

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY



107 719

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

BOOK 1: THE EMERGENCE OF A NATION
SECOND EDITION · REVISED AND ENLARGED

THE *Making* OF
AMERICAN *History*

EDITED BY DONALD SHEEHAN · SMITH COLLEGE

THE DRYDEN PRESS · PUBLISHERS · NEW YORK

First Printing, March 1954
Second Printing, July 1955
Third Printing, September 1956

Revised Edition, Copyright 1954, by Donald Sheehan
Copyright, 1950, by Donald Sheehan

Published by The Dryden Press, Inc.
THE DRYDEN PRESS BUILDING
31 West 54 Street, New York 19, N. Y.

The selections reprinted in this volume are used by permission of and special arrangement with the proprietors of their respective copyrights.

Preface to the Revised Edition

This revision retains the basic pattern of the first edition but presents to the reader additional excerpts from the works of major historians in the areas of their special competence.

The purposes of this new edition are several. It is intended to provide material in fields omitted from the original collection, to keep the volumes abreast of current scholarship, and to meet the needs of its users. Some of the new selections are from books long established as classics, such as Dexter Perkins' *Hands Off* and Van Wyck Brooks' *The Flowering of New England*. Others, including George Kennan's *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* and C. Vann Woodward's *Origins of the New South*, have been published since the first edition of this book appeared but seem destined to have permanent importance. For subjects which cannot be fairly represented by a single title, historiographic essays are offered which explain the major trends in interpretation. All together, ten new selections have been added. And with the exception of two deletions, the text of the first edition has been retained.

It is appropriate for the editor to express here his gratitude for the helpful comments received from teachers and students alike. A special word of thanks needs to be reserved for Professor T. Harry Williams, of Louisiana State University, Professor Sidney Fine, of the University of Michigan, and Professor Sidney Glazer, of Wayne University. Their criticisms have been particularly helpful in the planning of this revision.

DONALD SHEFFHAN

Northampton, Mass.

January 3, 1954

Preface

This anthology is offered with the hope that it will form a useful supplement to textbooks in American history. Significant excerpts have been culled from the outstanding studies of several generations of our best scholars and combined into a whole illustrating the major developments in American society and government. At each focal point in the narrative of our national development, a selection is presented from the work of an expert whose special insight or ability will contribute to both understanding and interest. Although these specialists may have highly personalized views, an effort has been made to include only those writings which have gained a general acceptance among historians.

The purposes of such an anthology are several. It may, first of all, provide a solution for teachers whose desire to assign "outside" readings is thwarted by the inadequacies of the accessible libraries. Most college libraries contain individual copies of the books from which the selections in this anthology were taken, but it is manifestly futile to require three hundred readers to use a single copy. Today's students are often impatient with a course in American history which is limited to a textbook presentation. Most teachers would agree that some attempt should be made to add significance and meaning to a factual summary. It is hoped that this anthology will help to satisfy the demands of both students and teachers.

Further, students of American history should have some sense of the cumulative process of learning, some notion of how our present concepts have evolved from earlier ones. This is sometimes apparent in the selections themselves, but each introduction offers a summary of previous interpretations of the same subject and attempts to relate those interpretations to the general trends in historical analysis.

Even among scholars seeking to present an unbiased picture of the past there may be substantial disagreement. One group may find the explanation of events in political differences; another will emphasize philosophic or religious divergencies; a third will seek an economic basis for its analysis. Whether slavery was cruel or humane, whether the social contribution of Commodore Vanderbilt outweighed his ethical delinquencies—these and dozens of other specific questions

continue to induce a variety of answers. These differences, and the willing acceptance of conflicting points of view, give health and vitality to American scholarship. Individual historians may seek to explain all causation in terms of an isolated group of facts, but scholarship as a whole is not confined to the rigid dimensions of doctrinaire theory of any kind.

Some word must be said to explain why these secondary accounts are offered in preference to so-called "primary source materials." The editor feels that the average beginning student has neither the time nor the experience to depend upon contemporary documents. In a survey course, there is time for only the most elementary sampling of such material, and the fraction to which the student is exposed may not be representative of the whole. Obviously, there is much value in acquainting students with the nature of basic historical materials, but it is chiefly an illustrative value. In any case, familiarity with the most vital of the analytical studies made over a long period of years by the best historians is an essential part of historical study.

Since only works of outstanding importance have been included in this collection, the criticisms which the editor has offered in the introductions are not intended to cast doubt upon the value of the selections, but are included as a guide for the student whose ability to read critically is limited by his lack of knowledge of alternative points of view. Although many would disagree with the criticisms raised, the editor has made an attempt to avoid a personal judgment and to mention only those limitations which have been generally commented on.

Here, then, are the classical studies of our national past. All historical scholars know them, and textbook writers have built upon them. It is hoped that they will help to stimulate in students the lasting interest in history for which all teachers of the subject strive.

DONALD SHEEHAN

New York, N. Y.
February 28, 1950

CONTENTS: BOOK ONE

I · The Colonial Heritage

CHARLES M. ANDREWS

“Factors Influencing Colonization,” 4
FROM *The Colonial Period of American History*

FRANCIS PARKMAN

“The Combatants,” 34
FROM *Montcalm and Wolfe*

OLIVER M. DICKERSON

“Were the Navigation Acts Oppressive?,” 57
FROM *The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution*

II · The Foundations of the Republic

CARL BECKER

“The Spirit of '76,” 90
FROM *The Spirit of '76 and Other Essays*

CHARLES BEARD

“The Constitution as an Economic Document,” 119
FROM *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution
of the United States*

HENRY ADAMS

“The Inauguration,” 151
FROM *History of the United States of America*

WARREN H. GOODMAN

“The Origins of the War of 1812:
A Survey of Changing Interpretations,” 173
FROM *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*

III · *Nationalism and Democracy*

FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER

"The Significance of the Frontier in American History," 193

FROM *The Annual Report of the
American Historical Association for 1893*

GEORGE TAYLOR

"Domestic Trade," 225

FROM *The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860*

DEXTER PERKINS

"The First Challenge:
Monroe Hurls Defiance at Europe," 253

FROM *Hands Off*

JAMES PARTON

"Re-election of General Jackson," 294

FROM *Life of Andrew Jackson*

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.

"The Southern Dilemma," 311

FROM *The Age of Jackson*

IV · *The Failure of Compromise*

ULRICH B. PHILLIPS

"Plantation Life," 325

"Plantation Tendencies," 345

FROM *American Negro Slavery*

VAN WYCK BROOKS

"Alcott, Margaret Fuller, Brook Farm," 359

FROM *The Flowering of New England*

MARCUS LEE HANSEN
"The Flight from Hunger," 381
FROM *The Atlantic Migration: 1607-1860*

JOHN R. COMMONS *et al.*
Introduction "Labor Movement, 1840-60," 404
FROM *A Documentary History of American Industrial Society*

HOWARD K. BEALE
"What Historians Have Said about the Causes of the
Civil War," 426
FROM *Theory and Practice in Historical Study:
A Report of the Committee on Historiography*

•

BOOK 1:

THE EMERGENCE OF A NATION

•

PART I

THE COLONIAL HERITAGE

CHARLES M. ANDREWS

ALTHOUGH THE WRITING of history is based upon a scholarly exploitation of hindsight, the opportunity to see beyond a historical event or period carries with it the danger of perceiving in the event or period only the elements which led to some dramatic climax. Anyone concerned with the years between 1815 and 1860, for example, is assisted but at the same time burdened by his knowledge that the Civil War loomed just ahead.

Similarly, students of the earliest period of American history find it helpful to know that some trends in colonial life are reflected in the outbreak of conflict in 1776, yet it is with difficulty that they analyze that part of colonial culture which had little to do with independence. Instead of considering our early history as a thing in itself, they are tempted to begin with the product, the United States of America, and look back only for an explanation of its emergence. For many decades of historical writing, this tendency to focus on a unique national event led not only to a distorted view of what happened in the colonies but also to a lack of substantial interest in how the colonies came to be. Whatever attention was paid to the period before the settlement of Jamestown was devoted to a catalogue of explorations and a summary account of English tyranny.

Receiving his doctorate from Johns Hopkins University in 1889, Charles M. Andrews began his historical career in an intellectual environment which was to assist him in his work of broadening the concept of colonial history. The "nationalist" school of historians, whose patriotic assumptions had blurred

their objectivity, was giving way to a "scientific" group, whose intention it was to be guided solely by unadorned factual detail. Whereas such contemporaries as John Fiske and Herbert Baxter Adams overemphasized the influence of primitive German society upon American institutions, their views helped to restore the vital connection between European backgrounds and American settlement which was essential for Andrews' exposition.

Although his first book, *The River Towns of Connecticut*, revealed the interests of a native son, his succeeding volumes established him as a scholar in the field of Western European history. A lifetime of study had passed before the climax of his authorship was reached with the publication, in the 1930's, of his four-volume *The Colonial Period of American History*.

In contrast to those who considered the colonial era to be merely a background of the Revolution, Andrews viewed the development of settlements in America not even as American history but rather as a branch of the British chronicle. On the other hand, he considered a large part of American history to have occurred in England in the Middle Ages, when our patterns of government and social organization were being formed.

Like Herbert Osgood, whose pioneer volumes began the modern study of colonial history, Andrews regarded the transfer of Old World institutions and their evolution in a different environment to be the focal point of his investigation. Much of the old was modified; part withered away with the transplanting. Local self-government in a London suburb had certain limitations which it would obviously lose in the American wilderness. But Andrews saw that the characteristics of colonial institutions could best be understood in terms of the original models, especially since there were many points of continuing similarity.

Within his chosen field of institutional history, Andrews stands alone. The most frequently voiced complaint concerning his volumes arises not from any doubt concerning his knowledge but rather from the fact that his knowledge is so amply demonstrated. The sheer bulk of detail tends to limit the readability

and popular appeal of the work. Insofar as the volumes purport to be a general survey of colonial history, their chief deficiency lies in their comparative neglect of intellectual and cultural developments. Perhaps one is not justified in expecting a full treatment of early poetry; but when the concentration on institutionalism is such as to preclude adequate attention, for example, to the theory of Calvinism, the comprehensiveness of the work is distinctly impaired.

Nevertheless, writing in an era of increasing specialization, Andrews was distinguished not for narrowness but for the ambitiousness of his project. The origin and development of the basic economic and governmental patterns of colonial life is one of the grand themes in American history. These volumes bear witness to the skill and care which Andrews devoted to it.

Factors Influencing Colonization

BUT MONEY and companies and prosperity, essential as they were, would not have gone far had not other influences been at work that were social and religious in character. Privateering and trade enlisted the energies of only a small part of the population of England—which at this time numbered not less than five millions of people—and engaged the attention of those only who were ready to face stormy seas and dangerous experiences or were willing to risk their lives and fortunes in the pursuit of wealth. Most of those who up to this time had crossed the ocean were prospectors for the gold which was always luring them on to penetrate the unknown, or else they were born fighters who preferred to amass their riches rather by deeds of valor against the Spaniard.

From *The Colonial Period of American History* by Charles M. Andrews, by permission of the Yale University Press.

than by the more prosaic and peaceful activities of everyday life. Those that blazed the way, in like manner with the pioneers of the New World on its western frontier, were of the rough and ready sort, courageous and persistent, but turbulent, quarrelsome, and impatient, whose hands were better fitted for the sword than the plough.

Permanent colonization demanded a different type of recruit. It called for the common man as well as the adventurer, to whom life in old England had become, for one reason or another, joyless and burdensome, and who welcomed the opportunity that the new lands offered to better his worldly estate. Colonization demanded leaders and capital, but it demanded people as well—men, women, and children—to build homes, till the soil, and provide for the coming generations. Without colonists of this type, settlement was bound to be precarious and permanence was never assured. At the opening of the peace with Spain (1604) not a single colony of Englishmen had found place in either Asia, Africa, or America. Before the end of the century there were twenty colonies along the Atlantic seaboard and in the West Indies, peopled by nearly two hundred and twenty-five thousand human beings of all sorts and conditions, chiefly of English stock, engaged in building up communities of active, vigorous frontier life—towns, villages, farms, and plantations—and concerned with agriculture, industry, and commerce. This is an astonishing fact and points to forces at work in English society that were inducing a great migration and were bringing about an extraordinary enlargement of the English scene and expansion of English territory.

Conspicuous among the causes for colonization, in that it probably influenced the largest number of those who settled in North America, was the desire for land and an opportunity to make a home for wife and children. In the days of Elizabeth but a comparatively small part of England was available for tillage, and even that part had been considerably curtailed by the increase in sheep farming, the enclosure of the open fields and commons, and the conversion of tillable soil into pastures and plains. This transformation of rural life must have made a deep impression upon the popular mind and by just so much have loosened the ties that bound the country folk—normally a well-anchored social class—to the land of their birth. Arable land was growing scarce in the pres-

ence of the insistent demand for wool and efforts were being made in many directions to improve the situation. For a number of years a movement had been under way looking to the transmutation of moor, forest, and waste into more remunerative soil, by turning purprestures, assarts, and intakes into arable, draining the fenlands,¹ and irrigating where water was needed. In this effort private capital was being expended in reclamation projects that were authorized by parliamentary statute and were being carried on side by side with colonization during the seventeenth century. Many men, as, for example, Sir John Popham, were engaged in both enterprises, just as others, who were intimately concerned with settlement in America, were also deeply involved in trading undertakings in the East and elsewhere.

The lands thus reclaimed were trifling in extent as compared with the great reaches of a new continent and far more often benefited the landlord than the tenant. Not a project was set on foot looking to colonization in America that the promoters did not hold out the tempting inducement of land to those whom they wished to attract as prospective settlers. "With what content," reads a prospectus of 1622, "shall the particular person employ himself there when he shall find that for 12 10s adventure he shall be made lord of 200 acres of land, to him and his heirs forever. And for the charge of transportation of himself, his family and tenants he shall be allotted for every person he carries 100 acres more. And what laborer soever shall transport himself thither at his own charge to have the like proportion of land upon the aforesaid conditions and be sure of employment to his good content for his present maintenance."² "No man," said the Rev. Patrick Copland, in a sermon preached on April 18, 1622, "can justly say that this country is not capable . . . of all good things that the most opulent parte of Christendom do afford, neither are we hopeless that this country may also yield things of better value than any of these,"³ and the Rev. Daniel Price, preaching from St. Paul's Cross, May 28, 1609, describes the New

¹ Vermuyden, *Discourse concerning the Draining of the Great Fennes* (1642); Dugdale, *History of Imbanking and Drayning* (1662); Dodson, *The Designe for the Perfect Draining of the Great Level of the Fennes* (1664).

² *American Historical Review*, IV, 698.

³ Neill, *Memoir of Patrick Copland*, pp. 53-74.

World as a country "not unlike to equalize . . . Tyrus for colors, Basan for woods, Persia for oils, Arabia for spices, Spain for silks, Narcis for shipping, Netherlands for fish, Pomona for fruit, and by tillage, Babylon for corn, besides the abundance of mulberries, minerals, rubies, pearls, gems, grapes, deer, fowles, drugs for physic, herbs for food, roots for colours, ashes for soap, timber for building, pastures for feeding, rivers for fishing, and whatsoever commodity England wanteth"⁴ while the Rev. Mr. Simonds hopefully exclaims, "Let us be cheerfull to goe to the place that God will shew us to possesse in peace and plentie, a Land more like the Garden of Eden: which the Lord planted, than any part else of all the Earth."⁵ Winthrop made the same appeal later, when in 1629 he endeavored to encourage the hearts of those whom he was urging to join in the voyage to Massachusetts Bay. "Why then [he wrote] should we stand striving here for places of habitation (where many are spending as much labour and coste to recover or keepe sometimes an acre or twoe of Land, as would produce them many and as good or better in another Countrie) and in the mean time suffer a whole Continent as fruitfull and convenient for the use of men to be waste without any improvement."⁶

This appeal was made to every class and rank of men and was

⁴ Brown, *Genesis*, I, 313-314.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 289.

