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**LETTER**

*Belfast* TO *Samuel Clarke*  
*Instruction*

**Mr DODWELL**

Wherein all the Arguments in his *Epistolary Discourse* against the Immortality of the SOUL are particularly answered, and the Judgment of the Fathers concerning that Matter truly represented.

Together with **0-1-14**

A Defense of an Argument made use of in the above-mentioned Letter to Mr *Dodwell*, to prove the Immateriality and *Natural Immortality* of the Soul.

In *Four Letters* to the Author of *Some Remarks* on a pretended Demonstration of the Immateriality and *Natural Immortality* of the Soul, in Dr *Clark's* Answer to Mr *Dodwell's* late *Epistolary Discourse*, &c.

To which is added,

*Some Reflections* on that Part of a Book called *Amyntor*, or the Defense of *Milton's* Life, which relates to the Writings of the Primitive Fathers, and the Canon of the New Testament.

By **SAMUEL CLARKE**, D. D. Rector of *St James's Westminster*.

*The Fifth Edition.*

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L E T T E R

T O

Mr *DODWELL*, &c.

*SIR,*

**I**T is a thing of very ill Consequence, when Men of great Reputation in the World for Learning, in their Discourses upon the most important Doctrines of Religion, rashly and upon very little Grounds, allow themselves to advance new and crude Notions, and extravagant Hypotheses; which the Profane will not, and the Weak are not *able* to separate, from the principal and fundamental and most necessary Doctrines themselves.

For, as in Natural Philosophy and in the search after Physical Truth, the Systems and Hypotheses which ingenious Men invent for explaining the appearances of Nature, and which for some time are received with Applause, but afterwards are confuted by Reason and Experience; are apt to make Men think the Natural Causes of things absolutely impossible to be discovered at all; and have really such an effect upon very Many, as to make them reject for their sake, or

at least to call in question, even the certainest Truths which have been discovered by plain Experiments or clear Mathematical Demonstration it self: So in Matters of Religion likewise, the inconsiderate and groundless Notions, which Men of great Learning and much Reading, have with too little Judgment sometimes joined and intermixed with their Explications of some of the greatest and most important Doctrines of Religion; when upon due Examination, the absurdity and inconsistency of such Schemes plainly appears; have been apt to raise Doubts in many Mens Minds concerning the Truth even of the certainest Doctrines themselves, which are either the most plainly discovered by right Reason, or are most clearly delivered in Scripture.

You teach that the *Soul of Man is naturally mortal*, and will of it self perish and come to nothing, if not upheld by the extraordinary Power of God, in a praternatural way. Many, who see the imprudent Title of your Discourse, and will not take the pains to read the Book it self, will conclude that you suppose the Soul to perish at the dissolution of the Body; And all Libertines, when they *have* read and considered all that you offer, will still conclude, that if (as you grant to them) the Soul must of it self naturally perish sometime or other, there is no time so probable when it should perish, as at the dissolution of the Body; and they will easily persuade themselves to rely upon this, that God will not work a perpetual Miracle to preserve them praternaturally by his omnipotent Power, on purpose to inflict upon them an eternal Punishment, which by Nature they were not capable of undergoing.

These Mens Conclusion indeed is by no means right ; But it is such a one, as is very natural for Men of loose Principles and vicious Lives to draw from your Doctrin ; and therefore you ought to have been very careful not to give them such an Occasion of deceiving themselves, unless you had first been very sure that your Notion was either very plainly contained in Scripture, or very clearly demonstrable by right Reason : Which that it is not, I presume will appear from the following Observations.

You begin with a Distinction (*Præmon. Sect. 3.*) that the Souls of some Men are made immortal by the *Spirit* of God, to Happiness; and the Souls of some others, by the *Will* of God, to Punishment. Now what can be more precarious and groundless than this Distinction? For what real difference is there in the thing it self, between being immortalized by the *Spirit*, and by the *Will* of God ; *Eternal Life and Happiness* is indeed constantly attributed to the *Spirit of God* ; that is, those only who have the *Spirit of God*, and are *guided by it*, who obey the Will of God, and live in conformity to his holy Laws, shall be partakers of *Eternal Happiness*: And thus the *Spirit of God* is indeed necessary to qualify Men for, and to make them capable of, the *Happiness of Heaven*. But if, to make good Men capable of an *Eternal Duration* in order to that Happiness, it be necessary that the *Spirit of God* give them a new *Principle of Subsistence*, or superadd a *new Substance to their Souls* ; (as your obscure Expressions concerning *the Accession of an adscititious Spirit* &c. frequently seem to signify ; and without which, there is no other difference than only in Words, between being immortalized by the *Spirit* and by the *Will* of God ;) then nothing

can be more contrary to reason, than to suppose any Men made immortal without the addition of that new Principle; nor can any representation of God's Proceedings, be more harsh and incredible, than to suppose him by his Omnipotent *Will* and Power, eternally and miraculously preserving such Creatures unto endless Punishment, who never had in them, either *originally* or *additionally*, any *Principle of Immortality* at all. How *plainly* and how *very much* more agreeable to Reason and to our natural Notions of God is it, to say that all Creatures who shall ever undergo eternal Punishment, are such as having been created *naturally* immortal, and by wilful continuance in Sin, having so far depraved themselves as to become incapable of eternal Happiness, must consequently by the just Judgment of God fall into such Misery, as their immortal Nature so corrupted necessarily makes them liable to. When we speak of the Soul as created *naturally* immortal, we mean that it is by the *Divine Pleasure* created such a Substance, as not having in it self any Composition, or any Principles of Corruption, will *naturally* or *of it self* continue for ever; that is, will not by any natural decay, or by any Power of Nature, be dissolved or destroyed; But yet nevertheless depends continually upon God, who has power to destroy or annihilate it, if he should so think fit. When therefore you say that the *Original of the Immortality of such Souls as shall be eternally punished, may be more agreeably derived from the Divine Pleasure, than from the Nature of the Soul*; it thereby you mean that the Soul was made immortal by the *mere pleasure* of God, in opposition to its being immortal by the *necessity of its own Nature*, in the sense that God is immortal; then indeed



not *Plato* only, but all others also that ever held the Immortality of the Soul, have been and are of the same Opinion: But if by those Words you mean, as through the whole of your Discourse you expressly declare, that the Soul was created mortal, but by the Divine Omnipotence is upheld eternally; then it is, on the contrary, evidently far more agreeable to right Reason and to our Notions of God, to derive the Immortality of the Soul, and especially of a miserable one, from its *own Nature*, than from the *Divine Pleasure*; that is, to suppose the Soul to have been at first created such a Substance, as by the ordinary concurrence of Divine Providence would continue for ever; than that it was created of a mortal and perishable Nature, but by the extraordinary and miraculous Power of God, is continually supported, only to endure Torment and Punishment, beyond the capacity of its own Nature, to all Eternity.

There cannot easily be made a worse representation of God's dealings with Mankind, than what you affirm (*Premon. Sect. 4.*) that *if the Devils had not fallen, there had been no Hell at all; and that Mankind is no otherwise concerned in it, than as, by joining themselves to the Devil's Party, they intitle themselves also to his Punishment.* 'Tis true, the Fire of Hell was *first and originally* prepared for the Devils, because they were the *first and original* Offenders. But to say that, without their Fall, there *never* would have been *any* Hell at all; and that the same or equal Punishment should not then have been inflicted upon Wicked Men for the same Crimes, as there now shall; is representing God like an Arbitrary Tyrant, who without caring to make an exact, equal, and particular distribution of Justice, deals with all

Offenders of all ranks and degrees alike, because they have all *interpretatively* joined in opposing his Authority.

You affirm expressly (*ibid.*) that the Soul does *not depend on our gross Organical Bodies, nor perishes upon its dissolution from those Bodies.* I beseech you, if the Soul be such a Substance as is incapable of being hurt by so great a change and dissolution, as is caused in us by a violent Death, suppose by Fire; upon what Principle can it be imagined to be naturally mortal; or what Revolutions in Nature will it not be able to resist and supervive? You explain this further, by saying, that *Mens Souls do not so depend on any other created Being, but that they may still continue in their duration, whatsoever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleased still to continue that ordinary Providence, which is essentially necessary for their continuance.* And is not this the very definition of *Immortality?* or did ever any Man mean more than this, when he affirmed the Soul to be *naturally Immortal?* You distinguish it indeed from the *Natural Immortality of Angels;* but by such a *distinction,* as includes not in it any the least *difference.* For what difference is there between affirming concerning *Angels,* that *it is in the Power and Pleasure of God, to annihilate them when he thinks fit;* and concerning *Humane Souls,* that *they do not so depend on any other created Beings, but that they may still continue in their Duration, whatsoever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleased still to continue that ordinary Providence, which is essentially necessary for their Preservation?* And yet in the very next Words, you very inconsistently imagine the Soul as being a mere *Flatus,* to have a more immediate Dependence on God than  
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other Creatures, than even the meanest Particles of lifeless Matter have; which must make it cease to be, whenever he is pleas'd to cease to breath it; as being unable to continue its Duration, by the Powers given it at its first Production, and the continuance of those general Influences which are requisite for the support of Created Beings in general. According to these last Words, the Soul not being so much as a Substance of any kind at all, is likely to be more effectually destroyed by Death, than even the Body it self. Whereas according to the Words just preceding, your Scheme ought to have been on the contrary, that the Soul is by Nature Immortal, and must be mortalized by the Omnipotence of God, if ever it perish; and not, that it is by Nature Mortal, and must be immortalized by a new Act of Omnipotence, to enable it to subsist for ever. So that here, you seem to have framed no consistent Notion even of your own Scheme.

What you advance (*Præmon. Sect. 5.*) concerning its not having been culpable to hold communication and joyn with the Devil, before the Publication of the Gospel; and that the Devil was not to be looked upon as a publick Enemy, before his being declared so by the Gospel; is so extravagant, that it needs no Confutation. Was not the Devil an Enemy when he tempted our first Parent? And was he not publickly declared to be so, in the Curse pronounced to him thereupon? Is not the Devil described as a publick Enemy to God and good Men, in the History of *Job*? And as an Enemy to *Israel*, *1 Chron. 21, 1*? Or was he known to be an Enemy in *Temporal* Affairs only, (*Præmon. pag. 41.*) and could not be known to be so in things relating to the Life to come? Or had the Patriarchs,

triarchs, no expectation at all of a *better City* to come, after the present *Tabernacle* was dissolved? Is not *Idolatry* in the Old Testament constantly branded with as severe a character of *Rebellion* against God, as in the New? And in the Heathen World, before the Gospel was begun to be preached, (though *the times of that Ignorance* God did indeed *wink at*, that is, would not be so severe in punishing them, as those who should afterwards sin against greater Light;) yet was it no Crime to *worship the Creature more than the Creator*? was it no Fault that the World did *κείσθαι ἐν τῷ πνεύματι*, lie under entire subjection to the *Evil One*, 1 Joh. 5. 19? and in the *Power of Satan*, Acts 26, 18? Were not the abominable Rites of the Heathen, plainly a sacrificing to Devils? And do not all the Ancient Fathers, for whose Judgment you express so great an esteem, suppose in all their Writings against the Pagans, that before the proposing of the Gospel to them, they ought to have known from the Light of Nature and Right Reason, that those impure Spirits whose worship was attended with all manner of bestiality and wickedness, were professed Enemies to God and Goodness? Nay, does not St. Paul himself expressly affirm, that *That which may be known of God, was manifest enough to them, to have preserved them from Idolatry?* and that, because *they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, but changed the Truth of God into a Lie, for that Reason God gave them up unto vile affections, &c.*

Nor is it less absurd, to found (as you do in the same place) the Heinousness of Sin and the Reasonableness of the Severity of its Punishment, principally upon its being *interpreted* as a joyning with the Devil. Idolatry indeed, and Witchcraft,

Witchcraft, and Profane Scoffing at God and all Religion, may justly enough come directly under this Charge; and all other Sins also may in effect and in event, not improperly be looked upon as a promoting the Interest of the Devil, and an opposing the establishment of the Kingdom of God. But to make the *formal Reason*, the heinousness and demerit, not only of Idolatry, Witchcraft and Profane open Opposition of Religion, but also of all other Sins whatsoever, to consist not so much in the original depravity of the Actions themselves, in their contrariety to Right Reason, and to the Light of Nature and Conscience, in their opposition to the Nature and Will and Law and Authority of God, as in their being *interpretatively* a joyning and communication with the Devil; To suppose God inflicting upon Men such a Punishment, not as their Sins deserve in their own Nature, and such as the Nature of their own Souls makes them capable of falling into by wilful and obstinate corruption and depravation of themselves, but such as\* is *disproportionable to their Nature*, and † *exceeding the natural Powers of their degree of Being*; and to account for this, only by saying, that Christ *will so interpret* their not joyning with Him, as if they had joyned themselves to the Devil; Is not all this, to make God, in the hardest Sense, act *\* arbitrarily*?

\* *Præmon.*  
 † *Ibid.* p. 23.

Your Interpretation of Rom. 2, 12. and of Job. 3, 19. (*Præmon. Sect. 6.*) is so loose and Groundless, that *any Text* may in the same manner be brought to prove *any thing*, or rather no *Text* can really prove *any thing* at all. For if when St. Paul says, Rom. 2, 12. *that as many as have sinned without Law, shall also perish without Law; and as many as have sinned in the Law, shall be judged by* the

\* *Præmon.*  
 † *Ibid.* p. 27.

*the Law*; the Word *perish* be not evidently Synonymous to being *judged or condemned*, and signifies that every Sinner's Condemnation or Punishment shall be proportionable to the heinousness of his Sin with respect to the Light he sinned against; but on the contrary from the Word [*ἀπολλύνται*] *shall perish*, it can be concluded that the Persons spoken of shall only barely cease to be, in opposition to the Word [*κρίθῆσονται*] *shall be judged or condemned*; It will follow equally from the use of the same Word in other places of Scripture, that neither Rejecters of the Gospel, nor wicked Christians, nor even the Devils themselves, shall be condemned to any other Punishment, than bare ceasing to be: For of all these it is said in several Places of Scripture, that [*ἀπολλύνται*] *they shall perish or be destroyed*: And thus you unwarily overthrow all the Threatnings of the Gospel. Again, if when our Saviour says, *Joh. 3. 19. that This is the condemnation, that Light is come into the World, and Men love Darkness rather than Light*: his plain meaning be not this, that the clear Revelation of the Will of God made to Mankind in the Gospel, and the express denunciation of his Wrath against Sin, is the great Aggravation of impenitence, and that which makes Men obstinately continuing in their Sins utterly inexcusable, and their condemnation evidently most just, because they cannot now pretend ignorance of their Duty; but the Words [*ἡ αὐτὴ ἢ κρίσις*] *This is the Condemnation*, must signify a particular Kind of Punishment to be inflicted upon Men for *Associating with the Devil* as being the *Prince of Darkness*; I cannot see but by the same Liberty, any Asserter of any new Opinion may interpret any part of Scripture so as to countenance

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tenance any the most groundless Fancy or Imagination whatsoever.

Is it not a very weak Hypothesis, to imagine that the Souls of Men must needs be naturally Mortal, because otherwise God would not know how to dispose of the Souls of the Heathen; *since there cannot be any third Eternal State, suitable to the Nature of a Rational Soul; neither happy, nor miserable; as there must be, if those Souls be naturally Immortal?* (Præmon. p 43.) Is not the Universe large enough, for God to dispose of all his Creatures into States suitable to their Natures? Are there not in Gods *House many Mansions?* Or will Heaven and Hell be two such Places, in which there will be no Differences of States, no Space for Order and variety of degrees? Does not our Saviour himself expressly tell us, that they who *knew not their Masters will, and yet did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes?* And does not St. Paul, in the whole 2d Chapter to the Romans, plainly declare that Gentiles as well as Jews shall be judged according to their Works?

The rest of your Præmonition, being upon a different Subject, I forbear to consider at this time.

**I**N the Discourse it self (Sect 2.) you propose a most dark and unintelligible Notion, concerning [*ψυχή* and *πνεῦμα*] *Soul and Spirit*; not only distinguishing the *rational Soul* from the *sensitive*; which was the Philosophy of many of the Antients; but moreover making the *Spirit* different from both, and wholly præternatural to Man. The whole *natural Soul* (*ψυχή*) including both the *sensitive* and *Rational* part, (which

(which you elfewhere call the two Souls, pag. 220,) you fuppofe to be of it felf mortal, but to be made immortal in good Chriftians by the addition of the *Spirit*, (by the *Acceffion of an Adfcititious Spirit*, as you fometimes exprefs it) and in the Rejecters of the Gofpel to be made immortal without it. If by the *Spirit* you mean only an *Operation* of the Spirit of God upon our Souls, then (as I obferved before) there is no real difference between being immortalized by the *Spirit* and by the *Will* of God. But if by the *Spirit* you mean the addition of a new Substance or Principle of Subfiftence to the Souls of good Chriftians in order to immortalize them, which yet in them that reject the Gofpel are immortalized without that addition; is not this juft fuch another fuppofition, as if you fhould fuppofe the *Underftanding* to be one Substance in a Man, and the *Will* another, and the *Habit of Virtue* a third; notwithstanding that at the fame time it be confefled that all thefe things may be Faculties or Powers of one and the fame Substance? And your perverting the Words of St Paul to ferve your obfcure Hypothefis is very grofs. Does St Paul when he diftinguiſhes the *natural Body* [*ψυχικὸν σῶμα*] from the *Spiritual Body* [*πνευματικὸν σῶμα*] and calls the one *corruptible*, the other *incorruptible*; mean that the *natural Body* [*ψυχικὸν σῶμα*] is therefore *corruptible* or *mortal*, becaufe the *Soul* [*ψυχή*] or *Principle of Life* which is in it, is it felf a \* *mortal Principle*? or that the *Spiritual Body* [*πνευματικὸν σῶμα*] is made *incorruptible* by the fuperaddition of a *Spirit* to the Soul that animates it? The plain meaning of St Paul is only this, that the Body which in this prefent ftate is diffolvable and *corruptible*, fhall after the Refurrection, by the Power of

\* Pag. 2.



of God, be made *incorruptible*; without having any respect at all to the *Soul*, or the *Nature* of it, in his whole Discourse. Again, when St Paul derives our Title to the *Resurrection* of the *Body*, wholly from Christ; does he thereby mean to affirm, that, without the Resurrection of Christ, the *Souls* of Men must also have ceased to exist? On the contrary, for that very reason, because the *Souls* of Men would not have ceased to exist; therefore Christ thought them of value to redeem them from Misery, by the Purchase of his Blood, by his Death and Resurrection. And 'tis the worst representation of Christianity, that can be; something that might indeed \* *be thought hard dealing*; to suppose\* Pag. 5. (as you do) that the Gospel of Christ, which is every where in Scripture represented as the greatest Instance of God's tender Mercy and Compassion towards Men, should upon the whole so *very disproportionably* increase the Misery of sinful Men, as that whoever disbelieved or neglected that new Offer of Grace and Favour, should from thenceforth be condemned to everlasting Torments; notwithstanding that otherwise Sin, in its own Nature, against the Light of Reason and Conscience and the natural Law of God, was so little heinous, that had it not been for the Offer of this new extraordinary Grace and Favour, they that had lived in the utmost contempt of God and of his natural and eternal Law written in their Hearts, and in the most unrestrained practice of all possible wickedness, might have been safe from the fear of any other danger, than that of perishing finally by a natural Mortality.

Your

Your Conclusion from our Saviour's description of the last Judgment, *Mat. 25.* is very extraordinary; [*Sect. 3;*] that because the *rewardableness* of the good Works of the Righteous, is there ascribed to their having been done for *Christ's* sake; therefore no other *Persons* shall be concerned in that Judgment but those to whom the Gospel had been made known. You might exactly as well have concluded, that because *Charity* and *Uncharitableness* are the only particular Actions there mentioned, for which Men shall be adjudged to Reward or Punishment; therefore no regard shall be had to any other *Virtues* or *Crimes* in that final Judgment. It is evident by comparing other places of Scripture, that all kinds of *Actions* shall then be examined; and it is as evident, that all sorts of *Persons* shall be so too. Those who never heard of the Gospel, 'tis true, cannot be judged by the *same Rule or Form*, as those who did hear of it; But is it not very wonderful, to conclude from thence, that because

\* *Pag. 7.* \* *such persons must be judged by another form not fully and expressly (suppose) mentioned in Scripture, therefore that form cannot at all be known, what it is; and if that form could not be known, yet that therefore it ought not to be believed that there is any such form at all? Does not the same Light of Reason, which makes Men a Law to themselves, necessarily discover also to them at the same time what Rule they shall be judged by? Neither is it true therefore, that no such Form can be proved from the Scriptures: For does not St Paul, in the whole 2d Chapter to the Romans, largely declare that there is such a Form, and also what that Form is? And does not the Scripture every where plainly suppose,*

pose, that the Judgment shall be universal? The Phrase of *judging the World*, Acts 17, 31, manifestly implies it; and the opposition between Death and Judgment, *Heb. 9, 27*, though the stress of the Apostles Argument does not indeed lie upon it, and the universal particle [*All*] is not added, yet very evidently supposes the Judgment to extend to the very same Persons as Death doth. And what difference is there, between saying that 'tis appointed for *Men* once to die, or that 'tis appointed for *All Men* once to die? It is not a just answer here, to say that Universal Assertions are frequently in Scripture to be understood in a limited Sense. That can only be so, when either the common acceptation of the words, evidently limits their signification; as in that place you mention, *Job. 12, 19*; or when some other parallel places of Scripture, expressly add a Limitation. Where this is not the case, as it is not in the phrase of Gods *judging the World*, Acts 17, 31; the same expression being in all other places of Scripture likewise universal; if limitations may be added arbitrarily and at pleasure, there will then be no way left to distinguish at all, when any declaration is to be looked upon as *universal*, and when as only *particular*. You your self are forced to allow the Jews, who lived before our Saviours coming, to be concerned in the Judgment; and not them only, but also Others who lived before the Law, in the Times of *Noah* and the Patriarchs; because (pag. 11,) *as they were intitled to the Spirit; in Reversion, so they might be intitled to the Consequences of the Spirit, one of which is Immortality.* I suppose you will easily grant, that the Knowledge many of these Men had of Christ, was

but implicit and very obscure : And if that was sufficient to intitle them to Immortality, why is it not as easie to suppose that the Promise God made to *Adam* might intitle all Mankind to have some benefit of the Redemption purchased by Christ, according to their different proportions and capacities, tho' they never heard of him explicitly ?

It may here be observed also by the by, that, according to your obscure and indeed confused manner of expressing your self, you in this Section (pag. 8,) suppose *the Holy Spirit to immortalize Men to Punishment* ; and again (pag. 31,) that Men are qualified for the higher degree of Punishment, by the Accession of the *adscititious Spirit*, *whi b* makes them *ισάλληλοι* : Not very consistently with your first distinction, (*Præmon. Sect. 2.*) that the actually immortalizing Souls to Punishment, may better be ascribed to the *Pleasure* of God, than to the *Divine Spirit*. Unless you will say, that bad Men within the Covenant, are immortalized to Punishment by one Principle; and bad Men without the Covenant, or Rejecters of it, immortalized to Punishment by another Principle. And so there is no end of vain and groundless Imaginations.

That there shall be, as you say, (*Sect. 4.*) a very great difference in the Punishment of those who resist and reject the Gospel, from what it would have been if they had never heard of the Gospel; is undoubtedly very true. But does it from thence

+ pag. 11.  
& 12.

\* pag. 13.

follow, that God did not † oblige Men at all to worship himself, before any revealed Religion was instituted? Because the \* Scripture does indeed every where suppose the Condition of those who resist  
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*the Gospel dispensation worse than that of the worst sort of Criminals who never heard of the Gospel; does it from thence follow, that they that never heard of the Gospel, had therefore no concern at all in the final judgment? Because our Saviour declares that it shall be more tolerable for Sodom and Gomorrah in the Day of Judgment, than for those who rejected the Gospel when offered them; does it from thence follow, that those wicked People shall not be cast into \* outer dark-<sup>†</sup>ness at all? When our Saviour threatens that Carpernaum, which was exalted to Heaven, should be brought down to Hell; is it not a very extraordinary Interpretation of the meaning of those Words, and as wonderful an Inference from them, to conclude that those People, if our Saviour had not preached to them, would have † had no reason to fear the Punishment of Hell at all? An unprejudiced Person would rather conclude on the contrary, that for that very reason, because they were in danger of it, therefore our Saviour preached to them and exhorted them to repent and flee from the wrath to come. Lastly, if they that never heard of the Gospel, shall not indeed for their Unbelief be sentenced to || that Hell, which || was prepared for the Devil and his Angels; that is, to the same Degree of Punishment with those who reject or disobey the Gospel; yet does it at all from thence follow, that they shall have no concern in the general Judgment, upon account of their having obeyed or disobeyed the Law of Nature?*

The Case (See 6.) of that Text in St John, John 5, 28 and 29; *The Hour is coming, in the which all that are in the Graves shall hear his Voice,*

and shall come forth, they that have done good, unto the Resurrection of Life, and they that have done evil, unto the Resurrection of Damnation, is exactly the same with that before-mentioned, *Acts* 17, 31. The Words are *universal*; and the Instances you bring of other *universal* Affirmations, which must be understood in a *limited* Sense, have not the least similitude with the Text you are considering. If the *Gibeonites universal* Declaration to David, that for them he should not kill any Man in Israel, must needs indeed be understood in a *limited* Sense, because they themselves expressly *limited* it by demanding seven of Saul's Posterity to be deliver'd to them to be put to death: If *Abab's* sending to all Nations and Kingdoms to search for *Elijab*, must indeed of necessity, in the Nature of the thing it self, be understood only of those that bordered upon him; If *St Paul's universal* Declaration, that he baptized none of the *Corinthians*, must indeed be understood with an *exception*; because he himself in the very next Words adds an *exception* expressly: Is it just to infer from these Instances, that our Saviour's *universal* Affirmation in this place, concerning the Resurrection, may likewise be understood in a *limited* Sense, though neither in the Nature of the thing it self, nor from the Context, there be any the least Ground for such limitation? Nay though on the contrary, all the parallel Texts, which are very many, be likewise *universal*? It is a wonderful thing, to see in what manner *Learned* Men can argue, when *Prejudices* prevail over their *Judgment*.

Y<sup>our</sup>

Your 7th Section, to ordinary Understandings, seems to be mere Confusion. You suppose Man to consist of three distinct parts, *Body, Soul and Spirit*: But they who made this distinction, supposed these three parts to be in all Men by Nature; which will not serve your purpose. You bring in Plato distinguishing Mind [Νῆς] from [Ψυχή] Soul, and making the one mortal, the other immortal: But this likewise, being spoken concerning the natural Formation of all Men, is nothing to your purpose; For in your Hypothesis, you make the whole Man by nature Mortal. You mention Plato here (pag. 22 and 24, and again pag. 59 & 96, and *Præmon* pag. 21,) as avouring your own Notions: And yet in other places, (as pag. 33, 60, & 66,) you inconsistently speak of him as justly blamed for holding the contrary Opinion, for asserting Our Doctrine of the Souls natural Immortality, pag. 33. You affirm (pag. 23,) that there is no real difference between the Platonical Notions and those of the New Testament, only that That which the Platonists call Mind [Νῆς] and make it Immortal, the Sacred Writers call [πνεῦμα] Spirit, as being the Divine Breathing, Gen. 2. 7: Here you openly contradict your self, making the immortal [πνεῦμα] Spirit, common to all Men by their original Formation, and confounding it with what you elsewhere so \* often, in allusion to \* *Præmon.* that very Text, distinguish by the Name [πνοή] <sup>pag. 21 &</sup> *Breath*, and make it mortal. You bring in *Philo* <sup>25: and</sup> distinguishing the Immortal Soul from the <sup>in the Dis-</sup> *sen-* <sup>course it</sup> *sible formed Man*, as you darkly express it; But <sup>self,</sup> *pag.* even this also is directly against you: For *Philo* <sup>160 and</sup> opposing the immortal Mind of Man, that is, <sup>216.</sup> the

the rational Soul, both to the Body and to the sensitive Soul, still speaks of them all as *original* and *natural* Parts of the Man; and therefore when you apply to your Hypothesis of an *adscititious Spirit*, what he says concerning this [*πνεῦμα θεῖον*] *Divine Spirit or Soul* infused into Man by God's *breathing*. Gen. 2. 7; you again directly contradict your self, by contounding the Spirit [*πνεῦμα*] which you suppose immortal, with the [*πνεῦμα*] *Breath* or *Soul* which you make to be mortal. You cite (pag. 26) the Words of *Aratus*, Τὸ θεῖον ἐστὶν ἄσπετον as approved by *St Paul*, Acts 17, 28: *But* if those Words prove any thing, they prove directly against you: For *θεῖον* εἶναι, if it signifies any thing, signifies *Offspring of God* in that Sense which you oppose, (pag. 66.) And though you are pleased to understand them (pag. 66.) only of those that are immortalized by receiving or rejecting the Gospel, yet *St Paul* on the contrary as plainly applies them to all that *dwell on the Face of the Earth*, as it could be expressed in Words.

In the same Section, (pag. 22.) you call it a *precarious Fancy*, to make every cause of Motion distinct from Matter, to be properly what we call a Spirit, Independent on Matter, and Immortal: Here you seem to suppose the Soul of Man, to be something distinct from Matter; yet not a Spirit, nor Independent on Matter, least from thence it should follow that it was naturally immortal. In your Præmonition, p. 25. you make the Soul, as being a mere *Flatus*, to have a more precarious subsistence, even than mere Matter it self, saying that it is unable to continue its own Duration by the Powers given it at its first Production, and the continuance of those general Influences



fluences which are requisite for the support of Created Beings in general: Yet in the same page (as I observed before) you say that Souls do not so depend on any other Created Being, but that they may still continue in their Duration, whatsoever other created Influences be withdrawn from them, if God be pleased still to continue that ordinary Providence which is essentially necessary for their continuance: This is making them properly Immortal. In the *Discourse* it self, pag. 51, you suppose again that the Soul may depend on Matter, as to its Being and Preservation, though it be not a Modification of Matter, but distinct from it: Here you express your self, as if you thought it a Substantial Form, a contradictory Chimera, which arose merely from the misconstruction of a Greek Word in *Aristotle*, signifying indifferently either Substantial or Essential: And again, pag. 91, you suppose in like manner, that the Soul is something distinct both from Spirit, and also from Matter and Motion; that is to say, a Material Form; an active Substantial Principle, distinct from Matter, yet depending on Matter, in esse, in fieri, in operari, and which must accordingly be dissolved on the dissolution of that Matter on which it depends. In pag. 220, you suppose, on the other hand, the Two Souls (as you call them) to be not only distinct, but also separable: And pag. 218, you seem to incline to the Notion of those Philosophers, who owned the *πνεύμα* to be material like the steams of odoriferous Bodies; Which Consideration alone, you say, is sufficient to cut it off from any pretensions to any proper natural Immortality. Is not all this, the greatest Extravagancy and Confusion that can be? Did not the World know you to be a serious Person, these things would look

much more like the Raillery of an Unbeliever, than the Reasonings of one that in earnest intended to establish any consistent Notion. In reality, That the Soul cannot possibly be *Material*, is evident not only from the consideration of its noble Faculties, Capacities and Improvements, its large Comprehension and Memory ; its Judgment, Power of Reasoning, and Moral Faculties ; which Arguments have been urged with unanswerable Strength by the wisest and most considerate Men in all Ages from the times of *Socrates* and *Plato* to this very Day ; but the same thing is moreover demonstrable from the single consideration, even of bare Sense or Conscientiousness it self. For *Matter* being a divisible Substance, consisting always of separable, nay of actually separate and distinct parts, 'tis plain, that unless it were essentially Conscious, in which case every particle of Matter must consist of innumerable separate and distinct Conscientiousnesses, no System of it in any possible Composition or Division, can be an individual Conscious Being : For, suppose three or three hundred Particles of Matter, at a Mile or any given distance one from another ; is it possible that all those separate parts should in that State be one individual Conscious Being ? Suppose then all these Particles brought together into one System, so as to touch one another ; will they thereby, or by any Motion or Composition whatsoever, become any whit less truly distinct Beings, than they were when at the greatest distance ? How then can their being disposed in any possible System, make them one individual conscious Being ? If you will suppose God by his infinite Power superadding Conscientiousness to the united

Particles, yet still those Particles, being really and necessarily as distinct Beings as ever, cannot be themselves the Subject in which that individual Consciousness inheres, but the Consciousness can only be superadded by the addition of Something, which in all the Particles must still itself be but one individual Being. The Soul therefore, whose Power of Thinking is undeniably one Individual Consciousness, cannot possibly be a *Material Substance*. And if it be neither *Matter* nor any *Modification of Matter*, than (though you are pleased to † affirm somewhat † pag. 51, rashly, and without offering any reason for your affirmation, that such Reasoning is far from being *Self-evident*, yet it is really as notoriously *Self-evident* as any thing in Nature, that it cannot possibly depend upon *Matter*, as to its *Being and Preservation*. For if even one particle of *Matter* cannot possibly depend upon another, as to its *Being and Preservation*, (which I believe you will confess to be *Self-evident*;) because they are each of them distinct Beings; must it not be even yet less possible, for a Being which is neither *Matter* it self, nor a *Modification of Matter*, but intirely *distinct* from *Matter*, (pag. 51;) to depend on *Matter* as to its *Being and Preservation*?

It is not indeed of any great Moment in the present dispute; but it seems to show in general something of hast and inconsistency in your Notions; what you affirm concerning the Giants, (Sect. 8.) who you say, descended from the *Sons of Seth* and the *Daughters of Cain*; and yet in the very same Paragraph you call them the *Offspring of the fallen Angels*; and, upon their account, make two *defections* of Angels, one before the Fall of *Adam*, the other before the Flood.

You

You proceed ( *Señ. 9* ) to the Authority of the Fathers. *Justin Martyr*, whom you begin with, says indeed expressly, that the Soul ought not properly to be called *Immortal*: But this he says, not as you represent him, in opposition to our Doctrine, nor yet in opposition to *Plato*, but in opposition to the extravagant Notions of

† *Ἐὶ ἀθάνατος ὅτι ψυχὴ, ἀγέννητος ἀπαράρητος. Ἄγ ἐν κείνῳ δὲ καὶ ἀθάνατος ὅτι καὶ πᾶσι θεογράμμοις πλατωνικῶς.*  
*Dialog, cum. Tryph.*

\* *Ἀναγκη καὶ πᾶσι ψυχᾶς θεογράμμοις-- ὅτι ἀεὶ ἀθάνατοι.*  
*ibid.*

† *Μόνος ὁ ἀγέννητος καὶ ἀθάνατος ὁ Θεός. ibid.*

some † *pretended Platonists*, who taught such an *Immortality* as implied *necessity of existence*. For the reason he gives why Souls ought not to be called *Immortal*, is because \* *they had a beginning, and depend continually upon God for the Preservation of their Being*. In which Sense, neither are *Angels* *Immortal*; but † *God only*. All that he says therefore, does not in the least imply, but that the

Soul may be such a substance, as is able to continue its own Duration for ever, by the Powers given it at its first Production, and the continuance of those general Influences which are requisite for the support of Created Beings in general: Which is all that we mean by *natural Immortality*. Nay, that he did actually think the Soul to be in this sense *Immortal*, may justly be gathered from those very words which you your self cite from him: *Ὅτι αὐτὸς μὲν καὶ φθαρτὸς. &c.* *What Plato thought concerning the World, that it must needs indeed be in its Nature capable of being destroyed and brought to an End, because it had a Beginning; yet that God would never actually*

destroy it : The same may be thought concerning the Soul, and concerning all things that are or can be, excepting only God himself (*διὰ τὴν ἐξαρτιότητά*) that they are capable of being destroyed : Which last words seem clearly to explain what he means by the word [*φθαρτὸν*] corruptible, which he applies not only to the Soul of Man, but also to all Created Beings whatsoever; namely, not to signify any Tendency to Corruption in the Nature of the thing it self, but only a Dependence upon the Will of God, in opposition to Self-existence. He does indeed say, that the Souls of the Damned shall continue to exist *as long as God thinks fit*; and implies as if he thought they should finally be destroyed, after very long Punishment : But this, not by a natural Mortality, but by the Will of God, who is as able to destroy if he thinks fit, as to create : Which Opinion, if there was any ground for it, would yet signify nothing at all to your purpose.

*Tertius* Opinion, if it was of any Authority, would prove too much for you. For he fancied that the Soul was dissolved with the Body, and rose again with it at the Resurrection. This part you pleasantly call his *Humane Reasoning* (*Señ. 10;*) as if you thought all the rest of what he says in the very same Sentence, was *immediately Divine*. Yet even *He* also is expressly against you. For as he makes *all* Souls to die with the Body, so he makes them *all* to rise again with it also; leaving none of them in their natural Mortality; but raising them all either to eternal Happiness, or [*δύνασιν δὲ πίνακας ἐν ἀδύναστοις λαμβάνουσι*] to immortal Punishment.

*Irenæus* is so very full and exprefs against you, and your perverting of his words so very gross, that with the same liberty any person might easily make any Author seem to countenance any Heresy or absurd Opinion whatsoever, even from the very Words themselves, wherein he with all possible clearness expresses himself against it. The Passages which you your self cite, are as clear and plain as can be desired. He in exprefs words (as you your self cite them,) declares the

\* Quæ sunt natura immortalia; quibus a sua natura adest vivere. *lib. 5. c. 4. o* † *ibid.* c. 7.

Soul to \* *be immortal in its own Nature*, and affirms that it does † *not die*. To evade this, you suppose he means only, that the Soul

does not *die in the same Manner* that the Body does, namely by *ceasing to breathe*; A more surprising evasion could not possibly have been invented; His Words, which the Reader would expect you should have transcribed at length,

~ Hæc [ *caro* ] enim est, quæ morietur & solvitur; sed non Anima, neq; Spiritus. Mori enim, est vitam amittere habilitatem, & sine Spiramine in potterum, & inanimalem & immobilem fieri, & deperire in illa, ex quibus & initium substantiæ habuit. Hoc autem neq; Animæ evenit; illa est enim vitæ: neq; Spiritui; incorporeus est enim & simplex Spiritus, qui resolvi non potest, *lib. 5. c. 7.*

are these; that † *'tis the Body only that dies, not the Soul: For, to die, is to lose the Powers of Life; Breath, Sense and Motion; and to be separated into its first Principles of Composition; which the Soul, the Flatus vitæ, and the Spirit which is a simple and un compounded and indissoluble substance, cannot be: is not the word [ *Spiramen* ] Breath, in this Sentence an excellent ground for your dissenting by denying that the Soul dies, does not mean to deny that it dies,*

finction; that Soul dies, does

dies, but only to deny that it dies in the same Manner the Body does, viz. by ceasing to breathe?

Again, He expressly affirms that † the Soul and Spirit is not mortal : By this you say he means only, that the Soul does not actually die when the Body dies ; but, be-

\* \*Οὐτε δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ θνήσκει, ἕτε το πνεῦμα, lib. 5. 13. as the Words are cited by you : & lib. 5. 7, almost the same Words again.

ing ashamed of this Interpretation, you add immediately, that he means also further, that the Soul in its own Nature, does not consist of contrary Principles, tending to a Dissolution by its own Nature, as the Body does : This is expressly giving up the whole Question ; and directly contrary to what you add presently after, that Death is natural to the Soul on account of its natural Constitution. It is here further to be observed also, that these last words which you your self cite out of Irenæus, that the Soul and Spirit is not Mortal, [ἕτε ἡ ψυχὴ ἕτε το πνεῦμα,] are directly contradictory to the Notion you advance, pag. 3, concerning [σῶμα ψυχικόν] the natural Body's being therefore opposed to [πνευματικόν] 1 Cor. 15, 44, because it has only a Mortal Principle [ψυχὴ] in it ; and also directly contradictory to what you insinuate pag. 41, concerning Irenæus's understanding [πνοὴ ζωῆς] the Breath of Life, Gen. 2, 7, to be, what You all along would distinguish it to be, a Mortal Principle : Which he is indeed so far from ~~from~~ doing, that, on the contrary, he, in that very Chapter from whence you have taken most of your Citations, declares [ψυχὴ] the Soul, not to be mortal, for \* that very reason because it is [πνοὴ ζωῆς] the Breath of Life, Gen. 2, 7. Notwithstanding that he does indeed, at the same time, con-

\* Quæ sunt ergo mortalia corpora? nunquidam Animæ? Sed incorruptibiles Animæ quantum ad comparationem mortalium corporum. Insuffici enim in faciem hominis tradistinguish

Deus flatum vite (Gen. 2, 7.) & factus est in animam viventem; *Flatus autem vite*, in corporalis est. Sed ne mortalem quidem possunt dicere hominem ipsum flatum vite existentem. Et propter hoc David ait; & anima mea illi viver; tanquam immortalis substantia una ejus existente. *lib. 5. c. 7.*

tradistinguish it, as St. Paul does, from πνεῦμα ζωοποιῶν; The πνεῦμα ζωοποιῶν being plainly with him, as it is with St. Paul, that divine Power which Spiritualizes and Immortalizes, not the Soul, but the *Body*, at the Resurrection.

*Irenæus* does indeed, with other Antient Writers, allow, that whatever is γεννητόν or had a beginning, must be φθαρτόν, that is, as *Justin Martyr* expresses it, ὅτιον τε ἐξαφανισθῆναι, capable of being destroyed. But this is only meant (as the Antithesis of the Words [γεννητόν] and [φθαρτόν] evidently shows) of the Nature of the Soul as opposed, together with that of Angels and of all other the highest Created Beings whatsoever, to That Immortality which arises from *Necessity of Existence*, which must needs be peculiar to God alone; Which is nothing to your purpose.

I cannot see how you collect any thing at all from *Athenagoras*, (*Se7. 12*) He does indeed distinguish Νῆς; from ψυχή according to the old Philosophy; but he does not found any thing upon that distinction, which is in the least to your purpose. He neither affirms the *Soul* to be mortal, nor makes any doubt but the *Bodies* of all Men shall rise again unto Judgment. All you pretend to gather from him, is, that the *Soul* is not it self sufficient to immortalize the *Body*: But to this you have your self given a full answer, that *No Body* ever thought it was.



The Words you cite from *Theophilus Antiochenus*, (Sect. 13,) relate wholly to the Question concerning the state of *Adam* in Paradise, whether he was created Mortal or Immortal in that State: Nothing therefore can be gathered from thence, concerning the Nature of a separate Soul.

*Theophilus* determines, that He was neither Mortal nor Immortal

\* originally by his Creation; that is (as you your self explain it, pag. 46.) God neither design'd for him *Corporal Death*, nor *Corporal Immortality*; but he was capable of being either, according as he should behave himself: But whether *Adam* before his Fall was in that Sense naturally immortal, or naturally

mortal; what is this to the Soul? which, supposing *Adam* never so mortal, you your self acknowledge does not perish by that Mortality which denominates a Man Mortal, that is, the Dissolution of the Body.

His saying that from that Text, *Gen. 2, 7*, most Men [*ωλειονες*] stiled the Soul immortal; does not imply (as you imagine) that *Theophilus* himself thought it Mortal; but it implies some doubt concerning the proper use of the Word *αθανασις*, which (as has been before noted) seemed to many of the Antients to imply as much as *αγεννησις* Necessarily existing, (in the Sense that St Paul says of God, *1 Tim 6, 16*, *ο Μονος εχων αθανασίαν* that He only hath Immortality;) or at least to signify an indefectible State of Virtue and Happiness: And therefore it is,

\* Note; your Emendation, *εγωμαι* for *εγω μεν*, in this Passage of *Theophilus*, is without ground. For the Sense is nor, [*εδε τεπ εγωμαι.*] not so, I suppose; but [*εδε τουτο εγω μεν.*] I dare not assert That neither, for my part; answering to [*εδε τουτο θα μεν*] in the preceding line; As any one that pleases to compare your Book, may observe.

that

that he says concerning *Adam*, Ἐὰν ἀθάνατον αὐτὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐπιποιήκει, θεὸν ἂν ἐπιποιήκει: *If Adam had been made originally immortal, he had been made a God.*

It is also further to be observed from this passage of *Theophilus*, that the Text you so frequently allude to, *Gen.* 2, 7, was παρὰ τοῖς πλείοσι by most of the *Antient*, understood in a Sense directly contrary to your Notion of the πνοὴ signifying in that place a *Mortal Principle*. And it is with very extraordinary difficulty, that you here labour to suppose, that [πλείονες] those most *Men* whom *Theophilus* affirms to have collected the *Immortality of the Soul* from this *Text of Scripture*, were not *Christians*, but either *Jewish Pharisees* or *Heathen Philosophers*: which Supposition of *Heathen Philosophers* proving the *Immortality of the Soul* from a *Text of Scripture*; and that a *Christian Writer* speaking of most *Mens* Sense concerning a *Text of Scripture*, should thereby mean the Sense of *Heathen Philosophers*; This, I say, with all that follows in that Section, is so extremely absurd, as to need no Confutation.

*Tertullian* does indeed suppose the *Soul* to be *Material*; from whence it must also necessarily be confessed to follow that it would be *naturally Mortal*; and no one can (as you say, *Sect.* 14.) believe such a *Soul* as he supposes, to be independent on *Matter* in its own Nature. All this is very true; and yet even *This* seems to be nothing to your purpose. For though the *natural Mortality* of the *Soul* is indeed a necessary *Consequence* of *Tertullian's Doctrine*; yet, since *Tertullian* did not see nor own that *Consequence*; and,

if he had seen the Consequence, would have disowned the Doctrin; his *Authority* (which is what you would make use of) is not for you, though the *Consequence of his Doctrin* be; And therefore you are guilty of a very manifest Fallacy, when you say (pag. 55.) that *the Church had not declared against this Doctrin of Tertullian, which supposed the Souls natural Mortality*: For his Doctrin did not *then* suppose it, tho' our Philosophy shows it to be indeed a Consequence. He says expressly in many places of his Book *de Anima*, that the Soul is *immortal*: He reckons this among those Opinions of the Philosophers which gave occasion to Heresies, that \* *some of them denied the Immortality of the Soul*: He denied † *that the Soul grew or increased in substance*, notwithstanding he thought it Material; *least it should follow from thence, that it was capable likewise of perishing*: He strongly || *opposes the Opinion of those who thought the Soul received Nourishment; least from thence likewise it should follow that it was liable to perish*: He expressly affirms, \* *that all Mankind, without exception, shall rise again to eternal Happiness or Punishment*: And many other such Passages are to be found in his

Works. You seem to be aware of this, when you say, that *Tertullian does indeed own the actual Immortality of the Soul*: But then, what you insinuate in your next Words, [Especially of all

C

who

\* Alii immortalem negant Animam. cap. 5.

† Cæterum animam substantia crescere negandum est, nec etiam decrescere substantia dicatur atq; ita & defectum creditur. cap. 37.

|| Auferenda est Argumentatoris occasio, qui, quod anima desiderare videatur alimenta, hinc quoq; mortalem carnem intelligi cupit, quæ eibis sustinetur, deniq; derogaris eis exigescat, postremo subtractis intercidat. cap. 33.

\* Restituetur omne humanum genus — exinde in immensam æternitatis perpetuitatem. *Id. in Apologetico.*

who were, upon that account, obliged to come over as Profelites upon the Publication of the Gospel,] is extremely unfair; since *Tertullian's* Words, being every where as universal as can be, are directly contrary to what you would insinuate by the Word *Eſpecially*.

And here upon occasion of the Passages you cite out of *Tertullian*, concerning *the Propagation of the Soul ex traduce*, and its having a *Humane Shape and Difference of Sex*; I cannot forbear proposing it to your more calm and serious consideration, whether your manner of citing the Fathers, by picking out chiefly such Sentences, wherein for want of Philosophy they were evidently mistaken, and which can only be of disservice to Religion, and tend to confirm profane Men in their Mockery and Contempt; is not a very ill representation of those Writers, and a very ill manner of showing your regard to them. I believe, should any other Person do the like upon any other Philosophical Subject, you would immediately look upon him as doing it with an ill design, and deserving a very severe Censure.

What you say (*Sect. 16.*) concerning *Tertullian's* deriving the Humane Soul from the *Flatus Vitæ* mention'd *Gen. 2, 7*; proves, not that he thought the Soul Mortal, because you groundlessly interpret that Text so; but that he understood that Text contrary to what you have done, because he clearly declares the Soul derived thence to be immortal: As I have before shown particularly concerning *Irenæus*. And what you offer in the rest of that Paragraph, concerning *proper Immortality* belonging only to God, is all entirely against your self, and not in the least against our Notion; as has likewise been proved before.

The

The Words you cite out of St Cyprian, (*Scēt.* 18.) are evidently nothing to your purpose; being spoken only concerning *regeneration* or the *new birth* in the *moral* Sense, without any the least hint of any *natural* mortality of the Souls of those who are *not regenerated*. *Amobius*, you your self acknowledge to have his *Paradoxes on this Subject*; that he was but a *Catechumen*, when he wrote his *Book*; and was not truly instructed in the *Christian Doctrine*. But, you say, he is more to be regarded when he speaks conformably to the Sense of other *Catholick Doctors of that early Age*, that is, when you think he says any thing agreeable to that Notion which you not truly attribute to the *Fathers*. And yet even *He*, does not say any thing really agreeable to that Notion. For though he does indeed blame the boldness of certain *Platonists* for supposing the Soul to be \* *necessarily Immortal*, to have come from Heaven, and to return thither again of course at the dissolution of the Body; running out with much oratorical Liberty upon the weakness of those *Mens Arguments* for the *Immortality* of the Soul; and does Himself contend that the Soul is of a † middle Nature, neither mortal, nor immortal, but capable of either condition according to its behaviour; yet all this he does purely upon *That Argument*, that whatever had a beginning must also necessarily be capable of being destroyed; and that whatever is *possible*, must needs in its Nature be liable to perish; and accordingly therefore applies it to *Angels* \* and all other *Created Beings* what-

\* Animus; qui immortalis a vobis & Deus esse narratur, &c. lib. 2.

† Medietas ergo quaedam, & animarum anceps ambiguaque natura, &c. lib. 2.

\* Omnis omnino, Dii, Angeli, Demones, aut nomine

quocunq; sunt alio, qualitatibus  
& ipsi sunt mediæ, & ambiguar  
fortis conditione mutabiles. *lib. 2.*

soever, in the very same Sense  
as he does to Men: which is  
not the Notion of Mortality  
You are contending for. And

when he supposes the Souls of the Wicked to  
perish finally, (which you imagine to be for your  
purpose;) he understands it of *all* the damned,  
as well those that *had heard* the Gospel, as those  
that *had not*; and those that *had received*  
*the Spirit*, as those *that had not*; conceiving  
them *all* to be destroyed by the Power of  
God inflicting such Punishment upon them, and  
not that *any* die by a *natural* mortality.

*Lactantius* is throughout his whole Work as  
full and expres against you, as any Author that  
ever wrote either before or since. So that your  
perverting his Words to favour your Notion, is  
really, what upon second Thoughts you your  
self will hardly excuse. I shall first show briefly,  
how clearly he asserts the natural Immortality of  
the Soul, and then consider in how very extra-  
ordinary a manner you misrepresent him.

