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FOR ENGLISH LITERATURE





LORD BYRON'S
CAIN, A MYSTERY,
WITH
NOTES.

W. H. BIRCHALL, PRINTER, 5, ST. JAMES'S PL. CLERKENWELL, LON

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LORD BYRON'S

// CAIN, A MYSTERY: //

WITH

N O T E S;

WHEREIN THE

RELIGION OF THE BIBLE

IS CONSIDERED, IN REFERENCE TO ACKNOWLEDGED

Philosophy and Reason.

BY HARDING GRANT;

Author of "Chancery Practice."

"JUDGE RIGHTEOUS JUDGMENT."

"PROVE ALL THINGS."

"JUSTIFY THE WAYS OF GOD."

LONDON:


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LORD BYRON'S

PREFACE.

THE following scenes are entitled "a Mystery," in conformity with the ancient title annexed to dramas upon similar subjects, which were styled "Mysteries, or Moralities." The author has by no means taken the same liberties with his subject which were common formerly, as may be seen by any reader curious enough to refer to those very profane productions, whether in English, French, Italian, or Spanish. The author has endeavoured to preserve the language adapted to his characters; and where it is (and this is but rarely) taken from actual *Scripture*, he has made as little alteration, even of words, as the rhythm would permit.* The reader will recollect that the book of Genesis does not state that Eve was tempted by a demon, but by "the Serpent;" and that only because he was "the most subtil of all the beasts of the field." Whatever interpretation the Rabbins and the Fathers may have put upon this, I must take the words

* Some variations will be occasionally noticed.—G.

as I find them, and reply with Bishop Watson upon similar occasions, when the Fathers were quoted to him, as Moderator in the schools of Cambridge, "Behold the Book!"—holding up the Scripture.* It is to be recollected that my present subject has nothing to do with the *New Testament*, to which no reference can be here made without anachronism.† With the poems upon similar topics I have not been recently familiar. Since I was twenty, I have never read Milton; but I had read him so frequently before, that this may make little difference. Gesner's "Death of Abel" I have never read since I was eight years of age at Aberdeen. The general impression of my recollection is delight; but of the contents I remem-

* Certainly, the scriptures are the only rule and authority. But then those scriptures must be the subject of *fair reasoning* and criticism, derived from right sources, in order to be understood in *some* parts of them. For instance Bishop Watson, I presume, would have referred to reason and common sense, and perhaps other legitimate authority, in explaining those words of Jesus Christ—"This is my Body:"—he would not, I must suppose, have "held up the book" in order to prove that Christ's human body was literally eaten in the wafer or bread in the celebration of the Lord's Supper. And so of other things. Therefore the mere "holding up the book" is not *always* sufficient. But in *general* it is. Yet again, it is not when the same passage is differently rendered or understood by different individuals. And individuals have a right to differ. In such cases must not reference be had to analogy, and *other* rational aids to a true interpretation?—G.

† Yet it will be seen throughout the Notes, that his Lordship has many *allusions*, if not references, to the New Testament.—G.

ber only that Cain's wife was called Mahala, and Abel's Thirza: in the following pages I have called them "Adah" and "Zillah," the earliest female names which occur in Genesis; they were those of Lamech's wives: those of Cain and Abel are not called by their names. Whether, then, a coincidence of subject may have caused the same in expression, I know nothing, and care as little.

The reader will please to bear in mind (what few choose to recollect) that there is no allusion to a future state in any of the books of Moses, nor indeed in the Old Testament. For a reason for this extraordinary omission he may consult "Warburton's Divine Legation;" whether satisfactory or not, no better has yet been assigned. I have therefore supposed it new to Cain, without, I hope, any perversion of Holy Writ.*

With regard to the language of Lucifer, it was difficult for me to make him talk like a Clergyman upon the

* In the course of the Notes, it will be seen that I differ from Lord Byron and Bishop Warburton on this subject. But to enter largely upon this discussion is no part of the business of the Notes. Yet a kind friend has since adverted to the instances of Elijah and Enoch; and Saul's *idea* that Samuel *could* be *raised*; also Daniel's declaration—"they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament, and they that turn many to righteousness as the stars—*forever and ever*:" also David's "*waking up*" after the divine likeness; *et alia*: and I apprehend that though it be generally admitted that the Old Testament *abounds* with *less clear*, indeed, yet, still, *evident* testimonies of a future state.—G.

same subjects; but I have done what I could to restrain him within the bounds of spiritual politeness.

If he disclaims having tempted Eve in the shape of the Serpent, it is only because the book of Genesis has not the most distant allusion to any thing of the kind, but merely to the Serpent in his serpentine capacity.*

Note.—The reader will perceive that the author has partly adopted in this poem the notion of Cuvier, that the world had been destroyed several times before the creation of man. This speculation, derived from the different strata and the bones of enormous and unknown animals found in them, is not contrary to the Mosaic account, but rather confirms it; as no human bones have yet been discovered in those strata, although those of many known animals are found near the remains of the unknown. The assertion of Lucifer, that the pre-adamite world was also peopled by rational beings much more intelligent than man, and proportionably powerful to the mammoth, &c. &c. is, of course, a poetical fiction to help him to make out his case.

I ought to add, that there is a “Tramelogédie” of Alfieri, called “Abel.”—I have never read that nor any other of the posthumous works of the writer, except his Life.

* In the Notes, however, this is rather differently imagined.—G.

P R E F A C E

TO THE

NOTES.

It may possibly be thought by some, that the dramatic poem which is the subject of the following annotations, is not a proper one for extended comment. The writer however has a contrary persuasion. Nor does he yield to the painful idea, that English minds, and the spirit and taste of the present age or day, are so sunken, and lost to rationality, as to be wholly and universally averse to serious subjects, *merely* because they are the opposite of light and frivolous, and invite thought;—or because man's spiritual and eternal concerns form their prominent feature.

In this undertaking, the author is aware that his *professed* province is that of Annotator. To guard against the censure of having sometimes exceeded his due limits, or drowned the text in his Notes; he avows that he intends no promulgation of the original (so well known) but for the sake of his accompanying comment, as a frank exposition of his own sentiments on the subjects (deemed by him important to human welfare) to which the original work affords occasion. He therefore relies upon immunity from condemnation on the score of

length at any rate; whilst, on the score of *sense*, he is conscious he *must* bear the shock. Yet he entertains a *hope*, that, to *some* extent at least, the impressions, under the influence of which (satisfactorily to himself) he has written, may be destined to find their way to the minds of those who read; and if so, his end will be most happily gained.

Should some, of more advanced years and mature knowledge, be of opinion that many, or all of the points which come under consideration, are so obviously *self-antidoted*, as neither to require nor deserve discussion; he would observe, that those matters which some may think thus obvious and self-antidoted, may not be so to others; especially those of *earlier* years, and consequently of less matured and established experience and reflection. In this latter class, there may be many, in whom PRINCIPLE is yet fluctuating. But he further thinks, that complete and desirable disentanglement of right from wrong, and truth from error, is often not to be effected on a cursory perusal. Many also who may read *these* lines, are well aware, that propositions are sometimes advanced not only concisely, but so artfully, that what is contained in very few words, may require the use of many to confute them effectually. They know too, that it is far easier, often, to *feel* intuitively, a position or assertion to be false, than to *shew* it to be so; because several subjects or ideas are in such cases involved in the confutation of one short dictum, the unravelling of which therefore, to detect its error, may require both time and thought. Charges are easily made; but often not so

easily answered ; yet does not that imply that they *can not* be answered. And if something of this kind be not done on *some* occasions, error and vice triumph, and make progress and impression. The only way to prevent this (if desirable to be prevented ; which will not be denied by any who love the truth) is to expose, the self-contradiction very often, and always the irrationality, of error and of vice, by solid and convincing argument. He has also felt, that the very *habit* of practically extricating truth from falsehood, by a right process, may be useful to those who are beginning life. This effect he has sincerely *intended*. His success or failure in his attempt, he is aware, must be left to other judgment than his own.

• He disclaims *preachment*. Yet, if Lucifer himself be sometimes found to preach as well as to philosophize, his annotator perhaps may be excusable, if his annotation should occasionally also bear some unavoidable resemblance to the text in that respect. And although he would not (if able) entrench upon that higher office ; yet he trusts it is not a literary, or any other offence in a layman — for laymen also are not forbidden to consult for souls — if he venture to express opinions connected with spiritual and religious, as well as moral and philosophical subjects, where and when the occasion seems to demand it. He relies too on not being inculpated (for the topics are sometimes, as he conceives, important) nor too closely curtailed, if he be found using the privilege of an Englishman (friend to all constitutional and righteous government) in expressing his mind freely upon matters he deems too

interesting to his fellow creatures to be wholly omitted.*

He cannot, moreover, promise, that some repetitions, or at least the same or similar matter, in different points of view, may not, sometimes, occur; but flatters himself this will not be felt as strictly tautological, but rather pardoned, from the nature of the original, which deals considerably in repetition, and which therefore makes repeated observation in some respects unavoidable; for error is so little ceremonious in point of repetition, (often her only weapon, and only hope,) that unless closely followed, she may escape; as, he thinks, will be perceived.

I am not unaware of the existence of various *other* productions of the late Lord Byron's pen. And though I may sometimes express myself in favourable terms towards his Lordship ["render unto all their dues"] on account of several passages in *this* performance; yet that apologizes not for any other of his Lordship's publications that may be justly deemed (if any such there be) objectionable; and with which I am quite unacquainted. Nor can I *pledge* myself, that his Lordship was the subject of those religious persuasions, which I have, perhaps, occasionally, in these pages, indulged a hope of his having

* The late venerable Granville Sharp once told the present writer, on an accidental (his first and last) interview, that the new Spanish Government could not stand, because it was not a *righteous* one; and being therefore displeasing to the Almighty he would not sustain it. He wished them to have adopted the institutions of his admired ALFRED! How far his ardent benevolence to his fellow men was more than simply and justifiably enthusiastic, and bordered on Quixotic, I shall leave to better judges than myself of that nice distinction.

been, from his introduction of matters directly connected with religious principles; which I can hardly account for being so introduced, unless by an individual, who, at least, did not wholly condemn the subjects implicated in them. But the truth is, that in these Notes I have treated his Lordship precisely as I would have done any other author: that is, impartially and candidly, and as having no other knowledge of him than from the work before me. I have therefore given him deserved credit for all the good I have found; and charged all of a contrary nature to the account of his intention of exemplifying evil characters and principles, for the purpose of so exposing them, that good may be educed from their confutation. It has appeared to me, that Christian charity, and common justice, (and what is that religion which embraces not charity and justice?) demand this mode of dealing with the late Lord Byron; of whom, although I know but little biographically, I am from that little quite unprepared to think he was a man (even if less happily distinguished than some others in spiritual matters) capable (that is, having the disposition) of deliberately and intentionally doing any thing he deemed hurtful, to any creature. That *much*, of a *contrary* character, including generosity and sympathy, did, indisputably, belong to him, is, I fancy, well known. That he was an oppressor, and therefore not *truly* noble, I have not found. What relates to his responsibility to his creator, belongs not to man to scan; or, if he do, with candour and caution, regulated by the word of truth:—that word, which says, “he that is without sin among you, let him cast the first

stone." Yet sin is that which is opposed to God; and which, unrenounced by man, and uncanceled by the Redeemer of sinners, will separate from him;—FOREVER!

As to Lucifer and Cain; *them* I have (*ex animo*, and to the best of my ability) not spared: yet I hope not to the neglect of all required *equity*.

Were it right that I should assign a reason for this publication so long after the appearance of its principal, I would say, that about nine years ago, on its first appearance, I read a few lines of it in the papers of the day, with great displeasure. Since which, I have been totally forgetful of it, until a few months past, when being very unexpectedly induced to read it through, I was much surprized at many parts of it, of a nature I little looked for, and was thence swayed considerably in the author's favour.* This impression was so strong, as to persuade me that an appropriate comment in the form of Notes, would, if under right guidance, be useful.

If I should be thought to be sometimes rather discursive, I can only say, I have been no more so than I judged needful for elucidation.

With respect to novelty, it may possibly be difficult to shew to be incorrect that ancient scripture apophthegm, —“there is nothing new under the sun.” But whether that assertion can be literally and unqualifiedly sustained or not; it may I think, be safely affirmed, that at the present day at any rate, it is not *quite* the easiest of all possible things to produce what is absolutely new, in any

* “Fiat justitia, ruat cælum.”

department of whatever is "knowable" among men, within the whole range of material or intellectual being. Things or ideas may indeed be so combined, or modified, or dressed up, as to be new to many; yet others may quickly analyze, or disrobe them, and so discover their origin. What object of human attention is there which is not, more or less, comprehended in this liability? Those subjects which form the ground work of the ensuing annotations are not least exposed to the observation of their want of novelty. Appropriate newness of expression and of application, to meet recent authors, seems therefore to be all, or nearly all, that can be expected in point of novelty; but freshness of application is still not without its serviceableness, considering the proneness of man to forget, or to disregard.

If, then, the "sage erudite profound" (to whom what can be new?) find little or no claim to novelty in these Notes, he will not be surprized, nor will his candour suffer it to operate unfavourably to their author. I affect not that celebrity; and if any affect it, can they stand the ordeal of severe scrutiny?

Still, short of such absolute newness of thinking or writing, there is doubtless much debateable space to be usefully, and even *agreeably*, occupied. This, according to my power, I aspire to take possession of; that is, my proper niche and *modicum* of that arena. When, however, I say *agreeably* occupied, I frankly do not mean on the present occasion, *that* sort of agreeableness which serves merely to pass an hour by *amusing*, at the expence of all the higher, and infinitely more important and interesting,

realities of our nature. Amusements must fail with our bodies; not so our higher percipient faculties. *They* must survive; and if not *rightly* provided for in our present state of being, the pleasures and gratification of all our inferior and ill-suited imaginative amusements (whether of more serious or frivolous cast) must be among our bitterest and *never-ending* annoyers. Ever-lasting and never-ending, are words of most serious import, when to the one is attached happiness, and to the other misery. Why will we not care to *secure* the first?

I wish to add explicitly, that I have treated the proceedings and speeches of Cain and Lucifer with the same earnestness as if they were existing and earthly personages; which I say for the purpose of disclaiming all personality towards the author of their characters. In fact I have felt myself to have had to do with Cain and Lucifer, and not with Lord Byron, throughout, except when I have met with sentiments which I conceived his Lordship to have held in common with myself.

DRAMATIS PERSONÆ.

MEN.

ADAM.

CAIN.

ABEL.

SPIRITS.

ANGEL OF THE LORD.

LUCIFER.

WOMEN.

EVE.

ADAH.

ZILLAH.



C A I N.

ACT I. SCENE I.

The Land without Paradise.—Time, Sunrise.

ADAM, EVE, CAIN, ABEL, ADAH, ZILLAH,

Offering a Sacrifice.

ADAM.

GOD, the Eternal! Infinite! All-Wise!—
Who out of darkness on the deep didst make
Light on the waters with a word—all hail!
Jehovah, with returning light, all hail!

EVE.

God! who didst name the day, and separate
Morning from night, till then divided never—
Who didst divide the wave from wave, and call
Part of thy work the firmament—all hail!

Note 1.

ALTHOUGH it is not generally, if ever, expected of a dramatic writer to vouch for the existence, the attributes, or the principles of all his characters; yet, the subjects and the objects of the work before us are, (unlike most others of that class,) of so paramount an interest to mankind, that it is scarcely to be supposed that Lord Byron's powerful and inquisitive mind should suffer them to employ his pen, without examining every source of evidence in their support. At least, this observation applies to the opinions which we must suppose him to have seriously entertained; such, in particular, as those which respect the being, and the attributes, of deity. The preceding and subsequent addresses (beautiful and scriptural as they are) preclude therefore all doubt of the result of his lordship's enquiries on the subject of them, and convince us, were such proof wanting, that he was not *atheistical* in his sentiments.

Yet, even indulging the hope that atheism, in the present day, has but few if any real votaries, it may still be not out of place here, to advert briefly to some of the considerations which, it is imagined, must, more or less, have influenced Lord Byron's mind, in rejecting that strange and unnatural system, as unworthy of reasonable beings.

PLATO'S definition or description of atheism it is presumed will not, even at this distant period, be objected to. His name, however, high as it stands in the records of human intelligence and worth, is not thus introduced affectedly, or as if no modern and satisfactory explanation of the term were believed to be now extant. He is referred to rather, with the view of retaining some familiarity with the sages of antiquity, whose convictions of the existence of a supreme creator and moral governor of the universe resulted from the investigations of the highest order of human intellect, uninfluenced by, because unacquainted with, the christian revelation. And are there not some persons to whom,

at this day, that circumstance is a recommendation on that subject? *Reason*, therefore, in these ancients, (for Plato, though thus singled out, is but one of many, though perhaps the chief,) may surely be allowed to be unbiassed and uncorrupted by any supposed christian errors or deceptions; if indeed, which is not here allowed, any thing, *truly* christian, can deceive or mislead.

The definition or description then, which Plato (*de leg. l. x.*) gives of atheism, appears to be this. First, that it is a denial of the existence of any supreme being, or original cause and maker of all things. Secondly, admitting such a supreme being, but denying his providence and government of human affairs. Thirdly, admitting the divine providence and observation of men's actions, but denying his justice in punishing sin. For, (contrary to the opinions of some philosophizing geniuses of the present day,) the masters of reason of old time, and even before the introduction of christianity, thought that there was such a moral quality affecting man as *sin*, and that it needed the forgiveness of the Moral Governor of the universe. It is with the first only of these three aspects of atheism, as exhibited by Plato, that we have here to do.

Lord Byron therefore had, as may reasonably be supposed, similar views to those of Plato, and the other ancients who thought with him, respecting the existence and attributes of deity. We may take a glance at the deductions of reason which probably influenced a mind like Lord Byron's, as well as that of Plato.

Plato first demonstrates the Divine and Supreme Existence, from the universal consent of all times and nations; for where can a nation be found in the known world (such is Plato's reasoning) where deity has been wholly excluded from their belief; or, in other words, atheism publicly professed? Plato therefore considers "the hypothesis *that there is a god*, to be a self-evidencing first principle needing no argument for its confirmation, because nature itself instructs us therein; it being that which the most profligate men cannot rase out of their souls."

Such was the opinion of Plato indeed, and others of similar

character, in *his* time. But *some* philosophers or geniuses, of *modern* time, it must be confessed, think Plato and the rest not so remarkable for wisdom, as for folly, in that opinion. For, instead of concluding, with them, from a view and consideration of nature, as will presently be more particularly noticed, that there must be a god, these *other* philosophers, of *this* day, on the contrary think, that such view and consideration of nature require them, in all reason, to believe, that there is *no* god. So, we are told, "the fool hath said in his heart there is no god." What are called the scriptures therefore take part with Plato. But with these *moderns* the scriptures weigh not.

Here, if a short digression may be allowed, it seems desirable, in point of connexion, to add, that as Plato spoke of men not being able to rase out of their souls the notion of deity; so, in point of fact, he really believed and taught, that man's nature is twofold; viz. spiritual, as well as animal; and that the former, in common usage termed the soul, is distinct from the latter; not depending for its existence upon the organization of the brain, or any other part of the body; but immaterial, immortal, and capable of the most acute apprehension of happiness or misery. This capacity of intense happiness or misery indeed it is, which renders such disquisitions so important and interesting; for otherwise (were the present state all) they would be, comparatively if not absolutely, trifling and useless. And what does intellect itself weigh, when placed in the opposite scale to mental enjoyment or suffering, except as made conducive to the acquisition of the one, or preservation from the other?

It is indeed granted, that as there are some philosophers (or geniuses) of the present day who despise Plato, and the rest of those of elder time, who believed in a god; so there are other, or perhaps the very same philosophers or geniuses of this age and nation, who equally despise the ancients just noticed, for that other opinion of theirs, that man has an *immortal* spirit or soul, or any spirit or soul *at all*. The philosophy, and learning, and

temper, of these philosophers (or geniuses) unlike the learning of Plato and his confederate weaklings, leads *these* more enlightened, more intellectual persons to a supercilious contempt of those who believe in the possibility of any enjoyment or suffering, either spiritual, or purely mental, in their present, or any future state of existence beyond the grave. They think themselves exalted in denying any such attributes of their nature; and in affirming themselves and all their species to be animals only, in common with their brethren of the forest and the field. These philosophers moreover, deeming themselves animal only, like those their equals of the field or the stall, *consequently* claim their privileges of exemption also from not only all responsibility to any superior, almighty power, or moral governor, as moral beings and responsible moral agents; but also from the intrusions of that most inconvenient and troublesome annoyer, called conscience. Thus, coupling their denial of a god, a soul, and a conscience, they walk at liberty, without unmanly restraint. What other concern have they respecting their moral character or conduct, or their social intercourse, than to keep themselves clear of conviction and punishment? For if they have the power of committing evil with impunity as to human knowledge, they have no fearful motive whatever to debar them slavishly from the acquisition of any object of their desires. But if man be not, in his nature, a creature to be influenced by fear, as well as by his love of morality, why any human laws? Or how can *they* regard morality, who deny a god, the source of all morals, and whose sanctions alone it is, which make morality more than an empty name?

In all human systems of philosophy or ethics, there are perhaps always some conveniences and inconveniences, some advantages and disadvantages. Nor do I pretend to think that the ethics of these moderns of the present day are free from some *most serious*, (though *future*) disadvantages; which I do not particularize, because, as the scriptures weigh not with them, (though scripture *doctrines* weighed with Plato) I deem it a hopeless task. I therefore content myself

with having thus generally stated the conveniences to be derived from this system of philosophy. It is true there may be some (possibly the major part by far of civilized society) who deem these ethics dangerous. But if so, they have no right, that I know of, to condemn them, except in the way of opinion or argument: though certainly at liberty to be on their guard against their disciples: and also at liberty to restrain them, if they suffer their inward freedom to seduce them to evil acts, if, happily for society, such acts should be discovered.

The above Platonic argument however from universal consent for the existence of God [against these moderns who think all nature cries aloud, there is *no* god] may be extended, by even adverting to the polytheism of the pagan world; which nothing, but the indelible notion springing out of general tradition, that there was some supreme being to whom they owed their homage, can account for. Their ignorance at the same time, of the one and only true God, forms no objection to this position. Nor, even in the *jurisprudential* institutions of any civilized portion of mankind, has tradition ever been, as tradition merely, refused in evidence.

CICERO's equal authority with Plato, and his character for clearness of intellect, and strength of mind, and understanding, and all rational investigation; not inferior to any mortal I presume of the present or any preceding period—these well known characteristics of that eminent person need not here be enlarged upon in favour of the existence of a god now under consideration. Nor can it be needful to quote his beautiful yet convincing arguments, drawn from a contemplation of the heavens, and the whole creation, for the existence of a supreme, self-existing, independent, omnipotent, all-wise, infinite mind, or pure intelligence; spiritual, and remote from all matter, in its essence; and which he, with others, denominated God, and deemed the sole creator, as well as moral governor of the universe. Cicero's arguments, as is well known, turn chiefly upon the gross absurdity and irrationality of denying or doubting these first principles, in the face of

such evidence; deeming those not to be deserving the name of men, who do so. But the following arguments of Plato, or reasoning deduced from his philosophy, however cursorily stated, being of somewhat different description, and perhaps not much adverted to in modern times, may possibly be thought not inapplicable or uninteresting.

The *subordination* of second causes and effects to a *first cause*, Plato, then, considered as affording another source of argument for the existence of God, as appears in his *Timæus*. This argument includes the creation of the world by a first cause. That the world, whether considered as a whole, or as consisting of its component parts, cannot be self-created, or eternal, appears evident from the following considerations. First, if self-made, it must have acted physically before it had a being; which is a plain impossibility. Then, as to its being eternal, if it be said that eternal existence does not necessarily imply self-creation, but only necessary self-existence; can such self-existence be, satisfactorily to reason and common sense, attributed to any being not of an intelligent nature? And is matter intelligent? And does not the refusal to admit the *one* principle of a supreme, necessarily self-existent, intelligent, and infinite being, involve innumerable other and insolvable difficulties, which are all avoided by the admission of that one principle? Some of these difficulties will be glanced at presently. And to the admission of that one, master principle, there seems to be no shadow of objection, but this; that man finds a difficulty in conceiving of such a being. But is that a sufficient reason, against such a mass of evidence in favour of that one master principle? For can man comprehend even his own existence, his intellectual powers, or mental capacity? We see effects which nothing but such an adequate cause can account for. And is unsatisfactory uncertainty to be preferred to rational certainty and its beneficial consequences? If indeed any will have the world to have been eternal, but not necessarily self-existent; that notion may perhaps be allowed; and that even without prejudice

to the attributes of the Supreme Being, if we admit the possibility of an eternal *creature*, whether matter generally, or matter in any specific form. Supposing therefore the sun to have eternally shone, or the world to have eternally existed, still it must have been from an active, intelligent first cause. But whether God has forever had creatures co-eternal with himself, or passed an eternity without creation, what created being can tell, unless from revelation? And to man that point has not been revealed.

The world, and the atomic particles, of course, of which it is composed, are also known to be material. It is essentially necessary to matter to be inert, incapable of voluntary motion; nay, even to resist by its *vis inertie*, any change of its present state. How then can such particles of matter, inert, incapable of self-motion, unintelligent, be rationally believed or imagined to have come casually together, and to have formed wonderful productions, wherein intelligence, skill, and design are undeniably manifest, without the intervention and operations of an intelligent power, of which matter itself is destitute?

If then the world was undeniably *produced*, it must have been so produced by some cause, as there is no effect without a cause. And that such cause must, in this case, be a supreme, self-existent and intelligent being, the first cause of all things, seems satisfactorily clear to reason, since, in tracing cause and effect, the mind finds no resting place until it arrives at that point — a first cause.

That the world, or the matter of which it is composed, cannot be eternal, seems demonstrable again from considering, that, if eternal, it must have been immutable and invariable, which is inconsistent with the circumstances or qualities of generation and corruption (or composition and dissolution of bodies) which attend it, and which necessarily follow matter and motion; but which generation and corruption (or composition and dissolution of bodies) we, in fact, see around us. Cause and effect, again, must necessarily attend generation and corruption. But cause

and effect imply priority and posteriority, which cannot be in what is eternal. Does not our reason also, and common sense, assure us, that the world's present course of successive generation and corruption is inconsistent with its eternity? Nay, the very conception of succession in eternity, implies a flat contradiction. A further argument for the existence of God as the first cause of all things is, that as we see nothing but what is produced by something else; there must be some first producer. How, for instance, can the first man have been otherwise produced than by some first cause? For, succession is inconsistent with eternity; therefore an eternal succession of men is a contradiction in terms. May we not then as well deny all effects, even ourselves, to be, as deny a first cause? Abundant other evidences of the existence of God, the first cause, [by the ancients termed also the Chief Good; and to whom they attributed the characters or properties of perfect beauty derived from harmony; and perfect goodness; or rather harmonic beauty itself, and goodness itself,] are to be found in Plato and others: and of those evidences which are here adverted to, the foregoing is confessed to be an imperfect outline. The elaborate and satisfactory works of modern writers upon this important topic, are too well known to need particularizing here. It is however hoped, that the little which has been said may at least have some weight towards proving that atheism was not the faith of the deepest thinkers, and the clearest reasoners of antiquity. As to the famous hypothesis of Aristotle to prove the eternity of matter and of the world, viz. that nothing can be produced out of nothing; whatever credit may be given to that axiom in inferior matters, it seems evidently erroneous when applied in limitation of the powers of an omnipotent being. For Aristotle appears not so much to have disputed the being of God, as he did that God could produce the world out of nothing; therefore concluding that the world must have been eternal. But surely the difficulty to reason is greater to conceive of a thing making itself, which it must have done, if at all, before it had existence, which is

most *absurd*; than the difficulty of believing in a self-existent and omnipotent intelligence, which, however inexplicable or incomprehensible by a finite perception, yet certainly implicates no *absurdity*.

But to little purpose would be the reasoning of a whole universe of Plato's and Cicero's on this subject, the foundation of the highest hopes and most important interests of man, or on any other, if to be defeated by that universal, never-satisfied, and cherished *uncertainty*, which, even in this day, I apprehend some either affectedly or sincerely, hold. I believe that the escape from the Aristotelian method of philosophizing, not in metaphysics only but in physics also, and the substitution of the *experimental* philosophy of Bacon, and Newton, and Boyle, is considered as one of the greatest happinesses of mankind. It may indeed, I suppose, without fear of contradiction be said, that philosophy is now, more than ever, deemed to be deserving of the name, so far only as it is *useful* to man, and subservient to his real and substantial benefit; or, in other words, to his happiness. That *certainty*, generally speaking, is essential to the happiness of man, who will deny? Physical certainty so far as obtainable, is therefore, I apprehend, now thought the highest praise, as well as the ultimate aim, of genuine and approved experimental philosophy. And is *moral* certainty less needful, or less sought for by the wisest men? By moral certainty I mean, that generally admitted *exclusion of doubt* which is the effect of evidence, termed moral also as opposed to physical; evidence arising out of such human testimony, whether oral, traditional, or historical, as is generally deemed credible in civilized society, and thereupon received as truth, and acted upon in the common affairs of life. But ought not moral certainty, thus defined, to be extended also to the testimony resulting from those deductions of reason which approve themselves to a considerate mind and competent understanding, whether our own, or that of other men, of known and adequate intellectual and moral character? asserted,

that human life is miserable in pretty exact proportion to the want of this certainty? Does the painfulness of uncertainty need any other proof than its own existence? This painfulness it is admitted, is experienced in greater or lesser degrees, according to the natural feelings of individuals; but is it not inseparable from man? To pass then from individual to social life. Do not the wants of the latter call aloud for certainty? Are men satisfied without it? Are not the utmost possible efforts made to obtain it? Witness our judicial, legislative, and other public proceedings. We are here considering moral, (as explained above,) not mathematical certainty. ~ Yet I think that some metaphysical speculators of the present day carry their nice distinctions and everlasting objections not only to the extent of doubting of moral or physical certainty, or evidence, but even of mathematical truths themselves; that is, what the generality of mankind do not scruple to consider as truths; though these exquisite reasoners scarcely, I suspect, admit any such quality, or character, of human regard as truth, of any sort. Do they believe in morals, or morality? Do they believe their own senses, their own existence? But can all this scepticism be good for man? If not good, is it desirable? What indeed can be conceived more *detrimental* to human welfare than principles which lead to the denial of all moral, if not physical certainty, and consequently undermine the force of all evidence whatever among men? It is still, perhaps, to be believed, that these very persons, from the necessity of things, do, with Cicero and other Academicks, who saw the evil, admit and act upon their secret admission of probability, as a substitute for certainty. So far the evil may be abated. But its mischief consists in being used (as I fear it sometimes *is* used) to perplex, unsettle and mislead the unwary, or less informed. In that view, surely, it is highly censurable, and ought to be exploded. And in fact, unless it be abandoned, and this Pyrrhonism abjured, how can even the existence of a supreme being be satisfactorily, or morally, or any otherwise, proved? To proceed.—

ABEL.

GOD! who didst call the elements into
 Earth—ocean—air—and fire, and with the day
 And night, and worlds which these illuminate
 Or shadow, madest beings to enjoy them,
 And love both them and thee—all hail! all hail!

Note 2.

In this further address to God, the author, in addition to the divine attributes of power and wisdom, recognizes in the Almighty that other attribute of *goodness* also, without which, it has been emphatically said, the other attributes would be unbeneficial to man: for what benefit could be expected from infinite power, even united to infinite wisdom, uninfluenced by equal goodness? Abel therefore says, “and madest beings to enjoy them.” What, but goodness, can rationally be supposed to create beings susceptible of enjoyment; in other words of complacency and delight; beings of course inferior, helpless in themselves, and dependent upon their maker? Was any *evil* being ever known to use its power in that way, and not rather in the way of producing misery? God therefore is good, or rather, goodness itself, if reason is to be regarded. Power, wisdom, and goodness then, appear to have constituted, in Lord Byron’s mind, as in those of Plato and Cicero, and others before adverted to of highest repute for intellect, science, and morals amongst the ancients, essential parts of the character of the Supreme Being. It is admitted, that power does not necessarily, of itself, imply or include good morals, or goodness; but neither does it necessarily exclude those qualities. The question is, how are we to be satisfied, that goodness, and good morals, do actually make part of the character of the Almighty? Now all men, in civilized and moral society, must be supposed to be familiar with the meaning affixed to the terms good morals, and good-

ness. They need no laboured explanation, but speak for themselves. In order therefore to ascertain whether a being, possessing power, do, or do not also possess good morals and goodness, must not recourse be had to human investigation? But human investigation, if I mistake not, will, in such an enquiry, be exerted, in scanning and judging of the moral character of the powerful being in question, by his acts and operations. If the result of such enquiry be, that those acts and operations, in the judgment of right reason, are moral and good, and especially if only so, and most eminently so, and that in perpetual exercise; what can reason conclude, and reasonable beings admit, but that such powerful being must be good and moral also? But are not the operations of God, with which we are conversant, eminently good, as producing good? Is not all nature replete with the goodness of its author? Have we not therefore equal proof of the divine morality, since that very goodness which is clearly attributable to the Almighty, necessarily includes morality. For whoever is not moral is not good, because immorality produces evil, and evil is the opposite of, and therefore inconsistent with, goodness. These remarks may possibly seem uncalled for yet, but they are made in anticipation, for reasons which will appear afterwards. And a few other observations, in anticipation also, seem desirable in this place.

If then there be a god, and he is an infinitely good and moral, as well as an all-powerful and all-wise being, can any reasonable man suppose him not to regard his intelligent and moral creation, the human race? Or can he be believed to neglect, and not attend to, their moral character and conduct, so essential to the general welfare of man? Do good, and wise, and moral *men* act so in *their* spheres? Would they deem it rational or right so to do? And can that, which is intrinsically rational, moral, good, and right among men, be deemed to be otherwise in reference to the Supreme, the source and centre of all that is good and moral? And does not our reason tell us, that on such a

subject it is allowable and right to argue thus from the lesser to the greater? And are there not some things, and some occasions, and this among them, in which it is absolutely necessary, that the dictates of our reason, its dictates I mean intuitively perceived in such cases, should be our final and decided guide? And (to extend the subject a little, by anticipation again) are not good morals closely connected with good government among men? And is not such good government found to be needful, and very good, because needful and beneficial? And can moral government (for all good government is moral government) rationally be supposed to be *less* good, or needful, or beneficial, as between the Supreme, and his rational and moral creatures? And if God be, by all intelligent and reasonable men, admitted to be, alone and necessarily, the moral governor of his creature man, and to be all-wise and all-good also; is it possible, in the very nature of things, or can a rational and moral being believe, that from an almighty being, of such attributes or character, any *evil* law, or regulation, can proceed? And if these considerations be granted, is not *obedience* justly and reasonably requirable by, and due to, such a lawgiver? Or can any, who condemn *such* legislation, be justifiable in the sight of right reason, social and reasonable man himself being judge? These inquiries will be found to be pertinent, more especially, in a future note.

We have indeed been here speaking, more particularly, of *evil laws* or *regulations* as not to be supposed possible to proceed from such a being as God. Hereafter we shall have occasion to prove, that no evil whatever, properly so called, can proceed from him; for that even what *men* call evil *cannot* be absolutely so. Does light produce darkness, or sweet bitter? It *must* be good in a *right* point of view, not excepting even the evil suffered by evil and unreasonable men. Men of a contrary character will not call, or consider as evil, anything which may be judged to proceed more immediately from, or even ~~as occurring~~ by the permission of, a being infinitely wi
) can have

no evil in his nature. The evils therefore, so termed, which God may even inflict or permit, in support of his moral government, who will call intrinsic or pure evil? Ask the legislature, and the dispensers of criminal justice, in all nations, what *they* think of legislative or judicial evils, when enacted or exercised against evil men. Will not such evils be termed good? And must not all, who regard the well-being and happiness of society among men, hold the same opinion?

With respect to the existence which the Almighty permits, of what is commonly meant by the natural evils of pain or suffering in any portion of God's creatures, that subject will be somewhat more particularly considered in a future note or notes.

But, after the foregoing recognition of the divine attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness, the author's just views (and should we not say animated feelings too?) do not stop even at the latter, the divine goodness. He adds—"and love both them and thee:"—an amiable intimation that God himself is a proper object of the sublimest regard of which an intelligent and moral creature, such as man, is capable, towards his creator. And do not reason and nature, even in reference to humanity, to human relations, teach and confirm the same? But the next address and note will afford occasion for some extension of this idea. This address is from—

ADAH.

God, the Eternal! Parent of all things!
 Who didst create these best and beautiful beings,
 To be beloved, more than all, save thee—
 Let me love thee and them:—All hail! all hail!

Note 3.

Here Lord Byron evidently rises higher still; for, not content to hold his maker forth as the parent of all things, and the proper

object of the due and most sublime regard of his creature man;—he represents Adah, as I conceive, looking round her upon her father, her mother, her brothers, her sister,—“all the charities”—and after declaring that *they* were to be beloved more than the *unintelligent* parts of creation, immediately adverts to the superior title, and claim, of the creator himself, the “parent of all things”—to the supreme love of man, paramouly to any creature, intelligent or not. The entire accordance of this sentiment with *scripture* is well known. The enquiry *here* is, whether that sentiment is consistent with what is usually received as good reason and sound philosophy.

In this enquiry then, brief and superficial as it must be, I shall again resort to unbiassed antiquity, and to right reason, if Plato and Cicero and others of those sages who thought with them, uninfluenced (or, as some would say, uncorrupted) by christianity, are allowed to possess such rationality.

According to Plato's principles therefore of philosophizing on *morals*;—and taking man to be a rational, intellectual, moral, considerate being; every man, in every act, virtually, if not actually, intends some last end, or ultimate object. What considerate man does not? Now Plato considers this last end, or ultimate object, in every man's intention to be, the acquisition of that which, when obtained, we neither desire nor need anything beyond it. Cicero's, and the Stoics' ideas of the last end of man seem to accord with those of Plato herein, though perhaps some of them make *virtue* their last end; but even then, it will perhaps be granted, that taking virtue in its utmost extent of meaning, they and Plato mean *nearly* the same thing, though Plato certainly soars the highest. This last end, or ultimate object, of Plato, being also in itself so satisfactory (for what can be imagined more satisfactory to man than his possessing the utmost of his desires and having no ungratified wish left?) and exceeding all other wants and desires, they termed a *perfect* end. In common life generally, it must be owned, this process of the mind is not much

regarded or, thought of; but still, the restlessness of man's nature, and the importunity, and incessant craving of his wants and desires, prove the fact; and reflecting men realize it in their own experience. 'But, is there any earthly thing which, a man having coveted and then obtained, satisfies him so, that he neither desires or needs any thing else beyond or beside it? Certainly not. That needs no other proof than universal experience. Man also being, (according to Plato) spiritual and immortal, as well as animal, in his nature, requires a last end, or ultimate object, for the satisfaction of, and corresponding with, his wants and desires, in *that* view of his complex character.' This is so, whether a man perceive, or is conscious of it, or not; it is still so, in fact. Its not being *perceived* is no proof it does not exist; it only proves the man to be inattentive to the operations of his moral nature. His spiritual and immortal part, however disregarded, he cannot get rid of, nor ever be *truly* satisfied without the appropriate satisfaction it requires. These observations however do not, I confess, apply *experimentally*, to men, who have learned to persuade themselves, that they are neither spiritual, nor moral, but merely animal beings, and therefore actuated only by animal motives, except indeed by such other motives also as arise from that moral obliquity and *natural* evil of which they cannot divest themselves. But, happily for society, these are but few.

- In pursuing this subject therefore, Plato asserts, not only that this adequate object, this perfectly-satisfying last end of man, cannot be found on earth, or among earthly things; but, that it can no where at all be found, out of the *chief good*; which he shews to be nothing below, or other than, Deity himself. He thence concludes, that God's spiritual and pure, and infinite nature, is alone sufficient for, and indispensable to, the wants and the desires of man, however remote that truth may be from the consideration of many, if not of most men. For it must be allowed, that, even among men who do not consider themselves to be animal merely, but admit the spirituality and morality, and

immortality of their natures, some are *too little considerative* of this Platonic, but elevating, aggrandizing, and solacing contemplation. For

“These are the thoughts which make man, man ;
The wise illumine, aggrandize the great.”

Yet reason seems to declare, that however man may obscure or disregard this doctrine *now*, the truth of it hereafter, in a disembodied, spiritual state of existence, will be *too palpable* to be *then* neglected.

But not only does Plato shew this *chief good* to be *sufficient* for man's utmost wants and desires, but that such chief good [God] being essential and perfect goodness, and essential and perfect beauty, viz. perfect beauty derived from perfect harmony; in other words, goodness itself, and beauty itself; must therefore necessarily, be altogether and alone *worthy* of man's supreme love and desire. And what can we conceive of the human mind, if it be not most powerfully attracted by what is perfect, and all-beautiful, and immeasurably attached to what is all-good? This reasoning, though apparently incontestible, pays perhaps a higher compliment to human nature than some may think it merits; but at least it appears to be *true*, and to have been the impression of Lord Byron's mind (a mind not to be despised) if we are to credit what he has written, as well as that of Plato. Here also it is hardly possible to forbear noticing the strict agreement, not only of Lord Byron, but of Plato, in these sentiments, with those passages of scripture which Plato never saw: for instance, among innumerable others, Deut. vi. 5.—Matth. xxii. 37.—Mark x. 18.—Psalm lxxiii. 25.—Can it be believed, that if Plato had been acquainted with the christian revelation, *he* would have despised or rejected it? And *how* are its modern despisers superior to Plato? Are they so in *morals*; are they so in *mind*?

It may however possibly be objected, that this doctrine of

Plato, and that view of scripture which corresponds with it, is of so abstruse or abstracted a nature, and so inconsistent with the present condition of man, as to be plainly unreasonable; and if practicable, yet absolutely prejudicial to society. Such objections are in fact made. It is said, that, to be under such an influence, must unfit man for all social intercourse, and for all those duties which man owes to man, and must therefore obstruct all the affairs and common concerns of human life. Or, in other words that the world could not go on, if all men were so influenced: and that therefore, what is not good for the whole is not good for any part. But it must first be enquired, if it be *not* good for the whole, or wherein *hurtful* for the whole. Yet *Plato* was a most social man. His whole life and energies (at least a full proportion of them) were exercised in promoting the *temporal*, as well as future and spiritual, benefit of his fellow creatures. Witness his thoughtful writings. But it may be said he was still much abstracted from the ordinary *business* of life, and therefore more at liberty to attend to those speculative matters than men more usefully employed in social duties. Let us then try the matter a little more *practically*. God not only (leaving *Plato* for a moment) requires this supreme regard of his creature man to himself, as may, hereafter, more properly than here, be shewn; but he also commands all *social* duties from man to man, even to the extent of loving his neighbour as himself. Can the benevolent and busy man go farther than that? And can it be allowed, that God commands duties irreconcilable with one another? Yet he requires man to love his God with *all* his heart, mind, soul, and strength; and *his neighbour as himself*. The benevolent and busy man then cannot surmise of his maker, that he discountenances the social duties while he requires *supreme* regard to himself, but inculcates them to the uttermost. Ought not God to be obeyed in thus inculcating social duty? The benevolent and busy man will be the first to say, yes. But is not love, among enlightened and benevolent men, allowed to be the most powerful incentive to

obedience, and its strongest stimulus, as it is in fact to every action, whether in man, or his inferior fellow creatures? Would a master or a father among men (supposing him a *good* man) prefer being served, either by his servant or his son, from fear, rather than from love? Suppose such a master or parent as is here meant, whose servant or son was supremely devoted to him in heart and affection, should require that servant or son to be careful in performing all duties incumbent on him towards others; would such servant or son be less likely to attend to those injunctions, because he loved his master or his parent ardently? If we apply this as between man and his creator (and does not every principle, natural, moral, and revealed, require it?) then, not only does all objection to the supreme love of man to God not so much vanish merely, as, rather, become *changed* into the strongest advocate in its favour. It is true, the servant, or the son, might feel the habitual or unremitting glow of love and regard to his master or parent; but would that render him negligent of pleasing and obeying him by the performance of the social duties enjoined by him? Is such the nature of love, to be so negligent? we have seen it is not. Thus then Plato's reasoning appears to be practically sustained.— But to proceed.

ZILLAH.

Oh, God! who loving, making, blessing all,
 Yet didst permit the serpent to creep in,
 And drive my father forth from Paradise,
 Keep us from further evil: — Hail! all hail!

Note 4.

In this address or invocation, Zillah, like the rest, recognizes the goodness and love of her creator to his creatures; and after adverting to the occurrence which

“Brought death into the world and all our woe,
With loss of Eden, till one greater man restore us;”

she then deprecates any further ill effects of her parents' transgression of their beneficent creator's

“Sole command, Lords of the world beside.”

It may possibly be imagined, that this notice taken by Zillah, of God's having permitted the serpent to creep in and drive her father from Paradise, is done in an invidious spirit, as if to stigmatize, or create odium against God. But I take it not so. I rather take it as a just exposition of Zillah's correct piety; which, while she recollects the painful event, leads her also to improve it by so appropriate a supplication. Is it not natural and proper? Who would not, (in a right state of mind,) do the same? Zillah's observation however on this part of her own and parents' history there will be ample occasion to consider hereafter. The following colloquy then succeeds.

ADAM.

Son Cain, my first-born, wherefore art thou silent?

CAIN.

Why should I speak?

ADAM.

To pray.

CAIN.

Have ye not pray'd?

ADAM.

We have, most fervently.

CAIN.

Have heard you.

And loudly : — I

ADAM.

So will God, I trust.

ABEL.

Amen !

ADAM.

But thou, my eldest-born, art silent still.

CAIN.

'T is better I should be so.

ADAM.

Wherefore so ?

CAIN.

I have nought to ask.

ADAM.

Nor ought to thank for ?

CAIN.

No.

ADAM.

Dost thou not live?

CAIN.

Must I not die?*Note 5.*

In all this conversation, it must be confessed, the author has extremely well represented that (to say the least) *untoward* spirit of Cain, which the scriptures, briefly, seem to afford sufficient ground for. But, as if to furnish an antidote, he makes Adam ask his son whether, if he even have "nought to ask for," he has not aught to thank for? And when Cain bluntly answers, "No," his father enquires, "dost thou not live?" Here, therefore, we see discouraged some of the worst of human feelings, discontent, and ingratitude, by asking a question, conveying an affirmation, which, I suppose, will be generally allowed to be both sound morality (for do not good morals require gratitude?) and good divinity: viz. that existence itself is a subject of thankfulness, unless very good reason be shewn against it, if that be possible. For I incline to think, not only that the, perhaps universal, voice of human nature (for *extremely few* hinders not universality) is certainly opposed to this dissatisfaction with existence; but also, that if *every* consideration relating to man were *duly* weighed, there never did, or does, or will exist, a single human being, from whom thankfulness for his existence might not, according to right reason, be shewn to be justly due. Or, if it should be required to be granted, that there have been, or are, some individuals among mankind, whose evident sufferings have so much exceeded their apparent enjoyment, that they may be excused for such an uninformed state of mind as to induce their wishing they had never existed; still, that was not Cain's case. His existence was, undeniably, of the very

opposite character to that of pain or suffering; namely, *all* enjoyment, (at least having the *means* of it,) as we have every reason to suppose. It was therefore only his own disposition of mind and heart that caused his discontent. And he was the only instance of such discontent in his family. Cain indeed confesses the plenitude of the benefits he had from his maker's bounty. "I have nought to ask." Is not this a hint to others? For are not all men too apt, when they have all things so abundantly that nothing is left to be asked for, (things relating to the body merely are here meant) too apt to be unthankful to their benefactor?

"Forgetful what from him they still receive."

Cain, however, replies to his father's question, by asking another — "Must I not die?" — implying doubtless, that in his opinion, a *terminable* existence is undesirable, and therefore no subject of thankfulness to the donor. But as Cain's unthankfulness for life plainly arose not from any ills he endured by it; nor from any evil, so far as appears, that he expected, from death; we are led to conclude, that he was unthankful for a positive good, merely because he must, at some uncertain period, lose it. This I conceive to be, generally speaking, an immoral and wrong principle, and not in accordance with the usual and approved feelings of mankind. If indeed the enjoyment of a present good were the forerunner, or cause, of an inevitable future evil, of much greater magnitude especially, the case would be otherwise, and Cain right in his sentiments and dissatisfaction. There would in fact then, be no cause for thankfulness. But, had he, or has any man ever had, or will any man ever have, to complain of being exposed to future, specified evil, of which he was not himself the author, either by actually creating, or at any rate by not using the means afforded him of avoiding it? On the subject of death itself, Cain will hereafter afford a proper occasion for some remarks upon it. But *here*, Cain seems clearly wrong; nor will, it is conceived, have any imitators among wise and good men; the be-

then themselves not excepted. To this purpose, and in countenance of Adam's fatherly exhortation to Cain, to pray, or praise, I shall I hope be excused for a short instance of *pagan* sentiment, so opposite to Cain. To some it may possibly be either new or forgotten; others will easily suffer themselves to pardon its introduction.

“Where then shall hope and fear their objects find?
 Must dull suspense corrupt the stagnant mind?
 Must helpless man, in ignorance sedate,
 Roll darkling down the torrent of his fate?
 Must no dislike alarm, no wishes rise,
 No cries invoke the mercies of the skies?
 Inquirer, cease; petitions yet remain
 Which heaven may hear; nor deem religion vain.
 Still raise for good the supplicating voice,
 But leave to heaven the measure and the choice;
 Safe in his power, whose eyes discern afar
 The secret ambush of a specious prayer.
 Implore his aid; in his decisions rest;
 Secure, whate'er he gives, he gives the best.
 Yet, when the sense of sacred presence fires,
 And strong devotion to the skies aspires;
 Pour forth thy fervours for a healthful mind,
 Obedient passions, and a will resigned;
 For love, which scarce collective man can fill;
 For patience, sovereign o'er transmuted ill;
 For faith, that, panting for a happier seat,
 Counts death kind nature's signal for retreat:
 These goods for man the laws of heaven ordain;
 These goods he grants, who grants the means to gain;
 With these, celestial wisdom calms the mind,
 And makes the happiness she does not find.”

Dr. Johnson's Juvenal.

I scarcely deem myself at liberty in this place, to advert to the cause for *thankfulness* for existence arising from *future* prospects, as made known by the christian revelation. There will probably be a more proper occasion for glancing at that subject hereafter. The family conference then proceeds.

EVE.

Alas!

The fruit of our forbidden tree begins
To fall.

ADAM.

And we must gather it again.
Oh, God! why didst thou plant the tree of knowledge?

CAIN.

And wherefore pluck'd ye not the tree of life!
Ye might have then defied him.

ADAM.

Oh! my son,
BlaspHEME not: these are serpents' words.

CAIN.

Why not?
The snake spoke *truth*: it *was* the tree of knowledge;
It *was* the tree of life: knowledge is good,
And life is good; and how can both be evil?

Note 6.

The above reflections of Eve and Adam are very natural and appropriate. Eve laments the sensible effects of the fruit of the forbidden tree as shewn in the character of Cain obviously. This disposition was that of ingratitude to God, and discontent with all his mercies, so opposite to that of every other individual he was connected with. With respect to Adam's emphatic question, addressed to the Almighty, we recognize, not a daring interrogation of his creator for planting the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, but rather an expostulatory yet reverential appeal to heaven, arising from an excitement of mind, such as in the scriptures we find attributed to the patriarchs, and the prophets, occasionally, and to the Redeemer himself; for instance, Psalm lxxx. 7—12. Isa. lxiii. 17. Matth. xxvii. 46. These reverential though earnest expostulations we see the Almighty kindly bearing with (as he talked with Moses face to face, and treated Abraham as his friend) and as arising from human infirmity, and sometimes from grief, or other allowable feeling, and not from any perverse or rebellious spirit. These therefore are by no means to be confounded with those arraignments of the divine proceedings, arising from a very different, viz. an actually resisting and rebellious state of mind towards God (which who can justify, and of which who can sustain the consequences?) which we find noticed by the apostle Paul, in Rom. ix. 19, 20, 21. Such is the light in which I view this very natural expression therefore of Adam in his trying circumstances, and excited as his paternal and pious mind was, by his son's distressing conduct. But if we may be allowed to give an answer to Adam *why* God planted the tree of knowledge, it seems clear enough, that it was placed there as the sole pledge of Adam's obedience to and dependance upon his creator, by complying with his prohibitory restriction from its fruit. It should seem that Adam's nature was so excellent (short of absolute perfection) that there was nothing in it to lead to his displeasing his maker, unless in the one instance of not complying with that prohibition. And who can say, that such a test

was inappropriate as between the Almighty, as a moral governor, and his creature, man? And could any test be easier? It cannot be questioned, that both Adam and Eve *knew* they were disobeying God's command, and putting his threatenings to the proof, by their transgression. God had denominated the tree, that of the knowledge of good and evil. The knowledge imparted by eating its fruit was chiefly that of the knowledge of the good they had lost, in losing their creator's favour, at least that high degree of his favour which they enjoyed from his more immediate presence, so long as they continued obedient; and the evil they had thus acquired, by breaking fealty with him. A created being indeed must be imperfect, because perfection implies infinity, which can only belong to an infinite self-existent being. Adam therefore, being thus defective, was capable of error, which God, an infinite and therefore perfect being, is not. Error he committed; that is, an error of the will. He suffered his will to prevail over his better reason, unless it be said that reason required him to partake with Eve, as he did, the consequences of her transgression, in preference to preserving his own existence and happiness by adhering to his maker's law. But that is too much to be readily granted. For what would be the consequences? Should some argue (as some do) that man can do no good thing, nor even abstain from evil, without the aid of God's supernatural and immediate influence and power, either exciting, or restraining, according to the circumstance; yet admitting that, as declared by God himself in his word, yet these same persons will not deny that man has nevertheless, in himself, the power of doing *evil*. That power we know he has, for he uses it constantly, freely, deliberately and determinedly. We know too, that his conscience bears witness against and condemns him for the commission of such evil. Cain however, as if to preserve and even improve upon his consistency, asks his parents, why they did not pluck the tree of life, and so have defied their maker? On this daring impiety, and equal folly, no remark need be made; but his father's reproof was as proper as can be imagined, tempered as it was by parental tenderness.

It should be noticed however that Cain was wrong also, as it

should clearly seem, in ascribing such power or virtue to the fruit of the tree of life, as that a single seizure of its fruit should have conferred immediate and positive immortality on his parents, and so have enabled them to defy their maker's denunciation of death. For there seems every reason to believe, that the fruit of the tree of life was rather medicinal and restorative, than any thing beyond that. So that, had the inhabitants of Eden at any time incurred hurt or sickness, which, if left to its natural course, would produce death; the fruit of the tree of life, by its sanative quality, would cure and restore their health; thus when needed, preserving the person and constitution sound and healthful, and of course preventing death. This appears to be the meaning of "lest he put forth his hand, and eat, and live forever;"—that is, if God should permit man to continue in Eden, he would, by this occasional use of the fruit of the tree of life, ward off those diseases which were, with the gradual decay of nature also, to produce in time the mortality pronounced upon him. The eating of the fruit therefore, without necessity, would probably have been attended with no other effect than resulted from the fruits of the other trees, viz. refreshment merely. But this differs much from Cain's idea. And though, had Adam continued in Eden without transgression, the Almighty, might, and probably would, have translated him from thence to heaven, as afterwards he translated Enoch, yet it cannot be supposed Adam would have been so translated had he remained in Eden after his transgression. So that the tree of life would have kept mankind in a perpetual state of moral degradation, and alienation from their maker's peculiar favour and more special presence; which, from after events, it clearly appears was not the divine intention.

Cain persevering to insist that the snake spoke truth, for that the trees *were* those of knowledge and of life; and, that life and knowledge being individually good, they could not both be evil; Eve, though she does not enter upon a logical confutation of her son's plausible argument, yet gives him a more satisfactory reply in other respects, as it was scriptural, sensible, and proper. This reply is as follows:—

EVE.

My boy! thou speakest as I spoke in sin,
 Before thy birth : let me not see renew'd
 My misery in thine. I have repented.
 Let me not see my offspring fall into
 The snares beyond the walls of Paradise,
 Which e'en in Paradise destroy'd his parents.
 Content thee with what *is*. Had we been so,
 Thou now hadst been contented.—Oh, my son!

Note 7.

Without referring to the astonishing, and more than complete, *remedy* which the Christian revelation affords, to all who embrace it, for the *subject* of Eve's lamentation, viz. her fall and its effects; one cannot forbear an acknowledgement of respect for the author who could imagine so excellent a reply for her. Every moralist, and every christian, must approve it. She does not defend nor extenuate, but ingenuously confesses, her fault. She felt that she had wilfully (or are we, in mercy, to say negligently and carelessly only; but I doubt that would, now, not satisfy even herself) offended a beneficent creator, father, and righteous moral governor. She reproaches not him but herself. She deplores the misery her transgression had brought upon her; yet so greatly mitigated, by that mercy which her penitence was sure to find; and she declares she *had* repented. That Adam had also repented we cannot doubt. That he, and Eve, had also found *peace* again at least, with their maker, cannot be doubted, through the Mediator who was made known to them in the promise, that her seed should bruise the serpent's head. She then deprecates of Cain an addition to her sorrow from his pursuing similar conduct to that which lost them Eden. She seems to forebode the snares which even now probably were preparing for him. Her concluding exhortation to contentment is certainly most appropriate.

It seems highly probable however, that Lord Byron expected, if he did not intend, that Cain should, at some future period, be answered after another manner than his mother had done. Let us see if it may not be done as it requires. In the first place, he justifies his asking his father, why he did not pluck the tree of life, by saying, that the snake spoke truth; and he seems to mean, that the truth the snake spoke was, that the one tree was that of knowledge, and the other that of life: but the snake in fact said no such thing. It was God who had called the tree that of the knowledge of good and evil; (not of knowledge generally;) and the truth, such as it was, which the snake spoke, was, contradicting God's denunciation of death upon eating the fruit, and telling Eve she should not die, for that God knew they would, by eating the fruit, become as gods, knowing good and evil. These were *snake* truths indeed. But presently we shall be more familiar with their real author, and discharge the poor snake, who must till then bear the brunt. We will examine the first of these truths—that Eve should not die. It was one of those truths which they utter, who

“Palter with us in a double sense.”

Eve and Adam certainly did not instantly die on eating the fruit, as if it had been the most life-destroying of all modern poisons. But they instantly died to that life (not their *natural* life) which enabled them to hold happy and near intercourse and friendship with their maker, and the loss of which may well be termed death, as the common experience and expressions of mankind testify in many instances of human relationship. It cannot be supposed that God ever *intended* to put an immediate end to their *natural* existence on eating the fruit; had he intended it, he would have done it. Yet his word cannot be falsified. Die they certainly must. Another than a *merely natural* extinction of life must therefore be looked for. And that other death certainly was, partly in what has been stated, the losing of the sensible enjoyment of the divine favour, wherein only,

“————— life is found,
All else beside, a shadow and a sound ;

and partly and chiefly, in the deterioration of their moral and spiritual nature generally ; which, deterioration, compared with the state in which they were created, may well be called also a death, and which began in Adam and Eve and increased in their descendants, from generation to generation, until it ended in the natural death of the whole human race, (except one family,) at once, in the deluge : and we know how death has not failed to be executed upon man *since* the deluge. Thus far was the snake's truth *false*. For God's denunciation *did* take place. They *did* “surely die.” But it was more false still. For, even naturally, death, in its seeds, began to work in Adam on his transgression, and was never to be obstructed by the fruit of the tree of life, as it would otherwise have been. And the *end*, we know, whether at a longer or a shorter period, was total death. Adam therefore may as well be considered to have become the subject of the divine denunciation, the moment he broke the divine law, and sentence was passed upon him ; as a criminal among men is considered to be dead, as to all purposes of social or civil life, when his condemnation has been given. The intervening period, between that and execution, does not restore him to *civil* life ; and certain execution, at the appointed day, hour, and moment, completes his positive extinction. So much for the snake's truth,—that Adam should not die. As to the snake's truth respecting the trees of knowledge and life, he had said nothing about them. Cain is therefore exceedingly incorrect, to say the least. But leaving form, let us come to substance, and try his grand argument. He says,—“knowledge is good, and life is good, and how can both be evil ?”—meaning, as far as I can discern, that two good things cannot be also evil things ; and therefore, knowledge being good, why did God debar ye from it, as if it were evil ; and life being good, why should ye not have secured it by plucking the tree ; or why has God driven ye away from it, as if it were an evil thing ? Thus slyly does Cain

charge his maker with having, under a pretence of their being evil, deprived his creatures of two good things, knowledge, and life. Our business then is, to unravel this mystery, or rather, detect this fallacy. The deception of Cain's argument consists in this, that he speaks of knowledge and life in the abstract. For, in the *abstract*, certainly, knowledge and life are, as he says, really good, and not evil, and it would be an act of cruelty to deprive any being of them: which is the very thing Cain aims to fix upon his maker. But Cain is not to be allowed thus to puzzle and confound the case, by making premises of his own, in order to come to his own conclusion. He must therefore not be suffered to argue thus at *large*, but be confined to the actual circumstances of the *case*. And then it will be found, that the question is not, whether knowledge, *generally*, be evil; (which nobody affirms;) but, whether the *particular* knowledge, which God had forbidden Adam to acquire from that fruit, be or be not evil. And who, for a moment, can doubt that, unless he deny all moral government? For is not all knowledge evil, which is obtained through the medium of crime? Or if any one maintain, that good knowledge *may* be obtained through the medium of evil actions; still, must not such knowledge, even if good in its *nature*, possess a *peculiarity of moral evil*? However, the knowledge obtained by the transgression was, intrinsically, and in its very nature evil, as has been shewn, and as Eve herself ruefully confessed and deplored; and doubtless Adam too. Nor, otherwise, would God have forbidden it. True, the divine goodness, according to his eternal purpose, has made this very transaction the medium of unspeakable good to his fallen creatures. But that does not alter the moral quality of the evil thing that he has thus transmuted. Disobedience was evil, and what was acquired by it must necessarily be so too upon every moral principle. As to the other branch of Cain's question, how can *life* be evil, being a good thing *generally*; that must be treated in the same way, by confining the argument to the case before us; and then it is easy to see, as indeed we have seen in part, that the life which Adam would have acquired, had he remained in Eden,

and warded off death by the use of the tree of life, would have been very evil indeed, by keeping him in that deteriorated state of moral and spiritual existence, far from his maker's favour. Whereas by his expulsion, and subsequent death, he attained, no doubt, that *better* life, which his faith in the promised seed secured to him. Thus is Cain's question presumed to be answered, "If knowledge and life be separately good, how can both be evil?" We now proceed.

ADAM.

Our orisons completed, let us hence,
 Each to his task of toil—not heavy, though
 Needful: the earth is young, and yields us kindly
 Her fruits with little labour.

EVE.

Cain, my son,
 Behold thy father cheerful and resign'd,
 And do as he doth.

[*Exeunt* ADAM and EVE.

ZILLAH.

Wilt thou not, my brother ?

ABEL.

Why wilt thou wear this gloom upon thy brow,
 Which can avail thee nothing, save to rouse
 The Eternal anger?

ADAH.

My beloved Cain,
 Wilt thou frown even on me?

CAIN.

No, Adah! no;

I fain would be alone a little while.

Abel, I'm sick at heart; but it will pass:

Precede me, brother—I will follow shortly.

And you, too, sisters, tarry not behind;

Your gentleness must not be harshly met:

I'll follow you anon.

ADAH.

If not, I will

Return to seek you here.

ABEL.

The peace of God

Be on your spirit, brother!

[*Exeunt* ABEL, ZILLAH, and ADAH.]*Note 8.*

In this family group, have we not interesting features? Let us examine them individually. The author, it must be owned, in the person of Adam, pays deserved and repeated homage to the goodness of his maker, by a cheerful and grateful recognition of his paternal tenderness; who, although as a moral governor bound to maintain his own most righteous and benign laws, yet so greatly mitigated, not to say abolished, or changed into good, the evil effects of their infraction. With respect however to the mitigation of the *immediate* effects; in the first place, Adam, instead of instant anni-

hilation, was permitted to enjoy existence a great length of time; for there can be no doubt he *did* enjoy it, and that even with a considerable degree of his maker's favour, and his providential care and goodness. In the next place, compare the execution with the sentence, upon the earth. The sentence ran thus;—"Cursed is the ground for thy sake: in sorrow shalt thou eat of it all the days of thy life: thorns also and thistles shall it bring forth to thee; and thou shalt eat the herb of the field: in the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread 'till thou return unto the ground." Yet scarcely had this judgment been pronounced, when we find the culprit himself, the sufferer from it, not only, according to Lord Byron's just conception, and even in his extra-paradisaical condition, performing his sun-rise and grateful orisons with his family, but, forthwith proceeding cheerfully to his toil, which by his own confession, could not have been much, if any thing greater than in Eden, since he describes it as "not heavy, though needful;" and rejoicing, that the "young earth yielded kindly her fruits with little labour." Eve's and Zillah's affectionate enforcement of Adam's fatherly and generous exhortation, or invitation rather, to labour, apparently not more than healthful exercise, is, more seriously it must be owned, and further urged on Cain, by Abel's monitory intimation of the painful consequences of his wrong habit of mind. And can reason shew the contrary of Abel's apprehension? Rather, is it not the height of irrationality to be disregarding of the favour of the divine author of our existence, whom we have every reason to know is goodness itself, as well as moral purity, and who is not indifferent to the neglect and disobedience, or the regard and moral conformity, of his intelligent creature, man? But, in a different strain still, Cain's beloved Adah, whose character throughout will, I presume be deemed an amiable one, shews her attachment to him. The author has also well and amiably conceived of Abel's character in his farewell to his brother. Cain's reply to Adah raises some interest in his favour, from his apparently softened, and even distressed, feelings. But let him again speak for himself, before we pronounce, too peremptorily, upon his improved state of mind.

CAIN. (*Solus.*)

And this is
 Life!—Toil! and wherefore should I toil?—because
 My father could not keep his place in Eden.
 What had *I* done in this?—I was unborn,
 I sought not to be born; nor love the state
 To which that birth has brought me. Why did he
 Yield to the serpent and the woman? or,
 Yielding, why suffer? What was there in this?
 The tree was planted, and why not for him?
 If not, why place him near it, where it grew,
 The fairest in the centre? They have but
 One answer to all questions,—“’t was *his* will
 And *he* is good.”—How know I that? Because
 He is all-powerful, must all-good, too, follow?
 I judge but by the fruits—and they are bitter—
 Which I must feed on for a fault not mine. ✕
 Whom have we here?—A shape like to the angels,
 Yet of a sterner and a sadder aspect
 Of spiritual essence: why do I quake?
 Why should I fear him more than other spirits,
 Whom I see daily wave their fiery swords
 Before the gates round which I linger oft,
 In twilight’s hour, to catch a glimpse of those
 Gardens which are my just inheritance,
 Ere the night closes o’er the inhibited walls
 And the immortal trees which overtop
 The cherubim-defended battlements?
 If I shrink not from these, the fire-arm’d angels,

Why should I quail from him who now approaches?
 Yet he seems mightier far than them, nor less
 Beauteous, and yet not all as beautiful
 As he hath been, and might be: sorrow seems
 Half of his immortality. And is it
 So? and can aught grieve save humanity?
 He cometh.

Note 9.

This soliloquy, in which Lord Byron has, with his masterly hand, given fresh expression to his principal character, requires to be analyzed. But I must begin by confessing, that the incipient sympathy lately expressed for Cain, on account of his apparently softened feelings, is neutralized at least, if not wholly extinguished, by this soliloquy. Cain takes upon him to say many things which, if true, would impugn the character of his great creator; all of whose moral and intelligent creatures are not of Cain's mind. Cain's allegations or insinuations, or both, must therefore be enquired into.

First, as to his complaint of life; that, it is conceived, is sufficiently answered in Note 5, to shew, that *he* had no just cause of complaint of life at all. By such complaint he outrages the immense preponderancy of human opinion and feeling. And in regard to toil; his own father, as we have just seen, has completely prevented, or removed, *that* ground of discontent. But what *good* man complains of honourable toil? Besides, if we try him by the agriculturists, or husbandmen, or farmers, of the present day, especially with his father's evidence, what will be their verdict on *his* complaint of toil, whilst "the young earth yielded her fruits with little labour," and in a climate so luxurious and abundant? Such indeed were the local characteristics of *his* situation, that it were almost difficult to believe the divine curse upon the ground, for man's sake, had been executed. — Discontented, murmuring Cain, however, enquires *the*

reason of all this toil; and he perceives it to be, because his father could not keep his place in Eden. That was true. But, (had the toil been such as to have rendered the enquiry necessary,) he ought to have asked, or rather not forgotten, for he certainly knew, the *reason* that his father could not keep his place in Eden. *We*, however, have seen, it was impossible he should, unless moral government be disclaimed, and its sanctions of course reprobated, or God declared to be a being so devoid of goodness, as to be utterly unfit to be a moral governor. But that has been before considered. - Cain next asks, what *he* had done in that? We reply, certainly nothing. And for this he himself gives the best of reasons; he was unborn. He adds, that he sought not to be born. That also is readily admitted; for what mortal ever did, or could, or can, seek to be born? - But if by these remarks he mean to insinuate, that not being personally the transgressor, he ought not to be *punished* for the transgression, the reply is, neither was he. For what, in the shape of *punishment*, had he to complain of, that his father, and his brother had not? and yet they did not complain. Is it, among men, generally thought *commendable* to be dissatisfied with one's parentage, or birth into the world, unless indeed so far, as, where deemed desirable, to excite to honourable exertion to improve their circumstances? - Cain, however, enjoyed, at least possessed, and *might* have enjoyed, had he been so minded, all the fruits of the earth which "yielded so kindly with little labour." And he had never known any other; which his father *had*. But from Adam's apparent character it does not seem at all likely he had been filling Cain's head with stories of the better condition of the earth in Eden, but rather the reverse. - Why then was Cain so *singularly* dissatisfied? Can he be justified?—But he says moreover, he loves not the state to which his birth had brought him. So it plentifully appears. Yet he seems the only one of his family of that turn of mind. They all appear pleased with their existence. Then why not he? What peculiar disadvantages did he labour under? He has stated none, and therefore complains without even assigning a *reason* for

his complaint: a course of proceeding, which, I apprehend, will be approved by very few, if any, of *these* days at any rate. He asks why his father yielded to the serpent and the woman. By *the woman*, I suppose he means his mother. His father did *not*, as it should seem, yield to the *serpent*; for the scripture says, Adam was not deceived. Adam therefore appears to have yielded to Eve, probably from his attachment to her. His offence therefore was the more direct and deliberate. But, says Cain; if my father did yield, why should he suffer for it? Now does Cain ask that question (—"Or, yielding, why suffer?") in simplicity, as really considering what the reason of his father's suffering—such suffering as we have seen it to be—was; or does he ask it in a way of alledging that his father suffered unjustly, and without any reasonable cause? It seems to me that the *latter* was the spirit in which he put the question. Upon that supposition, the answer is very obvious, that his father must necessarily have suffered, as Cain calls it, if moral government, as before observed, be not to be rejected as between the Almighty and his moral creature man. But will or can any reasonable man say, that moral government generally *should* be abolished? Should government among men be abolished? And should not God govern men, if *they* see it needful to govern each other? Government doubtless, even among men, is a *species* of evil (though a great good) arising from man's depraved character through this very transgression. Were man perfectly restored, or perhaps endued with a superior moral and spiritual character, even to that he possessed before his fall, as scripture is generally thought to promise before the world's final change, government would scarcely be wanted, where there should be no evil human disposition. Regulations, voluntarily observed and never violated, might be the utmost that such a desirable state of man would require. But till then, who are they, who, like Cain, complain of moral government? Or if there be any, are they to be regarded? Cain next asks, "what was there in this?" If moral government is not to be exploded (and we may ask all civilized mankind if it should be) then, there was *every thing* in it.

God had declared to Adam before hand the penalty of transgressing his command. Was it a hard command, or had the deity no right to give it? Was it morally possible it should not be maintained, without letting in the rudiments of all disorder and disorganization? There was therefore every thing in it. He then argues, the tree was planted, and why not for his father? Moral government again must answer that question. Yet if a more specific answer were required, it might be, that, God evidently did not *intend* the tree for Adam's use in common with the other trees of the garden. It was planted by the Almighty for purposes of his own, and does it not seem extremely over-bearing and arrogant in Cain, to say the least, that he should desire to debar his maker, beneficent as he was, from the reservation of a single plant out of thousands? I confess, I feel, that scarcely any term could be too harsh in reprobating this tyrannical disposition in Cain. Who will not say, that it would have been infinitely more proper in him to have enquired, not why his maker did not plant that tree for his father; but why his father did not abstain from its fruit, in obedience to his creator's will? Had he not enough beside? But though we have no disposition to bear too hard upon our first father (for we are all human) and yet know not how to justify him; still there is *one* thing we can do, which is, to admire the surpassing benignity of the Almighty; who himself, like a father, yet necessarily retaining his character of a moral governor, mitigated as he did, the penalty of Adam's choice, by declaring, as in effect he did,

“Man shall find grace, the other none.”

But Cain pursues his interrogations of his creator. If not; if the tree were not for his father, then, at any rate, why place his father near it where it grew? as if God had placed him malignantly in the way of temptation; or as if his placing him near it were as good as telling him it was his; or that such proximity gave his father a right to it, notwithstanding his creator's prohibition. All that might have been so, but

for the divine express prohibition which gave Adam full notice. But we have seen it was not Adam who in the first instance neglected the admonition. He fell, not inadvertently, but by choice. God placed Adam near the tree, that is in the same territory, as we have seen, that Adam might, as a moral agent, shew his relative connexion with his creator by obedience. Yet Adam, and Eve too, might have *avoided* the tree if there were any thing particularly inviting in the appearance of its fruit. But the probability seems to be, they had not felt any peculiar attraction of that kind; that is, Eve more especially, until met by the serpent in its neighbourhood. As to the serpent, we shall have more to do with *him*, in the proper place. Cain observes, that his father and mother had but one answer to all questions, viz. "that it was God's will, and that God was good."—But what Plato, what Cicero, what christian, will not admire Lord Byron for ascribing such an answer to Adam and Eve? If God be a being of infinite and perfect wisdom and goodness, how can his will be *rationally* disputed? And if so, and if God be also a moral governor, and moral government be right, could Cain have received from his parents a more rational or proper, or (it ought to have been to him) *satisfactory* answer? But Cain will not easily give up his point. He asks, "how knows he that God is good? Does all-good follow all-powerful?" We reply, certainly not, and it is admitted in a preceding note; but in that note it is maintained, that although power and goodness do not *necessarily* go together, yet that, in the instance of the deity, they most assuredly *do*, and that it *cannot be* otherwise. Other and interesting opportunities will be afforded for more largely shewing that fact. But we cannot omit asking Cain, how it came to pass, that he only, of the whole human family, could not tell whether God was good or not? His father, his mother, (the *immediate* objects of the divine displeasure, such displeasure and so tempered, as it was,) his brother, and his sisters, they all knew, and felt, and ~~gratefully~~ *confessed*, and exulted in, the goodness of their

Cain did not know even from the creation,
e, from the enjoyments of all creatures,

that he who formed and sustained them *could not be but good*? from an *evil* being such things *could not* have proceeded. Then whence was Cain's ignorance of this goodness? Must it be ascribed to the weakness of his intellect, or the wilful perverseness of his disposition? But Cain does not seem deficient in intellect, for he reasons much. So here, he says he judges of God's goodness by the fruits, and they are bitter. As Cain is very dark in his inuendos generally, we must find out as well as we can, what are the bitter fruits he alludes to, for he does not say in his speech, unless they be life, and toil, and his father's not keeping his place in Eden, and the tree planted and not for his father, and his father being placed near it the fairest in the centre. If these then are not the bitter fruits Cain means, I own I know not what they are. I think however we may venture to conclude they are; and then the question comes, *whose* fruits they are, and how bitter they are after all this display. Was it a fruit of God's goodness then, or of his parents' wilful disobedience, that his father kept not his place in Eden? Cain evidently would have us believe that it was God's goodness, viz. such a *kind* of goodness, which produced all these bitter fruits: but that cannot be allowed upon Cain's mere assertion or insinuation. If God had *enticed* or *forced* Eve or Adam to eat of the forbidden tree, then the bitter fruits certainly would have been of God's procuring. But instead of that, the Almighty laid the strongest interdict possible against their committing that act. As to his toil, that was another fruit; but whether from God's goodness, or his parents' fault, who can have any difficulty in determining? And how terribly *bitter* that fruit was, let not only the husbandman of this northern clime say, but Adam himself, in *that* clime, where Cain himself existed, and where "the young earth yielded kindly her fruits with little labour." As to his life, if he meant that as another fruit, and if he found it a bitter one, are we not forced to ask, whether its bitterness were not of his own making? Life does not appear to have been bitter to the rest. But Cain says moreover, that he must *feed* on these bitter fruits, and that for a fault not his. As to the fault of

his father and mother, no one says it was his fault; it was their's exclusively. But had Cain no faults that *were* his? With respect to the necessity of his *feeding* on the bitter fruits, we have seen how bitter they were, and may then judge of the hardship Cain had to undergo in being obliged to feed on the same provisions on which his father, mother, brother, and sisters gladly fed. Has he shewn that he possessed greater intellect or discernment than they? Whence his more fastidious palate? Whence his delicater stomach? — His description of the angel-like being whom he now discerns to be approaching him is imaginative; and perhaps sufficiently near the truth, had we the means of knowing it. He asks, why he quakes at *him*? and why he should fear him more than the fiery-sworded spirits around the gates of Paradise? And afterwards he seems half disposed to quail again at this same novel, angel-like appearance with whom *we* also shall presently be pretty familiar, and who is, in fact, no other, nor less, than Lucifer himself. Cain seems to attribute more of terror to him, from some cause or other, than to those other spirits. But one thing appears certain; that Cain had not adopted, unless he was naturally and invincibly timorous or nervous, that sentiment of one (in Racine, I believe,) who said to Abner, "Oh, Abner! I fear God, and I fear none beside him." But Cain, having thus cast off the fear of his maker, was a prey to any fear beside. — His claim however to Eden's gardens as his "just inheritance" is equally modest and curious. Let us just look into this claim of his, because he speaks of it as something of which he had been (by his maker of course) unjustly deprived. In the first place, if I mistake not, the term, inheritance, means, either *possession* of property actually descended and *come to* an heir; or else, an indefeisible *right* which an heir has to his ancestor's estate after his ancestor's death. Now in either of *these* senses, Cain could have no claim at all to the inheritance of Eden's gardens. In the first case of course he could not, because they had never actually descended or come into his *possession*; so that he could not have been deprived of that which he never had. In the other case, that

of having a *right* to them in future, even in his father's life time ; if his father had *absolute right* in them himself, then Cain could not claim them ; because his father might, if he chose, prevent their *descending* to Cain, either by parting with them, or forfeiting them for treason, or disinheriting his son by will, and giving them to some other person. If his father had *not* an absolute right himself, but only a conditional right, holding them upon certain terms which he violated ; then, his father having forfeited his own right, how could Cain *possibly* have any, unless the gardens had been *entailed* upon him ? Such then was actually the case here. Adam forfeited his interest in Eden. Eden was *not* entailed upon Cain, as *Canaan* was, afterwards, upon the descendants of Abraham, by the Almighty. What "just inheritance" in Eden's gardens then had Cain to complain of being deprived of ? He had plainly no inheritance of any kind at all in them. * But Lord Byron well sustains his hero's character in thus making him advance such a claim, to shew, by that illustration, how one evil quality such as pride, or unreasonable discontent, and especially both those qualities united, lead to other moral evils ; even to the assumption of right to things to which we have no right : dispositions these, which have plentifully led to rapine, tyranny, and oppression among men. Cain ascribes an appearance of "sorrow" to the being he sees approaching him, even to the extent of "half of his immortality." Yet the fire-armed cherubim whom he describes as defending the battlements of Eden, he does not say looked sorrowful at all. Whence the difference ? We shall see perhaps in the proper place ; only remarking here, that sorrow does not seem to be a *covetable* thing by *human* beings at any rate, generally, if not universally speaking. He then asks "Can aught grieve save humanity ?" This seems to savour somewhat of the rhetorical in Cain ; for there were but very few human beings in his time, and none of them grieved, save himself. And what reasonable cause of grief *he* had, has been enquired into, and seems inexplicable, except as arising from pride and discontent ; (*unreasonable* discontent ;) and who sympathizes with *such* grief, or the subjects of it ? But room

must now be made for the great personage, with whom, from some parts of Cain's description of him, as sorrowful and so forth, one almost feels compelled to sympathise, and to be interested for him too, as we had begun to be, for Cain. But how permanent these feelings may be, when, as Cain has done, he also shall have spoken for himself, will shortly appear. He now advances.

