

THEOLOGICAL
SEMINARY

*The Libel against Professor William
Robertson Smith.*

Division _____
Session _____
No. _____

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

IN THE

FREE CHURCH PRESBYTERY
OF ABERDEEN,

FEBRUARY 14, TO MARCH 14, 1878.

WITH FORM OF LIBEL.

ABERDEEN:
ALEXANDER MURRAY, 216 UNION STREET.

EDINBURGH: MACLAREN & MACNIVEN.

GLASGOW: D. BRYCE & SON.

1878.



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Free Church of Scotland.
Presbytery of Aberdeen.
The libel against Professor
William Robertson Smith

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NOTE.

THE present reprint is made from the newspaper report of proceedings during the eight days on which the Presbytery were engaged in (1) discussion of the relevancy of the main charge of contradicting or being opposed to the Confession of Faith under the eight particulars stated; and (2) discussion of the general relevancy of the second charge of dangerous and unsettling tendency. The prior proceedings had reference only to matters of form. In order to keep the reprint within reasonable limits it has been found necessary so far to condense the speeches on both sides in the Presbytery, retaining the line of argument sufficiently in every case to bring out the points. The object of the reprint being to bring before the Church as clearly as possible the opinions of Professor Smith on all the points raised, his speeches—with, of course, the omission of remarks during incidental discussions on mere matters of form—have been reproduced, without any material abridgment, from the fullest available report—that in the *Daily Free Press*. The Draft Form of Libel is prefixed to enable the reader to follow the course of the argument intelligently at the different stages.



DRAFT FORM OF LIBEL.

THE FREE PRESBYTERY OF ABERDEEN

AGAINST

MR. WILLIAM ROBERTSON SMITH.

MR. WILLIAM ROBERTSON SMITH, Professor of Oriental Languages and Exegesis of the Old Testament at Aberdeen, you are indicted and accused, at the instance of the Free Presbytery of Aberdeen :—

That whereas the publishing and promulgating of opinions which contradict or are opposed to the doctrine of the immediate inspiration, infallible truth, and divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, or any part or parts thereof, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith, and to the doctrines of prophecy and angels therein set forth ; as also, the publishing and promulgating of opinions which are in themselves of a dangerous and unsettling tendency in their bearing on the doctrine of the immediate inspiration, infallible truth, and divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, or any part or parts thereof, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith, and in their bearing on the doctrines of prophecy and angels therein set forth ; as also, the publishing and promulgating of writings concerning the books of Holy Scripture, which writings, by their neutrality of attitude in relation to the said doctrines, and by their rashness of statement in regard to the critical construction of the Scriptures, tend to disparage the Divine authority and inspired character of these books, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith, are severally offences, especially in a Professor of Divinity, which call for such censure or other judicial sentence as may be found adequate ; and more particularly :—

Primo :—Albeit the opinion that the Aaronic priesthood, and at least a great part of the laws and ordinances of the Levitical system, were not divinely instituted in the time of Moses, and that those large parts of Exodus, Leviticus, and Numbers, which represent them as having been then instituted by God, were inserted in the inspired records long after the death of Moses :—

Secundo :—Albeit the opinion that the book of inspired Scripture called Deuteronomy, which is professedly an historical record, does not possess that character, but was made to assume it by a writer of a much later age, who therein, in the name of God, presented in dramatic form, instructions and laws as proceeding from the mouth of Moses, though these never were, and never could have been uttered by him :—

Tertio :—Albeit opinions which lower the character of the inspired writings to the level of uninspired, by ignoring their divine authorship, and by representing the sacred writers as taking freedoms and committing errors like other authors ; as giving explanations that were unnecessary and incorrect ; as putting fictitious speeches into the mouths of their historical characters ; as giving inferences of their own for facts ; as describing arrangements as made use of in their complete form at a certain time which were not completed till long afterwards ; and as writing under the influence of party spirit and for party purposes :—

Quarto :—Albeit the presentation of opinions which discredit the authenticity and canonical standing of books of Scripture by imputing to them a fictitious character ; by attributing to them what is disparaging ; and by stating discrediting opinions of others, without any indication of dissent therefrom :—

Quinto :—Albeit the opinion that the portion of Scripture known as Canticles, although included among the books which in the Confession of Faith are declared to have been immediately inspired by God, is devoid of any spiritual significance, and only presents a high example of virtue in a betrothed maiden, without any recognition of the Divine law, and that its deletion from the canon was providentially prevented by the prejudice in favour of an allegorical interpretation, to the effect that “from verse to verse the song sets forth the history of a spiritual, and not merely of an earthly love” :—

Sexto :—Albeit opinions which contradict or ignore the testimony given in the Old Testament, and also that of our Lord and His Apostles in the New Testament, to the authorship of Old Testament Scriptures, upon which authorship most momentous teaching was sometimes based :—

Septimo :—Albeit opinions which disparage prophecy by representing its predictions as arising merely from so-called spiritual insight, based on the certainty of God’s righteous purpose, and which exclude prediction in the sense of direct supernatural revelation of events long posterior to the prophet’s own age :—

Octavo :—Albeit the opinion that belief in the superhuman reality of the angelic beings of the Bible is matter of assumption rather than of direct teaching ; and that angels are endowed with special goodness and insight analogous to human qualities appears as a popular assumption, not as a doctrine of revelation :—

Albeit that all these opinions, or one or more of them do contradict or are opposed to the doctrine of the immediate inspiration, infallible truth, and divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith as aforesaid, and to the doctrines of prophecy and angels therein set forth ; as also are in themselves of a dangerous and unsettling tendency in their bearing on the doctrine of the immediate inspiration, infallible truth, and divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith as aforesaid, and in their bearing on the doctrines of prophecy and angels therein set forth ; as also that the writings containing these opinions do exhibit neutrality of attitude in relation to the said doctrines, and rashness of statement in regard to the critical construction of the Scriptures, tending to disparage the divine authority and inspired character of the books of Holy Scripture, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith as aforesaid :—

Yet, true it is, and of verity, that you, the said Mr. William Robertson Smith, are guilty of the said offence of publishing and promulgating opinions which do contradict or are opposed to the doctrine of the immediate inspiration, infallible truth, and divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, or part or parts thereof, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith, and to the doctrines of prophecy and angels therein also set forth : or otherwise of the said offence of publishing and promulgating opinions which are in themselves of a dangerous and unsettling tendency in their bearing on the doctrine of the immediate inspiration, infallible truth, and divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith, and in their bearing on the doctrines of prophecy and angels also therein set forth ; or otherwise of the said offence of publishing and promulgating writings concerning the books of Holy Scripture, which writings, by their neutrality of attitude in relation to the said doctrines, and by their rashness of statement in regard to the critical construction of Holy Scriptures, tend to disparage the divine authority of these books, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith, in so far as you, the said Mr. William Robertson Smith, have published and promulgated or concurred in the publishing and promulgating the following articles and remarks, of which you are the author, *videlicet* : articles “Angel,” “Bible,” “Canticles,” and “Chronicles,” in the ninth edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* ; also, article “The Sixteenth Psalm,” in *The Expositor*, number XXIII., of November 1876 ; and article “The Question of Prophecy in the Critical

Schools of the Continent," in the *British Quarterly Review* of April 1870; also, "Remarks" by Professor W. R. Smith on a memorandum of the sub-committee on the article "Bible" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, published in the College Committee's report to the General Assembly; all which publications being to be used in evidence against you, are lodged in the hands of the Clerk of the Presbytery, that you may have an opportunity of seeing the same; of which articles and remarks you have acknowledged yourself to be the author, to the said Free Presbytery of Aberdeen, at its meeting held there on the twelfth day of April, eighteen hundred and seventy-seven; in which articles and remarks you, the said Mr. William Robertson Smith, express opinions which do contradict or are opposed to the doctrine of the immediate inspiration, infallible truth, and divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, or part or parts thereof, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith, and to the doctrines of prophecy and angels also therein set forth: or otherwise you express opinions which are in themselves of a dangerous and unsettling tendency in their bearing on the doctrine of the immediate inspiration, infallible truth, and divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith, and in their bearing on the doctrines of prophecy and angels therein also set forth: or otherwise the said articles and remarks, of which you are the author, exhibit neutrality of attitude in relation to the said doctrines, and rashness of statement in regard to the critical construction of the Holy Scriptures, tending to disparage the divine authority and inspired character of the books of Scripture, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith. More particularly and without prejudice to the said generality:—

Primo:—You, the said Mr. William Robertson Smith, in the article "Bible," published in the foresaid edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, and at the pages thereof aftermentioned, expressed yourself as follows, *videlicet*, page 638a: ¶ "If then the Deuteronomic legislation is not earlier than the prophetic period of the 8th and 7th centuries, and, accordingly, is subsequent to the elements of the Pentateuchal history which we have seen to be known to Hosea, it is plain that the chronology of the composition of the Pentateuch may be said to centre in the question whether the Levitic-Elohistic document, which embraces most of the laws in Leviticus with large parts of Exodus and Numbers, is earlier or later than Deuteronomy. The answer to this question turns almost wholly on archaeological inquiries, for there is, perhaps, no *quite* conclusive reference to the Elohistic record in the Prophets before the Exile, or in Deuteronomy itself. And here arises the great dispute which divides critics, and makes our whole construction of the origin of the historical books uncertain. The Levitical laws give a graduated hierarchy of priests and Levites; Deuteronomy regards all Levites as at least possible priests. Round this difference, and points allied to it, the whole discussion turns. We know, mainly from Ezekiel xliv., that before the Exile the strict hierarchical law was not in force, apparently never had been in force. But can we suppose that the very idea of such a hierarchy is the latest point of liturgical development? If so, the Levitical element is the latest thing in the Pentateuch, or, in truth, in the historical series to which the Pentateuch belongs; or, on the opposite view, the hierarchy theory existed as a legal programme long before the Exile, though it was fully carried out only after Ezra. As all the more elaborate symbolic observances of the ritual law are bound up with the hierarchical ordinances, the solution of this problem has issues of the greatest importance for the theology as well as for the literary history of the Old Testament": Pages 634b and 635a: ¶ "A just insight into the work of the prophetic party in Israel was long rendered difficult by traditional prejudices. On the one hand the predictive element in prophecy received undue prominence, and withdrew attention from the influence of the prophets on the religious life of their own time; while, on the other hand, it was assumed, in accordance with Jewish notions, that all the ordinances, and almost, if not quite, all the doctrines of the Jewish church in the post-canonical period, existed from the earliest days of the theocracy. The prophets, therefore, were conceived partly as inspired preachers of old truths, partly as predicting future events, but not as leaders of a great development, in which the religious ordinances as well as the religious beliefs of the Old Covenant advanced from a relatively crude and imperfect to a relatively mature and adequate form. ¶ The proof that this latter view, and not the traditional conception, is alone true to history depends on a variety of arguments which cannot here be reproduced. That the religious ideas of the Old Testament were in a state of

growth during the whole prophetic period became manifest as soon as the laws of grammatico-historical exegesis were fairly applied to the Hebrew Scriptures. That the sacred ordinances were subject to variation was less readily admitted, because the admission involved a change of view as to the authorship of the Pentateuch; but here also the facts are decisive. . . . But perhaps the clearest proof that, during the period of prophetic inspiration, there was no doctrine of finality with regard to ritual law any more than with regard to religious ideas and doctrines, lies in the last chapters of Ezekiel, which sketch at the very era of the Captivity an outline of sacred ordinances for the future restoration. From these and similar facts it follows indisputably, that the true and spiritual religion which the prophets and like-minded priests maintained at once against heathenism and against unspiritual worship of Jehovah as a mere national deity without moral attributes, was not a finished but a growing system, not finally embodied in authoritative documents, but propagated mainly by direct personal efforts. At the same time these personal efforts were accompanied and supported by the gradual rise of a sacred literature. Though the priestly ordinances were mainly published by oral decisions of the priests, which are, in fact, what is usually meant by the word *law* (Torah), in writings earlier than the Captivity, there can be no reasonable doubt that the priests possessed written legal collections of greater or less extent from the time of Moses downwards. Again, the example of Ezekiel, and the obvious fact that the law-book found at the time of Josiah contained provisions which were not up to that time an acknowledged part of the law of the land, makes it probable that legal provisions which the prophets and their priestly allies felt to be necessary for the maintenance of the truth were often embodied in legislative programmes, by which previous legal tradition was gradually modified." Page 635b: ¶ "Previous reformers had been statesmen or prophets. Ezra is a scribe who comes to Jerusalem armed, not with a fresh message from the Lord, but with 'the book of the law of Moses.' This law-book was the Pentateuch, and the public recognition of it as the rule of the theocracy was the declaration that the religious ordinances of Israel had ceased to admit of development, and the first step towards the substitution of a *canon* or authoritative collection of Scriptures for the living guidance of the prophetic voice:" Page 636b: ¶ "But in its present shape the Pentateuch is certainly subsequent to the occupation, for it uses geographical names which arose after that time (Hebron, Dan), refers to the conquest as already accomplished (Deut. ii. 12, *cf.*; Num. xv. 32; Gen. xii. 6), and even presupposes the existence of a kingship in Israel (Gen. xxxvi. 31). And with this it agrees, that though there are marked differences of style and language within the book of Joshua, each style finds its counterpart in some section of the Pentateuch. In the subsequent books we find quite similar phenomena. The last chapters of Judges cannot be separated from the book of Samuel, and the earlier chapters of Kings are obviously one with the foregoing narrative; while all three books contain passages strikingly akin to parts of the Pentateuch and Joshua *cf.*, (for example, the book of Deuteronomy with Josh. xxiii., 1 Sam. xii., 1 Kings viii.) Such phenomena not only prove the futility of any attempt to base a theory of authorship on the present division into books, but suggest that the history as we have it is not one narrative carried on from age to age by successive additions, but a fusion of several narratives which partly covered the same ground and were combined into unity by an editor."

Secundo.—You, the said Mr. William Robertson Smith, in the foresaid article "Bible," published in the foresaid Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, expressed yourself, at page 637b, as follows, *videlicet*: ¶ "Now the Book of Deuteronomy presents a quite distinct type of style which, as has been already mentioned, recurs from time to time in passages of the later books, and that in such a connection as to suggest to many critics since Graf the idea, that the Deuteronomic hand is the hand of the last editor of the whole history from Genesis to Kings, or, at least, of the non-Levitical parts thereof. This conclusion is not stringent, for a good deal may be said in favour of the view that the Deuteronomic style, which is very capable of imitation, was adopted by writers of different periods. But even so it is difficult to suppose that the legislative part of Deuteronomy is as old as Moses. If the law of the kingdom in Deuteronomy xvii. was known in the time of the Judges, it is impossible to comprehend Judges viii. 23, and above all 1 Samuel viii. 7. That the law of high places given in this part of the Pentateuch was not acknowledged till the time of Josiah,

and was not dreamed of by Samuel and Elijah, we have already seen. The Deuteronomic law is familiar to Jeremiah, the younger contemporary of Josiah, but is referred to by no prophet of earlier date. And the whole theological stand-point of the book agrees exactly with the period of prophetic literature, and gives the highest and most spiritual view of the law, to which our Lord himself directly attaches his teaching, and which cannot be placed at the beginning of the theocratic development without making the whole history unintelligible. Beyond doubt the book is, as already hinted, a prophetic legislative programme; and if the author put his work in the mouth of Moses, instead of giving it, with Ezekiel, a directly prophetic form, he did so not in pious fraud, but simply because his object was not to give a new law, but to expound and develop Mosaic principles in relation to new needs. And as ancient writers are not accustomed to distinguish historical data from historical deductions, he naturally presents his views in dramatic form in the mouth of Moses." As also, in your said "Remarks on Memorandum of the Sub-Committee on the article Bible," expressed yourself as follows, *videlicet*, page 20: ¶ "When my position is thus discriminated from the theories of those who like Kuenen ascribe the origin of Deuteronomy to a pious fraud, I do not think that it will be found to involve any more serious innovation in our conception of the method of revelation than this—that the written record of the revelation of God's will which is necessary unto salvation makes use of certain forms of literary presentation which have always been thought legitimate in ordinary composition, but which were not always understood to be used in the Bible." And at page 21 of the said Remarks you expressed yourself thus: ¶ "It is asked whether our Lord does not bear witness to the Mosaic authorship of Deuteronomy. If this were so, I should feel myself to be on very dangerous and untenable ground. But it appears to me that only a very strained exegesis can draw any inference of authorship from the recorded words of our Saviour."

Tertio:—You, the said Mr. William Robertson Smith, in the article "Chronicles," in the foresaid Edition of the "Encyclopædia Britannica," and at the pages after-mentioned, expressed yourself as follows, *videlicet*, pages 708b-709a: ¶ "In general, then, it seems safe to conclude with Ewald, Bertheau, and other cautious critics, that there is no foundation for the accusation that the Chronicler invented history in the interest of his parenetic and practical purposes. But on the other hand it is not to be doubted that in shaping his narrative he allowed himself the same freedoms as were taken by other ancient historians, and even by early copyists, and it is the business of historical criticism to form a clear conception of the nature and limits of these freedoms with a view to distinguish in individual passages between the facts derived by the Chronicler from his written sources and the literary additions, explanations, and inferences which are his own. In particular: ¶ 1. His explanations of verbal and material difficulties must be critically considered. Thus even Keil admits an error in 2 Chron. xx. 36, 37, where the Tbarskish-ships, that is ships fit for a long voyage, which Jehoshaphat built on the Red Sea (1 Kings xxii. 48), are explained as ships voyaging to Tartessus in Spain. Such criticism is especially necessary where remarks are introduced tending to explain away the differences in religious observances between early times and the period of the Chronicler. Thus in 1 Chron. xxi. 28, sqq., an explanation is given of the reasons which led David to sacrifice on the threshing-floor of Ornan instead of going to the brazen altar at Gibeon. But it is certain that at the time of David the principle of a single altar was not acknowledged, and therefore no explanation was required. In 1 Kings iii. 3, 4, Gibeon appears only as the chief of many high places, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Chronicler has simply *inferred* from the importance of this sanctuary that it must have possessed a special legitimation, which could only consist in the presence of the old brazen altar. ¶ 2. A certain freedom of literary form was always allowed to ancient historians, and need not perplex anyone who does not apply a false standard to the narrative. To this head belongs especially the introduction of speeches like that of Abijah in 2 Chron. xiii. This speech is no doubt a free composition, and would be so understood by the author's contemporaries. By such literary devices the author was enabled to point a lesson without interrupting the thread of his narrative by reflections of his own. Similar remarks apply to the psalm in 1 Chron. xvi., which is made up of extracts from Psalms cv., xcvi., cvi. ¶ 3. A usage not peculiar to the Chronicler among Old Testament writers, and which must be carefully taken into account by the historical critic, is that of giving statistical

information in a narrative form. . . . A different application of the same principle seems to lie in the account of the institutions of Levitical service which is introduced in connection with the transference of the ark to Jerusalem by David. The author is not concerned to distinguish the gradual steps by which the Levitical organization attained its full development. But he wishes to describe the system in its complete form, especially as regards the service of the singers, and he does this under the reign of David, who was the father of Hebrew psalmody, and the restorer of the sanctuary of the ark :” Pages 706b-707a : ¶ “What seems to be certain and important for a right estimate of the book is that the author lived a considerable time after Ezra, and stood entirely under the influence of the religious institutions of the new theocracy. This standpoint determined the nature of his interest in the early history of his people. ¶ The true importance of Hebrew history had always centred in the fact that this petty nation was the people of Jehovah, the spiritual God. The tragic interest which distinguishes the annals of Israel from the forgotten history of Moab or Damascus lies wholly in that long contest which finally vindicated the reality of spiritual things and the supremacy of Jehovah’s purpose, in the political ruin of the nation which was the faithless depositary of these sacred truths. After the captivity it was impossible to write the history of Israel’s fortunes otherwise than in a spirit of religious pragmatism. But within the limits of the religious conception of the plan and purpose of the Hebrew history more than one point of view might be taken up. The Book of Kings looks upon the history in the spirit of the Prophets—in that spirit which is still echoed by Zechariah (i. 5, 6) : ‘Your fathers, where are they? And the prophets, could they live for ever? But my words and my statutes, which I commanded my servants the prophets, did they not overtake your fathers? so that they turned and said, Like as Jehovah of Hosts thought to do unto us . . . so hath he dealt with us.’ But long before the Chronicler wrote, the last spark of prophecy was extinct. The New Jerusalem of Ezra was organized as a municipality and a Church, not as a nation. The centre of religious life was no longer the living prophetic word but the ordinances of the Pentateuch and the liturgical service of the sanctuary. The religious vocation of Israel was no longer national but ecclesiastical or municipal, and the historical continuity of the nation was vividly realized only within the walls of Jerusalem and the courts of the Temple, in the solemn assembly and stately ceremonial of a feast day. These influences naturally operated most strongly on those who were officially attached to the sanctuary. To a Levite, even more than to other Jews, the history of Israel meant above all things the history of Jerusalem, of the Temple, and of the Temple ordinances. Now the author of Chronicles betrays on every page his essentially Levitical habit of mind. It even seems possible from a close attention to his descriptions of sacred ordinances to conclude that his special interests are those of a common Levite rather than of a priest, and that of all Levitical functions he is most partial to those of the singers, a member of whose guild Ewald conjectures him to have been. To such a man the older delineation of the history of Israel, especially in the books of Samuel and Kings, could not but appear to be deficient in some directions, while in other respects its narrative seemed superfluous or open to misunderstanding, as for example by recording, and that without condemnation, things inconsistent with the Pentateuchal law. The history of the ordinances of worship holds a very small place in the older record. Jerusalem and the Temple have not that central place in the book of Kings which they occupied in the mind of the Jewish community after the Exile. Large sections of the old history are devoted to the religion and politics of the ten tribes, which are altogether unintelligible and uninteresting when measured by a strictly Levitical standard ; and in general the whole problems and struggles of the prophetic period turn on points which had ceased to be cardinal in the life of the New Jerusalem, which was no longer called to decide between the claims of the Word of Jehovah and the exigencies of political affairs and social customs, and which could not comprehend that men absorbed in deeper spiritual contests had no leisure for the niceties of Levitical legislation. Thus there seemed to be room for a new history, which should confine itself to matters still interesting to the theocracy of Zion, keeping Jerusalem and the Temple in the foreground, and developing the divine pragmatism of the history, not so much with reference to the prophetic word as to the fixed legislation of the Pentateuch, so that the whole narrative might be made to teach that the glory of Israel lies in the observance of the divine law and ritual :” Page 707b : ¶ “In the later history the ten tribes are quite neglected, and political affairs in Judah receive

attention, not in proportion to their intrinsic importance, but according as they serve to exemplify God's help to the obedient and His chastisement of the rebellious. That the author is always unwilling to speak of the misfortunes of good rulers is not to be ascribed with some critics to a deliberate suppression of truth, but shows that the book was throughout composed not in purely historical interests, but with a view to inculcate a single practical lesson. The more important additions which the Chronicler makes to the old narrative consist partly of statistical lists (1 Chron. xii.), partly of full details on points connected with the history of the sanctuary and the great feasts or the archæology of the Levitical ministry . . . and partly of narratives of victories and defeats, of sins and punishments, of obedience and its reward, which could be made to point a plain religious lesson in favour of the faithful observance of the law The minor variations of Chronicles from the books of Samuel and Kings are analogous in principle to the larger additions and omissions, so that the whole work has a consistent and well-marked character, presenting the history in quite a different perspective from that of the old narrative. ¶ Here, then, a critical question arises. Is the change of perspective wholly due to a different selection of items from authentic historical tradition? May we assume that everything which is new in the Chronicles has been taken exactly from older sources, or must we judge that the standpoint of the author has not only governed the selection, but coloured the statement of historical facts? Are all his novelties new data, or are some of them inferences of his own from the same data as lie before us in other books of the Bible?"

Quarto.—You, the said Mr. William Robertson Smith, in the said article "Bible," published in the foresaid Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, and at the pages aftermentioned, expressed yourself as follows, *videlicet*, page 639b: ¶ "In the book of Job we find poetical invention of incidents, attached for didactic purposes to a name apparently derived from old tradition. There is no valid *à priori* reason for denying that the Old Testament may contain other examples of the same art. The book of Jonah is generally viewed as a case in point. Esther, too, has been viewed as a fiction by many who are not over sceptical critics; but on this view a book which finds no recognition in the New Testament, and whose canonicity was long suspected by the Christian as well as by the Jewish Church, must sink to the rank of an apocryphal production. ¶ In the poetical as in the historical books anonymous writing is the rule; and along with this we observe great freedom on the part of readers and copyists, who not only made verbal changes (*cf.* Psalm xiv. with Psalm liii.), but composed new poems out of fragments of others (Psalm cviii. with lvii. and lx.) In a large part of the Psalter a later hand has systematically substituted Elohim for Jehovah, and an imperfect acrostic, like Ps. ix., x., cannot have proceeded in its present form from the first author. Still more remarkable is the case of the book of Job, in which the speeches of Elihu quite break the connection, and are almost universally assigned to a later hand:" Page 640b: ¶ "In this sketch of the prophetic writings we find no place for the book of Daniel, which, whether composed in the early years of the Persian empire, or, as modern critics hold, at the time of the Maccabean wars, presents so many points of diversity from ordinary prophecy as to require entirely separate treatment. It is in point of form the precursor of the apocalyptic books of post-canonical Judaism, though in its intrinsic qualities far superior to these, and akin to the prophets proper:" Pages 635b, 636a: ¶ "The miscellaneous character of the Ketubim" [embracing Psalms, Proverbs, Job, Canticles, Ruth, Lamentations, Ecclesiastes, Esther, Daniel, Ezra, Nehemiah, and Chronicles] "seems, in fact, to show that after the Law and the Prophets were closed, the third part of the canon was open to receive additions, recommended either by their religious and historical value, or by bearing an ancient and venerable name. And this was the more natural because the Hagiographa had not the same place in the synagogue service as was accorded to the Law and the Prophets."

Quinto.—You, the said Mr. William Robertson Smith, in the aforesaid article "Canticles," published in the aforesaid Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, and at the pages aftermentioned, expressed yourself as follows, *videlicet*, page 32b: ¶ "To tradition, again, we owe the still powerful prejudice in favour of an allegorical interpretation, that is, of the view that from verse to verse the Song sets forth the history of a spiritual and not merely of an earthly love. To apply such an exegesis to Canticles is to violate one of the first principles of reasonable interpretation. True

allegories are never without internal marks of their allegorical design. The language of symbol is not so perfect that a long chain of spiritual ideas can be developed without the use of a single spiritual word or phrase; and even were this possible it would be false art in the allegorist to hide away his sacred thoughts behind a screen of sensuous and erotic imagery, so complete and beautiful in itself as to give no suggestion that it is only the vehicle of a deeper sense. Apart from tradition no one, in the present state of exegesis, would dream of allegorizing poetry which in its natural sense is so full of purpose and meaning, so apt in sentiment, and so perfect in imagery as the lyrics of Canticles. We are not at liberty to seek for allegory except where the natural sense is incomplete. This is not the case in the Song of Solomon. On the contrary, every form of the allegorical interpretation which has been devised carries its own condemnation in the fact that it takes away from the artistic unity of the poem and breaks natural sequences of thought. The allegorical interpretation of the Song of Solomon had its rise in the very same conditions which forced a deeper sense, now universally discarded, upon so many other parts of Scripture." Page 35a: ¶ "The heroine appears in the opening scene in a difficult and painful situation, from which in the last chapter she is happily extricated. But the dramatic progress which the poem exhibits scarcely involves a plot in the usual sense of that word. The words of viii. 9, 10, clearly indicate that the deliverance of the heroine is due to no combination of favouring circumstances, but to her own inflexible fidelity and virtue. In accordance with this her *rôle* throughout the poem is simply a steadfast adherence to the position which she takes up in the opening scene, where she is represented as concentrating her thoughts upon her absent lover with all that stubborn force of will which is characteristic of the Hebrews, and as frustrating the advances of the king by the mere naive intensity of pre-occupied affection." Page 35b: ¶ "We learn that she was an inhabitant of Shulem or Shunem in Issachar, whom the king and his train surprised in a garden on the occasion of a royal progress through the north. Her beauty drew from the ladies of the court a cry of admiration." And page 36b: ¶ "A poem in the northern dialect, with a northern heroine and scenery, contrasting the pure simplicity of Galilee with the corrupt splendour of the court of Solomon, is clearly the embodiment of one phase of the feeling which separated the ten tribes from the house of David. The kingdom of Solomon was an innovation on old traditions partly for good and partly for evil. But novelties of progress and novelties of corruption were alike distasteful to the north, which had long been proud of its loyalty to the principles of the good old times. The conservative revolution of Jeroboam was in great measure the work of the prophets, and must therefore have carried with it the religious and moral convictions of the people. An important element in these convictions, which still claims our fullest sympathy, is powerfully set forth in the Canticles, and the deletion of the book from the canon, providentially averted by the allegorical theory, would leave us without a most necessary complement to the Judean view of the conduct of the ten tribes which we get in the historical books. Written in a spirit of protest against the court of Zion, and probably based on recollections of an actual occurrence, the poem cannot be dated long after the death of Solomon."

Sexto:—You, the said Mr. William Robertson Smith, in the aforesaid article "Bible," published in the foresaid Edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica at page 638b, expressed yourself as follows, *videlicet*: ¶ "The assertion that no Psalm is certainly David's is hyper-septical, and few remains of ancient literature have an authorship so well attested as the 18th or even as the 7th Psalm. These, along with the indubitably Davidic poems in the book of Samuel, give a sufficiently clear image of a very unique genius, and make the ascription of several other poems to David extremely probable. So, too, a very strong argument claims Psalm ii. for Solomon, and in later times we have sure landmarks in the psalms of Habakkuk (Hab. iii.) and Hezekiah (Isaiah xxxviii.) But the greater part of the lyrics of the Old Testament remain anonymous, and we can only group the Psalms in broad masses, distinguished by diversity of historical situation and by varying degrees of freshness and personality. As a rule the older Psalms are the most personal, and are not written for the congregation, but flow from a present necessity of individual (though not individualistic) spiritual life. This current of productive psalmody runs apparently from David down to the Exile, losing in the course of centuries something of its original freshness and fire, but gaining a more chastened pathos and a wider range of spiritual sympathy.

Psalm li., obviously composed during the desolation of the temple, marks, perhaps, the last phase of this development." As also in the same article "Bible," you expressed yourself in the terms already quoted under heads "Primo" and "Secundo." As also in the same article "Bible," page 640b, in the said Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica you expressed yourself as follows, *videlicet* : ¶ "In the period of Exile more than one anonymous prophet raised his voice; for not only the 'Great Unnamed' of Isaiah xl.-lxvi., but the authors of other Babylonian prophecies, are probably to be assigned to this time."

Septimo :—You, the said Mr. William Robertson Smith, in the aforesaid article "The Question of Prophecy in the Critical Schools of the Continent," published in the *British Quarterly Review*, of April, 1870, and at the pages aftermentioned, expressed yourself as follows, *videlicet*, page 326 : ¶ "The prophets prophesied into the future, but not directly to the future. Their duties lay with their own age, and only by viewing them as they move amidst their contemporaries does the critic learn to love and to admire them : " Page 323 : ¶ "True prophecy is always ideal, seeking to grasp, not the immediate future, but the eternal and unchanging principle which Jehovah, the living God, is ever working out more fully among his people. The critical study of prophecy has done no greater service than to point out how small a fraction of the prophetic writings is strictly predictive." As also in the said article "Bible," published in the foresaid Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica, at page 640a, you expressed yourself as follows, *videlicet* : ¶ "The prophecies contain—1st, reproof of present sin ; 2d, exhortation to present duty ; 3d, encouragement to the godly and threatening to the wicked, based on the certainty of God's righteous purpose. In this last connection prophecy is predictive. It lays hold of the ideal elements of the theocratic conception, and depicts the way in which, by God's grace, they shall be actually realized in a Messianic age, and in a nation purified by judgment and mercy. But in all this the prophet starts from present sin, present needs, present historical situations. There is no reason to think that a prophet ever received a revelation which was not spoken directly and pointedly to his own time." As also in article, "The Sixteenth Psalm," published in "The Expositor," No. XXIII., of Nov., 1876, at the pages aftermentioned you expressed yourself as follows, *videlicet*, page 369 : ¶ "That the sixteenth psalm delineates an ideal which throughout the Old Testament dispensation was never realized fully,—that is, in a whole life,—but which only expressed the highest climax of subjective conviction, was not felt to detract from its religious truth. Nay, in religion the ideal *is* the true. The destiny of him who is admitted into full fellowship with God *is* life, and if that fellowship has never yet been perfectly realized, it must be realized in time to come in the consummation of God's kingdom and righteousness. This, like other glorious promises of God, is deferred because of sin ; but, though deferred is not cancelled. Thus the Psalm, originally an expression of direct personal persuasion, must necessarily in its place in the Old Testament liturgy, have acquired a prophetic significance, and so must have been accepted as parallel to such highest anticipations of eschatological prophecy as Isaiah xxv. 8—'He hath swallowed up death for ever : " Page 370 : ¶ "We may say, then, that in the mouth of the Psalmist himself our psalm did not set forth a remote prophecy or a religious problem, but a truth of direct spiritual intuition. But accepted into the Old Testament liturgy as an expression of the faith of Israel, and so confronted with that experience of sin and imperfect communion with God of which the Old Testament was so sensible, it necessarily became part of a problem which runs through the whole dispensation, while at the same time was a help towards the solution of the problem. Like other psalms, in which the ideal is developed in the teeth of the empirical, it came to possess a prophetic value for the Church, and it was felt to set forth truth only in so far as it was transferred from the present to the future : " Page 371 : ¶ "The psalm is fulfilled in Christ, because in Christ the transcendental ideal of fellowship with God which the psalm sets forth becomes a demonstrated reality. And becoming true of Christ, the psalm is also true of all who are his, and in the Psalmist's claim to use it for himself the soundness of his religious insight is vindicated ; for Christ faced death not only for Himself, but as our Surety and Head."

Octavo :—You, the said Mr. William Robertson Smith, in the aforesaid article "Angel," published in the foresaid Edition of the Encyclopædia Britannica at the pages aftermentioned, expressed yourself as follows, *videlicet*, page 27a :—"It is indeed certain,—to pass to the second side of the doctrine,—that the angelic figures of

REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS

IN THE

FREE PRESBYTERY OF ABERDEEN.

THE Free Presbytery of Aberdeen met at Ten o'clock A.M., on 14th February, in the Hall of the Free West Church—Professor S. D. F. SALMOND, Moderator—in order to resume consideration of the case of Rev. Professor Smith. There was a large attendance of the members of Presbytery as well as of the public.

The Moderator laid down the rules on which the debate was to be conducted.