⁶ *Life and Letters of John Winthrop* (1864), p. 310. "Great pity is it," said Francis Higginson, "to see so much good ground for corn and for grass as any is under the heavens, to be altogether unoccupied, when so many honest men and their families in old England, through the populousness thereof, do make shift to live one by the other . . . As for wood, a poor servant may have more timber and fuel than could many a nobleman in England . . . And as for fresh water the country is full of dainty springs and some great rivers and some lesser brooks" (paraphrase in Young's *Chronicles of Massachusetts Bay*, pp. 242-254). Higginson's *New-England Plantation* (1630) is almost entirely taken up with alluring descriptions of the material advantages of New England, with only twelve lines at the end devoted to the "true Religion and holy Ordinances of Almighty God taught amongst us."

John Rolfe wrote from Virginia in 1616, "Seeing too many poor farmers in England work all the year, rising early and going to bed late, live penuriously, and much ado to pay their landlord's rent, besides a daily tasking and care to feed themselves and families, what happiness might they enjoy in Virginia where they may have ground for nothing more than they can manure, reap more fruits and profits with half the labour" (*Historical Manuscripts Commission, Eighth Report*, II, no. 208).

rarely omitted from the discourses and pamphlets that were issued to encourage settlement from 1607 to 1682. The small feudal landowner and tenant farmer were alike discontented in England: one with the depreciating value of his landed estate and the dwindling returns from his tenancies; the other with the insufficiency of his acres for cultivation. Both were confronted with the changing conditions which were accompanying the breaking up of the medieval system of landholding, and the fall in the value of silver which was leading to the rise of prices. Decreasing profits from the soil, stationary or falling rents, the difficulty of finding laborers and the unreliability and transient character of those that were obtained, the growth of luxury and the cost of living, the demand for better and more varied food, houses, equipage, and display—all these conditions tended to make the lower classes necessitous and the upper classes covetous and greedy. The tenantry resented the retention of the old feudal incidents and a land law which favored the landlords in all that concerned the use of the soil and the tenures by which it was held. They were growing impatient of feudal practices and payments that made occupation uncertain and living precarious. They suffered from the encroachments of their lords upon their fields and commons, the passage of hounds and huntsmen over their cultivated acres, and heavy tithes, taxes, and rates. Laws of inheritance, conveyancing, and tenure, still medieval, were to remain medieval for many generations to come, upheld by the lawyers and the courts. The heavy feudal burdens upon farmer and tenant, still living in something of a medieval atmosphere, made many a man long for the freer life of the New World, where land was plentiful and tenurial demands less likely to be imposed.⁷ Thus land-hunger and the

⁷ Sir Ferdinando Gorges and Sir Henry Spelman proposed in 1623 that a tenant belonging to any one of the patentees, to whom grants were made in New England, should not be allowed to "depart from the place where he is once planted, without lycence from his Land Lord" (*Proceedings*, American Antiquarian Society, 1867, p. 93); and the Massachusetts Bay Company in 1629 suggested that all who transported themselves to New England at their own charge and were not adventurers in the common stock "should, by way of acknowledgement to such from whom they receive their lands, become lyable to the performance of some service certayne dayes in the yeare, and by that service they and their posteritie after them to hold and inherite their lands, which wilbe a good meanes to enjoy their lands from being held in capite" (*Massachusetts Colonial Records*, I, 405). But in neither case was this last remnant of the old bondage, an example of which may also be

desire for a greater amount of property-freedom were among the powerful inducements that drove a restless awakening people to migration overseas. The bulk of the colonial population was of the artisan and tenant class, holding as a rule by some form of burgage or copyhold tenure. They became freeholders in America.

Imagination played its part. All classes of the population in cities and boroughs and notably along the eastern and southern coasts from East Anglia to the West Country were stirred to their innermost souls by the visions of wealth and the tales of a sumptuously bountiful nature that were told by those who sent letters back from America or returned from ocean voyages thither. "It is the goodliest and most pleasing Territorie of the World," wrote Richard Lane to Hakluyt in 1585, "for the Continent is of a huge and unknown greatness," and a later writer, in pious rhapsody said that "such luxuriant plantie and admirable raritie of trees, shrubs, hearbs; such fertilitie of soyle, insinuation of seas, multiplicitie of rivers, safetie of ports, healthfulnesse of air, opportunitie of habitations, hopes in present, hopes of future, worlds of varietie in that diversified world; do quicken our minds to apprehend what our tongues do declare and fill both with arguments of divine praise."⁸ Raleigh's

found in Gorges' charter of 1639, ever enforced. Bradford, on his farm at Jones River in Plymouth Colony, 1647, had tenants, who owed him "rents and other dues" (*Plymouth Records*, II, 119), but whether this was a common practice at so early a date it is impossible to say. Another Plymouth colonist seems to imply that it was not, when he wrote "We are all freeholders, the rent day does not trouble us" (*Young's Chronicles of the Pilgrims*, p. 250), and George Cleeve of the Maine settlement said that "he would be a tenant to never a man in New England" (*Trelawney Papers*, p. 265). Roger Williams once wrote that "Land is one of the gods of New England," and Thomas Hutchinson, at a later date, remarked that "where there is one farm [in New England] in the hands of a tenant, there are fifty occupied by him who has the fee of it" (*Hutchinson Papers*, Massachusetts Historical Society). "Some persons," wrote Governor Francis Nicholson, at that time in Maryland, "taking up great quantities of land . . . is one great reason why the young English natives and servants, when they are free, leave these colonies and go Southward or Northward, for they are not naturally ambitious of being Landlords and not Tenants" (*Maryland Archives*, XXIII, 87-88). There is a curious token or coin extant for the year 1647, which bears the inscription, "In Virginia land free and labor scarce; in England land scarce and labor plenty" (*William and Mary Quarterly*, XIV, 162-163). The device was evidently issued to attract settlers.

⁸ Hakluyt, VIII, 319; Purchas, *His Pilgrims*, XIX, 231. It must be remembered that language of this sort was due in part to the inflated style of the day and in part to a desire to make an impression for propagandist purposes. There can be

picture of the fabled Manoa, written in the style of Francisco Lopez' description of the court and magnificence of the emperor of Guayanacapa in Peru, must have whetted the appetite for gold of many a reader of the *Discoverie*, which was published in 1596. "All the vessels of his home, table and kitchen were of gold and silver and the meanest of silver and copper . . . He had in his wardrobe hollow statues of golde . . . He had also ropes, budgets, chests and troughs of golde and silver, heaps of billets of golde . . . Besides all this, he had an infinite quantitie of silver and gold inwrought."⁹ To the home dwellers following the weary round of daily toil, the scenes presented by that great press-agent of English discovery, Richard Hakluyt,¹⁰ whose *Principall Navigations, Voiages and Discoveries of the English Nation* appeared in its final form in 1600, were a panorama of exciting novelties—pictures of new peoples and places, habits and ways of life, with boundless possibilities of wealth and creature comforts. Credulous and unenlightened as they were English readers believed the tales and rumors that were handed on from man to man and formed the gossip of the tavern and the market place. The London theatregoer, though generally of the upper class only, must have gazed agape at Seagull, Spendall, and Scapethrift, whose lines in *Eastward Hoe* rivalled the accounts of the gold of Manoa that lured Raleigh to his ruin, as they told of the land where gold was more plentiful than copper in England and where rubies

little doubt, however, that the tales of the English voyagers were eagerly read in many quarters, quickening the imagination and widening the mental horizon of many a young Englishman, such as the one of whom his father said, "In tender years he always lov'd to read, Reports of travailes and of voyages . . . he would whole dayes and nights (sometimes by stealth) be on such bookes, As might convey his fancy round the World" (Brome, *The Antipodes*, 1640).

⁹ Raleigh's *Discoverie*, p. 18; also pp. 24, 71-72.

¹⁰ An excellent epitome of Hakluyt's character and purpose may be found in Parks, *Richard Hakluyt and the English Voyages* (1929). Still better is Taylor, *Late Tudor and Early Stuart Geography, 1583-1650* (1933), which appeared too late for use in this volume. It emphasizes especially the widespread influence of Hakluyt's great work. Of no little importance was the influence of Hakluyt's predecessor, Richard Eden, who in 1555 published *The Decades of the Newe World*. The Hakluyt Society was founded for the publication of works of this sort and the latest volume (*Documents concerning English Voyages to the Spanish Main, 1569-1580*. Edited by Irene A. Wright, 1932) contains seventy-three Spanish documents and sundry additional English accounts, some of them reprinted, with an enlightening introduction by the editor, which with the documents themselves admirably maintains the Hakluyt tradition.

and diamonds could be picked up on the seashore "to hang on their children's coats and stick in their caps, as our children wear saffron guilt brooches and groats with hobles on 'em." And there in Virginia, continues the play, "wilde boare is as common as our tamest Bacon is here," and you can "live freely there, without sergeants or courtiers or lawyers or intelligencers. You may be an alderman there and never be a scavenger; you may be a nobleman and never be a slave, you may come to preferment enough and never be a pander. To riches and fortune enough and have never the more villanie nor the lesse wit."¹¹ These were rousing words, and to the hearers at Blackfriars in 1605 and to those that read any one of the five editions of the play issued in the same year, they must have made an appeal similar to that of *Westward Hoe*, on the stage only a few months before, creating amazing fancies and stimulating endless curiosity.

Alluring indeed must these tales have been to overcome the natural repugnance of an insular and inexperienced people to make the voyage to this distant unfamiliar land, for the narratives of travel and adventure were filled no less with tales of shipwrecks, storms, and suffering than of gold and a bounteous nature, and with accounts of weird monsters, strange beings,¹² and terrifying natural

¹¹ *Eastward Hoe*, ed. Harris, pp. 45-46. There are many similarly extravagant descriptions in the dramatic literature of that day: For example:

"Say all this is true, That I spent millions, what's that to you, I'd melt both Indies, but I'd feast 'em all." Dekker, *The Wonder of a Kingdom*, 1635.

"When each ship of ours, Was able to spread sayles of silke: the tacklings of twisted gold: when every marryner At his arrivale here had his deepe pockets Crammed full of Pistolettes: when the poorest ship-boy Might on the Thames make ducks and drakes with pieces of eight fetched out of Spayne." Anonymous, *Dick of Devonshire*, undated, but early seventeenth century

"Now shall your lordship see a Spaniard's skill, Who from the plains of new America Can find out sacred simples of esteem To bind and unbind nature's strongest powers, This herb, which mortal man have seldom found, Can I with ease procure me when I list." Anonymous, *Grim, the Collier of Croyden*, 1606.

"This devil, whose priest I am and by him made, A deep magician (for I can do wonders) Appeared to me in Virginia." Massinger, *The City Madam*, 1652.

¹² Raleigh reported Amazons, though he doubted their mutilation, and also men with eyes in their shoulders and their mouths in the middle of their breasts. Harcourt's men repeated the same tale in 1604—"men whose shoulders are higher than their heads" (*Discoverie*, p. 56). The editor of the *Discoverie*, Dr. Harlow, thinks that these were the origin of Shakespeare's "Anthropophagi," men whose heads do grow beneath their shoulders, *The Tempest*, 1609 (*ibid.*, xcix). But the

phenomena intermingled with the descriptions of riches and the comforts of life. The yarns of sailors contained rich ingredients for nightmares and the frightening of timid souls. One may wonder the more that in the early days, when such tales were more fantastic than at a later time, there could have been found not only men of the hardy, adventurous type who were willing to cross the water, but women also, two with children yet unborn that went to Roanoke, and boys and girls of tender age, such as took part in that same Raleigh expedition of 1587. Of the forty women and children who embarked for the Amazon in 1616 none ever returned or were heard of again.¹⁸ Later when the sailors' narratives had lost some of their fiction and their exaggerations had been curbed, the voyage to America became a fairly common matter, and the shiploads of maids sent to Virginia in 1619 and following years, "for the making of the men feel at home," the women of the *Mayflower* and later

source may be traced to Sir John Mandeville, with his similar tale of fabulous monsters. In Brome, *The Antipodes*, appears the following:

"Doctor. Drake was a Dy' dapper to Mandeville, he then
Had left a passage ope for Travailleurs;
That now is kept and guarded by wild beasts,
Dragons and serpents, Elephants white and blue
Unicorns, and Lyons of many colours,
And monsters more, as numberlesse as namelesse.

Peregrine. What people sir (I pray proceed) what people
Are they of the Antipodes? Are not such
As Mandeville writes of, without heads or necks
Having their eyes placed on their shoulders, and
Their mouths amids their breasts?

Doctor. In brief Sir, all
Degrees of people both in sex, and quality
Deport themselves in life and conversation
Quite contrary to us."

Richard Brome wrote fifteen comedies. See *Momus Triumphans or the Plagiaries of the English Stage expos'd in a Catalogue*, Gerard Langbaine, 1688, p. 2. This work is a "Catalogue of Plays."

¹⁸ John Scott's "Narrative," Rawlinson, A. 175 ff., 356 ff. It may be noted that only four years after this voyage to the Amazon, the Pilgrim maids and mothers faced the possibility of a voyage to the Wild Coast, that is, to Guiana, or to "some of those fertile places in those hott climates" that were "rich, fruitful, and blessed with a perpetual spring," but wiser heads prevailed and the plan was never seriously entertained (Bradford, *History*, I, 61-62). But had it been entertained and carried out, the women would undoubtedly have gone—to their death.

vessels to Plymouth colony, and those that spent distressingly uncomfortable days and weeks in the one hundred and ninety-eight ships that went to Massachusetts Bay between 1630 and 1643, endured nothing worse than did the pioneer women of the westward movement in American history. But very real were these dangers and discomforts. The tossing of a small vessel in rough and stormy seas, the fearful winds and drenching waves, and the constant dangers from contagious diseases, such as scurvy and smallpox, in a ship crowded with passengers, furniture, provisions, and livestock, and providing at best unwholesome and unappetizing rations and often inadequate clothing, must have made the voyage of from six to ten weeks a dreaded event. As the Rev. Francis Higginson said in his journal of the voyage of the Puritan company in 1629, "those that love their owne chimney corner and dare not go farre beyond their owne townes end shall never have the honour to see the wonderfull workes of Almighty God."

Not all who went to America did so willingly or with the desire to see the wonderful works of Almighty God. In the eyes of the home authorities colonization performed one of its most important functions in enabling the country to get rid of undesirable members of its population and so to improve its social condition. England in Elizabeth's day was distressed by "a monstrous swarm of beggars" and a no less monstrous brood of criminals, born in huge numbers in the wretched slums of the dirty, dilapidated towns or created by the class distinctions, joyless child life, pitiless laws, and filthy prisons that hedged about the youth of the lower classes. There was no excess of population in England, but there was unequal distribution,¹⁴ as men from the decaying rural districts, forced into a sort of

¹⁴ Beer, *Origins of the British Colonial System*, ch. III; Cheyney, "Some Conditions surrounding the Settlement of Virginia," *American Historical Review*, XII, 521-526. Robert Powell, *Depopulation arraigned, convicted and condemned* (London, 1636), refers to this unequal distribution of population and attributes it to the enclosures, the razing of houses and mansions, and the decay of agriculture (p. 7). The dangers arising from overpopulation in the towns and the attendant evils of beggary, vagabondage, and crime are among the subjects treated by William Simonds, in a sermon preached before the Virginia Company, April 25, 1609, entitled "Virginia Britannia" (Brown, *Genesis*, I, 288-289), and by Robert Gray in "Good Speed to Virginia," 1609 (*ibid.*, 298). John Donne, in more figurative language, expresses the same hope when he says that the settlement of Virginia "shall redeem many a wretch from the jaws of death [and] the hands of

perpetual "moving on" by the vagrancy laws, infested the highways and wandered into the urban rookeries. There was great scarcity of food, which made men and women desperate and drove them to commit a great variety of petty crimes, whereby to secure money and subsistence. Thus there existed, particularly in the towns and suburban districts, an excess of population of the worst sort—beggars, vagrants, thieves, and the wretched poor, who had to be dealt with in one way or another. The press-gang and the crimp took their quota, the plague and the gallows had a larger share, and the workhouses and the prisons (horrible places of confinement) received their thousands. But still the problem remained unsolved. Of the few Englishmen of this type engaged in the early voyages for exploration and settlement, some were criminals by preference and nature, others from necessity and circumstance. Lack of money, food, and employment drove many of them to accept any opportunity that offered.

