ gehoerte. Und es war die Partei der ~~"Nationalliberalen", in der ein gewisser Stresemann neuerdings bemerkbarer wurde. Beide Parteien waren immer~~ in jeder Phase ihrer ~~eigenen und der Staats~~geschichte ~~rigoros~~ (strictissime) gegen ~~die~~ Demokratie ~~und~~ Parlamentarismus ~~als~~ Regierungssystem gewesen, ~~das fuer sie den westlichen Libertinismus im Gegensatz zum Geist~~ (waren. Sowohl die Partei des katholischen „Centrums" wie die der „Nationalliberalen" hatten nicht) ~~des~~ patriachalischen Autoritaet, ~~repraesentierten. Beide hatten sich bis zum Tage zuvor gegen jede Erweichung des wohlwollenden kaiserlichen Absolutismus gewandt.~~ (Prinzip) Ploetzlich standen sie ~~an diesem Tag~~ als Pfeiler und Zeugen der Demokratisierung (auf der Buehne).

~~Keines falls~~ (Kein) gibt es i gendwelchen Zweifel darueber,

welchen Charakter dieser erste Akt in dem Schauspiel der deutschen Demokratisierung gehabt hatte. Es war ausschliesslich eine Prozedur "von oben" gewesen. Und es war ausschliesslich eine Prozedur gewesen, wie das Auswaertige Amt es gesagt hatte, "the most important prerequisit" for approaching President Wilson zu schaffen. In kritischen Augenblicken einmal Demokratie zu spielen. Einmal war fuer Berlin jedwede Neuigkeit. Als im Maerz 1848, die Woge der buergerlichen Revolution ueber Europa gefluted war, auch bis nach Berlin hinueberfluted und die Bevoelkerung auf die Barrikaden gegangen war. Die Hohenzollern-Koenige jener Tage hatten unter grosser Ruehrung eine Verfassung gegeben und ein Parlament feierlich berufen. Als die Welle sich etwas ausgelaufen hatte -- noch im December desselben Jahres hatte er die Konstituante wieder auseinandergejagt und diktiert, was ihm selber passte. "Der Wortbruch ist die erhabenste Tradition der Hohenzollern" hiess der Lieblingsausdruck des radikalen Historikers, der uebrigens mit Beginn des Weltkriegs aber

zum hitzigen ~~Rechts~~radikalen der Rechten geworden war, denn so nah liegen

in Deutschland die Extreme beisammen. ~~President Wilson hatte~~

~~recht gehabt~~, an dieser ~~pl~~ploetzlichen ~~Herbst~~-Demokratie

alle Zeichen der Dauer, ~~und~~ der Echtheit zu vermissen, - und er

hatte unrecht gehabt, im weiteren Verlauf an diese, seine eigenes

Qualifikation Urteil zu vergessen. ~~Der erste Akt war nur fuer ihn,~~

~~und nur "von oben her" insceniert worden.~~

Es war nichts als ~~als "prerequisit"~~

~~ein prerequisit"~~

Wie vor 66 auf

~~Es kam~~ der zweite, ~~Akt~~, die Ausschiffung des Kaisers,

und ~~seines aeltesten Sohnes~~ mit ihm des Kronprinzen, ~~Wie ging das~~

~~zu?~~

~~Wiederum war die Ursache Wilson.~~ ~~Die Noten, mit denen~~

~~ein weiteres prerequisit" fuer ihn~~

~~Wilsons Antwoerten hatten anscheinend vermeintlich~~

~~er antwortete, schienen zu~~ bewiesen, ~~dass er sich mit der~~

~~kaiserlichen~~ dass die Herbst-Demokratie ~~keinesfalls zufrieden geben~~

~~werde.~~ Die letzte, ~~vom 23. Oktober, schien deutlich genug~~ deutlich zu sagen,

dass er den Kaiser noch immer als Herrn in Deutschland erachte,

und dass ~~dem~~ einem solchen Deutschland ~~des Kaisers~~ keine Gnade gegeben würde.

Der Kaiser stand also im Weg? ~~Ohne den Kaiser konnte man einen~~

~~billigen Frieden haben, und mit ihm~~ Mit dem Kaiser konnte man einen guten?

Als ein

eine einfache matter-of-fact-Angelegenheit ~~begannen~~ haben die Deutschen zu sagen, ~~dass~~ besonnen, dass dann eben der Kaiser abdanken muesse. Es war keine ~~hammmmmm~~ Leidenschaft dabei, keine besondere Animositaet, und ~~kein~~s keine Demokratie. Es war die reine Sachlichkeit, ~~Wenn~~ diese Pleite glimpflicher ausgehen kann, ohne den Kaiser, dann selbstverstaendlich Gottbefohlen, Kaiser. ~~Schreib einen Zettel,~~ ~~dass Du~~ Verzichtest, und die Sache ist erledigt. Die Menschen ~~sprachen~~ haben davon gesprochen, ~~dass er diesen Zettel schreiben werde~~. Sie erwartet, ~~dass er ihn schreiben werde~~. Und als es nicht geschah, ~~tat~~, ~~wurden~~ haben sie verdriesslich. Zwei Tage nach Wilsons letzter Note, am 25. Oktober, ~~erschien~~ war in der "Frankfurter Zeitung" ein Artikel erschienen, der zum ersten Mal oeffentlich aussprach, was die Meisten ~~alle~~ dachten, ~~dass Wilhelm II. die Pflicht habe, zu verschwinden~~. Die Frankfurter Zeitung war damals, ~~Sie war nicht nur die beiweitem~~ beste Zeitung Deutschlands, und vor ihrem Ende durch ihre Feinde Gestalt ist, hat selbst Widersacher ~~deutscher Luft~~ Demokratie in sich aufgesogen. ~~Sie~~ Sie, ~~die alte Dame in Frankfurt~~, fuer ihren Teil war ~~allerdings wirklich~~ wirklich demokratisch. ~~In ihr war~~ noch ein Hass ~~auf~~ gegen ~~Preussen~~ aus dem Jahre 1866, in dem Preussen die freie Reichsstadt ~~mit Waffengewalt~~ annektiert

775

hatten, wie achtzig Jahre spaeter Oesterreich annektierte, werden und den Buergermeister, ein souveraenes Staatsoberhaupt, so ins Gefaengnis warfen und darin verkommen liessen, wie es spaeter mit Schuschnigg geschehen wird. Residuen der ~~Residuen spielten eine groessere Rolle im Leben der Einzelnen und der Kollektivitaeten, als die Materialisten sich traeumen lassen. Ich lernte die Residuen dieser Preussen-Aversion in dem Hause kennen, in dem ich meine Jugend verbrachte; die~~ Grossmutter erzaehlte, wie sie von preussischen Soldaten mit Bajonetten bedroht wurde. ~~Ich lernte sie kennen in dem Blatt, in dem ich meine ersten Artikel schrieb;~~ die Aelteren in der Redaktion von den Zeiten sprachen, als Protest gegen die Annexion freiwillig zum Refugee wurde und in einer nicht-preussischen Stadt erschienen war. Die Frankfuerter Zeitung -- heute unter dem alten Namen ein Nazi-Schmutzhaufen -- war wirklich demokratisch. Auch ~~Sie war ausserdem eine der seltenen oeffentlichen Stimmen in Deutschland, die~~ hielt taeglich Wilhelm II., der weniger ein Berserker als diese Lebens- und Sieges-Mimiker, ein

war, - der ~~unfähige~~ Theatraliker Wilhelm II., dieser Lohengrin- und Siegfried-

~~ein schwaechlicher Theatraliker, ein Lohengrin- und Siegfried-~~

~~Imitator war~~ Imitator, seit jeher ohne Sympathie behandelt, ~~hatte Die~~ Herrscher der Kriegszeit

hatte die Kämpfe mit der Zensur gefühlt. Als ihr 1915

~~Herren, die sie schrieben, waren~~ damals ausserdem tapfer. Als die

~~Kriegszensur ihnen 1915~~ zu viel in ihren Artikeln herumstrichen

~~gab~~, sie bekannt, ~~dass sie nun~~ von jetzt ab ueberhaupt keine

editorials ~~mit ihrer eignen Meinung~~ mehr ~~veroeffentlichen~~

~~werden~~, und ~~sie blieben~~ bei dieser Demonstration ~~mutterseelenallein~~

~~viele~~ Monate lang ~~unter Kriegsgesetzen~~. Niemand wusste, wie

~~es~~ gelungen war, den Artikel ~~der die Abdankung des~~ Kaisers

durch die Zensur ~~durch~~zubringen. ~~Tatsaechlich~~ war der

Zensor, einer Meinung mit ~~ihnen~~, und hatte die Columne

unter ~~Risiken~~ fuer sich selber durchschluepfen lassen. Wie dem

auch sei, ~~das~~ Kind war ~~zum ersten Mal oeffentlich beim Namen~~

~~genannt, und an dieser Stelle sogar wirk~~

Man wartete, was geschehen werde, ~~und~~ es geschah ~~nichts~~.

~~Wilson hatte gesagt, mit dem Kaiser koenne Deutschland nur auf~~

~~das Schlimmste hoffen, und~~ der Kaiser ~~ruehrte~~ sich nicht. Sollte

man's fuer moeglich halten? ~~Ein~~ fair~~es~~ Verhalten fuer

~~einen anstaendigen Fuersten?~~ War es nicht genug, dass er den Krieg ~~in diese Patsche gebracht hat~~ nicht gewonnen hatte? Will er dem Land jetzt die Moeglichkeit versperren, dank Wilson mit einem blauen Auge davonzukommen? Die Stimmung war anders geworden, -- ~~schwoll an~~ -- und am 29. Oktober sah hatte Herr Philipp Scheidemann sich veranlasst gesehen, einen Brief an ~~den Reichskanzler~~ Prinz Max ueber die Sache zu schreiben.

Philipp Scheidemann ~~war~~ selbst ~~ohne bestimmten Posten,~~ war ein Mitglied ~~der~~ der Regierung des ~~Reichskanzlers~~ Prinzen ~~Max.~~ Er war ~~der~~ linkste Mitglied dieser Regierung, und in gewissem Sinne war er ~~der~~ staerkste. Er ~~war der Exponent~~ vertrat in der Regierung die groessten und ~~best~~organisierte Partei ~~unter den zahlreichen Parteien~~ dessen Führer No 2 er war. des Landes, ~~denn~~ die Er vertrat "Mehrheits-Sozialdemokratie". Das war die Partei, hinter der der groessere Teil der Arbeiter~~schaft~~ klasse marschier te. Es war die ~~traditionslose~~ sozialistische Partei, ~~in~~ deren Programm seit altersher ~~jeher~~ Anti-Monarchismus, Anti-Militarismus und Anti-Nationalismus ~~figuriert hatte.~~ Die drei dominierenden Figuren dieser Partei waren Friedrich Ebert und Philipp Scheidemann. Die Demokratisierung irgendwie glaubhaft zu machen --sei es ~~vor~~ Wilson, sei es ~~vor~~ den Deutschen selbst, -- war ~~un~~möglich, ~~ohne dass~~ wenn nicht diese Partei ~~als ein Partner in ihr figurier~~ - und diese Führer sich von ihr ~~te.~~ Deshalb war Herr Scheidemann ~~die~~ der im Augenblick tatsaech-

lich sterkste ~~Position~~ Gewicht in dieser Regierung. Wenn er ~~im Namen seiner Partei einen Forderung entschlossen vorbrachte,~~ forderte, war ~~ihr in dieser Konstellation~~ schwer zu widerstehen. Nun, Scheidemanns ~~Brief stellte die Forderung~~ Liste forderte, (stellte,) ~~dass~~ das Cabinet wolle beschliesse, "to ask the Imperial Chancellor to advise His Majesty to retire of his own will." Und warum.[2] ~~soll der Kaiser sich zurueckziehen?~~ In dem Brief ~~steht~~ war ein einziger Grund angegeben: ~~der aber dreimal;~~ alle Welt sei "convinced that the prospects of getting tolerable terms for the Armistice and the Peace are being ruined by the Emperors remaining in his exalted office."*

~~Dann kam~~ Am 31.Oktober - sechs Tage nach dem Artikel der ~~buergerlichen~~ Frankfurter Zeitung,-- ~~ein Artikel des "Vorwaerts"~~, war ein Ton so weit gegangen, das auf die Mehrheits-sozialistische Partei ~~dann~~ in die Oeffentlichkeit gegangen war, ~~der Haupt-Blatter der Socialdemokratischen Partei~~ ("Was wird der Kaiser tun?" war seine Ueberschrift, und sein Text war von ungewöhnlich vorsichtiger ~~veröffentlicht. Er wollte nicht provozieren,~~

*Scheidemann: The Making of ~~the~~ New Germany, Vol II., p.214.

Unter dem Titel: „Was wird der Kaiser tun?" hatte ihr Hauptblatt, der „Vorwärts", nicht eigentlich gesagt,

~~heurer Vorsichtigkeit .Er sagte nicht~~ was der Kaiser tun solle, ~~und~~ (aber es hatte gesagt,) ~~warum er es tun solle.Er sagte nur immer wieder,~~dass alle Welt ~~sich frage,was er tun werde. "This war!The Kaiser did not wanthim to do it!",~~ aber jetzt koenne er einen wichtigen Dienst zur ~~gluecklichen~~ besseren Beendigung des Krieges leisten.

~~Und dann kam~~ Am gleichen Tag die von Scheidemann geforderte Aussprache ~~im Kabinett.~~ Der Fuehrer ~~No 2~~ der deutschen Arbeiter, ~~der erste hiess Ebert~~ vom Setzer ~~zum Politiker, und vom Politiker jetzt~~ zum Minister aufgestiegen, begruendete, warum der Kaiser ~~fort~~ muesse.An und fuer sich habe seine Partei nichts gegen ihn. "We have always tried to read into Wilson's notes our view that the President is not demanding the Kaiser's abdication.But the Foreign Office will corroborate me when I say that all foreign countries interpret them otherwise."* ~~Und das Land~~ interpretiere ~~ihn ebenfalls otherwise, und all mählich~~ folgten ~~sogar~~ die Arbeiter ~~dieser Auffassung~~. "Let us make no mistake,this demand did not originate among the workers.

* Prince Max of Baden: Memoirs, Vol II,p.241

but in middle6class circles." Aber jetzt sei~~t~~ ~~public opinion~~ so ziemlich alle Klassen einig,-eingeschlossen sogar viele Offiziere of all ranks, "up to and including that of Colonel." Public opinion sei ueberzeugt, dass Deutschland ohne Verschwinden des Kaisers "shall not get any peace such as will allow our people the chance of further development". Dem muesse der Kaiser ~~selbst~~ Rechnung tragen, so lange es noch "dignified" moeglich sei, ("in hmm the interest of the Kaiser himself and his name in history.") ~~Zoegere er, so werde er "undignified" durch strikes und riots gezwungen werden~~, und es drohte sogar ~~die~~ Abspaltung vom Reich ~~Sueddeutschlands~~. "That would be the worst fate which could befall us. The Empire must be maintained ~~in all its greatness and power.~~"

So ~~sprach~~ hatte ~~Ebmmm~~ der radikalere, ~~der~~ linkere, der zwei Fuehrer der deutschen Sozialisten-Partei (gesprochen.) Wiederum ~~wie zuvor in seinem Brief, war mmmm mit~~ keinem anderen Wort ~~die Rede von Republikanismus oder Demokratie. Es war ausschliesslich die Rede von~~ als Wilson und die ~~mmmmm leichteren oder schwereren~~ Friedens-Bedingungen, ~~die mit oder ohne den Kaiser zu gewaertigen seien.~~ Und selbst das ~~brachte~~ hatte Herr Scheidemann nicht als ~~eigene~~ Meinung, ~~oder die~~ (angebracht) der sozialistischen Meinung.

Prince Max of Baden: Memoirs, Vol. II p. 241

Fuehrer vor gebracht, sondern nur als Meinung des Publikums draussen,

which "cannot now be kept in hand any longer."

Sichtlich hatte er darin Recht gehabt. ~~Vor das Publikum immer schwerer in der Hand zu behalten, so~~ ~~Sichtlich wurde das Publikum immer boeser.~~ Das Publikum war in allgemeinen Tempo ~~kuehl~~ bitterer, ~~kuehler~~ boeser, grosser geworden. ~~Das letzte, was man von ihm gehoert hatte, waren sein~~ ~~Es hoerte nichts mehr~~ Dank Wilsons ~~Erhatte mit hoechst~~ unzu-

friedenen Bemerkungen ueber die ~~kaiserliche~~ Demokratisierung, ~~die~~ hatte es

~~hatte~~ nicht, ~~genuege~~, ~~gewesen. Seither schien alles zu stocken~~, was ~~man~~ ~~von ihm gehoert hatte.~~ Gleichzeitig in Paris geschah, wusste niemand in Deutschland, - ~~von Deutschland~~ dem Deutschen Publikum

~~hatte~~ es so ~~gehalten~~, als sei alles im ~~Guten, aber in Entfernung~~ ~~aus geschen~~, ~~hoerte man nur Schweigen. Nichts mehr von~~ Armistice

Entflattern, der Armistice und der ~~nichts mehr vom~~ Wilson-Frieden. Also soll ~~das~~ weiter gehen?

diese verlorene Sache, nur wegen des Kaisers? Also kein Schluss

~~Ende~~ und kein billiger Friede, nur weil der Mann da ~~oben~~ droben kleben

bleiben ~~wollte~~? ~~Die Missstimmung wurde zum Zorn.~~ Eine Welle von Zorn ~~und Hass~~ (Rumoren) ~~hatte~~ Sie hatte alle Dämme gesprengt, ~~Dann war~~ als in den ersten ~~Der Zorn wurde explosiv als~~ am 4. und 5. November-Tagen Matrosen aus Kiel und Wilhelmshaven ~~und Hamburg an allen Orten~~ überall im Lande auftauchten, und erzaehlten, was

~~sich~~ dort ~~ereignet hatte~~ vorgegangen war. Die Admiralitaet hatte der Flotte

~~klar zum Gefecht machen lassen, und hatte~~ Befehl zur Ausfahrt

gegeben, um eine Seeschlacht der Verzweiflung mit der englischen

zu fuehren. Niemand ~~wusste~~ hatte sicher gewusst -- und niemand weiss bis heute sicher, --

ob der Oberste Kriegsherr Wilhelm II. ~~oder der Prinz von Baden~~ von dem Beschluss zu dieser Seeschlacht etwas gewusst hatten oder nicht, ~~oder nicht~~, ob ~~sie~~ er ihn gebilligt hatten oder nicht. Die Matrosen jedenfalls hatten ihn nicht gebilligt. Wenn ~~sie~~ auch Wilson die geringste Aussicht auf Armistice und Frieden bestand, musste sie durch den Schlag in diesem Augenblick ~~unrettbar~~ zerstoert werden. Wenn die Aussicht bestand, war es ausserdem viehisch, sie jetzt noch in den Tod zu schicken.

~~Wie dem auch sei,~~ Dieser Krieg war auf alle Fälle verloren. ~~Die Bitte um Waffenstillstand hatte es eingestanden.~~ Diese hoffnungslose Seeschlacht, ~~die jede wegen ihrer Hoffnungslosigkeit~~ all die Jahre hindurch gemieden, ~~worden war,~~ und ~~die jetzt noch hoffnungsloser war als frueher~~, konnte (unmöglich noch etwas) ~~nichts~~ ~~mehr daran~~ an dem Ausgang ändern. Die Matrosen ~~sahen~~ haben nicht ein, (wozu sie in dieser Minute noch sterben sollten. Die meisten Offiziere ~~sahen~~ haben es ~~ebenfalls nicht ein~~, ~~denn sie verhielten sich~~ auch nicht eingesehen, denn mit wenigen Ausnahmen (voellig passiv) gegen das, was nun ~~geschah~~ (geschehen war, verhalten.) ~~Es geschah~~ Es war aber, ~~dass~~ geschehen, dass die Matrosen ~~beginnend auf~~ zuerst auf den Schlachtschiffen "Markgraf" und die Feuer gelöscht hatten;) die Ausfahrt verweigerten, (dass der Streik von da aus auf die ganze Flotte uebergriff, ~~deren Besatzungen die~~ so war.

~~Euer loeschten und an Land gingen;~~ und dass ~~Hubderte~~ Tausende von

~~ihnen,~~ Metroden, da sie nun ja doch schon ~~in der Rolle dann~~ (~~dann~~ ~~zu~~ ~~von~~ zu) Meuterern (gewordn)

waren, ~~bedroht von den Konsequenzen der Meuterei,~~ sich in die

Eisenbahnen ~~setzten~~ gesetzt und die Predigt der (Kriegsbeendigung) Gewaltsamen ~~mittels~~

~~Streik und Meuterei ueber das Land~~ in alle Himmelsrichtungen zu tragen begannen haben.

[Empörung war aufgestaut, wo sie mit ihrer Geschichte auftauchten.
~~Die Irritation wuchs ins Ungeheure.~~ Das (war also) der

Kaiser ? Nicht nur ~~nicht~~ (wer er nicht) zum Fortgehen zu bewegen, um dem

~~Frieden kommen kann und Volk nicht~~ ~~billigeren~~ Wilson-Frieden

die Bahn freizumachen, ~~sondern moeglicherweise damit beschaeftigt~~? Der Treulose war sogar drauf und dran,

den Frieden und Armistice ueberhaupt, (absichtlich und verräterisch,) zu sabotieren. ~~absichtlich~~?

[Von diesem Augenblick an war die Stimmung reif geworden zur Revolte gegen den Kaiser. Es war eine Frage von Tagen geworden, wann es ausbrechen werde. Die dem Thron am naechsten standen

hatten keinen andren Gedanken mehr gehabt, als wie der

Kaiser (wie verhindert, vor der ~~Explosion~~ Eruption,) von der ~~Buehne~~ (Catastrophe) weggebracht werden koenne. [Der General

Groener, der an Ludendorffs Stelle gesetzt worden war, hatte

vorgeschlagen, dass der Kaiser in den Graeben den Soldatentod

suche. Das war abgelehnt worden. [Die Minister und der

Prinz-Kanzler hatten zuerst in Deputationen, dann in immer

hastiger einander ~~folgenden~~ folgenden Telephongespraechen, die freiwillige Resignation von ihm verlangt. Der Kaiser war nicht zu bewegen gewesen. ~~Er hatte sich~~ In seinem Hauptquartier befand er sich im Gefolge gedreht und gewanden. Mit ~~dem~~ seinem militaerischen Hofstaat ~~der ihn umgab~~ hatte der Kaiser am den Plan ventiliert, den Krieg ~~Krieg sein zu~~ sich selbst zu überlassen und mit der ~~Feldarmee~~ Feldarmee gegen die ~~unbotmaessige~~ aufgebrachte Heimat zu werfen. Gruselige Szenen hatten einander in ~~der Hauptquartiere~~ der Villa Fraineux in Spa gejagt. ~~ziehen.~~ Der 77jaehrige General-Adjutant von Plessen hatte gefunden, die Armee werde sich leicht dazu benuetzen lassen, ~~man brauche~~ Es werde gehen, wenn man erzähle, den Soldaten ~~nur zu sagen~~, dass "die Marine, zusammen mit juedischen Kriegsgewinnlern und Drueckebergern, ~~ihnen~~ der Armee die Verpflegung abschneiden wolle", ~~dann werde es gehen.~~ Groener und Hindenburg hatten ~~alle derartigen~~ alle solche Ideen aussichtslos genannt.

"The army", hatte Groener gesagt, "will march home in peace and order under its leaders and commanding generals, but not under the command of Your Majesty, for it no longer stands behind Your Majesty."* Der Kaiser, in immer wechselnden Schauspieler-Posen, hatte entschlusslos hin- &

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* Lutze: Fall of the German Empire, Vol. II, p. 543

hergeschwankt. Um dem ~~Beschw/telephonischen~~ Draengen aus
von wo
Berlin zu entgehen, ~~dann zuletzt~~, an dem kritischen 9.November,
zuletzt fast alle Viertelstunde bei ihm angerufen wurde, hatte er
schliesslich
~~zuletzt~~ sogar die Telephonhoerer abhaengen lassen. Und dann
hereingeplatzt, in Berlin das
war die Nachricht ~~zu ihm gekommen~~, dass ~~der~~ Prinz Max ~~seine~~
Kaisers
Abdankung publiziert hatte, ~~ohne dass sie ueberhaupt ge-~~
~~sehehen war.~~ Der ~~kaiserliche~~ Kanzler, jede Minute ~~den Ausbruch~~
der Revolte befuerchtend, hatte die Nachricht ausgegeben,
der Kaiser habe ~~dann~~ die Krone niedergelegt und der Kronprinz
habe auf die Erbfolge verzichtet, ohne dass der eine wie der
andre es wirklich getan hatten. Das war das Ende. Einige
Stunden lang war der Kaiser ~~in seinem Hauptquartier im~~
~~belgischen Spa~~ noch ~~fahrig~~ hin- und hergetaumelt, war von der
zu dem ~~unter Dampf wartenden~~ Hofzug gefahren,
Villa ~~Freinense in~~
vom Hofzug wieder zur Villa, von der Villa wieder zum Hofzug.
Im Morgengrauen des 10. war er mit ~~Gefolge~~ einem Haeuflein von
treuen Getreuen
der hollaendisch-belgischen Grenze erschienen, und nach einigen Stunden
dem er
Warten, die Minister der Koenigin Wilhelmine benachrichtigt, dass er
~~war ihm erlaubt worden~~ die Grenze ~~zu~~ ueberschreiten.

Auch In diesem ~~ganzen~~ Ablauf hatte ~~nichts~~ wiederum nur Wilson, der Amerikaner und der Sieger eine Rolle gespielt. ~~als der Waffenstillstand und der Wilson-Frieden.~~ Aus keinem anderen ~~Grund wurde, der Kaiser~~ und Weder waren Wilhelm und sein Sohn ~~Kronprinz~~ ~~sie persoenlich, nicht die Monarchie~~ beseitigt (worden), als weil das Land auch das ~~auch~~ für ein unerlaessliches „prerequisite" gehalten hatte. ~~ueberzeugt war, dass Wilson das verlange; dass es eine Vorbedingung sei~~ (fuer den ~~Waffenstillstand~~, Friedens für ~~den besseren~~ ~~Frieden~~, bessere für ~~und den Frieden ueberhaupt~~. Niemals war in dem ganzen Verlauf ~~von irgendwelcher Seite die Forderung nach dem Ende der Monarchie erhoben worden, die Forderung nach der Republik, entsprungen aus~~ republikanisch-demokratischer Ueberzeugung, ~~Im Gegenteil~~ (Selbst von der linksten aller) Parteien, eben der Mehrheits- Sozialdemokratie, war der Gedanke gewuenscht worden, die Monarchie zu erhalten. ~~Die Idee war gewesen, den~~ ~~dynastischen~~ ~~raedele in der Gestalt, der Dynastie, einem~~ unmuendigen Enkel des Kaisers, zu uebertragen, ~~und bis zur~~ Muendigkeit irgend einen ~~Prinzen~~ zum "Regenten" zu ernennen. ~~Die Gruende, weshalb selbst die~~ ~~der einzigen Partei, deren Programm stets republikanisch war~~ ~~Fuehrer, im deren Programm immer der Republikanismus gestanden~~ ~~hatte, jetzt, im Augenblick, wo sie wirklich war, in diesem Augenblick~~ absolut nichts von einer Republik

die Republik gestanden hatte, und die Gründe waren divers. Als

~~hatten wissen wollen, waren divers, und von fundamentalistischer Natur. mochten wie immer beschaffen gewesen~~ (Führer selbst dieser republikfeindlichen Partei

~~sein. Als~~ Tatsache bleibt, dass die ~~Partei führung dem~~ die Republik, halte vernichten

~~sie nicht Monarchie gewollt hatten. Sie hatten nicht den mindesten~~ (dringend

~~Zweifel daran gelassen.~~ wollen. Jeder einzelne ~~von~~ ihnen ~~Fuehrer~~ hatte

~~das~~ das dutzendfach erklärt.