Enter LUCIFER.

LUCIFER.

Mortal!

CAIN.

Spirit, who art thou?

LUCIFER.

Master of spirits.

Note 10.

Before we engage with this formidable dramatis persona, we would prefer endeavouring to ascertain, if there are reasonable grounds for believing that such a being *really* exists. For there have been, and are, some men of some name, who even admit and defend (at least professedly and generally) the authenticity of the Bible, both Old and New Testament, and who have maintained, and do maintain, that all which is said therein, respecting the devil, or Satan (and that the Lucifer of Lord Byron is the same with the devil or Satan is not disputed) is merely figurative; not pointing to or intending, any *real* being or existence, but only the metaphysical "principle of evil," producing the ~~evil~~ ~~to which have been wrongly~~ ascribed to the devil, Lucifer his sub-

ordinate agents. Much reasoning has been employed to support this hypothesis. To go no further however in the matter than I can help, I will merely state, that there are some plain considerations I cannot get over, which induce *me* to believe, with Lord Byron, (for though as a dramatic writer not bound to believe all he writes, I think he did in this instance) that Lucifer, or Satan, is in fact a *real* being, originally good and high, but now evil, and physically as well as morally degraded, though still possessing great and destructive powers, (yet limited and controlled by God) and those powers arising, so far as human nature is affected by them, from his intellectual, as well as other superiority to man. The considerations I have alluded to are simply these. In reading the New Testament throughout in relation to this subject, and indeed the Old Testament as well, there is so great a multiplicity of passages, without a solitary one to contradict them, where this being is spoken of as a real person, with such attributes and acts ascribed to him, as it seems to me impossible to reconcile with their being intended to apply to a metaphysical, *ideal*, *principle* of moral evil only. That there are in the scriptures numerous figurative expressions, and some moral qualities, such as wisdom for instance, personified, and other things allegorized, as the parable of the prodigal son, is certain. But where, from the beginning to the end of the Bible, will be found such a continued, unvarying, multiplied ascription of personal acts to any other subject, as is found in relation to Lucifer or Satan? The greatest violence therefore must be done to all received notions of reading, and understanding what we read, in order to turn what is said of the individual *reality* of this being into figure or allegory. Another consideration is this; that although the persons referred to, as thinking Satan a mere nonentity, would confound the accounts of his possessing men, as related in the New Testament, with the diseases they are said to have laboured under; yet I see so *marked* a *distinction*, unvaryingly made, between such possessions, and those maladies of a mere physical nature which are there also mentioned; that such confusion, of opposite

things, appears to me to be wholly untenable. I therefore must conclude, that scripture speaks of Lucifer, or Satan, as a real being or existence. Should it be objected, in this connexion, as incredible, that God should have created such a being; or that such a being, originally good, should have become evil; or being so, that God should suffer his existence, or his malevolence to be exercised in the world; those points will be perhaps, briefly considered in a future note, or notes.

But besides what has been said respecting the real existence of Lucifer, and, if the expression may be allowed, in *aid* of revelation, we shall advert to other sources of information, than revelation, for guiding our conclusions. And if, for demonstrating the existence of God, the universal consent of all times and nations be of any weight, why not for demonstrating the existence of Lucifer? The same question may be asked in reference to general tradition, and the indelible impressions of the human mind. All these sources of evidence apply to the subject of the existence of Lucifer, with perhaps equal force as to that of deity. Neither is fabulous antiquity, or ancient fable, wanting, to afford its concurrent testimony. And who denies an appropriate weight of testimony to ancient and traditional stories? The wisest, as well as the most ingenious, of the heathen classic writers, Plato, Cicero, Virgil, Ovid, Horace, Homer, Livy, to name no others, are constantly adduced to evidence leading facts, relating to the world and the transactions which have taken place in, or respecting it. The deluge alone need be mentioned as having ancient and heathen testimony, derived from tradition, to support the scripture account of it: not that I mean, *properly* speaking, that scripture *needs* such support. And as there can be no counterfeit where there is no original; therefore, generally speaking, there can be no tradition where there is no fact, whether more or less remote or disfigured, as its foundation. For it is not in the nature of man, (at least among *civilized* and well-informed society,) that false reports should universally, and for the utmost length of time, obtain. That, experience contradicts, without any laboured

proof. That there have been some false reports, or even traditions, eventually detected as false, rather confirms than weakens the general truth.

Consent then, of mankind, if not *absolutely* universal, yet sufficiently near it for this purpose, *does* concur, from the earliest times to the present, and in all nations and countries, and whether savage or civilized, to attest the fact now before us, viz. the real and personal existence of a spiritual, and mighty, evil being. This notion and belief has obtained amongst not only the *best* informed minds, and those of the highest moral character, but also among the least informed, and least moral of mankind, and does so to this day. With respect to the first class, let all civilized Europe witness; and for the other class we refer to the wild and untutored African, the superstitious Indian, and the ferocious American. Whence then this universal persuasion but from tradition, however modified, transmitting facts, however disfigured, from one generation of mankind to another; and with them spreading as *they* overspread the earth? The fact is stubborn; I mean of universal persuasion. Moral evidence, and reasonable certainty must, therefore be rejected if we would refuse weight to this testimony, arising from the belief of men of every class of moral and intellectual character. Whether we will condescend to endeavour thus to ascertain rationally the truth of the proposition before us, (the existence of Lord Byron's Lucifer, and the scriptures' Satan) or envelope ourselves in the proud mantle of universal scepticism, is another matter.

Having thus however glanced at the evidence arising from universal consent and tradition for the proof of the existence, and real personality, of Lucifer, we now pass easily to a brief notice of certain *historical* documents of antiquity, derived also from tradition.

It is assumed, because Lord Byron says nothing to contradict, it, but rather every thing tending to confirm it, that his Lucifer is the same with "Leviathan that crooked serpent," Isaiah xxvii. 1, and the "Lucifer" of Isaiah xiv. 12. For though these names are by the prophet accommodated primarily to Nebuchadnezzar king of Baby-

lon, yet I apprehend that it is thought, by the best commentators on the Bible, that the name is identified with that "prince of the power of the air," who is, under various denominations, so largely noticed in the New Testament, viz. Satan, or the devil.

In the Samothracian mysteries of the Cabiri (see Gale's Court of the Gentiles) *Pluto* is styled *Ariokersos*, which is the same with the Phenician or Hebrew *Achazi Keres*, i. e. *Death is my Possession*, *Strength*, or *Power*; which is the character given to the devil by the Hebrews. Thus the author of the epistle to the Hebrews styles him, Hebrews ii. 14.; viz. "that through death he (that is Christ) might destroy him that had the power of death, that is, the devil;" which is, according to the Hebrew idiom, *Achazi Keres*; or, according to the Greek, *Ariokersos*, the *Lord of Destruction*; which was *Pluto's* name among the *Samothracian Cabiri*.

As *Pluto* was termed by the Phenicians *Muth*, *Death*; and by the Samothracians *Ariokersos*, *Lord of Death*; so also by the Egyptians, *Typhon*; whom they supposed to be a monstrous giant, cast down by *Jupiter* into *Tartarus*, or *Hell*, as an enemy of the gods; it appears from *Bochart*, that *Typhon*, among the Egyptians, was the same with *Pluto* among the Grecians.

To the fable of *Pluto*, may be subjoined that of the giant *Enceladus*, nearly, if not entirely, the same with *Pluto*. This *Enceladus* also was a fighter against the gods; and, either by *Minerva*, or *Jupiter* himself, cast down to *Hell*, and there overwhelmed with *Etna*, whence fire proceeded out of his mouth and nostrils, and which was referred to the burnings and eruptions of *Etna*. It can be no objection to these traditionary fables, that they are reasonably thought to have been brought by the Phenicians, from the Jewish church, into Greece. For the very name *Enceladus*, appears to be derived from a transmutation of the Hebrew word *akalathon* or, *nesh akalathon*; which, in *Isaiah xxvii. 1*, is in English called "*Leviathan that crooked Serpent*:"—a slight and easy transposition of some Hebrew, into Greek letters, effects this construction.

That *Enceladus* is exactly parallel to the devil's character in

Isaiah xxvii. 1, seems highly admissible from his other name *Typhon*, or *Typhos*; who is thus described by Pindar, *Pythia* 1. "*en Tartaro keitai thebn polemios Tüphòs ekatonkaranos* :—there lies in Tartarus that hundred-headed Typhos the enemy of the gods." — The attributes of this *Enceladus* or *Typhon* are said to be, that he waged war with Jupiter, and contended with him for the empire, for which he was struck down, by Jupiter, into Tartarus. More might be written to shew the accordance of these things with the scriptures; but the little which has been said may be sufficient to create some evidence, from ancient tradition, that the attempts, made to destroy the generally received declarations of the Bible, shewing the actual existence of Lord Byron's Lucifer, are too ill founded, and too sternly opposed by all moral testimony, to be successful with *most* men. I say *most* men; for though I recollect that a multitude is not to be followed in *evil*; yet I would ask, if there be not instances in morals, and in philosophy, wherein *weight* is properly to be admitted to a vast preponderancy of *numbers* where intellect, integrity, and independency, are no more wanting in the many, than in the few. It has recently been observed, that it can be no discredit to ancient tradition that it may be traced up to the matters related in the *Bible*. That divine record is universally allowed to contain the most ancient account of the earliest proceedings of the earliest men from the creation of the world. If Bochart's authority may be credited, and Plutarch's, as cited by him, the eldest Egyptians looked upon *Typhon* as an evil god, or the cause of all ill; and, hating as they did the Jewish patriarchs, who opposed their idolatry, and especially Moses, for reasons obvious enough; they applied the notions of this god of *all ill* to Moses, who was the instrument of such disasters (the ten plagues) to them. See *Gale*.

Having thus, perhaps, succeeded, in *some* degree proportioned to the subject and to the limits prescribed to an occasion of this nature, in proving to the satisfaction of *most* persons, that in contending with Lord Byron's Lucifer we are not fighting with a shadow, but with a real and powerful, malicious and vengeful being, accord-

ing to evidence which it seems irrational to resist; we now return to the commencement of the interview between Cain and Lucifer.

In answer, then, to Cain's question, to Lucifer, who he was, Lucifer announces himself "Master of Spirits." This may be admitted to be true so far as relates to *evil* spirits; but certainly not as relating to *good* spirits. For that there are good spirits is as certain, as that there are bad ones. And neither were doubted, as it should seem, by Lord Byron. But that Lucifer should be master of *good* spirits is not credible, from considerations which may occur hereafter, besides the gross improbability that such a dominion would be permitted to him by the Almighty.

By spirits indeed, here, Lucifer could only mean angels; viz. that order of intellectual and immaterial beings, spiritual and celestial, of high intelligence, and incomparably greater than man in every superior attribute. We are informed by scripture, which is the only source of our knowledge respecting them, that they were created before man. But at what earlier period, or whether at the time of the creation of the world, but preceding man's formation, and as composing the "*host*" of the heavens, we have no express account. Those who are conversant with the scriptures may learn much respecting these superior and interesting beings. They are, in fact, interesting to man, in either of the general characters they sustain, as good or bad. It appears most clearly, that they are exceeding numerous, and that at some period, whether more or less remote from or nearer to, that of their own creation, we are not told, a considerable portion of these high intelligences used that volition and power with which their creator had endued them, in revolting from him; but that the greater portion of them, in scripture language "kept their first estate." These important events are also figured out by the foregoing and other traditionary accounts to be gathered from prophane history, which, it cannot be reasonably doubted, had their origin from the Hebrew scriptures. Of the apostate, fallen, or revolted portion of these angels or spirits then, it is, that, as scripture abundantly informs us, Lucifer is what he

stiles himself, "Master;" or head, chief, or prince. Thus—"he hath Beelzebub, and by the prince of the devils casteth he out devils." And,—“he casteth out devils through Beelzebub, the chief of the devils.” Beelzebub, Satan, and Lucifer are all one. These then, the spirits of whom Lucifer tells Cain he is master, are largely described as busying themselves, under God’s providential permission, in the affairs of mankind. Not indeed in assisting, or serving, (unless in bad matters,) but in injuring them; especially in whatever relates to their duty to their maker, and their eternal welfare. On the other hand, there is equal reason to be assured, that those of the angels, “who kept their first estate,” are not only most happily occupied in attending their creator in his own more immediate presence, in their native regions of light and glory, but are also, most gratefully to themselves, employed in good offices to man, and in executing the purposes of God’s government upon earth, and in the affairs of mankind:—“Are they not sent forth to minister to those who shall be heirs of salvation?” These are therefore links in the great chain of intellectual being, which the Almighty, in his infinite goodness, has constituted between himself and man, the more extensively to manifest and communicate that happiness and enjoyment, which all his creatures derive from himself, its everlasting source. As we are further informed also in scripture that opposition exists between the two classes of these spirits, the good and the evil, those who revolted and those who kept their first estate; it is also on that account necessary to limit Lucifer’s *mastership* to the former only.—We have now seen what is meant by Lucifer’s sounding title “Master of Spirits.” But Cain cannot be supposed to have known what *we* know, and it therefore cannot be altogether surprizing that he should be somewhat dazzled by Lucifer’s grand pretension. The conference, then, proceeds.—

CAIN.

And being so, canst thou
Leave them, and walk with dust?

LUCIFER.

I know the thoughts
Of dust, and feel for it, and with you.

CAIN.

How!

You know my thoughts?

LUCIFER.

They are the thoughts of all
Worthy of thought; — 't is your immortal part
Which speaks within you.

Note 11.

It is said above, that Cain cannot be supposed to have known so well who, or what Lucifer was, as we do. Yet from his manner he must apparently have had some idea that he was not exactly of the same character as those angels of God, who, we shall find presently, Cain was not unaccustomed to see, and who therefore "walked with dust" familiarly. He seems however to have somewhat rallied from his former quaking and quailing, so as to have answered Lucifer by asking *who he was*, (unless he did it in a fright, not knowing what he said,) after Lucifer had so magisterially saluted him with the startling address, "Mortal!"—However, he does appear to have conducted himself with tolerable firmness towards this "mightier far, and sterner and sadder, and yet sorrowful" being. For he, first, was sufficiently collected to ask him, respect-

fully, who he was; and, being informed, to pay him a sort of compliment, by expressing his surprize that he should condescend to walk with dust. But Cain had departed from his God, and was therefore a subject of that malign, and even perhaps subduing influence, which, as well as an ensnaring influence also, Lucifer knew, and still better *now* knows, how to practise upon all that yield themselves to, and accept *him* as their lord and master. Of which, more will occur from Lucifer himself presently. I must therefore upon the whole take leave to observe upon the degeneracy of Cain (how unlike his father and brother!) in thus flattering Lucifer, whom I really think he *felt* was a being opposed, like himself, to his maker, by ascribing to him, as a *condescension*, his associating with man. Man, so long as he retains his allegiance to his God, is a favourite of the Most High; equally so as, not to say, through his Son, more so than, the highest archangel. And the angels of God therefore think it no condescension, but a high delight, to perform the commissions they receive from heaven to mankind. This Cain must have known, had not his rebellious spirit indulged against his maker, darkened all his better faculties, and left the worst only to operate upon him. Thus therefore he deemed himself honoured by the notice of Lucifer. Lucifer however, as will appear ere long, knew with whom he was now engaged, and without doubt had prepared himself with all his wiles. He therefore begins with Cain in the same way in which he succeeded with his mother, that is, by pretending to sympathy and feeling. He tells Cain he “knows the thoughts of dust, and feels for *it*, and with *him*.” That Lucifer feels *with* such men as feel with him, there can be no doubt. And there is as little doubt that he feels *for* all men universally; viz. much in the same way as the wolf feels *for* the sheep. But by his assertion that he knows the thoughts of dust, that is, of man, we must suppose he meant to impress Cain with the idea that he knew the thoughts, not only of Cain, but of all mortals. At that time mortals were very few. Had the world been peopled however, I pre-

sume Lucifer would have extended his pretensions of knowing the thoughts of dust, to man generally, the whole human race. We ought however to question this. For were it the case, what an immense advantage would Lucifer possess! But I no more believe that Lucifer has this power, than that he is master of good spirits, or, that he is the Omnipotent himself; whose sole prerogative it is to know the thoughts of man. It is not to be believed, therefore, that the knowledge of man's thoughts is entrusted even to good angels, much less to bad. Yet spirits, and Lucifer among them in an eminent degree no doubt, are extremely wise and sagacious; and, from what they see and hear among mortals, can guess shrewdly, and probably with much accuracy, of men's thoughts, from their words and actions. It seems highly probable that Lucifer had been invisibly present and attending the foregoing family conferences, and heard all that Cain had said. For his locomotive and active powers may be conceived to be astonishingly great, short of ubiquity, which belongs to the Omnipresent God only. At that early stage of the world he had little to attend to. Since that his occupations of course have been increased with the increase of mankind; and he is now very possibly, or rather certainly, obliged to commit some of his work to his inferior, and servile fellow rebels of whom he is "Master." With all these aids therefore, and Cain's communicativeness to him, he no doubt did, in an inferior sense, know his thoughts, which he cannot do, so long as man keeps them to himself. If he utter them aloud, Lucifer, or some of his satellites, may be at hand, and the one would register them in his memory if for his purpose, and the other report them also to his "Master," if relating to matters wherein the subaltern thought Lucifer's superior skill were required. It appears to me that these ideas are not fanciful or idle, but important, as well as sanctioned by every evidence, natural, as well as strictly scriptural.

Lucifer's pretensions, however, seemed to stagger Cain himself, and he makes a question of Lucifer's knowledge of his cogitations. The "Master of Spirits" therefore plies Cain with flattery,

as he had before done with sympathy. He tells Cain of the *grandeur* of his thoughts, which there seems little reason to doubt Lucifer had picked up partly from Cain's observations to his parents, and partly from the foregoing *soliloquy* of his which has been considered. And, for the first time, Lucifer tells Cain he had an immortal part, which it was, that dictated his sublime reveries. This bait, so finely gilded, Cain readily swallowed; and the confabulation thus proceeds.—

CAIN.

What immortal part?

This has not been reveal'd: the tree of life
Was withheld from us by my father's folly,
While that of knowledge, by my mother's haste,
Was pluck'd too soon; and all the fruit is death!

LUCIFER,

They have deceived thee; thou shalt live.

CAIN.

I live, ✕

But live to die: and, living, see nothing
To make death hateful, save an innate clinging,
A loathsome and yet all-invincible
Instinct of life, which I abhor, as I
Despise myself, yet cannot overcome —
And so I live. Would I had never lived!

Note 12.

Cain says, his immortal part had not been revealed. Lord Byron in his preface says, on the authority of Bishop Warburton,

that the Old Testament did not reveal a future state to the Jews, but more especially not the book of Genesis. Yet it seems difficult to believe, that those among the Old Testament patriarchs and others who are represented to have walked with God, and to have been much and personally favoured by their maker, should not have had some, if not *full*, as afterwards, yet *satisfactory* knowledge of a future existence after death imparted to them, although temporal sanctions alone were generally employed in enforcing the observance of the divine institutions. Indeed the accounts given of several Old Testament individuals, and their own expressions, seem to establish this idea, so accordant also as it is, with the benignity of the Almighty displayed to them. To Adam and to Eve also, one scarcely knows how to imagine, that *some* intimation of a renewed existence after the present life embracing perhaps the real and natural immortality of the human soul, was *not* given; conveyed, as may be supposed, in the promise, that the woman's offspring should destroy the author of their present calamity. How is it possible to confine the meaning of that promise to the fact of the serpent bruising man's heel, and man bruising his head, in a sense merely literal? It appears evident, that it was the intention of their merciful creator to convey consolation to the minds of his offending, but penitent creatures. That consolation *would* be imparted by the intimation, that a future, and better existence should be thereafter obtained by them, through the victory of Christ over Satan or Lucifer. I deem them penitent, because that seems most probable, and is not contradicted by their stating the facts to their offended maker; Eve by attributing her error to the serpent, and Adam by attributing his to Eve. Those were days of great simplicity. Now no consolation could have been imparted to them without such an accompanying intimation of their restoration as has been supposed. And the kindness of the divine conduct subsequently, seems to confirm it. That this was Lord Byron's view of the matter also appears probable, from that mention of the "Atonement" which will occur

hereafter, notwithstanding the objection which Cain there makes to it. Generally speaking however, Cain may perhaps be allowed to have been sufficiently correct in saying, that his immortality had not been revealed. *Fully so*, certainly not; although if communicated to Adam and Eve, as above suggested, he must, from ~~them~~, have heard *something* of it. Cain's observation of his mother's haste in plucking the tree of knowledge too soon, is right so far as it squares with the fact, that it is always too soon to do what is wrong. Otherwise, as referring to her having done it before his father had secured life, notwithstanding their expulsion from Eden, by plucking the tree of life, it is inapplicable, as appears from what has been before said respecting the incapacity, as it should seem, of the fruit of the latter tree to confer instant immortality instead of a present remedy against disease, or the infirmities and decays of nature; so that it required a constant repetition. *Had* Adam therefore plucked of that tree first, he would have gained no benefit by so doing; for not needing it, it would have been without effect. Or had Adam taken of the fruit, and had it possessed those powers of immediate immortality, it would only have procured them a perpetuity of unhappy existence, as has before been observed, supposing a transgression to have subsequently occurred, which cannot be doubted; for the tree of life had no *moral* efficacy. Cain therefore was not wise, as it seems to me, in imputing folly to his father. And as to his father's removal from Eden that he *might not* eat of the tree of life, we have seen that it was done in mercy, and doubtless according to the foreknowledge and appointment of God, to whom nothing can be unforeseen, or unprovided for. Cain further says, that all the fruit, of his mother's thus plucking the tree of knowledge, was death. That was true, in its mitigated meaning; and supposing Cain ignorant of, or not to have appreciated, the amazingness of the provision of that *better life* which this very death was the forerunner of, to all that should embrace that *medium*, through which, the better life was to be obtained. Still Cain had no ground for speaking of that

fruit of death as if it had been matter of surprize, since he well knew that the Almighty had forewarned his parents of the effect of that other fruit, which produced this fruit of death. Where then was there any cause for wonder or complaint?

Lucifer here, in his reply to Cain's lamentation, assuring him his parents had deceived him, for that he should live, begins that course of instruction and *deception* with Cain, which, we shall presently, see, he carries to a great extent in the sense he puts upon the immortality he has announced to Cain. For it will, after this, appear to be Lucifer's aim to persuade Cain, that he is immortal, not through an immortal nature bestowed upon him by his creator, but through a principle of life, existing in him, or he in it, independent of God, if not superior to him; thus leading Cain into gross atheism, for ulterior purposes, which will be gradually unfolded, for Lucifer's advantage, (so to term it,) and Cain's destruction. Such is the sympathy and feeling of this "Master of Spirits" who has thus introduced himself to Cain in the exercise of his vocation of "going about, seeking whom he may devour;" and which vocation he was just then *beginning* to exercise. Since that time, abundant practice has made him a most consummate adept. Lucifer also was equally himself in slandering Cain's parents by saying "they have deceived thee." In the first place, though it was true, as Lucifer said, that Cain was immortal, and should not die eternally, (but live for ever, miserable or happy,) yet his parents had *not* deceived him in telling him of the divine denunciation as to his natural death. It is not to be supposed that, as Lucifer intimates, Adam and Eve had told Cain positively, as from themselves, he should die, as if *they* pronounced sentence upon him. Lucifer knew they had only reported God's words to Cain. Lucifer therefore seems to me, like himself, to have charged the Almighty here with deception, as he did Eve, when he said "thou shalt *not* surely die; for God doth know," and so forth. See then the depth of the malignity of Lucifer in his enmity against his maker; in slandering whom he is always most

in his element, unless when also destroying the souls of men. Lord Byron's penetration, in thus imagining the character of Lucifer, is admirable.

In his reply to Lucifer, Cain seems not to have been at all comforted by the assurance that he should live, in spite of his parents, or rather the divine *deception*: for such, Lucifer clearly meant to *insinuate* it was. For Lucifer deals much in insinuation. Quoth melancholy Cain—"I live but to die."—[And in one sense, what mortal does not?] So he still harps upon this monster death:—but he was not a Christian certainly; therefore, so far as possible, allowance shall be made for him. Life and immortality had not *then* been brought to light by the Gospel. God's time was not come. But now it is, and Lucifer skulks, in comparison with what he did before. Yet Cain's father and mother, in all apparent probability, believed and rejoiced in the promise God had given them of future life and happiness, as before noticed, and which Cain must have heard of. Surely then Cain must have been what is usually called an unbeliever. That is, an unbeliever of the word of his creator! What happiness can such expect? As to Cain's avowal of seeing nothing to make death hateful, it is to be surmised he did not mean it in the sense which has been glanced at, *viz.* as being the introducer to a better life; in which view it could not properly, be hateful. Cain seems merely to mean, he could see nothing to make life desirable, consequently not death hateful; therefore he was content to be extinguished or annihilated; forgetting what his friend Lucifer had told him, or will tell him—there was that in him which *could not* die. However, in this mere hatred of life how unlike was he to the rest of his family and of mankind since! For, with all its inconveniences, we find life still more desirable, to the incalculable majority, than Cain thought it. Cain therefore I suspect must, in most or all his singularities be content with solitary dignity. Solitary dignity! This reminds me of much on that subject presently. But Cain (I wrong him) says he *does* see something to make death

hateful, namely, "an innate clinging, a loathsome and yet all invincible instinct of life which he abhors, as he despises himself, yet cannot overcome." Now here is his singularity again. That very clinging to life, and loathsome, and yet all-invincible instinct of life, which he abhors, is, I believe, not so abhorred by nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand of mankind. It is I apprehend *generally* thought to be implanted in all earthly creatures for their good. And as for his despising himself for not overcoming what was invincible, that seems very irrational, and what even the greatest philosopher or the greatest general that ever lived, would not have done, or was ever known to do: unless such philosopher or general were very short of a sane mind. Yet what moral evil (unless dreadfully rooted discontent) was there in Cain, which there was not, by his own confession, in Socrates? and yet Socrates professed to have overcome it: but Socrates did not, it is conceived, reckon among his evils his instinct of life. He suffered, and then died, because they would suffer him to live no longer; but even he (and christianity was not then) died with hopes full of immortality. It is not meant that he was faultless, and who is? Or who is expected to be? Yet this does not countenance wilful error or vitiosity. "And so," says Cain, "I live; and would I had never lived!" Cain therefore lived miserably in spite of every surrounding providential mercy, and concludes with a wish than which none, certainly, more appropriate, could have been devised for him. But on the whole, I conceive he will have few, compared with all mankind, few imitators. The wonder is, if one man of any sanity can resemble him, in these days especially, when the Gospel, at any rate, if nothing else, brings complete relief. Lucifer however resumes his lecture.

LUCIFER.

Thou livest, and must live for ever: think not
The earth, which is thine outward cov'ring, is

Existence — it will cease, and thou wilt be
No less than thou art now

CAIN.

No *less!* and why

No more?

LUCIFER.

| It may be thou shalt be as we.

CAIN.

| And ye?

LUCIFER.

| Are everlasting.

CAIN.

Are ye happy? ↘

LUCIFER.

| We are mighty.

CAIN.

| Are ye happy?

LUCIFER.

, No: art thou?

CAIN.

How should I be so? Look on me;

LUCIFER.

Poor clay!

And thou pretendest to be wretched! Thou!

CAIN.

I am:—and thou, with all thy might, what art thou?

LUCIFER.

One who aspired to be what made thee, and
Would not have made thee what thou art.

CAIN,

Ah!

Thou look'st almost a god; and——

LUCIFER.

I am none:

And having fail'd to be one, would be nought
Save what I am. He conquer'd; let him reign!

CAIN.

Who?

LUCIFER.

Thy sire's Maker, and the earth's.

CAIN.

And heaven's,

And all that in them is. So I have heard
His seraphs sing; and so my father saith.

LUCIFER.

They say — what they must sing and say, on pain
Of being that which I am — and thou art —
Of spirits and of men.

CAIN.

And what is that ?

Note 13.

Lucifer, in this stage of the dialogue, after announcing Cain's immortality, very truly tells him, that, compared with his ultimate state of being, his present earthly covering is scarcely existence, and that it will cease. All this is true. For nothing can be more true, as Plato, and Cicero, and all Christians will acknowledge, than that this life is nothing compared with eternity, either in respect of duration or sensibility. Duration endless. Sensibility, either of happiness, or misery, most exquisite. And upon Lucifer's adding, that in such his ultimate and immortal state, Cain should not be a being *less* than he now was, and Cain expressing his ambition to be something *more*; Lucifer plainly tells him he should be *as they*; viz. as Lucifer himself, and his fellow rebels against the Most High; and of whom he will presently afford opportunity of saying a little more. Cain, however, does, here, shew some sense and spirit, by not being exactly satisfied with his mighty friend's general assurance of his being like *them*; he desires to know what they, in fact, are. Lucifer, pa-

tron-like,^a thinks to astound, if not satisfy, his client and adherent Cain, with one of their principal attributes, and therefore tells him they are "everlasting." This shall not be disputed here. Perhaps *some* deduction may be made from this attribute, or at least from Lucifer's pretensions to it, hereafter, in the proper place. But miserable Cain seems to have learnt, some way or other (though he would not take the lesson from his parents, or family, nor even practise it) that there was such a thing as happiness, though he refused the cup when offered to him, as will appear hereafter. He therefore asks his lofty yet sorrowful and new acquaintance the important question—"Are ye happy?" It was a question, something like the sword of Michael, given him from the armoury of God, and similar in its powerful effects; for

"————— then Satan first knew pain,
And writh'd him to and fro convolv'd; so sore
The griding sword, &c."

But he tries to evade Cain's piercing question,—

"Which brought to his remembrance from what state
He fell,"—

by shifting it. He answers therefore by telling him of *another* of his attributes, "we are mighty." But even this not satisfying Cain's present anxious mind; and happiness appearing to him to be the chief good, and last end, of man [as in fact, *rightly understood*, it is, for what is existence without it?]^b he sticks to his text, and drives even Lucifer to a corner, by repeating his ques-

^a I do not mean this of *all* patrons. But are there not *many* Luciferian patrons among men?

^b This is not meant to clash with the Platonic and Christian sentiment in Note 3— that *God* is man's chief good and last end: for what

tion, regardless of Lucifer's high-sounding, but hollow, compound attribute of everlasting might. The Master of Spirits therefore, unable to resist answering, at last, being thus *put to the question* by his humble friend, confesses, Prometheus-like, the very truth, viz. that he and his associates are *not* happy. But as if resolving to be even, or as far as may be lessen the effect of his avowal, he retorts on Cain the same question respecting himself. And he succeeds (as in parley he mostly does) in thus diverting Cain's attention. For had Cain been permitted to *dwell* upon the circumstance of his unhappiness, though possessing an everlasting and mighty nature, it might have led him to suspicious thoughts concerning his real character. Lucifer therefore asks Cain if *he* is happy? And Cain's answer is a sad one, however true. He says "How should I be so? Look on me." What he meant by desiring Lucifer to look upon him to see the proof of what he said, does not appear clear to me; for the dire event had not yet occurred, for which the mark was set upon him. We must therefore suppose, that his dark, and discontented, and even daring nature, looked through his countenance, and that it was, in scripture language, somewhat "fallen." This seems the more likely, as he so much resembled this congenial spirit in character and conduct; and he, we have learned, was also "sorrowful," and

"Of a sterner and a sadder aspect"

and

"Sorrow seem'd half of his immortality."

If therefore it is true, that happiness is important to man, it appears to me, that all praise is due to Lord Byron's memory, for thus evidencing, in his two prominent characters, that happiness, and contempt of God, go not together. And so Plato, as we have seen.

is happiness but that? And where else can *true* happiness be found? And what is not *truly* a thing, is *not* that thing. It *may* be a *counterfeit* of it.

Lucifer, nevertheless, undaunted, absolutely sneers at the inferiority of his poor friend's wretchedness to his own :—

“ —————Poor clay!
And thou pretendest to be wretched! Thou!”

As if Cain were really too *mean* to be wretched. Cain, however, seems rather nettled as this indignity; he therefore persists in claiming the honour of being wretched, as well as Lucifer himself, though “Master of Spirits, everlasting, and mighty.” He manfully asserts, afresh, his own pretensions—“I am”—and, almost with an appearance of hostility, and certainly with less *reverence*, than he had before observed. For he interrogates—“And thou, with all thy might, what art thou?” This was rather an affronting, or at least uncourtly, unceremonious treatment of one who had done Cain the condescension of walking with dust, as Cain himself expressed it. But Lucifer was not defective in that sort of wisdom, which, although it do not pursue “virtuous ends by virtuous means,” nor even has discernment enough to see what is really and substantially, good, yet is extremely astute in every view. So here, Lucifer's end was, to entrap Cain, and get him (of which more hereafter) body and soul for himself forever. Cain was, probably his very first prey of the human race. Adam and Eve had turned to their God again. Of Abel there can be no doubt, because the scriptures testify of him. And Adah and Zillah appear to be piously disposed. Cain therefore, the only dissentient, the only one of the human family who had said

“ —————Evil, be thou my good!”

was a most covetable acquisition to Lucifer, as we shall see presently from his own shewing. As then the angler one while teazes, then amuses the finny object of his steady looks and serious regard; or, as the deep politician, or the wary gamester, avoids perturbation; and as the skilful general suffers not himself to be thrown out of his

design by the petulance of his adversary, whom he fully intends to overcome; so Lucifer controls every emotion. He therefore coolly, and even with specious shew of civility and affection, informs his rather alarmed and inquisitive client, that he (Lucifer) was one who aspired to be *what* made him, and who would not have made him what he was. Cain appears to have been much struck by his communication. He did not, indeed, at once, advert to the impieties and folly of Lucifer in having attempted to

“——— have equalled the Most High;”

but instead of that, blinded as he was by his own defection from his maker, he fancies Lucifer, for such daring, must be something great, and so tells him he looks almost a god, and, — was going, it should seem, to add some accompanying adulation, when Lucifer, honestly stopped him with saying he was none: adding, that having failed in that attempt, he would be nought but what he was. This to be sure was practising that useful maxim of making a virtue of necessity. Yet it was really a good lesson to Cain, would he have taken it. For who finds fault with an exhortation to be contented with one's condition, unless upon very *reasonable* grounds of discontent? Lucifer moreover, thus excited, could not keep his own secret; “he conquered.” His *permission* to his conqueror to reign, is quite in good taste for him.

From Cain's succeeding question, one should almost suspect he had *not* understood Lucifer to have made an attempt upon his maker and his throne; for he now asks him, *who* it was that he permitted thus to reign. To which, on his replying “thy sire's maker and the earth's,” Cain immediately, and with more propriety than could almost have been expected, adds, what he had learned from his parents, and from the songs of seraphs, “and heavens and all that in them is.” Lucifer's remark upon this addition of Cain's to his own declaration, leads to rather important considerations. He observes, that the seraphs *must* sing, and Cain's father *must* say, what they severally did, *on pain* of being what Lucifer was among spirits, and Cain among men.

And let any reasonable and moral being say, if any thing could well be worse. We shall now however take permission to examine a little into this alleged *necessity* of the seraph's so singing. "Must" is always a hard word. And here it is under a sufficient *penalty*, it must be confessed.

This "must," then, certainly implies a *constraint* upon the will, the free will of the creature, imposed upon it by the creator. Lucifer means to insinuate, that the seraphs in question are neither more nor less than in a state of degrading slavery, or at least painful constraint; while he (Lucifer) and his rebel companions, are wholly free. And whatever is about to be said of seraphs, will of course apply to Adam. Now it is to be observed that this "must" is merely *asserted* by Lucifer. But assertion is no proof. And it appears to me that, unless the whole be considered as a fable, Lucifer's assertion should be *shewn* to be false. For no one to whom revelation is not a non-entity, can be indifferent to the character of the exalted and amiable beings in question. But if they be slaves, or if they cannot, on most rational grounds, be *shewn* not to be so, how can they but suffer in our estimation; or the Almighty himself not be an object of abhorrence, instead of due and sublime regard; and Heaven itself detestable, as a place of the basest slavery, instead of most desirable, as the very bosom of true liberty? We will therefore endeavour to see what kind of *proof* Lucifer ought to have adduced in support of his assertion. Should he not, then, first have proved, that the Supreme Being (whom he unquestionably intends as the *object* of this *necessitated* service) was *not* infinite in goodness, and moral excellence, as well as power? Had he shewn that, to the satisfaction of any reasonable mind, he had done something, and established something like a substratum, on which to raise his superstructure. Because, for the seraphs to have sung, in the way of adoration to a being *unworthy* of adoration from a defect of goodness, and yet possessing power, coercive power, only; it would certainly have implied compulsion and servility in the seraphs. But that foundation Lucifer has not laid. Or, he has admitted the exalted nature

of deity; then, should he not have shewn, either that there ought to be only one being in existence; or else, if more than one, that he ought not to be superior to, or excel, the rest in power, or in wisdom, any more than in goodness or moral excellence; but that all ought to be equal; all of them omnipotent, all of them omniscient, all of them infinite, in all good and high qualities. But how could any rational being have admitted the possibility of that? That foundation also is therefore not laid. Still, if he could not have shewn either of those proofs of the degradedness of the seraphs, he should have shewn that there ought not to be such a moral quality existing, as love to what is superiorly good; or respect, much less reverence, for what is superiorly excellent. But that foundation he has not laid. If he could not have *thus* proved his point, he should have shewn the impossibility of the existence of creatures so constituted, as, in their very natures, to admire, love, and adore a being, infinite in wisdom, goodness, and moral excellence, with the utmost spontaneity, as the most congenial and delightful, natural and voluntary act of their existence. Yet, neither is that foundation laid. Had he even failed here, and been obliged to admit, that there were such existences as last described, then, as his last resort, he might have boldly shewn (if he could) that the seraphs in question were not those voluntary and spontaneously acting creatures, but of a different and baser nature. But this last also he has not done. But, however free and unconstrained the seraphs are in their admiration of infinite goodness and excellence, we "must" now submit to the constraint of reason, in declaring, that Lucifer's assertion of an *ungrateful necessity* operating upon the seraphs, is as false as he is slanderous.^c Let Lucifer then be thus addressed:—

^c The seraphs, in this note, have been considered as acting from the *freeness of their wills*, in the common acceptation of the term, and in opposition to the servility ascribed to them by Lucifer. How far that freeness is consistent with a philosophical and scriptural *necessity*, will be cursorily considered on a future occasion in the course of these notes.

“All are not of thy train ; there be, who faith
 Prefer, and piety to God.
 Apostate ! still thou err'st, nor end wilt find
 Of erring, from the path of truth remote ;
 Unjustly thou depriv'st it with the name
 Of servitude, to serve whom God ordains
 Or nature : God and nature bid the same,
 When he who rules is worthiest, and excels
 Them whom he governs.—*This* is servitude,
 To serve the unwise, or him who hath rebelled
 Against his worthier, as thine now serve thee.”

More serious matters however now await our notice in the following truly Satanic ebullition of daring prophanity ; in which the author's correct ideas of the being he was exhibiting, are manifest. For upon Cain's asking Lucifer “And what is that ?” that is, what it was to be like Lucifer among the spirits, and like Cain among men, Lucifer thus replies :—

LUCIFER.

✕ Souls who dare use their immortality—
 Souls who dare look the omnipotent tyrant in
 His everlasting face, and tell him, that
 His evil is not good ! If he has made,
 As he saith — which I know not, nor believe —
 But, if he made us — he cannot unmake :
 We are immortal ! — nay, he'd *have* us so,
 That he may torture : — let him ! He is great —
 But, in his greatness, is no happier than
 We in our conflict ! Goodness would not make
 Evil ; and what else hath he made ? But let him
 Sit on his vast and solitary throne,

Creating worlds, to make eternity
 Less burthensome to his immense existence
 And unparticipated solitude !
 Let him crowd orb on orb : he is alone
 Indefinite, indissoluble tyrant !
 Could he but crush himself, 't were the best boon
 He ever granted: but let him reign on,
 And multiply himself in misery !
 Spirits and men, at least, we sympathize ;
 And, suffering in concert, make our pangs,
 Innumerable, more endurable,
 By the unbounded sympathy of all —
 With all! But *He!* so wretched in his height,
 So restless in his wretchedness, must still
 Create, and re-create——

Note 14.

After perusing this speech, the incipient sympathy one could hardly help feeling for Lucifer himself, when Cain first introduced him by the description of his sadder as well as sterner countenance, and of sorrow being half his immortality — this sympathy is all dispersed, unless we recognize as our own, his sentiments and principles thus expressed, and which we now proceed to examine. The author indeed, in this extraordinary and almost horrifying, declamation, seems to have outgone all other exhibitors of Luciferian audacity and malignity, Milton perhaps not excepted. But Lucifer must be met even here. We will endeavour to attend him diligently, step by step, in this portentous invective. For although his horrible assertions, (as in the instance of the seraphs, but still *unproved*,) may in the *general* be abhorrent to our minds, and in that abhorrence provide their antidote; yet it does seem, that such accusations against

deity, if unfounded, as it is presumed few, if any men, think they are not, should not be suffered to escape in silence, or with argumentative impunity; but should be dragged forth to the blaze and light of truth, and confronted with such evidence as shall condemn Lucifer and his abettors, if unhappily there be any such besides his own Cain, as convicted of the grossest and most slanderous falsehood. And is it not grateful to every ingenuous mind to see malice defeated, and the fair character defended and illustrated? And can it be the less so because the *object* is that, which *ought* to be of the first and highest interest in the breast of every intelligent human being?

The first feature is—his answer to Cain's preceding question, what it is to be like Lucifer and himself; and he describes it as of souls who (in the first place) dare use their immortality. Now this is rather an imposing expression—dare use their immortality. He plainly makes common cause with Cain and mankind, very readily associating himself with them, and with Cain as their representative; for he afterwards speaks of "spirits and of men—*we*," and so forth. But it seems to me, his chief aim is, to excite Cain, and whoever should resemble him in after times, to "use their immortality." For it does not appear that angels, good or evil, (being all of the same general nature) are said to have souls. They are all spirit. At least they are of an entire essence, so ethereal, as to know no distinction between soul and body, like man. Still, in this stimulating address to man, Lucifer of course *includes* himself, and his associates, scot and lot with them. But as to human souls daring to use their immortality; so long as the soul and body are together, the soul is not in a *condition* to use its immortality; it must therefore wait until, by its separation from the body, it shall have entered upon its immortal state. And when so entered upon its immortality, the soul, dare or not dare, will have no choice. It *must* be subjected to the state it had procured to itself while in the body. It *must* associate with Lucifer in Hell, however involuntarily, when the prospect closes upon them; or voluntarily with the spirits in Hea-

ven. But this is not what *Lucifer* means I confess, though it is the fact. The following lines shew in what manner he proposes these souls shall use their immortality. And we will now see how that is.

He first says, they are souls who dare look the Omnipotent in the face—a most tremendous expression, unless he were speaking of those who were in a state of favour with their maker, as Abraham and Moses, with whom God was pleased to converse face to face.—As to Lucifer's expression "his everlasting face," it shall be passed over as merely Luciferian. But the grand feature now occurs. He says—who dare look the omnipotent "*tyrant*" in his face. Can any one who knows, or reveres his maker, pass this lightly over, without confuting Lucifer, and all, if any, who join him, in this most horrible ascription to deity? But we will not confute him by declamation like his own, but by reason, truth, and common sense. For, with a little accommodation, we may adopt his sentiment who said,

" I (we) hate when vice can bolt (*his*) arguments,
And (*reason*) hath no tongue to check his pride."

The whole context shews then, that Lucifer, here, intended the term "*tyrant*," not in the innoxious sense of old time, when it was used in *good* part for a king; but, in the more modern sense, when it is used in *bad* part, and means, an absolute, imperious despot; an oppressor; a hard and cruel master. It is also plain, that he thus applies this term in *bad* part to the Supreme Being, the creator of Adam, and Eve, and Cain, and of the Seraphs before mentioned; in a word, the God with whom we have to do, the maker of the world, and of all mankind. It is then important to shew Lucifer's unblushing and daring falsehood in ascribing this character to God. And the question is, can his accusation, for such it is, be established at the bar of reason, common sense, and truth; or is Lucifer to be found, as he has, from the highest au-

thority, been called, not a slanderer only, but a liar, and the father of lies. It is (if we may with the utmost reverence be allowed the expression) a trial of character. And in such a trial, we know that matters of fact, in the shape of conduct and notorious actions, weigh incomparably heavier than unproved assertions. The judgment, for or against Lucifer, must depend either on the evidence he brings to sustain his charge, or on the evidence adduced to nullify it. As, however we may not be able to find a single jot of evidence on the part of Lucifer (for evidence and proof are not his allies) to substantiate his accusation, we will begin with our evidence to falsify it. In similar cases, among men, *comparison* is often resorted to for eliciting the truth. Let us therefore, now, begin with comparison. History will furnish us readily with examples of tyrants, or tyranny, in the sense before us. A Nero, a Caligula, a Tiberius, a Domitian, a Dionysius of Syracuse, offer themselves immediately. Do not they furnish every feature that Lucifer himself could wish, if he were able to identify Jehovah, in point of character, with either of those? But to which of them, and in what particular, is the Almighty to be likened? What are the evil features, in all or any of them, to which the Almighty is not diametrically opposed? If then they are allowed to be Luciferian tyrants; and no similarity, but perfect unlikeness, be found in Jehovah; can right reason, or common sense, allow the Almighty to be considered as coming under that denomination? But we have shewn, and may have to shew further, that the Almighty is, in very fact, diametrically opposed, in character, to the tyrants mentioned.

Try we however one other test for an *opposite* comparison to the last, also among mortals. These comparisons will be forgiven, as we hold ourselves justified, by the motive. This then shall be of that emperor whose complaint to his friends was, that he had "lost a day," if a day escaped him unmarked by some instance of his benignity to his fellow men. Now is this man deemed, by the universal voice of human nature, to be the very reverse of a

tyrant in the sense of Lucifer, before us? And does the Almighty resemble him closely (if such inversion of language may be pardoned) in his universal conduct and invariable actions? If he do, and that he does we have seen, and shall, by Lucifer's aid, see more; and if Titus were not only not a Luciferian tyrant, but the acknowledged "delight of mankind"—then, what becomes of Lucifer's assertion? But we must reverse a recent expression (the Almighty's resemblance to Titus) by stating, that this same Titus, whose goodness left not a day unmarked; this "delight of mankind," whose beneficence was only bounded by his power—was and is universally allowed to have been, in character, a great imitator or ressembler of the Divine Being, in his beneficence and kindness. But the beneficence of Titus was human, as was his power, and therefore limited. *He* could not do good to *all* men, in *all* places, under *all* circumstances, and in every minutest particle of time, and without cessation. Much less could he have so done before he himself existed; and still less from the period of the existence of man himself; not to insist upon the *intention* of beneficence, in the divine mind, from all eternity. Thus then, if comparison, of either kind, be any test of truth, Lucifer's ascription, of evil tyranny to the Almighty, is found to be most false and slanderous.

We will now dismiss comparison, and advert briefly to matter of fact, in falsification of Lucifer's most opprobrious charge. Does then creation, animal or rational, proclaim the rule of an imperious, cruel despot; a hard or oppressive master; or that of parental care and kindness? Ask the seasons; the spring, the summer, the autumn, the winter, and then spring again. Ask their produce. Ask the feathered singing tribes, the frisking flocks, and gamboling herds. Ask the sun, the moon, the stars; the rain, the frost, the snow. Ask the whole earth. Enquire of the mountains with their springs and minerals; the verdant and fruitful hills; the fertile and beautiful vallies; the resplendent and enriching streams; the forests and the groves. Would a

“tyrant” have furnished these for the use of man? Would *such* a being whose *gifts* are racks, and dungeons, and tortures, have thus filled even the inanimate earth as with joy and laughter? Then come the moral and social institutions of men; their discoveries, their inventions. Who gave them? Then, the ties and charities of life, whence do they spring? Are these the emanations of a Nero who perpetrates, and delights in making, misery among the subjects of his power? Are not, rather, these

“Thy works? Parent of good,
Almighty!”

and do they not declare,

“Thy goodness beyond thought?”

When, or where, was a “tyrant” ever heard of, whose character and acts resembled these? Since then not one jot of evidence has Lucifer brought to sustain his charge, and we have such a mass of evidence against it, the result can only be his conviction of lying and of slandering?

Other, and equally unproved *assertions* we shall now meet with, and treat with the care and impartiality they demand. Lucifer’s next assertion is, that God’s “evil is not good.” If it be admitted that God’s evil is not good, that of course is admitting, either that God is an evil being in himself, or that he does evil, or both. But neither of these propositions is admitted; on the contrary they are both denied. And if the denial can be sustained, it will follow that Lucifer is still slanderous against his maker. Can we then shew that God is neither evil in himself, nor does evil? But have we not shewn the first from his character, and the second from his works? Who thinks of accusing Titus of having been an evil being? Who thinks so of Alfred, and of thousands of other mortals of former and present times? Those

comparisons are faint, because all mortals are of *imperfect* goodness; but they are illustrative. And what then are the streams to the fountain, the shadow to the substance? Then we have seen the positive *works* of the Almighty. And who expects good works from an evil being? Is it in the nature of evil to produce good? A good being may *educe* good out of evil; but that is another thing? Who expects light from darkness, or sweet from bitter, or grapes from thorns, or figs from thistles? Who looks for good fruit from an evil tree? If God then be good, and goodness, evil cannot be God's; and if there proceed from the divine essence that which devils or men call *evil*, it must, if there be any authority in reason, or in the meaning of propositions, or of words, or of common sense, be still, and that essentially, and necessarily, *good*. It cannot be otherwise. The only task (nor that a hard one) would be to shew *how* it is so. But should it be contended, that evil actually exists, from some source or other, in creation, physical and moral, whence then, or from whom, comes it? That point may be somewhat considered hereafter. Meanwhile, it is not here granted, that evil does so exist, in the philosophical, and true, which is the only *right* sense. Before that be granted, it must be *shewn*, that what men term evil is not, in fact, good. God is good, and he is omnipotent. Does even any good and powerful *man*, *intend* to do evil? If any good man have the power of hindering evil, will he even permit it? But if he permit what some may term or think evil, *must it not* be that he himself thinks it good? Otherwise, would not his pretended goodness be a contradiction? Then, if to his goodness and power he also unite wisdom, is not that the crowning security that all he even permits, as well as does, must be good? Is it then possible, in the very nature of things, that evil, *properly* speaking, can either spring from, or be suffered to exist by, a being of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness? Under *such* government there *can be no evil*, philosophically, and *truly*. If this argument be opposed, it must be by asserting, either that God is evil, or powerless, (for no good, and sufficiently powerful, being would suffer

evil,) or else, that evil is sometimes necessary and serviceable, or in other words, good; but is not that giving up the point, and conceding, that under the conduct of such a being as we see and know God to be, all must be good? And does not this reflection create most grateful sensations towards the author of all things? And does not reason and common sense confirm it? The existence of evil therefore is not to be allowed.

Yet it should seem, that, without inconsistency, we may, in a *secondary* sense, allow of the existence of evil; and that without involving or puzzling the point at all, or unsaying what has been said. And it is thus. When we look again at Lucifer's assertion, "his evil is not good," we may conceive, that Lucifer meant, not what we have been considering, evil in the general; but, really and honestly that specific sense of pain and suffering, which Lucifer's punishment as a rebel had produced on him, and which he therefore naturally enough and readily called evil, and which, to *him*, it must be confessed, *was* so; and that, certainly, *did* proceed from God. Evil then may, thus, I own, proceed from God, in a secondary, or modified sense. But then, it is evil of a peculiar nature, and may be termed, *good* evil. So, although *Lucifer* calls his punishment evil, who else will do so? Who, on the contrary, will not, in reply to him, say, "Nay, Lucifer, but, as it respects thee, God's evil is very good?" At least this must be allowed, so long as moral government is allowed, and culprits will bring on themselves its just visitations. Yet another view of the matter may, and perhaps should, be still taken. I have admitted this punishment of Lucifer to be God's evil, though a *good* evil. But is it so? Is it not rather Lucifer's *own* evil? Did he not, in fact, not only, in common language, *procure* it; but did he not even *create* it, by, if the expression may be allowed, *forcing* even benevolence and omnipotence itself, to inflict it, from due regard to the rest of his creation, and the support of his moral government, essential as that is to the good of others? This then, after all, must be termed Lucifer's own, and not his maker's evil. And may not that conclusion be applied to many other cases?

As to his doubt, or affected doubt, of the Omnipotent having made them, (himself and his associates, and perhaps Cain, and mankind, he probably meant,) it has little, if any weight. If God be supreme, and the first cause of all things, he certainly made him, whether Lucifer chose to know, or to believe it, or not. And as to his assertion, that if God made them, he could not unmake, for that they were immortal; the point is perhaps not material to be metaphysically enquired into, since Lucifer could not deny the divine power to overcome, and restrain him, and keep him in as great subjection as God saw fit. Yet it seems difficult, even in theory, to deny to omnipotence the power of extinguishing, or putting an end to, a subject of its own creation. Is it inconsistent with the scripture or with reason to suppose, that God may have created beings immortal in a way inferior to his own immortality; that is, by enduing them with an inherent, *limited*, capacity of continued existence (not mortal like mortal man) *until*, or unless, God himself should terminate, or extinguish it? Can we admit, that any being subsists, *necessarily* and *unavoidably*, besides the One, necessarily Self-existent, Being, himself? Would not this be to admit rivals to God's essential superiority?—Can it be supposed, that any created being can say to his maker, “I subsist in despite of thee? Thou hast conferred that upon me which, with all thy omnipotency, thou CANST NOT take away from me thy creature?” To me, I confess this seems very hard to digest; especially while, on the other hand I do not see that the idea of a subordinate, or limited, immortality, such as is here supposed, militates at all against either the dignity, or the responsibility, or the happiness of man. He is also not at all the less *spiritual* on that hypothesis. But it seems extremely difficult to limit the Almighty, in any thing that does not oppose his own nature, (such as his doing wrong; denying himself; saying what is not true; and so forth,) or that does not involve a contradiction. But is it a contradiction to say, he can destroy what he has created? At the same time, we may have, as in fact we have, *every evidence* from himself, that he *will not*, does

not *intend* to destroy it. This leads to Lucifer's next charge.

This is, that God would *have them* immortal, that he may torture them. Now this seems to fall in with the ideas above thrown out, and looks as if Lucifer himself gave up his own independent immortality. But if man or angel be independently, and irrevocably immortal, does not that let in more than one independently existing being? And can that be allowed? However, it seems to me, that if Lucifer be right in saying the Almighty would "*have them*" immortal, that expression implies choice and power; for, generally speaking, we think that if we have the power of *having* a thing *one* way at our will, we may also have it *another*, even the opposite way. So if God might *have them* immortal, why may he not *have them* mortal? But as to God's having them immortal, that he may torture them, (expressly of course, Lucifer means, for that purpose,) that is merely Lucifer's slander again; for the thing is as impossible, as it is for God to do evil. Torturing, and punishing justly and necessarily, are not synonymes. The latter may consist with perfect goodness; but the former, in the usual *bad* sense of the word, is the act of cruelty and tyranny. And we have seen that God is not cruel; that he is not a Nero. Whether Titus ever had occasion to punish or not, I cannot tell; but who would believe of him or of Alfred, that they tortured for torturing sake, and kept victims alive for the very purpose? That infinite goodness may see it *necessary* to preserve the immortality of Lucifer, or of any other being, for *punitory* and *moral* purposes, is quite another matter; and, how serious or awful soever it may be, yet not inconsistent with the divine goodness, nor with his incapacity of evil, as before explained. — Lucifer's *permission* to the Almighty to punish him is quite in his own stile. His acknowledgment of God's greatness is correct. But that the Almighty should be *no happier* in his greatness, than Lucifer and his fellow rebels are in, what he ostentatiously calls, their "*conflict*," is irreconcilable with common sense. But what "*conflict*" can there be between a creature capable of instant annihilation, and its creator,

who has the power of annihilating? Besides, Lucifer's "conflict" is over, never to be renewed, if his rebellion can be called conflict, which can only be *properly* so called as between equals in some kind or degree or other. But what kind or degree of equality was there ever between Lucifer and his creator? God indeed, for his own wise, and righteous, and beneficent purposes, *permitted* him to conflict, as he calls it; and still, *for a time*, and for the same purposes, *permits* him to be somewhat at *large*, and to boast; but that is all; and even that will soon end; and he will then be confined to his own place, under everlasting chains of darkness. As to their being happy, *at all* happy, in their "conflict" therefore, it may easily be imagined what is the happiness of a condemned felon, respited indeed, but awaiting his certain execution. With respect to his suggestion of God's not being happy in his greatness; that is absurd, if it be admitted that there is such a state of being, as happiness. For if there be, (and how many will be found to deny it?) it must be the result of goodness, wisdom, and power. A deficiency in either of those qualities must proportionably impair, as the possession of them must ensure, happiness. But God possesses those attributes in a perfect and infinite degree. His happiness therefore is perfect, and infinitely, that is, inconceivably, great. Nor can he be otherwise than so, for his nature makes it as necessary as his own existence. I believe too it will be granted, that *all* beings *desire* happiness, either intellectually, or instinctively. But happiness; I speak of rational, substantial, and *real* happiness; mental satisfaction; arising from moral (including religious) considerations; not the gratification arising from inferior or unworthy sources, such as the senses merely; or the *amusement* derived from transitory, external, perishing objects or pursuits; *such* happiness can only be proportioned to the moral perfection of its subject. Evil beings therefore must be void of *true* happiness in proportion to their defect of goodness. And if there be any beings *all* evil, such beings must be all wretched. Lucifer and his companions, and any who may resem-

ble them, must be those wretched beings therefore ; although God, in the order of his government and providential arrangements, has hitherto seen good to allow of the *tempering* of that wretchedness by the intervention of various external circumstances ; circumstances however, which, in his own fore-appointed time, will cease forever ; and then, wretchedness, as sure as effects follow their causes, wretchedness unmixed, undisguised, unalloyed, must be the condition of those, who are not the subjects of that opposite happiness, which is reserved for all who have made it their decided choice. If these things then be so, who *would* be otherwise than happy, if he could ensure it ? But God *can* ensure it by all his attributes. He is therefore happy. That misery also, I mean real, substantial, *mental* misery, is no imaginary thing, will not be denied. In fact, however erroneous in the pursuit of the one, and in their attempts to escape the other, still mankind acknowledge misery ; which should not be forgotten.

Lucifer then says — “goodness would not make evil.” Here, some way, he has stumbled upon the very truth which some pains have been taken to establish. The difference is, that he does not allow his *maker* to be that goodness ; but which we trust it has been seen he really *is*. His question, “What else but evil hath he made ?” should have been, “What else hath he *not* made ?” And then we would have joined him. That the world is *full* of goodness, cannot with any modesty be denied ; and we need not *weary* ourselves with finding out its only possible source and author.

He then, (most appropriately for *him*,) *permits* the Almighty to sit on, as he terms it, his vast and solitary throne. That God’s throne, taken figuratively, is vast, there can be no doubt ; for it corresponds with his nature. But, for reasons presently to be given, it cannot be considered as strictly solitary ; though in one sense, most, if not all thrones, even among men, are so, as being occupied by the monarch only ; except perhaps among the Roman Emperors, with whom association was common. But to shew, that God’s throne is *not* solitary in the common acceptation of the term, requires some proof.

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 . I am aware that in the foregoing notes, a *revelation* has been in part *assumed*; and that, because Lord Byron has himself assumed one. But, as I propose shewing, as well as I may, that God's throne is not solitary, I prefer considering first, the authority of that revelation, which is to bear me out in ascertaining God's throne to be otherwise than strictly solitary.

. Supposing then the Divine Being to be, *what*, throughout these pages, he has been considered, not indeed by Lucifer, but by those who "are not of *his* train;"—is it not highly credible to reason, that he should make, to his creature man, some *revelation* of himself, comprizing his nature, his character, his attributes, and even his proceedings, to such extent at least, as may be essential to man's happiness or welfare? Is it *irrational* to suppose, that such communication should be made by a moral governor to his moral subjects? Is not such communication requisite, where one party is expected to conform to the *will* of the other? Does not the practice of mankind themselves confirm this idea? And we have seen, that in cases of *intrinsic*, moral rectitude, and wisdom, it is allowable to argue from man to God. We have indeed, in the foregoing notes, *assumed* the revelation we are now adverting to; but, for our present purpose, it seems proper to look to its *reality*. We have considered the existence of God; the existence of Lucifer; and there appears to be equal occasion for examining, to some extent at least, into the reality of this revelation.

. That such revelation to the human race was, in the earlier ages, and amongst the most intelligent of mankind, expected and desired, there seem to be historical grounds for believing. This expectation may not have been extensive; but its *existence* shews that the idea of such revelation may well consist with enlightened reason. It is said, I believe, of Socrates, that *he* expressed his persuasion, that God would, at some period, send a person into the world to instruct man more fully in his will, and in the way of obtaining pardon for sin. So far, therefore, such a revelation has the sanction of ancient consent and tradition, if it can be credibly shewn

to have afterwards actually occurred. The Christian revelation then is alleged to be the precise communication above supposed to be reasonably looked for, and which is just stated to have been actually expected and desired by some of the best and wisest of mankind. It is not meant to lay much stress upon that, nor does the subject need it; but it has a right to its *degree* of weight. The *positive* evidences also, for the reality and truth of this revelation, are such as cannot be refused, until all rational and moral certainty, and demonstration, arising from moral testimony generally admitted on other subjects, be discarded. That evidence will be glanced at presently. But it may meanwhile be remarked, that if such revelation be so established, the office of reason, after having allowed the credibility of the revelation, would be, to acquiesce in its contents; and, in cases of apparent difficulty, to ask, not whether particular facts narrated, or truths declared, be or be not exactly correspondent to the usual and received notions of man, and therefore whether or not likely, or credible: but, whether such particular facts or truths be so revealed and taught. This may be applied to many cases arising in the perusal of this revelation.

We may now consider, though cursorily, the general grounds of the credibility of the revelation itself, or of the documents which contain it. There are various kinds of proof. Some arise from the *internal* evidence of its fitness to the character, condition, and wants of men; and the superiority of its morals to any anterior system of morals that had appeared in the world, recommending themselves as they do, intuitively it may be said, to man's spiritual, moral, and higher nature. And with respect to the *wants* of man in particular, the fitness of this revelation arises from its disclosure of a source, whence those wants may be abundantly supplied, whether relating to his mortal, or immortal, character. This argument I own will have no weight with those who think it *rational* to deny a spiritual or immortal nature to man, and to confine his being to a merely animal existence. These can have no idea of the wants of the human soul. They differ, it is true, not only from those who receive this revelation in the

view here briefly given of it, but also from Plato, and Socrates, and Cicero, who knew not of it. *They* could only *desire* it.

Other evidences of the authenticity of the Christian revelation arise from *external* sources: such as its extensive reception among those of mankind, in every point of view most competent to judge of its truth, or detect its fallacy, whichever should prevail in their judgments. Nor is this reception confined to the higher classes of intellectual character. It has prevailed also among such multitudes of the middle and lower ranks of mankind, usually distinguished by plain good sense and integrity, and independency of mind, that, to allow no authority to such a combination of moral evidence, seems altogether subversive of all rational certainty, or moral evidence whatever: the inconveniences of which, and the irrationality of contemning such evidence, has been briefly considered.

The incessant and unsuccessful attempts which, for eighteen centuries, have been made to destroy the *credit* of this revelation, form another external proof of its authenticity. It has been assailed by all the powers of the human mind, and all the malice of the human heart. Devils and men have conspired against it in every form. Were it not for its intrinsic worth, and its conformity to the prevailing sense of mankind, it never could have out-rod the storms it has encountered. It is true, those who receive it believe, that it has been so sustained by its almighty author; but, notwithstanding that conviction, and the accompanying conviction of its continued and final triumph; they do not shrink from every collateral and *rational* proof of its excellence and truth; and that, in some measure, from regard to the prejudices, as well as best interests, of *others*. To this source of evidence may be added the corresponding one of the personal sacrifices and sufferings, which have been made and undergone, by every class of mankind, male and female, old and young, strong and weak, wise and simple, high and low, rich and poor: such an accumulation of testimony as the world never saw on any other subject, and which nothing can account for but its divine origin, and its influential authority and power over the mind of man. Other religious and

philosophic systems have vanished before it, as the shades of night fly from the orb of day. This alone remains; and while all other systems have been, by the investigations of reason, found delusive, and false, and pernicious; this alone has been ascertained to be founded on a basis, which reason, instead of condemning, justifies and approves. Of those, comparatively few, individuals, who have still opposed and rejected it, it may safely be said, they have been "weighed in the balance and found wanting." This too seems to be a subject, among others, in which an argument from *numbers*, when intellect and integrity are not wanting, ought in all reason, it is presumed, to be influential in inducing our attention and regard, *at least*. That Christianity has been, or is, grossly abused or misapplied, forms not, nor can, rationally, form any objection to it. Rather, it is a confirmatory circumstance in its favour. For such abuse and misapplication, and all the evils which its enemies ascribe to it, are even anticipated in its own records, long before it had obtained any footing in the world. Nor can any other incongruities or discrepancies, which are sometimes observed among men who profess to be its advocates, be justly chargeable on itself. Its benefits are general. If one abuse it, there is no reason another should. Its own testimony and its character should be resorted to in such cases. With respect to objections made to this revelation, as a revelation, on account of some alleged *difficulties* attending some parts of it; they are certainly of no more account as to its general excellence, than the spots which are said to be on the sun, are to its general splendour and its universal influence. Besides, it is not impossible that it was *intended* there should be some such apparent difficulties. It is given to man as an intellectual and moral agent. In his *intellectual* capacity he satisfies himself of its certainty; in his *moral* capacity he then perceives it requires a certain submission of his own reasoning powers, which his very reason teaches him the rationality of yielding. It is not however meant to be denied, that this revelation teaches man to expect *other* aid, than his reason alone, in judging of it; yet not an aid that supersedes its *proper* use.

The difficulties also, just alluded to, are not of a nature to affect its general credibility, or *right to reception*. And it is thrown open to all, to use and enjoy.

There are other evidences of the authenticity of this revelation, internal and external, at which I have not glanced; such for instance, as the standing one of the Jewish people at this day. Nothing, but the over-ruling power of God, can account for their preservation, or for their invincible attachment to the *Old Testament*, which they thus (however unwittingly or unwillingly) confirm; but which must stand or fall with the *New*; the one being indisputably connected with, and dependent on, the other. The moral evidence which exists, that the different parts of each Testament must have been written, generally speaking, by the persons whose names they bear; and that those persons had neither the will, nor the power, to deceive, forms another proof. Nor can it be believed, if the being and providence of God himself be not rejected, that the Almighty would have suffered such a persuasion, if erroneous, to have taken hold of the mind of man as it has evidently done; the only instance of the kind. Besides, its precepts and instructions are every way favourable to man's best interests. And that this revelation develops the inmost recesses of the human mind and heart, as never was done before, is also undeniable.

The foregoing is acknowledged to be only such a *sketch* of the authenticity of the Christian revelation, as may justify a few extracts from it, in aid of the preceding; and some following remarks, on the *solitariness* of God's *throne*, as alleged by Lucifer.

First then, the revelation we have been considering, informs us, that so far is the eternal throne from being solitary, in the literal or commonly received sense, that, although the Divine Being is, emphatically, "One," yet he is so, and in such a manner, and so peculiar to himself and his own nature, as even to amount to the *reverse* of solitary as implying the exclusion of all social, satisfactory, or grateful intercourse. I am aware it has been said of some superior individuals among mankind, and by one perhaps in particular, of

himself, that he was "never less alone than when alone." Also of the Divine Being it has been truly said, that he must be perfectly happy in the contemplation of his own infinite perfections. But scripture, or the revelation we have been considering, informs us, that God subsists, in his very nature and essence, in the three-fold, yet united, character or mode, of Father, Son, and Spirit; one, undivided, Jehovah. - Does not man know, that he has a body, and a mind, a soul, and a spirit? They are one man, united, yet distinct; each has its several office; but all together constitute one individual. But can he explain the *manner*, exactly, of this *intimate connexion* between the several constituents of his own being, though he knows the *fact*? It is acknowledged, that the comparison is imperfect, but it may serve for illustration, or at least for proof so far as it goes, and to shew, that if man cannot comprehend himself, it is not likely he should comprehend his creator. "Who can find out the Almighty to perfection?" is one of the communications made by scripture. If man *could* do so; or could, beyond what his maker has informed him; man would be God, and not man. And does not reason itself *intimate* to us, that it is to be *expected*, that the Divine Being must subsist in a manner, *different* from all other beings? But the truth seems to be, that the Almighty has, in this revelation, communicated much concerning himself, which, from the whole tenor of the New Testament especially, it much imported man to know. The scriptures, then, speak largely of the *acts* of the Spirit of God, and of his positive operations; and those, such acts and operations, it may be ventured to be said, as much denoting individuality and personality, as any of the acts, ascribed to Satan, prove the reality, and actual *personality*, of his existence. Upon the same species of scriptural *evidence* therefore, that I believe Satan, or Lucifer, to be a *person*, I believe the Spirit of God to be properly a *person*. I believe the fact therefore upon *evidence*, though I cannot, nor expect that any created being, man or angel, ever will be able, to explain it. It is not *likely* they should. To ascribe the actual personal operations of the Holy Spirit to the mere *breathing* or *influence* of God, seems

most absurd; for why, if the Spirit be not God, should divine *acts* be ascribed to the mere *breathing* or *influence* of deity? Why should it not have been said that God did so and so, instead of his *Spirit* having done it? By seeking to avoid one difficulty therefore (so averse are we, *not to understand* things *infinitely above us*) how many absurdities do we not run into? It does appear, that if the Spirit be not a divine person, even God, equal to the Father, most egregious *deception* is practised upon man, and upon his rational perceptions, throughout the scriptures. Why should the Spirit be said to *perform* things which a *substance*, a *person*, only can? And which it were absurd to ascribe to a mere breathing or influence. It is said — “the Lord God and his Spirit hath sent me.” Now here is a *personal act* of sending, ascribed to the Spirit. Suppose we read, “the Lord God and his *breathing* or *influence* hath sent me.” Can that be received? It is also written — “on whom thou shalt *see* the Spirit *descending*.” But who could *see* a *breathing* or *influence* descending? To descend, is the *act* of a real *being*. Besides, in that case the Spirit was pleased to *assume* the appearance of a dove. But can we admit, that a mere *breathing* or *influence* would or could *assume* a bodily shape? Again, the Spirit *suffered not* Paul to go into Bythynia. Is not *hindering* a *personal act*? If it had been a breathing, or influence, merely, of divinity, why had it not been, *God* suffered not? But to cite, were endless, to the same purpose. The fact is, it appears that the Divine Being is *economical* in his nature; and that he acts, towards man, especially, in an harmonious, orderly, and distributive manner, according to the various purposes of his government. And what possible objection can man rationally have to that? Multitudes, of the *first classes* of human intellect, have received it. The Spirit, then, is God; distinct in person from, yet one with, the Father. It is remarkable too, that the same persons who would reduce Lucifer to a *metaphysical principle*, would also reduce God, in the person of the Spirit, to a mere *breathing* or *influence*. In *this* respect then, and so far, the throne of God is *not solitary*.

I have perhaps been led imperceptibly to speak of the Spirit before the Son. But a few words respecting that divine person in the deity also, will serve additionally to confute the allegation of the solitariness of God's throne. For although the Father, the Son, and the Spirit are one God; yet we cannot avoid the apprehension of a property in the divine essence, quite the opposite of solitariness, even in the *throne* of God. Of the *proper divinity* of the Son, indeed, and his equality and oneness with the Father, I have not *now* so much to do, as with the fact of the *intimate communion* subsisting between the Father and the Son. Yet of the *oneness* of the Father and the Son; and that Jesus Christ was as truly God, as he was truly man; there is, to my mind, such *unequivocal* and *perpetual* evidence in the New Testament; and such a *multiplicity of acts* ascribed to Jehovah; and so many instances of the divine character, name, and nature also stated in the *Old Testament*, as belong to God only; but all which are demonstrably referable to, and identified with Christ—the Son—the Messiah;—that it seems astonishing, how we can come to any other conclusion, than that the *Son* is Jehovah, as certainly as the *Father* is Jehovah. In reference however to the alleged solitariness of God's throne, it is therefore said of the Son, (personified by *wisdom*, or the *word*,)—“the Lord possessed me before his works of old:—I was set up from everlasting:—I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him.”—Thus was the divine nature, in the person of the Son, associated with, and rejoicing in the presence of, the Father. That we cannot comprehend the *mode*, does not invalidate the *fact* revealed. Again—“I will declare the decree—thou art my Son—sit thou on my right hand until I make thine enemies thy footstool.”—“Glorify me, O Father, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was;” which evidently means, from all eternity. But it does on the whole appear to me from multitudes of other passages, and the whole harmony and scope of scripture, that Christ is essentially Jehovah, in the person of the Son, for *aeconomical* purposes; and that the Holy Spirit is essentially Jehovah, in the person of the Spirit, for

other œconomical purposes; and, that the Father, Jehovah also, sustains that character, or person, in like manner. On these grounds it is, that I contend, that God's throne is not, nor ever was, properly, "solitary," though Jehovah is "One God:" but that there ever was an *ineffable communion* between the divine persons; three, yet One.

