LETTERS

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

LORD HAWKESBURY,

AND TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

HENRY ADDINGTON,

ON THE

PEACE WITH BUONAPARTÉ,

TO WHICH IS ADDED,

AN APPENDIX,

Containing a Collection (now greatly enlarged) of all the Conventions, Treaties, Speeches, and other Documents, connected with the Subject.

BY WILLIAM COBBETT.

"They shall seek *Peace*, and there shall be none. Mischief shall come upon Mischief, "and Rumour shall be upon Rumour: the Law shall perish from the Priest, and the "Council from the Ancients. The King shall mourn, and the Prince shall be clothed "with Desolation, and the Hands of the People of the Land shall be troubled."

Ezekiel, vii. 26.

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PEACE WITH BUONAPARTÉ.

A

SERIES OF LETTERS

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

LORD HAWKESBURY,

&c. &c. &c.

LETTER I.

Pall-Mall, 12*th Oct.* 1801.

MY LORD,

THE PORCUPINE, of which I was the founder, and of which I am still the Proprietor*, has, ever since the terms of the PEACE have been promulgated, borne a distinguished part in disapproving of those terms. On this important subject, it has contained several articles, which, while their literary merit have commanded the admiration, have not failed to

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* These letters were first published in THE PORCUPINE, of which paper, at the date of this letter, I was still the Proprietor, but in which I have had no concern, either as Proprietor, or Conductor, since the 21st of November, 1801.

awaken the fears, and to direct the opinions, of the public.

By those, who are not accustomed to examine and compare the characteristics of style, these articles have, of course, been imputed to me; and, while it appeared probable that they might draw down popular vengeance on the head of the writer, I scorned to make the slightest attempt to remove the imputation; but, now, when the "*tumult of* "*exultation* and *delirium of joy*" have somewhat subsided, when the citizens have suspended, for a time, the exercise of their "*imprescriptible rights*," when, in plain English, the reign of the rabble has given place to the reign of the law, now, it is my duty to yield this literary honour to the Gentleman, to whom it belongs, and to whose zeal, talents, and perseverance, the Church and the Monarchy of England owe that support, the want of which, I greatly fear, they will, at no very distant day, have occasion to lament.

But, my Lord, though I cheerfully resign all the honour of *writing* the articles, above alluded to, I resign no part of that which is to be derived from participating in the principles and sentiments of the writer. As to communications from Correspon-

dents, and little straggling paragraphs, the Conductor of a paper is never looked upon as being politically responsible for their contents; but, with respect to the Leading Articles of THE PORCUPINE, on the subject of the Peace, I do most implicitly subscribe to every sentiment contained in them; and, were I to propose an addition to any of their qualities, it would be to the keenness of their censure.

Censure, as well as applause, if unaccompanied with the reasons, whereon it is founded, seldom produces any very lasting effect; and, as I have not resumed the pen for the purpose of furnishing amusement for an idle hour, I shall, in the series, to which this letter is merely an introduction, go at some length into an examination of the measure, which you and your colleagues have thought proper to adopt, and shall, unless I am very much deceived, most clearly prove to you, that that measure is not less dangerous in its consequences, than it is disgraceful in itself. I am,

MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most humble
and most obedient Servant,
WM. COBBETT

LETTER II.

Pall-Mall, 14*th Oct.* 1801.

My Lord,

Before I say any thing about the more distant, though inevitable, effects of the Treaty, which you have signed, I think it necessary to take some notice of those effects, which the bare knowledge of its existence has already produced, and brought home to our doors.

It requires no very great degree of penetration to discover, that your Lordship would gladly draw a veil over the scandalous occurrences of the last seven days, particularly those of Saturday. Nor should I have much objection to follow your example, were I not well persuaded, that every attempt to disguise our situation will only tend to accelerate the consummation of our ruin.

From the moment that it was *resolved* (for what *reasons* you and Mr. Addington, and Mr. Pitt best can tell) to make Peace, every one at all connected or acquainted with the *press*, could perceive the uncommon pains that had been taken to prepare the public for a favourable reception of whatever terms

terms BUONAPARTÉ might be prevailed on to grant, and to give a Ministerial direction to the popular applause, which it was easy to foresee would be excited by any Peace, however injurious and dishonourable to the country. When, therefore, it was perceived, that the signing of the Preliminaries occasioned what the most servile of all the servile echoes of the Treasury was pleased to term, the "*tumult of exultation* and *delirium of joy*," it was fondly imagined, in the regions of Whitehall, that the measure had completely answered its purpose; that the Ministers would now be supported by the unanimous voice of the nation, and would be immoveably fixed in the *enjoyment of their places*, an object which some people are ill-natured or ignorant enough to regard as not the least important of the Treaty.

Leaving this uncharitable suspicion to be removed by a continuation of that disinterestedness, which has hitherto so strongly marked the character of the present Administration, I shall now proceed to lay before your Lordship, a narrative of facts, which will clearly convince you, that no part of the admiration and gratitude, inspired by the Peace, falls to the lot of you and your Colleagues.

On

On Friday last (the 9th of October), the Ratification of the Preliminary Treaty was brought to Dover, by CITIZEN LAURISTON. The people of Dover, like those of other places, had, previously to the arrival of this man, expressed their joy at the return of Peace, without passing, however, any commendations on those who had made it; but, the moment this *Citizen* set his foot on shore, the moment this harbinger of happiness arrived from the land of liberty, where the holy right of insurrection had been exercised with such memorable success, the whole nation seemed to be drunk with delight. The CITIZEN was drawn through all the towns from Dover to London, by the two-legged beasts inhabiting those towns. Notwithstanding this interruption, he arrived here time enough in the evening to have waited on your Lordship; but he very prudently deferred his visit till the next morning, when a fresh set of Citizens stood ready to serve him in the capacity of horses or asses, of which he did them the honour very graciously to accept. Being seated in the coach with Citizen OTTO, and another person, of whom I shall speak hereafter, the beasts drew him down Bond-street, down St. James's-street, to the front of the KING's Palace, where they

they stopped and gave him the cheer of triumph. They next drew him along Pall-Mall to the Prince of WALES's Palace, where they repeated their plaudits. Your Lordship must remember his triumphal entry into your Office in Downing-street, and, I believe, very few are disposed to envy you your feelings on the occasion. He was next drawn to the Admiralty, where it is hard to conceive what business he could have, unless it were to witness the humiliation of England, on the very spot, whence had issued the orders for the humiliation of France. Lord St. VINCENT gave him a very polite reception, and, giving the appellation of "*gentlemen*" to the wretches who were dragging the carriage, requested them to be "careful of the strangers, and not "overturn them;" to which a fellow amongst the crowd replied: "Never you trouble your head "about that; *take care we don't overturn somebody* "*else*." He was drawn to the Horse-Guards, through which the soldiers, participating, I suppose, in the feelings of all around them, suffered the carriage to enter the Park, and to pass on to St. James's through the Mall, a road exclusively appropriated to the carriages of the ROYAL FAMILY. I purposely omit a description of the CITIZEN's visit to the

Duke

Duke of York, and of the reception given to him by his Royal Highness, sincerely wishing that I could hide them for ever from the knowledge of the world.

When the Citizen arrived at his lodgings, the brutes who had drawn him, and those who had followed his triumphal car, pressed round the door, to see and to salute him. Those who came within reach of him, *kissed* his hands, his jacket, his pantaloons, and his boots; those who were not able to get at any part of his precious person, went on their knees and kissed the stones he had walked upon; while others were obliged to content themselves with slobbering the coach and the poor unfortunate horses, who, when they passed my door, seemed ashamed to accompany the beasts that had usurped their office.

The act of taking off the horses and drawing a man's carriage, is nothing new in the history of popular phrenzy; but, for *Englishmen* to bestow this highest mark of admiration and love on a *Frenchman*, is something new; and it clearly indicates such a change in the sentiments and affections of the people, as must fill every reflecting mind with the most serious apprehension. Those who cannot

bear

bear to look danger in the face, would fain persuade us, that this disgusting scene was not the effect of any settled partiality, but was a mere momentary ebullition of joy at the return of Peace, and at the prospect of Plenty! But, if so, how comes it that this joy did not break forth sooner? How comes it that no such mark of popular gratitude was bestowed on Mr. ADDINGTON, on your LORDSHIP, or on Mr. PITT? Every man in London knows, that you made the Peace: every one has read your elegant letter to the LORD MAYOR, and has seen your name at the foot of the Treaty itself; yet, my Lord, have your horses been suffered to draw you along very quietly, and without the least danger of the rivalship of the mob. During this war, how many Commanders have returned to England covered with glory; yet, not one of them, nor all of them put together, have received, from the people of England, a thousandth part of the caresses, which they bestowed on a Frenchman, who brought them the terms of a Peace, acknowledged by themselves to be disgraceful to their country.

It is, indeed, very true, that CITIZEN LAURISTON was, by people in general, taken to be *one of*

the brothers of BUONAPARTÉ, which (however unpleasant the fact may be) was certainly one cause of the popular adoration; but, the real truth is, that nine-tenths of the lower orders of the people, saw in CITIZEN LAURISTON, not merely a BUONAPARTÉ, nor a Frenchman, but a republican, a leveller, one of that nation who have murdered a King, a Queen, a Prince, and a Princess; who have stripped the Nobles of their titles, and rifled the treasures of the rich; who have abolished tithes, and driven the Clergy into exile; who have, in short, made distinction and property of every species change hands; who have raised the vile and the poor upon the ruins of rank and of fortune. The people here look upon the present French as *a nation of poor men*, who, after a long and arduous struggle, have recovered the possession of that property, and of all those other good things, which the great and the rich had, for centuries, unjustly with-held from them. They therefore rejoice at the Peace, because they hope, with him who promises very fair to be their leader, that the Peace will soon enable them "to follow the glorious example." Be you assured, my Lord, whatever your minions may tell you to the contrary,

contrary, that this, and this alone, is the great cause of the "*tumult of exultation* and the *delirium of joy*."

As an apology for the *nation*, it is said, that the miscreants, who drew LAURISTON were *hired* for the purpose. So it was said of the cut-throats of Paris. But, then, we naturally ask, *who hired them?* And where did the person who hired them go to find ten thousand wretches, base enough to participate in this detestable act? To say that they were hired by any body but the agents of France would be to ascribe to one part of the nation what is thus taken from the affections of another part; and, if the agents of France are already able to hire the populace, in every town from Dover to London inclusive, what may we not expect from their future exertions? Citizen LAURISTON threw the mob a handful or two of guineas ("*l'or de Pitt*"); but this was rather by way of compliment than reward; and, in short, it must be evident to every one, that this story about *hiring* the beastly crowd, is no more than a very weak attempt to disguise a most shameful and ominous truth.

While CITIZEN LAURISTON was exciting the "tumult of exultation" in the street, a numerous body of Citizens (not less than two thousand,) assembled at the Shakespeare Tavern, were giving full swing to the "delirium of joy." In this assembly it was openly and loudly proclaimed, that the Peace was a subject of exultation, because it acknowledged and ratified *the defeat of England and the triumph of the Republic of France*; because it established the practicability as well as the justice of *changing the form of a government at the pleasure of the people;* besause it reminded the people of England of a right, which they had always possessed, of *cashiering one King, and choosing in his stead another whom they liked better, whether a native or a foreigner;* and lastly, because it formed the close of a series of events, *which furnished the people of this country with a* GLORIOUS EXAMPLE. Those who kissed the boots of CITIZEN LAURISTON, could not, perhaps, have so well *expressed* their reasons for rejoicing at the Peace; but I will venture to say, that every man of them *felt* them in their full force.

After

After a day so passed, a disorderly and riotous night was naturally to be expected; but of that night, my Lord, the numerous and interesting events must form the subject of another Letter.

In the mean time, I remain,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most humble

and obedient Servant,

Wm. COBBETT.

LETTER III.

Pall-Mall, 16*th Oct.* 1801.

My Lord,

That "self-praise is no commendation" is a maxim, the truth of which is universally acknowledged. He who has atchieved any deed of great national glory or utility, has no occasion to call upon the world to join him in rejoicing at it. Conscious of the brilliancy of his actions, he scorns to have recourse to those paltry artifices, by which men of different conduct and inferior minds bespeak the suffrages of the ignorant and noisy crowd, and drown, for a time at least, the voice of reason and of justice: and, my Lord, though no one, acquainted with the dignified character of your Lordship, and that of your colleagues, can possibly believe, that the *illuminations* of Saturday, the 10th instant, were set on foot from motives such as are here described, yet, give me leave to say, that, all the circumstances considered, I think we may be allowed to question both the modesty and the wisdom of beginning those illuminations.

For

For the Government to illuminate, is, in fact, to *force* every private person to follow its example, or, to expose him to the insults and violences of the mob. Do I say, then, that Government is *never* to exhibit this mark of joy and applause? No. There are certain events, at which every *good* and *loyal* subject must *necessarily* rejoice; such, for instance, as the return of the Birth Day of the King, a signal victory over the enemy, or the like, in the celebrating of which the Ministry may, with great propriety, take the lead. But, I do conceive, my Lord, that it is not very proper, nor very seemly, for *Ministers* to force (either directly or indirectly), or even to invite, the public to applaud, and exult at, *any* measure of *the Cabinet*, more especially a measure, the only apology that can be offered for which, is, *dire necessity*.*—There are many considerations,

* There were *six thousand* lamps exhibited at the Post-Office on Saturday night. Each lamp is charged to private individuals, *sixpence*; and, of course, not *less* to the Government. The whole cost of this exhibition, then would be *one hundred and fifty pounds*, a sum that might have been saved, at a time when the *distresses of the nation* are urged as a reason for sacrificing its honour.

Not

derations, which may induce a man to *submit* quietly, and in silence, to national calamity and disgrace: but nothing short of the most odious and detestable tyranny can make him join in *rejoicing* at either. This species of tyranny, my Lord, I have had to resist.

From the scenes of violence and outrage, which had taken place on the preceding Wednesday night, in some parts of the town, not far from Pall-

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Nor is this prodigality seen in its true light, till compared with the parsimony which the Ministers displayed, in this respect, when they were, at last, compelled (however reluctantly) to announce to the public the reduction of Alexandria, and the final re-conquest of Egypt. This was one of those events, at which, as I observed, "every *good* and *loyal* man must *necessarily* rejoice;" yet the Ministry *exhibited no signs of joy*. They did, indeed, cause the Park and Tower guns to be fired; but *that* they were obliged to do, wishing, I dare say, at the same time, that all London had been deaf. It must be oil and wine to the wounds of our gallant army in Egypt, to learn, that their glorious atchievements were celebrated by *the illumination of the Porcupine Printing-Office alone*, while the treaty, which provides for the evacuation of a country, *out of which this army had driven the last of the enemy*, set the Capital in a blaze of exultation, encouraged and begun by the Ministers themselves!!!

Pall-Mall, I had reason to expect, that, on the arrival of the Ratification of the Preliminaries, my dwelling-house here, as well as my Printing-Office in Southampton-street, would be attacked; because my sentiments respecting those Preliminaries were publicly known, and because it could not be imagined that I should belie by any manifestation of joy at night, the principles and sentiments, which I had promulgated in the morning. Impressed, my Lord, with this belief, and still more deeply impressed with the ideas, which I had imbibed in my childhood, that an Englishman's house was his castle, and that every subject of His MAJESTY possessed the right of exercising his unbiassed judgment, so long as he paid implicit obedience to the laws of the realm, I made application to the Bow-street Magistrates for legal protection. At their desire I went to their office, and was very politely received by the Magistrates then sitting, Mr. BOND and Sir WILLIAM PARSONS, to whom I related the grounds of my apprehensions, and from whom I received a promise of all *practicable* protection.

It happened, my Lord, precisely as I had expected: about eight o'clock in the evening, my dwelling-house was attacked, by an innumerable

mob, all my windows were broken, and when this was done, which occupied about an hour, the villains were preparing to break into my shop, and had actually made one of the shutters give way. Fearing that the cannibals might murder myself and my children, I now ordered my windows to be lighted; but even this, my Lord, did not satisfy this unlawful and ferocious rabble, who, ever and anon howled out that I was the publisher of the PORCUPINE. The attack continued at intervals, till past one o'clock on the Sunday morning, During the whole of this time, not a constable, nor peace officer of any description, made his appearance; nor was the smallest interruption given to the proceedings of this ignorant and brutal mob, who were thus celebrating the Peace.

The PORCUPINE OFFICE, in Southampton-street, experienced a similar fate. The Clerk, the only person in the house, narrowly escaped with his life. Before the attack began, and as soon as he perceived a disposition to begin it, he went, in obedience to an order he had received, to the Public Office in Bow-street, and related the danger. But the persons he found there, so far from being disposed to render him any protection, literally

pushed him from the door, saying that there were no magistrates at the office. If there had been magistrates, and if the force, which is always at the command of those magistrates (and for which the nation annually pays no trifling sum), had been properly employed, I have no scruple to assert, that this scandalous breach of the peace would never have taken place; an assertion which is fully warranted by the events of the following Monday night, when a detachment of the officers of Bow-street (sent by the express command of Lord PELHAM) effectually prevented, at both my houses, the attempts to renew the attack, though not a single light was exhibited in the windows of either, and though the swinish multitude* was more numerous and noisy than ever.

* This expression, the use of which has so often been cited as an *offence* on the part of MR. BURKE, I thus repeat, after due consideration, and upon a thorough conviction of its propriety. The sober, modest, frugal, quiet, and cleanly poor, are to be treated not only with compassion but with a certain degree of respect; but those that are headstrong, noisy, growling, slothful, filthy in their carcasses, nasty and excessive in their diet and their drink, are to be treated with abhorrence.

Let

The motives for my conduct, on this occasion, having been grossly misrepresented, I think it not altogether useless to state them to your Lordship. It has been said, that I acted from *pique* against Mr. ADDINGTON, Mr. PITT, or your Lordship, from one or all of whom I had received *some slight*. But, my Lord, you know that, as far as relates to yourself, this imputation is totally groundless; and I declare to you that it is equally so, with respect to Mr. ADDINGTON and Mr. PITT, the former of whom stands the first, after the Princes, on the list of Subscribers to my Works, and the latter has shown me marks of commendation, of which many a greater and better man than myself would have been proud. I did, indeed, once hear of an expression,

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Let the soup-shop philanthropists own such brutes for their "fellow creatures," if they please, for my part I call them the *swinish multitude*, and I sincerely wish, that the Gadarean Devil would enter into them, and drive them headlong into the sea.—One of the great vices of the age, is, the almost universal propensity to flatter this turbulent part of the poor. Hence the Sunday-schools, the soup-shops, the subscriptions, and all the other numerous devices for *coaxing* them and *keeping them in good humour*; hence too the eternal cant about *humanity*, which is, now-a-days, become a most significant term, meaning no less than, *hypocrisy inspired by cowardice*.

pression, made use of by Mr. Pitt, respecting me, at which I was deeply wounded; but, after inquiry, I have every reason to believe it to have been a base and wicked misrepresentation, fabricated by a servile wretch, who had the impudence to regard me as his *competitor* for the favour of the Ministry. In short, my Lord, till this unfortunate Peace was made public, I entertained no other sentiment towards your Lordship, Mr. ADDINGTON, or Mr. PITT, than that of *respect*.

Some have asserted, that I have shown this marked dislike to the Peace, *because I was gaining money by the continuance of the War*. In every possible view of it, this assertion is false. The War brought me no private good, while it was a very heavy clog on much the most considerable branch of my business; and one of the very first effects produced by that Peace, which I so decidedly disapprove of and so loudly condemn, was a saving to me of upwards of *seventy guineas* in insurance; a fact which, while it establishes my disinterestedness, may serve, *en passant*, to convince your Lordship and the public, that my success in life depends neither upon your nor their patronage.

Consistency

Consistency of conduct, an agreement between my words and my actions, required that I should resist, on this occasion, the mandates of the ignorant rabble; but, I must confess, that this was not the only motive of my resistance. I foresaw what would happen, and I conceived that I had a good opportunity of setting an example to those, who have hitherto escaped the general degradation, and are yet capable of being awakened to a sense of the dangers that threaten us. My house exhibits, at this time, no very imperfect emblem of the consequences which I fear will result from the Peace I was called upon to celebrate: *Property destroyed—the Crown and Mitre disfigured and broken—the Arms of Royalty torn to pieces—the names of Princes defaced.* It is impossible for any thinking man to see or hear of this, without being led into such a train of reflection, as must end in a conviction of the dangers to which the Peace has exposed us. Those who are accustomed to trace events to their causes, will not deny, that the fate of nations has often turned on a cause much more trifling than the unlawful and riotous demolition of a house; and, though I am not vain enough to believe, nor sanguine enough to hope, that I am the

favoured

favoured instrument, chosen to awaken my country to a due sense of the horrors which await it, I am sure it is my duty to endeavour to awaken it; and when I look back on the singular success of my humble endeavours in America, I feel myself irresistibly impelled to proceed.

"*You stand alone,*" say some persons. This is not true to the extent which is meant to be conveyed by the words. I do, indeed, stand almost alone with respect to the demolition of my house; but, had no fear of the mob existed in London and Westminster, that house would have been amongst the vast majority. The *Public Offices* gave an invitation to a general manifestation of joy, and the rabble *enforced* it. When I began my opposition to French principles and French influence in America, even my countrymen called on me to desist, telling me that I "stood *alone*;" but I stood long enough to find myself in the majority. I stood long enough to hear *ça ira* exchanged for *God save the King*. I stood long enough to see the people of Philadelphia, who had threatened to murder me because I openly exhibited, at my window, a picture of Lord Howe's victory over the French; I stood long enough to see these very people make a public

public celebration of Lord NELSON's victory of the Nile. Nay, my Lord, I stood long enough to see the time, when I was the only writer in the country, who dared to stand forward in behalf of a body of injured and unfortunate *Frenchmen*, who finally owed to me, and to me alone, their deliverance from ruin, and, perhaps, from death.

But, my Lord, with shame and grief I confess, that the Americans were not so far gone in baseness as Englishmen now are. Amidst all their Republican follies, they still retained some little sense of national honour. Their government did, indeed, repeatedly debase itself at the feet of the insolent tyrants of France; but, there was always a considerable portion of the people, who put in their unequivocal protest against this debasement; and, never did even the vilest of the rabble dare to become the beasts of the *sans-culotte* agents. We have seen the Americans make Peace with France; since that we have seen the French Envoy arrive amongst them; but, we have heard of no public demonstrations of joy on the occasion, much less have we heard of any scene, such as that which was exhibited in London, on the 10th of October. They received him, as it was proper to

receive

receive the agent of an insiduous and malignant foe, with whom they found it necessary to live in peace; without insult, indeed, but with coldness and reserve. They knew the value of Peace as well as we: they knew they had neither fleet nor army to carry on War; they yielded too far to the enemy; they, too, may be justly accused of cowardice; but they have not, like us, proclaimed that cowardice to the world, through every channel that sound or sense can supply.

However, my Lord, England, humble and base as she is become, is still my country; and, though I can neither retrieve her character nor prevent her destruction, it is my duty to stand by her side, and partake in her fate. I feel some consolation, too, in reflecting, that, if my children should out-live the storm, and see better days, they will remember, with pride, that their father never bowed the knee to the regicides of France.

Having now, my Lord, explained the motives of my resistance of the Peace-loving Mob, I return to my narrative of the scandalous proceedings of the 10th of October.

The sentiments, which prevailed amongst the people in the streets, in every part of London and

Westminster, were such as indicated the most decided partiality for France; that is to say, for *republicanism* and *regicide.* The smashing of the glass, and the cracking of the wood-work of my house were accompanied with shouts of "France "for ever!"—"Huzza for BUONAPARTÉ!"—"Huzza for the Republic!"—The same was heard repeatedly opposite every house, which was brilliantly illuminated, not excepting the *Public Offices*, amongst which the Admiralty was most conspicuous, as well for its brilliancy as for the infamy of the language, and the conduct of its admiring mob, who were constantly engaged in an open defiance of the law from seven o'clock on Saturday evening, to nearly three o'clock on Sunday morning. Of those private persons, who made any other display than the candles, which they hoisted by compulsion, nine-tenths were *republicans*, and the other tenth *fools*. The principles of those who exhibited transparencies were easily distinguished by the devices which they had chosen; and, a gentleman who took particular pains to verify the fact, has assured me, that *nineteen transparencies out of every twenty, were expressive of attachment to* BUONAPARTÉ'S *person, or to the cause of France!*

It

It was impossible to view these abominations without calling to mind the following verses from the most elegant poem which the latter times have produced, and the last line of which seems to be prophetic of the very event of which I am now speaking :

" The sword we dread not :—of ourselves secure,
" Firm were our strength, our Peace and freedom sure.
" Let all the world confederate all its powr's,
" Be they not back'd by those that should be ours,
" High on his rock shall BRITON'S GENIUS stand,
" Scatter the crowded hosts, and vindicate the land.
" But, French *in heart*, though victory crown our brow,
" Low at our feet though prostrate nations bow,
" Wealth gild our cities, commerce crowd our shore,—
" *London* may SHINE, but *England is no more.*"

In many parts of the metropolis the language openly held, during the whole of Saturday and of Monday evenings, was infamously disloyal, not to say treasonable. At a print-seller's in St. James's-street, where a considerable crowd were assembled, a man approached the window, and pointing to a portrait of a GREAT PERSON, not unknown to your Lordship, first made the motion of *stabbing*, and then of *ripping up*, grinding his teeth at the

same time, and exclaiming, "Ah! *that* I would! "*that* I would!"—Then turning to a portrait of Mr. PITT, "Ah!" said he, "*and that long fellow* "*too*," repeating, at the same time, the gesticulations expressive of his bloody wishes. After this he pointed to a portrait of BUONAPARTÉ, and, taking off his hat, gave three huzzas, in which he was joined by all those around him!!!* Such, my Lord, were the people who rejoiced, who *sincerely* rejoiced at the Peace,† which your Lordship had the

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* This was the fact alluded to in the following elegant paragraph:—"In various parts of the town and its suburbs, "the cry of *Buonaparté for ever* prevailed; and in St. James's "Street something occurred too horrid for repetition."—— "Here is

"Food for meditation ev'n to *madness*."

† "In the awful and tremendous storm which came on "during the rejoicings on Saturday, some descried the vengeance "of Heaven denounced on our country. Heaven avert the "omen! But it really looked as if BRITANNIA, shrouded in "sable robes, had exclaimed, with Zanga,

"——Horrors now are not displeasing to me!
"Rage on ye winds, burst clouds, and waters roar!
"You bear a just resemblance of my fortune,
"And suit the gloomy habit of my soul."

the honour to sign, and the news of which you had "*the great pleasure*" of communicating to the Lord Mayor.*

In

* The following Epigrams, which appeared in the Porcupine of the 12th and 15th of October, should not be lost.

EPIGRAM.

Addressed to them who are rejoicing in the Peace.

THAT no one should halloo, 'till out of the wood,
Is a maxim, which none can deny;
And a truth so important, if well understood,
Discretion will always apply.

Then a truce to your guns, which seem too much in haste,
Although Omnium and Stocks both have rose;
O, do not that powder so wantonly waste,
Which, 'ere long, you may need for your Foes!

ON THE PEACE.

SATURDAY NIGHT, OCTOBER 10, 1801.

THIS night, the Heavens in fury weep; §
Fit heralds they of our *repose*,
Beneath whose smiling surface sleep
More dreadful storms than erst arose!

§ Alluding to the tremendous storm of thunder, lightning, and rain, which interrupted the illuminations.

In my last letter, I observed, that, of all the admiration and gratitude, inspired by the Peace, no part fell to the lot of your Lordship and your colleagues; and, indeed, my Lord, the corporations, and other public bodies, do still persist in a most obstinate taciturnity. Either they are very dull of perception, or they are very ungrateful, or the "blessing," which has been conferred on them, is no blessing at all. These bodies are not wont to be so backward in giving their opinions; and the only reason which I can perceive for their backwardness now, is, that they cannot approve of the Peace, without offending their own consciences; and cannot openly disapprove of it, without offending the mob.

TO THE RIGHT HON.

LORD HAWKESBURY.

Is this, my Lord, to meet the Foe,
With Paris in our view?
N'importe! You don't to Paris go,
But *Paris comes to you.*

October 10th, 1801.

mob. Curious dilemma! It is, however, not to be denied, that the measure has a decided *majority* of the nation in its favour; I mean as to *numbers*; but as to the other mode of dividing the suffrage, according to *property* and *wisdom*, I would by no means recommend it to be resorted to.

After the facts already related, one would hardly suppose it posssible, that any thing could be found, calculated to add to the disgrace of the nation. I shall, however, simply relate one more, and should be extremely glad to hear it contradicted with truth.

When CITIZEN LAURISTON arrived at Dover, he had, in company with him, one LUNDBERG, a Swedish Captain, who had been taken up and sent out of England, twice during the War, under the Alien Law, and whose vessel, on one occasion, had been seized. The King's Officers at Dover, having recognized this man, were, of course, taking the proper measures for preventing him from proceeding into the country, when the modest harbinger of "Peace and Plenty" declared, in a most peremptory manner, *that unless Citizen* LUNDBERG *was permitted to proceed with him, he would instantly return*

turn to France with the Treaty. Intimidated at this dreadful menace, the officers released LUNDBERG, who came on to London with LAURISTON, was here the companion of his triumphal procession, and was actually drawn with him to the Public Offices and through the Royal road in the Park, as described in my last letter. Nay, the Citizens returned to France together, and were again drawn by the people through the ancient city of Canterbury. At Dover, LUNDBERG laughed at the officers, told them he could now set their Government at defiance, and added, that he should soon have a vessel to ply between Calais and Dover!—" How are the mighty " fallen! Tell it not in Gath! publish it not in the " streets of Askalon!"

One inference must be drawn from this strange event. It proves, beyond the possibility of doubt, the fixed determination of BUONAPARTÉ to make us drink the cup of degradation to the very dregs. For it cannot, for a moment, be supposed, that LAURISTON would, without authority, have dared to act as he did; and, if the CORSICAN encouraged such conduct, he has already given us a striking proof of that *pacific disposition*, that *sincerity*, and *moderation*,

on

on which, and which alone, we are, in future, to depend for our safety*.

In the next letter, my Lord, I shall enter on my promised discussion of the causes, the conditions, and

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* Since the first edition of this letter appeared, some of the minions of the Ministry have had the impudence to assert, that the fact here related, respecting LUNDBERG, is not founded in truth. They have said, that LAURISTON met with LUNDBERG, by accident, at Calais, and that, foreseeing the necessity of having an interpreter, he engaged the Swede in that capacity, at the recommendation of an inn-keeper. But, will it be believed, that LAURISTON could not speak English? And, if that were the case, will it be believed, that he would have postponed the procuring of an interpreter, till he arrived at Calais? Even allowing this too, will it further be believed, that he would have chosen, for this office, an entire stranger? And, should English baseness and credulity admit even all this, the disgrace is only so much the more complete; for, how great must have been the contempt, which LAURISTON entertained for this government and nation, when he threatened to return with the treaty, unless he was permitted to take with him, a fellow, whom he had, *but the day before, picked up at an inn!!!* I never pretended to say *where*, or *how*, LAURISTON first took this Swede under his protection. That was a circumstance quite immaterial. All I wished to insist on was, and yet is, that LUNDBERG had been sent out of England under the Alien Law; that he returned in defiance of that law; that he, by

 that

and the consequences of the Treaty. In the course of this discussion, I shall attribute to your Lordship, no other responsibility, than that which you must necessarily assume. You have signed this Peace as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and as such, and such only, I address myself to you. Personality is entirely out of the question; it is the measure itself

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that act, was guilty of felony; that the officers at Dover apprehended him as being so guilty; that the threats of LAURISTON disarmed the law, in open violation of which LUNDBERG was brought to London, and taken back again to Dover and to Calais. These are the facts that are of importance, and none of these facts have been, or can be, denied. LORD TEMPLE, feeling, as every true Englishman must, the indelible disgrace cast on his country by this insult, asked LORD HAWKESBURY, in his place in the House of Commons, if there were any foundation in the report respecting LUNDBERG; to which he received *no answer*. It is well known, that this unparalleled indignity has been the subject of much conversation, and of as much discontent as the broken spirit of the nation can be expected to express: nor is this unknown to the Ministers, who, had they been able, would long ago have sent forth a public and explicit contradiction of my statement.—But, not to leave to inference the establishment of so important a fact, I again declare, that what I have stated respecting LUNDBERG is true, and for proof I can appeal to the records of the Alien Office, and, if necessary, to the affidavits, of persons at Dover.

itself that I dislike, and that I shall attack, and not its authors, whom I have hitherto highly respected, and who have, perhaps, in this instance, weakly sacrificed their own opinions to the ignorant clamours of the populace.

I am,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most humble

and most obedient servant,

Wm. COBBETT.

LETTER IV.

Pall-Mall, 19th Oct. 1801.

My Lord,

In entering on an examination of the Peace, which your Lordship has signed, the attention of every Englishman is first naturally turned towards the Mediterranean, the theatre of our present warlike operations.

Four years ago, my Lord, we had not a single vessel floating on that sea, nor was there a single port open to us in the whole extent of its immense coasts. The enemy, on the contrary, who, by force, by terror, or by fraud, were become the absolute masters, not only of the waters, but of the surrounding shores and the islands, or of the humbled Powers, to whom they belonged, might, with no great impropriety, call it the *French Sea*. Our Continental Allies, disarmed by force or by fear, were all prostrate at the feet of the Republic. On this sea, as it were in its own home, we sought for the formidable and all-conquering foe, we found him, we attacked him, we fought him foot to foot. Minorca

was

was the first fruit of our valour; with a fleet inferior both in number and strength, we *destroyed* the fleet of France; by a blockade of more than a year we became masters of an impregnable fortress, at once the best military and naval station in the Mediterranean, if not in the world; finally, in the course of one single campaign, the glory of which will, I am much afraid, my Lord, outlive Great-Britain herself, we rescued, from the fangs of the invaders, a whole kingdom, conquered and defended by a numerous army of their chosen troops. Porto Ferrajo, fortunately succoured by Admiral WARREN, must, in a few weeks, have been effectually relieved by a detachment from our victorious army in Egypt.

By this line of naval stations, all of them impregnable, all inaccessible to our enemy, Gibraltar, Mahon, Porto Ferrajo, and Malta, to which it would have been very easy to add Corfu or Alexandria, our brave countrymen, by land and sea (for the former have now shown that occasions only were wanting to exalt their fame to a level with that of the latter), had laid a solid foundation for the sway of Great-Britain, in that distant sea, so lately regarded as the patrimony of France; they had raised an insurmountable barrier between French

ambition and the territories of the Turk, as also between the plundering projects of the most daring of robbers, and our golden territory of the East; they had established for us an exclusive commerce with Turkey, and had bound that Power to England by the ties of gratitude and self-preservation; by our possession of Porto Ferrajo, the trade was entirely cut off between the western and eastern coasts of the French Republic (for, my Lord, all men of sense persist in regarding the farcical kingdom of Etruria, the states of the Church, and the Kingdom of Naples, as neither more nor less, than provinces of France); in short, the French were completely driven from the Mediterranean sea, and scarcely dared to risk a few miserable fishing smacks, even under the shelter of their batteries.

To preserve this Empire of the Mediterranean to the end of time, required, at most, only ten or twelve thousand men, judiciously distributed in the three or four posts above-mentioned, with a few ships of the line, accompanied by a proportionate number of frigates. Our gallant army, having expelled the enemy from Egypt, were at hand, and ready to take upon them the preservation of these valuable possessions, which, had they even been

open

open to the assaults of the foe, we might, I presume, safely have committed to the defence of those arms, by which they had been conquered. From the abundance, and the consequent cheapness, of provisions of every sort, the land and sea forces, employed on this station, would have stood in no need of supplies from home, and would have been maintained even at less expense than in any part of Great-Britain.—To all these advantages may be added, ten thousand seamen inured to the Southern Seas, the commerce of which constantly employs so considerable a portion of our marine.

Now, I ask you, my Lord; nay, the nation asks you, in a voice that will ere long be heard, how you have disposed of these inestimable acquisitions, purchased with the skill, the valour, the treasure, and the blood of her children.

MINORCA is given up to *Spain*—that is to say to *France*; PORTO FERRAJO to the *King of Etruria*—that is to say *to France*; MALTA to the Knights of that Order—that is to say *to France*—I am sure your Lordship's candour will spare me the trouble of proving the two former assertions, in consideration of which indulgence, I will give you an ample demonstration of the third.

The

The Order of Malta, my Lord, is a religious and also a military association, subjected to certain established rules, and consisting exclusively of Catholic nobles. This association is composed of eight *tribes* (commonly called *Langues*), to wit, the three *tribes* of France, two of Castile and Arragon, comprehending Portugal, one of Italy, one of Germany, and one of Bavaria, which has superseded the ancient tribe of England. Now, my Lord, you, who know these things so well, cannot doubt, that all these countries are directly under the influence of, or in a state of absolute dependance on, the Consul, or government, of France. The families and the patrimonial possessions of the Knights, together with the commanderships of the Order, are the surest possible pledges of a ready and blind obedience on their part. These Knights of Malta, or Knights of BUONAPARTÉ, which ever you please to call them, will be the sovereigns of the island, and will, of course, possess and exercise all the powers of government. They will be just as numerous as BUONAPARTÉ pleases; they will be chosen by him, and, in fact, they will be so many soldiers under his command. Will the garrison, kept in the fortress by the guaranteeing Power (if, indeed, that Power should

should have a garrison there), be able to resist a sudden attack on the part of France, favoured by a conspiracy of the numerous individuals invested with the supreme authority of the island? Can the fleets of Russia, frozen up in the ports of Revel and Cronstadt, during more than six months in the year, and separated from Malta by a voyage of two months, at least; can these fleets be expected to prevent a French *coup-de-main*, and preserve the independence of the island, in spite not only of the French but of its own lawful and reigning Sovereigns? Besides, what interest can Russia possibly have to induce her to undertake so distant and expensive an expedition, in order to preserve the independence of a territory, from which she will derive no manner of benefit? And, if, tired of the mere guardianship, she should wish to seize on the sovereignty of Malta, and should accomplish that wish, what then becomes, my Lord, of your guarantee? The Ottoman Empire will then be placed between the Russian armies and the Russian fleets, while the Greek religion will soon enlist more than one half of the subjects of the Porte under the banners of its most formidable enemy. Should this event take place, you will have preserved, or, to speak more correctly,

our brave fleets and armies will have rescued, Turkey from the hands of France, that you might yield her to Russia, whose empire, now bounded by the Danube, the Black Sea, and the mountains of Caucasus, would then extend itself, without the least interruption, from the Baltic and the Frozen Sea, to the burning coasts of the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulph; while Persia herself, more than half surrounded by this gigantic Power, and exhausted by an inveterate and devouring anarchy, must soon fall into its hands; and thus would the empire of Russia reach to the borders of India. This, your Lordship, with the gravity, so characteristic of your station, may probably treat as chimerical; but, my Lord, recollect, that the expeditions which I have here traced out for Russia, are by no means so difficult to execute, as those in which the republicans of France have frequently succeeded. It was doubtless, the dread of Russian ambition that prevented your wise predecessors from yielding to the popular voice, which was loud for the cession of Malta to the Emperor Paul, who had, not without solid reasons, caused himself to be proclaimed Grand Master of the Order.

If, my Lord, you tell us, that it is the KING of NAPLES, to whom you mean to commit this important guarantee; we shall not trouble you with reasoning, but simply ask you, *who is to guarantee the King of Naples?* Not to sport longer with your feelings, my Lord, it is evident, that, which ever way we view the subject, *Malta is delivered up to France.*

There is, indeed, one precaution, my Lord, and only one, which is capable of giving something like reality to this guarantee, and which will secure, for some years at least, the independence of Malta, by giving time to the guaranteeing power and the other Powers interested, to come to its aid, in case of need. We have seen this fortress, undeniably the first in the world, snatched, in the space of two days, from the feeble or venal hands of a man, whose infamy will live as long as the glory of LILLE-ADAM. This precious deposit ought, then, in future, to be confided to the guardianship of *tried* firmness and integrity.

If the Catholic Nobility of Europe boasts a man, whose virtues, whose actions, and whose sentiments render him worthy of being the chief of a religious association, founded upon courage and honour, it

is certainly that man, whom the Powers of Europe, and England in particular, ought to put in possession of this most important charge; and, my Lord, give me leave to say, that any other choice will certainly be regarded as a new insult to the understanding of the nation, or as a shameful juggle with BUONAPARTÉ

From this moment, then, all the coasts of the Mediterranean, even to their nethermost recesses, from Gibraltar to Ceuta, together with all the numerous Islands, scattered through that immense space, become the exclusive property of the French Republic, as they formerly were of the Roman Empire. How, then, are we to maintain a competition with France in the commerce of Italy and the Levant? She will place so many obstacles in our way; her ingenious malice will invent so many embarrassments, checks, and prohibitions, in all the States of the Mediterranean, which she will continually keep in awe, by terror or by intrigue, that vexation alone would drive our merchants from the trade, even if they had not to contend with the immense disadvantage, that will arise from the high price of labour, and the distance of the market. Under these circumstances, my Lord, I appeal to

your

your candour, whether you would advise any British merchant to risk a cargo, of any amount, were it only for a twelvemonth, in any part of Italy or Turkey?

In signing the abandonment of Malta, of this eternal monument, raised to the glory of Britain by the intrepidity, the vigilance, and unwearied perseverance of her troops, were you well aware, my Lord, of what you were doing? Did you duly estimate the importance of the object, and consider the magnitude of the sacrifice you were making? Did you recollect, that, to enable us to get possession of this Island, nothing less was required than the battle of the Nile, the conquest of Italy by the Russians, a rupture between France and the Porte, involving the States of Barbary, which, otherwise would have been able and willing to succour the garrison; and, besides this wonderful concurrence of favourable events, a blockade of more than a year, without an hour's intermission—a blockade without a parallel in the naval annals of the world? Has *Fortune* (a female that never pardons the neglect of her advances) promised your Lordship a second miracle in our favour? Did not your hand tremble, my Lord, when you resigned *for ever*,

into

into the power of our mortal enemy, this most valuable spot of the globe, the fruit of so much patience, toil, and valour, seconded by unexampled good fortune?

As a counterbalance for this sacrifice, we are told to consider the *concessions* you have obtained from the enemy. Let us now turn to these concessions, for God knows we stand in need of consolation.

In three months time, the French engage to *evacuate* Egypt, where, at the very moment the Treaty was signed, they had *no other force than a garrison, who were prisoners of war!!!* The surrender of Alexandria had not, nor, indeed, *has it yet* been celebrated by *illuminations;* but, my Lord, you must have known, that, if the news had not actually arrived, it was not at many leagues distance from London. If Mr. Otto was generous enough to make you an offer of this *concession,* he must have discovered in you, during the course of the negotiation, strong symptoms of an amiable simplicity; and, if he granted it at your request, he must have been not a little surprised, either at your want of information, or at your *distrust of our army,* to whom this article of the Treaty

makes but a very poor return for their valour and their sufferings.*

But, as if it had been extremely difficult to bring the French to consent to this *important* concession, you stipulate, by way of equivalent, to evacuate Egypt (which was *really* in *our* possession), in six months from the signing of the Treaty; that is to say, you not only engage to leave the country open to a new invasion, but also to give up all the advantages which might, and would, have been derived from the gratitude, and even from the self-interest, of the ally, whose dominions we had rescued, and whose existence we had preserved.

It

* From the Dispatches of General HUTCHINSON, it appears, that every Frenchman in Egypt had surrendered to our army *eighteen days before* this *concession* was obtained from France. That BUONAPARTÉ knew this is now certain, and that our Ministers were not much behind him in information no one can doubt. To insert a stipulation for the *evacuating* of Egypt was, in itself, a most shameful thing; but to hold it out as a *concession* obtained from France, requires a degree of assurance rarely to be met with. The fact is, the stipulation was neither more nor less than a pretext for *yielding up Egypt to the mercy of France.*

It must be confessed, however, that BUONAPARTÉ, too, has taken on him an engagement of very great importance. He guarantees the *integrity* of our *Allies*, the Sublime Porte, Naples, and Portugal. When his hand was in, I wish, my Lord, he had guaranteed *our integrity* also, for I am much afraid this Treaty has given it a furious shock.