~~Dutzend von Beratungen erklärt.~~ Am 6.November hatte

der General Groener die sieben wichtigsten dieser Fuehrer, an

ihrer Spitze ~~gefuehrt von Friedrich~~ Ebert und ~~Philipp~~ Scheidemann, zu

einer ~~Privat~~beratung um sich vereint. Unter seinem Eid, wird er als

Zeuge in einem Prozess ~~zu erklären wird er~~ viele

Jahre spaeter ueber diese Besprechung ~~erzaehlen~~ aussagen: "Ich fand die

Vertreter der Sozialdemokratie durchaus verstaendig. Von keiner

Seite ist ein Wort gefallen, das darauf schliessen liess, dass

die Herren etwa auf eine Revolution hinstrebten. Im Gegenteil,

von der ersten bis zur letzten Aeusserung ist nur davon

gesprochen worden, wie man die Monarchie erhalten koenne!"*

* "Eine Ehrenrettung des deutschen Volkes". Der Dolchstoss-Prozess in Muenchen, Oktober-November 1925. Zeugen- & Sachverstaendigen-Aussagen. Verlag G.Birk & Co., Muenchen, p. 217.

Am folgenden Tag, dem 7.November, hatte Ebert einen schriftlichen Pakt ganz besonderer Art mit Prinz Max geschlossen. Er war der Oberste einer nicht nur republikanischen, sondern auch sozialistischen Partei, auf deren Fahne das Wort Sozialismus stand, hatte. Aber an diesem Tag hatte sich mit dem Prinzen sowohl verbündet, gegen die Eventualität, dass aus die Aufruhrbewegung eine sozialistische Bewegung werde, als auch gegen eine Republikanische, wie sie dann ausarte. "If I succeed in convincing the Kaiser", hatte der Kanzler ihm gefragt, "can I count on your support in fighting the Social Revolution?" Sichtlich unter dem Eindruck der bolschewistischen Revolution in Russland, hatte der sozialistische Führer die "Unhesitating and unequivocal" Antwort gegeben: "Unless the Kaiser abdicates, the Social Revolution is inevitable. But I will have none of it; I hate it like sin." Ob Eberts Partei, hatte der Kanzler weiter gefragt, dann einverstanden sei mit der Krönung des minderjährigen ältesten Kaiser-Enkels, bis zu dessen Mündigkeit eine Regentschaft eines Prinz Eitel Friedrich, als Regent? "On behalf of himself and his party" hatte Ebert sich einverstanden erklaert. "On these constitutional points no difficulties would be put in the Governments way."* Ja, selbst als in der Nacht des 9. November, infolge eines Irrtums, aus einem Missgeschick, das

*Prince Max of Baden: Memoirs, Vol.II, p.312-13

Als Ebert fast rasend gemacht hatte, ~~doch~~ (--dennoch) die Republik ~~in~~

~~Deutschland~~ ausgerufen worden war, ~~hielt der sozialistische~~ (hielt dieser spätere Präsident der

~~Fuehrer~~ (Republik immer) noch stundenlang daran fest, (halten,) auf ~~irgend~~einem Umweg

doch noch ~~die Monarchie~~ zu retten. Er hatte den Prinzen

Max aufgefordert, to remain as "Reichsverweser". ~~Waehrend~~

(Ein Regent (ist) in der monarchischen Terminologie der Vertreter

eines unmuendigen Fuersten. ~~ist, ist der~~ (Ein) "Reichsverweser" (ist) die

monarchische ~~Treuhaender, wenn eine ganze~~ ("Ueberleitung von einer erloschenen) Dynastie ~~erloschen~~ (in einer)

~~oder verhindert ist. Der Admiral Horthy wurde einige Jahre~~

spaeter in dem wiederaufgerichteten Koenigreich Ungarn, dessen

Koenigsdynastie aber an der Ausuebung der Regierung "verhindert"

~~war, fuer die Zeit dieser Verhinderung Reichsverweser. Das~~

~~reuen.~~ Die ~~Deutsche Reich~~ (Krone Ungarn durch einen "Reichsverweser" von der Dynastie

hatte Ebert ~~als einen Ausweg auch fuer Deutschland gesehen,~~ (noch in diesem Augenblicke erstrebt.)

(Hohenzollern auf ihre andre Abkunft zu leiten,) die Loesung und

~~und~~ hatte den Posten dem Prinzen Max vorgeschlagen. ~~Erst als~~ (Es war

(Er) ~~dieser~~ abgelehnt hatte, hatte ~~Eberts~~ Kampf ~~fuer die Erhaltung~~

~~der Monarchie in Deutschland geendet.~~

(Durch welchen Regierfehler? Wie war

Das war (nach dem Regierfehler zustande) ~~Und wie war das~~ zugegangen, ~~dass trotz dieser~~ (Wie war?)

~~einhelligen Bemuehung aller~~ (der) sozialdemokratischen Fuehrer ~~um~~

~~die Konservierung der Monarchie schliesslich doch die Errichtung~~

die Republik ~~in Deutschland ausgerufen~~ worden. ~~war? Wenn die Weder~~

~~Stufe Eins~~ der Ereignisse ~~die Demokratisierung, nichts~~

~~mit einem Drang zur Demokratie zu tun gehabt hatte,~~ ~~die Stufe Zwei, die Absetzung des Kaisers, ebenfalls nichts~~

~~mit ihm zu tun gehabt hatte,~~ was hatte ~~mit ihm zu tun die~~

~~Stufe Drei, die Republik?~~

~~Sie hatte ebensowenig damit zu tun gehabt.~~ Eine ~~spuk~~

~~hafte Entgleisung~~ hatte sich ereignet, ~~einer der bizarrsten~~

~~Vorgaenge der Weltgeschichte.~~ Die Abdankung des Kaisers war

proklamiert gewesen, ~~und~~ vor dem Gebauede, in dem die sozial-

demokratischen Fuehrer sassen, hatte sich eine Menschenmenge

angesammelt. Sie war durstig nach Nachrichten, ~~und~~ verlangte,

dass jemand rede. Scheidemann ~~er~~ war ~~hinausgegangen~~, um vom

Fenster zu reden. Aber auf dem Wege war er angehalten worden.

~~und~~ die Nachricht war ihm gebracht worden, dass ~~er~~ vor einem

andren Fenster am ~~einem~~ andren Ende der Strasse ~~Unter den~~

~~Linden~~ eine andre Menschenmenge versammelt sei. ~~und dass~~ Zu

(in den naechsten Minuten Herr Karl Liebknecht reden und die deutsche Sowjet-Republik proklamieren. Da war Scheidemann Balance über den Haufen geworfen worden. Da hatte er nichts mehr gegen empfunden als die Notwendigkeit, die Menschen am Ende der Strasse innerhalb von Minuten, die die Welt erschüttern, zum diesseitigen Hinueberzulocken. Da hatte er sich gesagt, dass das nur moeglich sei mit der Entfaltung eines ebenso revolutionaeren Magnetismus, wie Liebknecht ihn verkörperte, wenige Stunden zuvor, der bolschewistischen Sensation, werde. Und er war an sein Fenster gestiegen und hatte auf eigne Faust, das Ende der Monarchie verkündet, "The monarchy has broken down. Long live the new! Long live the German Republic." Er war vom Fenster zurueckgegangen zu seinen Freunden, und "Ebert's face turned livid with wrath when he heard what I had done. He banged his fist on the table and yelled at me, ‚Is this true?'....He made a scene which passed my understanding. ‚You have no right to proclaim the Republic...'"*) Noch fuer mehrere Stunden hatte Ebert versucht, das fait accompli, das Kollege Scheidemann geschaffen hatte, zu ignorieren. Er am Nachmittag

*Scheidemann; The Making of New Germany, Vol.II p.214

Die Republik war ins Leben getreten in den deutschen und auslaendischen Zeitungen stand, hatte der es aufgegeben. Die deutsche Republik war ins Leben getreten gegen den Willen der einzigen Partei, die sich republikanisch nannte. Sie war ins Leben getreten, als Produkt der Augenblicks-Panik, der Augenblicks-Taktik und der Augenblicks-Formel eines einzigen Mannes einer improvisierten Ansprache an einen Strassen-Auflauf.

Das wenigste von diesen Vorgaengen war bekannt gewesen, als mit dieser deutschen Republik am 11. November der Waffenstillstand geschlossen wurde, man konnte sich taueschen. Man konnte den Prozess, der da in weniger als anderthalb Monaten in drei Stufen von der unbeschraenkten Monarchie zur Republik gefuehrt hatte, fuer etwas andres halten als er war. Selbst wenn man die nackten Vorgaenge besser gekannt haette, was in dem Kreis der maszgebenden Akteure vorgegangen war, haette man noch immer sagen koennen, dass das nackten Vorgaenge nicht die ganze Geschichte seien, und tatsaechlich ist das spaeter lange gesagt worden. Richtig, die nackten äusseren Vorgaenge bei der Demokratisierung und dem Sturz des Kaisers

~~hatten keine andre Ursache als Wilson. und die Sorge um~~

~~den Waffenstillstand und Frieden.~~ Richtig, ~~der nackte Vorgang~~

~~bei~~ der Ausrufung der ~~Politik hatte keine andre Ursache als~~

~~die Entgleisung~~ eines ~~einzigen~~ Mannes. Aber ~~hinter~~ den ~~nackten~~ Vorgaengen gibt es die Stimmungen, ~~die~~ Wuensche, ~~die~~ Triebe des Volkes. ~~Man konnte sagen, dass~~ hinter dem ~~ganzen~~ Verlauf eben doch ein Drang zur Demokratie ~~wirksam gewesen sei; dass~~ die Akteure, ~~auch~~ ohne es zu wissen, und zu wollen, dem Druck eines ~~demokratischen~~ Volkswillens gehorcht. ~~Die Geschichte endete auch das Ziel gewesen sei, mit der sie begann, und der Wunsch danach die Triebkraft, die die Maschine heizte.~~

Es ~~ist~~ schwer, ~~schon heute noch festzuhalten, nachdem~~ das deutsche Volk ~~durch sein eigenes Verhalten~~ in vierzehn Jahren Republik einer ~~hoechst geringen Grad von~~ demokratischen ~~Sehnsucht~~ bewiesen ~~hat~~. Aber schon damals war es in Wahrheit ~~mindestens~~ vorschnell, an ~~eine brennende~~ Sehnsucht

dieser Art im ~~Herzen des~~ ~~nach Demokratie im~~ deutschen Volke zu glauben, ~~und diese~~ ~~diese plötzlich aufgetauchte~~ ~~ihre junge~~ Demokratie als ein ~~festes~~ ~~Bollwerk~~ ~~verlaessliches Bau Material fuer die neue, bessre Welt zu~~ ~~betrachten.~~ In den Augen ~~Praesident Wilsons~~ und seiner Gefaehrten ~~im Glauben~~ stellten sich die Vorgaenge so dar, als habe Deutschland sein 1776 erlebt. Alle Voelker der Erde ~~stellten sich so dar, als ob alle~~ in der Tiefe ihres Herzens ein 1776 begehrten, ~~und~~ durch ~~fremde~~ verhasste Gewalt ~~an dem Vollzug eines 1776~~ gehindert ~~seien.~~ ~~Das deutsche Volk, wie alle Voelker, brannte stets nach seinem 1776,~~ jetzt hat es sein 1776 vollzogen, es hat ~~seine~~ demokratische Natur durchgesetzt. "We are not ennemies of the German people and they are not our ennemies", hatte Wilson ~~fr~~eh waehrend des Krieges gesagt. "They did not originate or desire this hideous war... and we are vaguely conscious that we are fighting their cause, as they will some day see it themselves".* ~~Die Hypothese von der~~

*William E.Dodd: Woodrow Wilson and his Work, p.232

und Gnade
inhaerente Gleichheit aller Voelker, an die inhaerente

~~und Gnade~~
demokratische Sehnsucht aller Voelker ~~an d ie gleiche Erloes-~~

~~barkeit aller Voelker durch Freilegung ihrer gleichen demo-~~

~~kratischen Instinkte~~ war ein Fundament der ganzen

perfektionistischen Religion.

Nun, ~~mmmmmmmmmmm~~ die ~~e~~ demokratische Sehnsucht des

(immer äußerst ~~peinlich~~ peinlich für den, der es kannte, ~~Niemand gleich. Es gab~~
deutschen Volkes fuer ~~unzweifelhaft zu halten, war mindestens~~

~~Es~~ in Deutschland nicht nur Millionen überzeugte
~~dogmatisch. Das Interesse an Demokratie war in Wahrheit~~
Anti-Demokraten, Tatsächlich war selbst bei den Andern das Interesse
~~ziemlich matt~~ (und zwar in allen Schichten. ~~Spitzkreise nur~~
~~intensiv~~ an Demokratie ziemlich matt.

~~Es~~ war ~~es~~ schon deshalb, weil der durchschnittliche
Deutsche ~~der Kaiserzeit~~
gar nicht das Gefuehl hatte, ~~von~~ unter einer drückenden Autokratie zu leben.

~~und bedrueckt sei, und in Ketten schmachte.~~ Sehr viele im
Ausland stellten sich die Zustaende und Empfindungen ganz
falsch vor. Es gab ~~an der~~ in der staatsrechtlichen Basis der deut-
sohen Zustaende, theoretisch gesehen, eine gewisse Autokra-
tie. Der Kaiser hatte einige Rechte mehr als der Koenig von
England, ~~und~~ der Reichstag einige Rechte weniger als das Hou-
se of Commons. Aber ~~das~~ war ~~unterhalb das~~ taeglichen, normalen

Er hörte manherlei Kritik an gewissen Punkten der Verfassung.

Der Reichskanzler bedurfte Kaiser Wilhelm im Reichstag, hier konnte von den Volksvertretern, wenn Viele geneigt.

schließlich das weit weg vom konkreten, täglichen,

Satz, der unterstrichen werden.

Lebens. ~~Was~~ Ihr diesen ~~anbelangt~~ gab es keinen wirklichen Unterschied zwischen Deutschland und den westlichen Demokratieen. Es war das Zeitalter des Liberalismus. Der ~~Mann~~ Mensch in Deutschland genoss ~~ungefaehr~~ in summa die gleiche Sicherheit des Rechtes, die gleiche Unantastbarkeit der Person, die gleichen ~~four freedoms~~ Freiheiten, wie der Franzose oder Brite. ~~Man konnte den Kaiser und~~ ~~die jeweiligen Kanzler angreifen und kritisieren, und karrikieren, Man konnte Prozesse gegen den Staat fuehren und gewinnen, konnte tun und lassen, was man wollte.~~ Die Autokratie war eine Sache im ~~letzten~~ fernsten, fast unsichtbaren Gehalt abstrahierten Hintergrund. ~~Sie war nicht zu bemerken. Im Dasein des gewoehnlichen Menschen~~ Das Verhältnis zum Kaiser war nicht brennend. Die ~~Entsprechend hatte das Gegenteil, die~~ Demokratie, ~~mit~~ hatte nicht den fascinierenden Glanz, den sie 1776 fuer die Amerikaner, oder 1789 fuer die Franzosen gehabt hatte.

[Diejenigen andrerseits, deren Bedürfnis nach Aenderungen brennend war, ~~Die nicht den Zustaenden zufrieden waren, auf der anderen Seite~~, waren zum groessten Teil Sozialisten, ~~Sie~~ ihr ~~waren die sozialistische Schule gegangen, und das hiess: in~~ ihren Augen hing alles ~~Schicksal der Menschheit ausschliess-~~

~~lich~~ davon ab, ob der Kapitalismus fortbestehe oder entthront werde. Die Hauptrichtung des Sozialismus nannte sich allerdings „sozial-demokratisch". Aber die Meinung dabei war die, ~~dass die Demokratie sich geradezu von selbst als Nebenprodukt~~ (automatisch, aus dem ~~Sozialismus ergeben werde.~~ Wenn der Kapitalismus zerstoert ist, ~~tritt~~ ohnehin Demokratie, ~~eint~~ solange der Kapitalismus herrscht, ~~ist~~ die Demokratie ohnehin ~~ein Schwindel und wertlos.~~

Das war in jenen Zeiten die ~~Psm~~ Mentalitaet der Sozialisten in allen Laendern. Ueberall sollte erst in den folgenden, ~~Krassen~~ Jahrzehnten gelernt werden, dass die Demokratie eine hohe ~~primäre~~ Kostbarkeit ~~ist~~ auch ohne Sozialismus, und dass umgekehrt der Sozialismus keineswegs Demokratie ~~im Gefolge haben~~ muss. ~~Auf Reisen in der Schweiz~~ Damals wusste das alles noch ~~niemand~~, Waehrend der ~~zufriedenere~~ groessere Teil der Deutschen ~~also~~ nichts Wesentliches der Demokratie entbehrte, glaubte der ~~unzufriedenere~~ kleinere Teil, etwas viel Wesentlicheres zu entbehren. ~~als die Demokratie. Es hatte keine Berechtigung, anzunehmen~~, dass die ~~der~~ deutschen Gemuetern ~~plötzlich~~ eine demokratische Leidenschaft

durchglueht seien, war ~~eine~~ Annahme ~~der Perfektio~~ Demokratie ~~Kolbrook~~ gekommen war, dass den Menschen kein ~~besonderer~~ Wunsch erfuellt worden war. Die voelkischen Demokraten ~~fuehlten~~ bestrebt eine moerderische Apathie und ihr Leidenweg in der Republik begann mit dem Versuch, das ~~Mandat~~ Volk zu ueberzeugen, dass die Demokratie etwas äusserst Begehrenswertes und nicht sehr von ihm Begehrtes sei.
~~Aber sie hatten eine noch vagere; eine noch gefaehrlichere~~.

Aber Was hatte die ganze Frage ~~der deutschen Demokratie~~ mit den Dingen zu schaffen, um die es ~~für die Welt~~ jetzt ging? ~~Es~~ ging es für die Welt jetzt um die Sicherung des Friedens, ~~und~~ so weit Deutschland betroffen war, ging es um die Sicherung des Friedens vor Deutschland. Welchen Einfluss hatte ~~die~~ darauf ~~dass sie ein Deutschland eine echte o~~ ~~Existenz oder Nicht Existenz~~ die Gefahr einer deutschen Demokratie?

~~Krieg ist schlecht~~, lautete die Antwort der Sekte.

Alle Voelker sind gut, ~~keines will das Schlechte~~. Sobald ein Volk die Demokratie hat, entscheidet es ~~mehr~~ ~~sich~~ ~~selbst~~ ~~nehmen~~ gemaess seinem eignen Willen. ~~und macht~~ Infolgedessen keinen Krieg mehr. Der Krieg wurde gemacht von den deutschen Autokraten. Das deutsche Volk ~~hatte keinen~~ hatte nichts damit zu tun. ~~gemacht war das Opfer~~. Waere es frei gewesen, eine Demokratie, so haette es ~~den~~ auch diesen Krieg verhindert.

Haette es ihn verhindert? Haette ein Reichstag,
(die Votierung des Kriegszustandes verlangt
von dem ein republikanischer Reichskanzler ~~getreten waere,~~

hätte, sich anders verhalten als der Reichstag von 1914, von dem
(die Votierung der Kriegskredite verlangte?
ein kaiserlicher Reichskanzler ~~trat?~~ Haetten die Beamten,
Offiziere, Politiker, Zeitungen und schliesslich die Menschen
sich anders verhalten? Würden sie sich das nächste Mal anders verhalten?
Alles, was sich im besten Fall von der Demokratie

erwarten laesst, ist offenbar dies: ~~je echter und wirksamer~~

~~sie ist, desto unverfaelschter bringt~~ dass sie die wahren In-
unverfälschte (trotz. aber sind alle
stinkte und Ideen eines Volkes zur Geltung. ~~Welche Instin~~
Völker darin gleich, trotz unterschiedlicher Geschichte, Erziehung, Tradition? Welche
Instinkte und Ideen des deutschen Volkes in Sachen Krieg ~~und~~

~~Sachen Friede~~ waren seit 1914 erkennbar geworden? Welche

~~waren~~
~~dagegen~~ insbesondere jetzt, ~~1916,~~ 1918, am Ende des Krieges, (am Anfang der Demokratie?
~~dies~~

~~erkennt~~
~~nostizier~~bar? Ver-

~~Volk beherrschen,wenn in der Zukunft wieder einmal zwischen~~

Krieg und Frieden zu waehlen sein wird ?Das war der einzige

Punkt,der jetzt interessant war.

~~Und hier boerte~~ der entschuldbare Irrtum auf. Vermutungen ueber die Zukunft ~~muessen~~ immerhin einige ~~ge~~ Verbindung mit den ~~erkennbaren~~ Tatsachen der Gegenwart ~~haben~~. Es war nicht allzuschwer,die Instinkte und Ideen zu erkennen,mit denen neun Zehntel des deutschen Volkes auf diesen jetzigen Krieg reagiert hatten. Sie rechtfertigten ~~viel~~ Optimismus. ~~Die ernstlichsten Symptome~~ deuteten darauf hin,dass dieses Volk -- demokratisch oder nicht -- im gegebnen Augenblick durchaus wieder fuer einen neuen Krieg zu haben sein werde.

Die Historiker und Alten (zu erkennen, mit denen sein Schicksal des deutschen Volkes nicht allzu hoch, die diesen [illegible] des deutschen Volkes fuenfundneunzigprozentigen Mehrheit waehrend dieses letzten Krieges, und mit Bezug auf diesen letzten Krieg, gedacht, getan, gewollt, und bewiesen hatte, noetigte zu der Befuerchtung, dass es [illegible] Optimismus. Die Symptome deuteten darauf hin, dass dieses Volk [illegible] ebenso leicht wieder fuer einen neuen zu haben sein werde. Das deutsche Volk in allen seinen wesentlichen Gliedern hatte diesen letzten Krieg, - der formell gewiss vom Kaiser erklaert war, - nicht nur von Anfang an zu seinem eigenen gemacht. Tatsaechlich weigerte es sich sogar jetzt, am Ende, mitten in der Niederlage, waehrend der Verjagung des Kaisers, sich von diesem Krieg zu trennen.

Niemand, ausser ein paar Wenigen Isolierten, anerkannte, dass es [illegible] auf der deutschen Seite, beim Kaiser oder sonstwem, eine Schuld an der Entfesslung dieses Krieges gegeben habe. Das aeusserste, was [illegible] es gab, war die Behauptung [illegible] einiger trotziger Sozialisten, -- und, natuerlich, der Lenin'schen Kommunisten, -- dass der Krieg entfesselt worden sei von "dem Kapitalismus", was den

~~Der Pruefstein war die Frage, wie dieser Krieg entstanden war.~~ Der test Pruefstein war das, was man ~~spaeter~~ die Frage der "Kriegs-Schuld " nannte.

Dem deutschen Volk war 1914 ~~von seinen Regenten~~ erzaehlt worden, dieser Krieg sei ruchlos von den Feinden ~~anderen~~ ~~Seite~~ aufgezwungen ~~begonnen~~ worden, ~~man sei von Neidern und Hassern ueberfallen da worden~~, es ein heiliger Verteidigungskrieg. Gut, das Millionen ~~Manche~~ konnten ~~man~~ glauben. So lange der Krieg noch unentschieden war, konnten andere glauben, es sei ihre Pflicht, die Augen (und den Mund geschlossen ~~zuzuhalten~~) zu halten; "right or wrong, my country", ~~jetzt darf man nicht verlieren. Die besten~~ Das war anfechtbar in hohem Grade. Gute Vorbilder ~~in der Geschichte~~ haben es (sich weniger leicht gemacht. ~~anders gehalten.~~ Das letzte Vorbild, das ~~nun~~ deutsche Politiker von der Naehe gesehen hatten, ~~und nachahmen hatten koennen,~~ ~~war~~ (sahe) nach Beginn des deutsch-franzoesischen Krieges von 1870 der ~~grosse~~ eminente Historiker Thiers geliefert. Als Fuehrer der Opposition gegen Napoleon III. war er (in der Kammer aufgestanden und hatte ~~gesagt~~ erklärt: Wir werden das Land mit verteidigen helfen, aber zugleich (Zeit) verdammen wir die Anzettlung dieses

~~ungeheuros~~ unsrer eigenen Regierung, Kriegs als Verbrechen und eines Tages werden wir die ~~Schuldigen~~ zur Rechenschaft ziehen. Zwei Monate spaeter war er Praesident der ~~Rep~~ franzoesischen Republik, und stand auf einer klaren Basis. Das haette in Deutschland nachgeahmt werden koennen. Aber dass ~~es~~ denen, die ~~sich~~ Pacifisten und Internationalisten ~~genannt~~ haben, die historische Phantasie, und dem Scharfsinn dafür ~~fehlten~~ -- mindestens diese Qualitaeten, um von ~~der des~~ persoenlichen Mutes ~~nicht~~ zu reden, -- war ein Mangel, ~~der auch unter anderen Umstaenden noch mehr als einmal sichtbar werden sollte. Aber mehr als einer hat, kann~~ er nicht geben. Die Acceptation des deutschen Unschulds-Mythos durch Parteien wie die Socialdemokratie ~~laesst sich~~ fuer den ~~gewissen~~ Zeitraum des Krieges ~~mit einigen Entgegenkommen~~ ~~in gewissem Umfange~~ exculpieren.

Aber der Krieg neigte sich seinem Ende entgegen, und eines Tages ging er ganz zu Ende. ~~Die Etablierung eines~~ ~~dauernden~~ gesicherten Weltfriedens ~~wurde dann~~ die grosse Sehnsucht, das ~~grosse~~ Interesse, die grosse Aufgabe der Zeit, ~~wurde die Etablierung~~

Demokratie,und erbot sich, ~~in ihrem eigenen Land~~ all~~e~~r ihr Auesserstes feur deh Welt-Frieden zu tun.Nie wieder das Verbrechen einer Kriegs-Entfesselung!~~Was~~ kannn man im eigenen Lande ~~helfen~~ tun, um das Verbrechen ~~der~~ künftiger Kriegs-Entfesselung zu bannen?

~~Wer das will,~~ Man muss ~~in seinem Land~~ den Horror gegen das Verbrechen entfachen. ~~Er~~ Man muss die Moral gegen das Verbrechen mobilisieren. ~~Und Ausserdem~~ Man muss ~~es~~ den Menschen ~~ein-~~ begreiflich machen, ~~haemmern,~~ dass,wo immer Krieg war ~~und ist~~ (und sein wird, das) ~~dieses~~ Verbrechen ~~die Gattung~~ begangen worden sein muss,weil Kriege nicht "entstehen", (sondern ~~bereits wurde~~ aber aufgerufen werden.) nicht "ausbrechen", Wie anders aber koennte ~~wirk~~ das alles ~~mobblisiert und eingehaemmert~~ begreiflich gemacht werden, als wirksam geschehen, wenn nicht mit Hilfe des gluehend akuten Exempels dieses ~~letzten~~ gerade ~~grausigsten~~ eben erlebten Krieges? Hic Rhodos,hic salta! Der ~~Lehrstoff~~ Horror und die Moral und die Lehrung waren zu entwickeln aus ~~war~~ dem konkreten Verbrechen,unter dessen Folgen ~~man~~ wir ~~dem~~ man jetzt stand, nicht aus kuenftigen die hypothetischen Verbrechen, ~~einer kuenftigen Zeit~~.Das ist eine schlechte Predigt, die ~~die vor dem~~

Auch muss man den Hirte Hüten die nötigen Tricks, die bei der Empfindung versagen, kennen, den Verbrechen Kriegen,

das Verbrechen von morgen ~~warnt, und~~ (aufruft, aber) das ~~sichtbare~~ von heute versteckt und beschoenigt, ~~und den Menschen die Unempfindlichkeit dagegen suggeriert,~~ (Was hilft der Aufruf: Habt acht, so machen sie Kriege!, verknuepft mit der Belehrung: Dieser Fehler freilich wurde nicht so gemacht!)

~~Wenn man~~ (wer helfen will, gut kaempfen,) das Verbrechen ~~der Kriegs-Entfesselung~~ (im eigenen Land) ~~bekaempfen will,~~ muss ~~man~~ ferner (den Blick ~~und das Verstaendnis~~ (blinde Tricks, die dabei verwandt werden,) ~~fuer~~ die (~~Prozedur der Entfesselung~~) schaerfen. So sieht ein (Aggression) ~~Angriff~~ aus, so wird das gemacht! Solche Nebel werden darueber gebreitet, solche Phrasen werden gebraucht! ~~und solche Wahrheiten stecken dahinter.~~ Es ist der Trick (der wichtigsten Waffen) ~~aller~~ (Aggressionen) ~~Kriege~~, dass sie als Verteidigungs~~kriege~~ aufgezogen werden.