Transportation to the colonies appears very early as an official remedy for dire conditions at home, and from the first was adopted by judges in the criminal courts, town councils, and others in authority. Poor children, likely to become a charge upon the parishes, were sent over from many a provincial town, while London and Middlesex furnished a large number.¹⁵ Maids were shipped to become wives and mothers, and notorious offenders were ordered by parliament to be banished to Virginia;¹⁶ the poor were encouraged

the executioner . . . shall sweep your streets, and wash your doors from idle persons and the children of idle persons, and employ them. [Colonization] is not only a spleen to drain ill humours of the body, but a liver to breed good blood" (*Works of John Donne*, Alfred ed. VI, 225-244). Brown has a brief notice of Donne, *Genesis*, II, 880.

¹⁵ This subject will be considered again in the chapter on Virginia. That vagrants were sent from other parts of England than London is evident from the Coffer Books of Winchester, "30 December 1625, 60s for the apparelling of six poor boys that went to Virginia" (*Hampshire Notes and Queries*, IV, 82-83); from the Account Books of a Devonshire town, "10s 4d. Paid for shoes for three boys sent to Virginia" (*Barnstaple Records*, II, 136); and from the records of a justice of the peace of Dorchester in which is the deposition of a poor laborer "that he came to this Towne to meet with his aunt and to entreate her to gett him a place to go to New England" (*Dorchester Records*, p. 666).

¹⁶ This plan of sending to the colonies "notorious and wicked offenders that will not be reformed but by severity of punishment, in order that they may no more infect the places where they abide within our Realme" was made the sub-

to go as servants and though kidnapping and spiriting were strictly forbidden,¹⁷ the government lent its aid by giving legal sanction to a system of indenture and later established a registry office for "such servants as should voluntarily go or be sent to any of the plantations in America or elsewhere." This office had a chequered history, but seems to have functioned intermittently during the colonial period, though none of its records are known to be in existence. Local ports such as Bristol had each its own system, and under this arrangement thousands of indentured servants went to the American colonies.

Equally significant, though much less frequent, was the transportation of undesirable soldiers, political offenders, and those convicted of crime. On account of the peace with Spain many soldiers of fortune, disbanded or broken privates, sailors, and others, bred for war or themselves the product of war, were looking for active employment and, unable to settle down to the humdrum pursuits of peace, were in danger of becoming a public nuisance, if not a menace. The government was only too glad to get rid of men of this stamp and hustled many of them, who would in all probability have become burdens at home, off to America, where they succeeded, under the strenuous conditions of a sea-faring and pioneer life, in attaining a certain measure of respectability and even distinction in the New World. In later years transportation became a frequent form of punishment in a great variety of minor offenses, and was even suggested as a penalty in cases of smuggling, resisting officers,

ject of a royal proclamation, dated December 23, 1617. Both Winthrop and Gorges give reasons similar to those in the text. Gorges wrote in 1611, "This peaceable tyme affords no meanies of ymployments, to the Multitude of people that daylie doe increase and manie ar inforced (by necessitie) to seek some wayes to sustaine themselves, and although this (of all other her the worst), yet in the multitude there is no feeling of honestie or Religion (as in the multitude there is litle) even this Course is aplauded and therefore their number is liklier daylie to increase" (Baxter, *Gorges*, III, 172). In its petition to parliament of 1624 the Virginia Company gave as one of its objects, "The removinge of the Surcharge of necessitous people, the matter of fewell of daungerous insurrections, and thereby leavinge the greater plentie to susteyne those remayninge within the Land" (*Virginia Company Records*, II, 526).

¹⁷ A large number of kidnappings are recorded and the subject is treated in the preface to the *Calendar of State Papers, Colonial*, 1661-1668, xxvii-xxix. In 1618 a man was executed because, among other crimes, he had counterfeited the royal seal and had taken up "rich yeoman's daughters . . . to serve his Majesty for breeders in Virginia" (*Court and Times of James I. I.* 108).

and importing "alamodes or lustrings" contrary to law.¹⁸ Prisoners taken in war were despatched chiefly to Barbados and Virginia—Irish after Drogheda, Scots after Preston, Dunbar, Worcester, and Penruddock, and English after the Monmouth rebellion of 1685.¹⁹ Offenders against the Conventicle Act of 1664, chiefly Quakers convicted of attending field conventicles, were ordered to be handed over to the masters of ships sailing to America and delivered to the governors of the several plantations whither they were bound.

The transportation of those arrested for crime or condemned to death stands in another category. The laws of England were distinguished above those of all other countries by the large number of petty offenses for which the death penalty might be inflicted, and it was the lenient judge who substituted transportation for execution. Transportation of criminals was due also in part to the feeling that it was a waste to destroy so much good brawn and muscle, which might "yield a profitable service to the Commonwealth in

¹⁸ Resolution of a committee of the House of Commons, 1697-1698, "That such persons, their aiders and abettors, as shall be convicted of importing Alamodes or Lustrings contrary to law, and shall not within one month's time after such conviction pay the forfeiture imposed already by law shall be banished into some island of his Maj. plantations in America." *Report of the Committee to whom the Petition of the Royal Lustring Company of England was referred, etc.* (London, 1698), p. 53. The smuggling of goods and the obstruction of customs officers in Scotland went on until, in 1754, the High Court of Justiciary in Edinburgh ordered the banishment of three of the worst offenders and their transportation "to one or other of his Majesty's plantations," never to return to Scotland (Mackenzie, *Book of Arran*, p. 131). For transportation as a penalty for theft and rapine upon the northern borders of England, see Stock, *Debates*, I, 336-338, 423, II, 142, note 42, 411, 412, 417-418.

¹⁹ The transportation of political prisoners continued to a very late date. Stock, *Debates*, I, 247, 248-250, 252, 291 gives the debates in parliament after the insurrection of 1659. Harlow, *Barbados*, pp. 294-301, has an excellent account of transportation and the condition of labor in that colony before 1685. The political prisoners were far from willing to go and sometimes resisted very strenuously. In an unpublished newsletter, of date October 17, 1685, we are told that of the 800 deported to the West Indies after Monmouth's rebellion, 100 at Bristol, "aboard a ship to be transported to Nevis for Sir Wm Stapleton . . . threatened to knock the captain and his men on the head and go whither they pleased; but being forewarned he [the captain] hath taken occasion to prevent them" (Information furnished the *Times Literary Supplement*, February 24, 1921). On the same subject see 39 Eliz. c. 4; 18 Chas. II, c. 3; 31 Chas. II, c. 2; 4 Geo. III, c. 11, 1; *Calendar State Papers, Colonial*, 1661-1668, §§ 24, 32, 331, 769, 770, 772, 790, 791, 798; *Acts Privy Council, Colonial*, I, § 631; *Calendar State Papers, Domestic*, 1664-1665, p. 4; Harding, *Bristol and America*, p. 4.

parts abroad," when a new country might reclaim the criminal and make him or her (for women in large numbers were transported as well as men) a worthy subject of the king. But behind all else was the wish of the state to be quit of such undesirable people.²⁰ The practice dates from the very beginning of settlement and continued to the end of the colonial period, when Botany Bay in eastern Australia took the place of the American colonies.²¹

Two other powerful and impelling motives appear, essentially different from those which have already been presented. The first was that curious mingling of the religious with the pecuniary spirit, which had characterized the crusading movement and had accompanied the early activities of every colonizing nation, except perhaps the Dutch, who never seem to have possessed the desire to convert

²⁰ *Acts Privy Council, Colonial*, I, §§ 12, 13, 14, 50, etc. See also *ibid.*, 517. "This day several Lists of the Names of Prisoners remayning in the Prisons of Newgate, White-Lyon in Southwarke, Gate house at Westminster, New Bridewell (otherwise called the House of Correction) at St. James Clerkenwell, Bridewell in London, House of Correction at Westminster in Tottlefields, and the Prison of the Marshalsey were presented," etc. These prisoners were to be sent to Jamaica "for the advance of that plantation." Others also "of loose and idle conversation who remain in the said Prisons" were to go, thus "acquitting this Nation of them." In 1616 Gondomar wrote to Philip III, in order to impress upon him the undesirability of Virginia and its uselessness to Spain, saying that the colony was in such bad repute "that not a human being can be found to go there" and that "two Moorish thieves," who were granted the privilege of going to Virginia instead of being hanged, "replied at once, decidedly and with one accord, that they would much rather die on the gallows here, and quickly, than to die slowly so many deaths as was the case in Virginia" (Brown, *Genesis*, II, 739-740). Local English court records are filled with entries of reprieves, as, "15 James I Stephen Rogers: for killing George Watkins . . . He puts himself guilty, to be hung, reprieved after judgement at the instance of Sir Thomas Smith, Knt. for Virginia, because he is of the carpenter's art." "6 August, 16 James I, Ralph Brookes was reprieved, at Sherif Johnson's order, so that he should be sent to Virginia." *Middlesex Session Rolls*, II, 224, 225. See also article by A. E. Smith, "Transportation of Convicts," *American Historical Review*, xxxix, pp. 232-249.

Though transportation was a more welcome penalty than hanging it was considered a severe punishment to be avoided if possible. Among the Domestic Papers are many entries such as these: William Bird of St. Andrew's, Holborn, tailor, prayed for free pardon for his wife, whom he "maliciously indicted for stealing a silver watch," without the clause for transportation; and "Warrant for inserting in the next general pardon William Fellowes . . . without any condition of transportation." *Calendar of State Papers, Domestic*, 1682, p. 207; 1683, pp. 340, 385.

²¹ Flanagan, *History of New South Wales*, 2 vols., 1878.

anybody. This revival of the old crusading fervor in the guise of missionary enterprise finds expression in the pages of Hakluyt and in every statement of plan and purpose drawn up by the early companies and in every charter that was issued out of chancery at this period and for many years thereafter. In the preamble to the first letters patent erecting the Virginia companies of London and Plymouth, the hope was expressed that so noble a work would "hereafter tend to the glory of his divine Majesty, in propagating of Christian religion to such people as yet live in darkness and miserable ignorance of the true knowledge and worship of God," and might in time bring the infidels and savages "to human civilitie"²² and "to a settled and quiet government." "To carry the benefits of Christian faith," "to enlarge the bounds of the Christian religion" or, as the *True and Sincere Declaration* puts it, "to preach and baptize into *Christian Religion*, and by propagation of the *Gospell* to recover out of the armes of the Divell a number of poore and miserable souls, wrapt up in death, in almost invincible ignorance." This was one of the main objects, officially at least, in the minds of all who promoted voyages of exploration and settlement in the years from 1580 to 1640. "Lastly, and above all the rest," says a Bristol document of 1622, "by this opportunitie, there is no country within this realme, but by this course hath a speciall occasion and meanes presented unto them to dedicate their best service to the God of Heaven and Earth, by endeavoring to advance his glory in seeking how to settle the Christian ffaith in those hethenishe and desert places of the World; which whoe shall refuse to further, lett him undergoe the blame thereof himselfe."²³

²² "Civilitie" was a word frequently used in this connection, meaning "civil government" or "civilization," preferably that of the English type.

²³ Brown, *Genesis*, I, 53, 339; Hazard, *State Papers*, I, 184; *American Historical Review*, IV, 699. In its petition to the House of Commons in 1624, the Virginia Company placed first among its objects, "The Conversion of Salvages to Christianitie and establishinge the first Plantation of the reformed Religion" (*Virginia Company Records*, II, 526). The clergy of the day were very zealous for the propagation of the Gospel among the heathen Indians, sometimes alluded to as "rude warriors," and sometimes as "noble savages, Virginian princes" (Chapman, *Mask at Whitehall*, 1613). Crashaw, Crackenthorpe, Donne, and Price all refer to the need of planting the church in America and the conversion of the heathen "from the divill to God" (Brown, *Genesis*, I, 255-256, 312-315, 362; Donne, *Sermons*, clvi).

Of similar purpose, with less of the spirit of the crusader and more of the humility of the monk and the zeal of the inquisitor, was the religious impulse which drove thousands of men and women to the New World for the sake of conscience and conviction, in their desire to worship God in their own way, which they believed was the only true way. Pilgrims, Puritans, Roman Catholics, Quakers, Huguenots, Moravians, Mennonites, Mystics, and Pietists all took part in the settlement of America, each group primarily to escape from a land—England, France, Germany, and Austria—where they were unable, either because of opposition or actual persecution, to live their lives as they wished. In these lands they were unable to gather in meetings or churches of their own convictions, to order their social and family relations according to what they believed to be the purpose of God, or to control the opinions and practices of others, who were everywhere in the majority, in matters of ecclesiastical polity, religious creeds, and political government. No one of these religious groups formed a completely homogeneous body of men and women, of entirely like minds, influenced by a common religious purpose, for the Reformation had thrown the European world into a state of religious confusion and disorder. Even the Pilgrims were accompanied to America by a large number of those who were influenced by other motives than soul conviction; while the covenanted Puritans, formally admitted to church membership, constituted but a small part of that great body of colonists who laid the foundations of the Massachusetts Bay colony. The remainder, though undoubtedly in sympathy with the main Puritan ideals, were far from always seeing eye to eye with their leaders and were always possessed of as strong a desire for land and homes as for freedom of religious thought and opportunity for religious worship. No single impulse was at work driving these men and women to cross the sea and no single group of motives was common to all who for religious reasons undertook the task of settlement. Could we penetrate the minds of the humbler folk among them, whose thoughts have remained unrecorded—the followers not the leaders in the great migration—we should doubtless find that the burdens and necessities of life determined their decisions quite as often as did high ideals in government and religion. That the great majority of them were religious in spirit and submissive to what they be-

lieved to be the will of God cannot be doubted, but discontent with the material conditions surrounding their lives was always a potent influence leading these men and women to change their environment and to hope for better things in other climes than their own.

The whole idea of colonization, as worked out by the English in America, was new. Neither Portugal, Spain, Holland, nor France had been interested to transport men, women, and children overseas for other ends than trade and profit. There were no precedents for plantations, properly so called, in which homes were erected, tillage begun, domestic life cultivated, and the means wherewith to continue a separate social and economic life brought into being. English merchants had settled on the Continent in 1407 and again in 1505 and had been granted by the crown certain privileges for the purpose of maintaining good government among themselves,²⁴ but such partnerships did not constitute a plantation. Roberval had in his company the makings of a plantation, but its members were of too mongrel a sort to succeed. Gilbert had planned a colony in Newfoundland, but his associates were men only, rough, undisciplined and restless, not of the sort from which thrifty law-abiding settlers are made, and his experiment came to a fatal end. Raleigh went a long way farther, when in 1587 he attempted to found on American soil a colony that had within itself all the rudiments of self-perpetuation and the promise of a continuous existence. He provided families, thus assuring to the settlement, as he hoped, children and grandchildren to carry on the work, and he issued instructions for political government in order to give efficiency to the management of plantation affairs. His colony had within it the seeds of permanence and had it been located in a better place, it might in time have grown into something akin to a settled, self-governing community. It contained husbands and wives, mothers and nursing children; in it births took place, baptisms were performed, letters written and tokens sent, and within its borders peaceful industry prevailed and order reigned. This early experiment was planned in the spirit of wisdom and represented a new departure in colonizing methods. Its failure was the failure of circumstance. Just how much it contributed to the later successful efforts at colonization it is impossible to say. It embodied a new idea, the idea of a plantation

²⁴ Lucas, *The Beginnings of English Overseas Enterprise*, pp. 61-62, 86, 92.

designed for permanent not temporary residence, the energies of which were to be devoted not merely to the finding of gold, although that hope was always present, or to the carrying on of trade, although that too was a major object in all the seventeenth century settlements, but also to the raising of crops, the breeding of stock, and the accumulation of a surplus, within a definite area of land, hitherto unoccupied, fertile, and capable of profitable tillage. In this sense, Plymouth and Massachusetts Bay, although very unsatisfactory colonies from the British point of view, were farther advanced as plantations than was Virginia during the first twelve years of its existence.)