With respect to God's creating worlds, as Lucifer suggests, to make eternity less burthensome to his immense existence, that is as absurd an idea as can well be imagined. For who can conceive of *eternity* being burthensome to an omnipotent and *eternal* being? Is not eternity, if we may be allowed the expression, God's very *element*? And what can be burthensome to omnipotence? The divine existence, indeed, Lucifer truly calls immense; and that it is so, is most consolatory to all intelligent beings who do not rebel against him. This they have no cause to do.

With respect to what Lucifer calls God's "unparticipated solitude," as the scriptures do not state with certainty the period when angels were created; so neither can any mortal therefore conclude with certainty on that point; though, having, I think, seen that God's throne never has been strictly solitary, but (so to speak,) the seat of eternal counsels between Father, Son, and Spirit, yet one Jehovah—it does seem to me reasonable to suppose, (revelation not contradicting it,) that there were, ever, some subjects of those eternal counsels; as well as, in particular, some high created intelligences, capable of perceiving and enjoying the divine goodness, in his more immediate presence. All this is certainly beyond mortal ken, seeing that revelation is silent on it, as not material to man yet to know. But, at any rate, we know from revelation, that *since* man's creation (how long before we cannot tell) the reverse of solitude is ascribed to God; for that multitudes, beyond number, have continually rejoiced before him. From that consideration, and from the beneficent and communicative nature of the Divine Being, one should, so far as revelation does not contradict, (and here it does not; for, to say the least, it leaves every one at

liberty to think and judge) be led to believe it highly, if not most, probable, that God, not only had planned from eternity his work concerning man, but had other and superior creatures, to behold his glory and enjoy his goodness. But this it is confessed is only inferential reasoning from our *present* knowledge of the divine beneficence, which makes us prone to doubt of God's ever having dwelt in absolute external solitude, any more than on a solitary throne. But whether these notions have any weight or not; or whether the Almighty, at an *earlier*, or *later* period of his own eternity, first created other beings, does not militate against, or at all affect, the absolute and unlimited goodness of his nature; or his rectitude, or his wisdom.

Lucifer's next description of deity we agree in;—that he alone is “indefinite” (great beyond comprehension) and “indissoluble;”—and well for man that he is so. But when he adds to that, the term “tyrant” again, we recollect he is already convicted of gross slander and falsehood on that score. He says, that could the Almighty crush himself, it would be the best boon he ever granted. The idleness of the metaphysical supposition of the *possibility* of the Almighty's crushing *himself*, merits no reply. But *vere* it *possible*, and to take effect; instead of being a boon, it would be the greatest calamity to all creation, unless to Lucifer and his crew. The Almighty will certainly “reign on,” of course, without Lucifer's permission, but not “multiply himself in misery,” which is impossible, without question, even to the Almighty. Misery belongs only to evil; of which, as no particle subsists in God, so neither can any particle of misery. The only way in which the Almighty could multiply himself in misery would be, first to desire, and choose, and decree it in himself, which is not to be expected.

Is Lucifer, or is he not, a desirable friend? Another question is, do men, or do they not, in every class of life; not, of course, *all* men of every class, but yet *some* men of all classes, as is perhaps to be feared; though probably always unintentionally, yet really no less certainly, cultivate Lucifer's regard; *such* regard, I mean, as is

proper to Lucifer? It appears to me to be not an idle enquiry; and I do think, that man is not unindebted to Lord Byron for putting them on advertng to this very subject. Lucifer himself, at any rate, whatever men may do, speaks of his and their mutual sympathy. No trifling circumstance if true. It involves occasion for the deepest consideration to some, doubtless, if not to all. At the time of his thus asserting, that, at least, spirits and men, *they* sympathized, (a very flattering assumption for man, truly!) meaning of course by spirits, himself and his rebel associates, Cain was the only mortal that then came within his declaration. But of Cain the fact cannot be denied, even from what we have seen, but especially from what we shall see hereafter. Lucifer, without doubt, spoke prospectively; whether this congratulatory reflection of Lucifer ever were really made or not, its importance, as a hint to man, is the same. Some similar useful hints will escape from him also hereafter, which will be noticed. What *his* sympathy for man is (and I think he spoke the truth) we can be at no loss to imagine. I have no doubt that he actually does feel the same kind, and at least no less degree of it, towards man, as we understand the shark does when hovering round, or scenting human prey at a distance. Human souls are, without any doubt, equally an object of Lucifer's most intent and unremitting regard, and it may be safely affirmed, so long as the revelation we have considered remains unoverthrown, that men sympathize also more with this fascinating tempter than many, if any, are aware of. *Scripture* confirms that assertion at any rate. It behoves us then to look to ourselves. I do not mean that mankind do so literally; as if they felt regard for Lucifer, though I am not quite sure some have not done, or yet do not, even that; but I mean what amounts to the same thing. For if men would carefully examine themselves, in reference especially to their creator, they would find, they had more of it, at least, more *community of feeling* and *sentiment* with Lucifer, than they suspect. But I must not further anticipate what is to come. Now, as to Lucifer's philosophical, or metaphysical, or social idea, that suffering in con-

cert makes pangs more endurable by the unbounded sympathy of all, I hardly know how exactly to concur in that sentiment, however pleasing and satisfactory it may be to parties concerned, or encouraging to any to try the experiment. For experiment is in many cases the surest though sometimes dreadfully hazardous, test of truth. Sympathy in enjoyment I have heard of, and sympathy in sorrow too, and that the one is improved, and the other soothed by it. But as to the practical and absolute good effects of sympathy, amongst convicted and hardened murderers for instance, awaiting their execution, and their consciences also leaving them no rest, I very much doubt of any material or beneficial effects of sympathy in such cases: the very case of Lucifer, except that he had added treason and rebellion to murder; and we are told, from the authority we have considered, that he is a murderer, and was so from the beginning. How far therefore the pangs of conscience, and torment in Hell (for thither we must transport ourselves in thought, to get any good from Lord Byron's and Lucifer's hint) can be so mitigated by this same unbounded sympathy, I own I do not see; nor wish, for my own part, to prove. To say the least, is it not immensely desirable to keep clear of the *occasion* for this alleged sympathetic anodyne for pangs innumerable, as we must suppose they are which are experienced in a future and irremediable state of mental misery? The *possibility* of the thing cannot be doubted. Too many of us are too careless on the subject. It should be the first thing with us, and we too frequently make it the last, if we give it any place at all. With respect to his *finale* in this piece, respecting the Almighty's imagined restless wretchedness in his height, Lucifer, as the best way of venting his exacerated enmity, transferred his own sensations and condition to his maker, which was eminently appropriate for *him* to do. He seems to have been going to say something (but choked probably with rage and malice) about the Almighty's creating and re-creating, of necessity, to keep the divine conscience at ease; but as he stopped short, so shall we: only observing, that if God *do* create and re-create, we know it *can only* be for

good, and not for evil. Nothing, *really* evil, can proceed from perfect goodness, infinite wisdom, and unbounded power.—Having thus considered this speech of Lucifer's, we now attend to Cain's sympathetic reply.

CAIN.

Thou speak'st to me of things which long have swum
 In visions through my thought ; I never could
 Reconcile what I saw with what I heard.†
 My father and my mother talk to me
 Of serpents, and of fruits and trees : I see
 The gates of what they call their Paradise
 Guarded by fiery-sworded cherubim,
 Which shut them out, and me : I feel the weight
 Of daily toil, and constant thought : I look
 Around a world where I seem nothing, with
 Thoughts which arise within me, as if they
 Could master all things :—but I thought alone
 This misery was *mine*.—My father is
 Tamed down ; my mother has forgot the mind
 Which made her thirst for knowledge at the risk
 Of an eternal curse ; my brother is
 A watching shepherd boy, who offers up
 The firstlings of the flock to him who bids
 The earth yield nothing to us without sweat :
 My sister Zillah sings an earlier hymn
 Than the birds' matins ; and my Adah, my
 Own and beloved, she too understands not
 The mind which overwhelms me : never till
 Now met I aught to sympathize with me.
 'T is well—I rather would consort with spirits.

Note 15.

Cain in this soliloquizing kind of reply to Lucifer's soliloquizing kind of oration, recognizes, in Lucifer's, many things, which long had swum in visions through his thought. But it seems to have been *such* thought as Cain would have been wiser and happier without. But are wisdom and happiness desirable things? To some, and to Cain, among them, one should almost think not. Thought somewhat resembles knowledge, of which we have seen, that knowledge, *abstractedly*, as the snake truly said, is good; but that there may be, and doubtless are, some species of knowledge, of which we cannot but predicate, that such knowledge is evil: like the knowledge of the effects of the forbidden fruit. Nor does it alter the fact, that God, in his unceasing mercy,

“ Out of evil still educes good.”

Evil, I mean, if such a thing can, philosophically, be admitted, not God's but man's, or that of Lucifer, his sympathizing confederate. Now it has been said, that there is such a thing as thinking to no purpose; and also, that the thoughts of some men are no better than waking dreams. And I must confess that Cain's cogitations seem to be much of that stamp. Yet, unprofitable as they may be to himself, yet, as out of poison, I think it has been said, honey may be extracted; so, moral good, out of Cain's moral evil.

He says then, first, he never could reconcile what he saw with what he heard. What did he see? He could see nothing wherein the goodness of God was not manifestly and exuberantly displayed. Even in *these* regions, where Eurus, and Boreas, and Notus, and Auster, so often conflict, and set the elements in uproar; yet, even in these comparatively hostile climes, how are our grateful feelings excited by the divine bounty and care, so perpetually forcing itself upon our notice! And in the situation of Cain's residence it is known, that nature is more beautiful and more bounteous still. This then

was what Cain could not but see, if he saw aught; or if indeed his sight were not jaundiced by his strange and unapprovable discontent. And what can we suppose he *heard*, which he could not reconcile with what he saw? He heard, as he says, sometimes, the songs of seraphs. If so, I venture to say, *their* songs could not but be, in *themselves*, perfectly in tune with, and therefore reconcilable to, what Cain saw around him. He also heard what his father, and mother, and brother, and sisters said. And that, as we have *seen*, was, and we believe *always* was, in perfect conformity to the seraphs' songs: the burthen of which was probably, in effect, "Glory to God in the highest; on earth peace; good will towards men." Now these things, seen and heard, I cannot but think were perfectly and gratefully reconcilable to Adam, and to Eve, to Abel, to Adah, and to Zillah; for their addresses to God, as before related, bespeak as much; then why not equally reconcilable to Cain? However, so, it seems it was not. *Our* business is, to consider, whether Cain was right or wrong, or neither one nor the other; for that there is no importance at all in the state of our minds or our feelings towards our maker. But if we are induced to conclude him most seriously wrong; then, we should examine, and look to ourselves.—He observes, that his father and his mother talk to him of serpents, and of fruits, and trees. That they should have related to him what they knew, and which it *imported* their children to know, of the "snake," and of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and of the forbidden fruit of that tree, it is most natural to suppose. It was their obvious parental duty so to do, and they do not appear to have been wanting in parental care or feeling. But as to their talking in any *other* way of serpents, and of fruits, and trees, it is not likely. But that, doubtless, was what Cain, in his way of speaking, meant: rather a distorted, and not very respectful way, towards his well-meaning father and mother, I confess, in my own opinion. The next object of his thought seems to have been, the exclusion of his father and mother, and himself (of course including his brother and his sisters, though the measure of the verse did not admit of his naming them) from what he says they called their

Paradise; the gates which shut them out, being guarded by fiery-sworded cherubim. Now if Cain *saw* this, as he says he did, it seems to me to have been obviously and easily reconcilable with what he *heard* from his parents. But I must question if Adam and Eve were not better instructed than, in the conversations with their children, to call Paradise any longer *theirs*, after they knew that their maker (against whom they do not appear to have been affected with feelings like their son's) had taken it from them. Nor do I suppose that Adam conceived that he had that indefeasible or "just inheritance" in Eden's gardens, which we have seen Cain lay claim to. We have also seen that there was, upon the whole, little, or rather not any, cause of complaint for this exclusion from the tree of life, but much otherwise: especially considering the mitigation which Adam experienced of the curse upon the ground, while his toil was not heavy, and the young earth yielded kindly with little labour. Nor did *Adam* complain. Cain however *does* complain of the weight *he* felt of daily toil and constant thought: but of that toil and thought enough has been said. Had his thought been of matters, or on subjects, calculated to give honour to his maker, [the first concern of man; for God says — "him that honoureth me I will honour; and, he that despiseth me shall be lightly esteemed,"] or advantage to himself, or benefit to others, he would not have felt their weight, at least not unsatisfactorily. For *such* thought, though sometimes it *must* create weariness of spirits, yet finds its own reward, and the spirits revive again. Cain then looks around him on a world where he seems nothing. That was at once a right and a wrong feeling. There was one who addressed his maker after this manner; — "when I consider the heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained; what is man, that thou art mindful of him?" Also, compared with God himself, man is still more a nonentity, apart from the divine purpose and goodness. If then those were the views Cain took of the subject, he was right in seeming to himself to be nothing in the world. But in other respects he was wrong in that feeling. For considering man as an immortal, moral, and responsible being, he is much in the world;

inasmuch as his station and state in this world is connected with eternity. And in eternity, man assuredly will not, *cannot* be nothing. He will be of unspeakable importance *there*, to himself, whatever he may be here. That is not sufficiently reflected upon. Also, considering him as the object of so much of the divine goodness which he enjoys above the rest of the creation, man is much in the world. "Is it nothing to be a daily and hourly recipient of divine mercy? It has been said — "man, know thyself." It has also been said — "man, respect thyself." Is it not for a want of *true* self-respect, that we pursue such courses of conduct often, as lead to *worse*, much worse, than nothingness, here and hereafter? He is also *something* at any rate, whether greater or less, and by no means nothing, if he employs, *as he can*, those talents which his maker has endued him with for the common good of his fellow creatures. For man is, or ought to be, social; at least so far as to be concerned for the common good, and most of all for the highest and most important good, of his fellow men. These considerations however are not meant to imply, that Cain should have thought more highly of himself than he ought to think; only, that he should not have thought himself nothing, in those respects which are last glanced at. What those thoughts were, which Cain says arose within him, and made him fancy he could master all things, I cannot divine, because I never knew or heard of any mortal before who professed any thing like it, unless it might be the "admirable Crichton," of, I think, the 14th or 15th century, or a little later. He perhaps went as near such an opinion of his own powers as any ever did. But he does seem to have been an admirable man certainly. And Cain thought all this misery was confined to himself (and so it was as respected mortals, for all his family were exempt from it, being contented and happy in, and grateful for, their maker's goodness) until he so (happily shall I say, or fatally?) met with a sympathizing fellow sufferer in the great, the mighty, the everlasting "Master of Spirits." He then gives his *reasons* for having thought that his misery was his alone. And they are these. His father, he says, is tamed down. How *rampant* Adam had been does not ap-

pear. From what we have seen however in the preceding pages, I should not have conceived the Almighty (if I may presume so to speak) had had much trouble or difficulty in reducing him from any beast-like violence of conduct. Nor should I have suspected even Adam's *spirit* to have been any thing like so stubborn as his son's, if stubborn at all. His mother too, he says, had forgot the mind which made her thirst for knowledge at the risk of an eternal curse. What the peculiar knowledge was which Eve thirsted for, we have seen; and it appears to have been of the most deleterious and deathly kind. Happy then for Eve, if, through the pardoning mercy of her God, she *had* in reality forgot the mind which made her thirst for such knowledge. And who could wish for the revival of such a mind? But although Eve certainly transgressed in the very teeth of the penal death which was denounced, yet it is much too harshly and incorrectly expressed by Cain, to say, that death amounted to an eternal curse. For God did not say so. 'And it is apparent from his first promise, and his subsequent fuller revelation, that so far was the death threatened from being an eternal curse; that, to as many as embrace that promise and that subsequent revelation, that very death is made the passage to an infinitely better and eternal life and blessedness. This view of things (and it appears a scriptural one) seems to draw the sting of death, completely, and from an enemy to become man's friend. But this does not countenance evil, or immorality, or contempt of God, or a rejection of the *medium* through which that better life is to be attained. Of that medium occasion will be given for a little observation hereafter. Cain's description of his brother as a watching shepherd boy, is perhaps spoken in simplicity; not contemptuously. With respect to Abel's offering up the firstlings of his flock, more may be said afterwards in its place. But although the Almighty had certainly declared, that in the "sweat of his face" Adam should eat bread; and although, generally speaking, I believe bread cannot be obtained without more or less of human labour, yet it was most ungracious of Cain to say that God bid the earth yield them *nothing* without sweat: for I believe in those climates, it yields

much. At any rate let Adam witness—"toil, not heavy, though needful;"—and as observed before, what sort of characters are they who complain of that? But also, is it different with the body and the mind? Does the sanguine experimental chymist, when he tortures nature, complain of his sudatory, the laboratory? Or the Newtons of their laborious studies? For even Newton attributed more to his labour than to his genius. His description of Zillah makes some atonement; to whom he assigns a grateful and lark-like disposition to the adoration of her maker. But as for his own peculiar Adah, she was, it seems so much vitiated, or stultified by the infecting piety of her father, and mother, and brother, and sister, as to be incapable of understanding the mind which over-whelmed himself. And who, amongst mortals, will he find to do so? Having now however at last met with one to sympathize with him, he prefers to consort with spirits. This seems to please Lucifer prodigiously, as we shall next see.

LUCIFER.

And hadst thou not been fit by thine own soul
 For such companionship, I would not now
 Have stood before thee as I am: a serpent
 Had been enough to charm ye, as before.

CAIN.

Ah! didst *thou* tempt my mother?

LUCIFER.

I tempt none,
 Save with the truth: was not the tree, the tree
 Of knowledge? And was not the tree of life
 Still fruitful? Did I bid her pluck them not?

Did I plant things prohibited within
 The reach of beings innocent, and curious
 By their own innocence? I would have made ye
 Gods; and even He, who thrust ye forth, so thrust ye
 Because "ye should not eat the fruits of life,
 And become gods as we." Were those his words?

CAIN.

They were, as I have heard from those who heard them,
 In thunder.

Note 16.

Lucifer, like all destroyers, begins this part of the dialogue with flattery; that is, if any being, pretending to rationality and immortality, besides Cain, will deem himself flattered by companionship with this "Master of Spirits." Of those who disclaim a soul, or an immortal spirit, we say nothing. They are few, and must stand or fall by their own election, when the unbarring of the gates of death shall have let them into the *then* appalling secret. Yet how can they account for the impressions of immortality, if an imposture, throughout mankind? Why thus;—"I believe in nothing which is not the subject of my senses." What then becomes of evidence?

Here however, Lucifer discloses a circumstance which apparently confirms the idea that it had been, though perhaps obscurely, revealed to Adam that a hostile spirit inhabited the serpent. And this revelation was probably made in the promise that the woman's seed should bruise his *head*. For Lucifer's expression, "I would not now have stood before thee as I am," implies his habit, or his power at any rate, of assuming other forms; while his allusion to the fascination of Eve by the serpent, connected with the other, and thus forming a whole, proves that it was he, who in the serpent, had "charmed" Eve, and

through her, Adam, and in effect, as he pretended, the whole family. This evidently was Cain's impression, and seems to have been that of Lord Byron. As for Cain, he was even greatly excited. "Ah! didst thou tempt my mother?" This home-thrust, Lucifer parried off as well as he could, seemingly afraid to venture upon a flat denial. Yet the way in which he does it is such, as to shew that he was not altogether unwilling to be thought to have been the tempter of Eve. For, says he "I tempt none, save with the truth. He then proceeds to *prove* that Eve was tempted with the truth, whoever tempted her;" "was not the tree the tree of knowledge?" We have seen in what respect it was so. And he asks, if the tree of life was not yet fruitful; implying, that as he had promised Eve they should not die, so neither would they have died, had they forthwith plucked the tree of life, which continued fruitful, notwithstanding their eating of the forbidden fruit. Thus he proved his tempting none but with the truth. But what murderer may not say the same, when he decoys another to share a certain plunder? He asks if *he* bid them not pluck the fruits? Implying, it was not *he* who hindered their acquisition of knowledge, and of life too. Certainly he did not bid them so abstain. His business was (which he accomplished) quite the contrary, in respect of the fruit of the *prohibited* tree: he bid them not abstain from, but pluck it, in defiance of their maker and his threatening of death. But what thank to him for that? Or at least, if good be, as has been shewn, educed from it by the arrangements and goodness of God, still, no thank to Lucifer. He did all *he* could to procure temporal and eternal death to his deluded prey. His next question is, if *he* planted things prohibited within the reach of beings innocent, and curious by their own innocence? His reflection of course is upon God, for having done so. And it is to be seen, if the Almighty can *justly* be so reflected on. We admit Adam and Eve to have been innocent. As to their curiosity we know not. They may or may not have been curious. Probably they were, as they were intelligent, new in existence, happy, and surrounded by objects calculated to excite admiration. Suppose then all this, and then, that their Almighty benefactor

and familiar friend informed them that of all which he had placed in their lovely territories, he excepted one tree only from their use, viz. the tree which he specifically pointed out to them, growing in the centre of the garden, which he told them was (not the tree of knowledge generally, but) the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. And this information he accompanied by a direct injunction not to eat of that tree, because in the day they should do so, they should surely die.

Now can we imagine Adam and Eve to have been destitute of common sense, or of common discretion? Certainly not. Then what person of the present day, of common sense and common discretion, would not say, that if he or she suffered their curiosity to lead them into so egregious a disregard of their own interests, they richly deserved all the consequences? Or, does our innocence justify our wilfully becoming criminal? Or, does innocence *imply* a necessarily attendant morbid curiosity which no motive can restrain? Or, can that curiosity be justified, which, not content with what it may reasonably and lawfully indulge in, will, besides, in spite of every moral opposition, deem itself entitled to a prohibited object merely because within its reach? - The truth however is, that Eve, being assailed by a sophister, suffered her curiosity to induce her assenting to his sophisms, by which she became willingly, yet against her conscience, convinced; though that conviction included in it not only a disregard of her own eminent danger, but a most ungrateful disregard to the will of her beneficent creator. The foregoing observations and questions of Lucifer prove him to have *overheard* Cain's preceding soliloquy, from which, conjurer-like, he here draws arguments, as if from his own store of knowledge of the thoughts of dust, and which he knew would bear their share in fixing his hold on Cain. His pretence that *he* would have made them gods, is in exact keeping with his character. He did, however, make them such gods as they were, and which was all he could do. But he is altogether wrong in saying, that the Almighty thrust them forth that they might not eat the fruits of life, and become gods as they, viz. as Lucifer and his satellites. For they had already become as much and as miserable gods, as Lucifer could make them;

and we have seen, that they were thrust forth expressly to prevent the *perpetuation* of that misery, and to make way for its final and everlasting removal, by their, and their posterity, by faith, eating of that *other* fruit of life which came down from heaven, and of which, if man eat, he shall never die. As to Lucifer's asking Cain if those were the Almighty's words, and Cain's replying yes, as heard in thunder, they are both wrong. They were *not* the Almighty's words: nor have we any intimation of God having spoken in thunder. The divine observation was; "behold the man is *become* like one of us, therefore, lest he put forth his hand and eat of the tree of life," and so forth; very opposite to Lucifer's statement. The tree of life was not to *make gods*; the *other* tree was to do that, according to Lucifer; and the experiment was tried. Lucifer rejoins thus;—

LUCIFER.

Then who was the demon? He
 Who would not let ye live, or he who would
 Have made ye live forever in the joy
 And power of knowledge?

CAIN.

Would they had snatch'd both
 The fruits, or neither!

LUCIFER.

One is your's already,
 The other may be still.

CAIN.

How so?

LUCIFER.

By being

Yourselves, in your resistance. Nothing can
 Quench the mind, if the mind will be itself
 And centre of surrounding things — 'tis made
 To sway.

Note 17.

Here again, Lucifer, as if criminally conscious, seems to allude to some being who had been suspected of tempting Eve in the shape of the serpent, and thereby betraying, and procuring her that death which was threatened on the eating of the forbidden fruit. He asks — "then who was the demon?" Now Cain had not been speaking of any demon. It looks therefore something like the accusation of a guilty conscience. But it also appears to shew Lord Byron's view of the matter too, against Lucifer's innocence. But more of that afterwards. As however this term "demon" is used here for the first time, and occurs shortly on another occasion, that will be a proper occasion for some remarks on the subject. It is sufficient here, just to notice that, among the ancients, demons comprehended beings both of good and evil character: or at least, if not evil in its worst degree, yet approaching it, and much inferior in morals to the good. That Lucifer, in this place intends the latter, that is, demons of the worst class, cannot be doubted; otherwise, he would not have applied the term to the Almighty, to whom he can ascribe nothing good. And on this occasion he certainly does, however covertly and with horrible impiety, yet highly in character with himself, and which shews the author's judgment, impute the term, in its evil acceptance, to the Supreme, by insinuating that it was *he* (the Almighty) who "would not let" Cain and his parents live; for that he himself (Lucifer) would have made them live forever. To be sure, he does *seem* to ask the question fairly, as to which was the demon of the two. But we can

scarce suppose he meant, to adopt the character himself. And if not, he must have intended to apply it to the Almighty. Indeed it is apparent, from his after assertion, that he himself would have made them live forever. We will very shortly (for Lucifer requires much *repetition* in order to keep closely up with all his slanders) examine into this allegation of his, that it was their maker who would not let them live; that is, of course, by expelling them from Eden, and the use of the tree of life. If therefore it was Lucifer who prohibited and warned Adam from the forbidden fruit, as the procurer of his death; and if it were the Almighty in the serpent who told Eve she should not die, and persuaded her to disregard the penalty of such prohibition; then Lucifer is right in charging it on the Almighty that he would not let Adam live. But the exact reverse of that proposition is true, and the conclusion must be exactly the reverse also. For it was Lucifer who *induced* them to incur the certain means of death. Who then was it would not let them live? Apply this to common life, and all doubt vanishes. But what is more common than for culprits to throw their crimes on others? But if it should be said still, that it was God who would not let them live, because he removed them from the use of the tree of life; the answer is, that had they been permitted from its use to have preserved their existence, such existence would have been a hopeless state of spiritual and moral *death*, in alienation from their maker, and incapacity of his regard: whereas by their being subjected to mortality through their necessitated abstinence from the tree of life, they were put into a certain road to immortal life and bliss, with a renewed enjoyment of their creator's favour; that is as many as accept the appointed medium made known by the revelation, of the authenticity and credibility of which, some short notice has been taken. As to Lucifer's boast that *he* would have made them live forever; it is well known he has not the power of giving life, though it is equally certain he is, instrumentally, and often, the inciter to death. He is well aware, that after death there is no redemption; and that, if that be not secured in life, and he can bring to the grave, his work is done.—What the “Master of Spirits” means by his causing them to live in

“the joy and power of knowledge,” I cannot tell. I think it must be mere Luciferian and unmeaning bombast. We know what sort of knowledge the fruit of the tree of knowledge had imparted; not a *joyful* knowledge certainly, to its *immediate* recipients at any rate. And what could be its power? It produced moral and natural weakness. And I know of no *other* knowledge which Lucifer had either the capacity or the *will* to impart, that would have been *good* for man. *This* knowledge he willingly gave, because he knew from Eve it led to death. But neither, I apprehend, does other and general knowledge, by any means, *certainly* procure either joy or power. There may be much knowledge unaccompanied by either. Other and collateral *circumstances* are necessary to make knowledge productive of those pleasant fruits; circumstances, under higher control than Lucifer's. But of that Cain chose to know nothing. Besides, knowledge *may* produce the reverse of joy; sorrow and sadness, as many know. All depends upon the right *use* of knowledge, and the *kind* of knowledge. I therefore think that Lucifer's pretence amounts to less than nothing. For there is no kind of knowledge under the sun, but one, which can produce a power that will drive away sorrow and sadness, or procure happiness in despite of them. And that *one* kind of knowledge Lucifer *could not* give, for he knew it not himself; and who can impart that which he does not possess? What that *one* knowledge is, may be learned from the revelation so often adverted to.

Lucifer next, on Cain's lamenting, though unwisely, as we have seen, that his parents had not snatched both the fruits or none; tells him, that one was his already, and that the other, meaning that of life, may be still. And upon Cain's enquiring how that should be, he tells him, rather enigmatically perhaps, — “by being yourselves in your resistance.” What Lucifer meant exactly by that expression, is not, perhaps, quite easy to determine. We must guess. For many of Lucifer's oracles of old required guessing at; and after all would deceive. If, however, he meant resistance to the Almighty, (as it seems almost incredible he should,) he gave but poor encouragement

to Cain to resist that power by which he, "with all his might," had been overcome. Or if he meant, that man should resist extinction of his being; yet that seems too unlikely to suppose; unless it be in connexion with his preceding vaunt that *if* God had made him he could not unmake. But that I hardly can imagine. Did he then mean what some of the philosophizing ancients, the Stoics perhaps especially, intended by their inward resistance of all mental impressions from external evil, pain, or suffering, and that the true dignity and power of man consisted in such resistance? This possibly was Lucifer's meaning; for that he had some meaning I believe, though possibly, what I should deem an absurd one. Some individuals I apprehend have in fact practised this mode of being themselves in their resistance to a considerable extent. But what does that lead to, unless proceeding from right principles? For *death* they cannot resist; that is, successfully. Some indeed have exclaimed in their extremity and resistance to their maker—"God! I won't die," and have expired instantly. Resistance of death is therefore vain. And it was death that Cain was most concerned about.

But Lucifer proceeds. He endeavours to stimulate Cain still more by telling him—"nothing can quench the mind, if the mind will be itself and centre of surrounding things." What Lucifer here also exactly means, may not be quite plain to see. Yet neither can it be material, if it be true that the mind itself *may* be quenched; whether it will be itself and centre of surrounding things, or not. That imaginary operation of the mind's power therefore cannot save it. It may be quenched by the same hand which bestowed it (whatever the mind is) in man's creation. It must be owned that Cain had not experience of that truth, and therefore was not a match for Lucifer; but after the lapse of six thousand years, there is evidence enough of the quenchability of the human mind, even before the body fails, or at least is resolved into its dust. What, else, made

"From Marlborough the tears of dotage flow,
And Swift expire a driveller and a shew?"

Therefore, though man should employ his whole existence in making his mind be itself and centre of surrounding things; or, in other words, though the mind may *will* to be itself and centre of surrounding things, yet, if the mind be *quenched*, what becomes of its *will*? And that the mind may be quenched needs no proof but abundant experience. That some minds are commensurate in power with their corporeal tenement, and only drop with that, is no argument against their *liability* to be sooner quenched, either by the invisible hand of God, as it should sometimes seem, or by bodily causes more or less visible. This the mind must therefore be exposed to, so long as body and mind are so mutually dependent, that it is hard to tell which first affects the other. Lucifer's concluding attribute of the mind, however, is less exceptionable, if not rather just and grand — "'t is made to sway." And who can deny it? And this, so long as its powers are continued, it ought to do, and will do, in all who are duly conscious of their "high original," and permit their minds to retain their superior station in controlling and directing their inferior nature. Had Eve done so, and Adam, they had not transgressed. Had Cain done so, he had not been discontented.

For some reason or other, this piece of metaphysics seems to have been lost on Cain, who appears absorbed in the more interesting enquiry, which Lucifer himself had given rise to, respecting his mother's misfeasance. He therefore overlooks the metaphysics, as if beyond his comprehension, or, in his opinion, beside the matters in hand; and boldly, though rather quaintly, returns to his charge against Lucifer, with his — "but didst thou tempt my parents?" The following confabulation thereupon ensues.

CAIN.

But didst thou tempt my parents?

LUCIFER.

I?

Poor clay! what should I tempt them for, or how?

CAIN.

They say the serpent was a spirit.

LUCIFER.

Who

Saith that? It is not written so on high :
 The proud One will not so far falsify,
 Though man's vast fears and little vanity
 Would make him cast upon the spiritual nature
 His own low failing. The snake was the snake—
 No more ; and yet not less than those he tempted,
 In nature being earth also—*more* in *wisdom*,
 Since he could overcome them, and foreknew
 The knowledge fatal to their narrow joys.
 Think'st thou I'd take the shape of things that die?

Note 18.

Here, as was just above observed, Cain abruptly turns to charge Lucifer again with tempting his parents. Lucifer, *first*, addressed his new acquaintance by the appellation of "Mortal!" Afterwards, on the example set him by Cain, he calls him "Dust." Now, he honours him with the dignified attribute of—"Poor clay!" And he soothingly evades, yet appears to answer, Cain's repeated interrogatory, concerning his parents, by asking Cain, what he should tempt them for, or how? So that he seems unable, with all his audacity, to deny the fact. Cain however, seeming to be rather posed with this question, and not attempting to answer it, I shall take leave to endeavour to answer it in his stead. As to the "*what*," then, which he should tempt them "*for*;" it was, I presume, according to all

that we can collect from his words and actions, that he might, at events, induce them to disobey their maker's command, the pur of which he well knew from his conversancy with Eden, and doubt from his having picked up, from time to time, such information respecting the forbidden fruit, as induced him to practise skill upon Eve, in the way he did. He therefore knew, that it could succeed in prevailing upon her to listen to him, there was probability of Adam's being induced to join her in her transgression. The consequence of that he was sure would be the execution of divine sentence; and, if he did not know exactly what death yet he was sure it must be something that would not only bring misery to the new-made mortals, but most likely bring them, in some way or other, under his permanent influence, and perhaps dominion. This, as we shall find from himself more distinctly ere long, was therefore the "what" he tempted Cain's parents for. And we may reflect his saying, not long since, that pangs were made more enduring by the unbounded sympathy of all. The well-known though homely maxim, therefore,—“the more the better,” applies, most emphatically to Lucifer in this affair. With respect to the “how;” the answer is given to our hand. We have seen it was (for he has not denied but rather confessed it) by actuating the serpent in his suggestion to Eve. Cain tells him, that his parents said, the serpent was a spirit. If Cain said truth, which we have a right to believe he did, they must have learned it by revelation from heaven, as has been before noticed. The manner, in which Lucifer, however, receives this intelligence from Cain, seems to yield fresh proof of its truth; for he is evidently touched again by it to the quick; and seems to start, in asking “Who saith that? It is not written so on high: the proud One is not so far falsify.” With respect to his assertion of its not being written so on high, (I suppose he means not recorded in Heaven) was not incorrect; and said so boldly and safely, for the reason presently given respecting Cain's not distinguishing between the serpent being a proper spirit, and ~~being~~ *only inhabited* and *actuated* by a spirit. As to his ” given to the

mighty, it is quite in his appropriate style. But, his declaration that God would not so far falsify, as to say, that the serpent was a spirit, requires a little consideration. That expression *seems* perhaps to amount to a denial of his having had any thing to do with the serpent; which he had not denied before. And it does appear to me, that Lord Byron (whose business it was to exhibit *character* with all appropriate accuracy) both believed in the serpent's having been inhabited by Lucifer, and also intended to preserve Lucifer's artful character. I am not willing to afford the appearance of cavilling, even with Lucifer, nor to affect distinctions without a difference. But I must believe, that Lucifer on this occasion is taking advantage of Cain's inaccuracy, in stating that they (his parents) said the serpent was a spirit. The probability seems to be, that they told Cain the truth, as revealed to them from Heaven, (not that the serpent was a spirit, but,) that the serpent was *inhabited* and *actuated* by a spirit: and Cain did not advert to the *difference*; which gave Lucifer his advantage over him. This therefore afforded Lucifer an opportunity of affirming the negative of Cain's statement, which he probably would not have done, had Cain only asserted the serpent's subjection to some spiritual influence foreign to himself. And this, by the way, leads us to an additional argument to prove Lucifer's intimate connexion with the snake in this affair, in the way attributed to him. For although the snake was, in scripture language, more *subtle* than any other beast of the field, and therefore perhaps by Lucifer deemed fittest for his purposes, as creating least suspicion; yet scripture does not say, that he was inimical to man; which, at that happy period, no part of the creation was. But the serpent (under diabolical influence) was so inimical. And even were we to allow to any *beast* the power of being rebellious also against his creator (by disputing his word as the serpent did) we cannot think that such was the case at *that* time. Nothing therefore seems to me to remain, but that the *snake* must have been *prompted* and overborne, by a superior and spiritual power, for purposes such as a being like Lucifer had to effect. I think then that Cain, has been represented by Lord Byron

as thus mistaking his information, in order to give Lucifer this apparent advantage over him, thereby to further develope Lucifer's specious but deceptive character. I say *apparent* advantage; for *substantially* the effect was the same, either way.—Lucifer's *next* assertion however, that man's vast fears, and little vanity, would make him charge his error in this matter upon the spiritual nature, is more easily made than proved; for it has been seen, I think, that the serpent was certainly actuated by a wicked spirit; and there seems every evidence that the "Master of Spirits" was the culprit; and we have also seen, and shall see further presently, that mankind, universally, have had such impressions of the existence of such an evil being as Lucifer, that nothing but the fact, however disfigured by tradition, can account for. Even Plato seems to have had an idea of the fall of man, through means not altogether unanalogous to this transaction. What Lucifer *means*, by man's vast fears and little vanity, is perhaps not otherwise intelligible, than by supposing, that by his vast fears he alludes to Adam and Eve in the first instance, and their posterity afterwards, seeking some refuge from the divine displeasure, by attributing their error to Lucifer or some other spirit; as Eve did in her imperfect manner, though there seems every reason to believe that God revealed the fact to Adam afterwards, as it certainly was revealed subsequently and more distinctly under the Christian dispensation. And as to the little, or contemptible, *vanity* of man, Lucifer probably meant, that man, to gratify his little pride, and not to avow his inferiority in understanding, to a mere reptile, would ascribe his deception, and fall, to a more powerful, that is, to a higher and spiritual being; as, in point of fact, was the truth. It may be thought by some, to be rather trifling to dwell so much upon this subject. But as the fact comprized in it is of the utmost concern to man, it cannot be altogether uninteresting to arrive at satisfactory conviction in our minds respecting it. It appears to me to be a matter, the reverse of insignificant or unimportant, whether we are or are not thoroughly satisfied that there is a powerful and spiritual adversary of man. 'Tis true, the New Testament establishes that fact, and

some may ask, is not that sufficient? It assuredly is so, for general purposes, to those who believe it. But is it not allowed to all, and in some cases necessary, that their faith be confirmed by reason and rational evidence, for various desirable purposes? And may it not be safely asserted, that the belief of the existence and operations of the devil (to speak plainly) forms no small part of the faith of Christians? I had almost said, its foundation. For perhaps it is not too much to affirm, that had there been no devil, there would have been no Christianity, no redemption, necessary: nor, most assuredly, would Jesus Christ have "come to *destroy the works* of the devil," by his own sufferings and death.

I therefore observe a little further, that this matter seems confirmed (taking the relation before us as a fact, more than a drama, as in this instance we safely may) by Lucifer's being so tremblingly alive, whenever Cain touches upon it, instantly standing upon the defensive, either in the way of evasion, or justification, or denial, as the case may require. He seems too, to rejoice with secret exultation at the snake's success. Was there not reason for that? Was he not rejoicing at his *own* success? He says "the snake was the snake; no more." That is true, taken with explanations lately given. But his next description of the snake is curious, and seems again to confirm the truth; for he says he was *more* in *wisdom* than they he tempted, since he could overcome them. But his *more wisdom* did not necessarily import his *more malice*. Then again; this same snake "*foreknew* the knowledge fatal to their narrow joys." But how can it be believed that the snake, as the snake merely, could foreknow it? It *cannot* be supposed his *natural* "subtlety" extended so far. And even the foreknowledge Lucifer speaks of was what he had acquired by his tampering with Eve, and from what he overheard in Eden, as there seems reasonable ground to suppose. Nor is it any argument against these views of the matter, that Moses says nothing of them, but relates the affair simply, as it occurred to outward observation; for we know the brevity and simplicity of his narrations. When Lucifer designates the happiness of the first human pair by the term *narrow joys*,

he of course speaks contemptuously as usual : but their narrowness I apprehend did not consist so much in their inferior *nature*, as in their *insecurity*, as being liable to be lost by overstepping the limited boundary set to them ; and which was, the necessity of obedience to the divine command. As to that part of his defence here, which questions Cain whether he could suppose he would take the shape of things that die, there can be no difficulty in it when we recollect that upon his *conqueror's* ejecting him once out of some poor demoniacs, he craved permission to enter into a herd of swine. Yet even this last interrogatory, which perhaps Lucifer thought unanswerable because he did not foresee his own future base associations for the purpose of gratifying his malice and enmity, did not dislodge Cain from his idea of the serpent's spirituality, in some way or other, as we shall see by his succeeding question.

CAIN.

But the thing had a demon ?

LUCIFER.

He but woke one

In those he spake to with his forky tongue.

I tell thee that the serpent was no more

Than a mere serpent : ask the cherubim

Who guard the tempting tree. When thousand ages

Have roll'd o'er your dead ashes, and your seed's,

The seed of the then world may thus array

Their earliest fault in fable, and attribute

To me a shape I scorn, as I scorn all

That bows to him, who made things but to bend

Before his sullen, sole eternity ;

But we, who see the truth, must speak it. Thy

Fond parents lis

And fell. For what should spirits tempt them ? What
 Was there to envy in the narrow bounds
 Of Paradise, that spirits who pervade
 Space — but I speak to thee of what thou know'st not,
 With all thy tree of knowledge.

CAIN.

But thou canst not
 Speak aught of knowledge which I would not know,
 And do not thirst to know, and bear a mind
 To know.

LUCIFER,

And heart to look on ?

CAIN.

Be it proved.

Note 19.

We may remember Lucifer's having himself given Cain occasion for this notion, by so impiously attributing that character and nature to the Almighty ; and we then referred to a future opportunity of saying a few words on the subject, more directly, of demonology, as illustrative of our principal proposition respecting Lucifer's operations concerning man. That opportunity now occurs.

It is, then, well known, that the ancient heathens, not only the Egyptians and others of the earliest nations, but the Greeks also, of later origin than they, had their peculiar superior deities ; and that the most enlightened among them acknowledged one in particular of those superior deities as the Supreme God. But, whether more or less gross in their notions of those superior deities, they had inferior dei-

ties also. These they considered to have been the souls of men, perhaps chiefly of the higher mental and other qualities while in the body, and whose souls the superior deity or deities raised to a nature inferior indeed to their own, but superior to the human. These were called by an appellation, which, in the English language, is translated for the most part demons. It clearly appears too, that these beings were deemed to be of a spiritual nature, and not always, nor perhaps chiefly, inimical; but often, if not generally, friendly and beneficent, to man. They were, moreover, at least the better among them, considered as forming an intermediate and connecting order of existence, and to officiate as mediators between the gods and mankind; not only by revealing to the latter the mind and will of the former, and transmitting their prayers and sacrifices, but even by inspiring encouragement, consolation, or mental support, in difficult or painful circumstances. These mediative beings were considered as being gifted with a power of access to the human mind, at least to an extent needful for their purposes. It is evident, however, that this system, though in itself erroneous and hurtful, was capable of increased mischief by abuse and perversion. How true it may be (but it seems very credible) that these mediators were the offspring of dark and traditionary notions derived from the Jews, or Jewish writings, relating to the Messiah, need not here be entered into; nor perhaps would the disquisition be a very easy one; yet that is asserted as a fact by learned men. These demons, at the same time, are decidedly to be distinguished from those evil beings, or spirits, and Lucifer at their head, with the belief of whom also, the heathen and pagan world abounded, and who, in a former note, are shewn to be recognized by the writings of the Old and New Testament. For all the above-mentioned purposes however, of intervention, and mediation, and other services, it was further thought, that the demons in question, (sometimes termed also genii,) must necessarily, from their spiritual nature, inhabit and actuate those individuals to whom they chose to attach themselves, whether for better or worse ends; for having been themselves originally human, their regard to man, either

in benevolence or malice, continued, and they were unrestricted in the objects of their attention. Hence Socrates, perhaps more pointedly than any other heathen, though so eminent for wisdom generally, and for virtue, was accustomed to maintain, that he was attended and guided by, and that he highly revered, his good demon or genius. Plato also, and Cicero, not to mention others, appear to have entertained the same, or very similar views. It does not seem clear, that much, if any, *direct* evil agency was ascribed to these demons; though there seems to have been attributed to them at least various degrees of goodness; insomuch that the lowest degree approached the nature of direct and positive evil, manifested by suggestions to the mind, more or less contrary to what was right and good. Yet the belief of evil genii appears to have obtained. Hence it is related of Brutus, that at the battle of Pharsalia, his evil genius appeared to him, and told him he would meet him again at Philippi: in which last battle Brutus was killed. That Lucifer however, or Satan, with whom we are now concerned, has actually taken great advantages of these notions of men, and turned them to his purposes of diabolical mischief against their welfare, there seems most abundant reason to believe, unless we would reject testimony, which, to reject, would be to shake the foundation of all moral evidence and reasonable certainty. These remarks may serve to explain the author's meaning in the reply of Lucifer to Cain now before us, in which he causes Lucifer to ascribe an indwelling demon or genius to Eve; adding that the snake *woke* that demon by the words he spoke to her. There seems to be some difficulty in this, inasmuch as at that early period of the world there could be no demon in the sense we have been considering, because no mortal had yet died. If therefore Eve were so inhabited or possessed at all, it must have been by one of the associate rebel angels whom scripture usually calls devils.

Lucifer in this speech renews his assurance to Cain, that the serpent was no more than a mere serpent, (which is granted with the explanation of Lucifer's *inhabiting* him, as above given) and refers Cain for satisfaction, to the cherubim who guarded the tree. That was

idle, because Cain had no access to them: and if he had, it does not follow they should know the fact, unless God had revealed it to them, which it does not appear he had done, or that it was necessary or desirable he should, as he probably did to Adam and Eve who were so much more interested in it. But all this duplicity is quite in good keeping with Lucifer's general character. Lucifer then refers to what he describes as the *fabulizing* of the event of the fall of man in future and remote ages of the world. The fact is, that *traditions* of the event have been preserved from its origin, though, as may be expected, much distorted. But it appears that even Plato had an idea of it, (however acquired,) and that he ascribed it to the intervention of evil in the iron age of the world, disharmonizing the primeval rectitude of of man. As to Lucifer's affectation of scorning the shape of a serpent, we need only add our persuasion, to what has been before said, that he would scorn no shape whatever, by the assumption or inhabitation of which, he might accomplish his seducing and destructive purposes. That he scorns all who worship infinite wisdom, power, and goodness we know. But when he characterizes God's worshippers as merely bending before his "sullen, sole eternity," we have already seen the utter unfoundedness of that calumny, from the nature of superior spirits, as well as from the nature of the Eternal himself, the very opposite of sole or solitary, in Lucifer's sense, and of "sullen," in any sense at all. What he exactly means by saying, that he and his, who see the truth *must* speak it, I do not immediately perceive, unless a compliment to themselves be intended, which indeed appears likely. And yet it will be seen, that, whether compulsorily or not, Lucifer does sometimes speak the truth, though lies are his proper element. It is acknowledged that he spake the truth in saying, that Cain's parents fell by listening to a creeping thing: but still he has not shewn, that he himself was not *in* that creeping thing: indeed he has even confessed it and with secret if not open triumph: such is his boasted *veracity*. He then asks again for *what* should spirits tempt them? That has been answered; and though there were nothing in the mere narrow bounds of Eden itself to tempt

spirits who pervade space, yet the human race was sufficient temptation to evil beings who are ever desirous of associating others with themselves, or of destroying or annoying them if they cannot. Besides, they had "pangs innumerable" to be alleviated by the unbounded sympathy of men, as well as devils. But when Lucifer had mentioned *space* he stops, and tells Cain, that, with all his tree of knowledge, he knew nothing about *that*.—And upon Cain's replying he had nevertheless a wish, and a thirst, to know any thing of which Lucifer could speak to him; and possessed a mind also to know it; and that he had even a heart to look on it, Lucifer then names a subject of some interest, in the ensuing continuation of the dialogue.

LUCIFER.

Dar'st thou to look on Death?

CAIN.

He has not yet

Been seen.

LUCIFER.

But must be undergone.

CAIN.

My father

Says he is something dreadful, and my mother
Weeps when he's named; and Abel lifts his eyes
To Heaven, and Zillah casts her's to the Earth

// And sighs a prayer; and Adah looks on me,
// And speaks not.

LUCIFER.

And thou?

CAIN.

Thoughts unspeakable

Crowd in my breast to burning, when I hear
Of this almighty Death, who is, it seems,
Inevitable. Could I wrestle with him?
I wrestled with the lion, when a boy,
In play, till he ran roaring from my gripe.

LUCIFER.

It has no shape; but will absorb all things
That bear the form of earth-born being.

CAIN.

Ah!

I thought it was a being: who could do
Such evil things to beings save a being?

LUCIFER.

Ask the Destroyer.

CAIN.

Who?

LUCIFER.

The Maker — call him

Which name thou wilt; he makes but to destroy.

CAIN.

I knew not that, yet thought it, since I heard
Of death: although I know not what it is,

Yet it seems horrible. I have look'd out ↙
 In the vast desolate night in search of him ;
 And when I saw gigantic shadows in
 The umbrage of the walls of Eden, chequer'd
 By the far-flashing of the cherubs' swords,
 I watch'd for what I thought his coming ; for
 With fear rose longing in my heart to know
 What 't was which shook us all — but nothing came.
 And then I turn'd my weary eyes from off
 Our native and forbidden Paradise,
 Up to the lights above us, in the azure,
 Which are so beautiful: shall they too die?

LUCIFER.

Perhaps — but long outlive both thine and thee.

CAIN.

I 'm glad of that ; I would not have them die,
 They are so lovely. What is death ? I fear,
 I feel, it is a dreadful thing ; but what,
 I cannot compass: 't is denounced against us,
 Both them who sinn'd and sinn'd not, as an ill —
 What ill ?

LUCIFER.

To be resolved into the earth.

CAIN.

But shall I know it ?

LUCIFER.

As I know not death,

I cannot answer.

CAIN.

Were I quiet earth,

That were no evil: would I ne'er had been

Aught else but dust!

Note 20.

In this part of the conversation between Lucifer and Cain, and in answer to Lucifer's question whether he dared to look on death — commonly termed the King of Terrors, — Cain seems scarcely to know what to say. He therefore replies, death has not yet been seen: Lucifer then tells him, he must at any rate be undergone. Cain's description of his family's various impressions relative to death, is exceedingly appropriate, and could only have proceeded from one who had pictured the scene to himself in its most natural form, as Lord Byron must have done. The subject was of general interest to the first human family, and was likely to produce the sensations ascribed to each of the individuals who composed it. Cain's own feelings and heroism are equally appropriate to *him*; and the *latter* part of his animated portrait of himself seems to have taken its rise from the known intrepidity of one (Lord Byron himself) who delighted in feats of marine, and perhaps other hardihood: not the least of which (it may be) was his undaunted prowess in riding on the mane of Old Ocean, in its most terrific and sublime, and hazardous, excitement. Such an ascription of boldness therefore to Cain, in wrestling with the lion, was very natural for Lord Byron to imagine. Cain's observations therefore are natural and simple enough: but,

when Lucifer says that death will absorb all things that bear the form of earth-born being; he only speaks, first, as a malevolent spirit, and then, as one ignorant of that provision which is made to counteract and defeat that very death, that all-absorbing death, which he himself brought into the world by his success against Eve. That counter-acting agent I scarcely need say is the Gospel, or that revelation, of the authenticity of which something has been said in a preceding note. And upon Cain's asking Lucifer what, but a real being, could do such acts as he had ascribed to death, Lucifer bids him ask his maker, or the "destroyer," for that they were both one, since the Almighty made but to destroy. Here again is an assertion of Lucifer's without proof: but it is a fresh instance of his gross untruth. Of this however more afterwards. At any rate the Almighty does not appear to have *then* destroyed any thing he had made, unless Lucifer meant his own destruction in being expelled from Heaven for his rebellion. And though afterwards the earth was destroyed by a flood, sufficient reason is given for it by the Supreme Moral Governor, of whose wisdom and *goodness*, enough has been said for this place, to shew, that what he does *can only* be good, and not evil. And that, generally speaking, God is the "*Preserver* of men," as Job calls him, rather than the destroyer of his creatures, is too self-evident to need enlarging upon. It is *absurd* to speak of God as a *professed* destroyer, and that in the worst of senses. What good *man* even was ever known to make, and then destroy, for destruction's sake? Especially when animate and sensitive beings were the object? But destruction, from moral considerations, is another thing. And God has been pleased to reveal, that a kind of moral necessity was laid upon him to destroy the world (by the deluge) on account of the wickedness of mankind. Happily, the general sense of mankind, in the present day, (I mean *enlightened* man,) is against revilers of the deity. And general sense is *good evidence*. Cain honestly confesses that he did not *know* that his maker was also a destroyer, yet he thought it since he heard of death, and "yet he did not know what death was, though it seemed to him horrible." His entertaining so dishonour-

able a thought, then, of his maker, upon such insufficient grounds, was *unreasonable* to say the least; from his conversation with Lucifer, ought he not rather to have deemed *him* the destroyer? Had he not, so far as he could, already destroyed his father, and mother, and family, and Cain himself, by causing their disobedience, and thereby introducing all the evils, (such as they were,) and even death itself, of which Cain so grievously complained? Cain's description of his looking out for death is picturesque certainly. He speaks of the very idea of death as "shaking them all." Of this a little will be said presently. Cain then enquiring of Lucifer if the "beautiful lights in the azure" were to die too, Lucifer answers more doubtfully than we, now, need do, as we are decidedly informed they shall, at the fore-appointed moment, pass all away with a great noise, and the elements melt with fervent heat. God has once, certainly, seen it right to destroy the earth by water, on account of the *self-willed* wickedness of man. I say *self-willed*, because I believe, that no moral agent, that is, no intelligent human being, ever practised wickedness which his conscience did not convict him of having been willingly and wilfully, and not by force, committed by him. We are *credibly* informed, the earth will again be destroyed; but by fire. Yet neither was the former, nor will be the ensuing destruction, merely wanton, as Lucifer would have it, but the result of motives corresponding with the *known* character of the infinitely wise and perfectly good creator of all things, and of which wisdom and indisputable goodness every day brings renewed instances.

Cain now again expresses his consternation at this terrible death. But he was incorrect in saying it was *denounced* against them that sinned not as well as against them that sinned. It was denounced, in fact, only against them who sinned. The others merely suffer it as from a cause producing its effect. Had Adam and Eve, as moral agents, obeyed their reason and not their will, that cause had not existed. The same observation applies to moral agents of the present day. And if a man pursues that course which produces evil to his progeny, as well as to himself, who is the denouncer of that evil?

Lucifer in answer to the question what the ill of death is, replies, the being resolved into the earth; which elicits from Cain a confession, that he thought it no evil to be quiet earth, and that he fairly wished he had never been aught but dust. A very appropriate wish for an intelligent being and moral agent, like Cain, who was wilfully ignorant, as it should seem, of the immense value of his existence. But Lucifer himself will reprove him presently. It must not be allowed, however, that Lucifer's definition of the ill of death is either sufficient or accurate. He may, to be sure, be excusable, for the reason he gives, and for not knowing all that *we* know on the subject. His definition was still insufficient, inasmuch as he did not extend the ill of death, (if an ill it can be proved, which it cannot, except to moral agents who neglect its remedy,) to its future consequences beyond the resolution of the body into earth; and it was inaccurate, for not explaining that it was all ill to some, but not to others. But this last explanation we cannot suppose he would have given if he could, because it must unavoidably have led to a detection of his own practices upon man, as well as man's concurrence in them.

But, the importance which the author has, in the person of Cain, given to the subject before us, seems to justify a few further passing remarks. I do not, myself, know of any nations or individuals of antiquity who generally entertained that *horror* of death which Cain here does. Not that the ancients were universally, or altogether careless about it in *some* respects; rather perhaps the contrary. Yet death I apprehend was to the heathen and pagan world, as at this day, more usually at least an object of disregard or calm indifference, if not, sometimes, of desirable anticipation. Nor, perhaps, has death ever been so much a matter of fearful apprehension to many individuals, as since the introduction of the Christian revelation. The difference may have arisen from the greater ignorance and darkness of the preceding periods. But the effect is the reverse of what one would have expected from the enlightening and encouraging, yet serious contents of that revelation, rationally established

as it is in point of authenticity. There seem to be three or four more obvious views in which the extinction of mortal life (no uninteresting object to a considerate mind) may be regarded as a subject of apprehension or anxiety, or of, to say the least, most grateful acquiescence. We will imagine the first to be the apprehended pain or suffering of its approach, or the fearful agonies of its encounter. Yet those apprehensions have often proved unfounded; and, in perhaps the great majority of instances, those agonies do not occur. Another source of anxiety may be from unwillingness to part with, or solicitude for the welfare of, those we leave behind us. To some, possibly, the disinclination to lose the pleasures (so termed) or the gratifications, whether animal merely, or intellectual, of the present state, may form another source of dissatisfaction or regret. But another, and perhaps very prevailing one may be, the idea of a succeeding, unknown, disembodied, spiritual, and extremely sensitive state and condition of existence, divested of all the qualifying and defensive circumstances of the present life: introduced to associations with other spiritual and more powerful beings, whether good or evil, pure or impure, beneficent or malignant, friendly or hostile, who can tell? Or with what capacity invested of inflicting pain upon beings of far inferior strength, and incapable of repelling or avoiding the most cruel aggressions? And who dares say, that such a state of existence cannot, or may not, be? And who, even in this world, is not most uncomfortable, to say the least, in the presence of, or in unavoidable association with, those of mankind, of whom we know there are not a few, whose natures and characters are such as to render miserable not themselves only, but all who are so unhappy as to come within their influence. This misery is of course increased when they who cause it are to be ranked with the worse than brutal,—the blood-thirsty, and the violent: how then, where such dispositions, with corresponding powers, shall be unrestrained, and unsubdued, by laws, or circumstances, or the overruling influence of Heaven? Who would not rather earnestly covet, in the unchangeable state of future being, the society of the virtuous,

the pious, the friendly, the benevolent? To *ensure* the latter, is the point man should keep in view.

- Yet, besides these considerations, another arises from the possibility of a disapproving reception by, and the subsequent, perpetual, and irreversible displeasure of, the Supreme, man's creator and moral governor, of a nature of infinite moral purity; the rejection from whose presence must, itself, be misery; but in whose presence, there is the utmost reason to be assured, nothing, in any degree dissimilar to himself in point of moral purity, can be allowed to be. And how is man to acquire (for in himself he has it not) that perfect, and spotless, moral excellence, so indispensable to his well-being in a future state? The revelation, before considered, can alone solve that important question. — Is it then *not* consistent with the nature of man, or the sanctions of true philosophy or right reason, to permit these considerations seriously to affect, with more than transient power, his thoughts, pursuits, and purposes, while passing through the present intervening stage of being? How far, indeed, every alarming and painful apprehension of futurity may be removed, and every desirable and assured anticipation obtained, by the reception of the revelation glanced at, must be left to individual conviction. But Lord Byron, it will be seen, has in a future page, caused one of his personages to notice a matter, which will *require* a few more remarks, in connexion with the foregoing. Cain's wishing, however, that he had ne'er been aught else but dust, induces some further excitement of his mind from Lucifer, in reply.

LUCIFER.

That is a grov'ling wish,
Less than thy father's, for he wish'd to know.

CAIN.

But not to live, or wherefore pluck'd he not
The life-tree?

LUCIFER.

He was hinder'd.

CAIN.

Deadly error!
Not to snatch first that fruit: — but ere he pluck'd
The knowledge, he was ignorant of death.
Alas! I scarcely now know what it is,
And yet I fear it — fear I know not what!

LUCIFER.

And I, who know all things, fear nothing; see
What is true knowledge.

CAIN.

Wilt thou teach me all?

LUCIFER.

Ay, upon one condition.

CAIN.

Name it.

Note 21.

It does not appear from scripture, that Lucifer had any ground for telling Cain that his father wished to know: on the contrary, it is said, "Adam was not deceived." His error seems to have arisen from a different motive, as elsewhere observed. Cain, also, should appear to be wrong, in saying his father did not wish to live, because

he did not pluck the life-tree, the nature and intention of which tree has been before considered. Lucifer's repetition of Adam's having been hindered, only reminds us of the mercy of God in so hindering him, from continuing in the use of the tree of life: therefore Cain is again erroneous in ascribing error to his father in not snatching that fruit. As to Cain's saying that his father, until he had plucked the tree of knowledge, was ignorant of death, it amounts to nothing, because he afterwards knew no more of death than the name, until Cain himself, with Lucifer's aid, introduced it, with all its horror, into the world. His renewed confession of his ignorance and yet fear of death, fearing he knew not what, draws from Lucifer rather a pompous pretence of universal knowledge which emancipated him from all fear whatever. But setting aside the absurdity of that pretence, (for no knowledge, in any created being, can save him from liability to the cause of inevitable fear, but the true knowledge of God,) there is little reason to credit Lucifer on this occasion, when we recollect that he cannot be supposed to have *known* all the divine intentions respecting man or himself ultimately; and as to his *fearing* nothing, when we recollect that, when the pinching time arrived, he questioned his *conqueror* if he was come to torment him before his time. We are also informed, that the devils believe and *tremble*.—Such is the worth of Luciferian knowledge. This bait however, of universal fear-dispelling knowledge is not lost upon Cain, who instantly swallows it, and is caught, for he expresses his desire of being taught all, by such a master, and Lucifer consents to gratify him upon one condition, which Cain, sensibly enough, desires to know before he shall assent to Lucifer's terms: what those terms are, will now appear.

LUCIFER.

That

Thou dost fall down and worship me—thy Lord.

CAIN.

Thou art not the Lord my father worships.

LUCIFER.

No.

CAIN.

His equal ?

LUCIFER.

No;—I have nought in common with him!
 Nor would: I would be aught above—beneath—
 Aught save a sharer or a servant of
 His power. I dwell apart; but I am great:—
 Many there are who worship me, and more
 Who shall—be thou amongst the first.

Note 22.

If Lucifer had *feed* Lord Byron to plead his cause, or advance his interests with mankind, he pitched upon an advocate, who has, in truth, betrayed his client. For, to say nothing of what has gone before, or may come after, his Lordship has, in this condition of Lucifer's for teaching Cain all things, evidently discovered his client's cloven foot. For, as if to give Lucifer his death-blow as to his reception among men, he makes Lucifer say that, which, however appropriate to himself, must be expected to operate in diminution of his kingdom, and in lessening the number of those whom he seeks to entrap, and hold secure, in order that by "the unbounded sympathy of all" he may make his own "pangs more endurable:" because it is self-evident that if, as Lucifer requires, men worship

Aim, their alienation from their maker, and consequent subjection to Lucifer's dominion, follow of course. But of this, Lucifer will afford further occasion to say a little more, hereafter. This proposition therefore to Cain, though quite consistent with Lucifer's pride, enmity, and ambition, is far otherwise than in his usual garb of artifice and deception. It is so palpable, as to need no detection; it speaks plainly for itself. It even goes beyond his daring offer to his conqueror in future times, whose lord he would not venture to style himself as he here does Cain's. To that circumstance the author seems to advert on this occasion. But the different entertainment given to Lucifer by Cain and his own superior lord, is important. The Saviour, when invited to fall down and worship him, bids him in effect begone to his own place; but Cain continues his friendly conference. Yet is not all praise to be withheld from Cain; who, though he does not dismiss him as he should have done, at least demurs, and questions his right to adoration. He tells him he is not his father's God, and questions him as to his equality with him. His inequality to the Almighty, Lucifer honestly enough confesses, but seems to labour for words to express his detestation of his creator. Nor will that be wonderful, so long as evil shall be the opposite of good. Lucifer, though he wisely disclaimed being a sharer, any more than a servant of God's power; yet seems to have *not* had the sense to know, that a servant, though an unwilling and not honoured one, he *must* be. He was not one of those to whom it would be said, "well done good and faithful servant." He very truly says, he dwells apart: he might have added — as far asunder as Hell from Heaven. But he exults that he is great, and has many worshippers and will have more. Yet, is greatness, without goodness, the procurer of happiness? And who are they who are content with the first without the last? They must resemble Lucifer. For none, but the wicked, are unhappy:—"Acquaint thyself with God and be at rest." And is not true rest true happiness? Is not that the *last end* of Socrates too? and of Plato? and of Cicero? And of whom not? — But is not Lucifer's claim to greatness, and to

many worshippers, a sufficiently clear indication of his being the very "tyrant" he could not prove his maker? For, if I mistake not, the love of greatness and of rule, are of the essence of even human tyranny. Was a good man ever known to seek it? True, on good men it may be *conferred* by Providence, for the good of others. He invites (or *bids*) Cain to be among the first of his slavish worshippers. Who then would belong to Lucifer? But I will not be too severe. Presently his information, if it do not deserve our thanks, must ensure our acknowledgment of the service he has rendered by it to mankind. The succeeding parley is therefore of some importance.

CAIN.

I never

As yet have bow'd unto my father's God,
 Although my brother Abel oft implores
 That I would join with him in sacrifice:—
 Why should I bow to thee?

LUCIFER.

Hast thou ne'er bow'd

To him?

CAIN.

Have I not said it?— need I say it?
 Could not thy mighty knowledge teach thee that?

LUCIFER.

He who bows not to him has bow'd to me!

CAIN.

But I will bend to neither.

LUCIFER.

Ne'er the less,

**Thou art my worshipper : not worshipping
Him makes thee mine the same.**

Note 23.

Cain keeps hold of some sort of respect from us, by holding fast his own independency of spirit, in hesitating still to worship Lucifer, any more than he had worshipped Jehovah, which he had refused to do in spite of every solicitation. And when his potent friend interrogates him if he really had not bowed to Jehovah, and Cain expresses some displeasure at the apparent doubt entertained of his veracity, he replies,—“Have I not said it?” And he speaks somewhat slightly of Lucifer’s mighty knowledge, if it could not teach him that. Lucifer now however, I had almost said, is for making mankind great amends, at least amends in a great degree, by telling Cain (who, sturdy as he was, would not bend, neither to Jehovah nor to him) that he who had not bowed to Jehovah, had bowed to Lucifer; for that not worshipping Jehovah made him Lucifer’s, no less than if he had externally paid him divine homage.

Now, if this be not giving a most important admonition to man, I know not what is. Here is presented to the consideration of every individual the great question — *Whose worshipper he is!* and consequently, by that test, What is to be his condition throughout eternity? It is in vain to contend with Lucifer on this point. God is on his side: his word declares it; — “He that is not with me is against me.” There are but two parties; — God himself, and

he, whom God, for wise and good purposes, permits, hitherto, to be "the foe of God and man." He that is not for one, is for the other; and he, that is for one, is against the other. We are God's, if we worship him: Lucifer's, if we worship *him*. What then is worship, that we may know whose we are? If we ask man what is worship towards God, he will say, an act of religious reverence. But he will go no further. And if man appear in outward and apparently reverential adoration of his maker, he is deemed by man a worshipper of God. But if we enquire of God, in his word, what his worship is, he replies — "My son, give me thine heart:" — "In vain do they honour me with their lips, while their hearts are far from me." If we ask of man the meaning of giving our *heart* to a fellow mortal — any of the charities of life — none are at a loss to know the answer. Do all, then, who appear in *outward* worship, deal thus with God? if they do, they are his worshippers; if not, they do not worship him. What then says Lucifer? — that they worship *him*: and revelation confirms this truth. The discourse then proceeds; and when Lucifer has told Cain that not worshipping God he becomes Lucifer's, Cain enquires —

CAIN.

And what is that?

LUCIFER.

Thou 'lt know here — and hereafter.

CAIN.

Let me but

† Be taught the mystery of my being.

LUCIFER.

Follow

Where I will lead thee.

CAIN.

But I must retire

To till the earth — for I had promised —

LUCIFER.

What ?

CAIN.

To cull some first fruits.

LUCIFER.

Why ?

CAIN.

To offer up

With Abel on an altar.

LUCIFER.

Saidst thou not

Thou ne'er hadst bent to him who made thee ?

CAIN.

Yes —

/ But Abel's earnest prayer has wrought upon me ;

The offering is more his than mine — and Adah —

LUCIFER.

Why dost thou hesitate ?

CAIN.

She is my sister,
Born on the same day, of the same womb ; and
She wrung from me, with tears, this promise ; and
Rather than see her weep, I would, methinks,
Bear all — and worship aught.

LUCIFER.

Then follow me !

CAIN.

I will.

Note 24.

The first observable particular, in the above portion of this conference, is Lucifer's answer to Cain's enquiry what it was to be *his* ? Lucifer does not venture to tell him, but gravely informs him he *shall* know, not only here, but hereafter. That *hereafter* indeed is big with interest ; but at *present*, Lucifer wisely declines unfolding the secrets of his prison-house. Cain however appears willing to go all lengths, if he might but know the mystery of his being. And what was that ? Was there any greater mystery in the being of Cain, than there is in the being of man now ? And what is that ? Why, clearly this ; — that man (as informed by evidence that reason forbids to be contested) is the creature of an incomprehensible superior being of infinite power and goodness and wisdom : — that he

has an immortal and immaterial, as well as animal nature; the former of which is capable of, and destined to, a happy or miserable, and eternal, existence after the dissolution of the latter: that the quality of such existence depends upon his use, or abuse, or neglect of the gifts of his creator, among which is the revelation of his will and of the relation in which his creature man stands to him. This is the mystery of the being of Cain, of which, although he had not the written evidence above adverted to, yet he certainly had sufficient *other* evidence (moral evidence) arising from the works of nature, his own existence, and the testimony of his father and his mother. Those whom what is usually allowed to be moral evidence will not satisfy, nothing can: they choose to be dissatisfied. It must however be admitted, that whether Cain were satisfied on the point of his mysterious being or not, he was decided on another point; which was, that he had made his election of Lucifer as his confidential guide, in opposition to his maker. This Lucifer saw, and therefore boldly bids Cain to follow where he would lead him; as if he had said — “and then I will shew thee what thou wantest to see — the mystery of thy being.” This produces an explanation; for, on Cain’s intimation that he must retire to keep an appointment for offering up some first fruits, Lucifer reminds him of having declared he had never bent to him that made him: and the subsequent acknowledgments which Cain makes of his insincere acts of external worship (worship as he terms it) are painful; especially when he expresses a willingness for the gratification of others however regarded by him, to worship, as he terms it, aught. This was what Lucifer was evidently aiming at. Cain had told him he cared not whom or what he worshipped; for the sake of pleasing them he wished to please. He was therefore in Lucifer’s opinion so devoted to, or at any rate fit for, him, that he confidently tells Cain again to follow him, and Cain, as readily, consents. — The entrance of Adah stops them awhile. —

Enter ADAH.

ADAH.

My brother, I have come for thee ;
It is our hour of rest and joy — and we
Have less without thee. Thou hast labour'd not
This morn ; but I have done thy task : the fruits
Are ripe and glowing as the light which ripens :
Come away.

CAIN.

See'st thou not ?

ADAH.

I see an angel ;
We have seen many : will he share our hour
Of rest ? — he is welcome.

CAIN.

But he is not like
The angels we have seen.

ADAH.

Are there, then, others ?
But he is welcome, as they were : they deign'd
To be our guests — will he ?

CAIN. (*To Lucifer.*)

Wilt thou ?

LUCIFER.

I ask

Thee to be mine.

CAIN.

I must away with him.

ADAH.

And leave us ?

CAIN.

Ay.

ADAH.

And *me* ?

CAIN.

Beloved Adah !

ADAH.

Let me go with thee.

LUCIFER.

No, she must not.

ADAH.

Who

Art thou that steppest between heart and heart ?

CAIN.

He is a god.

ADAH.

How know'st thou ?

CAIN.

He speaks like

A god.

ADAH.

So did the serpent, and it lied.

LUCIFER.

Thou errest, Adah ! — was not the tree that
Of knowledge ?

ADAH.

Ay — to our eternal sorrow.

LUCIFER.

And yet that grief is knowledge — so he lied not :
And if he did betray you, 't was with truth ;
And truth in its own essence cannot be
But good.

ADAH.

But all we know of it has gather'd
Evil on ill : expulsion from our home,

And dread, and toil, and sweat, and heaviness ;
 Remorse of that which was — and hope of that
 Which cometh not. Cain! walk not with this spirit.
 Bear with what we have borne, and love me — I
 Love thee.

LUCIFER.

More than thy mother and thy sire ?

ADAH.

I do. Is that a sin, too ?

LUCIFER.

No, not yet ;
 It one day will be in your children.

ADAH.

What !
 Must not my daughter love her brother Enoch ?

LUCIFER.

Not as thou lovest Cain.

ADAH.

Oh, my God !
 Shall they not love and bring forth things that love
 Out of their love ? have they not drawn their milk
 Out of this bosom ? was not he, their father,
 Born of the same sole womb, in the same hour

With me? did we not love each other? and
 In multiplying our being multiply
 Things which will love each other as we love
 Them? — And as I love thee, my Cain! go not
 Forth with this spirit; he is not of ours.

LUCIFER.

The sin I speak of is not of my making,
 And cannot be a sin in you — whate'er
 It seem in those who will replace ye in
 Mortality.

ADAH.

What is the sin which is not
 Sin in itself? Can circumstance make sin
 Or virtue? — if it doth, we are the slaves
 Of —

Note 25.

The character of Adah, as portrayed by the author throughout, is generally an amiable one, although, as she lived so long ago, we must occasionally take leave to differ from her, and shew her errors, however venial under *her* circumstances, when they occur. Her first salutation to Cain, in reference to their usual mid-day recess, and the preparation of the fruits for the intended offering, must be allowed its due appropriateness and beauty: she therefore bids Cain come away. She seems, in her attention to Cain, to have overlooked Lucifer, to whom therefore Cain directs her attention: — “See’st thou not?” She replies coolly, she sees an angel; as if no uncommon thing to her: for, adds she, — “we have seen many:” and she

then, with equal simplicity and hospitality, invites Lucifer, through Cain, to partake of their simple refreshments. Adah's simplicity and all-absorbing affection for Cain, was indeed such, that she was not struck, even then, with the difference (for we must suppose she had found at least a moment to glance one hasty look at him) between the sadder, and sterner, and sorrowful aspect of Lucifer, and the more joyous and pleasing countenances of the heavenly messengers she had been accustomed to. Cain therefore points out to her his unlikeness to them, meaning, I suppose, that Lucifer had the bearing of a spirit of superior order. Adah says she was not aware there were other angels than such as she had seen, but still persists in inviting Lucifer to be their guest. The continued colloquy with Adah is very much in her favour in point of character; especially her indignation at Lucifer's apparent interference between her and Cain, and her not giving him credit for being a god, but telling Cain, that if he spoke like one, as Cain said he did,—"so did the serpent, and it lied." This looks very much like Adah's having a notion of the snake's being inhabited, and actuated. And such Lucifer seems to have thought was her idea; for he immediately, as before, starts in the snake's defence, by telling Adah she erred; for that the tree *was* the tree of knowledge: or rather asking her if it was not; and that rather sarcastically. Now comes our first apology for Adah. She was wrong, certainly, in her answering Lucifer in exactly such terms; for, however the violation of the tree was to have been lamented, yet we have plentifully seen, and shall see further, that *eternal* sorrow was by no means the inevitable effect of the tree being that of *knowledge*, as Lucifer always affects to call it, in odium of the Almighty, instead of the knowledge of good and evil:—a material difference, if accurately followed up. Adah's information however respecting the means of avoiding the eternal sorrow she spoke of, was limited, without a doubt, and perhaps had not much impressed her mind. But Lucifer must again at every turn defend the serpent; and he now repeats, that he lied not; (to Eve, in saying that she should obtain knowledge from that fruit;) for that her

very grief was knowledge. Perhaps it was : yet not very desirable I presume, *generally speaking at least*. So that, adds the "Master of Spirits," — "if he did betray you, it was with the truth." Especial comfort for Adah, and for all, who, like Eve, listen to Lucifer ! But now comes a sentence in a kind of logical form, or rather perhaps metaphysical, — that "truth in its own essence cannot be but good." Without all question, truth, in the abstract idea of it, is essentially good : for it is the contrary of falsehood, which is essentially evil. But the abstract idea of any being, or quality, is one thing ; and its practical application, another. And what is there, which, being good in itself essentially, may not become evil from the mode of its application or use ? If Lucifer therefore had said that the particular truth which the serpent spake to Eve, had been a good truth, or good in its own essence, he might have been well contradicted. But not having said that, Lucifer in effect said nothing worth saying, except as calculated to mislead Adah ; as he had before misled her mother, who too readily gave way to her inclinations which fell in with his "glozing lies." The serpent's truth therefore, so far from being good in its own essence, was exceeding bad in its own essence, being adapted to produce evil, and evil only.