Our brave army, my Lord, had, without the aid of your Treaty, put the SUBLIME PORTE in full possession of all its invaded territory; and a very trifling squadron, stationed at Malta, would have been an effectual guarantee of this possession, while it would have guaranteed to us the exclusive commerce of the Levant.

The KING of NAPLES was no longer our *Ally*; he had already made Peace, and that, too, without any cession of territory; for BUONAPARTÉ does not, like the British Ministry, *ask for that which he already has*. You are pleased, my Lord, to represent the recall of the French army under MURAT, as an act whereby the independence of the POPE and of the KING of NAPLES is re-established; and as a complete and final evacuation of their respective States. But, my Lord, permit me to ask you

one

one question. When a man goes out to take a walk, putting the key of the street-door in his pocket, is such a man, in the common acceptation of the words, said to *evacuate his house?* You will, I know, answer in the negative; and you may rest assured, that, from the banks of the Po and the frontiers of Etruria, the army of MURAT has only a few days march, totally unobstructed, and they are again in the territories of those Allies, for whom you have obtained so respectable an independence!!

One might have hoped, that you would have, in *reality*, provided for the safety of Portugal, the ally whose constant and unshaken fidelity imperiously demanded of us, to make in her behalf every sacrifice, compatible with the security of the nation and the honour of the Crown. But, my Lord, Portugal had already made Peace with Spain and France. Besides, do you sincerely believe, that to obtain for the Court of Spain the town of Olivenza and its district, which contain about 1,800 inhabitants, was the real object of the War against Portugal, and that these acquisitions once secured, it only remained for the hostile powers to lay down their arms and live in Peace? No, you believe no such thing. BOUNAPARTÉ had then, another reason

for foregoing at once so easy and so advantageous a conquest as that of Portugal. This reason, since you are, or seem to be ignorant of it, was, the possession of the port of Madeira by one of our squadrons, and the fear, which France entertained, of throwing the Brazils into our hands. This, my Lord, was the true and efficient guarantee of Portugal, and the other guarantee, which you would fain make use of as a specious mask to your enormous concessions, can answer no purpose but that of weakening, and, perhaps, destroying the former; for, the Peace, which you have signed, will enable the French to anticipate us in the Brazils; and, the moment they have put us off our guard there, BOUNAPARTÉ will no longer demand the cession of Olivenza, but of Lisbon, my Lord, and of Portugal itself, which was the real object of the cession that France has obtained of that part of the Portuguese territory, which is situated on the north of the river Amazons, and contiguous to the French possessions in Guiana.

It is not true, then, my Lord, that the Peace secures the Independence of Turkey, Naples, and Portugal; on the contrary, it exposes Turkey to the inroads of France, which would have been for

ever

ever prevented by a small squadron, stationed at Malta; it furnishes the French with the means of seizing on the Brazils, and thus deprives Portugal of the only surety for her existence. You have not then, my Lord, signed the guarantee of the *integrity* of these States, but the guarantee of their *destruction*. What a mistake, my Lord, for a *Statesman* to commit! yea, even for a suckling Statesman!

With regard to Naples, your Peace leaves her just in the same situation that it found her; that is to say, at the absolute command of her all-powerful and all-devouring neighbour. You found the dove in the clutches of the vulture, and in those clutches she still remains.

If it were not for wasting too many of those precious moments, which are employed in fixing the destinies of empires, I would beg your Lordship to listen to *a fable*.—A young shepherd had just taken charge of a numerous and well conditioned flock, having, to assist him, plenty of watchful and courageous dogs, which had always successfully resisted the attacks of a neighbouring wolf, or had, at least, set some bounds to the effects of his voracity; but the shepherd, not having much of the *hero* in his composition, and wishing, perhaps, to

save his master a part of the food, which his faithful dogs so dearly earned and so richly deserved, proposed to make peace with the wolf. The wolf, under some pretext or other, always kept a fox in or about the hut of the shepherd, ready to negotiate. The simple, timid shepherd and the cunning fox soon came to an amicable adjustment. It was agreed between them, and *even signed*, my Lord, that his Wolfish Majesty should leave off his ravages, and that the shepherd should dismiss his dogs. The fable does not say what became of the *sheep*, at which I must, therefore, leave your Lordship to guess.

Permit me, my Lord, to ask you, if you have lately heard any thing of the unfortunate Sovereign of Piedmont and Savoy. He was, my Lord, one of our allies; nay, what is more, he was our *faithful* ally; we led him into the War, and he fought by our side, till necessity compelled him to yield. And yet, my Lord, your treaty says not a word of any mitigation of his misfortunes. You might, I think, have obtained him a promise from the GRAND CONSUL, counter-signed by the honest Citizen TALLEYRAND, not to seize on the island of Sardinia the moment our fleets should have bid a

final

final adieu to the Mediterranean. Your friend BUONAPARTÉ has been, on this subject, more communicative than you. He has lately told the French, and has left this cowardly country to hear it at second hand, that "*Le Piemont forme notre 27e. division militaire!*" Without another word! Without any apology for the seizure, or any apprehension of the displeasure of the monarchies of Europe, in consequence thereof!

But, it is time to turn our dejected looks from the Mediterranean and its borders, so lately the scene of our glory, and now the scene of our ignominy, and to endeavour to find elsewhere some mitigation of our disgrace, some consolation for the disastrous sacrifices, of which I have made the mortifying enumeration. The importance of our East-India possessions give them a claim to priority of attention: the effects, therefore, which the Peace will have on them, shall be the subject of my next letter.

I am, MY LORD,

Your Lordship's most humble

and most obedient Servant,

WM. COBBETT.

LETTER V.

Pall-Mall, 22d Oct. 1801.

MY LORD,

OUR successes, by sea and land, had exempted from all danger of attack, that part of our empire which surpasses the mother country in extent and population, and rivals her in wealth and industry; and it even seemed to have been impossible for Fortune herself to open a road to it for our enemies. But fortune, alas! finds wonderful resources in the boldness of some men, and in the pusillanimity of others. You, my Lord, have contrived to place the French arms in its vicinity. The whole of the rich and extensive possessions of the Dutch, in that part of the world, are restored to Holland; that is, to *France.* I shall not ask your Lordship to admit the existence of this identity, for you yourself have acknowledged it in the most authentic and solemn manner. You have received *from the hands of Buonaparté alone*, without the consent of Spain and Holland, without even the mere form of Ministers, from these pretended independent States, the cession of the Islands of

Trinidada

Trinidada and Ceylon, which belonged to them before the War. And, should these two Powers prove to be, *in reality*, independent, and should they refuse to ratify the present, which BUONAPARTÉ has made you of their territories, how, my good Lord, will people smile at those brilliant illuminations, which were the happy result of a fortunate coalition between the inventive faculties of the Ministry, and the executive powers of the mob? But, my Lord, notwithstanding your courtly condescension to ALI BUONAPARTÉ, you knew, as well as I, that he held the Court of Spain and the Batavian Republic in a state of the most abject subjection.

If our naval superiority should prove sufficient to secure us, for some years to come, against all danger of attack from their islands, the possession of the peninsula of Malacca affords an easy means for the march of a French army into the territory of Bengal, in concert with the kingdom of Birman, or our other neighbours in the East. You have, it is true, my Lord, obtained permission from the French to keep the Island of Ceylon, the absolute value and relative importance of which are not to be questioned. But I must request your Lordship to observe, that the French do not give it us; we

were

were already in possession of it, and they were unable to take it from us :—so they kindly leave it to us. I could, however, have wished, my Lord, for the honour of the English name, that this conquest had been made on our real enemies, and, since it is the only one which they condescend to yield to us, that we might light our bonfires and illuminate our houses, without blushing before a Prince, to whom it formerly belonged, whose attachment to us cost him his dominions; who, in seeking an asylum on our shores, brought with him the useful and respectable relics of his fortune and his party; —a Prince, in short, who is the descendant of that race of heroes, whom we have some reason to consider as English, since we are indebted to them for one of our Sovereigns, and since, in the course of two hundred and fifty years, their attachment to the interests of this country has never varied an instant, even in times and circumstances the most critical and the most difficult. But let not my Patriotism outstrip my prudence! With-hold from the French, did I say, a settlement which once belonged to them? No, my Lord, I do not mean to accuse you of having harboured a wish to commit a sacrilege so gross! Do we not know that every country

which

which has, at any time, been incorporated with the Great Nation is inalienable, that it has acquired a sort of consecration, a character of indelible sanctity, and that, impregnated with the fire of liberty, it would destroy all profane inhabitants. This sacred right is not lost in the lapse of time; and THE CONVENTION, whose fortune and whose virtues BUONAPARTÉ inherits, justly claimed for modern France, on that ground, the limits of ancient Gaul. We shall, probably, 'ere long, be informed that Cisalpine Gaul and Celtiberia have also been united to France. You know, my Lord, that the French acknowledged the God Mars; and it is asserted, that, in the pillage of Rome, they discovered that same statue of the God *Terminus*, which would not give up its place to the master of the Gods. It was, no doubt, in conformity with this incontestible, though novel principle of the law of nations, that you thought yourself obliged to restore to France Pondicherry, Mahé, and all that she ever possessed on the Continent of India, thereby opening a way into the very heart of our Eastern Empire, if not for the arms, at least for the intrigues of our enemies, which are almost as formidable as their arms. You cannot have for-

gotten, my Lord, that the French contrived to establish Jacobin Clubs at Seringapatam, at a time when they did not possess a single inch of land in the country:—and these are the men whom you have just introduced into the heart of our most valuable settlements!

There was, indeed, one consideration of a consolatory nature, which might have cheered the gloomy prospect of our distant dangers. So long as we were in possession of Saint Helena and the Cape of Good Hope, the only places of rest or refreshment to be found in the vast expanse of ocean, which separates Europe from India, we had no reason to fear, that a fleet of ships of War and transports, sufficiently large for the conveyance of a powerful army, could steer directly for Batavia, without touching at any port on the way. In order to effect such a voyage, it would be necessary to combine the uncertain winds of the Atlantic with the regular monsoons of the Indian Seas; nor could it be made by such a fleet in less than eight months, and I leave your Lordship to guess what would be the state of an army after such a voyage.

But, my Lord, you have very graciously condescended to remove this difficulty for the French,

by restoring the Cape of Good Hope to Holland, that is *to France.* You will urge, no doubt, that it has become a *free port !*—Do you mean to say that it will be open to us in time of Peace? All ports are so. Do you mean to say that it will be equally open to us, in the event of a War with France? I apprehend that no one of His MAJESTY's ships would venture to enter the port on the faith of such a treaty. Besides, my Lord, I will honestly confess to you, that it is far beyond the power of my limited faculties to comprehend the possibility of our being at War with France, henceforth, without being at War with Holland at the same time. Do you limit your definition of a free-port to a port at which the produce of the country may be purchased without the payment of duties to the Sovereign of the port? Assuredly, my Lord, in that case, you will have imposed on the East-India Company a debt of gratitude, which they will never be able to repay, by enabling them to buy their beef and mutton for their crews at the Cape, a few shillings per lot cheaper than they could before. No doubt this inestimable advantage surpasses all the benefits, which the administration of Mr. DUNDAS had procured for them, and

which could not be very important, since a single stroke of the pen sufficed to render them of no effect. For my part, I am disposed to consider the term *free port*, as signifying a port that may be seized by the first power who chuses to occupy it, and that France will be that power, will very soon be proved.

But, I had nearly forgotten, my Lord, that your foresight and penetration had led you to adopt another precaution, and to exact from Holland a formal stipulation, that she should never cede the Cape of Good Hope to any other Power. On such a stipulation I have nothing to say, except, that, at the very time when you deemed the engagement satisfactory, the Directory of the Batavian Republic called in the aid of the French Generals ANGEREAU and SEMONVILLE to assist them in making their fellow-citizens *freely* accept the constitution, which is destined to give the finishing stroke to that stupendous fabric of national wisdom and national happiness, of which the preceding constitutions had merely laid the foundation. BUONAPARTÉ will easily find means to conciliate the interests of France with the engagements of Holland. For instance, Holland will

make

make no cession to France, and France will contrive to render it unnecessary.

In the course of this War, my Lord, our imagination, borne on the wings of admiration and gratitude, successively traced the triumphant progress of our fleets through the four quarters of the globe; we delighted in contemplating the trophies raised, by her favourite sons, to the glory of Great-Britain; and in anticipating the advantages, which our country would derive from the possession of those valuable settlements, which their valour had gained. And you also, my Lord, have, it seems, followed the footsteps of our warriors; led on by the Genius of Fear, whose progress is infinitely more rapid than that of the Genius of Victory. Like a furious tempest, which, darting with the velocity of lightning, from one extremity of the horizon to the other, destroying the harvest, defeating the hopes of the husbandman, by robbing him, in one hour, of the fruits and the reward of a year's labour and fatigue, tearing up whole forests, overthrowing hamlets and towns, laying waste whole districts and spreading death and desolation around, the Genius of Fear traverses, in a moment, the whole circumference of the globe.

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It did but show its hideous front, and, in an instant, all the conquests, all the trophies of our fleets and armies disappeared! No trace of these is now left, except in the sacred remains of our martyred countrymen: and, in a few years, the very recollection of them will die away; for, which of us will not labour to expel it from his mind? Yesterday, our hearts, fired by their example, envied them a death so honourable; to-day, it extorts only tears and regret, since you have rendered it alike useless to their glory and to the prosperity of the nation. This malevolent demon darts from the Cape of Good Hope into the new world, and there we trace its footsteps by the destruction which attends them.

Surinam (which was given up to us by the Stadtholderian party), *Berbice*, *Demerara*, and *Essequibo*, restored to Holland, that is to France, give our enemy, in conjunction with French Guiana and with the country ceded to him, to the north of the Amazons, a continental empire, which extends from the mouths of the Amazons to that of the Essequibo, and which borders on, and threatens, at the same time, the American possessions of both Portugal and Spain.

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All the islands taken from the French, that is to say, all those which they possessed before the War, even Martinico, which uniting an excellent port and a formidable fortress, in a wholesome climate, with the most advantageous naval port, was, in our hands, the key of the Archipelago of Mexico, and the only protection we had for the possessions which BUONAPARTÉ has allowed us to retain in that part of the world. He, undoubtedly, ought to show some gratitude to us for having preserved those colonies in a flourishing state of cultivation, while the rage of that sect, which he so long served with zeal and fidelity, desolated the other French settlements, whose inhabitants had not had time to call us in to preserve them.

The chief of these unfortunate Colonies, and the richest perhaps in the whole world, was St. Domingo, which contained upwards of half a million of negroes, and twenty-four thousand mulattoes, employed in the cultivation of the Island, under the direction of thirty-two thousand Europeans. In addition to this most valuable Settlement, the French now possess the Spanish part of St. Domingo. By this union of the different parts of the Island (which had been expressly prohibited by one of the articles

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of the treaty of *Utrecht*, that solid monument of the wisdom of our fathers!), more extensive than the Island of Great-Britain, it may, one day, be rendered adequate to supply a quantity of sugar, and coffee, sufficient for the whole consumption of Europe. This Island now belongs to BUONAPARTÉ. You have not, indeed, *given* it to him; for, unfortunately for him, it was not in our possession. But, as the War did, in reality, deprive him of all its benefits, we may fairly reckon it amongst the acquisitions of the Peace; for, it is absolutely impossible but TOUSSAINT must fall in a struggle against the French Government, disengaged from every embarrassment, and having at her nod thousands and tens of thousands of soldiers, officers, and generals, inured to all the fatigues and dangers of War, and emboldened by victory. For some time, perhaps, the mountains in the centre of the Island may shelter the straggling remnant of the sable battalions; a tribe of savage maroons may thus be formed, to live upon wild fruits, terrify the settlers in the vicinity of the mountain, and steal their hogs and poultry; but, destitute of arms and ammunition, what can they do against a colony, powerful in itself, and supported by a mother country, which has given

law to all Europe? In short, it would be totally impossible for these wandering fugitives to exist long in time of Peace. The rigour of the republican measures, and the dispatch, with which they executed them, are well known. BUONAPARTÉ would only have to say, as in the case of the unfortunate Chouans, "*qu'on me dise, avant six jours*' "QU'ILS ONT VÉCU!"

In answer to this, my Lord, your partizans, will cry "*so much the better!*" Nay, these sapient politicians go so far as to assert, that by a secret article of your treaty, Great-Britain is to assist BUONAPARTÉ in re-establishing the colonial system of the Island, and, of course, in making War against its present ruler; whose title is much better than that of BUONAPARTÉ's, and with whom, be it remembered, my Lord, GREAT-BRITAIN *has, at this moment, a treaty of amity and commerce!* However, since we happened to come too late to preserve this Island in a flourishing state for our enemy, the only way of obtaining pardon for our negligence is to lend a hand in repairing the injuries, which have arisen therefrom.

But, my Lord, be assured that BUONAPARTÉ will find a way of doing this without our aid; I

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will venture to foretell the destiny of the Negro army, which amounts to from 30 to 40,000 men, and the existence of which you regard as incompatible with that of the colonial system, not only of St. Domingo, but of our Islands also. This army, my Lord, divided in its councils, corrupted or intimidated, will be very soon beaten, and in great part *destroyed*; for, to conquer and to spare, is by no means a republican maxim. Those who escape the lead and the steel will not amount to many thousands; and, lest they should again trouble the tranquillity of the Island, they will be employed, together with the very army, by whom they have been conquered, to invade, to subdue, to lay waste, and destroy our Island of Jamaica, which is separated from them by a distance of not many hours sail. Spanish America will be their next prey; a prey which they will very quietly seize on, in spite of our Island of Trinidada, which is doubtless a second Garden of Eden, since we have given up the wide world to obtain it.

I have before cautioned you, my Lord, against treating apprehensions of this kind as *chimerical*. Those who, in 1793, thought it a very easy matter to conquer France, have lived to see the French in

Egypt,

Egypt, in Arabia, and Palestine. The project, of which I speak, is by no means new: the plan of the conquest is already traced out. Louisiana once made a part of the favoured earth, that the destinies have consecrated to liberty; of the promised land of the Grand Nation, and, of course, it is now to come under her sway; for so the Republic one and Indivisible has decreed. Yes, my Lord, you know, or you ought to know, that the cession of Louisiana to France was the subject of one of the secret articles of the Treaty signed at Basle by M. YRIARTÉ. On the same principle, with which the Republicans have long insulted Europe, this country was demanded, not as an equivalent, or as a sacrifice, but as a *restitution*, it having *once belonged to France!* Louisiana borders on Mexico, my Lord, and I can assure your Lordship that the march to Paris, even in 1793, would not have been so easy as a march from New Orleans to the city of Mexico. Ten thousand French soldiers, inured to the hardships and fatigues of the camp and the field, accustomed to danger as the eagle to the tempest, and attracted by the richest prey that ever tempted the rapacity of man, would snatch this glittering prize from the feeble and enervated hands of the Spaniards,

who at present hold it, with much greater ease than a handful of their ferocious and sanguinary ancestors, took it from its ancient possessors.

I am, My Lord,

Your Lordship's most humble

and most obedient Servant,

Wm. COBBETT.

LETTER VI.

Pall-Mall, 24th Oct. 1801.

My Lord,

The bare enumeration of our numerous conquests has already cost me more time and pains, than it cost you to surrender them into the hands of our enemy. I have traced your Lordship over the Mediterranean and the Levant, into Egypt and Africa, on the seas and the land of Asia, to the islands and the Continent of America:—Gracious God! what a scene of desolation! Fortresses, harbours, cities, provinces, and islands, you have scattered like autumnal leaves. The whole globe, my Lord, is strewed with the ruins of England. Even the fisheries on our own coasts were a charge too weighty for your feeble and trembling hands.

It is for the French, and what is worse, it is for the *regicide* French, that our fleets and armies have fought, bled, and triumphed; it was for them that we took Minorca and Malta; it was for them

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that we defended Porto Ferrajo; we drove them from Egypt, that we might again leave it at their mercy, together with the other dominions of the Turk, who, in any future emergency, will in vain hope for protection from our fleets, which, by your Treaty, my Lord, are for ever banished from a sea, of which their valour, had given us the absolute dominion. For the Regicides of France, and to facilitate their communication with India, we received from the partizans of the STADTHOLDER, the Cape of Good Hope and the fleet in its harbour. To the Regicides of France we have surrendered the Spice Islands; in South America we have gained for them a vast Continental territory, extending from the Amazons to the Essequibo, and that, too, at the expense of Portugal, and of the STADTHOLDER, by whose adherents Surinam was committed to our charge.—The French Islands, particularly Martinico, which we received from the faithful subjects of LOUIS XVI. we have given up to those who led that Prince to the block. The unfortunate inhabitants of Martinico, who, in evil hour, confided in the honour of England, and braved the vengeance of the cut-throats, are now yielded up to answer for their resistance. LA CROSSE, the

co-operator of RIGAUD and VICTOR HUGUES, the worthy rival of FOUCHÉ, is now at Guadaloupe, ready to arraign them at his bar; the bloody tribunal is already organised; the muskets, which are to put an end to these miserable dupes of our promises, are already primed. A poor, spiritless, equivocal clause in your treaty will not save them from Republican vengeance, which has never yet wanted for a pretext to shed innocent blood. By what hitherto unheard-of right, my Lord, have you delivered up to BUONAPARTÉ, that portion of the French dominions which had been deposited in our hands by the Loyalists, for the purpose of being restored to their King? BUONAPARTÉ had, indeed, taken possession of the greatest part of the inheritance of the KING of FRANCE; but did he thereby acquire a legal claim to the rest?—*Necessity*, dire necessity, might, perhaps, form some apology for our conduct at Toulon. The fleet and army of the allies could hardly escape themselves on that occasion; we refused assistance to none of the miserable inhabitants, and those who suffered, were the victims of their confidence in those bloodthirsty monsters, from whom they ought to have fled. And here, my Lord, I cannot help remind-

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ing you, that, at Toulon, this very same BUONAPARTÉ, to whose mercy you have abandoned the Loyalists of Martinico, was a principal actor under the Commissioners of the Convention, FRÉRON and MAXIMILIEN ROBESPIERRE, and performed so well his part, as to be honoured with the name of *Terrorist*, and to be driven from his post as such, after the fall of that infernal tyrant, who was, with no great impropriety, styled the *King of Terrors*.

To return to Martinico, and the other Colonies yielded to us by the Loyal French and Dutch, will you deny, my Lord, that part, at least of these possessions were *held by us in trust?* The whole world will attest it, and, from one end of the universe to the other, honour and justice will join the unfortunate Loyalists in invoking the vengeance of heaven on our heads.

The numerous and useful acquisitions, made by your predecessors, are a sufficient proof of their zeal and their talents. If they did less than they might have done; if they even committed some glaring errors, it was because they held the reins of power in times of unexampled difficulty, when genius could borrow no aid from experience; but, their errors were more particularly owing to the influence,

influence, which they suffered to be produced in their councils by *popular clamour*. What immortal honour would they not have obtained, had they followed the impulse of their own minds!—The conquests which your Lordship has tremblingly yielded to the foe, would, in their hands, have been the certain means of obtaining a *secure, honourable,* and *advantageous* Peace. We have seen, my Lord, how far the Peace, which you have made, has accomplished the two latter objects; let us now see, what *security* we are likely to derive from it. Let us cast our eyes over Europe; let us look round the British Islands; let us, however frightful the sight, view the *interior* of those Islands. It no longer behoves us to talk of colonies and of conquests; but, like a man on his death-bed, to examine ourselves and prepare for our end.

We have taken a view of the *foreign* territory of the French Republic. We have left her in possession of more islands and more colonies, in every part of the world, than remain to us, who *were,* who yet *are,* but God knows how long we *shall be,* called the Naval Power, by way of eminence. In every quarter we have traced her am-

bitious footsteps, and have observed some part or other of that edifice of universal domination, which she is erecting with such boldness and dispatch. On every side, we have seen the enemy at our doors; every where is she close to our most precious possessions; threatening us from every promontory and every harbour, and ready to draw forth, and turn loose against us, the numerous and obedient allies, which our pusillanimity has compelled to enlist under her banners.

But, frightful as this gigantic power is elsewhere, she is more particularly so, when we view her on the Continent of Europe, and on the shores of England. The Republic of France, properly so called, includes France, Belgium, Germany on this side the Rhine, French Switzerland, Savoy, and Piedmont, and contains a population of thirty-one or thirty-two millions, all having the same rights, the same laws, the same language (with some trifling exceptions), inhabiting a territory undivided, and all thus melted down into one and the same nation, more numerous than any of those which have heretofore over-run the world. The Turkish and Mahometan population, which formed the Ottoman Empire, did not amount to a fourth part of

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the number. Latium, and, since the *Social* War, Southern Italy, were the foundation of the Roman Empire; a few hordes of robbers in the deserts of Arabia, founded that of the Saracens. A chain of fortresses, together with rugged mountains and the sea, rendered France in her ancient limits, inaccessible to her enemies, though consisting of the principal military Powers of the Continent, whose armies no sooner stepped on her territory than they were driven out of it with disgrace. The Rhine, the Meuse, the fortresses of Flanders, Flushing, Maestricht, Juliers, Luxemburg and Mentz, have now been added to her already insurmountable barrier.

Holland, Switzerland, and the whole of Italy, are provinces subservient and tributary to the Empire of France; they recruit, pay, and clothe her armies; they enrich her Generals and her Commissaries; her Ambaassadors are the Legislators, the Ministers, the real Sovereigns, the absolute Despots, of these States, which your Lordship, and your Colleagues, wish us to regard as independent. France receives an additional population of eighteen millions from these different provinces, which

are all separated from one another by her own territory, all destitute of fortresses, except where she has a garrison, all without arsenals, without armies, except those which she obliges them to maintain, under her command, for the purpose of keeping them in awe; all totally cut off from every relationship with one another, except the yoke which is their common portion. What resistance, my Lord, can they ever make against her will? Their murmurs would be instantly drowned in their blood, and the hour of their revolt would be that of their destruction.

Spain, destitute of forces, at a distance from all foreign aid, cut off from the universe by the very enemy that is preparing to swallow her up, is in as complete subjection to the French Government as any one of the departments in the centre of France. Her fleets are in the ports of France; French Admirals and Generals command at Cadiz; and the KING of SPAIN is in a state of such abject servitude, that he has received and executed the order to chastise his son-in-law, the PRINCE of PORTUGAL, *for the aid which this latter gave him at the commencement of the War!!!* These two nations, which are

are at the nod of BUONAPARTÉ, and which will be revolutionized whenever he pleases, add thirteen millions more to the population of the empire of France.

This Power, which, in no age of the world, has ever had its equal, amounts to a population of nearly sixty-three millions. A population not scattered over divided countries, but forming one body, under an active, vigilant, vigorous government, invested with more authority than any government on earth ever possessed; a government which gives *to one man alone the power of suspending the laws at his pleasure.* The seat of this empire enjoys all the advantages that nature has been able to bestow, seconded by industry and commerce, and is, beyond all comparison, more rich in natural and acquired productions than any other portion of the globe, of like extent. I think, my Lord, that the strongest national prejudices; nay, I believe, that the high spirit of patriotism, which animates the breast of your Lordship, will scarcely refuse these advantages to the immense country circumscribed by the sea from Embden to the mouth of the Po, and, on the other side, separated from the rest of Europe by the Po, the Mincio, the

the Lake of Garda, the Alps, the Rhine, and the Zuyderzee.

The animating soul of this colossal power, the French Nation hitherto so called, is composed of men characterized by every formidable quality. Active, laborious, and hardy, at once enterprizing and persevering, bold and insinuating, with a passion for national glory, which has now been swelled into a sort of fury by the victorious close of a long and bloody war against all the powers of Europe. They are, as Mr. PITT, in his better days, described them, "*an armed nation*," a nation of soldiers, not formed by field-days and reviews, but by ten years of battles, of defeats, and of victories, foreign and domestic, and by a species of enrolment so general and inexorable, that scarcely remains there a man amongst them, who has not faced the enemy.

Such, my Lord, is no exaggerated picture of the power of France, considered in herself, and as forming one political body, with all the appendages which her usurping ambition has drawn around her. But, in the political world, nothing is absolute; a nation, particularly with regard to its power, must always be considered relatively with

other

other nations. Let me beseech your Lordship, then, to accompany me to the new frontier that France has formed around her. Though we have run away, my Lord, we may venture to look behind us on this terrific power; and it will require no great exertion of courage to stare her neighbours in the face.

The Zuyderzee and the Rhine, as far as Basle, separates France from Germany; fortresses, three deep, and, in some places, four deep, render this first natural barrier completely insurmountable. From Basle to the other extremity of Switzerland, the Rhine and the Lake of Constance, together with the numerous and excellent military positions of Switzerland, form a line of defence not less secure than the former. At the upper end of the Lake of Constance, where the Rhine becomes too shallow to form a barrier, rise the higher Alps of Switzerland, and of the Grisons, which separate Germany from Italy. The country of the Grisons in particular, which gives to France the command of the sources of the Rhine, of the Inn, and of the Adige, and, consequently, the command of those different vallies, penetrates like a wedge into the body of the Austrian monarchy, driving on towards

wards its heart, that is to say, its Capital, and wrenching its German from its Italian possessions. At the foot of the Alps, the Lake of Garda, the Mincio, defended by Mantua and Peschiera, the lower Po, with its vast marshes, defended by the citadel of Ferrara, separates the whole of Italy from the rest of the world; and, such is the advantage of this frontier, that these three fortresses are alone sufficient to secure the quiet possession of Italy, where sixteen millions of inhabitants will, from this time forward, cultivate the most fertile soil in the universe for their new and domineering masters on the other side of the Alps. These fortresses, at the same time, render useless twenty others, which France has hitherto been obliged to support against Piedmont, on the frontiers of Dauphiny and Provence.

To this frontier, so formidable, whether for attack or defence, the EMPEROR has no one fortress to oppose, nor has nature furnished a single obstacle, except the feeble current of the Adige and the Inn.

From the Lake of Constance to the German Ocean, all that vast and fertile country which lies between the Rhine on one side, the Elbe, Bohemia,

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and Austria on the other; and which, united under one and the same Sovereign, would form a great and powerful kingdom, but now divided into more than two hundred petty States, destitute of arsenals, of fortresses, and nearly destitute of troops, the open or secret enemies of each other, distrusting, and not without reason, the fidelity of their own subjects, who are highly Jacobinized, exhausted by war, and trembling at the very idea of a French army; such a country may offer a desirable prey to France, but it offers not an enemy worthy of a day's preparation.

The two great Monarchies, Austria and Prussia, are, then, the last and only bulwarks of the expiring liberty and independence of the nations of Europe. A hearty union of exertions between them might have done much, though their united population, according to the highest estimates, amounts to only thirty millions; that is to say, to one half of the population of the French Empire. But, this concert, so strongly urged by every honourable motive, and even by self-preservation, is so far from taking place, that, at this moment, it is matter of great doubt, which has the ascendance at these Courts respectively, their hatred of each other, or

the fear which they both entertain of their common enemy.

Russia alone can now boast with propriety and truth of her independence. At her immense distance from France, however, she can never act as a principal in any war against that power, but merely as an auxiliary, and can never employ but a very small proportion of her forces in such a contest. Besides, what political relations can we have with countries situated beyond the Niemen and the Boristhenes? We maintain a communication with these countries by Riga, much in the same manner that we maintain a communication with China by Canton. It is, then, but too true, that the best half of Europe has been subjugated by France, and that the other half now lies prostrate at her feet. This last was waiting in anxious silence for the favourable moment to grasp the friendly hand, which we held out to raise it from its horrid state of degradation. But the Peace which you have concluded, has blasted its hopes, and rivetted its chains for ever. You, my Lord, are the herald selected by the inflexible mandate of fate, to proclaim to Europe the dreadful truth, that she must now resign herself to her lot, and *obey*.

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I shall not detain your Lordship any longer in Europe, which, unfortunately, has become to us more of a *terra incognita* than either of the other three quarters of the globe. These are still accessible to us, we still have colonies, subjects, and tributary States, in these; their commerce is, almost exclusively, our own; but, Europe, my Lord, is shut against us; from Riga to Trieste we can only penetrate into her countries through France, or through those nations which are in a state of subjection to the French Republic. We must, then, my Lord, direct our attention to the coasts of France, to those coasts which now, for the first time, assume a fearful aspect, and portend destruction to our country. But this must form the subject of another Letter.

I am,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most humble

and most obedient servant,

Wm. COBBETT.

LETTER VII.

Pall-Mall, 26th Oct. 1801.

My Lord,

Not only is France by far the most powerful nation on the Continent, but there exists nothing, in any union or probable combination of the other Powers, which may yet be called independent, to balance against her enormous weight. No longer, therefore, have we reason to hope for any diversion on that side; and, in all future struggles, we must prepare ourselves to meet the undivided force of this mighty empire.

Much dependence is placed, and, perhaps, very justly placed, on our *navy*; but, my Lord, the enemy will not be without a naval force. Notwithstanding the losses which France has suffered in her own navy, as well as in the navies of her principal provinces, Holland and Spain, she is become the naval power next in rank to Great-Britain, and that she now possesses the means of rising superior to us, even in this our favourite bulwark, is a truth, my Lord, which, unfortunately, it is

but

but too easy to prove. She is the nearest, or rather is the only country near, to England: we are enveloped with her encroachments. The long rivalship of the two nations has been succeeded by a deadly and settled hatred against Great-Britain, or at least against the British Monarchy; a hatred originating with the sect which now governs France, and communicated by them to almost every description of Frenchmen, who, with some few exceptions, regard this government as the principal cause of all those calamities, which they have suffered for the last ten years; of all those bloody deeds, which have stained the annals of their country for ever; of all those evils, in short, which arose from their own folly, and the weakness of their lawful Government. I say the *weakness*, and not the *despotism*, of the French Monarchy; for, your Lordship must have observed (and I pray God you may never furnish an exemplification of its truth), that it is to *weak*, still more than to wicked, men, that Empires owe their destruction.

The Jacobins, that is to say, the *Republicans* of France, look upon the British Government, and not without reason, as the author of all their disappointments, all their humiliations, all the dangers

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and alarms, which they have experienced during their long and arduous struggle. Our naval power, our commercial prosperity, and our political institutions, they regard as the greatest, if not the only, obstacle to their plan of universal domination. Our riches, which are exaggerated a thousand fold by their thirst of plunder, are a standing object of temptation; and, to suppose that they will neglect any means of coming at them, would argue a total ignorance of their inclinations and their character. By nature enterprizing, enthusiastic from habit, elevated by success, eager for vengeance, ardent in the pursuit of pillage, and encouraged by the supplicating tone of their victim, what reason have we to hope for their forbearance? In a word, my Lord, the Republic of France sees no bar but Great-Britain between her and the empire of the world. Must she not, then, strongly desire to remove that obstacle? And will she not, for the attainment of that end, employ all the means, which intrigue, perfidy, and even temerity, can add to the resources of a government powerful beyond example, and seeking for nothing but the exercise of that power, equally prodigal of men and of things, equally a stranger to shame and remorse,

and

and feeling not the least restraint from the consideration of the miseries that even its own subjects may suffer from its desperate enterprizes?

What protection, then, my Lord, does your Treaty afford us against the united exertions of so much power, malignity, and rage? *Here*, or no where, it is, that we are to look for the price of so many extraordinary and unexpected concessions. It was, doubtless, to purchase "security for the "future," *at home*, that you surrendered so many of our possessions *abroad*, and that you left those, which, as yet, remain in our hands, exposed to such imminent danger. It was, say your advocates (for there are such men, my Lord), to keep the French from the mother country, that you offered the colonies as a prey to their rapacity; but, my Lord, did you never read, in the fable, that the wolf, after having swallowed the kids, finished his repast upon the dam?

From Brest to Dunkirk, the French coast always presented a formidable aspect to this country; the conquest and the subsequent cessions of Belgium augmented our danger; but the subjugation of Holland, by extending this menacing coast to the Texel, by giving France the absolute command of

so many ports, harbours, and rivers, just opposite our most vulnerable part, opposite the mouth of the Thames, has, at once, swelled this danger to the highest pitch, and rendered it perpetual. Your partizans say, we could not rescue Belgium from the French:—I know it. Still less was it in our power to liberate Switzerland, Italy, Spain, and the States on the Rhine. It would have been ridiculous to ask BUONAPARTÉ, to give up countries which had been ceded to him by their Sovereigns. You had, my Lord, no other means of providing for the safety of Great-Britain, than that of insisting on the real independence of Holland. This you might have done, my Lord; you might have re-established a government in that country, which would necessarily have been the friend and ally of England, and would, if necessary, have been able to make a respectable and efficient resistance, 'till we could have lent our aid, and have roused the rest of Europe to oppose any new act of injustice and usurpation on the part of France. Not having done this, my Lord, all the territory, all the commerce, and all the revenue, which you affect to regard as restored to our ancient ally, are surrendered to our implacable enemy. Our sacrifices

operate

operate doubly against us. Not only do we yield up our strength and prosperity, but we yield them to those who will direct them against our existence. We take the point of the sword from the breast of our mortal antagonist, and, like a despicable poltroon, present him with the hilt.

The moment it became the interest of Great-Britain to treat, Holland ought to have been the great object of her negotiation. Our ancestors were so firmly attached to this system of policy, that, not content with keeping Flanders, and, of course, the power of Austria, between France and Holland, they maintained a long war to obtain for this latter country that security which was given by the *Barrier Treaty.* Flushing, Bergen-op-Zoom, Breda, Bois-le-Duc and Maestricht, together with the Ecluse, and other fortresses on the left bank of the Scheldt, were not sufficient to quiet their fears no this most important point: and they never were at rest till they had put into the hands of those who were most interested in their defence, all the fortified places that cover Belgium on the side of France.

To obtain for Holland that security, which I insist is absolutely necessary to our own, you need not have asked for kingdoms nor even large provin-

ces from BUONAPARTÉ. A very small share in that distribution of states, which this generous conqueror is making with so liberal a hand, would have been quite sufficient for the purpose; for instance, Ruremonde, Juliers, Guelders, and Cleves, together with the fortresses on the left bank of the Scheldt, those of Flushing and Maestricht, were all that was wanted. The cession of them would have affected neither the security nor the power nor the prosperity of France, but it was absolutely necessary to the independence of Holland, and, consequently, to the security of England. The French government could have no other object in holding them than that of perpetuating the subjugation of Holland; and the world will judge whether you ought to have connived at a subjugation, which must inevitably be the forerunner of our own. Holland once freed, your Lordship might have extended your restitutions to *Ceylon*, without abandoning the interest, or forfeiting the honour of the nation.

As things now stand, not only the ancient *Barrier*, as fixed by the Treaty of that name, but Belgium also, and along with it the interposing power of Austria, are all become of no avail in the protection of the United Provinces; nay, even the

barrier

barrier within the Scheldt; Flushing their best defended port, the key of the Scheldt, and, in some sort, that of the Meuse; Maestricht, which commands the country on the left of the Meuse; Juliers, Ruremonde, Guelders and Cleves, whence the French can, at any time, penetrate into the heart of the United Provinces, even beyond the Yssel; all are in the hands of France, where, thanks to your treaty, my Lord, they will for ever remain. By this treaty, Holland is become the *unalienable* property of the French Republic; and therefore, as I promised to prove to you, it is to France, it is to regicide France, that you have given up the Spice Islands, the Cape of Good Hope, Surinam, Berbice, Demerara; in short, it is to our most powerful and most implacable enemy, that you have given up more colonies and islands than she ever before possessed, while you thought you were giving them up to our friends!—Permit me once more to exclaim, what a mistake for a *Statesman* to commit! Yea, for a suckling Statesman!

Not content with securing to the French the sovereignty of Holland, by leaving the country entirely open to their inroads, you have, by abandoning the old government, confirmed them in the

possession of the revenues, the administration of affairs civil and military, in a word, of all the authority and resources of the State. How small soever might be the force left in Holland, if the Peace had replaced the direction of it in the hands of the STADTHOLDER, we might have relied on his cordial friendship, and the salutary chastisement which the Dutch have received from their new masters, would have prevented any future defection from his authority. But, my Lord, unless some one of those important *secret articles* (with which your partizans endeavour to amuse us) provide for his re-establishment, this Prince is destined to pass his life in deploring the destruction of the State, which was founded by the courage, the skill, the fortitude, the treasure, and the blood of his ancestors. That the Stadtholdership re-established would have yielded us a reciprocity of protection no one will deny: I leave your Lordship, who are, doubtless, a judge of such matters, to tell us what benefit we shall derive from the government, which is at this moment under the creative hands of AUGEREAU and SEMONVILLE the Legislative Aides-de camp of the most indefatigable Legislator that ever existed.

If BUONAPARTÉ had intended to leave Holland

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in possession of *real* independence, why should he have refused to restore the Old Government, especially as it would have saved him the trouble of making a new one? The reinstalment of the STADTHOLDER would certainly not have been a more glaring infraction of that article of the Jacobin code, which declares that "*all men are born, and remain, "equal in rights,*" than the creating of *a King of Etruria.* And, if BUONAPARTÉ's intention was to keep Holland in subjection, by the help of his new government, or by any other means, I again ask, my Lord, ought you to have connived at a subjugation, which will inevitably be the forerunner of our own?

In place of *your* ULTIMATUM, then, my Lord, let us for a moment, suppose, that you had insisted on that which I have presumed to point out; that is, on our part, a complete restitution of *all* conquests to their former possessors; on the other, the re-establishment of the Stadtholdership, the restitution of the Ecluse, Flushing and Maestricht, the cession of Ruremonde, Cleves and Guelders, with their districts, to cover the country between the Meuse and the Rhine, and to prevent the French from entering, at pleasure, into the United Provinces. What would

would have been the consequence? If BUONAPARTÉ had consented to it, you would have rescued Holland from his grasp; you would have laid a solid foundation for her independence; you would have had a just claim to the attachment of her Government; you would have strengthened our most ancient and useful alliance; you would have convinced the nations of Europe, that, within her sphere of action, at least, England is yet something; you would have had the secret applause and gratitude of Prussia, for interposing a new barrier between her and France; but, above all, you would have driven from our sight the prospect of invasion, that horrible spectre, which will now haunt us, night and day, to the hour of our dissolution.

If BUONAPARTÉ had rejected *this* ULTIMATUM, you would have pulled the mask from his ambitious projects, you would have given a general alarm to all Europe, whose confidence and admiration you would have gained by so striking a proof of moderation and disinterestedness. But, my Lord, he would not have dared to reject it. The French, a great portion of whom sighed for Peace, and who were reconciled to BUONAPARTÉ merely because he had promised it them, would never have continued

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the War for the sake of a few fortresses, in no wise necessary either to their security, their greatness, or their prosperity, and not making altogether one half of a department of France. Had he persisted, however, you would have destroyed his popularity; instead of which, your Peace has raised him to the highest pinnacle of power and of popular favour. Pardon me, my Lord, if I am compelled to believe, that what you have done, is precisely the contrary of what you meant to do, or of what you ought to have done. Pardon me, too, if in proposing an *Ultimatum*, I have, in some sort, usurped your functions; but really, my Lord, your *coup d'essai*, is by no means calculated to dishearten young beginners in the diplomatic career.

