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VOL. XII.

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET
SIR THOS. BYAM MARTIN, G.C.B.

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ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR THOMAS BYAM MARTIN, G.C.B.

Vice-Admiral of the United Kingdom

Painted by Geo. Richmond, 1849

LETTERS AND PAPERS

OF

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET

Sir Thos. Byam Martin

G.C.B.

EDITED BY

SIR RICHARD VESEY HAMILTON, G.C.B.

ADMIRAL

VOL. II.



PRINTED FOR THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

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INTRODUCTION

THE family of the late Admiral Sir William Fanshawe Martin have done me the honour, at the request of the Council of the Society, to entrust me with the papers of their grandfather, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Thomas Byam Martin, G.C.B., in the view of my making a selection from them for the use of the Society. The task, however interesting and instructive, has not been an easy one. The papers fill a dozen large volumes, in quarto and folio, and comprise several hundreds of letters—unarranged, dealing with a great variety of subjects, and many of them in a fragmentary condition. The labour of reading through these, and selecting those which appeared suitable for my purpose, has been very great, but has left me with an exceedingly high opinion of Martin, not only as a naval officer, but also as a statesman, diplomatist, and administrator; abundantly gifted, too, with the tact and temper so necessary when dealing with allies, and with the military or other branches of the public service.

In reducing this great mass of material to order, it seemed to me that three volumes would be necessary to do justice to it. The first, to contain Martin's early career, up to 1807; the second (this present), from 1808 to 1813 inclusive; and the

third, the remainder of his career. In consultation with our Secretary, I decided that the second of these volumes should be published first, as being descriptive of events on which History has not dealt as fully as it has done with the more brilliant portions of the great war ; and although but little known, our fleets in the Baltic had a very important part in the downfall of Napoleon.

In the last century we sent fleets to the Baltic on several different occasions. In 1700 Sir George Rooke assisted Sweden against a combination of Denmark, Poland, and Russia, when Denmark was forced to make peace, and Charles XII, let loose on Russia, won the battle of Narva.¹ In 1715 Sir John Norris took a strong fleet to the Baltic in the view of curbing the insolence of Swedish privateers and of bringing such pressure on the King of Sweden as might induce him to cede Bremen and Verden to the Elector of Hanover. Always with the same object in view the fleet returned to the Baltic in the successive summers of 1716, 1717, and 1718. But after the death of Charles XII, when the Tsar was threatening the independence of Sweden, the object was changed, and in 1719, 1720, and 1721 the fleet visited the Baltic each year as a demonstration in favour of Sweden. In 1721 peace between Russia and Sweden was concluded ; but in 1726, when Russia was again threatening the peace of the north, she was overawed by the presence of a fleet under Sir Charles Wager ; and in 1727 by one under the command of Sir John Norris. 'A strong resolution rendered unnecessary strong measures,' and the mere sight of

¹ See *The Journal of Sir George Rooke* (N. R. S. vol. ix.).

the English fleets induced a more pacific temper.¹ For more than seventy years after this the Baltic was unknown to English fleets ; but in 1801 Nelson took one into the Gulf of Finland ; and in 1807, consequent on the Treaty of Tilsit and the betrayal to our Government of its secret terms, the Danish ships were seized by an expedition sent out under the command of Lord Gambier.

Sweden had not joined the coalition between Russia and France ; and for her protection against Russia a powerful fleet was sent to the Baltic in 1808, under the command of Sir James Saumarez. Of this fleet, the *Implacable*, of 74 guns, commanded by Captain T. Byam Martin, was one.

The history of the situation and policy of Sweden at this time, and of the election of Bernadotte to be Crown Prince, is to be read in Alison's 'History of Europe' and in Ross's 'Memoirs of Lord de Saumarez' ; but some interesting details are here given from Byam Martin's letters (pp. 10, 11, and 175-7). In 1810 Napoleon compelled Sweden, much against her will, to declare war against England, and for the next two years we were theoretically at war with Sweden. Practically we were not so, owing to the forbearance, tact, and judgment of Sir James Saumarez, who, notwithstanding much difference of opinion, accepted from the Swedish Government a verbal message of their pacific intentions, and resolved that, at all events, he would not commit the first hostile act. His conduct was not only politic but generous ; and this aspect of it was fully recognised by the Crown Prince, who, in November 1812, sent him a diamond-

¹ *Dictionary of National Biography*, s.n. Norris, Sir John.

hilted sword of honour, valued at 2,000*l.* The Swedish Minister, too—Baron Platen—wrote to him:—

‘You have been the guardian angel of my country. By your wise, temperate, and loyal conduct, you have been the first cause of the plans which have been formed against the demon of the continent You were the first cause that Russia dared to make war against France. Had you fired one shot when we declared war against England, all had been ended and Europe would have been enslaved.’¹

With Saumarez’s policy, however, Martin was only indirectly concerned. It is more to my immediate purpose to call attention to the splendid seamanship displayed in the ‘tedious and anxious passage through the Great Belt, without the assistance of pilots’ (p. 17), and in the passage through the Lysert Channel (pp. 169, 172), as feats which may well serve as an example to officers who may be placed in similar situations. A still more important matter is the correspondence (pp. 50-1) of Saumarez with Sir Samuel Hood and Martin, the captors of the *Sevolod*, relative to attacking the Russian fleet in Port Baltic. It will be seen that Saumarez was only dissuaded from the attack by the strong remonstrances of Hood and Martin, whose recent achievement gave their opinion great weight, independent of the reputation both of them had as ‘fire-eaters.’ In accepting their advice, however, Saumarez took the entire responsibility on himself, and so represented it in his official letter. As events turned out, his forbearance was all for the

¹ *Memoirs of Lord de Saumarez*, vol. ii. pp. 293-4.

best ; but at the time there were not wanting critics to assert that he had let slip an opportunity of destroying the Russian fleet, and this judgment has been recently repeated and emphasised by Captain Mahan.¹ Alison has ascribed his inaction to political prudence and the fear of inflaming Russian national feeling against us. But it is not improbable that the popular odium was the cause of the delay in duly recognising Saumarez's many and great services. He was not made a peer till after the accession of William IV ; and William IV himself was, some years later, still ignorant of the facts, which Sir John Ross related to him.² We now have the matter fully explained for the first time.

It will be seen (pp. 31-3) that Martin comments very unfavourably on the state of the Swedish fleet. It had been extremely bad when Sir Sidney Smith was serving with it in 1790,³ and the course of events had necessarily tended to make it still worse. The internal dissensions, the deposition of the King, the death of his successor's son, the conquest of Finland, the treacherous surrender of Sweaborg, had been deadly blows to the administration and had deprived the navy of its choicest supply of seamen. It may be doubted if either Hood or Martin could have done much under such a series of adverse circumstances, many of which were probably unknown to Martin, or with such men as he describes (p. 32). Nor does it appear that the Russian fleet was much better. It too had been very bad in 1790, when it had a

¹ *The Atlantic Monthly*, 1893, vol. i. pp. 605 *et seq.*

² *Memoirs of Saumarez*, vol. ii. p. 124.

³ Barrow's *Life of Sir W. S. Smith*, vol. i. chapters iv. and v.

certain stiffening of English officers ;¹ and now that these were necessarily withdrawn, it was a great deal worse. It did not venture to attack the inferior fleet of Sweden in Oro Sound, prior to the junction of the Centaur and Implacable (p. 31); and it allowed the Sevolod to be cut off, captured and burnt in its immediate neighbourhood, without any real attempt to rescue or support her (pp. 47, 48).

In 1812, when Russia had refused longer to submit to the arbitrary rule of Napoleon, who thereupon assembled the armies of Europe, crossed the Niemen and marched on Moscow, Martin, in command of a small squadron, co-operated with the Russian army and saved Riga. It is very easy to overlook the enormous influence which this little squadron exercised on the course of the war ; but it is clear that without its presence in the Gulf of Riga and commanding the coast navigation from Danzig northwards, the French army would have been able to rest on the sea and to receive its supplies freely from North Germany. Martin's squadron, in fact, cut its communications ; with what fatal effect is one of the commonplaces of history. And yet how incapable the Russians—with a fleet still numerically strong—were to perform this service for themselves, appears not so much from their not venturing to attempt it, but from the fact, made known in the memoirs of Saumarez (vol. ii. pp. 287–289), and now confirmed by the letter of Lord Cathcart (p. 311 of this volume)—though it has not appeared in any History I have read—that the Tsar had resolved to send his fleet to England during the winter, as he did not consider that it would

¹ Penrose's *Life of Captain James Trevenen*, passim.

be secure either at Cronstadt or at Sweaborg, if Napoleon should march on St. Petersburg. It was on the point of sailing when the retreat of the French from Moscow rendered the measure unnecessary.

In 1813 Martin was sent on a mission to Wellington, who was complaining, most unjustly, of the Admiralty for not having foreseen wants he could not foresee himself. Indeed, according to Napier, 'No man could have foreseen the extraordinary errors of the French army during 1813. Wellington did not expect to cross the Ebro before the end of the campaign; and his battering train was prepared for the siege of Burgos, not for that of Bayonne.' As it was, the battle of Vittoria was fought on June 21, and the siege of St. Sebastian commenced on the 29th. Wellington appears to have forgotten or ignored the tremendous strain which the war with the United States was putting on the Admiralty, and to have supposed that the Admiralty had nothing else to do than to supply his army; he began at once to complain that ships, boats &c., had not been already placed to carry out his unforeseen wishes. In a letter of July 9 he wrote:—

'I wrote to Sir G. Collier the other day to make a particular disposition of one ship with the battering train, he being on the flank of the army at Passages, to blockade St. Sebastian by sea; and he was obliged to quit his station himself for the purpose, having no vessel to send. This is not the way the service can be carried on.' And in continuation he wrote:—

'I do not know what measures to take about

our vagabond soldiers. By the state of yesterday, we had 12,500 men less under arms than we had the day before the battle. They are not in the hospitals, nor are they killed, nor have they fallen into the hands of the enemy as prisoners. . . . I believe they are concealed in the villages in the mountains.'¹

A sailor might fairly have asked, 'Is this the way to carry on the service?' But again, on July 19, he reported that 9,638 men were missing, and in the same letter complained of want of naval co-operation. That this want of co-operation was due not only to the surprise which he had sprung on the Admiralty by his unforeseen and rapid advance, but also to the stress of circumstances which Wellington did not give himself the trouble to inquire into, appears from the following letter from Collier to Sir Thomas Graham, dated on board the Arrow at Passages on July 21 :—

'What a terrible night was the last! Of the six men-of-war off the port at sunset, the Lyra is the only one which has held her ground, and the Arrow, which fortunately put in here before dark. I am much concerned for the Sparrow, and fear she must have gone ashore. The Constant must be in a critical position, as well as the Sylvia. As to the Surveillante I can form no opinion; but I cherish the hope that, if the gale moderates, we may yet see her again; but all is uncertain, as she must have parted in the night when, I fear, the wind was dead on the shore, blowing hard and a tremendous sea. Signal guns of distress were heard about

¹ Gurwood's *Wellington's Despatches*, vol. x. p. 519.

11 P.M. I am very uneasy, as you may suppose. . . .
What weather for July!' ¹

The Surveillante happily escaped the effects of the gale; but at this time nearly one-third of her crew were landed, besides other men and officers from the smaller vessels, to do the work of artillerymen and in getting guns into position for the army. And of 'the steady and gallant conduct' of these men, particularly after the unsuccessful attempt to storm St. Sebastian on July 24, the most favourable reports were made. In point of fact, Wellington, notwithstanding his wonderful ability and grasp of even minute details, was very much adrift about naval matters; resembling in this his great opponent, Napoleon, who—as Fouché expresses it—'lost himself in his naval plans, thinking he could move fleets with the same precision with which he manœuvred armies.'

In the spelling of foreign names, the exact verification of which is, in most cases, impossible, I have, as a general rule, followed Alison; and for the names of places I have followed the 'Universal Atlas' or the Admiralty charts. The spelling so adopted may not be always correct; but it has, at any rate, the advantage of making reference more easy. The dates in the letters from Russia are the old and new style.

In conclusion I have to express my warmest thanks to Professor Laughton for the assistance he has given me, both by advice as to the arrangement of the letters, and by sharing with me the labour of correcting the proof-sheets.

¹ *Wellington's Despatches*, edited by his son, vol. viii. p. 101.

ILLUSTRATIONS

ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET SIR THOMAS BYAM MARTIN,
G.C.B., VICE-ADMIRAL OF THE UNITED KINGDOM *Frontispiece*
Painted by George Richmond, 1849.

THE RUSSIAN SHIP SEVOLOD, 74 GUNS, STRIKING
HER COLOURS TO H.M.S. IMPLACABLE, 74 GUNS,
CAPTAIN T. BYAM MARTIN, ON AUGUST 26, 1808,
IN THE BALTIC *To face p. 36*

THE RUSSIAN SHIP SEVOLOD, AFTER THE ACTION
WITH THE IMPLACABLE, DESTROYED IN THE
PRESENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FLEET " 48



JOURNALS AND LETTERS

OF ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET

SIR T. BYAM MARTIN

*IMPLACABLE, CAPT. T. B. MARTIN.*¹

1808.

January 15th.—Commissioned the ship.

March 21st.—Went out of harbour. Received
4 flat-boats.

31st.—Sailed from Cawsand Bay.

April 7th.—Anchored at Gottenburg.

11th.—Sailed—passed Kronborg Castle and
anchored in Sound.

May 2nd.—Still at anchor off Helsingborg. The
Kila arrived with a convoy from up Baltic. The
Danish gun-boats came out to attack them. Elsinore
Castle fired several shot, which were returned. Sent
the boats to assist.

14th.—Weighed. Steered for the Great Belt.

July 23rd.—In company with Superb, Rear-

¹This Abstract gives an outline of the proceedings of the
Implacable during the greater part of 1808, and is a key to the
letters.

Admiral Sir R. Keats, we, Implacable, tried to make the passage over the shoals off Prussian and Swedish Pomerania—got into $4\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms.

August 16th.—Joined the Centaur.¹ Received supply of provisions.

19th.—Foggy. Fog cleared. Saw 3 strange sail to the eastward—made all sail in chase—closed them. Set steering sails. Cleared ship for action. The chase proved to be 3 Russian frigates. At 3 o'clock the enemy's frigates N.N.E. 5 miles. The wind died suddenly away so as to leave a perfect calm—sent all the boats ahead to tow the ship. The enemy got an air of wind and gained a great distance, leaving us completely becalmed. At $\frac{1}{2}$ after noon signal of recall. Saw Swedish fleet at anchor, in all 11 sail.

20th.—Light wind, made all sail to join the Centaur; stood in towards Oro Road. Observed the Russian fleet, 2 three-deckers, 7 two-deckers, and some large frigates at anchor under Hango Head—distance 5 miles. Anchored with a spring on our cable about 4 miles outside Oro Road, the Centaur and Implacable nearly filling up the passage, when, by means of the spring, their broadsides were brought to bear upon the entrance. Employed in various ways to make everything fit for immediate action.

Sunday, 21st.—Got the sheet-cable out of the stern port and bent it to the anchor. The hammocks kept up all night in case the Russian fleet should make any night attack. Performed Divine service.

22nd.—The Russian fleet weighed and stood to sea. Ship's company employed in making wads to increase the supply to the utmost. The enemy's

fleet on the starboard tack bearing from us S.E. by S. The enemy's fleet, 24 sail in number, standing towards us in a menacing way. Hove upon our springs, people at quarters ready to receive the enemy. The enemy tacked out of gun-shot and stood out to sea. A Russian frigate stood in with flag of truce to communicate.

23rd.—Enemy lying to in the offing. Hove short and got another spring on the cable.

24th.—Enemy in sight but more distant, and withal to windward, fresh breezes.

25th.—At 6 o'clock in morning weighed and run out to sea in company with Centaur. At 8 o'clock the Swedish fleet were all outside. Went on board the Admiral with Sir S. Hood; on return gave the Swedish Admiral three cheers—made all sail in chase of the Russian fleet far to windward. Swedes under all sail, but making very little progress to windward.

At noon Centaur and Implacable had gained on the Russian fleet, but now 12 miles to windward.

Under all sail. Observed two or three of the Russians to carry away topgallant yards and one of them topgallant masts, which were quickly replaced. Ship all ready for action, ready to take any advantage a favourable slant might offer. Hango Head N.E. 12 miles. At 2 o'clock enemy 10 miles to windward—Swedes and selves under all sail in chase, Swedes far to leeward.

26th.—At 12 o'clock midnight, fresh breeze and clearer, at 4 o'clock enemy's fleet from E.N.E. to E.S.E., Swedish fleet S.W. by W., 12 miles to leeward.

Observed the enemy's leewardmost ship, relying upon her good sailing, had closed nearer to us than the others, and made a push to cut her off; at 5.20 she crossed our bows on opposite tacks and fired a

broadside—tacked in her wake; she tacked again and we let fly a broadside into her when she was in stays; we tacked again and run alongside of her to leeward, within half-a-pistol shot, and renewed the action. We fired 3 shot—the enemy's fleet bore up to succour their ship—Centaur two miles on our lee beam. At 7.50 we had completely silenced the enemy and her ensign was down and pendant half-mast down. The leading ship of the enemy, a three-decker, having come within a gun-shot, Sir Samuel Hood made our signal of recall—the Swedes 12 miles to leeward. Finding our boats shot through, we could not take possession of enemy, and bore up to join the Admiral. Our opponent was greatly crippled, and with a signal flying—a large-frigate took her in tow. Our mizen mast very badly wounded so as to make it quite wonderful that it did not fall over the side; we had 6 men killed and 24 wounded. Employed repairing damages. At 9 made signal we were all ready again—made all sail with Centaur in chase of enemy, then steering for Port Baltic, sometimes called Rogerwick. Our opponent was so crippled that she could not reach the harbour and she anchored outside. The Russian fleet sent all their boats to tow her in, and had her in tow when the Centaur leading in, run her on board athwart her bows, and on our approach the enemy fired her lower deck guns at us and was soon in our possession. The two ships went on shore together on the beach, and we cut away both anchors, and being close to the Centaur had only scope to veer to half a cable; fortunately the ship floated just as they were about to come in contact or she would have been lost. The boats towed her out.

The Implacable was too near the shore to attempt to cast; but when the boats of the two ships

appeared to give her motion ahead, both cables were cut, and succeeded in getting off. Bent cables to sheet and spare anchor, and anchored in 39 fathoms.

26th and 27th.—Employed during the night removing the prisoners from the Russian ship, and at 6 on the morning of the 27th, all the prisoners having been removed, we set fire to the ship and completely destroyed her. The Swedish fleet joined company and anchored.

28th.—Employed repairing damages and making arrangement for the convenient accommodation of prisoners.

Bent new main-sail, new top-sails, and other sails, to replace those cut by shot.

29th.—Centaur and Swedish fleet in company, joined company the Salsette frigate and Magnet and Ariel sloops.

30th.—Noon several sail in sight in the W.N.W. —P.M. arrived the Victory, Sir J. Saumarez; Goliath, Mars, Africa, Cruiser sloop, and Thunder bomb.

31st.—Arrived the Rose, and Baltic cutter; employed landing the prisoners. The Russian fleet in the harbour using great efforts, as they had done from the moment of anchoring, for defence of the place.

Weighed and anchored further in. Recovered one of our bower-anchors and 20 feet of cable, and the spring hawser that was upon it. Died of his wounds, Patrick Brazel marine.

September 1st.—Erebus preparing as a fire-ship.

Sent boats to tow out the Salsette, she being under the guns of the enemy.

4th.—Departed this life, Cornelius Eastmoore, North Sea pilot, who died in consequence of the loss of his thigh in the action.

5th.—Carpenters preparing the Erebus, and Baltic cutter, as fire-vessels.

6th.—Captain Hope, captain of the fleet, having gone home, Captain Martin was appointed in his place. He rejoined Implacable in England after the campaign.

B. MARTIN TO SIR HENRY MARTIN, BART.

Plymouth, March 29th, 1808.

My dear Henry,—The easterly wind still detains the Implacable at Plymouth, and there is every prospect of its continuing to blow from the same quarter. If it would only moderate we should try to make some progress towards our destination, but to sail at present would only subject us to the risk of being driven out of the Channel. The Triumph, Edgar, and Sirius go with us to the Downs, where I expect to join Hood, and the Implacable is one of five sail intended to proceed as an advanced squadron under his orders, but this intention in confidence, as also that the ships from this port are directed to take as many flat-bottomed boats as they can stow, which looks as if we were to be associated with the soldiers, but I repeat that this is mentioned in confidence. It is impossible not to feel deeply interested about the King of Sweden, and in admiring his manly, and heroic spirit, we must deplore the insufficiency of his means to resist such gigantic enemies. The arrival of an English force in the Baltic seems in every point of view of the utmost importance, and an instant's delay ought to be considered as the blackest treason in those who are going there; much as I enjoy and delight in home, I heartily hope we may be able to sail to-morrow. It will be a new and interesting scene to me, and the admirals who are selected for the service will leave nothing undone

that can promote the glory of our country, or tend to the preservation of our magnanimous ally. I am sorry to say this easterly wind has occasioned great sickness at Plymouth, and specially on board the ships; I have lost several men, and others are in a very precarious state at the hospital, amongst them Mr. Phipps, a near relative of Lord Mulgrave's. The Implacable is tolerably well manned, and I am very well pleased with the officers.

Adieu, ever yours,

T. B. MARTIN.

B. MARTIN TO SIR HENRY MARTIN.

Implacable, Helsingborg, April 23rd, 1808.

My dear Henry,—It is not from a lack of inclination, or of inquiry, that I have nothing material to communicate to you of the movements of our neighbouring enemies, but the forbidden intercourse between this country and Denmark, which makes it difficult; and very seldom that we can collect anything like authentic intelligence of what is going on either in Zealand, Holstein, or Russia. And in respect to ourselves nothing has yet transpired tending to develop the views of Government in this quarter, further than the immediate protection of Sweden from invasion; and on this score there is not much to apprehend at present, for the Danes seem solely occupied in preparations of defence, and notwithstanding their boasted project of overrunning Sweden in conjunction with the troops of their magnanimous ally, they are busily employed in throwing up works at all the most assailable points of the Island (Zealand), and I believe it would be a matter of much satisfaction to his Danish Majesty to be certified that his best efforts would be proof against the united attack of British and Swedish troops.

An English army of 30,000 effective men, with 10,000 Swedes, would make Zealand a sure conquest, and I think any less decisive measure will disappoint the public expectation, and produce no event of consequence or credit to the country, and what is worse, any half measures would betray a want of cordiality in the cause of our faithful and noble-minded friend, the King of Sweden. Not a Frenchman is as yet on Zealand, and it is understood they have even withdrawn from Funen, and scattered their force in Holstein and Jutland: whether from want of provisions, or with an intention to steal over to Norway is not known, but the last is not improbable seeing our cruisers thickening so fast in the Belt and Sound. After what we have seen and heard in the last eighteen years, one ought not to be surprised that the footsteps of Frenchmen are marked by the same iniquity in the country of an ally as in any conquered province; but here they seem to exceed all former atrocities both in their general and personal insults. How long the Danes will bear with it, or how they will be able to prevent it, is more than I can tell; but with the exception of their King, and a few of his creatures, I believe there is a universal wish to free themselves from such a connection. The Swedish army of Finland remain at Uleaborg unmolested by their powerful adversaries, owing to the difficulty, or almost impossibility, of advancing in such an uncultivated tract of country. The Swedish General Klingspore in the course of his retreat was summoned to lay down his arms; the answer was, 'Come and take them.' Baron D'Armfelt is gone towards Norway at the head of 10,000 men, but the recent break-up of the frost greatly impedes his progress, and will make it some time before he can commence offensive operations. The Implacable, I am sorry to say, has been very

sickly. At this time we have fifty-seven men in the list with the same complaint which has been so prevalent and destructive in England: five have died since we sailed from Plymouth, and as no small augmentation of my troubles and anxiety, Arthur Fanshawe has had the measles, but is now entirely recovered, and the people are mending. The weather is yet very cold, and we are not to look for summer till the end of next month; they have no spring, and altogether I think it a miserable climate. We have no confirmation of Strachan's having been delighted again—nor anything in contradiction of it, except a report that the French fleet (thirty-one sail) were safely arrived at Corfu. Our last newspaper from England is of the 8th inst., brought out by the Goliath, and you may suppose we look with no small degree of impatience for more recent intelligence.

I long very much to know what is done, or doing, in respect to Joe; it is high time his business was decided, if the success of it depends upon the present Treasury.

It is uncertain how long we may remain at this anchorage, but probably till the arrival of Sir J. Saumarez, of whose sailing we are uninformed. The Centaur is our companion, and Goliath is between this place and Koll.¹ Give my kindest love to Lady M., Joe, and the girls.

I am, ever affectionately yours,

T. B. M.

The Danes are building a vast number of gun-boats at Copenhagen and Elsinore. They have already about thirty-five, and from the quantity of timber I see about it would be no difficult matter to have as many hundred by midsummer. Those at Elsinore have not yet attempted to fire upon us;

¹ Kullen of modern atlas.

they are frequently moving, but merely scudding along shore just as the wind happens to blow. Let me hear from you soon.

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN, BART.

Implacable, Helsingborg,
May 5th, 1808.

My dear Henry,—I have just now been amusing myself in ascertaining the diversity of human beings which compose the crew of a British ship of war, and as I think you will be entertained with a statement of the ridiculous medley, it shall follow precisely as their place of nativity is inserted in the ships' books: English 285, Irish 130, Welsh 25, Isle of Man 6, Scots 29, Shetland 3, Orkneys 2, Guernsey 2, Canada 1, Jamaica 1, Trinidad 1, St. Domingo 2, St. Kitts 1, Martinique 1, Santa Cruz 1, Bermuda 1, Swedes 8, Danes 7, Prussians 8, Dutch 1, Germans 3, Corsica 1, Portuguese 5, Sicily 1, Minorca 1, Ragusa 1, Brazils 1, Spanish 2, Madeira 1, Americans 28, West Indies 2, Bengal 2. This statement does not include officers of any description, and may be considered applicable to every British ship with the exception that *very* few of them have so *many native subjects*.

I am sorry to say the Swedes do not go on so prosperously in their warfare as those who respect the virtues and heroism of their King would wish. Baron D'Armfelt has recently experienced a check in his invasion of Norway and lost 80 men; but he maintains his ground with an intention to advance whenever the impediments occasioned by the thaw and consequent bad roads will enable him to do so in a compact and more rapid form than has been hitherto practicable. It is an essential point for them to conquer Norway lest the French by stealing

over handful of men at a time should at length collect in force and fall on the rear of the Swedes, but I believe if once the country is subdued we shall find it a difficult and unpleasant task when the general day of swapping arrives (if it ever does), in prevailing on our dear and valiant friend to step back into the *status ante bellum*, which no doubt will be required of him, but he will consider the cession of Norway as the least recompense for the unprovoked insult, hostility and injury on the part of the Danes.

There has also been some sharp fighting in Finland, and I fear to the disadvantage of the Swedes who are outnumbered, but nevertheless in the last affair of which we have heard, they made near 300 Russians prisoners, and what is spoken of as much to their military fame, these 300 men were part of a column intended to turn their right wing. While these operations have been going on in the east and west extremes of the kingdom, the Russians (no doubt prompted by the unwearied enterprise of the French) have approached Stockholm and now menace the capital in a most alarming manner—they have in the first instance possession of the island Aland at the entrance of the Gulf of Bothnia—and to our utter astonishment news reached this place a few days since of 4,000 Russians and French having effected a landing on the island of Gothland;¹ they were conveyed thither under the protection of a Russian line-of-battle ship and smaller vessels. It is much to be lamented that Sir S. Hood did not come here with a stronger squadron, and unluckily two ships, the Nassau and Stately, were so sickly as to induce him to order them to England—otherwise he would have been off

¹ This force was captured shortly afterwards.

Gothland before this enterprise was effected, but three times the number of English ships now here would not be sufficient to guard the Belt and Sound. Our friend is placed in a situation of great responsibility and trust, without any adequate means of fulfilling the public expectation, which I say is most cruel and unjust. But remember all I tell you is in confidence, that it does not go beyond the ears of the family. I could say much more upon this subject, but it will be prudent to defer doing so till we meet. The Danes have a line-of-battle ship, 3 Indiamen, 3 prams, and 21 gun-boats ready for service at Copenhagen, and a few armed boats lying just within us at Kronborg Castle, but they seem greatly deficient in the spirit of enterprise¹ or they might do mischief; when any convoy appears we send the ships' boats to protect them, and the Danes never venture to dispute the point, although a wasteful expenditure of powder and shot seems to make them very conceited of their unprofitable doings.

Your affectionately,
T. B. M.

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN.

Implacable, off the Koll, May 11th, 1808.

My dear Henry,—After spending five weeks as a guard-ship at Helsingborg, you may very well conceive the pleasure with which we enter upon more active service, and such as promises much variety, if not advantage, from the course of business there is in view; at all events the very move has awakened a feeling of hope, which amongst seamen

¹ They showed plenty of spirit later on in attacking our convoys, and even attacked frigates and smaller vessels with their gun-boats, capturing several sloops of war.

is the best stimulus to exertion and good humour, and I already see its influence on the *drones* in this ship, who begin to smile, and stir their stumps in a most becoming manner. I have been waiting some days for a wind to go upon a very interesting and flattering service, with a small squadron, but intelligence of a most deplorable nature having reached Sir S. Hood, from our Minister at Stockholm, he has reassumed the command, and after passing Kronborg Castle, without molestation, we have anchored here on our way towards the Belt. It appears that the strong fortress of Sweaborg in the Gulf of Finland, has fallen into the hands of Russia, through the treachery of Vice-Admiral Cronstedt; a wretch whose perfidy receives a deeper dye from the circumstance of his having been long enjoying the King's particular confidence and favour. This important post may be considered the direct high road from Russia to Stockholm, and covered under such a multitude of rocks, that no vigilance can hinder the transport of troops, so that the Swedish capital is in imminent danger of being sacrificed by the treason of this atrocious old scoundrel. To add to the calamity, the whole flotilla of Sweden is included in the surrender of Sweaborg, besides six thousand of the best troops. This loss is utterly irreparable, and by way of making mockery and treason go hand in hand, it is stipulated that the Flotilla shall be restored to Sweden when England gives up the Danish fleet. I have seen the Gazette, and an official detail of all that has occurred in Finland. The King mentions his having dismissed Admiral Cronstedt, and all who joined with him in the council of war, from his service—which I think bad policy, for they will now never return home to be hung. Something like a general action has taken place in Finland, in which the Swedes claim a decided victory, 400 prisoners,

a general, several officers, cannon, colours, and ammunition waggons, is stated to be the fruits of their attack, besides the glory of having defeated a Russian army of superior force ; but all this can scarcely be considered as a set-off against the calamity I have before stated. Thank you for the plan of Cronstadt, it may be very useful, and at all events it is what I very much wished to have.

T. B. M.

B. MARTIN TO SWEDISH CAPTAIN.

H.M.S. Implacable, at sea, May 26th, 1808.

Sir,—Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood has charged me to make inquiry of you respecting the state of Gothland, whether the enemy has effected any further landing on that island, and the force they are now supposed to have there, with such other particulars as you may be acquainted with. The Rear-Admiral is also desirous to obtain information respecting the naval force of the enemy either at sea or in the different ports of the Baltic.

It may be satisfactory to you to know that we were with the Swedish squadron off Rugen on Tuesday last.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient humble servant,
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To the Captain of his Swedish Majesty's ship, Manlicheten.

[*Copy of reply.*]

H. Swedish Majesty's ship Manlicheten,
May 26th, 1808.

Sir,—It is satisfying for me to let the Rear-Admiral know that the Russian force, about three

thousand soldiers, had capitulated and entirely vacuated the Isle of Gothland. We don't expect that they effect any further landing, because five hundred soldiers, one¹ battery of Wend's artillery, and some iron guns² of ours is in the place, besides the inhabitants of the island.³

I am sorry that I cannot give the Rear-Admiral information about the Russian forces; none of our cruisers has seen any of them. We suppose the fleet is in the Gulf of Finland.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient servant,
(Signed) O. A. NORMAN.

To Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.B.M.S. Implacable.

B. MARTIN TO SIR SAMUEL HOOD.

H.M.S. Implacable, off Windau (Coast of Courland),
June 4, 1808.

Sir,—I beg to acquaint you, that on the first inst. the boats of the Implacable captured a small Russian sloop from Libau, bound to Riga in ballast; the master of which informs me that there are no French troops at Windau, Libau or Memel, nor any unusual collection of force at either of those places.

I landed the prisoners under a flag of truce at Windau, and the inclosed is the copy of a letter⁴ which accompanied them; the commander's reply was verbal, expressive of his gratitude for the liberation of his countrymen, and he assures me that there was not an English prisoner in the neighbourhood of Windau.

^{1, 2, 3} This information is from His Excellency Count Lewenhaupt, the Swedish Ambassador in London.

⁴ Not found.

The Salsette being now in sight, I shall dispatch her to you without a moment's delay, and lose no time myself in the further execution of your orders.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient humble servant,
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Sir Samuel Hood, K.B., Rear-Admiral of the White, &c., &c., &c.

*By Thos. Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.M.S. Implacable.*

You are hereby required and directed to cruise in his Majesty's sloop under your command, between Libau and Danzig, for the purpose of observing any preparations the enemy may be making, and obtaining information of the assemblage of troops or vessels for the invasion of Sweden; and also to obstruct as much as possible the trade of his Majesty's enemies, taking care as opportunities may offer, or occasion may require, to communicate all useful intelligence or observations to Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, K.B., at the place of rendezvous herewith transmitted to you. You are to continue on this service until you receive further orders.

Given under my hand on board H.M.S. Implacable, this 7th day of June, 1808.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Capt. Morris, H.M. sloop Magnet.

B. MARTIN TO SIR HENRY MARTIN.

Implacable, off Danzig, June 9th, 1808.

My dear Henry,—Our cruise up the Baltic has been so dull and unproductive of intelligence, or any observation worthy of communicating, that I am

at a loss to think in what way I can make a letter acceptable to you—but take it as it comes, and although you may not get your penny's worth for your penny, you will at least acknowledge that I am unwilling to see a cessation of your already too languid correspondence.

After a very tedious and anxious passage through the Great Belt (*without the assistance of pilots*) we joined a Swedish squadron of three sail off Rugen, and from thence steered towards Bornholm, with an intention to get up the Baltic, and Gulf of Finland; but a cutter met us off this island, with despatches from Sir J. Saumarez, announcing a change of arrangement with the Swedish Government, by which the service we were destined upon was transferred to the Swedes fleet, while the guard of their own coast is given to the English; but Sir S. Hood thought it advisable to show ourselves up the Baltic, and immediately made for the coast of Courland, whither we were followed by a Swedish frigate (the *Bellona*) to request his return, as our too punctilious ally would not call in any of his detached squadrons till Sir Samuel made his appearance; at this time our boats were gone away with the *Salsette* frigate, and *Magnet*, into the Gulf of Livonia, to try if anything could be cut out of Riga; and I was left to cruise off Windau till their return, then to run down the south coast of the Baltic, and reconnoitre the ports of Libau, Memel, and Danzig, at neither of which could I discover any hostile preparations, or the prospect of being able to attack their vessels with any chance of success, or I should willingly have indulged a number of my cut-throat fellows, who seem to have an uncommon longing for such experiments. I did send the boats away twice to pay the Frenchmen a visit at Danzig, but each time the wind failed, and on

the last occasioned the ship being completely on a lee shore, in the Gulf of Danzig, when from the strength of the wind we were obliged to strike top-gallant masts, and carry a press of sail to get off. I should have mentioned that our boats took about twenty sail of small things at Riga ; but only four of them worth keeping, if they can be so considered, when I tell you that if the Agents are honest I shall get about £12. It is melancholy to think of the immense trade which so lately gave consideration to these ports, and now to behold the whole extent of coast from Riga downwards without even a fishing boat daring to venture out ; and such is the despotism of Bonaparte's agents, and the disgraceful servility of the Emperor Alexander, that the French Consul frequently goes to the Custom House, demands the inspection of their books, and threatens the vengeance of the little Corsican scoundrel if he entertains a suspicion of the least connivance at English speculation, which is still alive, although commerce seems to have perished. How long the imperial feelings of Alexander can bear such degradation, or mercantile avarice endure such privations, time only can show ; but I think Bonaparte's encroachments on Russian Poland will soon cook up another squabble, and he has paved the way to success by scattering Alexander's troops in every direction. I am ignorant of what is going on in Finland, Sweden, or Norway, nor do I know the least about our army under General Moore ; but I am sure if Zeeland is not possessed by the English, that the Swedes will be at the mercy of France in the winter, when our ships are driven from the Belt. The Swedish Navy is in a sad state, the ships are bad in themselves, and without anything to make them respectable in point of discipline ; perhaps they may be a match for the Russians, but certainly

contemptible in opposition to any well-organised
marine. T. B. M.

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.M. ship Implacable.*

Whereas I have thought it expedient for the good of H.M. service to take and employ the Russian prize sloop (name unknown, but now to be called the Humbug),¹ and man her with the seamen named in the margin, as a tender to his Majesty's ship Implacable, under my command.

This is therefore to require and direct you forthwith to repair on board the said sloop Humbug and take upon you the command of her accordingly, and to do your utmost to take, destroy, or annoy the trade of his Majesty's enemies.

You are to follow the orders of Captain Morris, of his Majesty's sloop Magnet, and when charged with despatches take great care not to be diverted from your course, and to have a weight constantly attached to the despatches ready to sink them if there is danger of their falling into the hands of the enemy.

Given under my hand on board H.M.S. Implacable, this 9th June, 1808.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Mr. John Jenkins, master's mate of H.M. ship Implacable, hereby appointed to command the Humbug sloop.

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.M.S. Implacable.*

Whereas it is necessary for the preservation of the health of the company of his Majesty's ship

¹ A very curious name to give a vessel, but so written in letter-book.

under my command (particularly as some scorbutic cases have been represented to me by the surgeon), that they should be supplied with fresh meat whenever the same can be procured, and there being no contractor, agent, or other instrument of the victualling at this place.

You are hereby required and directed to purchase, at the most reasonable rate possible, a proportion of fresh beef for the complement of the said ship, at the rate of five pounds per week for each man, during the time she may be in this port.

And you are further hereby required and directed to purchase twenty-two live oxen (with fodder for half the number for one week), eight of which are to be slaughtered on board his Majesty's ship under my command for the use of her company, and the remaining fourteen to be distributed to the ships of the squadron under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, in such proportions as he may be pleased to direct. And for the amount of the said fresh beef and live oxen you are to draw bills on the Commissioners for Victualling his Majesty's Navy, according to the printed instructions in that case provided. For doing which, this shall be your order and sufficient warrant.

Given under my hand on board his Majesty's ship *Implacable*, at Carlsrona, this 19th day of June, 1808.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN, Captain.

Mr. Allen Field,

Purser of H.M.S. *Implacable*.

H.M.S. *Implacable*, June 29th, 1808.

By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable.

You are hereby required and directed to accompany the Swedish ships under convoy of two sloops

of war belonging to that nation, off the Island of Sprogo, and follow the orders of Captain Graves, of H.M. ship Brunswick, for your further orders.

You are also to receive from H.M. sloop Rose seventeen men belonging to the Royal Marines, in order that they may join the Edgar, their proper ship.

Given under my hand at sea, June 29, 1808.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Captain Reynolds,
H.M. ship Tribune.

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.M.S. Implacable.*

You are hereby required and directed to accompany the Swedish convoy under the charge of two sloops of war belonging to that nation, through the Great Belt, and having so done, proceed in the execution of the orders you have received from Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, Commanding-in-Chief.

You are also to receive seventeen marines from the Tribune to join his Majesty's ship Edgar, their proper ship.

Given under my hand on board H.M.S. Implacable, at sea, June 29th, 1808.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Captain Mainwaring,
H.M.S. Tartarus.

Memorandum sent to Sir Samuel Hood, K.B.

July 1st, 1808.

The Exertion gun-brig, in standing in ahead of the Cruiser, run aground, and was attacked by a Danish schooner and two gun-boats; her fore mast and bowsprit are badly wounded, fourteen shot through her hull, and five men badly wounded. Captain Graves has sent the brig to Sir James

Saumarez, and it is supposed she will immediately go to England.

Captain Reynolds sent a flag of truce to the Commandant of Fehmern, who informed the officer of the Tribune that all the French troops had withdrawn from the Danish territory and marched to the southward.

The Cruiser is gone with the Tartarus to as far as Sprogo; she had only three tons of water and very little wood, which made it necessary for her to repair to that place to complete.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

*By Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, K.B.,
to B. Martin, &c., &c., &c.*

You are hereby required to cruise with his Majesty's ship under your command off Rugen, and use your best endeavour to defeat any object the enemy may have of moving troops from that part of the coast or near it to Zeeland, or to carry on operations against Sweden; also to give protection to any of the trade of his Majesty's subjects or his Allies passing, and annoyance to the enemy, stretching towards Moen. On the arrival of his Majesty's ship Dictator, you will direct Captain Campbell to take your station with the said ship, and you will proceed to join me off Eastholm, where you will also forward any despatches for me that may arrive.

Given on board the Centaur, at sea off Moen Island (Zeeland), 1 July, 1808.

(Signed) SAMUEL HOOD.

To Captain Martin, of his Majesty's ship Implacable.

By command of the Admiral,

J. H. CLULOW.

A copy of the above order sent to Captain Campbell, July 9th, 1808.

ADMIRAL SIR R. G. KEATS TO B. MARTIN.

Superb, in the Great Belt, July 7th, 1808.

My dear Sir,—I take the chance of a convoy going eastward to acknowledge the receipt of your obliging letter of the 12th, which reached me at Gottenburg, which place I left on the 3rd—the same day Sir John Moore, with the forces under his command, took its departure under the protection of Audacious, for England. This has terminated the military part of the expedition to Sweden; and although I fear circumstances not pleasant led to its precipitate return, still—as I do not understand they originated in any change of political sentiments on the part of his Swedish Majesty—I should hope no interruption to the harmony between the two countries will ensue from it, but in these ticklish times one cannot be too suspicious perhaps. I wish much to hear your recent information confirmed, and, indeed—if there is yet any spirit or strength left in Russia—it must be evident that the present affords a moment more favourable for its exertion that it was fair to expect would so soon occur. I am sorry I have not my papers to send to you. Our last accounts from England were dated February 22, at which time it seems hopes were still entertained that the Spaniards would give the fleet up to us.¹ I acknowledge I have never indulged a belief of that sort; though if our papers are at all to be depended upon, Bonaparte has roused a spirit in Spain that he may find very difficult to subdue. The Belt is become my headquarters, and hitherto a peaceable one; though from the rapidly increasing numbers of their gun-boats I should much question if they will allow any of us to be quiet much longer. Sir James Taverney was to leave Gottenburg on the

¹ The French ships at Cadiz, refugees from Trafalgar.

4th for the Sound. If you come this way I shall have much pleasure in shaking you by the hand. Intermediately, accept the kindest wishes of

My dear Sir,

Your faithful and obedient

R. G. KEATS.

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN, BART.

July 11th, 1808.

My dear H.,—The confidential manner in which I have been put in the possession of some authentic facts relative to the very extraordinary result of General Moore's conference with the King of Sweden, and the precariousness of our communication either by sea or land, restrains my desire to gratify you with the detail of an event of such moment; but I may venture, without any breach of trust or risk of being subject to impeachment of treason, to say that as there was no visible change of political sentiments on the part of his Swedish Majesty previous to Sir John Moore's interviews, so there is good grounds to hope their misunderstanding may be explained and adjusted without detriment to the friendship subsisting between the two countries, provided the affair is truly represented and considered with that calmness and temper which is due to a matter of such importance as a good understanding with our last remaining ally at this critical juncture. It seems to me to have been an unfortunate meeting of two high-minded and honourable men, each smarting under the sting of disappointment—the one that his campaign had been unsuccessful, the other that his views of acquiring glory in the mountains of Norway had been obstructed. But to a sovereign—the intimate ally of one's own King—nothing surely can justify any

expression of disrespect, much less of reproach. The King of Sweden quitted his capital on the 1st instant, having appointed a Council to conduct public business during his absence, but without permitting a creature to know what object could have prompted him to so sudden a measure. It is believed his yacht took a course towards Finland, where he certainly has an army, and a fleet also, of eleven sail of the line. The Russians have about the same number—excuse ambiguity. I can always trust to your comprehension.

I am willing to ascribe the King's voyage up the Baltic to the very best of motives, and I persuade myself it will soon appear that he is gone to rouse the Russian Bear to a sense of the advantages the present state and temper of Europe offers to him, if he has any spirit or honour left. You folks in England will no doubt form many conjectures of what may come to pass here, and I hope give us credit for being prepared for the worse.¹

Endorsed.—Baltic, July 1808, about Sir John Moore.

B. MARTIN TO MR. DRUSENA.

His Britannic Majesty's ship Implacable, off Pillau,
July 30th, 1808.

Sir,—It gives me great pleasure to open a communication with you through the obliging offices of Mr. Steenke,² whose readiness to deliver a letter to you induces me to say that I shall gladly avail myself of every opportunity to transmit you such intelligence as I may from time to time receive of the interesting transactions going on in Spain.

¹ A good account of Sir John Moore escaping from arrest by the King at Stockholm is given in Saumarez, *Memoirs*, ii. 102.

² Head of the pilot service at Pillau.

The date of my last London paper (which is not now on board) was of the 9th of July, and contained a statement of the success which attended the loyal and patriotic exertions of the Spaniards; and as Prussia and England cannot but have the same feelings at this momentous crisis, I will venture to congratulate you on the very pleasant prospect which is thrown open to us by the heroic example of an insulted and oppressed people.

I am perfectly aware of the delicacy of addressing you under present circumstances, and I shall be glad if you will put me in the way of doing so in a confidential manner, assuring you that any person that may be sent to this ship will experience the most friendly treatment.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your very humble servant,

T. B. MARTIN,

Commanding his Majesty's ship the Implacable.

[For fear of exposing Mr. Drusena at Konigsberg to detection this letter did not bear any name, but was to be delivered into his hand.]

P.S.—I send you a copy of the King of England's Order in Council, suspending hostilities against Spain, and also the latest English papers I have; and copies of the declaration of the Spanish Junta and their address to the people of Portugal.

I understand you have intelligence of the successful attack which the Spaniards made on the French fleet in Cadiz.

B. MARTIN TO MR. DRUSENA, LATE CONSUL AT KONIGSBERG, UNDER NAME OF H. HAHN.

Implacable, July 30th, 1808.

Sir,—I am very thankful for the information contained in your letter of this morning, and rejoice

at that part of it which relates to the temper manifested by the people of Poland. I trust the time is not far distant when all nations will feel disgusted with French tyranny, and direct their vengeance against that atrocious murderer Bonaparte.

It is probable I may be off Pillau again in the course of a few days, and shall feel much obliged by your sending me any news which may in the meantime arrive from Poland or Spain, and the boat which brings it shall carry back to you whatever intelligence I may receive of the transactions in the latter country.

I wish it were in my power to comply with your request to have licenses, to ship timber, &c., but no such authority is delegated to captains of English men-of-war.

The vegetables sent off by Mr. Steenke are very acceptable, and if you can send a much larger supply by a fishing boat to-morrow morning, the person who brings them shall be paid their value. I send by Mr. Steenke the amount of your charge for those now sent on board, and by his hands return the newspapers, as there is no person on board sufficiently acquainted with the German language to make use of them.¹

I am, &c.,
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

*(Extract of a Letter) from Byam Martin to
Sir R. G. Keats, July 30, 1808.*

I have not seen the Salsette or Magnet. The Implacable reconnoitred Danzig the 20th, and made

¹A proof of the necessity of knowing foreign languages and better inducements being held out to officers to qualify as interpreters than at present exists.

no discovery of importance. I have opened a communication with Pillau by a cutter belonging to the King (of Prussia), and have so good an understanding with the captain that I can send anything into the country you may wish. I have sent the particulars of what is going on in Spain and the King's proclamation.

Much murmuring in Prussia at the treatment they experienced from the French. About twelve thousand French are in the neighbourhood of Danzig. The Prussian army fifty thousand strong; those who were on leave are called in. A very large Russian army is in Poland. No certainty about the Spanish troops, but some supposed to be still in Pomerania. No French troops at Kolberg. General Blucher has twelve thousand Prussians at Triptau. A courier passed through here yesterday with good accounts from Spain, and pushed directly on for St. Petersburg.

I am, Sir,
Your obedient humble servant,
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To R. Admiral Keats, &c., &c., &c.

BYAM MARTIN TO SIR R. G. KEATS.

H.M. Ship Implacable, Brosterort, S.W. 8 leagues,
August 2nd, 1808.

Sir,—The Ranger being about to return off Bomholm, gives me an opportunity of transmitting to you the copy of two letters which I have addressed to you, since my arrival in the Gulf of Danzig. The first was sent by an empty sloop, which I detained, and the other by a galliott from Konigsberg, bound to England.

After having reconnoitred Danzig on the 27th ulto., I stood towards Pillau in the hope of intercepting some fishing boats, that I might quietly convey to the shore a copy of his Majesty's Orders in Council, proclaiming peace with Spain, and also several copies of the declaration of the Spanish Junta, and their address to the people of Portugal; Mr. Canning's statement of the liberal and unqualified support Great Britain would give to their patriotic exertions, and with such details of the success which had attended the Spaniards as I could collect; but the weather having proved unfavourable for taking any fishing boats, I stood in with the ships two or three different times, without chasing any of their small vessels, and in all matters showing so peaceable a demeanour, that I was fortunate enough to excite the confidence I wished, and on the 31st ulto. a small cutter came out with a very intelligent man, Mr. Steenke, harbour-master and chief of the pilots at Pillau, and finding from this gentleman that Mr. Drusena, the late English Consul, was residing at Konigsberg, I thought it desirable to invite him to a communication, which might enable me to obtain some useful information, and herewith you will receive a copy of my letter to him sent through the hands of a Mr. Hay at Pillau, with two letters from the last-mentioned gentleman, and one from a Mr. Gibson. I trust I may have the satisfaction to obtain your approval of what has been done in this business, since it has unquestionably given great spirit to the people in this part of the country, and afforded them a knowledge of the transactions in Spain, of which they had before but a very vague account.

The Prussian army is said to be growing to a very formidable force, but the want of money and

arms prevents their recruiting so rapidly as it is wished.

I am, Sir, your obedient humble servant,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Rear-Admiral Keats, &c., &c., &c.

BYAM MARTIN TO MR. DRUSENA.

H.M.S. Implacable, August 10, 1808.

Sir,—It is uncertain when I may be able to call off Pillau again, but in the interim Captain Acklom, of the *Ranger*, will, from time to time, communicate with you in such a manner as to evade a suspicion of that intercourse which seems so mutually gratifying. I don't know any more secure mode of conveying our letters than through the hands of Mr. Hay, but Captain A. will be guided by whatever hints may be given to him on the subject.

The news which you will herewith receive from Spain cannot fail to excite the most lively pleasure and exultation in the bosom of every honest, well-disposed man, and as I trust the North of Germany abounds with inhabitants of this description, it is impossible to make an estimate of the benefit which would result from a quick and extensive circulation of the declarations I sent to you, and extracts from the accompanying newspapers, translated into the language most commonly understood throughout Prussia, Poland and Russia. To a person wishing so ardently as you do for the downfall of French tyranny, it must be highly satisfactory to find that in your retirement at Königsberg you may thus be contributing as essentially towards the common cause as if you were actually heading one of the Patriotic Legions in Spain. It is of all things desirable to get some Spanish translations sent to

the troops of that nation in Pomerania, or wherever they may be. Now is the time for general exertion, enthusiasm I should say, to break the chains with which France has enslaved the Continent. The example of Russia would animate all, and I trust ere this she is doing something more than put on an hostile appearance towards France.

I must entreat you to furnish Captain Acklom with intelligence of what is going on upon the Continent. A letter left to his address at Mr. Hay's can very easily be sent off either by Mr. Steenke or a fishing boat.

I am, Sir, your very humble servant,
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

Mr. Drusena, Konigsberg.

Remarks on, and Proceedings with, the Swedish Fleet, and Capture of Sevobod.

August 22nd, 1808.

My private remarks since joining the Swedish fleet in Oro Road, in the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia, on the 20th of August, 1808.

Sunday, 21st, I accompanied Sir Samuel Hood and Captain Webley on a visit to Rear-Admiral Nauckhoff. The conversation the Admirals held was entirely with reference to the state of the fleet, and the force of the enemy. Sir Samuel strongly urged the most active preparations for an attack upon the Russian fleet which was then in sight, at anchor under Hango Head. It did not appear to me either from the language or subsequent conduct of the Swedes that they intended to be very quick in getting ready for sea, although it was their duty to have been so long before, since it appeared they had been eleven days in sight of the enemy. A great number of sick had been landed on the small islands

around the anchorage, and by what I learnt from the captain of the fleet the ships could not be ready in less than five days, and at all events would not move till joined by three sail of the line from Jungfurt Sound. The Swedish force at this anchorage consisted of eight sail of two-decked ships (two without poops), three frigates, a brig, and a cutter. One of the line-of-battle ships was in so sickly a state as to be under orders to return to Carlsrona. The others were also sickly and inefficient to a degree that astonished me. There were very few seamen in the fleet; the crews are formed chiefly of men drawn by law from the different provinces, wretchedly clothed, and with a pay of 4s. per month! It is no wonder that such men are already eaten up with scurvy. I made every inquiry of the captain of the fleet (Krusenstjerna) respecting the strength of the Russian fleet, and plainly discovered that the Swedes had never taken the trouble to reconnoitre them; although the multitude of islands which lie between the two fleets afforded the utmost facility to do so with the greatest accuracy and security. Captain Krusenstjerna assured me the Russians had no three-deckers, and when I told him we had received what might be esteemed almost authentic intelligence of their having two, he persisted in saying it was otherwise, and added that Admiral Henikoff's flag was in a seventy-six gun ship, and that his fleet consisted of thirteen or fourteen sail of the line.

The impression made upon my mind by this visit without any prejudice or previous disposition to think ill of the Swedes was certainly as unfavourable as it was possible to be, nor did I conceal from Sir Samuel Hood and Captain Webley on our return how much I was struck by such an absence of all energy, and evident deficiency of everything that could tend to make the Swedish force efficient, and worthy to

co-operate with British ships. The first impression is said to have great weight; but I have observed and judged without prejudice on further acquaintance, though unhappily without any improved opinion of them.

From the 21st to the 24th the Swedes got on slowly in their preparations, and on that day the three sail under Admiral Jagerfelt arrived from Jungfru Sound, with another frigate. The afternoon of the 24th the Russian fleet advanced towards the anchorage occupied by the Centaur and Implacable as if with a determination to attack us, and the menace was conducted so boldly that we were prepared, if necessary, to cut and form a junction with the Swedes at their anchorage four miles within; but in the mean time the two ships hove upon the springs on the cables and almost filled up the passage, presenting their formidable broadsides to the enemy. At two o'clock the Russian fleet tacked and stood off, still preserving the blockade, but keeping more to the eastward than they had for the three preceding nights during which they had been under sail. They had obtained what seemed chiefly required by this manœuvre—an exact knowledge of our force; and this they had particularly from a frigate that was sent in with a flag of truce for no other purpose. The Russian who was the bearer of the letter to Sir Samuel Hood had only been a few months from on board his Majesty's ship *Flora*, Captain Maitland, where he had been serving a long time, so that his observations were probably correct.¹

At daylight on the 25th the Swedish Admiral made the signal to weigh, and by half-past eight

¹ The same occurred when Sir G. Hornby was at the Princess Islands, off Constantinople—the Russian pretended not to speak English, but was recognised by one of his late messmates. One of the evils of admitting foreign officers to our Navy.

o'clock his fleet had contrived to get tolerably well together outside of the Benskar Rock, when the Centaur and Implacable being near the Gustaff-Adolf gave Admiral Nauckhoff three hearty cheers in order to stir up among the Swedes the same noble spirit so conspicuous on board the British ships. After this I went with Sir Samuel Hood to the Swedish Admiral, and it having been agreed that the British ships should attack the three-deckers, we returned to our respective vessels, and forthwith commenced a general chase, the enemy being so far to windward as to be but indistinctly seen from the deck, and at the time standing towards us, but they soon hauled up and made all sail to windward.

The Swedish ships not being coppered were soon left far astern; and finding the Implacable sailed better than the Centaur, I determined to quit my appointed station astern of the Admiral and push on, observing at the time that if Sir Samuel Hood disapproved of it, he would say so by signal; but he very handsomely allowed us to have all the benefit of the Implacable's better sailing. The chase continued all night, but before the close of day we had gained so much on the enemy as to give a reasonable hope of bringing them to action in the morning, provided the Swedes should be sufficiently at hand to support us, which was certainly not much to be expected, seeing the various disasters that had befallen them in tacking; but in truth everything they did was awkward to an extreme degree.


The navigation in the Gulf of Finland being very confined, and a weather chase making it necessary to tack very frequently, gave us a decided advantage, and it was astonishing how much was gained on the enemy in every tack we made. At 2 o'clock in the morning we were so close upon the rear ship that I thought it right to shorten sail till the Centaur

closed nearer, being more than 3 miles to leeward. At 4 o'clock the courses were again set, and we soon crossed within gunshot of the leewardmost ship of the Russian fleet, but without firing on either side; and seeing that she must very soon tack again on account of the nearness of the land, the Implacable was immediately put in stays in the hope of getting a position under the stern of the Russian when she again tacked; but seeing what was intended, and determined to counteract this manœuvre, put his helm down just as we hauled the main-yard; his bad management, however, enabled the Implacable to fetch close up under his lee quarter before the ship had gathered way. In this position the Russian ship opened a good smart fire, and she presently received a very handsome return for it, and our helm was again put down to follow in the wake of the enemy. After coming about, I was desirous to fetch to windward of the Russian ship and if possible to force her down upon the Centaur, then about 2 miles on our lee beam, while we closed with a three-decker without a poop which was the next ship to us of the Russian fleet, then about a mile and a half to windward. The wind was too scant to accomplish this desirable point, and after keeping the ship very close to the wind to try it, she was edged away and passed a few feet from the lee quarter of the enemy, when a broadside with three shot in every gun (except the carronades which had only one) was poured into her with tremendous effect, and the two ships continued abreast of each other for a time, but unfortunately the Implacable forged ahead more than was desirable although the sails were backed to prevent it; she presently recovered her position abreast the enemy, and our fire seemed to tear the ship to pieces. The captain of marines told me there was not a creature on the


quarter-deck of the Russian, and one of the men came down from our foretop to report the same. The Russian ship had her ensign twice shot away, and after the last time when it was probably hauled down the pendant was lowered in token of surrender. At this time the whole of the Russian fleet was coming down upon us before the wind, and the advanced ship, a three-decker, not far off; and the Centaur having our signal up to discontinue the action, and of recall, and the boats which were ordered to be lowered down to take possession of the enemy having been damaged in the action, I was constrained to abandon a ship so completely beaten and bore up to close with the Admiral.

The body of the Swedish fleet was at this time about ten miles to leeward, and others further off, but the *Camilla*, Swedish frigate, was a couple of miles only to leeward of the Centaur. On closing with the Centaur she gave us three cheers; and I had the gratification to meet the most cordial reception from Sir Samuel Hood, with the warmest expressions of approbation of what he had witnessed.

The *Implacable* had suffered in her rigging and sails, and the mizen mast was so severely wounded, that it was extraordinary it could stand until it was fished; but the water was as smooth as a millpond. In thirty-five minutes the exertions of the officers and men enabled me to report by signal that we were ready to renew the action, whereupon the Admiral threw out the signal to make all sail, and instantly set his courses. We set everything but the mizen topsail, which could not be done until the mizen mast was fished. At this time the ship we had engaged continued in a most disabled and distressed state, and was taken in tow by a very large frigate, but the Centaur's approach obliged the frigate to cast off



The Russian Ship SEVOLOED, 74 guns, striking her colours to H.M.S. IMPLACABLE, 74 guns, Captain T. Byam Martin, on the 26th AUGUST, 1808; in the Baltic.



her tow, and the disabled ship made for the shore in the best way she could, and the land being at the time at a short distance, the whole Russian fleet pushed into Rogerwick, or Port Baltic as it is commonly called, where they anchored, leaving our crippled adversary unable to fetch in, and obliged to anchor outside and to leeward of the port. In the evening about 9 o'clock, soon after the Russian had anchored, I observed an immense number of boats with the disabled ship in tow, which I made known by signal, when the Admiral pushed in with great gallantry, and run on board the Russian ship. The boats made their escape on the approach of the Centaur, but a great number of men had been put on board the Russian to supply the place of those killed in the action with the Implacable.

The Centaur and the Russian ship went on shore together stem on upon the beach, the former having run on board the enemy with considerable velocity, and this untoward circumstance occurred while the Centaur was in the very act of boarding the enemy. The Implacable was following so close to the Centaur that when she took the ground they were but little more than a half a cable's length apart; and in order to give the Implacable a greater power to heave the Centaur off, both anchors were at once cut away, but we were so near that only half a cable could be veered out. Stream cables and hawsers were immediately passed from both ships for the purpose of bringing to the capstan of each ship, and also to bring to on purchases to haul by hand. When the Centaur floated, the sterns of the two ships were nearly in contact, so that if she had not started at the moment, the ship would have been lost; the ships were so close that, holding by the gaff signal halliards I stepped on board the Centaur to see the Admiral. When the Centaur

was towed out some distance, the difficulty was in being able to extricate the Implacable, as the wind was very light, and under any circumstances the ship was too near the shore to attempt to cast with the air of wind in the direction it was. As many of the boats of both ships as were in a condition to swim had tow-ropes ahead after we had weighed one anchor and hove short upon the other. When the efforts of the boats showed that they had power to draw the ship ahead by bringing the cable up and down, the cable was then cut, and by immense exertion the boats towed us out.

While all this was going on, the Russian fleet had got under sail, and, with everything set, were steering down upon us. Happily the wind continued very light; though I do believe that, coming down upon the broadsides of the two ships, they would have been cut up severely, particularly by advancing with a light air. The moment the Implacable had anchored, the boats were employed taking the prisoners out of the Russian ship (the Sevobod), and that done, she was set on fire, and burned for several hours before she blew up. The following day the Swedish fleet anchored near us, and on August 30th—in the afternoon—the Victory, Goliath, Mars, and Africa arrived, the former bearing the flag of Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, the commander-in-chief. Captain Hope having previously gone to England, I was appointed captain of the fleet, and went on board the Victory; my old first lieutenant—Pipon, in the Fisguard—was made Post into the Implacable.

In the action with the Sevobod on the morning of the 26th, the Implacable had six men killed and twenty-four wounded; the Centaur, in the evening, had two killed and several wounded.

The Russian fleet consisted of the following ships¹ :—

	Guns.		Guns.
Blagadoth	120	Argus	50
Gabriel	110	St. Theodore	44
North Star	74	Scharlivoy	44
Amgelten	74	Pollux	24
St. Anna	74	Castor	24
Boreas	74	Hermione	20
Eagle	74	Melpomene	20
Sevolod (taken)	74	Woltoff	18
Michael	74	Lizette	18
Hero	50	Two Corvettes.	
Rapid	50	Two Cutters.	

The Russians had been very active fortifying their position, and with assistance had made it strong before Sir James Saumarez had arrived ; nevertheless he was exceedingly anxious to attack the enemy.

If by any good fortune Sir James, with his four sail of the line, had arrived immediately after the Russians had taken shelter in Port Baltic, this might have been practicable ; but the enemy had moved their anchorage so close in, that it would have been very difficult to have made an attack without the risk of getting on shore.

Sir James consulted me verbally on the point, and felt that the chance of success was greatly diminished ; but still his ardent mind made him desirous to make an effort, and he said he wished to have the opinion of Sir Samuel Hood and myself in writing.

B. MARTIN TO SIR S. HOOD.

H.M. ship Implacable, off Rogerwick,
August 26th, 1808.

Sir,—The action this morning between the Implacable and the rear ship of the Russian line

¹ From a list in B. Martin's writing.

was so immediately under your own observation that it would be superfluous to trouble you with any statement upon that point ; but in transmitting a list of killed and wounded, I trust I may be allowed the opportunity to express my thankfulness to the officers and ship's company of the Implacable for their eager and active exertions to close with the enemy, and the truly noble and spirited conduct which they displayed during the engagement ; but it is my duty to acknowledge in a more particular manner the great assistance I derived from Mr. Baldwin, the first lieutenant, and Mr. Moore, the master ; and if the fact of our opponent being completely silenced, and her colours (both ensign and pennant) down when the approach of the whole Russian fleet occasioned your recalling me, can tend to make that affair worthy of being distinguished by any mark of approval from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, it is impossible their patronage can be bestowed upon a more thoroughly deserving officer than Mr. Baldwin.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Sir S. Hood, K.B., Rear-Admiral of the White, &c., &c., &c.

Translation from the 'Stockholm Gazette.'

Headquarters at Grelsby, 3rd of September, 1808.

The first of this month his Royal Majesty received, by Captain Rundquist and the English Lieutenant Thompson, the following report from Rear - Admiral Nauckhoff and Rear - Admiral Hood :—

‘The departure of the fleet was, in convention with Rear-Admiral Hood, fixed on the 25th August. The plan of attack was arranged, and in order to facilitate the communication between the two fleets, Admiral Hood sent Lieutenant Thompson (a distinguished officer who, in the same honourable manner as his Admiral, has lost his right arm in battle) on board with the English signals and telegraph; I ordered the Count de Rosen to embark on board the English Admiral’s ship.

‘The 25th, at a quarter past 5 in the morning, the English and this ship weighed and made sail. The rest of the fleet came as soon as possible after, so that by 7 o’clock the whole of the fleet was outside of the Rocks. The wind was N.E., and N.E. by N., with fresh breezes, and at 8 o’clock it came a little more E.N.E. and E. by N., when all sail was set and general chase given to the enemy, which we could now only distinguish from the masthead, 23 sail in number.

‘The signal to prepare for action was made at half-past 7. The line of battle was formed, but as it retarded the chase, a signal was made that the fleet should make the best of their way without attention to the heavy sailing ships. At half-past 3 in the afternoon the signal was repeated for the Frederick Adolph to separate and go to Carls-crona.

