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By G. G. Coulton, M.A.

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
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CAMBRIDGE : BOWES & BOWES.

**THE MAIN ILLUSIONS OF
PACIFICISM**



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THE MAIN ILLUSIONS OF PACIFICISM

A Criticism of Mr. Norman
Angell and of the Union of
Democratic Control

BY

G. G. COULTON, M.A.

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PREFACE

Though my first perusal of the *Great Illusion* convinced me of Mr. Angell's great inaccuracy, yet it is only the more recent and detailed study of his works—and, still more, his evasions when put upon his defence—which have revealed his deficient sense of moral responsibility. If, however, nothing but his personal reputation were concerned, it would be a waste of time at the present moment to deal with his writings; especially since most men are agreed that there is much truth in the old ideas which form the main framework of his doctrine. But Mr. Angell has inextricably mingled these older truths with falsehoods of his own; and the practical result of his propaganda has been the encouragement in Anglo-Saxon countries of a vague and illogical anti-militarism which, on the Continent, would not be supported by half even of the Socialist party. "Norman-Angellism" (to use the title adopted by his followers themselves) does not venture to plead plainly for disarmament; yet, so far as it can be called in any sense a logical creed, its logic points in that direction. At the Angellite Summer School of 1914 one of the most prominent disciples confessed, "If we give them [*i.e.* the public] an impression that we are 'peace at any price' men, and that we are going to advocate disarmament, they will not listen to us." Yet, out of the thirteen other disciples who

spoke in this discussion, no fewer than five admitted that "Norman-Angellism" seemed logically to lead to non-resistance, while three others spoke with an uncertain sound. And Mr. Angell himself, among the selected reviews of his book, includes one which applauds him for having helped the cause of reduction of armaments before this war.*

On the Continent, this fatal vagueness of purpose has never enjoyed anything like the same popularity. By far the most important book on this subject, by any continental pacifist, is the *Armée Nouvelle* of the late Jean Jaurès. Whether right or wrong, Jaurès left the public in no doubt about his main views. He insisted that patriotism was one of the greatest of human forces; that armaments, until the world undergoes some radical change, will always be necessary; and that our aim must not be to weaken our defensive forces, but so to democratize them that, while even stronger for national defence, they may be rendered almost useless for aggressive purposes. These doctrines he reinforced, not only by the definite text of a Bill which he introduced, but also by working out his whole scheme on paper, almost down to the minutest details; and some of his main contentions have been abundantly justified by the experience of the present war.†

* See below, pp. 32 and 183 *note*.

† This book, of which a large edition was soon sold out, has recently been officially republished by the Socialist party (*Librairie du Parti Socialiste*, 142, rue Montmartre, 2f. 50). An abbreviated edition will shortly be published in English (Simpkin Marshall and Co. 1s. net).

The object of this present book, therefore, is to awaken the public mind, and especially the Liberal and Labour mind, to the need for a clear policy, in national defence as in diplomacy, without provocation, but without weakness. Its aim is to expose that faint-hearted idea which underlies so much of our vague peace-talk, that a democracy can only refrain from aggression by keeping itself powerless. So long as armies are needed at all, no democracy can hold its own, in the long run, unless the main force of the state be in a People's Army. Its constitution must be settled by the people; meanwhile, however, we can see such armies actually at work in Switzerland and Norway; and such is the ideal also of the continental democracies. The delusion, too widespread in Britain, that French socialists looked upon their campaign against the three years as a step towards the Voluntary System, rests upon ignorance, not only of Jaurès's book, but of the whole continental outlook.* In the spring of 1914, and again in September 1915, Parisians of every shade of political thought assured me that Frenchmen treated Voluntary Military Service scarcely more seriously than Voluntary Taxation. Here, then, is a clear practical issue, which renders it worth while to expose, not only Mr. Angell's vagueness and want of logic, but also his extraordinary blunders, and the disingenuous methods by which he has attempted to conceal them.

* See the present writer's pamphlet, *Workers and War*. (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes. 1d.)

The last six chapters deal with the Union of Democratic Control. They form part of my original plan; but circumstances compelled me to publish them separately some months ago, before the rest of the book could be finished. A writer in the *Socialist Review* has accused me of inaccuracy in entitling them "a criticism of the U.D.C.," since I combat only the smaller portion of the U.D.C. official programme. But neither those chapters, nor any other chapters of this book, appeal to the too numerous minds which love to swallow doctrines whole. The U.D.C. propaganda, like Mr. Angell's, rests partly upon old truths and partly upon demonstrable falsehoods. I have attempted to separate these diverse elements, and my appeal is to readers who, while definitely repudiating Bernhardt, are thoroughly disgusted by the frequent sophisms and mis-statements of professional pacifists. I make no appeal to those who, like my *Socialist Review* critic, imagine that loyalty compels us either to swallow the doctrines of some particular Author or Union altogether, or to reject them altogether.

G. G. C.

GREAT SHELFORD,
CAMBRIDGE,
December, 1915.

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I

THE LITERARY MORALITY OF PACIFICISTS *

This is not a time for recriminations; but the public is at last aroused, and will listen seriously, and will form its own judgment. Here, then, is the moment for pointing out one of the very dangerous tendencies which seem to underlie the current advocacy of Pacifism. The recent enormous diffusion of pacifist doctrines seems due to two main causes, apart from Mr. Angell's own literary skill. First, its actual kernel is true and generous; and, secondly, its husk was admirably adapted to protect it under recent world-conditions. An era of peace, almost unparalleled in world-history, has encouraged slipshod thinking on the subject of war: all fallacies which could not be brought to the test of immediate martial experience have enjoyed a very happy time in our generation. Men who would not dream of leaving their house unbarred to their brother-men by night, and who would scream for a policeman at the least provocation, have been quite content to believe that the soldier is a hireling murderer, and that Brotherhood would effectually keep the Germans from infringing neutral rights or neutral soil. The

* This chapter is reprinted, with slight alterations, from the *Nineteenth Century and After* for October, 1914.

pacifist, therefore, conscious of the real justice of his main purpose, had involved himself also in a whole husk of delusions, which a single stroke of German policy has now dispelled. And these delusions were all the more fatal because they were so flattering to the secret pride that lurks in us all. There are "Norman Angell Leagues" everywhere, and a *Norman Angell Monthly* journal. The young Angellite feels that he has got hold of "the new thing"; he is tempted to contrast his own alertness with the dulness of the old fogey who remembers something very like it as the new thing of his own youth. The older Angellite, very often a person of rather limited reading and outlook, suddenly feels himself to be taller by a head and shoulders than the mere outsider, and commanding a proportionately wider intellectual horizon. For he has read and understood a serious book which, to do it justice, is almost as readable as a novel. To him it has revealed new realms of thought: he naturally measures the absolute novelty of the theories by the novelty of his own discovery, and heartily pities other people who cannot see that "Norman Angell has knocked the bottom out of all that."

Let me therefore preface my article by admitting my agreement with most of Mr. Angell's first "Key-chapter," which gives its name to *The Great Illusion*. If it is not very new in substance, it is at least expressed in new language of great force, and with comparatively little exaggeration. War is a curse, and we must do all we can to stop it. But how?

This is really the main question ; and here Mr. Angell wanders off into very confused reasoning and very gross misstatements. Everywhere he argues as if we had only two alternatives—on the one hand the present state of things ; and on the other, some vague moral action which he very imperfectly defines.

(1) He completely ignores the well-defined and apparently practical solution proposed by all the democracies of Europe. If the Continental Radicals and Socialists could have had their way, the world would by this time have been armed on the Swiss system, with a law compelling every able-bodied man to train in defence of his country, and no possibility of raising any aggressive force beyond such volunteers as could be induced to invade a foreign nation—that is, a huge preponderance of defensive over offensive forces in every civilized country. This (as Jaurès and Bebel pleaded) would at last bring International Arbitration within practical politics. Mr. Angell apparently shares the vulgar misapprehension that Continental democrats are opposed to the principle of Compulsory Service ; and, in his only military reference to Switzerland, he describes it as an “undefended nation . . . defended by a comic-opera army of a few thousand men” (p. 34). Yet Switzerland, in the first week of this very August, put into the field 200,000 armed and trained men : in figures of British population, more than two and a half millions. Military experts judge her far more competent than Belgium to defend her neutrality.

(2) This, no doubt, is only a sin of omission, but such omissions vitiate an apostle's whole case. If we are at the top of a burning house, and a supposed expert rushes in to tell us that our only chance of escape is to risk a leap in the dark, his omission to note the presence of a common-sense fire-escape may be more dangerous to us than even a deliberate falsehood. But, in fact, Mr. Angell's sins of commission are even worse than his omissions. The chapter to which he himself refers us as "Key-chapter No. 2," is the second of the second book—and this involves, by implication, the fourth chapter also, which professes to supply detailed proof for the bald assertions of the second. In these two chapters he quotes two scientific authorities of European reputation as supporting his main contentions. On p. 145 Professor Karl Pearson is quoted in support of the assertion that "Man's struggle is the struggle of the organism, which is human society, in its adaptation to its environment, the world—not the struggle between the different parts of the same organism" (*Grammar of Science*, pp. 433—438). Nobody who knows the Professor's work would find it easy to credit him with any such grotesque statement. The fact is, that in this very passage he insists with almost brutal frankness on "the battle of society with society," and on the right of strong races to squeeze out the weak. It is extremely likely that Mr. Angell got his reference from some second-hand source which he has misunderstood. Again, on p. 194, he quotes Otto Seeck's famous

phrase, "the rooting-out of the best," and claims Seeck as supporting his assertion that the downfall of Rome was due to her foreign wars. He gives no reference, and has evidently never had Seeck's actual book in his hands; for, three lines farther on, he cites another sentence from the same context, without realising that here again he is dealing with Otto Seeck.* And the error of fact is, in this case, even more grotesque than in Professor Pearson's. The famous pages in Seeck's first volume which develop this thesis of the "rooting-out of the best," do *not* attribute this eliminating process to international warfare. On the contrary, Seeck is at great pains to show how the barbarous German tribes, during three hundred years of perpetual warfare, grew strong enough to crush at one stroke that great Roman Empire which had enjoyed three hundred years of a peace unparalleled in the ancient world. So far as Seeck condemns Roman militarism as responsible for this elimination of the most manly elements, it is because the imperial army, by relying on voluntary enlistment, gradually segregated, and to a great extent sterilised, the most adventurous elements of the nation. In other words, if we are to believe Seeck, it is conscription and war that strengthen a race both physically and morally, while

* This is curiously borne out by a glance at Mr. Angell's new edition (p. 236). Imagining himself to have silently deleted all reference to Seeck, he has in fact left the longer quotation from Seeck in its place, not knowing its paternity; and he still quotes a sentence from Seeley which (as Seeck would have shown him) is false in that context. It is an admirable example of what Mr. J. M. Robertson has called "plundering and blundering."

nations are not only weakened but demoralised by a long period of peace, defended by the swords of a hireling soldiery. He emphasises this contention by instancing other nations of antiquity. It was not external war, but internal political quarrels (he contends), that ruined Greece and Rome. Seeck's thesis may be overstrained—I, for one, feel that it is—but that is not the present point. The point is that this historian of European reputation, after what even his antagonists would admit to be a detailed and masterly survey of the actual evidence, sums up in the extreme militarist sense; and that Mr. Angell, on the strength of a couple of dozen words which he has picked up somewhere at second-hand and misunderstood, claims the verdict of the specialist in his own favour.

This, and a good deal more, I pointed out about a year ago at the Cambridge War and Peace Society, which was founded mainly for the discussion of Mr. Norman Angell's writings. No member then present ventured to defend these two references in face of the actual words of Professors Pearson and Seeck: the general apology amounted to this, that Mr. Angell is a journalist, and must be judged by journalistic standards of literary accuracy. But, some six months afterwards, one of Mr. Angell's official subordinates wrote to ask me for a note of these mistakes, since the author was bringing out a new edition and wished to correct them. So far, so good. On a subsequent occasion, however, when the matter was publicly discussed again, this intermediary held out

no hope that the correction would amount to anything more than a silent omission of the two false references. Mr. Angell might indeed bring himself to eliminate the flat falsehood; he would indeed delete the references; but he could not afford to delete also his main suggested falsehood. Professor Pearson, whose authority on a special point of sociology even Mr. Angell's warmest admirers would admit to be at least double that of the Master, will indeed no longer be quoted as saying the very thing which he has not said. But this falsehood, this pseudo-scientific axiom flatly opposed to real scientific authority, is still to stand in Mr. Angell's text, without any hint of Professor Pearson's contradiction.* Similarly, decency forbids that Professor Seeck should any longer be claimed as a pacifist; but here, again, we must still disguise the fact that Mr. Angell is setting up his own journalistic *obiter dictum* against the considered verdict of a specialist of European reputation: and all this on two points which lie at the very foundation of the second "Key-chapter."

This decision seemed to me so crude an assertion of the non-moral legal maxim, *caveat emptor*, that I ventured to argue still further with the intermediary in question; with Mr. Angell himself it was useless to argue, since he had declined my direct challenge to discuss in writing, not only his obvious blunders, but what seemed to me his deeper misconceptions

* Not indeed in its crudest expression; but the whole misstatement is still there in substance, and Mr. Angell still builds his theory upon it.

and sophisms. I urged the pleas which will probably occur to most of my readers: that, in ordinary political journalism, this kind of thing might pass muster, but that it ill becomes a pacifist to live by Disraeli's maxim, "Never retract, never explain, never apologise"; that this silent and furtive misrepresentation was, morally, even less justifiable than the carelessness which had begotten the original misstatements; and that he who would truly serve the cause of world-peace must not deliberately adopt a standard of literary rectitude lower than the ordinary standard of commercial rectitude adopted by self-respecting business firms. Moreover, it becomes possible to point out a concrete example of the endless blunders which may thus breed from the writing of a single blunderer who has a hundred thousand readers at his command. Professor Starr Jordan, President of the University of Stanford, U.S.A., had lately given a public address at Cambridge on "Eugenics and War." Instead of the scientific arguments which we might have expected from him as a biologist, he had based a great part of his address upon this Angell-Seeck blunder; and when, during the ensuing discussion, Seeck's actual words were brought to his notice, the Professor was too confused by this shock to put up either a defence or an apology: he preferred to allow one of his main points to go by default.* The Professor had simply

* See the Professor's contemporaneous article in the *Eugenics Review* (late 1913 or early 1914), in which the same misuse of Otto Seeck's authority occurs. I am not aware that the author has since offered either explanation or apology to the public.

fallen into the same ditch as the 99,999 other readers ; and in that ditch Mr. Norman Angell proposes to leave them all wallowing ; for my representations through his intermediary were as fruitless as my direct challenge had been to himself. The world in general has no time to verify a writer's references, and, until a few weeks ago, it was impossible to impress upon Mr. Angell his moral responsibility in this matter. The lamentable events of this August may possibly force him to abandon this Nietzschean attitude: he stands now no longer on the pedestal of the Superhuman, but must render the moral account which is required from other men.

For these are only the two worst from among many similar instances. He makes great sport of an article by Mr. Sidney Low in the *Nineteenth Century* for October 1898.* In his five references to this article (ed. 1911 pp. 173-4, 187, 198, 205) he so steadily ignores Mr. Low's qualifying phrases, and so grievously misrepresents his actual argument, that it is only charitable to infer second-hand knowledge here again: the whole thing is apparently suggested by certain passages in Mr. J. M. Robertson's *Patriotism and Empire*. The only alternative supposition is that of a gratuitous and deliberate unfairness of which I cannot believe Mr. Angell capable. Renan, again, argued that, "War is one of the conditions of progress." Mr. Angell, in defence of his second "Key-chapter," quotes this as "War is *the* condition of progress," and makes short work of the sentence

* *Should Europe Disarm?*

thus garbled. He complacently applies to the soldier in general what Mr. Bernard Shaw has said about the British volunteer soldier, who must be humoured if we would get him to enlist at all.* In another place, arguing after his own fashion about military nations, he bases himself on the assumption that Russia drills a larger portion of her population than Germany (p.184). A reference to Whitaker, or to a dozen almost equally accessible authorities, would have told him that the Germans have an overwhelmingly larger proportion under arms. Moreover, even Mr. Angell's literary conscience will scarcely allow him to retain in the next edition a sentence which occurs on this same page: "As already pointed out, the men who really give the tone to the German nation, to German life and conduct—that is to say, the majority of adult Germans—have never seen a battle *and never will.*" (Italics mine.)

The last few days have shown us a most instructive parallel to Mr. Angell's literary methods. The *Frankfurter Zeitung*, a paper whose fairness is generally most conspicuous, was betrayed into publishing the now notorious John Burns oration. It is apparently the only journal which has since honestly confessed: "We shall not hesitate, if a forgery is in question, to acknowledge this." But it cannot help adding: "In any case, what was put into the mouth

* Here are some of the words which Mr. Angell, though he has lived in Paris, finds it in his conscience to apply to the foreign conscript: "He has the easiest of lives . . . dressed prettily, and washed and combed like a child, . . . forbidden to marry, like a child, and called 'Tommy,' like a child. He has no real work to keep him from going mad, except housemaid's work" (p. 206).

of Mr. Burns was very excellent; he would have had no reason to be ashamed of it." (*The Times*, September 15.) There we have exactly Mr. Angell's point of view. The words which he, a journalist, put into the mouths of professors speaking *ex cathedra* upon their special subjects, are (he considers) very excellent, and such as they would have no reason to be ashamed of. What the *Frankfurter Zeitung* has been betrayed into under bitter stress of war, Mr. Angell cheerfully perpetrated in piping times of peace. Moreover, he had not even the *Frankfurter's* excuse, that Mr. John Burns may possibly be actually thinking the things he is reported to have said. The authors whom Mr. Angell falsified had said, only too explicitly, the very opposite. It is almost as if the Germans had put the Burns speech into the mouth of Sir Edward Grey.

More might be said, but this much may suffice to explain why I have tried hard, for some time, to persuade Mr. Angell to discuss his thesis publicly. It may also supply one, at least, of the reasons which have hitherto prompted his refusal.

I have begun with him as the most prominent example of the too common pacifist attitude towards inconvenient facts. Another very flagrant offender is the International Arbitration League. The tone of its official journal is always gratuitously provocative. It has gloated over an inscription borne in procession on certain Trade-Unionist banners: "To Hell with Conscription!" The editor has refused space for protest or contradiction, even where he has

made a personal attack. The paper is largely supported by members of the Society of Friends, who, however, probably never read it, but simply pay their money for the Cause, and believe piously that the *Arbitrator* must be an honest, peaceable journal, as they believe piously that Mr. Norman Angell must know what he is talking about when he quotes from learned professors. Let me quote one further instance out of many. The League has officially published a leaflet by Mr. John Ward, M.P., alleging that a certain factory manager "outside Zürich" had lost nearly 50 per-cent. of his men during the autumn manœuvres of 1907, and had complained to Mr. Ward that his works might almost as well have been closed. The writer, when challenged, could not supply the manager's name or address; but after a long and most romantic chase, in which Mr. Ward himself gave me only the most unwilling and niggardly assistance, I at last succeeded in identifying two factories as the only two which could possibly answer to his description. The managers of both these factories, on inquiry, treated the whole story as absurd: 5 per-cent. of their men at the most had been called out, and they emphatically repudiated the suggestion that compulsory service reacted disadvantageously upon Swiss industry and trade. On inquiring further from the official Labour Bureau at Zürich, I was told that, "we should never even discuss the possibility" of such a case as I quoted. My attempt to find the Swiss colonel who was alleged to have been present when the words were spoken elicited only a

suggestion that "your informant has been egregiously hoaxed." Finding it hopeless to appeal to the Secretary, Mr. F. Maddison (who finally threatened to emphasise the incriminated assertion by thick type when he came to reprint the leaflet), I looked down the long list of Vice-Presidents of the International Arbitration League, and fixed upon the name most honourably known to me by report. This was a gentleman deep in all religious and charitable works, a member of Parliament, and a business man of high standing. His embarrassment when appealed to was piteous and even ludicrous: why should *he* be made responsible? To do him justice, he had probably never before looked at the League publications; but, in the long run, no more satisfaction was to be got from him than from Mr. Ward or Mr. Maddison: the pacifist in him could not accept a code of honour which the business man would have disdained to infringe. For years and decades still to come, the International Arbitration League will continue to base its attack upon Swiss compulsory service upon assertions which the Swiss themselves find too grotesque for argument. Honourable business men and the Society of Friends will pay for the broadcast dissemination of this and similar falsehoods; they will continue to apply odious names to those who conscientiously differ from them, and will wonder all the time why "the average sensual man" still fails to see that he is entertaining angels of Truth and Justice unawares.

In my original article I had quoted another case,

but it is sufficient here to pillory two of the most prominent among these authors who do evil in order that peace may ensue. The root of this war-difficulty is not only war itself, but also those thousand injustices upon which war is based, and which make some men rush to war as an actual relief. Let me acknowledge again the great service Mr. Angell has done by bringing the man in the street to face the possibility that even successful war may not "pay." But how shall he really convince the world, until he has proved, equally conclusively, that there is no salvation in untruth and injustice, which lie at the root of war? The writings of professional pacifists do not really commend their cause. Religion is a noble thing; but the religious tract has too often made itself a byword. Pacifism is a noble ideal; but the first step towards its realisation must surely be this: that its advocates should consistently manifest at least that moral courage which we expect from men of lower professions.

I have emphasised all this, because our worst troubles in this present crisis may possibly come from that slipshod, inaccurate, and essentially dishonest pacifism, which is as far from true peace as sentimentality is from true feeling. For the moment, the danger may seem remote. We no longer hear the voices of those who have cursed the soldier's trade that made their own trade possible, or who have piled up big fortunes behind an Army and a Fleet whose existence they daily deplore. Only here and there can the German Chancellor state his case

against Sir Edward Grey in phrases borrowed from the Independent Labour Party's manifesto. But as this murderous war drags on, those who first lose heart will soonest revert to the false gospel of "Peace, Peace!" where there is no peace. We shall again be flooded with prophets whose knowledge is often on a par with their candour, and of whom we may almost say with Voltaire :

Notre crédulité fait toute leur science.

There will be a chorus of "Trust German promises!" from men whom we cannot even trust ourselves—from men who earn a reputation for idealism by preaching, in international relations, a higher code than they themselves practise either in literature or in ordinary business. They would not release a fraudulent debtor upon his word of honour; nor would they fail to demand very substantial recognizances as security against personal assault. Germans see this very clearly; and that curious medley which disciples call "Angellism" has been responsible for a good deal of very dangerous German contempt. However illegitimate the deduction may have been, it was only natural that Germany should have suspected cowardice and wilful self-deception in a population which rules its every-day business dealings by strict common sense, but which will swallow the commonest nonsense rather than face the one root-problem of national defence. In a few months there may be room again for an "Angellism" under cover of which real peace would be gambled away

for false peace; and we shall then need to remember that outspoken word of the great Nonconformist R. W. Dale: "I believe in peace—true peace—at any price; in peace, even at the price of war." *

So far I wrote in the autumn of 1914; it is necessary to write even more emphatically now. Mr. Angell has answered me; the reader will find this answer, with my rejoinder, in Appendix I. It will be seen that Mr. Angell attempts to justify his want of literary rectitude by pleading that things just as bad are regularly done in politics; moreover, in his attempt to escape from the consequences of his inaccuracies, he now takes the liberty of misquoting even his own printed words, citing "partly" instead of "solely," and so on. It will be seen that my attempt to correct his gross misquotation of Renan only resulted, by a curious error, in Mr. Angell's pillorying me among those who shared the perverted views which (on the strength of his own misquotation), he attributes to Renan. The fact that ample apology has been made since, and that the blunder was evidently due to sheer carelessness, leaves unaffected the point which I shall have to expand later on, that this writer is not only extremely inaccurate himself, but that he specially appeals to an unthinking and uncritical type of reader, for whom anything like careful revision would be waste of time. Even in his last edition, the 23rd, there is

• *Life*, by his Son, p. 130.

a footnote asserting that "now even 3-foot dwarfs are impressed" into the French army. I have watched, for some years, with growing amusement, how this absurd statement has persisted unchanged from edition to edition. It is probable that Mr. Angell originally wrote "5-foot dwarfs," and that the 3 was originally a printer's error. But the book has had (if we may trust the public statement of a disciple) more than 100,000 readers. Of all these, not one has read it critically enough to represent to himself what a 3-foot dwarf would look like in a regiment, to realize the blunder, and to send the Master a warning post-card. This incident tells the same tale as when we pick up a book, and find that some of the leaves have never been cut; or when a schoolboy appears at morning school on Tuesday with Monday's ink-spot still on his nose.

The International Arbitration League, again, has published in its own journal a so-called "reply" which it does not permit me to reprint, but which (as the reader may see if he has the patience to wade through Appendix II) is simply a tissue of fresh inaccuracies. It confirms my charge that the public men, who allow their respected names to be used as a cloak for the propaganda of that League, are not only indefensibly ignorant of, but also indefensibly indifferent to, what is sometimes done in their name. The reader of this Appendix will see that I warned one of the League's most honoured Vice-Presidents of certain facts, which, if the investment of his own money had been concerned, would have aroused his

gravest suspicions. His enquiries, in that case, would certainly have been thorough enough to convince him that statements were being circulated by the League which would not bear serious examination. Yet, as things are, this upright man of business took the earliest possible opportunity of washing his hands of the whole affair, and of dismissing the question before any serious evidence had been produced—none, indeed, has been produced even yet—in favour of the wild assertion to which his League is committed.

It cannot be pointed out too often or too emphatically that this is the sort of thing which makes anything like International Arbitration very difficult at the present stage of civilization. If the moderate man, really anxious to find some means of avoiding the horrors of war, had to fight only against the Militarist, there would then be more chance of peace. But the worst enemies of Peace in our present world are those of her own household. That they are too often dreamy, unpractical, over-credulous, and impatient to reach forward to what they so much desire, is a matter of common notoriety. But it is seldom realized how untrue they often are to their own best principles. In my experience you might almost as well expect that the leopard would change his spots as that the professional pacifist, the pacifist propagandist, should confess even the grossest blunder as frankly and as publicly as he first published it. So long as this is so, it can avail but little that these men are (as they often are

indeed) kind-hearted, well-meaning, ready to sacrifice a great deal for their cause. They must show themselves ready also to sacrifice their prejudices, their cherished bosom-delusions, when these become no longer credible to the single eye of truth. They must be ready, harder still, to confess when they have been in the wrong. That member of the Society of Friends who, among his own brethren, recently confessed that he was not prepared to dispense with soldiers and sailors, and that he thought it more just and democratic to drill with these men under a law of compulsory service than to escape from the burden by paying others to fight, showed the highest moral courage. His sacrifice was far greater than that of his distinguished co-religionist, who got his windows smashed for protesting against the Boer war. Without ceasing to reprobate the indefensible violence thus offered to a good man, and without attempting to minimize the sacrifice which his honesty imposed upon him, we may fairly point out that in this present world, without soldiers and sailors, he would never have risen to the possession of those plate-glass windows which the hooligans smashed, or of the many thousand pounds a year which he raked in comfortably behind those windows. It is seldom that the pacifist is really called upon to show as much of moral courage as the commonest soldier must often show of physical courage. And—more significant still—when the call does

come, the moral courage is too often deficient.* It may be a very hard thing to keep the party propaganda true and clean; but it must be the first essential of anything like a real international understanding, that the world should be able confidently to accept the pacifist's Yea as yea, and his Nay as nay. The first Pacifist Illusion is the lurking belief that we may, for the sake of a Cause, commit any injustice short of actual fighting.†

II

MR. ANGELL MISUNDERSTOOD

It was necessary to deal first with the great moral illusion of Pacifism. To its devotees this doctrine is a religion, with the weakness as well as the strength of an official creed. In all ages one of the great temptations of religion has been, not only the neglect of, but even an active aversion to, what have seemed "dangerous" truths. The devotee has, too often, not stopped short at the negative sin of blinking unpalatable facts, he has also committed the positive sin of burking them; and the priesthood, the professional propagandists, have in this respect been among the foremost sinners. We may

* This extreme rarity of high moral courage is emphasized even by the writer to whose support Mr. Angell appeals more emphatically, perhaps, than to any other—Jacques Novikow. (*Luttes entre Sociétés Humaines*, 1893, p. 435.) It will be seen later on that Mr. Angell, in spite of his frequent claims of familiarity with Novikow's work, has in fact only the most superficial acquaintance with it.

† The second Renan blunder, to which reference is made on p. 16, is described in Appendix III.

safely predict that some day men will find it almost as hard to make allowance for the attitude of many 20th-century pacifists towards incontestable facts, as for the attitude of the 17th-century theologians towards witchcraft or the dogmas of rival religions. Modern historians are amused at the ease with which it was possible, in past ages, to play upon religious prejudices for purely political purposes. Future historians will note, with scarcely less amusement, the extent to which militarist Germany is able to play upon the peace societies of the United States, and the commercial spirit in which an emissary attempts to buy the neutrality of Italian socialists.* And these future students will draw the conclusion that, if so many able business men have so long accepted Mr. Angell's false quotations as gospel—if they are still anxious rather to shield than to expose the absurd fictions of the International Arbitration League—it is only because there is a large section of the public which does not wish to know the truth, since it cannot afford to face the truth. A bosom-delusion becomes, in process of time, a bosom-sin; and the conversion of a drunkard is scarcely more difficult than that of the man who has, little by little, built all his hopes upon one-sided or perverted facts. Our personal regard for many of these men must not blind us to the fact that their delusion is as great, and perhaps even as mischievous to mankind, as that of the 17th-century witch-hunters.

* See *L'Humanité* for Aug. 3 and 8, 1915, reproduced from the Italian socialist journal *Avanti*. The emissary's assertion that he was commissioned by Mr. Carnegie has since been flatly denied.

And it is, at bottom, at least as silly. Our superstitious ancestors, to whom Mr. Angell is never weary of referring, did not close their eyes more resolutely to facts than many pacifist prophets do; nor were they more grossly credulous to swallow whatever flattered their prejudices; nor were they more persistent in backing each other up, or more uncharitable in vilifying, even to the verge of slander, those who were not of their own faction. The same party-spirit which has so long sheltered Mr. Angell from an exposure of his literary dishonesty has enabled him to pose also as an Apostle of Reason. He has been taken at his own valuation by a mass of uncritical people to whose prejudices he appeals; and his frequent claims to be rigidly logical have even imposed upon a certain number of more careful readers. He is a typical specimen of that very successful kind of pretender which Lowell characterized in seven words, "an inaccurate man with an accurate manner." He claims to be performing a work "of intellectual sanitation" among mankind, and to correct the misconceptions of "those whose special competence is the philosophy of statecraft in the international field, from Aristotle and Plato, passing by Machiavelli and Clausewitz, down to Mr. Roosevelt and the German Emperor."* Yet, in fact, it would be as difficult to find a dozen consecutive pages of Mr. Angell's work without some gross logical error as it would be to find a single illogical page in Aristotle. And his boast of "intellectual sanitation"

* *Foundations, etc.*, p. ix; *Illusion*, 1914, p. 14.

is on a par with the advertisement of a second-rate plumber—the sort of person from whom most of us have suffered at different times—whose drains and pipes and taps are ostentatiously correct on the surface, but whose work, under careful inspection, is found to have filled our house with the very poisons which it had undertaken to carry away. We all know how the guilty plumber, under these circumstances, fights for his fees with alternations of pathetic virtue and cynical ferocity; and my Appendix I. shows Mr. Angell, our Intellectual Sanitary Expert, fighting by the same methods for his own reputation. In these succeeding chapters I propose to show that his reasoning is as false as his quotations are; and that he is intellectually, as well as morally, unworthy of the pedestal to which his own exertions, and a systematic process of puffery, have raised him. His book is sold in a wrapper that cries for public attention in the same strident tones as the soap-boilers and pillmongers of our generation, and with the same commercial justification. There is something in the stuff, or it would not pay for advertising. But, in so far as it is sound, it is not new, and in so far as it is new, it is either unprofitable or positively mischievous. We have heard it whispered of a certain famous pill that its purgative properties are indeed admirable, but that it is liable to produce cutaneous eruptions, against which the inventor has guarded by producing an equally famous unguent. It needs Bungay's Ointment to counteract the too drastic action of Bungay's

Pills; and Bungay thus profits at both ends. Mr. Angell's genius has achieved a similar triumph in the world of literature. To correct the misconceptions inevitably created by his *Great Illusion* you must buy his *Peace Theories and the Balkan War*. The first book will teach you that war cannot "pay," whether in the economic or in any other real sense. The second teaches you that the war of the Balkan States against Turkey will "pay," but only because this war is not war; on the contrary, it is the "cancellation" of war. Here is a promising field for logical analysis: so, having already put Mr. Angell's morality under the microscope, let us now look equally closely into his reasoning.

His main advantage in this field is due to a quality which in all ages has assured the charlatan's success. He blows his own trumpet with the most patient persistency and (it must be added) with the adroitest changes of tone. It is not only that, like Mr. Vincent Crummies, he can't understand how his name gets so often into the public papers. His puff direct is even more effective than his puff oblique; as when he informs us "incidentally" that he has the honour to boast Mr. A. J. Balfour and Lord Esher as his two co-trustees on the Garton Foundation, or when he professes to have extorted unwilling assent from "even the bitterest critics" of the first half of his *Great Illusion*—a claim which, of course, has scarcely more foundation than Bungay's claim to similar reluctant homage from rival pill-mongers. And, of these direct puffs, his most

frequent is the constantly-reiterated claim to produce all his effects by pure reason. He positively bores the public into believing that he is nothing if not logical—an Apostle of Intellectual Sanitation. He has a favourite phrase to carry off any rather dubious argument: "Let us be honest!"* We are irresistibly reminded of an immortal passage in Dickens: "'Let us be merry!' said Mr. Pecksniff. Here he took a captain's biscuit." Mr. Angell's intellectual honesty is to Aristotle's, or even to Roosevelt's, as Mr. Pecksniff's merriment was to Mark Tapley's.

Yet he has bored and wheedled thousands of readers into taking him at his own valuation. He appeals, as an Intellectual, to them as Intellectuals; and he reminds them that, starting from obscurity a few years ago, he and they together have achieved an astonishing success. Mr. Angell is said to have sold more than 100,000 copies of his *Great Illusion* alone; yet we must remember that Mr. Houston Stewart Chamberlain has, in less than a quarter of Mr. Angell's period, sold 130,000 of his "War-Essays," a book which seems to appeal to German militarism by methods similar to those which Mr. Angell has found so successful in his appeal to Anglo-Saxon pacificism. Indeed, if we may believe the *Journal de Genève*, these two great wits do indeed jump very

* *Foundations*, etc., p. 194; *Prussianism*, etc., p. xii; (this latter is repeated, in more delicate language, more than once elsewhere;) *Illusion*, p. 283; *Foundations*, p. 175; cf. *Prussianism*, pp. xvi ff. "Let us be honest, at least with ourselves . . . We must . . . shun self-deception and insincerity as the devil that will destroy us."

close together.* Mr. Chamberlain, it appears, writes, "There is *no* war-party in Germany; this is a lying invention of the *Times*." Moreover, he contends that Germany cannot even fairly be called a "military" nation, for the simple reason that "out of every two officers you will find one to be a professor, a merchant, or a lawyer." This is astonishingly like the passage on p. 218 of *The Great Illusion* (repeated in slightly varying terms on p. 225), by which Mr. Angell attempts to clear up current misconceptions as to "what is reputed (*quite wrongly incidentally*) to be the most military nation in Europe—Germany." In support of the parenthesis which I have italicized, Mr. Angell proceeds to reason as follows. He writes: "The immense majority of adult Germans—speaking practically, all who make up what we know as Germany—have never seen a battle, and in all human probability never will see one. In forty years 8000 Germans have been in the field about twelve months—against naked blacks. So that the proportion of warlike activities as against peaceful activities works out as one against hundreds of thousands." From which he argues that German life during the last forty years may fairly be brought under Mr. Roosevelt's condemnation of "a career of unwarlike ease"; that few Germans "can pretend to fall under its influence" (*i.e.* the influence of war); and that France is, in every sense worth considering,

* June 27th, 1915, article by Maurice Kufferath, of the Royal Belgian Academy.

a much more military nation than Germany.* This, of course, was written before the war. If our soldiers are now dying by thousands, it is partly due to the state of popular opinion in Anglo-Saxon countries until a few months ago, which made it possible for this kind of nonsense to pass as superior wisdom.† It has already cost us untold lives and gold to prick this and similar bubbles. The fact is that Mr. Angell's logic is as false as his borrowed plumes of learning are; he not only quotes like a journalist, but he reasons like a journalist. He is "the inaccurate man with an accurate manner."

Mr. Angell complains that people have frequently misconceived the drift of his book. This is a wicked world, and "old prejudices, natural human rebelliousness" have exposed the Apostle "to gross distortion, a mindless derision, honest and dishonest misrepresentation, falsification, and sheer falsehood." (*Prussianism, &c.*, p. ix.)

It is quite true that a good many journalistic critics, taking journalistic licence, have misrepresented his doctrines almost, though not quite, as grossly as Mr. Angell himself has misrepresented the doctrines

* On p. 252, again, he speaks of Spain and Italy as "States which are much more highly militarized even than Germany."

† On the Continent this illusion has been far less potent. The majority of the peace-party in France, and even in Germany, were in favour of a compulsory citizen-militia for home defence; and the first German delegate to the Hague Conference, Baron v. Stengel, congratulated his countrymen publicly on the fact that the ideas of German pacifists "make more progress in other countries than at home." (*Westminster Gazette*, Sept. 1st, 1909.) Bernhardt's complaints of the growth of pacifism in Germany leave this fact untouched.

of two far more distinguished men—Karl Pearson and Otto Seeck. They have quoted him without reading him, and their careless haste has betrayed them into blunders almost as grievous as Mr. Angell's own.

It is true, again, (as Mr. Angell himself points out two pages earlier) that "very few 400-page books other than fiction get read with any attention beyond the first 200 pages," so that the general public has "a very lopsided view of the case presented by the book as a whole." In other words, the public mainly knew him by the First Part, the only really valuable part; and even those who were supposed to have read him knew little or nothing of the Second Part, which it will presently be my task to dissect.

Thirdly, Mr. Angell's own vagueness, inconsistency, and changes of front under cover of an accurate manner, have left his readers under equally vague, various, and contradictory impressions. He has owed nine-tenths of his popularity to the large class of half-educated and loosely-thinking people who vaguely feel that we ought somehow to be able to get rid of war by ignoring war, and who catch eagerly at everything which seems to justify this complacent delusion. These people have, naturally enough, read Mr. Angell just as uncritically as they read the stern facts of life; each has found his own fad in the book, and has thenceforward appealed to *The Great Illusion* in support of the fad. From a wide experience of public debates and discussions, I can assure Mr. Angell that his supporters often mis-

understand him as grievously as his critics do. It could not be otherwise, seeing that Mr. Angell constantly misunderstands and contradicts himself. But he may console himself with the reflection that any pains spent upon rendering *The Great Illusion* more logical and more veracious would also have rendered it less popular; and that, as Rousseau warned us long ago, "Truth does not lead to Fortune." Let us therefore, in order to avoid such misconceptions, start here with a brief summary of *The Great Illusion*, as far as possible in the author's own words.

Part I aims at proving that war cannot "pay" commercially: "there can be no transfer of wealth" by military conquest: "confiscation of an enemy's property [is] an economic impossibility under modern conditions." Although Mr. Angell is quite wrong in asserting that even his bitterest critics have now admitted these points, he has really re-stated in this First Part, with great clearness and force, Cobden's financial arguments against war; and, while many among even his most favourable critics would accuse him of considerable exaggerations, yet, on the other hand, many of the least favourable have been obliged to admit that there is much truth in his presentment. Mr. Angell can rightly claim to have shown (after Cobden and others) that even a victorious war is not likely to "pay" commercially in the long run. And he therefore claims, with equal justice, to have put the pacifist propaganda upon a far more practical footing than the majority of his contemporaries.

Without altogether abandoning the moral reasons against war, Mr. Angell has shown originality in emphasizing the practical reasons; and this emphasis, compelling most of the public to look at the question from a different angle, must be of permanent value. So far, Mr. Angell is in the strong position of the soap and pill proprietors; his wares, if not so perfect as he claims, have still a nucleus of solid value. Without granting that it is *impossible* for war to "pay" commercially, we may yet concede that this is *very unlikely*, unless the victory be unusually rapid and complete.

Part II is more ambitious than Part I, and in the same proportion more unsuccessful. Mr. Angell, having exhausted the financial argument, proceeds to reason from sociology and from history, sciences of which he is evidently very ignorant. By the help of false sociology, of false history, and (until I compelled him reluctantly to correct them) of false references, he undertakes to prove "that the warlike nations do *not* inherit the earth; that warfare does *not* make for the survival of the fittest or virile; that the struggle between nations is *no* part of the evolutionary law of man's advance, and that that idea rests upon a profound misreading of the biological law; that physical force is a constantly diminishing factor in human affairs," and that "state limits no longer coincide with real conflicts between men." (*The Great Illusion*, 1914, pp. xiv-xvii; 1911, p. viii; italics are Mr. Angell's.)

Part III is called "The Practical Outcome."

There is nothing really practical about it. In the earlier editions Mr. Angell did indeed propose to form an actual association, taking as his text Mr. Ramsay Macdonald's speech after his visit to Germany in 1910: "Wherever I have met German working-men, I have received this message, 'Tell the men of England that we stand for peace.'" (p. 324, note.) Mr. Angell's proposal was that there should be a system of international "pairing" to demand a reduction of armaments on both sides. As many English M.P.'s as possible were to pair with German members of the Reichstag, and similarly English with German "professors, students, trades unions, &c." A hundred anti-militarist deputies (he thought) would influence German armament policy in the Reichstag practically as a hundred M.P.'s would influence our House of Commons; similarly with the professors and trades-unions; and so the reduction of armaments would go on with real evenness and real security on both sides. It needed colossal ignorance of actual German conditions to imagine, even in 1910, that the preaching of a hundred German deputies and trades-union leaders would exert the same practical influence upon German armaments as their British brethren might exert upon ours. In any case this solitary "practical" suggestion was so ridiculous that even the author seems to have wearied of it; he certainly never translated it into action, and it is silently dropped from the last edition. This Third Part, therefore, now consists mainly of (1) repetitions from the first two Parts, and (2) attacks

upon his critics, whose words (as I point out in Appendix III. B.) he carefully distorts.

There is, however, one aspect of this Third Part which had better be dealt with here and got out of the way. Mr. Angell complains that people have misunderstood him; there exists "a hazily-conceived fear that ideas like those embodied in this book must attenuate our energy of defence, and that we shall be in a weaker position relatively to our rivals than we were before." To attribute this result to the Angellic propaganda would be, he contends, to libel it. (ed. 1911, p. 301; 1914, p. 326.) Yet, even when he wrote these words, he must have known that this was "the practical outcome" of his book. His contention that, so far as his theory affected the British attitude towards armaments, it would equally affect that of our possible enemies, is either intentionally misleading, or betrays again a colossal ignorance of Germany. We must incline to the former and less favourable alternative in view of Mr. Angell's own actions. In the 1914 edition the words remain unchanged; yet we find, among the specially-selected puffs at the end of the book, one from the *Economist* which gives the whole case away. It runs: "Nothing has ever been put in the same space so well calculated to set plain men thinking usefully on the subject of expenditure on armaments, scare, and war . . . The result of the publication of this book has been, within the past month or two, quite a number of rather unlikely conversions to the cause of retrenchment." In other words,

while *The Great Illusion* was converting even "unlikely" people to a reduction of British armaments, German armaments were notoriously increasing by leaps and bounds; yet Mr. Angell actually makes this British retrenchment a matter of boasting. In spite of Mr. Angell's efforts to face both ways, the "unlikely converts" had understood his drift only too well, and Mr. Angell, by reprinting the testimonial, expressly approves this interpretation of his own teaching.

Moreover, any doubt that had previously existed must have been swept away by the events of the past year. Mr. Angell, in the spring of 1914, had made another attempt to face both ways (p. 330). He reckoned himself by implication among "sincere and patriotic men"; and, writing explicitly of himself, he claimed "a lifelong and passionate belief that a nation attacked should defend itself to the last penny and the last man." Less than half a year after those words were written came the Great War. In the first few weeks of that struggle Mr. Angell wrote again, "Very many will genuinely feel that this is not the time for any consideration save the triumph of our arms. The belief in the vital need for that I share as intensely as any could." Yet he was, in those very days, helping to found the Union of Democratic Control, of which it may probably be said that not a single prominent member has ever appealed publicly for recruits in this war, and the general effect of whose propaganda is certainly most unfavourable to recruiting. He has now gone over

to America, and has written in the *North American Review* a frankly anti-British statement of the case for the neutralization of the seas; and at the same time he has frankly abandoned his former attitude as a born Englishman, which had been definitely implied in the phrase, "triumph of *our* arms." He writes now, "At a very early age I acquired American citizenship; and though, by necessarily prolonged absences in Europe, I have reverted to British citizenship, I always claim the right in dealing with American problems to speak as an American, because in those cases I feel as one. It is as an American that I envisage the problems here dealt with; and so I write."

Now, a man has every right to rise above patriotism if he can; but no man has a right to play fast and loose with patriotism. When Mr. Angell wrote those words about "the last penny and the last man" he was obviously posing before the public as a patriotic Briton—a man of enlightened patriotism, no doubt, and with a rather superior consciousness of his elevation above the narrower patriotic feelings—but yet a real patriot at bottom. When, still more recently, he claimed to yield to no man in realizing the necessity of "our" victory, he was basing his argument definitely on his British birth and British nationality; and, not two pages before, he had once more written, "Let us be honest, *at least with ourselves.*" The words which I have italicized gain a new significance from Mr. Angell's recent revelations. When he wrote them he was

presumably honest with himself; and Mr. Norman was already perfectly aware that Mr. Angell, while writing of *our* victory, was thinking as an American. But, however clear he may have been with himself, he was certainly something less than honest with his public; and, in view of this recent change of front, impartial readers will find it easier to understand the otherwise almost incredible moral obtuseness shown by his own attempted defence in Appendix I.

III

THE JUGGLE WITH THE WORD 'FORCE'

Mr. Angell's Second Part, it must be repeated, is the most ambitious portion of his book. The First Part, dealing almost exclusively with the financial side of war, leaves those readers cold who feel that we may have nobler things to fight for than money, and that, if Belgium had betrayed France to Germany, it would be rather distressing than consoling to reflect, with Mr. Angell, upon the commercial superiority of Belgian three-per-cents. to those of the Great Powers (*The Great Illusion*, p. 25). In the Second Part, he goes much farther, and undertakes to prove that "military power cannot achieve *any* of those objects for which civilized states are founded," in spite of the "age-long delusion of men that *in some way* war was bound up with the 'struggle for life'" (*Prussianism*, xii, xiii; italics mine). The chapter in which he specially

undertakes to prove this, his "second key-chapter," as he calls it, is the second of the Second Part of *The Great Illusion*. This chapter (to quote his own words) aims at proving that "the real law of man's struggle [is] struggle with nature, *not* with other men." (*Ibid.* p. 173.) The word which I have here italicized is no mere inadvertent exaggeration, for it is repeated over and over again, *e.g.* "not man with man," "not with one another," and in his synopsis he himself emphasizes the word by italicizing it: "the struggle between nations is *no* part of the evolutionary law of man's advance." (*Illusion*, 1911, p. 213; 1914, p. 273: synopsis of ed. 1911, p. viii.) This, then, is the proposition for which he at first claimed the support of Professor Karl Pearson; though the Professor had in fact written the exact opposite, saying: "The struggle for existence involves, *not only* the struggle of individual man against individual man, but *also* the struggle of individual society against individual society, *as well as* the struggle of the totality of humanity with its organic and inorganic environment. (*Grammar of Science*, 1st ed., p. 432; italics mine.) Confronted with this correction, Mr. Angell now pleads that "the argument stood on its merits, without reference to Pearson one way or another." (Appendix I., p. iv.) What, then, are those "merits," on the strength of which Mr. Angell, a journalist, claims the right of contradicting one of the most distinguished modern sociologists upon a purely sociological question?

To begin with, Mr. Angell's proposition seems, on the face of it, to fly in the face of common-sense and ordinary experience. We know that a great part of our life's work is, in fact, spent in a struggle with our fellow-men; nor is it easy to conceive any future state of society in which this struggle can disappear altogether. How, then, does Mr. Angell maintain his proposition, in the teeth of specialists and in the teeth of common sense? By a very simple process of sophistry: by changing his terms, in the course of the argument, as often as it suits his momentary convenience. A conjurer asks for our handkerchief; he cuts it into half-a-dozen pieces; he burns the residuum; and presently he hands us back our handkerchief, whole and unsinged. He has deceived a thousand pairs of observant eyes. Mr. Angell is still more successful: he has deceived his readers, and his own self into the bargain. His intellectual honesty is as transparent as Mr. Pecksniff's merriment. His claims to rest everywhere upon "hard thinking," to be nothing if not clear-sighted and logical and rationalistic, are too frequent and too emphatic to admit any doubt of his own sincere convictions on this point.* Let us therefore follow closely the ramifications of his thought during this second key-chapter.

His final object (it is hardly necessary to remind the reader) is to prove "that military power cannot

* Compare, for instance, *Great Illusion*, ed. 1914, pp. 352, 355, 358—62; *Prussianism*, pp. xvi, xvii, 29, 30; *Foundations*, p. ix; *Peace Theories*, &c., p. 107.

achieve any of those objects for which civilized states are founded :” * that armies do not “pay”—still less does actual warfare “pay”—in any real sense whatever, even apart from the purely economical question with which his first key-chapter has dealt.

How, then, does he prove this? By the simple process of begging the whole question, under cover of a great deal of loose and popular argument about cannibalism, slavery, etc.† The argument, at its start, follows the line that the struggle of man with man does not pay; *therefore* war does not pay. Of course, if this first half be true, the second must follow as a necessary consequence; but *is* the first half true? We know that our main struggle is with Nature, or (as the author elsewhere puts it) with our environment; but is not our fellow-man part of Nature, and a very considerable part of our environment? and are we, in the face of our daily experience, to believe that the struggle with our fellow-man forms *no* part of our life-development? How will Mr. Angell prove this paradox? As I have already said, by constantly shifting his terms. By *struggle*, we presently find that he means only *physical struggle*: “force” or “physical force” are the

* *Prussianism*, p. xiii; cf. *Foundations*, 196, “We attempt to show the *irrelevance* of war to the ends, either moral or material, for which states exist:” and again *ibid.* p. 197, 205. These summaries are clearer than any which I have found in the text of the *Great Illusion*: Mr. Angell had meanwhile benefited by further discussion, and, in one case, even by the earlier lessons of this present war.

† See *Illusion*, ed. 1911, pp. 114, 144—56; ed. 1914, pp. 129, 186—99; and the briefer summaries of the same arguments in *Foundations*, pp. 65—67 and 157—61.

terms he presently uses as equivalent for the "struggle" with which he began. Presently, again, we find physical force further narrowed down, for the exigencies of his argument, to the *exercise of physical force*; the threat, or the mere consciousness of *latent* physical force, which is often quite as powerful a stimulus as the actual exercise of it, is left entirely out of the question. Presently we find that, though Mr. Angell is aware how much society gains by the actual exercise of police-force, this again must be excluded from his definition. He cannot deny that it pays for the policeman to fight the burglar; but (he argues) it would not pay for an organized police-force to fight another police-force: that would be *war*. The argument, by this time, has boxed the compass: when Mr. Angell says that the actual exercise of physical force does not pay, he must be understood to mean that the actual exercise of physical force *in war* does not pay. Here, at last, his logical plight is pitiable in the eyes of all among the 100,000 readers who have taken the trouble to follow his actual arguments. By manœuvring to avoid the obvious pitfalls which beset him in this attempt to contradict both Professor Pearson and common-sense, he has finally embogged himself in the less obvious, but equally fatal, quagmire of question-begging. He has undertaken to prove that war does not pay because "struggle" does not pay; but "struggle," in order to keep the argument watertight, has gradually been narrowed down to "war"; so that his reasoning, under analysis, runs thus: "War does not pay

because *war* does not pay!" He has quietly assumed, by a gradual process of verbal jugglery, the very proposition which it was his business to prove.

Moreover, at a very early stage of his argument Mr. Angell had tried to stop an obvious leak by inserting a foot-note to the effect that "co-operation does not exclude competition" (p. 189). This, like so many of his other propositions, is put so loosely that it may pass either as a truism or as a paradox, according to Mr. Angell's own requirements of the moment. Is he using *co-operation* here in a strict, or in a loose sense? If in a strict sense (which alone will really help his present argument) the statement is plainly false; for perfect co-operation *does* exclude competition. *A* and *B*, drapers at opposite sides of the same street, in so far as they compete with each other, do in fact violate the perfect law of co-operation. It may well be that *A*'s energies do a good deal to stimulate those of *B*; but they certainly do a good deal also to neutralize *B*'s efforts. No doubt this competition leaves room for a considerable amount of co-operation; it may quite well be that, even between these two rivals, there is more co-operation than competition; but the fact remains that, if their co-operation were perfect, it would exclude competition. Mr. Angell's argument, if intended as a novelty, is false.

If, on the other hand, Mr. Angell is speaking only of *imperfect* co-operation, his remark is so true as even to be commonplace; but it upsets his main argument. A very great deal of co-operation

is, of course, compatible with business competition, but it is compatible also with "struggle," even with "physical force"—nay, even with physical force in its most brutal form—with war. One of the redeeming features of war is the example which it affords of human co-operation on the grandest, and often the most unselfish, scale. As John Stuart Mill wrote fifty years ago: "Until labourers and employers perform the work of industry in the spirit in which soldiers perform that of an army, industry will never be moralized; and military life will remain what, in spite of the anti-social nature of its direct object, it has hitherto been, the chief school of moral co-operation."* Therefore, though *partial* co-operation is (as Mr. Angell pleads) really consistent with business competition, yet this partial co-operation is consistent even with war, and still more consistent with those martial preparations which may go on for generations without ending in war. This, however, upsets his whole thesis. He has undertaken to prove that "struggle" with our fellow-men is wrong, because the *only* law of human advance is the law of co-operation. But "business competition" (he says) is good, because

* *Essay on Comte*, 1865, p. 149: cf. p. 146. Almost equally emphatic is Novikow, whom Mr. Angell calls "to my mind the greatest of all," *i.e.* of all pacifist writers, though in this, as in other cases where he speaks familiarly of an author, he has evidently read only smatterings of Novikow's work. "The organization of intellectual propaganda," writes this suggestive but curiously unequal author, "is almost always closely copied from the organization of our standing armies, because these latter have the most perfect organization which men have yet invented on this earth." And again, "All governments, even those which are most deeply imbued with the ideas of Divine Right, are absolutely radical in military matters."—*Les Luttes entre les Sociétés Humaines*, 1893, pp. 440, 447.

business competition is consistent with a great deal of co-operation. Having got so far, what reason has he for denying that war, which also involves enormous co-operative efforts, may possibly also be good? So far is Mr. Angell from grappling with this obvious difficulty, that he has not even logic enough to realize its existence.

And he had been previously forced into similar difficulties by the facts of the Balkan War. When this broke out he was naturally asked whether the victory of the Balkan States over the Turk might not "pay," if not commercially, at least in other more important senses. Unable to deny this, he pleaded that this admission still left untouched his proposition that war never pays, if only we would be careful to use words in their true Angellic sense. In this Angellic sense the Balkan States might attack Turkey, but they would not thus be making war; they would be, to the deeper observer, waging defensive and not offensive war; and (Angellically speaking) defensive war is *not* war. It is even "the negation of war," "the cancellation of military force," and none but a muddle-headed person could think otherwise.* To an interviewer representing the *Christian Commonwealth* he said (Nov. 13, 1912): "This war is in my view justifiable, because it is a

* *Foundations*, p. 63, *Prussianism* p. xiv. "If our thought were as clear in these matters as it ought to be, and might be, we should all realize that the proposition, that 'Military force is religiously, socially, and economically futile,' does not condemn a war of defence, or resistance to religious oppression, since such a war is not the imposition of military force upon others; it is the cancellation of such force, the attempt to see that military force is not imposed upon us."

means of bringing force and conquest to an end; between two forms of war and force—the other being that which the Turk has been waging daily for 400 years—it is the choice of the less evil form.”

Here the interviewer mildly bleated: “That is rather too paradoxical for my understanding, Mr. Angell.”

The Master blandly replied: “I do not wish to be paradoxical. Let me put it this way: The rule of the Turk is based on force. He lives by the sword. In Europe he is an alien ruling caste superimposed upon the nations whom he compels to pay tribute to him. He is incapable of administering those States.” Therefore (we are to argue) the Turk is a brigand, against whom we may justly and successfully use force. But this is not force in the Angellian sense. *This* anti-Turkish force may pay; but it still remains eternally true that “force,” in the sense in which that word is used in *The Great Illusion*, never pays. We may thus enjoy the double pleasure of pummelling the Turk to our heart’s content, and, at the same time, of abusing him as a villain who is “using” force against us, while we ourselves are not “using” force, but “cancelling” or “neutralizing” it. It need scarcely be pointed out that, to Mr. Houston Stewart Chamberlain, Great Britain is the Turk; while Germany, in declaring this present war, was simply “cancelling” our brutal force. This Anglo-Teutonic Angell would claim that British rule in Ireland is a long tale of blood and injustice, that we oppress India, and that we

are "incapable of administering" populations as Germany would administer them. So far, of course, we are only arguing *ad hominem*; but, the more Mr. Angell thinks over this revised theory, the more he will realize how easily a coach-and-four may now be driven through his original proposition. War does not pay; but it pays to attack a nation which is "incapable of administering" its territory. So long, therefore, as one nation believes itself far superior in civilization to another (and therefore able to administer its territory far better), so long will it believe an attack upon that nation to be just and remunerative, at least in the widest sense, if not commercially. Turkey, having long ago gained her present territory by conquest, only wants now to be let alone, and to govern her subjects after her own fashion. This Turkish government (we all agree with Mr. Angell) is a very bad one; and therefore Mr. Angell assures us that to attack Turkey is not to *make* war—on the contrary, it is actually to *cancel* war. In so far as this argument is true, it is destructive of Mr. Angell's general case; for it justifies an attack on any nation by any other which is convinced that its own victory would substitute a good government for a bad one. It justifies, to a Frenchman, the later aggressive wars of the French Revolution; and, in the eyes of a large number of Germans, it would justify this present war, since these men believe that a German victory would be a triumph for civilization. Therefore Mr. Angell has now to convince Germany, not only that she gained

nothing commercially by the Franco-German War, but also that German Kultur is not sufficiently superior to be worth substituting forcibly for other administrative methods. How long would this lesson have taken to learn, but for the bloody lessons of this present war? For, as Mr. Angell rightly argues elsewhere, we ourselves should never have been safe until Germany also had been convinced; since, so long as men thoroughly believe a falsehood, so long they will act accordingly, and so long must we shape our actions, defensively, in accordance with theirs. Under this plea of "neutralizing force," Mr. Angell's logic leaves the question almost as he found it:* German armaments, and European counter-armaments, are still justified until Germany can be disabused, not only as to the commercial question, but also as to the unquestioned superiority of German administration. Yet this is the thinker who modestly claims to correct the fundamental misconception of all "those whose special competence is the philosophy of statecraft in the international field, from Aristotle and Plato, passing by Machiavelli and Clausewitz, down to Mr. Roosevelt and the German Emperor."† This is he who, discussing a complex problem in sociology, does

* I am not pleading, of course, that the German point of view is justified. I simply remind readers what that point of view actually is, and what all well-informed people, who had no axe to grind, knew it to be before this war broke out. Even Lord Haldane, as he now tells us, knew of this danger, though he held his tongue about it. This being so, it was obviously Mr. Angell's business to think out the consequences of his theory at an earlier date, and he may be doubly criticized for realising them so little even now.