\* Licet verum de animæ  
immortalitate sentiret, &c.  
*lib. 7. § 8.*

|| *pag. 33, 66, &c.*

\* Apparet animam non in-  
terire, neq; dissolvi, sed ma-  
nere in Sempiternum *lib. 7.*  
*§ 9.*

|| *lib. 7, § 12 &c.*

\* Quod ex terra fuit, in Ter-  
ram resolvitur; quod ex cæ-  
lesti Spiritu, id constat ac vi-  
get Semper, quoniam divinus  
Spiritus sempiternus est. *lib. 7.*  
*§ 12.*

He approves \* that Notion  
of *Plato*, which you || so often  
condemn, concerning the na-  
tural Immortality of the Soul:  
He declares that \* *the Soul does*  
*not perish nor is dissolved, but en-*  
*dures for ever*: He is very large  
and particular || in confuting  
all *Lucretius's* Arguments a-  
gainst the natural Immortali-  
ty of the Soul: He affirms,  
that \* at Death *the Body re-*  
*turns to the Earth; but That*  
*part our of ourselves, which God breathed into us,*  
*endures*

endures and lives for ever; And again, that \* the Soul is not corruptible, but endures for ever; because it proceeded from an eternal Original: And concludes; || I think, saith he, I have sufficient'y proved the Soul is not dissolvable. He expresses himself in the very same manner concerning the natural duration of wicked Souls, as of good ones. *The Effect of that Death*, saith \* he, *which wicked Souls are subject to, is not the extinguishing of them, but the punishing them eternally: This Punishment we call the second Death; which is it self also perpetual, as eternal Happiness is; The second Death is the suffering eternal Torment; the damnation of Souls to eternal Punishment, according to their Deserts.* Again: *As the Life of the Soul*, saith || he, *is eternal, in which it enjoys divine and unspeakable Happiness; so its Death also must needs be eternal, in which it endures everlasting Punishment and endless Torments for its Sins.* And again: *Death*, saith \* he, *does not destroy and extinguish the Soul, but subjects it to eternal Torments.* And that all this might not possibly be understood either of your immortalizing Spirit, or of the mere Will and Pleasure of God, sustaining the Soul and causing it to endure beyond the

\* Ergo anima, quæ fragilis non est, in æternum manet, quoniam Origo ejus æterna est. *ibid.*

|| Declaravi, ut opinor animam non esse solubilem. *lib. 7. § 13.*

\* Cujus [mortis] non ea vis est, ut injustas animas extinguat omnino, sed ut puniat in æternum. Eam pœnam, secundam mortem nominamus, quæ est & ipsa perpetua, sicut & immortalitas. — Mors Secunda, est æterni doloris perceptio; Mors est animatum pro meritis ad æterna supplicia damnatio. *lib. 2. § 12.*

|| Sicut Vita Animæ sempiterna est, in qua divinos & ineloquibiles immortalitatis suæ fractus capit; ita & mors ejus perpetua sic necesse est, in qua perennes pœnas & infinita tormenta pro peccatis suis pendet. *lib. 7. § 11.*

\* Mors autem non funditus perimit ac delet, sed æternis afficit cruciatibus. *lib. 7. § 12.*

original capacity of its own Nature; he adds expressly in the very next Words, as if he had foreseen and designed to prevent your Hypothesis,) that the reason why the Soul is subject to such endless Punishments, is because it was created originally immortal, and therefore cannot die: For

¶ Nam incirire prorsus anima non potest; quoniam ex Dei Spiritu, qui est aternus, originem cepit *ibid.*

which you call the

\* Si est immortalis Anima, quomodo patibilis inducitur & pœnæ sentiens? *lib.* 7, 20.

¶ Eius naturæ reddi animas ut, si non extinguibiles in totum, quoniam ex Deo sunt, tamen cruciabiles fiant per corporis maculam, quæ peccatis inepta sensum doloris attribuit. *ibid.*

\* Quid ergo mirum, si cum sint immortales animæ, tamen patibiles sint Deo? *ibid.*

*the Soul.* ¶ says he, cannot utterly perish and be extinguished, because it has its Original from the Spirit of God [he means that

*πρόσ Gen. 2, 7,] which is eternal.*

And again; in Answer to that Objection, † how that which is immortal, can be capable of suffering; he has these remarkable Words: *Mens Souls, faith*

¶ he, though they are not capable of being utterly extinguished, because they are of Divine Original; yet by being immersed in Sense, and depraved by Sin, they become liable to Misery and Torment.

And again: \* *What wonder is it, faith he, if Souls, notwithstanding that they are immortal, are yet capable of having Punish-*

*ment inflicted upon them by God?*

Most of these Passages, which are as remarkably full and clear against you, as if the Author had written on purpose to oppose your Hypothesis, you inexcusably pass over without notice. And from these Passages any one may easily observe, how very grossly, I had almost said beyond Example, you misrepresent those other places which you do cite from him. The Passages which you cite, *pag.* 70, wherein *Lactantius* affirms *Immortality*, not to be the necessary Condition of



of our *Nature*, but the Reward of our *Virtue*; are all plainly meant, not of Perpetuity of Duration, (which he every where affirms to belong necessarily to our Nature) but of the eternal indefectible Happiness of Heaven; which this Author always means by the word *Immortality*, as alone deserving that glorious Title; notwithstanding that at the same time he expressly and constantly affirms the opposite state to be of equal duration and perpetuity. Thus when, speaking of that second Death,

*which he says || does not extinguish wicked Souls, but subjects them to endless Misery, he says,*

*that That likewise is of perpetual Duration, as Immortality also is;*

*'tis evident that by Immortality he means to express, not Duration, but Happiness: And in the place*

*which you cite to prove that he did not think Immortality natural to Men, he*

*declares that by Immortality he means \* the unspeakable and eternal Happiness of Heaven:*

*and when he says || there would be no difference betwixt just and unjust, no such thing as Reward and Punishment, if all Men*

*were born Immortal; 'tis very evident from the Thread of his Discourse, that he means,*

*if Men were born originally, and without un-*

*dergoing any Trial, into such a State, as \* the Good Angels are now in, and the Saints shall be in after the Resurrection, namely a State of Inde-*

*fectible*

*|| Cujus non ea vis est, ut injustas animas extinguat omnino, sed ut puniat in aeternum. Eam pœnam, secundam mortem nominamus; quæ est & ipsa perpetua, sicut & immortalitas. lib. 2, 12.*

*\* Ne Immortalitatem delicate assequerentur ac moliter. sed ad illud æternæ vitæ inrelequibile præmium summa cum difficultate, &c. lib. 7. § 5.*

*|| Nam nihil interesset inter justum & injustum; siquidem omnis homo natus, immortalis fieret. ibid.*

and without un- \*

*\* Cum posset semper Spiritibus suis immortalibus innumerabiles animis procreare sicut Angelos genuit, quibus Immortalitas sine ullo malorum*

periculo ac metu constar, &c.  
*ibid.*

fectible Virtue and Happiness ; then the Nature of Rewards and Punishments, would be taken away. Again ; Those Passages which you cite pag. 71, wherein you suppose that *Lactantius* by that *immortal Spirit* which *God put or inspired into an Earthly Body*, means, not the *natural Soul of Man*, but the *Divine Spirit received in our Saviours regenerating Baptism*, as a new Principle of Immortality ; These Passages, I say, if to any one that pleases to compare the places, they do not appear to be \* all and every one of them clearly spoken on the contrary, concerning that *natural Soul*, which God is said to have breathed into Man, *Gen. 2, 7* ; it will not be easie to conceive how any Man can possibly express his meaning in Words : And when from this Passage, [*Fictio corpore, spiravit ei animam devitali fonte Spiritus sui, qui est perennis ; ut si Anima superaverit, que ex Deo oritur, sit Immortalis & in perpetua luce versetur*] you infer that the Soul is Immortal, only *conditionally*, if it be victorious ; your misrepresentation of the Passage, is very extraordinary : For the Words are not one entire Sentence, as any one would imagine them to be by your manner of citing them ; but two Passages, at a Page distance from each other ; and, not *Anima* (as you seem to understand it) but *Homo* is the Nominative Case to *fit immortalis & in perpetua Luce versetur* ; And so far is the Author from making the Souls immortality *conditional*, by these Words ; that directly on the contrary he in this very Sentence means to say, that the Soul must of Necessity be *Immortal* in all circumstances ; only with this difference, that || if a

|| Ex rebus diversis ac re-  
 pugnansibus Homo factus est ;

Man lives after the Spirit, his Im-  
 mortality shall be a Happy one ;  
 but

but if he live after the Flesh, his Immortality must be a Miserable one. When therefore you say, that the way, according to Lactantius, taken by Providence, for making Mans actual Mortality or Immortality the Reward or Punishment of his Free-will was to join his Soul to his Body immediately, which being it self Frail and

Mortal, could not secure the Soul from actual Mortality; and That this he supposes would make the Complex of the Soul and Body actually Mortal; you might with the same Truth; and with as much appearance of Reason, have said, that Lactantius wrote his Book with a design to disprove the whole Christian Religion, or any other particular Article of it whatsoever.

Again, when Lactantius says, that \* since this Temporal Life is succeeded by Temporal Death, it follows that the Soul must rise again to eternal Life, because temporal Death has an End; It is a

very great and palpable misrepresentation, to infer from these words, (as you do, pag. 73,) that Lactantius was so far from owning the Immortality of the Soul, as natural to it, that he seems to own its actual Death, for the space between the Death of the Body and the Resurrection; and therefore ascribes the Resurrection to the Soul as well as the Body: For what can be a grosser misrepresentation of any Author, than from one single Passage (even supposing that Passage not reconcileable with the rest,) to affirm that his Opinion was just contrary to what he largely and expressly

—ut, si Anima superaverit quæ ex Deo oritur, sit immortalis & in perpetua luce versetur; si autem Corpus vice rit, — sit in tenebris sempiternis & in Morte. Cujus [Mortis] non ea vis est, ut injustas animas extinguat omnino, sed ut puniat in æternum. lib. 2, 12,

\* Quia temporalem vitam temporalis mors sequitur, consequens est ut resurgant animæ ad vitam perennem, quia finem mors temporalis accepit. lib. 7. § 10.

pressly almost in every Page of his Book declares it to be? But aiter all, this Passage is not difficult to be reconciled: For when he who says a hundred times in his Book, that the Soul has no dependence on the Body, but subsists as well and better after it is separated from it, says in one single Passage that Mens Souls do [*resurgere*] rise again to eternal Life; can any thing be more evident than that his meaning

|| A Deo corporibus induentur. lib. 7, 23. rursus carne induentur. *ibid.* 21.

is, that the Souls shall be || *united* again to their Bodies at the Resurrection before the Judgment? It is an easie

Figure, and very usual in the best Authors, and in the Scripture it self, to signify by the Word [*Soul*] the same as [*Person*] in general: Thus *Gen.* 46, 26, *All the Souls that came with Jacob into Egypt, &c.* And *Lev.* 5, 2. *If a Soul touch any unclean thing, &c.* In which places nothing can be more absurd than to understand *Soul* in the strict and proper Sense of the Word: And yet there is just as much Reason so to do, as, from the Passage now cited, to conclude that *Lactantius*, contrary to what he expressly declares in almost every Page of his Book, was of Opinion that *the Soul died with the Body*. Had not the World deservedly an Opinion of your great Learning, there would be no need to take notice of such extraordinary misconstructions: Which really, Sir, in your representation of this Author, appear to have proceeded from greater Prejudice, or greater Want of Care, than Men of your known Abilities are ordinarily guilty of. At last you come off, *pag.* 75, with saying that *Lactantius's* Reasonings either prove or are consistent with a precarious Immortality; at least even by our modern Reasonings, do not imply any Necessity of

an Immortality by Nature : And who, I beseech you, ever taught any other Immortality of the Soul, than a precarious one ; that is, depending on the pleasure of God Almighty ? or who ever imagin'd, that any thing which was γεννητὸν and had a beginning, was not also capable of Being destroy'd and having an end, if God should so please ?

You begin with St. Athanasius (Seēt. 21.) very ominously ; Acknowledging that he does indeed own the Doctrine of the Souls Immortality, as a Doctrine of the Church : Which he does, not only in † the Words you cite from him, but also largely and fully in many other places of his Oratio contra Gentes ; styling the Soul \* rational and immortal ; affirming that || when it is separated from the Body, it will have a much clearer knowledge of its own Immortality ; and proving its Immortality distinctly, from several Topicks and Arguments : If the Soul, saith \* he, be distinct from the Body ; as we have before shown ; and the Body is mortal ; It follows necessarily, that the Soul, being distinct from the Body, must be immortal : And again ; The Soul, saith † he, therefore meditates and thinks upon things immortal and eternal, because it is it self Immortal ; For as the Body, being it self Mortal, has all its Senses employ'd about mortal things ; so the Soul, whose Ex-

† Ὅτι ἡ ἀθάνατος γεννητὴ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησιαστικῇ διδασκαλίᾳ. Orat. cont. Gent.

\* τί ἐν ἑνὶ τῷ πάλι, ἡ ψυχὴ λογικὴ καὶ ἀθάνατος, ibid.

|| Πᾶς ἔχει μᾶλλον καὶ πολλῷ πλεον, ἀπολυθεῖσα τῷ σώματι, — φανερωτέραν ἔξει τὴν τῆ ἀθανασίας γνῶσιν. ibid.

\* Εἰ γὰρ ἄλλω αὐτὴν ὁ λόγος ἀπέδειξε παρὰ τὸ σῶμα ἔστι ἡ τὸ σῶμα εὐτε θνητὸν ἀρχὴ τῆ ψυχῆ ἀθάνατον εἶναι, τῷ μὴ εἶναι καὶ τὸ σῶμα. ibid.

† Διὰ τὸ τὸ γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα καὶ ἀόριστα λογίζονται καὶ οὐρανῶν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἀθάνατος ὄντι. Καὶ ὡς περὶ τὸ σῶμα θνητὸν τυχόν ἦσθαι, θνητὴ καὶ αἰ τὰ τε θεωρεῖσθαι ἀθήσεις ἕως αἰωνία θεωρεῖσθαι καὶ λογισμῶν τῆ ψυχῆ, ἀρχὴ καὶ αὐτῶν ἀθάνατον εἶναι καὶ αἰετῆ. ibid.

culis

culties are employed about immortal things, must it self of necessity be immortal and live for ever: These Arguments are plainly drawn from the Nature of the Soul it self, and are directly contrary to your Notion of an Immortalizing Spirit or Will of God: And accordingly, speaking of the Heathens, he expresses himself in the very

† 'Εἰ δὲ ψυχῶ ἀξίῳσιν [1].  
 αὐχέσιν] ἔχειν, καὶ ἐπὶ πᾶσι λογικῶ μέγα φρονεῖν, εἰκότως οὕτω ποιεῖντες· διὰ τὸ ὡς μὴ ἔχοντες ψυχὴν, παρὰ λόγον παλιῶσι, καὶ ἐκ αὐτοῦ φρονεῖν φρονεῖσιν, ἀλλὰ κρείττονας ἑαυτῶν καὶ τῷ Θεῷ πιστοῖ ψυχὴν ἢ ἀθανάτου ἔχοντες καὶ μὴ βλέπουσιν αὐτοῖς, τὸ θεὸν ἐν τοῖς βλέπομένοις καὶ θνητοῖς ἀπειχεῖσιν. *ibid.*

same manner concerning Their Souls in particular; If they pretend to believe, saith † he, that they have a Soul, and value themselves upon their Rational Faculties, as they justly may; why, as if they had no Soul, do they act contrary to Reason, and not think as they ought to do, but make God a Being meaner than themselves? For having themselves an immortal and invisible

Soul, yet they make God like to things visible and mortal. When therefore to Athanasius's general Assertion concerning the Immortality of the Soul, you answer, that That does not concern your Cause, because your Question is not whether the Soul be Immortal, but whether it be Immortal in its own Nature; you are guilty of a very great Fallacy: For if by the Souls being Immortal in its own Nature, you intend to express what we mean, that the Soul by the powers given it at its first Creation is naturally able to continue for ever; then Athanasius's Assertion does concern your Cause; because, in all the places now cited, he expressly maintains the natural Immortality of the Soul in that Sense: But if by Immortal in its own Nature, you mean necessarily Immortal, as God is; then neither Athanasius, nor we, nor perhaps any

any Body else, ever meant that the Soul was *Immortal in its own Nature.*

From the Passages therefore now cited, wherein *Athanasius* so expressly and very largely asserts the *natural Immortality* of the Soul, 'tis very reasonable to conclude, that all those Passages in His Book *de Incarnatione verbi Dei*, which you understand to imply a *natural Mortality of the Soul*, ought (that they may not be inconsistent with what he so fully and expressly asserts elsewhere.) to be understood concerning that natural Mortality which is the Dissolution of the Body and Separation of the Soul, without determining what becomes of the Soul after that Separation. And those Passages may the better be understood in that Sense, because they are all spoken concerning that Mortality *Adam* incurred by his Sin in Paradise; the Consequence of which Mortality, with respect to the State of the Soul separated thereby from the Body, antecedent to the Promise of Christ, was not a Question necessary to be entered into. And this is still the more confirmed by This, that even those Phrases, *θάνατος κερτίσανθη, φθορῆς παραδείσου. ἐν τῇ τοῦ θανάτου φθορᾷ ἕμειν* and the like; which seems at first sight to make the most for your purpose; 'tis plain need not be understood to express the *total Extinction or utter Annihilation* of *Adam*, if Christ had never been promised; but either his having no ground to expect any Restoration to his former state by a *Resurrection of the Body*; which seems to be the meaning of them in some places; or else (which is evidently their Signification in some other places,) *Death's continuing to prevail and extend it self over his Posterity:*

Thus,

\* Τέτο ὁ γενόμενος, οἱ μὲν ἀνθρώποι ἀπέθνησκον, ἢ ὅ φθαρὰ λοιπὸν κατ' αὐτῶν ἠκμασεν, καὶ πλεῖον ἤ κατὰ φύσιν ἰσχύσα καθ' ὅλα τ' ἑγένετο, καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πλημυλημάσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἐκ ἀχεις ὄρων ἀεισώτων εἰσῆκεισαν, ἀλλὰ κατ' ὀλίγον ἐπεκλεινόμενοι, λοιπὸν καὶ εἰς αὐτεὺν ἐληλύθασιν. — Δια δὴ ταῦτα πλεῖον τοῖς θανάτοις κερτήσαντες, καὶ τ' φθαρῆς παραμύθησι κατ' ἑβ' ἀνθρώπων, τὸ μὲν τ' ἀνθρώπων γένος ἐφθείρετο. *De Incarnat. Verbi.*

Thus, *When Adam had sinned,* saith \* *he, Death entred into the World; and this Destruction prevailed more and more over the whole Race of Mankind. For Men encreased and multiplied their Sins beyond measure: And therefore Death prevailing more and more, and this Destruction continuing to have Dominion over Men, the whole Race of Mankind was lost.*

The same thing (namely that the Phrases before-mentioned do not signify the total extinction of *Adam* both Soul and Body, if *Christ* had never been promised; but only That Mortality which is the Dissolution of the Body and separation of the Soul;) may also be gathered from those other Expressions of the same Author in his Book *de Incarnatione Christi*, from some of which you very unreasonably endeavour (*pag. 85.*) to conclude the direct contrary. For when he speaks of the Souls being held [*ἐν δεσμοῖς*] in Bonds, and [*ἐν δεσμοῖς θανάτου*] in the Bonds of Death; 'tis plain this does not signify the Extinction of the Soul, but its confinement to [*ἄσους*] the separate State. And therefore, speaking of *Christ's* delivering Men from that Mortality which was the Consequence of *Adam's* Sin, he

saith; \* *To that place where the Body of Man was corrupted, thither did the Body of Christ go; and to that Place, where the Soul of Man was detained in Death, thither did Christ go with his Humane Soul, &c.* In which

\* Δια τὸ καὶ ὅπου διεσπάρεται τὴν πῆν ἀνθρώπου σῶμα· ἐκεῖ παρῆναι Ἰησοῦς τὸ ἴδιον σῶμα· καὶ ὅπου κεκοράπητο ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ ἀνθρώπου ἐν θανάτῳ ἐκεῖ ἐσπαρῆκεται ὁ Χριστὸς τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν ἰδίαν ἑαυτοῦ, &c. *De Incarn. Christi contra Apollinar. lib. 1.*



which Passage 'tis evident, that by the Words [*κικράτητο ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ ἀνθρώπινον ἐν θανάτῳ*] *the Soul of Man was detained in Death*, is not meant the *Extinction* of the Soul, but its *Confinement* to [*Ἄδης*] *that separate State*, to which the Soul of Christ descended. And in that very Passage, where from the Souls being concerned in the Sentence [*θάνατῳ ἀποθανῆ*] *thou shalt surely die*, you would infer the *Extinction* of the Soul; if you had cited the Words at length, it would have appeared that *just the contrary* was intended: The Words are these; God, saith † he,

*passed upon Man a double Sentence of Punishment; saying to his earthly Body: Dust thou art, and unto Dust shalt thou return; and so the Body turned into Corruption; And to his Soul, Thou shalt surely die; and so the Man was separated, and condemned to depart into two different places: From the last of which Words it is very evident, that by applying that Threatning [*θάνατῳ ἀποθανῆ*] thou shalt surely die, to the Soul; he did not mean its Extinction, but its Separation and Confinement to [*Ἄδης*] the separate State.*

Your last Citation out of this Author, (pag. 86,) is very remarkable. Against certain Hereticks who taught that the Soul was *corporeal*, he argues from those Words of our Saviour, *Fear not them that kill the Body, but cannot kill the Soul. If,* saith \* he, *the Soul be, as you Appollinarists contend, corporeal; why cannot it be killed and perish with the Body? and why doth St Peter, speaking of*

† Διπλῆς τῆ πωρείας τῆ ἀπορίας δέδοκε τὸ μὲν γνήσιον ἑρκεῖας, Γὰρ εἶ καὶ εἰς ἡν ἀπελεύση καὶ ἕως υποδέχεται φθορὰ πὶ σῶμα, δεσποτε ἀποφθινάωδον. Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ, θάνατῳ ἀποθανῆ καὶ ἕως διχῶ διαμερεῖται ὁ ἀνθρώπος, καὶ ἐν δύο τόποις ὀρχεῖται κατὰ δίκην, τ.κ. *ibid.*

\* Πῶς εἰ σαρκικὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ' ὑμᾶς. εἰ σωθήσκει τὸ σῶμα καὶ σμυθέσεται; πῶς δὲ καὶ ὁ Πέτρος τὸς ἐν Ἄδῃ κατεχομένους ψυχᾶς, ἀνεύ-

separato

κατὰ ὀνομάσεις, &c. De ad-  
ventu Christi contra Apollinar.  
lib. 2.

separate Souls, call them Spirits?  
Here you say, the [σαρκενὴ ψυχὴ]  
fleshly or corporeal Soul, is  
plainly opposed to the [πνευματικὴ] Spiritual Soul,  
and for that reason is supposed as capable of being  
killed by Men, as the Body it self. Is not this very  
extraordinary? when the plain and express mean-  
ing of Athanasius, is to show that there can be no  
such thing at all as [σαρκενὴ ψυχὴ] a fleshly or cor-  
poreal Soul; because, if there was, it would be  
capable of being killed, which our Saviour says  
cannot be.

All that you say, Sect. 22, seems to be ut-  
terly Unintelligible: And those words in par-  
ticular, pag. 91, (which I have before had an  
occasion to take notice of,) where you suppose  
the Soul to be *Something distinct* both from Spirit,  
and also from Matter and Motion; that is to say,  
a Material Form; an active Substantial Principle,  
distinct from Matter, yet depending on Matter in esse,  
in fieri, in operari, and which must accordingly be  
dissolved on the dissolution of that Matter on which  
it depends: These words, I say, appear so very  
absurd and contradictory in themselves, that no  
Confutation of them can be stronger than the  
bare transcribing them.

You seem very certain, Sect. 24, that your  
Doctrine can have no ill Influence upon Mens  
present Practise; because, tho' you assert indeed  
the natural Mortality of the Soul, yet you teach  
at the same time, that the Souls of all those,  
who hear of the Gospel, whether they imbrace  
it or no, shall be actually immortalized; and so  
bad Men can take no advantage of the Doctrine  
concerning

concerning the *Natural Mortality* of the Soul, to encourage themselves in their Wickedness with the Hopes of Impunity. But can you really think, Sir, that it is a thing of no ill consequence in Praëlife, to raise new disputes, to fill the Minds of weak and unstable Men with endless Doubts and Scruples, and the Mouths of the Profane with new Topicks of Scepticism and Raillery, against the most important and fundamental Doctrines of all Religion? Or can you be indeed perswaded, that such Men as are pleased with some of your Notions, will as readily admit all the rest also? You are forced to make a new and distinct Hypothesis upon every particular occasion: You first suppose the Soul of Man naturally Mortal; and then, to secure to good Men the Unchangeable State of Heaven, you are forced to suppose *their* Souls præternaturally immortalized to Happiness by the Divine Spirit: Yet, because all who receive that Divine Spirit, do not so behave themselves as to be capable of the Happiness of Heaven, you are forced (though † unwillingly) to suppose some † *Præmon* of them immortalized by the same Divine Spi-<sup>pag. 22,</sup> rit to Punishment; And after this, least those <sup>compared</sup> who reject the Gospel and never receive the Di-<sup>with your</sup> vine immortalizing Spirit at all, should take ad-<sup>Discourse</sup> vantage of the Souls natural Mortality to en-<sup>pag. 8 &</sup> courage themselves with hopes of Impunity in their Wickedness, you are forced to suppose *Their* Souls made immortal without any immortalizing Principal at all. by the mere Omnipotence and Arbitrary Pleasure of God. Now, all these Hypotheses appearing very precarious and independent on each other; is it not very obvious to perceive that profane Men will very  
D gladly

gladly and with great advantage make use of all your Arguments for the *Natural Mortality* of the Soul; and drop the following parts of your Hypothesis? And indeed I cannot see, but you must in some measure be answerable for this ill Consequence. For it is not enough to prevent then atural and obvious ill Consequences of an Hypothesis, that a learned and ingenious Man is able to invent such further Suppositions, and to find out such Shifts and Distinctions, by which he shall think he can evade the force of those Consequences. There is hardly any Opinion so extravagant or of so mischievous consequence, but an ingenious Man may maintain it in such manner, as that upon his whole Hypothesis it shall not be easie to charge him with any ill consequence, for which he will not be able to find some evasion: And yet he that maintains it, must nevertheless be answerable for such ill Consequences, as are naturally apt to follow from the Opinion it self, without the additional Hypothesis which are made use of it to salve it. The Epicureans, who taught that *Pleasure was the Chief Good*, when they were charged with the obvious ill Consequences of that Doctrine, were provided to make such ingenious Explications of it, that they thought themselves abundantly able to evade all those ill Consequences that could be drawn from it: Yet that Doctrine was evidently a very pernicious Doctrine; and they who maintained it, could not be excused (as *Cicero* has largely shown) from being answerable for those Consequences, which were

\* Quasi ego id curem quid ille aiat aut neget: illud quaero, quid ei consentaneum sit dicere, qui &c. *Cicero*.

but \* too naturally drawn from it by the generality of Men, who would not attend

to

to the Subtilties and Distinctions of those Philosophers. He that will suppose Men to have *no Soul at all*, but that their Life is entirely extinguished at the Dissolution of the Body; and at the same time supposes that at the Resurrection their Life shall be restored again, and continue for ever; will be sure to pretend that no ill Consequence can be drawn from his Doctrine, because he supposes Men actually and in event as much Immortal, as if they *had Souls really distinct from their Bodies*: And yet I believe you yourself make no doubt but That Opinion is a very pernicious one. He that will affirm that there is no other Substance in the World but *Matter*; and at the same time supposes Matter capable of all the same Powers and Attributes, which we ascribe to Spirit; may likewise with the same Reason pretend, that no ill Consequence can be drawn from his Opinion: And yet no Body can doubt but such an Opinion leads directly to Atheism. 'Tis not therefore so very clear, as you seem to suppose it to be, that none of those Consequences are to be charged upon you, which (if your whole Hypothesis be granted) you can find indeed a way of evading.

You attempt to prove (*Señ. 25*) that the *Immortalizing Principle* was generally believed no Ingredient in the Nature of the *Humane Soul* among the *Heathens themselves*; by saying, that the popular *Heathens* believed only their first Ancestors to have been Gods, their next to have been Heroes or Demi-Gods, and the later Generations to have been pure Men; Unless the Supreme Being were pleased (even in the degenerate Ages) to confer the nobler Principle on some choice Favourites. Here you seem to forget, that the popular *Heathens* (as you

call them) had all a notion of *Elysian Fields* and of a *Tartarus*, that is, of a Place of future Happiness or Misery, where the Souls of those which you call *pure* or mere *Men* were to be disposed of, either to continue there for ever, or to come out upon new revolutions, but not to be extinguished. Yet presently after, (pag. 96.) you say that by the oldest Tradition, *all Souls were supposed to have the Divine Principle connatural to them*; And the rest of the Section is wholly spent in explaining the Notions of those whom you call (pag. 100) the *Traditional travelling Philosophers*, who believed that Human Souls underwent many Purgations and different Revolutions, but that *no part of the divine seed might perish finally*; and that *all Humane Souls were thus far at least of a divine extraction, not as the Notion of the Divine might intitle them to infinite Perfection, but as it might at least intitle them to Immortality*. All which is so far from being any thing to your purpose, of proving that the *Immortalizing Principle was generally believed no ingredient, in the Nature of the Humane Soul among the Heathens themselves*; that on the contrary it seems to me to prove rather directly against you.

Señ 26, You all along confound either *necessary Immortality*, or else the Notion of *Præ-existence* and Revolutions of Souls, with *natural Mortality*. That which any of the Primitive Christians blamed *Plato* and *Origen* for, was not their asserting the *Immortality* of the Soul, but its *Præ-existence* and everlasting *Revolutions*. Their Maxim, that *whatever had a Beginning, must therefore be capable likewise of having an End*, does not at all prove against *natural*, but only against *necessary*

cessary Immortality, that is, necessary and independent Existence : As is evident from what you your self observe, that upon this Principle they owned none Immortal but God himself ; No not the Angels ; And that the Apostle affirms of God, [*ὁ ἄβυσσος ἔχει ἀθανασία*, 1 Tim 6, 16,] that He only has Immortality, as being the *ἀυτο ἀθανασία* from whom All that will pretend to Immortality, must derive it, and not from their own Nature ; that is, not from the Necessity of their own Nature, but from the Will of God ; who was pleased to create them Immortal, and upon whom (notwithstanding their Immortality, that is, notwithstanding their natural Power of continuing for ever, without being liable to be destroyed by any created Force,) they nevertheless continually depend for their Preservation.

Aristotle by affirming the immortal Soul to be [*ἄσχετον*] from without, means plainly that it is something distinct from the Body, and not (as you interpret him pag. 101.) that it is not ingredient in the Constitution of Mankind in general, or (as you \* elsewhere express your self) that it is a praternatural Principle ; as if, naturally, Men had no rational Souls at all.

The other Maxim you mention, That nothing that is possible can be Immortal, proves likewise only against necessary, not against natural Immortality. For a Thing's being capable to be acted upon, does not all prove that it is capable of being destroyed by any natural Power. Every perfectly solid Particle of Matter it self, is incapable of being destroyed or even divided by any Power of Nature, though it is as capable of being moved and agitated and acted upon, as any compound Body. The Soul may in like manner be very capable of suffering and of being acted upon ; and yet it will not at

\* *Præmon*  
 Discourse  
 pag. 24, &  
 pag. 300.

all follow, that it is capable of being destroyed by any natural Power. Those of the Antients, who proved that the Soul of the rich Man in the Parable, must have been Corruptible, because it suffered Torment; you acknowledge, prove at the same time that it must likewise have been Coporeal: But the Corporality of the Soul, you know, was taught only by one or two Men. The rest were all of a different Opinion. And Lactantius is very particular and express in answering that Ob-

\* Si est immortalis anima; quomodo patibilis inducitur, ac pœnæ sentiens? lib. 7. § 20.

† Eius naturæ reddi animas, ut si non extinguibiles in totum, quoniam ex Deo sunt, tamen cruciabiles fiant per corporis maculam, &c. *ibid.*

\* Tantam esse Dei potestatem, ut etiam incorporaliæ comprehendat, & quemadmodum voluerit, afficiat. Nam & Angeli Deum metuunt, &c. Quid ergo mirum, si cum sint immortales animæ, tamen patibiles sint Deo? *ibid.* § 21.

|| Sed tamen docent nos sanctæ literæ, quemadmodum pœnas impii sint laturæ. Nam quia peccata in corporibus contraxerunt, rursus carne induentur, ut in corporibus piaculum servent. *ibid.*

jection; \* If the Soul be immortal, how then is it possible and capable of enduring Punishment? and if it be capable of pain, how is it not capable of Dissolution?

The Answer he gives, is; first, † that (according to the Notion of the Stoicks) the Souls of Men; though by reason of their Divine Original they cannot indeed be extinguished, yet by being immersed in Sense and depraved by Sin, they may become liable to Misery and Punishment: Secondly, \* that tho' we indeed do not know how Immaterial Things can be acted upon, yet God has as much Power over them, as over corporeal Things: And lastly, || that in order to endure Punishment, the Souls shall again be united to their Bodies. All which Passages undeniably show that Lactantius did not think the Soul naturally corruptible,

and preserved præternaturally by the Power of God; but on the contrary, that the Soul was naturally



turally Immortal, but by the Power of God made capable of enduring Punishment.

If there was any strength in the Argument you make use of, *Sect. 27*; that *because the actual Immortality of the Soul is a Revelation of the Gospel, therefore it is not capable of being proved by Reason from the Nature of the Soul it self*; It would follow by the same Argument, that *Moral Obligations*, because they are *Revelations of the Will of God in the Gospel*, therefore are not capable of being proved by Reason, from the Nature of God, of Men, and of Things. Some things revealed in the Gospel, are indeed of such a Nature that they could not have been known *at all* without Revelation: But others (of which the *Immortality of the Soul* is one,) are such as were capable of being in great measure discovered by the Light of Nature and right Reason; but yet by the Revelation of the Gospel, are made known with much greater *Certainty*, greater *Clearness*, greater *Authority*, and in a *Manner* much better fitted to all *Capacities*. This seems to be the proper meaning of the Word [*φωτισαυτη* 2 Tim. 1, 10,] *has brought to Light*, has clearly discovered, has universally and evidently made known, that which before was but *obscurely* and *difficultly* and *imperfectly* understood. The Allusion you suppose to be between the Words [*has brought Life and Immortality to Light through the Gospel,*] and those other words of the Apostle, [*an Inheritance incorruptible, that fadeth not away, of the Saints in Light,*] is indeed some little Similitude of Words; the word *Light* being used in both places; but not the least Allusion or Similitude in Sense. And indeed you seem your self to be con-

scious of the weakness of your Argument in this whole Matter ; by your saying that the Immortality of the Soul, *at least † in Heaven*, is plainly supposed not to be known without divine Revelation ; and again, *At least \* as to the giving us that immortal Life in Heaven* ; and, That the Immortality of the Soul could not have been otherwise known with *|| that Certainty* that might support the Practise which Religion expects in consequence of it ; and again, That it could not have been known, *at least \* with that Assurance* which was requisite for the Practise which Religion requires pursuant to the Belief of it.

That the Sadducees (Sect. 28,) denied the Immortality of the Soul, is very true ; But then it is worth observing, that the same Men asserted also that there was *no Resurrection, neither Angel nor Spirit*, Acts 23, 6. Your interpretation of which words, is very extraordinary. *What is the meaning of Spirit here, as it is joynd with Angel, you say is manifest : It is that Immortalizing Spirit which makes us ἠσπόμενοι, that is, Immortal and entitled to Heaven, as well as the Angels are ; That same Spirit indeed by which the Angels themselves are entitled to Immortality. — This therefore oblig'd them [the Sadducees] to deny the actual Immortalizing of either Angels or Humane Souls, when they denied them Both that Spirit which could alone immortalize them.* These Words, I think, need no Reflexion to be made upon them.

Your Interpretation (Sect. 21,) of that Text, 1 Cor. 15, 22, *As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive* ; seems very forced and unnatural. You understand it to signifie, that as All who descended from Adam, must die ; so  
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All who are in Christ, that is, all Christians, shall be made alive. But this Interpretation, if it was true, would prove too much for you; namely, that those only who embraced, not those who rejected the Gospel, should be raised again: And the general tenor of Scripture, which every where declares that Unbelievers, who never were *in Christ*, shall be raised to Condemnation; shows plainly that your Interpretation of this Text is wrong. And how the false Notion certain Hereticks had of a metaphorical Resurrection, 2 *Tim.* 2, 18, tends to prove that *St Pauls* true account of the literal Resurrection, is to be understood in a particular and limited Sense; is not easie to conceive.

Your Inference in the same place, against the Universality of the Resurrection, from what the Apostle says concerning *Baptism*; seems likewise wholly precarious. For the Apostle does not in this Chapter say any thing, by which he might seem to ground the Resurrection upon *Baptism*: But only, arguing against those who pretended to be Christians, and yet did not believe the Resurrection of the Dead, he shows how absurd it was for such Persons to be *baptized*, and thereby to expose themselves to such hazards as they must unavoidably do by their professing Christianity, if they had no expectation of a Resurrection from the Dead. Whatever be the meaning of that difficult Phrase, of being *baptized for the Dead*; the stress of the Argument plainly lies upon these Words. *And why stand we in Jeopardy every Hour?* That *Baptism*, whatever it was, exposed them to some hazard, and gave occasion to their being persecuted; and the Apostles Argument is, that it was foolish for them  
to

to expose themselves to such danger needlessly and to no purpose, if there was to be no such thing as a Resurrection from the Dead. The Apostle grounds the reasonableness of being baptized, and of embracing Christianity, which was a persecuted Religion; purely upon the Hopes of a Resurrection from the Dead; But he does not at all ground the Resurrection upon Baptism, nor says any thing which does in the least insinuate that the Resurrection should not be universal.

The Conclusion you draw (*See* §. 32.) from what *St. Paul* teaches, *Rom.* 5. is very obscure. The Sum of the Apostle's Doctrine, there, is that That Condemnation which was brought upon Men by *Adam*, they are delivered from by *Christ*. How you can infer any thing from thence, against the universal Immortality of the Soul, I do not perceive. You suppose that those over whom Death reigned between the times of *Adam* and *Moses*, were extinguished by a total Mortality both of Soul Body; But the Death there spoken of, is plainly the same Death to which all other Men likewise are subject: For 'tis not said, that Death reigned over *Them only*; but that Death reigned *even* over them also, as well as over the rest of Mankind; notwithstanding that they had not sinned against any positive Law, as *Adam* before, and those who lived under the Law did *after*; but were subject to Death, only as it was a natural Consequence of *Adam's* Transgression: To infer from hence, that their Souls as well as Bodies, were subject to that Mortality, is begging the Question which was undertaken to be proved. Those who are subject

to Death in consequence of *Adam's* Transgression, are indeed stiled *Many*. *ver.* 15 and 19; as those to whom the the Benefit of Christ's Death redounds, are also in the same place stiled *Many*: But those *Many* who die thro' the Offence of One, are, *ver.* 12 and 18, expressly called *All Men*; and there is no good reason to suppose, but that the Death of Christ, who was promised immediately upon the Fall of *Adam*, may conditionally extend its Virtue, and Benefit under different Dispensations, to all Men likewise. To say that the Dominion of Death, signifies in this place something peculiar, under which *all Men are not included*; because the Apostle affirms that *Death reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's Transgressions*; is very singular and groundless: For the Dominion of Death is not there *confined* (as you suppose it) *to the space between Adam and Moses*; so as to signify a particular kind of Death prevailing at that Time, an extinction of Soul as well as dissolution of the Body; But the Apostle's assertion is plainly This, that in Consequence of *Adam's* Transgression, Death (in the common acceptation of Mortality) reigned in that space of time also, even over them that had not transgressed any positive Law *after the similitude of Adam's Transgression*, as well as over those who had in their own Persons disobeyed positive Laws. From whence how any thing can be collected to *your* purpose, is very difficult to imagine.

Whether that Text, *Job.* 1, 9, *That was the true Light, which lighteth every Man that cometh into the World*; was ever alledged by Any, to prove  
that

that an *Immortalizing Spirit* is given to every Particular by Christ himself; I cannot tell. But I think your Interpretation of it, (Sect. 33,) is utterly unintelligible. The *αὐτὸν*; you \* say, is *That which our Apostle here makes in all Men, [in every Man that cometh into the World,] inlightned by the visitation of the Δύο, as an external Principle: yet so as not to make any change in the Nature, in the Person so inlightned, without peculiar divine Favour, and dispositions in the recipient, for such an Union with the Δύο, as may qualify it for the divine Favour of raising it above its own Nature: Till then, they are separable again, and this external Visitation of the Δύο, leaves the visited ψυχὴ, as Mortal as it found it, where there is no particular design of God for Immortalizing it to Punishment* What the meaning of this, and all that follows in that Section is; and how you collect it from the fore-cited Text of St. John; is not, I believe, possible to be understood.

When St. Paul says, 1 *Thess.* 4, 16, that the *dead in Christ shall rise first*; These words do not indeed prove that there must afterwards be a Resurrection of them that never heard of Christ: because the *dead in Christ*, which are here said to *rise first*, are not, 'tis true, opposed in this place to the *dead out of Christ*, but to them that shall be found *alive in Christ* at the time of the Judgment; (Where note by the by, that you † misinterpret this Text, by opposing the *dead in Christ*, and which are said to *rise first*, not, as the Apostle does, to them that shall be found *alive in Christ*, but to those who had been formerly in Christ and did not die in him, or to those who might have been in him if they had pleased, but never were in him actually.) But other places of Scripture, as has been

been before shown, do sufficiently prove the Universality of the Resurrection : And particularly that parallel Text, 1 Cor. 15, 23; where the same Apostle says, that *every Man* shall be raised in his own Order; *Christ the First-fruits, afterwards they that are Christs at his coming; And then cometh the end,* &c. Which words being immediately subjoined to that universal declaration, *As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive;* cannot, without great force, be interpreted to any other Sense, but that *the End* must signify the general Resurrection of all the Dead. See Rev. 20, v. 5. 12 & 13.

Your Interpretation (Señ. 25.) of that Text, Rom. 2, 12, *As many as have sinned without Law, shall also perish without Law, and as many as have sinned in the Law, shall be judged by the Law;* is not only groundless; the word [*ἀπολείνται* shall perish] which you understand to signify *Annihilation* or *bear ceasing to be*, being evidently Synonymous to [*κρίθισονται* shall be judged;] But also (as I before observed upon your *Premotion*, Señ. 6.) you thereby overthrow all the Threatnings of the Gospel, which frequently express the Punishment even of the worst of Sinners by that same word [*ἀπολείνται* shall perish] which you here interpret to signify only *a bare ceasing to be*. You are your self sensible of this difficulty, pag. 142; where you confess, that *though the word, Perish, may bear that milder Sense of only ceasing to be, yet it is also used in the Scriptures, concerning them whom all must believe liable to the severest positive Infirmities*. You seem indeed sensible, I say, of this difficulty upon your Interpretation : But yet you give no answer to it : Only you say, pag. 144. that *though the word will indeed bear a larger Signifi-*  
*on,*

on, yet in this place Annihilation may perhaps be more natural. Is not this a very singular manner of arguing? To \* collect from the signification of the word ἀπολῦνται, that those of whom it is here spoken, shall only cease to be; and yet at the same time to confess that in other places of Scripture That word has no such Signification; only in this place, *Annihilation may, perhaps, be more natural.*

\* See *Præmon.* pag. 35.

Your Interpretation of those other words of the Apostle, that *when the Gentiles which have not the Law, do by nature the things contained in the Law, these having not the Law, are a Law unto themselves*; is no less extraordinary; Namely, that the Gentiles being a *Law unto themselves*; does not signify their Obligation to obey the Law of nature, with respect to future Rewards and Punishments; but only there † *owning the Reasonableness of the things imposed as a Law by God on the Jews, but not on themselves*; which would no further oblige Them to the Observation of them, than as their own Interests might prevail with them to observe them, as they would avoid the Punishments and obtain the Rewards of Providence in This Life. Is not this very wonderful; that the Gentiles should be able to judge of the Reasonableness of God's moral Law to the Jews, and yet not be sensible that the Reasonableness of the Thing laid a strong Obligation upon themselves also? Or that they should be sensible of an Obligation laid upon them to live virtuously (which it would sometimes happen they could not do without exposing even their Life it self,) and yet not have any ground to expect a future Judgment, nor any other Rewards and Punishments than in the present Life? Is not this, destroying the very Nature of Virtue and Vice; and contrary to some of your own Arguments, *Seçt. 47, and elsewhere?*

† *pag. 144.*



It is not a very consistent Notion, to suppose as you do, (*Seet. 35, 36, and elsewhere,*) that the Souls of Men, though naturally mortal, yet are neither dissolved with their Bodies, nor yet perish afterwards by any natural Decay; but survive, and continue to subsist in a separate State; and none of them ever perish actually by that decay and Mortality which you suppose natural to Them; but that those who shall neither be immortalized to Happiness nor to Punishment, shall yet subsist till the general Judgment, and then be dissolved by that *exquisite fire which is to prevail in the last Conflagration, at least so far as to deprive them of any sensibility of Pain.* Is not this Notion more properly a supposing them to be naturally Immortal, that is, capable of subsisting for ever by the Powers given them at their original Production; but that God, by the interposition of his Almighty Power, praternaturally destroys at the last day, such of them as are neither capable of eternal Happiness, nor yet deserve eternal Punishment? This certainly would have been rather the more consistent Scheme of the two, and somewhat a more defensible Explication of your Notion, (with respect to the *bare Reason* of the Thing,) than to affirm that all Souls are *naturally mortal*, and yet that none of them ever die by a *natural decay and Mortality.* But your Hypothesis, however varied, would not yet have been truly consistent. For why, I beseech you, must it needs be supposed, that God cannot dispose of all his rational Creatures into States suitable to their several Natures, and proportionable to their several

veral capacities and deserts, without destroying and taking away their Being? And what can be more forced and disagreeable to Reason, than to suppose that the Sodomites and Ninevites and other Heathens of all Sorts, must indeed all appear at the Day of Judgment, but yet that their appearance there will be † *with no Design of concerning them in the Judgment of the Day, but only in the retrospective part of the day, for vindicating the Divine Providence, in relation to what had been trans-*

† pag. 148. *acted by it formerly?* You imagine indeed, ‖ that the Sodomites and Egyptians and other wicked Men to whom the Gospel was never preached, may endure the Sufferings of the future eternal State, during the time of their Duration; that is, from the time of their

\* pag. 311. *Death to the Day of Judgment; And that \* the Infelicitities good Heathens may have suffered in this Life, may be sufficiently rewarded by the Happiness of the intermediate space between their Death and the Judgment, though they have no share in those Eternal Rewards which are to follow after the day of Judgment: But, upon your Scheme, how can this be applied to those who shall live at the End of the World, when there may be as good and as bad Men among the Heathens, as ever were in any other Age, and yet these, according to your Notion, must All perish together at the Conflagration? And besides, because I presume you will not be less moved by Authority than by Reason; is not this extremely like one of those very Notions, which Tertullian, whose Authority you are otherwise so very desirous to make use of, blames the \* Stoicks for, and ridicules them as vainly*

\* Qui animæ aliquod tempus indulgent, ab excessu usq; in conflagrationem universitatis, ut Stoici, &c. Tertull. de Anima.

and

and † needlessly imagining, that the Souls of their Disciples should continue capable of Instruction and Improvement in the separate State, when at the same time they believed they were all to perish in the approaching *Conflagration*?

τὴν ὃ ψυχὴν γεννηθῆναι  
τε καὶ θαρτεῖν. Οὐκ εὐθὺς ὃ ἔ-  
σ· μαλὸς ἀπαλλαγῆσαι θείρε-  
σαι· ἀλλ' ἐπιβλεῖν πρὸς χρο-  
νος καθ' ἑαυτὴν τὴν μὲν ἡδ' ἰ-  
σποδασίαν μέχρι τ' εἰς πῦρ ἀ-  
ναλύσειν ἢ πάντων. &c.  
*Numeris apud Euseb.*

† Quis autem illis postumæ  
Eruditionis usus ac fructus,  
jamjam *conflagratione* perituris?  
*Tertull de Anima.*

What you advance in your *41st and following Sections*, concerning the State and Condition of *separate Souls*, is in every respect too uncertain to have any thing built upon it. Whether they who never heard of the Gospel in This Life, shall hereafter have any new Offer made to them, and undergo any new Trial; or whether all Mankind, even those who never heard of Christ at all, shall however, by virtue of the original Promise of the Messiah made to *Adam*, have so much benefit of the Redemption purchased by the Blood of Christ, as that at the general Judgment they shall all in some Proportions, and according to their several Capacities, have relief from the Equity and Mercy of the Gospel-covenant; (which seems, of the two, to be much the more probable Opinion: For how shall they who are found alive at the end of the World, undergo any new Trial?) Which soever, I say, of these ways be true, it makes little difference as to the main Question. That, upon the whole, God is no Respector of Persons; and *that* our Saviour *could not confine his design, as a Saviour of Souls, to any particular People* (as you prove largely and well in your *47th Section*.) but will certainly in some manner or other extend the offer of his gracious Covenant, or at least the Be-

nefit and Equity of it in some Proportions, to Men of all Ages and Nations in the World; must undoubtedly be allowed by all confidering Persons: And this very confideration alone, if you had not at other times reafoned inconfiftently with your felf, might eafily have faved you the whole trouble of inventing your wonderful Hypothefis concerning the natural Mortality of the Soul, in order to difpofe of thofe Gentiles who never heard of Chrif: But then as to the particular Manner, how the Equity and Mercy of the Gofpel fhall be extended to thofe to whom it never was preached; this, there is no Neceffity of determining; And certainly your Notion, (*Seft. 42.*) concerning feparate Souls being of Neceffity to be *baptized with Water*, even in the *literal Senfe*, in order to be made capable of any Favour of this kind; might very well have been fpared.

As to what you teach in the *42th and following Sections*, concerning *two diftinct Souls* in Men; Many antient Writers do indeed fo exprefs themfelves, as if they fupposed the *fenfitive Soul* to be one Subftance, and the *rational Soul* another: But both That Philofophy it felf, and your explication of it particularly, is very unintelligible: And your interpretation of that Text, where the Formation of Man is defcribed, is really ridiculous; The Words are thefe; *And the Lord God formed Man of the Duft of the Ground, and breathed into his Nostrils the Breath of Life, and Man became a living Soul.* Gen. 2, 7. Upon this Text, † p. 16. 2 16. you † fay; *Here is a Man fupposed before the Divine Breathing; Certainly not a dead Man, which is indeed no Man, but a Man animated with that lower Soul,*

*Soul, which is common to him and Beasts and therefore cannot be imputed to a Divine Breathing.* Can any thing be more absurd than this Interpretation? or can any thing be more plain; than that the meaning of these Words is, that God first formed the *Body* of Man out of the Dust, and then inspired into it a living *Soul*? But which way soever the Philosophy of this Question be determined, it will still be nothing to your purpose: For suppose, if you please, that the *Sensitive* and *rational* Soul be really two distinct Substances; yet how does this tend to prove that the *Rational Soul* is ever the more *naturally Mortal*? Did not those antient Philosophers, who thought Man composed of three distinct parts, a *Body*, a *sensitive Soul*, and a *rational Spirit*; teach that the *rational Spirit* was *naturally Immortal*? as you your self confess \* concerning *Plato* and *Fbilo*; and you \* p. 136 22 bring no Authority nor Reasoning, in these & 23. Sections, to the contrary.