‘The two English vessels, which were copped and good sailers, got ahead a great deal. His Majesty’s fleet, nevertheless, gained so much on the enemy that at sunset we were 5 or 6 leagues from them. During the whole of the night we worked about without signals or lights. The chase continued with all sail, without taking in reefs in this vessel. At daylight the 26th, the English ship Implacable, and not far from her Sir Samuel Hood in the

Centaur, had come up in the wake of the enemy's sternmost ship. The frigates of his Majesty had, by change of wind in the night, lost upon their tacks, so that they were not much more to windward than this ship. Major Fischerstind, with the ship Tapperheten, was most to windward and not more than one and a half leagues from the English. The brave Admiral Hood, however, made his best endeavours to join the enemy. At 5 o'clock Captain Martin, of the Implacable, passed to leeward of the rear ship of the enemy, who gave him their broadsides. The Implacable continued her course a sufficient distance ahead of the enemy's ship, then tacked about, passed, and gave her a broadside in the bows, with three shot in each gun, and another in the side, then tacked again and gave her also another in the stern. Admiral Hood now came up nearer to her, but he was obliged to keep in his fire in order that the Implacable might not receive any injury from him. The enemy's ship appeared with sails shot and flying away, and had already been taken if the others had not come before the wind to her assistance. Three of them were already within gunshot of Sir Admiral Hood before he kept before the wind some cables' lengths, and then hove to for only 10 or 15 minutes to wait for his Majesty's fleet, which did all that lay in their power to come up. The enemy hauled to the wind and continued its former course at the same instant that Sir Samuel Hood hove to. The ship Tapperheten and the frigates came now up in the dead-water of Admiral Hood, who, with his two ships, was about half a German mile ahead of them, continuing the chase with all sail set, to force the enemy to a general action which, to all appearance, would have cost them their whole fleet. By the brave and admirable effort of the English Admiral and his captains the enemy could not have

avoided an engagement if the wind at 9 o'clock had not changed to N.E., by which the retreat to Port Baltic was opened. The enemy entered at half-past 11 with their whole fleet, except the vessel which the Implacable engaged, which anchored at the entrance, close to the Island of Rogo. Admiral Hood went to her and got aground, but by the timely assistance of the Implacable, which anchored at her stern, she soon came off, and at the same moment she approached the enemy's ship¹ and entangled her bowsprit in her main rigging, cut off her cable, and gave a broadside in her bow, boarded and took her, and finding she was of no use from being so much cut up, they set her on fire the next morning, after taking out the prisoners. That the fleet of his Majesty during the well made and forced chase after the enemy has done everything that was possible is, besides my testimony, fully shown by the annexed letter from Admiral Hood.

'The conduct of the English Admiral, and his two Captains, Martin and Webley, surpasses everything my pen is able to write. A few examples are perhaps to be found, in the English naval history of such a brave and intrepid enterprise, as for two ships to engage a fleet of 9 sail of the line and 12 frigates at such a distance from and without assistance from the rest of the fleet, and at last, in 20 minutes, to take and destroy a ship of 74 guns.'

Endorsed.—'Swedish Gazette,' respecting the action with the Russian fleet, 26th of August, 1808.

Sir Henry Martin, Bart., 26 Upper Harley Street, Cavendish Square, London.

¹ The Centaur grounded after having been on board the enemy. It was her cable parting which threw them both on shore, and then the Implacable hove her off.

Translation of a Letter from the King of Sweden to Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood, dated Head-quarters at Grelsby, 5th September, 1808.

Rear-Admiral Hood,—Your letter of the 28th of August, with the papers that accompanied it, was delivered to me on the evening of the 1st of this month by Lieutenant Thompson, together with the pendant that was flying on board the Russian line-of-battle ship the *Sevolod*, when she was captured by you on the 26th of the same month.

I cannot sufficiently express to you the great satisfaction I have felt on hearing of your gallant conduct against the common enemy, and that of your officers and ships' companies under your orders; and notwithstanding your personal sentiments, and the naval glory which had already distinguished you, previously assured me that you were about to gather fresh laurels on this occasion, yet so active a zeal and such honourable exertions have paved the way for your success, that you are thus doubly entitled to my distinguished esteem.

I have determined to send to the King your Sovereign, the flag which you have offered me, because it has been captured by his men-of-war; and at the same time I shall ask the consent of his Britannic Majesty, for you and the principal officers under your command to accept the marks of approbation which it is my intention to give you.

(Signed) GUSTAF ADOLPH.

[MEMO.]

Centaur, Carlsrona Harbour, October 12, 1808.

The Commander-in-Chief, Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, having transmitted to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty my letter detailing my proceedings with the ships under my orders,

and the squadron under Rear-Admiral Nauckhoff in chase of the Russian squadron, and he having received their Lordships' directions to express to me their highest approbation of the most distinguished and gallant conduct of his Majesty's ships under my orders in the action above-mentioned.

Their Lordships have further directed the Commander-in-Chief to express to you, the officers and ships' companies of the *Centaur* and *Implacable*, their approbation of your and their conduct, which he has directed me to communicate to you and them, from him, and also to signify to Lieutenants Lawless and Thompson of the *Centaur*, and Lieutenant Baldwin of the *Implacable*, that their Lordships have been pleased to promote them to the rank of Commander for their meritorious services on this occasion, and I have to request you will be pleased to communicate the same to the officers and ships' companies you respectively command, and to the lieutenants of the ships whose names are mentioned.

(Signed) SAM. HOOD.

To Captain Martin, of his Majesty's ship *Implacable*, and Captain Webley, of his Majesty's ship *Centaur*.

T. B. MARTIN TO SIR HY. MARTIN.

Implacable, August 27, 1808.

My dear Henry,—Your curiosity upon all naval affairs, and particularly those in which I have any concern, makes me regret the very short notice I have of an opportunity to send letters to England, or I should have pleasure in giving you a detail of our proceedings since coming in sight of the Russian fleet on the 19th inst., on which day the *Implacable* chased three of their frigates, and was gaining on them at the rate of about three feet to one, when it came perfectly calm and they were enabled to escape


by the help of those abominable things called sweeps, *alias* large oars. The following day we came in sight of the Swedish fleet, seven sail of the line and three frigates lying at anchor thirteen miles from Hango Head, where the Russian fleet of nine sail of the line and fourteen frigates and sloops lay menacing our friends with an attack, nor did our junction with the Swedes make any manifest alteration in this bold resolution, and they had the audacity to stand within five miles of us on the 23rd inst., seemingly with intention to risk a battle under circumstances which betokened the courage of a Nelson without a particle of that great man's judgment. However, the Russians thought better of the business and stood out to sea, and at daylight the following morning we led the Swedes in pursuit of them, when, to the astonishment of all, the Russians pressed off to windward in the greatest haste. At this instant Hood and I went for a moment to the Swedish Admiral. A general chase was agreed upon, and a plan adopted in case of being able to force them to an action. After pursuing them all the day and during the following night, the Implacable was able to close with the rear ship of the enemy, and having worked within pistol shot, we threw into him such a mass of iron as seemed almost to tear the fellow rib from rib. The object in attacking this ship was to try and provoke them to a general action, for the parity of sailing between the squadrons left no chance of doing so but by worrying the lee ships and drawing down the weather ones to protect them. The Gabriel, a three-decker mounting 110 guns, was about two miles to windward, the Centaur as much to leeward of us, and the Swedes twelve miles beyond. Had they been nearer the Russians could not have avoided an action or must have abandoned their rear ships. The Gabriel's signal, I find, was made twice to assist

our opponent, and at length the whole fleet bore down upon us, but not till we had taken forty-five minutes' beating at the fellow and actually compelled him to strike; when Hood, seeing our critical situation, called me off, and a Russian frigate was obliged to tow off the shattered ship, while their fleet endeavoured to cover her retreat into port; but it was three hours before a sail was set, and at length the enemy thought it wise to push into port lest we should play a trick with others of their party, as we should most assuredly if he had made one more tack from the shore. The lame bird being unable to reach port, anchored in an exposed situation, which enabled Hood in the evening to perform the most determined, well-arranged, glorious act that I think our naval history can boast of. He stood in with the utmost coolness, grappled with the enemy, and beat him to a mummy. We, as in duty bound, followed upon the heels of this noble fellow, and to my utter surprise, after the firing had ceased for three or four minutes, the Russian fired into the Implacable and left me totally at a loss to know the meaning of it, and seeing the Centaur was on shore, I instantly dropped an anchor in such a position that I could either attack the enemy or assist in heaving off my friend. At this moment the Centaur lashed the bowsprit of the enemy to her rigging and boarded her, sword in hand, regardless of her own fate, so that the Russian was subdued. If I had time to write I could never find language to express my admiration for this assault. It was done in defiance of twenty-three sail of Russians lying close at hand, and at a moment when the boats of the fleet were actually towing the ship round the point of the harbour. After some difficulty and much anxiety, I had the good fortune to heave the Centaur off the shore just when the Russian ships were setting sail

to come down upon us, but we stuck to the prize till the prisoners were removed and the ship set on fire. She blew up this morning at seven o'clock. I am sorry to say we had six men killed and twenty-one wounded; the Centaur had four killed and nearly as many wounded. We killed (in our action), according to the Russian account, forty-five, wounded 100. Nor have the poor wretches met with a much less murderous treatment from the Centaur. The spirit, the love, the enthusiastic kind of attachment formed between our officers and ships' companies is one of the most interesting things I ever witnessed. It is a matter of doubt to me which is greatest, the wonder and admiration of the Swedes, or the terror of the Russians; the effect on each will be highly conducive to the interest of our dear country. The captain of the Swedish fleet actually shed tears on board the Centaur this morning in admiration of what had passed. I will not waste my paper by a list of the fleets, but briefly state that the Swedes have ten sail¹

¹ List of Swedish fleet in B. Martin's handwriting, corrected by Admiral Cyprian Bridge:—

Ship's name.	Guns.	Captain.
Dristigheten . . .	74 . .	Tornqvist.
Faderneslandet . . .	74 . .	Blessing.
Tapperheten . . .	66 . .	Fischerstind.
Gustaf III. . . .	74 . .	Petterson.
Gustaf IV. . . .	78 . .	{ Rear-Admiral Nauckhoff.
Wladislaw	76 . .	{ Krusenstjerna.
Försigtigheten . . .	74 . .	{ Commodore Jugerfeldn.
Manligheten . . .	74 . .	{ Count Wrangel.
Chapman	44 . .	O. A. Norman.
Eurydice	44 . .	Ameen.
Bellona	46 . .	Petterson.
Jarramas	42 . .	Baron Lagerbjelka.
Dolphin, cutter brig.	34 . .	Hohn.
<hr/>		
Centaur	74 . .	{ Rear-Admiral Sir S. Hood.
Implacable	74 . .	{ Webley.
		Byam Martin.



The Russian Ship SEVOLOD, after the action with the IMPLACABLE, destroyed in the presence of the Russian Fleet.

of two-decked ships and five frigates, the Russians two first-rates, seven of seventy-four guns, and fourteen frigates and sloops. We have received some damage in the action, which makes me think we cannot remain here much longer, and I am sorry to say [*remaining three lines erased*].

I am, ever yours affectionately,
(Signed) T. B. M.

We killed thirty-three men on the Russian's main deck and dismounted eight of his guns. As usual, I must tell you whatever you make known of my communications, it is never to appear as coming from me.

This is the first instance of an action between the English and Russians. It was the finest sight imaginable to see twenty-four sail of them flying before two British ships, which literally was the case, as the Swedes were so far distant. We are now blockading the enemy in a port to the west of Revel, called Rogerwick or Port Baltic.

On the 30th Sir J. Saumarez arrived, and shortly after appointed Captain Martin Captain of the Fleet, in consequence of which he quitted the Implacable and went on board the Victory, in which situation he remained till Captain Hope unexpectedly returned from England and resumed his situation as Captain of the Fleet.

Freedom of City of Exeter conferred.

City of Exeter.—At a Chamber holden at the Guildhall of the said city on the twenty-sixth day of September, one thousand eight hundred and eight.

Resolved—That the Freedom of this City be presented to Rear-Admiral Sir Samuel Hood,

Knight of the most honourable Order of the Bath, and to Thomas Byam Martin, Esquire, Captain in his Majesty's Navy, in testimony of the high respect of this body for the bravery displayed by them in the late engagement with the Russian Fleet in the Baltic, and for their meritorious services to their country on former occasions.

By order of Chamber,
H. LEY,
Town Clerk.

*SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO BYAM MARTIN,
AND HIS REPLY.*

Victory, off Rogerwick, 1st September, 1808.

Is it your opinion that with the united force of the English and Swedish squadrons, the enemy's ships in the harbour of Rogerwick can be attacked with any reasonable hopes of success, without running too great risk of losing some of his Majesty's ships and those of our ally?

Is it your opinion that an attempt to destroy the enemy's ships by means of fire vessels can be made without too great danger and with well-grounded hopes of success?

(Signed) JAMES SAUMAREZ.

REPLY.

I have no hesitation in giving a decided opinion that the Russian fleet in Rogerwick cannot be attacked with any reasonable hope of success, or without the risk of losing some of his Majesty's ships. It would be a hazardous thing with a powerful squadron of British ships to attack an enemy so strongly situated; but with a force composed principally of Swedish ships, I am confident it would end in disappointment—if not in disgrace.

Under favourable circumstances I think fire-

vessels may be used with a probability of success, fully sufficient to justify the attempt.

His Majesty's ship *Implacable*, September 1st, 1808.

T. B. MARTIN.

To Sir James Saumarez, Bart. and K.B., Commander-in-Chief, &c., &c.

[Sir Samuel Hood expressed the same opinion.]

SIR S. HOOD TO B. MARTIN.

My dear Martin,—The enclosed papers in my frank of to-day you ought to have received before, but I had a hope on my arrival here I should have heard further on the subject of the honour therein mentioned to be conferred on me; as I had my doubts if they were the first and second Orders of the Swords, and am not yet satisfied on that head, but imagine these only to be the second and third. As our King has authorised us to accept them, they cannot well be refused, and I believe it has been done with a good intention on the part of the King of Sweden; if however it should be below what we according to our rank ought to expect we cannot be obliged to wear it. I hope to leave this for town in about two days, when I may have received further information and will write; in the meantime I think you should not wait for Admiral's letters.

I hope you found Mrs. Martin and all your little fellows quite well, also the Commissioner's family, and your own brothers and sisters well. I landed at Cromarty on the 4th, and stayed with Lord Seaforth a week, and am now with Lady Hood visiting some of her friends and taking a look at the country, though the season except for this town is not favourable. As the *Implacable* is gone to Plymouth I imagine you intend embarking in her once more; should this

be the case I am sure I shall be very happy if we were together. What is to be done with her I have not heard, nor do I expect until I get to town. I hope they will allow me to remain quiet this winter, which as the Centaur wants docking may be probable. Pray make my kind respects to Mrs. M., Vernon Spencer and all at his house, in which Lady Hood desires to be joined. And believe me most sincerely and truly,

Yours faithfully,

SAMUEL HOOD.

Edinburgh, November 20th, 1808.

[All papers connected with the capture of the *Sevolod* are kept together without reference to dates.]

The following sheets are a detail of what passed after Sir J. Saumarez joined the fleet, then blockading the Russians in Rogerwick.

B. MARTIN TO CAPTAIN KRUSENSTJERNA.

Victory, off Rogerwick, 6th September, 1808.

Sir,—Sir James Saumarez desires me to express his thanks to Rear-Admiral Nauckhoff for his obliging inquiries, and I have the pleasure to say that I think he is better this morning than yesterday.

I must repeat to you the very anxious wish of Sir James Saumarez to obtain Admiral Nauckhoff's acquiescence in his proposal to make a part of your squadron efficient and serviceable by drawing supplies from two or three of the other ships and sending them to Sweden with the sick.

You seem so fully apprised of the propriety of this suggestion, that it is unnecessary to recapitulate the argument of yesterday in proof of the absolute necessity of it, for the interest of his Swedish

Majesty and the effectual co-operation of the fleets.

Sir James in regretting the unqualified restraint which prevents Admiral Nauckhoff detaching so large a part of his forces as the obvious necessity of the case requires, desires me to say that it will for the present be highly satisfactory to him if Admiral Nauckhoff will consent to part with one ship of the line.

Sir James will have his despatches ready to send whenever the frigate is seen to be getting under sail.

I have the honour to be,
 (Signed) T. B. MARTIN,
 First Captain.

*CAPTAIN KRUSENSTJERNA, FIRST CAPTAIN OF
 THE SWEDISH FLEETS, TO B. MARTIN.*

Gustaf IV Adolph, off Rogerwick, 7th September, 1808.

Sir,—I humbly entreat you to excuse that I have not before answered your obliging letter of yesterday, but I was till late in the evening occupied with sending away and receiving despatches.

Admiral Nauckhoff received with the highest satisfaction your kind information that the health of his Excellency Admiral Sir James Saumarez is on the recovery. He desires me to solicit that you will be pleased to declare to Sir James his sentiments of respectful gratitude and obligation for the benevolent assistance of lime-juice and sugar, as well as for the attendance of the surgeon from the Victory, which the Admiral believes will afford considerable relief to the great number of sick in the squadron, who increase every day in the most discouraging manner.

Admiral Nauckhoff is fully convinced of the pressing necessity to draw supplies out from four ships,

thereby to set the rest in a state of activity, but he cannot do it without the greatest responsibility, as he by a letter received yesterday from Baron Rajalin is informed that two vessels laden with provisions are on their way to the fleet, and besides that he received six weeks ago, his Majesty's positive orders not to send any ship home. Admiral Nauckhoff thinks it imprudent at this moment to diminish the number of ships so considerably, but as necessity dictates the law, he is of opinion to send one ship home with so many sick from the others as she can possibly take. I hope she will be ready to-morrow evening.

The Jarramas frigate brought up yesterday, as a prize to the united squadrons, the Russian ship John Baptist from Petersburg, Cornelieus Katt, master, bound to Rotterdam with hemp, iron, tallow and linen, sailed from Cronstadt the third of the month. I send the master of that ship to the Victory, where you will have an opportunity to learn from him the intelligence he can afford respecting the enemy's forces. This prize shall be sent to Carlsrona, with the line-of-battle ship who is designed to take part of the sick.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) MP. KRUSENSTJERNA,

Captain of the Swedish Fleet.

Captain Martin, Captain of the British Fleet, &c.,
&c., &c.

CAPTAIN LUKIN TO B. MARTIN.

Mars, Thursday, September 8th, 1808.

My dear Martin,—Although on account of the feebleness of the wind we did not stand in to-day as far as usual, yet owing to the particularity of the light I have been enabled to see their intended mode

of defence clearer than I ever have done yet. They are—as I before told you, moored in a straight line along the beach above the Mole, and they have each, I speak of the three nearest ships—a hawser from their bow end and from their quarters to the shore, so that they can cant their broadside either way I take it. Chief of their guns from the inshore side are landed. The Admiral was landing guns very plain this morning, and was dragging them up the beach there and independent of the Mole-head, and what may be called the fort, which contains about thirty-six embrasures. Each ship has a battery upon the beach with embrasures, upon her bow and quarter, so that she might be flanked if ever so closely attacked, and if the main forts could not fire into one without firing into the other. I do not know whether you will exactly understand me; but in case you should not, I send you a little sketch of their appearance before they struck top-masts and hauled in quite so close, and a little plan just done this morning. I did not like to make any part of this note into the shape of an official letter to Sir James, but you can as well inform him if you think proper; and if he wishes it officially communicated, I can do it. Covering bombs is very stomacky work in a 74 close into a bight full of batteries. However, I am very willing to fag for your poor wounded lads.

Ever sincerely,

W. LUKIN.

To Captain Martin, Captain of the Fleet.

CAPTAIN LUKIN TO B. MARTIN.

Mars, Thursday morning, about September 1808.

My dear Martin,—We can discover no boom from our mastheads. Whenever the fire-vessels do go

in it would be well, in my opinion, that they should keep the lighthouse side on b'd as much as the wind would allow, as the principal look-out is upon Rogo Point. I had hoped, however, by the Admiral himself making signal for a flag of truce, and hearing by my lieutenant that the fire-ships were stopped, that you had contrived somehow or other to settle all matters with these gentlemen, unless Sir James has a particular view in throwing shells at them, such as placing them in a state of consternation. The Thunder Bomb should not throw at them on the lighthouse side, for they will certainly move out guns, which they have begun to do already, and we should have been most horribly puzzled yesterday if they had, and we should not have got off without being wickedly cut up.

Yours ever,
W. LUKIN.

SIR S. HOOD TO B. MARTIN.

My dear Martin,—I am very happy to find the Admiral is better, and I think we may look for a continuance of amendment from what I observed of him yesterday.

I think we shall be well rid of every Russian prisoner; I do not believe they care the smallest atom about them.

With very great attention I have read your masterly performance on the sharing of prize money with the Swedish fleet,¹ &c. I do not think the candle requires in the least to be snuffed, it is made of excellent materials. The only circumstance will be how it meets the usual sharing of the Swedes, and this can be only done by your conference with

¹ Not found amongst papers.

the First Captain. I rather believe their mode of sharing may be different from ours as to classes and being in sight at a capture.

Believe me, yours most truly,

SAMUEL HOOD.

Monday, 11 A.M. (about September 1808.)

T. B. Martin, Esq., Captain of the Fleet, &c.,
&c., &c., Victory.

Endorsed.—Sir Samuel Hood.

B. MARTIN TO SIR HENRY MARTIN, BART.

Off Port Baltic, Victory, September 9th, 1808.

My dear Henry,—I have been here about a week in the capacity of Captain of the Fleet, having left the Implacable, to engage in a much more arduous duty than I expected. It is true I have undertaken it under circumstances of great difficulty, and probably such as never before appertained to the office; however, of this I can say no more until I have the pleasure of seeing you in London on my return to England. We are now at anchor off Rogerwick or Port Baltic, with five sail of British line-of-battle ships and eight Swedes, which you gentlemen in England will say is a large force.

The enemy are very strongly fortified, so as to bid defiance to the whole navy of England; but our zealous Admiral intends to blockade them for some time to come, notwithstanding we already feel the approach of winter and look with fear and trembling to the tempestuous weather which sets in so early in these seas.

It is impossible for me to find any language capable of conveying to you the admiration I have of Sir James Saumarez's zeal and anxiety to get at the enemy, and he has once or twice nearly deter-

mined to hazard, or rather (as it would inevitably be) to sacrifice, his fleet in order to have the glory of destroying the Russians; the universal opinion of the impracticability of doing so with the least hope of saving our ships has alone induced him to abandon so rash an enterprise. As the matter now stands our operations must be reduced to the tedious and vexatious business of a blockade, but we have forced the enemy into such a corner that whenever the wind comes at north-west, I think several of them will be lost. This place is three days' journey from St. Petersburg, and I am woefully disappointed that nothing in the shape of a pacific overture has yet reached us. All has been done in every way that can be done, and the rest must be left to the chapter of accidents.

I am ever your affectionate, T. B. M.

CAPTAIN BATHURST TO B. MARTIN.

(Since killed in battle at Navarino.)

Salsette, off Port Baltic, 20th September, 1808.

Dear Sir,—Since writing to you I have made out an extensive boom in front of the enemy's ships, reaching from near the Mole to those large buoys to the westward of them which completely cover them from approach, without going above it. We were much nearer in yesterday and this morning, but did not observe it, and our boat was in there the time before that we took the flag of truce in. We observed yesterday that their boat put off very soon, and rowed well over to the island side, and the Russian officer told ours that they did not wish us to come within the point, probably that it might not be observed by us.

I am your most obedient, humble servant,

W. BATHURST.

J. B. Martin, Esq., Captain of the Fleet, &c., &c.

T. B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN.

October 14, 1808.

My dear Henry,—Captain Hope having resumed his situation on board the *Victory* has occasioned my return to England with Sir J. Saumarez' despatches; or rather for the purpose of giving the Admiralty every information of the transactions in the Baltic since the affair of the 26th of August; and to state the impossibility of attacking the Russian fleet in *Rogerwick*. I have also despatches for Mr. Canning from our minister at *Stockholm*, so that probably with one and the other it may be four hours after this reaches you before I can work up to *Harley Street*.

If your carriage is not wanted perhaps you will have it ready and accompany me to the brother of Sir J. Saumarez, No. 30 *Canterbury Row*, *Newington*, as I must see him as soon as possible.

I have no news, but plenty of talk for you for four days, after which I must depart westward.

Ever yours,

T. B. MARTIN.

I left the *Gulf of Finland* 28th *September*.

Sir *Henry Martin*, *Bart*.

Lockinge, *Wantage*, *Berkshire*.

London, T. B. M., *October 14*.

Endorsed.—*October 14, 1808*. On arriving in *England* from the *Baltic*, after leaving the *Victory* as acting captain of the fleet.

IMPLACABLE, 1809.¹

March 9th.—

11th.—Sailed from Cawsand Bay to proceed to Baltic.

16th.—Arrived in Downs; found lying there Venerable, Centaur, Blake, Plantagenet, Alfred, Mars, Princess of Orange (Port-Admiral's ship), and Denmark, all of the line.

18th.—Sir Samuel Hood hoisted his flag on board Centaur.

20th.—Centaur sailed.

21st.—Agent paid head-money for the Sevold, Russian ship of the line, destroyed last year in the Baltic.

22nd.—Victoria's 76th anniversary.² Constant exercise of great guns as stated in log.

Wednesday, April 26th.—Sailed for the Baltic.

May 3rd.—Anchored in Wingo Sound, Gottenburg. Found there the Centaur and some small vessels of war.

5th.—Arrived, the Victory bearing the flag of Sir J. Saumarez, with the Minotaur and the Melpomene.

6th.—Weighed anchor and went to sea; Ariel and Prometheus in company.

8th.—Ship not answering her helm owing to calm, sent boats ahead to tow, and following boat to sound. At 1 found the ship to strike lightly abaft. At 3 anchored. Sprogo Island N. 4 miles.

¹ This abstract gives the proceedings of the Implacable in 1809.

² Meaning not ascertained.

14th.—Admiral Sir R. Keats came on board to call upon me.

19th.—Arrived off Danzig.

26th.—Observed several guns fired at Danzig. Anchored. Sent Lieutenant Hawkey in cutter, manned and armed.

27th.—Cutter returned, leaving Lieutenant Hawkey and John Granbury on shore. At 2 o'clock the morning of the 28th Lieutenant Hawkey and Granbury returned, having made their escape in a shore boat.

28th.—Came on board flag of truce (Captain Robart).

30th.—Fired a gun and made signal for flag of truce. Sent some Russians on shore who had been taken in the vessel captured.

Sunday, June 8th.—Melpomene joined.

10th.—Anchored in Carlsrona. Found the Victory, Temeraire, Bellerophon, Minotaur, Ruby, and George.

19th.—Sailed with the fleet; took our station in the line.

20th.—Anchored 4 or 5 miles from Carlsrona.

22nd.—Sailed.

28th.—Parted company with the squadron, Melpomene in company.

30th.—Took a Russian galliot. Observed a large Russian man-of-war—cleared for action; the ship disguised. The enemy bore up and made all sail, we following with studding-sails, seeing that she had discovered us to be a ship of war. Had the deception succeeded 5 minutes longer we should have taken her. Fired bow guns at her, but distance too great. The enemy run into Aspo and joined 4 small ships of war; she was out of our reach.

July 2nd.—Melpomene in company in chase. Captured galliots. Saw 6 strange sail anchored in

shore; sent boats manned and armed. Anchored the ship in 7 fathoms off the Great Tyter Island. The boats took 4 galliots laden with naval stores from Narva, bound to Reval. The Prometheus joined company with despatches.

3rd.—The boats cut out two small luggers. Bellerophon joined company.

7th.—Sent the boats, together with those of the Bellerophon and Prometheus, manned and armed, in shore under Lieutenant Hawkey.

8th.—At daylight observed several vessels coming out from under the land. At 4 observed a ship, a brig, 2 galliots, and 4 luggers, standing towards us, and six gun-boats taken by our boats. Observed the ship to get ashore—sent boats to her assistance. Lieutenant Hawkey and 4 men of the Implacable killed, and many wounded in the attack. Employed manning the prizes. The ship could not be got off—set her on fire. The convoy was laden with supplies for the Russian army at Abo. Melpomene, Prometheus, and 20 prizes in company.

9th.—Nargen Island 5 leagues. Saw the Victory and squadron at anchor. Buried Lieutenant Hawkey, 2 seamen, and 2 marines with military honours. Sent the Melpomene to Carlsrona with the prizes, 17 in number, having scuttled 3 of the worst.

10th.—Joined company with the Victory and fleet at Nargen.

12th.—Sent an officer with flag of truce, the Victory, St. George, Temeraire, Plantagenet, and Owen Glendower in company.

24th.—Phœbe joined with 4 prizes. Sailed to go between Hogland and Cronstadt. Saturn, Princess Caroline, and Cerberus under my orders.

October 5th.—Saturn and Bellerophon in company, working through the Belt. Bellerophon got on shore. Shortened sail, and anchored to assist her.

November 16th.—Sailed from Gottenburg.

18th.—Fresh gales and squalls, violent snow-storm ; struck top-masts.

19th.—Strong gales and squally, heavy sea. Anchored in 22 fathoms and veered out two cables ; ship rode easy.

20th.—Hove up the anchor, brought to the *Ida* cutter. The Master came on board to pilot the ship ; went back off the sands.

22nd.—Arrived at Plymouth.

February 27th, 1810.—Captain George Cockburn superseded me.

B. MARTIN TO SIR HENRY MARTIN, BART.

Cheltenham, January 13th, 1809.

My dear Henry,—I had flattered myself I should escape the Herald pickpockets, and not be subject to their extortionate formalities, in receiving from the King of Sweden the Order of the Sword, but the following copy of a letter from Sir Isaac Heard will show that I am called upon to pay for this honour. However, I have thought it well to give an evasive kind of answer, and taken the liberty to say you would call at the College of Arms, by which step you may ascertain what is likely to be the amount of their demand, and at the same time intimate my unwillingness to have more done than is absolutely needful ; and as for any registering of arms, or such like humbug, I see nothing in it but the giving them a more plausible pretence for ransacking my pocket.

Sir,—Captain Webley, of H.M. ship *Centaur*, having transmitted to me copies of the correspondence relative to the Order of the Sword conferred by his Majesty on the officers distinguished for their services in the Baltic, and given me his instructions

to take such steps in his behalf as may be necessary for obtaining the usual Royal license authorising his acceptance of that honour, and Captain Webley having favoured me with your address, I take the liberty to assure you that I shall with pleasure receive your commands on the same subject, and direct every attention to be paid to their execution.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

ISAAC HEARD,
Garter.

Sir,—I am favoured with your letter of the 7th inst., and beg to say that it was signified to me some time since that his Majesty had granted his permission to Sir Samuel Hood, Captain Webley, and myself to accept and wear the Order of the Sword conferred upon us by the King of Sweden, and I was not aware of any further notification of his Majesty's authority being necessary, but I will beg my brother—Sir Henry Martin—to call at the College of Arms and make such communication as may be needful.

I have the honour to be,
T. B. M.

I find Sir Samuel Hood and Webley are likely to be gazetted immediately; and as my not appearing of the party would look awkward, and not be rightly understood by the world, I must beg the favour of you to have an early conference with Sir Isaac.

I don't understand that Mr. Maxwell is anxious to go before the 22nd; if he is, I shall accompany him sooner, and I should not like to put it off beyond that time.

Yours affectionately,
T. B. MARTIN.

Endorsed.—About the Swedish Order of the Sword.

ADMIRAL SIR SAMUEL HOOD TO B. MARTIN.

Glastonbury, 29th January, 1809,
Wednesday night.

My dear Martin,—You ought to have heard from me when at Plymouth, but it appeared doubtful if you would be in London or at Cheltenham. I will not delay longer giving you a line to the latter place in case you should be returned thither, not only to thank you for all your three letters—which at last reached me—but also to tell you I am on my way to town, and to assure you how much pleasure it will afford me to meet you there. If you have not already paid your *devoirs* at the Queen's Palace, I think I may be likely to do so, for surely they cannot again so very suddenly send her away. Be assured it will be a very great satisfaction to meet you anywhere, made more so if I have the honour of attending you to our worthy and most excellent King after all the services you have rendered your country, and more particularly on our late occasion in the Baltic, where your exertions were the sole cause of my good fortune, and no one can feel a higher sense of your merits than I do, or a more sincere friendship.

We have had a tolerable troublesome trip of it, but good fortune has favoured us beyond all our hopes—indeed, I would at one period have bargained for the loss of half the army. Poor Sir J. Moore is a severe loss to the country, and he fell in a most gallant manner. He, however, was not without enemies, and I fear things had not gone so well as could be wished, therefore it may be a circumstance that will wipe away all censure from those who were desirous of showing it, and the action was such as to save the credit of our army, which was before lost, in the idea of every Spaniard.

I cannot now add more. In the hope of seeing you soon for a longer chat, and with my kindest regards to Mrs. Martin,

Believe me, most truly and sincerely yours,
SAMUEL HOOD.

P.S.—I have stopped to write this, you therefore have it in a hasty scrawl.

I hope to be in town Tuesday morning.

B. MARTIN TO SIR HENRY MARTIN, BART.

Cheltenham, February 23rd, 1809.

My dear Henry,—Before we go hence I must drop you a line in acknowledgment of your favour of the 20th, and to observe in respect to the Swedish order, that after receiving the investments I should have no more hesitation in wearing the order than if the form pointed out by Sir Isaac Heard were followed to its utmost extent. I shall, however, readily waive my own opinion—if different from Sir Samuel Hood's—and willingly adopt the example of my worthy Admiral and kind friend, knowing that I can never err in following his steps upon any occasion, either professional or private. I therefore send you the letter to Mr. Canning, begging that whatever Sir Samuel Hood does may be made the rule of my proceedings; trusting you will have the goodness to cast an eye towards the College of Arms to prevent me the mortification of receiving a title from Sir I. Heard, which I so recently declined from the fountain of honour.

We leave this on Friday and sleep at Bath that night. I have written twice to Gillman to meet us at dinner, but without receiving an answer, so that he is probably gone elsewhere.

The Implacable's return to Plymouth was less

owing to any damage sustained than to the unabating violence of the westerly winds, and it is therefore likely she will sail again whenever the weather will permit.

Affectionately yours,
T. B. MARTIN.

B. MARTIN TO SIR HENRY MARTIN, BART.

Implacable, off Rugen, May 11th, 1809.

My dear Henry,—The service upon which I am now proceeding is of so secret a nature that I must not communicate what I could wish for your information and entertainment; indeed the precariousness of our intercourse with England either by way of the Belt or through Sweden will make me shy of saying much of our probable operations in this quarter. I may, however, without impeachment say that our chief calling here is to keep open the trade, and by guarding the Swedish coast, leave them at liberty to act as their own interest may dictate without intimidation from Russia; and while the summer lasts they may safely trust to our protection, but when the winter comes on, and these frozen seas enable the Russians to pour in their barbarous legions, it will be politic in the Swedes to imitate some of the beasts of their climate and change their skins with the varying season, or Stockholm will beyond doubt fall into the Emperor Alexander's hands, unless the still greater rapacity of the tyrant, the master and keeper of this Russian bear, should claim it as his own. Of the affairs in Germany I shall soon have some late and positive intelligence, but I fear there is nothing in that quarter to encourage any very sanguine expectation of advantage from the struggle which Austria has determined to make. The Archduke is however in great force, the war is

popular, time has been taken for preparation and the people enthusiastic in the cause, but nevertheless the odds are greatly against them. The Implacable has very narrowly escaped leaving her ribs on the Island of Fuen ; we had passed through the Belt as far as Nyborg on that island, where we found Admiral Bertie ; and while I was paying my duty to him, the undercurrent (of which you may have heard me speak before) had such an effect upon the ship as to render her totally ungovernable, notwithstanding there was a breeze of wind that would have carried her four miles an hour. When I left Admiral Bertie's ship I observed Implacable, as I thought, in a dangerous situation, and without knowing the cause of it, I kept waving to her to haul out, and at length got on board full of indignation at a supposed inattention to my beckoning command ; and I had certainly good reason to be angry that the ship was not anchored immediately on finding her so entirely at the mercy of the current. However the signal was made for boats, and by the help of them and with a little increase of wind we were extricated from the danger, after grazing over the edge of a bed of rocks, but so gently, that I was scarcely sensible of her touching ; and as we make not the least water, or perceive any difference in the ship's sailing, it is natural to infer she is not injured by the accident. If we had stuck fast the whole Danish flotilla in the Belt (seeing our danger) were prepared for a general assault, and would no doubt have given us an unmerciful thrashing. Our convoys, which are more numerous than ever in spite of the state of Sweden, are attended through the Belt by four, or six, line-of-battle ships, and even this formidable force does not restrain the efforts of the Danes, though as yet it has prevented their success.

T. B. MARTIN.

B. MARTIN TO SIR HENRY MARTIN, BART.

Off Bornholm, May 14th, 1809.

My dear Henry,—The reports which I mentioned to you as setting the affairs of Austria in so unfavourable a light, seem to have been fabricated by the French to damp the patriotic spirit which Bonaparte sees so generally rising in Germany, and which threatens such serious consequences to his usurpation. Sir R. Keats and I have been tracing the different items of authentic intelligence, and comparing dates with the French fabrications, and we find that in the action wherein the Austrians had the greatest advantage, the French general at Stralsund had been directed to read an account of their annihilation, and that everything was at the mercy of the French.

The Archduke Ferdinand has overrun Poland, he is in possession of Warsaw, Posen, and Thorn,¹ and probably by this time of Danzig, and his presence has served to animate the Prussians with a Spanish-like spirit which promises the best consequences. Three Prussian regiments² have actually marched from Berlin to join the Austrians without their King's consent, and in spite of this timid stupid monarch the whole country is taking up arms, and they enter so rapidly as to make it impossible to swear them in fast enough; the last account mentioned an increase of their force to 120,000 men. Hesse is in a complete state of revolt, and little Jerome has sent to threaten them with his brother's wrath, but they care not a damn for him or his valet. Of 30,000 Poles in the service of France, 17,000 have been taken or deserted to Austria. In the Tyrol, the French are all killed or taken, but

¹ Only captured the *tête de pont* when he was recalled.

² Schill's rising.

these glorious achievements have cost the Austrians much blood.

The timepiece yesterday gave longitude to a cable's length.

I am, ever affectionately yours,
T. B. MARTIN.

B. MARTIN TO MR. DRUSENA.

Copy sent to Sir James Saumarez and Sir Richard Keats.

[No date. Probably on arrival about 18th.]

Implacable, off Pillau, May 1809.

Sir,—I have the pleasure to acquaint you of my being off this port, and trust there will be no difficulty in renewing the correspondence I had the satisfaction to commence with you last year through the hands of Mr. Hay. I shall most readily attend to any scheme you may suggest for the secrecy and facility of our communication, though I hope to learn that the tide is so turning against the Tyrant, as to free us from the necessity of that rigid caution which has hitherto been observed.

The security and protection of the trade with Great Britain is an object of such constant consideration with the Commander-in-Chief, Sir James Saumarez, as to make it an important part of my duty to give every degree of safety to such vessels as may be bound from the ports in this neighbourhood to England; and Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Keats, having with this view recommended to you that merchant ships should not put to sea after the expiration of the term which he stated, the Tartar and Cruiser were directed to remain off the southern coast of the Baltic.

I beg to say that if you will give me notice of the time when any number of vessels may be ready

to put to sea from Pillau, I will, if possible, give them the protection of some man-of-war to the appointed rendezvous, but I shall be able to speak more positively on this point when you inform me of the precise time they will be ready to sail.

Should the Commander-in-Chief's arrangements admit of this occasional accommodation to the merchants, I need not observe how necessary it will be on their part to prepare their vessels punctually to the appointed time.

The present interesting state of affairs in Germany makes it unnecessary to say how much you may gratify me by frequent and detailed accounts of the hostile armies, and of the policy likely to be adopted by the different courts under this new state of things. And as I shall at all times transmit your communications to Sir James Saumarez, it may be well to distinguish authentic intelligence from mere rumour.

I send you my last newspapers, and in that of the 24th ulto. you will see Lord Gambier's official report of the destruction of the French squadron at Rochfort¹; besides which, several French frigates have been captured going to the relief of the colonies. The capture of Martinique by the British force under General Beckwith is of course known to you.

You will I am sure have pleasure in the perusal of the accompanying narrative of the 'Siege of Saragossa,' which I think ought to appear in the German language, and be thrown into the most general circulation, for wherever there is a spark of patriotism or courage, it will be inflamed by reading such an account of heroic achievements of General Palafox and his brave companions; it will also serve to destroy that dangerous and false opinion, which

¹ Better known as the Basque roads affair.

has been so fatally current, 'that the French arms are irresistible.'

I am, Sir, your humble servant,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

P.S.—I shall be impatient for intelligence with respect to the armies, and hope I am not unreasonable in looking for a reply to this letter by to-morrow evening. When you have quite done with the 'Siege of Saragossa,' I will beg of you to let me have it again.

It was supposed our army in Portugal under the command of Sir James Craddock or Sir A. Wellesley would come into contact with the French under General Soult about the 20th of April, and accounts from that quarter were most anxiously looked for. London papers of the 28th of April have been received in this country, but without any important news. Matters in Spain were going on more prosperously, and the spirit of the people in no degree subdued by the reverses they experienced during the winter.

MR. DRUSENA TO B. MARTIN IN ANSWER TO LETTER OF 18th.

22nd May, 1809.

Sir,—Your esteemed favour came safe to hand early this morning, and I rejoice at the renewal of a correspondence which afforded me so much pleasure in every respect last year, but to which the severity and long duration of the winter has occasioned a painful interruption of many months.

I most readily comply with your desire to write to you immediately, and you may rely upon my transmitting you from time to time all the information I can collect, trusting in your goodness to send me in return all the news you learn, as we have not any other safe means of getting intelligence from England.

I shall be much obliged to you to send me all the newspapers you can spare and every intelligence sealed, and directed to me, that I may have it first and exclusively. You will do me justice not to suppose that in expressing this desire I am actuated by any selfish motives, but merely from the earnest wish to be more effectually useful in my situation by having it in my power to oblige this Government by the information I shall be enabled to give, at same time that it affords me more frequent opportunity for confidential intercourse by which I can learn their sentiments or get some information from them in return.

Mr. H.¹ (James Fisher) will provide the means of communication the same as heretofore, but I must still recommend the greatest secrecy and most rigid caution, as hitherto observed; for although this Government² entertain (*entre nous*) the best possible disposition, it is too early yet to show it in any shape; a contrary conduct would injure them. I wish an interview between us could be contrived. I write to Mr. Fisher on the subject to-day. Perhaps I might be able to get off in a boat some little distance from Pillau (wind and weather being favourable), for I should not like to be away from my station long, as there is no saying what may happen.

Since the 8th inst. I have written and forwarded eight different despatches to Sir Richard Keats, to which I hourly expect the honour of a reply. No doubt he will have communicated the contents of my letters to the Commander-in-Chief, Sir James Saumarez.

¹ In this secret correspondence Mr. Fisher, at Pillau, took the name of Hay. It was through Mr. Fisher that I first opened a communication with Mr. Drusena, who assumed the name of Hahn.—*Note by T. B. M.*

² Prussian.

I shall be very happy to second to the best of my power the views and measures adopted for the security and protection of the trade. You will be aware I cannot appear openly in the business, and can only give my instructions underhand. By what you mention it seems that no merchant ships should put to sea after the departure of the Cruiser; of course they must now await further directions. If I am wrong in my opinion, I shall be obliged for your advice, and to say till what time I should direct the masters to be ready to proceed; meantime, I hope some of H.M. ships of war will remain on the coast, particularly off Danzig, where they are again fitting out boats of the same construction as the *Voltigeur*.¹ The latter is still in port, and has been lengthening her masts ten feet. Her owner (Mons. Audriel) wanted to send her out, but 'tis said the crew refused to go. Nothing but hanging the captains, or sinking one of them, crew and all, will put an effectual stop to their depredations; such rigour I consider justifiable. The privateers sail under French colours, and the captains and greatest part of the crew are Danzigers, &c., which is against every convention.

A Danish privateer of 4 guns and 23 men has put into Windau in distress. Some other Danish privateers have appeared off the coast of Pomerania. I have transmitted lists of the vessels loading for Great Britain, and propose continuing therewith. Those who omit handing in their names will only have to blame themselves if any detention happen to their ships, as it certainly looks suspicious if they elude giving in their names.

There is great want of licences owing to the long interruption, and the difficulty of communicating with England. I have inquired whether ships

¹ A privateer that harried our commerce in 1808.

would be allowed to pass without, or whether the Admiral could grant them a kind of interim licence, to which have not yet received an answer. I enclose a list of ships loading at Danzig ; there may be more, but it is difficult to get any direct information, as all letters are opened there.

I sent the information Sir R. G. Keats desired me to forward (if possible) to Riga. I have received in return a list of vessels at that port, whereof I transmit a copy herewith. The whole of them, with the exception of the American vessel Betsy, Alexander McDougall (who is detained for reasons not known to my correspondent), are now loaded and ready for sea (17th May), but it seems they are not permitted to depart until some transports now loading for Government are gone.

Thirteen vessels had already arrived at Riga, besides five that have not been permitted to enter the port, as their papers were not in order. I also inclose a list of ships ready to sail from Memel. Whereas merchant ships only begin to load according to when they are chartered, and then get ready as they can, one after another, I cannot say the precise time they will be ready for sea. Some of them have occasion to load in the Roads, whilst others can load up in the port. Could it not therefore be managed and allowed that ships might depart as soon as ready, and proceed to their appointed rendezvous? As there are so many ships of war cruising in the Baltic, they would not run much risk, as this sea will probably soon be cleared of privateers.

I likewise beg leave to hand you list of ships expected at Pillau, with valuable cargoes, chiefly India goods, and insured in England, which I recommend to your protection, and I hope some of H.M. ships will continue to cruise for the protection of the

ships coming to these ports. I have hitherto corresponded with Captain T. R. Toker, of H.M. sloop Cruiser, but suppose it will be no longer necessary if you remain on the station.

I wish it was in my power to greet you on this occasion with some pleasant news, but our expectations have been greatly damped, and the last accounts do not afford a very encouraging prospect. However, if the Hungarians only come forward as they were expected to do, I hope the Austrians will be able to retrieve their affairs.

On the 5th Marshal Lannes was only 3 stages from Vienna, and Massena at Arstetten on the 6th. The Austrians had lost a great many prisoners in their retreat. At Vienna every preparation had been made to defend the place. The last accounts received on Saturday advise that Vienna had been summoned to surrender; about 50 French soldiers had penetrated the suburbs, but were killed by the inhabitants. If B. gets possession of that capital I fear we shall hear dismal accounts thence. Marshal Hiller had passed the Danube, and had only left 10,000 men on the other side. I hope he has been able to join the Archduke Charles. The Austrians should never have engaged in a general battle. Their misfortune was, however, owing to the bad management of the Archduke Lewis. From Italy the accounts continue favourable, as also from the Tyrol, whence Generals Chastellar and Jellachich have penetrated into Bavaria.

The French say they found considerable magazines at Ried, Lambach, Wels, Linz, and Enns. The Austrian Court have retreated to Ofen. The 'Vienna Gazette' did not arrive with the last post. Nine transports have arrived at Auray in Brittany, with the garrison of Martinique (Paris, 5th May).

Major Schill has been very successful hitherto;

he began the campaign with only 500 men, and he has now a small army of 6,000, some say even 10,000 men; but unless our troops soon arrive, or some support of arms and ammunition is furnished him, I fear he will be crushed. He merits every support and assistance from us (the British) that it is possible to give him; and then I am confident (so great is his reputation and popularity) that he would be able to bring all the North of Germany into a state of insurrection against the Tyrant. I fancy his object is to gain some place on the coast of the Baltic, or at the mouth of the Elbe, to get supplies from the English, with whom I hardly doubt but he stands in close connection. If there are any means of assisting him from this side (the Baltic) I doubt not the Commander-in-Chief (Sir J. Saumarez) will afford it him. It is really of the utmost importance to support him, considering the great advantages such an army will be to our troops on their landing in Germany. If Schill is crushed, I doubt if the people's spirits would not be entirely damped, and no other insurrection hereafter take place.

Jerome Napoleon, *soi-disant* King of Westphalia, has declared Schill to be a robber and outlaw, and has set a price of 10,000 francs for delivering him up. Schill has made a parody on this proclamation, with only the difference that he has set a reward of 2,000 francs for whoever will deliver Jerome up dead or alive. At Wittenburg he defeated a considerable number of Westphalians, although they had eight pieces of artillery and he not a single one.

Schill has taken Demmin in Mecklenburg-Schwerin. The Austrians have bombarded Thorn on the Vistula since the 15th. They expected it would not hold out many days. I have not yet heard that it is taken. At Danzig they are greatly afraid that when Thorn falls the Austrians will make an

attempt to take Danzig. I hope they will, and in this expectation I inquired of Sir R. G. Keats whether his Majesty's fleet would co-operate from the sea. I am anxious for an answer hereto, as I would then probably have it in my power to apprise the Austrians of it, and in my opinion and in that of many persons I can depend upon, Danzig might be very easily taken: consider the capital situation it would afford for his Majesty's ships to lie in, to refit, to get provisions, in short, in every possible respect.

The garrison by all accounts does not consist of more than 3,000 effective men, mixed troops—French, Poles, and Saxons. The inhabitants have been enrolled, but are greatly averse to serve. It is said that some troops have been shipped on board the fleet in the Baltic. A small force in conjunction with the Austrians would be sufficient to take that place and Urichselmunde; let me entreat you to advise the Commander-in-Chief hereof without delay. It was on this subject chiefly I wished to converse with you, it has been so very particularly recommended to me. You understand I did not find in your letter a list of queries you refer to, it must have been forgot. I am very much obliged to you for the newspapers, and consider it a great favour to let me have them—the latest was of the 20th. The narrative of the 'Siege of Saragossa' shall be returned. I am going to get it translated. If the German papers will be of any service to you I will send them with pleasure. Time will not permit me to translate them, as for good reasons I write and copy all my letters myself, and my correspondence for gaining intelligence or giving it is very extensive; on which account I beg you will have the goodness, once for all, to accept my apology for writing in such haste. After all, I shall not be able

to send this down to-night, but must do so to-morrow.

By the last accounts from St. Petersburg the Austrian Ambassador, Prince Schwartzenburg, was still there, and though his functions were suspended he was very civilly treated, so much so as 'tis said gave umbrage to Caulaincourt.¹ The rumour of serious disturbance there has not been confirmed. Permit me to recommend the inclosed to your kind care, and believe me ever with great regard and due respect, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

HEINRICH HAHN.

The one to Sir R. G. Keats is merely to contradict a report which has not been confirmed, mentioned in my last.

Fevers are very prevalent here, and unfortunately the chief remedy cannot be got of good quality for any money. As several of my friends and some of my own family are also confined with this disagreeable complaint, I must make bold to request the favour, if you can spare it from your own or get it in any way from H.M. ships, to let me have two or three pounds of good red bark powder, or at present any smaller quantity you can spare, and send it for me to Mr. Hay, acquainting me with the cost, and I will reimburse any way you please.

I am just now informed that four vessels which sailed from Pillau arrived off Hanno² the 14th, in quest of convoy, but not meeting any, put into Carlsham. This occasions much uneasiness here among the merchants, and therefore shall be obliged if you can give me any information on the subject.

¹ The French Ambassador at St. Petersburg.

² The general rendezvous for the Baltic trade wanting convoy through the Belt. (See map.)

B. MARTIN TO SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ.

Implacable, off the Heel of Danzig,
20th May, 1809.

Sir,—My passage to this part of the coast has been made so tedious by contrary and light winds, that I only arrived off the Heel of Danzig the evening of the 20th; and I have since been diligently employed examining that neck of land, and the anchorage within it, conformably to your order of the 5th inst.; and the following is the report, which I beg to submit you, upon the different points referred to in the said order:—

It being represented to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the possession of the Heel of Danzig would afford a commodious situation for a squadron, or the trade occasionally to resort to, you are therefore to proceed to Danzig Bay and make such observations as circumstances will admit of the state of that place, of the nature of the batteries, of the number of men it would in your judgment take to render the Heel impregnable to any attack of the enemy.

The Bay of Danzig is a spacious and convenient place for a squadron, or the trade under the protection of men-of-war, occasionally to resort to during the summer, and the possession of the Heel of Danzig is not absolutely necessary for their safety, as the only secure anchorage is beyond the protection of batteries, where any number of ships may lay at a distance from one and a half to three miles from either shore. There are no batteries, guns, or troops on the Heel; but about 200 inhabitants, heartily disposed to show every attention to the

English. In obeying this call upon my judgment, I must speak with great diffidence, feeling how deficient I am in knowledge of such matters. The narrowest part of the Heel is seven miles within the point, where it is about 400 yards across, and might be speedily cut through, so as to form a security against attack by land. But the whole extent of the Heel on either side is a flat smooth beach, and an enemy in force at Danzig would probably attack it at more points than one, so that I should suppose a thousand effective men the least number that could be employed for its defence, after being placed in the most tenable state by the skill of engineers, and calculating on the constant presence of armed vessels to interrupt the transport of troops. In the winter the Bay is frozen over.

Of the means it would afford of giving security to convoys that may occasionally put in there; also whether ships of war

The security of merchant ships must depend upon men-of-war, for batteries erected on any part of the Heel would

or convoys can find shelter there in gales of wind from any quarter, and without being liable to be annoyed from batteries that the enemy may have in their power to erect against them.

not afford protection to them, as the only good anchorage is at the bottom of the Bay, and at a considerable distance from the shore. I think there is sufficient shelter in gales of wind from any quarter during the summer; but in the winter season I am of opinion it does not afford proper security against the violence of easterly winds, even if the navigation of the Bay were not obstructed by the ice.

The enemy cannot erect any battery capable of giving the least annoyance to the shipping; but if possessed of much enterprise, they might perhaps take advantage of a strong S.S.E. wind to push fire-vessels out of Danzig; the distance, however, and the shortness of the nights in the summer would be greatly against the success of such an attempt. At present there are no troops whatever at Danzig.

Whether the Heel of Danzig will supply wood and water.

Wood may be had in any quantity, and I learn from one of the inhabit-

ants that they are tolerably well off for water ; they said we might fill fifty butts a day, but I apprehend it would not be difficult to procure a larger supply.

It appears, however, that the only part of the Heel where water can be had is at the town, just within the point, and there the anchorage is not by any means so good as at the bottom of the Bay.

Herewith you will receive a chart of Danzig Bay, in which the Implacable's track and soundings have been laid down with the greatest care, and, I trust, with proportionable accuracy. It is accompanied by a paper of remarks and directions respecting the quality of the bottom, and bearings of the land when in best anchorage.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your very humble servant,

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, Bt. and K.B., Commander-in-Chief, &c., &c., &c.

B. MARTIN TO SIR RICHARD KEATS.

Implacable, off the Heel of Danzig, Wednesday night,
21st May, 1809.

Sir,—I had the honour to receive your letter of yesterday's date by the Bellerophon this evening ; and as the Austrians are certainly not before Danzig. and Mr. Hahn confirms the report of their having made a retrograde movement for the protection of Galicia, I shall conformably to your directions signi-

fied in your letter forthwith send the *Bellerophon* back to your appointed rendezvous.

I fear there is now scarce any probability of Danzig being attacked, for whatever success may have attended the efforts of the Archduke Charles, this division of the army must be placed under great restraint by the menacing attitude of the Russians bordering on Austrian Poland; but if from any unexpected change this place should become the scene of their operations, you may depend upon my best efforts to render them assistance, and of my giving you timely information of their appearance.

If I felt at liberty to detain the *Bellerophon* for a few hours, it is not likely after my recent communication with Pillau that I should obtain any further information in so short a time; but I think on Friday I shall have positive accounts of what has taken place in the neighbourhood of Vienna, and if you will permit any vessel to stretch across about that time, I will take care to be prepared so as to prevent her being delayed. I should have mentioned in my letter by the *Constant*, that a note from Mr. Fisher, dated this morning, spoke of the want of further and authentic particulars of the defeat of the French army, but at the same time nothing had occurred to take from the credit of the current report upon that head.

I understand the *Ariel* is on her way back to this place, and I propose sending her as far as Libau with directions to Captain Forrest to cruise till the 15th June off the entrance of the Gulf of Livonia, as seeming more conformable to your wishes than the place and time assigned for his cruising, in the orders of which a copy was transmitted to you by the *Constant*.

I shall direct the *Ariel* to return here again

after executing this service, and her passing up and down the coast will afford protection to the trade.

I have the honour to be, Sir, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Keats, K.B.

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.M. ship Implacable, &c., &c., &c.*

It being an object of the greatest importance to afford every security and protection to the trade between Great Britain and Pillau :

You are hereby required and directed to cruise from Danzig to Brusterort, taking such a position as from wind and weather you may judge best, using the utmost vigilance to intercept the small boat privateers, which are frequently sent from Danzig alongshore towards Pillau.

The Implacable's rendezvous is off the Heel of Danzig.

Given under my hand on board the Implacable, off Pillau, the 23rd day of May, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Captain White, H.M. sloop Ariel.

FROM MR. DRUSENA.

25th May, 1809.

Sir,—I hope my long letter of the 22nd inst. came safe to hand; since then I have not been honoured with any of yours, but agreeable to your desire I set down to acquaint you with the news.

I am happy to inform you that Thorn was taken¹

¹ Erroneous information. Only a *tête de pont* over the Vistula was taken, when the Austrian army had to retire.

on the 19th by storm. Further particulars I have not heard, because so little pains is taken by the Government to get intelligence even of what passes so very near.

The Austrians will most probably march towards Danzig. They are under great alarm at that place, and taking every measure for defence, causing the fortifications to be augmented all around, and blocking up the gates, &c. The inhabitants are forced to assist, but with great reluctance; some ships of war having appeared off Hela, they fear the English will land and co-operate with the Austrians. I wish they may, and then I am convinced you would gather fresh laurels by the taking of this very important place.

I have procured, and enclose herein, a list of ships laden or about to load for Great Britain from Danzig. Some have sailed since Friday last, but it is feared they will not now be allowed to leave the fair water on account of the British men-of-war in view.

The Voltigeur had been sent up the Vistula, to take the craft on that river bringing down stores and provisions for the Austrians.

Of the 50 vessels at Riga, according to the list sent you, only 35 had cleared out on the 20th inst. All the papers of such vessels as now arrive at Riga must be sent to St. Petersburg for examination, previous to their being permitted to discharge or to load, ships in ballast not excepted, of which it would be well to apprise those going there.

The Danish privateer I advised having put into Windau, went to sea again, and being chased by a man-of-war, run ashore near Libau. The crew escaped, and part of them have arrived there.

From Memel have not heard any news since my last. At Libau about 20 ships had arrived.

[Very great precaution was necessary in carrying on the correspondence with Mr. Drusena, consul at Königsberg or Danzig, hence no mention of names.—*Note by T. B. M.*]

The 26th May, 1809.

Sir,—I did not send the foregoing off last night, as I received an intimation from Mr. H. I should probably receive letters from you this morning. At noon I had the pleasure to receive your obliging lines of the 22nd and 23rd inst., to which I now have the honour to reply.

Mr. Johan Labes is a very respectable, rich merchant of Danzig, also a considerable shipowner, and I should be sorry to say or do anything to injure him; but the circumstance you mention looks most suspicious, and is very like what I have suspected here, according to what I hinted to Captain Tucker, viz., that ships were loading corn for Denmark but had got licences for England to show in case of being overhauled by British men-of-war. They would probably join convoy, but afterwards endeavour to slip into a Danish or Norwegian port. I heard this by chance, but could not get further information, as I could not do it without creating suspicion. I was, however, much vexed to think British generosity should be abused in such a manner. Rye is not an article so generally imported into England, and we all know the Danes are much in want of it. To be sure, it may be said that, France being at war with Sweden, ships could not clear at Danzig direct for a Swedish port. In my opinion, however, British licences are only granted for the importation of foreign goods to a British port, and not for a free navigation of the seas or to carry goods from one foreign country to another. If this cargo (the *Augusta's*) was intended for Sweden, why not provide it with a Swedish licence?

Whatever I can learn on the subject I will punctually communicate; but in this, as well as in other things, I beg your kind indulgence, and that you will have the goodness to consider the delicacy of my situation—that I cannot act so openly or with such vigour as when this country was in another situation; and as H.M. Government wish me to remain here for sake of intelligence and other reasons, I must be most cautious not to do anything to oblige me to quit my station. I wished it was possible to speak with you, as I cannot trust all I have to say on paper; but there are many obstacles in the way of such an interview, and the more successful the French—alas!—are, the more precaution must be used by this Government and by myself not to draw any injury upon them. On this account I am also at a loss what to do respecting the issuing of such certificates you so kindly authorise me to grant to supply the accidental want of licences. If I gave such, it would certainly be spoken of (so silly are most of the people here), and, of course, occasion much vexation to this Government; and if not endanger my person, at least be the cause of my being ordered out of the country, for which, most likely, I should even incur the blame and censure of my own Government.

I should be very sorry if this reasoning should any ways injure me in your opinion. If I had the honour to be personally known to you—I trust it would not—my name may lead you to suppose me a foreigner cool in the cause. I have the honour to be a true-born Englishman, and ever have I been most zealous to prove my attachment to my dear native country and my loyalty to his Majesty, more particularly in the station I have had the honour to hold these 11 years.

Permit me to mention my being struck with

what you mention in your letter of the 22nd—that Danzig can only be considered as a French port, whereas in Admiral Sir R. G. Keats's letter to me of the 30th April he expressly includes Danzig in the number of those ports to which I was to give assurances of protection for ships bound to a British port, which I have done accordingly, and by the list sent herewith you will observe several ships are profiting of this assurance; many are in want of licences, or they would have sailed already. I shall be obliged to you for your kind explanation should I have taken what you say in a wrong light.

I am much obliged by your kind intentions to send me the English newspapers. They are the only ones one can learn the truth by or draw any comfort from; the German ones are all under the control of the French, and dare not insert anything without leave.

I wish I could send you some good news, but, alas! affairs go very contrary and bear a dismal aspect. A French messenger arrived yesterday and brought the enclosed General Orders, given at Schönbrunn the 13th May, by which it appears the French are in possession of Vienna. God only knows if the Austrians will be able to retrieve their affairs. It is said overtures of peace have been made—the Emperor to lose his hereditary States, to cede Galicia to Poland and Saxony, and to retain only Hungary and Bohemia. Bonaparte declared to the Deputies of the Archduke of Saltzburg—who came to sue for his clemency—that they should never again come under the sceptre of Francis. The papers say he has given it to the Prince Royal of Bavaria.

Your queries have now come to hand, and shall be returned by my next. I shall hardly be able to answer them all.

It strikes me it would be well if you could send me the certificates for ships sailing without licences for me to fill up here, allowing me to sign them with my feigned name and put the seal I put to this letter, which you are now acquainted with ; half a dozen or so would do for the present. Captain Acklom sent me some last year for ships going with provisions to Colberg, whereof the enclosed is one that remained over. If this meets your approbation, please inform me whether I can send the like to Danzig and Memel, where there are several ships in want of them ; of course, should then request to [*torn out*] continue to supply me therewith from time to time.

This being all that occurs at present, I have the honour to remain, Sir,

Your obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) HEINRICH HAHN.

The French Consul illuminated his house yesterday, but a strong guard was placed in the street to prevent any riots. The people were, however, more restrained by their regard for the King not to bring any fresh troubles upon him.

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable.*¹

I do hereby require and direct you to proceed to the head-quarters of the Austrian army, with the despatch you will herewith receive, and land in a

¹ The object of this was to inform the Commander of the Austrian army that had been reported to have captured Thorn and supposed to be near Danzig, of the readiness of Captain Martin to co-operate with him should he lay siege to Danzig. The Austrian army, however, owing to Napoleon's victory at Wagram, had to retreat. Lieut. Hawkey was taken prisoner.

boat belonging to his Majesty's ship Implacable, under my command.

Given under my hand on board the Implacable, the 26th day of May, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Lieut. Hawkey, H.M. ship Implacable.

*BYAM MARTIN TO GENERAL COMMANDING
THE AUSTRIAN ARMY. No. 1.*

His Britannic Majesty's ship Implacable, off Danzig,
May 26th, 1809.

Sir,—Understanding the Imperial Austrian army is arrived before Danzig, I hasten to assure your Excellency of my readiness to employ the ship I command in any way you may suggest for the speedy reduction of the place.

There is a small French privateer in the river which has done considerable injury to the British trade, and I have therefore to request your concurrence in my wish to bring her out with the boats of this ship.

The moment Danzig is in possession of the Austrian army I shall forthwith despatch a vessel to announce the event to Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, the Commander-in-Chief of the British fleet in these seas, and it will be highly acceptable to him to receive any intelligence which may have been recently received from the armies in the South of Germany.

With the warmest wishes for the glory and prosperity of the Austrian arms,

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Excellency's most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To his Excellency the General-in-Chief of his Imperial Austrian Majesty's army before Danzig.

B. MARTIN TO SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ.

His Britannic Majesty's ship Implacable, off Danzig,
May 27th, 1809.

Sir,—Since my letter to you of the 22nd instant, I have completed the Implacable's water at the Heel of Danzig from two wells which together yield about fifty butts in the twenty-four hours. The method of getting it by a bucket is tedious ; but if worked fast the wells become exhausted, and delay is occasioned by waiting for them to replenish. I have learnt from two or three different quarters that the enemy had prepared materials at Danzig for the construction of a six-gun battery on the Heel Point, all which was shipped and 300 men in readiness to come over to throw up the works, when the Implacable appeared. I cannot vouch for the truth of this report, but I think its being spoken of with confidence by several persons entitles it to some credit, and it may not be improbable that the enemy looked to this as a place of retreat if hard pressed at Danzig. I shall at all events be frequent in my observations and guard against any project they may have there.

Thorn is said to have surrendered to the Austrians on the 18th instant ; and on Sunday the Imperial army was stated to be within 20 leagues of Danzig ; on Thursday we heard from several different vessels that they were in the suburbs, and yesterday a firing having commenced at two different advanced batteries I naturally concluded the attack was begun and immediately anchored the Implacable as near the town as I could, thinking it my duty to offer the Austrians any assistance the ship might be capable of giving. With this view I wrote the accompanying letter (No. 1) to the commanding general, and sent Lieutenant Hawkey

about six o'clock in the evening to a merchant vessel at the mouth of the river, with directions not to proceed further unless the master of the vessel could actually point out the Austrian encampment; but he (the master) said no troops of that nation had arrived, that the Poles doing duty at Danzig were thickly planted along the shore, besides having horse patrols. Notwithstanding this Lieutenant Hawkey, prompted by the most zealous, active, enterprising temper I ever met with, determined to land, being persuaded that what he had before heard, and the firing he had seen, destroyed the credibility of the master's report; and this unfortunate prepossession making him the less mindful of my earnest and repeated cautions, has led him into the hands of the enemy with one of the seamen (a foreigner) belonging to the Implacable. It was not intended that there should be any secrecy in his proceeding—he was dressed in full uniform, had his commission, the letter from me to the Austrian general, and an order from me to proceed to the head-quarters in his pocket. The boat was provided with the usual flag of truce, and two marines to carry another flag before the lieutenant after landing. I am thus particular that you may have no apprehensions respecting his personal safety.

I cannot blame this officer's want of more strict attention to my injunctions without at the same time rendering every praise to the motive which guided his steps. Perhaps it would be difficult, or impossible, to find a person whose heart and mind are so completely devoted to the good of the service, or one who on all occasions is so cheerful and so exemplary in the discharge of his duty.

It is not in my power adequately to express to you how much I deplore his absence from the Implacable.

I wrote the accompanying letter (No. 2) to the Governor of Danzig that I might have an opportunity to learn whether Mr. Hawkey was in his possession, and the French officer (unasked) mentioned his having been taken.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Sir James Saumarez, Bt. and K.B.