† *The Great Illusion*, 1914, p. 14.

not find it worth while to let the public know the very different conclusions of a sociologist of European celebrity like Professor Karl Pearson.*

IV

FORCE IN RESERVE AND FORCE IN EXERCISE

Mr. Angell, as we have seen, tries to prove his second key-chapter by arguing in a circle; but this does not absolve us from further consideration of his proposition. True propositions have occasionally been supported by very defective logic; let us therefore consider this one on its own merits, apart from the author's vicious methods of presentation. Is it true that the law of co-operation excludes the law of struggle between man and man? Is this true, even in the diluted form to which Mr. Angell has gradually reduced it by the time we come to Chapter V? Can it be asserted, as a probable fact, that "the diminishing factor of physical force" is one of the main keys to human progress? Mr. Angell is right in emphasizing the paramount importance of this question. All national policy must depend upon our answer to it. If we conclude with Mr. Angell, and admit his contention that this diminution is now proceeding at a greatly accele-

* It would be wearisome here to heap up examples of this kind; in Appendix III I give enough to show that false logic is not exceptional with Mr. Angell, but habitual; that he thinks in false logic.

rated pace, then we must agree with him in staking our main hopes for peace upon the silent operation of enlightened commercial self-advantage, backed up by a rational and systematic exposition of this new gospel. If, however, the factor of physical force diminishes not at all with progressive civilization—or diminishes so slowly that we cannot prudently count upon any very considerable decrease within one or two generations—then the question of sufficient armaments remains one of the main foundations of all sound policy, since a nation may almost as easily get into war by keeping up inadequate fighting-forces as by plunging into provocative military preparations.

No moderate person will quarrel with the first half of Mr. Angell's double-headed proposition. It is doubtless true that the main law of human progress is human co-operation, and that this law profoundly modifies the crude deductions of "Nature, red in tooth and claw with ravine," which have often been drawn from the Darwinian hypothesis. But this truth had lost the gloss of novelty before Mr. Angell left school; theologians have emphasized it for at least thirty years, and so have some men of science. Co-operation, then (we are agreed), is the main law of progress; but we come upon very different ground when we attempt to rule "struggle" out altogether. Though co-operation and struggle are very different processes, they are to a very great extent reconcilable—perhaps even inseparable—and there seems no reason why man should not progress by co-operation *and* struggle, just as he progresses

by theory *and* practice, by work *and* sleep. Here, as so often elsewhere, Mr. Angell seizes upon a commonplace, and stamps it as his own by distorting it into a paradox. If he had contented himself with stating the supreme value of co-operation, all moderate-minded readers would have thought, "trite, but true!" By going on to deny the law of struggle, he does indeed quit the dead level of commonplace; but it is at this point that he also wanders away from the truth.

Indeed, as we have already seen, he himself abandons a great part of this novel ground. By the time we get to the summary of Chapter V, we find him admitting that, "though [a] diminishing one, force has always been an important *rôle* in human affairs . . . Force that aids co-operation [is] in accord with the law of man's advance." The thoughtful reader, noting this admission, naturally asks himself, "May not a certain amount of force be destined *always* to aid co-operation? may it not even be that co-operation, as it grows more complicated, will need an *increasing* amount of physical force to aid it?" The question is obvious; but Mr. Angell makes no serious attempt to answer it; he does not even seem to anticipate it. Here, as elsewhere, he seems hopelessly confused in his own mind between *latent* force and *patent* force. He is (to borrow his own complaint against a militarist adversary) like a child who mistakes the cheque-book for the money. If the struggle is not obvious on the surface, he often treats it as non-existent. His illustration of the

cannibal's larder on pp. 189, 190, though it professes to prove his case, ignores the fact that, not only the Bank of England, but even a modern labourer's cottage, can depend upon far more physical force to defend it than the larder of a cannibal chief. When we say that the British labourer is protected by "the arm of the law," we mean not only the village policeman, but all that stands behind this policeman; and under strict analysis, this means that there are millions of British people who would be ready (if their efforts were conceivably required) to contribute their personal physical force, with the added physical force of gunpowder, in defence of that labourer against patent injustice. If physical force is so seldom exerted among us, this is not because the force itself has dwindled or disappeared—the very contrary is the case—but because its manifestation is no longer necessary. If there were really less physical force in Great Britain than in an Australian native tribe, wrongdoers would soon find this out, and not even our moral superiority would protect us from frequent conflicts between the physical force of the lawbreakers and that of the lawkeepers. This very obvious fallacy vitiates Mr. Angell's whole argument. When, on p. 191, he writes that, with the introduction of money-rent, "*even* the form of force disappears," the fact is that it is *only* "the form of force" which has disappeared; the reality of force is stronger than ever. No system of money-rent would be possible (in any society that can be treated as within the range of practical politics) without physical force in

the background as one of its sanctions. If the modern tenant does not dream of fighting for his farm, this is due, in many cases, to the fact that he knows the overwhelming physical force of society to be against any such action.* The force is still there, ready for use if it were needed; the fact that it is so seldom needed is a testimonial to its magnitude. Society has only to say "Let it be!" and the very word is creative; the thing commanded is done at once, because all resistance would be obviously hopeless.

Moreover, it is difficult to escape from the conclusion that this physical force is of the essence of society; and that the civilized state differs from the savage tribe, not only in *using less* force, but also in *possessing more*. Mr. Angell himself seems dimly aware of this, though, as usual, he does not see its bearing upon his argument. He writes that cooperation between men "was born of a failure of force. If the isolated force had sufficed, the union of force would not have been resorted to."† He is

* "The instincts of the city man may at bottom be just as predatory as those of the cattle-lifter or robber baron; but taking property by force has become one of the least profitable and the most speculative forms of enterprise upon which he could engage. *The force of commercial events has rendered the thing impossible.*"—(*The Great Illusion*, 1914, p. 69.) Under the words which I have here italicized, Mr. Angell disguises from himself and from his readers the fact that a city man, if he tried to take property by force, would have to face a far more formidable array of physical force than ever confronted a cattle-lifter or robber baron. The fact that this physical force may not here be the *only* deterrent, is not to the point. The point is, that civilized society has far more physical force at its call than barbarous society has; and that this force would be used without hesitation against a city man who tried cattle-lifting.

† *Foundations, &c.*, p. xxxviii.

here speaking only of the struggle with Nature; but is this not also pertinent to the struggle of man with man? What had failed (as Mr. Angell might have reflected upon re-reading his own words), was not *force* in itself, but *isolated* force; united forces had succeeded; the moral is, not "let us have less force," but "let us have more." Here, therefore, as usual, he is emphasizing what nobody denies—the value of co-operation; but he is still as far as ever from proving that force (by which he means physical force) is not a useful adjunct, or even a necessary factor, in human co-operation. A large number of people, as society is now constituted, would cease to co-operate with their fellows in the fight against Nature, were it not for the more or less evident pressure of physical force. What Mr. Angell calls "economic pressure" owes a great deal of its sanction to the policeman. He produces no logical proof for his conclusion that, "as the complexity of co-operation grows, the element of physical compulsion declines in effectiveness" (*ibid.*)

Indeed, it may reasonably be contended that this is the very opposite of the truth. When we bear in mind the distinction between *latent* and *patent* force, and remember the immense power even of the former, we must confess that the enormous latent force of modern society exerts a far stronger pressure upon civilized man than that which is exerted upon the savage by the more visible, but intrinsically smaller, force of a native chief. A murderer goes to the scaffold without a struggle; for he knows the overwhelming

odds that are silently arrayed against him. A naturally indolent man goes to work with perfect regularity, knowing that an unseen but almost impregnable barrier stands on either side of the road—that he *must* work, or come to the hated workhouse. If, under these conditions, he works better than a slave, this is not because the physical forces arrayed against him are less powerful than those arrayed against the slave, for in fact they are greater. Mr. Angell, mistaking the cheque-book for the money, assumes that this factor of physical force is weakening because it is less frequently (or at any rate less visibly) exercised. He does not consider the possibility that those who make least show may have most in reserve: that the man with the biggest balance at his banker's may handle least money under his children's eyes. If society, in virtue of its enormous reserve of physical force, is able to say to the murderer, "Be thou hanged!" and he walks quietly to be hanged, may we not say that one great measure of civilization is its growing store of physical force? and that the dwindling *exercise* of such force is in rough proportion to its increasing *accumulation* in the background?

It is not only that a screw-jack and an oil-engine, very cheap articles, will enable me to raise weights which a dozen prehistoric men could not have moved, and to saw an amount of wood which they could never have sawed: so far we are still within the bounds of Mr. Angell's thesis; these things do enable us to beat our ancestors, but only in the

struggle with Nature. Beyond this, however (and here we come quite outside Mr. Angell's purview), a Browning pistol and a few boxes of cartridges will raise me as far above primitive man in my struggle with my fellow-men, as those other mechanical appliances exalted me in the struggle with Nature. Mr. Angell commits a childish blunder when, in order to prove the "diminishing factor of physical force," he argues from the fact that the man of the Stone Age was stronger in body than we, and that extinct monsters were far stronger in body than primitive man. Any armament-firm could make a weapon which a man might carry in his pocket as easily as a bull carries its horns, and which, throwing large-calibre explosive bullets, would render him superior in physical force to any monster that ever lived. The chapter which Mr. Angell heads "Diminishing factor of Physical Force" needs correcting to "Increasing factor of Physical Force." States are now armed against other states with forces greater, beyond all comparison, than those of the past. Not only can the individual fighter carry in his pocket enough to kill a dozen mailed knights, but the modern state, to an even higher degree than the modern man, commands forces superior to those of the medieval state. The theory of the "nation in arms" is common to both ages; but in practice, since the French Revolution ushered in a new world, Europe has had incalculably more warriors, more carefully trained, than she ever had in the Middle Ages. Even an unmilitarist country like Britain keeps up, in peace time, a number of sailors

and soldiers which would have seemed fabulous in the past.*

Although, therefore, we agree with Mr. Angell (and with dozens of writers before he was born), that actual warfare will become less and less frequent in human society, we still look in vain for proof of his proposition that already, in this everyday world which we know, "military power is socially and economically futile."—(*The Great Illusion*, Synopsis, p. viii.) The later Roman Empire forgot its *exercise* of military power to an extent almost unexampled in the ancient world; yet its *latent* military power was the main basis of its existence, and of its economic and moral sway over the subject peoples. Even when the reality of this power had enormously decayed, the belief in it kept Roman ideals supreme in Europe. We seek vainly in Mr. Angell for any closely-reasoned attempt to show that latent military power will not play, in the modern and future world, a part as important, or almost as important, as it played in the case of Rome. All he proves is, (what most reasonable men have long thought), that the nations are increasingly likely to use this latent power as a lever for negotiation; that the stronger is increasingly likely to impose his will by a diplomacy which offers war only in the last resort; that

* We are not bound to take into consideration the proportion of population; the pertinent fact here is that Britain in 1913 possessed potentialities of military force greater beyond all comparison than the Britain of 1313, for instance. Moreover, if we take countries like Germany and France, we find even a larger number of hours of military preparation, *per head of population*, than in the Middle Ages.

the weaker will, with corresponding probability, bow unresistingly to such diplomacy; and that moral forces will increasingly co-operate with this humaner (yet not less irresistible) form of physical pressure. But between this and the proposition quoted above from Mr. Angell's synopsis—the only part of the proposition for which Mr. Angell could claim any real originality—there is a gulf which he himself, as usual, ignores. He beats at an open door, proves a commonplace proposition, and passes thence, under cover of loose language and superficial journalistic illustrations, to write as if he had proved a very different proposition, almost as paradoxical as the other was commonplace.

Moreover, though he skips so lightly over logical gulfs in his general argument, yet sometimes his conscience awakens under criticism, and he realizes that he has gone too far. We have seen how, in his attempt to justify the errors which I pointed out in the *Nineteenth Century and After*, Mr. Angell took the liberty of presenting his propositions in a very diluted form, and even of misquoting his own words, substituting "*in part due*" for the "*solely due*" of his printed text.* In his booklet called *Prussianism and its Destruction*, while twice professing to reprint the Second Part "exactly as it appeared in *The Great Illusion* previous to the war," he omits in fact a great part of the first two chapters, including this contemptuous sentence: "The pundits declare that

* See my postscript to Chapter I, and Appendix, pp. ix—xi and xvii—xviii.

the German battleships have been especially built with a view to work in the North Sea," and again, "It has become impossible for the army of a state to embody the fight for an ideal, for the simple reason that the great moral questions of our time can no longer be postulated in national terms."* Moreover, in re-stating the main proposition of his *Great Illusion* under the searchlight of this present war, he considerably dilutes it from those terms which I have quoted a few pages back: "Military power is socially and economically futile."

But, pleads Mr. Angell pathetically, "*The Great Illusion* was not a prophecy;" the author makes no pretence of competing with "astrology and crystal-gazing," or with "Old Moore's Almanac." This, like others among his more recent pleas, is hardly consistent with what he wrote before the war. Opening his *The Great Illusion* almost at random, we find him prophesying that "the struggle for domination will cease because it will be realized that physical domination is futile;" that the substitution of Internationalism for Nationalism "is but a step, and a step that, if history has any meaning, is bound shortly to be taken"—perhaps within this generation (pp. 199, 221). Indeed, so far as the book is not prophetic, it is worthless; for (as will presently be seen) Mr.

* *The Great Illusion*, 1914, pp. 183, 185. It is true that a parenthetical remark on p. viii of *Prussianism*, etc., refers very obscurely to these omissions, but certainly not enough to warn the reader who, four pages earlier, has twice been given clearly to understand that Part II has been reprinted in its entirety. The re-statement and the apology referred to in my next sentences are from the same p. viii.

Angell is extremely ignorant of the past, and his history is often ludicrous. The only value of any new idea is, that it should be prophetic; and we must judge its value to some extent even by the author's prophecies in minor cases. A Great Innovator who cannot prophesy had better take to some less ambitious trade. We have therefore every right to judge Mr. Angell by the accuracy of his forecasts; and, to save space in my text, I have relegated to Appendix IV a series of extracts from his writings which the reader may amuse himself by testing in the light of actual present facts.

V

MR. ANGELL'S HISTORY

Any reader who has struggled through a page or two of this Appendix IV, has probably formed his own estimate of Mr. Angell's value as a prophet of the future. It is worth while to study him now as an historian of the past—the more so, as he produces a puff from a French reviewer who speaks of his "prodigious erudition." Let us see in what this "prodigious erudition" consists.

There is, perhaps, no subject on which he harps so often as on the decay of religious warfare. A careful enumeration would probably show that he introduces it on at least twenty separate occasions within the three volumes by which he is best known; the indices to

two of these volumes show sixteen such repetitions of the same argument, and it is one of those most frequently quoted by Mr. Angell's adherents. Yet here he has entirely failed to grasp the essential facts; and, in the real light of history, this illustration actually tends to upset the theory which he imagines it to support.

He is bent upon proving that force had nothing to do with the cessation of religious warfare. "Religious wars came to an end, not by virtue of the state imposing peace—the trouble arose largely from just that attempt—but simply because the general development of European thought undermined that conception of the relation of force to religious faith and truth out of which the conflict arose." And this "development of European thought" he conceives as "the result of certain definite intellectual and moral efforts of certain definite individual men," or as he puts it elsewhere, of "discussions which were the outcome of the Reformation." * He has no suspicion of the fact that these intellectual and moral efforts remained almost inoperative for some fourteen centuries, and that what hastened the process of enlightenment was physical force. The comparative futility of persecution—I say advisedly, *comparative*, for here again Mr. Angell falsifies a commonplace truth by pushing

* *Foundations, etc.* pp. 79, 148: *Prussianism, etc.* p. 24: cf. *Illusion*, 1914 p. 352. "Our security from persecution is due simply to the general recognition of the futility of the employment of physical force in a matter of religious belief." But the reader must refer to all the pages given under 'Religion' or 'Religions,' in the indices to these two books, to realize Mr. Angell's complete ignorance of the real part played by physical force in putting an end to religious persecution.

it to exaggeration—was finally brought home to men, not by better arguments than of old, but by a practical demonstration which had been impossible until the 16th century. The Christian, Tertullian, wrote his *Apology* about 198 A.D. He pointed out that the attempt to suppress Christianity by force, and to dismiss its arguments unheard, implied, in itself, a lurking suspicion that the doctrine might after all be true. If our ideas be wrong (he argues), then expose them publicly, and punish us by derision. To inflict physical punishment upon us is to leave our ideas untouched: “The mob vainly rejoiceth in our hurt; for the joy, which they claim to themselves, is ours, who would rather be condemned than fall away from God Nor yet doth your cruelty, though each act be more refined than the last, profit you anything. It is rather the allurements to our sect; we grow up in greater number as often as we are cut down by you. The blood of the Christians is their harvest-seed.” These last sentences, which are repeated by one early Christian writer after another, contain under their rhetorical exaggeration a solid element of truth, which even the persecutors could not contradict. Persecution did actually give an impetus to Christianity. Moreover, Tertullian was able to argue further in terms which anticipate the *Great Illusion*. He reasoned that, if the Roman authorities drove the Christians to desperation, it would not “pay”; for the Christians were already so numerous that their mere departure would hopelessly weaken the Empire; “Ye would tremble at your own desolation

ye would have to seek whom to govern." * We may profitably compare this with Mr. Angell's argument that, if we could "destroy" Germany altogether, we should destroy millions of our best customers in trade.

We have here, therefore, as early as A.D. 198, the most unanswerable argument that has ever yet been urged for the futility of force in matters of religious belief—the fact that, in this case at least, the employment of force was actually advertising the persecuted doctrine, and actually increasing the number of its adherents. Yet so ineffective was this argument, by itself, that, as soon as the Christians themselves got the power, they began to persecute. The final ruin of paganism was effected by physical force; physical force helped to maintain the supremacy of Roman Catholicism; and, fourteen centuries after Tertullian had formulated the strongest logical argument that has ever been formulated against religious persecution, the world in general was scarcely more convinced of the value of toleration than it had been in Tertullian's time. Indeed, the later centuries of the Middle Ages are marked, not by decrease, but by a very great increase, of persecution; and the 16th century is the great age of religious wars. Not only early Christians like Tertullian, but medieval heretics, plead for toleration in language which (if argument alone had been needed) would have been final. Why, then, did men still persecute? Mr. Spurgeon (if a current anecdote be true) saw clearly the cause which Mr.

* Oxford translation, 1842. pp. 2, 79, 103, 105.

Angell has entirely missed. At a great religious gathering, amid thunders of applause, Mr. Spurgeon reminded his fellow-Baptists that they alone, of all the denominations which grew up at the Reformation, had never preached or practised persecution. When the cheers had subsided, he added drily: "Because we have never been able." Mr. Angell carefully refrains from specifying the "definite individual men" of the Reformation period whose arguments, he imagines, killed persecution; and the character of all his references to this subject makes it evident that he has picked up most of his ideas after the fashion already exposed in my first chapter.*

The fact is, that persecution is not so futile as Mr. Angell believes. Physical force *has* succeeded in stamping out creeds that had not sufficient inherent vitality to resist it. Not absolutely unaided force, of course, for reason always plays its part in human affairs; but physical force has played a very important part also. Mr. Angell, who once quotes Gibbon in support of a point where Gibbon's authority is very doubtful (*Foundations*, p. 145),

* The saying which he attributes to "the night of St. Bartholomew" really belongs to more than three centuries earlier; the "eminent Catholic of the fifteenth century" whom he quotes, without even naming him or his book, is extremely suggestive of paste and scissors. (*Foundations*, pp. 52, 53, 71.) His article on 'De Haeretico Comburendo' in *War and Peace* for March 1915 is, as history, false on every point which does not come within the scope of an elementary school-book. In the *Weekly Dispatch* for Feb. 28, 1915, he quotes from "somewhere in one of the books of a sixteenth-century writer" a passage which I cannot believe to be genuine. I say this with every sense of responsibility, and will gladly insert a correction-slip at this page if Mr. Angell will give me actual chapter and verse for the definite passage which he professes to be quoting.

might have remembered the remarkable pages in which that historian points out firstly, how greatly the physical force of Christianity commended it to Constantine as a state religion; and, secondly, how enormously such force succeeded in destroying paganism under Theodosius. (Chaps. xx. xxviii.) Lecky, again, whom he quotes so frequently, might have saved him from the elementary blunder of supposing that persecution has seldom or never succeeded. Many medieval nonconformities were certainly stamped out by persecution: even school histories note how Wycliffism, from being enormously popular in the 14th century, was driven underground, and dragged on a precarious existence until the Reformation broke out. Lecky gives many other well-known instances; but Mr. Angell apparently knows Lecky as he knows his other books: *i.e.* he has picked up a few sentences from him at second-hand.*

Beliefs, of course, are very various in their character. The same sort of persecution which easily overthrew tottering paganism in the Roman Empire, had already been comparatively powerless against the far more living ideas of Christianity; indeed it had actually stimulated and strengthened those ideas. Much depends on the vitality of the belief attacked; but much depends also on the amount of force applied. Let us take, as a concrete instance, the supposition that some modern government found it worth while to persecute Mr. Angell's own

* See Appendix V, "Persecution," and especially Appendix X, "Mr. Angell's Borrowed Plumes."

doctrines. Let us take for granted that he himself would be ready to go to the stake if this were necessary—which, fortunately for us all, it is not. But how about all the members—or even most of the members—of these numerous “Norman Angell Leagues”? If the German Emperor applied to them the methods of Theodosius, how many would hold out to the end? At first, all would resist bravely; the indignant sense of outraged justice and freedom would support them, quite apart from belief in this particular “-ism.” Some would be martyred, and the rest would be subjected to a slow, leaden pressure of persecution. The Angellite official would be legally deprived of his office; the Angellite tradesman would lose his custom by public boycott; the pinched faces of wife and child would add to the man’s own misery; to crown it all, he and his family would be social outcasts.* Long before this point, he would begin to look a little more closely into the *Great Illusion*. This excellent work, treasured at first as a sort of Family Bible, would in process of time be subjected to something of the same critical analysis to which another distinguished pacifist, Mr. J. M. Robertson,

* As Mr. Angell himself says, speaking of far milder persecutions than this, “These ‘sanctions’ are so much more effective than the burning alive. . . . Though (as we have seen) the average man can go to his death with a laugh, the same man will sell his conscience for an extra pound a week.” (*War and Peace*, March, 1915, pp. 88—89.) This whole article is full of equally incautious admissions, which expose still more plainly the absurdity of Mr. Angell’s limitation of force to the actual exercise of physical force in those chapters of the *Great Illusion* criticized above. Here, where his argument demands a very contrary emphasis, he drives a third coach-and-four through the *Great Illusion*.

has recently submitted the old-fashioned Bible. Under the spirit of this Higher Criticism, our persecuted Angellists might begin to see with other eyes: the Master's literary liberties in quotation might no longer please; his moral obtuseness might shock; careful analysis would lay bare his defective logic, and even the Disciple might begin to notice his constant habit of setting up dummies to tilt at, or of assuming an ell where he has in fact proved only an inch. And finally, under such careful examination, the large majority of Angellists might very well say, "Here is a book which made us think, and from which we may still learn a good deal, if we don't take it too seriously; but, after all, the author has not really proved 'that physical domination is futile,' as it is written on p. 212. of *The Book*: and, therefore, until mankind is more reasonable, it will be wise not to give up ancient safeguards too hastily. We are no longer orthodox Angellites; physical domination has opened our eyes to truths which we had too complacently ignored; you need not persecute us any longer."

This particular illustration is submitted, of course, only as a working theory; but there can be no doubt that it corresponds roughly to many actual episodes in history, of which Mr. Angell has no suspicion whatever. If Mr. Angell would take the purely moral ground, and argue that unjust force, like other injustices, always fails *in the long run*, he would of course have the vast majority of respectable people with him. But, as a rule, he carefully avoids this

ground, though his embarrassment since the outbreak of this war has induced him to substitute, for his earlier and cruder denials of the value of physical force, a diluted formula which seems to leave more room for the momentary success (and only the final failure) of an immoral aggression. (*Prussianism, etc.*, p. viii.) But history is full of examples of persecutions which have succeeded for several generations at least; and how many men look forward more than a generation to the consequences of their actions? Mr. Angell is quite right in claiming that his own main originality is in the utilitarian argument; that, instead of asking with most previous pacifists, "Is the exercise of force *morally justifiable*?" he asks, "Does it even *pay*?"* And, in this matter, history seems very definitely to decide against him. A good many wars have "paid" quite enough to satisfy, not only the generation which won them, but their children into the bargain; and, for at least three men out of four, this is quite enough. A great many religious persecutions have succeeded for many generations; some of them, apparently, have succeeded altogether, leaving only the vaguest wreckage of the persecuted tenets to float on the stream of history. In many cases it was only necessary that the application of physical force should be sufficiently thorough and sufficiently ruthless. Half-measures

* Not, of course, that he abandons the moral ground; but it does not enter into the scope of his book. He insists that the most effective appeal is not to prove that aggression and victory are immoral, but that they are essentially incapable of procuring the advantages which men expect from them. See especially *Foundations, etc.*, pp. 196, 205.

have failed, but persecutors have often succeeded when they have dealt as the Germans are now dealing with Belgium. This distinction is vital to a comprehension of the whole subject. Berthold of Regensburg, a great Franciscan mission-preacher of about 1250, expresses a common orthodox point of view, when he says: "Had I a sister in a country wherein was but one heretic, that single heretic would keep me in fear for her, so poisonous is the heretic." The earlier religious wars aimed at complete extermination of the unorthodox, or at least at their complete social subjection. When, after more than a century of such wars, it became evident, even to the dullest capacity, that no such complete and crushing victory was possible for either Catholic or Protestant, then at last people began to listen to the real voice of reason, which had spoken at least fourteen centuries before. Except for this military deadlock, except for this balance of force against force, we have no sufficient ground for supposing that religious wars would have ended nearly so soon as they did. Wycliffism was an immature creed, uncertain of itself; therefore persecution paralysed it and almost killed it. So long as Catholics hoped that Lutheranism was equally immature, and therefore equally open to successful attack, so long they had real and sufficient reason for risking their lives in the attempt to kill a creed which they believed to be not only poisonous but destructible. The arguments of religious pacifists failed to convince, not only because men would not listen to them, but also because the

pacifists themselves (like Mr. Angell) saw only one side of the truth, while the militarists saw only the other side. It needed long and bloody fighting to prove that Lutheranism was in fact indestructible. Then only did men begin to see clearly that religious wars would not pay; that a residuum of heretics would always be left, after the extremest sacrifices of blood and treasure. Then at last came in the real force of reason, and men became ripe for the arguments of those "certain definite individual men" who are really so indefinite in Mr. Angell's pages, and who are probably equally indefinite in his mind. Historically, he puts the cart before the horse; and, in his forecast of future developments of internationalism, he makes the same mistake, because he has entirely misunderstood his historical foundation.

Mr. Angell himself seems to have realized this fact rather late in the day, possibly as a direct consequence of my criticisms. In July 1914 we find him saying, "The case for toleration was not made out by any operation (*sic*) of the reformers. The case for improving faith by physical force is an extremely strong one . . . We got religious toleration by the instinctive realization by all parties concerned, that force was futile. After thirty years' war the original combatants in these wars found they had got to keep military force out of religious difference if their States were to survive." (*International Polity Summer School Report*, p. 31.) It is thoroughly characteristic that Mr. Angell himself thus silently slid into a position destructive of his former

arguments, and that the *élite* of his disciples, gathered to hear him, swallowed the new gospel as passively as the old, without the least apparent realization of this change of front.

Therefore, so far as the history of religious warfare is a helpful analogy—and it is in many ways most helpful—it preaches the very opposite of Mr. Angell's doctrine. It teaches, not only that the balance of physical forces was the real factor which gave the *coup de grâce* to religious wars and persecution, but also that even the intellectual reasons against persecution were logically insufficient until this balance of physical forces had come about. It was not even true, *as a matter of pure reason*, that a war of extermination against Protestantism would defeat its own ends, until it had first become true that the Protestants were too strong, physically, to be exterminated by such physical force as the Catholics could oppose to them. Therefore, in accordance with this historical analogy, we must expect the final cessation of European wars, not through argument only, but also through a similar balance of force.* Such a balance, at last, will not

* Mr. Novikow, whom Mr. Angell quotes so often, and seems to have read so carelessly, points out in a suggestive passage how the political Balance of Power in Europe, which did at any rate do something to check the indiscriminate warfare of the past, was brought about. He indicates how the process began on a small scale among the Italian city-states of the 13th century, and how it repeated itself on a larger scale after the Reformation. The weaker or less aggressive parties grouped themselves against the aggressors; the law of co-operation came in to counteract the naked law of struggle; "each realized the absolute impossibility of subjugating the others . . . and the European Balance of Power was established."—*Darwinisme Social*, p. 309.

only compel even the most aggressive Powers to pause and ask whether aggression is likely to pay, but will also enable pure reason to answer that question with a far more decided negative than can at present be given—except, of course, by Mr. Angell's method of composing history with paste and scissors, and ignoring all inconvenient facts of the past. In short, Mr. Angell's own argument, if only he will face the actual facts, drives him here towards that solution of the difficulty which he so persistently ignores—the solution proposed by a pacifist of longer standing and incomparably greater distinction than himself—the solution of Jean Jaurès. I shall try to show, in a future chapter, not only how exactly Jaurès's scheme tallies with the true lesson of the past, but also how strongly it is supported by the very facts of this present war which accord so ill with Mr. Angell's forecasts.

Very similar is the story of the duel, to which Mr. Angell makes a parallel, but even more vague, appeal. The duel was not killed by "certain definite intellectual and moral efforts of certain definite individual men." Not even Mr. Angell, in this case, commits himself to so absurd an assertion. The most definite and weighty pronouncements against the duel were, perhaps, those of the medieval Church; yet it is in Roman Catholic countries that the custom mainly survives. The "definite individual man" whose work did most to mitigate duelling was Richelieu, who astonished the world, not only by declaring the thing illegal, but by actually venturing to execute

one of the great nobility for fighting a duel. In Anglo-Saxon countries it is the police who have done this work. When a man finds that, after escaping his adversary's sword or pistol, he will probably be ignominiously punished, he will then listen to the "intellectual and moral efforts" of more reasonable men. In southern Italy and Sicily, where the police have little power against any sort of crime, duelling is still common. Many causes, of course, have contributed to the decay of the duel; but the deciding factor, as in religion, has been a balance of forces which has compelled the would-be aggressor to count the cost before striking. At this point reason has a real chance of exerting its legitimate influence.

Here, then, is a matter of history upon which Mr. Angell bases one of his main arguments. It is, indeed, if we may judge from the daily papers, the argument which has done most to impress the public. Inter-state wars, he says, will cease as rapidly and as completely as religious wars and the duel did, so soon as the one decisive intellectual argument against them has been brought fairly before the public. This decisive argument (he continues) is no longer the old plea, "wars are immoral," but simply, "wars cannot attain their own end": physical force is *irrelevant* to religious belief: physical force is *irrelevant* to any real good for which a state exists. We have seen that this supposed analogy of the past, from which Mr. Angell so confidently forecasts the future, is mistaken in two essential particulars. What killed religious wars was not the argument

that they were irrelevant and useless; that argument was current for many centuries during which religious warfare did not abate, but actually increased in intensity. Moreover, the argument itself was false in a very large number of cases; if the religious belief be not too strong, physical force *can* kill it, or at least can hopelessly stunt it. If any writer between 1500 and 1700 believed in the entire irrelevance of physical force to religious belief, then that man was a dreamer of exaggerated dreams; but Mr. Angell has as yet made no pretence of producing any such author; it is pretty plain that here, as in other cases, he writes merely at random. For, in fact, it was physical force—defensive physical force—which not only made men open their ears to the intellectual argument, but which actually endowed that argument with an essential truth which it had hitherto lacked. When Protestants were numerous enough, and could fight well enough, to render the idea of their total extermination Utopian—when, in fact, physical force had exalted partial tolerance into a necessary law of nature—then men began to listen more patiently, on all sides, to ideas of complete tolerance. Since then, it has become increasingly difficult to make persecution pay, as it has become increasingly difficult to live by forgery or burglary; but in all these regions we are still far from the day when mankind will be guided by argument alone. Aggressive physical force may only too easily profit its exerciser, for many generations yet to come, unless we are prepared on our side to back up our arguments by a

reasonable show of defensive force. To neglect adequate defence on the plea that physical aggression cannot pay, is precisely the most likely method of enabling physical aggression to pay. Here, as in thousands of other cases, what does most to render tyranny possible is precisely the supineness of those well-meaning and loose-thinking thousands who imagine that they can kill it by bleating about its uselessness. And, although Mr. Angell himself disclaims all ideas of non-resistance, I shall try to point out in a later chapter how fatally his vagueness and irresolution have encouraged such ideas in other people.

VI

THE SURVIVAL OF WARLIKE NATIONS

Under this chapter-heading Mr. Angell makes an even more unfortunate incursion into the domain of history. (Part II. chap. 4.) He asserts that the Roman wars "played no small rôle in the degeneration of Rome and the populations on which the crux of the Empire reposed." To a certain extent this is doubtless true; even Bernhardt would admit that a nation can have too much of war; but here, as usual, Mr. Angell makes an illegitimate use of a proposition containing elements of real truth. To begin with, he claims for it the authority of Seeck and of Seeley. Seeck, as we have seen in Chap. I, says the exact opposite; and the quotation which Mr. Angell brings from Seeley, "the Roman Empire perished for want of men," was evidently picked up

from the same second- or third-hand source from which he picked up his Seeck.* The words come from an essay of Seeley's, which, read as a whole, is very far from bearing out Mr. Angell's contention that the Roman wars resulted in a gradual weeding-out of the fittest. Seeley emphasizes the fact that the stationary tendency of Roman population was more obvious *during the Empire*—that is, during centuries of such peace as the ancient world knew neither before nor since—than during the fighting centuries of Rome. And he attributes this depopulation mainly to a very different cause—the avoidance of marriage, and the practice of infanticide.† Speaking of the parallel depopulation of ancient Greece, (which again was more obvious during the more peaceful generations) Seeley notes with approval, "The shrewd observer Polybius explains that it was not owing to war or plague, but mainly to a general repugnance to marriage, and reluctance to rear large families, caused by an extravagantly high standard of comfort." ‡ This is the more important because, though Seeck may fairly be said to start from a

* See Appendix VI. "Principal D. Starr Jordan."

† See the extraordinarily illuminating article of Prof. J. L. Myres in the *Eugenics Review* for April, 1915, "The causes of the Rise and Fall in the Population of the Ancient World," especially p. 44, where he notes how Rome caught from Greece the example of "its limited families and its pretext of high living to excuse a low birth-rate." In one Sicilian-Greek graveyard, out of 570 interments, 233 are recognizable as murdered infants. p. 37.

‡ *Lectures and Addresses*, 1870, pp. 50—51. Seeley's remarks about Roman militarism at the end of this essay, whether true or not, are not to the present point; they leave untouched the fact that depopulation, and general degeneration, attacked Rome specially during the centuries of peace.

militarist point of view, nothing of the kind can be urged against Seeley, whom again Mr. Angell has cited not only at random, but incorrectly. Nor has he, here, even the lame excuse that, apart from the false footnote, the argument of his text is sufficient to prove his own version of the historical facts in opposition to the view of these historical authorities. The only proof he professes to bring in this case of Rome, is a bald assertion in the text, backed up by an appeal to these two authorities who in fact contradict him. As the book stands, the only thing that can weigh with any thoughtful reader is, not Mr. Angell's unsupported assertion, but his claim to support this by first-rate specialist authority. Yet, of these two authorities, one is at great pains to explain to us that foreign wars do *not* result in the survival of the unfittest, and that Greece and Rome were ruined by their chronic political quarrels, followed by political murders. The other finds the main cause of racial degeneration in that artificial limitation of families which, it is notorious, has often been a characteristic of nations in which the warlike spirit is lost or abeyant. While Seeck's arguments tend to support Bernhardt, Stengel, Roosevelt, and all the militarists of whom Mr. Angell most disapproves, even Seeley is quite out of sympathy with those other extremists of Mr. Angell's pattern, who contend that war is an unmixed evil to the race. Seeley would rather bear out the doctrine so clearly formulated by J. S. Mill during the American civil conflict: "War is an ugly thing, but not the ugliest

of things; the decayed and degraded state of patriotic feeling, which thinks nothing *worth* a war, is worse . . . As long as Justice and Injustice have not terminated *their* ever-recurring fight for ascendancy in the affairs of mankind, human beings must be willing, when need is, to do battle for the one against the other." * Let us consider now, in the light of race-survival, this moderate and balanced position—the position which Mr. Angell never ventures to face, confining himself always to the easy and childish task of demolishing extremist exaggerations. The real problem here is not that of securing the largest possible number of readers by the cheap method of setting exaggeration against exaggeration, and of appealing to loose-thinking pacifists against equally loose-thinking militarists. A theory which is to carry final conviction must take account of all the facts, and must appeal most of all to that large number of thinking persons who hate war, yet who feel that peace with moral degradation is worse than war. It must appeal to those who see that some of the things which most surely lead to war are things which extreme pacifists too often cherish as virtues—class-prejudice, and the obstinate refusal to face unpalatable facts, and the Pharisaical misrepresentation of an opponent's motives, or even of his actual recorded words.

Mr. Angell in this very chapter, and quite apart from the Seeck case, affords a very gross instance of

* *Dissertations and Discussions*, 1867, Vol. III., p. 205. Compare R. W. Dale's words which I quote later on.

misrepresentation. I point this out in my first chapter; and, since Mr. Angell puts up no defence for it in Appendix I, but simply ignores the accusation, I must expose him more fully here.

Already, before the Cambridge War and Peace Society, I had pointed out that he had misrepresented Mr. Sidney Low's easily-accessible words so grossly that the only charitable plea for him was one of complete ignorance—that he had apparently taken the whole thing at second-hand from Mr. Robertson. He has made no attempt to rebut the charge of misrepresentation; the facts were too plain to be denied. But, tacitly admitting his fault in the 1914 edition, he has attempted to get rid of it as furtively as in the Seeck and Pearson cases. He has cut out the quotation from Mr. Low on p. 139, although this was (for once) quite correct. On pp. 173-4, where he refers back to this (now omitted) quotation, he has twice cut out Mr. Low's name and inserted *Leo Maxe (sic)* instead, though the quotation still refers plainly to Mr. Low. On the other pages he has simply substituted *militarist*, or some similar word, for Mr. Low's name. In every case he has retained, unaltered, the vicious argument which depended for its point upon the (now admitted) misrepresentation of Mr. Low's words. Here, as in the other cases, whatever ignorance or carelessness might be pleaded in extenuation of the original mis-statement, there is a very deliberate purpose evident in the attempt to disguise the outward fault while retaining the essential falsehood.*

* See Appendix VII.

Moreover, in this chapter again, his logic is scarcely less defective than his literary morality. He devotes the whole chapter to what he calls the Illusion of "the survival of warlike nations." It is thoroughly characteristic of his method that it never occurs to him to proceed from a clear definition of the word "warlike," upon which his whole argument turns. At one moment he measures a nation's militarism by the actual amount of fighting done; at another by the number of citizens it trains as soldiers. Even when he has called us to "a closer examination," and shows himself conscious that these are different standards, he uses them so confusedly as to arrive at the conclusion that Germany is a less military nation than France, or even than Spain and Italy.* Moreover, he takes no account whatever of the distinction drawn in that famous saying attributed to Moltke, that Britain fifty years ago was the least military, yet the most warlike, of European nations. The distinction, whether Moltke spoke truly or falsely, is very obvious and very real. A nation may conceivably fight less and drill less, and yet be more formidable and more determined when it actually comes to war, than its rival. To add still further to the confusion, Mr. Angell uses *war* and *conquest* as interchangeable terms. With all his pretensions to logical accuracy, he never once realizes the necessity of starting from a clear definition. It might be even truer to say that he instinctively avoids clear

* *Illusion*, pp. 218, 225, 232-3; cf. p. 368 (Index), "Reputed military character of Germany disproved on investigation."

definition, since this would tie him down from the first, and would expose his frequent fallacies.

His historical instances, quite apart from the Roman blunder, are often childish. The South American Republics, and the Bedouin tribes upon whom he lays so much stress, are not so much *warlike* as *quarrelsome*. Their subjects are almost as ready to fight each other as to fight the stranger. Mr. Angell ignores the distinction between civil broils and national warfare, though such a distinction is vital to any clear consideration of the subject. And he ignores also the notorious fact, to which Novikow gives prominence, that "history shows the most warlike nations to have been, at the same time, excellent productors. The Romans were first-rate farmers, the Athenians were distinguished by industrial ingenuity, the Italians were very capable merchants."* Novikow, indeed, tries to explain this by asserting that "nations are not living because they are warlike, but warlike because they are living." This may be true—all reasonable people must hope that it is true—but it still leaves us to face the problem of successfully separating two things which hitherto have been so inseparable, and of killing a nation's fighting instincts without otherwise affecting its real life. Novikow seems scarcely to grasp the importance of this problem; he is a dreamer who passes easily from the conception of that which ought to be to the assumption that it will soon be; he seldom seems to realize the full complexity of

* *Critique du Darwinisme Social*, p. 213. *Luttes, etc.*, p. 432.

human instincts and aspirations.* Mr. Angell wholly ignores the problem, though his own Novikow has left him no excuse for such ignorance. He avoids the whole difficulty by the simple artifice of denying the notorious historical fact which Novikow honestly faces—by denying that the world's greatest commercial, artistic, and literary achievements are due to the nations which have also shown pre-eminence in war. "The warlike nations," he writes, "do not inherit the earth." He supports this partly by his above-mentioned twaddle about South American Republics, and (so far as he deigns to mention Europe at all) by drawing up a scale in which modern Germany figures as less warlike than modern France, or Italy, or Spain! He makes no pretence of facing the facts supplied by the last 3000 years of world-history. For this omission we may, in one sense, be deeply grateful. As George Eliot once remarked of her boarding-house tea, "Thank Heaven it has no taste, or it would doubtless have been undrinkable!" Judging from the occasional specimens which Mr. Angell has given, we may thank our stars that he spares us a full conspectus of his general notions concerning world-history; yet he might at least have begun by going to some encyclopedia for the barest and simplest facts, or even by studying his friend Novikow with ordinary care. The living nation, as

* For instance, in one of his more recent books which Mr. Angell has translated with an approving preface, he claims that man's interests are "to have the maximum of enjoyment with the minimum of work." (*War and its Alleged Benefits*, 1912, p. 141.)

Novikow clearly points out, has generally been the warlike nation ; and Mr. Angell's attempt to get rid of this inconvenient fact by an *ipse dixit* is only another instance of his complacent and unabashed charlatanism.* He can at most plead that the living nation has not always been the most *quarrelsome* ; but here, again, he is simply mistaking the cheque-book for the money. The most warlike nation of all, with the vastest reserves of physical force, might easily go through generation after generation without more bloodshed than is involved in small punitive expeditions. Up to a certain point the German Emperor pleads quite sincerely that he wanted peace in 1914 ; he wanted a repetition of previous negotiations, in which the Kaiser's appearance "in shining armour" had forced his opponents to yield without striking a blow. Neither in fact, nor in logic, has Mr. Angell grasped even the rudiments of his main problem. Not only might the most warlike nation fight least, it might even drill least. If Germany had succeeded in absorbing the greater part of Europe, she might easily have kept her position of most warlike nation without drilling half the percentage of population which other countries were drilling ; her mere appearance in shining armour would always have sufficed to coerce the rest. Neither by actual fighting, nor by the proportion of population drilled, can we decide off-hand whether a nation is warlike or peaceful ; we need to take account of three important factors at once.

* See Appendix VIII, "Warlike States and Higher Civilization."

This triple uncertainty underlies Mr. Angell's "accurate manner" at every point; it undermines his whole pretence of rigorous logic.

But (it may be argued) faculties that are not exercised become gradually paralysed; under these last conditions even the Germans would gradually become really unwarlike, in all three senses. No doubt; but how long would the process take? In the Roman Empire it took from three to four centuries. Supposing, therefore, that it took only two centuries in Germany's case, what is to be our fate meanwhile? However fully we may agree that the bully does not really gain in the end, we have even Mr. Angell's authority for the modest belief that things may be even more uncomfortable, meanwhile, for the bullied party. And what hold can the "certain definite intellectual and moral efforts of certain definite individual men" get upon the German, so long as, the more intellectually we read Mr. Angell, the more we are compelled to confess that Germany might really gain, for a couple of centuries or so, by her predatory policy? Even among reasonable and honest men, how many are willing to forego an advantage in hand for the sake of what might happen two centuries hence? Even supposing that all Germany were convinced, to-morrow, of the impossibility of gaining a penny by warfare, many of the bravest and most generous Germans would still fight to the death for the chance of imposing German civilization upon Europe as completely as the Romans imposed theirs. In so far as they have failed in

Alsace and Lorraine, it may be argued with only too much probability that they have failed by using *too little* force: hence their deliberate cruelties in Belgium and France. It is a notorious fact that a large proportion of the peasants in those unhappy districts have already reached that state of mind which prefers the certain conqueror to the uncertain liberator; and that they would willingly accept even German domination, as a price for the end of this War. The people who talk glibly of persecution as never succeeding, are the people who never knew real persecution, and who have neither history nor imagination to correct their fortunate lack of personal experience. It is easy for Mr. Angell to talk, who tells us at one moment that Britain ought to defend herself to the last man and the last penny, and presently migrates to make money and popularity by lecturing in America, as an American, against the country of his birth. The German who believes that persecution can pay, on a large scale, is not only more vigorous, but actually more intellectual, than Mr. Angell has recently shown himself.

Moreover, there is another obvious limitation to Mr. Angell's argument that the disuse of warlike faculties leads to their atrophy. A Germany victorious over Europe would, it is true, drill less of her manhood; but so would the other states, if only because Germany would insist upon this. It would be very long, therefore, before the warlike functions of Germany showed any marked degree of atrophy compared with other nations; very long, that is, before

she lost her power of coercing by the mere rattle of her sabre. To say that Germany could not limit armaments by force, because Napoleon failed in thus limiting Prussian armaments, is simply to provoke from the German the retort that Napoleon was a mere beginner, a bungler, in the real science of coercion. The bleatings of these well-meaning men of intellectual pretensions, who have assured us that a nation cannot successfully be persecuted, are directly answerable for the systematic attempt of modern Germany to outdo the Napoleonic methods of persecution.* There is no question here of the *final* retribution for injustice; of Germany's decay and martyrdom a few centuries later on, like the decay and martyrdom of the Roman Empire. Old-fashioned pacificism commands the assent of all reasonable people, in its assertion that injustice brings its reward in the long run. But it is Mr. Angell's peculiar boast to have superseded this plea of the older pacificists, in favour of the new and more convincing plea that aggression cannot bring even immediate success. Judging him, therefore, by his own standard, outside the purely financial sphere, must we not conclude that he relies entirely on false facts and false logic, which appeal mainly to those who wish to avoid unpleasant truths, and

* "Could Germany 'own' Canada, she would have to 'own' it in the same way that we do. . . . [Canada's] language, law, morals, would have to be, after German conquest, what they are now. Germany would find that German Canada was pretty much the Canada that it is now." (*Great Illusion*, p. 98.) This nonsense is repeated in half-a-dozen other passages of his works.

which encourage such well-meaning, but indolent people in a state of mind most favourable to the enterprises of the militarist? What made it possible for Napoleon to force the St. Bernard, was the indolent conviction of all Austrian experts that the thing was impossible. The mass of Germans will always believe in the possibility of bending British colonies to German ideas, so long as Britons argue its impossibility by Mr. Angell's slipshod methods, or reward such loose thinking by the applause of a hundred thousand slipshod readers. Militarists see the real weaknesses of pacificism—its too frequent and complacent unrealities, and the intellectual and moral delusions which so often alloy its fundamental nobility of purpose—at least as clearly as pacificists see the faults of their opponents. Moreover, your militarist is often a shrewd, if cynical, judge of personal character. Many of us, who had very little respect for Mr. Angell's "prodigious erudition" or his "accurate manner," were nevertheless very much surprised at his frank abandonment of his native country at the moment when a great American like Henry James was doing the exact opposite, and was choosing British citizenship as a sign that he deliberately associated himself with the fortunes and dangers of Britain at war. We were taken aback; but it may be very much doubted whether Bernhardt or Ballin or Dernburg were surprised. They had doubtless "sized him up" long ago; and their dangerous belief in Anglo-Saxon decadence is largely due to the avidity with which a certain section of

Anglo-Saxondom swallows the flattering sophistry of Mr. Angell and his friends.

The word sounds harsh ; but I am more and more convinced of its justification. A man who can write so clearly whenever he is on safe ground, could certainly think clearly if he dared to think straight. When a militarist blunder is to be exposed, his choice of words and illustrations is generally admirably suited to the purpose he has in view. By nature or by practice, he has evidently a clear eye for terms. When, therefore, he leads us on in argument through a perpetual confusion of terms, and when his proposition is found actually to depend on false or shifting terminology, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that this jugglery is, if not conscious, at least subconscious and instinctive. He knows perfectly well, at the bottom of his mind, that to clear his terms would be to spoil his case ; hence the curious contrast between the clearness of his sentences and the vagueness of his terminology—a note of sophistry in all ages.

VII

WAR AND CIVILIZATION

Let us fix our eyes on Mr. Angell's main point, which he himself, under cover of this loose terminology, evades. He is all the while working up to the conclusion that " military power cannot achieve any of

those objects for which civilized states are founded."* When, therefore, by way of proof for this proposition, he asserts "that the warlike nations do not inherit the earth," he must interpret *warlike* as *possessing military power*, and he must bear in mind that the *latent* military power of one nation may be far more effectual, even for aggressive purposes, than even the *exercised* military power of another. Mr. Angell puts Arabia and Morocco at the head of his list of warlike powers, and Great Britain at the bottom; yet he must know that a mere threat from Britain would, in many cases, exercise a far stronger coercive force than an actual declaration of war from Arabia and Morocco combined. An intelligent child, after watching an auction, might come home and write an essay on "The Diminishing Factor of Money in Commerce." He would argue from the fact that an amateur, jingling his sovereigns in his pocket, was quite unable to wrest a coveted picture from a dealer who simply nodded to the auctioneer, and produced no money even when the prize was knocked down to him. Our intelligent child would conclude from this that money cannot achieve any of those objects which civilized men covet. But, of course, our child must not be too intelligent, or he might see the truth, and that would spoil his essay. Mr. Angell's attempt to show the irrelevance of military force to civilization simply rests upon a childish ignorance of the true nature of military power.

* *Prussianism*, p. xiii; cf. *Illusion*, 1914, p. 212, "military domination is futile."

And yet this ignorance is voluntary, or at least semi-voluntary and subconscious. When he is on another tack, he makes true distinctions, which, in the argument we are now concerned with, would have been fatal to his case. He writes: "Is it not somewhat childish and elementary to conceive of force only as the firing off of guns and the launching of *Dreadnoughts*? . . . The mind which can only conceive of struggle as bombardment and charges is, of course, the Dervish mind." "Even with armies the pugnacity must be translated into intellectual and not into physical effort; . . . war is becoming as hopelessly intellectual and scientific as any other form of work: officers are scientists, the men are workmen, the army is a machine."* His friend Novikow, a dozen years earlier, had shown himself aware of the same truth: "Even the most retrograde governments will have to understand at last that the conflict of two armies on a battlefield, under exhaustive analysis, reduces itself simply to the conflict of two intelligences."† Yet our retrograde Mr. Angell wholly ignores

* *Illusion*, pp. 274, 276—7: cf. 240, where the author points out that the American victory over Spain was mainly a matter of business organization. Yet, whenever it suits his argument of the moment, Mr. Angell characteristically ignores all this, and speaks of victory in war as a matter of luck; cf. *Illusion*, p. 236, "even supposing the better nation wins," and p. 261, "the mere hazard of war"; again, *Prussianism*, pp. 34—36, perhaps the crudest of all. More recently, however, where it has been his main object to justify the refusal to appeal for recruits, and to spend his energies rather on inventing peace-terms, he boxes the compass again and assumes that, in any case, the juster side must win in this present war; cf. *Prussianism*, p. 41, "It is quite certain, moreover, that the British nation . . . is going to win," and p. 234, "Let us cast our minds forward to the stage at which England is completely victorious, and is able to say to Germany: 'You must never renew this mad race for armaments.'"

† *Luttes, etc.*, p. 447.

this fact when it suits his temporary convenience. At those times war is to him nothing but a superannuated survival from savage life; and success in war is mainly a matter of luck or of brutal qualities. But the real difficulty, to any impartial student of these subjects, is the patent falsehood of this simple and easy solution. War, as admitted by thinkers so different as Mill and Novikow, has in fact hitherto brought out human powers of co-operation and organization more remarkably than even the arts of peace. In theory there seems no reason why a community should not develop, in peace-time, just the same spirit of sacrifice for the common good; but we are reluctantly compelled to admit that in practice this is not done; and, while we are bound to do everything in our power to avoid each particular war, we cannot honestly deny that, in the light of history, occasional warfare seems less pernicious than the steady practice of many things which are done, and omission of many things which are left undone, under the name of peace. We rightly spend a great deal of time and money in protecting ourselves against typhoid fever; yet in many cases a patient recovered from typhoid enjoys a long period of better health than he had known before. The Chinaman does not fight, but he murders his own female children to prevent over-population; and the steady continuance of this practice is a moral and social gangrene worse than war. It would be much easier to blink these things, and (like Mr. Angell) to reach a simple conclusion by denying the notorious facts of history,

or by ignoring the well-known tendencies of human nature; but we may remind him of his own motto, "Let us be honest, at least with ourselves." Both history and psychology make it plain that, by escaping war, we do not necessarily attain to peace in the real sense. Real peace, in which a man rejoices in his neighbour's prosperity, is of course at all times infinitely preferable to war. But mere absence of war, mere ruminant tranquillity, may be more uncivilized, more beast-like, than energetic peace with intervals of war. The real problem is one which Mr. Angell's method of omitting inconvenient facts ignores altogether. Let us state it in the words of his own friend Novikow. As this suggestive, but curiously unequal, writer puts it, "It is intellectual improvement which has made war possible among men"; and again, "If men did not fight each other they would simply be like tigers, who do not eat each other."* War, therefore, from this point of view, is so far from being a barbaric survival that it actually differentiates *homo sapiens* from the mere tiger; it is actually an achievement of civilization! Not necessarily, it is true, a permanent achievement; all morality must impel us to regard it as merely a passing stage, to hope that men will gradually gain enough self-control to barter with the threat of war instead of war itself, and finally, as human nature goes from better to better, to achieve more co-operation than at present, with less even of the threat of war; just as our modern police seldom need even to

* *Darwinisme Social*, pp. 53, 57.

threaten the ordinary citizen. But the fact is that war, in the technical sense, has grown with civilization, and that (as even Mr. Angell recognizes in unguarded moments) it taxes the most complicate resources of civilization. To preach, with Mr. Angell and Mr. Novikow, that we must now divert these pugnacious habits and instincts from our fellow-man to our environment, seems at first sight a very simple gospel; but, unfortunately, our fellow-man is part of our environment, and even the most important part. Here, as everywhere, Mr. Angell's transparent clearness of style is gained at the expense of ignoring all but the most superficial aspects of his subjects. He writes with the attractive directness of an intelligent child—of a child who mistakes the cheque-book for the money.

I do not pretend here to substitute a new theory of War and Peace for Mr. Angell's or Mr. Novikow's. I simply remind the reader that Mr. Angell's whole originality lies in his claim to have stated a theory so self-evident that all well-disposed persons can understand it; by the help of which theory, generally and rapidly accepted, he and his friends hope to convince "the men that count," in all countries, that aggression cannot bring, even to the victor and even for a generation or two, any appreciable gain, financially or otherwise. The whole point here is, that the theory should be not only true, but also comprehensible to the ordinary man. Otherwise we have advanced little beyond the older pacifists, who appealed to our moral feelings, and to the fact that

all injustice, in the long run, proves less successful than patient justice would have been. Yet I attempt to show, what the reader himself may verify with a little thought and trouble, that this new theory is simple only in so far as it is false and imperfect. Mr. Angell writes with the clearness and conviction of a man who sees only half the real picture, and that half only through his own spectacles. There would not be much harm in this, except for the practical conclusions drawn by Mr. Angell himself, and still more emphatically by some of his supporters. They are so convinced of the rapidly-approaching advent of this new gospel that they wish us in the meanwhile to take a lead in national disarmament. Without ceasing to look clearly to the main chance in other ways, in this matter of War and Peace they are Zionists, Fifth-Monarchy-Men, Latter-Day-Saints, who would have us subordinate ordinary business precautions to the consideration of this new Jerusalem, in which such precautions will be not only superfluous, but sinful. Apart from these practical deductions, Mr. Angell might safely be left to find his own level, like Mr. Stewart Houston Chamberlain of our day and Mr. Martin Tupper of a generation ago. But matters of practical national policy can risk no such delay; and, while the *Economist* is welcoming *The Great Illusion* as the cause of conversions to the propaganda for military retrenchment, it is of pressing importance to point out clearly how Great the Illusion is; how fundamentally rotten is this lever which is to move the world; how essentially

this theory depends upon facts which are not facts, and upon "hard thinking" which is simply pretentious thoughtlessness.

In concluding "it is by working with one another, and *not* by fighting with each other, that men advance," he simply repeats his old blunder of "by struggle with nature, *not* with other men." He advances two separate propositions, and proves only the first of the two. The struggle with fellow-man *is part of the struggle with nature*.* Novikow, in his earlier book, frankly admits that the struggle of man with man is, and always will be, part of man's evolutionary process. "There will always be economic struggles . . . and therefore always political struggles . . . The struggle will be eternal, and the victory will always belong to the most intelligent; but the methods will change." By all means; all reasonable people are so far in agreement with the older pacifists, that they look forward to, and work for, the diminishing *exercise* of physical force. But will the methods ever change so radically that "the most intelligent" will be content to live without a considerable *reserve* of physical force? And, to bring the question again to its practical test, are "the most intelligent" people of to-day those who believe, on

* As I have pointed out above, Mr. Angell cannot evade this by pleading that he uses *struggle* in the sense of *warfare*, for that would be to confess that he had tried to beg the whole question under cover of a loose use of words. Novikow, at one point, falls into the same exaggeration, but he corrects himself in the next sentence (*Darwinisme Social*, p. 276), and shows that he is only exposing the opposite exaggeration of those "who would attribute the progress of human production to competition *alone*."

Mr. Angell's mere word, that the era of man's struggle with man is past; that military power cannot achieve any of those objects for which civilized states are founded?* We may say deliberately "on Mr. Angell's mere word," for the facts and the arguments by which he tries to bolster up the proposition are not worth the paper on which they are printed.