Es ist (wesentlich für die) ~~die Essenz aller Kriegs~~-Verhinderung, dass der Verteidigungs-Trick durchschaut und aufgedeckt wird. Was hilft es, die Wachsamkeit und das Misstrauen (platonisch) gegen kuenftige ~~theoretische~~ Faelle zu schaerfen, (als) ~~und~~ (des) ungeheuren praktischen (Exempel) ~~Fall~~ der blutigen Gegenwart zu (exemplifizieren?) ~~verdecken?~~ Was hilft es, zu predigen: Habt acht, so (machen sie) ~~entstehen~~ Kriege! - aber von (diesem) ~~die Menschen~~ Krieg (gesellschaftlich) ~~in dessen Wueste~~i ~~mmstehen~~, zu predigen: Dieser ~~freilich wurde nicht so gemacht!?~~

(Auf diese Weise war aller Dienst für den (kuenftigen Unmenschen) ~~Unmenschlichkeit, allerdings~~

Es wurde in den Tagen der Niederlage enorm viel ueber Frieden in Deutschland geredet, Aber die nackte, erkennbare Tatsache war, dass nur einige Wenige die Unmoeglichkeit empfanden, die zwei widersprechendsten Dinge mit einander zu vereinen: Moral fuer morgen, und Immoral fuer gestern und heute. Diese Wenigen waren und blieben isoliert. Die Fuehrer von mindestens neun Zehnteln des Volkes blieben dabei, dass es auf der deutschen Seite keinerlei Verantowrtlichkeit fuer diesen Krieg gegeben habe, dass dieser Krieg von den Gegnern geplant und begangen worden sei, und dass der Gegner die Welt mit Heucheleien dumm machen. gemacht haetten; dass Deutschland das Opfer sei, das nihts zu bereuen, nichts zu raechen, nichts zu saeubern, nichts wesentliches fuer sich selbst zu lernen und

Während die ~~Feinde der Demokratie~~ erlauchte deutsche Demokratie sich als Mitglied der (gegen internationalen) Moral (wichtiges) ~~vom Range~~ erweist

Die Führer von dem Zeitalter der (Völkes) ~~deutschen~~ ~~demokratischen~~ nehmen bemerkenswert ~~wenig~~ (geistigen) Rücksicht auf die Hypothese, daß (in Sachen Krieg) ~~sie~~ ~~jeder~~ die Moral der Demokratie (vollkommen anders sei als die Moral der Autokratie. Sie ~~Ihr Gesichtspunkt~~ akzeptierten im Laufen dieses Krieges ~~Verlauf~~,

~~daß sie Recht geht oder, nach dem Ende, ob in mitten der~~

~~Niederlage sind in den Anschauungen der Demokratie, selbst~~

~~sehen sie selbst~~ keine Unterscheidung zwischen dem Volk und dem (Herrn) ~~Führer~~ von Gottes Gnaden.

~~Einzig auf dem Krieg zu reflektieren und~~ dem vermeintlichen nur autokratischen

~~stürzenden~~ Krieg als Zustimmung der (vollen Republik) Demokratie. Sie ~~fordern~~ fordert, ganz Deutschland, ~~durch identifizieren~~ ~~sollen~~ Volk und Fürst) zu identifizieren,

~~Volksgenossen~~ vor (in Sachen dieses Krieges) jeder ~~jedem die Feinde~~ (Gegnerschaft für die Schuld am Verbrechen des Imperialismus)

dieses Krieges zu ~~strafen~~.

~~Ihr Kriegsziel~~ führt sie, ~~die Demokratie~~ zu ~~schwanken~~ der freien Vereinigung der

schwanken, die seit 1914 ~~Europa~~ gekämpft worden — schlimmer

(und in beiden ähnlichen Explikationen von verhängnisvoller Verblendung.

~~im gleichen Zeit~~ ~~die internationale Moral fuer morgen~~ ~~gefordert~~, und die internationale Immoral von gestern und heute gebilligt wurde. Die Fuehrer von mindestestens neun Zehnteln des Volkes blieben dabei, dass es auf der deutschen Seite keine Verantwortlichkeit fuer die Entfesselung dieses Krieges gegeben habe. ~~Arten von Vertuschung~~. Sie sagten, ~~dass~~ das Verbrechen von den Alliierten begangen worden, ~~sei, dass~~ dieselben Krieg geplant und insceniert ~~haetten~~ und die Welt mit Heucheleien irregefuehrt haetten. Sie ~~sagten, dass~~ das Verbrechen von niemandem begangen worden, ~~sei,~~ der Krieg sei "entstanden" oder ~~es~~ "ausgebrochen" infolge des ~~anonymen~~ Wirkens ~~von dunklen Maechten~~ ~~Neutren, die~~ der "historischen Kraefte", oder "des Kapitalistischen System", oder sonstwie metaphysisch ~~benamst wurden~~. ~~Die erste Variante enthielt eine Implication~~, dass ~~Deutschland~~ ~~die tatsaechlich~~ ~~einbetrogenes~~ Opfer sei und dass ~~sie~~ von den ~~Veranstaltungen~~ der Betrueger ~~da drueben~~ auch weiterhin nur Uebles ~~zu~~ erwarten ~~habe~~. ~~Die zweite~~ ~~Variante enthielt die~~

Implication, dass Kriege eben ein hocheres Schicksal sein, und dass alle das Gerede ueber die kuenftige Sicherung von Recht und Frieden inhaltslos und muessig sei.

Beide Varianten sagten den Deutschen, dass jedenfalls all right sei, dass in seinem Haus nichts zu aendern, an seinem outlook nichts zu aendern, an seinem Mythos mit allen darin enthaltenen Implicationen wenigstens bis jetzt, nach dem Kriege noch zu trennen. Sie blieben dabei, vermaehlt mit diesem Krieg.

In dem gleichen Artikel, in dem ihr Blatt, der

Sie werden ~~[illegible]~~ in ihrer Weise dafür
träumten von einer ordentlichen Welt. Aber die meisten, und
nicht zum wenigsten die wissbegierigsten, waren, ~~[illegible]~~ ohne ~~[illegible]~~ es
daneben und darüber auch selber zu schaffen, regelläre Produkte der deutschen Tradition. Sie waren
landläufige Patrioten. Man wird das eigene Nest nicht beschmutzen!
Man wird ~~[illegible]~~
die Toten nicht entehren! Man wird dem deutschen Volk
kein Bösen-Kraut pflanzen! ~~[illegible]~~ Warum sollte
man? So gut wie die Deutschen ist Deutschland noch allemal!
Sie brauchten es auch jetzt nicht prinzipiell, sich von dem
deutschen Kupfertiefs-Mythos zu trennen. Sie blieben dabei ~~[illegible]~~
~~freudig~~ Sie blieben patriotisch verwachsen mit diesem Krieg.

In dem gleichen Artikel, in dem ihr Blatt, der

"Vorwaerts", die Abdankung des Kaisers gefordert hatte,

hatte er (akklamiert) gesagt: "This war! The Kaiser did not wish it!"* ~~Bitte sie, sich die Deutsche Demokratie als Krieg der Kaiser Bethmanns anzusehen.~~

Berliner
Scheidemann sprach in einer Arbeiterversammlung von ~~dem~~ seinem

"ungebeugten Stolz" (seiner ~~Genossen~~ auf ~~ihren~~ den Anteil) an dem

~~Kriege~~ Verteidigungskrieg. "Das Volk, ganz besonders auch der

sozialistische Teil des Volkes, hat seine Sache in diesem

Kriege gut gemacht. Und wenn der Erfolg, fuer den es blutete

und litt, nicht eintrat, so kam das daher, weil man nicht

seine Stimme hoeren wollte."** ~~Wenn~~ der Erfolg, ~~eingetreten~~ (wenn auch ~~nicht eingetreten~~ ~~hatte~~ eingetreten wäre, hätte ~~alle Lobeshymnen~~ ~~waere, kann~~ ueberhaupt kein ~~Schatten~~ wäre das, wofür ~~gekämpft~~ ~~gelitten~~ ~~gestorben~~ ~~wurde~~ ~~ist~~ gefallt worden.

~~Schatten den angebeugten Stolz verdunkelt.~~

auch die Regierung (in diesem Krieg die Sache) gut gemacht gehabt.

(von Gottes Gnaden)

~~Dieser Stolz auf die patriotische Sache erfuellte~~

~~auch~~ Ebert, in dem pathetischsten Augenblick seines Lebens, zeigte

den gleichen patriotischen ungebeugten Stolz. ~~auf die patriotische Sache.~~

Das Kaiserreich war am Ende, der Reichskanzler Prinz Max ~~nahm~~

(von Ehrfurcht überwältigt,

nahm Abschied von ihm. An der Tuere drehte er sich, noch

einmal um: "Herr Ebert, I commit the German Reich to your

keeping!" "I have lost two sons for this Reich!", antwortete

und blieb in seiner Vorstellung

der Sozialistenfuehrer.*** Es war (ein Krieg "fuer das Reich", und

* Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalender, 1918, Vol. I, p. 342
** „Vorwärts", Oct. 31, 1918
*** Prince Max of Baden: Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 362

die gestorben waren, waren für eine gute Sache gestorben. Er wird bald ~~sagen~~ ~~gab es~~ schon ~~gewesen; in seinen~~ Vorstellungen ~~keine~~ so weit sein, nicht mehr zu trösten, dass ~~der Krieg~~ ~~zu seinem Vorteil~~ ~~Deutschland~~ ~~kritischer~~ ~~Anfechtung~~ beendet worden ist. Als am 11. Dezember die Garde-Regimenter nach Berlin zurückkommen, wird er in einer Ansprache ~~sie~~ die Heimkunft des „unbesiegten Heeres" feiern.

[während Prinz Max Schiff sich der europäischen Küste nähert]

Die Fuehrung der Socialdemokratie in Bayern zeigte sich ~~ausserst~~ vergleichsweise streng. Sie forderte:"Einsetzung ~~und~~ eines Staatsgerichtshofs zur Feststellung und Aburteilung aller Schuldigen,..." Aller Schuldigen ~~an was~~ an was? "....die fruehere Friedensaktionen zum Scheitern gebracht haben und damit fuer den ungluecklichen Kriegsausgang die Verantwortung tragem."* Am ungluecklichen Kriegsausgang, nicht am Krieg! Das wird in der Folge, ~~der ganze~~ (was den Krieg anbelangt, hauptsächlich der Radikalismus der Partei werden. Alle Schuld ~~lueber die sie reichlich reden wird~~ wird die Schuld am ~~schlechten~~ üblen Ausgang des Krieges, ~~oder an der Verlaengerung des Krieges sein~~ niemals ~~die Schuld~~ an der Entstehung ~~des Krieges. Das~~ Thema ~~Schuld~~ in Bann getan ~~am Krieg wird~~ faktisch ~~von ihr~~ ~~manhaft sein.~~ ~~Die National-~~ ~~versammlung~~ wird ~~spaeter einen~~ parlamentarischen Untersuchungs~~ausschuss~~ Kommission einsetzen, die zwei Verantwortlichkeiten klaeren soll: die ~~Verantwortlichkeit~~ am Krieg, und die

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*Schulthess' Europaischer Geschichtskalender, 1918, Vol. I., 338

~~Verantwortlichkeit~~ am Zusammenbruch. ~~Es~~ die Kommission wird viele Jahre bestehen. Ueber die Schuld am Zusammenbruch werden dickleibige Gutachten ~~von Sachverstaendigen~~ gedruckt werden, Zeugen werden vernommen und gegenuebersgestellt werden, die Protokolle zahlloser Sitzungen werden erscheinen. ~~Dann~~ Fuer die andere Schuld, die am Krieg, wird (niemals in ~~all die~~ Jahre, ~~hindurch keine~~ Zeit vorhanden sein. Keine Sitzungen, ~~keine~~ prominente Gutachten ueber bestimmte Zeugen, ~~keine~~ Protokolle. Einige ~~Sachverstaendige fuer einige Fragen~~ Komplexe der Schuld bei solchen Spezialisten bestellt werden anfangs ~~ernannt~~ werden. ~~Wenn sie ihre Gutachten abliefern,~~ Es wird sich keine Gelegenheit ~~sich~~ ergeben, darueber zu verhandeln, ~~und~~ nicht einmal Geld wird da sein, sie zu drucken. ~~Ich erinnere mich, wie~~ Zwei der angesehenden ~~von ihnen~~ Verfasser werden mich nach langem Warten ~~vielen Jahren~~ bitten, ihre ~~schliesslich zu mir kamen und mich baten, ihre Untersuchungen~~ ~~eine ueber den Mord von Sarajewo, eine ueber die englische Flotten-Politik~~ in einer meiner Zeitschrift abzudrucken, damit sie nicht ~~vollkommen~~ zwecklos verschimmelten. ~~Und~~ Ich erinnere mich an die ~~Kampagne gegen~~ heftigen Interventionen, die ~~dann~~ sofort einsetzten, um auf die Publikation noch zu ~~ver~~hindern. ~~eingeschlossen sogar~~ Ich erinnere mich, dass die ~~eine Drohung der Reichstags-Direktion~~ Untersuchungs-Kommission sogar mit einem Prozess

~~wegen Verletzung des Urheberrechtes~~ Idolle, -- denn diese Gut-

achten seien ihr Eigentum, ~~de Kommission,~~ und sie koenne damit

machen oder nicht machen, was sie wolle. Es war normal, dass das alte Reich – „nicht ein Land mit einer Armee, sondern eine Armee mit einem Land", nach Mirabeaus ~~Worten~~ unsterblichem Wort – seine Partisanen und ungehörten Verteidiger Waterloos. Das Tragische und Unheilbringende war, dass, sobald die Schuld am Kriege aufs Tapet kam, jeder Unterschied zwischen ihnen und den Führern des neuen Reiches aufhörte. ~~Nein, die Fuehrer dieser Demokratie bis ganz~~ ~~nach links hinueber~~ waren nicht gewillt, ihre Vermaehlung dieser Demokratie mit diesem Krieg zu loesen. (Sie gingen das deutlich von der ~~ersten Regierung~~ dieses Reiches aus.) ~~Und das Volk dieser~~ Und wenn Demokratie den Volkswillen widerspiegelt, so ~~ging schon dies~~ (Das Volk dieser Demokratie hatte ihn ~~es auch nicht von ihnen. Es war~~ ~~Es war~~ nicht ~~verlangte~~. ~~Für die Lage, aus welcher heraus dieser Krieg entstanden war, war es~~ ~~Niemand~~ von einigen Isolierten abgesehen -- ~~nirgendwo~~ ein ~~Interesse~~ dafür ~~existent~~, ~~Niemand~~ wollte (in der Tat niemand) Rechenschaft.

Niemand wollte ~~das~~ eigne Haus saeubern. (Niemand wollte anscheinend, niemand moralisch) ~~Niemand~~ ~~Bescheid wissen ueber das Verbrechen und die Tricks. In~~

In Wahrheit war ~~Niemand~~ das deutsche Volk ~~vollkommen~~ so gut

wie indifferent gegen die ~~Frage, wo der~~ Schuld an diesem Krieg, ~~entstanden war.~~

Er war verloren, das war schlecht. Waere er gewonnen wor-

den, das waere gut. Wer konnte ~~sich einbilden, dass~~ annehmen, dass in diesem Volk und diese Demokratie ~~die~~ von Instinkte, und Ideen ~~dieses Volk einen Damm~~ derart fest sein, die gegen einen neuen Krieg, ~~bilden~~ ~~werden?~~ (die Verunmöglichung Entfernung eines) ~~wuerden?~~

einen ihr wie verlässlichen Damm bilden werden?

~~Wer durfte sich einbilden,~~

In Paris versammelten sich dann im Januar die

Delegationen der 27 Staaten, die schliesslich

4 Gegner
Herr ueber die geworden waren. President

(Mitte Dezember) (am Freitag, dem 13. – einem ominösen Datum für die Abergläubischen, Red.)
Wilson war in Europa angelangt.) Er hatte in koeniglichen

Empfaengen zu Paris, zu London und zu Rom nochmals

seine Hoffnungen
verkuendet.

Als er zurueckkehrte in das Hotel Crillon am Place de la

Concorde , das die franzoesische Regierung ihm als Sitz

eingerichtet hatte, empfing er ein langes Schriftstueck des Marschalls Foch.

Der Generalissimus stellte einige (unter anderem,) Betrachtungen auf ueber ein Thema an, das kaum militaerisch genannt

werden konnte .Er sprach ueber den man fuer Gewinn, den den Frieden von der Republikani-

sierung Deutschlands

erwarten duerfe.

"La crise peut renaître", sagte das Memorandum, Foochs, das datiert ist vom 10.Januar 1919."Pour en éviter le retour il ne suffira pas sans doute de changer la forme du Gouvernement allemand." .Une république, batie sur les mêmes

principes de centralisation du Pouvoir et de militarisme présentera tout autant de dangers et constituera une aussi redoutable menace pour la paix. Elle est facile a realiser, semble-t-il, dans un pays imbu de l'esprit prussien, des méthodes prussiennes, des doctrines militaires, et où règne encore en maitre de par le temperament, comme par la tradition, le principe de l'autorité."

Ja, die Phantasie des Marschalls ging noch weiter. Er wurde ein tiefen abstrus. Er sprach von der Moeglichkeit, dass sich gerade aus der Republik ~~morgen~~ in einiger Zukunft ein noch schlimmerer Absolutismus ~~werden~~ koenne entwickeln als der brauchere. ~~als man ihn bisher gekennt habe~~. "Bien plus, l'Allemgane républicaine,

~~républicaine~~, libérée des entraves que l'existence des petites principautés occasionnait incontestablement à l'Empire, a chance de trouver un surcroît de forces... Pourra sortir un fonctionnement démocratique des institutions d'apparences républicaines, qui auraient, sans cela, toute la puissance d'un pouvoir

absolu. Nous ne verrons se produire une pareille évolution qu'avec le temps, beaucoup de temps sans doute. Mais alors...? " x)

Welche Ideen ueber Republik und Demokratie! Der ~~und rollender~~ Marschall war ~~als brillanter~~ Stratege gewesen. Aber das war sichtlich nicht sein ~~Fach~~ Domäne.

(brillant

hier

ein Geschenk des Himmels.

x Gabriel Terrail (Mermeix): Le combat des Trois, p. 212

~~Chapter 2 : Das Statut der Welt~~

5.

~~Im Damm Hotel Crillon zuParis war Vier~~ Drei undeinhalb Monate spaeter war die Stimmung im Hotel Crillon deprimiert. Der Praesident sprach an diesem 29. März 1919 mit einer fahlen Stimme: "Gentlemen, I am in trouble and I have sent for you to help me out....I do not know whether I shall see Mr.Clemenceau again.I do not know whether he will return to the meeting this afternoon.In fact,I do not know whether the peace Conference will continue.M.Clemenceau called me a pro-German and abruptly left the room".*

Clemenceau kam nicht zum Nachmittags-Meeting, ~~und~~ Er erschien ueberhaupt nicht mehr ,wo Wilson war. House ~~versuchte~~ versuchte, die beiden wieder zusammenzubringen. ~~Er liess~~ Es gelang ihm durch einen gemeinsamen Freund ~~beiden~~ Lion or dem "père de la victoire" nahelegen, sich mit Wilson auszusprechen. "Talk to Wilson!" brauste der alte Mann auf."How can I talk to a fellow who thinks himself the first man in two thousand years to know anything about

*Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Col.House, Vol IV,p.396

peace on earth ?"*

Aber der Greis, der so explodierte, wusste, dass er wi-

der mit Wilson sprechen werde! Er ~~hatte nicht die Absicht,~~ die

Friedenskonferenz auffliegen zu lassen. ~~Dann~~ seinem ~~rastlosen~~

neben ihm in seinem Land schienen so gar dazu bereit .Poincare,

der Praesident der Republik, und Foch, der Marschall, liessen

deutlich genug ihre Ansicht durchblicken, dass man gewisse Dinge

nicht annehmen duerfe, was immer daraus entstehen moege. Selbst

wenn Wilson nach Hause fuehre, und moeglicherweise auch Lloyd

George: jetzt, in diesem Augenblick, fuer dies eine Mal, brauche

sich Frankreich auch allein nicht vor den Deutschen zu fuerchten.

Wenn alle Stricke rissen, koenne es in dieser einmaligen,

nie wiederkehrenden Situation seine Sicherheit auch

ohne Hilfe von den Deutschen erzwingen. Lieber noch das, so

~~schlimm es waere,~~

~~immer arbeitenden Kopf war selbst unter den Gewittern~~ seiner

~~Zorn- und Verzweiflungs~~ausbrueche eines ~~grosse~~ Klar~~heit~~. Er stand

*Wickham Steed:"Is it peace?", The Fortnughtly, Jan.1935, 6.

hier als Streiter der Vernunft;der einzigen und vollen Vernunft;~~ausschliesslich der~~ Vernunft und nicht nur einer franzoesischen,sondern der universellen.Aber mochte die Goettin der Vernunft,die alte Goettin der Jakobiner,ihm vergeben:ihm war es nicht vergoennt,ihr gut zu dienen.Er war gewillt,das Ringen um Vernunft ~~in den hauptsaechlichen Fragen~~ bis hart an die Grenze des Bruches zu treiben. Aber waehrend er das tat, durfte er ~~keine Sekunde~~ nie vergessen,dass wirklich zu brechen es wahrscheinlich noch schlimmer sei ~~/////////////~~ als sich zu fuegen .~~Was er an der aeussersten Grenze vor dem Bruch nicht erreicht hatte,musste er wahrscheinlich immer preisgeben.~~

Das ~~war~~ musste, wie er es sah, sein ~~Schicksal.~~ Aktion sein. Denn er hatte die Bilanz dieses Krieges gezogen.Und ~~das Wesentliche~~ die Bilanz war fuer ihn die Notwendigkeit,die Freunde zu behalten.Fast um jeden Preis die Freunde behalten!

~~ke neswegs refusieren~~ werde,to act with him. Es war "cuelly suffering".* Aber es war sein Schicksal,sich ~~im~~ an der letzten Grenze Gewalt anzutun.

~~Wenn man ein Stueck Meer zwischen sich~~ und diesem Nachbarn haette, ~~mmmmmmmmmmmm~~ Wennman auch nur ~~mmmm~~ den schmalen Kanal, der den Englaendern immer wieder wenigstens die Zeit gab, die sie brauchten,um sich ~~mmm~~ Miseren schliesslich doch noch ihren ~~Gefahrenzuzuwenden~~ zu entwinden! Oder wenn die Franzosen wenigstens noch Kinder in die Welt setzten wie die Kaninchen und die Deutschen! Aber dieses Frankreich liegt in gefaehrlichster Naehe neben dem heute gefaehrlichsten Nachbarn der Welt. Waehrend es zu Napoleons Zeiten die weitaus groesste Population aller Staaten hatte,versteift es sich seit Jahrzehnten darauf,nur eben gleich an Zahl zu bleiben,-~~waehrend~~ und drueben dieses Deutschland waechst und waechst, ist heute 70 Millionen stark ist gegen 40 Millionen Frnazosen,und in ~~zehn Jahren~~ vielleicht

*Tardieu:The Truth about the Treaty,p.96

Dieser Krieg hatte eine schreckliche Tatsache entschleiert. Er hatte Deutschland um ein Vielfaches staerker gezeigt als man je geahnt hatte. Sie waren in Deutschland jahrzehntelang allzu fleissig im Gebaeren gewesen. ~~Sie hatten das Land ruecksichtslos industrialisiert. Sie waren in ihrer Disziplin und Organisation und kriegerischen Loyalitaet foster geworden als je zuvor.~~ Was das bedeutet, hatte sich jetzt entpuppt. Man hatte die halbe Menschheit gebraucht, um das eine Deutschland niederzuringen. Fuer Frankreich allein waere es hoffnungslos gewesen. Und fuer Frankreich allein musste es von nun ab ~~mit jedem weiteren Jahr~~ nur immer noch hoffnungsloser werden. Die Zahl der Menschen, die hier ~~im einen Land~~ nur konstant blieb, wuerde (dort) ~~im anderen~~ mit jedem Jahr um annaehernd eine weitere (dreiviertel) Million steigen. Das Verhaeltniss, das mit 39 zu 66 Millionen heute schon schlecht genug war, wuerde unaufhoerlich schlechter werden. Die Perspektiven waren schwarz. Die Schwaeche! ~~Die Schwaeche!~~ Die Schwaeche in dieser

teuflischen Naehe zu diesem gefaehrlichsten aller denkbaren Nachbarn! Wenn diese Deutschen sich je wieder ~~imstande sein würden, sich~~ militaerisch ~~ungehindert zu~~ entfalten könnten – was dann?

Der gespenstische Gegensatz zwischen Augenblick und Dauer, Gegenwart und Zukunft, verfolgte den Greis erbarmungslos.

Da stand man in einer Gegenwart, in der Frankreich vorueubergehend zur staerksten Landmacht der Erde geworden war. Und da stand man vor einer potenziellen Zukunft, in der es allein, auf sich selbst gestellt, ~~keine~~ vielleicht keine Aussicht hatte, auch nur ~~ein~~ paar Monate zu standhalten ~~zu~~ koennen. ~~Jederzeit, im Handumdrehen, im Lauf von drei oder vier unbesonnenen~~ Jahren, konnte aus der grusamen Zukunft Wirklichkeit werden, und ~~aus der exceptionellen Gegenwart eine versunkene Erinnerung~~. Die Idioten des Erdballs starrten fasciniert, in Bewunderung oder Feindschaft, auf die Gegenwart. Er, Clemenceau, ~~waelzte sich in seinen Naechten~~ stoehnend unter dem Albdruck der Zukunft.

Wie ihr begegnen?

~~Frankreich~~ Man konnte die Gunst der ~~vorueubergehenden~~ Gegenwart auf eigne Faust bis zum auessersten ausnuetzen. ~~Da die Verbuendeten sich~~ ~~nur einen excessiv schwachen gemeinsamen Frieden mit Deutschland zu~~ ~~sich entschlossen waren,~~ ~~erlauben, konnte~~ Man konnte ~~Frankreich~~ ~~durch~~ in das andere Extrem

jetzt zu Brei zerstampfen,und dann versuchen,den Brei in

dauernder Kontrolle zu halten.Im Augenblick konnte wahrschein-

lich niemand das stoppen, ~~auch Amerika und England nicht.~~ Aber

wie die Geister beschaffen waren, war das der Bruch zumindest

mit dem amtlichen Amerika,-- und ~~dem Tross,der ihm~~ frueher und

spaeter folgen wuerde, Es konnte enden mit moralischer

Aechtung und unabsehbarer Feindseligkeit in der ganzen Welt.

~~Es gab einige Franzosen, die lieber sogar das riskieren zu~~

wollen schienen,als einen Frieden zu acceptieren; ~~der den Keim~~

~~zu einem neuen Krieg mit Deutschland barg.Die zwei staerksten~~

Franzosen neben Clemenceau schienen undefiniert dieser

Meinung: der Praesident Poincaré und der Marschall Foch, Clemen-

ceau schloss müde die Augen und liess sie reden; oder er flammte auf wie

bügelte ihre Remonstrationen nieder.Fuer eine potenziell

schwach gewordene Nation war es eine heroische Narretei. Es

war der Pfad in eine Katastrophe.Um spaetere Katastrophe vom

Feinde her auszuschliessen, wird er nicht eine heutige Katastro-

phe von den Freunden her heraufbeschwoeren.