In like manner your long Excursion, in the 55th Section, concerning the *Separate State*, does not at all prove, nor indeed so much as suppose, that the Soul is *naturally Mortal*: On the contrary, the Authorities you there cite, do all suppose it *Immortal*. Wherefore the particular groundless, not to say absurd Notions, which you there advance, concerning the *Habitations of separate Souls*, and the *Extent of the Power of Evil Spirits over them*, &c. not being of any importance with respect to the main Question; need not here be examined.

The Argument you propose, (Señ. 60.) that a *naturally mortal Soul* is more suitable and agreeable to be joyned with a *naturally mortal Body*, as a con-

*stituent of Human Nature, than a Soul that is naturally Immortal.* This Argument, if it proved any thing, would prove that the Soul ought to be of the same Nature and Duration with the Body, and that it ought to die at the same time with the Body, that is, that there ought to be no Soul at all. For it is just as much disagreeable and unsuitable to the Body, to have such a Substance united to it, as is capable of subsisting at all after the Dissolution of the Body; as to have such a Substance united to it, as is capable of continuing to subsist for ever. Since therefore you your self acknowledge that the Soul is naturally able to subsist separate for many ages after the dissolution of the Body; this Argument, if it had any strength in it, would prove a great deal too much for you; and be of the same force against *your own* Notion of the Soul, as against *ours*; Unless you could persuade the World to believe, that not only the *Immortalizing Spirit*, but even the *rational Soul*, that Soul which you suppose to be *naturally Mortal*, is it self also a *praternatural Principle*, (as you \* once or twice very absurdly assert,) and not originally a constituent Part of *Human Nature*.

\* *Præmon.*  
p. 24. and  
*Discourse*  
p. 300.

Neither has the Argument you draw from the Doctrine of *Original Sin*, any greater strength in it. For there is no necessity of supposing, upon any Scheme, that such Persons as have no actual Sin of their own, shall ever be condemned to eternal Torments merely for the Sin of our first Parent. 'Tis true we cannot peremptorily affirm in particular, how God will dispose of such Souls, as having no actual Sins of their own to answer for, yet have no express Title, by the ordinary  
Means,

Means, to the Rewards of the Gospel : But certainly 'tis a very weak and poor Argument, to conclude that numberless Souls must therefore necessarily be annihilated, merely because we do not know in particular, what State and Condition it will please God to assign them.

The same may be said of your Argument drawn from the Doctrine of *Reprobation*. You answer it your self, by supposing that the Doctrine of *absolute Reprobation* is not the Doctrine of Scripture. And as to that *Præterition*, which is barely the not affording all Men the same Means of Knowledge ; 'tis answered in your own Scheme, by what you say ( *Sect. 45, 46, and 47*) concerning the new Trial some Persons may undergo in another State ; and 'tis answered better by supposing that all Men may however be judged in proportion, according to the Equity of the Gospel, though they never had any explicit Knowledge of it.

Lastly, As to your Argument drawn from the Difficulty of reconciling eternal Punishments with the Goodness of God ; That Difficulty does not arise chiefly from the *difference of the Persons*, who may be concerned in those Punishments proportionably in *different degrees* ; but the real difficulty of the Question lies in this, how it is reconcileable with the Goodness of God, to put *any Persons at all* upon a necessity of making such an *Option*, wherein if they choose amiss, the Misery they incur must be irrecoverable. And this difficulty is evidently much better answered, by supposing the Souls of Men to be naturally immortal ; so that they who render themselves incapable of Happiness, must consequently fall in-

to remediless Misery; than it can be answered in *your* Scheme, where none can be liable to endless Punishment, without being miraculously immortalized on purpose, by the Arbitrary Will and Power of God, beyond the original Capacity of their Nature.

And now, Sir, I cannot but earnestly recommend it again to your most serious consideration; whether the new and inconsiderate Notions you have advanced, and (the Arguments I will not say, because I think you have not offered any that are of any real force, but) the Pretenses of Reason and Authority, which you have put into the hands of sceptical and profane Men, to confirm them in their prejudices against the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul; are not likely to be of great disservice to Religion; And whether you ought not (as all good Men are of Opinion you ought) to think of some means of making satisfaction to the Church, to whom you have given so great Offence; and of preventing the effect of that encouragement, which your Notions in this matter (tho' no Body doubts but it is contrary to your intention) have given to Immorality and contempt of Religion.

If zeal for the defense of a Doctrine of such importance, has in any part of this Letter caused me to drop any Expressions, which may be thought too sharp, and to carry in them too little of that respect, which all the World acknowledges to be justly due to you upon account of your very great Learning; I know you will pardon it upon such an occasion as this; and I cannot doubt but upon second Thoughts, you will



will be somewhat dissatisfied with *your self*, for having published a Book, at which all good Men are sorry, and all profane Men rejoyce.

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*A D V E R T I S E M E N T.*

**W**Hereas the Author of certain Remarks upon the Sermons preached at Mr *Boyles* Lecture in the Year 1704, has published a Vindication of those Remarks, with more misrepresentation of the Doctrine contained in those Sermons, and in those preached in the Year 1705: The Author of the said Sermons, humbly conceiving that there is no Objection either in the Remarks or in the Vindication of the Remarks, which has not been either prevented in the Sermons themselves, or fully answered in the Preface to the second Volume? and not thinking it fit to trouble the World with any further Reply to mere Calumny and ill Language; desires to refer this matter wholly to the impartial Reader, who by comparing the Books themselves, with the Remarks, will judge on which side Truth and Reason stands.



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A

# D E F E N S E

Of an ARGUMENT made use of in a *Letter* to Mr *Dodwell*, to prove the *Immateriality* and *Natural Immortality* of the SOUL.

**I**N a *Letter* to Mr *Dodwell*, upon occasion of his late *Discourse* concerning the Nature of the *Soul*, the following Argument was among others particularly made use of, to prove the *Immateriality* and *natural Immortality* of the Soul.

‘ The same thing, *viz.* that *the Soul cannot possibly be Material*, is moreover demonstrable from the single consideration even of bare Sense and Consciousness it self. For, Matter being a divisible Substance, consisting always of separable, nay of actually Separate and distinct Parts; ’tis plain, unless it were essentially conscious, in which case every Particle of Matter must consist of innumerable separate and distinct Consciousnesses, no System of it in any possible Composition or Division can be an Individual conscious Being. For suppose

‘ three

*Letter to Mr Dodwell. page 25.*

' three, or three hundred, Particles of Matter,  
 ' at a Mile, or any given distance, one from  
 ' another; is it possible that all those separate  
 ' Parts should in that State be one Individual  
 ' conscious Being? Suppose then all these Par-  
 ' ticles brought together into one System, so as  
 ' to touch one another; will they thereby, or  
 ' by any Motion or Composition whatsoever,  
 ' become any whit less truly distinct Beings,  
 ' than they were at the greatest distance? How  
 ' then can their being disposed in any possible  
 ' System, make them one Individual Conscious  
 ' Being? If you suppose God ~~by~~ by his Infi-  
 ' nite Power superadding Consciousness to the  
 ' united Particles, yet still those Particles, be-  
 ' ing really and necessarily as distinct Beings as  
 ' ever, cannot be themselves the Subject in which  
 ' that Individual Consciousness inheres; but the  
 ' Consciousness can only be superadded by the ad-  
 ' dition of Something, which in all the Particles  
 ' must still it self be but one Individual Being.  
 ' The Soul therefore, whose Power of Thinking  
 ' is undeniably one Individual Consciousness,  
 ' cannot possibly be a Material Substance.

To invalidate the force of this Argument, the following Objections have been offered to the publick.

\* A Letter containing some Remarks on a pretended Demonstration, &c. pag. 11.  
 ' I. That \* an Individual Power may reside in  
 ' a Material System which consists of actually  
 ' separate and distinct parts; That an Individual  
 ' Power can be lodged by God in, or superadded  
 ' to That which is not an individual Being; or  
 ' it may follow from the Composition or Modi-  
 ' fication of a Material System consisting of  
 ' actually separate and distinct Particles; and if  
 ' so,

So, then the very Soul and Strength of the foregoing Demonstration is gone. That as to this, Matter of Fact is so plain and obvious, that a Man can't turn his Eye, but he will meet with Material Systems, wherein there are Individual Powers, which are not in every one nor in any one of the Particles that compose them, when taken apart and considered singly. That a Rose, for Example, consists of several Particles which separately and singly want a Power to produce that agreeable Sensation we experience in them when united; And therefore either each of the Particles in that Union contributes to the Individual Power which is the external cause of our Sensation; or else God superadds the Power of producing that Sensation in us, upon the Union of the Particles. That this may be the Case of Matters Thinking. Those Particles which compose the Brain may under that Modification, either have the Power of Thinking necessarily flowing from them, or else may have the Power of Thinking superadded to them by the Power of God, tho' singly and separately they may not have the Power of Thinking. And That the Fallacy of the fore-mentioned Argument lies in this, that by an Individual Power is there meant a Power that can only proceed from, or reside in an Individual Being: Which is a plain begging of the Question.

II. That though a System of Matter were allowed not to be capable of Thinking, yet \* it is evident, \* page 8  
 that, according to the foregoing Argument, the  
 separate and distinct Parts of Matter are capable of having a Power of Thinking, or an Individual Consciousness superadded to each of them;

‘ them; because the want of Individuality or  
 ‘ Distinctness, is the sole Reason urged, why a  
 ‘ System of Matter cannot have a Power of  
 ‘ Thinking or an Individual Consciousness; and  
 ‘ it is only required that a Thing be an Indi-  
 ‘ vidual Being, in order to its being a proper Sub-  
 ‘ ject of a Power of Thinking, or at least in  
 ‘ order to its being a Subject to which it may be  
 ‘ possible for God to superadd a power of Think-  
 ‘ ing.

\* page 13,

III. ‘ That though it were allowed, \* that Con-  
 ‘ sciousness could reside only in an Individual  
 ‘ Being; and also that That Individual Being  
 ‘ must be an Immaterial Being; yet even then  
 ‘ the Soul would not be proved to be naturally  
 ‘ Immortal; that is, the Thinking Immaterial  
 ‘ Being would not be proved to be Immortal, but  
 ‘ only the bare Immaterial Subject or Substance it  
 ‘ self; Because Thinking is an Action which may  
 ‘ commence after the Existence of its Subject,  
 ‘ and may perish or cease to exist, its Subject  
 ‘ still remaining.

† page 9,

IV. ‘ That if † an Individual Being can only  
 ‘ be the Subject of a Power of Thinking, then,  
 ‘ according to the foregoing Argument, either it will  
 ‘ be proved that Material Substance is capable of  
 ‘ Thinking, or else that neither is Immaterial Sub-  
 ‘ stance capable of it: Because either several Par-  
 ‘ ticles of Matter, when united in one System,  
 ‘ may become an Individual Being, and be by  
 ‘ the Power of God rendred incapable of any  
 ‘ Division or Separation by Natural Causes, and  
 ‘ consequently be a Subject capable of Thinking,  
 ‘ or else Immaterial Substance also may as well  
 ‘ be conceived capable of Division, upon Sup-  
 ‘ position

position that Extension is not excluded out of the Idea of Immateriality.

V. *That if* \* from the Power of Thinking, \* page 14  
 or Individual Consciousness, we can prove the Immateriality of the Soul, and from its Immateriality prove its natural Immortality; *then* the Consequence will be, that all the numerous sensible Creatures in the Universe are put in the same Condition with Man, and made capable of eternal Happiness as well as he; *or else* to avoid this Consequence, *it must be supposed*, either that all those Creatures are only mere Machines, *or else* that their Souls shall be annihilated upon the dissolution of their Bodies; *And if so*, then the proof of the natural Immortality of *Mens* Souls from their Immateriality, tends not to prove that their Souls shall *really be* Immortal.

The Question being of great Importance, and the Objections very ingenious, as containing in brief all that can be said in Favour of *Matter's* being capable of Thinking; It is presumed it may be acceptable to the impartial Reader, to see a clear Answer given to each of them as they are here represented in their full Strength, tho' (for Methods sake) in somewhat a different Order than they were at first published.

I. To the First. *viz.* That *an individual Power may reside in a Material System: as Sweetness, in a Rose; And that Thinking may be supposed to do so, as well as any other Individual Power; It is answered*, that 'tis so far from being true. as is alledged, that *Matter of Fact is so plain and obvious that a Man can't turn his Eye, but he will meet with Material*

terial Systems, wherein there are Individual Powers, which are not in every one, nor in any one, of the Particles that compose them, when taken apart and considered singly; This, I say, is so far from being True, that, on the contrary, 'tis both absolutely false in Fact, and impossible and a direct Contradiction in the Nature of the Thing it self, that any Power whatsoever should inhere or reside in, any System or Composition of Matter, different from the Powers residing in the single Parts. For the clearer and more distinct Explication and Proof of which Doctrine, it is to be observed that all Powers or Qualities may be distinguished into three sorts. 1<sup>st</sup>, Some Qualities there are, which do strictly and properly speaking, inhere in the Substance to which they are ascribed. And concerning these, it is evident at first sight, that every Power or Quality, that is or can be inherent in any System of Matter, is nothing else than the Sum or Aggregate of so many Powers or Qualities of the same kind, inherent in all its parts. The Magnitude of any Body is nothing but the Sum of the Magnitudes of all its Parts. Its Motion, is nothing but the Sum of the Motions of all its Parts. And if Cogitation in like manner could possibly be a Quality really inherent in a System of Matter, it must likewise necessarily be the Sum and Result of the Cogitations of the several Parts: And so there would be as many distinct Consciousnesses, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the System consists; Which I suppose will be granted to be very absurd. Compositions or Divisions of Magnitude, varied in infinite manners to Eternity, can produce nothing in the whole System, no Quality or Power whatsoever, but mere Magnitude; Compositions and



and Variations of *Motion*, nothing but *mere Motion*. And *Sound* may as well be added to a *Colour*, or *Colour* to a *Smell*; or any *Quality* be made to subsist, without any *Subject* at all; as that any Power whatsoever should be superadded to, and really made to *reside* in any *Compositum* or *System* of *Matter*, without being made to inhere *proportionably* in the *Parts* of that *Whole*, taken singly as well as together. This, I say, is evidently at first sight *True*, of all real *Qualities*, which truly and properly *inhere* in the *Subject* to which they belong; such as are *Magnitude* and *Motion* in *Matter*. 2dly, Other *Qualities* there are, which are *vulgarly* looked upon as *Individual Powers*, resulting from and residing in the whole *System*, without residing particularly in each or any of its single and original *Parts*; such as are the *Sweetness* of certain *Bodies*, their *Colour*; &c. But this is only a *vulgar* and very *gross* *Error*. For neither do these *Qualities* reside in, or at all result from, the whole *System*, in any *proper Sense*: Neither in *any Sense at all*, in which they can be ascribed to that *Body* or *System* of *Matter* to which they are *vulgarly* supposed to belong, are they truly *Individual Powers*. In the *first* place they are not *really Qualities* of the *System*, and evidently do not all in any *proper Sense* belong to it, but are only *Effects* occasionally produced by it in some other *Substance*, and truly *Qualities* or *Modes* of that other *Substance* in which they are produced; Thus the *Sweetness* of a *Rose*, is well known not to be a *Quality* really inhering in the *Rose*; but a *Sensation*, which is merely in him that smells it, and a *Mode* of the *Thinking Substance* that is in the *Man*. In the *next* place, these *Qualities*, in no *Sense* where-

in they can be ascribed to the System of Matter, are *Individual Powers*. They are Individuals, only as they are *Modes* of the Thinking Substance that perceives them; but in the Bodies themselves they are *only specifically*, not *individually*, single Powers; that is, they are only a number of *similar Motions* of *Figures* of the Parts of the Body. Nay, they are not always so much as *specifically* single Powers. Thus Compound Colours, as certain *Greens*, for Example, which are *Individual Modes* in the Thinking Substance that perceives them, may in the Objects be nothing but a number of *Figures* or *Motions* *even specifically* different, namely such as usually represent both *Blue* and *Yellow*. And the same may be said of *Heat*, *Light*, *Taste*, *Sound*, and all those others which we call *Sensible Qualities*. 3dly, Other Powers, such as *Magnetism*, and *Electrical Attractions*, are not *real Qualities* at all, residing in any Subject, but *merely abstract Names* to express the *Effects* of some determinate Motions of certain Streams of Matter: And *Gravitation* it self, is not a *Quality inhering* in Matter, or that can possibly *result* from any Texture or Composition of it; but only an *Effect* of the continual and regular Operation of some other Being upon it; by which the Parts are all made to tend one towards another. Under these *three* Heads must necessarily be contain'd all possible Qualities, Modes or Powers whatsoever: They must either be *Qualities really inhering* in the Subject to which they are usually ascribed; or *Modes produced* by it in some other Subject; or else *mere abstract Names*, signifying certain Powers or Effects that do not properly reside in any Subject at all. And now the Question is, among which of these *Three* sorts of Powers must *Consciousness* or *Thinking* be reckoned.

ened. I suppose it will neither be said to be a mere abstract Name, nor yet an Effect produced in or upon a Foreign Substance, (as the Sweetness or Colour of a Rose, is not any individual Power in the Rose it self, but merely a Sensation excited in him that smells or sees it;) but that it is certainly a Power or Quality truly and really inhering in the Thinking Substance it self. And therefore, if that Thinking Substance be a System of Matter, the former Reasoning holds strictly and demonstratively true, that the Consciousness, must inhere in all and every one of the Particles of that System, taken singly, as well as together. To suppose any Power or Quality of this kind, arising from, or belonging to any whole System of Matter, without belonging to the several Parts of which that Whole consists, is a direct and express Contradiction: 'Tis supposing either an Universal to exist, without Particulars; or an Effect to be produced without a Cause, or to have more in it than was in the Cause; or that a Quality is by the Power of God made so to arise out of Nothing, as to be superadded to a Subject, and to subsist without inhering in that Subject, to which it is at the same time supposed to belong. By this I presume it sufficiently appears with what possibility of Truth it is alleged, that the Particles of Matter which compose the Brain, may under that Modification either have the Power of Thinking necessarily flowing from them or else may have the Power of Thinking superadded to them by the Power of God, though singly and separately they may not have the Power of Thinking. And it will easily be judged, whether it be indeed a Fallacy and a plain begging of the Question, to affirm that an Individual Power, properly

and strictly speaking, such as Consciousness or Thinking must needs be acknowledged to be, *can only proceed from, or reside in, an Individual Being*; or whether the contrary be not rather demonstrated to be a plain Contradiction.

II. To the Second, *viz.* That according to the Argument now under Consideration, it not a *System of Matter*, yet at least *the separate and distinct Parts of Matter*, are capable of having a Power of Thinking, or an Individual Consciousness superadded to each of them; seeing it is only required that a thing be an Individual Being, in order to its being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking: It is answered, First, that supposing any Particle of Matter could be truly an Individual, that is, an Indivisible or Indiscernible Being; yet it would not therefore follow, that it could be capable of thinking. For though Divisibility or Discernibility in any Subject, is a sufficient Proof that That Subject is not capable of such an Individual Power of Thinking; yet it does not from thence presently follow on the contrary, that whatever is Indiscernible, is therefore capable of Thinking. Though the present Argument proves indeed only, that whatever is Discernible, cannot Think; that is, that Individuality is a *sine qua non*, or a necessary Qualification without which no Subject can be capable of Thinking; yet it does by no means exclude other Considerations. or at all imply that whatever has this Property of Individuality, must therefore necessarily be capable of Thinking, and cannot by any other Property be rendered, or by any other Argument proved to be, incapable of it. Though the want of Individuality or Distinctness, is indeed the sole Reason urged in the present Argument,

gument,

argument, *why a System of Matter cannot have a Power of Thinking or an Individual Consciousness*; yet it ought not therefore to be said, that it is *Only required that a Thing be an Individual Being, in order to its being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking*. Besides; Supposing any Particle of Matter could be truly an Individual Being, and also that upon that account (which yet is by no means necessary) it could be capable of Thinking; yet still the principal part of the Question would be certain and unavoidable, that a Thinking Being must be, if not immaterial, yet however *naturally Immortal*: For whatever is Indiscerpible, tho' it were supposed Material, could not by any Power of Time, or any Force in Nature, receive any such Alteration, but that not only its Substance, but even all its Qualities also, must naturally remain for ever unchanged. But then, Secondly, it is answered farther, that the Supposition it self of this Objection, is utterly impossible, *viz.* that any Particle of Matter can be truly an Individual or Indiscerpible Being. For it is necessarily included in the Nature of Solid Substance, how *small* soever it be conceived to be, to consist still of Parts not essentially connected, and not at all depending upon each other for their Existence. So that it is absolutely impossible and contradictory, to suppose any Particle of Matter so truly an Individual, but that by the Power of God (for the *Powers of Nature* here are nothing to the purpose) it may be divided into two or more Particles, which shall each of them separately be as Perfect and Compleat Matter, and continue to have all the very same Properties, as the whole Particle had before it was divided. Suppose then the smallest

imaginable Particle of Matter, indued with Consciousness or Thought : Yet by the Power of God, this Particle may be divided into two distinct Parts ; and then what will naturally and consequently become of its Power of Thinking ? *If* That Power will continue in it unchanged ; then there must either be two distinct Consciousnesses, in the two separate Parts ; or else the Power continuing in the intermediate Space, as well as in the parts themselves, must there subsist without a Subject ; or else, not the Material Substance, but some other Thing, is the Subject of the Consciousness. *If* the Power of Thinking will remain only in One of the separated Parts ; then either That One Part only, had at first the Power residing in it ; and then the same Question will return, upon the supposition of *Its* being likewise divided ; or else it will follow that one and the same Individual Quality may be transferred from one Subject to another ; which all Philosophers of all Sects in the World, have always confessed to be impossible. *If*, in the last place, it be said, that upon the Division of the Particle, the Power of Thinking, which was in it, will wholly cease ; then it will follow, that That Power was never at all a real Quality inhering or residing in the Substance, (in which mere separation of Parts, makes no Alteration ; ) but that it was *merely an external Denomination*, such as is *Roundness* in a Globe, which perishes at its being divided : And this, I suppose, will be granted to be sufficiently absurd. There is no way to evade this Argument, but by affirming either that a Particle of Matter may be so small, as that it shall not be in the Power of God to divide it ; or that if it be divided, it will consequently

frequently and necessarily be annihilated ; (neither of which, I suppose, will be affirmed,) or else that the same may be argued concerning Immaterial Substance also ; which is the *Fourth* Objection, and will be considered presently in its proper place.

III. To the Third, *viz* That though *Consciousness* were allowed necessarily to infer *Indivisibility*, and *Indivisibility* to infer *Immateriality*: yet even then not *the Soul*, the *Thinking immaterial Being*, but only the *bare Immaterial Subject* or *Substance* itself, would be proved to be naturally *Immortal*; since *Thinking is an Action* (a *Power* it should rather have been call'd) which may commence after the *Existence of its Subject*, and may cease, its *Subject still remaining*: It is answered, that the contrary is evidently *True*: namely, that not only the *bare Immaterial Subject*, but the *Subject* and the *Power* together, the *Thinking Immaterial Being* it self, is hereby proved to be *naturally Immortal*: Because, whatever Substance is wholly *indiscernible*, is plainly, by *Virtue of that Property*, not only *it self* incapable of being destroyed by any *Natural Power*, (for so also is the most *discernible* Substance likewise;) but all its *Qualities* and *Modes* also, are utterly incapable of being affected in any measure, or changed in any degree, by any *Power of Nature*; For all real and *inherent Qualities* of any Substance, are either *Modifications* of the Substance it self, or else *Powers* superadded and connected to the Substance, by the *immediate Power of God*; And in either of these cases, 'tis manifest no *Quality* can be altered by any *natural Power*, which is not able to affect and make some *Alteration* (in the

Disposition of the parts at least) of the *Substance* it felt ; which in an *indiscernible* Substance 'tis evident cannot be done. The *Soul* therefore, the *whole Conscious Being* ; the *Power of Thinking* that resides in it, as well as the *bare Immaterial Subject or Substance it self* ; (whatever may be said concerning the *Power of God* in this Question ;) will clearly, notwithstanding what any *Finite Power* can do, of necessity be *naturally Immortal*. The Truth of this Reasoning is evident from what we cannot but observe even in the *Material World* ; namely, that all the Changes which are caused therein by any Powers of Nature, are Nothing but Changes of the Order and Disposition of the Parts of compound Bodies. The original and perfectly solid Particles of Matter, which are, (not indeed absolutely in themselves, but) to any Power of Nature, *indiscernible* ; are utterly incapable of having not only their Substance, but even any of their Qualities or Properties altered in any measure by any Power of Nature : As is evident from the Form or Species of those we vulgarly call simple or elementary Bodies remaining always unalterably the same, and indur'd continually with the same Powers and Qualities.

IV. To the Fourth, *viz.* That according to the Argument we are now considering, either a *System of Matter*, being by a strict Union of Parts made an Individual Being, may become *capable of Thinking* : or else *Immaterial Substance* also may as well be conceived capable of *Division*, and consequently incapable of Thought : *supposing Extension not excluded out of the Idea of Immateriality* : It is answered, that the Case is very different :

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
Because some of the *first* and *most obvious* Properties which we *certainly know* of *Matter*, as its having *partes extra partes*, strictly and properly speaking, that is, its consisting of such Parts as are *actually unconnected* and are *truly distinct Beings*, and can (as we see by Experience) exist *separately*, and have *no dependence one upon another*; do necessarily and confessedly imply *Discernibility*: But in *Immaterial Beings* we do *not know* of any such Properties, as any will imply *Discernibility*. It cannot be collected from any Property we know of *Them*, but that they *may be* such Beings as can no more be divided than annihilated, that is, whose whole *Essence* may be necessarily *One*, and their *Substance* essentially indivisible, upon the same Ground as their *Existence* continues: Nay, the *only* Properties we *certainly and indisputably* know of them, namely *Consciousness* and its Modes, do prove (as has been before shown) that they *must necessarily* be such *Indiscernible Beings*. As evidently as the *known Properties* of *Matter* prove it to be certainly a *Discernible Substance*, whatever other *unknown Properties* it may be endued with; so evidently the *known and confessed Properties* of *Immaterial Beings* prove them to be *Indiscernible*, whatever other *unknown Properties* They likewise may be endued with. How far such *Indiscernibility* can be reconciled and be consistent with some kind of *Expansion*; that is, what *unknown Properties* are joyned together with these *known ones* of *Consciousness* and *Indiscernibility*; is another Question of considerable Difficulty, but of no Necessity to be resolved in the present Argument. Only This: As the Parts of *Space* or *Expansion* it self, can demonstrably be proved to be *absolutely Indiscernible*; so

it ought not to be reckoned an insuperable Difficulty, to imagine that all *Immaterial Thinking Substances* (upon Supposition that *Expansion* is not excluded out of their Idea,) may be so likewise.

V. To the Fifth, *viz.* That by the forementioned Argument, *all the sensible Creatures in the Universe are put in the same Condition with Man, and made capable of eternal Happiness as well as he; or else that, to avoid this Consequence, all those Creatures must either be supposed to be only mere Machines, or else that their Souls shall be annihilated upon the dissolution of their Bodies; And if so, then the Proof of the natural Immortality of Mens Souls from their Immateriality, tends not to prove that their Souls shall really be Immortal:* It is answered, that, though all Sensible Creatures have certainly in them something that is Immaterial, yet it does not at all follow, either that they must needs be annihilated upon the Dissolution of their Bodies, or else that they must be capable of Eternal Happiness as well as Man. This is just such an Argument, as if a Man should conclude, that whatsoever is not exactly like himself, can therefore have no Being at all; Or that all the Stars of Heaven, if they be not exactly like our Globe of Earth, cannot possibly be any Globes at all. Certainly the Omnipotent and infinitely Wise God may, without any very great difficulty, be supposed to have more ways of disposing of his Creatures, than we are at present let into the secret of. He may indeed, if he please, annihilate them at the dissolution of their Bodies; (And so he might, if he thought fit, annihilate the Souls of Men; and yet it would be never the less true, that they

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are *in their own Nature Immortal;*) or he may, if he pleases, without either annihilating them or suffering them to fall into a State of entire Inactivity, dispose of them into *numberless* States, concerning the particular Nature of which, we are not now able to make the least conjecture. I suppose, That Man does not do any great Honour either to God, or to the Christian Religion, who will needs contend, that through a boundless Eternity there shall never exist any thing in the immense Universe, but what must needs partake either of the Happiness or Misery of *Mankind*.



A





A Second

## D E F E N S E

O F A N

ARGUMENT to prove the *Im-*  
*materiality* of the SOUL, &c.

SIR,

**I**N abstract and *Metaphysical* Speculations, it is hardly possible that any thing should ever be so clearly expressed, or so strongly proved; but Those who are not very much versed in such Enquiries, will perpetually be apt to misapprehend what is said; and Men of Wit and Parts will always be able to raise new Difficulties, and perplex their Readers with intricate and endless Disputations.

Since you have not thought fit in your *Rep'y*, to offer any new Arguments, but only to urge again the same Objections which you had before advanced, against what I persuade my self I have already explained with as much clearness as can reasonably be expected in Questions of this Nature; I think I might very well, without entering into any further debate, have now left it wholly to the judicious and impartial Reader, to consider and determine with himself on which side the

the greatest Strength of Reason and Argument lies. Nevertheless, the Candour and Ingenuity with which you have written, have once more engaged me to endeavour to give you satisfaction in this matter; by pointing out to you some of the principal Instances, wherein you seem either to have mistaken the Question itself, or to have misunderstood my Argument upon it. But hereafter, unless any new Objections shall be proposed, and not merely Repetitions and ingenious Representations of the former Difficulties, you must excuse me if I think not my self obliged to do so any more.

In repeating my answer to your first Objection, you cite my Words thus; \* *To suppose any Power or Quality of this kind, arising from, or belonging to the several Parts of which the Whole consists, is a direct and express Contradiction*: Whereas my Words were; *To suppose any Power or Quality of this kind arising from or belonging to [any whole System of Matter, without belonging to] the several Parts of which that Whole consists, is a direct and express Contradiction* †. I make no question but this is only a Fault of the Press in your Reply. Yet it was proper to take notice of it, because perhaps every Reader will not be at the Pains to compare the Books; and it happens, as the Passage stands in your citation to give a very disadvantageous Representation of my Sense.

In your preliminary defining the Signification of the Terms \*, I cannot see any Reason, (unless it be to perplex the Reader with a new Question, *Whether the Soul always Actually thinks or not*, which is wholly foreign to the Matter at present in Dispute;) I cannot see any Reason, I say, why  
you

\* Reply,  
page 10.

† Defense  
page 81.

\* Reply,  
page 10.

you should affirm that *Consciousness cannot be properly employed to signify the same thing with a Power of Thinking, unless by a Power of Thinking, be understood, not a Capacity to Think, but Actual Thinking.* For, the thing to be proved, being This, that a Divisible Substance is not capable of a Power of Thinking; what difference can it make, whether by a *Power of Thinking* you understand *actual Thinking*, or a *Capacity to think*? For I presume you will not deny, but whatever is proved incapable of *actual Thinking*, is also proved incapable (*pardon the Expression*) of a *Capacity of Thinking*; and whatsoever is proved incapable of a *Capacity of Thinking*, is also proved incapable of *actual Thinking*. Wherefore there was no need of endeavouring at this time to perplex and multiply the Question by any such disputable Distinction; Which kind of Difficulties, foreign to the thing at present under Consideration, they who are desirous to come at Truth, and to come at it the nearest way, ought always very carefully to avoid.

*Consciousness*, in the most strict and exact Sense of the Word, signifies neither a *Capacity of Thinking*, nor yet *Actual Thinking*, but the *Reflex Act* by which I know that I think, and that my Thoughts and Actions are my own and not *Others*. But in the present Question, the Reader needs not trouble himself with this Nicety of Distinction; but may understand it indifferently in all or any of these Significations; because the Argument proves universally, that Matter is neither capable of this *Reflex Act*, nor of the first *Direct Act*, nor of the *Capacity of Thinking* at all.

By an *Individual Power* I mean (in the Sense that Logicians commonly use the Word *Individual* when they oppose it to *Specifick*;) such a Power as is *really and truly* in the nature of the thing itself *One Power*, in opposition to its being such merely in our *abstract Complex Notion*. For Instance: When I speak of my own Consciousness, and call it an *Individual Power*; I mean thereby to express that it is really and truly one undivided Consciousness, and not a multitude of distinct Consciousnesses added together: But when I speak of the Blueness (suppose) or Redness, or Sweetness of a Body, as of a *single Power* belonging to that Body; 'tis evident I can mean only, that it is such merely in the *abstract complex Notion* or *Idea* I frame in my Mind; that is, in the same Sense as we say an *Army* or a *City* is *One*; But that really and indeed it is a vast Multitude of Bluenesses, Rednesses, or Sweetnesses; or rather (to speak strictly and properly) a vast Multitude of such Parts as excite in us the Sensations of Blueness, Redness or Sweetness. Now the thing to be proved, was that such an Individual Power as Consciousness, cannot possibly inhere in or result from a divisible Substance. And this I did prove; not by *defining* or *supposing* an *Individual Power* to be a *Power that cannot possibly inhere in or result from a divisible Substance*; (which would indeed have been a *Begging* of the Question;) but by *demonstrating*, that it would necessarily imply a plain and direct Contradiction, for any Power which is really *One* and not *Many*, (such as your self acknowledged Consciousness to be, by confessing it does not reside † in the single and separate Parts of the Brain,) to inhere in or result

† page 15.

from



from a divisible Substance. Wherefore it is altogether without Reason, that you endeavour to perplex your Reader by telling him that \* a *System of Matter being supposed to be a Power incapable of residing in a Being that consists of Parts, the Question of Matter's Thinking will amount to this, Whether that which cannot think, can think*; When you well know that I made use of no such Supposition, but endeavoured to prove (and, I hope, have proved with some strength and clearness) what you seem to insinuate as if I only *supposed*.

I. You reply to my Answer to your first Objection; that † it is nothing else but *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*: that in enumerating the sorts of Powers or Qualities of Matter, I suppose that a System of Matter has and can have only Powers of one sort or kind, such as Magnitude and Motion, which are only the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind; Which, what is it else but to argue, that because we know of no other Powers of a different kind in Matter from Magnitude and Motion, therefore it Has and Can have no other Powers? Now I cannot think, Sir, but a Man of your Understanding, if you please to consider the Matter a second time, will find it is by no means *Argumentum ad Ignorantiam*. For if a Disjunction be complete, (as that in which I enumerate the several sorts of Powers of which Matter is capable, either is; or else you ought to have proved that another Member could be added to it, to show that it was not;) it contains in it all the possible particulars, as well the *unknown*, as those that are ever so well *known*. For how many particulars soever be supposed to be *unknown*, and how impossible soever it be supposed to come at the knowledge of those particulars;

particulars; yet if the Heads or Kinds be rightly distributed, they must of Necessity contain under them all the *unknown* particulars as certainly as those that are the *most known*. All the possible Qualities, I said, or Powers of Matter, (whether *known* or *unknown*,) must of Necessity be either *Qualities really inhering in the Subject it self to which they are ascribed*; or *Modes produced by it in some other Subject*; or else *mere abstract Names signifying certain Powers or Effects that do not properly reside in any Subject at all*. Now if this Disjunction be true; and Thinking be at all a Quality or Power of Matter; and be confessed not to belong to either of the two latter sorts; it must of necessity, (how *unknown* soever the Nature of it be otherwise supposed to be,) be included in the former. And then the Argument holds unanswerably good; that *Thinking*, (or, if you please to imagin any other even yet more abstruse Qualities or Powers of Matter, even these also) as well as Magnitude and Motion, which I instanced in; and whatever else be reducible to this Kind; by truly and really inhering in the Subject itself; must of necessity inhere in all and every one of the particles of the System, taken singly as well as together. Because, as I said before, to suppose any Power or Quality of this kind, arising from, or belonging to any *whole* System of Matter. without belonging to the *several Parts*, of which that whole consists, is a direct and express Contradiction: 'Tis supposing either an *Universal* to exist, without *Particulars*; or an *Effect* to be produced without a *Cause*, or to have more in it than was in the *Cause*; or that a *Quality* is by the Power of God made so to arise out of Nothing, as to be superadded to a *Subject*, and to  
subst

subsist without inhering in that Subject to which to it is at the same time supposed to belong.

To this you Reply, \* that to suppose a Power \* *page 14.*  
 arising from Matter, without belonging to the Parts  
 of which the Whole consists; is not to suppose an Uni-  
 versal to exist without Particulars, but a Particular  
 Power existing, to which several Particular Powers con-  
 tribute; as every Man is a Particular Man, though  
 various Powers are necessary to constitute him of that  
 Species. But, Sir, if the Whole or result, which  
 you call a Particular Power, be entirely and Specifi-  
 cally different from all and every one of the par-  
 ticular Powers contributing to it; as *Thinking* ma-  
 nifestly is; from all the Powers of particles not  
 indued with *Thought*; you will find, if you please  
 to consider it carefully, that 'tis as certain and e-  
 vident as any *Arithmetical* Demonstration, that  
 such a Particular Power is a *Whole* bigger than all  
 its Parts; a *Whole*, that contains something in it  
 besides All and every one of its Parts; that is, I  
 think, an *Universal* without particulars. It is ex-  
 actly as if you should assert, that a *Smell* and a  
*Colour* could be joyned together to make up a  
*Sound*; or as if *Hardness* and *Figure* could be the  
 particulars contributing to constitute a *Motion*. A  
*Man*, if you mean the whole Man, the Thinking  
 Person; (as the Reader may be apt to think you  
 do; and suppose him to be constituted of mere  
 Matter, whose single particles are none of them  
 indued with *Thought*; is such a contradictory  
 Whole: But if you mean, (as you seem to do,)  
 the Body only, with its Mechanical Powers;  
 then there is nothing in it, differing from the  
 Powers of the single Parts; except only the bare  
 Name, the Abstract Notion of its being a *Whole*;

which is a complex Idea in our Mind ; but in the Thing it self tis nothing at all, but its being the Sum of the Magnitudes, Figures, and Motions of all the several parts ; from which constituent parts no Whole can (without an evident Contradiction) differ any otherwise, than as in numbers a *Thousand* differs from *Ten hundred*, or as in Weights a *Pound* differs from *sixteen Ounces*, or as an *Army* differs from all the *Men* that compose it ; that is, in nothing but the bare Name.

You add: *Neither is it a supposing an Effect produced without a Cause : For the different Powers in the single and separate Parts of a System of Matter, by uniting in one Operation or Power to operate, are the Cause of the Existence of that Power which did not exist in the Particles singly considered. And thus in those Particles which compose the Brain, &c.* Now here, Sir, I really cannot but wonder how a Gentleman so well skilled in Philosophy, as you are, can suffer himself to be imposed upon by so very gross and palpable a Fallacy. For though the different Powers in the **single** and separate Parts of a System of Matter, (as, for instance, their Magnitude, Situation, **Figure** and Motion,) may by uniting in one Operation or Power to operate, be the Cause of the Existence of another Power of *the same Species*, which did not exist in the Particles singly considered ; that is, may constitute another Magnitude, another **Figure**, another Motion, than was in the single Particles ; just as twenty different Numbers added together, constitute a new Number different from any of the Particulars : Yet those Powers cannot, without an evident Contradiction, be the Cause of the Existence of any other Power of a *different Species* : (as *Thinking* is confessedly of a *different Species* from *Magnitude*,

*mitude, Figure, Motion,* or whatever other properties may belong to *Unthinking* Particles of Matter;) for the same reason as the Addition of different Numbers in Arithmetick, cannot without a manifest Contradiction, be the Cause of the Existence of a Line or a Figure ; or the mixture of Taſts, conſtitute a Colour ; Namely , becauſe thus the *Effect* would contain more in it than was in the *Cauſe* ; that is, ſomething would without any Efficient, be produced out of Nothing. In like manner; though the different Powers in the ſingle and ſeparate Parts of a System of Matter, (their Magnitude *ſuppoſe*, Situation. Figure and Motion.) may, by uniting in one Operation or Power to operate, be the cauſe of the Exiſtence of a Power to *affect ſome foreign Subſtance*, which Power did not exiſt in the Particles ſingly conſidered ; that is, certain particles united, may prick the Skin and cauſe Pain, which the ſingle ones could not do ; or may ſtrike the Eye ſo as to excite the Senſation of Blew or Red, which the ſingle ones could not do ; Juſt as a Wedge may force it ſelf a paſſage, where a Body of ſome other ſhape could not : Yet thoſe Powers cannot, without an evident Contradiction, be the cauſe of the Exiſtence of any new Quality *really inhering in the Subject it ſelf*; (as *Thinking* confeſſedly is a Quality *really inhering in the Thinking Being it ſelf*, and not barely an *abſtract Notion*, or *Power of affecting ſome foreign Subſtance*;) for the ſame Reaſon as the ſharpening of the point of a Needle cannot poſſibly be the Cauſe that the Needle it ſelf ſhould feel pain.

From hence it eaſily appears how defective \* your Similitude is \* , when you ſay it is *no Contradiction to ſuppoſe a Power ariſing from Matter,* \* p. 12. 14.

without belonging to the Parts of which the Whole consists; no more than to conceive that a Whole is not the same with a peice of a Clock; Wherein the Power resulting from the different contributing Powers in the System, neither belongs to any Part of the System when considered by itself, nor is it of the same sort or kind with any Power in any part of the System. For that which you call the Power of a Clock, to show the time of the Day, is evidently nothing in the Clock itself, but the Figure and motion of its Parts; and consequently not any thing of a different sort or kind from the Powers inherent in the Parts: Whereas *Thinking*, if it was the result of the Powers of the different parts of the Machine of the Body, or of the Brain in particular, would be something really inhering in the Machine itself, specifically different from all and every one of the Powers of the several Parts out of which it resulted: Which is an express Contradiction, a supposing the *Effect* to have more in it than the *Cause*. And therefore, though you are pleased to make use of it as a *Similitude*; yet in reality this Power of *Thinking*, which truly and properly inheres in its Subject, has not in any respect the least appearance of *likeness* to the Power of a Clock to show the time of the day, which is merely an abstract complex *Notion* in the Man that beholds it, and nothing at all really in the Clock itself.

† page 15.

In like manner, when you say † it may be conceived that there may be a Power in all those Particles which compose the Brain, to contribute to the Act of *Thinking*, before they are united under that Form; though, while they are disunited, they have no more of *Consciousness*, than any Being which produces *Sweetness* in us (that is made up of Parts wherein dif-

ferent

ferent Powers inhere) when under a particular Form, has a Power to produce Sweetness in us, when its parts are disunited and separated ; you fall again into the same Fallacy. For the Power of a Body to excite in us the Idea of Sweetness, is nothing else but a certain Figure and Motions resulting from different Figures and Motion, of its original constituent parts ; just as the Power of a Pin to cause Pain in us, is nothing but its Motion and the sharp Figure of its Point, resulting from different Motions, Figures and Situations of its constituent parts. And if the Effect of the Powers, by which the several particles that compose the Brain, contribute (as your Phrase is) to the Act of Thinking, was likewise only the exciting of certain *Thoughts* in something which was before a *Thinking Substance*, your Similitude would have something of likeness in it. But that Particles which in themselves have no *Thought*, should ever contribute any thing towards making the Substance, which they constitute a *Thinking Being* ; this I am sure you can no more be able to clear from being an express Contradiction ; (though I doubt not but you can argue upon it as acutely as any One ; ) than if you should undertake to prove, that a Solid Mass of Marble is made up of Particles, which without having any Solidity themselves, contribute by other unknown Powers to constitute a Solid Mass ; or that a Foot-square of any Matter, is made up of Particles, which without having any Extention themselves, contribute by other different and unknown Powers, to constitute an extended Solid Quantity.

And here I cannot but take notice, that besides the Contradictions before-mentioned, you have, by choosing to annex Consciousness to so flux a Substance as the Brain or the Spirits in it, fallen into another very great Absurdity. For if the Brain or Spirits be the Subject of Consciousness; and the Parts of the Brain or Spirits be (as they certainly are, whatever Question may be made concerning any original *Solid Stamina* of the Body,) in perpetual flux and change; it will follow that That Consciousness, by which I *not only Remember* that certain Things were done many Years since, but also *am Conscious that they were done by Me, by the very same Individual Conscious Being* who now remembers them; it will follow, I say, that That Consciousness is transferred from one Subject to another; that is to say, that it is a real Quality which subsists without inhering in any Subject at all.

But to return to the Argument before us. You suppose that the Particles which compose the Brain, though themselves *void of Consciousness* when taken singly, may yet by other different Powers contribute towards the making up One *Conscious Whole*. This I affirm to be, and I think I have proved to be, an express Contradiction; an assigning more to the *Effect* than was in the *Cause*; a making the *Whole* bigger than all its *Parts* and Specifically different from All and every One of them. The occasion, the common ground and foundation of Mens Erring in this whole

\* *Demonstr.* Matter, I have \* elsewhere largely discovered; and shall here repeat what I think may be sufficient to satisfy an inquisitive and unprejudiced Person. "Whatever can arise from, or be compounded

of the Being and Attribution of God. Prop. 8. Sect. 2.



“pounded of any Things; is still only those  
 “very Things, of which it was compounded :  
 “And if infinite Compositions or Divisions be  
 “made eternally, the Things will still be but  
 “eternally the same : And all their possible Ef-  
 “fects, can never be any thing but Repetitions  
 “of the same. For Instance : All possible Chan-  
 “ges of *Figure*, are still nothing but *Figure* : [All  
 possible Variations, Compositions and Divisions  
 of *Magnitude*, are still nothing but *Magnitude*]  
 “All possible Compositions or Effects of *Mo-*  
 “*tion*, are still nothing but *mere Motion* : All  
 Compositions of *Magnitude*, *Figure* and *Motion*  
 together, are still nothing but *Magnitude*, *Figure*  
 and *Motion* : And how many other Qualities  
 soever, *known* or *unknown*, the Particles of Matter  
 be supposed to be indued with ; those Qualities  
 can never in any Composition or Division pro-  
 duce any new Power specifically different from  
 themselves, unless a *Cause* could give more to the  
*Effect* than is in it self. And consequently, if  
 the Matter of the Brain be the Subject in which  
 Consciousness inheres, That Consciousness can-  
 not possibly be the result of any other known or  
 unknown Powers of the several constituent Parti-  
 cles, but what must themselves have been origi-  
 nally of the same *Species*, that is to say, so many  
 several Consciousnesses. “That which has been  
 “apt to deceive Men in this Matter, is this ;  
 “that they imagin Compounds to be somewhat  
 “really [specifically] different from the Things  
 “of which they are compounded. Which is a  
 “very great mistake. For all the Things, of  
 “which Men so judge ; either, if they be really  
 “different, are not Compounds nor Effects of what  
 “Men judge them to be, but are something to-

“ tally distinct ; as when the Vulgar thinks  
 “ Colours and Sounds to be Properties inherent  
 “ in Bodies, when indeed they are purely  
 “ Thoughts of the Mind : Or else, if they be  
 “ really Compounds and Effects, then they are  
 “ not different, but exactly the same that ever  
 “ they were ; As when two Triangles put to-  
 “ gether make a Square, that Square is still no-  
 “ thing but two Triangles ; or when a Square cut  
 “ in halves makes two Triangles, those two  
 “ Triangles are still only the two halves of a  
 “ Square ; or when the Mixture of Blew and  
 “ Yellow Powder makes a Green, that Green is  
 “ still nothing but Blew and Yellow intermixt ;  
 “ as is plainly visible by the help of Micros-  
 “ copes : And in short, every thing by Compositi-  
 “ on, Division or Motion ; is nothing else but  
 “ the very same it was before, taken either in  
 “ whole or by Parts, or in different Place or Order,  
 [so as to excite in our Minds different *complex*  
*Notions*, and occasion new *abstract Names* of Things,  
 but by no means to produce any new real Quali-  
 ty in the Things themselves, such as *Consciousness*  
 is agreed to be, inhering truly and properly in  
 the Subject it is ascribed to.]

The true state of this Case, seems in brief to  
 be This. Sometimes we consider one and the  
 same Quality of a thing, in different Circum-  
 stances and Respects. and with relation to other  
 different things ; which relation may be changed  
 by the alteration or removal of those other things,  
 and a new Effect be produced, without any alte-  
 ration at all of the Thing it self or any of its Qua-  
 lities ; and yet then we give it a *new Name*, and are  
 apt to think that *new Name* a *new Quality*. Some-  
 times we consider several distinct Qualities of  
 the same Thing, and give them different

different parcels of Matter, together ; and, because some new Effect is thereby occasioned in some other Being, we give the *imaginary Whole* a *new Name*, and think that *new Denomination* a *new Quality*. But with how little reason this is done, will abundantly appear by the following Instances. The same particle of Matter, which makes a point in the Surface of a *Globe*, may, by other parts being shaved off, become the point of the Angle of a *Cube*, without undergoing any alteration it self ; and produce an effect, which it could not produce before : But is this truly a new *Quality* or *Power* in the Point it self? *Blue* and *Yellow Powder* mingled together, occasion a new Effect, and are called by a *new Name, Green* : But is this really a new *Quality* or *Power*? is it not plainly the same two *Qualities*, which they had when separate, acting still distinctly, as appears in a *Microscope*? That *particular and determinate degree of Velocity* in a *Wheel*, whereby it turns once round precisely in twelve Hours, is that which you call the *Power of a Clock* to show the time of the Day : and because such a *determinate Velocity of Motion* is made use of by Us for the Measure of Time, and has an *abstract Name* given it to express that use ; is it therefore really a new *Quality* or *Power* distinct from the *Motion* it self? And, to mention no more ; When a *Weight* in one Scale of a *Balance*, does, by taking out part of the Weight that was in the other Scale, begin to *preponderate*, which it did not before ; is this any new *Quality* or *real Power* in the Weight that is not altered, different from what it had before?

I shall observe but one Thing more upon this Head; and that is, that whereas I affirmed *every Power or Quality that is or can be inherent in any System of Matter, to be nothing else than the Sum or Aggregate of so many Powers or Qualities of the same kind inhering in all the Parts*; meaning that the Powers inhering in the several Parts, must be of the same kind, or Species with that Power, which is the result of the Whole; you seem all along to understand it as if I had asserted that the Powers or Qualities inhering in the several Parts, must needs be all of the same kind or Species one with another; Thereby diverting your Reader from the true strength of the Argument, and perplexing him with that which has no relation to the Question: For whether the Powers of the several Parts be all of the same kind one with another, or of ever so different kinds one from another; that which I affirmed, is still equally certain and necessary; that the Power of the Whole, being but the Sum or Mixture of the Powers of the Parts, cannot possibly be of a different kind or Species from all the several Powers of the Parts, as *Thinking* is of necessity specifically different from all and every one of the Powers, known or unknown, of Particles which are confessed to be void

+ page 12. of Thought. Wherefore when you say, \* he ought to have demonstrated, if he would have proved the point he undertook to prove, that there can be no other power in any System of Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind; And

+ page 13. that † till it is demonstrated, that there can be no other Power in any System of Matter, but what is the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind, it may as well be supposed that there are Powers of different kinds in different Particles of Matter; And that

'tis \* so far from being the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same kind, that the new Power will be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of a different kind; And that † the Power of every System will not be † page 15. the Sum of Powers of the same kind, but the Sum of Powers of different kinds: All this is entirely besides the Purpose.