Belgium and Holland include all the different mouths and branches of the Scheldt, the Meuse, and the Rhine, with several ports fit for the reception of ships of War, particularly those of the smaller size. The vast countries which the Rhine, the Meuse, and the rivers that fall into them, run through, are covered with forests, containing an abundance of oak and other ship-timber, which by means of these rivers will be conveyed at a very small expense, to the yards and docks near the sea. There are even

considerable

considerable forests of pines, as fit for masts as any that come from Norway, upon the mountains of the Vosges and the Schwartzwald, the foot of which is washed by the Rhine. Thirty thousand French, Spanish, and Dutch sailors, which the Peace restores to our enemy, will man these new fleets. This same Peace will lay open to the French the naval magazines of the North. But, why do I talk of naval *stores?* By the Convention, my Lord, which you and your colleagues have made with the honest neutrals of the North, you have taken care to give us the enjoyment of this particular blessing of Peace by anticipation; for, such, my Lord, are the conditions of that Convention, that BUONAPARTÉ, might in any future War (if it should be possible for us ever to go into another War) have a three decker built in any port of the Baltic, and bring her to France, through the middle of our fleet, without the least danger of her being captured. It would only require the precautions, 1st, to man the vessel with one half Russians, Danes, or Swedes; 2d, not to insert the name of the proprietor in the ship papers; 3d, not to take her into a blockaded port. The observance of the two first conditions depends on the enemy; and as to the third, I appeal to Lord

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St. Vincent (to whose opinion I am sure you will *implicitly* subscribe), whether we can extend a blockade *from the Texel to Ancona.*

To exercise and instruct their sailors will be the first advantage, which the French will derive from the Peace. They will apply themselves to the renovating of their navy, with that activity and perseverance, which mark all those undertakings, which they regard as conducive to the accomplishment of their grand scheme of universal sway. And, such are their domestic resources, from the immensity of their possesions, and their foreign resources, from the ascendant which they have gained over all the other powers of Europe, that a very few years will elapse before they will have a navy far superior to that of the monarchy. To their own they will add the navy of Holland, and will dispose of that of Spain more absolutely than ever. And it is easy to perceive, that the kingdoms of Denmark and Sweden, whose geographical situation clearly marks them out amongst the last of the future conquests of France, will seek to cultivate her friendship as a permanent protection against their formidable neighbours, Russia and Prussia; so that the French may safely reckon these two powers amongst their future

maritime auxiliaries. And, do you not tremble, my Lord, at the maritime influence, or, rather, the maritime dominion, which extends from the Gulph of Bothnia to the Gulph of Venice?

Methinks I hear you make a triumphant comparison between these infant undisciplined fleets and those of Great-Britain. But, my Lord, if we were certain (which I am far from being), that we shall ever again be able to send fleets to sea, let us not forget, that our enemies will have nothing to do *but to cross the narrow channel, which separates our shores from theirs*. Naval tactics are not necessary in an enterprize, the success of which requires but a few hours of favourable wind.

The French having no enemy to dread on their land board, may easily maintain, and they will maintain, a numerous army along the coast from Brest to the Texel. This army they may double, at any moment they please, by those sudden and efficacious means, which are become familiar to the people; and, my Lord, however you may be disposed to sneer, one and the same southerly wind may bring four armies on our coasts. It is not necessary to name the points of embarkation or disembarkation; the enemy is perfectly acquainted

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with the subject. But you will say, perhaps, "what will the people of England be doing all this "while?" For an answer to which question I beg leave to refer your Lordship to those *people of England*, who drew Citizen LAURISTON to your Office in Downing-street: and who, while they were rejoicing at your Peace, and joining in your illuminations, cried, "BUONAPARTÉ *for ever!—Huzza* "*for the Republic of France!*"

Great-Britain will, as the least possible evil, be obliged constantly to maintain a numerous army (I hear that the proposed *Peace* establishment is to be *three times* as great as it was during the last Peace) to repel an invasion, and numerous fleets to prevent the invaders from approaching her shores. We shall never know when an aggression is about to take place; for the great and mighty Republic will be *always preparing*; and, be you well assured, my Lord, that *she* will not suffer impertinent neighbours to ask questions. While our dock-yards and fleets are in a state of inactivity, we shall see vessels of all countries sailing to the ports of France, with all the materials necessary to re-establish her navy; and it is not going too far to say, that she will receive thirty thousand

mariners from this country, some of whom, as your Lordship may recollect, are not a little infected with Jacobinism. In the mean time BUONAPARTÉ, or his successor (for your Peace has established the Republic), will dispatch troops and warlike stores to the West-Indies, the Cape of Good Hope, and to India. We shall not, as I before observed, dare to inquire into the extent, destination, and object of these armaments. We must observe their operations in silence, and prepare for resistance in secret; for they will not suffer *us* to embark a single regiment, without rendering them a full and satisfactory account.

The military and naval establishment for such a Peace cannot be much less expensive, than what would have been necessary for the continuance of the War, or else it will be totally insufficient. It will not even be attended with the advantage of forcing the enemy to incur a proportionate expense; for the French Government, certain of having land-forces at its command, whenever it shall have occasion for them, will always be able to diminish them with facility; and, consequently, to appropriate to the navy a great part of the funds, now employed for the support of the army.

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The consequence of this state of mistrust, uneasiness, expense, and danger, on the one part; and of threats, intrigues, and hostile preparations on the other, which is honoured with the name of *Peace*, will enable the French, suddenly, and with the greatest advantage, to renew a War, which will be pregnant with the greatest danger to England, in as much as the French will have had time to collect their forces and their means of attack, so as to bear upon the points which they have in view; and as they will moreover have it in their power to choose both their time and their point of attack.

It is no longer, then, my Lord, the loss of our conquests which we have to regret; it is no longer the dangers to which our distant possessions are exposed by the loss of those conquests, that we have to avert: in a word, it is no longer for glory and for empire that we have to contend, but for our safety and our independence.

I am, My Lord,

Your Lordship's most humble

and most obedient Servant,

Wm. COBBETT.

LETTER VIII.

Pall-Mall, 28th Oct. 1801.

My Lord,

When restraints are imposed on our power in every part of the globe; when the honour of the English name is tarnished; when we have cause to tremble for the very safety, nay, even for the existence, of our country; can her commerce command any portion of our attention? Yes, my Lord, commerce is the vital principle of that empire, the basis and the support of that power. By commerce alone shall we henceforth be able to make good our engagements. By commerce alone shall we be enabled to support the expense of that enormous peace establishment, which is now entailed upon us for ever. From commerce alone can we derive resources for the support of a War, which our implacable enemy meditated in his heart, at the very moment when his hand signed the instrument of Peace. It becomes necessary, then,

to examine in what manner you have provided fo the commercial interests of the nation.

To investigate every branch of our commerce, to trace it through all its varied ramifications, with a view to ascertain the influence which the Treaty of Peace will have upon them, would require a work of an immense size, and infinitely beyond my abilities to compose. Indeed, I know, that the composition of a work so complicated, and requiring such an extent of knowledge, natural and acquired, would exceed the powers of any one man. My observations, therefore, shall be limited to a few leading points, all of which appear to me to be incontestible.

The happiest state of commerce is an union of luxury and wealth. This union was found in the Austrian Netherlands, in that rich and fertile country, whose superabundant productions furnished the most immoderate luxury with the means of satisfying all its wants, and even of gratifying all its caprices. The commerce of the Netherlands is lost to us, and has been wholly transferred to our enemies.

The Rhine, which, from one extremity to the other, is subject to the domination of the French,

released

released from all those restrictions, which the contradictory interests of its different Sovereigns had imposed, will henceforth be the channel, through which all the produce of the French and other European Colonies, will be conveyed into Westphalia, the circles of the Upper and the Lower Rhine, and, along the Mein, into the heart of Franconia, and again into Suabia, Switzerland, and Bavaria. The Mediterranean will, in the same manner, supply the wants of Switzerland, and those of Piedmont, and the Cisalpine Republic, from Genoa to Nice. In the other parts of Italy, the Commerce of France will be sure to receive that preference, which the enjoyment of power invariably confers. The Italian silks, and especially those of Piedmont, will give to the Silk Manufactures of France the same superiority which the Wool of Spain confers on her Cloths. The Oils of Calabria will supply the Soap Manufactories of Marseilles. Turkey, by the force of habit, the temptation of proximity, and the influence of fear, will be brought back to the use of French Manufactures. Spain, even before the War, was, and *a fortiori* now, will be, tributary to French industry. In none of these nations, can we expect to maintain a compe-

competition, at once against the distance of situation, the cheapness of labour, and the dependence of the countries themselves upon France. Besides, will the British Merchants ever be tempted to venture their goods, to any amount, in countries open to the French Arms? Was the neutrality of the Grand Duke of Tuscany sufficient to protect the British warehouses at Leghorn, though that Prince was the brother of our most powerful ally? Would it protect them, now, then, when the country belongs to the phantom of a King, set up by BUONAPARTÉ, the creature of his will, and the abject dependent on his power? No, my Lord, though the promises of BUONAPARTÉ may be deemed a satisfactory guarantee by some of our Statesmen, I strongly suspect that our merchants will be little disposed to risk their property on the faith of such a security.

By the restitution of all the Spice Islands, except Ceylon, our commerce in that article is greatly reduced. At the beginning of the late War, the Americans had not more than eight or ten ships employed in the India trade; they have, at this time, upwards of two hundred; and, assuredly, the French

will rather purchase the productions of that country from them than from us.

The French West-India colonies, which produce sugar, coffee, cotton, and indigo, will greatly exceed our own, in extent, population, and value; and, consequently, they will, 'ere long, have a much greater quantity of the produce of the West-Indies to dispose of in the European markets, than ourselves; while, at the same time, they will have a more extensive market for their commodities. Our manufactories of the finer cottons will, in all probability, preserve their superiority for some time; but the coarser productions of the French manufactories will be cheaper than ours, and will consequently find a readier sale in Germany, and generally throughout the Continent, where motives of habit and economy have a very general influence. Will not the difficulty, which our merchants must experience in the recovery of the sums, which they have expended in the French colonies (now going into the hands of BUONAPARTÉ), induce them to embark still deeper in such enterprizes, the moment they find them in possession of a power, able and willing to afford them protection? Should this

this be the case, no inconsiderable part of our capital will be employed in enriching our enemies. Unhappily, too, many of our countrymen, driven from their native land by the load of necessary taxes, which they will long have to support, attracted by the magnificent monuments of the arts, by political curiosity, by the pleasures of a capital, which will offer numberless temptations, to the children of wealth and indolence; by the moderate expense which will be necessary for the full gratification of their different tastes, will be the means of transporting another portion of our capital to France. And, Heaven knows! what principles and what manners they will bring back with them in return for their money! Religion, morality, and patriotism, tremble at the thought.

It is evident that the chief, or rather, the only, obstacle to the sudden revival of trade and industry in France, is, the want of capital. For the accomplishment of this grand object, nothing else is requisite for a country, so favoured by nature; nor indeed, is the laborious activity of her inhabitants inferior to the abundance and variety of her natural productions. This very want of capital opens a wide field of speculation to foreigners of every

country; and it is to be expected that the English, the Dutch, and the Swiss, will not fail to avail themselves of such an opening. A man who would merely vegetate in England on a capital of five, six, or even ten thousand pounds, would, with the aid of industry, rapidly acquire an immense fortune in France. The difference of language and religion, it is to be feared, would present but trivial obstacles to emigration, for French is almost universally spoken; and, in these times, unfortunately, religion has very little influence on the actions of men. The love of their country, that best and noblest of passions, will, it is to be dreaded, prove a still weaker inducement to keep them at home; for the country of men, whose pursuit is *money*, or *pleasure*, is that, in which they can gain the most. Besides, my Lord, what is called public or national spirit, is nearly extinguished in Europe. Many causes, which it is needless for me to specify, had sensibly weakened it every where; the French or Jacobinical Revolution completed its destruction; and, perhaps, this is the most fatal blow, which it has inflicted on social order. It is, in principle, a moral Revolution, and a political Revolution only in its effects. Hence, it is general, not merely in

all nations, but in every description of men. The division of mankind is no longer regulated by countries; a man is no longer considered as a Briton, a Russian, a Dane, or a Dutchman, but as a Jacobin or an Anti-Jacobin, as a friend or an enemy to the French Government, which is no longer the Government of a nation, but the Government of a sect, of which France is the first and most important conquest. If any spark of public spirit be still to be found in Europe, it is in France that we must look for it. The very origin of the Revolution, the signal successes which have marked its progress, the military glory, and the decided superiority, which the French nation have acquired by it, all combine to attach the people to the soil which gave it birth. There this public spirit even pervaded their armies; crowds of Austrian deserters joined the Republican standard, while the number of French deserters was comparatively few, even at a time when the French *Volunteers* were *forced* into the service, and led hand-cuffed and fettered to the army, where they were in want of every thing. You cannot be ignorant, my Lord, that Great-Britain contains a considerable number of these zealous partizans of the Jacobinical sect.

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They no longer take the trouble to conceal their sentiments. Do you suppose that the love of their country will keep in England, men, whom political fanaticism, a well-founded hope of gain, and the cheapness of all the enjoyments of life, so strongly invite to emigrate to France? They will take their fortunes with them; and this will produce another diminution of our capital. But, Heaven send, they may all emigrate, even with their riches, and transport to the opposite side of the Channel, their parricidal hatred of their country, which is infinitely more dangerous, while they remain here, than it could be if they resided among our enemies.

In a word, in France, and in all the countries which acknowledge her sway, French commerce will have a decided preference over our own. And the utmost we can expect, in other countries, which still retain their independence, is to be placed upon an equal footing with her. On which side, then, is the ultimate advantage? I have shown, that our commerce will lose by the Peace, in the Mediterranean, in the East-Indies, in the West-Indies, and, lastly, in our own Manufactures. Where then has

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it gained? The Commercial Treaty, which is to be signed at Amiens, or elsewhere, will no doubt inform us.

So much, my Lord, have you done for our Commerce; and I am very apprehensive, that the same Peace has inflicted a more deadly blow on our external consequence. The consideration, which a government enjoys in the estimation of foreign powers, constitutes one of its most important possessions. It is at once the appendage of its power, its wisdom, and its equity. It is, in some sort, the standard of its external power. Before the Peace of the 1st of October, Great-Britain enjoyed the most exalted and extensive consideration, and that too of the most honourable kind. Her tutelary power was only exerted for the purpose of protection, never for the infliction of injury. Other nations only looked up to her for support, and never considered her as an object of apprehension. Even the success of our enemy on the Continent, only served to increase her consequence, by directing their supplications and their hopes to her. Here, my Lord, you stand, as it were, upon your own ground; and you will, no doubt, think it the height of presumption in me, to attack you on it; nevertheless I shall make the attempt.

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The Sublime Porte, my Lord, has just afforded us a proof of the estimation in which she holds our consequence, in the Treaty of Peace, which she signed with France, eight days after the conclusion of your own Treaty. By this Treaty she grants the same privileges to the usurpers as to the liberators of Europe, not only in the other parts of her dominions, but in Egypt itself; in that country, for the recovery of which she is exclusively indebted to our arms, and which we might still have kept in spite of her. BUONAPARTÉ, in this Treaty, adds insult to outrage, by the insertion of a clause as impudently at variance with truth, as adverse to the glory of our arms; in which it is said, "The *French will evacuate Egypt.*" Will not you, my Lord, cause this egregious error to be rectified, and take some means for preventing the name of Great-Britain from becoming henceforth the sport of nations?

Such is the position in which we voluntarily leave the Porte, that in signing this Treaty, she has done nothing more than attempt to provide for her own safety. Shall we enjoy any influence with the Sovereign of Piedmont? He is no longer

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in existence. With the King of NAPLES and the Pope? They no longer exist but in name. With Spain and Portugal? Your Treaty, by multiplying the dangers which threaten their American settlements, from an invasion by the French, and by diminishing the means of preventing it, has completed the subjugation of these two powers, and removed the only cause which compelled the French Government to observe some degree of forbearance towards them. With the Swiss? We have now as little connection with them, as with any of the wandering tribes which inhabit Mount Caucasus. With the States of Germany inclosed, on one side, by France, on the other by Prussia and Austria, and which might with propriety be called the *Germanic Body*, since the Emperor is its head and the King of Prussia its destroyer? They would all of them tremble at the bare thought of a French army. With Prussia? We may judge of her partiality, by the unprovoked invasion of Hanover, which was under His MAJESTY's immediate, legal, and certainly not *gratuitous* protection, both as Director of the Circle of Lower Saxony, and as head of the Armed Neutrality of the North of Germany. If the King of Prussia's partiality was the

effect of fear, six months ago (for a *King, conquering from cowardice*, is one of the most curious phenomena of the present day), what will become of that partiality, now that our enemy rules without obstacle, and without a diversion, over the whole extent of Europe? The partiality of Denmark and Sweden for France, for the last ten years, is unfortunately but too notorious, and I have before shown that such a partiality will, henceforth, be pointed out by political wisdom.

Russia and Austria still remain to be considered. These distant countries are only accessible to us by two points; the first, during four months in the year, by Riga and Saint Petersburgh; the second, by Trieste and Venice. We could sail to America in less time. The Emperor of Russia has, of late, betrayed an indifference to the question, to which, indeed, the distance of his territories may, in some degree, have contributed. The Emperor of Germany was our ally, because France threatened him, and we threatened France. The alliance will probably continue, because France now threatens us both. What a change have the motives of our alliances undergone?

Lastly,

Lastly, have we retained any influence over Holland, over that country which was our natural friend, whose existence depended on our alliance, and the conquest of which threatens our own independence? No; Holland has, in fact, become a province of France. Its government, even if it were truly free and independent, would be an enemy to our government, if only because it has usurped the place of the STADTHOLDER. All that I have said on this subject may be summed up in these few words: What have we done for our allies by the Peace?—NOTHING.—What can we do for them henceforth?—NOTHING.—What consequence shall we, in future, possess?—NONE AT ALL.—Our enemy, then, has the whole world for him, and Great-Britain against him. When I say Great-Britain, it is not Great-Britain, victorious in every quarter of the globe, rich, mistress of the sea, and of all the sources and all the channels of commerce;—but Great-Britain, tarnished, mutilated and dishonoured. We may, then, with propriety, now apply to ourselves Virgil's observation on our ancestors, in the time of AUGUSTUS—

Et penitus toto divisos orbe Britannos.

Remember, my Lord, that, not long after this observation was made, Britain became a province of the Roman Empire.

I am,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most humble

and most obedient servant,

Wm. COBBETT.

P.S. My Lord, my opinion respecting the commercial projects of the French is fully corroborated by the following article, which appeared in the *Journal des Débats* of the 26th Vendémiaire (Oct. 16th) entitled, *A Short View of the Preliminaries of Peace with England*, which article, for the convenience of your Lordship, I will endeavour to translate into our mother tongue.

" Those who have estimated Ceylon and Tri-
" nidada merely according to their superficial con-
" tents, have not discovered a much greater degree
" of information in examining the Treaty, as re-
" lating

" lating to the interests of France. Scarcely do
" they seem to have perceived the port of *Antwerp*,
" which is so celebrated in the annals of commerce,
" and which, situated, as it is, between the Southern
" and Northern Seas, will now become the grand
" market of all Germany. At a single glance over
" our European conquests, we perceive the im-
" mensity of territory, of population, and of
" strength, that we have acquired; but, it will
" require long study and meditation to enable us
" to estimate the industry and the wealth, which
" will be added to our commercial system, and to
" teach us how vast the commerce of Belgium
" always has been, notwithstanding the restric-
" tions laid on her by England and Holland. The
" hemp, flax, and timber, which have heretofore
" been brought to us by the Dutch, as produc-
" tions of the Baltic, will now come to us directly
" from the Electorates; and, indeed, the Rhine,
" the Meuse, and the Scheldt, which the Peace
" leaves entirely at our command, will give us, on
" the Continent, a commercial superiority, equal to
" that which we have obtained in the cabinet and
" in the field.

" Nor

"Nor is the Peace less favourable to our great-
"ness and prosperity in other parts of the world.
"The genius of our Government has opened to
"the commerce and *to the squadrons of France,*
"THE CAPE OF GOOD HOPE, *that bulwark of*
"*India.* The importance of this acquisition can
"be *fully estimated* by those only, *who are ac-*
"*quainted with the character, the disposition, and*
"*the political situation of the inhabitants of Asia.*
"Ever since 1756, England has destroyed the ba-
"lance of European power beyond the Cape of
"Good Hope; and, if she now gains, by the de-
"tention of Ceylon, an accession of strength, in
"that quarter, she thereby loses, for ever, all the
"advantages, which she derived from the friend-
"ship and the alliance of Holland, whose politics
"she too long influenced, both in Europe and in
"Asia. Thus, the Peace gives us back all our
"Asiatic possessions, and *policy* will add the Cape
"of Good Hope, together with a decided influence
"over Holland, and *will revive the connection so*
"*happily formed, with the Indian Princes, by Du-*
"*pleix, Labourdonnaye, and Bussi.* 'SYMS,' says
"the author of the *Traité d'Economie politique,*
"gives us an excellent key to the politics of India:
"he

" he tells us, that, while he was on his embassy, " and particularly while he was negotiating a treaty " of commerce with the Emperor of Birmans, he " was well or ill treated according to the nature of " the news, which circulated in Asia, respecting " the situation of France. Our triumphs, or our de- " feats, were the criterion of this Prince's delibera- " tions."

" In the western hemisphere, Martinico, Saint " Lucia, and Tobago, return to the arms of the " mother country, loaded with English improve- " ment, English industry, and English capital.— " Our colonies owe even their former riches to the " tempory possession of them by the English. " Martinico now comes back to us in a state the " most flourishing that can be conceived, while " Saint Lucia and Tobago will soon acquire a first " rate place in the colonial system, heretofore too " little attended to by our Government.

" French Guyana, happily situated to the wind- " ward of the Island, *has been enlarged in extent by* " *a cession of part of the territory of Portugal*" [notwithstanding the "*integrity* of our allies," my Lord], " and opens to an enlightened government a vast " field for speculation, agricultural, commercial, " and *military*.

 " The

"The magnificent" [the word is not misapplied] "colony of Saint Domingo, now greatly "augmented by the addition of the Spanish part of "the island, will resume her former prosperity; "and, if we have the policy to unite the industry "of the colonist with the *warlike spirit of the buc-* "*caneer*, the Islands will soon become to her what "Europe is to France."

LETTER

LETTER IX.

Pall-Mall, 4th Nov. 1801.

My Lord,

Upon taking my leave of your Lordship, I could have wished to present you with a summary of what, perhaps, you have not had leisure to peruse in detail; but, so fertile is the Treaty that you have signed, that, upon a review of the preceding Letters, I perceive them to contain little more than a mere enumeration of evils. In the conclusion, therefore, of my long and painful task, I shall content myself with a recapitulation of a few of the principal points.

The Peace takes from England a great number of rich colonies and important naval stations, not to replace them in the hands of friendly or neutral powers, but in those of our enemy.—It endangers those distant possessions which are still ours, by admitting the French into their neighbourhood, and, of course, by exposing them to their arms and their more dangerous intrigues.—It wholly deprives us of

some of the most considerable branches of our commerce, it diminishes all the other, and, here as every where else, what is taken from us, is given to the power which has been, which is, and which will be, bent on our destruction.—We had but one dangerous neighbour, and this Peace has rendered her a thousand times more dangerous than ever, by adding 300 miles to the length of her coast. She had but one port which was formidable to us, and that was opposite a part of our Island far distant from the seat of our riches; but the Peace furnishes her with ports in abundance opposite the mouth of the Thames. From the masts of her vessels, riding at anchor in these ports, she can see the shore, whereon she wishes to disembark; nor is this shore, for above 120 miles along the coast, more than 60, and, in some places not more than 40, miles from London.—Before the War there was but one naval power capable of contending with us: this power is still our enemy. We had destroyed a great part of her navy, and that of her two maritime allies; but, the Peace gives her the full and permanent possession of those three navies, one of which had been long accustomed to fight by our side; and, she will find, in her immense acquisitions, a super-abundance of all the materials necessary

sary to the re-establishment of her maritime force, while the principal rivers of Southern Europe, which are all at her command, will convey these materials into her newly-acquired ports, opposite the mouth of the Thames.—Our enemy stood in need of seamen: the Peace at once restores 30,000 of her own, and will send into her service 30,000 of ours.—This enemy, rendered all-powerful on the Continent by the Peace, which will consolidate her domination, left us no hope of any diversion on that side, nor, indeed, any thing to preserve us from her attacks but our naval superiority, which the Peace furnishes her with the means of taking from us at a day, far less distant than many are willing to believe. That day, my Lord, will be the day of a complete and universal revolution, the signal of which will be, our relinquishment of the sovereignty of that sea, which our forefathers named the *British Channel*, and which we must now add to *the title* and *the lilies*, already yielded, not to the descendants of St. Louis, but to the grovelling republican despots, who have usurped their authority and their dominions.—This state of danger, with regard both to the mother country and the colonies, will now become, our uninterrupted inheritance: we must, therefore, keep

ourselves constantly upon the defensive, by sea as well as by land, which will cause a permanent augmentation of taxes; and, after all, the success of our defensive system will ever be extremely precarious.—We had a great number of allies. The Peace leaves us not one. There is not, at this day, a nation upon earth that would not as soon have our enmity as our friendship.—In short, this fatal Peace, curtails our possessions, diminishes our commerce and our revenue, augments our permanent expenses, exposes us to continual danger within and without; and, which is worse than all the rest, it blasts for ever the honour of England: it is at once injurious, precarious, dangerous, and disgraceful. And, yet, my Lord, you call on us to *rejoice!* The Jacobins may, indeed, rejoice with reason and with sincerity; for this peace gives to them a greater victory, than the battle of Marengo gave to BUONAPARTÉ; the latter decided the fate of Italy, but the former has decided the fate of the universe.

And, where are we to look for the reasons which dictated this destructive and dishonourable Peace? At the time when your Lordship gave it your sanction, had France obtained over us a superiority so great, that you could not refuse, nay, that you

you were called upon to *offer* her, without any equivalent, so many valuable possessions, all of which were totally inaccessible to her arms? If that be the case, we must confess, however humiliating the confession may be, that we are no longer the rival, but the dependant and the vassal of France. And, how shall we ever dare to dispute any thing with this power, aggrandized by all our losses? It will be more dangerous to refuse her *Ireland*, at any future period, than it would, heretofore, have been to refuse her *Martinico*; for, it is in vain to disguise the fact, that she can now wrest the former from us with much greater facility than she could have recovered the latter. There are men, my Lord, who have the impudence to repeat, that the cessions which we have made, have preserved our allies; but the truth is, that these cessions have only imposed on us the necessity to redeem our allies as often as BUONAPARTÉ pleases. It will not be with *conquests* that we shall hereafter have to pay their ransom: your treaty has left us none. We must abandon them to the first usurpation, or redeem them, even for a short space, at the expense of our own territory. In a late proclamation, well calculated to give Europe a correct opinion of his moderation, BUONAPARTÉ, not less generous as an

enemy

enemy than magnanimous as a conqueror, has thus candidly communicated his grand secret: "The "French Government, always great, always just, "will keep only those of its conquests, which are "given to it by nature, and which its safety re-"quires. If it retains certain provinces belonging "to Portugal, it is only *to force* the PERFIDIOUS "*English to give up the Colonies, which they have* "*taken from us, and from our Allies by surprise.*" Thus, my Lord, whenever BUONAPARTÉ, who, at this very moment, is giving such striking proofs of his moderation in Switzerland, in Holland, and in Italy, shall wish "to force the *perfidious* English" to cede to him Ceylon, Jamaica, Gibraltar, &c. &c. he has only to have recourse to his infallible secret; that is, to seize on Portugal. As to another war, on our part, the thing is next to *impossible*.

There remains, then, my Lord, no evasion, no subterfuge, nothing to justify this Peace, but *necessity*. Necessity, *irresistible necessity* is the only plea, which can possibly, without a total abandonment of principle, be urged in justification of a measure, which has blasted the prosperity, enfeebled the power, tarnished the glory, and endangered the safety of Great-Britain. But, my Lord, *real* necessity, wherever it exists, is not a thing to be hid-

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den or feigned. Its characteristics are not equivocal: its tremendous voice is not to be smothered: it is neither to be shunned nor resisted. Hannibal, who was born and bred in a hatred of Rome, who lived but for her destruction, and who embraced death with transport, when the enemy of his country had enslaved the world; Hannibal, who did not content himself with making, in the Senate, a vapouring proposition to march to Rome, but who did actually march thither from the remotest corner of Spain, yielded at last to *imperious necessity*; and, after the battle of Zama, sued for Peace, of which, though such as might be expected from a vindictive and all-powerful conqueror, he was the first to advise his countrymen to accept. This, my Lord, is a high example in your favour; but, if men of the most intrepid courage do sometimes yield to *real* necessity, the phantom of necessity much oftener appals the heart and influences the conduct of the coward.

When your Lordship signed the Peace of Downing-Street, had our enemy torn from us not only all our conquests, but also a part of our own territory? Had we lost a decisive battle under the walls of our capital, and, with the remnant of our forces, our last hope and resource? No, my Lord,

the

the numerous conquests, which we had made from France and her Allies, were all in our hands, and the enemy had even ceased to attempt to disturb us in the possession of them. Not a single hostile soldier had his foot on any part of our vast empire. Our enemies were, indeed, full of hatred and malice, but they could not reach us. We had been in pursuit of them, into a country a thousand leagues from our coasts, where we had just made prisoners of war a whole army, composed of their chosen troops, and more numerous than our own. Had our fleets (the floating ramparts of Britain) been beaten, or had they, by their flight from the enemy, exposed our coasts to his ravages?—No, my Lord, ten years of victory without a single defeat had been the lot of our navy, and ten years of defeat without a single victory, that of the navy of France. That navy was no longer to be seen on the ocean. A great part of it we had destroyed, another considerable part had been added to our own navy, and the miserable remainder was hidden in the ports of France, where it scarcely found shelter from the assaults of our seamen. Had we any thing to apprehend from *invasion?* No, my Lord, after the battle of Camperdown, in 1797, our enemies, having no

hopes

hopes of coming at us with their fleets, had recourse, or pretended to have recourse, to the ridiculous invention of rafts, to convey their devastating hordes to our coasts, an invention which they threw aside the moment they perceived that it no longer gave alarm to the credulous and cowardly inhabitants of London and Westminster. They were too cunning to think seriously of opposing the infancy to the manhood of navigation, the raft of the savage to the ships of Great-Britain, and they themselves were the first to laugh at their farcical preparations. Since that epocha, my Lord, our enemy has lost more than thirty ships of the line and fifty frigates; and, was our spirit so debased, were we become such despicable poltroons, as to dread the efforts of this crippled and almost annihilated navy? It was no longer with ships of war, for the enemy had none; it was no longer with rafts, for they were become a subject of derision; it was with barks, with bateaux, with barges, with lighters, that Great-Britain was to be invaded! A disembarkation, from a fleet like this, of thirty thousand men, or even fifty thousand, with our war establishment on foot, might, indeed, have given us some trouble, but it would have been followed by a total defeat of the enemy, and would have freed us, for ever after, from all alarms of inva-

sion; the day of such a descent would have been much more fortunate for England, than that, on which the timid councils of our cabinet exposed the country, not to the hostility of a few thousands of men, almost naked, and disarmed, in a string of frail and defenceless boats; but to that of one or more powerful armies, perfectly armed, accoutred, and provided, conveyed in the innumerable vessels, which will, in a very short time, swarm from the multiplied ports of the enemy, and escorted by squadrons capable of defending them on the passage, and of covering their disembarkation. In that day, my Lord, we may, perhaps, see the Hero of the Nile himself (the shade of HANNIBAL will not rise to protest against *this* comparison) dissuading his countrymen from resistance, and exhorting them to submission. In that fatal day, my Lord, BUONAPARTÉ, or, perchance, his successor, will only execute the death-warrant, which was signed on the 1st of October, 1801.

That our fleets, or our armies, wanted either skill or courage, will hardly be asserted, even by those who made a merit with the nation of having obtained the "*evacuation*" of Egypt: nor is it true, that the nation at large, though considerably

debauched

debauched and debased by the Philanthropists and Jacobins, was totally destitute of that spirit, which animated our forefathers, and which raised the name of England amongst the highest nations of the earth.—Whenever the Government called upon the people for their support in the cause of justice and of honour, that support was cheerfully given, of the truth of which the War with the Northern Powers furnished a striking and memorable proof. That war was purely a War of honour. The Northern Confederacy was formed to compel us to forego a right, which we inherited from our ancestors: the people were not tempted by any prospect of plunder, nor driven on by the dread of revolution; but, on the contrary, they knew the War would injure their immediate interests, and that they had nothing to fear for their safety, though it should not take place. They were, in short, urged by no mean selfish consideration; the object was fair and honourable; it was stated to them fairly and honourably, and therefore, it was, that the War had their cordial support; notwithstanding a combination of circumstances, well calculated to break the spirit of the proudest nation upon earth. At the moment when we had just lost our most powerful ally, we

were attacked by a maritime confederacy of four great nations, two of whom had it in their power to do infinite injury to our trade, while the others could, and did, shut against us the granaries of the North, and that, too, in a time of alarming scarcity; yet, never was there a War that had a more cordial support from the people at large; never did the nation appear so great; on the day in which Great-Britain declared War against the Northern Powers, she appeared as great as she did at Acra, greater than at Aboukir or under the walls of Alexandria. It was not the remembrance of that day, my Lord, that dictated your answer to the arrogant propositions of our most malignant and implacable foe.

But, my Lord, you have disclaimed the *plea of necessity*, of any and of every sort. With what view you and your colleagues do this in one place, while you hold an exactly contrary language in another, and while your ignorant partisans exhaust their lungs in a repetition of the word *necessity*, is a secret too profound for me to penetrate: I only beg leave to remind your Lordship, that, your disavowal of the plea of *necessity*, however solemn, and however strongly backed with the no less solemn asseveration of the CHANCELLOR OF THE

EXCHE-

EXCHEQUER, has produced *no rise in the funds*, no confidence in those who hold the only scales, capable of weighing the declarations of Ministers of State. I will further say, my Lord, that however outward appearances may, at present contradict me, there are ninety-nine out of every hundred thinking men in the nation, who regard the Peace that you have made as *injurious*, *precarious*, *dangerous*, and *disgraceful*; and, if there existed no real *necessity* for making it, nor, in the minds of you and your colleagues, any conviction of such necessity, where shall we look for the motive by which you have been urged to this deed?

If, however, notwithstanding all its disadvantages and all its dangers, the Peace which you have signed could be regarded as solid and durable; if the expensive Peace-establishment, which it renders necessary, and which, to use the words of the Speech from the Throne, is essential *effectually* to provide security of our possessions, whence it seems to follow that your Peace supplies only a *nominal* and *apparent* not an *effectual* security; if, I say, this new military establishment left us no Wars to dread from the same enemy, who has sold us Peace at so dear a rate, we might still descry a

ray of consolation in our future prospects, and hope to find, in tranquil obscurity, some relief, some mitigation of the painful recollection of our past greatness. The situation of Great-Britain, both at home and abroad, would no doubt be, relatively and comparatively, bad. Loaded with a debt, which, even on the 1st of January, 1801, amounted to the enormous sum of £497,572,422: a debt, the interest of which absorbs a revenue greater than that of any State in Europe (our enemy excepted), while France has washed away her debt in the blood of her creditors; encumbered with a military force, estimated by many, who even doubt its sufficiency, at triple the force, which we maintained before the War, while France can support a much larger establishment at a much less expense, and even quarter an immense army in Holland, Switzerland, Piedmont, the Ligurian and Cisalpine Republics;—despoiled, by the voluntary loss of so many colonies, and other advantages, transferred to France, as well as of several important branches of her commerce, the British nation, although fallen from the proud eminence on which she stood, and descended (I do not say *cast*, my Lord) into the croud of second-rate Powers, might still with the

aid

aid of her capital and her industry, maintain an arduous struggle against this combination of adverse circumstances;—and, by the adoption of a rigid economy, hitherto foreign from the national character, but now become a matter of imperious necessity, might still find, in the improvement of her own territory, and in the cultivation of her colonies, and of those branches of commerce, which you, my Lord, have suffered her to retain, an existence, if not brilliant and honourable, at least supportable, and, if you will, *comfortable!*

But this supposition of a state of permanent tranquillity, is, my Lord, perfectly chimerical. From 1688 to 1801, an interval of 113 years, we have had six different Wars to maintain against France; that is to say, from 1688 to 1697; from 1702 to 1713; from 1740 to 1746; from 1755 to 1762; from 1778 to 1782; and, though last not least, from 1793 to 1801; making a period of *forty-nine years*. Many of these Wars originated in the ambition of the French Monarchs; and some of them, perhaps, in the restless jealousy of our own commercial spirit. I admit, my Lord, that, in future, from the situation in which your Lordship has placed us, we shall very rarely be the aggressors.

But

But French ambition will still continue to operate as a motive to War; nor will it, I imagine, be contended, that its influence will have been rendered less powerful, by the transmutation of a Monarchy, limited at home and confined abroad by other Powers nearly equal to it in force, into a Republic, or, rather, a political association of soldiers, governed in a military manner, by a military Aristocracy (for, from the GREAT CONSUL himself, to the lowest *Gendarme*, all the agents of the Government are officers, as all its subjects are soldiers), *more numerous*, including the subjugated and tributary states, than *all the rest of Europe together*; and whose absolute dominion over the Powers of the Continent, the most consummate ignorance, the most inveterate prejudice, or the most wilful obstinacy, can alone deny.

Besides, my Lord, France will unquestionably become a party in any dispute, which may hereafter arise between Great-Britain and the Northern, or any other, Powers of the Continent. Her support will ever be given to our adversaries; and her hacknied pretext of protecting the world *against the Despotism of England*, will be ever in her mouth. This is the rudiment, the very alphabet,

used

used in the school of usurpation. Was it not the unvaried policy of the Romans to protect the weak against the strong; the Achæans and Etolians against PHILIP; the Kings of Africa against Carthage? And did they not constantly finish by swallowing up, indifferently, friends and enemies; those Powers which had preserved a strict neutrality, and those to which they had extended their protection? The most trifling dispute, then, with any Power on the globe, will be a subject of humiliation to us, if we yield to France, and a ground of War if we assert our rights. We cannot hope always to have such a harmless Administration as the present; and it is, therefore, impossible, but that, sooner or later, we must again have cause to go to War with France.

Under what auspices, under what disadvantages, shall we begin a new War? Not a single ally shall we find on the Continent. Those Powers who will be most favourably disposed towards us, in secret, will deem themselves happy, if France will suffer them to remain neuter. The moment War shall de declared, the whole Continent, except perhaps the ports in the Baltic, will be shut against us. We shall find no more partizans of the STADT-

HOLDER to give up the Dutch fleet to us, or to resign the different colonial possessions of Holland into our hands; no more French Royalists to invite us to Toulon, Martinico, and St. Domingo; no more officers, who, from a rooted principle of loyalty, which will reflect honour on the memory of the French nobility, long after the destruction of that illustrious body, to resign the command of French fleets and armies, in order to fight as private soldiers, under the banners of a Power, who promised protection to their lawful Sovoreign; no more Vendeans, whose heroic perseverance against the most execrable tyranny, deluged France with the blood of six hundred thousand of her sons. Our blockades will no longer be confined to Toulon, Brest, and Rochefort; they must be extended along the whole of the coast which reaches from Ancona to the Texel. Our enemies will possess numerous colonies, and important naval stations in the four quarters of the world. Thus we shall have to guard against attacks wherever we have a possession open to attack. The most fertile imagination cannot conceive, much less can the most active vigilance prevent, that infinite number of military combinations and plans of attack, which such a complicated state

of

of things will suggest to the insatiate ambition and the restless and inventive spirit of the French. But why talk of distant possessions, when our attention will, in all human probability, be limited to the defence of our own Island, our own homes, our own existence, threatened, at every point, by that monstrous power, whose whole malice and whose whole force will be directed against Great-Britain herself? Intent only on averting present destruction, all our cares, all our efforts, will be confined to the field of battle, on which our fate must be decided. But what would be our lot, my Lord, if this enemy, to whose good faith you have confided interests so dear to us, and so opposed to his own, should, by an act of perfidy which would set a seal upon all pretensions of a similar nature, and at the same time, render the repetition of them perfectly needless, attack us in time of peace!—I turn from the contemplation of this horrid prospect, on which, however, it will be the first duty of His MAJESTY's Ministers to keep their eyes constantly fixed.

But the noisy partisans of *Peace, of any Peace whatever*, even of *the name of Peace*, will exclaim—Is England, then, condemned to wage perpetual War with France? Yes, my Lord, she is; and it is your Peace which has reduced her to this lament-

able necessity. It has suddenly transported to France a part of our force and of our riches; and in a few years it will give her a naval superiority. In all quarters, and with inconceivable rapidity, it multiplies her means of attack, and diminishes our means of defence. It leaves our enemy armed and prepared; it compels us to remain also under arms. This Peace, then, my Lord, is a real state of War; for you know, as well as I do, that the duration of a siege is not estimated by the days of assault, nor the length of a campaign by the days of battle.

And even had we been obliged to embrace the measure of an *eternal and active War*, instead of this *eternal and passive War*, which you have signed, while you fondly imagined you were signing a Peace, it perhaps would not be impossible, my Lord, to prove that such a War, well conducted, in conformity with our actual position, and limited to its proper objects, would be less expensive than the defensive War, which has become necessary, especially when we consider the superiority of trade and revenue, which we should enjoy during the existence of your Peace;—that such open War should have been incomparably more burthensome to France than to us;—and that, by harrassing and molesting the

French,

French, in all quarters, by excluding them from every sea; by deriving their industry of all the raw materials which their own soil does not produce, and their commerce of the carriage and sale of their own productions; by compelling them to purchase from us many articles of indispensable necessity to them; by so increasing and prolonging the discontents, as well in France herself, as in countries which she has subdued, and by giving to those Powers, who are now thrown into consternation by our late conduct, a well-founded motive of hope, we should either have succeeded in overthrowing the French Government, or reduced our enemies to the necessity of soliciting from us a Peace, very different indeed from that, which they have recently dictated to us. A full discussion of this important subject would greatly exceed my ability, nor, indeed, would it be possible to reduce it within the necessary limits of a Letter. I shall, therefore, content myself with having suggested it to your Lordship, and leave it to become the object of your serious reflections, in those hours of repose when the Statesman shall give place to the Student.

But, my Lord, amongst so many things to blame, I gladly give my approbation to one part of your

your conduct: as a peace-maker you are rather of the lamest, but you are an excellent hand at a *truce*; for you may rest assured that BUONAPARTÉ will never break his compact with you, until all the places which you have so liberally yielded to him, shall be safely lodged, either in his own hands, or in those of his Dutch and Spanish receivers.

For the present, my Lord, I think (and here I am sure you will agree with me in opinion), it proper to close my observations on the Peace of Downing-street, and on the danger and disgrace to which it has for ever doomed our country. I cannot, however, conclude without submitting to your consideration the means of preventing, or rather postponing, some of the evils of this Peace.

The engagement of the 1st of October is certainly not superior to the first law of every state, which is the *salus populi*, the first law of nature, self-preservation; but the will of BOUNAPARTÉ has now superseded all law, human and divine, and, therefore, if he chooses to hold this fallen kingdom to the terms of the Treaty of Peace, she will be thereunto holden and bound. It remains, then, for us to make the best of the hard terms which have been dictated to us. The more diastrous the conditions

of

of the agreement are, the more necessary it is for our Government to insist on an unreserved, unequivocal, and faithful execution of those clauses which leave the nation some hope, and some small means of palliating the fatal effects of the Treaty in general. Now, my Lord, these clauses are:

1. The *real* neutrality and independence of Malta, so that this most important Island may, as far as human prudence can go, be prevented from falling into the hands of France, or of Russia, if she should be fixed on as the guaranteeing Power.

2. The *freedom* of the Cape of Good Hope, an expression to which you, doubtless, attach some meaning or other, but in which I can discern none at all.

3. The *integrity* (if we must talk French) of our Allies.—1st. I can hardly think that the integrity of the Porte is secured, when France obliges that Power, eight days after the date of our unfortunate and disgraceful Treaty, to recede from its engagements with us, and to take from our commerce and navigation those favours, which we so well deserve at her hands.—2d. You have omitted, in speaking of the integrity of Portugal, the words "*as before the War.*" They were, in fact, not necessary;

cessary; for the Peace between Portugal and France was signed on the 29th of September, at Madrid, and your Treaty, in two days afterwards, at London: the French and English Governments, therefore, at the time of signing the Treaty between them, necessarily looked upon Portugal as in a state of War with France, and, consequently, the integrity stipulated for, referred to the commencement of the War. The cessions, then, which, by the Treaty of the 29th of September, Portugal makes to France in South America, are annulled by the Treaty of Downing-street, as are also the clauses of the Fifth Article of that Treaty, which limit the sovereignty of Portugal, with respect to commercial regulations, and in direct hostility to Great-Britain. Your Lordship has, I know (after consulting your friend Citizen OTTO) publicly declared, upon being asked a second time, that the cessions made to France by the Treaty of Madrid, of the 29th September are *not* now to take place, and that they are annulled by the Treaty of Downing-street; but, my Lord, the *Moniteur*, which was received at my house much about the same moment that your Lordship was making this declaration, informs me, that the Treaty of Madrid of the 29th of September, has been

ratified

ratified by the French Government, "*sans aucun* "*changement.*" This article of news comes to us under the signature of BUONAPARTÉ, and the counter-signature of TALLEYRAND, a couple of citizens who are not apt to eat their words, and whose authority I am sure your Lordship will not dispute, though fifty Portugals were at stake.