B. MARTIN TO GOVERNOR, DANZIG. No. 2.

His Britannic Majesty's ship Implacable, off Danzig,
27th May, 1809.

Sir,—It being the bounden duty of every person of every nation to make the calamities of war press as lightly as possible on individuals, I take the liberty to request your Excellency will be good enough to assure the fishermen that their boats shall not be molested in pursuing their common occupations.

I take this occasion to state to your Excellency that I have seven people of Danzig on board this ship as prisoners of war, and that I am willing to exchange them for any British subjects in your possession.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your Excellency's most obedient, humble servant,
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To his Excellency the Governor, or Commanding Officer at Danzig.

His Britannic Majesty's ship Implacable,
May 28th, 1809.

Sir,—I thank your Excellency for the letter you have done me the honour to send on board.

Lieutenant Hawkey and the sailor who accom-

panied him returned to this ship last night, and I shall take an early opportunity of landing the seven men belonging to Danzig with a desire that they will consider themselves indebted to your Excellency's politeness¹ for their liberation.

I have the honour to be with high respect, Sir,
your Excellency's very humble servant,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To his Excellency the Governor, or Commanding Officer at Danzig.

B. MARTIN TO GENERAL GRABOWSKI.

His Britannic Majesty's ship Implacable,

May 30th, 1809.

Sir,—Conformably to the promise I made to your Excellency, I take the first opportunity of landing the seven Danzig men, and at the same time I beg to return the boat by which the lieutenant of this ship escaped from the shore, and request you will have the goodness to direct that she may be restored to the right owner.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

His Excellency the General Count Grabowski, commanding at Danzig.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

His Majesty's ship Implacable, off Danzig,

27th May, 1809.

Sir,—Since my letter to you this morning I have received a flag of truce from the Governor of

¹ He had sent off unasked to inform Martin of the capture. Little incidents of this nature soften the hardships of war, and conduce to respect between antagonists.

Danzig, promising to give up Lieutenant Hawkey and the seaman of the Implacable if he can find them; but this active young man has escaped from two parties, and since eluded the vigilance of the patrols, and I suspect is gone forward to the Austrian head-quarters, and will probably succeed in delivering to the general my offer of assistance towards the reduction of the place; but I see no prospect of rendering them any essential service by men-of-war unless it be in the transport of troops across the river. But I trust they will have no reason to complain of want of exertion in this ship in whatever way she can be made useful against the common enemy. I cannot learn whether the Austrians are advancing towards Danzig or not, but Thorn has certainly fallen,¹ and I apprehend this place is their next object. I send you a letter which I have received from Mr. Drusena this afternoon with my answer. The paragraph which states some transports to be loaded at Riga on account of the Russian Government excites a suspicion that troops may be embarking there with a view to a descent on the Swedish coast; but this is a conjecture of my own upon hearing of the renewal of hostilities between those countries, and which I venture to impart, as a frigate may yet be detached in time to frustrate their views of whatever nature they may be.

I at present occupy a station close off Danzig with the threefold object of preventing the transport of guns or men to the Heel, to be in readiness to meet any proposal from the Austrian general, and to blockade the several privateers fitting at that port, but occasionally stretching towards Pillau to countenance the active trade which the merchants of

¹ Only a *tête de pont* on right bank fell.

that port are disposed to carry on with England. You will observe that Mr. Drusena again hints at the want of licences ; but if the unlicensed ships are handed over from one man-of-war to another, it will at once fulfil the desire of Government to give every facility to the trade, while on the other hand it will secure its passing into the right channel—which is not always the case when empowered to baffle the inquiring of our cruisers, under cloak of regular licences. Two or three vessels which I have fallen in with have certainly been using their licences in a way which was not intended, but there is no place that I could send them to without great hazard of loss to the captors.

The master of the Implacable has been sounding in every direction, and his report confirms me in the opinion that line-of-battle ships cannot act against Danzig ; but by placing heavy guns in small vessels—and especially if there was a bomb-ship here—it may be possible to render good service to the Austrians should they attack it.

I have sent the Ariel with this despatch and feel anxious for her return, as I am now quite alone.

It has been inquired of me when a convoy is likely to sail for England. I fancy it would be esteemed a great accommodation to the merchants if you would enable me to communicate to them when different convoys are intended to sail.

Since writing the foregoing letter Mr. Hawkey and the seaman who was with him have made their escape, after being taken up four times. I cannot learn the exact force at Danzig, but all accounts agree in stating it to be very small.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Sir James Saumarez, Bt. and K.B.

B. MARTIN TO MR. DRUSENA.

Implacable, off Danzig, 27th May, 1809.

Sir,—I am favoured with your letter of the 22nd instant which seems to have had some unaccountable delay on the road, and which I recommend to your inquiry.

1st. Whatever newspapers come into my hands shall be forwarded to you without delay, and I now send you the two latest in my possession.

2nd. I have begged Mr. Hay to make the pilot boat stretch further off shore, that our communication may not be so exposed to observation from Pillau.

3rd. There can be no difficulty whatever in your coming off to the ship if you have anything to impart which might need a personal interview, but you must appoint a time, as I am unwilling to keep the ship long at one place.

4th. I have no hesitation in saying that the protection afforded by our cruisers is quite sufficient to make it perfectly secure for merchant ships to proceed to the appointed rendezvous whenever they are ready.

5th. You mention that transports are loading at Riga on account of the Russian Government; pray be good enough to give me further information respecting them, and particularly the nature of their lading, and probable time of being ready. You will understand how important it is for the Commander-in-Chief to have the fullest information upon such points, to make the arrangements he may deem necessary. It is one of the queries proposed in the paper I sent to you to know what military force the Russians have at Riga; I would also beg information upon the same head with respect to Windau and Libau.

6th. I have transmitted your letter to the Commander-in-Chief, that he may be in possession of your ideas at the advantage of giving help to Colonel Schill; but let me observe how much it will at any time tend to expedite the succour he is in need of, if, in stating the nature of his wants, you were to point out what place the supplies may be sent to. I should think Colonel Schill would do well to establish a stronghold at the mouth of the Elbe where he might readily obtain supplies from England.

7th. I had anticipated what you recommend in respect to the co-operation of the British ships with the Austrian army, by sending a letter of which the enclosed is a copy to the general commanding it; but I question if it has found its way to him. You may therefore send forward that which I now enclose, and assure him of my most zealous assistance; but at the same time I doubt whether it would be possible to approach sufficiently near to render any effectual help except in the transport of troops across the river.

To Mr. Drusena, Consul, Königsberg.

*No. 2. Translated Copy of a Letter received at
Königsberg, 28th May, 1809, per Estafette.*

Breslau, 22nd May, 1809.

This moment the most joyful news has been received here from many different places, as also from Brünn, and even direct from Vienna, that the Archduke Charles in conjunction with General Hiller, together about 200,000 strong, have totally defeated the French on the 16th May above Vienna, at Tulln on the right side of the Danube. The French were retreating in great disorder towards Lintz, exposed to three different fires and pursued

by 30,000 of the Hungarian insurrection. Field-Marshal General Jellachich joined by General Chastellar was stationed in Bavaria to receive the flying enemy. This has not yet appeared in print, but there is the greatest probability of the whole truth of this account, as upwards of a hundred letters from very different places contain the same relation; and what gives it a greater appearance of certainty is, that the French bulletin has not been received, and several merchants of Brünn advise further that all the public treasure that had passed through that place on the way to Hungary was stopped by couriers, and ordered back to Brünn. God grant we may soon receive a complete confirmation of this incomparable joyful account. It is not confirmed that the French have actually entered the city of Vienna, or taken the real fortifications. It is true they had possession of the suburbs and Napoleon's declaration from Schönbrunn does not say more; it is also quite true that 500 Voltigeurs had scaled the walls of the fortress (citadel), but in the true sense of the word they were all butchered by the corps of Vienna Butchers, that not a limb of them came out again.

The French officers made prisoners declare that, after the five days' battle at Regensberg (Ratisbon), Napoleon had said: 'I no longer know the Austrians which I beat in 1805; they fight like lions at present, but as to the generals, they are just what they formerly were.'

29th May, 1809.

Relation.

By command of his Royal Highness the Archduke, Generalissimo at head-quarters at Breitensee, in the March-Feld, on the 23rd of this month May, the

following preliminary account of the brilliant victory gained on the 21st and 22nd is given.

On the 19th and 20th May, the Emperor Napoleon had passed the larger arm of the Danube with his whole army, to which he had drawn all the reinforcements of his subjected confederates, and had formed his forces on the island of Lobau, by which it was of course to be foreseen that he would make the second passage over the lesser arm of the Danube.

His Highness resolved to meet him with the army, to permit him to cross over, then to fall upon him and to frustrate his daring attempt. This created the greatest enthusiasm in the whole army; every sentiment of the purest love of their country, of faithful attachment to their monarch, had made them heroic, whilst the smoke of the burning towns and villages, the scenes of devastation which marked the progress of the enemy's army through Austria, enflamed them to a just vengeance; with the greatest exultations, and repeated shouts of 'Long live our good Emperor Francis!' and confident of the victory, our columns advanced towards the approaching enemy on the 21st at 12 o'clock at noon, and the battle soon began after 3 o'clock.

The Emperor Napoleon commanded the attack in person, endeavouring to break through our centre with the whole of his cavalry, and this mass of horse supported by 60,000 infantry, his guards, and upwards of 100 pieces of artillery, his two wings resting upon Aspern and Essling, two places rendered tolerably strong both by nature and by art. Nowhere did he break through; our battalions formed in masses, and repulsed his cavalry on all sides, whilst our cuirassiers routed his harassed horsemen, and our light horse spread death amongst his flanks. It was a gigantic battle, nearly surpassing all description.

The battle soon became general with the whole infantry; more than 200 cannon emulated in spreading a mutual devastation. Aspern was taken, lost, and retaken ten times; Essling could not be maintained after repeated storming. It was 11 o'clock at night, villages were in flames; we remained masters of the field of battle. The enemy were pressed together, having the island Lobau and the Danube behind them; night had put an end to the bloody work. Meanwhile the enemy's bridge over the larger arm of the Danube was broken through by means of vessels on fire floated down the river. During the night the enemy was incessantly employed drawing all their disposable troops from Vienna, and from the Upper Danube, across the river by means of boats, endeavouring also with the greatest exertions to restore their large bridge; and at 11 o'clock in the morning they began the attack with a most terrible cannonade from the whole of their artillery, upon which the battle spread over the whole lines. By 7 o'clock in the evening every attack had been repulsed, the obstinate perseverance of the enemy was obliged to give way to the heroism of our troops, and the completest victory crowned the exertions of an army which, in the French proclamations, had been declared to be destroyed, and which had now dispelled the phantom of the invincibleness of their opponent.

The enemies' loss was prodigious; the field of battle is covered with dead bodies. Already 6,000 bodies, wounded drawn from under the dead, and lie in our hospitals. When the French could not maintain themselves any longer in Aspern, the brave Hessians were ordered to make the last attempt, and were sacrificed.

On the departure of the courier, the Emperor Napoleon was in full retreat on the other side of the

Danube, which he covered by the occupation of the large island, Lobau. Our army is engaged in the pursuit. The details of the occurrences of these remarkable days will be published as soon as received.

Brünn, 24th May, 1809.

By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain his Majesty's ship Implacable, &c., &c., &c.

Whereas I have received information of several privateers cruising on the south coast of the Baltic, this is therefore to require and direct you to proceed with the best expedition in his Majesty's sloop under your command, off Libau, and cruise between that place and Memel for the space of ten days from the date hereof; at the expiration of which time you will join me between Danzig and the Heel.

The protection of the trade from those ports to Great Britain is to be made the chief object of your attention, and several ships being about to sail with licences, you will see them safe off the coast, directing them to make the Ulklippor Rocks off Carlsrona, where they will be put into the way of meeting the convoy bound to England.

You are to keep a most vigilant look-out for the Russian fleet from Cronstadt, which may be expected to put to sea very soon, and in the event of your discovering them return forthwith and join me upon this rendezvous.

Should you fall in with any of his Majesty's cruisers, you will apprise them that I have received intelligence of several transports, laden on account of the Russian Government, being about to sail from Riga, and to direct their attention towards that port as far as may be consistent with the orders they are under.

You will endeavour to ascertain if there is any unusual collection of Russian troops at Libau or on that part of the coast, and collect what information you can respecting the fleet at Cronstadt.

Given under my hand, on board the Implacable, the 31st day of May, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Captain Forrest, his Majesty's sloop Prometheus.

P.S.—Should you obtain information of the movement of the Russian transports now loading at Riga, you will stretch off the south coast of Oesel, forming the entrance of the Gulf of Livonia, and having shown yourself there, return and continue to pursue the orders above stated.

B. MARTIN TO HEINRICH HAHN.

June 2nd, 1809.

Sir,—I am favoured with your several letters up to the 29th ulto., and let me, I pray you, allay those apprehensions which induce you to call so earnestly upon me to consider the delicacy of your situation, by assuring you I am so fully aware of it, that nothing shall be wanting on my part to keep our communication under the most perfect cloak of secrecy; for I feel how much it behoves me to act in it with such circumspection that not even a suspicion may go abroad which should tend to deprive Government of your valuable services.

The intelligence from the neighbourhood of Vienna is of a nature to excite the most lively joy amongst all who feel unwilling to bear the Tyrant's yoke, but I confess my credulity has so often led to disappointments and vexation, that I am too fearful of giving too readily into a belief of a total defeat of the French army, though the credit which the report

seems to obtain in its circulation through Germany certainly encourages a hope that you may gratify me with an authentic confirmation of it.

My sentiments in respect to Schill are entirely in unison with yours, and I trust enough has been said to call forth every assistance both from our fleet in this quarter, and from England, but much must depend on the promptness with which he meets the needful succour. I strongly suspect he has already benefited by the presence of our squadron in the Belt. I, however, fear the efforts of this noble patriot will be unavailing unless the higher classes of people show more energy in this last struggle to extricate the world from its disgraceful bondage; but perhaps you will think I am not warranted in supposing there is a shameful apathy among the people of property and consideration in the country, which damps the better spirit of their inferiors. I want to see the world in arms, and a hue and cry from one end of the Continent to the other after the blood-thirsty monster who has so long kept us in hot water. I calculate on the 'Siege of Saragossa' doing some good, but it should be accompanied with a short, warm, well-written pamphlet, setting forth the Tyrant in his true and infernal character.

I had a 74-gun ship with me yesterday for the purpose of assisting, had the Austrians been approaching Danzig; but I fear there is now scarcely a possibility of their being able to do so while Russia holds so menacing an attitude, even if she has not commenced hostilities. However, if there should be any change, I rely on your giving me early information, that I may be prepared to afford our friends effectual help.

In respect to the alarm you take at an expression used in my letter of the 22nd ulto., 'That Danzig could only be considered as a French port,' I must

beg to observe that although it is one of the places from whence vessels are permitted to trade direct to Great Britain, yet this does not transform it into anything bearing the least claim to be considered otherwise than the possession of an enemy, as in fact it is. We see only a French flag at the fort, and we know it is occupied by troops in the service of France ; but notwithstanding this, I am fully aware that the port is open to trade under certain conditions, and vessels from thence with licences, and not violating these licences, will pass unmolested.

The galliot *Augusta* was liberated after a few hours' detention. It is therefore unnecessary to make any remark upon the suspicion which attached to her ; and as I have lately seen a letter from Mr. Labes, addressed to the captains of his Majesty's ships, concerning the *Geschwindigkeit* (Sagert master), wherein he seems so thoroughly to understand the cause of her detention, that I need only say she is sent into a port for adjudication, under such strong circumstances as to leave no doubt of her condemnation as a prize. The misapplication and abuse of licences is growing to such a pitch that I feel very earnest in the hope that Government will adopt measures to keep the trade in its proper channel. Every security and every facility will unquestionably be given to vessels pursuing objects compatible with their licences and the intention of the British Government.

My former proposal of a substitute for licences in the way of a certificate from you, and endorsed by me, would be much more satisfactory than any other method, because this suggestion has obtained Sir R. Keats's approbation, and I have not authority from Sir James Saumarez to use his name, as in the document you have transmitted to me. But I feel so heartily disposed to fulfil the desire of Government, 'That there should be no impediment to a

direct trade with England,' that I will endeavour to hit upon some expedient to remove the objectionable part of my first proposal.

It will give me great pleasure to see you on board the *Implacable*, but as there appears considerable risk of its being known, and as the consequence might be unpleasant, I will not hold out an inducement to such an undertaking, by leading you to suppose I have anything to communicate which may not safely pass through the hands we have hitherto found so faithful in the course of our correspondence. But you may possibly have something to impart which it would be wrong to commit to writing; I shall therefore be off Pillau by 10 o'clock to-morrow morning (north, 2 leagues), wind and weather permitting, but I think it will excite less suspicion by keeping under sail instead of anchoring. I can land you the same evening, or perhaps it may be better to desire the pilot boat to come off for you the following morning. I mention this that you may understand how readily you may return on shore, but at the same time I assure you it will be a great pleasure to me to be favoured with your company as long as you can conveniently stay.

I have had two or three despatches from the Admiral, but not a single private letter or newspaper. It appears extraordinary, but Sir R. Keats says the *Implacable* brought the latest letters he had received from England.¹

In the course of a very short time we must have papers, and they shall be immediately forwarded to you.

The convoy is still in the Belt, and so is Sir James Saumarez.

I am, Sir,
Your very obedient, humble servant,
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

¹ *Implacable* left England March 30th. Sir R. Keats must have been nearly two months without letters from home.

H. HAHN TO B. MARTIN.

2nd June, 1809.

Sir,—Yesterday morning I had the pleasure to receive your favours of 30th May, for which and the newspapers sent me I am very much obliged, and return you sincerest thanks.

Before I begin to reply to your letters I must communicate and congratulate you upon the very good news we have received through different channels yesterday and to-day of a glorious victory the Austrians at Aspern have gained over the French army, commanded by the bloodthirsty Tyrant in person. A messenger arrived yesterday noon from Glatz, which place he left on the 27th, and brought an official account of a great battle fought on the banks of the Danube on the 21st and 22nd May, according to the enclosed relation from Brünn the 24th May, of which I have made a hasty translation. You may imagine the great joy this glorious news occasions here.

This morning an Austrian courier arrived here from the Emperor of Austria's head-quarters at Wolkersdorf, which place he left on the 26th May; he was charged with despatches for Prince Schwartzenberg at St. Petersburg, but on applying to the Russian Secretary here, was told that the Prince had left St. Petersburg, and that he had particular orders not to give a passport to any Austrian whatever. I had an opportunity to get this courier to my house and learnt from him that on the 23rd, Bonaparte's head-quarters were at Laxenburg, that on the 26th they had not heard of the French having yet evacuated Vienna. Bonaparte was collecting his troops and it was expected another battle would be fought daily, which would probably be decisive. He supposed the French army on the 21st

and 22nd amounted to about 150,000 men; their loss in the battle was estimated at near 40,000. The above-mentioned despatch from Brünn stated that the Austrians had taken the island of Lobau and made 6,000 prisoners there. This circumstance the courier did not know, but said it was very probable; the island was very large, about 18 leagues in circumference. The Austrians were in great spirits and quite enthusiastic. Prince Louis Lichtenstein greatly and chiefly contributed to the victory by routing the French cavalry, which suffered most terribly. Aspern and Esling are reduced to a heap of stones, not a wall left standing breast-high. The Austrian army was in greater force than the French. He did not know what generals or marshals were killed or wounded on either side. The Empress was at Buda with all the Court and the foreign ministers. Mr. Stuart there also. Bonaparte's situation was considered very critical. This courier returned immediately.

Another piece of good news is that the Austrians have defeated a body of 10,000 Poles near Posen, and completely routed them.

Austrian accounts state their troops were in possession of Memmingen, Munich, and Ratisbon, Saltzburg and Lintz. The French accounts from Leipzig say the Austrians have been defeated at Memmingen and at Lintz. They lie perhaps, as usual.

Major Schill has reached Stralsund, it is said, and had communicated with a British man-of-war. The Prince of Brunswick Oels has collected a corps and entered Saxony; he has issued a very spirited proclamation. No doubt both these brave patriots will be joined by thousands when the victories on the Danube become public.

The Prince and Princess of Weimar arrived here

from St. Petersburg the 31st May, and propose staying a few days.

A Prussian Jager was despatched this afternoon to St. Petersburg, most probably with the accounts from Austria.

I am anxious that this letter should reach you by the 4th, as it will add to the joy that elevates the heart of every Briton on that day.¹ Perhaps you may also have it in your power to send me some glorious accounts from England in return, which you hourly expected.

I forwarded the copy of your letter for the Austrian commander by means of the above-mentioned courier, not knowing a safer or better conveyance. I am glad your young man made such a lucky escape.

I notice your obliging offers respecting the P. of O.,² and have written to him on the subject, but I believe he will not be able to profit of them, as he cannot embark at Pillau so immediately under the eye of the King, who is supposed not to know about it. He wished he could take his departure from Colberg; he is now at Berlin.

I hope my last despatch reached you safe; it partly answers to the contents of the letters before me. And I must beg you will excuse my breaking off at present, having so much to do and anxious to get my despatches off to Mr. Sec. Canning, which I make bold to trouble you with, herein enclosed, requesting to forward them speedily, as perhaps they may be the first accounts he will get.

I have the honour to be, with the highest consideration and regard,

Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) HEINRICH HAHN.

To Captain T. B. Martin.

¹ King's birthday.

² Prince of Orange.

B. MARTIN TO H. HAHN.

June 5th, 1809.

Sir,—The news contained in your letter of the 2nd came to me as you wished, on the 4th, and added greatly to the joy we all felt on the anniversary of his Majesty's birthday. I trust his life will be spared to us yet very long, and that he may see his efforts for the preservation of religion, and the independence of the world, prevail against the infidel Tyrant and his host of myrmidons. But although much be done, much more remains to do, and we can only hope this decisive and brilliant victory¹ on the part of the Austrians may be a prelude to a course of success capable of rousing the senseless Continent from that terrified kind of torpor which the name of a French army has imposed. I hear nothing of any great accumulation of Major Schill's force, or indeed anything concerning him except corroboration of what you state respecting his reaching Stralsund. I heartily wish this glorious patriot may be promptly and abundantly succoured.

In consequence of what you say respecting the wish of the Prince of Orange to embark at Colberg, I shall immediately send the *Rose* off that place to wait his arrival, which I trust will not be delayed, as I am led to think the fulfilment of other arrangements depends upon his getting down the Baltic. Should he come to this place I will appropriate another vessel to his accommodation, but of course it is desirable that the one assigned by the Commander-in-Chief to that service should be so employed.

Sir J. Saumarez has advised me to be cautious in granting licences, as Government have not thought proper to authorise the doing so: the fact is, they

¹ Of Aspern.

never calculated on the want of them ; however, I mention the circumstance that you may be aware that I cannot well deviate from the Admiral's injunctions, except under very pressing necessity, which you would of course set forth on making the application.

The convoy bound to the different ports in this sea was left off Bornholm three days since, and another large one is following through the Belt.

The trade assembled at Carlsrona will proceed as soon as the ships arrive from Stockholm. And a second division will follow as soon as they are collected at the same port, of which I beg you to apprise the merchants, desiring the vessels may speak some of our cruisers off the Ulklippers, before they enter the port.

If you still hold the intention of giving me the pleasure of your company on board the Implacable, I will beg of you to appoint the time, and the ship shall be in a convenient place to receive you.

After I have your answer upon this point, I shall fix on a time for completing my water at the Heel, or Heela.

Can you be good enough to procure me any very accurate map of Germany?

I am, Sir, your very humble servant,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

P.S.—It was understood Soult had proposed terms to Sir A. Wellesley, and had been told in reply that nothing but an unconditional surrender would be accepted—a good resolution which we may ascribe to the general indignation occasioned by the Cintra Convention, in which Sir Arthur's name was so much involved. I sent the Cruiser to the Admiral last evening, with the good news you favoured me with, and I hope she will be back again in two or three days with late newspapers.

The men-of-war which escort the convoy up

will afterwards cruise for the protection of the trade. The Cruiser has taken another privateer brig off the Eastholms.

H. HAHN TO B. MARTIN.

June 6th, 1809.

Sir,—My letter of yesterday I hope reached you safe this morning. I had the pleasure to receive your esteemed favour of same date, for which return thanks.

We have not received any particular news to-day, and the French are quite silent upon the affairs at Lobau. We have no official account of the French having evacuated Vienna; it is said there are still 15,000 men there. Bonaparte is collecting all his troops, and ordered Bernadotte (Duke Ponte Corvo) and D'Avout (Duke Auerstädt) to join him. This I hope will be prevented by the corps of Generals Chastellar, Jellachich and Kollowrath; the two former are advancing from the Tyrol by way of Bavaria and Saltzburg, and Kollowrath, after having been first beaten near Lintz, afterwards defeated the French in his turn, and took that city. These three corps probably may join hands, and form a line betwixt Bonaparte's army and his corps above mentioned.

We may therefore expect very important news from that quarter daily. The Archduke John, who retreated from Italy as mentioned, has faced about again and given his pursuers a good drubbing, of which effect particulars by next post.¹

The Duke of Brunswick has entered Saxony with a corps of only about 2,000 patriots. The King of Saxony was preparing to quit Leipzig, and

¹ An erroneous report; he was defeated.

fly to some safer place; the whole batch of kings are in a pretty plight.

The King of Bavaria is continually moving from Munich to Augsburg, and back again.

The Tyrol peasantry intercepted twenty-six waggons laden with treasure and the crown jewels, &c. These patriots behave very well. In an attack the French made upon them they were greatly annoyed by grape-shot; they immediately collected hay waggons which they shoved before them, and firing from behind these, they killed a great many French.

Major Schill has certainly taken Stralsund, and is entrenching himself there; he found about 15,000 muskets there and 200 cannons, the latter, however, I believe are mostly old iron ones. A very strong corps of Danes, Dutch, and French are in quest of this brave patriot; I hope he will not only be able to resist them, but also to defeat them. I am assured his force has accumulated to 10,000 men, and some add a few thousands more. This is certainly very considerable, and the greatest possible proof of the attachment people have for him, as also of his great abilities considering he set out with only 500 Hussars at a time when the Austrian army was unfortunate, and without being countenanced by any of the great Powers, at least without any commission, and declared a robber and an outlaw by the King of Westphalia. What might he then be able to effect if he was supported by the British nation! At Lunenburg he took down the French arms, and put up the British, which caused very great sensations, and I am assured if at the same time he could have issued a proclamation that he did this in the name of the King of Great Britain, in whose service he was engaged, thousands would have joined him, but as yet he had no authority or commission to produce. I

wish it may be in the power of the Commander-in-Chief, Sir James Saumarez, to appoint him Colonel or even General in H.B.M. service, which, seconded by a declaration on the part of the Admiral, could not fail to produce the greatest effect. I am happy to observe you agree with me in opinion that he should be promptly and abundantly succoured. I wish he had some strong place in his possession, or could cross to Rügen, to organise his troops, for which he certainly cannot have had time whilst continually marching.

Marshal Massena (Duke of Rivoli) has been frustrated in his attempts to penetrate into Hungary by way of Presburg.

We do not hear anything yet of the operations of the Russians in Galicia.

Monsieur D'Oubriel is arrived here as Russian chargé d'affaires, and has probably instructions to engage Prussia to join against Austria, but in this there is no likelihood of his succeeding.

I am confidently assured that Baron Jacobi Kloert, late Prussian Ambassador at the Court of St. James, who has lived retired on his estates since his return from England, has been sent for by the King; this looks well, as he is so staunch a friend to the good cause. I doubt though if he will accept any official charge, unless a change of system according to his ideas takes place.

I observe that from the instructions you have received from the Commander-in-Chief, I must not expect you will send me any more substitutes for licences, unless under very pressing necessity. That necessity is certainly at hand, for the merchants, owing to the great difficulty of communication, have not been able to obtain sufficient from England, and several have freighted, and are lading vessels for England, under condition of furnishing the

masters with licences, and they cannot sail without. I mentioned this formerly to Admiral Keats, who no doubt has laid my inquiry before the Commander-in-Chief. Meantime he replied 'that although he could neither grant licences or passports to any vessels contrary to the provisions of the Orders in Council, he would nevertheless give protection and escort to any that may come to him laden with naval stores for England, in the same manner as the licensed vessels, provided no strong reasons should appear to the contrary.'

The four substitutes sent me, you will perceive by my No. 5, I had forwarded to Danzig, and the ships loading there will no doubt meet the protection Admiral Keats gave me hopes to expect, particularly on producing the substitutes you sent me, and I even hope from the intentions manifested to encourage trade to England, the Commander-in-Chief will authorise you to contrive to issue and send me such substitutes. They will be more particularly wanted now that supplies of Polish and Russian produce is coming down in quantities from those countries, which merchants would eagerly buy up and ship for England by the vessels expected to arrive were they provided with licences; but they cannot procure them so suddenly from England, and meantime the short season for such adventures elapses. I doubt not, Sir, if you would have the goodness to represent the foregoing to the Commander-in-Chief, he would grant such licences, and you may be assured I would be most cautious in not issuing any that may be sent to me, but to the most respectable houses.

I am obliged by the information afforded me respecting the convoys coming up, and those about to depart from Carlsrona, and I shall duly attend to your directions, and apprise the merchants thereof.

I rejoice that the Cruiser has taken another privateer, and wish the seas may soon be cleared of them.

Pray what has been the fate of Captain Kahn, taken on board the Tilsit, is he hanged yet?¹

I have not yet received further intelligence from Riga respecting the transports, nor of what military force there is at Riga, Windau, and Libau. As letters are so frequently opened there, people are afraid to write, and travellers seldom know anything of these matters.

I have been asked whether ships going to Pillau or Stettin will be molested by the British cruisers. I shall be obliged for your opinion on this subject. It was imprudently said at same time that vessels might clear for Colberg, and slip into Schwinemunde. I suspect such things have been done, but it will be very difficult for me to come at the real truth.

I am looking for an accurate map of Germany, and if I meet with one will send it.

I hope the convoys got safe through the Sound; did the Danes make any attempt?

This being all that occurs at present, I beg leave to recommend the enclosed letters to your obliging care, and remain with great regard,

Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) HEINRICH HAHN.

By Sir James Saumarez, Bart. and K.B., Vice-Admiral of the Blue, and Commander-in-Chief of a Squadron of his Majesty's ships and vessels to be employed on a particular service.

You are hereby required and directed to take under your command his Majesty's ship Melpomene, Captain Warren having received my orders for that

¹ No other information given about him.

purpose, and proceed off Nargen in the Gulf of Finland for the annoyance of the enemy, using your endeavours to take or destroy any of their ships of war you may fall in with, and intercept their coasting trade, and also to afford every protection in your power to the trade of his Majesty's subjects, sailing under licences.

You are to keep a vigilant look-out for the enemy's fleet from Cronstadt, and on the event of receiving information of their having put to sea, you are to repair without delay to join me off Hango Head or wherever the squadron may be, and remain upon this station and service until further orders.

Given on board the Victory off [not given],¹
June 28th, 1809.

JAS. SAUMAREZ.

To Thos. B. Martin, Esq., Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable.

By command of the Vice-Admiral,

SAMUEL CHAMPION.

By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable, &c., &c., &c.

You are hereby required and directed to cruise off Pillau in the cutter you command, and on joining his Majesty's sloop Ariel follow the orders of Captain White, her commander, for your further proceedings.

You will herewith receive two most secret despatches—the one to Captain White, and the other to Captain Toker—for which you will get a receipt, and take great care they do not fall into the hands of the enemy.

¹ Probably Hango Head, from B. M.'s order of 29th to Captain Warren (*see* below).

Given on board the Implacable, off Pillau,
June 8th, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Lieut. Weir, H.M. cutter Alban.

P.S.—The security and protection of the trade being an object of great importance, you will make it your first consideration while cruising off Pillau, and be particularly on the look-out after some small privateers, which the enemy frequently sends from Danzig alongshore to Pillau.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable, &c., &c., &c.

Pursuant to directions from Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, Bart. and K.B., Commander-in-Chief, &c., &c.

You are hereby commanded and directed to place the crew of his Majesty's ship under your command at two-thirds allowance of bread, commencing on the 1st of July, 1809, and to be continued until you receive further orders.

Given under my hand on board the Implacable, at sea, June 29th, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Captain Warren, Melpomene.

By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable, &c., &c., &c.

In case of unavoidable separation, the island of Nargen, and between that and Hogland, along the south coast of the Gulf (*of Finland*), is to be considered as the rendezvous, where you may not only

expect to join the Implacable, but such other ships as may be detached this way from the Commander-in-Chief, taking care, however, not to approach the island so as to be seen from Reval, or to give an appearance of watching that port, lest it should occasion some restraint upon the licensed trade which is carried on from thence to Great Britain.

The object of our employment in the Gulf of Finland is the annoyance of the Russian trade and the destruction of her cruisers, combined with every possible protection and security to such vessels as may be sailing with licences from the English Government.

You are to be very vigilant in looking out for the enemy's fleet from Cronstadt; and in the event of receiving information of their having put to sea, use your best endeavours to apprise me thereof, or proceed without loss of time to the Commander-in-Chief, off Hango Head, or wherever the squadron may be, from the situation of the enemy's squadron you may judge most expedient.

You are to continue on this service until further orders.

Given under my hand on board the Implacable, at sea, June 29th, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Captain Warren, Melpomene.

B. MARTIN TO SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ.

Implacable, off Porkola Point, July 6th, 1809.

Sir,—In pursuing the directions I had the honour to receive from you on the 20th ulto., I have now to report that your intelligence of a small Russian squadron off Hogland being confirmed by a neutral vessel, it became necessary to contrive some

scheme to entrap them, as in this confined navigation they had a port of retreat and security in almost every direction. The Implacable and Melpomene were therefore disguised by striking their fore and mizen topgallant masts, and covering the ships with painted canvas. I also determined to push up the Gulf by the Tyter Islands in preference to the customary route north of Hogland, in order to cut in between the enemy and Cronstadt. This stratagem succeeded in the outset to my perfect satisfaction, and one of the finest frigates I ever saw was drawn within about 2 miles of us, when an unlucky circumstance discovered us to be men-of-war, and although the confusion of the enemy was great and our sailing very superior, yet the nearness of Aspo enabled him to get beyond our reach, as there was no person on board the Implacable at all acquainted with the intricate navigation leading to that place, where four other Russian men-of-war (frigates and sloops) were at anchor, but soon made off, accompanied by the ship we had chased, to a great distance within the rocks towards Fredericksham, upon which the Implacable and Melpomene also weighed anchor and stood into the Gulf of Narva,¹ and captured nine sail of vessels laden with timber, spars and cordage, belonging to the Emperor of Russia, and which I doubt not will prove valuable acquisition to our own dockyards.

The boats of the ships, under that active officer Lieutenant Hawkey (of whose intrepidity and spirit I had occasion to speak so highly when off Danzig), have looked into every creek along the south coast of the Gulf without finding any vessels whatever, and he is now on the opposite shore with the same view.

¹ Near the scene of Charles XII.'s defeat of Peter the Great.

Since writing the above Lieutenant Hawkey has returned with three vessels captured by the boats of the Implacable, Melpomene, and Prometheus, under his command. He reports eight sail of gun-boats protecting some ships in shore; and is very desirous of attacking them, which shall be done if there is a reasonable hope of success.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Sir J. Saumarez, Bart. and K.B.

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN, BART.

Off Bornholm, June 9th, 1809.

My dear Henry,—I am unexpectedly called from the neighbourhood of Danzig and Pillau to form one of a squadron which Sir J. Saumarez is collecting off Carlsrona, as I suppose, for the purpose of making a parade up the Gulf of Finland, in order to keep the Russians from any hostile attempt on the Swedish coast, which we still consider under our protection, as the present Government seem to acknowledge it their interest to adhere to the political connections and pursuits which were thought so unwise in their deposed monarch.

My last accounts of the hostile armies (although I had letters sent from the shore yesterday at noon) do not reach to a later period than the sanguinary battle before Vienna on the 21st and 22nd of May, after which Bonaparte is represented as retreating towards Italy, and as having fixed his head-quarters at Grätz, 22 German miles from Vienna, leaving as it is said 15,000 men in the city, and Massena with a powerful corps (having been completely baffled in an attempt to enter Hungary by the way of Presburg) was probably in the vicinity of the capital, so

that the Archduke would scarcely venture to advance on the Tyrant, lest he should be hemmed in between two fires. I am not certain of the position of the army immediately under the Archduke, but of the different detachments I can speak more positively and with great pleasure, as serving to demonstrate the very critical situation of the Tyrant, who has desired Bernadotte and D'Avout to succour him from Bavaria with a numerous, but motley mixture of devils, formed by the contingents of the confederated Princes; but their advance will be opposed by the Austrian Generals Chastellar, Jellachich and Kollowrath; the two former are pushing out of the Tyrol along by Saltzburg, while Kollowrath, after getting in the first instance a good drubbing near Lintz, has since completely defeated the French and taken that city; by which these three corps form a line between Bonaparte and his supplies. The Archduke John, after showing himself an accomplished general by a masterly retreat out of Italy, had reached Klagenfurt when he heard of the victory gained by his brother before Vienna, and facing immediately about thrashed his pursuers to one's heart's content.¹ The Archduke Ferdinand has also acquired great military fame by chastening the fellows in Poland very handsomely, but the Russians kept him greatly in check. Schill, the noble patriot (I can scarcely speak of him without feeling a Roman strutting about within me), is entrenching himself at Stralsund, where he has found 15,000 stand of arms and 280 pieces of cannon; but there is a most powerful corps of Dutch, Danes, and French on the point of attacking him, and much is to be feared from so unequal a contest. He ought to have the most ample and speedy

¹ A false report.

succour from England, but in matters of such great moment we are too often tardy both in our decisions and our movements. If this man is properly supported he will do more than all the powers of the Continent towards its emancipation. The Duke of Brunswick with his followers, only 2,000 strong, has entered Saxony and given a nimbleness to the heels of the King which I fancy he never felt before, and he is gone from Leipzig to seek a safer place; and the Bavarian King has also but a restless time of it, and in one of his flights from Munich the Tyrol peasantry took from him the incumbrance of 26 waggons laden with treasure and the crown jewels.

I must conclude. Adieu!

Yours affectionately,

T. B. M.

Notwithstanding what I have said, I pray you not to be too sanguine in the expectation that Austria can bear up against so powerful a confederacy if we take Russia into the balance against them.

I wrote to old Heard to say I will have no dealings with him. Sir James has with him Victory, Temeraire, Minotaur, Bellerophon, Ruby, and Implacable, and two or three more at hand.

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN, BART.

Implacable, Gulf of Finland, July 7th, 1809.

My dear Henry,—Since my last letter to you from off Carlsrona I have been engaged in a very anxious and active service by which my strength is nearly exhausted, and feet so blistered from incessant walking that I have been obliged to anchor off Sweaborg, *alias* Helsingfors, for the sake of rest and

refreshment. Having received intelligence of a Russian squadron of frigates cruising off the east side of Hogland, I proceeded in that direction with the *Melpomene*, and had both ships disfigured by striking the fore and mizen topgallant masts, and covering the sides with painted canvas, for as they had a secure port to retreat to in every direction it was evident there could be no hope of closing with them but by some scheme to decoy. And never did a stratagem answer better, or promise more complete success, for it served to entice the finest frigate I ever saw within the distance of two gunshots, when a foolish impatience on the part of *Melpomene's* officers induced Captain Warren to uncover the ship's sides, and thereby show to the enemy our true character. Captain Warren with some reason ascribes this over-eagerness to a signal which was made by mistake from *Implacable*. I had directed the signal for *Melpomene* to keep to leeward of the chase to be bent, ready to throw it out on our being discovered, but the signalman understood it was to be immediately hoisted. Wherever the blame may be most due, or whether it should be considered a joint concern, it was certainly the most unfortunate thing that could possibly happen, and just at a time when eight minutes more would have placed the Russians under our guns; as it was we pressed her very hard and had a decided advantage in sailing.

Off Port Baltic, July 10th.

I have been so employed morning, noon, and night in the pursuit of one thing or another, or in keeping the ship clear of the rocks, that I really and truly have not found a moment of leisure to continue my epistle; and I have now but very little time to tell you that on the 7th I sent the boats of the squadron to attack eight Russian gun-boats, and

a convoy within the rocks; and although we have sustained a heavy loss, it has been a most brilliant affair, and given a character to the country which we stood in need of amongst the Russians. Of eight gun-boats we have taken six and sunk one, and brought out twelve sail of merchant vessels laden with supplies for the army.¹ I have lost that most gallant young man Hawkey, who first came to sea with me in the *Fisgard*; his coolness and intrepidity is the theme of admiration throughout the squadron, and it was his example which secured to us such complete success. I have now briefly to say that Sir J. Saumarez has given me so ungracious a reception, and so censured me for undertaking this expedition, that I have applied for a court-martial in the following terms:

‘Sir,—In the interview I had the honour to have with you yesterday evening in the presence of Captain Hope and Mr. Secretary Champion, you were pleased to cast such a censure on my conduct in the execution of the orders which I received from you on the 28th ulto., that I trust you will consider it due to me to have an opportunity of proving before a court-martial, that I have acted strictly conformable both to the letter and spirit of those orders, as relating to the attack upon the Russian flotilla under Porkola Point.’²

‘I have therefore to request you will order a court-martial to inquire into my conduct for having directed the boats of the squadron to make an attack, which you have denominated wrong,

¹ ‘A most gallant business, admirably planned and as admirably carried out, and was not accomplished without a serious loss. . . . The last words of Lieut. Hawkey were—“Hurra! push on; England for ever!” . . . The whole of our loss’ was ‘4 officers and 8 seamen killed. One officer, 25 seamen, and 11 marines wounded.’—James V. 264.

² In Baro Sound, coast of Finland.

indiscreet, and such as should not have been undertaken.

‘I am, Sir, &c.’

Extract from Sir J. S.’s orders of the 28th alluded to: ‘In the Gulf of Finland, for the annoyance of the enemy, using your endeavours to take or destroy any of their ships of war you may fall in with, and intercept their coasting trade.’

On several occasions I have had reason to observe a something in Sir James’s conduct that always brought to mind a belief that I was considered too much an admirer of Sir S. H. and Sir R. K.,¹ and too sensible of their absence from this station to be pleasing to the chief. Captain Hope, and I believe every officer here, feel as I feel in the business; and I am confident had the Russians not been attacked, reflections would have gone abroad much to my prejudice, to say nothing of the injury which might arise to the service by checking that spirit of enterprise which has tended as much as general actions to exalt the glory of our country. Happy is the man who can strike the medium between too little and too much. In this instance I should have thought complete success would justify the undertaking. I can have no answer to my letter till I rejoin the Admiral, after landing the prisoners at Fort Baltic. You will perhaps think me wrong in entertaining an idea of giving the ship up after the court-martial (if it is granted); Hope advised the contrary, and I don’t feel at all disposed to act hastily. My kindest love to all, and believe me ever affectionately yours,

T. B. M.

The *Melpomene* is going home with twelve or fourteen of our most valuable prizes—the others will be disposed of here.

¹ Sir S. Hood and Sir R. Keats.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

H.M. ship *Implacable* in the Gulf of Finland,
July 8th, 1809.

Sir,—The position taken by the Russian flotilla under Porkola Point seemed so much like a defiance, that I considered something was necessary to be done in order to impress these strangers with that sense of respect and fear which his Majesty's other enemies are accustomed to show to the British flag; I therefore determined to gratify the anxious wish of Lieutenant Hawkey to lead the boats of the ships named in the margin,¹ which were assembled at 9 o'clock last night, and proceeded, with an irresistible zeal and intrepidity towards the enemy, who had the advantage of local knowledge, to take a position of extraordinary strength within two rocks, serving as a cover to their wings, and from whence they could pour a destructive fire of grape upon our boats, which notwithstanding advanced with perfect coolness, and never fired a gun till actually touching the enemy, when they boarded sword in hand, and carried all before them.

I believe a more brilliant achievement does not grace the records of our naval history; each officer was impatient to be the leader in the attack, and each man zealous to emulate their noble example, and the most complete success has been the consequence of such determined bravery. Of eight gun-boats, mounting each a thirty-two and twenty-four pounder and forty men, six have been brought out, one sunk, a large armed ship taken and burnt; and the whole of the ships and vessels (twelve in number) under their protection, laden with powder and provisions for the Russian army, brought out.

I have deeply to lament the loss of many men killed and wounded, and especially that most valu-

¹ *Implacable*—*Bellerophon*—*Prometheus*—*Melpomene*.

able officer Lieutenant Hawkey, who after taking one gun-boat was killed by grape shot in the act of boarding the second. No praise from my pen can do adequate justice to the merits of this lamented young man. As an officer he was active, correct and zealous to the highest degree, the leader in every kind of enterprise, and regardless of danger; he delighted in whatever he thought could tend to promote the glory of his country.

His last words were 'Huzza, push on; England for ever!' Mr. Hawkey had been away in the boats on different service since last Monday, accompanied by Lieutenant Vernon, whose conduct in this affair has been highly exemplary, and shows him worthy to be the companion of so heroic a man; but while I am induced to mention the name of Mr. Vernon from his continued services with Mr. Hawkey, I feel that every officer, seaman, and marine has a claim to my warmest praises, and will I trust obtain your favourable recommendation to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

Lieutenant Charles Allen, of the *Bellerophon*, was the senior officer after Mr. Hawkey's death.

I am just now informed that Lieutenant Sterling, of the *Prometheus*, who was severely wounded, is since dead. His conduct in this affair was very conspicuous, and Captain Forrest speaks highly in praise of the zeal and activity of his services on every occasion.

I am sure you will readily believe that Captain Forrest did not witness the preparation for this attack without feeling an ardent desire to command it, but I was obliged to resist his pressing importunity as a matter of justice to Lieutenant Hawkey.

The Russians have suffered severely in this conflict; the most moderate statement makes it

appear that two-thirds of them have been killed, wounded, or jumped overboard.

Enclosed is a list of killed, the names of the officers employed, an account of the vessels captured, and number of prisoners.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Vice-Admiral Sir J. Saumarez, Bt. and K.B.

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.M. ship Implacable.*

You are hereby required and directed to collect from the different ships the wounded Russian prisoners, and proceed with them to Port Baltic, where you are to land them under a flag of truce, and procure from the Commandant of that place a receipt of credit for the number of men you may land, and having so done, continue to follow the orders you have received from the Commander-in-Chief.

Given the 8th July, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Captain Warren, Bellerophon.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, off Nargen Island, 10th July, 1809.

Sir,—I yesterday received your letter of the 8th instant, conveying to me the particulars of a most gallant attack made by the boats of his Majesty's ship under your command, and those of the ships named in the margin, under the orders of Lieutenant Hawkey, of the Implacable, upon a Russian flotilla of eight gun-boats in a position of extraordinary

strength within two rocks, under Porkola Point, with a convoy under their protection, and which, through the irresistible zeal and intrepidity of Lieutenant Hawkey, and that of the officers and men under his orders, and through their determined bravery in boarding the enemy, was attended with complete success ; six of the gun-boats, mounting each a thirty-two and a twenty-four-pounder, and manned with forty men, having been brought out and one sunk, and the whole of the ships and vessels, twelve in number, captured, and a large armed ship taken and burnt ; and also acquainting me with the severe loss the service has sustained in that most valuable officer, Lieutenant Hawkey, who conducted the attack, and of Lieutenant Sterling, of the *Prometheus* ; and expressing your highest approbation of the conduct of Lieutenant Vernon and of all the other officers, seamen and marines, who were employed upon this service, and which I shall not fail to represent in the strongest terms to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

In giving every possible credit to your zealous intentions, and to the undaunted bravery and gallant conduct displayed by the officers and men in the execution of your orders, I cannot, under all circumstances, but express my concern that the attack has been made, not deeming the object in view to have been adequate to the risk and danger attending so hazardous an enterprise, and to the severe loss that must inevitably have ensued from the very strong position the enemy appear to have taken.

I am, Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,
JS. SAUMAREZ.

P.S.—I have also received a list of the killed

and wounded, the names of the officers employed, an account of the vessels captured, and number of prisoners.

To Thos. B. Martin Esq., Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, off Nargen Island, 10th July, 1809.

Sir,—I have received your letter of the 6th instant, detailing an account of your proceedings in company with his Majesty's ship Melpomene, under your command, in pursuance of my orders to you of the 28th ultimo, and acquainting me of the means you adopted in order to cut off a large Russian frigate from getting to Cronstadt, but which unfortunately escaped to Aspo, and which afterwards made off with four other ships of war that you found at anchor off that place, within the rocks towards Fredericksham; also stating your having subsequently stood into the Bay of Narva and, in company with the Melpomene, captured nine vessels laden with timber, spars, and cordage, belonging to the Emperor of Russia; and also acquainting me of the exertions of Lieutenant Hawkey and of the capture of three of the enemy's vessels by the boats of the Implacable, Melpomene, and Prometheus, under his orders; and I have to acquaint you that I highly approve of your proceedings upon the different services stated in your letter.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

J. SAUMAREZ.

Thos. Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, off Nargen Island, 11th July, 1809.

Sir,—I have received your letter of yesterday's date, stating that in the interview I had with you on the preceding evening, in the presence of Captain Hope and Mr. Champion (Secretary), I passed such a censure on your conduct in the execution of the orders you received from me on the 28th ultimo, that you trusted I would consider it due to you to have an opportunity of proving before a court-martial that you had acted strictly conformable both to the letter and spirit of those orders as relating to the attack upon the Russian flotilla under Porkola Point, and requesting me to order a court-martial to inquire into your conduct for having directed the boats of the squadron to make the said attack.

I have in reply to acquaint you that, having at no time considered any part of your conduct requiring to be inquired into by a court-martial, I do not think fit to comply with your request, neither can I admit that any part of the conversation I had with you on the said evening—particularly in presence of Captain Hope and Mr. Champion—to have given any justifiable grounds for your making an application for a court-martial on your conduct.

I must at the same time observe that if after the receipt of this letter you persist in demanding a court-martial, I shall take the earliest opportunity to transmit your application to the Secretary of the Admiralty for the consideration of their Lordships.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

JS. SAUMAREZ.

Thos. Byam Martin, Esq.,

Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable

B. MARTIN TO RUSSIAN COMMANDANT,
ROGERWICK (PORT BALTIC).

Implacable, 11th July, 1809.

Sir,—I have to acquaint your Excellency that the Commander-in-Chief of his Britannic Majesty's fleet in the Baltic has directed me to offer 99 Russian prisoners in exchange for British prisoners of war; or, in the event of your not having so many, I am to require a receipt for that number with a promise of not serving against his Majesty or his allies until duly exchanged.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

The Commandant at Rogerwick.

[MEMO.]

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.M. ship Implacable, &c., &c.*

The public service requiring that the Russian prisoners now on board his Majesty's ships in the Gulf of Finland should be immediately landed, and Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, Commander-in-Chief, having given directions that they should be put on shore at Rogerwick, it becomes impossible to procure before any of his Majesty's Consuls the declaration of the Russian officer as to the number of the men on board at the time of their being attacked. I do therefore require and direct you to take to your assistance any two signing officers, and in my presence take the necessary depositions of the Russian officers.

Given under my hand on board the Implacable, the 11th July, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Captain Warren, Melpomene.

THE DECLARATION.

We, the two principal officers of the flotilla of his Majesty the Emperor of Russia, employed at Por kola, do solemnly declare that at the time we were attacked by the British boats, the number of persons in the gun-boats which have been captured and destroyed amounted to two hundred and thirty-one men.

Given under our hands on board his Britannic Majesty's ship Implacable, July 11th, 1809.

(Signed) [*Names not given.*]

Sworn before

Witness

(Signed) FREDK. WARREN.

T. FORREST.

JOHN RUDE.

ALLEN FIELD.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, off Nargen Island, 13th July, 1809.

Sir,—Having received your letter of yesterday's date, explanatory of the circumstances that induced you to order the attack upon the enemy's flotilla of gun-boats the evening of the 7th instant, by the boats of his Majesty's ship under your orders, I am perfectly satisfied that you directed the attack to be made in the full conviction that the opposition on the part of the enemy would not have been so great as it proved, and that you considered the force you detached perfectly competent to the service they had to perform, without being attended with so great a loss as it has unfortunately incurred. Under the circumstances I have refrained from transmitting your application for a court-martial, satisfied as I have always been that no part of your conduct required it.

I am, Sir, your most obedient, humble servant,

J. SAUMAREZ.

Thos. B. Martin, Esq.,

Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ,

Implacable, July 14th, 1809.

Sir,—It is my duty to state to you that, after Lieutenant Hawkey was killed in attacking the flotilla on the 7th inst., the command of his boat fell to John Granburg, a boatswain's mate, who, at the head of the crew, boarded and carried the enemy's gun-boat in the most gallant manner.

I have therefore to request you will be pleased to recommend him to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty as a candidate for a boatswain's warrant.

I am, Sir, &c., (Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Vice-Admiral Sir J. Saumarez, Bt. and K.B.

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN, BART.

Implacable, off Revel, July 16th, 1809.

My dear Henry,—After despatching my last letter to you, two notes came from Sir J. S., couched in most conciliatory terms, but I considered it due to me, that as blame had been officially attached to my conduct, so it should be officially removed, and I a second time excused myself the interview Sir J. desired, adding that I expected the paragraph in his letter (No. 2) should be rescinded, and accordingly at nine o'clock on Thursday night an official letter arrived, affording all the satisfaction I wished, and we shook hands yesterday, with a mutual promise of being on a perfect footing of the *status ante bellum*, so that as all is to sink into oblivion, I will not pester you any more on the subject.¹

¹ A most creditable termination on both sides of a very unpleasant business. Great allowance should always be made by juniors for the difficulties and worries of a Commander-in-Chief; who also should consider the feelings of juniors, and make amends for any erroneous view he may have taken.

There are no copies of Byam Martin's own letters on this subject.

We are at anchor with five sail of the line near Reval, getting wood and water from an island called Nargen. The Russians have thirteen sail of the line ready for sea, of which four are three-deckers. Our force in this part of the Baltic is nine sail, and Sir J. S. entertains a hope that the disparity of force may tempt them out, but if they do, I shall think it a proof that we did not give them such a bellyful of iron last year as I supposed. The bear of an Emperor still adheres to the French interest, and I believe has ordered his army to attack the Austrians.

We are now quite out of the way of communication with Germany, and look for news of the armies from the English papers, though a vessel or two off Pillau would give late news.

Yours affectionately,

T. B. M.

[MEMO.]

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.M. ship Implacable, &c., &c., &c.*

You are to pay the strictest attention to the navigation and care of the vessel entrusted to your charge, and on your arrival in England to be particularly attentive to prevent embezzlement, for at Sheerness (the port to which you are to proceed in case of separation from convoy), there is more robbery of vessels than in any port of England. You are never to sleep on shore, and when the cargo is delivering, take an inventory thereof, stating the measurement of the spars and plank, bringing the same to me as soon as can be.

After the vessels are cleared and disposed of as Messrs. Cooke and Halford may direct, you will go on board the flag-ship for a passage to the Baltic.

Given, &c.,

T. B. MARTIN.¹

To Messrs. Luscombe, Ormond, Broderick, Loveday, &c.

B. MARTIN TO SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ.

His Majesty's ship Implacable, August 4th, 1809.

Sir,—Captain Pater having reconnoitred Cronstadt on the 1st instant, I lose no time in transmitting to you, by the Erebus, his report of the enemy's fleet.

I arrived off Hogland yesterday morning, and have sent the Cerberus and Cruiser to watch the passage from Cronstadt on each side of the island of Lavensari, and the Alexandria will occupy the station I had assigned to the Erebus, between Aspo and Sommars Rock; and one of the ships will occasionally stretch into the Gulf of Narva.

I propose continuing mostly at anchor off Hogland with the Implacable and the Princess Caroline, as being more safe than cruising in this confined navigation; the ground appears to be good, but the depth of water is thirty-eight fms. The situation, however, is desirable from being central, and I believe as secure as any I can take, with a view to

¹ This must be 1808 or 1809. As showing the opinion of an impartial and sound judging officer on the home system of robbing prizes — a point on which the Lord Dundonald was very strong—it is worthy of notice.

the proper execution of my orders. By what I learn from Captains Pater and Cochrane, no Russian vessel is allowed to put to sea, in consequence of their trade being so much cut up; but I do not understand the least restraint is laid on the neutral flag.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Sir J. Saumarez, Bart. and K.B.

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.M. ship Implacable.*

You are hereby required and directed to proceed in his Majesty's sloop Erebus under your command, and cruise between Aspo and Sommars rock, for the purpose of annoying the trade of the enemy, and watching that part of the coast, that I may be apprised by signal, or otherwise, as may be necessary of the approach of the enemy's fleet from Cronstadt, and also of any trading vessels within the rocks, which may be assailable by the boats of the squadron, without risk of being drawn into action with the gun-boats.

Given on board the Implacable, off Hogland,
August 4th, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Captain Autridge, Erebus.

*B. MARTIN TO CAPTAIN WHITBY
(H.M.S. CERBERUS).*

H.M. ship Implacable, off Hogland,

August 8th, 1809.

Sir,—I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, stating your having chased a large

Russian frigate and corvette in sight of Tolbukin, and your very sufficient and proper reasons for not persisting in the chase, so as to bring them to action. I shall take the earliest opportunity of transmitting your letter to the Commander-in-Chief, persuaded that he will fully approve of your conduct.

The important service on which you are employed requires that you should not be drawn into any contest with the enemy's advanced ships while in reach of succour from Cronstadt; indeed under any circumstances the keeping in a state to watch and report the approach of the Russian fleet is an object of the first consideration.

I had intended that the Alexandria should occupy the station before assigned to the Erebus, with the orders of which you will herewith receive a copy; but I have now directed Captain Cochrane to put himself under your command, and have to desire you will, in addition to your former orders, consider the station between Aspo and Sommars Island as within the limits of your command, and I should not wish any of your ships to go east of Seskär, except under very particular circumstances.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Captain Whitby, Cerberus.

P.S.—One of the ships, or the brig under your orders, may occasionally come to this anchorage, for the purpose of keeping their water complete.

B. MARTIN TO CAPTAIN WHITBY.

H.M. ship Implacable, off Hogland, 8th August, 1809.

Sir,—Captain Toker has delivered to me your letter enclosing Captain Cochrane's report of the information he had obtained of the enemy, which

accords with the intelligence I received yesterday morning.

I do not altogether credit the report of a general embargo at St. Petersburg; and when I suggested to the master of the neutral the probability of its being only an event apprehended by his owner, he admitted it was likely. I should indeed trust it is not the case; and knowing the importance our Government attach to the licensed trade with Russia, I am anxious to avoid by all possible means every measure which might tend to restrain it, and I would therefore wish you to keep on this side of Seskär until the Commander-in-Chief's pleasure is known respecting a nearer approach to Cronstadt. Having occasion to forward despatches to Sir J. Saumarez, I shall be glad if you will send the Cruiser back to me with the weekly accounts and reports of vessels boarded, and give up making any detachment to the Gulf of Narva until further orders; but I should wish you to purchase any quantity of stock which the inhabitants of the Great Tyter Island may be willing to part with for the sick of the squadron.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Captain Whitby, H.M. ship Cerberus.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

H.M. ship Implacable, off Hogland, 9th August, 1809.

Sir,—I herewith transmit to you a letter which I have received from Captain Whitby, of H.M. ship Cerberus, stating his having chased a Russian frigate and corvette off the Tolbukin on the 6th inst.; and apprehending it to be the intention of the enemy to draw our advanced ships near to

Cronstadt and tempt them to some hazardous contest or exposure to the gun-boats in event of calm weather, I judged it right to desire Captain Whitby would not go to the eastward of Seskär, as you will see by the accompanying letter.

I beg to transmit you a list of the vessels boarded by the squadron, and to refer you to the statement of the master of the *St. Michalia*, an intelligent English seaman, for the most minute account I have yet seen of the Russian fleet; and he assured me his observations were made with great accuracy for the purpose of affording correct information to the British cruisers. I have drawn out in a rough manner a plan of Cronstadt to point out more readily the description given by this man of the position of the ships and new batteries, which I hope will convey to you a tolerable idea of them. The master alluded to stated that an embargo had or would immediately take place in consequence of the *Cerberus* having appeared off the port; but he agreed with me that it was probably only so stated on the apprehensions of his owner and with a view to hastening his departure. The fact will soon be ascertained with this easterly wind, and I hope before this letter is closed to have the satisfaction of reporting the trade (Russian excepted) still free.

The master, when on board the vessels No. 1 and No. 4 in the accompanying plan for the purpose of buying stores, observed that no running rigging was rove and very few men on board. From the number of turns in their hawse, he doubted many of them having hands enough to clear it.

I am, Sir, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Sir J. Saumarez, Vice-Admiral of the Blue,
Commander-in-Chief, &c., &c., &c.

P.S.—No merchant vessel has passed down from

Cronstadt since the supposed embargo, but I hope to see some soon, as our frigates are on their station this side of Lavensari.

B. MARTIN TO CAPTAIN WHITBY.

H.M. ship Implacable, off Hogland, August 19th, 1809.

Sir,—I herewith transmit a copy of a general memorandum, issued by the Commander-in-Chief, for the guidance of the squadron, which you will cause to be copied and returned to me.

I also send three printed papers from the Admiralty for each of the ships under your orders.

In order that the licensed trade between St. Petersburg and England should be left as free as possible, it is desirable that the ships under your command should not go eastwards of Penisari, but watch the passage on each side of the Lavensari, and between Sommars Island and Aspo (all places in Gulf of Finland).

I am, Sir,

Your obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Captain Whitby, his Majesty's ship Cerberus.

SIR EDWARD O'BRYEN TO B. MARTIN.

Admiralty, August 19th, 1809.

Dear Martin,—While I lament with you the loss of Lieutenant Hawkey, allow me to congratulate you on the noble success of the survivors, whose gallant conduct deserves and calls for warm admiration, and which no doubt will ensure them honourable distinction.

Sir Rupert George does not think it possible to

facilitate the release of Lieutenant Hawkey.¹ I saw him this morning by Lord Mulgrave's desire, but every attempt will be made to procure his return to this country. Nothing can be done for him (in the way of promotion) as the matter now stands. You say that Mr. Charles Hawkey has passed the examinations which qualify him for a lieutenant. His passing certificate has not been lodged, which should be done with all possible despatch. Where is he? If he be in the Baltic, and that you have a vacancy in the Implacable and would like to have him, give me a hint. I assure you that Lord Mulgrave has every wish to attend to your recommendation of these two young men. . . .

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

H.M. ship Implacable, at sea, August 24th, 1809.

Sir,—Thinking it will be satisfactory to you to learn that there is no embargo on any but Russian vessels at Cronstadt, I send the Erebus with the intelligence of my having this day boarded a number of licensed ships, which sailed yesterday from that port, bound to England. They agree in stating that the trade experienced no check, except when our cruisers were in sight of Cronstadt, and the strict injunctions I have given to Captain Whitby not to go beyond Penisari will prevent a recurrence of the alarm occasioned by his second appearance off Cronstadt.

I do not get any information from these vessels except that some of the chief officers of the Russian army on the Austrian frontiers had been recalled, but their names were forgotten.

¹ From the original letter; evidently a mistake for some other name, or an allusion to Lieut. Hawkey's escape from Danzig, previously mentioned. This letter is in allusion to the affair at Porkola, reported July 8th.

It was known at St. Petersburg that the English had entered the Scheldt with 40,000 men, but nothing had been heard of their progress or operations.

Near fifty sail of vessels will sail in the course of the week from Cronstadt.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Sir J. Saumarez, Bt. and K.B.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

H.M. ship Implacable, off Hogland, August 25th, 1809.

Sir,—The Prometheus joined me late this evening with bullocks for the squadron, and Captain Forrest will return off Nargen without a moment's delay.

I have had the honour to receive your letter communicating the sentiments of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty respecting the attack made upon the enemy's flotilla off Porkola Point, and desiring that a report may be made of such of the men as particularly distinguished themselves on the occasion and are eligible for promotion, which I will lose no time in communicating to the other ships, that a return may be made of men as may be thought deserving any mark of their Lordships' favour.

Since my letter of yesterday's date by the Erebus, nothing had occurred deserving your notice.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, Bt. and K.B., Commander-in-Chief, &c. &c.

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.M. ship Implacable, &c. &c. &c.*

Whereas Captain Pater, of his Majesty's ship Princess Carolina, has, in consequence of an application from the purser of that ship, requested me to order a survey to be held on a quantity of cheese and butter, the warranty of which will expire the ensuing month, and which is stated to be unfit for men to eat.¹

Given under my hand on board the Implacable, off Hogland, August 28th, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. M.

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.M. ship Implacable, &c. &c. &c.*

Whereas I have received intimation of the enemy's intention to send supplies of provisions along the North shore of the Baltic for the relief of their army in the Gulf of Bothnia :

You are therefore hereby required and directed to proceed in his Majesty's ship under your command, and take with you the Prometheus (Captain Forrest being directed to follow your orders), and occupy the anchorage at Aspö, for the purpose of intercepting any vessel passing near that island, and of apprising me by signal, or otherwise, as may be necessary of any trade within the Rocks, which may be assailable by the boats of the squadron; watching most vigilantly the approach of the enemy's fleet from Cronstadt, and join me at this anchorage in case of obtaining information of their probable departure from that port.

As by these orders you are placed in a situation

¹ The quality of provisions appears to have improved, as there are fewer complaints in the Byam Martin papers than some years previously.

which may require the boats of the ships to be sent on service, you will on such occasions govern yourself by the Commander-in-Chief's secret general memorandum of the 31st ulto.

Given under my hand on board the Implacable, off Hogland, August 30th, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Captain Pater, H.M. ship Princess Caroline.

B. MARTIN TO CAPTAIN WHITBY.

H.M. ship Implacable, off Hogland, August 30th, 1809.

Sir,—I think it necessary to acquaint you that I have received intimation of the enemy's intention to take every possible opportunity and means of conveying supplies to the Russian army in the Gulf of Bothnia. I have therefore detached the Princess Caroline and the Prometheus to Aspo, but I suspect it will be attempted to pass vessels along the South shore of the Baltic, and I am satisfied your vigilance in watching the passage south of Lavensari will baffle any such attempt.

I have it in contemplation to go into the Gulf of Narva with the Alexandria, when she returns to me after delivering this letter, but I shall not remain more than three or four days; in the meantime the Saturn will remain at this anchorage.

I am, Sir, yours, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Captain Whitby, H.M. ship Cerberus.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Implacable, off Hogland, September 2nd, 1809.

Sir,—By two vessels which left St. Petersburg on Thursday last, I learn that the licensed vessels at

Reval are prevented sailing, in consequence of the British fleet being at anchor near that port. The master of the vessel (an American bound to London), and his passengers both state that a letter had been received by Mr. Sparrow, English agent at Petersburg, from the house of De Burg at Reval, stating the circumstance, and I trust you will approve of my detaching the *Alexandria* to you with this intelligence.