Adah, in her reply to Lucifer's metaphysical and deceptive jargon, still requires allowance to be made for her, though her error must again be shewn. For she had none of those causes of lamentation she here expresses. She feels more in Cain's spirit, and that which Lucifer had infected her with, than her own, which has been and will be seen, to be of a better kind. Such is the effect of bad moral associations. It is true she was not *aware* whom it was she had been conversing with and exposing herself to ; though she seems to have discerned enough of his character to excite her suspicion. She speaks of the effect of that knowledge of truth, which Lucifer had given to the family, as being productive only of evil on ill. That was correct, certainly ; since the *ill* was, her mother's transgression, and evil gathered on it no doubt. But as to expulsion
~~Adah~~ ^{Adah} been no home to her ; nor do her parents,

whose it had been, appear to have so regretted it; enjoying still, as they did, the mercies of their creator, in their new abodes. What did *she* dread? What toil, sweat, heaviness? This is all mere Cain-ism, not Adah-ism. Nor was it Adam's language. As to remorse, she had no occasion for any, if she had committed no crime. Perhaps by remorse she means regret at the lost enjoyment of Eden. As to hope of that which cometh not: what such hope had she? She appears to have had little if any thing to hope or fear. And if she meant to describe the condition of human nature more generally, in black colours, still, the attributes she ascribes to it belong to none, but such as neglect moral duty, and the over-balancing advantages of an all-healing revelation. She makes amends however by her concluding affectionate address to Cain, and her apparently suspicious regard of Lucifer, with whom she requests Cain not to walk. Yet what she says about the *burthen* they had borne and were to bear, is certainly exaggerated, as far as we can judge of the probable circumstances of their situation. The ensuing conversation, elicited by Lucifer, is very Luciferian, and evidently intended by him to excite discontent and unhappiness. It relates to divine arrangements in the progress of mankind, relating to family relationships, which arrangements, although not obtaining in the very first period of the human race, yet have since been found and acknowledged by mankind themselves, to be essentially conducive to their best interests. Adah, however, instinctively as it were, again begs of Cain to avoid Lucifer, and "go not forth with this spirit, he is not of our's." This induces from Lucifer another of his Luciferian remarks, more of a moral, than metaphysical kind. He turns preacher, and says what is, and what is not, sin;—he, the very root of sin itself— all sin! But this again draws from Adah (for being once in his vortex she cannot escape) a kind of anxious question or two:—"What is the sin which is not sin in itself? Can circumstance make sin or virtue?" As Lucifer did not condescend to resolve Adah's enquiries, we will endeavour to do it; for it ought to be done. As to the first, there can, of course, be no sin that is not sin in itself; because, whatever

is, is so in itself, be it what it may. If a thing be not a thing in itself, how can it be at all? The *useful* question is, what is, or, is not, sin? As to her other enquiry, there is also no doubt that circumstance can make sin, and perhaps virtue too. As to its making sin, we must suppose that the term sin is meant to apply, not to offences against human, but against divine laws. And then, questionless, an act may be in itself indifferent, and therefore, not sinful, if not forbidden by the Almighty. If it be so, it then becomes sinful; because sin consists, as against God, in the transgression of his law. This will hold, so long as moral government be not exploded as between God and his creature man. Sin is therefore a relative thing, and can only exist where there is a governor, and the governed. For if there were only one man in existence, and he without any moral governor, there could be no such thing as sin; for there would be no law, and consequently no offence by its transgression. The same reasoning applies to human government also. No act is an offence, until the law has made it so. With respect to circumstance making virtue, it is less material; but probably there are many acts which would be indifferent, and even wrong, in themselves, abstractedly speaking, but which circumstance might convert into virtue. Abstractedly speaking, it is wrong for one man to kill another: but suppose an individual hazards his own life, by killing unavoidably, in opposing or apprehending, a murderer: in such a case I suppose that the circumstance would make virtue. But here again Adah is rather in fault; for she says that if it were as has just been stated, then they were slaves of——: what she meant exactly to have said we need not enquire, as Lucifer stopped her.

LUCIFER.

Higher things than ye are slaves: and higher
 Than them or ye would be so, did they not
 Prefer an independency of torture
 To the smooth agonies of adulation

In hymns and harpings, and self-seeking prayers
 To that which is omnipotent, because
 It is omnipotent, and not from love,
 But terror and self-hope.

ADAH.

Omnipotence

Must be all goodness.

LUCIFER.

Was it so in Eden?

ADAH.

Fiend! tempt me not with beauty; thou art fairer
 Than was the serpent, and as false.

LUCIFER.

As true.

Ask Eve, your mother: bears she not the knowledge
 Of good and evil?

Note 26.

There is no difficulty in recollecting, that the *higher things* than man, whom Lucifer above speaks of to Adah, as being slaves, are the seraphs, of whom something has been already said, in Note 13; in addition to which, it can only be necessary to advert to the reasonableness of supposing, that intelligent creatures of the seraphs' nature would be so far from being slaves, (which of course implies unwilling servitude,) that in them, the adoration of God must necessarily be volition itself; or, in Lucifer's language, volition in its very essence: and if volition consists in *the power of choice exerted*, then, without

a notable confusion of terms and ideas, how can that be slavery, or the seraphs slaves? But, if Lucifer will have it, that to act, though most spontaneously, yet from the influence of motive, be slavery, then what being is not a slave? Must not Lucifer himself be in slavery? Does not he act from the motive and influence of malice? Yet would he himself acknowledge himself not free? He says none are free but himself. And, (if we may so speak with reverence,) is not the Supreme Being himself a slave? for does not he act from the motive and influence of perfect goodness? Can it be conceived of any intelligent being to act without motive? To act from motive, then, does not imply that the agent is not free, if freedom consists in exemption from slavery; or free will in the power of determining our own actions. For we may freely determine our own actions, though under the influence of motive. But should it be still objected, that these views of the influence of motives, make man the creature of necessity arising from motive; and that therefore, if his moral conduct be thus necessitated, he ceases to be responsible, because no longer possessing free will; the satisfactory answer seems to be, that, however inexplicable, yet in fact necessity and volition do so exist together, as to leave in man that freedom and free will at any rate, which renders him *consciously*, a responsible, moral agent. Assuming that the revelation before spoken of is authentic, and that it declares only what is true; it may be affirmed, that these conclusions are sanctioned and established by it. But some say, this system deprives man of merit; for where there is not perfect freedom and free will there can be no merit; and if no merit, where the incitement to virtuous action? But what is the merit, that those, who reason so, require? Is it the merit arising from their being, or imagining themselves, or being by others imagined, to be, independent creatures? But can we conceive of an independent creature? Is not that a contradiction in terms? A self-destroying proposition? Who is or can be independent besides God? Can there be two independent beings? Or, if not, can it be shewn that God does not govern, or direct, or control, his moral creature man? Or are we Epicureans, discharging the Almighty

from the continued and incessant care and burthen of governing his own creatures? But can any thing be burthensome to infinite power, and infinite wisdom, the capacity of perpetual, unlimited, instantaneous, and simultaneous perception? Or is the idea, of the carelessness of God for man, agreeable to that revelation which has been spoken of? Or can it be shewn that God does not so govern man through the medium of influential motives? And does not the commonest experience inform us, that motive and volition are consistent? Will not the offering of an orange to a child, induce voluntary motion towards the offerer. Will he not open his little eyes and little mouth, and stretch out his little arms, and, if he may, put his little feet in motion? And do we not in that instance see motive, or necessity, united with volition? Can the child resist? But man, it is said, has reason which the child has not. But is not reason swayed by motive? Does reason even act but from motives, of which indeed she judges before she acts? Cannot God, without violating man's free will, cause him to see a particular object in a particular point of view; and has God divested himself of the power even of *influencing* man's reason itself to approve that object? And can God do wrong, or evil? Is not God universally allowed (except by him who hath said in his heart, and perhaps with his tongue, that "there is no God") that the Divine Being is *necessarily* self-existent? Is not God then under a *necessity* of existing? Is he not (speaking reverentially) under the *necessity* of speaking truth, and truth only. "Can he lie?" Is he not under equal *necessity* of not denying himself? "Can God deny himself?" Can God act otherwise than from the motive of perfect goodness, combined, indeed, with the prior one of advancing his own glory in the manifestation of that very goodness? And will man arrogate to himself to be a less necessarily-acting creature than his maker? What does such a sentiment lead to, but, either opposition to God, or a denial of his existence, his power, his wisdom, or his goodness? If these things be so, then the seraphs are not "slaves," though acting from the motives, and influence, of their nature.

But Lucifer does not say things by halves. He therefore tells Adah there are "higher things" still than either man or seraphs. By these he must mean archangels, and that he and his associates were of that class, if not superior even to those of them who kept their first estate. But that superiority he does not nor can prove. Neither does scripture appear to countenance it. But if they were so, the superiority was lost. Neither can he prove nor does it appear probable, even that archangels are higher than seraphs; that is, in nature; though, in point of heavenly harmony and order, there may be difference in degrees, in some particular respects. He then says, that these higher things would be slaves also, (meaning himself and his rebellious crew,) did they not "prefer an independency of torture to the smooth agonies of adulation in hymns and harpings," and so forth, to the end of his tirade, every member of which must be considered in its order, for it is important to man. His "independency of torture" may pass with little notice, if independency and preference consist in the *want* of *power* to second the *will* to resist; and if torture can be ascribed to any but to a "tyrant," which, we have seen, God is not. Then, as to the "smooth agonies of adulation"—the terms are I own, to me, incomprehensible, because, as I conceive, contradictory. For if agony means excessive pain, great distress of body or mind, then what rational idea can we form of the *smoothness* of those sensations? But at any rate we have seen they *cannot* belong to the seraphs in question; for they enjoy the perpetual reverse of such sensations. And as to adulation, that also cannot be ascribed to the seraphs, if adulation mean flattery, and if flattery mean false praise, or praise unmerited; because their praise of God, who will say can be false or unmerited? *God* can and does merit, though man, strictly speaking, cannot and does not. Besides, adulation implies insincerity. But insincerity cannot consist with either voluntary words or voluntary actions, wherein the agent *means* what his words express and his actions imply. But that must be so where such agent acts according to his nature, and has no motive for dissimulation. Such are the seraphs as has been seen. That the seraphs do,

indeed, hymn and harp, the scriptures teach. And even on earth, many mortals in their little way love harmony and singing. The next object of Lucifer's animadversion is, "self-seeking prayer." If he mean to speak of prayer in Heaven, it shews his ignorance and absurdity; for in that region of fulness of bliss, and destitution of all want, (if I may so speak,) prayer can have no place; for all is praise. If he mean to apply "self-seeking prayer," covertly, (for Lucifer speaks often more covertly than openly,) to Adam and his race, he must then be asked, what can prayer be but "self-seeking" in its nature as between God and man; for what is prayer but the expression of desire; and does not desire arise from a sense of want? And are not want and desire of the very essence of so needy a creature as man is? And has not the beneficent creator of man invited him to express to himself those wants and desires for the very purposes of gratifying them; and thereby keeping in existence an intercourse of goodness on the one hand and grateful feeling on the other? And is gratitude contemptible? But, adds Lucifer, this "self-seeking prayer to the Omnipotent is only because he is omnipotent." To what else, but omnipotence, can it be right or profitable for any being to address his prayer for the supply of innumerable wants?— Still Lucifer says, it is "not from love." Lucifer talk of love! The very attribute of which he is most eminently destitute and ignorant! However, we will bear with, yet sift his meaning. He says, "not from love, but from terror, and self-hope." Now it must be confessed, in all reason, I think, that the sensations of a petitioner to the throne of Heaven must depend upon his state of mind and the object of his supplications. If under a grateful sense of God's past and present goodness he still prays for its continuance and increase; then, how is it possible to disassociate the idea of love from such supplication? But if the prayer be, for pardon and forgiveness of sin, under a sense of guilt, and of God's infinite majesty, and purity, and hatred of iniquity; then, if the supplicant never knew God's love before, it is not to be denied, that his prayer must not only be very "self-seeking," but also spring from a *greater* or *lesser* degree of terror. What Lucifer

means by his last expression, "self-hope," I hardly see, unless he mean, the selfishness of hoping for an answer to our supplications. After all however, could one believe that Lucifer could possibly mean well to man, one would not withhold from him our acknowledgement of having here given to man at least some useful hints, that might easily be improved. But we may *learn* even from an enemy.

Let us now attend to the propriety of Adah's reply to Lucifer's multifarious comments on subjects in which he does not seem very accurately versed. She says,—“omnipotence must be all goodness.” Now although in a former note we admit that power and goodness do not *necessarily* go together, according even to Cain's own reasoning, yet it has been endeavoured to be shewn, that in the instance of the Jehovah, of the seraphs, and of mankind, those attributes do actually, and necessarily, unite in him. We next have to admire her noble reply to Lucifer's taunting question—“Was it so in Eden?” She deprecates his snares, and undauntedly tells him (Cain standing absorbed, we must suppose, in strange feelings) that he is “as false as, though fairer than, the serpent.” See, now again, Luciferian enjoyment of misery in others, of his own procuring; how he “tortures” poor Adah with referring to the serpent's truth, as exemplified in her mother's mournful knowledge of good and evil. [God's having eduiced good out of that evil, is another matter quite.] Unhappy Adah was now completely overcome, nor can her reply be considered as altogether right, yet entitled to our indulgence. It now follows:—

ADAH.

Oh, my mother! thou
Hast pluck'd a fruit more fatal to thine offspring
Than to thyself; thou at the least hast past
Thy youth in Paradise, in innocent
And happy intercourse with happy spirits;
But we, thy children, ignorant of Eden,

Are girt about by demons, who assume
 The words of God, and tempt us with our own
 Dissatisfied and curious thoughts — as thou
 Wert work'd on by the snake, in thy most flush'd
 And heedless, harmless wantonness of bliss.
 I cannot answer this immortal thing
 Which stands before me ; I cannot abhor him :
 I look upon him with a pleasing fear,
 And yet I fly not from him : in his eye
 There is a fastening attraction which
 Fixes my fluttering eyes on his ; my heart
 Beats quick ; he awes me, and yet draws me near,
 Nearer and nearer :— Cain — Cain — save me from him !

Note 27.

This lamentation of Adah must be a little considered. In the first place, she is certainly wrong in ascribing to her mother an act more fatal to her offspring than to herself ; for they were all upon an exact equality, except that her children had not the pain of expulsion from Eden. It does not seem likely she passed much of her youth in Eden, since it is clear she left it before the birth of Cain. With respect to Adam's, and her intercourse there with happy angelic spirits, it seems from scripture to be highly probable. Adah's comparison of such intercourse with that she and Cain now had with Lucifer, is striking, and very *courageous*, as being made in Lucifer's presence, whom she seems to consider as a legion of demons in himself. The "dissatisfied and curious thoughts" which Adah so ingenuously confesses, and with which he tempted them, were more Cain's than Adah's. Her confession of inability to answer Lucifer is very natural. We have endeavoured, and shall endeavour to answer him in her stead, as Cain does not seem disposed to help her. The "fastening attraction,"

which Adah ascribes to Lucifer, tends to remind us of the difficulty there is in escaping from snares and evils into which we have suffered, or may suffer, our propensities to lead us, without due consideration of their perplexing, and often disastrous and irremediable consequences. The *rattlesnake* was probably in Lord Byron's mind when he described Lucifer's magic influence over poor Adah.

CAIN.

What dreads my Adah? this is no ill spirit.

ADAH.

He is not God—nor God's: I have beheld
The cherubs and the seraphs: he looks not
Like them.

CAIN.

But there are spirits loftier still—
The archangels.

LUCIFER.

And still loftier than the archangels.

ADAH.

Ay—but not blessed.

LUCIFER.

If the blessedness
Consists in slavery—no.

ADAH.

I have heard it said,
 The seraphs *love most*—cherubim *know most*—
 And this should be a cherub—since he loves not.

LUCIFER.

And if the higher knowledge quenches love,
 What must *he be* you cannot love when known?
 Since the all-knowing cherubim love least,
 The seraphs' love can be but ignorance:
 That they are not compatible, the doom
 Of thy fond parents, for their daring, proves.
 Choose betwixt love and knowledge—since there is
 No other choice: your sire hath chosen already;
 His worship is but fear.

Note 28.

Cain had a much better opinion of his new acquaintance than Adah had. And upon his assuring her she need not fear, for that he was no ill spirit, Adah, resorting to her knowledge of cherubs and seraphs, declared, that as he looked not like them, he was not God's. And when Cain, who felt interested in the dignity of the "Master of Spirits," adverts to there being loftier spirits still than those Adah had mentioned, viz. the archangels, Lucifer, not to compromise his own grandeur by silence, interposes, by hinting at *his* superiority even to the archangels. That seems to be a matter on which there is a difference of opinion; but it cannot be material to man, now. At any rate, Adah, apparently suspecting Lucifer's self-exaltation, retorts upon him, that, admitting such loftier ones to be, yet they were not

“blessed.” As if (with others since) she thought exaltedness without blessedness not particularly desirable. But Lucifer, in his manner, takes advantage of Adah’s simplicity, by again insinuating, that the blessed spirits, alluded to by her, were in a state of slavery; for he acknowledges, that he and his fellow rebels were *not* blessed like Adah’s cherubs and seraphs, if blessedness consisted in *slavery*. But that point has been recently considered.

Now comes a sad error in Adah; yet a venial one; for she did not, as Lucifer did, pretend to logic and metaphysics. But what she unhappily says, gives such occasion of perverted reasoning to Lucifer, that it must be well considered. Adah observes, she has heard it said, “the seraphs *love most* — cherubim *know most* ;” and she then concludes Lucifer to be a cherub, “since he loves not.” Adah’s mistake therefore is, in concluding Lucifer to be a cherub, because he loved not; as if cherubs *loved not*, because they *knew* most; which was *not* what she had heard. What she *had* heard was, that cherubs indeed *knew* most, but *not* that their knowing most occasioned them not to love at all. Of course the love here meant is love to God. That the cherubs do in fact love God less than the seraphs do, is by no means certain, nor is there apparently any good reason for supposing it. And who has been in Heaven and returned again to tell us? Nor is it revealed. But at any rate there was *no ground* for concluding the cherubs did not love *at all*, merely because they *knew* most, which perhaps, in some respects they do, as being most intent upon the divine nature and proceedings, and taking pleasure in the contemplation of them. But what would our great philosophers, Bacon, and Hale, and Locke, and Newton, and Boyle, and Haller, and Boerhaave, and multitudes besides, say, were they to be told, that because they knew most of God and his works, therefore they loved him not? Would they not say it was a most *inconclusive* falsehood and slander? This therefore was a grand mistake of Adah’s, and gave Lucifer an opportunity of sophisticating and of puzzling her again, as we shall see. For no sooner had Adah pronounced her unfortunate conclusion, that he must be a cherub since

he loved not, than he sets about arguing upon her error, as his foundation; assuming, or at least supposing, that the higher knowledge quenches love; a merely gratuitous, general, position, which was neither granted, nor was true; but as false as Adah's own unlucky conclusion; or, if allowed at all, it must be with much modification. For fraud, like Lucifer himself, ever affects to deal in generals. Higher knowledge then, does *not*, necessarily and *universally*, quench love, as Lucifer would infer; for it would *not* in respect of a good being's knowledge of a good being; although it *would*, in respect of a good being's knowledge of an evil being; and so it would in respect of an evil being's knowledge of a good being; if an evil being be capable of loving any being *at all*. For good cannot love evil, nor evil good. But good loves good, and evil hates it. God and cherubs are good. Therefore *supposing* the cherubim to have the higher knowledge of God; that higher knowledge would *not quench* their love of God: it would rather increase it, from the obvious nature of good, and of good beings. Lucifer's next question, or conclusion, therefore, being drawn from the false premises before noticed, falls to the ground of course, when applied to God in the way of slanderous insinuation, viz. "what must he be you cannot love when known?" We will, however, though not obliged, take the pains to answer that question. Whom does he mean, in the first place, by "you?" — whom *you* cannot love when known? I *suppose* he means, not Cain and Adah merely, but all beings *indefinitely*, by that collective term "you." At any rate, he means to puzzle and confound. We must therefore, as usual, try to untie and separate his artful but disingenuous enquiry, or *insinuated* position, by replying, *discriminately*, that he, whom, when known by a good being, that good being cannot love, must be evil; because good beings love all *but* evil; and it is not in the nature of things that they can love evil. Therefore good beings knowing Lucifer for instance, cannot love him. Again, he, whom, when known by an evil being, that evil being, Lucifer for instance, cannot love, must be good; because although evil beings hate all things, yet they hate what is good when known to be so, supremely.

God therefore is not that being who, as Lucifer would aspersingly insinuate, cannot be loved when known, at least by good beings; for *they* cannot *but* love God: and as to God's being him whom, when known by evil beings, those evil beings cannot love; to that position we object not, for the reasons given; but it proves that God is good.

Lucifer's next assertion is, that since the all-knowing cherubim love least, the seraphs' love can be but ignorance. But let us try again this artificer of fraud. He now, unblushingly and falsely *assumes*, first, that the cherubim are, not merely *most* knowing but *all*-knowing, by way of making his argument more conclusive; but his assumption is so far from having been granted, or admitted, that it is a thing impossible; for none can be *all-knowing* but God himself alone. Yet allowing him to *mean* (for it is not easy to find out his meaning always) only that the cherubs are, as Adah has it, *most* knowing, i. e. as compared with the seraphs; still, he then makes another ungranted assumption, viz. that the cherubs love least also; for which we have seen, there is no ground; but on the contrary, that the reverse should seem more probably the truth, since a good being's love of a good object must be in proportion to his knowledge of that object. But even if the cherubs were more knowing and less loving than the seraphs; yet, what has that to do with, or how does that warrant, his slanderous conclusion of the seraphs' *ignorance*? Have the premises and the conclusion a sufficient *relation* to each other to warrant the Luciferian syllogism from which that conclusion is drawn? If not, the "Master of Spirits" is convicted of sophistry, which is a most detestable engine, but of which I doubt we shall see much more before we are quit of this arch-deceiver. We will try his reasoning however, as well as we may.

Does it then follow, that if the cherubs *know most*, and even *love least* too, as between them and the seraphs, that therefore the seraphs *know nothing*, or are positively ignorant? May not one being, man for instance, know less than another, and yet know *something*; perhaps *much*? Certainly so, it will be replied. Consequently then the seraphs may, and doubtless do, for any thing Luci-

fer has shewn to the contrary, know amply enough, even if less than the cherubs, to render their love to God highly intelligent and not ignorant. And if so, their love cannot be "but ignorance." Or did Lucifer merely intend, after all, in a fit of generosity (if that be possible) and even against himself, to reflect upon that well-known, though far from universally-received, maxim, that "ignorance is the mother of devotion?" If he did, we readily excuse him; and agree with him, that that maxim is founded in vile deception, and is subversive of the spiritual rights, and destructive of the spiritual nature, of man. To whom does it belong?

His assertion, that the "doom," as he terms it, of Adam and Eve, proves that knowledge, and the love of God, are incompatible, is in the same generalizing, and deceptive strain. For he makes *all* knowledge to be thus incompatible; whereas *no* knowledge is so, which is not the result of, or connected with, resistance to, or disregard of, the divine will; and, let man himself say, if *such* knowledge must not, necessarily, be incompatible, and *justly* so, with the love of God? Nay, would it not, under similar circumstances, be so even among men? But the knowledge of good and evil obtained by Adam and Eve, though obtained through too facile a transgression, was not the result of that determined, and *hostile* resistance to God's will, which is the effect of hatred like Lucifer's, and is therefore incompatible with love. They fell, but without malice, and God dealt with them accordingly; and so far was their fault or their sentence, from being incompatible with love to God, that, though their love might have been obscured for a time by fear or terror, as it well might; yet there is every evidence, that God *restored* to them, perhaps the *whole* of the love they had for him even before their transgression. Such was God's goodness:—"Man shall find grace; the other, none." So runs the whole revelation. Lucifer therefore is equally false and inconclusive here also; for it is clear that Adam and Eve loved their maker after their fall and "doom." But this is not to lead to presumptuous disobedience. There was therefore, no occasion for Lucifer to tell Adah and Cain to choose betwixt the love of God

and knowledge, in that general way. He *might* have bid them choose between love and a deliberate and *rebellious* pursuit of knowledge expressly forbidden by their maker, which *all* knowledge by no means is. *Such* knowledge and love we grant are incompatible. As to there being no other choice, that idea of course connects with the other, and shares its fate; that is, amounts to nothing. And as to their sire's (Adam's) having chosen already; he had *not* so chosen as to have made an irremediable breach between his maker and him; for it *was* remedied even then; though Lucifer, as usual, would lead their minds from that fact, and make the breach wider, and irreparable, if he could.

The truth or falsehood of his concluding assertion, that Adam's worship was but fear, rests upon what is *true* worship of Almighty God; whom it no less maligns than Adam, and man in him. We will endeavour to see how the matter really stands. His definition then, of the worship of God is, that it is "but fear." And we know, though he never tells explicitly what he means, that he *does* mean fear, not reverential, or filial, but that of a cruel tyrant, to whom the mere external *form* of worship is paid, through dread and compulsion. But form is not substance, neither is a counterfeit the reality; and it is with *reality* we have here to do. Fear, indeed, in a *good* sense, that is, either reverential, or filial, or both united, must, and will form part of the feelings of every rational creature towards God, if he have an adequate knowledge of the Divine Being, either from the light of nature, as it is called, or from express revelation. But in any other, that is in a *bad* sense, the worship of God is *not* fear; it is adoration; and adoration is reverence, high esteem, and love. Therefore the true worship of God is (not fear, but) reverence, high esteem, and love. It is, the habit and state of man's heart and mind towards his maker; the sincere homage of the soul and spirit, under an appropriate sense, not of God's majesty only, but of his goodness. We are speaking of the *real*, [not fictitious, or superstitious,] worship, of sincere believers in God and in Jesus Christ, and of whom the apostle Paul was writing to Timothy when he said, "for God hath *not* given us the spirit of *fear*: but of power, and of *love*, and of a

sound mind." Besides, a considerable, perhaps the chief part of the worship of God consists in praise and thanksgiving, gratitude, and asking favours; but do any of these acts when *sincere*, (and if not sincere they are nothing; but if sincere, do they or can they,) proceed from *fear*? Is fear the impelling motive of those acts even among men? Are not love and confidence rather the compounded motive? If they *do* proceed from fear, that is slavish fear, they are not *true* worship, and are not *the thing* now defended against Lucifer's aspersion. True worship knows no servile or terrifying, though it may and *ought*, a reverential and filial fear; for the scriptures declare — "perfect love casteth out all fear, because fear hath torment." And if Lucifer had read the Psalms of David, he would have seen that *his* worship was what we have been describing, and *not base fear*; and that even when imploring forgiveness for heinous crimes. And the apostles are full of exhortations to true believers to draw near to God with *boldness* and *confidence* in their worship. Now how do boldness and confidence consist with slavish fear? Perhaps some may, and *sincerely* too, worship God, in greater and more erroneous fear than they *ought*; but that is not chargeable upon their maker, but upon themselves, from various considerations. They have not as they should have done, "followed on to *know* the Lord:" had they done so, they would not be under the dominion of this *Luciferian* fear; nor of any fear at all, but filial and reverential; which is perfectly consistent with the "glorious *liberty* of the *children* of God." Lucifer, therefore, to say the least, shews his *ignorance* of this subject; an ignorance however, comprising gross untruth; and, it must be feared, not unmixed with his usual malignancy, against his maker, and his maker's sincere worshippers; unless he really meant his fulmination merely against formality. — The following further conversation then takes place, after Lucifer's telling Cain and Adah they must choose between fear and love.

ADAH.

Oh, Cain! choose love.

CAIN.

For thee, my Adah, I choose not—it was
Born with me—but I love naught else.

ADAH.

Our parents!

CAIN.

Did they love us when they snatch'd from the tree
That which hath driven us all from Paradise!

ADAH.

We were not born then—and if we had been,
Should we not love them and our children, Cain!

CAIN.

My little Enoch! and his lisping sister!
Could I but deem them happy, I would half
Forget—but it can never be forgotten
Through thrice a thousand generations! never
Shall men love the remembrance of the man
Who sow'd the seed of evil and mankind
In the same hour! They pluck'd the tree of science
And sin—and, not content with their own sorrow,
Begot *me*—*thee*— and all the few that are,

And all the unnumber'd and innumerable
 Multitudes, millions, myriads, which may be,
 To inherit agonies accumulated
 By ages! — and *I* must be sire of such things!
 Thy beauty and thy love — my love and joy,
 The rapturous moment and the placid hour,
 All we love in our children and each other,
 But lead them and ourselves through many years
 Of sin and pain — or few, but still of sorrow,
 Intercheck'd with an instant of brief pleasure,
 To Death — the unknown! Methinks the tree of knowledge
 Hath not fulfill'd its promise: — if they sinn'd,
 At least they ought to have known all things that are
 Of knowledge — and the mystery of death.
 What do they know? — that they are miserable.
 What need of snakes and fruits to teach us that?

Note 29.

In the last foregoing portion of the dialogue, Adah's enjoining Cain to choose love before knowledge must be approved of, as not only indicative of her amiable and appropriate character, but as affording occasion of remarking the intrinsic justness of the sentiment; since God, who is himself essential love, ["God is Love,"] has made that quality the most indispensable to man, and the most acceptable to himself. But it should be understood *primarily* of man's due regard to his maker; which, as we have seen, even the heathen Plato presents to man's consideration. From thence, its proper source, it will diffuse itself, in various measures, through every required channel: of such truth, scripture also is full.

Cain's reply however, to Adah, is not wholly satisfactory. He did not agree with Plato, much less with Christianity, nay, not even

with his own parents and family. Adah's remonstrances with him respecting their parents will gain for *her* our fresh regard ; while Cain's feelings towards them must create abhorrence. They are wholly condemnable, upon every principle of nature, humanity, and justice ; and his horrible representation of the consequences entailed upon man by his parents' error, is, to the utmost excess, overcharged and exaggerated, the imaginary production of his own discontented and self-distempered mind. Even *admitting* that a portion of what is commonly termed evil, is mingled in the immensely preponderating good of human life ; *that* has been somewhat, and will be more, considered ; but is far from affording one grain of exculpation to Cain for these enormously distorted statements. As to human life leading to what he calls "the unknown," viz. death, that has been briefly noticed. Death, at this day, is objectionable only to the unbeliever in *that* revelation, which none can reject, who do not reject all rational and moral evidence. His charge against the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, is only a repetition of his former futilities : it promised nothing ; or, if any thing, death to its violator. All he says in reference to it is absurd of course : there was no such *compact* as he basely, and more artfully than ignorantly, pretends. The "mystery of death," we have fully seen, is no mystery at all. Nothing is plainer than death and its consequences. God, by incontestable revelation, has taken care of that. But we make Cain some allowance for the time in which he lived. His parents, he had no right to say, knew nothing but that they were miserable : *they, said not so.* Who ever said that snakes and fruits were wanted to teach it ? Lord Byron has however well preserved the abhorrency of Cain's character. Could Shakspeare have done it more effectually ? Adah reproves him.

ADAH.

I am not wretched, Cain, and if thou
Wert happy ——

CAIN.

Be thou happy then alone—
 I will have nought to do with happiness,
 Which humbles me and mine.

ADAH.

Alone I could not,
 Nor *would* be happy: but with those around us,
 I think I could be so, despite of death,
 Which, as I know not, I dread not, though
 It seems an awful shadow—if I may
 Judge from what I have heard.

LUCIFER.

And thou couldst not
Alone, thou say'st, be happy?

ADAH.

Alone! Oh, my God!
 Who could be happy and alone, or good?
 To me my solitude seems sin; unless
 When I think how soon I shall see my brother,
 His brother, and our children, and our parents.

LUCIFER.

Yet thy God is alone; and is he happy?
 Lonely and good?

ADAH.

He is not so ; he hath
 The angels and the mortals to make happy,
 And thus becomes so in diffusing joy :
 What else can joy be but the spreading joy ?

Note 30.

In all the foregoing, as well as following, interventions of Adah, it is pleasing to see how Lord Byron, in her, has at least given strong hints for opposing the characters of Cain and Lucifer. Here then, we again see Adah correcting Cain's wretched views and feelings, by her own example. She tells him *she* is not wretched ; and was proceeding to tell him the happiness that would result from his being happy ; but Cain stops her, by bidding her be then happy alone ; for that he would have nought to do with happiness which humbled him and his. Was this shewing much consideration for Adah, until at least he had *weighed* the humiliation he adverted to ? As he did not, let us weigh it for him.

He means, I suppose, that the happiness of Adah, and of his father and his mother, and of Abel and Zillah, was enjoyed at the expence of their honour ; and that they were consequently existing upon their own disgrace. This must be the meaning of being humbled by happiness, as applied to himself, and with which he will have nothing to do. Otherwise, it is absurd to talk of happiness humbling its possessor. As well might we talk of the Supreme himself being humbled by *his* happiness. It is not in its nature. But *true* happiness admits not, nor can consist with, what is base or immoral. Therefore if a mortal man accept, from a fellow heir of dust, any gratification, or means of *happiness* as he may term it, at the expence of his integrity, or moral recitude, and of becoming *justly* vile and contemptible ; such a man may be truly said to have to do with happi-

ness which humbles *him*, if not *his*. And had Cain shewn that the situation and circumstances of his father, mother, brother, and sisters, in relation to their great and good creator, preserver, and benefactor, at all resembled the circumstances just stated, or could possibly resemble them; then he would have been right in having nought to do with happiness which humbled him, if not his. I make that distinction, because no individual is humbled, that is, in the sense of being *disgraced* or rendered *justly* vile or contemptible, by another's fault; but may remain respectable and respected still: nothing but a person's *own* delinquency can *so* humble him. But if Cain *deemed* himself so "humbled," merely because his father was deprived of Eden, and he himself of the gratifications he desired from the possession of Eden; or if he thought that the sole deprivation of inheritance, or rank in life, not arising from his own ill conduct, not only reduces the individual in his external circumstances, but actually "humbles" him in the *ill* sense of that term; such sentiments only shew Cain's *pride*, his ignorance of the true dignity of man, and his arrogancy towards, because discontent with, the providential arrangements of, his creator.—Adah's observations on death are very natural for her whose knowledge was so limited as her's of course was. But *we* have, in *these* days, seen what constitutes death an object of either pleasing, or fearful, thought; a foe, or friend, to man.

Lucifer, however, has long been a quiet looker on, and listener, to gather what he might from this confabulation between Cain and Adah. He now breaks silence, thinking he sees a fair opportunity of sowing a little more of his precious seed of discontent with, and consequently hatred of, *his* "conqueror," but Adah's beneficent creator. With Cain he had now no trouble. He was his. But Adah was of another spirit. Upon her therefore, he must try his skill once more. He begins his subtle attack, by craftily *reminding* Adah of her having said, in her simple manner, she could not be alone and happy. This draws from Adah an explanation of her own disposition and character, which, however approveable and amiable on the whole, yet seems to require a little modifying. She intimates her idea, that no one,

in solitude, can be either happy or good ; for, that to her, solitude seems to be even sin. It is sufficiently clear that the great and beneficent author of all existence, and of all happiness, has made the whole animal creation social ; and man perhaps eminently so, for various reasons, not necessary to advert to here. But man differs much from other creatures, and more especially in his moral and intellective character. This peculiarity, united with considerations arising from his more immediate relation to God, gives rise to numerous exceptions to the general ideas respecting solitude. Occasional solitude therefore is well known to be not only consistent with, but very promotive of, both happiness and goodness, in man. Those who cannot bear solitude, under circumstances appearing to invite or require it, may therefore justly suspect that all is not right within. Where God is sensibly present to the human mind (and he ought ever to be so) there can be no painful solitude, unless conscious criminality make it painful. Then indeed solitude is naturally, though unavailingly shunned. But I allege not crime to Adah for shunning solitude ; only some want of thought. On the other hand, Cain seems much to have *affected* solitude. His mind was considerative and firm, though no less dreadfully than wilfully darkened and perverted. He seems even to have possessed *some* traits of character which attract our regard : and almost induce us to pity, more than reprobate him, for his truly appalling, and equally unjust and unallowable (not to add unaccountable) enmity against his maker. Such however was the *mixture* which the author's imaginative mind seems to have intended. If there be any good in Cain, let us not overlook it, while we condemn the evil. We shall have occasion perhaps still more than we have had, to *oppose* our disposition to feel interested *too much* in his favour.

Lucifer however, plies his darts. He now, after having elicited from Adah, that she thought goodness and solitude to be incompatible ; alleges (but how truly, we have seen) that her God is alone ; and is he happy ? "lonely and good ?" Adah, somewhat warmly, if not indignantly, replies in a way which confirms all that has been,

however imperfectly, said in the foregoing pages, to prove that God is not solitary, and that much even of the divine blessedness consists in imparting it to his intelligent creation. But the arch-fiend does not let Adah off so easily. He has other missiles yet in store to infix in her sensitive mind. This we shall now see, when she asks, "What else can joy be, but the spreading joy?"

LUCIFER.

Ask of your sire, the exile fresh from Eden ;
Or of his first-born son ; ask your own heart ;
It is not tranquil.

ADAH.

Alas ! no ; and you —
Are you of Heaven ?

LUCIFER.

If I am not, enquire
The cause of this all-spreading happiness
(Which you proclaim) of the all-great and good
Maker of life and living things ; it is
His secret and he keeps it. We must bear,
And some of us resist, and both in vain,
His seraphs say : but it is worth the trial,
Since better may not be without : there is
A wisdom in the spirit, which directs
To right, as in the dim blue air the eye
Of you, young mortals, lights at once upon
The star which watches, welcoming the morn.

ADAH.

It is a beautiful star ; I love it for
Its beauty.

LUCIFER.

And why not adore ?

ADAH.

Adores the Invisible only. Our father

LUCIFER.

But the symbols
Of the Invisible are the loveliest
Of what is visible ; and yon bright star
Is leader of the host of Heaven.

ADAH.

Our father
Saith that he has beheld the God himself
Who made him and our mother.

LUCIFER.

Hast *thou* seen him ?

ADAH.

Yes — in his works.

LUCIFER.

/ But in his being?

ADAH.

No—

Save in my father, who is God's own image ;
 Or in his angels, who are like to thee —
 And brighter, yet less beautiful and powerful
 In seeming : as the silent sunny noon,
 As light they look upon us ; but thou seem'st
 Like an ethereal night, where long white clouds
 Streak the deep purple, and unnumber'd stars
 Spangle the wonderful mysterious vault
 With things that look as if they would be suns ;
 So beautiful, unnumber'd, and endearing,
 Not dazzling, and yet drawing us to them,
 They fill my eyes with tears, and so dost thou.
 Thou seem'st unhappy : do not make us so,
 And I will weep for thee.

Note 31.

When Adah, a little above, had declared her maker was happy in diffusing joy, though she states it in the form of a question ; — “ what else can joy be, but the spreading joy ? ” Lucifer, Lucifer-like, and still feasting on the misery he hoped he was promoting in his intended victims, as well as to seize a fresh occasion of vilifying his maker, bids her enquire of, as he tauntingly terms him, her fresh-exiled father, and of Cain, and even of herself. As if he had said — “ you ask ‘ what else can joy be but the spreading joy ? ’ I refer you

for information, to your father, to tell you whether the Almighty do not find joy in banishing his creatures, and driving them from their happy home. Ask Cain too, how much joy has been given him from the same source. Ask your own heart, for you know its occasional uneasiness on the same account." All this, of course, was to generate, in Adah, hateful thoughts of her creator; the aim of Lucifer, ever. He therefore would convince those that listen to him, that their maker is the author of all evil, calamity, and misery, to man, and the whole creation; forgetting, as he does, the obvious reply, that — were *that* God's nature, there would be *nothing but* evil to be seen or known; for omnipotency *will* accomplish its desires. If evil, or the infliction of misery, were God's delight, he could not delight in good also. It is not in the nature of things. What therefore he delighted in, he would have. It is very evident that Adah had been *made* untranquil by all this tampering with Lucifer; and, in her simplicity, she confesses the fact, though scarcely alive to its true cause. And is it not in the *nature* of such conferences, to produce such effects? She had now, in truth, been acting the very part she lamented her mother's doing; — parleying with, instead of flying from, her foe. Some foes are to be met; some, avoided. Still she seems to entertain a doubt of Lucifer's celestial origin; and therefore, after avowing her own untranquil state, plainly asks him if he is of Heaven? Lucifer's reply, as usual, was not direct, but yet confessing in effect, that he was not. And here we have another instance of his ironical and no less malicious way of creating odium against his maker. For he refers Adah to him for information as to the cause of his not being of Heaven, as well as of Adam's banishment, and of Cain's misery, and her own untranquil state, and of all the *other* "happiness" she had been proclaiming or speaking of when she described God's happiness in diffusing joy; for he is *fond* of making *common cause* with man against his maker. The Almighty also he terms, in his own sarcastic style, "the all-great and good maker of life and living things:" meaning of course to imply that just the reverse of good was the divine character. And the cause of all this

happiness (meaning misery) he says was God's "secret," and that he kept it. But all this ironical defamation is shaftless to us, whatever it might have been to Adah. We have already seen its nature, directly opposed to truth. At any rate, the Almighty had made no "secret" of these affairs, (though "secret things belong to him, but things that are revealed, belong to us,") for *all know* why Lucifer was expelled from Heaven; why Adam was removed from Paradise; why Cain was unhappy; (because unreasonably discontented;) and why Adah was untroubled. Lucifer then, very properly, says, *they* (making common cause again with man which he always affects) must "bear;" but, as to his pomposity in saying some of them must *resist*, we know its amount. The seraphs were unquestionably correct in saying it was in vain. As to its being worth the trial because better might not be *without*; he, with all his sagacity, seems to have forgotten, that, still, *worse* may be *with*. And certainly would be; because, if Lucifer's "pangs" were produced by his rebellion, it follows that every additional rebellious act must add to their accumulated severity, as cause produces its effect.

Lucifer's assertion of a wisdom in the spirit directing to right, and so forth, is perhaps a flattering metaphor. But if it have any meaning in reference to the subjects of these pages, I should conceive that meaning to consist in an insinuation, that the wisdom of man's spirit as naturally directs him to oppose his maker, (and which he seems here to call "right,") as his eye lights at once upon the morning star. Or did Lucifer *innocently* mean to pay a compliment to his own spiritual discernment? However, as to *man*, I think that *his* true, and not metaphorical wisdom, is to consult and follow the dictates of his reason and conscience, (especially if enlightened by the revelation we have spoken of,) as his only sure and safe guide. But this star that "watches, welcoming the morn," seems to be otherwise also of some importance in Lucifer's idea. For, as before he had tempted Eve to disobedience, so now he appears to tempt Adah to plain idolatry, by worshipping himself. And even if Adah could be excused for adoring a symbol of *deity*, (which she could not,) yet this

star seems, by Lucifer's account, to have been a symbol of *himself*, as the "leader of the host of Heaven;" which possibly he *had* really been. Adah however seems proof against him in this all-important point. She remembers, and adverts to, the right object of her father's worship,—“the Invisible only;” though Lucifer adds his gloss, to induce her to think that the symbols were the legitimate objects of adoration. Adah says her father had, by his own account, beheld God himself. That was, to say the least, incorrectly expressed; yet it is generally believed (by those who have thought upon biblical subjects) that the Divine Being did, not only in Eden but in other places also in after times, in various modes, hold immediate communications with man. The *Shekinah*, or divine glory, was perhaps one mode. The assumption of the angelic form, perhaps, another. In all which, Adam might, and perhaps excusably, think, he saw God himself. Yet of course not, as Lucifer expresses it, in his *essence*; which no created being can do. Adah, herself, only professes to have seen her maker in his works, or in her father, as God's moral image to a certain extent; or in the angels, as his representatives. All which is more accurate. Her description of the difference between the angels of God with whom she had been familiar, and Lucifer, will perhaps be thought somewhat pleasing; and her concluding expressions may interest us in her favour; especially the last: but as to her weeping for Lucifer; had she known him thoroughly, she might well have acted upon the principle, that “charity begins at home.” Lucifer's sympathy, however, will shew itself in his following prophetic announcements.

LUCIFER.

Alas! those tears!
 Couldst thou but know what oceans will be shed——

ADAH.

By me?

LUCIFER.

By all.

ADAH.

What all ?

LUCIFER.

The million millions —
 The myriad myriads — the all-peopled Earth —
 The unpeopled Earth — and the o'er-peopled Hell,
 Of which thy bosom is the germ.

ADAH.

Oh Cain !

This spirit curseth us.

CAIN.

Let him say on ;

Him will I follow.

ADAH.

Whither ?

LUCIFER.

To a place
Whence he shall come back to thee in an hour
 But in that hour see things of many days.

ADAH.

How can that be ?

LUCIFER.

Did not your Maker make
 Out of old worlds this new one in few days ?
 And cannot I, who aided in this work,
 Shew in an hour what he hath made in many,
 Or hath destroy'd in few ?

CAIN.

Lead on.

ADAH.

Will he

In sooth return within an hour ?

LUCIFER.

He shall.

With us acts are exempt from time, and we
 Can crowd eternity into an hour,
 Or stretch an hour into eternity :
 We breathe not by a mortal measurement —
 But that 's a mystery. Cain, come on with me.

ADAH.

Will he return ?

Note 32.

Adah's observation to Cain, that Lucifer "cursed" them, was perhaps not far from truth, so far at least as his will, and his hopes, suggested his direful prognostications. They are no doubt realized to a considerable extent, though not to the extent he describes, as he considered *all mankind* as being the objects of them, and that all mankind were the descendants of Adah; whereas all *her* posterity perished in the flood some centuries afterwards. But the sum total is abundantly made up since. Still, some truths and some considerations should be remembered; viz. that although Lucifer's admonition is correct, so far as relates to the multitudes which will people Hell; yet greater multitudes, by far, will arrive at Heaven. For although the Redeemer himself speaks of the broad way to destruction which most choose; and the narrow way to life which few pursue; yet that allusion probably is confined to men as they fall within our ordinary observation; whilst other parts of scripture attest the amazing superiority of number, in the grand result, of the saved beyond the lost. For we are told of a long period, (perhaps soon to commence,) when wicked men, and unbelievers in the Redeemer, will, if not totally unknown in the earth, yet be extremely few; but the populous world, on the contrary, true worshippers of God. But there is another consideration. This is, the probable salvation of innumerable infants; who, though dying without having attained even a consciousness of existence; yet, having souls and spirits, those souls and spirits may be expected to grow and expand in their future and blessed state, as they would have done in this, though in the former they will be free from all danger of ever perishing.—This safety is secured to them, as there seems good reason from scripture to believe, by the eternal election of the Father, and his donation to the Son, who therefore redeemed, and saved them with an everlasting salvation. This is not expressly revealed; but the revealed goodness of God seems to support such an hypothesis. To what exact period of their age this elec-

tion of infants is limited, or, when they precisely become responsible, it may be impossible to determine, nor is it for man to know : acquiescence, in the incontestible righteousness and goodness of his creator, in *his* duty and his wisdom. The *Gospel* is, confessedly, the *ordinary* medium of salvation ; and the introduction and reception of it are attended with the greatest benefits, and the highest satisfaction, to those who hear of and embrace it. It is therefore the *ordinary* appointed means of *ultimately* bringing, in God's time, *all that shall be saved*, to the knowledge of himself. But if it cannot be proved from scripture, (and I do not think it can,) that God has *not* elected, and given *infants* to the Son, to redeem and save, as above supposed ; where can it be proved from scripture, that the Father has *not*, in like manner, elected and given to the Son, multitudes of adults also, to whom he has not sent the Gospel yet ; but whom he may immediately influence by his Spirit, independently of that medium ? If so, what a door is opened for still another immense number of the ransomed race ! This certainly is conjecture only ; but I cannot at present consider that scripture *denies* it ; while, at the same time, it still corresponds with God's abundant goodness. But be all this as it may, it bears not at all upon the fate of those, who, having *heard* the Gospel, *reject* its "joyful sound ;" *reject* God, in the *person of the Son*, the only creator and Redeemer of his creatures ; and who therefore place themselves under the fearful answer to that important question, "how shall we escape, if we neglect so great salvation ?"

Cain, however, notwithstanding Lucifer's announcements, not to say denunciations, is well pleased with his destroyer, and declares himself his candidate, his adherent, his follower ; I had nearly said, and perhaps might, his worshipper. When Adah expresses her surprise at Lucifer's promised quick return of Cain, he boasts of his celerity ; and argues, that having *aided* in the creation of the world, which took, he says, many days ; why should not he be able to *shew* it in a few ? That he may have power to shew things rapidly I do not deny ; but that he "*aided*" in creation, seems *more than doubtful* ; because we read, that God himself was the sole creator, by the

word, the Son. Though Lucifer might have been, with the other angels, *present* at it. As to the world being made out of old worlds, that too, very greatly requires confirmation. Cain appears impatient to be on his way, under such auspicious convoy, to the strange place to which Lucifer proposed taking him. And upon Adah's repeating her amiable anxiety for his safe return, the high infernal potentate describes, in lofty, if not exaggerated terms, the nature and powers of ethereal spirits like himself; which, in fact, should seem to be very great; but as to their *mysteriousness*, that I take to be merely Luciferian deception; their powers being, simply, the properties with which the Almighty has endued some of his superior intelligent creatures, for his own glory, and for the accomplishment, instrumentally, of his own beneficent purposes. The reply too, of Lucifer to Adah's last enquiry, if Cain would return, is somewhat remarkable.

LUCIFER.

Ay, woman ! he alone
 Of mortals from that place (the first and last
 Who shall return save ONE)—shall come back to thee
 To make that silent and expectant world
 As populous as this : at present there
 Are few inhabitants.

ADAH.

Where dwellest thou ?

LUCIFER.

Throughout all space. Where should I dwell ? Where are
 Thy God or Gods—there am I : all things are
 Divided with me ; life and death—and time—
 Eternity—and Heaven and Earth—and that

Which is not Heaven nor Earth, but peopled with
 Those who once peopled or shall people both—
 These are my realms! So that I do divide
His, and possess a kingdom which is not
His. If I were not that which I have said,
 Could I stand here? His angels are within
 Your vision.

ADAH.

So they were when the fair serpent
 Spoke with our mother first.

LUCIFER.

Cain! thou hast heard.
 If thou dost long for knowledge, I can satiate
 That thirst; nor ask thee to partake of fruits
 Which shall deprive thee of a single good
 The conqueror has left thee. Follow me.

CAIN.

Spirit, I have said it.

[*Exeunt* LUCIFER and CAIN.]

ADAH. (*Follows, exclaiming.*)

Cain! my brother! Cain!

Note 33.

Lucifer here, as will be seen more fully afterwards, intimates to Adah, that the region to which he is about to conduct Cain is what he calls the realm of death. He evidently refers to the REDEEMER,

when he says that Cain is the only mortal, *save ONE*, who should return from it. The knowledge of this important fact we may suppose Lucifer to have acquired before his expulsion from Heaven. Jesus Christ was truly man, as well as God, and therefore, as to his humanity, "mortal;" but Lucifer seemed not aware, by his speaking so coolly of Christ's resurrection from the dead, that his so returning from that shadowy realm, was the very means of destroying Lucifer's power, and of ultimately confining him to his own place forever. The "silent and expectant world" was, according to Lucifer's own prediction, peopled partly from the inhabitants of the Earth to the flood, and still more from thence to the present moment.

His answer to Adah's enquiry where he dwelt, viz. "throughout all space," seems to shew, that Lucifer, at any rate, was of that opinion which recognizes space as a reality, and therefore as what is extended, immoveable, capable of receiving or containing matter, and penetrable by it; and therefore that it is doing violence to our understanding, to *deny*, that the conception of space is distinct from the conception of matter. As to the "*infinity* of space," that is perhaps another (metaphysical) question still. Yet if space, or extension of place, or that something, whatever it be, which is capable of receiving or containing matter, be supposed to be bounded or limited; does not that seem to be supposing bounds or limits to the power and operations of infinite deity? Does it not even limit the divine existence to certain bounds? And how does all that agree with God's acknowledged infinity? Besides, can we conceive of any place or thing bounded, without conceiving also of some place, or extension, beyond that bound? Whatever is bounded, is certainly included; and whatever is included, must have something larger, or more extensive, to include it. If so, what limit can be assigned to the succession of such boundaries, and such extensions, to include one another? How does that differ from infinity? Then are there not greater difficulties attending the nicety of denying infinity to space, in common language and according to common perception, than in admitting it? And should not that always be admitted, which involves

least difficulty? And does not the same reasoning, which denies infinity to space, lead to the denial, by circumscribing the powers, of God? Both are incomprehensible to finite beings; to the highest created intelligence in Heaven, no doubt, as well as to the meanest upon Earth. What else is there more adapted to hide conceit, and pride, from man or angel? Incessant reasoning can make no progress in this enquiry. The knowledge it aims at is not essential to man or angel's happiness. They never can understand it, if not revealed by God himself, as he has revealed other and essential matters; but this it does not seem rational to suppose he ever will reveal: and it is even perhaps a question if a finite intellect be capable of comprehending such a revelation.

When, in answer to Adah's question where he dwelt, Lucifer replies, "throughout all space: where should I dwell?" he certainly exceeds the truth. For there is every reason to believe that God, though omnipresent has, with the blessed spirits, some more peculiar "*habitation*," if we may so speak philosophically, as well as *scripturally*, were he especially manifests his glory, and communicates his more immediate presence. This must be a portion of space. But there, Lucifer has never "*dwelt*," (though he may have casually been, an intruder, or permitted visiter for especial purposes, as appears from scripture,) since his expulsion. His *dwelling*, as he has properly before declared, is *apart* from thence. But all the rest of space is granted him. His expression of Adah's "God or God's," should seem to be that of contempt of the proper deity of the Son: of which somewhat has been before said. His assertion that all things are "divided" with him, is, it must be confessed, so absurd, as to be self-contradicted. For division with another implies compact; and what *compact* can he shew, between his almighty "conqueror" and himself? But if division consists in a subdued rebel's occupying such territory, and possessing such property, as his sovereign, for certain reasons of his own, *assigns him* for a time, until the final execution of his sentence of condemnation; then Lucifer is right in

f *some extent*; but not an exact moiety as

the term "divide" in general implies. As for life and death, he has probably, in some instances, the power given him of terminating, instrumentally, the former, and procuring the latter. To allude to no other, it appears highly admissable that he instigated Saul, and Judas, to self destruction.

As for "time," Lucifer is certainly permitted to occupy it wholly; and eternity he also will, no doubt, occupy. But for Heaven and Earth, not so. With Heaven he can have nothing to do, because evil can no longer subsist or enter there: evil *was* there, though concealed from all but God, before Lucifer's rebellion and expulsion. Earth he will continue to infest for his allotted period, under divine control. But he seems very accurate in the description of his own realms and their peculiar population. For assuredly Hell must be peopled with those who, before, shall have possessed both Heaven and Earth. Lucifer himself, and his associates, are of the first class; men who have rejected their maker's appointed way of salvation, the other class. These realms then, Lucifer boasts of as being his; and, with triumph, rather superior to his logic, concludes — "so that I do divide his, and possess a kingdom which is not his," whilst the truth of the matter was, he divides or possesses *neither*; but possesses, for such time, and in such manner, as the Almighty sees fit, merely *whatever* God pleases to permit him so to do. And he thinks to rivet all his assertions, by loftily asking Adah if he could stand there, were he not that, which he had said. To which Adah *might* have replied, "certainly; for that he stood there by divine permission; and God had not withholden from him the power of speaking lies." He also reminds Adah, that God's angels are within sight, in case she entertained any apprehension of danger from him. But to this Adah sensibly replies:—"so they were, when the fair serpent spoke with our mother first." The Almighty did not, on *that* occasion, prevent Eve from following her own imagination; and by having done so, she might learn her liability to transgress, and fall.—Without further notice of Adah, Lucifer turns to Cain, and tells him he has heard all that he had been saying; and that he could satiate his thirst for know-

ledge, if that were what he longed for; and sarcastically refers to the loss occasioned by the eating of the forbidden fruit; nothing like which, he said, would he ask Cain to partake of, or to incur the deprivation of any good the "conqueror" had left him. Cain, after all he had seen and heard of Lucifer, might well have suspected his promised gift of knowledge. He however resolutely determines to follow him.

ACT II. SCENE I.

The Abyss of Space.

CAIN.

I tread on air, and sink not ; yet I fear
To sink.

LUCIFER.

Have faith in me, and thou shalt be
Borne on the air, of which I am the prince.

CAIN.

Can I do so without impiety ?

LUCIFER.

Si Believe—and sink not! doubt—and perish!) thus
Would run the edict of the other God,
Who names me demon to his angels ; they
Echo the sound to miserable things,
Which knowing nought beyond their shallow senses,
Worship the word which strikes their ear, and deem
Evil or good what is proclaim'd to them
In their abasement. I will have none such :

Worship or worship not, thou shalt behold
 The worlds beyond thy little world, nor be
 Amerced, for doubts beyond thy little life,
 With torture of *my* dooming. There will come
 An hour, when, toss'd upon some water-drops,
 A man shall say to a man, "Believe in me,
 And walk the waters;" and the man shall walk
 The billows and be safe. *I* will not say
 Believe in *me*, as a conditional creed
 To save thee; but fly with me o'er the gulph
 Of space an equal flight, and I will shew
 What thou dar'st not deny, the history
 Of past, and present, and of future worlds.

Note 34.

In this commencement of their aerial, or abyssal, tour, Cain begins by expressing his wonder, and his fear of sinking. The fact was, he was not in a place, nor in society, at all consistent with his allegiance to his creator. Well, therefore, did his conscience create some misgivings of what would become of his "immortal part" especially, should he actually sink into that dark, dreary, and horrible gulph. Lucifer however, quickly offers himself as an object of confidence; thus imitating, almost in words, and from whatever motive (indeed it could only have been his arrogant affectation of godhead) his "conqueror" Jesus Christ, in after time, who certainly required faith in *himself*; and who if he were mere man and not very God and Jehovah, as well as man, was as Luciferianly *arrogant*, as this his imitator. But as to Lucifer's claim to be "Prince of the Air," it cannot be allowed; since he does not appear to have been constituted such a prince. He is indeed called in scripture the "Prince of the *Power* of the Air;" which is another thing; and means only, that he is the head and ruler of those spirits, who adhered to him in his rebellion,

and with him were expelled from Heaven, and with him have Hell for their abode. Over *them* he rules; and with their assistance and *power*, and by divine permission, ranges about in the air of this universe; producing, by the *power* allowed him, considerable effects upon it. His operations in regard to Job are well known. Storms, tempests, hurricanes, may also be, sometimes, his immediate and permitted agency, or that of his subalterns, though still under divine regulation and restraint, and for good purposes. Cain, rather unaccountably, seems to be affected with some religious qualms, or scruples, about having faith in his abyssal guide, however powerful; for he asks if he may do so without impiety; which excites from the latter an answer, which requires some examination, before the propositions contained in it can be allowed to pass.

First, he almost more audaciously than one could have expected, calls himself a superior God; viz. by terming (whether wittingly or not, I will not say,) Jesus Christ the "*other* God"—he himself, of course, being *one*; so that he made himself equal in deity to Jehovah. Of this, somewhat more hereafter. Meanwhile we must, rather narrowly as usual, look into his allegations. He says, that *other* God [i. e. Jesus Christ, as will appear presently] names him demon to his angels. Those angels, however, know what he is very well, and by *experience*, without such express naming. His name, Devil, means calumniator, false accuser, and every thing bad of that nature; his name Satan, signifies, an adversary; but as for his having been named *demon*, that does not appear from scripture explicitly, though perhaps inferentially. Yet he would gain little or nothing, by it, in point of *character*, if it were so. As to the angels "echoing the sound to miserable things;" (meaning of course by "miserable things," mankind;) neither does that appear either. But the Almighty has himself informed man of it, by the revelation he has given to him. This revelation indeed has been said to be, and so in some respect it was, "by the *ministry* of angels," but a ministry derived from an *express commission* differs totally from an *echo*. Then for his thus terming men "miserable things"—that is merely

in keeping with his own name, "calumniator;" because, though man, from many causes, is not exempt from misery (not of God's making but his own, in combination with Lucifer himself) yet that is not the same with mankind, generally, being called "miserable (or contemptible) things." On the contrary, if they be "things" at all (which indeed they are, if they are any thing; for *something* is certainly a thing; and a man is surely something) they are still, in the divine mind, at least so many of them as revolt not against their maker, happy, high, and most excellent *things* in every point of view, if *aided by*, (and *not* rejecting,) that revelation of which mention has been made. Things they are, as much superior to Lucifer, and *his* subjects, as Heaven is superior to Hell. Besides, they do also *know* something, and that very considerable, beyond their "shallow senses." True, their senses are, *comparatively* speaking, shallow; yet sufficient for all their present purposes: but although they must see, and hear, and read, and in some sense, *think* perhaps through the *medium* of those respective senses; yet, the knowledge, thereby acquired, is sufficiently certain, and extensive, and intellectual, and spiritual, to render these same "miserable things" infinitely happier, and infinitely higher, (because the objects of divine regard,) than Lucifer himself. Then, as to "worshipping the word which strikes their ear;" it is possible that *some* do so; but that is not characteristic of *all*; and certainly *not* of those who adhere to their creator, and duly regard and comprehend his revelation. His written word indeed they *revere*; but they *worship* himself alone. But if by "word which strikes their ear" Lucifer means (which I hardly think) Jesus Christ, who is, emphatically, "the Word of God:" him also, as one with the Father, they certainly *do* worship, in heart, whenever *that* word in an appropriate manner, strikes their ear; for in striking their ear it finds access (through that "*sense*," certainly) to their judgments and every other reasoning faculty of their minds. These persons then, who thus hear and judge, do *not* deem good and evil what is proclaimed to them in their *abasement*; for, in the first place, they are *not* abased, but highly *exalted* by their maker's favour, so long as they duly regard

him: they are as intellectual, and spiritual, to say the *least*, as
 • Lucifer himself: and, in the next place, they deem what they hear proclaimed, to be good or evil, not merely because they hear it proclaimed, but because their reason shews them that it is so proclaimed (by revelation) upon the most indubitable authority, and all rational persuasion. Their principle is, to receive as binding, no religious doctrine or practice, which cannot be shewn to be taught and required by Jesus Christ, or by his apostles, in his word. And that alleged word, itself, they receive not, but as agreeable to their reason; that is, only on the ground, that right reason and rational evidence bid^d them admit the authenticity, and consequent authority, of that collection of writing, called by eminence "the Book" or the Bible. Now Lucifer says, he will "have none such;" that is, none such as *he* has described. But he must be told, that he can have no other; for they only are fit for and worthy of him. As to those who have just been distinguished from them; they are infinitely above Lucifer, and much more above his affected rejection. He then pretends to disregard Cain's worshipping him or not, (though he had before required it as a condition of knowledge to be imparted,) and promises him a view of other worlds; and that he shall not be amerced, beyond Cain's present little (meaning insignificant) life, with tortures of *his* dooming, because he (Cain) entertained doubts: insinuating, of course, that God dooms man to future torture, for doubting. We have seen before, the evil use which Lucifer ever makes of the term "torture;" and have proved, that God, from his very nature, neither does, nor can, torture, in the true sense of that odious word. But it is not for doubting, that even God's sanctions, take place in man. Those sanctions are for actual, and known, and continued, sin, for which repentance, or pardon, in the way God requires, has been neither obtained; nor sought. For many, if not all, believers in Christ, have doubted before they believed. It is the determined *rejection* of Christ therefore, on *rational evidence*, and not doubting, which procures man that consequential misery, which Lucifer, according to his own peculiar nomenclature, calls being "amerced for doubts

beyond man's little life ;" but which others call the loss of eternal life and happiness, arising from man's refusal of their *free donation*. Thus however it is that we see Lucifer's malicious, if not very skilful, and perpetual insinuations against his maker. He then adverts, in the same spirit, to Peter's walking on the water at the bidding of Christ, relying on his faith in him, (as Lucifer in imitation requires of Cain just above,) and affects that *he* will not require a "conditional creed" in order to save him from sinking, as Christ did of Peter.

I know not how to forbear some addition here, which in fact I cannot but think the subject calls for. It appears to me then, that Lucifer, just above, has led us to some other weighty considerations. He alludes to Christ as to "a man," *requiring faith in himself* for salvation:—not as a skilful pilot in a storm on Earth, but far otherwise and beyond that, even for eternal life. Now that Christ did so is true. The difficulty is to reconcile his doing so with his being a *good* man, if a *mere* man. We will see however how the matter stands, and how those persons can maintain their consistency who deny Christ's proper deity. He says:—"as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of Man be lifted up, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have eternal life." Now it is evident that the Israelites, when bitten by the fiery serpents, were required (not then to practise moral duties for their cure, but) to *look upon* the brazen serpent on the pole, that they might live. This of course was an act of faith; and as many as so beheld the serpent of brass lived. Here therefore Christ constitutes himself a similar object of faith to those who so believed in his sacrificial and atoning elevation on the cross, as the Israelites did; not indeed as they for securing their temporal life, but for obtaining eternal life; in other words, the eternal salvation of their souls. This then was quite apart from the performance of his moral precepts. *That*, follows or accompanies salvation; but is no more the *means* of salvation, than a shadow is its substance. But the instances are endless (so to speak) wherein Christ requires this faith in him; the New Testament is full of it; so that it can be no misapprehension, but

absolute and deliberate rejection, not to yield it. Those who deny Christ's divine nature have no difficulty in admitting him to have been *truly* man, as he indeed was : but they affirm too that he was a *mere* man ; but in general, with little exception, allow him at least a perfection of moral character as man, which no other man ever possessed. But what should we in these days think of a teacher of morality who should require *faith in himself*, and men to *trust in him* for salvation, when the Bible is abundant in declarations, that salvation is to be sought for and had from God alone, without the intervention of man, in spiritual as well as in temporal concerns ? For the Almighty declares, by his prophet, "cursed be the man that *trusteth in man*, and maketh flesh his arm, and whose heart departeth from the Lord." Now this Christ knew, and yet required man to do the very thing to him which is here forbidden to be done to any *mere man*. Either then he must have been the God of Salvation, or else a most impudent pretender. The declaration just quoted, certainly relates to spiritual as well as temporal matters, as is evident from the whole tenor and analogy of scripture. Temporal things are only spoken of *for the sake of, and in reference to*, spiritual and eternal concerns, which are ever in scripture the *ultimate* object. But yet again, in more direct language, Jehovah says he himself is man's only Saviour ; — "a just God and a Saviour, there is none beside me. Look unto *me*, and be ye saved, all ye ends of the Earth." What then can be thought of Christ for assuming the very same place and office as Jehovah if he were not Jehovah ? But he does so, even in the foregoing comparison of himself to the serpent in the wilderness. But the scriptures are *full*, in testimony that *Jehovah* is man's only Saviour, and that *Christ is so too*. What then are we to conclude, but that Jehovah and Christ are one and the same ? Jehovah says "look unto me and be ye saved : " and of Christ it is said, that there is "no salvation in any other ; for there is none other name under Heaven, given among men, whereby we must be saved." Yet *some hope* to be saved *without his name*, i. e. *by their obedience* to his precepts !

Again : what would those who deny Christ to be Jehovah, God, as well as man, say of any teacher of morality in this day, who should, with all possible complacency, as if entitled to it, and a thing with which he was quite familiar, receive *every ascription of divine character, and every expression of divine worship*? Did Paul, or Barnabas, or Moses, so? But Jesus did. The worship paid him was *adoration*, not civil respect; as is most evident from the instances: to have received which adoration must have been the utmost wickedness in him, and idolatry in those who paid it, *were he not Jehovah in the person of the Son*. Either, then, Christ is Jehovah, and then these persons, in not worshipping him, do not worship God as they ought; or if they deem him mere man, they, or many of them it is conceived, if not all, pay him *much greater* professed respect than they *ought to do* to any mortal like *themselves*; which I think a serious dilemma, worthy of deep consideration. I am not unaware of different interpretations and various opinions; but I go upon the whole scope and tenour of the scriptures, and their total unimportance and want of rational sanction upon any possible hypothesis short of that which runs *through the entire system* — the *proper deity* of Jesus Christ, as God in the person of the Son, uniting the two natures for the purpose of bringing man back again, and reconciling him, to his maker, *by* the mediation and sacrificial atonement of *him* who is both God *and* man. Upon any other hypothesis God is, from scripture, (as appears to me,) less accessible *now* than he was *before* this revelation. All confidence, (or imaginary confidence, rather,) in him, is totally misplaced, fallacious, and destructive: he evidently will not, as it should seem, receive any who, after knowing this revelation of Christ, *reject* him as “the Mediator between God and man,” refusing to rely upon *him alone* for acceptance, — for being, as scripture expresses it, “accepted” *not in themselves, merely, but* “in the Beloved.” Indeed, Christ declares that if we believe in him in the way the Father requires, *then* “the Father himself loveth” us who do so. Otherwise, there is abundant evidence, that God “rejects our confidences.” God is

holy and just ; man is impure and unrighteous, except as viewed by God in the Son, in whom *alone* he is "well pleased:" so that, without Christ, man cannot possibly approach his maker. He can have no *well-founded confidence* and assurance ; all is dark and uncertain. — Such then (the revelation of Christ as just stated) is the "conditional creed" which Lucifer thus stigmatizes, and may well make the butt of his continual animosity and ridicule, knowing it is the medium of restoring man from the captivity of his own infernal thralldom to "the glorious liberty of the Sons of God."

As to Lucifer's telling Cain he durst not deny what he should shew him, viz. "the history of past, and present, and of future worlds;" perhaps it will appear, that if Cain durst not deny it, others may.

CAIN.

Oh, god, or demon, or whate'er thou art,
Is yon our Earth ?

LUCIFER.

Dost thou not recognize
The dust which form'd your father ?

CAIN.

Can it be ?

+ Yon small blue circle, swinging in far ether,
With an inferior circlet near it still,
Which looks like that which lit our earthly night ?
Is this our Paradise ? Where are its walls,
And they who guard them ?

LUCIFER.

Point me out the site
Of Paradise.

CAIN.

How should I? As we move
Like sunbeams onward, it grows small and smaller,
And as it waxes little, and then less,
Gathers a halo round it, like the light
Which shone the roundest of the stars when I
Beheld them from the skirts of Paradise:
Methinks they both, as we recede from them,
Appear to join the innumerable stars
Which are around us; and, as we move on,
Increase their myriads.

LUCIFER.

And if there should be
Worlds greater than thine own, inhabited
By greater things, and they themselves far more
In number than the dust of thy dull Earth,
Though multiplied to animated atoms,
All living, and all doom'd to death, and wretched,
What wouldst thou think?

CAIN.

I should be proud of thought
Which knew such things.

LUCIFER.

But if that high thought were
Link'd to a servile mass of matter, and,
Knowing such things, aspiring to such things,
And science still beyond them, were chain'd down
To the most gross and petty paltry wants,
All foul and fulsome, and the very best
Of thine enjoyments a sweet degradation,
A most enervating and filthy cheat,
To lure thee on to the renewal of
Fresh souls and bodies, all foredoom'd to be
As frail, and few so happy ——

CAIN.

Spirit ! I
Know nought of death, save as a dreadful thing
Of which I have heard my parents speak, as of
A hideous heritage I owe to them
No less than life ; a heritage not happy,
If I may judge till now. But, spirit ! if
It be as thou hast said, (and I within
Feel the prophetic torture of its truth,)
Here let me die: for to give birth to those
Who can but suffer many years, and die,
Methinks is merely propagating death,
And multiplying murder.

Note 35.

Mortals who, like Cain, forsake or forget their God, (what mortal does not so, *more or less?*) are apt to be much affected with admiration of, if not veneration for, objects or persons by no means entitled to those sentiments from their fellow dust, except in cases of moral and religious excellence; and then, guardedly: nor will *such* require it, though it be *instinctively* paid them by those who regard those estimable qualities wherever they perceive them. The way to avoid *undue* veneration for man, is, to know and adore his maker. This is exemplified by Cain in the present instance: being estranged from the Majesty of Heaven, his debased mind prompts him to ascribe even a kind of *deityship* to so evil a being as Lucifer: and so it ever has been. But passing over Cain's miserable and ignorant adulation, or adoration, or whatever it may be called, of Lucifer; still, his description of the effects of their quick distancing of Earth, and of the other objects introduced to him in their progress through space, is apparently suited to the supposed fact. Yet the astonishing scenes he describes as passing through, seem not to have affected him with any thing like a corresponding feeling towards him, who

“—— toss'd this mass of wonders from his hand.”

Rather than so, we shall find Cain and Lucifer engaged in disquisitions concerning them, more “curious” than either “devout” or useful; it may be, pernicious. But Lucifer's insinuation of the fixed stars, described as he describes them, being inhabited worlds, and their inhabitants all doomed to death, and wretched, is truly in his own Luciferian style of calumny, against the author of their existence. On that subject, (*viz.* the unfoundedness of the assertion of God's making misery,) enough has been said to prevent the need of any enlargement on it here. Cain's pride of thought, in knowing such things saying, is contemptible enough.

For it is all mere Luciferian *hypothesis*; — if this, — if that, — if the other; and every supposition merely gratuitous, and unfounded in fact; at least so reason says, because unsupported by any *evidence*: — it is all therefore mere *sound*, and nothing more. How then can Cain be admired for his pride of thought, in thinking about non-entities? Lucifer's animadversions, however, in reply, respecting the constitution of human nature, are merely slanderous, and such as no reasonable, or rightly-constituted mind will regard with any other feeling than utter detestation, and most marked disapproval. Still, they are fit for Lucifer's utterance, "foe to God and man." Otherwise, it is not to be denied, that the more mankind rise above, or keep in due subjection, their inferior nature, and cultivate their superior destination, the better for them. The *mind*, certainly was "*made to sway*," as Lucifer elsewhere has truly said: nor is there any other means of happiness to man. As to the human soul being "link'd to a servile mass of matter;" that is what all true philosophers would say it should be, in man's present state of being. To vilify human nature indeed, because it is not wholly spirit, is as *rational* as to quarrel with deity, because any thing at all in creation is different from what Lucifer, or any other opposer of his maker, would have it be. To that quarreling there is no end; nor can any *reasoning* reach it. Otherwise, and taking things as they actually exist, the body *ought* to serve the soul. The unhappiness is that the subjection, through man's degeneracy, is not more complete. Nor is the soul, though confined in, strictly chained down, as Lucifer would have it, to that servile mass, except in such as, despising the revelation before mentioned, *choose* such bondage. That revelation, by its moral efficacy, when sincerely received, chains the material, enfranchises the immaterial, part of man. For although it seems true, that the soul (given to every individual immediately by God, yet as part of man through Adam, not pure, or sinless, or perfect) in its ordinary operations, beholds and acts from representations made on that part of the human frame (as may afterwards be again noticed) which is adapted to the reception of impressions made upon

it from without, viz. the organ of sensation, the brain ; nor has the soul the means of acting absolutely without the body ; yet is the soul not to be denied the possession of other powers, by which it can reflect upon itself, and discriminate between what it beholds, and make its choice. Besides this, the soul, as a spirit, is susceptible of impressions from spirits, or spiritual agents. Hence Jesus Christ exhorts his disciples to ask of God the gift of the Holy Spirit, promising its donation ; the effect of whose powerful influence is, to renew and raise the soul, in its nature and tendencies, above the imperfections of its material tenement, and give it a freedom from it, even while confined to it ; and to make it victorious over them in time, and in eternity ; however liable to suffer, intermediately, from their annoyances. The soul of man therefore is capable of *immediate* communion with its maker, through his Spirit. And the *soul* of man is *the* man, *emphatically* speaking : though the union of soul and body constitutes the *entire* human nature. In these views of the subject therefore, Lucifer's exaggerated statements amount to nothing, or may be even useful.

Cain then renews his complaints against both death and life, regardless of the mercies of the latter, and of the provision made against the evil of the former ; which provision his family, it should seem, had accepted, though *he* would not. Of whom then had he to complain, for this "heritage not happy?" His feeling, or fancying he felt, the "prophetic torture of the truth" of what Lucifer had been, I must say, *vapouring* forth, may be fine sentimentality and fine language ; but by no means proves its truth : had he consulted unbiassed reason, and followed rational evidence, he would have known it was all delusion. His concluding ideas are quite fit for *him* ; but will not be received by any who regard the revelation God has given. Those who reject that revelation on the evidence it offers, I conceive to be incapable of conviction on any moral or rational subject to which they object ; and therefore must be left, however painfully, to their unhappy choice. Cain having, lastly, expressed his preference to die, Lucifer replies : —

LUCIFER.

Thou canst not
All die—there is what must survive.

CAIN.

The Other
Spake not of this unto my father, when
He shut him forth from Paradise, with death
Written upon his forehead. But at least
Let what is mortal of me perish, that
I may be in the rest as angels are.

LUCIFER.

I am angelic: wouldst thou be as I am?

CAIN.

I know not what thou art: I see thy power,
And see thou shew'st me things beyond *my* power,
Beyond all power of my born faculties,
Although inferior still to my desires
And my conceptions.

LUCIFER.

What are they, which dwell
So humbly in their pride, as to sojourn
With worms in clay?

CAIN.

And what art thou who dwellest
So haughtily in spirit, and canst range
Nature and immortality— and yet
Seem'st sorrowful ?

LUCIFER.

I seem that which I am ;
And therefore do I ask of thee, if thou
Would'st be immortal ?

CAIN.

Thou hast said, I must be
Immortal in despite of me. I knew not
This until lately— but since it must be,
Let me, or happy or unhappy, learn
To anticipate my immortality.

LUCIFER.