~~Es gab Franzosen von Verstand und Gewicht, die~~
Von ihm herum pfiffen manche
lieber sogar das riskieren zu wollen, ~~schienen~~ als einen
~~allzu utopischen~~ Frieden zu acceptieren, ~~einen Frieden~~ der
allzuviel Moeglichkeiten fuer eine Wiederholung des Grauens
offen liess. Der Praesident Poincaré und der Marschall Foch
schienen, ~~jeder mehr dito/dito~~ die ~~quälende~~ Friedenskonferenz fort-
~~schritt~~, immer ~~umso~~ mehr disponiert, den Bettel hinzuwerfen und ein
Ende mit Schrecken einem Schrecken ohne Ende vorzuziehen. ~~In~~
~~ihnen zog sich~~ so etwas wie ~~eine Explosion des nationalen~~
~~Selbsterhaltungs-Triebes zusammen~~. Clemenceau schloss muede
die Augen und ~~verneinte~~, wehrte ab, oder er flammte auf und bügelte sie
nieder. Er hatte solche Anfechtungen selber. Aber fuer eine
potenziell schwach gewordene Nation war auch das schon zu
viel Abenteuer. Es war zur Vermeidung einer spaeteren Katas-
trophe (vom Feind die Flucht in eine sofortige Katastrophe bei den Freunden.) ~~zur Vermeidung~~
~~einer Katastrophe von Seiten des Feindes die Flucht in eine~~
~~Katastrophe von Seiten der Freunde.~~

~~Was war die Alternative?~~

Den Kelch des Schicksals ~~leeren~~ musste gelehrt werden! Die Konsequenz ~~ziehen~~ aus der Schwaeche (musste gezogen werden!) Die Zaehne zusammenbeissen und wenigstens vermeiden, dass auf den Untiefen dieser quaelenden Konferenz auch noch die Freundschaften stranden,-- und vor allem nicht die mit Amerika. Kaempfen um die wichtigsten Dinge! ~~Die baren Unmoeglichkeiten mildern.~~ Das war moeglich,-in gewissem Grad.

~~Nicht nur Frankreich allein hatte an der Erhaltung Frankreichs Interesse.~~ Alle (Leute -- wenn sie es auch nicht ganz verstanden -- ~~verstanden~~, was es ~~heissen~~ (für alle bedeuten) wuerde, wenn ein nochmals zur Weltherrschaft vorbrechendes Deutschland den franzoesischen Prellbock zu zerschmettern vermoechte, wenn ~~die~~ franzoesische Armee wegfiele, ~~und~~ (wenn) die franzoesischen Kuesten von Deutschland besetzt würden; wenn sogar das Territorium verloren ginge, das ~~in deutsche Hand. Wahrscheinlich war sogar, seit Tardieu ein~~ Memorandum darueber geschrieben hatte, die Unentbehrlichkeit des puren Territoriums namens Frankreich, mit dem Appendix der ~~Low Countries~~, begriffen. Welches andere Territorium in Gottes (fast allein als) weiter Geographie ~~koennten die Uebersee-Demokratieen noch als Landungsplatz~~, Aufmarschgelaende, ~~Korridor und Schlachtfeld~~

~~gegen Deutschland benuetzen, wenn das franzoesische verloren wa~~ ~~zur Verfügung stehe.~~

~~waere? Offenkundig ging die Sicherheit Frankreichs auch die~~

~~anderen am eigenen Leibe an.~~ Dies und jenes war ihnen abzurin-

gen. Das ganz Absurde konnte so weit ~~umgeknetet~~ *fertig* werden, dass

es wenigstens nur noch defekt war. Aber ~~immer~~ immer noch

besser ein defektes settlement mit Deutschland und mit

den alten Freunden verbunden bleiben, als das radikale settle-

ment mit Deutschland und die alten Freunde in Feinde verwandeln.

Die Freunde! Was hiess das? ~~in der Politik mit~~

~~ihren Unberechenbarkeiten und ihrem ewigen Widerstreit zwischen~~

~~nahen Interessen und weiten Interessen?~~

Er war kein Phantast. Man hatte eine Allianz ge-

habt. Man sollte wieder eine Art Allianz haben. Der Voelker-

~~bundspakt~~ *Sicherheit*, dieses ~~kuemmerliche~~ Paket von Watte, das im ~~den~~

~~ersten Wochen~~ *Anfang* der Konferenz fabriziert worden war, wurde als

eine Art Allianz gedeutet. Niemand wusste, was daraus werden

wuerde. Papier und Buchstaben, das war immer ungewiss. Der brave

Er war kein Traeumer. Er stellte sich nicht vor, dass er die Allianzen von heute unbedingt als Allianzen halten wuerden. Das Papier und die Buchstaben, aus denen konnte alles moegliche werden. Der brave Jules Cambon, der ein so tuechtiger Botschafter in Berlin gewesen war, kam zu ihm: "Sie glauben an die Allianzen? Wie koennen Sie an die Allianzen glauben?" Nein, er glaubte nicht an die Buchstaben, er glaubte an die Gefuehle, die Sympathieen; an das, was dieser Fuchs von Bismarck "die Imponderabilien" gannannt hatte. Die Wege Frankreichs, Englands und Amerikas konnten, was immer in alle moeglichen Papiere geschrieben wuerde, zeitweise trennen. Sie weit auseinandertreiben. Aber so lange Frankreich nicht das Reservekapital von good will bei ihnen keinen Anlass dazu. Wenn er in der Versuchung gewesen waere, so haette dieser Lloyd George ihn rasch eines anderen belehrt. Der hatte wahrlich erlebt, was dieses Deutschland war. Der war wahrlich Realist genug, um die beaengstigende Zukunft Frankreichs hinter der taueschenden

x Gabriel Terrail: Le Combat des Trois, p. 228

~~zu verstehen.~~ Nichtsdestoweniger selbst diese ~~ephemere~~ ~~Ueberspannte~~ ~~(um in Lloyd Georges~~ ~~(in Lloyd George's~~ französische Staerke, ~~genuegte, um mindestens~~ ephemer ~~den~~ ~~das berechnende englische Pendel~~ ~~fundamentalen Instinkt aller Politik, und aller englischen~~ ~~abgrundtiefen~~ ~~insbesondere~~ in Bewegung zu setzen: ~~den~~ ~~Instinkt~~ ~~des~~ ~~Balancierens, der Favorisierung des vermeintlich Schwaecheren~~ ~~gegen den vermeintlich Staerkeren~~. "From the very day after the Armistice", ~~wird~~ Clemenceau einige Jahre spaeter zu ihm sagen, "I found you an enemy to France." "Well", erwiderte Lloyd George, "was it not always our traditional policy?" *

Es konnte zuweilen unertraeglich werden. "Never have two men in critical debates looked more like going down on one anothers throat," ** wird Clemenceau erzaehlen hoeren. ~~Nein,~~ ~~er glaubte~~ ~~Nein,~~ ~~redende verlies sich~~ er nicht ~~auf den Buchstaben irgendwelcher~~ Allianzen. ~~Aber~~ ~~nicht der gestrigen und nicht der moeglichen morgigen. Die~~ Wege Frankreichs und Englands, Frankreichs und Amerikas, England und Amerikas konnten sich trennen. Was immer in irgendwelches Papier geschrieben war oder geschrieben wuerde: ~~die ihre Wege~~ konnten zeitweise weit auseinandertreiben. ~~Aber er~~

* Clemenceau: Grandeurs & Misery of Victory, p. 121
** Ibid. p. 100

er glaubte an etwas, was nicht Papier und Buchstaben war. Er
in extremis
glaubte/an die Kraft der Lebens-Interessen,-- vorausgesetzt

dass/nicht ~~vollkommen~~ noch stärkere kontraere Gefuehle, ~~Sympathien~~

Antipathieen, Moralitaeten sogar die Lebens-Interessen ver-

schleiern. ~~Was immer sich inzwischen ereignen sollte, in-~~

sie einer kuenftigen Krise mit Deutschland wuerden die

Lebens-Interessen der drei Nationen ~~selbst~~ doch immer wieder

dahin tendieren, sie (auf, die gleichen ramparts) zusammenzutreiben. ~~-- vorausgesetzt dass~~ Solange

nicht Frankreich die ~~emotionellen~~ "Imponderabilien", wie jener ~~Fuchs von~~

Bismarck sie zu nennen geliebt hatte, ~~den Durchbruch der~~

~~ponderablen Interessen verhindern, --Solange Frankreich nicht~~

~~die Imponderabilien [illegible] in den Hintergrund~~

total fuer sich verdarb, --solange es nicht selbst (unwiderbringlich) das Reserve-

kapital seines good will zerstoert, und besonders den immensen

good will in Amerika, ~~in dem Clemenc au fuenf seiner besten~~

~~Jahre gelebt hatte~~, --solange konnte es darauf vertrauen, ~~dass die~~

~~drei Demokratieen in kuenftigen Facilen rascher oder langsa-~~

~~mer~~, schliesslich doch auf den gleichen ramparts stehen wuerden.

~~Es konnte ueber peinigende Phasen hinwegfuehren. Aber wenn~~

~~Frankreich nicht sich selbst verlor, konnte es darauf vertrauen. Auf was sonst koennte es vertrauen? Was sonst waere seine Reserve fuer die Zukunft?~~ Nichts wird ihn einen Mann wie Wilson, -- bewegen, ~~dem Mann~~, mit den Vorurteilen, ~~und Blindheiten,~~ die er nun einmal hatte, dazu zu treiben, einen Kreuzzug gegen Frankreich in der Welt zu proklamieren. Hart an der Grenze des Bruchs musste (Clemenceau ~~er~~ immer nachgeben, ~~Dazu war er verurteilt. Immer wieder musste er sich unterwerfen,~~ -- entgegen seinem Verstand, sein Urteil, seiner Ueberzeugung.

Er tat es. Er tat es immer wieder.Aber es war eine Folter .

"It made me suffer cruelly."*

Lloyd George,der war kein besonderes Problem.Er sass nicht auf Principien fest,weder auf denen Wilsons noch Clemenceaus.Er politisierte sich durch.Im Fach des Nichts- als -Politikers war er sicher ein Virtuose.Gegen Virtuositaet gab es Virtuositaet.

Der schwere Fall war Wilson. An ihm war mehr zu respektieren."A man with excellent intentions",konzedierte Clemenceau; und wenn es "a doctrinarian" war ,so war er es ~~ein~~"in the finest sense of the word."** Aber welche Tragoedie! "There are probably few examles of such a misreading and disregarding of political experience in the maelstrom of abstract thought",*** war Clemenceaus erwogenes Urteil ueber ihn.Ihm, diesem abstrakten Mann "with rigidly fixed and cristallized emotions"****

*Tardieu:The Truth about the Treaty,p 96
**Clemenseau:Grandeur and Misery of Victory,p 199
*** Ibid
**** Ibid

Noch fuer jenen Amerikaner Wilson, von dem er sagte, dass er "made me suffer cruelly"*, empfand er eine Dosis von Sympathie. Noch in ihm fand er wieder, was ihm in der jungen Nation da drueben immer als das Hoffnungsvollste erschienen war: die Staerke des moralischen Instinktes, die besondere Kraft des Verlangens nach Gerechtigkeit. Er mochte ihn with excellent intentions; "a doctrinarian in the finest sense of the word;"** tragisch, dass man es mit ihm und seinen "rigidly fixed and cristallized emotions"*** gerade bei dieser jetzigen Aufgabe zu tun hatte. "There are probably few exaples of such a misreading and disregarding of political experience in the maelstrom of abstract thought",**** sagte er von dem Mann, der ihn cruelly suffering machte. Aber er plaedierte (in seiner Umgebung: noch fast allein) "with rigidly fixed and cristallized emotions" dafür, den retain their

*Clemenceau: Grandeur & Misery of Victory, p 199
** Ibid
*** Ibid.

musste er,cruelly suffering,seinen Verstand immer wieder unterwerfen,-- ~~und~~ obwohl er fest war in der Gewissheit,dass aus alledem nur Unglueck herauskommen werde. ~~Er zweifelte keine Minute,dass der aergste Feind fuer Wilsons Ziel Wilsons eigene Ideen seien.~~ Dies sollte nach dem Wunsch des Praesidenten -- und nach dem der ~~Welt~~ Menschheit-- der war to end war gewesen sein. Auch nach Clemenceaus skeptischerer Ueberzeugung konnte es mindestens gewesen sein a war to end for a very long time war with Germany.Aber was hier jetzt in Zubereitung war, war eher ein peace to end peace. Jedesmal,wenn Clemenceau ein weiteres Mal vor einem der 27 Punkte kapituliert hatte,-- ganz oder dreiviertel oder halb kapituliert,-- sagte er sich, dass der naechste Krieg dadurch um ein weiteres Quantum gewisser geworden sei. ~~Es war quaelend fuer ihn als Staatsmann und Patriot und Weltbuerger.Es war noch quaelender~~ fuer ihn als Denker.Was waere quaelender fuer einen Mann des Gedankens,als beim Triumph des Gegenteils seiner Gedanken Tag um Tag nicht nur ein machtloser Zeuge,sondern sogar ein Mitwirkender sein zu muessen?Aber es musste sein.

~~Im was ging es?~~ Der Kern des Unglücks ~~Grausame~~ war, dass diese ganze

Sekte, Wilson eingeschlossen, keine ~~Ahnung~~ Begriff hatten von der

Natur der Menschen und der Voelker, - keine Vorstellung von den wirklichen

Kraeften, die die Maschine der Geschichte treiben. Sie

wollten die Welt verbessern, - gut, warum nicht ? Warum

sollte man nicht die Welt verbessern koennen? Da war viel

Platz! Da war enorm viel Platz. Der eisgraue Mann war ~~nicht~~ (kein nicht ~~der beste~~) mit der

Welt zufrieden. Das beste, was er von unsrem Dasein zu sagen hatte, war

Kurzlich: "The glory of our civilization is that it enables us

occasionally to live an almost normal life".* ~~Er ganz~~

~~gewiss anerkannte~~ die Erwuenschtheit (es wäre!) das „occasionally" laenger

und das „almost" kompletter zu machen. Bisweilen hatte er

apokalyptische Gesichte: „Je réfléchissais cette nuit à ~~Ueber~~ cette bizarre histoire qui

se termine dans la crotte... Il n'y a pas eu parallélisme

entre le développement de la science et le développement de

l'esprit. ~~Les hommes sont commes des singes qui auraient~~

volé la foudre de Jupiter. Vous pouvez prévoir ce qui va se

passer un de ces quatre matins: ils vont

*Clemenceau: Grandeur & Misry of Victory, p.105

s'entre-tuer jusqu'au dernier.Il en réchappera peut-être une douzaine de nègres,au Congo.Alors ils recommenceront l'histoire.La meme histoire."* Es gab Notwendigkeit und Platz, die Welt zu verbessern.

Aber wenn man das wollte -- und gerade dann man das wollte -- musste man es doch annehmen die Verbesserungen derart einrichten, dass sie den Eigenschaften des Materials, mit dem man es zu tun hatte, und nicht den nicht existierenden Eigenschaften eines nicht existierenden Materials, Du kannst eine Maschine verbessern, indem Du Teile veraenderst oder hinzufuegst, die infolge der erprobten Naturgesetze dies und jenes besser machen werden. Aber Du kannst sie nicht verbessern, indem Du die Naturgesetze als veraltet erklärst und Dir Teile einbaust, von denen Du Dir ausgedacht hast, dass sie die Schwerkraft ausser Geltung setzen werden. Die Welt verbessern das heisst, in den existenten

*Jean Martet:Le Tigre,p 284

135 9/1

Aber wenn man das wollte, ~~— und gerade dann, —~~ musste man ~~nuechtern~~ erabf sein. Gerade dann! Er war ein Arzt gewesen, ein Naturwissenschaftler. Man musste ~~nuechtern~~ sein wie ein Arzt, ein Naturwissnschaftler. Was man tun kann, darueber bestimmen die Eigenschaften des Objektes. Man muss ausgehen von den ~~exakten~~ vorhandenen Eigenschaften des Materials, mit dem man etwas vorhat, nicht von ~~tatsaechlich nicht existierenden~~ abhandenen Eigenschaften. ~~Du kannst eine Maschine verssorn, indem Du Teile hinzufuegst, die infolge~~ Man muss konstruieren gemäss der Naturgesetze, ~~dies und jenes besser machen werden. Aber Du kannst Dir nicht einbilden, die Naturgesetze seien anders als sie sind und konstruieren~~ nicht gemaess einer imaginaeren Physik, ~~konstruieren~~

Das war in Clemenceaus Urteil Wilson. Das war die Sekte. Sie konstruierten nicht fuer Triebkraefte, die vorhanden waren, eine bessere Maschine. Sie konstruierten eine Maschine fuer bessere Triebkraefte, als vorhanden waren. Sie planten Perfektionen nicht gemaess dem ewigen Wesen der Menschheit. Sie planten Perfektionen gemaess einem angeblich veraenderten Wesen der Menschheit.

O, er wusste, der Greis, dass es nichts Undankbareres

gibt,als Enthusiasten mit der Wirklichkeit zu kommen,oder Erfindern mit physikalischen Lehrsaetzen. Enthusiasten wehren sich gegen die Wirklichkeit auf ihre Weise. ~~Sie~~ Jahn auch Buchez werden zu Zeloten -- und dann ist alle Hoffnung verloren.Clemenceau fand in den Zeitungsausschnitten aus aller Welt hauefiger und haeufiger Spuren des Zelotismus.Die Welt-Erloesung,das

Ein Missverstanding war schwer moeglich, wenn man ernstlich zuhoerte, und wenn man ~~im stande war~~ nicht erkannte wer ~~die Intoleranz~~ der Zelotismus, ~~abzustreifen, die~~ der Enthusiasmus so ~~oft ~~ewookt~~~ häufig auszeichnet.

Der Zelotismus-- man kann nichts gegen ihn tun. ~~Jeden Morgen blaette te~~ fand Clemenceau in den Zeitungsausschnitten aus aller Welt ~~hatte~~ ~~hauefiger~~ haufiger und haufiger ~~Dinge, die sichtlich aus dieser~~ keine Spuren. ~~Die~~ Welt-Lösung, das ~~Feld kamen.~~ Und er musste es schon sagen; ~~die Welt Erloesung~~ begann mit einer ~~huebschen~~ vielversprechenden Dosis von Gehaessigkeit und Luegen -- und von Ignoranz. Er las sich geschildert als ~~giftigen Veraech~~ Verächter und Hasser der Demokratie,--wahrscheinlich weil er fuenfzig Jahre lang auf der vordersten Schanze der Demokratie gestanden hatte, und ganz klein, nicht bei dem guten, Wetter, das alle gruenen Froesche ~~den Demokraten hervorlockt und~~ quaken macht, ~~sondern in schlechtem Wetter, bei Sturm und Gewitter.~~ Er sah sich als "Militaristen" angeprangert,--als ob er nie dem Diktatur-versuch jenes ~~"beau general"~~ "beau general" Boulanger die Gurgel abgedreht haette; als ob er nie den weltbewegenden Kampf um

jenen kleinen Kapitaen Dreyfus gefuehrt und nach Jahren neuer Wuehlarbeit einem zerschmetternden Sieg ueber den Generalstab seines Landes beendet haette; als ob er nicht immer der Beelzebub aller goldbestickten Kaeppis gewesen waere; uns als ob er nicht noch heute faehig waere, selbst dem einzigen von ihnen, den er gelten liess, den, den er selber gross gemacht hatte, dem lorbeergekroenten Marschall des Siegs, vor den Repraesentanten der Welt Schweigen zu befehlen und ihn aus dem Zimmer zu schicken wie einen kleinen Sekretär. Er sah sich portraetiert als "Imperialist",-- auesserst treffend nach einer Vergangenheit, in der er zum Beispiel gegen jede einzelne Kolonial-Erwerbung seines Landes, besonders gegen die Indo-Chinas, furiose Opposition entfaltet hatte: "Wanting colonies without colonists! The French don't want to leave Paris, Bordeaux, Marseille. The French don't want to have children. What's all this fuss about colonies then?"* Eine aparte neue Welt wird das werden, der Liebe das Menu mit solchem Kaviar fuers Volk beginnt. Hübsch wird sie safe for democracy (gemacht sicher und wirksam wird sie aufräumen mit Militarismus und Imperialismus,

* Jean Marie ~~Jean Marte~~

x Jean Martet : Georges Clemenceau, p. 275

~~gemacht werden,~~ wenn das ~~abschreckende~~ Gegenbeispiel

Clemanceau ~~sein soll~~.

Aber im Ernst, was warf ihm die Sekte vor? Wo lag

der Hase im Pfeffer? ~~Der weitaus~~ intelligenteste,

diese Sekte von Schwaermern, die in die Lage geraten war,

einen Praesidenten der Vereinigten Staaten ~~zu den ihren zu~~

~~zaehlen, ueber ihn zu sagen begann. Der weitaus intelligentes-te~~
~~der Brite,~~

~~von ihnen,~~ John Maynard Keynes, ~~jetzt selber~~ Mitglied des Stabes
der britischen Delegation,
~~der Friedenskonferenz,~~ wird es ein Jahr spaeter in einem Buch

zusammenfassen, das die Runde ueber den Erdball machen wird.

Millionen Menschen
Alles, was ~~mmmmmmm~~ viele Jahre lang ueber die Friedens~~kon-~~

~~reden und~~ denken werden,
~~struktion~~ von Versailles ~~mmmmmmmm~~, wird tatsaechlich ausgehen

von diesem ~~Buch mit dem reizlosen Titel~~ bestseller mit dem trockenen Titel: "The Economic

Consequences of the Peace". Bibliotheken von spaeteren ~~Buechern~~ Baenden

und Gebirge von Zeitungsartikeln werden fuer Jahrzehnte nur

Keynes-Variationen ~~des Keynes'schen Themas~~ sein. Nun, die Anekdote
~~mmmmmmmm~~

~~das Thema des denkwuerdigen Buches~~ wird sein, dass einem

Greis namens Clemenceau aller Glaube an die perfekte neue

Welt gefehlt habe; und dass er ~~durch die Abstriche und Aenderu-~~
dank seiner Ironie,
~~ungen, die er einem schwachen~~ Amerikaner geistige Ueberlegenheit über einen naiven und hilflosen Wilson abrang,

die handgreiflich nahe perfekte Welt ~~in eine imperfekte~~ sabotiert habe

~~vorballhornt habe.~~

~~Es wird selbst in dieser Kritik nicht an Hochachtung~~

So wird es noch in der bitteren Anklage nicht an Hochachtung fehlen."Clemenceau was by far the most eminent member of the Council of the Four,and he had taken the measure of his collaegues He alone both had an idea and had considered it in all its consequences.His age,his character,his wit and his appearance joined to give him objectivity and a defined outline in an environment of confusion.One could not despise Clemenceau or dislike him.... "But! ("But only take a different view as to the nature of civilized man,or indulge,at least ,a different hope."* ~~Der alte Mann,weigerte sich,anzuerkennen, "that we~~

But what?

~~("with a cynical and almost impish air"~~

J. M. Keynes: The Economic Consequences of the Peace p. 29

Das war,in einem Satz,der ganze Kampf von Paris.Das ganze Problem war dies.Ist es moeglich,von der nature of civilized man eine andere view zu nehmen als die,die aus jeder Seite der menschlichen Geschichte hervorgeht?Und wenn man keinen besseren Verlass hat,als "to indulge,at least,a different hope", darf man dann die Geschicke der Menschheit nach dem schrecklichsten aller Kriege ausschliesslich auf die Basis dieser vagen Hoffnung stellen?

Die Perfektionisten -- selbst der intelligenteste von ihnen,-- waren fanatisch in der Behauptung,die Hoffnung sei ein absolut und unanfechtbar ausreichendes Fundament.Spricht

~~haben die Hoffnung. Spricht~~ nicht ~~fuer~~ diejenigen, die ~~Eure Hoffnung nicht teilen, und~~ das Schicksal der Welt nicht dem Wuerfelspiel einer puren Hoffnung anvertrauen wollen? Nein, ~~nicht sprciht fuer sie~~ sie ~~sind wicked~~. Der alte Mann Clemenceau weigert sich, anzuerkennen, "that we are at the treshold of a new age." Er blieb dabei, that "there is nothing very new to learn about this war."** Ihm war nicht auszureden die Ueberzeugung, "that essentially the old order does not change, being based on human nature which is always the same"*** ~~Und so verkoerperte er die Sabotage der neuen~~ Welt. "The Old World was tough in wickedness."

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* J.M.Keynes: The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p.32
** ibid p.33
*** ibid p.35

Wickedness or wisdom, das war hier die Frage.

Das Problem der human nature hatte sich ~~auf der~~ ~~mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm~~ auf der Konferenz vom ersten Tage an immer wieder praesentiert. Obwohl die 27 Punkte ~~angenommen~~ aufgezwungen waren, konnte nicht verhindert werden, dass sich bei jeder praktischen Anwendung ~~wieder~~ aufs neue die Frage ~~stellte~~ erhob, ob das passe zu der human nature. Und obwohl schon Normen, Regeln, Begriffe acceptiert worden waren, die die Umkehrung alles bisher dagewesenen waren, blieb ~~es~~ noch immer unbewiesen, dass sich ploetzlich auch in der Natur der Voelker eine Umkehrung ~~alles bisher dagewesenen~~ vollzogen habe.

Die Natur der Voelker spielte ~~natuerlich~~ selbstverstaendlich eine Rolle, wenn es sich um die Deutschen handelte. Der Greis Clemenceau, man muss das zugeben, ging in seinem Cynismus so weit, nicht eine Silbe von all den Verheissungen ueber eine Aenderung der deutschen Natur zu glauben. ~~Nicht wegen der Demokratie, nicht wegen irgend einem anderen Grund. Die Demokratie hatte~~ ~~mmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmmm

~~aendert nicht den Charakter eines Volkes, sondern sie bringt~~

~~ihn bestenfalls unverfaelschter zur Geltung~~. Ueber den

Charakter des deutschen Volkes hatte Clemenceau ganz bestimmte

Meinungen. ~~Fuer ihn~~ blieb ~~ein~~ Volk, ~~das~~ that "joins to his

wealth of intellectual culture a fundamental lack of Moral

culture."* Fuer ihn blieb es das Volk, von dem er auf die

Frage, ob es die Welt jetzt in Frieden leben lassen werde,

ohne Zoegern antwortete: "Je vous réponds: Non. Je ne crois

pas."** ~~Es~~ blieb das Volk, von dem man ihn sagen hoeren wird:

"Mark well what ~~I'm~~ I'm telling you: in six months,

in a year, five years, ten years when they like as they like

the Boc

das m

hoeren:

vie. L'Allemagne n'a pas ce culte-là. Il y a dans l'âme allemande

*Clemenceau: Grandeur and Misery of Victory, p 154
**Martet: Le Tigre, p 72
***Martet: Georges Clemenceau, p. 20
****Clemenceau: Grandeur and Misery of Victory, p 106

Es blieb das Volk,ueber das er schreiben wird;"I was forced to realize that the German revolution was mere window dressing,and that,with the aggressor of 1914 not a whit cured of his insane folly,we should continue ~~to~~ without respite to be subjected,in a new setting, to the same attack from the same enemy."***

,dans l'art,dans la pensée,dans la litérature de ces gens-là, une sorte d'incompréhension pour ce qu'est réellement la vie,pour ce qui en fait le charme,la grandeur,et une sorte d'attirance maladive et satanique pour la mort.Ces gens-là aiment la mort.Ces gens-là ont une sorte de divinité qu'ils regardent en tremblant,mais avec quelque chose comme un sourire d'extase,comme un vertige,et qui est la mort.D'où ça leur vient? Je n'en sais rien...Relisez leurs poètes:la mort...la mort à pied,à cheval...partout!dans toutes les poses!dans toutes les costumes!Ils sont guidés,hantés par ça....Réfléchissez à ce que je vous dis pour ce qui est des Boches...Le Boche aime la guerre pour elle-meme et parceque au bout de la guerre il y a le carnage.La guerre est un pacte avec la mort. Le Boche y rencontre sa meilleure amie."*Es war das Volk, auf das fuer ihn, mit einem Wort, dasselbe zutraf wie auf alle Voelker: "Each of us lives encased in his own past.Auguste Comte said that we live dead men's lives and it is true.We are encased by the past which holds us in its grip,and spurs us forward to

* Marcel : Le Tigre, p. 74

new efforts".* Das war ueber die nature der Deutschen. ~~Und~~

~~natuerlich spielte die Frage von der nature of civilized man~~

~~in diesem Spezialfall Deutschland nehmen koenne, eine~~

~~hoerlich ein Problem in den Friedensverhandlungen. Ob Clemen-~~

~~ceaus Ansichten ueber diesen Specialfall wicked oder wise~~

~~waren, konnte nur die Zukunft entscheiden.~~

Aber ~~eine~~ vielleicht noch ~~entscheidendere Rolle~~

~~spielte die Frage nach der nature of civized (in einem~~

~~Zusammenhang, in dem sie fuers erste weniger Deutschland, als~~

~~vielmehr alle anderen Nationen betraf.~~ Der Voelkerbund sollte

gegruendet werden. Wie war er ~~zu gruenden, wie~~ einzurichten,

damit er ~~im Einklang stehe mit~~ der nature of civilized man,

und damit man von ihm erwarten koenne, dass er ~~angesichts der~~

~~human nature~~ funktioniere ?