My intention to go into the Gulf of Narva is suspended until the *Alexandria* returns, as I think it unsafe for ships to be alone in this navigation.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Vice-Admiral Sir J. Saumarez, Bart. and K.B.

B. MARTIN TO CAPTAIN WHITBY.

H.M.S. *Implacable*, off Hogland, 12th September, 1809.

Sir,—The Commander-in-Chief being desirous that the ships should be well supplied with slops¹ previous to the setting in of bad weather, I have to desire you will send me a statement of any which may be necessary for the *Cerberus* or *Nemesis* in order that they may be supplied from the extra slops on board the *Implacable*.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Captain Whitby, *Cerberus*.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

H.M.S. *Implacable*, off Hogland, September 14th, 1809.

Sir,—There not having been any lights shown at Hogland last night, I sent to the Russian officer in

¹ A nautical name for clothing

charge of them to know the reason of it, and learn that under cover of the dark and blowing nights, boats have been sent across, and taken away not only the oil, but all the lamps; I am therefore going to take off the Russian officer and his party, and under such provocation I should feel myself abundantly justified in destroying a new public building of brick, and I suspect intended for soldiers. Such a step on the part of the enemy would, I think, justify even the destroying of the lighthouses, for after we are compelled to withdraw from this station, they would thereby be prevented navigating their ships with any degree of safety, and by all accounts it is intended to force supplies towards the Gulf of Bothnia the moment we are gone. I shall not, however, venture to act on my own opinion of what is due to such conduct, but wait your authority.¹

I am, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Sir James Saumarez, Bt. and K.B.

B. MARTIN TO GENERAL BRIGHT.

H.M.S. Implacable, off Hogland, September 14th, 1809.

Sir,—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having decided that a return should be made of the seamen under my command whose exertions in attacking the Russian flotilla on the 7th July might entitle them to promotion, I think it at the same time due to the persons named below, belonging to your ever distinguished corps, to state that they were employed on that service, and have

¹ Cannot find an answer.

the strongest claims to be recommended to your notice as deserving promotion.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Lieutenant-General Bright, commanding the Royal Marines at Plymouth.

Thos. Barlow.

3 J. Short.

15 J. Carr.

117 H. Banfield.

James Taylor.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

H.M. ship Implacable, off Hogland, September 14th, 1809.

Sir,—Agreeable to the directions signified in your letter of the 23rd ulto., I beg to mention the persons named below¹ as having distinguished themselves in the boats of the Implacable, under Lieutenant Hawkey, in attacking the Russian flotilla, and as being deserving the promotion which the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are pleased to offer to such as are recommended for their zeal and intrepidity on that occasion; and I also transmit a list of men recommended by Captain Warren, of his Majesty's Bellerophon.

It is necessary that I should observe that John Williams, the gunner's mate of the Implacable, will not have completed the servitude of one year as a petty officer until June 1810, and Richard Chew (*alias* Dugald Campbell) served an apprenticeship to

¹ John Williams, gunner's mate, candidate for gunner's warrant; Dugald Campbell, caulker, a candidate for a carpenter's warrant. They would be well pleased with promotion when their time is completed.

a shipwright, is rated caulker, but never served as carpenter's mate.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Sir J. Saumarez, Bart. and K.B.

THOMAS B. MARTIN, ESQ., CAPTAIN OF H.M.S. IMPLACABLE, &c. &c. &c., TO CAPTAIN WHITBY.

Captain Forrest being placed under your command, you are hereby required and directed, with his Majesty's ships Cerberus, Nemesis, and Prometheus, to cruise to the eastward of Hogland for the purpose of watching the enemy and of communicating to the Commander-in-Chief, off Nargen, such material intelligence as you may obtain of their movements, taking care to apprise his Majesty's ships at anchor off Porkola Point of the approach of any squadron belonging to the enemy.

This order is not to prevent your taking shelter on the west side of Hogland if, when it blows hard from the eastward, you think it necessary to do so.

Given under my hand on board the Implacable, off Hogland, September 18th, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Captain Whitby, H.M.S. Cerberus.

SURVEY OF STORES.

By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of H.M.S. Implacable, &c. &c. &c.

Whereas Captain Pater, of his Majesty's ship Princess Caroline, having represented to me that two bower cables of twenty-two inch, pinnace's main-sail, and one bower anchor of 68 cwt., are

much broke so as to be unfit for their proper uses, and requesting I will order a survey to be held on the same :

You are therefore hereby required and directed to repair forthwith on board H.M.S. Princess Caroline, and there take a strict and careful survey of the stores above mentioned ; and if you find them as represented, leave them in charge of the boatswain of that ship to be applied to such uses as may be proper, reporting to me from under your hands your proceedings therein.

Given under my hand on board the Implacable, off Hogland, 20th September, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. M.

To the Master and Boatswain of the Saturn, and Boatswain of the Implacable.

B. MARTIN TO PRIZE AGENTS.

Implacable, off Hogland, in the Gulf of Finland,
Sept. 21st, 1809.

Sir,—Conformably to the wishes of the men named in the margin,¹ late of the Diomedé, and now on board his Majesty's under my command, I acquaint you that unless the prize money due to them for the Cape of Good Hope, Buenos Ayres, and Monte Video, and received by you under their power of attorney, is forthwith paid, I shall state the case to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, with a request that their solicitor may be directed to sue for the same.²

I am, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Mr. C. Farrell, Middle Street, Gosport.

¹ Lewis Home and John Johnson.

² B. Martin evidently shared in the common naval opinion of prize agents.

SIR JAMES SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, Carlsrona, October 8th, 1809.

My dear Sir,—Although I am aware that you lay no great stress upon outward honour, allow me to say that the high mark of distinction conferred upon you of the Order of the Sword of Sweden, when the gallant and intrepid action which occasioned its being conferred¹ is considered, it is as highly to be prized as a dukedom, and I sincerely congratulate you upon it.

As I hope soon to be at Gottenburg, I think it most advisable to keep the insignia of the Order in my possession till I can have the pleasure of delivering it to you in person.

The Plantagenet sailed last Friday morning with a convoy of 240 sail, and was joined by the *Mercurius* with 40 others from Stockholm.

The *Majestic* and *Temeraire* proceeds with them to the Belt, when the *Bellerophon* will accompany the convoy to England. When a convenient opportunity offers, I wish you to order the *Ranger* to the Nore, taking the trade from Gottenburg, but as her assistance may be required in fitting the Nyborg vessels, you need not hasten her departure. I am concerned to find by Captain Acklom's last despatch that no victuallers had arrived from England.

I am, my dear Sir,
Yours ever most truly,
J. SAUMAREZ.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, at Carlsrona, 8th October, 1809.

Sir,—I have great satisfaction in enclosing to you the copy of a letter I have received from his

¹ The capture of the *Sevolod* the previous year. Probably delay occurred in preparing the insignia of the Order.

Excellency Count Charles de Mornco, which was accompanied with the decorations of the Order of the Sword, of which Order you have been elected Chevalier Grand Croix from the 15th of October last year, in consequence of the military services you have rendered to Sweden.

The letter was also accompanied with a document from the King of Sweden, authorising me to invest you with the insignia of the Order, which I shall be happy to comply with when circumstances permit me to have that honour, and I request you will accept my sincere congratulations on your eminent services being rewarded by his Swedish Majesty with so high a mark of distinction.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient, humble servant,

JAS. SAUMAREZ.

T. B. Martin, Esq., Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable.

DE MORNCO TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Stockholm, le 3 Octobre 1809.

Monsieur l'Amiral,—Monsieur Martin, capitaine de vaisseau au service de sa Majesté Britannique, étant déjà, en conséquence des services militaires rendus par lui à la Suède, déclaré Chevalier Grand-Croix de l'ordre de l'Épée depuis le 3 Octobre l'année passée, je m'empresse maintenant, Monsieur l'Amiral, de m'acquitter des ordres du Roi en ayant l'honneur de faire passer ci-jointes à Votre Excellence les Décorations dudit ordre, que Sa Majesté désire qu'elle veuille bien lui remettre pour s'en décorer d'abord.

J'ai en outre l'honneur d'y ajouter l'acte d'autorisation accompagné d'une traduction Française.

C'est avec les sentimens de la considération la

plus parfaite et la plus distinguée que j'ai l'honneur d'être,

Monsieur l'Amiral, de votre Excellence
Très-humble et très-obéissant serviteur,
(Signé) CHARLES COMTE DE MORNCO.
M. le Vice-Amiral Sir James Saumarez.

By Thomas B. Martin, Esq., Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable, &c. &c. &c.

Whereas Francis Treadwell, Master of the Flora transport, having represented to me that a puncheon of brandy stored in the ground tier of the said vessel appears to be deficient of the marked contents :

You are therefore hereby required and directed to repair forthwith on board the Flora transport, and there take a strict and careful survey on the puncheon of brandy above represented, to ascertain the quantity deficient and the cause of the same, reporting to me from under your hand your proceedings therein.

Given under my hand on board the Implacable, in Hawke Roads, October 10th, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. M.

To the Master of the Implacable and Pursers of the Alexandria and Rose.

[MEMO.]

Copy sent to Sir J. Saumarez, Bart. and K.B.

October 17th, 1809.

By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable, &c. &c. &c.

The Alargo's convoy having been dispersed in a gale of wind, you are hereby required and directed

to give them every assistance and protection they may stand in need of, and see them in safety as far as Wingo Beacon.

In case of falling in with a victualler, which was under the Alargo's protection, desire the master will hoist a wheft at the main topgallant masthead when off Wingo, that he may be sent direct to his destination.

Given under my hand on board the Implacable, in Hawke Roads, the 16th October, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Captains Cochrane, Mansell, Crispin, and Champion, and Lieutenant Wells.

B. MARTIN TO ADMIRAL DIXON.

Implacable, October 21st, 1809; Hawke Road.

Sir,—The wind looking favourable for the departure of the Nyborg vessels, I shall hasten off such as are ready, and by the time the Diligence returns I hope the remainder will be fitted.

The Danish prisoners you sent here have proved most useful in manning the vessels, and if others should fall into your hands, it will be highly desirable to have them for the same purpose.

I have appointed the Ranger and Wrangler to go with a considerable number of vessels bound into the Baltic, of which I am anxious to apprise you, in case such protection should not be deemed sufficient for them.

I have directed Captain Acklom, who is placed under my orders, to return to me from Sprogø, if in your arrangements he is left at liberty to do so.

Other convoys are expected, and I shall venture to send them forward with the best protection I can, as the season of the year admits of no delay in getting them to their destination.

A heavy sailing sloop (hired as a navy transport) arrived here two days ago with stores for several of the ships under your orders, which, with the exception of the Ardent's, I have put on board the Diligence, such a conveyance being rendered secure by a flag of truce.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Manly Dixon, Esq., Rear-Admiral of the Blue, &c. &c.

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of
H.M. ship Implacable, &c. &c. &c.*

Having released you from the execution of that part of your orders from Admiral Douglas, which directed you to join Rear-Admiral Dixon with the navy transport :

You are hereby required and directed to hoist the signal for a convoy to England, and having given instructions to such masters of merchant vessels as may be desirous to avail themselves of your protection, proceed with them as soon as wind and weather will permit, after the 23rd inst., in sight of the Nore, and then follow the orders you have received from Vice-Admiral Douglas.

Given &c., October 19th, Hawke Road.

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Captain Spears, Chanticleer.

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of his
Majesty's ship Implacable, and Senior Officer at
Gottenburg, &c. &c. &c.*

You are hereby required and directed to proceed in the hired brig Charles under your command, and anchor in St. Kalf Sound¹ for the purpose of pro-

¹ A few miles north of Wingo Sound.

tecting the scattered ships of the outward-bound convoy which have anchored at that place. You are to notify to them the necessity of their coming to Flemish Roads without loss of time, and to return and join me yourself the moment the wind is favourable for the convoy to come up.

Given under my hand on board H.M. ship Implacable, in Hawke Roads, October 23rd, 1809.

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Lieutenant Hexter, H.M. armed brig Charles.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Implacable, Hawke Roads, October 24th, 1809.

Sir,—The Sarpén arrived here on Sunday with four transports bound to Anholt, with ordnance stores, brick and lime, and having herself 35 tons of provisions stowed mostly on deck. The wind does not admit of the transports making any progress towards the island, but as it is moderate I have directed the Sarpén to make the best of her way, intending to send the Avenger with the four vessels, and also another transport which came out under the Calypso, bound to the island.

The Woodlark arrived yesterday, having separated from a convoy which sailed under her protection from Yarmouth the 15th instant; she is directed to see five vessels belonging to Mr. Solby into the Gulf of Finland, and then return to the Nore.

The Nightingale and Clio have entered the Sleeve, but their convoy are much scattered. I hear about forty sail have arrived at St. Kalf Sound, and learning that two Swedish privateers were chased in this neighbourhood I sent the Implacable's boat to

lay with them during the night, and the Ranger to cruise for two days without the Rocks. The Charles armed ship is only waiting for a pilot to carry her to St. Kalf Sound for the protection of these ships, which I trust will not delay her return to the Humber after the 26th.

The list of vessels bound into the Baltic is increasing fast and the coming convoys threaten to make it very large; under such circumstances I am a good deal perplexed in finding a force adequate to their protection, and reluctantly as I should at any time intrude on your disposition of the ships in this quarter, I persuade myself you will approve of the Tribune going as far as Sprogo when she comes in, which by a letter from Captain Reynolds may be expected to-morrow.

I have sent the Wrangler to Admiral Bertie off the Koll to inquire if it will be proper to send the convoy through the Sound; and I hope the Diligence will sail with the Nyborg vessels in time to apprise Admiral Dixon of their being likely to go through the Belt.

My weekly report on Friday will contain a long list of captures. The Rose arrived yesterday with ten, the Tribune sent in three and the Avenger brought in five on Sunday.

The Chanticleer will sail in the course of the day with all the trade now ready to take advantage of her protection.

I know nothing of the Ardent or Plantagenet's convoy.

I am, Sir,
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Vice-Admiral Sir J. Saumarez, Bt. and K.B.,
Commander-in-Chief, &c. &c. &c.

*A very strong Letter to Mr. Lindegreen, apparently
a Prize Agent.*

Implacable, Gottenburg, October 25th, 1809.

Sir,—Having learnt from Captain Warren, previously to his leaving Carlsrona, that the timber vessels injured on the Piles were left in your charge, it is necessary I should inquire of you what has been done respecting them, or rather why you did not take steps for the security of the property instead of permitting it to be scattered about and exposed to the depredations which, after your example, is so generally practised at Carlsrona. The truth is, you not only neglected the security of the property, but from day to day delayed any steps towards preparing the vessels for its reception, in the hope that the season of the year and the fast closing relations between England and Sweden would soon throw the whole into your own hands.

This last idea (for I know you well) must have operated powerfully at the time you gave Mr. Field a bad bill on account of the captors, and I feel quite satisfied in my own mind that you wrote home to have acceptance procrastinated and at length rejected; this bill still remains unpaid, and it is a point which calls loudly for explanation, and the sooner you manufacture a story for the occasion, in order to satisfy your more respectable associates in mercantile business, the more likely you will be to save your credit.

I am, Sir,

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Mr. Lindegreen, Carlsrona.

B. MARTIN TO REAR-ADMIRAL BERTIE.

Implacable, Hawke Road, October 28, 1809.

Sir,—I send herewith a copy of a letter which I have received from his Majesty's Consul at this

port, and as he seems to consider that the detention of the Swedish vessels therein alluded to may be productive of disagreeable consequences, I must beg your directions as to the measures to be taken. The Lieutenant of the *Stately* left this ship before Mr. Smith's letter came to me, so that I have no means of consulting or advising him upon the subject.

I opened a letter you addressed to Captain Acklom desiring to have a victualler conveyed to you; but as there is but one at this place, I have thought it best to wait the signification of your further directions before I send her. The enclosed is a return of provisions on board of her, by which you will see there is no bread remaining.

The *Curlew* came in yesterday with several prizes, and I have charged Captain Tancock with this letter.

I beg to enclose a copy of a letter I have received from the Admiralty, by which it appears their Lordships are very anxious to get another convoy into the Baltic as expeditiously as possible, and under such circumstances it may be the more desirable to push through the Sound.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Rear-Admiral Bertie.

B. MARTIN TO MR. SMITH.

Implacable, Hawke Road, October 28, 1809.

Sir,—I have received your letter of yesterday's date stating the detention of several Swedish vessels by the detachment of his Majesty's ships under Rear-Admiral Bertie, and I will lose no time in transmitting it to the Rear-Admiral, that his determination may be known as to the disposal of them.

I am not exactly acquainted with the circumstances under which the vessels in question have been detained, but I have heard in a mere vague way that they were engaged in carrying supplies from one Danish port to another, directly contrary to the licence under which they claim protection. At all events, I will venture to pledge myself that if the vessels and cargoes had borne a clear, legitimate Swedish character, and following a trade permitted by Sweden and England, the Rear-Admiral would never have allowed them to be detained.

I am, Sir, your very humble servant,

(Signed) T. B. M.

To J. Smith, Esq., British Consul, Gothenburg.

By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Captain of his Majesty's ship Implacable, &c., &c., &c.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having signified to me their directions that the convoy which was intended to sail from the Nore on the 22nd inst. should pass on direct to the Baltic without putting into Gothenburg :

You are therefore hereby required and directed to hold yourself in momentary readiness to join the said convoy whenever they come in sight, and taking under your command the vessels named in the margin, escort them off Sprogo, where you will receive from Rear-Admiral Dixon orders for your further proceedings.

Should the officer who comes from England charged with the convoy have orders to proceed to the Belt, he is to fulfil them accompanied by the vessels under your orders ; but if he is only directed to come as far as this port, you will send him to me for further orders.

In the event of seeing the Ranger, you will take Captain Acklom under your orders as an additional protection to the convoy.

Given 28th October, 1809, Hawke Road.

(Signed) T. B. M.

To Captain Thicknesse, Sheldrake.

C. YORKE, FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY,
TO BYAM MARTIN.

Admiralty, August 10, 1810.

Sir,—I have the honour of your letter of the 6th inst., and am highly pleased to have had an opportunity of testifying my regard and consideration for an officer of your distinguished rank. Though I have not at present the satisfaction of his personal acquaintance, I hope I may one day or other have that honour.

I beg to assure you that in recommending you to his Majesty for the command of his own royal yacht (a suggestion which his Majesty highly approved of and immediately adopted) I had only in view the state of your health, &c. which I was informed was such as to make it desirable for you to remain some time on shore, to recruit after a severe and highly creditable service at sea, for a length of time. This circumstance and your high rank in the navy led to your late appointment; but I beg you to believe that, whenever you shall find yourself inclined to resume active employment at sea, we shall all be extremely well pleased to contribute to placing you again in a situation where you will be able to do his Majesty good service, and yourself honour, as you always hitherto have done.

I remain, Sir, with great regard,

Your most obedient and faithful servant,

C. YORKE.

Captain T. Byam Martin.

FROM CAPTAIN GRIFFITH TO B. MARTIN.

Northbrook House, near Bishop's Waltham,
February 5th, 1811.

My dear Martin,—I hear so often of you from different people coming from your part of the world, and have so little to say of myself, that I have thought it unnecessary to do that which I suspect I am never sorry for finding an excuse for not doing, namely, writing. I should now however like to have a late favourable report I had from Mrs. Sawyer of Mrs. Martin's health confirmed by a line from yourself—that she is going through the winter, notwithstanding the distress of mind occasioned by a severe affliction, better than usual, and that sanguine hopes are entertained of her restoration to health, as the spring advances.

You will probably have read in the papers, as I see it is there noticed, of my wife having added to my family—the inevitable tax, as it would appear, of my coming on shore; and yet I was in hopes that, well stricken in years as we both are, there was an end of all such doings between us—my share of the concern now amounts to three boys and three girls; and as they are all strong, healthy, and as far as their dispositions have unfolded themselves everything I could wish, it would be criminal to repine.

I have not yet asked for a ship, and am just now hesitating whether I shall do so this year or wait until the next. I should wish to be afloat a little before, but not very long, another promotion takes place. What have you got that is desirable coming forward at Plymouth?

The person Sir H. Neale left in the yacht as clerk is a *protégé* of mine; it did not occur to me until the other day, or I would have written to you in his favour; if he had been removed I should no

doubt have heard of it, therefore I conclude he remains, and I hope discharges his duty to your satisfaction. If Bedford is in your neighbourhood pray remember me to him; I was sorry to hear he had been unwell. George Martin I find has struck his flag, and devoted himself to his Princess for the winter. I don't believe there is any truth in the report of his being married; I should, however, rejoice to hear of his having quitted Palermo, but he has taken a house there for two years, which is rather ominous. His health is very indifferent.

Mrs. Griffith joins in kind remembrances to Mrs. Martin, as also in desiring to be remembered to the Commissioner and Mrs. Fanshawe, with, my dear Martin, your sincerely affectionate friend,

ED. W. GRIFFITH.

P.S.—I suppose you often see Sir R. Calder.¹ Pray tell him the H.H.C.² does not go on well, and that his presence seems to be much wanted to keep it together. The H.H.³ have it hollow this season. All this may be unintelligible to you as it relates to fox-hunting, a pursuit I don't recollect that you partake of or value yourself.

Captain B. Martin, R.N., Plymouth, Devon.

CAPTAIN GRAHAM MOORE TO BYAM MARTIN.

Brook Farm, Cobham, Surrey,
September 4th, 1811.

My dear Byam Martin,—I lose not a post in acknowledging your two very acceptable letters of the 7th and 18th of August, both of which I received last night on my return here from a Scotch tour of

¹ Sir R. Calder lived at Bishop's Waltham; at this time he was Commander-in-Chief at Plymouth.

² Hambeldon Hunt Club.

³ Hampshire Hounds.

eight weeks. The Sovereign yacht¹ being bestowed on me, and in succession to a fire-eater like you, I think was a very honourable appointment, and quite of a piece with every part of Mr. Yorke's conduct to me ever since he has been our lord and master. At the same time I think it would not have been becoming in me to have availed myself of his partiality to me to the exclusion of some other good fellow who had served better and had more mouths to cram than an old bachelor like me. I therefore, with many thanks, requested he would allow me to decline the honour he had done me. I assured him that I felt it very flattering to me to be offered an appointment which had before been filled by you, and which if I had been a married man or less fortunate than I have been in the service I would have been most happy to have accepted of. I understand she is now, and very properly, given to Bayntun. You may well believe that I would not have unshipped your *ci-devant* scribe, but would have been too happy in any opportunity of doing what might be agreeable to you. I think they made a very shabby promotion, but as it was I do not see how they could have given me the Marines over the heads of Surridge, Linzee, and honest Barton, and really if they had I would not have felt comfortable. Thank God I am well enough off and, when I look about me, have no reason to complain of foul play. I have very often inquired about you and your excellent wife, who was always my very great favourite; as that old sinner George Lumsdaine used to say, 'If a man could get hold of a woman like that it is worth while to marry.' I begin to get more and more ashamed of skulking and certainly shall not lie by much longer,

¹ Vacated by B. Martin's promotion to Rear-Admiral, Aug. 1, 1811.

though I really have great calls on me here. I beg to be most kindly remembered to Mrs. Martin. I shall write to Octave Billy, as poor Alan Gardner used to call him. My love to him and his wife. I saw Lord Hood¹ in the streets two days ago, very strong and well. Always, my dear Martin, truly and affectionately yours,

GRAHAM MOORE.

Whenever you are in the humour to write to me pray do.

¹ Then eighty-seven years old.

ABOUKIR, 1812.¹

May 9. Hoisted my flag blue at the mizen.

12*th.* Sailed ; death of Mr. Perceval.

18*th.* Made the Naze of Norway.

23*rd.* Anchored in Wingo Sound, Gothenburg ; saluted the flag of Sir J. Saumarez.

June 5. Sailed—came calm ; anchored outside in 15 fathoms.

6*th.* Anchored at Anholt in 12 fathoms ; sent an anchor and buoy on board the Censor gun-brig to be laid down on the N.-W. reef.

7*th.* Joined, the Cruiser.

8*th.* Joined, convoy the Cressy, Crescent and Briseis with a convoy ; weighed, anchored the ships of war and convoy for the night.

9*th.* Weighed and proceeded with the ships of war and convoy to the Great Belt.

10*th.* Hoisted out the boats and armed them to protect the convoy, the gun-boats of the enemy being numerous and menacing ; left convoy in charge of Cressy. Passing Nybourg and fired.

11*th.* Anchored in Hanno Bay ; saluted Rear-Admiral J. Morris. Ariel and Briseis sailed.

12*th.* Orion joined—Sir A. Dickson.

14*th.* Arrived the Mars—Lukin.

16*th.* Sent out a buoy and placed it on a 3-fathoms bank.

17*th.* Weighed and made sail—calm ; made signal for boats to tow, Orion in company.

¹ This abstract gives the proceedings of the Aboukir in 1812.

20th. Heel of Danzig one mile ; joined company the Renard ; Ariel parted company.

22nd. Sent away a cutter with despatches.

23rd. Fell in with large Russian frigate ; officer came on board.

26th. Orion, Censor, Briseis and Ariel in company.

29th. Ranger—Captain Acklom joined.

July 1. Anchored in Libau Road in 7 fathoms ; a large church East $\frac{1}{2}$ South 6 miles.

Sent the captain on shore with a flag of truce ; found lying here Swedish frigate.

2nd. Orion and others in company. The tender sent by the Admiral to Riga returned ; Orion, Ariel, Renard and tender in company ; parted company with Orion, sent her off Danzig.

3rd. Sent boats to sound the passage of Lyserort with the master, pilot, and mates in different boats. Boats returned. Admiral determined to try the passage though but little more water than the ships' draft, but it was of great importance to join the Russians at Riga for the defence of the place, the French army being on its march upon it.

Sent all the sloops of war and the boats of the squadron to anchor so as to denote the deepest water, with flags to denote depth ; got the stream anchor into the launch in case of touching, after guns moved forward to bring the ship on an even keel.

Much thunder and lightning ; at 4.40 anchored.

4th. Weighed. Ariel ahead on one bow, the Briseis on the other, to denote depth of water. Going under very easy sail, and occasionally shivering the sails, merely keeping up a sufficient rate to enable the ship to answer the helm well. Least water we had $4\frac{1}{2}$ fathoms, $4\frac{3}{4}$ —5 and 6 fathoms ; the first ship of the line that ever attempted it.

Arrived at Riga.—

5th. Sunday anchored off Dünemünde at a distance of 6 miles in 15 fathoms.

6th. Weighed and worked further in ; Ariel in 12 fathoms, $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Dünemünde ; spires of Riga S.S.E.

6th. Saluted the Russian flag with 17 guns, which was returned. Ranger in company.

Employed fitting out a flotilla of gun-boats ; sent our carronades on board the Ranger. Sent two 12-pound guns to Ranger and four more 18-pound carronades.

8th. The Ranger went into the river and anchored within Dünemünde lighthouse.

9th. The Admiral had permission from the Government to employ our men in fitting a telegraph on the high church at Riga, the Admiral being at head-quarters.

10th. The Reynard sailed with despatches.

11th. The telegraph ordered the Briseis to be supplied with eight weeks' provisions.

19th. Censor sailed with the Admiral's despatch and took on board 3 Spaniards who had deserted from the French army.

21st. Sent 2 lieutenants, 3 petty officers, one marine officer, sergeant, corporal, 9 marines and 90 seamen to man some of the gun-boats fitted by the artificers of the squadron—and 3 weeks' provisions.

22nd. Sent a master's mate, surgeon's assistant, and 24 seamen on the gun-boat service. Carpenters still employed fitting out boats.

Sent a boat into the harbour to take possession of a Danish brig, brought her out of the river and put on board a lieutenant, 2 petty officers, 14 seamen and 7 marines, with 6 weeks' provisions and 11 tons of spirit casks to be filled with salt water as

ballast. The brig sailed for Dagö with orders from the Admiral.

24th. The Reynard arrived with despatches from Admiral J. S. and letters from England. Sent launch with an officer and 14-pound carronade, shot and ammunition of all sorts, to join the gun-boats.

Daily arrival and sailing of vessels with despatches. Sent supply of provisions to gun-boats.

31st. Arrived a Russian flotilla: 1 corvette, 4 brigs, 2 schooners, 68 gun-boats, each 60 men; saluted Lord Tyrconnel.¹

August 4. Sent second barge and pinnace, with carronade. Lieutenant and 2 days' provisions to join gun-boats.

12th. Arrived Russian frigate, 3 store-ships, 2 schooners, 3 galliots, and 33 large gun-boats under the command of Rear-Admiral Möller. Captain of flag-ship came on board, saluted the Rear-Admiral with 13 guns, which was returned with equal number.

18th. Sent boats to board galliots under Danish colour.

Manned and armed all the boats; sent a mate and 6 men to take charge of the galliots; boats proceeded into the harbour.

19th. Arrived a Russian brig of war.

20th. Came out of harbour Russian frigate and 13 sail of armed transports, with troops on board, to follow our Admiral's orders. The Ranger came out of the harbour.

Received on board the Aboukir a Russian officer of artillery and 14 men, 2 field-pieces with ammunition &c.

21st. Made signal with gun to weigh. Wind shifted and anchored.

¹ At that time a peer was entitled to a salute.

22nd. Weighed. Ranger, Briseis and Russian squadron in company: total, 20 sail.

25th. Joined company H.M. bomb Meteor. Sent the Briseis to anchor off the long-extended dangerous shoal off Domeness, that the squadron by keeping outside might avoid all danger.

26th. Anchored the small vessels to mark the passage over the shoals, the Admiral having determined to proceed during the night, steering between the vessels showing one side one light, the other two. We had better weather going out by night than passing in by day; never less than 5 fathoms.

September 3. Daphne and Renard joined company. Anchored with the fleet in 17 fathoms under Heel of Danzig. Sent on shore flag of truce.

Sent the Russian artillery officer and his men on board one of the transports.

4th. Admiral received despatches by the Earnest.

7th. Weighed and anchored off Danzig.

13th. Came on board 4 deserters from the French garrison at Danzig. Joined company the Devastation bomb.

15th. Sent away the Russian squadron; 16 sailed from the Heel.

[He then joined the Commander-in-Chief; nothing of importance occurred, and on arrival in England was appointed second in command at Plymouth.]

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN.

Plymouth, Feb. 29th, 1812.

My dear Henry,—If I had gone to London a fortnight ago it might possibly have been advantageous to me; at least, I might have sounded about and ascertained what obstacles lay in the way of my wish to get appointed to the Channel fleet; but now

it is too late, Lord A. Beauclerc being nominated to that situation, although Mr. Yorke gave me such encouragement to look for it. The worst of it is that at the bottom of all this there is an election job, as it appears that the chief friend of Lord A. B. and the father-in-law of his captain recommended his Lordship to push hard for the western station, as the best means of undermining Sir C. Pole's interest; no doubt good, though interested, advice on the part of this notoriously cunning old rascal, his Lordship's friend. Notwithstanding the possibility that my presence in London might have been useful to my views, I do not reproach myself for having determined not to go; for I still adhere, and ever shall, to the idea that professional employment loses all its gratification if only to be obtained by interest, or a sneaking, dirty importunity; and I would rather go without it than have it on such terms. There is now no vacancy left in the Channel fleet, and I would not give a farthing for any other, so that going to town now would be fruitless and unsatisfactory on that score; but Kitty joins with me wishing most sincerely to do so, for the sake of enjoying such a six weeks as we did in the year 1805; she bids me not only to thank you, but to say she feels very much flattered by your kind, though treasonable, proposal. Now that Henry Rogers is promoted it will give me much pleasure, if I should be ever employed, to have Mr. Smith as first or flag lieutenant, whichever he may prefer, and if he should think such a situation better than the one he at present holds; but I repeat to you that I do not expect to be called forward, and that if I am neglected a few months longer, I have taken an unalterable resolution to give up the service, at least so far to give it up as not to seek, or to take, any employment.

We hear Mr. W. Pole is to be the new First Lord ; and I would go to London if I thought he would take me as one of his sub-workers.

Yours ever affectionately,
T. B. MARTIN.

About hoisting my flag in the Channel fleet.—I found in a conversation with Admiral Domett that if the report of Ganleau having sailed from Brest had not been contradicted, it was at this time decided by the Admiralty that I should hoist my flag in the Bulwark and proceed with seven sail of the line in quest of him.

Sir Henry Martin, Bart.,
26 Upper Harley Street.

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN.

Gothenburg, H.M.S. Aboukir, May 26th, 1812.

My dear Henry,—I arrived here on Saturday last after having beat about in the Sleeve¹ against a heavy gale of wind that came on the night on which I sent my last letter to you, so that I have now tried the Aboukir in all ways, and in all ways disapprove of her. She is unquestionably a bad man-of-war, but good enough for the service likely to be required of her in this quarter, unless the equipment of four Swedish line-of-battle ships should be with any wicked view against our commerce, or a desire to replenish their navy with some of our ships of war, but of this I shall know more when in their neighbourhood, and as Swedish politics unravel ; we shall either be very intimate and dear friends, or forced into hostility by the British Government.

¹ The sea between Norway and Denmark was so called.

The first object of my inquiry at this place, and perhaps the first in importance, is the state of our negotiation with Sweden, which, if productive of the alliance so earnestly desired by this country, may lead to other connections capable of begetting a totally new order of things on the Continent, such as the tyrant (Bonaparte) already sees, but in vain strives to avert: his offers of money, territory and friendship to Sweden is without bounds, and in my opinion betrays an evident dread of meeting as an antagonist one tutored in his own school of war, and who, from his birth, parentage and education, may be supposed as free as his patrons from all restraint of conscience, gratitude, or any feeling of virtue in the attainment of his views. And doubtless there must be some great object to induce him, as prince of a country so impoverished and of late so degraded in the scale of nations as Sweden, to turn with disdain from so tempting a bait—such magnanimity is not natural to a Frenchman, nor is it consistent with the grasping avarice of the Swedish character—but so it is, and the hostility of this nation towards France has been expressed in such unequivocal and haughty terms, as to leave no alternative but determined war, or the greater evil of submission to that miscreant whose vindictive spirit is too well known by the Crown Prince (Bernadotte) to be trusted—and hence the best pledge of his fidelity to us. Mr. Thornton is now at Orebro, where the Swedish Diet is assembled, and each party, actuated by a sincere desire of peace, has left the road to conciliation so entirely free from impediments that the good work has already approximated to the utmost point of Mr. Thornton's powers; and it now rests with our Government to decide whether we are likely to have our pennysworth for our penny by agreeing to subsidise Sweden. I should certainly say yes, feeling

that a negative would destroy the great prospect of a confederacy against France, and other reasons which you will collect from what I have to say on the general state of politics : at any rate, Sweden is utterly incapable of going on upon the immense scale of warfare which they contemplate without such assistance ; nor indeed can they maintain their present large military establishment, which is beyond anything before known ; and in the expectation and full trust that we cannot withhold the required subsidy, the Diet have unanimously voted an augmentation to their army of 60,000 men, which I understand will give them a total of 140,000 ; but I don't feel quite satisfied with my information on this point (and shall endeavour to speak with more certainty in my next letter). The Swedes ask of England sixty thousand pounds a month, one half of which they will be content to take in articles of British manufacture, and surely if our Government have any intention of giving parliamentary relief to the manufacturers, they will jump at this way of killing two birds with one stone, by adopting this best way of subsidising—best of the two I mean, for I agree with Captain Paisley that if there is any subsidising it should be in arms, ammunition, and clothing. The Swedes are in close alliance with Russia, and it is thought the completion of the present negotiation would prove an immediate stepstone to our reconciliation with Russia, which would in a very great degree repay the subsidy by giving us naval stores at half the present cost, and by a great increase of our exports and imports, to say nothing of the good timber we should get, in any quantity, instead of the rotten stuff from America.

It is quite astonishing how Bernadotte has contrived to make himself so popular amongst all classes of the Swedes ; they absolutely idolise him ; and

acts of his which in former days would have produced rebellion, and perhaps have drawn forth another Ankarström¹ to play the regicide, have been met with unqualified expressions of universal loyalty and satisfaction. His drain upon a thin population is not only suffered, but approved and entered into with an enthusiasm that is truly extraordinary, and almost in a moment forms his immense army—in short, this clever fellow has completely renovated the military character of the country, and makes one recognise in the nation that mad spirit of war which we read of in the time of Charles XII. He has worked up the minds of the people to a happy pitch of contempt for the French, and inflamed them with an idea that Sweden is to be first and foremost in a confederacy for breaking the shackles which Bonaparte has bound round the world, and that this is the object of Bernadotte's ardent ambition, and of Bonaparte's great dread. I do entirely believe, and persuade myself it will be a misfortune that we shall ever have to deplore if England, from faction, or poverty, has not the means of setting this mighty engine to work. I would do it upon every principle; I would do it if it were only to set a thief to catch a thief. A French messenger was at Orebro² last week to offer anything that could be asked, but report says he was sent off with a short and very unsatisfactory answer—Satan, I defy thee. We shall soon see what will be the end of such big talk. Nor has Bonaparte's call upon his dear father-in-law been received in a way corresponding to such a connection; and I am assured that the account in the English papers of an alliance offensive and defensive between them has no foundation in truth, for the

¹ The assassin of Gustavus III. in 1792.

² About twenty miles from Stockholm.

Austrian Emperor will only promise a strict neutrality, which is worse than actual hostility, inasmuch as the roaring lion is less dangerous than the sleeping crocodile. The Archduke Charles is gone to the army on the Polish frontier.

The Russians have on the frontier a prodigious army in high order, and abundantly supplied; thanks for this to the long course of intelligence which bribery obtained from Bonaparte's War Office, whereby his secretly determined hostility was learnt long since, and has occasioned an almost hourly augmentation of the Russian force, and the war with Turkey has been treated quite as a secondary object compared with the preparation against the French. Alexander is now reviewing his army, but promises to withdraw from the scene of action and the danger of an interview if the French advance. The Russians speak of having 300,000 men now on the frontier, but we make great abatement for paper soldiers, and bring it to what is stated upon pretty authentic intelligence, viz. 220,000, with ample supplies in their rear, and upon which they are just now obliged to fall back for about forty miles, as the part of the country they have lately covered is quite exhausted, even to such a degree that the unhappy natives are obliged to abandon it. And yet it is over this land of desolation that the French have to advance to get at their enemy, which the knowing ones say is next to impossible, and if not undertaken immediately, the daily enormous consumption of his magazines will oblige him of necessity to wait till after the coming harvest; for even Bonaparte's powerful and merciless hand, seconded by the most wonderful exertions of his commissariat, cannot, it is said, provide supplies adequate to his wants, and the people throughout the Continent are exasperated to the highest degree at having the bread snatched from

their very mouths to feed the soldiers. Perhaps he may have a double object in this measure, for besides forming magazines, he will find his ranks well filled, for all will turn soldiers in order to be fed. The state of the Continent, both from the discontent of the people, and the confederacy which seems to be forming against the power of France, is peculiarly propitious to the interest of England; but fie upon England's naughty children to be quarrelling amongst themselves, and thereby losing all the advantages which are thrown in our way. In Holstein, Sleswig and Mecklenburg, they have been robbed of every sack of corn, and the wretched inhabitants, as well as the Danes in Zealand, who depend upon the two former duchies for supplies, are reduced to a state of starvation, particularly at Copenhagen, where the distress of the people beggars all description. Sweden is indebted to her friendship with Russia for not suffering with her neighbours in this sad calamity; she also owes much to the foresight and wisdom of Bernadotte, who, at the hazard of his popularity, and contrary to remonstrance from his Council, has prohibited distillation from grain, or the application of it to any purpose but that of actual food. This the Swedes have borne with more patience than was expected, but they don't relish it, having an immoderate love for what they call snaps—*alias* unmixed spirits—*alias* what you suck in when out shooting. The consequence of this sensible decree is that scarcity is converted into such a plenty as to admit of exportation, but the prohibitory decree against the misuse of grain is to remain in force a year. I wish England would adopt the same wise way of turning scarcity into an abundance, for we can now no longer look for supplies from the Continent, there being the greatest, and I fear most justly founded, apprehensions of a general famine.

They say nothing but the most frugal use of corn, and a harvest of unexampled plenty, can ward off this dreaded and terrible event. In speaking before of Bonaparte's advance, or rather his difficulty in doing so, I ought to have mentioned that there is a report, *via* Copenhagen, of his having arrived at Berlin, but it is not believed.

Notwithstanding the severe losses of last year, we are carrying on just as large a trade as ever, and it is not the fault of Sweden if you West India people have any grounds of complaint about the low price of sugar, for it is incredible the quantity brought to this port. Admiral Morris sailed a few days since with 170 sail of ships, and we have reason to believe he has passed them safe through the Belt, in spite of the numbers and enterprise of the Danish gun-boats. I shall probably have at least 200 sail to take through in a few days; half that number are now waiting here for protection, and four convoys daily expected from Leith and different ports in England.

It is not yet decided where I am to be employed, but probably along the south shore of the Baltic; and I shall like it very much—at least better than anything else.

A packet is just announced coming in from England, and I trust with accounts of the country being in a less disturbed state than when I sailed; worse it cannot be.

The weather is yet very cold; the glass in my cabin, with all the windows shut, but no fire, is generally about 49°. The marine barometer certainly indicates the changes of weather most accurately, and is a most useful and amusing companion.

I have just written the Commissioner such another letter as this, which I think will supply him with reading for a week; when you have read this, pray

send it to Mr. Bastard, for if I were to write to him I could only repeat what this contains.

Ever your affectionate,

T. B. M.

Gothenburg, May 26.

Endorsed.—Interesting account from Gothenburg.

Sir Henry Martin, Bart.,
26 Upper Harley Street,
Cavendish Square, London.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Aboukir, off Anholt, 7th June, 1812.

Sir,—In pursuance of the directions signified in your letter of the 3rd instant, I have examined into the state of the island of Anholt, and particularly as to its defence; but in offering the following opinion it is right to make an unreserved confession of my ignorance in matters of military defence, and to express a fear that what the engineer would recognise as material points may have escaped my notice altogether.

Of the importance of Anholt for the benefit and safety of the trade there can be no doubt, for the navigation of the Cattegat (at all times dangerous) would be most perilous in the fall of the year without the light to guard against the dangers wherewith the island is surrounded.

The force at present on the island amounts to five hundred and fifty men, including officers, and thirty-four pieces of ordnance.

The only part of the island desirable, or necessary to be defended, is the narrow part where the light-house is situated.

The defensive works at this point consist of nine carronades mounted in four different galleries of the lighthouse, which is remarkably strong and well built, so as to be incapable of injury from the concussion of guns, and from its circular form, size and substance not liable to be much damaged by the shot of an enemy.

Round the lighthouse is a solid, well-built rampart called Fort York, whereupon are six 24-pounders, as at A in the accompanying drawing.¹

In advance of Fort York, about one hundred or more yards distance, is a battery mounting ten guns, called Fort Masarine, as at B, connected with this work, and laying back is a breastwork made with casks, and within it are three mortars as at C.

The whole of the works are surrounded by strong palisades. For the defence of these works (and no other operations against an enemy actually landed should be undertaken) I think three hundred men would be quite enough; indeed, I shall have to suggest the probable sufficiency of one-third that number, but I speak now of the works unnecessarily extended as they appear to be at present.

Hinting my opinion to Captain Maurice that his establishment would bear this reduction, he seemed to consider that in the event of a protracted siege, five hundred men would be necessary to afford the proper reliefs, and to supply the possible necessity of a sortie, therefore, consistently with his ideas, the present establishment admits only a reduction of fifty men. My opinion, however, remains unchanged by arguments founded on so improbable a contingency. First because the climate makes it impracticable for an enemy to undertake any field operations until the ice goes off, and soon after this period it may be presumed a frigate or two will be sent out time enough

¹ Not found in papers.

to prevent the possibility of much progress in a siege ; secondly, the impediments to the landing of cannon and materials needful for such operations are great, by reason of the violent surf thrown up by the least freshness in the wind ; thirdly, an enemy has no means of subsistence on the island ; and lastly, in respect to the possible necessity of a sortie, I oppose the very great improbability—impossibility I may say—that even the most active enterprising enemy could do anything to render such a measure expedient, because the approach to the place is one unfathomable depth of loose sand, at once making it impracticable to undermine the works, or to erect batteries ; for it would require undisturbed leisure to overcome the almost insurmountable difficulty of drawing cannon, or procuring and constructing platforms to work them on, over sand in which you sink more than half leg deep at every step. The sand is no doubt convenient for filling bags and making a screen to their approach, but of what avail is this without cannon ?

It appears to me the lighthouse and battery called Fort York are abundantly sufficient for the defence of the place ; and it is to be lamented that the works were ever extended beyond it.

A small number of men—one hundred for instance, or indeed sixty—would be quite enough to defend the town and Fort York, and there is under the tower a magazine and store-room capable of holding six months' provisions for five hundred and fifty men, which it may be presumed would be room enough for barracks if the garrison were reduced to the number I have mentioned ; that the accommodation either under the battery or in the galleries of the tower would be too cramped for the constant residence of this reduced garrison, but sufficient for the very short time it would be possible for an

enemy to keep them in ; and, encircled as the whole work is with strong palisades, the men might continue in their present barracks without danger of surprise.

The lighthouse has water which it would not be possible for an enemy to cut off ; therefore, presuming on the accuracy of my opinion, which indeed is corroborated by that of Captain Maurice, that the lighthouse and the battery round it (Fort York) is impregnable against anything short of a regular siege, I venture to recommend that none of the other batteries should be repaired, but allowed to stand as they are (and as I understand they are capable of doing for two years), and that the garrison may, if desirable, be reduced to three hundred men at least.

It is at present in contemplation to have a revetment to strengthen the mortar or half-moon battery, C, and by the last packet orders were received by the ordnance storekeeper to purchase the materials mentioned in paper No. 3, the amount of which is estimated at 3,599*l.* 9*s.*, and the labour about 500*l.*

This work appears to Captain Maurice and myself so evidently unnecessary, that I have advised his directing the storekeeper only to make the needful inquiries about the materials, and not to purchase them until your approval has been signified ; believing the Board of Ordnance are not apprised of the inutility of it ; at least Captain Maurice has never applied for the performance of such work.

Thirteen hundred palisades are also ordered out and it is unknown to the Governor for what purpose, but he concludes that the Board of Ordnance are not aware that an ample supply of palisades were sent out in the Leyden last October.

The Government horses on the island amount to forty-seven, the fodder for which is brought from

England at a very considerable expense. The Governor thinks thirty-five would be sufficient for his vedettes, and for drawing up the stores and provisions from the beach, which is a very short distance, but as all the articles of any great weight are already in the garrison, and only provisions occasionally to be drawn up, I cannot bring myself to see the occasion for more than twenty horses; although I wish to speak with every deference to Captain Maurice, whose long residence and gallant defence of the island¹ entitles his opinion to the greatest consideration and attention.

I will recapitulate the foregoing observations in order to place the opinion I have formed in a clearer light, viz. that the only essential defence is the lighthouse battery and Fort York, therefore all repairs of the others is superfluous and an unnecessary expense, particularly the proposed expenditure on the half-moon battery, C, amounting to near 5,000*l.* That it is practicable to reduce the garrison to three hundred men or a smaller number with perfect safety. That a reduction of more than one half the large expense for purchase and maintenance of horses may be made.

You desired I would give a detailed report of my observations, and I trust this will not be thought more prolix than the subject required.

I cannot conclude without observing that the clean, wholesome state of the garrison and the well-arranged preparation for defence does the greatest credit to Captain Maurice.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, &c., &c., &c.

¹ March 1811, in which the Danes were defeated.

B. MARTIN TO CAPTAIN ROSS.

[*Secret.*]

Aboukir, 11th June, 1812.

Sir,—It having been represented to the Commander-in-Chief by Mr. Thornton that in consequence of this country suffering considerably from the scarcity of grain, that contracts have been entered into by the Government with individuals for the importation of a considerable quantity (principally rye) from the Russian ports of the Baltic, and as Swedish vessels so laden will be for the most part escorted under Swedish convoy to Stockholm and other Swedish ports, but there being a number of vessels of this description at the port of Reval and no convoy intended to proceed as far up the Gulf of Finland, it is his direction that you allow Swedish vessels furnished with Swedish licences, and laden with grain, to proceed from the Gulf of Finland without convoy to the port of Stockholm only, taking care that they do not deviate from that track.

There is also a vessel called the Ariel at the port of Reval laden with Russian brandy for the Swedish Government, which he directs may be likewise allowed to proceed to Stockholm without molestation.

These directions you will please to communicate to his Majesty's ships and vessels under your command.

I am, Sir, &c., &c., &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Captain Ross, H.M. sloop Ariel.

B. MARTIN TO CAPTAIN ROSS.[*Secret.*]

Aboukir, 12th June, 1812.

Sir,—In event of your falling in with any Russian vessels under Swedish convoy, bound either to the ports of Russia or Sweden, it is the Commander-in-Chief's direction that you do not molest them; or should you fall in with any Russian ships or vessels of war after having received information that hostilities have taken place between Russia and France, he likewise directs you to show any attention, or render them any service in your power against the common enemy; it being well understood that a similar disposition will be manifested by the subjects of his Imperial Majesty.

You will be pleased to communicate this to the captains of his Majesty's ships and vessels under your orders who may not have received it.

I am, Sir, &c., &c., &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral

Captain Ross, H.M. sloop Ariel.

*B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN.**Extract from a portion of a Letter.*

I have on board a very gentlemanlike man, a Mr. Cumming, of Kent, who is going into Russia for two months and intends visiting the army; he is of a temper easy to be accommodated, has travelled over Europe, speaks all languages, has much general and well-digested information, and is very communicative. I have promised to land him; and in return I am, as occasion offers, to be favoured with his correspondence which I expect to find very entertaining; he

is recommended to Sir J. Saumarez by Lord Gambier. I should tell you that he has been in Russia twice before, and is acquainted with the chief ministers, &c., &c.

I just now learn that a vessel is arrived from Memel bringing an account of the death of Romanzoff, the chief minister of Alexander, and the principal promoter of the French interests at St. Petersburg; he died suddenly, and by such a visitation of God! The Russians consider themselves relieved from one great impediment to the progress of hostilities—this looks well. Yesterday I had Admiral Morris and a party of ten to dine with me, and in the evening a play was got up which for neatness, good scenery, excellence of dresses and good acting was never surpassed at Portsmouth or Plymouth. One or two of the characters, particularly Wingle in the Bee-hive, would have been applauded at Covent Garden. The whole thing was as much superior to that which you saw on board the Saturn as the London performance is to the country. But I am ashamed to think of the expense the officers and midshipmen must have been at in buying up the best part of the stock at the Deal Theatre.

Yours ever affectionately,
T. B. M.

P.S.—The Russian army extend in a line from Kowno through Grodno on to Bialystok, headquarters at Wilna. The French left wing is at Tilsit, the right at Bielsk.

June 17.

To Sir Henry Martin, Bart.,
26 Upper Harley Street,
Cavendish Square, London.

B. MARTIN TO THE GOVERNOR OF RIGA.

His Britannic Majesty's ship *Aboukir*,
off Windau, 22nd June, 1812.

Sir,—Understanding hostilities have commenced between Russia and France, it is expedient that I should apprise your Excellency of my being on the south shore of the Baltic with a squadron of British ships, and that under existing circumstances I consider it my duty to frustrate and defeat any attempt which may be made along the coast against the possessions of his Imperial Majesty; and also to co-operate with the Russian fleet and army in any way that may tend to the annoyance of the common enemy.

This profession of friendly co-operation with Russia against France is conformable to the spirit of my instructions from Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, the Commander-in-Chief of the British fleet in the Baltic, and I doubt not but he will sanction the offer which I take upon myself to make of the services of the squadron under my orders if, from the nature of the war, their zeal can be made effectual to the common interests of our Sovereigns.

Captain Acklom, of his Majesty's ship *Ranger*, will have the honour to deliver this letter to your Excellency, and he is desired to remain off Riga for any communication you may be pleased to honour me with; and I shall readily attend to, and transmit to my Commander-in-Chief, any suggestion relative to operations which it may be practicable for me to carry on against the enemy.

Conceiving it possible that the perusal of the English papers may be agreeable to his Imperial

Majesty, I shall take great pleasure in forwarding them to your Excellency as often as they reach me.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

His Excellency the Governor of Riga.

*B. MARTIN TO COMMANDER OF RUSSIAN
TROOPS, LIBAU.*

His Britannic Majesty's ship *Aboukir*,
24th June, 1812.

Sir,—I have directed Captain Ross, of his Majesty's ship *Ariel*, to proceed with this letter to Libau, the object of which is to know if in the event of the army approaching the place it may be in my power to afford you any assistance, and particularly in rescuing the ships of his Imperial Majesty's subjects from the hands of the enemy.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

The Commanding Officer of his Imperial Majesty's troops at Libau.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Aboukir, Danzig Bay, 25th June, 1812.

Sir,—I arrived off the Heel of Danzig on the night of the 18th inst., and proceeded to reconnoitre the port the next morning, without being able to discover more than a few light merchant vessels with top-masts struck.

From the fishermen at the Heel I learn that the French privateers have been laid up for some weeks; one of the most intelligent natives of this place assured me he had seen Bonaparte at Danzig about the 12th inst., and that he (the fisher-

man) had followed with the multitude who were collected to see him. But this information was so much at variance with what I had incidentally heard at Hano, that I endeavoured to persuade the man he was mistaken, by observing that Bonaparte was known to be at Warsaw about that period; but he persisted in his first assertion, and added that he had then ordered new works which are now in progress for the defence of the place; and I hope I have made an arrangement that will enable me to ascertain the extent of these new defences.

My informant could give no reasonable guess at the number of troops at Danzig, they were so constantly coming and going.

At Pillau they had between two and three thousand, of whom a large portion had advanced to Memel.

The Heel of Danzig remains without any works, although it appears to have been recently surveyed by French engineers; but I cannot imagine that they have any intention to erect works that can either annoy us or add to the security of Danzig, which is described as remarkably strong.

Finding nothing to call for my continuance off Danzig, I pushed away for Polangen¹ to arrange with Mr. Gibson and Colonel Ahnischildt about continuing the correspondence opened with those gentlemen by Captain Acklom, but the advance of the enemy towards Memel obliged them to go to Riga, having left a request that Captain Acklom would follow them to that place, which he immediately complied with, and proceeded thither a few hours before I arrived. I therefore hastened to Windau in the hope of overtaking the Ranger, but not doing so, I sent a boat after her into the Gulf of Livonia with a letter for the Governor of Riga (of

¹ Between Memel and Libau.

which the enclosed is a copy), considering that Captain Acklom's appearing off Riga without some such credential might be viewed with a suspicion of his being employed only to collect intelligence. I have since written another letter to the Governor (No. 2), by the Renard, to place Captain Acklom's continuance there in the more pleasant light of being only a medium of communicating to me any wishes of the Russian Government, in which I can be made useful against the enemy. I am assured it is the character of the Russians to be particularly jealous, and alive to anything like a watch upon their movements, or a desire to know more than they may choose to impart; besides this, any change in the politics of Russia, whereby their present pacific temper towards us might suddenly cease, would place the Ranger in a hazardous situation. Conceiving therefore that her remaining off Riga is the only effectual way of obtaining direct, early, and authentic intelligence, I have felt it my duty to provide as well as I can for her safety. I do not understand that the present forbearance and friendly intercourse between England and Russia has any limited duration, or that any notification of a renewal of hostilities has been stipulated; and I am persuaded the Russians, if unrestrained by such conditions, would not hesitate in taking advantage of the first knowledge of a change of sentiment, and of any momentary superiority of force which they might have.

I shall therefore feel it my duty to be very guarded, and in the event of a Russian fleet coming down the Baltic I hope you will approve of my taking up such a position, with the Aboukir and Orion, as will prevent their cutting us off from Admiral Morris at Hano; if the public service admitted of my having another line-of-battle ship

I should consider myself safe against any hostile efforts.

I have occasion to keep the ships so constantly moving about between Pillau and Riga, that it is impossible to give you any other statement of their disposition.

Captain Ross, of the *Ariel*, has been off Memel since Sunday, and now reports to me that the place is occupied by about two hundred Prussian troops with a French commandant and several officers of that nation; the men are greatly dissatisfied, and openly express an abhorrence of the cause in which they are compelled to serve; and I understand this very natural feeling is general amongst the Prussian officers and soldiers.

I have previously given directions to Captain Ross to facilitate the escape of any of the Confederate troops who might show a disposition to free themselves from the tyranny of Bonaparte, but he is not to commit himself by any other engagement than that they should be landed at some Russian port.

If it were desirable to get recruits for the German Legion in the English service I have no doubt they may be collected to any number along the coast, but I have only taken upon myself to assist any effort they make to join the Russians.

The *Ariel* fell in with a Russian frigate on the 15th inst., and Captain Ross was informed by the officer who boarded him that they had orders to give every protection to the British trade, and to act against the French, either by capturing their vessels or annoying the ports in their possession; this I consider an unequivocal proof of an hostile decision on the part of Russia against France, and such as would justify my writing to the Governor of Riga; but lest I should have judged erroneously,

and exceeded your wishes, I took the precaution of making it an act of my own, in which I had to look for your sanction.

I expect the Renard will leave Riga about Saturday, Captain Acklom being directed to send her off the moment he has anything in the least interesting to communicate.

I have now sent Captain Ross to Libau to ascertain the state of the numerous fleet of merchant vessels in that port, and to urge their loading and sailing as expeditiously as possible, for I am apprehensive the large stock of corn, and the temptation of so rich a fleet, may induce the enemy to push there when it is least expected. I have recommended anchors being laid down at different distances, from the harbour out to the roadstead, to enable the ships to haul out when it is calm, or the wind in; I believe many of the licensed ships are nearly ready for sea, and I intend sending one of the sloops of war to Hano with them immediately.

I have not been able to renew my intercourse with Pillau, but the open communication I have with the other ports now renders it of less consequence.

At Memel and Libau it is said that Bonaparte was quite frantic on hearing that the Russians and Turks had made peace; it is added that the latter power has agreed to keep the Austrians in check during the war with Russia and France. This is only common report, and may possibly have no foundation in truth.

I fell in with a Russian frigate and brig yesterday evening cruising off Libau; and the captain sent an officer on board the Aboukir to offer his congratulations on the return of 'Peace, Friendship and Union' between the two countries.

I have received your letter of the 13th instant, desiring that any ships of the squadron having

occasion to call off the island of Dago for fresh provisions and vegetables should apply to Baron Sternburg for such supplies; I have also received your packet for the Baron and will forward it as soon as possible.

Herewith I have the honour to transmit for your information a diary of my proceedings, the state and condition of the squadron, a copy of Captain Acklom's orders, and a general order for the guidance of the ships cruising on this coast.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, &c., &c., &c.

B. MARTIN TO BARON VON OSTEN, LIBAU.

His Britannic Majesty's ship *Aboukir*,
30th June, 1812.

Sir,—I am informed by Captain Ross, who waited on you last week with my letter, that a large quantity of corn will remain at Libau, after all the vessels now in the port are loaded, and I also understand from him that it is your wish to have ships sent to receive it, but, as I have no means of procuring ships for that purpose, I beg to say that the squadron under my command shall take on board as much of the corn as can be put away to prevent so large a quantity being destroyed, which will of course be the case, rather than let it fall into the hands of the enemy.

If you acquiesce in this proposal the corn must be sent off to the ships as expeditiously as possible, and receipts will be given for the quantity received on board; and I trust means will be taken to relieve the ships from so inconvenient a charge by

sending vessels for it from Riga or other ports as soon as possible.

I shall be much obliged to you to inform me of the date of your last accounts from the army, and if there is any news.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,
T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Baron Von Osten, Libau.

*CAPTAIN ACKLOM TO REAR-ADMIRAL
MARTIN.*

H.M.S. Ranger, Riga Bay, 27th June, 1812.

Sir,—I beg leave to acknowledge the receipt of your orders of 22nd and 23rd by the Renard and Raleigh, containing two letters for the Governor of Riga, which I was prevented from delivering until yesterday in consequence of his absence; upon my anchoring here on the 23rd an officer came on board with a flag of truce from Vice-Admiral Chichacoff to say we might get any refreshments we wanted, but that boats would be expected to bear a flag of truce; on the following day I waited upon him, stating I had a letter to deliver to the Governor from you if he would allow me to wait on him. As the Governor made some difficulty about receiving me, I stated to him, agreeable to your instructions, that you had been induced to make this reciprocal offer from what had passed between the captain of the Russian frigate *Amphitrite* and the *Ariel*, in which 'he said he was directed to capture all French vessels and to protect all vessels under British colours,' but that unless he could receive me publicly in my uniform I must decline delivering my letters. About five o'clock yesterday afternoon he informed me as the

French had passed the borders he should be happy to see me, and could undertake to say the Governments were at peace, upon which I delivered him your letters, to which he returned the accompanying answer. [*Not given.*]

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Aboukir, off Memel, 30th June, 1812.

Sir,—The Ariel joined me yesterday evening from Libau, where I had sent Captain Ross (as I mentioned in my letter of the 26th instant) for the purpose of ascertaining the state of the trade at that port. He reports to me that about forty vessels are ready to sail from thence with cargoes of grain, hemp, &c. ; the corn belongs to the Russian Government, and is to be taken to Riga under convoy of a frigate now waiting off the port, and about twenty sail of merchant vessels were warping out to join her when the Ariel came away ; of those that remain fourteen sail are bound to England, and six to Sweden.

The grain remaining at Libau after all the vessels are full will be about one thousand tons, and the Governor has applied to me for three large merchant ships to take it off ; but the impossibility of affording such assistance has determined me to hasten off Libau with the Aboukir, Orion, Ariel, and a tender belonging to the Ranger, that we may receive as much of the corn as possible on board the ships, rather than let it fall into the hands of the enemy, who are much straitened for supplies. One large ship is also required to take off the corn from Windau.

I shall forthwith communicate to Admiral Morris this want of ships, but as there is no chance of his being able to give the needful help, I have thought

it right to apprise the commanding officer at Carlscrona of the circumstance, that he may, if he pleases, send for the corn; in the meantime I shall leave nothing undone to preserve it from the hands of the enemy.

The guns, ordnance, stores and troops have been removed from Libau. The enemy are about sixty miles off and the greatest apprehension is entertained of their immediate advance, as war was declared by the French on the 22nd instant.

Captain Ross, of the *Briseis*, has also heard from Pillau that war had been declared by the French.

At Pillau there is the greatest distress for grain, so much so that it is thought impossible they can subsist themselves and the French troops more than three weeks.

The troops of the enemy frequently pass through Pillau, and go by water across the *Curische-Haff* towards Memel.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,
T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, &c., &c., &c.

LIEUT.-GENERAL ESSEN TO B. MARTIN.

Sir,—Having received the orders of his Majesty the Emperor that the late French Consul Sadet should quit this empire by sea, I have chosen the port of Danzig as the place of his debarkation. He is to depart immediately in the Russian brig *Commerstrack*, commanded by Lieutenant Glatow.

I request your Excellency that you will please to furnish the commander of this vessel, Lieutenant Glatow, with an order on your part to the English vessels of war in the Baltic, to admit of his fulfil-

ling the order I have given him for landing the aforementioned late Consul, M. Sadet, at Danzig.

Please to receive the expression of consideration with which I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your Excellency's, &c., &c., &c.,

Lieut.-General ESSEN.

Riga, June 29 (July 11), 1812.

To his Excellency Admiral Martin.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Aboukir, 2nd July, 1812.

Sir,—The Renard joined me this morning with the accompanying letters from Captain Acklom and General Essen, the Governor of Riga, and in consequence of the wish expressed by the Governor I propose going immediately off that port with the Aboukir, Ariel and Renard, leaving the Orion and Briseis in the Bay of Danzig; but the latter will be relieved by the Censor, and follow me off Riga as soon as Lieutenant Lucas has delivered to Admiral Morris the despatches I now address to you.

I intend to take from the Orion as many carpenters as she can with propriety spare, and I have no doubt that by exertion I shall very soon equip a stout division of gun-boats for the defence of the river about Riga.

I shall not appoint any person above the rank of lieutenant to command the gun-boats, conceiving you would wish the chief posts to be held by an officer of higher rank, and of your own nomination.

When I have rendered all the service in my power to General Essen, I propose resuming my station in the Bay of Danzig, unless circumstances arise to make a different proceeding obviously

advantageous and necessary for the good of the service, and as my arrangements are strictly governed by this feeling, I trust they will not fail to meet your approval.

By a private letter which I have received from an English gentleman at present on a visit at Riga, whose means of information, and strict veracity, is entitled to the utmost confidence, but whose name I am forbid to make public, I have received the following information :

‘ Captain Acklom will apprise you himself of the particulars relative to the issue of his mission to the Governor, General Von Essen, who was only appointed a few weeks ago, and is the same who succeeded upon a former occasion to the command in Holland ; he is a brave, active, and I believe excellent officer. I called this morning to pay him my personal visit, and though he was very busy, having just received a courier from the Emperor, and had many officers then waiting for audiences of him, he took me into his private room and kept me in conversation for near an hour ; I have not time left me (for I have only an hour to get all my letters ready in) to apprise you of all that passed in the course of it, but I must say that he was more unreserved and communicative than I could (though an old acquaintance) reasonably have expected of him under the present circumstances.

‘ He asked me a number of questions respecting you, and the number of small vessels belonging to your squadron, the size of the boats which carried guns, &c., &c., &c., and on my observing that I was confident he would find you anxious and always ready to afford the most cordial co-operation or assistance that might be required of you consistent with your instructions from home, he said that their own knowledge of maritime defence was but

limited, and that he would have been happy to have seen you at Riga yourself. I then told him that if he would make such a request in writing, that no doubt but that you would comply with it provided it did not otherwise prove inconvenient to you or interfere with the other services you were employed upon, and in consequence of my adding I was going to send down some letters to go by the Renard, and offering to enclose any from him to you, he has this moment sent me the one for you which goes herewith, with a request to transmit it by the same conveyance. If it should in the smallest degree prove inconvenient to you to comply with his suggestion, or you should have any reason for wishing to decline so doing, your noncompliance will not prove any unexpected disappointment, because I expressly apprised him of the chance there was of your other operations not permitting you to leave your squadron without permission from home. I impressed this by way of precaution so as that your answer whatever it might be may prove entirely satisfactory to him. He told me he was much pleased with the delicacy which Captain Acklom had shown yesterday towards their own Admiral, and with his readiness to assist them in erecting telegraphs.

‘The French crossed the Russian borders on the 24th June, in four different places, viz. at Georgenberg,¹ Kowno, Olita and Miritsch (N.B. in the Governor’s despatches the two first places are only named), but only a few of their picquets were resisted and partly taken by the Cossacks. It was expected that a battle would be fought on the 27th instant.