VIII

EUGENICS AND WAR

Sir Ronald Ross, as editor of the quarterly *Science Progress*, published some brief remarks under this title in the issue of January, 1914 (p. 591). He took for his text Professor Karl Pearson's complaint that "eugenics is rapidly developing into a topic for the *poseur*, the congress-loafer, and the paragraphist"; and, while his strictures were directly applied to Principal Starr Jordan, they strike almost equally directly at Mr. Angell, who on this point has followed Principal Jordan blindly, only adding a few extra blunders of his own. He himself has repeated

* That is, cannot even be *one* factor in such achievement. If Mr. Angell had only been concerned to deny that military force is the *only* factor, he would have been combating what not even Bernhardt has asserted. Even if he only meant to deny that military force is the *principal* factor, he would still be preaching a commonplace which no reasonable person ever questions. It is essential to his whole argument that we should understand his words in their absolute sense. If military force be only *one* of the many factors in human success, how can he logically persuade men to forego this considerable, and perhaps even decisive, advantage?

the whole of his main argument in his attempted reply to my first chapter; I need only refer the reader, therefore, to Appendix I, p. iv, where the whole text will be found.

Let me first point out the more obvious mis-statements, exaggerations, or defects of logic.

(1) "Conquest does not make for the elimination of the conquered." A dangerous half-truth: *e.g.* the Australian aborigines, North American Indians, Maoris, &c. By the simple process of indulging in equal exaggerations in the other direction, Pan-Germanists are persuading themselves that they will be able to "eliminate the conquered" very effectually.

(2) You do not "carefully select . . . the mentally soundest" to send into battle. In Germany and Switzerland, where illiterates are excluded, illiterates are practically non-existent; there is no other mental selection. The British voluntary system, again, carefully avoids risking the lives of those whom pacifists would select as the mentally soundest. The men who have listened to the editors of the *Daily News* and the *Economist*, and who look first to the main chance, have remained at home to breed, and will be disproportionately represented in our next generation.*

* On the morning of August 4, when the violation of Belgium was a practical certainty, the *Daily News* published a leader advising us to remain neutral because "we should be able to trade with all the belligerents (so far as the war allows of trade with them); we should be able to capture the bulk of their trade in neutral markets; we should keep our expenditure down." Mr. F. W. Hirst's letter, to the same effect, appeared in the same paper about the same time.

(3) "Exterminate" is a gross exaggeration. Under ordinary conditions a few years of peace rapidly obliterate the numerical wastage of war.

(4) "We no longer exterminate the women, the children." This, by an almost incredible blunder, is advanced by Mr. Angell as a proof that, having "exterminated" the *élite* in war, we leave only the "worst" to breed from! The fact that no modern wars—not even German wars in Belgium—touch more than one woman or child out of many hundreds, is one of the most consoling facts from the eugenic point of view; Dr. C. W. Saleeby, and, less definitely, Professor J. A. Thomson, have given it the emphasis which it deserves. A man is not merely what his father was before him. A money-grubber who has taken the *Daily News* article at the editor's own valuation may still have a brave wife, and therefore better children than himself. Again, not only the men who *would* not go to this war, but the children who *could* not go to it, will be fathers in their turn. There is salvation in the women and children.

But the first three of these, however significant of Mr. Angell's habitual inaccuracy, are only matters of detail: it is only the third which shows how little he has grasped even the rudiments of a science upon which he does not fear to tread. The clearness of his theory depends, as usual,* upon the omission of

* It is worth noting here again, that this patent nonsense has passed unaltered through more than twenty editions. Of all the 100,000 readers who have claimed to follow Mr. Angell in this "hard-thinking" which is to change the face of the universe, not one has detected so gross a blunder, or has drawn the complacent Apostle's attention to it.

essential factors, which at best would embarrass his argument, while in some cases they speak clearly and directly against his pet conclusion. He takes leave to forget that a mother has at least a half-share in the birth of her child; and he is equally oblivious of another essential factor which is now attracting increasing attention from professional eugenicists. As both Sir Ronald Ross and Professor Thomson point out, though all war may be dysgenic, there can be little doubt that a voluntary recruiting system is more dysgenic than a system of compulsory service. There is not only justice, but sound political wisdom in the principle enunciated by the leaders of the great French Revolution, and supported by John Stuart Mill in the first and fourth chapters of his *Essay on Liberty*, that the individual should be compelled "to bear his fair share in the common defence, or in any other joint work necessary to the interest of the society of which he enjoys the protection." Under such a system, all able-bodied men are exposed equally to the risks of war; nor is it true to say, with Messrs. Jordan and Angell, that, of those who go out, it is only the weaker who come back. Disease is often more formidable than the sword; and here it is plainly the stronger who mostly survive. Moreover, even in actual fighting, it is a shallow fallacy to assume that the best always expose themselves most, and are therefore killed in disproportionate numbers. Here, as in other departments of life, the boldest course is often the safest; and, on the whole, more men are killed on a retreat

than in an assault. This can be proved statistically; in nearly every war the beaten side is found to have lost far more heavily than the victors.

If, therefore, *all* the able-bodied men of a nation are exposed to the same risk, we have strong *a priori* reasons for expecting that those who survive will be, on the whole, of superior vitality to those who have fallen; either stronger, or more resourceful, or more determined, or all three together. But if, on the other hand, we call out only the most enterprising and most patriotic to fight for us, while the less enterprising and the less patriotic remain at home to make money and rear families under protection of a fleet and an army in which they bear no share—then we are not only teaching a bad moral lesson, but we are actually breeding out the virtues of courage and self-sacrifice. In proportion as all war is unavoidably dysgenic, war under these conditions is wilfully dysgenic.

Here comes in the remarkable argument of Otto Seeck, which Messrs. Jordan and Angell have so flagrantly and unconscientiously misrepresented. The first cause which Seeck finds for Graeco-Roman decay is the frequency of political quarrels followed by wholesale political murders; even in domestic politics no man could take a decided line without exposing himself to proscription and assassination. Therefore after several generations of this, "the men who had been bold enough to expose themselves in politics had perished almost without exception; only the cowards survived, and from their broods came

Nonsense
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the new generations."* The next most serious cause was, according to Seeck, "the barbarization of the armies." Rome, like practically all other nations, began with the principle of Universal Service. In the growing days of the Republic, when war was a profitable business, the *privilege* of serving in the army was limited to citizens who had at least some small "stake in the country"; the possessionless class, the proletariat, was excluded from the regular army, though it would certainly have been impressed if it had been needed. With the period of the Civil Wars, from Marius onwards, came the system of paid long-service armies, raised mainly by voluntary recruiting, and mainly now from the proletariat. From this time forward, the principle of the Citizen Army fell more and more into the background. The Voluntary Army system, invented during the unconstitutional rule of Marius, was still further developed by the still more despotic and unconstitutional rulers who followed him—Julius Caesar, Augustus, and the later Emperors. At last, compulsory service survived only as an exception—and, therefore, as a most burdensome and glaringly unjust exception—from which many redeemed themselves by money payments. Long before the fall of Rome, Imperial law recognized that "our armies are generally raised by voluntary recruiting," and that

* *Untergang d. Antiken Welt*, Vol. I. ed. I. p. 269; ed. III., p. 286. Mr. Angell, in his latest edition, still quotes this in an absolutely false context, and in justification of a thesis which Seeck flatly contradicts. Principal Jordan, from whom he has evidently borrowed it, shows a little more sense of Seeck's actual meaning on this point, though even he is very misleading.

voluntary recruiting became more and more difficult. It was finally impossible to raise the necessary 150,000 legionaries among the six millions of Roman citizens; non-Romans were recruited, in increasing numbers, even for the legions.

This, then, was the process of steady development during the three most peaceful centuries which the civilized Western world has ever enjoyed; centuries during which the armies spent some nine-tenths of their time on the frontiers, guarding civilization against the outside barbarian. During all this time there was a perpetual flow of adventurous men from the provinces to the frontier barracks, where they spent all the best part of their lives, and came back, if at all, too late to found a family. This was, as Seeck insists, a thoroughly dysgenic system; it helped to "breed out" a very virile element from the Roman Empire.*

The fighting actually done by these men, their

* Principal Jordan, in quoting from Benjamin Franklin's letter to Baynes, and others who quote from Darwin's *Descent of Man* (part I. chap. v. ed. 1901, p. 206), fail to note that the main dysgenic element which both of these writers find in the army-system is one specially characteristic of *voluntary* recruiting, which makes the recruit into a professional long-service soldier, and *prevents his marrying* (a point emphasized both by Franklin and Darwin) during the prime of life. The very fact that both Franklin and Darwin speak of a *standing army* might have drawn attention to what was evidently in both their minds, in spite of Darwin's use of the word "conscription." French "conscription," at the time when Darwin wrote, was in fact mainly a long-service system, uniting the disadvantages both of voluntary and of compulsory service; the army was both "conscripted" and "standing," and a similar mixed method was in force in other countries also. Since 1871, when Darwin wrote, no continental army-system has prevented a man from marrying as early as 25; it is only under the British voluntary system that this highly dysgenic cause is at work.

actual losses in battle, were far smaller than those of the barbarians outside the Empire. Of the German tribes, in especial, we know that they fought ceaselessly, from generation to generation, with Romans, or with other German tribes, or with more distant barbarians. If carnage in battle were the main cause, or even one of the main causes, of national degeneration, the facts of Roman history would be absolutely inexplicable. These barbarians, after three hundred years of ceaseless warfare, would have sunk to the lowest depths of weakness; Rome, strengthened by three whole centuries of unexampled tranquillity, would have been bred and civilized up to an almost superhuman standard. Towards the close of the first century, Rome was in a position immeasurably superior to that of the outside nations. At the end of the fourth century, therefore, (if the Jordan—Angell theory were as true in fact as it is superficially simple) the Roman should have stood higher above the Goths and Vandals than the modern Briton stands above the Australian aborigine. Yet, at the first serious attack from the Goths and Vandals, the Roman Empire collapsed like a house of cards.

Nor is this an isolated example. Seeck gives a series of very startling parallels from ancient history. Down to the very latest times, again, we are confronted with facts which no legitimate mental process can reconcile with this simple Jordan—Angell theory. After Rome, they both choose Spain as the example of the warlike, and therefore unsuccessful, Power. But Spain, during the last 600 years, at

least, has been less warlike than France or Germany or Austro-Hungary, whether we consider her wars fought, her numbers of drilled men, or her reserves of military power. It is even disputable whether, in any real sense, Spain has shown herself more warlike than Britain or Italy. Certainly, on the whole, she has more claim to the position of least warlike, than to that of most warlike, among the European Powers. But this is not the way in which the Jordan—Angell mind works. For them, it is necessary to begin by picking out a confessedly *less successful* nation; to assume that this nation is *warlike*; and thus to prove that warlike nations (in the plural) are less successful than peaceful nations. I say advisedly “to assume,” for neither author sets himself to prove the only part of the proposition which really needs proof—the specially warlike character of Spain.

Nearly a century and a half ago, this same question of Spanish decay was dealt with by Bernardin de St-Pierre, a philosophical observer who was very far indeed from a militarist. In the sixth chapter of his *Wishes of a Recluse* he wrote: “Spain has been weakened neither by wars nor by emigrations to America, as so many politicians have alleged; but on the contrary, by peace, and the excessive multiplication of noble families which has resulted from it. The long and bloody wars of the League cut off great numbers of men of family in France; but France, so far from being weakened, increased in population and riches up to the time of Louis XIV. The emigrations from England, a country much

smaller than Spain, have formed in America colonies much more flourishing and more populous than the Spanish; and so far from diminishing the strength of England, they would have increased it had they been more closely united to the Mother Country, from which they separated merely in consequence of their strength. It is because in England the interests of the nobility are linked to those of the people; and because, like them, they apply to agriculture, to commercial navigation, and trade. Finally, several states in Italy, which, as Genoa, Venice, Naples, and in Sicily, etc., have had neither wars to support nor colonies to supply, are reduced to a state of weakness which is constantly increasing, without the possibility of ascribing it to any other cause but the inheritance of nobility, and fresh patents which are continually multiplying the class of idle noblemen at the expense of the labouring classes of the people."

Since those words were written, France has done far more fighting than Spain, and kept a larger proportion of men under arms, yet she still holds her lead. Nor (comparing Spain with England) can we go off into the simple explanation that English industrialism has made the whole difference. Industrialism is, of course, a magnificent asset; but it would still remain for our two philosophers to prove that the industrial nation cannot also be warlike, or *vice versa*. They have jumped instead to the superficial conclusion that these two activities exclude each other. A man cannot, of course, be fighting and doing factory-work at the same time,

just as he cannot read and run at the same time. But many of our most distinguished men of brains or of business have been equally distinguished athletes; and, as even Novikow admits, the warlike nations have, on the whole, been the living nations in other ways. France's industrial record stands quite as high above Spain's as does her military record.

And the same difficulty meets us down to the very latest times. The extraordinary development of Germany, since her two bloody wars of 1866 and 1870, proves this much at least, that we cannot reduce the problem to the simple journalistic terms in which Messrs. Jordan and Angell write of it. France, again, has advanced very much since 1870, except in population. And here are the words in which Abraham Lincoln's official biographers write of the United States since their great war: "The carnage and the waste of it had surpassed the darkest forebodings, the most reckless prophecies . . . It seems a disheartening paradox to the lovers of peace, that all this homicide and spoil gave only a new impulse to the growth and wealth of the nation. We have seen how the quick eye of Lincoln recognized the fact, on the very night of election, that the voting strength of the country was greater in 1864 than it had been in 1860, and the census of 1870 showed a prodigious advance in prosperity and population. The 31,443,321 of 1860 had in the ten troubled years of war and reconstruction increased to 38,558,371; and the wealth of the country had

waxed in an astonishing proportion of \$16,159,616,068 to \$30,068,518,507. Even the re-conquered States shared in this enormous progress.”*

This, of course, is an exceptional case; an enormous amount of this prosperity was due to immigration. But the fact remains that the numerical wastage even of a great war may be rapidly supplied, and that the highest manifestations in poetry, art, and science have often been shortly after, or even during, such wars. These facts tend to show that, though war is a very wasteful as well as a very horrible thing, a nation may be even more wasteful, and may do more horrible things, in time of peace. We cannot solve the problem by quietly assuming, with Messrs. Jordan and Angell, that a nation freed from war will always substitute healthy peace activities for its old warlike activities; that the time of tran-

* Nicolay and Hay, *Abraham Lincoln*, Vol. X. 1890, p. 339. The difficulty of seeing these things in their true perspective at the time is admirably illustrated by a passage in Mr. T. P. O'Connor's *Lord Beaconsfield* (1879, p. 539). Though Beaconsfield was far from an anti-militarist, he prophesied in 1863 that America, when the Civil War was over, would “be an America of armies, of diplomacy, of rival States and manœuvring Cabinets, of frequent turbulence, and probably of frequent wars” An equally lurid prophecy, written from a very different and almost Cobdenite standpoint, may be found in the leader of the *Illustrated London News* for Sept. 19, 1863. The writer sums up, “Freedom of speech, freedom of writing, freedom from arbitrary arrest, freedom of the person—all these are gone [in America]. They may not, perhaps, be gone beyond recall; but, certainly, they are not to be re-obtained by the present generation without struggles as keen and sanguinary as have always attended the conquest or re-conquest of such priceless treasures in other civilized nations.” It is hardly necessary to remind the reader of the real fact that all these liberties were restored without a struggle, as soon as the end of the war rendered the restrictions unnecessary. Between June 1865 and August 1866 ordinary peace conditions were successively proclaimed in all the States of the Union (*ibid.* p. 338).

quillity (I avoid the word *peace*, which partly begs the question) will not be a time of even greater national waste and immorality than a period of tranquillity chequered by war. Next to Rome, China is our greatest example of a nation enjoying ages of comparative freedom from war.* Yet China is not only infinitely less industrialized than warlike Europe, but far less productive in literature; and it will be seen presently that even Mr. G. L. Dickinson, who has for years held a brief in favour of China, confesses the present generation of young Chinamen to be fatally lacking in political sense.†

I have been so gratuitously misrepresented by professional pacifists that I must remind the reader here again of my point of view. If Bernhardism seemed a serious danger to English civilization, I would infinitely rather spend my time in combating Bernhardism. I have, however, never met an otherwise serious and responsible person who, if he had to choose between adherence to all Bernhardt's exaggerations or to all Mr. Angell's, would not choose the latter.‡ But my point is: Why should we blindly rush into ridiculous and fatal exaggerations on *either* side? And, above all, how can it be safe or moral for any nation to shape its practical policy, not by the

* When Mr. Angell argues from the assumption that "the United States is perhaps the least militarized nation in the world," he is taking further liberties with well-known facts. Since the United States had a history, she has not only fought incomparably more than China, but drilled an incomparably larger proportion of her population.

† See my later chapter, *Peace and War in History*.

‡ See the later chapter of his book, *Prussianism in Britain*.

methods of old pacificism, which depended upon the gradual rise of our moral standards, but according to the dictates of this new quackery, which promises to render disarmament possible by convincing the world that "military power cannot achieve any of those objects for which civilized states are founded" ? —which promises to convince the world, yet cannot even convince itself, without ignoring the most essential facts, or without the grossest logical fallacies. Would it not be a grave national disaster if, in order to cure the small minority of their Bernhardistic follies, the majority were to rush into the opposite follies of Angellism ?

It only remains to notice three more arguments used by Mr. Angell in this Chapter V.

I. He writes (ed. 1914, p. 233): "Perhaps the militarist will argue that, while useless and unjust wars make for degeneration, just wars are a moral regeneration. But did a nation, group, tribe, family, or individual ever yet enter into a war which he did not think just?" It ought not to be necessary to remind him that, when we are discussing the survival of the fittest, the point is, not what people think themselves, but what they are. If a man who *thinks himself* strong attacks another who *is* strong, he is bitterly undeceived by the result; and the same is true of justice. Only those who believe that justice has no effect on human actions—not even an indirect effect—will plead that (other things being equal) the nation which only *thinks* itself just can contend successfully against the nation which *is* just;

or again, that the man who fights under a misconception has the same moral force as one who fights under reasoned conviction, having carefully weighed both sides.*

Moreover, if this argument of the identity between the appearance of a thing and the reality of the thing were valid, it would be fatal to his own case. His whole theory, as we have seen, depends upon the real distinction between offensive and defensive warfare. Offensive warfare, he says, can never "pay"; but defensive war is profitable, since it is not war, but the cancellation of war. Now, hasty people have sometimes argued—indeed, as will be seen in a later chapter of this book, even Mr. Angell's distinguished colleague, Mr. Bertrand Russell, does actually argue—that there is no real distinction between the offensive and defensive in warfare, because both sides always claim to be fighting in self-defence. This objection, if it were valid, would of course ruin Mr. Angell's whole case; but Mr. Angell would rightly dismiss it as sophistical. He might justly say even more; he might say, it is "as patently sophistical as my own argument about real justice and imaginary justice on p. 233 of *The Great Illusion*."

II. Again, his attempt to prove that war is one

* In his *Prussianism* (e.g. pp. 41, 234) Mr. Angell seems to recognize that justice is not only a moral but a material asset in war; but there again his language is distressingly, and perhaps purposely, vague. On p. 36 of the same book he clearly rules out the influence of justice altogether: "The outcome of physical conflict, the arbitrament of the sword, is in the end only an accident as far as the moral issues are concerned."

of the most dysgenic factors in history, because it works by false selection, is to a great extent stultified by his footnote to p. 218, "The most recent opinion on evolution would go to show that environment plays an even larger rôle in the formation of character than selection (see Prince Kropotkin's article, *Nineteenth Century*, July 1910, in which he shows that experiment reveals the direct action of surroundings as the main factor of evolution). How immensely, therefore, must our industrial environment modify the pugnacious impulse of our nature!"

This argument depends as usual on our mistaking the cheque-book for the money. If we confine ourselves to the consideration of actual war and actual fighting, the argument is true, but useless for our main purpose. Nobody doubts that absolutely continuous war would be as bad for the race as absolutely continuous eating and drinking would be.* Even Bernhardi only hopes to have wars, like meals, at fairly regular intervals; in the mean time he would keep the nation alert by the completest preparations for the next coming war. These preparations are compatible with a very high decree of industrialism; we actually see that, in the generation which has prepared for this present war, Germany has made

* Mr. Angell himself recognizes that, "excluding a few extremists," even militarists are "always in favour of peace" at any given moment. But, as usual, he recognizes this truth only at a point where it is of momentary convenience for his argument; and he counts it among the "Fallacies of Militarism." (*Prussianism*, p. 103.) The fallacy (to use no stronger word) is of course his own: even the worst militarists are not quite so foolish as it suits Mr. Angell's purpose to paint them.

more rapid advances in industrialism than Britain herself. As compared with us, she is not only more military than she was thirty years ago, but also far more industrial. Bernhardt complained that this prosperity was rendering her too peaceful; but Baron v. Stengel, Germany's first representative at the Hague Conferences, congratulated himself that German pacifists had more influence abroad than at home; and that, if German ideas were drifting away from war, the other Powers were losing their militarism even more rapidly. There is nothing in history to prove that a state may not, for many generations, keep up a high standard of industrialism and of militancy. We have already noted that modern China is as little industrialist as she is militarist: with a population of great natural skill in mechanics, she knows little of mechanical or commercial co-operation on a great scale; her inventions and her literary achievements date mainly from her earlier and more military centuries. And, indeed, many impartial observers are even inclined to attribute a great part of German business efficiency to the effect of universal military service.* Industrialism

* Professor Hadley, President of Yale University, said in a purely educational address at the end of 1908: "The majority of intelligent and patriotic Germans will to-day tell you that the German Army gives the German nation habits of discipline, cleanliness and efficiency which cannot be obtained in any other way; and that two years of withdrawal from active industry is a very cheap price to pay for training which makes a man a more efficient worker and a more useful citizen for twenty years thereafter." (*Nation in Arms*, January, 1909, p. 9.) Similar evidence is given by Mr. W. Harbutt Dawson in his *Evolution of Modern Germany*. (1908, p. 151.) Speaking of educational influences which give the German workman an advantage over his English rival, he says: "The first is the continuation school, and

is inconsistent, no doubt, with the constant *exercise* of military force in war; but it is perfectly consistent with the accumulation of enormous *reserves* of military force; indeed, even such thoroughly unmilitarist observers as Principal Hadley and Mr. W. H. Dawson believe that the two lines of energy are not only not antagonistic, but actually supplementary one to another. In emphasizing the preponderant effect of environment, therefore, Mr. Angell at once weakens his argument from selection by more than 50 per cent. without gaining any corresponding advantage. He does not realize that his true business is, not to confute exaggerations which even Bernhardi never indulged in, but to meet the moderate people who are reluctantly compelled to believe that war has never yet had exclusively evil effects, or tranquillity such exclusively good effects, as to enable us to treat the whole question as a self-evident contrast in black and white. Mr. Angell, in his saner moments, shows himself quite aware that warlike organization and industrial organization call out very much the same qualities; he insists that direction is what is needed; that we must direct our pugnacity, not against our fellow-man, but against the planet; to wring as much as possible out of mother earth, and to enjoy this in all possible harmony with our fellow-man. That, of course, is perfectly true; it is the truth of the older pacificists; it is, in another form, the truth

the second is the institution of military service." The reader will find in my Appendix II that the general Swiss opinion is to the same effect.

of Dante and St. Augustine, that love is the main-spring of life, and that earth would be a heaven if our love were always directed to worthy objects. But this requires not only the intellectual assent which (according to Mr. Angell) is to change men's views on this subject in a generation or two; it requires a far deeper change of heart. To direct our love or our pugnacity in the right direction is at least as hard as to eat and drink exactly what we know to be right. Therefore, while two-thirds of our drink-bill remains confessedly injurious to national physique and morals, it is not idealism but self-deception to hope for more rapid victory than this in the matter of War and Peace. Nor is our case here improved by bolstering up these hopes with facts that are not facts, and with arguments that really tell against our own case.

III. Mr. Angell's final argument on this subject is one which, as I know from bitter experience, is as telling with prejudiced audiences as it is essentially slanderous. It may be put in one line: "The soldier, though a necessary rascal, is an undeniable rascal." I am not dealing with this in my text, because I believe that this present war, if it has done nothing else, has rendered all decent people far more generous towards our private soldiers. Present-day facts have reminded us of Ruskin's remark, that the moral difference between a soldier and a civilian is not the difference of killing, but of being killed. Mr. Angell, when he encouraged what was lately his own country in defending herself "to the last

penny and to the last man," incurred the same responsibility before God as I do and as the soldier does. His share in the carnage now raging over Europe is not really diminished by the fact that he, in common with those who are past military age, does not risk his own life. Like Aesop's trumpeter, he is morally accountable, even though he escapes the physical burden. These facts are at last self-evident; and the public is now as considerate to the soldier as it was inconsiderate eighteen months ago. I have therefore relegated my remarks on this subject to Appendix IX, where they may be found by anyone who thinks that I am doing Mr. Angell injustice.

A good deal has been written lately about War and Eugenics by men of various degrees of eminence in physical science. The three best known are perhaps Sir Ronald Ross, Mr. Chalmers Mitchell, and Professor J. A. Thomson. Each of these, in effect, warns us to steer carefully between cheap Bernhardism and cheap Angellism.

Mr. Chalmers Mitchell points out how, "even on the physical side, the evidence is vague and conflicting"; how untrustworthy are the hearsay statistics as to the fall in French stature adduced by Mr. Angell and others; and how, though the French children conceived during the war of 1870/1 were distinctly below the average, yet careful anthropometrical investigation proved that "a fortunate compensation is afforded in another direction. For

the generation conceived of the men returned to their families at the close of the war has shown a distinctly upward tendency almost as marked. Those who survived the perils and privations of service were presumably in many cases the most active and rugged, the weaker portion having succumbed in the meanwhile either to wounds or sickness. The result was that the generation conceived directly after the war was as much above the average, especially evinced in general physique more than in stature, as their predecessors, born of war times, were below the normal."*

Professor Thomson writes: "We have practically no certainties in regard to the biological effect that a great war may have on a race." Though "there are more than hints of dysgenic tendencies in modern war," yet "we cannot end without expressing the hope that, even if the natural inheritance of our race must suffer impoverishment through the tragic sifting of this most terrible war, we shall win through in the end with our social heritage enriched." And Sir Ronald Ross, after noting in detail some of Principal Jordan's worst blunders, concludes: "In fact a general survey of human history appears to lead us to a conclusion precisely opposite to that arrived at by Dr. Jordan. War is a dreadful thing;

* Mr. Angell himself is dimly aware of this possibility, though, as usual, he forgets it just in that context where it would really be most to the point. In *Prussianism*, p. 56, he points out that a *very possible* result of this war will be to increase the fertility of "the people of simple life." Such people form, of course, the backbone of every state.

but nevertheless it may quite possibly be utilized by nature for raising racial standards; and the first concern of science is to ascertain truth."*

IX

MR. ANGELL'S GERMAN HISTORY

Our author's ignorance of Roman history is natural enough, though a man who cannot quote three consecutive Latin words correctly might have shown at least the Socratic wisdom of avoiding a subject of which he knows so little.† Moreover, as a rancher and a journalist he was not likely to be very strong in religious history; here, again, however, there was no reason why he should have rushed in where even fools have sometimes feared to tread. But he might at least be expected to know a little of the history of our own times, and especially of Germany and Belgium; for Anglo-German relations form an essential part of his *Illusion*, and his references to Belgium are frequent. To realize the depth of his complacent ignorance here, it is necessary to study the Summer School Report and the preface to his *Prussianism*.

* See P. Chalmers Mitchell, *Evolution and the War*, pp. 75—78; *Eugenics Review*, April 1915, pp. 1, 14; *Science Progress*, Jan. 1914, p. 591.

† Through perhaps a dozen editions he has printed "latifundia perditere Romam"; in the latest we have *Romam* corrected to *Italiam*, but *perditere* still remains. (*Illusion*, 1914, p. 223; *Prussianism*, p. 141.)

The "International Polity Summer School" met, under the auspices of the Garton Foundation, from July 17 to July 27, 1914. It was attended by the *elite*, not only of British, but to a certain extent of foreign, Angellites. In a debate on July 23, Lieut. Townroe pointed out, not only that Jaurès, the leader of French pacificism, was in favour of compulsory recruiting, but also that for thirty years it was the Liberals of Belgium who fought for compulsory military training, and the Belgian Conservatives who resisted it. To this Mr. Angell fluently replied with an excuse with regard to Jaurès which led Lieut. Townroe to rejoin, "I doubt whether Mr. Angell has really read Jaurès's book." Mr. Angell was silent here; and my present readers know that Lieut. Townroe might have put it still more bluntly, "It is quite evident that Mr. Angell has never read it." With regard to Belgium Mr. Angell replied with equal readiness, "That was why it was that in Belgium the conservative people resisted the proposal for a militia, because it was a step away from the more thorough-going military measures which are now there established." (p. 181.) It would be difficult to pack more untruths into so few words. (1) The Conservatives resisted the proposal for compulsory service *on anti-militarist grounds*; I am informed, for instance, by a Professor Fernand Deschamps of Antwerp that anti-militarism was actually the one essential dogma of the Antwerp Conservative party; that men of the most varied political views were welcomed into that party so long as they were willing to vote

as anti-militarists. The motto of the Belgian Conservatives, in military policy, was "not a man more, not a half-penny more," or, as a variation, "not a gun more." (2) There was never any Liberal "proposal for a militia"; the Liberals consistently fought during thirty years for "the more thorough-going military measures which are now there established"; *i.e.* for the very thing which (according to Mr. Angell's fiction) the Conservatives desired! The Socialists would gladly have had a militia instead, but their wishes never came within practical politics; therefore they supported the Liberals. (3) Thus, not only are Mr. Angell's details wrong, but the whole point of his excuse is flatly contrary to the facts. The Liberal platform was not "a step *away from* the more thorough-going military measures," but a step *towards* such more thorough measures; indeed, one Liberal fraction broke off from the party because it looked upon even the considerable military increase under the recent Law as insufficient. Again, so far were the Conservatives from desiring more thorough-going measures, that they resisted in fact on exactly opposite grounds; because, as a professionally pacifist party, they objected to what they designated as Liberal "militarism." Their objections, apart from their real pacifism, rested mainly on religious and social grounds; for, until a few years ago at any rate, the Belgian army was a hotbed of anti-clericalism, and the Conservative party in Belgium is the clerical party. I have followed Mr. Angell too closely to have any illusions

now as to his motives for making a statement so dogmatic and so contrary to the actual facts. In Appendix X the reader will find overwhelming proof that it is *habitual* with Mr. Angell to quote from books which he has not even read, while carefully giving full titles, &c., in order to produce an impression of familiarity with them. In the case of Jaurès, Mr. Angell repeated here the same misstatement which I had long before corrected in the assistant who acted as intermediary between him and me.* This assistant frankly confessed that the actual quotations I produced from Jaurès's book rendered the statement untenable; and it is not conceivable that, during all those months, this assistant should not have given Mr. Angell any warning hint. With regard to the excuse about Belgium, I have no doubt myself that Mr. Angell was impelled to get rid of an otherwise insuperable objection in debate by answering it in the first words that came into his head. Lieut. Townroe, in the face of such confident assertions delivered with so accurate a manner, would naturally distrust his own knowledge of Belgian politics (in which he is no specialist) and would not venture to enter upon so direct a conflict upon matters of fact. This suspicion, as the reader will see, I base upon what I can prove to have been Mr. Angell's conduct in other cases. If it does him injustice, he has the remedy in his own hands. Any evidence which he can produce from Belgian papers and reviews, or from well-informed and responsible

* See p. 6 above, and Appendix I., p. xix.

Belgians, lending even the remotest support to the mis-statements which have here been pilloried—or, again, any plausible explanation of the misconceptions which have betrayed him into these mis-statements—shall be printed at my expense and added to this book, and I will call attention to the addition by an erratum-slip at this present page.

Let us now turn to the historical assertions in his *Prussianism, &c.* This book is simply a reprint of a portion of his *Illusion* with (1) a preface, (2) three preliminary chapters designed to put Anglo-German relations in their proper perspective, and (3) an epilogue, which is practically a plea for the policy of the Union of Democratic Control. The book was published during the present war, and in the light of the earlier facts of that war. It is significant of Mr. Angell's mentality, and of the mentality of those with whom he is now chiefly working, that the invasion of Belgium is not once mentioned, as possible or actual, in this book of 240 pages.

Now, his *Illusion* had already shown a very defective grasp of real German facts. Mr. Angell has not even the superficial knowledge of Germany which he has of France; he has not even been *Daily Mail* representative in Berlin. In 1909, when his publishers honoured me with a presentation copy of his book, though I knew nothing then of the author's literary career, the second-hand character of his German references was at once evident, though his French references seemed at least superficially

correct.* I have since found these latter to be less correct than I then thought. Nobody who knew anything of actual German life and thought could have exposed himself by suggesting Mr. Angell's serio-comic plan for limiting armaments *pari passu* on both sides of the North Sea, through a system of "pairing" between Members of Parliament, Professors, &c. Only a very ignorant person, again, could have accused Mr. Hyndman of ignorance for arguing from the assumption (to which even Bebel had publicly committed himself) that the German socialists, if war were declared, would march with the rest. (*Illusion*, 1914, p. 299.) The quotations from Mr. Angell himself, which I give in Appendix IV, show how utterly he miscalculated the strength of German finance, and how accurately a correspondent laid his finger on those errors four years ago; yet finance is generally conceded to be the subject on which Mr. Angell is least ignorant. His miscalculations as to German national cohesion were, of course, still more fatal. And finally, even after the declaration of war, and after even busy people had found time to read one or two elementary books or

* See Appendix X, "Mr. Angell's Borrowed Plumes." The reader may easily verify a good deal for himself by tracing Mr. Angell's quotations through the index. Here, for instance, are all the references to German writers occurring in the first column of the index to ed. 1911: pp. 210; 325—27; 83—85. These include seven quotations from German newspapers, and four from German books. In no case is the reference to the newspapers a direct one; the context makes it fairly plain that all the quotations are taken at second-hand from the *Daily Mail*. In the case of the books, though the German titles are given in full, there is no chapter-and-verse reference; and, as will be seen in Appendix X, Mr. Angell has evidently never seen the books to which he refers his readers.

articles on German history, Mr. Angell came forward with an explanation in his most accurate manner, which owes all its point to ignorance of the most essential and notorious facts.

We may thus briefly summarize the argument of Mr. Angell's *Prussianism*, in so far as the book is not merely a reprint of the earlier work :

(i) Before this war the Practical Man despised me as an Idealist, and denied that ideas had any real force. (ii) But the first lesson of this war has been to convince the Practical Man, like the rest of the world, that one German idea is at the bottom of all things, and that it is the Idealist who has made Germany what she now is. (iii) Since, therefore, an idea has transformed Germany, why should not an idea similarly transform Europe—the idea of which I am the humble exponent? If Treitschke could so completely hypnotize them, why should not we be as completely hypnotized by *The Great Illusion*? (iv) *Conclusion*: We shall not destroy Prussianism by force, but by clear argument: an idea created Prussianism, an idea will shatter it.

To this I answer: (i) You grossly exaggerate the attitude of the Practical Man towards ideas. (ii) The world in general knows that deeds contributed even more than ideas to create the present German mentality; it is only you and your friends who ignore this; (iii) even were it otherwise, yet the fact that

Treitschke's great intellectual and moral force, with an equal weight of learning, had only served to lead the Germans wrong, would not supply any logical ground for the conclusion that we were going to be led right by the ideas of a journalist who, under stress of argument, cannot even quote his own words correctly. (iv) The true conclusion is, that force is as necessary as argument to destroy a Prussianism which was created as much by force as by argument. These are my points; and I must again beg the reader's indulgence for the wearisome task of exposing a series of specious fallacies, and of unravelling new falsehoods from amid the old commonplaces with which they have been mingled.

We have seen that Mr. Angell's whole claim to originality lies in his emphasis upon the *rapid* convertibility of mankind, at this stage of civilization, to ideas which will result in an immediate beginning of disarmament. Older pacificism was sound enough, but too slow, with its appeal to the gradual raising of moral standards; now, however, we have in *The Great Illusion* a new invention altogether: "no previous experience necessary." The author writes: "I have succeeded, in an hour's talk, in giving an intelligent boy of twelve a clearer grasp of the real meaning of money and the mechanism of credit and exchange than is possessed by many a man of my acquaintance running large businesses. Now, if everybody in America, England and Germany could have as clear an idea of the real nature of wealth

and money, it would, in ten years' time, be an utter impossibility to organize a war scare."* By "hard thinking," and by writing on his forehead the golden motto, "Let us be honest!" Mr. Angell has worked out a theory comprehensible to the meanest capacity, and warranted to revolutionize the world! But he finds humanity in general slow to accept new ideas, and he therefore attacks the unconverted with his usual weapon of falsification. He puts up a Turk's Head, plunges headlong into the fray, and raises a great cloud of dust, from which he finally emerges very red and hot, and with only just breath enough to blow the trumpet of victory.

The Turk's Head here is Mr. Angell's conception of the Practical Man, who (it appears) believes and says that theories and ideals "should be *no* concern of statesmen and men of action, since it is their business to deal with 'things as they are.' Such is the attitude (as of course you are aware, if you have followed the discussion of the issues of war and peace, or of the more fundamental problems of international relationship) that has *invariably* been adopted by *all* those who desire to retain their reputation for practicality and common-sense."†

Now, is there one average man in a thousand who really holds that ideals are *no* concern of the

* *The Great Illusion*, 1911, p. 329. Most illuminating, in this connexion, are certain hints which Mr. Angell and his disciples let fall at their Summer Conference of 1914, only a few days before this war suddenly fell upon us.

† *Prussianism*, p. 2. Italics here and elsewhere mine, unless otherwise stated.

statesman? * Is it not, in fact, precisely the *ideal* of the average man which stands most in Mr. Angell's way? The heaviest cross which our Apostle has to bear (or shall we say, the most poisonous gas which our Intellectual Sanitary Engineer has to fight with?) is that obstinate and unbusinesslike ideal of patriotism, which prompts most men cruelly to misinterpret the journalist who can write on Monday as a Briton, and on Tuesday as an American. Here, as usual, Mr. Angell really means only a part of what his argument compels him to assert. He means that the average man is reluctant to abandon "things as they are" for a half-baked ideal, and that the average man, though he could not have given chapter and verse for Mr. Angell's blunders, very strongly suspects Mr. Angell's ideal of immaturity. The gross exaggeration, however, was necessary for Mr. Angell's controversial purpose, which was to exalt his own idealism by contrast with the brutal realism of "all those who desire to retain their reputation for practicality and common-sense."

And now the Great War has given him his chance. Until now (he argues) all practical men were invariably convinced that ideas were worthless. Now, all practical men are invariably saying that the one most important thing in this war is an Idea: there-

* I had intended to collect from this chapter the many similar instances where Mr. Angell's argument depends on ignoring all qualifications, and misrepresenting his opponents by describing their views with absurd exaggeration. But this habit of his is sufficiently exposed in Appendix III; and the curious reader may amuse himself by underlining the many similar instances which he will find in this first chapter of *Prussianism*, &c.

fore Mr. Angell is triumphant, but condescendingly merciful to the poor practical man, who will know better in future. Only, unluckily, this new and repentant practical man in the Preface to *Prussianism* is just as unreal as the old unrepentant one was; they both exist only in Mr. Angell's imagination, and for the benefit of Mr. Angell's theories.

He writes: "The first chapter of this volume contains an attempt to show how *completely* we have been won to the view that this war, and the transformation of the German people from a beneficent moral force in Europe to an evil one, is *all* the work of an idea, a false philosophy advocated by *a few professors and writers.*" Again, "The war in which we are engaged, the greatest in so many respects that has marked our history, or any history, *has but one basic and fundamental cause*: theories, aspirations, dreams, desires—the *false theories of professors*, the false ideals of ideologues. For we in Britain are practically agreed that this war is the result of a false national doctrine, *which is in its turn the work of half a dozen professors* and a few writers and theorists—Nietzsche, Treitschke, and their school." Again, "This miracle of transformation, *the work of a few professors*, has been accomplished within a period of half a century or less. And the very practical British people who gave this verdict were until yesterday declaring that ideas, theories, and doctrines *are of no account or import in the world.*"

Who ever asserted such nonsense as these last

words? The only evidence Mr. Angell can give us is to quote, without chapter and verse, from "a popular journalist" whom he does not even name, and who appears to have said that "all fine-spun theories, all *sentimental* aspirations and *vague* generalities, *the whole collection of shibboleths treasured by the idealists and the dreamers*, are shattered by the first whiff of grapeshot."* The very words *sentimental*, *vague*, *shibboleth*, show plainly that the writer is speaking only of *unreal* ideas, and that he uses "the idealists" in scorn for "the self-styled idealists," exactly as Mr. Angell uses "the practical man" for "the self-styled practical man." It would be as absurd to accuse even this anonymous journalist of denying the value of true ideas as to accuse Mr. Angell of denying the value of real practice. Mr. Angell, as usual, is using the arts of the pillmonger. In order to advertise his wares he exaggerates grossly at both ends: he represents the patient as far worse, and the cure as far more complete, than anything which is justified by the facts. The public never suffered from such a violent abhorrence of ideas as Mr. Angell would have us imagine; nor, on the other hand, is the public so foolish as to agree now with Mr. Angell in attributing the present war so exclusively to professorial ideas. The general public is well aware that practical facts did far more to form the

* *Prussianism*, pp. xvi, 2, 5, repeated again p. 80. On p. 50 he shows a vague consciousness that German victories did also contribute to the same result; but there is nothing in his book, I believe, that could seriously attenuate the false impression conveyed by the words which I have italicized.

present German mentality than all the professors of the Fatherland put together. But for these hard facts the professors would have preached in vain; they would not only have seemed, but they would actually have been, dealers in "vague generalities" or "shibboleths," and therefore almost negligible. We must not fall into Mr. Angell's own vice of exaggeration, and say that he, the popular idealist, positively hates facts; but it may safely be said that he shows quite as little respect for facts as the average practical man shows for ideas.

It is almost an insult to the reader to recapitulate the practical facts which alone have given force (and even some measure of reality) to professorial ideas in Germany. During the years when (as Mirabeau exaggeratedly put it) "Prussia's only industry was war," she rose from comparative obscurity to the rank of a First-Class Power. When the French Revolution turned all Frenchmen into soldiers, the Prussian Government feared to introduce Universal Service, lest it should harm them commercially and politically;* the result was the overwhelming catastrophe of Jena. Universal Service was then introduced with the help of a wave of public opinion, and the Wars of Liberation put Prussia even higher than

* Not that the people feared to lose their liberties, but that the King feared to arm the citizens lest they should then proceed to vindicate their liberties, as the French had done. In the columns of the *Nation* (June—July 1915) I have appealed vainly for a single instance in history of a nation which, having adopted compulsory service, has found itself less democratic or less prosperous than in its old voluntarist days. Even in Germany, Universal Service brought about, as a direct result, Universal Suffrage.

she had stood before Jena. In 1848 the democratic leaders attempted to create a German Empire, and their childish incompetence in practical politics rendered them the laughing-stock of Europe. A few years later Bismarck came into power. He insisted on spending enormously upon the army, in steady and open defiance of parliamentary votes, and thus helped to win two wars which rendered Prussia undisputed mistress of a North German Confederation.* Thenceforward Bismarck was master of Germany; not for what he had argued, but for what he had done. In 1870 a greater and still more successful war created the present German Empire. After a brief commercial crisis, Germany cast free-trade theories to the winds, and entered upon that career of industrial and commercial expansion which has few equals in history.

We, outside Germany, see clearly that this is not all the truth; but we need to remember that the outsider himself does not see the whole truth; that part, though perhaps the smaller part, is visible only from inside; that, while we see things which the Germans are blind to, they also see things which it is hard for us to realize. On the one hand, we are perfectly willing to chime in with the epigrammatist who says that these wars made Germany great and the Germans small. Again, as Free Traders, we have a right to believe that, in the long run,

* It is noteworthy, moreover, that he undertook the war of 1866 just at the moment when Mr. Angell would have us believe it an act of sheer madness—at the moment of an almost unexampled commercial crisis. See the end of Appendix IV.

Germany will see almost as much reason to regret her commercial as her military policy. But, on the other hand, Mr. H. G. Wells, whom no man will accuse of disloyalty to the democratic idea, has recently confessed with courageous frankness that German successes have put non-German Democracy very seriously upon its trial. (*The Nation*, July 24, 1915.) German arguments often seem to us ridiculous; but German facts must give us seriously to pause. If, then, honest outsiders are so impressed; if we, who feel that we would rather die than live under the Prussian *régime*, are yet compelled to do just homage to actual facts, what must be the influence of these facts upon German mentality? It is nearly thirty years since I first spent my holidays in Germany, with personal friends who were strong anti-Bismarckians and pacificists. In pointing out the danger from the teaching of Treitschke (who in those days was at his height of popularity), my friends pointed out also that the real danger lay in the facts upon which Treitschke took his stand—among them, the fact that militarist Germany was gaining hand over hand, in European influence, over comparatively pacific Britain; and that Austria, before whom Prussia had positively quailed in Bismarck's early days, was now a humble satellite of the Prussianised Empire. Success of this kind is enough to intoxicate a nation, even though all the professors should hold their tongues.

Let us, for a moment, put ourselves in the German position, and suppose that our peace policy had been

as exaggerated, and as apparently successful, as the war policy of Prussia has been. The parallel would run, roughly, as follows: Under George I we should have been a third-rate power; under George II we should already have risen into the first rank, our policy all the time being so markedly pacific that Mirabeau might have been able to say of us: "The national industry of England is peace." Under George III we allow ourselves to forget a great deal of our pacifist traditions, and are rudely awakened by the worst disaster in our history—worse, in proportion, even than the Norman Conquest. Then by a conscious and definite return to pacificism we regain all that we had lost, and more. Later on, we drift towards militarism again, under the influence of a sudden Tory revolt. The Tories, for a moment all-powerful, presently show a practical impotence which renders them ridiculous to their own and all future generations. A most determined pacifist of remarkable genius, becoming prime minister shortly afterwards, pursues his own policy in spite of the almost unanimous militarism of the House of Commons. For years he becomes the most hated man in the kingdom; even after his final success, a Bill of Indemnity is needed to shield him from the legal results of his unyielding defiance to the Commons. But that defiance bears fruit. The two rivals whom for centuries we had dreaded are within four years (1866—70) reduced to impotence. A few years before, we had been on bad terms with Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa; but now, two-thirds

of the English-speaking world is welded together into one of the most indissoluble existing political unities. After a brief commercial crisis, we enter upon a generation of commercial expansion almost as remarkable as our political achievements; and this era of prosperity coincides with our abandonment of the old tariff system, and our frank adoption of Free Trade.

We have here a pretty exact analogy to the last 150 years of German history. If, under these circumstances, "half a dozen professors" preached the world-wide mission of England, taught the world how we had grown to greatness by peace and free trade, and insisted that by peace and free trade we were destined to revolutionize the world—if the gospel preached by these men seemed the only reasonable gospel to the vast majority of our countrymen—where would a real historian find the main cause of all this? Would he attribute the success of the doctrine mainly to the influence of actual facts?—to the national experience burned into men's minds even through the fire of affliction? Or would he ascribe it to the chance that certain men hit upon a certain idea, and were persuasive enough to communicate that idea to the people—to inoculate the body-politic with a bacillus from which it had previously been immune? What, again, should we think of a German militarist, who should seize upon this attitude of Britain as demonstrating the force of ideas as opposed to the force of facts, and who should seek to advertise his own militarist nostrums

under cover of the success which had attended the professorial pacifist propaganda in England?

I must again apologize to my readers for labouring a point so obvious. But if it were necessary to recall Mr. Norman Angell at every step to the obvious, he would no longer be the Mr. Angell whom we have known for the last five or six years. His account of the change in German mentality leaves out the one essential and controlling factor; and his whole argument depends upon this absurd omission.

Moreover, his ideas about earlier German generations are childishly superficial. He has got hold of a few newspaper tags, and has pieced them together with pathetic docility. Even the most hastily-written among them do not, of course, really bear him out; the gulf between pre-Bismarckian Germany and modern Germany is really far narrower than Mr. Angell imagines. It is not only that the ideas of the Prussian squirearchy, who possess so much political power in Germany, have changed less, perhaps, during the last hundred and fifty years than those of any other class in Europe. But of Germany in general, even the wildest journalistic licence will not excuse the following description in a book which professes to correct world-wide political misconceptions by dint of sheer "hard thinking" and "being honest": "There was a Germany that for centuries in Europe meant, as even our newspapers in war-time admit, 'cradle-songs and fairy-stories, and

Christmas in old moonlit towns, and a queer simple tenderness always childish and musical . . . All other nations had some wickedness in them; but they kept a kind of innocence which made them the musicians of the world.'"* Even British insular ignorance never really went so far as this in its misconception of the general German character. As early as 1791 the future Bishop of Lichfield must have expressed the thoughts of many Englishmen when he wrote, "Germany is divided into many small and ill-governed states, and fortunately; for otherwise, what power in Europe could withstand its confederate and united powers?" A little later we find a correspondent in the *Monthly Magazine* pointing out that the characters in German fiction and drama, which seemed so overdrawn to English readers, were in fact true to life; that they faithfully mirrored a certain crudeness and lack of balance in the German national character: "What would be with us extravagance is with them but nature."† This last, of course, was written while we and the chief states of Germany were political allies. If Mr. Angell, instead of building his theories out of newspaper-snippings, had read for himself in German literature and history of a century ago, he would have realized how much of the modern German character existed then; and with what fatal ease a

* *Prussianism*, p. 49: the quotation is from the *Times Literary Supplement*.

† *Tour through Germany, etc.*, by Robert Gray, M.A., pub. 1794. *Monthly Magazine* for 1798, Vol. I. pp. 173—4.

people so lacking in independent political experience might be first intoxicated by sudden success in war, and then systematically misled by the philosophers of militarism.*

In this context Mr. Angell brings in again, at some length, his analogy of the Wars of Religion. The analogy is even closer than he suspects; for in each case Mr. Angell bases his demonstration upon exactly the same fundamental blunder. We have seen how his philosophy of religious history entirely ignored the working of practical experience in putting a stop to wars of creed. In that field his whole argument is radically stultified by his failure to realize how the fighting-man not only made it possible for the voice of reason to be heard, but actually gave the dignity of full-truths to arguments which, without him, would have remained half-truths; how it was the "cancellation of force by force," which not only *proved* that persecution would not pay, but actually *made* persecution into an unprofitable business. His whole argument about Prussia—that is practically the whole of his *Prussianism*, except

* In 1818, in the kingdom of Hanover, a poor wretch was solemnly subjected to judicial torture on the accusation of having stolen a cow. (S. Laing, *Observations, etc.*, 1850, p. 193.) As Laing remarks, "The public functionaries in Hanover are as highly educated and humane as those of any other part of Germany." What was really lacking was "the want of progress in humane civilized feeling with the progress of the age, the want of responsibility to public opinion." On p. 275 of the same book, and on pp. 130—7 of his earlier *Notes of a Traveller*, Laing points out that German idealism was confined to a very few, leaving the many untouched; and German literature itself is full of similar indications. Laing's earlier book, especially, is of great interest now; his very prejudices and inaccuracies are stimulating and instructive; they mark the British point of view two generations ago.

those parts which are merely a textual reprint of his former fallacies—is vitiated by an exactly similar blunder. The change for the worse in Germany has been far more due to deceptive facts than to deceptive theories, and we must open German eyes to the facts by “cancelling their force” before they will even begin to listen seriously to our theories. Moreover, we ourselves cannot be sure of the truth of our own theories until we have cancelled German force. If we fail to cancel it—worse still, if the Germans succeed in cancelling ours, and securing a heavy margin of victory to boot—is not international burglary certain to be at a premium for another generation at least? And what then becomes of the Angellic doctrine (as distinguished from that of the older pacifists) that unjust force not only fails in the long run, but even bears no desirable fruit in its own generation?

The parallel is complete even in small details. Mr. Angell, while assuring us that the suppression of religious warfare was mainly “the result of certain definite intellectual and moral efforts of certain definite individual men,” makes no attempt to name these men. Again, while assuming that “we” must win in this war, he founds what is practically an anti-recruiting society—the Union of Democratic Control—and presently goes off to America, where he drops even the British mask implied in this “we.” Without undue militarism, we may feel very strongly convinced that Mr. Angell would have done more to destroy Prussianism by beating up half a dozen

recruits, than by thus leaving the despised Practical Man to do all the hard and dangerous work, while Mr. Angell secures fresh royalties by printing such nonsense about modern history as can only confirm the Teuton in his contempt for British education. Let my readers, after verifying the astounding blunders which I expose in Appendix X, ask themselves what an average educated German is likely to think of the country in which a writer of this kind has posed successfully as a prophet for so many years. To do the Germans justice, their Bernhardis and their Houston Stewart Chamberlains do at least read the books from which they profess to quote, and do really possess something more than a Board-school boy's knowledge of history.

X

THE PRUSSIAN WITHIN OUR MIDST

It is good to put oneself sometimes at an adversary's point of view: let us therefore take a peep at international politics through Mr. Angell's spectacles. Germany, as we see her through these magic glasses, is a nation that was once idealistic and pacific, but "half a dozen professors and a few writers and theorists . . . have radically transformed the nature and character of a nation of some seventy million souls . . . This miracle of transformation, the work of a few professors, has been accomplished within a

period of half a century or less."* Thus the revolutionary work of these propagandists began just about ten years before Mr. Angell was born; an interesting date. During all his thinking life, our Author has had this world-drama before his eyes; one of the most remarkable movements, not only in modern history, but in the whole story of mankind: to quote his own words, a "startling miracle," a "miracle of transformation," "the miraculous force which this idea of conquest has exercised over the mind of the German." This has been "the one basic and fundamental cause" of the present war, the greatest war in all history. During the past six or seven years Mr. Angell has risen from obscurity to fame by his writings on the causes of wars in human history. Before July 1914 he had published three volumes, in each of which this was the main theme; while the second theme was the true comprehension of Anglo-German relations. Yet, amid all this mass of verbiage, we shall seek in vain for any passage in which Mr. Angell plainly exposed that which he now declares to be the one basic and fundamental factor in this question. War and international relations (especially Anglo-German) are his own peculiar pro-

* *Prussianism*, pp. 2, 5; cf. 79—81. Whatever may seem on these last pages to weaken the force of the quotations here given is itself contradicted by Baron v. Stengel, who, as German representative at the first Hague Congress, is a far better witness than Bernhardt. The *Westminster Gazette* reviewer (Sept. 1st, 1909) writes: "The German pacifists often regret that their ideas have made more progress in other countries than at home; but, according to Herr von Stengel, the German people ought really to be congratulated with the fact. Prussia was led to 1806-7 [that is, to the worst disasters in her history] by pacifist and humanitarian ideas."

vince; he expressly claims to have corrected the misconceptions of all previous writers in this field, from Aristotle and Machiavelli down to the German Emperor. Yet he had not once brought himself, in the days when such an explanation would have been of vital consequence to his readers, to warn them of this volcano on which they were living all the time. When he mentioned German ambitions it was to imply that they were scarcely, if at all, more aggressive or significant than British ambitions. Sometimes, indeed, he actually went out of his way to imply the very opposite; as when he scornfully quoted one of Mr. Blatchford's warnings, and added, "it would be difficult to pack a more dangerous untruth into so few lines"; or again, "The pundits declare that the German battleships have been especially built with a view to work in the North Sea"; or again, "There is no such thing as British morality as opposed to French or German morality." These, with much more of the same sort, may be found in Appendix IV. Nor can we plead for Mr. Angell the very natural excuse which Lord Haldane, in a similar position, pleads for himself. A Cabinet Minister may remind us, with only too much justice, that it would have been as much as his place was worth to tell the truth to the people.* But it has been the essence of Mr. Angell's whole mission to "be honest"; to shake "the average sensual man" out of his complacent

* *The Nation*, August 7, 1915 (Lord Haldane's writing of public opinion before this war broke out): "The democracy in this country was suffering from an indisposition to reflect, and in consequence was not disposed to listen to the few who preached."

delusions; to "shun self-deception and insincerity as the devil that will destroy us;" to labour without fear or favour at his task of "intellectual sanitation." If, therefore, between 1909 and 1914, he knew all the while that half a dozen professors had "metamorphosed" the Germans from an idealist people into "unspeakable savages and barbarians, quite unworthy to be regarded as belonging to the family of civilization, surpassing Huns in barbarity, Turks in wickedness," then his silence is most perplexing. For the one thing that is most certain about Mr. Angell is his high standard of frankness in these matters; he has proclaimed this too often to leave any reasonable room for doubt; and in thus expounding his own mental characteristics he is, for once, on ground where his first-hand knowledge is equal to his confident dogmatism. Moreover, even though we were to doubt him here, and to suspect him of error upon a point where he alone can speak with authority—even though we were to assume that he has no more than the average man's conscience and love of truth—we should still be almost equally embarrassed. We should then explain his silence on the same grounds on which we so readily pardon Lord Haldane's; it would have been as much as Mr. Angell's circulation was worth to tell the real truth about Germany; and the average man does not aspire to martyrdom, even where only income, place, and popularity are at stake. But, even so, we should still be far from explaining his desire to martyrize others for telling the truth. To hold his tongue altogether

would have been unheroic, but natural. But to pour all his most unsavoury vials of pacifist wrath upon Mr. Blatchford, and yet to be perfectly aware all the while that half a dozen professors had in fact metamorphosed the average German of *The Great Illusion* into something far worse even than the average German of Mr. Blatchford's sensational articles—here, to be sure, is something more (or something less) than natural! The only certainty is that Mr. Angell, all the time that he was posing as an apostle of international information and sanity and frank speech, either did not know the one basic and fundamental factor of the question he was writing about, or else had some mysterious reason for concealing the truth—and for actually contradicting the truth—while he professed to be telling the truth.

And now, since the outbreak of war, Mr. Angell publishes his *Prussianism and its Destruction*, of which the third chapter bears the title which I have here transcribed for my own. Instead of offering any apology for his own blindness or dishonesty of earlier years, Mr. Angell is here mainly concerned to prove how much "Prussianism" there is even in the average British conception of politics. This seems to him the main practical issue in this present war. He admits, in a perfunctory way, that "it is probably now true that there can be no permanent peace in Europe until Germany is defeated" (p. 67); but he leaves that dirty and dangerous job to his pet aversion, the Practical Man; he himself has more important work to do. "The defeat of Germany *alone*

will not give us permanent peace" (as if any sane person had ever believed that it would!). Permanent peace can only come when we have purged ourselves also of the leaven of Prussianism. For this purgation it needs an Intellectual Sanitator like Mr. Angell; and here (rare concession to logic!) Mr. Angell actually begins by defining what he means by his own fundamental term (p. xiii). "Prussianism . . . What that doctrine is we know. It is the belief that the things of *greatest value* in life, the ends for which we form our human societies, are *best* promoted by adding to the political and military power of the State; by making it dominant over others; by extending its rule and expanding its territories." Another rough definition is given on the last page of the book: "The Prussian view that *only* force can give us security."