Principal BROWN said—Now that the Presbytery had reached the stage when they might consider the relevancy, he had a motion to submit. As to the statement Professor Smith had given in in pamphlet form, his first thought had been that as what he had previously written remained absolutely untouched by that statement, he would just pause once or twice when an additional remark or two were suggested. On second thoughts he would not even do that, but only in closing add a sentence or two regarding that statement. Principal Brown then, in reference to the form of his motion, went on to say that the Libel really meant one charge in three diminishing degrees of gravity, the eight particulars being, not charges, but so many examples or illustrations of the charge. What he meant to do at present then, in order to find whether the general charge was relevant, was to select the first two particulars, to discover whether an offence inferring censure was contained in them as supported by the extracts, and so a relevant charge contained in the major and minor. His feelings in undertaking this duty were such as the Presbytery would not envy, but he did it under the compulsor of truth. The Libel Committee had acted wisely in not putting Deuteronomy in the fore front of the Libel, seeing the public had got it into their heads that it was the only thing that they need care much about. Well, as to the argument that the veracity of the writer and the authenticity of his writing are of far greater consequence than mere authorship or date, he could believe that the Pentateuch may have been made public as a written document considerably later than its presumed date, were there evidence to that effect. If its historical evidence were abundantly attested, he had no greater interest in the question of date than that referring to Biblical Introduction. But when we are told of Deuteronomy, for example, that, being, as on the face of it it is, professedly a historical record, it does not possess that character, but was only made to assume it by a writer who lived many ages after; that what is there re-

lated in lengthened detail, of speeches made and things done by Moses—filling nearly the whole of that book—is no history of actual occurrences at all, but is merely a historical dress, “in dramatic form,” put upon a certain state of things in the Israelitish history, to give it additional dignity and sacredness; that when Moses, after rehearsing the chief points in their history, and the great principles of their economy, is said to have written it down and caused it to be put beside the ark, he did nothing of the kind in point of fact, but is only represented to have done it; and that when he is said to have composed an extended song, recounting, in lofty poetic strains, all their past fortunes and all their future prospects, according as they should act towards God, which the people were to learn by heart, the writer of this book knew very well that Moses never did so, but that he himself was only putting it into the mouth of Moses:—what are we to say of such a book? I will not give a name to what it is; but I am safe in saying it is not authentic history; and if a professedly historical record it is destitute of the first requisite of all history—authenticity. Is it inspired history; and if it is not, can it possess divine authority? I trow not; and therefore I conclude that should any one in this Church hold and publish such a view of the book of Deuteronomy as his own, it would be a relevant charge. Now for *Primo*, the subject of which is the whole Levitical legislation embodied in the middle books of the Pentateuch, clearly the same remarks as on Deuteronomy apply here. If that legislation was not divinely instituted in the time, and under the direction of Moses, but was only inserted where we find it many years after his death, if this is held and published by any minister in this Church, I take it for granted that every court of our Church would pronounce this a relevant charge. Dr. Brown quoted the passage where Professor Smith says, “The Deuteronomic law is familiar to Jeremiah,” &c. (p. 7 of Libel), and proceeded:—The point I wish you to note here is not the date assigned to this book, but the naked admission that the book is not history. And if not, pray what is it? Dr. Kuenen calls it “a pious fraud”—a fraud, because he holds it was given forth as genuine Mosaic history, which it was not; but a pious fraud, because done for a pious purpose. Professor Smith says, no, not a fraud, because the generation to whom it was communicated knew what it was, and because its object was not to impose as history what was not such, but to “expound and develop Mosaic principles in relation to new needs.” This, sir, may be very ingenious, but if I had to choose between Kuenen’s view and this, I should say that Kuenen’s was at least intelligible, whereas I doubt whether any Englishman—looking at the matter apart from our own case—would be able to comprehend how Professor Smith’s explanation explains anything at all. For of all conceivable ways of “expounding and developing Mosaic principles in relation to new needs”—supposing the author of Deuteronomy had that for his object—the very last plan he would dream of, I should think, would be to write a book of history, telling at great length, and in minute detail, that Jehovah, the living God—the God of truth—said to Moses what he never said to him, and bade Moses do, and Moses accordingly did, what he never bade him do, and never was done by Moses, and that this was

quite well known to those for whom it was meant. And now you will observe that the theory of the two critics (and that is what we have to do with) is exactly the same—that Deuteronomy is not an authentic history; the only difference being that Kuenen, believing that the religion of Israel and its records have no supernatural character, can say coolly that the whole thing is a pious fraud, while Professor Smith, happily differing from him in this, and holding Israel's religion to be supernatural and Divine, is driven to seek some other explanation of the theory consistent with that view. That he does think it consistent with it, I have not the shadow of a doubt; but that it is *not* so, but the reverse, I believe will be the verdict of this Church, and not only so, but the general body of believers in supernatural revelation, looking at the matter in a purely abstract light. I am constrained, therefore, to hold, in the light of the second particular, that this Libel is *relevant*—both in the *major* and in the *minor*—not only abstractly, but in respect of the particular case before us. Coming next to *Primo*, Dr. Brown read that count and relative extract (p. 5 of Libel), and said—The question here raised—as it is one between the “critics” among themselves—meaning those of the new school—is one we have only indirectly to do with. But I must state what it is. Both sides, then, of the advanced school are agreed in this, that the “hierarchical law”—meaning the sharp line of demarcation drawn in the middle books of the Pentateuch between the standing and functions of the *priests* and the *Levites*—was not in force before the Exile. Professor Smith says, not only was it not in force up to that time, but apparently it had never been in force. “We know” this, he says. And pray who are the “we” who know that? I don't know it. I will venture to say that, excepting himself, not a man in this Presbytery, if in this whole Church, knows it. I thought all believing Christendom knew just the reverse. But the “critics” know it, and when did they discover it? Why, but yesterday, when for the first time true criticism would seem to have arisen. And how have even they come to know it? Why, says Professor Smith, “mainly from Ezek. xlv.” Sir, I will not be dragged into an exegetical wrangle over that chapter. I had occasion once—I rather think before Professor Smith was born—to go pretty minutely into that darkest of all portions of Old Testament prophecy; and, however little I may have made of it, were I to indulge my own inclinations, I should undertake to show that there is not a vestige of ground for such astounding conclusions. And is it to be the boast of this modern criticism, that in seeking to establish the most startling of all Biblical theories, it has to hunt for proof of it in that pre-eminently difficult portion of Old Testament prophecy, the last nine chapters of Ezekiel? And, sir, is it learned criticism on that passage that yields such conclusions? Why, so far from that, nearly all their reasoning is as accessible to the English reader of his Bible as it is to the scholars, and I will venture to say that any intelligent reader of his English Bible is as competent to decide on it as the most profound scholar. But, now, a word on this “great dispute—(as Professor Smith calls it)—which divides critics, and makes our whole construction—(mark that word ‘our,’ makes our whole construction)—of the origin of the historical books un-

certain." And what is it? Simply this, whether the whole Levitical legislation did exist before the Exile, but up to that time was not in force, apparently never had been in force, but lay *in nubibus*? or, on the other hand, whether it never had any existence at all before the Exile. The dispute, you perceive, then, is not between them and us; it is not between the "critics," as they style themselves, and those who, under the not very respectful name of "traditionists," believe the Levitical legislation to have been—what the books recording it explicitly say it was—divinely instituted under Moses, and by him carried into effect while the Israelites yet lay encamped on the great plateau of Sinai; it is a dispute between one class of the advanced critical school and another. Yes, for they both hold that the Levitical legislation is not what the middle books of the Pentateuch represent it to be—that the Lord did not say unto Moses, "Take thou unto thee Aaron thy brother, and his sons with him, from among the children of Israel, that he may minister unto me in the priest's office," &c. (Dr. Brown here quoted the words, in which the priesthood is expressly assigned to Aaron and to his sons). Now, I say all this, related as matters of fact which then and there took place, is held to be no historic reality at all; and I suppose I may add that on the same view, though it is said that Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, representing the Levitical families, rebelled against Moses and Aaron, insisting that they had as good right to burn incense as priests, as Aaron and his sons, this never took place, the earth never swallowed them up, and the plague which broke out, and was only stayed by Aaron standing between the living and the dead, never did break out, and Aaron's rod never budded as a token to whom the priesthood exclusively belonged, nor was thereafter deposited in the ark—I say, I suppose we must hold this—I will not say *as what*, but at least as *not history*. And if not, pray how am I to know, when I am reading a historical work, whether I am reading history or no; for if ever any book professed upon its face to be a plain record of historical facts and nothing else, surely this is it. Well, I was saying that the "critics" of the advanced school are at one as to its not being history; and the difference amongst them simply is, whether it existed, but was not in force before the Exile; or whether it first took shape and saw the light after the Exile, when, Ezekiel having sketched it out, Ezra came to Jerusalem armed with the Pentateuch in this new form, with the whole middle books of it, embodying the whole Levitical legislation newly and deftly woven into the heart of it! This, sir, it seems, is "the great dispute which divides critics, and so divides them as to make *our* whole construction of the origin of the historical books uncertain." Alas! sir, for those who can accept either this pre-Exilic or the post-Exilic construction of the Pentateuch, or those whose construction of the origin of the historical books is rendered uncertain by such miserable speculations. What, then, is the conclusion to which I am driven, in the light of statements on which I am commenting, but that this form of Libel is relevant—relevant alike in the abstract and in its relations to the present case, relevant alike in the major and the minor proposition. Coming, in conclusion, to speak of Professor Smith's statement of the case in its general features, Dr. Brown said—If I have read that pamphlet

aright, it is more far-reaching and cuts deeper than most of his friends, I suspect, are prepared for. I refer to his views of what constitutes the inspiration of the Scriptures and the latitude which it provides for the admission of errors in the Bible, where its contents are thought not to affect what is spiritual and saving. But whether these views are right or wrong in themselves, the attempt to make it appear that this is the view taken of the Scriptures in our own Confession of Faith, is to me the most amazing thing in the whole pamphlet. Those of us who are old enough to have read the celebrated Tract XC. when it first came out, in which Dr. John Henry Newman, ere he dreamt that he was fast posting to Rome, endeavoured to show that nearly whole and total Romanism was recognised in the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England, will remember the astonishment which that tract created in the minds of Protestants and Romanists alike; and such will have some idea of the feeling with which I read this part of Professor Smith's defence. Still, I must not forget that it is the Libel itself, and not the statement in defence of it, which we have to decide on to-day. At the same time, if anything will tend to deepen the conviction of the Church that the case before it involves far deeper matter than many have hitherto thought, it will be the Defence he has now laid before us, and got us (I question if to his own advantage) to receive as a paper in this case. They had, said Dr. Brown, been accused of being the enemies of criticism; he was only the enemy of a criticism such as this, which outraged his common sense. He could scarcely believe that he had read aright the words on the title page of Dr. Candlish's pamphlet, "The Authority of Scripture Independent of Criticism." He would not be accused of undervaluing the witness of the Spirit, but to put it as a substitute in the place of criticism reminds me, said Dr. Brown, unpleasantly of the sarcastic conclusion of Hume's Essay on Miracles, that it appears on the whole that the only safe ground on which we ought to rest our belief in the Christian religion is, not human reason, but faith, and he that believes in the Christian religion on this ground is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which overturns all the rational principles of his nature. No, sir, give criticism its place as well as faith; but let it not be a criticism such as I have shown this to be in its results. Nor is it learned criticism at all. All the difficulties alleged to exist in what is called the traditional views have been seen and weighed by Jews and Christians alike from the very beginning. There is absolutely nothing new in them. And nearly all—certainly all of them that are of any moment—are as patent in our English Bible as in the original. Whether they have been all rightly met, may admit of question. Indeed, whether some of them admit of such a solution as would satisfy every believer in Revelation, may be doubted. But the new critics admit that their solution is encompassed with difficulties, and Professor Smith has professed himself willing to receive new and better light—which, from the deepest bottom of my heart, I hope and pray he may receive. For I could speak warmly of his qualities were this the time and place. But I cannot refrain from expressing my conviction that if this style of criticism is to be recognised as legitimate in this Church, it will revolutionise the whole Church in its

Biblical and Confessional theology. I shall not live to see it, but some now hearing me will; and knowing that "shortly I must put off this my tabernacle," after more than 40 years' service as an ordained minister, I have a duty laid upon me by my conscience, by my ordination vows, by my position in the college where I have taught for 20 years, and where I now preside. I have a duty to the whole professorial staff of the Free Church, of which I have lived to become the father—as, indeed (with one venerable exception), of the whole Professorship of Presbyterian Scotland—placed as those bodies are as special guardians of the Faith that has done so much for Scotland—in view of all these things, I have not been able to hold my peace nor keep in the background in a case which I hold to be so vital as this, and so I have braced myself up to express my mind as I have done, and to conclude with the following motion:—

The Presbytery having considered the Form of Libel against Professor Smith, and heard him thereon, resolve that the same, including its three charges in the major proposition, and the corresponding averments and extracts in the minor proposition, in their bearing upon these charges respectively, be found relevant as a Libel.

MR. DAVID MITCHELL, elder, seconded. He quoted the words of the Confession as to the judicial duties of synods, &c., to determine in controversies of faith, "which determinations and decisions, if consonant with the Word of God, are to be received with reverence and submission." Now it thus appeared that in their judicial functions they were to be guided, not by the principles of a higher criticism, or any criticism, but by the Word of God and the Confession of Faith, and he might add common sense, which enabled the ruling elder such as he and others to take part in their procedure. Mr. Mitchell went on to say that there were three charges which did not go under any legal name just because they did not happen to possess one. The eight particulars enabled them to comprehend the description of the charges. Professor Smith had, in the abstract, admitted the relevancy of the first charge, but denied the relevancy of the other two. With regard, in the first place, to Professor Smith's argument that new offences in ecclesiastical as well as in civil matters could not be punished unless they had been declared punishable by Act of Parliament, he quoted from one of Sir Archibald Alison's works to the effect that by the common law every new crime as it arose became the object of punishment, provided it was in itself wrong, and hurtful to others; and on the same principle he contended that every new ecclesiastical offence as it arose was censurable and punishable by the law of the Church, if it was in itself injurious to the faith and morals of the people and the principles of the Church—and surely no one would seriously maintain that opinions which were of a dangerous and unsettling tendency to the inspiration and divine authority of God's Word were not injurious to the faith of the Church. As to the third charge, while he admitted that it contained censurable matter, it did not itself alone constitute an adequate expression of the offence contained in the case, yet since it had been put in along with the others he quite agreed to it being included in Principal Brown's motion. He therefore maintained that there was censurable and punishable matter in all the three charges. As to whether the averments made in the minor proposition

amounted to the offences, Mr. Mitchell, after noting the points gone over by Dr. Brown as to the Aaronic priesthood, &c., said, here a question occurred to his mind. What evidence did Professor Smith produce for things so contradictory to the established principles of the Church for so long a period? With such abilities as he (Mr. Mitchell) possessed he had looked for the evidence to be produced. It might be his blindness—(applause)—but he had failed to find any evidence except the simple opinions and assertions of Professor Smith himself and kindred critics. Now biblical criticism had its own place, and its own functions, and its own uses, but it humbly seemed to him that when criticism set itself to discredit the long-established rules of evidence, and to contradict the opinions that had been believed for a long period, it was going out of its place, beyond its sphere, and became misleading and dangerous. Nor were they without illustration of what he had now stated. Some years ago the critics of the “Book and its Story” maintained that Genesis x. and 10 was unhistorical and incorrect when it stated that the founders of Babel were the descendants of Ham. The critics said they were descendants of Shem. In the providence of God the ruins of Babel were exhumed and examined, and there were found the cuniform inscriptions that formed the records of its ancient inhabitants. These monuments proved that the critics were wrong and the Bible right. Thus the higher criticism was not an infallible guide. The question they were to consider there was had they an infallible guide? As believing the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, he was obliged to answer that they had. It set forth that the Word of God was to be received, not because of the testimony of any man or any church, but wholly of God who was the truth itself. It set forth the second rule, viz., that the only infallible interpreter of God was Scripture. The Confession said Holy Scripture was the infallible rule, but the Pentateuch was part of Holy Scripture, and therefore the question relevantly arose, what did the Pentateuch say of itself?—(hear, hear.) As a plain reader of the Bible, he was led to believe what the Pentateuch said. Leviticus concluded—“These are the commandments which the Lord commanded Moses for the children of Israel in Mount Sinai.” The Book of Numbers concluded—“These are the commandments and the judgments which the Lord commanded by the hand of Moses unto the children of Israel.” Deuteronomy began—“These be the words which Moses spake on this side Jordan.” He had learned this week that it should be the other side Jordan. Now, these words were plain and unequivocal to him as a common sense reader of the Bible. Mr. Mitchell proceeded to refer to Professor Elliot’s work, believing with him that the Pentateuch contained internal evidence of its own authorship. He next gave quotations from the New Testament, showing that our Lord and His disciples spoke of the law promulgated by Moses in the Pentateuch. Alluding to the third head in the Libel, the lowering of the Books of Scripture to the level of uninspired writings, he asked—Were such a description given to any uninspired human writings, what weight or authority could they possess, and were such descriptions to be believed about the Word of God, what weight or authority could they possess?

In conclusion, he asked what would be the effect in the Church if the opinions of Professor Smith were generally to be believed? Would they have the effect of increasing reverence and regard for the Word of God, or the very opposite? or as Principal Brown had pointed out, if they were to be generally believed would not the Church in a short time fall to pieces? He seconded Principal Brown's motion.

Rev. Mr. ANDERSON, Cults, moved—

That the Presbytery find the second charge in the major proposition, along with the corresponding extracts in the minor in their bearing on that charge relevant.

He felt unable to vote for the relevancy of the first alternative, or to hold that the whole Libel was relevant. On this point he was not sure, but the original word "subvert" would have been better than "contradict or are opposed to." The question, more especially in reference to the second alternative, was—Is this a charge that can be legitimately brought against a Professor? Opinions dangerous in themselves were on the line of serious error, and Professor Smith might thus set young men on an inclined plane, and though he might pull himself up at a certain point, most of those adopting his theories might go to the bottom. After referring to Professor Smith's answer to various points in the second charge, he said he questioned certainly whether the Church would be warranted in deposing or even suspending a professor on proof of the matter involved in the second charge. But that was very different from remonstrating or placing restrictions, or from sundry other ways of marking disapprobation of a professor's conduct—(hear, hear). As for the Libel, he was of opinion that it had given Professor Smith the fullest opportunity of having his opinions tested. If they could bear the test of the first charge, he was no heretic; if they could bear the test of the second and third, better and better! He believed that under a charge like this, his interests would be duly guarded. Adverting to Professor Smith's opinions on Deuteronomy, Mr. Anderson said, Professor Smith did not go so far as to say that the book was a pious fraud and a forgery; but explain and guard his own theory as he might, it was morally certain that most of those who would go his length would go farther, and hold that such a book could have been fabricated only with intent to deceive. They must freely accept Professor Smith's explanation as satisfactory to his own mind and as enabling him to reconcile his theory with his belief in inspiration, but they must freely judge of the natural effect of a theory like that on other minds than his. He then went on to indicate what to his mind would be the "dangerous and unsettling effect" of the other opinions expressed in the remaining particulars, remarking that no one could wonder if some of the discrepancies pointed out by Professor Smith in Chronicles should be regarded by a youth who read the criticism otherwise than as specimens of inspired blundering, or rather as destructive of the idea of inspiration. He concluded by expressing sorrow if he had done the slightest injustice to Professor Smith or shown the slightest unkindness, but he could not possibly have conscientiously said less consistently with his convictions.

Mr. DALGARNO seconded.

Mr. STEPHEN said it should be borne in mind that Professor Smith in his writings had been dealing with the Bible in its literary aspect ; and questions of authorship and date chiefly were involved. In this controversy criticism and exegesis must both be allowed scope, though not to the extent that faith give place to human reason. Still reason must have place, and this may be denied to undue degree. As for instance on the matter of judging, not once do the committee seem to have thought it necessary to connect with any of Professor Smith's statements which seem adverse to a due appreciation of the Divine authority of the Bible his repeated assertion of his belief of the Divine authority of the Bible, and also the mode of his arriving at this belief—viz., the witness of our Lord, and the testimony of the Holy Spirit, though the testimony of the Spirit is the essential element by which our Confession affirms, we arrive at the full persuasion of the Divine authority. Mr. Stephen moved that—

The Presbytery find that the proposed Libel, however excellent and applicable as a whole, is irrelevant in several respects, in respect that in the first premiss it is inapplicable, stating the opinion as applicable to Professor Smith's writings, that the Aaronic Priesthood and the great part of the laws and ordinances of the Levitical system were not instituted in the time of Moses ; in respect that in the second premiss the statement is unwarranted that it is maintained in Professor Smith's writings that Deuteronomy is not a historical record, but was made to assume its character by a writer of a later date, whereas his opinion applies to the legislative parts of Deuteronomy ; in respect that in the third premiss the opinion is exaggerate, assuming the standard of judging not compatible with the human agency employed ; in respect that in the seventh premiss the opinion is inapplicable and exaggerate, that predictions arose merely from so-called spiritual insight. The writings say it arose in spiritual intuition, and the Divine Spirit might employ the human mind to the full extent in its perception of God's righteous purposes, while superintending and controlling it all.

Mr. Stephen's motion did not find a seconder, and it accordingly fell to the ground.

Mr. Masson was about to address the Presbytery, when

Mr. SLOAN said, they had been told that as soon as the Libel was found relevant the case would be settled as far as the Presbytery was concerned, but to-day it appeared that the relevancy and the proof were dissociated from one another. He had fancied when he heard the motion read that they were to be committed to holding the whole Libel as relevant, and that virtually they were now called upon to serve it upon Professor Smith. If it meant that the counts gave a legitimate ground of libel, then perhaps he might see his way to agree to the motion, but he should like to understand exactly its scope.

The point thus raised led to a general discussion on the form of procedure, when, various members having spoken,

Mr. LAIDLAW drafted a motion, which, however, was not pressed, to the effect that the Presbytery having found the first general charge relevant, proceed to examine the relevancy of the particulars *Primo* to *Octavo*.

Professor SMITH pointed out that if they went to the vote upon Principal Brown's motion and it was carried, then the case was finished so far as the Presbytery was concerned ; and if it was lost, then the case might also be considered as finished, although not in a direct manner.

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not by conviction as Dr. Brown desired, but by acquittal—(applause). Dr. Brown's idea was this, that possibly under the first and second head he (Professor Smith) had done something inconsistent with the Confession of Faith. Some other members of the Court might think that under the third head he had done something inconsistent with the Confession; some might think that he had done so under the fourth head, and so all through the Libel. So that if they took a slump motion or Libel, then all these people's ideas were slumped together, and he would be found guilty of having done something inconsistent with the Confession, although there might not be a majority of the Court in favour of the view that any one of his opinions were contrary to the Confession—(applause). That was a fallacy, and a radical fallacy—(applause). Dr. Brown must observe that it was no use to have ten witnesses unless the ten witnesses not only said that they knew the accused to be a thief, but that he stole some individual thing. He thought that the common sense of the Court—

Principal BROWN said that the case about theft would not apply, because there were three or four charges of theft, whereas this was one charge and expressed in the major proposition.

Professor SMITH said that that enabled him to show exactly where the thing lay. It did not matter, it seemed, which of these particulars might be viewed by any member of the Presbytery as convincing, provided he gathered from it the general fact that he had in something been going against the general doctrine of the Confession, and that was just the same thing as to say that ten different thefts had been proved against him, because each of ten men thought that one different theft had been proved. The contention that it was only necessary to prove generally that he had been teaching against the Confession without proving the particular and individual things which he had done contrary to the Confession was one that, if adopted, would do him the gravest injustice, and make the whole course of legal process absolutely ridiculous.

Mr. LAIDLAW then moved—

That the first charge, namely, of "publishing and promulgating opinions which contradict or are opposed to," &c., being truly a subject of Church censure, this portion of the major where the offence is stated in its simple and abstract form is relevant, and that the Presbytery find accordingly.

Mr. BELL seconded, and the motion was agreed to.

The Presbytery then proceeded to take up the particulars:—

1. "Primo"—*Views on the Aaronic Priesthood.*

The CLERK having read *Primo* (see Form of Libel, p. 5),

After a considerable pause,

Professor SMITH said—If no one moves that this is relevant, then I apprehend it drops of itself.

Principal BROWN—No; I shall rather move that it be held relevant. I believe there are those who think with me, and after my statement in the morning it behoves me to move it. He accordingly moved—

That the Presbytery find the first particular under the major proposition of the Form of Libel against Professor Smith, with the corresponding averments and extracts in the minor proposition, in their bearing upon the first charge to be relevant.

Mr. IVERACH rose to move a counter motion, as follows:—

That, deferring for a moment the question of the relevancy of the abstract proposition under *Primo* in the major, the Presbytery find that the second proposition is not brought home to Professor Smith's articles by the narrative in the minor.

He did not think *Primo* as stated in the Libel was a fair representation of Professor Smith's opinion as stated in the articles. He would certainly think it a grave thing if it were brought home, but he found in the Answer that Professor Smith had given in that he distinctly stated it as his opinion that he believed that the Aaronic priesthood was instituted in the wilderness.

Mr. MASSON said they were dealing with Professor Smith's previous articles, and not with his Answer.

Mr. IVERACH said he was dealing with a paper in the case.

Mr. D. MITCHELL said the Answer had only been given in a few days ago. Since the time the articles were written Professor Smith might have retracted every word he had said, and yet the Libel might have been relevant in all the materials it dealt with.

Professor SMITH rose and said it was certainly open to Mr. Masson and Mr. Mitchell to prove that he had stated an untruth. He declared as deliberately as he had done in his Defence that the opinion that the Aaronic Priesthood was not founded in the wilderness, had never been held by him, and was not expressed in the article. Ever since he was able to hold such an opinion he had held and taught that the Aaronic Priesthood and foundation, although not every detail of the Levitical Priesthood, was instituted in the time of Moses, and he had also always taught that that institution was under the direction of God himself—(loud applause).

Mr. SELBIE—What does Professor Smith mean by the Aaronic Priesthood?—("Oh, oh," and laughter.)

The MODERATOR said that question was irregular. He did not think Professor Smith was there to be catechised by all the individual members of the Presbytery.

Mr. IVERACH said his object was really to get at the opinions of Professor Smith. They had accepted his Answer as a paper in the case, and if they wished to get at the truth of Professor Smith's opinions as to what he holds now, and as to what he said he held, they must take the document along with them. Under these circumstances, he thought it would be seen that Professor Smith held that the Aaronic priesthood was instituted in the time of Moses. There were unfortunate expressions in the quotation, yet they should hold his opinions as stated in the Answer. The Presbytery should be more anxious to get at the truth of his teaching than to uphold the relevancy of the charge, and they should read his articles in the light of the explanation he had now given. He concluded by moving his motion.

Mr. SELBIE contended that Professor Smith did, in the Bible sense of the word, deny the Aaronic priesthood of Aaron. That being the case,

the other rites and ordinances, as having been instituted in the time of Moses, were also necessarily denied, because these were associated with the Aaronic priesthood. In reference to Professor Smith's views of the infallibility of the truth of Scripture, Mr. Selbie maintained that these views were not in accordance with those of the early Reformers, and in support of his contention read a long extract from Dr. Owen, bearing on the objective as well as the subjective evidence of infallibility to be found in the Bible.

Mr. BANNATYNE contended that the words of Scripture had to be looked upon as inspired and from God, the same as the subject matter of the books themselves, although Professor Smith seemed to deny this, as was shown by his interpretation of 1st Corinthians ii 13.

Professor SMITH, in reply, maintained that nothing that he had written could be construed by the strictest use of language or the most vigorous application of tests in construction, to mean that he had stated the opinion that the Aaronic priesthood was not Divinely instituted in the wilderness, although he admitted that his position might have been misunderstood by those who were not thoroughly acquainted with the subject. As to Mr. Bannatyne's argument, Professor Smith pointed out that that gentleman had been basing his criticisms upon an expression incorrectly translated from the Greek. In the verse referred to by Mr. Bannatyne, the expression, "not in the *words* which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth," had to be read in connection with the fact that in the original Greek the word used was not *rhema*, the articulate spoken word, the vocable, but *logos*, which meant argument, reasoning, not arguments and reasoning taught of men's wisdom, but taught of the Spirit. Surely no one could say that there was anything in his writings in the least degree inconsistent with that. Here was a very practical instance of how unwise it was to rely too much on common sense and the English version, and how it was possible to gain a little light by looking sometimes at the original—(laughter and applause). He thought that a person who was accustomed to use the original might sometimes come nearer the truth than a person who always relied on common sense and the English version.

Mr. BANNATYNE—Who is doing that?

Professor SMITH—You are doing so.

Mr. BANNATYNE—Indeed! May I ask if *Logos* never means word?

Professor SMITH thought Dr. Brown would admit he was right in this matter.

Principal BROWN said Professor Smith's grammatical exposition was no doubt perfectly correct.

Professor SMITH proceeded to say that he did not hold the doctrine of the Enthusiasts, but he held that the doctrine of the infallible truth of the Scriptures meant that in it we can find a complete and perfect guide for the soul's salvation, and that an honest man holding that view would not go far wrong on any point of that kind. Alluding to the observations which had been made by Mr. Selbie as to Owen's opinions on the question of inspiration, he said Mr. Selbie was wrong, in the first place, in supposing that Owen was one of the fathers of the Reformation,

seeing that he lived 100 years after that event—(laughter and applause)—and, in the second place, Owen's theory of inspiration, which went the length of holding that the Hebrew vowel-points even must be held to be inspired, was admitted by every man in Europe who knew anything about these things to have been completely demolished by Walton. He went on to say that he perfectly agreed with the brethren who had spoken on the other side that we required a historical faith, that our religion is a historical religion, and not a mere religion of enthusiasts based upon individual spiritual illumination. He said the duty of the prosecution was to put the opinions which they regarded as constituting an offence in language so precise that there could be no doubt that he held them; and he complained that *Primo* was not a correct representation of his views. Those who supported Principal Brown's motion were bound either to show that *Primo* exactly represented his views, or else let him have the advantage of having it corrected, so that he might know exactly what was taken exception to, and what he was to be censured for. He was unable to see wherein Principal Brown objected to his views. He said that he had given up all that was historical in the middle books of the Pentateuch; but it surely would not be pretended that that lay in his words. He held that there were certain portions of the system which were subsequent developments, and which were afterwards incorporated with what was original, but he contended that that was not inconsistent with the Standards of the Church. He then went into a minute examination as to the Aaronic Priesthood, combating the arguments of Principal Brown and others, and challenging the Presbytery to disprove the statements which he had made in his Answer and Defence. The speech was loudly applauded at the close.

Mr. LAIDLAW moved :—

That the first particular in the major proposition, with the corresponding averments and extracts in the minor, be held not relevant to support the first charge.

He said that at a later stage he might be disposed to place *Primo*, with some other particulars, under the heading of tendency to disparage the Divine authority and Divine character of Scripture, but in the meantime he would content himself with moving the motion.

Mr. SLOAN seconded, on the ground that Professor Smith had stated that *Primo* did not accurately represent his views.

Principal BROWN replied at some length, and, in concluding, said they were introducing into the Church a mode of dealing with the Bible, which although it was plausible at present, and was captivating to many, would, in its eventual effects, be destructive of the historical authenticity, and consequently of the Divine inspiration and authority of the Scripture—(hear, hear, and hisses).

Mr. Iverach here withdrew his motion.

Professor SMITH wished that it should be distinctly stated that this motion was withdrawn on the understanding that it was rendered unnecessary by Mr. Laidlaw's motion. He (Prof. Smith) would certainly dissent from the Presbytery doing anything, and guard himself against any attempt on the part of the Presbytery to find him guilty of a charge without giving him the precise words of his offence.

The two motions were then voted on with the following result :—

For Principal Brown's motion—Principal Brown, Messrs. W. L. Mitchell, Arthur, Bannatyne, Selbie, Goodall, and Masson, *ministers*; and Messrs. Collie, W. W. Milne, D. Mitchell, Aberdein, Wildgoose, and D. B. Murray, *elders*—14.

For Mr. Laidlaw's motion—Messrs. A. F. Moir, Johnstone, Laidlaw, Anderson, Sloan, Low, Clark, Iverach, Semple, Innes, Macqueen, *ministers*; and Messrs. Paterson, James Moir, Barnett, W. Milne, W. Valentine, D. McHardy, and J. Fleming, *elders*—18.

The result was received with loud applause.

Principal Brown craved leave to dissent and complain to the Synod. The Presbytery then adjourned.

ABERDEEN, 19th February, 1878.

The Presbytery met by adjournment on 19th February—Rev. Professor S. D. F. Salmond moderator, and there was a large attendance of members of Presbytery, of students of the Free Church College, and also of the general public. A number of clergymen of other denominations were also present; and after the business had commenced, Rev. Dr. W. P. Smith, Keig-Tough (Professor Smith's father), entered the hall, and was received with loud applause.

Principal BROWN gave in his reason of dissent from the finding of the Presbytery on the *Primo* charge come to at the evening sederunt last Thursday, viz. :—

Because based as it is upon the severance of the priesthood of Aaron and his sons, for the separation of the Levites to be their assistants in the service of the Tabernacle—the latter being represented as having no actual existence for many centuries after the death of Moses, it compromises the historical authenticity, and consequently the Divine inspiration and authority of a large and fundamental portion of the Pentateuch, and ought to be resisted to the last.

Messrs. Laidlaw, Sloan, Yule, and Moir were appointed to answer these reasons of dissent, and to appear at the bar of the Synod in support of the judgment of the Presbytery. Messrs. Laidlaw, Iverach, and Johnstone were appointed to answer Mr. Mitchell's reasons of dissent, and to support the decision of the Presbytery as to the mode of procedure before the Commission.

2. "Secundo"—*The Age and Composition of Deuteronomy.*

The CLERK having read *Secundo* (see Form of Libel, p. 6),
Principal BROWN moved—

The Presbytery finds the second particular under the major proposition of the Form of Libel against Professor Smith, with the corresponding averments and extracts in the minor proposition, to be relevant.

He intimated that in making this motion or any others that he might submit or record, he reserved his right to bring forward his general motion, and if it were rejected to uphold it before the other Church courts.

Professor SMITH said that he also reserved his right to bring up the question whether the larger motion indicated by Principal Brown was in any sense competent—(applause).

Mr. D. MITCHELL seconded Principal Brown's motion.

Mr. A. F. MOIR moved as an amendment :—

The Presbytery finds under *Secundo* that this particular, and its corresponding extracts and averments in the minor, are not relevant to sustain the first alternative of the general major.

In moving his amendment, Mr. Moir said he was only the more emboldened to do so, that his views on the question involved were decidedly adverse to those of Professor Smith. I hold his positions, in relation to Deuteronomy, said Mr. Moir, to be for the most part contrary to fact, and based, so far as I am qualified to judge, on very inadequate evidence. What is more, Moderator, though I desire to speak very humbly, yet I wish to give expression to the conviction which I entertain, that it seems very unlikely to me that the Church of Christ will ever permanently, at least, take up the ground that I understand Professor Smith to occupy. At the same time, I feel that the present crisis is a very important one for the Church of which I am a member and office-bearer. I feel that this Presbytery is called upon to decide in matters of a very delicate nature, and which will more or less, according to our decisions and the decisions of our superior Courts, affect either favourably or adversely the liberty of thought and investigation which every office-bearer of the Church may justly claim. It is because I would not have the Church to which I belong—would not have the Church of Christ indeed—to dogmatise rashly, and merely by a popular vote in the Synods and Assemblies, in regard to points that are not distinctly and clearly and in so many words defined in the Standards, that I have taken up the position which I have held all along in the case. It was not, Mr. Moir went on to say, whether Professor Smith's views concerning the literary history of the Bible were true or false. It was not even whether the Divine authority of the Bible is endangered. Nobody, whose opinion is worth listening to, thinks that it is; and it was with profound sorrow he heard that authority spoken of as dependant on a man's receiving or rejecting these opinions. The only question before this Presbytery at present is, said Mr. Moir, whether Professor Smith's opinions contradict or are opposed to the Standards of the Church. Moreover, Moderator, if I understand our position aright, our Standards are not to be read in the light of recent or even present controversies. That is to say, we are not entitled to import the ideas of our own immediate age—the ideas born of our own immediate controversies—into our interpretation of our Church Standards. Mr. Moir went on to say that the Confessions of the Reformed Churches, while affirming in language that cannot be misconstrued their belief in the Divine authority of Scripture and in its self-evidencing power, have yet carefully abstained from committing themselves to any theory of the nature or the extent of inspiration. It is well known to us all that our own Confession has followed their wise example. This is the more remarkable, inasmuch as many of those points which have been so keenly discussed in our own day were mooted, and had become the subjects of

controversy in the churches before the Westminster Confession was drawn up, and that makes it all the more noticeable that no attempt has been made to define the nature of inspiration in the Confession. After dwelling somewhat fully on this point, Mr. Moir said their first position was that the Standards of our Church, while affirming that the canonical Scriptures contain the Word of God, do not in any wise determine in what manner the books of Scripture were collected, or by whom or at what periods written. We have the authority of the College Committee, comprising some of the wisest and most competent men in the Church for what we thus advance (Special Report, page 5, near the bottom of the page.) The Confession of Faith abstains from deciding such points (points involved in historical criticism), and it is important that much liberty of judgment about them should be maintained. Our second position is that, in dealing with Professor Smith's writings, you are dealing with writings that affirm both the Divine origin and authority of the Books of Scripture. After referring to the attempts that had been made to show that Professor Smith occupied the same ground as the rationalistic critics, Mr. Moir said, I unhesitatingly affirm and maintain that Professor Smith does not occupy the same place as is occupied by such men as Gray and Kuenen. It would be most unfair to compare him with these in any way. His position differs from theirs *toto caelo*. Professor Smith maintains the supernatural element in the Bible from the beginning of his article. In his last paper laid on the table of this Presbytery (page 52, near the bottom of the page), he maintains that the assumption that everything supernatural is necessarily unhistorical, makes all criticism impossible; views so frankly stated both in this paper and in his article "Bible," (*Encyclopædia Britannica*, page 634a), while his paragraph upon the "Popular Religion of Israel" has always commended itself to me as unexceptionable in tone and expression, (*Encyclopædia Britannica*, page 635a). So far is Professor Smith from occupying the same platform with those to whom he has been too often likened, that he stands upon that very place which was blessed by the Apostle Paul, (Eph. vi. 24)—"Grace be with all them that love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity." He is of that mind which was acknowledged by John to be of God, in contrast to that other mind which he denounces as the spirit of Antichrist, (1 John iv., 2)—"Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is of God, and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh is not of God." There is a very great difference between holding even reprehensible critical views and belonging to the rationalistic school. And, however much we may differ from Professor Smith, or even deplore some of his statements, we have no right in the exercise of brotherly charity to name him in the same day with writers of that class. But as we have shown that the Confession does not determine anything dogmatically bearing upon critical points; as it advances no theory upon the inspiration of Scriptures, and as Professor Smith maintains the supernatural element in the Bible—its divine inspiration and authority—it follows that before we can condemn him under the first alternative of our general major, and this particular in it, it follows, I say, that we must show by strict argument that the

sentiments advanced by him in the extract, *Secundo* in our minor, are logically inconsistent with the doctrine of our Confession. Now, that certainly has not been done yet, and much as I dislike Professor Smith's theory of Deuteronomy, I am convinced further that it cannot be done. That is, that it cannot be shown by logical argument to contradict the Confession, nor even, I think, to contradict the ideas which have prevailed among us with more or less acceptance up to a certain point. I do not think that there is one of us who would commit himself to the opinion that the book of Deuteronomy as it now stands, is the Deuteronomy that Moses left behind him. No one can read the Book intelligently without seeing in it traces of a later editor. Especially is this true of the 34th chapter, for, I suppose, none of us are of the opinion of the worthy elder, who being asked if he thought Moses had written the account of his own death, made answer that he saw no difficulty in believing that, if Moses were inspired to do it. In this instance, there is very great virtue in that if. If this were admitted then it followed that the difference between them and Professor Smith was one of degree—a very great degree, no doubt—still it should be kept in view that Professor Smith substantially admits that the addresses which form the greater part of Deuteronomy were founded upon genuine words of Moses. And though they might still hold his views so far unsatisfactory, he was not prepared to say that they either had made out, or logically could make out, the opposition of his views to their Standards. Moreover, I am convinced, that unless we could make out that contradiction clearly, we are bound to give Professor Smith, holding as he does the Divine authority of Scripture, alongside of that critical scheme of Deuteronomy which we condemn, the full benefit of any doubt there may be in the matter. It has been assiduously maintained, both here and elsewhere, that Professor Smith's critical views necessarily weaken the force of the internal evidence for the Divine origin of the Bible,—the evidence which our Confession extracts from the consent of all the parts. I confess that if I could receive the statements of the critics, it would have an opposite effect on me. For if I have adored the Wisdom which has made so many authors, writing over so many centuries in succession, to speak and write in such wise as to manifest from beginning to end of their testimony that the one Divine purpose and grace was being developed and expanded from generation to generation, to a much profounder marvel am I moved if I adopt the theory of the higher criticism, for then I have contemporaneous as well as successive authors contributing each his quota to this truly unique collection, and yet I find that through all its pages "One unflinching purpose runs." I beg to move the adoption of the amendment—(applause).

Mr. R. A. MITCHELL, of Gilcomston Church, seconded Mr. Moir's motion. He said the question for the Presbytery to consider was simply this—Has it been proved that Professor Smith's view of Deuteronomy was an inadmissible view? Probably they might all be agreed it was not a correct view. But he thought the attempt to prove it inadmissible had entirely failed. If he had ascribed the origin of the book to a pious fraud, it would have been entirely different. That was

the view of the matter taken up by Kuenen and critics of his school ; but it was a view with which Professor Smith had no sympathy whatever. They could not conceive of the God of Truth giving a fraud of any kind. This Professor Smith held as firmly as he did. The whole character of the book excluded such a hypothesis. To say that a later inspired writer had thrown his composition into the form of a speech by Moses, but that the writer had no intention to deceive, might seem not a probable account of the Book to some. But God had, as a matter of fact, made use of composition which seemed very strange to them. Was it not a strange thing, for example, to find a prophet saying that he was directed by God to do certain things, which, in point of fact, God did not really direct him to do ?—

Mr. MASSON—Name.

Mr. MITCHELL—Hosea ; and other prophets also. That is known to everyone acquainted with such matters—(laughter). They explained that by saying that the prophet was speaking figuratively. Very good ; but his words looked very like literal history, and it required some exercise of the critical faculty—a faculty which was possessed in some measure by all men—to discover that they were not to be understood literally, but only figuratively. Well, the fact was that God had made use of a great variety of forms of figurative composition for the purpose. Was it not conceivable that He should have employed the particular form of composition which Professor Smith supposed him on this occasion to have employed. Why should he not have done so ? He (Mr. Mitchell) saw no reason which could warrant him in deciding *à priori* that the thing was impossible. He would go further and say that it was no business of theirs to determine *à priori* what particular form of composition God might have employed for the purpose of conveying to men a knowledge of Himself and of His will, and that it would be gross presumption on their part to attempt determining in this off-hand fashion what it was competent for God to do. He knew that those who were very keen sighted in detecting rationalism in others did not like to have the charge of rationalism brought home to themselves—(applause)—but he held that those were chargeable with rationalism, and rationalism of the grossest kind, who undertook to prescribe to the Spirit of God the particular forms of literary composition which He might employ. He hoped the Presbytery would give no countenance to the new fangled rationalism which undertook to dogmatise what particular forms of composition the Spirit of God might employ. And unless it was disposed to do so it would not give its sanction to the statement contained in the Libel, that Professor Smith's view regarding Deuteronomy was inconsistent with the inspired character and Divine authority of the Book.

Mr SELBIE argued that much that had been said by Messrs. Moir and Mitchell had no bearing on the point at all. Professor Smith had complained in his Defence of the expression in the Libel—"The book of inspired Scripture called Deuteronomy, which is professedly a historical record," etc., as putting these words in his mouth. They entirely denied that. Let Professor Smith say what he might, the book of Deuteronomy does profess to be a historical record. Professor Smith does not recognise

it as that, and therefore there was no other conclusion than that he believed it had been made to assume the appearance of a historical record. He might think that this was not fraud, but how could they reconcile this procedure of the writer, or writers, with honesty? Those who supported the Libel had never doubted that various forms of composition were employed, but the question was whether the God of truth would really employ forms of composition which seemed to be contrary? If this book had not been intended to be a historical record the whole Church of God had been deceived for many generations, and only now was the truth becoming known—(hear, hear). Professor Smith had stated in his Defence that it was only part of the book of Deuteronomy to which he referred, but in his article "Bible" he did not make it clear that he was referring to anything but the book. Mr Selbie having gone on at some length,

Mr. SLOAN, after other interruptions, said that all through Mr Selbie's speech he had had the conviction that he was not speaking to either of the motions before the House—(applause). They were not there for the purpose of showing from Scripture that Professor Smith's views are wrong, but to show whether Professor Smith's views on Deuteronomy—no matter whether they approved of them or not—were or were not inconsistent with the inspiration of that book—(hear, hear).