Thou didst before I came upon thee.

CAIN.

How ?

LUCIFER.

By suffering.

CAIN.

And must torture be immortal ?

LUCIFER.

We and thy sons will try. But now, behold !
Is it not glorious ?

Note 36.

Lucifer repeating here his information to Cain of his immortality, the latter, to shew his proficiency under such a master, uses the term "the *Other*," when alluding to the Almighty as not having spoken of that immortality to Adam, although the probability seems to be, that the Almighty *had* revealed his immortality to Adam ; for, besides what has been already said, it will presently appear that *Adah* was informed of the "*atonement* ; yet how could she have heard of it, but from Adam ? And what is the knowledge of the atonement, but the knowledge of immortality ? And if *Adah* knew of it, how could Cain not know it ? His expression of his father being "shut forth from Paradise, with death written on his forehead," is much too strong, or rather not true, considering all circumstances, as has been shewn : — God's merciful dealing with him in particular. His desire that what is mortal of him might perish, in order that, in what remained, he might be as angels are, is perhaps more than excusable if we can conceive his wish to have been, to resemble *those* angels who had *not* revolted, like Lucifer and his, from their maker. But of that there is too much evidence to the contrary. In answer to Lucifer's question, if he would be as he was, for that he was angelic ; Cain honestly replies, he did not know *what* he was ; yet acknowledging his power superior to his own. This seems to induce something like a retort courteous from Lucifer ; who asks his wary disciple what then *they* are, who though proud, yet are humble enough to sojourn

with worms in clay? meaning mankind, as I conceive; and Cain in particular perhaps. There seems something more smart than usual between the friends on this occasion, apparently approaching to fitful; for Cain, in his turn again, asks his guide what *he* is, who, so haughty, and ranging nature and immortality, yet seems sorrowful? Lucifer very ingenuously confesses to the truth of Cain's surmise; for that he was what he seemed, viz. "sorrowful." Yet far different was Lucifer's sorrow, or woe, from that far-famed erratic knight's, whose lugubrious and care-worn countenance was aye brightened to a smile, whenever his favouring stars conducted him to the relief of injured beauty. *His* errantry was to defend and save: Lucifer's, to assault and destroy. This wofulness, however, the "mighty and everlasting" assigns as a reason for asking Cain, honestly enough, if he too would be immortally sorrowful, or sorrowfully immortal, whichever he preferred. We shall however find another occasion for considering if sorrowfulness and immortality be *necessary* companions; though the "Master of Spirits" seems to mean us to suppose they are so. Cain, then, asserts his desire of anticipating his immortality, since Lucifer had before told him he must be immortal, in despite of himself; and that, whether happy or unhappy.

Now I beg here to offer my own humble opinion, that (thanking Lord Byron for so excellent a hint) Cain was both right and wrong in this last wish of his. I think he was immeasurably wrong, in hazarding an entrance upon an unchangeable state, without a rational *certainty* of its not being an *unhappy* state at any rate, if not the *most happy*. Is there not such a thing as unhappiness? Is it not the very thing a sensitive being would, and does, avoid? And do not men in common life, forecast much and anxiously, to avoid it? Do they leave important things of this life to uncertainty, if they may be made certain? And yet Cain, (could he be of sound mind?) is careless whether his immortality be happy or unhappy! Who can pretend to wisdom that acts thus? But now let us see wherein he was *right*; and let him have his meed of praise; and perhaps the honour of setting us an example worthy to be followed.

He is desirous of "*anticipating* his immortality." I am not quite sure that he meant it exactly in my own sense ; but at any rate I will take him so, and I hope without wronging him by so doing. There is a celebrated saying, — "Man, know thyself;" and I believe it is universally approved of: for though I cannot think that *all*, or the *best* and most *important*, knowledge, "centres there," (for to know *God, and Jesus Christ which is life eternal*, is the *most* important,) yet still, so far as it goes, it is doubtless an excellent maxim. Now I will, from Cain's wish, form another maxim to accompany the one just noticed ; and it shall be — "Man, anticipate thine immortality." To what superior thoughts may not this maxim, seriously embraced, lead us ? To what conduct not incite ? What actions not suppress ? If all men did so, under the influence of reason, guided by revelation, must not all unhappiness be banished from the Earth, and man made ready for the enjoyment of the immortality he had anticipated ? But there are more specific reasons for anticipating our immortality, as men anticipate a journey to regions known or unknown. If unknown, how anxiously are not maps and histories consulted ! if known, or when known, what pains are not taken to be rightly qualified for happy domiciliation, where the final residence is anticipated ! For to be, *ever*, where we must be irremediably ill at ease, or miserable ; what want of common sense would not be attributed to him, who should not use all means in his power to avoid it ? Yet, is not that glaring improvidence, with respect to futurity, the constant course of man ? In life's bustle, and deceptive glare of grandeur, or poisonous and destructive draughts of inebriating gratifications, it is true, this distant (yet near) region, is no more realized to the mind, much less *familiarized*, than a Utopia or a Laputa. But when the uninvited solitude or silence of decaying nature overtakes us ; when the sceptre, and the sword, and all things else, fall from the powerless grasp, and the unknown, because neglected, regions of eternity press upon our view ; then those things which before obstructed it, lose their importance ; and, if our senses are not stupified, how can we look forward to that scene of *new associations* with composure,

unless, having *anticipated* them, through the medium of the revelation we have considered, we are *assured*, without a doubt, or an *uncertainty*, and far beyond a feeble *hope*, that our reception in that new shore will be happy, and our final destination, ever blessed? These matters *should not* be thrust into the shade of the *back ground*, so much as they are, by immortal spirits.

Here Lucifer again leads us to further reflection still. He tells Cain, he had, in fact, anticipated his immortality, before he came upon him. "Came upon him!" rather an ominous expression! reminding us of a vulture, or a wolf, pouncing, or springing upon, his prey! However, Cain not rightly comprehending his highly metaphysical friend, asks him for an explanation; *how* he so anticipated his immortality? The oracular response is, — "by suffering." This seems to require consideration. Does he mean to allege, or insinuate, that, because "sorrow was half of *his own* immortality," that therefore suffering was so identified, and one, with immortality itself, that whoever suffered, did, in fact, ascertain thereby that he necessarily was immortal? I know not what other meaning to give his words, so congenial to his avowed and well-known character. I must therefore take that to be their meaning; and at the same time express my own entire dissent from his doctrine. So far are suffering and immortality from being *necessarily* one and the same thing; or even suffering from being the *constant attendant* upon immortality; that immortality is the sure, and never-ending *exemption from suffering*, to all who do not *reject*, or *neglect*, the *means* which God has graciously appointed, for ensuring an immortality at once unsuffering and happy. Lucifer probably does not mean bodily, but mental suffering; and that it is a proof of an immaterial, rather than immortal, principle in man. For immateriality does not seem to include absolute immortality, independent and in defiance of, the Almighty, as before remarked; or, although mental suffering should imply both immateriality and immortality, yet, by no means a *suffering* immortality, for the reason above given, deduced from revelation. But, *otherwise*, I confess, with Lucifer, that mental suffering in this life, *may inti-*

mate future and interminable misery, if not prevented, through the medium of that revelation ; because we *know* we are immaterial and *immortal too*, without an express exertion of divine power put forth to annihilate us ; and that, we have every scriptural ground for believing never will be done. Besides, if suffering anticipates immortality, it may be said that our assurance of immortality requires suffering as its evidence ; but if the evidence of our future happy or unhappy and immortal existence arose from suffering only, it would be very inconclusive and therefore unsatisfactory. We have in fact a *real* evidence, altogether satisfactory.— Cain then shews his scholar-like proficiency again, under so effective an instructor, by asking him if “torture is to be immortal?” We have considered the total inapplicability of the term “torture,” to the Divine Being, as being abhorrent to his nature. But God, as a just moral governor, can, without “torturing,” (which none but *tyrants* practise,) and either in a more *immediate* way, or by permitting causes to operate their effects, visit evil beings with the sanctions of his just laws ; the never-ending consequence of which would be, their enduring, commensurately with their immortal existence, the misery which their chosen evil had brought upon them. And this seems to be a sufficient answer to Cain’s enquiry about “immortal torture.” As for Lucifer’s bravado, that he, with *his* legions, and Cain, with *his* sons, would “*try*” whether torture must be immortal, that is quite in his own way. But I apprehend there is every evidence, that he never will have permission to make the experiment, after the wretched attempt he has already made. His subsequent and abrupt question to Cain, draws from the latter the following descriptive and enthusiastic admiration.

CAIN.

Oh, thou beautiful

And unimaginable ether ! and
Ye multiplying masses of increased

And still increasing lights ! what are ye ? what
 Is this blue wilderness of interminable
 Air, where ye roll along, as I have seen
 The leaves along the limpid streams of Eden ?
 Is your course measured for ye ? or do ye
 Sweep on in your unbounded revelry
 Through an aerial universe of endless
 Expansion, at which my soul aches to think,
 Intoxicated with eternity ?
 Oh God ! Oh Gods ! or whatsoe'er ye are !
 How beautiful ye are ! how beautiful
 Your works, or accidents, or whatsoe'er
 They may be ! Let me die, as atoms die,
 (If that they die) or know ye in your might
 And knowledge ! My thoughts are not in this hour
 Unworthy what I see, though my dust is ;
 Spirit ! let me expire, or see them nearer.

Note 37.

It is not my purpose to expatiate upon the beauties or the wonders of the works of the great and all-good creator, so calculated, as they nevertheless are, to excite the admiration of all intelligent beings ; and allowably so, if that admiration excite praise to God. Then indeed we may bid our praise flow

“——redundant ; like Meander flow
 Back to thy fountain ; to that parent-power
 Who gives the tongue to sound, the thought to soar,
 The soul to be ——.”

But Lord Byron was to depicture the feelings of a mind like Cain's, who, unhappily, had imbibed, and had suffered Lucifer to saturate

him still deeper with, notions and impressions hostile to, and derogatory of, his maker. It is therefore not to be a matter of surprize, that, in these very animated and expressive lines, Cain should as he has done, have gone to the very verge, by nearly, if not quite ascribing self-existence or self-creation to those splendid effects of divine power; — to man's perceptions great, though to deity not so; and even nothing, in the estimation of God himself, if his word may be credited, compared with the human soul, destined as that is, to an endless existence of the utmost interest. Cain, however, is here represented to have yielded himself to far different sentiments. He is carried away, by the blaze of external and perishing things, from his and their creator, and from himself. How unlike to Plato and to Cicero! Yet he was alive to what he deemed some perception of eternity, — “intoxicated with eternity.” Eternity itself is doubtless the most serious of considerations. It is that which makes man important; otherwise an insect, buzzing or fluttering his hour. But *should* eternity procure to us, by our own neglect, eternal wretchedness, the idea is, or should be, tremendous. Self-condemnation, without end, and without hope! What worse can be conceived? as Adah has strongly expressed it, — “remorse of that which was, and hope of that which cometh not!” Cain's wishing to die as atoms die, if he may not know these things in their might and knowledge, savours more of enthusiasm, than of soundness of mind, to say the least; but his doubting the death of atoms has a very atheistical appearance at any rate, it must be confessed; and as to their “might and knowledge,” they seem to be words without any appropriate meaning; unless he meant, as perhaps he did, to ascribe to them self-creation, or self-existence, and intelligence; which is merely *atheistical* of course. His concluding estimate of his “thoughts,” and his “dust,” and his repeated desire of extinction, if he might not see these things nearer, are indications of a mind in some degree puerile, as well as totally estranged from its proper centre — its creator.

LUCIFER.

Art thou not nearer ? look back to thine Earth !

CAIN.

Where is it ? I see nothing save a mass
Of most innumerable lights.

LUCIFER.

Look there !

CAIN.

I cannot see it.

LUCIFER.

Yet it sparkles still.

CAIN.

What, yonder !

LUCIFER.

Yca.

CAIN.

And wilt thou tell me so ?

Why, I have seen the fire-flies and fire-worms
Sprinkle the dusky groves and the green banks
In the dim twilight, brighter than yon world
Which bears them.

LUCIFER.

Thou hast seen both worms and worlds,
Each bright and sparkling—what dost think of them?

CAIN.

That they are beautiful in their own sphere,
And that the night, which makes both beautiful,
The little shining fire-fly in its flight,
And the immortal star in its great course,
Must both be guided.

LUCIFER.

But by whom or what?

CAIN.

Shew me.

LUCIFER.

Dar'st thou behold?

CAIN.

How know I what
I *dare* behold? as yet, thou hast shewn nought
I dare not gaze on further.

LUCIFER.

On, then, with me.
Wouldst thou behold things mortal or immortal?

CAIN,

Why, what are things ?

LUCIFER.

*Both partly : but what doth
Sit next thy heart ?*

CAIN.

The things I see.

Note 38.

This part of their conversation in the Abyss of Space commences with rather interesting observations, which seem to bring us into company with these adventurers, upon the amazing distance they were at from the Earth ; so that Cain could scarcely believe that what Lucifer pointed out as being it, was so in reality. Cain's recollection of the fire-flies, and fire-worms, in his own world, shews his attention to the smaller, as well as greater works of nature ; or rather, of nature's author. Lucifer's question,—what he thinks of them ? produces from Cain a conclusion that all must, little, as well as great, be *guided*. From this, one would have hoped, that he was abandoning his atheistical inclinations, and approximating the right sentiments of Plato, and of Cicero, and those other enlightened, powerful, and ingenuous minds, among the *unchristianized* heathen, who thought with them. But, no ! Lucifer, in his artful manner, (to keep Cain still advancing in his renunciation of his maker,) asks him —“but by *whom*, or *what*,” guided ? A question, not without a deep meaning, as will appear presently ; for, instead of replying that his father's God, and his own God, made them all, and guided them ; what does Cain, but, like the needle to the pole, instinctively

turn him to his chosen "guide, philosopher, and friend," the foe of God and man, with — "shew (thou) me." Lucifer begins his response by aiming to excite an apprehension in Cain of something wonderful or tremendous, the more effectually to secure his hold upon his mind; — "dar'st thou behold?" Cain very sensibly replies, by demanding how he can know what he *dare* behold? but adds, he dares gaze further on all that Lucifer has yet shewn him. Lucifer then seems to dart on with another amazing, yet easy, exertion of his locomotive powers, and then asks him, conjurer-like, if he "would behold things mortal or immortal?" which draws from Cain an enquiry — "what are things?" and which his instructor then tells him are partly both; and he then asks Cain what sits next his heart. This apparently simple question will appear soon to have been intended to lead to a train of important results; for Lucifer asks his pupil no question, but to prepare him, imperceptibly, and unsuspectingly for that ultimate state of mind he was aiming to bring him into. On Cain's replying, that the things he then saw, did *then* sit next his heart, some rather interesting discourse follows.

LUCIFER.

But what

Sate nearest it?

CAIN.

The things I have not seen,
Nor ever shall — the mysteries of death.

LUCIFER.

What, if I shew to thee things which have died,
As I have shewn thee much which cannot die?

CAIN.

Do so.

LUCIFER.

Away, then! on our mighty wings.

CAIN.

Oh! how we cleave the blue! The stars fade from us!
The Earth! where is my Earth? let me look on it,
For I was made of it.

LUCIFER.

'T is now beyond thee,
Less, in the universe, than thou in it:
Yet deem not that thou canst escape it; thou
Shalt soon return to earth, and all its dust;
'T is part of thy eternity, and mine.

CAIN.

Where dost thou lead me?

Note 39.

The "mysteries of death," then, it seems, were still the object of Cain's vitiated curiosity, and what *had* sat nearest his heart. These mysteries he despairs of ever seeing, unaware as he was of being, at that very moment, under Lucifer's guidance, in the road to acquaint himself with them; and that, dreaded as they were, by his own introduction, through the *procurator* of his chosen friend and guide. But we have seen, that death is no mystery at all. Its nature and

consequences have been explored, and found to be friendly, and that in the highest degree, to all who consider it aright, upon the principles of the revelation before adverted to. It is true that man's mortal body must undergo decomposition, and be resolved into dust again, as Lucifer has said. But what has man's *spirit* to do with that? His spirit is ethereal and immaterial. It must be more exquisitely sensible also without, than with, the cumbrous investiture of flesh and blood; or, as Lucifer and Cain would, not unaptly, term it, "dust," or "clay." From all this, death, we know, sets the imprisoned spirit free. Then, if tutored to have sought things above, to them it gladly soars. Instantly, on the sinking body's granting its dismissal, it enters upon a state of peaceful, but ineffably blissful, expectation of re-union, even with its former companion, refined and glorified, and fitted to enjoy together a happy immortality. Where then the mystery, except in that goodness which has provided all this for man? Man has but *one* concern in this affair: that is, to be, in his *present* state, and by Jesus Christ, united to that goodness, through the medium of the revelation we have considered. Be this *neglected*, the effect is no mystery still; yet awfully tremendous. What philosophy then is that, which contrives, "in the flight of three score years, to push eternity from human thought?"

Cain, nevertheless, gladly assents to Lucifer's proposition to shew him things which had died, as well as that which, (he said,) could not die. With respect to the first, *we* must beg to *demur*, at least, to that offer; for no *human* being had, then, died: and as to what Lucifer, presently, will say had lived, that is not so easily proved as said. With respect to what he says he had shewn Cain as things that could not die, he must of course mean, the systems of creation and atomic worlds they had been passing through, and to which he and Cain were so disposed to attribute self-existence and immortality; but with what reason, we have seen and shall see; to say nothing of revelation, which settles all disputes upon that subject, until that revelation itself can be overturned upon rational demonstra-

tion. It says — “they shall perish.” Cain’s sensations, upon experiencing the effect of the fresh spring which Lucifer causes him to take with him into the abyss, are very natural; as are also his desires of another look at his quick-receding Earth, before he loses it entirely; as the mariner leaving his native nook of land, takes his last glance of its extremity — for he “was made of it.” Yet, in another point of view, it seems obvious to reflect upon the unhappiness of attachment to *evanescent* things, if that attachment be not subdued, or kept in its proper place, by a certainty of our *welcoming* things permanent, which we are inevitably approaching. Lucifer, however, quickly tells him, that, inconsiderable as his Earth was to him now in appearance, and still less in the universe, yet he could not escape it, but must return to it; for it was “part of his, and of his own eternity.” By this last expression, he means, I presume, if he mean any thing, that material and immaterial beings are all equally eternal; thus huddling up all existence into one essential, common, necessary, eternal and *unexplainable something*, (or nothing,) to the exclusion of a first cause. It gives Cain a past eternity, as well as Lucifer; which is the thing he affects. But this cannot be admitted; at any rate with respect to Cain and Lucifer; because revelation flatly contradicts it. And with respect to matter, we have seen, exclusively of revelation, the reasons against believing it to be even eternal; and much more, against its being self-created, or self-existent. For even if it be admitted that there have been creations by deity, both intelligent and unintelligent, co-eternal with himself; and that God has never been without *external* manifestations of his glory and goodness; yet what has become of the *intelligent* part of those creations, since revelation speaks not of them? Or is the *silence* of revelation no bar to things it does not notice? At most, therefore, if this idea of an eternal creation, material and immaterial, *can* be admitted, *consistently with scripture*, it then may be: but if it cannot be made consistent with scripture silence, then it cannot be so admitted; because any suppositions which contradict a divine revelation, as the Christian revelation is, must be false. Nor is the disquisition mate-

rial ; for it is unessential to man's true happiness. But man's adherence to the word of God, is essential to his happiness.

Cain seems overwhelmed with the scene before him of, perhaps, a horribly dismal, as well as alarmingly deep and interminable region of abyssal space ; — “ Where dost thou lead me ? ” But this apparently anxious enquiry, leads to other Luciferianly-curious propositions. The grand-master (of spirits) tells him he is leading him —

LUCIFER.

To what was before thee!
The phantasm of the world ; of which thy world
Is but the wreck.

CAIN.

What ! is it not then new ?

LUCIFER.

No more than life is ; and that was ere thou
Or *I* were, or the things which seem to us
Greater than either : many things will have
No end ; and some, which would pretend to have
Had no beginning, have had one as mean
As thou ; and mightier things have been extinct
To make way for much meaner than we can
Surmise ; for *moments* only and the *space*
Have been and must be all *unchangeable*.
But changes make not death, except to clay ;
But thou art clay — and canst but comprehend
That which was clay, and such thou shalt behold.

CAIN.

Clay, spirit! What thou wilt, I can survey.

LUCIFER.

Away, then!

CAIN.

But the lights fade from me fast,
And some till now grew larger as we approach'd,
And wore the look of worlds.

LUCIFER.

And such they are.

CAIN.

And Edens in them?

LUCIFER.

It may be.

CAIN.

And men?

LUCIFER.

Yea, or things higher.

CAIN.

Ay? and serpents too?

LUCIFER.

Wouldst thou have men without them? must no reptiles
Breathe, save the erect ones?

Note 40.

The information, if information it may be called, which Lucifer has just above given Cain, though it may lead to much curious and endless lucubration, yet drives us to the old enquiry — Is it useful? that is, conducive to the real welfare and happiness of man? For Lucifer and Cain, both, have said much, and will say more, about the *evil* in the world, and the misery men suffer through that same evil. Now if men do actually *suffer*, (from whatever cause, and if suffering be undelectable,) then, is it not more desirable to pursue those speculations, which have a tendency to remove that suffering, than those which have no bearing at all, or an evil bearing, upon it? In that view then, it is quite unimportant to man, whether his world be, as Lucifer will have it, only the wreck of a former world, or not. But if it promote God's glory, and do not contradict his word, nor create any irrational and wrong thoughts of deity, to believe it, there may be no harm in so doing. We know *this Earth* has been once, with its inhabitants, destroyed as to its dress and furniture, but restored again; and that without any imputation upon the divine goodness as the moral governor of his creatures. Had he not been good (and what is wholly good, of course has no place for evil) he would not have so restored the world.

With respect, however, to Lucifer's assertion, (in answer to Cain's enquiry,) — that this world is no more new than life is; and, that life *was*, before either Cain or himself; and even before things which seemed to them greater than either; a little investigation is necessary. If the world were no more new than life was, then of course the world was as old as life itself, which is God, who is essen-

tial life : for his revelation says — “ in him was life.” And so say Plato and Cicero too. Now even if scripture do not say that *matter* has *not* always been, as an eternal effect of divine power and goodness ; yet it *does* say that *this world* was not so, but was brought into existence, about, as is rationally calculated, six thousand years ago, and no more. So far then, at any rate, Lucifer errs ; for the world is newer than life. He says, further, that this “ life ” was before Cain and himself. That is, of course, self-evident. But, when he says, that it was before things which seem to them greater than either of them, that will not do : for nothing seemed to Lucifer to be greater than himself, except the Omnipotent ; and he was hard put to it to admit even that. He must therefore mean, that this same life was before God ; and that God himself, as well as Lucifer and Cain, and the world, are merely the effects of a certain *undefinable principle of life*, which gave birth to all. This is metaphysical refinement, and atheism, of sufficiently high nature, certainly. Who can go further ? Why, Lucifer himself tries to do it, in what follows ; for he asserts that God had as *mean a beginning* as Cain had. This is evidently what he intends by saying, that many “ *things*,” which pretend to have had no beginning, had one as mean as Cain’s. Now no being, or “ thing,” but God, ever *pretended* to have had no beginning. Or, if it be said that Lucifer pretended to the same, yet we cannot suppose that he meant so to debase *himself*. But all this is opposed to the greatest among the ancients ; to say nothing of revelation. He is right however in saying, that many things will have no end ; because scripture declares it, and that he himself is one of those things, and angels and men, who associate with him, are others of those things. The same may be said of God. But *this world* we know *will* have an end. As to his “ mightier things extinct, to make way for much meaner than we can surmise ; ” that seems merely imaginary, or poetic, and is perhaps partly on the Cuvierian system of a pre-adamite world ; which system, so far as not contradicted by revelation, may be harmless, however useless. His next proposition, that “ moments only, and the space, (“ *the* ” space, for rythm, I presume,) have been, and must be, all

unchangeable," seems correct, if he mean his moments as parts of time, and time as a portion of eternity; for eternity is unchangeable without a doubt. A similar meaning may apparently be given to the unchangeableness of space; as we seem unable to conceive of the absence or variableness of space, either in the eternity that is past, or to come. But it does not follow, that because eternity and space are unchangeable, they *alone* are so. God is unchangeable; and eternity and space are not God; nor can it be allowed, as I suspect some have maintained and perhaps do maintain, that God, and space, and eternity, are all one; a species of atheism, of course, confounding things most distinct, and disregarding every principle of rational and moral evidence, as well as common sense. Lucifer then says, that "changes make not death, except to clay;" and he tells Cain he is clay. Before, he told him he was a reptile. By the last expressions however, it should seem he intended, that although the *bodies* of men are subject to death, on account of a certain change to take place in them, yet that no such change can cause man's *spirit* to die. To this there seems no other objection than, that *revelation* speaks of a death even to man's spirit; viz. consisting of a total loss and extinction, not of perception generally, but of the capability of perception of spiritual happiness; the consequence of which must be, the perception of spiritual as well as bodily misery. This appears deserving of man's consideration, as do also the means of avoiding it; for it is what the scriptures call "the *second* death," commencing after the resurrection of the body, and the final judgment. But possibly he means also, that the changes which the whole creation might undergo, did not occasion death to any thing but man. If, again, by this he meant to allege the eternity of matter, however modified, in opposition to absolute annihilation, perhaps scripture does not discountenance that; though, *then*, would even the "clay" of man's *body* be a subject of death, in *this* meaning of Lucifer's? He then repeats to Cain, that he is clay, and can only comprehend that which was clay, and that such he shall behold. But this compliment to Cain, and to human nature, requires observation. For though man

be clay, yet he has a mind comprehending much, beyond clay ; that is, beyond what relates to mortal man merely. He can comprehend much of a *spiritual* nature, through the medium of what has been revealed to him ; and much of the Divine Being himself ; and is capable of scanning, and judging of things, with which clay, that is his mortal part, has nothing to do. But this need not be enlarged upon.

Cain however seems, himself, to be somewhat touched, that the "spirit" should think him capable of surveying only what had been clay ; and therefore, upon his telling him he can survey whatever Lucifer would ; the latter, by another stretch of their mighty wings into space, brings Cain into apparent contact with certain lights, which he took for worlds, and which Lucifer assures him they were. Cain's interpreter however does not positively say that those worlds have Edens in them, but admits there *may* be, as well as men, or things higher. And even in the present day, I apprehend, some persons are strongly inclined to think, that not only the moon, but the stars, and planets, and even the sun, are inhabited ; of course, if at all, by beings suited to their habitations, whether of heat or cold. Of the profitableness of these disquisitions, or any bearing they have upon making sure work in regard to our own future happiness, nothing need be said. But the immensity of God's works seems a poor foundation for the hopes of men in regard of futurity, and is not what the *revelation*, before spoken of, holds out for that use. Peace with God, and a certainty of redemption and salvation, are not to be met with in contemplating the stars, whether worlds or not ; inhabited or not inhabited. Yet, without such *certainty* of salvation, ought man to be *satisfied* ? And does not scripture encourage, if not *require* such certainty ? — Upon Cain's extending his enquiry to serpents, Lucifer pays him and human nature the compliment to ask, if he "would have no reptiles breathe, save the erect ones ? As Lucifer, then, considers man as no better than a reptile, of not the most beloved kind, either, what may not man expect from him, if he ever fall within his power ? — Cain then proceeds.

CAIN.

How the lights recede!
Where fly we ?

LUCIFER.

To the world of phantoms, which
Are beings past, and shadows still to come.

CAIN.

But it grows dark, and dark—the stars are gone !

LUCIFER.

And yet thou seest.

CAIN.

'T is a fearful light!
No sun, no moon, no lights innumerable.
The very blue of the empurpled night
Fades to a dreary twilight, yet I see
Huge dusky masses ; but unlike the worlds
We were approaching, which, begirt with light,
Seem'd full of life even when their atmosphere
Of light gave way, and shew'd them taking shapes
Unequal, of deep vallies and vast mountains ;
And some emitting sparks, and some displaying
Enormous liquid plains, and some begirt
With luminous belts, and floating moons, which took
Like them the features of fair Earth : — instead,
All here seems dark and dreadful.

LUCIFER.

But distinct.
Thou seekest to behold death, and dead things ?

CAIN.

I seek it not ; but as I know there are
Such, and that my sire's sin makes him and me,
And all that we inherit, liable
To such, I would behold at once, what I
Must one day see performe.

LUCIFER.

Behold !

CAIN.

'T is darkness.

LUCIFER.

And so it shall be ever ; but we will
Unfold its gates !

CAIN.

Enormous vapours roll
Apart—what's this ?

LUCIFER.

Enter !

CAIN.

Can I return ?

LUCIFER.

Return! be sure: how else should death be peopled?
Its present realm is thin to what it will be,
Through thee and thine.

CAIN.

The clouds still open wide
And wider, and make widening circles round us.

LUCIFER.

Advance !

CAIN.

And thou !

LUCIFER.

Fear not—without me thou
Couldst not have gone beyond thy world. On! on!

[They disappear through the clouds.]

Note 41.

On Cain's remarking the receding lights, and enquiring of his powerful conductor, perhaps in some consternation, whither they were flying? Lucifer replies,—“to the world of phantoms, which

are beings past, and shadows still to come." But this is confessedly poetic, and as visionary as the phantoms of the past, and the shadows of the future themselves were; and, as Lucifer himself afterwards acknowledges, when he tells Cain that all he had been shewing him was a vision. As to any *reality* therefore in that vision, or in these phantasmagoric representations, the idea must be dismissed, however amusing they may be. For they all seem at variance with the representations given by the unerring guide—the revelation of truth. But other matters will soon occur, of more interest, and requiring more serious attention; for although the things themselves be considered as merely fictitious, yet not so the ideas to which they give birth; *they* are real and important, in one sense or another. It cannot be denied, still, that Cain's description of these regions is somewhat striking; at any rate to a mind not pre-engaged by important *realities*. Lucifer observes to Cain, that what he saw, though obscure, was distinct; and reminds him, that he had sought to behold death, and dead things. This, Cain does not seem quite to relish, or acquiesce in; but confesses he had an inclination to behold, at once, what he understood he must behold one day, *perforce*. The entrance into the realms of death, as exhibited by Lucifer, has something awful;—clouds, and darkness, and enormous vapours are their gates! There Lucifer unfolds, and discloses a scene, which Cain, bold as he was, does not describe, but seems to start at, and exclaims, "what's this?" and upon being bid by Lucifer to enter, he seems to decline it; and chooses rather to ask if he can return? Now here I think Lord Byron, in putting this most appropriate and important enquiry into Cain's mouth, must have taken a leaf, or part of a leaf, out of the book of Job, wherein it is said of a certain character, whom, I doubt, Cain too much resembled, "he believeth not that he shall return out of darkness." Besides, it is further due to Lord Byron, that he has, in the person of Cain, given an instance of an individual of his atheistical character; or if not atheistical absolutely, yet so hostile as he was to his creator; being alarmed at the idea of entering a place of terrific description, from which he may not be able to escape. Did

Lord Byron take his notion from that passage of the New Testament which states, that Lucifer's horrible territory (Hell) is bounded by a gulf which, having once passed, none can repass back again to life, but must remain there forever? [The *irremeabilis unda*, and *novies Styx interfusa*, of Virgil; and the *qui ter Geryonen Tityonque tristi compescit undá*, of Horace; shew the *ancients* to have entertained serious thoughts of futurity: and whence they derived them too, perhaps.] The reason, which Lucifer, however, *here* gives to induce Cain's belief of his assurance that he *should* return, seems satisfactorily consistent with the truth, according to revelation: for doubtless these deathful regions (at least what is analogous to them) have become populous as he foretold; yet not principally from Cain's progeny, which became so soon extinct at the deluge. After Cain's further remarks on the fearfulness of the place, and Lucifer's repeated encouragement to rely on him for safety; they seem to advance, and to plunge into the midst of these shades and horrors. Then succeed stranger visions still.

SCENE II.

*Hades.**Enter LUCIFER and CAIN.*

CAIN.

How silent and how vast these dim worlds !
For they seem more than one, and yet more peopled
Than the huge brilliant luminous orbs which swung
So thickly in the upper air, that I
Had deem'd them rather the bright populace
Of some all unimaginable Heaven
Than things to be inhabited themselves,
But that on drawing near them I beheld
Their swelling into palpable immensity
Of matter, which seem'd made for life to dwell on,
Rather than life itself. But here, all is
So shadowy and so full of twilight, that
It speaks of a day past.

LUCIFER.

It is the realm
Of death. — Wouldst have it present ?

CAIN.

Till I know

That which it really is, I cannot answer.
 But if it be as I have heard my father
 Deal out in his long homilies, 't is a thing—
 Oh God! I dare not think on 't! Cursed be
 He who invented life that leads to death!
 Or the dull mass of life, that being life
 Could not retain, but needs must forfeit it—
 Even for the innocent!

LUCIFER.

Dost thou curse thy father?

CAIN.

Cursed he not me in giving me my birth?
 Cursed he not me before my birth, in daring
 To pluck the fruit forbidden?

LUCIFER.

Thou say'st well:

The curse is mutual 'twixt thy sire and thee—
 But for thy sons and brother?

CAIN.

Let them share it

With me, their sire and brother! What else is
 Bequeath'd to me? I leave them my inheritance.

Oh ye interminable gloomy realms
Of swimming shadows and enormous shapes,
Some fully shewn, some indistinct, and all
Mighty and melancholy — what are ye ?
Live ye, or have ye lived ?

LUCIFER.

Somewhat of both.

Note 42.

The abyssal travellers are at length arrived at their destination, promised by Lucifer, — Hades; the state of the dead; “the realm of death,” as denominated by him. It is almost superfluous to remark, that however the poet’s fancy is displayed throughout the description of these regions, yet it is merely ideal. Hades, the state of the dead, in scripture imports that state generally; viz. the *condition* of spirits which have left their bodies; and not a *place*. Revelation, if established, is man’s guide on this point; and it teaches, that the *state* of every departed spirit, *immediately* on its quitting the body, is, a condition of incipient happiness, or incipient misery. This has been before noticed. In answer to Lucifer’s enquiry of Cain, if he would have death present, he wisely declines that favour also, on the ground of his ignorance of its nature; and refers to his father’s long homilies upon it, from which he had concluded it must be something dreadful, as he has before sufficiently declared. But with all possible respect for Cain’s veracity, I could scarcely have thought it likely, that Adam would have talked (or preached, if Cain like it better) so dismally of death. For it is not to be supposed, that the Almighty had revealed to Adam any terrific, or indeed any *specific* information as to the nature or consequences of death. That at least does not appear. That he should *die* if he transgressed, is, simply, all the Almighty appears to have told him: and even that was afterwards

softened by the cheering promise. Whence, then, this morbid fear of death, in Cain? Nothing but unpardoned guilt *ought* to make death either dreadful or hateful; but *that*, well may. Cain's imprecations, on the Almighty, and on his Father, are horrible; but shew the author's strong conception of character, in which, I suppose, neither Shakspeare nor Milton have exceeded him, in shewing to what wickedness such persons as Cain may proceed. What he says of Adam's not retaining, but forfeiting, his life, has been sufficiently considered under former Notes. He chose to disobey his maker, and to incur death, fore-announced to him. No doubt his posterity were, as Cain insinuates, innocent of their ancestor's personal fault: yet, of their own they have faults enough and to spare. Cain, especially, is totally inexcusable for his inveterate enmity against his parent, and for his (self-destructive) inculpation of his creator. What follows between the two confabulators is equally futile and disgusting, it must be confessed. But instead of the curse being mutual, as Lucifer terms it, there was no curse at all from Adam to his Son. The only curse that was pronounced by the Almighty, was (not upon Adam, but) upon the ground; and that merely in the way of being rendered somewhat less fruitful without some human labour. It was therefore absurd in Cain to talk of leaving a curse to his brother and sons as an inheritance;—an inheritance he never had. The address of Cain to the mighty and melancholy shadows and shapes is somewhat interesting, if we can forget realities and truth for a while, and transport ourselves to the scenes presented to us in this visionary description. As to Lucifer's telling Cain that the shadows and shapes were somewhat of both kinds of that which Cain enquired after respecting them, viz. that they *had* lived, and *yet* lived in a partial manner; by the first, one can easily suppose he meant, they had formerly been in life entirely; and by the last, we suppose he meant, that they *now* experienced a kind of existence, but far inferior, and perhaps altogether of a dismal, gloomy and melancholy nature, retaining their former appearance as to mightiness of stature, but melancholy;—“mighty and melancholy,” as Cain has it. But we are not

to forget that it is all poetical and unreal, still. Cain's noticing what Lucifer said respecting these shadows' enjoyment of somewhat like life even now, leads to some important matter arising from the following interrogation.

CAIN.

'Then what is death ?

LUCIFER.

What ? Hath not he who made ye
Said 't is another life ?

CAIN.

Till now he hath
Said nothing, save that all shall die.

LUCIFER.

Perhaps
He one day will unfold that further secret.

CAIN.

Happy the day !

LUCIFER.

Yes; happy! when unfolded
Through agonies unspeakable, and clogg'd
With agonies eternal, to innumerable
Yet unborn myriads of unconscious atoms,
All to be animated for this only !

Note 43.

Lord Byron has instruction in almost every line, which he conveys through the medium of characters from whom we should not altogether expect it. Here, Lucifer, in answer to Cain's question, — "then what is death?" glances at an important New Testament doctrine, viz. that death is, if not exactly what Lucifer terms it — "another life," yet approaching it very nearly. One can hardly suppose Lord Byron had not the following passage in his mind, "Jesus said, I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live." This appears to be more than a *casual* agreement; and if so, it amounts to an express acknowledgment, by Lucifer, of the proper deity of Christ "he who *made* ye." If God made man (as none but atheists deny) and if Christ made man as the scriptures affirm; what follows, but that Christ must be God, unless the scriptures be untrue? Here however Christ says, not, he that professes to *obey my precepts*, but, "he that *believeth in me*, though he were dead, shall live." Obeying follows, but is not a substitute, for believing. But this introduction of the subject by Lucifer gives rise to another, and perhaps still more interesting view of it, and it is this; Jesus Christ says further, as if extending his first declaration — "and whosoever *liveth*, and believeth in me, shall *never die*." What is that but saying, that those who so believe in him that is, their spirits, shall not merely survive their bodies, as the spirits of all (not being annihilated) *must do* by their natural immortality; but shall not experience that *second death* before adverted to? Again, it is said of Christ, emphatically, that "in *him* was life;" and none deny "life" to be in God, the *Father*, emphatically also. How can this community of attribute between God and Christ which is *perpetually* occurring in scripture, be rationally accounted for, but by the union of the two natures in Christ? If not so, the scriptures, to a *plain* mind, are most *deceptive*.

But here is another remarkable allusion which Lord Byron causes Lucifer to make to the *Gospel*. He says, — "perhaps one

day he will *unfold* (which is done by the Gospel) that further secret ;” — meaning doubtless, the secret of death, being, as he terms it, another life : not far indeed, if at all, from the truth, as we have just seen. Does Lucifer say that sarcastically ? We shall see, and then judge. I am not sure. For upon Cain’s rejoicing, in apparent and somewhat characteristic simplicity, — “happy the day !” — then comes Lucifer’s damper, if I may be allowed the expression. But we will examine this damper, or *intended* extinguisher, of Cain’s joyful anticipation. Lucifer then, speaks of this other life being so unfolded, through the *unspeakable agonies* of death. But it is very seldom, indeed, I conceive, that the agonies of death are any thing of that description. Perhaps much, very much oftener, it may be termed “the soft transition.” This must be known to most. Few die in agonies. If they do, they are seldom very, if at all, *sensible* of them. God deals with astonishing mercy and tenderness in this affair also, though the very thing Adam expressly incurred. But how often are the pains of death caused by errors of life ! Does not temperate life, *generally* speaking, *secure* an easy death ? And even those who experience lingering declines, or other protracted dissolution, often find great *alleviations*, both mental and bodily. Lucifer’s “agonies unspeakable” are therefore very greatly exaggerated ; nor is God to be hardly thought of for man’s own faults. Then, as to this other life being “clogg’d with agonies eternal,” that cannot be denied with respect to those who refuse the means God has provided for avoiding them. Jesus Christ said to some, — “ye *will not* come unto me, that ye might have life.” But, in candour and common sense, must not *coming to Christ* for *life*, mean something different from professing to *obey his precepts* ? Apply the matter to ordinary subjects, for illustration. Then how is God chargeable with man’s eternal misery ? Let any man say, whether his rejection of Christ as a Saviour be owing to his perception of God’s having *forbidden* him to receive, or *incapacitated* him for receiving, Christ as such a Saviour. With regard to the *numbers* Lucifer absurdly alludes to as being animated for eternal misery only, where does *revelation* teach

or countenance any thing of that kind? And Lucifer is not to be believed upon his own word only. We have seen the reverse. Cain continues his remarks upon the strange scenes Lucifer presents to him.

CAIN.

What are these mighty phantoms which I see
 Floating around me?—they wear not the form
 Of the intelligences I have seen
 Round our regretted and unenter'd Eden,
 Nor wear the form of man as I have view'd it
 In Adam's and in Abel's, and in mine,
 Nor in my sister-bride's, nor in my children's :
 And yet they have an aspect, which, though not
 Of men nor angels, looks like something, which,
 If not the last, rose higher than the first,
 Haughty, and high, and beautiful, and full
 Of seeming strength, but of inexplicable
 Shape; for I never saw such. They bear not
 The wing of seraph, nor the face of man,
 Nor form of mightiest brute, nor ought that is
 Now breathing; mighty yet and beautiful
 As the most beautiful and mighty which
 Live, and yet so unlike them, that I scarce
 Can call them living.

LUCIFER.

Yet they lived.

CAIN.

Where?

LUCIFER.

Thou livest. Where

CAIN.

When?

LUCIFER.

They did inhabit. On what thou callest Earth

CAIN.

Adam is the first.

LUCIFER.

Of thine, I grant thee—but too mean to be
The last of these.

CAIN.

And what are they?

LUCIFER.

Thou shalt be. That which

CAIN.

But what *were* they?

LUCIFER.

Living, high,

Intelligent, good, great, and glorious things,
 As much superior unto all thy sire,
 Adam, could e'er have been in Eden, as
 The sixty-thousandth generation shall be,
 In its dull damp degeneracy, to
 Thee and thy son;—and how weak they are, judge
 By thy own flesh.

CAIN.

Ah me! and did *they* perish?

LUCIFER.

Yes, from their Earth, as thou wilt fade from thine.

CAIN.

But was *mine* theirs?

LUCIFER.

It was.

CAIN.

But not as now.

It is too little and too lowly to
 Sustain such creatures.

LUCIFER.

True, it was more glorious.

R

Note 44.

The description which Cain gives of the imposing figures he saw in this land of phantoms and shadows, is somewhat curious, it must be confessed; but the reality of their existence is, of course, quite another thing, and requires far other evidence than Lucifer's ipse dixit; but which evidence is wholly wanting; for I do not presume that the evidence of M. Cuvier carries a jot more weight than his. As to their having lived, and that on Cain's Earth, and their being so great that Adam (the first of human beings only) was too mean to be the last in rank with them; it is all of the same apocryphal complexion. When Cain asks his conductor what these *appearances* now are, he replies—what Cain shall be. But that cannot be admitted, until revelation be rejected; because revelation tells us that man, after death, shall be *very different* (as we have before observed) from a mere phantom, conscious of only *very obscure* and *imperfect* sensations at most. For though man's spirit, until the resurrection, will be in a separate state, yet it will be one of a positive and great happiness, or the reverse. This has been glanced at already; but these high intelligences, though "mighty," are yet "melancholy," without any distinction: *all melancholy*: which cannot be, under the Christian dispensation. On Cain's enquiring what they *had* been, Lucifer replies—(so far as I understand his Luciferian arithmetic) about sixty thousand times superior to Adam in Eden, in every living, high, intelligent, good, great, and glorious, attribute. Cain is evidently affected by this relation of the extinction of those high intelligences, or, I had almost said, "their high mightinesses." Cain's Earth, it seems, could not have sustained them, only that it was then "more glorious." But his concern for them appears in his next question:—

CAIN.

And wherefore did it fall?

LUCIFER.

Ask him who fells. ✓

CAIN.

But how ?

LUCIFER.

By a most crushing and inexorable
Destruction and disorder of the elements,
Which struck a world to chaos, as a chaos
Subsiding has struck out a world: such things,
Though rare in time, are frequent in eternity.—
Pass on, and gaze upon the past.

CAIN.

'T is awful!

LUCIFER.

And true. Behold these phantoms! they were once
Material as thou art.

CAIN.

And must I be

Like them ?

LUCIFER.

Let He who made thee answer that.
I shew thee what thy predecessors are,
And what they *were* thou feelest, in degree

Inferior as thy petty feelings and
 Thy pettier portion of the immortal part
 Of high intelligence and earthly strength.
 What ye in common have with what they had
 Is life, and what ye *shall* have — death ; the rest
 Of your poor attributes is such as suits
 Reptiles engender'd out of the subsiding
 Slime of a mighty universe, crush'd into
 A scarcely yet shaped planet, peopled with
 Things whose enjoyment was to be in blindness —
 A Paradise of Ignorance, from which
 Knowledge was barr'd as poison. But behold
 What these superior beings are or were ;
 Or, if it irk thee, turn thee back and till
 The Earth, thy task — I'll waft thee there in safety.

Note 45.

On Cain's enquiring of Lucifer the cause of the falling of the world when inhabited by these superior beings, he, in his own style, bids him "ask the feller;" (that is, him who fells, or hews down;) by which term of course he means to stigmatize the Almighty, whom he charges with mercilessly bringing down whatever he pleases, regardless of the sufferings he thereby creates to sensitive beings. But the total inapplicability of this defamation, to God, we have seen, and that it cannot be admitted upon any principle of moral evidence, which is totally against it; because the divine character is incontestibly of an opposite nature. And as to his description of the *manner* of the falling of that world, which Cain calls awful, and his friend pronounces to be no less true, it is, of course, of similarly unfounded and imaginary character with the rest. Lucifer then, directing his attention to the phantoms again, assures Cain they were once mate-

rial, and like him ; but refers him to his maker (*insultingly* to God of course) for information — whether he should be like them. And after descanting upon Cain's despicable powers compared to theirs, he fairly says, that so much as he has in common with them, is life ; and what he *shall* have in common with them, death ; but that, we have seen, is not true : the death of the human race does *not* lead to this phantomic state, but a more *sensitive* state and condition a great deal. We cannot but acknowledge Lucifer's courtliness in again comparing mankind to reptiles ; though what particular *species* of reptile, as enjoying blindness, I do not exactly know. But if there be any such, they are God's creatures, and ought not to be despised. And if they do enjoy blindness, (and all creatures do, by the arrangements of divine goodness, enjoy their existence, whatever that may be ;) then, these very blind reptiles are superior to Lucifer, and their existence more desirable than his, until it be shewn that elevated misery is preferable to humble happiness. With respect to Earth being "a Paradise of ignorance, from which knowledge is barr'd as poison," that is evidently a fresh reflection upon God who prohibited the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of *good and evil* ; (not the tree of *knowledge*, as Lucifer pretends ;) but in fact no useful and good knowledge is barred from this world by the Almighty. The specific knowledge indeed, which *was* barred from man in Eden, *was* poison, in a very allowable and material sense ; but from which the Almighty and Beneficent Alchymist (if I may so speak) produced most healthful streams of eternal life. On the contrary, we see and know how God has *filled* the Earth, since Adam's days, with *useful* knowledge, though by degrees suited to man's progressive powers. What the *ignorance* was, which God certainly *did* require of Adam in Paradise, we have seen ; but that ignorance was so far from being a bar to general and useful knowledge, that it seems reasonable to believe, if man had not incurred a great intellectual, as well as moral, loss, by his disobedience to his maker, he would, with his superior and undiminished faculties, and unvitiated mind, have made vastly greater acquisitions in knowledge of the highest description, than he has

since actually done ; although, through the unremitting goodness of his creator, the knowledge he has acquired, even of many things which in Eden would not have been needed, is, to say the least, far otherwise than contemptible. After inviting Cain's consideration of what these superior beings are or were, Lucifer tells him, if it were irksome to him to do so, he would safely waft him back to till the Earth, his task. We shall see how willing Cain was to return, after this fascinating excursion :—

CAIN.

No: I'll stay here.

LUCIFER.

How long ?

CAIN.

For ever ! Since
I must one day return here from the Earth,
I rather would remain ; I am sick of all
That dust has shewn me—let me dwell in shadows.

LUCIFER.

It cannot be: thou now beholdest as
A vision that which is reality.
To make thyself fit for this dwelling, thou
Must pass through what the things thou see'st have pass'd—
The gates of death.

CAIN.

By what gate have we enter'd

Even now ?

LUCIFER.

By mine! But, plighted to return,
 My spirit buoys thee up to breathe in regions
 Where all is breathless save thyself. Gaze on;
 But do not think to dwell here till thine hour
 Is come.

CAIN.

And these, too; can they ne'er repass
 To Earth again?

LUCIFER.

Their Earth is gone for ever —
 So chang'd by its convulsion, they would not
 Be conscious to a single present spot
 Of its new scarcely harden'd surface — 't was —
 ✓ Oh, what a beautiful world it *was!* }

CAIN.

And is.
 It is not with the Earth, though I must till it,
 I feel at war, but that I may not profit
 By what it bears of beautiful untoiling,
 Nor gratify my thousand swelling thoughts
 With knowledge, nor allay my thousand fears
 Of death and life.

LUCIFER.

What thy world is, thou see'st,
 But canst not comprehend the shadow of
 That which it was.

Note 46.

Cain, what with his idea of the necessity of one day returning from Earth again to these shadowy regions; and what with his sickness of all that "dust had shewn him" in his own world; chooses to decline Lucifer's offer to conduct him safely back; and prefers taking up his eternal abode at once, in shadows. That many, like Cain, are "sick of dust," that is, of this world, and that from various causes, is certain. Those causes are too well known to need being particularized. But whoever believes, in good earnest, the Christian revelation, and lives under its *proper influence*, cannot be *sick* of, that is, disgusted with, life, so long as it pleases him who gave it him, to continue it. To be thoroughly disengaged from, in point of *attachment*, (to say the least,) so as to be *glad* of the prospect of escaping from it to a far better, in God's appointed time, is quite another thing. But nothing, save the authentic contents of his revelation, can rationally work this desirable state of mind in man. *Without* that sanction, it appears highly *irrational* to desire to quit the present life, even with the utmost of its inconveniences; because we can by no means be rationally sure, except on gospel principles, of not exchanging it for a much worse. Cain however, of all men, seems to have had the least possible cause to be dissatisfied with life. Nor were any of his relatives so; then why he? Lucifer tells him however, he cannot have his wish without passing through the gates of death; which occasions Cain's asking, by what gate they entered? Lucifer replies—by his; and that his spirit buoys Cain up, to breathe where else he could not. As to Lucifer's existence, it has been shewn.

But if his existence is important to man, so of course his powers must be. He here gives an instance of his power, though not of the terrific kind; nor does it seem incredible that he *should* thus transport Cain, whether actually or in vision, need not be determined, when we recollect his transactions with his own creator, the Son, (in his humiliated state, afterwards,) by transporting *him* from place to place, and exhibiting things, either to his bodily sense, or to his mind; though there does not appear to be sufficient ground for rejecting the *literal* account, as given in the New Testament, respecting Christ's temptations.

It cannot, without refusing moral evidence so strong that the refusal of it would undermine all moral evidence whatever among men, be doubted, that it has pleased God, (and it *cannot* be but for wise and good purposes,) to permit to Lucifer very considerable power and influence over the human frame; but still subserviently to his own (the divine) direction. And it is evident that Lucifer can cause in men the effects, or at least the appearances of properties and capacities beyond those which naturally belong to them. This is evident in the cases of demoniacal possession and influence recorded in scripture; as well as, also, in numerous other instances of the same kind, of which there is too much moral evidence to allow their being reasonably doubted. It does seem indeed, that the progress of the Gospel, and of the improvement of the mind and intellectual powers of mankind, has greatly diminished the *grosser* instances of Lucifer's power in this respect; and it is possible also, that the Almighty has, for reasons of his own, seen it right, more specifically to abridge his operations in the present period of the world's existence. But is there not as much danger from the Scyllean advance of intellect on the one hand, as from the Charybdal abyss of ignorance on the other? If the latter expose to deception of one kind; does not the former expose to deception of another kind? And which is worse, it may be hard to say; whether to believe too much, or too little. For, as before hinted at, what are not the evils to which man is exposed, by rejecting moral evidence of many things beyond his own personal

knowledge? And is it not a question, whether the same preference of what is called *rationality* in the present day, to *evidence*, do not as readily lead to the disbelief in God, as in Lucifer? *Scripture* speaks as decidedly of the one, as of the other. If we reject scripture therefore, in respect of Lucifer, and his operations; why not reject God and his operations? And what does that lead to? But reasonable men are not prepared to say, the world would go on better were the belief in a supreme moral and providential governor thrust out of it, and all things left to chance, and man.

But besides scriptural and other evidence, there are not wanting (vide *Barter*, on the immateriality of the human soul) physiological reasons for crediting the alleged operations of Lucifer and his subordinate infernal agents. It is thought that the cases of extraordinary excitement in lunatics, or mad persons cannot be satisfactorily accounted for upon any other supposition than that of its being the work of those malevolent spirits; (under God's permission;) since physical causes, though they may affect the soul in the way of limiting its faculties, or deadening or impeding its activity, yet cannot be imagined to animate it in so terrible a manner as is often seen; because matter, from its own inertness, is incapable of any action at all, unless employed as an instrument by some other cause. Hence it is concluded, that some living, intelligent cause, operates upon the material organ, (the sensory, for instance,) and there forms those images or representations which the soul, always active, lively, and percipient, cannot but behold, and which thereupon excite in the soul, that extraordinary emotion of which we are speaking. It could not be the voluntary act of the soul (which never acts without volition) to be thus the tormentor of itself, as well as of its companion the body also, which it regards with affection, and without whose aid its own powers would be chiefly unemployed and useless; for it is not permitted to act separately; otherwise it might prefer to act as a separate person from the body altogether, unclogged by matter; which is not the intention of the author of their united existence. But this is not meant to derogate from the divine influence of the Holy Spirit

upon the soul, in an immediate manner. It is admitted, that the disorder of the *material* part of man may produce effects of such a nature as approximate to its own inertness and inactivity, such as idiocy, sleep, apoplexy, or the like ; but not cause rage, distraction, frenzy, unless *wrought upon* as above stated. Nor could the disease be lodged in the soul itself, which is an uncompounded, simple substance, and hath no parts, and therefore properly, no constitution, or corporeal frame : neither is it liable to any change or alteration in its own nature. Hence there appears no other way for its being thus affected, but from the cause already assigned. It should seem therefore that the term “madness” carries with it a sort of imputation on the soul itself, as if chargeable with some fault in its own constitution : an imputation it does not merit. On the other hand, it sometimes is difficult to find the distinguishing line between mental affliction of this nature, and bad moral character. The same reasoning is applied (in reference to the agency of spiritual beings) to the phenomenon of dreaming also ; in which state the soul is *obliged*, being ever awake, and attentive, and yet confined to the body, to behold whatever illusory representations are made on the sensory during sleep, the same as in the case of persons awake. But as to dreams, there seems to be latitude for the intervention of *good* and benevolent spirits also, either in the way of thus making useful or monitory images or impressions ; or perhaps by opposing and modifying the mischievous operations of evil spirits ; or by relieving the soul from them altogether, or in other ways of which we cannot be fully aware. And as evil spirits may make impressions for the soul’s perception, which it abhors and dreads, and regards with aversion, and would gladly avoid if it could : so good spirits may impress subjects of an opposite nature, which the soul may contemplate with pleasure and *willingness*, and possibly retain, and employ for its future use. These notions seem rather to be confirmed by, than to oppose, that petition in the form of prayer which Jesus Christ gave to his disciples at their request,—“and deliver us from evil ;” which many persons, of competent judgment, have thought, might have been more appropriately

rendered "*the* evil one;" which the original word is believed to *import*, by way of *eminence*, when ascribed to Lucifer, or Satan; since it expresses the idea of an *agent*, *purposely* evil, malignant, false, mischievous, vicious, wicked, *habitually* bad. Nor can it, I presume, be denied, that this view of the subject has a tendency to recommend an increased sense of man's dependance upon the unceasing goodness, and providential defence, of God, against these evils, or this "evil," to which he is exposed. I say, "evil," certainly; and so does Christ himself; but doubtless in the qualified manner in which we have before considered it; and in accommodation to common language and perception.

Cain was grieved, as it should seem, at the idea of these phantoms never being able to repass to their world again, which Lucifer tells him was gone for ever. This is so scriptural, one cannot help supposing Lord Byron adopted the feeling and the idea from that source. It certainly invites to consideration; for if a condition of happiness be lost, without a recompence, and we feel its loss, and are without hope beside; what can be more affecting to so sensitive, and so helpless a creature as man? Helpless, that is, more especially, in the next and final state, deprived of the external resources he possesses in this. Cain declares here, that he was not at war with the Earth, beautiful as Lucifer states it to have been, and as Cain allows it still to be; therefore his war was *only* with *his maker!* and that, because he could not enjoy its beauties without toil! But in that sentiment, he will not find any among the rational, and rightly disposed of mankind, to join him. As to his not being able to "gratify his thousand swelling thoughts with knowledge," he has not given us a very favourable specimen of his manner of thinking, nor shewn, to any rational mind, that his "swelling thoughts" ought to be gratified. or were worth gratifying. It is well known, there are thoughts no better than waking dreams: such, it must be confessed, were Cain's. He neglected realities, to pursue shadows, impertinencies, and destruction. These "swelling thoughts" do not appear to have haunted, or to have been entertained by, his father, or his brother. Yet *they*

were happy. But Cain would "have nought to do" with such happiness as theirs. He seems, with Lucifer, (having added his spirit to his own,) to prefer the "independency of torture." And if that be desirable, it will be obtained, if sought. His complaint, however, of not being able to allay his thousand fears of life and death, is more curious still, if possible. What could be his fears of life, seems hard to say. His was the only family on Earth, united and affectionate, as it should seem; or, himself the only exception. From them therefore he had no evil to fear: and from whom else could he? And excessive or unfounded fear of life, belongs only to the timid, or the insuperably nervous; neither of which weaknesses seems at all applicable to Cain. As to his fears of death, too, they *might* have been all removed, by his accepting, with his father and mother, brother and sisters, that *complete antidote* against such fears, which the Almighty had, even at that early period, provided, by what Adah speaks of presently — the "Atonement." Are fears of life and death desirable? There certainly *may be* such fears in many besides Cain. And even if steeled against them here, their result will be realized hereafter, by all who, like this miserable Cain, forsake their God, cultivate Luciferian companionship, and despise the antidote or remedy just mentioned. Lucifer however, condoles not much with his melancholy friend. His office is, in fact, not to allay, but to create and foment, discontents with, and enmity to, his maker. He coolly tells him, he sees what his own world *is*, but cannot comprehend the shadow of what it *was*. Yet his own representation of it is a shadow also, notwithstanding the descriptive figures now about to be presented to our contemplation.

CAIN.

And those enormous creatures,
Phantoms inferior in intelligence
(At least so seeming) to the things we have pass'd,
Resembling somewhat the wild inhabitants

Of the deep woods of Earth, the hugest which
 Roar nightly in the forest, but ten-fold
 In magnitude and terror ; taller than
 The cherub-guarded walls of Eden, with
 Eyes flashing like the fiery swords which fence them,
 And tusks projecting like the trees stripp'd of
 Their bark and branches—what were they ?

LUCIFER.

That which
 The Mammoth is in thy world :— but these lie
 By myriads underneath its surface.

CAIN.

But
 None on it ?

LUCIFER.

No : for thy frail race to war
 With them would render the curse on it useless—
 'T would be destroyed so early.

CAIN.

But why *war* ?

LUCIFER.

✓ You have forgotten the denunciation
 Which drove your race from Eden— war with all things,
 And death to all things, and disease to most things,
 And pangs, and bitterness : these were the fruits

CAIN.

But animals—
Did they too eat of it, that they must die ?

LUCIFER.

Your maker told ye, *they* were made for you,
As you for him.—You would not have their doom
Superior to your own ? Had Adam not
Fallen, all had stood.

Note 47.

The Cuvierian system seems to be that which leads to these representations exhibited by Lucifer to Cain. But however imaginative or amusing such speculations may be, they cannot, I suppose, be shewn to be certain or very probable; namely, that this Earth was formerly the habitation of larger and more powerful animals than at present; at least to the extent here stated. In a rational point of view, the pursuit of that which we call knowledge, but which, if consisting in the discovery of what is useless to man, either for time, or for eternity, is, to say the least, lost labour. But if the acquisition of such knowledge be accompanied by a disposition, (perhaps springing from that very knowledge,) to forget or to deny God, or to neglect our spiritual and eternal welfare, it then becomes fraught with death. The greatest unhappiness of man is to be amused with toys of various kinds, and suffer them to shut out the most serious realities from his mind.

But we have now to notice another representation of Lucifer. He states that the fruits of the forbidden tree were, "war with all things, and death to all things, and disease to most things, and pangs, and bitterness." A melancholy catalogue, this; but not to be denied, with some reasonable modifications. Yet these fruits were, properly

speaking, not so much *denounced* by the Almighty on Adam's removal from Paradise, as they were the proper *effects* of his transgression; which I think a fair distinction: for denunciation is a *hard* word, and death was *personally* denounced upon Adam only; and that by way of gentle, though solemn *warning*. The *modifications* of this "war" are also to be noticed; for they are many; and the war itself, with the animals and the elements, and every thing else which man has to overcome, whether moral, physical, or intellectual, is much mitigated by a thousand providential circumstances of facility; and man's nature is much adapted to it; so that the war is little more than the agreeable use of his natural faculties. Occasional difficulties and pains are not denied; but even they have their alleviations. So kindly has God *tempered* this war with all things. And besides that, is not this war considerably *increased* by man's own imaginations, and excessive and artificial desires? Then, as to the "death to all things;" that is true of every thing mortal, certainly. But to *man*, we have seen, almost by Lucifer's own shewing, that death may be considered nearly "another life;" but certainly the *entrance* to an incomparably better life than the present, if it be not man's own fault in rejecting or despising the way to it. If he do so, it must be confessed that the death Lucifer speaks of is the entrance to another death infinitely more dreadful; but it will be of the own-procuring of every individual who incurs it: — a remedy and a refuge are provided. With respect to the "*disease* to most things;" what things are exempt from it in some shape or degree or other? Yet in many, so slight, as to be next to unimportant; and in others, the subject of very great reliefs, either from instinctive remedies, or skill of man, which God has kindly given him; and *man's* diseases are well known to be greatly of his own making, and very avoidable by the right use of his physical and moral and rational nature: to say nothing of the counteracting skill and knowledge which God has so benignantly bestowed on him. The "pangs and bitterness," which Lucifer also enumerates, are no doubt sometimes considerable, and extremely various; but we should, first, remember to what extent

they are chargeable on man only; and indeed, may it not be asserted, that they are *wholly* attributable to himself, if *personal*, whether mental or physical? If they are of a *relative* kind, resulting from social connexions, have they not their *mitigations*? But beyond all other considerations, there is *revelation* to cure what nothing else may; and *that* is infallible and perfect.

With respect to Cain's question—whether the animals too had eaten of the forbidden fruit, that *they* must die? I presume he meant—not to ask what he could not but have known; but, rather, to enquire, why they should die, *not* having committed that transgression? Lucifer's answer is full of matter, requiring consideration, and some discrimination too. We advert however first, to Lord Byron's honest confession and regret in his preface, that he could not always make Lucifer speak as a clergyman; but now, we have before us, happily, a proof of his *eminent* success. For what more appropriate communication can proceed from the most eloquent or pious lips, to man, than an admonitory exhortation to remember, not only, or principally, that the animals were made for him; but more especially that man himself was made for his creator? Here then, of Lord Byron it may be said, though in the person of man's grand enemy, that, like his own Abel, "he being dead yet speaketh." But Lucifer having given the theme, we ought not to pass it over neglectfully. In the first place, we should recognize its perfect accordance not only with the light which man had in Adah's day, as we have seen by her interesting address to deity, before noticed; but, still more, with the revelation which the Almighty has so explicitly made to man, and which has been considered: for in that he declares,—“the Lord hath made *all* (things) *for himself*; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil.” And, “this people have I formed *for myself*; they shall shew forth my *praise*.” And, “all things were created by him, and *for him*.” Again; “every one that is called by my name, for I have created him *for my glory*. Also; “for thou hast created all things, and *for thy pleasure* they are and were created.” These are only a few out of abundant scripture testimonies to the truth of Luci-

fer's declaration to his attentive auditor; forming, it is true, a slender congregation. If all other preachers therefore should unfaithfully withhold this great and interesting truth from man, Lucifer alone must have the praise; — I mean the Lucifer of Lord Byron.— Quotations may not be multiplied; else it were easy to shew, from the oracles of truth, that God's end, in the whole creation, is to manifest his own glory; and that the true intent of man's creation in particular, is, to glorify his creator. God may, moreover, easily be shewn, from his word, to be exceeding *tenacious of*, or "jealous" for, his glory. And most rightly. For the divine glory embraces all his attributes,—his love, his mercy, and his goodness, as well as his justice, his holiness, and his truth. But, though man was made for his creator's glory, and the true end, and paramount duty, of man, is to cultivate his existence, intentionally, and exclusively, with that view; yet, God not being man, (who usually aims at his own glory very unworthily, and without regard to the happiness of those who contribute to it,) therefore man's own proper and true *happiness* is essentially connected with his glorifying his maker, and with his *inward* surrender of himself to him, and honouring him in every way in which the word, and providence, of God, may lead him to do it; and that, to such extent, as the ability, given him of God, may enable him to do. God then, is glorified by his creature man, in loving, obeying, and venerating his maker supremely, as the *first* object of all his rational, and intellectual, and affectionate, and moral nature, as required not only by reason, according to Plato, but also by the divine word, where that word is known; and (as part of, and included in, that supreme devotedness to his creator's glory) in "loving his neighbour as himself," as required by the same authority. This is man's duty and his high and distinguishing privilege; and this, as it should seem, the meaning of his being made for his maker, according to Lucifer's true announcements. How far man performs this duty, and enjoys this privilege, and thereby secures his own true happiness, let every one's conscience, enlightened by his maker's word and spirit, tell him. But if this be not man's sincere intent

and *desire*, in this life, what can he rationally think must be his condition in the next? If he delight not or *desire not* to delight himself *here*, in him who made him, and for whom he was made, how can he expect to do so hereafter? And not delighting in God, what other object of complacency or means of happiness can he ever find?

In entreating my readers however (if, happily, readers I may have) to acquire and cultivate as their first and last concern, the love of God their maker, I only ask them to acquire and cultivate that feeling towards the author of all existence, which the most ingenuous and affectionate children can be imagined to experience towards the most generous and affectionate of parents. What hardship, what difficulty, what misery, in that? If revelation be to be credited, and the testimony of multitudes upon multitudes of those who have embraced it during the progress of eighteen hundred years; it is the reverse of hard, difficult, or miserable. But is HE who died that we may live for ever, and who bore the divine displeasure against sin, to the very uttermost, that man may not — is *he* to be less regarded than the Father? Surely no. Jesus Christ therefore, even God our maker still, but in the person of the Son, in whom, and in whose mediatorial character, Jehovah can alone be visible in beatific vision, in heavenly glory — he too, is to be equally regarded with the Father. Nor is the less reverential attention due to the same God, in the person of the Spirit, whose kind and gracious offices to man are equally inestimable, and indispensable. Without this divine influence, how is man's mind to be rightly directed, or man's affections to be raised to things above the dust? For the advanced in life, then, what can be so consolatory as this three-fold motive for love to God our maker? For the *less* advanced in life, what so worthy of their first regard? and of which it may be said, it is at once "*decus et tutamen*," their defence and glory?

These are matters between every man and his creator, certainly. But they are (let the bustling and thoughtless world say, and Lucifer suggest, what they may to the contrary) most momentous, and should not be despised, if happiness, here and hereafter, be a rational object

of man's pursuit. Those who have God's word, have a sure and sufficient guide, and should trust none other; though occasional and honest admonitions and exhortations are still useful. It is man's unhappiness not to pay due regard to that word, and to the influence and aid of that Holy Spirit, of whom it speaks, and to whom it directs,

“As the star that watches, welcoming the morn.”

It is to be regretted, that although we see the world perpetually leaving us in the course of time, as the ocean leaves the shore by its imperceptible ebbings, still we *will* act and think as if this world was our final home. We will not cultivate an acquaintance with that world between which and our souls the partition is so proverbially slight and of uncertain duration. Yet the transition will be more important than can adequately be imagined. Why then leave it to chance? Why not secure our maker's present and future friendship, his favourable and blissful reception, when our spirits, disembodied, must stand either trembling or rejoicing before him? If to do so were incompatible with all or any of the needful and rational purposes or pursuits of this life; the case would be a different one. But it is not so. The favour of God, and the enjoyment of it paramently to every other enjoyment, does *not* interfere with any human enjoyment, or felicity, that is not condemned by the known laws of *morality* and *reason*. Why then will we so throw away our immortal spirits, and doom them to eternal woe, for the sake of—what? Can those things help or save us, for the sake of which we so act? There may be, in some individuals, true religion with a defect of prudence and ordinary wisdom. But true religion, (*viz.* the union of man's heart with his maker, through and in Christ) does not require the absence of, but rather enjoins, all wisdom and prudence even in this world's concerns. But it certainly requires man not to make this world his god. If we do, the “god of this world” is our master and lord; and him, as Lucifer has truly admonished us, we serve and worship.

And what *then*?—Having however *secured* (by God's grace) the heart to God in Christ, man cannot but glorify his maker, and benefit his fellow creatures, as its natural effect. No compulsion, no persuasion then, is, generally speaking, necessary. All is voluntary. What is not voluntary we know to be never acceptable with God. This may certainly be exemplified in various modes and degrees according to circumstances. But even its *negative* effects are not unimportant. Where this principle reigns, and that state is enjoyed, it is sure to exclude immorality. Dishonesty cannot stand before it. Indulged vitiosity, in any shape, is incompatible with its existence. And so of all other infesters of human life and destroyers of social happiness.

But Lucifer further reminds his disciple, that the animals were made for man, as man for God. Both true, certainly. Yet, doubtless, the animals were made, to enjoy existence themselves, as well as for man's use. Nor were they made for his *abuse*, that I can find in the record of donation. Is this distinction sufficiently regarded? Are not the animals *abused* to many *God-forgetting*, man-demoralizing, *Lucifer-gratifying* purposes; for man's irrational, unmerciful, *amusement*, rather than for his *use*? For this abuse their common creator never designed them. Or, will it be said, that their faculties and powers *prove* them designed for such purposes? That allegation may be answered first, by asking, if those purposes be such, whereby man can glorify his maker, in the feelings or expression of gratitude or thankfulness, for such *use* of the animals, in accordance with the divine *word*; If not, those purposes *must* be wrong, if the word of God be right. Secondly: does it follow, that the animals were designed for the purposes in question, merely because they are capable of being *trained* to them by the *art* and *skill* of man? It is conceived, not so by any means: but were it so asserted; it might then, thirdly, be asked, whether every use of the art and skill of man is necessarily, or certainly, agreeable to the mind and will of the Almighty, as developed in his word? And fourthly; whether, in point of fact, it be not too evident to be contradicted, that num-

berless instances of the exercise of man's *talents*, and art, and skill, are diametrically *opposed* to the *nature*, and the *word*, of God? But, to do Lucifer full justice, in this part of his admonition, it should be added that these observations may be extended to *all* subjects of human life, wherein we should remember that man was made for his creator; meaning doubtless to glorify him, as has been said, by his rational and moral existence; else, what would the expression mean, that man was *made for* God?

Lucifer, as we have seen, reminds man of the animals having been made for man, which, in a large sense, is true. The divine grant runs thus;—"have dominion over every living thing:—into your hands are they delivered:—every thing that liveth shall be for meat for you." Now this is clearly a *dominion* given to man, but not a *tyranny*. Are not the terms essentially different? Does not the former mean lawful and just sovereignty; the latter, despotic and lawless oppression? Do not all *just* sovereigns *legislate* protectively for their subjects? do they not protect them? Why then should not man legislate protectively (as indeed of late years has been attempted) for those subjects of his *dominion*, not *tyranny*, which God has thus graciously bestowed upon him, and of which legislation the almighty sovereign himself has so kindly and condescendingly set the example? God has thus legislated for his inferior animal creation. Ought then, *senatorial* man to call this legislation "petty," which his *creator* deems *not so*? Senatorial man, however, in his ready defence, has countenanced the assertion, that tyrannous, infernal cruelty to baited, "tortured," worried animals, is needful, or useful, to a nation's *courage*. But is not cruelty much oftener associated with cowardice, than with courage? Are not cruelty and every baseness usually united? And are not the *most part of truly brave* men the most humane? Look from the highest to the lowest grades of mankind in every age of the world, for examples. [And are not the animals also, generally, too much *oppressed*, beyond their strength and powers, and even beyond the just, and reasonable wants of man?] But if *courage* be in fact needful to a nation, yet are we prepared to

admit, that *bad morals* are needful to a nation? Or, that *good morals* are *not* needful? Is not cruelty of the very essence of bad morals? Do we discard revelation? If not, then does not revelation declare, that "righteousness (and what is righteousness but good morals?) exalteth a nation; but sin (and are not bad morals sin?) is a reproach to any people"? Then, even if cruelty *were* necessary to courage, ought it to be cultivated at the expence of good morals, until revelation as well as common sense be exploded? The same revelation also declares, that "a righteous man regardeth the life (doubtless meaning the entire treatment) of his beast." Then he who acts oppositely to that, must of necessity be an unrighteous (wicked) man. Now the "end of a righteous man," we are told, "is peace;" but that "there is *no peace* to the wicked:" and that *peace* is *emphatic*, and extends to interminable existence. These are important considerations though arising out of Luciferian teaching. But is not consideration too little the habit of man in all times, and in these not the least? And is not England, to all appearance, too fast verging to the condition of ancient Rome, prelusively to her decline and downfall, when ("da panem, da ludos") the people, if feasted and amused, cared for nought else? Religion and freedom were then despised! As if man (adverting now to amusements) had not serious and useful subjects enough in life, provident of the present, prospective of the future, to engage him rationally and agreeably, without Luciferian expedients for preventing him from regarding his true original and end, and important destination. On a dying bed, and at the judgment seat of Christ, what will avail the vicious, the frivolous, the irrational, the useless, the destructive, the time-murdering, the God-dishonouring, the God-forgetting *amusements* of life? Will not regret, not now to be conceived of in any adequate degree, be the wretched and hopeless and self-condemning result? What else can we expect with any rationality, in the place of never-ending and still-increasing happiness, in the enjoyment of intellectual and spiritual gratifications, emanating from the Supreme himself! Why will not man *thus* "anticipate his immortality?"

Why will he tie himself down to things here which he *cannot* possess in that future state of being, and the *craving* for which may, *possibly*, constitute no small part of his unutterable misery. This soul-destroying, and truly Luciferian, rage for frivolous and vicious amusement, seems to be recently, in *some* small degree, yielding to the progress of greater rationality, as is evident in the establishment of mechanical and literary and scientific institutions—much to be admired and applauded, certainly; but still with caution, however favourable the aspect in some respects may be. For science will not secure or even promote happiness to the soul in a future life and state of being. Lucifer fell not by frivolity and vice, but by pride of intellect. The latter may be, perhaps is, full as much his instrument of ensnaring and destroying, as the former. He himself fell by intellect, and self-adulation, and defiance of his maker. And does not neglect lead to defiance? Piety then is the only safe-guard; nor is it, still, *necessarily* incompatible with science.