‘The lady of Count Wittgenstein (one of the generals) arrived here last night from the army,

¹ Between Tilsit and Kowno.

and Barclay de Tolly's lady is expected here this evening. The Russian army, it would appear, is in the most complete and effective order, and the officers (even those who were dispirited on a former occasion) in the highest spirits, and in the conviction that as long as they act on the defensive, Bonaparte cannot possibly make any impression on them. I was however told to-day, and from a source which I conceive perfectly authentic, that the Russian army only consists of about 200,000 men, including the reserve; this I confess surprised me much after hearing on my arrival yesterday people estimating it at 300,000 to 400,000 men, including the reserve. The generals who have commands in the army are Barclay de Tolly, Prince Bagration, Count Wittgenstein, General Tormasson, Bagdahufa (q. Bagavout), and Docteroff; and Count Tolstoy Osterman (an able officer) having been called to Wilna, it is supposed he will also get a command. The time being now expired which Captain Acklom prescribed to me for sending down my letters I am obliged to end this without mentioning several things which I should have done (leaving you to draw your own conclusions thereupon), though as I have not visited anybody yet, excepting the different Governors, I have not been able to collect much intelligence of a nature to admit of considering them perfectly authentic.

'The Russian fleet of eight or nine ships of the line, coppered last winter, commanded by Admiral Crown in chief and Admiral Greig, second in command (both Englishmen), were ordered to Finland some time ago to take troops on board, but no late accounts are received of them; from 25,000 to 30,000 men are expected at this place in a week or two, but whether those expected by the fleet or from other quarters I forgot to ask the Governor. I will

thank you to let me know by first conveyance whether I am likely to have the pleasure of seeing you here or not, as in the latter case I shall probably be able to collect and transmit to you very soon some intelligence of such an authentic nature as may probably prove acceptable. I shall also thank you to send me the paper of ciphers which I forgot to ask you for in my hurry on leaving the Aboukir. If I had had it now I should have mentioned in this letter my authority for the intelligence that the Russian army consists only of about 200,000 men, including the reserve, as it would have enabled you to consider it as perfectly authentic; but the quarter I received this from makes me fear to mention it here in a common way, though I even send this letter down to the Ranger by my own servant; it is to be observed however that many troops are still on their march from different quarters to join the army, and that the advance guard of the army which had been in Turkey had joined, or at least were near the army in Poland.'¹

I herewith transmit two letters which I have received from the Governor of Riga.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, &c., &c., &c.

[This is given as written; the meaning is plain.]

GENERAL LOUIS (RUSSIAN) TO B. MARTIN.

Riga, 4th July, 1812.

Dear Sir,—In answer of your Kind Letter I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency the

¹ The intelligent and respectable person from whose letter the above extract is made was the late Patrick Cumming, Esq., who had been a passenger with me on board the Aboukir.

General plan of the attack proposed to morrow on the Enemy—it is to attack the Enemy on different points, the first Column Infantry march to day from Dennemunde to Narn Krog and to morrow at 5 o'clock. the troops under the command of Lieut. Cornnal Tidemann continued their march on both sides the River to the Town Slock where they are to attack the Enemy in the forenoon at about 11 o'clock. it would be necessary that the Gun Boats (English) would advance at the same time when the troops march, and combined their attack upon Slock, and to destroy the Bridge there, after the execution of this plan the Gun Boats should advance, farther to the Bridge of Kalnetana to destroy it also a part of troops following the movement. To morrow morning at 5 o'clock. I also propose to leave Riga and advance in two Divisions to Piekinhoff and Anmnhoff the Enemy will be amused with trifling attacks until I shall here the cannonade at Slock, at the same time the attack will turn seriously, and to compel the Enemy to lay down their Arms, not having any retreat after having destroyed the Bridge.

I have the honour to be Sir,
Your most obedient and humble Servant,
LOUIS.

Rear-Admiral Martin, Riga.

Endorsed.—General Louis, plan of attack.

ESSEN, GOVERNOR OF RIGA, TO B. MARTIN.

Sir,—Being as yet unprovided with gun-boats likewise necessary for the defence of Riga, I had reclaimed your support, and you have had the goodness to take upon you the armament of vessels for that purpose, for which I have the honour to

repeat to your Excellency the expression of my acknowledgment, but at the same time, having no officers of the Russian marine at my disposal to be employed in the command of these boats, I address myself to you with that confidence which you have known to inspire me with, in requesting that you would please to charge an English officer under your orders with this command.

I have the honour to be, with distinguished consideration, Sir,

Your Excellency's
Very humble and obedient servant,
ESSEN, Governor of Riga.

Riga, June 26 (July 8), 1812.
His Excellency Rear-Admiral Martin.

B. MARTIN TO ESSEN.

His Britannic Majesty's ship *Aboukir*, off Riga,
5th July, 1812.

Sir,—Participating as I do most sincerely in the feelings expressed by your Excellency on the return of a good understanding between Russia and England, I could not resist your flattering and gratifying invitation, and therefore hastened to Riga the moment I had the honour to receive your letter of the 14th (27) of June.

I shall have the honour of paying my personal respects to you the moment I have closed some letters, but in the mean time I am anxious to give you the earliest intelligence of a vast quantity of corn being at Libau waiting for ships from Riga to take it off, and I apprehend there is great risk of its falling into the hands of the enemy unless vessels are immediately sent to receive it. Having under-

stood that this corn was bought up for the service of his Imperial Majesty, I went off Libau and offered to take as much as could be received on board the King's ships under my command, and I herewith transmit a letter which I received from Baron Osten on that subject.

I beg to acquaint your Excellency that I have placed ships off the several ports occupied by the enemy for the purpose of intercepting supplies and annoying them as much as possible, and learning that it would be satisfactory to you to obtain intelligence of what is going on in the rear of the French army, I have given directions to the several commanders to use every diligence in obtaining information, and to convey it to you as expeditiously as possible.

I trust the means I have taken will prevent any supplies reaching the enemy ; as yet we have only found one instance in which they have attempted to benefit by their possession of a sea-port, and this occurred last Sunday, when two vessels pushed in and anchored off Pillau, where they were soon under the protection of a strong guard of French soldiers ; but the boats of H.M.S. *Briseis* attacked the enemy with admirable gallantry, beat the French back into their boats, taking only a few prisoners, and the vessels were both brought out with the loss on our part of only one man killed and four wounded.

I had a communication with Pillau on the 27th June, and learnt that about 4,000 of the enemy were then in the place, but they are described as passing so constantly through the town as to make it at any time difficult to ascertain their numbers. It is said they have many boats on the *Curische-Haff* by which stores, guns, and men are conveyed towards Memel.

Provisions are so scarce at Pillau that my

informant thought it would be impossible to subsist the inhabitants more than three weeks.

Herewith I transmit for your Excellency's information a statement which came to me from a person who is described as a respectable intelligent officer lately in the Prussian service.

Permit me to inform your Excellency that I have brought with me to this port all the shipwrights and carpenters of the squadron, thinking they may be useful in fitting out gun-boats, or other matters connected with the defence of Riga; but in whatever way you may desire to employ them, or in any way that the squadron under my command can be made useful to the service of his Imperial Majesty, they shall be at your disposal to the utmost extent that may be practicable, consistently with other points of duty which call for my attention. I make this offer from a full persuasion that I speak the sentiments of Vice-Admiral Sir James Saumarez, than whom, if at hand, no one would be more forward in assisting the cause in which our nations are associated; and I am sure he will approve of the cordiality with which I shall embrace every opportunity of manifesting the sincere disposition I have to meet your wishes, and of testifying the high respect with which

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

His Excellency General Essen.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Aboukir, off Riga, 7 July, 1812.

Sir,—I have to acquaint you that I arrived here on Sunday evening, and yesterday I had the satisfaction to meet a most friendly and cordial reception

from General Essen, who expressed in strong terms the obligation conferred upon Russia by the readiness I had manifested in complying with his wish to obtain the co-operation of the squadron, if his expectation of an attack should be realised; he also mentioned the Emperor's concurrence and approval of his application for assistance.

The Russian flotilla ordered here from Sweaborg is not yet arrived, and if the place should be attacked in their absence, the boats which I am now equipping will I trust afford effectual assistance in the defence of the place, as the river is admirably well calculated for such sort of warfare, having innumerable low islands to shelter the boats.

The apprehension of an attack upon Riga has for the present subsided, the division of the enemy which menaced it having inclined more from the coast towards their centre. In the meantime the defensive operations are going on with great activity, but on a scale that appears to me too extended.

The garrison at present consists of about 4,000 men; more are expected in the course of the day, and it is ultimately to be increased to 30,000 men.

The last accounts of the Russian army came up to the 4th, at which time they were falling back upon the river Düna; but General Essen has appointed to meet me in the course of an hour, and promises to give me precise information of their positions, which I will then communicate to you.

There does not appear to be any officer named as commander-in-chief of the army, but its movements are directed by the Emperor, who wavers under the perplexing councils of three differing advisers; and hence the want of that promptitude so essential in all military operations. General Pfoule¹ recommends falling back, General D'Armfelat (a

¹ See Council of War, p. 210.

Swede) urged the expediency of advancing, and General Benningsen was for remaining on the ground they first occupied. The ultimate adoption of General Pfole's advice is considered most judicious, inasmuch as it increases the difficulties of the French by drawing them more into a wasted country, and over roads which have been broken up to impede their progress.

The seeming supineness of the French in not having advanced upon the Russians in their former position is not to be accounted for; it has been imputed to a want of provisions; but this is not likely to be the cause, for by the active and successful rapacity of their commissariat they have beyond doubt procured large, and I believe abundant, supplies; it is true however that there is a distressing scarcity throughout the country, but this scarcity is occasioned by the sweep that has been made in order to make up prodigious magazines at different stations; in short the peasants are starving, but the soldiers have an abundance.

The only difficulty experienced by the enemy is in procuring fodder for their horses, and this is most seriously felt, and has occasioned a considerable diminution of their numbers.

It is believed by some very intelligent and well-informed men that Bonaparte is unwilling to do anything hostile while the slightest hope of a pacific arrangement on his own terms can be entertained; and his call upon the Emperor Alexander to testify a similar disposition has been repeated, and most pressing, but without avail. The Emperor having given a public and unqualified refusal to enter into any terms—(to use his own words) 'all treaty being unnecessary, as the French have only to withdraw from Russia, Poland, and Prussia to restore their former good understanding.'

The people, and particularly the Russian army, are enthusiastic in the cause, and with such violent animosity as they show towards the French, I doubt if they could brook anything like submission or compromise.

It may be presumed that Bonaparte's anger towards Russia is not vented with its usual promptitude owing to the known disaffection of the Prussians, and the spirit of resentment which is felt and ready to burst forth in Switzerland, the Tyrol, Calabria, and the northern part of Italy, and the organised state of these revolting people places them in a formidable light, to say nothing of the effect to be expected from their example.

Nothing can be more active, judicious, and conciliating than Captain Acklom's conduct at this place, and his unremitting diligence in the service assigned to him affords a very desirable example to the Russians with whom we are associated in the defensive preparations.

I think bomb-vessels might be used here with great effect if the enemy advance, and shrapnell shells would be also very desirable for our own gun-vessels, but I fear it is late in the season to look for such assistance on our part. Of an attack upon this place I entertain no doubt.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, &c., &c., &c.

The Council of War at the Emperor's headquarters, which sits daily from eleven o'clock in the morning till three in the afternoon, consists of :

The Prince of Oldenburg,
Count Arakochoff,
Count Armenfelde,

Privy Councillor Mordurnnoff,
 General Benningsen,
 General Barclay de Tolly,
 Count Kotschulberg,
 Count Romantzoff,
 Count General Wintzingrode,
 General Pfoule,¹

with some others ; each have the privilege of giving their opinion in writing, or verbally, in matters relating to the army or to the war.

Endorsed.—Admiral Martin's letters.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Aboukir, off Riga, 7 July, 1812.

Sir,—I am this instant come from General Essen after a most satisfactory conference, in which he has promised me that the trade to England shall not experience the slightest interruption, and that the impediments I had pointed out should be removed without delay.

The loading the ships and their departure shall therefore be accelerated by every exertion in my power, and I have notified that the Renard will be ready to sail with convoy on the 12th instant.

An idea is entertained by the Russian Government that the vessels under Prussian and Danish colours, although furnished with licences, may push to the ports of those nations ; but my promise to watch them closely has obviated this chief objection to their departure, and by way of security, and to satisfy the Governor, I have ordered the officers

¹ It was General Pfoule's opinion which governed the decision of the council, and it was wisely decided to draw the French into old Russia rather than wait their attack upon the Russian fortified camp at Dünaburg.

giving out the instructions to write on the back of their licences 'that if found deviating from their course without justifiable reason they will be liable to seizure,' and the captain of the convoy will be ordered to watch them closely ; but I am assured by Mr. Gibson, a most loyal, intelligent and respectable British subject, that there is no doubt of their intention to go to England.

About seventy sail of vessels, mostly laden with corn, will be ready to sail on the 12th for Hano, and you may be assured of my unremitting exertions to expedite the loading and sailing of the numerous ships that will still remain.

A courier is this instant arrived from headquarters, which were at Widzy when he came away at twelve o'clock the night before last ; but the army was to fall back the next morning to Druda and Braslow close by their fortified camp at Dünaburg, and in this strong position (where I understand their wings are covered by two lakes) they mean to make a stand, and it is supposed an action will take place to-morrow.

The Prince Bagration has joined the Emperor ; their united force is 210,000 men, but many of them sick. This does not include between 20,000 and 30,000 Cossacks under General Platow, Colonel Rennie, and other officers of distinguished reputation.

It is very much believed that General Scharnhorst, a Prussian officer of great military abilities, will be immediately placed in command of the Russian army.

The French army cannot be reckoned at less than 300,000 men ; their head-quarters have been advanced to Widzy after an affair of outposts, which took place two days ago without any material result.

Another courier arrived this morning from Mit-tau with an account of the advance of a division of the confederate army towards this place under Marshal Macdonald, who crossed the Niemen at Tilsit the 28th and 29th ultimo ; they are mostly Germans. The advance, consisting of about 600 Prussian Hussars, surprised a division of Russian cavalry at Szowel, where they now lay.

This division is opposed by fifteen battalions, four squadrons of Dragoons, a squadron of Cossacks, a squadron of Uhlans, and twelve pieces of cannon under an active general who left this place three days ago, but whose name I forget ; this corps is at Bouski, Kolmion, and Doblén, with his advanced guard at Janizeck.

General Essen supposes Macdonald will be able to invest Riga in the course of a week, but he says it will take five weeks and 10,000 horses to bring up his cannon for the siege.

I have proposed to the General (who is most hearty and conciliating in his attentions) to fit two or three ships as bombs, and he has readily adopted the idea, leaving their equipment to be immediately undertaken by the carpenters of the squadron.

The troops that were opposed to the Turks are certainly approaching the Emperor's army, but still the treaty of peace is not ratified, and much apprehension is entertained lest Bonaparte's intrigues at Constantinople should produce a renewal of hostilities.

In conversation with General Essen and an aide-de-camp of the Emperor's who has been sent to meet me, it was asked, by desire of the Emperor, if I could make any hostile demonstrations in the rear of the enemy. I said that we could only show the ships off the ports, and they had been so accustomed to see them that I doubted of its producing any uneasy

sensations, but that I was ready to do anything that could be suggested to forward the common cause.

I herewith send the Emperor's declaration of war against France and a proclamation declaring Riga in a state of siege.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,
T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, &c., &c., &c.

P.S.—General Essen has given me a large plan of the river and the works at Riga, a copy of which shall be forwarded to you the moment he sends it over.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Aboukir, Riga Bay, 12 July, 1812.

Sir,—Since my letter of the 7th we have been in hourly expectation of most important intelligence from the Russian army, but nothing has taken place except skirmishing with the outposts, in which the Russians are represented to have been invariably successful, and in one affair General the Prince of Hohenloe commanding the Würtemberg troops was made prisoner with about forty men.

It is very difficult to collect anything like accurate intelligence, and except upon occurrences decisively in favour of Russia. I believe their own generals at Riga are kept much in ignorance of the movements of the army; I am therefore cautious not to be misled by the idle reports of the town, and shall never communicate to you any information that does not come from a credible source. I must, however, acknowledge General Essen's readiness to impart all he knows, perhaps sometimes more than he believes.

I have just procured three maps of the seat of war (the best I can get) and herewith I send two of

them, thinking it may be desirable to forward one to the Admiralty, that in referring to places I may do so by the map which will lie before you, and them.

The Russian army is now said to occupy a position extending along the south bank of the Düna from Dizna to Dryssa, and it is said the Emperor was to cross the river yesterday and establish his head-quarters at the last-mentioned place, where, as well as at Dünaburg, there is a strong fortified camp; you will see by this that they have been slowly retiring from Braslow, and are followed still more slowly by the French, who have not horses to get their artillery forward with any expedition.

It is supposed the Russians are now near the spot where, with inferior numbers but superior artillery, they are willing to try the event of an action, and although there is much in the character and force of the enemy to excite a fear of the result, yet all accounts agree that the confidence and spirits of the army lead them to desire the conflict with an ardour that was never known before.

General Essen told me the Prince Bagration had joined the Emperor, but I believe he must have meant that they were in communication only; his joining, however, is expected, and highly desirable, as the French are so much superior.

The corps of Marshal Macdonald is yet in Courland and his head-quarters at Showeck in Szowel, and his advanced guard at Janizech; whether he intends to push on to invest this place is doubtful, but so menacing a position keeps up the alarm at Riga, and people with their effects are going off every hour.

Macdonald's corps consists of 20,000 men, mostly Prussians; he has left two battalions at Libau and one at the following places each, viz. Memel, Tilsit, and the Bridge of Georgenberg.

The Polish division of General Radziville has joined him to supply the place of these detachments, and makes the force immediately under the Marshal amount to 20,000 men.

General Louis, whose name I did not recollect in my last letter, commands the Russian corps which watches Macdonald, and they are a little beyond Mittau, but not in force to act offensively.

The French army with the whole auxiliary force now in the Russian territories is computed at near 400,000 men, but 60,000 are non-combatants ; it is said that Bonaparte can bring 200,000 to bear upon any point occupied by the Russians without drawing in the necessary corps of observation ; an opinion however prevails that he will not attack the strong fortified position occupied by the Russians, but push on and thereby force them into the field, where the Emperor Alexander will be obliged to trust to the tactics of the Russian generals, instead of the courage of his soldiers.

There is much uncertainty with respect to the actual state of affairs between Russia and Turkey, and it is not known here whether the peace is ratified or not, or if any more of the troops which were employed in that quarter are marching towards the Emperor.

I have been applied to by several merchants to know if the existing understanding between England and Russia would admit of property being shipped in Russian vessels for conveyance to Great Britain ; and as there is a great quantity of corn, hemp, flax, masts and iron now lying here, I have taken upon myself to grant the paper (No. 1) whereby the shipment of such articles is allowed to be made direct to Great Britain.

I have thought it of the greatest importance to give every facility to the removal of these valuable

articles, as well as to place them beyond the reach of the French, as to promote a direct trade to England. I have therefore taken upon myself to grant the paper alluded to, which will have the force and effect of a licence, and I trust the peculiar circumstances of the case will justify the hope I entertain that the adoption of this measure will only be anticipating your wish.

It has also been represented to me that a considerable quantity of colonial produce, mostly belonging to British merchants, is now in Riga, and I have granted the paper No. 2, by which such property is allowed to be sent off to Petersburg to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy.

In this and in all I have done it has been my earnest desire to act upon the great governing principle of our orders in Council, viz. to promote as much as possible the direct trade to England, and to turn it by every means from the hands of the enemy.

I have found myself entangled in embarrassments, that seemed almost endless, with respect to the situation of our licensed trade at this port, and one difficulty has scarcely been removed before another has presented itself, and but for the decided and friendly interference of General Essen's controlling power, I should never have got over the difficulties suggested by the civil government and the custom house officers, who would have a material personal advantage by the confiscation of any vessels, and they persist in thinking that British licences ought not to screen the Danish and Prussian flag from the hostility of Russia, but while this is made a subject of reference to the Emperor, I hope to get all the ships out. You will herewith receive a list of those I have been enabled to get away since my arrival.

Conceiving it probable that the merchant ships now arriving from England will be desirous to know

if it is safe to proceed hither, I have written Admiral Morris to offer an opinion that light vessels may without risk come for the hemp, &c., &c., but that it would be wrong and hazardous to bring any cargoes.

The forty gun-boats expected from Sweaborg are not yet arrived, in the meantime we are making considerable progress with the bomb-vessels and gun-boats. Three mortars are now placed in a large flat boat 100 feet long, and two gun-boats will be finished, and by the middle of the week we shall complete three more, so that, with eight boats and carronades from the Aboukir, we shall have a tolerable sea defence if the enemy advances.

When the gun-boats arrive and I find my continuance here can no longer be useful I shall proceed off Danzig.

Count Lieven, the late Russian Minister at Berlin, passed through Riga yesterday on his way to Petersburg; he corroborates what I had before said of the diminution of the French cavalry and artillery horses; he said he passed a vast number dead on the road. The inhabitants, particularly of Prussia proper, hearing he was the Russian Minister, flocked round his carriage and expressed the most earnest wishes for the success of the Emperor Alexander's arms; but in Poland is a very different feeling towards Russia, and the nobles join the enemy with parties of from fifty, eighty, to one hundred of their peasantry mounted, which forms a very useful addition to the army. The Count does not reckon the Marshal Macdonald's corps at more than 17,000 men.

The Russian Resident from Danzig is also arrived, having left it nine days ago, at which time the garrison was 14,000 strong, composed mostly of the troops of the small States of the Confederacy; more troops were constantly arriving.

It is said that no less than 400 pontoons have been sent from Danzig on carriages drawn by four horses each.

I have this instant heard from an intelligent person who is well acquainted with the fortified camp at Dryssa that it is formed by a curve of the river and is of no very great extent, but remarkably strong.

The works about Riga are getting on very fast, and a new Commandant is appointed to Dünamünde in the room of the present one, who is not very active.

I have the honour, &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

To Vice-Admiral Sir J. Saumarez,

July 12, 1812.

B. MARTIN TO ADMIRAL MORRIS AT HANO.

Aboukir, Riga Bay, 11 July, 1812.

Sir,—I beg to acquaint you that the merchant vessels at this port are loading with the greatest expedition, and that vast quantities of grain, hemp, flax, masts and iron will still remain after all the ships are gone; and as the division of the enemy under Marshal Macdonald have not made any forward movements towards Riga for several days, an opinion prevails that the place is not likely to be invested for some time, if at all.

I have thought it right to mention this circumstance in case you should be applied to for information as to the safety of the trade in proceeding to this port. My opinion is that empty vessels would do well to hasten here for cargoes, and may do so without risk, but it would be hazardous and unwise

to bring colonial or British produce at a moment when the merchants are so alarmed as to be shipping off such produce for Petersburg.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Rear-Admiral Morris.

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN.

Riga, July 12, 1812.

My dear Henry,—Long as the days are they are too short for the business I have to do, and I am sadly off for a scribe to make my loads of writing go on smooth and pleasantly. I suppose not a day passes that I have not at least forty merchants tormenting me about the difficulties they meet with owing to our licences being so unintelligible to the Russians; and being mostly under Danish and Prussian flags, the folks here think the ships and the property of those nations should be sequestered, and so I believe they ought, but while they are afraid to take so bold a step, I am hurrying the fellows neck over heels out of the port, loaded with corn, hemp and masts for England. I should think not less than 100 sail of vessels so loaded have got away since our arrival, and I have despatched a vessel to Hano Bay recommending light vessels to be hastened here for cargoes. There is much colonial produce at Riga which I am getting away towards Petersburg and places where it may be disposed of. Macdonald's corps of 20,000 Prussians and Poles are still in Courland and menace this place; his head-quarters are at Szowel; I suspect he will advance and cut off the communication between this place and Dünemünde at the entrance of the river, but I hope to get on board

first. We have astonished the Russians by fitting out bomb-vessels and gun-boats for them with such expedition ; I hope by the middle of next week to have a good formidable flotilla for them, and at General Essen's request I have appointed an English officer (Captain Stewart) to command them.

Count Lieven, late Russian Minister at Berlin, passed through Riga yesterday and says he found a great many dead horses on the road, and that the inhabitants particularly in Prussia proper, upon hearing he was the Russian Minister, flocked round his carriage expressing the most earnest wish that things would go well. But in Poland there is a very different feeling towards Russia ; there the nobles join the French as they advance with troops of horse formed of their peasantry.

The fortified camp at Dryssa is formed by a curve of the river ; it is not of great extent, but very strong, and the Russians wish to provoke an attack there. In too much haste to add more than the assurance that I am yours ever,

T. B. M.

Endorsed.—Riga, July 1812.

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN.

My dear Henry,—While I continue to send you a copy of my public letters you will desire nothing more from me, and I am yet so busy as to have but very little time for writing. I only repeat that you cannot be too reserved about such communications, for it would be exceedingly offensive to the Admiralty if anything I said should become the subject of public chat. I hope you write often to Joe and tell him what is going on.

There was a sharp attack on Dünaburg early yesterday morning, and an officer by the name of Igelstrom is just arrived who says the French were repulsed with the loss of 1,000 men; this was the third attack on the place and they seemed preparing for a fourth. I am living on shore at Riga almost ruined and poisoned by the filth of the town. If you happen to meet Domett he may possibly say how the Admiralty take my meddling with the trade, but I would not have you ask the question in a way that could be capable of showing a doubt in my mind of having done right.

I shall in all probability remain at Riga several weeks longer unless the French get possession of it, which is not impossible or improbable. Sixty-seven sail of ships have sailed for England with hemp and corn since my arrival; forty-seven are now nearly loaded with hemp, and forty with corn for the same destination—so that if hungry you will have plenty of bread—if miserable, plenty of rope to hang yourselves.

With love to Lady M. I am ever affectionately yours,

T. B. M.

July 17—night.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Aboukir, Riga Bay, July 15, 1812.

Sir,—Colonel Balabin, aide-de-camp to the Emperor of Russia, arrived here last night with a message from his Imperial Majesty expressive of his cordial thanks for the prompt assistance which has been offered by the British squadron, on its being known that Riga was menaced by the French, also signifying his Majesty's wish that I should if practicable continue here until the place is brought

into a better state of defence ; and not having any material object in view elsewhere I trust you will approve of my acquiescence in his proposal, though I have qualified it in such a way as to leave me at liberty to depart without exciting any surprise.

Colonel Balabin speaks of the position of the army as remarkably strong, and regrets the improbability of an attack being made upon them in their intrenched works, but if the enemy attempt to cross the river, which is fordable at some places, the Russians are to give them immediate battle.

The colonel, though at first rather reserved, became in the course of conversation more communicative, and has given me a better idea of the situation of the army than I have been able to collect before. It appears that the Emperor with the main body is on the south side of the river opposite to Dryssa, and Generals Doctoroff and Wittgenstein, with about 15,000 men each as marked in the accompanying paper [*not found*].

The army occupy the ground from Dryssa towards Polotsk as far as Disna, and they have a small force at Dünaburg, but the provisions, &c., which were at this place have been removed, and the works will be destroyed on the approach of the enemy.

Observing to the colonel how much an army is usually magnified on paper, and expressing a doubt as to the accuracy of what was said of the force of either side, he admitted that the Russian army was not so numerous as I supposed, but it astonished me to hear him reduce that part of it which is with the Emperor to so low as 120,000 men or less, viz., on the south side of the river about 80,000 ; and with Generals Wittgenstein and Doctoroff at Dryssa 30,000.

Colonel Balabin is not so unreasonably sanguine

as the other Russian officers in calculating the probable results of an action, but, in speaking with more deference of the French, he gives unbounded praise to the spirit and good order of the Russian army, and particularly to the excellent condition of their artillery.

It is not, I think, too much to entertain the best hope that if they are attacked in any strong position the invincible courage of the Russians will make the result such as we could wish, but if they are drawn into the field there is much reason to dread the consequences.

Three large bridges are immediately in the Emperor's rear and two more are nearly complete; the country and neighbourhood of Dryssa is mountainous and woody.

The Prince Bagration has about 60,000 men besides 25,000 Cossacks, and it is believed that he was on his march towards the Düna, by the way of Minsk; this position which was intended to threaten the enemy seems now to place the French army at Widzy nearly between the Emperor and the Prince, and yet no apprehensions appear to be entertained at head-quarters for his safety; but a different opinion exists elsewhere, and it is a matter of much doubt whether the French army, which had made no forward movements from the 6th to the 10th, were kept back owing to the fatigued state of the horses, or had returned against the Prince Bagration in the hope, and I fear with every prospect, of forcing him into the marshes near the river Priepez, far from any magazines, and in a bad country. In this case, if the Austrians remain stationary, the Prince Bagration may possibly be joined by the corps of General Tormasoff, who is at Lutzk (in Volhynia) with 50,000 men watching the Austrians, who hold an intimidating attitude on the frontiers of Galicia.

I have received from the Emperor's headquarters four hundred proclamations, with a request that I would get them distributed along the coast of Prussia, Mecklenburg, and in the neighbourhood of Hamburg, I therefore send equal parcels to yourself, Admiral Morris, and Sir A. Dickson; begging to observe that the Emperor attaches much importance to their immediate and general circulation.

I have sent the Ariel to Sir A. Dickson, as Captain Ross has a knowledge of some persons about Rose Head who may be likely to get the papers into circulation more readily than at any other place.

I mentioned in my last letter that a detachment of Prussian troops had reached Libau; it seems, however, that after getting to Hielegan, about two leagues from it, they were suddenly ordered back.

The whole of Poland is in a state of insurrection against the Russians, and their willing exertions in favour of the French is materially useful in the transport of provisions, stores, &c., &c.

I beg to enclose an extract of a letter from Count Chasot who is at the Emperor's head-quarters, and also a copy of the Emperor's proclamation to the Germans.

I am, &c., &c., &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, &c., &c., &c.

P.S.—I just now learn that a change has taken place in the staff of the Russian army, which places the Marquis Panluzzi at the head of it; he is an Italian but possessing an inveterate aversion to the French, and is described as a very able officer; and General Wolzogen, a German, also an officer of great talent, is next under the Marquis. These appointments are

thought very favourable ; but I can perceive even here that jealousy is awakened by the admission of foreigners into such high situations.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

[*Private.*]

Victory, Wingo Sound,
15th July, 1812, 11 P.M.

My dear Sir,—Your highly important despatches dated the 7th instant have but just reached me, and I am truly happy to find the cordial reception you met with on your arrival at Riga and the favourable impression your exertions for the defence of that important city must make upon his Imperial Majesty and the whole of the Russian army, who must derive fresh spirits on seeing a nation with whom they were so recently in hostility exerting themselves in giving every support to their cause.

I hope Admiral Morris will have hastened the *Orion* to join you, as the assistance of her carpenters will be of great service in fitting the bomb-vessels and gun-boats. If you find two or three small vessels adapted for conveying your despatches I have no doubt but General Essen would readily furnish them for that purpose, and you could put an officer with a proper crew from the ships under your orders to man them.

Your former despatches were transmitted very soon after their arrival, but the strong westerly winds we experience will occasion some delay to those I have now received ; I hope it may give time for the arrival of your next accounts, and that they will convey a favourable result of the battle expected at the time you sent off your letters.

Mr. Thornton came from Orebro last Saturday and stayed with me till Monday morning ; we both

dined with Count Rosen. There can be no doubt of the peace with Russia and Sweden being very soon settled. Two packets have arrived this day, and possibly Mr. T——'s letters by them may enable him to sign and to put the finishing hand to the articles. The war will then be carried on upon a more extensive scale—but I regret the tardiness and the delays in so advanced a state of the season. I hope your apprehensions respecting Turkey will prove groundless, and that Bonaparte will not have the assistance of the Porte in the present contest. You must allow me to recommend your paying due attention to your health, and not run the risk to impair it by over-fatigue or too much exertion.

Believe me ever most truly yours,

J. A. SAUMAREZ.

[A rather unpleasant correspondence took place between B. Martin and the Russian Admiral at Riga concerning the detention of an English merchant vessel by the latter. The former's conduct was approved.]

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Riga, 20th July, 1812.

Sir,—I am this instant come from General Essen who has repeated his order that every vessel now loaded or producing a licence with my endorsement shall be allowed to sail. But the Danish and Prussian vessels which are not loaded will be detained.

The General has heard that 10,000 Danish troops are marching to join the French.

If Sweden is sincere in her good wishes towards Russia, it can never be manifested at a more

favourable moment, and it is impossible to speak or press too earnestly the great importance of a landing in the rear of the enemy; it may be the salvation of Russia, if the delay has not already been too great.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,
T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, &c., &c., &c.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Riga, 20th July, 1812.

Sir,—No official advices have been received from the Emperor's head-quarters since the 12th, and this appears to me rather strange, for with large allowances for the circuitous route which couriers are obliged to take by reason of the enemy making frequent excursions across the Düna, we ought not to have been so long without advice from Dryssa; the date of the last private account came up to the 13th.

The private accounts are chiefly from (name not given) by which I learn that the head-quarters of Bonaparte were last at Belmonte (a place I cannot find on the map), about thirty English miles from the fortified camp at Dryssa on the road from Wilna, where he seems more disposed to observe and perhaps threaten the Russian camp than attack it; in the mean time he has confounded the calculations of the Russian generals, by making Marshal Davout with 80,000 select troops, including a large body of cavalry, push between the Russian Grand Army and the Prince Bagration, directing his march along the road towards Moscow by the way of Minsk, and a person who is arrived here says he saw part of Davout's army, consisting of about 5,000 cavalry,

at Borrsdoff between Minsk and Mogileff, but they had drawn back in consequence of the Prince Bagration having promptly pursued Davout with about 60,000 regulars and 10,000 Cossacks. He had already reached their rear and in some sharp skirmishes had made two colonels and some men prisoners. The . . . adds in a postscript to his official letter to the civic Governor of Riga that he had received accounts (but not official) that the Emperor had detached Doctoroff's corps with the young Count Vander Phalen's cavalry to Polotzk, from whence he could support either the Russian main army or the Prince Bagration.

It is not known that any corps has followed Davout, or that Bonaparte has made any movement to support him, or to threaten Bagration, and if such a detachment is made, it must be on a very small scale, for by what I can collect of the force of the different corps, Bonaparte cannot be much superior to the Emperor.

Prince Bagration, although not esteemed very able, is active and enterprising, and these qualities are said to have a right direction through the assistance of a French emigrant of great merit, Chevalier Le Prie, who is chief of his staff.

The corps of Macdonald is now advancing upon this place, and a sharp affair occurred yesterday evening between the Marshal and General Louis of this garrison, who has been watching him with about 3,000 men; it would seem that the cavalry of General Louis were either not sufficiently extended to watch the movements of the enemy, or negligent in doing so, and General Louis was actually surrounded, but most gallantly cut his way through the French, and is now falling back on Riga, having lost between 300 and 400 men killed and wounded; this action lasted from five till ten o'clock at night.

Macdonald is near Ecklaw, and continuing to advance when the last accounts came away at ten last night.

The town is thrown into the utmost confusion by this intelligence, and the suburbs are now on fire; the garrison consists of about 10,000 men including General Louis' corps, and 18,000 more were intended to come, but this cannot now be the case; I can scarcely venture to encourage a hope that the place will hold out any great length of time with so insufficient a garrison, and particularly if besieged (as expected) by the corps of Macdonald and Oudinot.

I cannot get any satisfactory account of the force of the French army. The troops destined to act against Russia were said to form ten corps, which I make out as follows—but it does not agree with the general opinion that they amount to 400,000 men :

Bonaparte,	four corps	.	.	130,000
Davout,	two „	.	.	80,000
Macdonald,	one „	.	.	20,000
Oudinot,	one „	.	.	20,000
Austrians,	one „	.	.	30,000
Victor's force and position uncertain,	say one „	.	.	<u>20,000</u>
				300,000

It is believed that Davout has only one corps, in this case I am at a loss to account for the tenth.

About half of the army under Bonaparte's immediate command are said to be Germans and other foreigners.

The division of the Austrian army is governed by the orders of Bonaparte, and have passed the borders; General Tormasoff is, as I before mentioned, occupied with that corps, and each had

taken prisoners from the other, so that the hostile disposition of Austria is now pretty conclusive.

I have sent four Spanish deserters on board the *Aboukir*, and as they seem extremely anxious to join their army in Spain I shall send them to Hano by the *Censor*. The desertion from their legion has been very great, and every man will fly from the service of France the first opportunity ; there is a Spanish or Portuguese regiment with each corps of the army.

I enclose a statement just now delivered by an officer who left General Louis last night.

Our three mortar vessels and four gun-boats, besides six Russian gun-boats under Captain Stewart, are now ready for service, and I have procured a light merchant vessel from the Emperor to receive 100 officers and men from the *Aboukir*—besides the *Aboukir's* boats will assist where necessary.

At this moment, which calls for the exertions of everyone present, I find myself thrown unexpectedly into new difficulties about the licensed ships, all under Prussian and Danish colours being ordered to be detained, but I am sure to procure their release by making it the condition of our co-operation ; I suppose there cannot be less than 200 sail now in the river, and full that number have sailed since I arrived. I have stated to the General the propriety of ordering the ships down the river, and this is done.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c., &c.,
T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, &c., &c., &c.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Riga, 24th July, 1812.

Sir,—The last accounts from Dünaburg, which I mentioned in my letter of the 10th instant, left it at so interesting a moment that I fear the want of more recent information must be ascribed to the fall of the place, and to our communication being cut off by the patrols and foraging parties of the enemy who frequently cross the Düna.

But we are also without any official intelligence from the Emperor since the 12th, although the arrival of travellers has made it evident that the road to this place by the way of Pernau is still open, and messengers have also been sent to the Emperor by that route. It is extraordinary that the General should be so uninformed of what is passing with the other corps of the army, but I believe it is a fact that he has no knowledge of anything beyond the limits of his own command; and as he professes not to expect intelligence from head-quarters unless of a favourable nature, I am very apprehensive that so long a silence bespeaks something more than mere inactivity; but, on the other hand, I feel confident that the enemy would not leave us in ignorance of any decisive advantage they may gain over the Russians.

General Louis came into the garrison the evening of the 21st with his detachment, all much exhausted by continued skirmishing during his retreat from Marshal Macdonald; this General is now gone forward again with 3,000 or 4,000 men towards the falls at Kirchelholm, about eight English miles up on this side of the river, where it is supposed the enemy will attempt to cross.

Captain Stewart, with ten sail of gun-boats, is stationed between this shore and the long island of

Dahlenholm and within reach of the falls, to give any assistance in his power, and it will be an important gain of time if the gun-boats oblige the enemy to cross further up, as I flatter myself they will, but if the enemy establish themselves in any force and throw up works on Dahlenholm, the gun-boats may find it difficult to maintain their present station.

The corps of Marshal Macdonald is now stated at nearer 30,000 than 20,000 men, and his advanced post in the Mittau Road is about eight miles off, and another considerable body is at Dalenkirke, opposite Kirchelholm.

Since the retreat of General Louis the enemy has been nearly stationary and probably waiting for their other divisions to close up, but the alarm here amongst all classes has been very great, thinking that the enemy would rush forward with their whole force, at a moment when least expected; and this, after much wavering and contradiction of orders, induced the General to direct the extensive suburbs on this side the water to be set on fire at eleven o'clock last night; forgetting, I fear, that the inhabitants had been lulled into security in the morning by being given to understand the place would not be immediately destroyed. The consequence has been most shocking, and the scene of uproar and confusion beyond anything I can describe, for the inhabitants were taken so much by surprise that some were actually burned to death in their beds. The whole of the suburbs are now nearly consumed; the houses on the opposite side of the river were burnt three days ago.

I was very anxious that this melancholy expedient should have been delayed till the danger was more imminent, and had offered an opinion that at this dry season such preparations might have

been made as would have rendered the destruction of the suburbs certain, if set on fire after the enemy came in sight ; but it was deemed imprudent to wait.

The irritation produced in the public mind by this premature measure is, I am sorry to say, very great, and will no doubt be manifested in the most resentful manner when the enemy invest the place.

The suburbs had a population of 15,000 souls, and many families have wandered into the woods, while others are floating about the river on stages, with their effects, in a most deplorable state.

On the night of the 21st a very considerable store-house was set on fire in the citadel, but it was soon put out, and without doing any material injury ; a Polish deserter is suspected of having set it on fire.

Finding myself greatly distressed for small vessels to go with despatches, and to do the various duties required of them at this moment, I have obtained one of the sequestered vessels (a fast sailing, copper bottom brig) from General Essen, and a lieutenant and men from the Aboukir have been put into this brig, now called the Saumarez, and she will be known by using the Aboukir's pendants on falling in with any of our cruisers ; she sailed for Dago yesterday evening in quest of the Russian flotilla which have been so long and so anxiously looked for at this place.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, &c., &c., &c.

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN.

Riga, July 25, 1812.

My dear Henry,—I must continue to write to you by deputy, for I have not a moment to myself, morning, noon, or night—I mean that I must send you copies of my official letters instead of writing myself.

Last night exhibited a most horrible scene in the shape of 3,000 houses burning with incredible fury; to-day the tragical picture is still more shocking, for besides thousands of women and children, who are wandering about the streets without shelter from a most severe rain, and without food, there are others floating about the river on stages with children and furniture of all sorts; poor wretches! no hope of relief, or even a look of compassion from the authors of their premature sufferings.

My guard, consisting of Cossacks and Hulans, are just gone from the door as the weather is set in bad, and I have received a multitude of official letters which call for an immediate answer. I was otherwise going to my advanced post of gun-boats which, I persuade myself, have arrested Macdonald's progress for the moment.

Macdonald is collecting his division about seven miles off, but I doubt his investing the place until the main armies have had a battle.

The Russians are an extraordinary stupid set of people, and their inactivity is most disgusting.

The people in Courland and Livonia are not much more loyal to the Russians than the Poles have shown themselves, and the lower orders have been heard to express their joy at the prospect of bettering their condition.

With love to all, ever affectionately yours,
T. B. MARTIN.

Endorsed.—Burning suburbs at Riga.

ADMIRAL CHICHAGOFF TO B. MARTIN.

Bolderaa, 14 July, 1812.
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Sir,—I had the honour to receive your letter dated the 21st July, containing a list of articles wanted for the Russian gun-boats. The artillery officer received orders to supply such articles as were in his possession; the cordage has been unfortunately burnt, and such other articles as were not in the stores of this place were ordered to be sought out and purchased in Riga.

As we are quite destitute of all articles here, I beg, Sir, you will have the kindness to order all such as are wanted to be purchased by Mr. Kliberg, whose business it is to supply the Government with necessaries, and who is furnished with my orders to supply the demands made by you. The Russian gun-boats are supplied with seventy-five charges each.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,
Vice-Admiral CHICHAGOFF.

To Rear-Admiral Martin.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Riga, 27th July, 1812.

Sir,—General Barclay de Tolly, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Army, has announced his junction, by forced marches, with the corps of Prince Bagration at Witepsk, where the messenger, who is just arrived, left him on the 24th instant; and the following day the army were to be put in motion to act offensively against Bonaparte, who had proclaimed his intention to march to Moscow,

and had advanced so rapidly towards White Russia as to be only a short distance from the province of Smolensk.

The Emperor Alexander had himself reached Smolensk, probably to stimulate by his presence the natives of that loyal province to exertions suited to the danger with which they were threatened.

Smolensk is two hundred English miles from Moscow.

The Emperor's activity and earnestness in the prosecution of the war affords an admirable example to his subjects, who in old Russia are devoted to his cause.

The nobles of Moscow have offered to raise 100,000 men at their own expense, besides a voluntary contribution of two millions of silver roubles to be at the Emperor's disposal.

We learn by the same messenger that the peace with Turkey is ratified, and the Russian troops who were in that quarter are marching to join General Tormasoff at Lutzk, and act in the rear of the French.

It is very probable these movements will draw Macdonald's division from this neighbourhood, and I understand he was himself at Kuntzbork, half way between this and Dünaburg, yesterday. We suppose there are not more than seven or eight thousand men left in the vicinity of this place.

If any arrangement could be made to bring the Russian Army, now embarked at Sweaborg, to this place, in preference to joining the Swedish expedition, the corps of Oudinot and Macdonald would find themselves in a perilous situation, placed as they now are between the division under Count Wittgenstein and the garrison at Riga, and so remote from the help of their main army. I hint at this in case it may be practicable to impart the idea to those

who are more competent to estimate the advantage of such a measure. I fear General Essen will not take upon himself the responsibility of ordering a step so apparently desirable.

I am, Sir,
T. B. MARTIN.

All well July 27.

Vice-Admiral Sir J. Saumarez, &c., &c.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, Hawke Road, 1st Aug. 1812.

Sir,—I have this day received your letter of the 20th ult. with its enclosures, and informing me of the intelligence you had received by private accounts from the armies, and a statement of the different corps forming the French forces ; also informing me that three mortar vessels, four gun-boats, and six Russian gun-boats under Captain Stewart were ready for service, besides 100 men and the boats of the Aboukir to assist when necessary.

I have also received your letter of the same date informing me that General Essen had repeated his orders that every vessel loaded, on producing a licence endorsed by you, should be allowed to sail, but the Danish and Prussian vessels which were not loaded would be detained.

I have to acquaint you that I expect the Meteor and Devastation bomb-vessels from England, when I propose to detach them to join you without delay.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,

JAS. SAUMAREZ.

Rear-Admiral Martin, &c., &c., &c.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Riga, 4th August, 1812.

Sir,—The Russian gun-boats, so long expected and so anxiously desired, arrived here on the 31st. ult., and now form a most important acquisition to the defence of the place; but their number is certainly greater than necessary, although the river affords an extensive range for their operations, and in many parts the land is so flat as to make them peculiarly useful against the approach of an enemy.

This flotilla, which is to be commanded by Admiral Moller, consists of 102 sail of remarkably fine boats, mounting 280 guns, and a complement of 5,000 men.

With such ample means of sea defence I thought it a matter of delicacy to express to General Essen my apprehension that the services of the British squadron, which had been offered to him at a time of great need and peril, could no longer be desirable in the river; but as it had been an early promise that, in the event of the place being attacked, the advance battery should be manned with the seamen, I could not relinquish our claim to that post while the enemy continued to menace the place.

The Governor was good enough to repeat what he had before intimated, that his confidence was in the gun-boats which were manned by the English, and desired that he might not yet be deprived of their services. Conformable, therefore, with his wishes Captain Stewart will retain the command of the boats which were fitted by the British ships, but it is agreed that I am to withdraw the sixty seamen of the *Aboukir*, who had been lent to the six Russian boats which were originally in the river.

The way Captain Stewart has conducted himself

in the command of the Russian and English gun-boats is highly praiseworthy, and his unremitting activity, so creditable to the country, has been willingly imitated by the officers and men of the *Aboukir* and *Ranger*, who are placed under his orders. They have unquestionably kept the enemy from crossing the river at the falls above the town, where a body of infantry and horse still remain entrenched; the only time they advanced towards the boats they were dispersed in a very few minutes, after losing five men and two horses killed.

The Emperor having been pleased to express a wish that I should remain at Riga while the ships could be made useful in its defence, I of course would not leave it abruptly, or without his concurrence. I therefore thought the arrival of the flotilla seemed to mark that time as the most proper to state that in the event of the enemy withdrawing from this neighbourhood I should be glad of the permission of his Imperial Majesty to consider myself at liberty to go to such other parts of my station as may hereafter appear most desirable for the common interest.

Conceiving this a proper mark of deference to the Emperor's wishes, I was unwilling to delay it any longer, for I cannot expect an answer in less than ten days, and by that time I should imagine something decisive will take place, so as to develop the intentions of the French in this neighbourhood. I had also in view the propriety of being fully prepared to go to the lower part of the Baltic where the expected landing of a Swedish army seems to promise more active employment to the squadron.

I am much inclined to suspect that the enemy send their cannon &c. by the *Kurische Haff* to Memel, and from thence close along the shore to Libau, and it is probable that a dash at either or

both those places, or other parts in the rear of the enemy, would be harassing to them, even if not attended with any better consequences. It would be best effected by a squadron of men-of-war, and a body of 1,000 or 1,500 active troops; not such as compose this garrison, who are described, and I trust truly, as the refuse of the army, for I never saw soldiers more sluggish, and apparently less calculated for the duties required of them.

Before any operation of this sort can be undertaken the season would no doubt be considerably advanced, as it will be necessary to add some Swedish or Russian men-of-war to the British ships, and the troops of one of those nations selected for the service. It is also right to observe that Libau and Memel are bar harbours, and that no landing can be effected unless the wind is off shore.

In suggesting the advantages to be expected from such a measure I also state the probable delays and difficulties (if they may be so considered), that the whole may be seen at one view, and I will only add that if the plan could be acted upon promptly it would be likely to produce the best consequences.

The landing of the Crown Prince¹ at the head of the Swedish troops is an event which becomes every hour more essential to the salvation of Russia; his popularity in Germany, and his military reputation, will tend to unhinge the whole Rhenish Confederacy, and make him the most formidable enemy that Bonaparte has yet met with. Such co-operation will be giving to us, if done immediately, the full benefit of our most politic connection with a country which has at its head a person so capable of producing a new order of things throughout the Continent.

¹ Bernadotte.

By some prisoners just now brought in we get a confirmation of what I stated in my last letter respecting Macdonald's movements towards Düna-burg; it now appears that he has gone that way with the division of General Grandjean, leaving about 12,000 Prussians in this neighbourhood. Whether the Russians have any force at Düna-burg is doubtful; it was said they had thrown the guns into the river and retired, and it is added, but I know not on what authority, that Count Wittgenstein had gone from Drissa towards the main army; these movements are not improbable, and seem consistent with each other, but the leaving only a corps of Prussians about this place is extraordinary, and on our part may be turned to good account.

General Grawart, who commands the troops of the enemy in this neighbourhood during the absence of Marshal Macdonald, sent on the 27th ult. to summon General Essen to surrender, assigning as a reason for doing so that his battering train would arrive in the course of a fortnight.

This attempt to impress us with an idea of the strength of the enemy I consider a very decided indication of their weakness, and the summons seems, as far as I can get at dates, to have been sent just when half the corps were going towards Düna-burg.

A person in a private capacity is arrived from the head-quarters, which he left on the 28th or 29th, between Witepsk and Smolensk, about thirty-five miles from the former, and the French army at no great distance in advance of them, and it was believed a general action would take place in a few days.

There had been a sharp affair in the neighbourhood of Witepsk, where it seems a strong division of the enemy crossed the Düna, and attacked part of the corps of Prince Bagration, but they were repulsed

and pursued across the river to the distance of several miles ; the enemy sustained a considerable loss in killed and prisoners, mostly Würtemberg troops ; the Russian loss is not mentioned, except that a General Okuloff was killed.

Speaking to General Essen about the men which he desired might remain in the gun-boats and mortar vessels, I observed that something decisive would probably take place long before the season would call for the departure of the ships, but, as the anchorage is very exposed, I suggested a doubt whether you would allow the ships to remain here after the first week in September, and I promised to ask whether under any circumstances you would approve leaving men behind, which indeed cannot be done without some sloop of war being also left in the river. I told him you would readily do anything for the defence and preservation of Riga, but unless it was actually besieged I thought you would not like to leave men at the risk of their being shut up during the winter, and particularly as he had more than five thousand Russian seamen in that port.

The General seemed to admit and to acquiesce in the reasonableness of these observations.

An attack is to be made to-morrow morning on a division of the enemy posted at Shlok,¹ which you will see described in the accompanying map ; it is about twenty-three miles from Dünamünde.

The boats under Captain Stewart are associated with a Russian division on this service, and two or three regiments will proceed from Dünamünde and Riga to co-operate with them. The plan of the attack originates with the Russian Generals ; however good it may be, it is undertaken with the disadvan-

¹ On sea coast about seventeen miles west of Riga.

tage of having been publicly known and spoken of for the last two days.

The boats will probably be absent for two days.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

T. B. MARTIN.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Riga, 5th August, 1812.

Sir,—I have infinite satisfaction in acquainting you that a messenger is arrived from General Count Wittgenstein, stating that a severe action was fought between his corps and that under Marshal Oudinot on the 2nd and 3rd inst. in the neighbourhood of Poloszk or Polocki.

It appears that Oudinot had crossed the Düna and was marching with a view, it is supposed, of coming round upon Riga and cutting off the communication with St. Petersburg, when Count Wittgenstein commenced a most spirited attack, and obliged him to recross the river with the loss of 3,000 prisoners and some cannon.

The fighting had been very sharp, and the Count was pursuing the enemy when the courier came away.

The loss of the killed and wounded is not mentioned on either side, except that General Kulnieu of the Russian hussars is killed, and Count Wittgenstein slightly wounded.

This affair, which will greatly increase the confidence of the Russian soldiers, is likely to produce other important consequences, and will probably oblige Marshal Macdonald to withdraw the remainder of his corps from the vicinity of Riga.

The division of General Grandjean, which I

mentioned in my last letter to have gone towards Dünaburg, was no doubt intended to second the operations of Oudinot.

An official report of this action will probably be published in the course of the evening, and I shall forward it to you to-morrow by a vessel going to Hano.

We have no accounts from the main army since that of the 29th ult., which mentioned Prince Bagration having driven the enemy across the river.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your ever obedient servant,
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, &c., &c., &c.

Memo. by Rear-Admiral Martin, sent to Sir James Saumarez from Riga, 10th August, 1812, on the conduct of Captain Stewart in an expedition up the Boldero river to drive the enemy from Shlok and, if possible, penetrate to Wittau.

'Captain Stewart commanding the flotilla in the river Düna has reported to Rear-Admiral Martin the general good conduct of the officers and men under his orders, but particularly their patient performance of the arduous duty they have been engaged in for the last three days.

'The excessive fatigue of so distant an enterprise in boats when the heat in this climate is peculiarly oppressive has given the officers and men an opportunity of showing to our new allies that intrepid and manly perseverance which the Rear-Admiral is confident will ever distinguish the officers and seamen in the pursuit of the enemy. The Rear-Admiral regrets that circumstances unconnected with

the duties of the boats prevented the officers and men obtaining that reward which they most desired, but the misfortune of having to deal with a flying enemy does not the less entitle them to his best thanks for the credit which the country and service has gained by their exemplary conduct, and he requests Captain Stewart will accept and communicate his thanks to them accordingly. The Rear-Admiral will feel great pleasure in communicating to the Commander-in-Chief his opinion of the merits of Captain Stewart, Lieutenants Chimley, Duncan, Kyle, Marshall, Furze, Osmond, and the petty officers and seamen employed.'

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, Hawke Road, 12th August, 1812.

Sir,—I yesterday received your letters of the 4th and 5th inst. informing me of the arrival at Riga of the flotilla of gun-boats so long expected, also detailing your proceedings and the intelligence you had received of a severe action between Count Wittgenstein's corps and Marshal Oudinot, in which the latter was defeated with the loss of 3,000 men taken prisoners and some cannon.

As by the time you will receive this letter the season of the year will be too far advanced for the *Aboukir* to remain at the insecure anchorage of Riga, I have to desire you will repair in her to Hano Bay, leaving Captain Acklom in the *Ranger*, with such smaller vessels as you may judge necessary to place under his command, to co-operate against the enemy upon the *Düna*, and also leaving Captain Stewart with such officers and men under his orders as you may judge advisable for the service entrusted to him ; but in the event of your considering it inex-

pedient to leave the Ranger off Riga, I have to desire you will please to give orders to Captain Acklom to repair with her off Reval, placing such small vessels as you can spare under his command, for the purpose of keeping up a communication from the Russian head-quarters, directing him to transmit his letters to me to Dalaro, under cover to Mr. George Hoy at Stockholm, and also communicating to his Excellency Edward Thornton, Esq., at Stockholm, any intelligence he may consider of importance for my information.

I have the honour, &c., &c., &c.,
JAMES SAUMAREZ.

Rear-Admiral Martin, &c., &c., &c.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

(*Private and most Secret.*)

Victory, Hawke Road,
12th August, 1812.

My dear Sir,—It is in contemplation of the Emperor of Russia to have a meeting with the Crown Prince, at his Majesty's particular desire, and I believe Abo is the place fixed upon for the interview.

It may be favourably considered, in the event of its taking place, if you were to make the offer through General Von Essen to have the honour of conveying his Imperial Majesty, and you would in that case repair to Reval or to whatever port the Emperor proposed for his embarkation.

Lord Cathcart set off on Sunday for Stockholm, to have an interview with the Crown Prince. Mr. Thornton accompanied him. As soon as the arrangements are made for conjoint operations, I shall be

informed of it, but how much to be regretted that they have not been made sooner! I have strongly urged the advantages to be derived from a force landing in the rear of the French army, and suggested it on your first sailing for the Belt, in the event of the war taking place; but you will observe the plans were previously settled between Russia and Sweden, and the expedition from Finland was intended to act with the Swedish troops in a different quarter. This is perfectly confidential.

Lord Cathcart when he left Gothenburg proposed to have returned this way to communicate with me in person after seeing the Crown Prince, but as he is to meet him at Stockholm instead of Orebro I expect he will embark from Delave, and the Aquila will be ordered to that place from Hano Bay.

If the two bombs are not required at Riga, pray send them to Morris, to be at hand to act where they may be wanted.

Yours ever, my dear Sir, with the most sincere attachment,

JAS. SAUMAREZ.

Admiral Martin.

Endorsed.—12th August, 1812.

ORDERS IN COUNCIL.

(*Copy.*)

Council Office, Whitehall, 13th August, 1812.

Sir,—Having laid before the Lords of His Majesty's most honourable Privy Council the copy of a letter from Sir James Saumarez, dated the 5th inst., with its enclosure (transmitted in your letter of yesterday) on the subject of the difficulties experi-

enced by Admiral Martin with respect to Prussian and Danish vessels furnished with British licences, I am directed to desire you will acquaint the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that it appears to the Lords of the Council, from Admiral Martin's statement, that he has acted with great judgment on the subject to which it refers. I am further directed to transmit to you a note of the description of licences that have been granted for vessels trading to the ports of Russia, within the Baltic, which the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty may perhaps think it may be useful to forward to Admiral Martin for the purpose of assisting him in preventing, as far as may depend on him, any abuse of such licences.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) CHETWYND.

J. W. Croker, Esq., &c., &c., &c.

(*Copy.*)

Description of licences which have been granted for vessels to and from the ports of Russia within the Baltic.

<p>To export to a certain amount, and to import return cargoes.</p> <p>To export generally goods allowed by law.</p> <p>To import goods allowed by law in return for cargoes exported in the preceding year.</p>	<p>In all these licences the name and character of the vessel, the tonnage and master, and the ports of import and export were named.</p> <p>They were granted to Prussian or Danish vessels, as well as to American or other vessels.</p>
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- To import grain, meal, or flour on certain conditions at, to the course of their voyage &c. These were granted in blank for any vessels not French, in order to facilitate the importation of grain into this kingdom.
- To import goods allowed by law, from Riga or ports of Russia within the Baltic or Gulf of Finland, to the north of Riga, without a previous export. These were granted in blank to any vessels but French; and were first issued on the 14th July, 1812, when from the intelligence received it was presumed that British property in those ports might be in danger.
- To import hemp and other naval stores for the use of the dockyards. These were granted in blank for any vessel not French, but were only granted to persons who had actually contracted to bring home stores.

Since the 1st of August, the day after the news arrived of the signature of peace with Russia, no licences have been granted for foreign vessels, not Russians, to trade between Russia and Great Britain.

ESSEN TO B. MARTIN.

Admiral,—General Louis, having presented me with a detailed account of the attack on the enemy's left wing on the 24th July, makes handsome mention of Captain Stewart of the British Navy, who commanded the advanced guard of gun-boats, he having completely accomplished the part assigned him in

destroying the raft upon the River Aa, by which the enemy thought to have covered their retreat; the effect was such as we could have wished, one officer and more than 100 soldiers being under the necessity of surrendering themselves prisoners of war.

It is particularly agreeable to me to be able to acquaint your Excellency of the distinguished conduct of Captain Stewart and of the lieutenants of the British Navy, Messrs. Chimley, Kyle, Marshall, Duncan, Ormond, and Furse, who were under his orders; and to request you will have the goodness to inform Admiral Saumarez of it. I dare add my personal prayer to his Excellency in recommending to his justice and goodness the said Captain Stewart and lieutenants above mentioned.

Accept, Admiral, the sentiment of the highest consideration with which I have the honour to be,

Your Excellency's &c., &c., &c.,

ESSEN.

Riga, 1st (13th) August, 1812.

Admiral Martin.

*SIR H. MARTIN TO MR. BASTARD,
OF KITLY, DEVON.*

Tunbridge Wells, 14th August, 1812.

My dear Sir,—I this morning received a numerous set of papers from Byam, and a plan of the situation of the Russian army upon the right bank of the Dwina at Dünaburg, Ballin, Drissa, to Polock or Polotsk, but the subsequent abandonment of the position renders the plan (which is merely a sketch) now uninteresting. Byam's last despatch is dated Riga, 27th July, and Lady Martin is now copying Byam's estimate of the respective forces as follows:

Russian Force.

With the Emperor at head-quarters .	80,000	Garrison of Riga, 10,000 men, not included.
Near the main army, under General Wittgenstein	15,000	
Near the main army, under General Doctoroff	15,000	
Prince Bagration, army regular troops	60,000	
Near the main army, General Plattow's Cossacks (with the Prince)	25,000	
Army of General Tormasoff opposing the Austrians	50,000	
	245,000	

French Force.

Bonaparte at head-quarters .	130,000
Davout	80,000
Macdonald (near Riga)	20,000
Oudinot (near Riga)	20,000
Victor (supposed)	20,000
Austrians	30,000
	300,000

The account of Prince Bagration having totally cut up nine cavalry regiments of Davout's army, and taken 1,000 prisoners, with upwards of fifty Staff and superior officers, was received at Riga on the 25th July.

Byam had ten gun-boats then ready and a long vessel with three mortars mounted, all of which were posted up the river under the orders of Captain Stewart in a position to impede the advance of the enemy upon Riga. Byam had already despatched nearly 200 vessels for England and Petersburg from Riga, the former laden with wheat, hemp, and masts, the others with colonial produce and English

goods; and he was using every effort to get off 200 more of the same description.

25th July.—The main army of Russia having advanced to Smolensk, Count Wittgenstein is left at the entrenched camp at Drissa with his own and the 6th corps of the army. There is a small body of the enemy, perhaps 1,500, at Dalenkin, seven miles from Riga, on the opposite side of the river, and about two miles from our boats. The heavy cannon of Macdonald's army have passed Libau on its route this way.

Byam gives a sad account of the destruction of the suburbs of Riga, for after wavering and much contradictory orders it was at last (unexpectedly by the poor inhabitants) set on fire at eleven o'clock at night. Nothing could describe the uproar and confusion which ensued, for so little was it expected that many were burnt to death in their beds. The suburbs are now nearly consumed (24th July); the houses on the opposite side of the river were consumed three days ago. Byam was very anxious that this melancholy but necessary destruction should have been delayed till the danger was more imminent, and he offered an opinion that at this dry season matters may have been so prepared as to have destroyed the suburbs with certainty even after the enemy came in sight, but it was deemed imprudent to wait. 'I am sorry to say (he observes) that this conflagration has produced great irritation in the public mind. The part destroyed had a population of 15,000 souls, and many families have wandered into the wood, while others are floating about the river on stages with their children and effects, in the most deplorable state. Prince Bagration, although not esteemed very able, is active and enterprising, and these qualities are said to have a right direction through the assistance of a French

emigrant of great merit, Chevalier St. Prie, who is chief of his Staff. About half the army under Bonaparte's immediate command are said to be Germans and other foreigners. There is a Spanish and Portuguese regiment with each corps of the French army (which consists of ten corps); a great many of these have already deserted, and reports say that all would do so if they could. There are 200 sail at least of vessels now in this river, and I stated to the General the propriety of ordering them down to a safe position, which has been done.'

Riga, 19th July.—General Wittgenstein's advanced corps, near Drissa, under Major-General Kulnieu, has had an affair with the French, in which they entirely cut up the 10th Polish and 11th French cavalry Chasseur regiment; the French Brigadier-General Baron de St. Geneist, a captain, two subaltern officers, are with 140 prisoners, and 400 killed. Russians, ten killed, forty-two wounded. The Prince of Hohenloe, commanding the Würtemberg troops, has been taken prisoner with forty men by the Russians. The Poles are decisively against the Russians, and the people of Courland and Livonia do not appear so loyal to them as might be wished; but all the inhabitants of Russia proper, and at Moscow, as well as the armies, are devoted to the cause of Alexander.

16th July.—'Sixty-seven sail of ships have sailed for England with corn and hemp since my arrival; forty-seven with hemp and forty with corn are just departing for the same destination, so that if hungry you will have plenty of bread, if miserable you will have plenty of rope to hang yourselves. T. B. M. to H. W. M.—Send copies of my news to Mr. Bastard, but pray hint to him again, as I now do to you, how necessary it is not to use my name as authority for any news, as it might give

great offence to the higher powers should such conversation reach their ears, as coming from an officer in command.'

H. W. MARTIN.

Endorsed.—To Mr. Bastard, of Kitly.

LORD TYRCONNEL TO B. MARTIN.

Petersburg, August 16, 1812.

My dear Sir,—I arrived here with the Swedish Minister, Count Lowelhulm, on the 16th, who was good enough to give me a place in his carriage, which, as you may imagine, after having performed a long journey in the country carts, was not unacceptable. I met Colonel Balabdin, to whom I had the honour of being introduced at Riga, just as I was upon the point of leaving Count Romanzow's house, where I had dined, and as he appeared in a great hurry, I had not time to ask him where you were, or what he supposed would be your future plan of operations; and upon my returning the next day to Count Romanzow's to inquire where Colonel Balabdin lived, and by what means I could write to you, I was informed he had already set out again for Riga, and that he had come to Petersburg from thence with communications from you to the Emperor. I then told Count Romanzow what you desired me to make known to his Majesty whenever I had the honour of being presented to him, but as I supposed that you had desired Colonel Balabdin to communicate fully with the Emperor, and to inform him of your future plans, and what you thought would most benefit the common cause, I should only beg him to state to the Emperor that you had desired me to say that as you imagined the Russian naval force was sufficiently strong at Riga without your assist-

ance, you thought you might be more usefully employed elsewhere, but that you did not wish to leave Riga or to take any further steps without the concurrence and approbation of his Majesty. I do not know whether this was right, but at any rate it could do no harm. I have so little time to write that you must pardon me for any inaccuracies and the informality of my letter, and for the little intelligence I am able to send you. I ought, however, to tell you that I was yesterday presented to the Emperor, of whom I had received the most favourable character from Mr. Thornton, and I cannot say how highly gratified I was by the kind reception I met with, and how much he surpassed even the description, favourable as it was, that Mr. T. had given me of him. He leaves Petersburg to-morrow for Abo, where he is to have a conference with the Crown Prince¹ in order to arrange, I suppose, their future plan of operations. I am not to be of this party, as I believe it is wished that the suite of the two potentates should be as small as possible. Lord Cathcart, however, I suppose will be there, as I find he has landed in Sweden, and that it is from that cause that Mr. Thornton did not prosecute his journey to England, whither he was going (as I understand) to urge our Government to give immediate assistance to Sweden. As the communication is now open between Riga and the army I suppose you have heard of the late successes of Count Wittgenstein, and of General Winzingerode, and that the communication is established between the corps of Count Wittgenstein and the main army. This is all the military news I have been able to learn; even if I had heard more I should have hardly time to write it. I have, however, sent you the letter I wrote to you from Smolensk and which I had no opportunity of despatching

¹ Of Sweden, Bernadotte.

before ; it will not convey anything new or interesting to you, but it will, at any rate, show that I had not forgot your kindness or the confidence you showed me, and that it was my wish, if possible, to repay you as far as was in my power by communicating what little intelligence I had been able to collect. May I beg you to remember me kindly to Mr. Cummins and Captain Acklom, and to believe me ever, my dear Sir,

Most sincerely yours,
TYRCONNEL.