Mr. SELBIE said that if it were made out that Deuteronomy professed to be one thing and was another, it must be inconsistent with inspiration. That had been the purport of his speech, and he held it was perfectly to the point.

Mr. MASSON agreed with the statement of Mr Sloan, that the point before them was whether Professor Smith's writings were logically consistent with the Standards of the Church. The whole question before them must be argued out on the bases that Professor Smith had laid down. They did not want to lay down any particular way *à priori* in which God was to reveal His Word. But they held that the whole Word of God was written by Him, and that inspiration attached itself to the whole Word of God. If, therefore, there was anything proved inconsistent with that position, then necessarily by real true logical deduction they infringed upon that position, and upon the inspiration laid down by the Word of God. According to his view Professor Smith had put forth a personation theory, and the question came to be, in a book professing to be historical on the face of it, in which it is stated that Moses uttered a certain speech, could this theory be maintained, that these words were put into Moses' mouth, and that he really did not utter them?

Mr. YULE said the point in hand was not the refutation of Professor Smith, but to ascertain whether according to the Confession of Faith, he was within his liberty—yea or nay. The charge was not whether these views were dangerous and unsettling, but whether they were contrary to the Confession. They were there to try the question as a question of law, and nothing more. If they strained the law to reach a man, or if they made a law at a time like this, instead of strictly interpreting the law as it is, they were guilty of a great offence against justice; in fact, it would be nothing more or less than tyranny. He was opposed to Professor Smith's theory, but he was constrained by the justice of the case

most heartily to support Mr Moir's motion. If there be any doubt as to whether Professor Smith had contravened the Confession he ought to get the benefit of the doubt—(hear, hear). He did not plead for Professor Smith alone. The whole question was this, whether this criticism was to be permitted, or was to be shut out of the Free Church by the ultimate decision in this question; and therefore he felt that in deciding on a question like this, which involved such world-wide issues, they should not proceed on words in their Confession that were never meant to meet such questions—(hear, hear). It was said that Deuteronomy was professedly historical, but that was just begging the question. The question at issue was whether it was professedly, throughout and in all respects, historical. Professor Smith had not denied that Deuteronomy was historical; he only said that the book as it now stood was a presentation in dramatic form, and that raised the question whether there could be such a thing in the Word of God, and at the same time that that Word could be infallibly true and Divinely authoritative. He cited Hosea and Job as examples of dramatic presentation of what appeared on the face of it as history. Then there was the case of the parables of our Lord, some of which were manifestly parables and some were not manifestly such, and it was a question of the intelligence of the people to whom it came as to what they considered it to be—(applause). Such presentations as those argued for here were common enough in ordinary literature, and the writers thereof were not charged with fraud, and why should the charge of "pious fraud" be brought against the Divine record?

MR. BANNATYNE, after giving an illustration with reference to the views he took of relevancy and proof, said he had little difficulty with *Secundo* of the major as it stood, less perhaps than with the particulars under *Tertio*. He held it was no begging of the question to say that in the contents of Deuteronomy itself they would find sufficient evidence that it was a historical book. Again and again did Deuteronomy expressly assert that Moses was the speaker of the words and the divinely appointed giver of the laws and instructions it contained. Again and again were the places where he spoke the words and gave the laws and instructions designated. Again and again did the book profess to be a true and matter-of-fact historical record. To compare the book of Job with it in that particular seemed to him to go into a line which was very much divergent from the matter in hand. There were grounds upon which he thought they could not maintain the historical value of the book of Job from beginning to end, but that was not before them now. No element had been pointed out to show that Deuteronomy did not come before them as a historical book. But to hold the supposition of its being a drama, strung from fancy, with the express declarations of the book itself, seemed to him so preposterous—seemed to him a heresy so detrimental in essence, that he was shut up to the conviction that *Secundo* must be maintained. Turning to the subject of inspiration, he said the theory of Professor Smith was to his mind totally different from that of the Confession. He called the attention of Professor Smith to this fact, and also to the fact that never once in his Answer, so far as he (Mr. Bannatyne) had been able to find out, had Professor Smith intimated that he held him-

self in the eye of the Church bound to abide by the Bible itself as a rule of faith and manners—"Oh, oh.") He (Mr. Bannatyne) made that assertion, and he should like any one to point him out anything to the contrary. In the pamphlet Professor Smith did not own that; in fact, he declared virtually the opposite.

Professor SMITH said perhaps he would be allowed at once to make a decisive statement of his entire adherence to the Confession of Faith, as to the Bible being the one perfect rule of faith and life. And he had stated so in the clearest language he had been able to find.

Mr. BANNATYNE said Professor Smith was not speaking to the point he (Mr. Bannatyne) was speaking about.

Professor SMITH said he merely thought it would relieve Mr. Bannatyne's mind to know that however bad he (Professor Smith) was, he was not so bad as that—(applause).

Mr. BANNATYNE, resuming, said he had remarked that Professor Smith in no part of his pamphlet had intimated that he held himself in the eye of the Church responsible in respect of having the Bible *per se* as one of the Standards of the Church.

The MODERATOR suggested that Mr. Bannatyne should depart from this line of argument.

Mr. BANNATYNE begged the Moderator's pardon.

The MODERATOR said he must rule then that Professor Smith be allowed to meet this charge.

Mr. MITCHELL said Professor Smith had used the expression "however bad I may be." Now, none of the members of the Presbytery had ever said anything about him being good or bad.

Mr. BANNATYNE said it was at any rate offensive.

Professor SMITH asked the Presbytery to look at what he had said about the doctrine of their Standards. He had said over and over again that he agreed with the doctrine of the Standards that Scripture was the only and infallible rule of faith and life. He had said, too, personally about himself—"If I am asked why I receive Scripture as the word of God, and as the only perfect rule of faith and life, I answer with all the fathers of the Protestant Church, 'Because the Bible is the only record of the redeeming love of God, because in the Bible alone I find God drawing near to man in Christ Jesus, and declaring to us in Him his will for our salvation. And this record I know to be true by the witness of His Spirit in my heart, whereby I am assured that none other than God himself is able to speak such words to my soul.'"

After some general discussion,

Mr. Bannatyne was proceeding to vindicate his line of argument, when

The MODERATOR ruled that discussion should not proceed on that line.

Mr. Low supported the motion of Mr. Moir. When he found in the statement of Professor Smith very deliberate declarations of his own views that there was no fraud in the Book of Deuteronomy, it went far to take him (Mr. Low) out of the difficulty. The very least they could do was to accept Professor Smith's deliberate and clear and most honest statement as to the value of his own words; and, doing that, he did not

see how they could come to the conclusion proposed in the motion of Principal Brown.

Mr. BELL said he felt shut up to the view that, irrespective of what Professor Smith believed his theory to amount to, the theory itself involved on the part of the writer a pious fraud. He must therefore vote for the motion made by Dr. Brown.

Mr. JOHNSTONE, in a humorous speech, pointed out that such an orthodox man as Dr. Chalmers had been condemned by some for writing the article "Christianity," in the Encyclopedia published in 1813. The attack on Dr. Chalmers was contained in a pamphlet on the "Principles of Christian Evidence, illustrated by an examination of arguments subversive of Natural Theology and internal evidence of Christianity advanced by Dr. T. Chalmers in his Evidence and Authority of the Christian Revelation. By Duncan Mearns, D.D., Professor of Theology in King's College and University, Aberdeen." In this publication Dr. Mearns says—"It thus appears that the principles upon which Dr. Chalmers' system of 'Christian Evidences' is constructed not only subvert the conclusions of natural theology with the internal evidence, but destroy also external proofs; and that the various arguments he employs in support of his system are destructive of each other and of the object at which he aims. . . . When he makes common cause with the sceptic—when he adopts his principles, or rather his negation of principles—when, on the part of Christianity, he forms an alliance with Atheism, the basest of her foes—and when, sacrificing the internal evidence as the seal of this monstrous confederacy, he turns the arms of Christianity against natural religion, her ancient and faithful ally, his proceedings no longer possess the character of harmless inanity." That was what was said about one of the greatest of their men, and Mr. Johnstone asked the Presbytery to have a care what they were doing with Professor Smith—(applause).

Mr. ARTHUR supported the motion of Principal Brown. He held that both the Bible and the Confession of Faith were the articles of the Church—first the Bible and second the Confession—and if they destroyed the one they destroyed the other; and similarly, if they destroyed one part of Scripture they destroyed all. To tell him that the God of truth inspired a man to tell a lie—(hisses)—in order to reveal His will was a thing abhorrent to his reason and to his mind altogether. Professor Smith in saying that Deuteronomy was not historical said there was no intention to deceive, and Kuenen, who held the same view as to historicity, said it was a pious fraud. To him Kuenen was the logical man.

Mr. ANDERSON said he could not vote for Dr. Brown's motion.

Professor SMITH, who was received with loud applause, said it was not necessary that he should say much upon the merits of the case, because there had been no arguments advanced from the other side that had not been very well covered by those who had supported Mr. Moir's amendment. Before going into the merits, however, he would refer to a remark made by Dr. Brown, who seemed to hold that though it might not be possible to make out that what he had said was inconsistent with the

language of the Standards, the charge might yet be found relevant to imply direct heresy by an argument based on the words of Scripture. This view of the matter had not occurred to him at the time he drew up his Answer, because it seemed to him to be entirely excluded by the language of the Libel.

Mr. BANNATYNE—Not a bit of it.

Professor SMITH said that any reference to this had been too indefinite to allow him to condescend upon it in his Answer, and if Dr. Brown was prepared to take that line of argument then he should have had information of that by a clearer wording of the Libel—(hear, hear). The three items charged against him of promulgating “opinions which contradict or are opposed to the doctrine of the immediate inspiration, infallible truth, and divine authority of the Holy Scriptures,” were items which did not occur in Scripture but in the Confession, and they could only be understood in connection with the Confession. What he wished to say just now was really as to a point of order. If Dr. Brown’s argument in the case rested on this supposition he certainly did not bring it up in his speech on Thursday. They were there in a judicial capacity. They were not discussing or trying to throw light on an abstract question, but to do justice to an individual person according to the rules of law. It was not allowed that an advocate for the prosecution in summing up in his final speech should introduce evidence or a line of argument which had not already been brought in in his previous speech—(hear, hear, and applause). He therefore called upon the Court, through its moderator, to give him protection; and as Dr. Brown had unnecessarily waived the right of speaking in introducing his motion, when he (Professor Smith) would have had an opportunity of answering his argument, to confine him in his reply to enforcing the arguments already used or replying to those that had been advanced against his proposal; and failing that, he claimed that he, as the accused person, must have the opportunity of reply.

Principal BROWN—I have not the least objection to that.

Professor SMITH said he should now like to say a word as to what was really covered by this charge. Gentlemen on the opposite side had been very anxious to lay weight on the fact—which after all was a mere formal fact—that he was not at present at the bar. He had followed Mr. Bannatyne’s remarks on the relevancy, he confessed without being exactly able to understand what Mr. Bannatyne meant. The relevancy, as he understood it, meant that the whole document was a consistent logical production. If this charge were found relevant he did not know what remained for proof, for finding the charge relevant was really finding it proven. Therefore those who voted for Dr. Brown on this motion were voting practically for his deposition—(hear, hear, “No, no,” and applause). He was not charging Dr. Brown with having said so. He was pointing out the natural consequence of the adoption of this motion; for, if this particular were found relevant, then it was found that what he had said of Deuteronomy in those extracts came under the category of doctrine contrary to the Confession, and the Court knew very well that, for teaching contrary to the Confession, this Church had never recognised any other punishment than that of deposition—(applause).

Mr. BELL did not believe that that was at all a necessary conclusion. He thought the Church might say that that was not a doctrine to be taught, and that might be censure enough.

Mr. SELBIE thought that this line of remark was not in order. What they had to consider was whether this particular were relevant or not, and not the result of the voting upon that motion.

Professor SMITH said he was making no appeal *ad misericordiam*, and he had only gone into this line of remark because there was an ambiguity as to the meaning of relevancy, and because it might conduce to simplification if he pointed out what this vote really meant. He had been sure that Mr. Bell did not know what it fully meant, for if he had done so he would have brought more clear and fully-considered arguments before coming to the conclusion to which he had arrived on so grave and important a case—(applause). He thought perhaps there had been two points raised in this discussion which were real points of consequence. The first was whether the doctrine of inspiration to which he had professed his attachment was the doctrine of inspiration held by the Church. The second was whether he was guilty of logical inconsistency—of logical inconsistency so gross and palpable—that it could be made a ground of Church action and ultimately of deposition, in holding that certain views of the book of Deuteronomy were consistent with the Standards. He had not, he confessed, been able to gain a very precise view of the nature of the test which had been raised on the other side of the house as to his statements in his Answer. He quite understood that there might be statements in that pamphlet which were not exhaustive, as Mr. Moir had said. But that Answer was not intended to be an explanation of all that the Confession teaches, but upon such parts of Confessional teaching as were covered by the language of the Libel. He took up the Libel and he read that he was accused of promulgating doctrines and opinions contradictory or opposed to the doctrine of the immediate inspiration, infallible truth and Divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, and he had taken up those points part by part. He understood Mr. Masson's difficulty to be that he had not done full justice to the particular section which discussed infallible truth and Divine authority. He had understood Mr. Masson to say that Professor Smith's view was this—that inspiration proper could only teach what of God's will was necessary to salvation, and that the test of what was necessary to salvation was the witness of the Holy Spirit. He was at a loss to understand how that view of his testimony as to the Holy Spirit could have been formed. The test of how much was necessary to salvation was what God had given them. God knows that better than we. The testimony of the Holy Spirit is that which convinces us that in a certain book we are not dealing merely with subjective truths, and not dealing merely with spiritual illumination, but with certain things which are the personal dealings of God with us, the personal dealings of God with the Church. He (Professor Smith) understood the difficulty to be something like this—that he put the witness of the Holy Spirit into such a position that there could not be any line drawn between his views and those of the enthusiasts. But he was in no such position. He had never said

anything against the proofs which could be brought forward to satisfy even a sceptic that there are things in the Bible which cannot be understood by natural means. On the contrary, he said that if they went to the history and wished to understand how the wondrous things therein had originated, on the supposition that they were nothing but the outcome of a natural process, then he had said he was convinced they could not explain the history in that way; and could not get a consistent sense out of it. The whole history was the story of God manifesting Himself by His word, and ultimately by His incarnate Word, Christ Jesus, and the external evidences and this history was, he thought, full. No one said that in order to prove the historicity of the scheme of salvation it was necessary to go into the question of inspiration. The question was to deal with Scripture as ordinary history. Let them take any passage away if it were doubtful, let them take away a whole book if there was any dispute as to its meaning. But still it would be found that in this Book they had really a narrative of God's actings to man, different in kind from that given to those outside that line of revelation. God had given us a very precious record of that revelation, which serves to us not merely the purpose of supplying adequate historical information that may be studied by historical evidence, but which He, in His great grace, has made to appeal to every heart. The simple believer does not require to go to the Church, which, by means of its scholars, has discovered what the revelation is, but that simple believer can take this Book in his hand and find God speaking to him as clearly as to the people of old—(applause). In that sense the Reformation fathers had always treated the witness of the Holy Spirit as an absolutely indispensable and necessary thing; as the one evidence which can be brought forth against the impugnors of this truth. He was rather surprised that he should have to explain the relation of the Testimony of the Spirit to the subordinate evidence. Many of the Protestant Confessions did not mention the subordinate evidence at all, as for instance the Gallican Confession. But let them look at Calvin. How did he deal with that matter? He takes up the witness of the Holy Spirit and discusses it at great length, and amongst other things he says—

We must hold that belief in the doctrine is not established till we have *undoubted persuasion* that God is its author.

And further he says—

Unless this certitude be present, which is higher and stronger than human judgment, it is vain to defend the authority of Scripture by arguments, or to confirm it by the consent of the Church.

—(Applause). He did not think that Dr. Brown, as he spoke on Thursday, would have passed that by, for if he would not accept his (Professor Smith's) position, he must equally fall foul of Calvin—(laughter and applause). There was one other quotation from Calvin which he would give them—

There are other reasons, neither few nor weak, by which the dignity and majesty of Scripture is not only asserted to pious hearts, but vindicated against the arts of adversaries, but they are not in themselves sufficient to confirm the Scripture to faith till the Heavenly Father frees the reverence for it from all controversy by showing his Divinity in it.

—(Applause.) He held that this showed manifestly enough that he had been following the line of Calvin by putting the witness of the Spirit in the forefront, as the essence of the whole question. After a reference to the views of Turretin, one of the post Reformation fathers, on this subject, Professor Smith proceeded to take up the question of his being at variance with the subordinate Standards. What was this wonderful section of the Confession that he had overturned?—

V. We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to a high and reverend esteem of the Holy Scripture, and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the Word of God; yet, notwithstanding our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts.

Had he not “a high and reverend esteem” for the Scriptures? Could it be said that one who valued Scripture because God in it had come down to man would be insensible to the evidence of Scripture from “the heavenliness of the matter?” “The efficacy of the doctrine!” Was that denied? Certainly never by him—(applause). “The majesty of the style.” That must be taken in the sense in which it was meant. It was not to be supposed that by the phrase it was meant that the whole was equally impressive, or that persons who read one of the genealogical chapters in Chronicles would be struck with the majesty of the style as a proof of Divine authorship—(laughter and applause). The phrase must apply to the Bible as a whole, and was there a word he had ever said that forbade him from feeling as he did feel when he read Isaiah or the Sermon on the Mount, or other portions of Scripture, that there was a dignity more than human in the very expression? Surely there was nothing in his argument that went against that. Mr. Moir had effectively spoken to the point as to the “consent of all the parts.” That might be held on any critical theory. It was one consistent scheme of Divine salvation that was worked out from the beginning to the end; and he did feel that the whole scheme had been deepened in his heart by every step of progress he had made in understanding the true meaning and construction of the Scripture—(applause). On the “entire perfection thereof,” which was the next clause of this section of the Confession, Professor Smith said that he had been surprised, knowing as he did their feeling on the subject, that the Libellers had not included that as one of the points of the Libel. It seemed to him that they had carefully left that point out. That was a large subject, and of course he could not go into it now. But this he would say, that the entire perfection of Scripture would scarcely be denied by any one who admitted the rest—the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole, which is to give glory to God. Dr. Brown had represented him as wishing to put the witness of the Holy Spirit in the place of criticism. Having had the misfortune to write his speech before seeing the pleadings of the person accused, Dr. Brown was compelled to refer to the pamphlet of Dr. Candlish. But he might have made the

same remarks with reference to him (Professor Smith), so he would take it as referring to himself. Dr Brown said it was very absurd to set up the witness of the Spirit in the way which would allow them to overlook the ordinary evidence on which must rest their belief in ancient records. Suppose that the ancient records did not bear the test of criticism, then of course when that test was applied to them they would disappear; but it so happened that his (Professor Smith's) position was this—that the documents of the Old Testament stood the test of criticism in such a way that although it does modify the view about some of them, they had not to give up their faith that these books were the word of God. External evidence did not carry them to the doctrine of the Divine authority and infallible truth of Scripture. Every apologist knows this, and Dr Brown would never for a moment be supposed to hold anything else. The external evidences do prove that it is impossible to explain away Scripture as a myth or a fiction. It occurred to him that the question in the Libel was different, whether the document had certain specific characters of its own different from other documents, and he thought he would not be far wrong in putting in the forefront that, as this document professed to be more than human reason can grasp, it must be the Holy Spirit that manifests it as such. It might be said that criticism would lead them to interfere with the canon; but criticism must proceed by the ordinary means of historical inquiry; and the first principle of these is that you must not make up your mind beforehand as to the result. On this he was more conservative—far more conservative—than Dr. Brown—(laughter)—because he says that the process of historical inquiry must be completed before applying the testimony of the Holy Spirit. Now every Christian Church must be ready to give a reason for its faith on historical grounds. But there was a simpler method, which did not cover all the details, which left room for much investigation on difficult points, but which nevertheless was satisfactory to the believer. There was that in this book which could not be the imagination of men; there was that in it which immediately revealed itself to the soul as the Word of God. There was there, above all, the personal Christ, a personality which men could not have imagined, a personality which must be historical, and which must be Divine—(hear, hear, and applause). Passing from the general question, the exact point of all this discussion was whether his views were consistent or not with the Confession. Dr. Brown had been very positive on this point, but this very positive opinion was only a few weeks old—(laughter). Dr. Brown had been a member of the College Committee; he had not been a silent member, and he had cleared his conscience on one point by putting in his dissent.

Principal BROWN asked Professor Smith not to enter on this delicate subject, as he would have to follow his example if he did so.

Professor SMITH said that he appealed to the printed document of last Assembly, and proceeded to point out that the College Committee had declared that his views were not inconsistent with the Confession, and that on this point Dr. Brown had not dissented. Moreover, Dr. Brown still agreed with the College Committee on this when the word "subvert" was removed from the Libel, declaring that they could not prove that the opinions

were contrary to the Confession. Passing to the details, Professor Smith said that the discussion had brought one point into great clearness. The position of those who supported Dr. Brown's motion was that, though he (Professor Smith) would not believe it, his views really implied a pious fraud, and that no man of ordinary sense could doubt this. Any one who agreed with him as to the data on which his theory was built would, it was argued, be more consistent in holding the book to be a pious fraud. It was then not his theory that involved pious fraud, but the acceptance of the exegetical data on which the theory rests. This point must be made clear, for he had said all along that while no theory is final, the facts forced them to seek some theory different from the ordinary one. Were gentlemen so sure that his (Professor Smith's) facts were wrong that they were prepared to exclude him and all who might share his difficulties from the Church, for believing and trying to explain them in a way consistent with the Divinity of the dispensation of Scripture. Fault was found with him for urging that men should study the questions as carefully as critics before judging of the exegetical facts. He did not allude to his own study. Dr. Brown had said that he was studying and had formed his views on these subjects before Professor Smith was born—(a laugh)—but during the last 30 or 40 years some hundred thoroughly equipped scholars had been following out the subject, and it was not unreasonable to suppose that they had got some fresh light on it. After some other remarks, Professor Smith alluded to the appeal to common-sense made by Mr. Mitchell, and appealed to Hugh Miller's "Testimony of the Rocks," from which he quoted two passages, the latter of which ran as follows:—

It has been well remarked that when two opposing explanations of extraordinary natural phenomena are given—one of a simple and seemingly common sense character, the other complex and apparently absurd—it is almost always safer to adopt the apparently absurd than the seemingly common sense one. Dr. Kitto's "plain man," yielding to the dictates of what he would deem common sense, which, of course, in questions of natural science is tantamount to common nonsense, would be sure to go wrong.

Professor Smith concluded by urging that the burden of proof did not lie on him. In this country every one is held innocent until his position has been proved untenable, and he thought he might say to the Court that no proof had been offered to make it certain and absolutely clear that he had made assertions regarding Scripture that were absolutely inconsistent with these doctrines—(loud applause).

Principal BROWN, adverting to the difficulty of following Professor Smith's long speech, after returning from Edinburgh at a late hour the previous night, and sitting for above five hours to-day, began by noticing the challenge that had been thrown out to him as to introducing new matter into the debate at this stage, and stating that he only meant to follow up the arguments he had already brought forward, and went on to discuss the point raised as to taking the Standards of the Church and Scripture together. He could well remember two cases in which it was laid down that liberty to appeal to the Scriptures in opposition to what is laid down in the Standards, was properly refused until such time

as the Church itself changed the Standards. But it was conceivable that the foundations on which the Confession of Faith rests might be subverted by interpretations of Scripture which it did not contemplate, and it was quite warrantable for them to consider whether the foundations were affected by the views brought forward. If they could show that the views were inconsistent with what could possibly be the doctrine of the Confession of Faith, then they had good ground to go upon, and it was this ground he still took up, and not any new argument that he sought to introduce. Coming to the merits of the question, he read extracts from Professor Smith's writings, showing that he went a great deal further than what he said in the Answer to the Libel.

Professor SMITH here pointed out that in one of the quotations the phrase *book* meant the legislative part of the book, as was abundantly clear by an explanation that preceded.

Principal BROWN maintained that an ordinary reader could only understand it to mean the whole book, and Professor Smith had written in a strange style if it means only the legislative part of the book. He (Principal Brown) could not see how any man reading Professor Smith's articles could read them in any other light, and his own defender had understood him as he did. As to its not being a historical book, he argued there was not a shred of argument used to show that it was not a historical record. It was all very well to read pamphlets about it, but after reading the book itself, he defied any man to come to the conclusion that it was not a historical record. There never was a more nakedly professed history than the book of Deuteronomy. Everybody could see that the legislation was but part of the history, and he defied any man to read it naturally in any other light than as a historical record. A great deal had been said about coupling the name of Professor Smith with Kuenen, but he failed to see very much distinction in their theories. It did not matter to him whether it was three or five centuries, if the theory is that it was so long after the death of Moses before these things were written. That was sufficient for them. There had been a great deal of special pleading on the part of Professor Smith's friends, but he maintained that what he had said on Thursday had not been answered, that the theory was utterly inconsistent with any conceivable understanding of the book as it stands. He did not differ from Professor Smith as to the right way of using historical criticism, and the witness of the Spirit, in as far as he referred to them to-day; but he did hold that the way in which the witness of the Spirit was introduced before, and in his Answer, was not compatible with the view that he took of the subject. Principal Brown then went on to defend his action in the College Committee, explaining that up to a certain point he had earnestly hoped that he would not be compelled to take any part in the proceedings. He anticipated the fearful condition of matters that would arise, and it was his earnest hope that he would not have to take part in the proceedings; but as events emerged he found it impossible to carry out this intention, and he finally made up his mind to throw aside all delicate considerations, and to take the position he was now doing, which was such as that he could not express to others. The things he had uttered in this matter had been wrung from him. Would to God

he had been a thousand miles away; but when he was here he could not resile from the position he now occupied, and "which he occupied with very much pain indeed—(applause).

The vote was then taken, with the following result:—

For Principal Brown's Motion—Principal Brown, Revs. Dr. Longmuir, W. L. Mitchell, Leslie, Craven, J. Macdonald, Arthur, Hendry, Bannatyne, Selbie, Bell, Goodall, and Masson—*ministers*; Messrs. W. W. Milne, D. Mitchell, Aberdein, Ritchie, Wildgoose, Murray, and Dr. Gordon—*elders*—20.

For Mr. Moir's Amendment—Revs. Dr. Spence, Dalgarno, Moir, Yule, Johnstone, Anderson, Selkirk, Sloan, R. A. Mitchell, Low, Clark, Iverach, Gage, Semple, Innes, M'Queen—*ministers*; Messrs. Collie, G. H. Paterson, Thom, J. Moir, W. Gordon, Barnett, W. Milne, Valentine, McHardy, and Taylor—26.

The result was received with loud cheers, which were renewed on Dr. Spence formally announcing the finding of the Presbytery.

The Presbytery then adjourned.

ABERDEEN, 21st February, 1878.

The Presbytery met on Thursday, 21st February, at ten A.M., to resume consideration of the Libel against Professor Smith. Rev. Professor S. D. F. Salmond was moderator, and the Court was crowded during the day.

3. "Tertio"—*Lowering the Character of the Bible.*

The CLERK having read the particular under *Tertio* (see Form of Libel, p. 7),

Mr MASSON moved—

That the Presbytery find the third particular, under the major proposition, of the Form of Libel against Professor Smith, with the corresponding averments and extracts in the minor proposition, to be relevant.

After remarking that the expression, "the committing of errors like other authors," very fairly raised the whole question, he said the points to be decided to-day are—1. How much the Confession of Faith really covers when it claims for that written word divine authority and infallibility. 2. What list does the Confession of Faith really give us of what is infallibly true and divinely authoritative? With regard to the first, we have the views of Professor Smith clearly laid down in his reply. If I understand him aright, he holds that the Confession of Faith does not bind him down to take *all* the Bible as the infallible record of God's mind and will, necessary to salvation. He distinctly avers that, as to matter of faith, the expression, "Knowledge of God and of His will, which is necessary to salvation," rules everything, and that that expression not being synonymous with, and covering all, the subject matter of the word of God, he is left free to treat the other parts as he would do any other book, and if, in that research, he finds errors, these not affecting his faith, don't in the least touch upon infallibility. In other words, unless it can be proved

that these errors affect in some way the perfection of the word of God, as the rule of faith and life, the Confessional position remains untouched. Having read extracts from Professor Smith's Answer in proof of this, Mr. M. continued—Now, the first question to be settled, if possible, is, what does the Confession of Faith really cover by the expression, "Knowledge of God and of His will necessary to salvation?" Mr Masson went on to argue at length that the expression was actually synonymous with acceptance of the whole canonical Books that form the Bible, as books given by God, and so free from error. He distinctly denied that the Confession attaches infallibility only to those matters which the witness of the Spirit testifies to, these being what they might, if they pleased, call the subordinate evidence to the perfection of the word. The Confession of Faith, therefore, rightly sends every one who would know that the Bible is what it professes to be, viz., God's Book—to the Bible itself. And so we hear men acknowledging that, when looked at from this standpoint, they are bound to receive this Book as divinely true and perfect. Then the Confession goes on to say that, having the above evidence, if one would in addition also possess in his own soul a full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, then we must have the work of the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the Word in the heart. I contend, then, that the divine authority and infallibility of God's word is based, first, on these former evidences, and not alone on the latter, and if so, Professor Smith's claim to treat the word of God as a book containing errors is not in accordance with the Confession.

Mr BANNATYNE seconded the motion. Subject to the appeal on "subvert," he never thought there could be much difficulty in finding the generality of the major relevant. The immediate inspiration, infallible truth, and divine authority of the Holy Scriptures are, he held, directly set forth in the Scriptures themselves in such words as "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God;" in the claims preferred by and on behalf of the writers, as setting forth the words of God rather than the words of man, and in the express assertions that the Holy Ghost miraculously and infallibly moved and guided them, and that God wrote or spoke by means of them. The Confession of Faith uses distinct language on the subject, declaring that the Lord, after revealing Himself and His will, which was necessary for salvation, was pleased to commit the same wholly unto writing; that the Holy Scripture has God as its author and is the word of God; and that it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God; that some things abundantly testify to this, but that the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts, gives us full persuasion of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof, and that the Supreme Judge, in whose sentence about such things as religious controversies, and decrees of councils, and opinions of men and their doctrines we are to rest, can be no other but the Holy Spirit speaking by the Scriptures. He adverted to this for the purpose of showing what he was interrupted in when supporting Principal Brown's motion regarding *Secundo* on Tuesday, namely, one of the two things in reference to which there is not agreement among the members

of this Presbytery and the Presbytery itself; of the existence of that disagreement they must take note, or else they should carry on their present and future discussions like men who unwittingly used terms with a totally different meaning attached to them.

Professor SMITH—I rise to order. I wish to point out that Mr. Bannatyne is asking the Presbytery to take it as an assumption that there is a difference upon a subject in this matter between myself and the whole of the Presbytery. I would point out that that is an attempt of Mr. Bannatyne to decide a matter which can only be settled by a vote of the Presbytery.

Mr. BANNATYNE said that was not a point of order but an explanation of something which he had said, which he could explain himself. He proceeded—The Professor whose case was before them held a view of inspiration totally different from what he (Mr B.) made free to say the Confession of Faith presented, and from what had been almost universally till now attached to it throughout the Church. Mr Bannatyne quoted a number of passages from Professor Smith's Answer to show that his conclusion on this point was that it was only what in Scripture was necessary to salvation, apart from the outward phraseology in which it was conveyed, that secured for it the designation of the word of God. That did not appear to be the view of the subject of inspiration given either in the Bible or in the Confession of Faith. The contents of the Bible might be the soul, and the phraseology of the Bible might be the body, but the life of the one was the life of the other. From this view of inspiration he was not to be driven by any sneering reference to the distinction betwixt the Greek words, *rhema* and *logos*—(laughter). This distinction in the New Testament did not exist—(“Oh, oh”). You may lift your hand, Professor Smith, but I make a fair challenge in the matter to you. *Rhema* is not so often used as *logos*, but in proportion to the frequency of their occurrence he would undertake to show that *rhema* means as often the thing spoken of as *logos*; that *logos* as often means the act of speaking as *rhema*, and that the one as often indicates the words uttered as the other. And so once more he referred to 1st Cor., ii. 11, 15, as conclusive on the point of the inspiration of the phraseology of the subject matter of Revelation and Scripture. Mr. Bannatyne next referred to what was said at last meeting by Professor Smith about the Holy Spirit bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts. The question was not one betwixt Professor Smith's view and that of the mystics, nor was it a question as to the views of any reformer or the Confession, as held by Professor Smith or rejected by him. The question was exclusively one as to the meaning of the 5th section of chapter 1st of the Westminster Confession of Faith—(hear, hear)—and as to the bearing of the first part of the section upon the last part of it. After elucidating this point at some length, Mr. Bannatyne said that Professor Smith's theory struck at the root of the infallible truth and divine authority of the word of God, as contained in the Westminster Confession. Professor Smith had been far too long in unfolding that theory to them. Under it he could find room for a great deal more than from *Primo* to *Octavo*. In conclusion, he maintained that under the Standards none of the particulars charged could be found irrelevant.

Mr. ANDERSON, Cults, said he found that he had fallen into a mistake. Dr. BROWN and those who voted with him rightly voted that the particulars were relevant in general, though they confined the strength of their pleading to establish the relevancy of the first charge. Mr. LAIDLAW and Mr. MOIR both confined their remarks to the first charge, and on that view he voted against the relevancy of the first two particulars. Had he understood that the relevancy of these particulars took in the second charge also, he would, of course, have supported them on both occasions. He made this explanation very strongly and emphatically, because it bore very decidedly on the position of others besides himself.

Mr. MOIR, Woodside, said that was something new, as they understood that Dr. BROWN's Tuesday's motion had nothing to do with any other part of the general major except the first charge.

Principal BROWN said that Mr. MOIR should have attended better to the form of his motion. He had moved that the whole Libel be found relevant.

Mr. IVERACH said their position was this. They had found the first alternative in its abstract form to be relevant, and they were now going on to consider whether these abstract charges, *Primo* to *Octavo*, sustained the relevancy of the first alternative major. Then when they had gone through all these they would begin anew and afresh to consider, first, whether the second alternative was relevant; and again, whether the eight particulars bore out that relevancy—(applause).

In course of discussion on the point, Mr. SELBIE and Mr. MASSON expressed disagreement with the view of Dr. BROWN, Mr. MASSON holding that Mr. IVERACH had given a clear explanation of the effect of his motion. Ultimately, Mr. MASSON agreed to add to his motion the words, "under the first charge of the general major."

Principal BROWN said he had not been one of those who had prepared this Libel, but, on looking over it, he had come to the conclusion that some of the particulars were relevant in respect of the first charge, and that others of them could not be made out clearly and satisfactorily to be relevant under the first charge. He foresaw, according to the mode in which the majority were proceeding, that their policy was to find all these particulars irrelevant in their bearing on the first charge, and then it would be contended that the second was not a legitimate charge, and that the third charge was much less so. The consequence would be that the whole would go up to the superior Courts in a defective manner. He wanted the whole matter to come under the cognisance of the Church, that Professor SMITH and the truth should get the justice that the case required, and therefore begged to move:—

That no motion bearing that this or that particular be found relevant as charged is a competent motion.

He did not care though he stood alone, because he wished to preserve his rights, and he should dissent and complain to the superior Courts.

Mr. SELBIE thought Principal BROWN was under a misapprehension, and that his motion was quite unnecessary. Mr. D. MITCHELL, elder, indicated a similar view, but would second the motion rather than that his venerable friend should stand alone.

Mr. SLOAN having assured Dr. Brown that he was under an entire mistake if he thought the other side had all seen their way to finding none of the particulars relevant, especially under the second charge,

Mr. BANNATYNE suggested that the proper course for Dr. Brown to adopt was to move the original motion without the added words.

Principal BROWN agreed to adopt that course.

Mr IVERACH rose to move :—

That the Presbytery find under *Tertio* that this particular, with its corresponding averment and extracts in the minor proposition, is not relevant to sustain the first alternative in the general major.

It was with extreme satisfaction that he saw that Mr. David Mitchell was continuing his studies in the legal department.

Mr. D. MITCHELL—I am not here on my trial, and I object to being the subject of Mr. Iverach's notices. I hold them in contempt—"Oh!" and applause)—but I have a right to be protected as a member of Court. I will continue or discontinue my studies as I have a mind.

Mr. IVERACH—I express my satisfaction, because at a previous meeting Mr. David Mitchell made an astounding assertion about the word "count," which was proof positive to me that he had never read these things—(laughter)—for if he had read them he would never have made such an assertion.

Mr. D. MITCHELL—I repeat the statement that the word "count" is an English term though sometimes used in Scotland.

Mr. IVERACH—I repeat that the word "count" is used in Scotch ecclesiastical procedure—(laughter and applause).

Mr. A. F. MOIR—It was I who used the word "count," and when I did so Mr. Mitchell called me to order; but I think when he is so short-tempered himself he might have left me alone—(laughter).

Mr. D. MITCHELL—Mr. Moir has not touched me, and if he does I will answer him—(laughter)—It is Mr. Iverach I have to do with, and I object to be the subject of his flattering notices.