Now, how many people worth considering, among the Allies, really hold such views as these? According to Mr. Angell, very many (p. 83), "In what follows, I want to show how much Prussianism, which we now persuade ourselves is the work of Nietzsche and Treitschke, and has so large a responsibility for this war, is in reality just part of the general political conception of Europe, and how much our own thought has contributed to it." He proceeds to quote from Admiral Mahan, Professor Spenser Wilkinson, "A Rifleman," General Homer Lea, Professor Cramb, Ruskin, Mr. H. F. Wyatt, Cecil Rhodes, Earl Grey, Colonel Maude, Major Stewart Murray, Dr. Miller Maguire, and Lord

Roberts; and he ends with a reference (without chapter or verse) to "our own popular journalists," who "have for years poured ferocious contempt upon 'the amiable sentimentalists at the Hague, with their impossible dreams of arbitration and disarmament.'"

To begin with, pacifists themselves (including Mr. Angell) have spoken of the Hague Conferences in terms, which, without being ferocious, imply a good deal of quiet contempt.*

But that is a small thing: our main task is to protest against Mr. Angell's attempt to put the whole problem again in a false light, and again to confuse the issue as hopelessly as he did in the years before the war. We protest, to begin with, against his calm assumption that this war may be left to take care of itself, and that it will run automatically to a right conclusion. While admitting at one moment that the world needs an abundance of defensive force to "cancel" aggressive force, and that a nation must defend itself "to the last penny and to the last man," Mr. Angell seems at other times to regard it as the enlightened man's first duty to ensure that his own shall be the last life to be sacrificed, and his own the last penny to be spent. All "hard thinkers," it appears, will leave the militarist dead to bury their dead; they will devote their higher energies to theorizing about the peace that will come when other men have done the fighting and borne the suffering, and successfully "cancelled" the German attack. If ever there was a

* See Appendix XI, "Conference and Arbitration."

time for the sword in one hand and the trowel in the other, we are living in that time now. Yet Mr. Angell quietly writes: "It is quite certain, moreover, that the British nation is going through with this war, and that it is going to win, at whatever cost Let us cast our minds forward to the stage at which England is completely victorious, and is able to say to Germany, 'You must never renew this mad race for armaments.'"* From a man who has not only done no personal war service since this war broke out, but has even abstained from recruiting help, and has withdrawn from the responsibilities of British residence and citizenship, these words are no more than an impudent mockery. There are many cases, no doubt, in which no private citizen has a right to ask what another is doing to ensure the victory of the juster side in this war. If Mr. Angell had been content to subside into decent obscurity, it would have been unfair to ask why, as a comparatively young and healthy man, he has not at least joined the Officers' Training Corps. But he persists in forcing himself into public notice; the less he does, the more dogmatically he writes; and he himself thus compels us to ask what can be the mentality of a born Englishman who, even now, treats this war only as a thing to be written about from some

* *Prussianism*, pp. 41, 234; cf. xviii, xix, 76, where he makes the kindred and equally cheap assumption, "We must not forget that we shall be the predominant political factor in Europe on the morrow of the war." It is a too common pacifist illusion that, amid the war-weariness that peace will bring, the men of most influence will be those who most loftily ignored the Great War while it was yet a reality.

superior standpoint, and in no sense as a burden to be borne.*

Let us turn, however, to Mr. Angell's main point—the extent to which British statesmanship is permeated with “Prussianism,” and “how much our own thought has contributed to it” (p. 83). Apart from the fact that two of the writers whom he quotes are Americans, writing for Americans, a few minutes' careful perusal of the remaining eleven will suffice to expose the poverty of the author's case. There is very little in any of these extracts which cannot be paralleled from the pacifist philosopher, Immanuel Kant, whom Mr. Angell himself quotes on p. 10 as one of the bygone heroes of his own creed, and as a man whose very existence is a standing reproach to modern Germany with its professor-made militarism. The particular passage from Professor Cramb, which Mr. Angell condemns on p. 87 as “out-Bernhardi-ing Bernhardi,” does not really go much further in praise of war than the passage from Kant, which will be found side by side with it in Appendix XI. Kant writes, of course, in a different tone; but in strict logic his admissions go almost or quite as far as Professor Cramb's assertions. It is probable that Mr. Angell knows about as much of Kant as of the other German authors whom he professes to quote.

Moreover, apart from such comparisons as these, there is nothing in the passages produced by Mr. Angell to bear out his contention that British public

* See Appendix XII, “Theory and Practice.”

opinion, or British diplomacy, are seriously infected by "Prussianism" as he himself has defined it. Although he has gone out into the highways and hedges to find stuff for his purpose—although, of his thirteen chosen authors, two are not British at all, while it is probable that at least four of the others are unknown, even by name, to the majority of my readers—yet, even thus, he fails to produce a single writer who asserts that armies and navies are *the best* means of obtaining *the things of greatest value* in life, or that *only* force can give us security. Even those who come nearest to it can be brought under Mr. Angell's definition of Prussianism only by that process of furtive distortion which we have already caught our author employing with Renan and other authors. For, of course, he is attempting to prove a patent absurdity. Even if we look at history only through the Angellic spectacles, we still miss altogether in Britain that professorial religion of war to which (as we are told) we must attribute nearly all the perversity of modern Germany. With the doubtful exception of Professor Cramb, whose lectures were delivered to comparatively small audiences, and who was little known until eighteen months ago, is there a single English professor of History who can be accused of setting himself to preach militarism? Our school histories, with all their faults, are, as a whole, more impartial and less chauvinistic than those of other great countries. If any elementary school teacher had tried to convert his class to a belief in even the most democratic

form of compulsory military service, he would almost certainly have received a plain and final warning to amend his ways; the idea was championed only by a minority even among teachers who were comparatively independent of government control. If, again, we pass from teachers to authors, Ruskin is the only one on Mr. Angell's list who can compare in influence with Treitschke, or even Nietzsche. The single passage quoted from this writer, apart from ordinary Ruskinian exaggeration of rhetoric, says no more than the pacifist Kant had admitted; and even Mr. Angell would not venture to suggest that the sum-total of Ruskin's influence on the British people weighed in favour of militarism.

But we waste time in dealing seriously with a proposition which is put forward only to save Mr. Angell's face, and to cover the bottomless ignorance of real German thought and character revealed in his earlier books. No great people has been so systematically indoctrinated by its professors and schoolmasters as the Germans have; and many observers had told us before the war, what Mr. Angell publishes only after the war, that this indoctrination was almost altogether in the militarist direction.* But, as all students of history know, facts have done far more even than words to form the modern German character; and the success (real or apparent) of Bismarck's deeds converted a nation in which the majority would have gone on laughing

* For instance, the very plain-spoken article by Mr. Elzbacher in the *Contemporary Review* for October, 1906: "Education and Mis-education in Germany."

at Bismarck's speeches to all eternity. In Britain, facts have seemed to teach the very opposite lesson. Our prosperity during long peace has tempted us to look upon war as an evil best avoided by the simple process of ignoring it; and peace-fallacies have been as popular here as war-fallacies have been in Germany. The man who preaches "Prussianism" here is somewhat in the position of the pacifist over there; he is in a decided minority, and his exaggerations are neutralized by the dead weight of public opinion against them. Moreover, even those exaggerations or actual falsehoods are mingled with truths which the inert majority needs to face. When we find Mr. Angell, who passes for a particularly reasonable man, pillorying as "Prussianism" statements which are supported, not only by Kant, but even by Mr. Angell's own peculiar ally, Novikow, we may well congratulate ourselves that Britain has not been so long and so systematically indoctrinated with professorial Angellism as Germany has been with professorial militarism.* Mr. Angell's fear of our Prussianization by this war is no doubt partly temperamental, and may be compared with the bitter cry of a past generation, that it would "Prussianize" us to abandon that voluntary system of education

* *Great Illusion*, 1911, p. 329, "I have succeeded, in an hour's talk, in giving an intelligent boy of twelve a clearer grasp of the real meaning of money and the mechanism of credit and exchange than is possessed by many a man of my acquaintance running large businesses. Now, if every boy in America, England, and Germany could have as clear an idea of the real nature of wealth and money, it would, in ten years' time, be an utter impossibility to organize a war scare."

which, for half a century, rendered the ignorance of the British working classes a byword in the civilized world.* But it is difficult not to suspect also that Mr. Angell deliberately exaggerates his fears in order to draw a red herring over that trail of ignorance which, wherever Germany is concerned, may be traced all through his previous writings.

XI

THE STATE AS A PERSON

In the chapter thus entitled, and in his treatment of the same subject outside *The Great Illusion*, Mr. Angell again starts from a truth which is commonplace even to the verge of absurdity, and goes on to exaggerate it into a falsehood. He is concerned to explode the arguments of writers who see a strong analogy between state quarrels or friendships and those of individuals. Such analogies may, of course, easily be pressed too far; on the other hand, there obviously is a great deal of truth in them. It would therefore be the province of "hard thinking," in a case like this, to attempt some sort of delimitation; to show as clearly as possible how far the analogy is true, and where (on the other hand) it breaks down.

* I have produced quotations to this effect, from the days before 1870, in an article contributed to the *Nineteenth Century and After* for January, 1915.

But Mr. Angell here, as usual, simply demolishes extreme statements which exist only in his imagination, and goes on to reason so loosely that he is presently in conflict with facts, and even with his own premisses. To him even "the approximation of a State to a Person" is "false." (*Illusion*, 1914, p. 292.) "It is only our careless speech which leads us to say that 'Great Britain' is in favour of that, or 'Germany' of this; forty millions or sixty millions are never all of the same mind." (*Foundations, etc.*, p. 111.) With just the same elaborate pedantry, and just the same falsehood for all practical purposes, we might say that only careless persons will call a book "good" or "bad," since 80,000 or 90,000 words cannot all be of the same meaning. This is where the virtue of "the accurate manner" comes in. Thousands of readers are struck by this obvious truth so solemnly enunciated, and are prepared to find that the rest of the book is equally indisputable. A meaningless platitude of this kind, delivered in the right manner, carries conviction also with regard to the historical statements or the abstract arguments which Mr. Angell has carefully marked with the same superficial stamp of accuracy. The public recognizes the trademark; Blugg's pills are the best advertisement for Blugg's ointment. Moreover, beyond a certain point, both Mr. Angell and Mr. Blugg can afford to despise the public; their own particular following is so numerous that they can affront with impunity the common sense of the rest. In the very chapter which is devoted to combating

the vulgar view of the State as a Person, Mr. Angell himself falls into exactly the same comparison; he explains national and international dislikes by self-interest, and illustrates them thus: "The phenomenon is a commonplace of individual relationship. 'I never noticed his collars were dirty till he got in my way,' said someone of a rival." (*Illusion*, 1914, p. 302.) Again, within a few months of the day on which Mr. Angell complained of the careless persons who say that "Germany is in favour of this," he might be found writing, "Sixty-five million Germans are now fighting as a united nation, because *all* have been deluded into the belief that it is a war of defence against hostile nations determined to destroy German nationality. This, of course, is an utterly false view. *But it happens to be that held by the German people.*" Moreover, the main point of this whole book is the supposed transformation of a fairly homogeneous nation of idealists into an equally homogeneous state of Prussianists by "half a dozen professors and a few writers and theorists—Nietzsche, Treitschke, and their school."*

Let us contrast a few more of Mr. Angell's statements on this subject—a subject really of great

* *Prussianism, etc.*, pp. 2, 234, cf. 64; italics mine. Mr. Angell's recent *North American Review* article was written, he tells us, "as an American"; but, if there is no distinctive national morality, how can there be a distinctively national truth? In that article he repeatedly argues from "America" or "The Americans," as a body possessing one homogeneous set of convictions or feelings on this subject. It is absurd to have to argue these small points; but the only way of meeting a sophist is by pinning him down to his own words.

complexity, and needing extreme precision of language. (*Italics are mine*):

"There is no such thing as British morality as opposed to French or *German morality*." (*Illusion*, 1914, p. 298.)

"The transformation of the German people from a beneficent moral force in Europe to a very evil one is all the work of an idea."

"Nietzsche, etc. . . . have radically transformed *the nature and character of a nation of some seventy million souls*."

"German wickedness."

"Here then are a *people* . . . to-day become, thanks to the metamorphosis of a false doctrine and idea, *unspeakable savages and barbarians*," etc. (*Prussianism, etc.*, pp, xvi, 2, 3, 5.)

"There is, at the present moment, great ill-feeling in England against 'the German.' Now, '*the German*' is a *non-existent abstraction*. We are angry with the German because he is building warships, *conceivably* directed against us; but a great many Germans are as much opposed to that increase of armament as we are; and the desire of the yokel to 'have a go at them Germans' depends absolutely upon a confusion just as great as—indeed greater than—that which exists in the mind of the Boxer, who cannot differentiate between the various European peoples." (*Ibid.* p. 306.)

"*Very rightly* we attribute the evil influence of *the German* to an idea and a tradition."

"A doctrine that can accomplish this double miracle—so transform a great and civilizing *nation* as to *make it a danger to mankind*."

"*The German*, like most of the other men of Europe, may have a general impression that conquest will somehow enrich him."

"The evil Germany that we now know." (*Ibid.* pp. 3, 9, 49.)

“A people’s conception of ‘what is true, what is beautiful, and what is right,’ and their maintenance of that conception, need not necessarily have *anything whatever* to do with the particular administrative conditions under which they may live—the *only* thing that a conception of ‘State’ predicates.” (*Ibid.* p. 297.)

Even when the Allies have won this war, “there will be the material fact of the existence in Central Europe of a hundred millions of Germans, *bred and trained in the ideas of Prussianism.*”

“And this revolution, this transformation, which has turned a great country from something good into something evil, is the work of an idea, of a false doctrine, and the effect of *institutions* which have been the outgrowth of that false doctrine.” (*Ibid.* pp. xvii, 49.)

Even before this war, Mr. Angell can scarcely have been entirely ignorant of the fact that one of the most “particular administrative conditions” of Germany was its militarism, and that one of its most efficient “institutions” was the educational system which, for more than a century, had indoctrinated the nation with increasing thoroughness in just those ideas which it suited a reactionary government to teach. Therefore, even according to his own narrow and rudimentary historical ideas of eighteen months ago, it was extraordinarily foolish of him to believe that a nation’s administration and institutions had not necessarily anything whatever to do with the people’s conceptions. Even if he had read his Lecky with any care (as I pointed out in an earlier chapter) he would have realized that all governments, even those which have laboured far less thoroughly here than the German rulers, have had considerable success in fashioning the views of their subjects. And

now, since the war, Mr. Angell's efforts to rehabilitate himself have only made his plight more pitiable. In order to save his face he is obliged to lay an even ludicrous emphasis upon the influence of the German professors, who are notoriously creatures and mouth-pieces of their Government in a stricter sense than can be predicated of any other country. So far are German administrative conditions from leaving German conceptions unaffected, that it would have been less false to assert the very opposite; to say that the Germans are what their administrative conditions have made them. Whatever may have been the metamorphoses of Germany since Goethe's time, it is the Administration which is mainly responsible for these; first, by intoxicating the people with successful war, and secondly, by appointing, inspiring, and favouring teachers of all grades, who have steadily indoctrinated the youth with militarism. The State is not a Person; it may even be true, as Mr. Angell asserts, that it is growing daily less like a Person. Yet, for any time that we may consider within practical politics, the man who conceives of it as a person will think incomparably more truly than he who can conceive it only as a bundle of "administrative conditions," under which a man may live his individual life, uncoloured either by imitation or by reaction from his surroundings. Mr. Angell, who has lived a few years on an American ranch, and taken out American letters of naturalization, imagines that this empowers him to write as an American. To judge by his light-hearted excursions into history,

biology, and unread books, he would probably be perfectly willing to-morrow to take out Chinese letters of naturalization, and write as a Chinaman for the *North American Review*. But such things are possible only to the author of *The Great Illusion*.

Jaurès, in the very midst of his Internationalism, wrote: "For my part, I have never taken paradoxical utterances against patriotism too seriously. The Fatherland is not an outworn idea; it is one which is changing and growing greater Those Frenchmen (if any still exist) who say they don't care whether they live under the German or the French militarist, under the soldier in a helmet or the capitalist President, are guilty of a sophism too absurd for refutation In France and Spain, Germany and Italy, since the Revolution, democracy has been inseparable from nationality. That is the only reading which makes sense of their history for the last hundred years If the proletariat had really been indifferent to their respective Fatherlands, would not Europe have been given up to the Cossacks?" (*L'Armée Nouvelle*, 1910, pp. 449, 450, 542, 544.) He points out that Marx, from whom the well-known parrot-cry of "the working man has no country" has been borrowed, never meant that phrase seriously, and contradicted it in later years as flatly as Mr. Angell contradicts his own thesis, that a state has no individuality. Mr. Angell's conception of the separate citizen living his own life, apart from that of his state, is on a par with that crude and rudimentary theology which, until a few generations

ago, conceived of man as a soul dwelling in its body like a squirrel in its cage. He has not learned enough in this field to begin realizing the complexity of the subjects with which he deals. That is why he was able to teach an intelligent boy of twelve, in an hour's talk, all the main points of his own theory. His own mental position, on many of the most complex problems which beset humanity, is that of an intelligent boy of twelve. Hence, in a great part, his enormous success with a certain section of the public; he has the exact quality which made the fortune of Mr. Arnold Bennett's hero in "What the Public Wants." In that admirable play, the multimillionaire newspaper proprietor had formed, at this very age of twelve, a clear idea of what he wanted in a boys' magazine, though no then-existing boys' magazine gave it. Grown to manhood, he created an ideal boys' magazine, and proceeded thence to found a whole group of phenomenally successful papers by keeping always before his eyes "What the Public Wants"—"that is" (replies his more critical brother) "by standing always at your old point of view of twelve years old." The great man confesses the soft impeachment. If, on many points of history and biology, and what (with equal pedantry and inaccuracy) he calls Polity, Mr. Angell had advanced materially beyond his intelligent little friend of twelve, he would never have burst on an astonished world with his *Great Illusion*.

In this chapter we are now considering, as else-

where, his blunder is double; both his temperament and his superficial habits of thought combine against him. He is not one of those to whom the feeling of patriotism naturally appeals. Again, this temperamental deficiency is not corrected by the accurate observation and analysis which enabled a man like Darwin to write correctly on passions which were foreign to his own character.

(1) In most men a foreign schooltime and a few years of work abroad would actually increase the love of home, even while tempering this love with a clearer recognition of their native country's limitations. Under these same conditions, however, one man in a thousand will actually learn to prefer the foreign country, and partly transfer his allegiance to it, as he has every right to do. Patriotism, in this latter case, is not so much lost as transferred. Between these two classes comes a third, happily not very numerous, of people in whom a few years' change of residence involves an almost total loss of nationality; the fibre of their patriotism is not strong enough to survive even a fairly gentle and brief uprooting. The moral condition of these people resembles the intellectual condition of those poor derelicts whom we sometimes meet at home or abroad—men whom transplantation has deprived of all real human language—in whom a twenty years' disuse has killed their mother-tongue, while even a twenty years' residence has not really taught them the language of their adoption. Mr. Angell may have twenty different letters of naturalization in his

pocket; he may collect enough to fill a postage-stamp album; but he has no nationality. We may answer him like the Woman of Samaria: "Thou hast had five husbands, and he whom thou now hast is not thy husband." He resembles the capitalist of his own admiration: "The capitalist has no country." (*Illusion*, 1914, p. 309.) This is a dangerous temperament—in the vast majority of cases a fundamentally anti-social temperament from the highest point of view of human society. For one man who has no strong national ties because all human beings have for him an equal human appeal, there are a million in whom the determining factor here is, not a superabundance of love for humanity at large, but a deficient sense of loyalty to the immediate society in which fortune has cast their lot. In most men this sense of loyalty is instinctive; they are no more ashamed of preferring their own country than of preferring their own family; they heartily despise a person who, without conspicuously superabundant charity in his immediate personal relations, is always fidgetting about distant missionary work; and this contempt is justified, not only by social instinct, but also by strict logic. In spite of all the selfish elements which a microscopic examination will find in patriotism, there are unselfish elements also which satisfy the closest analysis.

(2) For the law of co-operation (as Mr. Angell is constantly reminding us) is stronger than the law of rivalry. But no real co-operation is possible unless a man fulfils his immediate and obvious social duties

with that care which their very nearness demands. He is bound in morals, as well as in law, to nourish his own family before he spends money upon foreign missions; because this first is a work of co-operation for which he is obviously fitted, and in which his efforts are sure to produce the most direct and certain results. It is only on a solid family system that the state can be built up, in any civilized society that is within practical politics; and, similarly, it is outside practical world-politics to tinker at internationalism except on a solid foundation of nationalism. In all but a negligible number of cases, the man who does not prefer his own family is the very worst material for a real patriot; and the man who does not prefer his own country is no true internationalist: this indifference marks, not his wealth of human sympathies, but the leanness of his soul and the poverty of his observation. He has not even the frankly logical and selfish reasons which the financier might allege for dissociating himself from all national preferences.

Mr. Angell, on p. 305, bases himself upon "that lessening of the reciprocal sentiment of collective responsibility which the complex heterogeneity of the modern state involves." We need not pause to consider whether this lessening be not (as in the case of physical force) rather apparent than real; we need only ask whether, during any period practically worth considering, Mr. Angell imagines that states will cease to be marked, both from within and without, by the sense of collective responsibility? Are we

even within sight of a state of things in which (say) the German people will in no sense be held responsible for any outrage committed by Germans, until it has been disavowed and punished by the German Government? Or, to go to the very root of the question, is not civilization itself based on the sense of collective responsibility? If there is no other God but Co-operation, is not Collective Responsibility his Prophet?

I need hardly insist here again on that complacent but colossal ignorance of the real Germany which Mr. Angell shows in his application of this theory. In answer to a *Morning Post* critic, who had very truly pointed out that nations fight for ideals as well as for food, he replies, "Does the *Morning Post* really suggest that the Germans are going to attack England because they don't like the *English taste in art, or music, or cooking?* The notion that preferences of this sort need the protection of *Dreadnoughts* is surely to bring the whole thing within the domain of the grotesque."* These words may be found reprinted on p. 182 of his *Prussianism*; yet all the earlier part of that book rests upon a tardy recognition of the fact that this present war "has but one basic and fundamental cause—theories, aspirations, dreams, desires"—which

* It will surprise only those who take Mr. Angell at his own valuation, as a writer who "shuns self-deception and insincerity as the devil that will destroy us" to find out that the *Morning Post* is grossly misquoted in the words which I have italicized; the critic actually wrote: "Law, literature, and science . . . the whole people's conception of what is true, of what is beautiful, and of what is right." (*Illusion*, 1914, p. 296).

the Germans have aspired to force upon other nations.

Again, he abuses Mr. Hyndman and Mr. Blatchford for not recognizing the seriousness of German social democracy, of whose views he writes (p. 299), "These problems are for most men probably—are certainly coming to be, if they are not now—much more profound and fundamental than any conception which coincides with or can be identified with state divisions." Yet everybody who knew anything about the Social Democrats was perfectly aware that, even in times of peace, they had officially proclaimed their solidarity with other Germans in case of future war. All but the wilfully blind knew perfectly well that Mr. Angell's "particularly competent German" was deceiving either himself or Mr. Angell when he wrote "There is no one German people, no single Germany," together with that even greater nonsense which follows on p. 307 of the *Illusion*, and which I have reprinted in Appendix IV. Mr. Angell might have been excused for not anticipating the extent to which Social Democrats would now be found to condone, or even to advocate, the annexation of Belgium; but for his belief that, already in 1909, internationalism might prove a stronger force among the Social Democrats than nationalism, he had no excuse whatever. Bebel, whom he claims to have known personally, could accuse him even more plainly than in the Biblical words, "I kept silence, and thou thoughtest that I was altogether such an one as thyself." Bebel did *not* keep silence; he plainly confessed to us all, that

if war came his Germanism would overpower his socialism; yet Mr. Angell chose to ignore this. With the tenacity of a shipwrecked man clinging to a straw, he still chose to believe that the Social Democrats were as incapable of feeling their nearer collective responsibilities as he himself is.

His whole treatment of this subject is childish, and would be exquisitely ridiculous, if only we could forget for a moment that these are the follies which have contributed so heavily to the worst waste of blood and treasure which the world has ever seen. He attempts to prove his case by choosing the most exaggerated instance he can think of; yet even here he can only convince the wilfully blind. "If a Chinese Boxer is injured by a Frenchman he kills a German, and feels himself avenged—they are all 'foreign devils.'" After all, the Boxer does see with one eye here, while Mr. Angell, like Mr. Pecksniff, shuts both with an air of sanctimonious complacency, and drones out, "Let us be honest!" The fact is that, in normal times, all Europeans make common cause against the Chinese. To the Boxer, therefore, all distinctions between Germans and Frenchmen are practically irrelevant; Germans and Frenchmen are solid against him; they recognize, and therefore he recognizes, their collective responsibility. If he murders a Frenchman, a German will help to punish him; therefore, in murdering a German, he is doing his best to teach even a Frenchman that the Chinese worm may possibly turn if trodden upon; that it may not "pay" to come and oppress the Far East.

"If the Chinese Boxer had our clear conception of the different European nations," Mr. Angell thinks he would recognize this as frankly absurd. He would recognize that Europeans have no sense of collective responsibility; that "the German" is a non-existent abstraction; and that a State is simply a bundle of administrative conditions.

The reader will naturally ask: How can a man manage to write all the volumes that Mr. Angell has written on this subject without once stumbling upon the truth that not only nationality is impossible, but even civilized society is impossible, without collective responsibility? The answer is simple. On this, as on other subjects, he recognizes the truth freely enough whenever it is not a matter of life and death for his theory to deny it. At the Angellite Summer Meeting of 1914 Mr. A. E. Fulton suggested on July 19th "that societies have to attain nationality before they are capable of international sense" (p. 23); and Mr. Angell, who intervened at some length in the debate, had nothing to say against this. Again, on July 26, Mr. John Allen spoke for the British Dominions, and explained why Angellism made little headway there. He found one of the main causes in the fact that "so far as questions of immediate disarmament are concerned, and so far as questions of persuading nations to give up their nationality are concerned, you do not at the present time express any definite opinion." In Canada, and Australia and New Zealand, as Mr. Allen explained, many of the finest feelings are bound up with this sense of nationality and national

honour. It is true that Mr. Haycock, of Manchester, Mr. Angell's right-hand man, met Mr. Allen with the enquiry: "National honour, what does it mean? How can a nation act honestly or dishonestly? . . . How can a nation insult another nation?" This, of course, was orthodox and uncompromising Angellism, but Mr. Angell did not here back it up. And Dr. Nasmyth, of Boston, U.S.A., while disagreeing generally with Mr. Allen, admitted that "when we get down to the roots of nationalism we find it is a very important survival factor; we know that we must stand together as a nation because the nation can give us security, can give a citizen a chance to bring up his children in some comfort, and give them opportunities in life and a chance to enjoy some of the higher fruits of civilization. . . . You cannot separate, as a rationalist, the sentiment of nationalism from the facts of national welfare." Meanwhile Mr. Angell, though the whole question of his success or continued failure in Greater Britain was at stake, made no attempt to bring in his Boxer and his Yokel here; he simply talked round the main point; and Mr. Allen's final reply was pathetic, in the struggle it showed between his loyal Angellism and his overpowering common-sense. "Mr. Angell said: 'Why should not the same relation exist between the foreign countries as exists between the Dominions and the Empire?' and other people, I think, repeated it [in this discussion]. I should say the reason is simple. For precisely the same reason that the relations between two Englishmen are

different from the relations of an Englishman and a German." Even this faithful disciple was constrained for once to answer the master as we should answer a boy of twelve. (*Report*, pp. 364, 378, 381, 384.)

But men like Mr. Allen were in an almost invisible minority at this Summer School. If anything could make reasonable people despair of world-peace, it is the fact that thousands of otherwise intelligent persons, true and sincere lovers of peace for the most part, can not only tolerate the most superficial sophisms in an author who flatters their general preconceptions, but can actually refuse, on principle, to consider seriously the objections which common-sense will at once suggest. To their minds, as to the unbalanced religious mind, the idea of criticizing the doctrines of their professional teachers is positively wicked; it must be ruled out from the first as a "temptation." No doubt our natural love of peace is a real natural religion, to be cherished like other religious feelings, but also to be guarded from that special vice which in all ages has beset the individual religious mind, and has shown itself still more dangerous in the organized religious body. "A wonderful and horrible thing is committed in the land; the prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means; and my people love to have it so." This is the story of all ages and all lands; and we can scarcely affirm that war itself has caused more harm to humanity than is wrought daily by falsehood posing as Super-Truth.

It is fortunate, after all, that the Chinese Boxer is as yet untainted by the "clear conceptions" which are a lantern to Mr. Haycock's path.

XII

THE PRACTICAL OUTCOME

We have seen how Mr. Allen complained, even under the Master's nose, that, on the all-important practical questions of denationalization and immediate disarmament, "you do not at the present time express any definite opinion." After which he very logically proceeded: "It seems to me, with respect, that a policy that does not help the ordinary citizen to choose a definite course of action which does concern this general principle, is not a helpful one." (*Report*, p. 364.)

Mr. Angell, as we have already seen, entitled the latter part of his *Illusion* "The Practical Outcome," and did make some profession of sketching a definite course of action for stopping armaments and warfare. English and German members of Parliament, Professors, etc., were to pair off on the principle of a reduction of armaments, and this pairing would ensure an equitable and proportionate reduction on both sides of the North Sea. We have seen, however, that this proposal was too practically absurd for even Mr. Angell to retain it in his latest edition. The only trace now left of this Utopian

proposal is that the section is still headed "The Practical Outcome." But (as even his friends see, apart from the wilfully blind) there is nothing practical in the outcome with which Mr. Angell now leaves us. The latter part of his book, like many other portions, is now simply a mass of vague generalities.

It is most instructive to note the attitude of the Summer School in general towards this melancholy fact. Mr. E. A. Fulton, speaking as a sincere pacifist but as a doubting Angellite, was free to express his misgivings under no other limitations than those of politeness towards his hosts. He pointed out that in Austro-Hungary disarmament was almost more a question of domestic than of foreign politics; and that their present army-system would not necessarily be abandoned if actual war were altogether out of the question. He emphasized the disconcerting fact of Irish nationalism, complicated by the fact that, during the past few weeks, pacifists had been clamouring for armed interference in Ulster. He pointed out the equally great, though different, difficulty involved in our rule in India. Finally, he pointed out that many of his fellow-pacifists did great harm by their lack of discrimination, by their habitual use of "the careless language of a civilized politician, addressing an audience as indifferent to the realities of war as himself. . . . Perhaps the hardest task of a pacifist is, in consequence, to assert the civilist view without flattering the mistaken self-sufficiency of peaceful and industrious citizens." Mr. Fulton's

whole paper is remarkable in itself, and doubly remarkable when we remember that it was read less than a fortnight before the outbreak of this war. He appealed to Mr. Angell and his assembled Angellists for some more definite guidance as to the bearing of the Angellic theory upon these obvious and insistent practical problems.

Mr. Herbert Bloye, an occasional lecturer for Angellic propaganda, felt "that the difficulties suggested by the paper were very real," and stated a further difficulty from his own experience. "I do not see how the Australians can refuse to admit the Japanese to that area [*i.e.* undeveloped Australia] for mere political reasons; and I do not see how the Angell doctrine affords any solution of the Australian-Japanese problem." The society, therefore, had now four political problems of capital importance, clamouring for practical solution in terms of the *Great Illusion*; yet succeeding speakers were shy of propounding any definite solutions. Dr. Mez, of Munich University, did indeed remind the faithful, "Mr. Angell has shown that it is quite sufficient to have half-a-dozen policemen to look after 100,000 people," and inferred from this that Ulstermen, when sufficiently indoctrinated with the *Great Illusion*, might allow themselves to be restrained from their cherished political action by a similarly disproportionate police-force. But others, who knew less of Munich and more of Ulster, were evidently less hopeful. Mr. Hilton, another official lecturer to the society, and a very precious testifier, (as our forefathers would have

put it 200 years ago,) protested that "we have nothing to do with application [of principles]; it is not our concern; it is not our job." His position was nearly that of the now almost departed Calvinism, wherein faith alone avails, and all our righteousness is but filthy rags. "You might have a society of distinctly civilist [*i.e.* Angellic] temper frequently at war; or you might have a society of equally pronounced militarist temper for the most part at peace." He admitted that the Ulster question "is one that touches the foundations of our doctrine, and we must deal with it. But here again Mr. Fulton has asked us to deliver judgment on particular cases, to choose between *Yes* and *No*. That is not what we are out for . . . Our object is to show that coercion in any sphere of life is fatuous and unprofitable." Mr. R. O. Kapp confessed, "Mr. Fulton made it clear that there are a good many problems that we cannot answer"; but this in a tone of subdued discouragement; he did not glory, like his predecessor, in the transcendence of Angellic Faith over all the good works of the faithless. Mr. Bloye, who spoke next, was still more despondent. "There are few things which have dispirited me more than Mr. Hilton's remarks, or Mr. Angell's blessing upon those remarks. Mr. Hilton said that Norman-Angellism was not a formula, it was a way of thinking. I quite realize it is primarily a way of thinking. But if it is merely a way of thinking, and not in some sense a formula; if there are no results of our thinking; if we are not able to reduce the results of Mr. Norman Angell's

thinking to some practical shape, I fear I have grossly misunderstood his work. In the summary of the grammar* there is an axiom, that to annex a province and its inhabitants is not to annex wealth, for the inhabitants possess the wealth. That is tantamount to a formula in which the words are carefully and precisely chosen. This is one of the phrases which summarise the main teaching of Mr. Angell. Are these axioms applicable universally or not? . . . Mr. Norman Angell has limited himself very carefully in some respects; in time, space, and circumstance; but if we carry that too far we lose all authority. If, for instance, we take Australia to-day, will this doctrine apply? Mr. Hilton says it does not matter if it applies or not—it is a way of thinking; but I fear it would be a sign of immense weakness in our cause if we could not show that our ideas were of universal application.” Then rose Mr. Haycock of Manchester, in no such womanish mood. “You want to convince people, and in order to do this you have to be dogmatic, and there is not one argument that can be brought against Mr. Angell’s thesis that you cannot find an answer for. . . . Let us have the note of optimism and the note of fighting. Don’t let us have, ‘I agree with you partly.’ We want to hit, and to hit hard.” But he made not the remotest attempt to apply this dogmatism or this hard-hitting to Mr. Fulton’s three problems, which were still wan-

* There is, apparently, an official grammar of Angellism published for the use of propagandists and of the Inner Circle. It is several times referred to in this Report.

dering about unsolved. Mr. Angell himself, who intervened no less than eight times in the debate, sometimes at considerable length, had no real solution to propose. Finally, Mr. Fulton very aptly summed up the debate. "I find that several speakers really, in the main, see the difficulties almost as acutely as I do. . . . We have in history, I think, a proof of the tendency to constant reaction, even with a movement destined to succeed. . . . It is the length of time and the difficulty of the process which makes me pessimistic." This, then, is the Practical Outcome. Mr. Fulton produces three obvious problems of War and Peace, and begs for solutions in terms of the *Great Illusion*; yet even the Great Illuder can give no effective answer; and his trustiest henchman can only cry aloud for dogmatism, without even pretending to supply that foundation of reason which alone could justify the dogmatist. If only Mr. Angell had been in Mr. Haycock's fighting mood, he might have answered all objections in the pithy words which Swift puts into my Lord Peter's mouth during a memorable religious debate: "By G——, it is true; and G—— confound you eternally if you offer to believe otherwise!"

But Mr. Angell made some concessions to reason. Though he had little to say on the very definite and urgent problems before the house,* yet he contended, (as his disciples have contended elsewhere,) that the

* He complained, from the very beginning, that "Mr. Fulton's paper was complex, difficult, and dealt with obscure points." Yet the paper was, in fact, remarkable for its clearness and force; and its main points, which Mr. Angell so carefully shirked, were obvious.

real practical outcome of his doctrine lies in its power of leavening men's minds with the Angellic faith, and thus obviating the misunderstandings which, as things now stand, tend towards war. "It is true we do not point out to the statesman how he can proceed, because his and ours are two quite different objects. We are saying to the statesman: 'We know quite well that you cannot reduce your navy because of public opinion; but *in five years* we are going to bring you a new public opinion.'" Later on in the debate he offered a slightly more modest estimate than this which I have italicized: "We say that there are forces in action, and the dissemination of our ideas in Germany and France will increase their influence. In ten years the spread of our ideas will have brought about the possibility of a co-operation between the Great Powers. . . . Give us ten years, and our movement will produce a change in public opinion."

Scarcely less pathetic was the virtual admission of impotence to solve, in terms of the *Great Illusion*, the practical problem of conflicting national aspirations. (*Report*, pp. 364—385.) But perhaps the most illuminating sentence in all this bulky volume is one pronounced by Mr. Dennis Robertson, who, as a young Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, takes his discipleship in a discriminating spirit. "I am one of those," he said, "who think that there are few people at present who have any idea of what Norman Angell's doctrines are." (p. 325.)

In the light of this illuminating sentence let

us consider Mr. Angell's practical attitude towards Germany on the very brink of the present disaster. I believe it may safely be said that neither he, nor any of his disciples, betrayed any real grasp of the fact that, if Angellism was not destined to enjoy its ten quiet years for turning us all from war-thoughts to peace-thoughts, the force foreordained to shatter these hopes was the deliberate ambition of official Germany, which had aroused a wider echo among the German people than any similar ideas had aroused among any other people since the destruction of the Napoleonic legend. As ridiculously as Mr. Angell now exaggerates the rapidity and completeness of Germany's conversion to an intolerably Chauvinistic ideal, so ridiculously did he and his friends blink it up to the very eve of the catastrophe. Yet they had no excuse. It is not only that the truth had been told over and over again by men who were denounced as scaremongers by the very persons who are now desperately striving to rehabilitate themselves with the public by calling the Germans "Huns," "heinous polecats," or "unspeakable savages and barbarians." The truth had been told quite as plainly by one of Mr. Angell's own allies, Professor Otfried Nippold, in his little book on "German Chauvinism," which had been published less than a year before this Angellite Summer Meeting.* The author pointed out that the nation was being "hypnotized" for war (p. 120); that even the number and distinction of

* "Der Deutsche Chauvinismus." Berlin. Kohlhammer, 1913.

the advocates was less significant than "the fact that these preachers of war, though often thoroughly stupid men, find such a numerous public" (p. 123). He insisted that there had been of recent years "a sudden increase of jingoism in Germany" (p. 128); a "transformation of German psychology in national matters" which had startled him when he returned to his native land after long years of absence (p. vii). He complained of "a system of incitement to war such as would have seemed simply impossible only a few years ago." And, while regretting "that I must limit myself to so few actual examples, out of a mass of material with which I could fill whole volumes" (p. vii), he does in fact fill 110 octavo pages, in extremely small type, with jingoistic extracts from German papers, reviews, and public speeches, collected during the period Jan. 1912—June 1913; indeed, nearly all come within a single year, from March to March. No such damning document could have been compiled in any other country of the world.

Now, there is not so much special significance in the fact that Mr. Angell had not read this book; though it forms Vol. IX of the "Publications of the Society for International Understanding," of which Mr. Angell is probably a member, and which certainly no man has a right to ignore who is making a considerable income as a professional pacifist. Moreover, the earlier publications in this series are by men with whom Mr. Angell in his writings professes familiarity, though he cannot always spell their names

correctly.* Still, considering that (as we now know) he has not ever read the German works from which he does profess to quote, it is certainly a minor matter that he should ignore any particular volume, however important. Indeed, it may even be the sign of an awakening literary conscience that, in this particular case, he has made no profession of reading things which in fact he has not read. But, on the other hand, it is essentially significant, and essentially ruinous to his claims, that he should have ignored what was perhaps the one supreme factor in European politics. For, not only was this in itself the one most obvious factor; it was also the one factor on which his own candid friend had tried as earnestly to make him see the truth, as those adversaries had tried, for whose revelations Mr. Angell had nothing but hard words. A medical man, whose crass professional ignorance has cost the patient his life, is justly punished by law for not knowing the things which he was under an implied contract to know. A professional pacifist, whose ignorance (so far as it has influenced the world) has contributed to the worst slaughter in history, goes off with a light heart to America and lectures there upon the blindness of "the average sensual man."

"Give us ten years!" Ten days after those words were spoken, it was becoming evident that the Great War was at last upon us. Within ten weeks more, Mr. Asquith revealed how definitely Germany

* In the short list on p. viii of *Polity* one is mis-spelt, and two in the list on pp. 33—4.

had foreshadowed her aggressive designs even in 1912, by her answer to Lord Haldane's peace-mission; and Italy had told us how Austria planned the attack upon Serbia as early as 1913; and the White Book had shown how enormously these aggressive designs were encouraged by the belief that Britain was partly powerless, partly unwilling, to interfere. This was the real Practical Outcome of Mr. Angell's gospel of "wait and see." International politics, unfortunately, are a great deal too complicated to be settled by ideas which a boy of twelve can master in an hour: and the men who lived under this illusion are, in spite of themselves, among the most responsible parties for this present war. Dr. Schiemann has told us, in the *New York Times History of the War* :

"On Feb. 18, 1913, Charles Trevelyan, M.P., paid me a visit and assured me with great positiveness that England would under no circumstances wage war. A ministry which undertook to make such preparations for war, he said, would at once be deposed."

Mr. Trevelyan replies to this (*Morning Post*, Sept. 22, 1915.)—

"Sir—I have not seen Professor Schiemann's article, which is referred to by a correspondent in your columns to-day. Not being endowed with the gift of prophecy, I could not have given anyone an assurance that Great Britain would not wage war on Germany. What I told Professor Schiemann was the same as I told individuals in private conversation and my constituents in speech and writing, that we were not bound to fight for France or Russia, as any engagement or understanding to take part in a European war had been repeatedly and emphatically denied by the heads of our Government. Like most Englishmen then, I regarded war with Germany as most unlikely and I always said so openly."

Mr. Trevelyan, it will be seen, admits what is in effect a fatal miscalculation, and only shelters himself under the phrase "like most Englishmen." Yet he, as a minister, could easily have gleaned some true details of the Haldane failure while most Englishmen were still in helpless ignorance. Most Englishmen, again, had not been drawing £1200 a year as political experts, nor had most Englishmen the opportunity of assuring foreign politicians, at private interviews, that Germany was free to make a mess of Europe without fear of our interference. Mr. Trevelyan thinks the mistake is entirely on Professor Schiemann's part; but his own excuses leave plenty of room to explain how a German was almost certain to adopt Professor Schiemann's interpretation; and nobody who has read even a little of Mr. Trevelyan's utterances can fail to see what confusion of thought he habitually conceals under slipshod good intentions and slipshod vagueness of language.* Quite recently, in a pamphlet which he published for the National League of Young Liberals, he based his arguments on the principle that "out of freemen accustomed to free action in all their doing, the highest type of democracy can alone be built." Here we have a Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Education showing, not only that he has never read so obvious

* In this very letter, for instance. We all know that he is not endowed with the gift of prophecy; but how does this go to disprove that he did not in fact make that unlucky forecast which Dr. Schiemann is sure he made? A man needs no prophetic endowment to make a foolish prophecy; he only needs a very ordinary lack of common-sense and discretion.

an authority as Mill on Liberty (or indeed any standard author on the same subject), but that he has even forgotten the political action of his own father, to whose name Mr. C. P. Trevelyan mainly owes such political distinction as he has ever enjoyed. Sir George Trevelyan was one of the chief movers in compulsory education.* Compulsory Insurance and compulsory shop-closing are again among other most notable achievements of modern Liberalism; and Mr. C. P. Trevelyan knows very well that he would have to go among savages to find "freemen" of the type that he here defines. It is the Bedouin and the Turcoman who boast that they obey no man, and even these are often compelled by the struggle for existence to belie their own boast.† Here, again, is a gem from the very next page of Mr. Trevelyan's pamphlet :

"It is good to be ready to die for one's country. No decent Englishman has ever had any doubt of what he would do if his country were in danger. And the only people who are ignorant of this deep-seated national feeling are these narrow militarists. They fail to see, like Mr. Martin, M.P., in "Stalky and Co.," that we don't always prate on the housetops of our deepest sentiments."

* "One of England's greatest educational reformers once said: 'You can never really unite those three qualities—that education shall be voluntary, that it shall be efficient, and that it shall be universal.' . . . I am delighted to find that the Government has pledged itself, in framing this Bill, to many excellent proposals—the first of which is an uncompromising enforcement of compulsion." Mr. G. O. Trevelyan in the House of Commons, March 7, 1872.

† The fact that, in other places, he contradicts his own principle, and writes common sense on this subject, is not here to the point. When Mr. Trevelyan can write, and correct the proofs of, such reckless stuff as this, he has no reason to complain that foreign politicians misunderstand what he tells them in private confabulations.

Within a few months after these words were written, our country found itself in the greatest danger we have ever faced since the Napoleonic era. For aught Mr. Trevelyan and most Englishmen can see, the present may prove even more serious than the Napoleonic peril. Yet Mr. Trevelyan, so far from volunteering himself, as his age would have permitted, found nothing more pressing to do than to pose as one of the figure-heads of a Union which, without actually preaching against recruiting, has in fact, by its deliberate and ostentatious abstention, been among the chief anti-recruiting agencies. If his main object had been to show us how incapable he is of saying the thing that he really means, he could scarcely have taken any more efficacious course. But we must not press persons of this kind to either extreme. He did not really mean his patriotic brag; nor, on the other hand, does he really mean his present anti-patriotic action; like Mr. Angell, he is incapable of really meaning anything from which any practical conclusion can be drawn. No man plays more surely into the hands of the militarist than a well-meaning, complacent, purblind Illusionary of this kind, persuaded of his mission to convince the world of a gospel which he himself only vaguely conceives. Only keep enough guinea-pigs on the premises, and you will soon be plagued with rats, who have an infallible scent for their natural prey. The mental complacency of these sleek victims seems to attract the bloodsucker even more, if possible, than their physical defencelessness.

XIII

GOOD COIN OR BAD?

It may be objected with some truth that all this is only negative evidence. Mr. Angell, no doubt, did make only one practical suggestion in his *Great Illusion*, and did find this so unfortunate that he dropped it quietly into the ditch at the next stage of his journey, like a child of shame. Pressed for practical solutions at the Summer School, he did more than once fail to supply them, and fell back on the plea that he was creating "an attitude of mind," which would be formed in five or ten years. All this, no doubt, was a little like Hans Andersen's story of the Emperor's new clothes, and one or two of his disciples seem to have felt uncomfortable doubts which, at any moment, might have burst out:—

"But the Emperor has nothing at all on!" said a child-like Fellow of Trinity.

"Listen to the voice of innocence!" exclaimed Professor Johann Mez of Munich; and what the Fellow had said was whispered from one to the other.

It really seems to have been touch and go; and the practical impotence of these discussions does lend itself to very damaging criticism. But it has been very truly said that no man was ever written down except by himself. It would still have been possible to hope against hope that Angellism had some real practical application, if Mr. Angell himself had not taken pains, in a recent article, to prick his own bubble. I quote from the long communication of

four quarto columns which is officially reproduced in "War and Peace" for September, 1915. It is entitled "A New Kind of War."

The gist is, that Germany should be first brought down, and then kept down for as long as the world's interests may require, by a sort of commercial war. America, "in view of the situation created by the sinking of the *Arabic*," is to lead this new crusade. "All international trade now affected by British action" is to be controlled by "all the Allies *plus* the United States, and with the unofficial co-operation of the remaining neutrals as well." Economists might have a good deal to say as to the difficulty of framing, for so heterogeneous a collection of allies, a series of tariff regulations which would not be more irksome to one or other of the contracting parties than to Germany herself. I only take here the more obvious objection, that Mr. Angell, directly he condescends to detail, stumbles into a series of hopeless violations of his own most cherished principles.

(1) The most efficient means of indemnifying ourselves at Germany's expense, he thinks, might be "by sequestration of German property throughout the world." Yet, before this war, he had insisted *ad nauseam* on the impossibility of doing any good by confiscation: *e.g.* "wealth in the modern world has become intangible, so far as conquest and confiscation are concerned"; and "every financier knows that, if Germany conquered Holland or Belgium to-morrow, she would have to leave their wealth

untouched; there could be no confiscation." At the Summer School, he actually intervened to correct a disciple who implied that a nation might lose anything by defeat in war, beyond the direct injury which she would suffer from invasion.

(2) Other measures might be "some sur-tax by tariff, ship and mail dues." This, again, is directly contrary to the economic ideas on which his *Great Illusion* was built. It is obvious that such sur-taxes and dues imposed against Germany could be maintained only so long and so far as Germany was impotent to cut the knot with her sword. China, for instance, would be quite unable to impose such dues against European commerce, because the European nations would force their way through, in spite of any Chinese decree to the contrary. Therefore this "new kind of war" against Germany depends on the Allies' power and willingness to face the old kind of war. What then becomes of Mr. Angell's fundamental doctrine, "that political and military power is economically futile"?

(3) Thus, he hopes, "there would be a situation in which the channels of trade would for a long time have been turned away from Germany." This, again, is rank heresy against the real Angellic gospel, according to which you cannot damage another nation's trade without hurting your own: according to which it is an absurdity to think of trade in terms of nations; "the prosperity of commercial Europe is to-day one and indivisible,"—and therefore, of course, of the civilized commercial world also. As a disciple put

it with the Master's tacit approval at the Summer School of 1914, the essential originality of Angellism, as compared with the older pacificism, is that it demonstrates "it is impossible to hit another man on the cheek without hitting yourself."* Lest the reader should think it intrinsically incredible that Mr. Angell should commit himself to such contradictory absurdities, I give a mass of quotations in Appendix XII. What has enabled Mr. Angell to enjoy so long a period of comparative impunity is the extreme wearisomeness of dealing with such a gigantic and convinced impostor, on the scale which the magnitude of his imposture demands.

This, then, is the new kind of war, by which "German aggression would be faced by forces that mere military power could not meet." "Two or three obvious objections" (adds Mr. Angell) "will be urged to the course just outlined." But he does not mention the first and most obvious objection of all, that no such system of commercial coercion would be possible unless the Allies possessed means of military coercion also; that this newest and most ingenious Angellic scheme of civilization would need an infinitely stronger basis of force than the defence

* It would be extremely interesting to hear a frank discussion of these new developments of Angellism by a few men of distinction who were impressed by the Angellism of eighteen months ago. Mr. Lowell Dickinson, for instance, wrote on p. 26 of his *War and the Way Out*, "If Mr. Norman Angell and his followers cannot convince the reader that, from an economic point of view, the prosperity of one nation implies and enhances that of another, and that political power is a consideration irrelevant to economic power, I cannot hope to convince him." The new Mr. Angell, it appears, is the person whom Mr. Dickinson must now set himself to convince.

of a cannibal's larder; and that he is thus leading the world, not away from force, but towards such an unprecedented organization and demonstration of force as would render even Germany powerless. On this point he still remains blind, and clings pathetically to his *Great Illusion*, the teaching of which has been so admirably summed up on p. 2 of the official *Thirty Points*.* "Do you refuse Burgundy in favour of Rhein wine (*sic*) because of the superiority of Germany's navy? Have you ever been influenced in your purchases by the naval standing of another country? If not, why should the heathen Chinees or anybody else be influenced by the British navy?"

A French professor, who was present at that which Angellites call "the now classical address before the Institute of Bankers,"† remarked upon the curious mixture of old truths and new follies which the speaker had managed to deliver in the same breath and with the same air of impressive conviction. I sent this September *War and Peace* for his amusement; and he wrote back, "Mr. Angell's thoughts are so confused; he mixes up so many different questions; he so hopelessly confounds the relative values of the social forces which are at play; he so completely ignores political and economical

* *Thirty Points for Angellism*. (War and Peace Pamphlets No. 5.) This contains a brief abstract of the Master's doctrines, drawn up by a member of the Manchester Norman Angell League, and published officially by the Garton Foundation, of which Mr. Angell is principal working trustee, and (I believe) actually president.

† *Polity*, pp. 81 ff.

realities, that it is depressing to discuss his ideas. Especially depressing is the fact that he defends true ideas (for instance, the truth that, *in the long run*, no military power in the present world can prevent a country from developing itself in the economic field, so long as it goes on working and inventing) by arguments so bungling, so false, and so repugnant to the most elementary common sense."

We have here the whole moral in a nutshell. It is indeed depressing that so many thousands should have been led, by Mr. Angell's carefully-graduated logical confusions, into a sort of vague fatalistic belief in early disarmament and even in some sort of non-resistance.* Even more depressing, perhaps, than the Master's hazy but carefully-veiled sophisms is the clotted nonsense into which his disciples have boiled down the Angellic doctrine—*e.g.* when the official *Thirty Points* asks whether China ever bought anything from us under the influence of our

* In spite of Mr. Angell's professed indignation at those who so mistake him, the fact is undeniable. I have pointed out above (p. 32) that he himself has approvingly reprinted a puff commending him for having converted so many men to retrenchment in armaments. The whole debate at the Summer School (pp. 239—258) is still more significant. Mr. Bloye, a devoted disciple, said, "I think Norman-Angellism will lead us in time to take a view like that"; *i.e.* that, "if England were to disarm, it would immediately take away from Germany her fear of England's deceit and jealousy of England's power." Mr. Williams, Herr von Lübtow, and Mr. Collinson agreed that Angellism logically led to non-resistance, and Mr. Benson remarked "we get at every meeting" a kindred difficulty of interpretation. Mr. Haycock, however, felt that "if we do advocate non-resistance we may as well shut up shop." Mr. Angell tried hard to avoid any real commitment, but finally ranged himself on the side of those who would resist aggression.

Dreadnoughts, or when Mr. Seymour Cocks put Angellism into one brief sentence, "We say that it is impossible to hit another man on the cheek without hitting yourself." But even the *Great Illusion* has its silver lining, and we may find real hope in the fact that the book owes its main popularity to the true ideas mixed up with it, and to the real desire of this present generation to hear certain truths which, at an earlier stage of history, had often been preached to deaf ears. There is something sound in Bungay's Pills, after all; otherwise they could not be advertised with such success. There was probably something even in Martin Tupper's *Proverbial Philosophy*. Mr. Angell's success is a welcome proof that most people do really desire peace, though doubtless the majority hope to get it without too great a tax upon their intellect and their purse, or too great a sacrifice of their pet prejudices.

Why, then, spend so much time in exposing these errors, when our author does really say a good many true things, and has really appealed to many readers who might otherwise have refused to consider the problem of peace and war? The question can best be answered from the infallible scriptures of Mr. Angell himself. He writes: "There is a law in economics known as the Gresham law. When good and bad coin are in circulation together, it is the good coin which disappears, because people try always to pay their debts in the worst; in other words, the

bad coin drives out the good. Something similar takes place in politics in this matter." (*Great Illusion*, 1911, pp. 135, 318.) That is, the bad ideas drive out the good: where truth and falsehood are alike current, the residuum left in the minds of the multitude is mainly false. Without altogether accepting this pessimistic view, we must still recognize that there is only too much truth in it; and Mr. Angell's book is a remarkable case in point. Real Angellism, the authentic gospel of the *Great Illusion*, is often foolish enough; but the residuum which its perusal leaves in the popular mind is still more foolish. Many have read it with discrimination, and therefore with mingled feelings of welcome and regret. But, on the other hand, young men whose enthusiasm naturally outruns their discretion, older persons with a weakness for cheap originality, and Manchester propagandists itching to get one day ahead of the rest of England, have seized with unerring instinct on that which is most original (and therefore most untrustworthy) in the Angellic message. Unconsciously and inevitably they keep the worst coin to pay their intellectual debts with. Even Mr. Cocks, with his pathetic belief that you cannot hit another man on the cheek without hitting yourself, is sober compared with disputants whom I have heard in other similar debates. When Mr. Angell himself thus indexes a certain page of the *Great Illusion*, "GERMANY . . . reputed military character of, disproved on investigation, p. 218," he still falls short of the nonsense about Germany which has

often been bleated in the name of the *Great Illusion*.*

His teaching is true and useful, so far as it drives home the truth which has become more and more apparent as the centuries go on, that war is an injustice, and that no injustice "pays" in the long run. But he deludes both himself and his followers in blinking the intimate relation between war and other less obvious injustices, and in imagining that he has discovered new truths which will enormously accelerate the process of our conversion to real peace. These imaginary discoveries have to a certain extent served a useful purpose; they have called attention to the old truths, as a Russian priest's reputation for miracle-working will bring tens of thousands to listen to his plain moral preaching. But, "in accordance with a sort of Gresham's law," there comes a time when the true spirit evaporates from an amalgam of this sort, and leaves only the dregs behind.

For a very long way, therefore, all are working together:—the "older pacifists," the Angellites, and thousands of people whom these two parties pharisaically condemn as militarists, but who would often be ready to make quite as great personal sacrifices for peace as the rest; who, in fact, only stick at sacrificing reason or common sense. It is at this point that we really part. We insist on the

* Here, for instance, is a gem from the "Norman Angell Monthly" for April, 1914 (p. 201). "From Dr. John Mez of Munich comes a letter on the subject of the German Minister of Marine's telegram of sympathy on the loss of the A 7. He suggests that, if the whole of our fleet were to be destroyed by a similar accident, precisely the same thing would happen."

fact that non-resistance is an impossible ideal; not even a moral and highly-civilized ideal; an ideal abandoned in practice by the body which, beyond all others, would have had most chance of success. The Society of Friends could easily raise the capital needed to found a non-resistant state. Its members, with their high average of comradeship and steadiness and business capacity, would form the best conceivable material to work with. Their known probity, their wide influence, and their long pacifist tradition would secure a grant of facilities for buying up some island large enough for the experiment; and they would be able to start with the cleanest of white sheets in international relations. Yet, in practice, there is no whisper of any such plan. The world is far riper for a Peace-State than it was in Penn's day; yet Penn's brethren no more dream of repeating his experiment than Bernhardt does. That is the first fact for a pacifist to face.

The next is, that this reduces the peace-problem to a practical question of the balance of armament. Nearly all men, in effect, recognize the necessity of armaments; we nearly all want enough, yet no more than enough; here we all differ only in degree; how can a nation make itself strong, without becoming aggressive? This problem, the real practical question of all, Mr. Angell constantly treats as insoluble.* Jaurès

* *e.g. Illusion*, 1911, p. 4, where he only considers "a limitation of armaments by agreement." The continental democratic solution would limit armaments at first, not by agreement, but by showing an unmistakable balance of defensive over offensive force. It would put peace-loving nations in the position of a man who can say to his

and the continental socialists generally, as will be seen in Chapter XIX, propose a clear-cut solution for this problem; one, moreover, which Mr. Angell has less right than any one to neglect, since it rests, like his own, upon the recognition of an essential difference between offensive and defensive warfare. No theory of pacificism can satisfy the thinking public, which does not take the continental view into account, give clear reasons for rejecting it (if reject it we must), and propose at least some equally clear and practical solution to take its place.

Nor will any theory satisfy us which does not recognize certain unquestionable historical and biological facts. These may best be stated in the words of distinguished pacifists themselves,—pacifists who (unlike Mr. Angell) had really read widely before they theorized, and would have disdained to quote habitually from books which they had never seen.