Lucifer's observations have been seen to be fraught with matter of contemplation. His now reminding Cain of his maker's declaration that man was made for *him*, leads to the conclusion glanced at above—that man should therefore *consult for*, and not *disregard*, the divine glory, as lately endeavoured to be explained, in all he “acts or thinks.” To say the least, it seems that man should not act or think any thing designedly and habitually inimical, or derogatory to his creator, or to that relation of friendship and favour, which man ought, rationally, and solicitously, to *wish* to maintain with him. Whatever habits or practices therefore cannot be sanctioned by God's word, however speciously excused by their harmlessness, innocence, and so forth, is surely contrary to the possibility of preserving friendly intercourse with our maker whom we so purposely dishonour and despise. In a former note, an apophthegm has been suggested from Lucifer's hints, viz. “Anticipate thy Immortality.” Lucifer now also affords matter for another, viz. “Man was made for God.” May not the recollection of this truth save man from much error and misery, and promote his acquisition of his truest dignity, and only secure and

most elevated happiness? But does not this relate to man politically, as well as individually? For is not political man as much God's moral creature, as is individual man? If so, do not the few, who represent the many, come within that description? For does not representation imply moral similarity between the representative and the represented, and a community of interests; and that what is good for the one is good for the other in their moral and political relation? If it be good therefore for the represented to regard morality, and to make their creator's glory the first influential object of their existence, in order to the enjoyment of his favour and regard, wherein alone their existence can be happy; then should not the same governing principles obtain as much among the representatives as among the represented? This is certainly meant to apply to the great council of a nation. Can the question be evaded? Should then such great council, as it were by rule, if not by statute, shut their creator out from their councils? Were not they, as well as those they represent, *made for him*, and for his glory? And does not man's happiness and welfare consist in consulting for and promoting it? Are not that happiness and welfare, and that promotion of the divine glory, essentially connected; and may it not be truly added, most gratefully so too? Where then is the rationality of excluding from national councils all consideration for the mind and will of God, and confining their pursuits and purposes exclusively to *man's* mind and will; as if God were not only "not in all their thoughts;" but as if the represented nation itself had no God, and as if there were no supreme moral governor of the world? But should not the revelation we have considered be first shewn to be a falsity, and then rejected? Having done that, their proceedings would be consistent and safe; otherwise most inconsistent and unsafe. What then must be thought of, or felt for a nation, professing a belief of a supreme moral governor, and that the revelation in question is a reality and truth, whose great council nevertheless acted as if there were no such existence as that revelation, or the supreme whom it declares, and whose "eyes run to and fro through all the Earth, to shew himself strong in behalf

of those whose heart is perfect towards him." It is indeed granted, that not even any *individual* is, or can be, so devoted to his maker's glory as he *ought* to be, in all his ways; but there is much space between that, and not regarding God *at all*. Yet, has there not been a time, when, in the great council of England, the divine glory, and real religion, *were* consulted for, and, to some good extent, at least, made an object of sincere legislation?—"Hæ tibi erunt Artes!" —By the art, then, of piety to God, which includes justice towards man, it was, under the divine favour and protection, and when his name, and authority, and mind, and will, were heard and considered and venerated, and not forbidden in their councils, that England, rose; became revered, and established; and tyrants trembled and fell before her. But her rulers, *then*, believed the divine declaration, —"Them that honour me I will honour; and they that despise me shall be lightly esteemed." Does not the page of fair history reveal such a period? But if this national exaltation has been lost; is it not because God and religion have been first too much abandoned? Is God's name, or revealed *will*, or his *glory* (which always implicates justice and beneficence to man) permitted to be brought into question in the senate? Yet can it be less incumbent on a nation collectively than it is individually, to acknowledge God in all their ways; and carefully to consider if every proposed measure be agreeable to those principles which he has declared in his word, (the authenticity of which we have considered) and which he requires to be made the rule of man's conduct, toward himself first, and therein necessarily toward man also? Are a few hundreds or scores of men, because in council assembled, therefore more mighty, more independent of, their maker, of the ruler of all things, and more capable, because thus confederated, of sustaining themselves without his protecting and supporting power? What can be more erroneous than such a supposition? Has not a great authority said, and an equally great authority repeated, that, "as Carthage has lost her liberties and perished; and as Rome has lost her liberties and perished; so will England lose her liberties and perish, when her legislative shall be-

come more corrupt than the executive?" But if this be true *politically* (Heaven avert the sign!) may it not be applied with force a hundred and a thousand-fold more intense, if, for political liberties, we substitute religion? For if a nation be *politically* to perish, when her legislative shall become more corrupt than her executive; what must be her fate, when she loses her *true* PALLADIUM of *sincere* religion? That is, real, and *internal*, piety to God? External profit not, where the heart is absent. They are not accepted. Either then "the book" itself is a fable; or God has said,—“shall I not visit for these things? Shall not my soul be avenged on such a nation as this? You only have I known of all the families upon Earth; therefore I will punish you for all your iniquities.” Questionless, England, of all the nations upon Earth, most resembles ancient Israel, in God’s electing and sovereign dealings with her. England has been, and is, God’s favoured people; eminently the depository of his Gospel, as was Israel of his Law. But what has been the fate of Israel? What has been the fate of once Christian Africa? What, of once Christian Rome? For has Rome the Gospel in its purity? What is Romish Christianity? What are Romish morals? What is Romish, or African liberty? Why then will not English councils legislate for God? Is a nation even likely to be a *loser* by having God for her friend and her defence? Why will they despise him? Why do they practically renounce him? What must be the consequence, when once his long-suffering shall have waited its appointed time? But is England not, at this very moment, suffering under this God-renouncing system? Fanes may be multiplied; but God seeks the *heart*. He dwelleth not in temples made with hands, in which he finds no corresponding sentiments towards himself. What are the sacrifices he requires? Pomp and ceremony delight him not. But far *otherwise*. [Isa. i. throughout, and Nahum iii. throughout. “Art thou better than populous No?”] —Yet, is there a Briton born, though mournful, when contemplating these things, whose expostulation will not end with

“ ENGLAND! with all thy faults, I love thee still ;”?

and, with a patriot of a much less favoured country, [so far as human transiency will permit,]

“ ESTO PERPETUA !”?

But *should not* these things be *considered*?

In speaking of the animals, Lucifer uses the term “doom,” which seems not justly applicable, and to be only employed odiously in the way of aspersion of his maker. Indeed it appears to be equally wrong even in regard to man. For dooming, or destining, is rather the act of Luciferian “tyrants” than of a righteous judge, or beneficent and wise legislator. But the *animals*, especially, were not only not doomed, but they were not even judged as man was, for they had not transgressed. As to the serpent indeed, his condemnation, such as it was, was doubtless right, as proceeding from rectitude itself, whether man perceive it fully, or at all, or not. Yet *some* propriety, even man perhaps may see in that divine act.

As the animals however do appear, or are supposed, to have undergone a change in their nature, and to have incurred some, perhaps much, loss of happiness and enjoyment in consequence of man’s delinquency ; so, it is thought, there are some scriptural grounds for believing they will ultimately be delivered from their deteriorated condition, and be restored to their original and better nature, and unsuffering enjoyment of existence. Perhaps, against this notion may be quoted from scripture, — “the spirit of man goeth upward, but the spirit of the beast, downward to the Earth :” but this does not seem discrepant with those other parts of scripture which appear to point to their restitution. It may mean only, that the spirit of the beast (doubtless *immaterial*, if not immortal like man’s) does, in the *first* instance, go downward to the Earth, vanishing in death : yet this is not saying that God will not, much less, cannot, *preserve* the spirit of the beast if not *naturally* immortal, for its future restor-

ation to the body. It seems also to be highly consistent with the divine goodness thus to recompense the animals for their unmerited sufferings on man's account, and *from* man; so that, at the grand consummation it may appear, that nothing has been, as Lucifer would express it, "amerced of happiness," which has not sinned. And though many of the animals have not been the subjects of man's superiority, but have retained their liberty; yet they may be happier if restored to those more *innocuous* dispositions we may suppose them to have been endued with. Clearly also, many parts of the animal creation were *not* made for man's use; for man neither needs them, nor *can* domesticate them. These therefore seem to be created, to shew the *infinity*, nearly, of the exhibitions of divine power and goodness; and when is *that* source of delight and admiration to be withdrawn? Should these seem to be *trifling* lucubrations, does not the known benevolence of the author himself fairly call them forth? For I rather think *he* was of a disposition towards animals not to object to these notions, or what has preceded, or what follows, on their account. As to there being, therefore, no adequate motive for this restoration, because the animals were generally made for man, and man will not need them in a future state; it does not follow that they were not created to *enjoy existence* for themselves; of which enjoyment they are more abridged by man than they ought to be. Neither does it appear clear that their being (at least by man) denominated "brutes," is any argument against such restoration; for, if the term "brute," whether used as a quality or a species, be considered, it will be found more applicable to multitudes of the *human* kind, than to other animals. Besides, does not the term "brute," in its radical derivation, most properly signify what is void, not of reason alone, but of animation too: viz. brute, or insensible, *matter*, or earth, only? If it should be objected too, that they are endued with instinct merely, and not with reason; let those qualities be accurately enquired into; and let it be seen if man be not as much a creature of instinct, as the inferior animals; and they, as much the subject of reason, as man; the difference, in regard of reason, being

chiefly, if not wholly, in the *degree*. Nor does their not knowing God, or their freedom from moral accountability, seem to militate against their restoration. Neither is it to be overlooked, that if the works of creation are now, and possibly will be through all eternity, *one* source of praise to God; why may not the existence of animals constitute a part of it? For even now, not a few of mankind take pleasure in seeing them happy, as well as in noticing their faculties, their forms, and habits; no small source, it may be, of admiration, of the universal and benignant creator. Besides, without enlarging upon their rationality, can it be disputed that they possess, not only the powers we term mental, such as attention, consideration, recollection, determination; so as, apparently, to deduce proposition from proposition beyond the office of mere instinct; but, apparently, moral qualities also, which they need not for their usefulness to man; for would they not be equally useful without those dispositions? gratitude and affection for instance: — “The ox knoweth his owner, and the ass his master’s crib: Israel doth *not* know; my people doth *not* consider:” — where is the divine antithesis, if regard and consideration, be not here ascribed to those animals; unless man himself be not a regardful or considerative animal? And are those qualities instinctive merely? If they be, why do they so often fail in man? And what is *consideration*, if it be not an act of reasoning? And can there be reasoning, without reason? The difference then seems to be in the degree, the extent, the objects. But do not these things tend to raise the animal creation (so called in distinction to the human) somewhat above brutality as well as man? And if the animals exhibit a variety of moral character, does not man equally so? And are not animals as sensible of difference in the treatment of them, as man himself, and equally affected, in their characters, by such difference?

CAIN.

Alas! the hopeless wretches!
 They too must share my sire's fate, like his sons;
 Like them, too, without the so dear-bought knowledge!
 It was a lying tree—for we *know* nothing.
 At least it *promised knowledge* at the *price*
 Of death—but *knowledge* still: but what *knows* man?

LUCIFER.

It may be death leads to the *highest* knowledge;
 And being of all things, the sole thing certain,
 At least leads to the *surest* science: therefore
 The tree was true, though deadly.

Note 49.

I by no means wish to be *too* severe on Cain: but can we credit him for sincerity in this curious lamentation over the animals? We shall see. Can a proneness to misrepresentation, and sarcastic untruth, consist with sincerity? He affects to commiserate them for suffering his sire's fate, like his son's, without having shared the apple. Is not this, merely sneer, or irony? Did not Cain *know* that the animals *did* not, *could* not, share the *apple*, as he calls it? What then had they to do with it? But we shall see further. He then laments, that they were equally miserable in not partaking of "the so dear-bought knowledge." But did he not *know*, that the *animals* had nothing to do with what he calls dear-bought knowledge? Then as to this same dear-bought knowledge; if he mean the knowledge of good and evil, which is all the knowledge it applies to, it was not *bought* at all: it was *stolen*, or sacrilegiously *seized*. Buying, implies a compact, of bartering and exchanging, for money, or other

equivalent. But what compact was here? Was the transaction a matter of compact, or barter, or selling, between the Almighty and Adam? Did God say to Adam, "I will sell you that fruit which shall yield you knowledge, at the price of dying for it"? Or did he say, "eat not of it, lest thou die"? Was that *prohibition a compact of sale*? How *unfair* and *uncandid* then, in Cain, so to misrepresent the matter. He must have *known* better. Whom then does he seek to *mislead*, or to asperse, by such arts?—Therefore, neither was the tree a "lying tree." It did *not* promise knowledge, or any other thing. It was not endued with the animal or intellectual *power* so to do. If Cain mean that there was a lie at all in the case, it is his maker he thus, *covertly*, charges with it! horrible impiety! but still in character. So then, *neither* the Almighty, nor the tree, "promised knowledge." There was no promise at all; but *threatening* there was; which Cain, thus disingenuously and wickedly, terms a *promise*. *Knowledge* was *not* promised, but *death* was *threatened*. The tree was not even *called* the tree of "knowledge," but, "of the knowledge of *good and evil*," emphatically; and they were bidden to *avoid* that knowledge, as not being good, but evil. Yet they *chose*, and seized it, in defiance of their maker. What then becomes of Cain's slanderous insinuations against his creator? Lucifer, in his reply, does not much mend the matter; for though he compliments the tree as true, yet he calls it "deadly." But it was not so. Was it the Upas, diffusing its letiferous vapours all around it? It would have been for ever innocuous, if not sacrilegiously violated; and sufficient *notice* was given of the consequence of such violation. God therefore planted no deadly tree, *candidly* speaking, Lucifer however very justly intimates, that death may lead to the highest knowledge. For so, according to revelation, it certainly does, the highest and the best, or else the most tremendous. At least this is true in respect of the *degree* of such knowledge, since such knowledge is *inceptively* acquired in *this* life. In the next, we shall know *more*, either of happiness or misery, than we do here. But as to any *impertinent* kind of "highest knowledge," that idea is

merely Luciferian. He does not say what he *means* by “highest knowledge.” We have therefore to guess as usual, and can only give it the signification we have done, viz. the highest *degree* of the knowledge of good and evil; of good, at any rate to those who shall be saved; and of evil, to those who shall be lost. With respect to death being the sole thing certain; that is perhaps true, as far as regards the state of man in this life; but from the revelation before considered, we learn, that *judgment* is as certain as death:—“after death the judgment.” It is mere deception to talk of death leading to the surest science. What science? He has not *said*. Is death itself a *science*? Is not this mere jargon; and the *unconsciously adopted* language of those philosophers (or geniuses) of modern times before adverted to, who, in their attachment to their beloved uncertainty, do nevertheless, I believe, after their unacknowledged master, admit, that death, but death alone, is certain? A concession perhaps to be wondered at. Yet the sole *certainty* of death, and this pretended *surest science*, have no necessary or proper connexion at all. Are not these, words merely, without rational meaning? Yet quite proper for the “Master of Spirits,” who may truly be termed also, Master of *Arts*. He is artful, though not wise. And the apostle Paul would have us not be “ignorant of his devices.”

CAIN.

These dim realms!

I see them, but I know them not.

LUCIFER.

Because

Thy hour is yet afar, and matter cannot
Comprehend spirit wholly—but 't is something
To know there are such realms.

CAIN.

We knew already
That there was death.

LUCIFER.

But not what was beyond it.

CAIN.

Nor know I now.

LUCIFER.

Thou knowest that there is
A state, and many states beyond thine own—
And this thou knewest not this morn.

CAIN.

But all
Seems dim and shadowy.

LUCIFER.

Be content ; it will
Seem clearer to thine immortality.

Note 50.

I confess, that so much conversancy with Lucifer, in *this* part of their dialogues, where he seems to act the part of an obliging guide and interpreter, has almost the effect of, in some measure, making one forget his real character as man's destroyer. But we must be on our guard against those amicable feelings. For as long

as we have any desire to keep out of his power, and clear of his dominions, so long he, assuredly, is most hostile to man, and seeks his ruin. With this recollection then we proceed. Cain acknowledges his ignorance, still, of these dim realms he had been beholding. And Lucifer attributes it to Cain's being yet so far from his "hour," (of death,) and to the incapacity of matter wholly to comprehend spirit: meaning, I suppose, that these phantoms were spiritual beings. But it must not be forgotten that *real* spirits are very different from these phantoms, and cannot be seen in their proper state, by *mortal eye, at all*. To be seen, they must be *embodied*, as the scriptures tell us they have, in divine kindness to man, sometimes been, perhaps by a power they have of that nature, or of assuming the *semblance* of body when commissioned by the Almighty, in the case of *good* spirits; or permitted by him, as in the case of evil spirits: as Lucifer assumed or inhabited the serpent, or, as he personated Samuel at the instance of the witch of Endor. He says, truly, that man, while in the body, cannot comprehend spirit wholly, and that it will appear clearer to him in his future state. Now I do not think that Lucifer meant this in the way that those do who receive the Christian revelation in its whole extent. For Lucifer, I apprehend, meant to tell Cain that he, in that *phantasm* state, should comprehend spirit more clearly. But that state we have seen to be a mere figment: whereas the state in which *Christians* expect to be after death, will be that of their spirits (or souls) and bodies, reunited, after the general judgment, when, not only their bodies will be relieved from their present cumbrous and evil qualities, and be made *ethereal*, or approximating, in excellence, to it, or rather, most glorious; — "like unto his (Christ's) glorious body:" but their spirits also, there can be no doubt, will receive new powers, and an inconceivable accession of light and knowledge, to which their present state can be less compared, than that of the weakest or meanest, to the highest and most matured, human intellect, on Earth. Consequently, there is every scriptural reason for concluding, that the human spirit *then* will be greatly more capable of comprehending spirit, in its

most extended and exalted sense, than now.—To return. When Lucifer tells his inveigled friend and client that “’t is something to know there are such realms” as he had been shewing him, we must remember their shadowy, and fictitious, character. The only *substantial* realms beyond death are those developed by revelation. Cain very sensibly observes to his preceptor, that after all his exhibitions, he did not know what was beyond death; nor does his preceptor appear to remove that impression. The Gospel has brought that to light; but Cain, certainly had it not fully, nor even partially, it should seem, as his father and family had, for he did not seem to admit it into his mind, as *they* did.

CAIN.

And yon immeasurable liquid space
Of glorious azure which floats on beyond us,
Which looks like water, and which I should deem
The river which flows out of Paradise
Past my own dwelling, but that it is bankless
And boundless, and of an ethereal hue—
What is it?

LUCIFER.

There is still some such on Earth,
Although inferior, and thy children shall
Dwell near it — ’t is the phantasm of an ocean.

CAIN.

’T is like another world; a liquid sun—
And those inordinate creatures sporting o’er
Its shining surface?

LUCIFER.

Are its habitans,
The past leviathans.

CAIN.

And yon immense
Serpent, which rears his dripping mane, and vasty
Head ten times higher than the haughtiest cedar
Forth from the abyss, looking as he could coil
Himself around the orbs we lately look'd on—
Is he not of the kind which bask'd beneath
The tree in Eden?

LUCIFER.

Eve, thy mother, best
Can tell what shape of serpent tempted her.

CAIN.

This seems too terrible. No doubt the other
Had more of beauty.

LUCIFER.

Hast thou ne'er beheld him?

CAIN.

Many of the same kind, (at least so call'd,)
But never that precisely which persuaded
The fatal fruit, nor even of the same aspect.

LUCIFER.

Your father saw him not?

CAIN.

No: 't was my mother
Who tempted him — she tempted by the serpent.

LUCIFER.

Good man! whene'er thy wife, or thy sons' wives
Tempt thee or them to aught that's new or strange,
Be sure thou see'st first who hath tempted *them*.

CAIN.

Thy precept comes too late: there is no more
For serpents to tempt woman to.

LUCIFER.

But there
Are some things still which woman may tempt man to,
And man tempt woman:—let thy sons look to it!
My counsel is a kind one; for 't is even
Given chiefly at my own expence: 't is true,
'T will not be followed, so there's little lost.

CAIN.

I understand not this.

LUCIFER.

The happier thou! —
 Thy world and thou are still too young! Thou thinkest
 Thyself most wicked and unhappy: is it
 Not so?

CAIN.

For crime, I know not; but for pain,
 I have felt much.

Note 51.

Passing over the foregoing ingenious description of a pre-adamite ocean, and its inordinate inhabitants; and also that of the serpent; which perhaps seems entitled to somewhat more of credit if we may believe in the Norway Kraken, or the American accounts of their sea serpents; and passing over also their ironical conversation relative to the identity of this pre-adamite serpent with, or its resemblance to, that which tempted Eve; and disregarding too, what Lucifer asks, and Cain replies, respecting Adam's not having seen the serpent, but Eve only; and that it was she who tempted Adam, being herself tempted by the serpent; which accords with scripture, both the Old and New Testament; — passing these matters over, as of little or no interest, we then come to the *morality* which Lord Byron has caused Lucifer to draw out of the temptation of Eve, and of her influence over Adam; for morality we cannot but call it. Now this piece of morals, thus preached by Lucifer himself, is not perhaps so light, or insignificant, as the apparent levity of its *style* may convey the idea of. In fact, Lucifer says truly, (and Lord Byron merits thanks for it,) that it is chiefly at *his own* expence; viz. the advice he gives. And most assuredly it is man's own fault, if it be not so: and, if man will prefer the consequences of *wilful disre-*

gard of that revelation, with which Lucifer, in this point, agrees ; he certainly can blame himself only for those consequences, severe as they often are immediately, but, in numberless cases, dreadfully more so, as there is every ground to believe, in a *future* condition of existence. Cain's acknowledged ignorance of some of the future effects of man's depravity, through the fall, is in some sort benevolently met, even by Lucifer ; at least we would say benevolently, did we not know him too well otherwise, and that he was only watching to make that prey of Cain which ultimately we shall find he did. He then reminding Cain that he thinks himself wicked, and unhappy, and asking him if it is not so, Cain confesses the latter, but appears to decline the imputation of the former, and seems not to know that he was guilty of any crime. There is a saying, — "judge not, that ye be not judged ;" and another, — "judge righteous judgment : " now taking both these together, it does seem to me, that, still in union, they permit a *candid* and just *consideration* of the character and conduct of others, as well as of our own. Indeed without it, how could moral society exist ? How could moral good be recommended, or moral evil discountenanced ? With these cautions, then, does it follow, that, because Cain did not acknowledge his consciousness of crime, he is to be therefore acquitted of it ? Is there not such a thing as crime against God, as well as against man ? What are they who deny it ? Without then entering into any other argument, or looking for any other evidence, I must ask if we have not, in the course of these pages, seen abundant proof that, putting his conduct in regard to his parents out of the question, Cain was truly, and highly, criminal, as against his creator ? Yet he did not seem to be conscious of it. But there is another saying ; — "having their conscience seared with a hot iron." Can Cain be acquitted of pride, discontent, rebellion, against his maker ? I mean, as exhibited *here* : if Lord Byron has made him worse than scripture has done, all the better. He has the advantage of that. But we are now trying, not the Cain of Moses, but the Cain of Lord Byron. Well then, is not pride morally evil, or criminal, in reference to God ?

Did not God, in Cain's days, require humility towards himself, as much as he has done since? Is humility towards God improper for, or unworthy of, man? Did not Cain declare he "would have nought to do with happiness that humbled him and his"? Had not that a direct reference to his maker, and his proceedings with his creature man, Adam and his family? To seek no further proof, however easily found, is not Cain thus convicted of *pride* in reference to his maker? Is *discontent* against God no crime against him? Its *unreasonableness* need not be here again considered. And is Cain's discontent with, and arrogant and insidious invectives against, the divine proceedings, no *crime* against his maker? And are not his discontent and invectives too notorious to need proof? Need it be asked, if *rebellion* against the Almighty be a crime against him? And is not the associating ourselves with avowed rebels, and entering into all their views and sentiments, *direct* rebellion? Then what else is Cain's league with Lucifer; and in defiance of—whom? Thus much for Cain's fancied freedom from crime. I say nothing of the grossest *ingratitude*. Is that a *crime*, or a sin, or a baseness; or *what* place does it occupy in the nomenclature, or classification, of moral character? As to the *pain*, of which he says he had felt much; no words or time need be spent, in reiterating the self-evidencing fact, that Cain was the voluntary fabricator of his own misery. If ever *heautontimorumenos* was applicable to any being, it is to this Cain. This assumption however, of pain, by him, draws forth a sort of consolatory speech from his sympathizing friend; who knew something of the same *kind* of pain himself, and was very desirous of helping Cain forward in the increase of his.

LUCIFER.

First-born of the first man!

Thy present state of sin—and thou art evil,
Of sorrow—and thou sufferest, are both Eden

In all its innocence compared to what
Thou shortly may'st be; and that state again,
 In its redoubled wretchedness, a Paradise
 To what thy sons' sons' sons, accumulating
 In generations like to dust, (which they
 In fact but add to,) shall endure and do.—
 Now let us back to Earth!

CAIN.

And wherefore didst thou
 Lead me here only to inform me this?

LUCIFER.

Was not thy quest for knowledge?

CAIN.

Yes: as being
 The road to happiness.

LUCIFER.

If truth be so,
 Thou hast it.

CAIN.

Then my father's God did well
 ✓ When he prohibited the fatal tree.

LUCIFER.

✓ But had done better in not planting it.
 But ignorance of evil doth not save

From evil; it must still roll on the same,
A part of all things.

CAIN.

Not of all things. No:

¶ I'll not believe it — for I thirst for good.

LUCIFER.

And who and what doth not? *Who* covets evil
For its own bitter sake? — *None* — nothing! 't is
The leaven of all life, and lifelessness.

Note 52.

Shall we say, that in his speech now before us, Lucifer has placed himself in the pulpit of modern times, and become a preacher; or invested himself with the robes of the academy, or the porch? — “First-born of the first man!” Who can deny solemnity here to Lucifer, specious, if not real? His ascription of sin, and of evil, to Cain, must also be acknowledged to be true. The wonder is, how Lucifer, of all beings, should utter such a truth. Yet that wonder may cease when we recollect his oracles afterwards. We will however give him, even him, his due; for *justice* should ever be done to *all*, without exception of character. Whether Lucifer would pronounce a truth, which he thought likely to keep man out of his own power and dominion, is another matter. But he certainly has done so, recently, to some extent, (if obeyed,) either intentionally or unwarily. Lord Byron, in his preface, as is before remarked, confesses he finds it difficult to make Lucifer talk like a clergyman. Here, however, it is conceived, he has again overcome that difficulty. For what can be more appropriate to that important and responsible cha-

racter, than to tell their congregations of their state of sin and their evil nature? If not deeply apprized of *that*, how shall they ever escape their dreadful consequences? And what can be more calculated for benefit, than this faithful announcement to all who have not, by receiving the revelation spoken of, in the way it requires, been emancipated from the thralldom of that state of sin, and delivered from the consequences of that evil nature? But excellent as is Lucifer's commencement of this confabulation, there seems an alloy, in the progress of it, calculated only to work mischief in such a mind as Cain's. But we will follow him, and see. He next speaks of Cain's sorrow, and suffering; but we have so particularly considered the *cause* of that sorrow and suffering, such as it was, and of Cain being the procurer of it to himself, that more needs not be said. This suffering and sin, he says, are both *Eden*, compared to what he shortly *may* be; which seems to glance at, if it would not prepare him against, the catastrophe which will, ere long, be to be painfully considered; and in the procuring of which, as we shall see, Lucifer himself had no small share. This the *friendship* of Lucifer ever leads to, and ends in. He completes his consolatory address to Cain by declaring, oracularly, the redoubled wretchedness of Cain's posterity, both in what they should endure, and what commit; and compliments his posterity with being only dust added to dust. This explains Lucifer's meaning of the *immortality* he so much magnifies as the property of man, and as shewn in his phantoms; an immortality, neither productive of happiness as a spiritual being, nor of accountability as a moral agent: than which doctrine nothing can be more false, more degrading, or more destructive. Yet after all his friend Lucifer's information and civility, Cain seems to think he had been led a long journey only to hear the homily of misery he had just been preaching: and on Lucifer's asking him if his quest was not for knowledge, he replies, sensibly enough, "yes, but as the road to happiness." Happiness, therefore, even Cain desired. But he had not learned, that it is not every kind of knowledge which leads to happiness. The result of his expedition might have informed him

of that; since, after Lucifer had imparted to him all the knowledge he could, or would, (though he had promised him *all* knowledge on the condition of Cain's falling down and worshipping him as his lord,) yet Cain was still miserable. Why did he not then conclude that his guide, and counsellor, was as great a deceiver of himself as he had been of his mother? and why not *then*, at any rate, betake himself to that *other* road to the happiness he sought, which his father, mother, brother, and sisters had done with success, by acquiescing in their creator's dispensations towards them, and gratefully accepting his parental and providential kindness? But not so Cain. He rather attends to hear what his worse instructor will say next. And what is that? Forsooth, that if truth be the road to happiness, Cain has it! But we must notice his artifice again, and his logic. He had before said, that the *tree* was productive of knowledge, because *grief* is knowledge: and that it was *true*, because it was productive of *death*, which he calls the "surest science." He now says that if truth be happiness, Cain has the truth the tree imparted, and therefore has happiness. This may be Luciferian logic, or metaphysics, but it did not convince Cain that he was happy. His *feelings* contradicted Lucifer's *argumentation*. So far from acknowledging the truth of what his friend said, or at least the correctness of the inference Lucifer would affect to draw from it, that he declares his father's God did well in prohibiting the acquisition of that truth and knowledge, which he now found to be not productive of happiness at all, but of misery. This proves, as Cain seems also now to see, that truth and happiness are not synonymous, or *necessarily* connected. Like knowledge, as before observed, it depends on the *nature* of the truth, whether it produce *happiness* or not, though it may produce *knowledge*. Besides, *abstract* truth merely, or ideal truth, however excellent, cannot procure happiness, unless embodied, and connected with interesting and important *facts*. It is a truth, that there is a God, and a Lucifer, and a Heaven, and a Hell, and happiness, and misery. But though we know all that to be truth abstractedly, such knowledge will not produce happiness, if not con-

nected with our interest and concern in acquiring Heaven, and happiness, and the favour of our maker ; and escaping Hell and misery, and the tyranny and dominion of Lucifer. Unapplied, abstract truth therefore, has no more effect in this important respect, than a wintry, transient, sunbeam, has upon the vegetation of the frost-bound earth. Besides, are there not truths, as Cain confesses, the knowledge of which is misery ? Lucifer, (rather remarkably) does not deny Cain's approbation of the interdict laid upon the tree ; but adds, that the Almighty would have done better in not planting it. That assertion, however, cannot be granted, until Lucifer be shewn to be possessed of wisdom and goodness, superior to that of the creator. Nor does the planting of the tree diminish Adam's *voluntary* offence, nor Lucifer's *voluntary* malignity, nor the *voluntary* crimes of mankind from that day to this. He apparently asserts besides, that if Adam had abstained from the forbidden fruit, and so remained happily ignorant of the evil he incurred by taking it ; still, that abstinence and ignorance would not have saved him from the evil in question. But who can concur in that self-contradicting assertion ? For such I take to be his meaning by saying, that "ignorance of evil doth not save from evil," but that "it must still roll on the same, a part of all things." What other application, than that absurd one, can be intended to be made of his wise apophthegm ? which nevertheless we will try a little farther. Ignorance of some physical evils certainly may not save from them : my ignorance of an intended plot against me would not, *as* ignorance, necessarily save me from that plot : on the contrary, that ignorance might hinder its prevention and it would still "roll on" upon me. Or if God had determined to punish a nation for its sins ; the nation's ignorance or *unbelief* of that awful fact, would not save from it ; (though *repentance* might ;) it would "still roll on the same." Instance Nineveh and Jerusalem. But were I traitorously *inclined*, but ignorant of a plot against the state, and on account of that ignorance did not join in it, and the conspirators were caught and executed ; can any one in *common* sense say my ignorance did not save me, though I escaped, by it, the punishment

I otherwise should have met with? Would that punishment still have rolled on upon me? I therefore, myself, cannot, I own, see the truth of this apophthegm of this "Master of Spirits." Or is my own ignorance the cause of my blindness? As to evil being part of all things also, that I venture to deny: admitting, in common language, evil to be at all; yet not to the extent of being a part of *all* things. Assuredly, there are *many* things exempt from it: many of the good gifts of God. They need not be particularized. Is not even Christianity a part of all things; and what evil is in that? Nor is evil to be admitted to roll on in despite, *always*, even of reason, forecast, and good sense; but *never*, certainly, in despite of God's protective and defensive providence. Besides; although ignorance, generally speaking, is not to be advocated, but good and right *knowledge* rather; still, we must affirm that in numberless instances of human life (common experience proves it) ignorance of evil is a preservative against evil: when that ignorance ceases, then the evil occurs. Instances need not be mentioned. As to evil being "a part of all things," somewhat has been said, and somewhat more will perhaps be said in a future Note. Even Cain opposes Lucifer on this topic; for, he says, he thirsts for good, as a proof that there must be good unmixed with evil: otherwise he should not find that innate craving for it, which he did. What the good was which he thirsted for, he does not say. One would rather suppose, it was knowledge, from his general turn of mind and many of his speeches. But what knowledge was Cain in quest of as the road to happiness? We have, I conceive, seen, that knowledge may be evil, as well as good, and productive of misery, as well as happiness. The word and knowledge of God are the only *true* knowledge, as being, at least, conducive to real happiness. But this Cain rejected in favour of Luciferian chimeras.—Lucifer agrees with Cain in his thirst for good, which he declares is common to all creatures, as well as their not coveting evil for its own bitter sake. Theoretically, this seems true; but, practically, do we not see the most part of intelligent, moral, accountable beings, act as if evil was their object? For in pursuing

good, as they intend, they take the very *road* to evil, in spite of every warning their creator, in his word, has given them. I now speak of such as have *heard* of the revelation before mentioned. The truth is, that this same "Master of Spirits" has so blinded the eyes, and darkened the minds, and perverted the inclinations, of those who, like Cain, prefer him in effect, (though they deny his existence it may be,) before their maker, that they take good for evil, and evil for good; darkness for light, and light for darkness; bitter for sweet, and sweet for bitter; whereas, a due regard to the revelation before noticed, would rectify all their errors, discover all the Luciferian deceptions they labour under, and point out clearly the road to supreme and true good, and solid because rational happiness. That revelation speaks of, and describes, these very things; and assures us that it will ultimately be brought in evidence against all who have knowingly despised or neglected it. Plato, Cicero, and others of *those* times, who knew not the scriptures, will be found to have (must I say instinctively, or from the right use of their reasoning powers?) come very much nearer to them than multitudes who have heard of, and rejected them in whole, or in part. But *their* minds "bore sway." They sincerely sought truth. — Cain resumes: —

CAIN.

Within those glorious orbs which we behold, †
 Distant and dazzling, and innumerable,
 Ere we came down into this phantom realm,
 Ill cannot come: they are too beautiful.

LUCIFER.

Thou hast seen them from afar.

CAIN.

And what of that?

Distance can but diminish glory — they
When nearer must be more ineffable.

LUCIFER.

Approach the things of Earth most beautiful,
And judge their beauty near.

CAIN.

I have done this —

The loveliest thing I know is loveliest nearest.

LUCIFER.

Then there must be delusion. — What is that,
Which being nearest to thine eyes is still
More beautiful than beauteous things remote ?

CAIN.

My sister Adah. — All the stars of heaven,
The deep blue noon of night, lit by an orb
Which looks a spirit, or a spirit's world —
The hues of twilight — the sun's gorgeous coming —
His setting indescribable, which fills
My eyes with pleasant tears as I behold
Him sink, and feel my heart float softly with him
Along that western paradise of clouds —
The forest shade — the green bough — the bird's voice
The vesper bird's, which seems to sing of love,
And mingles with the song of cherubim,
As the day closes over Eden's walls ; —

All these are nothing, to my eyes and heart,
Like Adah's face: I turn from Earth and Heaven
To gaze on it.

LUCIFER.

'T is frail as fair mortality,
In the first dawn and bloom of young creation
And earliest embraces of Earth's parents,
Can make its offspring; still it is delusion.

CAIN.

You think so, being not her brother.

LUCIFER.

Mortal!

My brotherhood 's with those who have no children.

CAIN.

'Then thou canst have no fellowship with us.

LUCIFER.

It may be that thine own shall be for me.
But if thou dost possess a beautiful
Being beyond all beauty in thine eyes,
Why art thou wretched?

CAIN.

Why do I exist?

Why art *thou* wretched? why are all things so?
Ev'n he who made us must be, as the maker

Of things unhappy! To produce destruction
Can surely never be the task of joy,
 And yet my sire says he's omnipotent:
 Then why is evil — he being good? I ask'd
 This question of my father; and he said,
Because this evil only was the path
To good. Strange good, that must arise from out
 Its deadly opposite. I lately saw
 A lamb stung by a reptile; the poor suckling
 Lay foaming on the earth, beneath the vain
 And piteous bleating of its restless dam;
 My father pluck'd some herbs, and laid them to
 The wound; and by degrees the helpless wretch
 Resumed its careless life, and rose to drain
 The mother's milk, who o'er it tremulous
 Stood licking its reviving limbs with joy.
 Behold, my son! said Adam, how from evil
 Springs good!

LUGIFER.

What didst thou answer?

CAIN.

Nothing; for

He is my father: but I thought, that 't were
 A better portion for the animal
 Never to have been *stung at all*, than to
 Purchase renewal of its little life
 With agonies unutterable, though
 Dispell'd by antidotes.

Note 53.

Cain seems filled with almost extatic delight at the glories and beauties he had been beholding in the upper regions of space. How was it that, absorbed in admiration and love of the creation, he not only did not admire and love, but abhorred, their creator? Not so Plato; not so Cicero. How different were their minds and affections towards the great author of what they saw and admired, and how totally void of that disposition to complain of ill and evil. Ill and evil they certainly perceived, (moral ill,) and studied and laboured to eradicate it, with all the intellectual means they had, unassisted by revelation. Still we cannot but partake with Cain, in his sensations produced by the view of the glorious, and dazzling, and innumerable, orbs, in whose immense and unknown abyssal ocean he had been sailing, under no inconsiderable convoy. He therefore deemed these stupendous and interesting objects "too beautiful for ill to come within them." But Lucifer undertakes to convince him of the contrary, by a species of rather curious argument, yet fit for *him* to use, as it leads, ultimately, to the never-failing subject of ill and evil. If there be such a thing as subtlety, which also, among other things, perhaps, modern philosophers or geniuses may think uncertain, it is surely to be found in him; yet not apart from evil, (as in the serpent it originally was,) but combined with it. Cain's idea, in opposition to Lucifer's suggestion, that distance can but diminish glory; and that, if seen nearer, that glory must be more ineffable; one would take to be the fact. Whatever is perfect, (without defect,) must, generally speaking, be engaging in proportion to our nearness to it, unless it be of "insufferable brightness," like the divine glory itself. As to objects *not* perfect nor free from defect, nearness may certainly diminish *their* attractions. But *moral* considerations may counterbalance this diminution of attractiveness, as we shall see. For Lucifer then tries Cain's positions by bidding him prove them by reference to some terrestrial object of his regard, in order to detect

the *delusion*, which, the former asserts, must lie hid in the subject of his admiration. This Cain was not long in complying with, and then alleges *Adah* as the instance, in which nearness did not diminish glory, or attractiveness. He then launches out into most exuberant and poetic praise of *Adah's* face; calling into *weak* comparison all nature—the stars, the brilliant midnight glories, the heavens, the earth, the gorgeous rising, and the unspeakable setting, of the sun, the paradise of evening clouds, the forest shade, the green bough, the nightingale's voice; all this, and more, is nothing, to his eyes and heart, like *Adah's* face. Now *Adah* was a mortal; and what mortal is perfect? Yet the *moral* considerations, above adverted to, induced Cain to think *Adah* all perfection. He admired, it should seem, her pleasing countenance, animated by, and thus an *index* of, superior loveliness of *mind*, which seems to have belonged to her. For she was, as represented, of a feeling disposition, and not only loved her relatives with affectionate simplicity, but was not destitute of a due sense of the claim of her benignant CREATOR to her superior and supreme regard: a character which adds to beauty a dignity and charm, without which, a “set of features and complexion” is to be deemed but a painted toy, or in Lucifer's own emphatic language, “deception and delusion.” And can one forbear respecting, even Lucifer, and Lucifer's pourtrayer also, for that, among other good, and *sound*, moral lessons? But Lucifer, like a true and stanch philosopher, unmoved by his friend's enthusiastic strains, once again speaks truth. For though he does not try his disciple's patience by denying his ascriptions to the fascination of *Adah's* pleasing face; yet he assures him still, that *Adah's* face is, after all, “as *frail* as fair mortality can make it,” and therefore, “still, delusion:” a truth which holds to the present moment, in all like cases. But Cain was less philosophic than his master, as may well be allowed him. He therefore contends, that Lucifer's rigid judgment proceeds from his unacquaintedness with *Adah*; her beautiful or pleasing countenance, and amiable temper; her generosity and nobleness, and superior mental and moral endowments; “and in her tongue,

(it may be imagined) was the law of kindness." This remonstrance of Cain, produces from the other a declaration, though apparently rather unconnected, that his brotherhood was with those who had no children. To this announcement Cain replies, seemingly with some warmth, that Lucifer then could have no fellowship with mortals. I cannot positively say, whether this (rather keen) remark, piqued Lucifer, or not. But he certainly throws out in return, something like a cutting intimation of the possibility, that Cain's children might be for him : an admonition, again, which calls for our acknowledgement. For does it not point to the most important and interesting object of parental regard ; — that of using all the means, which revelation enjoins, for preventing the accomplishment of Lucifer's (must I not say) *friendly* hint ? It is applicable now as much as then ; and will be so to the end of time. The *unhappiness* is, that, as Lucifer says, rather exultingly, upon a former occasion, it will do him no injury, because it will not be *regarded* ; therefore, it may be, "there's little lost" to him, by it. So much the worse for man.

But Lucifer was acting a deep part against Cain. His object was to make him irrecoverably his own. If therefore he spoke tartly what he *wished*, from a sudden pique, yet he would not let trifles make a breach between them. He ever studies men's leading traits of character, and applies himself to improve them to his purposes. Discontent with, and aversion to, his creator, seem to have been Cain's prominent dispositions. Like the future Archimedes, Lucifer wanted only a place capable of sustaining his infernal fulcrum, to enable him to move the universe. That *place*, in the present instance, he saw to be the disposition of Cain just mentioned, chiefly discontent ; upon which he might fix his engines, and be then able to move the whole universe of Cain's nature, his body, soul, and all. On that therefore he began to act, by asking him why, possessing what was beautiful beyond all beauty in his eyes, he was still wretched ? This "woke," as Lucifer has before expressed it, "the demon within him," as appears from his answer, which requires some consideration.

He first, then, asks, why he exists ; why is Lucifer himself

wretched? why are all things so? But as he himself does not wait, to answer his own questions, or to receive one from his oracle, he must be content with one from another quarter. To the first therefore,—why does he exist? the answer clearly is, plainly, because he does so by the will of his creator; a being infinite, and irresistible in power; and no less infinite, and perfect, in wisdom and in goodness; and by whom his parents and relatives, and all other things, existed also. In answering his enquiry,—why Lucifer himself is wretched? [which, Lucifer, by the way, never denies, and which affords no mean lesson to mankind,] there can be no difficulty either. It is because Lucifer is an evil being; self-corrupted; (for even what wicked mortal can deny his own concurrence in his own wickedness?) rebellious against his righteous and beneficent creator; malignant towards creatures inferior to himself in strength, because the objects of his maker's regard: placing his whole complacency (*such* complacency as Lucifer is capable of) in devising and executing mischief, and destruction, and causing misery; because he seeks tyrannic power, and is of insufferable pride and arrogancy; because fear, and not love, is the spring which he uses in all his operations. Therefore is he wretched. And who will say, not necessarily so, so long as cause and effect do not cease? And as to Cain's most imposing question of all—why are *all things* so? i. e. wretched; were it not for the seriousness of the subject, one could not but smile, at this cool way of arguing assumed by Cain, and by all who, like him, are not ingenuous, and argue not for truth, but for victory, by puzzling and imposing for a moment, rather than solidly convincing. For he solemnly asks, *why* a thing *is*, which is not at all: thus begging the very question. Such sophisters scarcely merit a reply. Yet a reply shall briefly be given Cain. The question implies, of course, the proposition,—that all things are wretched. That is so far from being granted, that it is flatly denied, as being self-evidently untrue, as I trust we have seen, and shall see. Where then is there room for argument, the *foundation* failing? That is the present reply. But we shall now see how apt a scholar Cain shews

himself of his arch-rebel instructor. Lucifer, on a former occasion, had impiously designated the Almighty as "so restless in his wretchedness." Now, says Cain, (who forgot the glorious orbs, and Adah's face, and all the beauties of the deep blue sky, and every other object of divine power which so lately delighted him;—but I also forget—he was an unbeliever, an atheist,) to shew his preceptor his proficiency, and how he could improve upon his master—"even he who made us must be, (that is wretched,) as the maker of things unhappy." Now Cain, and Lucifer, and his associate spirits, were those very "things unhappy" which Cain alludes to. For neither Cain nor Lucifer had ever *shewn* that there were any unhappy beings in the world besides themselves; though they *affected* to make Adah and her family acknowledge themselves so. But is it receivable by common sense, that the Almighty should be wretched on account of the self-created wretchedness of such beings as Cain and Lucifer? Is it so even among men; and even among the most benevolent of men? Again, however, Cain displays his scholar-like retention of his master's lessons on the *destructions* wrought by the Almighty. Therefore, in order to prove the Almighty wretched at any rate, he argues, that "to produce destruction can surely never be the task of joy." We will meet this redoubtable assertion. His meaning of course is, in connexion with the foregoing, that the Almighty must be wretched, or cannot be happy, inasmuch as he "*produces*" destruction. But should not Cain have first proved, that destruction can never be good, or beneficial, before he asserted that destruction could not afford joy, or at least satisfaction? Because the doing of a *good* and *beneficial* act, *does*, according to its nature and degree, afford joy and satisfaction as every one knows. Well then, what evil destructions, if any at all, had Cain known in *his* days, *perpetrated* by his creator? Does he call God's exercise of his moral government, in removing Adam from Paradise, destruction? If he do, we do not agree, until he has shewn moral government to be evil and unbeneficial, as well as that the removal itself did, in any way at all, resemble destruction. Or did he mean—for he and Lucifer, and their

fraternizing malcontented votaries are remarkably dark and enigmatical in their aspersions; they cannot speak out, for they have nothing to say in a *direct* manner; so we must *guess* at their meanings; a favour they do us:—did he then mean that his so much dreaded *death* was the destruction he charged the Almighty with producing? But that had not occurred: he should have waited. Or did he mean those destructions “common in eternity,” which Lucifer had been speaking of? But how did he know that Lucifer spoke truth? Or who, or what, was Cain, to set himself up in judgment and censure upon his maker? Or if we can suppose that, by his preceptor’s assistance, he took a prospective glance at the future deluge; then, when the whole earth, like Cain and Lucifer, had *perverted their way*, and filled the world with *violence*, and because totally incompatible with good moral government; can we, in any reason, suppose the Almighty must be wretched or unhappy in removing that evil in the *only* way which seemed right, and best, to infinite wisdom, and absolute goodness? And, even among mortals, is it *usual* to question the conduct of a man in the ordering of his own property; more especially, when he is of an established and well-known character, for discretion and benevolence? But we would not insist upon the total want of *right* in Cain to talk thus arrogantly of things which belonged not to him. But rather convince him of his error, in point of rationality, if possible, as we have tried to do. He however goes on a little further still. Therefore, quoth Cain, “and yet my sire says he’s omnipotent.” But what has that to do with the matter? He *may* be a wretched destroyer, though omnipotent. For we have admitted of our own accord, that omnipotence and goodness do not *necessarily* (as Cain himself argued) go together: although, in the instance of the Divine Being, we have seen they *actually* do and must.—Cain next proceeds to ask—“then why is evil, he being good?” This comes in rather ill time and ill taste from Cain, who had not been admitting God’s goodness, but saying every thing against it. It therefore carries greatly the appearance of that way of speaking, called ironical, viz. saying one thing and mean-

ing another, which Lucifer and Cain much use in aid of their bad logic, and worse principles, often. As if he had said, in plain English,—“how *can* God be good, since there is evil?”—forgetting *what* the evil was; viz. his own and Lucifer’s self-created misery, and no other evil! For *other* evil Cain had not pointed out. But we shall see if he *do* point out aught else he deems evil, and if he do, shall not pass it over. Cain says, he had asked the same question of his father, who replied, “because this evil only was the path to good.” I would not, too readily, suspect, or accuse, Cain of untruth; though I cannot tell how to avoid having a better opinion both of Adam’s piety and good sense, than to think he could have answered his son’s question *exactly* in the way stated. For by his alleged answer he certainly gives Cain and Lucifer the opportunity to make that striking remark, “strange good, that must arise from out its deadly opposite.” Adam’s error in his answer, consists in this; it implies the proposition — that there is no good which does not come through previous evil, as its necessary path or channel — than which, nothing can be more opposed to the fact: and, if true, it would reflect upon the power or the goodness of God, or both. But the truth, and the fact, are, that the *chief part* of all the good in creation (and it is *full* of the divine goodness) comes, in its ordinary course, *directly* and originally from divine beneficence, without the intervention of any evil (as it is termed) at all. That the Almighty sometimes (as often as he sees fit) *educes* good out of evil which has *occurred*, is true; but it is quite another thing, and is the *distinction* Adam should have made, if he did not; and then he would not have so answered his son’s captious and unfair question. With respect to the existence of evil at all in the world, we have seen, and shall see afterward. But Adam’s answer makes evil the principal, and good the accident; whereas in reality, good is the prevailing feature of creation, and evil, (if any, properly speaking, there be,) accidental. Cain’s tale of the suckling lamb stung by a reptile, requires notice.

It cannot be denied, that sympathy and tenderness of heart in man, towards the animal creation, is not more amiable, than *due*

from him as we have seen ; cruelty therefore, in any shape, to animals, must be criminal in the sight of heaven.—If Cain also accurately reported to Lucifer his father's observation upon his having cured the lamb, viz. "see son, how from evil springs good," by way of confirming his former one—"that evil only was the path to good ;" Adam, I conceive, was as incorrect as before ; for is there not a difference between good *springing* from evil as its *source*, and evil being educed from, or changed into, good, by a distinct and almighty power, and beneficent kind of alchymy ? God himself is the only source of all original good, as he is the transmuter of much evil into good also. It would therefore have been better that Adam, on curing the lamb, had directed his son's attention to the remedies God had mercifully provided for the animal's benefit, and the skill he had given man to apply them. The remedies providence has afforded for disease, are one thing ; the bringing good out of evil, whether physical or moral, quite another. Thus, if a man receive an injury, the goodness of God is visible is giving man skill to apply a remedy. But out of that evil, if to be so termed, God may *educer* good also by bringing the party into circumstances beneficial to him ; thus educing good out of evil. But God's *immediate* gifts of good are another thing still, irrespective of any evil at all ; and they constitute by far the greater part of divine operations, as is evident from a just survey of creation.—But the subject requires discrimination. I will not therefore deny, that the Almighty does *sometimes*, cause evil or rather suffering, for *special* and preparatory purposes, to precede some moral or other good he intends to a *moral* agent. But then that very evil or suffering is part of the good itself, and is by no means involved in Cain's wrong meaning, or in Adam's erroneous explanations. As to Cain's assertion that it would have been better for the animal never to have been stung at all ; although *nature* may lead us to join him in that sentiment, and humanity and feeling for animals are essential ; yet Cain's opinion is not to be placed in competition with his maker's ; or can it be supposed, that *man* is more considerate of them than God himself ? Somewhat of the divine regard for his animal

creation has been before noticed. On a superficial view, one may be apt to think with Cain. But the stinging must have arisen, either by the appointment of the Almighty; or by his permission; or without his knowledge. The last it could not be; for he knows *all* things without any of the difficulty *we* may conceive in attending to minute as well as great matters. Else he were not infinite. It must therefore (the stinging) have occurred either by his appointment; or with his observant permission; neither of which can, in reason, be allowed to cause, or sanction, any thing that had *better not* have taken place; unless we think it right to detract from the perfection of either the divine wisdom, or goodness. *Man's* not seeing a thing to be right, or best, is no proof that it is not actually so, until he can shew his wisdom and goodness to be greater than his maker's. But notwithstanding this, man is not excused from being the accountable, because the *voluntary*, and therefore immoral, cause, of much suffering to animals; compared with which, their *other* sufferings bear but a small proportion. What has been here said however, respecting the existence of evil, with the knowledge, as well as permission, if not the appointment of God, does not at all interfere with the fact of its introduction into the world originally by man himself by his transgression; and *that*, through the "devices" of Lucifer. Nor does it interfere with the certainty of man's *just responsibility* for all the evil he knowingly commits; and of the truth of which assertion, his own conscience, without any reasoning, will convict him. God neither *forces* nor entices any man to sin. Man sins *voluntarily*, as no sinner can deny; or, if he do, he will not be believed by upright men. As to the temptations or instigations of Lucifer; how far they, or any other circumstances may plead for man before his judge, it is not for man to pronounce positively: God is alone competent. But man *may* warn his fellow men to beware they do not wrap themselves up (with or without Lucifer's suggestion) in an imaginary veniality; when, had they duly attended, if not to the word of God, yet to their own consciences, they would have been informed that what they deemed venial, was not so. In fact, *no* sin is venial, great or small, if *reve-*

lation is to be credited. ~~Death alone~~ can atone for, or satisfy for, sin : viz. either the eternal death of the sinner's soul and body ; (and we have seen what *that* death consists in ;) or, the *death of Christ* : whichever the sinner chooses, supposing he has heard of, and has capacity to comprehend the latter. If an offence, which, against a fellow subject is simply criminal, yet when committed against the *King* be *treason* ; do not analogy and *reason* require us to consent to the proposition, — that an offence against *God* must be of *infinite* malignity, and require an *infinite* expiation ? The offence, in all reason, partakes of the nature or character of the offended party. Somewhat more on the subject of evil generally, will occur hereafter.

LUCIFER.

But as thou saidst
Of all beloved things thou lovest her
Who shared thy mother's milk, and giveth hers
Unto thy children —

CAIN.

Most assuredly :
What should I be without her ?

LUCIFER.

What am I ?

CAIN.

Dost thou love nothing ?

LUCIFER.

What does thy God love ?

CAIN.

All things, my father says ; but I confess
I see it not in their allotment here.

LUCIFER.

✓ | And, therefore, thou canst not see if *I* love
| Or no, except some vast and general purpose,
| To which particular things must melt like snows.

CAIN.

Snows! what are they?

LUCIFER.

Be happier in not knowing
What thy remoter offspring must encounter;
But bask beneath the clime which knows no winter!

Note 54.

The beginning of this portion of the conversation induces the repetition of a previous observation on the relationship between Cain and Adah ; a relationship obtaining in that early period of the world, but afterwards forbidden by the Almighty to the Jews, and since adopted from them by mankind generally, and acquiesced in by all well-regulated societies and individuals as conducive to their best welfare. Cain's renewed declaration of his regard for Adah, and his asking Lucifer if *he* loved nothing, leads, finally, to his questioning Cain as to what his God loved. Cain's reply, that, though his father told him God loved all things, he could not see it in their allotment here, is altogether in character with Cain, as is too obvious to need

proof. He who, alone of all the then existing human race, could see nothing but evil in the creation, was not much prepared to think that it could be the object of the creator's regard. And if Cain himself loved not his maker, how could he conceive of his maker's love? Nothing but love can comprehend love, any more than, as Lucifer justly says, "any thing but spirit can comprehend spirit." But if Cain be reprehensible, or even pitiable, for his total, but voluntary, destitution of love to his creator, what must be the condition of Lucifer, who, when Cain asked him if he loved nothing, dared not reply? He was conscious that he loved not any thing; and was apparently confounded with the sense of his own voluntarily evil nature. For although there may have been some remains, however small, of good in Cain, which disposed him as a mere man to love Adah, and his children, and that probably by divine appointment, in the general constitution of the world, besides his being yet in a probationary state; yet not so of Lucifer; he was not human; he was not a probationer; he had *chosen* evil finally; and in effect said — "evil, be thou my good;" and being himself therefore as essentially evil, as God is essentially good, and goodness; he *could not* love; it was not in his *nature*, in *any* respect whatever, as it was in Cain's. Love, in its degree, *partakes* of moral perfection. Where there is love, therefore, there is not *entire* moral imperfection. But total evil is total imperfection, total defect of all goodness and excellence, and therefore includes a total impossibility of loving. And Lucifer *is*, emphatically, *evil*. Still, even with regard to man, love to the creatures, is distinct from love to the creator. The former by no means involves the privileges of the latter; nor can possibly, by itself alone, contribute to man's happiness in his *future* state of being. The latter alone, can procure, as it is indispensable to, that happiness; — that all-important, "final and perfect end," of man. These things, from rational and immortal beings, demand serious attention.

It appears to me, that Cain's having confessed to Lucifer that he could not see God's love in the allotments of the creation, leads the latter to the remark he makes, that neither could Cain "see whether

he loved or not, except some vast and general purpose, to which particular things must melt like snows." Now if Lucifer meant by this, (for such is his *indirect* way of aspersing his maker at every turn,) to insinuate, that the Almighty, also, has only some vast and *general purpose* which he loves, regardless of the happiness or sufferings of the creatures who *contribute* to that general purpose, he should be contradicted. All *general purposes* must be made up of *particular acts*, or intentions. For, are not *all* generals necessarily composed of individuals? We have seen abundantly, that the general purpose of the divine mind is, and cannot but be, to make known his own glory (with which his goodness is inseparably connected) by the diffusion of happiness. Then, as the objects, or subjects, of that happiness, are and must be *individuals*, in order to make up the *general purpose*; therefore, the vast and general purpose of God must be, to diffuse happiness to the individual subjects of that vast and general purpose. Hence the particular as well as general, *providence* of God, in contradiction to Lucifer's apparent *exclusion* of such particular providence. That *some* of these individuals do *not* enjoy happiness, is *another* consideration quite; and may be hereafter, as it has been in some measure already, touched upon; but such *exceptions* do not affect *this* argument of God's particular providence. Otherwise, we might (if the allusion may be allowed) as well talk of a general congress, or a general meeting, without any individuals to compose it. The *particular* providence of God therefore pervades his whole intelligent and moral, as well as his unintelligent, and animal creation. Reason also agrees, as it ever does, with revelation, in this matter. To deny a *particular* providence is not only to be an unbeliever in that revelation, but to be little if any other than an atheist; for it would be to consider the Divine Being as a mere Epicurean deity; and how much is Epicureanism better, or other than, mere atheism? Does not even all nature speak the same thing? Is not matter inert? Could it, then, continue in motion, without an unintermitting propelling power? What can that power be but God? And is it *rational* to believe,

that God regards his moral and intelligent creation less than he does his inanimate? Does man himself act so? And we are authorized, both by reason and revelation, to argue from man to God, on points of universal and moral rectitude, as before observed. Besides, how could the divine moral government be carried on, without particular providence? As well might we expect the government of any nation to be conducted by laws and proclamations without *particular* personal enforcements, or a whole army to be kept in health by a general order, without specific attention to individuals. For it cannot be made appear that God has so constituted creation, as that, having once set it going (if I may so speak) it shall keep on by a perpetual motion without further care, like a set of automaton wound up to their pitch. Scripture also denies that doctrine. This assertion of a *particular* providence, (without which a universal providence amounts to nothing,) is not meant to detract from God's having a perfect *foreknowledge* of every the most minute circumstance connected with his moral and providential government throughout all time and space; nor from his having foreordained every act and event that he wills for effectuating his moral and providential purposes. All things are therefore settled and known by him from the beginning to the end; or, in scripture terms—"known unto God are all his works, from the beginning of the world;" or, rather, "from eternity." It must therefore be, that with God there never was a beginning, nor progress, nor termination. One eternal *now* is alone applicable to him, to whom *all things*, all events, have been *present*, from everlasting, in one uninterrupted view, the unvarying object of the contemplation of the *infinite* mind of deity. Why then should man exalt himself, and not rather feel his proper nothingness? Nothing truly, and less, except on those *scripture* principles before adverted to, and on *which*, he certainly becomes important to himself. On a former occasion we may remember, Lucifer declared that ignorance could not save from evil. Yet here he recommends Cain to remain happily ignorant of the evil of snows. For so Lucifer seems to choose to consider them. But man thinks them good. They may

be, and are, sometimes, trying and painful, individually; but it by no means follows, *rationaly*, that what is trying, and painful, is therefore *evil*: of that we have before spoken, and may again.

CAIN.

But dost thou not love something like thyself?

LUCIFER.

And dost thou love *thyself*?

CAIN.

Yes, but love more
What makes my feelings more endurable,
And is more than myself, because I love it.

LUCIFER.

Thou lovest it, because 't is beautiful
As was the apple in thy mother's eye;
And when it ceases to be so, thy love
Will cease, like any other appetite.

CAIN.

Cease to be beautiful! how can that be?

LUCIFER.

With time.

CAIN.

But time has past, and hitherto
 Even Adam and my mother both are fair :
 Not fair like Adah and the seraphim—
 But very fair.

LUCIFER.

All that must pass away
 In them and her.

CAIN.

I'm sorry for it ; but
 Cannot conceive my love for her the less.
 And when her beauty disappears, methinks
 He who creates all beauty will lose more
 Than me in seeing perish such a work.

LUCIFER.

I pity thee in loving what must perish.

CAIN.

And I thee who lov'st nothing.

LUCIFER.

And thy brother—
 Sits he not near thy heart ?

CAIN.

Why should he not ?

LUCIFER.

Thy father loves him well—so does thy God.

CAIN.

And so do I.

LUCIFER.

'T is well and meekly done.

CAIN.

Meekly !

LUCIFER.

He is the second born of flesh,
And is his mother's favourite.

CAIN.

Let him keep
Her favour, since the serpent was the first
To win it.

LUCIFER.

And his father's ?

CAIN.

What is that
To me ? should I not love that which all love ?

LUCIFER.

And the Jehovah—the indulgent Lord,
 And bounteous planter of barr'd Paradise—
 He, too, looks smilingly on Abel.

CAIN.

I

Ne'er saw him, and I know not if he smiles.

LUCIFER.

But you have seen his angels.

CAIN.

Rarely.

LUCIFER.

But

Sufficiently to see they love your brother :
His sacrifices are acceptable.

CAIN.

So be they ! wherefore speak to me of this ?

LUCIFER.

Because thou hast thought of this ere now. ^h

CAIN.

And if

I *have* thought—why recall a thought that ——(*he pauses, as agitated*)—Spirit!

Here we are in *thy* world; speak not of *mine*.

Thou hast shewn me wonders; thou hast shewn me those

Mighty pre-adamites who walk'd the earth

Of which ours is the wreck; thou hast pointed out

Myriads of starry worlds, of which our own

Is the dim and remote companion, in

Infinity of life: thou hast shewn me shadows

Of that existence with the dreaded name

Which my sire brought us—death; thou hast shewn me much

But not all: shew me where Jehovah dwells,

In his especial Paradise— or *thine*:

Where is it?

Note 55.

In the beginning of this portion of the dialogue, Lucifer again confesses his inability to love any thing but himself. Not so Cain. The former then assumes the philosopher, or moralist, again, and glances at the disposition in man to lose his attachment to things, which have lost their original attractions. Cain's subsequent exposition of his own views and feelings on that subject, doubtless are to his praise. Yet his idea of the Almighty's losing more than he, in seeing perish any human beauty, must be confessed to be wholly irrational. It is part of God's appointment and plan that every thing human *do* decay and perish. But if man accept the revelation offered him, he is there told, all human beauty shall be abundantly *more than restored*; and shall, beyond the grave,

“—flourish in immortal youth.”

The two friends then proceed to reciprocate their mutual condolences. The “Master of Spirits” pities Cain in loving what must perish; and Cain him, in loving nothing. And who does not know, that Cain is infinitely superior to his guide and counsellor, who *could not but be miserable* in loving not at all? for he is, on *that* very account, the opposite to God; and what is opposite to God, *must be wretched*; and revelation declares that “God is Love.” And his works declare the same. Lucifer’s loving *nothing*, however, is very different from not setting the affections *inordinately* upon any earthly and perishing object, which neither religion nor reason justifies. But as Plato and the Bible shew, the affections *cannot* be inordinately set upon God. The *whole* heart is required, and may safely and most happily be yielded to man’s chief and infinite good.

The author now approaches his preparatory incidents for the catastrophe of his performance, and seeks for matter to fill up the outline, or very general account, given in scripture. And this he seems to me to do with great judgment and feeling, and perhaps with all the probability that can be expected. He reads to man here also another instructive lecture. And the use he makes of the adversary of God and man, is such as to preclude our admitting a doubt of his belief in his existence, and operations. Though we are considering a fictitious relation, yet we must deem it, for our present purpose, a representation of facts, so as to draw from it all the good it has a tendency to promote. On reading therefore the succeeding conversation between Lucifer and Cain, respecting Abel, Lord Byron has contrived, without any violation of, if not perfectly in unison with, probable truth, to create, if possible, in our minds, an *interest in favour of the future fratricide*. That interest however will, perhaps, afterwards, be alternately excited, and lost again, until at, and possibly after, the consummation. In the scene before us however, we cannot forbear feeling for the exposure of Cain to Lucifer’s diabolical and artful suggestions. The counterpoise to that feeling is, the

recollection of Cain's general character, and his having *voluntarily*, and determinedly, placed himself under the immediate tuition of his tempter and destroyer. One cannot help feeling at the same time a kind of sympathy and concern, at beholding the apparent struggles of the self-made victim to escape the snare. But Lucifer is now approximating to his grand point, and therefore draws his net closer and closer, and fixes his envenomed darts deeper and deeper. In reading the whole, wherein Lucifer so resolutely aims to excite envy and hatred towards his brother in the breast of Cain, one should have been induced to believe, that Cain had never, before this unhappy juncture, entertained an unkind thought against Abel, were it not for Lucifer's telling him, that his inducement for speaking of Abel and his sacrifices as he did, was, that Cain *had been thinking* on those matters ere then. In a preceding Note, we have objected to Lucifer's claim to *know* the thoughts of man, though we admitted his sagacity in *guessing* them. Even among men we find some shrewd guessers, and some bold asserters of facts beyond their absolute knowledge, and merely from inferences they have drawn. Now, as before observed, there seems every reason to believe, that Lucifer is present at different places with amazing quickness. And when the world was so thinly peopled, he had less engagement, and therefore could pay undivided attention to the Eden family. We suppose then, that, in fact, he had been present at their sacrifices: that he had observed the circumstances he mentions, of the divine acceptance of those of Abel on account of their being *animal*, according to divine appointment, and of the instances of favour shewn to him by the Almighty, and so forth, as here stated by Lucifer. He also may be thought to have studied Cain closely, and to have noted the effect which the above-mentioned circumstances had upon him, although he repressed his feelings: but Lucifer knowing them to be harboured in his breast, takes this method of exciting into a flame, what seems, for the time at least, to have been smothered or forgotten. And Lucifer knew from Cain of the sacrifice at hand, in which he had promised Adah to join with Abel. It seems then as if Luci-

fer would *prepare* him for that eventful occasion. Still, poor Cain, if I may be allowed so to term him, would, apparently, fain escape if possible; as should seem by his remonstrating with Lucifer, for recalling his, perhaps abandoned, thoughts, and for speaking to him of *his* world while they were in Lucifer's. At any rate it can, I think, do us no harm to imagine with Lord Byron, (and not overlooking the *fascinating* and dreadful effects of evil associations not easily escaped when once entered into,) that some such Luciferian, Satanic influence as that now before us, *did* seize upon (though too much *encouraged*) and actuate, and keep possession of Cain, from this moment especially, to the tragic perpetration. Cain, however, at length regains some apparent calm in his disturbed and agitated spirit, so as to be able to acknowledge to Lucifer his obligation for what he had shewn him; and ends with requesting Lucifer to shew him, if not Jehovah's dwelling, at least his own.—Lucifer's character is admirably sustained throughout, and in every incident; so here, his sarcastic allusion to "the indulgent Lord, and bounteous planter of barr'd Paradise." And Cain was too forward to unite in those sarcasms; forgetting, not only their injustice, when the occasion was fairly recollected, but also the accumulated punishment he and Lucifer were securing to themselves, when, at the appointed time, the divine forbearance towards them should have an end.—We now proceed to Lucifer's answer to Cain's enquiry after Jehovah's, or his, especial Paradise, or dwelling. It seems not impertinent here, just to glance at what *revelation* tells us was the cause of the Almighty's favour to Abel, and his acceptance of his, and rejection of Cain's, offerings. It was, that Abel evidently believed in the "atonement" mentioned presently by Adah; and offered his lambs prospectively in faith of the future *great* sacrifice, of which *his* was a type, and the antitype of which was the consummation of the promise made to Eve. In this atonement, Cain did not, as the rest of his family did, believe. He therefore ran directly counter to his creator's mind and will and purposes of mercy; and what can we, as moral agents, conceive, but *must be* the consequence of

CAIN.

We are brethren,
 And so we shall remain; but were it not so,
 Is spirit like to flesh? can it fall out?
 Infinity with immortality?
 Jarring and turning space to misery—
 For what?

LUCIFER.

To reign.

CAIN.

Did ye not tell me that
 Ye are both eternal?

LUCIFER.

Yea!

CAIN.

And what I have seen,
 Yon blue immensity, is boundless?

LUCIFER.

Ay.

CAIN.

And cannot ye both reign then?—is there not
 Enough?—why should ye differ?

LUCIFER.

We both reign.

CAIN.

But one of you makes evil.

LUCIFER.

Which?

CAIN.

Thou! for

v / If thou canst do man good, why dost thou not?

LUCIFER.

And why not he who made? *I* made ye not;
Ye are *his* creatures, and not mine.

CAIN.

Then leave us

His creatures, as thou say'st we are, or shew me
Thy dwelling, or *his* dwelling.

LUCIFER.

I could shew thee
Both; but the time will come when thou shalt see one
Of them for evermore.

CAIN.

And why not now?

Note 56.

Lucifer informs Cain, as he has done before, that his dwelling was "o'er all space." And we admit, that, at any rate for a season, he has an ample range; but, to admit his power of pervading *all* space, is inconsistent I conceive, with his being *excluded* from penetrating again into the regions from whence he was *expelled for ever*. His pretensions of having the range of all space, therefore, must be disallowed, and he be confined to Hell, or to such excursions in *this* world, as, under the title of the "prince" or ruler, "of the power of the air," may be *permitted* to him by the Almighty. Besides which indeed, it does appear from scripture, that he has been occasionally allowed to introduce himself among "the sons of God," as *before* noticed. But there seems to be reason to conclude, from *some* passages of scripture, that, according to that remarkable expression of Jesus Christ, on his disciples declaring that even the devils were subject to them, "I beheld Satan as lightning fall from Heaven" — he has been *peculiarly* excluded from thence ever since. In fact, his *external* powers in particular, have declined incontinently, from the time of the Saviour's appearance on the earth. Cain seems to have had some notion of Lucifer's expulsion, by pressing him with the necessity of his having some appropriated habitation, as all other beings appeared to have. And upon his intimating that the Almighty and he did not *dwell* together, Lucifer is under the necessity, as well as not averse, to admit *that*; but asserts, that they *reigned* together, though their dwellings were *separate*. Nothing can be more true than the latter: but as to the *former*, it is not true; or at least with qualification; for although we admit him to be "prince or ruler of the power of the air," he *does not* reign even in that capacity; he only *exercises his authority* under the permission of his maker, who suffers it for a season, until all his purposes are accomplished. Perhaps Lucifer may be *considered* as reigning, more properly and absolutely, over his *own* *realm* *than*

spirits : and if so, he may be said, in an inferior sense, to reign *together with* the Almighty ; since the Almighty of course has not given up his own dominion over either Lucifer or them. Such then is the way, if at all, in which Lucifer *reigns*, either jointly or separately. Cain's reply, as will be seen in the next Note, is founded entirely on his ignorance, and the deception which his chosen teacher was practising upon him. There are not *two of them* ; so that Cain need not have wished there was but one. There *was*, and *is*, an *unity of purpose* ; viz. in the Almighty himself. And Cain, of all men, had little reason to talk of the elements being "jarr'd in storms." If the elements sometimes *are* affected, in the way of what men call storms, winds, earthquakes, thunder, lightning, hurricanes, and the like, such as he brought on Job ; yet those are casual, or even if appointed accidents, belonging to the system, though probably the effect of man's transgression too, but still under divine direction and controul ; and are not to be considered as such "jarring of the elements" as Cain, though *he* most likely had never seen such things at all, describes rather as chaotic confusion than either the course of nature or those other and comparatively very inferior disturbances just adverted to. As to his question to Lucifer, how they (the Almighty and he) as spirits wise and infinite, came to separate ; although the question is quite appropriate to Cain, yet it is in itself no less absurd ; for Lucifer, though a spirit is neither wise nor infinite. Infinite, of course, as a creature, he cannot be ; of which, more presently. Wise he is not, though he is cunning ; for wisdom ever pursues virtuous ends by virtuous means ; but he seeks evil ends by evil means. Besides, wisdom is never disjoined from goodness. He who is not good, is not wise, however otherwise *knowing* he may be ; because goodness is an attribute of God ; and he that does not resemble God in *some* degree in all his moral attributes, cannot be wise, as is obvious without argument. As to the "separation" of Lucifer from God, we well know what *that* was. Cain's concluding question,—if God and Lucifer are not brethren, in their essence, nature, and glory ; after all that has been said in former

pages, needs no specific refutation of its grossness ; only, that as to Lucifer's *glory*, where shall we look for it, unless in the defeat of his rebellious attempts, and his punishment for them? With respect to Lucifer's asking Cain, if he and Abel were not brethren, (in order to encourage and keep up the idea of Cain's preceding silly ascription of Lucifer's brotherhood with the Almighty,) it requires no reply. As to his enquiry if infinity can fall out with immortality; Cain should have known and remembered what *kind* of "falling out" it was between the Almighty and Lucifer; and that Lucifer was *not* infinite, though immortal; nor even immortal, in *defiance* of God, but subject to the divine *power* to extinguish his immortality, and deprive him of all existence, if he saw fit. When Cain adverts to the boundlessness of space as sufficient both for the Almighty and Lucifer, the latter again declares they *do* both reign. *How* they reign, is seen before. As to their "differing," we have just remarked on the *kind* of "falling out," between omnipotence and any created being. So also their "differing." But Cain, now, assumes a serious look, and makes a very serious charge. "One of you makes evil." And, upon Lucifer's challenge, he does not stick to fix it upon Lucifer; and his charge is grounded upon the proposition, or question, that, if Lucifer *can* do man good, why does he not? Lucifer vindicates himself by throwing the burthen, of doing good to man, upon man's creator. In that, he does rightly. But it need not have been in the form of a question,—“why not he who made?” He need not have asked why the Almighty did *not* do that, which he actually does. Cain, then, upon Lucifer's renouncing his *right* to man as *his* creatures, requests him therefore to *leave* them God's creatures: but he softens his injunction, by an alternative, to gratify his own curiosity—“or shew me thy dwelling, or *his* dwelling.” Lucifer now puts on all his preposterous, as well as impious, audacity, by pretending he *could* shew Cain, not his own dwelling only, but the Almighty's: but that is impossible, correctly speaking; for God dwells “in the light which no man can approach unto.” Lucifer therefore could shew him no more than he had done;

no more, in fact, than Cain could see on his own Earth, when he gazed upon his favourite "azure." *Truly*, however, does Lucifer add, that the time would come, when Cain should see *one of them* "for evermore." This very serious intimation does not seem to have made a corresponding impression on Cain's mind. Somewhat on the subject, has been hinted at in the course of these Notes, and precludes the necessity or propriety of adding more here. But Cain was impatient;—"and why not now?" Long before this time, Cain *has* realized this, of all things most interesting, and all-important, experience; whether with that God, in bliss and glory, whom he despised and rejected; or with that "Fiend," as Adah has called Lucifer, who brought "death and all their woe," (mitigated as it mercifully was,) and whom Cain preferred as his friend and guide—it is not for us to *say*, however painful the *apprehension*.—This solicitude of Cain, however, draws from Lucifer the following weighty, or at least imposing, and false, communication.

LUCIFER.

Thy human mind hath scarcely grasp to gather
 The little I have shewn thee into calm
 And clear thought; and *thou* wouldst go on aspiring
 To the great double Mysteries! the *two Principles!*
 And gaze upon them on their secret thrones!
 Dust! limit thy ambition; for to see
 Either of these, would be for thee to perish!

CAIN.

And let me perish, so I see them!

LUCIFER.

There

The son of her who snatch'd the apple spake!

But thou wouldst only perish, and not see them ;
That sight is for the other state.

CAIN.

Of death ?

LUCIFER.

That is the prelude.

CAIN.

Then I dread it less,
Now that I know it leads to something definite. — 341

Note 57.

Before we enter upon the principal subject of this Note, one cannot forbear adverting to Cain's desperate curiosity, which he would gratify at the price of what he calls perishing; but to perish by being annihilated was not in his power: the only way therefore in which he could have his choice to perish, was, to be lost eternally; that is, to enter upon a state of endless and inconceivable misery, to which all the misery he pretended to, or which he could suffer to his dying day, could far less be compared, than the warmth of the mildest sun-beam to the most devouring fire. It seems however to have delighted Lucifer, that Cain should shew himself so worthy of his parent, by even exceeding her: for *she* thought not of *losing*, but increasing, *her* happiness. Yet Lucifer is honest; and fairly tells Cain, he would gain only a loss by perishing in the attempt without accomplishing his purpose; and that the sight of the secret thrones of the two principles was only obtainable in the other state, to which death was the prelude, and which therefore, Cain declared was now less terrific to him, since, on Lucifer's word, he knew (he should have said *believed*) it led to something definite.

Yet Lucifer was correct, too. For death of course, if revelation is to be credited, *does* lead to something *definite*. The question should be, *what* that definite is. And that I think should have been Cain's enquiry, before he was satisfied to die, upon such a serious uncertainty. However, he must take his own course; and we will now proceed to Lucifer's redoubtable "double mysteries, the *two principles*, on their secret thrones."