Mr. IVERACH—I did not anticipate that I should have roused Mr. Mitchell in this way. I certainly think, and I submit to the Moderator, if when a statement is made regarding the use of the word "count," I am not entitled to refer to it in my remarks, and to say that the statement regarding the word "count" was such as to prove to me that Mr. Mitchell had never read these cases; and I submit I was not out of order—(hear, hear). Mr Iverach went on to express his satisfaction that the abstract charges *Primo* to *Octavo*, which really contained the whole pith and marrow of the case, were now receiving the sustained attention their character demanded. These charges had to fulfil two conditions, first, they must state adequately, and express accurately the opinions held by Professor Smith. When stated affirmatively they must embody a recognised doctrine, law, custom, or, at all events, a principle of discipline of this Church. And if they satisfy these conditions a further question arises, What is the value of them? Supposing that as they stand they accurately express Professor Smith's opinions and embody a principle of this Church, do they amount to a contradiction of the Confession, or are they of a dangerous and unsettling tendency, or are they rash and unguarded state-

ments? Now, my contention is that *Tertio* does not accurately represent Professor Smith's views, does not embody a doctrine of this Church, and even if it did, it does not amount to a contradiction of the Confession; which for the purposes of the trial must be accepted as the Church's interpretation of the Bible—they could not go to the Bible for a fresh interpretation during a judicial investigation. It would be most unsatisfactory and unsafe to attempt such a thing, and I regard the procedure of the opposite side, said Mr. Iverach, as one full of danger to the interests they have most at heart. I regard with high approval the refusal of Principal Brown to be drawn into an exegetical discussion as to the meaning of a portion of Scripture on the floor of this Presbytery. I heartily wish that both he and those who act with him had been consistent, and had refused to be drawn into any exegetical discussion at all. I refuse to enter on such a discussion. I say here is the formulated Creed of the Church. I will try any case that arises in questions of doctrine by this Creed; but I refuse to take the responsibility of saying on the strength of my own power and skill in the interpretation of Scripture what opinions are consistent with the holding of office in this Church. The Church has no right to cast such a responsibility on me. I refuse to undertake so great a task. I will, to the best of my ability, judge what opinions are inconsistent with the Confession. But when the Church has not spoken in her Confession, I will not undertake to speak in her name. I do not think so highly of myself as to do so. That is a safe position for every minister and elder of this Church. It seems to me that ministers on the other side have come to an opposite conclusion. Some evidently think themselves competent to declare off-hand what the meaning of Scripture must be, and some elders, under the light of common sense, are equally prepared and ready to make their interpretation the basis of a judicial decision. If they feel themselves equal to so great an honour, I congratulate them on the good terms on which they are with themselves, and on the high estimate they have formed of their own capacity. But I refuse to permit them to interpret Scripture for me, or in the name of the Church in which I am a minister. I refuse to accept their interpretation as the ground of judicial action. I judge of these abstract propositions as I would judge of propositions about to be added to the Confession of Faith. If we hold them relevant, we bind this Church to them, we make them terms of office binding on the ministers of this Church. But I regard the Confession as the charter of my ministerial freedom, as defending me from assaults formed on every private interpretation of Scripture. Proceeding to the examination of *Tertio*, Mr. Iverach said, that agreeing with Professor Smith and Dr. Candlish in the main, he had always held and taught his people that in all the books of Scripture they would find the will of God for their salvation, holding the objective testimony of the Spirit, as a distinct thing from subjective enlightenment of the Spirit, which made him in a sense independent of criticism. A sarcastic allusion had been made to Dr. Candlish in this discussion, and a reference to Hume. I believe, said Mr. Iverach, that Dr. Candlish's position is that of our Scottish theology. He is really in the full sweep of the richest and fullest stream of our Scottish evangelical

tradition. His is the position of one who has the fullest confidence in the glory and power of the Word of God. Historically his doctrine has always been associated with the times and the people, who have been most distinguished for vigorous faith and aggressive work. Coming more directly to Professor Smith's view, he has asserted again and again, that "if you eliminate the supernatural hand of a revealing God from the Old Testament, you destroy the whole consistency of the history, you destroy the very thing on which the possibility of a sound criticism rests." Brethren should carry with them the undeniable fact that the aim of all Professor Smith's critical labours has been to place the wonder of that supernatural history in a more luminous light. That principle in all fairness they must carry with them. Well let us look at *Tertio*, "Ignoring their divine authorship, &c." The same charge can be brought against any and every work on introduction with which I am acquainted. Ignoring is an unfair word. Where you do not mention any belief of yours you cannot be said to ignore it. I am amazed to find that Mr. Bannatyne holds that Professor Smith has ignored the divine authorship of the Bible. I have been here throughout the whole discussion, and I on the same ground might bring a relevant charge against this Presbytery of ignoring the doctrine of the atonement—(laughter). I have heard no allusion to it in the course of all this discussion.

MR. BANNATYNE—There is no necessity.

MR. IVERACH—Very well; there is no necessity for Professor Smith to have said anything about it in his article.

MR. BANNATYNE—Question?

MR. IVERACH—This is a charge that can be brought against all persons dealing with questions of introduction. It can be brought against Keil, and it can be brought against Dean Alford, because in the introductory sections to the Greek Testament he has not found it within the scope of his commission to deal with such a question. Against any of us who ever had to deal with these questions the same charge might be brought, and I have no doubt that it could be brought against Dr. Brown too—(laughter and applause). And then the Libel goes on to say that Professor Smith has said that the sacred writers have taken freedoms, like other authors. I did not like that phrase in Professor Smith's article, and I do not like it in the Libel. But Mr. Bannatyne, in his speech, has conceded that a certain measure of freedom was to be allowed to the inspired and sacred writers.

MR. BANNATYNE—Under inspiration.

MR. IVERACH—Of course under inspiration. The writer was to be allowed to put the matter in the literary form that was most natural to himself, and the "taking freedoms" meant by Professor Smith implied no more than the matter of form. The next statement in the Libel is that Professor Smith avers that the inspired writers "commit errors like other writers." I submit that that is not a fair statement of what Professor Smith says. Even such a man as Keil has admitted that errors have been made, and I stand here to say that I will not commit myself or my Church to a position which even Keil has abandoned as indefensible. As to the possibility of errors in the Word of God, I cannot settle that ques-

tion on the high *à priori* ground on which Mr. Bannatyne and Mr. Masson have taken it up. I cannot settle on any doctrine of inspiration and without inquiry if there be any error in the Word of God. I shall demand great and overwhelming evidence for the proof of any error, but I refuse to say beforehand, I refuse to commit the divine revelation of God to so hazardous and perilous a position as to say that there is no error, grammatical, historical, or scientific, in the Word of God—(hear, hear). It is a question of historical evidence, and the man who takes the opposite position, that such errors in the letter are inconsistent with truth and humanity, goes in the direction of rationalism of the grossest nature. I do not make myself a judge of the literary form which it may please God to make the vehicle of His revelations of Himself, but I would say whatsoever is consistent with truth, and honesty of purpose, and purity of intention, in purely human literature, is equally consistent with truth in the Divine Word of God—(hear, hear, and applause). Mr. Iverach then quoted from Dr. Hugh Martin on this same subject, and, using the phrase of the Rev. Doctor, said—“If He in His graciousness, not ill to please, but pleased with reverential honest effort, should put speeches into the mouths of others as Scripture truth, why should we not be content? If He in His graciousness should use this or that or the other literary form, the wonder is not that He condescends to use it, but that He has condescended to use human speech at all. When I go to the Bible I find that as matter of fact He, in His graciousness, has used many forms, I had almost said all pure forms of literature. I find He uses plain unadorned narrative, legal forms, simple didactic statements, and the short sententious proverbial mode of speech. I find Him condescending to use type and symbol, and even dramatic symbolic action. I find that He uses the stately eloquence of Isaiah, the plaintive monologues of Jeremiah, the dark splendour of Ezekiel, or the abrupt rustic speech of Amos. I find also that all poetic forms are used from the complex drama to a form which seems to us so utterly artificial as that of an acrostic psalm. He, in his graciousness, not ill to please, has used these forms, and I am content, humbly grateful, that He has condescended to speak at all.” But the Libel comes to me and says here you must draw the line, here you must say is a literary form which He cannot use. I refuse to draw that line. I am willing to inquire if He has used it. It is a matter to be investigated. But I am not prepared to affirm that this is a literary form which He in His graciousness may not use. We are not competent to say in what form He may be pleased to reveal Himself to men. We must humbly inquire what are the forms He has graciously condescended to use. As to the last clause of *Tertio*, “writing under the influence of party spirit and for party purposes,” if I were to say that the Epistle of Paul to the Galatians is a keen and a fierce polemic against the party to whom Paul was opposed, I should say what is distinctly true. If it was said of my statement that I in using that statement accused the Apostle Paul of writing for party purposes and under the influence of party spirit, I should be misrepresented; and I hold that Professor Smith is misrepresented here. He has not represented the writer of the Chronicles as writing from a party spirit or under a party influence. He has simply said that a man writes best on the subject in

which he takes the deepest interest. He has simply said that the writer's whole conception of the revelation of God is coloured by the standpoint that he occupied. He has simply said that the chronicler being very likely a priest, being very likely a Levite and a singer in the Temple—and I have yet to learn that that is not a fair inference from what the chronicler says—he naturally takes a deeper interest in all that concerns the Temple, and I have yet to learn that He in his graciousness, not being ill to please, may not make use of the idiosyncracies and deepest sympathies of our common human nature to convey His will to men—(applause).

Mr. GAGE, in seconding the amendment, said they were not there to refute Professor Smith's views, but to determine whether they contradicted or were opposed to certain parts of Scripture formulated in their Standards. He did not think that he could be found guilty thus far under *Tertio* of lowering the character of Scripture. If there has been any point made plain in this discussion regarding Professor Smith's position, and if there be one point more than another he himself has emphasized again and again, it is this, that he believes in the Divine authorship of the Scriptures. That distinctively is the differentiating factor between his whole standing and that of the rationalists, who go to Scripture with an attenuated if not altogether extinguished belief in the supernatural. Coming to Professor Smith's mode of dealing with Chronicles, then, he asked was a man not to be allowed the liberty of acting in the way he thought best adapted to set the truth in its real light, and for God's glory? We may think the Professor acted unwisely in doing as he did in adopting the plan he chose in this specific case, but to say that in adopting it he lowers the character of the inspired writings to the level of uninspired, is to say something totally different from what his own explanations and reiterated statements admit of. Neither under this nor the previous charge did Professor Smith seem to him to have contravened the range of liberty allowed under the expressions of their symbolic documents. After illustrating his position on this point in some detail, Mr Gage said there must be toleration—such allowance as is consistent with firm, loyal, and honest adherence to the doctrine of Scripture as stated in our Standards. The graver indictments in this *Tertio* are in my judgment those where Professor Smith is charged with making the inspired writers (1) give inferences of their own for facts; (2) give explanations that are unnecessary and incorrect; and (3) commit errors like other authors. On these points we must distinctly understand that inspiration is not under Professor Smith's explanation of his meaning an intermittent attribute of Scripture. He acknowledges difficulties and manfully tries to face them. Some of them, I think, he needlessly exaggerates. He appears to press too far also certain forms of expression. But what he means he tells us (Answer, page 58, line 3, "But I state," &c.) In view of all these considerations, and in our earnest regard for truth, we shall do well to remember in present circumstances that there may be the danger of yielding to other worse "tyrannies" (I adopt the words of my friend, Mr. Masson) than the tyranny of calm scholarship, and to other worse "worships" than that of genuine and devout learning. By coming to a finding really narrower than real argu-

ment constrains us to do in the interpretation of our Standards, we may do injustice to the cause of that reverent and believing criticism, whose objects are noble, whose services are often so valuable, whose results have been largely recognised as so important, and whose lasting interests are interests vital not only to our Free Church, but to the whole Church of God. It may be advantageous for us to remember at our present stage the words of Dr. Schaff, in his admirable paper on the Consensus of Reformed Confessions, read to the General Presbyterian Council at Edinburgh—"Luther and Calvin," says he, "with the profoundest reverence for the divine substance of the Bible, had a very liberal view of its form." While differing very far from several of the positions taken up by Professor Smith in reference to the matters included under this *Tertio*, I cannot see that our Confessional Standards declare such views as he advocates inconsistent with and opposed to their definite teachings, and so support the amendment.

Mr. SELBIE supported Mr. Masson's motion. He contended that ignoring divine authority in the article "Bible" was a serious matter, and if Professor Smith started with the belief in a divine and human authorship, he failed to see how it was scientifically consistent to ignore the former. With respect to the expression "fictitious speeches," he did not think sufficient importance had been attached to it.

Professor SMITH—Did I use the word fictitious?

Mr. SELBIE said that was in the charge. He was about to allude to a speech to which Professor Smith referred, which must be regarded as a fictitious speech—and that was what was put into the mouth of Abijah in the 13th chapter of Chronicles. Professor Smith, he understood, held that some of the things that were uttered by Abijah were not historically correct.

Professor SMITH said he had not said so, and he had not proceeded on that argument.

Mr. SELBIE said Professor Smith certainly stated in his article "Bible," that the Deuteronomic age was the 7th or 8th century before Christ. He also held at the same time that Deuteronomy made no distinction between the Levites and the Aaronites as to the priesthood.

Professor SMITH said that while he had stated that the distinction did not exist at the time of Deuteronomy, he had not made up his mind as to whether it had existed before, and had been obliterated. That, he thought, was one possible solution of the difficulty.

Mr. SELBIE—That is something new.

Professor SMITH said it was not. He had stated that in his article, and had repeated it in all his speeches. He did consider it a little hard, when he had contradicted things, that gentlemen should rise up and not only repeat them, but found a long argument upon them, and say that he called a certain speech fictitious because he held certain things in it as unhistorical. The subject was one upon which critics were divided, and on which he had expressed no opinion.

Mr. SELBIE said he was not satisfied—(laughter). Professor Smith had raised a new question—whether the Levitical period was not older than the Deuteronomic. When speaking about Deuteronomy, he said the Levites were all eligible to the priesthood—

Professor SMITH—At the time of Deuteronomy.

Mr. SELBIE—And one part of the article raised the question whether the Levitical period was not after the Deuteronomic.

Professor SMITH said that the author of Deuteronomy contemplated this, that an ordinary Levite might, under certain conditions, become a priest. The Levitical legislation did not contemplate that. It is an open question whether the Deuteronomic state of things was the earlier. He did not profess to know what was the relation of priests and Levites in Abijah's time, and therefore could not argue on such grounds as to the character of the speech.

Mr. SELBIE said he would not press the question farther—(laughter)—and he went on to refer to the portion of Professor Smith's Answer where it was stated that, "according to the Confession, infallible truth and divine authority go together," and "the two predicates are inseparable, the one does not extend beyond the other, and both are proved by one and the same evidence—namely, by the witness of the Holy Spirit, &c." Now, he (Mr. Selbie) could not understand that these two predicates were proved simply by the witness of the Holy Spirit. He held that the infallible truth belonged to the word itself, and when the Spirit brought that home to him he saw the infallible truth. But it existed whether it was brought home to him or not.

Professor SMITH—Certainly.

Mr. SELBIE said with regard to the use made of the names of Luther and Calvin, and what they had said, he wished to observe that Luther wrote a great deal, and that there was reason to believe that things he uttered in some of his earlier years he lived to regret. Now he thought there was something in the heart of Professor Smith, that if spared a few years longer a good many things he had written just now he would not be inclined to stand to—(hear, hear).

Mr. YULE said they were certainly not there to refute or confute Professor Smith, but to try and ascertain the law of the Church on this particular subject which they were now called upon to decide. As to the interpretation of the Scriptures they must appeal to the Confession of Faith so far as it had pronounced, and matters on which the Confession had not decided they must be considered at liberty to discuss, until it was shown from the word of God that they touched upon points of faith. He proceeded to criticise the wording of *Tertio*, remarking with regard to the charge against Professor Smith, of representing the sacred writers as taking freedoms, that when they looked at the particulars, and kept in view Professor Smith's explanation, it not only "became small by degrees and beautifully less," but in fact vanished altogether—(applause). In point of fact, where Kiel, an orthodox critic, as all knew, admitted an error in Chronicles, Professor Smith does not go so far. In regard to this whole matter he says—"It will, however, be noted that on all such points I carefully avoid hasty conclusions, and am unwilling to go beyond an admission that in some cases the evidence points to a possible, or, at most, a probable error." Looking at the extract given from the article, and looking at that explanation, they were certainly bound to admit that explanation to be the mind of Professor Smith. As to the witness of the

Spirit testifying to the infallible truth of Scripture, what the Confession had reference to was what man was to believe concerning God and what duty God required of man, and not to mere incidental matters of history or science. All this and more was covered by Professor Smith's teaching; and he nowhere eviscerated the word of God of its worth as a rule of faith and manners given us by Divine authority as infallible truth. Passing to another point, he said that people who adopted the highest doctrine of inspiration allowed that there were difficulties in Scripture, such as that about the Tharshish ships, which had neither been solved by the explanations of Keil nor of Dr. Douglas, of Glasgow. Calvin did not scruple to say that a mistake had occurred in Matthew, by the name of Jeremiah having got in instead of Zechariah, and were they to hold that their Professor was a heretic because he said that in certain places similar errors had been committed? As to the averment that a fictitious speech was put into the mouth of Abijah, who was a historical character, he referred to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus as affording a parallel case, where a speech is put into the mouth of Abraham of historical character. The strongest and worst thing in the indictment appeared to him to be that in which it was alleged that party spirit influenced the writers of Scripture, and that they wrote for party purposes. These were not Professor Smith's words, and the extracts did not bear out these words to any extent whatever. What Professor Smith said about the Chronicles was what any of the members of Presbytery might say about other writers of Scripture, and what they were accustomed to say about the New Testament writers. It was the commonest thing imaginable to say that Matthew wrote for one purpose and that the Apostle John wrote for another purpose, and they had also to consider that the Apostle Paul wrote for one purpose and the Apostle James for another, which was nothing more nor less than Professor Smith said about the writers of Kings or the writer of Chronicles. On the whole, he maintained that if they fairly and impartially viewed this matter they would find that Professor Smith had not contradicted the Standards of the Church under this head—(applause).

Mr. JOHNSTONE referred to Dr Chalmers' position concerning Scripture criticism. Dr Chalmers had said that he held "it as a sure and irresistible position that it (Scripture criticism) must just be conducted on the same principles and by the same methods with the criticism of all other ancient authorship. To determine the genuine readings of any book in the New Testament you must proceed on the very indications which guide you in the genuine readings of Horace and Cicero, and to determine the sense of any Scripture passage, you employ the very instruments which are wielded by linguists and grammarians when they try to penetrate the meaning of any obscure or controverted sentence in the poets or the historians or sages of Greece." In quoting further, Mr. Johnstone cited a passage where Dr Chalmers referred to the divine and human agency meeting together, and says "there is a grievous misunderstanding, should the divine be thought to supersede the human; instead of which the one should stimulate the other to its uttermost"—(hear, hear). He was very glad to see that some of the brethren on the opposite side understood that—(laughter).

Principal BROWN—That is just the A B C of the subject.

Mr JOHNSTONE—That is the very reason why I was surprised that it was not attended to—(laughter and applause)—and I thought a word from Dr Chalmers would have more effect than anything I could say. Though Professor Smith had written unadvisedly in some respects, he did not sympathise with the alarmists who wished to make the very worst of his position. He wished to say, in conclusion, that the discussion on the other side had been conducted with a degree of mist and misunderstanding and misstatement which was quite in keeping with *Tertio*, which had been proved to be a misstatement and a misrepresentation of Professor Smith's position. He thought they should all be very glad to receive this pamphlet of Professor Smith's, and he considered it strange that there had not been a manifestation from all quarters of the House of thankfulness to God that their young friend had been led to state directly what he held in connection with the points which had been raised—(applause).

Principal BROWN said as he did not intend to vote on this point, he would take the opportunity of making an explanation. From the time that he had examined the Libel thoroughly, he had made up his mind that the right course was to consider whether it was relevant as a charge, it being understood that the charges, though three literally, were only three different forms of one and the same charge. He also considered that the question of relevancy was one thing, and after that was decided the question of how they were to regard the three charges, was another and a subsequent one. Accordingly he made up his mind that the course agreeable to the tenor and intent of the Libel, and, he held, agreeable to the way in which such matters were judicially handled, was either to move, or second, or support, a motion affirming that these particulars were relevant to infer church censure, but nothing further, all further action being reserved for the future stage. But as he saw from the feeling of the Court that he should stand alone if he moved that this third particular or any other particular was relevant simply without reference to some one of the three forms of charge, he was put in the position of not being able to vote at all, and for this reason that although he thought this third charge did border very closely upon the first alternative charge, he was not prepared to say that it was relevant in its bearing upon the first portion of the charge. He therefore thought it his duty to give the benefit of any doubt that he had on the subject to Professor Smith. He had no doubt that *Tertio* was relevant to the second alternative charge, and when they came that length he should support any motion that was made to that effect, but he decidedly objected to going along with a motion that it was not relevant to the first charge. The Answer of Professor Smith to the Libel had been repeatedly referred to by both sides, and he could not see how they could avoid referring to it provided it was distinctly understood that they were not judging of the Answer but of the Libel itself. He admitted the great ability that was displayed in the Answer, but he could not refrain from saying that his judgment was that the view of inspiration advocated in that pamphlet was not the view of inspiration involved in the statements of the Confession of Faith. That might seem to shut him up to the first form of the charge, and so it would, if he had

to judge of the Answer. But since he had not to judge of the Answer, but of the Libel, he was not prepared to say that there was in the article *Tertio* sufficient ground to hold that it was relevant in relation to the first alternative. As to the dispute about the Greek words *rhema* and *logos*, he had already stated that Professor Smith's critical remarks were undoubtedly correct, but he had also stated that they had no bearing on the statement of Mr. Bannatyne. After illustrating this point, Principal Brown, in reply to Mr. Iverach's contention, that they must not go outside the Confession, he said the Confession did not bear on such questions, because they were not raised up to the date of the Confession. Yet as they shook the very foundations of the Confession, they must have liberty to go outside it, and not be limited by its *ipsissima verba*. He referred as in point to the judgment of the Court of Arches in the case of the "Essays and Reviews," which were found not to come within the limits of the Thirty-nine Articles, the result leading to the doctrine of the Church of England being undermined and subverted. Principal Brown concluded by stating that, as he did not in his conscience believe that *Tertio* was clearly relevant under the first charge, although it was very close to it, he would decline to vote at all.

Professor SMITH said that he now wished to say one or two words upon what had been said in the course of the debate. Dr. Brown had alluded to a point which he (Professor Smith) was very glad had been brought under the notice of the Presbytery. The Doctor had said that the Free Church would not consent to allow the question of doctrine to be decided in the way in which the Court of Arches decided on the matter of the "Essays and Reviews." The Court of Arches, in deciding that case, had been led very much by Lord Westbury, who was anxious to secure as much freedom as possible, and who had almost gone as far as to say that no action could be taken unless there was a verbal contradiction between what was stated in the "Essays and Reviews," and what was stated in one of the Thirty-nine Articles. He (Professor Smith) did not stand up to ask that his articles should be judged in any such way. What he asked was that before they should come to a decision against him, it should be found that there was a logical line of inconsistency between his articles and the doctrines of the Confession; and if this Court acquitted him it must be on the ground that there was no logical inconsistency between his views and the creed of the Church. Therefore, Dr. Brown might be relieved of any fear which he might have that this Church was liable to go the length of the Court of Arches, and insist, not upon logical inconsistency, but upon verbal difference. There was no fear that this Court would go the length of the Court of Arches, and he himself would not desire that it should be so—(applause). This fact somewhat modified the necessity of going outside the Confession. Dr. Brown had said that when the foundations of the Confession of Faith were shaken by such views as those they were now considering, then they had to go outside the Confession, and build up these foundations by reference to the Bible and to common sense. It so happened, however, that the foundations of the Confession were in this case part of the Confession itself. The doctrine of the infallible truth of the Bible was as much a part of the Confession as the

statement that the Bible was infallible truth, and if he had assailed this doctrine or built up an opinion on grounds opposed to this doctrine, he could refute it without their going outside the Confession at all.

Principal BROWN—My remark did not apply to this stage of the proceedings at all, but to a subsequent stage, so that these remarks of Professor Smith's are inapplicable and irrelevant.

Professor SMITH—If my reply is irrelevant, of course it is quite obvious that the remarks which called it forth are irrelevant also—(laughter and applause). Dr. Brown is here as a judge, and I hope his example will not be followed by any others who are now present. He has said distinctly that this charge is not to his mind clearly made out, and that he does not think himself justified in voting for Mr. Masson's motion. If that is anything at all, that is a verdict of not proven—(hear, hear)—and, in such a matter as this, that can only be given effect to by a vote on his part that this charge is not relevant—(applause). I am therefore entitled to his vote, and I have a right to claim it—(applause)—and to say that he is not doing his duty as a judge if he stands up and says "I am not clear that this is a relevant charge, but nevertheless I will withhold my vote"—(applause).

Principal BROWN—I beg to say that I shall claim my liberty to act as I please, and I do not hold the one result necessarily to follow from the other. My mind is in a state in which I do not choose to go into the distinction that has been drawn by Professor Smith. And allow me the liberty to say when you are insisting upon this line of remark that you shall not have my vote.

Professor SMITH—Very well, then; that is quite clear; but I hope that no other judge in this Court will consider it consistent with his functions, if he thinks that this charge is not a relevant one, not to give me the benefit of his vote—(applause). I was very much surprised that the mover and seconder made no attempt whatever to bring home to my articles the general proposition in the abstract major. There was no attempt on their part to say that I do these things which are there averred. This point was certainly touched upon by Mr. Selbie, and by him only on the other side; it was also touched upon by those who have spoken in support of Mr. Iverach's motion, and it was clearly shown that a very great deal of proof was wanted to show that I said anything that amounted to the charge which is here preferred. I dissent from Mr. Selbie's proposal to take up other things than those in the extracts, because I have had no fair notice that such was to be done. The Libel should have been constructed so as to show any passages upon which the charges against me were built up.

Mr. SELBIE—It is stated distinctly that certain publications are in the hands of the Presbytery Clerk, and that these are to be used against you.

Professor SMITH—That is quite true, but so far as I understand the law of the case—and that was the assumption upon which I went in giving my Answer—the Libel was bound to show the definite thing that was to be brought and charged against me. The only passage that Mr. Selbie referred to was the passage about the tendency of a certain writing. It may be for good or bad. I did not say, and had no desire to say, it was for

bad. As to ignoring the Divine authorship, which is also charged under this particular, that, I think, does not fall under this head. Ignore and contradict, as has been pointed out already, are different things. When I contributed this article to the *Encyclopædia Britannica* I was writing under limitations—the necessary limitations of such a work. An appeal was made by one of the speakers—Mr. Bannatyne—to a former edition of the same publication, but the case is entirely different. The editor has been changed, the plan of the work has been changed, and I wrote with a distinct understanding that I was dealing solely with the literary question, and that there would be another article, the name of which I think is to be “Holy Scriptures,” in which the dogmatical position in regard to the Bible was to be treated. The article “Bible” was confined to the literary questions. I did not think it possible to discuss the literary questions about the Bible at all satisfactorily without admitting the existence of a supernatural factor in Bible history. I have said that again and again. I cannot do anything with the Bible unless you allow that, and that I put distinctly to the forefront of my article. The dogmatical or theological character of the book was a different question from the question of what were its literary characteristics. I distinctly admit that the religion of the Bible is the religion of revelation, that during the period of that history God spoke by his prophets to men. I did not go farther and ask, what are the theological characteristics of the record of revelation, because I had another question before me—the question of its literary characteristics. The two questions are distinct, and every one who has ever tried to write such articles, without keeping these two aspects entirely distinct, will recognise the difficulty that lies in such a way of treatment. I have here done what every orthodox writer does—(applause)—and seeing this has been so mis-stated, not through any fault on my part, but through the unfamiliarity of the Church with these lines of investigation, I regret very much that I did not put at the commencement of my article “Bible,” as I had at one time intended to do, a paragraph which I had written, and which I could yet show to the Presbytery, stating my distinct views dogmatically on the point now raised. In that paragraph I stated that I assumed the Bible as a record of revelation, and I stated the ground of that assumption, opposing the contention of the Tubingen school, whose hypothesis is that everything that is supernatural is untrue, and further explaining that while I then acknowledged its Divine characteristics I was to treat it in its purely literary forms. This statement corresponds with what I have said now. I did not put that paragraph in because I was strictly limited as to room, and because I did not know that I was entitled to ask the editor to put in what was of the nature of a personal explanation, and I did not think that that explanation was necessary. But, had I anticipated the persistent attempts that have been made to put the worst construction on everything I have said, I certainly would have taken care to protect myself—(applause). I have no objection to what was said about the speeches in Chronicles except on this one point of view, that my opinions were charged as being linked into something that was much more fargoin. The kind of grounds on which these speeches are viewed as free compositions has been shown by Dr. Delitzsch, whose remarks have

been quoted in Dr. Candlish's pamphlet, and ought, therefore, to be well known to the members of Presbytery. That speech of Abijah, to which Mr. Selbie made reference, bears the stamp of the chronicler upon it. It has his style, his very impress, and it contains an expression which Mr. Selbie will, as a Hebrew scholar, understand in its full meaning, namely, '*amme haarazot*'. To any competent Hebrew scholar that is an indication that that speech was written after the Exile, for that expression only came into existence at that time. Another thing in the speech of Abijah is that he says that Jeroboam revolted against his father Rehoboam when a young man and tender of heart, or, as he might be described, a raw lad. The chronicler has told us in the chapter before that he was a man of forty-one, and not quite twenty years had passed since. It is not likely, therefore, that Abijah, in speaking before the people, would have said that he was a raw lad. Such things as these are slight matters; they don't touch the value of the Bible; and I refer to them only in passing. I do not know what would be the result if I put myself in Mr. Bannatyne's position. If I felt that these things touched my faith, I could not study Scripture for one day without coming to something which would give my faith a wrench; and the Church should not put office-bearers in a position in which these slight matters would be elevated into vital matters, and men would have no choice between yielding up everything in Christianity and holding the extremest views of inspiration which it is possible for anyone to frame—(applause). As to the allegation about writing under the influence of party spirit and for party purposes—What I said was that the writer was partial to the service of the singers; and is there anything wrong in that? Suppose a member of this Church were to write a Church history, would he not be legitimately partial to the history of his own Church? Would he not treat it with particular kindness and fondness, and give it prominence? Mr. Bannatyne said that the liberty given to the writers of the inspired books might go so far as to effect a proportionate treatment of different things, and that is what I mean. The proportionate treatment of different things is different in different authors; and every author treats in the largest proportion the thing for which he has the greatest love. Is there anything heretical there?—(applause). That covers all the charges, and I think it really enough for my purpose. I came up with a good many notes, for instance, about the ships of Tarshish and other matters, but these points have not been brought up, and I need not trouble the Court upon the subject—(cries of "Go on," "Go on"). I have not been stating a theory of Inspiration as generally accepted. I have been trying to give an exposition of what the Confession says about Inspiration. No doubt there is room for further theory. To me it is a mystery. It is a thing which is due to the action of God's Spirit, and when we begin to study this we get into the region of the infinite, and can never expect to understand it; therefore I treat with great reverence all questions that go beyond the Confession; and on all such questions I have wished to speak with reserve, not but that I think there are things that can well be investigated by human reason, and human reason properly used, I think, will never be inconsistent with faith, but because these are sacred subjects on which we should speak

with caution. The only question I had to consider was how much is in the Confession, and how much that is not in the Confession is to members of this Church a subject of free and reverent enquiry—(applause). Mr. Masson referred to two points—what does the Confession cover in claiming Divine authority and infallibility for Scripture: and he seemed to say that I adopted the well-known view that part of the Scriptures is the Word of God, and part is not the Word of God; and he proceeded to say that I produced a certain arbitrary and somewhat subjective test to show which is which. On that subject I made a very distinct statement in my Answer. We may say silver is contained in the mould into which it is run. If the silver is only in the leaden ore, the man who has no means for smelting it is no richer by having it in his possession. If the Bible only contained the Word of God mixed with man's word like silver in the leaden ore, then no one could use Scripture for his own religious life who did not possess the requisite scholarship, as in the other case the man could not get silver without having a smelting furnace to separate it from the leaden one. Therefore that view is untenable, but there is another way in which Scripture may contain the Word. Scripture contains the Word of God, the pure Word of God, as the mould contains the silver seven times tried. The pure silver takes the shape of the mould, it may be an imperfect shape, but it is pure silver, and the man is enriched thereby at once without any further act. That is the way—(applause). It is pure silver, and no one comes to the Bible but finds in it the solid silver seven times tried by the furnace in the Old Testament and in the New Testament, and not merely the leaden ore. But that is not to say that the form of the Word of God will not contain things that are imperfect, just as pure silver may be in an imperfectly-shaped shell—(applause). Such a doctrine of the imperfection of Scripture really covers everything I have said. I never said, as Mr. Masson fears I do, that every individual soul is capable of telling at once what is the will of God in Scripture. The witness of the Spirit is an objective thing. It is like light in the world. It is only our eyesight that gives us the use of it, and there is no other evidence for the existence of light except our eyesight. In the same way it is only the witness of the Spirit that enables us to see the divine qualities of the Scripture, it would be difficult to prove it divine without the witness of the Spirit. Professor Smith added that he would be happy to answer any questions, but there were no other points which he now remembered as having emerged in the course of the debate which called for any reply from him, and he resumed his seat amid loud applause.

Mr. MASSON said he would waive the right of reply.

Several members here stood up, and, amidst some confusion, it was brought out that some gentlemen thought that, having appealed against the phrase "contradict or are opposed to," they were entitled to treat that as meaning "subvert."

Mr. SELBIE said it would be understood that in voting for the first motion they did so on the understanding that they claimed that the word ought to be "subvert."

Mr. BANNATYNE said all along they had protected themselves by saying

that they voted under cover with respect to the change of the word "subvert."

Mr. IVERACH said it was an impossible thing for a person to vote for "contradict," meaning all the time "subvert."

Professor SMITH said "subvert" was not in the Libel, and if they were not to stick to the Libel now, there was an end to all verity.

Mr. BANNATYNE—That is our look out, and not yours.

Mr. A. F. MOIR said they seemed to have arrived at a very strange position, that people who did not believe that the Libel was relevant would vote that it was relevant in one sense, and not in the one they were voting on.

Mr. JOHNSTONE hoped that this would be kept in view to show the value of the voting on the other side.

Mr. BANNATYNE—That is your explanation.

Mr. JOHNSTONE—I hope the reporters will take this down.

The MODERATOR—What we have before us now is a motion which does not contain the word "subvert" at all.

Principal BROWN here remarked that in his reply he had used a strong expression, and he should be sorry to use any expression which was improper. When he asked leave to withdraw his motion and liberty to dissent, he did it under the possibility that either Professor Smith or some one on the other side might say that that implied that he voted with them. No one, however, made any objection to it, and he said nothing. Whereupon Professor Smith said, "I claim your vote then," when he (the Principal) had replied, "I do not think it necessary to come to that conclusion, and you shall not have my vote." He did not like that expression, and he now begged to withdraw it.

Professor SMITH said he had not taken it at all in an offensive sense.

The vote was then taken with the following result:—

For Mr. Masson's Motion—Dr. Longmuir, Messrs. Craven, Arthur, Bannatyne, Selbie, and Masson, *ministers*; and Messrs. W. W. Milne, Mitchell, Aberdein, and Dr. Gordon, *elders*—10.

For Mr. Iverach's Amendment—Dr. Spence, Messrs. Stephen, A. F. Moir, Yule, Johnstone, Anderson, Selkirk, Sloan, R. A. Mitchell, Goodall, Low, Iverach, Gage, Semple, Innes, Macqueen, *ministers*; and Messrs. Collie, Paterson, Thom, Moir, W. Gordon, Barnett, W. Milne, Valentine, and Fleming, *elders*—25.

Principal Brown and Messrs. Bell and Fitzpatrick declined to vote.

The result was received with cheers.

Mr. Masson dissented and complained, and Mr. Bannatyne adhered.

The Presbytery adjourned till Tuesday next, at 10 o'clock.

ABERDEEN, 26th February, 1878.

The Presbytery met in the Hall of the Free West Church, at ten o'clock—Prof. Salmond, Moderator.

The following answer to Mr. Masson's reasons of dissent from the

resolution of the last meeting in regard to *Tertio*, was given in by the Committee of Presbytery :—

As from the constitution of men's minds there is large room for diversity of opinion as to what constitutes *virtual denial* of any confessional position, the Presbytery regards the very large majority in this division—25 to 10—a sufficient vindication of its decision that no virtual denial of the divine authority and infallible truth of God's Word was made.

4. “Quarto”—*Discrediting the Authenticity of the Bible.*

The Presbytery took up the fourth particular under the first alternative major proposition, (see Form of Libel, p. 9.)

Dr. LONGMUIR, after expressing his sadness of spirit at the commotion this case had made, and his regret and sorrow at seeing their Professor, whom he so much respected, and the members of Presbytery so much divided in opinion, said it must have struck those within this Court, as it had struck those without, that every one of those that voted against the relevancy denied their sympathy with Professor Smith's views, so that a judicial sentence that was wont to be quoted as a good joke was likely to be turned into earnest, when the finding of this Court would be—Professor Smith, you are declared not guilty, but you must not do the like again! Dr. Longmuir went on to comment on the phrase “poetical invention of incidents,” as applicable to the narrative of Jonah and the great fish, referring to the confirmation of that incident supplied by Layard's discoveries at Nineveh. When Layard brought to this country the slabs from Nineveh, I would not rest till I had seen them, said Dr. L., assured that they would cast much light on the historical parts of Scripture, and I was not disappointed. Brethren can scarcely conceive what my feelings were in seeing Dagon and Oannes, the one half-fish half-man, bent semicircularly like the mermaid, and the other, a man with the gill-covers of a large fish drawn over his head and the body of the fish hanging down his back. Dr. Longmuir illustrated his views on this point more fully, by quoting the words of our Saviour in Luke xi., as to Jonah being a sign to the Ninevites. He then remarked upon other passages, and continued—What is said with regard to Daniel appears to me to be quite sufficient to support the count we are now considering. He is only “akin to the prophets proper,” says the quotation; and, in his explanation, Professor Smith tell us that he (Daniel) is not called a prophet in the Old Testament; but the line that has been left blank would have contained the statement of our Lord that Daniel was a prophet (Mark xiii. 14). If Daniel has not been called a prophet in the Old Testament, he certainly has all the attributes of one, and few of the writings of the prophets are more frequently alluded to by our Saviour, who takes from him the prophetic but humble name of the “Son of Man,” and clearly alludes to his imagery when speaking of his return in glory. I need say little more on the Ketubim, than that our Saviour seems to include them in the expression Psalms, as being the first of the Hagiographa, or holy writings, when he speaks of the Scriptures as consisting of “Moses, the Prophets, and the Psalms;” and that the whole of these books are stamped with his au-

thority as "the Scriptures." Without enlarging further on these topics, I move the relevancy of *Quarto*.

Dr. GORDON (elder) seconded.

Mr J. M. SLOAN moved—

That the Presbytery find the particular *Quarto* irrelevant under the first alternative of the major, inasmuch as it is not explicit in statement, is destitute of any corresponding averments in the minor, and is not substantiated by the extracts adduced in support of it.

He held that the particular *Quarto* was not explicit, intelligible, or grammatical, and pointed out that, on a former occasion, Principal Brown had said that he could never make anything out of it. When they had such testimony as that, to the effect that this part was not intelligible, it would be a serious matter for the Presbytery to say that it contained the charge of contradicting the Confession of Faith, and that it was opposed to sound doctrine.

Principal BROWN said what he meant was, that the phrasology was unintelligible. He never thought that the drift and scope of it were unintelligible.

Mr. SLOAN said, he at the time stated that he thought it could be made intelligible, and he made a suggestion which he thought would accomplish that end. Professor Smith very generously made another suggestion in his Answer. But as neither suggestion was accepted, he submitted that they must hold it irrelevant. From the way the particulars were characterised it could not be found relevant. "Albeit, the presentation of opinions," &c. Whose opinions were they? Were they Professor Smith's opinions? He submitted that there was no distinct definition of whose these opinions were, and this want of definiteness was condemnatory of the particular. Suppose they admitted that it was Professor Smith's opinions that were referred to in the first part—and commence, "Albeit, the presentation of opinions, as your own opinions, which discredit the authenticity," and so on; then the concluding part of the sentence was—"without any indication of dissent therefrom." So that under this view of it they had the presentation of opinions of his own, which discredit the authenticity of Scripture, without any indication of dissent from his own opinions, which, Mr Sloan submitted, was perfectly unintelligible.

Mr. MASSON—That is not there.