Your Supposition, \* that the Matter of which \* page 16. an Egg consists, doth entirely constitute the young one; and that the Action of Sensation began under a particular Disposition of the Parts by Motion, without the Addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul; is in every part contrary to all the Discoveries in Anatomy, and to all true Philosophy: For so far is it from being true, that the Matter of the Egg, by any particular disposition of its Parts by Motion, is formed into or entirely constitutes the young one, that it does not constitute it at all, not so much as the Body of it; but only serves it for nourishment and growth: It being as impossible that the Organized Body of a Chicken should by the Power of any Mechanical Motions be formed out of the unorganized matter of an Egg; as that the Sun, Moon and Stars, should by mere Mechanism arise out of a Chaos. And that Sensation should be added to it by arising from a particular Disposition of the Parts by Motion, is still more impossible; because it is supposing something to come out of that, in which it never was: Than which, nothing in the World can be a more express Contradiction. You think it ridiculous to recur to the Addition of an Immaterial and Immortal Soul: Let it be so: I can as easily suppose, if you must needs have an Hypothesis; that the immaterial Substance was not Added afterwards,  
but

but was in it from the beginning, from the time that the Seminal Principle it self of the Organized Body was framed: And who shall tell us when That was? The deeper Discoveries every Age makes in Anatomy by Microscopical Observations, the further all these things are found to be removed backwards from the search and common Notions even of the most inquisitive Men. Suppose therefore we could not frame any probable Hypothesis at all, *when* and *how* the immaterial principle of Sensation came in; yet why ought this to incline any Man to doubt the Truth of a certain Proof which shows him that there Is such a principle; any more than the difficulty (which is altogether as great an one) of framing an Hypothesis *how* and *whence* the Organized Body came, make him disbelieve his Senses which discover it to him?

\* Page 15. You tell me again, \* that I have not right'y enumerated the known Powers of Matter. To prove which charge, you repeat what you had before said, concerning *Aggregates of Powers of the same kind*; wherein I have already shown that you lay stress upon that which is wholly foreign to the Question. And what you add concerning the *particular Texture of a Body*, as being something that is different from the *Magnitude and Motion of its Parts*, and on which depend certain Powers, as the Power of the Eye, for instance, to be operated upon by external Objects, and to contribute to the *Act of Vision*, which Power, because it ceases wholly upon the least Alteration of the Texture of any part of the Eye, 'tis evident does not *inhere* in the *Parts* of the System, in the same Sense with *Magnitude and Motion*: This also is altogether foreign to the Question.

Question. For the *Eye's Power of Seeing*, is not, as your Argument supposes, one of those Powers which I ranked under the *first* Head, that is, a Power which really inheres in the System, and consequently in all the Parts of it; But it is one of those Powers which I called the *third* sort, viz. which are mere abstract Names signifying certain Powers or Effects which do not at all reside in the Subject. For the *Eye* does not *See*, in the same Sense as the *Thinking Substance Thinks*; But *Seeing* in the *Eye*, is what *Magnetism* is in the *Load-stone*; not a real inherent Quality, but merely a Situation of parts and pores, so as to be the occasion of an Effect wholly extrinsic to it self, an effect produced in some other Substance by Rays transmitted through the pores of the *Eye*, just as the Magnetic Effluvia are through a *Loadstone*, or *Corn* through a *Sieve*. So that you might exactly as well have compared the Power by which the *Soul Thinks*, to the Power by which a *Sieve* transmits *Corn*, as to the Power by which the *Eye sees*.

You observe, \* that *Saying Consciousness is an individual Power, is but calling Consciousness by another Name, and not giving an account of what Consciousness is, or wherein it consists; which is requisite to demonstrate from Consciousness, that Consciousness cannot be added to a Being that consists of actually separate and distinct Parts.* 'Tis true, my affirming Consciousness to be an individual Power, is not giving an account of what Consciousness is; neither was it intended to be so. Every Man feels and knows by experience what Consciousness is, better than any Man can explain it: Which is the Case of all simple Ideas: And it is not at all necessary to define more particularly what it is; but abundantly

\* page 120.

dantly sufficient that we know and agree what it is not, viz. that it is not a multitude of distinct and separate Consciousnesses; in order to prove that it does not and cannot inhere in a Being, that consists of a Multitude of separate and distinct Parts. You your self acknowledge that the parts which constitute the Brain, are not separately and distinctly conscious; that is, that the Consciousness of a Man, is not a Multitude of Consciousnesses, but One. This is all that I suppose, when I call Consciousness an Individual Power; and from hence I think it is proved strongly, that Consciousness cannot reside in a Being that consists of a multitude of separate and distinct parts: Because if it could, it must necessarily follow, either that it would become a Multitude of distinct Consciousnesses, contrary to the Supposition which you your self allow; or else that an Individual Quality of each single particle, would become the individual Quality of every one of the rest likewise, which is a Contradiction in Terms; or else, that the Consciousness would be one Power resulting from the contributing Powers of all the several separate and distinct Particles; in which case, it would be, as I have before proved in enumerating the several kinds of Powers, a mere abstract Name or complex Notion, and not a real Quality residing in any Subject at all. 'Tis therefore wholly without reason, that you

† page 20.

say † *Mr. Clark's calling Consciousness an Individual Power, in his Sense of an Individual Power, is supposing that Matter cannot think: and that you insinuate to your Reader, \* that Consciousness being an Individual Power, in M. Clark's Sense of those Words, is supposing that it is a Power which can only reside in an Individual Being; to prove which he has*

\* page 21.

not



not said any thing, but barely by calling *Consciousness* an *Individual Power*. For an *Individual Power*, in my Sense of the Word, does not mean in the Definition a Power which can only reside in an individual Being; but it signifies *One Power*, in opposition to a *Multitude*; and I have proved that such a Power can only reside in an *Individual Being*, (not by Supposing it, but) by reducing the contrary Supposition to an express Contradiction.

What you say again \*, concerning Sums and \* page 22. Aggregates of Powers of *the same kind*; is repeating the same mistake, which I have before shown you to have fallen into, in understanding Powers of *the same kind* with *one another*, instead of Powers of *the same kind* [or Species] with the *Whole that results from them*.

You are pleased to entertain your self and your Reader, † upon my accusing you with supposing † page 23. *Sweetness to be in a Rose*. But I hope this will appear very pardonable, since it seemed necessary to me to understand you as I did, because I could not otherwise apprehend what you said concerning it, to be pertinent to your purpose. For you compared the Power which results from the several Particles of a *Rose*, without being in the Particles themselves separately and singly; to the Power which results from the several Particles of the *Brain*, without being in the Particles themselves separately and singly: Now the Power which you say results from the disposition of the several Particles of the *Brain*, is *Consciousness residing in the Brain it self*: Either therefore by the Power resulting from the disposition of the several Particles of the *Rose*, you must mean *Something residing likewise in the Rose it self*; or else your *Similitude*

militude is not at all parallel. Now that Power which resides in the Rose it self, as Consciouſness does in the Brain, and yet belongs not to the several constituent Particles of the Rose, can neither be *Magnitude* nor *Figure*, nor *Motion*, (for these belong to the several parts singly;) nor *Texture*, (for That, so far as it differs from the former, is nothing but a *mere abstract Notion*, and nothing really in the thing it self;) but must be either Sweetness it self, or something else equally unintelligible and inexplicable. If you will say you mean a Power not residing *in* the Rose at all, but resulting *from* it, then, (besides that as I said before, it is not pertinent to your purpose,) what is this, but supposing a Power subsisting without any Subject at all? a *mere name*?

In my Assertion, that the Powers in a Rose are nothing else but a Number of *similar* Motions or Figures, you \* tell me *there are two things to be proved*. 1st. *That the mere Figure and Motion of the parts of a Rose, do produce, or are the sole external cause of the Sensation caused by them.* 2dly, *That those Motions and Figures are perfectly similar.* By *Similar*, I meant that they were so far *similar*, as the Smell or Colour of the Rose was similar or homogeneous: But whether they be *similar*, or no, is of no concern at all in the present Question, unless you still continue in your former mistake about Powers of *the same kind with one another*, instead of *with the Whole*. And as to the other thing which you say wants proof; I think I may appeal to your self, whether you can find or conceive any thing else in the Rose, which can be the cause of our Sensation,

on, besides the mere *Magnitude, Figure, Situation*; and perhaps *Motion* of its parts.

You find fault with me † for asserting that † page 24<sup>s</sup>  
 Gravitation is the effect of the continued and regular Operation of some other Being on Matter; whereas, you think, *it does not appear but that Matter gravitates by virtue of Powers originally placed in it by God, and is now left to itself to act by those Original Powers.* This Opinion of yours, I cannot but think, Sir, to be a great mistake in your Philosophy. For when a Stone that was at Rest, does of it self, upon its Support being removed, begin to fall downward; what is it that causes the Stone to begin to move? Is it possible to be an Effect produced without a Cause? Is it impelled without any Impeller? or can a *Law* or *Power*, that is to say, a mere abstract Name or complex Notion, and not any real Being, impell a Stone and cause it to begin to move? In any other Case you would not doubt but this implied an absolute Contradiction.

II. When in my Answer to your second Objection, I said that though the want of Individuality is indeed the sole reason urged in the present Argument, why a System of Matter cannot think; yet that it ought not therefore to be said that Individuality is the *only thing required*, to render a Being a proper Subject of a Power of Thinking; (Because I would not exclude any other Argument, by which other inquisitive Persons might prove other Conditions also, as well as Individuality, to be necessary Requisites in order to a Subject's being capable of Thinking:)

You hereupon make the following Remark;

H

\* Upon

\* pag. 26. \* Upon this I observe that Mr. Clark owns the Truth of my reasoning, upon the Supposition, that Individuality is only required by him in a Subject of a Power of Thinking; (you should have added; and upon Supposition also, that a Particle of Matter, could be truly an Individual; ) but denies that I have any reason to infer that Individuality is only required, from the Want of Individuality's being the sole reason urged why a System of Matter cannot have a power of Thinking; Which I cannot help thinking to be all one, 'till there is a Difference assigned between only required in the present Argument, and the sole reason urged in the present Argument. Now This is a very unfair Observation: Because the Difference to be assigned, and which I did assign expressly, was between the sole reason urged in the present Argument, and what was only required (not in the present but) in any new Argument which Others might make use of.

\* page 30. III. The Question concerning the \* Alterations of the Modes or Qualities of Immaterial Beings, seem indeed to have some Difficulties in it, but not such as any way affect our present Argument. The Thing you objected was, that though the Substance of the Soul were proved to be both Immaterial and Immortal, yet it would not follow that it must be an Immortal Thinking Substance, because its Thinking might perish, though its Substance did not. To this I reply'd; that the Power of Thinking could no more be destroy'd by any Natural Power, than the Substance it self; because the Qualities or Modes of any Substance not being alterable otherwise, than by some alteration in the Substance it self; 'tis manifest that an Indiscerpible Substance not being it self alterable  
by

by any natural Power, it must follow that neither can any of its Qualities be altered by any natural Power. When therefore I said that all its Qualities and Modes are utterly incapable of being affected in any measure, or *changed* in any degree, by any Power of Nature; you had no reason to understand this, as if I had asserted, that an Indiscernible Substance could not be *acted upon at all* by any Power of Nature; But my meaning was, that it could not be so acted upon, as to *destroy, change or alter* any of its inherent Qualities or Powers; which was all that the thing in Question required me to prove. And that this was my meaning, you might have understood from the Comparison I used, of the original and perfectly solid Particles of Matter. For as those Particles, being (not absolutely in themselves, but) to any Power of Nature, indiscernible; are evidently incapable of having any of their Qualities or Properties altered in any measure by any Power of Nature; that is, their Figure, their Magnitude, their Hardness, and all the respective Effects or Powers depending upon these, can by no natural means be changed; and yet you could not imagin me to mean, but these Particles might be *acted upon*, might be *struck* by each other might be removed this way or that way, upwards or downwards; all which makes no real alteration in them: So an indiscernible immaterial thinking Substance, though it may be transferred from one part of the Universe to another, though it may be *acted upon* by a multitude of things, though it may have different Ideas represented to it, though the organs of the Senses may at times transmit different Species or hinder them from

being transmitted to it ; yet all this makes no real Alteration either in the Substance or its inherent Powers ; nor can its Power of *Thinking* (which was the Thing in Question) be destroyed or altered by these or any other natural Powers ; any more than the *Mobility* or *Hardness* of the original perfectly solid Particles of Matter can be destroyed by any of their *Actings* one upon another.

\* page 30. \* There is still less weight in what you add ; *Now till Mr Clark has a compleat Idea of both sorts of Beings, [Material or Immaterial,] and of their Powers and Operations one on another ; it is impossible for him, in Many Respects, to tell how far they can affect one another's Operations.* This is true indeed ; but what follows from it ? Because, in *Many Respects*, I cannot tell how far they can affect one another's Operations ; does it therefore follow, that I cannot in *any respect* tell wherein they can not affect one another's Operations ? All that I pretend to, is to deny the possibility of such Effects, as plainly imply a Contradiction ; and this, I presume, I may be allowed to do, though I were in *most respects* ignorant how far Material and Immaterial Beings can effect one another.

Asto the *Power of God* to destroy any Mode or Quality in an immaterial indiscerpible Substance, I said nothing concerning it, neither is our Question at all concerned in it. But since you have thought fit to put the Question whether, according to my Principles, God can destroy a Mode or Quality in an Immaterial Being, without making some alteration in the Substance it self ; I cannot but take notice, that all the Answers you have made for me to this Question, are such as I cannot approve, and that therefore I am

not

not concerned in any of their Consequences. The Answer I would make for my self, is, that supposing God to destroy any Mode or Quality in an Immaterial Being, it is reasonable to imagin that he must do it by making some such *Alterations in that Substance*, as may be analogous or equivalent to *altering the Disposition of the Parts in a Material Substance*. But you ought not to have jumbled † these two things together, (which I carefully distinguished) by supposing me to answer, that God must do it by making an Alteration in the *Parts* of the *Immaterial Substance* (to which it is not proper to ascribe any *Parts*,) and thence concluding that an Immaterial Substance is as *discerpible* by the Power of God, as a Material Substance. † p. 18. 32.

Lastly, you tell me \* that after all I make the Immaterial Thinking Substance to be in no other Sense *Immortal*, than I make the original solid Particles of Matter to be *indiscerpible*; that is to say, that the one is *immortal* and the other *indiscerpible*, only with respect to the Powers of Nature; but that in respect to the Power of God, neither is the one *indiscerpible*, nor the other *immortal*. Your Expressions in this whole Section lie under so much Obscurity, that I can hardly be sure wheth r I understand you right or not. But if this be your Sense; I confess I do indeed make it so; and I suppose no considerate Man ever made the Soul *immortal* in any other Sense. For though I believe it is not *discerpible*, even by the Power of God; yet he is undoubtedly able to destroy it, either by *annihilating* it, or perhaps by otherwise *depriving* it of all its Faculties, in ways which we can know nothing of. \* p. 18. 34.

IV. To the Difficulties arising from the *Supposition* of Immateriality not excluding Extention ; I answer,

1. That all these Difficulties are wide of the main Question. For if the foregoing Proof, that Matter is incapable of Thinking, cannot be shown to be defective ; it follows necessarily that the Soul must be an *Immaterial indiscerpible Substance*. But the Difficulties that arise from any following Hypothesis concerning other Properties of that Immaterial Indiscerpible Substance, as whether it be *Extended* or *Unextended*, whether it ever acts *wholly separate*, or always *in some material Vehicle*, finer or grosser, and the like ; the Difficulties, I say, that arise from any of these particular Hypothesis, affect only the particular Hypothesis, from which they arise, and not at all the foregoing general Proof. I take it to be demonstrated, that the Soul is an *Immaterial indiscerpible Substance* : He that thinks the Difficulties arising from the Supposition of that immaterial indiscerpible Substance being *Extended*, to be unsurmountable ; may try if he can find fewer Difficulties in supposing it *Unextended* ; And he that thinks the Difficulties that arise from supposing it *Unextended*, are not to be got over ; may try to solve the Difficulties that arise from supposing it *Extended* : but the main Argument remains firm either way ; and no difficulty arising from following Hypotheses can be so great, as to lessen the force of the foregoing positive Proof.

2. But conceiving Immaterialty not to exclude Extention, and supposing the Difficulties arising from that Hypothesis to be such as could not be clearly answered ; yet this would not weaken the

fore-



foregoing Proof, unless that Argument could otherwise be shown to be in it self defective. For there are many Demonstrations even in abstract Mathematicks themselves, which no Man who understands them can in the least doubt of the certainty of, which yet are attended with difficult Consequences that cannot perfectly be cleared. The *infinite Divisibility of Quantity*, is an instance of this kind. Also the *Eternity of God*, than which nothing is more self-evident; and yet the Difficulties consequent upon it, are such as have reduced most of the Schoolmen to entertain that unintelligible Notion of a *Nunc Stans*. And his *Immensity*, attended with much the like Difficulties.

3. But neither is this the true state of the Case. For the Difficulties arising from the Supposition of Immaterial indiscerpible Extention, are by no means like those before mentioned. Space, (which you *unphilosophically* call the meer absence of Bodies, and yet confess it to be positively infinite,) is without difficulty confessed by you to be an Instance of such an Extention; An Extension whose Parts (improperly so called) depend on each other for their Existence, not only because of its Infinity, but because of the Contradiction which a Separation of them manifestly would imply. And the only Thing required in the present case, is, to conceive that God can create a finite Substance, which shall not, like the solid, rigid, determined Extension of Matter, consist of Parts which are actually so many distinct Beings independent on each other for their Existence; but be a Substance perfectly and essentially One, so to that purpose any Division of it, shall necessarily infer a Destruction of the Essence of that

Substance. This must indeed be confessed to be a considerable Difficulty: But if the Difficulties arising upon any other Hypothesis, be (as they certainly are) *at least* as great; nothing can thence be inferred to the weakening of the foregoing Proof.

Your applying the Argument, by which I proved that Matter could not Think, in the same Words, to prove that neither could Immaterial Substance be capable of Thinking; is fallacious in the first Sentence. For the Supposition of the Substance being by *the Power of God divided into two Parts*, which concerning Matter is confessed to be always possible, may concerning Immaterial Substance (even tho' Extension be not excluded) be denied to be possible, as being a Supposition which destroys the very *Essence* of the substance itself.

V. As to your last Difficulty concerning Brutes, I answer, that your Disjunction is still imperfect, when you say \* they must either necessarily be annihilated some time or other, or else be capable of Eternal Happiness *as well as Man*. For tho' they should never be annihilated, yet why must they needs be capable of Eternal Happiness *as well as Man*; any more than their present Subsisting, implies that they must needs be capable of the *Expectations* and *Conditions* of eternal Happiness, *as well as Man*? But what is all this, to our purpose? Cannot God, if he pleases, cause them to perish at the dissolution of their Bodies? Or cannot he, if he pleases, annihilate them at any other time, when he shall so think fit? Or cannot he, if he pleases, without ever annihilating them at all, dispose of them into States *suitable*

\* pag. 43.  
and again  
p. 44.

ſuitable to their particular Natures ; which yet may in no propriety of Speech be ſtilled a Capacity of eternal Happineſs, as that of *Man* is ?

Having thus at large indeavoured, to give you particular Satisfaction, in every one of the Difficulties you propoſed ; I ſhall conclude with briefly repeating the Strength of the Argument, in a few plain and eaſy *Propoſitions* ; and ſo leave it to the Judgment of the inquiſitive and impartial Reader.

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**N** O T E ; by Conſciouſneſs in the following *Propoſitions*, the Reader may underſtand indifferently either the Reflex Act, by which a Man knows his Thoughts to be his own Thoughts ; (*which is the ſtrict and propereſt Senſe of the Word ;*) or the Direct Act of Thinking ; or the Power or Capacity of Thinking ; or (*which is of the ſame import,*) ſimple Senſation ; or the Power of Self-Motion, or of beginning Motion by the Will : *The Argument holding equally in all or any of theſe Senſes ; as has been before ſaid.*

## I.

Every *System of Matter* conſiſts of a *Multitude of diſtinct Parts.*

This, I think, is granted by all.

## II.

Every *real Quality* inheres in ſome *Subject.*

This alſo, I think, is granted by All. For whatever is called a *Quality*, and yet inheres not in any *Subject*, muſt either ſubſiſt of it ſelf ; and then it is a *Subſtance*, not a *Quality* ; or elſe it is nothing but a *mere Name.*

## III. No

## III.

No *Individual* or *single Quality* of one particle of Matter, can be the *Individual* or *single Quality* of another particle.

The *Heat* of one particle, is not the *Heat* of another. The *Gravity*, the *Colour*, the *Figure*, of one particle, is not the same individual *Gravity*, *Colour*, or *Figure* of another particle. The *Consciousness* or *Sensation* of one particle, (supposing it to be a *Quality* of Matter,) is not the *Consciousness* or *Sensation* of another. If it was; it would follow, that the same thing could be *Two*, in the same sense, and at the same time, that it is but *One*.

*Note*, From hence may be drawn an evident Confutation of that absurd Notion which Mr. *Hobbs* suggests in his *Physicks*, (*chap. 25. Sect. 5.*) that *All Matter* is essentially endued with an obscure actual *Sense* and *Perception*, but that there is required a Number and apt Composition of parts to make up a clear and distinct *Sensation* or *Consciousness*. For from this Notion it would follow, that the resulting *Sensation* or *Consciousness* at last, being but *One* distinct *Sensation* or *Consciousness* (as is that of a Man;) the *Sensation* or *Consciousness* of every *One* of the constituent particles, would be the individual *Sensation* or *Consciousness* of *All* and *Each* of the rest.

## IV.

Every *real Simple Quality*, that resides in any *whole material System*, resides in *All* the *Parts* of that *System*.

The *Magnitude* of every *Body*, is the *Sum* of the *Magnitudes* of its several *Parts*. The *Motion*

tion of every *Body*, is the Sum of the *Motions* \* Note, by  
of its several *Parts*. The *Weight* of every *Body*, Heat here,  
is the Sum of the *Weights* of its several *Parts*. is meant  
\* The *Heat* of every *Body*, is the *Heat* of its that Moti-  
several *Parts*. The *Colour* of every *Body* is the on which  
*Colour* of its several *Parts*. And the same is uni- causes in  
versally true of every *Simple Quality* residing in Us the Sen-  
any *System*. For residing in the *Whole*, and not sation of  
residing in the *Parts*, is residing in a *Thing*, and Heat ; By  
not residing in it, at the same time. Colour, that  
Magnitude  
and Figure,  
which  
causes par-  
ticular  
Rays to be  
transmit-  
ted to us ;  
etc.

## V.

Every *real compound Quality*, that resides  
in any whole material *System*, is a number  
of simple *Qualities* residing in all the *Parts*  
of that *System* ; some in one part, some  
in another.

Thus in the Instance of *mixt Colours* ; When  
the *Simples*, *Blue*, suppose, and *Yellow*, make  
the *Whole* appear *Green* ; In this Case, That  
*Portion* of the *System*, in which any one of the  
particular *Simple Qualities* resides, is a *Whole*  
*System* with respect to that *Quality* , and the  
*Quality* residing in it, resides in the several  
*Particles* of which That *Portion of the System* is  
constituted : And so of the rest.

## VI.

Every *real Quality*, *Simple* or *Compound*,  
that *results from* any whole material *System*,  
but does not *reside in it*, that is, neither in  
All its distinct parts, nor in All the parts of  
some *Portion* of it, according to the *Expli-*  
*cation* of the two foregoing *Propositions* ;  
is the *Mode* or *Quality* of some *Other Sub-*  
*stance*, and not of *That*.

All

All sensible secondary Qualities, *Heat Colour, Smell, Taste, Sound*, and the like, are of this kind; being in reallity not *Qualities* of the *Bodies* they are ascribed to, but *Modes* of the *Mind* that perceives them.

## VII.

Every *Power, Simple or Compound*, that *results from* any whole material *System*, but does not *reside in it*, that is, in all its parts, in the manner before explained; nor yet resides in any *Other Substance*, as its Subject; is no *real Quality* at all; but must either be it self a real Substance, (which seems unintelligible;) or else it is nothing but merely an *abstract Name or Notion*, as all *Universals* are.

Thus the Power resulting from the Texture of a *Rose*, to excite in us the Sensation of Sweetness, is nothing but an *abstract Name*, signifying a particular Motion and Figure of certain parts emitted. The Power of a *Clock* to shew the Hour of the Day, is nothing but one *new Complex Name*, to express at once the several Motions of the parts, and particularly the *determinate Velocity* of the last Wheel to turn round once in twelve Hours: Upon the stopping which *Motion* by the Touch of a Finger or any other Impediment, without making any alteration at all in the Number, Figure, or Disposition of the Parts of the Clock, the *Power* wholly ceases: and upon removing the Impediment, by which nothing is restored but *mere Motion*, the *Power* returns again, which is therefore no new real Quality of the *Whole*, but only the *mere Motion* of the *Parts*. The  
Power

Power of a *Pin* to prick, is nothing distinct from its mere Figure permitting it to enter the Skin. The Power of a *Weight* in one Scale of a Balance, to ascend or descend, upon increasing or diminishing the Counterpoise in the other Scale; is not a *new real Quality*, distinct from its *absolute Gravity*, though it occasions a new *Effect*; there being no Alteration at all made in the *Weight it self*. The *Power of the Eye to see*, is not a real Quality of the *Whole Eye*, but merely an *abstract Name* signifying a Transmitting and Refracting of the Rays of Light in a certain manner through its several Parts; Which Effect, by the interposition or removal of an Opake Body, is destroyed or renewed, without any Alteration at all in the Eye it self. A *Key*, by having many new Locks made fit to it, acquires a *new Power* of producing Effects, which it could not before; and yet no new real Quality is produced, nor any Alteration at all made, in the *Key it self*. And so universally of all Powers of this kind. If these Powers were any thing else, but mere *abstract Names*; they would signify Qualities subsisting without any Subject at all; that is, such as must themselves be distinct Substances. Which is unintelligible.

## VIII.

*Consciousness* is neither a mere *abstract Name*, (such as are the Powers mentioned in Prop. VII; nor a *Power of exciting or occasioning different Modes in a foreign Substance*, (such as are all the *sensible Qualities* of Bodies, Prop. VI;) but a *real Quality*, truly and properly inherent in the Subject itself, the *Thinking Substance*. If

If it was a *mere abstract Name*; it would be nothing at all in the Person that Thinks, or in the Thinking Substance it self; but only a Notion framed by the imagination of some Other Being. For all those Powers which are only *abstract Names*, are not at all in the *Things whose Powers they are called*; but are only *Notions* framed in Imagination, by the Mind that observes, compares and reasons about different *Objects without itself*

If it was a *Power of exciting or occasioning different Modes in a foreign Substance*; Then the *Power of Thinking* must be before in that foreign Substance; and that foreign Substance alone would in reality be Conscious, and not *This* which excites the different Modes in *That foreign Substance*. For the Power that is in one Substance, of exciting different Modes in another Substance; presupposes necessarily in that other Substance the *Foundation* of those Modes. Thus in the Case of all the *sensible Qualities* of Bodies; the *Power of Thinking* is beforehand in that Being, wherein those Qualities excite or occasion *different Modes* of Thinking.

It remains therefore that it must of necessity be a *real Quality*, truly and properly inhering in the *Subject itself, the Thinking Substance*; there being no other *Species* of Powers or *Qualities* left, to which it can possibly be referred. And this indeed is of itself as evident by every Man's Experience, as it can be rendred by any Explication or Proof whatsoever.

## IX.

No *real Quality* can result from the *Composition* of *different Qualities*, so as to be a  
new



new Quality in the same Subject, of a *different Kind* or *Species* from all and every one of the *Competent Qualities*.

If it could, it would be a *Creation of Something out of Nothing*: From compound *Motions*, can arise nothing but *Motion*: From *Magnitudes*, nothing but *Magnitude*: From *Figures*, nothing but *Figure*: From compositions of *Magnitude*, *Figure* and *Motion* together; nothing but *Magnitude*, *Figure* and *Motion*: From *Mechanical Powers*, nothing but *Mechanical Powers*: From a composition of *Colours*, nothing but *Colour*; which it self (as appears by *Microscopes*) is still the *simple Colours* of which it was compounded. From mixtures of *Chymical Liquors*, nothing but *Ferments*; which are only mere *Motions* of the particles in mixing, such motions as arise from the placing of *Iron* and a *Load-Stone* near each other. *Gravity*, is not a *Quality* of *Matter*, arising from its *Texture* or any other *Powers* in it; but merely an *Endeavour* to *Motion*, excited by some foreign *Force* or *Power*. *Magnetism* and *Electricity*, are not new *Qualities*, resulting from different and unknown *Powers*; but merely emissions of certain streams of *Matter*, which produce certain determinate *Motions*. Compositions of *Colours*, can never contribute to produce a *Sound*; nor compositions of *Magnitude* and *Figure*, to produce a *Motion*; nor *necessary and determined Motions*, to produce a *free and indetermined Power of Self Motion*; nor any *Mechanical Powers* whatsoever, to produce a *Power not Mechanical*. And the same must of necessity hold universally true, of all *Qualities* and *Powers* whatsoever, whether known or unknown: Because otherwise, as  
hath

hath been before said, there would in the Compound be something created out of Nothing.

## X.

*Consciousness* therefore being a real Quality, (*Prop. VIII.*) and of a Kind *specifically different* from all other Qualities whether known or unknown, which are themselves acknowledged to be *void of Consciousness*; can never possibly result from any Composition of such Qualities.

This is as evident from the foregoing Propositions, as that a *Sound* cannot be the result of a Mixture of *Colours* and *Smells*; nor *Extension* the result of a composition of parts *unextended*, nor *Solidity* the result of parts *not solid*; whatever other different Qualities, known or unknown, those constituent parts may be supposed to be endued with.

## XI.

No Individual *Quality* can be *transferred* from one *Subject* to another.

This is granted by All.

## XII.

The *Spirits* and *Particles* of the *Brain*, being *loose* and in perpetual *Flux*, cannot therefore be the seat of that *Consciousness*, by which a Man not only remembers things done many years since; but also is Conscious that *He himself*, the same *Individual Conscious Being*, was the Doer of them.

This follows evidently from the foregoing.

## XIII.

## XIII.

The *Consciousness* that a Man has at one and the same time, is *One Consciousness*; and not a *Multitude of Consciousnesses*; as the *Solidity, Motion, or Colour* of any piece of Matter is a Multitude of distinct *Solidities, Motions, or Colours*.

This is granted by All, who deny that the particles of the Brain, which they suppose to constitute a Conscious Substance, are themselves each of them Conscious.

## XIV.

*Consciousness* therefore cannot at all reside in the Substance of the *Brain, or Spirits*, or in any other *material System* as its *Subject*; but must be a Quality of some *Immaterial Substance*.

This follows necessarily from the foregoing Propositions compared together. For since every possible Power of Matter, whether known or unknown, must needs be either, 1<sup>st</sup>, a *real Quality* of the Matter to which it is ascribed; and then it must inhere in the several distinct parts; Or, 2<sup>dly</sup> a Power of exciting or occasioning certain *Modes* in some *other Subject*; and then it is truly the Quality, not of the *Matter*, but of that *other Subject*: Or, 3<sup>dly</sup>; a *mere abstract Name or Notion* of what is, properly speaking, no real Quality at all, and inhere in no real Subject at all: And *Consciousness* is acknowledged to be none of these: It follows unavoidable, that it must of necessity be a Quality of some *Immaterial Substance*.

Difficulties that arise afterwards, concerning *Other Qualities* of that *Immaterial Substance*, as whether it be *Extended* or *Unextended*; do not at all affect the present Argument.

For thus even abstract Mathematical Demonstrations; as those concerning the *Infinite Divisibility of Quality*, the *Eternity of God*, and his *Immensity*; have almost insuperable Difficulties on the other side: And yet no Man, who understands those Matters, thinks that those Difficulties do at all weaken the Force, or diminish the Certainty of the Demonstrations.

A Third  
DEFENSE  
OF AN  
ARGUMENT

Made use of in a

Letter to Mr D O D W E L,  
to prove the Immateriality and Natu-  
ral *Immortality* of the SOUL.

*In a Letter to the Author of the Reflexions  
on Mr Clarke's Second Defense, &c.*

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*The Third Edition.*

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*Arguments* seldom work on Men of Wit and Learning, when  
they have once engaged themselves in a contrary Opinion:

*Mr. Jobbs.*

We have as much Reason to be satisfied with our Notion of  
*Immaterial Spirit*, as with our Notion of *Body*; and the  
Existence of the One, as well as the Other. For it being no  
more a Contradiction that *Thinking* should exist separate and  
independent from *Solidity*, than it is a Contradiction that  
*Solidity* should exist separate and independent from *Thinking*;  
they being Both but *Simple Ideas*, independent one from  
another; And having as clear and distinct Ideas in us, of  
*Thinking*, as of *Solidity*; I know not why we may not as  
well allow a *Thinking thing without Solidity*, that is, *Imma-  
terial*, to exist; as a *Solid thing without thinking*, that, is,  
*Matter*, to exist. Mr Lock's Essay. Book II. Ch. 23. §. 32.

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A Third

## D E F E N S E

O F A N

## A R G U M E N T, &amp;c.

SIR,

**I**N my Last Reply I persuaded my self I had set the Question between us in so clear a Light, that there would have been no need of any new Debate, or of giving our Readers any further trouble in this Matter. But seeing you have found out a seemingly new *Distinction*, by which you still endeavour to evade the Force of the Argument; And, though your Evasion seems to Me indeed extremely slight, yet seeing you have thought fit to insist upon it in such a manner, as if you your self really believed there was some Strength and Weight in it; I shall endeavour to gratify the sincere Desire you profess to have of discovering the Truth, by showing briefly the weakness and inconclusiveness of what you have advanced in your *Reflexions*.

In order to prove that *Thinking* cannot possibly be a Quality or Power of *Matter*; I said that all the Qualities or Powers, which either Are in Matter,

whether they be known or unknown ; or are vulgarly Ascribed to it ; must of necessity be either,

1<sup>st</sup>. Real Qualities, truly and properly inhering in the Subject to which they are ascribed : Such as are *Magnitude* and *Motion* in Matter. These are always the Sums or Aggregates of Powers or Qualities of *the same Kind*, inhering distinctly in the several Parts of the Material Subject. Which not being true of *Thinking*, 'tis manifest that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality of *this Sort*, inhering in a System of Matter.

Or 2<sup>dly</sup>. Qualities, not really inhering in the Subject to which they are usually ascribed, but being indeed Modes excited and residing in some other Subject : Such as are *Colours*, *Sounds*, and all those which are commonly called the Sensible Qualities of Matter. These do not exist at all in That Subject to which they are usually ascribed ; but in some Other Subject. And this also not being applicable to *Thinking*, 'tis manifest therefore that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality of *this Kind*, in a Material Subject.

Or 3<sup>dly</sup>. Qualities, not really inhering in any Subject at all, but being mere Abstract Names, or external Denominations, to express certain complex Ideas framed in our Imaginations ; or certain general extrinseck, and relative Effects, produced upon particular Systems of Matter by foreign Agents ; or certain Dispositions of the particular Systems of Matter, requisite towards the producing of those Effects. Such as are *Magnetism*, *Electricity*, *Attraction*, *Reflexibility*, *Refrangibility*, and the like. These have no real existence by way of *proper inhering*, in any Subject. Which likewise since it cannot be said of *Thinking*, 'tis manifest



nifest that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality in a Material System, of *this Kind* neither.

You grant that *Thinking*, for the Reasons I urged, cannot be a Power or Quality of any of These Kinds: But you *Distinguish* upon the First Sort; and allege,

*That* there are some Real Qualities, truly and properly inhering in the Subject to which they are ascribed; which yet are not, like Magnitude and Motion, Sums or Aggregates of Powers or Qualities of the *same Kind*, inhering distinctly in the several Parts of the Subject: And that therefore *Thinking*, though it be not an Aggregate of Powers of the *same Kind*, may yet nevertheless be a Real Quality inhering in Matter

*That Numerical Powers, or particular and Individual Modes, are such real inherent Qualities, residing in a System of Matter, without inhering distinctly in its several Parts: in contradistinction to generical Powers, such as Magnitude and Motion, which you acknowledge to be the Sums of the Magnitudes and Motions of the several Parts.*

*That, for Instance, the Power of the Eye, to contribute to the act of Seeing; the Power of a Clock, to show the hour of the Day; the Power of a Musical Instrument, to produce in us harmonious Sounds; the particular Figures in Bodies, such as Roundness or Squareness; and particular or individual Modes of Motion, are such Numerical Powers, not at all resulting from any Powers of the same Kind inhering in the Parts of the System: And that Thinking therefore in like manner, not being an Aggregate of Powers of the same Kind, may yet inhere in a System of Matter, as one of these Numerical or Individual Modes of some Generical Power.*

That, upon this Supposition, of *Thinking* being a Numerical Mode of some Generical Power of Matter; it may be conceived, that as the Roundness of a Body, is not the Sum of the Roundnesses of the Parts; nor the Squareness of a Body, the Sum of the Squarenesses of the Parts; nor the Power of a Musical Instrument to cause an harmonious Sound, the Sum of Powers of the same Kind in the Parts singly considered; nor any particular Mode of Motion, the Sum of the same Modes of Motion in all the several Parts; So the Consciousness that inheres in a System of Matter, may yet not be the Sum of the Consciousnesses of the Parts.

That the Argument therefore drawn from Consciousness not being made up of several Consciousnesses, concludes no more against the possibility of its residing in a System of Matter; than the like Argument would conclude against the possibility of the Existence of Roundness, or any other Numerical Mode, in a Body.

For Roundness no more consists of several Roundnesses, than Thinking or Consciousness does of several Consciousnesses.

And Roundness is as specifically different from other Figures of which it may be composed, as Consciousness is from a Circular Motion.

So that Sensation may be conceived to be in the Parts of an Animal's Body, just as Roundness is in the Parts that compose a Round Body: Each Part has as much of Sensation, singly considered; as each Part of a Round Body, has of Roundness: And when the Parts are duly disposed, whole Thinking is performed, as whole Roundness exists by the Conjunction of Parts.

For Consciousness, being supposed to be a real Numerical Power, such as Roundness is; may result from the Composition of different Qualities, as Roundness does from different Species of Figure: And is consequently

quently a new Quality in the same Subject, of a different Kind or Species from all the component Qualities considered together.

Wherefore, though Consciousness be a real Quality, pag. 55. and different from all other Qualities, whether known or unknown, which are themselves acknowledged to be void of Consciousness; yet it may result from such Qualities as singly considered are void of Consciousness; In like manner as Roundness is a real Quality specifically different from other Qualities void of Roundness, and yet may be the result or Composition of such Qualities.

That Consciousness may be consider'd particularly, as an individual Mode or Species of Motion. pag. 19. 22 & 26.

For, as nothing more goes to the Composition of Roundness, than the Conjunction of several Particles pag. 26. not singly endued with Roundness; so upon This Supposition, nothing more needs go to the Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of several Particles not each endued with That Species of Motion called Thinking.

This, if I understand you aright, is the Sum and full Strength of what you have urg'd in your Reflexions.

And to This, I answer as follows.

It is absolutely impossible and an evident Contradiction, that any Real Quality should truly and properly inhere in a System of Matter, without being the Sum or Aggregate of a Number of Powers or Qualities, residing distinctly in the several Parts of the System, and being always of the same Kind with the Whole that results from them. For, as the Substance it self of a System of Matter, is nothing but the Sum of its Parts, existing

fting distinctly and independently from each other ; and the Whole cannot but be of the *same Kind* with the Parts that constitute it : So no *Power* or *Quality of the Substance* can be any thing else, but the Sum or Aggregate of the Powers of the several Parts ; and That Sum or Aggregate, without a Creation of something out of Nothing, cannot but be of the *same Kind* with the Powers that constitute it. If the Parts of the Substance be *similar*, then the System it self is an *uniform* or *homogeneous* Substance : If the Parts be *dissimilar*, then the Substance is *diform* or *Heterogeneous* : But still always of the *same Kind* or *Kinds* with the Parts that compose it. In like manner, if the Powers of the several Parts of the System be *similar*, the Power of the Whole will be a *simple* and *uniform* Power : If the Powers of the several Parts be *dissimilar*, the Power of the Whole will be a *compound difform* Power : But still always necessarily of the *same Kind* or *Kinds* with the Powers of which it is compounded. Since therefore you acknowledge *Thinking* to be a Power not composed of a Multitude of *Thinkings* ; and 'tis evident (as shall in the sequel be made fully appear) that no Powers void of *Thinking*, can be of the *same Kind* with the Power of *Thinking*, so as to be Parts of it, and that from a Composition of Them the Power of *Thinking* may arise ; it follows that *Thinking* is not a Power made up at all of Parts, and consequently that it cannot reside in a Substance that consists of distinct and independent Parts, such as all Matter is confessed to be.

For the clear explication of which whole Argument, and to vindicate the Notion from all the  
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Objections and pretended Instances you have brought to the contrary ; it is to be observed, that the Terms, *Kind*, and *Species*, and of *the same Kind* or *Species*, are very ambiguous Terms, and used in great Variety of Significations : Though among Men who seek Truth, and endeavour to express themselves with the greatest clearness they can, and are willing to understand each others meaning ; they do not often cause any considerable Mistakes.

For Example : 'Tis an evident Truth, that *All Circles of four foot Diameter*, are of *one and the same Kind* or *Species* ; and this is what the Logicians call *Species specialissima*. 'Tis true in another Sense, that *All Circles Whatever*, are of the *same Species* : In another Sense, that *All curvilinear Figures*, are of the *same Species* : In another, that *All plain Figures both streight-lined and curvilinear*, as opposed to solids, are of the *same Species* : And in another, that *All Figures whatsoever, whether plain or solid*, are of the *same Kind* or *Species* ; as contradistinguished from Motion or Thinking, or from any thing else of a totally different Kind. This is what they call the *Genus generalius*. And beyond This, it is neither *True* nor *good Sense*, nor can it in any manner be said, that *Figure* and *Motion*, or *Figure* and *Colour*, or *Figure* and *Thought*, are of the *same Kind* ; Because there is nothing Common in their Ideas, by which they can be ranked or compared together ; save only as they are all comprehended perhaps under the mere Abstract Name of *Quality* in general.

In like manner ; *All Squares of two foot diameter* are specifically different from *All Squares of one foot diameter* ; but not in the same Sense, nor so much, as Both are from *Parallelograms* : And *All Parallelograms* differ specifically from *All Squares* ; but not so,

page 25.

So, as Both do from *Triangles*: And *All Triangles* differ specifically from *All quadrilateral of Figures*; but not so, as Both do from *Spheres* or *Cylinders*: And *Spheres* or *Cylinders* differ specifically from all *Streight-lined Figures*; but not so, as They and All Other Figures differ from *Motion*, or from a *Tast* or a *Sound*; or as *Figure* or *Motion* does from a *Thought*. Which makes it appear by the by, with what Truth and Sense you affirm, that *Roundness* is as specifically different from all other *Figures*, as *Consciousness* is from a *Circular Motion*; That is, that a *Circle* differs from an *Eclipsis* (suppose) or from a *Parabola*, not only as much as it differs from a *Cube*, but even as much as it differs from the *Reason of a Man*: Or, as Logicians would express it, that the *Species specialior* differs as much from the *Species* next and immediately superiour to it, as it does from the *Genus generalissimum*; and not only so, but as it does also from any thing that is not so much as included even in *That Genus*.

Again: *All light Blue Colours* differ specifically from *All Dark Blues*; but not so as Both do from *Yellow* or *Scarlet*: And *Scarlet* differs specifically from *Blue*; but not so, as Both do from the *Sound of a Trumpet*.

Now to apply This to our present Question. When I affirm that every real Power or Quality inhering in a System of Matter, must of necessity be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of the same Kind residing distinctly in the several Parts of that System; 'tis manifest that by this Term, of the same Kind, is not to be understood the *Species specialissima*, but some of the *Species generaliores*. For Example: When I say the *Magnitude* of a *Cubic Foot* of Gold, is the Sum or Aggregate of the *Magnitudes* of its parts; I do not mean to say, that 'tis an Aggregate of *Cubic feet*, but of other

ther *Magnitudes* which constitute a Cubic foot, and which are of *the same Kind* with it, in the Sense that *All Magnitudes* are of *the same Kind*, and may be parts one of another : But *Magnitude* and *Motion*, or *Magnitude* and *Figure*, are not in any Sense of *the same Kind*, and cannot be parts of another ; Neither can *Figure* or *Motion* be a *Piece* of a *Thought*.

In like manner : When I say the Number *Twenty* is made up of *Parts of the same Kind* with the Whole : 'tis evident I do not mean that it is made up of *Twenties*, but of *Other Numbers*, which are of *the same Kind* with it, in the Sense that *All Numbers*, are of *the same Kind*, and may be parts one of another : But *Number* and *Sound*, or *Number* and *Colour*, are not in any Sense of *the same Kind*, and cannot be *Parts* one of another ; Neither can *Number* or *Figure*, *Motion* or *Magnitude*, be a *Piece* of a *Thought*.

Again ; When I say *Roundness* or *Globosity* or any other *Figure* of a *Body*, must needs be the *Sum* of *Qualities of the same Kind* inhering in the several *Parts* ; 'tis plain I do not mean to affirm, that *Globosity* is made up of *Globosities*, any more than the Number *Twenty* is made up of *Twenties*, or the *Motion of a Cubic foot* of *Matter* made up of the *Motions of Cubic feet* ; but that a *whole Round Figure* must necessarily be made up of *Pieces of Roundness*, which are all of the *same Kind* with it ; just as the *Numbers*, which are *Parts of Twenty*, are of the *same Kind* with the *Whole*, and the *Motions of the Particles of a Cubic foot of Matter*, which are *Parts of the Motion of the Whole*, are of the *same Kind* with the *Whole Motion*. But *Figure*, and whatever is not *Figure*, are not in any Sense of *the same Kind* ; Neither can any thing that is void of *Figure*, be part of any *Figure* whatsoever ; nor any

any thing that is *void* of *Curvity* in particular, be part of a *round circumference*; nor any thing that is *void* of that *particular degree* of *Curvity* which makes a *Circle* of a certain determinate *Diameter*, be part of the *circumference* of *That Circle*; nor any thing that is *void* of *Thinking*; be a *Part* or *Constituent* of a *Thought*.

From hence it clearly appears, that your *Distinction* of *Generical* and *Numerical Powers*, is of no *Service* to your *Cause*. For those *Powers* which you call *Numerical*, must as necessarily be *Aggregates* of *Powers* of the *same Kind*, as those which you call *Generical*. It is as evident, that the *Round Figure* of a *Globe*, [*its Superficial Figure*,] is the *Sum* of the *Convex Surfaces* of its outward *Parts*: and its *Solid Figure*, the *Sum* of all its *Solid Parts taken together*, consider'd like so many *concentrick Shells* or any other *Figures* which can be *constituent Parts* of the *Solid Content* of a *Globe*; as it is that the *Motion* of a *Globe*, is the *Sum* of the *Motions* of its *Parts*. And the *convex outsides* of its outward parts, and the *concentrick Roundnesses* of its inward parts, are as much of the *same Kind* with the *Whole Roundness* or the *Whole Globosity*, of which they are pieces; as the several distinct *Motions* or *Magnitudes* of its *Parts*, are of the *same Kind* with the *Whole Motion* or *Magnitude* which they constitute. For why is not a *Semicircle* or the *Arch* of a *Quadrant*, of the *same kind* with the *Circumference* of a *Circle*; and *concentrick round Figures*, or any other *Figures* which can be *constituent Parts* of the *Solid Content* of a *Globe*, of the *same Kind* with the *Figure* of the *Globe*; as much as the *Motion* or *Magnitude* of *half a foot cube* of *Matter*, is of the *same Kind* with the *Motion* or *Magnitude* of the *Whole foot cube*?



In reality, no other Powers but *Numerical Powers*, can properly in the present Question come under Consideration at all. For *Generical Powers*, considered as such, are nothing but Universals, having no being but in the Imagination considering and comparing several Particulars. In the Individuals themselves, wherein alone Powers really exist, they are not *General*; They are only made *General* by the considering and comparing together of Particulars; Which comparison has no Existence but in the Idea; And consequently *General* or *Generical Powers*, having no real Existence in things without us, have really neither Parts nor Whole, nor can properly come at all under Consideration in the present Question. 'Tis not *Motion* or *Figure* in general, that is made up of Motions and Figures; but 'tis the *individual Numerical Motion* or *Figure* of a Body, that is made up of the Motions or Figures of its Parts. The *Numerical Mode of Motion* of the Whole; is always the Sum of the *Numerical Modes of Motion* of the Parts: The *Numerical Mode of Superficial Figure* of the Whole; is the Sum of the *Numerical Modes of Figure* of the *Outsides* of its *Superficial* Parts: And the *Numerical Modes of Solid Figure* of the Whole; is the Sum of the *Numerical Modes of Solid Figure* of all the Parts taken together. In like manner, if *Thinking* could inhere in a System of Matter, it would not be *Thinking* in general, but always some particular *Numerical Thought*, that would be the result of the *Thinkings* of the several Parts.

If you will reply, that by *Generical Powers*, you do not mean *General Powers*, or *Universals*, which have no real Existence; (though when you reckon *Figure* among your *Generical Powers*, in  
opposi-

position to any particular Figure, as Roundness; your words cannot easily bear any other than this absurd Sense;) If, I say, you will reply, that by *Generical Powers* you do not mean *General Powers*, but only such *Sorts of particular Powers*, as *Are Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the same Kind*, in opposition to such other *particular Powers or Qualities*, as *Are not Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the same Kind*: I answer, that there is no such Distinction in Nature; But all Powers or Qualities whatever that inhere in Systems of Matter, whether they be such as you instance in for *Generical*, or such as you instance in for *Numerical Powers*; are equally and alike Sums or Aggregates of Powers of the same Kind. For if by this Term, of the same Kind or Species, you understand the *Species Specialissima*; in that Sense neither the One Sort of Qualities, nor the Other, nor any Wholes in the World, are Aggregates of Parts of the same Kind; It being no more true, that the *Magnitude or Motion* (which you call the *Generical Qualities*) of a *foot cube* of Matter, are made up of *cubic feet Magnitudes* or *cubic feet Motions*; than it is true that the *Roundness* (which you call the *Numerical Quality*) of a *Globe*, is made up of the *Like Roundnesses*. But if by the Term, of the same Kind, be understood (as common Sense requires, and as I before explain'd,) the *Species generalior*; then both the One Sort of Qualities and the Other, and All Wholes in the World, are Aggregates of Parts of the same Kind: It being equally true and evident, that the *Round Figure* of a *Globe*, (the *Numerical Quality*,) is, as to its *Surface*, made up of *Pieces of Surfaces spherically and concentrically convex*; and, as to its *Solid Content*, made up of *concentrick round Figures* or of *Shells spherically and concentrically convex*; which, being Pieces of the whole Sphe-

Spherical Surface, or of the whole Spherical solid Content, are respectively of the same Kind with it : as that the Magnitude of a foot cube of Matter, (the Generical Quality,) is made up of Inches cube, or of any other Magnitudes, which, being Pieces of a foot cube, are of the same Kind with it.

