THE

INTELLECTUALISM OF LOCKE:

An Essay.

BY

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TO

THE RIGHT REVEREND

WILLIAM FITZGERALD, D.D.,

LORD BISHOP OF CORK, CLOYNE, AND ROSS,

This Essay

IS DEDICATED,

IN GRATITUDE FOR THE INTEREST HE HAS TAKEN IN ITS PROGRESS,

AND IN ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF

THE BENEFIT IT HAS DERIVED FROM HIS SUGGESTIONS.

PREFACE.

THE object of this Book is indicated by its Title. It professes to establish by a rigorous analysis of the Essay concerning Human Understanding, that Locke is neither a Sensualist, ignoring the existence of any Elements of Thought but those supplied by the External Senses, nor an Empiricist, recognising the existence of no Elements of Thought but those supplied by Sense, External or Internal. It professes to establish that Locke, on the contrary, as recognising Ideas of which Intellect is properly the source, and Cognitions of which Intellect is exclusively the guarantee, is an Intellectualist—an Intellectualist in the sense of Reid and Kant.

To enunciate this doctrine is to proclaim that Locke's Philosophy has hitherto been interpreted by opposites. Any attempt to propitiate the prepossessions of the Reader in such a case is plainly out of the question; the utmost I can hope is to

guard against misapprehension. To secure this object I shall give, though at the expense of any interest which my Essay might otherwise possess, a synopsis of the results at which it professes to have arrived.

In the First Chapter, then, I give a brief sketch of the History of Locke's Philosophy, and point out certain antecedent probabilities in favour of my general conclusion. In the Second, I show that Locke regarded our Ideas neither as Separate Entities, nor as Latent Modifications of Mind, but as Percipient Acts ;—in other words, that his Ideal Theory was identical with that of Arnauld. In the Third, I show that Locke was not misled by an Ignis Fatuus in his Polemic against Innate Ideas, on the one hand ; and that, on the other, he systematically recognised the element of truth of which the Doctrine of Innate Ideas was the disguised expression. In the Fourth, I determine the meaning attached by Locke to the words Sensation and Reflection, and show that in declaring Sensation and Reflection to be the sole "Originals" of our Ideas, Locke merely contemplated the Chronological Conditions of Thought. In the Fifth, I show that, ulterior to Sensation and Reflection, Locke recog-

nises the Understanding itself as a principle genetic of Ideas which Sensation and Reflection are wholly incompetent to give. In the Sixth, I show that Locke anticipated the Kantian distinction of Knowledge into *A posteriori* and *A priori*, Synthetic and Analytic. In the Seventh, I endeavour to systematize Locke's views on the subject of the Three Ontologic Realities, the World, the Soul, and God. In the Eighth, I endeavour to perform the same office with respect to his views on Freedom and the Moral Law. In the Ninth, by a minute comparison of Locke's doctrines with those of Hume and Kant, I endeavour to show that Hume's doctrine was not the sceptical development, but the dogmatic reversal, of that of Locke, and that Locke, on all the fundamental questions of Psychology, was agreed with Kant, though with regard to the Science of Metaphysics the two Philosophers diverged.

These conclusions are so utterly alien to the accredited Criticism of the last hundred and fifty years, that, perhaps, I may be suspected of having failed to comprehend the nature of the question I have undertaken to discuss. To obviate this suspicion, I have selected as the expression of the received opinions on the subject of Locke's Philosophy, the two

greatest Philosophers which this generation has produced—M. Cousin and Sir William Hamilton. I have selected these from the great mass of Locke's Critics for a variety of reasons. In the first place, their acquaintance with the general Problems of Philosophy was so accurate, and their expression of Philosophical Opinion so clear, that a controversy which would have been vague when directed against others, becomes definite when directed against them. In the second place, the present reputation of these Philosophers stands so high, that a professed exposure of their errors of Criticism would be more likely to attract attention than any professed exposition of the Philosophy of Locke. In the third place, I must acknowledge the existence of some such feeling as that which animated the Unknown Knight in Ivanhoe, and, instead of selecting as antagonists those whose seat was least sure, I have preferred touching the shield of the most redoubted champions that the lists of Metaphysics can supply.

Should any professional Critic deem the subject worthy of his notice, all I would ask is, that he will study it with the attention which, from its very nature, the subject itself demands. This Essay professes to expose an error which for a century and a

half has vitiated the History of Philosophy, and thrown a shade upon the reputation of the chief of British Philosophers. Let it be studied, then, with the care due to the interests of Philosophy. Let it be studied with the respect due to the memory of Locke.

POSTSCRIPT.

The opinion which identifies Locke's Theory of Ideas with the Peripatetic Theory of Intentional Species has been so strenuously maintained by Reid, by Cousin, and by Sir William Hamilton, that, probably, there is no portion of the following Essay which will be regarded with so much incredulity as that which professes to demonstrate the contrary. I trust I shall be excused, therefore, if I direct attention to a perfectly decisive passage which I unfortunately overlooked when writing the chapter on Ideas.* In speaking of the fourth "Abuse of Words," —that of "taking them for things,"—Locke expressly mentions the Peripatetic Doctrine of "Intentional Species" as an instance (III. x. 14). He ridicules it as the fitting pendant of a Philosophy which asserted the reality of "Substantial Forms," "Vegetative Souls," and "Abhorrence of a Vacuum." He classes it with the "Soul of the World" of the Platonists, and with the "Endeavour towards Motion" in the "Atoms at Rest" of the Epicureans. He compares it to the Doctrine of "Aerial and Etherial Vehicles." He pronounces it to be "*gibberish*."

* See page 32.

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The Editions referred to in this Essay are:—The Second Edition of Sir William Hamilton's Discussions; the last Paris Edition of the Works of M. Cousin; and Sir William Hamilton's Editions of the Works of Reid and Stewart.

THE

INTELLECTUALISM OF LOCKE.

I.

HISTORICAL.

THE three works which have vindicated for England a name in the Philosophy of Europe are, the Instauratio Magna of Bacon, the Leviathan of Hobbes, and Locke's Essay concerning Human Understanding. Of these three works, Locke's Essay is, perhaps, that which has produced the most powerful and permanent effect. The development of Natural Science which has taken place since the time of Bacon is to be referred rather to the necessary tendencies of the age than to the genius of that great man. The Ethical controversies which were once connected with the name of Hobbes have long ceased to be a matter of interest to any but the recluse student of Philosophy. Locke's Essay, on the contrary, is not only the starting-point of Metaphysical Science in this country, it is still the text-book in all our Univer-

sities and Schools. On the Continent of Europe, and on the Continent of America, it is the same. The name of Locke is still a watchword in Philosophy; and the history of the Essay concerning Human Understanding is, in a great measure, the history of modern Thought.

The circumstances under which Locke made his first appearance as a Philosopher were, in many respects, unfavourable. Maintained in ancient times by the School of Epicurus, the system which educes all knowledge from Experience had, in the preceding age, been reproduced on the theatre of speculation by Gassendi, and accredited to Europe on the supposed authority of Hobbes. The Ethical theories of Hobbes had excited a mingled feeling of terror and disgust, and had called forth a powerful antagonist in Cudworth. Impressed with the necessity of investigating the Psychological foundations of morals, Cudworth, in combating Hobbes, reproduced the argument with which Socrates had combated the Scepticism of Protagoras, and anticipated the argument with which Kant combated the Scepticism of Hume. The efforts of Cudworth were worthily seconded by Cumberland. In the meanwhile, Cartesianism had effected a footing in this country; the Platonic tendencies of the age had been developed by More and Smith; and the first dim intimations of a Philosophy of Common Sense had been given by Lord Herbert. It was in this state that Metaphysical Science was found by

Locke. But Locke unfortunately was a Politician as well as a Philosopher,—a Politician, too, identified with a party in the highest degree obnoxious to those who, at that period, claimed to be arbiters in all questions of Philosophy. The Church and the Universities were then, as now, the chief centres of speculative activity, and the Clergy, though they acquiesced in the Revolution as a disagreeable necessity, had little sympathy with its principles, and were inclined to look upon its advocates with suspicion. Hence it was that, on his first appearance as a Philosopher, Locke was universally greeted as a second Hobbes, and the Essay was universally denounced as a a new Leviathan. True it is that Locke expressly disclaimed an intimate acquaintance with the works of his predecessor. True it is that he coupled the name of Hobbes with the ill-omened name of Spinosa, and pronounced him to have been justly decried by his antagonists.* Locke's disclaimer was unheeded. There was on some leading points a superficial appearance of agreement between the two philosophers, and the result was what might have been predicted. The whole Church militant, to employ the expression of War-

* Yet Mr. Stewart, who in one page quotes the passage in which Locke "disclaims any intimate acquaintance with the works of Hobbes" (*Diss.*, p. 213), in the preceding page asserts that, "to those who are well acquainted with his speculations, it must appear evident that he had studied diligently the metaphysical writings both of Hobbes and Gassendi" (*Diss.*, p. 212).

burton, resumed the arms, the temper of which had been tried in thundering on the steel cap of the Philosopher of Malmesbury. The University of Oxford, by a private agreement between the Heads of Houses, determined to ignore the existence of the obnoxious book. Even Newton was so carried away by the prevalent excitement as to wish that Locke were dead. In spite of this opposition, however, partly, perhaps, in consequence of its violence, the dry metaphysical tractate passed through successive editions with the rapidity of a romance. Pope satirized the abortive efforts of—

"Each fierce Logician still expelling Locke."

The doctrines of the Essay were popularized by Addison in the pages of the Spectator. Even the ridicule of Arbuthnot and the Scriblerus Club contributed to make the new Philosophy familiar to the reading public. The physico-metaphysical speculations of the School of Hartley belonged to a region in which Locke professedly declined to wander. But the intellectual impetus communicated by the author of the Essay was perpetuated by thinkers of a different order. Berkeley developed Philosophy into an Idealism which denied the objective existence of the world of matter; Hume, into a Nihilism which recognised the existence of nothing but our own Ideas. Outraging the ordinary convictions of humanity, and fraught with danger to life and morals, the Scepticism of Hume elicited

the indignant protest of Reid. The Scottish Philosophy was called into existence, and the result was the formation of the School of Common Sense.

Nor has the influence of Locke's Philosophy been less conspicuous in France. Struck with its apparent clearness,—attracted to it, perchance, by the hostility with which it was regarded by the English Church, Voltaire pronounced Locke to be the Hercules of Metaphysics, and proclaimed the Essay concerning Human Understanding to be a book which contained nothing but truths—truths, too, enunciated in the most unambiguous manner. But Montesquieu's sarcasm against Voltaire is well known. "Quant a Voltaire," said the illustrious President, "il a trop d'esprit pour m'entendre;" and the remark is as applicable to Voltaire's estimate of the Essay concerning Human Understanding as it was to his strictures on the Spirit of the Laws. Voltaire was a Gassendist, and unfortunately identified Locke with Gassendi. The system of the Essay in this manner became synonymous with Sensualism, and was made responsible for its results. Introduced to public notice by the Freethinker, it was no wonder that Locke became an object of hostility to the Ecclesiastic, and, so powerful was the feeling of animosity excited in the Church of France, that Voltaire himself complained that for thirty years he had been subjected to incessant persecution for the praises he had bestowed upon the English Philosopher. But even this added to the popularity of Locke. The most

austere of Philosophers became the Philosopher *a la mode*. In the salons of Paris, and the gardens of Versailles, fine gentlemen descanted with fine ladies on the origin of Ideas, and even the heroines of the stage amused their audience with disquisitions on the original, certainty, and extent of Knowledge.* But Locke's Philosophy was destined to produce more permanent results. Misled by the same error as Voltaire, Condillac enunciated the system of Transformed Sensations, and presented it to the world as a development of the Philosophy of Locke. The writers in the "Encyclopædia" participated in the views of Condillac. The Philosophy of Sensualism, thus accredited, was developed by D'Holbach into Atheism; by Helvetius, into an Animalism which acknowledged no characteristic difference between man and the lower animals. The hypothesis of the Man Statue was succeeded by the hypothesis of the Man Machine; which, in its turn, gave way to the hypothesis of the Man Triton. The stream of French speculation was thus poisoned at its source; the "dirt Philosophy" was everywhere triumphant; and even to the present day the disciples of the higher Philosophy denounce England as having debauched the morality of France.

Nor has the influence of the Philosophy of Locke been less powerfully felt in Germany. Attracted amidst his dreams of universal knowledge by

* For the influence of Locke on the fashionable circles in France see Stewart's "Dissertation," pp. 222, 552.

the celebrity of the Essay concerning Human Understanding, Leibnitz, for a moment, devoted his energies to the study of the new system, tracked it from position to position, and confronted it at every turn with the doctrines of the "Nouveaux Essais." But it was not through Leibnitz that Locke was destined to influence the Philosophy of Germany. The universal genius looked with contempt on the talents of the English Metaphysician. M. Locke, he said, had subtlety and address, and a sort of superficial Metaphysic, which he knew how to make the most of; but, on the whole, he missed the gateway of Philosophy, and understood nothing of the nature of the mind.* Hence it was that Locke's influence in Germany was neither immediate nor direct. It was the Scepticism of Hume that had aroused the indignant common sense of Reid, and it was the Phantom of the modern Pyrrho that aroused the speculative reason of Kant,—startled him, as he himself expressed it, from his dogmatic slumber. Regarding the Scepticism of Hume as the logical development of the Empiricism of Locke, Kant devoted his whole energies to supplying the alleged

* Locke, as Mr. Stewart has observed, was not backward in returning the compliment. "I see you and I agree pretty well concerning Mr. Leibnitz," he says in a letter to Molyneux, "and this sort of fiddling makes me hardly avoid thinking that he is not that very great man as has been talked of him." "Even great parts," he says in another letter, "will not master any subject without great thinking, and even the largest minds have but narrow swallows."

deficiencies of the Essay concerning Human Understanding, and the Kritik of the Pure Reason was the result. The reaction thus originated in Germany was, as is usual in such cases, Europeanized by France. Belonging to the German school of speculation rather than to the French, M. Cousin resumed the Kantian polemic, and his lectures on Locke's Philosophy constitute the best known, and, in the estimation of his admirers, the most valuable portion of his voluminous productions. The Scottish School became modified in the same manner as the French. The whole Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton is an attempt at the conciliation of the School of Common Sense with the School of the Speculative Reason; and, inheriting the animosities of both Reid and Kant, Sir William has accepted the criticism of M. Cousin, and pronounced his Lectures to be the most important work on Locke since the "Nouveaux Essais" of Leibnitz.

Locke is thus the centre of the Philosophy of Great Britain, Germany, and France. He is to the metaphysical disputes of modern Europe what in the eyes of Arnold the great Carthaginian was to the Second Punic War. The history of Philosophy gathers itself around his single person, and in the collision of contending Schools we see nothing but Locke, his followers, and his foes.

That the scope of a book which has thus for a century and a half been the centre of controversies and the source of systems, should never yet have

been properly conceived, may appear a paradox too extravagant to be entertained. Yet Dugald Stewart, in his Dissertation on the Progress of Metaphysical Science, does not hesitate to aver that in his opinion the Essay concerning Human Understanding had been far more generally talked about than read,—far more generally read than understood. Nor, even at first sight, is this paradox without certain antecedent probabilities in its favour. In the first place, the opinions concerning the purport of Locke's Philosophy are almost as various as the opinions enumerated by Cicero concerning the Nature of the Gods. "Res nulla est, de qua tanto opere non solum indocti, sed etiam docti dissentiant." While one set of commentators maintain, with Reid, that Locke regarded our Ideas as separate entities, another maintains, with Brown, that he regarded them as mere percipient acts. While one historian of Philosophy informs us that Locke rejected the Cartesian theory of Innate Ideas, another informs us that on the subject of Innate Ideas Descartes and Locke were in reality at one. If we ask Diderot, Condorcet, or La Harpe, "What was Locke's great and capital discovery?" they will answer, in the words of Condorcet, "Locke was the first who proved that all our Ideas are compounded of Sensations" (*Diss.*, p. 227). Put the same question to Reid, Stewart, and Sir William Hamilton, they will answer, in the words of Stewart, that the term which expresses "the peculiar and characteristic doctrine by which his system is dis-

tinguished" is "Reflection" (*Diss.*, p. 230). Even here the diversity of opinion does not cease. What does Locke mean by "Reflection"? Stewart tells us that under Reflection Locke includes the Understanding proper, and that "it is in this sense he uses it when he refers to Reflection our Ideas of Cause and Effect, of Identity and Diversity, and of all other Relations" (*Diss.*, p. 229). Sir William Hamilton, on the contrary, insists that Locke employs the term exclusively in its etymological sense of ἐπιστροφὴ πρὸς ἑαυτό, and regards it "merely as a source of adventitious, empirical, or *a posteriori* knowledge" (*Reid*, p. 346). The disciple of Condillac maintains, with La Harpe, that "the faculty of Reflection is the power which the mind possesses of comparing and combining its Perceptions." It is the same with reference to Sensation. Reid supposes that Locke's Sensation is merely Sensation proper (*Reid*, pp. 208, 290, 317)—Sir William Hamilton denounces Reid, and protests that it comprehends Sensation proper and Perception (*Reid*, pp. 208, 290, 317). It is the same with regard to a variety of other questions. Is Locke a Conceptualist, or is he a Nominalist? Is he a Materialist, or is he a believer in the Immateriality of the Soul? Is he a Necessitarian, or is he a believer in the Freedom of the Human Will? Does he reduce all Moral Distinctions to the accidental variations of opinion, to the arbitrary appointment of the civil magistrate, to the mere edict of the Deity—or does he repudiate the conclusions of Epicurus, Hobbes,

and Ockham, and acknowledge an Eternal and Immutable Morality with Plato, with Cudworth, and with Clarke? The question of Morality is a specimen of the irreconcilable diversity of opinion that subsists among the commentators. While Shaftesbury identifies Locke's doctrines with those of Hobbes, Stewart identifies them with those of Shaftesbury (*Diss.*, p. 243). Dissentient even from himself, Stewart at one time classes Locke with the "Minute Philosophers" (*Diss.*, p. 248); at another, he makes him responsible for the ethical paradoxes that are associated with the names of Helvetius and Mandeville (*Diss.*, pp. 111, 429). Where all is thus doubt and dissension, the conclusion to be entertained is obvious. It is that of Cicero in the corresponding case. "Opiniones cum tam variæ sint tamque inter se dissidentes, alterum profecto fieri potest, ut earum nulla, altera certe non potest, ut plus una vera sit."

Nor is this diversity of view the only circumstance that rouses the suspicion that Locke's Philosophy has been the subject of misapprehension. The monstrous absurdities for which he has been made responsible lead us to the same conclusion. The Scriblerus Club could find no parallel for Locke's Abstract Idea of a Triangle except Crambe's Abstract Idea of a Lord Mayor. Brown can compare Locke's theory of Personal Identity to nothing but the speculations which Gulliver listened to in the Island of Philosophers. But if we want the type of the criticism to which Locke has been subjected, we must have

recourse to the Lectures of M. Cousin—a work which professes to embody the criticisms of Reid and Kant—a work which has received the sanction of Sir William Hamilton—a work which may, therefore, be regarded as the expression of the philosophic sentiment of Europe on the merits of the great English Philosopher. If we are to believe his French expositor, Locke starts with a gratuitous "hypothesis" (p. 81). Throughout the Essay "contradictions gross as yea and nay are to be met with, not only from chapter to chapter, but from paragraph to paragraph of the same chapter" (p. 100). "In a critical point of view the most general characteristic of Locke's metaphysical system" is "confusion" (p. 116). The only expedient by which he maintains even the semblance of consistency is the systematic "mutilation of ideas" and "distortion of facts" (p. 148). He confounds what everybody else distinguishes (p. 109); he is guilty of "paralogism," "confusion," and "extravagance" (p. 128); he "destroys the belief of the human race" (p. 134); he "annihilates all moral responsibility and juridical action" (p. 139); he confounds consequent with antecedent, and antecedent with consequent (*passim*); at every step he is bewildered amid "Abysses of Paralogism" (p. 245); and "Absolute Nihilism" is the gulf in which his progress inevitably ends (p. 250). Surely, if M. Cousin be in the right, this is the very "midsummer madness" of Malvolio. As Lee was named the Bedlam Poet, so Locke should

be designated the Bedlam Philosopher. The great English Metaphysician is, after all, but a Metaphysician in motley. But who is the man whose masterpiece is thus stigmatized as a farrago of fatuity and falsehood? A man whose metaphysical sagacity has never been denied—a man proverbial for sobriety of judgment and breadth of common sense—a man described by M. Cousin himself as a "born Philosopher," a second "Socrates," "the sage Locke." Add to this, a man whose devotion to truth, as M. Cousin also admits, is attested by all his contemporaries, and demonstrated by every action of his life. That such a man should have produced such a book is, of all unlikely things, the most unlikely. M. Cousin's criticism is not only an insult to the memory of Locke,—it is an insult to Philosophy and to common sense. Whenever an author appears peculiarly absurd, the first suggestion should be that he has been misunderstood. A great genius is not gratuitously to be charged with absurdities which an idiot might detect. In any case, it is a mere balancing of probabilities, and it is at least as possible that M. Cousin may have misconceived the meaning of Locke, as that Locke should have merited the criticism of M. Cousin.

The probability of the existence of some strange misconception in connexion with Locke's Philosophy is confirmed by another circumstance. Strange to say, the points which M. Cousin and the critics select as points of attack are the very points which Locke

himself regards with peculiar complacency. Instead of regarding his fundamental principle as a gratuitous Hypothesis, he confidently appeals to "Observation and Experience" for the confirmation of its truth (I. iv. 25 ; II. i. 1 ; II. xi. 15). Instead of regarding his system as a rude mass of incoherent material, he exults in the reflection that it will be acknowledged to be "an edifice uniform and consistent with itself," even by those who may be disposed to view it as "a castle in the air" (I. iv. 25). Instead of regarding his Philosophy as exhibiting the mutilation of ideas and the distortion of facts, he insists that "if we examine the whole course of men in their several ages, countries, and educations," their "notions" will be found to depend on the "foundations" which he has laid, and to correspond in every respect with the "method" which he has thought proper to adopt (II. xi. 16).

Nor can it be said that Locke was ignorant of the conditions of the problem which he undertook to solve. Every metaphysical difficulty which was obtruded upon Reid and Kant, by the Philosophy of Hume, had already been obtruded upon Cudworth and Cumberland by the Philosophy of Hobbes. Nor, even if Locke had been ignorant of the metaphysical controversies which had agitated the preceding age, would he have been permitted by his contemporaries to ignore the great principles at issue. Never was any book greeted with such a storm of opposition as the Essay concerning Hu-

man Understanding on its first appearance. At the head of its assailants appeared the Bishop of Worcester. He took exception to Locke's theory of Ideas. He maintained that the reasoning against Innate Ideas invalidated the argument for the existence of a God. He challenged the theory of the origin of Ideas to account for the existence of the Idea of Substance. He denounced the theory of Knowledge as incompetent to give either the Immateriality of the Soul, or the expectation of a Future Life. Nor was Stillingfleet the only opponent that Locke was called upon to encounter. The efforts of the philosophic Bishop were seconded by Sherlock and by Norris. "Solid Philosophy" was "asserted against the Fancies of the Ideists" by Sargent. Lee confronted the supposed Scepticism of the Essay with an "Anti-Scepticism" in folio. Lowde assailed its fancied Hobbism with a "Discourse concerning the Nature of Man." Every leading objection that has been adduced against Locke's system by Leibnitz, Kant, or Cousin, by Reid, Stewart, or Sir William Hamilton, was thus obtruded on Locke's own notice by his own contemporaries. And what was the result? Locke tells us, in the Epistle to the Reader prefixed to the sixth edition of the Essay. He had not had the good luck to receive any light from those exceptions he had met with in print against any part of his book. Whether the subject he had in hand required more attention than cursory readers, at least such as were prepossessed, were willing to allow, or

whether any obscurity in his expressions cast a cloud over it, and those notions were made difficult to others' apprehensions in his way of treating them, he did not undertake to say ; but so it was, that his meaning, he found, was often mistaken, and he had not the good luck to be everywhere rightly understood. Whichever was the case, it was merely his own reputation that was affected. He declined, therefore, to trouble the reader with what he thought might be said in answer to the several objections he had met with to isolated passages in his book, "since I persuade myself," he said, "that he who thinks them of moment enough to be concerned whether they are true or false will be able to see, that what is said is either not well founded, or else not contrary to my doctrine, when I and my opposer come both to be well understood."

Now, if Locke professed to have derived no light from the exceptions of Stillingfleet, assuredly he would have derived no light from the exceptions of M. Cousin. If he protested that he had been mistaken by Lowde and Sherlock, he would equally have protested that he had been mistaken by Sir William Hamilton. If he declared that he was agreed with his antagonists of the School of Cudworth, he would have as readily avowed that he was agreed with his antagonists of the School of Reid and Kant. And this suggests the principle on which the Philosophy of Locke should in reality be judged. When, with reference to "the origin of the pure cognitions

of Reason," Kant divided philosophers into Noologists and Empiricists, he regarded Aristotle as the head of the Empiricists, and Locke as the follower of Aristotle in modern times. But if after the lapse of two thousand years it may be made a question whether Aristotle in reality regarded all knowledge as educed from Experience, a similar question may surely be raised concerning Locke. Fontenelle has said that History is merely a collection of *fables convenues;* what if the Empiricism of Locke be one of the *fables convenues* of Philosophy? This is the fact which it is the object of this Essay to establish, and it is on the establishment of this fact that I rest Locke's claims to be regarded as a great thinker. Viewed as a system of Empiricism, Locke's Philosophy has been the theme of ten thousand discordant judgments : viewed in its true character, it will exhibit in correlation the doctrines of which each of these discordant judgments was a partial glimpse. Viewed as a system of Empiricism, his Philosophy has been regarded as a chaos of contradiction : viewed in its true character, it will be seen to be, what he himself considered it, an edifice uniform and consistent with itself. Viewed as a system of Empiricism, his Philosophy presents the appearance of abysses of paralogism : viewed in their true light, these abysses of paralogism will be seen to be nothing but a species of metaphysical mirage thrown up by the ambiguities of language. Viewed in an Empiric aspect, the Essay concerning Human Understanding, to use an adaptation of

Locke's own metaphor, presents to the spectator nothing but a picture of confusion: viewed in the "cylindrical mirror" of a just criticism, the confusion ceases, the irregular lines are reduced to order, and the Essay presents to the eye the very form and features of a true Philosophy.

Nor is it merely as a point of speculative curiosity that this discussion commends itself to the attention of those who have the interests of Philosophy at heart. The great opprobrium of Metaphysics has hitherto been the diversity of opinion that exists amongst the acknowledged masters of the science. In modern times, the two chiefs under whose standards the rival factions of Philosophy have ranged themselves are Locke and Kant; and it will be no mean triumph over the enemies of Philosophy if it can be demonstrated that on all essential and fundamental points the rival chiefs are in reality at one. Nor is this discussion devoid even of the interest which nationality can give. It has long been the fashion to denounce the English School of Philosophy as essentially material, and to account for the alleged fact by the practical tendencies of the English people; as if the most practical nation of antiquity had not produced the most Ideal Philosophy, and as if England were not the native country of Shakspeare and of Milton. It is the object of this Essay to show that, rightly understood, the Philosophy of England is not unworthy of its Poetry—that Europe has no valid ground of complaint against

the English School—and that if the true Philosophy was developed in a reaction from the false, the false Philosophy was itself engendered by a misconception of the true. But a still more serious consideration remains to be pointed out. Locke has hitherto been identified with those whom the Roman orator denounces as the Plebeians of Philosophy. Sensualist and Sceptic—Materialist, Fatalist, and Atheist—those who centre all morality in self-interest, and all self-interest in sense—these have hitherto been regarded as the legitimate representatives of Locke's principles, the faithful depositories of his system. I wish to deprive them of that glory. I wish to transfer the authority of a great name to a higher and purer School of Speculation. I wish, in fine, to identify the chief of British Philosophers with a Philosophy which recognises the Intellectual dignity of Man—the Immutability of the Moral Law—the Being and the Attributes of God.

II.

IDEAS.

ACCORDING to Kant, the cause of the failure of the Metaphysicians who had preceded him was to be found in the fact that they had occupied themselves with the objects of knowledge before they had examined into the capabilities of the subject; and it was to supply this deficiency that he instituted his analysis of the laws to which Reason is itself subjected, and embodied the results in the Kritik of the Pure Reason. It was to a conviction of the same kind that the world is indebted for the Essay concerning Human Understanding. Finding himself perplexed with certain metaphysical difficulties, Locke fell into the same train of reflection as Kant. "It came into my thoughts," he says, "that we took a *wrong course*, and that, before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necesary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our Understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with" (*Epistle*).—"I thought that the *first step* towards satisfying several inquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into was to take a survey of our own Understandings, examine our own powers, and

see to what things they were adapted" (*Introduction*).—"Till that was done," he adds, almost in the very words of the German Philosopher, "I suspected we began at the *wrong end*, and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast Ocean of Being, as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our Understanding" (*Ibid.*). Locke, therefore, at the very outset repudiates what M. Cousin calls "the thesis of Sensualism."* He does not proceed from the Object to the Subject, from Being to Thought, from Ontology to Psychology.

* "Lectures on Kant," p. 45.—So little, however, is this the thesis of Sensualism—so little is Kant entitled to any originality for the counter-thesis, that even Hume enounces the Kantian method as unambiguously as either Locke or Kant. "Here then," he says in his "Treatise of Human Nature," "is the only expedient from which we can hope for success in our philosophical researches—to leave the tedious, lingering method which we have hitherto followed, and, instead of taking now and then a castle or village in the frontier, to march up directly to the capital or centre of the Sciences, to Human Nature itself: which, being once masters of, we may everywhere else hope for an easy victory." In his "Essays" he holds exactly the same language. "The only method of freeing learning at once from these abstruse questions," he says, "is to inquire seriously into the nature of the Human Understanding, and show, from an exact analysis of its powers and capacity, that it is by no means fitted for such remote and abstruse subjects. We must submit to this fatigue in order to live at ease ever after." This last sentence gives the *ipsissima verba* of the Philosopher of Kœnigsberg.

Impressed with the conviction that we can only know according to the measure of our capacities of knowing, he undertakes to survey our capacities of knowing as the necessary preliminary to the determination of the question he proposed to discuss—"the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge" (I. i. 2).*

But this is not all. Knowledge, according to Locke, "is nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our Ideas" (IV. i. 2). In order to ascertain the original and extent of knowledge, therefore, it is necessary to determine the original and extent of the Ideas with which knowledge is exclusively concerned. This enables us to see the whole lie of the Essay concerning Human Understanding, as it were, from the bird's-eye point of view. In the first book, Locke professes to demonstrate that we have no Ideas prior to Experience. In the second, he shows the nature of the Experience by which our Original Ideas are supplied, and the manner in which other Ideas are subsequently developed by the Mind itself. In the third he points out the nature of those General Ideas, in the contemplation of which, in his opinion, all General Knowledge consists. In

* M. Cousin considers the celebrated comparison which Kant institutes between himself and Copernicus, as referring to the necessity of commencing a System of Metaphysics with an Analysis of the Laws of Reason. The comparison, however, has a different reference.

the fourth, he investigates the nature of the connexions established among our various Ideas, determines their objective value, and pronounces the judgment of his Philosophy on the three great Ontologic Realities,—the World, the Soul, and God.