In the course of these Letters, my Lord, I have troubled you with no predictions on the effects, which this Peace will have on the manners, the morals, and the politics of this kingdom; if, after what you have seen during the last eleven years, you have any doubts on that subject, verily, verily, I say unto you, in the language of the Gospel, "neither would you believe, though one rose from "the dead."

I remain, my Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient,

And most humble Servant,

WM. COBBETT.

LETTERS

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

HENRY ADDINGTON,

CHANCELLOR OF HIS MAJESTY'S EXCHEQUER,

ON THE FATAL EFFECTS

OF THE

PEACE WITH BUONAPARTÉ,

PARTICULARLY WITH RESPECT TO

THE COLONIES, THE COMMERCE, THE MANUFACTURES, AND THE CONSTITUTION,

OF THE

UNITED KINGDOM.

BY WILLIAM COBBETT.

LETTERS

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

HENRY ADDINGTON,

&c. &c. &c.

LETTER I.

Pall-Mall, 28d Dec. 1801.

SIR,

OUR Sovereign has placed you at the head of the few, whose duty it is to administer the government; and, as I am one of the many, whose prosperity, whose happiness, and whose honour, must be materially affected by the manner, in which you perform that duty, I have an unquestionable right to examine into your conduct, and to communicate, to my fellow subjects, the result of my examination.

Were

Were I inclined, minutely to investigate all the measures of your administration, I should not want for *variety* of matter; but, the Preliminary Treaty of Peace, which you have entered into with France, "like Aaron's serpent, swallows all the rest" of the evils, which you have brought, and are bringing down, on the humbled head of your country. That Treaty appears, to me, to have laid the foundation of the ruin of the *Colonies*, the *Commerce*, the *Manufactures*, and the *Constitution*, of the kingdom. This being sincerely my opinion, it is my duty to endeavour to convince others of its justness, and, thereby, to produce such a change of measures, as may yet save us from the destruction, with which we are threatened.

Since the hypocritical sect of negro-loving philanthropists arose, it has been the fashion to speak contemptuously of our West-India colonial possessions; but, it is something remarkable, that the very men, who, one hour, have had their mouths full of the cant of humanity, have, the next, been ready enough to make a pompous display of the immense wealth and strength, arising from the possession of those favoured countries, which, for factious or selfish purposes, they denominated "scenes

of

of human woe." You, however, Sir, who must, by this time, have discovered, that the nation will still stand in need of revenue, surely cannot even affect to despise the possession of those countries, from the productive fields of which so considerable a portion of our revenue has heretofore arisen. In speaking to you, therefore, I may venture to lament the loss of one half of our colonies and the perilous situation of the other half, without dreading the ideot-like reply, which is generally made by the œconomists and philanthropists of the day.

The danger to our remaining West-India Colonies will arise from several causes, two only of which I, at present, think it necessary to dwell on; to wit: the additional dominion, which France acquires on the coast of South America, and the powerful military force, which she will have a sufficient excuse for maintaining in her island of Hispaniola, now commonly called Saint Domingo. Whoever casts his eye over the map of the West-Indies, must, at once, perceive, that these are precisely the two positions, which every military man would have chosen, in making his dispositions for the conquest of those territories, which England yet retains in that part of the world.

For

For more than a hundred years past, it has been the invariable policy of England, to prevent France from acquiring any considerable footing on those shores of South America, which are in the vicinity of the West-India Islands, lest, in consequence of such footing, she should become mistress of all the Leeward Islands. For this reason, principally, it was, that French Guiana was considerably narrowed by the Treaty of Utrecht, and that special provision was made for keeping her not only from commanding the Amazons, but from approaching nearer than one hundred and fifty miles distance from that important river. Thus circumscribed within limits, which gave but little scope to enterprize, and holding even what was left her, only, as it were, during good behaviour (which is seldom regarded as a very secure tenure), she seemed to attach hardly any value to the settlements, which she had there formed, and which she generally left exposed to the first invader.

But, the Treaty, the baleful Treaty, which you have made with France, has totally changed her situation in that quarter. To the north west of her former colony, you have given her the Dutch Colony of Surinam, and that of Berbice, Demerara, and

and Essequibo, situated on the fruitful banks of four rivers of the same names. These colonies contain about 75,000 square miles, and have 300 miles of sea coast.

That this country, Sir, is, *in fact*, given up *to France*, the world needs no other proof than the statements of yourself, your colleagues, and the public prints, which are known, and well known, to be under the influence, and even under the guidance of the Ministry. LORD HAWKESBURY, upon being asked by MR. WHITBREAD, "whether Spain and "Holland had been made parties to the prelimi-"nary treaty, and whether *they* had actually made "the cessions of Trinidada and Ceylon," replied, that, "the Preliminary Treaty was made *only with* "*France*, and that *no direct communication was* "*had, upon the subject, either with Spain or Hol-*"*land**." Some doubts having been expressed, in the public prints, as to the willingness of Spain and Holland to agree to these cessions, it was, by way of reply, stated in the *True Briton* (the proprietor of which daily receives his directions for the Treasury),

* Vide appendix H. last extract but one.

Treasury)*, that those nations had not the power to prevent the fulfilment of the treaty. The article, I allude to, concluded with the following words: "*They* [Spain and Holland] *may* GRUMBLE, *but* "*they* MUST SUBMIT."

Now, Sir, if you look upon as valid a cession, made to us, by France, of one part of the territories of Holland, you certainly will not deny, that that same France has a like power over every other part of the territories of Holland: and, indeed, would it not be an absurdity bordering on ideotism, to suppose, that France will not virtually possess every Dutch colony, while her armies are quartered, and while her proconsuls dictate laws, in the mother country?

From the boundary line of Surinam, French Guiana sweeps round first towards the South East, and then towards the South, comprehending a sea-coast of 330 miles. Here the French territory, in South America, would have ended; but, the treaties of

* I think it not wrong, that the proprietor of a news-paper has instructions from the offices of government; but, what a man, so instructed, advances, it is perfectly fair to cite as the language of the ministry.

of Badajos and of Madrid extend it 150 miles further to the Southward, even to the bank of the Amazons, of the navigation of which river they give her the absolute command.

Before I proceed, Sir, to observe on the dreadful influence, which this new empire must infallibly have on our colonial system, I cannot help making some remarks on the conduct of you and your colleagues, relative to the treaty, by which the last-mentioned part of that empire has been obtained by France.

In discussing the terms of a treaty, which professed *to secure the integrality of the territories of our allies*, the effect of every other treaty, containing stipulations relative to those territories, were necessarily taken into consideration. For this reason it was, that Mr. GREY, previous to the discussion of the Preliminary Treaty, repeatedly enquired of His MAJESTY'S Ministers, *whether the treaty, between France and Portugal, signed at Madrid, on the 29th of September*, 1801, *was, or was not, as far as related to cessions of territory, annulled by the Preliminary Treaty, between England and France.* To this question, the Ministry, at first, declined to

give an answer *; but, on a future day (still *previous* to the discussion of the Preliminary Treaty), LORD HAWKESBURY replied, to a repetition of the same question, that, "by the integrity of the ter-"ritories of Portugal, was meant such territories "and possessions as Her Faithful MAJESTY pos-"sessed *subsequent to the treaty of Badajos* †. In "her subsequent treaty with France, some change "was agreed on in the boundaries between French "and Portuguese Guiana; *but, all cessions, subse-"quent to the treaty of Badajos, were annulled by the "Preliminaries with England* ‡." And this answer was, by every one, looked upon as proceeding from an unquestionable source, because his Lordship prefaced it by observing, that the reason why it was not given before, was, that "the officers of "Government were not, *till that day*, in possession "of *official* information." Before, however, the Parliamentary discussion took place, the French official journal (the vehicle, alas! through which Britons

* Vide Appendix H, first and second extracts.

† Vide Appendix C.

‡ Vide Appendix H, third and fourth extract.

Britons are, in future, to learn their destinies!) informed us, that the treaty of the 29th of September had been ratified by BUONAPARTÉ, "*sans aucun changement*," a circumstance, which led Lord TEMPLE to enquire, "*whether this ratification extended to any cessions, made since the treaty of Badajos*;" to which Lord HAWKESBURY replied, that "*he could* ASSURE *the noble Lord, that the ratifi-* "*cation* DID NOT EXTEND TO ANY POINTS OF "CESSION*."

With this *assurance*, Sir, it was, that the Parliament and the nation entered on the discussion of the Preliminary Treaty; and need I add, that this explicit and solemn *assurance* has, from the subsequent proceedings of the French Government, received a contradiction no less explicit and solemn? Need I tell you, Sir, that the ratification of this treaty, in all its parts, has been publickly announced to the Legislative Body of France; that the cession which you and your colleagues declared to be *annulled*, has there been represented as still in force, and as insuring to our enemy a vast accession of riches and of power; need I tell you, Sir, that the very

* Vide Appendix H, fifth and sixth extracts.

very assurances, given by you to the Parliament of Britain, have been treated, by the Ministers of France, with the same sort of contempt which they bestow on the proceedings of the burlesque Legislatures of the Helvetian, Cisalpine, and Ligurian Republicks*? No: I need not. The humiliating, the disgraceful truth, has been proclaimed to the universe; and, if it has not stung *you* to the soul, I would not exchange feelings with you for a million times all the millions, of which you are the Treasurer.

The importance of the question, *whether the treaty of the 29th of September, was, or was not, annulled (as far as related to cessions of territory) by the Preliminaries with England,* must be evident to every one. To secure the *integrality* of Portugal

* Vide Appendix I, which contains the Speech of the Counsellor of State DEFERMONT, in the treaty of the 29th September, 1801, the whole of which speech should be carefully read, because it contains a development of the intentions of France with respect to Portugal. I wish the reader, too, to compare the insolent insinuations, and, indeed, the gross and unfounded calumny, contained in that speech, with the cautious and submissive tone recommended and observed within the walls of St. Stephen's.

tugal was an object of great and general solicitude; and, if the Preliminary Treaty did really affect that object, by annulling the cessions in South America, it acquired a merit, which it otherwise did not possess, and thereby weakened the opposition against it. What, then, shall be said of the Ministry, who could dare officially to state a circumstance, which must so materially affect an approaching discussion, if that circumstance had not the slightest foundation in truth? Either you had "*official information*" on the subject, or you had not: if you had, BUONAPARTÉ has given you a tolerable specimen of that good faith, on which you have made our future existence to depend; if you had not, your conduct merits an assemblage of epithets, which I shall leave the insulted nation to apply.

We have lately, indeed, heard from your own mouth*, that, notwithstanding the statements in the French Legislative Body, the treaty of Madrid, as far as relates to cession of territory, *is not to go into effect*. From this, it would appear, that BUONAPARTÉ

* Vide Appendix, L.

NAPARTÉ has yielded a little to your supplications. Some despicable creature, famous for low cunning and for nothing else (I mean some *Foreigner*, of course) has, perhaps, whispered in his ear, that to insist on the fulfilment of the treaty of Madrid, after what has passed in the British senate, would rather injure than assist his future projects. He has, perhaps, been told, that such unqualified contempt of us *so soon* might yet produce some sense of feeling in the nation, and might augment the number of those, who still wish to prevent their country from becoming a province of France. But, Sir, be assured, that his relinquishment is but a matter of expediency; a mere temporary trick. Some of his legions will garrison Fort Macapa, in less than three months after you have made the actual surrender of our numerous conquests.

The possession of the *territory*, however, back as far as the Carapanatuba is by no means necessary to produce the effects which I so much dread. The extension of territory, secured to France by the treaty of Badajos, an extension which you ought never to have suffered, will give her all the advantages of which she stands in need. It gives her the command of the Arowary. The

mouth of this river affords excellent anchorage, and is but a few miles distant from that of the Amazons. In fact, the Arowary falls into the mouth of the Amazons; and, it will require, considering the future situation of Portugal, but a very trifling expedition to give France the possession of the little Island of Caviana, which, only tolerably fortified, will be to the Amazons precisely what a cannon is to an embrasure. This was the light, in which these territories were viewed by the statesmen, who presided in the councils of England, in the reign of Queen Anne. They made the French retreat upwards of a hundred miles from the Arowary, never regarding the Brazils as secure, while that river remained at her command, and never dreaming of putting up the sword, 'till that security was provided for.—But, alas! the councils of England are changed!

From this long digression, Sir, I return to contemplate the dangers, to which, from these newly-acquired possessions of France, our colonial territories will, in future, be exposed.

These possessions now extend from the Amazons, or, at least, from the Arowary, to the Essequibo, comprehending a sea-coast of 780 miles,

terminated at each extremity by a navigable river, of which she will have the sole dominion.

On one flank, the restless and mighty Republick menaces the territories of Spain, on the other, the territories of Portugal*, while her front, well provided with harbours, ports, and fortresses, presents to our Leeward Islands an object of never-ceasing alarm. Grenada, Barbadoes, and St. Vincent, can never enjoy an hour's security, after France has once firmly established herself in her new American dominion; and, as to our island of Trinidada, which we have so dearly and so honestly obtained, a very small detachment, from the mouth of the Essequibo, will, in the space of a few hours, effectually relieve us from the load of expense and of shame, with which the possession of that territory will ever be attended.

The evil, which I fear, in this quarter, will not, indeed, be *immediate*. Those, therefore, who, for the sake of enjoying one or two years of ease and quiet, are willing to submit to a life of misery and disgrace, with the privilege of entailing these "blessings of peace" on their descendants, may treat

* Vide Appendix, G.

treat my apprehensions with indifference. But, Sir, those who have a due regard for their country; those who wish to see her still great and powerful; those who have been proud of the name of Britons, and who wish to hand down to their children, untarnished, that name, which untarnished they have received from their fathers; such men would feel no consolation in her *respite*, were it to postpone the day of her humiliation to the distance of ten thousand years. No such respite, as far as relates to the part of the globe I am now speaking of, will, however, be obtained. Her expulsion from the Leeward Islands was decreed on the fatal first of October. On that day her timid and degenerate sons, abandoning all the maxims and all the principles, which had theretofore governed her councils, yielded up the keys of her safety, and exposed her weakest part to the ravages of her most powerful and most implacable foe.

On the other side of the Western Archipelago, the danger is still greater, and much nearer at hand. France, having got possession of the whole Island of St. Domingo, will naturally be desirous of obtaining that of the Bahama Islands, which, held by us, are a bridle in the mouth of a

power, which is growing more and more formidable every day. What France here desires, the controul, which she has over the Floridas and Cuba, will enable her, at any time, to accomplish. She will stand in need of the Bahamas, and having the power to seize on them, she will find no inducement for forbearance, particularly in favour of a power, whose ruin will ever be the object nearest her heart.

There remains, then, nothing but Jamaica for her to invade and destroy; and I sincerely wish, that this opulent, this happy, this loyal Island, may be the last on the list of her conquests, as it is on that of my enumeration. But, this wish is vain. Long has the envious and malignant fiend scowled on this our favourite colony, this precious jewel in the British diadem. She well knows, that it is one of the principal sources of our wealth and our power, and she will risk her very existence but she will wrest it from our hands.

Recollect, Sir, that it is *now* in the power of France, to convey a powerful army to Saint Domingo; nay, you already *too well* know, that she is, as the first consequence of the peace, preparing such an armament. Recollect, that the whole force,

force, which circumstances will allow you to keep up in Jamaica, will never amount to much more than one of those legions, of which she will have to dispose, the moment the negro-army is subdued. Recollect, that the whole of Saint Domingo is now hers, and that Trinidada, when you received it from her hands, was not more completely under her command, than Cuba now is. With these facts well fixed in your mind, cast your eye over the map of the West-Indies. You will find Jamaica three parts surrounded by Saint Domingo and Cuba, from several points of either of which, six hours fair wind will convey an army to any part of its defenceless coast, from Point Morant to Montego-Bay.

But, Sir, I do you wrong to suppose you insensible to the danger. Your *warlike* preparations like the clapping of a run-away cock, are a sufficient indication of your fear. Those preparations, which have been retarded by that daring and fatal spirit that your pusillanimous peace has revived, will, instead of inspiring confidence, spread distrust and dismay through every part of our Islands; and, in that of Jamaica, it will be justly regarded as the signal of approaching destruction. The

fleet,

fleet, which, but yesterday, blockaded that of France in the port of Brest, must now sneak after it at a distance, unseen and unheard, like the impotent wittol, whose jealousy urges him to watch the invader of his honour, but whose cowardice with-holds him from preventing the consummation of what he dreads.

Should our fleet, though disheartened by the nature of its employment, prove an efficient protection to Jamaica; *when* can we hope to withdraw it? With its continuance on the station will cease the protection which it yields; and how are we to reconcile that continuance with a state of *Peace?* How are we to reconcile it with that "*security for* "*the future*," which your predecessor constantly stated to be the chief object of the war, and, which you and your partizans assert to be *completely obtained?* Am I told, that the commencement of this "*security for the future*" must take its date from the signature of the *Definitive Treaty?* I answer, that I have too high an opinion of your *gratitude* and *fidelity* to your Sovereign to believe, that you will call home the West-India fleet, upon the signing of that Treaty. Thus, then, Sir, we have already entered on that tantalizing state "of mis-

" trust, uneasiness, expense, and danger, on the one " part; and of threats, intrigues, and hostile pre- " parations on the other," which I took the liberty to describe to your noble Colleague, and which, I greatly fear, after having broken the spirit, and exhausted the patience of the nation, will lead it to seek for repose under the death-like tyranny of France.

To no part of the world can a Briton now turn his eyes, without sorrow and shame; nowhere can he look, without feeling his heart sink within him at contemplating the lamentable change, which a few, a very few, months have, with the aid of you and your colleagues, produced in the aspect and situation of his so-lately great and glorious country. But, in no part of the ocean, of which Britain was truely called the mistress, has that change been so striking, so injurious, and so disgraceful, as in the West-India seas. There we were the uninterrupted Lords of the waters and of the soil; not a hostile bark dared to show its canvass to the wind; not a gun was fired without our permission: our flag spoke peace and protection to the oppressed, and terror to the oppressor. There foreigners, of whatever nation, gladly owned allegiance

giance to our King, under whose just and gentle sway they found that prosperity and happiness they had never before enjoyed. Wherever we went, in whatever direction, from Mexico to Barbadoes, from Guiana to Bermuda, obedience, respect, and honour, followed our steps. This state of things, this source of wealth and of power, might, and should have been, preserved, till we could have found a compensation for its loss, in the re-establishment of our due portion of weight and authority on the Continent of Europe; but, you, Sir, thought otherwise, and, without any such compensation, you have yielded advantages and sacrificed character, which your country will never regain. Those, who had sought our protection, and had staked their fortunes and their lives on our promises, you have yielded up to the mercy of their remorseless persecutors; the trade and commerce, which we had gained, you have turned into the channel of our enemy; all the improvements, all the increase of population and of produce, which had arisen under our fostering care, you have gratuitously surrendered to that insolent enemy; that *security*, which had doubled the value of the conquered colonies, is now wanting to our own, even to our oldest and

most

most precious possessions. These will henceforward be every hour in jeopardy, and will, 'till they shall no longer own the sway of Great-Britain, continue to experience that depreciation in value, and that decline in population, which even the suspicion of insecurity never fails to produce.

I am,

SIR,

Your most humble,

and most obedient servant,

WM. COBBETT.

LETTER II.

Pall-Mall, 24th Dec. 1801.

SIR,

IN my last letter, I endeavoured to show, that the West India colonies, remaining in our possession, so far from having, by your peace, obtained "security for the future," are, by that peace, placed in a state of continual alarm and danger, which must lead immediately to their decay, and eventually to their ruin; a process, which, as I shall now attempt to prove, our *commerce* will also undergo.

That *very great commerce is a very great evil*, I, though perhaps somewhat singular in my opinion, am ready to avow. MR. PITT, in his speech of the 7th of June 1799, called the present war, "*a war of finance*;" and SIR WM. EDEN (now LORD AUCKLAND), in his letters to LORD CARLISLE, published in 1779, observes, that, "*War* "*is now become a science of* MONEY. *That side* "*must first quit the field whose Exchequer first fails.*"

Since

Since the publication of these sententious sentences, his Lordship has had the mortification to see his country twice quit the field in disgrace before a bankrupt enemy. No, Sir, it is on the *warlike spirit* of a nation that her honour, security, and happiness, must chiefly depend; and this spirit is generally found to exist in an inverse proportion to the magnitude of her purse. When I cast my eye over the calculations of Messrs. CHALMERS, ROSE, and PITT; when I perceive them deducing a proof of the increase of our greatness from the increase of our commerce and our wealth; when I see them recurring to the reign of Queen Anne, and stating, that then our shipping amounted to only *two hundred thousand* tons, and that now it amounts to *two millions* of tons—that our annual revenue then was not *three millions* of pounds, and that now it is *thirty-six millions* of pounds; tired with the triumphant comparisons of these arithmetical logicians, I turn to view the *conduct* and *character* of my country at the two epochs. At the former, I find her waging a long and arduous war for the preservation of the liberties of Europe. I find her explicitly declaring and honestly pursuing her object; and, having attained that object, having weakened the mighty

and strengthened the weak, humbled the ambitious and exalted the humble, I see her retiring from the field, loaded with laurels alone; seeking for compensation neither in spices nor in sugars, but contenting herself with a barren rock, at once the emblem of her disinterestedness and the monument of her glory. If I become more minute in my researches, I trace her through a series of those solid and noble national acts, which are the indubitable proofs of opulence at home and consequence abroad: her piety she shows, not in attempts to rob, but in bestowing a *Bounty* on, the pastors of the church; she expresses her gratitude to her hero, not in air-built *Naval Pillars*, but in a real and princely mansion; with one hand she raises the dome of St. Paul, with the other she demolishes the works of Dunkirk.—Such was England, Sir, in the infancy of her commerce, what she is *now* let the treaties of Shelburne and Addington tell.

But, Sir, at the present day, the question, with us, is not, *whether very great commerce be a good, or an evil:* unhappily, we have no choice. Our wants are created; and they must be satisfied, or we cease to exist as an independent nation. The necessities of the state, during *any* peace that we

can

can preserve with the Republick of France, will require the whole of our present revenue. Nine-tenths of that revenue arise, directly or indirectly, from our commerce. If, therefore, that commerce should now experience a considerable diminution, the measure, from which it will arise, must necessarily be an object of just condemnation, and must as necessarily be attributed to the imbecility, or to some quality more hateful, in the men, by whom it was adopted. That such diminution will take place, that it will be the precursor of the total ruin of our commerce, I am thoroughly persuaded; and, I now proceed to state the facts and reasons, on which this persuasion is founded.

Our commerce, exclusive of that with the East-Indies, which will, probably, continue undiminished, may be considered under three principal heads: I. With the Continent of Europe; II. With the West-Indies; III. With the United States of America.

I. *With the Continent of Europe* BUONAPARTÉ will, in consequence of the absolute power he possesses over all those states, which have hitherto afforded us the greatest commercial advantages, abridge our commerce, by every means that the ingenuity

ingenuity of a rival can invent, and that the malice of an enemy can employ. In the Mediterranean we never had much commerce; what we had, however, will be diminished. The port of Leghorn, which now belongs to BUONAPARTÉ's king of Etruria, will be open to us only so far as is convenient to France, who may, sometimes, think it not inconvenient to suffer a large quantity of British property to be deposited there, if our merchants should be found adventurous enough to make such a deposit. Our trade with the Ligurian Republick, with Naples, with the Island of Sardinia, and even with Constantinople, will be abridged, or not, as the interests of France may require.

In Spain and Portugal, with whom our commercial relations were of considerable importance, we shall have to support a competition with our enemy, and shall be hampered with partial restrictions. The latter of these kingdoms has already, through our pusillanimity, been compelled to throw open to all the world (that is to say, *to France*) those channels of commerce, which, for a century past, have been open to England alone.

With the borders of the Baltic, with Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, our commerce is very unimportant,

portant, and may not experience a very great diminution; but, with all the ports, through which we traded with Flanders, Holland, and Germany, the diminution will, after a short space of time, be immense. By your recognition, Sir, of the right of France to hold the keys of these countries, to retain the command of the *Rhine*, the *Meuse*, and the *Scheld*, you have banished for ever from the heart of Europe, the commerce and the influence of England. In my Letters to Lord HAWKESBURY, I stated, generally, my opinion on this subject, which opinion I find fully corroborated by a writer of great eminence, whose work I had not then seen, but which made its appearance, a few weeks previous to the signing of the Preliminaries of Peace. I allude, Sir, to the "*Financial and Political Facts of the Eighteenth Century*," by JOHN M'ARTHUR, Esq. who is a professed eulogist of Mr. PITT and yourself. His work, agreeably to its title, takes a view of the revenue, the expenditure, the debts, the manufactures, and the commerce of Great-Britain, for a century past. In treating of the commerce, he takes occasion to insist upon the necessity of carrying on the war, till France can be induced to

recede

recede from her enormous encroachments. He insists—but, I shall give you his opinion in his own words:—"Should the French succeed in their at-
"tempts to retain their conquests, and to secure to
"themselves the free navigation of the Rhine, the
"Meuse, and the Scheld,"—[which, Sir, thanks to your treaty, they have now done]—"they may,
"on the return of Peace, put in execution the
"vast projects, formed by the National Convention
"in 1792, and which BUONAPARTÉ *has obviously*
"*in contemplation.* A consideration of the outline
"of these projects may create some apprehensions
"in the minds of the generality of my readers;
"yet, it is to be hoped, *for the commercial pros-*
"*perity of this country*, that the Chief Consul's
"views, in his present arrangement of indemnities
"on the banks of the Rhine, &c. and thereby at-
"tempting to obtain the free navigation of those
"rivers, *may be completely frustrated, before this*
"*country makes Peace.*"

In order to show the importance of our struggles to prevent the accomplishment of these ambitious projects, on the part of France, the author next points out the probable consequences thereof, to other nations, and to Great-Britain in particular.

"The

"The French Republick," says he, "by joining, as intended, many of her navigable rivers "and canals, to the Rhine, the Meuse, and Scheld, "will be enabled to transport, at a cheaper rate "than heretofore, the various bulky commodities "of foreign growth and manufacture, and convey "them to the centre of Germany; also from the "Mediterranean Sea to the Bay of Biscay, to the "British Channel, and to the North Sea. The "consequence *obviously* resulting from such boundaries would be *to exclude the trade and manufactures of Great-Britain from the northern parts of Europe.* By joining some of the rivers and "canals to the Scheld, the French would, in time "of war, be able to transport, without interruption, "naval stores, ammunition, and provisions of all "sorts, from one place to another, in the *ci-devant* "Belgic provinces, and thence into Holland.

"The river Meuse would also open an extended communication with part of Germany and "Holland, and facilitate the transport of their "various articles of commerce. The river Rhine "would most effectually complete the interior "communication with the rest of Germany and "Holland.

" France, with three hundred navigable rivers, " and a number of extensive canals, some of them " already opening communications between the " Mediterranean Sea and Atlantic Ocean, would, " in accomplishing her ambitious plans, of securing " the navigation of the three great rivers just men- " tioned, most *essentially militate against the com-* " *mercial interests of this country*, and contribute " to her own aggrandizement, population, wealth, " and prosperity.

" The secret articles, and additional conven- " tion of the treaty of Campo-Formio, develop, " in a striking manner, the ambitious views of the " French Republick, with respect to the free na- " vigation of these rivers. His Imperial MAJESTY " consents to employ his good offices in the nego- " tiation of the Peace of the Empire, to obtain, " 1. That the navigation of the Rhine, from Hu- " ningen to the territory of Holland, shall be free " both to the French Republick and the States of " the Empire, on the right bank. 2. That the pos- " sessors of territory near the mouth of the Mo- " selle, shall, on no pretence, attempt to interrupt " the free navigation and passage of ships and other " vessels from the Moselle into the Rhine. 3. The

" French

" French Republick shall have the free navigation
" of the Meuse; and the tolls and other imposts,
" from Venloo to Holland, shall be abolished.

" The treaty of Peace, concluded at Luneville
" on the 9th February, 1801, having regard to
" what had been agreed upon by the deputation of
" the Empire, at the preceding Congress at Ras-
" tadt, resolved, in conformity with the precedent
" of what had taken place in similar circumstances,
" to stipulate in the name of the Germanic body.
" Some of the principal objects stipulated are the
" cession of the *ci-devant* Belgic provinces to the
" French Republick in the most formal manner.
" The Comté of Falkenstein, with its dependencies,
" the Fricthall, and all belonging to the House of
" Austria on the left bank of the Rhine, between
" Zarzach and Basle, are to be given up to the
" French Republick. The Duke of Modena, as
" an indemnity for the countries which this Prince
" had in Italy, is to have the *Brisgau*. In confor-
" mity with the second article of the treaty of
" Campo-Formio, the navigation of the Adige,
" which serves as the limits between His MAJESTY
" the Emperor and King, and the navigation of
" the rivers in the Cisalpine Republick, are to be

" free; nor is any toll to be imposed, nor any ship
" of war kept there.

" France, by securing the unlimited freedom
" of navigating the great rivers already noticed, it
" is natural to expect that she will make every
" effort, on the return of Peace, to promote an ex-
" tensive inland commerce, by means of making
" canals and rivers navigable. It will give many
" years employment to at least 50,000 disbanded
" soldiers, and render her ultimately independent,
" in peace or war, of many bulky commodities,
" drawn from the Northern States of Europe; more
" especially such articles as may be required for the
" construction, repairs, and equipment of ships in
" the navy and merchant service. In process of
" time, it may be feared that France may even-
" tually, by dint of numbers, *even supersede Great-*
" *Britain in those two grand points, Navy and Com-*
" *merce*; the former of which may justly be consi-
" dered the palladium of the country. *There are*
" *men who treat this matter lightly*, and lull their
" apprehensions to rest, by an idea that these
" things *cannot happen in our times*; but may the
" sun of Great-Britain never set so long as there
" shall remain a sun in heaven!"

Would

Would to God, Sir, that you had participated in the sentiments of this writer! But you are, I am afraid, one of those men, "who treat this "matter lightly;" who lull their apprehensions to rest by a hope, that these things "cannot happen "in our times;" and who, entrenching themselves behind these selfish reflections, sacrifice the interest, the honour, and the safety of their country to the obtaining of popularity, and the preserving of their places.——I resume my quotation:

"Should France be suffered to retain the "three great rivers before mentioned,"—[which she *has now retained*]—"as the boundaries of the "Republick, it will give her incalculable advan-"tages; and *in proportion as such an event would* "*diminish our commerce and manufactures, it would* "*give vigour and energy to those of the French.* "They would open the most extensive interior "navigation with Germany and Holland; they "would be able to receive, in a direct manner, "the productions and manufactures of Germany, "with which they have hitherto been supplied "through Holland, Bremen, and Hamburgh. It "would open a more extended market for their "wines, the growth of Burgundy and Champaign,

"which

" which would be conveyed at a much cheaper
" rate by interior water-carriage, instead of being
" transported, as heretofore, by land-carriage to
" Rouen and Havre-de-Grace, and thence carried
" by sea to the Netherlands and Holland; and,
" what is of far greater consequence, in time of
" war they would be able to send naval stores,
" ammunition, and provisions, to the cities and
" fortified places situated on these rivers, and carry
" on an extensive commerce from the sea-ports in
" the south and north, without the protection of
" armed vessels.

" Should BUONAPARTÉ, be successful in ac-
" complishing the avowed designs of all the rulers
" of France since the revolution," [which design he *has now* accomplished] " *it would not only mili-*
" *tate against the trade of this country to Germany*,
" but also materially affect the interests of the
" Northern Powers, from whom France formerly
" purchased timber for her navy; also iron, flax,
" hemp, &c. since it is obvious, that, were France
" to have the exclusive and free navigation of the
" Rhine, the Meuse, and Scheld, and joining to
" them by art many rivers and canals, she could,
" in any future war, receive at the several ports in

" the kingdom, timber of all kinds, from the im-
" mense forests in Alsace, Lorraine, and Burgundy;
" also flax and hemp, the growth of the different
" countries situated on the borders of the Rhine,
" and of the several rivers which are united to it.
" The mines of iron, copper, and lead, of Lux-
" emburgh and Limburgh, and the iron mines and
" coal-pits in the provinces of Namur, Liege, and
" other places; the leather manufactories in the
" principalities of Stavelo and Malmedy; and the
" manufactories of linen and woollen cloths, dis-
" persed in the countries annexed to France, in
" the vicinity of these rivers, would all tend to
" increase the wealth and power of that nation,
" to the prejudice of the other states of Europe.
" In short, France would acquire snch a gigantic
" preponderance in the scale of nations, that she
" might, on a future day, become more formidable
" to the liberties of all Europe than she was when
" in the zenith of her glory and prosperity, in the
" reign of Louis the Fourteenth, or than tyran-
" nical Rome in her best times. Indeed the
" strength of France would become too great for
" any power to resist.

" Can

"Can Great-Britain, then, seeing that her "power depends upon the prosperity of her com- "merce, view with indifference, these momen- "tous and colossal attempts of France towards "monopoly, and universal tyranny? Shall she "succeed in her designs of extending her terri- "tories and line of coast; at the same time an- "nexing, either by direct or indirect means (and "which, if permitted, she will do), all the ports "on the Continent, from Dunkirk to Hamburgh, "together with the enjoyment of the exclusive "navigation of the three great rivers before men- "tioned? If it be not insisted upon that France "relinquish her former pretensions, and consent "to some alienation of these countries, which, "according to the laws of her own making, were, "and are intended to constitute the territory of "the Republick, so as to cut up by the roots, the "vast objects and designs constantly avowed by "her successive revolutionary rulers, *there can be* "*little security in peace either for the commerce of* "*Great-Britain*, or for the tranquillity of the Con- "tinental Powers, whose proximity to the exten- "sive boundaries of the Republick, will at all times "particularly expose them to the danger of further

"encroach-

" encroachments. Neither can there be much " confidence placed in her preserving, for any " length of time, the relations of peace and amity. " However painful and burdensome the alternative " may be, namely, a vigorous continuance of the " war; yet surely the evil will be compensated, " if, by our energy and exertion, we ultimately " defeat the developed views of France, *and* " *thereby retain that weight in the scale of Europe,* " and influence among nations, which, by the " spirit and industry of ourselves and our fore- " fathers, we have, at the close of the eighteenth " century, so justly acquired."

We have *not* defeated the developed views of France, nor any one of those views; and we *shall not* retain that weight in the scale of Europe, which was the best legacy of our forefathers. Every encroachment, here represented as big with danger to the commerce and the consequence of Britain, you, in the name of your infatuated country, have sanctioned by the treaty of Downing-street; and, every evil, here predicted, will, most assuredly, ensue.

The copious extracts, which I have made from Mr. Arthur, leave me but little to add upon this part of the subject of my letter. It may

 not,

not, however, be amiss, Sir, to state some few of the facts, which have already transpired in confirmation of that gentleman's predictions. From the French papers we learn, that measures are actually taking for turning to account the possession of the *Rhine*, the *Meuse*, and the *Scheld*. To prevent the free navigation of the latter river was, it must be remembered, at one time, the only ostensible object of the War. It was *then* truly said, that this river was well calculated to be the rival of the Thames; and, such is now the confidence of its becoming so, that houses in ANTWERP have risen to double their former value, since the signature of the Preliminaries of Peace. Where the *capital* is to be found to awaken, from its long sleep, the commerce of that city, and to render it once more the emporium of Germany, is a question, to which you may easily find an answer *on the Royal Exchange of London.*

Precisely *when*, and *to what extent*, the diminution of our commerce with Flanders, Holland, and Germany will take place, it is, at present, impossible to say; but, that a diminution will take place, at no very distant period, and to a considerable amount, and that the evil will go on regularly increasing, I think no man, possessed of common

sense,

sense, and a common regard to truth, will hesitate to allow.

II. *With the West-Indies*, Sir, the commerce of Britain will experience, first an immense loss, and afterwards a regular decline, till the arrival of that fatal hour, when she shall there no longer possess a single inch of territory; which hour is, perhaps, less distant than our infatuation will suffer us to perceive.

In speaking of our commerce with Colonies, I must necessarily enter into details with respect to *population* and *produce*, for these are the source of *exports*, and furnish the means of purchasing *imports*, and these are the materials and the criterion of commerce. I must, too, consider this commerce relatively with that of France, with that of our rival, the sworn foe of our prosperity and our existence. Without taking this view of the subject, to enter on it at all would be totally useless; for, the question is, not how much commerce and power we do, or shall, possess, but how much France possesses, or will possess, more, or less than we. Not to render still more complex, a discussion, which must of necessity embrace objects so numerous, I shall here avoid supposing, that the commerce of the West-

Indies will, for some years at least, be molested by military or naval operations, notwithstanding twenty-five sail of the line and twenty-five thousand men have sailed for St. Domingo, from the port of Brest, and notwithstanding you are *attempting* to send out a British fleet to follow them *à la guette.*

With a view to disengage this important subject from the entanglement, in which it has been involved, by the officious ignorance of the defenders of the peace, I shall endeavour to give a clear statement of the West-India commerce of Great-Britain and France:—1st. Previous to the breaking out of the French revolution; 2nd. at the close of the war; and, 3rd. I shall give my opinion of what will be the state of it three years hence; for, I am not one of those, who are content to limit the duration of their national existence to less than six and thirty months.

A writer, Sir, who has at once *disguised* and *exposed* himself under the name of PHILANGLUS, has filled several entire pages of the Porcupine news-paper with figures, ranged in solid columns. These materials have been collected, undoubtedly, from official sources; and, as far as they relate to the commerce of Great-Britain, I feel the less inclina-

tion to criticise them, because their only tendency, like that of the statements of LORD HAWKESBURY, is to furnish a proof of what I acknowledge to be true, and of what is, indeed, notorious to all the world; to wit: *that the commerce of this country has been doubled during the war.* I should not have noticed this writer, whom, from his style, and his notions of commerce and politics, I take to be some pedagogue out of place, were it not confidently asserted, that *you*, Sir, have declared *his* defence of the peace to be *the best that has appeared.*

That the commerce of Great-Britain had regularly increased from the beginning to the end of the *War* is certain; but this would be a strange argument to use in defence of the *Peace*, were it not, at the same time, endeavoured to be maintained, *that the Peace would not, upon the whole, produce a diminution in that commerce.* Here I and your defenders are at issue. With respect to one of the four principal heads, under which I have divided our commerce, I have already stated that this diminution must be immense, a statement which I have backed with the opinion of a writer of great eminence on the subject of commerce

and

and finance: I now proceed to prove, that a like diminution will take place in our commerce with the West-Indies.

To reduce our resources even *to what they were before the war* would be certain ruin. Our *permanent necessities have doubled*; instead of three hundred millions, our debt is now six hundred millions. To attempt to support this debt upon our former resources would be like feeding a grenadier upon pap. With great kindness and care, the poor fellow might eke out a miserable existence, as long as he was suffered to lounge about his barracks; but his nerves would hardly be strong enough to support the fatigues of a field-day, much less to encounter the toils, the hardships, and the dangers of war.

Before the beginning of the late contest, the French commerce was, in the West Indies, much superior to that of Great-Britain, as will appear from the following table, on the statements of which I must here make some previous remarks.

I have contented myself with stating the *exports* from the several colonies, because they are quite sufficient as a criterion of commerce, the imports and all other advantages ever bearing a proportion

The

STATE *of the* WEST-IN
being an Account
of the Kind and Va

	COLONIES.
British.	Antigua - - -
	Barbadoes - - -
	Bahamas and Bermud
	St. Christopher's -
	Dominica - -
	Grenada - - -
	Jamaica - - - -
	Montserrat and Nevis
	St. Vincent's - -
	Virgin Isles - -
French.	St. Domingo - -
	Guadaloupe - - -
	St. Lucia - - -
	Martinico - - -
	Tobago - - -
	Fr. Guiana and the I. o

* The Miscellaneous Ar
trifling import.—Sugar, Mola
the Miscellaneous Articles be
minute for every useful purpo

† These Islands produc
session of them is greatly con

‡ This Colony, like our

portion

portion thereto. As far as relates to the old British colonies I have admitted the statements of BRYAN EDWARDS; but, with regard to those of France, I have had recourse to better authority. The statements respecting the population, shipping, and exports, of these islands, are founded on those of MOREAU DE ST. MERY, and of MONSIEUR J. M. DE LA BORDE, both of whom were French colonists, one an inhabitant of Martinico, and the other of St. Domingo.

[*See* TABLE, No. I.]

The

The only statement, Sir, in this table, which will, I imagine, give rise to any doubt or contradiction, is that which relates to St. Domingo. EDWARDS has stated its population at 535,260, and its exported produce at £5,500,000 sterling, while my statement makes a considerable addition to both. But, not to speak of the superior information of the writers, from whom I draw my facts, the mistatements of EDWARDS have, in the face of the British nation, long ago been exposed by MONS. DE CHARMILLY, who has clearly proved the "*Historical Survey of the French Colony of St. Domingo,*" to which PHILANGLUS appeals as to "*high authority,*" to be a tissue of misrepresentation, falsehood, and calumny. MONS. CHARMILLY divulged too many disagreeable truths to be listened to, at that time; but, I beseech you, Sir, to read his book, and you will, I am sure, agree with me, that the work of EDWARDS, instead of being quoted as indubitable authority, ought to be consigned to everlasting oblivion.

By means, which, in any times but the present, would have been the subject of parliamentary *inquiry*, at least; by means and by men, bearing a strong resemblance

semblance to those that lost us America, we lost St. Domingo, a colony worth more than all the other colonies we ever possessed. But, still the valour of our fleets and our army obtained us much that we preserved, 'till you and your colleagues once more reduced us to our former scanty limits. The state of our West-India commerce, at the close of the war, is exhibited in the annexed table. An increase had, indeed, been supposed to take place in the produce of our own colonies, as well as in those taken from the French; but, it is well known, that our old colonies do not admit of much increase, and it is more than probable, that all the increase, which was felt, arose more from the indirect trade with St. Domingo than from any other cause. For this reason, I have chosen to carry the same amounts through all my statements, except in that which relates to the French population of St. Domingo, which will receive a considerable addition (of which I shall speak more particularly hereafter) from the acquisition of the Spanish part of that immense island.

My statements, Sir, relative to the colony of Surinam, and that of Berbice, Demerara, and Esse-

 quibo,

quibo*, are founded on authority, on which you may place implicit reliance. The statement respecting Surinam has been furnished me by a gentleman, who has long lived in that country, where he is a planter and proprietor. That which relates to the colony of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, was, if I am not misinformed, some few weeks ago, submitted to LORD HAWKESBURY by a committee of West-India merchants and planters. I am persuaded that the correctness of neither will be called in question.

[*See* TABLE, No. II.]

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* These are the names of three rivers, at no very great distance from each other, in what was called Dutch Guiana, on the north-east shore of South America.

STATE *Close of the War.*

	COLON	Coffee.	Cotton.	Miscellaneous Articles, in value.	Value.
		lbs.	lbs.	£. Sterl.	£. Sterling.
British.	British Colonie	797140	9334024	513615	5182912
	Martinico * -	555812	323518	2965	1184022
	St. Lucia - -	300846	441062	976	383516
	Tobago - -			640	276503
	Surinam - -	003424	5013436	93121	1386355
	Berbice, Demer	966562	10841100		2054148
		623784	25953140	511317	10467456
French.	St. Domingo †				500000
	Guadaloupe ‡	160348	88526	1389	1456484
	Fr. Guiana and				
		160348	88526	1389	1956484

* The disproport pared with that of the British Islands, arises from the *double* ve to the latter.

† By circuitous r tages attendant on a produce of half a million sterling.—It is sland, which are not reckoned upon in the above statements.