Mr. SLOAN said that was not there, but it was not sense that was there. Then the particular was irrelevant, because it was inadequate in form. The word "presentation" was also inaccurate. Now the presentation of things which discredit the authenticity of Scripture was not a thing which was improper. They might require to present opinions for various purposes—for the purpose of information for instance—and that was what Professor Smith did. They might present the opinions of any heretic, of Voltaire, and not be subject to libel. Then, again, *Quarto* was inadequate in form, because there was no conclusion drawn from it in the minor. Proceeding to the extracts, Mr Sloan said the charge was irrelevant, inasmuch as these did not bear it out. Take the book of Job for example. He did not know that many would hold that the book of

Job did not contain poetical invention and incident. In an article in Professor Fairbairn's Encyclopædia it was stated that it was possible to hold that everything in Job took place as it occurred, but it was scarcely credible. Then as to the book of Jonah, Professor Smith manifestly was not stating a personal opinion at all, but there as elsewhere treating of the literature of the subject. Professor Smith holds by the authenticity and canonicity of all the books of Scripture—(hear, hear). He says, for example, "Esther has been viewed"—and he spoke here of what is matter of fact—"as a fiction by many who are not over sceptical critics," and that he can maintain and substantiate as a matter of fact. He then goes on to show why he rejects that view, "but on this view a book which finds no recognition in the New Testament, and whose canonicity was long suspected by the Christian as well as by the Jewish Church, must sink to the rank of an apocryphal production." The very fact, Mr. Sloan proceeded to say, that Professor Smith puts Esther among the canonical books of Scripture, shows that he does not accept the position taken up by these sceptical critics—(applause). With regard to the substitution of Elohim for Jehovah, Mr. Sloan remarked that there were in our present New Testament expressions which he supposed would not be found in our revised version. Now as they had not the old Hebrew manuscripts to go back upon, so that they might arrive at an accurate reading, there was greater scope for examining Old Testament writings according to liberal criticism. Then coming to the book of Daniel, Professor Smith had said in his article about prophetic writings, that he could find no place in it for Daniel, "which presented so many points of diversity from ordinary prophecy as to require entirely separate treatment." But Professor Smith did not identify himself with the modern critics. He merely put the alternative, and he said that it required separate treatment. He did not see how they were to base upon that any charge of holding a position contrary to the Confession of Faith.

Mr. JOHNSTONE, Belhelvie, seconded. After remarking that this trying case had been the cause of much irritation, he said he wished to refer to feelings of another kind, namely of gratification and thankfulness to God that had been expressed by a person to him, when he read Professor Smith's reply to a challenge that he did not hold the Bible as the great source of belief and ultimate authority. The person, when he heard it, said it ought to be printed separately, and cast abroad throughout the whole land. The extract was as follows:—"If I am asked why I revere Scripture as the word of God, and as the only perfect rule of faith and life, I answer with all the fathers of the Protestant Church, 'Because the Bible is the only record of the redeeming love of God, because in the Bible alone I find God drawing near to man in Christ Jesus, and declaring to us in Him His will for our salvation. And this record I know to be true by the witness of His Spirit in my heart, whereby I am assured that none other than God Himself is able to speak such words to my soul'"—(applause). He said, instead of nibbling away and chopping logic in a small way, why not, with all their hearts, receive this direct statement—(hear, hear). He did not say that it was an absolute, full, or correct statement, but it was a thing that they ought to be truly thankful

for. As to *Quarto*, it really tried one's patience to deal with a thing that they could not get hold of very well—(hear, hear). He proceeded—The obscure language of *Quarto* reminds me of an incident related by Hugh Miller, and which I may be permitted to refer to as an illustration. When working as a mason in a certain district in the Highlands, there came to Miller one day a woman wishing to be enlightened on a very deep theological question (which she stated with considerable precision). "I merely remarked," says Miller, "in reply, that she was, of course, acquainted with the views of the old theologians—such as Flavel—men who really knew as much about such things as could be known, and perhaps a little more—(laughter). Was she not satisfied with them? Not dissatisfied, she said; but she wanted more light." In order to get out of the difficulty regarding the matter in hand, Miller says—"One of the passages in Flavel, on this special point, had luckily struck me from its odd obscurity of expression, and I was able to quote it in nearly the original words." The passage from Flavel concludes thus—"It might be," he thought, "by way of concomitancy, as Estius will have it; or to speak as Dr. Reynolds doth, by way of ineffable resultancy and emanation"—(laughter). As this (says Miller) was perfectly unintelligible, it seemed to satisfy my new friend—(loud laughter). There is a power about a thing that is unintelligible—(laughter)—no doubt of it. Now he was unwilling to believe that any there could be satisfied in the same way with *Quarto*, but it should not be forgot that on the one hand Mr. Laidlaw had described it as "a perfect jumble," while Principal Brown on the other hand said he "could make neither head nor tail of it"—(laughter).

Mr. SELBIE, in supporting Dr. Longmuir's motion, admitted that the particular was not very grammatical or intelligible in its language, but held that the meaning was perfectly clear—(hear, hear). He held that the views of Professor Smith here under consideration, if they did not "contradict" the Standards, were "opposed to," and might be viewed as subverting them. This point he insisted fully upon. He held that Professor Smith had undoubtedly conveyed an erroneous impression of the views of the Free Church, and complained of his ignoring Jonah and Esther, while he had not, though questioned by the Presbytery, said a word as to whether he believed Daniel to contain authentic history. He considered his views on the Hagiographa very sad indeed.

Principal BROWN said he had had considerable anxiety in regard to his duty to-day with regard to this particular *Quarto*, and he could not help referring to the instructions which Professor Smith gave to him last Thursday—he would not like to say the lecture which he had read to him—as to his duty as a judge in this Court, and the challenge that he had thrown out to him (Principal Brown) to give him his vote as a matter of consistency if he did not see his way to vote on the other side.

Professor SMITH—It is a matter of justice, not of consistency.

Principal BROWN went on to say that had the doctrine of inspiration nakedly formulated in Professor Smith's Defence been formulated in the articles under investigation, he would have had no hesitation in voting last Thursday with those with whom he usually voted. It was because he was not quite clear that the doctrine of inspiration expressed in

the Libel was conveyed explicitly in the articles that he could not see his way to vote at all, but he did believe, and did now believe, that that doctrine, though not expressed in the articles, was the true key of the manner in which the articles treat various portions of Scripture—(hear, hear)—that the treatment of those portions of Scripture was dictated by, and, indeed, affected by, that view of inspiration which is formulated in the Libel, and it was because of that that he had great hesitation as to what his course ought to be to-day; and he confessed that he came there rather with the design of not voting at all upon *Quarto*, and adhering to the course he had followed on Thursday. After remarking that he had been considerably impressed by what Mr. Selbie had said as to giving “subvert” as an alternative, and sheltered under which he could have voted, Dr. Brown said he held that it was not consistent with any such view of inspiration as he believed was contained in the Confession to hold with regard to the book of Job such views as are expressed about the speeches of Elihu, or when it was said so very nakedly, and so offensively, that “in a large part of the Psalter a later hand has systematically substituted Elohim for Jehovah,” and not only so, but that great freedom was observed on the part of readers and copyists, “who not only made verbal changes, but composed new poems out of fragments of others.” A question on this point had been transmitted by the Presbytery, but Professor Smith had ominously left it unanswered. He did not care for the reason; but at anyrate they were left in the dark as to whether they were not at the mercy of readers and copyists for portions of the word of God which are believed to be inspired. He had nothing to say regarding Daniel in addition to what had been said; but regarding the Hagiographa, he would say that the statement made about it, or a third part of it, with regard to the openness in which it was left to receive additional books, put it in the same predicament as the valuable parts of the Apocryphal writings, because of the history they contain, or from their bearing an ancient and venerable name. If they applied this to the whole of the Hagiographa where were they? Our Lord had mentioned the Hagiographa by the name of the chief book, and this showed that the canon was then closed. On the book of Jonah, he could understand Professor Smith’s remarks in no other sense than that there was no clear evidence that Jonah was matter of history, and when he (Principal Brown) looked at what our Lord says, he was certain that He would not have spoken as He did if it had not been a matter of historical fact. Principal Brown concluded by stating that he would give his vote for Dr. Longmuir’s motion.

Mr. BELL had serious doubts as to Professor Smith’s position in reference to the extracts produced. At last meeting he had illustrated his views of inspiration by saying that while the silver was pure, the mould was imperfect. Now, he thought that that view of inspiration was hardly what he should like to accept, because it left it entirely open to every one to decide what the mould was and what the silver was. For instance, Jonah might be held to be only a bit of the mould, and so with other things which touched the substance of Scripture. In the circumstances, he felt he could not vote at all to-day.

Professor SMITH, in replying, said it was rather unfortunate to be always obliged to go back on the same point day after day, but it was necessary in this instance to do so. Mr Bell had misapprehended the import of his illustration. He had said that the Scripture was not like the silver in the ore, that the person who went to Scripture was not in the difficulty of the man who went to the ore and did not know what was silver and what was not. In the case of Jonah, for instance, he could not regard the book as canonical, unless he believed that it taught us divine truth, and unless any ambiguity that might arise as to its interpretation was not of such a kind as would lead any one to find in it what was not divine truth but human error. The question was of imperfections of form as distinct from the substance. It was not that part was good and part bad, but that the substance was all divine, and that in such a sense that it appeals as a divine and infallible guide to the simple Christian. He was surprised at the questions that had been raised as to the human imperfection of form, when such a man as Dr Bannerman, who held a very high doctrine of inspiration, indeed, admitted it. He could not enter upon that, but would quote a statement by Baxter, the author of the "Saints' Rest." Baxter was talking in his book upon Christian evidence, upon the differences of opinion that exist upon the doctrines of inspiration, and he goes on to state what all are agreed upon. "Yet all are agreed in this, that Scripture is so of divine inspiration as yet in the manner and method and style"—and surely that covered all questions of literal and figurative meaning—"to partake of the various abilities of the writers and consequently of their human imperfections"—(applause). Now, surely from the seventeenth century downwards, at all events, the expression "human imperfections of Scripture" had been freely used by the most orthodox writers; and it surprised him that such an explanation as this was necessary. As to what Dr. Brown had said, he would explain that on Thursday he had not asked his vote as a matter of consistency. He regretted to say that it seemed to him that Dr. Brown's conduct had been entirely consistent since the time he had written his motion and his speech supporting it, finding the whole matter relevant without considering his (Professor Smith's) Answer—(laughter and applause). What he had said was that he thought it just that Dr. Brown should give him his vote, because in a court of justice a man is to be held innocent and declared innocent until he is proved to be guilty—(applause). It was not just that any man should have to prove his innocence; it was just that a judge should be satisfied of his guilt; and it was just that when a judge was not satisfied of his guilt he should find the charge not relevant—(applause). Proceeding with his argument, Professor Smith said that no valid attempt, he might almost say no attempt, had been made to show that his theory of inspiration was inconsistent with the Confession; and there had been no attempt to show that following out that theory of inspiration in his statement about individual books, he had been led to statements which are manifestly inconsistent with the Confession. That was what the prosecution had got to find out. They had got to show that the statements he had made about biblical books were manifestly and directly inconsistent with the Confession—(applause). He argued that they were

not, because he said that they were fully in accordance with the views of inspiration, which, according to his argument, conserved all that is essential in the Confession. Some persons might think that his statement as to Confessional doctrine was not complete. No doubt it was not perfectly complete, because he had only taken up those points of the doctrine which he thought came up in the case, but no one had attempted by anything like a sound argument to show that anything he had said on this point was inconsistent with any point that had been clearly made out to be Confessional. To-day they had got from the ingenuity of Mr. Selbie a new distinction applied to the Libel, which had had a gratifying effect upon Dr. Brown, and had relieved him of the painful difficulty to which he would otherwise have been shut up of not voting against him (Professor Smith) on this point—(laughter and applause). What Mr. Selbie had called attention to was that the Libel did not simply use the expression “contradict,” but “contradict or are opposed to.” He (Professor Smith) had no doubt whatever that the Presbytery had intended that these terms should be synonymous, at anyrate that was what the general public would understand. But he would like to ask what was the logical meaning of “are opposed to.” They were speaking of opinions opposed to doctrines, and they were speaking on logical grounds, and the only two kinds of opposition known to logic were contradictory opposition and contrary opposition—(applause). But contrary opposition was more than contradictory, because, while contradictory opposition was an opposition between two things, one or other of which must be true, contrary opposition was an opposition between two things, one of which must be false, although possibly both were so. Therefore, if there was any sense in putting a different meaning on “opposed” than “contradict,” it would seem that Mr Selbie was anxious to point out not merely that his (Professor Smith’s) view of the Confession was false, but to keep it open for his (Mr Selbie’s) advantage that while his (Professor Smith’s) opinions were false, the Confessional opinions might be false also—(laughter and applause). That, he thought, was a piece of plain logic—(renewed laughter and applause). Before going to the points relative to this particular which had been raised in the course of debate, he would point out that they had gone back to that long dispute as to the difference between relevancy and proof, and he wished once and for all to crush any ambiguity that might arise in the minds of the Presbytery on that point. He would refer them to Hume’s Commentaries on the Criminal Law of Scotland, which was known to be an authoritative book on matters of this kind. If Mr Selbie’s position on this point had any meaning at all, it amounted to this, that they might adduce evidence afterwards to prove the major as well as the minor, and that they might prove anything not explicitly and in detail set down in the minor.

MR SELBIE—Not at all.

Professor SMITH argued that if this were not the explanation of Mr Selbie’s position, it was impossible for the Presbytery to know in what position he stood on this matter. Professor Smith thereupon proceeded to quote extensively from Hume, the drift of the quotations and of his argument being to show that the Presbytery in dealing with this case

must set down in the Libel the exact things with which he was charged, and that when any of these charges was found relevant it was impossible not to find it proven. Having exhausted this part of the case, Professor Smith went on to say that he wished to draw a little practical lesson from this. They had been in this Court brow-beaten by strong legal statements made by a single member of the House.

Principal BROWN—I think it would be well to avoid any allusion like that.

Professor SMITH—I withdraw the expression, but I will say that there has been a great influence exercised on certain members of this House by statements upon legal points proceeding from one member of the House, who, unfortunately, is the only member of the House who has had the advantage of a legal education—(laughter). I wish to point out in this instance that this gentleman, on so very important a point as this, was ignorant of the facts stated in the very clearest manner in this book of Hume's, which is recognised as a standard authority on the subject—(loud applause).

Mr MITCHELL—How do you know that I was ignorant?

Professor SMITH—I am glad to accept his statement, and it now appears that although he was fully acquainted with those facts, although he was here as judge, and not merely as prosecutor, he withheld these facts from the Court—(renewed applause). Mr Mitchell, upon his present explanation, not only knew these facts and withheld them from the Court, but he supported Dr Brown's way of going into the relevancy, although he knew all the time that this was clearly and directly in the teeth of Hume's exposition of the law on the subject—(applause)—for he objects to me giving him the only charitable explanation possible, that he did this in ignorance of the law—(applause).

Dr BROWN—Some of those who are not legal gentlemen may be able to say something on that at a future state.

Professor SMITH—Very well; I hope whatever is said will be done with reference to the clear statement in this authoritative book. He hoped he had made it clear to the Court that the nature of a Libel was this, that every fact they were going to state against him must be put down with the utmost detail and with the utmost distinctness which the prosecutor could reach, and after these had been found relevant, the whole question was simply whether these opinions said to have been stated by him had been stated by him—(hear, hear)—and the only sense which could be given to the statement, "without prejudice to the said generality," was this—that the whole papers were referred to, not that any new propositions might be started, but that, if necessary, the context might be appealed to, to help them to understand what the exact sense of the extracts founded on in the charge was—(hear, hear). If it had been intended to ground an argument against him on what he had said in his answers to the questions put by the Presbytery, that should have been put into the indictment, and all that they had to consider to-day was what he had said on these various topics as set down in the Libel. A man was answerable for what he had said; he was not answerable for what he had not said—(hear, hear). If a man was to be answerable

because, when discussing difficult and troublesome questions, he did not stop to explain his own views on each particular question and on each particular phase of each question, he did not know which of them would escape trial for heresy — (hear, hear, and applause). The charge under *Quarto* — that he had stated the opinions of other people which contradict or are opposed to the doctrines of the Confession — he thought would not have been pressed. Regarding the book of Jonah, he hoped brethren did not suppose that if he were to give his view it would be without paying the deepest and most reverential attention to what our Lord said, but how was he, in a literary question, to go aside to argue on such a point as that. The meaning of a prophetic sign in the Old Testament was a difficult question, and it went much farther than Dr. Longmuir seemed to say. It was not necessary that it should be a miracle in order to be a sign; and, for himself, he thought that the sign of the prophet Jonah would be more striking if it should be found that it was a parable, a book written under the guidance of God very long before that remarkable event of which it is an illustration. Before he could say it was a parable he would try to be sure of that. He had said that a very large number of writers, and he would say the majority of recent writers, undoubtedly do hold that Jonah is a parable, and that many very orthodox writers do the same; and they do so on various grounds, not so much on grounds of difficulty about the whale, but on the ground of the teaching of the parable. He was not going into that. These were not his views. When he stated his views on Jonah he would state them as frankly as he had stated his views on other things — (hear, hear, and applause). He would not be reticent about it. When he had in the course of his studies arrived at views which might not be generally accepted, he would not be backward at the proper time to lay them before the Church and say what he could in support of them, and wait in a respectful manner to see whether they agreed with her Standards. But because he had stated opinions which were current, and current among the majority of scholars, without even stating that he had accepted these opinions, it was unheard of that a charge of heresy should be grounded on any such thing — (applause). As to the Book of Esther, his position was this, that if he felt it was not a history, then it would to him lose its value as part of the Old Testament canon; and because he was not prepared for that step, therefore he had in writing on this question put in a *caveat* against extending to that book a method more legitimate in regard to other books. They must remember, however, that he did not say that that was not a question which the Church would have to face. They might have to face questions of canonicity now as the Church had often faced them before, but when they came to face them they must face these questions for what they are, and that was what he had said about Esther. The other details were really of very little importance. Dr. Longmuir himself seemed to admit that there was considerable variety as to the text of some of the Psalms. Dr. Brown had pathetically said that he (Professor Smith) was attacking the inspiration of the Psalms, but was the Principal not aware that the majority of scholars found no other explanation than that which he had given? At

a certain time in the Old Testament history, the word Jehovah was avoided, and the word Elohim was used in order to make it perfectly plain that the Israelites did not speak of God as of a god side by side with other gods, but as the only true God; and was it less probable that in the Psalms originally collected for liturgical purposes it might be thought wiser to remove from liturgical uses the word Jehovah and substitute Elohim, which gave a clearer testimony to the unity of God? Was it so very certain that Dr. Brown's contention was the right one, without going into any of these historical questions, that a member of Presbytery was entitled to rise, and in a tone of pathos declare that this was an attack upon the inspiration of the Psalms?—(applause). Regarding the book of Job, he had stated that the speeches of Elihu break the connection, and that he thought was certain. He did not say that that absolutely settled that they were not written by the same author, nor could he say absolutely that the speeches were by a later hand, because the question was one that admitted of and was receiving much discussion; but he did lean to the opinion that the speeches of Elihu were of a later time, and he defied any one to prove that there was anything heretical in that—(applause). The book of Job was an argument in which deep questions with regard to Divine Providence and the relations of Divine Providence to human righteousness were tossed backwards and forwards between the various interlocutors. That was the nature of the book, and if that were removed they would lose its instruction. Let them suppose that the speeches of Elihu were written by a later hand. Did it follow that they were not to accept this book as the gift of God because he had caused another link to be put in there, and yet another of these various conflicting and confronting views of God's providence with the discussion of which the book is taken up. He did not feel obliged to reject them, because he thought they were added afterwards. He held the book of Daniel to be canonical, because he found in it the mark of prediction, and in the New Testament sense he admitted that it contained prophecy. As to the closing of the canon, it had been said that it would not do to state that the writings of the Hagiographa, like Chronicles, were written after the prophetic succession had ceased. Malachi was the last of the prophets, and he would like to ask, was there nothing in the Old Testament later than Malachi, or would the fact that specific prophetic inspiration had ceased be an adequate reason for rejecting Ezra and Nehemiah, which were not written by the prophets? This question he thought had been raised by their going back to the idea of the canon of the Old Testament having been closed by the Prophets, but at all events it had been said that it would not do to say that the closing of the canon underwent fluctuations, and that when books came up with certain recommendations they had to be considered. He hoped that parity of reasoning would not be applied to the New Testament, for if it were it would be found that they had no New Testament canon at all, for the New Testament was closed by those gradual tentative ways, and by the gradual growth of opinion in the Church, precisely by those ways in which he had asserted that the Old Testament canon had been closed. As to the time at which it was closed, they had heard that the Psalms in the New Testament meant the whole Hagiographa. He

had no hesitation in saying that that, however often it had been repeated in books, was not proved, and that it was not very likely that when our Lord said the Psalms, he meant the Chronicles. They knew that the canon of the Hagiographa among the Jews was not completed until after the time of Christ. Gretz maintained that there was no official canon of the Hagiographa till A.D. 65, and the canonicity of the Song of Solomon was disputed in the second century. With these facts before him, had he said too much when he had said that the third part of the canon was open when the other two were closed; and if it was to be said that there was danger in such an assertion as that, were they not driven to the supposition that there was to be no investigation of the history of the canon at all?—(applause).

Mr. D. MITCHELL asked Professor Smith—Supposing there were a certain number of charges found relevant, did he hold that every one of these charges, when the decision comes, must be held as proved if held relevant?

Professor SMITH—Certainly.

Mr. D. MITCHELL said the Borthwick case consisted of 13 particulars, which were affirmed to be contradictory to the Holy Scriptures and to the Confession of Faith. Respecting that case, Mr. Mitchell said that Dr. Bannerman asked what course was competent to the accused if all the thirteen charges had been found relevant; and he pointed out that two courses were competent—first, that the extracts declared relevant were not faithfully quoted or accurately extracted. But the chief one was on the proof, that the extracts which had been found relevant did not bear the meaning put upon them at the stage of proof. So much was that the case that the late Dr. Candlish moved that one of the articles found relevant should not be held proved; and the late Principal Dewar, of this town, moved that two of them held relevant should not be held proved.

Professor SMITH was glad that Mr. Mitchell had brought forward this case, and said if he had done so before they would have understood the position of the other side. In the meantime he (Professor Smith) stood to what he had said, and the best legal authority on which he had been able to lay his hands upheld his view as the only one consistent with the ordinary practice of libelling. Whether the Borthwick case was conducted properly or not, it was a very curious thing that at so late a stage the gentlemen on the other side had shown their hand and indicated what they were going on.

After some conversation,

Dr. LONGMUIR briefly replied. The view of Jonah stood pretty much as he left it. It was said to be a poetical invention—(“No, no”).

Professor SMITH—I have not said that Jonah was a piece of poetical invention, but that a great many people held so.

Dr. LONGMUIR said “generally” was the word used, and he held it included Professor Smith.

Professor SMITH—Not in my opinion.

Dr. LONGMUIR—We differ on that point—that is all—(laughter). Dr. Longmuir dwelt on the alleged obscurity of the charge *Quarto*, but said they yet all apparently understood what it meant.

The vote was then taken, with the following result :—

For Dr. Longmuir's motion—Principal Brown, Dr. Longmuir, Messrs. W. L. Mitchell, Leslie, John Macdonald, Selbie, and Masson, *ministers*; and D. Mitchell, Bisset, Aberdein, Ritchie, and Dr. Gordon, *elders*—12.

For Mr. Sloan's amendment—Dr. Spence, Messrs. Moir, Yule, Johnstone, Anderson, Selkirk, Sloan, R. A. Mitchell, Goodall, Clark, Iverach, Gage, Innes, and Macqueen, *ministers*; and Messrs. Collie, Paterson, Thom, Moir, W. Gordon, Barnett, Valentine, McHardy, Cook, and Taylor, *elders*—24.

Messrs. Stephen, Craven, Bell, and Fitzpatrick, *ministers*; and Mr. Wildgoose, *elder*, declined to vote.

Dr. Longmuir dissented and complained to the Synod, and Dr. Gordon adhered.

5. "Quinto"—*The Song of Solomon.*

The Presbytery then took up *Quinto* (See Form of Libel, p. 9).

Principal BROWN, before proceeding with the particular, asked Professor Smith to give an explanation of what he meant by the word "betrothed," as in his article "Bible" he seemed to give one definition, and in his article "Canticles" another.

Professor SMITH said that, with respect to his article "Bible," Dr. Moody Stuart's argument in the Assembly was that he (Professor Smith) had assumed that the heroine was betrothed according to Mosaic law. Now, in ordinary English, the word was used in a wider sense. But there was no doubt the heroine had pledged her feelings to the shepherd. He asked to be judged by what was distinctly put in the article "Canticles." It was a pity that he had put the word "betrothed" in the article "Bible."

Principal BROWN said that in several instances the Canticles called the heroine a spouse.

Professor SMITH said *Kallah*, as was well known, was an extremely wide word in Hebrew—(laughter).

Dr. LONGMUIR then moved :—

The Presbytery find that the fifth particular under the major proposition of the Form of Libel against Professor Smith, with the corresponding averments and extracts in the minor proposition, be found relevant under the first charge of the general major.

He said he had been much shocked in reading the account which Professor Smith had given of the book now under notice. He could have sympathised with him if he had given a representation of one side of criticism as well as the other. But he thought all would agree that an undue prominence had been given to the one view, while the other had not been presented at all. He noticed very briefly the statement of Professor Smith that "True allegories are never without internal marks of their allegorical design," and then referred to the way the book had been preserved, and concluded with his motion.

Dr. GORDON seconded.

Mr. A. F. MOIR moved as an amendment—

That the Presbytery find that the particular *Quinto*, with the corresponding extracts and averments in the minor, is not relevant to sustain the first alternative charge in the general major.

With regard to the charge under *Quinto* that Canticles was devoid of spiritual significance, Mr. Moir said he could understand how upon Professor Smith's theory he might make the book of Canticles to serve most useful purposes in relation to the Christian and spiritual life; and he argued that there were none of Professor Smith's views on this point which contradicted or were opposed to the Standards of their Church. Then it had been brought against him that he did not give sufficient weight to opinions opposite to his own, and that he had not stated certain things which would have gone far to reconcile the views he had stated to the Confession of Faith. Well, if they were to be charged with heresy for the things which they missed out of their sermons, he did not know where any of them would stand. Professor Smith had just held to the point directly before him. With regard to the statement about the book being providentially prevented from being deleted from the canon, he expressed his astonishment that this charge should have ever occupied the place it did in a libel intended to carry the censures of heresy on the front of it—(applause).

Mr. SLOAN seconded the amendment. He differed entirely from Prof. Smith in his view of the Canticles. But the simple question before them was, were these views such as contradicted the Confession? On the contrary its canonicity and authenticity were admitted by Professor Smith; who did not say that the book was providentially inserted, but only that its deletion from the canon was providentially averted.

Principal BROWN said—I am not prepared to hold that an abandonment of the allegorical sense of this book, and an advocacy of the purely literal sense of it is a legitimate subject of Church censure. For myself I have tried hard to read myself into that purely literal sense of it in order to see if it would explain naturally and worthily, either as a praiseworthy Oriental composition or as occupying a place in Old Testament Scripture. But I confess I have failed. After remarking that with the exception of a very few spiritual men, such as Delitzsch, the residuum who had thrown off the allegorical view were men of whom you need expect recognition of spiritual significance no more than you need expect to get grapes of thorns and figs of thistles, Dr. Brown said of all the theories held, Professor Smith's view seemed to him the most unnatural and repulsive. After remarking on the wide sense given by Professor Smith to the word "betrothed," he said, well then, might Dr. Moody Stuart say in the speech referred to, that the crime imputed to Solomon by this offensive theory, though not perpetrated was none the less in itself; that viewed as a song it turns the simplest words into evil; since the heroine of the tale overcomes through no power of conscience and no sense of obligation to the divine law, but purely through firmness of will and the strength of a preoccupied affection. No Israelite, imbued with the principles of the law of Moses, could have conceived or composed it as an example of lofty virtue or of a character worthy of our admiration; and that, viewed in this light, the theory must be pronounced un-

worthy of Biblical criticism. As to some expressions used in this article, I should have thought, said Dr. B., they might have been spared, and if they might, that they should. But perhaps the theory is such that it required them adequately to set it forth. Of all the features of Professor Smith's theory, the most astounding to me is the light which it is said to throw upon the character of the northern trials. Dr Brown went on to argue that the two sacred histories of the revolt of the Ten Tribes given in Kings and Chronicles, instead of speaking of the pure simplicity of the north, spoke only of social and political grievances maddening the people into rebellion against the Royal family of Judah, and the readiness with which in the face of prophetic warnings the people fell into the calf worship of Jeroboam.

MR. YULE said he could not see that Dr. Brown's criticism of Professor Smith's views in regard to the Northern Kingdom had any bearing on the charge now under consideration, as there was nothing in the extracts quoted from Professor Smith's writings as to the state of the Northern Kingdom. As to Professor Smith's view of Canticles, admittedly taking the literal view was not heretical, and as to allegorical exposition he might ask brethren who held by it—which allegory?—(hear, hear.) Not one of them would pin their faith to any allegorical exposition yet given—(hear, hear). As to saying that in providence use had been made of a prejudice to preserve the book in the canon, why did they not admit that God in his providence had made use of actual sin for gracious ends, as in the case of Joseph sold by his brethren to save the tribe of Israel—(applause).

MR. CRAVEN said he endorsed the views submitted by Principal Brown, but he could not come to the same conclusion with him, and felt constrained not to vote with him. However much they might deplore the state of thought and feeling in any person who could not sympathise with the spiritual significance of the Song of Solomon, it was another thing to say that the views which had apparently been expressed by Professor Smith contradicted the Confession of Faith—(applause). He had some doubt as to whether they contradicted the Confession, and therefore could not vote on the side on which he had formerly voted.

MR. BELL and MR. SELBIE said that for similar reasons they would vote for neither of the motions.

Professor SMITH said he would not enter into the merits at great length, but he wished to be frank and explicit with regard to the use of the word "betrothed." Principal Brown had attached an importance and a meaning to it which he certainly did not attach to it, or else he would have been more careful in his language. In the first place, the article "Bible" was published some time before the article "Canticles," and when he wrote the former he thought he had satisfied himself in a general way that there was a great deal to be said in favour of the ordinary critical opinion. He had not formulated a definite opinion of his own, but simply stated that it was a lyrical drama in which, according to most critics, the pure love of the Shulamite for her betrothed is exhibited as victorious over the seductions of Solomon's harem. That was a mere general statement of the thing, and he certainly never thought of attaching

to the word "betrothed" the meaning betrothed by Jewish law. In speaking of Dr. Moody Stuart's criticism, he now found that he had overlooked the use of the word betrothed in the article "Bible," but he had still to point out that he did not state his own view in that article, and that even supposing he had, the word betrothed had two meanings. He undoubtedly held that the Shulamite considered herself pledged by her love to the shepherd, but that there had been no formal betrothal. He did not attach much importance to that, and even supposing she had been betrothed, and the betrothal had been cancelled—which was possible—and Solomon had taken her to his harem, that would not have changed the matter very much. It was natural to suppose that her love to the shepherd enabled her to overcome the temptations of Solomon's harem quite as much as any legal obligation; and he was not at all sure whether it represented a lower type of morality that she should rest upon a pure and true affection than that she should rest on a formal statement of the law—(applause). He was not sure that it was always the highest type of morality that depended upon the law for its sanctions. If he had known that this was to be elevated into a point of such importance, and that such enormous arguments were to be founded upon it, he would have tried to make it clear before. He apprehended that the state of the case was this, that she had pledged her affections with the shepherd, that during a progress she was seen by Solomon, who, along with the ladies of the Court, admired her. Really the matter came to nothing, but if Dr. Brown wished to press the word betrothed let him do it, and he would defy him to prove heresy from it. As to the Northern Kingdom, he held certain definite views on it which he was prepared to defend by arguments from the books of Samuel and Kings, but they were not included in the Libel, and they had therefore nothing to do with them. As to the book of Samuel—a book which was exceedingly difficult to understand, and which was not always rightly represented in our English version—he had made a reference to the state of the northern part of the kingdom, having in his view at the time 2nd Samuel, xx. 19. The meaning of that passage was exceedingly clear. It meant that if old customs and establishments were given up elsewhere, if they went to Abel and Dan, they would see that they had not forgotten them. The Northern Kingdom was conservative undoubtedly for evil, but also for good. Then as to Dr. Brown's way of explaining away the connection of the prophets with the northern revolt, he thought that his (Professor Smith's) was the more textual, and that the language of rebuke which Ahijah used went on the assumption that, so far as the revolt was concerned, Jeroboam had the right, and that it was only after that that he was dragged into sin and to a carnal policy. He had nothing to say about the carnal policy, but it was plain on the face of the history that the right was not on Rehoboam's side. No one who had been brought up on the principles of liberty—which surely had to do with morality and religion—would deny that Rehoboam and Solomon had broken their covenant with the Northern Kingdom, and that when Rehoboam went north to swear to the constitution of the Northern Kingdom, he just did as the Emperor of Austria did when, obedient to

the Constitutionals in Hungary, he went to be crowned at Pesh—(applause). It was a question of liberalism and freedom, and it was not remarkable that the prophets of God, who were always opposed to tyranny, rose up and took the part of the Northern Kingdom. Was a man to be considered a heretic for saying so? Was it to be said that tyranny and despotism were things that the word of God permitted, and that the word of God had not a word to say as to the principles of liberalism which had given us both our civil and our religious freedom?—(loud applause).

Mr. MOIR submitted his motion in the following form :—

That the Presbytery find that the particular *Quinto*, with the corresponding extracts and averments in the minor, is not relevant to sustain the first alternative charge in the general major.

He did not say anything about what *Quinto* would be in relation to the second general charge, and therefore he held that anybody who believed that the particular was incapable of sustaining the first charge was quite in order and doing right in voting with him.

Dr. LONGMUIR briefly replied, complaining of the degrading position to which the views of Professor Smith reduced Solomon.

The Presbytery then divided, with the following result :—

For Dr. Longmuir's Motion—Principal Brown, Dr. Longmuir, Revs. Messrs. W. L. Mitchell, J. Macdonald, and Masson, *ministers*; Messrs. D. Mitchell, Ritchie, Wildgoose, and Dr. Gordon, *elders*—9.

For Mr. Moir's Motion—Revs. Dr. Spence, Messrs. Craven, Moir, Yule, Johnstone, Anderson, Selkirk, Sloan, Bell, R. A. Mitchell, Clark, Iverach, Gage, Innes, and Macqueen, *ministers*; Messrs. Collie, G. H. Paterson, Thom, J. Moir, W. Gordon, Barnett, W. Milne, Valentine, Cook, and Taylor, *elders*—25.

Messrs. Stephen, Selbie, Goodall, and Fitzpatrick declined to vote.

The result of the vote was received with loud applause. Dr. Longmuir dissented and appealed to the Synod, with adherents, and the committee formerly appointed were requested to answer the dissent, and appear at the Synod to support the judgment of the Presbytery.

6. "Sexto."—*Ignoring Christ's Testimony to Old Testament Authorship.*

The Presbytery took up *Sexto* (see Form of Libel, p. 10).

Some conversation ensued as to the ambiguity of the charge under this head, and the consequent necessity of amending the Libel; but Professor Smith having expressed his willingness that the discussion should proceed,

Principal BROWN moved :—

That the Presbytery find the sixth particular under the major proposition of the Form of Libel against Professor Smith, with the corresponding averments and extracts in the minor proposition, to be relevant under the first charge of the general major.

In supporting his motion, Principal Brown said that what they complained of was such ignoring or contradicting of the testimony referred to as

virtually amounted to a discarding of the testimony. He would begin with the 110th Psalm as an example of the ignoring of authorship complained of. After referring to the questions formulated but not adopted by the Presbytery on Psalm xc., and so not answered by Professor Smith, the appeal to the Assembly and the decisive majority by which the appeal was sustained, he said, Professor Smith had never yet recognised the Davidic authorship of that psalm, although our Lord's argument is plainly worthless on any other view of its authorship. As to the 16th Psalm, two Apostles, Peter and Paul, as nakedly as words could express it, argued before the Jews that what is said in that psalm of his flesh not seeing corruption was not true of David, for his sepulchre was with them at that day, and that this was and could be true of none but one man—Christ Jesus. Yet, in his article in the *Expositor*, Professor Smith had not only utterly ignored the Davidic authorship of that psalm, but denied that the psalm does say what was true of none but one, and affirming that it specially says what is true of every saint, of whom Christ was the most eminent—that they would abide before God for ever. Among the other questions proposed to be put to Professor Smith, and adopted by the Presbytery before last Assembly was one as to what he meant by saying that “what is usually meant by the word *law* (Torah) in writings earlier than the captivity” are “the priestly ordinances.” His reply to that was that in writings previous to the Exile the word “law” generally meant not a written priestly ordinance, but an oral decision of the priests. Now what the Presbytery wanted to know was not anything about oral decisions of the priests or priestly ordinances, but whether, according to his construction of the Old Testament literature before the Exile, he had left any room for a *written word* in possession of the whole nation for ages. He had told nothing whatever about that, but about something that they wanted no information about at all. Principal Brown concluded by giving some of the characteristics of the written word as celebrated in the Psalms as perfectly converting the soul, the study of the saints by day and their song in the night, as broken by the wicked to the grief of the godly in the land, and of course they must have had it to break, etc. For such written word he found absolutely no room in Professor Smith's view of Old Testament literature. He did not rest on the word Torah (law). He rested on the fact that his scheme excluded it. In all these views, believing that this particular was proved relevant by the extracts in the minor, he had felt constrained to move accordingly.

Mr. RITCHIE, elder, seconded the motion.

Professor SMITH said the possibility of constructing such an argument as Dr. Brown had done was not hinted in the remotest way in the Libel, and his whole reading and previous knowledge had never led him to think that such an argument was possible. But this showed all the more forcibly that it would be no more than substantial justice that the whole points charged against him and included in Dr. Brown's speech should be specifically mentioned. It was the business of the other side to prove everything, and it would surely be incompetent for them to prove anything that was not in the Libel.

Mr. YULE moved—

That the Presbytery find the particular *Sexto* irrelevant, inasmuch as there is no specification of the Old and New Testament testimony which Professor Smith is said to have contradicted, and inasmuch as the extracts in the minor do not substantiate the charges as relevant under the first of the major.

With regard to the first point in his motion, it was obvious that because of the omission to specify the things with which Professor Smith was charged the Libel was most ill-constructed and illogical, and in regard to the second point he thought that Principal Brown had failed to show that the extracts quoted were sufficient to substantiate the particular. It was a curious thing that although a great deal had been said about previous questions to Professor Smith, none of these had been embodied in the Libel, or at least they had been, but in an exceedingly microscopic form. All these matters had been thrashed over already; he thought they were not worth thrashing over again, and he considered that Professor Smith's opinions were not contradictory to what most of them believed on the subject—(hear, hear). He (Prof. Smith) had stated publicly in regard to Deuteronomy, that, if he thought our Lord had said anything distinctly as to the authorship of that book, he would not in any way contradict the general view, and they must presume that the same applied to the Psalms—(applause). He was quite sure that Professor Smith would acknowledge the authority of our Lord as completely conclusive with respect to the Davidic authorship. After criticising various other points in Principal Brown's speech, Mr. Yule concluded by stating that it seemed to him that the charge of contradicting the doctrine of the Confession in this particular had not been made out, and that the charge must be departed from.

Mr. R. A. MITCHELL seconded the amendment, and said it became them to speak cautiously indeed with regard to the testimony borne by our Lord and His apostles on points as to the authorship of the Old Testament, because they should be careful to ascertain whether the apostles or Christ intended to bear testimony regarding the authorship of the passages they quoted, or if they merely made use of ordinary and popular expressions which had not any particular significance.

Mr. MASSON maintained that, as momentous teaching depended upon the authorship here the subject was one of very great importance, and though not directly involved in Professor Smith's writings it was a perfectly logical course to put the question asked.