*Tardieu: The Truth about the Treaty, p.96

Es ~~gab~~ hatte wenig Opposition in der Welt gegeben,

als bald nach Anfang des Kriegs die Idee auftauchte, dass dies-

mal nicht nur ~~einfach~~ Frieden geschlossen werden duerfe,

sondern dass die Staaten sich in einen Bund begeben muessten,

um gemeinsam ~~kuenftige Kriege zuverhindern.~~

~~Das Princip war einer der aeltesten Traeume der Menschheit.~~

Es war getrauemt worden von den Juden und den

Griechen. Vor dreihundert Jahren hatte ~~Heinrich~~ Heinrich IV.

von Frankreich-- der, der gewuenscht hatte, dass am Sonntag jeder

Franzose sein Huhn im Topf habe-- mit seinem Minister, dem

Kardinal Sully, einen ~~ganzen~~ Plan fuer einen Voelkerbund

entworfen, der den Namen "République Chrétienne" tragen sollte, und

dessen Organ ein "Sénat Européen" sein ~~und dem gegenueber~~ ~~wuerde.~~

Napoleon, hatte auf Sankt Helena fast lyrisch von

dem kuenftigen Bund der Voelker gesprochen. Es war eine der

ewigen Sehnsuechte der Menschheit. Es jetzt zu versuchen, war

ein einhelliger Wille.

~~114 a~~ 150

~~In allen Laendern~~

(private ~~Buende und~~ Associationen mit Committees)
hatten sich ~~hiergen~~ gebildet, um die Frage zu studieren : eine

(unter Wilson Vorsitzer, dem
in Amerika unter ~~dem~~ Ex-Praesident~~en~~ Taft, eine in England

(Sir Walter
unter ~~Lord~~ Phillimore, eine in Frankreich unter dem fruehren

(Léon Émile
Ministerpraesidenten Bourgeois. Am 5.Juni 1917 hatte die

(ausdrücklich, dass
franzoesische Kammer mit 467 gegen 52 Stimmen ~~ihrem Vertrauen~~

~~Wunsch~~
~~ausgesprochen, dass zur Sicherung des Friedes und der Unab-~~

~~haengigkeit of all great and small nations alike nach dem~~

~~150~~

~~dem Krieg~~ (nach dem Kriege gefordert,
eine League of Nations ~~gebildet werde~~. Als am 18. Januar

1919 die Friedenskonfernz eroeffnet wurde, (war, hatte
~~gab~~ es gegen das

Princip der League of Nations tatsaechlich nur eine (einzige wesent-

liche Opposition, (gegebene
die Isolationisten in den Vereingten Staaten.

Ueber das Princip ~~herrschte im Uebrigen~~ (hatte somit
Einverstaendnis in der

Welt, (gehersacht. Es ~~handelte~~ (hatte sich noch nur um alles
wie der Verwirklichung gehandelt.

Nun, die Schwierigkeit war gerade die ~~Art der Verwirk-~~ Wie.
~~lichung~~. Wie so haufig bei grossen Perfektions-Bewegungen,
war die Idee an und fuer sich das Einfachste und unwichtigste
~~Durchdenkung~~. Wie es gemacht werden koenne,
an der Sache.
ganze
war das Problem. Ein Himalaya von Schwierigkeiten erhob

sich vor jedem, der auch nur fuenf Minuten ~~daruber nachdachte~~, erwog,

wie es gemacht werden koenne. Wieviel von ihrer "Souveraenitaet"

~~ihrem selbstaendigen Willen und~~ ihrer selbststaendigen Macht,

einzelnen wollen?
wuerden die Staaten an den Voelkerbund abzutreten ~~gewillt~~

~~sein~~ Welchen Grad von ~~selbstaendigem Willen und~~ selbst-

staendiger Macht brauchte andererseits der Voelkerbund, um ~~seinen~~
~~Willen~~ ~~um sich~~ gegen die ~~einzelnen~~ selbständigen Staaten durchsetzen zu können?

~~Die essentials der staatlichen Existenz waren im Spiel. Ueber~~
Der Widerspruch griffen dem, was für die Existenz der Staaten und die
~~die essentiellen Erfordernisse einer Institution~~, die den
Existenz des Volkerbunds essentiell war, klaffte als ein beängstigendes
~~Staaten ein bestimmtes Verhalten auferlegen wollte~~ sollen,
Rätsel. Unbegreiflicherweise hatte
~~musste man sich klar werden.~~

~~Es gehoert zu den merkwuerdigsten Phaenomenen der~~
Friedens
~~ganzen Geschichte, dass~~ Praesident Wilson alles ihm Moegliche
getan, ~~hatte~~, um eine ~~ernstliche~~ Untersuchung der ganzen Frage zu
endgültige ernsthafte
~~schicksalsschweren Fragen~~,

(Widerstand; und besonders) um eine fruehzeitige ~~ernstliche~~ (internationale Aufrichtung der Gedanken) ~~Auseinandersetzung darueber,~~

zu verhindern. (Am) 20.July 1917 ~~schrieb~~ (hatte) ihm die franzoesische Regierung (offiziell) ihr Land sei "particularly impressed with the desire manifested by Mr.Wilson that a society of nations be constituted." Sie ~~schlug vor~~ (hatte vorgeschlagen), dass die Regierungen eine (gemeinsame) Hudson-Commission einsetzen sollten.* ~~um die Frage gruendlich zu untersuchen.~~ (beizulegen.) *Der Praesident ~~lehnte den Vorschlag~~ (hatte) ab. (Es sei) "premature". Es sei ratsam, "new subjects of discussion and perhaps of difference of views" zu vermeiden.** Am 3. September 1917 ~~machte~~ (hatte) die englische Regierung den gleichen Vorschlag (gemacht).*** Wiederum ~~war aus Washington keine Response zurueckgekommen. So war das~~ (hatte sie sich negativ verhalten. Und dabei war es) (während all) der (vergangenen,) langen Monate (in) denen man Zeit (und Ruhe) gehabt haette, ~~geblieben.~~ (geblieben.)

Aber nicht nur hatte Wilson es abgelehnt, das Problem von Regierungswegen zu studieren. Er hatte ~~sogar~~ all seinen

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*Ray St.Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol.VII, 176
** Ibid. p.203
*** Ibid. p.255

Einfluss aufgewandt, um serioese private Untersuchungen, und besonders internationale, zu verhindern. Er hatte nach allen Kraeften auf Mr. Taft's "League to Enforce Peace" gedrueckt, sich nur auf allgemeine Propaganda zu beschraenken, und nicht in die Probleme selbst hineinzusteigen. Am 20. Maerz 1918 schrieb er an House von seiner Genugtuung geschrieben, to have "prevented the particular thing I feared, that they would insist upon a discussion now of the constitution of the league of nations."* Am 11. July 1918 war Mr. Taft von der Mitteilung ueberrascht und veraergert worden, der Praesident "hoffe very sincerely", that the League to Enforce Peace will not study the League-Problem in connection with committees abroad and not establish international connections.** Ja, als das englische Phillimore-Committee um die selbe Zeit einen Entwurf zu Papier gebracht hatte, hatte Wilson auf die Regierung von London gedrueckt, sie ihrerseits moege

*Ray St. Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol. VIII, p. 38
** Ibid. p. 277

auf das Committee druecken, den Entwurf zu sekretieren und nicht der oeffentlichen Diskussion zu unterbreiten.

Warum hatte der Praesident die vermeintige nationale Erforschung des Problems und vor allem die internationale Abstimmung der Gedanken darueber so konsequent verhindert ? Die Gruende waren raetselhaft, wenn man sie nicht in seiner persoenlichen Natur suchen — in dieser Abneigung gegen Beratung, diesem Misstrauen gegen die Suendigkeit der Anderen, dieser immer moralischen Distanzierung, und, aus ihr folgend, dieser immerwachen "Aufzwingen".

Aber wenn er so wenig für die demokratische Kristallisation des League of Nation-Plans inklinierte, wenigstens in seinem eigenen, etwas autokratischen Geist die Probleme bis zum Ende und exakt durchgedacht ? Die Wahrheit war, dass er es nicht getan hatte. Er hatte, als ihm im July 1918 aus England der Phillimore-Entwurf zugesandt worden war, Colonel House gebeten, er moege doch einmal eine eigene Konstruktion zu Papier bringen. Als House ihm eine Woche spaeter seinen Versuch uebergeben, hatte, war Wilson unbefriedigt gewesen. Im August brachte er im Verlauf zweier Tage seine

eigenen Ideen auf einigen Blatt Schreibmaschinen-Papier niedergelgt. Die ~~der~~ erschienen nun wieder House unbefriedigend. Er hatte in mehrfachen Punkten Kritik geuebt, ~~und~~ sogar ~~von einem~~ die Wendung gebraucht. "an idealistic dream that could not be made practical"* ~~gespro-~~ Der Präsident hatte sein Manuskript in die Tasche gesteckt, - und damit ~~chon hatte~~ war seine exakte Bwschaeftigung ~~des Praesi-~~ ~~denten~~ mit der Frage ~~die er nach seiner Ankunft in Paris "the center of the whole programme" genannt hatte~~ tatsaechlich ~~vorbei~~ zu Ende gewesen. Er hatte den Voelkerbund nach seiner Ankunft in Paris "the center of the whole programme " genannt. Aber als man sich zu unterhalten begann, hatte ~~hatte deutlich genug gemacht, dass er alles auf diese eine Sache abzustellen gedenke. Aber als die Konferenz eroeffnet~~ ~~wurde~~ ~~hatte~~ sich gezeigt, dass er selbst keinen ~~eigenen~~ Plan in der Tasche hatte. ~~Es~~ Es hatte sich gezeigt, dass er im wichtigsten Punkt der ganzen Frage "schwamm". ~~Der~~

Der wichtigste Punkt ~~in~~ der ganzen Frage ~~wie man~~

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*Seymour :The Intimate Papers of Col.House,Vol.IV,p.48-50

effektiven
war offenkundig die der Macht, ~~der Zwang. Und die~~
~~Folge des Zwangs mit welcher~~ die der Bund ~~nicht~~ erhalten sollte;
~~angewendet werden~~
~~werde. Der Zwang~~, der physischen Gewalt, die,
der sie sollte ausüben können.

In der Seele des Präsidenten war all sein Lebtag
lang eine heftige Abneigung gegen alles gewesen, was nur von
Ferne an Macht und Zwang (Gewalt) erinnerte. Kurz vor dem Kriege, am 5. Juni
1914, hatte er als seinen Glauben proklamiert: „The real things
in the World are the things that are divorced from
Force." x Der Krieg, der in Europa ausbrach, ~~machte~~
hatte ihn (in dieser Aversion) ~~darin~~ gemacht. Er hatte sich (in) fragen
begonnen, ob es gegen die Macht und Gewalt des Bösen denn
(überhaupt) ~~eigentlich~~ ein anderes (wirksames) ~~als~~ ein (Macht und Gewalt
der Guten. ~~Und in das Manuskript~~ ~~der Rede~~ ~~Ausgedrückte.~~ In (einer Rede, die er im Mai 1916
in Mr. Taft's League zu halten hatte, hatte er zum ersten Mal
den Gedanken (ins Auge) gefaßt, daß gegen (seine tiefsten Instinkte)
erforderlichenfalls ~~Gewalt~~ sei. Aber in letzten Augenblicke hatte er (es) doch zurückgehalten,
dass er den Absatz wieder herausgestrichen hatte. Als (Wilson
Amerika in den Krieg eingetreten war, hatte seine Wandlung
sich allmählich vollzogen, und wenn er (in der Folge) vom Völkerbunds-
Gedanken gesprochen hatte, war er schließlich bis zu (dieser Aussage)
(Wendungen gelangt:
wie) „Force must be created, force so superior that no
nation or combination of nations can challenge or resist it."
Nicht war Right divorced from Force, sondern vermählt mit Force.

x H. W. V. Temperley: History of the Peace Conference, Vol. I. p. 174

Aber selbst wenn er ~~[illegible]~~ gesprochen hätte,
war seine Seele in Wahrheit noch immer gefesselt gewesen. Denn nun konnte
die Sache nicht beiseitegelassen, ohne zu klären, ob ~~[illegible]~~ jeder Zwang
~~[illegible]~~ (nicht mehr auf)
~~[illegible]~~ einen anderen Zwang voraussetzte, der ~~[illegible]~~ auf die Boeren
~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~.

(ebenfalls sei.)

(ein Zwang schuldhaftes
~~[illegible]~~ nicht nur ~~[illegible]~~ gegen die Boeren ebenfalls sein
~~[illegible]~~ werde. ~~[illegible]~~
~~[illegible]~~ auch ein Zwang für die Juden werde schändlich sein. Und
das war die Lüge.

~~der Frieden kollektiv geschuetzt und der Angreifer niederge-~~
~~halten werden kann, ist offensichtlich~~ offenkundig nicht
der Angreifer, ~~oder der Angegriffene~~, sondern die Uebrigen.
~~Das Problem ist~~ nicht der Boese, ~~sondern sind~~ die Guten.

Die Schwaermer der Welt ~~ergingen~~ sich in farbigen
Vorstellungen, was dem Boesen nun ~~alles~~ drohen werde. Die ganze
Welt wird den Verkehr mit ihm abbrechen. ~~Gut. Die ganze~~
~~Welt~~ wird ihm ~~keine~~ Waren ~~mehr~~ abnehmen ~~und keine Waren mehr~~
~~an ihn~~ liefern, ~~Gut, Die ganze Welt~~ wird gegen ihn losschlagen
mit den Heeren und Flotten und Luftgeschwadern. ~~Gut, Es braucht~~
~~nicht bewiesen zu werden, dass~~ kein einzelner Staat gegen die
vereinigte Welt bestehen. ~~kann. Wenn das ueber ihn hereinbricht,~~
~~ist der Boese verloren.~~ Es ist ~~nicht noetig~~, sich in grandiose
Bilder ueber das Schicksal des Boesen zu ~~ergehen~~, -- falls die
Guten ihm dieses Schicksal bereiten.

Die Guten- da ist die Achilles-Ferse! Werden sie
dem Boesen wirklich dieses Schicksal bereiten ? Kann man sich
darauf verlassen, dass sie es tun werden ? ~~Wie gibt~~ die

Gewissheit,dass sie es tun werden ?

~~Es gibt~~ Moerder ~~in jeder Stadt,~~ und sie

werden in gewissem Grad durch die Existenz einer Polizei

niedergehalten. Die ~~guten~~ ordentlichen Buerger sind keine Moerder, ~~nehmen~~

~~wir an, sie seien so gut, dass sie selbst dann keinen Mord~~

~~begehen, wenn keine Polizei vorhanden waere.~~ Aber nun kommt

der ~~gute~~ ordentliche Buerger ueber eine Landstraasse, und er sieht ~~wie ein~~

~~Fremder ueberfallen wird. Man~~ Moerder auf einen Fremden los gehen.

mit Messern und Revolvern. Was tut der ~~gute~~ ordentliche Buerger? Stuerzt er

sich ins Gemenge, um dem ~~Fremden~~ Mord zu verhindern? ~~helfen?~~ Das ~~ist sicher~~ Kommt vor, aber

~~selten.~~ Der ~~gute~~ es ist eher selten der ordentliche Buerger hat seine Verantwortung gegen Weib

und Kind; ~~und in Neunundneunzig von hundert~~ in den meisten Faellen wird er sich

lieber ~~geneigt sein, sich~~ davonzumachen, als einzugreifen. Es

soll vorgekommen sein, dass sogar Polizisten sich lieber

davon gemacht haben als einzugreifen. Wenn nicht eine starke

Autoritaet da waere, von der sie Schlimmes zu erwarten haben,

~~wenn sie ihre Pflicht nicht tun, so~~ wuerden viele Polizisten

sich davonmachen. Das ist die Erfahrung mit den einzelnen ordentlichen Menschen.

~~Menschen.~~ Es ist die human nature der ~~Guten~~. Anständigen. Sie tun nichts Böses.

Aber sie unterlassen manches Gute. Es ist ein gewaltiger

Unfähigkeit zwischen der Begehung von Bösem und der Unterlassung von Gutem!

Was ist die human nature der guten Voelker,-- ~~oder~~ derjenige, ~~der~~ momentan und im gegebenen Fall guten ~~Voelker~~ ? Die Geschichte lehrt, dass es ihr staendiger Trieb ist, sich ebenfalls davonzumachen. ~~Die~~ Tatsache, dass fast alle Kriege der Duelle, Geschichte ~~waren~~, in die kein Nicht-Betroffener ~~sich einmischte~~, zeigt die Neigung der ~~meisten~~ Falle guten, ~~aus fremden Haendeln draussen zu bleiben.~~ In den wenigen Faellen, ~~in denen grosse Eroberer sich schliesslich einer~~ Koalition gegen ~~ueberfanden~~, ~~hatte es meistens lange Zeit gedauert, bis de Entschluss zur Koalition sich du ehgerungen hatte~~, viele Kriege one by one, denen die jeweils Nichtbetroffenen sich ~~zu~~ druecken ~~versucht hatten~~, waren fast immer vorausgegangen.

Waehrend eine ~~die~~ Geschichts-Verzerrung, ~~die~~ glauben machen wollte, dass alle Herrscher und herrschenden Klassen immer ~~auf~~ ~~lauerten auf eine Moeglichkeit zu~~ Kriegen ~~ist~~, die eklatante Wahrheit die, dass ~~die Herrscher und Beherrschten in unendlich viel, viel Faellen stets~~ zahlreicheren Faellen ~~sich davonmachten~~ vor Kriegen, in ~~denen sie nicht unmittelbar angegriffen waren~~. So lange es auf

ankam,
ihr freien Willen~~war~~ haben die Nationen haufiger Krieg vermie-

den als gefuehrt.

Der Voelkerbund war ~~also~~ ein Problem der Guten. Human

nature ist ~~beim Angreifer der Angriff, beim Verteidiger den Angegriffe-~~

~~nen meistens die Verteidigung, aber bei allen anderen in/der~~

im allgemeinen
offenbar das Draussenbleiben-Wollen. Das ist der ~~normale~~ erwiesene

Instinkt. ~~Und diesen~~ Instinkt ~~zu ueberwinden~~, war das ~~eigent-~~

zentrale Problem.

Aber wenn dieses Problem gloesen werden sollte, so gab es nur eine Möglichkeit. ~~Es musste~~ Der Voelkerbund musste zwingend werden. Er musste zu etwas gemacht werden, das eine effektive Obergewalt über die einzelnen Staaten konstituierend wirkte. Es musste ihm (in einem ~~ganz, offensichtlich~~ Grad, offensichtlich dem gefährlichen Grad) die Souveränität über die einzelnen Staaten (und) übertragen werden, und die ihre musste in demselben Grad reduziert beschnitten werden. ~~Es musste ein Teil der~~

Der gute Wille und die geistigen Machtmittel der einzelnen Staaten mussten zum Teil ~~geopfert werden~~ auf den Altar des neuen Gottes (Voelkerbund) geopfert und als Kapitel in die neue Holding-Firma eingetragen werden.

~~Gerade~~ Das aber war Wilson nicht bereit. Er glaubte nicht, dass es möglich sei: denn ~~ein~~ kein Land der Welt würde das akzeptieren, am wenigsten von allen die USA. Er glaubte nicht einmal, dass es vorstellbar sei: denn ~~ein~~ solches (neues praktisches) System ~~wäre die Konstruktion~~ (durch Überstaat-

Kraft Paul dem ~~Paul dem~~ ~~Paul dem~~ seinen Geist ihres Antlitz am Register der Macht ~~die~~ wurden sie ~~Mächte~~ ~~Mächte~~ verfassen über alles.

die Welt-Herrschaft der Grossmächte sein, Und auf das war in seinem Geist erschreckend und pucadis.

Und so hatte er sie aufgehört, in dieser Tage eine gespaltene Person zu sein. Er hatte sie aufgehört, in einem ausweglosen Dilemma hin- und herzuschwanken. Der Völkerbund stand effektive über seine Mitglieder -- der Völkerbund aber andererseits stand keine Macht über seine Mitglieder: die wir er ~~ist keine~~ der ~~aus~~ Ausweg aus dem unlösbaren Widerspruch? ~~Eingestellten~~

Als Ausweg hatte er sich offenbar die Supposition, dass auf die Moral eine effektive Macht sei. Die eigene Moral der persönlich diversen künftigen Regierenden, die öffentliche Moral über diversen Völker, die universelle Moral der zivilisierten Menschheit ~~insgesamt~~ -- die wird die Gewalt sein, die die Gültige zwingt, sich zu unterwerfen. (wird, das Gute auch ohne moralischen Zwang) ~~Pflicht gegen die Bösen zu befreien.~~ ~~Die Menschen retten~~

Die Menschen waren bisher anders? Sie war es, - aber jetzt hat sich sie geändert! Daran hatte er sich gewöhnt. Im April 1918 ~~dass es~~ hatte er charakteristisch gewöhnt. ~~nahegebracht worden. Im April 1918 hatte ihm~~ Mr. Strachey, der

Herausgeber des Londoner "Spectator", ~~einen Brief darueber~~ in einem Brief ~~geschrieben. Er~~ hatte ihn gewarnt vor der Vorstellung, dass ein

Voelkerbund, der aus nichts als Versprechungen bestehe, sich ~~in~~

in der Wirklichkeit bewaehren werde.Die guten Voelker und Regierungen wuerden sich im kritischen Augenblick zu druecken versuchen. Besonders nach diesem schrecklichen Krieg wuerden sie, ~~sich~~ wenn es auf ihren freien Willen ankomme,alle Luftloecher und Ausfluechte ausnuetzen, um fuer vermeintlich fremde Angelegenheiten nicht wiederum zu den Waffen greifen zu muessen.

Wilson hatte geantwortet:"I feel the full weight of your fear. ...But it seems to me that the effects of this war may just as reasonably be expected to operate in the other direction."*

~~x Ray St. Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol. VIII, p. 74.~~

[Es wird gut sein, die Worte nicht zu vergessen! Sie werden ein Leitfaden durch die Geschichte von gewiss Tiefen sein. „It may just as reasonably be expected to operate in the other direction?" — we may indulge, at least, a different hope," — — das wird in letzter Analyse die Basis sein, auf die das Projekt des Völkerbunds, und das Projekt der neuen Welt, gestellt werden wird.

x Ray St. Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol. VIII, p. 74

Schon die ersten Eröffnungen, die Präsident Wilson in Paris gemacht hatte, hätten ihn darin bedenklich stimmen müssen. Vor dem Forum der Konferenz Plenum der Vorkonferenz Vollversammlung gestanden, — die Verteilung der früheren deutschen Kolonien, — hatte Wilson dabei von dem australischen Premierminister Hughes zu hören bekommen, was ihn weniger weltfremde Träume hätte glauben lassen können. Mr. Hughes war kein Vertreter des zynischen Europa, sondern der neuen Welt. Aber er hatte sich zu Wilson und allen seinen Ideen seit einer fast (schon in London verhalten.) exaltierten kühlen Feindseligkeit geäußert. „I hear that you are a cannibal!“ hatte Clemenceau ihn angesprochen, als er ihm Hughes in der Ersten Sitzung der Konferenz vorgestellt worden war. „The report is grossly exaggerated“, hatte der Vertreter des jungen Erdteils bescheiden geantwortet.* Aber (ohne Übertreibung) hatte er Wilson in dem Streit um die Kolonien — einem sachlich gleichgültigen Streit — kaum besser behandelt als einen (Ausländer.) Wilson hatte (Übersetzung) nicht schlecht dargestellt, Lloyd George's Ausführungen, „dictatorial and somewhat arrogant“ reagiert, und an einem Punkt hatte er einen Australier eine heftige Ansprache ins Gesicht geschleudert, die in dem Satz gipfelte: „Mr. Hughes, am I to understand that if the whole civilized world asks Australia to agree... Australia

* Lloyd George: Memoirs of the Peace Conference, Vol. I, p. 343

is prepared to defy the appeal of the whole civilized world." Ruhig und Befriedigt hatte der Australier gemurmelt: „That's about the size of it, President Wilson." × Es wäre die Gelegenheit gewesen, sich Gedanken ueber die prägende Macht dieses zu machen, was der Praesident für die Moral der zivilisierten Menschheit hielt.

Aber er hatte nichts anderes ~~[illegible]~~ im Gepaeck gehabt, und er hatte (weder die Termin planungen) auch keine Ideen ausgearbeitet.

Am 25. Januar 1919 hatte die Friedenskonferenz eine Kommission ernannt, die der Voelkerbunds-Idee Gestalt geben (die fünf Großmächte und fünf kleine später sieben) sollte. Praesident Wilson war zum chairman ernannt worden. Auf der 3. Februar A vor der ersten Sitzung der Commission anberaumt worden. Schon diese Zeit war eine fieberhafte Produktion von Völkerbunds-Entwürfen in Paris ausgebrochen.

Wilson hatte in drei Wochen (nicht weniger als drei) nebeneinander zu Papier gebracht. Der Südafrikaner Smuts hatte einen produziert. Der Engländer Lord Robert Cecil hatte einen. (Die englische Regierung einen produziert.) Der Italiener Orlando hatte einen. ~~[illegible]~~

× Lloyd George: Memoir of the Peace Conference, Vol. I p. 359

Um Clemenceau zu zitieren:
"Mr. Lloyd George, that complex personality whose Welsh astuteness could by turns assume the most varied aspects ... knows that there are times for being reasonable." *

163

Dann hatte sich ergeben, dass Lloyd George seinen besonderen Wert darauf legte, in dieser Sache überhaupt eine eigene Meinung zu vertreten. Er hatte vorgeschlagen, die englischen und amerikanischen Projekte irgendwie zu verschmelzen, und das Amalgam gemeinsam durch die Kommission zu steuern. Darauf hatte Wilson seinen ersten Juristen Miller beauftragt, den Cecil-Entwurf mit seinem Entwurf zu einem Cecil-Miller-draft zu amalgamieren.

Dann hatte er ihn beauftragt, - alles innerhalb weniger Tage - gemeinsam mit dem englischen Haupt-Juristen Hurst ein neues Amalgam zu präparieren, das den Namen Hurst-Miller-draft erhalten wird.

Dann hatte er ihn beauftragt, Wilsons eigene letzte Fassung einzuarbeiten.

Als die Stunde der Eröffnung der Kommission gekommen war, war am 3. Februar Mr. Miller der Meinung gewesen, dass die so veränderte letzte Wilson-Fassung das Dokument sei, das unterbreitet werden würde.

Dieses hatte er in den Sitzungs-Raum mitgebracht. Als er angekommen war, hatte Wilson ihm gesagt, (dass der wieder geändert sei und dass vorher der Hurst-Miller-draft vorgelegt werden) Mr. Miller hatte sich (in ein Taxi gesetzt, war nach Hause gefahren, um das andere Dokument zu holen, und als er mit ihm zurückgekommen war, war Wilson schon fertig mit seiner Eröffnungs-Ansprache fertig gewesen. Sie hatte sich gegenüberlegen mit der Verteilung des gerade neu fertiggestellten drafts.

* Clemenceau: Grandeur & Misery of Victory, p. 100

Der Voelkerbund hatte sich in diesem Draft als eine Art

Gentlement-Agreement zwischen den Staaten entpuppt.Jeder Staat

wuerde zwei Geloebnisse, ablegen.Eines ueber sein Verhalten im

~~als~~ Bundes ~~Mitglied~~.Eines ueber sein Verhalten ~~als Staat~~ ausserhalb des Bundes.

Jeder wuerde geloben, als Mitglied des Bundes -- entweder

des "Rates" oder der "Versammlung"-- gewissenhaft an der Fest-

stellung mitzuwirken,ob irgendwo ein Angriff drohe oder erfolgt

sei; und gewissenhaft an der Festsetzung von Gegenmassnahmen
mitzuwirken.