I am afraid I am taking a great liberty, but I should be much obliged to you if you would have the goodness to send the enclosed draft to Mr. Lowesten, who General Essen was kind enough to send with me to the head-quarters, and, if you should happen to see him, to tell him how grateful I feel to him for the attention he paid me and the care he took of me upon the road.

I forgot to mention that the treaty of peace which was signed at Orebro on the 18th between this country and England was solemnly published yesterday without waiting for the ratification.

Endorsed.—From Lord Tyrconnel, a very sensible enterprising young man, who died very soon after writing this letter. He was at the time a volunteer with the Russian army.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Aboukir, Riga Bay, 17th August, 1812.

Sir,—I have to acquaint you that couriers arrived last night from Count Wittgenstein and General Barclay de Tolly, by whom we learn that no important affair has yet occurred.

Count Wittgenstein's letter is dated the 13th inst.

at a small village called Doschock, about forty miles on this side of Polotzk, to which latter place he had pursued Oudinot, and leaving a strong advanced post in front of it, in order to deceive him, the Count immediately took a direction with his army towards Druda to meet Macdonald, of whose departure from this neighbourhood he had received early intelligence. Hearing, however, that Marshal Oudinot had obtained a reinforcement of 11,000 men he halted, and presently moved forward again in the direction of Polotzk, and, falling in with a small division of the French, he attacked them and took 600 prisoners besides baggage. It was conjectured that Oudinot had recrossed the river, and it was ascertained that his loss in the late action had been more severe than was at first reported.

General Barclay de Tolly's letter is dated the 10th of August at Smolenski; it speaks only of an attack made by Count Phalen's cavalry on the enemy's rear-guard, which he drove before him, taking two or three hundred prisoners and General Sebastiani's carriage with all his papers, from which part of Bonaparte's plan had been discovered, and amongst other things that his retreat at that time was merely a feint in order to draw the Russians' right wing into a situation which would enable him to turn or surround it; this had determined Barclay de Tolly to remain where he was.

Frequent skirmishes took place and they are represented as invariably favourable to the Russians, and everything at the army is going on in a satisfactory way.

Several small detachments from this garrison have been scouring the country and have destroyed a magazine and taken some prisoners, amongst them a French courier going to Macdonald with a vast number of papers and packets from two French Generals of engineers and artillery, dated at Tilsit,

by which it appears that a battering train for the siege of Riga is on the road, but it does not say whether it has passed Tilsit or not, and Marshal Victor (Duke of Belluno) with a strong corps is stated to be on his way to assist in the siege.

I am much inclined to suspect this messenger has been intended to fall into the hands of the Russians, though the General does not see it in that light.

The division of the enemy now in this neighbourhood is commanded by General Yorke, who informed General Essen that he had taken General Gravart's place.

This division, as I mentioned in a former letter, is composed entirely of Prussians, and they want only the British-German legion to be thrown open in order to bring the whole of them over.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c. &c.,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, &c. &c. &c.

CAPTAIN TOULOOBIEFF TO B. MARTIN.

Sir,—By order of the Minister of Marine his Imperial Majesty's frigate *Amphitrite*, commanded by me, corvette *Charlotta* (Captain Stanitsky), and brig *Phœnix* (Lieutenant Doctoroff), are appointed to cruise off the Gulf of Livonia to prevent the enemy's assaults on the commerce; and I am ordered also, on my arrival at the place of destination, to be under full directions of your Excellency, of which I have the honour to inform you. Here I shall wait for further orders.

Remain, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

Captain TOULOOBIEFF.

Endorsed.—Captain Tooloubieff of Amphitrite,
13th August, 1812.

August 4 (16), 1812.

His Imperial Majesty's ship Amphitrite, off
the Gulf of Livonia.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Aboukir, off Riga, 17 August, 1812.

Sir,—I beg to acquaint you that couriers arrived last night from the Count Wittgenstein and General Barclay de Tolly, by whom we learn that no important affair had yet occurred.

Count Wittgenstein's letter is dated the 13th inst. at a small village called Doschork, about forty miles on this side of Polotzk, where he had pursued Oudinot, and leaving a strong advanced post in front of it in order to deceive him, the Count immediately took a direction with his army towards Druya to meet Macdonald, of whose departure from this neighbourhood he had received early intelligence. Hearing, however, that Marshal Oudinot had obtained a reinforcement of 11,000 men he halted, and presently moved forward again in the direction of Polotzk, and falling in with a small French division he attacked them and took 600 prisoners besides baggage. It was conjectured that Oudinot had recrossed the river, and it was ascertained that his loss in the late action had been much more severe than it was at first reported.

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200 or 300 prisoners and General Sebastiani's carriage with all his papers, from which part of Bonaparte's plan had been discovered, and amongst other things that his retreat at that time was merely a feint in order to draw the Russian right wing into a situation which would enable him to turn or surround it. This had determined General Barclay de Tolly to remain where he was.

Frequent skirmishes take place and they are represented as invariably favourable to the Russians, and everything at the army is going on in a satisfactory way.

Several small detachments from this garrison have been scouring the country and have destroyed a magazine and taken some prisoners, amongst them a French courier going to Macdonald with a vast number of papers and packets from two French generals of engineers and artillery, dated at Tilsit, by which it appears that a battering train for the siege of Riga is on the road, but it does not say whether it has passed Tilsit or not, and Marshal Victor (Duke of Belluno) with a strong corps is stated to be on his way to assist in the siege.

I am much inclined to think his messenger has been intended to fall into the hands of the Russians, though the General does not see it in that light.

The division of the enemy now in this neighbourhood is commanded by General York, who informed General Essen that he had taken General Gravant's place.

This division, as I mentioned in a former letter, is composed entirely of Prussians, and they want only the British-German legion to be thrown open in order to bring the whole of them over.

I have the honour to be,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

*P. CUMMING TO B. MARTIN.*Riga, Monday, $\frac{5}{17}$ August, 1812.

My dear Sir,—General Essen enters into your ideas, and will comply with your suggestion in respect to the Spanish, by immediately sending off to Barclay de Tolly and Count Wittgenstein the Spanish letters which you transmitted to him.

I had a long conversation with the General this morning, who was extremely communicative and candid, and being only just returned from him, I hasten to put the substance of it to paper before anything can escape me.

In the first place, he told me that he had another combined attack on the enemy in this quarter in agitation, in which he would take care, as before, to request your assistance, and for that purpose, when he obtained the opinion of General Louis, he would instruct Admiral Möller (who, at any rate, must go down the river this afternoon or in the morning) to call upon you in order to impart the subject respecting which he means to speak to him this forenoon.

Couriers have arrived in the course of the night from Count Wittgenstein as well as from Barclay de Tolly with short communications, nothing of very great importance having occurred in these quarters.

Count Wittgenstein's letter is dated the $\frac{1}{3}$ instant at a small village called Dschock, about two marches on this side of Polotzk. After pursuing Oudinot to Polotzk, the Count left a strong advanced post in front of it in order to deceive him, and immediately took a direction with his army towards Druja to meet Macdonald. Hearing, however, that Oudinot had obtained a reinforcement of 11,000 men he halted and sent orders to the General of his staff to move forward again in the direction of Polotzk,

which he did, attacking and overthrowing a small French division, and taking 600 prisoners besides baggage. It seemed to be inferred that Oudinot had recrossed the river, but this cannot be ascertained as a fact. So matters stood with Wittgenstein on the $\frac{1}{13}$ instant, and considered favourable, as Oudinot's former army was, it appears, much more cut up than had been imagined.

Barclay de Tolly's letter is dated $\frac{29}{10}$ $\frac{\text{July}}{\text{August}}$ at a village on this side of Smolensk. Skirmishes frequently took place, but always to the advantage of the Russians. In an attack made by Count Pahlen on the enemy's rear-guard, which he drove before him, taking 200 or 300 prisoners, he also made prisoner of General Sebastiani's carriage with all his papers, from which part of Bonaparte's plan had been discovered. Out of this it appears that his late retreat was merely a feint in order to bring the Russian right wing into a situation which would enable him to turn or partly to surround it. Barclay de Tolly had therefore resolved to remain where he was. In other respects everything went on favourably.

Having told you what has been passing in distant quarters, I must now mention what has occurred in this neighbourhood. The General gave a kind of roving commission a few days ago to two officers at the outposts on this side the river, each having about fifty men. It seems that they crossed over to the other side, scoured the country in different directions, making some prisoners and taking and destroying an enemy's magazine, but, what is of more importance, they had taken a French courier going to Macdonald with an immense number of papers and packets despatched by two French generals of engineers and artillery from Tilsit. It appears from them that a battering train for the

siege of Riga is on the road (but whether it has passed Tilsit or not is not ascertained), and that Marshal Victor (Duke of Belluno) is also with a corps, either on the way or is to come to assist in the siege.

The Governor means to make public some part of the intelligence from the armies, but what part it is not for me to discriminate; and as his communications to me in general this morning were in confidence, I will thank you to keep the whole to yourself until you hear what part is mentioned from other quarters.

Believe me with sincere regard,

My dear Sir,

Yours very faithfully,

P. CUMMING.

ESSEN TO B. MARTIN.

Sir,—Colonel Balabin having this day returned from St. Petersburg brought me the Emperor's orders concerning the English squadron under your Excellency's command. His Imperial Majesty has desired me to acquaint you that should you think that your presence might be more useful in any other place now that the Russian flotilla has arrived in the Düna, his Imperial Majesty requests you to follow any other destination.

His Majesty nevertheless desires that his adjutant may accompany you, and that you will keep up an uninterrupted correspondence with me.

You proposed to me, Admiral, in the letter you did me the honour to write to me this day that Captain Stewart, with those under his orders attached to the gun-boats, should remain here under the orders of the Russian Admiral Möller. I must

think that the defence of Riga is much strengthened by the presence of so gallant an officer as Captain Stewart, and I accept your offer with pleasure and gratitude, provided that Captain Stewart will not lose time here, which might be elsewhere more profitably employed in following his profession. I make this remark, Admiral, from my own ideas, wishing as I do the welfare of Captain Stewart. You at the same time are acquainted that I am not deficient in a tolerably large Russian flotilla. Do me the favour to accept with homage the perfect esteem and very sincere devotion with which I have the honour to be, Admiral,

Your Excellency's &c. &c. &c.,
ESSEN, Governor of Riga.

Riga, 7th (19th) August, 1812.

His Excellency Admiral Martin.

ADMIRAL MÖLLER (RUSSIA) TO B. MARTIN.

Sir,—I shall not much apologise for venturing to write to your Excellency in English, and shall be happy if I can explain myself so that you will understand me. It is the General's orders to defer the intended expedition with the joint boats upon Schlook.

I have ordered the frigate, two goalets, and eleven transports to go to the roads and wait for further orders according to agreement. The list of the ships and names of the commanders I have enclosed. I beg your Excellency will furnish them with signals, which the commander of the frigate will soon translate. I likewise take the liberty of enclosing an order to the different commanders to put themselves under your command; I have further to inform you that three hundred soldiers

with proper officers are ordered from Riga, and if you will only send to inquire about them at the commandant's, and send your boats, they will be ready to be transported. There are two field pieces at Riga ready to be transported whenever you will please to send for them, or if you will think it more proper for our boats to transport them I shall be happy to receive your commands upon this subject.

I shall conclude this with begging your Excellency, if possible, to have all our transports returned in due time at this port, that the flotilla under my command should not be in want of their stores &c.

I have the honour to be with the highest esteem,
Sir,

Your Excellency's obedient humble servant,
O. V. MÖLLER, Rear-Admiral.

Ranger, August 8 (20), 1812.

Rear-Admiral Martin, &c. &c. &c.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, Hawke Road, 20th August, 1812.

Sir,—Having transmitted for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of the 16th ultimo, I have great satisfaction in acquainting you that their lordships have been pleased to express their approbation of your zealous and judicious exertions particularly as to the measures you have taken for the safety of the ships laden with naval stores or British produce, and that they are pleased with the clear and satisfactory statements which you have from time to time transmitted for their lordships' information.

I have also to acquaint you that their lordships have been pleased to approve of your proceedings

in having suggested to General Essen the probability of bringing over the Spanish and Portuguese troops in the French service, if his Imperial Majesty would guarantee their return home.

I have the honour, &c. &c. &c.,

JAS. SAUMAREZ.

Rear-Admiral Martin.

ADMIRAL MORRIS TO B. MARTIN.

Vigo, Hano Bay, 21 August, 1812.

Sir,—With this letter I send a parcel directed to you as money upon his Majesty's Service for the fleet, which I received from his Excellency Mr. Thornton, who received it from Captain Willoughby, to whom Mr. Champion had entrusted it.

Mr. Thornton, in his letter to me of the 16th instant from Orebro, says: 'I received last night from England the ratification of the treaty of peace with Sweden and with Russia, which I trust I shall very shortly exchange with the plenipotentiaries of both these powers; and I shall possibly before the exchange present my letters of credence as his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at this Court.'

The messenger who brought me Mr. Thornton's letter was to rejoin him and Lord Cathcart at Stockholm, from whence his lordship intended to pursue his voyage in the Aquilon to St. Petersburg.

I have the honour, &c. &c. &c.,

T. N. MORRIS.

Rear-Admiral Martin, &c. &c. &c.

P.S.—The Earnest has just returned from taking Lieutenant Baron von Dreison off Rugenwalde without any favourable circumstance having offered

for landing him, and from the report he makes to me of his instructions he wished to have been landed from a merchant vessel, and expected to have ships attending in the offing to receive such recruits as he might be able to raise ; his plan appears to have been so imperfectly arranged that he desires himself to return to Riga for further explanation, and I send him by the *Daphne* on his own application.

T. N. MORRIS.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

(*Private.*)

Victory, Hawke Road, 21st August, 1812.

My dear Sir,—I beg you will accept my most sincere congratulations on the change of your flag, which I hope will prove a happy presage of continued success to the important service entrusted to you. I place such implicit reliance on your skill and known judgment, that I leave it to you to make any variation in the arrangements pointed out in my former despatch, and which was in consequence of what you suggested as to the insecure anchorage off Riga for the *Aboukir*. I have been obliged to station in the Belt another line-of-battle ship more closely to watch the canal of Kiel, where you will find by the enclosed intelligence the enemy are endeavouring to push a large force, most probably intended for Zealand. I received a letter yesterday from Lord Cathcart, who left Orebro three days since on his way to the Emperor, after having seen the Crown Prince. It grieves me to find that the season is likely to be still more advanced before anything is finally arranged for the intended operations ; it is, however, satisfactory to know that the delay does not proceed from want of the best disposition from all parties, and you will be happy to find that the ratification of the peace with Sweden was transmitted yesterday

by an extra packet, by which conveyance your different letters were also transmitted.

The omission you allude to in Captain Stewart's order was, I assure you, not meant to give less title to the rank of post, but was owing to the difficulty of giving rank where no ship could be named to which he was appointed; but in my public and private communications to the Admiralty I took care to claim the rank of post-captain for him, and in a letter which I have received from Lord Melville he says, 'I perceive that you have appointed Captain Stewart of the Reynard, and other officers, to act in the gun-boats in conjunction with the Russians, but of course it must depend on circumstances as to how far it may be deemed expedient to confirm those appointments.' I shall, however, make the addition you wish in the order Mr. Champion will enclose to Captain Stewart.

I have received no account of the promotion that is understood to have taken place except in a letter from Admiral Hope, who says there are to be twenty from the post list and a proportion of commanders and lieutenants. The next packet, which I hope will arrive before the messenger for Hano sets off, will doubtless bring the Gazette with the promotion, and, what is of greater import, the details of Earl Wellington's glorious victory.¹

Lord Walpole, who is appointed Secretary to the Embassy in Russia, arrived here yesterday in the Calypso, and proceeded through the Belt with a convoy under the protection of the Zealous.

I hope your health is perfectly restored. Be assured of the sincere and unvaried attachment of, my dear Sir,

Your ever faithful,

J. DE SAUMAREZ.

Endorsed.—Rear-Admiral Martin.

¹ Salamanca, 14th July.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, Hawke Road, 23 August, 1812.

Sir,—I have the satisfaction to acquaint you that the convoy from the Belt, consisting of 224 sail, of which 124 were from Riga, arrived here yesterday and have proceeded this morning with a fair wind for the ports of their destination in England.

I have the honour, &c. &c. &c.,
 JAS. SAUMAREZ.

Rear-Admiral Martin, &c. &c. &c.

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN.

[No date. Probably August 20 to 25th, 1812.]

My dear Henry,—What a delightful active campaign I have had, and how I shall enjoy a month's sleep when it is over!

I send you letters and papers which will explain the crotchet I have now in view, with which General Essen was quite in raptures; but modesty (which never falls to the lot of more than one in a family) prevents my repeating his complimentary expressions. If the thing succeeds, as I trust it will, there is no calculating the advantage it may prove to the Russian army.

As the Swedes would not act for themselves, after encouraging us with so much hope, I think it cannot be taken amiss in me to personate Bernadotte, for I mean that the ships should hoist Swedish colours, as all the French part of the continent are terrified at their threatened visit.

I hope to be off Danzig on Sunday morning and am now very busy.

Not a creature in the ship has the least idea where we are going, and the commanding officer of the Russian troops, who thought he was only going on one night's service (and has only the things he stands in) is apprehensive I am going to take him to England. Adieu.

Ever yours,
T. B. M.

P.S.—Many thanks for your remembrance of my wishes about Plymouth or Channel fleet and for your well-timed letters to Hope and Domett. I do not mean to come to the Baltic again, it never agrees with my lungs; besides, I have now gone beyond my strength and will require a year to get about again. I am so thoroughly worn out.

Send all the papers to Mr. Bastard; he will return them to you again.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, 26 August, 1812.

Sir,—Herewith you will receive a packet of Gazettes and bulletins in the German language containing an account of the late glorious victory obtained by the Marquis Wellington over Marshal Marmont near Salamanca, which you will please to circulate as much as possible in the Russian territories.

I have the honour, &c. &c. &c.,
JAS. SAUMAREZ.

Rear-Admiral Martin, &c. &c. &c.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, 26th August, 1812.

My dear Sir,—The packet having just arrived with the mail to the 21st, I despatch a messenger with any letters there may be for you and also an additional supply of Gazettes in French and German. I have enclosed a few of each to General Von Essen and also to Baron Dornburg, which I shall thank you to forward. The last-named officer has been long known to me, and you will find him deserving any confidence you may think right to place in him.

Our successes in the Peninsula continue unre-mitted—4,000 prisoners have been taken at Valladolid, which the French evacuated after the dispersion of Marmont's army.

Affairs with America continue doubtful, though inclinable to peace. I have the greatest expectation that Captain Stewart will be made post, Lord Melville having desired Lieutenant St. Clair (the first upon the admiralty list) to be appointed acting in the Renard during his absence. St. Clair is at present on the Sheldrake, for which sloop Captain Brine has been commissioned. I have been directed to appoint Mr. Ormond to any vacancy upon your flag-lieutenant joining the Aboukir, and I propose to reserve one for him in the Victory. You will therefore have the goodness to send him to Wingo upon the arrival of Mr. Smith.

I am out of all patience at our present inactive state and sincerely lament the moment so long and anxiously wished for should have arrived when the most important services could be rendered to the general cause without our profiting of it. I fear the season will be too far advanced for the expected

operations from this country, and can only say that it has not been from want of any earnest representations upon the subject.

I am ever with the most sincere attachment,
Ever faithfully yours,

J. SAUMAREZ.

Admiral Martin.

Endorsed.—26th August, 1812.

ADMIRAL MORRIS TO B. MARTIN.

Vigo, Hano Bay, 29th August, 1812, 5 P.M.

Sir,—It is with really distressed feelings that I acquaint you that I have not in my power to offer you the smallest share of assistance. A report transmitted by Vice-Admiral Murray of the enemy's intention of sending 200 vessels by the canal of Kiel with ordnance stores of all kinds for Zealand has caused the Commander-in-Chief to order the Orion and every ship within my reach into the Belt to prevent supplies from reaching that island, and the Earnest is the only vessel with me, nor do I expect any to arrive. The Devastation sailed the 26th for Riga to join you.

I have the honour, &c. &c. &c.,

T. N. MORRIS.

Rear-Admiral Martin, &c. &c. &c.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Aboukir, Danzig Bay,
1st September, 1812.

Sir,—I have received a letter from Captain Stewart, dated at Riga the 24th and 25th ulto., reporting the proceedings of the flotilla under Admiral Möller, in his operations upon Shlok, which was intended as a diversion in favour of a

more serious attack up the Düna at Dahlnkirk, but I fear a want of combination in the movements of the different divisions prevented its being productive of the expected advantages; it was, however, so far successful that the Russians took one major, fourteen officers, and 650 men, with the loss on their part of about two hundred and eighty killed and wounded; amongst the former was Colonel Tiedeman,¹ of the Engineers, who was a volunteer on the occasion, and to whom Colonel Exeln handsomely attributes his success.

The enemy had about five hundred men killed and wounded.

I herewith transmit Captain Stewart's letter and a bulletin published by General Essen.

I have received a letter from a most intelligent person at Riga (who is much in the confidence of General Essen), forming a kind of diary of transactions in that neighbourhood from the 22nd to the 29th, both days inclusive, and it is from this that I have formed my report of the above affair as well as from Captain Stewart's account of it.

Everything was quiet at Riga on the 29th, but the enemy were thought to be making preparations for a siege, and an opinion prevailed that it would soon be invested.

On the 26th General Essen received a letter from Count Wittgenstein, dated Under the Walls of Polotzk on the $\frac{7}{19}$ ult., mentioning that on the $\frac{6}{18}$ ult. he had a very sharp though not general action with Oudinot, in which, after various manœuvres, and both armies having crossed and recrossed the river several times, the advantage was in favour of the Russians, who took two pieces of cannon, one

¹ An excellent officer and my particular friend; he was the best man connected with the Army at Riga, Colonel of Engineers. (Note B. Martin.)

staff officer, thirteen inferior officers, and 500 men prisoners.

Marshal Oudinot was so severely wounded on this occasion that he gave up the command to General St. Cyr.

Three Russian generals were wounded, but their loss of men is not mentioned.

The Spaniards in this affair had shown their unwillingness to fight in the ranks of the French, but, on the other hand, the Bavarians, less ashamed of their disgraceful connection, were not to be distinguished from the native French in their exertions.

I should mention that two squadrons of Russian horse made a most gallant and desperate attack on the French artillery consisting of seventeen pieces of cannon, and actually possessed themselves of the whole of it; but it seems in the impetuosity of their charge they not only killed all the men belonging to the guns, but most of the horses, and unfortunately so cut the traces that in the end it was with difficulty they brought off two guns.

The noble conduct of the Russian soldiers in every instance is truly admirable, and the enthusiasm and energy in the interior of the country holds out a most encouraging prospect.

The new levies at St. Petersburg are already armed and in daily exercise.

I arrived here yesterday morning, having been joined by the Renard, Ariel, Censor, and Saumarez, and am now at anchor with twenty-six sail off the mouth of the Vistula bombarding the lower part of Danzig with considerable effect.

To-morrow I shall move over to the Heel of Danzig, but on consideration I have changed my original intention of making a permanent landing there, and adopted a plan which I think better

calculated to deceive the enemy and to keep them longer in ignorance of our weakness and in perplexity as to our views.

By landing the 400 Russian soldiers to keep possession of the Heel, as I mentioned in my letter of the 27th, it would soon be known to the inhabitants the nation they belong to, and that our object was merely to deceive ; but I now intend to follow my last address to the inhabitants with another of which I enclose a copy.

By landing a few hundred men first in the dress of the Russian soldiers, then in a uniform allowed to the Russian seamen, and afterwards the marines of the squadron to exercise at the extreme of the Heel for an hour or two on different days, I shall impress the natives with a belief that we are full of troops, and having taken most sure precaution against any possible communication between our people and the inhabitants, nothing can be collected to discover our object, and when I sail hence (which will be about the 10th inst.) I shall go in the night, that they may be ignorant of the course we take, and it may be thought we were only going to another part of the coast, or to join another division of the army.

The Briseis and another brig will go off Pillau this evening to lay down small buoys towards the harbour, and their boats are to be discovered, as if unintentionally, at daylight in the morning.

The Ariel with six transports will go down off Colberg and make a show of having troops on board ; but this cannot be done until I get over to the Heel, when we lie at too great a distance for the enemy to detect the absence of these vessels.

I cannot but feel sanguine in the expectations that this diversion will have all the success that can be desired, and if it draws back the troops that are marching towards Riga only for a fortnight, the

season will then be at hand which must make it difficult if not impracticable to carry on a siege.

I have the satisfaction to add that nothing was known at Riga of my destination, and even conjecture had not lighted upon the right object. General Emme, the Lieutenant-Governor and second in command, told my correspondent so late as the 29th that he believed I was gone to the neighbourhood of Abo to wait the issue of the conference and act accordingly.

I have had the account of Lord Wellington's glorious action (Salamanca) translated into the German language and copies sent in various directions by my correspondent at Riga. Bonaparte, fearful of the circulation of such intelligence, has strictly forbidden all communication by flags of truce.

I told you in a former letter that I should send the Renard off Memel disguised as a merchant vessel in order to obtain intelligence, and Captain Brine has just now joined me, after succeeding in getting a pilot off.

I enclose his report for your information.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

P.S.—It was said Bonaparte had made a move as if intending to take the road to St. Petersburg, but finding it produces no effect on the Russian army he had resumed his former position.

General Prince Kutusoff, the late Commander-in-Chief of the army serving against the Turks, is appointed Generalissimo of all the Russian armies, and is on his way to join the grand army.

Endorsed.—September 1. To Sir J. Saumarez. My proceedings in the rear of the French army

which were attended with complete success, and the Emperor told these operations saved Riga.

Orders for landing forces on the Heel.

A landing is about to be made on the Heel of Danzig by the Russian troops and English seamen and marines, and it is my most positive orders that no kind of insult or unfriendly treatment be offered to the inhabitants, or the slightest depredation committed on their property; they are not even to be induced to sell their stock if in the least contrary to their inclinations.

No doubt is entertained of the general orderly good conduct of those who will be landed, but lest there should be any individual so unmindful of the kindness that is due to the unoffending inhabitants I have thought right to give this public notice that any improper behaviour towards them will be treated as it may be found to deserve.

But, above all, if anyone should be found so base and unmanly as to offer the slightest injury or insult to any woman he may be assured that it will be followed by the most immediate and severe punishment that it is possible to inflict.

(Copy.)

T. B. M.

[Not dated, but about end of August.]

Proclamation.

Inhabitants of the Heel of Danzig.

Eight thousand men, the advance guard of a numerous army is arrived here, and will for a few days take possession of the Heel, but not the least molestation, insult, or inconvenience shall be offered to you. We shall soon go to the opposite shore, and

by driving the French from Danzig your country will be the first to feel the blessings of that new state of things which mighty powers are preparing for you.

T. B. M.
Rear-Admiral.

[Not dated, but about end of August.]

*PURPORT OF A LETTER FROM B. MARTIN
TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.*

Riga, 9 August. Admiral Martin reporting too great publicity given by Governor of Essen to plans for drawing over Spanish and Portuguese troops from the French army.

Victory, Hawke Road, 6 Sept.

Secretary Admiralty, Sir,—Herewith I enclose for the information of Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty a letter from Rear-Admiral Martin acquainting me with his having sailed from Riga with 430 troops whom his Excellency General Essen had directed to embark on board Russian vessels, with a frigate and two sloops of war belonging to the Emperor, and his Majesty's vessels of war therein mentioned, with the intention of making a diversion at the Heel of Danzig with the view of retarding the operations of the enemy in their attack on Riga, which General Essen thought would be attended with the best effects.

(Signed) J. SAUMAREZ.

Directions for placing the different ships, and instructions to the officers on anchoring in Danzig Bay.

Standing into Danzig Bay the whole of the ships will steer in towards the town and have men stand-

ing on their booms and in their boats so as to give the appearance of being full of troops.

It is very probable the whole of the ships may be anchored off the mouth of the Vistula, but this must depend on the weather and other circumstances, and if it is so intended the signal No. 18 will be made.

Such ships as have Swedish colours will hoist them in standing into the bay, and Russian colours are not to be shown, but those ships which have not Swedish or English flags must not show any.

The Orion, Amphitrite Russian frigate, the Meteor and Devastation bombs, two Russian brigs, and the Ariel will remain off Danzig, and Sir A. C. Dickson will direct soundings to be taken about the mouth of the river, and lay down a few flags. It will be necessary to ascertain particularly how near the bomb vessels can approach and the best position for bombarding the lower fort.

The bombs should have an anchor down three cables lengths without them to heave off in case of its coming to blow hard on the shore.

If there is any indication of blowing weather Sir A. C. Dickson will bring the squadron over to the Heel.

The rest of the ships, after being a day or two off Danzig, or possibly on their first going in, will anchor under the Heel, according to the plan which is herewith sent to each ship.

It will be necessary that the ships which are required to anchor near the shore should drop a bower anchor two or three cables lengths without them to ride by if the wind blows on the shore.

On anchoring under the Heel Captain Acklom will immediately land at the narrow part of the land marked B with such marines as may be sent to him from the Aboukir, and plant sentinels directly across the sand to prevent the escape of the town people

with intelligence. He will also have a party of men to cut down trees and throw them across the only road which there is, so as to make it impassable and thereby oblige an advancing enemy to pass along the beach under the fire of the ships. Captain Acklom will also throw up such works as may be necessary to defend the narrow part of the neck of land against the approach of the enemy.

Captain Acklom will direct every shore boat to be taken possession of and taken off to the Ranger until they can be taken up to the town, and put under a guard which will be appointed for that purpose.

Captain John Ross will have a party of carpenters, masons, and other people to fortify the half-built lighthouse, and having so done he will hold himself in readiness to join any seamen and marines which may be landed from the squadron.

The Russian troops will be landed at the point B as expeditiously as possible, and Admiral Martin will accompany them, to point out the position he wishes should be occupied.

The inhabitants of Heisternest¹ will be sent to the Heel village with their property, that their houses may be used by the troops, and to prevent the possibility of their going to the enemy.

The marines properly accoutred for service, and the small arm men with half pikes, pistols, and cutlass, will be in constant readiness to land. No foreigner, either marine or seaman, is to be of the party.

The most strict attention to be paid to the orders herewith issued respecting the conduct to be observed towards the inhabitants of the Heel.

(Copy.)

T. B. M.

Endorsed.—Landing at the Heel of Danzig. ↵

¹ A village close to the narrow part of the Heel of Danzig.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Victory, in Hawke Road,
6th September, 1812.

Sir—I have received your letter of the 27th ultimo with its several inclosures and informing me of your having sailed from Riga on the 21st with the squadron under your orders, accompanied by the Russian frigate *Amphitrite* and two sloops of war, together with a detachment of 430 soldiers, for the purpose of making a diversion at the Heel of Danzig in order to distract the enemy and retard their operations against Riga.

I have to inform you that I approve of your proceedings and the measures you have adopted with a view of drawing the enemy's attention from an attack upon Riga.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

JAMES SAUMAREZ.

Rear-Admiral Martin, &c. &c. &c.

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

[*Private and most secret.*] Victory, 9th September, 1812.

My dear Sir,—Lord Cathcart's messenger arrived at Gothenburg late yesterday evening, by whom I have received a despatch from his lordship, the purport of which you will read in my public letter. It appears that until the reinforcement of 20,000 troops can be collected it is intended to send those at Helsingfors to Riga when they will be returned in time to join the expedition from Sweden. I am as yet unapprised of its real object, but expect it will be communicated to me from Stockholm when it has been finally determined upon. In the meantime, should you find that your presence at Riga is

no longer required, I would wish you to repair to Hano Bay with such part of the force as can be spared from the services at Riga or on that part of the coast. The services of Captain Stewart and the officers under him may be particularly useful at Riga, but you will of course follow the wishes of General Essen respecting them.

I hope soon to receive accounts of the favourable result of your expedition. Mr. Thornton will not arrive at Stockholm before to-morrow—his slow journey on account of Mrs. T. occasions great murmuring among the Swedes; it is certainly unfortunate he should be so tardy at this important crisis. I remain ever, with the truest attachment,

My dear Sir,

Most faithfully yours,

JAMES SAUMAREZ.

ESSEN TO B. MARTIN.

Monsieur Admiral,—I have not sent you any news this some time past, not having anything of consequence to inform you of. I now hasten to acquaint you that we must not reckon upon any co-operation on the part of the Swedes, since even a part of our forces which were in Finland are coming over to this country. I suppose in consequence of this, Admiral, you will think proper to put a period to the expedition you projected, the illusion with which we flattered ourselves having completely vanished. I cannot send you any news of consequence from our grand army, except that at the termination of many affairs of little moment the enemy continue always to advance.

I have the honour, &c. &c. &c.,

ESSEN.

Riga, $\frac{29}{10}$ August
September 1812.

Rear-Admiral Martin.

B. MARTIN TO SIR J. SAUMAREZ.

Aboukir, 13th September, 1812.

Sir,—I have this instant had the honour to receive your secret and confidential letter of the 9th instant, which has reached me in time to prevent the disposition of the ships as mentioned in my letter of yesterday's date, and the moment the wind will permit, those named in the margin shall proceed to Hano Bay.

I shall myself go off Libau to meet the *Daphne* on her return from Riga, expecting a reply to a letter which I wrote to General Essen on the 8th instant, begging to know if he could suggest any plan for the good of the common cause, in which that part of your squadron under my command could be made useful.

I shall now abandon the plan of sending the *Ranger* and ten sail of transports to make a show off Colberg, conceiving that I may more effectually promote the interest of Russia by hastening the frigates and transports away to Sweaborg for the purpose of assisting in bringing over the troops to Riga, and I shall send the *Censor* to inform General Essen of what I have done, trusting it will only be anticipating his wishes.

I beg to acquaint you that four deserters (Dutch soldiers) came off to the *Aboukir* this evening, having escaped from Danzig yesterday afternoon; they inform me that the garrison is composed of 4,000 French soldiers, and 6,000 of other nations, including two battalions which have marched in from the neighbourhood of Königsberg since our appearance in the bay, which they describe as having excited the utmost consternation amongst the French, and from their accounts

(coupled with other intelligence) I trust that the feint is likely to prove completely successful, but this cannot yet be ascertained.

These deserters speak of a paper being read at the head of every regiment wherein it is stated that Bonaparte had gone in the dress of a Prussian General to reconnoitre the position of the Russian Army, and that he had been attacked and completely surrounded by the Cossacks and a regiment of cavalry, but that the unexampled bravery and fidelity of the Prussians, and particularly the Black Hussars, had extricated him from this perilous situation, though not until he had received a wound in the arm and the thigh.

The plausible way in which the Prussians are made to appear so conspicuous in this affair is, I am persuaded, void of truth, and intended to falsify (if he can) the prevailing opinion of the disaffection of the Prussians, and especially the regiment of Black Hussars, who were in the neighbourhood of Riga when I was there, and would have come over in a body had they not been suddenly removed on a detection of this intention.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient, humble servant,
B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

Sir James Saumarez, Bart., K.B. &c. &c. &c.

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN.

My dear Henry,—I have every reason to believe my coming here has had the *best possible* effect in drawing back the detachments which were going to the army.

Bonaparte has succeeded wonderfully well in persuading the folks on the Continent that Lord

Wellington's army was nearly annihilated at the Battle of Salamanca, but I have circulated some thousand of our Gazette in German to undeceive them.

Yours ever,
T. B. M.

14 September, 1812.

Endorsed.—Off Danzig.

Sir Henry Martin, Bart.,
26 Upper Harley Street,
Cavendish Square, London.

MÖLLER TO B. MARTIN.

Riga, $\frac{2}{14}$ September, 1812.

Sir,—I had the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of the 8th, and am extremely happy the officers of his Imperial Majesty's Navy under your command have behaved so much to your satisfaction, and shall certainly represent them to the consideration of the Admiralty.

Feeling it my duty, I must beg leave to report to your Excellency that the conduct of the captains and officers of his Britannic Majesty's Navy here has been in every respect highly commendable and as true Englishmen, much to their and country's honour, respected and esteemed by every one that had the good fortune to be associated with them in the common cause.

I am most particularly indebted to Captain Stewart for the friendly and useful assistance he continues to give me, and I feel extremely desirous to recommend him in the strongest terms to your particular and most favourable consideration. The high opinion I entertain of this excellent and respectable officer, whose zeal in promoting the interest of the common cause is truly exemplary, has induced

me to propose to the Governor-General Essen to entreat your Excellency to leave this experienced and useful officer at Riga.

I have the honour, &c. &c. &c.,

A. MÖLLER, Rear-Admiral.

Rear-Admiral Martin, &c. &c. &c.

ESSEN TO B. MARTIN

Sir,—Colonel Balabin has delivered to me the different letters you had the goodness to send by him, in which you were so kind to communicate to me a detail of the expedition with which you had charged yourself, which has given me infinite pleasure. The success it has had has already produced the most salutary effects and promises yet much more, particularly for the city of Riga.

Believe, Admiral, in my sincere felicitations as well as in expressing the grief I feel that I probably shall not again have the honour of seeing you here this year, the advanced season proving an obstacle; at all events I entreat you to be persuaded of the high esteem with which you have inspired me, and the memory of which will always be a source of infinite pleasure.

As you have left it at my own disposal to keep with me Captain Stewart and the other British naval officers who are now here, I take the liberty of profiting by it that I may have the benefit of their services during the remainder of this campaign.

As to the Russian vessels which are now with you, may I request you to send them to Riga and the other ports agreeable to the list herewith sent?

I have the honour, &c. &c. &c.,

ESSEN, Governor of Riga.

Riga, $\frac{2}{14}$ September, 1812.

Rear-Admiral Martin.

COL. BALABIN, A.D.C. TO TSAR, TO B. MARTIN.

Dear Admiral,—I arrived from Petersburg yesterday night. Your expedition upon Danzig pleased the Emperor extremely, and I am happy to see that it really has produced the desired effect. This pleasure is a little damped by the loss of the Unicorn, one of the transports, which in coming to Riga ran ashore on Domness, and they have no news to this day of the people that were on board of her. What is to be done? No pleasure without pain! I received the parcel and letter of the 16th inst. you had the kindness to send me. The letter I will carry to Petersburg myself if I shall go thither soon, if not I will send it. It will be a strong proof of the utility of the expedition. I had the honour to see Lord Cathcart, and I delivered to him your letter, in answer to which I send you the one here enclosed. Lord Tyrconnel with Mr. Wilson set off for the army the day before I arrived in town. There was no official news from the army since the 27th and 29th.¹ The battle of the 27th was most sanguinary; a short account of it, I hear, you have already. The news of the 29th was that Bonaparte, manœuvring, does all he can to get possession of Moscow; to thwart this his intention Prince Koutouzoff was obliged to retire a few versts towards that city. This was the last news when I quitted Petersburg. Let us hope for the best. Having all Europe almost upon our hands, it is not an easy matter to thrash them all.

His Imperial Majesty's general aide-de-camp, Count Lieven, is named ambassador to your Court. In about two weeks he will sail in a Russian frigate with his lady and family from Cronstadt to England. Be so good to remember me to Captain Brown, C. Acklom,

¹ Borodino (date old style).

and Pipon, and all the gentlemen of your ship, for the kind and cordial reception I experienced from them during all the time I had the pleasure to pass together. I wish you, dear Admiral, all kinds of prosperity and most fervently desire that you may get home safe and in good health for the joy of your family and all those who have the advantage to know you.

I am, dear Admiral, with the greatest respect,
Your most humble and most obedient servant,
P. BALABIN.

Riga, September $\frac{11}{23}$, 1812.

Endorsed.—From Col. Balabin, aide-de-camp to the Emperor Alexander, the officer sent by the Emperor to attend me during my co-operation with the Russian forces.

ESSEN, GOVERNOR OF RIGA.

Riga, le Septembre $\frac{2}{14}$ 1812.

Monsieur l'Amiral,—Permettes-moi d'ajouter celle-ci a la Lettre officielle que j'ai l'honneur d'adresser aujourd'hui a Votre Excellence. Elle a pour but le désir de pouvoir vous exprimer, Mr L'amiral, toute l'Entendue de mes sentimens de haute Estime et d'attachement pour vous. Je vous souhaite de tout mon cœur Santé, prospérité et Succes dans toutes vos Entreprises.

Ressouvenes-vous de moi de tems en tems s'il vous plait avec intérêt, et croies que ne vous oubliera jamais.

Monsieur l'amiral
de Votre Excellence le très humble, très
obéissant et dévoué Serviteur,
ESSEN, Gouverneur de Riga.

Monsieur le Général,—Ayant entendu que le Général Essen ne se trouve plus à Riga, Je prends la liberté de prier à Votre Excellence de vouloir bien être le moyen de communiquer au Ministre de sa Majesté Imperiale la réception des deux décorations de l'Ordre de St Wladimir transmises à moi pour les Captains Browne et Acklom.

Ces officiers ont reçu cette marque de l'approbation de leurs services par sa Majesté Imperiale, avec les Sentiments de Respêt et Reconnoissance qui sont dus à la condescendance gracieuse de sa Majesté; et Votre Excellence me permettra à ajouter, que je regarde cet honneur, rendu aux officiers immédiatement sous mes ordres, comme une grace personnelle, et comme une repetition de la Confiance flatteuse que sa Majesté ait bien voulu reposer dans le desir sincere de tous les Officiers Anglois de contribuer à la defense de Riga, et de promoter en toute maniere les Interêts de sa Majesté.

J'ai l'honneur d'être avec la plus grande Consideration

de Votre Excellence le très obeissant et très humble Serviteur,

T. B. M.

Endorsed.—My letter to General Essen on receiving the orders of St. Vladimir for the captains under my command.

LORD CATHCART, AMBASSADOR TO RUSSIA, TO BYAM MARTIN.

St. Petersburg, September $\frac{17}{6}$, 1812.

Sir,—I had the pleasure of receiving your letters of the 24th ulto. with their enclosures soon after my arrival at St. Petersburg.¹

¹ There are no copies of these letters.

The activity of your operations, and the zeal and attention for the important objects of general service of the war which have been manifested in your own reports and in those of the Russian Government have afforded the greatest satisfaction to all those who are employed in conducting his Majesty's service in the North.

The diversion which you projected towards Danzig, and which you have since executed, has evidently been productive of great annoyance to the enemy, and may have retarded the progress of his operations on the coast more than has yet been ascertained.

The intercourse with Stockholm is not expeditious enough to enable me to profit by your communications to Mr. Thornton.

I will be much obliged to you for any information you may think it worth while to communicate to me at this place, while you are on this station, by any conveyance that may fall within your reach.

The variety of alarms which you are occasioning on the south coast of the Baltic cannot but be most useful, and I agree with you in regretting that there have not been means of carrying on the same system upon a more extended scale.

I have the honour to be with great truth and regard, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servant,
CATHCART.

Vice-Admiral Martin, &c. &c. &c.

ESSEN TO B. MARTIN.

(Copy.)

Riga, 24th September, 1812.

Sir,—I have had the honour to receive to-day your despatch of the 12th of this month as well as

that of the 16th, and I hasten to present to you my very sincere thanks for the interesting news you have had the goodness to communicate to me.

The expedition to Danzig, which your Excellency has conducted with so much judgment, has been (as I had the honour to inform you in my letter of the 2nd of September) very advantageous to the interest of this country, and particularly to the city of Riga, in arresting the march of the enemy's troops which were advancing towards it, and I can never sufficiently repeat to you, Sir, that the judgment with which your measures were taken, and the zeal with which they were executed, has acquired you the gratitude of all those who wish success to the common cause. I have no positive news relative to the ultimate destination of the troops under Marshal Victor, and I am consequently ignorant if they continue to advance towards Riga. At any rate there is nothing now to fear for this city since the arrival of the body of men under Count Steinheil, who, adding to them a part of this garrison, began offensive operations the 14th of this month. We have every reason to expect the most brilliant success, and even the capture of the parks of artillery destined for the siege of Riga in the event of their being still this side the Niemen.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
ESSEN, Governor of Riga.

Rear-Admiral Martin.

CAPTAIN STEWART TO B. MARTIN.

(Copy.)

Riga, 24th September, 1812.

Sir,—I beg you will accept my best thanks for the letter you did me the honour to write to me on

the 17th, and I must again express my gratitude to you for your uncommon kindness in promoting my interests in the service, being assured that I am entirely indebted to your good offices for any representations Sir James Saumarez may be pleased to make to the Admiralty respecting the appointments here.

The entry of the French into Moscow is truly distressing, but everything may still be hoped for from the spirit of the people, whose hatred to the enemy increases with their misfortunes. Admiral Möller tells me that when the images were about being removed from the churches the people (for the nobles had left the town) prevented it and exclaimed, 'We will defend them with our lives.' Many marched out with what arms they could procure. The battle, it is said, took place eighteen versts from Moscow, and the town was set on fire by the inhabitants.

There has been a great deal of indecision here in planning the intended attack.¹ The Admiral has been so chagrined at finding little attention paid to many remonstrances he felt it his duty to make respecting the expedition, that at last he protested against many arrangements; but to-day the General has embraced him, and assured him he is much indebted to him for his advice and that he will comply with his wishes as far as possible. People here regret that General Essen goes out; he does not feel easy on account of Wittgenstein being put over his head, and being anxious to signalise himself he wrote to the Emperor requesting his permission to command in the expedition.

The letter which General York has sent to Alexander has given rise to many conjectures; his character is not good, and therefore he perhaps only intends to deceive.

¹ On the French in the vicinity of Mitau.

Admiral Möller regrets your absence very much, as he thinks General Essen would pay great attention to your opinions. He is excessively overbearing to the officers acting under him, but great hopes are entertained of General Steinheil's abilities. Tomorrow the troops take the Sacrament previous to their going out.

I have the honour to be, Sir, with the greatest respect,

Your much obliged and very humble servant,
(Signed) HEN. STEWART.

To Rear-Admiral Martin.

Plymouth, October 23, 1812.

Sir Henry Martin, Bart.

To forward to J. R. Bastard, Esq., Kittey.

FROM THE CONSUL, RIGA, TO B. MARTIN.

Riga, $\frac{1}{2}$ September, 1812.

Sir,—I was gratified by your favour from off Danzig, and hope the expedition may have kept the enemy yet a while in suspense there. The Governor had similar accounts of the result of the diversion, which seems to have spread the alarm as far as Mitau; so I hope it has proved important to the operations on the point of taking place from hence. About 10,000 men from Finland are already here, uncommonly fine-looking fellows, and in a couple of days the remainder are expected, making in all 15,000 to 17,000 men. These, and about 10,000 of the garrison, are to make the attempt, I believe on Sunday or Monday (in three or four days), on the enemy, who are 18,000 to 20,000 strong, it is said, consisting of Prussians and others; so that if the Russians are only tolerably well directed there is little doubt of the result, though the enemy have the advantage of

the ground. There is no certainty (though many rumours) how the attack is to be made, but one corps, I believe, is to cross the river above Kirchlom. After driving away the Prussians, it is understood the corps marches to join Wittgenstein, who in about ten days will also get 15,000 of the new levies, fine fellows and tolerably trained, with their muskets and their axe (a national instrument, now used as a weapon). So that Wittgenstein, having now about 20,000 men, will be strong. The Moldavian army has certainly joined Tormasoff, who is said to be about 80,000 strong, and was soon to be reinforced by about 12,000 more, under the Duke of Richelieu ; however, the enemy opposed to him is said to be still stronger.

Capt. Stewart will no doubt be able to say how the gunboats are to be employed. Unfortunately there will not be full 2,000 cavalry with the expedition, and I hear there is no riding artillery. It does not increase the confidence that the Governor commands the expedition. We hear that Colonel Balabin brought him a long letter written by the Emperor himself appointing him to the command. The second in command, General Steinheil, is well spoken of.

People seem to apprehend that the projected attack may be delayed, as General York has been parleying. Last evening he sent to desire an officer might come to receive an important communication, as is credibly reported, and that this proved to be a letter to the Emperor Alexander, which was immediately forwarded. This forenoon the Governor had a conference with York, of which nothing has yet transpired.¹ It is feared York is

¹ Comparing this account with Alison xvi. 104, it would appear York had contemplated the step he finally took on December 25th, some time beforehand and previous to news of any disaster having occurred to Napoleon.

manœuvring in order to gain time ; but we must hope the Governor will continue his plans, unless York gives proofs of a determination to join him, and that the Governor may make some such demand at the moment of commencing operations, if not sooner. Should the attack be delayed without something certain of this kind it will be unfortunate. I believe it will be represented to the Governor that it would be best to accelerate rather than protract the attack, and to send an hour before to desire an immediate answer if York would give a suitable pledge of joining the Russians, as nothing less could protract the operations, either in reason or in a military point of view. That matters do not go well at Moscow¹ is a further reason for acting decidedly, as, if the Prussians have made proposals, that might alter their intentions, considering the irresolution of the king, and that York is not to be trusted. Probably I may be able to say something respecting the communication at foot.

It is not known for certain whether heavy artillery has arrived for a siege, though reported, nor is it known where Victor is ; but it is believed Macdonald has gone with part of his corps to join the army opposed to Tormassoff. Oudinot is confidently said to have died of his wounds. We are told the Prussians oppress Courland much, and are sending great quantities of corn away, probably to the main army.

Admiral Möller regrets you are not here, as you could have favourably influenced the Governor, which is not easy for others.

That the victory said to have been gained by the Russians at Mozhaisk² was at best but of a dubious nature you will have heard. Probably the

¹ For the Russians.

² A battle fought after Borodino to enable the Russians to draw off their stores, wounded, &c., which they succeeded in doing.

French were repulsed, but, either from choice or desperation, made another attempt to reach Moscow by turning the Russian left wing. A bulletin of the 29th old style says the Russian army, in consequence of such a movement of the French, and of their own loss in generals, retreated towards Moscow, in order also to be reinforced by the new levies. It is said from a respectable quarter that a sanguinary battle was fought eighteen versts from Moscow, which was not favourable for the Russians, and that a very great body of men went from Moscow to support the army, the result whereof was not known, though it was rumoured that the French had pushed on to the capital, and that a part had been burnt. The wealthy classes had fled with their valuables, upon which the population had taken the defence upon themselves. How far this may be authentic time will show. I fear the main part is true. Gloomy as aspects are, I am nevertheless not apprehensive of the ultimate issue, if Government only do not make peace, and take proper measures to bring forward talent wherever found. In order to promote this end, it might be well to proclaim that everyone who protected and brought forward men of eminent public talents should partake of all their honours and rewards. This would give the nobles an interest in promoting talent, even not in their own body, and, with the pressure of the necessity, could not fail of having a desirable result. The population of Russia seems most patriotic, and to become more enthusiastic as the danger increases. If this be but profited by, Russia cannot be conquered; if not, the Government does not deserve to be saved. But I hope the population will feel their strength, and pronounce their feelings so as to prevent any negotiation.

25th. I can only hear that the Governor went

to meet York yesterday in consequence of a document of importance for the Emperor.¹ The expedition, however, does commence to-morrow. Luckily it has been ordered from Petersburg. I can say nothing of the plan of operations, because it seems not to be unalterably fixed. The frequent change of it, if a finesse, would have a good effect, as the public this time is in the dark about it. I believe nearly the whole corps will go in one body, which will obviate any part coming too late; and perhaps it will pass the river here, and go up the road towards Baukse. The Governor, it is to be hoped, will gain laurels, being piqued that Wittgenstein has been promoted from an inferior to a higher rank.

The Emperor has displayed true munificence towards the widow of Tiedeman. She is to receive as pension his full pay of 1,900 Prussian dollars, which is far more than could have been expected.

I beg respects to Mr. Cumming, who I suppose will accompany you home, and have the honour to be, with the utmost respect, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

A. GIBSON.

The day after to-morrow is the Emperor's coronation day.

York is said to have told the Governor Moscow was taken.²

The remainder troops from Reval will be here in three or four days, but probably so many more of the garrison will be taken.

Endorsed.—From Mr. Gibson, Consul.

¹ To Mitau.

² Improbable, as the French only entered it on the 14th inst.

MR. CUMMING, A RESIDENT IN RIGA, TO
B. MARTIN.

Riga, 7th October, 1812.

Sir,—I feel much obliged by your favour of the 30th past, and by the papers sent; and I hope you will find your lady recovered on your arrival.

Alas! I can reciprocate no agreeable political intelligence. The expedition from hence must not have been well managed, having completely failed. Probably the troops were too much divided, or they might have succeeded in capturing the Prussian battering artillery &c. consisting of above 100 pieces, which stood at Ruhenthal, about seven English miles from Bauske, towards Mitau, on the south side up the Aa river, had they dashed on thither with nearly their whole force at once, as they were within five miles of it when obliged to retreat; but the attack seems to have been neither well laid nor promptly executed (indeed the plan of it was frequently changed, and even after leaving the town, as I am told), and certain it is that the Russians were comparatively far too weak in cavalry, besides having no flying artillery. The Prussians were strong in both, and probably their whole force exceeded expectation, having got some reinforcements, besides having concentrated their whole corps.

The Russians in all were not much above 20,000, and the Prussians must have been as numerous. The Russians got to Bauske and Mitau, but their main corps on advancing its right wing and centre towards Ruhenthal (this is a ford in the Aa), the Prussians attacked the left wing, destined to defend another ford, with their whole body at six in the evening, and forced it back, not being properly supported, which obliged the re-

mainder of the Russians to retire ; upon the whole, the Russians may have lost about 2,000 men and the Prussians fully as many. Some magazines were destroyed at Bauske, and a good deal of stores &c. were found at Mitau, which, however, the Governor would not allow the Admiral¹ to interfere in bringing away, and all were left in the hurry of the retreat very soon after. The flotilla arrived first at Mitau and came away last, which the Admiral was obliged to do without orders, after waiting for them in vain some time ; however, they were received at the Boldera. This attempt affords another proof that not much good is to be expected here. It is fortunate, therefore, that the Finland troops have marched by the north bank of the Düna to join Wittgenstein, whom they will reach in about ten days. We may then hope for better things. The news from the grand army you will hear sooner direct than from hence. People have generally been alarmed by the occupation of Moscow by the French ; but the Emperor Alexander remains firm, and therefore I have no fears of the ultimate result. If it is true, as is said, that the Russian population has even set fire to Moscow I think no one can doubt that such people are not to be conquered, if their leader persevere. But there is a shocking want of management in the army. I have just had an opportunity to learn some facts in proof of this, which I shall state. They come from Lieutenant Colonel von Kotzebue (son of the author), an officer who distinguished himself much in the Austrian staff last war, and is on the staff of Wittgenstein, where he has been advanced from captain this war, besides receiving three military orders ; a most intelligent, steady young man. I, however, request the name may not be mentioned to any one, except

¹ Russian Admiral.

you wish to do it to Government if you judge the information may be desirable and that the knowledge of the channel satisfactory. The Lieutenant-Colonel means one day to write the history of the war. The facts may, I think, be relied on. I state them only generally from memory, though correctly as to the main thing.

When the French passed the Russian frontiers at Kowno, Wittgenstein was in the neighbourhood of Keiduny, and the French had advanced a considerable way before W. got notice of their movements, which was in a manner accidentally, as it had been omitted to apprise him of them from headquarters; so that had the French shown activity and intelligence (the want of bread, forage, salt, &c., no doubt in some degree impeded their motions) Wittgenstein's corps must have been separated from the main army and forced back, perhaps even upon Riga. Now W. was to form a junction with the main army, which required his marching over Vilkomir if possible. The French, instead of pushing direct for that place, and so thwarting his object, followed him with nearly equal force (about 25,000 men) by the circuitous route over Keiduny. The road from thence to Vilkomir had several defiles, formed by marshes and woods, with two or three small cross-roads more direct, by means of which the French might still have intercepted, and perhaps cut off a whole or part of Wittgenstein's corps; they, however, contented themselves by simply following its footsteps, by which it safely reached Vilkomir. The French marched in three divisions at a considerable intervening space; and the ground was favourable for W. sending back a corps about a league unperceived by a small circuit, and cutting off the advanced division of about 10,000 men while he turned upon and destroyed the

remainder of their corps. W. would fain have struck the blow ; but his hands were tied by positive orders to avoid every action, and only to retreat. Wittgenstein effected his junction with the main army before reaching Vidzy, I think unexpectedly to the army, apprehensive for his fate. Near Braslau the French had incautiously pushed forward one of their wings (the left I suppose), so as to enable W. from the nature of the ground to cut off a corps of near 30,000 men, by closing a narrow passage with his corps while the main army attacked it in front. The Count W.¹ rode to the Emperor and urged him to improve the opportunity, attended as it was with no danger, but every consideration yielded to the desire of reaching the fortified position near Drissa. This position had been chosen merely because the curve in the river made it look well on paper and certainly was favourable had the enemy been obliged to attack it ; but as it commanded no roads, nor in any way obstructed the enemy's advance, it was not considered that the enemy would not probably fight merely because the Russians wished it. The objection of no roads leading to it was removed by such having been made. However, the enemy preferred taking the old roads, and pursued his route along the Düna, while the Russians, in expectations he would come to them, never once attempted to molest his progress, which the ground was exceedingly favourable for doing. The position was soon obliged to be evacuated without having rendered the smallest advantage, except to the enemy, whose advance it in fact favoured. Upon the Russian grand army following that of the French, the corps of Wittgenstein was appointed to cover the road to Petersburg by Sebesch. When stationed between Druda

¹ Count Wittgenstein.

and Drissa, Oudinot's corps was known to be advancing in three divisions by information received and the smoke of the fires. Immediately upon the third division coming up, and its being certain no more troops were following, there was a fine opportunity to profit by the nature of the ground, to pass the river unperceived, gain a march, and attack the enemy before he was properly in order, who could thus have been cut up (as he was afterwards beaten), and then Macdonald's corps must have shared the same fate. The Count was most eager for the operation, but he dared not, having again received orders not to pass the river nor to lose sight of his immediate destination to cover the road to Sebesh. The corps of Oudinot might, indeed, have been forced to take that direction, but it would have been the more surely cut off at the battle of Polotzk, when the Russians had destroyed one column of the enemy by their artillery, and another by their cavalry, which at the same time took fifteen pieces of cannon. Had the Russian right wing under General Helftrecht done its duty a division of Bavarians and a number of French might have been cut off, instead of which Helftrecht retreated, by which the remainder of the Russian corps suffered a loss (I think of above 3,000 men), besides most of the captured cannon. Upon Helftrecht being called to account for doing so, he pleaded orders from Prince Jachevill (pronounced thus), General of artillery, and supported this by referring to the facts of his only *following* the artillery. Jachevill denied having given any such orders, and Wittgenstein was too good, as it is called, to bring both to a court-martial. The command was, however, taken from Helftrecht. Jachevill, being a prince and a man of influence, has protection against punishment, besides possessing the grand Russian desideratum

of personal bravery, which attaches Wittgenstein to him. But from error of judgment, if not from a worse cause, this prince has on frequent occasions been backward in assisting operations with artillery when most evidently necessary, whereby much loss has been sustained.

After Wittgenstein was more at liberty to act according to circumstances, he was prevented from making the most of opportunities to cross the river and attack the enemy from want of pontoons, which he in vain desired to be provided with. It was always replied, he might construct bridges, without its being considered that this would always give the enemy time to be prepared. Wittgenstein has never been able to get a sufficient number of cavalry, though much in want of this, and though it could have been spared from the main army. He has been most pressing for reinforcements of troops to enable him to destroy the corps opposed to him and to operate in the rear of the enemy's main army, or in favour of this city. In addition to troops sending him from Petersburg, Wittgenstein was to have received direct the 15,000 men from Finland, most of which, if not all, came hither (it is possible some went direct, as it was said only about 10,000 had arrived here). The order was given when it was recollected at Petersburg that General Steinheil (who has the Finland corps) would have the chief command, being senior to Wittgenstein. As this was disagreeable to the great party. Wittgenstein's bravery and success had raised in his favour, the Emperor, to avoid collision, instead of raising W. above S., by making him General of cavalry (as has been erroneously reported), altered that most important plan of operations by ordering Steinheil hither in the first instance. By this some precious time has been lost, though no doubt it has drawn

troops of the enemy from other quarters, and it is to be hoped before Steinheil arrives with Wittgenstein the latter will have been advanced. Facts like those (which your experience will have fully corroborated) have no doubt occurred with all the corps of the Russian Army, and they account for the hitherto unfortunate issue of the Russian operations notwithstanding the wonderful bravery of the troops. The lieut.-colonel said the orders of Barclay de Tolly were below all criticism, and if followed Wittgenstein would not have had a man left. The Lieut.-Colonel v. K[otzebue] perfectly agrees that in the Russian *arm* alone, not in the *head*, can confidence be reposed. He, with most of his brother officers on the staff of W., though otherwise so fortunately situated, are heartily sick of the service, exposed as they continually are to the envy and cabal of the unintelligent Russians, seeing mere noble birth take so much the place of merit, there being anything like system, only in intrigue and corruption. The lieut.-colonel and his comrades are able only to swim against the stream by holding fast together (being mostly so called German-Russians or Germans), and boldly opposing whatever is wrong. The officers and men are much attached to him,¹ as well from his public as private qualities; but much of his success arises from the talent of his staff. In all Wittgenstein has made about 10,000 prisoners since opposed to Oudinot's (now St. Cyr's) corps, and got about 2,000 deserters. That corps, particularly the Bavarians, suffers much from the dysentery, though in a great measure only of a slight degree, and has been reduced to one third of its original strength or to about 20,000 combatants. The lieutenant-colonel assures me that upon the whole the French army has sustained immense losses from want of bread and

¹ Wittgenstein, I presume.

salt (as well as forage) owing to the exhausted state of Poland; and the measures taken, upon the Russians retreating, to deprive them of supplies; of butchers' meat there was no want. It was very different in Lithuania, he said, than in Courland, where the Prussians found plenty at least of grain. In this view the lieut.-colonel thinks it well the Russian army advanced to the borders, though it did not make a stand there; but he admits it would have had a better appearance had the Emperor established head quarters at Vitepsk or a town on the Duna. It seems that Winzingerode let an opportunity escape to strike a great blow in conjunction with Wittgenstein. He had been detached towards Vitepsk, with about 15,000 men, probably to operate in the rear of Bonaparte, if defeated at Smolensk. The Emperor sent him orders to join Wittgenstein, when Oudinot's corps would have been overpowered and the whole could have operated against Bonaparte or elsewhere with increased effect; but Winzingerode preferred returning to the main army, having no orders from Barclay de Tolly to act otherwise, without considering the advantage the whole would very soon have reaped from his overlooking this want of form—a circumstance which argues against any claim Winzingerode may have for genius. In addition to the *facts* before stated, Lieut.-Colonel Kotzebue mentioned some circumstances which did not come within his own knowledge but which he heard from others, who stated them as true. On the retreat General Pahlen sustained the attack of the French army at Vitepsk for two days, with only two divisions, and only got reinforcements by battalions, though the whole Russian army was close by. The town of Vitepsk was thrice taken and lost by the Russians, who were of course forced to fall back. The battle of Smolensk was

contrary to plans, and occasioned by Bagration refusing to retreat till ordered the third time. This system of retrograde movements had broken the fine spirits of the army. Kutusoff restored it by acquainting the general officers, upon his assuming the command, that for his part he was determined the enemy should only get to Moscow over his corpse. He asked their sentiments and received a reply to the same purport. The battle of Mozhaisk¹ completed the restoration of confidence. The Russians had decidedly the advantage. The French were in full retreat at twelve o'clock ; but the only benefit the Russians drew from it was to commence theirs an hour after. By the best information the French army was much dispersed, and had hardly 10,000 men in a body ; while the Russian centre and right wing were entire. This shows the great inferiority in the Russians, with respect to system : they are unable to follow up a victory, at least not with sufficient promptness, nor for the requisite length of time, and, it seems, rather retreat upon their resources than expose themselves to confusion and want. But it also proves a want of genius, which would consider how much the spirit of any army gains by advancing and loses by retreat. But notwithstanding every disadvantage arising from the want of head, Lieut.-Colonel K. agrees in the general opinion that if the Russian army be but employed with vigour and perseverance the situation of Bonaparte is most perilous in the heart of a hostile population, so far from home, and exposed to the sickness and privations inseparable from the roads and bad weather close at hand. A general plan has indeed been resolved upon, and is

¹ Between the Russian rear-guard and French rear-guard, September 8th, the day after Borodino ; the Russians held their ground long enough to enable the main army to retreat with all their stores &c. and wounded.

already begun to be executed, for entirely cutting off Bonaparte from his resources, and perhaps destroying him. It is probably in unison with this plan that Moscow has been evacuated for the present, as it could not well have been defended from within, being chiefly of wood, and it is only to be hoped that the resources may have been previously removed, as Kutusoff states. In the view to that general operation, it is also intended to increase Wittgenstein's army to 60 or 70,000 strong. Tormasoff seems to have been worsted, from his having retreated to Lutzk, and it's being said he is superseded and is to be brought to a court-martial. He is well known here, but as nothing more than a brave man. Some of the papers received from you have been distributed at Friedrichstadt, as well as in this neighbourhood, and Lieut.-Colonel K. has taken the rest with him for the same purpose. He has promised also to distribute all that General Dornberg may hereafter send him, which I have mentioned to the latter. The lieut.-colonel has the best opportunity to do this, being generally at the outposts. I wonder if the drawing the Russian troops from Finland hither, instead of leaving them at the disposal of Sweden, stops the departure of the armament from thence; at least General Nock, who commands one division, and was to have gone to Germany upon the Crown Prince desiring it, has received a letter from him to come, which of course cannot now be done until the Russians have altered the destination of these troops without previous arrangement with the Crown Prince. It would, at least, be quite in style.

Yesterday's post brings the news of a considerable and advantageous affair of outposts between the grand armies, and an important address of the Emperor Alexander to the Russians, wherein he

talks of supporting every misfortune rather than make a disgraceful peace. May he continue firm to this resolve, and Europe is saved.

I fear to have written too long a letter, and therefore conclude by shortly but truly subscribing myself with great respect,

Your most obedient,

[Signature torn off where letter was sealed.]

Riga, 26 September.

9 October.

I hear it is only the buildings round the Kremlin, a kind of fort in the centre of Moscow, that Bonaparte has been burning, for the sake of its defence. It is said General Lewis was not displeased at the expedition having failed, and is rejoiced at Steinheil's being gone, as he now plays the first fiddle under the Governor, and in fact leads him, though there is neither ability or harmony in the band.

Plympton, November 3, 1812.

Sir Henry Martin, Bart.

Upper Harley Street, London.

Endorsed.—This is a letter I received from my correspondent at Riga, and sent it to Mr. Bastard.

Aboukir Downs, October 12th, 1812.