A notable experiment along these lines was made in Ireland, at about the same time with the settlement of America.²⁵ Ireland was a fertile land, undeveloped, and near at hand. It was Roman Catholic in faith and tribal in its social structure, and in consequence invited colonization, partly as a phase of English policy, in order to introduce a Protestant element into the land, and partly as an agrarian necessity, in order to utilize the wide areas of land—then but sparsely occupied and tilled and commercially undeveloped under the pastoral and tribal systems—that were wanted to meet the land deficiency in England.

In the sixteenth century Queen Elizabeth and Sir Henry Sidney had been exceeding zealous for the "plantation" of Ireland, a term which meant to them the rooting out of the natives from the soil, and among the early promoters was the same Sir Humphrey Gilbert, who had been interested in the Northwest Passage and in Newfoundland. But this early effort came to nothing, and though a number of similar plans were inaugurated during the later years of Elizabeth's reign,²⁶ no results of importance were accomplished until after the accession of James I. The early schemes had related

²⁵ Bonn, *Die englische Kolonisation in Irland*; Cheyney, "Some English Conditions surrounding the Settlement of Virginia," *American Historical Review*, XII, 514 ff.; *History of England*, II, ch. XLIII; Bagwell, *England under the Stuarts and during the Interregnum*, 3 vols.; Maxwell, "Colonization of Ulster," *History*, July, October, 1916, pp. 86-96, 147-156; Dunlop, "Sixteenth Century Schemes for the Plantation of Ulster," *Scottish Historical Review*, January, 1925; Hill, *Plantation of Ulster*; Kernohan, *Planting of County Derry; Londonderry and the London Companies, 1609-1629* (1928); Carr, *Select Charters of Trading Companies*, pp. lxxi-lxxxiii.

²⁶ Dunlop, in the *Scottish Historical Review*.

chiefly to Munster, though three attempts had been made to gain a footing of Ulster,²⁷ where a few individual grantees had tried to establish themselves and their tenants in the face of bitter opposition on the part of the tribal chiefs. But with the flight in 1607 of O'Neill and O'Donnel, earls of Tyrone and Tyrconnel,²⁸ and the escheating of the greater part of Ulster to the English king (an incident in Irish history that has led to prolonged controversy as to its justice), that province of the north became the center of interest. Definite plans were laid for planting English colonists there, "to the great increase of his Majesty's revenue and to settle the countries perpetually in the crown." Many of the arguments that were advanced for Irish colonization were exactly the same as those that were used in promoting settlement in America.²⁹ It was argued that once the island was properly "planted" it would provide an outpost against Spain, which country had several times used Ireland as a convenient point of attack upon England; that such plantations would be a means of relieving England of her own excess urban population and social congestion and would offer an opportunity to reward those who had claims upon the English king, which could not be satisfied out of the meagre exchequer; that a new settlement in Ireland would open a market for English goods, should tribal

²⁷ Ulster was the strongest, richest, and most Irish of the provinces. Since the end of the sixteenth century many Scottish highlanders had settled there, led by the Macdonalds. Efforts had been made by the English to drive them out, because of the alliance which had existed at the time between Scotland and Ireland, but after the personal union of the crowns of England and Scotland in 1603, the situation changed and from that time forward Scottish migration to Ulster was encouraged. John Chamberlain wrote to Sir Dudley Carleton, January 23, 1609, "The [Privy] Council have been very busy of late how to plant Ireland with English and Scots" (Huntington Library, HM, 2904).

In the Huntington Library are many papers (Ellesmere, 1711-1741, notably no. 1736, "A Demonstration," 1602) relating to these early attempts to colonize Ireland, chiefly toward the end of Elizabeth's reign. They concern the allotted lands of Munster, the re-peopling of those lands, their division into seignories, and the conditions to be imposed upon those who shared in their distribution. These papers deserve study, as the tenures introduced into Ireland were the model for those of a seignorial sort that were set up by the English in America.

²⁸ Wilson, "Flight of the Earls," *Nineteenth Century*, 55, p. 479; Kernohan, *The Planting of the County Derry*.

²⁹ Doubtless many of those who took part in the settlement of Virginia had had experience in Ireland. In 1620 one Captain William Newce was encouraged by the Virginia Company in a project to send colonists to Virginia, because he had been successful in doing the same for Ireland. *Virginia Company Records*, I, 446-447.

ways be followed by "civilitie"; and, lastly, that the new Ireland would be a source of wealth for England and English merchants. King James urged on the undertaking and appointed three commissions (1608, 1609, 1610) to advance it, considering Ireland as his special care and eager to complete the unifying process of the three kingdoms. (His interest, however, was not so much the furthering of English expansion as the enhancing of his own personal dignity.)

Under the direction of Sir Arthur Chichester, lord deputy of Ireland, the work of "plantation" went steadily forward. Chichester was an able man, loyal to his duty, and honestly desirous of suppressing disorder and of bringing the country as quickly as possible out of its tribal state into one that was "regular," that is, Anglicized, settled, and peaceful. He had the inevitable mental limitations of all Englishmen of his day, in deeming English institutions capable of being transferred to any part of the world and of being successfully implanted in any land from which the native stock had been removed. But he was gifted also with a considerable amount of intelligence and, though without sympathy for the "barbarous" Irish, as he called them, he did believe in recognizing their ancient rights. But in this laudable belief he was overruled by the commissioners, whose plans took little account of native land claims. The Ulster territory was systematically partitioned, and the process of breaking up the Irish tribal institutions was hastened by sending out of the country to serve in foreign wars the warrior class, the "swordsmen," who formed the retinue of the chieftains and managed to live largely on their neighbors.

In promoting emigration to Ireland the Privy Council made every effort to enlist the support of the powerful livery companies of the City of London³⁰—just as the Virginia Company was doing at the same time—and in 1609 entrusted to them the settlement of

³⁰ Huntington Library, Ellesmere, 1740. Articles agreed upon, January 18, 1609 between the Privy Council on behalf of the king and the committee appointed by vote of the Common Council of the City of London on behalf of the Mayor and Commonalty, concerning a plantation in a part of the province of Ulster. The City was to spend £20,000, to build 200 houses in Derry, and to be ready to provide 300 more. *Londonderry and the London Companies*, pp. 13-18. Chichester Philips, the grandson of Thomas, the first superintendent, said in 1682, that his grandfather charged the society with having broken its covenants with the king and that the latter on being prosecuted was fined £60,000. Thomas Philips his father, who conducted the prosecution, spent all his personal estate in so doing. *Calendar State Papers, Domestic*, 1682, p. 309.

Derry, henceforth to be called Londonderry. They caused to be drawn up a statement, known as the "Motives and Reasons to induce the City of London to undertake the Plantation in the North of Ireland," that contains inducements not unlike those offered the same year by the men who were engaged in colonizing Virginia. In 1613, James I granted a charter to the Londoners, under the name of the Society of the Governor and Assistants of London of the New Plantation in Ulster, which was, however, quite different from that granted to the Virginia Company in 1612, though the position of the superintendent in Ireland, Sir Thomas Philips, was in some respects similar to that of a colonial governor and the attitude of the company to the king not unlike that of a private colony in America resisting the encroachment of the royal authority.³¹

The mainstay of the Irish colonizing movement was not, however, the London companies, but the fifty-nine Scottish "undertakers," as they were called, selected by King James, who not unnaturally had a partiality for his own countrymen, from a list submitted at his request by the Scottish Privy Council. To each of these "undertakers" a grant was made of from 1000 to 3000 acres, totaling 81,000 in all. During the years from 1609 to 1625, they planted Ulster province with thousands of tenants, the ancestors of the Scots Irish or Ulster Scots of our colonial history, and they did this at a more rapid rate than the Virginia Company was able to stock Virginia. Many of those interested in Virginia were interested in Ireland also—Sir Thomas Smith, Sir John Popham, and Sir Francis Bacon, the last named of whom, though not concerned with Virginia except as a subscriber to the stock in 1609, had been influential in securing the patent for the London and Bristol Company for the planting of Newfoundland in 1610.³² Chichester remarked

³¹ The parallel need not be pressed too far. It was, however, noticed at the time. "A motion was made," says an entry in the record book of the Virginia Company, "that for soe much as the Companies of London . . . had adventured good sums of monny toward the Plantation in Virginia some course might be thought uppon to excite them to make some proffits of the Lands due unto them, they having alredie done the like in Ireland with verie good successe." *Virginia Company Records*, I, 489.

³² Sir Francis Bacon in his essay on plantations says that Popham labored greatly in behalf of the Irish scheme and wisely too, since that plantation or any plantation was valuable that made it possible for many families to receive sustentation and fortunes and for England to discharge from her own bounds and

that he would rather labor with his hands in Ireland than "dance and sing in Virginia," and Bacon thought that Ireland was the more promising land of the two. It was many years before the American colonies—distant, but little known, and unprotected both by sea and land—were able to make a sufficiently strong popular appeal to attract settlers in large numbers. (Cromwell tried to persuade the New Englanders to migrate to Ireland in 1650) and even as late as 1680, Sir William Petty, who had received lands in Ireland under the Cromwellian settlement, queried "whether it be better to transplant out of England into Ireland or America?"⁸³

This attitude is not surprising, for men of the day, until well on toward the end of the seventeenth century, had very little knowledge of America. Of its geography, its flora and fauna, and the conditions of life in either New England, the South, or the West Indies, they knew vaguely if at all, for such of them as possessed information—and the number must have been very small—acquired what they had from sources that were never very reliable and frequently wholly erroneous. Some may have had a measure of familiarity with the leading topographical features, knowing of the existence of a great western land barrier, with large rivers flowing from it into the ocean, but even these had no comprehension of its length and its breadth. For many years even the best of them believed that through the barrier was a passage leading to the South Sea and to China, and during the entire colonial period even well-informed men were very ignorant regarding the details of physical features and boundary lines. Many, aroused by the reports of gold and silver obtained by

from Scotland so many people that were they to remain they might be the cause of future trouble. "Soe," he says addressing the king, "shall your Majesty in this work have a double commoditie in the avoydance of people here and in the making use of them there." He lays stress on the fact that Ireland was a weak spot in England's defense and was needed for England's safety and that under English control it would be sure to become a source of profit to the realm. He urges that the "undertakers" be encouraged and wishes "a closer correspondency between the commission [in Ireland] and the Counsell of Plantations [in England], wherein," he adds, "I warrant myself by the president [precedent] of a like Counsell of Plantations for Virginia, an enterprise differing as much from this [of Ireland] as Amadis de Gawle differs from Caesar's Commentaries." There is a manuscript copy of this essay in the Huntington Library, El. 1747, with several variant readings.

⁸³ *Petty Papers*, II, 109-110.

Spain after the discovery of the mines of Potosí in 1545, dreamed of similar mines in the northern continent, and for a century their descendants sought to find them. Of the products of the soil they continued to think in terms oriental and tropical, and of animal life in terms of strange creatures both on the land and in the sea. Many of them had a more certain knowledge of the West Indies, because English seamen had been preying on Spanish towns and fleets there for thirty years before the settlement of America, and from narratives and descriptions they had doubtless acquired a fairly accurate acquaintance with Caribbean routes and waters. As time went on and new routes were discovered, charts and maps drawn, and the arts of navigation improved, knowledge increased. With the widening of the scope of commercial enterprise, capital was diverted from privateering and illegitimate trade into the channels of a sounder and more substantial business activity, and, in consequence, pictures of America became more exact and the former unreal and fantastic world, inhabited by strange beings and alive with dangers and terrifying phenomena, gradually vanished. X

Men prominent in official and mercantile life began to seek, early in the seventeenth century, new opportunities for the employment of capital and saw in the West a field of commercial profit, rivaling and supplementing the advantages of the East. Through the influence of such important personages as Sir John Popham, lord chief justice of the king's bench, Sir Thomas Smith, head of the East India Company, and Sir Ferdinando Gorges, governor of the fort at Plymouth—all leaders in many public and private enterprises—attention was called for the first time to the possibility of utilizing capital for the promotion of plantations in America as well as in Ireland. Whatever had been done thus far in that direction had been the work of private individuals, depending on unassisted and unprotected private resources. Men of the Popham-Smith type, with the example of the great trading companies before them, saw the value of employing a similar form of organization—the legal chartered company—for the purpose of advancing settlement as well as trade. To them private purses were “cowlde comfortes to adventures” and had been “fownde fatall to all interprices hitherto undertaken, by reason of delaies, jeloces, and unwillingnes to backe that project which succeeded not in the first attempt.” They believed it

“honorable for a state rather to backe an exploite by a public consent then by a private monopoly.” “Where Collonies are fownded for a public we[a]ll,” these advocates continued, “ma[n]ye continewe in better obedience, and become more industrious, then where private men are absolute signors of a vioage, for-as-much as better men of behavior and qualitie will engage themselves at a publique service, which carrieth more reputacon with it, then a private, which is for the most parte ignominious in the end.”⁸⁴

This statement, by whomsoever written, was an appeal for funds, in the form of a joint-stock, and for the enlistment of organized capital and the organized company in a colonizing enterprise under the control of the state. There had been an approximation to such a plan earlier, when Gilbert, twenty years before, had invited a group of associates, chiefly of Southampton, organized on a voluntary joint-stock basis, to coöperate in a voyage of trade and colonization.⁸⁵ Raleigh, too, a few years later, apparently realizing after the failure of his last expedition that his career as a colonizer was at an end, made over (March 7, 1589) some of the privileges of his patent to nineteen merchants and others of London, among whom were Sir Thomas Smith and Richard Hakluyt.⁸⁶ These men came together and formed a voluntary joint-stock association for the purpose of accepting Raleigh's offer and furnishing merchandise, munitions, victuals, and other necessaries in exchange for rights of trade and other perquisites. Hoping to gain their support in carrying on what he had begun, Raleigh gave them £100, admitted them to the freedom of the “City of Raleigh,” granted them “free trade and traffique for all manner of merchandize or commodities whatsoever” in his “seignory of Virginia”; and promised to obtain for them, if he could, legal incorporation as a trading company under royal letters patent. Though the time for a trading company to take the lead in colonizing America had not yet come, it is nevertheless significant that Raleigh or someone else should have conceived the idea of a company as early as 1589 and that some of those who offered to become coöperators in his enterprise should have been influential in bringing about the incorporation of the Virginia

⁸⁴ Brown, *Genesis*, I, 37-38.

⁸⁵ *Calendar State Papers, Colonial*, 1675-1676, §§ 18, 19.

⁸⁶ Hazard, *State Papers*, I, 42-45 (taken from Hakluyt).

Company seventeen years later. It is quite possible that did we know the names of all the associates we would find that more of them had a part in promoting the actual settlement of America in 1606.