Professor SMITH said he was willing to meet any logical inference from the Confession, but he did not say that he was willing to meet any logical inference from the minor of the Libel, because he was entitled to have in the Libel the exact thing that he was wanted to meet.

Mr MASSON said that if Professor Smith had any idea about the 110th Psalm, and was prepared to acknowledge a certain position, then he must say that he had taken a very long time in giving expression to that opinion.

After remarks from Mr. Moir, elder, and Mr. Stephen, who reserved his opinion till he had heard Professor Smith's explanation on this important point,

Professor SMITH said he was confident that they would not do justice

to this portion of the case until they got to the substance of it, and the reason that he had taken objection to the form of the charge was because it was not such as would not enable them to get to the substance of it. As to the question of the testimony of our Lord, they had there a question of theology, but it had not been clearly put before the Presbytery. The question that had been raised here obliquely was, he believed, a more important one than had hitherto appeared, because it was more a question as to the doctrine of the person of our Lord than a question as to the explanation of Scripture ; and, he confessed, if the weight was to be laid on this head which seemed to be laid on it by some members on the other side, it would have been much fairer put in that way, because he stood there to say that he would not yield to any one in the reverence with which he approached the mystery of the incarnation ; and he would not set up his own human judgment in any way against that which came to him on the authority of Christ. Let them show him that the meaning of Christ was so and so, and he was willing to waive his judgment at once—(applause). And that was what he had said in connection with Deuteronomy. He had said that he was not able to see that the language of Christ, taken as human language is to be taken, did prove that it was literally written by Moses. It must be judged so. Although Christ was more than man, and although what He actually meant to say came to us with divine authority, yet in settling what He actually meant to teach us we must not put more into His words than could be put into the words of another person speaking in the same connection. He might use such expressions regarding Moses as that quoted, and yet his argument might not rest on it ; but if it were shown that Christ meant to speak to the authorship, and that his argument depended upon that, then he at once accepted the authority—(applause). Waiving the point of order, Professor Smith *ex gratia* took up the question of the 110th Psalm. It seemed to him, so far as he had been able to read the words of our Lord, that the probable interpretation on which He based his arguments was the assumption of the Davidic authorship. On that ground, confirmed by some arguments from the Old Testament itself, he thought it probable that the psalm was written by David. He thought it probable that that was the force of Christ's argument, but at the same time he would not go so far as gentlemen on the other side, and he believed it to be possible for a person perfectly honestly to hold that Christ was here making an *argumentum ad hominem*, and that He, by so doing, is simply endeavouring to prove to the Pharisees by taking their own premises, and their traditional view of the Psalms, that He is more than the son of David. If any one takes that view he would not say he was a heretic. Nay more, he would not undertake to say more than this, that in his opinion that was not the most probable view of the text—(applause). The reason why he had made no allusion to this in his article "Bible" was this : he was asking—Is there literary evidence that some of the Psalms are David's? Literary evidence must appeal to people of all theological opinions, and it was because there was this evidence regarding the 7th and 18th Psalms that he had cited them. His argument would not have been helped by mixing up the two things of belief and literary evidence, as it

was recommended that he should have done ; and he must say that if he had the same thing to do again he would do it in the same way. He did not desire his argument to be tripped up by its being pointed out to him that he was going into a theological argument, and not into a literary question. Dr. Brown surely possessed sufficient experience in this department, and sufficient address as a writer, to have caused him to abstain from using such an argument as this—(applause). In the case of the 16th Psalm they could not start from the title, and if the psalm was given to them without a title to rely upon, it was reasonable to suppose it must be understood by itself. When they had explained the psalm he was not aware there was anything in his exegesis to prevent anyone saying that the psalm was David's. He believed if anyone accepted the New Testament argument they did not require to refuse to accept what he had said regarding the psalm. Indeed he had followed in the same line as Calvin and many other critics. The argument of the Apostle rests on the fact that the Psalmist, whom he calls David, was dead and buried, and if there was no resurrection in Christ Jesus, then the hopes of the Psalmist were lying and false. His argument was that the Psalmist could not refer to himself, and that therefore the psalm must be fulfilled in some higher one who had power to triumph over death, not only for himself but for those who believed. It would be very difficult to prove that there was more than that in the Apostle's argument, and that one syllable in the argument would be broken down if they took out the word "David" and substituted any other. Professor Smith concluded with a long and elaborate argument as to his views respecting the Torah.

Mr. STEPHEN said he was perfectly satisfied with Professor Smith's explanation, and was prepared to vote upon his side—(loud applause).

Principal BROWN then replied.

Mr. BELL asked Professor Smith if he understood him to say of the 110th Psalm that it was probably Davidic. Did he really believe that it was Davidic?

Professor SMITH said he thought it was most probable that our Lord's argument was not an argument *ad hominem*, and he gave the like probability to the Davidic authorship. Not being quite sure of that he thought that probably the psalm was David's—(applause).

The vote was then taken, with the following result:—

For Principal Brown's Motion—Principal Brown, Rev. Dr. Longmuir, Messrs. W. L. Mitchell, Craven, Selbie, Goodal, and Masson, *ministers*; Messrs. Mitchell and Wildgoose and Dr. Gordon, *elders*—10.

For Mr. Yule's Motion—Revs. Dr. Spence, Messrs. Stephen, Moir, Yule, Johnstone, Selkirk, Sloan, Bell, R. A. Mitchell, Clark, Iverach, Gage, Innes, and Macqueen, *ministers*; Messrs. Collie, Paterson, Thom, Moir, W. Gordon, Barnett, W. Milne, Valentine, Cook, Fleming, *elders*—24.

Rev. Messrs. Anderson and Fitzpatrick declined to vote.

Dr. Brown dissented from the judgment of the Presbytery, and complained to the Synod. The usual committee was appointed to answer the dissent and support the judgment of the Presbytery at the Synod.

The Presbytery then arranged to meet again on Thursday, at ten o'clock.

ABERDEEN, 28th February, 1878.

The Presbytery met in the Hall of the Free Church College, on Thursday, 28th February, to resume consideration of this case—Professor Salmond, moderator.

The CLERK read the following reasons of dissent and complaint by Dr. Longmuir against the findings of the Presbytery at their last sitting :—

Quarto.—1. Because the assertion that the Book of Jonah is an instance of “poetical invention” is contrary to the references of the Saviour to it as history. 2. Because the denial that Daniel was a prophet is in opposition to the declaration of Jesus Christ that Daniel was indeed “a prophet.”

Quinto.—1. Because the representation of Canticles as a mere poetical allegory is inconsistent with the declaration of the Confession of Faith, that Canticles is one of the books that were given by inspiration of God. 2. That the theory expounded and embraced by the writer of the article “Canticles” exhibits both Solomon and the “betrothed maiden” in a degraded if not immoral view, which is inconsistent with a book inspired by the Holy Spirit of God.

7. “Septimo.”—*Disparagement of Prophecy.*

The Presbytery then took up the charge under *Septimo* (see Form of Libel, p. 11).

Principal BROWN, in absence of Mr. Selbie, who was to have moved in this particular, said—I never thought that Professor Smith’s articles expressly contradicted the doctrine of Scripture and the Confession, on the subject of inspiration; but I did and do think that they undermined or subverted it. Accordingly, when the Presbytery resolved to expel the word “subvert” from the Libel, and to substitute for it “contradict or are opposed to,” I immediately saw that this was a step that trenched upon the relevancy of the Libel before the stage of relevancy had been reached, and so was both unconstitutional and unjust to a large portion of those who were distressed and alarmed by those articles. Dr. Brown, after remarking that the object of the Libel was to give opportunity of judging if an ecclesiastical offence had been committed, and what was its precise nature and degree, adverted to the course followed on the other side, of interrupting the debate after it was begun, and changing the mode of procedure. This he held to be against the whole intention of the Libel, and nothing showed better the impropriety of the course than some of the speeches on the other side, showing how near a professor might come to an express contradiction of the Scripture and Confessional doctrine of inspiration, without going quite outside of the lines of Confessional orthodoxy. After further explaining his reasons for preferring “subvert” to “contradict or are opposed to,” as better expressing the real nature of the offence under *Quarto*, and similarly under *Septimo*, and quoting Professor Smith’s words as to prophets prophecying “into the future,” and true prophecy being “always ideal,” which he denied, Principal Brown said—the word “ideal” here is manifestly used to express merely the great general purpose of God to carry on gradually to its full completion in Christ his original design of redemption, and is put in sharp contrast with specific prediction of concrete future facts. The next sentence seems to concede strict prediction, that “the critical study of

prophecy has done no greater service than to point out how small a fraction of prophecy is strictly predictive." But presently, in the next extract, we have a formal definition of the whole elements of true prophecy, which, according to the plain meaning of language, excludes the strictly predictive element. "The prophecies contain, 1st, reproof of present sin; 2nd, exhortation to present duty; 3rd, encouragement to the godly and threatening to the wicked, based upon God's righteous purpose. In this last connection prophecy is predictive. (That explanation of 'prediction' as the mere evolution of a righteous government, is to me anything but evidence of the recognition of it in the sense of prediction of concrete future facts.) It lays hold of the ideal elements of the theocratic conception, and depicts the way in which, by God's grace, they shall be actually realised in a Messianic age, and in a nation purified by judgment and mercy. But in all this the prophet starts from present sin, present needs, present historical situations. There is no reason to think that a prophet ever received a revelation which was not spoken directly and pointedly to his own time." I could say much upon this, but I refrain, more especially as the extract given of the exposition of the 16th Psalm in the *Expositor*, which immediately follows the above, is a complete proof that my understanding of his view of prophecy is the correct one, and that this view is contrary to the Scripture view of the predictive element in prophecy. He says "the 16th Psalm delineates an ideal which throughout the Old Testament dispensation was never realised fully, that is in a whole life, but which only expressed the highest climax of subjective conviction, was not felt to detract from its religious truth. Nay, in religion, the ideal is the true." But mark more particularly what follows:—"We may say, then, that in the mouth of the Psalmist himself our psalm did not set forth a remote prophecy or a religious problem, but a truth of direct spiritual intuition"; and, in the next sentence but one—"Like other psalms, in which the ideal is developed in the teeth of the empirical, it came to possess a prophetic value for the Church." In other words this psalm was not intended to express a set of concrete historical facts, but what he calls "the transcendental ideal of fellowship with God," true supremely of Christ, but in its measure of all who are his. Now, sir, I affirm that this contradicts the statement of two inspired apostles, who both say that this psalm states a future concrete fact which was not true of David who wrote it, as it is not true, and never will be, of any but one man, Christ Jesus, that his flesh should not see corruption (and that word *diaphthora* unquestionably means just what we understand by corruption). But I will not say a word more on this. I might again refer to the 110th Psalm, our Lord's argument from which I hold to be inconsistent with Professor Smith's view of prophecy. He says the argument of our Lord was not an exegetical one dependent on the Davidic authorship of it, but a theological one. I say it is perfectly obvious that our Lord's argument is worthless if David was not speaking there, and speaking of Messiah's double relationship to himself, as is admitted by critics such as Canon Perowne, who is of no narrow school. Dr. Brown moved as follows:—

The Presbytery find the seventh particular under the major proposition of the Form

of Libel against Professor Smith, with the corresponding averments and extracts in the minor proposition, to be relevant under the first charge of the general major.

Mr BANNATYNE, in seconding the motion, referred to the fact of an appeal having been taken for restoration of the word "subvert." Every vote under the first charge was, he held, given under cover of that appeal. If, said Mr. B., you go on voting as if you were not subject to our complaint, you may have to undo all you are now doing. Irrespective of it, I cannot and will not vote. My privilege under it I will not forego. No man is entitled to denounce me for this.

Professor SMITH rose to order. Mr Bannatyne had said that he would not give his vote on the question before the house, but on the question which he believed should be before the house. He submitted that under those circumstances Mr. Bannatyne had no right to speak as expressing himself in rebellion against the Presbytery.

Mr. BANNATYNE—If Professor Smith had waited two minutes he would have seen something different from what he has now alleged. He then proceeded to express his concurrence with Mr. Selbie in favouring the use of the word "subvert" as better expressing the meaning of the charge than "contradict or are opposed to." You may in certain cases subvert unintentionally—you can hardly ever be said to contradict unintentionally. As I understand them, said Mr B., some in this Presbytery are declaring, and asking us to declare, that nothing from *Primo* downwards, in this Libel, contradicts or opposes, in the sense of contradicting the inspiration and infallibility, and divine authority of Scripture; while we on this side of the house are only going the length of saying, by our consecutive votes, that there is quite enough in *Primo*, &c., to make it advisable to proceed subsequently to prove whether or not the contents of these particulars and extracts do, in point of fact, either contradict, or oppose, or subvert, or whether or not they contradict or oppose so as to subvert, the inspiration and truth and authority of Scripture.

Professor SMITH—I again rise to the point of order. Mr. Bannatyne has attempted to entrench himself within a second line of defence for his conduct, but has not withdrawn from his previous position, that he is entitled to vote in rebellion to the judgment of the Presbytery.

Principal BROWN—Did he use the word rebellion?

Professor SMITH—I used the word rebellion.

Principal BROWN—I think it is an improper word.

Professor SMITH—I will explain why it is rebellion. It is always rebellion in a Church Court when a member of that court refuses to have his proceedings in the court conducted by the principles which the court itself has laid down—(hear, hear). If he considers that the court has gone beyond its authority in anything, he has the right to appeal and have all subsequent proceedings cancelled. If he finds his conscience seriously injured by what has been done, or is being done, he may absent himself from the court until the proceedings have been afterwards reviewed or cancelled by a supreme court. But no member can stand up in rebellion—I repeat the word—against the constituted authority, and take an opposite course to the course which had been taken by the court, by remaining in the court and insisting on his right to move and act in

accordance with his particular private opinion, which is not the opinion of the court. At this stage it is obvious that the interests of justice will be most seriously compromised if we allow this irregularity to go on further.

The MODERATOR—It is quite possible that the Commission will overrule the decision of the Presbytery, and if that is the case, the thing will come back to us, and we must vote on the first alternative again with a change in *Primo*. But in the meantime we have not the term “subvert” before us at all, and if Mr Bannatyne contends that he is to argue and vote on the ground that we have the word “subvert” in the Libel under the cover of his appeal, I must rule that he is out of order in that respect.

Principal BROWN thought the Moderator had ruled rightly as he had put it.

After some conversation,

MR. BANNATYNE went on to say that he would take “opposed to” instead of “contradict.” He then proceeded to argue that as regards predictive prophecy under this head, “spiritual insight,” to whatever extent, was inadequate; and only “direct supernatural revelation” of the events that were to occur long posterior to their own age, enabled the prophets severally to prophecy in the words they used. They saw what God saw, and only because God saw it and told them of it, and so they predicted it—no reasoning of their own could have led them to it. No insight of the nature of the insight of other holy men, however intensified, could have led them to its discovery. To him it was manifest that the opinions of Professor Smith animadverted on in *Septimo* were inconsistent with all this. The extracts in the minor fully supported the charge, and he therefore felt justified in seconding the motion.

MR. MOIR, Woodside, moved—

That the Presbytery having considered the particular *Septimo* in the Libel against Professor Smith, along with the corresponding averments and extracts in the minor: Finds that these are not relevant to sustain the first alternative in the general major.

The charge, he said, was a twofold one, that of “disparaging” prophecy, as representing it as spiritual insight; and that of excluding prediction in the sense of direct supernatural revelation. Now he maintained that the terms used here were misleading, and not borne out by the quotations made from Professor Smith’s writings. Professor Smith does not say that prophecy arises from spiritual insight, based on the certainty of God’s righteousness—only that one of the contents of prophecy is based upon that foundation. It was yet more misleading to say that he excluded the predictive element, or that prediction of events “long posterior” to the prophet’s time was excluded. But he put the question directly—Does prediction in its essence depend in the least on the length of time to elapse? Certainly not. Here, for example, is an instance of genuine predictive prophecy uttered not more than twenty-five or twenty-six hours before its fulfilment, and yet I have no doubt that we all admit its genuineness to be as undoubted as if the interval had occupied twenty-five centuries. I refer to 2nd Kings vii. 1 (compare verse 18). And if it could be proven that Professor Smith writes of a prediction uttered twelve

months before its fulfilment, would not that be equally valid with one extending over twelve centuries? In further illustrating this point, Mr. Moir referred to the article in the *British Quarterly Review*, written before Mr. Smith was a professor even, and in which the predictive element is certainly recognised. Moderator, said he, I read that article some time ago, and I have read it again, and always with increasing admiration. I cannot speak of it without recording my conviction that, taken as a whole, it is a very valuable contribution to our critical literature, and that it appears to me that from beginning to end the writer has set before him the most exalted aims. The quotations adduced from it in our minor must be read by the light of the author's purpose and method, as well as by the light of the other statements in the article. If this is allowed, and I for my part do not know how it can be refused, then I am very sure that they will convey to an unbiassed mind a very different impression from that which they convey if considered simply by themselves and by persons unacquainted with the scope and aim of the article. After noticing that the article is a criticism of certain writings of Ewald, Kuenen, and Gustave Baiir, and must be so viewed, Mr. Moir quoted from the Libel the extract:—"The prophets prophesied into the future, but not directly to the future. Their duties lay with their own age; only by viewing them as they moved amidst their contemporaries does the critic learn to love and to admire them." I think, Moderator, that those who drew up the Libel might have carried on the quotation a little farther, for what follows greatly modifies the quotation as they have made it:—"A prophecy then coming to us in the name of Isaiah, but having no roots in Isaiah's age, is to the historical student either an inexplicable phenomenon or a phenomenon unexplained. Certainly he is called upon to admit that another inquirer approaching the problem from a theological standpoint, taking the prophet on the divine side, may be able to explain what he cannot understand." The other extract is:—"True prophecy is always ideal, seeking to grasp, not the immediate future, but the eternal and unchanging principle which Jehovah, the living God, is ever working out more fully among his people. The critical study of prophecy has done no greater service than to point out how small a fraction of the prophetic writings is strictly predictive." Now, what are the allegations which these extracts are believed to substantiate. First, that the predictive element of prophecy is traced to human sources; and second, that it is excluded. I have already noticed that these sentences were penned in rigid conformity to the laws of historical criticism, and subject to its canons. After noticing that Professor Smith's writing was saturated with the idea of the subjective or organic unity of the Bible, and that he had kept ever before him the lofty purpose of showing how the spiritual influences operating in one age, worked onward to those that followed, Mr. Moir continued—Professor Smith has done noble service by emphasising such truths, and I am not prepared to admit that he has by so doing shut himself out from a full recognition of the predictive element in prophecy. He certainly has not denied it. I do not think that he ignores it; even in the very passage quoted from his article he admits the fact of predictive prophecy, and no one can deny the truth of the latter part of

the first quotation. That Professor Smith recognises a very substantial distinction between the mere believer and the prophet is manifest from what he advances (*British Quarterly*, April, 1870, p. 321):—"Nor was a man a prophet merely in virtue of his earnest faith in the God of Israel. The prophet felt the hand of Jahveh upon him impelling him in a course that he could not have chosen for himself; and, in this course, his individuality was not obliterated, but absorbed and swayed by the one Spirit of all prophecy. He speaks and thinks, not his own thoughts, but the thoughts of Jahveh, the living God, whose eternal purpose flows in ever varying form, but ever in substantial unity, through all the history of his people." Mr. Moir having more fully illustrated his point, said, I for one have risen from the perusal of this article impressed more than ever with the conviction that if Professor Smith appears to me—I will not say that he does—to err in too slavish an adherence to the canons and method of the critical schools; he has never for a moment lost sight of the lofty purpose with which he has bowed his neck to their yoke, viz., that he might assert even on the scientific platform, and in the use of scientific methods, that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh full of grace and truth. Mr. Moir having then referred to the third quotation from the article "Bible," and maintained that keeping the passages in their due connection the predictive element was acknowledged, and that the prophets usually spoke by direct inspiration, concluded—Still farther we are bound to remember that the *Encyclopædia Britannica* is an organic whole; that certainly we have not read its last utterance on prophecy, and that most probably Professor Smith will yet have something to say at greater length on the same subject. It is perfectly true that we are bound to judge according to what we have before us; but these are nevertheless perfectly fair considerations for us to keep in view in judging of our brother's writings, and that especially if we have reason to suppose, as we have, that he felt himself hampered, by want of space and other considerations, in giving a full exposition of his opinions. With regard to Psalm xvi., I shall content myself with saying that the exposition of that psalm, viewed as a whole, is in many respects all that could be desired, and better in some respects than anything that, so far as I know, has been hitherto offered to the Church. If there be error in the handling of it, and I am not prepared to say that there is not, still it seems to me that it is more exegetical than otherwise, and, at any rate, it is not of that pronounced type that would sustain a charge of heretical pravity. I think, too, that it is unfortunate that the very portion left out of the centre of the quotation is the one that would have gone farthest to modify our censure of Professor Smith, if it had been inserted in our Libel. I leave, however, some one of the brethren holding the same views generally that I do to take this matter up, and conclude by moving the amendment which I have already read.

Mr. R. A. MITCHELL, in seconding the amendment, said that the subject of prophecy was a very mysterious subject, a subject which presented many difficult problems which they had really no materials for solving. The psychology of prophecy was a subject with regard to which they should abstain from dogmatising, as they really knew little or nothing

about it. They knew very little of the *modus* of prophetic inspiration, the workings of the prophet's mind, when he was under the mysterious influences of the Spirit, or the way in which the prophet's foresight of future events might have been connected with his faith in the righteousness and gracious redemptive purpose of God. Professor Smith was charged with disparaging prophecy by representing it as a faculty of spiritual intuition. He thought he was justified in calling it by the word intuition by the consideration that in the Old Testament prophecy in general is spoken of as a "seeing" or "intuition." It could not be supposed, surely, that Professor Smith regarded the intuitions of the prophets as similar in kind to the intuitions of natural genius; but the meaning of his views was that the kind of truth which the prophet possessed was a kind which he derived from supernatural revelation. Surely that was the very essence of the Scriptural doctrine of prophecy—that prophecy was a supernatural gift of the Spirit of God, and not a power or product of man's natural reason. A man who maintained that maintained what was distinctive of the orthodox as contrasted with the rationalistic view of prophecy, and ought not to be gratuitously suspected of rationalistic tendencies. But evidently Professor Smith was suspected of agreeing with the rationalists in denying to the prophets a supernatural power of predicting future events. The fact that Professor Smith does not give such prominence as they had been accustomed to give to the predictive element in prophecy might have appeared to them a suspicious thing, if they were disposed to regard all his utterances with suspicion—(hear, hear). But undoubtedly Professor Smith was right in thinking that too exclusive a prominence has generally been given to the predictive element in prophecy, and that other elements not less important had been in some measure lost sight of. The prophets knew enough of the unfoldings of God's providence to enable them to speak with persuasive power to the men of their own time; and their words had deeper meaning than either they or the men of their own time could grasp. This he thought a sound and scriptural view of prophecy, and it was Professor Smith's view. Will any one deny that the prophet's own time occupied the foreground in his mind, and in uttering his predictions of the future, he took his start from "present sin, present needs, present historical situations?" To say that the prophet takes his start from present historical situations is not to say that his words don't reach far beyond them. To say that he speaks directly to the men of his own age is not to say that he does not speak also, and even more powerfully, to the men of later ages, nor is it to deny that in speaking to the men of his own age he spoke to them of the future Messianic age. The Libel speaks of Professor Smith as denying direct supernatural revelation of future events long posterior. But he says distinctly in his Answer to the Presbytery's question, that he regards the Personal Messiah as the primary subject of such prophecies as Isaiah xi. and others—in other words, that these prophecies contain direct prediction of events which certainly happened long after the age in which the prophets who uttered them lived. No doubt, while he regards the 16th Psalm as Messianic, he does not regard it as containing a direct prediction of Christ. But that, as we all know, is the view of Calvin and of

many others of the soundest and most orthodox expositors. Whether or not we agree with the view of the 16th Psalm taken by Calvin and Professor Smith, we may at all events abstain from condemning it as a view disparaging to prophecy, or inconsistent with immediate inspiration—(applause).

Mr. MASSON said he would feel compelled to-day to separate himself from the position taken up by Dr. Brown. Mr. M. went on to argue that Professor Smith's view of inspiration, as to be gathered from his writings, was not that of the Confession; and he would have liked a distinct avowal on the points left in doubt. Now I pass on to say, continued Mr. M., that one effect of Professor Smith's reply, in my mind, has been that I am much relieved on the point of prophecy, as far as the first charge is concerned, and I shall be very happy to carry out my convictions to-day, even although it may be at the expense of the support of those with whom I have been hitherto acting, by giving him my vote—(applause).

Mr. YULE was surprised that the count now before the Presbytery had been persisted in, as he thought the other side would have fallen from it. The question now before them was whether Professor Smith had contradicted or had said something opposed to the Standards on this point of prophecy. Dr. Brown had said the question had been raised how far a minister or a professor might go in certain directions. But they had not raised that question. What they had raised was how far had Professor Smith gone, and had he gone beyond the bounds which the Confession of Faith and the Scriptures had laid down—(applause). That was what they were trying to discuss, and he apprehended it was their duty to settle that. He could understand why some on the other side had not been able to say that *Septimo* contradicted or was opposed to the Standards, and for all the arguments that had been adduced, it seemed to him that all the brethren should be of one mind, and that they should find unanimously to the effect that Professor Smith's teaching on the subject of prophecy did not contradict the Standards—(applause). Mr. Yule maintained that the word "intuition," used by Professor Smith, entirely agreed with the Scripture idea of a "seer," and he had expressly stated that he did not exclude direct prediction.

Mr. SELBIE contended that Professor Smith had never admitted his belief in the strictly predictive element in prophecy.

Mr. JOHNSTONE said Professor Smith was charged with "disparaging prophecy by representing its predictions as arising merely from so-called spiritual insight based on the certainty of God's righteous purpose." Well, it was important to notice in the first place that these expressions were not Professor Smith's. It was a mistake to affirm that he represented the predictions of prophecy as arising merely from "so-called spiritual insight." "Spiritual intuition" were his words, and he gave the reasons for using them in his Answer. Mr. Johnstone referred to Principal Brown's statement that he might be prevented voting on certain of the particulars, and asked why so? Could it be explained on any other supposition than that Dr. Brown was unwilling to give Professor Smith the benefit of any doubt?—(applause).

Principal BROWN—I gave on a former occasion all the explanation that I thought necessary, and if it is not satisfactory I do not mean to waste the time of the Presbytery in giving another.

Mr. JOHNSTONE—Very well, I am satisfied. I shall draw my own conclusions from that.

Mr. BELL said he did feel that Professor Smith's position in reference to prophecy was quite consistent with the Standards—(applause). He did not think that it had been made out in the least degree that Professor Smith denied the distinctly predictive element in the Scriptures. It was possible that Professor Smith had not given so large and important a place to direct prediction as he might have done; and while he (Mr. Bell) might have serious difficulty about other views held by Professor Smith, he could not say he had the least doubt on the point now before them.

Professor SMITH on rising to reply was received with applause. He said—Following my usual rule in this matter, I shall begin by answering the questions which have been addressed to me, and I am grateful to those who have put such questions instead of trying, without any explanation, to see how much can be forced by an ingenious exegesis out of incidental expressions in my writings. Mr. Masson asks two questions. The first, I think, is a question as to what I mean in the distinction between direct and indirect Messianic prophecy, and I understand Mr. Masson is anxious to see whether all that I mean is as follows: that by what may be called ultimately a process of rational insight, holy men in the Old Testament stretched up towards an ideal, and this ideal ultimately was realised in Christ. It means more than that, because it means this, that holy men were able to stretch forth their hands after that because the Spirit of Christ himself gave them that hope—(hear, hear, and applause)—and unless it had been the case that God in his infinite love had decreed to send Christ into the world; unless He had planned out the purpose of redemption, and unless before the time for carrying it out arrived He had already, by His own Spirit, given rays to the men in the Old Testament of that light which in its full splendour was only to arise in the New Testament, they would not have been able to stretch towards that ideal. It is an ideal, but it is God's ideal. It is not man's ideal; and it is God's ideal, because it is only God that could have made it known in its perfect as well as its imperfect form.

Mr. MASSON—How do Christians rise up to it now?

Professor SMITH—Christians now have the whole thing made plain in the revelation of Jesus Christ. Christians no longer require fresh rays of light for new necessities, because every light that the Christian requires is given in the complete revelation of the New Testament, but in the Old Testament there was no complete or full manifestation of light in Christ, and therefore the necessary light was given by God to His Church from time to time in various ways. One of the ways was by the direct prediction of the Messiah, and another of the ways was by illuminating the heart of a man like the Psalmist to see in a vague manner so much of the truth to be realised in Christ as would suffice for a present necessity—(applause). As to the expression "intuition," Mr. Masson wishes to

ask me why I took the word "intuition," which he finds in Morell. I have not read Morell, I am sorry to say. I do not know whether he is right or wrong. I got it, as I have already said, out of the Old Testament, and even although the most heretical man should use a Biblical expression, I do not think that I would be inclined to find fault with him—(laughter and applause). The word "intuition" is a word that bears various senses; on the whole, however, I thought it was the word that best translated the Old Testament word *chazon*, which "vision" does not perfectly represent. The Hebrews regarded everything that came to a prophet as a seeing, because he did not get at it by dialectics, but because it was presented to his spiritual eyesight by God, just as an object is presented to the physical eyesight; and to say that a prophet saw it by spiritual intuition is not to say it is a mere natural act. Far from it. I use the word "intuition," and I find fault with the Libel for using the words "so-called spiritual insight," and for this reason, that while "spiritual insight" can also bear a perfectly sound sense, it is a vaguer and less satisfactory expression. As Mr. Selbie has pointed out, I did, in passing, speak of the spiritual insight of prophecy. When I have used at one time a vague expression in passing, and if at another time I have given a distinct definition of what I understood by prophecy, I object that the distinct definition was not the one upon which the charge was based, and it will require a good deal more explanation to get rid of this fact than the statement that I had used "spiritual insight" somewhere else—(applause). Well, was I entitled to say "spiritual" insight? I am surprised that the brethren on the other side who have dealt so much in philosophical and theological dissertations, who have had so much to tell us about psychology and theological distinctions which did not occur to a simple man like myself in writing a simple account of specific things—(laughter and applause)—should not have been aware that in discussing the word "spiritual" they had come into contact with a very important question, the question of grace, and that upon that subject I had never given an uncertain sound. For example, in my article upon "The Schools of the Continent"—I go back to that to show how consistent I have been—I make a clear and distinct statement on the subject, and in this connection I might say that if you want to know really what a man's views about prediction and revelation are, if you want to know whether he is orthodox or heterodox, you must go back and ask what he thinks about the nature of grace. I put it so in my reply to the College Committee. I said "My whole theory of revelation rests on the assumption that there is an absolute contrast between revealed and natural knowledge," and it is for this reason that I hold with our Confession that the natural man fallen into sin is not able to see any of the things of God except by supernatural enlightenment; and if that had been taken along with the expression "spiritual intuition," no gentleman would have risen on the other side and made a peddling criticism of the word "spiritual"—(hear, hear, and applause)—as if I was anxious to do away with the fact that God has given us a knowledge of Himself; that a salvation is given by His Spirit to those who but for His great gift would not have known of God at all—(applause).

Mr. MASSON—I think you should retract the word “peddling.”

Professor SMITH—I did not apply the term to Mr. Masson; and I will not retract the word “peddling” as applied to a number of criticisms that have been indulged in to-day—(hear, hear).

Mr. MASSON—You do not apply it to me?

Professor SMITH—It does not apply to what Mr. Masson said at all. As regards the criticisms of Mr. Bannatyne, I hope that when he is teaching his people he uses a somewhat more strict and fairer method of exegesis than he has applied to my writings.

Mr. BANNATYNE—I am much obliged to Professor Smith for the direction.

Professor SMITH—Working backwards on what has been said, I find that every day new difficulties are springing up and encumbering the case. It is like fighting with the hydra. When we have cut off one head, the next day we find three springing up in its place, and the issue becomes constantly complicated. First it was a question as to “subvert” and “contradict;” then it was, in addition to that, the question of relevancy and proof; then some one has a distinction between the Confession and Scripture, and a distinction between “contradict” and “oppose,” and by all these means in succession the other side have been drawn out of the mire of their embarrassments, and have been able to put their feet on a sure place and to take up a new speech or song against my heresies—(laughter and applause). I have yet to learn—since opinions necessarily are opposed in definite ways and are not gifted with the same versatility as that displayed by gentlemen on the other side—(laughter)—that there are more than two logical forms of opposition—the contradictory opposition with which Mr. Selbie is dissatisfied, and the contrary opposition which Mr. Selbie disclaims; and when these are removed I am unable to see what is left—(laughter and applause). As to the question of the difference between relevancy and proof, I am beginning to understand that better—(hear, hear). I do not say that I am beginning to see the justice of it better, but I am beginning to understand better what is meant. I see that what is meant is this, that I should not have had at this time any opportunity of disposing of what may seem to some to be *prima facie* evidence against me. It may be said that proof of relevancy is proof of a *prima facie* case against me. That would not help the argument of the other side, unless they mean more, that I shall not have an opportunity of destroying the appearance of a *prima facie* case against me until I shall be summoned and put to the bar. Is that an example of Christian charity? And may I ask whether every member ought not to be glad if by going a little more fully into the case at this time, it became manifest that it is not necessary to put me at this bar at all—(applause).

Mr. SELBIE—That is what is intended.

Professor SMITH—I have done that by disproving the charge that is brought against me. “Ah but,” says Dr. Brown, “we are not bound to prove the charge; all that we require to do is to say something in support of it.” This contention raises a very serious point, because it must be manifest that this trial is becoming more and more a trial upon exegetical grounds. Now we all know that no Presbyterian has ever held that there

was any infallible judge of the Scripture outside the Scripture itself. I cannot take any man's interpretation as infallible, or found the ground of heresy on that, but certain propositions on which we are all agreed have been drawn from Scripture and formulated in our Confession, and we have agreed that no office-bearer can remain in our Church who does not adhere to these propositions. There is a system of Bible truths which the Church is satisfied do come from Scripture, but here we have gentlemen going beyond that, drawing out their own exegesis of passages of Scripture, and making their own exegesis the test of orthodoxy in others. That is what Dr. Brown's argument on the 16th Psalm comes to. Let's see how he treated that subject when he himself wrote upon it in his Commentary:—

Calvin, who is followed by some of the best modern critics—such as Hengstenberg and Tholuck, to whom may be added Alexander—views the entire psalm as meant of David himself, but regards the words of the 10th and 11th verses as expressing his assurance of safety, not from any temporal danger, but from the dominion of death and the grave—an assurance of eternal life and blessedness with God; and since this would have been a baseless expectation but for Christ's resurrection, Peter, according to them, only seizes on the deeper import of the psalm in viewing it as a prophecy of Christ's resurrection. But, however this may be thought to bring out the Messianic character of the psalm, it does not, at least, seem to be the Apostle's way of viewing it. If words have any meaning, he lays down the following positions.

And so on. "If words have any meaning." No expression has been more familiar to us during the last few days than this remark of Dr. Brown's, with which he silences all argument—(laughter and applause). It is very trying to a comparatively modest man like myself, who am not always quite sure that words have no meaning except what I put on them—(laughter)—it is very trying to me to have to stand and have Dr. Brown, when I am stating views and explaining Scripture as well as I can, declaring that "if words have any meaning this borders on heresy, and although not contrary to the Confession, yet I shall be shut up to vote for the motions that these opinions are opposed to the Confession." But would Dr. Brown if, instead of me, Calvin, Hengstenberg, Tholuck, and Alexander were standing here, get up and, speaking in a heresy case as he now speaks in this case, say that "You, Calvin, Hengstenberg, Tholuck, and Alexander hold opinions that do not contradict the Confession, but for all that I feel shut up to vote that these opinions are dangerously opposed to the Confession?"—(laughter and applause). That is virtually what he is doing here. Would he have done that in regard to Calvin?

Principal BROWN—I never would.

Professor SMITH—That is what I say. If I were Calvin—(a laugh)—Dr. Brown would not do such a thing, because he would be laughed out of Court. But when I come up and give exactly Calvin's opinion upon this very point, Dr. Brown has no hesitation in rising and saying that in my mouth Calvin's opinions are heretical—(applause). Now, Moderator, so much for that; and now I am going to come to this article in the *British Quarterly Review*. Moderator, I am not to detain you with words of law, but at the time I wrote that article, and at the time that article was published, I was not a professor in this Church. I was not an office-bearer in this Church, and I was not a probationer of this Church;

I had signed no pledge, I had taken no test; I was free to say what I pleased, and I doubt whether anything contained in an article published at that time can be made the ground of a charge against me. It does not matter how unsound I might have been. I may have been unsound. Most students at some time in their career are unsound—(laughter and applause)—but the point to be considered is am I unsound now? or have I been unsound as a professor in this Church, and that is what the Libel undertook to make out. The Libel says that my views are opposed to the Confession of Faith, and that the offences which have been charged, “especially in a Professor of Divinity, are to be censured in order that others holding the same sacred office may be deterred from doing like offences in all time coming.” But these are not the views of a Professor of Divinity, and they are not the views expressed by a person holding sacred office, and they would have shown a little more consistency if they had left it out. For my own part I am glad they did not leave it out—firstly, because if read from first to last its testimony is in my favour and not against me, and consequently the fact that they had to go back so far as to a time prior to my becoming an office-bearer in the Church is clamant proof that they have very little evidence against me—(applause). Moderator, I was at the trouble to enquire at the clerk if that article had been lodged with the others papers in Court, and I found that it was not, and for a good reason. The paper is out of print, and those who wish to read it cannot get it. It is not doing much harm in the world if the views it contains are dangerous, for those who wish to get it cannot now obtain it. It is true that extracts from it are given in this Libel, but I am safe to say that very few of the members have seen more of the article than these extracts. To take an old publication, published before I was a professor, before I was a probationer, which is now out of print, which no one can see even if one wanted to do it, which no one can be able to judge of as a whole; to take two or three sentences from it in order to make out an accusation was a very curious specimen of justice—(applause). Now, there were one or two points on which great weight was laid by several speakers. I had said in that article that true prophecy was always ideal, and that Principal Brown denied. I said that what prophecy wished to grasp was not the immediate future but the eternal principles which God is working out more fully among his people. Principal Brown had denied that. But I do not know in what sense he was justified in denying that Prophecy was ideal unless he meant a mere human ideal; but surely no one who holds that the thing which Christ came to preach was the kingdom of God, will deny that all prophetic teaching culminates in this, which is not only ideal but the highest ideal that the human race has got. I am not one of those who think that the ideal is opposed to the real. I believe that the ideal is the real and the true, because I believe that God who in his own purposes has set before us the highest spiritual ideal, will in his own purposes also realise that ideal—(applause). And, therefore, when I say that true prophecy is always ideal, I do not mean that it is not real, not concrete, but that it is that and something more—(applause)—and that that was my meaning is plain from what follows. I said, “The business of

prophecy is to grasp principles which God has worked out," and I say then "these principles are grasped with such firmness, with so concrete a hold, that they never remain floating as it were in the air, but are always applied with confidence to the special needs and special circumstances of the theocracy. And so it was with Isaiah." But then I go on to say how far this ideal, which I say is a supernatural ideal—how God, setting before him this supernatural ideal, also therewith enabled him to predict the most striking events, such as the destruction of Sennacherib. There are one or two other things to which I may refer. I am found fault with for reducing prediction to a small fraction of the prophetic writings, and Mr. Selbie, with a subtlety which I envy and admire, suggested that I thought criticism had done no greater service than deny the evidences of revealed religion. That is a still finer inference. It appears to me that the evidence of prediction arises from those predictions which we know to be prediction, and if it so happened that some people had thought things predictions which were not, the removal of that mistake would surely relieve the evidence of prediction from the incumbrances which surround it, and would put in a still clearer light the evidence of that which remains; but what I meant by that was this, not that I thought I should reduce the number of predictions which are fulfilled as evidence, but certainly it was the case until recently in this country that people were too busy gathering these predictions from prophetic writings to pay sufficient attention to the mass of instruction and revelation which could not be used for the purpose of evidence, with which the prophetic books are filled. Moderator, I can take up the prophecies wherever you please, and I will undertake to find, as a rule, at least ten verses of general religious teaching of the highest kind—remember I do not disparage it for that—that, indeed, renders it of more value to me—but I say that you will find ten verses of religious teaching for one verse of prediction. Suppose Mr. Selbie to take the first chapter of Isaiah. How much of that is direct prediction? Yet few chapters are read with more edification from day to day.