What, then, is the nature of these Ideas which play so prominent a part in the Philosophy of Locke? According to Kant, the mind is conscious of nothing but its own Ideas; the Ideas of the mind are nothing but its various acts; and these acts are to be referred partly to the recipient capacities of Sense, and partly to the generative faculties of the Mind itself. Now, that Locke agrees with Kant in holding the mind to be conscious of nothing but its own Ideas, is admitted; it is the fundamental principle of the Essay. The first thing, therefore, to be ascertained with respect to the Ideology of Locke is the light in which Ideas themselves are to be regarded. That there are Ideas in the mind, Locke presumes will be easily granted. "Every one," he says, "is conscious of them in himself, and men's words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others" (I. i. 8). So far all is clear. But Locke, unfortunately, has himself created a difficulty in attempting to obviate a misconception. He defines Ideas to be "the immediate objects of our minds in thinking" (I. i., *Note*); and this naturally suggests a query. Are these "objects" separate objects, or are they the mere acts of the mind regarded in an objective point of view? In the words of Sir William Hamilton, are they objec-

tivo-objects, or are they subjectivo-objects? With regard to many of our Ideas, Locke's opinion on this point admits of no dispute. He speaks, for instance, of Ideas of Pleasure and Pain, which can be nothing but mental affections; of Ideas of Perception and Volition which can be nothing but mental acts; of Ideas of Relation which cannot possibly be separate entities; of general Ideas which he distinctly tells us are "something imperfect that cannot exist" (IV. vii. 9). The whole controversy, therefore, relates exclusively to Locke's opinion as to the essence of our Ideas of Sense. According to Reid, "Mr. Locke thought that there are Images of external things conveyed to the brain; but whether he thought, with Descartes and Newton, that the Images in the brain are perceived by the mind there present, or that they are imprinted on the mind itself, is not so evident" (*Reid*, p. 256). According to Brown, "the doctrine of this truly eminent Philosopher is, that the presence of the external object and the consequent organic change are followed by an Idea, which is nothing but the actual Perception" (*Lect.* xxvii., p. 171). Sir William Hamilton undertakes to adjudicate in this dispute, and the following are the words with which he opens the consideration of the question:—

"In his *language*, Locke is, of all Philosophers, the most figurative, ambiguous, vacillating, various, and even contradictory—as has been noticed by Reid and Stewart, and Brown himself; indeed, we be-

lieve by every author who has had occasion to comment on this Philosopher. Thus, on the matter under discussion, though *really* distinguishing, Locke *verbally* confounds, the objects of Sense and of Intellect, the operation and its object, the objects immediate and mediate, the object and its relations, the Images of Fancy and the Notions of the Understanding. Consciousness is converted with Perception, Perception with Idea, Idea with Ideatum, and with Notion, Conception, Phantasm, Representation, Sense, Meaning, &c. Now his language, identifying Ideas and Perceptions, appears conformable to a disciple of Arnauld—and now it proclaims him a follower of Digby, explaining Ideas by mechanical impulse, and the propagation of material particles from the external reality to the brain. The Idea would seem, in one passage, an organic affection, the mere occasion of a spiritual representation; in another, a representative Image in the brain itself. In employing thus indifferently the language of every hypothesis, may we not suspect that he was anxious to be made responsible for none? One, however, he has formally rejected; and that is the very opinion attributed to him by Dr. Brown—*that the Idea*, or object of consciousness in Perception, *is only a modification of the mind itself*" (*Disc.*, pp. 78, 79).

If this representation be just, Locke's Idea would seem to be a Psychologic Proteus from which we should vainly seek to extort an intelligible response.

"Omnia transformat sese in miracula rerum."

But the first thing to be remarked with reference to the preceding criticism is, that if Locke be confused, his confusion is worse confounded by his critic. Among the various hypotheses the language of which Locke is represented as using indifferently, there are enumerated hypotheses wholly independent in character: hypotheses involved in the connotation of the term—hypotheses as to the physical antecedents of the phenomenon—and hypotheses as to the essence of the phenomenon itself. On each of these points let us endeavour to ascertain the sentiments of Locke.

As to *the connotation of the term*, the word Idea in Locke's system performs two incongruous functions. At one time it denotes a Quality of Matter—an employment of the term which is evidently abusive, and which gives to Locke's system an appearance of Berkeleianism which it was never intended to present; at another, it denotes a Modification of Thought—and in this sense Locke employs it in its full Cartesian comprehensiveness, to include the objects of our consciousness in general. It is true that Locke sometimes employs the word with an exclusive reference to its etymological and anti-Platonic meaning of *Idea*, Ἰδέα, or Image; as, for instance, when he denies that we have any Idea of the Infinite, or any Idea of Substance. Nor does the exclusive employment of the term in this sense date, as Sir William Hamilton asserts, from the School of Condillac (*Disc.*, p. 70). It was in this sense it was em-

ployed by Hobbes, when he denied that we have any Idea of Spirit, Substance, the Infinite, or God (*Obs. ad Cart. Med.*); by Clarke, when he admitted that we have no Idea of Substance (*Attributes*, Prop. x.); by Berkeley, when he denied that we can form any Idea of Spirits and Relations (*Principles*, Sect. lxxxix.) Nay, Locke's contemporary, King, asserts that the employment of the term Idea to denote anything but the Intuitions of Sense is an abuse of language which bids defiance to the universal associations of mankind (*De Origine*, I. i. vi., *Note A*). But this is not the sense in which the term is systematically employed by Locke. It stands for "whatsoever is the object of the Understanding when a man thinks" (I. i. 8). It is used to express "whatever is meant by Phantasm, Notion, Species" (*Ibid.*) It is "the immediate object of Perception, Thought, or Understanding" (II. viii. 8). In a word, it is a general term which comprehends under it the Sensible Intuition, the Intellectual Concept, and the Rational Idea, of the Kantian.*

* Mr. B. H. Smart, according to Mr. J. S. Mill, has "justly" observed that "Locke will be much more intelligible if, in the majority of places, we substitute 'the *knowledge* of' for what he calls 'the *idea* of.'" "Among the many criticisms on Locke's use of the word Idea," says Mr. Mill, "this is the only one which, as it appears to me, exactly hits the mark" (*Logic*, i. 126). As it appears to me, the mark could not have been more ignominiously missed by the quoit-players of old, when Diogenes seated himself beside it to avoid being hit. Ideas, according to Locke, are, "as it were, the materials of Knowledge" (II. xxxiii. 19)—Knowledge

With regard to the *physical antecedents* of our Ideas, Locke, it is true, professedly declines to be made responsible for any hypothesis (I. i. 2). But he subsequently lays aside this sage reserve, and pronounces that, in the case of the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter, our Ideas are produced by Impulse, this, he says, being the only way in which we can conceive bodies to operate (II. viii. 11). Yet how little Sir William Hamilton was justified in identifying Locke's doctrine with the gross material hypothesis of Sir Kenelm Digby (*Disc.*, p. 81), is evident from Locke's own explanation of his meaning. He distinctly admits that "motion, according to the utmost stretch of our Ideas, is able to produce nothing but motion, so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the Idea of a colour, or a sound, we are fain to quit our reason, go beyond our Ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our Maker" (IV. iii. 6; II. viii. 13). This is not only Reid's opinion, it is his very language (p. 257). Locke's "Impulse" corresponds, in fact, to Reid's "Impression" (p. 248).

is "the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our Ideas" (IV. i. 2). "Ideas," in fact, "being nothing but bare appearance, or perceptions in our minds, cannot," in Locke's opinion, "be said to be true or false" (II. xxxii. 1). Mr. Smart's error has not even the merit of novelty. Stillingfleet, in one of his Controversial Letters, confounded the Idea with the *Being* of Substance; and what was Locke's reply? It is well worthy the attention of Mr. Mill:—"If your Lordship please, let it be the *Idea*" (II. xxiii. *Note A*).

It is merely a name for the change produced in the the organ, the nerves, and the brain, by the operation of the external cause (II. viii. 12). It is merely a name for the physical antecedents of Perception.

But neither with regard to the connotation of the term, nor with regard to the physical conditions of the phenomenon, have Locke's views anything to do with the point on which Sir William Hamilton undertook to adjudicate. Here the question, it is to be observed, is, not whether Locke held the Perception of external things to be merely by way of Idea, but whether he held the Idea of external things to be identical with their Perception,—two questions which Sir William Hamilton has frequently confounded, and to the confusion of which he is indebted for much of the apparent triumph of his celebrated polemic against Brown. According to Sir William Hamilton, all possible forms of the Representative Hypothesis may be reduced to three :—that which regards the representative object as "not a Modification of the Mind ;" that which regards it as "a Modification of Mind dependent for its apprehension, but not for its existence, on the act of thought;" and that which regards it as "a Modification of Mind, non-existent out of consciousness, the Idea and its perception being only different relations of an act or state in reality identical" (*Disc.*, p. 57). Now let us examine the intimations of Locke's Essay with reference to each of these forms of the Representative Hypothesis. Does Locke hold

the doctrine which regards our Sensible Ideas as numerically and substantially distinct from the sentient Mind?—distinct, to employ the material metaphors of Tucker, just as wafers are distinct from the box in which they are contained, or the fish from the water by which it is enveloped? Even the most objectionable passages in the whole Essay afford no countenance to such a view. It is true, Locke speaks of Ideas as existing "objectively" in the mind (*Epistle*). But it is evident that an act of mind may be an object of thought as much as a Separate Entity; and the first remark in the whole Essay is that the mind can make itself its own object (I. i. 1). Even Arnauld, from whom Locke may, perhaps, have borrowed the phrase, speaks of the objective presence of Ideas, nay, designates it "objective," to *distinguish* it from the "local" presence of external objects (*Reid*, p. 296). It is true that Locke holds our Ideas of the Primary Qualities of Matter to be "exact resemblances" (II. viii. 15). But so far is this from justifying Sir William Hamilton in attributing to him the absurdity of "Extended Ideas" (*Disc.*, p. 79), that a reference to the passages in question will show that, in stating our Ideas of the Primary Qualities to be exact resemblances, Locke merely meant to assert that those Qualities exist in nature exactly as in thought we conceive them to exist (II. viii. 9, 15, 17, 23). As to the expressions, Ideas "in" the mind, and Impressions "on" the mind, they are metaphors which

every philosopher employs; and to illustrate the injustice of converting them into expressions of philosophical opinion, I cannot do better than adduce the example of a great thinker, who, if we may believe Sir William Hamilton, "is one of the philosophers who *really* held the doctrine of Ideas, erroneously by Reid attributed to all" (*Reid*, p. 288). "Look you, Hylas," says Berkeley,—speaking under the character of Philonous, in the third of the Dialogues which he wrote to illustrate his Principles of Human Knowledge,—"Look you, Hylas, when I speak of objects as existing *in* the mind or imprinted *on* the senses, I would not be understood in the gross literal sense, as when bodies are said to exist in a place, or a seal to make an impression upon wax. My meaning is only that the mind comprehends or perceives them, and that it is *affected* from without, or by some being distinct from itself—in other words, by God."* Locke, undoubtedly, if

* According to Sir William Hamilton, "the Egoistical Idealism of Fichte, resting on the *third* form of representation, is less exposed to criticism than the Theological Idealism of Berkeley, which reposes on the *first*" (*Disc.*, p. 91). This I hold to be a representation of Berkeley's Idealism, which is not only opposed to Berkeley's reiterated and express declarations, but which, if adopted, would render his whole system a mass of unintelligible absurdity. It is not a little remarkable with respect to the Ideal controversy, that this, almost the only case in which Sir William Hamilton admits Brown to have been in the right, is almost the only case in which Brown can be demonstrated to have been in the wrong.

questioned, would have given a similar explanation of those passages in which he describes the Senses as the "Inlets" of Ideas, and speaks of the "Audience-chamber" of the Mind. Even Sir William Hamilton admits that no argument can be legitimately based on expressions so essentially vague and metaphorical. In point of fact the only passage in the whole of the four books of the Essay, which gives the slightest countenance to the views of Sir William Hamilton and Reid, is a parenthetical remark on our "not knowing how the Ideas of our Minds are framed, of what materials they are made, whence they have their light, and how they make their appearance" (II. xiv. 13); a remark which may well enough refer to the physical antecedents of Perception—the Species Impressæ of the Schoolmen, the Corporeal Ideas of Descartes. And as Locke's expressions cannot be identified with the dogma which asserts the Idea to be a Separate Entity, so he explicitly repudiates the dogma which asserts the Idea to be "a modification of Mind, dependent for its apprehension, but not for its existence, on the act of consciousness." "To imprint anything on the Mind, without the mind's perceiving it," seems to him "hardly intelgible" (I. ii. 5). "To say a notion is imprinted on the mind, and yet at the same time to say that the mind is ignorant of it," is, in his opinion, "to make this impression nothing" (I. ii. 5). "To be in the understanding and not to be understood, to be in the mind and never to be perceived," this he regards as

a contradiction in terms (I. ii. 5). His whole polemic against Innate Ideas, in fact, is a polemic against the doctrine that the existence of Ideas can be latent. But the strongest proof that Locke rejected both the first and second of the forms into which Sir William Hamilton has analyzed the Representative Hypothesis, is supplied by the passages in which he unequivocally avows his adoption of the third,—that the Idea is "a Modification of Mind, non-existent out of Consciousness, the Idea and its Perception being only different relations of an act in reality identical." On this point Locke not merely adopts the sentiments, he reproduces the very language of Arnauld. He tells us that, "whatever Idea is in the mind, is either an actual Perception, or else, having been an actual Perception, is so in the mind, that by Memory it can be made an actual Perception again" (I. iv. 20). He tells us, that when he says, "the Senses convey into the mind the Ideas of the Sensible Qualities" of Matter, he means that "they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those Perceptions" (II. i. 3). He tells us, that "external objects furnish the mind with the Ideas of Sensible Qualities which are all those different Perceptions they produce in us" (II. i. 5). He tells us, that "whatsoever is so constituted in nature as to be able by affecting our Senses to cause any Perception in the mind, doth thereby produce in the understanding a Simple Idea" (II. viii. 1). He tells us that the names of Sim-

ple Ideas "are never referred to any other essence but barely that Perception they immediately signify" (III. ix. 18). He tells us, in fine, that "our Ideas are nothing but actual Perceptions in the mind, which cease to be anything when there is no perception of them"* (II. x. 2).

Now in what manner would Sir William Hamilton require us to treat these declarations,—declarations, be it remembered, which might be multiplied *ad libitum*?† "We do not deny," he says, "that Locke occasionally employs expressions which, in a writer of more considerate language, would imply the identity of Ideas with the act of Knowledge" (p. 79); but "the opinions of such a writer are not to be assumed from isolated and casual expressions which themselves require to be interpreted on the general analogy of his system; and yet this is the only ground on which Dr. Brown attempts to establish his conclusion" (*Disc.*, p. 78). Now, in the first place, this statement is grossly unjust to Brown. In addition to quoting certain passages from Locke, Brown argues that Locke uses Idea as the synonym of Notion and Conception, which no one could suppose to denote anything but Mental Acts; that he employs his most objectionable expressions in cases in which

* Locke should have said, "actual *Perceptions* which cease to be anything when there is no *consciousness* of them." This employment of a word in two senses in one and the same sentence is characteristic.

† Compare Locke's Essay (II. viii. 7, 8; II. xxxi. 2, 12; II. xxxii. 1, 3, 14, 16; III. ix. 18; IV. iv. 4).

their literal interpretation would be absurd; and, "especially," that there is not a single argument in his Essay, or any of his other works, that is founded on the substantial reality of our Ideas as separate and distinct things. But, granting that Sir William Hamilton has done no injustice to Brown, the answer of the advocate of Locke is obvious. The expressions of Locke are neither isolated nor casual; even if they were isolated and casual, they are perfectly unambiguous; and, even if they were ambiguous, the interpretation given is in perfect accordance with the general analogy of Locke's system, for Locke's system is a recoil from Scholasticism—a protest against all gratuitous hypothesis—an appeal to the authority of experience and common sense. Add to this, that the Ideal Theory had already been exploded by his predecessor, Arnauld. But what is the ground on which Sir William Hamilton attempts to establish his own conclusion in opposition to that of Brown? The general analogy of Locke's system? No. Doubtless, then, the reiterated and official declarations of the work which embodies the principles of his Philosophy? Again we are doomed to disappointment. The critic who protests against the validity of an argument, based on the isolated and casual expressions of the Essay, bases his own argument on a casual and isolated expression extracted from Locke's Examination of Malebranche's Opinion—"which," he says, "as subsequent to the publication of the Essay, must be held authentic

in relation to the doctrines of that work" (p. 79). Even to this I must demur. The last hours of Locke's life were devoted to the preparation of the sixth edition of his Essay, and in the Epistle prefixed to that edition he tells the reader he has nothing to alter or to add. But what is the purport of the passage which, according to Sir William Hamilton, supplies "a positive and explicit contradiction of Dr. Brown's interpretation"? Locke, it seems, is found to ridicule the doctrine which reduces our Ideas of the Secondary Qualities of Matter to "Mental States," and, therefore, *a fortiori*, the doctrine which reduces "the resembling, and consequently extended," Ideas of the Primary Qualities to "Modifications of the immaterial, unextended Mind" (p. 77). A more infelicitous argument could scarcely be advanced. Sir William Hamilton is like the Stoic in the "De Finibus"—"quum perspicuis dubia debeat illustrare, dubiis perspicua conatur tollere." The phrase, "Modification of Mind," is ambiguous. It may either denote a Modification of the mental *Energy*, or a Modification of the mental *Substance*. If any one were to explain our different Ideas as different Modifications of Mind, in the same sense that the different images into which a piece of wax could be moulded are different modifications of the wax—such a declaration would be undoubtedly absurd. It would, in fact, correspond with the cruder form of the Egoistical Theory of Representation, which, as we have already seen, Locke, in his

Essay, has rejected. But what if by Modification of Mind we understand a Modification of mental action? The sense in which Locke understood the phrase is evident from the very passage quoted by Sir William Hamilton. "Can the same unextended, indivisible *Substance*," he asks, "have different, nay, inconsistent and opposite Modifications at the same time? Must we suppose distinct parts in an indivisible *Substance*, one for black, another for white, and another for red Ideas?" Irresistibly conclusive against the doctrine which represents our Ideas to be Modifications of the mental Substance, these questions have not the slightest force against the doctrine which represents our Ideas to be Modifications of the mental Energy, and, therefore, identical with the percipient act. Nay, the sequel of the passage so "superfluously conclusive" against Brown, is, in reality, superfluously conclusive against Sir William Hamilton—for Locke acknowledges that these "black, white, and red Ideas," as he calls them, are merely so many "*Sensations*," different "in sorts and degrees," which we can "distinctly perceive," or be conscious of, "at the same time," and "*so* are distinct Ideas" (*Ibid.*) Sir William Hamilton's argument is like the missile of the Australian. Hurled vigorously against Brown, it misses its mark, and recoils with fatal effect upon himself. The doctrine of the Examination is, in reality, the same as the doctrine of the Essay. In the one Locke repudiates the error; in the other, he enunciates the truth.

Hence it is that in the Examination Locke denies that our Ideas are "Modifications of *Mind*," while in the Essay he consistently admits that they are "Modifications of *Thinking*" (II. xix. 1); and hence, while in the one work he denies that the same unextended indivisible Substance can have different *modifications* at the same time, in the other he adopts the very phraseology of Brown, and argues that "the more probable opinion is that Consciousness is annexed to, and the *affection* of, one individual, immaterial Substance (II. xxvii. 25).

Brown, therefore, I conceive to be in the right. The Idea of Locke, like the Idea of Arnauld, is the mere act of thought considered as an object of reflection. The only Ideas he speaks of are those "Ideas which a man observes and is conscious to himself he has in his mind" (I. i. 8). If his antagonists "dislike the name, they may call them 'Notions,' 'Conceptions,' or how they please" (IV. i., *Note*). Locke presumes it will be easily granted him that there are such Ideas—a fact which is itself a proof that he was postulating no scholastic entities; and his "first inquiry" is, "how they come into the mind" (I. i. 8).

III.

INNATE IDEAS.

In order clearly to comprehend the scope of the celebrated polemic against Innate Ideas with which Locke opens the Essay concerning Human Understanding, it is necessary to advert to several distinctions, the existence of which has been very generally overlooked. In the first place, if there be any such thing as knowledge, there must be something which knows; and if there be anything which knows, it must be originally endowed with the capacity of knowing. Every philosopher, therefore, must recognise the existence of certain *Innate Capacities and Powers*. The Sensationalist must postulate as Innate our Capacities of Sense; the disciple of the School of Empiricism must postulate as Innate those Powers of Observation, Memory, and Induction, without which even Experience would be impossible. Granting the soul to be a sheet of white paper, we must still regard it as endued with certain properties before it can receive the handwriting of Experience; granting it to be a mere daguerreotype plate, we must still regard it as endued with certain susceptibilities before it can be painted by the Light

of Observation and reflect the image of the World. But not only must all philosophers, without exception, recognise the existence of certain Innate Capacities and Powers, they also, under one form or another, must recognise the existence of certain *Innate Laws of Intellectual Development.* If, for instance, they deny the existence of an Innate Law which predetermines the human mind to the anticipation of Experience, they admit the existence of an Innate Law which predetermines it to the Association of Ideas; if they deny an instinctive apprehension of the phenomena of the Future, they admit a suggestion of the phenomena of the Past, which is equally instinctive. And this, too, with perfect reason. Even if the mind of man be regarded merely as an animated and self-conscious magic lanthorn, we must admit a certain pre-arrangement and pre-adjustment of the mysterious chamber of thought, or thought itself would be merely the phantasmagoria of a delirious dream. But at this point the unanimity of Philosophers will be found to end. According to one School, the Mind possesses no power beyond that of combining, according to certain Laws, the various Ideas which it has passively received through its capacities of Sense: according to another, not only does the Mind receive, reproduce, and variously combine the phenomena of Sense, it regards them as subjected to Relation. It regards them, for instance, as subjected to the Laws of Space and Time. It regards them as inherent in

some Substance, and produced by some efficient Cause. Not only so, but it forms certain combinations of Ideas, elevates them into an Ideal, and objectifies these Ideals in the World, the Soul, and God. Now, these Forms of Sensibility, these Categories of the Understanding, these Ideas of the Reason—how are we to account for their existence in the Human Mind? That they exist is demonstrated by the very effort to explain away their existence. That they are not furnished by our Capacities of Sense is evident from the fact that they belong to the region of the Super-Sensible. But Sense and Intellect are the only conceivable sources of Human Knowledge. It is plain, therefore, that they must owe their existence to the Intellect. As the offspring of the Intellect, it is true, they may be regarded in a twofold light. They may be regarded either as Illusions of the Imagination or as Revelations of the Reason. As Illusions of the Imagination they may either be tacitly ignored, as was the procedure of the School of Condillac, or they may be merged into Habit and Association of Ideas, as was the procedure of Hume. As Revelations of the Reason, on the other hand, they may be regarded as Ideas having an actual existence in the human mind prior to all mundane experience, as was the opinion of Plato; or they may be regarded as Ideas having no actual existence till the human mind develops them by its own inherent force of thought on the occasion of Experience, as was the opinion of Descartes and

Kant. Of these latter Theories, the one may be denominated the Theory of *Innate Principles and Ideas*, the other the Theory of *Innate Forms of Thought*, and it is by a reference to these distinctions that the character of Locke's Polemic against Innate Ideas is to be determined.

Now, that Locke denies the existence of Innate *Ideas* is certain. It is equally certain that he denies the existence of Innate *Principles*. But what are we to understand by the terms Ideas and Principles, as employed by Locke? Locke's doctrine, it must be admitted, is disguised in a masquerade of metaphor. "Constant Impressions," "Inscriptions written by the finger of God," and "Native beams of Light"—such is a sample of the phraseology which occurs at every step in this celebrated argument. On certain occasions, however, Locke's meaning has laid aside its mask. By Ideas he gives us to understand he means not the capacity of Thought, but Thought itself—by Principles, not Truth in its latent energy, but Truth in its logical expression as an abstract "Proposition" or "Maxim"* (1. iv. 21). In denying

* Nor was this employment of the term "Principle" peculiar in the age of Locke. In his criticism on Archbishop Whately's Logic, Sir William Hamilton "makes bold to say," in opposition to the Archbishop, "that *no* Logician ever employed the term Principle as a synonome for Major Premiss." The Italics are his own. But is not this rather too dogmatic? Throughout the fifth book of the *De Augmentis*, Bacon uses the term "Principium" exclusively in the sense of Major Proposition,—a

Innate Ideas, accordingly, Locke merely denies the existence of Ideas "before impressions from Sensation and Reflection" (I. iv. 20). In denying Innate Principles he merely denies the existence of any knowledge anterior to Experience (II. ix. 6).

But what philosopher, it is asked, has ever maintained the doctrine of Innate Ideas, under the form in which it is denied by Locke? M. Cousin regards the Theory of Innate *Ideas* as a mere chimera. M. Cousin's translator professes his surprise that "Locke should ever have gravely instituted such a polemique, or that it should ever have gained such celebrity." Coleridge intimates that "the supposed error" which Locke labours to subvert is "a mere thing of straw" —"an absurdity which no man ever did or ever could believe." Even Sir William Hamilton himself, in spite of all his acquaintance with the Philosophers of the past, considers that Locke in his refutation of Innate Ideas was led astray by an "ignis fatuus." In opposition to these criticisms,

fact which it is of some importance to notice, as the ignorance of it has misled Mr. Mill into the assertion that Bacon ignored the Deductive method in Physical investigations. Bacon's account of Syllogism is decisive on this point: "In Syllogismo fit reductio propositionum ad *principia* per propositiones medias" (*De Aug.*, lib. v. cap. ii.)—"Ars judicandi per Syllogismum nihil aliud est quam reductio propositionum ad *principia* per medios terminos" (cap. iv.)—"Numerus vero terminorum mediorum minuitur aut augetur, pro remotione propositionis a *principio*" (*Ibid.*) This employment of the word "Principium" throws considerable light on Locke's Polemic against Innate Principles.

however, Locke tells us that the theory against which he contends was "an established opinion" (I. ii. 1), "a doctrine commonly taken for granted" (I. ii. 2), a "great point" (I. ii. 5). Moreover, this question of Innate Ideas was one which had established peculiar claims upon Locke's attention. He had been told that an Epitome of his doctrine which he published as the precursor of his Essay had been generally rejected because it denied Innate Ideas. He knew that his denial of Innate Ideas had caused him to be denounced by Sherlock from the Pulpit of the Temple as little better than an Atheist. He knew that his denial of Innate Ideas had caused even Newton to identify his moral doctrine with the ethical enormities of Hobbes. Nor is Locke the only person whose scientific reputation is here at stake. The Epitome was published under the superintendence of Leclerc. The Essay grew up under the eye of the metaphysical Earl of Pembroke. Locke was in constant communication with Molyneux, and Molyneux with a wide circle of philosophic friends. Add to this, that if Locke was deluded in this point, so also was the Philosopher of Malmesbury. Under these circumstances it is impossible to believe that Locke was labouring under a species of metaphysical monomania in contending against Innate Ideas—we have every reason to take him at his word, and to regard the theory of Innate Ideas as a "received doctrine" (II. i. 1).

Nor was the doctrine of Innate Ideas a doctrine too

monstrous to be received. On the contrary, it was the only theory by which the highest Schools of speculation in the ancient world could account for the existence of our *a priori* Concepts. So obviously was the doctrine of Innate Ideas involved in the principles of the Pythagorean Philosophy, that Pythagoras professed actually to remember the events of his antenatal life. So completely did it interpenetrate the Philosophy of Plato, that Plato denominated Philosophy itself by no other name than that of Reminiscence. Nor was this expression of Plato a mere metaphor. In the Tusculan Disputations the Roman orator reproduces the arguments of the Platonic Socrates as enounced in the Meno and the Phædo, and proclaims the doctrine of *Pre-existent* Ideas to be a necessary truth:—"Nec verò fieri ullo modo posse, ut a pueris tot rerum atque tantarum insitas, et quasi consignatas in animis, Notiones quas Ἐννοίας vocant haberemus, nisi animus, antequam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viguisset. Cùmque nihil esset,* ut omnibus locis a Platone disseritur, (nihil enim putat esse quod oriatur et intereat, idque solum *esse* quod semper tale sit quale εἰδεάν appellat ille, nos speciem), non potuit animus hæc in corpore inclusus agnoscere, cognita

* This passage is somewhat obscure, and the reading probably corrupt. The meaning is, that in the sphere of Experience, in which the Mind meets nothing but Phenomena, it could not possibly gain the necessary Ideas which it unquestionably possesses; —it must, therefore, have brought them with it. The Kantian argument is enounced, the Kantian alternative ignored.

adtulit" (*Tusc. Disp.*, i. 24). Now compare these words with Locke's enunciation of the doctrine against which he protests. "It is an established opinion among some men," he says, "that there are in the Understanding certain Innate Principles—some Primary Notions, Κοιναὶ Ἔννοιαι, Characters, as it were, stamped upon the Mind of man, which the soul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it" (I. ii. 1). Divested of the doctrine of Pre-existence, this is the very doctrine of Plato, enounced in the very words of Cicero. Indeed, so striking are the verbal coincidences, and so familiar does Locke show himself with the Tusculan Disputations in his controversy with Stillingfleet on the Immateriality of the Soul, that I can scarcely avoid suspecting that he had the very passage I have quoted before his view when he opened his polemic against Innate Ideas. Nor were these ancient speculations alien from the spirit of modern thought. The Philosophy that superseded Scholasticism was, in fact, essentially Platonic. The tide of speculation which sunk in Greece reappeared, like the Alpheus, with the chaff and stubble still floating on its surface. Locke speaks of the doctrine of Pre-existence as a doctrine still actually held (II. xxvii. 14). He regards the doctrine of Reminiscence as worthy of a set refutation (I. iv. 20). What, then, is more probable than that in the time of Locke Philosophy might have required an elaborate polemic against Innate Ideas even in their ancient and most objectionable form?