¶ Thus the early seventeenth century presents a shifting scene and a new outlook. Men who had turned their eyes to the East were turning them to the West as well, interested not only in the expansion of trade but in the expansion of England also. It was a period when much that was medieval was running concurrently with the beginnings of modern things. While clinging to the past men were also engaging in undertakings that were opening a new and unknown world. The times though confused resounded with activities pregnant with purpose and brilliant results. Political and social conditions were in a state of flux, marking a conflict between the old and the new. Feudal tenures, adapting themselves to a new agriculture, were altering the status of class and caste. The constitutional government of the Stuarts was entering upon its unsuccessful struggle of eighty-five years to maintain the divinity of kingship. Medieval methods and the medieval conception of the social order were threatened at their foundations by the forces of a new individualism; in fact, medieval habits and standards were breaking, though they were not yet broken and were not to be broken for many a long year.

The period was one of definite constructive effort in many directions. Capitalism and commerce, the roots and sources of the mercantilist policy, were beginning their long careers as increasingly dominant factors in the world's affairs. Capital, to which Englishmen owed their success in the field of foreign trade, was also to be of first importance in the field of colonization. But English capitalists were not confining their attention merely to that narrow fringe of territory along the Atlantic seaboard which later became the seat of the original thirteen colonies. Breaking through the barriers that hedged in their medieval life and with the boldness of a people released from the limitations of their insular existence, they were on the alert to take advantage of whatever new worlds and new waters had to offer. During the very years when Jamestown, Plymouth, and Massachusetts Bay were being settled, venturesome men were sailing north, south, and west across the ocean, seeking opportunities for the employment of the wealth of the day wherever they

could find an opening. From the Straits of Gibraltar and the Wine islands along the African coast to the Gulf of Guinea, and from Hudson Bay to the Caribbean isles and the Orinoco and Amazon rivers they were coursing in their small craft, searching vainly for gold and profitably for trade, and enduring untold hardships in the effort to exploit the resources they believed available in these distant lands.

These unities of origin and wide-spread seagoing activities are not apparent when the colonization of America is viewed solely from the American end and their significance is lost when the subject is treated only in the American field. Those who read American colonial history in the seventeenth century merely because of their interest in the history of the United States will miss much of the charm and fascination of the story and will never be able to grasp its meaning or the place of our colonies in the general history of the time.

The following pages will show that while those who engaged in the great adventure as promoters or participants were sometimes antagonistic and competitive, they were more often coöperative, with their efforts and interests frequently interlocking at critical points. Motives were strangely different but methods were much the same, and the Englishmen who came to America did not forget that England was their native land and they, though transplanted, were Englishmen still.

But whatever the motor power that impelled them to cross the seas, neither precursor nor pioneer, profiteer nor promoter, Pilgrim nor Puritan could have accomplished his purpose without the aid of the funds that had accumulated during this period in the hands of the capitalistic classes of southern and southwestern England. It is true that the mercantilist groups were scattered and formed but a small part of the total population of the kingdom, but they were a power in the rising towns of the south—London and the outports of the West Country—and were working together toward common ends—the increase of wealth, the financial solvency of the state, and the glory of the kingdom. Despite the diversities of origin and the divergencies of purpose among those who at this early time took part in the settlement of America—actuated as they were by commercial, religious, and proprietary aims—the colonizing movement

had unity and a oneness of being largely due to the coöperative activity of the mercantile and capitalist classes. Enthusiasm, religious zeal, and stoutness of heart might stir men's souls to action, but they could not meet the material needs that overseas colonies demanded. Loftiness of purpose might override men's fears of the dimly known western lands and conquer their reluctance to embark on dangerous voyages, but they could not provide ships and equipment, employ captains and seamen, and sustain communities of settlers until these had established themselves firmly in the new soil. The Virginia Company failed because of financial difficulties; the Pilgrims might never have made their famous journey had not London merchants financed their undertaking; the settlement of Massachusetts Bay is said to have cost its promoters £200,000, largely supplied by the merchant-capitalists of the company. English-America would hardly have been settled at this time had not the period of occupation coincided with the era of capitalism in the first full flush of its power, an era, the origin of which dates from the years of Elizabeth's reign and of which we of the twentieth century may be witnessing the transformation or the end.

FRANCIS PARKMAN

THE SAME NEW ENGLAND which produced Emerson, Hawthorne, and Melville also contributed some of America's greatest historians. The most important of these—William Prescott, John Motley, and Francis Parkman—had much more in common than a similar geographical origin. If Boston had an aristocracy, they were all members of it, born to social position, educated at Harvard, provided with the means of pursuing scholarly careers without having to worry about earning a livelihood. Insofar as they thought about politics, they shared a distrust in the more extreme manifestations of democracy at the same time that they prided themselves upon living in a country with a free government.

Although history is now often regarded as a social science, these men were reared in a tradition which was more apt to consider it as literature. As cosmopolites, they looked more to British authors such as Macaulay and Gibbon with their grand themes and narrative sweep than to American chroniclers of dry facts and detailed minutiae. What these New Englanders lacked in philosophic depth and moral insight they compensated for in drama and vividness. As practitioners of literature rather than of science, they combined a desire to express themselves correctly with a talent for expression that has not since been surpassed in American historical writing.

Even though he has been called "the last and the greatest of the Brahmins," Francis Parkman was, in many ways, too much an individual to be confined to the aristocratic Boston mold. If

he followed the conventional pattern as the grandson of a successful merchant and the son of a Unitarian minister, he quickly decided that his career would be devoted to neither of the Massachusetts staples—wealth and piety. It was perhaps a typical impulse that turned him to history, but the writing was not to be based solely upon the musty records of the Boston Athenaeum and the Massachusetts Historical Society. Research as Parkman conceived it obliged the historian to be a vigorous man of action. Having selected as his subject the French and Indian War, Parkman considered it a joyful duty to tramp through miles of wilderness in northwest New England and southern Canada. If he was to tell of the battles around Lake Champlain, he must visit the exact site of the old forts and see where Montcalm executed his strategy. Yet even this was not enough. How could he describe the savage Indians of 1756 by observing their domesticated descendants of the 1840's? Only in the Far West could one find natives as untouched by white civilization as were Wolfe's opponents. And so Parkman abandoned the ways of Boston to don a frontiersman's costume and live for months with the Indians of the great plains, sharing their hardships and their feasts of baked dog.

If this was not the current practice among scholars, neither was Parkman's scrupulous regard for printed and manuscript sources typical of the school of literary historians with which he is often grouped. Actually, Parkman is something of a transition figure in historical writing, halfway between Prescott and the so-called "scientific" historians of the late nineteenth century. His best work was not produced until 1884, more than forty years after the publication of Prescott's *The Conquest of Mexico*.

Parkman had not progressed very deeply into his subject before he decided that the French and Indian War would be merely the climax of a broad comparative study of the French and English colonies in North America throughout the hundred and fifty years of their existence. In searching for the cause of the ultimate defeat of the French, he looked beyond such super-

ficialities as the alleged superiority of British military leaders and founded his analysis upon the basic formative influences in the two groups of colonies. Whereas the French discouraged colonial growth through absolute government, the freedom permitted by the English acted as a magnet for prospective settlers. Whereas in the French colonies the Church insisted upon limiting immigration to persons of the accepted faith, the British colonies found room for dissenters and Anglicans alike. Thus, Wolfe's triumph over Montcalm on the Plains of Abraham was the victory of liberty over authority, of the ideal of toleration over the principle of uniformity. If the outcome of the battle summarized past developments, it also indicated the path of the future and the reasons for American greatness.

Perhaps this will seem a curious theme for one who exulted over Whig triumphs in Massachusetts and looked unhappily upon Irish immigrants within sight of aristocratic Beacon Hill. It will seem less curious if one scratches below the surface of Parkman the conservative to discover what seemed to him the basic characteristics of a desirable society. Distrustful of unlimited political democracy, he conceived of rule by the well-born and the able not as a means of exploitation but as the best defense of the liberties of all.

Yet Parkman was not eager to embrace the full implications of his historical theme. Perhaps his feelings are reflected in his obvious admiration for the noble characters of his story—French as well as English. A fundamental prejudice is revealed in his assumption of the racial inferiority of the Indians, which corrupted a sincere effort to paint a true picture of them. The fact that Parkman's work is poorest when it deals with social history and best when it involves heroic personalities placed in a dramatic setting may have resulted from aristocratic tastes; probably it owed more to a historical conception which was romantic and literary rather than sociological. Yet the Brahmin is less conspicuous than the American in Parkman's writings. The romance

grows from a passionate and intense pride in the achievements of a free people.

Even though Parkman's penchant for drama was disciplined and restrained by a scholarly respect for facts, more learned works on individual aspects of the French and English in North America have already appeared. But it seems most unlikely that the whole story will ever again be told with the vividness and literary skill with which Parkman fashioned his historical epic.

The Combatants

THE LATTER half of the reign of George II. was one of the most prosaic periods in English history. The civil wars and the Restoration had had their enthusiasms, religion and liberty on one side, and loyalty on the other; but the old fires declined when William III. came to the throne, and died to ashes under the House of Hanover. Loyalty lost half its inspiration when it lost the tenet of the divine right of kings; and nobody could now hold that tenet with any consistency except the defeated and despairing Jacobites. Nor had anybody as yet proclaimed the rival dogma of the divine right of the people. The reigning monarch held his crown neither of God nor of the nation, but of a parliament controlled by a ruling class. The Whig aristocracy had done a priceless service to English liberty. It was full of political capacity, and by no means void of patriotism; but it was only a part of the national life. Nor was it at present moved by political emotions in any high sense. It had done its great work when it expelled the Stuarts and placed William of Orange on the throne; its ascendancy was now complete. The Stuarts had received their death-blow at Culloden; and nothing was left to the dominant party but to dispute on subordinate questions, and

From Montcalm and Wolfe by Francis Parkman.

contend for office among themselves. The Tory squires sulked in their country-houses, hunted foxes, and grumbled against the reigning dynasty, yet hardly wished to see the nation convulsed by a counter-revolution and another return of the Stuarts.

If politics had run to commonplace, so had morals; and so too had religion. Despondent writers of the day even complained that British courage had died out. There was little sign to the common eye that, under a dull and languid surface, forces were at work preparing a new life, material, moral, and intellectual. As yet, Whitefield and Wesley had not wakened the drowsy conscience of the nation, nor the voice of William Pitt roused it like a trumpet-peal.

It was the unwashed and unsavory England of Hogarth, Fielding, Smollett, and Sterne; of Tom Jones, Squire Western, Lady Bellaston, and Parson Adams; of the "Rake's Progress" and "Marriage a la Mode"; of the lords and ladies who yet live in the undying gossip of Horace Walpole, be-powdered, be-patched, and be-rouged, flirting at masked balls, playing cards till daylight, retailing scandal, and exchanging double meanings. Beau Nash reigned king over the gaming-tables of Bath; the ostrich-plumes of great ladies mingled with the peacock-feathers of courtesans in the rotunda at Ranelagh Gardens; and young lords in velvet suits and embroidered ruffles played away their patrimony at White's Chocolate-House or Arthur's Club. Vice was bolder than to-day, and manners more courtly, perhaps, but far more coarse.

The humbler clergy were thought—sometimes with reason—to be no fit company for gentlemen, and country parsons drank their ale in the squire's kitchen. The passenger-wagon spent the better part of a fortnight in creeping from London to York. Travellers carried pistols against footpads and mounted highwaymen. Dick Turpin and Jack Sheppard were popular heroes. Tyburn counted its victims by scores; and as yet no Howard had appeared to reform the inhuman abominations of the prisons.

The middle class, though fast rising in importance, was feebly and imperfectly represented in Parliament. The boroughs were controlled by the nobility and gentry, or by corporations open to influence or bribery. Parliamentary corruption had been reduced to a system; and offices, sinecures, pensions, and gifts of money were freely used to keep ministers in power. The great offices of State

were held by men sometimes of high ability, but of whom not a few divided their lives among politics, cards, wine, horse-racing, and women, till time and the gout sent them to the waters of Bath. The dull, pompous, and irascible old King had two ruling passions,—money, and his Continental dominions of Hanover. His elder son, the Prince of Wales, was a centre of opposition to him. His younger son, the Duke of Cumberland, a character far more pronounced and vigorous, had won the day at Culloden, and lost it at Fontenoy; but whether victor or vanquished, had shown the same vehement bull-headed courage, of late a little subdued by fast-growing corpulency. The Duke of Newcastle, the head of the government, had gained power and kept it by his rank and connections, his wealth, his county influence, his control of boroughs, and the extraordinary assiduity and devotion with which he practised the arts of corruption. Henry Fox, grasping, unscrupulous, with powerful talents, a warm friend after his fashion, and a most indulgent father; Carteret, with his strong, versatile intellect and jovial intrepidity; the two Townshends, Mansfield, Halifax, and Chesterfield,—were conspicuous figures in the politics of the time. One man towered above them all. Pitt had many enemies and many critics. They called him ambitious, audacious, arrogant, theatrical, pompous, domineering; but what he has left for posterity is a loftiness of soul, undaunted courage, fiery and passionate eloquence, proud incorruptibility, domestic virtues rare in his day, unbounded faith in the cause for which he stood, and abilities which without wealth or strong connections were destined to place him on the height of power. The middle class, as yet almost voiceless, looked to him as its champion; but he was not the champion of a class. His patriotism was as comprehensive as it was haughty and unbending. He lived for England, loved her with intense devotion, knew her, believed in her, and made her greatness his own; or rather, he was himself England incarnate.

The nation was not then in fighting equipment. After the peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, the army within the three kingdoms had been reduced to about eighteen thousand men. Added to these were the garrisons of Minorca and Gibraltar, and six or seven independent companies in the American colonies. Of sailors, less than seventeen thousand were left in the Royal Navy. Such was the condition of

England on the eve of one of the most formidable wars in which she was ever engaged.

Her rival across the Channel was drifting slowly and unconsciously towards the cataclysm of the Revolution; yet the old monarchy, full of the germs of decay, was still imposing and formidable. The House of Bourbon held the three thrones of France, Spain, and Naples; and their threatened union in a family compact was the terror of European diplomacy. At home France was the foremost of the Continental nations; and she boasted herself second only to Spain as a colonial power. She disputed with England the mastery of India, owned the islands of Bourbon and Mauritius, held important possessions in the West Indies, and claimed all North America except Mexico and a strip of sea-coast. Her navy was powerful, her army numerous and well appointed; but she lacked the great commanders of the last reign. Soubise, Maillebois, Contades, Broglie, and Clermont were but weak successors of Condé, Turenne, Vendôme, and Villars. Marshal Richelieu was supreme in the arts of gallantry, and more famous for conquests of love than of war. The best generals of Louis XV. were foreigners. Lowendal sprang from the royal house of Denmark; and Saxe, the best of all, was one of the three hundred and fifty-four bastards of Augustus and Strong, Elector of Saxony and King of Poland. He was now, 1750, dying at Chambord, his iron constitution ruined by debaucheries.

The triumph of the Bourbon monarchy was complete. The government had become one great machine of centralized administration, with a king for its head; though a king who neither could nor would direct it. All strife was over between the Crown and the nobles; feudalism was robbed of its vitality, and left the mere image of its former self, with nothing alive but its abuses, its caste privileges, its exactions, its pride and vanity, its power to vex and oppress. In England, the nobility were a living part of the nation, and if they had privileges, they paid for them by constant service to the State; in France, they had no political life, and were separated from the people by sharp lines of demarcation. From warrior chiefs, they had changed to courtiers. Those of them who could afford it, and many who could not, left their estates to the mercy of stewards,

and gathered at Versailles to revolve about the throne as glittering satellites, paid in pomp, empty distinctions, or rich sinecures, for the power they had lost. They ruined their vassals to support the extravagance by which they ruined themselves. Such as stayed at home were objects of pity and scorn. "Out of your Majesty's presence," said one of them, "we are not only wretched, but ridiculous."