(1) *Historical*. Immanuel Kant wrote, "Long peace usually gives the predominance to the mere commercial spirit, with its concomitant failings of base selfishness, cowardice, and effeminacy, and thus tends to debase the national mind." And again, "Look at China, which . . . has no powerful enemy

quarrelsome neighbour, "I don't want to go to law with you, and I don't want you to go to law with me. I have therefore procured counsel's opinion, which shows that you would be most unlikely to win your case if you attacked me." Such a practical proof of complete readiness for defence would be the best step towards subsequent proposals for limitation of litigation, and would make the most quarrelsome man pause before he risked his money at law. Mr. Angell shows himself equally blind to his essential point on pp. 34, 36, 150, 152, 209, 211—2, 257, 278, 281—2, 287, 290, 292, 298, 302, 323, 331. (Ed. 1911.)

to fear, and has therefore lost every vestige of freedom." (See Appendix xi.) He might, of course, have added that the same problem meets us in the last three centuries of Roman history. Jacques Novikow, for his part, insists on the fact that "history shows the most warlike nations to have been, at the same time, excellent producers." It is the first business of the pacifist to grapple with these facts, and to show us how we can kill militarism without at the same time killing the spirit of enterprise and freedom. We believe that the problem must be soluble, sooner or later; yet we see more harm than good in the charlatans who arrive at a simple solution by ignoring notorious facts.

(2) *Biological.* Here, again, all solutions are valueless which ignore those two sentences of Novikow: "It is intellectual improvement which has made war possible among men"; and, "If men did not fight each other they would be simply like tigers, who do not eat each other." Every advance in civilization means an advance also in potential physical force. But the man who, when he could successfully gain his object by physical force, refrains from doing so, will always be as exceptional as the man who similarly refrains from taking advantage of his rival in commerce. Therefore the struggles of the future will not ignore physical force—on the contrary, Mr. Angell himself cannot frame a future policy for America without postulating a reserve of physical force beyond all that the world has yet known. But mankind will increasingly adopt the

habit of bargaining with potential force rather than actually producing it, just as we bargain with scraps of paper which imply an unseen reserve of gold. Physical force will increase as fast as wealth increases; only both will be less obvious to the superficial observer.

Again, the theorist who is to satisfy dispassionate readers must abstain from Mr. Angell's exaggerations of certain economic truths. The very fact that he is sometimes compelled to limit the application of his theory to "aggressive war between *highly civilized states*" might have warned him that it cannot be absolutely true even of these, since no hard-and-fast line can be drawn between one civilization and another. Moreover, it is comparatively seldom that he gives us clear warning of any such limitation; the general public judges him by such sweeping sentences as, "If conquest is not to be self-injurious it must respect the enemy's property, in which case it becomes economically futile"; or, "The forces which have brought about the economic futility of military power." The doctrine laid down in these sentences is one of which he himself recognizes the falsity in his recent article on "A New Kind of War." And a great many of his warmest adherents would refuse to apply even this, his main doctrine, to the problem of class-war. As Mr. Fulton put it without contradiction at the Summer School (p. 45): "In the case of Ireland I found that every pacifist is against Ulster, and not against the Nationalists. I consider that in that case the British army was pacifist, and

the majority of the British people was not." The same thing may be said even more emphatically of organized labour, which contemplates the employment of force against capitalism as lightly as it repudiates the same against other nationalities.

This brings me to my last point: that our theorists must take account of nationalism as a necessary step towards internationalism. At present, they cheaply assume that the internationalist is more highly developed than the nationalist; just as they take for granted that the man who is unwilling to fight is more civilized than his more combative fellow. As Mr. Fulton put it at the Summer School (p. 21), pacifism is often "widely confused with totally different things, like republicanism or democracy . . . Class-hostility is easily aroused, and very often is disingenuously expressed as anti-militarism." Even as a great many people hate war less for moral than for physical or political reasons, so also an equal number (very often the same men) catch at internationalism as an escape from national duties and obligations. Certainly pacifists are right to scorn the ideal of a narrow patriotism, "My country, right or wrong!" But even this imperfect ideal is infinitely more respectable than that other which, too often, silently takes its place—"My own fad, right or wrong!" Mr. Angell and his friends have yet to show the way between one dangerous error and another almost equally fatal. They have still to prove that he who makes a trade of preaching peace need not become either a charlatan or a dupe. These are strong

words; but I hope that most of my readers will admit me to have produced abundant evidence. Professional pacifists, as a class, are neither so careful of their original statements, nor so courageous in the admission of error, as their position demands. On the contrary, they are perverse in distorting their opponents' actual words, quick to impute motives, greedy to appropriate ideas by furtive means, slow to acknowledge their debts, and most reluctant to retract even the grossest misstatements into which they have once been betrayed. The authors of the *Great Illusion* and of the *Human Harvest* are doubtless philanthropists, but they are above all things philangellists or philojordanists; far more concerned to save their own faces than to save the public from serious error, with all the embarrassments that error always brings in its train. They hate war, yet they breed and foster those germs of injustice which are the main cause of war. Like our forefathers of two centuries ago, they cling to insanitary conditions, and rail meanwhile at the Devil for sending periodic plagues upon them. Before we can put an end to war, we must rise to a stage of civilization in which literary morality will be as truly emphasized as commercial morality. At present, thanks to the leniency of public opinion and to his own elusiveness of style, Mr. Angell has risen to fame on the strength of a book which inextricably intermingles old truth and mischievous error. In Mrs. Poyser's immortal words, the *Great Illusion* would need to be hatched again, and hatched different.

XIV

LOOSE STATEMENTS. "THE UNION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL"

We may now pass on from Mr. Angell himself to the Union which he helped to found when this war broke out. Here we find ourselves again confronted by this Gresham Law; the U.D.C. programme, laudable enough in the main, is alloyed with very mischievous stuff.

Whatever may be thought of the small group of professional politicians who speak for the Union of Democratic Control, nobody will deny the intellectual distinction of a still smaller group of scholars who write for it. Their very fewness combines with their individual distinction to create a generous prejudice in their favour, which goes far to counterbalance the natural prejudices of the majority. Professor Pigou has exploited this sympathetic mood, with considerable success, before more than one audience. He has been attacked in certain quarters with most regrettable vehemence and injustice; and his copious verbal quotations leave us in no doubt that he has received even more spiteful letters than fall to the lot of most people who take a strong controversial line. But may we not easily overdo this appeal to public sympathy? Unpopularity is not in itself a proof of real distinction. Unthinking people, even in their most impatient moods, need not be always and altogether wrong, nor are the greatest and most patient thinkers always in the right—witness Sir Isaac Newton's lucubrations on the Book of Daniel, or Burke on the French Revolution. We need to get away from mere bias on

either side; to realize not only the horrible significance of this present war, but also its far more momentous future issues; to get behind mere words and see the things in themselves; to regard these things (so far as a strong effort of will can enable us so to regard them) in the light in which they will appear to generations to whom most of us will not even be a name. The most distinguished advocates of the U.D.C. will be the very last to shrink from such direct and searching criticism. They will freely admit that the Few, like the Many, have their besetting intellectual dangers: that there is a subtle routine of Liberalism scarcely less perilous than the grosser routine of old-fashioned Conservatism; and that the man who is constantly accustomed to find himself outvoted, yet passionately unconvinced, is tempted sometimes to believe in the Divine Right of Minorities. This tendency, noticeable even among the most thoughtful, often comes out very glaringly among the thoughtless; for even minorities have their multitudes. There are hundreds of half-thinking people who hanker after cheap originality as others hanker after cheap jewellery; and who fancy that choice intellects, like giant gooseberries, can be produced by mechanical isolation from their fellows. Between these, and the really generous champions of a weaker cause, there are all sorts of gradations; a minority, under the microscope, will often show as many mixed motives as a majority; and its pleas demand exactly the same critical examination which we apply to the opinions of the multitude.

Many people do not hold aloof from the U.D.C. because they lack sympathy for the ideal of democratic control in foreign, as in every other department of policy. We want (as Dr. Johnson said of Greece) as much democracy everywhere as we can get; the only question is, where and how are we to get it? If there were any royal road to democratic control, we would be ready to follow that road at almost any cost. We only doubt whether, at this present stage of society, there is any immediate and practical method of enabling the mass of voters to understand clearly the multiform and complicated issues involved in any important negotiations between two or more great states. And, after studying the published pleas of the ablest champions of the U.D.C., we doubt whether even these protagonists do themselves understand the main issues; whether they clearly conceive either what they want to pull down or what they want to set up; whether, in short, even their most passionate appeals to reason are not based mainly upon temperamental impulse. The professional politicians of the U.D.C. were never distinguished, at their very best, for balance of mind or breadth of view; and even the scholars, whose authority these men are now exploiting, seem warped by a fatal spirit of impatience. Whatever Mr. Dickinson or Mr. Russell writes must be worth reading; yet both, in their recent publications, are most startlingly inaccurate just where we should expect them to have the clearest grip of their subject.

Let us start from an instance of this kind in Mr. Dickinson's *After the War* (p. 17). He writes:

“Virgil, Dante, Goethe, Shelley, preached peace no less than Jesus Christ, or Francis of Assisi, or George Fox.”

Compare this statement with a few brief quotations from the four poets appealed to.

(1) VIRGIL. “Arms and the man I sing” (*Aeneid* I. 1). “Thou, O Roman, remember to rule the nations with thy sway. These shall be thy arts, to impose the law of peace, to spare thy foes when they submit, and to crush the proud by war” (*Aeneid* VI. 851).

(2) DANTE. “Certain races are born to govern, and certain others to be governed and to serve, as Aristotle argues in the *Politics*; and for the latter, as he himself says, subjection is not only expedient, but just, even though they be forced into subjection. . . . It was of right that [the Romans] gained empire, by subduing to themselves the world. The Roman people gained their empire by duel between man and man . . . Who then is so dull of understanding as not to see that this glorious people has won the crown of all the world by the decision of combat? Surely the Roman may repeat Paul's words to Timothy, ‘There is laid up for me a crown of righteousness’—laid up, that is, in the eternal providence of God. . . . It has now become

manifest that it was by combat of man against man that the Romans gained their empire; therefore it was by right that they gained it; and this is the principal thesis of the present book." (*De Monarchia*, bk. II. chaps. 7—11.)

(3) GOETHE. "O blessed is he around whose brow Death wreathes his bloodstained laurels in the glorious hour of victory!"* (*Faust*, Pt. I.)

"For those resolute peoples are always extolled who have fought for God and for Law, for their parents and wives and children, and who have given up the ghost in serried ranks against their enemies If our enemies threaten us now or in the future, do thou [my wife] arm me thyself, and give the sword into mine hand." (*Hermann und Dorothea*, concluding lines.)

"'Conquer or die!' is the spirit which has created all nations . . . I am ashamed of my hours of repose; it would have been a gain for me to have suffered with you [who fought against Napoleon]; since, in virtue of the pains which ye have suffered, ye are greater men than I." (*Des Epimenides Erwachen*, ll. 793, 859, written in honour of the Battle of Leipzig.)

* Even the pacific and detached Renan writes in his autobiography, "La mort sur le champ de bataille est la plus belle de toutes." I quote this simply as a further instance of the difficulty of finding any first-rate writer who has adopted pacificism in George Fox's sense. Though Mr. Dickinson puts St. Francis in the same category I have never seen any attempt to support this by documentary evidence.

(4) SHELLEY. "The wise and generous policy of England would have consisted in establishing the independence of Greece, and in maintaining it against both Russia and the Turks. But when was the oppressor generous or just?" (Preface to *Hellas*, 1821.)

The above quotations are only a few among the many that could be produced. Dante gives to the old buccaneer Robert Guiscard a high place in Paradise, and is proud that his own ancestor should have won a place in heaven by killing Turks in Palestine; not only does he devote a third of his *De Monarchia* to an apotheosis of the successful force which made Rome mistress of the world, but he returns twice to the same idea in his *Commedia* (*Parad.* vi and xix—xx.). And in all this he takes Virgil for his text—Virgil, whose whole *Aeneid* is devoted to the same theme, and who, in that catalogue of famous Romans which precedes the well-known passage I have quoted above, confines himself almost exclusively to warriors. Goethe, it is true, scandalized good Germans by his aloofness during the wars of liberation; yet Goethe had the candour to apologize publicly for this, and to confess that the men who had risked their lives, while he had been mainly concerned with things of the intellect, were better men than he.* He had great admiration, not only for the bloodstained Napoleon and Frederick the Great, but also for

* Even if we deny, as a few commentators do, that Goethe meant this for a *personal* apology, this does not affect his judgment as to the value of the fighting-man in general.

Wellington and Blücher, who were certainly not ideal men of peace. He sometimes even justified the duel. He noted carefully that the bloody wars of Frederick the Great had given a great impulse to German literature, and done much to lift it from mediocrity; and in a memorable passage which I shall have to quote in full later on, he analysed the peculiar temptations of a nation at peace.* Shelley, the weakest and the least balanced of these four great poets, is the only one of whom Mr. Dickinson's assertion can be maintained as even approximately true. Yet even Shelley heartily applauded the Greeks when they shed Turkish blood; and he made it a crime against Castlereagh that England did not risk a European war for the sake of Greece. How much meaning lies in this preface to *Hellas*, may be realized by comparing it with Fyffe's defence of England's neutrality at this time when Shelley was crying for interference. "But to do justice at least to the English ministers of 1821," writes Fyffe, "it must be remembered how terrible, how overpowering were the memories left by the twenty years of European war that had closed in 1815, and at how vast a cost to mankind the regeneration of Greece would have been effected if, as then seemed probable, it had ranged the Great Powers again in arms against one another" (*Modern Europe* chap. 15). Where Greece was concerned, Shelley was more bloodthirsty than Castlereagh.

* Eckermann. *Gespräche*, index under the names quoted; *Sprüche in Prosa*. ed. Loeper (Hempel) 478—80 and notes; *Aus Meinem Leben* Books 6 and 12.

In other places, of course, Shelley does preach non-resistance; and Goethe's unpatriotic detachment is so much better known than his recantation, that it need hardly surprise us when we find Mr. Dickinson catching at these two great names to support his case. But what shall we say of Virgil and Dante, who in their very best-known works, and in some of the most conspicuous passages of these, preach the gospel of successful war almost as clearly as Bernhardt himself? The fact that they also sing the beauty of peace does not help Mr. Dickinson out; nearly everybody is agreed as to the beauty of peace; there is a vast gulf between this and "preaching peace no less than George Fox." It is impossible to escape the conviction that Mr. Dickinson is here hypnotised by his own thesis. It was necessary to find some great poets for his theory—Homer and Aeschylus, Shakespeare and Milton obviously would not do—let us fall back upon four who wrote sometimes in praise of peace, without asking ourselves whether these same men have not also written in praise of war. It was not the philosopher, but the advocate, who caught at these four witnesses, with a haste that is the measure of his desperate need; for if even the poets, if even the idealists do not bear us out, where do we stand?

Mr. Russell, again, bases himself upon alleged facts which can be as easily disproved. He constantly assumes the practical identity of English and foreign aims and methods in this quarrel. Both England and Germany are making "exactly similar

assertions" about the origin of the war; "the average Austrian is neither better nor worse than the average Englishman," from which it would follow that political and social freedom, in which we enjoy a start of Austria by many generations, have no effect upon national character (*War the Offspring of Fear*, pp. 2, 4). Again: "All the melodramatic wickedness which we attribute to them [the Germans], they with equal sincerity attribute to us." England and Germany are "extraordinarily similar even in the manner of their hatred of each other" (*Cambridge Review*, Feb. 10, 1915). "We did the same to Denmark in the Napoleonic war" as Germany has now done to Belgium (*ibid.* Feb. 24). In short, it is scarcely unfair to say that most of Mr. Russell's arguments are based upon the assumption that, in our present state of knowledge, we not only cannot apportion the relative guilt of Germany and England *exactly*, but it is almost useless to attempt any apportionment *at all*. "It is no use attempting to ascertain the facts, since they are not at present ascertainable" (*War, &c.*, p. 7). Now, what scientific justification can be found for this extreme agnosticism? The whole world knows already that Germany was found to have prepared for this war with the utmost elaboration, while we were in a state of most imperfect preparation for anything of such magnitude. Everyone knows that it had long been preached in Germany by writers of real repute, and that professors and schoolmasters had prepared the German youth for it in a systematic way to which no parallel

could be found in Great Britain. We know that the violation of Belgian neutrality, which has weighed so heavily *for* war in British minds, must have weighed to some real extent *against* war in the mind of thinking Germans; yet the undeniable fact remains that Germany voted more unanimously for war *and* violation, than Britain did for war *against* violation; and that, even now, those Germans who protest publicly against the final annexation of Belgium are even less numerous than the Britons who follow Mr. Ramsay Macdonald in speaking of our championship of Belgium as a piece of hypocrisy. Moreover, everybody knows now, what only a few Cassandras preached until last August, that German methods of war are marked by a calculated and systematic ruthlessness far beyond the methods of other equally civilized nations. Amid the hundreds of lies and exaggerations which are naturally current, incidents like Louvain and Aerschot are too well-known and too numerous to leave room for legitimate doubt; and their significance is clinched by their exact conformity to text-book prescriptions.* As the *Westminster Gazette* says (March 24, 1915), "What makes [Bernhardi's] books of importance is not that he wrote them, but that the German people have done what he said they would do, and behaved in war as he said they would behave. That is not to be explained away by any sophistry." The same

* This was written before the worse crimes of the poison-gas and the *Lusitania*, which the U.D.C. may be pardoned for not having anticipated. But there is no excuse for their ignoring Louvain, which was in conformity with official rules of the Germany army.

may be said even more emphatically of the actual German proclamations in Belgium, and of their official prescriptions for the behaviour of the army to invaded populations. If there were no more than this, Mr. Russell's agnosticism would still be utterly unscientific. To refuse to pronounce on such evidence as this is not to take a higher judicial standpoint, but simply to abdicate the noblest function of human reason, its power to distinguish right from wrong.

Moreover, even if we admit Mr. Russell's extreme claim, and assume that months or years must go by before the present evidence will become worth a wise man's judgement, even then there is no excuse for his statement about the bombardment of Copenhagen. We took the Danish fleet in 1807 because, if we had waited only a few weeks longer, it would have been seized by Napoleon, whose actual letters on this subject are now public property. This is freely admitted even by the best French authorities. As Count Albert Vandal puts it in Lavissee and Rambaud's *Histoire Générale*: "the English only broke the weapon which Napoleon was about to turn against them, before he could put his hand to it" (ix. 128). Lanfrey and Capefigue write no less plainly. (*Hist. de Napoléon*, Vol. iv. p. 129; *L'Europe pendant le Consulat*, etc. Vol. vii. pp. 61—70.) Again, Great Britain had never pledged herself by treaty to guarantee the neutrality of Denmark. No doubt our action was a lamentable breach of international law; but to ignore the vast difference between the events of 1807 and the present invasion

of Belgium, and to ignore the fact that a whole century's advance in civilization makes a crime less excusable in 1914 than it might have been in 1807, is simply to catch at a superficial excuse for denying inconvenient essential facts. Even if we were to accept the German interpretation of the documents found at Brussels—an interpretation of which American journals have exposed the absurdities in still plainer terms than our own papers—even so, it would be impossible to put the events of 1807 and 1914 in the same category.

Mr. Dickinson, again, is equally agnostic upon points equally vital to any true estimate of the present situation. He almost seems to think that this present war, like Mr. Winkle's gun, went off of its own accord." He writes :

“The Triple Entente faced the Triple Alliance in arms. The materials for the explosion were there. It was merely a question who should drop the first match. Our discussions as to who that was are not so important as we think. This year, we believe, it was Germany. But if it had not been Germany this year, it might have been Russia next.” (*After the War*, p. 5.)

Yet Mr. Dickinson cannot seriously mean that this question of the first match is almost immaterial, and that a mere might-have-been weighs equally in the scales of history with an ascertained fact. Every undergraduate possesses the materials for setting his rooms on fire; but in the case of an actual conflagra-

tion, the only thing which would interest judge and jury would be this very question : Who did drop the match ? Over and over again Mr. Dickinson assumes, for the purpose of his argument, that there is practically no moral distinction between Great Britain and Germany on certain important points. He sets off Maxse and Northcliffe against Treitschke and Bernhardi (*After the War*, p. 5)—as if their position and influence were comparable, and as if our own journalists had not at least this counterbalancing virtue in their ‘jingoism,’ that they did warn us, only too truly, both of what Germany meant to do and of what Britain was leaving undone. Again, it is quite unjustifiable to say, “we believe it was the German Government [which made the war], and with equal conviction Germans believe it was the British.” (*The War, etc.*, p. 11.) Neutrals have pointed out clearly enough that the German White Book, both in what it says and in what it leaves unsaid, betrays a very different state of mind to ours. The German people, again, know at the bottom of their hearts that they lack both a free press and freedom of public speech ; therefore it is as untrue to call the German and English convictions *equal*, as it would be to assert that a scholar, citing an author at random, has the same conviction as he would have had if he had carefully verified his references first. What Mr. Dickinson really means is, that the Germans *claim* as strong convictions as ours, and are determined to act as if they had really verified their claims ; but this, though perfectly

true, is only an aggravation of the moral difference between the two nations on this particular point.*

Let us take only one more instance of Mr. Dickinson's agnosticism: (*The War, etc.* p. 24.)

"I pass, lastly, to the relation between Germany and England. It is *the same story*—Germany is great: the British Empire is great; there is not room for them both; and therefore one of them must smash the other. That is the main position; *the rest is a question of choosing the appropriate moment.* Such, for many years past, has been the attitude of British and of German Imperialists. I do not propose to attempt *the idle and hopeless task* of apportioning the blame between them. That, if it can be done at all, will be better done by one who does not belong to either nation."

Let us analyse here the words which I have italicized. If it is really "the same story," then of course the U.D.C. is justified in what, in fact, is practically its fundamental assumption, that in this war we find little to choose between one nation and another. But how does Mr. Dickinson prove this contention of essential sameness? He proves a certain amount of rivalry and wild talk on both sides; but he makes no

* I assume, of course, that Mr. Dickinson here uses *conviction* in its strictest sense, implying moral responsibility also; that he means, not only that fixed frame of mind which a mad bull shares with a convinced man, but a mind which has come to its decision by legitimate intellectual processes. If he is only using the word in the looser sense, his argument on p. 11 would seem to rest on some confusion of thought.

attempt to prove that both sides have been *equally* earnest and deliberate in their projects and preparations for war; this, the first main question, is simply begged. "The rest is a question of choosing the appropriate moment"—Mr. Winkle's gun again. But who did in fact choose the appropriate moment? Great Britain, for a century, has enjoyed a maritime supremacy almost without precedent in the history of the world. What attempt have we made during all this century to "choose the appropriate moment"? Journalists have sometimes written rashly on the subject; Lord Roberts made one pronouncement, which, taken in its least favourable sense, might be construed as recommending an early attack upon the German navy; but this pronouncement raised a cloud of protests from one end of our country to the other. In Germany, meanwhile, "the appropriate moment" had been preached steadily, and almost officially, for years and decades. Last August, again, Great Britain certainly crossed the Rubicon with the utmost reluctance; and, but for the violation of Belgium, this war would probably have produced a national cleavage even more serious than the Irish Question. Germany, it is true, did not then "choose the moment" with direct reference to us, and she was in fact disappointed to find that her action involved us in the war. But there is little room for reasonable doubt that she seized the moment as appropriate for a Franco-Russian war which, as she well knew, was extremely likely to involve us also. In a court of law, the decision between a man's guilt

or innocence often hangs upon smaller differences than these. It is positively astounding that Mr. Dickinson should claim the right of ruling all this out for the convenience of his argument; and that he should ask us to join him in shirking "the idle and hopeless task of apportioning the blame between" English and German Imperialists.

Nor are these isolated instances. Mr. Russell, anticipating objections to his own peace-scheme, finds "by far the most serious objection" in the alleged fact that "it would diminish the profits of armament firms, and thereby impoverish many of the leading statesmen and ecclesiastics of all civilised countries." (*Camb. Review*, Feb. 10, 1915.) Even if the shareholders of these firms were a hundred times more numerous, and their profits twice as great, such an assertion would still exceed the legitimate bounds of rhetorical exaggeration, quite apart from its incompatibility with the true spirit of peace. War, again, Mr. Dickinson attributes to "the conception of the Abstract State," and "the aggression of the State" (*The War, &c.*, p. 21), though it is notorious that bloodshed is most frequent among animals or men in rough proportion to their individualism, not in proportion to their power of grasping the State abstraction. It is idle to put up a mere caricature of the State idea, as Mr. Dickinson does on pp. 8, 9, and to belabour this as a Turk's Head throughout the rest of the pamphlet. Might it not be safely said that, for one man who quarrels with the State because he has risen into higher fields of thought, a thousand quarrel with it

because they are not yet civilized enough even for those imperfect forms of State which have as yet been evolved? And have we not here one of those cases, frequent enough in history, where the paradox of the philosopher gains most of its power from its appeal to the prejudices of the common man?

It will be seen that the foregoing criticisms are not merely academic; on the contrary, they are made in direct protest against one notorious danger of the academic spirit—its too frequent diletantism in the face of hard practical affairs. The U.D.C. is mainly composed of people who, confessedly, underestimated the practical significance of the German menace until events came which opened everybody's eyes. Even the most distinguished champions of the Union seem scarcely to realize the full moral responsibility of having refused to believe until the very stones cried out against them. We are face to face now with the hardest and most terrible facts of the past century—perhaps, even, of our whole national history. The practical efficiency of the armed German, and his determination to shrink from no action which might conduce ever so little towards victory, have proved even greater than had been prophesied by the people who were called scaremongers a few months ago. For these hard practical facts the general public would find an equally hard and practical remedy: let us meet unjust force by just force, and let our first and paramount idea be that of conquering the Germans in this war. From this direct aim the U.D.C. calls us

away to certain ideal considerations: and the call is attractive in itself. By all means let us do everything in our power to overcome lower realities by higher ideals; but all this is not quite so simple as it sounds. What if our theorists prove to be just as mistaken now, in war-time, as they certainly were before the war? And how if they are only offering us an addled ideal after all? When Mr. Dickinson, with all his culture, goes so far astray over very simple literary facts—when two philosophers of so great subtlety and penetration are entirely unable to discern any practical difference between the mentality and the actions of Germany and of Great Britain, then surely there must be grave flaws somewhere. If an arithmetician cannot get his required answer except by assuming that two and two make five, or by ignoring as negligible the difference between florins and half-crowns, then we look very closely into the rest of his sum. And, if we had nothing more to go upon than has been already quoted, we should be legitimately suspicious of an ideal commended to us in the strength of these miscalculations. It is precisely the frequent irresponsibility of the idealist which gives so much practical power in human affairs to the most brutal realism. Here, as in so many other cases, the children of this world know their business better than the children of light. The militarist tests his shells a great deal more carefully than professors often test their ideas.

Professor Pigou, for instance, protested most vehemently against a certain quotation from his writings

which appeared in a leader of the *Morning Post*, and accused the writer of having suppressed all page-reference in order to disguise his unfair use of the words. The editor replied by quoting the words in dispute, and asking Professor Pigou to explain how they could possibly bear any other interpretation than what had been put upon them. The Professor, instead of answering this, wandered off in his next letter to another subject. The editor, however, held him to the point, repeating the quotation for the third time, and asking what other meaning the words could possibly bear. Professor Pigou replied now by demanding that the *Morning Post* should "print together the *whole* of the passage in your leading article where this citation was discussed, and the *whole* of the paragraph in my work from which it was taken." (*italics his.*) The Editor replied at once by printing the required matter in full—*i.e.* half a newspaper-column of small print. Professor Pigou, in his reply, simply turned aside again to another subject; from beginning to end he has made no attempt either to substantiate, or to apologize for, his accusation of dishonest misrepresentation. (*Morning Post*, Feb. 15, 17, 23, 25, 27.)

When this kind of thing is done by a Professor, we find it repeated in exaggerated forms by politicians. Readers doubtless noted at the time a controversy between the late Mr. Keir Hardie and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr. Hardie had grossly and publicly misquoted Mr. Lloyd George, and was called very plainly to account; he then attempted to confuse the

whole question in a long and rambling letter which contained no word of apology, but only insinuated the original mis-statements in rather more cautious language. Such instances are too common among professional pacifists to call for any special remark. Peace, like all other virtues, begets its own peculiar counterfeits. The man who really lives on a lower plane than that of every-day fact is able to persuade himself and others that he moves on a higher plane; and in peace-time we live amid a world of bubbles which nothing short of national disaster can completely explode. The militarist and the cynic, being shrewd judges of certain human weaknesses, are able to reckon upon this as a constant factor in their favour. Against truly ideal forces they would be powerless; but they know very well that the so-called ideal is too often only words, and words, and words; and that, though it requires some moral courage to combat vulgar errors, it needs far more courage in the wise and prudent to acknowledge, at the eleventh hour, a truth which has long been revealed to the simpler mind of the man in the street. If true pacificism, like all other religious movements, makes so little headway from generation to generation, is not this because neither its priests nor its worshippers take their vocation so seriously as a soldier takes his trade of war? Truth, no doubt, is stronger than dynamite; but half-truths are fragile weapons, and the militarist who keeps his powder dry will always beat the scholar who lets his ideas grow mouldy. Let us give the devil his due,

and remember that the soldier stakes his very life on his conviction of such facts as he can grasp. He thinks daily with Wellington, "Hard pounding, gentlemen; let us see who can go on pounding longest!" The fight may sway backwards and forwards, and the merest hair's breadth may determine it at last in favour of him who can seize on that tiny difference to his own advantage. This the soldier realizes. No true fighter shrinks from "the idle and hopeless task" of distinguishing between any two things that come before his mind; the children of this world are wiser in their generation than the children of light.

XV

GUILTY GOVERNMENTS & INNOCENT PEOPLES

Mr. Dickinson has appealed to Goethe, but has forgotten one of those passages in Goethe's autobiography which show him at his subtlest as a student of human nature. He is speaking of German intellectual life during the years of peace which followed the Seven Years' War, and notes that it gave birth to "another feeling, for which I can scarcely find a definite name; it might be called the Need of Independence, which always grows up during peace, and precisely where there is no real dependence. During war we suffer brute force as best we can; we do indeed feel ourselves injured

physically and economically, but not morally; for compulsion shames no man, and there is no dishonour in time-service; we accustom ourselves to suffer from friend and from foe; we have wishes, but not intentions. In peace-time, on the contrary, men's feeling for liberty comes out more and more; and, the freer we are, the freer we want to be; we will suffer nothing above us; we refuse to be constrained; no man shall be constrained; and this tender (nay, even sickly) feeling appears in beautiful souls under the form of Justice. This spirit, this feeling, showed itself everywhere in those days; and, just where few men were oppressed, we wanted to free those few from the pressure that happened to lie upon them; so that there grew up a sort of moral aggressiveness, a tendency on the part of individuals to meddle with government, which, however praiseworthy in its motives, led to incalculably unfortunate results." (*Aus Meinem Leben*, Bk. 12.) Is there not a moral here for the U.D.C.? Are not our own organized pacifists betraying exactly that lack of the sense of proportion, and exactly that unhealthy itching to snatch at the driver's reins, which Goethe describes as characteristic of the one-sided mind produced by continued peace? By all means let us discuss the future terms of peace among ourselves, so as to be ready when (or if) the hoped-for moment arrives, which will allow the Allies to settle terms of peace. So far the U.D.C. must command our sympathy; but is it just that they should attempt to tie the Government down, at this stage, to any definite and

explicit pledge which might prove fatally embarrassing when the actual time for negotiation arrived? Such pressure seems illegitimate to many who sympathize most strongly with all legitimate discussion; and this unfavourable impression is further deepened by the attitude of the U.D.C. towards our own and other Governments. Mr. Heitland has pointed out very clearly that the U.D.C., though professing to avoid controversy as to the origin or the wisdom of the war, does in fact take advantage of this to make a series of entirely unproved assumptions in its own favour. Precisely the points which it would have had most difficulty in proving are the points which it now silently takes for granted, under cover of the truce. Its agnosticism as to the comparative guilt of Britain and Germany contrasts very startlingly with its dogmatism on the guilt of governments as compared with peoples. "I had supposed it was a platitude," writes Mr. Russell in reply to a protest against his assumption that "the folly of war and the failure of governments are becoming evident [to the peoples] as never before." (*Camb. Review*, Feb. 24.) But, there again, he merely repeats the disputed assertion without form of proof; and this unproved assumption seems to lie at the base of most other U.D.C. utterances.

Mr. Dickinson, it is true, goes through a little more form of argument, but scarcely of serious argument. The very foundation from which he starts, his definition of the Governmental Theory on pp. 8 and 9, would be repudiated as a regrettable exaggeration.

tion, to say the least, by very many people who would otherwise be quite willing to go a long way with him in criticism of the existing state of things. When he describes governments as acting upon the assumption that "states . . . are *natural enemies*," and that "force is *the only arbiter* between them," we can scarcely doubt that in cold blood he would accept the amendment *natural rivals* in the first sentence, and a *frequent arbiter* in the second. These amendments, it need hardly be pointed out, would seriously affect the whole of his ensuing argument. When, again, he describes governments as holding that "war is an eternal necessity," and that "as a necessity, it should be accepted, *if not welcomed*, by all sound-thinking and right-feeling men," do not these words constitute an indefensible libel upon every single cabinet minister whom we have had for the last eight years at least, to say nothing of France or Belgium? In short, the theory which Mr. Dickinson would persuade us to accept as a true picture of the Governmental Theory is almost unadulterated Bernhardism. Nor is this only because it is "very briefly, and therefore crudely, expressed"; for in half-a-dozen places these exaggerations could be brought into conformity with facts by the simple substitution of a moderate word for one of sweeping condemnation; or, indeed, by the actual elimination of words which force the tones.

This fatal and Bernhardesque "Governmental Theory" is (we are told) "only too readily adopted by the ordinary man." The Press disseminates it by

an "appeal to the most facile emotions and most superficial ideas of the reader": "the Foreign offices and the Press do with the nations what they like"; so that this war, like other wars, is solely due to the fact that "a few men of the military and diplomatic caste have a theory about states, their interests, and their destinies." (*ibid* pp. 8—17.)

It is important to note, here again, the extraordinary contrast between these trenchant assertions on a question of great complexity, and Mr. Dickinson's extreme hesitation in giving even a conditional and *ad interim* decision upon the Anglo-German question. He is as passionately convinced of the guilt of governments, and the innocence of peoples, as he is coldly agnostic about the British and German White Books. For the comparatively simple special problem, he can find no solution; but he can solve the general problem, though it involves every factor of human progress and every instinct of human nature, in half-a-dozen lines: "We come, thus, once more up against the conception of the abstract state overriding the true aims, interests, and ideals of the peoples. *That, and that only, has caused this war. That, and that only, will cause future wars.*" (*ibid*. p. 21.)

Mr. Dickinson, it is true, has previously limited his very similar assertion on p. 10 to "civilized Western peoples in modern times"; and it is only fair to credit him with intending that this limitation should apply to the sentence above quoted. But why this limitation, which certainly has an artificial

appearance on the face of it? Within a very few years, the question of peace or war between West and East may be still more fateful than that of war between different nations of the West; and we have every right to suspect a formula which is confessedly inapplicable just where we might most need to apply it. Moreover, even under this limitation, Mr. Dickinson can only get the result he requires by conveniently omitting the wars of the French Revolution, which broke out as soon as the People had got rid of their Government, dismissed their professional diplomats, and undertaken to manage their foreign policy themselves. And how are we to get over the intrinsic improbability of the whole theory? Government is a symptom of civilization; why, in this particular case, should it work for barbarism? There is an enormous diversity of peoples on this globe; they vary from tribes which have scarcely any government at all to bureaucratic states like Russia and Germany, which have a very inconvenient amount of government. Why should not the Australian Bushman be your true pacifist? Zulus and Bedouins would then come very high in the scale; and the Russian peasant would live in a state of war almost as unbroken as the perpetual peace of the blessed Aborigine. We know the very opposite to be the fact. A survey of this kind may not be conclusive; but it is certainly the first and most natural method of testing the U.D.C. generalization; and it is strange that so obvious a difficulty should not have been anticipated immediately and con-

clusively met. If Mr. Dickinson has any valid reasons for formulating, for modern Western nations, a law which we know to be false in the case of Easterns and of older Westerns, it is clearly his business to give those reasons fully, and thus to justify what seems on the face of it an arbitrary exception suggested by the necessities of his thesis. If, again, he is convinced that the popular diplomacy of tomorrow would differ not only in degree, but almost by a whole horizon, from the provocative popular diplomacy of the first French republic, here again he should give his reasons, instead of silently omitting one of the most significant events in all modern history. By all means let us be rigidly judicial in our apportionment of international guilt; but let us try to keep something of the same attitude in apportioning the national blame. How can the Governmental Theory and the Press be proved guilty of this war, and future wars, when we know that, since the dawn of history, pugnacity has been roughly in inverse proportion to the power of evolving governments or of reading a newspaper?

Again, quite apart from its apparent incompatibility with exterior fact, does the U.D.C. theory possess even inward coherence? If "the ordinary man" is "only too ready to adopt" the poisonous theory of the State which Mr. Dickinson describes, and if he has such "facile emotions and superficial ideas" that the Press can easily maintain him under this homicidal or suicidal illusion, where does the innocent People come in? The ordinary man is

(*ex hypothesi*) only too easily seduced into crime; while the more educated and more thoughtful man is only too likely to be more or less definitely implicated in the immoral occupations of government or journalism. Therefore the really healthy residuum of the nation, the People in the U.D.C. sense, must apparently be sought among those who read no newspapers, or at least among those who confine their reading to the one or two papers which, neglected by the multitude, subsist mainly on the alms of the faithful. But here, again, we are in a strange dilemma if our sum needs this sort of manipulation. When this Democratic Union tells us to think of the People, must we carefully exclude the Multitude from our thoughts? If not, how do we arrive at our sweeping and clear-cut conclusion of popular innocence? "Policy, playing on ignorance, that is the origin of wars. But why the policy"? This question of Mr. Dickinson's is very pertinent; but would not a really judicial frame of mind have gone one step further, adding, with equal emphasis, "and why the ignorance?" In his very anxiety to excuse the People, Mr. Dickinson draws a picture of public gullibility which amounts to a very damning indictment of the public. Men are not thus deceived unless they have some wish to be deceived. The workman's lack of education and leisure will not suffice, by itself, to explain Mr. Dickinson's scarcely exaggerated statement of this side of the case. The People are no more impeccable than the Rulers. If the man in the street had taken the same interest in the front page of the

papers as he takes in the sporting page, then journalists and ministers would be shielded from what is now their worst temptation. We may put it even more strongly, and say that the People would not be so deeply deceived if they did not *ask* to be deceived. Why should we not confess of the mass, what we all know of our own selves, that we naturally love to hear pleasant untruths, and reconcile ourselves only by an effort to unpleasant truths? To formulate any theory of human affairs which neglects this essential fact is to flatter the People as our ancestors flattered the king. To draw a pathetic picture of "the patient populations" whose "humanity and collective wisdom" is contrasted with the folly and unscrupulousness of governments is as essentially false as to persuade the good Canute that the sea would obey his word. (*Camb. Review*, Feb. 10th, 1915.)

Moreover, is it not fundamentally unscientific to draw this hard-and-fast line between Peoples and Governments, in states like Britain and France and Belgium? Is it not generally recognized that, even in Germany, the People and the Government are far more nearly identical than we imagined before the outbreak of this war? As for ourselves, may it not be said without exaggeration that in nine cases out of ten, Government does or says pretty exactly what the People has prescribed?

Let us take the drink question, which lends itself to easy proof. The country annually spends upon alcoholic drinks nearly twice as much as upon Army,

Navy, and Education put together.* Most of us would shrink from treating all of this as pure waste; but no reasonable person will deny that the great majority of this drink bill represents not only waste, but positive injury to health or business. May it not safely be asserted that the amount thus wasted at present would, if economised, be amply sufficient to pay for Army, Navy, and Education, quite apart from the national gain on doctors' bills? Our Government, seldom troubling itself to preach temperance to the people, generally contents itself with its regular toll of the drink bill to spend upon useful national purposes; very much as the Italian Government pays its whole Education budget by the taxes raised from the gambling habits which it despairs of eradicating. Whom, then, are we to blame here? The Governments which take sometimes the moral, but generally the cynical business view, or the Peoples who steadily afford so just cause for cynicism?

To any unbiassed observer of national life, it must be obvious that the large majority of government actions are simply dictated by popular demands, not the less imperious for being tacit and instinctive. We cannot claim the privileges of democracy without frankly facing its responsibilities also. Governments, which depend for their very existence upon the popular vote, very naturally look to popular feeling with much of that deference which the successful

* In 1912 we were spending over £161,000,000 on alcoholic liquors, and not quite £90,000,000 on Army, Navy, and Education combined.

newspaper-proprietor so frankly expresses in Mr. Arnold Bennett's *What the Public wants*. "I've only one principle; give the public what it wants. Don't give the public what you think it ought to want, or what you think would be good for it, but what it actually does want. . . . I'm the only one that makes no pretences about the British nation." U.D.C. advocates, in their arguments, constantly mix up three very different things: the People's immediate interest, the People's ultimate interest, and the People's actual instincts, which find clear expression in their likes and dislikes, their action and their inaction.* We may willingly grant that the immediate interests of a people *always* demand peace; and in only a very small proportion of cases can war be reconciled even with their ultimate interests. But here everything depends upon a discrimination between immediate and ultimate interests, just as we may daily see parents dooming their children to future failure and discontent by their attempts to secure immediate happiness for them. And, quite apart from this ambiguity, which only becomes all the more serious in proportion as we try to shirk it, the awkward fact remains that the People, like ourselves, often look neither to immediate nor to ultimate interest; they

* *e.g.* Mr. Dickinson's axiom as to the Russian peasants: "They have one interest, and one only, the land." This is only a milder form of M. Novikow's thesis, blessed by Mr. Norman Angell, that a man's interests are "to have the maximum of enjoyment with the minimum of work." (*The War, &c.*, p. 16; *War and its Alleged Benefits*, translated, with preface by Norman Angell, 1912, p. 141.) People who can conceive no interest beyond their little plot of land will always be preyed upon by more far-seeing politicians or militarists: and M. Novikow's hedonism spells servitude even more plainly.

often follow no settled course whatever. They don't want war, but neither do they want to be bothered with the things which really make for peace; they forget that we can no more prevent war by merely disliking it, than we can keep our teeth sound by mere passive dislike of toothache. To prove the innocence of the Peoples, we should need not only to prove their good intentions, but also their prudent and unselfish actions. They hate war, but do they hate the things which inevitably lead to war? Taking even those politicians who have done most to kindle this conflagration, can we really lay much more guilt upon their shoulders than upon the mass of the People behind them? Most of us have no doubt in attributing the heaviest political guilt to Germany: but is it the whole truth to talk of the Germans in the mass as a "patient population"? Is it even any approach to the whole truth? The German people had long looked forward to a United Germany as the immediate goal of their highest political interests; they seemed to get their chance in 1848; but their failure was so ignominious that it gave a longer lease to absolutism. Then came Bismarck, a man who knew that nobody can really govern who cannot afford to be unpopular. Within a very short time Bismarck succeeded, or seemed to succeed, where the people had notoriously failed. He created the German Empire, in the teeth of popular opposition, by means of three successful wars. Facts, therefore, have conspired to deceive the mass of the German people. Many thinking men, even in Ger-

many, have seen the weak points of this new empire ; but the people as a whole has not ; for very few men really look far beyond the immediate experience of their own lifetime. Since those three wars the Germans have grown astoundingly prosperous, and have naturally expected to go on from strength to strength in the same way : as Bebel said to Hyndman, they were "drunk with victory." The passage on which Mr. Dickinson lays so much stress, in which Bernhardt complains of the growth of a peace spirit in Germany, is only comparatively true. For the contrary, we have the far more unexceptionable testimony of Germany's representative at the first Hague Conference in 1899, Baron v. Stengel. Ten years later, Stengel frankly stigmatized the peace movement as Utopian, and congratulated his fellow-countrymen on the fact that the ideas of German pacifists "make more progress in other countries than at home." (*Westminster Gazette*, Sept. 1, 1909.) The German people, as a whole, has not really wanted the things that make for peace.

Nor has the British people, though our miscalculation has been of a different sort. Here, again, the vast mass have looked no further than their own immediate experience. The country has known very little of war, and therefore has chosen to believe—or rather has lazily drifted into the belief—that the problem of peace is as simple as the problem of war seems to the German. We have not listened to the advice of a constructive democratic thinker like Jaurès, who held that the next stage towards world-

peace must be the general development of Nations in Arms, with the maximum of defensive force and the minimum of offensive; a sort of automatic International Police. Men who have attempted to popularize these ideas in Britain have been cried down as militarists; the loudest voices in this system of misrepresentation have been those of the most popular Labour Leaders, not one of whom has taken the trouble to learn what Jaurès and the majority of foreign socialists thought on this question.* Even Mr. Dickinson, with his exceptional opportunities, seems still in almost complete ignorance on this point.

Nor, on the other hand, have we made any attempt to live up to the higher morality which we have professed. Many of the men who most insistently cry "militarism" against all efficient systems of national defence will yet tranquilly contemplate the employment of brute force in a class-war, or as a settlement of the Irish Question. Our policy has simply been one of drift, in a direction contrary to that in which the Germans have been more consciously marching. Our masses, and even the men who profess to lead the masses, have been guided less by any definite ideal than by mere routine. This is admirably exemplified in two recent communications from Mr. Gilbert Cannan to the *Cambridge Magazine*, as remarkable for their violence of language as for their poverty of thought (Jan. 23, 1915). His whole thesis may

* See the present writer's *Workers and War*. (Bowes & Bowes, Cambridge, 1d.)

practically be put into a few lines: "Human beings born within the last thirty years" have "had no thought of war;" "they have enjoyed a swiftly-growing freedom"; "so confident, so trusting is youth!" And now suddenly war has come: where then can we find the scapegoat? The criminals are "the older generation," who "have become so entangled and bewildered that they will not and cannot admit that they have made fools of themselves." Even Mr. Dickinson preaches this gospel of the guilt of older men, and the innocence of the young: * so let us look the accusation in the face, and appeal directly to all those of the younger generation who are honestly trying to see both sides. Older minds indeed hope that the younger are a little better than ourselves; they have had better opportunities. But what grounds have we for believing in the crude contrast upon which Mr. Cannan builds his argument, or even in Mr. Dickinson's somewhat milder antithesis? Can "human beings born within the last thirty years" honestly claim to have made more advance than most generations have made beyond their predecessors? Have they so much more self-control than we, so much more altruism, so much more patience with divergent ideals?—in short, so much more of the qualities which make for real peace? Or is not Mr. Gilbert Cannan, under his hysterical phrases, just as thoughtless as any young German

* *After the War*, pp. 18, 19. "Old men made [this war], but you [young men] must wage it . . . Of all the best hopes of civilization and mankind, the old, the disillusioned, the gross, the practitioners of the world are the foes."

militarist? For there is no question of journalistic seduction here. The German needed no journalist to make him believe in war; no journalist, on the other hand, was able to induce the majority of Britons to face the real seriousness of German military preparations. To match the thoughtless persons who accepted the German peril with touching faith on the authority of the *Daily Mail*, there were perhaps an equal number of thoughtless Mr. Cannans, who would feel ashamed of believing anything that the *Daily Mail* prints; cheap credulity and cheap scepticism commonly go hand in hand. So far as it is true that "the younger generation had no thought of war," so far are they condemned by their own advocate: for such thoughtlessness is among the main causes which render Prussian Junkertum, or our far less aggressive British Junkertum, still possible. Nothing but hard thinking, with bold and consistent action, will get the better of a movement which has itself never lacked hard thought or boldness or consistency. To assert that the young men are guiltless of this war, and that it has been made by "the old, the disillusioned, the gross," is to flatter the young as fatally as the people have already been flattered. Of all the young men under thirty in Germany, is there one of any real distinction who has devoted himself to showing up the inevitable result of professorial militarism in that country?—to exposing this, not in the name of a party organization, not with an axe of his own to grind, but simply as a man of science, as a dispassionate observer who would

work with any party that showed an honest and consistent love of truth? And, among our promising young men in Great Britain, how many are there who have exposed unsparingly the People's love of drift?—who have told us plainly that, as the ignorance of the public tempts the journalist or statesman to lie, so this indolent British “we-had-no-thought-of-war” has nourished in Germany hopes of successful aggression? The young men have simply drifted with the rest—even the unborn U.D.C. has drifted with the rest—

“Rolled round, in earth's diurnal course,
With rocks and stones and trees.”

The weakness of even Mr. Dickinson's case may be measured by his impatience and his anxiety to find class-scapegoats. All his determination to fix the whole blame upon governments, or upon gross old men, is simply an attempt to shirk inconvenient facts by changing their names. The more insistently we try now to flatter the People by abusing Governments, or to flatter the young by abusing the old, the less chance of real salvation do we afford to the very classes on which we are fixing our hopes. Certainly Dante himself would have been the first to protest against the slipshod moral which Mr. Dickinson draws from those great words of the *Purgatorio* (*ibid.* p. 19). It was only after the bitter recognition of *his own* past faults that Dante was made Emperor and Pope over his own actions. Mr. Dickinson, in effect, turns this upside down, calling upon the young man first to confess that old

men are miserable sinners, and then to encircle his own unwrinkled brow with the crown and the mitre.* Dante knew that the self-taught man has got a fool for his master; and Dante would have told us very plainly that the self-crowned Emperor and Pope lives under the worst of all possible governments. Under whatsoever evils he may groan, he need seek no scapegoat outside himself.

Have Peoples, as a matter of actual experience, ever shown themselves so pacific as to warrant—I do not say the extreme views of the U.D.C., or the regular weekly assumptions of writers in the *Labour Leader*—but even Mr. Dickinson's and Mr. Russell's more moderate postulates? Mr. Dickinson's criticism of history's shortcomings has a painful amount of truth in it; but we can no more take a short cut to historical truth by rejecting all that historians have written, than we can solve all political problems by simply disbelieving the *Daily Mail*. And it would be difficult to find any historical work, fairly wide in its scope, which does not supply painfully numerous instances of warlike democracies. The French revolutionaries of 1789 passed on by very easy stages from wars of defence to wars of aggression; the bloodiest conflict between the years 1815 and 1904 was the American Civil War. In J. S. Mill's letters we find him rebuking

* This is how we must naturally understand Mr. Dickinson's words. The only other alternative would be to take him as assuming here the same personal authority which Dante grants to Virgil; the authority of an inspired teacher whose words are only less final than Holy Writ.

the folly of British working-men leaders who, misled by the mere name of Republic, wished to involve us in the Franco-German war. A letter of Lord Cromer's to the *Times* on April 19, 1915, gave numerous other instances of a similar kind; and Mr. Heitland has repeatedly challenged the U.D.C. for some historical proof of their assumption, without (I believe) eliciting any evidence. The actual facts of the past give us real hope of a difference of *degree* here; but they hold out no hope whatever of a *radical* difference, or of any royal road to world-peace. The Many will be slightly more pacific than the Few, as the young will be slightly better than the generation before them; but the more pains we take to write history as Mr. Dickinson would like it to be written, the less reason we shall find for believing that the People will create a new heaven and a new earth within a single generation. In July 1914 the Austrian people would probably have overthrown their government if war had not been declared. At the present moment the Italian people seems far more favourable to war than their government; some powerful Socialist fractions have actually taken the lead in demanding intervention. And, as a writer in the *New Age* has lately reminded us, the Russian pogroms are far more truly a popular than a governmental movement. In the 'sixties it was official diplomacy which avoided the war for which irresponsible public opinion was working in Britain and North America. Lastly, to pass from isolated instances to generalities, would not common sense anticipate the conclusion to which Lord

Cromer gives the authority of his immense experience, that "in the great majority of cases the conduct of the individual diplomatist merely reflects as in a mirror the public opinion and standard of national morality of the people whom he represents." However true it may be that democracy works in the long run for peace, and however desirable that our main international obligations should be more openly discussed and decided in Parliament, this attempt to set up innocent Peoples against guilty Governments would seem as mischievous as it is difficult to defend in logic or in history. It is reminiscent of some of Rousseau's worst extravagances, and some of the most hopeless blunders of the French Revolution—blunders to which the French Republic owes it that, after all her wars without and within, after all this People's blood shed by the French People, she is no further advanced to-day than slow-moving Britain.

XVI

STRONG WORDS AND WEAK WILLS

There can be no *revolutionary* change in foreign politics until the Peoples have learnt more. Mr. Dickinson himself is our most telling witness here. We have to work for the time when (to quote again from Arnold Bennett) "the public wants something better than the popular journalists can give it." Let us ask ourselves insistently the question

which Mr. Dickinson so strangely shirks: "Why this ignorance?" For the future, let us work hard and patiently, knowing that hard work and patience are even more necessary here than in most other departments of human life. And for the past, instead of looking about for an easy scapegoat, let us ask ourselves frankly whether the People has not been as much an *agent provocateur* as a victim, whether it has not got what it asked for, and whether its leaders themselves are guiltless in the matter.

I do not merely refer to the appalling unfairness and recklessness of statement in which some of the most prominent professional pacifists indulge. I have already exposed something of this in the *Nineteenth Century and After* (Oct. 1914). The campaign against the Defence Acts of Australia and New Zealand has been carried on by means of statements many of which are either wholly false or grossly distorted. A great deal of so-called Pacifist propagandism is conducted on principles quite incompatible with any real peace; moreover, a quite considerable section of the public loves to have it so; it protects the offender because "he is one of us," and it refuses to see that rancour is thus being preached under the name of peace.

But I refer mainly here to the responsibility of the U.D.C. itself. It musters hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of members, including a few very active politicians and very well-known writers. All these are convinced that one of the main roads to world-peace is the introduction of democratic control into

foreign politics. Some, no doubt, had already written or spoken in this sense before this war; but why had no organized movement been set on foot? If the People had known the truth, the People would have avoided war; why then is the U.D.C. formed only after war was broken out? Why was it not founded at least twenty years ago, to teach us the only way of shutting our stable door before our steed should be actually stolen? The more the U.D.C. advertise the efficacy of their present remedy, the more definitely they condemn their own past inaction. If this is the light of the world, why has it been so long hidden under a bushel? The question which the U.D.C. asks, "Why this policy?" is of very small importance compared with the question which it shirks, "Why this ignorance?" During all these years, when a world in travail has cried inarticulately for some such salvation as we are now promised, why did the U.D.C. (to borrow the immortal phrase of Beaumarchais) never "take the trouble to be born?" They could have found an admirable precedent. In 1847, Mazzini was one of the moving spirits of a *People's International League*; and his address to it is reprinted in his *Collected Works* (1870, Vol. VI, pp. 285 ff.). He warns the British nation against regarding foreign relations "as the exclusive and peculiar province of statesmen and diplomatists." Like Mr. Dickinson, he takes for his text the unsatisfactory settlement of Europe in 1815; but he points out a truth which has been emphasized by historians, though ignored

by Mr. Dickinson, that part of this unsatisfactory settlement was due to "politicians looking no further than their own day; *seeking only for present peace.*" He emphasizes the extreme danger of having no settled and definite public opinion on the main points of foreign policy, and complains that "in the ranks of the great industrial classes of this country—the substantial depository of political power—beyond the ill-considered cry of 'Peace, peace!' when there is no peace, absolutely *no symptom of public opinion* exists on the subject" (italics his). It would be difficult to describe more exactly the state of things still existing last year, after the lapse of two generations. I agree entirely with the U.D.C. in the belief that the want of a clear people's foreign policy has been one of our worst dangers for many years past, and is greatly responsible for the present war. But, two generations ago, the people were plainly warned not to leave foreign policy exclusively to "statesmen and diplomatists"; a League was even formed, but with no lasting success. Why this failure? Was it because diplomatists were too wicked to let the League live? or was it simply because the people took little interest in it, and their leaders made no attempt to give them a clear and consistent lead here? The hastiness with which the U.D.C. was formed in the autumn of 1914 is of a piece with the hastiness with which it now tries to grab at the driver's reins. In this matter it stands self-condemned.

Here, again, the children of light may learn

a lesson from the children of this world. Lord Roberts, whom Mr. Dickinson cites as a sad example of British militarism, lost no time in forming an energetic League, when once he had made up his mind as to the facts which he thought the country ought to know. He, and many with him, accepted the unpopular course of badgering people to make a personal, immediate, and tangible sacrifice for the sake of contingencies which the majority thought so remote that they accused him of scaremongering. He was subjected to violent misrepresentation and personal obloquy*; not, of course, by generous opponents like Mr. Harold Cox, but by people who stand high in the Pacifist party. He himself never attempted to impute motives to any man who differed from him; and, when this war broke out, he never even hinted, "I told you so," nor showed the least inclination to mark and hunt down any scapegoat. He at once postponed, *sine die*, the compulsorist propaganda of the N.S.L., and put its whole organization at the service of the War Office for the volun-

* I do not attempt to defend Lord Roberts's words at Manchester in their literal sense; my belief is that, like many far more practised writers and speakers, he said more there than he would have defended in cold blood. In any case, it is only fair to balance the quotation given by Mr. Dickinson with a later and equally formal pronouncement. In the *Morning Post* for Feb. 6, 1914, Lord Roberts met a direct attack by Mr. Philip Snowden upon the N.S.L. He wrote: "We of the National Service League advocate—I seize this opportunity of repeating it—a system which may be described as Compulsory Territorialism *minus* the caste-system among the officers which Mr. Snowden deplures, and *plus* an efficiency in training and organization which is quite impossible so long as that admirably devoted Force remains un-national. *Home defence is our first motive*" (italics his). Mr. Snowden made no attempt to answer this direct challenge.

tary recruiting campaign. Most people looked upon him as a typical, though amiable, militarist; yet he would have been perfectly willing to accept, on trial at least, all the main points of the military system elaborated by the pacifist Jean Jaurès. Whether right or wrong in the main, he did at least show foresight, patience, courage and generosity in a high degree; and he inspired a very powerful organization with his own spirit. We need only contrast this with the U.D.C. in order to realize why the world still listens seriously to the militarist, and is likely long to listen to him, though (we may hope) in a decreasing degree. It is a delusion of the Governmental Theory, says Mr. Dickinson, that "pacifists are men at once weak and dangerous." The remedy lies, to a great extent, in the hands of Mr. Dickinson and his friends. The world will never listen very seriously to a party which wakes up suddenly to the obvious, and attempts to make up for the lack of steady spade-work by emergency-methods which betray impatience even among its best minds, and sheer hysteria among the less balanced. It has been pointed out again and again that even Mr. Dickinson and Mr. Russell seem strangely vague and unpractical precisely where they are most emphatic; and that their impatience at the failure of Governments is not balanced by a correspondingly clear conception of what Governments might have done, or might now do. And, when even these writers seem so unprovided with a definite remedy for the long-standing popular ignorance which they deplore, it is not surprising

that, in less balanced minds, the same impatience of the past, and the same vagueness as to the future, shows itself in strangely unreasonable forms. It cannot be unfair to quote here from Miss Maud Royden (who is a University Extension Lecturer), and to select the passage which was singled out for special commendation by the official organ of the I.L.P.

Miss Royden's pamphlet is called "The Great Adventure—The Way to Peace," and the passage in question suggests a more definite policy, perhaps, than is put forward by any other member of the U.D.C. Miss Royden is not content with vaguely denouncing diplomats and assuming that the People would have done far better; she has a definite theory of what the people should have done in the month of August, 1914.