Nor was it merely in connexion with the doctrine of Pre-existence that the theory of Innate Ideas was maintained. It was also maintained in connexion with the doctrine of *Infusion*—the doctrine which regarded our *a priori* Ideas as infused into the Intellect by the act of God. The difference between such a doctrine and that which is at present held is obvious. Instead of regarding the human Intellect as an energetic principle of thought, it regarded it as a mere passive recipient of adventitious Ideas. Instead of regarding our *a priori* Ideas as necessary Concepts essential to Intelligence, it regarded them merely as the arbitrary results of a Divine appointment. Instead of regarding the concurrence of Experience as a necessary condition to the excitation of the spontaneous force of thought inherent in Intellect, it regarded the contents of the Intellect as independent of Experience.

Whether the Pre-existent Ideas of the Platonist and the Infused Ideas of the Cartesian were regarded as Separate Entities, corresponding to the *tertium quid* of Reid, is a different question. As commonly understood, the doctrine of Innate Ideas, in either of its forms, would, doubtless, have been repudiated by every Philosopher as energetically as it was repudiated by Dr. Henry More. No sane man could ever have believed "that there is a certain number of Ideas flaring and shining, like so many torches or stars in the firmament, to our outward sight, or that there are figures that take their distinct

places, and are legibly writ there, like the red letters or astronomical characters in an almanac." But the doctrine of Innate Ideas entailed no such monstrous consequence. Our *a priori* Concepts might have been regarded as *latent Modifications of Mind*, depending for their apprehension, though not for their existence, on the act of Consciousness; and the doctrine of Innate Ideas, whether Pre-existent or Infused, would thus correspond with that form of the Ideal Theory which constitutes the second variety of the Representative Hypothesis, as analyzed by Sir William Hamilton. It is this very form of the doctrine of Innate Ideas that Locke opposes in the passages already quoted in connexion with his sentiments about Ideas. It is in this sense that he pronounces it to be a contradiction to assert that there are "truths imprinted on the soul" before perception (I. ii. 5). It is in this sense that he denies that "the Understanding hath an implicit knowledge of these principles before first hearing" (I. ii. 22).

But the opinions of the Philosophers of the seventeenth century on the subject of Innate Ideas are best exhibited in their own language. When, in order to satisfy his mind upon the subject, Locke had recourse to the works of his predecessors, he did not, as Sir William Hamilton asserts, rely exclusively on the authority of Gassendi (*Reid*, p. 784); he consulted the work (I. iii. 15), which, even in the opinion of Sir William Hamilton, contains the most formal and articulate enouncement of the doctrines of Common

Sense, which at that time had appeared (*Reid*, p. 781). And what did Locke discover from the "De Veritate" of Lord Herbert? He discovered that the mind was not originally a Tabula Rasa, but a Book already printed, though only opened on the presentation of objects. He discovered that our necessary cognitions are "tanquam Dei effata in Foro interiori descripta;" that the truths of Natural Religion are "Veritates in ipsâ Mente cœlitus descriptæ, nullisque traditionibus sive scriptis sive non scriptis obnoxiæ;" that their great characteristic is "Prioritas." The language of the Laureate of Metaphysics is more objectionable still:—

> "Yet hath the Soul a dowry natural,
> And Sparks of Light some common things to see;
> Not being a Blank where nought is writ at all,
> But what the Writer will may written be."

The language of Sir Matthew Hale is as objectionable as that of Sir John Davies. "I come now to consider those Rational Instincts, as I call them," says the great lawyer, "the Connate Principles engraven on the Human Soul, which, though they are truths acquirable and deducible by rational consequence and argumentation, yet seem to be inscribed in the very crasis and texture of the soul antecedent to any acquisition by industry or exercise of the discursive faculty in man." Or take the case of Dr. Henry More. Though he repudiates the theory of "Flaring Torches" and "Red Letters," he repro-

duces, in words at least, the theory of Plato. He speaks of the Mind as possessing "actual knowledge" from the first. He describes this actual knowledge as "an active sagacity in the Soul, or quick Recollection, as it were, whereby some small business being hinted to her, she runs out presently into a more clear and larger conception." He compares the original state of the Soul to that of a Musician who has fallen asleep upon the grass, and practises his art the moment he awakes. Even the philosophical phraseology of Cudworth is vitiated by the admixture of incongruous metaphor. "The Mind," he says, "contains in itself virtually (as the future plant or tree is contained in the seed) general notions of all things, which unfold and discover themselves as occasions invite and proper circumstances occur." Sixteen years before Locke's first appearance as a Philosopher, Cumberland, in the Prolegomena to his celebrated work against the Philosophy of Hobbes, speaks of the Platonic theory of Innate Ideas as the accredited doctrine of the Platonists of the day, and himself gives it a modified support. Even subsequently to the publication of the Essay, and in professed antagonism to its doctrine, the Platonic theory was zealously maintained. "Should they admit that the Mind was coeval with the body," exclaims Mr. Harris, in high indignation, "yet, till the body gave it Ideas, and awakened its dormant powers, it could at best have been nothing more than a sort of dead capacity, for

Innate Ideas it could not possibly have any." King, in the Preface to his Treatise "De Origine Mali," maintains that even our Sensible Ideas are "Innate and Inexistent in the Mind from its first creation"—"Pre-existent as the statue in the block" (*Note* A). According to Sir William Hamilton himself, that Ideas are "found in the Mind, not formed by it," is strenuously asserted as the doctrine of his master by the Cartesian Roell, in the controversy he maintained with the anti-Cartesian De Vries (*Disc.*, p. 74). Nay, if we may believe the testimony of Dugald Steward, Brucker, himself a historian of Philosophy, "could imagine no intermediate opinion between the theory of Innate Ideas as taught by the Cartesians, and the Epicurean account of our knowledge as revived by Gassendi and by Hobbes" (*Diss.*, p. 226). But why multiply examples *ad infinitum ?* On this subject of Innate Ideas, no less a man than Leibnitz himself speaks in high commendation of the doctrine enounced by Plato and embraced by Tully—the doctrine which, according to our modern metaphysical critics, no man in his senses ever did or ever could believe.

Whether much of the language I have quoted should or should not be regarded as figurative, it is needless to pause to inquire. One thing, at all events, is certain. If the Platonic Dogma was defunct, the language of the Dogma survived. If the Philosophers had abandoned their old positions, they had left their camp-fires burning on the heights.

Locke's Polemic against Innate Ideas at least possesses the merit of Reid's Polemic against Ideas. The opinions against which both the one and the other protested may have become mere metaphors; but their protest will for ever prevent those metaphors from being reconverted into opinions. Poets, indeed, may still tell us, with Wordsworth, that—

> "Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting,"

and that—

> "The Soul which rises with us, our life's Star,
> Hath had elsewhere its setting."

They may describe our higher intuitions, with Bailey's Festus, as—

> "The imaged hint of ante-mundane life—
> A Photograph of pre-existent light,
> Or Paradisal Sun."

But the opinion has departed from Philosophy; its very language is forgotten. The first book of the Essay concerning Human Understanding has done justice upon both; and to this extent at least Philosophy is under everlasting obligation to Locke.

But this great Metaphysician has been subjected to a more serious charge. "Locke," says Reid, "endeavours to show that Axioms or Intuitive Truths are not Innate" (p. 465). "He does more," says Sir William Hamilton. "He attempts to show that they are all Generalizations from Experience;

whereas Experience only affords the *occasion* on which the Native (not Innate) or *a priori* cognitions virtually possessed by the Mind actually manifest their existence" (*Reid*, p. 465). But here the task of the vindicator of Locke is comparatively easy. This is a reproduction of an old objection, and to demonstrate its injustice he has merely to reproduce the old reply. Lowde objected to Locke's Theory exactly in the same spirit as Sir William Hamilton. Locke's answer is to be found in a note appended to the commonest editions of the Essay, and it is briefly this :—"We are better agreed than he thinks in what he says concerning Natural Inscription and Innate Notions: there is no controversy between him and me upon the point" (II. xxviii. *Note*). Locke, it is true, objects to the phraseology of Lowde as "misleading men's thoughts by an insinuation as if these Notions were in the Mind before the Soul exerts them, i. e., before they are known; whereas truly," he says, "before they are known there is nothing of them in the Mind but a *capacity* to know them when the *concurrence* of the circumstances, which this ingenious author thinks necessary in order to the Soul's exerting them, brings them into our knowledge" (*Ibid.*) Here then we have a remarkable coincidence. The "whereas" with which Locke professes to rectify the phraseology of Lowde is the very "whereas" with which Sir William Hamilton professes to rectify the theory of Locke. Locke's preliminary declaration is verified, and upon the

cardinal point of Intellectualism he and his opposer are found to be agreed, when each comes to be rightly understood.

Nor is Locke's note at variance with the indications of his text. We need not insist on those passages in which he recognises the existence of certain "Natural" and "Inherent" Faculties (I. ii. 1, 2), or on the still more celebrated passage in which he attributes to the Mind certain "Operations proceeding from Powers intrinsical and proper to itself" (II. i. 24). The existence of such Faculties and Powers is recognised by all. Neither need we insist on Locke's recognition of "Antipathies," which "are truly natural, depend upon our original constitution, and are born with us" (II. xxxiii. 7)—a point which both Shaftesbury and Harris, in fancied opposition to Locke, so needlessly undertook to demonstrate. The Essay contains intimations of opinion far more unequivocal than these. So far is Locke from rejecting the element of truth embodied in the Cartesian doctrine, that on this point he is a professed Cartesian. "Nunquam scripsi vel judicavi Mentem indigere Ideis quæ sint aliquid diversum ab ejus Facultate Cogitandi:"—such are the words of the Father of Modern Intellectualism. "If the Capacity of Knowing be the Natural Impression contended for, this great point will amount to no more but only to a very improper way of speaking, which, while it pretends to assert the contrary, says nothing different from those who deny Innate Principles:"—such are

the corresponding words of Locke (I. ii. 5). Locke, in short, exhibits the whole scope of his Polemic against Innate Ideas in a single sentence. He expressly tells us that "the only confessed difference" between himself and those whose opinion he opposed, related to the "dependence" of the Ideas and Principles in question "on the constitution and organs of the body"* (I. ii. 27).

The positive portion of Sir William Hamilton's criticism is as infelicitous as the negative. So far is Locke from holding Axioms or Maxims to be "Generalizations from Experience," that he holds them

* Nothing can be more confusing than the celebrated criticism, which, according to Mr. Stewart, affords the "key to all the confusion running through Locke's argument" against the existence of Innate Ideas (*Diss.*, p. 243). "Innate," says Shaftesbury, "is a word he poorly plays upon." But if there be any play upon words, it is not upon the word Innate, but upon the word Idea. "The question," says Shaftesbury, "is not about the time the Ideas entered." But it is the question of time,—in other words, the question of the chronological conditions of thought,—that Locke is professedly discussing. "The question," says Shaftesbury, "is whether the constitution of man be such that, sooner or later, no matter when, the Idea will not infallibly spring up." This Locke admits—admits it in the very language of Shaftesbury—admits it with reference to the very Idea on which Shaftesbury particularly insists. "From the consideration of ourselves," he says, "and what we infallibly find in our own constitutions, our Reason leads us to the knowledge of this certain and evident Truth, that there is an eternal, most powerful, and most knowing Being" (IV. x. 6). After this, the assertion that Locke had made the Idea of God "*un*natural" may be dismissed with the contempt it merits. It is simply a calumny of criticism.

to be Generalizations from "*Intuition*" (I. ii. 11; IV. vii. 19; IV. xvii. 14),—Generalizations, not because we compass their certainty by repeated and comparative experiments, but because all Intuitive Truths are first recognised in the particular instance, and subsequently embodied in the general expression (IV. vii. 10). "A man," he says, "will be in a capacity to know the truth of these Maxims upon the *first* occasion that shall make him put together" the requisite Ideas (I. ii. 16). They are "propositions which every man in his wits at first hearing what the names stand for must *necessarily* assent to" (I. ii. 18); they are "*self-evident*" propositions, admitted "without any proof," and assented to "at first sight" (IV. vii. 1, 2); they are "propositions, which, whether they come in view of the mind earlier or later, are all known by their *native evidence*" (IV. vii. 10). Hence it is that Locke refers the Principle of Contradiction for its credentials to "Common Sense" (I. iii. 4). Sir William Hamilton thinks this a "confession," the importance of which has been observed neither by Locke, nor by his antagonists (*Reid*, p. 784). But Sir William Hamilton might have detected a thousand such confessions; for these confessions are not Locke's repugnancies, they are his system. Not only does Locke refer the Analytical Axioms of Logic to Common Sense and and Intuition—he describes the Principles of Morality as constituting a "Natural Law," discoverable by our "Natural Faculties," and revealed to us by the "Light of Nature" (I. iii. 13; IV. iii. 20). In the same manner he iden-

tifies the Principles of Causality and Final Causes with "the Common Light of Reason" (I. iv. 9), with the "Principles of Common Reason" (I. iv. 10), with "Reason, and the Natural Propensity of our Thoughts" (I. iv. 11). It is by means of this portion of our "Intuitive Knowledge" that we attain the knowledge of the existence of a God (IV. x. 1),—a knowledge which Locke repeatedly attributes to the "Light of Reason" (III. ix. 23), an Idea which he systematically represents as a "necessary" development of the human mind (II. xvii. 5, 20), a discovery which, in his opinion, "a rational creature who will but seriously reflect" could never miss (I. iv. 9). Locke's definition of Reason is in itself decisive of the dispute. "Reason," he says, "is Natural Revelation, whereby the Eternal Father of Light and Fountain of all Knowledge communicates to mankind that portion of Truth which He has laid within the reach of our Natural Faculties" (IV. xix. 4). Nay, so impressed is Locke with the lofty prerogatives of the master faculty, that he scarcely hesitates to reproduce the very language which he has reprobated in others; and in speaking of the impediments to the progress of the Moral Sciences, he describes Reason as "the Candle of the Lord, set up by Himself in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish" (IV. iii. 20).

We are now in a position to determine in what sense Locke supposes the Mind to be originally, "as it were, White Paper" (II. i. 2). It is White Paper,

not as devoid of all intrinsic properties, not as destitute of all spontaneous force, but, to use Locke's own language, as "void of all Characters, without any *Ideas*" (*Ibid.*)—in other words, as aboriginally *White*. The metaphor by which Professor Sedgwick has proposed to supersede the Tabula Rasa of Locke and Aristotle is well known. Admitting that the soul is at first an unvaried blank, "yet has this blank," he adds, "been already touched with an immortal hand; and when plunged in the colours which surround it, it takes not its tinge from accident, but design, and comes out covered with a glorious pattern." It may be doubted whether this metaphor is an improvement upon that of Locke. A self-acting and self-conscious principle of thought, the Human Intellect stands isolated in the world of Matter, and material analogies are wholly inadequate to typify its action. The Mind is its own mirror, as it is its own place. Nought but itself can be its parallel. If we compare it to the enchanted sabre of the Caliph Vathek, we reduce Human Knowledge to a mere magical conjuration. If we compare it to the mysterious gem which flashed upon the breastplate of the High Priest, we ignore the inherent force of Intellect, and in reality preach the doctrine of Infusion. Divested of hypothesis, and undisguised by metaphor, the fact is simply this,—the Human Intellect comes into the sphere of Experience, endued with certain Capabilities and Powers; and in the presence of Experience it frames to itself the corresponding Concepts.

IV.

THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS.

"THAT all our knowledge begins with Expe-perience," says Kant, "there can be no doubt. For, how is it possible that the Faculty of Cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our Senses, and partly of themselves produce Representations, partly rouse our Powers of Understanding, to compare, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our Sensuous Impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called Experience? In respect of time, therefore, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to Experience—all knowledge commences with it." This, as we have seen, is the great point contended for by Locke in his Polemic against Innate Ideas. "But," says Kant, "though all our knowledge commences *with* Experience, it by no means follows that all our knowledge arises *from* Experience," and accordingly he establishes his celebrated distinction between knowledge *a priori*, and the *a posteriori* knowledge of which Experience is the exclusive source. This distinction, according to the all but universal opinion of Philosophers,

Locke has either utterly ignored, or, if he has recognised it, he has only recognised it in opposition to his fundamental principles.

Sir William Hamilton, as we have seen, is guilty of a twofold injustice to Locke on the subject of Innate Ideas. He represents him as misled by an Ignis Fatuus in what he denied. He represents him as misled by a Theory in what he dogmatically affirmed. But let us do justice to the Scottish Critic. He observes, whether consistently or not, that, "had Descartes and Locke expressed themselves on the subject of Innate Ideas and Principles with due precision, the latter would not so have misunderstood the former, and both would have been found in harmony with each other and with truth" (*Reid*, p. 785). But then with respect to "the question concerning the Origin of our Knowledge," Locke, it seems, "relied exclusively on Gassendi" (p. 784). He did not prepare himself for the discussion of that important question by studying "the writings of Aristotle, his Greek Commentators, and the Schoolmen" (p. 784). Otherwise, says Sir William Hamilton, "he would have seen that, in appealing to Common Sense or Intellect, he was, in fact, surrendering his thesis,—that all our Knowledge is an Educt from Experience" (p. 784).

But before charging Locke with having surrendered this thesis, Sir William Hamilton would have done well to have asked himself in what portion of Locke's writings this thesis is maintained.

That Locke holds all our knowledge to be grounded on Experience cannot be denied. Neither can it be denied that he holds that there are but two Modifications of Experience—Sensation and Reflection (II. i. 2), and that he represents Sensation and Reflection to be the two "Fountains of Knowledge" (II. i. 2), the two "Sources of Ideas" (II. i. 3), the only "Passages to the Understanding," whether of Ideas or of Knowledge (II. xi. 17). But here again we have the old masquerade of metaphor; and here again the question arises, what is the meaning which lies concealed beneath the mask?

Before, however, we can ascertain the functions which Sensation and Reflection discharge in the Philosophy of Locke, so dense is the obscurity in which that Philosophy is involved, that we must first ascertain what Locke understands by Sensation and Reflection. Of the word *Sensation* Locke gives a variety of definitions,—each of them, however, contemplating a different phasis of the question. As an Organic Affection, it is "such an impression or motion made in some part of the body as produces some perception in the Understanding" (II. i. 23). As a Mental Act, it is, "as it were, the actual entrance of any Idea into the Understanding by the Senses" (II. xix. 1). As a Primitive Capacity, it is that "Capacity of Human Intellect" whereby "the Mind is fitted to receive the Impressions made on it through the Senses by outward objects" (II. i. 24). Reid tells us that Locke's Sensation is

equivalent to Sensation Proper; his Editor tells us that it comprehends both Sensation Proper and Perception (*Reid*, pp. 208, 290, 317). But this controversy may be quickly settled. "Our Senses," says Locke, "conversant about particular Sensible Objects, do convey into the Mind several distinct Perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them; and thus we come by Ideas of all those which we call *Sensible Qualities*" (II. i. 3). Now what are the Sensible Qualities of Matter? "The power that is in any body, by reason of its insensible Primary Qualities, to operate, after a peculiar manner, on any of our Senses, and thereby produce in us the different Ideas of several Colours, Sounds, Smells, Tastes, &c., these," says Locke, "are usually called Sensible Qualities" (II. viii. 23). The Sensible Qualities of Matter, therefore, are the *Secondary* Qualities, and Locke's Sensation, consequently, is merely a Capacity recipient of Sensations.

But, according to Locke, when the Mind has once been furnished with Sensations, there are certain "Operations proceeding from Powers Intrinsical and Proper to itself," which it performs upon the Ideas thus supplied (II. i. 24); there is a "notice which the Mind takes of its own Operations, and the manner of them" (II. i. 4); and the "Capacity of Human Intellect," by which "the Mind is fitted to receive the Impressions made on it by its own Operations when it reflects upon them," Locke denominates "*Reflec-*

tion" (II. i. 24). As "the Understanding turning inwards upon itself, and making its own Operations the object of its own contemplation," it may be denominated "Reflection" (II. i. 8); as a mere "Capacity," recipient of nothing but the various Phenomena "obtruded" upon it from within, it may be denominated "Internal Sensation" (II. xi. 17), or "Internal Sense" (II. i. 4). Its objects are the various mental Operations, considered merely as *Operations*, and as distinguished at once from the Ideas operated upon, and from the Ideas developed in the Operation. Like the Empiric Consciousness of Kant, it is a "Capacity of receiving Representations through the mode in which the mind is affected by its own activity." Thus characterized by an utter absence of spontaneity, to use the Kantian term, it is with strict propriety referred to our Capacities of Sense. On this point there is even a verbal agreement between the English and the German Philosopher; and, as Locke designates Reflection by the name of "*Internal Sensation*," "*Internal Sense*," so Kant regards Consciousness as a "*Mode of Sensibility*," and names it "*der innere Sinn.*"*

But the Consciousness of Kant is not to be confounded with the Consciousness of Locke. Reid as-

* Obvious as this coincidence appears, it has been altogether overlooked by M. Cousin, whose whole criticism of Kant is vitiated by the oversight. Confounding the Consciousness which Kant regards as a Mode of Sensibility with the Consciousness which he himself considers as the Synonym of Reason, M. Cousin reduces Kant's System to a ruin of absurdity which rivals even the ruin

serts (p. 420), and Cousin re-echoes the assertion, that Locke has confounded Consciousness with Reflection, and "seems not to have been aware that they are different powers, and appear at different periods of life." Never was charge more gratuitously advanced. While Locke regards "Reflection" as a separate capacity restricted to the definite function which is implied in its very name (II. i. 4, 8), he regards "Consciousness" as the "essential" condition and "inseparable" concomitant of every modification of thought, whether Sensation, Reflection, or Understanding proper (II. xxvii. 9; II. i. 19). While he regards Consciousness as forced and inevitable, common to all, and coeval with even the first dim sensations of our ante-natal state (II. i. 25; II. ix. 5), "Ideas of Reflection," he tells us, "come later because they need attention; men seldom make any considerable reflection on what passes within them till they come to be of riper years; and some scarce ever at all" (II. i. 8). In fact, so far is Locke from meriting the censure of Reid upon this point, that the very passage in which Reid himself distinguishes between Consciousness and Reflection (p. 239) might have been borrowed, both meaning and meta-

to which he has reduced that of Locke. That Kant in one chapter should have regarded Consciousness as a Mode of Sensibility, and in another as one of the Primary Faculties in the service of the Understanding, M. Cousin pronounces to be a contradiction so flagrant, that it is marvellous it has never been exposed (*Kant*, p. 91).

phor from Locke (II. i. 7, 8), except, indeed, that Locke has avoided the absurdity into which Reid has suffered himself to be betrayed—that of regarding Consciousness as a specific faculty.

Equally erroneous is another statement of Reid's (p. 347) which has been reproduced by Stewart (*Diss.*, p. 229). It represents Locke as inconsistently identifying Reflection with the *a priori* Reason. "It is in this sense Locke uses it," says Mr. Stewart, "when he refers to Reflection, our Ideas of Cause and Effect, of Identity and Diversity, and of *all other Relations*." But where has Locke been guilty of such a reference? He regards our Relative Ideas, it is true, as developed in an operation of which Reflection may take cognizance, but he nowhere considers them as Ideas of Reflection. The recognition of these Ideas as Ideas of Reflection would, in fact, entail the distortion of his whole system. Reflection in that system is a mere mode of "Experience" (II. i. 2), an "Internal Sense" (II. i. 4), a "Capacity" recipient of nothing but mere Phenomena (II. i. 24), a source of those "Simple Ideas" from which our Ideas of Relation are expressly discriminated as "Complex" (II. xii. 1, 3). Add to this, Locke, as we shall see, expressly denies that Reflection is competent to give the Ideas in question. The Theory attributed to Locke by Mr. Stewart is in reality the Theory attributed by Sir William Hamilton to the "Subtle Doctor" (*Reid*, p. 777). The Theory of the Subtle Doctor, as Sir William Hamil-

ton perceived, has no existence in the work of Locke—Locke's Reflection is "merely a source of adventitious, empirical, or *a posteriori* knowledge" (p. 346).*

Such then are Sensation and Reflection, as conceived by Locke. Such are the two modifications of Experience, which he proclaims to be the Sources of all our Ideas, the Fountains of all our Knowledge. But what is the doctrine which lies latent beneath these metaphors? Sir William Hamilton will tell us that Locke adopts as the basis of his Philosophy "the twofold *Origin* of Knowledge" (*Disc.*, p. 272); and he will tell us right. But then it is to be noted that while by the term "Origin" Sir William Hamilton understands one thing, Locke understands another diametrically the reverse. The Intellectualist doctrine, as given by the Editor of Reid, is that "our Knowledge chronologically commences with Sense, but logically originates with Intellect" (p. 772); or—as some modern anti-Aristotelian has "incomparably enounced it"—"Cognitio nostra omnis a Mente primam *Originem*, a Sensibus *Exordium* habet primum" (*Ibid.*) But while Locke's opponents have thus em-

* Mr. Stewart's mistake is reproduced in the Article upon Locke which appeared in a recent Number of the "Edinburgh Review." Every attempt, indeed, which has hitherto been made to vindicate Locke's Philosophy on Intellectualist principles has proceeded upon this enlargement of the functions attributed to Reflection. Even Mr. Hallam, in his "History of the Literature of Europe," lends the weight of his authority to countenance the error of Mr. Stewart.

ployed the term "Origin" in the sense of Genesis or Logical Development, Locke unfortunately has employed the corresponding term "Original" in the exclusive sense of *Exordium* or *Chronological Condition.* No sooner has he announced his purpose to "inquire into the Original of Human Knowledge" than he forewarns the reader that it is merely a "*Historical* Method" he intends to pursue (I. i. 2); no sooner has he brought his inquiry to a conclusion, than he takes care to remind us that he has only given "a short and true History of the first *beginnings* of human knowledge, whence the Mind has its first objects" (II. xi. 15). If he tells us that Sensation and Reflection are "the only Originals of our Ideas," he tells us in the same breath that they are "the only Originals from whence all our Ideas take their *beginnings*" (II. i. 4). If he tells us that Sensation and Reflection are "the Original of all our Knowledge," he explains that they constitute "the *first* capacity of human Intellect"—that they enable us to take "the *first step* towards the discovery of anything"—that they supply "the *groundwork* whereon to build all those notions, which ever we shall have naturally in this world"—that "all those sublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their *rise and footing* there" (II. i. 24). In fine, when Locke states that Sensation and Reflection are "the Originals of all our Ideas," he merely states that "all our *Original* Ideas" are furnished by Sensation and Reflection

(II. i. 5; II. xxi. 73). Locke's theory of Sensation and Reflection is thus, as he himself intimates (II. i. 1), the mere counterpart and complement of his Polemic against Innate Ideas. In the first book of the Essay he shows that we have no Ideas anterior to Experience; in the second he shows the nature of that Experience, with which all cognition must commence.

But "at any rate," says Sir William Hamilton, "according to Locke, all our knowledge is a *Derivation* from Experience" (*Reid*, p. 294). Undoubtedly. At the very threshold of the second book Locke proclaims that "in Experience all our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself" (II. i. 2). But here again we have a criticism, which is truth to the ear and falsehood to the sense. Full of the Kantian distinction between "coming with" and "coming from" Experience, Sir William Hamilton has failed to observe that Locke employs the term "coming from" and its equivalents in the sense of "*coming with.*" Yet even the context of the passage which caused him to stumble thus ominously at the threshold of Locke's system, the very question which Locke is professedly answering, might have convinced him that he employs "derived from" merely as a rhetorical amplification of "*founded in.*" But Locke has not left us to mere inference in this matter. If by the inadvertent utterance of the wrong spell the magician has evoked a host of idola, he has himself furnished the counter-spell by which they

are to be exorcised. "Even the most abstruse Ideas," says Locke, "are derived from Sensation and Reflection." How? As being derived from Sensation and Reflection in Sir William Hamilton's sense of derivation? On the contrary, as "being no other than what the Mind by the ordinary use of its own Faculties *employed about* Ideas received from objects of Sense, or from the operations it observes in itself about them, may and does *attain to*" (II. xii. 8). "This," says Locke, "I shall endeavour to show in the Ideas we have of Time, Space, and Infinity, and some few others that seem the most remote from those Originals" (II. xii. 8). "A la bonne heure," exclaims M. Cousin, "ceci a un peu l'air d'un défi" (p. 100). Yet what is the utmost that Locke shows with respect to these Ideas? Nothing but what is shown by M. Cousin himself,—that they are "derived from" Sensation or Reflection, because Sensation or Reflection furnishes those Ideas "*without which*" they would never have been developed (II. xiv. 4),—that they are "received from" Sensation or Reflection, because, however remote they may seem from any objects of Sense, or operations of the Mind, they have their "*Original*," their Chronological Condition, "there" (II. xvii. 22),—that they "*terminate in* and are *conversant about* our Simple Ideas either of Sensation or Reflection," and are "*so* originally derived from" one or the other of those two Sources of our Knowledge (II. xxv. 9). In connexion with the Idea of Cause and Effect, Locke

explicitly raises the question, "*How* derived from the two Fountains of all our Knowledge" (II. xxv. 11), and his answer is, that "the notion of Cause and Effect *has its rise from* Ideas, received by Sensation or Reflection, and *terminates* at last *in* them" (II. xxvi. 2). What Locke says with respect to the Ideas of Substance must set this question for evermore at rest. "The general Idea of Substance," he says, "may be grounded on plain and evident Reason; and yet it will not follow from thence that it is not ultimately *grounded on* and *derived from* Ideas which come in by Sensation or Reflection" (II. ii. *Note*).