Jeder wuerde geloben, ausserhalb des Bundes -- in seinem

Dasein als Staat schlechthin-- den Beschluessen des Rates oder

der Versammlung gewissenhaft nachzukommen.

Es wuerden nichts als ~~mannhaftes~~ Geloebnisse sein,--

und das allein war schon ~~fragwuerdig~~ wenig genug. Aber die Geloebnisse

sollten ausserdem noch erheblich qualifiziert sein.

Zu den Massnahmen, ~~gegen den Boesen~~, die vom Rat oder der

Versammlung ~~beschlossen werden koennten, sollte~~ zum Beispiel

nicht die Intervention mit Waffengewalt gehoeren duerfen. Wenn

die Guten dem Boesen nur mit Krieg

~~Der Voelkerbund hatte sich in diesem Sinne als eine~~

~~Es entsprechende aber lebendige Kraft~~

~~hundertmal von ihm ausgesprochene Idee, dass kein Element von~~

~~In diesem Sinne hatte sich der Voelkerbund als eine~~

~~Zwang in die ganze Sache kommen duerfe. Der Voelkerbund hatte~~

~~sich in dem Sinne Wilsons etwa als ein Gentlemen-Agreement greifen~~

~~Staaten aufgefasst, ein Abkommen, das solche Gewalttaten~~

~~sollte im Wesentlichen eine doppelte Moeglichkeit aller Staetten~~

~~Dem Agreement hatte ein doppelter Inhalt~~ Jeder Staat ~~hatte~~, sowie

Gelobnisse ablegen, Eines ~~in seiner Eigenschaft als Mitglied des Rates~~ ~~seiner~~

~~sein.~~ Erstens das Gelobnis, in ihrer Eigenschaft als

ueber sein Verhalten im Bund. Eines ueber sein Verhalten ausserhalb des Bundes.

[jeder gelobte, als Bundes- ~~Mitglied des~~ "Rats" oder der "Versammlung" gewissenhaft an der

~~Feststellung mitzuwirken,~~ ~~in der Hoffnung~~

~~festzustellen~~, ob irgendwo ein Angriff drohe ~~oder~~ oder erfolgt

sei; und gewissenhaft an der Festsetzung gemeinsamer

[jeder gelobte, ausserhalb des Bundes-

Gegenmassregeln mitzuwirken. ~~Zweitens das Gelobnis, in~~

~~in diesem Sinne als Staat gegenueber~~

~~ihrer Eigenschaft als Staaten die~~ den Beschluessen des Rates oder

der Versammlung ~~gewissenhaft~~ gewissenhaft nachzukommen. ~~Zu den~~

[Es waren nichts als Gelobnisse, - und das war ihr ~~ganzer~~ ganzer Wert.

~~Aber die Gelobnisse sollten~~ ausserdem noch erheblich qualifiziert sein.

~~Beschluessen, die~~ rechtskraeftig gefasst werden koennten;

[Zu den Gegenmassnahmen, die vom Rat oder der Versammlung beschlossen

werden konnten, sollte nun beispielsweise nicht die Exekution mit

~~sollte, nebenbeibemerkt, nicht der Beschluss zum Kriegfuehren~~

Waffengewalt gehoeren, wenn

~~gehoeren. Das sollte den Mitgliedern nicht auferlegt werden~~

~~koennen, wenn die Guten dem Boesen nicht anders als~~ nur mit Krieg

wuerden beikommen koennen, so sollte der Voelkerbund nichts

bereits sein, das rechtskraeftig zu beschliessen. Der Rat oder die

~~anderes tun koennen, als "Empfehlungen" zu schliessen und~~

Versammlung sollten das nur "empfehlen" können, und

jeder Staat wuerde volle Freiheit haben, die Empfehlung zu

befolgen oder nicht. ~~The United States would never ratify~~

any treaty which put the force of the USA at the disposal of such group or body..." hatte Wilson schon Monate vorher geschrieben.* ~~Der Entwurf, der Wilsons Ideen inkorporierte, enthielt fuer die Guten also in keinem Fall und unter keinen Umstaenden die Verpflichtung, in den Krieg gegen den Boesen zu gehen.~~ Viele Irrtuemer ~~darueber~~ werden diesen Punkt während der naechsten Jahrzehnte in den Koepfen der gewöhnlichen Menschen ~~entstehen~~, aber dies war die Tatsache. ~~An einem~~ Zur Verhinderung eines Angriffs bis zum Krieg ~~gegen den Boesen teilzunehmen~~, sollten ~~die~~ jeder einzelne der Guten unter allen Umstaenden verweigern koennen, ~~ihnen irgend etwas von ihren Verpflichtungen zubrechen~~. Ihre bindende Verpflichtung ~~war~~ sollte beschraenkt auf kleine Massnahmen short of war, ~~auf diejenigen Massnahmen auf diejenigen die der Rat oder die Versammlung beschliessen~~ ~~wuerden~~. Aber ~~dieser Beschluss war wieder~~ auch das Beschließen von Massnahmen short of war wurde wieder qualifiziert. In der Mehrzahl der Faelle ~~nur dann gueltig, wenn er~~ sollten nur Beschlüsse verbindlich sein. ~~einstimmig gefasst war~~. Eine einzige Stimme ~~konnte die Einstimmigkeit zerstoeren~~ sollte Beschlüsse verhindern können. Der Staat,

*~~Ray~~ St. Baker: ~~Woodrow~~ Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol. VIII, p 43.

der zu irgend einer Sache (in seiner Eigenschaft) als Staat nicht verpflichtet sein wollte, brauchte (meist) nichts zu tun, als in seiner Eigenschaft als Mitglied dagegen zu stimmen. Dann wuerde nichts beschlossen, und er zu nichts verpflichtet sein.

Mit einem Wort: um (das Gute zu unterlassen, ~~nichts gegen den Boesen zu tun~~), wuerden die Guten nach diesem Entwurf zufolge ~~sich~~ meist nicht einmal eines technischen Bruchs des Gentlemen-Covenants ~~schuldig machen muessen~~ (wohig sein.) Einer Verletzung des spirits: ja. Einer Verletzung des Buchstabens: nein. ~~In den Krieg zu gehen, wuerde keinen~~ (Staat verpflichtet sein, weil darueber von vornherein niemals ein bindender Beschluss sollte gefasst werden koennen. Short of war ~~konnte~~ wuerde Verpflichtungen ausgewichen werden (konnen), weil in den meisten Faellen schon eine einzige Stimme einen bindenden Beschluss verhindern wuerde. Der Entwurf enthielt nicht nur keinerlei Sicherung gegen den robusten Bruch der Geloebnisse. Er machte es sogar fast ~~immer moeglich, sie juristisch einwandfrei zu brechen~~. Es ist fraglich, ob in der ganzen, so zweck- und ruhmlosen Laufbahn des Voelkerbundes jemals der Buchstabe verletzt worden ist!

Das war der Hurst-Miller-Draft. Er verkoerperte ~~den entschlossenen Verzicht~~ auf jeden Versuch, ~~das eigentliche~~ Dilemma zu loesen: wenn die Guten den Boesen zwingen sollen, was zwingt die Guten? Weder sollten die Staaten unter irgendwelchen effectiven Zwang gestellt werden, ihre Machtmittel im Bedarfsfall dem Bund zu borgen. Noch sollte der Bund effektive eigene ~~Machtmittel erhalten. Alles~~

den entschlossenen Versuch,zwei unvereinbare Dinge zugleich zu tun:die Staaten einem hoeheren Willen zu unterwerfen,und ihnen doch den eigenen Willen nicht zu beschraenken.

Niemand sollte behaupten koennen,dass irgend eine "Souveraenitaet" beeintraechtigt sei. Weder sollten die Staaten ihre individuelle Entschlussfreiheit und Macht de facto oder de jure an den Bund abtreten.Noch sollte der Bund de facto oder de jure eigene Machtmittel und unabhaenigege Entschluss-freiheit erhalten.

Alles sollte moralisch absoluter Zang sein.Aber alles sollte materiell und juristisch ~~absolut~~ Freiwilligkeit sein: Bekenntnisse zu einem Altruismus durch dick und duenn,++ zum Geist einer Kooperation auf Leben und Tod,-- aber mit keinerlei realistischen Sicherheiten fuer die Innehaltung.

Mr.Lansing, Wilsons ungluecklicher Secretary of State,der nie richtig erfuhr,was eigentlich vorging -- und dessen super-idealistische Sensitivitaet allmaehlich dahin gelangt war,sowohl einen starken wie einen schwachen Voelker-bund fuer unmoeglich zu halten -- hatte,als der Waffenstillstand sich dem Abschluss naeherte,die folgenden Gedanken einem Memorandum anvertraut:"From the littele I know

~~der Dilemma, das~~ sowohl ~~bietet der Souveränität~~ des Staates (nicht gefährlich, sondern, und ~~von den Erfordernissen~~ ~~einer~~ unerlässlich bei Völkern, -- ~~einer~~ durch eine ~~Regierung~~ Entscheidung gegenüber der Freiheit zu setzen. ~~die Union~~ (die Staaten wollten) ~~[redacted]~~ einen festen (ihre Kraft in Vereinigung) dem Bund zu geben. Doch ~~sollte~~ Der Bund ~~sollte~~ seine effektive eigene Macht erhalten. Alles ~~sollte~~, sowohl ~~das~~ gesetzliche wie ~~auf~~ reine (durch die zwingende Kraft) Freiwilligkeit (dem, - Gelöbnisse zum Altruismus) Gelöbnisse für Kooperation bis zu Tod und Leichen, - aber nur über Gelöbnisse, Bund selbst ~~die~~ (gesetzliche nicht straff) (auf moralische, ~~nicht~~ juristische. Mr. Lansing, der bedeutende Secretary of State, der da unvollkommen erfaßt, was eigentlich vorging, ~~hatte~~ ~~die~~ hatte ~~die~~ E im October ein ~~einen~~ Memorandum erhalten. ~~From the title I have~~

of the Presidents' plan I am sure that it is impracticable. Here is in it too much altruistic coöperation... It may be noble thinking, but it is not true thinking...

~~Dem~~ (Es) ~~dieser~~ (trouble) Plan ist getreut des Herr-Wilsons ~~Idealismus~~ ~~Präsident Wilson~~ ~~hatte~~ ~~ist~~ am 3. Februar in die erste Lesung ~~der Konvention~~ eingetreten (I can see lots of trouble ahead unless impractical enthusiasts and fanatics are suppressed. This is a time when sober thought, caution and common sense should control" x

Bald wird auch ihm, wie Clemenceau, und wie (zum Teil) sogar Haase, (tun) das

x Rob. Lansing: The Peace Negotiations, p. 43

Stigma der wickedness aufgedrueckt werden.

Praesident Wilson hatte der V Commission den von ihm gebilligten draft ausgehaendigt.Er hatte beantragt,dass er zur Basis der Arbeit gemacht werde.

Zum Wort hatte sich gemeldet Clemenceaus Vertreter in der Commission,sein Voelkerbunds-Specialist Bourgeois. Er hatte aus seiner ~~Tasche~~ Mappe ein eigenes Projekt genommen und vertreilt.Und er hatte ersucht,dass man jetzt zunaechst einmal vierundzwanzig Stunden lang nichts entscheide.Er kenne nicht Praesident Wilsons Projekt,Praesident Wilson kenne nicht sein Projekt,die uebrigen Mitglieder kennten beide nicht,-- man moege sich zunaechst einmal Zeit zum Lesen nehmen.

Der chairman hatte mit einer gewissen Irritation reagiert.Mit ~~einem~~

~~Skizze der nächsten Aufgaben~~

Jetzt ~~hatte~~ hatte Wilson Präsident der Commission den von ihm gebilligten Kraft ausgehändigt. ~~Er~~ Er hatte beantragt, dass er zur Basis der Arbeit gemacht werde. Er hatte den Antrag festgehalten, auch nachdem Clemenceaus Vertreter in der Commission, sein Völkerbunds-Spezialist Bourgeois, ein anderes Projekt auf den Tisch gelegt hatte. So wenig wie Bourgeois das Hurst-Miller-Projekt, hatte Wilson das ~~Bourgeois-Projekt~~ in diesem Augenblick ~~schon gekannt gehabt, das mit einer genauen Imitation~~ einen „bad diplomatic beginning", wie es später genannt wurde, – hatte er verlangt, dass man sich jetzt nicht unterbreche, und dass die Commission sogleich, anhand des Hurst-Miller-Kraftes zu prozedieren. Zum ersten Mal war die Abstimmungs-Maschine von ihm in Bewegung gesetzt worden, und damit das ~~Instrument~~ ~~der „Steamroller", wie es später genannt worden ist~~ – Gerüstes der englisch-amerikanischen Collaboration hatte, die sich ~~in den folgenden Tagen immer wieder~~ als ein „Steamroller" x erwiesen. Clemenceau- Das Bourgeois-Projekt war ~~trotz seiner~~ zu den Akten gelegt.

x George Bernard Noble: Policies and Opinions at Paris, p. 113

M. Bourgeois hatte natuerlich nicht darauf verzichtet, die Ideen seiner Regierung trotzdem zu vertreten. Er hatte es getan, indem er waehrend der zehntaegigen Beratung fast zu jedem einzelnen Artikel des Hurst-Miller-Draftes Abaenderungs-Antraege gestellt hatte,- Antraege aus dem Koecher seines eigenen Projektes. Er war ein monotoner, professoraler Redner, und seine unaufhoerlichen Wiederholungen hatten umsomehr gelangweilt, als

diese Conferenz im Zeichen eines diplomatischen Kongresses stand: die Häupter der Welt hatten keine gemeinsame Sprache! Clemenceau der der einzige unter den "Großen Vieren" "big four" und unter sehr vielen der Kleineren, der (es überwiegend und international war, die zwei Sprachen der Conferenz zu) die zwei Hauptsprachen beherrschte, - er hatte fünf Jahre in den U.S.A. gelebt, und seine Frau hatte in Springfield, Massachusetts, gelebt. Für die anderen musste alles, was gerade verhandelt wurde, Satz für Satz von Dolmetschern übersetzt werden, und das war ein quälende Prozedur.

Da es in jedem Augenblick klar war, dass Mr Bourgeois ja doch ueberstimmt werden werde, wer seine Existenz mehr und mehr als Zumutung empfinden worden. Zum Entgelt war er von Tag zu Tag schlechter behandelt worden. Am 11. Februar hatte Lord Robert Cecil, sich von seiner Ungeduld so weit hinreissen lassen, ein feuriger Voelkerbunds-Enthusiast, ploetzlich "very frankly" zu erklaeren, M. Bourgeois moege

~~seine Ironischen Worte~~ ~~zuletzt eine Behandlung zugezogen, als sei er eine Art Bettler~~

~~Am~~ 11.Februar ~~hatte~~ der englische ~~Delegierte~~ Lord Robert Cecil, ~~einer~~ feurigen internationalen Voelkerbunds-Enthusiast~~en~~ ~~alle Schuld mit diesen ernsten Worten nach einem plötzlichen Umschwung~~ "speaking very frankly" ~~plötzlich~~ erklaert, M. Bourgeois moege doch nicht vergessen, dass der ganze Voelkerbund "practically a present to France"sei. Wenn ~~Frankreich~~ nicht ~~damit~~ zufrieden sei, "because more was not offered", dann wolle er "very frankly", ~~warn~~, ~~dass~~ die Alternative einfach "an alliance between Great Britain and the United States. He asked them to consider this before they made any final conclusion."* Es hatte ~~die Franzosen~~ nicht davon uebergeugt, dass der Voelkerbund, wie er hier geboren werden sollte, ~~irgend~~ eine Kraft ~~und irgend eine~~ ~~Zukunft~~ haben ~~(Aber dass er sich immer~~ zu fuegen haben ~~wuerde, wusste Clemenceau schon vorher.~~

*Miller: Drafting of the Covenant, Vol.I p 217

~~Vorschlaege~~ ~~des~~ in den sogenannten Bourgeois-Projekten ~~sp~~ gestanden? ~~Was~~ war

~~Vorschlaege,die~~ in den zehn Commissions-Tagen in allen

~~moeglichen~~ denkbaren Zusammenhaengen und Verkleidungen immer wieder

von ~~den Franzosen wiederholt~~ Clemenceaus Lauten vorgebracht worden ?

Niemand hatte überrascht sein können, dass es das (hatte. Tatsächlich war der Clemenceau-Vorstoß von dem
~~gesetzliche~~ Prinzip ~~verletzt~~ ~~das~~ Prinzip, das die Moral
der Regierenden und Völker, wie hoch man sie auch (ausgegangen) ~~stehen~~
~~schamhaften~~ in ihren halten möge, keine Garantie dafür biete, dass das Böse von uns
ab immer bekämpft und das Gute nie überlassen (würde. werden) Selbstverständlich
war ~~die~~ sein Fundament die Überzeugung gewesen, dass der
Völkerbund entweder ~~nicht~~ ein Nicht sein würde, oder dass er
ein Gebilde mit Macht sein würde. Er gebierte nicht und
lehrte kein böses Gewissen, in Bezug des menschlichen Zusammen-
lebens an die Unentbehrlichkeit von Macht zu glauben. Es ist die
Existenz ~~einer~~ der Polizei, der Gerichte, der Gefängnisse und Gefängnis-
wärter, die die Reign of Law unter den Völkern erhält; die
Existenz einer ~~Macht über allen~~ (Bürgern) Es war die Etablierung einer
Königs-Gewalt, die (vor Zeiten) Ausstelle der (tausend) Kriege zwischen Grafen, Prinzen,
Städten und Provinzen die Reign of Law (innerhalb) ~~in~~ der Nationalstaaten
begründete, ~~die Etablierung einer Macht über allen~~ den kleineren
Souveränitäten Es wird nicht möglich sein, irgend etwas ~~politisches~~

~~"Ähnliches war auch in internationalen~~

~~Fragen die Regel. Es war im Gegensatz zu~~ ~~Fortschritten~~ zu erreichen, wenn nicht auch hier eine Übergewalt geschaffen wird. ~~Eine Macht, die über diesen Gewalten stünde.~~

Die Macht, wenn sie einmal da ist, kann so unsichtbar wie nur denkbar gemacht werden. Sie kann dem gelindesten Grad von Freiwilligkeit und Toleranz und Konstitutionalität und Unabhängigkeit Spielraum gewähren. ~~Nur muss~~ Die Macht ~~muss~~ da sein. ~~Näher liegt es, die Freiheit~~ ~~individuellen der~~ ~~Völker~~ ~~unter welchen Selbstbestimmungsrechte~~, in ~~welcher Weise~~ ~~die Gewalt der Staaten~~ ~~durch so~~ ~~mannigfachen Formen man sich~~ ~~äußert~~ ~~entfalten und die Tafeln des Gesetzes ordnen will: die Macht muss da sein.~~ Die Visionäre und Träumer (~~träumen Himmel und Hölle, ~~hielten es für ebenso leicht~~~~ ~~äußerten~~ ~~gegen seine~~ ~~Gegner~~ ~~ihn entgegen~~ ~~verrückt reaktionäre Überzeugung, das~~ sie (~~zynischem Skeptizismus~~ Keynes es ~~sagt~~ sind, ~~sein Glaube sei, die~~ "the politics of power are inevitable."x Sie werden nicht daran ändern, dass the politics of power are inevitable. Die Frage ist nicht: power oder nicht? ~~power~~ Die Frage ist: power in wessen Hand und zu welchem Zweck! ~~Es ist~~ ~~klar, dass einer~~ ~~grossen Macht~~ ~~Sanktion von innen vorgehalten, als~~ ~~Signatur, als notwendig ist, um die Reign of Law auf der~~ ~~ganzen Erdball zu erzwingen.~~

x J. M. Keynes: The Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 33.

Und so hatte sein Projekt ausgesehen.O,es war mitnichten perfekt und konsequent gewesen . Dass die Staaten nicht in einen einzigen Staat mit einer einzigen Regierung zusammengeschmolzen werden sollten, war ein Axiom.Wenn dies das Axiom war, gab es keine perfekte Loesung fuer das Problem, wie die Mitglieder vom Bund sollten gezwugen werden koennen .

Aber gebt diesem Bund wenigstens eine eigene Macht. Wenn die Macht der Staaten nicht abgeschafft werden soll,so gebt wenigstens daneben auch dem Voelkerbund eine Macht.Wenn sie vorhanden ist, stark und parat,wird im Notfall viel bereitwilliger fuer ein wirklich starkes Handeln gestimmt werden.Die Neigung,das Gute zu dann unterlassen, wird bedeutend schwaecher sein . Der Entschluss, jedem Staat dem Boesen in die Armee zu fallen,wird bedeutend leichter fallen, wenn die ultima ratio lauten wird:"Die Voelkerbunds-Armee soll marschieren!",und wenn sie nicht lauten muss : "Unsre Armee soll marschieren."

Der entscheidende Teil des Bourgeois-Entwurfs hatte

vorgesehen,dass der Voelkerbund ~~[illegible]~~ als eigene

Exekutiv-Macht eine eigene Armee, besitzen werde, verteilt ueber

alle Laender.

~~Er hatte vorgesehen,~~ dass ~~dieser~~ der Voelkerbund als wesentli-

ches Organ einen eigenen Generalstab besitzen solle.

Und ~~er hatte vorgesehen~~ dass diesem Voelkerbunds-General-

stab ausserordentliche Kompetenzen ~~eingeraeumt~~ verliehen wuerden.

Nicht nur wuerde im Wesentlichen er ueber die Groesse,Ausbildung

Bewaffnung und Rekrutierung der eigentlichen ~~Armee der~~ Voelker-

bunds-Armee bestimmen. ~~Eine fast gleiche analoge Kompetenz sollte er~~

Sogar ueber die daneben noch fortbestehenden nationalen

Armeen ~~haben~~ sollte er die Supervision haben, - und noch mehr als das!

In der Tat,~~ein~~ der Voelkerbundsrat "shall be

entitled,at any time,to require that the member States

introduce any alteration into their national system of recrui-

ting which the Staff may report to be necessary."*

*Dav. Hunter Miller:The Drafting of the Covenant,Vol .II,242

Niemand ~~konnte~~ Kenner, verkennen, dass das geradezu ermoeglichen wuerde, von England oder den Usa zu verlangen, ~~dddd/ddd~~ in irgendwelchem Grad die Conscription beizubehalten,-- damit auch sie immer eine stehende Armee bereit ~~haetten~~, ~~plus der Reserve der~~ ausgebildeten Jahrgaenge und Offiziere, und plus den entsprechend gefuellten Arsenalen. ~~Unzweifelhaft~~ Sichtbar war die ~~gesicherte~~ ~~Aufrechterhaltung einer starken~~ englischen und amerikanischen Militaermacht ein Hauptziel aller franzoesischen Wuensche.

Fuer Clemenceau lief alles ~~mit absoluter Konsequenz~~ unerbittlich immer wieder auf England und Amerika heraus. Wie immer man benenne, ~~bennnte~~, was jetzt geschehen sollte, und wie immer man es organisiere, -- ob man es als Voelkerbund, oder Allianz, oder ueberhaupt nicht organisiere,--der Kern war England und Amerika. ~~England und Amerika.~~ Krieg zu verhindern, ist unter allem Umstaenden eine Sache der Macht. Einen deutschen Krieg zu verhindern, ist unter allen Umstaenden Sache einer Macht, die England und Amerika inkludieren muss. Anders ~~ist~~ geht es nicht. ~~sicher, darauf kommt es an.~~ Durch welche Brille man es betrachte, durch die der individuellen französischen ~~Privat~~ Sicherheit,

oder durch die des ~~Welt~~Friedens der Welt schlechthin, oder durch die das im Voelkerbund organisierten ~~Welt~~Friedens; es war in der Sache immer dasselbe. ~~Alles hing ab von dem~~ Immer kam alles auf das rascheren, verlaesslichen Zusammenwirken einer englischen und amerikanischen Armee mit der franzoesischen. Das war die Lehre dieses letzten Krieges. Waehrend die Zeloten sich damit zu vergnuegen begannen, Clemenceau's Wunsch nach militaerischen Welt-Herrschaft Frankreichs zu entdecken, konzentrierten sich seine Sehnsucht auf die militaerische Staerke ~~darauf~~ Englands und Amerikas. ~~militaerisch stark. Beschuldigt hybrider franzoesischer Macht-Politik, verfolgte er in Wahrheit die Politik der gemeinsamen potenziellen Schwaeche gegenueber Deutschland.~~ Der Voelkerbund, was sonst konnte er im Kerne sein, als die vereinigte Macht der drei grossen Demokratieen? ~~Und jedenfalls, was sonst konnte er im Kerne sein als Macht?~~ Sie nennen das ein Direktorat der Grossmaechte? Sie erklaeren, es sei unbillig? Lassen sie doch die Fremden und Feindseligen die Welt sind anderen ein Direktorat der Grossmaechte sein, aber sei sind auch die Mehrheit sein. Das war Clemenceau. Welche Fremden! Welche Feindseligen!

Aber Perspektiven wie stehende Armee oder Conscription wollte selbst in diesem Jahr 1919, in dem ~~sie~~ beiden Laendern sie hatten ~~bestanden — noch bestanden~~ nur einen negativen appeal fuer die englische und amerikanische Mentalitaet. Und

~~noch negativ~~ war fuer die perfektionistische Mentalitaet die Vorstellung, dass das Instrument des Friedens ~~der Voelker-~~ ~~bund~~, im Kern ein militaerisches ~~Instrument~~ sein solle. Praesident Wilson war absolut unwillens, etwas derartiges auch nur ernsthaft zu diskutieren. Er hatte praktische Gruende dafuer angeführt. Vor Monaten hatte er ~~gegenüber~~ selbst den bescheidenen Gedanken, dass der Voelkerbund seine Mitglieder ~~eine~~ bindende Verpflichtungen enthalten koenne, ihm im Ernstfall Armeen zur Verfuegung zu stellen, irrealisabel genannt: "The United States would never ratify any treaty which put the force of the USA at the disposal of such group or body"* . Das ~~praktische Argument~~ galt verstaerkt und ~~erweitert~~ auf die noch viel weitergehende Idee, dem Voelkerbund schon in normalen Zeiten Kontingente ~~zu~~ ueberlassen und ein militaerische Controlle einzurauemen. "We must distinguish" hatte er ~~jetzt~~ in der Commission gesagt, "between what is pos-

* ay St. Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol VIII, p 43

sible and what is not.No nation will consent to control....

no nation would accept..* Aber abgesehen von den praktischen

Hindernissen hatte er ~~Frage waere~~ es auch gar nicht erwuenscht den Voelkerbund

auf diese Basis zu stellen. ~~Die einzige Methode~~ lies in our

having ~~confidence~~ confidence in the good faith of the nations

who belong to the League"**. Was heute noch nicht ist, ~~und~~

~~was sich in Zukunft noch als notwendig erweisen sollte, kann~~

im ewigen Aufstieg von Fortschritt zu Fortschritt ~~ausserdem na~~

spaeter hinzugefuegt werden."The Constitution of the League

must grow and not be made.."***

So war das Clemenceau-~~Projekt oder~~ Bourgeois*

Projekt ~~nachdem es schon nicht die Ehre erfahren hatte, als~~

~~ganzes zur Diskussion gestellt zu werden.,auch in jedem~~

~~einzeln vorgebrachten Teil Element unter dem Steamroller~~

~~geraten.~~ Man kann nicht umhin,die Tatsache festzustellen,dass

~~die franzoesische Opposition~~ die einzige gewesen war,der sich

*D.H.Miller:Drafting the Covenant,Vol.II, p 293

** Ibid p.295

***Ray St.Baker:Woodrow Wilson,Life & Letters,Vol VIII,p 43

Wilson
(bei der ganzen ~~Beratung~~ Gründung des Voelk rbunds ~~Projektes~~

~~Wilson~~ ueberhaupt ~~entgegengestellt~~ Skeptikern hatte. Die duestersten

Prognosen ~~ueber die Sabotage, die von den wicked Regierungen~~

~~der Alliierten zu gewaertigen sei~~ waren von den perfektionisti-

schen Metereologen gestellt worden. Lord Robert Cecil hatte

dem Praesidenten in einem Brief die ~~schrecklichste~~ (Obstruk-

tion vorausgesagt.* ~~Ein anderer war zu ihm gekommen und hatte~~

ihm ~~gesagt, dass~~ informiert, wie Lloyd Gorge ueber den Voelkerbund lache und wie

~~dass~~ Clemenceau "sneered at it." "Yes", hatte Wilson erwidert geantwortet,

"I know that Europe is still governed by the same reactionary

forces which controlled this country until a few years ago.