Versailles was like a vast and gorgeous theatre, where all were actors and spectators at once; and all played their parts to perfection. Here swarmed by thousands this silken nobility, whose ancestors rode cased in iron. Pageant followed pageant. A picture of the time preserves for us an evening in the great hall of the Château, where the King, with piles of louis d'or before him, sits at a large oval green table, throwing the dice, among princes and princesses, dukes, and duchesses, ambassadors, marshals of France, and a vast throng of courtiers, like an animated bed of tulips; for men and women alike wear bright and varied colors. Above are the frescoes of Le Brun; around are walls of sculptured and inlaid marbles, with mirrors that reflect the restless splendors of the scene and the blaze of chandeliers, sparkling with crystal pendants. Pomp, magnificence, profusion, were a business and a duty at the Court. Versailles was a gulf into which the labor of France poured its earnings; and it was never full.

Here the graces and charms were a political power. Women had prodigious influence, and the two sexes were never more alike. Men not only dressed in colors, but they wore patches and carried muffs. The robust qualities of the old nobility still lingered among the exiles of the provinces, while at Court they had melted into refinements tainted with corruption. Yet if the butterflies of Versailles had lost virility, they had not lost courage. They fought as gayly as they danced. In the halls which they haunted of yore, turned now into a historical picture-gallery, one sees them still, on the canvas of Lefant, Lepaon, or Vernet, facing death with careless gallantry, in their small three-cornered hats, powdered perukes, embroidered coats, and lace ruffles. Their valets served them ices in the trenches, under the cannon besieged towns. A troop of actors formed part of the army-train of Marshal Saxe. At night there was a comedy, a ballet, or a ball, and in the morning a battle. Saxe, however, himself a sturdy German, while he recognized their fighting value, and knew

well how to make the best of it, sometimes complained that they were volatile, excitable, and difficult to manage.

The weight of the Court, with its pomps, luxuries, and wars, bore on the classes least able to support it. The poorest were taxed most; the richest not at all. The nobles, in the main were free from imposts. The clergy, who had vast possessions, were wholly free, though they consented to make voluntary gifts to the Crown; and when, in a time of emergency, the minister Machault required them, in common with all others hitherto exempt, to contribute a twentieth of their revenues to the charges of government, they passionately refused, declaring that they would obey God rather than the King. The cultivators of the soil were ground to the earth by a threefold extortion,—the seigniorial dues, the tithes of the Church, and the multiplied exactions of the Crown, enforced with merciless rigor by the farmers of the revenue, who enriched themselves by wringing the peasant on the one hand, and cheating the King on the other. A few great cities shone with all that is most brilliant in society, intellect, and concentrated wealth; while the country that paid the costs lay in ignorance and penury, crushed and despairing. On the inhabitants of towns, too, the demands of the tax-gatherer were extreme; but here the immense vitality of the French people bore up the burden. While agriculture languished, and intolerable oppression turned peasants into beggars or desperadoes; while the clergy were sapped by corruption, and the nobles enervated by luxury and ruined by extravagance,—the middle class was growing in thrift and strength. Arts and commerce prospered, and the sea-ports were alive with foreign trade. Wealth tended from all sides towards the centre. The King did not love his capital; but he and his favorites amused themselves with adorning it. Some of the chief embellishments that make Paris what it is to-day—the Place de la Concorde, the Champs Élysées, and many of the palaces of the Faubourg St. Germain—date from this reign.

One of the vicious conditions of the time was the separation in sympathies and interests of the four great classes of the nation,—clergy, nobles, burghers, and peasants; and each of these, again, divided itself into incoherent fragments. France was an aggregate of disjointed parts, held together by a meshwork of arbitrary power, itself touched with decay. A disastrous blow was struck at the na-

tional welfare when the government of Louis XV. revived the odious persecution of the Huguenots. The attempt to scour heresy out of France cost her the most industrious and virtuous part of her population, and robbed her of those most fit to resist the mocking scepticism and turbid passions that burst out like a deluge with the Revolution.

Her manifold ills were summed up in the King. Since the Valois, she had had no monarch so worthless. He did not want understanding, still less the graces of person. In his youth the people called him the "Well-beloved"; but by the middle of the century they so detested him that he dared not pass through Paris, lest the mob should execrate him. He had not the vigor of the true tyrant; but his languor, his hatred of all effort, his profound selfishness, his listless disregard of public duty, and his effeminate libertinism, mixed with superstitious devotion, made him no less a national curse. Louis XIII. was equally unfit to govern; but he gave the reins to the Great Cardinal. Louis XV. abandoned them to a frivolous mistress, content that she should rule on condition of amusing him. It was a hard task; yet Madame de Pompadour accomplished it by methods infamous to him and to her. She gained and long kept the power that she coveted: filled the Bastille with her enemies; made and unmade ministers; appointed and removed generals. Great questions of policy were at the mercy of her caprices. Through her frivolous vanity, her personal likes and dislikes, all the great departments of government—army, navy, war, foreign affairs, justice, finance—changed from hand to hand incessantly, and this at a time of crisis when the kingdom needed the steadiest and surest guidance. Few of the officers of State, except, perhaps, D'Argenson, could venture to disregard her. She turned out Orry, the comptroller-general, put her favorite, Machault, into his place, then made him keeper of the seals, and at last minister of marine. The Marquis de Puysieux, in the ministry of foreign affairs, and the Comte de Saint-Florentin, charged with the affairs of the clergy, took their cue from her. The King stinted her in nothing. First and last, she is reckoned to have cost him thirty-six million francs,—answering now to more than as many dollars.

The prestige of the monarchy was declining with the ideas that had given it life and strength. A growing disrespect for king, min-

istry, and clergy was beginning to prepare the catastrophe that was still some forty years in the future. While the valleys and low places of the kingdom were dark with misery and squalor, its heights were bright with a gay society,—elegant, fastidious, witty,—craving the pleasures of the mind as well as of the senses, criticising everything, analyzing everything, believing nothing. Voltaire was in the midst of it, hating, with all his vehement soul, the abuses that swarmed about him, and assailing them with the inexhaustible shafts of his restless and piercing intellect. Montesquieu was showing to a despot-ridden age the principles of political freedom. Diderot and D'Alembert were beginning their revolutionary Encyclopaedia. Rousseau was sounding the first notes of his mad eloquence,—the wild revolt of a passionate and diseased genius against a world of falsities and wrongs. The *salons* of Paris, cloyed with other pleasures, alive to all that was racy and new, welcomed the pungent doctrines, and played with them as children play with fire, thinking no danger; as time went on, even embraced them in a genuine spirit of hope and good-will for humanity. The Revolution began at the top,—in the world of fashion, birth, and intellect,—and propagated itself downwards. "We walked on a carpet of flowers," Count Ségur afterwards said, "unconscious that it covered an abyss;" till the gulf yawned at last, and swallowed them.

Eastward, beyond the Rhine, lay the heterogeneous patchwork of the Holy Roman, or Germanic, Empire. The sacred bonds that throughout the Middle Ages had held together its innumerable fragments had lost their strength. The empire decayed as a whole; but not so the parts that composed it. In the south the House of Austria reigned over a formidable assemblage of States; and in the north the House of Brandenburg, promoted to royalty half a century before, had raised Prussia into an importance far beyond her extent and population. In her dissevered rags of territory lay the destinies of Germany. It was the late King, that honest, thrifty, dogged, head-strong despot, Frederic William, who had made his kingdom what it was, trained it to the perfection of drill, and left it to his son, Frederic II., the best engine of war in Europe. Frederic himself had passed between the upper and nether millstones of paternal discipline. Never did prince undergo such an apprentice-

ship. His father set him to the work of an overseer, or steward, flung plates at his head in the family circle, thrashed him with his rattan in public, bullied him for submitting to such treatment, and imprisoned him for trying to run away from it. He came at last out of purgatory; and Europe felt him to her farthest bounds. This bookish, philosophizing, verse-making cynic and profligate was soon to approve himself the first warrior of his time, and one of the first of all time.

Another power had lately risen on the European world. Peter the Great, half hero, half savage, had roused the inert barbarism of Russia into a titanic life. His daughter Elizabeth had succeeded to his throne,—heirress of his sensuality, if not of his talents.

Over all the continent the aspect of the times was the same. Power had everywhere left the plains and the lower slopes, and gathered at the summits. Popular life was at a stand. No great idea stirred the nations to their depths. The religious convulsions of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were over, and the earthquake of the French Revolution had not begun. At the middle of the eighteenth century the history of Europe turned on the balance of power; the observance of treaties; inheritance and succession; rivalries of sovereign houses struggling to win power or keep it, encroach on neighbors, or prevent neighbors from encroaching; bargains, intrigue, force, diplomacy, and the musket, in the interest not of peoples but of rulers. Princes, great and small, brooded over some real or fancied wrong, nursed some dubious claim born of a marriage, a will, or an ancient covenant fished out of the abyss of time, and watched their moment to make it good. The general opportunity came when, in 1740, the Emperor Charles VI. died and bequeathed his personal dominions of the House of Austria to his daughter, Maria Theresa. The chief Powers of Europe had been pledged in advance to sustain the will; and pending the event, the veteran Prince Eugene had said that two hundred thousand soldiers would be worth all their guaranties together. The two hundred thousand were not there, and not a sovereign kept his word. They flocked to share the spoil, and parcel out the motley heritage of the young Queen. Frederic of Prussia led the way, invaded her province of Silesia, seized it, and kept it. The Elector of Bavaria and the King of Spain claimed their share, and

the Elector of Saxony and the King of Sardinia prepared to follow the example. France took part with Bavaria, and intrigued to set the imperial crown on the head of the Elector, thinking to ruin her old enemy, the House of Austria, and rule Germany through an emperor too weak to dispense with her support. England, jealous of her designs, trembling for the balance of power, and anxious for the Hanoverian possessions of her King, threw herself into the strife on the side of Austria. It was now that, in the Diet at Presburg, the beautiful and distressed Queen, her infant in her arms made her memorable appeal to the wild chivalry of her Hungarian nobles; and, clashing their swords, they shouted with one voice: "Let us die for our king, Maria Theresa;" *Moriamur pro rege nostro, Maria Theresid*,—one of the most dramatic scenes in history; not quite true, perhaps, but near the truth. Then came that confusion worse confounded called the war of the Austrian Succession, with its Mollwitz, its Dettingen, its Fontenoy, and its Scotch episode of Culloden. The peace of Aix-la-Chapelle closed the strife in 1748. Europe had time to breathe; but the germs of discord remained alive.

THE AMERICAN COMBATANTS

The French claimed all America, from the Alleghanies to the Rocky Mountains, and from Mexico and Florida to the North Pole, except only the ill-defined possessions of the English on the borders of Hudson Bay; and to these vast regions, with adjacent islands, they gave the general name of New France. They controlled the high-ways of the continent, for they held its two great rivers. First, they had seized the St. Lawrence, and then planted themselves at the mouth of the Mississippi. Canada at the north, and Louisiana at the south, were the keys of a boundless interior, rich with incalculable possibilities. The English colonies, ranged along the Atlantic coast, had no royal road to the great inland, and were, in a manner, shut between the mountains and the sea. At the middle of the century they numbered in all, from Georgia to Maine, about eleven hundred and sixty thousand white inhabitants. By the census of 1754 Canada had but fifty-five thousand.¹ Add those of Louisiana and Acadia, and

¹ *Censuses of Canada*, iv. 61. Rameau (*La France aux Colonies*, ii. 81) estimates the Canadian population, in 1755, at sixty-six thousand, besides *voyageurs*, Indian traders, etc. Vaudreuil, in 1760 places it at seventy thousand.

the whole white population under the French flag might be something more than eighty thousand. Here is an enormous disparity; and hence it has been argued that the success of the English colonies and the failure of the French was not due to difference of religious and political systems, but simply to numerical preponderance. But this preponderance itself grew out of a difference of systems. We have said before, and it cannot be said too often, that in making Canada a citadel of the State religion,—a holy of holies of exclusive Roman Catholic orthodoxy,—the clerical monitors of the Crown robbed their country of a transatlantic empire. New France could not grow with a priest on guard at the gate to let in none but such as pleased him. One of the ablest of Canadian governors, La Galissonnière, seeing the feebleness of the colony compared with the vastness of its claims, advised the King to send ten thousand peasants to occupy the valley of the Ohio, and hold back the British swarm that was just then pushing its advance-guard over the Alleghanies. It needed no effort of the King to people his waste domain, not with ten thousand peasants, but with twenty times ten thousand Frenchmen of every station,—the most industrious, most instructed, most disciplined by adversity and capable of self-rule, that the country could boast. While La Galissonnière was asking for colonists, the agents of the Crown, set on by priestly fanaticism, or designing selfishness masked with fanaticism, were pouring volleys of musketry into Huguenot congregations, imprisoning for life those innocent of all but their faith,—the men in the galleys, the women in the pestiferous dungeons of Aigues Mortes,—hanging their ministers, kidnapping their children, and reviving, in short, the dragonnades. Now, as in the past century, many of the victims escaped to the British colonies, and became a part of them. The Huguenots would have hailed as a boon the permission to emigrate under the fleur-de-lis, and build up a Protestant France in the valleys of the West. It would have been a bane of absolutism, but a national glory; would have set bounds to English colonization, and changed the face of the continent. The opportunity was spurned. The dominant Church clung to its policy of rule and ruin. France built its best colony on a principle of exclusion, and failed; England reversed the system, and succeeded.

I have shown elsewhere the aspects of Canada, where a rigid scion of the old European tree was set to grow in the wilderness. The mili-

tary governor, holding his miniature court on the rock of Quebec; the feudal proprietors, whose domains lined the shores of the St. Lawrence; the peasant; the roving bushranger; the half-tamed savage, with crucifix and scalping-knife; priests; friars; nuns; and soldiers,—mingled to form a society the most picturesque on the continent. What distinguished it from the France that produced it was a total absence of revolt against the laws of its being,—an absolute conservatism, an unquestioning acceptance of Church and King. The Canadian, ignorant of everything but what the priest saw fit to teach him, had never heard of Voltaire; and if he had known him, would have thought him a devil. He had, it is true, a spirit of insubordination born of the freedom of the forest; but if his instincts rebelled, his mind and soul were passively submissive. The unchecked control of a hierarchy robbed him of the independence of intellect and character, without which, under the conditions of modern life, a people must resign itself to a position of inferiority. Yet Canada had a vigor of her own. It was not in spiritual deference only that she differed from the country of her birth. Whatever she had caught of its corruptions, she had caught nothing of its effeminacy. The mass of her people lived in a rude poverty,—not abject, like the peasant of old France, nor ground down by the tax-gatherer; while those of the higher ranks—all more or less engaged in pursuits of war or adventure, and inured to rough journeyings and forest exposures—were rugged as their climate. Even the French regular troops, sent out to defend the colony, caught its hardy spirit, and set an example of stubborn fighting which their comrades at home did not always emulate.

Canada lay ensconced behind rocks and forests. All along her southern boundaries, between her and her English foes, lay a broad tract of wilderness, shaggy with primeval woods. Innumerable streams gurgled beneath their shadows; innumerable mountains bared their rocky foreheads to the wind. These wastes were ranged by her savage allies,—Micmacs, Etechémins, Abenakis, Caughnawagas; and no enemy could steal upon her unawares. Through the midst of them stretched Lake Champlain, pointing straight to the heart of the British settlements,—a watery thoroughfare of mutual attack, and the only approach by which, without a long *détour* by wilderness or sea, a hostile army could come within striking distance

of the colony. The French advanced post of Fort Frederic, called Crown Point by the English, barred the narrows of the lake, which thence spread northward to the portals of Canada guarded by Fort St. Jean. Southwestward, some fourteen hundred miles as a bird flies, and twice as far by the practicable routes of travel, was Louisiana, the second of the two heads of New France; while between lay the realms of solitude where the Mississippi rolled its sullen tide, and the Ohio wound its belt of silver through the verdant woodlands.