This drives the misapprehension of Locke's doctrine of Sensation and Reflection to its last retreat. According to Reid, "Dr. Price, in his 'Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals,' has observed, very justly, that if we take the words Sensation and Reflection, as Mr. Locke has defined them in the beginning of [the second book of] his excellent Essay, it will be impossible to derive some of the most important of our Ideas from them; and that, by our Understanding—that is, by our Judging and Reasoning Power—we are furnished with many Simple and Original Notions" (p. 347). The objection thus advanced by Price, and ratified by Reid, is acquiesced in by Sir William Hamilton, and is, perhaps, the simplest expression of the views which have influenced Locke's Intellectualist opponents from the time of Stillingfleet and Leibnitz to the

present. It proceeds, however, on a fundamental misconception of Locke's nomenclature and System. Locke, it is true, denies that the Understanding can fashion a single new Simple Idea It is the fundamental principle of his System, that "Simple Ideas, the Materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the Mind only by the two ways, Sensation and Reflection" (II. ii. 2). But what does Locke mean by "*Simple Ideas*"? "The better to understand the nature, manner, and extent of our knowledge," says Locke, "one thing is carefully to be observed concerning the Ideas we have; and that is, that some of them are Simple, and some Complex" (II. i. 2). Strange to say, it is under the head of Complex Ideas that Locke considers the Ideas which his opponents persist in denominating Simple. What, then, is the ground of this diversity of language? As Notions that are essentially uncompounded, our Intellectual Conceptions may certainly be regarded as Simple Elements of Thought; but as Notions that are developed *ex hypothesi* in an act of Judgment, they cannot possibly be regarded as Simple Apprehensions of Sense. In the Simple Apprehensions of Sense, moreover, the various Sensible Phenomena are given successive and unconnected; in the *a priori* Concepts of the Understanding, the Phenomena of Sense are viewed as connected by a variety of insensible relations. It is plain, therefore, that the Ideas referred to the Judging and Reasoning Power may be denominated either Simple or Complex,

according as the Philosopher regards their essence on the one side, or their genesis and relativity on the other. The point of view selected by Locke is easily determined. Locke has described Simple Ideas as "uncompounded appearances" (II. ii. 1), and his critics have inferred that he regarded all uncompounded Ideas as Simple. But the fact is, that, properly speaking, Locke's Simple Idea is merely an uncompounded appearance, a Phenomenon, of Sense (II. ii. 1). It is an Idea which the mind does not "make," but "*receive*" (II. xii. 1). It is an Idea "in the reception of which" the mind is purely recipient, and, therefore, "wholly" (II. xii. 1), or at least "for the most part" (II. i. 25) "*passive.*" It is an Idea "obtruded" upon Consciousness with no co-operation of Intellect beyond that involved in the "bare naked perception" (II. i. 25; II. ix. 1; II. xii. 1). It is an Idea which "we receive from corporeal objects by Sensation, and from the operations of our own minds as the objects of Reflection" (IV. iii. 23). In a word, it is a "*Sensible* Idea" (II. xxx. 2). When, therefore, Locke denies, as he does deny, that the Understanding can frame to itself a single new Simple Idea (II. ii. 2), the very context shows that he merely meant to assert, what he asserts more explicitly elsewhere,—that the Understanding "can have no other Ideas of *Sensible Qualities* than what come from without by the Senses, nor any Ideas of other kind of *Operations* of a thinking substance than what it finds in itself" (II. xii. 2). When he

proclaims that "all the Simple Ideas we have are confined to those we receive from Corporeal Objects by Sensation, and from the Operations of our own minds as the objects of Reflection" (IV. iii. 23), he merely proclaims, with Kant, that the Sensibility, External or Internal, is the only inlet of Intuition, the only modification of Experience. The assertion that all our Simple Ideas are furnished by Sensation and Reflection is, in reality, a mere definition of the term Simple Idea. The Simple Idea of Locke, in fine, would thus far seem to coincide with the Sensible Intuition of Kant, and we might as well charge Kant with ignoring the so called Intuitions of Intellect, because he restricts all Intuition to Sensibility, as charge Locke with ignoring the so-called Simple Ideas of the Understanding, because he recognises no Simple Ideas but those of Sensation and Reflection.

But if Simple Ideas be thus restricted to the Sensible Qualities of Matter and the Intro-Sensible Operations of Mind, how, it will be asked, are we to explain Locke's Classification of Simple Ideas? If Sensation be a Capacity recipient of nothing but Sensations, how can Locke enumerate our Ideas of the Primary Qualities of Matter among our "*Simple Ideas of Sensation*"? No Sense is receptive of anything but its appropriate object; how then can he speak of "*Simple Ideas of Divers Senses*"? If Reflection be merely a Capacity recipient of mental Operations, how can he reckon our Ideas of the mental Powers among our "*Simple Ideas of Reflection*"? No

object can be at once a Quality of Matter and an Operation of Mind; how then can Locke speak of "*Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection*"? The answer to these questions will place Locke's Philosophy in a new and unexpected light.*

* Locke, says M. Cousin, evidently confounds Reflection with Consciousness (p. 95). Locke, as we have seen, most carefully distinguishes between them. Locke, says M. Cousin, capriciously restricts the province of Reflection to the Mind. Locke is both etymologically and philosophically correct, for, as Bacon remarks, we behold the objects of Sense with a "direct" ray, the operations of Mind with a "reflex." Is it Sensation, or is it the operations of the Mind which first enter into exercise? M. Cousin asks. The question is absurd, for, according to Locke, Sensation is itself an operation of the Mind. Locke, says M. Cousin, places the acquisitions of Sense before the acquisitions of Reflection. How could there be an Idea of Mental Operation, before a Mental Operation had occurred? Locke's Perception, says M. Cousin, is equivalent to Consciousness. Consciousness, according to Locke, is the concomitant of all our Faculties, the equivalent of none. Locke's System, says M. Cousin, consists in deducing all our Ideas from Sensation and Reflection. In Locke's System our Ideas are not deduced from Sensation and Reflection,—they are derived. According to Locke, says M. Cousin, our Faculties add nothing to the data of Sense, but the knowledge of their own existence and mode of action. This, as we shall see, is absolutely and unequivocally false.

V.

THE GENESIS OF IDEAS.

THE Origin of Ideas, as understood by Locke, refers exclusively to the Chronological Conditions of the development of Thought, and is, therefore, consistently centred in Sensation and Reflection—the two modifications of human Experience. But in addition to the data of Sensation and Reflection there is a class of Ideas, which, in the opinion of a large School of Philosophers, owes its existence to the generative force of the Understanding, and is spontaneously developed from within. The Genesis of Ideas by the Understanding is thus correlative to the Origin of Ideas in Sensation and Reflection, and must be discussed by every Philosopher who proposes to give a complete solution of the great Ideologic problem.

The manner in which Reid accounted, not only for our Intellectual Concepts, but for our Intuitions of the Primary Qualities of Matter, was by a process of Simple Suggestion. "I beg leave to make use of the word *Suggestion*," he says," because I know not one more proper, to express a power of the mind, which seems entirely to have escaped the notice of Philo-

sophers, and to which we owe many of our Simple Notions which are neither Impressions nor Ideas, as well as many original Principles of Belief. I shall endeavour to illustrate, by an example, what I understand by this word. We all know that a certain kind of sound suggests immediately to the mind a coach passing in the street; and not only produces the imagination, but the belief that a coach is passing. Yet there is here no comparing of Ideas, no perception of agreements or disagreements, to produce this belief: nor is there the least similitude between the sound we hear and the coach we imagine and believe to be passing. It is true that this Suggestion is not natural and original; it is the result of experience and habit. But I think it appears, from what has been said, that there are Natural Suggestions; particularly, that Sensation suggests the notion of present Existence, and the belief that what we perceive or feel does now exist; that Memory suggests the notion of past Existence, and the belief that what we remember did exist in time past; and that our Sensations and Thoughts do also suggest the notion of a Mind, and the belief of its existence, and of its relation to our Thoughts. By a like natural principle it is that a Beginning of existence, or any Change in nature, suggests to us the notion of a Cause, and compels our belief of its existence. And, in like manner, as shall be shown when we come to the Sense of Touch, certain Sensations of Touch, by the

constitution of our nature, suggest to us Extension, Solidity, and Motion, which are nowise like to Sensations, although they have been hitherto confounded with them."

Such is the theory of Rational Suggestion as enounced by Reid. Dugald Stewart thinks it "remarkable that Dr. Reid should have thought it incumbent on him to apologize for introducing into Philosophy a word so familiar to every person conversant with Berkeley's works," though he admits that Reid's employment of the term is different from that of Berkeley (*Diss.*, p. 347). Sir William Hamilton, on the other hand, thinks that "Mr. Stewart might have adduced, perhaps, a higher and, certainly, a more proximate authority, in favour, not merely of the term in general, but of Reid's restricted employment of it as an intimation of what he and others have designated the Common Sense of Mankind;" and accordingly Sir William adduces a higher and more proximate authority in Tertullian (*Reid*, p. 111). But we need not go so far into the region of antiquity for "a singular anticipation both of the Philosophy and of the Philosophical Phraseology of Reid." The anticipation is to be found in the Essay concerning Human Understanding; a higher and more proximate authority is to be found in Locke.*

* Reid's principle of Rational Suggestion was anticipated not only by Locke, but by Locke's immediate predecessor, Cumberland. "Utrobique intelligimus propositiones quasdam immutabilis

The fundamental proposition of the second book of the Essay declares, as we have seen, that "Simple Ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are *suggested* and *furnished* to the Mind only by the two ways, Sensation and Reflection" (II. ii. 2). Nor is this a mere rhetorical distinction. When Locke tells us that "the Idea of Solidity we receive by our touch, and it *arises from* the Resistance which we find in body" (II. iv. 1), it is plain he regards Resistance as an Idea furnished by Sensation, and Solidity as an Idea suggested by Resistance. When he tells us that "the Idea of Extension *joins itself inseparably with* all Visible and most Tangible Qualities" (II. xiii. 25), it is plain he regards the Ideas of Visible and Tangible Qualities, as furnished by Sight and Touch, and the Idea of Extension, as suggested by the Ideas of which it is regarded as the necessary concomitant. So also, when Locke enumerates our

veritatis. Hujusmodi aliquot veritates a rerum hominumque naturâ mentibus humanis *necessario suggeri*, hoc est quod a nobis affirmatur, hoc idem ab adversariis non minus diserte denegatur" (*De Legg. Nat.*, c. I. s. i.) Berkeley employs the term in a similar sense, so also does Bishop Butler. As an English word, the term is at least as old as Shakspeare:—

> If good why do I yield to that *suggestion*
> Whose horrid image doth unfix my hair,
> And make my sealed heart knock at my ribs,
> Against the use of nature?

Bacon also employs it in his "Advancement of Learning:" "To procure the ready use of Knowledge there are two courses,—Preparation and *Suggestion*."

Ideas of the mental Powers among our simple Ideas of Reflection, it is evident that he regards the Idea of the Power as suggested to the Mind by the Idea of the Operation. But if we wish to see the full purport of the Lockian doctrine of Suggestion, we must examine with peculiar attention Locke's analysis of our "Simple Ideas of *both* Sensation and Reflection." As enumerated by Locke, these Simple Ideas are our Ideas of Pleasure and Pain, of Unity and Existence, of Power and Succession (II. vii. 1–9). The vices of this enumeration are obvious. Pleasure and Pain, by Locke's own definition, are mere Ideas of Reflection (II. i. 4), and, by the fundamental distinction of his system, Succession and Power are not Simple Ideas, but Ideas of Relation, and accordingly Complex (II. xxi. 3, II. xxiii. 7). But, pretermitting these vices of detail, let us examine into the principle involved. The Ideas in question are described as "Simple Ideas *suggested to the Understanding* by all the ways of Sensation and Reflection" (II. iii. 1). And how suggested? Suggested apparently, not by Sensation, but by Ideas of Sensation; not by Reflection, but by Ideas of Reflection. Delight and Uneasiness "*join themselves to*" (II. vii. 2), and are "*concomitant*" of (II. vii. 3), "almost all our Ideas both of Sensation and Reflection" (II. vii. 2); "Existence and Unity are two other Ideas that are *suggested to the Understanding* by every object without and every Idea within" (II. vii. 7); "Power is another of those Simple Ideas which we receive from

Sensation and Reflection" by a similar process (II. vii. 8); "Succession is another Idea which, though *suggested* by our Senses, yet is more constantly offered us by what passes within our own Minds" (II. vii. 9). Nor are these the only intimations of Locke's opinion on the subject. When discussing the Simple Modes of Space, he tells us that "there is not any object of Sensation or Reflection which does not *carry with* it the Idea of One" (II. xiii. 26); at the commencement of his chapter on Number he tells us that "every object our Senses are employed about, every Idea in our Understanding, every thought of our Mind, *brings this Idea along with it*" (II. xvi. 1); in his opening remarks on Infinity he tells us that "the obvious portions of Extension that affect our Senses," as well as "the ordinary periods of Succession," both "*carry with them* the Idea of the Finite" (II. xvii. 2).* Here, then, as it seems to me, we have the Understanding unequivocally recognised as a source of Simple Ideas. If certain Ideas be suggested by, they must be superadded to, the data of Sensation and Reflection; if they be suggested to, they must be superadded by, the faculty of Understanding. Consider now what

* Locke is more accurate than M. Cousin. "L'Idée de Fini," says that Philosopher, "vient aisément de la Sensation ou de la Réflexion" (p. 131). A similar remark is made with respect to the Idea of Succession. But though Phenomena are both finite and successive, they cannot be regarded *as* finite and successive by any mere capacities of Sense.

Locke tells us with regard to the genesis of our Ideas of Unity and Existence. "When Ideas are in our minds," he says, "we *consider* them as being actually there, as well as we consider things to be actually without us, which is that they exist or have existence; and whatever we can consider as one thing, whether a real being or an Idea, *suggests to the Understanding* the Idea of Unity" (II. vii. 7). These Ideas, therefore, according to Locke, are not only suggested to the Understanding, but they are suggested to the Understanding in an act of Judgment. Why, then, are they denominated Simple Ideas? Apparently because they are suggested to the Understanding in an act of Judgment that reposes on a single datum of Experience—a way of getting the notion of relations which, according to Reid and to Reid's echo, M. Cousin, "seems not to have occurred to Mr. Locke" (p. 420). Whether Locke was right in mixing up the Simple Ideas furnished by Sense with the Simple Ideas suggested to the Understanding—whether it would not have been better if Locke had restricted the term Simple Idea to the domain of Sense, and thus rendered it convertible with the Intuition of Kant—this is another question. The main fact bids defiance to dispute. The formula which proclaims that "Simple Ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the Mind by Sensation and Reflection," recognises, in addition to the recipient capacities of Sensation and Reflection, a spontaneous

faculty of Suggestion which belongs essentially to the Understanding—Reid and Locke are in reality at one.*

But even if we ignore the existence of the principle of Rational Suggestion, the Essay concerning Human Understanding is not a mere Essay concerning Sensation and Reflection—it contains a Theory of the Understanding proper. Ideas, as we have seen, are divided by Locke into Simple and Complex. Simple Ideas are the Ideas "suggested and furnished to the Mind by Sensation and Reflection" (II. ii. 2); Complex Ideas, on the other hand, are the Ideas "made by the Mind out of Simple ones, as the materials and foundations of the rest"

* Since writing the above, I have discovered an unexpected corroboration of the justice of my views on this portion of the subject, in the last edition of Mr. Hallam's "Introduction to the Literature of Europe." Struck with the peculiarity of Locke's expressions with respect to the simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection, Mr. Hallam regards them as a decisive proof "that Locke really admitted the Understanding to be so far the source of new Simple Ideas, that several of primary importance arise in our minds, on the *Suggestion* of the Senses, or of our observing the inward operations of our minds, which are not strictly to be classed themselves as Suggestions or acts of Consciousness (Vol. iv. p. 128). But Mr. Hallam's criticism is vitiated by the error of Mr. Stewart. Misled by Locke's reiterated assertion that Sensation and Reflection are the exclusive *sources* of our Ideas, he has identified the Understanding proper with Reflection. Of the functions of the Understanding in connexion with the genesis of Ideas of Relation—the central point of the Intellectualism of Locke—Mr. Hallam, like every critic with whose writings on the subject I am acquainted, is altogether silent.

(II. xii. 1). As distinguished from the Simple Idea, the Complex Idea is an Idea which the Mind does not "receive," but "*make*" (II. xii. 1). It is an Idea in the making of which the Mind exerts "*acts of its own*" (II. xii. 1), and manifests "*its own power*" (II. xii. 2). It is an Idea which the Mind frames by means of "operations proceeding from *powers intrinsical and proper to itself*" (II. i. 24). It is the Idea of the Intellect.

But here again the whole Chorus of Critics bursts forth into a symphony of objection. "The Complex Idea of Locke," says M. Cousin as its Coryphæus, "is a Compound Idea" (p. 201); "the Materials of which it is composed are the mere Ideas of Sensation and Reflection" (p. 98); Locke restricts the functions of the Understanding to the "mere combination of the scattered elements of Sense" (p. 201); he concedes to the Understanding the possession of "no originative virtue" (p. 99).* Let us examine into the justice of this charge.

That Locke holds "the Materials of all our Knowledge" to be suggested and furnished by "Sensation and Reflection" (II. ii. 2) cannot be denied. Neither can it be denied that he holds "the Understanding" to be impotent to create "the least particle of new Matter" (II. ii. 2). But here a question similar to those already asked immediately suggests itself,—what does Locke understand by the word

* M. Cousin's criticism is here, as elsewhere, a mere *réchauffé* of Reid's. Cf. *Reid*, pp. 346, 347.

Material? That Reid should have stumbled over the expressions that lie scattered at the threshold of the Essay was natural; but the expositor of Kant might have recollected when expounding Locke, that if in the Essay concerning Human Understanding it is Experience which supplies "the Materials of Thinking" (II. i. 2), it is Experience which, even in the Kritik of the Pure Reason, supplies the "Matter" as distinguished from the "Form" of Thought. If Locke asserts that we cannot have any Idea which does not "wholly consist" of Ideas of Sense (II. xii. 1), if he asserts that even our Ideas of Relation are "collections" of Simple Ideas" (II. xxxi. 14; II. xxv. 11), I need remind no Student of the German Philosophy that, even according to Kant, our Concepts without *Content* are vacuous abstractions, and that on the fundamental principles of the Transcendental Logic it is as necessary to make our Concepts *sensuous* as it is to make our Intuitions intellectual. The sense in which Locke employs the word "Material" is evident from the mere juxtaposition of the two propositions which constitute the Æsthetic of the Essay,—"Simple Ideas, the Materials of all our Knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the Mind only by the two ways, Sensation and Reflection" (II. ii. 2); "Ideas of Relation all terminate in and are concerned about those Simple Ideas, either of Sensation or Reflexion, which are the whole Materials of our Knowledge" (II. xxv. 9)—propositions which have their exact counterpart in the Kantian

doctrine that all our Intuitions are furnished by Sensibility, External or Internal, and that all Thought must, directly or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to Intuitions. That the Concepts of the Understanding exist only in relation to the Intuitions of Sense is, in fact, one of the cardinal doctrines of the Critical Philosophy. It is also the doctrine of the Essay concerning Human Understanding. "Our Moral Ideas," says Locke, "signify nothing if removed from all Simple Ideas quite" (II. xxviii. 8), and the remark is equally applicable to every other Concept. Regarded in this light, the Scholastic brocard which proclaims "nil in Intellectu quod non prius in Sensu" is rigorously true, and the "sublime limitation of Leibnitz,"* the "nisi Intellectus ipse," betokens an utter misapprehension of the question. If Phillis were to say to Amaryllis, "there is nothing in the cheese-vat which was not previously in the milk-pail," and Amaryllis were to add, "except the cheese-vat itself," the addition would be regarded as palpably unmeaning. The metaphor may be a coarse one, but it conveys a true idea. Every Concept must have its Content, and the Content of every Concept must be supplied exclusively by Sense. In the System of Locke, as also in the System of Kant, the Understanding superadds nothing to the data of Experience but the *Form* of Thought. The Waters well from the Fountains of Sensation and Reflection—the Understanding de-

* The expression of Madame de Stael.

termines the Channel in which they are to flow; the Materials are supplied rough from the quarry by our Capacities of Sense—the Understanding, as the Architectonic Faculty, supplies the Design of the edifice into which they are to be combined.

But does Locke admit that in the formation of our Complex Ideas the Understanding superadds the Form of Thought? "The acts of the Mind wherein it exerts its power over its Simple Ideas," according to Locke, are chiefly three, Combination, Comparison, and Abstraction (II. xii. 1), and "Complex Ideas," he thinks, may be all reduced under the threefold head of Modes, Substances, and Relations (II. xii. 3). Let us examine each of these heads, and we shall find that under each, Locke admits the existence of an *a priori* element of thought, and concedes to the Understanding the possession of an "originative virtue."

Take, for instance, the Forms of Sensibility which Locke considers under the head of Modes. The most important of our Sensible Ideas, as we have seen, are given as Simple Suggestions of the Understanding. But the intellectual process does not terminate in this. "The Mind," says Locke, "having once got the Idea of Solidity from the grosser Sensible bodies, traces it farther, and considers it as well as Figure in the minutest particle of matter that can exist, and finds it inseparably inherent in body, wherever or however modified" (II. iv. 1). All "the Primary Qualities," in fact, are "such as

Sense constantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the *Mind* finds inseparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself singly be perceived by the Senses" (II. viii. 9). In other words, the Natural Suggestion is elevated into a Necessary Concept by a subsequent act of Judgment, and so far is Locke from sensualizing the Intellect, as Kant complains, that he intellectualizes the Sensibility itself. It is the same with respect to *Space*. The Simple Idea of Space is suggested by our Ideas of Sight or Touch (II. xiii. 2); the Simple Mode of Space, as a Complex Idea, is the creature and invention of the Understanding (II. xii. 1); the Necessary Concept of Space is the product of an act of Judgment which proclaims it to be "plainly and sufficiently" distinguished "from Body, since its parts are inseparable, immovable, and without resistance to the motion of Body" (II. xiii. 14). But this is not all. According to Locke, "we are apt to think that Space, in itself, is actually boundless" (II. xvii. 4). How does he account for the genesis of this Idea of *Infinity?* In order to compass this Idea, he tells us, that, "at first step we usually make some very large Idea, as, perhaps, of millions of miles, which possibly we double and multiply several times" (II. xvii. 5); and this being effected, Locke detects a triple element of thought;—"the Idea of so much," which, he says, is "positive and clear,"—"the Idea of greater," which he describes as "comparative,"—and

thirdly, "the Idea of so much greater as cannot be comprehended," and this he says is "plain negative, not positive" (II. xvii. 1, 5). Now, whence this "Idea of greater" which Locke admits? Whence this "Idea of so much greater as cannot be comprehended"? These Ideas, it is evident, are neither data of Sensation, nor products of the mere compositive Energy of Thought. How then does Locke account for their appearance in the theatre of Consciousness? As "the obvious portions of Extension that affect our Senses *carry with them* the Idea of the Finite" (II. xvii. 2), so, he says, the "addition" of the units of Finite Space "*suggests* the Idea of Infinite, by a power we find we have of still increasing the sum, and adding more of the same kind, without coming one jot nearer to the end of such progression" (II. xvii. 13). But is this Idea of Infinity merely a Natural Suggestion? On the contrary, "wherever the Mind places itself by any thought, either amongst or remote from all bodies, it can in this uniform Idea of Space nowhere find any bounds, any end, and so must *necessarily* conclude it by the very nature and Idea of each part of it to be actually infinite" (II. xvii. 4). In other words, the Idea of Infinity is suggested to the Understanding by its experienced incompetence to reconcile, in the synthesis of Thought, the Idea of any given Finite Space with the Idea of an Absolute Termination. It is true that Locke denies that we have any Idea of the Infinite (II. xvii. 7, 8, &c.) But by Idea, in

this case, as in the parallel case of Substance, he merely means Sensible Idea, or Idea of Imagination. That he admits the necessary *Concept* is evident from his assertion of the necessary *existence*. It is true, also, that Locke defines Simple Modes to be "only variations, or different combinations of the same Simple Idea" (II. xii. 5). But Locke, in connexion with this very subject, protests against being bound down by any mere "scholastic" definitions; he "contents himself to employ the principal terms that he uses, so that from his use of them the reader may easily comprehend what he means by them" (II. xv. *Note*). Besides, he is speaking merely of the *Content* of the Idea. Locke's account of the Idea of Eternity, and of the Idea of the Infinite Divisibility of Matter, is identical with his account of the Idea of the Infinity of Space (II. xvii. 5, 12). In each of these cases the Mind finds it "impossible to find or suppose an end" (II. xvii. 4)—there is a "*supposed* endless progression of the Mind" (II. xvii. 7)—the Concept is a mere "negation" of the conceivable (II. xvii. 18). In the words of Bacon, whose doctrine upon this subject Locke has reproduced, these Ideas are "Idola ex motu inquieto Mentis," "Subtilitates ex impotentia Cogitationis" (*Nov. Org.* lib. I. aph. xlviii.) In the words of Sir William Hamilton, whose doctrine upon this subject Locke has anticipated, "the Infinite and the Absolute are only the names of two counter-imbecilities of the Human Mind, transmuted

into properties of the nature of Things, of two subjective negations converted into objective affirmations" (*Disc.* p. 21).*

In the Genesis of Simple Modes, therefore, Locke recognises a twofold Intellectual element—a compositive act of the Imagination, and a suggestion of Intellect occasioned by an innate impotence of thought. In the second of Locke's Categories the Intellectual element is equally conspicuous. Not only does Locke intellectualize Sense by referring to Intellect our Ideas of the Primary Qualities of Matter ;—he further intellectualizes it by referring even our Ideas of Sensible Objects to the synthetic energies and *a priori* Concepts of the Understanding. The Phenomena of Sense as given by Sensation and Reflection, are isolated and successive. Our "Ideas of Substances," on the other hand, are "Combinations of Simple Ideas taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves, in which the supposed or confused Idea of Substance, such as it is, is always the first and chief" (II. xii. 6). They are "Collections of Simple Ideas with a Supposition of something to which they belong, and in which

* I may add that, as far as Time and Space are concerned, Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of the Conditioned, and the arguments by which it is sustained, borrowed as they are from Kant, are anticipated by Locke (II. xvii. 12, 18, 20, 21). Much of the dispute on the subject of the Infinite seems to me to be verbal. Sir William Hamilton agrees that the Infinite exists; M. Cousin agrees that the Infinite cannot be realized in Imagination. The controversy turns upon the meaning of the word *Idea*.

they subsist" (II. xxiii. 37). Reid, it is true (p. 376), and Cousin after Reid (p. 201), charge Locke with having in this reversed the procedure of the Understanding in the acquisition of Ideas.* But in reality Locke agrees with both Reid and Cousin. He admits that "the qualities that affect our Senses are in the things themselves so united and blended that there is no separation, no distance between them" (II. ii. 1). All he asserts is that "the Ideas they produce in the Mind enter by the Senses simple and unmixed" (*Ibid.*), and that they are combined into the unity of Sensitive Perception by a higher energy than that of Sense. Locke's "power of composition" (II. xxiv. 2) is in fact the τὸ συνθετικόν of the Greek Intellectualists (*Reid*, p. 830). His doctrine is that enounced by Plato, and reproduced by Kant.† So far, however, Locke has only recognised the *compositive* energy of the Soul. But if, as Locke's critics assert, Locke restricts the functions of the Under-

* M. Cousin represents Locke as making the Understanding commence with "*Abstractions.*" His language leaves it doubtful whether by "Abstractions" M. Cousin meant abstract *simple* Ideas or abstract *general* Ideas. That the mind does not commence with abstract general Ideas, Locke has repeatedly asserted (IV. vii. 9; III. iii. 7; II. xi. 9; I. ii. 14). Indeed, he treats such a notion with the most unmitigated contempt (I. ii. 25). His words in that passage are almost identical with those of Berkeley (*Prin. Int.*, sect. xiv.), who, nevertheless, attributes to him the notion which he ridicules.

† Comp. Cic., *Tusc. Disp.*, i. 20:—"Quid, quod eadem Mente res dissimillimas comprehendimus, ut colorem, saporem, calorem, odorem sonum?"

standing to the mere "Combination" of the Data of Sense whence this "*Supposition*" of Substance which he superadds to the "*Collection*" of Simple Ideas, and considers as the chief ingredient in our complex Ideas of Substances? Kant defines a Noumenon to be a "Hypothesis of the Understanding," and here we find Locke employing the very phraseology of Kant. "He abandons his system," says Reid; "he surrenders his thesis," says Sir William Hamilton. But a great consecutive thinker does not so easily surrender thesis and abandon system. Let us examine what his system and his thesis are.