My dear Henry,—The distressing account which I received of poor Kitty¹ before I left the Baltic has quite unhinged me, and I therefore begged Mr. Smith to write to you. I am just sending on shore to beg the telegraph may ask for leave for

¹ His wife.

me to proceed to Plymouth by land and the ship to follow.

You some time since inquired about my first opening the communication at Riga and the story of the Governor refusing to receive the officer I sent in his uniform, which was true, as you will see by the enclosed extract of a letter from Captain Acklom, whom I employed on the occasion. He is an excellent, intelligent officer.¹

Yours,
T. B. M.

Mr. Smith wrote to you by my desire, but the letter is missing with three others. I am going on to Plymouth to-night. Harley Street, Tuesday.

Endorsed.—Letter from Captain Acklom about flag of truce I sent in.

Sir Henry Martin, Bart.
Lockinge, Near Wantage, Berks.

*LORD CATHCART, $\frac{18}{30}$ SEPTEMBER, TO
LORD CASTELREAGH.*

My Lord,—Having had the honour this day to dine with his Imperial Majesty, the Emperor sent for me after dinner and was pleased to say :

That although the present position of the principal armies certainly could not portend any immediate danger to St. Petersburg, yet undoubtedly it had been and was still incumbent on him to consider measures of precaution in case of accident or untoward event.

That, determined as his Majesty is to persevere in the contest to the utmost extent of the resources

¹ See p. 196.

of his empire, a calamity at St. Petersburg such as has befallen Moscow would be a wound and mortification, but that neither the apprehension or the result of such adverse fortune would in any degree either abate or shake this resolution, and that the circumstances he was about to mention would afford an unequivocal proof of his fixed determination and of his confidence in Great Britain.

The subject to which he was about to advert was the security of his navy.

He did not rely on either Cronstadt or Sweaborg affording sufficient protection. 'That under all the circumstances of the case he could not help being of opinion that the most eligible situation for the fleet during the winter months might be in the ports of Great Britain; he desired to be informed whether it occurred to me there would be any objection on the part of his Majesty's Government to such a distribution of the Imperial Navy.' [Lord Cathcart, looking at the lateness of the season and the importance of communicating with his Government, took it on himself to assent to the measure, but could not say how it would be distributed.]

'His Imperial Majesty stated it was not his wish that the force should be inactive, but on the contrary that it should be employed in co-operation with the British navy as should be deemed by the Government of Great Britain to be most advantageous to the general interest.'

[Directions were given accordingly, and Sir James Saumarez gave orders to Rear-Admiral Martin to assist the passage through the Belt.]

B. MARTIN TO SIR H. MARTIN.

Plymouth : October 26, 1812.

My dear Henry,—My time has been much occupied on entering on my new office,¹ and yet I have done but little in the way of arranging matters so as to make them go on conveniently for myself and advantageously for the service ; with this preface I shall proceed to excuse myself for not having written to you since I reached Plymouth ; but having nothing material to communicate I thought I would wait at least for a frank to cover my letter.

I sent you some letters on Saturday which I received the preceding post from Riga. I had others corroborating the accounts they contained, and also one from the Emperor's aide-de-camp full of pretty expressions. I must not omit to mention a second letter from General Essen (besides the one I sent you) which accompanied the decorations of the Order of St. Vladimir for Captains Acklom and Browne in consequence of my having recommended their service to the Emperor's notice.

I say nothing to you about northern politics after sending you my letters ; but I have always been decidedly of opinion that if the Emperor has courage to persevere there is the best prospect of ultimate success ; and the determined resolution of the people, and their bitter hatred of the French, seems to make it more dangerous for the Emperor to listen to any pacific overtures than go on with the war. The worst thing I see in this view of the question is the continued influence of Romanzoff, who is French to the back bone, so much so that it will not surprise me any day to hear that the fellow is murdered by some patriotic Russian. The

¹ Second in command at Plymouth.

Russian army at this moment is perhaps the finest in the world, and properly directed are sufficient, in force and courage, to destroy every wretch Bonaparte has collected at Moscow, and to trace him by his stink from one end of the Continent to the other.

I have no good opinion of the Swedes; but Messrs. Thornton and Saumarez think differently. Had Bernadotte been cordially disposed to assist Prussia, there was in the summer many such opportunities as will never occur again, and so I told Mr. Thornton at the time.

I spoke my opinion without reserve to Lord Melville during the few hours I was in London; and also to Lord Liverpool, who sent for me. Their reception of me was more flattering than I could have expected under any circumstances, and I am sure more than I deserved; I took advantage of such a moment of sunshine and favour to ask Lord Melville to promote Mr. Smith, telling him I should regard it as a great personal kindness to me, and I understood my request would be attended to; but in this I now suspect I was mistaken, or in the hurry of his lordship's troubles about the Edinburgh election it has been forgotten.

Yours affectionately,

T. B. MARTIN.

I have to trouble you with two or three commissions when you go to London.

Plymouth, October 25th, 1812.

Sir Henry Martin, Bart., J. P. Bastard, Esq.,
Lockinge, Wantage, Berks.

Endorsed.—October 1812, after my return from Baltic 1812. [See postmark.]

SIR J. SAUMAREZ TO B. MARTIN.

Oxford: 29th November, 1812.

My dear Sir,—I received with the greatest pleasure your letter of the 25th yesterday morning. As I will own to you, anxious as I have ever been to preserve your esteem and favourable opinion, it was a disappointment to me not to hear from you upon your arrival in England, or since my return from the station. It has made me happy to find that you are in good health, and I trust Mrs. Martin is much recovered from her late indisposition.

You will probably have heard that my late command has ceased. The order to strike my flag was accompanied by a letter from the Admiralty marked in the strongest terms of the approval of the board, as also of his Majesty's Government for my conduct on the various points connected with the station. It has also afforded me the highest gratification to find that your services have been so highly appreciated by Lord Melville, and that they have been so justly considered by the Emperor of Russia, as the official letter¹ I transmitted to you from Lord Cathcart so amply testifies. I can truly say that I have ever felt happy in doing justice to the zealous exertions and to your abilities and judgment upon all occasions, but particularly in the defence of Riga when closely invested by the enemy, and it will ever be to me a source of the highest satisfaction that I had it in my power to select you for that important service.

The Victory is ordered to be paid off. Our friend Dumaresq informs [me he] is desirous to pass some time with his family before he is again employed. I know no one more truly deserving than he is, and I hope his merits will be justly appreciated

¹ Not seen.

at the Admiralty. I am here on my way to Cheltenham, where I propose to remain till January 7. Lady Saumarez unites in best compliments to Mrs. Martin and yourself. I remain with sincere attachment,

Most faithfully and truly yours,

J. SAUMAREZ.

My son desires his kind remembrance. He is in expectation of being ordained at Christmas.

Rear-Admiral Martin, &c. &c. &c.,
Kitley, Devon.

[There is no correspondence, private or public, in the Byam Martin papers in 1813 until September. During that year he was second in command at Plymouth, probably engaged in carrying out the executive duty of the port under the Commander-in-Chief, and consequently the duty of supplies for the north coast of Spain came directly under him, as is evident from Lord Wellington's letter to him of September 2, acknowledging the receipt of one of August 27.¹ The earlier letters from February 2 to August 31 are necessary to elucidate Rear-Admiral Byam Martin's mission to Lord Wellington's headquarters and how admirably he succeeded in disabusing his mind as to want of naval co-operation and of placing the relations between the two services on a proper footing. The letters from September 2 to September 21 are highly instructive as showing in how short a time this important service was carried out, and, as is always the case where clear-headed naval and military leaders meet in council, both determined to reconcile differences in their respective modes of working, and do their utmost, not for the benefit of their own particular branch, but for that of the public service.]

¹ See p. 353.

COLONEL BUNBURY, UNDER SECRETARY AT WAR, TO J. W. CROKER, SECRETARY OF ADMIRALTY.

[Enclosed in the following letter, p. 317.]

War Department, February 12, 1813.

Sir,—I am directed by Earl Bathurst to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a letter received this day from the Marquess of Wellington, together with an intercepted despatch addressed by General Thouvenot to the Duc de Feltre ; and I am to request that you will lay these papers immediately before Viscount Melville and request his particular attention to the earnest wish expressed by Lord Wellington, that the naval operations upon the north coast of Spain may be commenced as soon as the season will possibly admit, and to the importance which his lordship attaches to the possession of Santoña.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) H. E. BUNBURY.

J. W. Croker, Esq.

WELLINGTON TO LORD BATHURST, SECRETARY AT WAR.

Frenada, January 27, 1813.

My dear Lord,—I enclose the copy of an intercepted letter which has recently come into my hands which deserves attention. You see what General Thouvenot says of the blockade of Santoña. I earnestly hope that your operations upon the northern coast will be commenced as soon as ever the season will permit, and I hope that we may be able to get hold of that important port.

Ever, &c.,

(Signed) WELLINGTON.

To Earl Bathurst.

Victoria, le 26 Octobre 1812

Monseigneur,—J'ai l'honneur d'adresser ci-joint à votre Excellence l'extrait des Rapports qui me sont parvenus aujourd'hui.

L'Escadre Angloise a entièrement disparu de la vue du cotes du 4^{me} gouvernement ; mais l'occupation de Bilbao, Cartio, et Santander par les Ennemis empêcheront probablement pendant l'hiver toute communication par mer avec Santana.

Quelques Chaloupes ou Trincadours isolés pourront bien passer de nuit ; mais je doute qu'on puisse introduire dans cette place aucun fort convoi de vivres et de munitions.

Cependant la conservation de Santana doit constamment fixer l'attention pour que cette place ne soit pas obligée de se rendre faute de vivres et de munitions. Les mois s'écoulent vite, et au retour de la croisière angloise au Printems prochain, cette place importante seroit compromise si d'ici à cette Epoque on n'y introduisoit pas des vivres.

J'ai constamment réclamé l'occupation de la côte de marial à empêcher toute communication par mer entre les croisières et les bandes ; c'est alors seulement qu'on pourra commencer à améliorer notre position dans le 4^{me} gouvernement et parvenir successivement à la destruction de l'Ennemi.

Je suis &c.

(Signed) BN. THOUVENOT.

Au Duc de Feltre.
[Minister of War.]

*LORD MELVILLE, FIRST LORD OF ADMIRALTY,
TO LORD KEITH, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
CHANNEL SQUADRON.*

[*Secret.*]

Admiralty, March 4, 1813.

My dear Lord,—I enclose for your lordship's confidential information a copy of a letter lately received from Colonel Bunbury with its enclosures. I have stated to Lord Bathurst in reply, that you would of course employ as heretofore a sufficient force on the north coast of Spain to assist our allies and co-operate with Lord Wellington if he moved in that direction,¹ which squadron might even be increased beyond its former amount if found necessary; but that, as the corps of marines were destined for the American coast, the naval co-operation on the coast of Spain must be confined to the ships only.

Do you propose to employ Sir George Collier to superintend that service if his health is equal to it?

I have the honour to remain,

Your lordship's very faithful and obedient
servant,

(Signed) MELVILLE.

To Admiral Lord Keith, &c. &c. &c.

KEITH TO MELVILLE.

[*Secret.*]

Plymouth Dock, 13 March, 1813.

My Lord,—In further reply to your lordship's confidential communication of the 4th instant, I have had the honour to enclose an abstract of the official reports that have been transmitted to the Admiralty

¹ Apparently Admiralty had had no information of Wellington's future movements. Vittoria was fought June 21, and San Sebastian invested on the 29th, a rapidity of advance that could not have been foreseen.

since the marine battalions were withdrawn from the north coast of Spain.

By a reference to these returns your lordship will observe that Sir Home Popham did not quit Santander until the end of December,¹ and I therefore cannot understand the expression in General Thouvenot's letter from Vittoria of the 26th of October, wherein he states that 'L'Escadre Anglaise a entierement disparu de la vue des Cotes du quatme. Gouvernement.'

The Medusa, Iris, Surveillante, Fancy, Sparrow, and Lyra have been employed on the coast during the winter, and have generally approached as close to it as the weather would permit.

Sir George R. Collier will sail immediately to relieve Captain Bouverie in the command of the squadron, and a copy of the instructions by which he is to be guided will be found in the letter No. 19, mentioned in the enclosed abstract.

To these instructions I beg to call your lordship's attention, and I am not aware that I can at present make any addition thereto, other than to direct Sir George Collier as the season improves to take up a position along the coast from Cape Peñas to Arcachon nearer to the shore, and to keep up a constant communication with the Guerilla chiefs and to afford them all the countenance and support in his power.

The Arrow schooner had sailed from Basque Roads before I returned to Plymouth, but I have sent the Fancy hired cutter off Cape Machichaco until the Royalist is ready to go there.

I am, &c.,
(Signed) KEITH, Admiral.

Abstract of despatches transmitted to the

¹ (1812).

Admiralty by Admiral Lord Keith relative to the service on the north coast of Spain.

Enclosing the final despatch of Captain Sir H. Popham, who received orders on the 13th December to return to England, and arrived at Spithead on the 31st December.

Reporting the arrival of the Iris troop ships and marines.

Enclosing copies of new instructions for the senior officer on the north coast of Spain.

Encloses letters from Captain Bouverie dated the 30th December and 8th January, the former reporting the Fairy and Sparrow to be stationed off Santoña, and that fortress to be closely blockaded by land, and the latter containing intelligence that the enemy relieved Santoña by land on the 6th January without any opposition from the Spanish troops, but that no succours had been thrown in by sea.

Enclosing letters from Captain Bouverie dated the 12th and 20th January, reporting his proceedings, and stating that the enemy had not approached Santander.

Captain Bouverie states that the enemy continues in the neighbourhood of Santoña, which place they had provisioned for four months.

Extracts. No. 1.

Lord Keith wishes every attention to be paid to the points of Santoña and Castro as directed by Sir H. Popham, who directs a frigate to remain constantly in Santander, but his lordship thinks it unsafe to sanction any ship continuing there, as they repeatedly ground and drift in getting out in bad weather and particular winds; so that the advance of the French army would hazard their safety. His lordship sends instructions of this date to Captain

Bouverie for guidance of senior officer, recommends frequent but cautious communication with Santander and the Spanish chiefs, notices five French frigates being at sea and expected to return home in six weeks or two months, by which time the frigates under Captain Bouverie are to cruise two and two if the number admit, and to attend to this point in due time to intercept them.

The general orders under this date are to assist Spanish authorities, blockade the ports and places on the coast, protect the trade, and cut off enemy's supplies. To communicate frequently with Colonel Bourke at Corunna, to keep the ships constantly cruising along the coast from Peñas to Arcachon to prevent supplies and annoy the enemy's trade. Place two frigates to cruise fifty leagues from Cordouan lighthouse.

All vessels calling at Corunna with despatches to return with any Colonel Bourke may have to send, although there may not be any from Lord Wellington.

Repeats that five French frigates are at sea which will probably return in a month and desires the frigates under his lordship's orders would cruise two and two to intercept.

Directs that as the season of the year will soon permit the squadron to approach nearer the shore than during the winter, to take a position from Cape Peñas to Arcachon and consider it a primary object to keep up a communication with the Guerilla chiefs and afford them support.

Approves of his (Sir G. Collier) sending the *Lyra* to Lisbon for specie according to request from Colonel Bourke; and states the enemy's frigates to have arrived at St. Malo and therefore to attend to directions contained in letter of 13th of March.

In reply to Sir G. C.'s representation that the squadron in the vicinity of Castro and Bilboa would

be advantageous to General Mendizabel and other Guerillas, his lordship refers to his letters of the 13th March and 5th instant respecting the assistance to be afforded them, and Sir George to confine his operations principally to that service, cruising for the annoyance of the enemy's trade due north of Castro as far as 45°, when the more important duties on the coast will permit.

Desires that, instead of the directions contained in letters of 13th of March and 5th and 19th instant, to be guided by enclosed additional instructions (these instructions are not given to me¹). His lordship adds that it is necessary the *Iris* should return home to replenish and call at Corunna for convoy; directs the *Royalist* to be sent to replace the *Iris* and *Constant* to follow Sir George's orders after seeing a victualler to Corunna, which places the squadron at Sir G. Collier's disposal as under: *Surveillante*, *Sparrow*, *Lyra*, *Royalist*, *Constant*.

Acknowledges Sir G. Collier's letters of 20th and 21st June, stating the rapid success and advance of Lord Wellington's army, approves of the *Constant* being despatched with the intelligence, and directs his doing so either when Lord Wellington or the public service requires it. His lordship states that he has no small vessels to send to Sir George, but states that the *Briton* and *Dispatch* are stationed off the *Gironde*, and encloses an order directing the cutter to join Sir G., to be made use of if he requires her services and has the means of forwarding it.

Acknowledges letters of 10th May and 11th June, transmitting copies of correspondence with Marquis Wellington relative to protection required for the coast. His lordship states that he had already authorised Sir G. to take the *Dispatch* under his orders, and that the *Sparrow* was also

¹ Byam Martin.

directed to rejoin him as soon as he had landed Captain Fremantle and completed provision &c., and promises another small vessel whenever his lordship has them at his disposal to protect the coast as far as Cape Finisterre and to carry on the necessary duties : and now sends the *Fancy* for keeping up a communication. At this period Lord K. had under his orders only eight frigates, six sloops, five small vessels.

Acknowledges Sir George's letter of 14th ult. by the way of Plymouth. In reply to Sir George's inquiries respecting fishing boats at Santoña being allowed to pursue their avocations, his lordship says, as the enemy cannot escape by land, he is to prevent their doing so by sea, and use his best endeavours to prevent supplies of every description.

His lordship states that he had ordered the *Sparrow* to join as soon as she had completed her supplies, and as he had directed the *Arrow* to follow Sir George's orders he was at liberty to send the *Dispatch* to Plymouth to refit when she can bespared.

Acknowledges Sir George's letters of the 29th and 30th June, and 1st, 2nd, 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th July ; his lordship notices that Sir George has already the *Surveillante*, *Dispatch*, *Constant*, *Arrow*, *Sparrow* under his orders, the latter of which his lordship has reason to believe is on her way to rejoin Sir G. direct from Plymouth ; and his lordship says he has submitted to the consideration of the Admiralty Sir George's urgent application for six gun-boats and more small vessels for the particular services mentioned in Sir George's letter No. 30. His lordship approves of Sir George's exertions in general in executing the service entrusted to him, and recommends his continuing to afford every assistance in promoting the operations of the army, taking care to act at the same time with such discretion and professional

skill as not to occasion the loss upon the coast in the bight of the bay of any vessels under Sir George's orders, and to be guarded against surprise of an enemy. His lordship states the formidable force of the enemy's ships in the different French ports mostly ready for sea.

Communicates the approval of the Admiralty of his lordship's orders not to permit the fishing boats at Santoña to pursue their avocations; and adds the surprise of the Admiralty that a blockaded place like Santoña should ever have been permitted to receive supplies. Says he has sent the Fancy cutter, but she is not to be detained longer than for apprising Lord W. of the opportunity of sending letters to England.

Observes with regret the imminent danger of the squadron and its loss of anchors and cables on the 19th, laments he has not others to replace them until joined by some of the frigates from Plymouth, but intends to despatch the first that joins.

Acknowledges Sir George's letters giving an account of his proceedings from the 11th to 13th inst.; mentions also that the Admiralty had ordered the Juniper, Speculator, and Nimble to join Sir George and six gun-boats. His lordship recommends that after a sufficient number have been appropriated for the service of St. Sebastian, the remainder to be spread along the coast for general annoyance.

States, being that moment joined by the Andromache from Plymouth, that he sends by the Révolutionnaire the stores, &c., after delivery of which she is to rejoin his lordship without a moment's loss of time. Authorises Sir George to avail himself of the services of any small vessels which happen to go there, owing to his lordship's inability to send any more small vessels.

Alludes to a letter from Colonel Bourke to

Colonel Bunbury complaining of want of convoy. His lordship states that he had informed the Admiralty no such application had ever reached him, and is sure Sir George would have given it if applied to. Recommends a good look out for a privateer.

Lord K. acknowledges letter of No. 37 to 39 with account of proceedings before St. Sebastian from the 23rd to the 31st of August, expresses satisfaction at the good conduct of the officers and seamen employed at the batteries, and also at the zeal and cordiality with which Sir George seconds the operations of the army. Notices having called the attention of the Admiralty to Sir George's suggestion that vessels coming from Lisbon should call at Santander to take empty transports, and the pressing want of the army for battering artillery, and that he had applied to the Admiralty to supply the place of men killed and wounded on board the *Surveillante*.

Lord K. acknowledges letters Nos. 41 and 42 with account of proceedings from 4th to 7th inst., that he had transmitted copies to the Admiralty, and at the same time called their attention to the great want of powder and shot for the siege of St. Sebastian, and requesting them to hasten a victualler for the use of the navy. Approves of the means Sir G. had adopted for preventing supplies being thrown into St. Sebastian, and that Sir G. should by every opportunity transmit a return to him showing the manner in which the several ships and vessels were stationed on the coast. After taking out the powder and shot from the *Révolutionnaire*, to despatch her in execution of the enclosed order, and unless the service on the north coast of Spain should absolutely require the services of the *President*, to send her to him, first taking out of her such provisions, &c., as she can spare and as the

squadron could replace. 'I am apprehensive that the heavy surf which generally prevails at St. Sebastian, and the scarp of the works towards the sea, afford but little encouragement to an attack being made from the ships' boats or otherwise; but if you are of opinion that such an attack is practicable, or that a demonstration thereof in concert with the army will be conducive to the surrender of the place, I leave to your judgment the propriety of undertaking it, feeling confident that you will exercise the soundest discretion, and not wantonly and unnecessarily incur either the loss of men or ships. In case this measure should be adopted, you may avail yourself of the services of the *President* and *Révolutionnaire* in addition to that of the different sloops and small vessels under your orders, provided it will not subject the said frigates to any considerable detention.' If further supply of shot and powder wanted, to apply to Sir H. Neale for such as can be spared from the first ship of the line that may be ordered into port.

P.S.—'You will observe by the enclosed order that the captain of the *Révolutionnaire* is to communicate with you when he arrives off Bordeaux if the movements of the enemy's ships render it necessary.'

Sparrow being directed to follow Sir George's orders. He is to employ her while the operations are going on before St. Sebastian for preventing supplies from being conveyed coastways to that place from Bayonne, or in such other manner as she may be most useful.

With copy of letter from the Admiralty approving of Sir George's cordial and judicious co-operation with the army, and of the zeal and gallantry of the officers and seamen of the squadron, and with copy of another letter from the Admiralty that a pension

of 20*l.* per annum is settled upon the widow of Ignacio de Iberrcron, the Spanish pilot whose claims were highly recommended.

With copy of an 'Instruction' from the Admiralty, to which Sir George was to pay strict attention when he had occasion to send important intelligence to England. Also with a copy of a letter containing intelligence respecting the American frigate, *President*, and to cause the most diligent look-out to be kept, and send back the *Fancy* without a moment's delay, as Lord K. has no other means of keeping up a communication with the different stations.

That upon his arrival in Cawsand Bay on the day before found two gun-boats that Sir George had applied for had been forwarded to the north coast of Spain under the protection of the *Challenger*; and having ordered Captain Harris of the *Belle Poule* to take charge of three others to St. Sebastian, Sir George is directed to despatch him off Brest agreeably to his orders with the least possible detention. To employ them to the best advantage and cause every care to be taken of them, and as Lord K. thinks trincadors will be found preferable if properly equipped and rowed by the Spanish boatmen, who are acquainted with the coast, recommends Sir George's obtaining some of that description.

That on the 15th inst. Lord K. directed *Ajax* to make her appearance off St. Sebastian and the Cordouan lighthouse for the purpose of overawing the enemy and preventing Sir George's operations being disturbed by a superior force; and that as it appeared by the enclosed copy of a letter addressed by the Secretary of the Admiralty to Sir H. Neale in Basque Roads that their lordships had authorised the Rear-Admiral, upon a requisition being made to

him either by Lord Wellington or Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham, to detach two sail of the line off St. Sebastian, to assist in the siege, Lord K. recommends Sir G. to act in the most cordial manner with the captains of the said ships. He is to deliver to the senior captain of the said ships the enclosed order which was left open for his perusal.

Magicienne having been directed by the Admiralty to convey some specie to Santander and then to join you (Sir G.), he is to deliver to her captain enclosed orders, and when he could spare her to send her off Brest, and to observe that it is the express directions of the Admiralty that the frigates are not on any account to be sent away from the north coast of Spain (except the Belle Poule) until Sir G. is of opinion that they are no longer necessary there.

Gun-boats not being ready for the Belle Poule, that the Reindeer would take them as soon as possible. Speculator sent to apprise Sir G. of this, as well as to keep up a communication. Crews of these gun-boats to be victualled and supplied with necessaries from the Surveillante until further orders, that Speculator directed to accompany Reindeer and assist the gun-boats.

August 28, 1813, Keith to Collier.—Transmitting extracts of a letter from Lord Wellington to Lord Bathurst of the 11th inst., and one from him (Lord K.) to the Admiralty in reply. To pay the strictest attention to what is therein pointed out, as well as to the wishes of Lord W. in every respect as far as might be. That Lord K. would apprise the senior officer off the Gironde of Lord W.'s wishes, and direct him to use his utmost endeavours to prevent the intercourse between Bayonne and Bordeaux by coasting vessels, and that Sir George should give

similar directions to the *Révolutionnaire*, also acquainting Sir George that the enemy had then in the Gironde the *Regulus* 74, *Pallas* 38, and one other large frigate which escaped from Basque Roads on the 12th, therefore to guard against surprise. Also to detach the *President* to return to England, acquainting Lord Wellington thereof. Also to take every opportunity of apprising Lord W. of the state of the ships under Sir G.'s orders, and make a return of provisions in depôt in time to make application for further supplies.

August 28, 1813, Keith to Collier.—Acknowledging receipt of letter No. 45 dated 18th inst. reporting occurrences, and that Lord K. had called the attention of the Admiralty to Sir George's suggestion that the transports ordered to the coast of Spain may not be of such large tonnage. That Lord K. had requested to know of the Admiralty whether it was their pleasure that Sir George should be authorised to avail himself of the services of vessels arriving from Portsmouth and Plymouth by ordering them to return with convoys to England, or if he must provide such convoys from the vessels employed under his immediate orders for the duties upon the coast. With respect to the propriety of anchoring in Passages during the bad weather which might shortly be expected, Lord K. leaves it to Sir G.'s experience and prudence the best course to be adopted, recommending him to consult the best Spanish pilots and make himself and the officers under his orders well acquainted with the port in case he was compelled by necessity to have recourse to it. That *Andromache* ordered to join Sir G. instead of the *President*, and recommending his taking such provisions out of the latter ship as could be spared.

August 31, 1813, Keith to Collier.—Acknowledg-

ing receipts of letters Nos. 46, 47, 49, containing account of proceedings to 23rd inst. reporting the disposition of the vessels under your orders, and transmitting an extract of a letter from Lord Wellington to Earl Bathurst complaining of the inadequacy of the naval force on the north coast of Spain for the services to be performed. That same transmitted to the Admiralty. Lord K. adds: 'While the observations you have made upon the subject above mentioned, and upon the different points referred to in the said letter, will enable their lordships to judge of the propriety of increasing the force under your orders, I think it right to remark that I have constantly given that service the preference, and left in other stations fewer vessels than either their lordships' orders or even prudence demanded, and that the state of the crews of the line-of-battle ships under my command will not permit any men being detached from them for the purpose of being employed in clearing and removing stores from transports.'

September 2, 1813, Keith to Collier.—That the Lords of the Admiralty had directed him to give Sir George orders to avail himself of the services of the vessels arriving upon his station from Portsmouth or Plymouth, by ordering them to return with convoy to England, that he was so to avail himself accordingly.

Acknowledging despatches 51 and 52. To take the *Cydnus* under his command and deliver to her captain the accompanying order.

August 22, 1813, Keith to the Senior Captain of any line-of-battle ships detached off St. Sebastian from Basque Roads.—Recommending (in addition to Sir H. Neale's directions for his guidance off St. Sebastian) that ships of the line do not anchor off that place unless thought necessary by Lord

Wellington and Sir T. Graham, or unless it can be done with safety; but in general that they be kept under way at a reasonable distance from St. Sebastian to intimidate the enemy and to give protection to the operations of the siege and to the small cruisers employed in cutting off supplies. To pay attention to the weather, and avail himself of the local knowledge of Sir G. Collier that ships of the line might not be caught on a lee shore. To report frequently, and when service off St. Sebastian is at an end or his presence dispensed with to return to Basque Roads.

August 29, 1813, Keith to Sir Thos. Staines.—In consequence of Lord Wellington's representations of the great importance of preventing intercourse between Bayonne and Bordeaux, that the enemy's difficulties in obtaining supplies might be increased as much as possible, Lord K. directs him to use his utmost endeavours to prevent it as far as can be done with safety to his Majesty's ships and consider it as an act of primary importance. Lord K. adds he had applied to the Admiralty for two good cutters for this service, but that they might not have them at their disposal.

August 30, 1813, Lord Keith to Sir T. Staines.—Leaving it to Sir Thomas's discretion to continue on his present station or not according to circumstances, the situation of the enemy's force and the service requiring attention. That if Sir Thos. is obliged to return to Plymouth, he is to leave proper instructions with Captain Harris.

August 30, 1813, Lord Keith to Sir H. Neale.—That Captain Otway considered it absolutely necessary to remain off St. Sebastian in consequence of a letter from the Marquis of Wellington to Sir T. Graham, and therefore acquainting Sir Harry that the Abercrombie would sail from

Cawsand Bay on the 5th and the Clarence on the 9th of September, or as soon after as wind and weather would permit, for the purpose of rendering the squadron more complete in provisions, &c., and of relieving other ships. To detain the Belle Poule as short a time as possible. Enclosing the present disposition of the squadron.

August 25, 1813.—Letter from Mr. Croker to Lord Keith enclosing extract of one from Lord Wellington to Lord Bathurst dated 11th August, respecting the necessity for ships of war being employed on the north coast of Spain for military purposes solely.

Extract from Packet No. 1.

J. W. CROKER TO LORD KEITH.

Admiralty Office, 21st May, 1813.

My Lord,—Having laid before my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your lordship's letter of the 19th inst., stating the orders which you have given to Captain Sir G. Collier, senior officer on the north coast of Spain; I am commanded by their lordships to signify their direction to you (instead of the orders above referred to) to appropriate an adequate squadron to be exclusively employed along the coast of Spain from Cape Finisterre to the French territory for the purposes of protecting our communications and intercepting those of the enemy, of co-operating actively with the Guerillas, and of acting in communication with the Marquis of Wellington in every way that can facilitate his lordship's operations.

Your lordship is to direct the senior officer to acquaint the Marquis of Wellington with the orders

which he may receive from you to the foregoing effect.

I have the honour to be, &c.

J. W. CROKER.

Admiral Lord Keith.

[Secret.]

By Lord Keith, K.B. &c.

Additional Instruction for Captain Sir George Collier, of his Majesty's ship Surveillante or the Senior Officers for the time being of his Majesty's ships and vessels on the north coast of Spain.

The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having been pleased to direct that an adequate squadron should be exclusively employed along the coast of Spain from Cape Finisterre to the French territory for the purposes of protecting our communications and intercepting those of the enemy, of co-operating actively with the Guerillas, and of acting in communication with the Marquis of Wellington in every way that can facilitate his lordship's operations.

You are to pay the strictest regard and attention to these directions by constantly employing for these specific purposes the vessels placed under your orders, acquainting the Marquis of Wellington with the directions which you have received and reporting your proceedings from time to time to me.

Given on board the Superb in Cawsand Bay the 24th May, 1813.

(Signed) KEITH, Admiral.

By command of the Admiral.

(Countersigned) JAMES MEEK, Secretary.

*Extract of a secret and confidential Letter from
Admiral Lord Keith, K.B., to J. W. Croker,
Esquire, dated 23 June, 1813.*

[*Secret.*]

The enemy has twelve sail of the line besides the *Jemappe* in perfect readiness for sea and fifteen frigates, besides smaller vessels, either ready or in great forwardness in the different ports and rivers above mentioned, and the force at present employed under my orders for watching that of the enemy, for cooperating with Lord Wellington and the Spanish authorities on the north coast of Spain, for annoying the enemy's trade, and for keeping up the different reliefs, after allowing each ship and vessel a reasonable time in port to replenish, consists only of fourteen sail of the line, eight frigates, six sloops, two gun brigs, one schooner, and two hired cutters—in all thirty-three sail, of which at the present moment eleven are either in port or on their way there to refit, and the remainder at sea on the different stations assigned them.

The variety of objects to which my attention is directed by the several instructions which I have received will clearly show that it will not be possible even if circumstances require it to carry their lordships' present orders into complete effect unless by withdrawing small vessels from the north coast of Spain, or the *Hotspur*, *Briton*, and *Dispatch*, from off the *Loire* and *Gironde*, and this I feel unwilling to do without their lordships' sanction.

(Signed) KEITH, Admiral.

J. W. Croker, Esq.

KEITH TO WELLINGTON.

Queen Charlotte, in Douarnenez Bay, 3 July, 1813.

My Lord,—I have only this day received by way of Corunna and Plymouth a despatch from Captain Sir Geo. Collier, of his Majesty's ship *Surveillante*, enclosing a copy of your lordship's letter to him of the 6th of May.

I beg to state that previously to any movement on the part of your lordship's army I had ordered H.M. frigate *Surveillante* and the following sloops of war—Iris, Lyra, Sparrow, Royalist, Constant—for the service on the coast of Spain, but I am sorry to add that from necessity or some other cause the number of vessels of that description under my command has been so reduced that I am no longer enabled to fulfil the duty pointed out in my instructions, no part of which is so near my heart as that of co-operating effectually with the army under your lordship's command.

The object of your lordship's letter had not escaped my attention, for it is so highly important that I have in various shapes brought it under the notice of my superiors, but I am sorry to say, from the want of ships for other services, without effect. I shall continue, however, to solicit more small vessels, and I have in the mean time placed under the orders of Sir George R. Collier all that I can spare.

To watch and protect the coast as far south as Cape Finisterre would be my duty, and under particular circumstances I might go further if I had the means, but in doing so I should in some degree intrude upon the command of Admiral Martin, which is not only a subject of delicacy towards him but of danger to the service, because it would furnish

a pretext for officers so inclined and thereby disappoint the views and derange the plans of their Commander-in-Chief.

I am happy to say that the army victuallers sailed from Plymouth some time back, as well as one laden with supplies for the navy, which of course are at your lordship's disposal if you require them.

I took the despatches out of the *Constant* and forwarded them to England, and sent her back to the coast without an hour's delay, and I forward this by the cutter which is attached to the squadron merely for the purpose of keeping up an intercourse with the public offices.

Captain Sir G. Collier has directions to facilitate by every possible means your lordship's operations, and it will give me the highest satisfaction to know that himself and the officers under his orders render useful service to your lordship's army.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) KEITH, Admiral.

To the Marquis of Wellington.

SIR G. COLLIER, SENIOR OFFICER, NORTH COAST OF SPAIN, TO LORD KEITH.

Off St. Sebastian, July 13, 1813.

My Lord,—The *Mackerel* came here yesterday evening from Santander and England, and as I am requested by Lord Wellington to send her back with a Colonel Townsend, of the army, charged with despatches, I shall do so the moment that officer comes off. Lord Wellington came to this place yesterday, and having put things in train for the siege, goes off early to-morrow morning, over the mountains by the Puerto de Maya, I believe to-

wards Pamplona, to make a movement towards the enemy's left in case he should be inclined to intercept the operations connected with the siege. His lordship informed me he had written to England to request an additional number of small cruisers as well as frigates; the former, I think, are principally wanted. Your lordship will learn with pleasure that affairs in the southern coast are again recovering. Lord Wm. Bentinck was to be at Valencia on the 10th. General Ellis was there on the 6th. Suchet had fallen back, leaving a strong garrison of 2,000 men in the fortress immediately connected with the city.

It is impossible to say what turn affairs here may take. I have therefore been anxious not to choke the harbour of Passages with ships which can lay elsewhere. I understand from Sir Thomas Graham that the convent may be attacked within the twenty-four hours. It is intended to burn it with hot shot, a measure which will ultimately succeed, but I think from its appearance it will take some time. The breach in the town walls cannot take up much time, whatever the storming may. I have got a clear spot of ground for my anchorage and have just sighted my anchor, without observing the cable the least injured, but I do not intend any other vessel shall do the same thing. It is uncertain if Lord Wellington returns before the conclusion, but as he is the very life of the business I hope he may. The provision transports have arrived most opportunely, and Lieutenant Dunlop who brought them on to Santander, with my men who had been to England in some of our prizes, showed great zeal in hoisting a pennant on board the finest brig and bringing them in under his convoy. I write this in case the Mackerel should not fall in with your lordship in her way across, but only with one of your cruisers.

I have the honour to be, my lord, with great respect, though in too much haste to appear respectful, your lordship's most obedient and obliged servant,

GEORGE R. COLLIER.

Admiral Lord Keith.

I should have said that the remains of the French General Gazan's head division has been completely chased across the Pyrenees before Lord Wellington left him. The division under Longa had been very active on this occasion. Gazan disputed all the passes with obstinacy, and at the Puerto de Maya had collected three divisions. I do not know if I mentioned this in my letter by Fancy, but it shows the enemy have not willingly retreated.

Extract of a secret and confidential Letter from Admiral Lord Keith, K.B., to J. W. Croker, Esq., dated 15 July, 1813.

[Secret.]

I have received your letter of the 10th inst. acquainting me that all the American frigates are at sea¹ and signifying their lordships' directions to me, as it is not improbable that they may endeavour to get into a French port, to order the blockading ships to be vigilant, and, where I have two ships together, to take care that they are directed to keep in company.

The only frigates under my command that are at sea are the Surveillante attending to the service on the north coast of Spain, the Briton watching the Gironde, the Hotspur off the Loire, and the

¹ Adding very greatly to the naval difficulties, as it was now well known most of the American frigates were superior to ours.

Pyramus and Révolutionnaire attached to this squadron.

If they appear on the coast of Spain and fall in with any of the convoys laden with supplies for Lord Wellington's army, they may do considerable mischief; but I have not the means of increasing the force on that coast nor of stationing a ship of the line off the Penmarks for the purpose of preventing their entry into L'Orient in case they proceed there.

The Briton having been at sea since the end of February, I have given a discretion to Captain Sir T. Staines to return to Plymouth to replenish when the state of his ship and crew requires it, leaving the Royalist alone to watch the Gironde.

(Signed) KEITH, Admiral.

To J. W. Croker, Esq.

[*Secret.*]

Extract of a Letter from Admiral Lord Keith, K.B., to J. W. Croker, Esq., dated 16 July, 1813.

I yesterday reported to you in my letter No. 375 the intelligence gained by the Honourable Captain Percy of the Hotspur that nine frigates and three corvettes are ready to sail from Brest manned with the best men that could be picked from the line-of-battle ships.

If this information is correct—which I see no reason to doubt, because it is the precise number of frigates that there are in Brest—the enemy may have one of two objects.

1st. That of driving away the small vessels lying off the bar harbours, and protecting the convoys and communications on the north coast of Spain.

In my correspondence within the last month I have brought before their lordships the state of the enemy's force in the different ports within the limits of my command and that employed under my immediate orders, and in referring thereto I beg to observe that, although I am under the greatest anxiety at this moment lest the enemy by a superior force should obstruct Captain Sir George R. Collier in his co-operation with the army before St. Sebastian—a danger to which he is not only exposed from Brest but from L'Orient, the Gironde, and the Loire, in each of the two former of which places there is a line-of-battle ship and a frigate, besides smaller vessels, and in the latter three frigates whose state of preparation is not accurately known—I should not feel myself authorised under the directions contained in your letters of the 8th of February, 17th of March, and 24th April last to detach a ship of the line for a short time, even though I had one at my disposal, either off the Gironde to watch the *Regulus* or to protect the force employed under Captain Sir George Collier during the continuance of the present operations.

(Signed) KEITH, Admiral.

To J. W. Croker, Esq.

*PRIVATE LETTERS FROM SIR GEORGE COLLIER
TO ADMIRAL LORD KEITH.*

Monday morning, July 19, 1813,
Surveillante, off St. Sebastian.

My Lord,—I had the honour of your lordship's private communication by the *Arrow*; the *Sparrow*, as you will observe by my public report, arrived at same time. I find Lord Wellington so anxious about the blockade of this port, and so fearful that if there is not the appearance of many cruisers off it that

the enemy will take advantage and slip over to St. Jean de Luz or Hendaya, when driven to the last extremity, that I have not yet ventured to detach the Dispatch, as I hardly know how to spare the services of either of the other brigs, for as we cannot anchor very close to the shore the boats are obliged to lie out all the night, and the two small vessels Arrow and Sylvia while here are kept ready to protect them. I understand the garrison are more annoyed and more fearful from this circumstance than of the batteries now on the eve of opening. Indeed, if your lordship had a dozen small craft to spare just now, they would be most useful. The Constant is off the Bidassoa River. I sent her with the appearance of easterly wind to watch St. Jean de Luz. I know the enemy have boats of all kinds ready to steal in, and that the French are exerting every nerve to make an attempt to relieve the garrison, and send them ammunition. I fear all that is valuable at St. Sebastian is off. There are some trincadors and small things in the Mole still, which I yesterday saw from the lighthouse. I have been requested to send a carronade up there ; one or two will be sent, for the enemy have now fortified (that is, entrenched) the little island of St. Clara. But I am convinced, had an engineer officer gone up there, the necessity of one or two long guns would have been manifest, and I fear, before they evacuate the citadel or surrender, this will have to be done. It is the most commanding situation possible. I have reconnoitred the back of the dock, and give up all idea of its being stormed that way, unless indeed a sweeping battery be thrown up near the lighthouse, whenever a boat off ;¹ the last and only remaining gun (24-pounder) to be sent will be

¹ Whenever a boat can lay off it (the lighthouse) is probably the meaning of the sentence.

on shore, and I hope to-night, in its berth. I have had a request to send men to act as artillery men; from the increased number of the guns, forty 24-pounders, besides howitzers, mortars, and two 64-pound carronades, upon the sandhills of Chosse (according to Fefino) they are much wanted. I have had a request for 100, but have only been able to send about sixty; indeed, I see we shall have to do something at the lighthouse. I ought sooner to have said that the Dispatch is cruising off Santoña, where I think she may pick up one of three or four schooners said confidently to be coming from Bilbao in the end of this or the beginning of next month. They are only fish vessels, I believe, but at Bilbao even these turn out to good account. All French schooners from America are in the habit of pushing for Santoña in the first instance, though perhaps as they will receive the intelligence of events upon this coast very soon it may cease; but my opinion is that half the Americans bound to France will make this coast, as affording protection from the many small ports it has, and the care with which they may then coast it along. I think the case of the Brothers is very hard upon me, as well as the master. She is now made a Spanish brig of war. Nothing but a hard squall prevented me sending my boats on the instant into the Bidassoa, and when I sent one soon after I found a Spanish officer had taken possession of her because she had hoisted French colours, which was done to invite protection from the French, not knowing the Spaniards were so far advanced; her case would have been nearly similar to the Eliza's. The affair has been referred by Lord Wellington to the Spanish Government, but my opinion is, if ever she becomes merchant's property she may be seized by any British man-of-war falling in with her, as the Spaniards can scarcely legally

condemn, and as a captured English vessel, sound and in good condition, she can hardly be permitted to be condemned, in a Spanish port when that same permission is refused to British cruisers. I have not heard any of the particulars of the storming of the redoubt and convent yesterday. It was done in a most gallant style. I believe principally by Guards and Portuguese, but they overstepped their orders and pushed on after the enemy too far, by which I fear many more lives were lost than was necessary. To-morrow morning, I believe, the breaching batteries will certainly open.

COLLIER TO KEITH.

Surveillante, July 22nd, 1813.

As I received a letter stating the division of the army was short of artillery men, I consented to make up a small detachment of men—equal with officers and men to about sixty. I went on shore to arrange with the General the footing upon which these men were to be on, and as it became dark with an extreme bad night before I could return, I was obliged to stay on shore. I made an attempt to gain the ship next day, but the sea was too high, and in the night the occurrences occurred which I have thought right to detail in a public letter,¹ and as we are much in want of cables I hope your lordship will order some frigate to run down and spare me *one* as soon as possible. The breaching batteries (in which the Surveillante's officers and men have always been) opened on the 20th, and fired with very good effect; the Lyra's and Sparrow's men are in a 4-gun battery on a hill, which enfilades a battery on the east end of the rock. The General and superior officers are much pleased with their general

¹ Probably a cable parted: hemp at that period.

good conduct and expertness as artillery men. As the enemy's fire has slackened a good deal, I am in hopes we shall not have any more accidents. A second breach is to be effected before the storm is attempted, and two or three other attacks will be made at the same time by escalade. A feint will probably be made from the sea, but no landing can be attempted, as the surf against the rocks is so very violent.

It is considered by Sir Thomas Graham possible to make the attempt within the twenty-four hours. I think it may be somewhat delayed. I am fearful to detain the Sabina, as her orders appear positive as to her immediate return, but I shall avail myself of the opportunity to forward the king's messenger and my public letters by her. I hope your lordship will excuse the hurried manner in which I write, and I have the honour to remain, with great respect, my lord,

Your lordship's

Most obedient and obliged servant,

GEORGE R. COLLIER.

P.S.—Friday morning. The Sylvia cutter in sight from the masthead. I shall despatch her with the first intelligence of importance, and I shall direct her commander to make the Saintes. I fear that, though the town may be taken, the business will not be over, as my opinion is that the citadel and rock will hold out. The Lieutenant of the Sylvia is just now on board, and he reports his being all but lost in the gale.

TO CAPTAIN OTWAY.

[*Secret.*]

By Lord Keith, K.B. &c. &c. &c.

Whereas it is highly important in the present state of affairs that no obstruction should be given

by the enemy to the operations carrying on before St. Sebastian by Captain Sir George Collier of his Majesty's ship *Surveillante* in concert with the army under the Marquis of Wellington; and whereas it is expedient that a ship of the line should make her appearance off St. Sebastian and the Cordouan lighthouse, as well for the purpose of preventing the operations above-mentioned from being disturbed as for overawing the enemy's line-of-battle ships in the Gironde; you are therefore hereby required and directed, notwithstanding my order of this date for proceeding direct to Basque Roads, to make the best of your way off St. Sebastian for the purpose above-mentioned, and, after making your appearance there and ascertaining that no enemy's frigates or ships of the line have attempted to obstruct the said operations, you are, without interfering with the service entrusted to the direction of Sir G. Collier, to repair with all expedition off the Gironde for the purpose of intimidating the *Regulus*, French ship of the line generally at anchor near the Cordouan lighthouse, and having availed yourself of the earliest movement that wind and weather will permit of ascertaining that she remains at her usual anchorage, you are to make the best of your way to Basque Roads, and follow the orders of Rear-Admiral Sir Harry Neale for your further guidance, reporting your observations and proceedings to me through him.

Given on board the *Queen Charlotte*

in Douarnenez Bay, 15 August, 1813.

(Signed) KEITH, Admiral.

To R. W. Otway, Esq., Captain of H.M.S. *Ajax*.

By command of the Admiral.

(Countersigned) JAMES MEEK, Secretary.

COLLIER TO KEITH.

August 23rd, 1813.

My Lord,—I should have sent off Lord Wellington's letter to your lordship the moment I received it, but from accident the schooner was sent to the eastward by Captain Otway in chase of a sail, which he was not aware of was the Sparrow. I have to offer your lordship many thanks for your letters, and for the anchor and bower cable, with other stores, your lordship has been so good as to send. I have felt it necessary to send your lordship the copy of an extract of a letter from Lord Wellington to the Secretary of State, complaining much of the want of naval co-operation. I at the same time received a very friendly private letter, but as I do not know how his lordship's public one may affect me in your mind, I have considered it proper to give a reply to some parts which I consider over-stretched and the colouring much heightened. In the commencement there were difficulties; but these have been conquered, and the transports have of late been cleared without the assistance of the working parties, generally composed of Portuguese, who, being scarcely fed by their commissariat, cannot be presumed to work hard. Where there is such an army of Spaniards and Portuguese, a hundred or two as a working party to the transports would appear not a great reduction. Notwithstanding my opinion and admiration for everything coming from Lord Wellington, I must still maintain my opinion that this is no anchorage for a ship of the line, as at the most critical time the ship must cut or slip, and when the swell has once set in this becomes impracticable. One frigate might push in, if in day, for Passages and succeed; more would not, and the chances are

against ships of the line. Captain Otway in one calm day was, I believe, satisfied as to the anchorage. We have uncommon fine weather lately, and I *hope* it may continue, for there is no saying how long the siege may last. I consider the batteries may be ready on the 26th, and not by to-morrow as reported ; that the Horn Works and curtain in front of the town, which are to be destroyed, will take five days ; and that then it will be necessary to advance by the old rules of art, which will perhaps employ as many more days. That the whole town, unless burnt, will now present a series of fortifications to be reduced, and that, after all, the possession of the island Sta. Clara will be essential (before the castle can be attacked). Indeed, I think a 24-pounder upon it would be more useful as a blockade to the port than all the frigates under your lordship's command. Gun-boats are, however, much wanted, and will be even after the fall of St. Sebastian, the Spanish boats being of little use. But in spite of all, a boat carrying only two or three hands can steal along the space of a quarter of a mile without interruption of a dark night, and then she is in safety, for she is Spanish, her crew are Spanish, and the Alcaldi will declare they are good honest people. I cannot conceive anything more easy than such a communication to be kept up, and it is notorious that signals have been frequently made on this side the river separating St. Sebastian (Eumea) and that they have been regularly answered from the castle ; and the object, I consider, has been on these occasions to say that the coast is clear, or that a friend has passed over and not to fire. For as the river is fordable, and a path or passage for one man kept on the breach, nothing can be more easy of a dark night at low water ; therefore the circumstance of letters and despatches being sent cannot be matter of surprise.

The Sparrow is usefully stationed from the Bidassoa, by St. Jean de Luz, and on to Bayonne, with orders in doubtful weather to take an offing. After the Révolutionnaire had done her business with me, I gave Captain Woollcombe your lordship's orders; but as there were some transports which had put back, I requested Captain Woollcombe would see them into Bilbao and Santander, where he intended getting his water completed. Since this I have desired he will look in here. My opinion is that no more than one large vessel should be here about the equinox, although it is very possible we may have fine weather, having previously experienced so much bad.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) GEORGE R. COLLIER.

I cannot close this without observing on the handsome way in which Captain Otway has declined any interference in the direction of the transports or squadron and service in general. The weather is fine, and I pray it may continue.

Admiral Lord Keith.

FROM COLLIER TO LORD MELVILLE.

Passages, 23 August 1813.

My Lord,—Having had occasion to refer to Lord Wellington, respecting his wish for the services of the Révolutionnaire and President immediately before St. Sebastian, his lordship in answer gave me an extract of his letter to Earl Bathurst, which, as it would go by the Santander packet, must, ere this does, reach your lordship. I have thought proper to enclose a copy of it to Lord Keith, and upon some of the paragraphs I have presumed to offer my sentiments and statements, as I consider his lordship

has made his report in some degree upon the opinion of other officers. I hope I shall not be found to have erred in so doing.

I will not take up so much of your lordship's time as I did of Lord Keith's, but I conceive it necessary to put your lordship in possession of some of the statements made by myself.

The want of a convoy to Lisbon has only existed until a few ships were collected at one port, for which I have made Santander the rendezvous, as the safest and most central now that Santoña is blockaded by land, and so soon as ten or eleven transports were collected a small man-of-war was ordered to give them convoy to Lisbon. In the interim the *Freija* was expected from thence, and I considered it best she should return with as many as were ready and cleared belonging to the division of the *Tagus*. The *Freija* is said to be in sight off Santander, and will, I hope, take with her all the empty Lisbon transports.

Your lordship must be aware that if the whole Channel fleet were here it would not be practicable to send off every transport singly.

With respect to naval blockade, there was a string of armed boats every night the weather will permit within pistol shot of the batteries, as can be vouched for by the officers commanding the boats, and since the *Ajax* has been here Captain Otway has even considered them too close for their safety. But your lordship will readily conceive that where all the Spaniards of a town are decidedly French, that a letter can be conveyed by land as easily as by water, though I do believe that small boats in certain weather have escaped the vigilance of ours; but these have certainly carried nothing but a few eggs and fowls with letters. There are constant signals kept up at night from the walls of St. Sebastian,

with the hills over the batteries on the sands. May not their signals be intended to prepare the garrison to receive a courier then fording the little river east of St. Sebastian?

As to the want of seamen as a working party on board the transports, that no longer exists, as the number of them has so increased, and the whole of the artillery ones being ordered to remain that these vessels can now furnish a daily proportion.

In all countries the native boats are generally more convenient than those belonging to men-of-war. At first these were scarce, having been secreted, but of late I have heard of no complaint of the want of water transport.

The wharfs, being only three in number, are generally crowded, but these can only be approached just at high water by men-of-war boats; they have to pass over a mud flat, dry at half tide, so that the flat boats of the country are the best calculated for this harbour. They carry three or four 24-pounders at a trip, and pass over the shoal ground.

If a ship of the line can spare 100 men they would certainly be useful, but to do this she ought to be at anchor, and the coast is such that I have no hesitation in saying east of Bermeo the risk is greater than the good which could result. The *Ajax* in one day nearly lost her anchor, and there was little wind.

The *Surveillante* has lost two. If the *Ajax* had been here during our heavy gale, I affirm she must have been lost unless she could have run into Passages, which night prevented the *Surveillante* from attempting. The description of vessel, in my opinion, most wanted here—and I give it as a naval officer of some experience upon this coast—are the small brigs and schooners, and a proportion of gun-

boats ; the latter will be very useful after this siege shall be at an end.

The coasting trade or cabotage carried on from Bayonne to St. Jean de Luz is most difficult to prevent. Even the natives can only undertake it in the finest weather. But the Constant and Nimble have been constantly kept within two or three miles of St. Jean de Luz or lying off Bidassoa.

I am far from considering the Marquis of Wellington's letter as intended as a complaint against myself, though I certainly think it intended as conveying dissatisfaction at some part of the naval arrangements, and I have felt it my duty to put your lordship in possession of some of the circumstances connected with his lordship's remarks upon the general insufficiency of the naval co-operation, and a reference to the chart itself, independent of the general opinion of the naval officers at the board at which your lordship presides, will I think be convincing.

The batteries will again open about the 26th or 27th. It is reported they are to do so in the course of to-morrow, but I cannot think they will be ready before the time I state. Much will remain to be done when the town is taken, as the hill becomes stronger every day.

The island of Sta. Clara will, I hope, be taken. I have urged it strongly to Sir Thos. Graham, and I am disposed to believe this will be discussed in a day or two. It will be of more value as a blockading point than all the fleet at your lordship's disposal ; but I am decidedly against any attack by sea, for the reasons stated in my public letter to Lord Keith.

I have presumed, my lord, very much in the liberty I have taken, but my motive cannot be con-

sidered an improper one, as I am, with every sentiment of respect and feeling of gratitude, your lordship's &c. &c.,

(Signed) GEORGE R. COLLIER.

To Lord Melville.

MELVILLE TO KEITH.

Admiralty, 24 August, 1813.

My dear Lord,—Our military officers on the frontier of Spain do their duty on shore most admirably; but they seem to consider a large ship within a few hundred yards of the shore off St. Sebastian as safe in its position and as immovable by the winds or waves as one of the Pyrenean mountains. A fancy occurred to them that a few line-of-battle ships might very effectually and conveniently assist in the siege of that place, and accordingly Lord Bathurst submitted their suggestion to us. We replied that the scheme appeared to be very hazardous, but that we should direct two to be placed at the disposal of the commanding officer in Basque Roads in case he should think it practicable and Lord Wellington should still require them. This latter clause was inserted, because it did not appear to have occurred either to his lordship or Sir Thomas Graham, any more than it did to Lord Bathurst, that the measure would necessarily supersede Sir George Collier in the command, which would devolve on whoever might accidentally be the senior; and as Lord Bathurst concurred with me in thinking that in all probability Lord Wellington would rather forego the line-of-battle ships than change the active commander of the squadron at the most critical period of the campaign, the whole was left optional, and I should rather suppose they will not be demanded.

I have thought it necessary to give your lordship this private explanation with reference to your letter No. 440 to the board, which we received to-day.

I shall be glad to learn that you find yourself recovering, and I have the honour to remain, my dear Lord,

Your lordship's very faithful and obedient
servant,

MELVILLE.

Admiral Lord Keith, &c. &c. &c.

J. W. CROKER TO BUNBURY, WAR OFFICE.

Admiralty Office, 31 August, 1813.

Sir,—I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to send you herewith, for Earl Bathurst's information, a copy of a letter dated the 27th instant from Admiral Lord Keith relative to the employment of his Majesty's ships and vessels on the north coast of Spain; and to request his lordship to communicate to the Marquis of Wellington that the Board of Admiralty entirely concur with Lord Keith in his opinion of the extreme danger of keeping square rigged vessels on this part of the coast, and the almost impossibility of intercepting the communication along the shore between the Gironde and the Bidassoa.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) J. W. CROKER.

To Colonel Bunbury.

WELLINGTON TO MARTIN.

Leyaca, September 2nd, 1813.

Sir,—I have had the honour to receive your letter of the 27th ultimo; and I beg leave to

return you my best thanks for the communication of such important intelligence as it conveyed to me.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

WELLINGTON.

Rear-Admiral Martin, &c. &c. &c., Plymouth.

Endorsed.—2nd September, 1813. Marquis of Wellington. Thanks.

[The previous correspondence shows what had been done by the navy under Captain Sir G. Colliër and his predecessor in co-operating with the army. The remainder is correspondence relative to Byam Martin's mission to Lord Wellington.]

LORD MELVILLE TO B. MARTIN.

Admiralty, 2 September, 1813.

Dear Sir,—I am sorry to be under the necessity of putting you to any personal inconvenience, even for a short time; but as the public service requires it, I am persuaded that you will cheerfully submit to it.

There have been some unpleasant and most ill founded complaints of the want of naval assistance at St. Sebastian, and generally on the north coast of Spain, which I am thoroughly satisfied Lord Wellington would not have made, or have been the channel of transmitting, if he had himself superintended the siege and had been enabled personally and frequently to communicate with Sir George Collier, and to see instead of learning from others how the service was conducted. From the time of his preparing to open the campaign till the commencement of

operations in the neighbourhood of St. Sebastian, we never had the least intimation of more being expected or required from the navy than the protection of convoys and the securing the communication along the coast, and we cannot help feeling that it is rather unreasonable and somewhat too late to be complaining of the want of naval co-operation to an extent which never was hinted or thought of till the occasion had actually arisen on which it was to be used. Neither Lord Wellington nor those who are employed on the coast appear to have the least conception of what is physically practicable by ships and boats and seamen, and to be strongly impressed with the usual and complimentary notion that they can do anything. Sir George Collier is of a very different opinion, and I shall take the liberty of acting on the opinions of naval rather than military officers in those matters. Lord Wellington in a private letter which I received from him yesterday seems to contemplate the continuance of his naval demands throughout the winter, and as we are of course most anxious to render him every possible assistance, it is proposed that you shall proceed forthwith to his headquarters, and that after learning from him the general nature of his wants and expectations, you shall explain to him what is practicable and what is impossible, and, returning to Plymouth with as little delay as possible, report to Lord Keith for our information what you conceive will be necessary. Perhaps his lordship may authorise you to communicate with Sir Harry Neale or Commodore Malcolm, in case any aid within their power shall be required so immediately as to render a reference to him at Plymouth hazardous to the service; and also to give any additional temporary instructions to Sir George Collier which Lord Wellington's suggestions and demands may appear to render necessary, until Lord

Keith shall have the opportunity of further considering the matter on your return to Plymouth.

I have not time to write by this post to Lord Keith, and I have therefore to request that you will forthwith communicate this letter to him. Further papers on this subject will be sent to him for your information from the board to-morrow.

I have the honour to be, dear Sir,
Your most obedient and faithful servant,
(Signed) MELVILLE.

Rear-Admiral Martin.
[Second in command, Plymouth.]

J. W. CROKER TO KEITH.

Admiralty, 3rd September, 1813.

My Lord,—I have received and communicated to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your lordship's letters concerning representations made by Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington to Captain Otway and Sir G. Collier, adverting generally to the inadequacy of the naval force on the coasts of the Peninsula, and more particularly alleging the want of adequate co-operation in the siege of St. Sebastian.

Your lordship must be well aware from your own professional experience, and from the observations of Sir George Collier, that the several topics of Lord Wellington's representations may be fully and satisfactorily explained by a reference to circumstances of seasons, weather, and localities, which in so considerable a degree affect all naval operations, but which in the consideration of services to be performed in so hazardous a situation as the bight of the Bay of Biscay are most peculiarly important.

I enclose to your lordship copies of two letters

connected with this subject, which by their lordships' commands were addressed to the Secretary of State on receiving from that department a communication of a nature similar to those which your lordship has transmitted. These letters my lords understand have been transmitted to Lord Wellington, and will, they confidently trust, have been perfectly satisfactory to his lordship.

But as Lord Wellington in his communication to Captain Sir George Collier expresses his desire of knowing what degree of naval force he is to depend upon for the future ; and as neither the particulars of his lordship's demands, nor the detail of any obstacles to their execution arising out of mere naval circumstances, can be with sufficient celerity or accuracy conveyed on paper, my lords think it absolutely necessary that a personal communication should be opened with Lord Wellington for the purpose of ascertaining all the wants and wishes of his lordship as connected with this department, in order that if his lordship should be found to entertain any expectation of which any obstacles arising out of naval circumstances may exist, these obstacles may be fully explained to his lordship ; and that where no such obstacles may present themselves every facility and assistance that the British navy can give may be liberally, cordially, and with the least possible delay afforded to his lordship's operations.

With these objects my lords, having the fullest confidence in the professional judgment of Rear-Admiral Martin, second in command at Plymouth, have been pleased to direct him to hoist his flag in his Majesty's ship *La Créole*, and to put himself under your lordship's orders for the purpose of being employed on a mission to the Marquis of Wellington on the subject above stated.

Your lordship will therefore lose no time in

furnishing the Rear-Admiral with copies of the several papers herewith sent, and of such others as your lordship may think likely to be of use to him, giving him such further directions and advice as your lordship's long professional experience may suggest to you. You will direct him to proceed immediately to assume the temporary command and direction of his Majesty's naval force at present on the north coast of Spain, and of any other ships or vessels that may proceed to that quarter while he is engaged on this service.

He is immediately on his arrival to proceed to Lord Wellington's head-quarters, and to confer with his lordship on the general nature of his wants and expectations from naval assistance in the whole line of the operations which he may have in view.

He will explain to his lordship how far the execution of these wishes and the fulfilment of these expectations are, in his professional opinion, practicable by naval means and where they are impracticable, and he will endeavour to show to his lordship to what extent that which is practicable may be reckoned upon as certain, and in what cases it must be considered as contingent upon those circumstances of season and weather that control in so great a degree all naval operations, and which in a situation so dangerous as the bight of the Bay of Biscay should be most particularly attended to.

Having fully possessed himself of all his lordship's views on the subject, and having given such explanations as he shall have judged necessary, he is to issue, on the spot, immediate orders for the execution of such services as may be required in the manner most consistent with his lordship's wishes; and in order to enable him to make the most perfect arrangements and dispositions to this effect, your lordship will authorise him to communicate with Sir

Harry Neale or Commodore Malcolm, in case any aid within their power should be required so immediately as to render the delay of a reference to your lordship at Plymouth hazardous to the service.

Having thus provided for all urgent parts of the service, and having given to the senior officer any additional temporary instructions which Lord Wellington's suggestions or demands may appear to render immediately necessary, he is to lose no time in returning to Plymouth to state to your lordship the whole of Lord Wellington's views, the particulars of his own proceedings, and the observations with which his personal inspection of local circumstances may have furnished him, in order that your lordship may be fully enabled to make your arrangements for giving to the Field Marshal all the assistance which his Majesty's ships may be capable of affording; and your lordship will be so good as to acquaint me for their lordships' information with the result of the Rear-Admiral's proceedings and of your own intended arrangements, in order that if it should appear necessary an adequate increase of force should be placed at your lordship's disposal.

I have the honour to be, my lord,

Your lordship's most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) J. W. CROKER.

To Admiral Lord Keith, K.B.

LORD MELVILLE TO LORD KEITH.

[*Private.*]

Admiralty, 3 September, 1813.

My dear Lord,—I have received to-day your lordship's letter of the 31st ulto. and am glad to find from the enclosure that Lord Wellington had written

to Sir George Collier the friendly private letter which he mentions, and which I trust will have had the effect of removing from his mind any impression of his lordship intending to throw the slightest blame on him, which I am persuaded was never intended.

Admiral Martin will have communicated to your lordship the letter I wrote to him yesterday, and I have no doubt that, with a view to the future operations of the army, you will concur with us in the expediency of the proceeding we have adopted of sending the Admiral to confer with Lord Wellington.

It will not be necessary for us to enter into full explanations with the Secretary of State on the several matters of complaint which have been urged by Lord Wellington, but as our first and most important concern is to take care that the public service is carried on with efficiency, and with entire cordiality between the two great branches of it, we have no wish to enter into any contention with him which might irritate, and might obstruct the attainment of our main object. Admiral Martin's own good sense and zeal for the service will accordingly suggest to him the necessity of avoiding all disputes as to what is past, and of confining himself to two principal points. First, to explain to Lord Wellington what is practicable by the navy, and what is impossible on such parts of the coast as are connected with his operations either now or prospectively. Secondly, to learn from him the extent of his wants and expectations as to naval co-operation.

Though we have no desire, however, to take any step in the proceeding which may by possibility create unpleasant feelings in Lord Wellington's mind, and do not insist therefore on the Secretary of State conveying to Lord Wellington our observations

on his complaints, it is very necessary that your lordship and Admiral Martin should be apprised of our view of the question, and of the grounds on which we confidently assert that those complaints are groundless. I think it right, therefore, to submit for your private information the substance of such observations as have occurred to us on the subject.

The following are the chief grounds of complaint advanced by Lord Wellington.

1. That no line-of-battle ships had been sent to that coast, though it appeared that your lordship had recommended that measure.

2. That the supplies from Lisbon and other ports in Portugal and from Corunna are delayed for want of convoy.

3. That the maritime blockade of San Sebastian has not been kept up at all, and that all kinds of supplies and even reinforcements have been introduced.

4. That the squadron is so weak as not only not to be able to assist in the attack of the places, but that the soldiers are even obliged to load and unload transports, and the ordnance and stores were conveyed in boats of the country, navigated by women, there being no naval force to afford a proper assistance in boats.

5. That with a sufficient naval force an attack might be made from the sea, which would at least divert the enemy's attention, if it did not tend to insure the success of the assault by land.

6. That the coasting trade between the Gironde and Bayonne is not cut off.

Upon most of these points we hope that Lord Bathurst and Lord Wellington will see in Mr. Barrow's letter of the 18th and in Mr. Croker's letter of the 31st ult. replies satisfactory and conclusive; but the following observations will be of

use in guiding Admiral Martin if Lord Wellington should refer again to these points.