When therefore you say ; *If Powers of the same Kind* p. 12. 19. *be understood Generically, then you Do agree that the known Powers of Matter are nothing else but the Sums of Powers of the same Kind ; that is, the Figure and Motion of a Body,* [the Magnitude and Motion you should more properly have instanced in,] *consist of the Figures and Motions* [the Magnitudes and Motions] *of the Parts : But if the Terms, Powers of the same kind, be taken Numerically, (that is, as Powers really exist,) then there are Powers inhering in Systems of Matter, that are not the Sums of Powers of the same Kind ; As, the Roundness of a Body, is not the Sum of the Roundnesses of the Parts : Your Distinction is evidently very groundless. Because in the same Sense that the Roundness of a Body is not the Sum of the Like Roundnesses of the Parts, (for of Other Roundnesses, as of innumerable concentrick Roundnesses, and of the convex out-sides of its minute external particles, it may be and always is the Sum : ) In the same Sense ( I say, ) that the Roundness of a Body is not the Sum of the [Like] Roundness of the Parts ; in that same Sense it is true also, that neither does the Magnitude nor Motion of a Body consist of the [Like] Magnitudes nor Motions of the Parts. And on the contrary : In the same Sense that it is true, that the Magnitude and Motion of a Body does consist of [not the same, but the Different] Magnitudes and Motions of the Parts ; in that same Sense it is true likewise, that the Numerical Round Figure of a Body, that is, the Round Figure of its Surface, is the Sum*

of the Roundnesses, that is, of the round or convex out-sides, of its superficial parts; and its Solid Figure, is the Sum of all its Solid Parts taken together, which (as I before said) may be considered as so many concentrick Shells or any other Figures that can be constituent parts of the Solid Content of a Globe.

- pag. 20. And when you say ; It is a Contradiction to make Consciousness the Sum of the Consciousnesses of the Parts, as it is a Contradiction to make Roundness to consist in the Roundnesses of the Parts ; Though you would readily grant, that was Consciousness a generical Power like Figure and Motion, it would be likewise the Sum and Result of the Consciousnesses of the several Parts ; and so there would be as many distinct Consciousnesses, as there are Particles of Matter, of which the System consists ; which you do allow to be very absurd : And again ;
- pag. 21. If humane Consciousness be a Mode of some generical Power in Matter, it must not be the Sum of the Consciousnesses of the Parts : And ;
- pag. 55. Did Consciousness answer to Figure and Motion, [the generical Powers ;] That would likewise consist of the Consciousnesses of the
- pag. 56. Parts : And again ; Consciousness may result from such Qualities, as singly considered are void of Consciousness ; In like manner as Roundness is a Real Quality specifically different from other Qualities void of Roundness, and yet may be the Result or Composition of such
- pag. 59. Qualities : And ; Nor is Consciousness a Power which answers to Figure and Motion [the generical Powers,] which you agree consist only in the Figures and Motions of the Parts ; but it agrees or answers to [Numerical] Modes of Figure and Motion : All this, is only amusing your Reader with insignificant Words. For 1<sup>st</sup>. Consciousness, (as I shall hereafter have occasion more particularly to observe) is truly a more generical Power, than either Figure or Motion. For Fi-

*Figure* contains under it, nothing but the Modes of *Figure*; and *Motion*, nothing but the Modes of *Motion*: But *Consciousness* comprehending under it all the Modes of *Thinking*, contains in it self the Ideas of all the Modes of *Figure*, and the Ideas of all the Modes of *Motion*, and infinite *Other Ideas* besides. *Consciousness* therefore being a generical Power, not like, but infinitely more so, than *Figure* and *Motion*; must be (according to your own Confession) the Sum and Result of the page 20.  
*Consciousnesses* of the several Parts; and so there would be as many distinct *Consciousnesses*, as there are *Particles* of *Matter*, of which the System consists; which you do allow to be very absurd. But 2dly, Let us endeavour to imagine *Consciousness* to be, not a *Generical*, but a *Numerical* Power or Quality, such as *Roundness* is; and see what will follow from thence. It cannot be conceived that *Consciousness* in general is a *Numerical* Power, any more than *Figure* in general, or *Roundness* in general. But, as the individual *Roundness* of a *Globe*, is a *Numerical* Quality of that individual *Globe*; so you can only say that the individual *Consciousness*, which I find in my self at any particular moment of Time, is a *Numerical* Mode of some Power inhering in that System of *Matter* which constitutes my Brain. Now as the individual *Roundness* of a *Globe*, is not indeed made up of a Number of the Like whole *Roundnesses*; (even as the Number a *Hundred*, is not made up of *Hundreds*, nor the *Magnitude* of a *foot Cube*, made up of *feet Cube*; nor any *Whole* whatever, made up of a Number of the like *Wholes*;) but yet must needs be made up of such *Figures*, as are *Parts* of *Roundness*, nay *Parts* endued with that particular numerical degree of *Curvity* or *Roundness*;

and cannot be made up of *straight Lines*, nor of any *Figures* which are not *Pieces* of *Roundness*, or not *Pieces* endued with that particular determinate degree of *Curvity* or *Roundness*: So the individual *Consciousness* that I find in my self at any particular moment of *Time*, (supposing it to be a *Quality* inhering in a *System* of *Matter*,) must be made up, though not indeed of a *Number* of the very same *Consciousnesses*, yet of such *Powers* as are as much of the same *Kind* with that *Numerical Consciousness*, as *Arches* of *Circles* are of the same kind with the whole *circular Circumference*; or *pieces* of *Surfaces* *spherically* and *concentrically convex*, are of the same kind with the whole *Spherical Surface* composed of them all: That is, it must be made up of *Different Consciousnesses* indeed, but still *Consciousnesses* only, and not *Motions* or *Figures* or any thing else; any more than the *Roundness* of a *Circle* can be made up of *straight Lines*, or of *Colours*, or *Sounds*, or any thing else besides *Pieces* of *circular Roundness*; or than the *Surface* of a *Sphere*, can be made up of any thing else than *little Surfaces* having every one of them the very same *spherical and concentrick convexity*; or than an *Extended* or *Solid Substance*, can be made up of any other *Ingredients*, than such as are *Themselves Pieces* of *Extended* or *Solid Substance*. 'Tis by no means true, which you affirm, that *Roundness* is a new *Quality*, of a different *Kind* or *Species* from all the component *Qualities* considered together; or that it may be the *Result* or *Composition* of *Qualities* void of *Roundness*; Since it cannot be affirmed of any part of the *Arch* of a *Circle*, that it is wholly void of *Circularity*; as a *straight Line* is: And in like manner, 'tis by no means possible, that *Consciousness* may result from such *Qualities*,

lities, as singly considered are void of [all kind of] *Consciousness*; as *Motion* or *Figure* is. Nay further: *Every Part* of the *Circumference* of a *Circle*, is not only not wholly void of *Roundness*, but has really as much *Roundness* or *Curvity* (as much in *Degree*, though not so much of it in *Quantity*;) as the *whole Circle* it self has; For the same Reason as *one Circle* has as much *Roundness*, as *twenty*; or *one inch cube* of boiling *Water*, as much *Heat* [in *Degree*] as *twenty*; or *one foot square* of a white *Surface*, as much *Whiteness* as *twenty*: And therefore *Consciousness* in like manner, if it was a *Quality* answering to, or that could be compared with, the *Roundness* of a *Circle*; must consist of *Parts*, every one of which would have as much *Consciousness* [in *Degree*] as the *Whole*.

From the same Principles may easily be shown the *Absurdity* of all the rest that you have advanced, upon your favourite Instance of *ROUNDNESS*.

You say that the Argument drawn from *Consciousness's* not being made up of several *Consciousnesses*, concludes no more against the possibility of Its residing in a *System* of *Matter*; than the like Argument would conclude against the possibility of the *Existence* of *Roundness* in *Body*; which no more consists of several *Roundnesses*, than *Thinking* or *Consciousness* does of several *Consciousnesses*; and is as specifically different from other *Figures*, as *Consciousness* is from a *circular Motion*. But I think I have shown, that the Instances are not alike; and that *Roundness* does not consist of *Qualities* so different from *Roundness*, as you suppose *Consciousness* to be made up of *Qualities* different from *Consciousness*; that is, that the *Roundness* of the

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*whole*

*whole Circumference of a Circle*, is not so specifically different from the *Convexity of the little Arches*, of which it consists; or the *Roundness of a whole Globe*, from the *little spherically and concentrically convex pieces of Surfaces*, of which it is composed; as *Consciousness* is from a *circular Motion*, or from *Motion in a Square* or any *Motion at all* or any other, thing whatever that is wholly void of *Consciousness*. For *Roundness* can consist of nothing but *Pieces of Roundness*, that differ from it specifically only in the very lowest Sense of the word specifically; or rather they do not differ from it at all specifically, but in *Magnitude* only, as the *Part* from the *Whole*; it being hardly good Sense, to say that the *Number Twenty* differs specifically from the *Number Ten*; or that *360 degrees*, or *60 degrees*, differ specifically from *20 degrees* or from *20 seconds*, or from any other part of *One and the Same Arch*; Every part of which, has necessarily (as I before said) just as much *Roundness* or *Curvity* [in Degree,] as the *whole Arch* or *whole Circle* it self has: But *Thinking*, if it be made up of *Qualities utterly void of Thought*, as *Motions*, *Figures*, and the like; must consist of *Qualities generically* different from it self, in the highest Sense of the word generically; they being under no common *genus*, and having no similitude, nothing common one with another in their *Ideas*; and consequently cannot with any Sense be compared at all one with another, or be compounded one of another; any more than *Circles and streight Lines*, or *Colours and Sounds*, *Numbers and Tasts*, *Figures and Motions*, or any things whose *Ideas* have nothing common or alike betwixt them.

page 26.

Again: You allege in behalf of *Roundness* as well as *Thinking*, that 'tis so far from being as certain as



an Arithmetical Demonstration, that such a particular Power is a Whole bigger than all its Parts; that 'tis an Arithmetical Demonstration, that such a particular Power as Roundness is, is but just equal to all the Parts of which that Roundness consists. For what more goes to the Composition of Roundness, than the Conjunction of several Particles not singly endued with Roundness? And — what more goes to the Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of several Particles not each endued with — Thinking? But here also your Comparison is nothing to the Purpose. For, when you ask, what more goes to the Composition of Roundness, than the Conjunction of several Particles not singly endued with Roundness? if by not singly endued with Roundness, you mean not singly endued with [the same whole] Roundness; then your Assertion is no more than this, that the Parts of Roundness are not a Number of the same Wholes; or that the several Pieces of the Circumference of a Circle, are not so many Whole [Same] Circumferences: And then I answer, neither would the Parts of Thinking (if it inhered in a System of Matter) be so many Whole [the Same] Thoughts. But if you mean, that a Round Figure is a Composition of particles not singly endued with [any Part of] Roundness any [Curvity] at all; then your assertion is directly false: And such a Roundness, would be a Whole bigger than all its Parts; just as I said Consciousness would be, if it was made up of Motions or any other Qualities void of Consciousness. If you imagined Thinking to be made up of innumerable different Consciousnesses, as the Roundness of the Circumference of a Circle is made up of innumerable convex Arches, which are Pieces of Roundness; then indeed, and then only, your Comparison would be good: But to

suppose *Thinking* made up of Powers *utterly void of Consciousness*, is like supposing the *Circumference of a Circle* to be made up of *straight lines utterly void of convexity*; (or rather like supposing it to be made up of *Sounds or Colours*, or whatever else can be imagined even still more remote from the Idea of *Roundness*;) And This is evidently making a *Whole* bigger than *All its Parts*, that is, containing something different from, something over and above, something more than *All its Parts* taken together; nay, such a *Whole*, the *Sum* of whose parts neither make up the *Whole* it self, nor any *Part* of it: Which is a plain *Contradiction*. It is evident, that no *Whole* can possibly differ from *All its Parts* in any thing else, but only in the *Abstract Name*, the mere external *Denomination* of its being a *Whole*; which is nothing at all in the *Thing* it self, but merely a manner of *Conception*, a *Conjunction* of *Ideas* in the *Imagination* of the *Person* that beholds or thinks upon it. *Thinking*, if it was the *Quality* of a *System* of *Matter*, that is, the *Sum* or *Whole* of the *Powers* of its *Parts*; must differ from the distinct *Powers* of those *Parts*, no otherwise than as the *Idea* of the *Roundness* of a *Circle* differs from the *Idea* of the *Roundness* of *two Semicircles* (or of *four Quadrants*) *joined together*; or as the *Idea* of *Twice Six*, differs from the *Idea* of the *Number Twelve*. If therefore *Thinking* was, as you suppose, a *Composition* or *Result* of several *Powers*; and those *Powers* such, as were *Themselves utterly void of Consciousness*; *Thinking* would be either a *mere outward Denomination*, and nothing at all really in the *Thinking Substance* it self; just as a *Dozen* is only a mere *Name*, and nothing at all differing really in the thing

thing it self from *Twelve Units*; Which is what you will not affirm: Or else it must unavoidably be a *Whole* bigger than *All its Parts*; that is, containing *All its Parts*, and *Thinking* besides: Just as the *Curve Circumference of a Circle* would contain *more* of curvity in it than *All its Parts taken together*, if it could be composed of *Lines* that had none of them singly any *Curvity at all*; or a *Cube* would be *bigger* than *All its Parts*, if it were made up of *Parts* that had none of them singly any *Magnitude at all*.

[If upon this you will forsake your first Instance, and, seeking still for new Similitudes, allege that a *Square Figure* (suppose) may consist of *Parts*, that are none of them singly endued with any thing like *Squareness*: I answer, that the *Squareness* of the Figure of a Body, is a mere *external Denomination*, a mere *relative comparing together* in the Imagination the *Bounds of a Surface*, the *Situation of four straight lines with respect one to another*; and has not properly any real Existence in Things themselves, so as *Consciousness* is acknowledged to have in the Thinking Substance. The like may be said concerning all other Qualities, whose Essence consists merely in the *relative comparing the situation or other Respects of the Parts of a Body one towards another*: Such kind of Qualities having really no *proper Numerical Existence*, save only in the Idea. And Roundness it self, being considered in the same manner, might *this way likewise* afford a just Answer to your Argument drawn from thence.]

Lastly, You affirm that *Sensation is in the Parts* page 32 *of an Animal*, as *Roundness is in the Parts which compose a Round Body*: Each Part has as much of *Sensation*, singly considered, as each part of a *Round Body*

*Body has of Roundness; And when the Parts are duly disposed, whole Thinking is performed, as whole Roundness exists, by the Conjunction of Parts. But from what has been already said, I presume it is evident enough, that Senseless Figure or Motion cannot be so a Part of Sensation or a Piece of a Thought, as a Semicircle or Quadrant is a Piece of a Circle. To affirm that it can; viz. that Figure or Motion wholly void of Sense, can be so a Part of Sensation; is plainly (as I have before shown) the very same Thing, as if you should affirm that a Line wholly void of Curvity, could be so a piece of the Circumference of a Circle, as the Arch of a Quadrant is; or that something that has no Solidity and no Extension, might yet be a Constituent Part of an Extended and of a Solid Substance.*

I have shown that no part of the Circumference of a Circle, is wholly void of Roundness. If therefore *Sensation is* (according to your Assertion) *in the Parts of an Animal, as Roundness is in the Parts that compose a Round Body; and each part has as much of Sensation, singly considered, as each part of a Round Body has of Roundness; It will follow, not (as you intended) that Sensation can arise from a Conjunction of Particles utterly void of Sense; (for the circumference of a Circle cannot be made by a Conjunction of Lines, or the Superficies of a Sphere by a Conjunction of Surfaces, utterly void of Curvity:)* but, on the contrary, it will follow that *some degree of Sensation is really in every part of the Animal, singly considered; as some degree of Curvity is necessarily in every part of the circumference of a Circle, or of the Surface of a Sphere. And so you run unavoidably into that confessedly absurd Notion, that there are as many distinct Consciousnesses, as there are Particles*

icles of Matter, of which the Thinking System consists.

I am afraid our Readers are sufficiently tired with *ROUNDNESS*. The other Instance you allege, to prove that a Quality or Power inhering in a System of Matter, needs not be the Result of Powers or Qualities of the same Kind, residing in the Parts of the System; are still less to your purpose. For it is very evident concerning Those and All other possible Instances, that they never are nor can be any thing else, but the Sums of Powers or Qualities of the same particular uniform Kind with the Whole, when that Whole is *Simple and Homogeneous*; or of the same General Kind with it, when it is *Complex and Heterogeneous*. Which since you acknowledge cannot be the Case of *Thinking*, it will follow that *Thinking* cannot be a Power or Quality residing in a System of Matter.

The Power of a Clock to show the Hour of the Day, is not indeed a Result from the like individual Powers residing in the several Parts; any more than the Number a Thousand, is the Result of a Composition of Thousands; or Any Whole, a Composition of a Multitude of the same Whole: But, as the Number a Thousand is the Sum of a great many Numbers, but cannot with any Sense be imagined to be a Composition of Sounds or Colours; so the Numerical Power of a Clock, being it self nothing but Motion and Figure, cannot be the Result of any other Powers in the Parts, but such as are themselves singly of the same Kind, in the manner before explained; namely, Motions and Figures. And in like manner my present Numerical Consciousness, if it were at all a Quality inhering

in a System of Matter; though it need not indeed be the Sum of a Multitude of the *like individual Thoughts*, inhering in the several distinct Parts of the System; yet it must be the Sum of *Such Powers* in the Parts, as would themselves singly be of *the same Kind*, namely *Consciousnesses* or *Thoughts*: It being equally, and for the very same reason, impossible that my *Consciousness* should be the Result of such Powers in the Parts of my Brain, as are *toto genere* different from *Thinking*, and have nothing in their Ideas common with it or alike to it; (such as are *Figure* and *Motion*, and all other Powers which are *void of Consciousness*;) as that the fore-mentioned Number *a Thousand*, should be a Composition of *Sounds* or *Colours*, or of any thing else but *Numbers*.

page 15.

The *Power of a Musical Instrument to produce Harmonious Sounds*, is not indeed a Result from the *like individual Powers* residing in the several Parts of the Instrument; any more than the *Circumference of a Circle* is made up of a Number of the *like whole Circumferences*: But, as the *Circumference of a Circle* is the Sum of a Multitude of *convex Arches of like Curvity*, but cannot be an Aggregate of *Straight Lines* or of *Cubic Bodies* or of *Arches of unlike Curvity*; So the *Harmony* produced by a Musical Instrument, being it self, in the Mind that perceives it, nothing but *Sound*; and, in the Instrument, and in the Air, and in the Organs of Sensation, nothing but a *Motion of Parts*; cannot be the Result or Composition of any other Powers, but what are themselves singly of *the same kind* in the several Subjects respectively; namely, in the Mind that perceives them, *Sounds* likewise; and, in the Instrument it self, and in the

the Air, and in the Organs of Sensation, *Motion of the Parts*. And in like manner *Consciousness*, if it were a Power inhering in a System of Matter, could not be the Result of any other Powers in the Parts, but *some sorts of Consciousness*; for the very same reason as the *Circumference of a Circle* cannot (as was before said) be an Aggregate of *straight Lines*, or of *Cubic Bodies*; nor an *Harmonious Sound* a Composition of *Colours*, or of any thing else beside *Sounds*.

The *Power of the Eye to See*, is nothing else but P. 12. 14. 16 & 17. such a Power, as is in the *Object Glasses* of *Telescopes*, of *Transmitting* and *Refracting* Rays of Light, so as to paint the Image of the Object in the bottom of the Eye. And This is evidently nothing but the Sum of Powers of the same Kind, namely Powers of *Transmitting* and *Refracting* of Rays, residing distinctly in the several Parts of the Eye or of the *Glass*. Every Part of the Eye, *Transmits* and *Refracts* Rays; and those Rays paint several Parts of the Image: And the *Whole Image*, differs no otherwise from *all its Parts*; nor That which you call the *Numerical Power of the Whole Eye*, from the *single Powers of all its Parts*; than the Idea of a *Dozen* differs from the Idea of *Twelve Units*: Which, if it be as great a Difference, as is between the Idea of *Consciousness* and the Idea of a *Circular* or *any other Motion*, I will confess I have P. 13. 25. lost my Understanding.

But there is still a further peculiar unhappiness in your choosing to instance in the *Power of the Eye to contribute to the Act of seeing*, as a *Numerical Power* of a *System of Matter*, that does not inhere in the *Parts* of that System; and in your affirming, that upon *dividing or varying the least part of the* P. 13. 14. *Eye, the Power of contributing towards the Act of Vi-*  
sion

tion is entirely at an End. For so far is this from being true, (excepting only *accidentally* upon account of the Softness and Fluidity of the Matter of the Eye,) that on the contrary, not only *every Part* of the Eye (as I now said) *Transmits* and *Refracts* Rays, in order to paint at the bottom the several Parts of the Image of the Object; (and the Power of the *Whole Eye*, is nothing more than the *Sum* of those *Transmissions* and *Refractions*;) but moreover even *every Part* of the Eye has the same Power as the *Whole*, (differing only in *Degree*.) of painting at the bottom the *Whole Image* of the Object. For, as each Half of a broken Object Glass of a Telescope, or any Piece of it that retains the polish on both Surfaces, will represent distinctly the Whole Object, only with less Brightness and Luminousness than the whole Glass would do; So each part of the Eye, paints every part of the whole Object: And, if half of the Eye, or almost the Whole Eye be covered, so that you look only through a Pin-hole placed on the right side or on the left side or upon the middle of the Pupil; still the whole Object is seen distinctly, even by that very small part of the Eye; And consequently the Power of the Eye is the same both in the *Whole*, and in *every Part*.

And the same that has been said concerning these several Instances you chose to insist upon, may with very little variation be said likewise concerning all other Powers whatsoever that do or can reside in any System of Matter; The right explanation of the nature of which Powers, shows even your own Instances to be so many unanswerable Arguments against the Assertion you brought them to support.

This,



This, I presume, may be sufficient to prove against you in the *general*, that Every Power or Quality residing in any System of Matter, must of Necessity be the Sum or Aggregate of Powers of *the same Kind*, residing distinctly in the several Parts of the System: And consequently, that Whatever Power is not an Aggregate of such Powers; as you confess *Consciousness* or *Thinking* is not; cannot be at all a Power or Quality of Matter.

Not without some unwillingness you seem at last to determin in *particular* what Sort of Generical Power in Matter, you imagine *Thinking* to be a Numerical Mode of. You suppose *Consciousness* to pag. 19.  
*be a Mode of Motion*: You speak of *Thought* as a pag. 22.  
*Species of Motion*: And you conceive it a proper Expression, to mention a certain *Species of Motion* pag. 26.  
*en, called Thinking*.

You desire indeed it may not be *imputed to you as your Opinion*, since you *only take the Liberty to Suppose it*. But This will not serve you for an Evasion, when the Absurdity of the Notion is proved upon you. For you declare it as your positive *Opinion*, that *Human Consciousness or Thinking is a Mode of Some Generical Power in Matter*. What that Generical Power is, you will not positively determine; But you *Suppose* it to be *Motion*. Now I presume you *Suppose* That which you judge the most probable, and which you think will best serve your purpose in explaining the Nature of *Thinking*. I shall prove presently, that Nothing can be more absurd, than to *Suppose Thinking to be a Mode of Motion*. The same Arguments will prove no less strongly, that it is not possible for *Thinking* to be a  
*Mode*

*Mode of Figure*, or of any other *known* Property of Matter; And also that it is not possible for it to be a *Mode* of any *unknown* Power of Matter, which in the general is *void of Thinking*; Because every *unknown* Power which is *void of Thinking*, is as different from *Thinking*, as *Motion* it self is, or *Figure*, or any other *known* Power; for the same reason that a *Smell* or a *Taste*, or any other *known* or *unknown* Quality which is not a *Colour*, must of Necessity be as different from *Blue* or *Scarlet*, as the *Sound* of a *Trumpet* is. When therefore I have shown the

pag. 19. Absurdity of your *Supposition*, that *Thinking* is a *Mode of Motion*; I shall likewise have shown the

pag. 22. Absurdity of your *declared Opinion*, that *Human Consciousness* or *Thinking* is a *Mode of Some General Power in Matter*.

Now to prove the Absurdity of Supposing *Consciousness* to be a *Mode of Motion*, I offer the following Arguments.

1. Every *Mode* of any *Power* or *Quality*, is nothing else but *That Power* or *Quality* of which it is a *Mode*, understood with some particular Limitation; that is to say, 'tis nothing but a *particular Instance* of that *general Power* or *Quality*; nothing but the *general Power* or *Quality*, considered under this or that *particular Modification*. *Blue* and *Red*, and all other *Modes* of *Colour*, are nothing but several particular *Colours*; and can contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the *Genus* of *Colour*. *Acute* and *Grave*, and all other *Modes* of *Sound*, are nothing but several particular *Sounds*; and can contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the *Genus* of *Sound*. *Circular* and *Triangular*, and all other *Modes* of *Figure*, are nothing but several particular *Figures*; and can contain nothing in their Idea, beyond the *Genus* of *Figure*. In like manner All *Modes* of *Motion*, are nothing else but merely particular

Mo-

*Motions* ; and cannot contain any thing in their Idea; beyond the *Genus* of *Motion*. Now if *Simple Ideas* be the Foundation of all our Knowledge ; and *clear and distinct Perception* of the *Agreement or Disagreement* of those Ideas, be the best and greatest *Criterion* of Truth, that our Faculties inable us to attain to; then it is as evident as any Truth in the World, that *Consciousness* cannot possibly be a *Mode of Motion*. For I have as *clear and distinct a Perception*, that the Idea of *Consciousness* contains something in it besides and beyond the *Genus* of *Motion*, as I have that it contains something in it beyond the *Genus* of *Figure*. The Idea of *Consciousness* is as totally and generically different from the Idea of a *Circular Motion* or an *Elliptical Motion* or any other *Mode of Motion* whatsoever, as it is from the Idea of a *Circle* or a *Cube* or any other *Mode of Figure* whatsoever. I have therefore exactly the same *intuitive certainty*, that *Consciousness* cannot be a *Mode of Motion*, as I have that a *Circle* or a *Cube* is not a *Thought*, or that an *Acute Sound* is not a *Purple Colour*, or that any one thing in the World is not another, whose Idea is the remotest and most different from it, that can be imagined. To suppose *Consciousness* to be a *Mode of Motion*, is really a greater Absurdity, (if possible) than it would be to suppose *Roundness* to be a Property of a *Square* ; Because the Idea of *Local Motion* and the Idea of *Thinking*, having no common *Genus*, nothing wherein they agree or can be compared together; are evidently more different one from another, than the Ideas of any two plain *Figures* can be, which have a common *Genus*. And your Question, *What more goes* p. 12. 26. *to the Power of Thinking, than the Conjunction of several Particles not each endued with That Species of*

Motion called Thinking? Is truly more ridiculous, than if a Man should ask, *What more goes to the making up of a Scarlet Colour, than the Conjunction of several particles not each endued with That Species of Sound, called Scarlet?* Because no two Sensible Qualities are in their Ideas so different one from another, as the Idea, of *Consciousness* is from the Idea of *Local Motion*.

*Local Motion* can have no other effect upon any System of Matter, than only producing in it a different *juxta position* of Parts. To which to ascribe Thinking, Mr *Lock* himself, who had no prejudice against the Possibility of Matter's Thinking, acknowledges it is very Absurd. *To suppose, saith he, the Eternal thinking Being [or any finite thinking Being] to be nothing else but a Composition of Particles of Matter, each whereof is incogitative; is to ascribe all the Wisdom and Knowledge of that Eternal Being [or the Wisdom and Knowledge and all the Powers of the Finite thinking Being] only to the juxta position of Parts. Than which nothing can be more absurd. For unthinking Particles of Matter, however put together, can have nothing thereby added to them, but a new relation of Position, which 'tis impossible should give Thought and Knowledge to them.*

Book IV.  
ch. 10. §.  
16.

2. If Thinking was any *Mode* or *Species* of Motion, it would follow that *All Motion* would be some degree or kind of Thinking. For Motion, in the thing Moved, excepting only the difference of degrees of its *Swiftness* or *Slowness*, is a *Similar Quality*, and has no variety in it: All its different *Determinations*, or those which you call its *Modes* and *Species*, being *nothing really* in the *Body it self* that is moved; but mere *Abstract Notions* or *external Denominations*, conceived only in our *Imagination*. For, moving with one Determination, or  
with

with another; from North to South, or from South to North; is *merely* relative, and not really a different thing in the Body moved; that one of those Motions should be *Consciousness*, the other not. In like manner *Circular Motion*, or *Motion in any other Figure*, is not any thing really and truly inhering in the Body it self, different from Motion in a *straight Line*. For the Determination of any Body that *moves in a Circle*, is nothing else, at any given Point of Time, but a Determination to *move in a certain straight Line*; and, at another given Point of Time, to *move in another straight Line*; and so on: so that there is no such thing as a *circular Motion* of any particle of Matter, coexistent at once; but all Motion is, strictly and properly speaking, a similar and uniform Quality, *viz.* a Body's *Going on* according to its Determination; Which Determination is always in a *straight Line*; and causes the Body to go on actually in a *straight Line*, where it meets with no Resistance; and where it meets with Resistance by Intervals, there to go on into new *straight Lines* successively, into which it is diverted by such Resistance; and, where it meets with continual Resistance, there to go on in a *Curve Line*, into which it is continually diverted: And every such *curvilinear Motion*, whether *circular* or of any other Species whatsoever, is but the Idea of a Number of Successive Motions of a Body, never existent together: a pure *Ens Rationis*, or Operation of the Mind; which considering Past Motion and Future, and recollecting *the Whole* by the Memory and Fancy, calls *That Whole* sometimes by one Denomination and sometimes by another. How then can any of those *Modes of Motion* be the *Efficient* of Thought, or (according to

\* See Bi-  
of shop  
Nor-  
wich's Ser-  
mon on  
Immorta-  
lity of the  
Soul, pag.  
9. And  
Dr Bent-  
ley's Ser-  
mon II at  
Boyle's Le-  
cture, pag.

your Supposition) be themselves *Thought*; when they are evidently nothing but the *Effect and Product* of it, viz. Ideas framed merely by the *Imagination and Memory* ?

And the same that has been said concerning the *Modes of Motion* of a *single Body*, may easily be applied to the *Modes of Motion* of *any Number of Bodies*, in any *System or Composition* whatsoever. It being very evident, that it the *Progression* of *One Particle* of Matter *directly in a Straight Line*, be not *Consciousness* or *Thought* ; the *like Progression* of *Twenty Particles* at the same time *in Straight Lines*, cannot be *Consciousness* neither : The *Position* of those *Lines* with respect one to another, which determines the particular *Mode of Motion* of the whole *System*, being merely *imaginary, relative, and comparative* ; a figment only in the *Mind or Imagination*, and not any thing really existing in the *Bodies themselves*, at any one and the same *Moment of Time*.

In like manner the *Impulse* also, or *Beating of one particle of Matter against another*, is a thing similar and in all Cases alike ; differing in nothing, but in the *Degrees* or *Quantity* of the *Force* : And therefore must always and in all Cases, if ever in Any Case at all, be some *Degree of Thought*. From whence it would follow, that there must be as many several incoherent *Consciousnesses*, as there are *Particles* of the *Brain or Spirits* or of any other *Matter* in any *System*, that ever dash one against another : Which is what you are not willing to affirm.

3. If *Consciousness* were a *Mode or Species of Motion* ; then *Motion* would be the more *generical Power* ; containing *Thinking* under it, as (in the *Language of Logicians*) the *Genus* does the *Species*. But on the contrary 'tis evident (as I before ob-

ob-

observed) that *Thinking* (though simple and not compounded of Parts,) is, in the Sense we are now speaking of, a Power infinitely more generical than either *Motion* or *Figure* or any other Power of *Matter*; and consequently cannot be a *Mode* or *Species* of any of them. There are as many *Ideas of Figure*, as there are *Figures*; and as many *Ideas of Motion*, as there are *Modes of Motion*; and as many *Ideas of other things*, as there are *other things* in the World, that can be thought upon: And all these *Ideas*, are *Modes* and *Sorts* or *Kinds of Thinking*. Now if *Thinking* is a Power more various, more extensive, more generical, than *Motion*; 'tis manifest it cannot be a *Mode* or *Species* of *Motion*, as *Roundness* is a *Mode* or *Species* of *Figure*. If *Thinking* is a Power more generical, than *Figure* or *Motion* or any other Power of *Matter*; if it is a Power as universal, as all things taken together, that can be thought upon; 'tis certainly a generical Power in the highest degree; And consequently, (if it be at all a Power of *Matter*;) it will oblige you to run into the *Absurdity* you declare you would avoid. For, by your own Confession, you would grant readily, that, was Con-pag. 20.  
sciousness a generical Power like *Figure* and *Motion* (like *Figure* and *Motion* it is not, but infinitely more generical than either of them,) it would be likewise the *Sum* and *Result* of the *Consciousnesses* of the several Parts; and so there would be as many distinct *Consciousnesses*, as there are *Particles of Matter*, of which the *System* consists; Which you do allow to be very *Absurd*.

As *Figure* is the *Genus* of all the *Species* of *Figure*, so the *Idea* of *Figure* is the *Genus* of all the *Ideas* of all the *Species* of *Figures*: And so the *Idea* of *Motion*, is the *Genus* of all the *Ideas* of all the *Species* of

*Motions*; and the *Idea of Colour*, is the *Genus of the Ideas of all the Species of Colours*; and the *Idea of Sound*, is the *Genus of the Ideas of all the Species of Sounds*; and the *Idea of an Animal*, is the *Genus of the Ideas of all the Species of Animals*. The *General Ideas of Figure, Motion, Colour, Sound, Animal, &c.* are *generical Powers of the Mind*; And *Thinking* is the *Genus generalius of all those Powers*. With what *Sense* then can it be said to be one of the *lower Species*, or a *Numerical Mode of One of those Powers*?

4. *If it was the Motion of the parts of a Corporeal System, on which its Thinking depends: all the Thoughts There, must be unavoidably accidental and limited; because each one of the Particles, that by Motion cause Thought, being in it self without any Thought, cannot regulate its own Motions; much less be regulated by the Thought of the Whole; since that Thought of the Whole, is not the Cause of Motion, (for then it must be antecedent to it, and so without it,) but the Consequence of it: Whereby Freedom, Power, Choice, and all rational and wise thinking or acting, will be quite taken away: So that such a thinking Being, would be no better nor wiser, than pure blind Matter; since to resolve all into the accidental unguided Motions of blind Matter, or into Thought depending on unguided Motions of blind Matter, is the same thing: Not to mention the narrowness of such Thoughts and Knowledge, that must depend on the Motion of such parts. But there needs no enumeration of any more Absurdities and Impossibilities in this Hypothesis, (however full of them it be,) than That before-mentioned; since, let this thinking System be All or a Part of the Matter of the Universe, it is impossible that any one Particle should either know its own, or the Motion of any other Particle; or the*  
Whole



Whole know the Motion of every particular; and so regulate its own Thoughts or Motions, or indeed have any Thought resulting from such Motion. This Argument, is Mr Locks owns Words, (Book IV. ch. 10. Sect. 17.) to which I cannot but suppose you will give some Deference.

5. If *Thinking* was a *Mode* or *Species* of *Motion*; then in like manner as it is a proper Expression to say, that *Circularity* is one *Species* of *Figure*, and *Squareness* a second, and *Cubicalness* a third, and *Ellipticalness* a fourth; so it would be proper also to say, that *Circular Motion* is one *Species* of *Motion*, and *Motion in a Square* a second, and *Motion in an Ellipsis* a third, and *Thinking* or *Consciousness* a fourth; and, I appeal to the common Sense of all Mankind, whether I may not add with exactly the same reason, that a *Tree* is a fifth, and a *Syllogism* a sixth, and *Personality* a seventh, &c.

[If to this you will reply, that you do not mean as you say, that any *particular Motion* is itself *Thought*, but that *Thought* may be the *Result* of some *particular Motion*; I answer in the words of Mr *Hobbs*, that \* no *Result* of *Motion* can ever be any thing else but *mere Motion* still: (With a different *Juxta-position* of *Parts* perhaps; of which before, pag. 29.) And consequently all the fore-going Arguments hold equally good, against one *Notion* as against the other.]

\* *Motus*  
nihil gene-  
rat preter  
*Motum*.  
Leviat.  
c. 1.

Some of these Absurdities are so very gross, and yet such obvious Consequences of your Notion, that it can hardly be imagined you should have over-looked them. And indeed you do at last endeavour to obviate them in a *very effectual manner*; In such a manner, by which you may,

whenever you please, answer all the Arguments upon any Question in the World; and remove out of your way, not only any *Demonstration*, but even *Intuitive Knowledge* it self. You tell me, that I imagine *Consciousness* to be *Something else than what you contend it is*; That the *Term of Consciousness* stands with You, in another *Sense* than with Me: That with You, it signifies a *Numerical Power*, answering to *Roundness* in a *Body*, or to a *Motion peculiar to a System of Matter*; but that with Me, it relates to a *Chimera* or *Idea* of my own framing.

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page 60.

Now to This I reply in the Words of Mr *Lock*; (Book 4. ch. 1. Sect. 4.) *A Man infallibly knows, as soon as ever he has them in his Mind, that the Ideas he calls White and Round, are the very Ideas they are; and that they are not other Ideas, which he calls Red or Square.*

I think I know infallibly, as soon as ever I have it in my Mind, that the *Idea* I call *Consciousness*, *Perception* or *Thinking*, is the very *Idea* it is; and that it is not another *Idea*, which I call *circular Motion*, or *Elliptical Motion*, or *Motion in a Square*, or the *Motion of a Watch* or of any other *Machine*. And I appeal to what every Man finds in his own Mind; whether my Account of *Consciousness*, or yours which makes it to be merely a *Mode of Motion*, be the more *Chimerical Idea*.

Simple Ideas cannot be defined nor described. When any Dispute is carried so far, as to terminate in questioning the *Idea it self*; there is nothing then left but to appeal to the *Idea* which every Man has in his own Mind. If I affirm that this Paper is *White*, and you will contend that it is *Red*; we cannot confute one another by Arguments, but must appeal to the Judgment of  
the

the World. If a Man will tell me, that by *Scarlet-Colour* he does not mean That Chimerical Idea which I frame in my own Mind and call by that Name; but that He means thereby, only a certain *Numerical Mode of Sound*, I know not how he can be confuted, but by appealing to every Man's own Ideas. The *Idea of Consciousness* which I have in my Mind, appears to Me an Idea, which I think I clearly and distinctly perceive to be altogether as different from the *Idea of any possible Numerical Mode of Figure or Motion*, as my Idea of *Scarlet-Colour* is different from my Idea of the *Sound of a Trumpet*. If any other Person thinks his Idea of *Consciousness*, to be the same with his Idea of a *circular Motion* or of any other *numerical Mode of Motion*; I conceive there is nothing more to be done, but to permit him to have the pleasure of continuing to think so, as long as he pleases.

The Sum is This. I affirm that *Thinking*, cannot possibly be a mere *Mode of Motion*; because the *Idea of Thinking* and the *Idea of Motion or any of its Modes*, have not the least likeness or affinity between them. This, you say, proves nothing; because My *Idea of Thinking*, is a mere Chimera; but Your *Idea of it*, is the same as your *Idea of some Numerical Mode of Motion*. I reply; If this proves nothing, then neither can any Argument in the World ever prove any thing. For, Suppose the thing in dispute be, whether *a Square is a Circle*, or whether *Blueness is a Taste*: I contend this cannot possibly be, because my *Idea of a Square* includes in it nothing of that *Roundness* which is my *Idea of a Circle*; and my *Idea of Blueness* includes in it nothing like *That Sensation*, which is my *Idea of a Taste*.

May

May not another Person answer, that This proves nothing? because my Idea of a *Square*, or of *Blueness*, is a mere Chimera; but His Idea of a *Square*, is the same as his Idea of a *round Figure*; and his Idea of *Blueness*, the same as his Idea of some certain *Taste*.

To conclude. In reviewing this whole Matter, I can hardly persuade my self, but that you have mistaken your own Argument. Some ingenious Persons in the present Age have indeed undertaken to maintain, that God, by the immediate exercise of his Omnipotence, may make Matter Think; notwithstanding it be impossible that *Thinking* should result naturally, from any Composition or Division of the original Properties of Matter. I suppose they meant, that to Matter disposed in a certain Manner, and put into some particular Modes of Motion, Omnipotence could *Superadd* the Power of *Thinking*. I think the Argument drawn from the Divisibility of Matter, proves that Matter is not a Subject capable of such a *Superaddition*: And if it be not; then recurring to the Divine Omnipotence for the making out an Impossibility, is not *magnifying* but *destroying* the Power of God; as indeed all contradictory Apprehensions concerning any of his Perfections, are really and in event destructive of our whole Notion of God; and have no other Effect, than to give profane Men an occasion of scoffing at Religion. However, that assertion had the appearance (tho' a very false one) of being founded in a certain modest apprehension concerning the Inconceivable Extent of the Divine Power. But that any *Mode of Motion* should be (not a previous disposition or qualification, towards capacitating Matter for the Addition of such a Power; but that

that it should be) *Thinking it self*; when all the Matter supposed to be in that Motion, is acknowledged otherwise to be *void of Thought*: This is such an Extravagant Absurdity, as may justly cause wonder how it should ever enter into the Heart of any rational Man; especially in an Age, wherein Philosophical Knowledge has received so considerable Improvements.

Having thus particularly answered the Argument wherein you placed your main Strength; It remains that I take notice of some Incidents in your *Reflexions*, wherein I think you have either greatly misrepresented Me, or given very disadvantageous Representations of your own Philosophy.

In the Question, *Whether a System of Matter can have a Power of Thinking or an Individual Consciousness superadded to it, or flowing from any Modification of that System*; you said, you understood by a *Power of Thinking*, only *Actual Thinking*, and not a *Capacity of Thinking*.

I replied, there was no need of making any such Distinction; because my Argument was of equal force, in whatever Sense the Term *Consciousness* was understood; whether to signify the *Capacity of Thinking*, or *Actual Thinking*, or the Reflex Act of being *Conscious that I Think*.

Upon this, you make a long Expostulation, *what occasion I had for contending with you about the* pag. 5. *Sense you fixed to the Terms*. I did not contend much about it: But the *Occasion* of saying what I did, was, because in all Questions, the greater Latitude of signification the Terms may be allowed to be understood in, without making any  
Alteration

Alteration in the Strength of the Proof, the clearer and stronger such Proof always is; and the less perplexity, or room for quibbling, remains in the Question it self.

pag. 5.

You ask; *Have you not understood me in a Sense that answered all the Ends and Purposes of my Argument?* My Argument was indeed conclusive in the Sense you understood me in: But I had no reason to approve of your confining me to that Sense only, when the Argument was equally conclusive in any other Sense the Reader might happen to understand the Terms in.

pag. 6.

You say, you have taken but the same Liberty I allow to every other Reader. But, if I mistake not, there is some Difference between allowing the Reader to take the Term *Consciousness* in which of the Three fore-mentioned Senses he pleases; and allowing You to confine it to One of those Senses, exclusive of the others.

I affirmed that *the Reader needs not trouble himself with the Nicety of Distinction between a Capacity of Thinking, actual Thinking, and the Reflex Act of Thinking; but may understand Consciousness indifferently in all or any of these Significations.*

pag. 6.

This Sentence, you think, contains one of the nicest distinctions that ever you met with; being as much as to say, that the Reader need not understand *Consciousness indifferently in any of the before-mentioned Significations, and yet may understand it indifferently in any of these Significations.* But Where is the Niceness (the Ridiculousness I suppose you mean) of saying that the Reader may take a Word in a Sense, which yet he is not under a necessity of taking it in, but may likewise take it in some Other Sense if he pleases?

You

You add: *For you cannot See, but that whoever* page 6. *understands Consciousness in any one of those Significations, must use that nicety of Distinction I complain of, whether he will or no; For by Restraining Consciousness to any One of those Significations, he necessarily distinguishes That One from the other two: And that therefore you must needs own, you cannot See the least reason I had to blame you for a needless Distinction, when I allow you to understand Consciousness indifferently in three Significations, one of which you did assign as your meaning or Idea of that word. But, if you please to look once again, I suppose you will be able to See, that there is no absolute Necessity for him that understands Consciousness in any One of those fore-mentioned Significations, to Restrain it to That One Signification; as you desired to do.*

Lastly, You allege that *the whole Dispute turns* pag. 8 & 9. *upon the present Distinction of the Significations of the word Consciousness; And to prove that it does so, you cite a Sentence out of my Letter to Mr Dodwell, wherein the word Conscious cannot be understood in any other Sense, than to signify actual Thinking. 'Tis true; in that Sentence the word was so used; And in the very same Sentence it was also used Otherwise. Now, because in that passage which you made the Occasion of our present Debate, I once used the word in such a manner, as that the Nature of the Thing accidentally confined it to that Signification; though in the more emphatical part of the very same Sentence, it was used in a larger Sense; Does this prove that the whole Dispute now turns upon any Distinction of the Signification of that Word? You might as well have said, it proves the remotest thing in the World from our present Question. The Sentence*

tence it self was This: 'Tis plain, unless Matter were essentially Conscious, — no System of it in any possible Composition or Division can be an Individual Conscious Being. My meaning was, that unless Matter were essentially Conscious, that is, unless it were essentially indued with *actual Thinking*; it might be proved from its Divisibility, that no System of it in any possible Composition or Division, could ever be an individual Conscious Being, that is, could ever either *actually Think* or attain a *Capacity of Thinking*. How does it follow now from hence, that because in the former part of this Sentence, the word *Conscious* happens to signify only *actual Thinking*; therefore in the Question, [Whether *Consciousness* can inhere in a System of Matter,] the word *Consciousness* may not be understood at large, to signify either *actual Thinking* or a *Capacity of Thinking*? Between which, after all, there is no great Difference at the bottom.

Upon the whole; why you should be displeas'd with me for allowing the Terms of the Question to be understood in the greatest Latitude, and for endeavouring to prove more than you expected, *viz.* that no System of Matter could either have *actual Thinking*, or so much as any *Capacity of Thinking*; I could not imagine. And why you made such a Stir about a Distinction, which did and still does appear to me to be very needless; I could conceive no other Cause, but only that you might perplex the Question.

pag. 8.

Thus I have given you the *Reason*, you Demand, of my Conduct in this Matter: I do not Demand of You, but leave it to your Discretion, to choose whether you will give any *Reason* of yours, or no: For, (if you will give me leave to use your own Expression) I cannot assign a good one for you.

pag. 8.

YOU



You ask; *If the Soul or Principle of Thinking be* pag. 3.  
*Undivided, how can it think successively, divide, ab-*  
*stract, combine or amplify, retain or revive Impressi-*  
*ons in the Memory? and how can it be capable, partly*  
*or wholly to forget any thing? And the Corporeity of*  
*the Soul, you think, is further proved experimental-*  
*ly, from our being tired with contemplating, as much*  
*as with singing and dancing; from the Reaction of our*  
*Thoughts or of our Ideas and Words, mutually ex-*  
*citing each other; and from the Forgetfulness of*  
*Children and Old People, upon any cause that discom-*  
*poses the Organ.*

To this I answer. The Reason why the Soul or Principle of Thinking, though it self *Undivided*, yet thinks successively, divides, abstracts, combines or amplifies, retains or revives Impressions in the Memory, or partly or wholly forgets Things; is because *The Whole Soul* thinks successively, divides, abstracts, combines or amplifies, retains or revives Impressions in the Memory, or partly or wholly forgets things: And none of these Phenomena can be explained by the various Acts of the *various Parts of a Bodily Organ* alone.

Our being *tired with Contemplation*; the mutual *Reaction of our Ideas and Words*; our *Forgetfulness* that follows upon certain *Defects or Discomposures* of the Brain, &c; do not prove that the *Soul it self* is a *Bodily Organ*; but only that it *Acts upon*, and is *Acted upon by*, Bodily Organs; and is assisted by them, as Instruments in its Operations. Experience shows us, that the *Sight* is bettered by good Telescopes, and the *Hearing* by Instruments of conveying Sounds; but not that those Instruments therefore *Hear or See*: That all *Sensati-*

on is bettered by good Organs of Sense; but not that the Organs themselves are *Sensible*: That *Imagination* and *Memory* depend on the Brain; But not that the Brain *imagines* or *remembers*. The Organs of the Senses are entirely distinct from one another; But the Thing which perceives by those different Organs, is One and the Same Thing; one Thinking Being, which every Man calls *Himself*. And this One Thinking Being, has not some Powers in some Parts, and other Powers in other Parts; some Actions in some Parts, and other Actions in other Parts; But all its Powers, are the Powers of the Whole; and All its Actions, are the Actions of the Whole. The Whole Thinking Substance, Sees both the Whole Object, and every Part of it; The same Whole Substance Hears every Sound, Smells every Odour, Tasts every Savour, and Feels every thing that Touches any Part of the Body. Every Imagination, every Volition, and every Thought is the Imagination, Will, and Thought, of that Whole Thinking Substance, which I call *I myself*. And if this One Substance (which we usually stile the *Soul* or *Mind*) has no Parts, that can *Act* separately; it may as well be conceived to have none, that can *Exist* separately; and so, to be absolutely *Indivisible*.

I alledged that it is *Absurd to annex Consciousness to so flux a Substance as the Brain or Spirits*; because if such a Substance could be the Seat of that *Consciousness*, by which a Man not only remembers things done many Years since, but also is *Conscious* that He himself, the same individual Being, was the Doer of them; it would follow that *Consciousness* could be transferred from one Subject to another; that is, that a *Quality* could subsist without inhering in any Subject at all; which all rational

*Men*

*M*en allow to be impossible. To this you reply; that in order to retain the Consciousness of an Action, it is p. 28 & necessary to revive the Idea of it, before any considerable 29. Flux of Particles; and by reviving the Idea of that Action, I imprint afresh the Consciousness of having done that Action, by which the Brain has as lively an Impression of Consciousness, (though it be not entirely composed of the same Particles,) as it had the day after it did the Action, or as it has of a Triangle or any other new Idea not before imprinted on it. Consciousness of having done that Action, is an Idea imprinted on the Brain, by recollecting or bringing into View our Ideas, before they are quite worn out; which Idea continues in me not only the memory of the Action it self, but that I did it. And if there is every now and then, a recollection of a past Action; it may hereby be conceived, that a Man may be conscious of things done by him, though he has not one particle of Matter the same that he had at the doing of those things; without Consciousnesses being transferr'd from one Subject to another, in any absurd Sense of those Words. And again: If Matter p. 2. 53; can know at this Instant, that it Thinks; you can see no reason why it may not remember to morrow what it thinks of to day, though some Particles will be then wanting which it has at present: And if it can remember at all; then the Memory of things may be continued even after we have lost all the particles of Matter that we had at the doing them, by continual intermediate repeating or imprinting afresh our Ideas before they are quite lost or worn out. But the Fallacy of this Reply, is very evident. For to affirm that new Matter perpetually added to a fleeting System, may by repeated impressions and recollections of Ideas, participate and have communicated to it a Memory of what was formerly done by the Whole System; is not explaining or proving, but begging

the Question, by assuming an *impossible* Hypothesis. But supposing it were *possible*, that the *Memory* in general of such or such an Action's having been done, might be preserved in the Manner you suppose; yet it is a manifest Contradiction, that the *Consciousness* of its being done by *Me*, by *my own Individual Self* in particular, should continue in me after my whole Substance is changed; unless *Consciousness* could be transferred from one Subject to another, in the absurdest Sense of those Words. For to suppose that One Substance should be *Conscious* of an Action's having been done by it self, which really was not done by It, but by Another Substance; is as plainly supposing an Individual Quality to be transferred from One Subject to another, in the most absurd Sense; as 'tis plain that *Consciousness* is a *real individual Quality*, and different from bare *general Memory*.