"Man's power and its way of operation," says Locke, "is much-what the same in the material and intellectual world. For the materials in both being such as he has no power over, either to make or destroy, all that man can do is either to unite them together, or to set them by one another, or wholly separate them" (II. xii. 1; II. ii. 2). Such is the declaration, which, of all others, would seem to be most fatal to the conclusion which I have undertaken to establish. But what are we to understand by the expression—"*Set them by one another*"? "The second act of the Mind," says Locke, "is bringing two Ideas, whether Simple or Complex, together, and setting them by one another, so as to take a view of them at once, *without uniting them into one*" (II. xii. 1), "*though still considered as distinct*" (II. xxv. 1). The Setting together of Ideas, therefore, it would seem, is not to be confounded with their "Combination." But Locke

goes further. "Every one's experience," he says, "will satisfy him that the mind, either by perceiving or supposing the agreement of any of its Ideas, does tacitly put them into a kind of proposition, which I have endeavoured to express by the term 'putting together'" (IV. v. 6). The Setting together of Ideas, therefore, is in reality an act of *Judgment*, or, to employ the peculiar phraseology of the Essay, an act of "*Comparison*." Mark now what follows. "Besides the Ideas, whether Simple or Complex, that the Mind has of things as they are in themselves, there are *others it gets from their Comparison* one with another" (II. xxv. 1; II. xii. 1; II. xi. 4). It appears, then, not only that the Understanding can "combine" the Data of Sensation and Reflection, but that it can "compare" them; not only that it can "compare" them, but that there is a new class of Ideas which it develops on the occasion of the Comparison. These are the Ideas which Locke variously designates *Relations*, *Relative Ideas*, and *Ideas of Relation*. Now, what are the Ideas which Locke comprehends under this Category of Relation? With that disregard to system which is the great blemish of the Essay considered as a work of Art, no sooner has Locke divided Ideas into Simple and Complex, than for "brevity's sake" and "in a looser sense" he regards the Relative Idea of Power as Simple (II. xxi. 3; II. xxiii. 7); no sooner has he divided Complex Ideas into Modes, Substances, and Relations, than he discusses the Relations of Space amongst

Modes (II. xiii. 5, 7, &c.), and the Relation of Substance among Substances (II. xxiii. 1–4). But when he comes to the official consideration of the subject, what are the Relations which he enumerates? The Relation of *Cause* and *Effect* (II. xxv. 11), the Relations of *Time* and *Space* (II. xxvi. 3, 5), the Relations of *Identity* and *Diversity* (II. xxvii. 1), the Relations of *Equality* and *Excess* (II. xxviii. 1), and lastly, the Relations of *Right* and *Wrong* (II. xxviii. 4),—the very Ideas enumerated by Price and Reid and Stewart as the Simple Ideas for which we are indebted to the Reasoning Power; the very Ideas comprehended by Kant under the Forms of Sensibility, the Categories of the Understanding, and the Revelations of the Practical Reason. Locke, it is true, does not designate these Ideas as Simple. On the contrary, he regards them as Complex. But why Complex? Complex, apparently, not because they are Compound, but because they are generated in a complex act of Comparison. "My Notion of Substance in general," says Locke, "is quite different from my Idea of Substances, and has *no such combination* of Simple Ideas in it;" it is "only a Supposition of we know not what" (II. xxiii. *Note A*). Simple in their Essence, therefore, our Ideas of Relation are Complex only in their Genesis. The nature of this Genesis Locke has repeatedly exemplified. "Because we cannot conceive how Sensible Qualities should subsist alone, nor one in another"—in other words, on comparing the Idea of a Sensible Quality

with "the Idea of Self-Subsistence" (IV. iii. *Note*)—"we *suppose* them existing in and supported by some common subject, which support we denote by the name 'Substance'" (II. xxiii. 4). "From the observation of the constant vicissitude of things"—in other words, from comparing the two terms in the Complex Idea of Change—"we *get* our Ideas of Cause and Effect" (II. xxvi. 1); "the Mind must *collect* a Power somewhere, able to make that Change, as well as a possibility in the thing itself to receive it" (II. xxi. 4). "Considering anything as existing at any determined time and place, we compare it with itself existing at another time, and *thereon form* the Ideas of Identity and Diversity" (II. xxvii. 1). All these Ideas are expressly described as "the creatures and inventions of the *Understanding*." The utmost that Locke claims for Sensation and Reflection in their genesis is that they all "*terminate in*, and are ultimately *founded on* the Simple Ideas we have got from Sensation and Reflection" (II. xxviii. 18);* in other words, that Sensation and Reflection supply the Content of the Concept and the chronological condition of its development. That the Idea is not *educed from*, but *superadded to*, the Data of Sensitive Experience, Locke most unequivocally asserts. "Relation," he says, "is *a Notion superinduced*" (II. xxv. 4)—"it is not contained in the real existence of things; it is *something extraneous and su-*

* Comp. II. xxv. 9; II. xxvi. 2, 6; II. xxviii. 1; II. xxviii. 14.

perinduced" (II. XXV. 8). Whether the Relations enumerated by Locke are all suggested to the Understanding on the comparison of two Ideas, or whether, like the Simple Ideas of Unity and Existence, some of them may not rather be regarded as suggested on the contemplation of one, is another matter.* Yet even the process and nomenclature of Locke is not without authority in the very highest Schools of Intellectualism. What, for instance, is the language of the British Plato? "That there are some Ideas of the Mind which were not stamped or imprinted upon it from sensible objects, and, therefore, must needs arise from the innate vigour and activity of the Mind itself, is evident in that there are many RELATIVE NOTIONS AND IDEAS, attributed as well to corporeal as incorporeal things that proceed wholly from the activity of the Mind COMPARING one thing with another;" and, accord-

* Thus it may be contended that the Idea of Self-Subsistence, which forms the second term in the comparison by which the Idea of Substance is suggested, is itself the Idea sought for. On other occasions, however, Locke expresses himself in a manner to which no exception can be taken. "All Simple Ideas, all Sensible Qualities," he says, "*carry with them* a Supposition of a Substratum to exist in, and of a Substance wherein they inhere" (II. xxiii. *Note B*). But though Substance may be suggested by the Sensible Quality, the Quality and the Substance, it must be remembered, are two different things, though mutually related. This constitutes a difference between the Idea of Substance and the Idea of Existence which justifies Locke in regarding them under different categories.

ingly, he proceeds to enumerate the very Ideas enumerated by Locke, commencing with the Idea which has since played so prominent a part in the history of Philosophy—the Idea of Causation. Quoted by Mr. Stewart to prove that Kant was anticipated in the fundamental principle of his Philosophy by Cudworth, this passage equally proves that Kant was anticipated in the fundamental principle of his Philosophy by Locke. But why have recourse to indirect argument? Kant himself reproduces the words of Locke, just as Locke reproduces the words of Cudworth. "How is it possible," he asks, "that the Faculty of Cognition should be awakened into exercise otherwise than by means of objects which affect our Senses, and partly of themselves produce Representations, partly rouse our powers of Understanding into activity to COMPARE, to connect, or to separate these, and so to convert the raw material of our Sensuous Impressions into a knowledge of objects which is called Experience?" And under what Category does the great Critic of the Reason arrange our Ideas of Substance and Causation, the most important of all our *a priori* Concepts? Under the Category of "RELATION."

Nor is this "seeing in Homer more than Homer saw." Against the assertion that "the materials of all our knowledge are suggested and furnished to the mind only by Sensation and Reflection," the Bishop of Worcester objected just as Sir William Hamilton objects. "If the Idea of Substance," he

said, "be grounded upon plain and evident *Reason*, then we must allow an Idea of Substance which comes not in by Sensation or Reflection." The reply of Locke is so conclusive as to the sense in which he himself interpreted his Philosophy, that I make no apology for quoting the passage *in extenso* :—

"These words of your Lordship's contain nothing that I see in them against me ; for I never said that the General Idea [or Concept] of Substance comes in by Sensation or Reflection, or that it is a Simple Idea [or Intuition] of Sensation or Reflection, though it be ultimately founded in them ; for it is a Complex Idea, made up of the General Idea of something, or being, with the Relation of a support to accidents. For General Ideas come not into the mind by *Sensation*, or *Reflection*, but are the creatures and inventions of the *Understanding*, as I think I have shown ; and also how the Mind makes them from Ideas which it has got by Sensation and Reflection ; and as to the Ideas of Relation, how the *Mind* forms them, and how they are derived from, and ultimately terminates in, Ideas of *Sensation* and *Reflection*, I have likewise shown" (II. ii. *Note*).

The words which Locke adds to "explain himself and clear his meaning in this matter" are still more decisive as to his recognition of the Understanding as a source of Ideas ulterior to Sensation and Reflection:—"All the Ideas [or Intuitions] of the Sensible Qualities of a cherry come into my mind by *Sensation ;* the Ideas [or Intuitions] of Perceiving, Think-

ing, Reasoning, Knowing, &c., come into my mind by *Reflection*. The Ideas of these Qualities and Actions or Powers are perceived by the *Mind* to be by themselves inconsistent with [the Idea of] Existence ; or, as your Lordship well expresses it, 'we find that we can have no true conception of any Modes or Accidents, but *we must conceive* a Substratum, or Subject, wherein they are ;' i. e., that they cannot exist or subsist of themselves. Hence the *Mind* perceives the *necessary connexion* with inherence, or being supported, which, being a Relative Idea, *superadded* to the red colour in a cherry, or to thinking in a man, the *Mind* frames the correlative Idea of a support. For I never denied that the *Mind* can frame to itself Ideas of Relation, but have showed the quite contrary in my chapters about Relations" (II. ii. *Note*).

Not a single element of the Kantian solution of the problem is wanting in this exposition of his views by Locke. Our Ideas of Relation are not educed from, but superadded to, our Ideas of Sensation and Reflection. They are superadded in an act of Judgment. They are characterized by a perception of necessary connexion. They are the creatures and inventions of the Understanding. They are Rational Ideas. "Your Lordship," says Locke, "calls it 'the *Rational Idea* of Substance ;' and says, 'I grant that by *Sensation* and *Reflection* we come to know the powers and properties of things ; but our *Reason* is satisfied there must be something beyond them, because it is impossible that they should subsist by

themselves:' so that if this be that which your Lordship means by 'the Rational Idea of Substance, I see nothing there is in it against what I have said"—What, then, is it that Locke professes to have said?—"that it is *founded on* Simple Ideas of Sensation or Reflection, and that it is a very *obscure* Idea:" obscure, as he has just before explained, because it is not given as an Intuition of Sense—obscure, because it is not an *Idea*, Ἰδεα, or Image (I. iv. 18)—obscure, because, in the very language of Kant, it is an "indetermined" Concept of the Understanding (II. ii. *Note*)—obscure, because it is "a supposition of we know not what" (II. xxiii. 2).*

Such is the exposition of Locke's doctrine of Relation, as given by Locke himself. "I never said that Ideas, such as that of Substance, come in by Sensation or Reflection—I never denied that the *Mind* could frame to itself Ideas of Relation—I have showed the quite contrary in my chapters about Relation"—such are the emphatic and reite-

* This is the answer to M. Cousin's criticism on Locke's employment of the term "Obscure" (p. 143). M. Cousin himself defines a Cause to be a "*je ne sais quoi* à la quelle vous rapportez la production du phénomène" (p. 151). Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of Substance is even verbally the same as Locke's. Substance, he says, "expresses a *Relation;*" it is "only *supposed* by a necessity of thought;" "even as a Relative it is *not positively known*" (*Disc.*, p. 644). Reid's doctrine is equally coincident. "Our notion of Body or Matter," he says, "as distinguished from its qualities, is a *Relative Notion;* and I am afraid it must always be *obscure* until men have other faculties" (p. 322).

rated terms in which he repudiates the Sensualism and the Empiricism with which his name has been so long and so universally identified. As he expressed his agreement with Lowde on the subject of Innate Ideas, so he expresses his agreement with Stillingfleet on the subject of the Genesis of our *a priori* Concepts. All that his opponents contend for he himself insists upon, and here again he has verified the declaration of his Epistle to the Reader ;—he and his opponents are at one when each comes to be rightly understood.

What, then, is the general result at which we have arrived? Locke "sees no reason to believe that the Soul thinks before the Senses have furnished it with Ideas to think on" (II. i. 20)—he conceives that "Ideas in the Understanding are coeval with Sensation" (II. i. 23). So far Condillac, Diderot, and Condorcet, are in the right. So far Locke places the Origin of Ideas in Sensation. So far he undoubtedly belongs to the School of *Sensualism*. Locke holds that "Simple Ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished by Sensation and Reflection" (II. ii. 2), and that "Complex Ideas are made by the Mind out of Simple ones, as the materials and foundations" which constitute at once their content and the condition of their development" (II. xii. 1). So far Kant, Cousin, and Sir William Hamilton are in the right. So far Locke places the Origin of Ideas in Sensation and Reflection. So far Locke is to be regarded as the Evangelist of *Empiricism*. But

among our Simple Ideas Locke enumerates certain *a priori* Concepts, which he describes as "suggested to the Understanding" by the isolated Data of Sensation and Reflection (II. vii. 1–9); among the Complex Ideas, which he professedly regards as "the creatures or inventions of the Understanding," he enumerates certain "Modes, which are "suggested" to the Understanding by an Impotence of Thought (II. xvii. 4, &c.); certain "Relations," "supposed," "superinduced," and "superadded," by the Understanding in an act of Comparison or Judgment (II. xxv–xxviii.) Here, then, we have a triple element of *Intellectualism.* Here we have the Understanding unequivocally recognised as a spontaneous energy and a generative force. And here Locke is to be identified neither with Sensualism nor Empiricism, but with that great School of Speculation which from Plato to Kant has proclaimed the *a priori* origin of our higher principles of thought.

We are now in a position to estimate the critical value of the work which Sir William Hamilton styles "the most important work on Locke since the 'Nouveaux Essais' of Leibnitz" (*Disc.*, p. 80). Confounding Locke's order of Exposition with his order of Thought, M. Cousin charges him with rushing prematurely into the question of the Origin of Ideas (p. 80); confounding Locke's views on the question of the Origin of Ideas with his own views on the question of their Genesis, M. Cousin charges him with assigning an Origin that is essentially

defective (p. 81). Ignoring the systematic discussions of the Essay, ignoring the very titles of the chapters of the second Book, M. Cousin next asserts that Locke precluded himself from the very possibility of a return to truth by the omission of the pre-eminently experimental question of "the Inventory of Ideas" (p. 84); and, lest a fictitious reason should be wanting for an imaginary fact, informs us that the experimental method was in its infancy in the time of Locke;—in its infancy at a time when every canon of that method had been laid down in the "De Augmentis" and the "Novum Organon," and when its proudest triumph had been already achieved in the "Principia" and the "Optics." Thus stumbling at the threshold of his criticism, it is no wonder that M. Cousin misconceives the whole purport of Locke's Philosophy. Misconceiving what Locke means by a Simple Idea, he regards the Complex Idea as essentially Compound. Not only does he ignore the Simple Ideas suggested to the Understanding by the isolated data of Sense, and the Simple Modes framed by the Understanding in consequence of an impotence of Thought—he ignores even the Ideas of Comparison developed in the Comparison of Ideas. He reiterates that according to Locke the Understanding can only "combine, compare, and abstract" the data of Sensation and Reflection, without pausing to inquire what is meant by the term "compare." In a word, he overlooks the fact that Locke regards the most important of

our *a priori* Concepts as Ideas of Relation, and that he enumerates Ideas of Relation among those Complex Ideas which, by the fundamental distinction of his system, are "the creatures or inventions of the Understanding" (II. ii. *Note*). Accordingly, M. Cousin imposes upon Locke the necessity of explaining the Genesis of these Concepts by Sensation and Reflection (p. 100),—a necessity which could only eventuate in the mutilation and distortion of the Concepts. To show that Locke actually mutilates and distorts these elements of Thought, M. Cousin mutilates and distorts the words of Locke. In elucidation of his Idea of "Place," Locke remarks that "to say the universe is somewhere, means no more than it does exist" (II. xiii. 10); M. Cousin, confounding "Place" with "Space," represents him as openly identifying "Space" with "Body" (pp. 103, 120). In his account of the chronological conditions of the development of the Idea of Time, Locke observes that "we have no *perception* of Duration but by considering the train of Ideas" in our Minds (II. xiv. 4); M. Cousin represents him as holding that "Time in itself is nothing but the Succession of Ideas" (p. 129). Locke tells us that it is "the endless addibility of number" that gives us "the clearest Idea of Infinity" (II. xvi. 8); M. Cousin represents him as reducing the Idea of the Infinite to that of some "determined number" (p. 134). Locke holds that "Personal Identity," as distinguished from Identity of Spiritual Substance,

consists in "Consciousness" (II. xxvii. 7, 9); M. Cousin represents him as holding that Consciousness constitutes the only Identity of which we are susceptible (p. 138). Locke holds that our Ideas of "Substances" are "collections of Simple Ideas, with a supposition of something in which they subsist" (II. xxiii. 37); M. Cousin represents him as "officially" resolving the Idea of "Substance" into "a collection of Simple Ideas" (p. 144). Locke states that "from the observation of the constant vicissitudes of things we get our Ideas of Cause and Effect" (II. xxv. 1; II. xxi. 1); M. Cousin represents him as holding that our Ideas of Cause and Effect are nothing but Ideas of Succession (p. 150). Locke holds that the measure of what is everywhere "called and esteemed" Virtue and Vice is Praise and Blame (II. xxviii. 10); M. Cousin represents him as holding that Virtue and Vice in themselves are merely matter of opinion (p. 198). But M. Cousin is Orator as well as Critic. Not only does he slay his enemy—he drags him in triumph at his chariot-wheels. With respect to the Idea of Space, it seems, Locke "contradicts himself from paragraph to paragraph" (p. 100); with reference to the Idea of Time he is guilty of "Confusion," "Paralogism," and "Extravagant Results" (p. 128); with reference to the Idea of Infinity, he "annihilates the belief of the human race" (p. 134); with reference to Personal Identity, he "puts an end to all moral responsibility, to all juridical action"

(p. 139) ; with reference to the Idea of Substance, he is "hurled headlong into Nihilism" (p. 146) ; with reference to the Ideas of Right and Wrong, he "denaturalizes and corrupts Virtue" (p. 198) ; with reference to Religion itself, he evokes Deity from the "Abyss of Paralogism" (p. 245), and "avoids Atheism only at the cost of an Inconsequence" (p. 376).

If any apology for these remarks on M. Cousin were required, it is supplied by the illustrious Historian of the Literature of Europe. Admiring, as I do, the genius of M. Cousin, I cannot but regret with Mr. Hallam, that he "had nothing so much at heart as to depreciate the glory of one whom Europe has long reckoned among the founders of Metaphysical Science." "The name of Locke," as Mr. Hallam observes, "is part of our literary inheritance, which, as Englishmen, we cannot sacrifice. If, indeed, the University at which he was educated cannot discover that he is, perhaps, her chief boast; if a declaimer from that quarter presumes to speak of 'the Sophist Locke,' we may console ourselves by recollecting how little influence such a local party is likely to obtain over the literary world. But the fame of M. Cousin is so conspicuous, that his prejudices readily become the prejudices of many, and his misrepresentations pass with many for unanswerable criticisms."

VI.

INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE.

A JUDGMENT of the Understanding, as we have seen, is presupposed in Locke's account of the Genesis of our *a priori* Concepts, whether regarded as Simple Ideas, as Simple Modes, or as Ideas of Relation. In the Genesis of our Ideas of Relation, especially, we have seen that Locke explicitly enounces the necessity of an act of Comparison, which, in his phraseology, is in reality an act of Judgment. Locke's Theory of Judgment, therefore, would seem the appropriate pendant of his Theory of Relation. But all General Knowledge, according to Locke, consists in the contemplation of General Abstract Ideas (IV. vi. 13), and the consideration of Abstraction and Generalization, therefore, is a necessary preliminary to the consideration of the Theory of Knowledge. Hence, the discussions contained in the third book of the Essay,—discussions which Locke tells us he did not originally contemplate (III. v. 16; III. ix. 21), and which, interposing as a huge parenthesis between his Theory of Knowledge and his Theory of the Genesis of Ideas, have hitherto pre-

vented these theories from being viewed in their natural correlation.

Into Locke's Theory of General Ideas I do not intend, in this place, to inquire. Those who feel an interest in the subject will find it discussed at the end of this Essay, in the Appendix upon Berkeley. Suffice it to state, that I regard the absurdity of Abstract Ideas as a mere chimera of the Critics, which has no existence in the Essay concerning Human Understanding; and that, in opposition to the views of the Scottish School, I hold Locke to have been a moderate Nominalist. This being premised, I make no apology for omitting the consideration of what Mr. Mill justly denominates "that immortal third book of Locke,"—and pass forthwith to the consideration of Locke's Theory of Knowledge.

"Knowledge," says Locke, "seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repugnancy, of any of our Ideas" (IV. i. 2): a statement which has been vehemently impugned, but which in reality merely amounts to the self-evident assertion that in every proposition there must be a Subject and a Predicate, and that in every intelligible proposition the Subject and the Predicate must stand for definite Ideas. But how is this synthesis of Thought effected? On what grounds are we justified in asserting the connexions which exist among Ideas? According to the Philosopher of Kœnigsberg, we may either

have recourse to Experience, and discover that two Ideas are actually connected in point of fact—as in the Judgment which asserts that all Body is endued with Weight; or we may have recourse to Reason, and discover that two Ideas are absolutely connected by a necessity of thought, as in the Judgment which asserts that every Change must have some efficient Cause. This distinction, if we are to believe Sir William Hamilton, has no existence in the theory of Locke. "In Locke's Philosophy all our Knowledge is a Derivation from Experience" (*Reid*, p. 294); "he endeavours to show that Intuitive truths are all Generalizations from Experience" (p. 465); he maintains the "thesis that all our knowledge is an Educt from Experience" (p. 784); he "dogmatically" asserts that it is to "Experience" we are indebted even for the truths of Geometry itself (*Disc.*, p. 272). Once more from Locke's critic let us appeal to Locke.

"In some of our Ideas," says Locke, "there are certain Relations, Habitudes, and Connexions so visibly included in the nature of the Ideas themselves that we *cannot conceive* them separable from them by any power whatsoever; and in these only we are capable of *Certain and Universal Knowledge*" (IV. iii. 29). Now what is the knowledge with which this is deliberately contrasted? "The things," says Locke, "that, as far as our Observation reaches, we *constantly find* to proceed regularly, we may conclude do act by a law set them, but yet by a law that we know

not; whereby, though causes work steadily, and effects constantly flow from them, yet their connexions and dependencies being not discoverable in our Ideas, we can have but an *Experimental Knowledge* of them" (*Ibid.*) The distinction between Rational and Empiric Knowledge is here laid down with Kantian precision; but the following passage is, if possible, more striking still. "We must, therefore, if we will proceed as reason advises, adapt our methods of inquiry to the nature of the Ideas we examine, and the Truth we search after. General and certain Truths are only founded in the Habitudes and Relations of Abstract Ideas. A sagacious and methodical application of our thoughts for the finding out these Relations is the only way to discover all that can be put with truth and certainty concerning them into general propositions .... What then are we to do for the improvement of our knowledge in substantial beings? Here we are to take a quite contrary course. The want of the Ideas of their real essences sends us from our own Thoughts to the Things themselves as they exist. EXPERIENCE here must teach us what REASON cannot; and it is by trying alone that I can certainly know what other qualities coexist with those of my Complex Idea" (IV. xii. 7, 9).

But not only did Locke thus anticipate Kant in the recognition of the distinction between Rational and Empiric knowledge—he also anticipates him in the recognition of the Criterion by which they are to be distinguished.

The Criterion of Necessity, as we have already seen, is explicitly recognised in connexion with the Genesis of our Ideas of Relation. But in the fourth Book the recognition of the Criterion recurs at every step. To elucidate the distinction between what we learn from "Experience" and what we learn from "Reason," between what we must ascertain from "Things," and what we may ascertain by "Thought," Locke takes the Synthetic *a posteriori* Judgment, "Gold is malleable." This he pronounces to be an "Experimental Truth"—and why? "The *necessity* or inconsistence of malleability," he says, "hath no visible connexion with the combination of qualities which make up the other constituents of gold" (IV. xii. 9). To quote all the passages in which similar statements occur would be as tedious as it would be useless. In one single paragraph Locke tells us, with every variety of expression, that what distinguishes Experimental from Universal knowledge is the absence of "necessary connexion," of "necessary coexistence," of "necessary dependence and visible connexion," of "evident dependence or necessary connexion," of "the necessary connexion of the Ideas themselves" (IV. iii. 14). Yet what is the statement of Sir William Hamilton? "Reid, and to his honour be it spoken," says Sir William Hamilton, "stands alone among the Philosophers of this country in his appreciation and employment of the Criterion of Necessity" (*Reid*, p. 753).*

* Previously to Locke the Criterion of Necessity had been

Once more, however, let us listen to Sir William Hamilton. "No subject, perhaps, in modern speculation," he says, "has excited an intenser interest, or more vehement controversy than, Kant's famous distinction of *Analytic* and *Synthetic* Judgments *a priori*. The interest in this distinction was naturally extended to its history. The records of past Philosophy were ransacked, and for a moment it was thought that the Prussian Sage had been forestalled in the very groundwork of his system by the Megaric Stilpo. But the originality (I say nothing of the truth) of Kant's distinction still stands untouched. The originality of its author, a very different question, was always above any reasonable doubt. Kant himself is disposed indeed to allow that Locke (IV. iii. 9, sq.) had, perhaps, a glimpse of the discrimination; but, looking to the places referred to, this seems on the part of Kant an almost gratuitous concession. Locke, in fact, came nearer to it in another passage (I. ii. 19, 20); but there, although the examples on which the distinction could have been established are stated, and even stated in contrast, the principle was not apprehended, and the distinction consequently [was] permitted to escape" (*Reid*, p. 787).

Now, in opposition to Sir William Hamilton, I

enounced by Cumberland. "Cavendum, præcipuè cum de primis seu universalissimis veritatibus meditamur, ne ulli propositioni assentiamur absque summâ et *ineluctabili Necessitate*" (*De Legg. Nat.*, cap. II. sect. ix.) The reader will not have forgotten the "*necessario suggeri*" to which attention has already been directed.

maintain that the principle of the Kantian distinction *was* apprehended by Locke, and that the distinction was *not* permitted to escape. The Kantian distinction cannot be better expressed than in the words of Kant. "In all Judgments wherein the relation of a subject to a predicate is cogitated," says the Intellectual Critic, "this relation is possible in two different ways. Either the predicate B belongs to the subject A, as something which is contained (though covertly) in the conception A; or the predicate B lies completely out of the conception A, although it stands in connexion with it. In the first instance I term the Judgment Analytical, in the second, Synthetical. Analytical Judgments are, therefore, those in which the connexion of the predicate with the subject is cogitated through Identity; those in which this connexion is cogitated without Identity are called Synthetical. The former may be called Explicative, the latter Augmentative Judgments: for the former in the predicate add nothing to the conception of the subject, but only analyze it into its constituent conceptions; the latter add to our conception of the subject a predicate which is not contained in it, and which no analysis could ever have discovered therein." Such is the Kantian distinction as enounced by Kant. Such also, I contend, is the Kantian distinction as anticipated by Locke.

"To understand a little better wherein the agreement or disagreement of our Ideas consists, I think,"

says Locke, "we may reduce it all to these four sorts,"—Identity, Relation, Coexistence, and Real Existence (IV. i. 3). If we wish for an exemplification of these distinctions, Locke supplies it:—"'Blue is not Yellow,' is of Identity; 'Two triangles upon equal bases between two parallels are equal,' is of Relation; 'Iron is susceptible of magnetical impressions,' is of Coexistence; 'God is,' is of Real Existence" (IV. i. 7). That the examples on which the Kantian distinction can be founded are here stated is evident,—an assertion that can scarcely be made in connexion with the passage referred to by Sir William Hamilton (I. ii. 19. 20). "Real Existence" being discounted as belonging to the domain of Ontology, "Coexistence" corresponds to the Synthetic *a posteriori* Judgment of Kant, "Identity" and "Relation" to his Analytic and Synthetic *a priori*. Nor can it be maintained that Locke merely stated the examples. Not only is the distinction the fundamental distinction of his theory of Knowledge, but the terms in which he justifies it show that he was aware of its import in all its fulness.—"Though Identity and Coexistence," he says, "are truly nothing but Relations, yet they are so peculiar ways of agreement or disagreement of our Ideas," they are "so different grounds of affirmation and negation," that "they deserve well to be considered as distinct heads, and not under Relation in general" (IV. i. 7),—"as will easily appear," he adds, "to any one who will but reflect on what is said in

several places of this Essay" (IV. i. 7). Now what is it that is said in several places of this Essay? What is said with reference to our Judgments of Coexistence, as distinguished from those of Identity and Relation, we have already seen; and, if we were to quote every passage in which the distinction between "Universal" and "Experimental" knowledge is recognised, we might quote half the fourth book of the Essay. But what is it that is said by Locke of the Judgments of Identity, and the Judgments of Relation, as distinguished from each other? "We can know the truth of *two sorts of propositions* with perfect certainty," says Locke; "the one is of those trifling propositions which have a certainty in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not instructive; and, secondly, we can know the truth, and so may be certain, in propositions which affirm something of another which is a *necessary consequence* of its precise Complex Idea, *but not contained in it;* this is a real truth, and conveys with it instructive real knowledge" (IV. viii. 8). What has Kant added to the distinction thus enounced by Locke? Absolutely nothing. The very language of the two Philosophers is one. The summary of the Kantian account of our *Analytic Judgments* is that they are Intuitive Truths, arrived at by the analysis of a single Idea, conveying no new knowledge, but at once indispensable and unproductive. What is the summary of the Lockian account of *Axioms* or *Maxims?* "The evidence of all these Maxims consists in that

Intuitive Knowledge which is certain beyond all doubt, and needs no probation, nor can have any" (IV. xvii. 14; IV. vii. 19; IV. vii. 2); "their certainty is founded only upon the knowledge we have of each Idea by itself, and of its distinction from all others" (IV. vii. 14); they are "truths, self-evident truths, and so cannot be laid aside" (IV. vii. 14); they are "universal propositions, which, though they be certainly true, yet they add no light to our understandings, bring no increase to our knowledge" (IV. viii. 1). To illustrate the futility of attempting to increase our knowledge by means of Axioms, Locke describes a monkey shifting an oyster from one paw to the other, and fancying the oyster to be multiplied by the process. This rouses the ire of M. Cousin. "It is not exact," he says, "it is not fair, to concentrate all Axioms, all Principles, all Primitive and Necessary Truths, in the Axiom, 'what is, is,' 'the same is the same' —aux exemples vains et bouffons de Locke j' oppose les exemples, les Axiomes suivants" (p. 320); and M. Cousin opposes the Principle of Substance and the like. Here again we have the reproduction of an old error; what can we do but reproduce the old reply?—"If those who blame my calling them Trifling Propositions," says Locke, "had but read and been at the pains to understand what I had above writ down in very plain English, they could not but have seen that by '*Identical Propositions*' I mean only such wherein the same Term importing

the same Idea is affirmed of itself" (IV. viii. 3). In other words, while Locke restricts the term Axiom to our Intuitive Judgments of Identity and Analysis, M. Cousin, like Sir William Hamilton and Reid, understands him as applying it to our Intuitive Judgments in general.* Locke's examples of *Synthetic a priori* Judgments, it is true, are mostly taken from Geometrical Science; but he has not left us in doubt as to his views on the Principles of Metaphysics and of Morals. The Principle of Substance, as we have already seen, he recognises as a Rational Principle, with every variety of expression, and every concomitant of emphasis.† The Principle of Causation and Final Causes he expressly designates—"Principles of Common Reason" (I. iv. 10), and describes them as portions of our "Intuitive Knowledge" (IV. x. 1, 3, 4, *et seq.*).

* M. Cousin has charged Locke with extending his proscription of Identical Propositions to Propositions which are not Identical, as, for instance, in the case of—"all Gold is fusible." "So far is this from being an Identical Proposition," says M. Cousin, "that the man who first enounced it enounced a great Physical discovery; it can only be regarded as Identical when the notion of fusibility has become a part of the ordinary connotation of the word Gold." This is precisely the view of Locke himself:—"I see not how it is any jot more material to say 'Gold is fusible' [than to say 'Gold is yellow'], unless that quality be left out of the Complex Idea of which the sound 'Gold' is the mark in ordinary speech. What instruction can it carry with it, to tell one that which he hath been told already, or he is supposed to know before" (IV. viii. 5).

† II. ii. *Note;* II. xxiii. 1, 4, *Notes* A and B; IV. iii. *Note.*

He proclaims the Principles of Morality to be "Self-evident Propositions" (IV. iii. 18), and numbers them among those "Relations, Habitudes, and Connexions, so visibly included in the nature of the Ideas themselves, that we cannot conceive them separable from them by any power whatsoever" (IV. iii. 29). And under what category does Locke rank these Principles? If we ignored every intimation of the fourth Book, the very titles of the chapters of the second would tell us it is under the category of *Relation*. Does Locke regard *these* Principles as unproductive? On the contrary, it is by means of these principles we make the "endless discoveries" of Mathematics (IV. iii. 18; IV. xii. 7). It is by means of these that Moral Science may be invested with the progressive and demonstrative character of Mathematical (IV. iii. 18, 20). It is by means of these that we arrive at the "discovery" of a God (I. iv. 9, 17; IV. x. 1).