‡ This Island, ow ubject, to give France the full amount of all the advantages s

where, at the epoch of your unexpected and ominous elevation, we were the greatest, and, indeed, the only power; where every sail bowed obedience to

our triumphant flag; where the commands of our Sovereign were the universal law; where the earth teemed and the waters rolled for Britain, and for Britain alone.

[*See* TABLE, No. III.]

A sum-

A summary of these statements will simplify the comparison :

Value of Ex-

STA ars *after the Close of* 1801.

	Coffee.	Cotton.	Miscellaneous Articles, in value.	Value.
	lbs.	*lbs.*	£. Sterl.	£. Sterling.
Briti	3797140	9334024	513615	5182012
Fren	79171194	8237735	14470	10031520
Suri	6003424	5013436	93121	1386355
* Berb	5966562	10841100		2054140
	11141180	24092271	107507	14071820

† 125, art of the Island.

* In t tlements of less importance; but, not having the r in my statements. Besides, considered in the grand

five millions, its shipping to less than three hundred thousand tons, and its seamen to twenty-three thousand in number ; while the commerce of the enemy will

will be fed by a population of nearly a million and a half of souls, by a produce of fourteen millions of money, employing upwards of fifty thousand tons of shipping, navigated by more than forty thousand seamen! This contrast must pierce the heart of any man, not accustomed to anticipate with indifference the decline and disgrace of his country; and, if I thought you could contemplate it without shame and remorse, I should think my time ill-bestowed in presenting it to your view.

Now, Sir, as to *the correctness of my statements*, those which relate to the *past* will admit of little contradiction, or doubt. Those which relate to the *future* may be objected to on three grounds: 1. *It will, probably, be urged, that the colonies of Surinam, and that of Berbice, Demerara, and Esssequibo, are not surrendered* TO THE FRENCH, *but* TO THE DUTCH; 2. *That the future population of St. Domingo is overrated, and that the colony will not so soon as three years, if it ever does, return to its former flourishing and productive state;* 3. *That the old British colonies may increase in population and produce, which will consequently occasion an increase of our commerce with them.*

1. It is not the *nominal* possession of territory,

of

of any kind, and particularly of colonies, that is *advantageous* to the possessor. Such possession may sometimes add to the honours of a Sovereign, or state, but never to their riches, or their power. Our King was, 'till very lately, stiled *King of France*, and the title of *King of the Indies* is still used by the feeble and abject Sovereign of Spain. Nor is it of any consequence of what nation the *inhabitants* of a colony consist. Those of the Island of St. Thomas are almost entirely English and Scotch; divine service is performed according to the rites and ceremonies of the Churches of England and Scotland, and in the English language; yet, the colony belongs *bonâ fide* to Denmark, which derives therefrom all the advantages that it yields. The government, of the colonies I am now speaking of, may, indeed, be, for some time at least, administered in the *name* of the Batavian Republick; but, can any man of common sense and common candour, after viewing the state of vassalage, in which that Republick has been left by us, affect to believe, that the commerce of all its colonies will not be rendered either directly or indirectly, subservient to the advantage of France? Holland has not one single characteristic of an *independent* state. French generals command in all her districts; her towns and

fortresses

fortresses are garrisoned by French armies; French pro-consuls dictate the measures of her Cabinet; France makes War and makes Peace for her, answers for her conduct, stipulates for cessions in her favour, and alienates her territory. Can such a state be called independent? Can such a state be said to be the *sovereign* of any thing? *You*, Sir, ought to be the last of all mankind to atiribute to her such quality; you, who have actively consented to; you, who have sanctioned and ratified her subjection, by receiving a portion of her dominions from the hands of her conqueror, without even the formality of her consent*.

Without the *real*, though, perhaps, not the nominal possession, of the colony of Surinam and of that of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, France would derive little benefit from those possessions in South America, which she has been so anxious to extend. The mouth of the river Surinam is the best naval station on the coast, and, as a cruising station, one of the best in the world. Unpossessed of the river Essequibo, she would hold but a slackened rein over the Spanish territory, which is another great object in the long catalouge of

* Vide Appendix H, page xl.

of her meditated conquests. Add to these considerations, the desire, which she must ever have, to prevent Holland from again becoming opulent and powerful, and the still stronger desire of acquiring opulence and naval power herself, and who can be ideot enough to believe, that she will leave the immense commerce of these colonies really in the possession of that conquered and subjected state? Say, however, that this commerce shall still be carried on by the rightful owner, that none but Dutch ships shall trade to the ports of these colonies, and that Holland alone shall receive their exports; still France will be the real and only possessor of all the benefits therefrom derived; for, while the fleets and the treasury of Holland are at her command and at her absolute disposal, it matters very little, whether the fleets be stationed in the Texel, or at Brest, or whether the treasure be collected at Amsterdam, or at Bourdeaux; it matters very little to whom you *affect* to have surrendered her colonies, they are in fact surrendered to France, who now boldly and truly places them on the list of those commercial acquisitions, which are to eclipse and extinguish the commerce of Great-Britain.

2. It may be objected to my statements, *that*

the future population of St. Domingo is over-rated, and that it will not so soon as three years hence, if it ever does, return to its former flourishing and productive state.

The *population* of the French part of St. Domingo has been greatly under-rated by BRYAN EDWARDS, who estimated the white inhabitants at 33,000, at a time when he might easily have been informed, that the *white militia* alone actually consisted of 16,000 men, a circumstance that will fully satisfy any one capable of the least reflection, that the whole white population could not possibly have been less than from fifty to sixty thousand souls. To the French population before the War (and I shall hereafter prove that it will, in three years hence, supposing Peace to continue, have experienced no diminution) I have added the present population of the Spanish part of the Island, which your "*best* "defender," PHILANGLUS, states, upon the authority of EDWARDS, at 20,000, and which I, upon the authority of MOREAU DE ST. MERY, state at 125,000, of which only 15,000 are slaves; and which population is distributed thus:

In

In the district of	Azua - - -	500
——	Bani - - - -	1,800
——	Moulins à Eau	2,500
——	Jayna - - -	2,000
——	Santo Domingo	20,000
——	Mont-de-Plate	600
——	Bayaguana -	1,000
——	Seybo - - -	4,000
——	Higuey - - -	500
——	Samana - - }	500
——	Savane-la-Mer }	
——	Monte Christ -	3,000
——	Cotuy - - -	8,000
——	La Vega - -	8,000
——	St. Yago - -	27,600
——	Hinche - - -	12,000
——	Banique - -	7,000
——	St. Jean de la }	5,000
	Maguana }	
——	Des Plaines - -	21,000
		125,000

This statement of MOREAU was made from the actual census, furnished him by the Spanish Go-

vernor. The parts of a hundred were dropped in order to avoid encumbering the sentences, or the total would, probably, have amounted to a thousand or two more. By casting your eye on the population of *the City of Santo-Domingo* and its district, you will perceive whence has arisen the error of BRYAN EDWARDS, and the consequent error of his humble imitator. They have mistaken the population of the *capital* for the population of the *whole colony!* And these are "high authorities;" these are writers, on whom a British Minister has the weakness to rely for a defence of his measures!

Nor will the other objection, *that St. Domingo will not, so soon as three years, recover its former flourishing and productive state,* require any thing to remove it but a simple statement of facts.

Since incapacity, or something worse, lost us the possession of this Island, and particularly since your disgraceful Peace has restored it to the hands of our enemy, it has been much in vogue, to speak contemptuously of its value; to represent it as a colony, which was, indeed, *once* of some importance, but which is now in such a state of devastation as to leave the owner no hope of deriving any advantage from it, for many years, at least. I can remember

member, Sir, when different sentiments were entertained, and when a different language was held. I can remember when, soon after our landing on the Island, LORD HAWKESBURY (now Lord Liverpool) congratulated the House of Peers on the capture of a Colony, capable of yielding an export produce of *ten millions* annually; and this congratulation took place after the far greater part of the ravages had been committed. But *now* behold! this colony of unexampled, and almost incredible resources, though it has been ever since on the return to peace and prosperity, is become "*the* RUINED *and* RAVAGED *St. Domingo*;" a mere waste, a heap of rubbish, where a banditti of negroes are wandering about amongst the graves of their masters. But, not to leave any room for cavil on this score, I beg leave to quote the very words of your *defender* PHILANGLUS: —"The French colony, thus, appears to have con-
"tained, eleven years ago, above 530,000 inha-
"bitants. It was, however, computed, in the year
"1793, that the class of negroes alone had sus-
"tained a diminution of more than 100,000. Mr.
"EDWARDS says, that since that time the mortality
"has been still more rapid; and, including the loss
"of whites by sickness *and emigration*, he reduces
"the

" the population of St. Domingo, in June 1796, to " two-fifths of the whole number of inhabitants " (white and black) which it possessed in the be- " ginning of 1791. According to this calculation, " *upwards of* 300,000 *human beings have miserably* " *perished in this devoted country within the short* " *period of six years.* Of the cultivation and com- " merce of the Island, we may form an adequate " idea from the same authority; from which it ap- " pears, that the average exports from the French " part of St. Domingo previously to the Revolution, " were rather more than £5,000,000. In 1791, " they were upwards of £5,500,000. In 1800, " (according to an official report of the Minister of " the Interior, made in 1801.)

	livres	*sterling*
" The Imports into France from all the " French colonies in the East and " West-Indies, were, - - -	1,433,800 or	£61,825.
" The Exports from France to all the " French colonies in the East and " West-Indies were, - - -	282,300 or	£11,762.

" In 1788, St. Domingo imported French " goods to the amount of more than £3,500,000 " in five hundred and eighty vessels belonging to " France, carrying 189,679 tons, exclusive of 98

vessels

" vessels engaged in the African trade. In 1800, " I believe, (though I will not state this as a po- " sitive fact) *not a single French vessel cleared out* " *from France for this Island.*"

Now, Sir, the inference, evidently intended to be drawn from this statement, is, that the whites and others who have *emigrated*, are dead, or at least, are lost for ever to St. Domingo; that *three hundred thousand*, out of *five hundred thousand* blacks and mulattoes, have really died, or have been killed; and that the exports from the colony, in the year 1800, amounted *to only a certain portion of* £61,825; and that, *not a single ship did, in that year, clear out for the colony!*

I will not charge PHILANGLUS with *wilful falsehood*, nor with *wilful misrepresentation*, for, from the simplicity of his manner, it is evident, that his misrepresentation proceeds from that ignorance, in which he, probably, participates with those, who ought to have been better informed, before they adopted a measure, so desperate as to accept of a defender in him. But, Sir, this circumstance does not render an exposure of his misrepresentation less necessary; for, we have lately learned by experience,

rience, that neither the improbability, nor the falsehood, of a statement, operates to its discredit.

The devastation and the carnage, in St. Domingo, have been great; but have they been such as to warrant a belief, that 300,000 men have been actually killed by 200,000 survivors? There is, on the face of this statement, something too wonderful to obtain credit from any one, who has advanced beyond the history of Jack the Giant-killer. PHILANGLUS does, indeed, drop a word about *emigration*; but he confines it to the *whites*, and makes no deduction, on that account, from the number of his *slain*. If PHILANGLUS had been where I was, in the year 1793, he might have seen *ten thousand* blacks, whites, and mulattoes, land, *in one day*, and at one port, from vessels, coming from St. Domingo. Had he understood the subject, on which he was writing, he would have known, that the emigration began in the year 1790, and that it continued 'till Great-Britain and America entered into a treaty with TOUSSAINT, in the year 1798; he would have known, that 80,000 of the inhabitants of the French colony emigrated to the United States, that the slaves were there hired out by their masters, that the

the whole population there increased, rather than decreased, in number; and that both masters and slaves have, since the autumn of 1798, been gradually returning to the colony. He would have known, that there was a very considerable emigration, of all colours, to Old France; that great numbers went to New Orleans, to the Floridas, to Cuba, to Porto-Rico, to St. Thomas, and elsewhere: so that PHILANGLUS may rest assured, that a very great portion of "*the* 300,000 *human beings, who have* "*miserably perished in that devoted country,*" are yet alive and merry; and, I dare say, I shall receive his unfeigned thanks for having thus wiped the tears from his philanthropic cheeks.

Some writers deal in slaughter, as a popular species of the sublime, and as an infallible cure for the obstinate drowsiness of their readers. Whether this innocent motive produced the statement of PHILANGLUS is more than I can say, but that statement is certainly a most glaring exaggeration.—MONS. JEAN M. DE LA BORDE, who wrote in 1798, computed the mortality, occasioned by the Revolution, in the French colony of St. Domingo, at *fifty thousand souls*, and the eventual loss of negroes, supposing the colony soon to return under the go-

vernment of France, at *eighty-five thousand*; and these numbers were, by all the St. Domingo planters, whose opinions I had an opportunity of knowing (and they were not a few), thought to be much too high. There have been not many destructive battles in St. Domingo. Assassinations, murders, and most horrid acts of cruelty, have, indeed, been abundant; but, 300,000 men are not, in this way, so soon and so easily destroyed. The fact is, that the far greater half of the depopulation proceeded from emigration to friendly or neutral countries, and the persons so emigrating are now, and have long been, returning. Like birds that the gun of the fowler has scared from their food, they have been scattered in every direction; but your friendly hand having removed the cause of their fear, they are now flocking back to their haunt, where, when they are all assembled, they will scarcely perceive the diminution in their numbers.

But, false as is the statement of PHILANGLUS, with regard to the depopulation of this colony, his statement respecting *the diminution in its resources* is still more so. "Of the cultivation and commerce "of the Island," says he, "we may form an *ade-* "*quate* idea" from these facts, to wit, "that, in

" the year 1791, the exports were in amount up-
" wards of £5,500,000, and that, in the year
" 1800, the imports of France, from all the French
" colonies were only £61,825, and further, that,
" in the same year, not a single French vessel
" cleared out from France for that Island."

To tell a lie in the words of truth is an art ascribed to the SOCIETY OF JESUS, and were I disposed to join in the base calumnies heaped on that Society, I should not scruple to rank PHILANGLUS amongst the most finished of its pupils. He tells us, that, from the facts, which he has stated, " we
" may form an *adequate* idea of the *cultivation*
" and *commerce* of this Island," which " *adequate*
" idea" evidently is, *that the colony did not, in* 1800, *export produce to the amount of* £60,000, *and that not a single ship did, during that year, clear out for the colony.* This is the " *adequate idea*," which the deceived and insulted British public are taught to form of the cultivation and commerce of the French colony of St. Domingo; and this is the writer, whom, report says, you and your colleagues regarded as *the best defender of the peace!*

Now, Sir, I beg you to listen to a few *truths*, and if you do not turn with scorn from PHILANGLUS

and his defence, you must have much less sense as well as less candour than I sincerely believe you to possess.—During the year 1800, during that year in which PHILANGLUS would persuade you, *that the exports of St. Domingo did not amount to £ 60,000, and that not a ship cleared out for the colony;* during that very year, it appears, from the Custom-house returns of the United States, that 642 vessels were entered inwards, and 428 were cleared outwards, for the "*ruined* and *ravaged* St. Domingo!" It also appears from those returns, that, during the same year, foreign produce, much of which came from St. Domingo, to the amount of 39 millions of dollars (upwards of eight millions sterling), was brought into the United States for re-exportation.—Besides this, the Danes, the Swedes, and the Hamburghers, carried on a considerable trade with the "*ruined* and "*ravaged*" colony; nor was even Britain without her share; and, Sir, no trifling portion of those West-India imports and exports, boasted of in the House of Commons, on the memorable third of November last, ought to have been attributed to the "*ruined* " and *ravaged* St. Domingo."

Of these facts I was in possession at the time when PHILANGLUS began to *figure-away* in the columns

columes of the Porcupine. To stop him would have been an act of mercy, of which I thought him unworthy, and as to justice, I knew he would execute it on himself, were he but favoured with a sufficiency of rope. In the mean time, however, lest his ignorant spirit should resist the dictates of conviction, I provided me an instrument wherewith to give him the *coup-de-grâce*. This instrument is a letter from a merchant, who was in St. Domingo, in the year 1800, and who gives me the following account of the state, in which the French colony then was.

" *Liverpool, Dec.* 21, 1801.

" Dear Sir,

" In answer to your request about the state " of St. Domingo, I have to inform you, that, " when I left it, *in the month of April* 1800, I had " resided at Cape François for about three months, " prior to that time, and had occasion to go to " Gonaïves and St. Mark's to purchase cotton, " about 100 English miles distant from the Cape. " The estates, every where, appeared *in good* " *order and most of the sugar works and distilleries* " *were rebuilt*. All the estates had been restored

" to

" to the proprietors, except those on the list of
" emigrants. From the best information I could
" get, *they made nearly one-third the quantity of*
" *produce they* FORMERLY *made*, and every one
" seemed to think, they could make full as much
" as formerly, only for the large army they had to
" keep up to guard such an extensive colony, and
" carry on a war against General Rigaud and his
" Mulattoes, who were then in great force in the
" south-west part of the Island, but who are now
" subdued and returned to cultivate the estates.
" *During the three months* I was in the Cape, about
" *one hundred and thirty American vessels loaded*
" *with produce sailed from that port, and also a num-*
" *ber of Danes and Hamburghers, and ten French*
" *ships.* In that time, I sold goods in the Cape
" to the amount of 102,000 Spanish dollars, and,
" much to the honour of the Blacks and Whites,
" *collected the whole* IN CASH *without any dispute.*
" I paid government duty on my inward cargo
" 10,500 *dollars*, and on my outward cargo of sugar,
" coffee, cotton, and fustic, 7,000 *dollars*, my ship
" carrying upwards of 400 tons; and I was allowed
" to bring away a quantity of dollars, as I had not
" room in the ship to take more produce. As to

" the

" the police of the Cape, I have seen none better
" any where; indeed all colours seemed to be
" happy with each other, for I never heard of a
" robbery nor saw any of the inhabitants intoxi-
" cated, or quarrel in the streets. The troops were
" well armed, cloathed, and disciplined, and can,
" at a short notice, bring into the field upwards of
" 100,000 able men, under General Toussaint
" Louverture, Commander in Chief of the Colony
" *in the name of the French Republick.* The Cus-
" tom-house, Treasury, and the other Publick
" Offices, were conducted the same as in all other
" French colonies. I have been often in company
" with the General in Chief and many of the
" Black and White Officers, who always spoke
" with great respect of the French Nation, *and*
" *wished it was Peace with England, that the French*
" *might come and take possession of the Colony.* As
" to what state they are in at this time is not in my
" power to say; but, when I was there, produce and
" money were plenty, provisions and dry goods very
" cheap, and the Colony in a prosperous state.

" This, Sir, is a rough sketch of what I know
" of the Island at that time. Since that the Black
" army has taken possession of the Spanish part of

" the

" the Island, and a Mr. CAZE is made Governor
" of the city of St. Domingo. *He is a Frenchman*
" *and came out from France, while I was in the*
" *Colony, as first aid-de-camp to General Toussaint.*

" I wish, Sir, it were in my power to give you
" a more circumstantial account, but being always
" engaged with my commercial business prevented
" me."

" I remain, dear Sir,

" Your obedient Servant,

" * * * * * *"

Not having taken the precaution to obtain this gentleman's liberty for so doing, and not having time to wait for a return of post from Liverpool, I do not think myself authorized to insert his name, to which, considering the insignificance of my work, he might, too, very properly object; but, should an occasion offer for him to state these facts *at the bar of the House of Commons* (and I am one of those, Sir, who hope, that such an occasion will yet offer), I pledge myself to the publick, that his testimony there would be strictly conformable to the letter here submitted to your perusal.

This

This letter, Sir, firmly establishes the truth of all my statements relative to the French colony of St. Domingo. Here we find, that 130 American vessels, besides a number of Danes and Hamburghers, and ten French vessels, took in lading and sailed, *in the space of three months*, from the port of Cape François alone, which every one knows to have been the most ruined and ravaged part of "the *ruined* and *ravaged* St. Domingo." We further find, that many of the distilleries and sugar-works were already rebuilt, that the plantations were in a prosperous state, and that the estates had been restored to all those proprietors, who had been wise enough not to place confidence in England. We find no want of that *capital*, of which your defender has represented the colony to be so destitute; we find cargoes, even British cargoes, paid for in cash; we find a profitable custom-house under proper regulations, and we find abundance of proof, that the produce of the colony, even in 1800, was full as great as that of Jamaica ever has been. Before facts like these how quickly do the leaden columns of PHILANGLUS dissolve into their native dross!

If such, Sir, was the state of the French colony of St. Domingo, in 1800, and such, I am persuaded you will now be convinced it was, it has certainly been growing better and better to this hour. What, then, will it be *three years hence*, when all the proprietors, except those who foolishly trusted to British wisdom and British perseverance have returned, strengthened by the connexions, which they, for the most part, have formed in the United States of America? When France shall, too, enjoy the inestimable advantages to be derived from the sole possession of the Spanish part of the Island, which will greatly augment her population, strengthen her military defence, protect her navigation in time of war, extend her cultivation, and, above all, give her an ample, a regular, and never-failing supply of cattle of every description, a resource of which every other West-India colony is almost entirely destitute? Is it too much, Sir, to suppose, that, with all these additional advantages, and many more that could be mentioned, the French colony will, *in the course of three years*, attain to its former commercial importance? Most assuredly it is not, and those who attempt to hush the apprehensions, naturally excited by such a supposition, can

be

be influenced by no motive but that of a desire to deceive the nation, and thereby to shelter Ministers from the effects of its resentment.

3. The remaining objection which will probably be urged against my statement, is, *that the old British colonies may increase in produce and population, which will, consequently, occasion an increase in our commerce with them.*

The plantations in our old West-India colonies, Sir, like the fields of the mother country, will never be *exhausted*, while there are hands and capital to carry on their cultivation; but the progressive state of the former bears a strong resemblance to that of the latter, and leaves very little reason to hope for any considerable augmentation in produce; and, without an augmentation in produce, an increase of inhabitants would be an evil. Besides the state of the lands, however, there are two causes which will powerfully tend, not only to prevent an increase, but to occasion a decrease, in the produce and population of our old colonies; *I mean the migration of persons, and the transfer of capital, to the more favoured colonies of our enemy; and the vast advantages which the French planters*

and merchants will enjoy over those of Great-Britain, both in the field and in the market.

The population and produce, Sir, of our Leeward Islands have *already* experienced a diminution; a diminution, indeed, which we felt not, because what we lost in St. Vincent's, Grenada, Barbadoes, and St. Christopher's, we found transferred, with ten-fold interest, to the colony of Surinam and that of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo. These colonies are fertile beyond conception, and are capable of improvement to an incalculable extent. The progress of the latter colony, as exhibited in the following account, which your colleague LORD HAWKESBURY knows to be authentic, will enable you to form some idea of the value of one of those numerous acquisitions, which were gained by the valour and the blood of our countrymen, and which you have surrendered into the hands of an enemy, whom they had beaten in every part of the world.

Account of the produce exported from the colony of Berbice, Demerara, and Essequibo, since the establishment of a British custom-house there.

Years.	Vessels.	Hogsheads of Sugar.	Puncheons of Rum.	Bales of Cotton.	Pounds weight of Coffee.
1797 (from August)	45	1,483	720	2,425	4,938,230
1798	202	6,472	1,803	14,738	4,506,325
1799	212	5,392	1,501	15,758	8,846,877
1800	333	10,513	2,615	33,806	15,966,562

If this colony, Sir, while regarded as mere conquest, while its tenure was so very insecure, increased, as we here see it did, more than one-third in its produce in the space of three years, what, with its vast extent, may not be its produce when safely lodged in the hands of a power, which now commands the world? It was the migration of British subjects, and the transfer of British capital, that occasioned this prodigious increase. Both sought a more propitious soil. And, if the difficulties and dangers ever attendant on a state of warfare, were insufficient to restrain this inclination, what do you imagine will be able to restrain

it

it in future? The mere circumstance of the colony having changed masters? O, no, Sir! The planters who removed their capital and their slaves from Grenada to Demerara, took into their calculation the possibility, and the probability, of a transfer of the colony. And, if even this did not obstruct their speculations, what is there to obstruct them now, when the adventurers have seen the golden mine, and have begun to rifle its treasures? That the considerations of country, language, manners, and laws, will operate but as a very weak impediment is clearly evinced in the instance of St. Thomas and many other colonies. Capital seeks for an increase, as water seeks the sea, and it will follow wherever that increase is to be found, whether at home or abroad, whether in the country of a friend, or in the country of an enemy.

Another cause of the decrease in the population and produce of our old colonies will be, the vast advantages, which the French planters and merchants will, as I before observed, enjoy over those of Great-Britain, both in the field and in the market. Their vessels will sail cheaper than ours, their slaves will be cheaper obtained; and, unless we open our West-India ports to the Americans,

unless

unless we, in this point, give up our Navigation Act, and with it those advantages, which are absolutely necessary to the preservation of any considerable portion of our naval power, the French colonists will purchase lumber, flour, pork, and all the articles of first necessity, at a price greatly inferior to that, on which ours will be able to obtain them.* Be you assured, Sir, that one part of the plan of the rulers of France, is, *to make the interest of America coincide with the ruin of England*; and, in the prosecution of this plan, nothing can be imagined more effectual, than the granting to America, what she has so long and so anxiously sought for, those commercial concessions, which England will not, which England cannot grant her.

The produce of the French colonies, being raised at less expense, will, of course, be sold cheaper, than that of the British colonies; which circum-

* The idle notion of obtaining *provisions* from Canada, Nova Scotia, and God knows where, is now-a-days completely exploded. They must come from the United States, or the sugar-plantations must be turned into Indian corn-fields, and the food of the colonists must be confined to homony and mush.

circumstance, together with our exclusion from Flanders and Germany, and the opening of those countries to France, by the navigation of the Rhine, the Meuse, and the Scheldt, will leave us the British Isles alone as a market for our West-India goods, which, as they will gradually become less profitable to the planter, will gradually cease to be raised; negroes, to the great joy of Saint WILBERFORCE, will cease to be torn from the bleeding bosoms of those tender fathers and mothers who now barter them for a bit of glass, the negro-driver will cease to lash, the African will cease to labour, and thirty thousand British sailors, who labour much harder, will cease to encounter the dangers of the sea. Blessed prospect! and all this, Sir, you will have satisfaction to reflect, is to be attributed to *you!*

Hitherto, in considering the decline of our West-India commerce, I have proceeded upon the supposition, that it will, for some years, at least, remain unmolested by warlike operations; but, I cannot conclude this letter, long as it already is, without endeavouring to impress on your mind, the great and imminent danger to be apprehended from even the *present* movements of our enemy. A French

fleet

fleet and army, in spite of all the efforts, which I am persuaded you have made to prevent it, have sailed for the West-Indies. That army *and fleet too* you have, however, been led to believe, are destined for the reduction of TOUSSAINT and his Blacks to submission. But, Sir, you will, when it is too late, find, that no such armament was necessary for that purpose.

TOUSSAINT, Sir, holds his commission from the French Republick, in whose name he commands; in that name every act of authority, in the colony, is exercised; the Custom-house collects its duties, taxes are raised, writs are issued, processes are carried on, judgments are given, executions are levied, sentences are passed and executed, *in the name of the French Republick*. And, that TOUSSAINT is not an imitator of the infamous and accursed Parliament, who raised a rebel army in the name of their king, you may learn from the statement of my correspondent at Liverpool, who informs you, that he was frequently in company with TOUSSAINT and his officers both Black and White, who "always spoke "with great respect of the French nation, *and* "*wished for a Peace with England*, THAT THE "FRENCH MIGHT COME AND TAKE "POSSESSION OF THE COLONY." My

correspondent adds, this striking circumstance, that a M. DE LA CAZE, *a Frenchman, who came out from France in* 1800, *was, and is, Governor of the Spanish part of the Island, and resides in the city of Santo Domingo.*—Methinks I hear you titter at the *authority*, on which my apprehensions are grounded; but, Sir, I hope, for the sake of my country, that the document I am now about to produce, will turn your mirth into serious reflection. It is dated from the seat of Government of the United States of America, and is signed by the French Embassador, who was, last year, sent out to that country by BUONAPARTÉ. With these premises in your mind, Sir, read the document, and throw yourself on the mercy of your country.

" Notice is hereby given, *to Merchants trading* " *to the Island of St. Domingo,* That *the government* " *of the said island,* in order to provide against the " fraudulent entries and declarations made by " traders, with the view of evading the duties laid " on the value of goods, *have desired the commercial* " *agents of the French Republick in the United States,* " to attest the prices quoted in the invoice bills as " conformable to the prices current in the places " from whence the shipments are made. In con-

" formity

" formity to that desire, the agents aforesaid are
" directed to give the above-mentioned certificates.
" Such, therefore, as chuse to have their bills so
" certified, may apply for that purpose *to the French*
" *Commissaries in the several ports of the United*
" *States.*

" L. A. PICHON.

" *Georgetown (Potomac), 7th Floréal,*
" *9th year, (22d April,* 1801.")

Did you ever see this notice before, Sir? Were you before acquainted with a circumstance, which " leaves no loop nor hinge to hang a doubt on," that TOUSSAINT is, to all intents and purposes, an officer under the French Republick, and that his army is at her absolute command? If you were, and yet suffered that army to be re-inforced by an army from France, sailing out with your knowledge, and with your consent, while our brave fleet lay manacled at Torbay, it is not for *me* to sit in judgment on your conduct. But, Sir, I am persuaded you were not, and I sincerely hope, that the information I now give you, may produce such measures as will yet defeat the perfidious intentions of the enemy. There is, however, no time to be lost. *The conquest of Jamaica* is an enterprize much

less difficult than you imagine, and if that island falls, the sun of the Western hemisphere will never again shine on a British sail.

I would now, dispirited as I am by contemplating the approaching ruin of my country, enter on my proposed observations on the future state of our commerce with the United States of America; but, as our commercial connections with that country turn principally upon our exports thereto, they more properly belong to the subject of my next letter. In the mean time, I remain,

Sir,

Your most humble,

And most obedient servant,

WM. COBBETT.

P. S. Since this letter was written, accounts have been received of a partial revolt of the Blacks against the authority of TOUSSAINT, "*whom,*" says the writer, "*they had, at last, discovered to be no* "*more than a mere* DRIVER *acting under the orders* "*of their European masters*;" late, however, as these poor ignorant wretches were in making this discovery, it would seem, that they had more early

information

information than the *British Minister*.—This new insurrection, so far from retarding, will greatly accelerate, the complete re-establishment of the ancient system. It will furnish TOUSSAINT with an excuse, which he otherwise would not have had, to deprive the Blacks in general of that portion of freedom, which they now enjoy, an object, which, with the co-operation of the French army, he will accomplish in the space of two months. This insurrection, however, which will now be instantly quelled, is one amongst many favourable events, the advantages to be derived from which, we have for ever lost by the Peace.

Destitute of the aid of a French army, TOUSSAINT might have been reduced to such a state as would have induced him to have recourse to us; and the whole Island of St. Domingo might, with his hearty co-operation, have become an appendage of the British crown, an acquisition which would have been more than balance against the European aggrandisement of France.

LETTER III.

Pall-Mall, 29th Dec. 1801.

SIR,

OUR *manufactures* will follow the fate of our commerce: their existence is as inseparably connected as that of the flesh and the bone: they have grown up together, and together they must prosper, or decline.

The principal manufactures of this kingdom are, *hardware*, *woollens*, *linens*, and *cottons*. There are, indeed, many other important articles; but, the facts and reasoning, applied to these, will, with some trifling exceptions, necessarily apply to all the rest.

In speaking of manufactures, of any and of every sort, two things present themselves for consideration; to wit: the *means of production*, and the *market*. The means of producing hardware, of the finer sorts, are not very soon, nor very easily, acquired; this article of manufacture requires men trained

trained to the business from their infancy; it owes its perfection to a system too complicated to be soon established in any of the countries of our rival. But the same observations do not apply to the coarser kinds of hardware, the production of these require little else than strength, metal, and fire. Of the first France has more than we, and at a much lower rate; of the second her supply may now be more abundant and cheaper than ours; of the third, without which the other two were of little use, she was almost totally destitute, until *you*, Sir, insured her a constant supply. Your "best defender," PHILANGLUS, asks, with a triumphant sneer, how she is to rival us in hardware, *without coals?* She has them, Sir; you have left them at her absolute command; to the leather of Stavelo and Malmedy, to the iron, copper, and lead of Luxemburgh and Limburgh, you have generously added the coal-pits of Namur, Liege, and many other places, and have given her the principal rivers of Europe to convey them and their products withersoever she may please.

If I am told of that *capital*, the imaginary exclusive possession of which seems to be the only source of your consolation; if I am told of *the*

long

long time, necessary to bring these means into operation, I turn from speculation to *fact*; I turn to a country, where experience has proved, that neither great capital, nor long time, is necessary to the accomplishment of what I dread. There was a time, Sir, when the now United States of America imported their *plough-shares* from England; and, I dare say, you can recollect, that, only *twenty-seven years ago*, the great, though inconsistent, Lord Chatham, declared, that he "*would not suffer America to make a hob-nail.*" Yet, Sir, this country, *though, eighteen years ago, a* BANKRUPT, now furnishes an abundant supply of all the articles, of which I am speaking. Cutlery, a few choice edge-tools, and the finer kinds of hardware, she imports from England; but of anchors, cannons, mortars, bombs, balls, stoves, chains, bolts, bars, hinges, agricultural tools, edge-tools in general, and, indeed, all the coarser kinds of hardware, she produces more than she wants, and at a price greatly beneath the prime cost of those articles in England. And, instead of *not making a hob-nail*, she makes nails of every sort, in such quantities, and at so cheap a rate, that, in spite of our commercial regulations, in spite of the rigour of our laws, and the vigilance

of

of our officers, she exports no small quantity of this article to our continental and West-India colonies, while the supplying of those of other nations is almost exclusively in her hands.

With this example before our eyes, can we, after surveying the present boundaries and influence of France, which give her at once the *market* and the *means of production;* can we doltishly persist, that this article of our manufactures will not experience a considerable diminution?

In *fine* woollen cloth France has, to a certain extent, long been our rival. Cloth of this texture requires the wool of Spain, of which we shall, in future, have just as much as it pleases France to let us have, and not an ounce more. Those articles, which demand much wool and little labour, England will always be able to supply cheaper than any other country; but, these articles are the least profitable to the nation, and the vent of even these will be circumscribed by all those commercial restrictions, which France can adopt herself, or dictate to our other customers, of doing which she will let slip no opportunity.

The increase in the manufacture of Irish *linen* has, like much of our other increase, been produced

by the war, which has interrupted the operations of the manufacturers of that article, in the other countries. Can we suppose, that a decrease will not result from a peace, and from a peace, too, which has left those countries in the possession of a power, whose principal object is the ruin of England. The countries annexed to France abound in the raw material, of which linen is made; of hands she has more than an abundance; and, if you again ask me, whence the *capital* is to come, to revive the languishing manufactories, I again refer you to the example of America, or to the sentiments and dispositions on the Royal Exchange.

As to *cottons*, that immense source of individual and national wealth, we altogether depend, for the raw material, on our colonies and on foreign nations. Our consumption of this material amounts to 44,000,000 pounds weight, each pound costing, upon an average, 2s. and, when manufactured, worth, upon an average, 7s. 6d. Towards this astonishing consumption, the increase of which has been not less astonishing, our colonies, previous to your peace, furnished 25,000,000 of pounds; those which that peace has left us will furnish only 9,000,000, little more than one-fifth part of what

our

our present establishment would need, the other 16,000,000 having been thrown into the lap of our enemy. The cotton of Demerara was not only our own, not only did the profits of its cultivation come to England, not only did the carriage of it home employ British ships and British seamen, but it was the *finest* in the world. This precious material is now gone to France, whither it will speedily be followed by all its attendant advantages.

For almost the whole of our future supply of cotton we must look to the Brazils and Georgia; abundant sources, indeed; but the former totally under the power of France, and, from the latter, our exports will be the price of those commercial sacrifices, which, at no very distant period, we shall, probably, be called on to make to *another Republick*. Our supply will, at best, be very precarious, and will come to us at a vast increase of price, while the profits of culture and the advantages of navigation will remain exclusively in other hands.

There are some persons, Sir, who affect to believe, that the *climate* of France is unpropitious to the manufacture of cotton, forgetting, I suppose, that our cotton-manufactories came from that country, and forgetting that the same cloud covers

Dover and Calais. Others pretend, with your "best defender," PHILANGLUS, that the French cannot equal the inimitable ingenuity of our machines. Of this I greatly doubt, but, if it be really so, I am sure that the makers of those machines will never refuse to lend them a hand. To attempt to monopolize these inventions would be like bottling up moon-shine, or hiding the sun with a blanket. In short, with her vast increase of territory and population, with the means of production in her hands, and the market of the world at her command, is it next to impossible but France should endeavour to rival us in this capital branch of our trade, and if she makes the attempt, it is impossible but it should be crowned with success.

"Yet," (say the selfish and foolish partizans of the Peace) "yet, let us hope that this will not "happen *so soon*." Precisely how soon it may happen it is not in my power to foretell; but, that this species of manufacture is capable of an increase astonishingly rapid, we ourselves have furnished a striking example. No longer than twenty years ago our annual importation of cotton amounted to only *four* millions of pounds weight, and it now amounts to *forty four* millions. *Capital*, your adored capital,

capital, Sir; that capital, of which you seem to think we shall retain the exclusive possession, will follow where interest leads. He who can sell his goods cheapest will ever find the readiest market, and he who finds the readiest market, will never want for capital to furnish him with a cargo.

Having now stated those facts and reasons, on which my fears of the successful rivalship of France are founded, I shall now, as briefly as I can, endeavour to show why, and in what degree, that rivalship will affect us in our several markets, following the same order, which I observed in considering the diminution in our commerce.

To *the Continent of Europe* our exports of manufactured goods will be diminished by the revival of the manufactories in France, Belgium, and Holland, and by those new regulations, which France will compel the nations of Europe to adopt. Of her eagerness to exercise this species of compulsion, we have an instance in her treaty with Portugal, signed at Madrid, on the 29th of September. That this treaty,* which absolutely severs a connection between England and Portugal,

* Vide Appendix G.

gal, formed by mutual interest and cemented by an uninterrupted friendship of a hundred years, was not prescribed by France without an evil design upon our commerce, is evident from the tendency of its stipulations; and, if any doubt remained on that score, it would be completely removed by the comments, with which she has announced the treaty to the world. These comments which are to be found in the speech addressed to the Legislative Body by the Counsellor of State, DEFERMONT,* state, that the object of France, was, to establish such regulations, as should, in time "*introduce French woollens into the ports of Portugal;*" to break those engagements, "*which made that country submit to the monopoly of English merchants and manufacturers,*" and rendered it "*an English colony, a great, and almost exclusive, market for the productions of her industry.*"

Such, Sir, was the object of the treaty of Madrid, in the stipulations of which you have left our ancient and faithful ally fettered hand and foot. LORD HAWKESBURY's reply to MR. GREY, on this subject, can never be too often repeated. MR. GREY asked, whether the recent treaty between France

* Vide Appendix I.

France and Portugal would not deprive us of the commercial privileges, which we had theretofore enjoyed with the latter country; to which the noble and amiable Secretary cooly replied, that he had no official information on the subject of the treaty, and consequently could make no positive reply; but, that, with respect to the particular point in question, *it was one of those stipulations, which nations might enter into in time of profound peace, as well as at any other time;* and, that, if Portugal withdrew the privileges hitherto granted to English manufactures, *we might, in return, withdraw the privileges hitherto granted to the Portuguese wines, and admit those of* OTHER COUNTRIES *upon the same footing!* So, because Portugal is compelled to encourage the importation of our enemy's manufactures, we, in revenge, are to encourage the importation of the wines of our enemy! As a mask to our own baseness, we affect to believe, that Portugal has *voluntarily* withdrawn our privileges; and, the sacrifices, with which we hope to appease the wrath of the Grand Nation, we affect to regard as proceeding from motives of *self-interest!* And, do you really believe, Sir, that the penetrating eyes of the world will not see through

this

this mask? BUONAPARTÉ and the companions of his triumph must be highly diverted at the miserable tricks, with which we are attempting to disguise our disgrace.

France, upon looking round her, will find several other nations on whom she can, and will, impose such commercial regulations as she finds necessary for favouring her own manufactories, or those of any other nation, and for excluding ours. In spite, however, of all she can do, the nations of Europe *must*, for some time at least, receive our manufactories; but every obstacle thrown in their way will surely enhance their price to the consumer, which will as surely diminish the quantity consumed, until the price be lowered by the rivalship of France or some of her satellites. At first the diminution may not be severely felt by us; but, it will go on gradually increasing, 'till our present exports to the Continent will become much less than they were before the war, during which they have increased from £1,530,000, to £2,545,000.

To the *West-Indies*, Sir, our exports of manufactures must instantly experience a diminution of nearly one half their present amount. We have

given

given upon nearly one half of our market, especially if we take into the calculation, the goods which we sent to St. Domingo. That this diminution will, to a certain degree, take place, is admitted by your defender PHILANGLUS, because, I suppose, he regarded the denial as too glaringly false to be believed, even by the ignorant herd that rejoiced at the Peace.

There remain to be considered, Sir, our exports to *the United States of America*, that capacious market which has, for several years past, taken *more than one-fourth part of the whole of our exported manufactures.* This whole has lately amounted annually to £23,056,000, and it must be fresh in your mind, that LORD HAWKESBURY, in his defence of the Peace, stated, that our manufactures, exported to the United States of America alone, during each of the last three years of the war, amounted to £6,232,000. What purpose that cool and solid young nobleman meant to answer by this statement is, probably, explained by the pedagogue, PHILANGLUS, who, after piling up a whole column of figures, upon the back of the unfortunate Porcupine, to prove the acknowledged and well-known increase in the exports to the

 United

United States, makes the following sagacious observations:

"Our commercial connections with the "United States of America are fixed on such *solid* "*foundations*, that we have no reason to apprehend "that the future political dissensions of Europe "will affect them. For many years to come, the "Americans, although an extensive sea-coast, good "harbours, and a spirit of enterprize inherited from "their forefathers, suggest to them the employ- "ment of *a part of their capital in commerce*, must "continue to direct the largest portion of it to "agricultural improvements. While we can sup- "ply them with better and cheaper goods than "other nations can manufacture for them, or than "they can manufacture for themselves, they will, "from the strongest tie, that of interest, continue "to be united to us; but as a German writer well "observes, there are considerations, totally inde- "pendent of policy and interest, which must and "will *for ever assure to this country*, the almost "*exclusive commerce* of the United States; these "are, in the first place, the consanguinity of the "two people; and, in the second, the similarity of "religion, language, manners, and taste; the con-

"sumption

"sumption of the manufactures of Europe, will "necessarily keep pace with the progress of culti-"vation in America, until at some period yet ex-"tremely remote, the surplus hands not wanted for "agriculture or commerce must seek employment "in manufactures.—Our trade to North America "is of the greatest importance, as it principally "consists in the export of our home productions "and manufactures. Its increase has been very "rapid: and whether it be measured by the ton-"nage of the shipping employed, or by the value "of the merchandize sent out, by years of war, or "by years of peace, it will justify this conclusion, "*that our* FUTURE INTERCOURSE *with the* "*United States, will* ENLARGE *those sources of* "*employment and of wealth, which that country has* "*opened to British manufactures and merchants.*

This is the conclusion which, doubtless, LORD HAWKESBURY meant should be drawn from his pompous display of the state of our American exports;* and, Sir, I sincerely regret, that it is in my power to prove this conclusion to be grossly erroneous.

* Vide Appendix N.

The increase in our manufactures, exported to the United States of America, has arisen from three causes: From the regular increase of population and consequent wealth in the United States: From the decline in the manufactures of Holland, and the suspension of those of France and the countries now annexed to her empire: From the emigration occasioned by the war: From the re-exportation of our manufactures from the United States to the colonies of France, Holland, and Spain.