Thinking men seem, in all ages, to have found a difficulty in accounting, satisfactorily, for those circumstances in the world which are termed, and perhaps, in common acceptation, *properly* termed, *evils*, moral, and natural; such as the frequent disorders and conflicts between the very elements, between animals, between men: add to which, the errors, miseries, and vices of the latter. The difficulty seems to have consisted in conceiving that such a state of things could have been the production of a wise, and good, and all-powerful being. Their incapacity to find a solution of these enquiries, led some, such as Epicurus and Lucretius in particular, and those who adhered to their opinions, to deny that there was any God at all; or, if there were, that he was the author or governor of the world. Others, however, took a different view of things; and seeing the absurdity of admitting actions and effects, without also admitting some agent or cause; and still perceiving such mixture of good and evil, and imagining that the evil could not proceed from a good being, such as they took God to be; fell into the supposition of a god, or intelligence, or active principle, malevolent in nature, and therefore directly contrary and opposed to God, or the *good principle* they meant by that term. Thus the origin of these "double mysteries, the two principles." From this malevolent or evil principle, then, was supposed to proceed all the evil; as, from the good being, all the good. This was the opinion of the Manicheans, the followers of Manes, especially.

I believe it is considered as impracticable, nor can it be material, to trace to its source the origin of this opinion; for Manes appears not to have been its inventor, so much, as the reducer of it

into a more regular and palpable shape. Zoroaster, who, as well as Manes, was a Persian, and contemporary with Cyrus the great, and reformed the religion of the Persian Magi, (but Manes was so late as the second century of the Christian æra,)—is supposed to have held the same opinions. And in Bayle's Dictionary, Zoroaster is introduced as defending them, in the following manner. "Zoroaster," he says, "would go back to the time of the chaos, which, with regard to his two principles, is a state very like that which *Hobbes* calls the state of nature, and which he supposes to have preceded the establishment of societies. In this state of nature, one man was a wolf to another, and every thing belonged to the first occupier; none was master of any thing, except he was the strongest. To get out of this confusion, every one agreed to quit his right to the whole, that he might be acknowledged the proprietor of some part; they entered into agreements, and the war ceased. Thus the two principles weary of this chaos, wherein each confounded and overthrew what the other attempted to do, came at last to an agreement; each of them yielded something; each had a share in the production of man, and the laws of the union of the soul. The good principle obtained those which procure to man a thousand pleasures, and consented to those which expose him to a thousand pains; and if he consented that moral good should be infinitely less in mankind than moral evil, he repaired the damage in some other kind of creatures, wherein vice should be much less than virtue. If many men in this life have more misery than happiness, this is recompensed in another state; what they have not in a human form, they find under another. By means of this agreement, the chaos became disembroiled; the chaos, I say, a passive principle, which was the field of battle between these two active ones. You see what Zoroaster might object, valuing himself that he does not throw any imputation upon the good principle, of having with full purpose produced a work, which was to be so wicked and miserable; but only, after he had found, by experience, that he could do no better, nor more effectually oppose the horrible designs of the evil principle. To render this hypo-

thesis the less offensive, he might have denied that there was a long war between the two principles, and lay aside all those fights and prisoners which the *Manicheans* speak of. The whole might be reduced to the certain knowledge of the two principles, that the one could never obtain from the other but such and such conditions: an eternal agreement might have been made upon this foot."

That there is no occasion for resorting to such a hypothesis, is the opinion of perhaps all intelligent persons of the present day. But it may be proper to notice some of its inseparable absurdities. It is presumed, that the evil principle, who is one of the subjects of it, must be intended to be absolute and infinite in his nature; in other words, an *absolute*, and *infinitely evil*, principle. But the supposition of such an absolute, and infinitely evil, principle, is an express contradiction. For as this principle opposes and resists the infinitely good one; (for an *infinitely* good one also must be presumed; because less than infinite would be nothing, for the purposes proposed;) therefore, the evil principle must also be independent and infinite, or absolute, in knowledge and power. But the notion of a being infinitely *evil*, is of one infinitely *imperfect*; for *infinitely* evil, of course, implies the *total* absence of every thing good, whether moral or physical; its *knowledge* and *power* therefore must be infinitely imperfect; that is absolute ignorance and impotence; or, no knowledge and power at all. The one of these beings then (the good principle) is absolutely perfect; or, enjoys all manner of positive perfections; and consequently the other, being directly the reverse, must be purely the negation of it, as darkness is of light; i. e. it must be an *infinite defect*, or *mere nothing*. Thus this *evil* being must have some *knowledge and power*, in order to make any opposition at all to the *good* one; but as he is directly opposite to that good or perfect one, he cannot have the *least* degree of knowledge or power, since these are *perfections*; therefore the supposition of such an existence as this, implies a contradiction.

But supposing advocates of this doctrine to mean (as any person of sense must mean) by this evil principle, an absolutely *malevo-*

lent being of equal power, and other natural perfections with those of the good one. "It would be to no purpose," says Archbishop Tillotson, "to suppose two such opposite principles. For: admit that a being infinitely mischievous, were infinitely cunning, and infinitely powerful, yet it could do no evil, because the opposite principle, of infinite goodness, being also infinitely wise and powerful, they would tie up one another's hands: so that, upon this supposition, the notion of a deity would signify just nothing; and, by virtue of the eternal opposition and equality of these principles, they would keep one another at perpetual bay; and being an equal match for one another, instead of being two deities, they would be two idols, able to do neither good nor evil."

Neither does Bayle's amendment of this hypothesis free it from the difficulty. He supposes the two principles to be sensible of the above-mentioned consequence arising from their equality of power, and therefore willing to compound the matter by allowing an equal mixture of good and evil in the intended creation. But if the quantity of good and evil in the creation be exactly equal, neither of the principles has attained, or could expect to attain, the end for which it was supposed to act. The good principle designed to produce some absolute good, the evil one some absolute evil; but to produce an equal mixture of both, would be, in effect, producing neither. One would just counterbalance and destroy the other; and all such actions would be the very same as doing nothing at all. And that such an exact equality of good and evil must be the result of any agreement between them is plain; for, as they are by supposition perfectly equal in *inclination*, as well as *power*; neither of them could possibly concede, and let its opposite prevail. The creation therefore cannot be owing to such a composition. *Archbishop King, Origin of Evil, Chapter ii.*

The foregoing considerations seem satisfactorily to overturn these "great double mysteries, the two principles," and their "secret thrones," and discover the whole to be as much phantoms as any which Lucifer had been exhibiting to his wondering pupil; and if

Lucifer meant to insinuate that he himself was either of these principles, his deception is detected. The *good* principle he *could not* be, and the evil one is seen to be an impossibility. It therefore remains that there is one supreme creator and governor of all things; all-wise, all-powerful, and all-good; infinite, eternal, unchangeable; the God of Plato and of Cicero; the Jehovah of the Bible; the God of Christians. This conclusion arrived at, there nevertheless remains occasion for the observation, that moral and physical evil, (at least what mankind generally call, and *feel*, to be such,) actually exists in creation. And this has given rise to much reflection among men, and much reasoning, and various opinions, and considerable unsettledness, not to say uneasiness, to some thinking minds. In considering the question of the two principles, we have seen, that it is admitted, that *good only* was to have proceeded from the *good* principle. Seeing then we have concluded, that God is that good principle, and has no opposer, it has been, with some anxiety, asked, whence came evil into the world? If God could not hinder it, where is his power? If he could, and would not, where is his goodness? In order therefore to *account* for this production of evil, so called, it has been asserted, under the authority of much reasoning, that God, although omnipotent, *cannot* make any created being *absolutely perfect*; for that whatever is absolutely perfect must necessarily be self-existent, which a creature cannot be. Absolute perfection is therefore peculiar to God; and if he should communicate his own peculiar perfections to another, that other would be God. It may also be said that absolute perfection is infinity. And it cannot be supposed possible for God to create an infinite being. And as a being, not infinite, is necessarily imperfect, it is liable to evil. God then, it is said, must either not have created at all, or must have created beings *not infinite*, who, consequently, must be *imperfect* and defective. Had God himself not been *infinite* in *goodness*, he would not have created such beings, viz. finite, and consequently imperfect and defective, and whom he knew to be therefore liable to the unavoidable occurrence of what is called moral evil; he would rather have remained

satisfied with the enjoyment of his own perfections. But being *infinite* in goodness, he preferred to create, for the purpose of imparting felicity to the *greatest possible* extent ; while his goodness would still be exerted in diminishing the inevitable accompanying evils, in the greatest degree consistent with the order and well being of the whole. And the advocates for this opinion contend that the evil that is in creation, great as it appears, bears a very small proportion to the good. Had therefore the divine goodness denied existence to created beings on account of the concomitant evils, he might be thought unwilling to see happiness in other beings than himself, since he allowed none to exist beside himself ; and while he refused to admit every kind and degree of evil, he would have rejected also all the good. Thus then (it is said) the necessity for the Manichean *principle of evil*, to account for evil, is avoided, and that, in perfect consistency with the idea of a creator of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness. This system, it is conceived, accounts for what is termed evil, by the impossibility of God's creating any but finite, and therefore imperfect beings ; which are, from the necessity of things, liable to evil.

On the other hand, there are not wanting those who, with equal reverence for the Almighty, and regard to all his attributes of power, wisdom, and goodness, think it an unjustifiable limitation of his omnipotence and wisdom to suppose, that he *could not* have hindered, or cannot now hinder, evil ; asserting at the same time, that his *goodness* invariably orders all things for the *best*. They therefore resolve the existence of this, usually termed, evil, into the divine permission ; deeming that God is by no means *bound* to preclude evil from among his works. They attribute it to his unsearchable will, which is ever *rectitude itself*, that he thus allows the entrance, and the continuance, of what is externally felt as evil, as a seeming foil to the general loveliness and excellence of his creation. Those, who think thus, consider, that revelation throws scarcely any degree of light upon the divine motives to this permission ; and that the reasons of it are amongst those things which even the angels are represented as desirous to look into. They say also, that

“ All nature is but art, unknown to thee ;
All chance, direction which thou canst not see ;
All discord, harmony not understood ;
All partial evil, universal good ;
And, spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
One truth is clear : — whatever is, is right.”

It cannot be denied, that *scripture* decidedly countenances this unre-served ascription of *sovereign* right in the Almighty, on the one hand, to do “ what seemeth him good,” with his own ; and on the other, strongly approves and requires, the most implicit resignation of man to the will of his maker, as well as the most unlimited reposal upon his evident goodness. And it seems difficult to come to a more satisfactory or rational result. For though absolute and unlimited sovereignty on Earth, among weak and wicked men, is certainly not desirable ; yet that reason does not hold in regard of *Him*, who is as perfect in wisdom and in goodness as he is unlimited in power. Perhaps too great pains are taken to account for the divine proceedings. Are not men too unwilling or fearful to trust God to answer for himself ? Does not this arise from a secret doubt, or distrust, or unbelief, lest the Judge of all the Earth should *not* do right ? Ought not our vindications (if I may so speak) of the Almighty, to be *less* to account for or explain the *propriety* of his conduct, than to establish the truth and certainty of his revealed mind and will ? Yet those vindications may certainly extend to the removal of aspersions, and the detection and confutation of false charges, whether open or insinuating. Nor are men debarred from employing their faculties, in *concurrence* with, and *submission* to, the notices God has graciously given of himself, in enquiring into many things, which may throw pleasing and satisfactory light upon the general nature or reasons of the divine proceedings. And are the most sagacious of men, unaided by revelation, more equal to the comprehension of the divine and infinite mind, than an infant of a day old is to that of its parent, or so much so ? And if acquiescence in revelation be professed,

ought men to go beyond, much more to deny or contradict it in any part, because it squares not with *their* notions of right and wrong? This question does not clash with a preceding remark on the propriety of arguing from man to God on general moral principles, whenever it can be done without having the effect of contradicting his revealed mind and will. Having settled what is an authentic revelation, should not whatever that revelation states to be the will of God, or his acts, or his mode of proceeding, be received and acquiesced in, rather than canvassed and disputed? Among *men*, there may be greater latitude.

But to this must still be added, that, if revelation be to be relied upon, the evil, as it is termed, which is seen and felt in the world, is (when not the immediate act of God himself for his own righteous and beneficent purposes) either the natural or moral effect of its cause, the transgression of our first parents, through the instigation of Lucifer, and which induced a most important and deathly change in their whole nature; similar effects to which we see exemplified in a thousand instances among men; or else, such (so termed) evil, is the immediate and proper work of Lucifer himself, though still under divine regulation and controul, and applied to the purposes of the divine moral government. And Lucifer himself, it is to be remembered, was created, according to the foregoing suppositions, necessarily, *not infinite*, and therefore, not absolutely perfect, even in wisdom; and thence liable to too great self-exaltation from contemplating his *real* greatness, which produced in him pride, and rebellion, and an affectation of independency, self-creation, if not of sovereignty, and omnipotence. If it be asked — why then did God create such beings as Lucifer and his associate rebels, knowing their future fall, and all the moral evil and sin which they would be the instruments of introducing? there seem to be three ways of answering that enquiry. First, that they filled that *place* in creation, which the *connexion*, and the *dependance*, of the whole, *required*, and that, if created at all, they *must* have been so created, as is before explained. Secondly, that it was not consistent, as lately observed, with infinite goodness, *not*

to create in that way, rather than not create at all, though the subjects of unavoidable imperfection, and thence exposed to moral evil. Thirdly, if both those reasons are unsatisfactory, then there seems to be nothing to stand or to rest upon, but the absolute *wisdom*, and evident and perfect *goodness* of deity; to both which it seemed *good*, that there should be such a being, and such results. The only question is— are we, or are we not, disposed, by rational conviction of the propriety of so doing, to ascribe unerring wisdom and perfect goodness to God? If we are, in that we may rationally and securely rest: if not, what mighty system shall worms of earth *substitute* for that ascription, and for a ready submission to it? I say *worms of earth*, as always applicable to man when he sets himself in *array against*, by questioning, his maker. When he does *not so*, he retains his native and proper respectability in existence. Mere metaphysical disquisitions, are as interminable as they are futile and unsatisfactory on such subjects. Generations have passed away, and generations may pass away in disputing, and no satisfactory conclusions come to, except upon scriptural principles. The question if treated according to human notions must ever be left where found. The *labour* ought to be, to *establish revelation*. That established, all difficulty vanishes. "It is God's will, and he is good"—is quite sufficient, if that system, from which it is deduced, can be shewn to be, itself, impregnable. But man is *fond* of having moral, as well as other difficulties to encounter. He is not content with his creator's *authority*; but chooses to use his powers, given him for better purposes, in questioning that authority; or, if he fail there, in arguing upon or *denying* the *propriety* even of his creator's plain proceedings, and setting up a *better plan* of his own devising!!! This, in truth, is a Luciferian "gift" from the "fatal apple," as the "Master of Spirits" presently terms it.

These ideas are offered as just deductions and conclusions upon the basis of admitting, with Plato, and Cicero, and Lord Byron, the existence of a supreme creator and moral governor of infinite wisdom, and goodness, and power. And being convinced also of the authen-

ticity of that which has been previously considered as a revelation from the creator himself, are we not confident, that in these conclusions, reason is fully borne out by that revelation? Quotations from it to that effect were endless, and the subject is too notorious to need them. The whole revelation is that of the absolute supremacy or sovereignty, as well as of the goodness and wisdom, of the Almighty, and that "his ways are past finding out," farther than he sees it good to reveal them. And without such revelation, is it to be rationally expected that finite should comprehend infinite?

Connected with these subjects is that very trite one, on which so many and perhaps conflicting opinions have been held, and statements made, as to who is to be deemed the "author of sin." And a kind of morbid sensitiveness is often exhibited, even in common conversation, lest that character should be taken off from man and thrown upon his maker. From what I have ever read or heard spoken on the subject, it seems to me, that it has not yet been viewed *exactly* in the right way; nor so as to set the matter completely at rest, by shutting the door to that enquiry. I hold myself, therefore, to be quite at liberty, on this occasion, to state my own views of the matter; and if I do it freely, it will not be irreverently, but with the sincere desire of eliciting truth, and, so far as I may be permitted, justifying my creator, and attributing to man all he ought to bear. I am conscious of the delicacy, and perhaps difficulty, of the discussion; and if I treat it weakly, yet I trust it will not be hurtfully; and hope that a candid allowance will be made, if, in my anxiety to be clear, I should fall into a *little* of what may be deemed repititious statement. And as the subjects of the author of sin, and the origin of evil, go mostly together, I beg to be allowed some intermixture, though, I trust, not so as to create confusion. The *will* of God, as usually distinguished from his *permission*, will be also noticed.

It has, then, been before asserted, that physical or natural evil, admitting the term in its *usual* acceptation, is not legitimately to be considered as the ordinary spring of good, as Adam in a preceding page, has

expressed it. Good is imparted usually, and originally, without the aid of previous evil, in God's general administration. God alone is the spring of good. Evil, so called, sometimes occurs; and then, often, God *educes* good out of that also. This sentiment is not intended to be retracted or weakened; much less contradicted, by what, further, is about to be stated. It is admitted therefore that the revolted angels are the remote (as well as sometimes the immediate) cause of all physical, as well as, also, of all *moral* evil, or sin; inasmuch as sin first entered into the world by their (or Lucifer's) procurement, as has been seen; and, but for sin, there had been no *natural* evil. Yet it seems necessary to qualify this statement by observing, that it cannot be known that Adam would not have fallen, though Lucifer had not tempted. He might, for aught we know, have used his liberty to transgress, without foreign incitement. Sin however would still have been the result. It cannot also be denied, that God was the creator, originator, or author, of those beings who have thus caused sin, but who were nevertheless self-tempted, self-corrupted, and voluntarily revolted from their maker. If indeed that be a *mystery* to man, so it must remain. It is the *fact*. Should it then be demanded of me, if I mean thus to make God the author of sin; I reply, by first demanding, as I have a right to do, a definition of the term sin; what is sin? The *scriptural* answer must be, "sin is the transgression of the law;" meaning, of course, the *divine* law. But does not that require a *subject* of that law who either obeys or transgresses it? Is not man that subject? Can God be the subject of his own law? Can he be imagined to be the transgressor of it? Then if sin be the transgression of the law, and God cannot be either the subject, or the transgressor, of his own law; how can the Almighty, by any possible accuracy of language, be said to be the author of sin? *Man*, however, is, *actually*, the *committer* of sin, by that very transgression we are considering. But to term even man the "author of sin," generally, on that account, seems to be no less improper, than to term a man who commits an act of murder, the *author* of murder generally. We call him indeed a

murderer; and certainly the *author* of the particular murder he commits; but not of murder universally, or in the abstract. The very frequent expression, "author of sin," therefore, I confess is, to my own apprehension, a most unscriptural, incorrect, and unmeaning one, to say the least. To whom can it apply? To God it cannot, as we have just seen. Nor to man, I think, with any propriety. The just conclusion appears to me to be, that God is the author of all *things*, causes and effects, without exception; but man is a *voluntary*, and therefore *punishable*, sinner. But there can be no "author of sin," in the abstract; because sin is not a *general existence* like the material creation which has, *properly* speaking, an author; but it is a *specific act* (and therefore there is *no sin* where there is *no act*) either bodily or mental. For sin may be committed by the body, or in mind only. And a *created being only*, the subject of moral government, can be the perpetrator of such *acts* as *constitute sin*. Man indeed is *an* author of sin, so often as he transgresses his maker's law. And although God is the author of man's existence, including all his moral capacities and qualities — (for can any thing be without an author, or first cause? and what first cause shall we assign but God? —) yet, if man sins by transgressing the divine law, he is *conscious* that his *maker* did not *incite* him to it, much less *force* him, and therefore was not the author of his sinful act. Neither was God the author of Eve's or Adam's original transgression or sin, although he was certainly the creator and author of Eve, and Adam, and Lucifer in their respective natures, capacities, and qualities. But as they all *voluntarily* and by *choice*, committed their respective transgressions, they were therefore the *authors* of their respective sinful acts.

If then, nothing that is intrinsically and essentially (not merely formally, or relatively) evil, can possibly proceed from, or be permitted by, a perfectly good being, of sufficient wisdom and power to hinder it; and we have meant to shew no such evil can: and if God be such a being; as we have seen he is: and if moral evil be the crimes of men, and the crimes of men be transgressions of God's

law, and therefore sins : and if nothing can be, against or without the divine *will* ; then, what rational conclusion can follow but, that what is, in common language termed, and felt, as moral evil or sin, cannot be *intrinsically*, or *essentially*, (though it may be *formally*, or *relatively*) evil ; but must, on the contrary, be, intrinsically and *essentially*, good, in the divine government. Yet this it has been seen does not diminish man's responsibility for sin. For were that, which is called evil, intrinsically and *essentially* so, it could not be without God's will : and we have seen, that as a good and powerful being, God could neither will nor permit *essential* evil to be. And wherein, candidly speaking, consists the difference between will, and "efficacious purpose or permission," or, "*permissive will*" ? What is gained by those unscriptural distinctions ? Can the Almighty be supposed to *permit* any thing *against* his *will* ? What definite idea or meaning can be attached to "*permissive will*" ? And must there not be the *will* of *some* intelligent being for the existence of every individual thing, or quality, of which man can form an idea ? And will we admit any such Almighty being beside God ? Shall it be Lucifer ? Or his principle of evil ? With respect to calling sin a *not-being* ; or a *privation* ; or a *negation* ; or a *want of conformity to the divine law* ; rather than a *positive being*, like virtue or truth ; what is effected by that distinction ? For how came man by the nature, or character, which involves such not-being, or privation, or negation, or want of conformity ? Did he make himself ? Did Lucifer, or some "evil principle" opposed to God, create him ? Can we possibly escape from that circle ? Must we not ever revert to the same point ? I think so. But, out of the *fancied entanglement* of making man *irresponsible* for his actual moral evil or sin ; *that* we may and can escape from, and yet leave the almighty, the all-powerful, all-wise, all-good Jehovah, in full and undisputed possession of all his attributes, and the *sole and actual author* of all existence and all qualities, and without whose *will* nothing can be, or be conceived of, in the mind of man or angel. Who can, with rationality, deny that God is the *original source* of all, without exception ?

Must *not all* things, and *all*, objects of human or angelic thought, have some *original* source? What other than God will man be pleased to substitute? Will he, to magnify himself, substitute *himself* for his creator? And divide his empire? "So that I do divide his; and possess a kingdom which is not his," says Lucifer: and is man ambitious to imitate so imposing an example? Or shall Lucifer, or his principle of evil, be that *first* source? How then, it may be asked, shall the problem be solved, so as, at once to leave the Almighty in his sovereign, sole omnipotency, wisdom, and goodness, as the sole and declared first source and author of all things, even of man's and angel's entire nature, capacities, and qualities, physical and moral; and yet demonstrate man to be also justly inexcusable for sin? I solve it by God's own word. I solve it as I solve "God manifest in the flesh"—that "great mystery of right worship and true religion." I solve it as Dr. Copplestone solves the consistency of predestination with (as he conceives it) human liberty. He *solves it*, by declaring, that *he finds it in God's word*, and therefore *cannot dispute it*. It is true, that reverend dignitary finds too, according to his own views, that man possesses volition or general free will. And *I* find also in the divine word, that man indeed possesses (what he freely uses) a free will certainly *to sin*. The fact, therefore, I believe, on *evidence*. For God's *word* declares him the creator, author, and source, of all. So does reason. His word declares that nothing (no being or quality) can *be*, without his will. So does reason. Man is also pronounced a voluntary, and therefore guilty, sinner, by the same authority. What is the meaning of "efficacious purpose or *permission*," or, "permissive will"? Are there two kinds of the divine permission, one by God's will, the other against it? If not, then what is the meaning of *will*, in a being of *absolute power*? Does it not mean *effective determination*, leading to the *certain execution* of what such being wills? In such a being can "efficacious purpose or *permission*," or, "permissive will," mean any thing less than *absolute will*, or *effective determination*? Is a will, if not absolute and *effective*, any will at all, in *fact*? *Desiring* I take to

be different from *willing*. The former may belong to an impotent, the latter properly only to an omnipotent or powerful being. Even admitting, for argument, that the Divine Being may be said to *desire*, short of willing; can it be admitted, that God may desire, and be frustrated? Is not that idea contrary to the whole tenour of revelation? Would it not introduce the utmost confusion, so far as man can conceive? And is not the idea derogatory to the divine character in every view of it; its stability of purpose, not the least? *Nothing* therefore, *can be*, without the *will* of God.

Instead, then, of perpetuating the old enquiry, "who is the author of sin?" would not the *proper* question rather be, can the divine will, or acts, be otherwise, by any possibility, than right and good?

God's word again declares man to be a sinner: so does reason. It declares man to be punishable for sin: so does reason. The mystery, but the fact, is, that man's conscience tells him, and he is satisfied by conviction, that although God is the author of his entire nature, yet he sins *voluntarily* and against his better knowledge. He is therefore the author, because the *willing* perpetrator, of his own sin, and therefore justly liable to the penal consequences of sin. When man can shew that his creator forces him to sin, or that by any means he is not a free and voluntary agent in sinning; then, and not till then, I conceive, there will be a fairly open door for the unscriptural question of "who is the author of sin?" Sin, I beg to repeat, is "the transgression of God's law." God therefore, although the author of all existences, and all natures, is not the subject of his own law, nor can be the violator of it, and therefore not an author of sin, which character consists only in the violation of the divine law. Whoever violates or transgresses the divine law, and none other, is or can be, an author of sin. Sin is not an abstract: it is essentially *connected* with, indeed consists in, *acts*, either of the body or the mind. Man therefore, and Lucifer, and revolted angelic beings, are the only free perpetrators, and therefore authors, of their respective sinful acts: not of sin *abstractedly*, there being no such thing.

But for somewhat further elucidation, I beg just to repeat an early argument (to which I think few will disagree)—that, contemplating the directing hand of a being of infinite and absolute wisdom, and goodness, and power; reason and revelation forbid our admitting that real, *essential* evil can possibly emanate from, or be permitted by, such a being. Therefore ought not scripture *language* to be *interpreted* on this as on other subjects, and be considered as speaking according to the ordinary perceptions of mankind? So that, when the Almighty declares, he “creates *evil*;” it must mean, he performs such *acts*, or constitutes such *characters* among men, as his moral government, and the manifestation of his own attributes, and the *highest good*, render *right* and *necessary*; and which acts, &c. are therefore intrinsically, and essentially, *good*; although, to man, they have the nature, or impart the feeling, of that to which *human language* gives the term, “evil.” God then, speaks of evil, *accommodatingly* to human ideas. As, when his *arm* is said to be outstretched; his *ear* to hear; his *eye* to see, or that he grieves, or repents; while, at the same time, the Divine Being, as a pure Spirit, is admitted to be equally without parts, and without passions. It must, therefore, either be admitted that there is no such thing as absolute, and proper, intrinsic, and essential, but only relative and *formal* evil, whether moral or physical, in creation; or else it must be shewn, that God is *not* a being perfect in wisdom, goodness, and power; or, that such a being *can* and *may love* to do real evil; but which *alternative* propositions I again (fearless of being opposed by God-fearing and enlightened men) deny. For we have I trust clearly seen that the Almighty cannot be believed either to do or permit such evil. And where is the difference between permitting and doing in this case? If a man construct an engine, which he knows will, after certain revolutions, produce a specific effect, if he hinder it not; and he do not hinder it, but purposely allows the occurrence of the expected effect; in such case, I confess, that not the engine but the constructor of it must be considered the author of the effect produced. It cannot be denied. But, in the human and angelic creation, there

is certainly that nature which totally excludes any such conclusion in point of defence for sin. Man cannot pretend he does not sin *voluntarily*, and of free choice. Hence his just liability to the consequences of sin as declared in scripture. His *voluntary* commission of sin may be mysterious (as Dr. Copplestone admits predestination and volition to be, although consistent, however *apparently* inconsistent) since he was not self-created; but it is the *fact*. It is the will which even in human laws, creates responsibility, where understanding is not wanting. But man has *reason*, also another source of responsibility; and *conscience*, another still, and still more decidedly against his claim to irresponsibility. Hence, from these multiplied sources, man's accountability.

I am not unapprized not only of the arguments against the foregoing views of the sovereignty, and sole efficiency, of the will of God, and which are adduced by those who think it right to deny to their creator the privilege (claimed by themselves) of doing, with his own creatures, "what seemeth him good;" but also of the opposite arguments of those who *favour* these views, by shewing, that things could not be otherwise than those views describe them, on scriptural grounds; and that, on the same principles, the Almighty has more fully manifested his own character of wisdom and goodness, and produced *more happiness*, than he otherwise *could* have done. All which last, I concur in, and refer to. But my present province is to be more concise, and to place the subject upon the narrower, but not less firm, basis, of the divine revelation, as I have aimed to do; and in such reasoning and considerations as have appeared to me to be conformable to it.

In connexion with this subject too, it may be asked, if it do not appear quite consistent with the view before taken of the impossibility of there being any *real* natural evil in creation, to add, that according to man's nature in his present state, although much good may well be, and is, enjoyed, independently of evil—(always meaning "evil" in the sense before explained—) yet, that some such "evil," as it is termed, seems even necessary to procure to man the extent

and variety of enjoyment of which he is capable. Would he not, and a great portion of his *faculties*, become torpid and useless also, without those occasions, which the same "evil" affords for bringing them into action? Besides, is not man's *nature* fitted and prepared for it by his *mindful* creator? See the intellect, the skill, the mind, and the fortitude, bestowed upon navigators, travellers, enquirers into nature, in all her beauties, in all her grandeur, and in all her terror? What frozen, or torrid, clime; what mountain, what desert, what ocean, deters them? May they not stay at home? Do they complain of [as evils] their hardships, or their frequent sufferings, thus willingly and freely encountered? Do not the results of these exploits of man produce from some, as they ought to do from all, an increased reverence and admiration of God's works, as well as gratitude for numberless instances of his preserving providence? Whether man do, or do not, let his inquisitiveness, and unrestrained ardour, pry farther into the arcana of creation, than God would have him do, is, possibly, a question. But still, from those adventurers, neither evils nor sufferings are heard of as complaints. Beside travellers and navigators, consider agriculturists for instance. How often, and from *whom*, among *them* (is it from the wise, the good, the industrious?) do we hear those circumstances of the elements and seasons, which occasion trouble and perhaps suffering, complained of as "evil"? Does not God endow them with adequate powers of body and mind and other resources in themselves and others? Wonderfully, and beneficently, therefore, is the nature of man fitted for his present circumstances; as, in a future state, he will be fitted for *them* also. Then, look into more private life. At any rate *they* will not take upon them to complain (or if they do, they cannot be *listened to*, if *relieved*) who have *evidently* brought evils (or sufferings) upon themselves. And what multitudes are they? How many are there, who suffer evil from that most fruitful source? Then, if it be admitted, that there are some, who have *not* brought evils, (or sufferings) immediately, or remotely, on themselves, and yet labour under them; such will, it is conceived, be always of such a character, as

rather to justify than *charge* God, on account of them. The "evils" *these* suffer are ever so *mitigated* by attendant circumstances or inward consolations, of one kind or other, that either the sufferer would not be without them; (he calls them not evils;) or else, *at least*, is enabled by divine influence, to say, "*all* things work together for my good;" or, "shall I receive from God's hand good and not evil also?"—or, "he gave, and hath taken away; blessed be his name:" or, "he doeth all things well:"—or, "what I know not now I shall know hereafter:"—or, "though thou *slay* me, yet will I *trust* in thee." Or some such other expressions, out of the innumerable sources of *rejoicing in suffering*, which are to be found in that revelation before spoken of; which, if men receive, *all evil vanishes*, as the vapours before the sun. In one word; if, notwithstanding *rational* and *moral* evidence, men will *reject* that revelation which their creator has made respecting himself; "evil" then, to *them*, will and must be evil; for as it is Lucifer's so it is their *choice*; they may *pretend* not to choose it, but they do. Lucifer affected not to love evil "for its own bitter sake." Why then did he rebel against his maker? But to those who duly *receive* the revelation there *can be no evil*. As for those of mankind, less "*enlightened*" it may be, than the *rejecters* of revelation, and who never heard of it, they will not be judged by it. But, among *them*, the fewest complaints of evil will be heard. Perhaps no complaint at all. And if so, what will *they* say hereafter, who have these notices of God, and yet make his "evils" a subject of complaint?

Upon the whole of this subject therefore, I would reduce it to three or four principles;

First.—That God is a sovereign in the highest sense; a moral governor also; the sole creator and ordainer of all existences, with all their moral capacities, and qualities: that he is also all-wise, all-powerful, and all-good, and therefore cannot err; nor can do, nor permit, pure, essential evil.

Second.—That under such government *no pure essential* evil, moral or physical, *can be* in creation. All is, and cannot but be, *essentially* and absolutely good.

Third.—That man is, as in *scripture* declared, and in all right *reason*, and therefore *justly*, responsible and punishable for sin, *because* he sins *voluntarily*.

Fourth.—That the term, “the author of sin” is unfounded in *scripture*, and illogical. There can be *no* “author of sin,” in the abstract.

Is it not ever desirable to hold important truths without unscriptural hesitation, and to escape from wrong or incorrect impressions or persuasions? It appears also to me, that to deny God’s sovereignty and indisputable and absolute right over his creatures, accompanied too as that right is by unerring wisdom and infinite goodness; is, to deny his essential *nature*, and *attributes*; and to do *that*, is to deny God.

The consistency of considering the Almighty as the author of all intelligent creatures, with all their moral liabilities, on the one hand; and yet man as responsible for his sins on the other; is precisely that consistency which Dr. Coplestone advocates for the doctrines of predestination and free will, which, however *apparently* inconsistent, he declares to be the doctrine of God’s word, as well as of the establishment of which he is now a dignitary.

LUCIFER.

And now I will convey thee to thy world,
Where thou shalt multiply the race of Adam,
Eat, drink, toil, tremble, laugh, weep, sleep, and die.

CAIN.

And to what end have I beheld these things
Which thou hast shewn me?

LUCIFER.

Didst thou not require

Knowledge? And have I not, in what I shew'd,
 Taught thee to know thyself?

CAIN.

Alas! I seem

Nothing.

LUCIFER.

✓ And this should be the human sum
Of knowledge, to know mortal nature's nothingness;
 Bequeath that science to thy children, and
 'T will spare them many tortures.

Note 58.

The purposes for which Lucifer now tells Cain he shall convey him back to his world, are evidently in Lucifer's own contemptuous or sarcastic style. Those purposes however, although such as are either essential or allowable under right regulation, yet are not *all* the purposes for which Cain *should* have been taken back to his world. Yet it could not be expected of Lucifer to inform his hoped-for victim, that his *grand* purpose in his own world was, to become increasingly acquainted with his maker, and progressively advancing in the enjoyment of his favour; of which there are not wanting instances in the very record from which these transactions have taken their rise. Much less would Lucifer instruct Cain, that his *next* purpose, one indeed with, and inseparable from, the first, was, *after death* to avoid *his* (Lucifer's) realms and government, and to secure happiness in Heaven. These main, and truly important things, it was not likely that Lucifer should teach his pupil: and had he so taught him, there seems little hope of his then receiving the lesson. He does, however, seem to think his journey of little avail, by sensi-

bly asking Lucifer, to what end he had shewn him what he had. But the reply of Lucifer is still characteristically deceptive. It does not strike me, that Lucifer had taught Cain a particle of true or useful self-knowledge, as he pretended. For although, in answer to Cain's lamentation that he seemed nothing, Lucifer does say, truly enough, in *one* sense, that the human sum of knowledge should be, to know mortal nature's nothingness; yet not so truly in another and more important sense. But what else is to be looked for, generally speaking, from Lucifer, than deadly fallacy? I say generally, because I believe he has sometimes spoken truth, to serve his own purpose. However, as to the point before us, he should, and would, as a *faithful* interpreter, have informed his scholar, *distinctly*, wherein, that "nothingness" consisted, by Cain's bequeathing which to his children he would spare them many tortures. I must then endeavour shortly to supply this omission, by referring to a former Note wherein I acknowledged man to be nothing compared with, or in opposition to, his maker; but far otherwise than nothing, considering his immortality, his capacity for happiness, or misery, and his accountability as a moral agent.

CAIN.

Haughty spirit!

Thou speak'st it proudly; but thyself, though proud,
Hast a superior.

LUCIFER.

No! By heaven, which He
Holds, and the abyss, and the immensity
Of worlds, and life, which I hold with him — No!
I have a victor — true; but no superior.
Homage he has from all — but none from me;
I battle it against him, as I battled

In highest heaven. Through all eternity,
 And the unfathomable gulphs of Hades,
 And the interminable realms of space,
 And the infinity of endless ages,
 All, all, will I dispute! And world by world,
 And star by star and universe by universe
 Shall tremble in the balance, till the great
 Conflict shall cease, if ever it shall cease,
 Which it ne'er shall, till he or I be quench'd!
 And what can quench our immortality,
 Or mutual and irrevocable hate?
 He as a conqueror will call the conquer'd
Evil; but what will be the *good* he gives?
 Were I the victor, *his* works would be deem'd
 The only evil ones. And you, ye new
 And scarce-born mortals, what have been his gifts
 To you already in your little world?

CAIN.

But few; and some of those but bitter.

Note 59.

Cain's bold intimation to his haughty friend, that he himself had a superior, draws from him the above indignant reply, in which it must be owned the author has strongly and justly conceived the character he was exhibiting. But I cannot forbear thinking, that had Cain, or even Lucifer himself, been aware of the consideration given in the preceding Note, to the subject of the "two principles," either Lucifer would have been at least less confident, or Cain less credulous. Still, this further ebullition of Luciferian bombast, however

appropriate to Lucifer, requires a little examination. He first then would distinguish between a victor and a superior. Now, as between a Marlborough and a Bonaparte, or other similar opponents, suppose two pretty equally matched kings of the Saxon heptarchy, Lucifer's distinction may, perhaps, be allowed; because, as we are *credibly* informed,

“ He that fights and runs away,
May live to fight another day.”

And the contest may therefore be interminable, or much prolonged; and one of such equal parties meanwhile cannot command, or constrain the other. But as between the whole naval force of England, and a rebellious sloop of war, (a weak comparison or illustration I own, when applied to *omnipotence*,) in such case, I conceive the distinction to be perfectly idle. With respect to his description of his past and future battles with heaven, it is of course poetical, and not a subject of serious refutation or thought, after the account which, in former Notes, has been taken of Lucifer. He confesses however, that his victor has homage from all except himself. There are two kinds of homage; one constrained and servile, the other free and voluntary as we have seen in the seraphs. The latter of course cannot be expected from Lucifer; but the former he cannot withhold; for it is written, that, “at the name of Jesus every knee shall bow, of things in Heaven, and things in Earth, and things under the Earth.” This compulsive homage Lucifer paid when he told his victor, he knew him who he was, the Holy One of God; and when he prayed to be sent into the herd of swine; and when he asked him if he were come to *torment* them before the time. Tormenting is very like “torturing;” truly Luciferian. The time also is coming when Lucifer will pay this involuntary homage in still another manner. He admits, nevertheless, that he is to be conquered at last, and then gravely tells us (mighty personage as he is) that the conqueror will call him evil. And well he may; for, such (in the sense allowed in

these Notes) he is. Then he asks, what he apparently deems a very puzzling question, "but what will be the good he gives?" We will condescend to answer him, by saying, that, besides all the intermediate good he (that is God) has been giving man since the creation of the world, he will, at this happy consummation, in his own appointed time, of the final *restraint*, not *destruction*, of Lucifer, give everlasting peace, and freedom from his molestations;—no small good that, of itself. Had it been *best* that it should have occurred sooner, it would have been sooner done. If *he* had been the victor he says, and so forth; that is, *if* God had not been God, nor Lucifer Lucifer, then there would of course have been all the difference. His concluding excitement of Cain's discontent by the question he asks, is no less characteristic of himself, than Cain's answer is of *him*. But before we receive Cain's account as to the fewness and bitterness of God's gifts, we should hear his father, his mother, his brother, and his sisters; and, from the early parts of these pages, we cannot doubt what *their* evidence would be. What the "*bitter*" gifts were who can tell? If Cain means the tree of the knowledge of good and evil; that was so far from being a *gift*, like the all-healing tree of life, that it was expressly *excepted* from their use. They were, most strongly and implicitly, and under the most awful sanction, prohibited from eating of its fruit. How then a gift? And as to the *consequences* (fruits) of his parents doing so in violation of their maker's sole command, bitter as they may be termed, how could Cain, with any *justice*, charge them upon him, whose injunctions, if obeyed, would have prevented them?

As we now draw towards the end of our conversancy with Lucifer, in his proper person, his parting admonitions to his (too Lucifer-like) companion and pupil, must be attentively considered.

LUCIFER.

Back

With me, then, to thine Earth, and try the rest

Of his celestial boons to ye and yours.
 Evil and good are things in their own essence,
 And not made good or evil by the giver ;
 But if he gives you good— so call him ; if
 Evil springs from *him*, do not name it *mine*,
 Till ye know better its true fount : and judge
 Not by words, though of spirits, but the fruits
 Of your existence, such as it must be.
One good gift has the fatal apple given—
 Your *reason*:— let it not be over-sway'd
 By tyrannous threats to force you into faith
 'Gainst all external sense and inward feeling :
 Think and endure,— and form an inner world
 In your own bosom— where the outward fails ;
 So shall you nearer be the spiritual
 Nature, and war triumphant with your own.

[*They disappear.*

Note 60.

As to the *beginning* of this valedictory instruction of Lucifer to his listening auditor, viz. on getting back to his Earth, to try the rest of "his celestial boons," he means, I suppose, that Cain should ascertain, by living longer, whether he should experience more happiness than he had yet done. But that was not likely or possible without a change of mind. Or, probably, in his peculiar way, he hinted to Cain, he might possibly find some bitterer "gifts" still, than he had found hitherto : which, in fact, Lucifer anticipated for him, and was not wanting in the promotion of, and the effects of which we shall see presently, if indeed, those calamities a man *brings* upon *himself*, even by yielding to the suggestions of Lucifer, can *properly*

be called *God's* "gifts." He then assumes the fur again; or rather affects the eloquence which

"Drops manna, and can make the worse appear
The better reason, to perplex."

Let us however follow him and examine, and if we can find any place for praise, fairly give it. I do not wish to dispute with Lucifer for disputing's sake. Therefore, although not quite sure of the *exact* correctness of his position — that "evil and good are things in their own essence," yet as the admission of it can do his principal argument, and ultimate aim, no service, nor mine any injury, I shall admit it; and so proceed at once to observe, that admitting also that evil things or good things are "not made so by the giver" if not so in themselves; yet, in reference to the Almighty, (the vituperation of whom is the *key* to this speech,) *he* gives, and can give, nothing *but good*, as appears, I hope, throughout these pages. This fact *settles* all metaphysical subtleties therefore at once. God's gifts then are only *good*; therefore, "so we call him." On the other hand, *some* things we believe come, though *ultimately* as all things must, from God; yet, by divine permission, *immediately* from Lucifer, and are of the nature of and felt as, what we call evil; therefore Lucifer being the *voluntary* donor (or inflicter) of them, we not only "call *him*" evil; but, as such *volunteer* in the matter, he will assuredly have to *account* for these things in due time, notwithstanding God has thus intermediately *allowed* them, for his own ulterior good purposes; so that in fact, in respect of God and man, they are (intrinsicly) *good*. The case of Job eminently exemplifies this. God had special ends to answer in Job as a moral agent, and also to mankind generally; and therefore allowed Lucifer's voluntary action in it. Yet, no thank to Lucifer certainly. *His* aim was not good but evil; therefore, "so call him."—As to evil springing from God, we have seen, and know it *cannot*; nothing but *essential* good can spring from him. But not so in regard of Lucifer, as we have seen, so far as *his*

intention is concerned. As for the "true fount" of *all* things, we have seen, and well know, where, and what it is: and to whom we ascribe good; and to whom evil, in point of responsibility. He then bids Cain "judge, not by words, though of spirits, but the fruits of his existence, such as it must be." If by this he mean to recommend to Cain and to man, to look only at what he terms the evils (the "fruits") of his existence, and so continue discontented, and rebellious against his maker, as their author, and to draw his inferences accordingly; and to believe no revelation from Heaven, however authenticated by rational evidence; that is very good advice certainly for Lucifer to give in furtherance of his own kingdom, and to multiply its subjects; but such advice, as no considerate mortal will choose to follow. With respect to Lucifer's calling human reason a gift of the fatal apple; what can be more absurd? As if reason did not form an essential part of man's first nature? The gift which man received from the "fatal apple" was, a terrible *perversion* of that reason. The reason man had at his creation, the gift of his creator, bade him reverence his creator, and regard his injunctions. The dictates of that reason, however, man chose to slight, in complaisance to his will, and his inferior nature. The consequence was transgression; which transgression produced that altered nature, which immoral acts have ever a tendency to generate. Part of that altered nature consisted in the deterioration of man's reason in every respect for which that reason was given him. The *effects* of that deterioration have been operating ever since, in the alienation of man from his maker, and other calamities; and have only been at length removed by the *revelation*, (so far as embraced by man) of which so frequent mention has been made.

By recommending Cain not to let his reason (such as it was in him, or has been since in man) be overpowered by "tyrannous threats" to force him into faith against all external sense and inward feeling; I apprehend Lucifer, though *prospectively* of course, means to guard, not Cain, so much as mankind generally, against the Christian revelation before considered, which makes so *specially* against himself.

But he is very unfortunate in designating the truths of that revelation by the term "tyrannous threats," because he cannot possibly establish his charge; since those truths are of a directly contrary nature, and the revelation itself is precisely opposite to tyranny or threatening. It is a message of peace and mercy from the benignant creator to his revolted and depraved creature man, in his lost and wretched state, informing him in what way (a way most easy and beneficent) he may become reconciled to his offended maker, and be fully restored to his friendship, and favour, both in this life, and in that which comes. With these "glad tidings of great joy," as myriads of the intelligent of mankind have found them to be, (most honourable to the divine justice, holiness, and goodness, nor yet any way derogatory to the true dignity of man,) there is doubtless connected, as in reason there should be in all such cases, an explicit declaration of the awful consequences to man, should he *reject* this reconciliation with his maker. This part of the message I suppose it must be, which Lucifer intends by denominating it "tyrannous threats." But the divine nature has been seen to be diametrically opposite to a tyrant's character. This ascription of tyranny, and threatening, is evidently applied by Lucifer to create an *odium* in the mind of man against the whole revelation, lest man, by accepting it, should be translated out of the thralldom of his own kingdom of tyranny, darkness, and misery, into that of the Messiah, and so be changed from an heir of Hell to an heir of glory. But could we suppose, that *Lucifer*, in this place, was personating *man*, and speaking as some individual of mankind, and expressing his hostile feelings in that character, against the revelation in question — it should then seem, that like Lucifer himself, (but unlike Socrates, who anticipated such revelation and such a Saviour,) such individual adopts the same distorted sentiments; and from his objection to any *medium* of acceptance with his maker, beyond his own merits, or God's supposed general and necessary mercy, deems that to be tyrannous threatening which is only a beneficent *announcement* of the natural and inevitable consequence of rejecting such *medium* of reconciliation. Yet, with this

gracious arrangement, (God himself in Christ, by his death, reconciling his guilty creature to himself,) man does actually choose, at least *many* do, to be offended, and to disdain and refuse it; calling it, with Lucifer, "a forcing into faith;" "a conditional creed to save them;" "tyrannous threats;"—and what not beside? and so, spurns his God (offering to be his Saviour also) from him. All which, though at the instigation of Lucifer, working upon man's *natural* character, and intended to procure man's eternal ruin with his own; — ["spirits and men, we sympathize; that by the unbounded sympathy of all, our pangs may be made more endurable;"—] yet, man *concurrs*, thus, in his own destruction; preferring with Lucifer, their pride, and self-importance, and a Luciferian "independency of torture," before such salvation. Another view may be taken of this matter, to shew that the Gospel, or revelation in question, contains in it nothing of the nature of tyrannous threatening, but consists of the purest and most astonishing benevolence. For as man fell by pride and confidence in deliberately following his own inclination in disobeying his creator, and thus exercising, to his own destruction, his free will in which he seemed to glory; and possibly thought himself sufficient master of his own actions to justify his neglect of God's will and express command; therefore to eradicate from man that disposition to such pride, or, as scripture expresses it, "to hide pride from man;" we are assured, that the salvation we are considering was wholly gratuitous on the part of Jehovah, so far as man is concerned in point of merit or deserving; though on the part of Jehovah himself, in the person of the Son in the human nature of Jesus Christ, it was far other than gratuitous. That divine person of the Godhead paid for it a "*price*" (1 Cor. vi. 20) exceeding all human computation or conception: and the scriptures also declare that "the redemption of the soul is precious;" and speak of the *precious* blood of Christ, (which, if he were *mere man*, it could not be in any peculiar sense,) which price consisted in the sufferings which Jehovah, the Redeemer, in the human nature of Christ assumed by him, encountered and endured in the course of his fulfilment of his own law, in

the place of, and for man; thus truly magnifying his law and making it honourable, as predicted by the prophet four hundred years before; and also the death which he, as man, submitted to in accomplishment of the divine denunciation, — that man should die.

If this do not “hide pride from man,” what can? This vicarious obedience and death therefore, of Jesus Christ, constitutes that amazing but all-gracious method, or plan, plainly declared in scripture, by which it has pleased Jehovah, Father, Son, and Spirit, to restore and save innumerable multitudes of the lost human race; God, as Father, in his eternal love and goodness, appointing and “giving them” to the Son, to redeem; God, as the Son, accepting and undertaking that work; God, as the Eternal Spirit, engaging to lead them to the Saviour, and to regenerate the subjects of such redemption. How can this not be acknowledged a sublime economy, and most consolatory to man, because secure? How different from tyrannous threatening, or forced faith, is this! What hinders us from a spontaneous and glad acceptance of such an arrangement, and from earnestly desiring to form part of the ransomed “multitude whom no man can number”? This is what the scriptures plainly describe as the “everlasting (or eternal) covenant, ordered in all things, and *sure*.” The divine nature, in its three-fold character, is thus pledged that the redeemed shall never fall (finally) from their maker. They may fall into sin or error in this life, but they will rise again. [They will not live in voluntary, and known, and gross sin, nor in injustice to their fellow creatures. Those who do so are not to be credited for a pretended participation of these mercies.] They are denominated “the Church of God which he hath purchased with his own Blood.” Here the Blood of *God* is recognized as the purchase-price of the redeemed. And yet it was the “Blood of *Christ*.” How can that be, unless Christ and God are identically and essentially one, notwithstanding the assumption of the human nature, for this purpose, by Jehovah the Son? Of these also the Redeemer says, “they shall never perish, neither be plucked out of my hand, nor out of my Father’s hand;” and it is his declared

“will,” that they shall ultimately “be with him where he is, to behold his glory.” How *can* man object to this? These multitudes, thus redeemed out of every tongue and nation, are those who *evidence* their being thus included in this cheering covenant by their “*coming*” to Christ, by *faith* in him, *for* that life and salvation, and by “*receiving*” him as their Redeemer, and subsequently by regarding his precepts under the influence of the Spirit. What system can be so satisfactory to the human mind; at least to those who regard their immortality, and do not object to that *spirituality* of mind, and superiority over (not undue neglect of) the things of time and sense, which is both essential and preparatory to future happiness, in their future and ultimate state of being?

As Lucifer however has taken upon him to speak of what he terms a *forcing* into faith — “let it not (*viz.* your reason) be o’er-*swayed* by tyrannous threats to *force you into faith*,” and so forth, I may be allowed perhaps a few more words in annotation on that point. In the first place then, is not the expression, “force you into faith,” a contradiction? Might not Lucifer with equal propriety talk of forced volition, or forced free will, as forced faith? For is not faith in its very nature a spontaneous act or disposition of the mind, producing a *willing* reliance upon the object of that faith, and arising from a rational conviction of its truth? A *pretence* of faith then there may be, from compulsive force or other motives; but pretence is not the thing pretended; therefore such *pretence* to faith is no faith at all. *Real* faith then cannot be, and is not, the subject of *force*. In the next place, there are those who assert that faith (I mean such faith as Lucifer is here reprobating, *viz.* faith in Christ as a Saviour) is a divine donation or gift. And is a donation or gift generally understood to be a subject of *coercion*? That such faith is a divine gift, how can we deny, until we set aside revelation; which declares “by grace (or favour) are ye saved, through faith, and that not of yourselves; the gift of God, not of works, lest any man should boast”? If therefore God *bestow* this faith upon any man, how can it be reasonably said to be *forced* upon him? For in another place, the apostle declares “all men have

not faith." This we know by experience, because many disclaim it, and prefer trusting in their own works of righteousness. Such being the case, I am aware that Lucifer may retort—if your boasted faith be a gift of God, and if all men have not faith, does not that prove that God gives faith to some only of his creatures, not to all? and if so, how can God justly condemn any man who has not faith in Christ? In reply to any individual asking those questions, I must ask *him* three questions, his answer to which will afford a reply to *his* enquiries. The first would be:—do you know that God has determined *never* to give you the faith we are considering? The second is:—are you *desirous* of that faith; or do you dislike and reject it? The third is:—have you asked God to bestow it on you in the way scripture points out, viz. "in the name of, and for the sake of Jesus Christ"? I am certain the *first* of these three questions must be answered in the *negative*; which leaves at least an *open door* for the acquisition of this faith. If the second question be answered by saying, that this faith is in truth *disliked* and rejected by the enquirer; that *shuts* the door, for any thing I can see. How can he expect to receive, as a gift, what his mind revolts against? But if he *desire* it, I apprehend that to be an indication that he will obtain it; because that desire, if sincere, is, on scripture grounds, to be considered a *preparatory* gift of God, and the forerunner of the gift of faith, if followed (as sincere desires always are where opportunity is afforded) by requests for the donation. And there are abundant scripture exhortations to pray for faith and other mercies, and innumerable promises of such prayers being granted. But if my *third* question be answered, by saying, that the enquirer has never asked faith of God, and never will, or is careless about the matter; I must leave him in that chosen state of mind. God will deal with him as he sees fit. But his *word* affords him no happy prospect. The matter is between that soul and its maker. God *cannot* do wrong. But man's mouth is shut. His conscience will condemn him.

Such is the interpretation, which, alone, appears to me to be the true one, of these "tyrannous threats," this "forced faith," and

“conditional creed,” as opposed to “all external sense and inward feeling;” whereas, in the Christian revelation, in its *purity*, uncontaminated by the arts of wicked men, and as represented in the revelation itself; there is *nothing* which revolts against “external sense and inward feeling” any farther than a man wishing to be moral and good (good, not absolutely, but in the usual sense) and to be made superior to the moral ills of his *inferior* nature, would gladly choose. That in this revelation there are things which man’s *finite mind* cannot *comprehend*, is no contradiction to the last assertion. To be *beyond* reason, and *against* reason, are quite different predicaments.

But, it is scarcely doing justice or giving his due, even to Lucifer himself, to omit *one* view in which, it is perhaps *possible*, he meant to apply the terms we have been considering. And if he did so, we heartily join him. He perhaps had the power given him of *fore-knowing* not only the tyrannous threats, but the infernal inflictions, which his own wicked agents would in after times, subsequent to the Christian æra, practise upon their fellow men, persecuting, burning, torturing them, for not believing, and submitting to, all those monstrous, idolatrous, and absurd, contradictions to “all external sense and inward feeling,” which, for impious lucre, and wicked infernal sway, they would impose upon them. The objection to *this* being Lucifer’s meaning is, that it would be to obloquize his *own servants*, and instruments. Yet we have seen, he is not incapable of speaking truths which make against himself; so possibly here. But I am not sure; yet I thought it but just and right not to omit this apparent *possibility* in his favour.

Having thus endeavoured fairly to developpe Lucifer’s meaning, (whatever it was; for it is seldom perhaps *quite* easy to hit it,) respecting his alleged, or insinuated, tyrannous threats, and so forth — we now proceed to his concluding advice; than which, if rightly viewed, it appears to me, no wise and affectionate Polonius could have given better to his darling Laertes. For what can be more important or valuable to man, than, under the guidance of his maker’s word and Spirit, and the revelation we have considered, to “think

and endure, and form an inner world in his own bosom, where the outward fails;”—as fail it must and will:—so as to secure a peace which the outward world can neither give nor take away? This also is the road to that approximation to man’s “spiritual nature” which is his highest good, and the acquisition of which will, as Lucifer (if he meant that) most justly says, enable man to war triumphantly with his own inferior and earthly nature; which, though not destroyed till death, yet if not kept in due subjection, will hold him in captivity to the end of life, and throughout eternity. Should it be said, that this is not Lucifer’s meaning, nor the “spiritual nature” to which he alluded; but that the spiritual nature he meant is that which he taught Cain he should acquire in his future state among the *phantoms*, and which would lead him to an eternal enmity with his maker; I reply it may be, and I almost fear, is so. But I must also maintain, that such last-mentioned spiritual nature, if such *was* Lucifer’s intention, is wholly chimerical, and not to be found in those authenticated records which give the only true account of all spirituality, whether divine, angelic, or human.

ACT III. SCENE I.

The Earth, near Eden, as in Act I.

Enter CAIN and ADAH.

ADAH.

Hush! tread softly, Cain.

CAIN.

I will; but wherefore?

ADAH.

Our little Enoch sleeps upon yon bed
Of leaves, beneath the cypress.

CAIN.

Cypress! 't is
A gloomy tree, which looks as if it mourn'd
O'er what it shadows; wherefore didst thou choose it
For our child's canopy?

ADAH.

Because its branches
Shut out the sun like night, and therefore seem'd
Fitting to shadow slumber.

CAIN.

Ay, the last —
And longest ; but no matter — lead me to him.
[*They go up to the child.*
How lovely he appears ! his little cheeks,
In their pure incarnation, vying with
The rose leaves strewn beneath them.

ADAH.

And his lips, too,
How beautifully parted ! No ; you shall not
Kiss him, at least not now : he will awake soon —
His hour of mid-day rest is nearly over ;
But it were pity to disturb him till
'T is closed.

CAIN.

You have said well ; I will contain
My heart till then. He smiles and sleeps ! — Sleep on
And smile, thou little, young inheritor
Of a world scarce less young : sleep on, and smile !
Thine are the hours and days when both are cheering
And innocent ! *thou* hast not pluck'd the fruit —

Thou know'st not thou art naked! Must the time
 Come thou shalt be amerced for sins unknown,
 Which were not thine nor mine? But now sleep on!
 His cheeks are reddening into deeper smiles,
 And shining lids are trembling o'er his long
 Lashes, dark as the cypress which waves o'er them;
 Half open, from beneath them the clear blue
 Laughs out, although in slumber. He must dream—
 Of what? Of Paradise!—Ay! dream of it,
 My disinherited boy! 'T is but a dream;
 For never more thyself, thy sons, nor fathers,
 Shall walk in that forbidden place of joy!

ADAH.

Dear Cain! Nay, do not whisper o'er our son
 Such melancholy yearnings o'er the past:
 Why wilt thou always mourn for Paradise?
 Can we not make another?

CAIN.

Where?

ADAH.

Here, or
 Where'er thou wilt: where'er thou art, I feel not
 The want of this so much regretted Eden.
 Have I not thee, our boy, our sire, and brother,
 And Zillah—our sweet sister, and our Eve,
 To whom we owe so much besides our birth?

CAIN.

Yes — death, too, is amongst the debts we owe her.

ADAH.

Cain! that proud spirit, who withdrew thee hence,
 Hath sadden'd thine still deeper. I had hoped
 The promis'd wonders which thou hast beheld,
 Visions, thou say'st, of past and present worlds,
 Would have composed thy mind into the calm
 Of a contented knowledge; but I see
 Thy guide hath done thee evil: still I thank him,
 And can forgive him all, that he so soon
 Hath given thee back to us.

CAIN.

So soon?

ADAH.

'T is scarcely

Two hours since ye departed: two *long* hours
 To *me*, but only *hours* upon the sun.

CAIN.

And yet I have approach'd that sun, and seen
 Worlds which he once shone on, and never more
 Shall light; and worlds he never lit: methought
 Years had roll'd o'er my absence.

ADAH.

Hardly hours.

CAIN.

The mind then hath capacity of time,
 And measures it by that which it beholds,
 Pleasing, or painful ; little or almighty.
 I had beheld the immemorial works
 Of endless beings ; skirr'd extinguish'd worlds ;
 And, gazing on eternity, methought
 I had borrow'd more by a few drops of ages
 From its immensity ; but now I feel
 My littleness again. Well said the spirit,
 That I was nothing !

ADAH.

Wherefore said he so ?

Jehovah said not that.

CAIN.

No : *he* contents him.

With making us the *nothing* which we are ;
 And after flattering dust with glimpses of
 Eden and immortality, resolves
 It back to dust again — for what ?

ADAH.

Thou know'st —

Even for our parents' error.

CAIN.

What is that
To us? they sinn'd, then *let them* die!

ADAH.

Thou hast not spoken well, nor is that thought
Thy own, but of the spirit who was with thee.
Would *I* could die for them, so *they* might live!

CAIN.

Why, so say I—provided that one victim
Might satiate the insatiable of life,
And that our little rosy sleeper there
Might never taste of death nor human sorrow,
Nor hand it down to those who spring from him.

Note 61.

On Cain's arrival back to Earth, and meeting immediately, as was agreed on, with Adah, it must be confessed, that with all his lamentable faults and errors, he does not seem to add that of a want of parental tenderness. As to his alluding to his child's last and longest slumber, that was perfectly agreeable to his usual train of dismal thoughts. He of course meant death, the great object of his dislike, if not of terror. Assuredly, death is, to all, so far as respects the *animal* or *corporeal* part of man, the last and longest slumber: but not so as to his immortal part, as has been before noticed. With regard to Cain's asking of his sleeping boy, "must the time come when thou must be amerced for sins unknown, which were not *thine* nor mine?" it is answered, certainly not: for although *this little*

Enoch, and that other Enoch who "walked with God, and was not, for God took him," and all the race of mankind, partake of the *temporal* effects of Adam's transgression, and are in fact sinful, *derivatively* from their first parent; yet not one that ever breathed, or does, or shall breathe, has been, or will be "amerced;" that is, suffer exclusion from his maker's favour eternally, and lose the happiness of heaven, and incur the pains of hell, but for his own *personal* and wilful sin and wickedness, of which his own conscience will accuse him; which he would have escaped by not neglecting or refusing the ample remedy contained in the revelation before mentioned. Cain is again wrong in terming his boy "disinherited;" at least, in any *odious* sense as applied to the creator. How was he disinherited of that which his father never had? And how could his father be *disinherited* of what *his* father had lost before Cain was born? Besides, *disinheriting* is an act done against *an individual*. But God never did an act against either Cain or his boy. Much better had Cain, just before, called his boy — "thou little, young *inheritor of a world scarce less young*;" for so his father, Adam himself, termed it; — "the *young earth* yields kindly to us her fruits with little labour:" and ought not Cain then rather to have exulted in what his boy inherited, than to complain, unjustly, of his being *disinherited*, which he was not? It must not, however, be forgotten, that *man* is immensely *benefitted* by that disherison, if such it may be called, of Adam, as has been seen heretofore. His perpetual and unreasonable lamentations over Paradise, "that forbidden place of joy," savours of froward puerility, especially considering the many mercies, with which he was surrounded. For this, Adah will mildly reprove him presently. But this only shews the author's accuracy: for do not such characters still exist? This seems also to have been Lord Byron's individual judgment, by making Adah reply with so much good sense to Cain, in adverting to the power God had given them, even of making another Paradise; (of which, even in this climate, and at this day, the earth is not wholly incapable;) and especially ~~considering that~~ happiness could not so much depend upon *place* as

upon society ; and which she particularly insists upon. Still, when Adah included her hapless mother in her enumeration of the "charities," it awoke in Cain all his antipathies to death, which therefore he again places to his mother's account. — At every step, we see the author's aim to correct this unreasonable Cain ; thus he does in Adah's remonstrance with Cain, and her sharp animadversions upon "that proud spirit who withdrew him thence," and to whom she attributes the evil impressions upon Cain's mind. A pretty clear intimation, by the way, of Lord Byron's persuasion,—that evil spirits are not unacquainted with man, nor neglectful of inflicting upon him all the misery they may be *permitted* to inflict. Hence the peculiar fitness of that petition "deliver us from evil," (or the evil *one*,) as before referred to, which, *sincerely* presented, we cannot reasonably doubt of being effectually granted. — With respect to Cain's ideas of the *time* which he thought must have elapsed, during his flight among so many, and some of them not, at this time of day, very credible, wonders, that is probably correct ; as well as that time is, as he says, measured in the human mind, or perhaps the notion of time created, in the human mind, by its observation of "that which it beholds, pleasing or painful ; or little : " but what he means by "almighty," I hardly can conceive, unless he alluded to his having beheld "the immemorial works of endless ages," and "gazed on eternity." These things he probably deemed in some sense almighty ; though, I think, hyperbolically ; or, if he meant to ascribe self-existence and self-creation to them, that is merely atheistical of course. Nor can we but exceedingly approve the answer which Lord Byron has made Adah give to Cain, who lamented again his "littleness," and noticed Lucifer's correctness in telling him he was "nothing." She says, "wherefore said he so ? Jehovah said not that." This corresponds, I think, in substance, with a preceding Note, in which we distinguished between man's nothingness, as compared with his creator, which is true ; and as exempting him from moral responsibility, or from the capacity of immortal misery or happiness ; in which sense, man is not only *not nothing*, but he is of *great conside-*

ration. In consistency with his general plan, Lord Byron confined all Cain's sentiments to the views generally derived from the Old Testament only: Cain therefore, so far, is less to be censured for his notion of God's contenting himself with making man the "nothing" Cain said he was; and, after "flattering him with immortality" from the tree of life, yet resolving him back to dust again. But *why* the Almighty did so, has been seen. He had declared to man, that if he violated his (easy) prohibition, he should die. Was that flattery? Can it be *expected* that God, who is truth itself, and "cannot lie," should not perform what he had said? But, his mercy being equal to his truth, he has, as has been intimated before, provided a way for at once vindicating his truth, and securing to man, not indeed his first promised, and *conditional*, immortality, but an immortality infinitely superior in nature, as well as unconditional, and secure in its duration. It never can again be forfeited, or lost by those who accept, or "receive" it. — When Cain also, asks, for *what* was this original immortality lost, Adah most properly assigns the cause; on which Cain, as he had done before, so consistent is his character, again expresses his own displeasure, that his parents *alone* had not, personally, suffered death for their own "error." This calls forth a very beautiful and animated exclamation from Adah, which every generous mind must admire, expressly avowing her readiness to *substitute* even her own life, for her parents'. Cain, too, seems now to catch her amiable spirit. He declares his willingness to yield up his own existence, if one victim might satiate "the insatiable of life." This expression requires a little consideration. Did Cain, by the term "insatiable of life," mean merely death? If he did, his expression, we all know is not amiss. He *is* insatiable, although his insatiation will be destroyed, and in the mean time does more good infinitely than harm, to all who "receive *him*" who has *taken away his "sting."* But, if Cain meant, as I fear he did, most unreasonably, as well as most impiously, to throw that stigma (insatiate of life) upon his maker, we can only say, that his horrible impiety is in good keeping with his whole character. For, so far is

God from being thus insatiable, that, in order to restore and *secure* life, (instead of destroying it,) to his fallen, and lost creatures, he has designed and executed the amazing *plan*, which both Adah and Cain advert to presently, and which has recently been mentioned. With respect to Cain's wish to redeem his "little rosy sleeper there" from the sorrows he so much, however unfoundedly, complains of, we give him all the credit we can for it.

ADAH.

How know we that some such atonement one day
May not redeem our race?

CAIN.

By sacrificing

The harmless for the guilty? what atonement
Were there? why, *we* are innocent: what have we
Done, that we must be victims for a deed
Before our birth, or need have victims to
Atone for this mysterious, nameless sin—
If it be such a sin to seek for knowledge?

Note 62.

It has been before remarked, that although Lord Byron in his preface, professes to confine himself to the Old Testament, which in general he does, yet he has in some instances referred to the New. And here is an eminent instance of it, and affords the occasion before adverted to, on which Adah glances at the plan by which the all-wise and all-good Jehovah has provided for his fallen creature man an infinitely better life than he could have had in a Paradisiacal state, had he never fallen. Thus it is, as perhaps may be said, nearly in Adam's

words, God has, indeed, caused good to spring out of evil, in the highest sense, and in the highest degree. Yet it is agreeable neither to revelation nor to reason, to imagine for a moment, that the fall of man came unawares upon the Almighty, and that he was *driven* to some expedient to remedy that calamity. Scripture passages are too numerous and well known, as well as the nature of deity, to admit of our hesitating to feel the utmost assurance that the fall, and its superior remedy, was and must have been in the contemplation and counsel of God from everlasting; for all things are present with him in one eternal and uninterrupted view. To *man*, events must be divided, and distributed in succession, or he never could comprehend them; for his capacity, and his intellect, are finite: but that does not apply to the infinite Jehovah, to whom nothing *can* be unexpected, nothing confused, nothing uncertain, nothing difficult. But these views, and this ascription of eternal, immutable purpose in the Almighty, do not remove from Lucifer, or from man, their respective responsibilities for *voluntary* crime, and sin. They are each conscious of voluntary moral evil, and of voluntary neglect of, and opposition to, their creator, and his just and no less merciful, requirements: Cain had just expressed his willingness that either Adah or himself should die for their parents, provided that *one* victim might suffice. Now the atonement to which Adah immediately thereupon alludes, *does* consist of *one* victim only. She says—"how know we but that some *such* atonement (viz. of one victim) one day may not redeem our race?" This cheering apprehension she must have derived from her parents; who, in recounting their fall, would relate also the promise which accompanied their judgment, viz. that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head. This promise we have seen would have been of little or no meaning if not allusive to the destruction of Lucifer, and his works of sin and death, by that future, though then distant, undertaking of their creator himself "manifest in the flesh." Such was the divine economy, counsel, and covenant of mercy, from eternity, for giving unto all, who should *receive* the "atonement," a better than Paradisiacal life.

God's law had been broken. Man could not retrieve his error. Even future obedience could not remedy the past transgression. The divine word was passed, that man should die. What moral governor would God be, not to have executed his own sanction? Jehovah himself therefore, (to save multitudes of the lost human race from death eternal,) in the person of the son, and in the assumed nature of man, undertook the task, otherwise impracticable, of both perfectly keeping his own law, and of undergoing, in man's stead, the death denounced upon him. Thus shewing to man the only ground upon which (and not upon his own obedience) he could securely stand. Thus did Jesus Christ "give his life a ransom for many, the just for the unjust, that he might bring them to God." Is it not astonishing, that a human being should be found, to object to such an amazing plan of divine beneficence? Yet *some* among the lost race *do* object; and, with Cain, abhor a salvation which, not being procured by themselves, they imagine "humbles" them! Humbles them, before their maker!

Analogy to *human* practice between earthly sovereigns and their subjects, as well as reason, requires our assenting to the proposition, that an offence against an infinite being requires an infinite atonement. Must not offence, generally speaking, partake of the character of the offended? An *infinite* satisfaction or atonement, how could a finite being yield? God therefore, in the greatness of his mercy, became a substitute for his creature, and made *himself* an atonement to *himself*! Infinite to infinite! This had been impossible but for his infinite *goodness*. Astonishing must be *the nature of sin* to render such proceeding necessary. Thus however, in divine wisdom, was the divine law "honoured, magnified, and established;" the divine word kept,—that man should die; and yet man saved! Of what then has man to complain? Cain however, although he seemed recently to acquiesce in *one* victim being found to atone, yet now, when Adah has thus discovered *that one* victim, forthwith turns round and finds fault with the *principles* upon which that one victim is provided. We seem to hear him reply to Adah's grateful recol-

lection of her parental lessons, by pronouncing *his* objection, that the "harmless for the guilty" should suffer as the victim! Those who are determined to find fault, are never at a loss for occasion; because, where there is no just one, they make one to suit *their* purpose. But, in the first place, should we not think it rather curious in a condemned traitor, or criminal among men, when offered a pardon, instead of straightway and joyfully accepting it, to be found prying into his sovereign's *inducement* for thus exercising his unsolicited and sovereign mercy? Or, should such traitor or criminal learn that an individual, free from crime, had kindly devoted himself to receive the traitor's punishment in his stead, on a previous arrangement satisfactory to the sovereign himself; is it to be expected, that this traitor or criminal would quarrel with his life on account of the *mode* in which it was so preserved? And calumniate his sovereign beside? Was such an instance ever known? But Cain then asks "what atonement were there?" Does so silly a question deserve a serious answer? A condemned traitor or criminal question the sufficiency of the satisfaction his sovereign himself accepted! Who ever heard of such a thing? Can any thing be conceived more absurd, more incredibly contrary to all human conduct? Is the criminal the *judge* of the atonement, and not rather the favoured object and *recipient* of it? Was the atonement *his* concern? What should we judge of such conduct among mortals, but that it resulted from insanity? That certainly would be the most *charitable*, if not most *just* construction. Any other way of accounting for such conduct would imply the saddest moral character in the individual. How much more strongly does this apply as between man and his creator.

In making Cain thus criminate his maker for providing a "harmless" victim,—the "harmless for the guilty,"—it ~~sho~~ seem that Lord Byron had in view the very declaration of *scripture* itself, where, speaking of Christ, it says, "wherefore he is able to ~~as~~ them to the uttermost who come unto God by him, seeing he ~~e~~ liveth to make intercession for them. For ~~¶~~ came (or was suited to) us, who is holy,

separate from sinners." This is a scripture proof of the *fact*. Of the astonishing irrationality of any human being *quarrelling* with that fact, a little consideration has been offered just above.

Cain, now, however, skips to another objection to their being thus pardoned and saved; an objection, I confess, which, if well founded, will do away completely with all sin, all offence, all transgression, and the necessity of all atonement and redemption at a breath. "Why, *we* are innocent: what have *we* done?"—and so forth. I have not been criminating Adah for any great faults; but, as for this expostulator *himself*, has he not been convicted of pride and rebellion, to go no farther? Adah was, apparently, of a generally amiable disposition. Yet even she had shewn that the fall of her parents had infected *her nature* also as it must *necessarily* have done that of all mankind. If she had, or if others have, great complacency and affection towards their fellow creatures, yet have they loved their *creator* with *all* their hearts? Who of all mankind will *dare* to arrogate so much to themselves? But a defect in that alone, (leaving their *innumerable* other *actual* sins out of the question,) condemns the whole posterity of Adam. The word of God is *full* of this. And if there be any force in the reasoning of Plato and others, *reason* confirms the duty, and the appropriateness, of man's first, and principal regards being given to the source of all excellence and goodness—his creator. And so Adah declares in her address to God in the earlier part of these pages. What then becomes of Cain's silly "why, *we* are *innocent*"? Besides, mankind are not as Cain falsely says, "victims" at all: *Christ* is the *only* "victim." Nor are mankind *eternally* even punished, for Adam's sin, but for their own; such as Cain's, among the rest. Neither do mankind "atone" for even their own *actual* sin: *Christ* alone atones for them. As to his calling it "this mysterious nameless sin," sin is not at all mysterious. It is simply the transgression of God's law, through pride, unbelief, rebellion, ingratitude, and other irrational, or worse than bestial, iniquities, nor is sin "nameless." It has *many* names; like Lucifer's, its collective name is "**Legion.**"

He then adds: — “if it be such a sin to seek for knowledge.” How puerile is that? As if a servant, or a child, in the teeth of the master’s or parent’s prohibition, should think himself justified, by saying “if it be such a sin *to do*, what I am enjoined *not* to do;” suppose to open a chest, (which was prohibited to be opened,) to gratify curiosity! But who will justify that? Especially if the injunction was accompanied by a declaration that death should be the consequence of transgression.

ADAH.

Alas! thou sinnest now, my Cain; thy words
Sound impious in mine ears.

CAIN.

Then leave me!

ADAH.

Though thy God left thee.

Never,

CAIN.

Say, what have we here?

ADAH.

Two altars, which our brother Abel made
During thine absence, whereupon to offer
A sacrifice to God on thy return.

CAIN.

And how knew *he*, that *I* would be so ready
With the burnt offerings, which he daily brings

With a meek brow, whose base humility
Shews more of fear than worship, as a bribe
To the Creator?

ADAH.

Surely 't is well done.

CAIN.

One altar may suffice ; *I* have no offering.

ADAH.

The fruits of the earth, the early, beautiful
Blossom and bud, and bloom of flow'rs and fruits :
These are a goodly offering to the Lord,
Given with a gentle and a contrite spirit.

CAIN.

I have toil'd, and till'd, and sweaten in the sun
According to the curse:—must I do more?
For what should I be gentle? for a war
With all the elements ere they will yield
The bread we eat? For what must I be grateful?
For being dust, and grovelling in the dust,
Till I return to dust? If I am nothing—
For nothing shall I be an hypocrite,
And seem well-pleas'd with pain? For what should I
Be contrite? for my father's sin, already
Expiate with what we all have undergone,
And to be more than expiated by

The ages prophesied, upon our seed?
 Little deems our young sleeper, there,
 The germ of an eternal misery
 To myriads is within him! better 'twere
 I snatch'd him in his sleep, and dash'd him 'gainst
 The rocks, than let him live to ——

ADAH.