The mention of Mathematical Science suggests another misrepresentation of Sir William Hamilton, which it may be well to consider—the more so, as the consideration will place the Intellectual character of Locke's Philosophy in the strongest light. In illustration of the principle that the Mathematician is better fitted than the Metaphysician to perceive the difference between Necessary Truths and Truths that are furnished by Experience, Dr. Whewell refers to the case of Hume as holding that Geometri-

cal Truths themselves are only ascertained by Experience. Indignant at this "inculpation of the Metaphysicians," Sir William Hamilton asks, "why was *Locke* not mentioned in the place of Hume?" "If Hume did advance such a doctrine," he says, "he only sceptically took up what Locke dogmatically laid down. But in regard to Hume, Mr. Whewell is wholly wrong. So far is this philosopher from holding 'that Geometrical Truths are learnt by Experience,' that, while rating Mathematical Science as a study at a very low account, he was all too acute to countenance so crude an opinion in regard to its foundation, and, in fact, is celebrated for maintaining one precisely the reverse. On this point Hume was neither Sensualist nor Sceptic; but deserted Ænesidemus and Locke to encamp with Descartes and Leibnitz" (*Disc.*, p. 272). In this passage everything is incorrect. In the first place Sir William Hamilton neglects to tell us that, although Hume in his "Essays" admitted the *a priori* origin of Geometrical Science, in his "Treatise of Human Nature" he held even in its most paradoxical form the opinion attributed to him by Dr. Whewell. In the second place, in asserting that Hume merely sceptically took up what Locke dogmatically laid down, Sir Wm. Hamilton misrepresents the scope of the scepticism of Hume, which, as we shall see, was essentially dogmatic. But in the third place, granting that Dr. Whewell was wholly in the wrong with regard to Hume, Sir William

Hamilton is wholly in the wrong with regard to Locke. So far is Locke from regarding Geometrical Science as an educt from Experience, that he regards it as a product of pure Intellect. "The Mathematician," says Locke, "considers the truth and properties belonging to a rectangle or a circle only as they are in Idea in his own Mind. For it is possible he never found either of them existing mathematically, i. e., precisely true, in his life" (IV. iv. 6). "Real things," he says, "are no farther concerned, nor intended to be meant by any such propositions, than as things really agree to these Archetypes in his Mind" (*Ibid.*) "Intending things no farther than they agree with those his Ideas," he continues, "he is sure what he knows concerning those Figures when they have barely an Ideal Existence in the Mind will hold true of them also when they have a Real Existence in Matter" (*Ibid.*) These are the systematic declarations of the Essay. Like all other Abstract Ideas, our Ideas of Geometrical Figure, according to Locke are, "the creatures and inventions of the Understanding" (III. iii. 11). Like all other General Truths, Geometrical Propositions are discovered exclusively by "the contemplation of our own Abstract Ideas" (IV. vi. 16). The very example given to illustrate the nature of "Certain and Universal," as distinguished from "Experimental," Knowledge, is taken from Mathematical Science (IV. iii. 29). Accordingly, Locke tells us that our Mathematical Ideas are "Ingenerable and Incorruptible" (III. iii. 19); and

that Mathematical Propositions, as expressive of Immutable Relations, are "Eternal Truths" (IV. xi. 14). In other words, Locke adopts the very phraseology of the School of Plato—and Sir William Hamilton boldly identifies him with the School of Epicurus.*

One thing more, and the confutation of Sir William Hamilton's criticism is complete. Among the charges preferred against Locke by Stillingfleet was that of "affecting the honour of an original." "But," says Locke, "how little I affect the honour of an original may be seen in that place of my book where,

* I may add that Locke gives in his adhesion to the doctrine maintained by Stewart,—that the Principles of Mathematical discovery are not the Axioms, but the Definitions, or, as Locke would call them, the Abstract Ideas. "It is evident," he says, "that it was not the influence of these Maxims which are taken for Principles in Mathematics, that hath led the Masters of that Science into those wonderful discoveries they have made" (IV. xii. 15.) In connexion with this subject of Geometrical Figure I cannot resist quoting a curious remark of Mr. Hallam: —"On the supposition of the Objectivity of Space, as truly existing without us, which Locke undoubtedly assumes, it is certain that the passage just quoted (IV. iv. 6) is entirely erroneous, and that it involves a confusion between Geometrical Figure itself and its delineation to the eye. A Geometrical Figure is a portion of Space contained in boundaries, determined by given Relations. It exists in the Infinite round about us, as the Statue exists in the block . . . . The expression, therefore, of Locke, 'whether there be any Square or Circle existing in the world or no,' is highly inaccurate, the latter alternative being an absurdity" (*Lit. Hist.* iv. 133–4). I doubt whether this criticism be just. It is the 'delineation to the eye' that is exclusively contemplated by Locke (III. iii. 19).

if anywhere, that itch of vain-glory was likeliest to have shown itself, had I been so overrun with it as to need a cure." Now, where is it that Locke affects the honour of an original?—for there, if anywhere, we are likely to find the key to the interpretation of his system. Locke tells us it is where he speaks of *Certainty*. "I think," he says, "I have shown wherein it is that Certainty, real Certainty, consists" (I. i. *Note*). In what, then, does Certainty, real Certainty, consist, according to Locke? Doubtless in the Revelations of Sense, as might be expected from "The Sensualism of Locke"—doubtless in the Dictates of Experience, as might be expected from "Locke's Empiricism." So says Sir William Hamilton (*Reid*, pp. 207, 294, 465, 784). But what says Locke? "Sensitive knowledge," says the Sensualist, "reaches no further than the existence of things present to the Senses" (IV. iii. 5)—"Experimental knowledge," says the Empiric, "reaches no farther than the bare instance" (IV. 6, 7). In what, then, does Certainty, real Certainty, consist? Locke tells us. He tells us that "the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge" depends on the "bright sunshine" of "*Intuition*" (IV. ii. 1). He tells us that "the only true way of certain and universal knowledge" is "*by our Ideas*" and "the perception of their *necessary connexions*" (IV. iii. 14). He tells us that "the foundation of all knowledge and certainty" is to be found in that "*Intuitive knowledge*" which "neither requires nor admits proof" (IV. vii. 19; IV. xvii. 14).

He tells us that "as to all general knowledge, we must search and find it only in *our own Minds* (IV. iii. 31). He tells us that "general certainty is never to be found but in our *Ideas*" (IV. vi. 16). In short, he "founds Knowledge on Belief, the objective certainty of Science on the subjective necessity of Believing," and the doctrine of "Aristotle, his Greek commentators, and the Schoolmen," is thus enounced by the Philosopher who is said to have relied exclusively on the authority of "Gassendi" (*Reid*, pp. 771, 784). What, then, is the real position in which, at the close of this discussion, Sir William Hamilton stands to Locke? Locke centres the whole originality of his Philosophy in its development of scientific knowledge from Intuition; and Sir William Hamilton represents him as maintaining the thesis that all our knowledge is an educt from Experience! Well might Locke exclaim to Stillingfleet—"Truly, my Lord, my book hath most unlucky stars!"

The manner in which Sir William Hamilton closes his vindication of Reid against Brown is well known. "On all this," he says, "no observation of ours can be either so apposite or authoritative as the edifying reflections with which Dr. Brown himself concludes his vindication of the Philosophers against Reid. Brown's precept is sound, but his example is instructive. One word we leave a blank, which the reader may himself supply. That a mind *so vigorous as that of Dr.* —— *should have been ca-*

pable of the series of misconceptions which we have traced may seem wonderful, and truly is so; and equally, or rather still more wonderful, is the general admission of his merit in this respect. I trust it will impress you with one important lesson—*to consult the opinions of authors in their own works, and not in the works of those who profess to give a faithful account of them*"—(*Disc.*, p. 82).

Quam temere in nosmet legem sancimus iniquam!

The blank supplied by Brown with the name of Reid, and by Sir William Hamilton with the name of Brown, may, with respect to Locke, be supplied with the name of Sir William Hamilton himself. That Sir William Hamilton was a great philosophical genius, I admit. I acknowledge the powerful stimulus he has communicated to the spirit of Philosophy, which in this country had so long lain dormant, and to all appearance dead. The editor of Reid, the expositor of Kant, the critic of M. Cousin, above all, the author of that invaluable Analysis of the various Theories of Perception which constitutes his great contribution to the stores of Philosophy, Sir William Hamilton stands without a rival, the philosophic glory of an unphilosophic age. I do all homage to his memory. But a great Philosophical Thinker is not necessarily a patient and impartial Philosophical Critic. To the just appreciation of an alien system a certain passivity of intellect is required. A strong current of original thought pre-

vents the mind from being an equal mirror to the thoughts of others. The standing pool reflects the forest and the sky more faithfully than the running stream ; and it is possible to be a more faithful critic than a great man—not because one is a greater man, but because one is a less.

VII.

REAL EXISTENCE.

At the opening of the second book of the Essay concerning Human Understanding, Locke proclaims that "in *Experience* all our Knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately derives itself" (II. i. 2). At the opening of the fourth he proclaims that "it is on *Intuition* that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our Knowledge" (IV. ii. 1). Viewed in a spirit of antagonism, these two propositions present the appearance of an irreconcilable contradiction,—viewed in a conciliating spirit, which is, after all, the true spirit of criticism, they are found to correspond to the declaration of Sir William Hamilton, that "our Knowledge *chronologically* commences with Sense, but *logically* originates with Intellect."

To complete our analysis of Locke's Theory of Knowledge one point still remains to be considered —his doctrine of *Real Existence.* It is on this point that the doctrine of the Essay is especially impugned by M. Cousin. Locke, as we have seen, resolves all knowledge into a perception of the "conformity" or "difformity" of Ideas. This Theory M. Cousin at-

tacks from every side. What, for instance, he says, are the *Conditions of Conformity?* (p. 225). All Conformity, it seems, supposes Representation,—all Representation implies Resemblance,—all Resemblance involves an Image,—there can be no Image without Figure,—and Figure is one of the Primary Qualities of Matter. Locke's Idea, therefore, says M. Cousin, is a "Material Idea-Image" (p. 226),—a doctrine which, considered in relation to the "Object" of Knowledge, eventuates in "Nihilism" (p. 245), which, considered in relation to the "Subject" of Knowledge, entails "Materialism" (p. 251), and which, considered in relation to the Act of knowing, involves a Pleonasm if we possess the Original, and a Parologism if we possess it not (p. 261). But the chain of M. Cousin gives way at every link. In the first place, Locke's Conformity does not always imply Representation, for in Scientific Knowledge Conformity is nothing but "necessary connexion" (IV. iii. 14). In the second place, Locke's Representation does not always involve Resemblance, for in the case of the Secondary Qualities, our Ideas are merely the "constant effect" of an unresembling power (II. xxx. 2). In the third place, Locke's Resemblance does not entail the Idea-Image, for even in the case of the Primary Qualities of Matter the "exact resemblance" of the Idea is a mere assertion of the "real existence" of its object (II. viii. 15, 17, 23). The Idea-Image is thus a mere chimera of M. Cousin. Locke's Nihilism and Materialism, his Paralogism and Pleonasm,

die with the chimera that gave them birth. Nor is M. Cousin more fortunate when he assails Locke's Theory of Knowledge with respect to the "*Conditions of Agreement*" (p. 281). The Conditions of Agreement, he says, are three,—the existence of two Ideas "anterior" to the act of comparison, a comparison of these two Ideas, and a perception of their congruity (p. 281); a theory, he says, which ends in abstractions, which starts from abstractions, and which starts from abstractions only by the most ridiculous paralogism (p. 290). The answer of the advocate of Locke is as brief as it is triumphant. The word "*anterior*" has no existence in the Theory of Locke. According to Locke, Knowledge does not "result from," it "consists in," the comparison, the mutual predication, of Ideas (IV. i. 2). Of the compared Ideas one may be given in the very act of comparison. The Idea on which M. Cousin so strenously insists is a case in point. The Idea of Existence, according to Locke, is suggested to the Understanding by a single datum of Experience, a suggestion which is immediately followed up by a judgment which affirms that the datum of Experience in reality exists (II. vii. 7). The same answer is to be made when M. Cousin attacks Locke's Theory with respect to the "*Conditions of Comparison*" (p. 302). "Pour qu' il y ait comparaison," says M. Cousin, "il faut deux termes à comparer" (p. 304). Nothing can be more true. "Et il faut," M. Cousin continues, "que ces deux termes soient présents à l'esprit avant que

l'esprit les compare et juge" (p. 304). Nothing can be more false. "Eh bien!" M. Cousin triumphantly exclaims, "cela suffit pour renverser la Théorie du Jugement Comparatif en matière de Réalité et d'Existence" (p. 304).

But let us examine Locke's doctrine of Real Existence more narrowly. That doctrine is summed up in the proposition that "we have an INTUITIVE knowledge of our own Existence, a DEMONSTRATIVE knowledge of the Existence of God, and of everything else a SENSITIVE knowledge, which extends not beyond the objects present to the Senses" (IV. iii. 21). On each of the three great Ontological Realities let us endeavour to ascertain the views of Locke.

What, for instance, are Locke's views with respect to the Ontologic Reality of the WORLD? In professed opposition to Locke, M. Cousin asserts that we attain the knowledge of material existence "directly" (p. 262). Yet, he admits as distinctly as Locke himself, that all that Consciousness can attain "directly" is our own Ideas (pp. 75, 140). Here again we have a collision of shades; the fancied opponents are in reality agreed. "*Existence*," says Locke, "is an Idea suggested to the Understanding by every object without;—we consider things to be actually without us, which is that they have existence" (II. vii. 7). In the words of M. Cousin, our first notion of External Existence is a Suggestion of the Understanding on the occasion of a single datum of Sensation (pp. 297, 309). "Simple Ideas," says

Locke, "since the mind can by no means make them to itself, must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way" (IV. iv. 4); "it must needs be some *Exterior Cause* that produces those Ideas in my mind" (IV. xi. 5). In the words of M. Cousin, the Principle of Causality is "the Sire of the External World" (p. 157). "All Sensible Qualities," says Locke, "carry with them a supposition of a *Substratum* to exist in" (II. xxiii. *Note B*); "we cannot conceive how Sensible Qualities should subsist alone, and, therefore, we suppose them to exist in some common Subject" (II. xxiii. *Note A*). In the words of M. Cousin, Material Substance is a Revelation of Reason in the exercise of Sense (p. 142). When, therefore, Locke asserts that we have a "Sensitive Knowledge" of the External World (IV. ii. 14)—when he asserts that "Sensation" convinces us that there are Material Substances (IV. xi. 1; II. xxiii. 29)—he merely asserts that the Understanding possesses a knowledge of external things, to the development of which Sensation affords occasion—which is precisely the doctrine of M. Cousin.

Reid deems it "strange that Locke, who wrote so much about Ideas, should not see those consequences which Berkeley thought so obviously deducible from that doctrine" (p. 286). This is an injustice to Locke's philosophical acumen. "There can be nothing more certain," he says, "than that the Idea we receive from an external object is in our minds;

this is Intuitive Knowledge. But whether there be anything more than barely that Idea in our minds, whether we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us which corresponds to that Idea, is that whereof some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such Ideas in their minds when no such thing exists, no such object affects their Senses (IV. ii. 14; IV. xi. 1, *seq.*). Who these ante-Berkeleian Idealists may have been, we need not inquire; but Berkeleianism evidently existed before Berkeley. Locke settles the controversy much in the same way as Reid. An External Reality, he says, is the natural *Suggestion* of the Understanding (II. vii. 7); and "the confidence that our faculties do not herein deceive us is the greatest assurance we are capable of concerning the existence of material things" (IV. xi. 3).

But if Locke recognised the objective existence of the World of Matter, *a fortiori*, he recognised the objective existence of the Universe of Space. M. Cousin charges Locke with "explicitly" identifying the Universe of Space with the Material Universe, and professes to quote Locke's words in support of the allegation:—"To say that the world is somewhere means no more than that it does exist" (II. xiii. 10). Yet even the very context of the passage which M. Cousin so monstrously perverts might have convinced him of his error. "When one can find out and frame in his mind clearly and distinctly the place of the Universe," says Locke, "he will be able

to tell us whether it moves or stands still in the undistinguishable *Inane*" (*Ibid.*). If we demand whether Space be Substance or Accident, Locke, more wise in his profession of ignorance than his opponents in their plenitude of knowledge, replies, "I know not" (II. xiii. 17). That it is not a mere Form of the Sensibility, he is convinced. Here, again, the Speculative Reason of the Philosopher acquiesces in the dictates of the Common Sense of Mankind. The very Idea of Space, he says, "naturally leads us" to the belief of its objective reality. Adamantine walls would be unable to arrest the mind in its progress through it; Thought is incompetent to realize the Idea of its non-existence. Even here Locke does not abandon the sobriety of the true sage. Though Reason reveals the Existence of the Infinite, Imagination is unable to compass the *Idea*. "All our positive Ideas have always bounds" (II. xvii. 18). Man "can no more have a positive Idea of the greatest than he has of the least Space" (*Ibid.*). The Infinite and the Absolute are equally beyond the reach of his Imagination, and "the defect in his Ideas" on the subject is a mark of the disproportion that exists between his "narrow capacities" and the boundless extent of things (II. xvii. 21).

With regard to the World, Locke, according to M. Cousin, is betrayed into semi-scepticism—with regard to the SOUL, his Scepticism is absolute. "Sur l'existence de l'*Esprit*," says Locke, if we are to believe M. Cousin, "nous devons nous contenter de

l'évidence de la foi"—"voilà bien," he exclaims, "ce me semble le Scepticisme absolu." But what are the words of which this passage professes to give the translation?—"Concerning the existence of *Finite Spirits* we must content ourselves with the Evidence of Faith" (IV. xi. 12). Is this absolute Scepticism? Then all mankind are absolute Sceptics. The days have long passed since the Angel conversed with Adam. No longer do we hear the voice of "Woman wailing for her Dæmon lover." The denizens of the invisible world may still mix themselves up in the affairs of men as the gods and goddesses in "the tale of Troy divine;" but the mist which Pallas Athene removed from the eyes of Diomed still rests on the vision of ordinary men. Carried away with his illusion, however, M. Cousin is pitiless to Locke. The vehemence with which he precipitates himself upon his foe is characteristic of his nation. "There is no Philosopher at once more sage and more inconsequent than Locke—he explains *obscurum per obscurius*—he evokes Faith from the Abyss of Paralogism—partout, à chaque pas dans la Théorie de Locke des *Abîmes* de Paralogisme" (p. 245).*

* Monstrous as is this misrepresentation, it is gravely reproduced by M. Cousin's American translator—a Professor of Philosophy—a speaker of the English language—a countryman of Locke. "It was a question," he says, "about the Existence of Finite Spirits, *our own Souls*." In fact, every misrepresentation of M. Cousin is blindly reproduced by Dr. Henry—with one solitary exception in the case of the Freedom of the Human Will.

But from the din of a contentious criticism let us escape to the calm Philosophy of its illustrious object. "Experience," says Locke, "convinces us that we have an Intuitive knowledge of our own existence, and an internal infallible perception that we are. I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: can any of these be more evident to me than my own existence? If I doubt of all other things, that very doubt makes me perceive my own existence, and will not suffer me to doubt of that" (IV. ix. 3). Locke's Doctrine of the Soul, therefore, starts from the "Cogito ergo sum" of Descartes. But Locke is far from acquiescing in the Cartesian conclusion that the Essence of the Soul consists in Thought.* "We know certainly by experience that we sometimes think; and hence," he says, "we draw the infallible consequence that there is something in us that has a power to think" (II. i. 10); "the Idea of this action or mode of thinking is inconsistent with the Idea of Self-subsistence, and, therefore, has a necessary connexion with a support or subject of inhesion" (IV. iii. *Note*). Locke recognises, therefore, the existence of a *Thinking Substance.* Whether he

* I say the Cartesian conclusion, for, as Mr. Stewart has shown, we have no reason for considering it the opinion of Descartes himself (*Elements*, vol. i., *Note A*). In stating that Thought "*constitutes*" the Substance of the Soul, and that Extension "*constitutes*" the Substance denominated Matter, he merely means that Thought and Extension *determine* the nature of the two Substances in which they are inherent—as he has just before stated, "ex quovis Attributo *cognoscitur* Substantia."

regards this Substance as Material or not, is another question. "Concluding the operations of the Mind," he says, "not to subsist of themselves, nor apprehending how they can belong to body, or be produced by it, we are apt to think these the actions of some *other* Substance which we call "*Spirit*" (II. xxiii. 5). Here we have a recognition of the great Philosophic argument by which the Immateriality of the Soul has been vindicated by every Intellectual Philosopher from Aristotle and Cicero to Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin. Mind has none of the attributes of Matter—Matter possesses none of the attributes of Mind. Locke, it is true, concedes that he has not *proved*, and that on his principles it cannot be "demonstratively" proved, "that there is an Immaterial Substance in us that thinks" (IV. iii. *Note*); yet "from our Ideas," he conceives, "it may be proved that it is to the highest degree probable that it is immaterial" (IV. iii. *Note*). "Matter," as he elsewhere says, "is evidently in its own nature void of Sense and Thought" (IV. iii. 6)—Thought "cannot be the action of base insensible Matter, nor ever could be, without an Immaterial thinking Being" (II. xxiii. 15). The reason of Locke's reserve on this subject has been strangely misunderstood.—"Since we know not wherein thinking consists, nor to what sort of Substances the Almighty has been pleased to give that power, I see no contradiction in it," he says, "that the first eternal thinking Being should, if he

pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless Matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degree of Sense, Perception, and Thought" (IV. iii. 6). So far, therefore, is Locke from having recourse to Deity to prove the Immateriality of the Soul, as M. Cousin asserts, that it is only from a reluctance to set limits to the Omnipotence of God that he admits the possibility of its being material. Was Locke right in thus modifying his Philosophy by theological considerations? That is another question. That "all Quality presupposes a Substance," is a proposition, the negation of which involves a contradiction not only to the Laws of Thought, but to the Nature of Things. That "such as is the Quality, such also must be the Substance," is a proposition which is so far from being a Law of Nature that many Philosophers, the Philosopher of Kœnigsberg among the rest, have denied it even to be a Law of Thought. "It is not an easy matter," says Stillingfleet, "to give an account how the Soul should be capable of Immortality, unless it be an Immaterial Substance." M. Cousin goes farther—"If the Soul be not an Immaterial Substance," he says, "we ought not to say that its Immortality is doubtful; we ought to say that it is impossible" (*Kant*, p. 169). In other words, the whole fabric of our future hopes is founded on the floating island of a Metaphysical abstraction. The doctrine of Locke is more modest and more true. The Immortality of the Soul is dependent on the will

of the Deity. The power that created the Soul may continue its existence through Eternity, or annihilate it according to his own good pleasure. No necessary existence, no emanation from the divine essence, no attribute of divinity, is attributed to the Soul by Locke. Its hopes of Immortality are centred all in God.* "All the great ends of Morality and Religion," he says, "are well enough secured without Philosophical proof of the Soul's Immateriality, since it is evident that He who made us at the beginning to subsist here, sensible and

* According to Kant—and Tenneman is the mere echo of his master—Locke, "after having derived all the conceptions and principles of the Mind from Experience, goes so far in the employment of these conceptions and principles as to maintain that we can prove the Existence of God, and the Immortality of the Soul,—both of them lying beyond the limits of possible [actual] experience,—with the same force of demonstration as any mathematical proposition." But here there is a double misrepresentation. Locke did not derive all the principles of the Mind from Experience. Locke did not hold that the Immortality of the Soul is a demonstrable Truth. He holds the very contrary—that "it neither was nor could be made out by natural Reason without Revelation" (IV. iii. *Note*). Locke himself seems to have fallen into an historical error in his controversy with Stillingfleet. He states that in the whole first book of the Tusculan Disputations "there is not one syllable showing the least thought that the Soul was an Immaterial Substance." But the doctrine enounced by Aristotle, and adopted by Cicero himself, the doctrine of the "Quinta Natura," was itself the doctrine of Immaterial Substance, and Cicero supports it by the very argument of M. Cousin,—Mind has none of the attributes of Matter, Matter has none of the attributes of Mind (*Tusc. Disp.* i. 27). Locke

intelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can restore us to the like state of sensibility in another world, and make us capable there to receive the retribution He has designed to men according to their doings in this life"* (IV. iii. 6).

But our difficulties with respect to Locke's theory of the Soul are not yet exhausted. "He that shall, with a little attention, reflect on the Resurrection," says Locke, "and consider that Divine Justice shall

makes a still stranger mistake, in which, however, he has been very generally followed, among others by Clarke. As a proof of the necessity of a Revelation to decide the question of the Immortality of the Soul, he quotes the remark of Cicero—"harum sententiarum quæ vera sit Deus aliqui viderit, quæ verisimillima magna quæstio" (i. 11). But the truth is, Cicero is here speaking not of the Immortality of the Soul, but of its *Essence*—whether it was Air, or Fire, or Blood; whether it was a Number, a Harmony, or an Entelecheia—and the "Deus aliqui viderit," instead of being a recognition of the necessity of a Revelation, is merely a profane "*God knows.*"

* The value of the doctrine of Immateriality in the establishment of the Soul's Immortality seems to me purely negative. It is in this light it is regarded by Bishop Butler:—"Upon supposition that living agent each man calls himself is a single being," he says, "it follows that our organized bodies are no more ourselves or part of ourselves than any other matter around us," and that, therefore, "the dissolution of the *body* has no conceivable tendency to destroy the living being." Compare this with the conclusion deduced by Cicero from the same fact:—"eum simplex natura animi esset, non posse eum dividi; quod si non possit, *non posse interire.*" It is no wonder that with such a view Cicero proclaimed the Soul to be not only Divine, but God.

bring to Judgment at the last day the very same persons to be happy or miserable in the other, who did well or ill in this life, will find it, perhaps, not easy to resolve with himself what makes the same man, or wherein Identity consists" (I. iv. 15). This brings us to the consideration of Locke's Theory of Personal Identity—a theory which has passed into a byword of philosophical contempt, and which has been regarded only as an example of the absurdities into which genius may be betrayed. But the ridicule of Locke's critics has proceeded on the confusion of two things, which Locke has most carefully distinguished. Locke "agrees that the more probable opinion is that Consciousness is annexed to, and the affection of, one individual immaterial Substance" (II. xxvii. 25); and he holds that "whatever Substance begins to exist, must during its existence be necessarily the same" (II. xxvii. 28). With regard to the Identity of the Spiritual Substance, therefore, he concedes everything for which his antagonists contend. "But," says Locke, "it is not unity of Substance that comprehends all sorts of Identity, or will determine it in every case; it being one thing to be the same 'Substance;' another, the same 'Man;' and another, the same 'Person' (II. xxvii. 7). What then is Locke's Theory of *Personal* Identity? "To find wherein Personal Identity consists," he says, "we must consider what Person stands for, which, I think, is a thinking, intelligent being that has Reason and Reflection, and can consider itself as it-

self, the same thinking thing, in different times and places" (II. xxvii. 9). Now how is it that a thinking thing can *consider* itself as itself, the same in different times and places? Evidently by an act of Judgment, and accordingly, in strict consistency with himself, Locke enumerates the idea of Personal Identity among those Relative Ideas which he systematically regards as "the creatures or inventions of the Understanding." But what is the Chronological Condition of the development of this Judgment? Evidently an act of Consciousness. "Consciousness," says Locke, "is inseparable from thinking, and essential to it" (II. xxvii. 9)—"Consciousness," as he subsequently adds, including under it "a present representation of a past action" (II. xxvii. 13). But Consciousness is not only the Chronological Condition of the development of the Judgment. All self-regard is centred in happiness and misery, and all happiness and misery are centred in Consciousness.—What becomes of "any Substance not joined to or affected with our Consciousness" is a matter of the most complete indifference (II. xxvii. 17, 18). In this sense, therefore, our Personal Identity may be said to "consist" in Consciousness—Consciousness, by a third deviation of meaning, being employed by Locke to designate the continuity of correlated Consciousnesses (II. xxvii. 25). But this is not all. For the best refutation of Locke's theory of Personal Identity Sir William Hamilton refers us to M. Cousin (*Reid*, p. 351)—it

is to M. Cousin I would refer for its best elucidation and defence. In his Introduction to the Gorgias of Plato, the French Philosopher discovers the "Principle of Penality" in the fact that the unjust man thinks, and cannot but think, that he is undeserving. "That which declares and measures the Moral Imputability of Actions," he says in his Lectures on Locke, "is the Consciousness of the free will that has produced them" (p. 139)—"the Consciousness of Merit and Demerit is the condition of all Reward and Punishment" (p. 191). Expressed in other language, these are the very views of Locke. "Person," he says, "is a forensic term, appropriating actions and their merit" (II. xxvii. 26). The Consciousness in the continuity of which he makes Personal Identity consist is the "Consciousness which draws Reward and Punishment with it" (II xxvii. 13). It is in support of this view that he appeals both to the Common Sense of Mankind, and to the Justice of God. "Human Laws," he says, "do not punish the madman for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for what the madman did" (II. xxvii. 20). "Supposing a man punished now for what he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have no Consciousness at all, what difference is there," he asks, "between that punishment and being created miserable" (§ 26)? Nay, in this matter Locke does not hesitate to appeal to Revelation itself. "Conformable to this," he says, "the Apostle tells us that at the great day, when everyone shall 'receive accord-

ing to his doings, the secrets of all hearts shall be laid open.' The sentence shall be justified by the Consciousness all persons shall have that they themselves, in what bodies soever they appear, or what substance soever that Consciousness adheres to, are the same that committed those actions, and deserve that punishment for them" (*Ibid.*).

Locke's theory of Personal Identity is thus the theory, not, as Brown would say, of our Mental, but of our *Moral* Identity. M. Cousin denounces it as the annihilation of all Moral Responsibility; it is in connexion with our Moral Responsibility that its truth is most conspicuously clear. Moral Responsibility is no longer the mere creature of a Metaphysical dogma. If, as Locke believes, the soul throughout the term of its existence be one individual immaterial substance, then Identity of Substance and Identity of Person are coincident and one. But even if, as the Materialist asserts, the substance of the soul be subjected to fluctuations as incessant as the substance of the body—even if atom after atom and essence after essence should disappear in the running stream of change—yet if Consciousness continue, none of the constituents of our Moral Agency are necessarily lost. In the Moral world, as Conscience is the only judge, so Consciousness is the only witness. Before the august tribunal of the God within, the metaphysical subtilties of Substance and Essence are never raised. It is not upon these that Virtue builds her security, her exul-

tation, or her hope. It is not in these that Vice seeks refuge from the agonies of regret, repentance, and remorse. The Consciousness of good or ill desert is the condition of Moral Retribution ; the Consciousness of happiness or misery is the essence of Reward and Punishment. All the elements of our Personality thus gather around Consciousness ; and it is in Consciousness, therefore, that Locke has centred the Moral Identity of Man.