"We could have called on every neutral nation to refuse aid of every kind to the war-maker, and on our Allies to make no preparation for war, leaving to the first aggressor the appalling responsibility of marching against an absolutely non-resistant people. We could have called forth the peace-lovers in the world to fling themselves—if need be—in front of the troop trains. If millions of men will go out to offer their lives up in war, surely there are those who would die for peace! And if not men, we could have called out women! It would not be for the first time, nor would they have been slow to respond. There are those who are as ready

to die for peace as any of the millions who with such generous courage go to war. And had they been organized and ready there would have been no war. I am aware as I write it that the proposal to disarm, and appeal to the love and pity of humanity, sounds strange to-day. Yet not stranger surely than the Sermon on the Mount, still read aloud in our churches, by apparently serious priests, to seemingly receptive congregations. And as certainly as I believe that if we lived after the pattern there set forth, we should realize the kingdom of Heaven on earth, so certain am I that if we had disarmed in the first week of last August—not by an arbitrary decision of the Foreign Office, but on a demand from the people—there would have been no war. So great a moral miracle would have had its effect. The world would have been changed. No nation would have rushed into war ‘in self-defence.’ There would have been no war.”

Miss Royden claims to write from an intimate knowledge of the Man in the Street; and she has a wide experience of popular audiences. Here, then, we have one form of What the Public Wants—the particular public upon whose pulse Miss Royden has her finger—the public of Miss Corelli in literature, and of the late Mr. Keir Hardie in politics. She has caught the exact glamour of the Picture Palace—the exact mixture of reality and absurdity which brings a

gleam of relief into the monotonous lives of hard-working men and women, and which stimulates their imagination without over-taxing their brains. It seems absurd to bring this proposal to the test of reason; but the pamphlet is thoroughly symptomatic, and two of Miss Royden's main points have this real claim upon our attention, that they are used also by Professor Pigou and Mr. Russell.

The author's earnestness up to a certain point is evident enough; but it breaks down altogether under the final test of sincerity. Nobody is justified in thus solemnly appealing to the Sermon on the Mount who is not prepared to accept it and to enjoin it as a rule of private life: to sit quite loose of all personal property, to forego all appeal to the law for protection against theft and personal violence, and so on. Thousands of very sincere people have always doubted whether Christ meant these commands to be taken literally: but on one point there can be no doubt; that Christ did not mean us to emphasize them in word while neglecting them in deed. It is idle for any writer deliberately to appeal to this standard as a guide for public morality, when neither she nor any visible body of people has been accustomed really to regulate private life by it. Miss Royden is really appealing here, not only to our better instincts, but still more to that deep-seated instinct of self-deception which we all inherit from the uncivilized man. She conceives the Sermon on the Mount, at the bottom of her heart, as a sort of fetish to conjure with: an Ark of God which has

been kept shut up on ordinary occasions, but which we bring forth now in our extremest need, with the superstitious hope that it may secure for us that victory over the Philistines for which we had made no adequate preparation while yet there was time. The very words in which she tries to keep up her own courage involve a plain confession of impotence: "There are those of us who are as ready to die for peace as any of the millions who with such generous courage go to war. And, had they been organized and ready, there would have been no war." Just as our inevitable question before was, "Why this ignorance?" so we ask equally inevitably here, "Why this disorganization and unreadiness?" Our children of this world, our wicked Governments, believing that fleets and armies are indispensable in the world as it is, had made some sort of preparation; their actions show some real conformity with their belief; they have even sometimes faced a certain amount of unpopularity for this. Miss Royden, believing in a policy of Juggernaut, had confessedly made no attempt whatever to organize or drill her devotees. If, for every thousand men that are organized for war, only a hundred had prepared themselves with the same patience and sincerity to die for peace; if the pacifist apostles, with any approach to average military foresight, had organized their followers as they now tell us these men ought to have been organized, then we should doubtless have seen very remarkable developments, though scarcely in the precise form which Miss Royden pictures with such a

curious lack of imagination. But here, as with the Sermon on the Mount, she is only half in earnest; she, and the majority of her public with her, would doubtless be scandalized at the censoriousness of adversaries who should simply take her and them at their plain word, and ask them to act up to it. She preaches hysteria, and calls it peace. Nor is Professor Pigou, at bottom, so much more rational in his conception of the Great Adventure. He argues: "If it be the case—and that it *may* be the case no man is entitled to deny—that by a frank statement of the Allies' terms the war could be brought to an end, what will our responsibility be if we refuse to state them?" (*The Nation*, Feb. 6, 1915.) The logic of this is simply ludicrous; if it meant anything at all, it would bind us morally to make trial of every "may-be" that comes in our way, even where probabilities may suggest that the trial would be doing more harm than good. Most Britons, as the U.D.C. practically confesses, now believe that any premature statement of peace-terms would tend to prolong the war. So long as we believe this, it would be positively immoral for us to adopt such a course. Either Professor Pigou's argument is a furtive attempt to beg the whole question at issue (which we may dismiss at once as an unfair suspicion), or it was advanced in blindness to the plain fact that our first moral responsibility, in cases of difficulty, is to weigh carefully the probabilities of good or harm on either side. Neither he nor Miss Royden sees that there is as real a distinction between legitimate speculation

and gambling chances in politics as there is in business. To gamble with the national welfare is far more mischievous than playing ducks and drakes with our own money; and, so far as we can morally excuse such speculations, it is only by drawing the most unflattering distinctions between a writer's good intentions and his common sense.

Moreover, all history is full of warnings against these gambles for a good cause—even the histories of whose deficiencies Mr. Dickinson complains supply us with abundant examples. We do see forlorn hopes sometimes crowned by startling successes, but only in the hands of a St. Francis, a Joan of Arc, a George Fox, whose simple common sense went hand-in-hand with their transparent sincerity, and who blundered badly when they ventured beyond the plainer path. Miss Royden and Professor Pigou write as if they had never heard of that Great Adventure—perhaps the greatest of the the last thousand years—which would almost have been forgotten now-a-days if Dante had not pilloried it to all time as the Great Refusal. The furthest-reaching and most complicated system of government in the Middle Ages was that of the Papacy: moreover, this was almost altogether a government by diplomacy, since the Pope, as Pope, had no army. About seven hundred years ago the frequent worldliness of Papal policy, and its failures, were very shocking to all good people. A heroic remedy was tried, and a saint was put into the Papal chair—Celestine V. Men thought that the Papacy would

live now by the Sermon on the Mount. Not, of course, that men wanted themselves to live by the Sermon on the Mount, any more than Miss Royden's public does; but they thought they had now got hold of someone who would do it for them. The hermit-saint was put into the greatest throne of Europe, and the Great Adventure began. He possessed even more than Miss Royden's enthusiasm and good intentions, with even less ballast of practical experience, patience, or logic. There stood the greatest machinery of government in the Western world, ready to obey his touch; but the task was hopelessly beyond his power. His hasty good intentions were as mischievous here as they would have been in face of a modern motor-car or a biplane. His first touch threw the machinery into confusion; and every fresh attempt only made matters worse. After five months of this, Celestine voluntarily renounced the greatest practical opportunities that had ever been given into the hands of a saint. The first act of his successor was to annul, by a single bull, every decree that had been made in those lamentable five months; and the Papacy, having thus cleaned its slate, went forward more definitely than ever upon the lines of worldly policy. Few of us would ever have heard of this story but for the splendid lines in which Dante brands this man "who made, in his baseness, the Great Refusal," and who was therefore scorned alike by Heaven and by Hell. Celestine took the papacy because he deceived himself: Miss Royden mixes up Juggernaut with the Sermon on the Mount because she deceives

herself; and her own particular public loves to have it so. The unpopularity of the U.D.C. is not due mainly to men's dislike of real democracy, or to men's unwillingness to recognize a true ideal. Most hold aloof because they see so little in the Union beyond good intentions, anxiety, and haste. However supine and improvident its champions may have been in the past, the majority of readers would sympathize with them in any attempt to clear the ground patiently now. But patience is what they seem most to lack; like drowning men, they beat at random, and their vehemence is in itself a confession of failure. "Governments are incapable, if not criminal; we must force our own higher policy upon the Government"; but what, after all, is this higher policy? Where it is least vaguely expressed it seems to be most absurd. The Union can scarcely complain if the public, in one of the gravest crises of our history, resents this nervous clutching at the driver's reins.

The other main point of Miss Royden's plea—the idea of non-resistance—is supported by so high an authority as Mr. Russell, though of course from a very different point of view. (*International Journal of Ethics*, Jan. 1915, p. 139.) He writes: "The evils suffered during a hostile invasion are suffered because resistance is offered. The Duchy of Luxemburg, which was not in a position to offer resistance, has escaped the fate of the other regions occupied by hostile troops . . . As between civilized nations, therefore, non-resistance would seem not only a distant religious ideal, but the course of practical wisdom.

Only pride and fear stand in the way of its adoption." We need not emphasize the fact that the argument leading up to this conclusion depends for its main cogency upon two unphilosophical exaggerations; his "every strategist" and "every great nation" of p. 128 would need quite as much qualification as other loose statements already criticized. These necessary qualifications would practically upset his whole argument: but it is even more important to notice this theory that Belgium would have gained by imitating the non-resistance of Luxemburg. To begin with, the injustice of such a course could only be defended by pleas of national convenience, which would hardly fit Mr. Russell's general argument. It would be impossible to find any purely *moral* plea which would justify the Belgians in thus opening the back door to let Germany loose upon the weakest frontier of France, especially since that frontier had been left comparatively unfortified in reliance upon a treaty of neutrality which created, not merely a Belgian privilege, but also a corresponding Belgian duty. Secondly, what valid reason has Mr. Russell for supposing that Belgium, by betraying her trust, would in fact have avoided the horrors of invasion? In any fairly equal war, Belgian soil would have become the main battle-ground. Not only would the English and French have had the right to go and meet the Germans wherever they could find them, but they would also have been justified in inflicting direct punishment upon Belgium for her treacherous breach of neutrality. Only one contingency could have

saved Belgium from martyrdom, only one other could have *mitigated* her martyrdom; but neither of these contingencies will help Mr. Russell's case:

(1) If the Germans, with Belgian connivance, had cut their way straight through to Paris, and had ended the war as brilliantly as in 1866 or 1870, then the Belgians would, for the present, have lost little besides their honour. Considering what we now know of the astounding preparations made by Germany for this war, this issue would have been only too probable; but can Mr. Russell, as an impartial student of politics and morals, contemplate such a result with anything but horror?

(2) Again, if the Allies had been more successful from the first (as we might well have been, if only we had made anything like adequate preparations for a long-foreseen contingency),* what would Belgium have gained by her illegal compliance with Germany? She would now have been mainly in the hands of French and English enemies, instead of German enemies. If Mr. Russell's habitual agnosticism is

* In self-defence against those readers who scent militarism everywhere, I must point out that this is a question on which I follow not only the general opinion, but that of Mr. Russell himself, who writes: "Every student of strategy has known for many years past that this [the violation of Belgium] must be an inevitable part of the next Franco-German war." (*War the Offspring of Fear*, p. 10.) The *Arbitrator*, again, points out how Mr. Haldane had long ago warned Germany that we should fight in defence of Belgium. (May, 1915, p. 51.) Under these circumstances it would seem to have been the clear duty of every Briton, with the exception of believers in non-resistance, to vote for preparations which would have ensured adequate and immediate support to Belgium in such a crisis as that of last August (1914).

justified—if there is practically nothing to choose between the German soldiery and the Allied soldiery—Belgium would then have gained nothing, even in a material sense, by the sacrifice of her honour. Mr. Russell cannot mitigate the martyrdom of Belgium, even in theory, except by postulating the excessive inhumanity of German military methods, as compared with those of the Allies; and that is precisely what he cannot afford to do; for it would bring down the whole U.D.C. fabric about his and Mr. Dickinson's ears. The embarrassment of so distinguished a thinker in face of so simple a problem is surely a fair measure of the unsoundness of his general thesis.

Moreover, any advocate of non-resistance must find himself in an even worse dilemma unless he is prepared to ignore all past history. For two centuries and a half, at least, there has been a Religious Society which has constantly preached non-resistance on principle. Dr. Johnson pointed out with his usual bluntness that the Society of Friends seldom acted consistently on this principle; and, without injustice to the admittedly high standard of average conduct in that Society, it may fairly be pointed out that this inconsistency is as obvious among them to-day as it was 150 years ago. It is true that they did once make a real attempt to set up a non-resistant state in Pennsylvania, but this was very soon abandoned in practice, and finally even in theory. The Jesuit experiment of a non-resistant state in Paraguay lasted a little longer, but broke down under the first serious

trial. Yet there is plenty of wealth and energy among the Friends of modern Britain: why then do they not repeat their experiment? We know that they, if any men, could attempt it with some prospect of success. They might, with the hearty goodwill of the Powers, buy a fertile island somewhere, and divert to this high ideal of a non-resistant community those qualities of mind and body which are too often frittered away on an occupation most heartily despised by George Fox—the accumulation of capital. Even a moderate practical success would impress the world far more than any amount of inconsistent talk: yet non-resistants have hitherto relied mainly upon mere words. Here, again, the children of this world are one degree wiser. Theoretically, the production of artificial gold by chemistry would seem quite as possible as the creation of a non-resistant state. Why then does not Germany, with her wonderful scientific organization, seek an easy way out of one of her worst difficulties by making gold? Is it not because the thing has been tried and has failed, and because militarists are too wise to waste time even in discussing a possibility which, to judge by all reasonable standards, is still so remote? The Kaiser would be only too glad to know that Great Britain had set her ablest chemists to search for the philosopher's stone; but it is equally to his advantage that our best minds should spend their thoughts and words on this ideal of non-resistance, which receives scarcely more than lip-homage even from the men who look upon it as part of their religious creed.

XVII

SECRET DIPLOMACY

“No national or human interest is served by secrecy [in diplomacy]” writes Mr. Russell on p. 14 of his pamphlet. These words are perhaps not meant literally, though in that case it would seem unwise to have omitted the necessary qualifications, in a pamphlet appealing to a popular audience. Mr. Ponsonby, who has practical experience to guide him, confesses frankly that “no doubt a certain amount of secrecy is essential.” (*International Journal of Ethics*, January, 1915, p. 151.) Every thoughtful workman will remember that labour parties, trade unions, and other extremely democratic bodies conduct all their most delicate business in secret: he will therefore ask himself how the still more delicate negotiations of half-a-dozen great nations can be successfully conducted in public. Mr. Dickinson is far more cautious: but in his first pamphlet he still leaves us very doubtful as to what he means by secret diplomacy; and though, in his second, he enters into considerable detail, it is only at the expense of contradicting himself. On p. 34 of his first pamphlet he is resolved that “we, the plain people,” should say: “The Europe that shall come out of this war shall be *our* Europe. And it shall be one in which it shall be impossible that ever again there shall be a European war.” On p. 34 of the second pamphlet, in stating his detailed pro-

posals, he warns us, "I am not abrogating national sovereignty nor ruling out war as impossible. I am merely endeavouring to make it a great deal less likely than it is." Consistency is, of course, a much overrated virtue; but this change of front seems very significant. The moment Mr. Dickinson seriously sets himself to map out our future course, even upon the vaguest lines, he finds himself compelled to abandon one of his most important earlier positions. The evident impatience and haste of the U.D.C., and the contradictory statements which they offer us on the most important questions, would of themselves suffice to justify the scepticism of the general public. We may fairly ask them to set their own house in order before they undertake to guide the whole nation.

This is most marked in their attitude towards the Belgian question. Mr. Dickinson undertakes to review the principal points which are said to underlie and justify this present war. (*The War, etc.*, pp. 14—33.) This review occupies twenty pages, or nearly half his pamphlet, and ends with the words, "I have now reviewed, as fully as possible within the limits of a pamphlet, the main causes which, according to the Governmental Theory, may be held to have necessitated and to justify the present war." Incredible as it may seem, the word *Belgium* does not occur once within these twenty pages! For the U.D.C. mind, the mind that has risen superior to the Governmental Theory, Belgium exists only as a skeleton in the cupboard, to be decently ignored

until the time comes when the story of the martyrdom may supply a more convenient plea for a hasty peace. Mr. Russell's pamphlet mentions Belgium only twice. On page 3 she is apparently ranked among the states responsible for the war—as one of the combatants in this “great race conflict, a conflict of Teuton and Slav”—which, by-the-bye, with the parallel passage on p. 7, apparently asserts the very heresy which Mr. Dickinson scornfully condemns as a figment of the Governmental Mind. (*The War, etc.*, pp. 14–15.) On p. 10, again, Mr. Russell dismisses the idea that the violation of Belgium proves the Germans to be “capable of any act of sudden brigandage or treacherous attack,” arguing on the contrary that “every student of strategy has known for many years past that this must be an inevitable part of the next Franco-German war.” It is no unfairness to Mr. Russell to say that these two references to Belgium, his only references, tend rather to excuse Germany than to accuse her. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald has spoken of our attitude towards Belgium as a piece of hypocrisy. Mr. Keir Hardie based the I.L.P. abstention from the recruiting campaign on the selfish ground that “Germany, France and Belgium are all threatened with invasion, of which we [Britons] run no risk.”* No amount of hypocrisy

* See the present writer's *Workers and War*, p. 5, and compare Mazzini's words in the *Westminster Review* for 1852, p. 443. This is reprinted in his *Writings*, Vol. VI., p. 217. “A law of Solon decreed that those who in an insurrection abstained from taking part on one side or the other, should be degraded. It was a just and holy law, founded on the belief—then instinctive in the heart of Solon,

or exaggeration on the militarist side can excuse this deliberate shirking of the Belgian question by the U.D.C. Nor can it even be pleaded that the philosophers show here the defects of their qualities—that it is their rigid logic which leaves them cold to mere sentiment. They can be sentimental, and even rhetorical, when their thesis demands it; and in this Belgian case, if they suppress their feelings, it is not at the command of logic, but in defiance of logic.

This case of Belgium, at least, depends mainly upon no secret diplomacy. The public treaty by which we helped to guarantee her inviolability is more than two generations old. Gladstone, the most democratic Prime Minister that our country had known until then, proclaimed to the world in 1870 that Britain would go to war with the violator of Belgian neutrality. Since 1870 there has grown up the conviction described by Mr. Russell with only one point of exaggeration:—that the violation of Belgium must be an almost necessary incident in the next Franco-German war. This was known, not only to strategists, but to all of the general public who troubled to read the daily papers. Our national responsibility on this point (as may be seen from long extracts reprinted in the *Labour Leader* for Feb. 4th and 11th, 1915) was very fully discussed in the *Standard*, *Morning Post*, *Spectator*, and *Pall*

but now comprehended and expressed in a thousand formulæ—in the solidarity of humanity. It would be just, now, more than ever. . . . neutrality, that is to say, indifference between good and evil, the just and the unjust, liberty and oppression, is simply atheism.”

Mall Gazette (then a Liberal organ) during the Franco-German quarrel of 1887. Apart from the party moral which the *Labour Leader* draws from it, and which is not to the present purpose,* the main points are these. All parties were agreed that war might break out at any moment, and that such a war was almost certain to involve a deliberate violation of Belgium, more probably by Germany than by France. All agreed, again, that we ourselves should do all we could to avoid war; and it was the *Standard*, the chosen organ of Secret Diplomacy, which hit upon this idea which Mr. Russell is now trying to popularize, that Germany should be granted a "temporary right of way" through Belgian territory. The *Spectator*, agreeing that England must not go to war for Belgium if she could possibly help it, added that we could not, even if we wished, "bar the traversing of her soil" by a great Continental Power. And Sir Robert Morier wrote in 1875 a paper published in 1911, to the effect that Bismarck "speaks contemptuously of England, because it would not be able to give effective military assistance to Belgium."

These facts and considerations have been before the public for a whole generation; what then has the People done? It was in deference to the popular

* The *Standard*, probably inspired by Lord Salisbury, held that we were bound to defend Belgium, but might reconcile this obligation with granting "the temporary use of a right of way" to Germany through Belgian territory, so long as the anticipated war should last. Mr. Stead, in the *Pall Mall Gazette*, argued that we were not under any guarantee to defend Belgium, and did his best to whittle away the words of the 1839 treaty.

wish that Lord Haldane made it still more difficult for us to defend Belgium, by cutting down our Expeditionary Force to 167,000 men. When a member like Sir W. Byles complained these were too many, asking, "Whom did we want to kill?" he claimed quite truly to be acting in obedience to a popular mandate; he "had got his seat" by pledging himself to such action (*House of Commons*, Feb. 28, 1907, and March 12, 1908). It was in deference to the same popular opinion that Lord Haldane, in spite of warnings from experts, deliberately arranged that each company of British regulars should be equipped with less than half as many machine-guns as a Germany company. Yet, when he constituted the present Territorial Force, it had been (as he expressly and publicly explained) "to free the Regular Army from the necessity of remaining in these islands to fulfil the functions of home defence" (*Memorandum on the Army Estimates for 1908—09*). In spite of this, and in spite of the hard work done by the Territorial Associations, which cannot be described as popular bodies, the Territorial Army had so little popular support in peace-time that it never got higher than 82 per cent. of its nominal establishment, while its peace-training was (on the evidence of governmental statistics) as deficient as its numbers. And everybody who cared to enquire into the facts knew perfectly well, all this time, that even our Expeditionary Force could not be fully mobilized to meet any really sudden emergency. The actual facts of last August, though they dispelled much

pessimism, showed this quite conclusively. Although, in some cases, the ships were actually waiting for the men, not half our Expeditionary Force had reached Mons within four weeks of the German ultimatum to Belgium; while Switzerland, with $\frac{1}{13}$ th of our population, had put far more armed men upon her frontiers within a week. In all this there was plenty of publicity; if ever the People was responsible for anything, it has been responsible for this inconsistent policy of muddle and drift.

For we must note that all this is quite independent of the fact that this war would in all probability have involved us, Belgium or no Belgium. For more than forty years, war between France and Germany has never been very far off; in 1875, 1887, and 1911 peace only hung upon a single thread. Of any such war the violation of Belgium was an almost necessary contingency. Our pledges to Belgium were public property. Therefore, any day for forty-four years, we might have woken up to find that the one supreme question of the moment—supreme for British honour or British interests, and inseparable from the whole question of our future greatness or littleness—was the question of what we should do in face of an invasion of Belgium. Whether we take the most spiritual or the most material view of a country's duties, we cannot get over this fact. And even if we had, in the face of a Franco-German war, dissociated ourselves from France and Russia even more decisively than Italy dissociated herself from Germany and Austria, the Belgian problem

would still have involved the gravest moral and material issues. Yet the British people never seriously faced this. No wise Union of Democratic Control ever formed itself to warn us of this rock ahead. Is there even one single member of the present Union of Democratic Control who pointed out to his fellow-citizens that we must choose here between God and Baal? Is there a single Labour Leader who preached clearly and consistently any definite policy, either of formally disclaiming responsibility for Belgium, or of taking measures to give her immediate and efficient help whenever the crisis should come? Public as the whole thing has been, there has been no People's policy; nor is it any consolation when we are reminded that it was the Tories who, in 1887, advised that essentially selfish course which was championed by a professed Internationalist like the late Mr. Keir Hardie and a real philosophic Radical like Mr. Russell. The contrast, so far as it holds good, is profoundly depressing. If it is really moral for us to maintain now that Germany should have had her "right of way" through Belgium, then it was inexcusably immoral of us to go on stating or implying the contrary for forty years. If, on the other hand, we were bound to help Belgium, then we should at least have been in a position to send 160,000 men in time for Namur, instead of a bare 80,000 in time for Mons. It would be difficult, in the whole history of secret diplomacy, to find a worse instance of blindness and muddle than this thoroughly public business of the Belgian question. And that is why the U.D.C.

makes so little headway even among the classes whom it most flatters. We do really need popular control and publicity on many of the most important points of foreign policy; but we shall not get it by mere abuse or repudiation of our professional diplomats. We shall get it only by full and reasonable discussion, under the leadership of men who recognize that every privilege implies a corresponding responsibility. The People must take the trouble to look for themselves, must count the cost on one side or the other, and then must come to a clear-cut decision. And any true friend of the people must carefully abstain from mere flattery of our masters. The martyrdom of Belgium is due far less to any diplomatic perversity than to popular muddle or indifference; so, at least, most of us see every reason to believe; and the U.D.C. could scarcely give a better measure of its political incompetence than the blind persistence with which it shirks so obvious a consideration.

XVIII

PEACE AND WAR IN HISTORY

Let us suppose that the popular leaders had, in this matter of Belgium, really led the people; they would have pointed out the daily danger under which we lived, demanded a popular decision on the question, and carried this decision through Parliament. But they would first have needed to make

up their own minds to one definite course, and then to secure for that course the assent of the British voter. The two clearest alternatives were evident, (1) to denounce the treaty of 1839 by which we guaranteed Belgian neutrality; or (2) accepting our responsibility, to make sure that our Expeditionary Force was always sufficient to afford a reasonable hope of making good our guarantee. It might have been possible to urge a third course—that, without actually denouncing the treaty, we should still warn our friends to expect no help unless such help could be sent without serious risk to our national interests. Such a middle attitude would not have been heroic, but it might have avoided many misapprehensions, and would have left no room for any suspicion of hypocrisy.

For consistent non-resisters, the choice would of course be simple; we have no right to fight under any circumstances; therefore we take the first course. But there are very few who venture even to preach consistent non-resistance; no such policy would have the least chance of commanding a majority in this country. On any other moral principle, we seem bound, not only to promise protection to Belgium, but to be ready with the means of fulfilling our promise; to maintain an expeditionary force which, with Belgian help, could at least stop the first rush of invasion until France (or Germany) could send enough troops to make the country really secure. With mere questions of self-interest, the U.D.C. does not profess to deal; we need therefore only

ask ourselves what *moral* objections could have been brought against the choice of this third alternative as the British popular policy? They could, I think, be only two; that such preparations (1) would be more likely to create war than to prevent war, or (2) would create, in Great Britain itself, a spirit more harmful than the evils from which they were designed to save Belgium. In other words, apart from the predominantly selfish arguments which might easily have been used against our preparing seriously to stem any invasion of Belgium, men might have opposed it on moral grounds—and, in fact, large numbers did oppose it—through fear of “militarism.” Since even Messrs. Dickinson and Russell seem to use this word, and the still more important word *peace*, in the loose and unscientific sense in which they are constantly used on party platforms by the professional politicians of the U.D.C., we must here ask ourselves what we really mean by *peace* and *militarism*.

Peace is not merely a negative idea; if we got rid of steel and gunpowder to-morrow, we should not necessarily get real peace. We can conceive a state of society free from what we now call war, yet more immoral, more retrograde, and less truly pacific, than even the present condition of Europe. Pacificists habitually make exactly the same mistake about Peace which the leaders of the French Revolution made about Liberty. We may, I think, say fairly of Mr. Dickinson’s pamphlets (changing the word *Liberty* to *Peace*) what Lord Acton said about the

Declaration of the Rights of Man: Mr. Dickinson does not make it clear "that Peace is the goal, and not the starting-point: that it is a faculty to be acquired, not a capital to invest; or that it depends on the union of innumerable conditions which embrace the entire life of man" (*Lectures on the French Revolution*, p. 107). The French democrats of 1789 conceived Liberty too exclusively as the mere abolition of those particular tyrannies which had weighed upon France in the past: "when those are swept away, we shall have Liberty and keep Liberty!" So Mr. Dickinson seems to conceive Peace too exclusively as the mere abolition of these wars which have disgraced the past of humanity. The French, trusting to a too simple and easy formula, fell from past tyrannies into the worse tyranny of the Reign of Terror, and Mr. Dickinson's simple formula of perpetual peace might possibly land us in conditions worse even than the past conditions of intermittent warfare. It is astonishing that he should appeal to the example of the Roman Empire (as on p. 20 of his second pamphlet), or to that of China (as he does at such length in other writings), without once seriously asking himself what lessons they have to teach us here. The Roman Empire, for three centuries before its fall, enjoyed a deeper peace, over a vaster area, than any other political aggregate of anything like the same size has ever enjoyed in the west. We may see here, on a scale beyond all comparison greater than any other, the progress of a population to whom bloodshed in war was an infre-

quent experience. Such frontier fighting as took place during these 300 years was almost limited to barbarians in Roman pay, who defended the Empire against their fellow-barbarians dwelling outside the Empire. What, then, did these three centuries of peace produce after the first few generations? A literature of the kind which (it is difficult to avoid suspecting) would be produced by any generation of young men who might take Mr. Dickinson's advice and crown themselves lords over themselves; a literature of minor poets and minor novelists who have now scarcely more than an antiquarian interest even for the classical specialist; a literature of historians who scarcely rise above the level of mere chroniclers; and a literature of philosophers dependent for most of their ideas upon the philosophies and religions which they inherited from earlier and less peaceful generations. It was in these earlier warlike days, again, that the school of mechanical and physical sciences at Alexandria was at its greatest. Hero had practically invented the steam-engine before the long peace set in, and these three quiet centuries made no real scientific progress; they scarcely marked time. Sculpture and painting went, on the whole, steadily downhill. Society, instead of developing nobler liberties or higher justice, resigned itself more and more passively to a crushing despotism. The Empire was not even consoled by growing material prosperity; everywhere the steadiest and most industrious classes suffered under ruinous taxation and

vicious fiscal arrangements. Christianity did indeed spread steadily all this time; but it had been founded earlier, and in a nation whose whole history, up to that point and for some time after, is a story of perpetual wars. Moreover, many of the most determined modern champions of pacificism would be the last to accept Christianity as a counterbalance to the evils already enumerated. Meanwhile, during these three centuries, the barbarians outside the Empire were at perpetual war. The conflict came at last; and the Empire collapsed like a house of cards. This vast population, which had had the opportunity of strengthening itself during three hundred years of peace, was conquered, plundered, and martyred for centuries by those barbarians who had been weakened by three hundred years of almost perpetual war. There are, fortunately, considerations which may save us from the most pessimistic conclusions to be drawn from these unquestionable historical facts. It is possible to argue that the greatest minds—Marcus Aurelius, Origen, Augustine, Jerome—were absorbed by religious problems; that the Empire made a small sect into a world-religion, and this was a sufficient task for three centuries of civilization. But the facts are there; and it is unaccountable that Mr. Dickinson should have made no attempt to reconcile them to his theories. It is idle to repudiate Bernhardt if we are only to fall into worse exaggerations on the other side. It is idle to assume that, because war is an undeniable evil, the man who is not at war will necessarily be doing less harm to

humanity than the soldier does. It may be argued with much probability that infanticide, and the growing prevalence of celibacy, did more harm to Rome during the three centuries of peace than her wars had done in the past. When a wayward genius like Propertius could boast, in one of his sweetest elegies, that he was not the stuff either to found a family or to defend it, was he not prophesying, with the military decadence of Rome, her literary and social decadence also? * There is no salvation in an empire whose poets tend more and more to the type portrayed in Bernard Shaw's *Candida*.

China, again, seems to tell us much the same story. She was not so peaceful in the past—indeed, experts seem to criticize Mr. Dickinson for having exaggerated her peacefulness at all times—and her fighting days seem also to have been her great days in literature and in art. "The chief glory of the [T'ang] dynasty was the literature which sprung up under the fostering care of the rulers In the field of battle the nation was as successful as in the arena of literature." The standard dictionary of the Chinese language, and the standard national encyclopaedia, are now two centuries old; they date back to the days of the last great conquering Emperor. † These two centuries of comparative peace have produced nothing to supersede the old work done under stress

*Unde mihi patriis natos praebere triumphis?
Nullus de nostro sanguine miles erit.

LIB. II. *Eleg.* 6. 13.

† "China," by Sir R. K. Douglas. 1899. pp. 21, 122.

of war. The population is kept comparatively stable, apparently, by the murder of superfluous female infants. Though the Chinaman is, by nature, perhaps the cleverest mechanic in the world, the country's vast mineral wealth has been exploited almost altogether by foreigners. Nor does the Chinaman seem to be more progressive in political liberty than in other ways. As Mr. Dickinson himself confesses of the recent upheaval which has produced the Chinese Republic, "it is remarkable and, so far as my knowledge of history goes, unique that in a great revolution in a nation of four hundred millions one man only should emerge with the capacity for government; and Yuan Shih Kai, I believe, will not appear to history to be more than an astute and tenacious opportunist."

This he explains very simply: "The young men have ideas in plenty, but they have no experience, and, it would seem, no practical capacity. Too often they have not character. For it is, I fear, indisputable, as it is undisputed, that many of the new officials and of the new legislators are corrupt as well as incompetent."* Is this all that peaceful China can produce in her time of need? In Britain, after all our wars, the young men have perhaps more political sense than the young men of any other country, except those which are, or once were, British colonies. Mr. Dickinson looks confidently to our

* "An essay on the Civilization of India, China and Japan." (Report of the author's travels as a Fellow of the Albert Kahn Travelling Fellowships, 1914, pp. 58, 57.)

young men as supreme over their own destinies and those of the nation ; and he sets his highest expectations on those of them who are now fighting. How then, in the same breath, can he assume it as axiomatic that "every war makes our peace worse" ? (*After the War*, pp. 17—19.) In his unguarded moments, he hopes that this war will lead to a nobler peace ; moreover, he is as hopeful of higher things from the combative young Briton, as he is hopeless of the young Chinaman who has been formed by two centuries of comparative peace. There may be some other explanation of what seems the obvious lesson to be drawn from these two greatest empires that ever have existed—these two greatest practical examples of longstanding pacificism. It may not be true that a long peace, settling down into mere unthinking tranquillity, is worse on the whole than briefer periods of peace, chequered with intermittent wars. It may not be true that such tranquillity breeds a selfishness less violent, yet still more fatal with its slower poison ; and that man, when he forgets altogether to become a fighting animal, becomes an equally greedy and ruminant animal. But no serious attempt has ever been made, I believe, to explain away these facts of history : certainly no such attempt is made by Mr. Dickinson, though he quotes China and Rome in a way which necessarily raises this question. He tells us that "a city like Athens or Florence is worth all the empires that have ever been," because the "few thousands" of these small states have produced, in

art and poetry and thought, such men as the "gross insignificant millions" of greater countries cannot boast amid their vast numbers. Yet these little states were notoriously most pugnacious, and the gross insignificant millions have notoriously been most plentiful in ruminant China, and the ruminant three centuries of peaceful Rome. It is this which lends real force to the mischievous exaggerations of a writer like Bernhardt, when his opponents so persistently avoid facts and take refuge among vague speculations. As the Union of Democratic Control tempts Mr. Dickinson into the most unexpected literary blunders, so it seems to unnerve even his intellectual courage. He runs away from the facts which, even on his own showing, most need to be faced. The world would have made far greater progress if the balance of moral courage had always been on the side of peace-propagandists. The general public, hating war, and only too anxious to find any practical means of avoiding war, is too often compelled to choose between the militarist who tramples on fact, and the pacifist who hides his face from it.

The whole U. D. C. seems to lack any clear theory of balance between war and peace. They are emphatic upon points which few sane men would dispute, as (for instance) that war is a terrible evil, while true peace is one of the most desirable things on earth; if this were all, even the wickedest member of the Government would agree with them. At the other extreme, Mr. Dickinson admits clearly that war is not always

the worst evil we can face; his very first sentence protests that "this pamphlet is not a 'Stop the War' pamphlet." Between him and the Governmental Mind, therefore, is only a question of degree; both are agreed that a treaty of peace at this moment would be worse than war; at what moment, therefore, would peace begin to be better than war? Of course we cannot fix this mathematically; but a Union which practically exists in order to force the hand of the Government is morally bound to face this delimitation as one of its first problems. Yet here the U.D.C. seems as vague as on other equally vital points. In order to seize the exact moment for peace, it is essential that we should make every possible effort to balance the evils of a protracted war against the evils of an unripe, and therefore unenduring peace. To strike such a balance, we must try to face with equal determination the good and the evil which war produces. The U.D.C. seems to avoid this as instinctively as it avoids the Belgian question.

Mr. Dickinson would go on fighting for Belgium, Mr. Russell preaches non-resistance pure and simple. Not only ought Belgium to have submitted to German violence but (so he seems clearly to imply) British colonies would lose less by accepting German rulers than by resisting German arms (*Int. Journ. Ethics* p. 139).

Again, Mr. Dickinson treats war as always entailing an aggregate preponderance of evil: "Every war makes our peace worse," and Mr. Russell seems to assume the same of this war, though he would

justify wars of colonization (*Int. Journ. Ethics*, pp. 131—4). Yet, elsewhere, both these writers lead us to hope that a new and better world may arise on the ruins of this war; and Mr. Ponsonby is far more optimistic than either, though equally shy of logical conclusions. He complains of "the pronounced growth of materialism in all classes within recent years," without noting that the years thus condemned have been a period of unusual peace. Internationalism, he thinks, will probably "revive all the stronger from the shock of this war," the autocracies will be considerably democratized; we shall have "a higher moral tone" between nations, "a new European system," and a "new sense of responsibility" (*ibid* pp. 147, 151, 161, 163, 164). These sentences are perhaps not strictly irreconcilable in logic with the main assumptions of the U.D.C., but they are entirely out of harmony with its usual tone. Although their argument depends for all its cogency upon the deliberate balance of apparent contradictions, such balance is conspicuously wanting; rhetoric, and even passion, are substituted for reason.

Even now, when the *Lusitania* and the Bryce Report have still more definitely condemned any attitude of moral agnosticism in this war, the general public could easily renounce the idea of what the U.D.C. calls "a penal peace." Of the men responsible for anti-German riots, many would long ago have been venting their feelings more legitimately in the firing line, if many of us could have had our way; and the unreasonable passion of the rest finds only

too easy excuse in the unreasonableness of extreme pacifists. The general public would be only too glad to stop the war, at the first moment at which we believe we could secure a peace that would not prove worse than war. We could afford to leave Germany boasting idly to any one who would listen to her, so long as we ourselves were convinced that, in her heart, she would soon find she had no wish to repeat this experiment. However little we thus secured of what is commonly called "glory," however bitter the pill might seem, we would swallow it willingly if we could believe in its good effects. We disbelieve, not in wholesome medicine, but in these particular doctors, and in their present hasty formulae. We disbelieve because we have seen them blunder, and because we find them most vague where the occasion demands the greatest precision; moreover, while even Messrs. Russell and Dickinson cannot impress us, we find still stronger tokens of empiricism in Professor Pigou's naïve plea that the nation is morally bound to try his nostrum, because we cannot be certain that it would not do us some good. It is in just such honeyed words that Professor Williams commends to us his pink pills for pale people.

XIX

BRITAIN'S IDEAL

We have already seen what curious unfaith in democracy underlies some of the arguments of this Union of Democratic Control. But their worst un-

faith is yet to come. Pressed to give something more than mere abuse of diplomats and Governments, Mr. Russell and Mr. Dickinson and Mr. Ponsonby have all sketched out a positive policy, which they think might minimise the chance of war. Each introduces his scheme with a certain natural diffidence—" 'tis an ill-favoured thing, but mine own." Yet not one of these writers seems to have grasped clearly the fact that a far more definite scheme has long been approved by the majority of the democracies in the civilized world, as the next step towards world-peace. The Labour Members who support the Union of Democratic Control, and who are still more bound to know this fact, are equally ignorant, whether wilfully or through sheer indolence and stupidity. If they allude at all to proposals which are practically identical with those of the great pacifist Jean Jaurès, it is simply to dismiss these proposals as "militarism." Many of us remember a time when one single word was considered sufficient to condemn any new idea: "Why, that is downright *Socialism!*" Among those who boast their enlightenment to-day, this simple word *militarism* saves an equal amount of inconvenient reflection. For British democrats, the only chance of salvation lies in ignoring what democrats are doing on the continent and in our colonies.

Jaurès, it may perhaps be said, was the most remarkable figure in the world's democracies of a year ago. His university distinctions were greater even than those of Mr. Russell or Mr. Dickinson;

and, passing on into politics, he rapidly became a more real force than all the politicians of our I. L. P. rolled together. And Jaurès was convinced, on grounds of history and practical politics, that the next and most practical step towards world-peace was to be found in the creation of national defensive militias on the most democratic basis consistent with military efficiency. He held that this would automatically supply that balance of forces which would give a real chance to honest and popular diplomacy—a real chance to gradual reduction of armaments by mutual consent—and a real chance to some system of international arbitration resting upon foundations more solid than ‘scraps of paper.’ He was as willing as any other man to risk heroic measures for pacifism in the last resort; he had faced great unpopularity in France by advocating heroic peace-measures at the Stuttgart International Conference; and it was his fierce opposition to the extra year of military service which cost him his life. But he recognized clearly that the guarantees of peace offered hitherto by the Hague Conferences were “timid, and sometimes hypocritical” (*L’Armée Nouvelle*, p. 8); therefore it was one of his dearest wishes to render France really secure against invasion, yet without strengthening her for aggression. I have briefly summarized his proposals in my *Workers and War* (p. 17 ff); let me here indicate how they would have worked out in this present conflict.

Educate the whole nation (says Jaurès), from childhood up, to the conviction that war is legitimate

only in self-defence, after arbitration has been offered and refused. Let the army be trained on defensive principles; let officers study the defensive above all things, both in strategy and in tactics. We shall then have the national conscience always on our side; the forces of the future will fight with us; any man who marches will know that he risks his life for peace, and not for militarism; not for domination, but in defence of his wife and children. This *Armée Nouvelle* of Jaurès contains the most eloquent pleas yet uttered for a national defensive policy, first in negotiations, and then (if the worst comes to the worst) in war; nor can any reader of *L'Humanité* doubt that this is the spirit in which French socialists are fighting to-day. Mr. Dickinson should bless us so far; for to him, "nationality is only respectable on its defence. When it is waging wars of liberation, it is sacred" (*After the War*, p. 15). Mr. Russell, however, will not admit even this: for him, "nationalism [is] the great curse of the modern world, as religious bigotry was the curse of former ages" (*Labour Leader*, March 11, 1915). And he attacks the idea of defensive warfare in words which, with all due respect to so distinguished a thinker, seem both shallow and sophistical (*Int. Journ. Ethics*, p. 138). "The justification of wars of defence" (he writes) "is very convenient, since so far as I know there has never yet been a war which was not one of self-defence. Every strategist assures us that the true defence is offence; every great nation believes that its own overwhelming strength is the only

guarantee of the world's peace, and can only be secured by the defeat of other nations." The absurdity of this last sentence, as applied (for instance) to America, lies on the surface, and needs no further emphasis. But the first sentence is equally false at bottom. Even if we grant that, in every war, both sides claim to be fighting in self-defence, must we therefore conclude that there is no such thing as self-defence? Because every claimant and defendant asserts the justice of his own cause in the law courts, is there no such thing as justice? The whole sentence is only a repetition of the former attempts, already noted, to push a partial argument under the cloak of higher impartiality. Nor is it true, as a matter of fact, that every strategist is in favour of the offensive-defensive. Jaurès drew his main ideas of the defensive in warfare from one of the most brilliant of the younger military writers, Commandant Rossel, whose theories received considerable practical confirmation in the recent Balkan wars. Moreover, he is able to show that Clausewitz himself, the classical authority, preached the strategical and tactical value of the defensive, even in days when modern inventions had not yet put such enormous power into the defenders' hands. It is only the disciples of Clausewitz who have forgotten this. To find justification for dismissing unheard this idea of a sane defensive policy, Mr. Russell would have to ally himself with those extremists of modern militarism.

What, then, are the details of this defensive organi-

zation of a whole state—of this Nation in Arms, as Jaurès loves to call it? From ten years upwards every boy will begin to learn drill at school; and these exercises will become more complicated in proportion as he advances in other departments of knowledge. The boys with most intelligence and character will be trained for officers—the few who may choose it as a profession, at the expense of the state—but the large majority would be citizen-officers in the national militia. There will be a military faculty at every university, since “military science is an essential factor in human knowledge” (p. 385); nor will any student be allowed to qualify for the higher professions if he has not also gained his officer’s certificate. Rifle-shooting on holidays will be popularized, as in Switzerland. The service will be compulsory, and nearly twice as long as in Switzerland, *i.e.*, a whole year for the infantry, all told; the Swiss trainings only total up to about seven months. It shall be declared unconstitutional for any Government to enter upon a war until arbitration has been offered and refused. But, the war once declared, the soldiers must be mobilized more rapidly than has yet been possible under the old system. The minutest precautions must be taken, in time of peace, to enable every fighting-man to be called out without delay, and in conformity with obvious geographical conditions. The weakest geographical frontiers coincide roughly with the thickest populations. On all the frontiers, therefore, but especially on the weakest, an elaborate system of defensive positions will have

been chosen and prepared, and will have been tested by rehearsing every possible combination of attack or defence during the yearly autumn manoeuvres, from generation to generation. The mobilization will at once collect vast numbers of armed men at a very short distance behind the frontiers; upon these masses the country will mainly rely for the first shock. Smaller bodies on the actual frontier will fight rearguard actions only, falling back like skirmishers upon the main body, and meanwhile concerned only with destroying railways, or otherwise harassing the German advance. That advance naturally becomes slower and more tentative in proportion as the invading army extends its communications, and has to deal, no longer with its own perfect roads and railways, but with every form of broken bridge or road, with every permanent or extemporized barrier which human ingenuity can devise. Meanwhile the mobilization perfects itself; and, behind the masses which started up from the ground in those thickly-peopled frontier districts, the whole nation is now being steadily armed and brought forward into second or third line. Here, again, the whole defensive system has been carefully rehearsed and prepared for years and years. The first great conflict would involve such loss to the attacking Germans as we have seen in the worst battles of this war; and even a first success would confront the invader with equal, or worse, obstacles behind. Then, if a favourable moment came, the French might seize the offensive; if not, the two opposing armies would gradually dig

themselves in, and the prospect of a decisive military advantage on either side would grow more and more remote. But this stale-mate would in itself be a victory, for it would mean that the French were doing what they had always intended to do, and that the German intentions were proportionately frustrated. Then, as now, the country which had offered arbitration before declaring war would have secured the sympathy, if not the support, of neutrals: and the stale-mate would leave the aggressor as much weakened in moral as in military prestige. Here, also, comes in the consideration ably stated by Mr. Heitland (pp. 9, 10),* that the neutral states could do much to decide a war by simply boycotting the aggressor. To reply (as Mr. Russell apparently would) that it is seldom possible to decide who has been the aggressor, is to abandon as insoluble a comparatively simple problem, while leading us off into jungles of speculation in other quarters. The conscience of civilization is fairly unanimous in this present conflict; but the neutrals lack machinery for voicing that conscience without plunging into actual war.

If all the belligerents had been organized on businesslike lines of complete defence in times of peace, and if the possibilities of a neutral boycott had been fully provided for, could all the drill-sergeants and professors in the world have brought Germany and Austria to this adventure of 1914? As Jaurès insisted, a France acting openly and consistently upon such a policy would have done the

* "If we win"—W. E. Heitland, Cambridge, 1915.

utmost that any country can do to secure itself against war. He writes on p. 183, "What ardour we should show in defence, how great would be the confidence of all men, if the whole nation had been thus manfully educated, and if we were now called upon to fight like one man for the noblest of all causes, for the salvation of a great peace-loving people! . . . I doubt whether, in the face of a great nation which was wholly set upon peace, and yet wholly prepared for war, and which had risen before the emergency came upon it, by the firm decision of every soul, to this great height of defensive mass-tactics—I doubt whether any attempt at aggression could ever be made against such a nation. It is this hope of peace—this certainty of peace—which upholds me, I confess, throughout the hypothetical wars which I am forced to discuss." And these anticipations of Jaurès have been startlingly confirmed in the present war. What Joffre has actually done—after his first unsuccessful offensive, which was easily frustrated by the far greater readiness of the German army—is what Jaurès had preached as a steady national policy. This fact has already been pointed out by a Russian military critic—Michael Paulovitch—whose remarks were quoted at length from a Petrograd journal in *l'Humanité* for Dec. 26th last.

Here, then, is a theory differing from that of the U.D.C., not only in its superficial appearance of militarism, but on far more essential points. Jaurès, in contrast to so many British pacifists, had not

waited until it was too late to formulate his scheme for preventing war. The fact that his plan could not be carried out, and that war came upon us so irresistibly last August, is due quite as much to the blind indifference of anti-militarism in Britain and America as to the blind opposition of militarism in France. His book contains nearly 700 pages of close print; in fulness, in precision of detail—and, above all, in the care with which he bases himself on fact and experience—it contrasts startlingly with the crude and vague suggestions of the U.D.C., which assume for their success more prudence and disinterestedness in national affairs than the average citizen consistently displays in his own life. Moreover, he foresees for France no mock-peace like that of ancient Rome or China, bought by shirking national defence, and therefore profoundly demoralizing. He loved peace more truly than Mr. Macdonald or the late Mr. Keir Hardie loved it; for he could have said with the great Free Churchman, R. W. Dale, "I believe in peace—true peace—at any price; in peace, even at the price of war." It was Jaurès who wrote (p. 450), "A working-class which has abandoned the defence of national independence, and, at the same time, of its own development, will never be strong enough to bring Capitalism to its knees. The proletariat, having unresistingly suffered the invader's yoke in addition to the yoke of the capitalist, will never even be tempted to raise its head again."

It is obvious that these proposals bear quite as directly as those of the U.D.C. upon the question

of future peace or war. Moreover, they are full and clear, and demand from human nature no more than we can reasonably expect: Jaurès was not only a great idealist, but a remarkably successful statesman; his genial sympathy with man and nature was very different to the thin sour milk of human kindness which distilled from doctrinaires like the late Mr. Keir Hardie, whose most illuminating reflection upon the invasion of Belgium was that "*we run no risk*"! Moreover, the present attitude of the U.D.C. and the I.L.P. makes it easier to understand why Jaurès laid so much stress on the fact that this ideal of defensive national militias is cherished by socialists and working-men in every European country except Great Britain; and why he would have taught his schoolboys, from the first years in which their drill began, "that this training in strength and in adroitness aimed at securing, not only the independence of their own nation, but also the peace of the world and a new era of lofty human justice, composed of the united liberties of all other countries." (pp. 144, 277.) The U.D.C. writers emphasize, over and over again, the obvious fact that a war can often be prevented altogether if we can simply delay its outbreak for a few weeks; they are aware that the great temptation of an aggressive government is the hope of a sudden surprise, yet they absolutely ignore this common-sense suggestion for removing that temptation. Mr. Ponsonby dismisses a military equipoise among the Powers as a simple impossibility (p. 156); yet Jaurès argues most convincingly for this equipoise.

In the present conflict, if Belgium had been prepared by the steady work of past years and past generations to resist aggression—if the whole country had been intersected with trenches and wire entanglements for miles behind the frontier, as it easily could have been at very small expense, by the gradual efforts of a national militia—if, moreover, behind the Belgians there had been a France trained as Jaurès would have had her trained, and a Britain, not only so trained and therefore patently uninvadable, but also ready to send its Expeditionary Force *at once*, and ready if necessary with a million or two of *trained* volunteers later on—then it cannot be reasonably doubted that the plan of striking France straight to the heart, and of turning upon the other Allies in rapid succession, would have presented a very different appearance to the Germans. If this had been the state of Europe in July 1914, who will believe that a Balkan quarrel could then have kindled this European conflagration? Nor could the Allies, for their part, have bullied Germany or Austria. Those countries, by adopting the same purely defensive national tactics, could have made it plain even to Russia (and, what is a great deal more, even to the more bloodthirsty Russia which Mr. Russell conjures up before our imagination) that no attack on Austro-Germany would be likely to “pay.” Here, then, we should have, in practice, a real equipoise; for, even in this war, the peoples which wanted to invade other countries were in the minority, so that any system which had given a clear advantage to the

defensive would have thrown overwhelming weight into the scale against any policy of adventure. There is little fear in these days of one great nation attacking another on the strength of a very small margin of superiority. The real thing that leads to war is the national belief, steadily inculcated, that we are strong enough to finish our adversary almost at a single blow. No nation (it is admitted, by common consent) has cherished this belief so strongly as Germany; and, to do her justice, this country of ours is partly responsible for German miscalculations. I had occasion to point out in the *Spectator*, some ten years ago, the feeling which was already noticeable in Germany during my university days at Heidelberg (1887-8), and which seemed to increase from year to year—a steadily growing contempt for this nation, in which any man might avoid the burden of training for national defence, and in which something like 70 per cent. of able-bodied males did in fact avoid it. A friend, whose business has taken him every year to Heidelberg since that time, assures me that this feeling has grown even more rapidly during the last decade. George Meredith wrote twelve years ago: “For our part, we have only to take the warning the Germans give us, and be armed, stationed, and alert; that is the way to preserve the peace. . . . A slumbering England will offer Germany the choice it craves.” And, while Jaurès noted that we were the only country in which the democracy did not accept the compulsory principle, and that we had found a

temporary makeshift in an "oligarchical" territorial force which came up to standard requirements neither in numbers nor in training, he anticipated that we should some day fall into line with the rest, and that the Anglo-Saxon world might thus form the nucleus of this system to which he looked forward as a great and comparatively easy step towards world-peace. With all his idealism, he had also that practical grasp of immediate realities which we so often miss in the U.D.C. Mr. Russell, on his own showing, cannot bring the Kaiser and Bernhardt to peace until he has convinced them that German civilization is not "greatly and undeniably superior" to ours.* Jaurès, while equally ready to argue on moral grounds, would reinforce his abstractions by also convincing the Germans that it's a long, long way to Paris. Mr. Russell here plays once more into the hands of the extreme militarists, by arguing so frankly in favour of wars of extermination which substitute an undeniably superior for an undeniably inferior population, while he is so unwilling to justify any others. His argument puts a heavy premium upon the policy of "frightfulness," so long as the aggressor has sufficient belief in his own Kultur.

We have seen already that this Union of Democratic Control, belying its name, bases its attack against diplomatists and pressmen on the assertion of the extreme gullibility and ignorance of the multitude. And, apparently, it builds also upon this ignorance as an essential foundation of its own

* *Internat. Journ. Ethics*, pp. 134—5.

success. Mr. Russell and Mr. Dickinson, at least, must have some vague idea of what Jaurès really taught. They must know of him as an intellect equal to any that the U.D.C. can boast, and as a statesman who achieved practical successes far beyond those of any U.D.C. politician. What possible excuse, therefore, can they find for concealing from themselves, or from the British Democracy, the fact that foreign democracies have cherished a very different theory from their own?—a scheme based upon far more definite considerations of practical experience, and not only advocated throughout this one great book, but also fully discussed in parliament by perhaps the greatest of modern democrats? They have, of course, every right to disagree with Jaurès, if they can find reasons to set against his reasons. But to ignore the man—or to condemn him by distant implication, as their vague references to “militarism” would seem to imply—is a confession either of great weakness, or of most undemocratic convictions at the back of their minds. Democracy and Peace must be very fugitive and cloistered virtues if they will not bear the discussion of such a subject under such auspices as these.

For what, after all, is militarism? We cannot measure it by simply counting our men in uniform, but by the predominance of military feelings or ideas in the nation. As patriotism depends, not on the numbers of professed patriots, but on their quality and their influence, so a Nation in Arms may be far less militarist than a nation in which the unarmed

majority hires soldiers to invade other countries, or falls itself under the domination of military hirelings. Moreover, on the face of it, a system under which the vast majority of the army are citizens, spending only six or twelve months at most in the ranks, and commanded mainly by citizen-officers, would seem to ensure a real counterbalance to the militarism of a professional army. So long as our English national militia existed, such was always its political rôle.

Just as Continental Radicals constantly point out that universal service is the only really democratic form of recruiting, so we may observe that the British objection to this as "militarism" rests upon most undemocratic assumptions. It is extremely superficial to argue, as most do, from the German army and nation as they now are, without also considering what they have been. Conscription was invented, for modern times, by the French Republican Government, by far the most democratic in Europe (1798); Prussia followed suit only eight years after. There is no abuse and no cruelty in modern conscripted Germany which was not worse among the Germans of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, before Prussia introduced conscription. The German Empire even owes its universal suffrage to the fact that, in 1867, universal schooling and universal service already existed; so that no logical excuse could be found for refusing the universal vote. In the long course of world-history universal service is oftener found among democracies than in despotic states. So long as war is possible

(and we have seen Mr. Dickinson confessing that even his pill is not warranted to purge the world of all possible wars) why should we refuse to let the people face these terrible contingencies, and prepare against them, on the plea that such a recognition of facts would destroy the mental and moral balance of the nation? Will the trained and armed man necessarily want to go and kill somebody? Has this been the characteristic spirit of our Territorials? Even the Germans would have plunged unwillingly into this war if they had not been drunk with past victories—and, in the nature of the case, war can never bring this intoxication to both sides, while it often brings disillusion to both. In one word, is there no hope of keeping a democracy *moral* except by keeping it *weak*? Must the People necessarily become a bully, when it is strong enough to look the whole world in the face? This, it would seem, is the plain English of the parrot cry of “militarism” raised against ideas which are held by so many thoughtful democrats abroad. But may it not be precisely the mission of our own country, so fortunate in its sea-girt advantage and in its long liberties of the past, to prove the falsehood of this dishonouring assumption, and to shame so-called democrats out of their unfaith?

It was necessary to quote at length from Jaurès, in order to expose the ignorance of the U.D.C. upon this subject of capital importance. Whether such ignorance be wilful or involuntary, it is equally significant that this Union, claiming to be in a

special sense democratic, knows nothing whatever of the best democratic opinion on a subject which lies at the very root of the whole problem of world-peace.*

Otherwise, it would perhaps have been more to the point to remind my readers that this short-service and democratic militia system was advocated more than forty years ago for Great Britain by one of the most distinguished democrats we have ever had—J. S. Mill—and by his disciple, Professor J. E. Cairnes. Mill sketched the idea in his *Letters* (Vol. II. pp. 72, 291, 303), and Cairnes worked it out more fully in the *Fortnightly Review* for February, 1871. They wrote at a time when our naval supremacy was more unchallenged than it is at present; but they saw clearly that we cannot calculate upon the steady continuance of favourable naval conditions for whole centuries or even for whole generations; and it was to future generations that they looked forward, as well as to their own. There was no suggestion of weakening the Navy, or of reducing our expeditionary force, but simply of national insurance on the ordinary business principles of commercial insurance. They

* Mr. Bruce Glasier, a light of the U. D. C. and a former President of the I. L. P. Conference, permitted himself a year ago to deny that Jaurès held these views, though he had afterwards to confess that he had never even seen Jaurès's work. It was to expose such unintentional falsehoods that I collected the evidence from foreign socialists which will be found on pp. 8—9 and 21—2 of my *Workers and War*. To make assurance doubly sure, I recently procured a letter from M. Ed. Vaillant, the senior member of the French Parliamentary Socialist party, confirming all my assertions, and wishing me success in my efforts to bring democrats in this country round to the views of Jaurès.

considered it dangerous to have all our eggs in one basket; and they thought also that national character would not lose, but gain, by a system which strengthened our second line of defence without weakening our first. Let us, therefore, suppose for one moment that Mill and Cairnes had had their way in 1871, and that Great Britain had adopted the Swiss system for which they contended—in other words, Compulsory Territorialism, with a six or seven months' training, under a far more democratic officer-system than that of our present Territorials.