Oh, my God!
 Touch not the child — my child! *thy* child! Oh Cain!

CAIN.

Fear not! for all the stars, and all the power
 Which sways them, I would not accost yon infant
 With ruder greeting than a father's kiss.

Note 63.

Adah, just above, confirms what is lately asserted, that Cain need not refer to his ancestor to find sin which he himself personally committed. For if to arraign the conduct of the Almighty, and revile his utmost goodness and mercy, be not sin, what is? Cain's rough bidding to Adah to leave him, since she thought him a sinner, is answered by her in a way which I suppose will be unadmired by few, if by any. With respect to Cain's expressions in reference to his brother, to whom he attributes a "meek brow, base humility, more fear than worship," and all as a "bribe to his creator," a few observations must be made. As to the meekness of Abel's brow, and his base humility, little need be said. Who will join Cain in taunting Abel for his meekness, or in terming his humility towards his maker base? Pity there is not more of both among men! And ~~oh better had~~ it been for Cain to have partaken of the same

dispositions ! But what still stranger speech to talk of the possibility of bribing God ! Of bribing the power by whom all things subsist, and who could destroy all things by his fiat, as he created them ! If Cain believed, and could have shewn, that Abel was a *dissembler* in his worship, a *hypocrite*, that would have been another thing, and he might have so termed him ; otherwise, no *sincere* humility towards God, however great, *can* be base, because of the divine majesty, and greatness, and excellence. Humility towards wicked or base men, is another matter. But, in the sequel, we shall not find Abel to be basely humble, though meek, towards the violent and haughty fratricide. True humility is ever esteemed a virtue, and therefore cannot be base. As to his humility shewing more of fear than worship, it might shew so to Cain ; but how could he prove it ? We have in a former Note, distinguished between different kinds of fear, and of worship, and shewn what *true worship* is ; how did Cain know that Abel's worship was not of that description ? The unquestionable fact is, that it was so : for he has the divine testimony to it : — “not as Cain, who was of that wicked one, and slew his brother. And wherefore slew he him ? Because his own works were evil, and his brother's righteous.” Now this inspired record would hardly have been given of Abel, had he been a hypocrite. Adah's remonstrance is still consistent with herself. She plainly tells him that not the magnitude of the offering, but the spirit in which it is made is what makes it acceptable. She does not indeed advert to the necessity of an *animal* sacrifice, though there seems every reason to believe that those sacrifices had been instituted by the Almighty's instructions to Adam. Possibly Adam and Abel might have been accustomed to offer animal sacrifices. And as offerings of the first-ripe fruits were afterwards instituted, they, it may be, were also occasionally presented in divine worship in Paradise, which may account for Adah's reference to them. Cain however does not seem to have been in the habit of offering sacrifices either of one kind or the other. Cain's reply to Adah's kind and appropriate remonstrance is somewhat curious, but requires a little consideration also. He thinks he has done won-

ders in having, "according to the curse," condescended to cultivate the "young earth which kindly yielded her fruits with little labour," according to his father's account; as if that had been doing some great service to his maker, rather than to himself; and then asks, if he must do more. He then proceeds to argumentation, and enquires if his *war with the elements*, [viz. ploughing, sowing, reaping, sun-shine, rain, and so forth,] require him to be gentle. Yet most men, in these days, think that if those circumstances do not particularly *demand* gentleness, yet that gentleness, to say the least, is no *hindrance* to them; and still more, I suppose, that the same circumstances do not require the *opposite* to gentleness. He next asks, if he is bound to be grateful, for being dust, and grovelling in the dust, till he return to dust. I should answer, certainly not exactly so, nor is it indeed *possible* that he *should be* grateful for such considerations as those; and if there were *nothing else* in his existence that excited his gratitude, it shews he was not *capable* of gratitude; and what that creature is, whether man or other animal, and how esteemed, who is (unlike the "ox and the ass") devoid of gratitude, needs not be said. What he means by "grovelling in the dust" I do not know, unless that in dry weather some dust adhered to him in his work. But we hear not much if any thing of such complaints in these days amongst husbandmen: at any rate not of "grovelling." It seems to me, that to be destitute of gratitude to God, is a tremendous sign that we are total strangers to him, and ought to awaken our jealousy of ourselves when we detect our forgetfulness of, and unthankfulness to him; which, who is not too apt to fall into? For scripture abundantly informs us that if man's heart be given to his maker, ("son, give me thine heart,") let his outward condition be what it may, he *will* find cause for gratitude. Cain next acts the *sophister* again:—"if I am nothing:"—who has said he was nothing? Nobody but Lucifer, Adah herself being witness; for she reminded him that "Jehovah said not that."—And in a former Note we have seen, that man is *much*. Then, *supposing* himself nothing, (false supposition as it was,) he asks, if for nothing he shall be an hypo-

crise? Who has wanted him to be a hypocrite at all? But in fact he *was* something, and something very important too, whether Lucifer and he would allow it or not; for he was a responsible moral agent; how can he be acquitted of abusing his intellectual powers, in his rebellious conduct towards his creator, against whom he had no just complaint? As to his seeming well-pleased with pain; no one asked him to do that either. But what was his pain? We have seen. He then asks, if he should be contrite for his father's sin? Perhaps not; but he had abundance of his own to be contrite for. Yet *sorrow*, or *concern*, even for his father's sin, would not have been amiss: but *contrition* belongs to a sinner for his *own* sins; not another's. But how *absurd*, to talk, (as if he were the judge,) of his father's sin being *expiated* by what they all had undergone already! In the first place, was *he* the judge of that? In the next place, what *had* they undergone? Not death actually, which was the sentence pronounced; but merely his parents' removal from Eden, under very merciful and tender circumstances of divine attention and care, to a somewhat less exuberant soil; and they were all happy except himself; and why not he? And as to talking of future expiation by their seed; more absurd still. How could they expiate? None could, in fact, expiate, but their offended and gracious creator himself, in the person of the Son, and that upon the "accursed tree;"—as we have before seen. He himself provided the expiation, (of which all their sacrifices were emblematic or typical,) and which Adam and Eve, and Abel, all, except Cain, believed in, and gladly received, according to the prospective light they had. Cain's own, and Adah's *consequent* emotion, on the child's account, is natural enough. But his reflection upon their "young sleeper there," is quite in the distorted and exaggerated style of Cain and Lucifer; and we know that eternal misery will be the portion of none who do not, like Cain, despise the appointed means of avoiding it. Nor then, if they repent, and turn to their maker, through him, who died "the just for the unjust that he might bring them to God." Adah however seems to feel the terrificness of Cain's state of mind. She says:—

ADAH.

Then, why so awful in thy speech ?

CAIN.

I said,

'T were better that he ceased to live, than give
Life to so much sorrow as he must
Endure, and, harder still, bequeath ; but since
That saying jars you, let us only say —
)) 'T were better that he never had been born.

ADAH.

Oh, do not say so ! Where were then the joys,
The mother's joys of watching, nourishing,
And loving him ? Soft ! he awakes. Sweet Enoch !

[*She goes to the child.*]

Oh Cain ! look on him ; see how full of life,
Of strength, of bloom, of beauty, and of joy,
How like to me — how like to thee, when gentle,
For *then* we are *all* alike ; is 't not so, Cain ?
Mother, and sire, and son, our features are
Reflected in each other ; as they are
In the clear waters, when *they* are *gentle*, and
When *thou* art *gentle*. Love us, then, my Cain !
And love thyself for our sakes, for we love thee.
Look ! how he laughs and stretches out his arms,
And opens wide his blue eyes upon thine,
To hail his father ; while his little form

Flutters as wing'd with joy. Talk not of pain!
 The childless cherubs well might envy thee
 The pleasures of a parent! Bless him, Cain!
 As yet he hath no words to thank thee, but
 His heart will, and thine own too.

CAIN.

Bless thee, boy!
 If that a mortal blessing may avail thee,
 To save thee from the serpent's curse!

ADAH.

It shall.
 Surely a father's blessing may avert
 A reptile's subtlety.

CAIN.

Of that I doubt;
 But bless him ne'er the less.

Note 64.

Adah, we see, reproves Cain, not only for his terrible speeches, but even for saying it would have been better for his son never to have been born, considering the pleasures his mother would have in her various parental cares. In that, and in her sentiments displayed in her following animated description of her little one, I apprehend she will find many more to correspond and agree with her, than with Cain: for she speaks the voice of nature in its most amiable form. Her entreaty, too, to Cain, to love himself for their sakes, seems very allowable, to say perhaps the least. As for the childless ch

envying him the pleasures of a parent, that seems to be, most probably, her mere parental hyperbole; yet, on that score, pardonable: the *subjects* are totally different. She will, however, be applauded, for bidding Cain not to talk of *pain*, under all *his* circumstances: And if *she* did not, ought *he*? Her anxiety for him to bless his child is also very natural. But I think Cain's doubt of the efficacy of his so doing was well founded; for although some of the patriarchs, Isaac, Jacob, and others, pronounced blessings upon their families; yet they not only appear to have done it under divine influence, and immediate authority, but were also true worshippers of God, which Cain was not, and of course could not pretend to immediate divine influence or authority; without which, no mortal can convey a blessing to another; that is, from God; though he may *supplicate* of God to grant his blessing to others: but even that Cain was not likely to do, and in fact did not; so that his blessing, as he termed it, was mere mummerly, or gross mockery, if he did it in the divine name, infidel as he was; and if he did not, what did it amount to? Can man bless man? Do the scriptures authorize that idea? Who can bless but God only? It is true, man may pray to God for his blessing on his children, or other individuals, if God give him the *spirit of supplication*; otherwise what are mere words; are they not mockery, according to scripture, unless uttered under divine influence? "They that worship the Father must worship him in spirit and in truth; for the Father seeketh such to worship him." Beside, Cain was not, like the patriarchs, prospectively a believer in Christ; in whose name alone, through faith in him, and for his sake, as scripture abundantly tells us, we can come to God with any petition or request. In any other way, if scripture be true, God will not hear man for himself or others. Jesus Christ says, "that whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he will give it you."—And, "whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, that the Father may be glorified in the Son." And, "if ye shall ask any thing in my name, I will do it." But what can we think of a *mere man* directing prayers to be put up to God in his name, which God,

on man's account, for his sake will answer ; nay, which *man himself* will answer ? A man answer prayer to God ! Who can answer prayer but God only ? Either then Christ is God, or he was an arrogant, blasphemous, and wicked man ; though his folly must have been greater, if possible, than his wickedness. How any, after these and other similar pretensions of Christ, can profess to honour or reverence him, thinking him *mere man*, is strange, and painful to imagine. As mere man, he was to be deemed deserving of greater reprobation than Mahomet. But it is all made plain to those who credit him when he says, " I and my Father are one : — what things soever the Father doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise : — he that hath seen me hath seen the Father : — the Father which dwelleth in me, he doeth the works : — I am in the Father and the Father in me : — as the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom he will." Here the Son and the Father do the very same acts, each by his *independent power* ; and yet the Son is by some said to be a mere man like themselves ! Who among the prophets or the apostles, arrogated the power of quickening whom they would ? The Jews attempted to stone Jesus for presuming to forgive sin : — " who" say they " can forgive sin but God only ?"

ADAH.

Our brother comes.

CAIN.

Thy brother Abel.

Enter ABEL.

ABEL.

Welcome, Cain ! My brother,
The peace of God be on thee !

CAIN.

Abel, hail!

ABEL.

Our sister tells me that thou hast been wandering,
In high communion with a spirit, far
Beyond our wonted range. Was he of those
We have seen and spoken with, like to our father?

CAIN.

No.

ABEL.

Why then commune with him? he may be
A foe to the Most High.

CAIN.

And friend to man.
Has the Most High been so—if so you term him?

ABEL.

Term him! your words are strange to-day, my brother.
My sister Adah, leave us for awhile—
We mean to sacrifice.

ADAH.

Farewell, my Cain;
But first embrace thy son. May his soft spirit,

And Abel's pious ministry, recall thee
To peace and holiness !

[*Exit ADAH, with her child.*

Note 65.

The salutations of Cain and Abel are appropriate, so far as we are acquainted with Abel's character, as well as Cain's. Abel, however, with all his "meekness of brow," for which Cain lately scoffed at him, Lord Byron, with admirable judgment and right feeling, has made to possess the heroic and undaunted spirit of a martyr; — which more perhaps applaud, than think they should have courage, and fidelity to God, to follow. I know not whether his questioning his elder brother may be deemed by some too free or authoritative. But at any rate he seems to have done it more in a spirit of *regard*, than in a spirit inconsistent with that meekness of brow which Cain ascribed to him. He did not say of Cain, as Cain did of him, — "am I my brother's keeper?" Abel certainly *felt* for him; and thence his warmth, and honest and bold remonstrance. An amiable and noble example. But Abel shews, that the profoundest (and most due) reverence and regard to God may consist with the greatest intrepidity towards man. Abel therefore is not fearful though pious. He was another "Abdiel, faithful found." He saw, and felt for, his brother's dangerous condition, and would freely have sacrificed his own temporal existence, if it might have saved Cain from eternal misery. He however challenges Lucifer as "a foe to the Most High." Cain's reply is remarkable, — "and friend to man." Now this was appropriate for Cain: but will he find a second upon Earth to call Lucifer man's friend? He then horribly asks, if the Most High, *if to be so termed*, has been so? Abel might well start at that, perhaps first, indication to him of Cain's atheistical or impious state of mind, which induces him to call his words "strange," and to request of *Adah* to retire, that, by worship, Cain might, if possible, receive a better influence. Adah's farewell is of course beautiful and appropriate.

has the author forgotten to put into her mouth a wish, which none could, or would, have done, without some conception both of the nature and value of the peace of God, and of holiness too. Those words do not appear to me to be used sarcastically. Lord Byron therefore has from *me*, the credit of them. Happy all who enjoy their import.

ABEL.

Where hast thou been ?

CAIN.

I know not.

ABEL.

Nor what thou hast seen ?

CAIN.

The dead,

X The immortal, the unbounded, the omnipotent,
 The over-powering mysteries of space—
 The innumerable worlds that were and are—
 A whirlwind of such overwhelming things,
 Suns, moons, and earths, upon their loud-voiced spheres
 Singing in thunder round me, as have made me
 1) Unfit for mortal converse: leave me, Abel.

ABEL.

Thine eyes are flashing with unnatural light—
 Thy cheek is flushed with an unnatural hue—
 Thy words are fraught with an unnatural sound—
 What may this mean ?

CAIN.

It means—— I pray thee, leave me.

ABEL.

Not till we have pray'd and sacrificed together.

CAIN.

Abel, I pray thee, sacrifice alone—
Jehovah loves thee well.

ABEL.

Both well, I hope.

CAIN.

But thee the better: I care not for that;
'Thou art fitter for his worship than I am:
Revere him, then — but let it be alone—
At least, without me.

ABEL.

Brother, I should ill
Deserve the name of our great father's son,
If as my elder I revered thee not,
And in the worship of our God call'd not
On thee to join me, and precede me in
Our priesthood — 't is thy place.

CAIN.

But I have ne'er

Asserted it.

ABEL.

The more my grief; I pray thee
 To do so now: thy soul seems labouring in
 Some strong delusion; it will calm thee,

CAIN.

No;
 Nothing can calm me more. *Calm!* say I? Never
 Knew I what calm was in the soul, although
 I have seen the elements still'd. My Abel, leave me!
 Or let me leave thee to thy pious purpose.

ABEL.

Neither; we must perform our task together.
 Spurn me not.

CAIN.

If it must be so — well, then,
 What shall I do?

ABEL.

Choose one of those two altars.

CAIN.

Choose for me: they to me are so much turf
 And stone.

ABEL.

Choose thou!

CAIN.

I have chosen.

ABEL.

'T is the highest,
And suits thee, as the elder. Now prepare
Thine offerings.

CAIN.

Where are thine?

ABEL.

Behold them here —
The firstlings of the flock, and fat thereof —
A shepherd's humble offering.

CAIN.

I have no flocks ;
I am a tiller of the ground, and must
Yield what it yieldeth to my toil—its fruit :
[*He gathers fruits.*
Behold them in their various bloom and ripeness.
[*They dress their altars, and kindle a flame
upon them.*

ABEL.

My brother, as the elder, offer first
Thy prayer and thanksgiving with sacrifice.

CAIN.

No—I am new to this; lead thou the way,
And I will follow—as I may.

Note 66.

Cain confesses to Abel, that he had seen things which unfitted him for mortal converse: the effect not so much of what he had *seen*, however, as of what he had *heard* from Lucifer's poisonous injections. Lord Byron's conception seems to have been, that Cain was reluctantly drawn into the circumstances which wrought so horribly upon him. He seems desirous of avoiding *them*, and his *birth right* together. On the other hand, one knows not how to blame Abel; for evidently his importunities to his brother arose from the best feelings and purest intentions. Abel was far from envying, or coveting from his elder brother, that honour which his birth gave him, of precedency in religious acts; and on his brother's renouncing it, not only expresses his regret, but most honestly tells him he is labouring under some tremendous delusion; and encourages him to hope, that the proposed acts of worship would remove it, and restore him to that calmness which Adah wished him on parting. But it should seem, that Cain was too deeply tinctured with his own invincible antipathy to God, and Lucifer's additional lessons, to admit of that. Yet he is willing and desirous to be *well quit* of Abel, if he would perform his worship without him. It cannot be denied that Abel, by his ardour, brought the catastrophe upon himself. But who will not sooner admire than blame him; especially as he neither repented of it, nor had any enmity to Cain in consequence? But

though also one can scarcely avoid feeling for Cain in his present circumstances; yet, taking all together, from what we have seen of him past, and what we shall see of him to come; can he be excused? The choosing of the altars, and the other unwilling acts of Cain's who merely consents to follow Abel's instructions, are quite characteristic, and lead to important results.

ABEL. (*Kneeling.*)

Oh God!

Who made us, and who breathed the breath of life
 Within our nostrils, who hath blessed us,
 And spared, despite our father's sin, to make
 His children all lost, as they might have been,
 Had not thy justice been so temper'd with
 The mercy which is thy delight, as to
 Accord a pardon like a Paradise,
 Compar'd with our great crimes:—Sole Lord of light!
 Of good, and glory, and eternity;
 Without whom all were evil, and with whom
 Nothing can err, except to some good end
 Of thine omnipotent benevolence—
 Inscrutable, but still to be fulfill'd—
 Accept from out thy humble first of shepherd's
 First of the first-born flocks—an offering,
 In itself nothing—as what offering can be
 Aught unto thee?—but yet accept it for
 The thanksgiving of him who spreads it in
 The face of thy high Heaven, bowing his own
 Even to the dust, of which he is, in honour
 Of thee, and of thy name, for evermore!

Note 67.

With the foregoing address of Abel to the Almighty, we would not if possible, find any material discrepancy with the principles which throughout these Notes have been considered as scriptural. Yet, in some respects, I cannot but think Abel not quite correct on scripture principles. He says,—“and spar’d, despite our father’s sin, to make his children all lost, as they might have been, had not thy justice been so temper’d with the mercy”—and so forth. Now in the first place, God *cannot* (I speak reverentially, but I think scripturally) temper his justice with mercy in regard of the *salvation* of man; though he may and does in regard of *temporal* judgments. He has not done it. His justice has been *fully* satisfied, and *more* than satisfied, if possible, by the obedience and death of Christ. Not one particle of mercy did Jehovah the Father shew, to Jehovah the Son, the substitute of sinful man, in the matter of man’s eternal redemption. Did not Jesus suffer the very *uttermost* of the law? Did he not drink the cup of God’s displeasure against sin, to the *very dregs*? How then was God’s justice “temper’d” with mercy towards the Son of his love, whom he *gave* for lost sinners? Besides, I think Abel wrong in considering Adam’s children (mankind) “all lost, as they might have been, had not thy justice been so temper’d,” &c. For if the scriptures are to be credited, those who have received, and shall receive, Christ as their “atonement,” *never could have been* “lost;”—being “*chosen* in him before the foundation of the world;”—their names were “written in the Lamb’s book of life” from “*everlasting*,” as is evident throughout scripture: they were “*given*” to Christ, to die for, and save. Their redemption was not a casual, but a *settled* thing with God, and “according to his eternal purpose.” God had no *occasion* to entertain any *conflict*, therefore, between his mercy and his justice. Christ undertook to satisfy his *justice*. Man’s *desire* ought to be, to be *included* in this wonderful and gracious arrangement. He next says of the Almighty,

“without whom all were evil.” Now if God be indeed the sole cause of all things; then nothing is, or can be, “*without*” him. “For by him all things consist.” Therefore Abel first supposes that things *may* be without God, which is impossible; and in the next place, assumes, that all those things are evil: in contradiction of which it is presumed enough has been said. Again; he says, “with whom nothing can err, except to some good end of thine omnipotent benevolence.” What he means by omnipotent benevolence I hardly know: *infinite* “benevolence” I understand: what is meant by an “omnipotent” *being* I also understand; but the association of “omnipotent benevolence” I cannot see the propriety of at all. However, what is worse, is, he says, that to some *good end* of this same high-sounding (and had the speech been Cain’s or Lucifer’s, I should have added, insincere and ironical) “omnipotent benevolence,” things *may* “*err*” with God; which must be denied. Who will admit that *any thing*, of God’s doing, *can* be erroneous, for any purpose, or to any end, whatever? That many of God’s purposes are, to man, “*inscrutable*,” and will nevertheless be “*fulfilled*,” we know; but that does not make them *erroneous*. The offering which Abel says can be “*nought*” to God, was in fact, *much* to God; being, doubtless, of his own appointment, and prefigurative of Christ, the *great* offering, the lamb slain before the foundation of the world, of Jehovah’s merciful providing, for the redemption of multitudes of the lost race of man—multitudes, whose eternal salvation would, in God’s time, be *evidenced* by their certain reception of the Son as their Saviour.—Had Cain or Lucifer been the penner of this speech of Abel’s, I should have said, that the last four lines of it were intended to create an odium against the Almighty, by making Abel use expressions to him which, generally speaking, suit a tyrant, such as Lucifer pretends God to be, rather than the kind parent of all his creatures who approach him in the name of, and through, the Son—the gift of his love and mercy. Such servile expressions or actions belong not to *them*. God requires it not of those who are “*adopted*,” and made “*heirs of God, and joint heirs with Jesus Christ*.” Yet

this does not exclude the *lowest acts*, or feelings, of abasement, influenced by an immediate perception, bestowed by the Spirit, of the majesty, or goodness of God, and man's own delinquency and nothingness; as scripture testifies.—*Cain's* address now claims our attention.

CAIN. (*Standing erect during this speech.*)

Spirit! whate'er or whosoe'er thou art,
 Omnipotent, it may be—and, if good,
 Shewn in the exemption of thy deeds from evil;
 Jehovah upon Earth! and God in Heaven!
 And it may be with other names, because
 Thine attributes seem many, as thy works:—
 If thou must be propitiated with prayers,
 Take them! If thou must be induced with altars,
 And soften'd with a sacrifice, receive them!
 Two beings here erect them unto thee.
 If thou lov'st blood, the shepherd's shrine, which smokes
 On my right hand, hath shed it for thy service
 In the first of his flock, whose limbs now reek
 In sanguinary incense to thy skies;
 Or if the sweet and blooming fruits of Earth,
 And milder seasons, which the unstain'd turf
 I spread them on now offers in the face
 Of the broad sun which ripen'd them, may seem
 Good to thee, inasmuch as they have not
 Suffer'd in life or limb, and rather form
 A sample of thy works, than supplication
 To look on ours! If a shrine without victim,
 And altar without gore, may win thy favour,

Look on it! and for him who dresseth it,
 He is—such as thou mad'st him; and seeks nothing
 Which must be won by kneeling: if he's evil,
 Strike him! thou art omnipotent, and may'st —
 For what can he oppose? If he be good,
 Strike him, or spare him, as thou wilt! since all
 Rests upon thee! and good and evil seem
 To have no power themselves, save in thy will;
 And whether that be good or ill I know not,
 Not being omnipotent, nor fit to judge
 Omnipotence, but merely to endure
 Its mandate; which thus far I have endured.

*[The fire upon the altar of ABEL kindles into a
 column of the brightest flame, and ascends
 to heaven; while a whirlwind throws
 down the altar of CAIN, and scatters the
 fruits abroad upon the earth.]*

Note 68.

It is not without some difficulty that I have borne to transcribe this speech; nor could have done it, but for the purpose of its examination, I hope with some benefit to the minds of others as well as to my own. But if I felt occasion to make some remark on Abel's, much more so on this; in which, nevertheless, I think it must be confessed, that Lord Byron has displayed prodigious powers of mind, in so justly conceiving of, and portraying, such a character. The commencement, expressing doubt of the Almighty's existence and nature, is much in the manner of Lucifer: and Cain's daring assumption, that if God were good, it would be shewn in the exemption of his works from evil, is quite consistent with his character and spirit throughout. On the subject of evil, I add nothing here. In the first

place, although it might be heroism thus uselessly to brave a wicked or *evil* being of irresistible power, at the danger of the utmost punishment, yet it is any thing but heroism, and at least most egregious folly and insensibility, to act so towards a being whose works most manifestly speak *goodness* in the highest degree. This we have before considered, and concluded upon as incontestible, from every evidence. As to Cain's ascription of other names or attributes to the Almighty, I conceive, that whatever attributes mankind, in their ignorance, may have assigned to him, yet the attributes which *scripture* ascribes to the Almighty are those of being eternal, self-existent, independent, immutable, omnipotent, omniscient, omnipresent, infinite in wisdom, holiness, justice, truth, and goodness. With respect to Cain's questioning the Almighty if he must be propitiated with prayers; although Cain's spirit and irreverence, are such in this and some other similar parts of this speech, as properly speaking not to be *deserving* of serious replies, yet such replies shall be given. Cain therefore might be told, that the Almighty is *not* to be propitiated with prayers; of themselves, the prayers of sinful and rebellious man cannot, in reason, be *expected* to be propitiatory; but God has, both in the Old and New Testament, declared and appointed what propitiations he *will* accept: and they of his own providing. He did not lay so impossible a task upon man as to provide his own propitiation. Jesus Christ therefore it is "whom God hath set forth a propitiation through faith in his blood," for as many as receive him: — the very sacrifice which even Socrates is said to have expected from the divine goodness. The propitiations therefore, of the Old Testament, were sacrificial, and prefigurative of that of the New Testament, and fulfilled in the person of Jesus Christ. In and through whom, also, prayer, *then*, becomes, though not propitiatory, yet acceptable, and received. And what but Cain's pride, and self-conceit, and self-importance, could possibly hinder his acceptance of this arrangement? As to his speaking also of God's being induced with altars, and softened with a sacrifice; suppose it to be so, as in fact it then was, in so far as God *appointed* it as the mode he chose; what can there be to object

to, except in a rebellious and unreasonable mind? It has pleased the Almighty, in his wisdom and mercy, to dispense with those rites in latter times; they being completed in Christ: substituting only faith in the Son, and reliance upon God's acceptance for *his* sake, and for his sufferings, and for the sacrifice of himself. Cain's manner of noticing the shepherd's shrine, and God's delighting in blood, savours entirely of the same spirit of resistance to, and contumely of, his maker, and of putting his own views of right and wrong in the place of, and in opposition to, those of God; beside the insinuation of cruelty implied in it. Is reason to be abandoned and never submitted to, for the sake of gratifying our own conceits? If not, and if reason *be allowed* to put an end to doubts and objections, then reason tells us, that man has received a revelation from his creator, which informs him, that his creator did actually appoint those sacrificial institutions which the revelation speaks of, and all, evidently, prefigurative of the death of Christ, as the *real* atonement. Isaac, *intentionally* offered up by his father Abraham, was the most *eminent* type. What then has man to do but to receive and obey his maker's will so communicated to him? In Cain's time indeed the books of Moses were not written; nor *then* was there *any* written revelation; which perhaps may be thought to form some excuse for Cain. Yet there seems every reason to believe, that the Almighty had, even to Adam, revealed his will, that the sacrifices Adam and Abel were in the habit of offering, *should* be so offered; and that they had some, though obscure, perception, of the *end* of such sacrifices, namely, the ultimate great atoning sacrifice of Christ;—that "mystery," God himself, in the person of the Son, "reconciling the world unto himself" by such a stupendous method. With respect to God's appointing the blood of victims, it would be too long, and quite unnecessary here, to enter upon the subject. Suffice it, that he *did* require it as prefiguring the inestimable blood of Christ. The almost universal practice of sacrificing victims, among most nations, in some mode or other, without doubt derived from the Hebrews, proves the general impression upon mankind, of the required mode of procuring the divine favour, how-

ever the practice has been disfigured and *abused*; even to the extent of *human* immolation, with which the Almighty, by his prophets, was continually expressing his displeasure. But such a general impression, in my humble opinion, it cannot rationally be believed God would have either excited, or permitted, had it not been pre-lusive, and confirmatory of the *great* sacrifice ever in contemplation. May it not be, that human immolation, to appease the gods, especially of their sons, in some instances took its rise from traditions of the intentional sacrifice of Isaac by his Father? And we are informed, in his word, that it is only the *infinite* and *divine* worth of that blood (the divine being united with the *human* nature) which renders it available. It is called "the precious blood of Christ."— *Why* the heart's blood of Christ should be needful, who can tell, unless as indicative of being his *very life*, that life which man had forfeited, and which could only be redeemed by so costly and substitutionary an equivalent? But is it for *man* to quarrel with that? It is believed, that the blood, which issued from the body of the Redeemer on being pierced upon the cross, was the effect of a rupture of the heart from grief and mental agony, and therefore was his heart's blood; such rupture having been occasioned by his previous agonies of mind; and that his *death* was not attributable to his crucifixion, but to what is termed a broken heart. Thus the scriptures were amply fulfilled — that man must die. For the life of animals is in their blood. Man *did, thus* die most emphatically, that man might live: all this, confessedly, is resolvable only into the will of the Supreme. But who has been the sufferer? Who the gainer? Of what then has *man* to complain? I repeat, it cannot be known why it has seemed good to the Almighty not to restore man otherwise than through bloodshedding. But such is the fact. And the apostle says "without shedding of blood there is no remission." And another speaks of redemption by the "precious blood of Christ." Is it for man to revolt thus against his own salvation? The question is, has it been revealed; or is what is alleged to be such revelation, reasonably credible *to be* such revelation from our creator? If reason

cannot overthrow, but confirms that fact, disputing should cease. I do not deny indeed that many have sympathized, and perhaps some by recollection, do yet sympathize with the sufferings of Jesus Christ (God in the person of the Son) who confessedly endured the whole displeasure of God against sin, in all its accumulation; but such sympathy does not, surely, lead to *crimination* of the divine purposes and proceedings; only to increased *admiration* of them. How can reason reconcile it to the wisdom and goodness of God, that Christ should have suffered and died as he did (with such marked and pathetic descriptions for centuries before) if he were only a moral teacher, whose precepts we may observe or disregard almost at pleasure? Beside, as such teacher, or even witness to any truth, *he was not exclusively wanted*: and as in physics it is said that nature (or God rather) never does that circuitously, or at greater expence of means, which fewer may suffice for, how emphatically does that apply to this suffering bloodshedding and death of Christ? for which no adequate occasion can be shewn, if he were a mere moral teacher; for of such there had been, and were, enough. The subsequent expressions of Cain in this speech; respecting his sacrifice of fruits and blossoms, and an altar without gore, and a shrine without victim, and the rest, will now therefore be of no effect. They are merely rhetorical. We see the spirit of resistance and pride from which those expressions proceed. And with respect to Cain's tender *feelings* for the victims offered up on God's altars, where are the feelings of man even in the present day, (whether Cain ate flesh I know not,) in sacrificing such multitudes of victims for their own appetites?—the victims of the knife—the sledge hammer—the gun—the chase. The rest of Cain's speech is truly rant; and though impious, yet in character. As to its being a question with Cain whether he was himself good or evil, I believe it is a question with no one else: and his daring God to strike him, equals any thing Lucifer himself could have uttered, and perhaps exceeds it. All certainly does, as he says, and well for man that it does, rest upon God. Good and evil confessedly have no power themselves, because they are mere qualities; and power can only be

attributed to an intelligent agent. The *effects* of good and evil are no doubt in God's will only; where should they be? But if Cain meant to insinuate, that it mattered not to man (himself for instance) in regard to his maker's acceptance, whether he were good or evil; he was quite wrong: it makes great difference. But he, to be sure, of all men, had vast reason to talk of good or goodness in himself! *No man*, however, can be *truly* good in himself; only as a believer in Christ. When the Redeemer himself was complimented with the title of "good master," he, as man, disclaimed it; saying, that one only was good; that was, God. *In Christ*, however, who is God, the Father *considers* man as *good*: *out of Christ*, as *evil*. Beside, the scriptures declare, that "if any man be in Christ he is a *new creature*:" viz. regenerated by the Holy Spirit; and made, though not perfect, yet different to what he was before, in morals, and in piety to God. Thus again, admirably, the offices of the Son, and the Spirit, and the Father, one Jehovah, are illustrated. Who can wish for any other mode of salvation? How satisfactory! how secure! How consistent with morality; for without morality any pretence to faith in Christ is to be discredited. At the same time how justly abasing to man; how justly exalting to God and Christ! As to Cain's not knowing whether *God's* will were *good* or *ill*, we know what a judge *he* was of *that* matter. But *others* know, that God's will is good, and good only, as has been seen. He is however very correct in confessing himself unfit to judge omnipotence. The best thing perhaps he ever said: as well as that he was only fit to endure. And as to his having thus far endured it, as he terms his existence, it were happy for him if his evil disposition did not cause his *enduring* something in *reality*. It should however be added, in reply to Cain's objections to kneeling, and to prayer, in order to *win* any thing by so doing, that, whether kneeling or standing, which are mere circumstances if the *heart* be prostrate and sincere; yet, as to prayer itself, it must necessarily be the highest privilege of man: for what is it, but permitted intercourse with his maker in the expression of those various affections of which the soul, the spiritual nature of man, is the subject, under

the influence of the Holy Spirit? And when Cain says that he was what God made him, can he conscientiously say, that God forced him to consort with Lucifer? And although the Almighty certainly made Cain a human being, yet can Cain deny his own *voluntary assumption* of that rebellious spirit which distinguished him from the rest of his family; and that, in spite of their entreaties? Can he charge *that* on God? unless indeed in the same way that he charged his maker with his parents' disobedience, and its consequences; of which something has been said in a former Note?

ABEL. (*Kneeling.*)

Oh, brother, pray! Jehovah's wroth with thee!

CAIN.

Why so?

ABEL.

Thy fruits are scatter'd on the earth.

CAIN.

From earth they came, to earth let them return;
 Their seed will bear fresh fruit there ere the summer:
 Thy burnt flesh-off'ring prospers better; see
 How heav'n licks up the flames, when thick with blood!

ABEL.

Think not upon my offering's acceptance,
 But make another of thine own before
 It is too late.

CAIN.

I will build no more altars,
Nor suffer any.—

ABEL. (*Rising.*)

Cain! what meanest thou?

CAIN.

To cast down yon vile flatt'rer of the clouds,
The smoky harbinger of thy dull pray'rs—
Thine altar, with its blood of lambs and kids,
Which fed on milk, to be destroy'd in blood.

ABEL. (*Opposing him.*)

Thou shalt not:—add not impious works to impious
Words! let that altar stand—'t is hallow'd now
By the immortal pleasure of Jehovah,
In his acceptance of the victims.

CAIN.

His!

His pleasure! what was his high pleasure in
The fumes of scorching flesh and smoking blood,
To the pain of the bleating mothers, which
Still yearn for their dead offspring? or the pangs
Of the sad ignorant victims underneath
Thy pious knife? Give way! this bloody record
Shall not stand in the sun, to shame creation!

ABEL.

Brother, give back! thou shalt not touch my altar
 With violence: if that thou wilt adopt it,
 To try another sacrifice, 't is thine.

CAIN.

Another sacrifice! Give way, or else
 That sacrifice may be ——

ABEL.

What mean'st thou?

CAIN.

Give—

Give way!—thy God loves blood!—then look to it:—
 Give way, ere he hath *more!*

ABEL.

In *his* great name,
 I stand between thee and the shrine which hath
 Had his acceptance.

CAIN.

If thou lov'st thyself,
 Stand back till I have strew'd this turf along
 Its native soil:—else ——

ABEL. (*Opposing him.*)

I love God far more
Than life.

Note 69.

It is evident that Lord Byron had studied his subject very deeply; and though he has varied a little from, or gone a little beyond, the letter of scripture, which is very concise, yet he has apparently entered with great exactness into the minds of Cain and Abel in the present most interesting, not to say distressing scene. And were it allowable to ascribe to the author of a dramatic work the principles or feelings of all or any of his characters, except as *adopting* them for his particular purpose, one should be at a loss to say, whether Lord Byron ought most to be identified with Cain, or with Abel; so appropriately has he maintained the character of each. One may indeed pay his Lordship a like compliment in reference to the "Master of Spirits" himself. Cain's reply to Abel, on Abel's apprehension of the divine displeasure against the former, is remarkable for its stubborn and persevering sullenness, as well as for Cain's repeated allusion to Heaven's approval of Abel's sacrificial flames because "thick with blood." It may be so: the *reason* we have glanced at; — it was typical of *his* sufferings and self-devotedness, who afterwards was to sweat blood, and lose his life-blood, for that very Cain, if, at any period before his death, repentance should be given him, and he should turn to his offended maker, and accept his offered mercy in God's way. The mild *intrepidity*, which Lord Byron has so well introduced into Abel's character and conduct, is certainly admirable, and affords an excellent contrast to Cain's ascription to his brother of a "meek brow, and base humility." One should think Cain himself must have been struck with his own injustice, and Abel's magnanimity; which it is perhaps easier to admire than imitate. But the author's merit is the same. He has

shewn an example worthy of imitation. But can Cain's overbearing and tyrannical conduct be justified? What right had he to destroy his brother's altar? Whether Abel was more noble than prudent, I am not to discuss. But he has high reward. Who can give Cain credit for his affected tenderness over "lambs and kids which fed on milk to be destroyed in blood"? Perhaps the antediluvians did not eat flesh. Yet it may seem *unlikely* they should go on sixteen hundred years without; especially as they were clearly not scrupulous in their conduct. The grant to Adam did not, as it did to Noah, extend to the animals expressly for food. But Adam, when that grant was made, was in *Paradise*; at least, he was placed in *Paradise* afterwards, if not then. And as "*dominion*" was, in the first instance, given him over all the animal creation; probably the use of them for food, when excluded from Eden, was not *intended* to be prohibited, as it was not, in *words*. I grant, with Cain, there is something very painful, even in the present day, in the treatment and death of lambs and kids and other creatures, for food. And some persons refuse such food; though men of much milder spirits and meeker brow than Cain are found to kill them. But shall man pretend to be *more* merciful to God's creatures than God himself? Is not that pretence preposterous? Man's business is to mind that the animals suffer in the least possible degree; and, if he *will* have their lives for food, to take them in the easiest manner. With respect to Abel's "dull prayers," as Cain terms them; if they were sincere, which there seems no ground to doubt, they were more or less earnest; and sincerity and earnestness are incompatible with dullness; this is as between the supplicant and him to whom the supplications are addressed. To *Cain*, indeed, they may be very dull, because *he* could not possibly enter into their meaning, and they were, we know, very different prayers from *his*;—not his prayers indeed, but his infidel and daring effrontery. Infidel I say, for he expresses more than doubts of the being and character of Jehovah. Had he believed in him, he *could not* have so expressed himself. But even this is in exact accordance with his whole character, and shews the author's

just conception of it. But Cain's Luciferian spirit seems fast gaining upon him. He fancies he must be the sole arbiter of what is right and fit between his fellow creatures and his creator. He will not permit Abel to use his "pious knife," though his maker required him to do it. *He* would not permit a sacrificial altar, a "bloody record" of the Redeemer's future sufferings, to "shame creation," though the great Lord of creation, his own creator, saw no shame in it. But can Cain be justified? Abel, on the contrary, with great generosity, offers Cain his accepted altar to try another sacrifice; but will not suffer it to be thrown down. Cain becomes more and more enraged. Well may scripture say "he was very wroth." And for what *cause*? Men sometimes are so, and it is never right, though sometimes it may be somewhat excusable; but when proceeding from a tyrannous mind, it is indefensible altogether. In opposition however to Cain's terrific denunciations, and probably equally terrific aspect, behold the grandeur, and intrepidity, though the mildness also, of the "meek brow'd" Abel; who concludes the contest by declaring that he loved his "God far more than life." Others have done so, since Abel led the way.—It seems not impossible, Lord Byron, in this conduct of Cain, had in his view the pagan or the papal persecutions, in which such multitudes have followed Abel; for by Cain's declaring he would not "suffer any" other altar to stand, or be erected, he comes pretty near those who, in after times, destroyed their fellow creatures who were bent upon worshipping their creator according to the dictates of his word, and their own consciences. This the pagans would not permit, but they did not *always* force them to their false worship. Not so the *papal* persecutors. *They* would *force* their own idolatrous and wicked practices upon those who despised them; and in default of compliance, slew, burnt, "tortured," and destroyed them. Whoever would know the spirit and the sufferings of Christians, should read, not only Fox's Martyrology, and other similiar biography; but Milner's Church History; and Jones's (fifth edition) of the History of the Christian Church, including his Account of the Waldenses and Albigenses. Mosheim's

Ecclesiastical History, also, is worthy of perusal. After such records, who can believe that they relate to the disciples, and confessors, and martyrs of a *mere man*, who taught moral precepts only, of no very extraordinary sublimity as such; and who possessed, if mere man, no peculiar nature above other men, nor any superior sanction or influence to constrain, or power to encourage or support, those who, in their adherence to his precepts and declarations, endured most unimaginable sufferings, and “loved not their lives unto the death”? Christ a mere man, whose blood was of no more worth or efficacy than that of any other man or animal! If so, whence the influence of his sayings, (blasphemous and absurd, and deserving punishment, if not true,) any more than those of Socrates, or Seneca, or Epictetus, or Moses, or Isaiah? But Cain’s intolerance seems to have been against God himself professedly, full as much as against Abel. He did not wish to force Abel to *his* practices, though he would not permit any *other* worship. There seems therefore to be *some* difference in these three several modes of persecution—Cain’s, the pagan, and the papal. Cain’s the least odious perhaps, as he apparently would have suffered Abel, had Abel been less zealous, to have sacrificed elsewhere, and at any other time, than there, and in his presence; at any rate in his state of mind at that moment. But can he be justified in all or any part of this? Is his passion or his pride an excuse for his impiety, and tyrannical conduct? The account in scripture is very short; and so far as it may be profitable to dwell upon, and imagine, the real cause of the catastrophe, Lord Byron seems to have done it as judiciously as one could expect. The only doubt is, whether he will seem to have contrived to throw into Cain’s *subsequent* conduct, so much of better feelings, as to create too much indulgence for him. That *his* sufferings were infinitely greater than Abel’s, and that Abel’s loss of life was his immediate, and eternal gain, is undoubted. Surely credit is due to Lord Byron for such a character as Abel.

CAIN. (*Striking him with a brand, on the temples, which he snatches from the altar.*)

Then take thy life unto thy God,
Since he loves lives.

ABEL. (*Falls.*)

What hast thou done, my brother?

CAIN.

Brother!

ABEL.

Oh, God! receive thy servant, and
Forgive his slayer, for he knew not what
He did. — Cain, give me — give me thy hand; and tell
Poor Zillah —

CAIN. (*After a moment's stupefaction.*)

My hand! 't is all red, and with —

What?

(*A long pause. — Looking slowly round.*)

Where am I? alone! Where's Abel? where
Cain? Can it be that I am he? My brother,
Awake! — why liest thou so on the green earth?
'T is not the hour of slumber: — why so pale?
What, hast thou! — thou wert full of life this morn!
Abel! I pray thee, mock me not! I smote
Too fiercely, but not fatally. Ah, why

Would'st thou oppose me? This is mockery;
 And only done to daunt me:—'t was a blow—
 And but a blow. Stir—stir—nay, only stir!
 Why, so—that's well!—thou breath'st! breathe upon me!
 Oh, God! Oh, God!

ABEL. (*Very faintly.*)

What's he who speaks of God?

CAIN.

Thy murderer.

ABEL.

Then may God forgive him! Cain,
 Comfort poor Zillah:—she has but one brother
 Now.

[*ABEL dies.*]

CAIN.

And I none!—Who makes me brotherless?
 His eyes are open! then he is not dead!
 Death is like sleep; and sleep shuts down our lids.
 His lips, too, are apart; why then he breathes;
 And yet I feel it not.—His heart!—his heart!—
 Let me see, doth it beat?—methinks——No!—no!
 This is a vision, else I am become
 The native of another and worse world.
 The earth swims round me:—what is this?—'t is wet;
 [*Puts his hand to his brow, and then looks at it.*]
 And yet there are no dews! 'T is blood—my blood—

My brother's and my own ; and shed by me !
 Then what have I further to do with life,
 Since I have taken life from my own flesh ?
 But he can not be dead !— Is silence death ?
 No ; he will awake : then let me watch by him.
 Life cannot be so slight, as to be quench'd
 Thus quickly !— he hath spoken to me since —
 What shall I say to him ?— My brother !— No ;
 He will not answer to that name ; for brethren
 Smite not each other. Yet—yet—speak to me.
 Oh ! for a word more of that gentle voice,
 That I may bear to hear my own again !

Note 70.

It is not, I think, easy to say, in which the author has most excelled in this scene now before us ; whether in the transcendent character of Abel, or in the deep and interesting compunction of Cain. Had Lord Byron intended to have been Cain's apologist, he could not have taken a more effectual method than he has done, in attributing to him such sentiments and feelings as, though most beautifully natural, one should hardly have thought Cain capable of harbouring. But this mixture in his character is remarkable. It seems probable Lord Byron had in view Cain's apparent penitence when it is said of him in scripture, that, after being condemned by Jehovah, he expressed his apprehension (as the *margin* of the Bible reads it) that his crime was too great to be forgiven ; or by way of question—is my crime greater than can be forgiven ? This, in either way, certainly has some appearance of contrition. For although Cain is mentioned in the New Testament as one (to say the least) whose conduct should be avoided as deathful ; yet it is clear the Almighty dealt mercifully with him. On the other hand, as no account is given of his ultimate repentance and forgiveness, as in the case of David and others, his

final state is left in awful and *admonitory* darkness. How different however is Cain *here* from the hardened, unrelenting, ruthless, murderer! Our former indignation against him throughout this lamentable transaction, seems almost to subside into pity. Abel's consistent and steady piety also, and his evidently sincere brotherly affection, cannot be overlooked. Is not his revival as it were from the very gate of death on hearing the name of God mentioned—a name so dear to him above all others—finely and correctly imagined? But he may easily be left to the enjoyment of his early-acquired bliss, to look after wretched Cain. For who will not give him *credit* for misery now? He had indeed introduced into the world the enemy he so much dreaded—Death. The whole soliloquy needs no comment; it speaks plainly. How different from his former soliloquies! *His* eyes now, as well as his parents', were opened. He, too, has obtained "knowledge." This is one of the results, indeed the grand result, of Lucifer's teaching:—

"Hunc, tu, Romane, caveto."

He wanted to know what death was; and now he sees it, of his own procuring, but cannot believe it. He would be glad to hear again Abel's "gentle voice;" and could he have heard it, he would not repeat his mockery of his "meek brow," which was true; nor of his "*base* humility," which was false. But what humility? Who does not covet it? Who would not be, if he might, in faith, fidelity, tenderness, and courage of ethereal temper, such an Abel?—We have more however to bear, and must pass on to further trials. Lord Byron does not do things by halves. Let us just advert to Cain's question—"who makes me brotherless?" He does not now ascribe that evil to his *creator*, but seems to take it, very sincerely, upon *himself*.

Enter ZILLAH.

ZILLAH.

I heard a heavy sound : what can it be ?
 'T is Cain ; and watching by my husband. What
 Dost thou there, brother ? Doth he sleep ? Oh ! heav'n !
 What means that paleness, and yon stream ? No ! no !
 It is not blood ; for who would have shed his blood ?
 Abel ! what's this ? — who hath done this ? He moves not ;
 He breathes not : and his hands drop down from mine
 With stony lifelessness ! Ah ! cruel Cain !
 Why cam'st thou not in time to save him from
 This violence ? Whatever hath assail'd him,
 Thou wert the stronger, and should'st have stepp'd in
 Between him and aggression ! Father ! — Eve —
 Adah ! — Come hither ! Death is in the world !

[Exit ZILLAH, — calling on her Parents, &c.]

CAIN. (*Solus.*)

And who hath brought him there ? — I — who abhor
 The name of Death so deeply, that the thought
 Empoison'd all my life, before I knew
 His aspect — I have led him here, and given
 My brother to his cold and still embrace,
 As if he would not have asserted his
 Inexorable claim without my aid.
 I am awake at last — a dreary dream
 Had madden'd me ; — but *he* shall ne'er awake !

Note 71.

Even poor Zillah's grief, and agonized feelings, must yield to our attention to the chief figure in this almost petrifying scene. How different is Cain *solus* now, to Cain *solus* heretofore! But while we feel for him, yet must we not forget that horrible train of *self-indulged* impiety, and Luciferian attachment, which led to his dreadful end;—the very end, as it should seem from Lucifer's later conversation with Cain, that Lucifer had in view. If this be not reading a useful lesson to mankind, I know not what is. Yet this has Lord Byron done. What evils may not be avoided by attending to the many lessons the author has afforded us throughout these few pages! Wretched Cain confesses he is "awake at last," and that "a dreary dream had madden'd" him. How far that will plead in his favour, who can tell? Yet who can withstand sincere, heartfelt repentance? The scriptures do not, I believe, *say*, that repentance was *not* given him of God. Yet repentance without Christ, if scripture be true, is of no avail: but repentance, the *gift of God*, ever involves faith in the atonement. But to *presume* upon repentance being given, is surely most irrational. Who can command God to give it?

Enter ADAM, EVE, ADAH, *and* ZILLAH.

ADAM.

A voice of woe from Zillah brings me here.—
 What do I see?—'T is true!—My son!—my son!
 Woman, behold the serpent's work, and thine!

[*To* EVE.

EVE.

Oh! speak not of it now: the serpent's fangs
 Are in my heart. My best-beloved, Abel!

Jehovah! this is punishment beyond
A mother's sin, to take *him* from me!

ADAM.

Who,
Or what hath done this deed? — speak Cain, since thou
Wert present; was it some more hostile angel,
Who walks not with Jehovah? or some wild
Brute of the forest?

EVE.

Ah! a livid light
Breaks through, as from a thunder-cloud! yon brand,
Massy and bloody! snatch'd from off the altar,
And black with smoke, and red with ——

ADAM.

Speak, my son!
Speak, and assure us, wretched as we are,
That we are not more miserable still.

ADAM.

Speak, Cain! and say it was not *thou*!

EVE.

It was.
I see it now — he hangs his guilty head,
And covers his ferocious eye with hands
Incarnadine.

ADAH.

Mother, thou dost him wrong —
Cain! clear thee from this horrible accusal,
Which grief wrings from our parent.

Note 72.

Nothing can be more appropriate, or probable, than Adam's reflections upon his viewing the body of his no longer living son. And Eve's request to him to be spared the pain of being reminded of her own error, and the serpent's work, is equally natural. But her feelings carry her beyond due limits, in inducing her complaint of punishment from the Almighty. At least *I* do not consider the event in the light of punishment, and think her wrong in doing so. It was the *natural effect* of her transgression certainly, and for which transgression she was punished (if punishment it may be called) by being expelled from Paradise. Eve said she had repented. If so, she was forgiven: for supposing her repentance to have been *genuine* it was "the gift of God," with faith in the promised seed, preparatory to his pardon. And after forgiveness, there is no *vindictive* punishment. The point is, to be *rationally* satisfied that we *have* repented and obtained pardon. Then, and not till then, all is well. And although God may see fit to visit those he has pardoned in and through Christ with sufferings of body, or other temporal calamity, (perhaps often the effects of prior misconduct,) and to evince his hatred of sin; yet such visitation is not vindictive, or even punitive; but corrective, and for the sufferer's *good*. This therefore was no punishment. The very idea was probably an injection of Lucifer's into the mind of Eve, for obvious purposes; and there can be little doubt of Lucifer being then present with them, and enjoying their distress. Adam could not conceive it possible that any human being could have slain Abel. But Eve's maternal feelings, as is very much in accordance

with nature, make her sagacious in suspecting that she saw the cause in the smoking and blood-stained brand. And when Adam urges his son to relieve them from their dreadful uncertainty, Adah, like herself, interposes for Cain, urging him to clear himself from an act of which she thought him incapable. Eve however is too much alive to her feelings; and proceeds to adduce fresh proofs of Cain's guilt, notwithstanding Adah's remonstrance, and her again urging Cain to clear himself from the accusation, which, Adah says, grief had wrong from Eve: but all to no purpose; and we must admire the author's judgment and feeling in plunging Cain into such deep conviction, and, without doubt, sorrow too, as to be completely dumb. He seems to have been too honest to deny or extenuate his deed. Can it be extenuated? Had he received from Abel sufficient provocation, or any just provocation at all? I fear he cannot be acquitted of malice; if not *originally* against Abel yet certainly and fearfully against his maker: but afterwards, it must be confessed, apparently transferred to his brother, or at least extended to him, for his fidelity and fearless attachment to his God. Cain, however, has at least the credit of *apparent* conviction and sorrow. Well for him if genuine: it might happily lead to his renunciation of Lucifer and his own evil dispositions, and to salvation. Yet after what we have seen of him, are we prepared to think it likely that he would cease to wish still to "consort" with that infernal spirit? And these are the *fruits* of *his* friendship for man. Of whom, a little before, when Abel termed him "a foe to God," Cain replied "but friend to man."

EVE.

Hear, Jehovah!

May the eternal serpent's curse be on him!

For he was fitter for his seed than ours.

May all his days be desolate! May —

ADAH.

Hold!

Curse him not, mother, for he is thy son —
Curse him not, mother, for he is my brother,
And my betroth'd.

EVE.

He hath left thee no brother —
Zillah no husband — me *no son!* — for thus
I curse him from my sight for evermore!
All bonds I break between us, as he broke
That of his nature, in yon — Oh death! death!
Why didst thou not take *me*, who first incurr'd thee?
Why dost thou not so now?

ADAM.

Eve! let not this,
Thy natural grief, lead to impiety!
A heavy doom was long forespoken to us;
And now that it begins, let it be borne
In such sort as may shew our God, that we
Are faithful servants to his holy will.

Note. 73

Our difficulty is, whether most to blame Eve for her excessive anger against Cain, and giving such way to execrations so direful; or to apologize for the excitement of her feelings under such circumstances. Adah's consistent interference however there is no difficulty

in praising; and Adam's remonstrance is equally proper, in requesting of Eve that her grief may not lead to impiety. Assuredly a right and essential distinction. His recommendation for bearing in a proper spirit the effects of that death which had been forespoken to them, must be approved of. And *ought not* an event, that of death, when assuredly predicted from an authority they knew to be inviolable, to have been so credited by Eve, and by Adam, as to have induced their refraining from the act which would procure it? Our reason seems to convince us, that had the case been ours, we could only have blamed ourselves. Every-day occurrences have confirmed the same principle through every age of the world.—But we have yet more to bear with from unhappy Eve.

EVE. (*Pointing to CAIN.*)

His will!! the will of yon incarnate spirit
 Of death, whom I have brought upon the earth
 To strew it with the dead. May all the curses
 Of life be on him! and his agonies
 Drive him forth o'er the wilderness, like us
 From Eden, till his children do by him
 As he did by his brother! May the swords
 And wings of fiery cherubim pursue him
 By day and night — snakes spring up in his path —
 Earth's fruits be ashes in his mouth — the leaves
 On which he lays his head to sleep be strew'd
 With scorpions! May his dreams be of his victim!
 His waking a continual dread of death!
 May the clear rivers turn to blood as he
 Stoops down to stain them with his raging lip!
 May every element shun or change to him!
 May he live in the pangs which others die with!

And death itself wax something worse than death
To him who first acquainted him with man !
Hence, fratricide! henceforth that word is *Cain*,
Through all the coming myriads of mankind,
Who shall abhor thee, though thou wert their sire!
May the grass wither from thy feet ! the woods
Deny thee shelter ! earth a home ! the dust
A grave ! the sun his light ! and heaven her God !
[*Exit* EVE.]

Note 74.

I have reserved this unmeasured expression of Eve's torn heart and distracted mind to a Note by itself; not for what I have to say on it, so much as for the sake of keeping it unmixed with other matter, on account of its peculiar painfulness to peruse, so that it may be the more easily, if wished to be, avoided. The author, I think, has done ample justice to his subject, however, in thus investing the afflicted mother with a violence of feelings, which, if inconsistent with Christianity, is certainly less so with the state of man at that early period. Cain is, of course, in every view, the reverse of defensible; but it is not the genius of the religion of Jesus Christ to inflict, or wish to inflict, unnecessary pains on those who are about to atone for their crimes by suffering the legitimate sentence of the law, whether human or divine. In the present case, the sentence against Cain could only be that of God, not man: and the particulars of which will presently appear. Meanwhile, I doubt not every allowance will be made on the other hand for Eve, who now, for the first time, appears to have entertained any partiality for Abel, before Cain. On other occasions we have seen that she seemed to regard her "first-born" with every proper maternal feeling.

ADAM.

Cain! get thee forth: we dwell no more together.
 Depart! and leave the dead to me — I am
 Henceforth alone — we never must meet more.

ADAH.

Oh, part not with him thus, my father: do not
 Add thy deep curse to Eve's upon his head!

ADAM.

I curse him not: his spirit be his curse.
 Come, Zillah!

ZILLAH.

I must watch my husband's corse.

ADAM.

We will return again when he is gone
 Who hath provided for us this dread office.
 Come, Zillah!

ZILLAH.

Yet one kiss on yon pale clay,
 And those lips once so warm — my heart! my heart!
 [*Exeunt* ADAM and ZILLAH weeping.]

Note 75.

There seems nothing objectionable in Adam's deportment, nor
 contrary to what a father and a man of good sense and right

feeling may be expected to exhibit ; unless, in reply to Adah's still consistent intercession, he treads too closely upon Eve's ground, in imprecating Cain's own spirit to be a curse to him, while he professed *not* to curse him. For to me, there is little if any difference, apparently. But allowance is still to be made even for Adam. Cain's continued silence seems to me to be very correctly imagined, whether we attribute it to his usual taciturn and sullen character, or credit him for feelings, which, if he *did* possess, would perhaps most naturally be of a kind which, in a degree, would disqualify him for any ready utterance.

ADAH.

Cain ! thou hast heard, we must go forth. I am ready,
 So shall our children be. I will bear Enoch,
 And you his sister. Ere the sun declines
 Let us depart, nor walk the wilderness
 Under the cloud of night.—Nay, speak to me,
 To *me*—*thine own*.

CAIN.

Leave me !

ADAH.

Why, all have left thee.

CAIN.

And wherefore lingerest thou ? Dost thou not fear
 To dwell with one who hath done this ?

ADAH.

I fear

Nothing except to leave thee, much as I
 Shrink from the deed which leaves thee brotherless.
 I must not speak of this — it is between thee
 And the great God.

Note 76.

The author is I think still correct in the continued characters of Adah and Cain. The former not to be swerved from duty and attachment; which all must approve of in her: the other, to all appearance, under a powerful influence of remorseful and distressed feelings. They seem even to have obliterated his affection for Adah, at least his sense of it, as they well may, and to have absorbed every other consideration. He therefore covets solitude; and even thinks that Adah herself only waits his formal dismissal of her, to be induced to follow the example of her relatives by leaving her miserable, though rightly miserable, Cain. He goes so far as even to imagine she must fear to dwell with him. Her reply to that suggestion appears, I own, to be altogether what it should be, not even excepting her reference to the Almighty himself, as the sole arbiter of Cain's crime, and his fate. In all cases of crime and sin, the matter is certainly, as it respects the *other* life, solely, as Adah says, between the soul of the criminal and his maker. Let him be made acquainted, if he be not, with the *only mediator* between God and man. In the silence of the mind in solitude, let him await the gracious influences of the Holy Spirit to give him repentance unto life, and enable him to look to him, to whom the thief upon the cross directed his attention: and if, through the Spirit, he do so, he will be sure to find the same gracious acceptance and salvation. The Father denies the Son nothing; he cannot: — they are One. Securing the Son, therefore, through the Spirit, we secure the Father, to whom the Son is the

only way. Such is the will of Jehovah—Father, Son, and Spirit: one Jehovah. But in regard to Cain, the state of the world was then such, that he could receive no human judgment; and therefore no other judgment than that of his maker could be passed upon him.

A Voice from within exclaims,

Cain! Cain!

ADAH.

Hear'st thou that voice?

The Voice within.

Cain! Cain!

ADAH.

It soundeth like an angel's tone.

Enter the ANGEL of the LORD,

ANGEL,

Where is thy brother Abel?

CAIN.

Am I then

My brother's keeper?

ANGEL.

Cain! what hast thou done?

The voice of thy slain brother's blood cries out,
Even from the ground unto the Lord! — Now art thou

Cursed from the earth which open'd late her mouth
 To drink thy brother's blood from thy rash hand.
 Henceforth, when thou shalt till the ground, it shall not
 Yield thee her strength ; a fugitive shalt thou
 Be from this day, and vagabond on earth !

ADAH.

This punishment is more than he can bear.
 Behold, thou driv'st him from the face of earth,
 And from the face of God shall he be hid.
 A fugitive and vagabond on earth,
 'T will come to pass that whoso findeth him
 Shall slay him.

CAIN.

Would they could ! but who are they
 Shall slay me ? Where are they on the lone earth
 As yet unpeopled ?

ANGEL.

Thou hast slain thy brother,
 And who shall warrant thee against thy son ?

ADAH.

/ Angel of light ! be merciful, nor say
 That this poor aching breast now nourishes
 A murderer in my boy, and of his father.

ANGEL.

Then he would be but what his father is.
 Did not the milk of Eve give nutriment

To him thou now see'st so besmear'd with blood ?
 The fratricide might well engender parricides.—
 But it shall not be so !—the Lord thy God
 And mine commandeth me to set this seal
 On Cain, so that he may go forth in safety.
 Who slayeth Cain, a sevenfold vengeance shall
 Be taken on his head. Come hither !

CAIN.

What

Would'st thou with me ?

ANGEL.

To mark upon thy brow
 Exemption from such deeds as thou hast done.

CAIN.

No, let me die !

ANGEL.

It must not be.

[*The angel sets the mark on Cain's brow.*]

CAIN.

It burns

My brow, but nought to that which is within it.
 Is there more ? let me meet it as I may.

ANGEL.

Stern hast thou been and stubborn from the womb,
As the ground thou must henceforth till; but he
Thou slew'st was gentle as the flocks he tended.

CAIN.

After the fall too soon was I begotten;
Ere yet my mother's mind subsided from
The serpent, and my sire still mourn'd for Eden.
That which I am, I am; I did not seek
For life, nor did I make myself; but could I
With my own death redeem him from the dust—
And why not so? let him return to day,
And I lie ghastly! so shall be restored
By God the life to him he lov'd; and taken
From me a being I ne'er lov'd to bear.

ANGEL.

Who shall heal murder? What is done is done.
Go forth! fulfil thy days! and be thy deeds
Unlike the last!

[*The ANGEL disappears.*]

Note 77.

Lord Byron has somewhat varied from the scriptural account, in making the observation Adah's, rather than Cain's, that his punishment was greater than he could bear. The author probably thought it more consistent with the general character of Cain, so to do. The marginal rendering of the Bible is—"my crime, or offence, is greater

than can be forgiven." And some persons are of opinion the passage should be read interrogatively—is my crime or offence greater than may be forgiven? This last construction is even most in accordance with that evident regret, not to say repentance, which Lord Byron has attributed to Cain in his subsequent deportment and observations; a regret however, rather *sturdy* still, and quite agreeable to his unbending disposition. Cain need not have apprehended the want of population on the Earth to have ensured his destruction as Adah feared, had that been the divine will; because, as there appears every reason to believe he lived several centuries after this transaction, the world must have been numerously peopled long before his death, even by others than his own immediate descendants. It was of course most easy for the Almighty to affect Cain with, or impress upon perhaps his outward form, some peculiarity, so as to ensure his exemption from what he seemed to anticipate, viz. the general abhorrence of all his fellow creatures. Cain's wish to die, rather than be thus stigmatized, is very *natural*, certainly, and has found imitators in all ages. But death is not annihilation. And what security can any thinking man find, to satisfy himself that his condition after the death of his body, will not be, to his spirit instantly, and to both body and spirit ultimately, beyond conception worse than the worst condition of human existence? While there is life there is hope. If a man's *crimes* drive him to suicide, that is foolish, because sincere repentance, with corresponding dispositions of heart and mind, would secure his pardon with his maker, on *scriptural* grounds, if not with his fellow creatures. If follies, or vices, or unpleasing circumstances, or distressing events, be the impulsive motive, still there is a healing antidote for all, if men do not reject, but sincerely embrace, that merciful revelation from their maker, of which mention has been before made. In fact there is no human mental distress (while *reason* lasts) for which there is not a cure. And although Cain had not this resource, for which God's time was not arrived by many ages, yet there is no doubt God was ever accessible, even in that period of the world, to all who sought him according

to the light they possessed. Of this, the proofs throughout scripture are abundant. The prospect of an unknown future state, in unknown society and associations, it may be with infernal and malevolent, and *unrestrained*, evil, spiritual, and powerful beings, is certainly a serious one. One should almost think that all who disregard it *must* be of unsound mind, were there not so much evidence of the contrary. In *this* life evil spirits, both of devils and wicked men, *are* restrained; in the next, not. After all indeed, Cain does not appear to have been a suicide of his body, whatever he was of his soul. His discontent with existence only made him desirous, though unwisely, under all considerations, to be rid of it.—The angel's remark upon Cain's native stubbornness and sternness, and on Abel's contrary temper, draws from Cain a sort of apologetic reply, attributing his unhappy character to natural causes; or to causes partly natural, partly moral; but still such, as he seemed to intimate, he imagined would account satisfactorily, and extenuatively, for his own perverseness. This, by the way, was a kind of admission of the fact. But what would Socrates have said to him? Would he not have replied—"Granting thy supposition, that the circumstances of thy parents had an effect upon thy constitution, yet why didst thou not, as I did, by the use of thy reason, overcome thy evil dispositions? The physiognomist who declared to me that I had naturally those vicious inclinations he enumerated, did not know the pains I had taken to relieve myself by making war upon them, until, if I might not eradicate their very nature, yet until I had brought them into, and by continual exercise kept them in, subjection, and made myself the master of myself, untyrannized over by the worst of tyrants?" And who can prove this not to be man's duty? But in the *present* state of the world, with such positive assistance, as *revelation* offers, we must be inexcusable. Still, at best, Cain's way of accounting for his dissatisfied, and what is worse, his haughty, and *overbearing* spirit, (if even we *can* acquit him of malice, envy, or revenge,) is altogether a poor one, and equally inadmissible. Much defect of moral character may be borne with, or forgiven. But how can a *tyrannical* spirit be borne with, or if borne

with, forgiven? Forgiven, I mean, by man to men, *as men*. As *Christians*, it is another matter. *They* forgive, even while they oppose, if they do oppose. Cain was probably sincere in his offer to substitute himself in death, for Abel. His question "why not so?" savours however, still, of his presumptuous *daring*, as Lucifer called it in his parents, in pretending to question the point with, or or dictate to, his maker; which, who will pretend to justify, on any rational ground whatever? As for his not having sought for life, nor loving it, we have before considered that subject, on his previous declarations to the same effect. His saying that he did not make himself is not (in one sense) so easily granted. Because the most constant and common experience informs us, that wicked men do make themselves so: they are so *voluntarily*. What wicked man was ever heard to complain of being wicked? or, if he did in contrition and sincerity, he would assuredly be led to *seek deliverance* from his wickedness. Will society—will the common consent of mankind, therefore, admit Cain's plea, to murderers and other atrocious criminals; especially where the crimes proceed from studied and deliberate self-gratification? Does even *man* allow self-gratification, in vile and infernal offences, to be an available defence, against the sanctions of moral and social principles? Nothing but the want of reason can excuse such hellish delinquencies. They *may* obtain pardon of God if *duly sought*, (but to presume upon it is most hazardous,) but, at the tribunal of man, they *must* be visited. They ever have been, and ever will be, till civilized man himself shall be no more. The angel reminds Cain of the impossibility of recalling murder; which, perhaps, according to our ideas of both human and divine law, it was not, as wanting premeditated malice; and being rather the effect of immediate irritation. The angel's joining to his expulsion of Cain, to till a soil less yielding to him than heretofore—an exhortation to amend his doings—while it seems to imply in Lord Byron an idea of the possibility of Cain's ultimate repentance and forgiveness, (and Abel had prayed for it,) does not appear to me to be absolutely contradicted by scripture. But let not the possibility

of forgiveness lead us to presumptuous acts, accompanied, not only by present misery, but the *possibility* also of its proving irremediable, in their consequences to ourselves. I say *ourselves*, because in *this* instance, the evil was, in fact, infinitely most against Cain himself. But, in truth, the hazards of voluntary evil deeds are too great for any *rational* mind to encounter; yet it *is* done, at *all* hazards.

ADAH.

He 's gone ; let us go forth ;
I hear our little Enoch cry within
Our bower.

CAIN.

Ah ! little knows he what he weeps for !
And I who have shed blood cannot shed tears !
But the four rivers* would not cleanse my soul.
Think'st thou my boy will bear to look on me ?

ADAH,

If I thought that he would not, I would ——

CAIN. (*Interrupting her.*)

No,
No more of threats : we have had too many of them :
Go to our children ; I will follow thee.

ADAH.

I will not leave thee lonely with the dead ;
Let us depart together.

* The "four rivers" which flowed round Eden, and consequently the only waters with which Cain was acquainted upon the earth.

CAIN.

Oh! thou dead

And everlasting witness! whose unsinking
 Blood darkens the earth and heaven! what thou *now* art,
 I know not! but if *thou* see'st what *I* am,
 I think thou wilt forgive him, whom his God
 Can ne'er forgive, nor his own soul.— Farewell!
 I must not, dare not, touch what I have made thee.
 I who sprung from the same womb with thee, drained
 The same breast, clasp'd thee often to my own,
 In fondness brotherly and boyish, I
 Can never meet thee more, nor even dare
 To do that for thee, which thou should'st have done
 For me— compose thy limbs into their grave—
 The first grave yet dug for mortality.
 But who hath dug that grave? Oh, Earth! oh, Earth!
 For all the fruits thou hast render'd to me, I
 Give thee back this.— Now for the wilderness.

[*ADAH stoops down and kisses the body of ABEL.*]

ADAH.

A dreary, and an early doom, my brother,
 Has been thy lot! Of all who mourn for thee,
 I alone must not weep. My office is
 Henceforth to dry up tears, and not to shed them;
 But yet, of all who mourn, none mourn like me,
 Not only for myself, but him who slew thee.
 Now, Cain! I will divide thy burden with thee.

CAIN.

Eastward from Eden will we take our way ;
'T is the most desolate, and suits my steps.

ADAH.

Lead ! thou shalt be my guide, and may our God
Be thine ! Now let us carry forth our children.

CAIN.

And *he* who lieth there was childless. I
Have dried the fountain of a gentle race,
Which might have grac'd his recent marriage couch,
And might have temper'd this stern blood of mine,
Uniting with our children Abel's offspring !
O, Abel !

ADAH.

Peace be with him !

CAIN.

But with *me* !

[*Exeunt.*]

Note 78.

Cain's remark, upon Adah's noticing the crying of the child, savours, still, of that inveterate antipathy to life as well as death, which he carried about him ; as if he meant to ascribe his child's tears to an infantile presentiment of his future wretchedness and misery, equal to his parent's. That however does not follow, as is well known. And as to his observation that he, though a shedder of

blood, could not shed tears, that also, even at the present remote period from his, is no strange thing. Neither are tears a certain indication of a seriously awakened conscience. They may, also, be hypocritical and deceitful; while on the other hand, the strongest convictions, and most poignant anguish, and sincere repentance, *may* accompany the want of that *frequent* expression of human feeling. Cain, at the same time, as Lord Byron at least represents him, had no slight impression of the deepness of the stain he had incurred upon his soul—his rational and *accountable* nature and being. This is the first time Cain had said a word about his soul, much less expressed any solicitude for it. Happy if not now too late! Neither *his* feelings however, nor those of Macbeth, and multitudes of recenter date, are by any means to be desired. To think lightly of *mental* anguish, is the utmost irrationality. The ancients themselves also, to say nothing of Christianity, are full of the folly of permitting those passions to rule us, which, being indulged, are sure to produce this misery. And when incurred, how can we depend upon even the *will* to seek to the right quarter for remedy? The author seems to have well imagined these things; and has most judiciously made Cain repress even Adah's rising displeasure against her own "sweet Enoch" on the remotest idea of his not "bearing to *look*" upon his father, as Cain's right feelings had made him suggest. Cain already *seems* to improve. Not that I mean to excuse him; or to anticipate his repentance with certainty; but wherever we conceive *genuine* repentance to exist, it is impossible to resist it. Cain seems sensible of his fault by thus repressing in Adah the distant imitation of it by introductory threats, of which from himself to Abel, we have seen the fatal results. But Adah's refusal, again, to leave him, as he desires, alone with Abel's lifeless body, will reinstate her in our favour. It is quite unnecessary to comment particularly upon each sentence of Cain's following apostrophizing address to his dead brother. But who will not sympathize and go along with Cain in it? Who can forbear wishing that such in reality may have been his state of mind? Yet we cannot help remarking more especially his correct and un-

forgiving feeling towards himself. As to Abel, *his* forgiveness he needed not to have doubted : it had been given ; and God's pardon also was implored, with Abel's expiring breath. Abel was too happy in his God, not to forgive, and wish well to, all with whom he was concerned. So his Redeemer, afterwards. So the first martyr, Stephen. And so the multitudes besides who have since been immolated by the murderous spirit of intolerance. Nor is all remorse, or sorrow, real repentance, by any means. Remorse and sorrow *may* spring from other sources than a radical *change of mind*. Yet Cain's reminiscences of his early associations with his brother are highly amiable. He asks lifeless Abel once however, "why wouldst thou oppose me?" But may not Cain be asked if he was right in insisting upon doing that which Abel opposed? And was Abel worse than *heroic* and faithful to his God in opposing it? And was not Cain *tyrannical* in enforcing his unjust will by violence? As to Cain's despairing of God's forgiveness, it is natural. How could it be otherwise, considering his rebellious speeches, and his hatred to his maker? But still, God is not man. And, in the person of Jesus Christ, he has said, that *every* sin, without exception, but the rejection of the Holy Spirit, shall be forgiven to man, in *the way* his Gospel offers. Cain's concluding lamentation over Abel is certainly tender, if we may suppose that Cain's regret, for the *sternness* of his own blood, was unmixed with any degree of approbation or admiration of it, at the same time. And on Adah's final valediction to Abel, Cain, to the last, seems to be affected with a very just feeling of the want of that peace, of which we would indulge a hope he had now some apprehension ; and which apprehension, if *duly cultivated*, may, in all cases, be expected to lead to its still more happy acquisition.

It is not for me to apologize for my defects in the foregoing Notes ; — they are not voluntary : but, just before their issuing from the press, a small work has come to my hands, which has induced

my feeling the deficiency of my comment in Note 52, on Lucifer's telling Cain of his "state of sin." On that topic I confess there might well have been some enlargement. But I am not a preacher: I have, as I ought, disclaimed entrenching upon that higher office, even were I qualified; and trust that I have confined myself (*talis qualis*) to my business of lay annotator, as faithfully as I have been able. Still the subject of sin is not unimportant in my estimation, as it regards either myself or others. And I feel I should be *voluntarily* defective, were I to omit earnestly inviting my readers (if it please God I have readers) to connect with these Notes, the perusal of the small work above alluded to, and which consists of Six *Short Lectures* on the Parable of the Prodigal Son, preached, during the last Lent, in the Parish Church of Bradford Abbas, near Yeovil, Somerset, by the Rev. R. GRANT, the Vicar. To eulogize these elegant, though plain, spiritual, and faithful discourses of, clearly, a faithful minister of Christ, and of that Gospel and *revelation* which it has been the sincere, however imperfectly executed aim, even of *this* book, to advocate, is needless and would be improper. To select any extract from those lectures might not be easy. I only wish the opportunity to be given them of speaking for themselves; being confident, that should any approve of my own homely fare, they will be much pleased with the provision I now propose to their acceptance, not abundant indeed in quantity, but richly so, and most wholesome at the same time, in quality. Therefore I think myself justified in thus suggesting that little production strictly as supplemental to my own, in the way, and for the purpose, I have stated; convinced, that all who deem religion to be a matter of the heart, and life as well as (to say the least) of the head, these lectures will be most cordially received. They are published by Hatchard and Son, Piccadilly, price 3s. and the profits of their publication are stated to be applied in aid of the funds of the Sunday School instituted in the parish.

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