All the increase, which has arisen from the first of these enumerated causes, that is, *from the* REGULAR *increase of the population and consequent wealth of the United States*, we shall retain, 'till France shall be able to rival us, or 'till our trade shall be interrupted by the hostility of the American government, of which latter contingency I shall speak by and by. But, Sir, that this increase forms but a comparatively small portion of that, which has, of late years, taken place, will evidently appear from the following facts. A census was, last year, taken in the United States, from which you may learn, that their population then amounted to 5,214,801 souls. In the year 1790, when the former

mer census was taken, it amounted to 3,929,326 souls; so that, during the ten last years, the increase has been, 1,285,475 souls. But, from this increase must be deducted 30,000 emigrants from St. Domingo, who had not yet returned to their Island, when the census was taken; and, at least, 80,000 emigrants from France and Holland, and from the other French and Dutch colonies and dependencies. This reduces the increase to 1,175,475 souls, which is an addition of little more than one-*fifth* to the number and consequent wealth of our permanent customers, while the increase in our manufactures exported to America has, during the same period of ten years, been nearly as *two to one:* in 1790 they amounted to £3,694,000, and in 1800 they amountd to £6,232,000.

Such a disproportion would have taught PHILANGLUS, if he had understood the subject on which he was writing, or rather figuring, to seek for other and more proportionate causes; and, he would have found, that these causes were, the suspension of the manufactories in the countries, under the power of our enemy, which manufactories will now be revived. He would have found, that the emigration, occasioned by the war, sent to America backs to

wear our cloth and cotton, and money to pay for them; which emigration has not only now ceased, but a re-emigration is daily taking place. And, which is of still more importance in the account, he would have found, that of the vast quantity of British manufactures, exported to the United States of America during the war, one-fourth, at least, was re-exported to the West-India and South American colonies of our enemy, and her allies, Holland and Spain. These facts are so well-known, and the deduction from them is so evident, that, if PHILANGLUS had applied to any American merchant, if he had spent only one evening in either of the American Coffee-houses, if he had strolled but one hour in the American Change, he would have been fully convinced, that our manufactures exported to the United States, even *next year*, will experience *a diminution of more than* ONE-FOURTH, on the correctness of which opinion I would venture to stake my life.

Nor, Sir, is the enjoyment of the American trade, even with this diminution, fixed on such "*solid foundations*" as your "best defender," PHILANGLUS, seems to imagine. This man knows nothing of the present state of America, or of any other

other nation. He is a mere furbisher of cast-off maxims, a collector of political orts: he is fit enough, indeed, to be the secretary of a friendly society, to keep the accounts of a poor-house, to be a meter at a soup-shop, or a tally-man to the London Flour-Company; but, as to the resources, the interests, and the views of nations, he knows no more than the baby that is now riding my stick across the room. He, poor soul, thinks, that there are circumstances, "which, independent of interest and "policy, will *for ever* insure to this country the "almost *exclusive commerce* of the United States!" But, Sir, no longer to suppose you a party to his opinions, I now throw the driveller aside, and address myself directly to you.

You, Sir, are, or ought to be, a *statesman*; you, Sir, have, or ought to have, an accurate knowledge of the resources, the inclination, and the views, of America; and, if you have, I need not tell you how ticklish is our situation with respect to that country; on how slender a thread depend our commercial connections. If, however, you will take the trouble to open those writings and selections of PETER PORCUPINE, to which you did me the honour to subscribe, you will find, relating to this subject,

some

some facts, with which, without the least derogation from your talents or your zeal, I may venture to believe you are, as yet, unacquainted. To these facts I shall sometimes beg leave to refer you.

The "*solid foundation*," on which our commercial connections with America are fixed, is a treaty, all the commercial and maritime regulations of which, are of themselves to cease in *two years* after the end of the late, or the *present* (I do not know which to call it) war with France. *Then*, Sir, it is to be determined, in the negotiations of a new treaty, what further regulations shall be adopted *with respect to the American Commerce with our West-Indies*; and also it is to be determined, whether in any, and in what cases, *neutral vessels shall protect enemy's property* *. These are points, Sir, on which America will be much more obstinate than you imagine. They have ever been the objects nearest her heart; and, she will 'ere long obtain them, or she will effect the ruin of our colonies. The most formidable part of the opposition to the treaty of 1794, arose from those stipulations, which, in

* Vide the Treaty, Art. XII. PORCUPINE's Works, Vol. II. page 257.

in granting to the Americans a permanent trade with our Islands, restricted the carrying on of that trade to vessels of 70 tons burden, or under, and which exacted, as the condition of that privilege, that America should neither ship nor carry West-India produce to Europe. This, though no trifling concession on our part, though a dangerous departure from our Navigation Act, was, instead of being received as a favour, regarded as an injury and an insult. Nor, were these sentiments confined to the *Jacobins* of America: they were the sentiments of the nation, who, with the utmost unanimity, rejected the stipulations, which were even *excepted* in the ratification. So that, in two years from this time, our commercial stipulations with America will cease, and we shall then have to open our West-India ports to her, or she will impose such restrictions on the importation of our manufactures as shall compel us to yield. She will impose, on goods of British manufacture, a duty so much higher than that which she imposes on goods of other nations, as shall at once greatly diminish the importation of British goods, and, in the end, turn the channel of trade to other countries.

 This

This mode, Sir, of forcing us into commercial concessions was proposed to Congress in the year 1788. It was again revived in 1793-4, and was carried, in the Lower House, by a very great majority, but was thrown out in the Senate. By turning to PORCUPINE's Works*, you will find, that MR. JEFFERSON was the author of this plan, which was, in both instances, brought forward by MR. MADDISON †; and you will please to recollect, that MR. JEFFERSON is now *President* of the United States, and that MR. MADDISON is his *Secretary of State.* You ought to know, also, that the faction of our enemy had, in America, gained a complete triumph, previous to your disgraceful Peace, which will estrange from us the last of our friends. There will not remain a man in that country, who will not, hereafter, be ashamed to harbour an attachment to England. The contempt of us, in the continent of Europe, is great; but, in the continent of America it will be, if possible, ten thousand times greater.

That

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* Vide Dispute with Great-Britain, PORCUPINE's Works, Vol. I. p. 343, and the following.

† Vide the French Minister's Intercepted Letter, PORCUPINE's Works, Vol. I. page 286.

That the *people* of America will do nothing contrary to their *interests*, I know; but, the people of every nation look to their *immediate* interests; and, as I observed to you before, it is one part of the plan of France, *to make the interests of America coincide with the ruin of England;* and to effect this nothing more is wanted than to open the French and Dutch West-India ports to the former, and thereby furnish a plausible, and even *just*, grounds for such a discriminating system as will exclude our manufactures, little by little, from the United States.

Nor, were we disposed to carry on this trade, sword in hand, should we have the power to gratify that disposition. While the marine of France was unable to stir; while it remained unaugmented by that of Holland and Spain, and unrevived by the immense resources, which you have left in her hands, the naval and military power of America was a thing to be contemned; but, your Peace has at once humbled us and exalted every other nation, whose interests, or views, are, or may be, opposed to our own. It is much in vogue to talk of the United States of America as we talk of Otaheité. The sage, who owns the *True Briton*, speaks of it as a country,

"at so *great a distance* as to be little interesting to "Englishmen;" PHILANGLUS calls it an *agricultural* country; it is never mentioned (except, perhaps, by way of parenthesis) in any of the comparisons between the increase of the commercial and maritime greatness of England and other nations; when, indeed, it is thought necessary to make a flattering display of exported British manufactures, America becomes an *item* in the account; but, on all other occasions, our financiers and politicians affect to regard that nation as being independent of us in *form* only, as a mere colony, where the foolish people hew the woods and till the lands, to no other end than that of earning money to pay for British manufactures, and to swell the estimates of British navigation and commerce. Would these profound statesmen condescend, however, to receive information from such *a distance;* would they exercise but a very trifling portion of that industry, which they bestow in hunting out proofs of the decline of the commerce of France, Holland, and Spain, they would find that the United States is not entirely a nation of ploughmen and threshers; they would find, that she has considerable manufactories, and *some little* commerce; they would find that her

exports,

exports, in the year 1800, amounted to 71,000,000 dollars, or upwards of 14,000,000 pounds sterling *, and they would find, to their great surprize, that her shipping, at the end of that year, amounted to 939,000 tons, nearly one half as much tonnage as Britain now has, and 200,000 tons MORE *than Britain had only nineteen years ago*, at which time America was a *bankrupt*, and had not a single plank swimming on the water. These are, one would think, statements which might, with no great impropriety, be introduced amongst the "*financial facts of the eighteenth century.*" But, no! men of all parties imitate the servants of the King, who have long seemed ashamed or afraid to turn their eyes to America; but, be you well assured, Sir, that, if fortune does not speedily favour us in France, America, which we obstinately persist in treating with contempt, will, with the co-operation of a power that knows how to manage her better, give us the most mortal of those blows, under which you have doomed us to sink.

Such, Sir, not to mention numerous other untoward circumstances, are the "*solid foundations*," on

* This was before the scarcity in England was known in America. In 1801, the exports from America have been much greater.

on which our commercial connections with the United States of America are fixed, and on which we are taught to rely, not only for a continuance of our present exports to that country, but for an *increase* of those exports!

With regard, however, to our exports to America, as with regard to all the other branches of our trade, it is, as I before observed, impossible to say, precisely *when* and in *what degree*, the diminution will take place. The result of my statements and reasoning, is, that the diminution in the exports of our manufactures in general, will, in the course of three years, reduce them to what they were before the commencement of that war, from which, and its attendant conquests, a very great portion of the increase has arisen; and that, the European and colonial aggrandisement of France, with the irresistible influence, which the Peace has for ever insured to her, will enable her, in time, whether by intrigue, by force, or by rivalship, almost entirely to cut off our market, and to produce that ruin, which it is her favourite object to effect.

If a short time should, as I am fully persuaded it will, verify my predictions; if even the first year should cause a *diminution of one-fifth* in the foreign

 orders

orders for our goods (not taking into the account *a hundred thousand* domestic consumers, *who will now go to reside in France)*, and if *half a million of people should thereby be thrown out of work**, the inhabitants of Manchester, Norwich, Exeter, Birmingham, and Sheffield, will derive no more pleasure in reflecting on their foolish illuminations, than the brutal miscreants, who broke my windows to the tune of "Peace and *Plenty*," *now* derive from *the price of provisions*, on which score, by the by, I beg leave to present both them and you my hearty congratulations†.

Having

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* The silk weavers, in Spitalfields have already felt the effects of the Peace. Many of the orders, which they had received, have been countermanded; and, if I am not greatly misinformed, several hundreds of those, who were in employ before the Peace, are now begging about the streets.

† Since the Preliminaries of Peace were signed; since "*Peace and Plenty*" have been sung through our streets, and have decorated the windows of those, who live by amusing the idle, and flattering the tastes of the ignorant, bread has not, upon the whole, fallen a farthing, and every other article of life has advanced in price; mutton has risen one-ninth, beef one-seventh, butter one-tenth, bacon one-twelfth, and potatoes have trebled in price. There is now no resource left, but to cry aloud, and

spare

Having now, Sir, taken a view of the effects, which the Peace with BUONAPARTÉ will have in our *Colonies*, our *Commerce*, and our *Manufactures*; and having, as I think, fully proved that it will finally produce the ruin of them all, I should next enter on an examination of those effects with respect to our *Constitution*, that Constitution, which, you truly say, has been "*preserved* by the War," and which I greatly fear will be *destroyed* by the Peace; but, this must be reserved for another opportunity. I wish our Constitution to be what it *was*. Such as my small share in it came to me, such I wish it to descend to my children. But, this is a matter that requires more reflection than I, at present, have time to bestow on it. The rights and privileges of a British subject I most earnestly desire to preserve; but, I would sooner be deprived

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spare not, against forestallers, regraters, monopolists, farmers, corn dealers, millers, bakers, graziers, butchers, cheese-mongers, dairy-maids, and every other living creature that has, either directly or indirectly, any thing to do with the producing, procuring, or preparing of human food; but, above all, against Quakers, whose religion forbids them to employ either the arm of flesh or the arm of the law, the only two things, in this world or the world to come, that your hunter of monopolists is afraid of.

prived of them for ever, than suffer a syllable to escape me, prejudicial to the durability or the influence of the throne.

With this, Sir, I take my leave, begging you to be assured, that, I have, in this discussion, been actuated by no motive but that of public good; and that, whatever I may have incautiously uttered, savouring of asperity, is to be attributed, not to any personal dislike, but to that anger and resentment, which, after having combatted so long with the regicide Republick, I must naturally feel against those, who have established and exalted her on the ruin and disgrace of my country.

I am,

Sir,

Your most humble,

And most obedient servant,

WM. COBBETT.

P. S. Sir, the reply, the *standing* reply, to observations such as I have, in these letters, taken the liberty to address to you, is *that the enemy would not, at present, grant us better terms of Peace*, and *we were unable, by a longer continuation of the war,*

 to

to compel him so to do. I deny both these positions. A dignified and resolute mode of proceeding would have procured good and honourable terms, even now; and, if it had failed, I am certain, that this *nation* had both the *means* and the *will* to force him to compliance. The proof of these assertions I postpone to some opportunity, which will be afforded me by *a new weekly publication,* the first number of which I shall submit to the public in a few days. Having mentioned this work, Sir, give me leave to observe before hand, that I have no intention to range myself in a *systematic* OPPOSITION to His Majesty's Ministers, or to their measures. Such an opposition I disclaim. The first object, which I have invariably had in view, is, to contribute my mite towards the support of the authority of that Sovereign, whom God has commanded me to honour and obey; and, as the means most likely to effect this object, I have generally endeavoured to support the measures of those, who have been appointed to exercise that authority. If, therefore, I do now, or shall in future, openly disapprove of *some* of the measures of His Majesty's present servants, religiously abstaining from every act and word, tending to *weaken* the government, and exerting

erting all my feeble efforts to defend it against its enemies foreign and domestic, I trust that you yourself, if I should happen at all to attract your notice, will have the justice to acquit me of inconsistency of conduct.

APPENDIX

ering all my feeble efforts to defend it against its enemies foreign and domestic, I trust that you yourself, if I should happen at all to attract your notice, will have the justice to acquit me of inconsistency of conduct.

APPENDIX.

A.

NOTES

Presented to the French Government by M. KALITSCHEFF, *the Russian Minister at Paris.*

The Undersigned hastens to communicate to Citizen Talleyrand the commands he has just received from his Court.

His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, relying upon the Chief Consul's love of justice, by which he has obtained so great and so merited a reputation, entertains the hope, that he will fulfil the engagements into which he had entered with the late Emperor, not to insist upon the hard conditions to which the King of Naples had been obliged to submit. The Undersigned thinks it his duty to remind Citizen Talleyrand, that the admission of the five Articles, presented to the French Government by way of answer to its pressing representations for opening a negotiation with Russia, was the only motive for sending the Undersigned to Paris. The new instructions directed him to insist, that the said five articles, which had been agreed upon as the basis of the negotiation, should receive their speedy execution.

By

By these articles the two powers agreed that the King of the Two Sicilies, and the King of Sardinia, should be again put in possession of the respective states which they possessed before the irruption of the French troops into Italy. Citizen Talleyrand, Minister for Foreign Affairs, has been authorized repeatedly to give the assurance, that the five articles were agreed to, and that they would be carried into effect.

As, however, it has been seen that by force of arms the King of Naples has been compelled to agree to other terms: and as, in defiance of the most solemn promises, to conclude a definitive peace with the King of Sardinia, by which he was again to be established in his dominions, it is evident that the latter is excluded from his territories, there is every reason to suspect and believe, that unforeseen circumstances have changed the intentions of the French Government, and inspired it with other views and intentions repugnant to the above articles and measures which had been taken with his Majesty.

The Undersigned is commanded to represent to Citizen Talleyrand, that without positive certainty of the five articles alluded to, being carried into effect, and which were acceded to by the French Government as preliminaries, there can be no restoration of harmony between the two Countries; and he therefore declares, that neither the Armistice of Foligno, nor the conditions which in the first instance were presented to the Marquis de Gallo, and which afterwards, on the refusal of the latter to agree to them, were transmitted to General Murat, to be signed by the Chevalier Micheroux, can ever be acknowledged by the Emperor, and that they must ever be considered as directly inconsistent with the promises made by the Chief Consul.

This is the substance of the commands which the Undersigned has received, and which he has been directed to communicate

communicate to the French Government. He must also add, that the views which the Chief Consul announced, and his moderation, which was held out as directed to promote a General Peace, were the only grounds on which all Europe entertained the hope that the moment of that peace was at no great distance; that it would be permitted to look forward to the future with tranquillity; and that the system of robbery taken up by the Directory no longer existed. These were the only reasons that induced His Majesty the Emperor to send a Plenipotentiary to Paris, and through whom it was expected that the relations of amity with the French Government would be restored.

The Undersigned flattered himself, that the Chief Consul, in his wisdom, would consider that his fame is concerned in fulfilling the promises he had made, and the hopes he had raised, as it will depend upon him, by the re-establishment of a General Peace, to give repose to all Europe. He therefore requests Citizen Talleyrand to make known the contents of this Note to the Chief Consul, and, as soon as possible, to communicate to the Undersigned the resolution which the French Government shall adopt.

The Undersigned takes this opportunity, &c.

(Signed) KALITSCHEFF.

As no Answer was given to this Note, Count KALITSCHEFF, *on the 8th of May, presented the following.*

The Undersigned reminds Citizen Talleyrand, that he has yet to receive an answer respecting the objects on which he had the honour, by the command of the Emperor, his master, to address him; and therefore he begs him to notify to the Undersigned, whether the French Government, agreeably to the admission of the five Preliminary Articles, intends to keep its promise concerning the integrity of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the re-establishment of the King

of Sardinia in his dominions, as they were previous to the arrival of the French troops in Italy.

The Undersigned considers it unnecessary to make any farther observations respecting this affair, which has already been sufficiently discussed, and he hopes that Citizen Talleyrand will lay before the Chief Consul the contents of the present Note, and that he will communicate to him his resolutions agreeably thereto.

(Signed) KALITSCHEFF.*

B.

CONVENTION OF ST. PETERSBURGH,

Between England and Russia, concluded, June 5th (17th), 1801.

In the Name of the Most Holy and Undivided Trinity—The mutual desire of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias and of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, being not only come to an understanding between themselves with respect to the differences which have lately interrupted the good understanding and friendly relations which subsisted between the two States; but also to prevent, by frank and precise explanations upon the naviga-

* With regard to these Articles which are not enumerated in the above Notes, it is believed that the first contained a positive assurance that the Pope should be maintained in his Temporal Dominion; the second, that the Grand Duke of Tuscany should be indemnified in Italy, and not in Germany; and the third, that the arrangements in consequence of the Treaty of Luneville should be made with the concurrence of Russia.

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tion of their respective subjects, the renewal of similar altercations and troubles which might be the consequence of them; and the object of the solicitude of their said Majesties being to settle, as soon as can be done, an equitable arrangement of those differences, and an invariable determination of their principles upon the rights of neutrality, in their application to their respective monarchies, in order to unite more closely the ties of friendship and good intercourse, of which they acknowledge the utility and the benefits, have named and chosen for their Plenipotentiaries, viz. His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the Sieur Niquita, Count de Panen, his Counsellor, &c. and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland, Alleyn, Baron St. Helens, Privy Counsellor, &c. who, after having communicated their full powers, and found them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following points and articles:

Art. I. There shall be hereafter between His Imperial Majesty of all the Russias and His Britannic Majesty, their subjects, the states and countries under their domination, good and unalterable friendship and understanding, and all the political, commercial, and other relations, of common utility between the respective subjects, shall subsist as formerly, without their being disturbed or troubled in any manner whatever.

II. His Majesty the Emperor and His Britannic Majesty declare, that they will take the most especial care of the execution of the prohibitions against the trade of contraband of their subjects with the enemies of each of the High Contracting Parties.

III. His Imperial Majesty of all the Russias and His Britannic Majesty having resolved to place under a sufficient safeguard the freedom of commerce and navigation of

of their subjects, in case one of them shall be at war, whilst the other shall be neuter, have agreed:—

1. That the ships of the neutral power shall navigate freely to the ports, and upon the coasts of the nations at war.

2. That the effects embarked on board neutral ships shall be free, with the exception of contraband of war, and of enemy's property; and it is agreed not to comprise in the number of the latter, the merchandise of the produce, growth, or manufacture of the countries at war, which should have been acquired by the subjects of the neutral power, and should be transported for their account, which merchandise cannot be accepted in any case from the freedom granted to the flag of the said power.

3. That in order to avoid all equivocation and misunderstanding of what ought to be qualified as contraband of war, His Imperial Majesty of all the Russias and His Britannic Majesty declare, conformably to the 11th Article of the Treaty of Commerce concluded between the two Crowns on the 10th (21st) February, 1797, that they acknowledge as such only the following objects, viz.—Cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bombs, grenades, balls, bullets, fire-locks, flints, matches, powder, saltpetre, sulphur, helmets, pikes, ſwords, ſword-belts, saddles and bridles: excepting, however, the quantity of the said articles which may be necessary for the defence of the ship and of those who compose the crew; and all other articles whatever not enumerated here shall not be reputed warlike and naval ammunition, nor be subject to confiscation, and of course shall pass freely, without being subjected to the smallest difficulty, unless they be considered enemy's property in the above settled sense. It is also agreed that that which is stipulated in the present article shall not be to the prejudice of the particular stipulations of one or the other Crown with other Powers,

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by which objects of a similar kind should be reserved, prohibited, or permitted.

4. That in order to determine what characterizes a blockaded port, that determination is given only to that where there is, by the disposition of the power which attacks it with ships stationary, or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering.

5. That the ships of the neutral power shall not be stopped but upon just causes and evident facts: that they be tried without delay, and that the proceeding be always uniform, prompt, and legal.

In order the better to ensure the respect due to these stipulations, dictated by the sincere desire of conciliating all interests, and to give a new proof of their loyalty and love of justice, the High Contracting Parties enter here into the most formal engagement to renew the severest prohibitions to their Captains, whether of ships of war or merchantmen, to take, keep, or conceal on board their ships any of the objects which, in the terms of the present Convention, may be reputed contraband, and respectively to take care of the execution of the orders which they shall have published in their Admiralties, and wherever it shall be necessary.

IV. The two High Contracting Parties, wishing to prevent all subject of dissension in future by limiting the right of search of merchant ships going under convoy to the sole causes in which the Belligerent Power may experience a real prejudice by the abuse of the neutral flag, have agreed,

1. That the right of searching merchant ships belonging to the subjects of one of the Contracting Powers, and navigating under convoy of a ship of war of the said Powers, shall only be exercised by ships of

war of the Belligerent Party, and shall never extend to the fitters out of privateers, or other vessels, which do not belong to the Imperial or Royal fleet of Their Majesties, but which their subjects shall have fitted out for war.

2. That the proprietors of all merchant ships belonging to the subjects of one of the Contracting Sovereigns, which shall be destined to sail under convoy of a ship of war, shall be required, before they receive their sailing orders, to produce to the Commander of the Convoy their passports and certificates, or sea-letters, in the form annexed to the present treaty.

3. That when such ship of war, and every merchant ship under convoy, shall be met with by a ship or ships of war of the other Contracting Party, who shall then be in a state of war, in order to avoid all disorder, they shall keep out of cannon shot, unless the situation of the sea, or the place of meeting, render a nearer approach necessary; and the Commander of the ship of the Belligerent Power shall send a sloop on board the convoy, where they shall proceed reciprocally to the verification of the papers and certificates that are to prove on one part, that the ship of war is authorized to take under its escort such or such merchant ships of its nation, laden with such a cargo, and for such a port: on the other part, that the ship of war of the Belligerent Party belongs to the Imperial or Royal fleet of Their Majesties.

4. This verification made, there shall be no pretence for any search, if the papers are found in due form, and if there exists no good motive for suspicion. In the contrary case, the Captain of the neutral ship of war (being duly required thereto by the Captain of the ship of war or ships of war of the Belligerent Power) is to bring to, and detain his convoy during the time necessary

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for the search of the ships which compose it, and he shall have the faculty of naming and delegating one or more officers to assist at the search of the said ships, which shall be done in his presence on board each merchant ship conjointly with one or more officers selected by the Captain of the ship of the Belligerent Party.

5. If it happen that the Captain of the ship or ships of war of the power of war, having examined the papers found on board, and having interrogated the master and crew of the ship, shall see just and sufficient reason to detain the merchant ship in order to proceed to an ulterior search, he shall notify that intention to the Captain of the convoy, who shall have the power to order an officer to remain on board the ship thus detained, and to assist at the examination of the cause of her detention. The merchant ship shall be carried immediately to the nearest and most convenient port belonging to the Belligerent Power, and the ulterior search shall be carried on with all possible diligence.

V. It is also agreed, that if any merchant ship thus convoyed should be detained without just and sufficient cause, the commander of the ship or ships of war of the Belligerent Power shall not only be bound to make to the owners of the ship and of the cargo a full and perfect compensation for all the losses, expenses, damages, and costs, occasioned by such a detention, but shall further be liable to an ulterior punishment for every act of violence or other fault which he may have committed, according as the nature of the case may require. On the other hand, no ship of war with a convoy shall be permitted, under any pretext whatsoever, to resist by force the detention of a merchant ship or ships by the ship or ships of war of the Belligerent Power; an obligation to which the com-

mander of a ship of war with convoy is not bound to observe towards privateers and their fitters out.

VI. The High Contracting Powers shall give precise and efficacious orders that the sentences upon prizes made at sea shall be conformable with the rules of the most exact justice and equity; that they shall be given by judges above suspicion, and who shall not be interested in the matter. The Government of the respective States shall take care that the said sentences shall be promptly and duly executed, according to the forms prescribed. In case of the unfounded detention, or other contravention of the regulations stipulated by the present treaty, the owners of such a ship and cargo shall be allowed damages proportioned to the loss occasioned by such detention. The rules to observe for these damages, and for the case of unfounded detention, as also the principles to follow for the purpose of accelerating the process, shall be the matter of additional articles, which the Contracting Parties agree to settle between them, and which shall have the same force and validity as if they were inserted in the present act. For this effect, Their Imperial and Britannic Majesties mutually engaged to put their hand to the salutary work, which may serve for the completion of these stipulations, and to communicate to each other without delay the views which may be suggested to them by their equal solicitude to prevent the least grounds for dispute in future.

VII. To obviate all the inconveniences which may arise from the bad faith of those who avail themselves of the flag of a nation without belonging to it, it is agreed to establish for an inviolable rule, that any vessel whatever to be considered as the property of the country the flag of which it carries, must have on board the Captain of the ship,

ship, and one half of the crew of the people of that country, and the papers and passports in due and perfect form; but every vessel which shall not observe this rule, and which shall infringe the ordinances published on that head, shall lose all rights to the protection of the Contracting Powers.

VIII. The principles and measures adopted by the present act shall be alike applicable to all the maritime wars in which one of the two Powers may be engaged whilst the other remains neutral. These stipulations shall in consequence be regarded as permanent, and shall serve for a constant rule to the Contracting Powers in matters of commerce and navigation.

IX. His Majesty the King of Denmark, and His Majesty the King of Sweden, shall be immediately invited by his Imperial Majesty, in the name of the two Contracting Parties, to accede to the present convention, and at the same time to renew and confirm their respective treaties of commerce with His Britannic Majesty; and his said Majesty engages, by acts which shall have established that agreement, to render and to restore to each of these Powers, all the prizes that have been taken from them, as well as the territories and countries under their domination, which have been conquered by the arms of His Britannic Majesty since the rupture, in the state in which those possessions were found at the period at which the troops of His Britannic Majesty entered them. The orders of his said Majesty for the restitution of those prizes and conquests shall be immediately expedited after the exchange of the ratifications of the acts by which Sweden and Denmark shall accede to the present treaty.

X. The present Convention shall be ratified by the two Contracting Parties, and the ratifications exchanged at St. Petersburgh in the space of two months at furthest, from the day of the signature. In faith of which the respective Plenipotentiaries have caused to be made two copies perfectly similar, signed with their hands, and have sealed with their arms.

Done at St. Petersburgh, the 5th (17th) of June, 1801.

(L.S.) N. COUNT DE PANEN.

(L.S.) ST. HELENS.

Formula of the Passports and Sea Letters which ought to be delivered in the respective Admiralties of the States of the two High Contracting Parties to the Ships of War, and Merchant Vessels, which shall sail from them, conformable to Article IV. *of the present Treaty.*

Be it known that we have given leave and permission to N—, of the city or place of N—, master or conductor of the ship N—, belonging to N—, of the port of N—, of — tons or thereabouts, now lying in the port or harbour of N—, to sail from thence to N—, laden with N—, on account of N—, after the said ship shall have been visited before its departure in the usual manner by the officers appointed for that purpose; and the said N—, or such other as shall be vested with powers to replace him, shall be obliged to produce in every port or harbour which he shall enter with the said vessel to the officers of the place the present license, and to carry the flag of N— during his voyage.

In faith of which, &c.

Copy

Copy of the 1st separate Article of the Convention, with the Court of London, signed the 9th (17th) of June, 1801.

The pure and magnanimous intentions of His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias having already induced him to restore the vessels and goods of British subjects, which had been sequestered in Russia, his said Majesty confirms that disposition in its whole extent; and His Britannic Majesty engages also to give immediately orders for taking off all sequestration laid upon the Russian, Danish, and Swedish properties, detained in English ports, and to prove still more his sincere desire to terminate amicably the differences which have arisen between Great-Britain and the Northern Courts; and in order that no new incident may throw obstacles in the way of this salutary work, His Britannic Majesty binds himself to give orders to the Commanders of his forces by land and sea, that the armistice now subsisting with the Courts of Denmark and Sweden shall be prolonged for a term of three months from the date of this day; and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, guided by the same motives, undertakes, in the name of his Allies, to have this armistice maintained during the said term.

This separate article, &c.

In faith of which, &c.

Copy of the 2d separate Article of the Convention with the Court of London, signed at St. Petersburgh, the 5th (17th) of June, 1801.

The differences and misunderstandings which subsisted between His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias

Russias and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great-Britain and Ireland being thus terminated, and the precautions taken by the present Convention not giving further room to fear that they may be able to disturb in future the harmony and good understanding which the two High Contracting Parties have at heart to consolidate, their said Majesties confirm anew, by the present Convention, the treaty of commerce of the 10th (Feb. 21, 1797), of which all the stipulations are here repeated, to be maintained in their whole extent.

This separate article, &c.

In faith of which, &c.

C.

TREATY OF BADAJOS.

Treaty of Peace between Spain and Portugal, concluded at Badajos, June 6th, 1801.

As the object which His Catholic Majesty had in view, and which he considered as necessary for the general good of Europe, when he declared war against Portugal is obtained, His Majesty has resolved, after conferences had, to restore and renew the bonds of friendship and good understanding by means of a treaty of peace; and the Plenipotentiaries of the three Belligerent Powers having met together have agreed to conclude two treaties, which in their essential parts will be

but one, as the guarantee will be interchangeable, and will cease with respect to both when either shall be infringed. To carry into full effect this important object, His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, and His Royal Highness the Prince of Portugal and Algarve, have granted their full powers as follows: namely, His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain to His Excellency Don Emanuel de Godoy Alvanez de Faria, Rios Sanchez y Tarzosa, Prince of Peace, Duke of Alcudia, Lord of Soto di Roma and of the districts of Albala, Count of Everamonte, Grandee of Spain of the first class, perpetual Governor of the city of Madrid, and of the towns of Santiago, Cadiz, Malaga, and Ecija, Knight of the illustrious Order of the Golden Fleece; Grand Cross of the distinguished Spanish Order of Charles III. Commander of Valencias del Ventoso, Rivera, &c. Grand Cross of the Order of St. John, Counsellor of State, Chamberlain, Generalissimo, and Captain-General of the Armies of His Catholic Majesty, and Colonel-General of the Swiss Troops, &c.—and His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal and Algarve to His Excellency Louis Pinto de Sousa, Continto, Counsellor of State, Grand Cross of the Order of Avez, Knight of the illustrious Order of the Golden Fleece, Minister, and Secretary of State for the Affairs of the Kingdom, and Lieutenant-General of its Armies, who after having exchanged and verified their full powers in good and proper form, have concluded and signed, according to the orders and intentions of their Sovereigns, the following articles:—

Article I. There shall be peace, amity and good understanding between His Catholic Majesty the King of Spain, and the Prince Regent of Portugal and Algarve,

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as well by sea as land, through the whole extent of their kingdoms and possessions; and all captures which shall be made by sea after the ratification of the present treaty, shall be faithfully restored with all their goods and effects or their respective values paid.

Article II. His Royal Highness will shut the ports of his whole territories to the ships of Great-Britain in general.

Article III. His Catholic Majesty will restore to His Royal Highness the fortresses and places of Junemena, Arronchis, Portaligre, Castel, Davide, Barbauma, Campo Mayor, and Auguela, with all the territories hitherto conquered, by his arms, or which may hereafter be conquered, with all their artillery, fire-arms, or other warlike stores; and in the same condition in which they were when surrendered to him. And His Catholic Majesty will take, as a conquest, the fortress of Olivenza, with its territory and inhabitants, from the Guadiana, and unite the same for ever to his own territory and subjects; so that the river above-mentioned, shall be the boundary of the respective kingdoms in that part.

Article IV. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal and Algarve will not permit any dépôts of prohibited and contraband goods, which may be prejudicial to the interests of the Crown of Spain, to be formed on the frontiers of his kingdom, exclusive of such as appertain to the revenues of the Crown of Portugal, or are necessary for the consumption of the respective territories in which they are established. And if this or any other article shall not be maintained, the Treaty which is now concluded between the three Powers, including the interchangeable guarantee, shall be null and void, as is expressed in the articles of the present Treaty.

Article

Article V. His Royal Highness will immediately repair and make good all damages or injury which the subjects of His Catholic Majesty may have sustained, during the present war, from the ships of Great-Britain, or the subjects of the Court of Portugal, and for which they can rightfully claim indemnification; and in like manner His Catholic Majesty engages to make suitable satisfaction for all captures which may have been made by the Spaniards before the present war, in violation of, or within a cannon-shot of the Portuguese territory.

Article VI. Within the space of three months, reckoning from the ratification of the present treaty, His Royal Highness will pay to the treasury of His Catholic Majesty the expenses left unpaid when they withdrew from the war with France, and which were occasioned by the same, according to the estimate given in by the Ambassador of His Catholic Majesty, or which may be given in anew, with the exception, however, of any errors that may be found in the said estimates.

Article VII. As soon as the present treaty shall be signed, all hostilities shall cease on both sides, within twenty-four hours, without any contributions or requisitions being laid, after that time, on any of the conquered places, except such as may be allowed to friendly troops in time of peace; and as soon as this treaty shall be ratified, the Spanish troops shall leave the Portuguese territory within six days, and shall begin their march within six hours after receiving notice, without offering any violence or injury to the inhabitants in their way, and they shall pay for whatever may be necessary for them, according to the current price of the country.

Article VIII. All prisoners which may have been taken by sea or land, shall within fifteen days after the rati-

 fication

fication of the present treaty, be set at liberty and delivered up on both sides; and at the ſame time all debts which they may have contracted during their imprisonment shall be paid.

The sick and wounded shall remain in the respective hospitals, there to be taken care of, and in like manner delivered up as soon as they shall be able to begin their march.

Article IX. His Catholic Majesty engages to guarantee to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal the entire possession of all his states and possessions, without the least exception or reserve.

Article X. The two high Contracting Parties engage to renew the treaty of defensive alliance which existed between the two Monarchies, but with such clauses and alterations as the connexions entered into by the Spanish Monarchy which the French Republic may demand; and in the same treaty shall be regulated what aid shall be mutually afforded, should necessity require.

Article XI. The present treaty shall be ratified within ten days after it is signed, or sooner, if possible. In witness of this, we, the undersigned Ministers Plenipotentiary, have subscribed the present treaty with our own hands, and sealed it with our arms.

Done at Badajoz, June 6, 1801.

(L. S.) THE PRINCE OF PEACE.
(L. S.) LOUIS PINTO DI SOUZA.

D.

TREATY OF DOWNING-STREET.

Preliminary Articles of Peace between England and France, signed at London, October 1, 1801.

The First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French Republic, and His Majesty the King of the United Kingdoms of Great-Britain and Ireland, animated by an equal desire to put a stop to the calamities of a destructive war, and to re-establish between the two nations friendship and good understanding; for this purpose have named as follows:—That is to say, The First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people, Citizen Louis William Otto, Commissary for the Exchange of Prisoners in England; and His Majesty the King of England, Robert Banks Jenkinson, Lord Hawkesbury, Privy Counsellor of the King of Great-Britain, and Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—who have agreed upon the following Preliminary Articles:—

Art. I. As soon as the Preliminaries shall be signed and ratified, sincere friendship shall be established between the French Republic and His Britannic Majesty by sea and land, in all parts of the world. In order that all hostilities may cease between the two Powers and their respective Allies, orders shall be dispatched to the land and sea forces with the utmost celerity, each of the Contracting Parties engaging to give passports and every other facility for the expedition of such orders and their exe-

cution. It is further agreed, that all conquest which may have taken place on either side, or on the side of their respective allies, after the ratification of these preliminaries, shall be considered as nothing, and faithfully restored after the arrangement of the Definitive Treaty.

II. His Britannic Majesty will restore to the French Republic and her Allies, that is to say, His Catholic Majesty and the Batavian Republic, all their possessions and colonies conquered by the English forces in the course of the actual war, excepting the Island of Trinidad, and the Dutch possessions in Ceylon, of which possessions His Britannic Majesty reserves the full and entire sovereignty.

III. The Cape of Good Hope shall be open to the navigation and commerce of the two Contracting Powers, who shall each enjoy the same privileges.

IV. The island of Malta and its dependencies shall be evacuated by the English troops, and shall be restored to the order of St. John of Jerusalem. To ensure the independence of the island from both the Contracting Powers, it shall be put under the guardianship and protection of a third Power to be named by the Definitive Treaty.

V. Egypt shall be restored to the Sublime Porte, whose dominions and possessions shall be secured in their integrity, such as they were before the war.

VI. The territories and possessions of his most Faithful Majesty shall also be maintained in their integrity.

VII. The French troops shall evacuate the kingdom of Naples and the Roman States. The English forces shall also evacuate Porto-Ferrajo, and all the Ports and Isles which they hold in the Mediterranean or in the Adriatic.

VIII. The

VIII. The Republic of the Seven Isles shall be acknowledged by the French Republic.

IX. The evacuations, cessions, and restitutions, stipulated by the present Preliminary Articles, shall be executed in Europe within the month; for the Continent and Seas of America, and of Africa, in three months; for the Continent and Seas of Asia in six months, which shall follow the Definitive Treaty.

X. The respective prisoners shall, after the exchange of ratifications of the Definitive Treaty, be exchanged *en masse*, and without ransom, each side paying the private debts, which they have contracted.

Some discussions having arisen respecting the payment of the maintenance of prisoners of war, the Contracting Powers reserve it for the Definitive Treaty to settle this question, according to the law and usages of nations.

XI. To prevent every subject of complaint and dispute which may arise respecting prizes made at sea, after the signature of the Preliminary Articles, it is reciprocally agreed that the vessels and effects, which may be captured in the Channel and in the North Seas for twelve days after the exchange of the Ratifications of these Preliminary Articles, shall be restored on both sides. That the term shall be one month from the North Seas and the Channel to the Canary Isles inclusively, whether on the Ocean or in the Mediterranean; two months from the said Isles to the Equator, and, in conclusion, five months for all other parts of the world, without any exception or distinction for other parts of the world.

XII. All the sequestrations on one side and the other, in the funds, revenues, and audits, of whatever nature, belonging to either of the Contracting Parties, or their subjects, shall immediately after the signature of the

the Treaty be taken off.—The decision of all demands between the individuals of the two nations, for debts, property, rights, of whatever nature, conformably to the usages established by the laws of nations, ought to be demanded at the period of Peace, and shall be referred to competent tribunals. It is agreed that the present article shall, immediately after the ratification of the Definitive Treaty, be applied by the Contracting Powers to the respective Allies of the two nations, under the condition of a just reciprocity.

XIII. With respect to the fisheries on the Banks of Newfoundland, and on the Isles adjacent to the Coasts of St. Laurence, the two Powers have agreed that they shall remain as they were before the actual war, reserving to themselves the right of making, by the Definitive Treaty, such arrangements as may appear just, and reciprocally useful, to put the fishery in a condition to preclude future contention.

XIV. In every case of restitution agreed upon by the present Treaty, the fortifications shall be in the same state as they were at the moment of actual signing; and all the works constructed since the occupation of the places shall remain untouched.

It is further agreed, that in every case of cession stipulated by the present Treaty, there shall be allowed to every inhabitant, of whatever nation, or condition, a term of three years, to be reckoned from the notification of the Definitive Treaty, to dispose of their property, whether acquired before or during the war; during which term of three years, they shall have full liberty to exercise their religion, and enjoy their property.

The same advantages are granted to the restored countries, and all those who have formed there any establishments during the time these countries were in the possession

possession of Great-Britain. As to the other inhabitants of the ceded or restored countries, it is agreed that no one shall be molested, or pursued, either in his person or property, under any pretext whatever, either for his political conduct, or for his attachment to either of the Contracting Parties, or for any other reason. If it is not for debt, owing to another individual, or for acts posterior to the Definitive Treaty.

XV. The present Preliminary Articles shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at London within fifteen days at the farthest, and immediately after their ratification, Plenipotentiaries shall be named on both sides, who shall proceed to Amiens, to adjust the Definitive Treaty, in concert with the Allies of the Contracting Powers.

In testimony of which, we the undersigned, Plenipotentiaries of His Britannic Majesty, and of the First Consul of the French Republic, in virtue of our respective powers, have signed the present Preliminary Articles, and have thereto put our seals.

Executed at London, the 9th Vendémiaire (1st Oct.) 10th year of the French Republic (1801.)

(Signed) { OTTO.
HAWKESBURY.*

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* It is to be observed that the Treaty reached us through the papers of Paris, where Buonaparté had the modesty to publish it, before it was ratified by our Government. A faithful translation, therefore, has here given OTTO the precedence of HAWKESBURY, which, indeed, is a matter of no great importance; but to see *Vendémiaire* take the lead of *October*, and *Buonaparté* of *George the Third*, extorts a curse in spite of philosophy and religion.

E.

E.

TREATY OF PARIS.

Treaty of Peace between France and Russia, concluded at Paris, October 8th, 1801.

The First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French people and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, animated with the desire of re-establishing the relation of good understanding which subsisted between the two Governments before the present war, and to put an end to the evils with which Europe is afflicted, have appointed for that purpose for their Plenipotentiaries, viz.

The First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French People, Citizen Charles Maurice Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, the Sieur Arcadi, Count de Marcoff, his Privy Counsellor, and Knight of the Order of St. Alexander Neuski, and Grand Cross of that of St. Wlademir of the first Class, who, after the verification and exchange of their full powers, have agreed upon the following Articles :—

Art. I. There shall be in future, peace, friendship, and good understanding, between the French Republic and His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias.

II. In consequence, there shall not be committed any hostility between the two States, reckoning from the day of the exchange of the Ratifications of the present Treaty; and neither of the Contracting Parties

shall

shall furnish to the enemies of the other, internal as well as external, any succour, or contingent, in men or money, under any denomination whatever.

III. The two Contracting Parties wishing, as much as is in their power, to contribute to the tranquillity of the respective Governments, promise mutually not to suffer any of their subjects to keep up any correspondence, direct or indirect, with the internal enemies of the present Government of the two States, to propagate in them principles contrary to their respective Constitutions, or to foment troubles in them; and as a consequence of this concert every subject of one of the two Powers, who, during his residence in the States of the other, shall make any attack upon its security, shall immediately be removed out of the said country, and carried beyond the frontiers without being able, in any case, to claim the protection of his Government.

IV. It is agreed to adhere, with respect to the re-establishment of the respective Legations, and the ceremonies to be followed by the two Governments, to that which was in use before the present war.

V. The two Contracting Parties agree, till a new treaty of commerce be made, to re-establish the commercial relations between the two countries on the footing in which they were before the war, as far as possible, and with the exception of the modifications which time and circumstances may have produced, and which have given rise to new regulations.

VI. The present Treaty is declared to be common to the Batavian Republic.

VII. The present Treaty shall be ratified, and the ratifications exchanged in the space of fifty days, or sooner if possible.