The loss of time and labour would have been, as Mill insisted, far less than is often imagined. If we may judge from Swiss conditions, it would have been compensated, or even overbalanced, by the stimulus given to education and the increased efficiency of the workman.* The burden which such a militia would have cast upon the budget, according to the most favourable calculations, would have been four millions a year; according to the most unfavourable (which, however, are mainly based on assumptions contradicted even by our own War Office statistics), eight millions. Taking the extreme estimate, and

* Two years ago I sent circulars to 100 managers of Swiss firms, taken at random from a *Directory*, asking whether the compulsory service handicapped commerce or industry. Forty-six replied, of whom only one gave even a doubtful answer; even he did not venture to give a definite *yes*. The remainder gave me a categorical *no*, and often a *pas du tout*, or an explanation to the effect that they considered it a positive advantage. I gave additional facts in the *XIXth Century and After* for October, 1914, p. 914. The stimulus to education was freely acknowledged to me by M. Jean Sigg, the Genevese Trades Union leader, whose general attitude towards the national militia is far less favourable than that of most Swiss.

allowing for compound interest, it would have cost far less than half of what the first year of this war has already cost us, when we count destroyed property as well as expenditure upon army and navy. What, then, should we have gained? Let us calculate this as nearly as possible on the ordinary conditions of human nature and current politics. Mill's plan was not in the air; he looked for no sudden reversal of ordinary conditions. He did not assume that a multitude, which he could describe on Monday as enslaved to the silliest journalistic talk, would on Tuesday become capable of grappling with difficult problems in diplomacy. Nor, again, did he assume that it would be dangerous to let our democracy know what the best democratic minds abroad have thought on this subject. He took us as we are, capable of great improvement, marching slowly and steadily towards improvement, but no more likely to become angels by the cheap process of shutting our eyes to war, than to become devils under half a year of citizen-soldiering. He assumed that we could strengthen our home-defence force up to the standard of republican Switzerland, without losing our national self-control. He saw no reason why the multitude, compelled to do just about as much drill as the Volunteer of his day, or the Territorial of our day, should become worse men than we know the Territorials to be. And, in default of reasoned proof to the contrary (which, so far as I know, has never been offered), common sense would seem on Mill's side.

Strong, then, and self-controlled, what could Great Britain have done for world-peace during the last half-century? or rather, what could she not have done? We alone have little desire to expand—if you will, because we are overfed already—but let us, at least, make the best of a position left to us by our fathers. It is notorious that, as things now stand, our cry for peace has too often sounded like a cry of weakness. Germans are not the only foreigners who believe that we have grabbed more than we have the manhood to hold. It is not from any truly moral standpoint that we can argue: “Please leave us now in peace, to enjoy what our fathers won in war: so long as we don’t attack you, please don’t attack us.” Moreover, the argument is not even effective from a worldly point of view; it tempts the very aggression which it so pathetically deprecates. There would probably have been no such serious German fleet-rivalry but for the conviction that England, behind her fleet, was easily vulnerable; and that, even without complete command of the seas, a bold stroke might pierce us to the heart in a few days. Reasonable or absurd, the existence of this dream is now universally acknowledged; and we cannot escape the fact that our past professions of peace have sounded too much like the pleas of a bloated robber for mercy. Even when they were made with all sincerity, we could utter them with no real dignity, and they carried no conviction. Moreover, this cry for peace has *not* always been sincere; it has sometimes come from the

same throats which have appealed to force in labour disputes and in the settlement of the Irish question.

A Britain, strong enough to demand peace without raising inevitable suspicions of weakness, would be a firm nucleus round which all other sincere peace-movements could crystallize. Our colonies, more or less definitely, have already shown us the way. France and Belgium, Switzerland, Holland and Scandinavia, would certainly join with us in a League of Peace. We should stand on the double principle of Jaurès: that arbitration should first be tried; and that, behind this, the country should be organized with all its forces for defence. Such a League would have the best possible chance of cohesion against any aggressor. 'Scraps of paper' might help; but it would no longer depend wholly upon scraps of paper. The countries which still stood out of it would find increasing difficulty in justifying their policy before a more and more democratic and critical electorate. It is not unreasonable to conclude that, one by one, they would be forced to come in. Then, when all the Great Powers had formed such a union, the limitation of armaments might be seriously discussed, and we might even create an international police by land and sea. Until that time, no nation could be safe which had not organized its own national police. What is more, a nation suspected of any weakness disproportionate to its pretensions would still remain, what it has often been in spite of good intentions, a danger to European peace. And, lastly, the very

process which would liberate us from the foreign menace would also remove one very serious danger to national morality. In the past, this outcry of "militarism" against every proposal to imitate the militia of republican Switzerland has been bound up with a great deal of ignorance, and a still more dangerous dose of hypocrisy. The shirker has sometimes posed as a moralist; and even the best-intentioned moralists have protected the shirker. Peace in itself, honest peace, cannot corrupt a nation; but the habit of turning our eyes away from unpleasant contingencies, the habit of unconscious hypocrisy, involves a steady process of demoralization which no society can finally stand against. We, in this country, could afford to allow the fullest latitude to conscientious objections; the objector could simply register his name as an anti-militarist on principle, and would be set to serve in civil hospitals, or at some other useful work, while his neighbours were serving their country in the militia. To obtain such an official register of anti-militarists, and to note their behaviour in other walks of life, would be in itself a most important step in social science. It would help to clear up many open questions as to the relation between non-resistance and moral courage. It would enable pacifists to form a visible church; and, if their lives commended their doctrines, this would do more than anything else to further the interests of true peace. Here, again, ours is perhaps the only European country which could afford to make the experiment without hesitation.

Let us be honest with ourselves. How many of us would be willing to expose our personal savings or our means of livelihood to the same risks which the U.D.C. wishes us to face as a nation? or, if we could face the risk for ourselves, who would face it for his wife and children also? Is it not enough, for the next few years at least, to take one solid step in advance? Would not this be thoroughly consonant with our national traditions, and has it not been our main lesson to the world? If, after this war, we could show the first example in modern history of a great nation coveting nothing more, yet fearing for nothing that it possesses—too well defended to encourage any hopes of robbery, yet too self-controlled to fall into temptations of robbery—would not that be a glorious achievement for one generation? Men say now that 17th-century Britain, seeking her own salvation, supplied the model of constitutional government for the civilized world. Let them say that Britain of the 20th century, with the same inspired common sense, laid the foundations of the United States of Europe by the unaggressive measures which she took to protect herself and her children. Such measures would not discourage idealism; they would, on the contrary, supply a firm practical foundation for all higher ideals of peace; the sort of practical foundation which would save an idealist like Mr. Russell from imagining that Belgium might have avoided the horrors of war by letting Germany loose upon France.

It will be seen that the present writer, while

strongly sympathizing with every democratic movement which shows any real promise of permanence, has attempted to voice the feelings of a large number of Liberals who find in this U.D.C. propaganda little of the higher qualities which the champions of the Union have shown in other writings. This attempt to force the hands of the Government bears no trace of the long and patient thought which Mr. Dickinson seems to claim for it; on the contrary, it is everywhere suggestive of haste, impatience, and partiality. Essential questions are begged or ignored. The authors avoid deciding on the simpler issues, only in order to lead us away into mazes of vague speculation. Every war has had its literature of this kind, in which excitement and good intentions attempt to make up for long years of neglected spade-work and hod-work. What Goethe describes of his own younger days is equally true of modern Britain: long tranquillity has tempted many literary men to see war and peace in false perspective; they press one-sided views in the name of ideal justice; their "moral aggressiveness" lacks ballast; their attempt to dictate to the Government, if successful, would "lead to incalculably unfortunate results."

It would be difficult to state the case against the U.D.C. more weightily than it has been stated against the kindred "National Peace Council" by their own President, Lord Channing of Wellingborough. Lord Channing has resigned his Presidency because the Council had distributed an official circular calling upon the Government "to take or make the earliest possible

opportunity for discussing the terms of settlement with all other Governments engaged in this war." In his farewell letter he urged, "that to launch prematurely schemes so abstract and remote, so ambitious and vague, before we had brought this war to a successful conclusion, and could deliberate dispassionately upon the problems of the future, would lessen the weight of any advice the Council might give, and might incur the imputation that its members, like some groups of Pro-Germans in America, were seeking to get easier terms for Germany The plain facts are before us, and the plain duties they impose. If Germany has been and is mad, that is no reason why we should be madder still." This letter was sent simultaneously to the Press, and to the National Peace Conference itself for its meeting of May 5th. Press correspondents, curious to hear how it would be discussed, applied for admission to the meeting; but they were "informed that the agenda was 'routine,' and also 'private'." No information of any kind was communicated." We must leave the Union of Democratic Control to deal with this new scandal in secret diplomacy!

APPENDIX I

MR. ANGELL'S REPLY, AND HIS FRESH MIS-STATEMENTS

[Early in this year, 1915, I wrote to let Mr. Angell know that I was reprinting my accusatory article, and that I would gladly find room for any exculpatory statement from him. He sent me the following letter for publication in this Appendix.]

“In the October number of the *Nineteenth Century* appeared an article by Mr. G. G. Coulton, in which several pages were devoted to accusing me of ‘falsehood,’ of ‘a standard of literary rectitude lower than the ordinary standard of commercial rectitude adopted by self-respecting business firms,’ and of little less than personal dishonesty generally.

I am not sure that an author need or should reply to ‘criticism’ of that kind.

It is always open to those disposed to take it seriously to go to the books under criticism and examine for themselves the value of the points raised. I was and am quite prepared to abide by such a test sincerely applied. That indeed is my reply now, in so far as most of the criticisms are concerned. But I will deal as briefly as possible with what Mr. Coulton says are the worst cases, so that any reader of his article unfamiliar with the book he is criticising can judge of the heinousness of the less bad.

In the second part of *The Great Illusion* I tried, among other things, to render clear the confusion which I believe is very general on two points. The first is an indiscriminate application of the ‘struggle

for life' theory to states and nations; and the second, a misapprehension as to the operation of the 'survival of the fit' process in warfare. On the first point I tried to make plain that the survival value of co-operation among societies was greater than that of military struggle between them. I have tried to indicate the confusion, and state what I believe to be a true analogy in these terms: *

Struggle is the law of survival with man, as elsewhere, but it is the struggle of man with the universe, not man with man. 'Dog does not eat dog'; even tigers do not live on one another. Both dogs and tigers live upon their prey.

It is true that against this it is argued that dogs struggle with one another for the same prey; if the supply of food runs short, the weakest dog, or the weakest tiger starves. But an analogy between this state, and one in which co-operation is a direct means of increasing the supply of food, obviously breaks down. If dogs and tigers were groups, organised on the basis of the division of labour, even the weakest dogs and tigers could, conceivably, perform functions which would increase the food-supply of the group as a whole; and, conceivably, their existence would render the security of that supply greater than would their elimination. If to-day a territory like England supports in comfort a population of 45,000,000, where in other times rival groups, numbering at most two or three millions, found themselves struggling with one another for a bare subsistence, the greater quantity of food and the greater security of the supply is not due to any process of elimi-

* *The Great Illusion*, p. 187. Edition 1914.

nation of Wessex men by Sussex men, but is due precisely to the fact that this rivalry has been replaced by common action against their prey—the forces of Nature. The obvious facts of the development of communities show that there is a progressive replacement of rivalry by co-operation, and that the vitality of the social organism increases in direct ratio to the efficiency of the co-operation, and to the abandonment of the rivalry, between its parts.

All crude analogies between the processes of plant and animal survival which disregard the dynamic element of conscious co-operation are misleading and vicious, because fundamental facts of difference are not taken into account.

In elaborating this point I wanted to call particular attention to the works of a Russian author fairly well known in France, but hardly at all known in England, Jacques Novikow of Odessa, and to acknowledge my own indebtedness thereto. I therefore devoted a dozen lines in a foot-note to his *Critique du Darwinisme Social*, a book which impressed me very greatly, and the value of which is not, in my opinion, sufficiently appreciated. My very high estimate of Novikow is not shared by some of my friends, who have accused me of urging his claims to the exclusion of certain other and earlier writers in the same field. While correcting the proofs of *The Great Illusion* one of these friends called my attention to an article on Social Biology in, I believe, an American review, containing two brief references, one to Karl Pearson and the other to Otto Seeck. The phrases quoted seemed to imply that Karl Pearson had, previously to the appearance of Novikow's book, covered somewhat the same ground in about the same sense. I had not time

at the moment to go to the originals, but as I had been so emphatic as to the value of Novikow's work, it seemed only just to call attention to the earlier work of Karl Pearson, which I did, by adding to the foot-note these lines :

“The real application of the biological law to human society had, moreover, already been partly anticipated, in correction of some of the conclusions drawn by Spencer and Huxley, by Professor Karl Pearson.” (*The Grammar of Science*, pp. 433—38. Walter Scott, London.)

Now it appears that this isolated passage I had seen did not represent Professor Pearson's real views, or I misunderstood them. When I learned this the lines I have quoted were dropped from my foot-note. The argument stood on its merits without reference to Pearson one way or another—which was the case when it was originally written.

That is crime number one.

In stating my second point concerning the application of the 'survival of the fit' theory to war I wrote as follows :

What is the fundamental error at the base of the theory that war makes for the survival of the fit ; that warfare is any necessary expression of the law of survival ? It is the illusion induced by the hypnotism of a terminology which is obsolete. The same factor which leads us astray in the economic domain leads us astray in this also.

Conquest does not make for the elimination of the conquered ; the weakest do not go to the wall, though that is the process which those who adopt the formula of evolution in this matter have in their minds.

Great Britain has conquered India. Does that mean that the inferior race is replaced by

the superior? Not the least in the world; the inferior race not only survives, but is given an extra lease of life by virtue of the conquest. If ever the Asiatic threatens the white race, it will be thanks in no small part to the work of race conservation which England's conquests in the East have involved. War, therefore, does not make for the elimination of the unfit and the survival of the fit. It would be truer to say that it makes for the survival of the unfit.

What is the real process of war? You carefully select from the general population on both sides the healthiest, sturdiest, the physically and mentally soundest, those possessing precisely the virile and manly qualities which you desire to preserve; and, having thus selected the *élite* of the two populations, you exterminate them by battle and disease, and leave the worst of both sides to amalgamate in the process of conquest or defeat—because, in so far as the final amalgamation is concerned, both processes have the same result—and from this amalgamation of the worst of both sides you create the new nation or the new society which is to carry on the race. Even supposing the better nation wins, the fact of conquest results only in the absorption of the inferior qualities of the beaten nation—inferior presumably because beaten, and inferior because we have killed off their selected best and absorbed the rest, since we no longer exterminate the women, the children, the old men, and those too weak or too feeble to go into the army.*

And as a foot-note to this in the same proof correction I added a note of two lines based on the same article, to the effect that Seeck had found

* *The Great Illusion*, pp. 193—194. Edition 1911.

Roman degeneration in part due to 'the rooting out of the best.' The article in question does not seem to have presented Seeck's real view either, so I deleted that note also, leaving my proofs exactly as they had been originally.

This is crime number two.

Now even a busy man in reading his proofs should not give confirmatory foot-notes from sources that he has not verified. But it is the kind of thing which busy men, however scrupulous and careful they may desire to be, are sometimes guilty. In this case I was the less careful, because the notes were merely confirmatory. The argument in no way depended upon them. It had been originally elaborated, the book originally written, without reference to them in any way. The argument did not in the slightest degree owe anything to them, and it was in no way dependent on them. Their introduction was a matter of chance; in the one case, due, as I have explained, to a desire not to give undue credit to one writer to the exclusion of another. Both notes together occupied exactly six lines in inconspicuous type at the bottom of a page in a book of considerably over 300 pages. Yet because in the later edition I have allowed the argument to stand as originally written—because I have simply dropped out notes which formed no original part of it—Mr. Coulton does not hesitate to accuse me of falsehood and something approaching personal dishonesty.

Let me give an analogy. Suppose I had written a long essay on bi-metallism, and when correcting the proofs should see in the daily newspaper some extract from a speech, say, of Mr. Balfour's, which led me to add at the end a foot-note: 'In his speech at — Mr. Balfour showed general agreement with the views here expressed.' Then assume that later I learned that he had been misreported. I would

naturally, in the subsequent editions of such an essay, delete this reference. For thus deleting the reference and restoring the essay to its original form I am called by Mr. Coulton a liar. I am not exaggerating. Mr. Coulton delivers his verdict on the two cases I have described in the following words :

‘Mr. Angell might indeed bring himself to eliminate the flat falsehood; he would indeed delete the references; but he could not afford to delete also his main suggested falsehood . . . But this falsehood, this pseudo-scientific axiom flatly opposed to real scientific authority, is still to stand in Mr. Angell’s text, without any hint of Professor Pearson’s contradiction. Similarly, decency forbids that Professor Seeck should any longer be claimed as a pacifist; but here, again, we must still disguise the fact that Mr. Angell is setting up his own journalistic *obiter dictum* against the considered verdict of a specialist of European reputation; and all this on two points which lie at the very foundation of the second Key-chapter.’

It is evident that Mr. Coulton has a meaning special to himself in the words he uses. I am not setting up my own *obiter dicta*. I am submitting an argument, a working hypothesis of certain social and political processes, based on certain reasoning, the validity of which reasoning it will be for the reader to judge, and which does not in the slightest degree depend upon authority. It had been elaborated in obvious ignorance of the real views of the two professors cited, and having ceased to cite them, why in the name of fairness, reason, and common sense should I modify the argument as originally drawn up? Yet, because I do not, Mr. Coulton accuses me of literary dishonesty.

Such is the foundation of Mr. Coulton's verdict. In the other cases, as he himself admits, there is even less to go on. These are the two worst cases that Mr. Coulton can find. If the reader is disposed to attach value to the other cases, I would ask no better defence than that he should, by reference to the book itself, see what it is upon which are based the offensive accusations that Mr. Coulton brings.

On the intellectual, as distinct from the moral side, my great crime in Mr. Coulton's eyes is that I have refused to discuss with him some plan of 'compulsory military service on the Swiss system.' I have always refused to discuss such matters with Mr. Coulton, or anyone else, for a very good reason. They are entirely irrelevant to the truths which I find it already sufficiently difficult to keep clear of irrelevancy and misapprehension. While I have always accepted fully the right and duty of a nation to defend itself from aggression, and have no objection of principle even to compulsion, I have always left to others the task of determining just what form of defence would be most effective. It would be quite possible to accept every essential proposition laid down in *The Great Illusion*, and yet to favour compulsory military service, just as it would be possible to accept those propositions and to believe that compulsory service is not suited to our special needs. The difference between the two military systems has nothing whatever to do with what I have been mainly concerned to show. And that is why I have refused to argue the matter. I find the task of keeping the main outlines of what I believe to be the truths in *The Great Illusion* clear of irrelevancy and side issues far beyond my strength as it is. To enter into controversies on issues that properly do not touch them would be to confuse the public mind, already sufficiently confused on those issues.

In one paragraph Mr. Coulton pours blame on me for setting up my 'journalistic obiter dictum' against 'the considered verdict of specialists,' and in another pours blame on me for not taking sides in complex military problems. Mr. Coulton may feel equal to mastering all the range of subjects included in my books, and technical military problems as well. I do not. As things are I shall not be drawn into such discussion, even though Mr. Coulton continues to charge me with 'vulgar misapprehension' concerning the attitude of continental democrats to conscription. It happens that I was educated in France, have attended a Swiss university, lived 25 years of my life on the continent, and have discussed these very subjects with the authorities Mr. Coulton mentions, like Jaurès and Bebel, having enjoyed during some years the friendship of the former. As a matter of fact it would give me very great pleasure to deal with some of Mr. Coulton's dicta on that point. But it is a pleasure which I shall continue to deny myself.

NORMAN ANGELL."

To this reply of Mr. Angell's I rejoined as follows:—

"Mr. Angell's defence is certainly not calculated to improve his case.

(A) He now tries to excuse himself by thus describing his own original argument on p. 187. 'I tried to make plain that the survival value of co-operation among societies was *greater** than that of *military* struggle between them.' These words which I have underlined convey two serious implications contrary to the facts.

* *Note.* Here, as elsewhere in this Appendix, the italics are mine, unless otherwise stated.

(1) Mr. Angell did not merely plead that co-operation is a *greater* factor than struggle; he argued as though it were the *only* factor; he merely made a small exception, in a foot-note, in favour of business competition. (ed. 1911, p. 146; ed. 1914, p. 189.) He wrote, 'It is the struggle of man with universe, *not man with man*,' and again, 'our struggle is with our environment, *not with one another*.' (1911, p. 231; 1914, p. 273.) This is even more plain in his synopsis, where he writes: 'The struggle between nations is *no* part of the evolutionary law of man's advance.' (1911, p. viii: *italics his*.) In the form to which Mr. Angell now apologetically whittles down his proposition, it is a platitude too evident to be denied; whereas, in the form in which he actually stated it in his book, it is a paradox too absurd to be seriously defended: see my text, Chapter II.

(2) Mr. Angell did not, as he now pleads, limit the argument in his book to *military* struggle. The actual words of his book would deny all civilizing force to *any* kind of struggle by which one man could eliminate another man, or one group another group. Even his foot-note (supposing that it can be logically reconciled with his text) excepts only those forms of struggle which (he pleads) are really forms of co-operation in disguise.

(3) He is still more inaccurate in his present attempt to put the best face possible on his other blunder. He now writes: 'I added a note of two lines, based on the same article, to the effect that Seeck had found Roman degeneration *in part* due to "the rooting-out of the best."' Turning to the actual page of his own book from which he is here professing to quote (ed. 1911, p. 194) we read, 'Dr. Otto Seeck ("Der Untergang der Antiken Welt") finds the downfall of Rome due *solely* to the rooting out of the best.' It is obvious how seriously the

change of words which I have italicized alters the sense; and when Mr. Angell is driven thus to shift his ground three times in half-a-dozen lines, we may well suspect that he feels the weakness of his case. Moreover, the man who takes such liberties with his own text may well prove even more inaccurate when dealing with other men's facts and arguments.

Let us now deal with those inaccuracies. Mr. Angell pleads that the whole of his error lies in having claimed two distinguished authors as witnesses in his favour without having even looked at either of them. In other words, he falls back upon the excuse which I quoted for him, 'that Mr. Angell is a journalist, and must be judged by journalistic methods of literary accuracy.' So far the plea is good enough; the original error, it may readily be granted, was natural under Mr. Angell's circumstances. But what I insisted upon very plainly, and what Mr. Angell seems still unable to realize, is the gravity of perpetuating the worst features in this original error by attempting now to hush it up; the gravity of leaving 100,000 readers in the dark, in order that Mr. Angell may save his face. '*It appears,*' he now writes, 'that this . . . did not represent Professor Pearson's real views'; and again, 'The article in question does not *seem* to have presented Seeck's real view either.' Why these vague words 'appears' and 'seems,' at this time of day? Why has he not yet taken the trouble to verify the facts, and why has he not yet the frankness to confess that both Pearson and Seeck *flatly contradict* his own theories? He pleads, 'It is always open to those disposed to take it seriously to go to the books under criticism and examine for themselves the value of the points raised.' But how can we expect the ordinary reader, however serious, to find time to look up Seeck in some great library? especially when

we remember that the book has not been translated into English. It is no part of the reader's business to save Mr. Angell from gross blunders, but it is very clearly Mr. Angell's business to avoid imposing gross misstatements upon his readers. With what face, then, can he now attempt to throw upon the public the trouble of referring to Pearson and Seeck when he has not yet troubled to refer to them himself?

And why is Mr. Angell, even now, so curiously shy of facing the actual words of the two professors to whom he once so confidently appealed? The mystery can best be explained by here confronting the actual views of these professors with Mr. Angell's mis-statements about those views.

(B) We read in *The Great Illusion* (ed. 1911, pp. 144—45), 'Struggle is the law of survival with man, as elsewhere; but it is the struggle of man with the universe, *not man with man* . . . Man's struggle is the struggle of the organism, which is human society, in its adaptation to its environment, the world—*not the struggle between different parts of the same organism* . . . If struggle between men is the true reading [of the facts], those facts are absolutely inexplicable.' And then Mr. Angell's foot-note gives us to understand that this stuff has the high authority of Professor Karl Pearson, on pp. 433—438 of his *Grammar of Science*. The very pages, it will be seen, are specified; and none but the most cynical reader could have suspected that Mr. Angell had 'conveyed' all this reference at second-hand, without ever taking the trouble to glance himself at the passage which he so definitely commended to his reader. I should not myself have thought of verifying the reference, but that I was at once struck with the fact that the views here attributed to Professor Pearson were absurd on the face of them, and I knew that the Professor was not given

to writing absurdities. If we refer, then, to Professor Pearson's actual words, we shall find that he contradicts Mr. Angell in the plainest terms. He writes, 'The struggle for existence involves *not only* the struggle of individual man against individual man, but *also* the struggle of individual society against individual society, *as well as* the struggle of the totality of humanity, with its organic and inorganic environment' (p. 432). On p. 436 he speaks of 'the battle of society with society,' and 'of individual with individual' as part of the world-process. And finally, on p. 437, 'We have always to remember that, hidden beneath diplomacy, trade, adventure, there is a struggle raging between modern nations *which is none the less real if it does not take the form of open warfare.* The individualistic instinct may be as strong or stronger than the socialistic, but the latter is always far stronger than any feeling towards humanity as a whole. Indeed, the "solidarity of humanity," so far as it is real, is felt to exist rather between civilized men of European race in the presence of nature and of human barbarism, than between all men on all occasions.' He goes on to explain that the civilized man's instinct is to dispossess the uncivilized, but that this is good for humanity: for 'it is a false view of human solidarity, a weak humanitarianism, not a true humanism, which regrets that a capable and stalwart race of white men should replace a dark-skinned tribe which can neither utilize its land for the full benefit of mankind, nor contribute its quota to the common stock of human knowledge.'

It is this argument of Professor Pearson's which I contrast, in my text, with Mr. Angell's 'own journalistic obiter dictum.' Mr. Angell complains that I must be using these contemptuous words 'in a meaning special to myself.' On the contrary, I use

them in their plain and ordinary sense. He imagines himself to have 'elaborated' 'an argument . . . based on reasoning . . . which does not in the slightest degree depend upon authority.' Yet the reader need only turn to Mr. Angell's own text to see how little there is of 'elaboration,' 'argument,' or 'reasoning' there. In four pages of verbiage he simply proves what few thinkers have seriously doubted, viz., that co-operation between men is a *more* civilizing force, *on the whole*, than is the struggle between individuals and societies. But from this he jumps, without form of argument, to a very different conclusion, viz., that civilization *does not in any way involve* the struggle of man with man; that, as he puts it even more pithily on p. 231, 'our struggle is with our environment, *not with one another.*' In other words, after having triumphantly demonstrated a fairly commonplace truth, he claims to have established an obvious falsehood. It is a well-worn truth that the struggle of man with man is not the *whole* process of civilization; but it is equally false to assert, as Mr. Angell does, that it is *no part* of that process. The whole thing is a typical instance of his incapacity for close reasoning, and may be compared with the inaccuracy with which he quotes even his own words, quietly substituting 'in part' for 'solely,' and then turning upon me in an attitude of injured virtue! Again, it is only by equally slipshod methods that Mr. Angell is able to complain, 'I am called by Mr. Coulton a liar.' I carefully abstained from any such accusation. What I did say, and what I think most readers will now say with me, is that Mr. Angell has a very defective sense of literary morality: that 'this falsehood, this pseudo-scientific axiom, is still to stand in Mr. Angell's text, without any hint of Professor Pearson's contradiction,' and that the

writer's very excuses do but emphasize his moral obtuseness.

(C) The Seeck case is of the same kind. Mr. Angell, arguing that war 'makes for the survival of the unfit,' quotes Otto Seeck as attributing the downfall of Rome *solely* to this cause; such is the only possible meaning which can be attached to his note in the earlier editions. Yet the truth is that Seeck argues at great length, and with a mass of historical facts to support him, *for the exact contrary of this*, as the reader may see in my text. Mr. Angell now pleads that his note referring to Seeck 'was merely confirmatory.' This is not really true. Mr. Angell bases his argument on an historical instance—the downfall of Rome (p. 195), quoting no historical facts, but appealing for confirmation by his foot-note to two great historians whom he represents as concluding definitely in his favour. It is this foot-note which absolves Mr. Angell from giving, in his text, the facts which we should otherwise require in support of his sweeping general conclusion. If, for instance, I state briefly a certain conclusion, and quote Darwin as voucher for it, then what weighs with every thoughtful reader is, not my statement in the text, but my foot-note appealing to Darwin. If that foot-note is wrong, almost everything is wrong. The real evidence lay all along, not in my own brief statement, but in Darwin's supposed corroboration; and if it turns out that Darwin, instead of corroborating, contradicts me, then my only way of setting myself right will be to meet Darwin openly and victoriously; to array facts and arguments against the facts and arguments which had influenced him, and laboriously to prove that, in spite of Darwin, I am still right. Silently to suppress Darwin's verdict directly it turns out to be unfavourable, and quietly to repeat my own brief conclusion without any pre-

tence of basing it on a fresh review of the evidence, is patently unfair to the public; and it is strange that Mr. Angell can defend such a course.

He now attempts to justify himself by pleading that his conduct in suppressing these facts will bear comparison with what his conduct would have been in a political matter, in which Mr. Balfour had been the authority misquoted. To a large number of readers, who think that war itself is scarcely more unjust than many things which are daily done in party politics, this excuse will be far from convincing; if the Apostle of Light is driven to plead that his literary morality is no worse than ordinary party-morality, then he must indeed be in a bad way. Let us rather take an analogy from those matters of finance from which Mr. Angell himself is fond of arguing, and to which I had already directed his attention, by pointing out that self-respecting business firms follow a standard of morality higher, in some important respects, than that which Mr. Angell and other pacifists sometimes practise. Mr. Angell would himself admit that his own authority on a technical point of sociology (like that dealt with in the first case we are discussing) is very small compared with that of an expert like Professor Pearson; and that his own knowledge of Roman history is infinitesimal compared with that of Otto Seeck. In appealing to the first as backing up his theories on the sociological side, and the second on the historical side, he is therefore like a Company-promoter who puts out a prospectus claiming the financial support of two first-rate banks. It presently transpires that a perfectly innocent, though extremely careless, mistake has been made; and that these two great banks, instead of offering financial support to the Company, are in fact making heavy claims against it; that their names weigh as heavily on the debit

side as Mr. Angell had at first imagined them to weigh on the credit side. What would be the verdict of the business world if Mr. Angell had published a second prospectus silently deleting his original appeal to those great names, and concealing the fact that they made serious claims against the Company? These unfavourable claims might conceivably be unfounded, just as it is remotely conceivable that Mr. Angell might prove to be right against Pearson and Seeck, if he could once be induced to produce actual evidence against them, and to argue the case with something like the fulness with which they argue it. But the silent suppression of such adverse claims in the financial world would ruin his reputation for business probity; and, if he and his admirers view so differently this parallel case of conscience in the literary world, it is they themselves who supply the clearest justification for my hard words which have given Mr. Angell so much offence. As I wrote in my article, 'Pacifism is a noble ideal; but the first step towards its realization must surely be this: that its advocates should consistently manifest at least that moral courage which we expect from men of lower professions.'

(D) A few final words about the further misstatements of fact which Mr. Angell contrives to make in other parts of this brief defence.

(1) He writes: 'My great crime in Mr. Coulton's eyes is that I have refused to discuss with him some plan of "compulsory military service on the Swiss system."' The reader need only refer to my text in order to see that this is false. I incriminate Mr. Angell for 'declining my direct challenge to discuss in writing, not only his obvious blunders, but what seemed to me his deeper misconceptions and sophisms.' The words which he puts into inverted commas, thus giving the reader to understand that

they are a direct quotation from my article, do not occur in that article at all. With regard to the Swiss system of compulsory service, all I do is to convict him of ignorance, to show that he omits all reference to it in cases where such reference is demanded even by his own argument, and that he makes a ludicrous blunder on the one occasion when he does refer to it.

(2) It is equally false to accuse me of blaming him 'for not taking sides in complex military problems.' I simply blame him for ignoring the fact that such problems exist, and for thus falsifying the whole perspective on the general question of Peace or War. Only one actual book, I believe, was ever written by the great pacifist Jaurès* ; and that book deals from beginning to end with these military problems which Mr. Angell sets aside as 'entirely irrelevant.'

(3) But this, we are now told, is not through ignorance ; Mr. Angell was educated in France, was at a Swiss University, has known Jaurès personally, etc., etc. I happen to have begun my school life at that same French Lycée at which Mr. Angell was taught (St-Omer) ; and I know very well how astonishingly little learning of any kind the majority of English pupils picked up there. Some years ago I received from Mr. Angell a change-of-address card—why, I never discovered, since I had not the honour to know him. But I was much amused to find that, within the compass of this small card, the French word *adresse* was three times misspelt. The thing is small, but it has some real significance in this context : and, when we are reminded that Mr. Angell

* I find I am wrong here ; Jaurès wrote several of the earlier volumes of the *Histoire Socialiste*. But his official biographer, Rappoport, lays far more stress on his *Armée Nouvelle* than on any of his other writings.

was at one time a representative of the *Daily Mail* in Paris, it may be replied that this in itself is no very convincing proof of his familiarity with real French life and thought. I have exposed an instance of extreme ignorance in this field on p. 10 note. Again, whatever he may have learnt at his Swiss University, he certainly did not learn the most obvious facts about one most characteristic Swiss institution, the Citizen Army, which he mentions only to blunder over it (see p. 3 of my text). Finally, with regard to Jaurès, I happen to have equally interesting evidence. One of Mr. Angell's most trusted subordinates—the same whom he employed as intermediary to find out from me the easiest method of suppressing his misquotations in the earlier editions of *The Great Illusion*—committed himself recently at Cambridge to certain assertions about Jaurès's position as an anti-militarist which were quite false, and which he frankly retracted afterwards in a letter to me. The incident proved pretty clearly that this trusted disciple had been left by his master in a state of complete ignorance about what was perhaps the most characteristic doctrine of the great French Apostle of Peace—Jaurès's theory of a Nation in Arms. Unless, therefore, we are to suppose that Mr. Angell had deliberately concealed these vital facts from his disciple, we are driven to the obvious conclusion (which is further corroborated by his silence in *The Great Illusion* and elsewhere) that Mr. Angell knew Jaurès after the same sort of slipshod fashion after which he knows French and a good many other things—enough to talk and write about, but not enough to save him from ridiculous blunders.

I hope I have here shown quite enough to make thoughtful readers judge Mr. Angell no longer according to his own professions of knowledge, but according to such knowledge as he can actually

produce, and can substantiate by ascertainable facts or correct references.

G. G. COULTON."

To this rejoinder (posted to Mr. Angell on March 4, 1915, with an offer to print any observations which he might wish to make) he has vouchsafed no answer.

APPENDIX II

THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION LEAGUE

A document of four columns, purporting to reply to my article here reprinted in Chapter I, was published by Mr. Maddison in the sheltered pages of his own journal, the *Arbitrator*, for January, 1915. Mr. Maddison complained that it had been refused by the editor of the *Nineteenth Century and After*. I wrote at once to Mr. Maddison, pointing out that, if the editor had in this case broken his constant tradition of allowing replies to controversial articles, it was probably because Mr. Maddison's article consisted mainly of personalities and vague inconclusive verbiage. I added that the editor could not have known, what I was now prepared to prove, that the article also contained serious inaccuracies. Finally, I offered to reprint his whole "reply" within the covers of this book, to give him as much further space for the discussion as I occupied myself, and so to arrange that I might not have the last word. This challenge he declined; therefore, not being permitted to print his reply in full, I must shew how even his fresh excuses expose, more clearly than ever, the impossible methods of this so-called pacifist League.

His first argument is that the President of the League is Mr. Thos. Burt, one of the oldest and most respected members of the House of Commons. If (he urges) the League had really published gross misstatements of fact, then Mr. Burt must surely have found it out and put things straight long ago. The argument is singularly unconvincing: we all know what abuses are possible, under certain circumstances, in societies which have a highly respected but very hardworked public man for their figure-head. Moreover, Mr. Maddison proceeds, a dozen lines lower down, to demolish his own case. He abuses me for attempting (though only in the last resort) to obtain the suppression of the published falsehood by applying straight to one of the Vice-Presidents. "The ordinary business of the League,"

writes Mr. Maddison, "is controlled by a Council, on which, as it happens, no Vice-President has a seat. This is known to Mr. Coulton, for the names are printed on the front page of the *Arbitrator*. . . . The Vice-Presidents take no responsibility, financial or otherwise, for the League's work." This was not known to me until I learned it by bitter experience; I should never have been so rash as to assume that the absence of a Vice-President's name from the Council List was a proof of his having nothing to do with the real working of the League. Moreover, Mr. Maddison is now proving a great deal too much; for *Mr. Burt's name also is absent from the Council*. If, therefore (as Mr. Maddison now argues) nothing but my perversity could have imagined a Vice-President to be responsible for the crooked things done in the name of the League, then it is still more perverse of Mr. Maddison to shelter himself behind the name of Mr. Burt, who, by his own showing, is equally irresponsible. Mr. Maddison himself, as paid secretary and editor of the *Arbitrator*, is of course responsible for the publications. Mr. John Ward, also, is responsible for this particular leaflet, not only as its author, but also as a member of this Council which (as we are now told) alone does the real business of the League. It is evident, therefore, by this time, that I had committed the blunder of attempting to persuade a Vice-President (who has no real power in the League) to cancel a mis-statement disseminated by Messrs. Maddison and Ward, who have indeed the power, but who lack the will, to confess their error. I can only plead that it was an obviously honest blunder; I had not been cynical enough to imagine, until Mr. Maddison revealed it, the impotence and unreality of these sixty-three peers and members of parliament who allow their names to be used as guarantees of the League's respectability.* Moreover, this revelation exactly

* Mr. Maddison puts it even more strongly lower down, where he says of this Vice-President, "He never attempted to dismiss the whole matter, so far as he was personally concerned, by disclaiming any responsibility, *as he might well have done, and which, I feel sure, most other Vice-Presidents would have done.*" The first statement is not strictly accurate; for the gentleman in question protested to me, "It is rather hard lines that a Vice-President, who has nothing to do with the administration, should be troubled with a matter of this kind, until at any rate you have fully dealt with the officers and the Committee"—which of course I had, in the persons of Messrs. Maddison and Ward. But the significant part is that which I have italicized, in which Mr. Maddison presumes that most of the other Vice-Presidents would have troubled even less about the matter than this one did.

corroborates one of my main complaints in Chapter I of this book. The system, as described by Mr. Maddison himself, is obviously demoralizing. A certain propaganda is steadily carried on by the secretary, a professional journalist armed with the ordinary methods of professional journalism, but working under cover of a host of names respected by the public as the names of distinguished and disinterested men. It is to the warranty of these names that the League owes most of its influence. Yet, the moment the question of responsibility is raised, the public is treated as perverse for supposing that these names have ever served for any other purpose than for show! Moreover, even in the same breath with which he pleads this, the erring journalist attempts to shelter himself behind one of these show-figures, instead of dealing with the actual facts of the case. With those facts I must deal briefly now, not so much with a view to corroborating what I have said in my first chapter, as for the sake of showing how systematically the British public used to be misled on subjects of great international importance before the outbreak of this war, when there was no real excuse for ignorance.

Mr. John Ward wrote in 1910, at Mr. Maddison's request, a leaflet purporting to show that the Swiss system of Compulsory Territorialism proves a very serious hindrance to Swiss industry and commerce. The thing was not very likely in itself, since the Swiss spends less than seven months of his whole life upon his military duties, and everybody knows that drill is, in itself, an educative influence. It is rendered still more improbable by the statistical fact, noted some years ago by the British Minister at Berne, that Switzerland does more trade, per head of population, than any other European country except Holland, and that it is difficult to explain this superiority by merely natural advantages.* Moreover, Mr. Ward based his own assertions confessedly upon a *single instance*—upon the alleged experiences and reflections of a single manager at "a factory (electrical engineering) outside Zürich. It usually employed 2200 men. A Colonel of the Swiss Army was present at the interview I had with the Works Manager. 'How does this three weeks' training affect your works?' 'For all that time the factory might as well be closed,' he answered. 'Nearly half the workmen are absent on service, and this disorganises our business to such an extent that each year work which we might have goes to your country.'"

* Adams and Cunningham, *The Swiss Confederation*, Chap. xv.

Here are three statements sufficient to startle anyone who has travelled among the Swiss people and looked at all closely into their army system. The whole tone of Mr. Ward's leaflet implies that this experience of his is typical, the sort of thing you may come across any day in Switzerland. Indeed, it is *necessary for his whole argument* that this should be a typical case. In every country, and under every law, we may find an isolated hard case here and there; the only question is, whether such a case is fairly common, or whether on the other hand it is highly exceptional.

By taking a great deal of trouble, I collected the experiences of 46 Swiss employers, great and small, taken quite at random from a directory by the Lausanne printers whom I employed. Not one of these factories showed an instance of absences, during the manœuvres, amounting to even a quarter of the percentage which Mr. Ward quoted as typical. So much for the question of fact and of numbers. With regard to the matter of opinion, 45 out of my 46 informants gave a categorical *no* to my question whether the compulsory service handicapped Swiss trade and industry: many of them added a most emphatic "pas du tout," "certainement pas," or an explanation that, in their opinion, the service was a positive industrial asset. And the 46th, without giving a positive *no*, was equally unwilling to give a positive *yes*.

I pointed this out in the *Nation* for Oct. 10, 1913 (the *Daily News* and *Daily Chronicle* refused to insert a brief letter from me on the subject), and appealed to Messrs. Ward and Maddison for some evidence corroborative of the statement in their leaflet, pointing out that, even if there was not some extraordinary error of fact at the bottom of the whole affair, it certainly conveyed an impression very far from the truth. This particular experience of the manager near Zürich might just conceivably (I admitted) be true; but it was certainly far too exceptional to be quoted as a type; yet the whole leaflet's argument depended upon the implied typical nature of this case. This appeal in the *Nation* elicited no reply.

I therefore approached Mr. Ward directly, throwing no doubt upon his *bona fides*, but pointing out that, apart from the evidently exceptional nature of this experience, there might be some mistake about the experience itself; that, since Mr. Ward knows no German, the dialogue certainly took place in a language foreign to one or other of the interlocutors, and that the Colonel who stood by need not really have been listening to the talk. I urged that it could not be very difficult for Mr. Ward to give me some further clue which would enable me to

identify the Manager or the Colonel, and obtain their written evidence upon the point in dispute. Mr. Ward, in his reply, entirely ignored this request for more definite indications; and a second letter, in which I politely pointed out this omission, brought me only a curt acknowledgment of receipt upon a post-card. I then submitted the facts to Mr. Maddison, who assured me that he had no intention of withdrawing the leaflet so long as Mr. Ward should stick to his assertion. It was only then, at last, that I appealed to one of the Vice-Presidents, with no direct result. Indirectly, however, it brought a letter from Mr. Ward, not to me, but to Mr. Maddison, who published it in his *Arbitrator*, and refused my letter of protest. In this letter Mr. Ward insinuated dishonesty against me, and argued that my ignorance must be feigned, since the factory in question had been visited under the auspices of the National Service League, and an officer of the League had "heard the statements just as I heard them."

This letter, now published by Mr. Maddison in order to convince his own particular public of my bad faith, supplied just what I needed to bring him and Mr. Ward to the final test. Now at last I knew that the factory was one of those officially visited; and there were only two such factories near Zürich. Also, in addition to the Swiss Colonel of the earlier version (or perhaps, instead of the Swiss Colonel, who in this second version seemed to have been forgotten) we had now "an officer of the National Service League" who was appealed to in corroboration. The whole series of statements of fact, thus narrowed down within verifiable compass by Mr. Ward himself, now ran thus:

(1) At one of these two factories, now definitely located, the manager told Mr. Ward that he had had nearly half his 2200 men absent for the manœuvres of 1907; and that the factory might as well have been closed *pro tem*.

(2) A Swiss Colonel heard, and tacitly approved of, this statement (first version).

(3) An officer of the National Service League heard it (second version).

The last of these points was the shortest to clear up. Only one officer of the League was present at all upon this whole Swiss journey; this was Mr. G. F. Shee, the then Secretary, now Secretary to the Royal Lifeboat Institution. Not only did Mr. Shee at once repudiate this assertion of his presence at any such conversation in 1907 (which he now heard of for the first time in 1914), but his repudiation was borne out by unimpeachable facts. Mr. Shee's first work, on returning home in 1907, was to publish, in the official journal of the National Service

League, actual statistics of absences on service during these autumn manœuvres of 1907; and these statistics were absolutely incompatible with the statement which Mr. Ward, three years afterwards, published with no voucher but his own memory. The statistics thus published by Mr. Shee were printed from a copy supplied to him by the manager of the works in person, and a similar copy of these statistics was officially supplied to *each separate member of the Commission, including Mr. John Ward himself*. In 1907, therefore, Mr. John Ward possessed, in type-script, a table of statistics quite incompatible with those which, in 1910, he furnished to Mr. Maddison from memory. He made, in 1907, no attempt to impugn these statistics—which, in fact, were taken straight from the books of one of the biggest firms in Switzerland, and supplied to each member of the Commission on the spot, with the manager at hand to answer all questions. Such is the documentary evidence of the year 1907. Against this, Mr. Ward has now absolutely nothing to set but his vague memories of three years later, by which time he had forgotten the very name of the works to which he appealed, or of the Swiss Colonel whom he imagined to share his own delusions. Again, a little more than three years further on, his memory plays him still worse tricks. He now imagines that the witness present was an officer of the National Service League—an officer whose corroborative silence would have been far more valuable evidence than that of the Swiss colonel, yet of whom he had no recollection when he wrote the leaflet in 1910, and who, now, not only denies the whole story of his presence and tacit approval, but is able to disprove it by actual printed documents of the year 1907, and is able to prove that in 1907 Mr. Ward also had those documents brought to his notice. This story, then, upon which Mr. Ward partly based his insinuations of dishonesty against me, and which Mr. Maddison in his “reply” cites again as an instance of my bad faith, did in fact supply me with my first definite clues for disproving all Mr. Ward’s assertions.

(2) For the Swiss Colonel helped his case no better than the officer of the National Service League. There were apparently only four Colonels at the manœuvres. I wrote to all four, but received answers only from two, Colonels Pfyffer and Wille: the others may possibly have been dead, and in any case the two who answered me were the two who had most to do with entertaining Mr. Ward and his fellow-commissioners. Both of these gentlemen treated Mr. Ward’s assertions, which I submitted to them textually, as too inaccurate to be seriously discussed. And Colonel Wille (who is now General Commandant of the Swiss

Army) wrote, "The gentleman who publishes this story has either been egregiously hoaxed by his informant in Switzerland, or else has misunderstood him. I look upon it as out of the question that any Colonel should have stood by and tacitly approved of any such statement."

(3) But Mr. Ward's letter to Mr. Maddison enabled me, at last, to identify his factory with certainty as one of the two officially visited by the Commission near Zürich. These were (1) the great machine works of Sulzer Bros., and (2) the Oerlikon Electric Works. The managers of both of these factories, at my request, were obliging enough to look at their books for a whole series of years, including 1907. At Sulzer's I was informed that 1907 had been only a normal year, and *about five per cent.* of the workmen had been absent on manœuvres; it will be remembered that Mr. Ward, quoting from memory, asserts the proportion to have been "nearly half" of the total staff. The manager, with regard to the general effect of the military service, reported, "Our opinion is that no disadvantage arises for the firm. The universal military service has a great educational effect, which has a beneficial influence on industry also." And he sent me, in confirmation of his evidence, a type-written table of figures *similar to that which had been supplied to Mr. Ward himself, among other Commissioners, in the year 1907!* The Oerlikon manager was, if possible, still more unfavourable to Mr. Ward. He also began his answer by pointing out that 1907 was not a heavy year, and answered that, even in an exceptionally heavy year, the maximum of workmen absent at any one time was between three and four per cent.

(4) In the meantime I had consulted the official Labour Bureau at Zürich (*Arbeitersekretariat*) upon the subject. In the absence of the Director through illness, the sub-Director replied, "Such a case as you contemplate has never happened among us, *and we should never even discuss its possibility.*" (Italics his.)

Confronted with this evidence, Mr. Maddison was at last compelled to reconsider his refusal to allow me even a few lines of protest against the accusation of bad faith which he had permitted himself to print in his *Arbitrator*. But he appended to my letter the following reply from Mr. Ward, with a note to the effect that he would now print no more from me. The final act in this curious comedy, therefore, must be my exposure here of the fresh inaccuracies by which Mr. Ward, like Mr. Maddison, attempts to cloak past blunders.

He writes (*italics mine*):

“ Feb. 13, 1914.

“ SIR,—I have nothing to add to *my previous letter*.

“ I have stated the facts that came under my observation during the tour which was conducted under the auspices of the National Service League six years ago. *I gave them publicity at the time*, after discussion with my friends who were part of the deputation. *They are the agreed statements, not merely of myself, but of those who were associated with me*, and I vouch personally for the accuracy of the same.

“ Yours sincerely,

“ JOHN WARD.”

To this it must be noted:

(1) Mr. Ward's “previous letter,” like all his other communications, offered no vouchers whatever for his extraordinary assertion. Therefore, “I have nothing to add to my previous letter” means, in plain English, “I have not, even now, any real evidence to produce.”

(2) Mr. Ward did *not* publish his “facts” at the time, but only three years after the visit: whereas Mr. Shee had published, within a few months of the visit, the contradictory facts *given in writing to each member of the Deputation separately*, by Messrs. Sulzer.

(3) Mr. Ward now, for the first time, appeals to “those who were associated with him,” but, as usual, without producing a shred of proof. This appeal is demonstrably false with regard to some at least of the working-man representatives, and is probably not true with regard to any one of them.

(a) Mr. J. T. Macpherson, himself a Labour M.P. at that time, and a colleague of Mr. Ward's on this Commission of 1907, definitely dissociates himself from Mr. Ward's statement, writing to me (January 24, 1914): “I have no knowledge of the statement made by Mr. Ward, M.P. I did not hear any employer, to be perfectly honest, depreciate the Military System.”

(b) At least three other working-man representatives on the Commission gave, from the very first, evidence which contradicts Mr. Ward's, viz., Messrs. Stubbs, Morgan, and Suthers.

(c) Though I have sent letters of enquiry to the other Labour M.P.'s who were on the Deputation, pointing out

the overwhelming evidence against Mr. Ward's assertion, and asking whether they could help him out with any corroboration, not one of them has offered to support him. It would, indeed, need considerable courage to step now into the breach and support an assertion, which even the Swiss Labour Bureau treats as too foolish for serious discussion.

We are therefore thrown back, as before, upon Mr. Ward's unsupported word. By this time every unprejudiced reader will have formed his own conclusions as to the value of this evidence, and will ask himself how able business-men can expect to bring about world-peace by scattering leaflets containing statements so absurdly at variance with easily-ascertainable facts, and confessedly based upon the distant recollection of a conversation between Mr. Ward, who knows no German, and a German-Swiss, who perhaps did not know very much English. Whatever corroborative evidence Mr. Ward has since attempted to produce, has only made his case more hopeless than before.

APPENDIX III

MR. ANGELL'S LOGIC

(Italics mine throughout, unless otherwise stated.)

(A) Further details illustrative of his confusions in the Second Key-Chapter, and its continuation (Chap. V.)

At the beginning of the argument (p. 187) the word is *struggle*, four times repeated; then by way of variation, *rivalry* twice; then *struggle* again (188); then *conflict*; then *the use of physical force*; then *struggle for extermination between rivals*, which of course imports fresh considerations vitally affecting the argument, though Mr. Angell betrays no consciousness of change. On the next page (189) he begins to realize that his reasoning needs serious modification, and adds a modifying footnote which (as we have seen) does not help his argument, unless we take it in a sense in which it is demonstrably false. As the argument proceeds, it becomes plain that he is altogether neglecting the important factor of latent force, and thinking only of force actually applied; nor is he consistent even here, for on p. 190 he finds it convenient to slide into a

new word—*pugnacity*—which he uses as practically synonymous with these others.*

When, again, the argument is continued in Chapter V, the confusion becomes still greater. The proposition which started as "the real law of man's struggle [is] struggle with nature, not with other men," is now modified to "the employment of physical force in the affairs of the world has been a constantly diminishing factor." And then follows an admission which takes us still farther from our starting-point. "Yet throughout the whole process the employment of force has been an integral part of progress, until even to-day in the most advanced nations force—the police-force—is an integral part of their civilization." Force, we are thus told, is often advantageously employed, and we have only to find "the principle determining the advantageous and the disadvantageous employment of force." This principle is that "force employed to secure completer co-operation" is good, "force which runs counter to such co-operation" is bad. He illustrates this by the case of the bandit: but why not take the case of the Chinaman? China has vast military resources which, for want of co-operation, are almost undeveloped. If, therefore, Germany compels China to grant her enormous mining concessions, we have here a force that makes for co-operation; within a generation or two a few thousands of individualist peasants will be replaced by ten times as many operatives, bound together by complex bonds of financial and industrial organization. Therefore the Chinaman, fighting against such an intrusion, stands in the same category in which Mr. Angell puts the bandit: he "refuses to co-operate," and must therefore be coerced (p. 259). Here again, the author himself makes room for a coach-and-four to run through his own proposition.

It is tedious thus to pursue a slipshod writer through verbal minutiae; but it is a necessary part of any full exposure. It is impossible, without a good deal of detail, to show that such false logic is not exceptional with Mr. Angell, but characteristic; it would probably be impossible to find any five-and-twenty consecutive pages in which no serious fallacy can be pointed out.

* Developing a similar argument in the preface to his *Prussianism*, &c., he introduces an even greater confusion between similar, yet far from identical, terms:—*war, political and military power, military power, power over others, force, force in the shape of the army, physical force* (pp. xii—xv). On pp. 20—24 of the same book, much the same unconscious jugglery goes on with *military and political power* or *domination*. It is only through such looseness of terminology that he conceals from himself and from his readers the frequent confusion of his arguments.

(B) One of his favourite fallacies is the characteristically journalistic trick of setting up a dummy to tilt at, or (in a modified form) of misrepresenting the opponent's point of view in order to score an easy point. I have already pointed out (p. 9) how he attacks Renan by the simple process of changing that author's "one of the conditions" into "the condition," and how all his strictures upon Mr. Low depend upon ignoring that gentleman's actual words, which it is charitable to suppose that Mr. Angell had only taken, as in other cases, at second-hand. The Renan case has led to a characteristic incident, to which I refer on p. 16 of my text. A few months after I had pointed out a few of Mr. Angell's erroneous references before the Cambridge University War and Peace Society, one of his collaborators wrote to say that, as a new edition was being prepared, Mr. Angell would be grateful for a note of the incriminated passages. I therefore supplied a brief note referring to the Pearson, Seeck, Low and Renan cases. The first two, (as we have seen) were in part corrected, but silently; the Low mis-statements (as I show later on in my text) were not so much corrected as disguised. Mr. Angell's assistant, meanwhile, had jotted my name on the margin beside Renan's, as a reminder that I had criticized Mr. Angell's misquotation of Renan. My name was left by an oversight on this margin; the Renan mis-statement was left uncorrected; and the result was that the printer naturally inserted my name in the text. Therefore, on p. 223 of the 1914 edition, I find myself pilloried among the "militarists," between Moltke and Renan; and the reader is left to understand that my perverse doctrines have been quoted and refuted, together with theirs, on some previous page. The fact is, of course, that I have never written anything like what is there imputed to me—that in fact I have written words plainly irreconcilable with these doctrines—and I am only imperfectly consoled by the distinction of the company into which I am thus thrust, and by the fact that Renan, at least, never wrote such nonsense as Mr. Angell here attributes to him. The whole incident is, of course, a piece of pure carelessness, but a piece of significant carelessness, for it shows how little Mr. Angell is concerned to correct even an obvious misquotation pointed out in deference to his own request.*

In fact this distortion of his adversaries' views is systematic with Mr. Angell; and, as he could not really have corrected his unfair references to Mr. Low's article without re-writing a good

* It is significant also that a Latin blunder in a footnote on the same page has been allowed to stand through several editions, and is still there.

deal of his book, so he probably felt also that the correction of the reference to Renan would set a bad precedent, and would involve a process of tinkering which might never end. I point out a similar instance of garbling words in Appendix IX. If this criticism seems too strong, let me justify it by a reference to the last 48 pages of *The Great Illusion*, which I have recently looked through for another purpose, and in which, while I was about it, I also noted the author's distortions, one by one.

p. 317. Mr. Angell thus re-states the thesis of his whole book: "that the world has passed out of that stage of development in which it is *possible* for one civilized group to advance its *well-being* by the military domination of another," and claims that most critics have allowed this "central proposition" to be "in essence sound." This is certainly not true. A good many critics, like myself, have gladly admitted that Mr. Angell makes an extremely good case for the *commercial* side of his proposition; that it is improbable (though not *impossible*) for military domination to "pay" in terms of money. From this, however, he here proceeds inaccurately to assume that other kinds of "well-being" are equally irrelevant to military domination—an entirely unauthorized jump.

pp. 318—9. He quotes a single sentence from the *Times*, "No doubt the victor suffers [in war]; but who suffers most, he or the vanquished?" He proceeds to argue that this sentence "would imply that the motive behind such prospective aggression is not a desire for political advantage *or gain of any sort*. Germany apparently recognizes aggression to be, not merely barren of any useful result whatsoever, but burdensome and costly into the bargain; she is, nevertheless, determined to enter upon it in order that, though she suffer, someone else will suffer more!" It ought not to be necessary to point out that the *Times* sentence implies no such thing. The victor will suffer, but there is no hint in the *Times* that his suffering will be utterly barren of counterbalancing gain. That consideration lies outside the *Times* writer's argument; and therefore, assuming common-sense on the part of his readers, he does not turn aside to labour so obvious a point. Many persons, even outside Germany, believe that her costly victories of 1870 brought her enormous advantages in the next forty years, and would have carried her farther still if only she had had a little more moderation. Her sufferings were only second to those of France; yet she believes that those sufferings brought her far more compensating advantages, and that her modern greatness has been built upon them.

pp. 327—8. "Change of thought will not come about so long as the energies of men in this matter [*i.e.* 'the political conduct of Europe'] are centred *only* upon perfecting instruments of warfare"; and again, "and this is precisely, my critics urge, why we need do *nothing* but concentrate on the instruments of force." The words which I have underlined contain, of course, a gross misrepresentation of his opponents. Even extreme militarists—even men like Bernhardi—do not rely upon force *alone*; and Mr. Angell here silently shirks the mass of criticism which admits that reason is far more than force, and peace in nearly all cases better than war, yet which looks in vain, throughout his books, for any real proof of the extreme proposition that military domination can *never* advance the well-being of civilized groups.

p. 330. "What must inevitably happen if the nations take the line of the 'practical man,' and limit their energies *simply-and-purely*" to piling up armaments?" Here, again, the words I have italicized imply the same falsehood. The practical man does not dream of limiting national energies "simply and purely" to armaments; he only gives a great deal more weight to armaments than Mr. Angell does; and, if he chose to imitate Mr. Angell's unfair methods, he would jump to the conclusion that the *Great Illusion* advocated the "simple and pure" abolition of armaments.

p. 337. He supposes the adversary to say that, since men are little disposed to listen to reason, "therefore we should not talk reason." What people say, of course, is not that we should not talk reason, but that we must take care to secure our position by other means also, and not to rely upon reason alone. The same exaggeration has already occurred on p. 317.

p. 337. "*The* determining factor" is force. Only a very few extremists ever say this: the people whom Mr. Angell ought to deal with are the large majority, who would say "*a* determining factor." Here, as usual, he ignores the real crux under cover of a distortion of his adversaries' ideas.

p. 339. "Will you leave *everything* severely alone, and leave wrong and dangerous ideas *in undisturbed possession* of the political field?" Here, again, no reasonable person holds these views; we only hold that wrong ideas must sometimes be met by force, and not by ideas alone; that, for instance, this war may possibly kill Pan-Germanism more thoroughly than any argument unsupported by force could have killed it.

p. 340. "By reason, *rather than* by physical force." Here he ignores, as usual, that most men do not advocate physical force as a *substitute*, but as an *ally* for reason; that most men would say "by reason *and* by physical force." Mr. Angell goes still further on p. 40 of his *Prussianism, &c.*: "Such, then, is for the moment the *all but universal* view: the military defeat of Germany will *of itself* destroy the old fallacies and sophisms, &c." The vast majority, of course, held no such view even at the beginning of this war; they only held that the military defeat of Germany was *one* factor, even if a necessary factor, in the destruction of false ideas. Yet he repeats the same mis-statement, perhaps even more crudely, at the end of the same paragraph.

p. 340. It is not true that "*most* people deny" the reasonable proposition which he has enunciated; we can only say with truth that *a certain proportion* of people deny it; moreover, the quotation which he proceeds to give from the *Spectator* cannot in any sense be called a denial of that proposition.

pp. 342—3. The whole of this victorious demonstration, in seven contrasted propositions, depends upon a similar distortion of his imaginary adversary's views.