It therefore you will answer, (which is the only possible seeming Evasion in this Case,) that That which we call *Consciousness*, is not a *fixt individual numerical Quality*, like the numerical Figure or Motion of a solid Body; but a *fleeting transferrible Mode or Power*, like the Roundness or the Mode of Motion of Circles upon the Face of a running Stream; And that the *Person* may still be the same, by a continued Superaddition of the like *Consciousness*; notwithstanding the Whole Substance be changed: Then I say, you make *Individual Personality* to be a mere *external imaginary Denomination*, and nothing at all in reality: Just as a *Ship* is called the *same Ship*, after the Whole Substance is changed by frequent Repairs; or a *River* is called the *same River*, though the Water of it be every day new. The *Name* of the Ship, is the  
same;

same ; but the *Ship it'self*, is not at all the same ; And the continued *Name* of the River signifies Water running in the same Channel, but not at all the *same Water*. So if a Man at forty Years of Age, has nothing of the same Substance in him, neither material nor immaterial, that he had at twenty ; he may be called the *same Person*, by a mere *external imaginary denomination* ; in such a Sense as a *Statue* may be called the *same Statue*, after its whole Substance has been changed by piece-meal : But he cannot be *really and truly* the *same Person*, unless the *same individual numerical Consciousness* can be transferred from one Subject to another. For, the continued Addition or exciting of a *like Consciousness* in the new acquired parts, after the manner you suppose ; is nothing but a Deception and Delusion, under the Form of Memory ; a making the Man to seem to himself to be Conscious of having done That, which really was not done by Him, but by Another. And such a Consciousness in a Man, whose Substance is wholly changed, can no more make it just and Equitable for such a Man to be punished for an Action done by another Substance ; than the Addition of the like Consciousness (by the Power of God) to two or more new Created Men ; or to any Number of Men now living, by giving a like Modification to the Motion of the Spirits in the Brain of each of them respectively ; could make them All to be One and the same individual Person. at the same time that they remain several and distinct Persons ; or make it just and reasonable for all and every one of them to be punished for one and the same individual Action, done by One only, or perhaps by None of them at all.

*Mr Lock* himself, in the very place where he contends that *Consciousness* makes the *same individual Person*, notwithstanding that the *Whole Substance* be supposed to be changed ; acknowledges expressly, (*Book II. ch. 27. Sect. 13.*) that such a continuation of the *same Consciousness* in a fleeting Substance, would be a representing *That to the Mind to have been, which really never was ; a representing to One intellectual Substance as done by it self, what it never did, and was perhaps done by some other Agent ; a representation without reality of Matter of Fact, as several representations in Dreams are ; a Transferring by a fatal Error from One to Another, That Consciousness which draws Reward or Punishment with it ; a making Two [or Two Hundred] Thinking Substances, to be but One [Individual] Person ; And leaves it to be considered, how far this may be an Argument against those who would place Thinking in a System of fleeting Animal Spirits.*

To say here, that Gods *Justice and Goodness* will not permit him to put any such inevitable Deceit upon Men ; is nothing to the Purpose. For if it be but *naturally possible* for him to do That, which, upon Supposition of the Truth of your Notion, will be a *plain Contradiction* ; this is a certain Demonstration that your Notion is False. And I think it is a *Contradiction plain enough*, to say that Gods impressing permanently upon 1000 Mens Minds, after the manner of the representation of a Dream, the like *Consciousness* with that which I find in my own Mind ; would make every One of them, to be, not Persons like me, but the *same Individual Person* with my self. According to such Reasoning as this, Accidents need not have any necessary Dependence on their Substance : And the same individual Substance may as well be concei-  
ved

ed to exist in a thousand places at once, under like Accidents; as the same *Individuating* Accidents or Qualities can inhere in a Thousand different Substances at once. By which same Subtilty, (as Believing *too much* and *too little*, have commonly the Luck to meet together, like things moving two contrary ways in the same Circle,) all the Absurdities in the Doctrine of *Transubstantiation* may easily be reconciled.

You deny that we have any Consciousness at all, that pag. 57. we continue the same Individual Being at different times. If so; it can be to no great purpose for us to dispute about Any Thing: For, before you receive my Reply, you may happen possibly to be entirely changed into another Substance; and, the next time you write, may deny that you have any Consciousness at all, that you continue the same Individual Being who wrote this Remarkable Sentence. But to the Assertion, I answer: Either Consciousness proves a Man to be the same Individual Being at different times; Or else it is a mere Deceit and Delusion: and by being added in like manner to other Substances, might (as I said) make an Hundred other Men with equal justice liable to the same punishment with himself for any One Individual Action done by Him. But of this more, when I come to speak of the usefulness and importance of the present Argument to the Ends and Purposes of Religion.

You affirmed, that *The Matter, of which an Egg consists, doth entirely constitute the young One; and that the Action of Sensation began under a particular disposition of the Parts by Motion:* To this I answered; that so far is it from being true, that the Matter of the Egg, by any particular Disposition of its Parts by

*Motion, is formed into or entirely constitutes the young One ; that (according to the best Discoveries by Microscopes and in Anatomy) it does not constitute it at all, not so much as the Body of it ; but only serves it for*  
 pag. 31. *Nourishment and Growth. You reply : If by our Eyes we can perceive the organized Body of the Animal to be Part of the Matter of the Egg ; no Microscopical Observation can destroy such Matter of Fact, and— make us See Nothing, where we do See Something. Now I am very sorry, Sir, to find you in a serious and important Question descend to so extremely mean and trifling a Quibble. For, This is exactly the same thing, as if you should say, that by your Eyes you can perceive an inclosed Worm to be Part of the Matter of the Nut it feeds on ; or that by your Eyes you can perceive a Man to be Part of the Matter of the House he dwells in.*

I called Gravitation the Effect of the continued and regular Operation of some Other Being on Matter. You  
 pag. 34. *replied ; that it does not appear, but that Matter gravitates by virtue of Powers originally pla ed in it by God, and is now left to it self to act by those original Powers. To this I answered : that a Law or Power, that is to say, a mere abstract Name, or complex Notion, which is no real Being ; cannot impel a Stone, and cause it to begin to Move. You reply again ; that*  
 pag. 35. *you deny not the necessity of a Being impelling another, in order to cause that Mode of Motion called Gravitation : That you suppose it to be caused by the Impulse of Other Bodies : And, to speak your own Opinion, it seems Matter of Fact to You, that the external Figure and internal configuration of the Parts of Matter, are those Powers in Matter, by which it receives that peculiar Mode of Motion called Gravitation, from the circumambient impelling Bodies. I did imagine, Sir, when I expressed my self with such brevity in*  
 pag. 36. *my*



my first Answer, you had been so well acquainted with Natural Philosophy, as not to be ignorant that it has been demonstrated even Mathematically, that Gravitation cannot arise from the *configuration and texture of the parts of Matter*, and from the *circumambient impelling Bodies*; because, if it did, it would not be proportionable to the Quantity of Matter or the Solid Content of all Bodies, without any regard to their Superficial Proportion; as we find by Experience it is; seeing all Bodies, of all Textures, and all configurations of Parts, and all varieties of superficial Proportion; [a Bullet, or a Feather, or a piece of Leaf-Gold, or a Sheet of Paper;] descend in *Vacuo* with equal Swiftnefs. And if *Material Impulse*, be not the Cause of Gravity; then some Being that is *not Material*, (for *Laws* or *Powers* are nothing but mere empty Words,) must of necessity be allowed to be the Cause of it. But it seems you are, notwithstanding the Force even of Demonstration it self, still of Opinion that Gravitation is *purely owing* to the outward Figure and inward Configuration of the parts of Matter, and the impulse of circumambient Bodies. For, *drop a pound of Lead, in the Form of a Pullet, from the top of a Tower: and it descends in a very quick space to the ground: Vary the external Figure of the Bullet, by beating it broad with a Hammer: and its Tendency downward decreases: Vary the configuration of its Parts by Five; and it will ascend, instead of descending.* Certainly the Reader cannot but be greatly surprized, to meet with such Philosophy as This, in our present Age. For, what has All This to do with Gravitation? or with the Cause of Bodies Tending downward? Has a Pound of Lead in the Form of a Bullet, a greater Tendency downward, than under any other Form; because the Air

See the incomparable Sir Isaac Newton's Principia throughout; and the Quæries at the End of the Latin Edition of his Opticks.

pag. 57.

pag. 36.

making less Resistance to it when in that Form, suffers it to fall more swiftly? Or when it is beaten out into a *thin Plate*, which is still of a *Pound-weight*, does its *Tendency downward decrease*, because the Air making greater Resistance to it when under that new Form its Superficies is enlarged, suffers it now to fall but slowly? You might by the same Philosophy, and exactly with the same Truth, affirm that a *Hundred-pound-weight*, so long as you support it with your Hands, has lost its *Tendency downward*, because it does not descend; But, I presume, Experience will easily convince you of the contrary. In like manner; when *Lead* being evaporated by Fire, *ascends* in the Air *instead of descending*, because it is carried upward by the Motion of the Air, which ascends being rarefied with Heat; is therefore its *Tendency downwards decreased*? You might exactly with the same reason have affirmed that a *Pound of Lead* in one Scale of a *Balance*, loses its *Tendency downwards*; whenever a greater Weight in the opposite Scale, forces it to *ascend in stead of descending*. The Truth, is plainly This: As a *Pound of Wood*, during the time of its ascending from the Bottom of a Pail of Water towards the Top, is as much a *Pound-weight* added to the weight of the Whole Water, as a *Pound of Lead* is, that lies still at the Bottom; and consequently the *Tendency* of the *Wood downwards*, is always the very same, whether it be *ascending* in Water, or *descending* in the Air; So your *Bullet*, whether it falls swiftly in the form of a *Bullet*, or slowly in the form of a *thin Plate*, or falls not at all while it is *supported in your Hand*, or on the contrary ascends in the form of *Fume*, (in which case, It is in the Air, exactly what *Wood* is in the Water;) still its *Tendency downward*, that is, its

Gravitation, continues always the same, without any the least *decrease* or *increase*: Which is the direct Contradictory to your Assertion. As *in Vacuo* all Bodies, of all Figures, and all Textures whatsoever, actually descend with equal Swiftness; so in the open Air, and every where else, their *Tendency downwards*, that is, their Gravitation, whether they ascend or descend, whether they fall swiftly or slowly, or not at all, continues always invariably the same; and cannot be *increased* or *decreased* by any change whatsoever, of their *external Figure*, or of the *internal configuration of their Parts*, or of the *circumambient impelling Bodies*. Gravitation therefore cannot possibly arise from the *external Figure*, nor *internal configuration of the Parts of Matter*, nor from the *circumambient impelling Bodies*; since by no alteration of Any or All of these things, can the Gravitation of any Body be in the least *increased* or *diminished*; And consequently Gravitation is quite another thing, than you seem to have at all thought of, when you *spoke your Opinion* about what *seemed Matter of* p. 12. 35. *Fact to you*, and talked of the *Decrease* of a Bullets *Tendency downward*, upon the variation of its Figure.

[Whoever will explain *Gravity*, which by Experience is always proportionable to the *Solid Content* of Bodies; must assign such a Cause, as can act upon Bodies in proportion to their *Solid Content*, without any regard to their *Superficial Proportion*; that is to say, such a Cause, as can reach and penetrate to the very Center of every solid particle of Matter: Which I suppose you will hardly affirm your *circumambient Bodies*, how subtle soever, are capable of doing.]

And

page 37.

Principia  
Philoso-  
phic Ma-  
thematica

And not content to have erred so very grossly, in the first Foundation of all Natural Philosophy; you could not forbear professing further, that you have often Admired that Gravitation should be esteem'd a matter of such Difficulty among Philosophers; and that you think it to be so evident and necessary an Effect of Matter in constant Motion perpetually striking one part against another, that you wonder every Body should not see it. I suppose the rest of the World will no less Admire at You, for imagining that by so slight an Admiration you could at once set aside all the Propositions in that most excellent Book before-mentioned; wherein it is made appear by strictly Mathematical Demonstrations, drawn from the Laws of Motion now agreed on by Mathematicians and established by Experiments, and from the Phenomena of the Heavenly Bodies; that the present Operations of Nature, depending upon Gravitation, cannot possibly be Mechanical Effects of Matter in constant Motion perpetually striking one part against another.

Not much unlike to This, was Mr Hobbs's fancying that he had confuted all the Propositions in Euclid, by Admiring at Euclid's Definitions of Lines and Surfaces: And all Men ever since, that understand the first Elements of Geometry, have Admired at Him for fancying so.

page 38 &  
39.

But that which follows, is still the most wonderful of all. You say: Whether you take Mr Clarke right or no, the incomparable Sir Isaac Newton (in the Preface to his Principia,) is of Opinion, that  
 “ Several Phenomena of Nature may depend on cer-  
 “ tain Forces or Powers, whereby from Causes yet  
 “ Undiscovered, the Particles of Bodies are mutually  
 “ impelled against each other, — or recede and are  
 “ driven from one another: Which Forces or Powers  
 “ being

“ *being yet unknown, the Philosophers hitherto have attempted Nature in vain.* Now to insinuate to your Reader by such a Citation, that This Great Man is of your Opinion in the present Question; when on the contrary, the very Sentence you cite, was spoken by him (as appears from the words immediately preceding those you have cited,) not concerning *Gravitation*, but concerning *Other* more particular Phænomena of Nature, in express *Contradistinction* to those of *Gravitation*; and when in that whole Book, from one End to the other, he is professedly confuting and showing the absolute Impossibility of your Notion of *Gravitation*; and when he has \* elsewhere in express *Optic.* words declared, that by the Terms, *Forces* and *Powers*, he does not mean (as You did by *Powers* *originally placed in Matter by God*) to signify the *Efficient Cause* of certain determinate Motions of Matter, but only to express the *Action* it self by which the Effect is regularly produced, without determining the immediate *Agent* or *Cause* of that Action: After all this, I say, to insinuate to your Reader by the citation of a piece of a single Sentence, that That Great Man is of your Opinion; is (to use your own Expressions once more,) such a *Conduct*, as the World may justly demand a *Reason* of from your self; for *I cannot assign a good one* *p. 18. 322.* *p. 15. 8.* for you.

Lastly: As you declare it to be your Opinion, that *Gravitation* is caused by *Material Impulse*; so you think it impossible, that it should be owing to any *Immaterial Cause*: And you believe it to be as *intelligible*, that *Matter might act without Impulse*, by *Powers placed in it by God*; as that an *Immaterial Being* should move *Matter* without being able to *impell it by Contact*.

This

This Belief of yours is founded wholly upon the Supposition, that there is nothing in the World but *Tangible* Substance; Which Opinion you give no Reason for; and therefore it is a *mere Prejudice*. But further: I presume you will hardly deny, but God himself is an *Immaterial Being*; and that He can move Matter, though he does not *impell it by Contact*. Other *Immaterial Beings* therefore, though they do not *impell Matter by Contact*, yet it does not from thence follow that they cannot move it at all; Because from God's moving it, it is manifest that there are other ways of moving it, besides that of *impelling by Contact*. But *Powers* or *Laws*, are not real Beings; They are nothing but mere Words, or Notions; and can neither act in any Sense, nor move Matter either with Contact or without it. I conceive an ordinary Reader may be able to discern the Difference, between affirming that an *Immaterial Substance*, a real Being, though not hard and solid, may move Matter; and affirming that a *Law* or *Power*, a mere Word or Term of Art, which is really No Thing, and has not truly any Being or Existence, save only in the Imagination, can cause Matter to move.

Upon the Whole; All that you have advanced in these Sections about *Gravitation*, is such marvellous Reasoning, to be made use of in the present Age, after so many great Discoveries, founded upon Experience, and even Mathematical Demonstration; that though I have no cause at all to be displeas'd with you, for arguing in such a manner; yet I believe your Readers cannot but think you might very well have forborn going out of your Way; to give so very disadvantageous a Representation of your own Philosophy.

I have been the longer upon this Head, because the true Theory of *Gravitation*, as it has been made out by that excellent Person whom you just now so unfortunately cited, does in its obvious and necessary Consequences, more entirely subvert the very Foundations of all possible Hypotheses, wherewith *Materialists* would undertake to explain the Phenomena of Nature *Mechanically* by the mere Powers of Matter and Motion; than any Discovery in natural and experimental Philosophy, that has ever yet been made in Any Age: Showing the *Matter* of the Universe to take up almost an infinitely small and inconsiderable part of that Space, which you suppose to be filled with it; bearing in truth far less Proportion to it, than a Tennis Ball does to the Body of the Earth: And consequently, that the great Phenomena of Nature cannot possibly depend upon any *Mechanical* Powers of Matter and Motion, but must be produced by the Force and Action of some higher Principle: And so leading us even with Mathematical Certainty, to *Immaterial Powers*; and finally to the Author of all Power, the *Great Creator and Governour of the World*.

See Sir  
Isaac Newton's  
*Optics*.  
page 314  
& 345.  
Lat. Edit.

I affirmed, that *there are many Demonstrations, even in abstract Mathematicks themselves, which no Man who understands them, can in the least doubt of the Certainty of; which yet are attended with difficult Consequences, that cannot be perfectly cleared: As, for instance, those concerning the infinite Divisibility of Quantity, and the Eternity and Immensity of God.* In Answer to this, you say that *if there are any such Demonstrations, from whence any Contradictions or Absurdities follow in our way of conceiving things, &c.* And again: *Absurdities and*

page 42.

page 42.

Con-

Page 43.

*Contradictions, &c.* And again: *Absurdity, Contradiction, or Disagreement of Ideas; &c.* And

page 43.

again: You require me to prove that any *Absurdity or Contradiction* follows either from the infinite Divisibility of Matter, or from the Eternity or Immensity of God, in our way of conceiving; and if I cannot, I have no ground, you say, from those Instances, to put Human Nature in such a State of *Scepticism and Absurdity*. Now, by all the

Page 48.

*Rules of Answering*, (to use your own Expression;) you ought to have changed my Words, *Difficult Consequences that cannot be perfectly cleared*; into *Absurdities, Contradictions, and Disagreements of Ideas*; Because *Absurdities, Contradictions, and Disagreements of Ideas*, are things just as different from *Difficult Consequences of Demonstrated Truths, which cannot be perfectly cleared*; as *Light* is from *Darkness*. *Absurdities, Contradictions, and Disagreements of Ideas*, are things already perfectly cleared; that is, things proved with perfect clearness, to be False and Impossible: But *Difficulties that cannot be perfectly cleared*, may attend things either possibly or certainly True. *Absurdities, Contradictions, and Disagreements of Ideas*, do with as perfect clearness prove a thing to be False; as a positive Demonstration proves a thing to be True: And therefore it is absolutely impossible, that they can Both be applied to the same thing; even just as impossible, as that the same thing should at the same time be both true and false. But *Difficult Consequences that cannot perfectly be cleared*, may be, and very often are, found to attend Things which are Demonstrated to be True. The Reason is; because *Difficulties that cannot perfectly be cleared*, do not (like *Absurdities and Contradictions*) arise from a Perception of the Disagreement of Ideas, but barely from



from the *Defect or Imperfectness of the Ideas themselves*. Our *Reason* is able to apprehend clearly the Demonstration of the Certainty of the Existence of some Things, where the *Imagination* is not able to comprehend the Ideas of the Things themselves. This is plainly the Case of the *infinite Divisibility of Quantity*, of *Infinity and Eternity* in general, of the *Actions of Immaterial Substances upon Matter*, and of many other Things. Here therefore I have just Cause (if I may use your own Expression once again) to demand a Reason of your Conduct; and to complain that you have greatly departed from that Fairness, for which your former Papers were justly commended. page 8.

And you can still the more hardly be excused in this Matter; because you knew I had before expressed my self very particularly and fully concerning the same Thing, in a Book which you your self cite upon another occasion in the very next Page to That wherein you accuse me so wrongfully. My Words were These: (*Demonstrat. of the Being and Attrib. of God, p. 11.*) “ Since  
 “ in all Questions concerning the Nature and Per-  
 “ fections of God, or concerning any Thing to  
 “ which the Idea of Eternity or Infinity is joined;  
 “ though we can indeed demonstrate certain Pro-  
 “ positions to be true; yet it is impossible for us  
 “ to comprehend or frame any adæquate or com-  
 “ plete Ideas of the Manner How the things so  
 “ demonstrated, can Be: Therefore when once  
 “ any Proposition is clearly demonstrated to be  
 “ True; it ought not to disturb us, that there  
 “ be perhaps perplexing Objections on the other  
 “ side, which for want of adæquate Ideas of the  
 “ Manner of the Existence of the Things demon-  
 “ strated, are not casie to be answered. Indeed,  
 “ were

“ were it possible there should be any Proposition,  
 “ which could equally be *Demonstrated* on both  
 “ sides of the Question, or which could on both  
 “ sides be *reduced to imply a Contradiction*, [*as Some*  
 “ *have too inconsiderately asserted* ;] This it must  
 “ be confessed, would alter the Case ; Upon this  
 “ absurd Supposition, all Difference of True and  
 “ False, all Thinking and Reasoning, and the  
 “ Use of all our Faculties, would be entirely at  
 “ an End. But when to Demonstration on the  
 “ one side, there are opposed on the other, only  
 “ Objections raised from our Want of having  
 “ adæquate Ideas of the Things themselves ; this  
 “ ought not to be esteemed a Real Difficulty. ’Tis  
 “ positively and clearly Demonstrable, that Some-  
 “ thing has been *from Eternity* : All the Objec-  
 “ tions therefore raised against the *Eternity* of any  
 “ thing, grounded merely on our Want of having  
 “ an adæquate Idea of *Eternity* ; ought to be lookt  
 “ upon as of no real Solidity. Thus in other the  
 “ like Instances : ’Tis Demonstrable, for Ex-  
 “ ample, that Something must be actually *In-*  
 “ *finite* : All the Metaphysical Difficulties there-  
 “ fore, which arise usually from applying the  
 “ Measures and Relations of Things Finite to  
 “ what is Infinite ; and from supposing *Finites*  
 “ to be [Aliquot] Parts of *Infinite*, when indeed  
 “ they are not properly so, but only as Mathe-  
 “ matical Points to Quantity, which have no  
 “ Proportion at all ; [and from imagining all *In-*  
 “ *finites* to be *Equal*, when in things desperate they  
 “ manifestly are not so ; an *infinite Line*, being not  
 “ only *not equal to*, but *infinitely less* than an *infinite*  
 “ *Surface* ; and an *infinite Surface*, than *Space infinite*  
 “ *in all Dimensions* ;] “ ought to be esteemed vain  
 “ and of no Force. Again ; ’Tis in like manner  
 “ Demon-

“ Demonstrable, that Quantity, is infinitely Divisible: All the Objections therefore raised [by supposing the *Sums Total of all Infinites* to be equal, when in desperate Parts they manifestly are not so; and] “ by comparing the imaginary *Equality or Inequality of the Number of the Parts of Unequal Quantities*, whose Parts have really *no Number at all*, they all having Parts *without Number*; ought to be look'd upon as weak and altogether Inconclusive: &c.

Concerning the *Questions*, Whether Immaterial Substances be extended or not; and Whether, upon Supposition of their being extended, they may not nevertheless be of such a Nature, as not to consist of Parts which (like the Parts of Matter) are themselves every one of them complete distinct Beings, separable, and wholly independent of each other: *Also*, Whether from the Immateriality of the Souls of Brutes, it follows that they must of necessity be put into an eternal State of Rewards and Punishments: Concerning these *Questions*, I say, I have nothing further to add; but only that I think All you have advanced upon these Heads in your *Reflections*, hath been already clearly obviated in my former Papers; To which therefore I refer the Reader, who, I fear, is already too much tired with Repetitions.

In the last place, you challenge me to show that my Argument is of any Use to the Ends and Purposes of Religion. That it is of the Greatest Use, will I suppose easily be granted; if it be evident that the Notion I am arguing against, is utterly destructive of Religion. And in what respects it

is so, I shall give you an Instance or two to consider of ; and so conclude.

1st then ; If the *Mind* of Man, were nothing but a certain *System of Matter* ; and *Thinking*, nothing but a certain *Mode of Motion* in that System : It would follow, that, since every *Determination of Motion* depends *necessarily* upon the *Impulse* that causes it, therefore every *Thought* in a Man's Mind must likewise be † *necessary*, and depending wholly upon external Causes ; And there could be no such thing in Us, as *Liberty*, or a Power of *Self-determination*. Now what *Ends and Purposes of Religion*, mere Clocks and Watches are capable of serving, needs no long and nice Consideration.

† See above ; pag. 33. & 34.

2dly. If *Thinking*, in a *Man*, be nothing but a *Mode of Motion* or of any other *Quality of Matter* ; it will be but too natural a Consequence, to conceive that it may be only the same thing in all *Other Rational Beings* likewise ; and even in *God* himself. And what a *Notion of God* This would give us, is not difficult to imagine. A Friend of yours has given us a very broad hint, whither This tends ; when he tells us that \* *the greatest Freedom or Liberty we can conceive to belong to ANY BEING*, is such as he there largely explains to be No *Liberty* at all, but absolute *Necessity*, such as the *Motion* of a *Watch* or *Clock* is determined by.

\* Essay concerning the Use of Reason in Propositions, the evidence whereof depends upon Human Testimony. pag. 47.

3dly. If the *Soul*, be nothing but a *System of Matter* ; and *Thinking*, nothing but a *Mode of Motion* or of some other *Power of Matter* ; the Doctrine of the *Resurrection*, (as I before observed, pag. 66, &c.) will be inconceivable and incredible ; and the Justice of future Rewards and Punishments, impossible to be made out. The *Notion* of the *Soul's Immateriality*, evidently facilitates

cilitates the Belief of a *Resurrection* and of a future Retribution, by securing a Principle of *Personal Individuality*, upon which the Justice of all Reward or Punishment is entirely grounded: But if *Thinking* be in reality nothing but a *Power* or *Mode*, which inhering in a loose and fleeting System of Matter, perishes utterly at the Dissolution of the Body; then the restoring the Power of *Thinking* to the same Body at the *Resurrection*, will not be a Raising again of the same *Individual Person*; but it will be as truly a *Creation* of a *new Person*, as the Addition of the like Power of *Thinking* to a new Body *Now*, would be the *Creation* of a *new Man*. For, as God's superadding *Now* to a new parcel of Matter, the like *Consciousness* with what I at this time find in my self, would not make that new parcel of Matter to be the same *individual Person* with me, but only *another Person Like me*; so his superadding *That Consciousness* at the *Resurrection*, to the same particles of Dust, of which my Body was formerly composed; will not be a *Restoration* of the same *Person*, but a *Creation* of a *new one* like me. For, the sameness of the senseless Particles of Dust, 'tis evident from the flux nature of the Substance of our Bodies, is not that which *Now* makes me to be the same *Person*; and therefore cannot be that, which will *Then* make me to be so. If my present *Consciousness*, be nothing but a *Mode of Motion* in the fleeting particles of my Brain or Spirits; this *Consciousness* will be as utterly destroyed at the Dissolution of my Body, as if the very Substance of my Body was annihilated: And it would be just as possible for the same *Individual Person* to be created again, after an *absolute An-*

*ribilation* ; as to be *restored again*, after such a *Dissolution*. But now, if the *same Person*, after *Annihilation*, could, by restoring of the *same Consciousness*, be created again ; he might as possibly be created again, by addition of the *same Consciousness* to new Matter, even before annihilation of the first : From whence it would follow, that *Two*, or *two Hundred*, several *Persons*, might *All*, by a *Superaddition* of the like *Consciousness*, be *one and the same individual Person*, at the same time that they remain *several and distinct Persons* : It being as easy for God to add *my Consciousness* to the new formed Matter of *One* or of *one Hundred Bodies* at this *present Time*, as to the *Dust* of *my present Body* at the *Time of the Resurrection*. And no Reason can be given, why it would not be as just at any time, to punish for *my Faults* a new created Man, to whom *my Consciousness* is by the Power of God superadded ; as to punish That Person, who at the *Resurrection* shall by the same Power be new made out of the *Dust* of *my Body*, with the *same Consciousness* superadded : It being allowed that *Then*, as well as *Now*, 'tis not the *Sameness* of the particles of *Dust*, that makes the *same Person*. But if it was ; yet That would make no difference in this Matter : For, the *Particles of Dust*, which in the course of *twenty Years* have successively been part of the *Substance* of *my Body*, are enough in *Quantity* to form several *Bodies* : And if the *Addition* of a like *Consciousness* with what I now find in *my self*, to *One* of those *Bodies* at the *Resurrection*, will make *It* to be the *same Individual Person* with *Me* ; the *Addition* of the like *Consciousness* to *Twenty* of them, would consequently make every one of them to be (not *Persons like Me*, but) the *same Individual Person* with *Me*, and with
 each

*each other* likewise. Which is the greatest Absurdity in the World : An Absurdity equal (as I before said) to that of *Transubstantiation*. This inexplicable Confusion, wherewith your Doctrine perplexes the Notion of *Personal Identity*, upon which Identity the Justice of all Reward or Punishment manifestly depends ; makes the *Resurrection*, in Your way of arguing, to be inconceivable and impossible : And consequently your Doctrine, (which supposes the Body to be the Whole Man,) is destructive of Religion ; leaving no room for Reward or Punishment, but in the present Life only ; and consequently giving Men liberty to do every thing for their present Pleasure or Advantage, that can be done with a good Colour, and without being obnoxious to human Laws : Which is the greatest Mischief that can possibly befall Mankind. But if the Soul be, as We believe, a *permanent indivisible Immaterial Substance*, then all these Difficulties vanish of Themselves.

It is here to be observed, that all the Absurd Consequences which I have now (in considering of what Use my Argument is to *Religion*) shown to follow from your Doctrine, with respect to the *Resurrection* ; do equally follow from it (as has been before proved) even *without respect to the Resurrection*. For as it is Absurd to suppose, (which you must do in your Scheme,) that at the *Resurrection* the *same individual Person* can be restored ; merely by the Addition of a *like* Consciousness with that which utterly perished at the Dissolution of the Body, to the Dust of the same Body when recollected again : As this, I say, is plainly Absurd, because in the same manner twenty other Men formed out of the same Dust, (of which there is quantity enough belonging to every Person that

has lived any Number of Years,) may also by an Addition of the like Consciousness become every one of them *That One Same Individual Person*, at the same Time that they remain so many several and distinct Persons: So, without regard to any future Resurrection, there is the very same Absurdity in supposing (as you do,) that a Man *at this present Time*, though he has none of the same Substance belonging to him, may yet, merely by a like Modification of the Motion of his Spirits, continue to be *the same Individual Person* he was twenty Years since; There is, I say, the very same Absurdity in this Supposition, as in the former; because there is no difference between supposing that any Number of new Bodies at the Resurrection *co-existently*, or any Number of different Men now living *contemporarily*, or any Number of different Bodies *succeeding* one another in one continued Form by a perpetual uninterrupted Flux of Particles, (which is the thing you contend for;) can be *One and the same Individual Person*, merely by a like Modification of the Figures and Motions of their Parts respectively, without having any thing at all *the same* in them.

To the *Propositions* I laid down at the Conclusion of my former Reply, you have objected nothing, but what (I think) is already clearly answered in the foregoing Pages.



A Fourth

# DEFENSE

OF AN

# ARGUMENT

Made use of in a

Letter to Mr *DODWELL*,

To prove the Immateriality and Natural *Immortality* of the *SOUL*.

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*In a Letter to the Author of the Answer to Mr Clark's Third Defense, &c.*

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With a *POSTSCRIPT*, relating to a *Book*, entitled, *A Vindication of Mr Dodwell's Epistolary Discourse, &c.*

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*The Third Edition.*

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*If we look into the World, is there not evident proof, that Men professing Learning, are capable of believing and defending any Absurdity in Nature? Answer to Mr Clark's Third Defense, pag. 49.*

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Printed in the Year 1718.



A Fourth

## D E F E N S E

O F A N

ARGUMENT to prove the *Im-*  
*materiality* of the SOUL, &c.

SIR,

**O**F repeating the same Things over and over again, there is no End. The Thing I proposed to prove, is, I think, so fully made out in my foregoing *Defenses*; that I might safely leave the whole Matter to the intelligent and impartial Reader, without any further Inlargement. Your last Answer is little more, than a renewing of your former Assertions, sometimes in the same, and sometimes in different Words; as if you thought all that I had advanced to the contrary, was entirely wide of the Question. Whether that be really the case or no, I am very willing the World should judge: And therefore, in reply to your perpetual Repetitions, I shall not transcribe my former Papers; but only refer to them, as occasion shall offer; and desire they may fairly be compared together: And, as I go along, shall endeavour to point out to you some of the chief Misrepresentations and Fallacies you appear to be guilty of: And where you offer at any Argument that seems new in any part of it, shall consider it in its place.

You

*Answ. pag. 3.* You begin with charging me, that *out of Four Objections insisted on in your Reflexions, I have dropt the consideration of Three.*

Whether this be true, or no; they who please to compare the Papers, may find. I am not sensible, that I have passed over any of your Objections, or any part of any of them, unanswered: Only, where you have repeated the same Things again, (as, for Instance, in that poor Objection drawn from our *Ignorance of the manner how God will dispose of the Souls of Brutes;*) instead of repeating my Answers, I have only referred to them as they stood in my former Defenses; which is ultimately appealing to the Judgment of the intelligent Reader: And for this Complaint, I shall give you more frequent Occasions hereafter.

*pag. 3. & 4.* *And in answer to your Fourth Objection, you say I am so far from showing (as I ought to have done,) that if Conscioufness did inhere in a System of Matter, it must consist of the Conscioufnesses of the Parts; that on the contrary I have only endeavoured to prove, that, as Roundness must consist of several Pieces of Roundness, or Tendencies towards Roundness; so, if Conscioufness did, in like manner with Roundness, inhere in a System of Matter, It must consist of several Tendencies towards Conscioufness. And this you call an apparent Desertion of my Argument.*

Now to this, I reply; that, *consisting of the Conscioufness of the Parts, and consisting of several Tendencies towards Conscioufness, is the very same thing.* For, as nothing that is not *Curve*, can have any *Tendency towards Curvity*; as nothing that is not *Colour*, can have any *Tendency towards Colour*; as nothing that is not *Sound*, can have any *Tendency towards*

towards *Sound*: So nothing that is not *Consciousness*, can have any *Tendency* towards *Consciousness*. Differences indeed and Degrees there may be, of the distinctness of *Consciousness* and vigor of *Thinking*; as there are different degrees of the *Curvity of a Line*, different degrees of the *Brightness of a Colour*, and different degrees of the *Cleanness of a Sound*: But as it is plainly impossible that any *Colour* should have any *Tendency* towards being any *Sound*, or that any *Figure* should have any *Tendency* towards being any *Motion*; so it is likewise ridiculous to imagine that any *Motion*, or any other Quality of Matter void of *Consciousness*, should have any *Tendency* towards being *Consciousness*.

Besides: The Curvities of the several little Arches that constitute the Circumference of a Circle, are not properly *Tendencies* towards *Roundness*; (for a *Part* has no more *Tendency* to the *Whole* by *Composition*, than the *Whole* has a *Tendency* to its *Part* by *Division*;) but they are themselves, being taken together, the whole Circle, or the *Roundness* it self: So that *Roundness* is not a new real Quality, resulting from the Curvities of the several parts: but only a *Name* of the *Whole*, a mere external Denomi-  
See Third  
*nation*: Even in the same manner as the Twelve  
Dejeze,  
*Units* that constitute the Number a *Dozen*, are not  
Pag 152.  
153. 3<sup>d</sup>  
Edit.  
 properly so many *Tendencies* towards a *Dozen*, (as towards any *real* new Thing or Quality;) but are  
 Themselves, being taken together, the Number a  
*Dozen*; which Name is nothing but a mere *Term*,  
 an external *Denomination of the Whole*, and nothing  
 at all really in the Things numbered. *Consciousness*  
*therefore* in like manner, if it was nothing but  
 the *Sum* of those *Motions* or *Modes of Motion*,  
 which you call *Tendencies* towards *Consciousness*;  
 would not be a distinct Quality really inhering

in the Thinking Substance, (as every Man feels by Experience, and you your self grant that it is;) but it would be a mere *Word* or *Term of Art*, nothing but a *Name* or *external Denomination*, such as are those Qualities which I ranked under the Third Sort.

*Third De-*  
*fence, pag.*  
*134.*  
*Answ. to*  
*Third De-*  
*fense, pag.*  
*20.*  
*pag. 22.*  
*pag. 4.*  
*pag. 23 &*  
*24.*

Wherefore when you confess, that *the Parts*. (of Roundness, suppose,) *must be so far of the same Kind, as to have a Tendency to that Individual Figure of which they are a Part: And that in that Sense you have always allowed Consciousness to consist of Powers of the same Kind; because if Consciousness inheres in a System of Matter, it must necessarily be allowed that the distinct Beings in that System contribute towards Thinking, as the Pieces of a Circle do towards a Circle, or as all the Parts of a System of Matter contribute towards the System: And again; that What is said in the Third Defense, may, for ought you know, be a Vindication of the Conclusion before-cited, (viz. that if Consciousness did inhere in a System of Matter, it must consist of several Tendencies towards Consciousness:)* And again; You do, *in that Sense, allow Consciousness to consist of Powers of the same Kind; For, according to You, it consists of Parts which have a Tendency to Thinking or Consciousness, as Roundness does of Parts that have a Tendency to Roundness: In all these Passages you directly give up the Question. For, those Modes of Motion (or of any other Quality of Matter) which you call Tendencies to Consciousness, either are themselves Consciousnesses and Thoughts, or not. If they be; then, as the whole Curvity of a Circle is made up of the Curvities of the several little Parts or Arches of which it is composed, so whole Consciousness or Thinking will likewise be made up of several partial Consciousnesses or Thoughts; which is giving up the Question with one*

one Hand : Or if they *be not* ; then, as the Roundness of a Circle, so far as it differs from the Curvities of the little Arches of which it is composed, is nothing but a *bare Name* of a *Whole*, a *mere external Denomination* ; so *Consciousness*, as far as it differs from those constituent Modes that are *no Consciousnesses*, will be only a *Name of a Whole*, a *mere External Denomination*, and nothing at all really in the Thinking Substance it self ; Which is giving up the Question with the other Hand.

You represent me all along speaking, as if my whole Argument was founded upon the Supposition, that *in the Idea of an Immaterial Being* pag. 5. *Extension is contained.* That *Extended Being* of pag. 44. *Mr Clark's.* You think him mistaken in making pag. 48. *the Soul an Extended Being.* In making an *Extended* pag. 50. *Being, as such, &c.* An *Immaterial Substance* and a pag. 55. *Clock agree, according to Mr Clark, in being Extended.* And, to make *Immaterial Being Extended, as Mr* pag. 83. *Clark does.*

This is neither doing Me nor your Readers Justice. For my Argument is not at all founded upon any Supposition either of Immaterial Substance being Extended or Unextended. That which I undertook to prove, was, that Matter, (all whose solid Parts are so many distinct, separable, independent, unconnected Beings ; ) could not be a Subject capable of Individual Consciousness ; And that therefore Consciousness must have some other Subject to reside in. Whether That other Subject be Extended or Unextended, (whatever you may suppose my Opinion to be, upon other Grounds,) the present Argument determines not ; but leaves every Reader at Liberty to judge as he shall find Reason. Only I affirmed *by the by*, for Argument's sake,

fake, that I thought the Difficulties arising from the Supposition of Immaterial Substance being Extended, were not greater, but rather less, than those which arise from the Supposition of its being Unextended. See *Second Defence*, pag. 118, 119, 120.

*Answer to  
3<sup>d</sup> Def.  
Pag. 5.*

*pag. 83.*

*pag. 16.  
Reply to  
first Def.  
Pag. 59.  
and Re-  
sist. on  
2<sup>d</sup> Def.*

*pag. 43.  
1<sup>st</sup> Def.*

*pag. 24.  
and 2<sup>d</sup>  
Def. pag.  
39.*

It is here also further to be observed incidentally ; that, when you ask, *What other Argument can be made use of to prove all Matter divisible by the Power of God, but what is drawn from the consideration of its Extension ?* and affirm, that *if Matter, as an extended Being, is divisible ; all extended Beings must be divisible : and, that I have no other Reason to make all Matter divisible, but because it is Extended : and, when you mention the Divisibility, add by way of Explication, or (which is all one) the Extension, of Matter : You seem to forget, that you your self expressly allowed Space, though extended, to be absolutely Indiscerpible ; And, therefore you your self make Matter divisible, not barely as an Extended Being, but as finitely Extended ; And, that I gave still another Reason for stiling Matter divisible ; viz. God's having by his own Will and good Pleasure created it such a Substance, all whose solid Parts we find by Experience to be so many distinct Beings, loose, independent one from another, and unconnected ; that is, having no essential connexion one with another, nor any dependence one upon another for their Existence : as the Parts of Space evidently have, even separate from the Consideration of its being absolutely Infinite ; and as the Parts of Time have, (forasmuch as every Moment, co-existing with all the Parts of Space, is yet both indivisible in it self, and inseparable from the other Parts of Duration ;) and as the Parts, improperly so called, of Immaterial Substances may have,*



have, for any thing that can ever be proved to the contrary, on Supposition of their being Extended. But all this is beside the main Argument, which (as I have said) does not necessarily imply any such Supposition.

In like manner; when you make a long and pompous Discourse about *Adequate and Inadequate Ideas*, and about *Difficulties that cannot be perfectly cleared*; (that is, which cannot be cleared wholly, but yet may in great part, and enough to satisfy any reasonable person; though, it seems, you know no such Difference :) When, I say, you talk about these things as of great necessity to be premised, and as if you would have the Reader think the Whole Argument depended upon the right stating of them; whereas in reality they have no relation at all to the Argument, but were started only upon occasion of that foreign and incidental Question concerning the *Extension of Immaterial Substance*; In all this Matter, you have by no means made a right Representation of things.

However, as to the Distinction it self, between *Absurdities or Contradictions*, and *Difficulties that cannot be perfectly cleared*; I desire only, that what I have said upon this Head, (*3d Defense, pag. 189, 190.*) may be compared with what you have said upon it, (*Answ. pag. 6 — 16.*) And whether then I had not reason, (notwithstanding the Amusement of Ten Pages about *Difficulties arising from the Perception of the Disagreement of perfect or adequate Ideas, and Difficulties arising from the Perception of the Disagreement of imperfect or inadequate Ideas*; when on the contrary I had expressly said, that the Difficulties I meant, did not arise from the Perception of any Disagreement of Ideas at all, but merely from

*Answ. to  
3d Def.  
pag 6 —  
16.*

*pag. 6.*

*Answ. pag.  
5, &c.*

our

our having in our *Imagination* either *no Ideas*, or such very imperfect ones as cannot well be compared together, of Things whose Existence or Certainty we can nevertheless demonstrably prove by *Reason*, and apprehend many of their Properties by the *Understanding* ; Which every one, that understands the first Elements of *Mathematicks*, knows to be the Case of *All Sorts of Infinites* and of *Some Finites* : Whether I say, I had not good reason) for the Distinction I made, I am willing any one, who pleases to compare the Books, should judge.

pag 6.

You ask, *What is a Difficulty which cannot be perfectly cleared by reason of defective Ideas, but a Difficulty which arises from the Perception of the Disagreement of those Ideas?* I answer ; 'Tis a Difficulty arising, not from the Perception of any *Disagreement* of Ideas, but from the *want or Defectiveness* of Ideas in the *Imagination* ; which therefore we cannot compare so as to *Imagin* distinctly how they agree, though we can by our *Reason and Understanding* demonstrate it is *impossible* they should disagree. This is plainly the Case in most Questions, concerning *Eternity. Immensity, &c.*

pag. 14.

You declare your self of another Opinion ; And, that you think, *whatever can be demonstrated, can be perfectly cleared from all Objections and Difficulties ; And, that all the Difficulties that may be urged against the Immensity and Eternity of God, &c. which Mr Clark says cannot be clearly answered, are to be clearly answered ; And, in order to answer them clearly, you would only require these equitable Conditions of him, that he would define the Terms, Immensity. Eternity, Immaterial Being &c.* It is a pleasant Instance of an *Equitable Condition*, that you desire me to give a  
De-

Definition, that is, to express the Idea, of things whereof I contend we have no Ideas or very imperfect ones, (seeing we can only give Negative Descriptions of them;) though we have certain Demonstrations of their Existence. And 'tis no less remarkable, that notwithstanding all this stir about the *Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas*, yet you yourself, when you come to discourse more particularly concerning the nature of Thinking, talk of a *Power in Matter unknown to us*,<sup>page 354</sup> and of we which have *no Idea*; of which nevertheless you venture to affirm that it may *comprehend under it Thinking and its Modes*, as *Figure does Roundness*. But, to pass this over: Since it is your declared Opinion, that all the Sorts of Difficulties now-mentioned, may be *clearly* answered; I cannot but think you would very much oblige the World, in answering them *clearly*. And I will offer you a fair Opportunity of doing it; by reconciling, if you please, the two following Accounts together: or else by maintaining either of them, and answering *clearly* the Objections and Difficulties contained in the other.

*It is evident to me, that God must be an Immaterial Being, that is, a proper Immaterial Being, a Being without any of the Properties of Matter; without Solidity, Extension, or Motion; and that exists in No Place; and not a Being that has Extension, and consequently exists in Place and has Parts. — Thinking in God, cannot be founded on any Objects acting*

*The next Absurdity charged on the Attribute of Eternity, is, How God should co-exist with all the Differences of Time, and yet there be no S U C C E S S I O N in his Being. This I own to be as absurd, as —; and that there is a manifest Contradiction in this Notion or Conception. For if by Succession in God's Being, is understood, (and I know not what other*

○

*Sense*

upon him ; nor can Thinking in him be SUCCESSION or consist of Parts ; nor can his Thinking have any MODES, because Modes of Thinking are DISTINCT ACTS of Thinking. But as his Essence is eternal and immutable, without any the least Variation or Alteration : so his Thinking is one Numerical INDIVIDUAL ACT, comprehending all Things and all the Possibilities of Things at one View ; and is as fixt and permanent and unvariable, and as much without SUCCESSION and parts, as his Essence. Answer to Mr. Clark's 3d Defense, pag. 33, 34.

Sense to put upon it,) co-existing with all the Differences of Time ; then the Difficulty is, how to conceive God to co-exist with all the Parts of Time, and yet not to co-exist with all the Differences of Time. Now I acknowledge I cannot do This. But in behalf of Gods Eternity I beg leave to plead, that if God does \* co-exist with the Differences of Time, then he does co-exist with the Differences of Time ; and it by no means can be said, that he does not co-exist with all the Differences of Time, if it be true, that he does co-exist with all the Differences of Time.--To say, God exists all at once, is to say that he actually exists in time past, present, and to come ; that is, that Time past is not past, and that Time to come is come, and was always come. But to give some Satisfaction to those who think it an Imperfection for God to co-exist with the several Parts of Time, I desire it may be considered, that if God Operates at different Times, and takes up the Space of Six Days in the Creation of the World, redeems Mankind 4000 Years after, and will judge Men in a Time not yet come ; then he Operates not all at once : And if he Operates not all at once, then he Exists not all at once : For if

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\* Note : All that is here argued concerning Gods co-existing with the Differences of Time, may in the very same manner be applied to his co-existing with the different Parts of Place or Extension.

he existed all at once, there could be no distinction of Time in its Operations. Past, present, and to come, must be attributed to the Being that Operates, as well as to its Operations, because Operations at different Times, suppose Succession in the Nature of Things and Existing all at once, supposes no Succession: and consequently if there is a Succession in the Nature of Things, there is no such Thing in Nature as Existing all at once. Now if there is no Imperfection in supposing that God Acts at different Times; as there is not: What Imperfection can there be in supposing that he does not exist now at the time of the general Judgment, any more than that he is not now judging the World? Essay concerning the Use of Reason, &c. pag. 53, 54.

This Difficulty you must by no means pass over unsatisfied: because the Author of the Essay here cited, is believed to be a Person, whose Reasoning you cannot flight.

But to proceed now (as you say) to the Question it *Ans. pag.* self My Argument, you pretend, is inconclusive; 16. because, in my Enumeration of the possible Qualities of Matter; individual Modes of Figure, Motion, and other Qualities: (such as are the *Roundness pag. 153,* of a Circle, the individual Mode of Motion of a Clock, 154. and, in your Opinion, *Consciousness or Thinking;*) *Ans. pag.* are omitted: not being reducible to any of the 17, 18. three Heads there mentioned.

I answer: *Whole Roundness* (as you call it,) that is, the Name of the Sum of the Curvities of the little Arches that constitute a Circle; And, the *whole Mode of Motion of a Clock*, that is, the Name of the Sum of a certain Number of Motions; And, *Consciousness or Thinking*, that is, as you suppose, the Name of the Sum of *ten Thousand distinct Mo-* *pag. 19,*

*tions*, or of a number of any other Qualities void of Consciousness: do all plainly belong to the *Third* sort of Qualities I mentioned; That is, they are all plainly nothing but bare *Names of Wholes*, mere *external Denominations*, so far as their Idea is different from that of their constituent Parts; and are nothing at all really in the Things themselves. Which whether it can possibly be the true Notion of Consciousness; making it nothing at all really in the Thinking Substance it self, but a mere empty and foreign Name; I leave every Man to judge from his own Experience.

See 3d  
Def. pag.  
151, 152,  
153, 154,  
155, 156.

For my contending that *Thinking* was not such a bare external *Name* of a number of Qualities, but it self a *real distinct Quality* in the Thinking Substance: you before called my Idea of *Thinking* a mere *Chimera* of my own framing, (though I believe no Man can help being conscious of the like *Chimera* in himself;) And now you repeat it again, In answer to which, I refer you to what has been already said, *3d Defense*, pag. 168, 169.) and to what you will presently give me Occasion to add further upon this Head.

Reffect. on  
2d De-  
fense, pag.  
60.  
Answ. to  
3d Defense,  
pag. 19.

Answ. pag.  
20. You allow that no *Quality* can reside in a *System* of *Matter*, but what must be always in a certain *Sense* of the same kind with the *Whole* that results from the *Parts*: (that is to say, of the same kind with It self; But I suppose you mean, of the same kind with its constituent *Parts*;) Namely, that the *Parts* must be so far of the same kind, as to have a *Tendency*, &c. And that in *That Sense*, you have always allowed *Consciousness* to consist of *Powers* of the same kind.

pag. 20.  
23.  
3d Def.  
passim.