To whom belonged this world of prairies and forests? France claimed it by right of discovery and occupation. It was her explorers who, after De Soto, first set foot on it. The question of right, it is true, mattered little; for, right or wrong, neither claimant would yield her pretensions so long as she had strength to uphold them; yet one point is worth a moment's notice. The French had established an excellent system in the distribution of their American lands. Whoever received a grant from the Crown was required to improve it, and this within reasonable time. If he did not, the land ceased to be his, and was given to another more able or industrious. An international extension of her own principle would have destroyed the pretensions of France to all the countries of the West. She had called them hers for three-fourths of a century, and they were still a howling waste, yielding nothing to civilization but beaver-skins, with here and there a fort, trading-post, or mission, and three or four puny hamlets by the Mississippi and the Detroit. We have seen how she might have made for herself an indisputable title, and peopled the solitudes with a host to maintain it. She would not; others were at hand who both would and could; and the late claimant, disinherited and forlorn, would soon be left to count the cost of her bigotry.

The thirteen British colonies were alike, insomuch as they all had representative governments, and a basis of English law. But the differences among them were great. Some were purely English; others were made up of various races, though the Anglo-Saxon was always predominant. Some had one prevailing religious creed; others had many creeds. Some had charters, and some had not. In most cases the governor was appointed by the Crown; in Pennsylvania and Maryland he was appointed by a feudal proprietor, and in Con-

necticut and Rhode Island he was chosen by the people. The differences of disposition and character were still greater than those of form.

The four northern colonies, known collectively as New England, were an exception to the general rule of diversity. The smallest, Rhode Island, had features all its own; but the rest were substantially one in nature and origin. The principal among them, Massachusetts, may serve as the type of all. It was a mosaic of little village republics, firmly cemented together, and formed into a single body politic through representatives sent to the "General Court" at Boston. Its government, originally theocratic, now tended to democracy, ballasted as yet by strong traditions of respect for established worth and ability, as well as by the influence of certain families prominent in affairs for generations. Yet there were no distinct class-lines, and popular power, like popular education, was widely diffused. Practically Massachusetts was almost independent of the mother-country. Its people were purely English, of sound yeoman stock, with an abundant leaven drawn from the best of the Puritan gentry; but their original character had been somewhat modified by changed conditions of life. A harsh and exacting creed, with its stiff formalism and its prohibition of wholesome recreation; excess in the pursuit of gain,—the only resource left to energies robbed of their natural play; the struggle for existence on a hard and barren soil; and the isolation of a narrow village life,—joined to produce, in the meaner sort, qualities which were unpleasant, and sometimes repulsive. Puritanism was not an unmixed blessing. Its view of human nature was dark, and its attitude towards it one of repression. It strove to crush out not only what is evil, but much that is innocent and salutary. Human nature so treated will take its revenge, and for every vice that it loses find another instead. Nevertheless, while New England Puritanism bore its peculiar crop of faults, it produced also many good and sound fruits. An uncommon vigor, joined to the hardy virtues of a masculine race, marked the New England type. The sinews, it is true, were hardened at the expense of blood and flesh,—and this literally as well as figuratively; but the staple of character was a sturdy conscientiousness, an undespairing courage, patriotism, public spirit, sagacity, and a strong good sense. A great change, both for better and for worse, has since come over

it, due largely to reaction against the unnatural rigors of the past. That mixture, which is now too common, of cool emotions with excitable brains, was then rarely seen. The New England colonies abounded in high examples of public and private virtue, though not always under the most prepossessing forms. They were conspicuous, moreover, for intellectual eminence. Massachusetts had produced at least two men whose fame had crossed the sea,—Edwards, who out of the grim theology of Calvin mounted to sublime heights of mystical speculation; and Franklin, famous already by his discoveries in electricity. On the other hand, there were few genuine New Englanders who, however personally modest, could divest themselves of the notion that they belonged to a people in an especial manner the object of divine approval; and this self-righteousness, along with certain other traits, failed to commend the Puritan colonies to the favor of their fellows. Then, as now, New England was best known to her neighbors by her worst side.

In one point, however, she found general applause. (She was regarded as the most military among the British colonies.) This reputation was well founded, and is easily explained. More than all the rest, she lay open to attack. The long waving line of the New England border, with its lonely hamlets and scattered farms, extended from the Kennebec to beyond the Connecticut, and was everywhere vulnerable to the guns and tomahawks of the neighboring French and their savage allies. The colonies towards the south had thus far been safe from danger. New York alone was within striking distance of the Canadian war-parties. That province then consisted of a line of settlements up the Hudson and the Mohawk, and was little exposed to attack except at its northern end, which was guarded by the friendly and warlike Mohawks, whose "castles" were close at hand. Thus New England had borne the heaviest brunt of the preceding wars, not only by the forest, but also by the sea; for the French of Acadia and Cape Breton confronted her coast, and she was often at blows with them. Fighting had been a necessity with her, and she had met the emergency after a method extremely defective, but the best that circumstances would permit. Having no trained officers and no disciplined soldiers, and being too poor to maintain either, she borrowed her warriors from the workshop and the plough, and officered them with lawyers, merchants, mechanics,

or farmers. To compare them with good regular troops would be folly; but they did, on the whole, better than could have been expected, and in the last war achieved the brilliant success of the capture of Louisbourg. This exploit, due partly to native hardihood and partly to good luck, greatly enhanced the military repute of New England, or rather was one of the chief sources of it.

(The great colony of Virginia stood in strong contrast to New England.) In both the population was English; but the one was Puritan with Roundhead traditions, and the other, so far as concerned its governing class, Anglican, with Cavalier traditions. In the one, every man, woman, and child could read and write; in the other, Sir William Berkeley once thanked God that there were no free schools, and no prospect of any for a century. The hope had found fruition. The lower classes of Virginia were as untaught as the warmest friend of popular ignorance could wish. New England had a native literature more than respectable under the circumstances, while Virginia had none; numerous industries, while Virginia was all agriculture, with but a single crop; a homogeneous society and a democratic spirit, while her rival was an aristocracy. (Virginian society was distinctly stratified.) On the lowest level were the negro slaves, nearly as numerous as all the rest together; next, the indented servants and the poor whites, of low origin, good-humored, but boisterous, and sometimes vicious; next, the small and despised class of tradesmen and mechanics; next, the farmers and lesser planters, who were mainly of good English stock, and who merged insensibly into the ruling class of the great landowners. It was these last who represented the colony and made the laws. They may be described as English country squires transplanted to a warm climate and turned slave-masters. They sustained their position by entails, and constantly undermined it by the reckless profusion which ruined them at last. Many of them were well born, with an immense pride of descent, increased by the habit of domination. Indolent and energetic by turns; rich in natural gifts and often poor in book-learning, though some, in the lack of good teaching at home, had been bred in the English universities; high-spirited, generous to a fault; keeping open house in their capacious mansions, among vast tobacco-fields and toiling negroes, and living in a rude pomp where the fashions of St. James were somewhat oddly grafted on the roughness

of the plantation,—what they wanted in schooling was supplied by an education which books alone would have been impotent to give, the education which came with the possession and exercise of political power, and the sense of a position to maintain, joined to a bold spirit of independence and a patriotic attachment to the Old Dominion. They were few in number; they raced, gambled, drank, and swore; they did everything that in Puritan eyes was most reprehensible; and in the day of need they gave the United Colonies a body of statesmen and orators which had no equal on the continent. A vigorous aristocracy favors the growth of personal eminence, even in those who are not of it, but only near it.

(The essential antagonism of Virginia and New England was afterwards to become, and to remain for a century, an element of the first influence in American history.) Each might have learned much from the other; but neither did so till, at last, the strife of their contending principles shook the continent. Pennsylvania differed widely from both. She was a conglomerate of creeds and races, English, Irish, Germans, Dutch, and Swedes; Quakers, Lutherans, Presbyterians, Romanists, Moravians, and a variety of nondescript sects. The Quakers prevailed in the eastern districts; quiet, industrious, virtuous, and serenely obstinate. The Germans were strongest towards the centre of the colony, and were chiefly peasants; successful farmers, but dull, ignorant, and superstitious. Towards the west were the Irish, of whom some were Celts, always quarrelling with their German neighbors, who detested them; but the greater part were Protestants of Scotch descent, from Ulster; a vigorous border population. Virginia and New England had each a strong distinctive character. Pennsylvania, with her heterogeneous population, had none but that which she owed to the sober neutral tints of Quaker existence. A more thriving colony there was not on the continent. Life, if monotonous, was smooth and contented. Trade and the arts grew. Philadelphia, next to Boston, was the largest town in British America; and was, moreover, the intellectual centre of the middle and southern colonies. Unfortunately, for her credit in the approaching war, the Quaker influence made Pennsylvania non-combatant. Politically, too, she was an anomaly; for, though utterly unfeudal in disposition and character, she was under feudal supe-

riors in the persons of the representatives of William Penn, the original grantee.

New York had not as yet reached the relative prominence which her geographical position and inherent strength afterwards gave her.) The English, joined to the Dutch, the original settlers, were the dominant population; but a half-score of other languages were spoken in the province, the chief among them being that of the Huguenot French in the southern parts, and that of the Germans on the Mohawk. In religion, the province was divided between the Anglican Church, with government support and popular dislike, and numerous dissenting sects, chiefly Lutherans, Independents, Presbyterians, and members of the Dutch Reformed Church. The little city of New York, like its great successor, was the most cosmopolitan place on the continent, and probably the gayest. It had, in abundance, balls, concerts, theatricals, and evening clubs, with plentiful dances and other amusements for the poorer classes. Thither in the winter months came the great hereditary proprietors on the Hudson; for the old Dutch feudality still held its own, and the manors of Van Renssalaer, Cortland, and Livingston, with their seigniorial privileges, and the great estates and numerous tenantry of the Schuylers and other leading families, formed the basis of an aristocracy, some of whose members had done good service to the province, and were destined to do more. Pennsylvania was feudal in form, and not in spirit; Virginia in spirit, and not in form; New England in neither; and New York largely in both. The social crystallization had, it is true, many opponents. In politics, as in religion, there were sharp antagonisms and frequent quarrels. They centred in the city; for in the well-stocked dwellings of the Dutch farmers along the Hudson there reigned a tranquil and prosperous routine; and the Dutch border town of Albany had not its like in America for unruffled conservatism and quaint picturesqueness.

Of the other colonies, the briefest mention will suffice: (New Jersey, with its wholesome population of farmers; tobacco-growing Maryland, which, but for its proprietary government and numerous Roman Catholics, might pass for another Virginia, inferior in growth, and less decisive in features;) (Delaware, a modest appendage of Pennsylvania;) (wild and rude North Carolina;) and, farther on, South Carolina and Georgia,) too remote from the seat of war to take

a noteworthy part in it. The attitude of these various colonies towards each other is hardly conceivable to an American of the present time. They had no political tie except a common allegiance to the British Crown. Communication between them was difficult and slow, by rough roads traced often through primeval forests. Between some of them there was less of sympathy than of jealousy kindled by conflicting interests or perpetual disputes concerning boundaries. The patriotism of the colonist was bounded by the lines of his government, except in the compact and kindred colonies of New England, which were socially united, though politically distinct. The country of the New Yorker was New York and the country of the Virginian was Virginia. The New England colonies had once confederated; but, kindred as they were, they had long ago dropped apart. William Penn proposed a plan of colonial union wholly fruitless. James II. tried to unite all the northern colonies under one government; but the attempt came to naught. Each stood aloof, jealously independent. At rare intervals, under the pressure of an emergency, some of them would try to act in concert; and, except in New England, the results had been most discouraging. Nor was it this segregation only that unfitted them for war. They were all subject to popular legislatures, through whom alone money and men could be raised; and these elective bodies were sometimes factious and selfish, and not always either far-sighted or reasonable. Moreover, they were in a state of ceaseless friction with their governors, who represented the King, or, what was worse, the feudal proprietary. These disputes, though varying in intensity, were found everywhere except in the two small colonies which chose their own governors; and they were premonitions of the movement towards independence which ended in the war of Revolution.) The occasion of difference mattered little. Active or latent, the quarrel was always present. In New York it turned on a question of the governor's salary; in Pennsylvania on the taxation of the proprietary estates; in Virginia on a fee exacted for the issue of land patents. It was sure to arise whenever some public crisis gave the representatives of the people an opportunity of extorting concessions from the representative of the Crown, or gave the representative of the Crown an opportunity to gain a point for prerogative. That is to say, the time when action was most needed was the time chosen for obstructing it.

In Canada there was no popular legislature to embarrass the central power. The people, like an army, obeyed the word of command,—a military advantage beyond all price.

Divided in government; divided in origin, feelings, and principles; jealous of each other, jealous of the Crown; the people at war with the executive, and, by the fermentation of internal politics, blinded to an outward danger that seemed remote and vague,—such were the conditions under which the British colonies drifted into a war that was to decide the fate of the continent.

This war was the strife of a united and concentrated few against a divided and discordant many. It was the strife, too, of the past against the future; of the old against the new; of moral and intellectual torpor against moral and intellectual life; of barren absolutism against a liberty, crude, incoherent, and chaotic, yet full of prolific vitality.

OLIVER MORTON DICKERSON

THE PATRIOT legends of our national past have sometimes been as convincing to historians as to Fourth of July orators. One of the most enduring of these stories depicted the American Revolution as a struggle between good and evil, between freedom and vindictive absolutism. Indeed, the whole colonial period was conceived as merely a preparation for this conflict, during which the British Crown and Parliament became increasingly oppressive and the colonists more steadfastly determined not to endure tyrannical rule.

As the nineteenth century ended, a group of historians attempted systematically to emancipate the study of colonial history from this patriotic distortion. Prominent among them was George Louis Beer, who devoted his career to a re-examination of the whole theory and practice of British mercantilism. His conclusions were sympathetic to the mother country and took issue with the views of earlier American historians such as George Bancroft, who had argued that the British trade controls were so unjust as to have been a primary cause of the revolt in 1776.

Beer did not question that the colonies' economy had been regulated. But whereas previous nationalistic historians had regarded the commercial restrictions as a crude method of unilateral exploitation, he contended that they produced benefits for all parts of the empire. If colonial economic development was hampered in some directions, it was stimulated in others. For example, the colonies were not permitted certain kinds of

manufactures which would compete with English goods, but their exports of raw materials to the homeland were given official encouragement.

In more recent years, many historians have come to believe that Beer overemphasized the benefits of British mercantilism and minimized its disadvantages to the colonies. He has been accused of relying too much on official acts and theoretical discussions giving the rationale of mercantilism while neglecting actual business statistics. Further, the increasing attention given to the economic backgrounds of all political changes caused historians to seek an economic explanation of the American revolution. It has been pointed out that Beer did not allow for the growth of the colonial economy; imperial laws which may have been helpful to the struggling settlements of the seventeenth century were not equally appropriate to the needs of the more mature colonial economy of the 1760's. Although this analysis was not limited to followers of Karl Marx, it fitted Marxist theory to describe the Revolution as an instance of conflict between two competing groups of capitalists—British and colonial—each eager to control government in its own behalf.

Published in 1951, Oliver M. Dickerson's *The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution* is an important contribution to this continuing controversy. Like Beer, Dickerson believes that British trade controls were favorable to colonial economic development. He finds criticism of the British Navigation Acts conspicuously lacking even in the turbulent pre-Revolutionary decade. Contrary to the conclusions of other specialists, he asserts that the legal trade within the British Empire was so profitable that customs evasion and smuggling were minor items in colonial commerce.