It may, I think, be safely affirmed that a careful analysis of any 50 pages in Mr. Angell's writings, taken at random, would yield similar results to this. His whole process of argument depends upon a distortion of his adversaries' views. He writes habitually, and evidently thinks habitually, in terms of what Schopenhauer used contemptuously to call "the Woman's Fallacy"—the argument of the wife who, when her husband complains that the soup is cold, retorts victoriously, "Oh! you want it to come up boiling, I suppose!"

APPENDIX IV

MR. ANGELL UNDER THE TEST OF ACTUAL FACTS

(*Italics, unless otherwise stated, are mine.*)

(A) GREAT ILLUSION. Ed. 1911.

p. 32. "The three per cents of powerless *Belgium* are quoted at 96, and the three per cents of powerful Germany at 82; the three and a half per cents of the Russian Empire, with its hundred and twenty million souls, and its four million army,

are quoted at 81, while the three and a half per cents of Norway, which has not an army at all (or any that need be considered in the discussion), are quoted at 102. *All of which carries with it the paradox that the more a nation's wealth is protected the less secure does it become.*"

[In the 1914 edition, Holland is substituted for Belgium, but only, I am assured, because the corrector wished to bring the quotations up to date, and happened not to have the Belgian prices available at the moment. The alteration, however, is only superficial; for the summaries are unaltered, still leaving *Belgium* instead of *Holland* (pp. xiv., 25); and on p. 34 Mr. Angell, forgetting that he has altered *Belgium* into *Holland* on p. 32, still boasts that Belgian securities stand 16 points higher than German, and leaves the argument unaltered.]

p. 42. "The citizens of countries like Holland, *Belgium*, Denmark, Sweden, Norway are, *by every possible test*, just as well off as the citizens of countries like Germany, Austria, or Russia."

I have noted, on p. 10 of my text, how Mr. Angell applies Bernard Shaw's contemptuous and unjust words to the French soldier. In Mr. Angell's latest edition, a few lines are added *which expressly clinch* this application *to the French soldier*; let me therefore quote here in full the words thus applied by Mr. Angell to the Frenchmen who have gone out from their homes to bear the burden of war side by side with our own soldiers in the trenches (ed. 1911, p. 206; ed. 1914, p. 247.)—

"For permanent work the soldier is worse than useless; his whole training tends to make him a weakling. He has the easiest of lives; he has no freedom and no responsibility. He is, politically and socially, a child, with rations instead of rights—treated like a child, punished like a child, dressed prettily and washed and combed like a child, excused for outbreaks of naughtiness like a child, forbidden to marry like a child, and called 'Tommy' like a child. He has no real work to keep him from going mad except housemaid's work."

Ibid. 263. "Mr. Blatchford commenced that series of articles which has done so much to accentuate ill-feeling with this phrase: 'Germany is deliberately preparing to destroy the British Empire'; and later in the articles he added: 'Britain is dis-united; Germany is homogeneous. We are quarrelling about the Lords' Veto, Home Rule, and a dozen other questions of domestic politics. We have a Little Navy Party, an anti-

Militarist Party; Germany is unanimous upon the question of naval expansion.

It would be difficult to pack a more dangerous untruth into so few lines. What are the facts? If 'Germany' means the bulk of the German people, Mr. Blatchford is perfectly aware that he is not telling the truth. It is not true to say of the bulk of the German people that they are deliberately preparing to destroy the British Empire. The bulk of the German people, if they are represented by any one party at all, are represented by the Social Democrats, who have stood from the first resolutely against any such intention. Now the facts have to be mis-stated in this way in order to produce that temper which makes for war. If the facts are correctly stated, no such temper arises.

What has a *particularly competent German* to say to Mr. Blatchford's generalization? Mr. Fried, the editor of 'Die Friedenswarte,' writes:

"There is no one German people, no single Germany. . . . There are more abrupt contrasts between Germans and Germans than between Germans and Indians. Nay, the contradistinctions within Germany are greater than those between Germans and the units of any other foreign nation whatever. It might be possible to make efforts to promote good understanding between Germans and Englishmen, between Germans and Frenchmen, to organize visits between nation and nation; but it will be forever impossible to set on foot any such efforts at an understanding between German Social Democrats and Prussian Junkers, between German anti-Semites and German Jews."

Ibid. 324, note. "In a recent address, reported in the *Times* of June 1, 1910, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald said: 'Wherever he had met German working-men, he had received this message, 'Tell the men of England that we stand for peace, tell the people of England that there are elements in Germany that stand for war, but that we are fighting those elements, and we want their support in fighting the same elements in England.' The message of peace was given to him about ten days ago by the most representative working-men's committee in Germany, and also by the very men who built the German Dreadnoughts in Kiel."

Ibid. p. 298. "Modern wealth and trade [are] intangible in the sense that they cannot be seized or interfered with to the advantage of a military aggressor."

Ibid. p. 300. "Germany could do us relatively little harm, since the harm which she inflicted on us would immediately react on German prosperity."

Ed. 1914, p. 183 (this, and the two following, do not seem to occur in the earlier editions.) "The pundits declare that the German battleships have been especially built with a view to work in the North Sea."

Ed. 1914, p. 328. "Here, for instance, is General von Bernhardi, who has just published his book in favour of war as the regenerator of nations, urging that Germany should attack certain of her enemies before they are ready to attack her. Suppose we reply by increasing our military force? It suits Bernhardi entirely. For what is the effect of this British increase on the minds of Germans possibly disposed to disagree with Bernhardi? It is to silence them and to strengthen Bernhardi's hands."

Ed. 1914, p. 359. "The younger mind . . . really sees the quite plain fact that the citizen of a small state is just as well off as the citizen of a great. From that fact, which is not complex or difficult in the least, will emerge the truth that modern government is a matter of administration, and that it can no more profit a community to annex other communities, than it could profit London to annex Manchester."

(B) FOUNDATIONS, &c., p. 78. "There could be no such event as anti-Socialist Germany fighting a Socialist Britain."

Ibid. p. 115. "The condition is, indeed, well described by our own Consul-General in Germany, Sir Francis Oppenheimer, who points out in his last report that the close alliance between the banks and the industries in Germany creates a situation which—I use his very words—'must in times of international crisis result in general collapse.'"

Ibid. p. 117. "Bismarck was nearer to being able to apply the methods of Attila, some 1500 years removed from him, than we are to being able to apply the methods of Bismarck, from whom only forty years separate us."

Ibid. p. 117. "I beg you to remember that there have been two Morocco incidents in the last ten years, and on the first occasion the British Navy did *not* stand in any special sense behind France."

Ibid. p. 119. "There is not a Government in Europe that has not radically changed its views on policy in ten years."

Ibid. p. 159. "Recent events seem to indicate surely that no European Government is bent upon aggression." These

words were spoken at the United Service Institution on October 8, 1913. It is now public property that in August, 1913, Austria had been sounding Italy as to an immediate attack upon Serbia; and that, more than a year earlier, Germany was arousing the just suspicions of our Government by attempting to bind us down to complete neutrality in case of a war like the present one. Mr. Asquith and Lord Haldane have emphasized the obviously aggressive character of this proposal; and Sir Edward Grey has officially published the actual texts, with an equally plain exposure of their significance. (Daily Papers, Sept. 1, 1915.)

Ibid. p. 181 (*à propos* of the British and German Navy Leagues). "Do you suppose that, if for every year during the seventeen years that they have existed, these two bodies had met thus to discuss policy, to discuss the why and wherefore of the armaments at all, we should now be faced by the present condition of this problem?"

Ibid. p. 205. "If, for instance, 'The Prussian Ideal' is to be imposed on Europe, the greatest problem of its advocates is to overcome its enemies in Germany, and not abroad."

WAR AND THE WORKERS (no date, but apparently published in 1912 or 1913). National Labour Press. 3*d.*

p. 12. "Do you know that every time a big ship has gun practice it costs a good deal over £10,000 in gun-powder, projectiles, and so on. That £10,000 came from your pockets, and it has now gone up in smoke or lies at the bottom of the North Sea. Well, you say, most of it has gone in wages. It hasn't, as a matter of fact, but for the sake of argument I'll assume it has. Would it not equally have gone in wages if you—the thousand or the hundred of you that subscribed it—had spent it on a thousand boiled chickens, bundles of asparagus, pianos, suits of clothes, summer holidays, a home of your own in the suburbs—all things which you could have had, but haven't got, because you prefer fireworks in the North Sea?"

Ibid. p. 21. "But all these other problems, poverty, ignorance, uncleanness, slums, degeneration, sex-difficulties, the misery of preventable death from loathsome disease, have to wait for any real and effective solution, and the oppressions, meannesses, the hates of misunderstanding, the wearisome and silly lying about one another's 'intentions' have to go on because the political wisacres with their astrology have laid down the 'axiom' that man must necessarily fight, that the

war-passion was waiting to overwhelm him at the first suitable opportunity, and that especially would all human wisdom fail *when war broke out in the Balkans. And now the simple demonstration of events shows the whole thing to have been a monstrous misjudgment.*"

DAILY MAIL, Sept. 15, 1911. Mr. Angell wrote, in a long article: "It is true, of course, that we seem to be approaching a condition of things foreseen by De Bloch nearly twenty years ago, in which two great nations having declared war will find themselves *reduced to a condition of practical paralysis by the sheer stoppage of the complex industrial and social machine*—a condition of which the railway strike in England recently gave a faint reflection. As a Socialist orator remarked the other day at the Jena Congress: '*We shall not need to declare the general strike. The Minister of War, by mobilization, will do it for us.*' If on top of financial stringency comes the closing down of factories and mines, because the men would be called to the front, the failure to supply the markets, the practical stoppages of those elaborate services, without which, as we saw in the railway strike, civilization becomes every day more helpless, the problem of ending the chaos at home will become a more pressing one than that of annihilating the enemy abroad, especially as the enemy will be in a like condition of helplessness."

And again: "If Germany had France by the throat tomorrow, the last thing she could afford to do would be to precipitate a financial crisis there; and, again, she could only avoid that by allowing France to go about her own business in her own way."

To this article "A member of the Stock Exchange" replied on Sept. 20, pointing out that "the financial advisers of the German Government and the financial experts of the General Staff of the Army know a good deal more about Bourse panics than Mr. Norman Angell seems to do. They have studied them to better purpose, and would take the risk of them any day. The first of Prince Bismarck's two great wars, that of 1866, was started in the very throes of the worst financial panic Europe had ever seen up to that time. Another thing the German financial experts know about panics, which Mr. Angell apparently does not, is the rapidity with which they generally right themselves. . . . This worst conceivable effect of a great European war can be averted, or at least to a large extent counteracted, by appropriate measures within the power of every civilized state. A three months' or a six months' *moratorium*

would give any country breathing time to adapt itself to war conditions. It has been frequently resorted to with good effect in Argentina and other Spanish American states. That the Germans have it in mind as a military contingency is proved by a curious passage in the latest report of Sir Francis Oppenheimer, our Consul-General at Frankfort (see the *Daily Mail* of Sept. 16). The German Government, it says, is understood to have ready a scheme by which all withdrawals of bank deposits would be legally stopped at the outbreak of hostilities, the Government holding itself responsible for a year's interest. This would be, in fact, a *moratorium*, and in able hands it might prove an effective antidote to a war scare. There could not be much of a panic if the country was reduced to a state of barter, and there was nothing to panic with. When the time comes for 'conversations' between Berlin and London about Egypt or India, Mr. Norman Angell's 'financial interdependence of the economic centres of the modern world' will not, I fear, prove much of a bogey to Pan-Germanic fire-eaters. International finance, instead of being a safeguard against war, is just as likely to furnish it with new and more destructive weapons than have ever been used before."

It is not only important to note how exactly this man of business gauged the situation which Mr. Angell so dogmatically misjudged, but it is useful also to compare this difference of opinion with Mr. Angell's boast, that "though this proposition [of mine] concerning the intangibility of trade and wealth in the modern world, so far as military power is concerned, was at first treated with superior contempt as a foolish piece of paradoxical political theorising, it is to-day never seriously challenged by educated people." (*War and the Workers*, p. 20; cf. *Prussianism*, p. xii.) Mr. Angell, as I have pointed out elsewhere, is here misled by his own wishes and by the voice of his flatterers. Even among those who admit the value of his argument in the earlier part—the financial part—of his *Great Illusion*, large numbers hold that it is crude and exaggerated, that it lends itself too dangerously to certain easy-going fallacies, and that it would need a good deal of thinking out by clearer heads than Mr. Angell's before we could act upon it with absolute security.

To the foregoing may be added a few quotations from speakers at the Angellite Conference just before the outbreak of war. In each case Mr. Angell was in the chair, correcting where he thought necessary; so that the following quotations from the

"Summer School Report," though not all in his own words, have the stamp of his tacit approval:

pp. 44—5. Mr. Norman Angell: "There are 6,000,000 men in Russia able to go to war without *the industrial disorganization you have in the case of Germany*. It is a real danger you have to face . . . As the tendency to reconciliation with Germany grows, the movement of Western Europe, checking the more barbarian power [of Russia], is going to be the great division of the Powers."

p. 66. Herr von Lübtow, of Christ's College, Cambridge: "Mr. Angell visited seven universities in Germany, and has spoken to very large crowds, and with the exception of two places he had a hearty reception, and in many cases a majority voted in favour of his theory."

p. 127. Dr. Mez, of Munich University: "Would the population of Germany support the Government [in an aggressive war]? We have a majority against an aggressive policy."

p. 157. Mr. John Hilton: "There is no occasion for me to go into the influence of credit on international relations, nor to trace the probable effects upon world finance and world-industry of a great war. That is done once and for all by Mr. Norman Angell in his already classic address to the Institute of Bankers. I will merely remind you, and you will probably understand the reason why more readily from the simple story I have been telling, that an attack upon any country with a highly-developed credit system would shatter at the first onslaught that confidence in which credit has its being. People would refuse to accept paper; people who held paper would present it and demand gold. There would be a run upon the banks." The result would be (continued the speaker) to "jam the break on the world's industrial mechanism"—"a wave of petrification would spread outward from the banks"—the farmer of Argentina and the tea-grower in China would find "paralysis creeping over their industry." The reader should try to get at this volume and read pp. 157—9; the picture may almost vie with that celebrated scene of the Last Judgment as seen under the red and raging eye of Robert Montgomery's imagination. Herr von Lübtow was much impressed: "It has been a very great pleasure to me to listen to this clear and simple explanation of the credit system." Then Dr. Nasmyth, of Boston, U.S.A., proceeded to explain how "Mr. Angell's case, that these [small] countries are really more secure, can be shown to be true, because the Government securities of Holland, Belgium, Norway, etc., are higher than the others." Then rose Mr. Mawson, Hon. Sec. of the Liverpool Norman Angell Society, asking ingenuously,

"I saw in the paper the other day that the German Government were making an arrangement with some leading banks for an increased gold reserve. Can you explain this action?" *Mr. Hilton*: "I cannot, except that whenever there are international complications, or when a nation desires to extend its currency, the banks find themselves obliged to increase their holding of gold." This was on July 22nd 1914; before a week had passed, even *Mr. Hilton* and *Mr. Angell* must have begun to understand why Germany was increasing her gold reserve. It is only fair, however, to point out that *Mr. Angell* carefully sat on the fence while his pupil, *Mr. Hilton*, described this petrification of banks, this jamming of brakes, and this paralysis of industry. He held that such a catastrophe "would not necessarily follow. I do not know what would happen. I am not a prophet at all. It is at least arguable that [in case of war between England and Germany] . . . pressure will be brought upon the respective governments [by their own capitalists and merchants], that raw material should be passed and exports go on, and the whole war might conceivably fizzle into a mere duel between the navies and nothing else."

p. 183. We find *Mr. Graham*, of the Oxford Norman Angell Society, saying: "It is precisely the same as our misunderstanding of Germany's navy. It is there because they are afraid that we will attack their commerce; but of course the people in England say it is to attack us."

APPENDIX V

PERSECUTION

In the present age we run a far greater risk of minimizing than of exaggerating the success of persecution in a large number of cases—its success, that is, for whole generations, and often even for centuries. Variations of thought are doubtless more intangible than animal variations, but they are not wholly intangible. To take an extreme case: it is obvious that, if *A* has conceived an epoch-making idea, and *B* kills him before he can communicate it, *B* has, perhaps for centuries, killed that idea. If, again, the idea be still confined to a small group of men, we may conceive a larger group treating these men with such ruthless severity that they would never dare to communicate it; it is almost by an accident that *Roger Bacon* was able to communicate his thoughts to posterity. Here, as in most cases

it is a question of the balance of forces. The vitality of an idea depends mainly on its essential truth. No idea is absolutely true, and therefore none is absolute in its vitality; so that, in cases where it has not contained a much larger proportion of truth than the old ideas, the adherents of the old have been able, by ruthless force, to suppress the new, if only by compelling the persecuted minority to look more closely into their own creed, and to ask themselves whether its peculiarities were really worth dying for. Subject a "crank" to mere mild persecution, and you will leave him more cranky than ever; moreover, hundreds of potential cranks will join him, partly from generous motives, and partly for the sake of the small importance which such mild persecution brings them. But, in the days when persecution was persecution in earnest, even the crank himself was likely to change his mind, and his very children were glad to sever their connexion with him. Some tenets, on the other hand, have had enough vitality to withstand even the cruellest persecution, and to convert even the persecutors. Here, as in other places, Mr. Angell's paste-and-scissors erudition tempts him to state a clear and apparently convincing proposition, by the simple process of ignoring essential facts. He has not even read Lecky with any care, though it is upon Lecky's historical data that he professes to base his theory. While Mr. Angell asserts "the futility of the employment of physical force in a matter of religious belief," Lecky points out that "in the great conflicts between argument and persecution, the latter has been continually triumphant—there is scarcely a country in which the prevailing faith is not in some degree due to bygone legislation"—that is, as the context shows, to *coercive* legislation.* The clearness of Mr. Angell's style is in a great measure due to his self-satisfied ignorance; complicated problems appear transparently simple to him, because he has never gone far enough to suspect the existence of the complicating factors. It is a melancholy but undeniable fact that physical force has had too much influence, even in matters of opinion, to enable us to rule it out so easily from our future calculations. No doubt it would not be easy for the German Emperor, master of a British colony, to Germanize it; but Mr. Angell's history and his psychology would seem equally elementary when he speaks of this as a thing inconceivable, and assumes

* *The Great Illusion*, p. 352; see also index under the name 'Lecky', and compare Lecky's own words in the first ten pages of his Chap. IV. Part 2. The sentences here quoted are from ed. 1900, Vol. II., pp. 4, 10: and few historians would venture to dispute their truth, though in other sentences Lecky may perhaps exaggerate.

that no nation could possibly succeed, even for a generation or two, by resorting to more brutal methods than Britain has ever used.* Moreover, we must remember that Mr. Angell has here to convert not us alone, but the Germans also, before any fundamental change in international relations can come. As he urges, "not the facts, but men's opinions about facts, is what matters" (*Illusion*, 327); and, so long as Germany believes that Germanism can successfully be imposed by force, so long must we arm ourselves defensively against an aggressive Germanism. It is possible, however—and here is a real ray of hope—that the present war (*i.e.* the lesson of physical force) may teach Germany what no argument seemed likely to teach her without this bitter practical experience. The military deadlock of these months, and the predominantly defensive preparations which, if the French working-classes have their way, will be made after the war in all European countries, may well succeed in supplying a practical demonstration analogous to that which killed religious warfare. When hard facts, quite apart from arguments, make it extremely doubtful whether even the most deliberate and ruthless aggression can pay, then the Age of Reason in War and Peace will begin to dawn. And, if this be so, Mr. Angell's readers will begin to ask with great curiosity why he has never mentioned the projects of the great pacifist, Jean Jaurès, even where his own argument cries most loudly for some such mention.

APPENDIX VI

PRINCIPAL DAVID STARR JORDAN

An American biologist, author of "The Human Harvest" (2nd ed. 1907). This book, which undertakes to prove the dysgenic effect of war, relies to a great extent on professedly historical data. Whatever may be Principal Jordan's distinction in his own proper sphere—the biology of fishes—he lacks, not only the rudimentary knowledge of Roman history, but even the prudence which might have withheld him from devoting the greater part of his space to a subject so far from his own sphere

* "No other nation could gain any advantage by the conquest of the British colonies, and Great Britain could not suffer material damage by their loss." "Were a Power like Germany to use force to conquer colonies, she would find out that they were not amenable to force." "Could Germany 'own' Canada, she would have to 'own' it in the same way that we do." (*Illusion*, pp. 29, 98, 100; *Foundations*, p. 151)

of competence. He makes much of the idea (evidently borrowed) that the *vir* of early Roman history became the *homo* of the later Roman ages. He is ignorant even of the plural of *vir*; p. 21 has a paragraph headed "The story of the Vires"; and on p. 22 we find "men who are vires." His history is on a par with his grammar. He asserts that, under Marcus Aurelius, "the business of the state was mainly war" (p. 13). If we are to attach any sense whatever to his words on pp. 23—24, he imagines that the expansion of the Roman state began (or possibly culminated) at the battle of Philippi, and that the earlier generations of Rome were peace-loving and peace-keeping compared with those who lived under the empire. It is evident also that he imagines Napoleon to have invented conscription in France. His whole notions of history are not only extraordinarily superficial, but extraordinarily inaccurate, yet his book mainly relies upon supposed historical examples.

When I wrote the first chapter of this volume, I imagined Principal Jordan to have borrowed his Seeck and Seeley quotations from Mr. Angell; but further study and investigation shows that this does Principal Jordan injustice, and that the latter is, directly or indirectly, the "conveyer." A passage from Seeck, "only cowards remained, and from their broods came the new generations," is correctly quoted by Principal Jordan as referring to the Roman civil wars; Mr. Angell copies the quotation, but, misunderstanding Professor Jordan's context, applies it to the Peloponnesian wars, and attributes it to the pen of "one historian of Greece,"—a blunder which survives even in the latest edition, from which he has attempted silently to remove all reference to Seeck! Other indications tend to show that Mr. Angell copied from Professor Jordan; it is still a mystery from whom Professor Jordan copied; one thing alone is pretty evident, that he has not really read Seeck carefully for himself. If this kind of thing had been done on the militarist side, the plunderers and blunderers would long ago have been exposed to the just ridicule of the reading public. Let us hope that one good effect of this war will be to render even pacifists less tolerant of the pious falsehoods which have too long been current in their camp.

Since writing the above words, I have read Principal Jordan's new volume, "War and the Breed." It is little more than an amplification of his "Human Harvest"; some of the most glaring inaccuracies have been corrected; but others, again, have been freshly imported. Something like a quarter of the book consists of verbal quotations from books or from newspapers; yet Principal Jordan is even more reluctant than Mr.

Angell to furnish adequate chapter-and-verse references. For instance, twenty-one authors are quoted in the first fifty pages; in thirteen cases Dr. Jordan has not indicated even the titles of the books from which he has taken these extracts; in only three cases does he give any page-reference, even of the loosest kind. In the last instance, where we are referred vaguely to fifty pages of a closely-printed octavo book, I have taken the trouble to verify the reference and find that it is far from bearing out Dr. Jordan's claim. His professed translations from the German are extremely inaccurate. I have never had the misfortune to come across any book, written by a professed scientist, which treats its alleged authorities with such a hopeless neglect of all scientific method.

Nor is Dr. Jordan more scientific in his own original contributions to this subject. Two examples may suffice. (1) While carefully marking, in theory, the necessary distinction between the Standing Army System and the Conscript Army System, he frequently confuses the two in argument; e.g. he implies (like Mr. Angell) that the conscript is forbidden to marry so long as he remains in the army—a defect which is inherent only in the Standing Army System. (2) Again, he commits himself to the most reckless and absurd assertions of fact; as when he claims that “the Massachusetts farmer, whose fathers came from Devon or Somerset, has as much of the blood of the Plantagenets, of William and Alfred, as flows in any royal veins in Europe.” It is scarcely credible that such nonsense should be written by a biologist professing to deal scientifically with a problem of heredity, which demands, above all things, the strictest accuracy of observation and of statement. Such books as this bring science into contempt, without even helping the cause of real peace.

APPENDIX VII

THE LOW AND ROBERTSON FALLACY

In the *Nineteenth Century* for October 1898 Mr. Sidney Low exposed the practical futility, for immediate purposes at least, of the Hague Peace Conference. It should be noted that his criticism of this and similar efforts was scarcely more severe than what Mr. Angell himself has since indulged in (e.g. *Illusion*, 350—51). Mr. Low, like many other sensible men, went on to urge certain considerations which are generally too much neglected by anti-militarist writers. He pointed out first, that great armaments do not necessarily spell war; secondly, that a

state of perpetual "freedom from external shocks and alarms," is in itself somewhat enervating; and thirdly, that these preparations for war are not pure and unredeemed loss, since they do in fact contribute much to stimulate the arts of peace, and militarized Germany is also commercialized Germany. On all these points Mr. Low argued with general moderation and balance, though Liberals might reasonably complain of one sneering word: "The Cobdenite ideal of a state in which every citizen is ceaselessly engaged in the ennobling process of buying cheap and selling dear leaves something to be desired. The accumulation of riches and the steady pursuit of material comfort do not tend to the development of the highest type of character." Not that the stoutest Radical might not agree with the staunchest Tory in admitting the general truth of these sentences; but he might well object that the admittedly imperfect ideal here described is not truly "Cobdenite," either in the sense that Cobden himself defended it half a century ago, or that the majority of his disciples defend it now. In other words, though we all agree in deprecating such excessive commercialism as Mr. Low describes, yet there is room for serious difference of opinion as to Cobden's responsibility for it. The necessity of such discrimination between one unfair word and the main unexceptionable assertion is obvious, yet Mr. Angell takes the cheaper course of misrepresenting the argument altogether. In spite of Mr. Low's careful and repeated qualifications in other parts of the article, our critic chooses to construe all his three main contentions in that extreme and unqualified sense which the author himself had repudiated. Mr. Low, while saying plainly that he considered war in general as a horrible thing, went on to point out that war is *sometimes* good, commerce is *sometimes* bad, and armaments *may possibly* ensure peace rather than war. Mr. Angell, referring five separate times to this article, ignores its qualifications every time. (Ed. 1911, pp. 173, 174, 187, 198, 205.) Assuming, absolutely without justification, that Mr. Low speaks of war as *always* (or at least *mainly*) good, commerce mainly bad, and armaments mainly pacific in their action, he quotes on p. 206, and again summarizes on p. 173 a "brilliant" analysis of this reasoning "by Mr. J. M. Robertson, which gives a result something like this: (1) War is a great school of morals, therefore we must have great armaments to insure peace; (2) secure peace engenders the Cobdenite ideal, which is bad, therefore we should adopt conscription, (a) because it is the best safeguard of secure peace, (b) because it is a training for commerce—the Cobdenite ideal." It need scarcely be pointed out that this "brilliant" exposure is one of

the oldest and stalest of sophisms. In every sentence it represents the opponent as saying what he did not say: to take only the first, Mr. Low left no doubt that he looked upon war in general as a curse. This "brilliant" piece of analysis, of which Mr. Angell and Mr. Robertson are so proud, may best be exposed by applying the same logical process to a more familiar pair of contradictories than peace and war—to the everyday antithesis between fasting and eating. A doctor, we will suppose, commits himself to three separate statements: (1) Fasting is *sometimes* highly beneficial, (2) too great security of food *sometimes* encourages the Fat Boy's ideal of merely eating and sleeping, (3) if you fast *occasionally*, or at least train yourself systematically with a view to fasting, you will find yourself all the more active and alert for the task of earning your daily bread. It would be difficult to find three more unimpeachable propositions; yet the brilliant Mr. Robertson and the brilliant Mr. Angell would turn them into sheer nonsense: "for if fasting is beneficial, why are we so foolish as to eat? if eating leads to somnolence and low ideals, who but a lunatic can advise us to labour for food which, on our opponent's own showing, can only do us harm?" The brilliant Mr. Robertson, it may here be noted, rose into political distinction by journalism and lecturing, one of his chosen subjects being Roman history. Yet it is not many years since, in a debate before the University of Durham, he maintained publicly that no nation had ever successfully kept up a first-class army and a first-class fleet at the same time; nor did he seem at all discomposed when met with the reminder that this was the very process by which Rome conquered, first the Mediterranean and then the world.

APPENDIX VIII

WARLIKE STATES AND HIGHER CIVILIZATION

The Greek states, the glory of ancient civilization, were certainly warlike in every sense of the word. The next great period of European literature was that of the militarist Roman. The three great poets of the Middle Ages—Dante, Chaucer, and Petrarch—were products of warlike states at about their most warlike period: conscription was more real in Chaucer's England than in any other great country of Europe. Medieval France created Gothic art and the Crusades side by side; without her, we may almost say that neither the Gothic cathedral nor the

Crusader would have existed, and the two movements coincided very nearly in order of time. The University system, again, was preponderantly a French movement, and was most active during the reigns from Philip Augustus to St. Louis, when France was at her highest military power during the Middle Ages. China has been, on the whole, decidedly the least warlike of great world-states in either of the senses recognized by Mr. Angell; yet the millions of China have contributed far less to world-progress than the few thousands of pugnacious Athens or Florence.

Mr. J. M. Robertson, in his *Patriotism and Empire* (pp. 74—77) produces a few flimsy arguments and instances in the contrary direction; he only succeeds in whittling down the too sweeping generalizations of Mr. Sidney Low. Goethe, whose pacificism and breadth of view naturally command Mr. Robertson's admiration, has a passage in the sixth book of his autobiography which his admirer has evidently forgotten. Goethe confesses plainly the experience of his own early life, that the wars of Frederick the Great, bloody and exhausting though they were, gave a great stimulus to German literature. Mr. Thomas Hardy, whom nobody will accuse of militarism, anticipates of this present war that it will kill a great deal of useless literary stuff, and give a better chance of survival to works of sterling merit. Mr. Robertson and his friends kick in vain against the pricks; they will do better frankly to acknowledge with their ally, Novikow, that the living nations have hitherto been the warlike nations, and to recognize that the problem is not so simple as their own simplicity had imagined it to be. If war were an unmixed evil, and non-war an unmixed good, the human race would have solved this problem many centuries before it produced Mr. Angell or Mr. Robertson. The real task for the "hard thinker" is to avoid easy extremes, and to work steadily for the elimination of warfare without illusions as to the rapidity or easiness of so beneficent a change. We cannot wholly destroy a bad thing except by producing a better. When the industries of peace are organized as closely, as elaborately, and on as firm a basis of self-sacrifice as we can see at present in the British Army, then pacificism may lift up its head, for its redemption draweth nigh. Meanwhile, nothing is to be gained by hiding our heads in the sand, by denying to war even those virtues that it possesses, and by lazily assuming that, when the spirit of militarism has been exorcised, no worse spirit will take its place.

APPENDIX IX

MILITARY MORALITY

On p. 161 of *Foundations* we find Mr. Angell saying to a military audience, "Those of you who have done me the honour to read my books know that I have . . . tried to do full justice to all that the soldier's profession has of abnegation, dedication to an unselfish purpose, discipline, and duty."

Now, it is true that he pays somewhat perfunctory homage to some, at any rate, of these qualities in his chapter on "The Diminishing Factor of Physical Force"; though I cannot think that any reader will manage to find, even there, exactly the things which Mr. Angell, face to face with the soldiers, claims to have said. But after these somewhat lukewarm admissions, with another preliminary "Let us be honest!" he calls upon his readers to consider the other side of the picture. After indicating that there is nothing in European war-history more magnificent than the last stand of the Dervishes at Omdurman, he goes on to point out that, at the back of their bravery, these Dervishes were dishonest and disloyal. Upon this he comments, "This difficulty with the soldier's psychology is not special to Dervishes or to savages. An able and cultivated British officer writes: 'Soldiers as a class are men who have disregarded the civil standard of morality altogether.'" Mr. Angell quotes to this effect for half a page; but the officer from whom he quotes is writing of Remington's Irregulars, not only freely but also with evident paradoxical exaggeration for literary effect, very much as Bret Harte described Roaring Camp, or as some of us have heard old cattle-ranchers, in their outspoken moments, describe from their own experiences. Not only does Mr. Angell make no allowance for this, but he cannot refrain from a characteristic distortion of the evidence. The officer goes on to say: "Since I got to know [the soldier]"—that is, his good as well as his bad side—"I have thought *rather less* of the iniquity of these things [the soldier's vices] *than I did before.*" Presently Mr. Angell repeats this; and the words I have italicized become, under his pen, "thieving, lying and looting and bestial talk *do not matter.*" In another place, (as we have already seen in Chapter I,) he applies even to the citizen-soldier a ridiculous series of exaggerations which Bernard Shaw has heaped upon our professional soldiers; and in a third, with almost equal unfairness of context, he applies to the soldier in general a very plain-spoken passage from Mr. Blatchford.

It is not necessary to insist here upon the slanderous injustice of applying this kind of judgment to our armies in Flanders; the more important question is: Ought not Mr. Angell to have seen the falsehood of his contentions even when he wrote his book? He has raked together, indiscriminately, all that he can find to give colour to his contention that the soldier is a worse man than the civilian. From the savage, from the conscript, from the volunteer, he picks in turn the reproach peculiar to each, and assumes that it may be applied indiscriminately to all soldiers. The wild Dervishes were disloyal; this, to our philosopher, is part of "the soldier's psychology." Remington's Scouts were a troop of irregular horse raised for an emergency in the Boer war; they differed as much from the ordinary soldier as the French Foreign Legion differs from the French soldiers of the Line: but their idiosyncrasies are (for Mr. Angell) characteristic of the soldier in general. Under our voluntary system, the soldier must be petted in time of peace, or we could not get him to enlist. He is "dressed prettily and washed and combed like a child . . . he has no real work to keep him from going mad except housemaid's work": so says Bernard Shaw of the British soldier, and so says Mr. Angell (who cannot plead even the excuse of invincible ignorance, since he actually earned his living for a few years in France,) of the foreign conscript! Again, under our voluntary system, we must have professional long-service soldiers, forbidden to marry and condemned to long years of barracks; Mr. Blatchford's description of their life is applied to the barrack-life of the conscript, which ranged from less than four months (Switzerland) to an extreme of two years in France and Germany, when Mr. Angell wrote. In further appealing to "the large body of French literature dealing with the evils of barrack-life," he ignores the fact that Urbain Gohier, one of the most uncompromising of these writers, holds a single year of barrack-life to be rather beneficial than harmful, while Jean Jaurès, the most determined adversary of the Three Years System, had no objection to six months of barrack-life.* He makes great capital, of course, out of the Dreyfus scandal; but he ignores the fact that this scandal was due quite as much to political as to military conditions, and that nothing of the kind is even remotely conceivable in Switzerland, which also has com-

* Since writers who ought to know better are not ashamed still to repeat the slander that Jaurès was arguing here only as an opportunist, and that his real convictions were altogether against compulsory service, I may here refer readers to my exposure of this fiction in *Workers and War* (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes. 1d.)

pulsory military service.* All this exaggerated abuse of military life may be reduced to its true value by simply recognizing two facts, which I challenge Mr. Angell to disprove. Firstly, Jaurès himself advocated, *on principle*, beginning military training in all schools at the age of 10, and giving the adult youth a whole year in the army, half of which was to be spent in barracks. Secondly, not only in Switzerland or Norway, but in countries like France and Germany, where the service is far less popular, the abolition of the compulsory principle could not secure a majority even within the socialist party.

But let us, for a moment, take at Mr. Angell's own valuation the evidence which, pieced together from different sources, he applies indiscriminately to soldiers in general. If we are to believe what he would have us believe, the military atmosphere is absolutely poisonous, and even in peace-time, Britain keeps hundreds of thousands of men in moral degradation in order to defend the rest.† The only righteous conclusion, if this were so, would be to disband our army and navy, and to attempt again what the Friends tried unsuccessfully in Pennsylvania and the Jesuits in Paraguay—the foundation of a pacifist, non-resisting state. This policy, however, Mr. Angell more than once repudiates. He definitely upholds the voluntary system, which involves long years of barrack life and celibacy; yet he gloats upon the defects of that system, and predicates those defects of other systems which, in fact, are comparatively free from them. He would have us rely upon the soldier to defend us; he would have us speak smooth words to the soldier when we are addressing him; but he bids us remember all the while that, despite certain good qualities which save him from being “in every aspect despicable,” the poor soldier is necessarily a sort of moral leper.‡

* See p. 31 of my *Strong Army in a Free State*, where I quote an instance in which some privates, through the civil authorities, secured an officer's punishment for having lost his temper, and abused them on parade with undue violence of language. The two statements here following in the text are fully elaborated in my *Workers and War*, published a year ago, in which I offered to print, at my own expense and between the same covers, any disproof of my assertions which could be brought forward. None whatever has been offered, though the pamphlet has been widely circulated.

† If this seems too strong a summary, I would ask the reader to refer himself to *Illusion*, pp. 247—49, 255—56, 283—86, and to note the turn which Mr. Angell carefully gives to all these quotations and observations.

‡ Compare the libellous paragraph in the *Arbitrator* for January, 1914, p. 9, designed to expose the soldier before the eyes of pacifists as a man deficient in moral sense.

However, publican though he be, the soldier does at least fulfil the useful function of acting as a foil to Mr. Angell; we must be grateful to him for pointing the moral that Mr. Angell is not as other men. For, after two pages of this carefully-packed abuse, our author concludes, "Is there no place for the free play of all the best qualities of the Viking and the soldier in a world still so sadly in need of men with courage enough, for instance, to face the truth, however difficult it may seem, however unkind to our pet prejudices."

* * * * *

"Let us be honest, at least with ourselves!" Let us take another captain's biscuit to keep us merry, while we watch Mr. Angell showing a brutal and licentious soldiery how the honest man faces the truth and gets rid of pet prejudices!

APPENDIX X

MR. ANGELL'S BORROWED PLUMES

We have already seen how Mr. Angell's confident references to Seeck, Pearson, Seeley, and Lecky are evidently at second-hand (as he himself has confessed of the two first), and how his "accurate manner" disguises from the unsuspecting reader the fact that Mr. Angell knows nothing of these authors but those scraps which he has actually dished up for us. But, beyond this, I am prepared to prove that the references to German writers in the 1911 edition of his *Illusion* are similarly borrowed, though with elaborate attempts to make it appear that Mr. Angell was drawing from his stores of actual reading.

As I point out at the beginning of Chapter IX, his German newspaper quotations are apparently taken from the *Daily Mail*, and he himself implies as much. This is perfectly natural; we all have to quote at second-hand from foreign newspapers, though it is better then to mention our immediate authority quite clearly. But the case of the German books is different.

On p. 138 (ed. 1914, p. 168) he quotes from Moltke's letter to Bluntschli. No reference is given; the reader has no chance of verifying the quotation except by referring to the index of Moltke's Complete Works, which run to half-a-dozen volumes, and can probably not be found in more than a dozen public libraries of Great Britain. When we have at last unearthed the

actual letter, we find that Mr. Angell has left out more than a line of Moltke's own words, though without in any way warning us of the omission. Why is this? The answer is quite simple: he himself has never seen the original: he has taken his quotation from Novikow, who gives exactly the same extract in his own French, omitting exactly the same words as Mr. Angell, but inserting the warning asterisks which accuracy requires in these cases. Moreover, to anyone who compares the three versions, it is quite evident, apart from this indication, that Mr. Angell has translated from Novikow's French, and not from Moltke's original German.

Mr. Angell follows up the Moltke quotation with one from Renan; here, for once, he gives us full references, but only because this quotation also, including the chapter-and-verse reference, is silently borrowed from Novikow. Novikow, in the middle of his quotation, leaves out three or four of Renan's sentences, and marks the omission. Mr. Angell omits the very same words, without any more warning than in the Moltke case. Moreover, his translation blunders over a phrase so simple that it sets us wondering why the *Daily Mail* could not have found for its Paris representative a man who, if he did not already know the French for "self-satisfied," was at least capable of understanding the phrase when he came across it.*

To the Moltke quotation Mr. Angell appends a note: "For *precisely similar* views in more definite form, see Ratzenhofer's 'Die Sociologische *Erkenntniss*,' pp. 233, 234. Leipzig: *Brockhaus*, 1898." † Here, again, page-reference and all is "conveyed," without acknowledgment, from the same context in Novikow, including the mis-spelling of the word *Erkenntniss*, and with the addition of a far more serious blunder. Novikow has referred to Ratzenhofer in a different context, and, in this context, the appeal is fairly correct. Mr. Angell, while copying Novikow's description of Ratzenhofer's views, and applying this description

* Renan: "En forçant la médiocrité satisfaite d'elle-même à sortir de son apathie." Angell: "And compels satisfied mediocrity itself to awaken from its apathy." Two lines above, he omits the phrase "de la sorte," apparently not understanding it. Elsewhere, in an attempt to display his command of idiomatic French, he prints an allusion to "the Voltaires and the *Rousseaux*," a pedantic blunder which impresses a Frenchman as it would impress us to find a foreigner lecturing about "the Platoes and the Newmen." (*Foundations*, &c., p. 224.)

† In the 1914 edition the English words I have italicized are altered into "an expression of these," and the two mis-spelt German words are corrected.

to his own context, has unconsciously changed a slight exaggeration into a plain mis-statement. It is quite untrue to say (as Mr. Angell does) that these two pages of Ratzenhofer outdo the two quotations to which he actually appends the reference. Ratzenhofer simply asserts, in temperate language, that states have always been formed under the pressure of force; his words are not only far more moderate than those of Moltke or Stengel, but have also very little in common with them. If Mr. Angell, in 1911, had actually seen these two pages of Ratzenhofer's book, and had been capable of translating them, he would at once have seen the suicidal folly of covertly stealing this particular reference from his friend Novikow, even though it may have helped to impress the earlier reviewers with his "prodigious erudition."

There is a third German quotation in this passage of the *Illusion*—half-a-page extracted from Baron v. Stengel's "Weltstaat und Friedensproblem." No page-reference is given, and Mr. Angell (in all his editions) makes the elementary school-boy blunder of writing *Stadt* (town), where Stengel wrote *Staat* (state), and thus spoiling the whole sense. It is evident that, here again, he has borrowed at second-hand while professing to quote directly. The same tale, again, is told by the four references to German authors on pp. 83—85 of the 1911 edition. Although in one case actual quotations are given, and in all cases the full titles of the books, there is no reference whatever to page or even chapter; and there are two more of these small but significant blunders in German which show that Mr. Angell is out of his depth all the time. The 1914 edition supplies fresh evidence of the same kind. On p. 22 he professes to quote six lines from Dr. F. Bachmar. The full title of the book is given, but no reference to page or chapter; and, among the four German words which Mr. Angell quotes, he mis-spells two.

I have now dealt exhaustively, I believe, with *all* his actual quotations from, or references to, German books in the 1911 edition. It has been seen that, while he produces them all with the accurate manner of a man who knows exactly what he is talking about, yet all are pretty evidently borrowed, without acknowledgment, at second-hand. The fact that his numerous quotations from German periodicals and papers are equally second-hand, though quite different in its bearing on his notions of literary morality, is almost equally significant when we come to ask with what authority Mr. Angell speaks on Anglo-German relations.

Nor had Mr. Angell's "prodigious erudition" grown much in this field, even by the end of 1914. In the preface to

his *Prussianism*, while explaining that it is "an idea, a false philosophy advocated by a few professors and writers," which has "seduced the great German nation from what we know it once was, morally and intellectually, to what we now believe it to be," he adds with portentous solemnity: "Is there no warning at all in the fact that Nietzsche was not a German, but a Slav; that his great pupil in the philosophy of history, to whom more than to any other man we ascribe the fatal turn in our generation of German policy, Treitschke, was also a Slav?" To begin with, both men were only half Slavs by birth; while by language, residence and education they were entirely German.* It is therefore decidedly less accurate to write them down offhand as Slavs, than to dismiss offhand as Italians D. G. Rossetti and his sister, whose parentage at least was purely Italian. If, as Mr. Angell contends elsewhere, environment is more than heredity, then the semi-Slavonic parentage of these two men means, at the most, one quarter of Slav to three quarters of German.

But it requires the most brazen and colossal ignorance to describe Treitschke as Nietzsche's "great pupil in the philosophy of history." When Treitschke, a young doctor of twenty, had already made up his mind for life that Prussia was the destined creator of a new German Empire, Nietzsche was a boy of twelve, just leaving his village school for the grammar-school of the neighbouring town. A year before Nietzsche went up to the University of Leipzig as an undergraduate, Treitschke had already ended his brilliant professorate there, and had laid the foundation of all his future teaching. Moreover, if Mr. Angell had read anything of the two men's actual writings, even hastily and superficially, he would have recognized the absurdity of calling either the other's pupil, or of speaking of them as co-founders of a common "school" (p. 2). Each went his own separate way; on most points their views are quite irreconcilable; they have scarcely anything in common but an admiration for force, which they share with another man who was one of Nietzsche's pet abominations, Carlyle. Mr. Angell is almost equally inaccurate about Nietzsche on p. 16; he evidently knew nothing of either man beyond the scrappy and inaccurate references which were then flooding the daily papers; † and even into these confused scraps he has imported a worse confusion by his hideous blunder of dates.

* Until Nietzsche went off, as a professor, to German Switzerland.

† He does not so much as mention their names, I believe, in any of his writings before this war; yet he now makes them the key to all German history for the last fifty years!

What he says about Goethe, again, on pp. 10 and 49 betrays an almost equal lack of first-hand knowledge. On p. 54 we find him labouring under the illusion that the insurrection of the Paris Commune broke out in 1870, and before the French Government had accepted Bismarck's peace terms. On the same page, where he writes "*thanks to the very condition imposed by Napoleon,*" a little more knowledge of German history would have compelled him to write "in spite of." On p. 53 his references to "Jéna and Auerstadt" are evidently taken without acknowledgment from some French book; both names are mis-spelt in the ordinary French fashion. Probably at least one in twenty of the German words or names he uses are mis-spelt.

In exposing this ignorance of German which underlies his constant affectation of familiarity, I have had occasion to point out his blunders in the French language and in French facts, for which he has far less excuse. And, wearisome as it is to track a slippery writer through all his subterfuges, I must here emphasize more fully his ignorance of the man whom he was morally bound to study almost above all others—of Jean Jaurès, unquestionably the most distinguished of all men who have written on War and Peace during the last ten years.* Beginning with exceptionally brilliant University studies, and an equally brilliant start as professor, Jaurès entered parliament at the age of 26, and, after some years of hesitation, finally identified himself with the Socialist party. In the Dreyfus affair he was one of the earliest and boldest champions of justice. Within a few years he had succeeded in welding the different Socialist groups into a single parliamentary party; at his death he was the greatest figure in international socialism, one of the greatest champions of world-peace, and one of the most influential statesmen in France.

We have seen, at the end of Appendix I, that Mr. Angell claims to have known Jaurès personally. This makes it all the more inexplicable that he should always and altogether ignore what is most characteristic in Jaurès's pacifist doctrine. Jaurès (as I show briefly in my *Workers and War*) held that practical measures must go hand in hand with propagandist teaching: that in international, as in religious, warfare we must prove *in practice* that war does not pay. Nations, he held, must organize

* See, for instance, the tribute to his memory as lately as August 5 1915 in the *Labour Leader*, from the pen of the German socialist, Eduard Bernstein, who quotes approvingly from "the last great book of Jaurès, *The New Army*."

themselves democratically and defensively on the militia system; this would deprive aggression of half its hopes of success; the world would then begin to listen to reason, and we should be one great step further towards Internationalism and Arbitration. Mr. Angell cannot combat this, as others do, by pleading that there is no real difference between offence and defence in war; Mr. Angell's whole theory, as we have seen, depends upon the distinction which he makes between offensive and defensive warfare. Yet one of the most characteristic things about the *Great Illusion* is, that it seems to have been written by a man ignorant of Jaurès's very existence. Why (seeing that the distinction between offensive and defensive is as essential as both Jaurès and Mr. Angell hold) does the latter uniformly argue in ignorance of that essentially defensive scheme of national armaments which forms the whole gist of Jaurès's book, *L'Armée Nouvelle*? Why, for instance, at the very outset of his *Great Illusion*, does he distinctly rest his argument on the supposition that the pacifist has only two alternatives—"a resort to general disarmament, or, at least, a limitation of armament by agreement"? Why does he here, as everywhere, ignore Jaurès's contention that the democratisation and defensivisation of armaments is a prior step to either of these alternatives, and that the real check to war will come when nations are armed, defensively, even better than now, but without legal power of compelling their citizens to fight an offensive campaign? * In my reply at the end of Appendix I, I have pretty conclusively proved that these omissions were not due to conscious concealment of Jaurès's views, but to sheer ignorance; and proof positive of this is at last afforded by the official *International Summer School Report*, which I had not seen when I wrote that reply in Appendix I. There (as I point out in Chap. IX) we find Lieut. Townroe politely pointing out that Mr. Angell had not read Jaurès's book, and meeting with no contradiction.

* *Great Illusion*, ed. 1911, p. 4; similar ignorance shown on pp. 34, 36, 150, 152, 209, 211, 212, 257, 278, 281, 282, 287, 290, 292, 298, 302, 323, 331. In ed. 1914 these first four cases occur on pp. 4, 35—37 (which ignores the very serious defensive power of Switzerland) and 192 *note*, ignoring the fact insisted upon by Jaurès, that intelligent drills, such as the Swiss have long practised, does not weaken the citizen's initiative, but actually stimulates his intelligence.

APPENDIX XI

CONFERENCE AND ARBITRATION

I. NORMAN ANGELL. *Illusion*, 1914. p. 350:

"Much of the pessimism as to the possibility of any progress in this matter is based on the failure of such efforts as Hague Conferences. Never has the contest of armament been so keen as when Europe began to indulge in Peace Conferences. Speaking roughly and generally, the era of great armament expansion dates from the first Hague Conference. Well, the reader who has appreciated the emphasis laid in the preceding pages on working through the reform of ideas will not feel much astonishment at the failure of efforts such as these. The Hague Conferences represented an attempt, not to work through the reform of ideas, but to modify by mechanical means the political machinery of Europe, without reference to the ideas which had brought it into existence."

II. Mr. Angell's ally, JACQUES NOVIKOW (*Luttes, &c.*, p. 691):

"The Associations and Congresses, which meet in different towns of Europe and America, diminish the value of their work by pursuing the aim of perpetual peace. They might as well found societies for the abolition of murder. There will always be murderers; there will always be wars. Murder and war will cease when men are perfect; that is to say, never. Therefore these different international leagues are pursuing a chimera that can never be realized; they are looking for the Philosopher's Stone. . . . Societies will always be compelled to train for the trade of war, in order to defend themselves against all eventualities. No, there is no question of suppressing war altogether; the question is simply, how to suppress war, as a permanent institution, among a certain number of nations."

III. JEAN JAURÈS. *L'Armée Nouvelle*, 1910, p. 8.

"Let [Socialism] interfere on every possible occasion to give truth and fulfilment to the first guarantees of peace, so timidly—and sometimes so hypocritically—outlined at the Hague by the governments themselves."

IV. IMMANUEL KANT. "Criticism of the Aesthetic Judgment." (Collected Works, ed. Hartenstein, 1867, Vol. V., p. 270.)

"Even war, when it is waged with discipline and with respect for civil rights, has something noble about it, and at the same

time ennobles the thoughts of the nation thus waging it, in proportion to the dangers to which that nation is exposed, and to the courage with which it has managed to make head against them. On the other hand, long peace usually gives the predominance to the mere commercial spirit, with its concomitant failings of base selfishness, cowardice, and effeminacy, and thus tends to debase the national mind."

Kant also spoke of Perpetual Peace as "an unrealizable ideal" (eine unausführbare Idee), though one which we must always keep in mind, and to which we must draw nearer and nearer as the world progresses. He recognized that the expansion of trade, and the growth of a more enlightened self-interest, would do much to kill war; but he was far too clear-sighted to cherish illusions of a royal road to peace. Dietrich, in his book "Kant und Rousseau," quotes a very plain-spoken passage. Kant, writing in 1786, expresses a serious doubt whether, in a society like the present, civilization or even freedom could develop without occasional war. He continues: "Look at China, which . . . has no powerful enemy to fear, and which has therefore lost every vestige of freedom. At the grade of civilization at which the human race now stands, war is an indispensable means of furthering civilization itself; and only when civilization has been perfected—God knows when that will be!—would perpetual peace be wholesome for us; moreover, it is only through such a perfect civilization that it would become possible. (p. 140; a full and extremely interesting conspectus of Kant's utterances on War and Peace will be found on pp. 45—49 of this book, with full quotations from the philosopher's works on pp. 138—143.)

V. Professor CRAMB. *Germany and England*, pp. 71—2; the passage which, according to Mr. Angell, "out-Bernhardi's Bernhardi":

"In the laws governing the States and individuals the highest functions transcend utility and transcend even reason itself. In the present stage of the world's history, to end war is not only beyond man's power, but contrary to man's will, since in war there is some secret passion or lingering human glory to which man clings with an unchangeable persistence; some source of inspiration which he is afraid to lose, uplifting life beyond life itself; some sense of a redeeming task which, like his efforts to unriddle the universe, for ever baffled yet for ever renewed, gives a meaning to this else meaningless scheme of things."

APPENDIX XII

SELF-CONTRADICTIONS

(A) Mr. Angell writes in *War and Peace*, September, 1915:

“The arrangement would in the circumstances amount to an international control of the world’s supplies for the purpose of withholding them from Germany, and in such a way as to avoid difficulty between the combatants and between them and the neutrals, and as to render the blockade or siege of Germany effective not merely by sea power, but by co-operation between the nations of the world as a whole. Such an international body made up of representatives of America, Britain and her Colonies, France, Russia, Italy, Belgium, Japan, and, less officially, of the Scandinavian and Balkan States, Holland, Switzerland and Greece, would not deal merely with matters of exports and imports, with trade between them, but with financial arrangements as well—with exchange and credit difficulties, loans, censorship of mails, and all the thorny problems that have arisen during the war. From these matters it might perhaps proceed to deal with such problems as the disposal of German property—interned ships, businesses of various kinds, royalties on patents, bank balances and so forth, and, it may be, more remote arrangements as to the future control of German action in the world; tariff arrangements; the conditions upon which Germany should at the peace be once more admitted to the community of nations, whether on equal terms or not; whether the most efficient means of exacting some indemnification for damage done might not be by sequestration of German property through the world, and possibly some sur-tax by tariff, ship and mail dues, all of course subject to due legal judgment of an international court. . . .”

“Let us see how far the general method here indicated might apply to a later situation of the war. . . . But if we can assume the international control of the world’s wealth in some such a way as that above indicated, there would be a situation in which the channels of trade would for prolonged periods have been turned away from Germany, and a situation also in which, for instance, Germany’s enemies would control every pound of cotton grown in the world. And the needs of the war would have engendered between those enemies much mutual helpfulness, in the way of loans, credit arrangements, etc., with their resources organised and their action co-ordinated by central

international organs. If such a situation really existed, German aggression would be faced by forces that mere military power could not meet."

(B) From the writings of Mr. Angell and his authorized exponents:

Thirty Points, p. 3. "Nor must it be forgotten that private property on land is immune from capture in time of war."

Illusion, 1914, p. 38. "Every financier in Europe knows that if Germany conquered Holland or Belgium to-morrow, she would have to leave their wealth untouched; there could be no confiscation."

Ibid. p. 52. "If the Germans looted London, it is not putting the case too strongly to say that for every pound taken from the Bank of England German trade would pay many times over. The influence of the whole finance of Germany would be brought to bear on the German Government to put an end to a situation ruinous to German trade, and German finance would only be saved from utter collapse by an undertaking on the part of the German Government scrupulously to respect private property, and especially bank reserves."

Ibid. p. 58. ". . . to interfere by confiscation in some form, in which case he [the conqueror] dries up the source of the profit which tempted him." This whole chapter (pp. 45—60) is entitled "The Impossibility of Confiscation"; cf. index under heading "Confiscation, impossibility of."

Foundations, p. 77. "Confiscation of private property on a large scale by a conqueror, in our day, is impossible."

Ibid. p. 93. "Wealth in the modern world has become intangible so far as conquest or confiscation is concerned."

Ibid. 1914, p. 31. "The conqueror is thus reduced to economic impotence, which means that political and military power is economically futile—that is to say, can do nothing for the trade and well-being of the individuals exercising such power."

Ibid. p. 63. "Commerce is simply and purely the exchange of one product for another. If the British manufacturer can make cloth, or cutlery, or machinery, or pottery, or ships cheaper or better than his rivals, he will obtain the trade; if he cannot,

if his goods are inferior, or dearer, or appeal less to his customers, his rivals will secure the trade, and the possession of *Dreadnoughts* will not make a whit of difference."

Summer School Report, p. 80. Mr. Angell: "What is [Germany] coming for? You say she is coming to take our trade. She cannot do it."

Thirty Points, p. 4. "The prosperity of commercial Europe is to-day one and indivisible."

Foundations, p. 93. "Military power cannot actively or latently control markets to its own advantage . . . Political power has ceased to be a determining factor in the economic sphere . . . It is an outrageous absurdity to represent a nation, a large part of whose population would starve to death but for the economic co-operation of other nations, as a separate entity struggling against other distinct entities."

Ibid. p. 154. "It is just as untrue to represent the nations as economic units in the field of international trade. We talk and think of 'German Trade' as competing in the world with 'British trade,' and we have it in our mind that what is the gain of Germany is the loss of Britain, or *vice versa*. It is absolutely untrue. There is no such national conflict, no such thing as 'British' trade or 'German' trade in this sense."

Summer Report, p. 242. Mr. Romanes, Secretary of the Oxford branch, was observing, "Norman-Angellism says that no country can gain by aggression; but we think that a country can lose by defeat . . ." Here Mr. Angell interrupted him with a warning restriction of this too generous concession to current ideas, and interposed the words, "Can suffer by the injury inflicted by invasion!" The chastened Mr. Romanes was then able to finish his sentence with the Master's approval . . . "but that injury cannot be inflicted by the transfer of any material wealth from the defeated country to the conqueror." The matter had already been put in a nutshell by Mr. Seymour Cocks (p. 5): "The old pacifist said that if a man hits you on one cheek you have to turn the other cheek. We [Angellites] say that it is impossible to hit another man on the cheek without hitting yourself. Owing to the interdependence of nations it is impossible to injure another nation without injuring yourself."

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