In faith of which we, the undersigned, in virtue of our full powers, have signed and sealed the said Treaty.

Done at Paris, the 16th Vendémiaire, 10th year of the French Republic (8th October, 1801).

CH. M. TALLEYRAND.
The Count DE MARKOFF.

F.

TREATY OF PARIS.

Preliminary Treaty of Peace between France and the Ottoman Porte, signed at Paris, 9th October, 1801.

The First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French People, and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, wishing to put a stop to the war which divides the two States, and to re-establish the ancient connection which united the two nations, have, with this view, appointed the undermentioned Plenipotentiaries, viz.

The First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French People, has appointed Citizen Charles Maurice Talleyrand, Minister of Foreign Affairs; and the Sublime Ottoman Porte its late Basch-Muhassebe and Ambassador, Essyd-Aly-Effendi, who, after having exchanged their full powers, have agreed to the following Articles:

Art. I.

Art. I. There shall be peace and friendship between the French Republic and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, in consequence of which hostilities shall cease between the two Powers, from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present Preliminary Articles; immediately after which exchange, the entire province of Egypt shall be evacuated by the French army, and restored to the Sublime Porte, the territory and possessions of which shall be maintained in their integrality, as they were before the present war.

It is understood that after the evacuation of Egypt the concessions which may be made in that Country to other Powers, on the part of the Sublime Porte shall also be common to the French.

II. The French Republic acknowledges the Constitution of the Republic of the Seven United Isles and the Ex-Venetian Countries situated on the Continent. It guarantees the maintenance of the Constitution. The Sublime Ottoman Porte acknowledges and accepts to that effect the guarantee of the French Republic as well as that of Russia.

III. Definitive arrangements will be made between the French Republic and the Sublime Ottoman Porte, relative to the property of the respective citizens and subjects which may have been confiscated or sequestrated during the war. The political and commercial agents, and the prisoners of war of every degree, shall be set at liberty immediately after the Ratification of the present Preliminary Articles.

IV. The Treaties, which existed before the present war between France and the Sublime Porte, are all renewed. In consequence of this renewal, the French Republic will enjoy, throughout the whole extent of the States of His Highness, the rights of commerce and navi-

gation as formerly, and with the same immunities as will in future be enjoyed by the most favoured nations.

The ratifications will be exchanged at Paris in the space of eight days.

Done at Paris the 9th of October, in the 10th year of the Republic, or the 1st of the month Gemasy-ul Ahir, in the year one thousand two hundred and sixteen of the Hegira.

(Signed) CH. M. TALLEYRAND.
ESSEYD, ALY-EFFENDI.

G.

TREATY OF MADRID.

Treaty of Peace between France and Portugal, concluded at Madrid, September 29th, 1801.

The First Consul of the French Republic, in the name of the French People, and the Prince Regent of the kingdom of Portugal, equally desirous of restoring the connections of amity and commerce which subsisted between the two states before the war, have resolved to conclude a peace by the mediation of His Catholic Majesty, and have appointed as their Plenipotentiaries, that is to say, on the part of the French Republic, Citizen Lucien Buonaparté, and on the part of Portugal, His Excellency M. Cypriano Bibiero Freire, Commander of the Order of Christ, one of the Privy Council of His Royal Highness, and his Minister Plenipotentiary to the King of Spain. The Plenipotentiaries having exchanged their full powers, agreed to the following articles;

ART. I.

ART. I. There shall always in future, be peace, amity, and good understanding between the French Republic and the kingdom of Portugal. All hostilities shall cease, by land and sea, on the Ratification of the present Treaty, viz. In 15 days, on the seas near its coasts, and those of Africa; in 40 days from the Ratification, hostilities shall cease, by land and sea, in America and Africa, beyond the Equator; and in three months after for the countries and seas to the west of Cape Horn, and to the east of the Cape of Good Hope. All the prizes made after any of these periods shall be restored. The prisoners of war taken on either side shall be restored, and the political connections between the two countries shall be put upon the same footing as they were before the war.

II. All the ports and roads of Portugal, in Europe, shall be shut against all English vessels of war and of commerce, and shall remain so till the conclusion of Peace between England and France; but the ports, &c. shall be open to the vessels of the French Republic and her Allies. As to the ports, &c. of Portugal in the other parts of the world, the present Article is to be obligatory in the terms fixed for the cessation of hostilities.

III. Portugal engages not to furnish, during the course of the present War, to the enemies of the French Republic, and her allies, any assistance in arms, vessels, troops, ammunition, provisions, or money, under any denomination or pretence whatsoever. All prior acts, engagements, or conventions which are contrary to the present Article, are to be regarded as null and of no effect.

IV. The limits between the two Guianas (French and Portuguese), shall, in future, be determined by the river Carapanatuba, which falls into the river Amazons, at about a third of a degree to the North of the Equator, above Fort *Macapa*. These limits are to follow the course of the river up to its source, whence they shall turn towards the great chain

chain of mountains, which divide the rivers. They shall then follow the windings of the chain, to the point where it comes the nearest to Rio-Branco, about two degrees and one-third north of the Equator*.

The Indians of the two Guianas, who, during the war, have been carried from their habitations, shall be mutually restored.

The citizens and subjects of the two Powers, who are comprized in the new demarkation of limits, may retire into the territories of their respective States. They are also to be allowed to dispose of their property, real or personal, within two years after the exchange of the Ratifications of the present Treaty.

V. A Treaty of Commerce shall be negotiated between the two Powers, to establish in a definitive manner the commercial relations between France and Portugal: in the mean time it is agreed upon,

First, That the communications shall be re-established immediately after the exchange of the Ratification, and that the Agents and Factors of Commerce shall, on each side, be restored to the possession of the rights, immunities, and prerogatives which they enjoyed before the War.

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* This clause being of very great importance, it may not be amiss to subjoin it here in French, in order to show, that the translation is faithful.

" Les limites entre les deux Guyanes Française et Portugaise, " seront déterminées à l'avenir par la rivière Carapanatuba qui se jette " dans l'Amazone à environ un tiers de degré de l'équateur, latitude " septentrionale, au-dessus du fort *Macapa*. Ces limites suivront le " cours de la rivière jusqu'à sa source, d'où elles se porteront vers la " grande chaîne de montagnes, qui fait le partage des eaux; elles " suivront les inflections de cette chaîne jusqu'au point où elle se " rapproche le plus du Rio-Branco vers le deuxième degré et un tiers " nord de l'équateur."

Secondly,

Secondly, That the citizens and subjects of the two Powers shall equally and reciprocally enjoy in the States of both, all the rights which those of the most favoured nations enjoy.

Thirdly, That the commodities and merchandize produced from the soil or manufacture of each of the two Powers, shall be admitted reciprocally without restriction, and without being liable to any duty which would not equally affect the commodities and merchandize of a similar nature imported by other Nations.

Fourthly, That the French cloths may be immediately imported into Portugal, on the footing of the most favoured merchandize.

Fifthly, That in other points all the stipulations inserted in the preceding Articles, and not contrary to the present Treaty, shall be provisionally executed until the conclusion of the Treaty of Definitive Commerce.

Sixthly, The Ratification of the present Treaty shall be exchanged at Madrid within the term of twenty days at farthest.

Executed in duplicate the 7th Vendémiaire, in the 10th year of the French Republic, (29th September, 1801).

(Signed) LUCIEN BUONAPARTÉ.
CYPRIANO BIBIERO FREIRE.

H.

MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS,

Respecting the Treaty between France and Portugal, signed at Madrid, 29th September, 1801.

The following articles are taken from the debates of the *Morning Chronicle* and the *True Briton.*—Either might have been sufficient, but if the reader find them to agree in the report of a speech, he will, doubtless, regard that agreement as an indubitable proof of their correctness. I have therefore given the part of each day's debate, to which I wish to direct the reader's attention, from both of these papers. I would recommend the reading of *all* the extracts, on the subject, without which it is impossible to form a correct opinion with respect to it.

EXTRACT *from the Debates in the House of Commons, on the 30th of October,* 1801.

From the Morning Chronicle.

MR. GREY rose and said, that he did not mean to object to the day which the noble Lord had proposed for the discussion of the preliminaries, but he thought that there were a few points, the clearing up of which would greatly assist the deliberations of the House on this subject. Though the preliminaries had now, for the first time, been put officially in the possession of the House, yet

yet, as they were long since so well known to the public, he did not see that any question about a specific article could properly be considered as irregular. If, however, the noble Lord should think that he could not answer any such question without violating his public duty, or injuring his interests of the country, it was the farthest thing in the world from his wish to require an answer to such an inquiry. Laying down this distinction, therefore, he did not conceive that, by now asking one or two questions of the noble Lord, he could be accused of any impropriety or irregularity of conduct. By one of the preliminaries of peace *the integrity of the dominions of the Queen of Portugal was positively guaranteed.* What he wished to know was, what was meant by *the integrity*, provided for by the article in question? Whether was it, he desired to be informed, the present integrity, as it stood after a treaty with Spain, by which a whole province was expressly ceded, or was it the full and undiminished integrity of the dominions of our Ally, as they existed before that treaty was formed? This was a question, the answer to which he viewed as of high moment in forming a fair opinion of the nature of the peace; but he would repeat, that if the noble Lord could give him any reasons to believe that the answer could not be made consistently with the duty he owed to the public, he would be far from pressing the subject. Passing from this point, the Honourable Member proceeded to touch on another subject, an explanation of which, though it did not immediately rise out of the preliminaries, would be of great utility in enabling the House to come to a final decision on the character of the peace. It could not, he imagined, have escaped the attention of those employed in the negotiation of that peace, on which he for one sincerely and heartily congratulated the country;

it could not, he believed, have escaped the knowledge of any man at all accustomed to public affairs, that a short time previous to the signature of the preliminaries, a treaty of peace was concluded betwixt the kingdom of Portugal and the French Republic.—One article of this treaty, we saw from the public statements given of it, was this: that the goods of France should be introduced into the markets of Portugal, with every advantage and privilege formerly extended to the most favoured nations. He wished to know whether such an article was known to Ministers. or whether they had got satisfactory assurances that our relations with Portugal would be maintained on the same footing as before the conclusion of this treaty. Such an article, he contended, would be contrary to all the express treaties betwixt this country and Portugal formed in the last century, and would in fact virtually abrogate its stipulations. Were Ministers then aware of this, or had they received assurances that no former commercial arrangements betwixt this country and Portugal were to undergo any material change? With regard to the expediency of forming new commercial arrangements in the present circumstances of Europe, and of establishing a new system of mercantile policy in the intercourse of states, he chose not to hazard an opinion. Perhaps it was absolutely necessary to introduce some new regulation, but if such an article as the one he had alluded to were carried into effect, if France were to be allowed to sell her goods in the markets of Portugal with every advantage previously peculiar to this country, a most material change would be introduced into our commercial system, a change which would become a most important object of consideration in the discussion of the terms of peace. An explanation of the two points which he had thus stated he considered to be extremely essential in determining his vote for the ratification of the preliminaries, as probably he should vote

for

for this ratification. For though he could not shut his eyes to the situation in which such a peace would leave this country, though he clearly saw that this situation would be one of unequalled difficulty and danger, yet, instructed as he was in the state of this country, of France, and of Europe at large, if a better peace could not be obtained, or if even a worse peace had been concluded, still, firmly convinced as he was that the farther prosecution of the war was far more dangerous than any which such a peace could present, he should have given it his support.

LORD HAWKESBURY thought that the questions proposed were unusual and irregular, and therefore he declined at present to enter into any explanation. When the subject came regularly before the House, he should be happy to afford every possible explanation which could facilitate the discussion, but such an explanation in the present stage he apprehended would be inconsistent with his public duty.

From the True-Briton.

MR. GREY said, he did not rise to object to the motion which the Noble Lord had made, but perhaps no incovenience could arise from his asking an explanation upon one or two points; and if he was fortunate enough to obtain an answer, it might assist the House very much when they entered into the consideration of the Preliminaries. It was true that the Preliminaries had only just been laid upon the Table, and, therefore, in point of form, he could not be supposed to be acquainted with their contents; but it was also notorious, that they had been published in the public papers, and were known to every man in the country. In looking over these preliminaries, there were two points which ap-

peared to him to require explanation; however, if the Noble Lord was of opinion that it would be improper, or inconvenient, to answer his questions, he should not press them. The first point was this: there was an article in the Preliminary Articles, by which we stipulated for the integrity of the dominions of Portugal; he wished to know, whether by that article was to be understood the territories of Portugal as they stand now, after the cessions which had been made to Spain, or whether it meant those territories as they stood before the commencement of hostilities. It appeared to him, that no inconvenience could arise from giving an explanation upon this point, and therefore he hoped the Noble Lord would answer his question. The next subject was one which he confessed did not arise out of the Preliminaries, but yet it appeared to him to be of the greatest importance, and to require explanation. It could not have escaped the attention of those who took an interest in the great event which had so recently happened (and upon which he congratulated the country), it could not, he said, have escaped their attention, that about the time, or a little previous to the signing of the Preliminaries between this country and France, there was a Treaty of Peace signed between Portugal and France. In the body of that treaty, he observed a stipulation which he wished to know whether Ministers had information of, or whether they had received any satisfaction from France about, he meant an Article by which it was stipulated, that the manufactures of France wete to be admitted into Portugal upon the footing of those of the most favoured nations. This stipulation appeared to him to be inconsistent with the Treaties of Commerce subsisting between this country and France, and must give rise, on our part, to a new system of politics and commerce, and must make an alteration in the nature of our connection with Portugal. He wished to know whether Ministers were aware of this circumstance

when they signed the Preliminaries of Peace. He admitted that the situation of Portugal, and indeed the situation of Europe in general, was so changed, as to render it necessary, in some instances, to deviate from our old system with Portugal, and undoubtedly the stipulation to which he had alluded, would make a complete change in our commercial and political relations with that country, and therefore the explanation which he had required, appeared to him very important to enable them to discuss the Preliminaries fully. If, however, the Noble Lord should think it proper to decline giving that explanation, he should lament it, but should not press it further. The answer of the Noble Lord, if he should think it right to give it, would have a material effect upon the satisfaction which (as at present informed) he felt at the peace. He could not shut his eyes to the dangers to which this country would be exposed by this treaty, yet was now prepared to say, that if better terms could not be obtained, that, dangerous as the situation of this country would now be, still that the danger of continuing the war would be greater, and therefore he was of opinion, that Ministers were entitled to the gratitude of the country for having concluded this peace. He would not trouble the House any farther at present, but reserve himself for the discussion of the Preliminaries, if he should then think it necessary to enter into the debate.

LORD HAWKESBURY said, it was not from any unwillingness to answer the Hon. Gentleman that he now declined giving the explanation which he required, but he thought if he gave it now it might lead to a premature, and in some degree, irregular discussion of the subject; he therefore wished to decline giving any further answer, until the day which should be appointed for taking the Preliminaries into consideration, on which occasion he should be happy to give

give every possible information that was not inconsistent with his public duty.

EXTRACT *from the Debates in the House of Commons, on the 2d of November,* 1801.

From the Morning Chronicle.

MR. WHITBREAD rose and said, that as to-morrow stood appointed by the Order of the House for taking into consideration, the Preliminaries of Peace with France, there was a point or two amongst those Preliminaries, of which, in order to the more clearly understanding their objects, he wished to have explained by the Noble Lord opposite to him (Lord Hawkesbury).

By one of the Preliminary Articles it is agreed that certain territories which heretofore belonged to Spain and Holland shall be ceded to England. He desired to know if this cession was made by any person or authority directly on the parts of Spain and Holland; or many other changes and difficulties, for which it was impossible for all the wisdom of those who suggested this, whether the cession rests merely on the authority of France?

LORD HAWKESBURY said, he had no objection to answer the Honourable Gentleman, *that the compact for cession of the territories alluded to was directly with France*; and it was upon the condition of those cessions only which others on the part of England were to be made.

MR. WHITBREAD declared himself perfectly satisfied on this point.

LORD

LORD HAWKESBURY said, there was another point relative to which an explanation had been asked by an Honourable Gentleman on a former night: *It was respecting the integrity of the Portuguese territory, as meant by the sixth Article of the Preliminaries.* He had no objection to give, by way of explanation, an answer to that question *now*, of the *official* information concerning which the Officers of Government were not in possession *till this day.*

By the integrity of the territories of Portugal, was meant such territories and possessions as her Faithful Majesty possessed *subsequent to the Treaty of Badajos.* At that treaty her Faithful Majesty had agreed to cede to Spain the town and territory of Olivenza. In the subsequent treaty with France, some change was agreed on in the boundaries between French and Portuguese Guiana; *but all cessions subsequent to the Treaty of Badajos were annulled by the Preliminaries with England.*

MR. GREY (to whose enquiry on a former night the Noble Lord alluded) said, that the Noble Lord had certainly given an answer to one of his questions; but there was another of still more important moment which remained to be answered.—By the treaty of peace between France and Portugal it was expressly stipulated that the woollens of France should be admitted in Portugal upon the same footing as those of England had usually been; and he asked whether, in guaranteeing the integrity of the Portuguese territories, his Majesty's Ministers had acceded to a principle so materially injurious to the commercial interests of this country?

LORD HAWKESBURY answered, that if Portugal had thought fit to enter into such a stipulation, it was surely competent

competent for the Parliament of Great-Britain, *if they chose*, to form such regulations for admitting the wines of other countries in preference to those of Portugal, as would lead to arrangements amply to counterbalance any inconvenience from such a treaty on the part of Portugal.

From the True-Briton.

MR. WHITBREAD observed, it appeared by the Preliminary Treaty, that certain cessions had been made to this country by Spain and Holland, or rather that certain territories were ceded on the part of those two powers: he therefore wished to know whether Spain and Holland had been made parties to the Treaty, and whether they had actually made those cessions to Great Britain.

LORD HAWKESBURY said, he had no objection whatever to answer the question of the Honourable Gentleman. *The Preliminary Treaty was made only with France, and no direct communication was had upon the subject either with Spain or Holland.* The cessions, however, made by Great-Britain in the Preliminary Treaty, were understood to be made as the condition of those cessions made on the part of Spain and Holland.

MR. WHITBREAD declared himself perfectly satisfied, understanding, as he did, that Spain and Holland were not made parties to the Treaty.

LORD HAWKESBURY assented. He would now, he said, answer a question proposed on a former evening by an

an Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Grey), which he did not *then* answer on that evening, *because his Majesty's Ministers were not in possession of sufficient information upon the subject.* That Honourable Gentleman wished to know whether the integrity of Portugal, as guaranteed by the Preliminary Treaty, was to be considered as the integrity of that kingdom prior or subsequent to the Treaties made between that country and France and Spain. He could *now* inform that Honourable Gentleman, *that the integrity of Portugal, as guaranteed by the Preliminary Treaty, was the integrity of Portugal as settled by the Treaty of Badajos,* between Spain and Portugal, whereby the district of Olivenza was ceded to the former, and the river Guadiana made the boundary of the latter.

MR. GREY said, if he understood the Noble Lord rightly, the integrity of Portugal was to be so considered after the cession of the district of Olivenza to Spain by the Treaty of Badajos, *and that any treaty made between France and Portugal since that period, was wholly out of the question, so far as it related to any cession of territory.*—But the Noble Lord had taken no notice of another question which he asked, namely, whether that part of the treaty between France and Portugal whereby the manufactures of the former were to be admitted into the latter country on the footing of those of the most favoured nations, was done away or not, by the Preliminary Treaty before the House.

LORD HAWKESBURY said, he wished to be clearly understood: at the period of the Treaty of Badajos, between Spain and Portugal, there was also a treaty entered into between France and Portugal, the former was ratified, whilst the ratification of the latter was refused. It

 was

was understood that the Preliminary Treaty between this country and France, considered Portugal as subject to the articles of both those treaties, *and that the treaty between France and Portugal was to be considered as equal in every respect to the Treaty of Badajos, between Spain and the latter kingdom.* With respect to the other question of the Honourable Gentleman, he was really at a loss what answer to return to it. Portugal might, if she pleased during a period of profound peace, consent to admit the woollen manufactures of France on the same footing as those of England; and Great-Britain might, in return, consent to admit the wines of other countries on the same terms as those of Portugal. This seemed to him to be a matter of regulation which had nothing strictly to do with the terms of the Preliminary Treaty, inasmuch as such kind of regulations might be made as well during a period of profound peace, as at any other time.

EXTRACTS *from the Debates of the House of Commons, on the 4th of November,* 1801.

From the Morning Chronicle.

LORD TEMPLE requested to be informed, whether Ministers were informed of the ratification of the treaty betwixt France and Portugal, as stated in the French official paper, and *whether they had assurances that the ratification did not extend to any cessions made since the Treaty of Badajos?*

LORD

LORD HAWKESBURY said, that Ministers certainly had no information of the ratification, except through the medium of the French papers; *but he could assure the Noble Lord that the ratification did not extend to any points of cession.*

From the True Briton.

LORD TEMPLE said, he only wished to put a question to the Noble Secretary of State. It would be in the recollection of the House that the Noble Lord had stated, and he conceived himself perfectly in order in mentioning it, *that the treaty made between France and Portugal on the 29th of September last, was to be cancelled and abandoned*, and that the Treaty of Badajos alone was to be adhered to with relation to the article of the Preliminary Treaty which guaranteed the integrity of Portugal. It had been stated also in another place, which it would be irregular in him to comment upon, that by an arrêt of the First Consul, published officially, it appeared that the ratification of the Treaty of the 29th September had been received, and that by the arrêt, the First Consul seemed to act upon that treaty thus ratified, by ordering the restitution of prizes, &c. He therefore wished to ask the Noble Lord, *whether the ratification of that treaty did or did not make any alteration in that view of the subject which had been warranted by the statement of the Noble Secretary of State.*

LORD HAWKESBURY said, in answer to the question of the Noble Lord, he had to observe, that his Majesty's Ministers were not in possession of any official information relative to the ratification of the treaty

alluded to, and that they knew nothing further of the subject than what the Noble Lord, or any other individual, might be informed of through the medium of the French papers. *The ratification of the treaty, however, of the 29th September, could make no difference in the execution of the Article of the Preliminary Treaty relative to Portugal.* The Noble Lord had stated, that the Treaty of the 29th September was to be cancelled and abandoned; but it should be remembered, that his (Lord Hawkesbury's) statement had gone no farther *than the integrity of the territory of Portugal.* He did not know what other points that Treaty might embrace, *he only wished that his statement might be confined to the point of territory.*

I.

EXPOSITION OF THE PRINCIPLES OF THE TREATY OF MADRID,

As laid down by DEFERMONT, *Counsellor of State, in his Speech to the Legislative Body, on the 30th of November,* 1801.

Citizens Legislators,

The treaty which I have the honour to lay before you, is another of those acts for which we are indebted to the wisdom of the measures adopted by Government, and to the courageous enthusiasm of the armies of the Republic.

You

You will readily perceive the advantages which it affords for the honour and prosperity of both nations.

It contains three principal articles.

By the first, Peace and amity are re-established between the French Republic and the Kingdom of Portugal; and the political relations between the two Powers are re-established on the same footing as before the war.

By the second, the limits are fixed for the future, between the two French and Portuguese Guianas. In an almost desert country, one could not make choice of better boundaries than the rivers and mountains, and it was natural that France, whose possessions in this part are much less than those of Portugal, should extend those limits to the ancient point at which they were fixed,

Lastly, the third part states that a Treaty of Commerce and Navigation shall be entered into between the two powers, which will fix definitively the commercial relations between France and Portugal; but, in the mean time, the communications shall be restored, the *citizens* and *subjects* of the two Powers shall enjoy *equally* and *respectively* in the States of either, every right and privilege which the most favoured nations enjoy; that the goods and merchandizes produced by the soil or the manufactures of each of the two States, shall be admitted reciprocally without restrictions, and without being subject to any tax which is not levied upon similar articles imported by other nations: it likewise stipulates that French cloths shall be introduced in Portugal upon the same footing as the most favoured merchandizes.

These stipulations prove that the government has confined itself within the bounds of moderation. It has wished for nothing contrary to the interests of a nation which demanded our friendship; the most strict justice

prescribed an entire reciprocity; it was demanded by moderation; it opens new sources for French industry, but it is not by assuring to it certain privileges or a monopoly, that such industry is wished to be increased; it is by exciting a noble emulation, that we ought to arrive at the height of prosperity. If the French Government had not consulted any other law than force, it might have been able to obtain greater advantages from Portugal. It thought, on the contrary, that the less powerful that nation was, the less it ought to attempt to weaken it.

Portugal, for a long time, was an independent power; in 1581, it fell into the hands of the Spaniards. The Portuguese then possessed the Cape of Good Hope, by which they opened a new road to the commerce of the Indies, and filled it with their name; that vast and rich country, in which they signalized themselves by innumerable exploits, and formed there the first European establishments.

They had discovered the Brazils, and in that part of America had begun to establish a rich colony.

The other Powers of Europe could not see without uneasiness the re-union with the kingdom of Spain of a monarchy so advantageously situated for acquiring in a great degree the commerce of the world, and which had the greatest riches, and the most extensive establishments in both the hemispheres.

When, therefore, in 1640, the Portuguese undertook to re-establish the House of Braganza on the throne, they received powerful assistance, but no power came forward in their behalf with so much alacrity as France.

Relations of amity were then formed between the two nations, which were not weakened 'till the beginning of the 18th century.

When

When the grandson of Lewis XIV. proceeded into Spain, the Portuguese Government, affrighted at seeing on that throne a Prince of the House of Bourbon, gave itself up, as it were to England, and consented to stipulations which have ruined its industry, and almost destroyed the ancient connections which existed between it and France.

The Treaty of December 27, 1703, which was confirmed in 1713, caused a monopoly of the trade of Portugal by the merchants and manufacturers of England to the exclusion of other nations.

All the woollens of England were admitted into Portugal, upon condition that Portuguese wines should pay in England only two-thirds of the duty upon French wines.

The English, by means of this treaty, caused the Portuguese manufacturers first to languish, and then entirely to cease. They became the agents and directors of the whole trade of Portugal. Almost all the wealth which came from the Portuguese colonies, came on account of the English. Portugal was thus, in some degree, an English colony, a market for English commodities alone.

It was in vain that an enlightened Minister, with uncommon energy and perseverance, strove to deliver his country from the degradation into which she had fallen. All that his genius and industry could accomplish, was undone by the English soon after his retreat. They were not more masters of the trade of their own colonies, than of that of the colonies of Portugal.

Manufactures then did not only find a ready sale in that country, but the English acted the part of factors between the Portuguese and all the rest of the manufacturing nations of Europe. They could not perform this

agency

agency without profit. And their profits were so much clear loss to the Portuguese, and to the manufacturers whose goods they bought for Portugal.

The Portuguese Government was not more fortunate in the measures it took to secure its political independence. Its means of defence were feeble; and it was reduced to trust its protection to the commercial power on whose dependence it was placed.

The Portuguese, naturally mild and easy in their temper, cherishing a delicate sense of honour and eager for glory, affable to strangers, and lovers of art and science, would of themselves have viewed the French Revolution, only as the emotion of a generous people rushing to the embrace of freedom. But the Government of Portugal was too much in a state of dependence on that of England, not to follow its example.

The French ship the St. Jacques entered the port of Jago, under the faith of the law of nations, expecting to meet with friendship and protection from a people who had not declared war against us. The ship and cargo were seized, confiscated and sold. Portugal then sent her armies to oppose us on the Pyrenees: her fleets joined the fleets of England: and she openly took part with our enemies.

After the peace of Campo-Formio, Portugal, dreading lest the armies of France should march through Spain, and invade her territories, sent an ambassador to Paris. He negotiated and signed a Definitive Treaty. That the Portuguese Government refused to ratify; and by this refusal, the animosity between the two nations was exasperated. The Portuguese squadrons were afterwards seen to cruise before Malta and Alexandria. And it is remembered that the general of the army of the east, while the Portuguese ships were within sight, inserted in his

his orders of the day, that a time would come when that nation should expiate, in tears of blood, the affront which she offered to the French Republic.

The Treaty of Luneville, by restoring peace to the Continent, pointed out the moment to exact vengeance for the wrongs which Portugal had done to France. At Madrid a convention was concluded between France and Spain, by which it was agreed that his Spanish Majesty and the French Republic should form a combined army, to oblige Portugal to relinquish her alliance with England, and to cede to the French and Spanish troops the occupancy of a fourth part of her territory, till the period of a definitive peace.

It was not the object of this convention, merely to gratify vain pride, or revenge offences, which the moment you are able to punish them, cease to have an existence; but this was a part in that grand chain of political operations, which reached from the Baltic to Hanover, and from Hanover to the confines of Otranto, and which thus tended to effect a general peace.

The French Government adhered to its engagements. A division of the army, with a numerous train of artillery, crossed the Pyrenees, under the command of General Leclerc.

General St. Cyr, an officer of distinguished merit, was sent to accompany the Spanish general, and to form with him a plan of the campaign. Hostilities commenced, but after two or three skirmishes, in which not more than four or five hundred men were, on both sides, engaged, the Spanish general concluded, in the name of his Government, the Treaty of Badajos, in which he forgot to stipulate the occupancy of a fourth of the Portuguese teritory, which was the thing chiefly provided for in the Convention of Madrid.

The First Consul immediately signified, that he would not ratify the Treaty of Badajos; that it was contrary to the political interests of the Allies; that it was in direct opposition to the Convention of Madrid; and that its certain consequence to his Catholic Majesty must be the loss of the island of Trinidad, if he should ratify it separately. The Court of Madrid did separately ratify the Treaty of Badajos, and thus lost the island of Trinidad.

After the peace with Spain, we continued some months at war with Portugal. We should have alone undertaken and accomplished that which Spain was, by the Convention of Madrid, to aid us in. We might have obtained the cession of a fourth part of the Portuguese territory till a general peace. But the negotiations with the Court of London were now advancing to maturity. Government gave its orders, and peace was signed with Portugal two days before the signing of the Preliminaries at London.

The French Government endeavoured to put our commercial relations with Portugal upon a footing advantageous to both nations; and at the same time to define the limits between Portuguese and French Guiana, in such a manner as to prevent all future differences.

In regard to the first object, France demanded of Portugal, terms of mutual equality, such as the Portuguese could not, in justice to their own interests, refuse. All nations stand more or less in need of one another. Whether they buy or sell, nothing can be more advantageous than to draw to their markets as many buyers and sellers as possible. All monopoly or exclusion of privileges to the profit of any one nation in the markets of another, hurts not only those nations which are excluded,

but

but even the nation which grants the monopoly, because it obliges that nation to buy at a higher price than could be otherwise exacted.

The provisions of the treaty are agreeable to those principles by which all commercial intercourse among nations ought to be regulated. If they make a happy change in our trading intercourse with Portugal, both the French and the Portuguese will have to congratulate themselves on the alteration.

Of the limits between the two Guianas, it may be stated, that by the convention of 1700, they were fixed at the river of the Amazons; for by that convention, the Portuguese were obliged to demolish all their orts on the left bank of that river. By the Treaty of Utrecht, those limits were afterwards regulated in a manner incomplete, full of contradictions, and apt to give rise to many disputes.

French Guiana is the only colony on the American continent that remains to us; while the English, Spaniards, Portuguese, and Dutch, possess there extensive and flourishing establishments which they regard as one great source of national wealth.

Cayenne, the principal port of the island of that name, is, likewise, the chief place of French Guiana. The progress of cultivation has changed the unwholesomeness of the climate. It is well known to navigators, and can be no longer an object of terror. The richest productions of Asia, and the Asiatic Archipelagos have been there naturalized. Thus transplanted, their vegetation is more vigorous, and their produce more abundant than in the countries to which they are indigenous. Cattle, timber, and other productions may be procured from attention to the culture of Guiana, in any quantity.

This uncultivated territory is little known beyond the distance of an hundred leagues inland. A few savage hordes have been met with in it, and easily persuaded to attach themselves to the French, by whom they are treated with mildness and humanity. We traffic with those savages till culture shall raise the value of the interior lands of Guiana.

The colony is far from being in a state of prosperity. It is still, however, of great importance to us, whether considered in respect to the assistance which Cayenne and our other colonies may derive from it, or as a new country destined to receive such of our countrymen as an adventurous disposition or misfortune shall carry to settle at that distance from their native land.

It were an error to suppose the Torrid Zone uninhabited by Europeans. The Amazon, the greatest river in the world, runs in a winding course parallel to the equinoxial line, two or three degrees south of that line, under which it comes at the point where its waters are discharged into the sea. La Condamine, who traversed the country, did not find its heat intolerable. It becomes more moderate as the level of the country rises. We have reason to hope that we may there form a valuable colony.

Without doubt it can only be by powerful aid that we may expect to see those hopes realized; but first of all it is proper to fix the yet uncertain boundaries of the colony.

If debates have taken place in the English Parliament on the means of reconciling this division of territory with the Preliminary Treaty concluded between France and England, which secures the integrity of the Portuguese possessions, these debates cannot cause any serious difficulty. It is evident that the clause in the Preliminary Treaty related only to the invasion

sion with which Portugal was threatened by the French army on its frontiers. This clause cannot likewise be applicable to a determination of the limits which has been constantly under discussion.

It was important, as well for Portugal as for France, that all misunderstanding at a future time should be prevented, and we may, in any point of view, consider the arrangement which has been the result of this object, as inimical to the integrity of the territory of Portugal.

In short, the only advantage which France will derive is, that of enjoying undisturbed, a country at present uncultivated, but which, by the care and encouragement of an enlightened government, incessantly occupied with the public prosperity, may receive speedy and great improvements, without exciting the envy or regret of Portugal, who still retains a much greater portion of territory than she is able to cultivate.

The new alliance between the two nations will become more useful; the advantages they will derive from it reciprocally will contribute to unite two people destined to esteem and love each other; and Portugal will resume in Europe the proper rank for a state, which ought to be jealous of its independence and its prosperity.

In vain do some men, who are insensible to the cries of humanity, and given to ancient prejudices, wish to prolong a war that has already cost so much blood and treasure to Europe; their murmurs will not avail over the wisdom which now presides in the councils of the respective governments. We may hope that a late treaty will soon put an end to all the miseries of war, and that treaties founded on justice and the common interest, will long ensure to us the inestimable blessings of peace.

K.

MR. ADDINGTON'S DECLARATION

Respecting the Treaty between France and Portugal, signed at Madrid, 29th September, 1801.

EXTRACT *from the Debates in the House of Commons, on the* 21*st of December,* 1801.

MR. WINDHAM said, as the House was likely to adjourn for some time, he should take the opportunity then offered, of requesting, before the House separated, some information upon a point of moment. He was sorry he did not see the Noble Lord (Lord Hawkesbury) in his place, who was the most proper person, from his particular official situation, to apply to for satisfaction upon the subject. He thought, however, that the House, with the most perfect propriety, with respect either to that Noble Lord, or any proceedings then going forward, might wish to have full information upon it at the present moment—he meant the integrity of Portugal, as guaranteed by the Preliminaries of Peace between this country and France. Since their signature, a treaty was understood to have been entered into between France and Portugal, which entirely changed the article, or the point of integrity stipulated with us. If so, it was a scandalous fraud on the part of France, and ought to be done away, either by not confirming a treaty founded in such a fraud,

a fraud, or by some other way. It was first communicated by a French paper, containing a copy of it; and the Noble Lord (Hawkesbury), upon having the fact stated to him in that House, and being applied to for an explanation, answered, that he hoped it would not be confirmed. Since, however, that hope was expressed, another communication had been received from France of the same kind, he meant the *Moniteur*, the French official paper, containing a discussion upon the subject, in which the debates upon the point in that House were alluded to; and a counsellor of state is stated to declare, that the article involved no doubt whatever, and that it could not be contended but that the river of the Amazons should remain the boundary between the French and Portuguese possessions in South America. Now, if any hope remained that this business might be set right, and was or might become a subject of conference at Amiens, he should acquiesce in answer to that effect; but, if any thing certain were known, if the hopes entertained upon the point were confirmed or given up, as the country must know the truth at last, he thought the sooner it knew it the better, as it would thence learn what sort of enemy we had to deal with. He deprecated any desire to embarrass Government, or to seek any information, the disclosure of which could have any injurious effect upon the negotiations for a definitive treaty. If, therefore, the information which he sought, would have any such tendency, he should be sorry to press for it.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER expressed a confidence that the Right Honourable Gentleman would be one of the last in the House to wish to embarrass the proceedings of Government, or press for any information, the disclosure of which would have

an injurious tendency. The information required in the present case, he thought, would not involve any such consequence. He assured him on this head, that *he and his colleagues had the best reason, short of a confirmation by the definitive treaty, to think that the treaty of Badajos would be in force, and that the treaty of Madrid would be cancelled.*

L.

Mr. ADDINGTON'S DECLARATION

Respecting the Plea of Necessity.

EXTRACT *from the Debates in the House of Commons, on the 29th of October*, 1801.

MR. WINDHAM said, that he should have followed the course of proceeding held out by his Honourable Friends on the Treasuty Bench, as the proper mode on this occasion had it not been for something that was thrown out by his Honourable Friend; he should have contented himself with giving a silent vote of approbation of the Address, had it not happened that some things were dropped which seemed to imply an approbation of the Preliminaries of Peace. His Friend did not intend it so, but from what he said, he seemed to convey an idea that all the Members of the House approved of that measure; he was desirous to give no countenance to opinions to which

which he did not assent. This matter being clearly understood, he should have no disposition to say more this night upon the subject, reserving the opinion he had formed, and the reasons he had to support it with, to the occasion that might regularly call for it, which would, he presumed, be a day appointed for that purpose; but as his Honourable Friend had gone a little further, and had given his opinion upon the outline of the subject, Mr. Windham said, he must likewise state his, which was, unfortunately, as decidedly against the peace, as that of his Friend was for it. He was aware that to dissent from any such general opinion as that of his Hon. Friend, was at all times painful to him, it was still more so, since that opinion was so generally approved of and supported. He could have no delight in being a mourner in a scene of general rejoicing—to wear a countenance of sorrow, while others seemed to sparkle with joy—to sink into despair while others were lifted up by hope, was a singularity not to be envied, nor should he be longer in assigning his reason for it than would be necessary in order to be understood. He admitted that those who had entertained opposite opinions upon the war might, as properly remarked by his Friend (Mr. Pitt), yet agree in feelings as to the termination of it.—So it was likely to happen that the Hon. Gentleman opposite to him (Mr. Fox), whose opinions were now happily known to his country, might agree with his Honourable Friend (Mr. Pitt) in the termination of this contest. Although he agreed with the Honourable Gentleman (Mr. Fox) in his view of the state of facts, that this was a peace glorious to France, he believed he differed widely from that Gentleman as to the feelings which should thence arise in the breasts of Englishmen. In his view of things (which might perhaps be a mistaken one) there was no cause for rejoicing

at the peace we were about to have; he foresaw that this rejoicing might be turned into bitter lamentation: thi he said, because he thought that the advantages, as some people called them, which this peace would bring with it, would pave the way to the ruin of this country. The general illuminations were to him no sign of comfort, for he saw no reasonable cause for the people of England to rejoice. He must, before he assented to them, ask himself, "Are these the lights of the sepulchre, or the tokens of the knell of our funeral?"—Before I put on my wedding garment, I must know whether I am invited to the feast or the funeral; from the bottom of my heart I think this precedes the bitterness of sorrow and the lamentation of death. Considering the situation in which we now stand, I think that the moment my Honourable Friends signed this treaty, they signed the death-warrant of their country; or, at least, they have given it a blow which I think it can never recover from. He said, he knew how unpleasant it was to the House, nay, he felt it unpleasant to himself, to dwell upon observations which were made against his wishes, although dictated by his judgment. He knew the uncertainty of human affairs, and how vain it was in man to attempt to prescribe bounds to the dispensations of Providence, the ways of which were invisible to human sight. He could not tell what changes there may be without and within us—What temper, what spirit the people of this and other countries may have—what may be done for our political salvation. He did not say we should not entertain any hope, for he knew that hope might exist when reasonable confidence was extinguished; and he knew that exertions ought to be continued, after reasonable expectation was gone; and, therefore, he did not wish the people of this country to despair; but all he would say was, that upon no

view

view he could take of public affairs, from no principle that he knew, that induced a reasonable man to act, could he state to himself the way in which this country could come out of the difficulty into which this peace would throw it. There was one thing more which he wished to take notice of: he had long thought there was only one way by which this country could escape from the dreadful effect which we all apprehended from the gigantic power of France; and that was, by preserving the superiority of our commerce. It had appeared to him also, that there was but one thing wanting for France, to enable it to extend its empire, and to become as much the terror of other nations by sea as it had by land, and that was, to extend its commerce: this, in a fatal moment, in his opinion, we had given to France. How our ruin could be avoided, he did not know.—Others, undoubtedly, entertained hopes; how well founded such hopes were, time would shew. All that he had hitherto heard upon that subject, appeared to him to be either very doubtful, or entirely defective. What might be the effect of what we now saw, no man could know; but he apprehended nothing to us but our ruin. This was nearly all he had to say, and which he apprehended was called for by what had preceded it on this occasion; he should not have added another word, if the expression of an "honourable peace" had not occurred to him. It need not have been introduced; it seemed to have been improvidently and impoliticly mentioned, for it was more than was asked. He would not ask for an honourable peace; not that he undervalued the honour of a nation; no, he thought honour one of its dearest possessions, but for the sake of argument, and for that only, he would put it out of the way, and say, in this particular case, "Shew me it is a safe peace, and I shall be contented."—

after saying this, which was certainly his opinion on this peace, whether that was a subject of censure or applause, there was certainly no disapprobation of the present Address implied by what he said, although he had no wish to dissemble any sentiment he entertained; because if what had gone abroad was true, we were really driven to agree to this peace by necessity. If that was the case, the framers of the peace on the part of this country, had great merit. We were not to condemn them for what they gave up, but to applaud them for what they had saved; not for Ceylon or Trinidada, but for saving to us Portsmouth or Plymouth, or preserving Ireland to the British Empire, and for preventing greater humiliation. If this was really our state, and we made peace from necessity, we must applaud them for the peace, because the value of the peace would then be judged of, not from the thing itself, but from the necessity which gave it birth. That however was a subject which should be discussed hereafter; and the questions would be, how far the peace was a peace of necessity? and, what the degree of the necessity was? for nothing, in his apprehension, could justify the putting of the state into such danger as this peace would, but absolute necessity. This was all he had to say at present upon this subject, except merely to add, that as to the Address now before the House, he concurred with the two Gentlemen who had just preceded him (Mr. Pitt and Mr. Fox), in giving it his assent.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER said, he hoped his Right Honourable Friend would pardon him if he expressed an opinion that he had gone into rather more minuteness than the question now before the House called for, even in his own view of it as explained by himself, and particularly at the conclusion of his speech, by which it appeared he concurred in the Address. The observations of

his Honourable Friend were (he would pardon him for saying so) a little premature; that subject was not now before the House; even in his Majesty's most gracious Speech from the throne, there was expressed no other sentiment on the peace, but such as was conveyed by these words: "That his Majesty trusts the arrangements will be found conducive to the general interests of this country, and to the honour of the British empire." In this there was no reference whatever even to that sentiment so conveyed from the throne. Indeed it would be irregular and indecorous to ask of the House an opinion upon a subject not fully before it. His Honourable Friend very well knew, that preliminary terms of peace had been signed on the part of his Majesty and the French Republic, but the terms were not before the House. His Hon. Friend had entered into the subject of the peace, however, and expressed some lamentation over it. He should not follow him in answer to what he urged now, although he might, in some measure, regularly do so. Nor should he enter into any dispute now upon the general proposition laid down by his Honourable Friend, not because he was unprepared, but because another opportunity would offer for that purpose. He should then enter on the discussion with his Honourable Friend, but he should do it under a painful feeling, for painful it was to him to differ in opinion from one who had proved himself to be a zealous advocate for, and a virtuous guardian of the constitution, and to whom (whatever difference of opinion might subsist between them) he would add, the country was under deep obligation for many great services, particularly when he warned the country of its danger, when its safety was at stake, and for the efforts he made to preserve it. His Honourable Friend had said, that we ought to consider the extension of our commerce as the only counter-balance in our power against the extension of territory of the French Republic. He would not

now

now refer to the terms of the peace, for that he could not do with regularity, but he would aver, that all that we had given up would have afforded to us no sort of security against the danger which was apprehended by his Honourable Friend. He did not agree with his Honourable Friend on the subject of the extent of the power of France, and of our mode of balancing that power, for he thought the best counterpoise of this country, against the growing power of France, was in the preservation of our Constitution—to our industry and skill, to our frugality and temperance, much was to be also confided:—To the right direction and preservation of what remained of the faculties, abilities, and resources of the country: and happily much indeed remained of such resources, much was to be looked for as a security for us in time of peace, for a continuance of its blessings. His Honourable Friend had said, he should abstain from saying many things which would occur to him to deliver on a future occasion. Nothing less could be expected from his liberality, candour, or justice; but he hinted at one thing which ought not to pass without a direct answer: he would therefore say, it never was in contemplation of those who had the honour of advising his Majesty to sign the Preliminaries of Peace, that what they did was the effect of necessity. His Honourable Friend had stated, that some unknown necessity might have been the cause—" I disclaim that plea," said Mr. Addington, " I will be no party to such a statement. I do not seek " my own justification, nor will my colleagues, I am per- " suaded, seek theirs, in any such way—that would be really " undervaluing the resources of our country. If instead of " acceding to the terms agreed upon, and which are likely " soon to be finally settled, the enemy had made it neces- " sary for us to continue the contest, we should, I am con- " fident, have continued the contest; and I am confident " also, that we should have proved to the world that we

" have

"have still sufficient faculties and resources to maintain the "honour and preserve the security of the British empire. I "could not forbear saying this, for the purpose, chiefly, of "disclaiming that species of justification which my Honour-"able Friend supposed to arise out of necessity. I hope "my justification, and that of my colleagues, will be found "in the actual state of things, in which, I hope, it will ap-"pear we have had a prudent regard to the true interest of "our country: and I aver also, that if we had not advised "His MAJESTY to conclude these terms, we should not "only have been wanting in what we owed to our con-"stituents, but of a gross perversion of our duty to "His MAJESTY as the father of his people."—He then observed that he should defer the observations he had to make on the present state of the Continent of Europe, as well as many other topics which would come into discussion at a future day; and observed that what he had already said, had been called for by what had been delivered by his Honourable Friend who had just preceded him.