But I have proved at large in my *Third Defense*, that *Motions* (or any other Qualities void of Consciousness) can be in no *Sense* of the same kind with

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Consciousness. And I have shown *just now*, that See above, they cannot possibly in any Sense have any *Tendency* towards it, any more than *Colours* or *Modes* 148. 202, 203. of Colour, can have any Tendency to *Sound* or *Smell*.

*The distinct Beings in a System of Matter, contribute,* Answ. pag. you say, *towards Thinking; as the Pieces of a Circle* 21. *do towards a Circle.*

That they cannot do so; and that there is no Analogy, no Similitude in the least, between the Things you compare together; I have shown at large in my *Third Defense*; and particularly *pag.* 148, 149. to which I refer you and the Reader.

You allege, that in order to contradict you, it must pag. 21. be affirmed, that every Quality that inheres in a System of Matter, must inhere Wholly in each Part of it: That Roundness is an Instance, that a Power may inhere pag. 23. in a System of Matter, without being the Sum of Powers of the same kind, that is, of Whole Roundnesses: That it is as impossible that Whole Consciousness should pag. 19. exist in each of the distinct Parts of a System of Matter, as that Whole Roundness should exist in each Part of a Circle: And that, unless in a round Figure each page 24. part must be Wholly round; and in a conscious System of Matter, each part must be Wholly conscious: and in that Sense consist of Powers of the same kind: not one step can be taken in defense of Mr Clark's Argument.

To all this, I think I have already given a clear and distinct Answer. *Third Defense*, *pag.* 148, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155.!

In representing Part of which Answer, you make pag. 26. it amount to this ridiculous Proposition; that though Roundness consists of Parts, none of which can possibly

be Round; yet, if Consciousness inheres in a System of Matter in like manner with Roundness; that is, if it consists of Parts, none of which can possibly be Conscious; there must be as many distinct Consciousnesses, as there are Parts: Whereas the plain Strength and Sum of the Argument, was this; that as Roundness consists of Parts, none of which can indeed be the Whole Roundness. but yet every one of them must of necessity be Pieces of Roundness; so Consciousness, if it inhered in Matter in like manner with Roundness, must likewise consist of Parts, none of which could indeed be the Whole Consciousness, but yet every one of them must of necessity bear the same Analogy to the Whole Consciousness, as the Curvity of a Semicircle bears to the Curvity of two Semicircles, or the Curvity of one Quadrant to the Curvity of four Quadrants. And whether such Parts can be wholly void of Consciousness, because they have not in them singly the Whole Consciousness; any more than the Arches of a Circle can be wholly void of Curvity or Roundness, because they have not in them singly the Whole Curvity or Roundness; I leave to your self to judge. Herein therefore you are guilty of a very great Misrepresentation; in charging me with a Contradiction, which arises only from your own ludicrous Interpretation of my Words. For if you absurdly, and in defiance of the most perspicuous Expressions, put your contrary Sense upon my Words; what wonder then is it, if they become contradictory to my own evident Meaning?

What you repeat (*Ans. to 3d Def. pag. 28, 29, 30.*) concerning your using it as a *Supposition* only, and not declaring it your *Opinion*, that *Thinking* may be a *Mode of Motion*; I only desire the Reader would be pleas'd to compare, with what I offered,



offered, (*3d Defense*, pag. 160). And, if in your *Supposition* you pitched upon the likeliest Quality of Matter you could find, to make Thinking a Mode of; and I proved the Absurdity and Impossibility of Thinking's being a Mode of *That* Quality; and, at the same time, made it evident that the same Arguments proved equally the Absurdity and Impossibility of Thinking's being a *3d Defense* Mode of *any Other* Quality or Power of Matter *page 160.* whatsoever; and yet you declared it positively to be your *Opinion*, that Thinking *was* a Mode of *Refle. 7. on* Some Power in Matter: I presume, your denying *2d Defense,* your self to be accountable for the Absurdity I *page 22.* charged you with, and complaining of my *Dis-* *ingenuity* in charging it upon you, (or, as you are *Answ. to* pleased to express your self, in *putting it upon you*;) *3d Defense,* will not be looked upon as of any Weight, till *page 28 &* you can Answer the *Argument* by which I proved *48.* it to be justly chargeable upon you; which *Argument* you have not taken the least notice of, as I might reasonably have expected an *Ingenuous* *ibid.* *Adversary* would have done.

You proceed to offer some Considerations, concerning the *Nature of Thinking*; from whence to deduce Arguments, to prove that it is merely an *Answ. page* *Affection of Matter.* *30.*

The Sum of your First Argument, is this.

The Mind is operated upon by Matter, and Sensations are excited in it by the Operation of Matter, and all our Senses depend on Material Organs.

Matter likewise is operated upon by Matter, and Motions are excited in it by the Contact and Impulse of Matter.

Therefore the Mind is Matter, and Thinking a mere Affection of Matter.

This Argument, I think, deserves no Answer. Yet the Reader may, if he pleases, consult upon this Head *the Third Defense*, pag. 175, 176.

pag. 31,  
32.

I shall only observe here, by the by; that whereas you say, *Thinking follows the Motion of Matter in our Senses, we have just as much reason to conclude that It is a Power or Affection of Matter occasioned by the Action of Matter, as we have to say that Fire is a Power or Affection of Matter, when it is produced by the rubbing of a Wheel and its Axle-tree*: it is evident on the contrary, that we have all the reason in the World to conclude there is no Similitude between these two things: Because Fire, as it exists in the Matter it self, (separate from the Sensations it excites in our Minds,) is confessedly nothing but mere Motion: But Thinking cannot possibly be mere Motion; as I have abundantly proved in my *Third Defense*; and will still further appear, when I come to consider in their proper place the Exceptions you have made to the Proofs there urged.

3d Def.  
pag. 160,  
&c.

pag. 33.

Your Second Argument, is this.

Human Thinking has Succession and Parts.  
Material Actions likewise have Succession and Parts.

Therefore Human Thinking is a Material Action.

This Argument also, I think, deserves no Answer.

ibid.

Your Third Argument, is.

Thinking has its Modes.

Qualities

Qualities of Matter have likewise their Modes.

Therefore thinking is a Quality of Matter. This is just as if I should argue.

Sound has its Modes.

Colour has likewise its Modes.

Therefore Sound is a Colour.

Or thus:

Spirit has Existence.

Matter also has Existence.

Therefore Spirit is Matter.

That I have not in the least misrepresented your Sense in these Arguments, I appeal to whoever pleases to compare our Papers together.

Your Fourth Argument, is this.

*ibid.*

Thinking, in God, who is an Immaterial Being, is without any Succession, Modes, and distinct Acts.

Thinking in Man, has, on the contrary Succession, Modes, and distinct Acts; as the Powers of Matter have.

Therefore Thinking, in Man, is a Power or Quality of Matter.

In this also there is no Consequence, though the Premises were true. But, that Thinking, in God, is without *Succession*, I know not whether you will continue to affirm, or not; when you have considered and compared together the two different Accounts of this Matter, which I just now transcribed; and shall have resolved which of them you will adhere to, by answering clearly the Objections contained in the other.

*See above, pag. 209, 210.*

In the mean time I cannot but take notice, that you use a very strange Expression, when you say *it is evident to you, that God must be an Immaterial*

*An sw. pag. 33.*

*terial Being, that is, a proper Immaterial Being, a Being without Any of the Properties of Matter, without Solidity, Extension or Motion, and that exists in No Place; that is, in other words, which exists not at all: For, if he exists at all, 'tis certain he exists in every Place. I should not have made this Remark, but that I am sure you are no Friend to Unintelligible Distinctions, and Words that have no Signification; and that you will be ashamed to give me the School-mens Answer, that God exists in every Ubi, but not in any Place; that is, that in Latin he exists every where, but in English no where. And yet, unless you give either this Answer or a better, (for it is a thing of too great importance to be pass'd over without any Answer at all;) it cannot be help'd, but your Words will signifie, what it is not possible to suppose you could mean.*

Pg. 34.

Nor is it a less wonderful Expression, when you affirm that *Thinking, in God, cannot be successive, nor have any Modes or distinct Acts of Thinking; but that it is one numerical individual Act, fixt and permanent and unvariable, and without Succession, &c.* That is to say; that God cannot vary his Will, nor diversify his Works, nor act successively, nor govern the World, nor indeed have any Power to will or do any thing at all. I do not charge you with Consequences; but I affirm they are too plain Consequences of what you profess.

Pg. 35.

You observe that I allow Matter to Act upon the Soul; Which since it cannot do by Contact, it must be by a Power whereof we have no Idea; and if there be in Matter any such Power whereof we have no Idea, why may it not as well be capable of Thinking? I

Answer: The Power by which Matter acts upon the Soul, is not a *real Quality* inhering in Matter, as *Motion* inheres in it, and as *Thinking* inheres in the thinking Substance; but 'tis only a Power or Occasion of exciting certain *Modes* or *Sensations* in another Substance; Which Power, is one of those Qualities I ranked under the *Second* Sort; And there is no Analogy at all, between a Subject's being it self capable of Sensation, and its being the Occasion of certain Sensations being excited in another Subject. 3d Def.  
page 134.

However, as to the thing it self, there is no more difficulty in conceiving how *Matter* may act upon *Immaterial Substance*, than in conceiving how it acts upon *Material Substance*. When a Globe, suppose, of a Foot Diameter, in Motion; strikes upon a Globe of a foot Diameter, at Rest: Tell me how *Matter* acts upon *Matter*, by *Contact*; why the Quiescent Globe makes a *certain determinate* degree of Resistance; why it *does not* make an infinitely great Resistance; or why it *does* make any Resistance at all. And when Light is reflected and refracted by Bodies, which it never touches; nay, at a distance from them evident to Sense; and, in some Circumstances, the nearer the Medium, whose Surface it reflects from, approaches to a Vacuum, the greater and stronger the Reflection is; (of which there are convictive Experiments published to the World;) Or when Matter acts, by the Cause of Gravitation, upon other Matter, in proportion, not to the bigness of the Superficies, but to the Quantity of the solid Matter it self; that is, acts upon the very Centers of the original solid parts of Matter; (of which, Mathematicians know there are Demonstrations extant;) Tell me how, in these cases, *Matter* acts upon *Matter*, *without Contact*; and

and I will undertake to tell you, how Matter acts upon *Immaterial Substance*.

Ans. pag.  
34, 35,  
36, 38.

It is worthy of Remark, that, both here and elsewhere, you seem willing to allow, that That Power in Matter, whereof you contend Thinking to be a Mode, is a Power you *pretend not to know*; a Power *unknown to us*, and of *which we have no Idea, no distinct Conception* in our Minds; and which you *know not* whether it be *Motion or no*.

See above,  
pag. 214,  
215

Whatever it be, I have shown that the same Arguments hold equally against Thinking's being a Mode of that unknown Power, as against its being a Mode of Motion. But that which I would here remark, is this. If it is *absolutely impossible* (as

Ans. pag.  
78.

you elsewhere affirm) to *prove that there are two different Substances in the World, because we have not Ideas of them*; how can we know there is any such unknown Power in Matter, without having an *Idea* of it? And if it can be known that there is a *Quality* in Matter, of which we have *no Idea*; why can it not as well be known that there is a *Substance* in the World, of which we have *no Idea*? If there be (as you say) *no other*

pag. 9, 13.

*Test of Truth, but the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas*; how can we affirm any thing concerning a *Quality*, of which we have *no Idea*? If *Difficulties which cannot be perfectly cleared*, are (according to you) *Contradictions and Absurdities*; why is this important Difficulty left *uncleared*? Again: If it be true (as you

pag. 16.

affirm in another place,) that *unless we have an Idea of the Creation of Matter out of Nothing, we must inevitably conclude Matter a Self-existent Being*; how comes it not to be as evident, that, unless we have an *Idea* of the formation of a Thought out of such *Qualities of Matter* as we have *no*

pag. 91.

*Idea* of, we must inevitably conclude that Matter cannot think? and, that, unless we *have Ideas* of those Qualities which we *have no Ideas of*, there can be no such Qualities in Matter? But all this, is only upon *our own Suppositions*: For the *unknown Quality* you make *Me* to ascribe to Matter, pag. 35 in order to enable it to act upon immaterial Substance; is not (as I just now shew) a real *inherent Quality*, but only a *Power* or *Occasion* of ex- See above, pag. 219. citing *Modes in another Subject*.

You observe further, that if the Soul be an *Immaterial Substance*, it is *a great Difficulty* to Answ. pag. 35. *conceive how by a mere Preference of the Mind* we can move our Hand, and cause it to rest again, when we will: Whereas, if *Thinking be nothing but a Mode of Motion, or Matter in Motion*, That *Difficulty is entirely at an End*; there being then nothing in it harder to be understood, than how the Hand of a Clock is moved by the *Weights or Spring*.

'Tis very true: If there be *no Liberty of Will at all*, then all the *Difficulties concerning the Manner of it*, are *entirely at an End*. Thus *Des-Cartes* put an End to all the *Difficulties concerning the Knowledge and Perception of Brutes*, by denying that they have any such thing as *Sense, Knowledge, or Perception* at all: And if you had deprived your *human Machines*, as he did his *Brutal ones*, of all *Sense and Perception*, all *Knowledge and Understanding*, as well as all *Liberty of Will*; some further *Difficulties* still, concerning the Nature of *Thinking and Perception* in general, would have been also *entirely at an End*. And thus, if I should say I could *entirely put an End* to all the *Difficulties about Opticks*, by supposing that Men have *no Eyes at all*, I should likewise say very true: But who would

would thank me for the notable Discovery, I cannot tell.

And yet there is a Difficulty even upon your own Supposition, greater than you seem to be aware of. For by what *Impulse*, by what *Preference*, by what *Power*, That Matter *first and originally began to move*, which you suppose impells both the *Weights of a Clock* and the *Thinking Materials in a Man*; is just as difficult to conceive, as how, by a mere *Preference of the Mind*, without any external *Impulse*, we can cause our *Hands to move*.

See Boyles  
Lecture for  
the year  
1704, pag.  
96, &c.  
2d Edit.  
pag. 122,  
&c. 1st  
Edit.

You go on in the next place to consider my Arguments against the Possibility of Thinking's being a Mode of Motion.

To my first, viz. that *Modes of Motion are nothing but particular Motions, and cannot contain any thing in their Idea beyond the Genus of Motion*; and that therefore we have the same intuitive certainty that *Consciousness cannot be a Mode of Motion, as we have that any one thing is not another, whose Idea is the most remote from it that is possible*: You reply; That we have no Idea of all the possible Modes of Motion; That though we have indeed Ideas of the more simple Modes of Motion, yet of the very complex ones we have no distinct Conception in our Minds; That therefore we can no more prove or know that Thinking is not one of these more complex Modes of Motion, than we can know whether two things agree or differ from one another, that we have no Idea at all; That it is not possible for us to say that Thinking does not consist in the peculiar Motion of the Spirits in the Brain, till we have a particular Idea of the Motion of those Spirits, and an Idea of Thinking as something distinct from a Mode of Motion; That Thinking has the genus of Motion,  
by

Ans. pag.  
36, 37, 38.



by arising from Motion, by being varied by Motion, by producing other Motions, by having Succession and Parts and innumerable Modifications; That no Idea of hum. in Consciousness can be produced beyond the genus of Motion; That saying we have an intuitive Certainty that Consciousness cannot be a Mode of Motion, is only affirming the Question in debate, which can signify nothing to any Body that wants Conviction, &c.

Now in all this, you have at last plainly declared the  $\pi\epsilon\tilde{\omega}\tau\eta\nu \downarrow \epsilon\tilde{\sigma}\delta\theta$  of your whole Hypothesis; namely, that you intend to make *Thinking* not a real Quality, but a mere empty Name or external Denomination, such as I at first ranked under the *Third Head*. For the most complex Modes of Motion possible, whatever Name we call them by, are still nothing but Motions; and the Name we give them, is nothing but a mere external Denomination. *Thinking* therefore, according to you, being only a very complex Mode of Motion [or of any other Quality of Matter] is likewise nothing but a mere external Name or Denomination of that Mode. Which Notion of yours concerning *Thinking*, is certainly a mere *Chimera*; and a very absurd one.

Every Man has within himself the *Idea*, (or, in your Language, the *Chimera*) of *Consciousness*; which, tho' he cannot produce (as you absurdly require,) that is, cannot define, nor describe, any more than you can describe your *Idea* of any Colour or Sound; yet he as certainly knows it not to be any complex Mode of Motion, as you know your *Idea* of Colour not to be any complex Mode of Sound: Which intuitive certainty, if it be only a bare affirming the Question in debate in one case,

and

3d Def.

p. 12. 134.

See Answ.

to 3d Def.

p. 18. 19.

See above,

p. 212.

Answ. to

Third Def.

p. 37.

and can signify nothing to any Body that wants con-  
 viction; 'tis so in the other likewise: And then  
 there's an end of all human Knowledge, and no  
 Man can pretend to know any one thing not to be  
 any other.

*ibid.* *Thinking* has indeed *Succession and Modes*, and  
 many other things in common with *Motion*; and  
 so has every thing, with every thing: The thing  
 I affirmed, was not that *Thinking* has no Property  
 that *Motion* has; but that it has something in  
 its Idea, which *Motion* has not; that it has some-  
 thing beyond, and totally different from, the Genus  
 of *Motion*: And this, I still affirm, every Man  
 has an intuitive Certainty of: Which *Intuition* you  
 yourself allow to be one Way, (*Answ.* pag. 78,) and, I add, 'tis of all others the most intallible  
 way, of knowing a thing to be true.

See Third  
 Defence,  
 pag. 161.

*Answ.* pag.  
 36.

We cannot indeed frame in our Minds distinct  
*Images* of the more complex Modes of *Motion*, as  
 we can of the more simple Ones: But are we not,  
 nevertheless, equally certain that they are all a-  
 like *Imaginable*, though our narrow *Imaginations*  
 cannot comprehend them? And that, if we could  
 represent them to our *Imaginations*, they would  
 all appear as remote from the Idea of *Thinking*,  
 as any One of them does? Because we cannot  
 comprehend in our *Imagination* a distinct Con-  
 ception of a vast number in *Arithmetick*, as we  
 can of a small one; do we not therefore know, but  
 that a vast number may possibly prove so differ-  
 ent from a Small one, as to turn into a *Plant* or  
 an *Animal*? Because we cannot form in our  
 Minds an *Image* of a Space Ten thousand Millions of  
*Miles* square, as we can of ten foot square: are we  
 not therefore sure, but that the great space may  
 possibly be something, whose true Idea shall have

no Similitude, no Relation to Extension? If I should plead in Favour of *Motion's* being a Mode of *Figure*, (as you do for *Thinking's* being a Mode of *Motion*;) that, though we have indeed *Idea's* of pag. 35.  
*the more simple Modes of Figure*, yet of *the very complex ones we have no distinct Conception in our Minds*; and that therefore, though we are sure indeed that a *Triangle* or a *Square* is not a *Motion*, yet we can no more prove or know that *Motion* is not one page 37.  
*of the more complex Modes of Figure*, than we can know whether two things agree or differ from one another, that we have no *Idea* of at all: If I should argue thus, I say, I know well what Mathematicians would argue concerning Me: And I can guess what Answer I should deserve, if I should tell the World further, that it is not possi- pag. 28  
*ble for us to say that Colour does not consist in a* & 37.  
*peculiar mixture of ten Thousand various Sounds, till we have a particular distinct Idea of the result of the mixture of those ten Thousand Sounds. I may call Scarlet-colour, if I please, a very complex Mode of Sound; and who shall confute me, by producing the particular distinct Idea of the result* pag. 37.  
*of a peculiar mixture of ten Thousand Sounds? And you may call Thinking, if you please, a very complex Mode of Motion: Yet neither of them will, by either of our Confidence in giving Things Names, be ever the nearer becoming such in reality. This I think, clearly shows your Notion to be something more than a difficulty that cannot be perfectly cleared; that is, (according to you,) something more than an Absurdity and Contradiction; But I will be content to look upon it, as being but barely contradictory and absurd.*

p. 18. 40.

To my second Argument, viz. *that, if Thinking was a Mode or Species of Motion, it would follow that all Motion would be a degree of Thinking*: You reply, that you do allow, that every Motion is a degree of Thought, in that Sense wherein it is proper to say that every Motion is a degree of Fire, &c. That is; you allow every Motion, to be as much a degree of the Sensation it self; of Heat, for instance, or of any other Sensation or Thought arising in the Mind; as it is a degree of that Mode of Motion in Matter, which excites in us such or such a particular Sensation: You allow every the slowest Motion of a Needle to be as much and as properly a degree of Pain, as it is a degree of that Motion which causes it to prick the Skin: You allow every Motion of a particle of Air, to be as truly a degree of the Thought and Reason of a Man; as it is a degree of that Mode of Motion, which, striking the Ear, excites in us the Sensation of Sound: You must by the same reason have allowed, if it had been desired of you; that a Streight Line is as much a Piece of a Motion, as it is a piece of the Figure of a Triangle. But I accept contentedly what you do allow; and I do not desire to be allowed any more.

p. 18. 40.  
41, 42,  
&c.

To my third Argument, viz. *that if Thinking was a Mode of Motion, then Motion would be a more generical Power than Thinking; whereas on the contrary, &c.* Your Reply is so uncertain and obscure, that 'tis hard to know what to make of it. The Strength of the Argument, which you pretend you cannot understand, was plainly this: That no particular Mode of any Power, can contain under it so great a Variety of Modes, as the Superiour Power it self does; for the same reason that *Quadrilateral*

lateral Figure, which is a Mode of Figure, cannot contain under it so great a Variety of Modes, as Figure in general does: And that therefore, if Thinking was a particular Mode of Motion, there could not possibly be so many Modes of Thinking, as there are of Motion. But now, on the contrary, 'tis evident there are more Modes of Thinking, than there are of Motion; because every Mode of Motion has a Mode of Thinking [an Idea] answering to it, and there are innumerable other Modes of Thinking besides: Thinking therefore cannot possibly be a Mode of Motion. [And the same Argument holds against the Possibility of its being a Mode of any other Power of Matter whatsoever.] This is in short the Sum of that Argument, which, you say, you are perfectly at a loss to know what it means. To know what it means, I believe every Man, except your self, is very able; But to know what to answer to it, you might well be perfectly at a loss. Instead of answering it therefore, you were resolved to be even with me for offering you an Argument you could not understand; and would needs say something in opposition to it, which you were sure neither I nor any Body else could understand; namely, that Ideas are not Modes, but Objects of Thinking. pag. 43. lin. 0, 13, 22, 23. However, this being manifestly absurd, you contradict your self again in the next page, and say it must be allowed that every distinct Thought, [that is, every Idea] is a particular Mode of Thinking; pag. 44. and so Thinking must in us have a great number of Modes. But yet, for all that, you say, our Thoughts are finite and limited; and we comprehend only the more simple Modes of Motion and Figure; and, since our Thoughts are all limited in point of Number, you see no reason from their Variety necessarily to pag. 45. conclude, that human Thinking cannot be a Mode

of *Motion*. You seem resolv'd indeed not to see the *Reason*: But the *Reason* is visible enough, and will force any Man to see it, that does not shut his Eyes; viz. that, there being more Variety of *Modes of Thinking*, than there is of *Modes of Motion*; and all the *Modes of Motion* (though we cannot actually attend to them, because their Number is infinite,) answering only to one species of the *Modes of Thinking*, (which *Modes of Thinking* under that one species, are likewise infinite in number;) 'tis plainly, and for the very same reason, as impossible that *Thinking* should be any one of the infinite Number of the *Modes of Motion*, as that *Figure in general* should be any one of the infinite number of the *Modes of Quadrilateral Figure*.

Fig. 45.

You add: If we consider but the prodigious Variety of *Sounds*, which are called distinct *Modes of Sound*; it is as easy to conceive, that upon supposition of *Thinking* being a *Mode of Motion*, it should have the several *Modes* that we are conscious it has; as that *Sound* should have all the distinct innumerable *Modes* which *That* has. But from what has been said, 'tis evident, that as all the *Modes of Sound*, though infinite in Number, yet bear no Proportion to the infinite Variety of the *Modes of infinite other things* put all together; so the infinite *Modes of Motion*, and their correspondent *Ideas*, bear no proportion to the infinite Variety of infinite other *Modes of Thinking*: And that therefore *Thinking* with its infinite Variety of *Modes*, can no more possibly be a *Mode of Motion*, though the *Modes of Motion* be allowed to be capable of infinite variation; than *Colours*, or *Smells*, or any other thing that has no similitude to

to

to these, can be any of the infinite number of the Modes of *Sound*.

My fourth Argument, was drawn from the *Authority*, and from the *Reasoning* of Mr *Lock*.

The *Authority*, you profess to despise. pag. 45.

To the *Reasoning*, you answer; that Mr *Lock's* pag. 45.  
*whole design in the Passage I cited*, was not to prove that *Human Thinking cannot be a Mode of Motion*, but that *Thinking in the Deity cannot depend on the Motion of the Parts of a Corporeal System*; and that, as the *Question is not the same*, so some of the *Consequences that Mr Lock draws from those Principles, affect only that really absurd Supposition of Thinking's being a Mode of Motion in God*.

I reply: 'Tis very true, that Mr *Lock* indeed is not there proving that *Thinking in Man*, but that *Thinking in God cannot be a Mode of Motion*; and that *Some of the Consequences he there draws, do indeed affect only the latter Question, and not the former*. But, if the *Reasoning* he uses, be as strong in one case, as in the other; and the *Consequences I made use of from him, were only such as affect both Questions alike*; (for which I ap- See 3d De-  
 peal to every Reader;) 'Twas by no means con- sence, pag.  
 sistent with *Ingenuity and Candor*, for you to in- 165, 160.  
 deavour to impose upon your Readers with so weak an Answer.

To my last Argument, (which also you seem Answ. pag.  
 unwilling to understand,) viz. that, if *Thinking* <sup>46.</sup>  
*was a Mode or Species of Motion*; then, in like man-  
 ner as it is a proper Expression to say, that *Circularity is one Species of Figure, and Squareness a se-*  
*cond, and Cubicalness a third, and Ellipticalness a*  
*fourth*; so it would be proper also to say, that *Cir-*

cular Motion is one Species of Motion, and Motion in a Square a second, and Motion in an Ellipsis a third, and Thinking or Consciousness a fourth; (which Consequence, I think, is abundantly absurd :) You reply, by quibbling upon the word *proper*, that the Argument has relation only to *propriety of Language*, and that you see not what ground I have to *contest this Language* with you : Whereas the Question was not whether it was *proper* with respect to the *Language*, but with respect to the *Sense* ; that is, whether it was *True* according to your Hypothesis, and a *just and necessary Consequence* from it, to say that *Thinking* differs no otherwise from *Circular Motion*, than *Circular Motion* does from *Elliptical Motion* or from *Motion in a Square* : And this, it seems, (as you are indeed this time very liberal in your Concessions,) you are willing to grant ; And I am well contented with the Concession.

pag. 47.

Ans. pag. 50, 51, &c. Upon the Question, *whether individual Personality can be preserved by a continual transferring of Consciousness from one parcel of Matter to another, in so flux a Substance as the Brain or Spirits*; you repeat what you had before advanced in your *Reflections*. In answer to which, I shall not repeat, but only desire the Reader to compare what I offered in my *Third Defense*, pag. 176--182, & 195--198. And I shall here make only some brief incidental Observations on what seems new in your reply.

See 3d Defense, pag. 176, &c. 195, &c. In the first place you disown none of the Absurd Consequences I charged on your Hypothesis. You deny not, but *One Substance may be Conscious of an Action's having been done by it self, which really was not done by it, but by Another Substance*; you make



make *Individual Personality to be a mere external* Ans. pag. 66, 67,  
*imaginary Denomination, and all Self-Consciousness a*  
*mere Dream and Delusion; you own that One Man* 74.  
*may possibly be two Persons, and 2 or 200 Men one* compare  
*Person; that is, not Persons exactly Like one another,* 3d Defense,  
*but all really and truly one and the same individual* pag. 179,  
*Person, at the same time that they continue so many* 180. and  
*distinct, intelligent, rational Men. These Absurdi-* Ans. pag. 72, 74.  
*ties, I say, you have not denied to be unavoid-*  
*able Consequences of your Hypothesis; nor have*  
*you done any thing towards clearing them from*  
*being Absurdities; but instead thereof, have only*  
*offered some loose Objections against what I pro-*  
*posed under this Head.*

You say you are sure, that my calling your Hy- A sw. pag. 52.  
 pothesis an impossible one, and instead of saying a  
 Word to prove it impossible, immediately arguing on  
 the supposition of its Possibility; is begging the Question,  
 and supposing what I was to prove. The particular  
 Hypothesis here referred to, (*viz. that Memory*  
*may be preserved in a fleeting Substance, by continu-*  
*ally repeating the Idea's, and imprinting them afresh*  
*upon new particles of Matter perpetually succeeding in*  
*the room of those that pass away.) was, I said, an*  
 impossible Hypothesis; And an impossible Hy-  
 pothesis it will always appear to be, till you can  
 find out some new Hypothesis, by which to make  
 it intelligible, how it is possible that new Ideas  
 printed upon new Particles, should be a Memory  
 of old Ideas printed upon old Particles. But I  
 did not enlarge upon this; because, supposing the  
 Possibility of it, yet it would avail nothing to-  
 wards your main purpose; the Question being,  
 not whether the Memory in general of such or  
 such an Action's having been done, might pos-  
 sibly be preserved in the manner you suppose;

but whether the *Consciousness* of its being done by *Me*, by *my own Individual Self* in particular, could in this manner be continued. Now how it was in me a *begging of the Question*, to argue, that, even on Supposition of the Possibility of the Hypothesis now mentioned, yet it would nevertheless be impossible for you from thence to make out the Conclusion you were to prove; I confess, I understand not: Neither do I understand how you can prevail upon your self to dispute in such a manner.

pag. 66.

*A Man*, you say, who, during a *short Frenzy*, kills another. and then returns to himself, without the least *Consciousness* of what he has done; cannot attribute that *Action* to Himself; and therefore the *mad Man* and the *sober Man* are really two as distinct Persons as any two other Men in the World, and will be so considered in a Court of Judicature. Extraordinary Reasoning indeed! Because in a *figurative Sense* a Man, when he is mad, is said *not to be Himself*; and in a *forensick Sense*, is looked upon as not answerable for his *own Actions*; therefore in the *Natural and Philosophical Sense* also, his *Actions* are not his *own Actions*, but *another Persons*; and the *same Man* is really two distinct Persons!

pag. 67.

You add: Should there be so strong a *Representation* to my *Understanding*, of a *Murder* done by me, which was really never done at all; so that I could not distinguish it in my *Mind* from something really done by me; I can no more help attributing this to my self, &c. 'Tis true, I could not help it indeed; But it would be, (as Mr *Lock* well expresses it,) a *fatal Error*; and not (as you would have it) a making me to be really the Person I am not. So that 'tis evident (you go on,) that *Self or Personal Identity* consists solely in *Consciousness*, though a false one; that is, it consists

See Third  
Defense,  
pag. 180.  
Answ. pag.  
67.

sists in a *False Representation*, in a *Dream*, as Mr Lock well expresses it again. And so all Mankind, it seems, are nothing but a *Dream*: Unless rather your Opinion it self be a *Dream*; as, I presume, it will be found to be, by every Man whose Reason is awake.

*The restoring, you say, the Power of Thinking to the same or to a different Body at the Resurrection, with a Memory or Consciousness extending to past Actions, will be a raising the same Person and not a Creation of a new one.* If so; then the restoring the like Power of Thinking to 20 different Bodies with a false Memory (a *Dream*,) or a Consciousness extending to imaginary past Actions, will be a making them all (as I said, and as you expressly allow,) to be, not Persons like one another, but one and the same individual Person, at the same time that they continue different, intelligent, rational Men. That is to say; if twenty of your Clocks happen to go exactly alike, they are no more 20 Clocks, but one and the same individual Clock.

Your Distinction between *raising the same Person* and *creating a new One*, is a Distinction without any the least Difference. For the *Memory or Consciousness extending to past Actions*, which you suppose makes the *same Person* in the one case; does exactly as well make the *same Person* in the other case: It being evidently as easy for God to add an imaginary *Consciousness extending to past actions that never were*, to a new created Body now; as to add an imaginary *Consciousness extending to past Actions that were done by one Body*, to another Body at the *Resurrection*. So that from your Opinion it unavoidably follows, that I may now at this present Time as possibly be created a-new and have another *Self-existent* at the same time with me,

me, by God's adding to *the Understanding* of a new-  
*See Anfw. pag. 66 & 67.* made Body *so strong a Representation* of my past  
 Actions, that That Other My-self could not distinguish  
 them in his Mind from things really done by him; (as  
 you express your self in a like Case :) This, I say,  
 is exactly as possible, in your Hypothesis; as it is  
 for me to be raised again at the Resurrection.

*pag. 69, 70 & 76.* Your Argument, by which you endeavour to  
 retort upon me, that, according to my Notion of  
 Individual Personality, there can be no Resurrecti-  
 on, nor any such thing as Personal Identity at all;  
 is founded upon a fallacious Representation, as if,  
 by the *same individual numerical Consciousness*, I un-  
 derstood the *same individual numerical Act of Think-*  
*ing*: Whereas the *individual numerical Consciousness*,  
 which Identifies the Person, is that Perception, by  
 which the Person is sensible, that his *Past Acts of*  
*Thinking* were his *own Thoughts* and not *another's*;  
 Which *Perception*, in the same continued Being, is  
 a *true Memory*, and can be *true* in that one nume-  
 rical Being only; But in your fleeting Being, it  
 would be a *false Memory*, a *mere Delusion*, and might  
 be impressed on any number of Beings at one and  
 the same time: All which, distinct, intelligent, rati-  
 onal Beings, because they happened to be in the  
*pag. 72.* same *Dream*, you would affirm to be one and the  
 same individual Person; And, for the same rea-  
 son, if twenty Pieces of Money happen to be stamp-  
 ed with so like an Impression, that they could not be  
 distinguished one from another; you must affirm  
 them all to be one and the same *Individual Shilling*,  
 notwithstanding their being different *Pieces of*  
*Silver*.

Having

Having granted, that if ever so many Thinking Beings have, (not one and the Same numerical Consciousness, as by your Comparison of a vast bulk of senseless Matter being added to a Man's Body, you would very artfully insinuate, in contradiction to the whole course of your Argument and most express Concessions; but) having granted, I say, and contended, that if ever so many distinct Thinking Beings have within themselves a Like Consciousness, or a Like present Representation of past Actions, they can all constitute but one and the same Person; You ask me, whether each of these distinct Thinking Beings must not unavoidably think himself the same Person that did the Action, and the same Person that every one of the rest will likewise distinctly think himself to be? I answer, as before; They must indeed unavoidably think so; But in so doing, they must also unavoidably be mistaken: And so, according to your Notion, we are all unavoidably we know not who, and do but fancy and dream our selves to be the Persons we think we are, and write and read about we know not Whom nor What.

3<sup>d</sup> Def.  
p. 180<sup>o</sup>

To your taking Refuge in the Justice of God, I have already answered; that the Question is not, whether God will do an absurd thing, but whether in the nature of things it be possible to be done. And whereas you allege that if God should cause to exist twenty present Representations of the same past sinful Actions in so many distinct Beings, the consequent Punishment would be twenty times as much as the sinful Actions deserved and his Justice required; and that therefore God will not do any such thing: I reply; The Difficulty does not lie there; Because the Punishment due to the single Person's sinful Actions, might be divided proportionably among

among the twenty distinct intelligent Beings, which in your way are One and the Same Individual Person; and so according to you, there would be no Injustice done, because the Punishment would not be more than the Offences deserved: And yet 'tis manifest, that in reality, 19 at least of these 20 distinct intelligent Beings would be punished unjustly, how small a proportion soever they bear of the Punishment; because they would be punished for what they had never been guilty of at all, however by a false *Consciousness* they might imagine themselves to have done what they never did.

pag. 74,  
75.

The Case you put, of a Person living well for some Years, and afterwards forgetting that he had done so, and then living for the future in all manner of Debauchery; is so far from being an *Absurdity*, as you call it, upon my Notion of Personal Identity; that, on the contrary, there is no manner of Difficulty in it. The Man is not *two Persons*, as much as any two Men in the World are two Persons; (which you declare he must be, in consequence of your Principles; A Consequence sufficient to have convinced almost any Man, of the Falsity of the Principles from which he sees and owns such an Absurdity to follow :) But he is, I confess, (as you add in the next Words,) *as much two Persons as the same Man Mad and Sober is two Persons*; that is, he is not at all two Persons, but plainly one and the same Person; and shall justly be punished as his Iniquities deserve.

pag. 53,  
54.

You urge, that my Argument is no more useful to the *Ends of Religion*, than yours; because, *unless the Soul, as an Immaterial Being, did perpetually*

ly *Think*; a *Proof of the Immateriality of the Soul*, would not necessarily prove a future State of Rewards and Punishments: And upon this you are pleased to make your self merry, in a very needless manner. Now what Connexion there is between the Soul's *Immateriality*, and its *Perpetual Thinking*; has been considered elsewhere. In this <sup>1st Def.</sup> place it may be sufficient to add, that whether the <sup>pag 85,</sup> *Immateriality and Immortality* of the Soul necessarily <sup>&c. and</sup> infer its perpetual actual Thinking, or not, yet <sup>2d Def.</sup> my <sup>pag. 114,</sup> Argument is evidently *useful* to Religion, by <sup>&c.</sup> proving at least the *Possibility* and *great Probability* of a future State of Rewards and Punishments; And yours is evidently *destructive* of Religion, by making a Future State of Rewards and Punishments not only *Improbable*, but *Impossible*; seeing it infers (as I have at large shown) an absolute *Impossibility* of a *Resurrection of the same Person*; And if a Resurrection were possible, yet, by introducing such an absolute and fatal *Necessity* of all human Actions, as Mr *Hobbs* and *Spinoza* formerly attempted to establish by the same *numerical* Argument, (though from your *Thinking in the same way*, I would not conclude you All to be the same *Individual Person*;) it manifestly makes all future *Reward unreasonable*, and all *Punishment unjust*: Of which more, immediately.

My first Argument to prove your Notion destructive of Religion, was, that by *inferring the Necessity of all Human Actions*, it makes Men to be *Subjects no more capable of Religion, than Clocks and Watches* are.

To this you reply, First, that *Thinking's being* <sup>Ans. to</sup> *a Mode of Motion in any System of Matter*, (which is <sup>Third De-</sup> the Supposition I refer to, that destroys all Liber- <sup>fense, pag.</sup> <sup>55.</sup>

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ty of Will,) is nowhere affirmed by you. But this is a mere Quibble; as I have shown at large, *Third Def.* pag. 159. And *above* pag. 214, 215.

*ibid.*

\* See *a-*  
*bove*, pag.  
205.

In the next place therefore, you answer ferociously; that *Men and Clocks Agreeing in being necessarily determined in all their Actions*, does no more prove them to be alike incapable of Religion; than an *Immaterial Substance and a Clock's agreeing in being* \* extended, proves them to be alike incapable of Religion. Had I not seen it, I could not have believed that either you or any reasonable Man could have given such an Answer. *Necessity*, if Men and Clocks agree in it, must make them both alike incapable of Religion; because *Necessity* is the very thing, that makes any Being incapable of Religion: But *Extension*, supposing *Immaterial Substance and Clocks* to agree in That, would not make Them both alike incapable of Religion; because *Extension* is not the thing, that makes any Being incapable of Religion.

*Necessity*, you must reply, is not the thing that makes any Being incapable of Religion; What is it then, that incapacitates for Religion? *Want of understanding*, you say: For *What excludes a Clock from being a proper Subject of Religion, but the Want of a human Understanding?* and *What is it that makes a Man a proper Subject of Religion, but his Understanding?* I answer: 'Tis not *Understanding*, but *Will*, that makes a Man capable of Religion; and 'tis not *Want of Understanding*, but *Want of Will and of a Power of acting freely*, that makes a Clock incapable of Religion. For, supposing a Clock to have the Understanding of a Man; yet if, for all that Understanding, it continued to be moved by the Weights as necessarily as it is Now, 'tis manifest it would Then have no more Power of doing either *good or evil*, than it has Now; And  
the

Answ. pag.  
55.



the only difference would be, that it would then know and understand it self to be incapable of Religion, whereas now it is incapable of Religion without understanding or being sensible that it is so.

And to make it appear, that *Necessity* in an Intelligent, as well as in an Unintelligent Being, incapacitates for Religion; and that there can be no Religion without *Freedom of Will*; I offer only the following Argument. *Religion* supposes a *future State of Rewards and Punishments*; and a *future State of Rewards and Punishments*, supposes that God is *pleased* and *displeased* with the different Actions of Men; and God's manifesting his *displeasure* towards certain Persons by *punishing* them finally, supposes that such *Punishment* is *just* and that the Persons *deserved* it : For *God cannot err*. Now, if Men, with all their *Understanding*, were under the same *Necessity* in all their Actions, as a Clock is in its Motions; then, though you would unreasonably imagin perhaps it might serve *some Designs* of human Government, to *pull* and *draw*, to *drive* and *push* such necessary Agents with the *Screws* and *Springs* of *Rewards and Punishments*, as Men govern their Clocks by the Addition and Substraction of Weights; yet neither from the Hands of *God* or *Men* could the good or evil Actions of such intelligent Machines *Deserve* either Reward or Punishment; nor could there possibly be any *Justice* in Gods final distribution of Rewards and Punishments; nor is there any reason why any Man should *reproach* himself, or be *blamed* by others, (even by those who would be so unreasonable as to *punish* the Machine,) for any Profaneness, Impiety or Wickedness whatsoever, for murdering a Man (for instance) with his Sword, when his Hand was moved *necessariy* to do

do it, by the Action of Subtle Matter upon his Brain and Spirits ; any more than if he had done it by another Man's *forcibly* using his Hand and Sword: Neither is it possible that God should be *pleased* or *angry* with any Man, for doing what he could not avoid doing ; any more than a Man can be *angry* with his Clock for going wrong, even supposing the Machine indued with Understanding enough, to feel and be sensible that its Weights necessitated it to do so. The Notion therefore you maintain, of Mens Actions being all *Necessary*, is totally destructive of Religion.

p. 55.

Till you can give a *clear* Answer to this Argument, you stand obliged by Promise to *allow that Man is no more a Subject of Religion, than a Clock ; nay, to go further, and allow that there can be no such thing as Religion.* Though, I hope, you will be better than your Word ; and own rather, that there is no such thing as *Necessity*.

p. 61,  
62.

Before we dismifs this Argument, you will expect I should answer the two Questions you put to me *ad hominem.* Though indeed you have no reason to expect it ; because you knew, (but, for Reasons best known to your self, took not the least notice of it,) that they were Both of them *directly* and *clearly* answered in the places from whence you had them.

First, you *desire* Mr. Clark, *who maintains* (you say) *the Certainty of all Events, to show what different Influence the supposed Necessity of our Actions can have on the Power of Self-determination, that the Supposition of the Certainty of our Actions has not.* I answer : Your supposed *Necessity* is directly contradictory to the *Power of Self-determination*, and therefore manifestly inconsistent with it ; But the *Certainty* I speak of in the place you cite, has

no inconsistency at all with the *Power of Self-determination*, because it means (as is there largely explained) only that *mere Futurity*, which you your self must confess all Actions had while they were yet *future*, even upon Supposition of the *Power of Self-determination*. For you can suppose, what you will not grant, a *Power of Self-determination*. And, I presume, you cannot deny but every *past* Action had, and every *future* Action has a *Futurity*, (which is all that was meant by *Certainty of Event* in the place now referred to,) notwithstanding that supposed *Power of Self-determination*.

Secondly; You ask, if (as Mr Clark affirms) the necessary and eternal different Relations, which different things bear to one another, always and necessarily do determin the Will of God; and God is unalterably determined to do always what is best in the whole; then how can he have a *Power of Self-determination*? I answer; The *Necessity* there spoken of, is only a *Moral Necessity*; which, as to the *Effects*, may be depended upon with infallible *Certainty*, (*viz.* that a *Wise* Being will not act *foolishly*, and a *Good* Being will not do *Evil*;) but, as to the *thing it self*, 'tis in the *natural and philosophical* Sense, of which we are now treating,) no *Necessity at all*, but *mere Self-determination*: As is at large explained in the Book you refer to. Which, if you would have \* taken to your self the *Character of an Ingenuous Adversary*, certainly you ought to have taken some notice of. For † when *Terms are defined and Instances agreeing to those Definitions given, whereby all Doubtfulness about one another's meaning is in the most effectual manner excluded*; To cite an Author's Words, notwithstanding this, and apply them to a Sense directly contrary to what the Au-

Boyle's  
Lect. Vol. 3  
1. 1st. Ed.  
pag. 215,  
217.  
2d Edit.  
pag. 169,  
170.

Boyle's  
Lect. Vol. 3  
1. 1st Ed.  
pag. 256,  
and 128.  
2d Edit.  
pag. 200,  
& 101.

Ibid. 1st  
Edit. pag.  
140, 237,  
243, &c.  
247, &c.  
2d Edit.  
pag. 110,  
111, 135,  
190, &c.  
194, &c.  
\* Answ. to  
3d Defense,  
pag. 28.  
† Ibid. pag.  
21.

thor largely and exprefsly explains he intends they fhould be taken in, is no fair way of managing a Controverfy.

My fecond Argument to prove your Notion *de-  
ftructive of Religion*, was drawn from the Confide-  
ration of the Nature of *Personal Identity*, and of the  
*Refurrection of the fame Perfon*. To which all the Re-  
ply you have made, has been confidered already.

pag. 230,  
&c.

To your Argument, that, *if we have no Idea of  
the Subftance of Matter and of the Subftance of Spirit,*  
*'tis impoffible to prove that one is not the other*; It  
might be fufficient to Answer, that an unprejudi-  
ced Perfon would be apt to think it as eafy to  
prove, that there is a *Subftance* in the World, of  
which we have *no Idea*, totally different from the  
*Subftance of Matter*; as that there fhould be a *Qua-  
lity* in Matter, of which we have *no Idea*, totally  
different from all the known *Qualities of Matter*.  
But to pafs this over: I affirm, that from our  
Knowledge of any Being's having certain Properties  
incompatible with the *Effential Properties* of Matter,  
we may certainly infer that the Subftance of that  
Being and the Subftance of Matter are not the  
fame. though we have no Ideas of the Subftances  
themfelves. We have no Idea of *Infinite*; and yet  
every Mathematician can demonftrate concerning  
Many Infinites, that one is not another; and in  
fome, the exact Proportion between One and An-  
other; without having an Idea of either. And to  
*your felf*, you fay, *'tis evident that God muft be an  
Immaterial Being*, becaufe he is *without Any of the  
Properties of Matter*: (I hope you mean the *pecu-  
liar Properties* of Matter; Otherwife *Exiftence* will  
be one of its Properties, as much as any of thofe  
you

Ans. pag.  
77, &c.

pag. 34,  
35, 38.

pag. 33.

you mention.) The most *Essential Properties* of Matter we know, are, I think, *Impenetrability*, *Divisibility*, and that which Mathematicians call its *Vis Inertiae*. If you will say, that though these Properties belong indeed universally to all the Matter we have any knowledge of, yet, for ought we know, there may be other Matter which wants these Properties; and so these Properties may possibly not be *Essential*, but only *Accidental* to Matter; Then, I say, you either mean nothing at all by the Word *Matter*, or else you mean by it the same as you do by the Word *Substance*; and then your affirming God to be *Immaterial*, will be as much as affirming him to have *no Existence*. And, p. 18. 53. as to the *Thinking Substance* in Man; When you shall declare, that by the *Thinking System of Matter in the Brain*, you mean a System of such Matter, as has no *Impenetrability*, no *Divisibility*, and no *Vis Inertiae*; we shall then dispute upon a new Foot.

In the mean time, *nothing seems clearer* to you p. 18. 83. at present, than that the *Essence or Substance of Matter consists in Solidity*; and that, to be *Solid*, is to be *co-extended with the Parts of Space*. If so; Then the *Omnipresent God* cannot co-exist with all the Parts of Space, without being *Material*: And I desire you would be pleased in your next, to Answer the Difficulties objected against your Notion of *Gods Immateriality*, as they are expressed in the passage I before-cited out of the *Essay concerning the Use* See above, p. 18. 209. of *Humane Reason*; substituting only the words [*co-exist with all the different Parts of Space*] all along instead of the words [*co-exist with all the Differences of Time,*] and [*Immensify*] instead of [*Eternity.*] And this I insist on the rather, and desire it the more earnestly; because (as I before observed,) it is generally believed that That Essay was written by a

Person, with whose *Reasoning* (for we are not to give any deference to *Authority*) you are thoroughly acquainted.

Answ. pag. 83, 84. As to what I said against material Impulse being the Cause of Gravitation; the *Whole*, you say, is *founded on this, that because a Bullet, a Feather, and a Piece of Leaf Gold descend with equal Swiftnes in Vacuo, therefore material Impulse cannot be the cause of Gravitation.* Whereas, on the contrary, this was only an incidental Instance, to show by a gross and vulgar Experiment, (what Mathematicians know there are Proofs enough of in Nature,) that Gravity is exactly proportionable to the Quantity of *Solid Matter* contained in Bodies, and not at all to the Quantity of their *Superficies*. This Proportion it is, that evidently shows Gravitation not to be caused by Material Impulse. And unless you could have found an Hypothesis, whereby either the Quantity of *Solid Matter* in Bodies, and the Quantity of their *Superficies*, could be made one and the same; or, upon Mechanical Principles, Bodies could, by *Superficial Contact*, receive Impulses proportional to the Quantity of *Solid Matter* contained in them; you would much more advantageously to your self, have acknowledged the first palpable Error: than by a heap of things beside the Purpose. have indeavoured to amuse only such Readers, as want Skill in Mathematicks.

pag. 85. My saying that you indeavoured to insinuate to your Reader, that That excellent Person, Sir *Isaac Newton*, was of your Opinion in the present Question; you *assure the Reader, is a pure Fiction.* But I hope you will take it in good part, that I was so complaisant to you as to imagin, that you were

were not your self so sensible of the *Needfulness* of your Citation out of his Book, as you now acknowledge that you were.

You tell us; *If we have not an Idea of the Creation* pag. 91.  
*of Matter out of Nothing, we must inevitably conclude Matter a Self-existent Being:* I answer; By the same Argument it follows on the contrary, that *if we have not an Idea of the Self-existence of Matter,* [that is, that every distinct particle of Matter in the Universe, is a Necessary, Independent, Self-existent Being,] *we must inevitably conclude Matter to be a Created Being:* And by a better Argument it follows; *if we have an Idea of the Possibility of the Non-Existence of Matter,* that is, *if we have an Idea that Space can (without a Contradiction) exist without Matter in it;* *we must inevitably conclude Matter not to be a necessarily existing, but a created Being.* In like manner: By the same Argument with yours, it follows, that, *if we have not an Idea (as \* you own \* pag. 35.* we have not) *of the inherence of Thinking in Matter,* *we must inevitably conclude it to inhere in something Immaterial:* And by a better Argument it follows; *if we see a disagreement of Ideas in supposing Thinking to inhere in Matter, we must inevitably conclude it to inhere in Immaterial Substance.*

What the rest of your loose and uncertain Discourse about *Creation* and *Self-Existence* tends to, I do not well understand: Only, I am sure, it is foreign to our present Question. Yet two things there are in it, which, I think, deserve to be remarked incidentally.