1. That it was not our intention to employ any line-of-battle ships in the bight of the Bay of Biscay is perfectly correct ; it is a determination in which I suppose every seaman must concur ; and if I have any doubt of the propriety of any step of their proceedings,¹ it would be their authority to your lordship to send, if Lord Wellington should make an earnest requisition to that effect, two line-of-battle ships off San Sebastian. This, I understand from your letters, you consider as a very hazardous measure, so much so that you have ordered these ships in the event of their going, as you did the *Ajax*, not to anchor but to keep standing off and on, as the best means of diminishing the extreme risk to which the ships are exposed on a coast where there is no shelter from the most prevailing winds, and where, if a ship parts her cable, there is scarcely any possibility of her being saved.

Admiral Martin well knows that ships continually under way and working so close to a dangerous, and for nine months out of twelve a lee shore, would afford but little co-operation in the way of boats or men to his lordship's operations ; indeed, compared with the risk they would incur, their assistance would be as nothing.

If there were any probability of the enemy's being rash enough to push down his line-of-battle ship into that quarter to co-operate with the garrison of San Sebastian, our ships of that description would doubtless be of use ; but there is little probability of the enemy's having recourse to so desperate an expedient, and after all the surest way of defeating such an intention, if it should be entertained, is by

¹ 'Their,' I apprehend, applies to the naval lords.

employing our line-of-battle ships in blockading him in his own ports.¹

Admiral Martin will of course learn that the *Ajax* remaining at Lord Wellington's desire some time upon the coast, and having anchored, her cable was so much rubbed that she was in danger of parting, and the *Surveillante* has already lost two anchors, and Sir George Collier is of opinion (and no one is better acquainted with that coast) that if line-of-battle ships had been there during a gale that happened some weeks since they must inevitably have been lost, and probably every soul would have perished.

2. We are not aware that any supplies have been delayed for want of means on the part of Sir George Collier; we did hear of the delay in one instance of some ships from Corunna bound to Santander, but on referring this case for Sir George Collier's report, they learned that the delay arose from the army or commissariat officers not having given any notice to, or made any demand upon, the naval service on that occasion, as Sir George Collier stated that had he been aware that convoy was wanted he would have instantly provided it; and in the last letter which you transmitted from Sir George he states that whenever even eight or ten empty transports are collected he is always ready to afford them protection. Lord Wellington seems to consider that any protection will be inadequate unless every individual ship shall either have special protection the moment she is ready to sail, or that she may be able safely to sail without any protection. Admiral Martin will, if necessary, represent in reply to this, that the naval means of this country, great as they are, have great and extended claims upon them, and that it cannot be expected that each

¹ A point on which every sailor will agree with Lord Melville.

individual or even every two or three transports can have separate protection of a ship of war. So great is the number of transports, so extended their services, that the whole Channel fleet would not suffice for protection of this nature, nor if it could be obtained would this facility of communication for individual transports afford any adequate advantage; and if it were to be understood that ships with valuable stores were accustomed to run without protection round the coasts of Portugal and Spain, it would encourage the privateers, either of America or France, to run to that station, and on so long a line of coast it would be impossible completely to put a stop to depredations when the chances and profit of success would be so great and the chances of escape so many.

But in fact I have great satisfaction in thinking how very little interruption (as far as I can learn) the innumerable vessels which have sailed from various ports with reinforcements and supplies for the army have met with. Some months ago one American privateer was reported to have made some captures off Oporto. At this time, as well as now, there was an ample force on the coast of Portugal, and except in this single instance (the occurrence of such single instances you will know can never be entirely prevented) we have no reason to believe that any interruption by an enemy has been given to any of the communications between Cadiz and Passages.

Your lordship can hardly be aware of the numerous and successive convoys granted from British ports to the north coast of Spain. It may therefore be useful to inform you, as an example, that between the 30th July and 9th August no less than ten different vessels of war gave convoy to Passages alone, and so anxious was the board to contribute,

however great the inconvenience might be to the naval service, to the early arrival of Lord Wellington's reinforcements and supplies that they did not detain vessels that were ready to sail one day for others that were to be ready on the next, but they appropriated distinct convoys for each succeeding day.

We cannot, therefore, but confidently hope that Admiral Martin will have no great difficulty in persuading Lord Wellington, if his lordship should again revert to this part of the subject, that his supplies have been, as far as depended on the naval department, forwarded with extraordinary celerity and success.

3. Lord Wellington seems inclined to think that the maritime blockade of San Sebastian has not been at all enforced, and that this is notorious to the whole world from the circumstances of General Rey's report having reached Marshal Soult.

It is a subject of regret that any communication should take place between the fortress and France, but Sir George Collier and Mr. Holland apprehend that it is possible that a letter may have been conveyed either by land or water in spite of the most rigorous blockade, but that the naval blockade has not to any considerable degree been broken. Sir George Collier admits that small boats may have passed in the night between the place and the adjoining French coast, but there is not in his opinion any reason to suppose that they conveyed anything more than letters or a few eggs and fowls, and he adds that when it is recollected that it is but one hour's sail with a favourable wind, and that the hour will of course be chosen most suitable to concealment, it surely is neither at all surprising nor in any degree to be attributed to the insufficiency of naval force that such occasional communications

should occur. A string of armed boats are kept every night that the weather will permit within pistol shot of the French batteries, and though Sir George Collier's zeal induced him to pursue these means, Captain Otway on his arrival was of opinion that the boats were too close for their safety.

It is unnecessary to recapitulate the means by which, in Sir George Collier's opinion, communications with the fortress may be and probably are kept up from the land side. Admiral Martin will be fully informed of these particulars by your lordship and Sir George, and he will see that if the naval blockade is imperfect, it is owing not to the want of force, but to circumstance of local position and of weather, of which there can be no control: and the board are strongly inclined to concur in an opinion of Sir George Collier that the occupation of the island of Santa Clara at the mouth of the harbour, which he states that he had urged to Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Graham, would be the more effective as a measure of blockade than the 'presence of the whole Channel fleet.'

4. We read with great surprise and with no small suspicion of there being some mistake in this part of his lordship's communication that the squadron is so weak as not only to be unable to assist in the attack of the place, but to be incapable of doing the ordinary boat work of the port of Passages.

We know that a body of seamen had been actually ashore doing the duty of artillerymen in the breaching batteries, and had received with much pleasure the testimony of the officers of the army of the zeal, gallantry, and effect that had distinguished their increasing efforts.

Captain Tayler, of his Majesty's sloop Sparrow,

had by the greatest exertion dragged up a 24-pounder gun to the summit of the lighthouse hill, and having expended all his ammunition on the enemy had gone to one of the breaching batteries to solicit a further supply, when he was unfortunately wounded most severely and dangerously.

This co-operation was perhaps, with reference to the number of men employed, not considerable, though in point of exertion it was admitted to have been very valuable; but surely if the officers of the army had thought the labours of the seamen would have been more beneficially employed in the unloading the transports in the harbour of Passages than in fighting the guns of the batteries, Sir George Collier would have deferred to their opinion and would have employed his men in that service, which more particularly belongs to the naval department.

That the boats of the country worked by women should have been employed in the conveyance of artillery &c., does not arise, as Lord Wellington seems to have inferred, from the want of means in the naval squadron, but, as Sir George Collier states, because those boats were in truth much fitter for the service than the boats of the men-of-war.

In all cases it has been observed that the boats of a country are better adapted to the work of its harbours and coasts than any foreign boats, and here in particular it was found that the men-of-war boats, little calculated in any situation for the transport of ordnance and such articles, were incapable from their draught of water, of going over the shoals to the wharfs except at the very top of high water—that is, I presume, for an hour or two in the day—while the boats of the harbour of a broad flat construction were enabled to go over at all times, and were besides better constructed for the kind of service to

be performed. Their being worked by women is the custom of the country, and in fact they are reported by Sir George to be from habit and practice much more efficient in this business than men.

I admit readily that it would have been very useful if a sufficient number of men could have been spared to assist in this sort of work, but considering the danger of that coast, the perpetual insecurity of the anchors and cables, and the various current military and naval services, I dare say your lordship will join with the professional members of the board in opinion that no ship on that station could afford to spare many men to those shore duties without disabling her as an effective ship of war, and Sir George Collier distinctly states that a ship of war could be of little use in lending men unless she remained at anchor, which your lordship thinks would be extremely dangerous.

If it should be said that a supply of seamen should be sent for this special purpose, I have only to reply that the drains of seamen which the American Lake Service has required has already greatly distressed us, and that the supply of seamen is so inadequate to the current demands of the service, that, as your lordship well knows, the ships in commission are too frequently short of complement, but not less than six sail of the line and sixteen frigates, with a great number of sloops and smaller vessels, are at this moment ready to receive men, and are lying useless because men cannot be supplied to them; and that three other sail and five frigates, besides sloops, &c., will be ready for men in the course of the present month. But it is satisfactory to find that Sir George Collier states that after the first few days, when the boats of the country (which had been secreted) were discovered

and brought out to use, no inconvenience or delay has been felt even in this part of the service. There are, it seems, but three wharfs at which the military landings or embarkations can take place; each of these is attended by one of his Majesty's naval officers with the master of a transport under him, the whole under the superintendence of one of his Majesty's naval captains, and here as much work is done as local circumstances will admit, and since the short period in the earliest part of the operations which I before mentioned no complaint of any delay on the part of the naval co-operation had reached Sir George Collier, and he seems inclined to think that Lord Wellington's complaint on this head must arise from information that related to that portion of the early operations which I before mentioned, during which the country boats were not to be found and Sir George Collier's arrangements had not been brought into effect.

Sir George Collier further states, in a letter dated the 23rd which I have this moment received, that ' transports arriving were cleared the day after, and many of them sent out of harbour the same day '— a circumstance that does much credit to Sir George's activity and arrangements.

5. It appears to me from the views and plans which I have seen of San Sebastian, and from the opinions of all the seamen with whom I have had an opportunity of conversing, that the sea face of that place is naturally such as to render the naval co-operation in an actual attack much less useful than Lord Wellington had been led to suppose; the opinion of Sir George Collier is that even in the way of demonstration or diversion the ships can be but of little use, as the enemy must be aware that he has little to fear from any attack on this side, while his means of annoyance with red-hot shot, with

which it seems he has provided himself, will expose his Majesty's ships to great loss in the event of their engaging his batteries. In Mr. Barrow's letter of the 18th, Admiral Martin will find some of the reasons which induced the board to think that his Majesty's ships could not be employed with any reasonable prospect of adequate advantage against this fortress; the late communications from that station strengthen very much that opinion.

6th. The interruption of the cabotage between the Gironde and Bayonne is, I feel as strongly as Lord Wellington can, of great importance, and your lordship knows that the board called your attention to this subject; but your opinion conveyed in your letter of the [not given], and of all other experienced officers is that owing to the peculiar nature of the coast the interception of this trade by naval means is of great difficulty; dangerous in the extreme to be attempted by square-rigged vessels, and not of very promising success even with cutters and schooners. Your lordship, however, has maintained as far as was possible, with wonderful perseverance, a close blockade of the mouth of the Garonne, and Sir George Collier has made a disposition of his smaller vessels that cuts off to as great a degree as the local situation will allow the communication with St. Jean de Luz and the Bidassoa.

Your lordship has several cutters or schooner-rigged vessels under your orders, and of course you will employ such of them on this part of the coast as you may consider prudent; but I feel that you may not be able to contemplate without anxiety the situation of even the smallest and most weatherly vessels on a shore so full of danger, and absolutely without the means of shelter and safety.

These are some of the observations which have occurred to me on Lord Wellington's several com-

munications, and of which I think it may be proper that Admiral Martin should be in possession. His own experience, your lordship's advice, and his communications with Sir George Collier will assuredly furnish him with still better information and enable him to satisfy Lord Wellington on any of these points to which his lordship may again refer; though I hope Admiral Martin will rather find his lordship disposed to make arrangements for the future than to recapitulate complaints which I am satisfied have arisen from misinformation.

Believe me, with great regard,
Your lordship's very faithful
and obedient servant,
(Signed) MELVILLE.

P.S.—I enclose for further information a copy of a letter which I have received from Sir George Collier. (See page 349, &c.)

Admiral Lord Keith, K.B. &c. &c. &c.

COPY SENT TO BYAM MARTIN

*Secretary of Admiralty to Under-Secretary of
War Office.*

Admiralty Office, 18 [probably August], 1813.

Sir,—I have received and communicated to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your letter of yesterday's date to Mr. Croker in which you acquaint him for their lordships' information that the Marquis of Wellington continues to represent in the strongest terms the great importance which he attaches to the presence of a powerful squadron upon the coast between Santoña and Bayonne, in order to co-operate with the allied army, and more par-

ticularly to aid in the reduction of St. Sebastian ; and you desire to be acquainted, for Lord Bathurst's information, whether there is any objection or insuperable obstacle to the adoption of arrangements to the following effect.

1. That bomb vessels and gun and mortar boats should be sent immediately to assist in the siege of St. Sebastian, also that flat-bottomed boats and craft fit for the conveyance of ordnance stores should be sent to the assistance of the army.

2. That the number of small vessels, if calculated to prevent the enemy's communications along the north coast of Spain, should be augmented.

3. That during the continuance of the fair season some line-of-battle ships should be stationed along the said coast, both to afford all the direct assistance in their power to the allied army engaged in the siege and to alarm the enemy for the security of his right flank and rear.

In reply to which I have their lordships' commands to acquaint you, for Lord Bathurst's information, that on the rapid and successful advance of the allied army under Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, after the battle of Vittoria,¹ to the eastern extremity of the north coast of Spain, Sir George Collier, in his letter of the 6th of July, addressed to Lord Keith and received at this office from his lordship on the 21st of the same month, points out the several positions and the force required to watch them in order 'to insure the fulfilments of his (Lord Keith's) wishes as well as those of Lord Wellington.' This force in his opinion should consist of one frigate, three brigs, and two small cruisers to be stationed in the manner pointed out in the letter above-mentioned, extract of which is herewith enclosed.

¹ On 21st June

At this time the force under his immediate disposal consisted of the

Surveillante	.	.	:	Frigate
Dispatch	.	.	.	Brig
Constant	.	.	.	Brig
Sparrow	.	.	.	Brig
Lyra	.	.	.	Brig
Arrow	.	.	.	Schooner

On the 17th July, Sir George Collier points out to Lord Keith the manner in which the squadron under his orders are employed, but makes no complaint, nor the least allusion to the inadequacy of his force to the service required of it. Extract of this letter I also enclose herewith, together with a copy of a letter from Sir George Collier to J. W. Croker, Esq., of the 31st July, from the latter of which his lordship will perceive the satisfaction he expresses on being joined by the Nimble and Speculator on that and the preceding day.

Sir George, indeed, has discovered in the progress of the siege of St. Sebastian that more small vessels were desirable for the performance of the various services required of him, and for preventing supplies being thrown into that fortress by small boats in the night time from St. Jean de Luz and Bayonne, and the two vessels above-mentioned were accordingly despatched to join him, and at the same time he was informed by Lord Keith that he was at liberty to avail himself of the services of any other small vessels that might join him from other quarters.

On the 29th July the President, Beagle, and Juniper sailed from Spithead, but put into Plymouth by contrary winds, from whence they again put to sea on the 9th August together with the Urgent gun brig, having under their protection the first

division of transports with the battering train on board ; and on the same day (the 9th August) the Zephyr sloop and Snap gun brig sailed from Spithead with the second division.

On the 5th August the Brisk sloop and Virago sailed from Cork with a convoy of transports.

All these ships of war have been put under the orders of Sir George Collier, in addition to which orders were yesterday given to the Magicienne frigate to receive on board specie for the army, and proceed with all possible despatch (taking with her such transports as may be ready at Spithead) to land the same at Santander, and then to join Sir George Collier.

With regard to the first point of the arrangements suggested by Lord Bathurst, as calculated to meet the wishes and promote the plans of the Marquis of Wellington—namely, that of sending gun vessels and gun and mortar boats, also flat-bottomed boats and craft fit for the conveyance of ordnance stores to assist in the siege of St. Sebastian—their lordships direct me to observe that had notice been given to them, and they could have been aware that vessels of this description would be wanted, immediate orders would have been taken for putting them in a state fit for service ; but as this was not the case, there is not any disposable force of this description ready for immediate use ; that a considerable number of these classes of vessels were prepared and sent out to Cadiz, and subsequently to the eastern coast of Spain, at the requisition of Earl Bathurst to co-operate with the army in those quarters, and that others have also been sent for the same purpose to the Baltic, on a similar requisition from Lord Castlereagh ; and their lordships are of opinion that before any of this description offered could be obtained from their present

stations the season would be too far advanced for carrying on naval operations with any degree of utility or safety in the south-east corner of the Bay of Biscay ; but I have to acquaint you, for Lord Bathurst's information, that Sir George Collier having in a letter of the 29th June addressed to Lord Keith, suggesting the expediency of being supplied with four or six gun-boats, orders were immediately issued on the 21st July, the day on which Lord Keith's letter was received at the Admiralty, to prepare for service six of the said boats, which were in every respect ready on the 25th July. The long continuance of westerly winds prevented their proceeding beyond the Downs till the 2nd August ; but two of them are now ready at Plymouth and ordered to be convoyed under the Challenger ; three others are on their passage thither, from whence, on their arrival, Lord Keith has been directed to convoy them to their destination with all possible despatch, and the sixth was unfortunately run down and sunk at the Nore.

On the second point of naval reinforcement proposed by Earl Bathurst, their lordships are willing to hope they have in an ample manner anticipated his lordship's wishes, the squadron of frigates and small vessels already joined, on their passage to join, or under orders, consisting of those whose names and descriptions are as below, all of which are or will be available for any service on which Sir George Collier may find it necessary to employ them.

Frigates.—*Surveillante*, *President*, *Magicienne*, of thirty-six guns each.

Sloops and Gun Brigs.—*Challenger*, *Stork*, *Despatch*, *Brisk*, *Sparrow*, *Zephyr*, *Lyra*, *Snap*, *Arrow*, *Constant*, *Nimble*, *Virago*, *Urgent*, *Juniper*, *Speculator*, five gun-boats and several despatch vessels.

In reverting to the third head of demand for naval reinforcement their lordships command me to observe that although they do not conceive that line-of-battle ships could either afford direct assistance by acting against St. Sebastian—as they could neither approach the works that cover the town nor bring their guns to bear on the castle upon the mount—or that they could occasion any alarm to the enemy for the security of his right flank and rear, yet they are fully aware that their crews and gun-boats might be usefully employed for assisting the allied army engaged in the siege. They trust, therefore, that the numerous force of frigates, sloops, and gun-brigs placed under the orders of Sir George Collier will be found to be amply sufficient for all the purposes that may be required, without the additional aid of ships of the line; and when the great risk is taken into consideration to which the ships are liable at this advanced season of the year, and in a situation which even in the midst of summer is subject to heavy gales of wind and an almost incessant swell, where they are exposed to a lee shore, on which there are no ports for large ships to run to with safety, and where they must generally be at anchor in fifty or sixty fathoms water, their lordships would scarcely feel themselves justified in sending ships of the line to such a situation but on the most urgent and pressing occasions. To enable Lord Bathurst to form some idea to which ships on this coast are exposed even in the summer months, I enclose extracts of two letters from Sir George Collier of the 22nd of July and 6th August.

At the same time, however, they command me to state that, aware as they are of the importance of naval co-operation with the army under the Marquis of Wellington, and the essential service which seamen invariably afford in operations connected with

the shore, they will direct two sail of the line to be sent to Basque Roads to be ready to proceed to the north coast of Spain, should Lord Wellington continue to be of opinion that, after the arrival of the several ships of war mentioned in this communication, their services are still indispensably necessary, in which case, and on a requisition to that effect from his lordship, or from Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Graham, to Rear-Admiral Sir Harry Neale, the latter has been instructed to order them to proceed to reinforce the squadron on the north coast of Spain.

I am, &c.

(Signed) JOHN BARROW.

LORD KEITH TO B. MARTIN.

[*Secret.*] Clarence in Cawsand Bay : 4th September, 1813.

Sir,—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having been pleased to direct that you shall proceed to the north coast of Spain in his Majesty's ship *Creole*, as well for the purpose of inquiry into the state and fitness of the naval force employed there in co-operation with the army under the Marquis of Wellington as for that of making suitable arrangements with the Field Marshal for any further operations in which the services of the navy are expected, you are to hoist your flag in the said ship and proceed forthwith off St. Sebastian and communicate with Captain Sir George Collier, of his Majesty's ship *Surveillante*, to whom you will be pleased to deliver the enclosed letter, which is left open for your perusal.

The letter which has been addressed to you by Lord Viscount Melville will have apprised you that this service has been intrusted to you in consequence of Lord Wellington having complained of the

inadequacy of the naval force which has hitherto been employed in co-operating with the army ; and it gives me great satisfaction that an officer so distinguished, and of such comprehensive knowledge, is to be employed on a service which I consider to be of high importance, not only because everything where the two services are acting in conjunction cannot be too clearly understood, but because a good understanding cannot possibly be too perfect.

For your information as to the transactions that are past, you will receive herewith the several instructions and papers described in the enclosed schedule, being all the correspondence that is important which has taken place either with the officers in command or with the Admiralty ; and with regard to the operations actually going on, or those intended hereafter, I think it right to submit to you the following observations.

As the siege of St. Sebastian is now far advanced, I think its importance justifies a degree of risk ; for certainly the risk is great for ships of war or frigates to remain in that part of the Bay of Biscay even at this season of the year. At a more advanced period I consider it absolutely impossible for any ship of war to continue there, except such as are capable of taking the harbours upon the coast in bad weather. Even in such cases it will be found that the swell after gales of wind is as detrimental and dangerous there as gales are on other coasts.

After the fall of St. Sebastian I hope that all supplies can be forwarded from the ports nearest to the armies in boats or small vessels, and that there will be little if any necessity for ships to be at anchor on the coast without the harbours, unless the Marquis of Wellington should make a forward movement into the French territory, in which case cutters or small vessels seem best suited to cruise

near the shores, with some frigates without them, and perhaps a ship of the line to appear off Bordeaux river from time to time, observing at other periods a prudent distance.

I mean my opinion, as to this great danger, to be confined to that part of the coast between Santoña and Arcachon, because without those limits I think a well-found ship will have room to stretch off on one tack or the other, but within them it appears to be quite impossible.

To have said even so much, however, on a subject upon which you are as capable of judging as myself seems almost impertinent ; because you will have the advantage of all the local knowledge and experience obtained by Captain Sir George R. Collier during a long course of service, and will be in possession of all the correspondence, both public and private, which has passed upon these important topics.

With respect to sparing men from the ships of war, it will be obvious that it is impossible to do it to any extent or for any length of time, because the ships which are on the coast must be kept in constant readiness to slip and gain an offing. This, however, is to be considered as applying only to ships not in ports.

You will receive herewith a statement of the enemy's ships and preparations in the different ports within the limits of my command so far as the same is known according to the last returns that have been received, together with the present disposition of his Majesty's ships and vessels under my orders ; and by the latter you will observe that there are four frigates, four sloops, and six smaller vessels appropriated for the service on the north coast of Spain, and that another frigate is under orders to proceed there with convoy from Spithead.

I shall send directions forthwith to Commodore Malcolm off Brest and to Rear-Admiral Sir Harry Neale in Basque Roads to attend to any application which you may consider it necessary to make for a reinforcement for any particular service that will not bear the delay of a reference to me for the consideration of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, but you will readily observe by the disposition above referred to that it is only the latter who is likely to have it in his power to comply with any requisition that you may make, and that only as far as assistance can be afforded by ships of the line.

After communicating with Sir George R. Collier and obtaining from him all the information that he may be able to afford, I recommend your proceeding to the headquarters of the Marquis of Wellington and explaining to him the objects of your mission ; and having, in your conferences with the Field Marshal, given every requisite explanation as to the past, and ascertained his sentiments with respect to future operations, and the extent of the naval force that it may be desirable to employ, you are to afford such explanations as, from your own judgment upon maturely weighing the information you may have obtained and the foregoing observations, may appear to you to be expedient : returning to Plymouth forthwith and reporting your opinion and proceedings to me for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

If, however, any circumstances should arise in the course of your mission which should induce you to continue upon the coast, you are to take charge of the squadron at present employed under Sir George R. Collier's orders in co-operating with the army, and report your proceedings to me without loss of time, for which purpose I have placed the Fancy cutter at your disposal ; and in any case, it

will be important that you acquaint Sir Harry Neale as soon as possible whether the services of any of the line-of-battle ships under his command are likely to be required, in order, if such should not be the case, that he may send to Plymouth such as can be spared from the service in Basque Roads.

Having thus stated to you my opinion generally upon the most important points, and put you in possession of such information as appears to be necessary, I rely with confidence on a zealous exertion of your talents for the preservation of a good understanding between the naval and military services, and on your satisfying the Marquis of Wellington by the exercise of the sound professional judgment for which you are distinguished as to the extent to which only a naval co-operation is practicable upon the coast in the bight of the Bay at so advanced a season.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) KEITH,

To Rear-Admiral Martin.

Admiral.

B. MARTIN TO LORD MELVILLE.

Plymouth, September 4, 1813.

My Lord,—You do me but justice in believing that I shall cheerfully enter on any service your lordship may require of me, but feeling much reduced and unequal to any long or harassing employment, I thought it but right to say so in my letter of yesterday.

Your lordship has given me a distinct view of the object of my mission, and I hope to execute it in a manner that will be satisfactory to your lordship and satisfactory to Lord Wellington, who will no

doubt see the earnestness of your lordship's desire to afford all the naval co-operation which his lordship's future plans may require, and which a due consideration for the safety of the ships will admit of.

I have requested some official papers of Lord Keith which will give me a knowledge of what has passed and prepare me for any retrospective allusion to the co-operation of the navy, and I have already read enough of those papers to make it evident that there is nothing new in the wish of the Admiralty to afford the army every possible assistance.

As the coast at the bottom of the bay cannot be approached sometimes for days together as the season advances, I have begged Lord Keith to give me a cutter that I may push in without delay.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Lord Melville.

MELVILLE TO B. MARTIN.

Admiralty, 4 September, 1813.

Dear Sir,—I will be much obliged to you to take charge of the enclosed, and I hope you will be able to proceed without delay on your voyage. My letter to Lord Wellington contains a copy of our instructions to Lord Keith respecting your mission.

I have the honour to be, dear Sir,

Your most obedient and faithful servant,

(Signed) MELVILLE.

To Rear-Admiral Martin.

KEITH TO B. MARTIN.

Clarence in Cawsand Bay, 6 September, 1813.

Sir,—In addition to the instructions contained in my letter of the 4th inst., I send herewith for your information and guidance a letter addressed to me by the Secretary of the Admiralty, containing their lordships' directions upon the several points connected with the service on which you are ordered ; and you will be pleased to pay the same attention thereto as if it proceeded direct from myself, and as, to save time, I retain no copy thereof, you will be pleased hereafter to return it, as well as the private one from Lord Melville which accompanies it.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

(Signed) KEITH, Admiral.

To Rear-Admiral Martin.

*REAR-ADMIRAL MARTIN TO LORD
WELLINGTON.*

Passages, 13th September, 1813.

My Lord,—Admiral Lord Keith having ordered me to this coast, and for my guidance delivered to me instructions which he had received from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty signifying their directions that I should proceed to your lordship's head-quarters for the purpose of learning the nature and extent of your lordship's wishes with respect to naval assistance, either now, or prospectively in the line of operations which your lordship may have in view.

I have the honour to inform your lordship that for this purpose I am arrived at Passages, and that

I shall set off for the head-quarters the moment I can provide myself with the means of doing so.

In the mean time it may be satisfactory to your lordship to be informed that if your desire of naval assistance and co-operation can be made practicable without exposing his Majesty's ships to imminent danger, it is a very material object of my mission to issue on the spot immediate orders for the execution of such services as may be required, and in the manner most consistent with your lordship's wishes; in short, if there are no obstacles arising from naval circumstances, it is the commands of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, and most strictly enjoined by Lord Keith, that every facility and assistance which the British navy can give may be liberally, cordially, and with the least possible delay afforded to your lordship's operations.

I will not, at present, trouble your lordship further than to assure you of the earnest desire I have to give as prompt and complete effect to these instructions as a due consideration for the safety of the ships will allow.

It may be convenient to your lordship to know that I return to Plymouth again after completing such arrangements as may be necessary, and I shall have great pleasure in receiving any commands your lordship may have to England.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Lord Wellington.

Rear-Admiral Martin's Observations respecting the assistance and co-operation of the navy with the army under Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington, K.G., delivered to his lordship Tuesday, the 14th of September, 1813.

Line-of-battle ships.

IF the co-operation of line-of-battle ships is considered of importance either from their force, or the large establishment of their boats and men, it will be necessary to state how little available those advantages are when ships of that magnitude are placed in a situation which affords no shelter or anchorage that could give the least hope of safety even in an ordinary gale of wind.

To have the benefit of boats and men it would be necessary that the ships should be in security, or at least not left in a perilous situation, as they must unquestionably be, if placed in the corner of the Bay between the Gironde and Cape Michachaco ; and presuming there can be but one opinion among seamen as to the unjustifiable hazard of stationing ships in a situation of such extreme danger at an advanced season of the year, it will be necessary, in the event of Lord Wellington's wishing to have such a force connected with the movements of the army, to prescribe a distant rendezvous (say twenty leagues north of Cape Michachaco) from whence with settled easterly winds they might approach the shore, but always most cautiously watching the weather, and taking care to push off on the least appearance of its blowing.

Ships so circumstanced can never be reckoned upon as likely to give much assistance to the

military operations ; but if Lord Wellington continues to desire a force of that description to appear occasionally in the vicinity of his army, and to give the best help that circumstances will permit, it may be done more readily from Basque Roads, where Lord Keith has placed two sail of the line as disposable for such service, and from whence they would easily sail with the wind at east, being the only wind with which ships could dare to approach the coast. But under the most favourable circumstances it would be unfair to encourage an expectation that they could be made useful to the army, for it is perhaps impossible that the map of Europe could exhibit a spot so unfriendly and hazardous to naval operations as that between Bayonne and Passages.

The force that may be reckoned upon as certain.

The naval force that may be depended upon as certain in assisting Lord Wellington's views will be all such vessels as can find shelter in Passages, St. Sebastian, and the Bidassoa, and their number and force will be regulated by his lordship's wishes and the capacity of those places to receive the ships.

The supplies of the enemy from the Gironde to St. Jean de Luz.

The difficulty of intercepting supplies passing from the Gironde to St. Jean de Luz arises from the local disadvantage already noticed.

It is practicable only in easterly winds and in the fine season, unless a light could be kept at the entrance of the Bidassoa, and the access of that river should prove more easy than I should suppose it to be in bad weather.

Our small cruisers, assisted by such as Revenue

cutters, appear to me to be vessels best calculated for this service, but, in spite of the most active vigilance, no doubt frequent opportunities of winds and weather would enable the enemy to push supplies along shore.

The supplies of the British army coastways.

It would probably be most convenient to the service, and best facilitate the conveyance of supplies from Corunna, if two or more vessels of war were exclusively employed passing to and fro from Corunna to Passages; one of them would be supposed to be coming from Corunna with supplies, while the other is going back with empty transports.

Two vessels of war on the Lisbon station might be employed in like manner in bringing up supplies as far as Corunna.

It is very possible that transports might for a time pass along the coast of Spain, and Portugal, without falling in with an enemy, but although cases of emergency might justify the hazard, it is by no means desirable to give a general sanction to their sailing without convoy, as it would probably soon be known to the enemy, and the temptation of ships passing unprotected with valuable stores would bring a swarm of privateers on the coast.¹

Hitherto the convoys have been so guarded and conducted that of the innumerable fleets which have been escorted along the whole extent of coast between Cadiz and Passages, and from England to

¹ From Lloyd's list, twenty-three merchant vessels were captured—August, September, and October, 1813—off the coast of Spain; but only one transport, sailing without convoy, was captured by the Lion, and not two as asserted by Lord Wellington.

Another case of capture of a transport occurred 25th September, which, however, had sailed under convoy. Confirming B. Martin's assertion, that no real 'interruption' to military proceedings occurred from capture of transports.

those, and almost every intervening port, I cannot trace an instance of capture or interruption. It appears, therefore, most advisable to follow a system so strongly recommended by past success, and if the Field-Marshal desires more frequent supplies arrangements will be made accordingly.

A frigate, four brigs, and four cutters to be constantly on the coast for any service Field-Marshal Lord Wellington may require of them. Four vessels of war to be exclusively employed in the protection of the transports between Corunna and Passages.

The Admiral commanding at Lisbon to give the same or a sufficient number of vessels of war to escort the transports to and fro from Lisbon, Oporto, and the Mondego and Corunna.

This will make the permanent force for the north coast of Spain as follows :

Frigate	1	
Brigs	6	N.B.—Altered
		to 6 at Lord Wellington's request.
For convoy	4	
Cutters or small vessels	4	
Flat boats	6	
Bomb ship	1	
	<hr/>	
	22	

A line-of-battle ship occasionally to show off Cordouan.

But if at any time the supplies coastways from Portugal should be so diminished as not to require this number of vessels, it should be notified to the senior naval officer that a part of the vessels may be released from their service.

And in the event of Santoña falling, reference will be made to Lord Wellington respecting his wish of the further services of the vessels employed in that blockade.

List of vessels of war under the orders of Captain Sir George Collier :

Frigate	Cutters and schooners
Surveillante	Holly
Brigs	Arrow
Sparrow	Nimble
Lyra	Sylvia, and
Challenge	Fancy (coming home)
Constant	
Beagle	

So that there remains due, to complete Lord Wellington's want of naval assistance, 1 brig, 1 bomb, 6 flat boats, and 4 vessels fit for convoy.

Disposition of the above force.

Surveillante	. . .	Ordered into Passages
Sparrow	} . . .	{ Cruising between Arcasson and St. Jean de Luz.
Constant		
Nimble		
Holly		
Challenger	. . .	Sent to Lisbon the middle of Septem- ber with Marshal Beresford.
Sylvia	. . .	Sent to Oporto
Dextrous	} . . .	{ Coming home with transports from Santander.
Gleaner		
Lyra	} . . .	{ Blockading Santoña.
Arrow		
Fancy	. . .	Sent to Sir H. Neale with despatches and to return.
		T. B. M.

TO CAPTAIN GORDON.

*By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Rear-Admiral
of the White, &c. &c. &c.*

Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington having informed me that two transports¹ laden with military stores for the army under his command were captured on the 25th ult. by the Lion privateer in the latitude 42.40 north and longitude 11 west, and that the privateer alluded to sailed from L'Orient about three weeks since to cruise off Cape Finisterre.

You are therefore hereby required and directed to proceed in his Majesty's ship *Magicienne* under your command off Cape Finisterre, and having stretched off and on there for a week to the distance of from eight to thirty leagues west of the Cape, and not seeing or obtaining any positive intelligence of the privateer being there, you are to go off Cape Ortegale and cruise between the two Capes as long as your provisions and water will last, when you are to proceed to Plymouth, reporting your arrival and proceedings to Admiral Lord Keith.

You are, in the execution of this service, to consider the protection of the transports and trade along the coast as your sole object, and to use all possible vigilance and execution for their safety.

Given on board the *Lyra* at Passages the 16th of September, 1813.

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

¹ From Lloyd's I am informed only one of these transports was captured. A second, which had sailed under convoy of the *Cydus* frigate, was captured on 21st September. The only two in the very busy months of August, September, and October 1813.

To the Honourable Captain Gordon, H.M.S. Magicienne.

By command of } GEORGE EASTLAKE, Jun.,
the Rear-Admiral } Secretary.

B. MARTIN TO VICE-ADMIRAL MARTIN.

His Majesty's sloop *Lyra*, Passages, 16 September, 1813.

Sir,—I send for your consideration an extract of a letter which I this day received from Field-Marshal Lord Wellington, that in the event of the transports alluded to being at Lisbon, you may be in possession of his lordship's wishes respecting the application of them to the services of the army in this quarter.

I availed myself of the arrival of the *Pomone* to send you a letter which I otherwise should have forwarded by one of the cruisers on this coast.

The privateer after which I sent the *Magicienne* has, I understand from Lord Wellington,¹ captured several transports coming from Lisbon to Passages.

Before this reaches you the *Challenger* will have arrived at Lisbon, and will of course bring hither any vessels which may be bound to this neighbourhood, which is probably all that will be required before the new arrangement takes effect ; but on or about the 1st of October a ship of war will be sent to Corunna to wait for any ships coming from Lisbon, Oporto, or Mondego.

I am, &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

To Vice-Admiral Martin, &c. &c. &c., Lisbon.

¹ See note, p. 387.

*FROM REAR-ADMIRAL MARTIN TO VICE-ADMIRAL
MARTIN, COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF AT LISBON.*

His Majesty's sloop *Lyra*, Passages, September 16, 1813.

Sir,—I have to acquaint you that in consequence of orders from the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty I have been directed by Admiral Lord Keith to proceed to the head-quarters of Field-Marshal Lord Wellington for the purpose of ascertaining the nature and extent of the Field-Marshal's wishes respecting naval assistance and co-operation, and that among other arrangements it has been considered most convenient to the service, and most conformable to Lord Wellington's wishes, that four vessels of war should be exclusively employed in protecting the transports to and fro from Corunna to Passages, and that the same or a sufficient number of the ships under your command should be employed in bringing up the transports from Lisbon, Mondego, and Oporto to Corunna and back, so that a frequent and safe intercourse may be established.

I think it right to acquaint you that my orders are to issue on the spot such directions to the ships under Lord Keith's command as may be necessary, and that in the way most consistent with Lord Wellington's wishes.

I shall therefore immediately appropriate four vessels to the service, and I think my instructions warrant me in saying that it will be the wish that the whole arrangement should be carried promptly and fully into effect, and the ships under Admiral Lord Keith will be directed to begin acting upon it the 1st of October.

I am, &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

To Vice-Admiral Martin.

WELLINGTON, IN HIS OWN HANDWRITING, TO
B. MARTIN.

Leira : September 16th, 1813, 10 A.M.

Dear Sir,—I enclose you a letter for Lord Melville and two or three others which I request you to have put in the post office.

When the great fleet of transports which had been attached to this army in 1810 was sent back to England in 1811, a certain number of troop ships of war were attached to it, and were generally on the Lisbon station.

I requested the Admiral of the Lisbon station (at that time Admiral Berkeley) to send these ships round to the eastern coast at the commencement of the last campaign, in order that they might cooperate with the army then expected there from Sicily, whose operations, it was then believed, would be very closely connected, and would depend upon those of the fleet.

Circumstances have since altered, and the army on the eastern coast is a good deal independent of the fleet, while this army has become more dependent on its maritime communications. I therefore requested some time ago the General Lord William Bentinck to urge the Admiral Sir Edward Pellew to send all the troop ships of war round again to Lisbon. I shall be much obliged if you will draw the attention of the Admiralty to this subject.

It is very desirable that we should have the service of them to bring round reinforcements both for the British and Portuguese army, which are waiting at Gibraltar and Lisbon for want of vessels to transport and others to convoy them, and they would be very useful here in conveying the wounded

to England or to ports on the coast, and for the general purposes of the service.

I have the honour to be, dear sir,

Yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

Endorsed.—16th September, 1813. Marquis of Wellington, requesting transports may be sent to Lisbon.

B. MARTIN TO WELLINGTON.

Oyarzun : 16 September, 1813.

My Lord,—On my return from your lordship's head-quarters yesterday afternoon I sent the *Magicienne* off Cape Finisterre in quest of the privateers which have been represented to your lordship as cruising so successfully in that quarter, and Captain Gordon, who commands that ship, is directed to continue between Cape Finisterre and Cape Ortegual for three months to protect the navigation along the coast.

I at the same time directed the *Lyra* and *Arrow* to proceed off *Santoña* and blockade that place as rigorously as possible, and not to permit the fishing boats to contribute in any degree by their supplies to the maintenance of the garrison.

The captain of the *Lyra* is to apprise the Spanish officer commanding before *Santoña* of the purport of his orders, and to give him every assistance which may be necessary for the annoyance and distress of the enemy.

On the arrival of the *Cydnus*, now hourly expected, I intend to join her in the blockade of *Santoña*, after which there will remain applicable to other duties the ships named in the margin,¹ so that to complete the number of vessels to meet your

¹ See page 389.

lordship's wishes, there remains to be sent to the coast one brig, and additional vessels for coast convoys, but in the meantime this part of the arrangement will not experience any delay, as the Challenger is already at Lisbon and the Sylvia at Oporto waiting for convoy.

I beg to state to your lordship that I have this day been to the mouth of the Bidassoa, and I find it capable of giving better security to small vessels than I had been led to expect, though certainly not such as can be deemed altogether safe anchorage in the winter season ; it is, however, highly important to find that sort of refuge for the small cruisers which is so necessary to encourage a perseverance in the hazardous duty assigned to them ; and in which I confess, my lord, that I do not think their best exertions will tend in any material degree to obstruct the communication of the enemy between the Gironde and St. Jean de Luz ; and the enemy, aware of the impossibility of our sending any ships of war into this corner of the bay, will presently bring forward a force that will almost dare the approach of these small vessels.

That nothing, however, may be left undone to forward your lordship's wishes, I have given a plan of a light, easy to be constructed at the Point of Higuera, that will be necessary for the guidance of the vessels, and I apprehend it will be found expedient to place a few guns there for their protection.

Under the sanction of your lordship's opinion respecting the perfect security of Passages against any attempt from the enemy, I shall direct the Surveillante to come into the harbour during the period of the equinox.

Before I leave Passages it will be satisfactory to me to know that I have in no instance misunder-

stood your lordship's wishes, which it is my duty, and I can truly say my desire, to promote by every possible means.

I have the honour to, &c.
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

P.S.—I beg to transmit a copy of the papers which I before submitted to your lordship, describing the naval force which I understood your lordship would wish to have on this coast.

To Lord Wellington.

*WELLINGTON, IN HIS OWN HAND, TO
B. MARTIN.*

Leira, September 17, 1813, $\frac{1}{2}$ past 9 A.M.

Dear Sir,—I have received your letter from Oyarzun and off Passages of yesterday.

In answer to the first I have to observe that I know that Admiral George Martin will send round the troop ships of war, or any other infantry troops he can get, with the 37th regiment from Gibraltar, the 77th from Lisbon, and about 1,200 Portuguese drafts, and a considerable number of recovered English soldiers who were waiting in Portugal for means of conveyance. The object of my letter of yesterday was to urge you to request the Admiralty to order these troop ships round from the eastern to the western coast of the Peninsula.

From the conversation I had with you here I understood that four vessels of those under Sir George Collier were to be constantly employed in taking convoys from Passages to Corunna and from Corunna to Passages; and the same number under Admiral George Martin, from Corunna to Lisbon. From your letter written on board the Creole of yesterday, I observe that two of the vessels of those

under Sir George Collier are already on the coast of Portugal, and are to bring convoys from thence.

I certainly have nothing to say to this subject, and as long as the convoys come safely, and with the regularity which is permitted by the state of the weather, it is a matter of indifference to me how they are disposed, and I can only form a private opinion on the subject, which private opinion may not deserve much attention. If, however, I have misunderstood you, and four vessels only are to be employed in convoys between this and Lisbon, I cannot but be of opinion that they will not be sufficient.

If Sir George Collier will send me the plan of the lighthouse, and will let me know where it is to be constructed, I will have it constructed. It will also be necessary that he should land for us the guns to be placed at Point Higuera.

I have the honour to be, dear Sir,

Yours most faithfully,

WELLINGTON.

Endorsed.—17th September, 1813; Marquis of Wellington respecting convoys, troop ships, and lighthouse.

FROM MARTIN TO WELLINGTON.

Passages, 17 September, 1813.

My Lord,—I did not intend that my letter to your lordship of yesterday's date should in the slightest degree suggest a difference in the number of vessels to be employed in taking the convoys, but merely to recapitulate what had been verbally approved by your lordship, and to ascertain, before leaving Passages, that I was in possession of your

lordship's wishes in respect to the degree of naval assistance requisite to meet your expectations.

Your lordship is perfectly right in stating it, as the result of our conversation, that four vessels of war belonging to the ships under Sir George Collier should be exclusively employed in passing the convoys to and from Passages to Corunna, and *four* ships from the Lisbon station in taking convoys from that place to Corunna and back ; and this will be acted upon forthwith.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
(Signed) T. B. MARTIN.

To Lord Wellington.

By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Rear-Admiral of the White, &c. &c. &c.

Pursuant to directions from Admiral Lord Keith.

You are hereby required and directed to proceed to Basque Roads with the ship under your command, and the Bellona, and follow the orders of Rear-Admiral Sir Harry Neale for your further proceedings.

Given on board the Lyra in Passages this 17th September, 1813.

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

To Captain Otway, his Majesty's ship Ajax.

By command of	}	GEORGE EASTLAKE, Jun.,
the Rear-Admiral		

FROM MARTIN TO COLLIER.

Passages, 17 September, 1813.

Sir,—In consequence of arrangements with Field-Marshal Lord Wellington respecting the naval force which his lordship thinks may be

necessary to adjust and co-operate with the army in the progress of his views,

I have to direct your attention to the following points, which you will carry into execution as punctually and effectually as possible.

It is considered desirable, with a view to a certain and frequent communication between Lisbon, Mondego, and Oporto, and the ports most contiguous to the main army, that four ships of war should be exclusively employed in escorting the transports to and fro between Passages and Corunna, where they will be met by ships of the Lisbon station appropriated to the same service between Corunna and the other ports.

This arrangement, if well attended to, is considered capable of affording that active intercourse between the ports that the Field-Marshal so much desires, and it will be time enough for it to commence the first week in October, because the Challenger is now at Lisbon and the Sylvia at Oporto, to return hither with the convoy.

I have apprised Vice-Admiral Martin of this arrangement, and have no doubt he will meet it, so as to prevent any obstacle to its execution at the period I have mentioned; but you will, of course, make it the first object of your attention to prevent the possibility of delay in bringing the supplies coastways to the army.

Another object considered of the highest importance by the Field-Marshal is that of cutting off the supplies between the Gironde and St. Jean de Luz, and you are to leave nothing undone, consistently with the safety of the vessels employed on this service, to enforce the most active, persevering, and vigilant attention to this duty; and in order to give confidence to the small vessels, the Field-Marshal has agreed to erect lights at the Point of Higuera

as a guide to the anchorage under that Cape, and guns for their protection.

I have now directed Captain Locke, of the Sparrow, to take under his orders the Constant, Nimble, and Holly, and to cruise for the above purpose between St. Jean de Luz and Arcachon, and you will in future so regulate the dispositions of the ships under your orders as to keep four vessels always on the above service, warning them to be very cautious and guarded against attack from the enemy's row boats.

I have directed the Lyra and Arrow to blockade Santoña, which Lord Wellington is anxious should be done as rigorously as possible, and you will see by the accompanying order to Lieutenant Campbell, commanding the Lyra, how strictly I have enforced his attention to this duty.

In the possible case of the army under Lord Wellington falling back and thereby exposing Passages to an attack from the enemy, it is necessary that two large anchors, one beyond the other, should be laid down to haul the transports out; indeed, this under any circumstances is a necessary measure to enable vessels to get out expeditiously from so narrow a harbour.

You are therefore to procure two of the heaviest anchors from the largest transports (being those permanently there), and if possible iron cables, and direct the anchors to be carefully placed for the above purpose.

But as the Field-Marshal assures me there is no cause of apprehension for the safety of Passages, you are to bring his Majesty's ship under your command into the harbour to refit, and to be sheltered from the bad weather that may be expected now on the approach of the equinox.

When the Andromache joins, you are to send

her to England with the transports having on board French prisoners, unless it is found expedient to send them sooner, in which case you will employ the *Andromache* in such manner as may best supply the absence of the necessary number of vessels to complete Lord Wellington's expectations of naval assistance, as described in the accompanying paper.

I am, &c.,

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

To Captain Sir George R. Collier, Knt., H.M. ship *Surveillante*.

MARTIN TO REAR-ADMIRAL SIR H. NEALE.

H.M.S. *Lyra*, Passages, September 17, 1813.

Sir,—Understanding from Lord Keith that he would apprise you of the object of my mission to Lord Wellington's head-quarters, it is right I should inform you of such part of the arrangements as may have connection with the squadron under your command, and also relating to the force to be employed along the north coast of Spain.

It has in the first instance been admitted by Lord Wellington that line-of-battle ships are not now required, and I have therefore directed the *Fancy* to cruise two days in the stream of Bordeaux for the purpose of delivering to Captain Otway an order to return to Basque Roads; but Lord Wellington considers it desirable that a line-of-battle ship should occasionally and at convenient seasons show herself off the Cordouan lighthouse and towards Archachon.

I transmit a paper describing the naval force which Lord Wellington thinks necessary to assist and co-operate with the army, and also a statement

of the disposition of the force along this coast, by which you will see that one brig and four other vessels suited to the protection of the transports along the coast will be necessary to fulfil his lordship's expectations.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

P.S.—Lord Wellington having received intelligence of the capture of some army transports in the neighbourhood of Cape Finisterre, I have sent the *Magicienne* to cruise between Cape Ortegal and Cape Finisterre as long as her provisions and water will last, and the *Andromache* will be ordered to England with transports having prisoners on board the moment she appears.

If you can make it convenient to send a sloop of war to join Sir George Collier before the 1st of October it will be very desirable in order to fulfil Lord Wellington's wishes respecting the convoys between this place and Corunna; and as there are no small vessels ready to take despatches, I trust it may be found suitable to your arrangements to send back the *Fancy* cutter.

T. B. M.

By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Rear-Admiral of the White, &c. &c. &c.

You are hereby required and directed to take under your orders the vessels named in the margin [not given] and proceed with them and the sloop you command to cruise between Arcachon and St. Jean de Luz for the purpose of intercepting the supplies of the enemy going coastways to the French army, and you are to use the utmost possible vigilance in the execution of this service, which Field-Marshal Lord Wellington considers of the highest importance.

The anchorage under the Point of Higuera appears to afford good protection for small vessels, and you are to proceed there whenever it is necessary to take shelter; but that you may be encouraged to persevere in the execution of this duty the Field-Marshal will direct a light to be established on the point for their guidance and guns for their protection. You are to be constantly on your guard against any attack from the enemy's row boats, which it may be presumed will be active in protecting their coast.

Given on board the *Lyra*, Passages, 17 September, 1813.

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

To F. E. Locke, Esq., Commander of his Majesty's sloop *Sparrow*.

By command of	} GEORGE EASTLAKE Jun.,
the Rear-Admiral	

By Thomas Byam Martin, Esq., Rear-Admiral of the White, &c. &c. &c.

It being necessary that Santoña and its port should be closely watched and blockaded, as well with a view to distress the enemy now in possession of that place as to prevent the corvette and small privateers which are there from annoying our trade passing along the coast,

You are, therefore, hereby required and directed to take under your orders the vessel named in the margin [not given], and, together with the sloop you command, proceed off Santoña for the purpose above stated, taking care not to be drawn from this service in chase, or to allow any other object to divert you from the closest possible blockade of the port, which Field-Marshal the Marquis of Wellington deems of the highest importance in order to possess him-

self of the place ; and that this may be done the more effectually, and his lordship's views the more speedily accomplished, you are not to permit any fishing boats to pass in and out ; but as it appears they have hitherto been allowed to do so, you are to notify by the first boats you can meet that such indulgence will not be allowed in future.

You are to obtain an early communication with the Spanish officer now investing Santoña by land and apprise him of the purport of your orders.

Given on board the *Lyra*, Passages, 17th September, 1813.

T. B. MARTIN, Rear-Admiral.

To Lieutenant Campbell, acting in the command of his Majesty's sloop *Lyra*.

By command of	} GEORGE EASTLAKE, Jun., Secretary.
the Rear-Admiral	

REAR-ADMIRAL MARTIN TO LORD KEITH.

Report of proceedings.

His Majesty's Sloop *Creole*, at sea, 21 September, 1813.

My Lord,—I have the honour to inform your lordship that I arrived at Passages in the night of Monday, the 13th inst., and the following morning at daybreak I despatched a message to head-quarters with the accompanying letter¹ announcing to Lord Wellington the purport of my mission ; and that I should follow as soon as I could find the means of doing so. In truth I was anxious to delay a few hours that the Field-Marshal might read his despatches, and be prepared for the subject to which they alluded.

¹ See page 383.

I have reason to believe the precaution of sending forward his lordship's letters tended very much to smooth the discussion which was to follow, and besides avoiding an abrupt appearance at the headquarters it gave me time to inform myself upon some essential points.

At two o'clock the same day I arrived at Lesaca. I was immediately introduced to the Field-Marshal, who received me with a cordiality that promised all that harmony and good humour which it was so desirable to preserve ; and, anxious to draw his lordship's consideration at once to prospective arrangements, I observed that the letters which I had forwarded, rather than wait the ceremony of delivering them personally, would have sufficiently apprised him of my being sent to ascertain and to forward his wishes in respect to naval assistance ; upon which his lordship observed how inadequate the force had hitherto been, and recapitulated with some warmth the several topics alluded to in his letter to Lord Bathurst, and dwelt much upon the frequency of his unavailing representations on the subject of naval co-operation. His lordship said since the taking of St. Sebastian (Sept. 9) he had ascertained that the enemy had had almost a constant communication with France, and that they obtained reinforcements and supplies with the utmost facility.

The Portuguese troops being employed in clearing some transports and in removing shot from out of the boats to the shore, was described as a duty belonging more to seamen than to soldiers.

In respect to an observation contained in one of Lord Wellington's letters to Lord Bathurst, 'that he believed the naval superiority of the enemy to be such that they might at any time drive the Surveillante and squadron from before the place,' his lordship admitted that he had made it from a belief that

the enemy had a frigate at Bayonne, and because the *Surveillante* was in a dismantled state, having part of her men and guns landed.¹

His lordship then adverted to the unprotected state of the coast and the insufficiency of the squadron under Vice-Admiral Martin, in proof of which, he said a letter received from him that day was dated on board the *Wellington* tender, and, as another proof of his assertion, he read me a letter from an officer² of the medical staff (as I understood) stating the capture of two transports off Cape Finisterre on the 25th of August, by the *Lion* privateer, and that he had reason to believe she had taken or destroyed nine others.

Speaking of the convoys with supplies for the army coastways, his lordship lamented that it was thought expedient to let the transports run singly, and thought there was a clashing of commands, and perhaps something like jealousy in sending the ships beyond their limits; he said it might be better for the service if one officer commanded from Gibraltar to the bottom of the bay. Upon these several points I observed that if his lordship had been disappointed as to extent of naval assistance, it was neither imputable to the Admiralty nor to your lordship (Keith), but, as it appeared, to Sir George Collier's erroneous conception of his lordship's wishes; for he had distinctly stated the force required, as his words are:

¹ These seamen, naval guns and stores were landed to make up for military deficiencies in artillerymen and Ordnance stores, and to perform duties, to parody Wellington's observation above, 'belonging more to soldiers than to seamen.'

² Who, of course, only went on hearsay. By the courtesy of the Secretary at Lloyds, I have ascertained only one transport was taken by the *Lion*, and not another transport was captured in August or September, and only one in October which had sailed under convoy. About twenty-five merchant vessels were captured in the vicinity of Cape Finisterre during August and September.

'to insure the fulfilment of your lordship's wishes, as well as those of Lord Wellington;' and at the moment when that application reached the Admiralty, the squadron under Sir George Collier had been so increased as to exceed his request by two vessels.

After quoting this part of Sir George's letter, I observed that one of a subsequent date described the disposition of the force without the slightest allusion to its being inadequate to the duties required, and that I believed the Admiralty must have been taken very much by surprise when the recent representations to that effect were made.

In respect to reinforcements being thrown into St. Sebastian, it was to be expected from its being so contiguous to the French coast, and my own opinion is that there would be nothing in the least degree surprising if they succeeded in doing so nineteen times out of twenty; for boats intent upon such an object come with muffled oars, and so quietly that unless they actually pull on board one of the guard boats, there is scarce a chance of their being intercepted.

The complaint of the Portuguese troops being employed in clearing the transports induced me to observe that if the men from the *Surveillante* had not been engaged in military duties on shore they would no doubt have done that which is more immediately their business.

Lord Wellington's unfounded surmise that the naval force of the enemy was so superior as to be able to drive off the small squadron under Sir George Collier being admitted as conjecture, I had only to state that even if it had been so the Admiralty could not be aware that the *Surveillante* had been so dismantled for military purposes as his lordship described.

In respect to his lordship's complaint of the unprotected state of the coast, and of Vice-Admiral Martin's flag being on board the tender, it was to be inferred from that that the ships were all engaged in giving convoy, or that protection the want of which was complained of.

Upon the authentic fact of the capture of the two transports, and the apprehension of further depredations by the *Lion* privateer, I gave Captain Gordon, of the *Magicienne*, the accompanying orders.¹

The accompanying paper,² which I delivered to Lord Wellington, contains a reply to his observations respecting the transports passing without convoy, and I thought his lordship expressed himself satisfied with it.

And the proposal that *four* vessels of war belonging to your lordship's squadron should be exclusively employed in escorting the transports to and fro between Passages and Corunna, and *four* of the Lisbon ships assigned to that service between Lisbon and Corunna, appeared also to meet Lord Wellington's wishes most fully, and on the original of the accompanying paper³ describing this plan, he marked with his pencil 'and the *Mondego*'—which I mention to show how much he seemed to enter into the idea, which I said was suggested with the twofold view of obviating the suspicion of any clashing or jealousy in the commands and to prevent the Admiralty and the Commander-in-Chief being perplexed by any indefinite number of vessels that might seem to be required for such service; and as Corunna is one of the ports with which a communication is to be kept up, I trust your lordship will consider this arrangement to combine all the advantages

¹ See page 390.

² See page 385 &c.

³ See page 388, portion of B. M.'s observations on naval co-operation with army.

proposed by it without anything to render it objectionable.

In the course of our conversation, Lord Wellington, alluding to naval assistance, made a very remarkable observation. His words were : ' If anyone wishes to know the history of this war, I will tell them that it is our maritime superiority gives me the power of maintaining my army while the enemy are unable to do so.' I replied that the observation was very striking, and that it placed the services of the Admiralty in a more valuable light than I had been aware of, for I knew as a fact, which had in a great measure fallen under my own knowledge and execution at Plymouth, that their anxiety to forward reinforcements and supplies could not be exceeded, and that vessels loaded one day were hurried off without waiting for those which would be ready the next, so that distinct convoys were assigned for each day, and I added that his lordship would perhaps be surprised when I told him that twenty-two sail of vessels of war had arrived off Passages during the month of August, besides the squadron previously there under Sir George Collier, and that this should not appear like mere conjectural assertion I presented his lordship with a list of their names, adding that at a moment when the American war occasioned such great and extensive claims upon the navy, I was sure that giving so large a force to one object must have perplexed the Admiralty in answering other calls. His lordship seemed astonished at what I had stated, and said ' he was certainly very much obliged to the Admiralty for it,' but persisted in saying there had not been force enough stationed on the coast. To this I could only reply that I was sure his lordship would consider my being sent to his head-quarters as an earnest of the willingness of the Admiralty to afford him every possible assistance,

and that I was confident the same feeling had always operated on the minds of the Board and of your lordship, and that his disappointment had originated in the want of information as to the extent of his wishes.

In the margin of the original of the accompanying paper¹ Lord Wellington wrote with his pencil, 'There is no reason whatever why line-of-battle ships should now remain off the coast. It might be desirable that occasionally in fine weather one should appear to the southward, but it appears impossible, and indeed it is not now necessary, they should remain.'

In consequence of this I wrote Rear-Admiral Sir Harry Neale the accompanying letter,² and left orders for the *Ajax* and *Bellona* to return to Basque Roads.

Lord Wellington, when speaking of his idea of a sea attack upon St. Sebastian, said he had sent some military officers—viz. General Pakenham, Lord Aylmer, and Colonel Thornton—to examine it with Sir George Collier, and that they had reported it impracticable.

I thought it right to remark to Lord Wellington that the harbour of Passages was so narrow that in the event of his falling back it would be impossible for the many transports now there to escape from the enemy unless the wind should be fair; but his lordship spoke so confidently of his being able to defend it that I had only to apologise for the observation, and said, as there was no apprehension on that score, I should order the *Surveillante* into the harbour; for as Sir George Collier's superintendence of the duties of the port, and the direction of the convoy, &c., was indispensably necessary, and the ship was not safe at anchor on the coast, there was

¹ See page 385.

² See page 401.

the choice only of sending Sir George away or bringing the ship into safety.

To make it more practicable for the shipping to get out of Passages, I directed Sir George Collier to procure from two of the large stationary transports, anchors and iron cables to lay down, one without the other, just outside the harbour, by which the ships may haul out with convenience and expedition.

I trust your lordship will approve of my having ordered the *Surveillante* into Passages during the period of the equinox; but I beg to remark that it is purely with a view to the safety of the ship, and not for any services she can render it in the harbour, as there are 976 men and boys belonging to the transports, and it may be reckoned on an average that 300 will be constantly in port to do the necessary duties.

Your lordship will observe by the statement in the accompanying paper¹ that one frigate is expected to be cruising on the coast, and of course some arrangement is required by which Sir George Collier may either remain on the spot, or be at liberty to make his ship duty a first consideration, for if it were blown off the coast a question might arise as to his authority on shore.

It is due to Sir George Collier to inform your lordship that Lord Wellington spoke of him in terms of unqualified praise, and his long connection with the army seems to fit him peculiarly for the situation he is in.

The *Andromache* not being required on the coast according the present arrangement, and as a strong convoy was requisite to bring home four transports with prisoners, I left directions for

¹ First paragraph, p. 388.

Captain Tobin to take charge of them, and the ship appeared off as I came away.

Lord Wellington appeared very earnest about intercepting the supplies of the enemy passing from Arcachon to St. Jean de Luz, and I promised to go to Fuenterrabia, and Point Higuera at the entrance of the Bidassoa, to see what sort of shelter it might afford to our small cruisers.

I had previously directed Lieutenant Stokes, of the *Constant*, to report upon the anchorage, and his opinion confirms the remark I made to General Graham, who accompanied me, 'that though perhaps not absolutely safe the anchorage under Higuera was more sheltered than I expected to find it'—and I suggested the necessity of placing two lights on the point for the guidance of the vessels, which will no doubt tend to encourage a perseverance in this important duty; and two lights are necessary to distinguish Higuera from the lights at the west end of St. Sebastian, which I requested Lord Wellington would order into use as essential to the navigation in the winter season.

Your lordship will perceive that I have directed Captain Loch, of the *Sparrow*, whose activity is much to be depended upon, to cruise with the *Constant*, *Nimble*, and *Holly* between Arcachon and St. Jean de Luz.

I transmit for your lordship's information several letters and papers; and on reference to the paper of observations¹ you will observe that one brig, one bomb vessel, six flat boats, and four vessels fit for coast convoy are necessary to fulfil Lord Wellington's expectations of naval assistance.

I have endeavoured to state with scrupulous accuracy all that has passed in the execution of the duty with which I have been entrusted; and it will

¹ Observations on force, pp. 385-9.

give me great satisfaction if I have acquitted myself so as to meet your lordship's approbation.

Lord Wellington having directed a part of the Spanish army to invest Santoña, I sent the *Lyra* and *Arrow* to blockade that port, and it was thought by his lordship that the frigate stationed on the coast would perhaps be necessary to do it the more effectually. This again calls for some speedy arrangement by which the *Surveillante* may be actively employed along the coast, but at present I considered Sir George Collier's personal attendance at Passages the more important duty of the two.

It was in speaking of Santoña that the idea occurred of the probable usefulness of a bomb vessel, and I said it was likely that a vessel of that description might be returned from the Baltic by the time I reached England.

I have the honour to be, my lord,
Your lordship's most obedient humble servant,
T. B. MARTIN.

P.S.—I beg particularly to call your lordship's attention to Lord Wellington's letter dated the 16th inst.¹

KEITH TO MARTIN.

Warspite, in Cawsand Bay, 22nd September, 1813.

Sir,—I had the honour to receive your letter of yesterday's date, with the several papers which accompanied it, giving an account of your proceedings in executing the mission on which you were despatched to the Marquis of Wellington relative to the naval service on the coast of Spain.

I fully approve of all the arrangements that you

¹ Page 393.

have made, and have not failed to call the attention of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to the prudence, zeal, and judgment which you have evinced in executing the important service confided to you.

I have the honour to be, sir,
Your most obedient humble servant,
(Signed) KEITH, Admiral.

To Rear-Admiral Martin.

*VICE-ADMIRAL DOMETT, ADMIRALTY, TO
B. MARTIN.*

[*Extract.*]

September 28, 1813.

My dear Sir,—We have said by telegraph, ‘Send flat boats to Sir G. Collier,’ and Bickerton has been directed also to send four from Portsmouth. Lord Keith has already been directed to act upon your arrangement and to give that service the preference, and we shall have the Vesuvius bomb ready to sail to join Sir George Collier the moment we can get her manned.

LORD KEITH TO REAR-ADMIRAL MARTIN.

Warspite, in Cawsand Bay, 29 September, 1813.

Sir,—I have great satisfaction in transmitting to you the enclosed copy of a letter from the Secretary of the Admiralty expressing their lordships’ entire approbation of your conduct upon the important mission on which you were sent to the Marquis of Wellington.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
(Signed) KEITH, Admiral.
Rear-Admiral Martin.

MR. CROKER TO LORD KEITH.

Admiralty Office, 27 September, 1813.

My Lord,—I have received and communicated to my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your lordship's letter of the 22nd inst., transmitting to me for their information a report which you had received from Rear-Admiral Martin of his proceedings upon the mission to the Marquis of Wellington, directed in my letter to your lordship of the 3rd inst., and I am commanded by their lordships to express to you their entire approbation of the conduct of the Rear-Admiral upon the important service entrusted to his care, and to desire you will signify the same to him.

I have the honour to be, &c.,

(Signed) J. W. CROKER.

Admiral Lord Keith, K.B. &c. &c. &c.

LORD MELVILLE TO REAR-ADMIRAL MARTIN.

[Private.]

Wimbledon, 4 October, 1813.

Dear Sir,—I received when at Portsmouth your letter of the 22nd ult. and have also perused your very satisfactory report of your mission. It has fully answered the purpose which I intended by it, a result which is chiefly to be ascribed to the manner in which it has been executed on your part. The account you give of Lord Wellington's conversation and remarks on my letter is very characteristic of him, and of the manly and honourable feelings which distinguish him.

I have also to thank you for the sketches which you sent me, and I have the honour to remain,

Dear Sir, your most obedient and faithful servant,

MELVILLE.

Rear-Admiral Martin.

(There are no letters of Byam Martin amongst his papers, for the remainder of the year 1813—he having resumed his post as second in command at Plymouth on his return from Spain. He had no more real war service. The third volume will commence with his mission, after Napoleon's downfall in 1814, as chief of the English commission sent to Antwerp to co-operate with Dutch and French commissions to arrange for the distribution of the ships in the naval arsenal at Antwerp.)

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