M.

MR. ADDINGTON'S ANSWER,

Respecting the sailing of the French Fleet and Army.

From the Debates in the House of Commons, on the 28th of December, 1801.

MR. T. GRENVILLE said, on a motion for adjourning the House even to so near a day he could not sit silent

silent under existing circumstances, nor consistently with his sense of duty forbear calling the attention of the House to a subject of the most serious importance, if not of alarm. He had been one of those who did not approve the grounds upon which the late Preliminary Treaty of Peace with France was concluded, because he did not conceive those grounds either so honourable, so advantageous, or so consistent with security to this country as existing circumstances warranted his Majesty's Ministers to demand. He had, on the night when those preliminaries were submitted for the opinion of the House, delivered his sentiments fully on the subject. A majority of the House had, however, decided by their vote against his opinion; he therefore felt it his duty, as he always should in such circumstances, to submit with profound deference to whatever appeared to be the declared sense of Parliament; and he rose not now for the purpose of starting any new objections, or giving any embarrassment whatever to his Majesty's Ministers on the subject of the pending treaty. There was, however, a circumstance which reached his knowledge this day, so strongly supported by the voice of general rumour, and accredited by general belief, as could not fail to interest the serious consideration of every man who heard him; and such an one as he could not, conscientiously as a Member of Parliament, or consistently with his duty to his country, pass over in silence at such a moment and on such a motion as the present.—The circumstance to which he alluded was the current, generally received, and uncontradicted report, that during the very negotiation now pending of a Definitive Treaty of Peace with France, founded on those preliminaries to which this House had so recently given its approbation, a French force of not less than sixteen sail of the line, with transports, conveying ten thousand

thousand troops, had actually sailed from Brest harbour on an expedition to the West-Indies, avowedly, as was said, for the island of St. Domingo, without any molestation or hindrance whatever on the part of Great-Britain.

Whether the fact was as is generally rumoured and believed, it was for His Majesty's Ministers to acknowledge or contradict. But if true, the decided superiority such a force would give to France in that quarter of the world, and the menace of danger it carried to some of our most valuable and important settlements in the West, should the enemy have it in design to break off the negotiation and commence hostilities, were considerations not to be contemplated without the most serious alarm.

He would not assume to say that the Government of France entertained such a design as that of rejecting the many superior advantages ceded to them in the Preliminary Treaty, and of breaking up the negotiation for the purpose of recommencing hostilities, which this proceeding would in such case enable them to do upon grounds and probabilities of effect so totally different and superior to what they could have done had their fleets been kept blocked up in their ports, as they were immediately previous to the signature of the Preliminary Treaty. He would not undertake to decide with what ultimate views the French Government, during the negotiation of a treaty, formed upon a truce concluded by both countries, upon a supposed union of sentiments upon the general grounds on which this truce was to be extended to a permanent treaty of peace, had thought fit to send out such a force without the assent of the British Government. But convinced he was, that if any stipulation for assent to such a measure pending the negotiation of a Definitive Treaty had been found amongst the preliminary articles, a very great number of those who had warmly and im-

plicitly approved those articles would never have been prevailed on to assent to such a proceeding without the most strong and unequivocal assurances indeed that no impediment whatever existed to the final conclusion of the treaty.

He had already professed his disinclination to embarrass His Majesty's Ministers by any new opposition on this subject. He meant not to found any motion upon this subject to which he now called the attention of the House; but he thought himself in some sort entitled to the thanks of His Majesty's Ministers for calling the attention of the House to the subject, which he did with two objects—First, that he might give them an opportunity of contradicting the rumour, if unfounded, for the satisfaction of the public mind and the relief of general anxiety; and, secondly, if the fact really was as generally stated and believed, that they might have an opportunity of convincing the country at large of their vigilance and activity in obtaining the necessary communications with the French Government upon the subject, and of their being prepared in the necessary steps for our security, whatever might be the designs of this expedition. But in all events he hoped that Ministers, by being fully ascertained of the designs of the French Government in this business, might be enabled to retain in their hands the means of counteracting the effects of any hostile disposition until the terms of peace should be finally concluded.

The CHANCELLOR of the EXCHEQUER. I know by experience how difficult it is, where the feelings are interested, to limit the discussion to the question before the House. Yet, making the largest allowance for curiosity and zeal, I am afraid it would be no easy matter to reconcile to order this long dissertation upon a rumour.

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The Honourable Gentleman is anxious to ascertain the *fact*; he wishes to know whether a statement, which has reached him, of an armament having sailed from Brest to the West-Indies, is or is not well founded. Of this event Government has received no regular information, but that it has taken place there cannot be a doubt. The degree of alarm and apprehension to which it ought to give rise, I allow to be a fair subject for enquiry and speculation. Whether there has been any communication upon the subject between the two Governments, this is not the time for me to state. Whether measures of precaution have been adopted to ward off dangers which are not likely, but which may assail us, the House will not at present call upon me to declare *(a loud cry of hear! hear!)*. But this I am ready to say, that nothing has happened to invalidate the reasonings of the Noble Lord alluded to by the Honourable Gentleman (Lord Hawkesbury); and that the illustrious person now at Amiens has experienced no unforeseen obstacle in the execution of the trust committed to him.

N.

EXTRACT *from Lord Hawkesbury's Speech in the House of Commons, the 3d of November,* 1801.

—But in stating the Terms of this Peace, he was aware of an answer that might, and most probably would be made, and that was, the increase of the power of France on the Continent, which ought to be considered in the general arrangements for a Peace. Now, with regard to the power of France, no man regretted it more sincerely than he did.—However other powers on the Continent had increased in power also, Russia and Prussia had much increased in power by the Partition of Poland;

Austria had also acquired great additional strength; and these were considerations which should accompany our thoughts upon the acquisitions of France upon the Continent. There was another point which should accompany our apprehensions on the extension of the territories of France, which was, that of the diminution of our wealth, and that by which states obtained wealth, commerce; and he believed if this part of the subject was considered fairly, and if we remembered to what the great wealth and power of Great-Britain was owing, we should make our minds at ease, after a little reflection upon that subject—we should find our power increased in a proportion fully equal to any of the powers of the Continent. He knew there was a difference of opinion as to the question how far the commerce of this country depended on the war, and what we ought to restore at the time of peace. He would take a view of the state of the case, as if the commerce arising out of the acquisition we had made were out of the question, and confine his statement to the commerce we had from those possessions we had previous to the war, and compare their produce at two periods—the peace before the war, and that of the war. By a paper which he held in his hand, it appeared that the value of exports of British plantation for three years preceding this war, was 2,185,000l. For three years of this war, 3.561,000l.—Colonial produce for the same time for peace, 3,877,000l. During war, 5,101,000l.—East-India imports for three years of Peace, 3,183,000l. For the same period of war, 5,617,000l.—Exports of British manufactures to America, three years of peace, 3,694,000l. For the ame period of war 6,232,000l.—British manufactures, &c. to our colonies for three years of peace 747,000l War in the same period, 1,224,000l.—British manufactures exported to the Continent of Europe, 1,530,000l War, 2,145,000l.

O.

BUONAPARTÉ's PROCLAMATION,

*Issued in the Arabic Language, on his landing in Egypt.**

In the name of God, gracious and merciful.—There is no God but God; *he has no son or associate in his kingdom.*

The present moment, which is destined for the punishment of the Beys, has been long anxiously expected. The Beys, coming from the mountains of Georgia and Bajars, have desolated this beautiful country, long insulted and treated with contempt the French Nation, and oppressed her merchants in various ways. Buonaparté, the General of the French Republic, according to the principles of Liberty, is now arrived; and the Almighty, the Lord of both Worlds, has sealed the destruction of the Beys.

Inhabitants of Egypt! When the Beys tell you the French are come to destroy your religion, believe them not: it is an absolute falsehood. Answer those deceivers, that they are only come to rescue the rights of the poor from the hands of their tyrants, and that

* This Proclamation forms but a very trifling article in that immense mass of materials, which may be brought in to elucidate the character of the man, on whose *good faith* our Ministers have staked the preservation of our liberties and lives.

the

the French adore the Supreme Being, and honour the Prophet and his holy Koran.

All men are equal in the eyes of God: understanding, ingenuity, and science, alone make a difference between them: as the Beys, therefore, do not possess any of these qualities, they cannot be worthy to govern the country.

Yet are they the only possessors of extensive tracts of land, beautiful female slaves, excellent horses, magnificent palaces! Have they then received an exclusive privilege from the Almighty? If so, let them produce it. But the Supreme Being, who is just and merciful towards all mankind, wills that in future none of the inhabitants of Egypt shall be prevented from attaining to the first employments and the highest honours.—The Administration, which shall be conducted by persons of intelligence, talents, and foresight, will be productive of happiness and security. The tyranny and avarice of the Beys have laid waste Egypt, which was formerly so populous and well cultivated.

THE FRENCH ARE TRUE MUSSULMEN. *Not long since they marched to Rome, and overthrew the Throne of the Pope, who excited the Christians against the professors of Islamism (the Mahometan religion).* Afterwards they directed their course to Malta, and drove out the *unbelievers*, who imagined they were appointed by God to make war on the Mussulmen. The French have at all times been the true and sincere friends of the Ottoman Emperors, and the enemies of their enemies. May the Empire of the Sultan therefore be eternal; but may the Beys of Egypt, our opposers, whose insatiable avarice has continually excited disobedience and insubordination, be trodden in the dust, and annihilated!

Our

Our friendship shall be extended to those of the inhabitants of Egypt who shall join us, as also to those who shall remain in their dwellings, and observe a strict neutrality; and when they have seen our conduct with their own eyes, hasten to submit to us; but the dreadful punishment of death awaits those who shall take up arms for the Beys, and against us. For then there shall be no deliverance, nor shall any trace of them remain.

Art. 1. All places which shall be three leagues distant from the route of the French army, shall send one of their principal inhabitants to the French General, to declare that they submit, and will hoist the French flag, which is blue, white, and red.

Art. 2. Every village which shall oppose the French army shall be burned to the ground.

Art. 3. Every village which shall submit to the French, shall hoist the French flag, and that of the Sublime Porte, their Ally, whose duration be eternal.

Art. 4. The Cheiks and principal persons of each town and village shall seal up the houses and effects of the Beys, and take care that not the smallest article shall be lost.

Art. 5. The Cheiks, Cadis, and Imans, shall continue to exercise their respective functions; and put up their prayers, and perform the exercise of religious worship in the mosques and houses of prayer. All the inhabitants of Egypt shall offer up thanks to the Supreme Being, and put up public prayers for the destruction of the Beys.

May the Supreme God make the glory of the Sultan of the Ottomans eternal, pour forth his wrath on the Mameloucs, and render glorious the destiny of the Egyptian Nation.

P.

EXTRACTS

From Speeches of MESSRS. PITT *and* FOX, *and* LORD HAWKESBURY, *respecting Buonaparté and Peace with France.*

MR. PITT.

June 7th, 1799.

EVERY event that has taken place within a short period, and the universal expression of the public opinion, shews that *we are rising in private wealth, and public prosperity and affluence.* Every thing convinces us that we are in a situation in which *we ought not to stop short of that adequate, full, and rational security which we have a right to expect: Indemnity for the past and security for the future.* Every thing that now presents itself to our view, must serve to do away the gloomy prognostics which some persons, from a spirit of opposition to government, and others from timidity and despondency, were in the habit of making.

It is only necessary for us to bear a pressure for a short time, and I have no hesitation in saying, that we have ample means to meet this pressure, and the additional burdens we are now wisely to impose on ourselves. If we look to the certainty of not being

baffled in that on which the enemy found their most sanguine hopes, and place their chief reliance, while they meditate our destruction, we shall have the satisfaction of seeing, that those resources which our enemies have been obliged to procure, through the medium of robbery, rapine, confiscation, and murder, are furnished to us by honest industry, and the free consent of a generous and loyal people; *and that too in such abundance as is sufficient to gratify every view of ambition which we may entertain.* Here Mr. Pitt went into calculations, to shew that the whole national debt would be extinguished in thirty-three years of peace; that, *supposing the war to continue ever so long, it could be carried on without the creation of a new debt; and that nine years of war might be supported without any material inconvenience to the nation.*

February 3d, 1800.

The all-searching eye of the French Revolution looks to every part of Europe, and every quarter of the World, in which can be found an object either of acquisition or plunder. Nothing is too great for the temerity of its ambition, nothing too small or insignificant for the grasp of its rapacity. From hence Buonaparté and his Army proceeded to Egypt. The attack was made, pretences were held out to the Natives of that Country in the name of the French King, whom they had murdered; they pretended to have the approbation of the Grand Seignior, whose Territories they were violating; their project was carried on under the profession of a zeal for Mahometanism; it was carried on by proclaiming that France had been reconciled to the Mussulman Faith, had abjured that of Christianity, or as he in his impious language termed it, of *the Sect of the Messiah.*

The only plea which they have since held out to colour this atrocious invasion of a neutral and friendly territory is, that it was the road to attack the English power in India. It is most unquestionably true, that this was one and a principal cause of this unparalleled outrage; but another, and an equally substantial cause, (as appears by their own statements,) was the division and partition of the territories of what they thought a falling Power. It is impossible to dismiss this subject without observing that this attack against Egypt was accompanied by an attack upon the British Possessions in India, made on true revolutionary principles. In Europe, the propagation of the principles of France had uniformly prepared the way for the progress of its arms. To India the lovers of Peace had sent the Messengers of Jacobinism, for the purpose of inculcating War in those distant regions, on Jacobin principles, and of forming Jacobin Clubs, which they actually succeeded in establishing, and which in most respects resembled the European model, but which were distinguished by this peculiarity, that they were required to swear in one breath, *hatred to Tyranny, the love of Liberty, and the destruction of all Kings and Sovereigns, except the good and faithful Ally of the French Republic,* CITIZEN TIPPOO.

What then was the nature of this system? Was it any thing but what I have stated it to be? an insatiable love of aggrandizement, an implacable spirit of destruction directed against all the civil and religious institutions of every country. This is the first moving and acting spirit of the French Revolution; this is the spirit which animated it at its birth, and this is the spirit which will not desert it till the moment of its dissolution, "which grew with its growth, which "strengthened

"stengthened with its strength," but which has not abated under its misfortunes, nor declined in its decay; it has been invariably the same in every period, operating more or less, according as accident or circumstances might assist it; but it has been inherent in the Revolution in all its stages, it has equally belonged to Brissot, to Robespierre, to Tallien, to Rewbel, to Barras, and to every one of the Leaders of the Directory, but to none more than to Buonaparté, in whom now all their powers are united. What are its characters? Can it be accident that produced them? No, it is only from the alliance of the most horrid principles, with the most horrid means, that such miseries could have been brought upon Europe. It is this paradox which we must always keep in mind when we are discussing any question relative to the effects of the French Revolution. Groaning under every degree of misery, the victim of its own crimes, and as I once before expressed it in this House, asking pardon of God and of Man for the miseries which it has brought upon itself and others, France still retains, (while it has neither left means of comfort, nor almost of subsistence to its own inhabitants), new and unexampled means of annoyance and destruction against all the other Powers of Europe.

The first fundamental principle of the French Government was to bribe the poor against the rich, by proposing to transfer into new hands, on the delusive notion of Equality, and in breach of every principle of justice, the whole Property of the Country; the practical application of this principle was to devote the whole of that Property to indiscriminate plunder, and to make it the foundation of a Revolutionary system of Finance, productive in proportion to the misery

and desolation which it created. It has been accompanied by an unwearied spirit of Proselytism, diffusing itself over all the Nations of the Earth; a spirit which can apply itself to all circumstances and all situations, which can furnish a list of grievances, and hold out a promise of redress equally to all nations, which inspired the teachers of French Liberty with the hope of alike recommending themselves to those who live under the feudal code of the German Empire; to the various States of Italy, under all their different institutions; to the old Republicans of Holland, and to the new Republicans of America; to the Catholics of Ireland, whom it was to deliver from Protestant usurpation; to the Protestant of Switzerland, whom it was to deliver from Popish superstition; and to the Mussulman of Egypt, whom it was to deliver from Christian persecution; to the remote Indian, blindly bigoted to his ancient institutions; and to the Natives of Great-Britain, enjoying the perfection of practical freedom, and justly attached to their constitution; from the joint result of habit, of reason, and of experience. The last and distinguishing feature is a perfidy which nothing can bind, which no tie of Treaty, no sense of the principles generally received among Nations, no obligation, human or divine, can restrain. Thus qualified, thus armed for destruction, the genius of the French Revolution marched forth, the terror and dismay of the World. Every Nation has in its turn been the witness, many have been the victims of its principles, and it is left for us to decide, whether we will compromise with such a danger, while we have yet resources to supply the sinews of War, while the heart and spirit of the

Country

Country is yet unbroken, and while we have the means of calling forth and supporting a powerful co-operation in Europe.

Having taken a view of what it was, let us now examine what it is. In the first place, we see, as has been truly stated, a change in the description and form of the sovereign authority; a supreme power is placed at the head of this nominal Republic, with a more open avowal of military despotism than at any former period; with a more open and undisguised abandonment of the names and pretences under which that despotism long attempted to conceal itself. The different institutions, republican in their form and appearance, which were before the instruments of that despotism, are now annihilated; they have given way to the absolute power of one man, concentrating in himself all the authority of the state, and differing from other monarchs only in this, that (as my Honourable Friend * truly stated it) he wields a sword instead of a sceptre. What then is the confidence we are to derive either from the frame of the government, or from the character and past conduct of the person who is now the absolute ruler of France?

Had we seen a man of whom we had no previous knowledge suddenly invested with the soverign authority of the country; invested with the power of taxation, with the power of the sword, the power of war and peace, the unlimited power of commanding the resources, of disposing of the lives and fortunes of every man in France; if we had seen, at the same moment, all the inferior machinery of the revolution,

* Mr. Canning.

which,

which, under the variety of successive shocks, had kept the system in motion, still remaining entire, all that, by requisition and plunder, had given activity to the revolutionary system of finance, and had furnished the means of creating an army, by converting every man, who was of age to bear arms, into a soldier, not for the defence of his own country but for the sake of carrying unprovoked war into surrounding countries; if we had seen all the subordinate instruments of Jacobin power subsisting in their full force, and retaining (to use the French phrase) all their original organization; and had then observed this single change in the conduct of their affairs, that there was now one man, with no rival to thwart his measures, no colleague to divide his powers, no council to controul his operations, no liberty of speaking or writing, no expression of public opinion to check or influence his conduct; under such circumstances, should we be wrong to pause, or wait for the evidence of facts and experience, before we consented to trust our safety to the forbearance of a single man, in such a situation, and to relinquish those means of defence which have hitherto carried us safe through all the storms of the revolution? if we were to ask what are the principles and character of this stranger, to whom Fortune has suddenly committed the concerns of a great and powerful nation?

But is this the actual state of the present question? Are we talking of a stranger of whom we have heard nothing? No, Sir: we have heard of him; we, and Europe, and the world, have heard both of him and of the satellites by whom he is surrounded. And it is impossible to discuss fairly the propriety of any answer which could be returned to his overtures of negotiation, without taking into consideration the inferences

inferences to be drawn from his personal character and conduct. I know it is the fashion with some gentlemen to represent any reference to topics of this nature as invidious and irritating; but the truth is, that they arise unavoidably out of the very nature of the question. Would it have been possible for Ministers to discharge their duty, in offering their advice to their Sovereign, either for accepting or declining negotiation, without taking into their account the reliance to be placed on the disposition and the principles of the person, on whose disposition and principles the security to be obtained by treaty must, in the present circumstances, principally depend: or would they act honestly or candidly, towards Parliament and towards the Country, if, having been guided by these considerations, they forebore to state publicly and distinctly, the real grounds which have influenced their decision; and if, from a false delicacy and groundless timidity, they purposely declined an examination of a point the most essential towards enabling Parliament to form a just determination on so important a subject?

What opinion, then, are we led to form of the pretensions of the Consul to those particular qualities which, in the Official Note, are represented as affording us, from his personal character, the surest pledge of peace? we are told that this is his *second attempt* at general pacification. Let us see, for a moment, how this *second attempt* has been conducted. There is, indeed, as the Learned Gentleman has said, a word in the first Declaration which refers to general peace, and which states this to be the second time in which the Consul has endeavoured to accomplish that object. We thought fit, for the reasons which have been assigned,

assigned, to decline altogether the proposal of treating, under the present circumstances, but we, at the same time, expressly stated, that, whenever the moment for treaty should arrive, we would in no case treat, but in conjunction with our Allies. Our general refusal to negotiate at the present moment did not prevent the Consul from renewing his overtures; but were they renewed for the purpose of general pacification? Though he had hinted at general peace in the terms of his first Note; though we had shewn, by our answer, that we deemed negotiation, even for general peace, at this moment, inadmissible; though we added, that, even at any future period, we would treat only in conjunction with our Allies; what was the proposal contained in his last Note?—to treat not for *general peace*, but for a *separate peace* between Great-Britain and France.

Such was the second attempt to effect *general pacification:* a proposal for a *separate* treaty with Great-Britain.—What had been the first? the conclusion of a *separate* treaty with Austria; and, in addition to this fact, there are two anecdotes connected with the conclusion of that separate treaty, which are sufficient to illustrate the disposition of this pacificator of Europe. This very treaty of Campo Formio was ostentatiously professed to be concluded with the Emperor for the purpose of enabling Buonaparté to take the command of the Army of England, and to dictate a separate peace with this Country on the banks of the Thames. But there is this additional circumstance, singular beyond all conception, considering that we are now referred to the treaty of Campo Formio, as a proof of the personal disposition of the Consul to general peace; he sent his two confidential and chosen friends,

Berthier and *Monge*, charged to communicate to the Directory this treaty of Campo Formio; to announce to them, that one enemy was humbled, that the war with Austria was terminated, and, therefore, that now was the moment to prosecute their operations against this Country; they used, on this occasion, the memorable words, "*the Kingdom of Great-Britain and the French Republic cannot exist together.*" This, I say, was the solemn declaration of the deputies and ambassadors of Buonaparté himself, offering to the Directory the first fruits of this first attempt at general pacification.

So much for his disposition towards general pacification; let us look next at the part he has taken in the different stages of the French revolution, and let us then judge whether we are to look to him, as the security against revolutionary principles; let us determine what reliance we can place on his engagements with other countries, when we see how he has observed his engagements to his own. When the constitution of the third year was established under Barras, that constitution was imposed by the arms of Buonaparté, then commanding the Army of the Triumvirate in Paris. To that constitution he then swore fidelity. How often he has repeated the same oath I know not, but twice at least, we know that he has not only repeated it himself, but tendered it to others, under circumstances too striking not to be stated.

Sir, the House cannot have forgotten the revolution of the 4th of September, which produced the dismissal of Lord Malmsbury from Lisle. How was that revolution procured? It was procured chiefly by the promise of Buonaparté (in the name of his army), decidedly to support the Directory in those measures

 which

which led to the infringement and violation of every thing that the authors of the constitution of 1795, or its adherents, could consider as fundamental, and which established a system of despotism inferior only to that now realized in his own person. Immediately before this event, in the midst of the desolation and bloodshed of Italy, he had received the sacred present of new banners from the Directory; he delivered them to his army with this exhortation: "Let us swear, fellow-soldiers, by the names of the patriots who have died by our side, eternal hatred to the enemies of the constitution of the third year." That very constitution which he soon after enabled the Directory to violate, and which, at the head of his grenadiers, he has now finally destroyed. Sir, that oath was again renewed, in the midst of that very scene to which I have last referred; the oath of fidelity to the constitution of the third year was administered to all the members of the Assembly then sitting (under the terror of the bayonet), as the solemn preparation for the business of the day; and the morning was ushered in with swearing attachment to the constitution, that the evening might close with its destruction.

If we carry our views out of France, and look at the dreadful catalogue of all the breaches of treaty, all the acts of perfidy at which I have only glanced, and which are precisely commensurate with the number of treaties which the republic has made; (for I have sought in vain for any one which it has made and which it has not broken) if we trace the history of them all from the begining of the revolution to the present time, or if we select those which have been accompanied by the most atrocious cruelty, and marked the most strongly with the characteristic features of the revolution,

volution, the name of Buonaparté will be found allied to more of them than that of any other that can be handed down in the history of the crimes and miseries of the last ten years. His name will be recorded with the horrors committed in Italy, in the memorable campaign of 1796 and 1797, in the Milanese, in Genoa, in Modena, in Tuscany, in Rome, and in Venice.

His entrance into Lombardy was announced by a solemn proclamation, issued on the 27th of April, 1796, which terminated with these words: "*Nations of Italy! "the French army is come to break your chains, the "French are the friends of the people in every country, "your religion, your property, your customs, shall be "respected.*" This was followed by a second proclamation, dated from Milan 20th of May and signed *Buonaparté*, in these terms: "*Respect for property "and personal security: Respect for the religion of "countries: these are the sentiments of the govern- "ment of the French Republic, and of the Army of "Italy. The French victorious consider the nations "of Lombardy as their brothers.*" In testimony of this fraternity, and to fulfil the solemn pledge of respecting property, this very proclamation imposed on the Milanese a provisional contribution to the amount of twenty millions of livres, or near one million sterling, and successive exactions were afterwards levied on that single state to the amount, in the whole, of near six millions sterling. The regard to religion and to the customs of the country was manifested with the same scrupulous fidelity. The churches were given up to indiscriminate plunder. Every religious and charitable fund, every public treasure, was confiscated. The country was made the scene of every species of disorder

disorder and rapine. The priests, the established form of worship, all the objects of religious reverence, were openly insulted by the French troops: at *Pavia* particularly the tomb of *St. Augustin*, which the inhabitants were accustomed to view with peculiar veneration, was mutilated and defaced; this last provocation having roused the resentment of the people, they flew to arms, surrounded the French garrison and took them prisoners, but carefully abstained from offering any violence to a single soldier. In revenge for this conduct, *Buonaparté*, then on his march to the *Mincio*, suddenly returned, collected his troops, and carried the extremity of military execution over the country; he burnt the town of *Benasco* and massacred eight hundred of its inhabitants; he marched to *Pavia*, took it by storm, and delivered it over to general plunder, and published, at the same moment, a proclamation, of the 26th of May, ordering his troops to shoot all those who had not laid down their arms, and taken an oath of obedience, and to burn every village where the *tocsin* should be sounded, and to put its inhabitants to death.

The transactions with *Modena* were on a smaller scale, but in the same character. *Buonaparté* began by signing a treaty, by which the Duke of *Modena* was to pay twelve millions of livres, and neutrality was promised him in return; this was soon followed by the personal arrest of the Duke and by a fresh extortion of two hundred thousand sequins; after this he was permitted, on the payment of a farther sum, to sign another treaty, called a *Convention de Sûreté*, which of course was the only prelude to the repetition of similar exactions.

Nearly

Nearly at the same period, in violation of the rights of neutrality and of the treaty which had been concluded between the French Republic and the Grand Duke of Tuscany in the preceding year, and in breach of a positive promise given only a few days before, the French army forcibly took possession of Leghorn, for the purpose of seizing the British property which was deposited there and confiscating it as prize; and shortly after, when Buonaparté agreed to evacuate Leghorn in return for the evacuation of the Island of Elbe, which was in the possession of the British troops, he insisted upon a separate article, by which, in addition to the plunder before obtained, by the infraction of the law of nations, it was stipulated, that the Grand Duke should pay to the French the expense which they had incurred by thus invading his territory.

In the proceedings towards *Genoa* we shall find not only a continuation of the same system of extortion and plunder, (in violation of the solemn pledge contained in the proclamations already referred to,) but a striking instance of the revolutionary means employed for the destruction of independent governments. A French minister was at that time resident in Genoa, which was acknowledged by France to be in a state of neutrality and friendship: in breach of this neutrality Buonaparté began in the year 1796, with the demand of a loan; he afterwards, from the month of September, required and enforced the payment of a monthly subsidy, to the amount which he thought proper to stipulate: these exactions were accompanied by repeated assurances and protestations of friendship; they were followed, in May, 1797, by a con-

a conspiracy against the government, fomented by the emissaries of the French embassy, and conducted by the partizans of France, encouraged, and afterwards protected by the French minister. The conspirators failed in their first attempt, overpowered by the courage and voluntary exertions of the inhabitants; their force was dispersed, and many of their number were arrested. Buonaparté instantly considered the defeat of the conspirators as an act of aggression against the French Republic; he dispatched an Aide-de-camp with an order to the Senate of this independent state; first, to release all the French who were detained; secondly, to punish those who had arrested them; thirdly, to declare that *they had had no share in the insurrection;* and fourthly, to disarm the people. Several French prisoners were immediately released, and a proclamation was preparing to disarm the inhabitants, when, by a second note, *Buonaparté* required the arrest of the three Inquisitors of State, and immediate alterations in the constitution; he accompanied this with an order to the French minister to quit Genoa, if his commands were not immediately carried into execution; at the same moment his troops entered the territory of the republic, and shortly after the councils, intimidated and overpowered, abdicated their functions. Three deputies were then sent to Buonaparté to receive from him a new constitution; on the 6th of June, after the conferences at *Montebello*, he signed a convention, or rather issued a decree, by which he fixed the new form of their government; he himself named provisionally all the members who were to compose it, and he required the payment of seven millions of livres, as the price of the subversion of their constitution, and their

their independence. These transactions require but one short comment; it is to be found in the official account given of them at *Paris*, which is in these memorable words: "*General Buonaparté* has pursued "the only line of conduct which could be allowed in "the representative of a nation, *which has supported* "*the war only to procure the solemn acknowledgement* "*of the right of nations, to change the form of their* "*government.* He contributed *nothing* towards the "revolution of *Genoa*, but he seized the first mo- "ment to acknowledge the new government, as soon "as he saw that it was *the result of the wishes of the* "*people.*"*

It is unnecessary to dwell on the wanton attacks against *Rome*, under the directions of *Buonaparté* himself in the year 1796, and in the beginning of 1797, which led first to the treaty of *Tolentino* concluded by Buonaparté, in which, by enormous sacrifices, the Pope was allowed to puschase the acknowledgement of his authority, as a Sovereign Prince; and secondly, to the violation of that very treaty, and to the subversion of the Papal authority by *Joseph Buonaparté*, the brother and the agent of the General, and the Minister of the French Republic to the Holy See. A transaction, accompanied by outrages and insults towards the pious and venerable Pontiff (in spite of the sanctity of his age and the unsullied purity of his character) which even to a Protestant, seem hardly short of the guilt of sacrilege!

But

* *Rédacteur Officiel*, June 30, 1797.

But of all the disgusting and tragical scenes which took place in Italy, in the course of the period I am describing, those which passed at *Venice* are perhaps the most striking, and the most characteristic: In May, 1796, the French army, under Buonaparté, in the full tide of its success against the Austrians, first approached the territories of this republic, which from the commencement of the war had observed a rigid neutrality. Their entrance on these territories was as usual accompanied by a solemn proclamation in the name of their general. " *Buonaparté, to the republic* " *of Venice.* It is to deliver the finest country in Europe " *from the iron yoke of the proud house of Austria,* " that the French army has braved obstacles the " most difficult to surmount. Victory in union with " justice has crowned its efforts. The wreck of the " enemy's army has retired behind the Mincio. The " French army, in order to follow them, passes over " the territory of the republic of Venice; but it " will never forget, *that ancient friendship unites the* " *two republics. Religion, government, customs, and* " *property, shall be respected.* That the people may " be without apprehension, the most severe disci- " pline shall be maintained. All that may be pro- " vided for the army shall be faithfully paid for in " money. The general-in-chief engages the officers " of the republic of Venice, the magistrates, and the " priests, to make known these sentiments to the " people, in order, that confidence may cement that " friendship which has so long united the two na- " tions, faithful in the path of honor, as in that of " victory. The French soldier is terrible only to the

"enemies of his liberty and his government." *Buonaparté.**

This proclamation was followed by exactions similar to those which were practised against Genoa, by the renewal of similar professions of friendship and the use of similar means to excite insurrection. At length, in the spring of 1797, occasion was taken from disturbances thus excited, to forge, in the name of the Venetian Government, a proclamation,† hostile to France, and this proceeding was made the ground for military execution against the Country, and for effecting by force the subversion of its ancient government and the establishment of the democratic forms of the French Revolution. This revolution was sealed by a treaty, signed in May, 1797, between *Buonaparté* and Commissioners appointed on the part of the new and revolutionary government of *Venice*. By the second and third secret articles of this treaty, Venice agreed to give as a ransom, to secure itself against all farther exactions or demands, the sum of three millions of livres in money, the value of three millions more in articles of naval supply, and three ships of the line; and it received in return the assurances of the friendship and support of the French Republic. Immediately after the signature of this treaty, the Arsenal, the Library, and the Palace of St. Mark were ransacked and plundered, and heavy additional contributions

* Vide Debrett's State Papers, vol. v. p. 28.

† Vide account of this transaction in the Proclamation of the Senate of Venice, April 12, 1798.——Debrett's State Papers, vol. vi. page 67.

were imposed upon its inhabitants. And, in not more than four months afterwards, this very Republic of Venice, united by alliance to France, the creature of Buonaparté himself, from whom it had received the present of French liberty, was by the same Buonaparté transferred under the treaty of *Campo Formio* to "*that iron yoke of the proud House of Austria*," to deliver it from which he had represented in his first proclamation to be the great object of all his operations.

Sir, all this is followed by the memorable expedition into Egypt, which I mention, not merely because it forms a principal article in the catalogue of those acts of violence and perfidy in which Buonaparté has been engaged; not merely because it was an enterprize peculiarly his own, of which he was himself the planner, the executor, and the betrayer; but chiefly because when from thence he retires to a different scene, to take possession of a new throne, from which he is to speak upon an equality with the Kings and Governors of Europe, he leaves behind him, at the moment of his departure, a specimen, which cannot be mistaken, of his principles of negotiation. The Intercepted Correspondence, which has been alluded to in this debate, seems to afford the strongest ground to believe, that his offers to the Turkish Government to evacuate Egypt, were made solely with a view "*to gain time**;" that the ratification of any treaty on this subject was to be delayed with the view of finally eluding its performance, if any change of circumstances favorable to the French should occur in the interval.

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* Vide "Intercepted Letters from Egypt."

But

But whatever Gentlemen may think of the intention with which these offers were made, there will at least be no question with respect to the credit due to those professions by which he endeavoured to prove, in Egypt, his pacific dispositions. He expressly enjoins his successors, strongly and steadily to insist in all his intercourse with the Turks, that he came to Egypt with no hostile design, and that he never meant to keep possession of the country; while on the opposite page of the same instructions, he states in the most unequivocal manner, his regret at the discomfiture of his favorite project of colonizing Egypt, and of maintaining it as a territorial acquisition. Now, Sir, if in any note addressed to the Grand Vizier, or the Sultan, Buonaparté had claimed credit for the sincerity of his professions, that he forcibly invaded Egypt with no view hostile to Turkey, and solely for the purpose of molesting the British interests; is there any one argument now used to induce us to believe his present professions to us, which might not have been equally urged, on that occasion, to the Turkish government? would not those professions have been equally supported by solemn asseveration, by the same reference which is now made to personal character, with this single difference, that they would then have been accompanied with one instance less of that perfidy which we have had occasion to trace in this very transaction.

It is unnecessary to say more with respect to the credit due to his professions, or the reliance to be placed on his general character: But it will, perhaps, be argued, that whatever may be his character, or whatever has been his past conduct, he has now an interest in making and observing peace. That he has

an interest in making peace is at best but a doubtful proposition, and that he has an interest in preserving it is still more uncertain. That it is his interest to negotiate, I do not indeed deny; it is his interest above all to engage this country in separate negotiation, in order to loosen and dissolve the whole system of the confederacy on the Continent, to palsy, at once, the arms of Russia or of Austria, or of any other country that might look to you for support; and then either to break off his separate treaty, or if he should have concluded it, to apply the lesson which is taught in his school of policy in Egypt; and to revive, at his pleasure, those claims of indemnification which *may have been reserved to some happier period* *.

This is precisely the interest which he has in negotiation, but on what grounds are we to be convinced that he has an interest in concluding and observing a solid and permanent pacification? Under all the circumstances of his personal character, and his newly-acquired power, what other security has he for retaining that power by the sword? His hold upon France is the sword, and he has no other. Is he connected with the soil, or with the habits, the affections, or the prejudices of the country? He is a Stranger, a Foreigner, and an Usurper; he unites in his own person every thing that a pure Republican must detest; every thing that an enraged Jacobin has abjured; every thing that a sincere and faithful Royalist must feel as an insult. If he is opposed at any time in his career, what is his appeal? *He appeals to his Fortune*; in other words, to his army and his sword. Placing,

* Vide "Intercepted Letters from Egypt."

then,

then, his whole reliance upon military support, can he afford to let his military renown pass away, to let his laurels wither, to let the memory of his achievements sink into obscurity? Is it certain that, with his army confined within France, and restrained from inroads upon her neighbours, he can maintain, at his devotion, a force sufficiently numerous to support his power? Having no object but the possession of absolute dominion, no passion but military glory, is it certain, that he will feel such an interest in permanent peace, as would justify us in laying down our arms, reducing our expense, and relinquishing our means of security, on the faith of his engagements? Do we believe, that after the conclusion of peace, he would not still sigh over the lost trophies of Egypt, wrested from him by the celebrated victory of Aboukir, and the brilliant exertions of that heroic band of British seamen, whose influence and example rendered the Turkish troops invincible at *Acre?* Can he forget, that the effect of these exploits enabled Austria and Russia, in one campaign, to recover from France, all which she had acquired by his victories, to dissolve the charm, which, for a time, fascinated Europe, and to shew that their generals, contending in a just cause, could efface, even by their success, and their military glory, the most dazzling triumphs of his victorious and desolating ambition?

Can we believe, with these impressions on his mind, that, if after a year, eighteen months, or two years, of peace had elapsed, he should be tempted by the appearance of a fresh insurrection in Ireland, encouraged by renewed and unrestrained communication with France, and fomented by the fresh infusion of Jacobin principles; if we were at such a moment

without a fleet to watch the ports of France, or to guard the coasts of Ireland, without a disposeable army, or an embodied militia, capable of supplying a speedy and adequate reinforcement, and that he had suddenly the means of transporting thither a body of twenty or thirty thousand French troops: can we believe, that at such a moment his ambitious and vindictive spirit would be restrained by the recollection of engagements, or the obligation of treaty? Or, if in some new crisis of difficulty and danger to the Ottoman Empire, with no British navy in the Mediterranean, no confederacy formed, no force collected to support it, an opportunity should present itself for resuming the abandoned expedition to Egypt, for renewing the avowed and favorite project of conquering and colonizing that rich and fertile country, and of opening the way to wound some of the vital interests of England, and to plunder the treasures of the East, in order to fill the bankrupt coffers of France, would it be the interest of Buonaparté, under such circumstances, or his principles, his moderation, his love of peace, his aversion to conquest, and his regard for the independence of other nations,—would it be all, or any of these, that would secure us against an attempt, which would leave us only the option of submitting without a struggle to certain loss and disgrace, or of renewing the contest which we had prematurely terminated, and renewing it without allies, without preparation, with diminished means, and with increased difficulty and hazard?

Mr. FOX.

February 15th, 1796.

Rather than continue the war for another campaign, independent of the moral reasons against its prolongation, I would *not*, unquestionably, *give up our honour*, *our dignity*, or *our liberty*, which, 'till I die, I trust I shall never fail to assert; but, I would give up all questions of etiquette and accommodation, and in fact, every thing short of what most nearly concerns our character. *Let it not be understood* that I wish for *a dishonourable peace*, but I am sanguine enough to think, that even yet this country may have fair and honourable terms of peace. The governors of France dare not refuse any reasonable terms which we may offer; if they do, others will soon be appointed in their place, who will accept of them when peace shall be proposed. I hope and trust, however, that it will not be proposed on the dividing system, and that this country will never give its sanction to any such transaction as the infamous partition of Poland. Dearly as I love peace, and anxiously as I wish for it, that such a peace may never prevail I most heartily pray. I hope when peace shall arrive, that the interests of humanity as well as of Kings, *and that of every particular state will be consulted*, and that tranquillity will be established on the broad basis of justice, in answer to the prayers of mankind, who are now fatigued with war, slaughter, and devastation.

LORD

LORD HAWKESBURY.

April 10*th*, 1794.

Mr. *Jenkinson* (now Lord Hawkesbury) declared, That there was no expedition which had been planned by the British cabinet but what had been eminently successful. He had no difficulty in saying that *the marching to Paris was attainable and practicable, and he, for one, would recommend such an expedition.*

February 28*th*, 1801.

Lord *Hawkesbury* said, The present government of France stood upon no principles; the former governments, bad and dangerous as they were, yet were founded on republican principles, but the present had nothing to support it. There was not a man in France, whether royalist or republican, could possibly be attached to it; all parties must be hostile to it, and the French nation must see with regret and indignation their rulers deposed by *an artful and daring Corsican Adventurer.*

FINIS.

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FOR PUBLISHING

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FROM THE

ACCESSION OF LEWIS SIXTEENTH,

TO

THE PEACE OF 18**.

BY JOHN GIFFORD, Esq.

One of His Majesty's *Justices of the Peace for the Counties of Middlesex, Essex, Surry, and Kent, &c. &c.*

THIS Work will be printed in Quarto; the first Volume will be published during the Winter of 1802-3, and the subsequent Volumes will follow, with all practicable expedition. It is not possible to fix the precise extent of a publication of this nature, for which the author has been employed, for several years, in the collection of materials. While, on the one hand, it will not be extended by unnecessary dilation, on circumstances of little moment, it will not, on the other, be abridged, for the mere sake of abridgement, and to the exclusion of any useful facts, or important documents. It is certainly difficult, in the composition of a Work of such magnitude and consequence, and at such a period, wholly to divest the mind of prejudice; but the Public may rest assured, that if, spite of all his exertions, any prejudice should remain in the mind of the author, it shall not deter him from the rigid discharge of that part of his duty, which requires a fair and full exposition of facts; with a constant reference to the authorities whence they are derived. The Appendix to each volume will

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