Such is Locke's doctrine with reference to the World ; such is his doctrine with reference to the Soul. What is the decision of his Philosophy with reference to God ? "The Theodicy of Locke," says M. Cousin, "in rejecting the argument *a priori*, and in employing by preference the argument *a posteriori*, still retains and develops the fundamental character of his system" (p. 375). But here there is a twofold error. In the first place, Locke does not reject the *a priori* argument. "Our Idea of a most Perfect Being," he says, "is not the *sole* proof of a God" (IV. x. 7). Neither in the second place is the argument which he adopts in preference the argument which is commonly designated *a posteriori*. Divested of the mystical speculations which would identify the Deity with Space, Locke's argument is in reality the argument of Clarke. Like Clarke, he postulates our Personal Existence, and by means of the Principle of Causality attains to the conception of a Primeval Cause ; like Clarke, he postulates our Personal Intelligence, and by the aid of the Principle

of the Complement of Effects, arrives at the knowledge of a Primeval Mind (IV. x. 3, 5). It is true Locke's Theodicy retains and develops the fundamental character of his Philosophy. But the fundamental character of that Philosophy is not the eduction of knowledge from Experience—it is the deduction of knowledge from Intuition. It is on the principles of "Intuitive Certainty"—it is by an appeal to the "necessary" development of the Laws of Thought—it is on the authority of our Rational Faculties that he repudiates both the Atheistic Materialism of the disciple of Hobbes and the Pantheistic Materialism of the disciple of Spinoza (IV. x. 1–19). The manner in which we frame the *Idea* of God, when, by the aid of the "Principles of Reason," we have arrived at a knowledge of his *Existence*, is purely Kantian. We combine all the various perfections which our Experience enables us to conceive, enlarge them with the Idea of Infinity, and then objectify the Concept (II. xxiii. 33–35). Nor in the formation of this "Ideal" are the Moral Attributes omitted. "Locke's theory," says M. Cousin, "tends to make God an Arbitrary King—to substitute in God will and power for reason and wisdom. It is a Theodicy of the Senses, not of the Reason—made for slaves and brute beasts, not for beings intelligent and free" (p. 195). But here again M. Cousin's charge is based on a mutilation of Locke's expressions. Locke does not assert, as M. Cousin says he asserts, that "the punishments

and rewards of another life are the sole touchstone, the sole measure of the rectitude of our actions" (p. 194); he asserts that "the only true touchstone of moral rectitude" is, "whether, as *Sins and Duties*, our actions are like to procure us happiness or misery from the hands of the Almighty" (II. xxviii. 8). If Locke proclaims the duty of a passive obedience to Heaven, it is not by a reference to a brute omnipotence of force. If God has imposed a law which we are called upon implicitly to obey, "He has a *right* to do it; we are His creatures. He has goodness and wisdom to direct our actions to that which is *best*" (*Ibid.*) So far, indeed, is Locke from regarding the Divine Will as the fountain of the Moral Law, that he regards the Moral Law as the regulative principle of the Divine Will. "If," he says, "it were fit for such poor finite creatures as we are to pronounce what Infinite Wisdom and Goodness could do, I think we might say that God himself cannot choose what is not good. The Freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best" (II. xxi. 49). Locke, therefore, is neither the disciple of Democritus nor the follower of Ockham. In the great Polity of Worlds he proclaims neither an Anarchy of Chance nor an Autocracy of Arbitrary Will. He regards it as the Free Monarchy of God. God, in his view, is not an Arbitrary King, nor is Man the slave of Omnipotence. Even the divine prerogative is limited by the Moral Law; the Moral Law is the charter of the rights and liberties of the universe.

VIII.

FREEDOM AND THE MORAL LAW.

"I own freely to you the weakness of my Understanding," says Locke in one of his letters to Molyneux, "that though it be unquestionable that there is Omnipotence and Omniscience in God our Maker, and though I cannot have a clearer perception of anything than that I am free; yet I cannot make Freedom in Man consistent with Omnipotence and Omniscience in God, though I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truth I most firmly assent to; and, therefore, I have long since given off the consideration of that question; resolving all into this short conclusion, that if it be possible for God to make a Free Agent, then Man is free, though I see not the way of it."

Locke, then, is professedly a believer in the Freedom of the Human Will. In the Essay, it is true, he asserts that "Liberty belongs not to the Will" (II. xxi. 14). But the contradiction is merely verbal. "I think the question is not proper," he says, "whether the *Will* be free, but whether a *Man* be free" (II. xxi. 21). Locke, therefore, does not, as M. Cousin asserts, destroy the question of Liberty;

does he, as M. Cousin asserts, destroy Liberty itself? All depends on the sense in which he attributes Liberty to Man.

In the first place, then, is Locke's Liberty the *Liberty of Spontaneity*—the Liberty of acting as we will, the Will being predetermined to act by the operation of certain motives? In this case Liberty is a mere Liberty in words—

> "Free-will is but Necessity in play,
> The clattering of the golden reins which guide
> The thunder-footed coursers of the Sun."

Such a Liberty is so far from being incompatible with Omniscience, that its effects could be mathematically calculated by "the Eternal Geometer," and had such been Locke's notion of Liberty, his difficulty would have had no existence. Is Locke's Liberty, then, the *Liberty of Indifference*—a Liberty independent on any motive and antecedent to any determination of the Understanding—a Liberty of which the expression is an irrational *sic volo*, and in which *stat pro ratione voluntas?* In that case Liberty is but a synonym for Caprice, and Man escapes being the Slave of Necessity only to become the Sport of Chance. Locke rejects such a notion with disdain. "To place Liberty in an Indifferency antecedent to the thought and judgment of the Understanding," he says, "seems to me to place Liberty in a state of darkness" (II. xxi. 71). What, then, is Locke's Liberty the *Liberty of Self-determination?* Is it a

liberty which leaves man as free to will as he is free to act? "In all proposals of present action," says Locke, "a man is not at liberty to will or not because he cannot forbear willing" (II. xxi. 24). In other words, we must either will to act or we must will not to act; "not to resolve," as Bacon says, "is to resolve;" the Will cannot remain passive; we cannot choose but will. But what of the selection of the alternative? Does man possess the power to will his will in this? "In that case," says Locke, "we must suppose one Will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that; and so on, *in infinitum*" (II. xxi. 25). Locke's Liberty, therefore, would seem to be neither the Liberty of Spontaneity, nor the Liberty of Indifference, nor the Liberty of Self-determination. What, then, is this Liberty of Locke's? It is the Liberty of *Self-suspense.*

To understand the meaning of this phrase we must give Locke's answers to a variety of queries. "What is it that determines the Will?" According to Locke, "the true and proper answer is, the Mind" (II. xxi. 29). "What is it that determines the Mind?" Locke tells us it is "the uneasiness of Desire" (II. xxi. 33). What is it that moves Desire? Locke's answer is "Happiness, and that alone" (II. xxi. 41). But Happiness, according to Locke, may be either true or false. Our Pleasures and Pains are sometimes found in competition. In the rational pursuit of our well-being it is frequently

wise to sacrifice the gratification of the moment to the Happiness on the whole. This is true of the present life, and *a fortiori* with reference to the future. Here, then, the Seat of Liberty is placed by Locke. The Mind possesses "a power to *suspend* the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires;" it is "at liberty to consider the objects of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with others" (II. xxi. 47). All that follows is moral necessity. "It is not a fault but a perfection of our nature to desire, will, and act according to the last result of a fair examination" (*Ibid.*) All "Liberty lies in this, that men can suspend their desires and stop them from determining their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires" (II. xxi. 52). Such is the theory of Locke.

But this theory of Locke involves a latent paradox. "Till we are as much informed upon this inquiry as the weight of the matter and the nature of the case demands," says Locke, "we are, by the *necessity* of preferring and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good, *obliged* to suspend the satisfaction of our desire in particular cases" (II. xxi. 51); in other words, to quote the heading of the paragraph from which this passage is extracted, "the *necessity* of pursuing true happiness is the foundation of all *Liberty*." Locke's Liberty, therefore, in words at least, glides down the slope of Motives into the

chasm of Necessity. But is this result entailed by the exigencies of Locke's Theory? It is. How, in fact, can the Mind be determined to the act of Self-suspense? By the operation of a definite motive? The Liberty of Self-suspense becomes at once transmuted into the Liberty of Spontaneity. By the operation of no motive? The Liberty of Self-suspense becomes either the Liberty of Indifference on the one hand, or the Liberty of Self-determination on the other. The Problem of Liberty remains unsolved by Locke.

The Metaphysical Problem, indeed, is insoluble by the faculties of man. The question agitated by the Lost Spirits on the "hill retired" has been agitated by Philosophers for three thousand years, and all in vain. We may reason high—

> "Of Providence, Foreknowledge, Fate and Will,
> Fixed Fate, Free will, Foreknowledge Absolute;"

but Reason now, as heretofore, can "find no end." It is in vain that Thought alights on that Hadean Hill. Still, as of old, it is condemned to roam "in wandering mazes lost." Its subtlest speculations are still—

> "Vain Wisdom all and false Philosophy."

But is there no Practical Solution of the Metaphysical Problem? no solution in which the Common Sense of Mankind can acquiesce? The only question which can be philosophically stated on the subject of Free-will, according to Mr. Stewart, is the

question of the matter of fact, as ascertained by the deliverance of Consciousness. But Consciousness is as unable to untie this Gordian knot as the Speculative Reason. Libertarian and Necessitarian alike appeal to its deliverance. The oracle gives but an ambiguous response. If determinable by any mortal faculty, the question is to be determined, not by Consciousness, but by Conscience. "We ought, therefore we can,"—such was the sublime enthymeme of Kant, the "Cogito ergo sum" of Morals. But this escape from the jaws of Necessity was impossible to Locke. What, in fact, was the sole Obligation which he conceded to Morality?—The Obligation to consult for one's own individual Happiness. The Desire of Happiness was the sole principle of Action which he recognised. It is true, he admitted that Virtue might itself be a source of Happiness. But what if a man found his Happiness in Vice? "A man may justly incur punishment," says Locke, "though it be certain that in all the particular actions that he wills, he does, and necessarily does, will that which he then judges to be good" (II. xxi. 56); and why?—"He has imposed on himself wrong measures of good and evil;"—"he has vitiated his own palate;"—"he had a power to suspend his determination" (II. xxi. 59). But by what is this suspense of determination to be determined? The Desire of Happiness is the sole possible motive, and Self-suspense, therefore, is the mere offspring of Self-love.

What Moral Responsibility can consist with such a theory? Given the strength of a man's Self-love, and the circumstances in which he is placed, his conduct is a matter of calculation. The Metaphysical difficulty subsists—the Practical solution is impossible. If Happiness be the sole motive, Moral Responsibility is a mere figment—if Moral Responsibility be a figment, Moral Freedom is a gratuitous hypothesis.

But on what grounds are we justified in proclaiming that the Desire of Happiness is the exclusive principle of Action? It is true that a man must act either to escape an Inconvenience, or to procure a Pleasure, or to promote an Interest, or to discharge a Duty. Everything else is the result of blind Instinct, and scarcely deserves the name of Action. But what right have we to assert that Duty can only be performed from a Desire of Happiness? Dependent on an inevitable Desire, it ceases to be Duty. That "Reason is not a *sufficient* motive to Action in such a creature as Man," we may readily acknowledge with Butler; but to assert with Sir James Mackintosh and Hume that "Reason as Reason can never be a motive to action," is to assert that Man cannot act because he ought, and that God cannot act at all. The fact of the case is, that the Rational Conception of Right is of itself sufficient to determine the will of a Rational creature in a case where his own Happiness is altogether unconcerned. That Man is under an Obligation to

secure his own Happiness is certain; but it is equally certain that he is under an Obligation to act aright. What should be the course of conduct if these two Obligations came into collision, is another matter. The Master of Moral Science has not hesitated to concede "that our Ideas of Happiness and Misery are of all our Ideas the nearest and most important to us; and that they will, nay, if you please, that they ought, to prevail over those of Order, and Beauty, and Harmony, and Proportion, if there ever should be, as it is impossible there ever should be, any inconsistency between them; though these last two, as expressing the Fitness of Actions, are real as Truth itself. Let it be allowed," he continues, "though Virtue or Moral Rectitude does indeed consist in affection to and pursuit of what is Right and Good as such; yet, that when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced that it will be for our Happiness, or, at least, not contrary to it." The harmony between Duty and Happiness being thus established by the hypothesis of a Moral Government, it is evident a man may perform his Duty, not because it is his Happiness, but because it is his Duty.* Here, then, if any-

* Comp. Aristotle:—*τιμὴν δὲ καὶ ἡδονὴν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν αἱρούμεθα μὲν καὶ δι' αὐτά (μηθενὸς γὰρ ἀποβαίνοντος ἐλοίμεθ' ἂν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν), αἱρούμεθα δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν.*—(*Eth. Nic.*, I. v, 5. Ed. Bek.)

where, both Freedom and Disinterestedness are possible. Whatever is done from blind Impulse is Automatism rather than Action. Whatever is done from motives of Happiness,—whether it be Indolentia, Pleasure, or Interest,—can be calculated with Mathematical precision. An action done from a regard to Duty is the sole disinterested action,—it is the sole action that can with any propriety be denominated free. Here, then, we discover the great oversight of Locke. That the Will should be determined by the Judgment is conceded by the most cautious advocates of Freedom. "There is a Moral Fitness or Unfitness of Actions," says Butler, "which I apprehend as *certainly* to determine the Divine conduct, as Speculative Truth and Falsehood *necessarily* determine the Divine judgment." The sufficiency of this Conception of Moral Fitness to determine the Will to Action was what Locke failed to see. It is this that constitutes the great blemish in his Moral Doctrine, the great defect in his solution of the Problem of the Will. Hence it was that he unconsciously allowed himself to be seduced into the Morality of *Self;* hence it was that, counter to his own intention, he was precipitated into the Metaphysics of *Fate.*

But if Locke's doctrine be erroneous with regard to the *Obligation* of Morality, if he failed to give the true answer to the question—"Why should Morality be made the guide of Action, and the rule of Life"? there is a point, scarcely less impor-

tant, in which his doctrine is liable to no exception. Condemning Locke to educe all our Ideas from Sensation and Reflection, M. Cousin considers him necessitated to refer the existence of our Moral Ideas to Sensation. But even on this narrow view of his Philosophy, Locke was not reduced to the necessity imposed upon him by his critic. Even if he had ignored the existence of Reason, he might consistently have referred our Moral Ideas to Reflection. That there is in man a susceptibility to the pleasures of Virtue, that there is, therefore, in man a Moral Sense,—whether original or acquired it matters not,—Locke repeatedly asserts (II. xxi. 69). Why then might he not, consistently with his own theory, have reckoned our Moral Sentiments among those "Satisfactions or Uneasinesses arising from any thought," of which, by the fundamental principle of his Philosophy, it is the function of Reflection to take cognisance? (II. i. 4). Why might he not have acquiesced in the conclusion which satisfied the moral convictions of Shaftesbury, of Hutcheson, of Hume? But Locke took his stand upon a loftier ground than this. He considered the great Concepts of Morality as no mere modification of Sense, no accident relative merely to the constitution of Humanity. On the contrary, he reckoned them among the "Relations" which he regarded as revealed by Reason, as essential to Thought, as independent even of the power of the Deity himself. Here Locke not only acquiesced in the con-

clusions, he reproduced the very language of Cudworth and of Clarke. With the Disciple of Plato, he recognised the "Archetypal Ideas" which pre-existed in the Eternal Mind. With the Scholar of Newton, he recognised the "Immutable Relations" which are invested with the Eternity of God. Hence it was that he held Moral Science to be susceptible of Demonstration. Hence it was that he regarded Morality as based on the foundations of the Mathematics. Locke reduce all Morality to Education and Opinion! Locke denaturalise and corrupt Virtue! M. Cousin might as well have preferred the charge against Socrates or Kant. Lowde, 150 years ago, preferred the same charge, and see with what calm dignity the great Englishman protests against its injustice:—"If he had been at the pains to reflect on what I have said, he would have known what I think of the Eternal and Unalterable Nature of Right and Wrong, and what *I* call Virtue and Vice; and if he had observed in the place he quotes, I only report as matter of fact what others call Virtue and Vice, he would not have found it liable to any great exception" (II. xxviii. *Note*). No: it was not with regard to the Reality of Moral Distinctions, it was not with reference to the Faculty by which those distinctions are conceived, that Locke was wrong. It was with reference to the *Obligation* of Morality,—it was with reference to the legitimate influence of Moral Ideas on the Will.

A third question, and the analysis of Locke's Moral Doctrine is complete. We have considered the question of the *Obligation*, and the question of the *Principle* of Morality; the question of the *Criterion* remains. In what does Morality consist, according to Locke? What are the Chronological Conditions of the development of our Moral Ideas? What is the Standard of Moral Right and Wrong? "Divine Law," says Locke, "is the measure of Sin and Duty" (II. xxviii. 8); and he has been identified with Ockham and those who reduce all Morality to the arbitrary edict of the Deity. "Civil Law," says Locke, "is the measure of Crimes and Innocence" (II. xxviii. 9); and has been identified with Hobbes and those who refer Moral Distinctions to the appointment of the Leviathan. "Philosophical Law," says Locke, "is the Measure of Virtue and Vice" (II. xxviii. 10); and he has been identified with Helvetius and the Sciolists who reduce Virtue and Vice to the mere accident of Fashion. Locke, in short, is explaining the application of a class of words, and his critics have regarded him as discussing a question concerning the reality of things. But the falsehood of these inferences is demonstrated by what has been already said. If Locke holds the will of God to be "determined by what is best" (II. xxi. 49), he acknowledges a Morality independent of the will of God. If he acknowledges the existence of a Light "which it is impossible for the breath or power of man to extinguish" (IV. iii. 20),

he acknowledges a Morality independent of the will of Man. If he enumerates our Moral Ideas among the Immutable Relations which Reason, whether Finite or Infinite, must necessarily conceive (IV. iii. 29), he acknowledges a Morality independent of Fashion, and Immutable as Mind itself.

Whether Locke would have held the welfare of the universe to be the sole object of Morality—whether he would have regarded a perception of Consequences as the chronological condition of the Moral Concept, it is needless to inquire. Locke has not professedly discussed the question. Intimations of his opinion on this matter are, doubtless, to be detected in the Essay, and such as they are, they point in the direction of Eudæmonism. But far above the domain of mere Happiness, Locke recognises the existence of Conceptions of a higher order. He recognises the existence of a Rational Conception of Right, whatever the occasion of its development. He recognises the existence of a Rational Conception of Duty, formed on the occasion of the Conception of Right. He recognises the Rational Conception of Merit and Demerit, founded on the occasion of the performance or non-performance of Duty. Here, then, is the great glory of the Moral Philosophy of Locke. On the question of Obligation he is erroneous—the question of the Criterion he has overlooked; but on the question of the Reality of Moral Distinctions, and the nature of the Faculty by which they are conceived, Locke

takes his stand upon the very summit of Moral Science. There, with the Stoic of old, he recognizes the existence of the *Lex Vera* in the "Right Reason, congruent to Nature, diffused through all, constant, everlasting." There, with the Greek Tragic Poet, he does homage to "those sublime Laws which have their original in Heaven, of which God is the fountain; neither did the mortal nature of Man produce them, nor shall Oblivion ever lull them into sleep."*

* Sophocles, *Œdipus Tyrannus*, l. 865, *et seq.*

With regard to Locke's opinion that Moral Science is susceptible of Mathematical Demonstration, there is one remark which I wish to make. Whatever may become of the question, whether all Morality may be resolved into an effort to promote the general Happiness, it is evident that Happiness occupies an important position in Moral Science. Benevolence is an affection to the Happiness of others; Prudence, an affection to our own. A being insensible to Pleasure or Pain could suffer no Injustice; and even the foundation of Piety itself is to be discovered in the fact that God is the source of the Happiness of the universe. In any case, we must determine in what the Happiness of any given being consists, before we can determine either the Rights which he enjoys, or the Duties of which he is the object. Moral Science, therefore, is to be compared to Mathematical Physics rather than to Mathematics. Right, Duty, and Desert are the Mathematical Conceptions to be employed in the solution of the Problem of Morals—Happiness is a Physical Element which intervenes, and destroys the purely Mathematical character of the Problem.

IX.

LOCKE, HUME, AND KANT.

THE preceding analysis of Locke's Philosophy has either effected nothing, or it has shown that for a century and a half that Philosophy has not only been misinterpreted, but interpreted by opposites. But an error in the Criticism entails an error in the History of Philosophy; and to complete the task which I have undertaken, I proceed to determine the relation in which Locke stands to his successors, and the position which he is entitled to hold in the development of modern Thought. The character of the conclusion at which I shall arrive may be readily foreseen. Warburton remarks, as a characteristic of the controversies of his own times, a strange propensity in the Clergy to mistake their friends for their enemies, and as strange a propensity in the Freethinkers to mistake their enemies for their friends. The remark of the great Theologian typifies the fate of the great Philosopher. He has been canonized by the Schools whose principles he devoted his energies to subvert; he has been anathematized by the Schools whose doctrine it was the great object of his Philosophy to enforce.

Locke's relation to the School of CONDILLAC may be easily determined. "The Essay concerning Human Understanding," says M. Cousin, "contained the germ of the theory of Transformed Sensation" (*Locke*, p. 99). "The doctrine of Condillac," says Sir William Hamilton, "was, if not a corruption, a development of the doctrine of Locke" (*Disc.* p. 3). But the injustice of this criticism is self-evident. Confounding our Ideas of Operation with the Ideas operated upon, the theory of Transformed Sensation ignores the existence of Locke's Ideas of Reflection; confounding our Ideas of Relation with the Ideas related, it ignores the existence of the *a priori* Ideas which Locke regarded as "the creatures or inventions of the Understanding." Add to this, that in restricting the elements of thought to Sensations, it ignores the existence of the *a priori* Ideas which Locke regarded as "suggested to the Understanding" by the isolated data of Sense.

But the error which has peculiarly vitiated the History of Philosophy is not so much the identification of Locke with Condillac, as the identification of Locke with HUME. "As a legitimate Sceptic," says Sir William Hamilton, "Hume could not assail the foundations of knowledge in themselves; his premises, not established by himself, are accepted only as principles universally conceded in the previous Schools of Philosophy" (*Disc.*, p. 87)—conceded by the "Sensualism of Locke" (*Disc.*, p. 616). Such also is the verdict of Reid and Kant, of Stewart,

Tenneman, and Cousin, in fact, of every historian of Philosophy—all have regarded Hume's system as the logical development of that of Locke. But with what gratuitous injustice let any dispassionate Philosopher decide. While the Intellectualist regarded the Materials of Knowledge as constituted not only by the Ideas which Sensation and Reflection immediately "furnish," but by the Ideas which the data of Sense immediately "suggest,"—the Sceptic dogmatically restricts the Materials of Knowledge to the Ideas furnished by Outward and Inward Sentiment (*Enquiry*,* sect. ii.) While the Intellectualist concedes to the Understanding not only the function of "combining" the isolated data of Experience, but the still higher function of "comparing" its original Ideas and developing a new class of Ideas on the occasion of the "comparison,"—the Sceptic dogmatically maintains that "the creative power of the Mind amounts to no more than the faculty of compounding, transposing, augmenting, or diminishing the materials afforded us by the Senses and Experience" (sect. ii.) While the Intellectualist com-

* In obedience to Hume's demand, in determining his philosophical sentiments I refer not to his *Treatise of Human Nature*, but to the second volume of his *Essays*. "Several writers who have honoured the Author's Philosophy with answers," says Hume, in his advertisement to the latter, "have taken care to direct all their batteries against that juvenile work which the Author never acknowledged. Henceforth the Author desires that the following pieces may alone be regarded as containing his philosophical sentiments and principles."

prehends under our "Intuitive Knowledge" not merely the Mathematical Relations of Quantity and Number, but the Metaphysical Relations of Substance and Causation, together with the Moral Relations of Right and Wrong,—the Sceptic dogmatically restricts all Intuitive Knowledge to the domain of Mathematics (sect. iv. part 1 ; sect. xii. part 3).*

To see the true correlation which exists between the two Philosophers, we have only to turn to the great problem which the Dogmatic Sceptic proposed to "the Lockian Sensualism" (*Disc.*, p. 616). According to Hume, "Mr. Locke, in his chapter of *Power*, says that, finding from Experience that there are several new productions in Matter, and concluding there must somewhere be a Power capable of producing them, we arrive at last by this reasoning at the Idea of Power. But no reasoning can give us a new, original, Simple Idea, as this Philosopher himself confesses. This, therefore, can never be the origin of that Idea" (sect. vii., part 1, *Note*). Here it is evident the Scepticism of Hume is affiliated upon "the Sensualism of Locke" by a mere accident of nomenclature. According to Locke,

* Cf. Cousin's Kant, pp. 62, 63:—"Kant remarque que si Hume au lieu de s'en tenir au principe de causalité, eût examiné tous les autres principes nécessaires, il aurait peut-être reculé devant les conséquences rigoureuses de son opinion. . . . . Il aurait dû rejeter tout jugement synthétique *a priori* c'est-à-dire les mathématiques pures et la haute physique, conséquence extrême qui peut-être aurait retenue cet excellent esprit sur la pente du Scepticisme."

the Idea of Power is not a "Simple Idea"—it is a Complex though uncompounded Idea of Relation, and as a Complex Idea it is by the fundamental distinction of his system "the creature or invention of the Understanding." It is true that Locke occasionally denominates the Idea of Power a Simple Idea, but, as if to obviate the very possibility of Hume's misconception, he tells us that he denominates it Simple merely "for brevity's sake," and "in a looser sense," since in reality it is "Complex" (II. xxi. 3; II. xxiii. 7).

The misconception thus commenced in the Idea of Cause is perpetuated in the *Principle of Causation.* "It was, as far as I know," says Mr. Stewart, "first shown in a satisfactory manner by Mr. Hume, that 'every demonstration which has been produced for the necessity of a Cause to every new existence, is fallacious and sophistical.' In illustration of this assertion he examines three different arguments which have been alleged as proofs of the proposition in question; the first by Mr. Hobbes, the second by Dr. Clarke, and the third by Mr. Locke. And I think it will now be readily acknowledged by every competent judge that his objections to all these pretended demonstrations are conclusive and unanswerable" (*Diss.*, pp. 441, 442). But where is this pretended demonstration of Locke's to be discovered? Nowhere. Locke regards the Principle of Causality as "a Principle of Common Reason" (I. iv. 9),—as a portion of our "Intuitive Know-

ledge" (IV. x. 1),—as a proposition, therefore, which "neither requires nor admits of proof" (IV. vii. 19). Locke maintains the doctrine by which the Sceptical conclusion of Hume was subsequently avoided. Locke agrees with Reid and Kant. What has Hume to object to this conclusion? He did not see the alternative, says Mr. Stewart. On the contrary, Hume saw it, and refused to recognise it as the truth. In the Essays to which he appealed as the sole depository of his Philosophical opinions, strange to say, there is no trace of the problem with which his name has been so generally identified. He shows that we cannot determine, *a priori*, by what Effect a given Cause will be attended (sect. iv.); he accounts for our belief in the Uniformity of the operation of natural Causes by "a species of natural instinct," "a mechanical tendency of thought," "a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our Ideas" (sect. v.); on his own exclusive principles of Empiricism he dogmatically denies the existence of any Idea of Causation, and merges it in the Idea of Antecedence (sect. vii.);* but to the Principle which proclaims that whatever begins to be must have an efficient

* On this subject I cannot refrain from pointing out the parologistic nature of Hume's argument. "When we analyze our Thoughts or Ideas, however compounded or sublime," he says, "we always find that they resolve themselves into such Simple Ideas as were copied from a precedent feeling or sentiment" (sect. ii.) You demur to this proposition. "There is one, and that an easy method of refuting it," says Hume, "by producing

Cause of its being—to this Principle Hume never once alludes, except, indeed, when he endeavours by its aid to destroy our belief in the Freedom of the Human Will (sect. viii.). But though the problem is not proposed, Hume has clearly intimated the principles upon which it should be solved. "All Intuitive Knowledge," he says, "is restricted to Quantity and Number" (sect. xii.). You demand a reason. "All other inquiries of men," he says, "regard only matter of fact and existence, and these are evidently incapable of demonstration" (*Ibid.*). You are not yet satisfied. "No negation of a fact," he says, "can involve a contradiction" (*Ibid.*). In vain you urge that a Change without a Cause is as much a contradiction of the Laws of Thought as a contradiction in terms. Hume has nothing to add. The matter is settled with the *dixi* of the Sage of Samos. And Nihilism is the result. Is Locke responsible for this Nihilism? Hume commences with a misconception of his doctrine, and ends with its positive reversal.

Hume, therefore, as it appears, was no legitimate Sceptic. His Nihilism was the illusion of an Intellect that denied itself. He was the Dogmatist of

that Idea which, in your opinion, is not derived from that source" (*ibid.*). You produce the Idea of Causation. "As we can have no Idea of anything," says Hume, "which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be, that we have no Idea of Connexion or Power at all" (sect. vii.). "Verum enim vero, quandoquidem, dubio procul." This is the very Logic of Master Janotus de Bragmardo.

Doubt. But whatever the character of his Scepticism, whether Sceptical or Dogmatic, whether Relative or Absolute, its effect upon the development of the Philosophy of Europe is beyond denial or dispute. Hume's Philosophy was the sowing of the dragon's teeth in the field of modern speculation; his theory of Causation was the rock of Cadmus, the throwing of which was the signal of mutual war to the host of Metaphysicians that sprang from the ground, like the warriors in the Grecian legend. It was the Scepticism of Hume that roused the indignant Common Sense of Reid; it was the scepticism of Hume which roused into action the Speculative Reason of Kant. But, as I have already said, if the true Philosophy occasioned the false by the force of misconception, the reaction from the false Philosophy only reproduced the true. Enounced by Reid, and systematized by Kant, the Intellectualism of modern Europe is merely a reproduction of the Intellectualism of Locke. Conceding more to the Common Sense of Mankind than Kant, conceding more to the Speculative Reason of the Philosopher than Reid, Locke is in reality at one with the two Philosophers who have proclaimed themselves his foes. Does any one reject this as a monstrous paradox? Let us compare Locke with KANT.