MR. SELBIE—I do not object to that.

PROFESSOR SMITH—I am glad of that. He does not object to the only thing a reasonable expositor would have taken out of what I said. He objects to something which he himself put into what I said: that is all—(laughter).

MR. SELBIE—What I found fault with was disparaging one part of prophecy. I attach importance to both.

PROFESSOR SMITH—I am quite willing to allow Mr. Selbie to attach importance to both. I attach importance to both, but, under the circumstances in which I was reasoning, I thought it important to point out the risk of overlooking the other thing. Dr. Brown has said that it is certain that God will do so and so, because God has a righteous purpose. I grant that, but Dr. Brown has missed the point. The question is—How does the prophet know God's righteous purpose and its details? I have said distinctly that his conception of the purposes of redemption and its details was given to him not by human insight, but by God. Am I disparaging the supernatural revelation of the prophets, because, while

fully admitting that what was given to them was given by God, I hold that God did that with a certain plan, so that prediction was a scheme and not a number of isolated facts—(applause). Then, again, Dr. Brown says if there is any meaning in the words that the prophets spoke directly to their own time, that means that there is no room for pointing to a future period. My grammatical education, my education in the English language must be different from Dr. Brown's. We don't speak the same language, if that is the meaning which he takes from my words.

Principal BROWN—I can only say that five hundred people have understood the statement as I did.

Professor SMITH—Very well. I am now going to read a passage from the article. I admit that many people have misunderstood me, but now it seems that Dr. Brown represents the unjudicial opinion of five hundred people outside of this court. He is here to try and understand my words in the fairest way—(hear, hear)—and he is here to try and put the best sense on them and not the worst—(hear, hear and applause). But the opinion of five hundred people outside this court seems to have more influence on Dr. Brown than clear expressions of mine repeated from time to time. Professor Smith having read the extract from the article "Bible" on the point under consideration, proceeded—The meaning of that is perfectly clear. It means that the prophet did predict, but that when he predicted he gave what would have a direct lesson and bearing on his own time—(applause). Dr. Brown said it could not mean that, because that was too obvious. I have yet to learn that if I say two and two make four, he is to argue that I mean that two and two make five, because it is too obvious that two and two make four—(laughter). In truth, if Dr. Brown had been familiar with the subject of prophecy he would not have found that this statement was superfluous. I was not talking about prophetic prediction except very obliquely; I had to give an account of the way in which critics proposed sometimes to change the received date of a prophecy, and I tried to explain that their criterion was that a prophecy would always show signs of the people to whom it was first spoken, not in limitation of its prediction, for the prediction will go far beyond that, to Christ and the resurrection and the last day; but at all events there would be something in it to show whom the prophet was directly addressing, and that is the argument used by the critics about the latter part of Isaiah. I do not say whether they are right or wrong, but it is a legitimate argument. It seems to me that they are right, and that the prophet goes far beyond his own time, and goes further—to Christ; but if there is anything clearer than another it is that he was speaking to the Jews in Babylon—(hear, hear). And the argument is that if Isaiah had addressed it to the future he would also have addressed it to the Jews of the time of Hezekiah. There are two connections in which the subject of prediction has come up in my writings. I wish to say that my own language in regard to prediction has been measured—and for two reasons. One was, because I was speaking of the critical evidence as to the date of prophecy, which is different from the critical evidence as to the reality of prophecy. The other reason was that I was dealing with the subject apologetically. Every one admits that the prophets predicted the future, but

a very considerable number of critics of the negative and non-supernatural school were anxious to show that these predictions had never been fulfilled, and the reason why I measured my language was that we must keep clear of this. There are many prophecies not literally fulfilled, and I measured my language in regard to Christ and his Church in order to take up those predictions to which I have specially referred. We all know that the Church contains at present a great many people who will not see any truth or reality in the prophecies spoken to the Christian Church. They say that the prophecy applies to the Jews. I am not now asking whether some of these things are true or not, but this I am very sure of, that any one who wants to make a safe statement about prediction must not rest his faith in prediction in the belief that some of these things are to be fulfilled literally in a future time. I am sure that they will be fulfilled spiritually in Christ and his Church, and I framed every expression so as to show this. Professor Smith concluded by stating that he had gone over the question step by step, and that he thought he had succeeded in showing that there was no ground for the charge contained in *Septimo*.

Principal BROWN, in reply, having for himself repelled a remark from the speaker to the effect that he could easily conceive how some of them came to the consideration of this case with minds previously disposed to suspect Professor Smith, said as to a remark of Professor Smith, that if he (Dr. Brown) had been acquainted with the subject of prophecy he would have done so and so, he now stated, as he had done already in the Assembly, that there was a great deal more involved in those questions with respect to Professor Smith's writings than many people are apt to imagine. In his younger days, being of a turn which he might call exegetical and suspicious, and of a negative leaning in regard to the interpretation of the Old Testament, and not being in a position to see that Jesus Christ was the efflorescence of Old Testament prophecy and the consummation of the Old Testament economy, he trembled at the prospect of going forward for licence in the Church that certainly held these views—as all orthodox Churches did—and such was the state of his mind that he seriously contemplated abandoning the study of divinity altogether and betaking himself to a secular profession, that he might keep a good conscience in the matter. He had never ceased from that time to make the subject of Old Testament interpretation a subject of special and anxious enquiry, and had endeavoured to keep himself abreast of the literature of the day, and he claimed not to be destitute of the faculty of exegetical interpretation, or of an acquaintance with this subject which would entitle him to speak on it as he had done. He said that the extract from the *British Quarterly* would not have been introduced if all the subsequent articles had not been written on the same principle. After criticising several of Professor Smith's views in regard to the Psalms and Isaiah to the same effect as on the previous day, he proceeded to refer to the argument about direct and indirect prophecy, and said he hoped they were not required at this time of day to draw the distinction between these two. It was because there was no sufficient recognition in Professor Smith's writings of the strictly predictive element of prophecy that constrained him to give his vote in favour of the relevancy. He denied that this was coming to be a question

of mere exegesis. Professor Smith had quoted from a commentary of his on Acts second, with the view of showing how he admitted his interpretation of the 16th Psalm was opposed to that of Calvin and others. What he said and now said was, that if words had any meaning, two inspired Apostles affirmed that the words about his flesh not seeing corruption were not true of any man save Jesus Christ. Calvin, Sir, has been once and again flouted before us in these discussions. But on the 110th Psalm Calvin, while not recognising any Psalm whatever as having a primary reference to Christ, admits that this one must be held to be an exception, which to me only showed that his scheme was not a sound one. Principal Brown concluded by expressing the pain which he felt in standing there, and said that if his conscience permitted him to do otherwise he would have most gladly done so; and often he was fain to exclaim, "Woe is me that I sojourn in Meshech."

Professor SMITH having replied to some remarks of Dr. Brown's as to the views of Ewald,

The division was taken, with the following result—

For Principal Brown's Motion—Principal Brown, Dr. Longmuir, Messrs. Craven, Arthur, Bannatyne, and Selbie, *ministers*; Messrs. W. W. Milne, D. Mitchell, Ritchie, Dr. Gordon, and Wildgoose, *elders*—11.

For Mr. Moir's Amendment—Dr. Spence, Messrs. Stephen, Dalgarno, Moir, Yule, Johnstone, Anderson, Selkirk, Sloan, Bell, R. A. Mitchell, Masson, Clark, Iverach, Gage, Semple, Innes, and Macqueen, *ministers*; Messrs. Collie, Paterson, Thom, Moir, W. Gordon, Barnett, W. Milne, Cook, and Fleming, *elders*—27.

The result was received with loud applause.

The usual appeal was taken by the minority, and Mr. Masson was, on the motion of Mr. Moir, appointed to act with the former committee, in answering the reasons of dissent against this finding.

8. "Octavo"—*The Personality of Angels.*

The CLERK then read the eighth particular (see Form of Libel, p. 11.)

Mr. CRAVEN (Newhills) rose to move that *Octavo* be found relevant. He admitted that Professor Smith's able and candid pamphlet had greatly relieved his mind on and modified his views in some particulars; but in regard to the "Doctrine of Angels" the Defence, so far from making matters better, had made them worse—(laughter)—and instead of relieving him had confirmed him in his former conviction that in the article on Angels he was justly chargeable with having contradicted the Confession of Faith. His teaching was simply this, not that the word of God contained in the Old and New Testament Scriptures revealed to us the real existence of angels, but that the Bible made us aware that there was among the Jews a prevalent belief in the existence of such superhuman beings; that there was no direct revelation, or at least a very obscure revelation; and that the existence of angels was a matter of popular assumption. If Professor Smith had merely said nothing more than this, that in the Scriptures there was not found any account of the creation of angels, possibly every member of the Court would have agreed with him.

But he maintained that this was not a point in dispute. He could not persuade himself to believe that Professor Smith did not believe in the real existence of angels, good or bad, but so long as he remained silent, not giving forth any positive utterance, multitudes who judged of the matter by his writings were, to say the least, in very painful doubt.

Mr. ARTHUR seconded the motion, and maintained that Professor Smith had in his writings called in question the Bible statement of the creation of angels and of their real existence.

Mr. J. M. SLOAN said he had been very curious to see who would undertake the duty of moving the relevancy of this particular. He thought their credit as a Presbytery had been tarnished by having on the face of the Libel a particular of this sort. It proceeded upon an entire misconception of the meaning of Professor Smith's writings, and he did not think, when these were understood properly, that there would be room for any debate whatever on the subject. He therefore moved :—

That the Presbytery find the particular *Octavo* irrelevant under the first of the major, inasmuch as the words in that particular, and of the corresponding extracts in the minor, when properly understood, are in entire consonance with Scripture and the Confession of Faith.

—(applause). He said he had had occasion again and again during the course of the discussion to notice the misapprehension which seemed to prevail as to Professor Smith's writings—(hear, hear). When he thought of the charge against Professor Smith contained in this particular, he was reminded of a declaration of one of Moliere's characters, who discovered that he had been speaking prose all his life and didn't know it—(laughter). He was afraid that some of the Presbytery would find that they had been teaching heresy during the greater part of their lives without knowing it—(laughter and applause). In further supporting his motion, Mr. Sloan remarked that though angelic beings were mentioned in Scripture several hundred times, there was not one positive assertion that they existed.

Mr. SEMPLE seconded the amendment, and expressed his astonishment that the particular had been made the subject of an affirmative motion.

Mr. SELBIE said he had come up to the Presbytery with the feeling that he could not support the particular, but from the nature of the Defence which had been given he was almost inclined to change his mind—(laughter). It had left a worse impression on his mind than it had before, and he was very anxious to hear what Professor Smith had to say on the subject.

Mr. BANNATYNE enumerated at considerable length the various references in the Bible to angels, and went on to remark that the view which Professor Smith took of the angelic life was merely a strange attenuation into thin air of the mighty angels that excelled in strength.

Principal BROWN said, if Professor Smith believed in the creation and personal existence of angels and in their human qualities, if it was possible to use language fitted to mislead the public, Professor Smith had used it. When he said, however, that "Nowhere do we find a clear statement as to the creation of angels," he (Dr. Brown) presumed that Professor Smith believed that angels had a personal existence, but did not believe that

they had existed from all eternity, and for Professor Smith to withhold that was a serious thing, more especially when they found him saying that the doctrine "that angels are endowed with special goodness and insight analogous to human qualities appears as a popular assumption and not as a doctrine of revelation." Now, there were many popular assumptions, and some of them were absolutely worthless. He thought for a man to write articles in a work that had attained a world-wide circulation, and leave them in the dark as to his real opinions, was not honest nor right.

Professor SMITH—I think the words "not honest" should be withdrawn.

Principal BROWN said he would withdraw it, and say it was not a fair thing to the public. Why was it that Professor Smith's articles had excited so much distress and alarm? It was not one statement that had caused it. It was the pervading spirit of negation manifested on many occasions, and the report of the College Committee had stated the same thing. If Professor Smith had clear views on these points, why should he not have stated them?

Mr. MOIR (elder) defended the phrase that the attribute of angels was a popular assumption.

Professor SMITH, who was received with loud applause, said—After listening to the incendiary speech of Dr. Brown I had difficulty in understanding that I was in a court of justice.

Mr. BANNATYNE—Is it right to use a word like that?

Professor SMITH—I will explain the word. I use it in a Parliamentary sense. I will explain it, and then I will withdraw it if the Presbytery asks me.

Mr. BANNATYNE—Principal Brown very readily withdrew a word which I was sorry he used, and I do not think that such a word as "incendiary" should be used—(applause).

Professor SMITH—I will substitute the idea, and I say that in listening to the speech of Dr. Brown, which was not addressed to convince this Presbytery of the errors of my article, but was directed to spread abroad among the public a strong and exaggerated expression of the rashness of my article—in listening to this I was unable to recognise that I was listening to the pleadings of a judge in a Court of Justice—(applause). Instead of addressing himself to the clear matter of fact whether a logical analysis of the statements in my article contradicted the Confession, Dr. Brown indulged in a by no means complimentary declaration as to the intentional obscurity of my statements. Instead of confining himself to ask the meaning of what I had said, he introduced things that he says I should have said.

Principal BROWN explained that he had been speaking on the College Committee's report, which entirely justified what he had said. He hoped that Professor Smith would not apply that dreadful word "incendiary" to him.

Professor SMITH—If it gives personal pain to Dr. Brown I shall withdraw the word, but simply for the reason that I am unwilling to give him personal pain.

Mr. BANNATYNE—It gives pain to the whole of us.

Professor SMITH proceeded to say that it was high time that members should show that what he had said was contrary to the Confession instead of indulging in general declamations as to what he should have said—(applause). When he removed from Dr. Brown's speech these remarks he found nothing in it to answer. A great part of Mr. Bannatyne's speech was quite beside the point. If he had read his (Professor Smith's) article he would have seen that he was not giving the finished doctrine of revelation. Mr. Bannatyne had proved upon his head many crimes of which he had no suspicion that he was guilty. He had fallen foul of him for speaking of "notions" in the New Testament in connection with the New Testament angelology. Angelology meant the doctrines and thoughts of the New Testament on this subject. He was not aware that any one could think without notions, but, if that were the position of Mr. Bannatyne, he could understand more easily how he had made himself so unintelligible on this occasion; for if he abstained, as a point of orthodoxy, from having notions in his head when he was thinking on subjects of revelation, he (Professor Smith) was not surprised that his ideas were somewhat obscure—(laughter).

Mr. BANNATYNE—Much obliged to you.

Professor SMITH proceeded to speak of the distinction between dogmatic and biblical theology, and said that in the article in question he had been treating the subject in the latter aspect. He wished to record how far the knowledge and doctrine of angels had got at different stages in the Old and New Testament, and he had nothing to do with the net result of it. It was not his purpose nor the business of the *Encyclopædia* to draw dogmatic inferences. The book was one for all the Churches. It would tell them what could be fairly and honestly drawn from the Bible by simple interpretation, and it would give them that as well as it could; but when it went to the inference which one or other Church had drawn, it would no longer argue the position of any of the Churches, but would, if necessary, give a slight sketch of what the different Churches have held. The inferences he drew were the inferences of their Church, else he would not be standing there—(applause). He agreed as thoroughly as Dr. Brown or Mr. Bannatyne that the way in which angels are mentioned in the Old Testament does carry with it the existence of angels, and if they existed they must have been created—(applause). In this article his duty was not to draw his own inferences or the inferences of anybody else; it was to state what was the status of the biblical facts. He had, however, distinctly stated that the existence of angels was a Bible belief. Gentlemen seemed to think this was a small thing to say. He thought it a very important thing for himself and for all who took the Bible belief as their own. On the authority of the Bible, and especially of our Lord, he admitted the reality of angelic agency and beings, though he would not like to be very dogmatic as to the details of the angelic nature.

Principal BROWN said that as Professor Smith had once and again appealed to him, as if he was taking the strongest position against him, he (Dr. Brown) was conscious that he was taking the very reverse. But the language of the article with respect to the points stated in *Octavo* was

entirely misleading, in his judgment. He believed the great proportion of the ministers of the Free Church had been impressed with the conviction that Professor Smith, whilst he might in a single word have shown that he believed in the personal existence of angels, had not done so, and he had made his Answer to the Libel appear to him (Dr. Brown) to be confirmatory of the feeling that he had against that article before. Up to within a few minutes ago he felt there was no ground in any of the particulars so clear as this ; but after what Professor Smith had just said he could not vote for the relevancy.

MR. SELBIE, MR. MASSON, and Principal BROWN thought that Mr. Craven might withdraw his motion.

MR. CRAVEN said he would yield to the superior opinion of Principal Brown.

MR. BANNATYNE said that he would agree to the withdrawal of the motion only on the distinct understanding that Professor Smith had now declared before them to-day his belief in angelic beings.

MR. SELBIE—Both good and bad.

MR. BANNATYNE—Yes, both good and bad—(laughter).

Professor SMITH said he could not accept the withdrawal on that ground. He did not think that justice would be done in the case unless the motion was withdrawn on the grounds that the statement in the articles did not bear out the allegation in the particular.

MR. CRAVEN—I cannot withdraw it on that account.

Principal BROWN was quite willing to have it withdrawn on the ground that they had now for the first time any evidence that Professor Smith believed in the personal existence of angels.

MR. SLOAN said they had in their hands the answers that Professor Smith gave to the questions submitted to him by the Presbytery.

Principal BROWN—That monosyllable I don't give much for.

MR. SLOAN—Well, if we don't give much for his distinct denial—

Principal BROWN—I don't take it as a distinct denial.

MR. SLOAN was proceeding to quote from Professor Smith's answers, when Mr. Arthur interrupted him, contending that they should proceed with the vote. Mr. Sloan, however, insisted on being heard, and said that when Professor Smith was asked to say whether the account given of the development of the doctrine of angels in his article was meant to leave it dubious whether he believed in the personal existence of angels, Professor Smith answered, "No."

Principal BROWN—I say that is not a proper answer—"Oh, oh").

MR. A. F. MOIR—It could not be much more definite than it was. I don't say it was polite, but it was one of the most definite I ever heard—(great laughter).

It was then agreed that the motion should not be withdrawn, and the vote was taken, with the following result :—

For Mr. Craven's Motion—Dr. Longmuir, Messrs. Craven, Arthur, and Bannatyne, *ministers* ; and Mr. W. W. Milne, *elder*—5.

For Mr. Sloan's Amendment—Dr. Spence, Messrs. Stephen, Dalgarno, Moir, Yule, Johnstone, Anderson, Selkirk, Sloan, Bell, R. A. Mitchell, Iverach, Gage, Semple, Innes, and Macqueen, *ministers* ; and Messrs.

Collie, Paterson, Thom, Moir, W. Gordon, Barnett, W. Milne, Cook, and Fleming, *elders*—25.

The result was received with loud cheers.

Mr. A. F. MOIR presumed that the Presbytery should now report progress. And now was the time to offer Principal Brown an opportunity to make a general answer on what was past. Mr. Anderson had also a motion before the house, which covered a portion of the general major, and Principal Brown had a motion which covered another part of it. If Principal Brown saw fit to reply now, the Presbytery would be pleased. He (Mr. Moir) meant to move a motion to the following effect:—

The Presbytery having found the first charge in the major relevant in itself; but having thereafter found the eight particulars under the major, with the corresponding narrative of the minor irrelevant to infer the foresaid charge, delete the first charge, (page 1 of the Libel)—namely, the charge of publishing and promulgating of opinions which contradict or are opposed to the doctrine of the immediate inspiration, infallible truth, and Divine authority of the Holy Scriptures, or any part or parts thereof, as set forth in the Scriptures themselves and in the Confession of Faith, and to the doctrines of prophecy and angels therein set forth, and also delete the passages relative to the said first charge in pages 3, 4, and 5 of the Libel [as separately printed].

Mr. SELBIE thought such a motion was incompetent. The Presbytery had agreed to go over the Libel *seriatim*. They had gone over only the first charge, and why Mr. Moir should make such a motion now he could not understand.

Mr. MOIR said his motion simply declared that they had done what they had done.

Mr. D. MITCHELL thought the motion of Mr. Moir was an entire departure from the resolution that had been arrived at by the Presbytery to go over the Libel *seriatim*. If it was proceeded with he should move an opposite motion.

Mr. MOIR said if the feeling of the Presbytery was against him, he did not want to insist upon his motion. He did not see, however, that it would have been any departure from the resolution of the Presbytery to take up the Libel *seriatim*.

The Presbytery then adjourned the further consideration of the case till Tuesday.

ABERDEEN, 12th March, 1878.

The Presbytery met in the Hall of the Free Church College, on Tuesday, 12th March, Professor Salmund, Moderator.

Dissent of Dr. Brown on *Septimo* was given in, and the finding of the Commission of Assembly on the two appeals sent up read.

Principal Brown craved—

That in terms of the deliverance of the Commission, the Presbytery enter his dissent and complaint against the motion finding that the word subvert should not be retained in the proposed Libel as made to the Synod instead of the Commission in the usual form.

This was unanimously agreed to.

Mr. A. F. MOIR read his motion as follows:—

The Presbytery, having reserved the rights of the parties whose motions have not yet been disposed of, and having, in considering the libel *seriatim*, found the first alternative charge of the general major relevant, but the eight particulars under the general major, with the corresponding narrative in the minor, irrelevant, in respect of the foresaid charge, do now find against the motion on their table in Dr. Brown's name, on the ground that it is inconsistent with their former procedure.

Mr. SEMPLE seconded.

A discussion of some length ensued, turning on the form of present procedure, and the precise meaning and judicial bearing of the Libel, Professor Smith quoting from Hume, as the chief law authority, to prove the only sense in which the Libel could be regarded as alternative, viz., that possessing beforehand the materials for determining "to which denomination the facts truly amount," the Presbytery must, at the present moment, according to the precedent of law, decide to what species of offence the *species facti* amount, and to which of the three they apply.

Principal BROWN expressed a wish to have his previous motion on this point brought to a vote to enable him to bring a dissent before the Synod. He still held that the charge was one charge, but with three diminishing degrees of gravity, and the illustrative particulars stood as witnesses.

The vote was then taken with the following result :—

For Principal Brown's Motion—Principal Brown, Dr. Longmuir, Messrs. W. L. Mitchell, Leslie, Arthur, Hendry, Bannatyne, Bell, Goodall, Masson, *ministers*; and Messrs Spring, W. W. Milne, Mitchell, Aberdeen, and Dr. Gordon, *elders*—15.

For Mr. A. F. Moir's Amendment—Dr. Spence, Dr. Binnie, Messrs Dalgarno, Moir, Yule, Johnstone, Anderson, Selkirk, Sloan, G. Macdonald, R. A. Mitchell, Low, Clark, Iverach, Gage, Semple, Innes, and Macqueen, *ministers*; and Messrs Collie, Paterson, Thom, Moir, W. Gordon, Barnett, Fleming, and Taylor, *elders*—26.

Messrs Stephen, Selbie, and Fitzpatrick, *ministers*, and Mr. Bisset, *elder*, declined to vote.

Principal Brown dissented, and complained to the Synod, and Mr. Bannatyne, Mr. D. Mitchell, and Dr. Gordon adhered.

THE SECOND CHARGE IN THE LIBEL— TENDENCY.

Mr. ANDERSON then moved :—

That the second charge in the general major be found relevant.

He was, he said, as clear in regard to the relevancy of this charge as he had been in doubt regarding that of the first charge. He held that opinions "dangerous" to the truth might do more mischief than a direct denial of Confessional doctrine; and it would require very strong proof to show that the Church had not power to deal with such opinions. The form of a libel, he maintained, was the fairest to the accused, as protecting him from any such sudden surprise as might come under a general motion. As for the vagueness of the words "dangerous and unsettling," the illus-

trative particulars removed that. It was most reasonable and righteous that the vast domain outside the logical fences of the Confession should be guarded by such a charge as this. He quoted the Form of Libel against Professor Simpson, accused of Arianism (1729) to show that "tendency" was made prominent in the charge then made. It ran thus:—"You, John Simpson, are guilty of impugning, or disowning, or denying the fore-said necessary or fundamental truths of the gospel: at least of undermining the same, and teaching, and venting, and maintaining things inconsistent with or *tending to overturn* the belief of the said blessed truths; or to *shake belief thereof*, or to *inject needless, ill-grounded doubts and scruples into the minds of men*, and to *render men dark and uncertain as to what they are to believe concerning the same.*" This latter part is little else than a paraphrase of the words, "dangerous and unsettling," and may be regarded as a precedent for the use of them. In our first charge, then, we have the strongest accusation that could be brought against any opinions, that of "contradicting or being opposed" to the Confession—and all beneath that is covered by the second charge. In further course of his argument, Mr. Anderson said—I have listened with the greatest pleasure to the warm evangelical utterances of Professor Smith. I cherish the thought that he is at one with us as regards the great truths that nourish our Christian life. But suppose a cold Rationalist in one of our chairs, who disliked our evangelical doctrines, and did all in his power to shake men's faith in them; yet meanwhile kept himself safe by introducing certain clauses, that were mere pasteboard barriers against the flood of his errors, since nobody attached any weight or meaning to them, but felt they were put in for a purpose. Must the Church tolerate this? When or how was it fixed that the most trifling error if it contradicted the Confession might be dealt with; but the most deadly if it could not be proved to do so might roll on unchecked for a lifetime? I should like to know when and how the Church of Christ got this rope twisted round her? Sure am I that her Lord never meant this. Why, the Confession might well be regarded as a curse to the Church if it protected one who publicly and for a lifetime sapped the foundations on which the Church rested. I would be sorry indeed to see our Assembly put down the free exercise of legitimate critical inquiry, or sacrifice a gifted Professor to popular prejudice—(applause). But this is far from likely. What "dangerous and unsettling" means will be exactly defined by the keenest discussion between the highest intellects in the Church. Its vagueness will disappear as it is applied to one opinion after another. It will be seen at a glance how such opinions are "dangerous" to the inspired passages they refer to, and how they are fitted to "unsettle" men's minds regarding these. Thus what is vague will become definite when brought close to the different points. I believe the question is just this—Must the Church of Christ, when she frames a Confession of Faith, limit her judicial action solely to what bears in a certain manner on that Confession? As the Body of Christ she has a certain power of what may be called self-preservation against outward injuries from her own office-bearers. Must she, then, when she frames subordinate Standards, and connects her offices and their temporalities with these, confine the exercise of that power to this single

line? She is the guardian of the truth; it is her very life's blood; has she a right thus to fetter her actions regarding it? He maintained that though the Church makes Confessions and finds them of great use, she must be equally at liberty to deal with error when merely insinuated through "dangerous and unsettling" opinions.

Mr. CLARK, Kingswells, seconded with some diffidence; and he rested his doing so largely on the opinion of Sir Henry Moncreiff at last Assembly, that in forming a Libel it was not necessary that you "should charge a man with heresy or immorality," but that "you may charge him with the dangerous character of his teaching, or you may say that his teaching is dangerous to the Church and injurious to the doctrine of the Church." In this view he said he would be inclined to add to the motion as follows:—

The Presbytery, having framed this Libel in accordance with a statement made at last Assembly on the nature of libels, finds, subject to the validity of said statement, this second alternative charge in the major to be relevant in the abstract.

Mr YULE moved:—

That the Presbytery find the second general charge in the major irrelevant, because "tendency" is not a matter which can properly be disposed of under the Libel; [and while it is their opinion that a dangerous and unsettling tendency does exist in some of Professor Smith's writings, especially in the parts indicated under the heads *Primo* and *Secundo* of this Form of Libel, they consider that until the Libel is disposed of it is not competent for them to proceed by way of admonition with regard to this tendency].

Mr. BANNATYNE thought this motion was incompetent under the form of procedure formerly resolved upon. It ought to be confined to the second alternative charge.

After some conversation, Mr. Yule agreed to limit the motion to the first clause, omitting the part in brackets.

Mr YULE then proceeded to speak in support of his motion. There was, he said, no precedent or example in the history of the Church in which any libel had been framed with such a charge in it as the one under consideration, and especially it was certain that no Libel had been framed in the part which, if their previous decision was to be regarded as the right one, would virtually be the main charge. Mr. Anderson had referred to the case of Dr. Simpson, and had quoted from that case a word that was somewhat like this charge of tendency—the word "undermine"—but they would observe that immediately behind that word there were the words "inconsistent with," and when they were discussing a logical proposition—the Libel being really a syllogism—the word undermining was not to be taken as a separate thing, but must be read in the light of the last of the words. Professor Smith had craved that a Libel should be framed in order that the charges against him might be put definitely; and having framed a Libel fitted to try a case of unsound doctrine they had fulfilled that crave. It seemed to him therefore that unless he held that everything of any sort they might have against a man ought to be reduced to the Form of a Libel they were not at liberty to go further. The opinion of Sir Henry Moncreiff, that had been quoted, was meant to meet the case of a person who was accused of something hardly amounting to unsound doctrine or blameable practice, and who refused to be dealt with

at all unless the charges were put before him in a syllogistic manner. That was not the case in the present instance, as Professor Smith had not refused to be dealt with. He also objected to this charge, as he had done before, because it was not clear or explicit. He did not think that the brethren who had spoken on the other side had made it much clearer what was really meant by the word tendency. Tendency might mean one or two or three or four or fifty things—(hear, hear). It was a most vague word, ranging from the slightest flutter to the most rapid rush. It was anything that the imagination of a man who used the word might attach to it—(applause). Being so vague and inexplicit, he decidedly objected to it being retained as a charge in the Libel—(hear, hear, and applause). It was most certain that if they went into the *magnum mare* thus opened out before them they would land in confusion. To think that the eight particulars which did duty for the first charge were sufficient to support the second charge, was, he thought, a very wild supposition, and hence he had moved in the terms he had indicated.

Mr. JOHNSTONE seconded, and in doing so maintained that adoption of a charge of tendency must lead to endless variety of views, which would stand in the way of a judicial finding of any real value. But was there a cause, or was it generous to attempt such a charge after all that had come and gone. Are all the frank, clear, straightforward—I had almost said recklessly honest—statements and explanations of Professor Smith, asked Mr. Johnstone, to go for nothing? Is it nothing to the purpose that respected brethren, who have been mistaking and all unconsciously misrepresenting Professor Smith's views and theories, have now in their hands his powerful Answer to the Libel—an answer which will be recognised as a valuable contribution to theological literature? Are all those wonderfully transparent speeches of his which it has been our privilege to hear, combining so many high qualities of scholarship and spiritual insight in dealing with God's word, with the true orthodox ring about them, to have no influence in the way of leading us to give up any further attempt at seeing heresy through the medium of this Form of Libel? That Professor Smith has written rashly and unadvisedly in many respects I have always said. But let me ask, in the name of all that is just and right, can we deal fairly with this case if we pay no regard to his purpose and method in writing those articles? After adverting to the obvious fact that with all his gifts Professor Smith was deficient in the art of being careful of appearances, and asking the Presbytery to bear always in mind that he had, in writing his articles, been called upon to deal with the Bible in its literary aspect, Mr. Johnstone said their duty manifestly was not to act as mere heresy hunters, but to try really to get at Professor Smith's meaning. The question is not whether in our search through Professor Smith's articles we may not come upon this and the other statement which will appear to some of us to be of a dangerous and unsettling tendency, but whether we should enter upon a charge of this nature at all. Is the charge of such a kind that, according to the ordinary rules of judicial procedure, it can be properly and wisely dealt with as a crime to be punished? In the present case, and looking at the articles on which the charge is founded, I think Dr. Rainy puts the matter correctly and

wisely as respects ecclesiastical action. And it may be added, to what Dr. Rainy has said, that God has for wise purposes left us in a measure of ignorance in reference to the questions indicated by Dr. Rainy. The right course then for this Church, according to the opinion of Dr. Rainy, "is to refuse to treat the questions indicated as matters for discipline." What then? Do you mean to let Professor Smith go free so far as the Libel is concerned? Precisely so—(laughter and applause)—and this in view of every interest concerned. Surely in some other and better way, if, after all that has passed, it were thought needful, the Church may speak to Professor Smith about tone and tendency, and he will hear the Church; for has he not in his Answer said, "I am sincerely sorry if, through fault of mine, my articles have given offence to belief and encouragement to doubt, and I am ready to receive, not only with respect but with gratitude, any warning on this head which their superior experience in dealing with various classes of men enables the brethren of the Presbytery to suggest"—(applause). These words were not words, of course, to be treated lightly by this Court. They evidently mean a great deal. Most assuredly they are fitted and ought to help us a little to see the path of present duty—(applause).

Mr. SELBIE maintained that, viewed in the light of the extracts given from Professor Smith's writings, the charge was well defined and distinct; and to look at it apart from the extracts was to deal with it unfairly. Though Professor Smith in his printed Answer had endeavoured with very great ability to show that the charge of tendency was not competent, he held that he had quite failed to make out his contentions, inasmuch as certain assumptions made by him were ill-founded and vitiated his whole argument. For instance, it was not necessary to prove that opinions logically inconsistent with the Confession had been held inferring high censure, inasmuch as the laws of the Church provide for minor as well as greater offences being dealt with. Mr. Selbie quoted from the "Practice of the Free Church," and argued at length in support of this view, and then proceeded—In short, then, we do not admit, while looking at Professor Smith's opinions even under this charge, that they are consistent with the Confession; but what we hold is that they are of a dangerous and unsettling tendency just because they do not appear to be consistent with the doctrines of the Confession, and because he has not shown, and we believe cannot show, them to be so. Under this charge we are not required to prove that his opinions contradict or are opposed to the doctrines named. All that we have to do is to show that they do at least seem to be inconsistent with the said doctrines, and it belongs to Professor Smith to show that we are wrong and that his opinions are consistent with the Standards. If it can be shown that the consistency of the opinions with the Standards is certainly a matter of doubt, that is amply sufficient to warrant and require us to hold the charge competent and relevant. In continuation, Mr. Selbie said Professor Smith appeared to assume further that his opinions were well founded; but that they did not admit, nor did the College Committee appear to do so. In conclusion, he pointed out that responsibilities as well as duties lie upon a Professor which do not lie upon an ordinary church member.

Mr. A. F. MOIR here moved that the Presbytery now adjourn till Thursday.

In course of conversation,

Mr. IVERACH asked if there had been any dissent and complaint under *Octavo*.

The MODERATOR said there had not.

Mr. IVERACH said, in that case the Presbytery's finding stood as a final judgment, and this finding had been to the effect that Professor Smith's views on "angels" were in consonance with the views of the Confession of Faith, and now if they went on in the lines suggested by Mr. Anderson's motion, they would be putting themselves in the extraordinary position of finding under the second head that things which they had declared were in entire consonance with the Confession of Faith were unsettling and dangerous in their tendency—(laughter).

Principal BROWN hoped they were not going to have a discussion on this point. It was manifest there was a difference between the two, though he could not now go into that.

Mr. IVERACH—I am merely remarking that we have found Professor Smith's views on angels to be in consonance with the Confession of Faith, and that now we are to proceed to say his views on that subject are dangerous and unsettling in their tendency—(laughter and applause).

Mr. BANNATYNE said the question as it came before the Presbytery was to declare that *Octavo* was not relevant under the first charge of the major. It said nothing whatever about its bearing on the second charge of the major.

Mr. SLOAN—If the motion is read, it ought to satisfy the parties on the other side.

Dr. SPENCE read the motion by Mr. Sloan, carried at last meeting, as follows :—

That the Presbytery find the particular *Octavo* irrelevant under the first of the major, inasmuch as the words in that particular, and of the corresponding extracts in the minor, when properly understood, are in entire consonance with Scripture and the Confession of Faith.

The reading of the motion was received with loud applause.

Some further conversation ensued, which, however, led to nothing, and it was closed by a remark of the Moderator that the position certainly was awkward.

The MODERATOR pronounced the benediction, and the Presbytery separated at 5 P.M.

ABERDEEN, 14th March, 1878.

The Presbytery met in the Hall of the Free Church College, on Thursday 14th March, at ten o'clock—Professor Salmond, moderator—and resumed.

In the course of the day the Court was crowded by the public, the attendance including a large number of the ministers of other denominations.

Mr. A. F. MOIR supported Mr. Yule's motion. In reference to a charge of "tendency," he argued that the law recognised no such charge even in very obvious cases, without having first made special legislative provision. Stone throwing, for example, was a common practice in Aberdeen, and the dangerous tendency of the practice could not be doubted; yet it could not be made a statutable offence till a municipal Act was got making it so. At first he thought that Professor Smith's writings were something terrible, but the more he studied them the better he understood them, and saw that there was really very little in Professor Smith different from his brethren—(applause). It is the constitutional right of every minister to have any offence charged against him stated so distinctly as that there can be no mistake about it. Pardovan says that nothing is to be admitted by any Church judicature as the ground of a process for censure, but what hath been declared censurable by the Word of God or some Act or universal custom of this Church agreeable thereto. But this charge is so indefinite that it cannot be referred to any Act or universal custom of this Church, and I challenge those on the opposite side to bring forward any instance of such a charge being held relevant. Reference has been made to the case of Professor Simpson of Glasgow, but that case was founded on a special Act of the Assembly inhibiting him from teaching certain doctrines, which he denied had certain tendencies. In further illustrating his view, Mr. Moir contended that in putting the charge in this loose constructive form they were really making Professor Smith responsible for other men's acts and opinions. And, passing from formal Church law as they usually understood it, he referred to the charge of heresy which the Apostle Paul was called to answer, when, although he was styled a "pest" and a "ringleader," a heathen judge even declined to send him to Caesar's bar unless his accusers could bring a definite charge against him.

Mr. Masson argued that their friends should not lay so much stress upon the word "tendency," but look at it in the light of the opinions quoted.

Professor BINNIE said he, as a new comer in the Free Church, and a colleague of Professor Smith's, had tried to persuade himself that he might take no part in the case; but felt himself unable to decline to vote with Mr. Anderson's motion—(applause). He did not think such a charge as that before them indefensible in a Libel. Though there were ambiguities in the Form of Process, he thought it did imply that it was competent in the Presbytery in such a case to proceed by Libel upon such a charge as that in the alternative. It was very true that it might be hard to find any precedent. But then there were various things to be taken into account. How many precedents had they altogether of a charge of heresy in the history of the Church from 1560 downwards? There was a great deal of talk going on just now, as if the Presbyterian Churches were hunting grounds for heresy. This was altogether unfounded. But he supposed there was no man present that had ever had anything to do with a charge of heresy before this case, and he thought it was not fair to institute comparisons between their blundering proceedings and the procedure in Civil Courts. He would like to see a Sheriff Court, constituted of men from the Sheriff downwards, who never saw a case

tried, and what a series of mistakes they would make. He did not think they could make very much of precedents in this case. Without going closely into the legal ground he would take two cases, neither of which represented Professor Smith's. Let them take the theory that the earlier Israelitish history was tainted with fable, and that they did not get upon solid historical ground till they advanced to the book of Judges. Well now, he was not prepared to adduce any passage out of the Confession of Faith that formally contradicted that. But suppose any person held that view, was there to be no strict judicial dealing in the case?—(hear, hear). To take another case: that of the views of Riehm on the book of Deuteronomy. He held that it was post-Mosaic. Then along with that he held, which Professor Smith did not hold but strongly repudiated, that it was a fraudulent production—that the man who wrote Deuteronomy wrote it with a fraudulent intent. Suppose that view were to arise amongst them; was there any formal contradiction of the Confession there?