But I am satisfied that if necessary I can reach the peoples

of Europe over the heads of their Rulers."** Und nun war es

zur Beratung gekommen,-- und nichts von der ganzen Feindseligkeit und Sabotage ~~Teufelei~~

hatte sich ~~auf weiter Flur~~ gezeigt. Alles war ohne ~~irgend~~ die geringste

* Ray St.Baker: Woodrow Wilson, Life & Letters, Vol VIII, 399
** Ibid. 235

~~welche~~ Schwierigkeit ~~ohne Obstruktion und Filibuster~~ genau so acceptiert worden, wie er ~~selbst~~ es vorgeschlagen hatte. ~~Es hatte~~ Nur einen einzigen ~~Opposition~~ Widerspruch hätte es gegeben,- und der hatte ~~nicht darauf ausgegangen~~ den Bund nicht unwirksamer, sondern wirksamer zu machen (wollen. ~~als sie nach Wilsons eigenem Plan, sein sollte.~~

Darueber gab es keinen Zweifel. Ein junger Zeitungsmann namens William C.Bullit, der eine gewisse Rolle in Paris gespielt hatte und der ~~bei weitem nicht~~ alles eher als im Verdacht stand, mit den reactionary forces zu sympathisieren, wird im September 1919 ein Verhoer vor der Senats-Kommission on Foreign Relations haben.Er wird gefragt werden, (--denn noch gab es keine Dokumente und Details--) wie denn die anderen Nationen sich zu dem League-Projekt verhalten haetten.Er wird antworten:"The French were not only anxious for it,but I believe were anxious greatly to strengthen it.They desired immediately a League Army to be established..."* Welch merkwürdige Welt! ~~Das war die einzige Schwierigkeit, die sich dem Praesidenten entgegengestellt hatte, und gegen sie hatte er sein eigenes Projekt erfolgreich ver-~~ ~~alles ganz anders lief als vorgesehen worden war. Nur durch die Einsicht seine persönliche Anwesenheit in Paris und den Einsatz seiner ganzen Autorität~~

*Hearing of Sept.12,1919

tödlich. Es war in bewegter Stimmung gewesen, als er sein

Projekt, nachdem es die Kommission passiert hatte, am 14.

Februar dem Plenum der Friedenskonferenz zur Billigung

unterbreiten koennen. "A definite guarantee

of peace" hatte er es in seiner Ansprache genannt. "It is a

definite guarantee by word against aggression." So ueber-

zeugt war der Präsident gewesen, dass damit der entscheidende Teil der

neuen Welt-Ordnung unter Dach und Fach sei, dass er an diesem

selben Tag Paris verlassen und sich fuer einen kurzen Auf-

enthalt in der Heimat nach Amerika eingeschifft hatte. Er wird

nach genau einem Monat zurueckkommen.

Clemenceau, der auf

seinem illustren Sitz als Praesident der Konferenz, beim

Hoeren der Worte "a definite guarantee--by word

nicht unterdruecken koennen, sich mit den beiden Haenden

in den beruehmten grauen Zwirnhandschuhen einen Moment lang

beide Augen zuzudrücken.

nothing less than the establishment of a system of interna-

tional law", war different. "Alas, could we be satisfied

with vain discussions of this law when we were faced with the

unsolvable problem of making it a living thing without inves-

ting it with any executive power!... A parliament of

super-parlamentarians without any instrument of authority,

that is the talisman we received."*

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*Clemenceau: Grandeur and Misery of Victory, p. 199

Abdr das allein brauchte noch kein Unglueck zu sein. ~~Dass der Voelkerbubd unmoeglich die Leistungen wuerde erfuellen koennen,die die Enthusiasten jetzt von ihm erwarteten,wuerde die Welt noch nicht in Katastrophen stuerzen muessen.~~ Clemenceau war bereit gewesen, das Experiment ~~selbst~~ mit dieser ~~bizarren~~ Art von Voelkerbund ~~geduldig~~ ironisch, aber geduldig und sogar sympathisch seinen Lauf ~~nehmen~~ zu lassen. ~~vorausgesetzt,dass die anderen bereit waren,ihn ebenfalls bescheidentlich nur als Experiment aufzufassen.~~

Es ist legitim,Versuch e anzustellen. ~~Es ist keine Tragoedie,wenn ein Versuch gemacht wird, der missgluecken wird.~~ Wenn einer misslückt, hat eine ~~Es bedeutet,dass eine~~ Verbesserung ~~ausbleibt;es bedeutet nicht,dass~~ eine Verschlechterung ~~eintritt~~ sich nicht verwirklicht; braucht nicht eingetreten zu sein. Das Wesentliche war, ~~kategorisch auf die Rolle eines~~ den Versuch bescheidentlich nur als ~~verweisen~~ aufzufassen. Das absolut Wesentliche war,im Uebrigen alles so zu setteln, dass es fuer sich allein Bestand haben koenne, ob der Versuch gelinge oder nicht.

Die Dinge,die mit Deutschland zu ordnen waren, mussten so geordnet werden, als gaebe es keinen Voelkerbund. Sicherheiten waren zu schaffen, die kraftvoll intakt bleiben wuerden, auch wenn der Voelkerbund ~~sich als~~ kraftlos ~~erweisen~~ zusammenbrechen sollte. Man hatte den ~~[illegible]~~ Ertrag -- den einmal und nie wieder erlangbaren Ertrag -- ~~aus~~ dem zerstoerendsten aller Kriege einzubringen. ~~Man hatte die Unmoeglichkeit zu etablieren -- die~~ Einmal und nie wieder konnte dafür gesorgt werden, dass eine ~~realisierbare Unmoeglichkeit -- dass es~~ in menschlich absehbarer Zeit zu einer noch zerstoerenderen Wiederholung ~~kommen koenne~~ ausgeschlossen sei. Davon ~~durfte~~ würde nichts unterlassen und nichts abgezogen werden, weil ein ~~unsicherer~~ ungewisser Versuch mit etwas vernünftlich noch Besserem ~~namens Voelkerbund~~ unternommen werden sollte. Davon durfte nichts unterlassen und abgezogen werden, weil in eine Wiege ein fragwuerdiges Baby gelegt werde, ~~und weil~~ Einige ~~erklaerten: Von nun ab wird~~ der Riese ~~da schlummern~~ soll, werde, von dem behauptet: nun ab wird sind wir ~~alle~~ nun ab schlimmen.

Der Voelkerbund sollte gesetzt werden ueber eine Welt, die das Produkt von tausend Friedens-Settlements hoechst altmodeischen Charakters war. Niemand dachte daran, die in fuenf Kontinenten ~~tausend~~ Maschen der tausend aelteren settlements wieder aufzutrennen. Die Enthusiasten zweifelte n keine Sekunde, dass der Voelkerbund auch in einer Welt, die das Produkt all dieser suendigen aelteren settlements war, vollen Segen stiften werde. Warum dann nicht auch in einer Welt, zu der noch ein einziges weiteres altmodisches settlement hinzugekommen sein wuerde? Warum sollten die Segnungen des Voelkerbunds nur reifen koennen, wenn er in diesem einen Fall nicht nach, sondern statt einem normalen Freiden errichtet werden wuerde? Dei Legitimitaet des Versuhhs wuerde aufhoeren, sobald man, waehrend er mit der ~~anderen~~ Uren Hand begonnen wurde, mit der andren so handeln wuerde, als sei er schon gelungen. Die

Legitimitaet wuerde aufhoeren, sobald man erklaerte: Jetzt,da
in Gestalt des Volkerbunds
wir die definitive allgemeine ~~der~~ Sicherheit ~~des Voelkerbunds~~ haben werden,
~~haben,konnen wir einen Frieden ohne~~ sind selbstaendige, ~~ausreichende~~ spezielle
Sicherheiten vor Deutschland ~~machen~~ "uebertrieben".

Der Greis,den sie ~~wegen seines schneidenden~~
~~Witzes der Zuflucht des Ueberlegenen~~ frivol zu nennen
pflegten, konnte auf der ganzen Konferenz nur eine Frivolitaet
,eine unbewusste, entdecken : diese frenetische Bereitschaft,
die ~~unbewiesenste Fragwuerdigkeit~~ luftigste Ungewissheit als Ersatz fuer die frivolste
~~erwiesenste Notwendigkeit~~ auszuleben.

Unwiderruflichkeit

auszugeben.Welch ungeheuerliches Gamble-Spiel! Der Ertrag

den Haaren

von vier hoellischen Jahren lag vor der Menschheit,-- und

dieser ganze Ertrag des Grauens und der Sehmerzen sollte

(in einem einzigen Wurf noch ein weiteres Mal

jetzt ~~noch einmal~~) auf dem Roulette-Tisch des Schicksals

riskiert werden. Er sollte auf ein einziges,unbekanntes

Nummer Nummer namens

Feld des Roulettetischs gesetzt werden, die Voelkerbund.

den Ertrag

So werden wir ihn vervielfachen!, sagten die Gambler.Und

wenn die Nummer nicht herauskommt ? Dann werdet Ihr ihn

verlieren,spurlos verlieren! Niemals war etwas derartiges

erhoert worden! Die Erinnerung tauchte auf an die alte

Rechtes

roemische Weisheit,dass die Absolutheit des ~~Rechtes~~ zur

Absolutheit der Unterdrueckung werden kann. "Summum ius,

summa iniuria." Das Maximum des Idealismus kann zum Maximum

der Frivolitaet werden.

Das zu verhindern, ~~hatte~~ war Clemnceau alles aufzubieten entschlossen. Wenn Sie sollten, wenn ihr Herz schon danach stand, sich an ihrem vertraeumten Voelkerbund erbauen. Aber wenigstens sollte nicht, mit Berufung auf die Kraft dieses Schattens, ~~Voelker-~~ ~~bundes,~~ auch noch ein vertraeumter Frieden geschlossen werden.

Er ~~hatte~~ konnte ~~es gehabt~~ nach Wilsons Abreise ~~klar genug~~ genug mit jedem neuen Tag existentiell geworden. Der Völkerbund war nichts als ein Feigenblatt. Selbst seine bescheidenen Versuche, ihn stärker und für gemacht. ~~Er hatte~~ Er hatte ihm erläutert, welche Alternative verständlicher zu konstruieren, waren gescheitert. Die Alternative war: trotz Völkerbund sich ~~aus~~ aus der Tatsache, ~~ergebe~~, dass alle seine Versuche fehlgeschlagen ~~waren~~ waren, den Völkerbund (wenigstens als halbwegs ~~ein~~ wenigstens ~~ein~~ ~~listisches~~ Instrument ~~zu~~ zukuenftigen Sicherheit ~~zu~~ konstruieren zu lassen, ~~Er~~ wollen ~~hatte~~ er zu Cecil, ~~gesagt~~, die normalen Alternative, ~~sei~~ jetzt "guarantees of another nature."

"Guarantees on the frontier". ~~muesse er jetzt fordern.~~ Der Kampf um die Bedingungen fuer Deutschland hatte (begonnen. Der Kampf hatte) ~~der~~ begonnen um die ~~Zerstoerung~~ Zerstörung der deutschen Militärkraft, ~~Kampf um die Bedingungen, die nach Clemenceaus standhügen~~ nicht für einige Jahre, sondern für lange, lange; nicht Formeln ~~Sicherheit der~~ ~~Beteuerungen fuer die ganze Welt unerlaesslich sein, waehrend~~ und Schatten-Institutionen, sondern effektiv. ~~im besten Fall~~ ~~die anderen nicht davon abzubringen waren, sie als Forderungen~~ ~~fuer die Sicherheit Frankreichs zu charakterisieren, und im~~ ~~schlechteren Fall als Forderungen des Clemenceauschen~~ Revanche

~~** war.~~

~~geistes, und seines unmenschlichen Hasses und seines finsteren Chauvinismus.~~

Waehrend das schon im Gange gewesen war, war ploetzlich noch einmal der Voelkerbund aufgetaucht. Praesident Wilson war am 14. Maerz aus Amerika zurueckgekehrt, ~~und~~ Er hatte eröffnet, ~~mitgeteilt~~, dass er noch zwei kleine Aenderungen im beschlossenen Statut verlangen muesse. Das hatte nach der Geschaeftsordnung bedeutet, dass ~~alles~~ das Ganze wieder von neuem durchgesehen beraten war. Die Commission hatte wieder ~~von neuem~~ beim Artikel I begonnen, -- und war übereinkommen worden, M. Bourgeois hatte wieder seine Antraege gestellt -- und Wilson hatte seine nachtraeglichen Wuensche geaeussert.

Dass die Freiwilligkeit der ganzen Sache auch äusserlich noch etwas Feierlichkeit verleihe, müsse jeder Staat das Recht haben, aus dem Bund wieder auszutreten. Jeder müsse auch dazu berechtigt sein. ~~Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of ... regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine.~~"

Esdem hatte verlangt, ~~dass~~ jeder Staat ~~auch~~ berechtigt sein, ~~aus dem Bund~~ wieder zu austreten. ~~Und~~ Demnach, sagte M. Bourgeois, wird die Substanzlosigkeit des Bundes um einen weiteren Grad substanzloser werden. Wenn etwas nicht passt, der wird austreten, und demnach wird man einen Bund ohne Mitglieder haben. Der Präsident hatte das keineswegs gelten lassen. Die ~~Er hatte erklaert, dass beides ja sichtlich nur~~ Clause habe sichtlich nur ornamentale Bedeutung habe, und dass es ihm nur helfen sollte, sie solle.

xx ... Ibid.

den Voelkerbund mit groesserer Sicherheit im Senat der Vereinig-

ten Staaten durchzubringen. (Sobald der Austritt Wunsch Tatsächlich ausgesteht, ~~Tatsächlich~~ ~~Verbindung~~ werde ganz offenkundig ein Staat der Welt so gegen können)

~~Was den Austritt anbelange, hatte er gesagt, das~~

~~nun ja ganz~~ ~~sei offenkundig rein akademisch~~ (und wollen. Das Protokoll hatte ver-

zeichnet :"President Wilson said that he did not entertain the

smallest fear that any State would take advantage of the

proposed clause. Any State which did so would become an

outlaw...* Die Clausel war angenommen worden. (Zum gleichen hatte der Präsident bemerkt, dass folgender Zusatz aufgenommen werde: „Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of... regional understandings like the Monroe-Doctrin". Die französische Demonstration lasse sich auf Pfeifer. Was soll das heissen? In der Monroe-Doctrin steckt ~~Was die Monroe-Reservation anbelangte, war die~~ ~~Tragweite noch schwerer abzuschaetzen. Eine exakte Definition~~ ~~der Doctrin existiert nicht. In dem Text von 1823 ist der~~ gar nichts drin.) Erstens das

~~Nachdruck~~ auf die Proklamation gelegt, dass sich nicht mehr in Angelegenheit

europaeischen Staaten ~~kuenftighin keine Einmischung auf dem~~

~~Territorium~~ der beiden Amerikas einmischen dürfte. Zweitens ~~gestattet sein solle. Aber es~~

~~steht auch darin~~ dass die Vereinigten Staaten ~~ihrerseits~~

*Dav. Hunter Miller: The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol. II, p 359

** " Ibid.

nicht eingreifen sollten "in the Wars" ~~of the~~ European

powers ~~" oder "in matters relating to themselves"~~. Was also

~~hiess~~ wollte die Clausel besagen? Dass ~~die~~ der Bund nicht

~~hiess die Monroe-Reservation ? Besagte sie, dass die USA~~

der Bund kein Recht haben würde, sich mit Fragen ~~Amerikas zu~~

~~befassen~~? Dass die USA nicht die Pflicht haben würden, in Fragen in Europa

~~nicht verpflichtet sein wuerden, in irgendeine europaeische~~

helfen würden? Präsident Wilson hatte erklärt, die Clausel besage überhaupt

nichts. Sie habe keinen Inhalt. Auch sie sollte nur dem Senat die Sache

~~Angelegenheit des Bundes mitzumachen, und der Bund and orseits~~

schmackhafter machen. Aber wie könnte etwas, was keinen Inhalt und keinen

Sinn hat, den Senat so kapitvieren? Und wenn Präsident Wilson

~~nicht berechtigt, sich mit irgend einer amerikanischen Angele-~~

keinen Sinn in der Clausel findet, welchen Sinn würde wahrscheinlich einer

~~genheit zu befassen? Oder besagte sie, wie Wilson es deutete,~~

~~ueberhaupt nichts~~?

Clemenceaus Interesse an der ~~fruchtlosen~~ legalistischen

Diskussion ~~ueber eine Auslegung, die irgend ein kuehftiger~~

~~amerikanischer Praesident~~ der enigmatischen ~~Reservation~~

~~mooglicherweise geben koennte~~, war schwach gewesen. ~~Er hatte~~ Ein Kind sah,

~~dass~~ die beiden neuen Klauseln ~~unzweifelhaft~~ neue

Aufpeitschungen waren. ~~Ein Anfänger musste~~

~~Elemente von Weichheit und Unverlaesslichkeit in die Voelker-~~

~~bundskonstruktion hineintragen sehen. Er hatte~~ dem Gestaendnis

des Praesidenten, ohne diese ~~Reservationen~~ Clauseln sei er "afraid that

the Senate would not agree to come in" * ~~entnommen, wie~~ musste ein Anfänger

entnehmen, die gefaehrdet Wilson in ~~Amerika~~ der Heimat die Aussicht gefunden hatte, den

*Da .H.Miller: The Drafting of the Covenant, VolII p.359

** ibid.

Voelkerbund ueberhaupt zur Annahme zubringen.

Aber das alles hatte ~~in [illegible]~~ nur ~~verstaerkt die~~ noch mehr sein bestärkt, ~~ohnehin fest gefasste Meinung, dass er ejtzt alles zu verlogen~~ sei ihr waren, wie sie sollten. Das Thema waren fest, ~~habe auf~~ die "guarantees of another nature."

~~Er hatte~~ In den Maerz-Tagen seit der Rueckkehr Wilsons ~~mit die heftigste Energie hinter das Forderungen~~ Zusammentöne hatten sich gehäuft. Die Gereiztheit war gestiegen. Ein ~~gesetzt, die in seinen Augen die Sicherheit des allgemeinen Friedens, und in anderer Augen die Sicherheit Frankreichs~~ garantieren sollten. Die Gewitter hatte sich Und dann ~~war sie~~ an jenem 29.Maerz entladen, ~~an dem~~ Wilson ~~selbst diese wieder zu annullieren, die sie Ihrem Vertreter~~ Clemenceau den Praesidenten einen Pro-German, ~~genannt hatte~~ ~~schliesslich abruptly den aum verlassen hatte.~~

"Then if France does not get what she wishes", ~~hatte~~ sagte Wilson, ~~gesagt~~, "she will refuse to act with us? In that event do you wish me to return home?"

"I do not wish you to go home", ~~hatte~~ er als Antwort, ~~gehoert~~, "but I intedd to do so myself."** Und ~~damit hatte~~ der ~~sie Tuer hinter sich geschlossen.~~ ~~Mann, der die feinste Mitbewegung des~~ ~~Augenblicks begriff,~~ ~~blieb allein zu~~

*Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Col House Vol IV p 396.
** Ibid.

Kleine Mann ~~ging wie ein Irrsinn, ging hinaus.~~
bizarrer
in der Kleidung, einer anderen Zeitalters ~~ging hinaus.~~
nächste hinaus.

6.

Die Zerstoerung der deutschen Militaerkraft ~~konnte~~ musste in Clemenceaus Augen ~~nur aus einer Prozedur bestehen~~ bestimmen ~~aus der simplen und ewigen Prozedur~~ mit (vernünftigerweise möglichen) der Verkleinerung Deutschlands.

Man lebte nicht mehr in biblischen Zeiten. Die Bevoelkerung zum einen Teil umzubringen, zum anderen in Sklaverei abzufuehren und ~~das leere Land dem Erdboden gleichzumachen~~ die Frage radikal zu töten, kam nicht mehr in Frage.

Also blieb ~~uebrig~~ als erste Aufgabe: dem Reich so viel Gebiet ~~wie moeglich~~ wegzunehmen, das in sichere andere Haende zu bringen war. Das ist die einzige realistische Moeglichkeit, die es fuer die Zerstoerung einer Militaermacht ~~gibt, heute noch gibt, oder heute schon gibt.~~

Die Verkleinerung des Gebiets,--vorausgesetzt, dass die abgetrennten Teile in starke, sichere Haende kommen, vermindert ~~unwiderruflich~~ die Quelle der Kraft, das "Potenzial". Sie vermindert die Menschenzahl und die Wirtschaftskapazitaet. Sie vermindert sie dauernd und unwiderruflich.

"Ersatz" dagegen sind alle Mittel, die ~~Alle anderen Erfindungen sind nur "Ersatz". Sie aendern~~ nicht das Potenzial, sondern nur die momentane Ausnuetzung des Potenzials. ~~Ersatz ist [illegible] "disarmement".~~

Keine ersinnbare Prozedur von disarmement kann mehr bewirken, als die Menge von Waffen und ~~die Zahl von Divisionen, die greifbar vorhanden sind,~~ zu restringieren. Keine kann die ~~innere~~ Kapazitaet zur Erstellung von Waffen und ~~der Aufstellung von Divisionen~~ restringieren. Wird die kuenstliche Restriktion aus irgendeinem Grunde schwach, kann der Desarmierte, wenn es ihm passt, sein unbeschaedigtes Potenzial wieder ~~nach Belieben~~ ausnuetzen. Kein "disarmement"

Ersatz ist ~~sogar~~ insbesondere jedes "disarmement". Kein ~~ersinnbare~~ (Laut die Eigenschaft der Dauer und Unwiderruflichkeit, disarmement respektiert) ~~Prozedur von~~ disarmement ~~kann mehr bewirken, als~~ die greifbar vorhandenen Waffen und Effektiven, ~~zu restringieren. Keine~~ aber nicht ~~kann~~ die Kapazitaet zur Erstellung von Waffen und Effektiven. ~~restringieren.~~ Wird die kuenstliche Bremse aus irgend einem Grunde schwach, so kann der Desarmierte ~~wenn es ihm passt,~~ sein unbeschaedigtes Potenzial wieder ~~nach Belieben~~ ausnuetzen. ~~Kein disarmement hat die Eigenschaft der Dauer und Unwiderruflichkeit.~~ Napoleon, ~~trotz des Diktates, das~~ der Preussen 1806 desarmierte, hat das 1813 erfahren.

~~Sobald~~ Die Regierenden in Frankreich ~~waehrend des Kriegs~~ glaubten nicht an die Moeglichkeit eines staendigen disarmements. (Sobald sie waehrend des Krieges einigermassen Vertrauen auf den guten Ausgang hatten fassen koennen, hatten sie unter ihren Kriegszielen ~~diesen ihren Kriegsziel~~ in den Vordergrund gerueckt: die Verkleinerung Deutschlands)

Das bedeutete Unterstuetzung jedes Anspruchs, den irgendwelcher Staat auf irgendwelches Stueck deutschen Gebietes erheben wuerden. Alles, was Polen, was Belgien, was Daenemark wollten, konnten sie, wenn es auf Clemenceau ankam, haben. Wollte nicht sonst jemand noch etwas? Schade, dass sonst keiner mehr etwas wollte.

Aber da war noch im Westen, direkt vor Frankreichs Toren, ein besonders entwickelter und wertvoller Teil Deutschlands. (mit rund 2 Millionen Einwohnern ~~Dazu gehoerte~~ Elsas-Lothringen, ~~und~~ Dass das dem Reich wieder genommen und Frankreich gegeben werden wuerde, war eine ausgemachte Sache. Wilson hatte es in die 14 Punkte geschrieben. ~~Er hatte in diesem Fall sogar auf sein Princip vom "Selbstbestimmungs-Recht" keine~~ Ruecksicht genommen. Die Elsas-Lothringer sollten gar nicht erst befragt werden. Ihre Entscheidung wurde als self-evident betrachtet.

Aber fuer die Verkleinerung Deutschlands bedeutete Elsas-

Lothringen noch wenig. ~~Noch~~ Ein ~~weit~~ hoch groessres ~~und wertvolleres~~

Gebiet ~~war~~ sollte -- nicht: Frankreich ~~einverleibt~~ verleiben, ~~aber~~: Deutschland ~~zu nehmen.~~ wollte. Vom Reich wegamputiert werden sollte alles Land bis

zum Rhein, und moeglichst noch breite Brueckenkoepfe jenseits.

Das Land links des Rheins, mit ~~einigen~~ den Brueckenkoepfen,

~~rechts~~ das waren ~~nur~~ 4 bis weitere 5½ Millionen Einwohner--

~~zusaetzliche 4 bis 5 Millionen~~ neben den 6½, die das Reich ohnehin schon

~~in Elsass Lothringen und im~~ Osten verlieren wuerde. ~~Aber~~ Es war ein

weiterer wichtiger Teil der deutschen Industrie-Kapazitaet: ~~Es war ein grosser~~ rund 30 %, zum Beispiel,

~~Teil der Fabriken. Fast die ganze Kohle. Fast das ganze Eisen und~~ der Metall-Industrie. Von dem Brückenkopf Düsseldorf aus wäre ferner

~~die ganze Stoffe "Waffenschmiede" -- Essen, Krupp, Bochum und~~ Teil der Fabriken. Fast die ganze Kohle. Fast die ganze Eisen- und Stahl-Industrie, Düsseldorf mit Essen und Dortmund und

Duisburg, -- in der Reichweite mittlerer Kanonen. Gott selbst hatte es so

eingerichtet, dass das alles nicht im Innern Deutschlands lag,

sondern im Grenzgebiet.

~~Ja, er hatte es so eingerichtet, dass das einzige, viel~~

kleinere, aehnliche ~~Agglomerat~~, das ausserdem noch existierte,

ebenfalls in einem Grenzgebiet lag. Es lag in Schlesien, an der

Ost-Grenze, -- und wuerde an Polen fallen.

~~Ein Deutschland ohne die Kohle~~ und die Industrie-Kapazitaet ~~des~~ Rheinland, ~~und Schlesiens~~ wuerde praktisch nie ~~mals mehr gefaehrlich werden koenen~~. Wo immer sie erwarten hatten koennen, dass ~~dieses~~ ihr Haupt-Kriegsziel unterstuetzt werden ~~wue~~ wuerde, hatten die Franzosen seit 1916 dafuer geworben.

Ein Premier- und Aussenminister ~~mit~~ Namens Aristide Briand hatte ~~im~~ Januar 1917 seinen Botschafter in London beauftragt, ~~bei~~ der britischen Regierung ~~ueber dieses franzoesische Haupt-Kriegsziel zu informieren. Mr. Balfour~~ zu sondieren. der Secretary des Foreign Office, hatte nicht Ja gesagt, aber auch nicht Nein. In Paris hatte man dieses Ausbleiben von Widerspruch fuer eine halbe Zusage gehalten.

Eine ganze, schriftliche Zusage war zwei Tage spaeter aus Russland gekommen. Der Petrograder Aussenminister hatte bestaetigt, dass "the Government of the Republic may rely on the support of the Imperial Government". ~~inbezug auf das Kriegs-Ziel~~ Einverstanden mit dem Rückfall Elsass-Lothringens, ~~und inbezug auf~~ (an Frankreich. Einverstanden mit Folgendem: "The rest of the territories situated on the left bank of the Rhine which now form part of the German Empire are to be entirely separated from Germany and freed from all political and economic dependance upon her."

Die Kaiserliche Russische Regierung, die das zugesagt hatte, war einen Monat spaeter in der Revolution untergegangen. Aber die ihr folgende demokratische Regierung ~~die ihr gefolgt war~~ hatte an der Zusage festgehalten. Erst die Bolschewiki, die ~~im~~ November 1917 die Macht an sich gerissen hatten, hatten diesen Vertrag, wie alle anderen, zerrissen.