If Locke asserts that "there appear not to be any Ideas in the Mind before the Senses have conveyed any in," and that "Ideas in the Understanding are coeval with Sensation," Kant asserts that "in respect

of time, no knowledge of ours is antecedent to Experience, all knowledge commences with it." If Locke holds that it is Experience which "supplies our Understandings with all the Materials of Thinking," Kant holds that it is Experience which supplies the "Matter" as distinguished from the "Form" of Thought. If Locke contends that "External and Internal Sensation are the only passages of knowledge to the Understanding," Kant contends that External and Internal Sensibility supply the Understanding with the conditions of its development. If Locke declares that "Simple Ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished only by Sensation and Reflection," and that our "Ideas of Relation all terminate in and are concerned about those Simple Ideas, either of Sensation or Reflection, which are the whole materials of all our knowledge" (II. xxv. 9), Kant declares that all our "Intuitions" are furnished by the External Senses or the Internal Sense, and that "all Thought must, directly or indirectly, by means of certain signs, relate ultimately to Intuitions." And in the same manner, if Kant views our Ideas of Sensible Objects as the product of the synthetic energies of the Understanding, it is as "collections" of the Understanding that our Ideas of Substances are viewed by Locke. If Kant regards Time and Space as native Forms of Sensibility and pure Intuitions of Reason,* Locke

* Cousin and Sir William Hamilton object to Kant that he has attributed our *a priori* Knowledge and Ideas to three separate

regards them as "Simple Modes" which the Understanding is not only prompted, but necessitated, to form on the contemplation of the data of Internal and External Sense. If, in addition to the Intuitions of Sense, Kant recognises certain Categories of the Understanding which Reason develops into Concepts, Locke recognises the existence of certain "Ideas of Relation," which he regards as "superadded" to the data of Experience, and which he expressly denominates "the Creatures and Inventions of the Understanding." If Kant insists upon certain composite Conceptions which the Human Intellect is necessitated to form, and which he denominates the Ideas of the Reason, Locke also admits the existence of certain "Abstract Ideas" which he attributes to "the workmanship of the Understanding," and which he regards as "Archetypes" and "Forms." In the Theory of Knowledge the unanimity of the two Philosophers is as conspicuous as in the Origin and Genesis of Ideas. If Kant divides all knowledge into *A posteriori* and *A priori*, the distinction between Experimental knowledge and knowledge supplied by Reason is fundamental in the Logical analysis of

Faculties. But the title of Kant's great work, the "Kritik of the Pure Reason," seems to demonstrate this to be a misconception. It is true, Kant speaks of the *Forms* of Sensibility, the *Categories* of the Understanding, and the *Ideas* of Reason,—but Forms, Categories, and Ideas he regards merely as *Laws* of development. The Intuitions, Concepts, and Ideas Proper that result are all alike the product of Pure Intellect.

Locke. If Kant regards all knowledge as either Analytic or Synthetic, *A priori* or *A posteriori*, Locke makes the distinction of knowledge with reference to Identity, Relation, and Co-existence, the basis of his Theory of Cognition. Finally, if Kant regards all Scientific Knowledge as a development of the Laws of Intellect, it is in the Faculty of Intellectual Intuition that the foundation of all Rational Certainty is laid by Locke.

Nor is this coincidence the result of accident. The two systems were not merely coincident in doctrine, they were coincident in the history of their evolution. Struck with the diversities of opinion that characterized the speculations of preceding Philosophers, the German was led to investigate the cause. Struck with the same spectacle of the various and contradictory opinions by which mankind are influenced, the Englishman was led to institute the same inquiry. Like Kant, he arrived at the conclusion, that "the first step towards satisfying the various inquiries into which the mind of man was apt to run, was to take a Survey of our own Understanding, and ascertain its Powers" (I. i. 7). Like Kant, he saw that we built upon "floating and uncertain principles," till we had examined our Primary and Original Notions, and determined their "necessary connexions and dependencies" (II. xiii. 28). Thus, at the very outset of their Metaphysical Speculations are the two Philosophers agreed. The Preliminary Condition, the *Propædeutic*, of the Science, according

to both, is an Analysis of the Laws of Thought. In the fundamental conception of Metaphysical Method, Locke is the prototype of Kant, and the Essay concerning Human Understanding is in reality an earlier Kritik of the Reason.

The common object of Locke and Kant was to demonstrate that all Rational Certainty is an empirically determined evolution of the Laws of Reason. The System of each was a fabric of Intellectualism reared upon an Empiric basis. Each, to employ the metaphor of Bacon, celebrated the Metaphysical espousals of Reason and Experience. But the development of every Philosophy is modified not only by the Spirit of the Philosopher but by the Spirit of the Age; and while Kant recoiled from the exclusive Sensualism of Condillac and Hume, Locke recoiled from the exclusive Intellectualism of the Schoolman and the Cartesian. Hence it happened that Kant was more peculiarly the Analyst of Intellect, Locke more peculiarly the Analyst of Sense; the Logical Element predominated in one, the Æsthetic Element in the other. And this different bias is apparent at every step in the progress of the two Philosophers. Both agreed in the repudiation of Innate Ideas, and in the recognition of Innate Forms of Thought; but while Kant was eager to determine the Forms of Thought, Locke was anxious to dispel the illusion of Innate Ideas. Both recognised the Origin of Ideas in Sense, and the Genesis of Ideas by the Understanding; but while Kant

devoted himself to the question of the Genesis, Locke threw his whole force into the question of the Origin. Both saw that there are two species of Knowledge,—the one Universal, and the product of Reason ; the other, Particular, and the Educt from Experience ; but while Kant was constantly proclaiming that our Rational Knowledge could not possibly be educed from Experience, Locke was constantly proclaiming with equal emphasis, that our Experimental Knowledge could not possibly be the product of Reason.

Starting from the same point, and journeying for awhile in the same direction, the two Philosophers, however, at length diverged. The point of divergence was with reference to the nature of Experience. According to Locke, our Experimental Knowledge was the result of a species of pre-established harmony. The World was invested with an actual existence on the one hand, and the Mind was predetermined to believe in its existence on the other (II. xxxi. 2). The various natural Causes operated uniformly in the production of their effects, and the Mind was predetermined to anticipate the uniformity (II. xxi. 1). Experience, in short, was the result of the correspondence between the external reality and thought. But Locke's successors abandoned his position. While Hume, though inconsistently, held that the Forms of Thought are determined by the Facts of Experience, Kant, on the contrary held that the Facts of Experience are determined by the Laws of Thought. It was on the

establishment of this principle, indeed, that Kant's Metaphysical System rests; it was here that he diverged not only from Locke, but from the Intellectualists in general.* So far is the Rational Idea of Space from being given by Experience, that it is the condition of the possibility of Experience,—such was the Kantian Formula, so celebrated in the recent history of thought. Whether Kant held that Space was nothing but a Form of Sensibility, may be doubted. It is inconceivable that so consecutive and acute a thinker should have denied the possibility of a knowledge of the Objective, and yet dogmatically have affirmed the objective non-existence of what, even on his own admission, possesses an Empiric reality, that is, a reality relative to our Experience. However this may be, the sentiments of Kant were far from being the sentiments of Locke. The Spirit of the Critical Philosophy pronounced its inexorable

* It was with reference to this procedure that Kant compared the revolution he effected in Metaphysics to the revolution effected by Copernicus in Astronomy. According to M. Cousin, Kant, instead of making Man revolve around Objects, made Objects revolve around Man, just as Copernicus, instead of making the Sun revolve around the Earth, made the Earth revolve around the Sun (*Kant*, p. 40). But Kant's comparison will not bear this exactitude of parallel. If the Spectator be transported to the Sun, the heavenly body is not the object; if, on the contrary, the Spectator remains upon the Earth, the object does not revolve around the subject. The true point of the comparison is this:—As the existence of certain motions in the Spectator makes the heavenly bodies appear to move, so the existence of certain Forms of Thought in Man makes certain so-called realities appear to exist.

non liquet on every argument in favour of the Objective. But, to go no farther, Locke's very distinction between the Primary and the Secondary Qualities is based upon the counter supposition. *A fortiori* the English Philosopher asserted the Objective Reality of Space.

The Philosophy of Locke was distinguished from that of Kant by an Empiric bias. In one respect, however, the Philosophy of Kant was more Empiric than that of Locke. Whatever his views on the nature of Experience, Locke recognised existence beyond its verge. But while the Englishman made Rational Certainty coextensive with the domain of Thought, the German restricted Rational Certainty to the domain of Actual Experience. Here Kant is to be compared, not with Locke, but Hume. On all questions of Ontology, indeed, the speculative Scepticism of the Critic of Reason was even more palpable, more all-pervading, than the dim shadow that dogged the footsteps of the Sophister of Sense. Admitting that we are necessitated to "*cogitate*" the great Ontologic Realities, the German Philosopher denied that we are able to "*cognize*" them; our thought, he said, never could be verified. Within the sphere of Experience, Reason anticipates, and Experience confirms; but what confirmation could the Anticipations of Reason admit when they transcended the sphere of all possible Experience? With regard to the World, the imagination was distracted on every side by counter inconceivabilities; the

Mind was divided against itself; Antinomy was its very Law. The argument in favour of the Immateriality of the Soul was a mere begging of the question—a Paralogism of Psychology; the controversy on the subject was a Metaphysical top that was kept standing on its point merely by being involved in an everlasting whirl. Even God himself, in a Metaphysical point of view, was a mere "Ideal." The domain of Experience, in fine, according to Kant, was an Enchanted Isle, from which the Understanding in vain attempted to escape, and all beyond was fog-bank and illusion. But Locke's Philosophy was animated by a more manly spirit. With that confidence in Reason which constant contact with reality rarely fails to produce, he reverenced its dictates as a Natural Revelation. Whatever we are necessitated to *think*, that, in his opinion, we may be said to *know*. Hence it was that he proclaimed that we have a knowledge of the World of Matter, and the Abyss of Space. Hence he proclaimed that Matter is evidently in its own nature void of thought, and that, the rights of Omnipotence reserved, the Soul is therefore Immaterial. Hence he proclaimed that the existence of God is a fact impossible to be denied, impossible to be made a theme for more than momentary doubt. Like Kant, he held that the Soul is confined to the Isle of Consciousness; like Kant, he protested against our "letting loose our thoughts into the vast Ocean of Being, as if that boundless extent were the natural possession of our Under-

standings" (I. i. 7). But in Locke's system the Soul is not left upon a desert shore, a desolate Ariadne, abandoned to darkness and despair. The ocean surrounds it, and the heavens stretch overhead. True, it can neither traverse the one, nor soar into the other. But its belief transcends the sphere of its Experience; and why should it gratuitously reject its own belief?

But while the Philosophy of Locke is thus advantageously contrasted with that of Kant on the subject of the reality of knowledge, there is one point with respect to which the genius of the German reached a far higher elevation of thought than that of his illustrious rival. By no Philosopher, ancient or modern, has the Moral Law been invested with such majesty as by the great Critic. Other Philosophers have recognised the eternal and immutable nature of Morality; others have recognised the universal and unconditional obligation which the mere conception of Duty is sufficient to impose. But to the eye of Kant the light of the Moral Law not only illumed the Path of Life—it lit up the Abyss of Speculation. It revealed the Freedom of the Will, the Immortality of the Soul, and the Existence of a God. The Metaphysical arguments by which the subtlest wits had for upwards of two thousand years contended for and against these great realities, he compared to the bootless encounters of the heroes in Valhalla. Each shadow mortally wounded its opposing shade; but the wound closed, the combat was

renewed, and each airy champion again wounded "the intrenchant air." The Moral Argument, on the contrary, Kant viewed as bidding defiance to dispute. We *ought*, therefore we *can*—such, for instance, was the sublime enthymeme with which he demonstrated the Freedom of the Will. But far different was the case with Locke. The speculative perception of "the eternal and unalterable nature of Right and Wrong" it was the glory of his system to admit. He neither ignored the existence of these Concepts, with Hobbes, nor did he degrade them to mere Sentiments, with Hume; still less did he represent them to be the offspring of Education and Fashion, with the licentious Moralists who insulted his memory by proclaiming themselves his followers. With Cudworth and with Clarke, he placed our Moral Concepts among those "Relations" so "visibly included in the nature of our Ideas that we cannot conceive them separable by any Power whatsoever." With Cudworth and Clarke, he was the assertor of an Eternal and Immutable Morality. But the legitimate influence of the Concepts of Right and Wrong upon the Will, Locke utterly ignored. It is true, he speaks of the Moral and Eternal Obligation which the Rules of Morality evidently possess. It is true, he compares the perception of Moral Obligation to the perception of Mathematical Truth. But Locke never rises to "the height of this great argument." Not only does he hold that the Will is determined by something from without; he holds that what

immediately determines the Will is the uneasiness of Desire. The Desire of Happiness is with him the sole motive by which man can be influenced, and Morality is thus divested of all its Moral Power.

If on minor points we compare the two Philosophers, the advantage is wholly on the side of Kant. The Philosophy of Transcendentalism we might describe as Cato describes the Philosophy of the Porch:—"Quid, aut in naturâ, quâ nihil est aptius, nihil descriptius, aut in operibus manu factis, tam compositum tamque compactum et coagmentatum inveniri potest? Quid posterius priori non convenit? Quid sequitur quod non respondeat superiori?" In the case of Kant, indeed, as in the case of Bacon, the love of System frequently degenerates into an affectation of Symmetry, in which all System is violated and lost. But if the Kritik is disfigured by the distortions of System, Locke's Essay is characterized by its utter absence. Never was there so systematic a thinker whose exposition was so unsystematic. His cardinal doctrine of Relation, for instance, is to be gathered not only from his chapters on Relation, but from his chapters on Modes and Substances, nay, from the notes appended to his discussion of Simple Ideas; while the whole doctrine of Relation, as developed in the second book, is utterly unintelligible without a constant reference to the doctrine of Intuitive Knowledge, as developed in the fourth. It is the same with his Metaphysic as with his Psychology. His doctrine of Real Existence is to be

sought not only in the fourth book, but in the second and the first—nay, even among the merely logical questions which constitute the matter of the third. Its fragments are to be found scattered up and down through the whole Essay, like the limbs of Absyrtus, the "disjecta membra" of Ontology. Add to this that Definitions are no sooner made than they are abandoned; Divisions are no sooner laid down than they are disregarded; Doctrines are no sooner enounced than fresh elements are incidentally introduced. Locke's Essay, in fact, is not so much an Essay, as a collection of materials for an Essay. All the Elements of the World of Thought are there, but it presents the appearance of a world emerging from Chaos rather than that of a world developed into Creation.

Closely connected with this absence of Systematic Exposition there is another serious defect in the Essay concerning Human Understanding,—the absence of a truly Scientific Language. Here again Locke presents a contrast with his rival. The Scientific Language of Kant satisfies all the requirements of Science. Mr. Stewart, indeed, with that disposition to disparage Kant which he had no anxiety to conceal, sneers at the invention of a new technical Language, and plumes himself on "the communication of clear and precise notions without departing from the established modes of expression." But these established modes of expression have been the ruin of Philosophy. Not only have they enabled an

unscientific Common Sense to constitute itself the arbiter of the subtlest speculations of the Scientific Reason, but they have been the main cause of that apparent diversity of opinion among Philosophers which has so long been the opprobrium of their Science. Do we wish for an illustration of the truth of this? It is supplied by Locke. Locke adopted the views of Mr. Stewart. Locke objected to the coining of new words. Locke abandoned the language of the schools. Locke endeavoured to satisfy the exigencies of speculation by the use of the ordinary modes of expression. To use his own metaphor, he made Philosophy appear in the garb and fashion of the times. And what has been the consequence? A superficial and illusive clearness, which has called down the plaudits of superficial thinkers. "No one," says Shaftesbury, "has done more towards the recalling of Philosophy from barbarity into use and practice of the world, and into the company of the better and politer sort." "The beauties of Mr. Locke's style," says Goldsmith, "though not so much celebrated, are as striking as those of his understanding. He never says more nor less than he ought, and never makes use of a word that he could have changed for a better." But these panegyrics have been dearly purchased. Whatever may be the merits of Locke's style in a mere literary point of view, the Philosophic Critic is constrained to admit, with Sir William Hamilton, that in his language Locke is of all Philosophers the most vague, vacillating, and

various. "Simple Ideas, the Materials of all our knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the Mind only by the two ways, Sensation and Reflection,"—such is the fundamental principle of Locke's Philosophy, enounced in language familiar to the most unphilosophical of readers. But what does Locke mean by "Simple Ideas"? What does he mean by "Materials of Knowledge"? What does he mean by "suggested" as distinguished from "furnished"? What does he mean by "Sensation"? What does he mean by "Reflection"? So far are these expressions from being clear, that they have been universally misunderstood; nay, they have been understood in a sense diametrically the reverse of that which they were intended to convey. It is the same with the terms "Original" and "Derived," "Complex" and "Compound," "Ideas of Comparison" and "Comparison of Ideas." Every word in Locke's Philosophy is an equivoque. Never was there such curious *in*felicity of language.

If we compare Locke and Kant with respect to what is commonly understood by Genius, we must certainly award the palm to Kant. The German Sage was not only endowed with the Spirit of the Philosopher, he was also endowed with the Spirit of the Poet. In the elevation of its tone, and the splendour of its diction, as well as in the unity of its plan, the Kritik of the Pure Reason is a Metaphysical Epic. We might style Kant, as Cicero styled Plato, the Homer of Philosophers. But the

temperament of Locke was cold. Like his great contemporary, Newton, he possessed the power, but not the passion, of Genius. He discusses the Immortality of the Soul and the Obligations of Morality in the same spirit as he discusses the Primary and Secondary Qualities of Matter. "The Thoughts that wander through Eternity" are invested with no superhuman grandeur as they flit across his page. The austerity of his countenance is reflected in the austerity of his style. Locke was the Philosopher of the Puritans.

Even as a Philosopher the superiority of Kant to Locke can scarcely be denied. He had a clearer and more comprehensive view of the great Metaphysical Problem. He was a more systematic thinker. But in contrasting the Essay concerning Human Understanding with the Kritik of the Pure Reason, one thing should never be forgotten, and that is the diversity of the circumstances under which they were produced. The Philosopher of Kœnigsberg was a Philosopher by profession. Throughout his whole life he was the Solitary of Science. Twelve years he spent in slowly elaborating his system in thought, and its embodiment in language was the result of one grand and uninterrupted effort. The absence of all contact with reality may, perhaps, have occasioned that shadowy Scepticism which only haunts the closet of the Recluse. It may also have developed that Ideal purity which floats around his Moral Doctrine. But

Silence and Solitude are the true associates of System. It is no marvel, therefore, if the Transcendental Philosophy issued from the brain of the solitary thinker full-grown and armed at all points, like the Goddess of Wisdom. But while Kant, like Socrates, had scarcely moved beyond the precincts of his native city, and, unlike Socrates, even amidst the buzz and bustle of that city, had moved self-centred and alone; Locke, from the first, had been a man of the world and a man of action. He had been bred to the profession of Physic. He had been mixed up in the most turbulent politics of the period as the friend and confidant of its most turbulent politician. He had visited most of the capitals of Europe in the train of Ambassadors and Diplomatists. He had been driven into exile on the charge of complicity with Rebellion. He was the companion of the men who consummated the great Revolution. He returned to his native country to subside into a Commissioner of Trade. Physician, Politician, Political Economist, and Philosopher,—Philosophy in his life was but an episode. The account which he gives of the composition of his great work is itself a justification of all its defects. "Begun by chance," "continued by entreaty," "written by incoherent parcels," resumed "as humour or occasions permitted"—what wonder is it if such a work reflects the agitations of his life? The agitations of his life detract from the perfection of his Philosophy, but they can only enhance our estimate of the Philosophical genius which under such circumstances be-

queathed to posterity so proud a memorial of its power.

The defects of the Essay concerning Human Understanding are undeniable. Locke takes no pains to conciliate prejudice, or to guard against misapprehension. He protests against errors without sufficiently marking his recognition of the truths they embody. He inculcates truths without marking his reprobation of the errors to which they are akin. He gives undue prominence to certain elements of thought. Add to this, his exposition is confused; his language is ambiguous; his book abounds in repetition and digression. But the merits of this great work are as undeniable as its defects. It contains the first and most complete exposition of Metaphysical Science to be found in the English language. It furnishes a Philosophy which at once satisfies the exigencies of the Schools and the exigencies of common life. With a sage reserve in pronouncing on matters which lie beyond the reach of our faculties, there is an equally sage reliance upon the veracity of our faculties with reference to the matters which lie within their sphere. Locke is the Metaphysical embodiment of the good sense and practical character of the nation from which he sprung.

But the spirit of Locke's Philosophy, to adopt a phrase originally employed with reference to Descartes, is more valuable than even his Philosophy itself. There breathes throughout the Essay a spirit of Intellectual Independence. There breathes a spirit

of Intellectual Toleration which is still more rare. The ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν of Aristotle, "the sacred and religious regard for Truth" inculcated by Butler, is seen conspicuous in every page of Locke. Nor has this absolute devotedness to the interests of Truth been unrewarded. The doctrine of the Essay may be enveloped in ambiguity, disguised by metaphor, darkened by defective exposition; but still it is, for the most part, *true*. And it is this presence of Truth, "unseen, but not unfelt," that has proved its salvation. No book has been professedly confuted so often, and with such a parade of demonstration, and yet no book has suffered so little from its professed confuters. The philosophical instinct of the ordinary reader has proved a more unerring guide than the philosophical acumen of the professed critic. Though unable to demonstrate that Locke was right, he was dissatisfied with every effort to demonstrate him wrong. He acquiesced, though he could not analyze. Hence it is that the Essay concerning Human Understanding, though the driest of all Metaphysical books, has also been the most popular. Hume prophesied that Addison would be read with pleasure when Locke was forgotten, yet it may be doubted whether even the Spectator has had a wider circulation than the Essay. The secret of this success was at once divined by the masculine sagacity of Warburton. Nowhere is the eloquence of the great Theologian so pure as where he manifests his sympathy with kindred genius,

and his eulogy on Locke will bear comparison even with his eulogy on Shaftesbury and Bayle :—"The sage Locke supported himself by no system on the one hand; nor, on the other, did he dishonour himself by any whimsies. The consequence of which was, that, neither following the Fashion nor striking the Imagination, he had at first neither followers nor admirers; but being everywhere clear and everywhere solid, he at length worked his way, and afterwards was subject to no reverses. He was not affected by the new fashions of Philosophy who leaned upon none of the old; nor did he afford ground for the after attacks of envy and folly by any fanciful hypotheses which, when grown stale, are the most nauseous of all things." This panegyric Mr. Stewart regards as "an additional example of that national spirit which, according to Hume, forms the great happiness of the English, and leads them to bestow on all their great writers such praises and acclamations as may often appear partial and excessive" (*Diss.*, p. 162). But the panegyric of Warburton is not more eloquent than just. Succeeding time will only confirm its justice, and to the latest posterity, when the native of a foreign land shall wish to pay homage to the philosophical genius of this country, he will speak of it as the country of Bacon and of Locke.

APPENDIX.

BERKELEY AND ABSTRACT IDEAS.

ACCORDING to Locke, "it is the contemplation of our own Abstract Ideas that alone is able to afford us General Knowledge" (IV. vi. 16). This passage suggests two questions—What, according to Locke, is the nature of our Abstract Ideas?—What, according to Locke, is the immediate object of the Mind in General Reasoning?

The consideration of these questions cannot be better introduced than by quoting two celebrated passages, which, though often commented on, have never yet been understood:—

"The next thing to be considered is, how General Words come to be made. For, since all things that exist are only Particulars, how come we by General Terms, or where find we those General Natures they are supposed to stand for? Words become general by being made the Signs of General Ideas; and Ideas become general by separating from them the circumstances of time and place, and any other Ideas that may determine them to this or that particular existence. By this way of Abstraction they are made capable of representing more individuals than one; each of which having in it a conformity to that Abstract Idea, is (as we call it) of that sort . . . . . There is nothing more evident than that the Ideas of the persons children converse with (to instance in them alone), are, like the persons themselves, only particular. The names they first give to them are confined to these individuals.

Afterwards, when time and a larger acquaintance has made them observe that there are a great many other things in the world, that in some common agreements of shape and several other qualities resemble their father and mother, and those persons they have been used to, they frame an Idea which they find those many particulars do partake in; and to that they give, with others, the name 'man,' for example. Wherein they make nothing new, but only leave out of the Complex Idea they had of Peter and James, Mary and Jane, that which is peculiar to each, and retain only what is common to them all"* (III. iii. 6, 7).

"Thus Particular Ideas are first received and distinguished, and so knowledge got about them; and next to them the less general or specific, which are next to particular; for Abstract Ideas are not so obvious or easy to children, or the yet unexercised Mind, as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so; for when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that General Ideas are fictions and contrivances of the Mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine. For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the General Idea of a Triangle? (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique, nor rectangle, neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon; but all and none of these at once. In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist; an Idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent Ideas are put together" (IV. vii. 9).

On this latter passage, Berkeley in the Introduction to his Principles of Human Knowledge remarks:—"If any man has the

* According to the Theory of Smith and Condillac, a name is first given to an individual, then instinctively transferred to all individuals that bear a resemblance to the first, and lastly, by an act of Reflection, made the symbol of the points in which the individuals agree to the exclusion of those in which they differ. According to Locke, the individual name is not transferred—a general name is fabricated. In the preceding quotation I have somewhat abridged the words of Locke.

faculty of framing in his Mind such an Idea of a Triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is, that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself, whether he has such an Idea or no" (sect. xiii.). The sense in which Berkeley understood Locke's Abstract General Idea is evident from what he has previously said. He considered Locke as holding that a General Idea might be idealized in its generality, that the Abstract Idea could be mentally realized "in Abstract" (sects. vii.–xi.). The criticism thus enounced by Berkeley was reproduced by Hume and accepted by Reid, Stewart, and Brown. It is acquiesced in by the Editor of Reid. Crambe's General Idea of a Lord Mayor, in fact, is, in the opinion of Philosophers, the type and parallel of Locke's General Idea of a Triangle. But, as Mr. Hallam has well observed on another occasion, "it ought surely to have occurred that, in proportion to the absurdity of such a notion, is the want of likelihood that a mind eminently cautious and reflective should have embraced it" (*Lit. Hist.*, iv. 148). Locke's General Idea, in fact, is not so much an *Idea* as a collection of the Ideas connoted by a General Term (III. iii. 6, 10, 13); his Abstract Idea is not a generalization capable of being individualized "in Abstract," it is a generalization obtained by a process of "Abstraction" (III. iii. 6). Locke's General Abstract Idea is in reality a mere "Definition" (III. iii. 10). It is true, Locke speaks of the General Idea of a Triangle as including "all and none" of the peculiarities of the various Individual Triangles "at once;" but it is the very nature of a Definition *virtually* to comprehend the peculiarities which it *actually* excludes. It is true, Locke speaks of the difficulty connected with the formation of our Abstract Ideas; but he is speaking of a difficulty, not of an impossibility, and the difficulty he alludes to is constantly betraying itself in minds unaccustomed to speculation, by abortive attempts to reduce the Abstract to the Concrete, the General to the Particular, the Definition framed by Intellect to an Image conceivable by Sense. The Abstract Idea is "the measure of name and the boundary of species" (III. iii. 14). It is, in the only proper sense of the term, a "Form"

(III. iii. 13). It is the Idea of Plato, the General Concept of the recent Logicians of Germany. In short, it is the "Scheme" of Kant. "No Image," says Kant, "could ever be adequate to our conception of a Triangle in general. It never could attain to the generality of the conception which includes under itself all Triangles, whether right-angled, acute-angled, &c. The Scheme of the Triangle can exist nowhere else than in thought, and it indicates a Rule of the Synthesis of the Imagination in regard to Figures in pure Space."

The ulterior question may now easily be settled. Locke's Abstract Idea is not the *Separate Essence* attributed to the Realist; for he holds that it is "something imperfect which cannot exist" (IV. vii. 9). It is not the *Idea-Image* attributed to the Conceptualist; for he tells us it is "an Idea wherein some parts of several different and inconsistent Ideas are put together" (*ibid.*). It is not the *Arbitrary Abstraction* attributed to the Nominalist; for though he holds it to be "the creature and invention of the Understanding" (III. iii. 11), he also holds that it must have its "foundation in the similitude of things" (III. iii. 13). It is a *collection of the Ideas* connoted by a general term (III. iii. 13, 14). But, the Concept once formed, did Locke hold that the whole collection of Ideas must be actually present to the Mind at every step of the reasoning process? If so, he must be regarded as a Conceptualist. Or did he hold that the connotation of the general term being once fixed, it might be employed as an *Algebraic Symbol*, the meaning lying latent during the process, and being called into evidence only when we come to interpret the result? In that case Locke is in reality a Nominalist. This point may be easily determined. Locke, it is true, maintains that "it is the contemplation of our own Abstract Ideas that alone is able to afford us General Knowledge" (IV. vi. 16); and this with perfect reason. The contemplation of the Concept must certainly have preceded the employment of the Symbol. Even in Algebra we must consider the Conditions of the Question before we can form the Symbolic Equation. But the meaning of the Symbol once determined, the Equation once formed, Locke unequivocally admits that the

General Term may be employed as an Instrument of Reasoning. This is evident enough from his distinction between Mental and Verbal Propositions (IV. v. 4); but one passage is decisive of the question. "I do not say," says Locke, "a man need stand to recollect, and make this analysis at large every time the word comes in his way; but this, at least, is necessary, that he have so examined the signification of that name, and settled the Idea of all its parts in his mind, that he can do it when he pleases" (III. xi. 9).

In spite of all apparent differences, Locke, and Berkeley, and Reid, are, in reality, at one. "How can you employ a General Term," says Locke, "unless you have a General Idea to regulate its application?" "I do not deny absolutely that there are General Ideas," says Berkeley, "but only that there are Abstract General Ideas" (*Int.*, sect. xii.). "My Abstract General Idea," Locke would reply, "is not a General Idea idealized in Abstract, —it is a General Idea obtained by a process of Abstraction." "Even admitting that modification of your doctrine," says Berkeley, "it is not necessary (even in the strictest reasonings) significant terms which stand for Ideas should, every time they are used, excite in the Understanding the Ideas they are made to stand for" (sect. xix.)* "Granted," says Locke, "I have stated precisely the same in the third book of my Essay." "But," exclaims Reid, addressing himself to Berkeley, "your reasoning seems unwillingly or unwarily to grant all that is necessary to support Abstract and General Conceptions. If, as you say, a man may consider a figure merely as *Triangular* (sect. xvi.); if an Idea becomes general, by being made to represent or stand for all other particular Ideas of the same *sort* (sect. xii.), then you concede

* According to Mr. Mansel, "throughout Berkeley's Dissertation, too little notice is taken of the important fact, that we can, and in the majority of cases do, employ Concepts as Instruments of thought, without submitting them to the test of even possible individualization" (*Prolegomena*, p. 31). I think Mr. Mansel, if he were to re-peruse that dissertation, would see reason to retract his assertion. In the Minute Philosopher, at all events (Dialogue vii., sect. vi.–viii.), Berkeley has left no doubt as to his views upon this point.

everything for which the Conceptualist contends" (*Reid*, p. 408). The answer of both Locke and Berkeley is obvious. "You confound the manner in which the Symbol is employed with the manner in which it was originally framed. *Framed* to connote the Attributes comprehended in a Concept, it may consistently be *employed* as an unmeaning Symbol."

The Scottish School is thus guilty of a double misrepresentation. It attributes to Locke an absurdity he never held—the absurdity of the Abstract Idea-Image. It refuses to Berkeley a doctrine which he undoubtedly did hold—the doctrine of General Notions obtained by Abstraction.

According to M. Cousin, the Realist was right with reference to the General Necessary Idea, such as that of Space, and the Nominalist was right with reference to the General Collective Idea, such as that of a Book. It is sufficient to remark that the Idea of Space is not a General Idea, and that it is with reference to General Collective Ideas alone that the whole controversy raged.

THE END.