The first, is; that from these Words of mine, [On whatever Hypothesis they (that is, Atheists) proceed, Nothing is so certain, as that Man, considered without the Protection and Conduct of a superior Being,

ing, is in a far worse case, than upon the supposition of the Being and Government of God, and of Mens being under his peculiar Conduct, Protection and Favour; ) you most uncandidly infer, that Atheists, according to Mr Clark, even while they continue so, have no reason to fear anything for their disbelief.

The second, is this; that, to gratify that Desire which even Atheists have to see a Truth established, so much for the Benefit of Men; you shall conclude this debate (you say,) with an Essay, showing a way how to demonstrate the Existence of God; viz. by proving the Creation of Matter out of Nothing: And this you do, by omitting for the present so useful a Design, and leaving it intirely to some of those Gentlemen that are appointed annually to preach at the Lecture founded by the Honourable Robert Boyle.

Instead of concluding therefore, as you promised, with an Essay showing a way how to demonstrate the Existence of God, you almost in the same Breath repent of so noble an Undertaking, and end your Discourse with a pretended Compliment to Me; that you will give me upon this Occasion a Testimony in my Favour; viz. that you verily think I neither believe too little nor too much; but am perfectly and exactly Orthodox, and in all likelihood will continue so. And considering we have had (you say) the Happiness in England, to have such rational Parliaments and Conventions, that have established nothing but Truth; I should have taken this as a Testimony very much in my Favour indeed; had you not elsewhere dropt some expressions concerning prostituting Conscience so far as to submit to any mere human Authority, and to the Decisions and Determinations of those Men, that in every Country have worldly Preferments to bestow: Which yet since you make no Application



tion of, neither shall I. Only, in return for your *Favour*, I shall, instead of giving *any* Testimony concerning *You*, conclude with most hearty Wishes, that you would be very careful, while you are disputing about *Metaphysicks*, not to oppose the Interest of *true Religion and Virtue*, without which nothing is truly valuable or praise-worthy among Men.

## POSTSCRIPT.

**W**Hereas there has lately been published a rude and scurrilous Book, entituled, *The Holy Spirit the Author of Immortality,* Or, *A Vindication of Mr Dodwell's Epistolary Discourse.*

Which Vindication the Learned Mr *Dodwell* has been so far from disapproving, (as there was Reason to expect he should have done,) that on the contrary he has referred to it in the following Words. *The Defense of what I have formerly produced from the Fathers, I left to the Abler Advocate for my Cause, raised up for me by Divine Providence. And again: I should now have proceeded to have Vindicated my Interpretation of, &c. if God himself had not partly superseded that part of my Work, by raising me up a more Able Patron. — that so Excellent a Person, so utterly unknown to me, should prevent me with a Defense so much Better than I could have made for myself. — I leave so much of — my Task, to him*

*The Scripture-Account of the eternal Rewards or Punishments, &c. pag. 1. & pag. 291.*

Q 4

who

who is so much Fitter for it — It looks to me, like a Divine Interposition, &c. And again: How much I am indebted to Providence that has appeared on this occasion, and to the Worthy Instrument who has so readily answered the Call of Providence, &c.

It cannot therefore be improper nor unseasonable, to give the World a few Instances of the Great Abilities That Author has discovered in his so highly commended Performance.

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In that Part which relates to the Fathers.

Vindicat.  
of Mr  
Dodwell's  
Epistolary  
Discourse.  
Preface,  
pag. 27.  
pag. 37.

THEY (saith he) [the Philosophers] maintained it [the Immortality of the Soul] by way of Anticipation, by the Instinct of Evil Spirits.

To what purpose, the pretended natural Immortality?  
To exist vitally for ever, for nothing!

pag. 43.

The Original Belief of a Natural Immortality, suggested by the Devil, was a Lie.

\* Οὐ γὰρ δι' αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ζῆν, ὡς τῆ Θεῶ. [Thus rendred, vindicat. very learnedly.] It is not so of it self to live, as it is pag. 6, 7 of God.

\* i. e. The Soul hath not Life from Itself, as God has from Himself.

Ἀνάστασις ἐστὶ τῆ πέπταχότῳ σαρκίς, πνεῦμα γὰρ ἔπίπτει. pag. 8, 10:  
The Resurrection is of the Flesh that fell; for the Spirit doth not fall.—What then? if it doth something\* analogous to falling, it's as much to our Purpose.

\* That is, if it dies, though without falling to the Ground, as the Body does. A very learned Distinction.

The Soul in its natural separation—, though Alive, pag. 11: is no more to the Man, than the Dead Carcass.

No created Beings can be naturally immortal, because by being such they would be † Equal unto God, not interior or subject to him, but independent on him.

† Contrary to common Sense, and to the express Declarations of All that defend the Soul's Natural Immortality.

Quemadmodum igitur Apostolus, &c. — Sic & pag. 27:  
Deus &c. [Thus rendred, without any Sense.]  
Whereas the Apostle &c, — So God &c.

\* In eo quod dicunt &c. [Thus translated, with pag. 46. no Sense.] At the same time they affirm &c.

\* i. e. In or by their affirming.

If [the Soul be] a God in one respect, or as to pag. 49.  
\* One Attribute; why not as to all the rest? (S. 2d

\* Viz, a Created Immortality, owing wholly to the Good Part, pag. Pleasure of God. 14.)

Though

pag. 61. Though he [*Athenagoras*] says indeed, that Men have *Perduration* without any Interruption, with respect to the *Soul*; yet this is not to be taken in a *proper*, but in a \* *figurative* Sense.

\* *What is living for ever, in a Figurative Sense?*

pag. 120. Then from this Opinion [*of the Souls natural Immortality,*] it will follow that its *Life* is \* *necessary*, or its *Existence*; and why not its *Propensions* and *Inclinations*? If so; then the Man in consequence *Incapable* of Sin, and no way *Obnoxious* to *Judgment* or *Penalties* on that account.—Then hence it will follow, that to be *Virtuous* or *Vicious*, is an *Indifferent* thing, &c.

\* *Nothing less.*

pag. 123. || Ex rebus igitur diversis ac repugnantibus H O M O factus est; ut, si &c, — sit Immortalis. Si autem &c. — sit in tenebris sempiternis & in morte. [*Thus rendred*] \* The S O U L is made of different and repugnant Principles: So that, if &c; I T should be Immortal: But and if, &c; S H E should be in everlasting Darkness and Death.

|| i. e. M A N is made up of two different and contrary Parts, (viz. *Soul* and *Body*;) That if, &c; then H E should be immortal, and enjoy perpetual Light: But if, &c; then H E should be in everlasting Darkness and Death. The Effect of which Death is not to Kill wicked Souls, but to punish them eternally; &c. And much more follows, to the same purpose.

\* Note, In the *Errata* he has put [*Man*] for [*the Soul*]. But even That Correction does not make the whole Sense right.

pag. 130. I am sensible this Paraphrase of mine, will be looked upon as *Forced*, by the \* *prejudiced* and ignorant: But I matter not *That*.

\* *That is, by all but Himself.*

Tunc cum Anima societate Corporis liberata, in <sup>pag. 130</sup>  
 solo Spiritu vivit : *When the Soul being delivered* <sup>& 131.</sup>  
*from the Society of this Earthly Body, lives or exists*  
*in the Spirit alone. That is, (supposing Lactantius*  
*to speak in a \* Christian Sense;) when the Soul and*  
*Body Both shall be Spiritualized, Immortalized, &c.*

\* i. e. In Mr Dodwel's Sense.

Homo configuratus est ex — Animo, & Cor- <sup>pag. 140.</sup>  
 pore ; — Aeterno, ac Temporalis : *Man is fashioned,*  
*of, — Soul and Body, — Eternal and Tempo-*  
*ral, &c. There may be some advantage taken*  
*from this Place, I foresee : But I think it's easily*  
*answered by this Distinction : Either Lactantius*  
*here argues from Principles allowed by the Philo-*  
*sophers ; Or else \* owns an Actual Eternal Princi-*  
*ple in Man, resulting from the Spirit of God, the*  
*τὸ θεῖον, the quid divinum, superadded by Baptism.*

\* i. e. *Supposing him, again, to speak in Mr. Dodwel's Sense ;*  
*it will then follow indeed, that he does speak in Mr. Dodwel's*  
*sense.*

Cum posset semper spiritibus suis immortalibus <sup>pag. 141,</sup>  
 innumerabiles animas procreare, sicut Angelos ge- <sup>142.</sup>  
 nuit : *Whereas he might always have procreated innu-*  
*merable Souls with their Immortal Spirits, as he gene-*  
*rated the Angels. I cannot question, whilst he \**  
*mentions Spirits in conjunction with Souls as causes*  
*of their Perduration, and immortalizing them ; but*  
*he means their being united with the Eternal Di-*  
*vine Spirit ; And because He is collated on every*  
*Individual in Baptism : speaks of him improperly,*  
*as if He was a particular Spirit to every Soul that*  
*is Immortalized.*

\* *The Author evidently means no such thing.*

Ἡ δὲ ἀλόγων [ψυχῆ] — ἐπιγείῳ ἔτι — συναποθ- <sup>pag. 73.</sup>  
 νήσκει τῷ σώματι — τῷ δ' ἀνθρώπου ἢ ψυχῆ, αἰεζωθ-  
 ὕπαρ.

ὑπάσχει καὶ ἀπλεύσιτος. [Thus interpreted.] *The* ||  
 irrational Soul, — *being earthly as to its Origination,*  
 — *dieth together with the Body : But the Soul of*  
 (The Ἀνθρώπος or) Man, (under such limitations as  
 are here\* supposed of — being united with and un-  
 der the guidance of the Spirit,) — *exists for ever, and*  
*shall have no End of its Existence.*

|| The Soul of irrational Creatures, he should have rendred it.

\* Supposed by his own Imagination.

pag. 177. Σύνθετος ὁ ἀνθρώπος, καὶ ἐκ ἀπλῶς, ἐδ' ἐξ ὁμοειδῶν με-  
 ρῶν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἁσωμάτου νῆς, καὶ σώματος τῆ ἐπιθυμητικῆς ἢ τοῦ  
 ἐμφύχου: [Thus explained.] *Man is a compounded,*  
*not a simple Being, not consisting of similar Parts, but of*  
*an incorporeal Mind (or Spirit.) [he doth not say,*  
*Ψυχὴ, Soul,] and of a Concupiscible Body or ani-*  
*mated by Ψυχὴ, Soul.] (Excellently distinguished!)*

pag. 179. *I am well aware that some may be ready to carp at*  
*this my Paraphrastical Version; viz. that it's Forced*  
*and Extorted. All I shall say by way of Anticipation,*  
*is only this; that either the Sense I have given, is ge-*  
*nuine; or that it's impossible to reconcile it to a\**  
*Christian Sense.*

\* That is, to Mr Dodwel's Sense. And so every Author must  
 needs speak Mr Dodwel's Sense; or else the same great Absur-  
 dity will certainly follow, viz. that he does not speak Mr Dod-  
 wel's Sense.

pag. 234. *Granting any Being to be actually Immortal, —*  
*there's no need of supposing it any further dependent*  
*on its Creator for Existence; but is now as Self-suffi-*  
*cient and Independent; as That Being that produ-*  
*ced it.*

*Had he been so created, Man would have been a* pag. 23.  
God.

*The natural Immortality of any created Being, will* pag. 236.  
*imply \* necessary Existence to all Eternity a parte*  
*post, as much as of God himself.*

\* *Nothing less.*

*To say that the Soul is naturally Immortal, and* pag. 237.  
*can in its own Nature, in consequence of the Design of*  
*God in its Creation, persevere in vital Existence for*  
*ever, and shall never die; is to make it in a strict*  
*and proper Sense necessarily-existent, independent,*  
*and its Death it self or Annihilation impossible even*  
*to \* Omnipotence it self.*

\* *Though it exists only in consequence of God's Design and Will*  
*in creating it; as is expressed in the very same Sentence.*

## In the Other Part.

*Such a Criticiser (he says) as Mr Clark, I foresee* pag. 37.  
*may take some Advantage of my \* seeming Mis-*  
*application of this Text: But, &c.*

\* *Nay, very real.*

*Might not this very Notion [the Heathens Notion]*  
*of The One God, terminate even in the Devil himself,*  
*the very Source of Error and Idolatry?*

*This pretended universal Consent of the Heathens,* pag. 74.  
*of owning One God, the Creator of all things; in*  
*them is plainly a Lie, though in Us the grandest Truth:*

*Be-*

Because by this One God, \* they meant the Devil.  
 — The actual Knowledge of God, must be from Revelation, either by God or the Devil; nay, by Both; and cannot be obtained by mere Natural Light. And that this two-fold Revelation, &c.

\* God forbid.

pag. 135. Hath Mr Clark \* proved — that Men are any way INTERESSED in the Vital Existence of the Soul after Death, any more than in their dead Bodies?

ibid. Or can he \* prove — that the ἄρσενος [the Man is Concerned in the happy or miserable existence of one Essential Part, suppose the Soul; whilst the other [the Body] is in a state of Insensibility? or [that the Man is concerned] in the happy or miserable state of Both the essential Parts, whilst actually separated from each other?

\* One would think, these needed no proof.

pag. 135. So then we have gained One Soul: The other [the Rational] he must yield us; Then here are Two Souls, &c.

pag. 146,  
 147. Is it possible for Compositum to consist of contrary constituent Parts? Would it not be monstrous for Man to consist of two essential constituent Parts, whereof one is dead, the other alive; or one Subject to dissolution, the other not? Or, is it not certain that the Soul is naturally mortal, \* BECAUSE the Body is? Or, is it not certain, that — Both his constituent essential Parts, as animal and reasonable, must partake of the same Nature as to Mortality and Immortality? Is not this SELF-EVIDENT as to both States, This and the future?

\* A most clear and Self-evident Consequence indeed!

What



*What signifies the separate \* VITAL existence of* pag. 149.  
*the Soul, to the Man? If the* <sup>ἄρθεω</sup> *[the Man]*  
*be dead, the Soul is dead to him as actually as the Body, &c.*

\* *That is; there is, no difference between being Alive and Dead.*

When he [*Adam*] was punished for his Trans- pag. 157.  
 gression,— The Breath of Life, that is, the Spirit  
 of him who saith *I am the Life*, withdrew from  
 this *Flesh* of an earthly original, and the *Animal*  
 dropt into *Death*; the *Immortality* of the *Soul* being  
 preserved, because it was only said to the *Flesh*,  
*Dust thou art, &c.* Cyril. Alex.] *Here I can confess,*  
*St Cyril differs somewhat; but agrees, in the main—*  
*that the Immortality of the Soul was preserved, because*  
*he supposes the Spirit \* did not recede from It.*

\* *That is to say; The Soul at death did not recede from*  
*the Soul, as it did from the Body.*

*Neither did these Antient Philosophers, as our Im-* page 196.  
*materialists, opine, that the Spirituality or Immate-*  
*riality of any Being argued its Rationality, or on the*  
*other hand its Rationality argued its Immateriality*  
*in the Sense of our Neotericks, or that its Spirituality*  
*inferred its Immortality. At this rate, the very*  
*ÆTHER, nay WINDS would be Rational and*  
*Immortal.*

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These are some few of the innumerable Instances  
 of the *Singular Abilities* of that Author, whom the  
 Learned Mr *Dodwel* so highly commends. Who-  
 ever casts his Eye upon this Specimen, 'tis presu-  
 med will not expect that any One should think it  
 worth his while, to follow more particularly so  
 strangely Stupid a Writer, through twice 200 Pages  
 of thick *Darkness*, even *Darkness* that may be felt.

SOME



SOME  
REFLECTIONS  
On that part of a Book called  
AMYNTOR,

OR THE

Defense of *Milton's* Life, which  
relates to the WRITINGS of  
the Primitive Fathers and the  
CANON of the New Testa-  
ment.

SIR,

THE Design which the Author of the *Defense*  
of *Milton's* Life professes that he had, in  
writing that part of his Book which relates to the  
Writings of the Primitive Fathers, and the Canon  
of the New Testament, was only to vindicate him-  
self from the Charge of *denying the Scripture and*  
*declaring his doubt that several pieces under the name*  
*of Christ and his Apostles, received now by the whole*

R

Christians

*Christian Church, are supposititious; by shewing that what he had said in the Life of Milton, concerning the spuriouſness of ſeveral pieces under the name of Chriſt and his Apoſtles, was meant not of thoſe Writings which are now received by the whole Chriſtian Church, but of thoſe Apocryphal Pieces, which were in many places received and approved in the Primitive Times.* This is what the Author profeſſes to be the only deſign of this part of his Book: And though for his own ſake I cannot but heartily wiſh it were really no other; yet becauſe there are ſeveral Paſſages, wherein he either ſo expreſſes the very ſlight eſteem that he has for the Primitive Fathers, as ſeems to reflect upon our Religion it ſelf; or raiſes ſuch doubts about the authority of the Canon of the New Teſtament, as *Hereticks* (to uſe his own words) may draw miſchievous inferences from, and by which *Scruples* may be put into the minds of *Sincere Chriſtians*; I have therefore ſent you ſuch ſhort remarks as upon reading the Book have occurred to me, and as I hope may be of ſome uſe to others on this Occaſion.

The Principal Propoſitions which our Author maintains, and which I thought moſt to deſerve conſideration, are theſe three.

Pag. 38,  
39.

*Fiſt, That the Books aſcribed to the Diſciples and Companions of the Apoſtles, which are ſtill extant, and at this time thought genuine, and of great Authority; ſuch as the Epiſtle of Clemens to the Corinthians, the Epiſtles of Ignatius, the Epiſt'le of Polycarp to the Philippians, the Paſtor of Hermas, and the Epiſtle of Barnabas; (for about the reſt which he mentions, there is no great Controverſie;) are all very eaſily proved to be ſpurious, and fraudulently impoſed upon the credulous.*

*Secondly,*

Secondly, That 'tis the easiest task in the world, to pag. 39.  
 shew the ignorance and superstition of the Writers of  
 these Books: That Barnabas has many ridiculous pas- pag. 45.  
 sages; and by saying that the Apostles before their  
 Conversion were the greatest sinners in nature, robs us  
 of an argument we draw from their integrity and  
 simplicity against Infidels: That the Pastor of Hermas  
 is the silliest Book in the World: And that Igna- pag. 45.  
 tius says, the Virginity of Mary was a secret to the  
 Devil; which, I suppose, he cites as a ridiculous  
 saying.

Thirdly, That they who think these Books genuine,  
 ought to receive them into the Canon of Scripture,  
 since the reputed Authors of them were the Con-  
 panions and fellow-labourers of the Apostles, as well  
 as St. Mark, or St. Luke, which is the only reason  
 he ever heard of, why these two Evangelists are pag. 49.  
 thought Inspired. For to say that these Books ought  
 not to be received now into the Canon, because the  
 Ancients did not think fit to approve them, is but a  
 mere evasion; since many Books now received as Cano-  
 nical, were not approved by the Ancients; and some pag. 57.  
 received by the Ancients, are now rejected by the Mo-  
 derns; and Mr. Dodwel owns, that anciently no  
 difference was put by the Church between the Apocry- pag. 73.  
 phal and Canonical Books of the New Testament:  
 and besides, no stress can be laid on the Testimony  
 of the Fathers; since they not only contradict one pag. 80.  
 another, but are often inconsistent with themselves in  
 their relations of the very same facts; were divided  
 into various Sects, who in those early days did, like pag. 56.  
 us, condemn one another for damnable Hereticks;  
 used to reason precariously, (as Irenæus the famous pag. 50, 51.  
 Successor of the Apostles, argues from the four Re-  
 gions of the World, and the four Winds, that there  
 cannot be more nor fewer than four Gospels) and

give hard names to those who contemn such precarious reasoning.

These are the principal Assertions of our Author, which because they seem to me not only to be false, but also to be proposed with too bold a liberty of passing censures upon the judgment both of the ancient and modern Church; I shall therefore in answer to them, and for a Vindication of the Primitive Fathers and Modern Doctors of the Christian Church, with submission advance these three Propositions.

*First*, That though we are not infallibly certain, that the Epistles of *Clemens*, *Ignatius*, *Polycarp* and *Barnabas*, with the Pastor of *Hermas*, are Genuine; yet that they are generally believed to be so, upon very great Authority, and with very good Reason.

*Secondly*, That therefore, though they are not received as of the same Authority with the Canonical Books of the New Testament, yet they ought to have a proportionable Veneration paid to them, both with respect to the Authors and to the Writings themselves.

*Thirdly*, That neither the Belief of the Genuineness of these Books, nor the Respect paid to them as such, does in the least diminish from the Authority of the New Testament, or tend to make the number of the Canonical Books Uncertain or Precarious.

I. *First*, That though we are not infallibly certain that the Epistles of *Clemens*, *Ignatius*, *Polycarp* and *Barnabas*, with the Pastor of *Hermas*, are Genuine; yet that they are generally believed to be so, upon very great Authority, and with very good Reason.

1. The Epistle of *Clemens* to the *Corinthians*, a \* great and wonderful Epistle, saith *Eusebius*, was unanimously and without any controversy received by the ancient Church; and † read publicly in most Churches, both anciently, and in his time. And that the Epistle now extant is the same with that which was so commended by the Antients, has not been questioned by any Learned Man these many years, and has been lately proved at large by the Learned *Doctor Wake* in his *Genuine Epistles of the Apostolical Fathers*, and by *Grabinus* in his *Spicilegium*, p. 261. whom I shall not now transcribe.

2. That *Ignatius* wrote several Epistles, \* one to the *Ephesians*, one to the *Magnesians*, one to the *Tralians*, one to the *Romans*, one to the *Philadelphians*, one to the *Smyrnaeans*, and one to *Polycarp*; *Eusebius* expressly testifies; quoting a large passage out of his Epistle to the *Romans*, which passage is now

extant word for word in that Epistle, being published with the rest above-mentioned. And that all the Epistles now extant under these Titles, are the same with those mentioned by the Antients; is sufficiently proved by the very Learned Bishop *Pierſon* in his *Vindicia*, *Cotelerius*, and others.

\* Τέταρτὴ ἢ ἔν τῷ κλήμεντος  
δωολογικῶν μίαν ἐπιστολὴν φέ-  
ρεται, μεγάλην τε καὶ θαυμασίαν  
*Euseb. H. st. l. 3. c. 16.*

Ἀνωμολογημένη παρὰ πάντι.  
*Id. l. 3. c. 38.*

Ἰκτανωπέτη γερφή. *Id. l. 5.*  
*c. 6. ex Irenaeo. l. 3. c. 1.*

† Ταύτην ἢ καὶ ἐν πλείοσις  
ἐκκλησίαις ἐπὶ τοῖς κοινῶς δεδι-  
μοστυεῦσθαι πάλαι τε καὶ καθ'  
ἡμᾶς αὐτὰς ἔγνωμεν. *Id. l. 3.*  
*l. 16.*

\* Μίαν μὲν ἐπιστολὴν τῇ κτ'  
πῶ Ἐρρησαν ἐκκλησίᾳ γερ-  
φει, — ἐπέγραψεν ἢ τῇ ἐν Μαγ-  
νησίᾳ, — καὶ τῇ ἐν Τράλλεσι  
ἢ ἄλλω, — πρὸς ταύταις καὶ  
τῇ Ῥωμαίων ἐκκλησίᾳ γερφει,  
— τοῖς τε ἐν Φιλαδελφίᾳ  
δοῦσις διὰ γερφῆς ὁμοῦ, —  
καὶ τῇ Σμυρναίων ἐκκλησίᾳ,  
ἰδίως τε πρὸ ταύτης ἀρρηγο-  
μένω Πολυκάρπῳ. *Euseb. Hist.*  
*l. 3. c. 36.*

3. The Epistle of *Polycarp* to the *Philippians*, is mentioned by † *Irenæus* that knew him living, and by \* *Eusebius*, || *Hierom* and others, whose Testimonies set

† *Lib. 3. c. 3.*

\* *Hist. 1. 3. c. 36.*

|| *In Catalogo, &c.*

down at large by *Cotelerius* I need not transcribe: And that the *Epistle* now extant under his Name, at least the greatest part of it, is the Genuine one, is acknowledged by \* all Writers eminent for Judgment and Learning.

\* See Dr *Wake's* Genuine Epistles, and *Cotelerius*, not. 1. in *Epistolæ Ignatii*.

4. The Pastor of *Hermas* is incontestably a most antient work, being cited by almost all the Primitive Fathers extant, that lived in or near the second Century; viz. by † *Irenæus*, by \* *Tertullian*, by || *Origen*, by *Clem. Alexand.* &c. whose Testimonies are set down at large by *Nicol. de Nourry* at the end of his *Apparatus ad*

† *L. 2. § 4. & 6.*

\* *De Orat. c. 12. & de Pudic.*

|| *Hom. 8. num. lib. 1, 2. &*

*3. de Princip. Comment. in Mat. Hom. 37. in Luc. multisq; aliis in locis.*

*Bibliothecam maximam veterum Patrum*, and præfixed to the *Oxford* Edition of *Hermas*, and to that of *Cotelerius*. Whether the Author of this Book be the same *Hermas* that is mentioned by *St. Paul*, though it is affirmed by many of the best and most judicious writers, yet is it not so certain, nor of such consequence, that we should be obliged to defend it.

5. The Epistle of *Barnabas* is also without controversy antient, a Work of the Apostolick Age, being quoted by almost all the \* Primitive Fathers; as you may see by the Testimonies set down at large, in all

\* *Clem. Alex. Strom. 2. & Strom. 5. Origen. contra Cels. lib. 6, &c.*

the same Authors with the Testimonies concerning *Hermas*.

Upon



Upon these *great Authorities* then, though we cannot be absolutely sure that these Writings are Genuine, yet we may well conclude and believe them to be so, notwithstanding the suspicions which some have raised to the contrary. There are also sundry other Arguments, which may be drawn from the simplicity of the stile and way of arguing used in these Writings, agreeable to the custom of the Age in which they are supposed to be written; from the conformity of the matters contained in them, to the Doctrine and Discipline of those times; and from the exact Agreement of all the Quotations of the most antient Authors, to the Copies extant at this day: All which taken together, afford so *good Reason* to believe these Books to be genuine, that whosoever considers them, may very well wonder at the confidence of Mr. T. who is pleased to affirm that 'tis the *easiest Task in the World to prove all these Writings spurious, and fraudulently imposed upon the credulous.*

II. *Secondly*, Though these Writings are not received as of the same Authority with the Canonical Books of the New Testament, yet ought they to have a *proportionable Veneration* paid to them, both with respect to the *Authors* and to the *Writings* themselves.

*Clemens* was a Companion of the Apostles, and *Ignatius* and *Polycarp* their immediate Successors; and if the Authors of the Epistle of *Barnabas* and of the Pastor of *Herimas* were not the same with the Fellow-Labourers and Contemporaries of the Apostles, known by those Names, yet are they so undeniably antient, (being certainly of the first Age,) as to challenge all the respect that can possibly be due to any Writers upon the ac-

count of Antiquity. And as to the Writings themselves, though Mr. T. will not be persuaded to grant with the Learned Dr. *Wake*, that they contain the true and pure Faith of Christ, without the least Error intermixt

\* In his Discourse of the Authority of the genuine Epistles, page 175.

with it; yet this we may be bold to affirm, that in general they are so far from betraying either the Ignorance or Superstition of their Authors, which Mr. T. so confidently charges them with, that they contain a very good account of that Doctrine and Discipline of the purest ages of the Church, which all learned and good Christians heartily wish could be restored at this day.

I. The Epistle of *Clemens* is stiled by *Eusebius*, (as I have already observed) a great and admirable Epistle; and was publickly read in the Christian Churches both before and in his time: “ And  
 “ indeed it does not at all come short of the  
 “ highest Praises which the Ancients have given  
 “ to it; being a Piece composed with such an  
 “ admirable spirit of Love and Charity; of  
 “ Zeal towards God, and of Concern for the  
 “ Church; of the most excellent exhortations  
 “ delivered with the greatest plainness and simplicity of speech, and yet pressed many times  
 “ with such moving eloquence too; that I cannot imagin what could have been desired in  
 “ such an Epistle, more proper for the end  
 “ for which it was composed; what could have  
 “ been written more becoming an Apostolical  
 “ age, and the Pen of one of the most eminent  
 “ Bishops of it. Thus the Learned Dr. *Wake*.

His making the *Scarlet thread* hung out by *Rahab* to the Spies, a Type of the *Blood of Christ*; however it may possibly seem strange to such as  
 Mr. T.

Mr. *T.* was yet in the Opinion of the Ancients very agreeable to the Tenour of the Scripture, and particularly to that Type of the *Scarlet Wool*, wherewith the Blood of the Sacrifice was sprinkled on the People under the Law, *Heb. 9. 19.*

The History of the *Phoenix*, mentioned in this Epistle, is confessedly a Fable. But he that considers that it was a Story at that time generally told and believed, as *Tacitus* largely relates; and that the best of Men never had any assurance of being preserved from vulgar and innocent Errors; will not be hasty in censuring an excellent Man, and an excellent Book, for making such a vulgar error the Topick of a popular Argument.

2. The Epistles of *Ignatius* are written indeed in a plain, simple, and unaffected stile; as are most of the Books of the Holy Scripture it self: but, whatever Mr. *T.* says, there is nothing in them either of *Ignorance* or *Superstition*; unless a *Firm belief of Divine Revelation* must be esteemed *Ignorance*, and a *strict Observance of the Laws of Christ* is to be called *Superstition*.

One Passage indeed there is in his Epistle to the *Ephesians*, which Mr. *T.* cannot but smile at: *viz.* that *the Virginity of Mary and her delivery, was kept in secret from the Prince of this World.* But he that considers the manner of our Saviour's temptation, and how the Ancients constantly, and (in the judgment of the very Learned \* *Grotius*) not without good Grounds, denied the Devil to have known any thing at first of the great Mystery of the Incarnation, will not for this passage condemn *Ignatius* of *Ignorance*,

\* Sanè Diabolum majus aliquid homine in Christo agnovisse hoc quidem tempore, constanter, nec sine magnis argumentis, negant Scriptores antiqui. *Grot.* in Mat. 4. 3.

3. The Epistle of *Polycarp* to the *Philippians* is a very valuable Monument of Antiquity, contain-

ing nothing in it unworthy the Character of so great a Father. \* *Irenæus* calls it a most compleat Epistle; out of which they that are careful of their own Salvation, may learn what was the Belief of that Apostolical Man, and what the form of sound Doctrine which he delivered in

his Preaching.

4. The Pastor of *Hermas* is a Book full of very excellent Moral Instructions, delivered for the most part in easie and natural Similitudes, and these also explained at large to the apprehension of the meanest capacities: For which reason, though it was not received into the Canon of

Scripture, yet (as *Eusebius* testifies) it \* was judged by the Ancients a most necessary Book, especially for those who were to be instructed in the first Principles of Religion; and was therefore accordingly read in Churches:

\* Προς μὲν πῶν ἀνπλελέκται δι' ὅς ἐκ ἀνέν ὁμολογικῶν τεθέειν ὑφ' ἐτέρων ὃ ἀναγκαίωτατον. οἷς μάλισα δεῖ σιχηώσως ἐπιστηγικῆς κίκεται ὅθεν ἦδη καὶ ἐν ἐκκλησίαις ἴσμεν αὐτο δεδμοχουμένον. *Euseb. Hist. l. 4. c. 3.*

And *Origen* (who was far from being an ignorant Man) judges it to \* be a most useful Book. But *Mr. T.* saith it is the silliest Book in the World. Why he should think so, I cannot apprehend, unless it be because there are here and there some few odd Passages scattered in it, very different from our modern way of Writing, which perhaps he can single out and expose: And so there is hardly any Book extant in the World, which a witty Man may not turn into ridicule.

All the Objections which I think have been hitherto made to this Book, are these : That \* it contains *fabulous Visions*: That it makes too much for *Free-will* : That it assigns to every Man two *Angels*: That it favours the *Novatians* in allowing but one *Repentance* : That it favours *Monkish Solitude* : and, that it speaks of *Purgatory*. The three first of these Objections we shall consider immediately ; But the three latter are so *directly false*, that one would wonder how prejudice could possibly be so strong as to make Men see in any Author those things, of which there is not the *least syllable or hint* in the whole Book.

That the *Visions* contained in it are *fabulous*, we ought not to say, unless we be sure, either that God never afforded any *Visions* to the first *Christians* ; or that these *Visions* have some particular *Circumstances*, which prove that they could not come from God. But if it were so, yet taking that which is used in this Book to be no other than a *Paraboli- cal way of Writing*, wherein the Church is introduced as representing its own *Doctrine and Discipline* to a *Person* in a *Vision*, it ought not to be stiled *fabulous*, any more than \* other Books of that kind which are written in our Age.

That maintaining the *freedom* of Mans *Will*, in the sense that *Hermas* asserts it, is a good Objection against a Book, I suppose neither *Mr. T.* nor any Man else, at this time of day, will contend.

\* Libri *fabulosi* sunt, in quibus contra Apostolicum consensum adstruitur *Liberum Arbitrium*, un- *Panitentia*, *Solitudo Monastica*, & quod memoratu dignum, *purgatorium* ab anu quâdam in *visione* tertiâ profertur. *Sculterus de Script. Apoch.*

\* Parable of the *Pilgrim* of the *Prodigal*, &c.

That

That *Hermas* assigns to every particular Man two Angels, if the Titles of the Chapters were of any Authority, could not indeed be questioned. But in the Book it self there is no such thing expressly affirmed: All that the Author there says, is only

\* Duo sunt nuntii cum homine; unus æquitatis, & unus iniquitatis. *Mandat. 6.* in general, That \* *there are two Angels with Man; one of Righteousness, the other of Iniquity;*

and that when good thoughts arise in a Mans heart, then the Angel of Righteousness (that is, some good Spirit) is with him; and when evil thoughts arise in his heart, then the Angel of Iniquity, (that is, some evil Spirit) tempts him: Which perhaps is no more, than what all Christians believe. So that *Cotelerius* in his Notes upon the place, might have spared the pains of proving other Fathers to have been of the same opinion with *Hermas*, till he had shown that these words do necessarily signifie that *Hermas* himself was of that Opinion.

That *Hermas* by allowing but One Repentance for great and scandalous Crimes, favours the *Novatians*, whose Heresie consisted in allowing no other Repentance at all, than that of *Baptism*, is so far from being true, that he in express words opposes his One Repentance to *Baptism*, and says more for the validity and efficacy of that after-Repentance for Crimes committed by Baptized Christians, in this one little Book, than perhaps is to be found in all the other Writers of the three first Centuries put together; insomuch that *Tertullian*,

after he turned *Montanist*, and had embraced the Opinion of the *Novatians*, \* exclaims with all imaginable tibi,  
 \* Cede-  
 fcriptura Pastoris, quæ sola mæchos amat, non ab omni concilio Ecclesiarum inter Apocrypha & falsa judicaretur, adultera & ipsa, & in de patrona sociorum. *De Pudicitia.*

imaginable

ginable bitterness against this Book for that very reason, because it was more favourable than any other Book then extant, in allowing Repentance to Adulterers after Baptism, which the *Novatians* denied.

That this Book favours *Monkish Solitude*, is also so far from being true, that on the contrary it even expressly allows \* *Second Marriages*, which was more than most Writers of that Age were willing \* Man-  
dat. 4. to do.

Lastly, So far is this Writer from establishing the Doctrine of *Purgatory*, that there is not *one syllable* about it in the whole Book: All the places where he speaks of Mens undertaking many hardships, and so *purging* themselves from their sins, being as plainly meant of the Penances to be gone through, according to the then established Discipline of the Church, as 'tis possible for any thing to be expressed by words.

5. The Epistle of *Barnabas* was very much esteemed among the Antients: And though, it must indeed be confessed, that it contains some very strange and allegorical Interpretations of Scripture; yet he that considers how much that manner of Interpretation was antiently in use among the Jews in their Targums, and how many important truths were that way conveyed, so that the Apostles themselves in their arguing with the Jews did often make use of it, as we see in their uncontroverted Writings; I say whosoever considers these things, will rather chuse modestly to suspend his Judgment, than rashly to upbraid this Author with the Terms of foolish and *ridiculous*.

And

And as to his saying that *the Apostles before their Conversion were the greatest sinners in nature*; this does not at all rob us of the Argument we use to draw from their Integrity and Simplicity against Infidels. For supposing them to have been never so wicked, were they the less *Simple and Illiterate* for that? Or is their Wickedness before their Conversion any way inconsistent with their Integrity after it? But besides, these Words might be spoken with relation to such sins, as though very great in themselves, yet sincere and well-meaning Men might be guilty of in their Ignorance; as St. Paul says of himself, that before his Conversion he was the *chief of sinners*, in respect of his blaspheming Christ and persecuting Christians even to Death, for Christ's sake.

In short, though it must after all be confess'd, that the Authors of these Writings used a plain, popular and unpolite Stile; that they were guilty of some Mistakes, in things wherein the whole world at that time erred with them; (for which Mr. T. is pleas'd to stile them *Ignorant*;) and that they deliver'd divers things, which tho' very agreeable to the strictness of their Discipline in the Primitive Church, yet the present times will not so well bear; (for which Mr. T. calls them *Superstitious*;) Tho' I say, all this must be granted; yet since in general the Matter of these Writings is such, that not only the Ancients thought fit to cite them in their Books and read them in their Churches, but also the Learnedst and most Judicious Criticks of our own times, as well Laicks as those of the Clergy, have receiv'd them as genuine, and recommended them as *containing the true and pure Faith of Christ*; I cannot but think that the very great scorn and

cont



contempt, wherewith Mr. T. hath thought fit to treat them, is a very bold assuming to himself, and undervaluing the judgment of the greatest Men both of the Ancient and Modern Church, and consequently a Reflexion upon our Religion its self; and that after all, we have very *good Reason*, as well as very *great Authority*, though not to receive these Writings as of the same Authority with the Canonical Books of the New Testament, yet to pay them a *proportionable Veneration*, both with respect to the *Authors* and to the *Writings* themselves.

III. *Thirdly*, Neither the Belief of the Genuineness of these Writings, nor the respect paid to them as such, does in the least diminish from the Authority of the New Testament, or tend to make the number of the Canonical Books uncertain or precarious.

This is the difficulty, on which Mr. T. seems particularly to insist, as if it were impossible for those who believe the Genuineness of these Writings to give any tolerable reason why they do not admit them into the Canon of the New Testament, as well as several others, which are now received: And therefore I shall endeavour to be somewhat more exact and particular in giving an Answer to it.

I. First then, tho' we have great Reason to believe these Books to be Genuine, yet have we not the same *certainty* of it, as we have of the Genuineness of the Books receiv'd into the Canon of the New Testament. The Books of the *New Testament*, as it might be proved of every one of them particularly, were received at their first coming forth as being written by Divine Inspiration, and were quoted as such by *Irenæus* and others

thers of the Ancientest Fathers: And though upon occasion of some Disputes that arose afterwards among Christians, the Authority of some few of those Books came to be called in Question; (not to speak at present of those Hereticks, the *Cerinthians*, *Marcionites*, *Manichees*, and others, who rejected whatsoever made against their absurd Opinions;) yet those few Questioned Books were so far from being (as Mr. T. falsely asserts) *rejected a long time by all Christians almost with universal consent*, that even those Books were not only kept entire

\* Γνωρίμων δ' ἐν ὁμοίαις τοῖς πολλοῖς — ὁμοίαις δ' ὡς πλείστοις ἢ ἐκκλησιαστικῶν γνησιότητάς. *Hist. l. 3. c. 25.*

ἡ ἑτέρα δὲ τέρων, ἕκ ἐνδιὰθρον μὲν, εἶναι παρελήφμεν, ὁμοίαις δ' πολλοῖς χρήσιμῳ φασί, μετὰ ἢ ἄλλων ἐσπεύδαθῃ γερῶν. *lib. 3. c. 3:*

from the beginning, but (as *Eusebius* expressly testifies) were \* owned by *most* Doctors of the Church, and were all along read together with the other Scriptures; and at last, upon the full and exact examination of all Circumstances, the matter being

put out of Question, they were unanimously received, as well by those Churches where they were doubted before, as by all other Christian Churches, into the Canon of Scripture; and so have been continued ever since by universal consent, and by the uninterrupted Succession of Christians in all Ages. Whereas of those Writings which we are now speaking of, that which is the least controverted, *viz.* the Epistle of *Clemens*, was for many Ages thought to be utterly lost: and though upon its appearing again, the best Criticks in the World thought they had *good reason* to pronounce it *Genuine*; yet they could not be so sure that it was free from corruption and interpolation, as we are of those Writings which were never lost. And

NOW

now this Argument is of peculiar force against Mr. T. For if he thinks, as he says, that he can with all the ease in the World prove these Writings spurious; (which notwithstanding his vain boast, he will never be able to perform;) he may at least allow those, who do not doubt but they are Genuine, yet not to advance them above their own rank, and place them among those which by the Universal Church have been received into the Canon of the New Testament.

2. *Secondly*, Though the matter of these Writings be such, as that they do therefore deserve very great veneration and respect; yet is there plainly something *humane*, something of *infirmit*, something of *infallibility* in them, for which they are with all reason thought inferior to the Writings of the Apostles. And this Argument is also peculiarly strong against Mr. T. For if he thinks, as he says, that he can with all the ease in the World show the *Ignorance* and *Superstition* of the Authors of these Writings; well may he allow those, who so far differ from him in this, as to think they deserve the high Character of Primitive, Holy, and Apostolical Men, yet not to presume to equal them with the Apostles themselves.

3. *Thirdly*, When we have made the best judgment of things, that we can possibly at this distance of time, we cannot after all but pay some deference to the judgment of the Ancients, especially when assembled in a Council; and allow them to judge somewhat better in the Ages next after our Saviour, what Writings were of Authority to be made the Standard and Rule of Faith, than we can after seventeen hundred

§

years;

years : Especially since of the doubted Books, which were sometime read promiscuously with the uncontroverted, 'tis plain they received such only into the Canon, whose stile, and matter, and agreement with the rest of the Apostolical Writings, do sufficiently prove them to have judged wisely and upon good Grounds. But this Argument is of no force with Mr. T.

4. *Fourthly*, Therefore, and which is a direct decision of this Question, I add, that the true reason why such a certain and determinate number of Writings are received as the Canon of Scripture, that is, as 'an Authoritative Rule of Faith and Manners, is because they were *written by the Apostles themselves*. (who are acknowledged to have been guided by an infallible Spirit,) or which is all one, were *dictated, reviewed and approved by them or some of them*. All the Books of the New Testament, except the Gospels of St. Mark, and St. Luke, and the *Acts of the Apostles*, are therefore received as Canonical, because the Church upon undoubted Grounds believes them to be *written immediately by the Apostles themselves*; and these three Books are therefore received as Canonical likewise, because we believe them to have been *dictated, reviewed and approved by some of the Apostles*. And this is a plain and direct reason, though Mr. T. is so modest to say *he never heard* of it, why the Writings of St. Mark and Luke, who were only Companions of the Apostles are received among the Canonical Writings of the Apostles; and yet the Epistles of *Clement* and *Barnabas*, who were Fellow-labours with the Apostles, are not. And that this is indeed the true reason, why some Books are received as of infallible Authority, and others  
not;

not ; may be sufficiently proved to any unprejudiced person, from what we find in the Ancients concerning this matter. That *all Books acknowledged to be written by the Apostles, were always received as of unquestionable Authority* is evident. The Question concerning any doubted Book, being not whether the Writing of an Apostle should be received as of good Authority or not, but whether that Writing said to be an Apostle's, were indeed the Writing of him whose name it bore. That *the reason why the Writings of St. Mark and St. Luke were always received as of certain Authority*, was not because they were Contemporaries with the Apostles, (for so were *Clemens* and *Hermas*, and *Barnabas*,) but *because their Writings were particularly approved and authorized by the Apostles*, is plain from *Eusebius* ; who tells us expressly that *St. Peter*

received and approved the Gospel of *St. Mark*, and that || it was this approbation that authorized it to be received by the Churches : In like manner, \* That *St. John* reviewed all the Gospels, and confirmed the truth of them : *Irenæus* likewise tells us\* that *what St. Mark wrote, was dictated by St. Peter* ; and that † *the Gospel of St. Luke was only a Transcript of St. Paul's Preaching* : *St. Paul* himself plainly refers to it, *1 Cor.* 15. 5. where declaring unto

the *Corinthians* the Gospel which he had before Preached, he puts them in mind *how that Christ rose from the dead according to the Scriptures, and that he was seen of Cephas, &c.* which appearance

|| Κυρῶσαι τε τῷ γεγραμῶ εἰς ἔνδοξον ταῖς ἐκκλησίαις. *l. 2. c. 15,*

\* Ἦδὼ δὲ Μάρκος ἢ Λουκᾶ ἦδ' κατ' αὐτὲς εὐαγγελίων τῶ ἕκαστον πεποιηθῶν. Ἰωάν' λω — ἀποδέξασθαι μὲν φασιν, ἀλήθειαν αὐτοῖς ἐπιμαρτυρήσαντα. *l. 3. c. 44.*

\* *Marcus* discipulus & interpres *Petri*, quæ à *Petro* annunciata erant, edidit. *3. cap. 1.*

† *Lucas* sectator *Pauli*, quod ab illo prædicabatur, Evangelium in Libro condidit. *Ibid.*

of our Saviour to *Peter*, is no where mentioned but in Saint *Luke's Gospel*, *Luke 24. 34.*

And in the first Epistle to *Timothy 5. 18.* he quotes it with the *express Title of Scripture*; *The Scripture saith, The Labourer is worthy of his Hire*; which words are no where found in Scripture, but in *St. Luke's Gospel*, *Luke 10. v. 7.* So that 'tis without great reason, that Learned Men have judged it to be *St. Luke's Gospel*, which the Apostle calls *his own Gospel*, *2 Tim. 2. 8.* and elsewhere. And then for the *Acts of the Apostles*, 'tis plain they are an Account of *St. Paul's Travels*, || written before his Death; so that they are with all reason believed to have been approved by him;

|| Baron. ad ann. 61.

\* Sunt enim Acta δούτερου eius operis λόγου eius πρώτου λόγου ipse sciam agnoscit Evangelium. Acta postea ob Evangelio divulgata, quibus commodius visum, ob locorum faciliorem expeditionemque invicem comparationem, Evangelistas separato codice complecti, et ab Actis secernere. *Dodwell. Dissertat. 1. in Irenaeum.*

† Vid. *Tertull. adversus Marcion. lib. 5. sub. initio.*

and if they were not, yet \* being anciently the same Book with the Gospel of *St. Luke*, they were undoubtedly reviewed by *St. John*, together with it, and their Authority was hardly ever, that I know of, called in question by any, but † *Marcion the Heretic*. Lastly, *That no other Books, however written by the Contemporaries of the Apostles were received*

*by the Ancients as of infallible and decisive Authority in matters of Dispute* is evident. *Eusebius* tells us expressly that the Authority of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* was questioned by some, not because they doubted whether it was written in the Age of the

Apostles. (for that they could not,) but \* because the Church of *Rome* thought it not to be written by *St. Paul*. The Pastor of *Hermas* also (as || the same

\* Ἰνδὸς ἀπετέλει τὴν πρὸς Ἑβραίους, πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἐκκλησίαν ἐς τὴν Παύλου ἵσαν ἀποστολὴν ἀνηλεῶς θάσσαντες. *lib. 2. cap. 2.*

|| Idem ibidem.

same Author tells us) was esteemed so much as to be read publickly in Churches and yet never received as of infallible Authority : Nay *Origen* goes farther, and thinks it to be not only a *useful* Book, but written \* even with some degree of Inspiration ; and yet || imposes it not upon any one to be received as Scripture.

In like manner the Epistle of *Clemens*, though the most unquestioned Piece in all Antiquity, and (as *Eusebius* styles it) \* ἀνωμολογημένη παρὰ πάντων, yet it is by the same Author † elsewhere reckoned up among the Apocryphal Pieces : that is, as *Cotelærius* well observes, not that any one doubted of its Genuineness or Excellency, but only that they would not reckon it among the Books τῆς θείας γραφῆς, to which *Eusebius* there opposes it.

The Truth is, the unquestioned Works of the Apostles were not anciently (as Mr. *Dodwel* confesses) kept in a distinct Book from the Apocryphal, but read and cited promiscuously with the Works of their immediate Successors : But then 'tis also certain, that as unquestioned Works of the Apostles, whenever they were cited, were looked upon by all as infallible and decisive ; so the other Pieces, whilst they were quoted and urged by some, might as freely be denied or not yielded to by others.

Vainly therefore doth Mr. *T.* object, That they who believe the Epistle of *Clemens* and the rest to be genuine, cannot give any reason why they do not admit it into the Canon of Scripture. And as falsely does he insinuate, that the Establishment of that Canon is uncertain and precarious. Could it be proved,

\* Quæ scriptura valdè mihi utilis videtur, &c, ut puto, divinitus inspirata. *Origen.* in Rom. 16. 14.

|| Si cui tamen Scriptura illa recipienda videtur. *Origen.* Rom. 8. in *Nun.*

\* Lib. 3.

c. 38.

† Lib. 6.

c. 13.

proved, *That the Epistles of James and of Peter, and of Jude, or any of them, were not written by those whose Names they bear*; we should indeed be obliged to reject them: And could the *Preaching and Revelation of Peter* be proved to be genuine, we should be obliged to receive them into the Canon of the New Testament. But so far is it from being true, *That the Preaching and Revelation of Peter were so receiv'd by the Ancients, as by more than a parity of Reason, to claim admission into the Canon with his second Epistle, and the rest of the some time questioned Books, that on the contrary these Pieces (besides the arguments that may be drawn from the Writings themselves) were received by so few of the Ancients, as to make \*Eusebius think, (though in that indeed he was mistaken,) that they were never quoted by any of the Ancients at all.*

\* Τὸ, τε λεγόμενον αὐτῶ κήρυγμα, ἢ τὴν καλεσμένην ἀποκαλυψιν, ἐδ' ὅλως ἐν καθολικοῖς ἴσως παρεδεδουμένα ὅτι μῆτε ἀρχαίων, μῆτε τῶν καθ' ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκκλησιαστικῶς συγγραφεύς, ταῖς ἐξ αὐτῶν συνεχρήσατο μαρτυρίαις.  
Hist. l. 3. c. 3.

What Mr. T. has invidiously urged about the Divisions among the Fathers, and their want of exactness in their Reasonings, I suppose

will not move those, who know that Truth is nevertheless such for being surrounded with a multitude of Errors; and that Men did not then write in a Nice and Scholastick way, but in a plain and unpolite Stile, mixing *Arguments, Similitudes and Illustrations* promiscuously, which is the way of representing things popularly, and to mean Capacities.

*Thus I have endeavoured to give a short Answer to the Difficulties which M. T. has with great freedom proposed: Hoping that what I have here very briefly and*  
with



*with Submission hinted, may give occasion to some abler and more learned Pen, to treat of this Matter with that largeness and clearness, with which so great a Point well deserves to be handled.*

I am, Sir,

*Yours.*

*F I N I S.*

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
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