Sie hatten noch mehr getan. Mit ungeheurem Laerm ueber die

Verworfenheit der buergerlichen Welt,hatten sie dieses Abkommen ueber die Verkleinerung Deutschlands sofort veroeffentlicht, ~~und "An Adle" gefunkt.~~ Es war ~~ein Vorklang dessen, was folgen sollte,~~ von übler Vorbedeutung sowohl, dass eine Reihe ~~von~~ vermeintliche Progressive ~~in verschiedenen Laendern~~ der Welt sofort in die Moskauer Entruestung eingestimmt waren. Und dass ~~am 17. Dezember 1917~~ hastig, der Secretary of the Foreign Office sich im Unterhaus erhoben und die Virginitaet seiner Regierung beteuert hatte:"We have never expressed our approval of it... Never did we desire and never did we encourage the idea."*

Die Franzosen waren bei ihrer Idee geblieben, ~~und~~ sobald ein Jahr später die Waffen geschwiegen hatten, hatte Clemenceau seine Karten auf den Tisch gelegt.

Das hatte wenige Tage nach dem Waffenstillstand (sogar.) ~~waren~~ Er und Foch, die zwei ~~hauptsaechlichen Artisanen~~ Väter des alliierten Siegs, die zwei groessten Franzosen der Zeit, -- in Wahrheit vorerst die zwei letzten grossen Franzosen ueberhaupt,--~~zu~~ waren einem Staatsbesuch nach London gekommen.Sie waren mit einer Extase empfangen worden,die dem englischen Temperament nie zugetraut worden war. Noch zwanzig Jahre spaeter wird Lloyd George in seinen "Memoirs" ~~staunend und~~ unfreundlich auf "such a reception as I have never seen accorded to any foreign visitors" zurueckblicken. "The intensity of the enthusiasm displayed were beyond anything I ever witnessed"** Es hatte ihn geniert. Er war schon im Begriff, sein sonst der „traditional policy" (balance of powers) Kurs umzustellen.

* Sitzung vom 17. Dezember 1917

**Lloyd George:Memoirs of the Peace Conference,Vol.I,p.77

Bei diesem Aufenthalt hatte Marschall Foch die Aufgabe gehabt, ~~uebertragen gewesen~~ die Amputation des Rheinlands vom Reich zum ersten Mal ~~als~~ offizielle Forderung anzumelden. Er hatte in den Vordergrund des ~~mit~~ militaerischen Argumente ~~darlegen wollen, dass dies~~ dass der Rhein die einzig verlässliche strategische Grenze sei. ~~einzige realistische Friedens Sicherung~~ sei. Ein Memorandum dieses Sinnes war von ihm ueberreicht worden. ~~Und obwohl die Zwischenfragen~~ Lloyd Georges hatte eher Antipathie verraten, aber ~~hatten, waren~~ die Atmosphäre dieser Fest-Tage war ~~dort~~ so gewesen, dass er wiederum kein Nein ueber sich gebracht hatte. Man werde das ueberlegen, ~~und, natuerlich,~~ die Meinung einer Autorität ~~Mannes~~ vom Gewichte des Marschalls werde immer mit einem favorablen Vorurteil ueberlegt werden.

Ehe die Friedenskonferenz eroeffnet worden war, hatte Foch ein zweites Memorandum ausgearbeitet. "Henceforth", hatte der Kernsatz gelautet, "the Rhine must be the Western frontier of the German peoples. Germany must be deprived of all access to or military utilization of it, that is to say, of all territorial sovereignty on the left bank of this River,"*

Was sollte mit dem ~~von Deutschland~~ amputierten Gebiet geschehen?

Einen kleinen Teil davon, das Saar-Becken, wollten die Franzosen ~~effen~~ fuer sich. ~~behalten.~~ Sie behaupteten, dass kein Unterschied zwischen dem Saar-Gebiet und Elsass-Lothringen bestehe. Dass es ~~bis 1814~~ einst ebenso zu Frankreich gehoert habe, wie

*Tardieu: The Truth about the Treaty, p.146/47

Elsass-Lothringen, ~~bis 1870,~~ und nur kuenstlich germanisiert worden sei.

Aber das Saar-Gebiet ~~das~~ war ~~höchstens 10 Prozent der~~ nur ein Viertel des totalen Rhein-Zone. Alles uebrige sollte zwar Deutschland genommen, aber keineswegs zu Frankreich geschlagen werden. ~~Ohne irgendwelchen Zweifel war das Negativum -- die Amputation von Deutschland--das einzige, was Clemenceau wie Foch wirklich interessierte. Das Positive, die Frage, wie das abgetrennte Gebiet politisch organisiert werden wuerde, war nichts als eine Zweckmaessigkeits-Frage.~~ Man mochte eine oder mehrere Republiken daraus machen. Diese Rheinische Republik ~~, oder diese Rheinischen Republiken~~ mochten sich ~~sich~~ regieren, wie sie wollten. Nur zu Deutschland durften sie nicht mehr gehoeren.

Und nur mussten sie --ja, das ~~war vielleicht~~ allerdings war die Hauptsache der Hauptsache: sie mussten ~~eine~~ staendig und ausschliesslich eine englisch-amerikanisch-franzoesische Garnison erhalten! Einige franzoesische, einige englische, einige amerikanische Regimenter wuerden die Dauer und Festigkeit der Abtrennung -- und damit des Friedens! -- repraesentieren.

Die Welt-Erloeser, die , wie Clemenceau schon bemerkt hatte, ihr Carrière mit einer vielversprechenden Dosis von Gehaessigkeit und Luegen begannen, hatten nicht unterlassen -- und werden zwanzig Jahre lang (nicht mehr) unterlassen-- den Sinn

des Rheinland -Projektes ~~abaund~~ vollkommen zu verdrehen.Sie sagten, und werden dabei bleiben, zu sagen:Die Franzosen, beutegierig,wollen das Rheinland schlucken.Sie wollen ~~sich mit fremdem Gut maesten~~ (die bedauernswerten Rheinländer unter das Joch einer Fremdherrschaft bringen.) Sie wollen ihre Militaer-Herrschaft in Europa etablieren.

Mr.Lloyd George, der a-posteriori~~sches Mitglied der~~ zu den Welterloesungs-~~Partei~~ (gehört haben will!) wird es in seinen "Memoirs" fertigbringen, auf zwanzig Seiten Abstand sowohl dies, wie auch das Gegenteil davon zu schreiben.Auf Seite 264 wird man ihn sagen hoeren, dass die franzoesischen Rheinlands-Vorschlaege

196

~~Memoirs of the peace conference I,264.~~

~~"The various projects for severing territory occupied by Teutonic populations from the German Reich~~ „were not due to a greed of possession. They were prompted by the obsession of France with the fact that in spite of the victory Germany would have a population nearly twice as large as that of France." [Auch auf Seite 281 und wenn es ihn auch ~~p. 281.~~ ~~auf~~ äußerst selten hören. Die Rheinland-Vorschläge selbst anerkennen] -

~~" The compromise,however,did not in the least satisfy the ideas of that formidable section of French opinion which looked forward to this crushing victory as~~ „the best opportunity ever afforded to France of satisfying her age-long ambition for the establishment of ~~FRANCE~~ French control,not only on the left but on both sides of the Rhine." Unter den neuen ~~Gegnern~~ Gegnern unter Gegnerwark sind Mr. Lloyd George als nicht der abwechslungsreichste Fortleben. Man findet bei ihm ~~fast~~ fast über jede Sache fast jede Meinung.

In diesem Fall war, wo die Franzosen wirklich wollten, wie gerade Ministerpräsident Lloyd George ~~Recht~~ nº 1. und nicht ~~Recht~~ nº 2.

[Marschall Fochs Memorandum vom 10. ~~Februar~~ Januar 1919 hatte ausgeführt: „ The Rhine, military frontier, without which cannot be maintained the peace aimed at by the coalition, ~~is~~ shall not be a territorial benefit for any nation. It is not a question, in fact, of

annexing the left bank of the Rhine, of increasing France or Belgium's territory ... but to hold securely on the Rhine, the common barrier of security necessary to the League of Democratic Nations. It is not a question of confiding to a single power the guarding of this common barrier, but to ensure by the cooperation ~~of allies~~ moral and ~~et~~ material of all democratic powers, the defense of their existence and of their future..." x ~~by forbidding Germany~~

Nur deutlicher ~~drückte~~ sagte Clemenceau (Adlatus, es aussprechen) ~~noch stärker sie~~ (der Minister und Schriftsteller André Tardieu, ~~der~~ in den ~~Friedensschlüssen~~ Schriftstücken, der das Rheinproblem) ~~der gegen Wilsons Ansprüche~~ bleiben und ~~dem ganzen Kompromiß~~ Memorandum vom Februar 1919 ~~sehr scharf~~ schrieben: „France does not demand for herself the left bank of the Rhine; she would not know what to do with it ... „Als einzige nützliche und ausreichende ~~France demands only one thing of~~ It is that the necessary and only possible and certain measures to prevent the left bank of the Rhine from again becoming a base for German aggression, ~~shall be taken by the Powers too gathered at the Peace Conference.~~" ~~dadurch~~ ~~einzige möglichen und sicheren~~ ~~Maßnahmen~~ ~~Schutz~~ ~~Schutz~~ (Schutz) ~~möglichst~~ ~~sichere~~ permanente „inter-allied occupation." xx ~~of the Rhine" xx~~

x R. S. Baker: Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement. Vol. III. p. 234/35

xx André Tardieu: The Truth about the Treaty. p. 166

~~Let the Syndicate be permanent, like the Chamber of the Seine. Refuse~~

Das war, was ausgesprochen worden war. Immer wieder.
Und immer wieder. Die [Forderung an sich selbst] war noch bevorstehend. Wer sich
selbst anschließen oder in ihr dominieren will, zeigt sich
darum, [selbst seinen eigenen] Typen [der] vor allen fortgesetzte hinzu-
bringen. [Abänderung] zu diesem Punkt wie in allem,
[Abänderung] verfolgt nicht eine Politik der Stärke, sondern der Schwäche.

Letzte Sinn des Rheinland-Projekts war klar, daß dort nicht nur eine ~~Deutschland sollte das Rheinland verlieren~~, sondern aber der eigentliche Sinn der Besetzung wurde erst deutlich ~~publiziert sein~~ dann dort statt der deutschen Truppen französische, sondern eine alliierte Militär-Macht zu stationieren, sollen eine ~~französische~~ eingehen, sondern französische plus englischen plus amerikanischen. Jeder deutsche Schuss über den Rhein würde dadurch künftig zu einem Schuss auf alle drei Staaten führen. Jeder deutsche Angriff über den Rhein, würde dadurch ipso facto zu einem Angriff auf Amerika und England werden, also auch Rhein stabile das Hauptmotiv Hauptmotiv sowohl von Abschreckung wie von Tüchtigkeit, das überhaupt zu haben war. Clemenceau wer das gewollte, das ~~Deutschland das Rheinland verliert~~, aber trotzdem Atlantic Pakt war ihm die ständige Etablierung englischer und amerikanischer Truppen am Rhein. Wenn sich die Frage so gestellt hätte, wäre er wahrscheinlich publizistisch bereit gewesen, englische und amerikanische Regimenter dafür permanent auf französischem Boden zu stationieren. Wenn Wilson uns klipp und klar ins Gesicht hätte: Wir sind bereit, Truppen unseres Landes am Rhein zu stationieren, wir gehen nicht zu, dass Deutschland das Rheinland verliert, - aber wir sind bereit, Truppen unseres Landes dauernd an der Grenze Frankreichs selbst zu stationieren, — wenn sie uns das gesagt hätten, wäre wahrscheinlich alle Probleme so komplett für uns gelöst gewesen, wie Probleme auf dieser Erde gelöst werden können, und er hätte für sein Land und die Welt

Maximum alles ~~in der Welt existierenden Anti~~ Extra-Isolationismus. -

Aber ~~sein Anti Isolationismus~~ seine kollektive Sicherheit ~~wischte alle Phantome und alle Phrasen~~ Lyrik beiseite und reduzierte

das Problem auf seinen ~~wahren~~ ~~banalen~~ prosaischen Kern: Meint Ihr, wenn

Ihr mutual assistance sagt, ~~zunaechst und~~ vor allem ~~und klar und bewusst~~ England, plus Amerika, plus Frankreich, ~~Ja oder Nein? Und er reduzierte sogar diesen Kern noch einmal:~~ Meint Ihr die unfragliche, ~~und~~ immer aktive (und parate) Bereitschaft ~~auf einen noch primitiveren und banaleren nucleus~~ (Meint Ihr) englische plus amerikanische plus franzoesische Regimenter?

Ja oder Nein? Der Standort einiger Regimenter von Staaten, die Regimenter ohnehin besitzen und Gottweisswo stehen haben:

das war das Problem des Problems. ~~In dieser ominont einfachen~~ Wie stand es damit?

~~probaten und billigen Weise konnten~~ alle, die ueber mutual assistance und kollektive Friedenssicherung redeten, die Goldhaeltigkeit ihres Glaubens und die konkrete Ve laesslichkeit ~~ihrer akademischen~~ Bereitschaft zu jedem Risiko beweisen. Wie stand es damit?

~~Kurz gesagt: waren sie in London und Washington bereit, den dank dem Waffenstillstand faktisch bereits bestehenden Zustand weiter bestehen zu lassen ?~~

Seit dem Waffenstillstand war das Rheinland ~~mit den~~ von Brueckenkoepfen tatsaechlich garnisoniert von ~~englisch-amerikanisch-franzoesisch-belgischen~~ der drei Mächte. Truppen. Nur politisch-administrativ gehoerte es noch zum Reich. Alles, was geschehen musste, war, auch das politisch-administrative Band zu zerschneiden, -- und die alliierten Garnisonen zur permanenten Einrichtung zu machen. Wie stand es damit?

~~2003a~~

Lloyd George hatte seine Hand schon gezeigt, kaum dass Clemenceau und Foch aus London abgereist waren. ~~In einer Rede zu Bristol~~ hatte er ~~am 11.~~ vorh im December 1918 polemisiert gegen eine Idee, die ~~er nicht nannte und die~~ in einer öffentlichen Rede niemand kannte, -- die ~~in seiner Darstellung~~ als die Idee irgend einer Okkupation ganz Deutschlands hatte erscheinen muessen, zu der Hunderttausende von englischen Soldaten erforderlich sein wuerden.

"There must not be an army of occupation", hatte er gesagt, "a large army of occupation,

kept in Germany indefinitely in order to hold the country down. That simply means keeping hundred thousands of young men from this country occupying Germany,maybe for a generation, maybe for more,withdrawing them from industry.....That would be bad business.Besides,it would simply provoke fresh conflicts,and instead of coming to an end of war we should be simply manufacturing fresh wars....."*

*Lloyd George:Memoirs of the Peace Confernce ,Vol.I,p.308

Die Methode wird charakteristisch ~~für die Anwendung der nächsten zwanzig Jahre~~ bleiben.Zwanzig Jahre lang wird man die Welt beharrlich so dargestellt sehen,als ob die Voelker immer zwischen good und bad business waehlen koennten, ~~////////////////////~~ --waehrend sie leider allzu oft nur zwischen bad und worse business die Wahl haben .Und vor allem wird man zwanzig Jahre lang verfolgt werden von dieser apodiktischdn Informiertheit darueber,was "simply" fresh wars und was lasting peace hervorruefen wuerde,-- von dieser so apodiktischen Informiertheit,dass sogar Begruendungen ueberfluessig waren.

Nein,Mr.Lloyd George hatte seine beiden Gleichungen nie begruendet,--nicht die Gleichung:Deutschland minus Rheinland gleich Krieg, und nicht die Gleichung:Deutschland plus Rheinland gleich Frieden.Er hatte sie nur aufgestellt,--aus dem Leeren ~~Er hatte sie~~ dekretiert,und damit Basta.Die Weltgeschichte wird sie rot durchstreichen.

Aber ~~Mr./~~Lloyd George behauptete. Und sofort nachdem die Friedenskonferenz eroeffnet worden war,hatte seine Delegation

~~Das war wahrgeworden. Sobald das Thema während der Wochen, in denen Wilson in Amerika weilte, gestreift worden war, hatten die Englaender sich negativ und immer negativer gezeigt. Deutschland darf nichts verlieren als Elsas-Lothringen verlieren. Und sogar die Besetzung anderer Gebiets, teile, die jetzt, während des Waffenstillstands eine Tatsache ist, muss sofort nach der Unterzeichnung des Friedens wieder aufhoeren. Es ist unerlaesslich, dass die gemeinsame Besetzung mehr, nicht einmal auf Zeit, und noch weniger nicht Besetzung durch eine einzige Macht. Sobald man die Unterschrift hat, muessen saemtliche Truppen nach Hause abruecken. Keinerlei Luecken und Deutschland muss wieder in den freien Besitz des ganzen Gebietes kommen.~~

Das war wahrgeworden. Sobald das Thema auch nur in den Wochen, in denen Wilson in Amerika weilte, gestreift worden war, hatten die Englaender sich in voller negativ und immer negativer Weise gezeigt. Deutschland darf in keinem Falle unter keinen Umständen mehr als Elsas-Lothringen verlieren. Und sogar die Besetzung anderer Gebiets, teile, die jetzt, während des Waffenstillstands eine Tatsache ist, muss sofort nach der Unterzeichnung des Friedens wieder aufhoeren. Es ist unerlaesslich, dass die gemeinsame Besetzung mehr, nicht einmal auf Zeit, und noch weniger nicht Besetzung durch eine einzige Macht. Sobald man die Unterschrift hat, muessen saemtliche Truppen nach Hause abruecken. Keinerlei Luecken und Deutschland muss wieder in den freien Besitz des ganzen Gebietes kommen.

~~Saemtliche ueberhaupt denkbaren Argumente wurden~~

von Lloyd George benutzt. ~~Er~~ erinnerte sich in diesem Fall an die vierzehn Punkte, auf das Selbstbestimmungsrecht. ~~Es wuerde~~ sein "a definite and dishonorable betrayal of one of the fundamental principles for which the Allies have professed to fight."* ~~Er fand heraus, dass diese permanente amerikanisch-franzoesisch-englische Wacht am Rhein nicht einen kuenftigen~~ Krieg verhindern, sodern ~~im Gegenteil~~ heraufbeschwoeren wuerde ~~Es wahrlich wie, wie der Fluch wirke, und es ist, wie wir wissen, wurde ausgesprochen. Aber es sind Worte~~

"Any attempt to divide Germany ... would cause endless friction and might provoke another war."** Es ~~wird~~ eventually lead to another war."*** ~~Sein Privatsekretaer~~ Philip Kerr, der spaeter unter dem Namen Lord Lothian bekannter werden wird, ~~focht wilde Kaempfe mit Clemenceaus~~ ~~rechter Hand, dem zum Minister gewordenen brillanten Schrift-~~ ~~steller~~ André Tardieu. Das englische Volk, ~~die~~

*---------

✗Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, Vol I, p 260
** Ibid.
*** Seymour; The Intimate Papers of Col. House, Vol. IV, p 360

~~oeffentliche Meinung~~ sagte Kerr, wuerde diese Amputation deutschen Gebiets, und diese gemeinsame Wacht am Rhein, nicht verstehen."It is the duty of the British Government", ~~Kanadischen Staates~~ grollte Tardieu ihn an, "to make it understand.Neither did the British understand in 1914 the necessity of conscription."* Zwanzig Jahre lang wird man den Unverstaendnis der Voelker ~~vorgeschuetzt finden, wo in Wahrheit~~ nur die ~~Regierungen zu faul oder zu interessiert oder zu boeswillig waren, to make it understand.~~

Nein, es war kein Weiterkommen mit Lloyd Georges Delegation.

Wie war es mit der amerikanischen?

In dem Monat ~~in~~ der Wilson ~~abwesend gewesen war,~~ war Oberst House sein Vertreter gewesen.Mit ihm hatte Clemenceau es hauptsaechlich zu tun gehabt,-- und es muss gesagt werden, dass House's ~~historisch-politische~~ Ideen nicht die starre Unabaenderlichkeit eines logarithmischen

*Tardieu:The Truth about the Treaty, p.174

~~gibt, als Enthusiasten mit der Probe der Wirklichkeit zu~~

kommen, oder Erfindern mit den physikalischen Lehrsaetzen.
Enthusiasten lehlte die Neigung zu Zoloten zu werden,
Wenige waren faehig zu der Groesse, deren sich dieser

brave House faehig zeigte : der Groesse, aus ihrem

System herauszuhorchen, ~~und~~ zu vergleichen, ~~und~~ nachzudenken ,

~~und~~ zu lernen. ~~Der alte Gentlemen aus Texas hatte zu lernen~~ aus Amerika

~~begonnen. In ihm~~ Systems ~~zu wirken~~. In ihm hatte es Wandlungen hervorgerufen, mit der

Wirklichkeit zu verkehren, statt mit Abstraktionen. In ihm hatte

es Wandlungen hervorgerufen, mit Clemenceau zu verkehren. Zwischen

~~ihnen~~ den beiden Männern hatte sich in diesen Monaten eine ~~wirkliche~~ Freundschaft

entwickelt, Man ~~ungefaehr die einzige Freundschaft, die sich auf~~

~~dieser Konferenz der Entzweiung entwickelt~~ hatte. Man

~~schrieb er : "I cannot restrain the desire to fall my arms~~

~~to you and press you against my heart."*~~ Man wird die alte

Freundschaft zwischen House und Wilson in die Brueche gehen

sehen. Nach der Unterschrift in Versailles (im Juni dieses Jahres), wird der Praesident

sein alter ego vieler ~~viele~~ Jahre ohne Wort und Erklaerung

fallen lassen. ~~und ihn~~ Niemals (in seinem Leben ~~mehr~~) sprechen und er ihn

sehen. Aber die neue Freundschaft zwischen dem 63-Jaehrigen aus

Texas und dem 78-Jaehrigen aus der Vendée wird halten, bis der

Aeltere zehn Jahre spaeter sterben wird. Der

* ~~Seymour:~~The Intimate Papers of ~~Col.~~House, Vol. IV, p 192

~~123~~ ~~127~~ 207

~~Mmmm~~ in die Brueche gehen; ~~mmmm~~ sie sich nie mehr ~~mmmmmmm~~ werden nach der Unterschrift in Versailles

~~Mmmm~~ sehen und sprechen. ~~mmmm~~ Aber die junge Freundschaft

zwischen dem ~~Mmmmm~~ dem 78-Jaehrigen wird halten, bis der Dreiundsechzigjaehrigen aus Texas und aus der Vendee

Aeltere ~~mmm~~ Jahre spaeter zu seinen Vaetern ~~mmmmmmm~~

~~Mmmm~~ eingehen wird. Der Nachruf, den der Colonel fuer Clemenceau

schreiben wird, wird beginnen: "In all my experience I have never

met a man who made upon me a more lasting impression".* House's

Biograph wird sagen, dass seine "feelings towards Clemenceau

were a mixture of affection and admiration, into which no

suggestion of misunderstanding ever intruded."** ~~Die Wahrheit~~

~~war, dass House, je laenger die Friedenskonferenz~~ dauerte, umso

umsomehr von den Dingen verstehen lernete, auf die er bisher

moralisch herabgesehen hatte, und umso weiter weggetrieben wurde

ihm als

von den Vorstellungen, die ~~mmm~~ bisher ~~mmmmm~~ Essenz der

gelten

Wahrheit ~~mmmmm~~ hatten. ~~Die Quelle dieser Wandlung war~~

bleibt

* Seymour: The Intimate Papers of Col. House, Vol. IV, p. 191
** Ibid.-

Die Wahrheit war, dass House ~~mit seinen Meinungen~~ ~~(Verkleinerung Deutschlands und die~~ ~~und Gefuehlen ueber die Wacht am Rhein zusehends mehr zu~~ ~~Clemenceau hinueberglitt~~ hatte begonnen, die Dinge durch eine andere Brille zu sehen, ~~als durch diejenige, die er~~ ~~in der abstrakten Ferne von Washington und New York getragen~~ ~~hatte. Er hatte begonnen, den Standpunkt, den er im Amt~~ ~~für bekaempfen hatte, im Grunde richtiger zu finden, als den,~~ ~~den Wilson einnahm.~~ ~~Seine Berichte ueber die Gespraeche, die~~ ~~darueber in Paris gefuehrt wurden,~~ beunruhigten Wilson, "Am made a little uneasy". Der Praesident ~~wuenschte nicht,~~ ~~dass diese~~ Frage ~~ohne ihn selber geregelt werde.~~ "I hope you will not even provisionally consent to the separation of the Rhenish Provinces from Germany under any arrangement but will reserve the whole matter until my arrival."* ~~Aber~~ ~~obwohl~~ House ~~die~~ Weisung ~~woertlich~~ befolgte und nichts

*Paul Birdsall:Versailles Twenty Years After.p 204

~~formell praejudizierte~~ Schob bekommen hatte, hatte er bereits alle Plan erörtert schon,
~~formell praejudizierte, ist es richtig, dass er sich~~
~~sympathisch verhalten hatte zu einem Plan, der~~ der Clemenceaus
mindestens ~~ein~~ guter Start ~~machen~~ die Separation
~~sollte zunaechst~~ einmal vollzogen ~~und~~, die alliierte Wacht
am Rhein ~~sollte zunaechst~~ einmal errichtet ~~werden~~; ~~und dann~~
~~werde die~~ die Bevoelkerung ~~nach~~ einigen Jahren abstimmen
~~lassen und werde dann hoeren, welchen Zustand~~ sie selber
wuenscht. ~~Es war nichts, was~~ Clemenceau befriedigt ~~hatte~~.
~~Er blieb bestehen darauf~~, dass die Regelung definitiv ~~und permanent~~
~~sein~~ muesse. Aber ~~es war ein weiter Entgegenkommen~~
~~im Prinzip~~. So ~~muss~~ Wilson ~~selbst~~ es ~~aufgefasst~~ haben. Als er
Als Wilson am 14.Maerz wieder in Frankreich gelandet war, ~~empfing~~ hatte ihm
House ~~mit seinem~~ Bericht. Und das ~~ist es~~, was die Reaktion
~~seiner Frau darueber sagte~~: "House has compromised on every side
,and so I shall have to start all over again and this time it
will be harder,as he has given the impression that my delegates
are not in sympathy with me..."*

*Paul Birdsall : Versailles Twenty Years After , p.207

210 Wer war in sympathy with him?

Er stand vor der Welt mit seinen Verkündungen -- auffassen

der seine verschiedenen Bedeutungen d Worts Friedens. Dem

Verkündung

auch ein Enthusiasmus für seine Prinzipien auf, die

Das Wort „Frieden" hat seine verschiedne Bedeutungen. Es herrscht

Frieden -- oder (auch) herrscht einen Friedens, das eine ist ein

Zustand, der ist die Errungenschaft von Kriegen --

eine) Anordnung, (Übereinkunft)

das andere ist (wenn) vom Jahre 1919 vom „Völkerfrieden" hervorgebracht wurde, so war

es auch darauf, ob der eine, oder der andere gemeint, wenn von

Wilsons Prinzipien gesprochen wurde, so sollen es einmal

gesehen, ob damit der bürgerliche Zustand, oder der gegenwärtige

einmalige Akt gemeint war. Wilson hatte seine Reihe von Prinzipien.

Er hatte Prinzipien für die Erhaltung d bürgerlichen Zustands, -- und er

hatte Prinzipien für den einmaligen, gegenwärtigen Akt. Es waren seine

völlig verschiedne Dinge, -- Auch völlig verschieden war der Grad von

Enthusiasmus, d in der Welt für die eine und die andere seiner Prinzipien-

Serien herrschte. Aber die Worte

Wilson hatte Verkündungen

Prinzipien für Frieden; Er hatte Verkündungen für

den bürgerlichen Zustand, Er hatte Verkündungen für die Unterbrechung.

für die allgemeine, übrigbleibende, ewige Erhaltung der

bürgerlichen Friedens-Zustands, Verkündungen und für die Unterbrechung dieses

einmaligen, spezielle gegenwärtigen Kriegs-Zustandes. Aber in seinen

diesen gegenwärtigen Krieg floss ein Teil seiner verschiednen Verkündungen

in seinem Kampf ebenso für die gesamten öffentlichen Reaktionen auf die

verschiednen Arten Verkündungen zusammen. Alles Entsetzen, das

er in der ganzen Welt für seine Verkündungen d ewigen Friedens-Erhaltung spürte,

spürte er als Entsetzen auch für seine Prinzipien über die bürgerliche,

spezielle Kriegs-Landschaft auf. Mit welchem