Professor SMITH—Certainly.

Professor BINNIE said he would like to hear it proved. He certainly believed that it subverted the whole doctrine of the Confession—(hear, hear). It was an advantage to all parties that they should put such a question in the way of strict judicial dealing, that the person should see distinctly what was being found fault with. Of course, he knew the answer that was given by some of the brethren who differed from him. They said the proper way to deal with the case was to enlarge the Church's Confession so that the Church might give forth a distinct voice with regard to these matters. But in the history of the Church that had not been the way in which the creeds had been enlarged. The addition of articles had taken place at the end of the controversy and not at the beginning. Professor Binnie concluded by saying that he had dealt only with the relevancy. What he held was, that when the Church found itself in presence of things that it perceived to be in themselves dangerous and unsettling, it was a quite right thing to say so; and that was the way this subject must be approached.

Mr. STEPHEN could not agree with either of the motions that had been submitted, and he went on to state his reasons at some length.

Mr. R. A. MITCHELL—It seems to me that it would be very easy for the Church to deal with such theories as Dr. Binnie has referred to. It would be very easy to show that the theories are inconsistent with the teaching of the Confession of Faith regarding the inspiration of Scripture. If any one in this Church were to promulgate the opinion of Riehm that Deuteronomy involves a fraud, he would be condemned at once on the ground that such is inconsistent with the inspiration of that book. I think Dr. Binnie was quite right in saying that the Church ought not to legislate with regard to such a case as this, until the controversy on the subject has been brought to a close. But if it is not right for the Church to legislate until that point has been reached, we have much more reason to say that it is not allowable for the Church to pronounce a judicial censure until that point has been reached. To pronounce a judicial censure would in fact be virtually legislating on the subject in an informal manner. Surely a subject can be thoroughly controverted in the Church, and

the Church thereby ripened for legislation, without a judicial process being instituted against any individual in connection with it. After showing that the only truly constitutional and judicial course was to confine the Libel to what was held to contradict the Confession, Mr. Mitchell pointed out that if no charge of that sort could be made good, the clear course for the Presbytery was to deal with Professor Smith in another and less judicial way in reference to any supposed tendency of his opinions—the way in short of frank brotherly conference. To condemn formally as “dangerous and unsettling” what they had found after careful examination not to be inconsistent with the doctrines of the Church, was in his judgment a perfectly monstrous thing, and a thing that overturned and stultified their previous decisions.

Mr. ARTHUR said it appeared to him that the opposition made to the relevancy of this second charge was unreasonable, not to say frivolous. He went on at some length to argue that the opinions of Professor Smith were dangerous and unsettling.

Mr. SELKIRK, Free East Church, said he had not taken an active part hitherto, and spoke now simply because he feared that by finding this charge relevant they would do Professor Smith a great injustice; they would do a great harm to the truth of Christ, and a great injury to the cause of Christ throughout the land; and he would go further, and say that if they found this charge relevant they would injure the cause of Christ throughout the world—(applause). He had been privileged for five years to be associated with Professor Smith, and had had opportunities of meeting with him in those moments of life when men were apt to unbosom and unbend themselves, and when he had looked into that life, anything purer, nobler, and more godly, it had never been his fortune to meet with before—(applause). He had had intercourse with him as a minister of the Church of Christ, and on every occasion on which he heard him open his lips in doing duty in the Church, he had blessed God that they had a minister who could give such fresh, clear, soul-enlivening and soul-exalting views of divine truth as he did—(applause). He had also read all Professor Smith’s writings, and he had never found anything in them either dangerous or unsettling. If they introduced the mode of dealing with unsettling matter proposed they would be introducing that which would be dangerous and unsettling to the best interests of the Church of Christ. And how were they to determine this whole matter? Mr. Selkirk asked them to look at the character of some of those who would be judges, instancing a probationer he had met in Ross-shire, and who, on being asked his opinion, at once said, “Professor Smith is a child of the devil and an enemy of all righteousness”—(loud laughter). The man who gave that answer a few months ago, was now a minister of the Free Church of Scotland. Mr. Selkirk then asked the probationer if he had read Professor Smith’s writings. He answered “No, I have *seen* them at manse,” which he took to mean that he had never read them. “Did he know Professor Smith personally?” “No, he would not know him if he met him on the street.” Mr. Selkirk then said, “Do you not think it is rather a harsh judgment to say what you have said about writings which you never read, and about a man whom you have never seen in the

flesh." The answer he got was, "Professor Smith is a mass of un-sanctified learning"—(great laughter). He asked them to think of the idea of the vote of such a man as that settling the whole matter perhaps.

Mr. BANNATYNE, in reference to some remarks made, defended the mode in which the Libel had been drawn, and reminded the Court that Professor Smith had left some of the Presbytery's questions unanswered, so that they could only proceed as they did, and they had gone very much upon the basis of the College Committee's report. He maintained that the abstract charge was competently made, and they would find out whether the particulars supported it.

Mr. IVERACH said the Presbytery would observe the exquisite vagueness of the charge in the Libel as compared with the wording of the College Committee's report. It is not said that Professor Smith's opinions endanger and unsettle the doctrines mentioned. It is not even said that they tend to endanger and unsettle these doctrines. That would seem to be too definite also. No. They are of a dangerous and unsettling tendency in their bearing on various doctrines. You have vagueness enough, as Mr. Yule has shown, in the word "tendency;" but the Libel brings an additional shade of darkness into it by saying it is a tendency with a bearing, and the Presbytery is called on to look at the deportment of the tendency—a vaguer thing still—(laughter). Tendency is vague enough, but a tendency with a bearing—I may frankly say that, although I believe I do understand English, tendency with a bearing, or what the deportment of a tendency can be—(laughter)—is a charge so vague, so mysterious, and so elastic that it should never have a place in any legal document whatsoever—(hear, hear). The supporters of the motion should consider the consequences of the procedure now initiated. They are departing from the recognised usage of the Church, departing from the forms of process, taking a step never before taken in our land in our Church Courts, initiating a course which will tend to make Libels as plentiful as blackberries and as valueless—(laughter and applause). If this be a competent and relevant charge, not one of us is safe for a single hour. I happen, I suppose, to hold unpopular opinions. I am sure that Mr. Bannatyne holds unpopular opinions—(laughter and applause).

Mr. BANNATYNE—And he is determined to hold all the opinions he finds in Scripture, be they popular or unpopular—(hear, hear).

Mr. IVERACH—Each one has some crotchet.

Mr. BANNATYNE—I don't admit a crotchet, though—(laughter).

Mr. IVERACH—Do you not see what a dangerous weapon you are forging, and how useful it may be in the hands of a majority who wish to put to silence an unpopular brother? Heretofore a trial by Libel has been the last resource of the Church—a means to which she applied herself when all other means has failed. If you hold this relevant, you will make it a much more easy thing for the Church to have recourse to a Libel. No doubt we shall have the high authority of Sir Henry Moncreiff quoted against us, but although his is a great authority, he is not infallible, and it seems to me that his utterance at last Assembly was a most dangerous and unsettling one—(hear, hear, and laughter)—because his opinion tends to bring down a Libel from the high position it once

occupied to a very common level indeed. If he be correct, a Libel is not the fearful and terrific thing the Church has always held it to be, but a thing regarding which you can pass no sentence save a gentle admonition—(hear, hear). Such a course will make a trial by Libel supremely unjust and ridiculous. Mr. Iverach went on to say that Sir Henry's book was inconsistent with his oral utterance, and to show that the course preferred was equally against the law and practice in ecclesiastical courts.

Mr. SLOAN stated certain difficulties he felt, such as—where a man who presented opinions that did not involve any very grave censure refused conference, what was the Church then to do? To Libel him or allow such opinions to go on? While protecting the rights of the individual they were bound to look to the rights of the Church. It was said that the Church could have a brotherly conference with the party or parties. Well, if a conference were frankly gone into, then he would say let nothing else be done. Had that been done in this case it would have saved him occupying the position he now did. He thought it would be extremely prejudicial if the Presbytery did not come to an affirmative finding in regard to this particular charge in the abstract. They had had extreme gratification in regard to the earlier part of this discussion; and he did expect that if they came to particulars under this head they would get such explanations as might lead them to vote every one of the particulars, with the averments and extracts, not to substantiate the charge. For the reasons he had given he felt himself constrained to support Mr. Anderson's motion—(applause).

Principal BROWN wished to say a few words with regard, first, to the question of competency and then of relevancy. With regard to the competency, he recollected very well that at the very outset certain members of Presbytery claimed the right at a later stage to question the competency of the second charge altogether. He also recollected that no minute was taken of that claim, and he himself, at the moment when the statement was made, had made up his mind that if it was not argued at that time he should dispute arguing the question of competency at this late stage. He now held, therefore, that it was incompetent to take up the question of competency after the Presbytery had accepted the Libel.

Professor SMITH—Would Dr. Brown state whether I have lost my right to object to its competency?

Principal BROWN said he did not know. He supposed Professor Smith could appeal against it. He did not see any reason why Professor Smith should not appeal. In that case all his rights were reserved. And now with respect to the relevancy. Principal Brown proceeded to quote the case of Professor Simpson, of Glasgow, and argued that that case was sufficient to establish, that from the beginning this Church had recognised the charge of tendency to be a legitimate charge to be put into a Libel. Referring to the report of the College Committee, the Principal said he held that the College Committee took up Professor Smith's case with exclusive reference to the tendency of his writings to affect inspiration. He quoted largely from the Committee's report in support of his contention, and said it was all very well to say that to the common people lectures, such as Mr Laidlaw had delivered on the Canon, or that any truth, might

unsettle people who did not understand it. But the College Committee were not speaking of such cases. They were speaking of the effects of the articles on the public mind, and not on the mind of the uninstructed. And, more than that, the members of that College Committee did feel and express that they could not read those articles without feeling that they had a most dangerous and unsettling tendency in their own minds—(applause). The Committee had expressed only what this second charge expresses, namely—that the writings were of a dangerous and unsettling tendency in respect of their bearing upon the inspiration of the Scriptures. He believed from the bottom of his heart that that had been established; and he would only say farther that if they were to interpret the doctrine of inspiration held in these articles by the Answer to the Libel—if they were to consider the Answer to the Libel as the true key to the view of inspiration maintained in those articles—then he thought the dangerous and unsettling character of those articles would appear to every one who was not prepared to admit the doctrine of inspiration formulated in that Answer, and he would tremble to be found standing on that ground.

Professor SMITH, who was received with loud applause, said—I think, Moderator, it will be convenient that I should begin by making one or two remarks on Dr. Brown's speech, because while the other speeches run into one another very much, and can so far be treated together, Dr. Brown laid before us very clearly three distinct points which may be taken up more satisfactorily while fresh in people's minds. The first point that Dr. Brown raised was that he maintained that the time had gone by for raising the question of the competency of any part of the Libel. Now, with regard to that, I may refer to the minute of Presbytery of October 31, 1877, at which the Libel was accepted in draft, and in that minute it is expressly stated that, under the Act 5 of 1853, "The Presbytery decline to commit themselves as to the competency and relevancy of any one of those counts or propositions until Professor Smith shall have the opportunity which that Act provides for stating his objections at the meeting therein required to be held. This motion was unanimously agreed to"—(applause). It is a very remarkable thing that persons taking a prominent charge in this case should, in the face of that minute, unanimously agreed to, rise up and say that the Presbytery's opportunity of discussing the competency of the matter is gone—(hear, hear, and applause). I leave it to the House to consider how very grave a responsibility rests upon those who make a statement so distinctly in the teeth of the Presbytery's own minute—(applause). I will also point out that, although the Presbytery had minuted nothing as to relevancy of the Libel, according to our rules of procedure we can discuss whether the major be true or not—that is, whether the offence or offences referred to be truly or not a subject of Church censure, inferring the indicated penalty. Well, that is the point on which we are arguing to-day, and I again repeat that it indicates an extraordinary recklessness, and shall I say, an overhaste on the part of those who sit on the other side, that such an argument as has been mentioned by Dr. Brown was breathed for a single moment—(applause). Now, the next point that Dr. Brown raised was the case of the Simpson Libel. Of course, one expected that that would

be alluded to, and upon this point I have something to say. Observe there were two Simpson cases, and the case here referred to is the second process against Simpson ; and that second case was based partly upon the Confession of Faith, also upon the special Act of Assembly passed against Simpson himself in 1717. In the copy of the Libel in that case, which I have here, the Libel is followed by passages from the Confession of Faith and Catechism, and also from the Act of Assembly on which the Libel—this particular Libel—is founded. Professor Smith quoted from this Libel to show the accuracy of this statement, and proceeded—Observe the meaning of the Libel in my case is that the promulgating opinions of a dangerous and unsettling tendency in their bearing upon orthodox opinions is an offence. It is put in the major of the Libel as being a sufficiently definite and recognised offence in itself to be put in an abstract form, as something for which a person is to be judged ; but in the case of Simpson all the expressions about “tend” appear in the minor. That of itself would be sufficient to indicate that the plan of the Simpson accusation was something different from ours. What it indicates is this. The Libel sets forth in its major, first, the doctrine of the Confession ; and, secondly, the Act of Assembly forbidding Simpson to use expressions used by the adversaries of the faith in an unsound sense, even although he himself might use these expressions in a sound sense ; and all that is said about tendency is simply a link between the general accusation of heresy and the lower accusation of contravening a special Act of Assembly ; and why tendency is put in the minor is that it is put there as an evidence that he does hold certain doctrines. It was a case raised on the ground that an unsound person was in a covert manner attacking truths he did not believe, but his disbelief in which he did not openly profess. The position was that Simpson was playing false with the Church, and therefore the Church in the first process forbade him to use certain expressions, saying “You shall not use them at all, because your scholars may take them up in an unsound sense ;” and then, when the case was brought up again, they fell back upon that as an evidence that he had been trying in a hidden manner to subvert the doctrine of the Church, and that he had been attacking the Act of Assembly in short. That comes out still more clearly when Simpson declared his adhesion to the Confessional doctrine, and contended that he had never held or deliberately taught the gross errors of which he had been accused, but the Assembly yet found him censurable for his uttering such things and using such expressions as were proved against him. The first question was one of his loyally accepting and teaching the Confessional doctrine, and the second was a question of his submission to a special Act of Assembly ; and in the second head the question of tendency came in ; but not as a charge ; only as evidence. As has been brought out by Mr. Moir, it would be perfectly competent to put in tendency as evidence, and that was what was done in the great constitutional case which is the precedent for looking at this constructive case. In a constructive case you must prove intention. You want to know what a man was meaning to do. You may have a man who sits in a chair, who, whenever there is anyone to overhear him, says nothing contrary to the

Confession of Faith, but who, when alone with his class, drops an occasional expression which tends to subvert the Confession. But how does it tend to subvert? By tending to let his students understand that he does not hold the doctrines which he verbally affirms his assent to. That is entirely a different case from this, and if that case had been raised, tendency would have been perfectly fair, not in the major, but in the minor, as part of the evidence against me, that I do not believe the Church's doctrine of inspiration; to show that I had used expressions, the tendency of which was to undermine that doctrine; that I had used expressions that no man in his sober senses would have used, unless his desire had been to shake people's faith in the doctrine so impugned by him. The allegation of tendency, viewed in the light of the Simpson case, has no reference to the case now before the Court, for in that case tendency was not put in the major as a crime, but only in the minor as evidence—(applause). The third point in Dr. Brown's argument is the relation of the present process to the statement of the College Committee, and the question is whether the College Committee indicated in their report as desirable, or at least pointed out as possible, such a charge of dangerous and unsettling tendency as is now formulated. The question is not whether they thought that in certain ways my views might be dangerous as tending to shake people's belief in the doctrine of inspiration, but whether this was a case to be taken up in a Libel—(hear, hear, and applause)—and the opinion they came to was that there was no middle course between the prosecution for heresy and immorality or proceedings by the Presbytery with a view to advice and admonition. On this very point Dr. Smeaton had dissented, and in the answer to Dr. Smeaton's dissent the Court held that it would have been competent for Dr. Smeaton to have moved for a process for error tending to heresy, and that if he had raised such a case it would have been within the function of the College Committee to have heard it. The College Committee did not of course take it upon themselves to express anything more than an opinion, and it is an opinion in which they may be entirely wrong, and certainly that was the opinion of several speakers who supported my suspension in the Assembly, and unless it had been the opinion of some part of the Church, it is not likely that the members of the College Committee would have consented to my suspension. They did not see their way to raising any Libel against me, and thereupon the functions of the Committee ceased. But their functions would not have ceased if they had seen their way to bring a Libel—(hear, hear). The College Committee evidently assumed that they were entitled to initiate all that can be managed by means of Libel. But neither they, nor the Act of 1861, under which they are appointed, ever dreamt that anything but a process for heresy or immorality would ever give rise to a Libel, or could call upon the Church to appoint a public prosecutor. The powers of the Committee are such as to show that at the time these powers were given, neither the Committee nor the Church dreamt that there could be any such thing as a Libel, except for heresy and immorality. Just as the Established Church, which has the same rules, I believe, as ourselves on this matter, has not up to this moment ever dreamt that such a thing would ever be possible. The College Committee, of course, might err,

and, on the other hand, the part which they had gone into might, when more fully explicated, be found to be more grave than they had thought it. That is, of course, possible, but there is no word in their report to give anyone the right to suppose that they considered that my opinions were dangerous and unsettling in their tendency in themselves, and in their bearing on inspiration in the way that has been argued by some members of this Court. Mr. Selbie and several others have given a definition of tendency in itself, which practically amounts to constructive heresy, with which the College Committee were not prepared to libel me. The College Committee did certainly say that there was a dangerous and unsettling tendency in my opinions as applied to other people—that my opinions might raise difficulties and unsettle the opinions of others, and that is all the sense they put upon tendency. It was not said that there is an apparent contradiction between my views and the views of other people stated abstractly, but simply that certain thoughtful men would feel subjectively that these opinions were wrong and inadmissible. To say that an opinion will not generally command assent, and to say that it raises trouble in the minds of people who do not assent to it, is a very different thing from saying that the opinion in itself abstractly is dangerous of tendency, in such a sense that it is practically and illogically inconsistent—(applause). So much, then, for the College Committee, and I think the whole history that has been given by various persons here shows distinctly that until now we have never contemplated dangerous and unsettling tendency as a crime. It is not in the Simpson case, nor in any other heresy case that I have seen. It is not mentioned in the College Committee's report. It was a happy thought that struck Sir Henry Moncreiff when speaking in the Assembly, and for myself I think I can see how a different sense may be put upon his statement. We shall again have a chance of hearing him on the subject in the Assembly, and if he repeats this opinion we shall hear it discussed, and if his ideas are approved of our forms will be altered accordingly; but in the meantime we have no other authority than Sir Henry Moncreiff. I therefore appeal on this point to Mr. Clark, that he is bound, if not to vote for me, to withdraw from the discussion, because he says he knows nothing about it except what he takes from Sir Henry Moncreiff—(laughter and applause). He said he would yield to Sir Henry Moncreiff, but you don't yield to an unauthoritative opinion in order to make a new crime. The thing is unheard of—(applause). Let us now come to the thing as it stands. The arguments before this Court have all proceeded from one position, which I heartily assent to. It is the position put forward by Mr. Anderson. I thoroughly agree with it, but I do not see any bearing that it has on the question before us. The position is that the Church is not subject to the Confession of Faith, but the Confession to the Church. Mr. Anderson says very properly that it is absurd to suppose that the Church is so bound by previous creeds and standards that she has composed that she shall not be able to meet a new emergency. That I admit as freely and fully and frankly as Mr. Anderson. The point was also raised by Dr. Binnie, who said that things might come up of so serious a character that the Church could not possibly tolerate them though they were within the limits of her present position;

and I for one cheerfully admit it, and I would be very sorry to be in the position of one of those churches which, from the restrictions that are placed over them by an outside power, are unable to have any control over their Confession—(applause). There are several most important questions that have to be decided between that and the finding of this charge relevant. In the first place it has to be inquired whether a judicial process is the proper way of meeting a new danger, and then even although that were granted, it would still have to be inquired whether the words in this Libel described any ecclesiastical offence in such a form that it would be possible to bring it to trial; and thirdly, it would have to be inquired whether in dealing with such a new offence the Presbytery is a competent court. Firstly, then, I ask—Has the Church no other way of dealing with this matter except by Libel? I understand Mr. Anderson to argue that legislation would not properly meet the case in question, because, as he stated to me afterwards, we have here a complicated body of detail which no legislative decision could cover. Not only does he say in effect that you should proceed to inflict the censures of the Church upon a man for that which he could not know to be an offence against the Church law by its previously being on the statute book, but you should proceed to inflict the censures of the Church on a man for publishing and promulgating opinions which the Church could not have condemned by legislative process—(applause). Is it proposed to condemn a man not only for that which is not forbidden by her constitution, but that which could not possibly be forbidden in her constitution?—(applause). Surely that is an extraordinary doctrine—(hear, hear). That surely is a doctrine that cuts at the root not merely of individual liberty, but it is a doctrine which reduces Church processes to chaos so absolute that this Presbytery can never in the lifetime of its present members expect to emerge from the gulf into which it is now to be precipitated—(applause). Dr. Binnie repeated that legislation ought not to come in the beginning of a controversy, but if legislation is not the way to begin controversy neither surely is judicial condemnation—(hear, hear, and applause). The thing is as clear as can be. If the Church is satisfied that I have deflected from her Standards in such a way that she can prove my deflection then the first step would be to say, "There may be other things on which to raise a larger question, but here is an office-bearer who is outside his contract with us. He is outside the proposition on which our whole subsequent argument will be built when we go into this large controversy which has been raised, and which we must go into with the aid of our previous Standards and Confessions. Here is one person who turns against our Standards, and unless he can show us need for revising them we will begin by thrusting him aside, but after that we will go on and expiscate the matter as fully as we are able to do." But how are we to do this? Surely so as to give every member the right of speaking from an advantageous position for asserting his opinion in the matter. Then at the end of a long controversy it is possible that some difficulties may be removed, that tendencies may have emerged into actualities. It is possible that the thing may have been seen in a clearer light, that we may have seen what the tendency actually is; and then we shall have the process of Libel over

again ; but if we have it, it will not be for being of unsound tendency, but because the controversy has ripened what was hidden into open and clear heresy—(hear, hear). I do not think it would be difficult to show that the hypothetical heresies suggested by Dr. Binnie are inconsistent with the Confession, and on a trial of course they would be censured as such. But if not, I would like the Church to discuss them until she saw they were contrary to the Confession of Faith, or in some way subversive of belief. And if I found them subversive of belief, and found it was necessary to introduce a protest against new error, I would do so by a legislative process. Dr. Binnie has appealed to the history of the Church, and it is doubtless true that in the history of the Church new creeds have been the end of controversy, but I have yet to learn that the way in which new creeds have been formulated has been by way of a heresy prosecution. Surely the creeds we know have been the results of councils and discussions. It was so even in the case of the Synod of Dort. I ask Dr. Binnie to throw aside this analogy. There is no member of Presbytery I should more desire to see on my side in this case. The cause I am standing up for here is far more important than anything that may happen to myself, for I am pleading the cause of a constitutional question which in all probability will settle whether the Free Church of Scotland is to exist or not—(hear, hear, and loud applause). I say this question will decide whether our Church shall exist, for let me tell the Presbytery that what Mr. Selkirk has already said about elders and deacons, I can say not only with regard to them, but with regard to students and younger ministers. I say anyone who can read the signs of the times will see that, not from any unfaithfulness to the doctrine of the Church, but from that rising and increased conscientiousness of feeling and solemn responsibility which permeates the office-bearers of our Church in a way hardly ever experienced before, you will not get men to enter into the service of the Church unless they know before what it is that the Church expects them to believe and to teach. No, Moderator. I appeal to those who have thought that for the sake of expiscating the truth in this case it is desirable to introduce so dangerous a precedent. I appeal to them to ponder what they are doing. I ask Dr. Binnie, Mr. Sloan, and Mr. Clark, I ask all who have stood in a hesitating position, whether they have weighed the fact that we are no longer dealing with one case, but dealing with the whole constitution of the Church, and with the whole possibility of finding office-bearers for it in the future—(loud applause). Now I admit this large view of the case is not the one urged by the speakers on the other side, and I confess I was surprised at the puny basis on which they were content to rest their argument. Once and again appeals have been made to the letters written by me, and as to whether I had or had not refused to go into conference with brethren of the Presbytery ; and the argument seems to be that such a charge as now stands on this Libel would have been incompetent and unconstitutional unless for certain circumstances that have already taken place in the history of the case. That was Mr. Sloan's argument, and I would give every force to it, because it is evident that those who put the argument in that way did it to avoid raising so large a question as otherwise would have been the case. The argument

seems to be this, that last spring the Presbytery entered into conference with me, and they did so because the Commission directed them to proceed against me according to the rules of the Church. After that, I did refuse to answer certain questions, because it seemed to me that these questions were not according to the laws of the Church, and that I was beyond the fair region of questioning. When the matter was before the Assembly, and when I found that it was proposed to suspend me—a course which, I venture to think, not with myself alone, but with a large minority in the last Assembly, was an unconstitutional course—I at once made up my mind to ask the Presbytery to frame a Libel against me. I did that in the interests of the Church, and when I told Dr. Wilson himself the course I proposed he was at first inclined to withdraw his motion of suspension. He did not do so, because I believe that motion was really drawn out by Dr. Begg and Dr. Kennedy, and put into his hands by them, and they were not disposed to let him go back.

Principal BROWN—No, no.

Professor SMITH—That is the fact as I understand.

Principal BROWN—I hope that is not to be insisted on.

Professor SMITH—I have the highest respect for Dr. Wilson, and there are few men in the Free Church I respect more. I do not mean to blame him, but I mean to say when a man makes a motion for several other people he is liable to such influences.

Principal BROWN—I know the fact. It is not true.

Professor SMITH—Sir Henry Moncreiff admitted it to me at last Assembly.

Principal BROWN—Sir Henry Moncreiff may admit what he likes, but I am in the knowledge of the fact that it is untrue.

Professor SMITH—It is a matter of no consequence. I alluded to it for the purpose of showing that in making a proposal of this kind to the Assembly I had acted in conference with those who were not likely to recommend anything rash, and Dr. Wilson said that he thought I was right, and his first impression was that it would relieve him of the necessity of putting his motion. The reason I have given for Dr. Wilson persevering in his motion may be wrong, but I am sure that whatever the reason is it is not discreditable to Dr. Wilson; and the gentlemen who interrupt can have nothing to do with it unless there is some history of the case which we have not yet got—(applause).

Principal BROWN—I think it is a pity to make such remarks.

Professor SMITH went on to detail the steps he had taken, explaining that his reason for asking a Libel was that the state of matters was so grave that nothing short of a Libel would clear his feet. He had asked a Libel in no spirit of recalcitration. I asked, he said, that all the charges against me should be reduced to the form of a Libel. I did not ask that things that were not charges and never could be charges should be made charges and put into the form of a Libel—(hear, hear, and applause). After Sir Henry Moncreiff's utterances on the subject, I was not to commit myself to any new-fangled charges; and, in making my crave to the Presbytery, I turned up the process book, and took the form for a heresy Libel and copied the very expressions out of it—(applause). When the

questions were put I answered—and the letter is in the minutes—that I was precluded *at that stage* from making any answers to the questions. I did this out of no disrespect to the Presbytery. I have never denied that there are many things in my writings that must be expiscated; and I have asked that the following reasonable course be observed—that it be first seen whether I am in rebellion against the constitution of the Church. I stand by my opinions. I make no effort to conceal them. I am ready to discuss them fully and frankly with anyone, and I have not shown the least disinclination to do so. I am rather surprised that Mr. Sloan should go back and say that his reason for supporting this motion was that I kept out of a frank and friendly conference, and that in order to get at this frank and friendly conference a new instrument of torture is to be invented in the shape of a Libel for dangerous and unsettling tendency—(laughter, “oh! oh!” and applause). I hear cries of “oh! oh!” and I will show why it is an instrument of torture. Torture according to the practice of the mediæval courts—(laughter)—is an application to suspected persons of a pressure by which they may be drawn forth to give statements which could not have been got from them by any ordinary means—(laughter and applause, again and again renewed). Torture is a process applied to persons who are in a strong suspicion of being guilty in order that, if possible, something may be drawn from them. Torture is a process by which a suspected person is assumed to be guilty until he has proved himself to be innocent—(laughter and applause)—and that, according to Mr. Selbie’s speech, is a precise definition of the Libel now before us—(laughter and applause). I sympathise with Mr. Sloan’s desire that we should get much fuller explanations, but I do not think that the information will be got by the use of the mediæval method I have been characterising—(applause). Professor Smith then proceeded to take up the arguments which at the preceding meeting had been adduced by Mr. Clark. It seemed to be Mr. Clark’s desire that this matter should be fully discussed; and in order to this being done it was necessary that he (Professor Smith) should be put at the bar, or, at all events, in a position such as he now occupied of being practically in the position of defender in the Presbyterial investigation that was now going on. This was a most extraordinary doctrine, and he could see the results of it in the excitement that had taken place over the case. There was the intervention of the Commission at stages never heard of before in Church procedure; the suspension of the person accused before the charges against him were formulated; constant excitement kept up by pamphlets; the heated state of feeling which necessarily arises when such questions of vital importance are discussed in a large Presbytery across the table. Taking all these things together, was this the atmosphere for a calm and effective discussion of questions which it is not now pretended in any way contradict the Confession? The effect of this had been that for the last eighteen months he had been kept in a constant whirl of excitement. He had been hurried on from one part of the case to another. He had had no opportunity, even although so disposed, of drawing out anything like a new argument. A hasty three weeks had been given him to bring forward his only written Defence, and even that had been grudged him by certain

members of the Presbytery; and he would ask in these circumstances had he received the facilities that it was desirable he should receive for doing what the Presbytery desired and making his arguments clear. The same thing might happen to other people if this system were adopted, for anyone might be accused if this method of conducting procedure were allowed; and he did not think that this was the way in which the Church, with honesty and decency, could proceed to the discussion of such important questions as these. He turned to Dr. Binnie and asked him to recal his historical parallel, and say when he remembered of important theological questions being settled, and settled to the satisfaction of the Church, by means of such a judicial process preceding the legislative declaration of the Church—(applause). Speaking of the reference that had been made by Dr. Brown to the form of process, Professor Smith said that the Act of Assembly on the subject was an authoritative part of the Constitution, and though Sir Henry Moncreiff's book was useful for guidance, the Assembly had carefully abstained from giving the production its imprimatur.

Principal BROWN—I quoted from the book that contains the form of process.

Professor SMITH—Exactly; just in the same way as the Bible may be said to contain all that about King James and "the bright occidental star," which, however, has not the authority of the Scripture—(laughter and applause). Professor Smith quoted from Sir Henry Moncreiff to show both that his exposition went beyond the Form of Process, and that all which he asserted was that a minister may decline to be dealt with until the charges against him be put in black and white, but he does not mean that when they are put in black and white the minister ceases to have the right to say afterwards that one of the things you have put in the charge is not a competent ground of accusation at all. And this is the extraordinary thing in the present case. Because certain things have got into the state of a Libel, because there is a regularly arranged statement of charges it is maintained, and has been seriously argued, again and again, that we have no right to ask whether these charges are charges, but that we have just to assume them to be so. I think I can find some better meaning to what Sir Henry said in last Assembly than the meaning which has hitherto been put upon it. He has expressed himself very incautiously, but he has never denied that it is the privilege of any member to stand up and argue that this is a charge which is not a charge at all, and that we must pass from the whole matter.

Principal BROWN—At the right stage.

Professor SMITH—And the right stage to pass from an incompetent charge is the very moment you find it incompetent—(hear, hear, and loud applause). Upon the contrary, this is Dr. Brown's proposal, which he has repeated frequently, that you can go into the whole case whether the charge is competent or not. But is it the privilege of the Church that it is to drag one of its members through a lengthy discussion when the ground of the whole investigation is itself incompetent? Surely not—(applause). There must be other ways of the Church getting what light she wants; there must be other ways of discussing and disposing of such

questions without inventing a new crime and without putting a person to answer it in circumstances which make it impossible for the Church to get new light on the subject—(applause). I think I have gone over a great many of the points which have been raised, and I now return to my positive argument which, in the speeches on the other side, has scarcely been touched upon. In cases of heresy which I have been reading I find that the form of motion was something like this:—"Having heard the objections of so and so, do repel these objections." I have not heard one word of repelling the objection which I take in my reply. That objection is based upon this, that our form of process limits the power and authority of the Presbytery in such a matter by declaring that "nothing ought to be admitted by any Church judicature as the ground of a process for censure but what hath been declared censurable by the Word of God, or some Act or universal custom of this national Church agreeable thereto." No attempt has been made to show that my opinions do violence to a declared censure of the Word of God or some Act or universal custom of this Church. Mr. Anderson, at a previous stage, referred to what is said in Revelation as to the consequences of adding to or taking away from that book, but the offence charged in the Libel is not interfering with the book of Revelation, it is teaching of a dangerous and unsettling tendency, and nobody has declared that this has been said to be punishable by the Word of God. The expression which I have quoted obviously means—by that which has been declared censurable by the Word of God—that which was common to all churches, the forbidding of immoral acts which were distinctly condemned in the Bible; and, I presume, also the forbidding of heresy in its stricter sense, as including things directly blasphemous and opposed to the central beliefs. Then further it says—"Some Act of this national Church." There is no Act of this national Church which deals with dangerous and unsettling tendency, and, as I have already said, it has been argued that the very reason why we are to proceed with the judicial process is because it cannot be brought under an Act. Then as to "universal custom." I have already pointed out that the Simpson case is not a precedent, because tendency occurs not in the major but in the minor, and is used in quite a different relation to what is in the present charge. And apart from this case, is a single act in a special case to be taken as establishing a universal custom of the Church, and applied under a form of process as a precedent to a new case? What are the laws of the Church which are spoken of so slightly? They are the precautions against wrong use of Church power, which our forefathers well knew always lies near to sinful human nature. They are these precautions against the infirmities and sins of human nature even in Church Courts, which are always liable to come in when people are heated by lively questions—(hear, hear, and applause). We have got laws from our ancestors that questions like the present may be discussed by calm wisdom, and not in a torrent of popular feeling—(applause). In conclusion, Professor Smith repeated that they must look upon this charge as an alternative charge in the Libel, notwithstanding Mr. Selbie's view that he had fallen into a fallacy, and that his contention was illogical. Curiously enough, Mr. Selbie had always charged fallacy on any attempt

to reduce this case to strict logical principles. In fact, his definition of fallacy seemed to be that which was in accordance with the ordinary rules of logic—(laughter and applause). The Presbytery having dismissed the graver charge of the alternative Libel, those who dissented must either abstain from voting or accept for the purposes of this argument the decision of the majority. Mr. Selbie having challenged the speaker, Professor Smith called attention to his (Mr. Selbie's) definition of the charge—namely, that his opinions seemed to be inconsistent with the Confession, and that Professor Smith required to prove that they were not really so, and showed that this reversed the usual rules of justice and threw the burden of proof on the person accused. The “seem” seemed to be the subjective opinion of those who voted in the minority on the previous and graver charge, and Mr. Selbie's argument was that having then failed to convince the Presbytery of what “seemed” to them, they were now entitled to make their seeming the ground of a new charge—(loud applause). If the charge was to be allowed as a precedent, they would never again see a charge of heresy without this alternative, and the difficulties thus raised would be perfectly enormous, for as a man was never charged for heresy unless there was some peculiarity in his opinions, every one who was offended by these peculiarities would be enabled to vote against him on the alternative charge, a state of things which no Church could possibly contemplate—(loud applause).

Mr. ANDERSON, in replying, said that nothing which Professor Smith or any one else had said had shaken his chief proposition, which was, he remarked, in general that “tendency” had been too much viewed by itself, and thus caricatured; that this charge was seen to be definite and fair when viewed in its surroundings; that the words “in themselves” denoted inherent danger—such as that of a stab in the direction of the heart, or a serious disease; and that when this charge was applied to separate opinions, it loses its vagueness. It was obvious at once how the theory of Deuteronomy was dangerous to inspiration, by suggesting the idea of fraud. What was dangerous came so close to the evil threatened, that the one was almost as distinct as the other. It was its shadow. He feared that there would be more uncertainty in the voting in the Assembly on the first charge, and Professor Smith might be voted heretical for all sorts of reasons; a word in the Confession—a sentence—its very tone and “tendency.” He maintained that separate legislation for everything that the Church thought wrong looked well in theory, but would be awkward in practice, and would result in a huge appendix to the Confession, and would not restrain those already in office—not even Professor Smith—that the Church of Christ had an inherent power of self-preservation which she could not part with—that in framing confessions, making contracts with her office-bearers, and guarding their legal rights, she could not lay aside this; that if deadly error is insidiously sown in her midst, she had at least the right of dealing judicially with the suspected party and protesting against his errors; and that a Libel was the fairest way of getting at the truth—even when that offence was supposed to be a minor one—not one of heresy.

The vote was then taken with the following result :—

For Mr. Anderson's motion—Dr. Brown, Dr. Longmuir, Dr. Binnie, Messrs. W. L. Mitchell, Leslie, Craven, Arthur, Hendry, Dalgarno, Bannatyne, Selbie, Anderson, Goodall, Masson, Clark, and Fitzpatrick, *ministers*; and Messrs. W. W. Milne, D. Mitchell, Aberdein, Wildgoose, and Dr. Gordon, *elders*—21.

For Mr. Yule's amendment—Dr. Spence, Professor Smith, Messrs. Moir, Yule, Johnstone, Selkirk, R. A. Mitchell, Low, Iverach, Semple, Innes, and Macqueen, *ministers*; and Messrs. Collie, Paterson, Moir, W. Gordon, Barnett, W. Milne, Valentine, and Fleming, *elders*—20.

Professor SMITH explained that he voted in this instance so that he might have the right of appeal.

Mr. STEPHEN declined to vote.

The result of the vote was received with loud hisses.

Professor SMITH in his own interest dissented and complained to the Synod against the finding, and some six or seven members adhered.

Mr. YULE gave in the following reasons of dissent from the finding of the Presbytery :—

1. Because the charge of tendency is too vague to be dealt with under a Libel, where definite proof is required of every alleged fact.

2. Because, granting that a dangerous and unsettling tendency does exist, there is a competent and convenient way of dealing with it open to the Presbytery if the graver charge is found irrelevant by the Courts of review.

3. Because we believe that to allow a charge for tendency, as distinguished from a charge for contradicting or being inconsistent with the Standards, to stand in a Libel, is a dangerous and unsettling innovation on the previous practice of this Church.

Professor SMITH requested that the Presbytery should adjourn for a fortnight, in order to give him time to prepare a statement to lay before the Court in exposition of his views on the eight points embraced under this charge. The proposal was at first opposed by Mr. Selbie, Dr. Brown, and Mr. D. Mitchell, but after discussion, and in view of the approaching sacrament and meeting of Synod, the Presbytery unanimously agreed to adjourn further consideration of the Libel till after the Synod had disposed of the appeals now pending in the case, and to allow Professor Smith to lay the statement to which he had referred before the Court.

The Presbytery adjourned at five o'clock.

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
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