What, then, brought on the complaints of the 1760's and eventual civil war? The answer must be sought not in the traditional pattern of commercial regulation but rather in Britain's attempt after the French and Indian War to introduce money-raising devices. Other historians have, of course, called atten-

tion to this shift in policy. What gives particular distinction to Dickerson's analysis is his emphasis not on the acts of Parliament themselves but on the manner in which they were administered. Unpopular though these laws were, they were less inflammatory than were the seizures of cargo and ships for technical causes, the extortionate tactics, and the interferences with legitimate trade to which American merchants such as John Hancock were subjected by mercenary customs officials. Thus, customs racketeering, not commercial restrictions, brought on the Revolution.

In seeking to defend the basic policies of British mercantilism, Dickerson has brought upon himself many of the criticisms originally leveled at George Beer. Certainly his theses will be rejected by the economic determinists, whose focus is upon the uncompromisable conflict between colonial interests and the British manufacturers, merchants, and landowners who controlled Parliament. His supporters are apt to be found among the more conservative historians, who believe the Revolution to have had a political origin, centering about the colonial zeal for self-government. Yet even among these, there are some who find his appraisal of British policy too complimentary, and his concentration upon corrupt administrators too narrow.

Though rich in factual detail, the book is not intended, nor has it been received, as a comprehensive summary of the trade laws. It is as argumentative in tone as it is uncompromising in its theses. Yet Dickerson writes not only with conviction but with the knowledge and understanding which come from a lifetime of devoted study to the pre-Revolutionary period. Already a distinguished historian when he published his *American Colonial Government* in 1912, Dickerson has provided in this present work both an appropriate capstone to his own career and a foundation for many scholarly arguments to come.

Were the Navigation Acts Oppressive?

BANCROFT says "American independence, like the great rivers of the country, had many sources, but the headspring which colored all the stream was the Navigation Act."¹ Other writers join in the general condemnation, but few are specific as to just who was hurt and by what provisions of the acts. Let us examine the operation of the system in detail.

Whatever may have been the opinion of some Americans in 1660 in regard to the basic law limiting the carrying trade of the British Empire to English vessels, by 1760 all opposition had disappeared, and a careful search of contemporary newspapers, pamphlets, and other publications discloses no record of anyone seriously proposing an abrogation of that law. Certainly New England, whose fishing, trading, and shipbuilding industry rested upon this law, would not be expected to ask for changes that would bring in the competition of foreign ships. The only sections of the colonial empire that could theoretically have found such a regulation even an imaginary grievance were those engaged in plantation types of industry, where markets were distant and freights heavy.

There may have been a time when freight rates were influenced by the presence or absence of the foreign-owned ships, but after 1700 the expansion of English shipping, especially from New England sources, had become so great that there was ample competition.² American ports swarmed with shipping, some owned in Eng-

Reprinted from *The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution*, by Oliver M. Dickerson, by permission of the University of Pennsylvania Press.

¹ George Bancroft, *History of the United States* (6 vols., 1st ed. New York, 1834-74), V, 159. In the last revision "Colonial Mercantile System" is substituted for "Navigation Act" (III, 60).

² See Emory R. Johnson, *History of the Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States* (Washington, 1915), Vol. I, Chap. iv.

land but much more of it in the colonies. In 1768 more than two thousand vessels cleared from the American continental ports for the West Indies alone. By 1771 it required more than one thousand vessels to serve Virginia and Maryland, and over eleven hundred for the two chief ports in Massachusetts, Boston and Salem. In 1770 a total of 4,171 ships, with a combined tonnage of 488,724, cleared from the various continental ports.³

The trade to the West Indies was indeed notable, employing more ships with a greater total tonnage than England was using in her trade with Holland, and far more than she used in her direct trade with Norway, Sweden, and the Eastland countries of the Baltic.⁴

In addition, colonial shipping enabled Britain completely to dominate the Mediterranean trade. In 1768 the clearances from American ports for south Europe totaled 436 ships, with a combined tonnage of 37,093. At that time England was only using 23,113 tons in her trade to the Straits of Gibraltar, which encountered less than one per cent of foreign competition. Clearances from America are not included in this figure, so the American tonnage is in addition to the English figure, but is included in the percentage of English ships passing the Straits.⁵

³ Total number of vessels clearing from the more important centers in the various years were:

	1768	1769	1770	1771	1772
Massachusetts	927	1172	1110	1143	1181
New York	480	795	612	741	700
Philadelphia	658	699	750	729	759
Maryland and Virginia	839	965	940	1005	1088
Charleston	429	433	455	489	485
Savannah	104	143	150	124	161

Compiled from *Customs* 16:1.

⁴ The number of ships and their tonnage clearing for the West Indies in 1768 were:

	<i>Ships</i>	<i>Tonnage</i>
New England	936	49,234
Middle Colonies	419	23,208
Southern Colonies	649	30,703

Ibid. For a comparable data for England's trade see Harper, *English Navigation Laws*, p. 317, fn. 81.

⁵ American figures are from *Customs* 16:1; English totals are from Harper, *op. cit.*, pp. 286-92.

The expansion of colonial shipping continued to the Revolution. (By 1775 nearly one third of all the ships in Britain registered as English were colonial built.) Instead of being oppressive the shipping clauses of the Navigation Act had become an important source of colonial prosperity which was shared by every colony. As a device for launching ships these clauses were more efficient than the fabled beauty of Helen of Troy's face.

There was another important compensation in having a shipping industry under the British flag adequate for all commercial purposes. The plantation industries, such as tobacco, rice, sugar, and indigo, had to depend upon an annual market of their staple product and an assured supply of food, clothing, tools, and other necessities that were not produced locally. This supply was dependent wholly upon the annual fleets that visited their ports. So long as England effectually controlled the seas, (English shipping could serve them in time of war about as freely as in time of peace.) Had they been dependent upon foreign shipping, the outbreak of a war might have meant complete suspension of their industries.

Business of any kind needs stability of conditions under which large investments of capital are made. The plantation colonies were conducted under conditions of as large individual investments of capital as were the manufacturing industries of the time. It was sounder economic practice to pay somewhat higher freight rates, if necessary, than to face the economic losses incident to a dependence upon foreign shipping; besides, there is no proof that freight rates within the British Empire were not as low after 1700 as those outside. Certainly there is no evidence in contemporary publications of any agitation to repeal this provision of the Navigation Act, nor did prominent Americans express any desire for a general relaxation of its major requirements.

ENUMERATION

Enumeration of commodities of colonial production has been pictured as an outstanding sin of mercantilism. The English continental colonies had three products of major importance, tobacco, rice, and indigo, included in the enumerated list. All were agricultural and were grown commercially only in the southern colonies.

It should be clear that no one would engage in producing enumerated commodities unless he expected to make a profit. If he found his venture unprofitable he could shift his energies to other crops. No one was under any legal compulsion to grow the enumerated products. In spite of the extravagant language that has been used to condemn the system, the grower of enumerated commodities was not enslaved by the legal provisions of enumeration. Obviously growers continued to produce rice, indigo, and tobacco because they made larger cash profits from their cultivation than they could make by using their land, labor, and capital in any other way.

The most cursory examination of these industries reveals that each had its list of wealthy planters who had accumulated fortunes in a few years by growing the enumerated crops. These men and their families were the aristocrats of the South. No similar conditions existed elsewhere in the vast agricultural regions of the colonies. Let us examine the conditions of each industry.

TOBACCO

Tobacco, the most important of all colonial exports, suffered from all the disadvantages of other agricultural crops. Late frosts could destroy the tender plants in the seed beds; and early frosts could damage the mature crop before it was harvested. Favorable seasons could produce unusually heavy yields; and heat and lack of moisture could seriously lighten a crop. There were recurring surpluses and shortages. Also there were worms, plant diseases, and soil depletion. All of these and many more were hazards that the grower had to face in colonial times and still does. All are interesting details of the burdens of the tobacco planter, but they have no possible connection with the Navigation Acts. They existed without benefit of law and always will.

(Tobacco growers in many cases were debtors) That condition was not peculiar to the tobacco industry and again has no possible connection with enumeration. Farmers who engage in commercial farming always have been in debt and always will be. Farming is a business. It requires land, buildings, equipment, labor, good clothing, and shelter for those engaged in it. Costs for these have

to be met for months before a crop can yield any return. Unless inherited, these things had to be supplied by the farmer himself from savings or from borrowings. Most farmers chose the latter course and hoped to make the business ultimately clear itself. In this respect tobacco raising was not different from other business enterprises.

(The great assembling and processing markets were in Great Britain,) as were also the bankers who supplied the essential working capital. Growing tobacco was one job, marketing it was another. Both were essential parts of the industry.

Tobacco was not only the most important colonial enumerated product, it was an essential source of revenue to the British government. (It was one article that could stand enormous taxation without materially reducing its consumption)

Prior to the union with Scotland tobacco could be shipped only to England or Wales; but after 1707 it could go to Scotland as freely as to England. Soon there developed most active competition between Scotch merchants, mostly in Glasgow, and the English tobacco merchants with headquarters in London or the English "outports." The customs service kept three sets of books: one for London, another for the "outports," and a third for Scotland. All of these have to be consulted to get the entire picture. Ireland remained a foreign country so far as tobacco was concerned.

The decade preceding the Revolution was one of rapid expansion for the tobacco planters. American tobacco was supplying a steadily expanding world market. (The most important fact in the complicated expanding tobacco trade was the rise of Scotland as a chief primary market. Scottish imports rose from 12,213,610 pounds in 1746 to 48,269,865 pounds in 1771, a growth of more than four hundred per cent in twenty-five years.) Finding, servicing, and holding an additional market for 36,000,000 pounds of tobacco was a real feat of merchandising. At the same time the London merchants were increasing their importations, but at a slower rate. The merchants in the English "outports" just about held their own. From 1767 to 1771 Scotland imported nearly as much American tobacco as did London and the "outports" combined and remained

the chief market to the Revolution. Table 1 shows the course of the tobacco trade for the nine years preceding independence.

Enumeration clearly did not hamper the expansion of the tobacco raising business in America. Any industry that enjoys an expansion of its total production of more than fifty per cent in five years and holds that growth has at least the appearance of prosperity.

TABLE 1. TOBACCO IMPORTATIONS INTO GREAT BRITAIN⁷
(in pounds)

	<i>London</i>	<i>Outports</i>	<i>Scotland</i>	<i>Total</i>
1767	25,723,434	13,417,175	28,937,891	68,078,500
1768	23,353,891	12,103,603	33,237,236	68,694,730
1769	24,276,259	9,480,127
1770	26,758,534	12,419,503	38,708,809	77,886,846
1771	42,952,725	15,006,771	48,269,865	106,229,361
1772	36,265,788	15,101,682	45,259,675	96,627,145
1773	37,918,111	18,010,718	44,544,230	100,473,059
1774	36,859,641	19,186,837	41,348,295	97,394,773
1775	45,250,505	10,210,997	45,863,154	101,324,656

This expansion of tobacco raising in America could not have occurred without the aid of the great tobacco marketing centers. The merchants at these centers found and developed new markets in Europe; graded, processed, and repacked the tobacco to suit the varying tastes of tobacco users; supplied, on their own personal security, the liquid capital to buy, ship, and store the annual crops; and found additional funds for loans to planters in America with which they bought land, slaves, and equipment to start new plantations.

The marketing of the tobacco crops each year employed enormous sums. The mere payment to the planter at the lowest price of two pence a pound would have required \$4,000,000. In addition there was freight, insurance, export duties, port charges, duties in England, unloading, cartage, warehousing, that had to be paid for. That was only the beginning. No merchandise sells itself. Purchasers had to be found. The tobacco had to be prepared to meet

⁷ Compiled from the records, *Customs 17:1-4*, and *Customs 14:1B*. Public Record Office, London.

varying demands. Some could be reëxported in the original hogsheads in which it was imported. Some had to be made into snuff or various type of smoking and chewing tobacco. A very important tobacco manufacturing industry was developing at the centers. A keen set of merchants sought out the varying demands and supplied the tobacco in the form desired. The results are impressive.

At the beginning of the century Spain was an important supplier of tobacco for the English market. She had under her control the finest tobacco lands in the world. But after 1760 Spain was actually importing more than a million pounds of American tobacco annually from Glasgow and London.⁸ In addition, American-grown tobacco was being exported to Great Britain, processed, and shipped back to the American colonies to be sold in the very areas where it was originally grown. In 1772 American customers bought more than 500,000 pounds of American tobacco processed in Great Britain, nearly one-fifth of which was imported at New York.⁹

On the eve of the Revolution America was raising tobacco for a world market, created by the merchandising skill of the English and Scottish merchants. Only a small part of the tobacco annually reaching Britain was ultimately consumed there. Johnson says that four-fifths of the total annual importations were reëxported.¹⁰ He does not give the source for his statement nor the time when it was true. His estimates for conditions just before the Revolution are much too low. Total British importations in 1772 were 96,627,145 pounds and total exports that year were 92,845,714 pounds, which is more than ninety-five per cent of the imports.¹¹ The trade through Scotland that year shows an even higher ratio of reëxports to imports. In 1772 Scotland imported 45,259,675 pounds of tobacco and exported 44,450,543, leaving only about a million pounds for home consumption,¹² or a little more than two per cent.

The course followed by American tobacco as it traveled from its three great primary markets to its ultimate consumers is shown in the following tables, one for England and another for Scotland:

⁸ *Customs* 17:1-2.

⁹ *Customs* 14:1B and *Customs* 17:1.

¹⁰ *Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*, I, 24.

¹¹ *Customs* 17:1.

¹² *Customs* 14:1B.

THE COLONIAL HERITAGE

TABLE 2. TOBACCO REEXPORTS FROM ENGLAND, 1772¹³
(in pounds)

<i>Countries to which Exported</i>	<i>From London</i>	<i>From Outports</i>	<i>Total from England</i>
Flanders	3,788,691	710,937	4,499,628
France	7,019,949	2,880,006	9,899,955
Germany	7,579,297	587,156	8,166,453
Holland	16,462,701	2,093,280	18,555,981
Ireland	29,714	1,655,517	1,685,231
Norway and Denmark	616,048	952,972	1,569,020
Spain	854,275	39,281	893,556
Sweden	456,929	990	457,919
Elsewhere	1,805,526	889,588	2,695,114

TABLE 3. TOBACCO REEXPORTS FROM SCOTLAND, 1772¹⁴
(in pounds)

<i>Countries to which Exported</i>	<i>Amounts</i>	<i>Countries to which Exported</i>	<i>Amounts</i>
Flanders	710,937	Norway and Denmark	789,329
France	22,514,188	Spain	130,081
Germany	3,096,706	Sweden	7,914
Holland	14,075,349	Elsewhere	252,930
Ireland	2,873,109		

Western Europe was the chief market, with France, Holland, and Germany taking more than 76,000,000 pounds in 1772, which was an average year, or more than seventy-five per cent of the total crop exported from America. Scotland was the chief supplier for France and Ireland and a keen competitor for the German, Dutch, and Scandinavian trade. Flanders was almost entirely supplied by the English merchants.

If the tobacco planters were oppressed by enumeration they should have prospered when freed. But what happened? There was a temporary rise in exports to the pre-Revolutionary levels, but the growers quickly learned that the markets gained for them by the British, and especially by the Scotch, merchants could not be held. An attempt by Jefferson, while Minister to France, to sell tobacco directly to the French government did not succeed. The French complained that the tobacco was not up to grade and

¹³ Compiled from *Customs* 17:I.

¹⁴ *Customs* 14:11B.

canceled the contract.¹⁵ Under the old plan of buying in the great central market at Glasgow they could select just the kind of tobacco that best fitted their needs. There was no such market in America and the growers had neither the experience nor the capital to set up such an organization of their own. Grading by public inspectors proved to be wholly inadequate as compared with the grading in the great merchandising and processing centers.

(Instead of thriving, the decades following the Revolution show that tobacco was a sick industry) gradually losing an important part of its former export trade. The Napoleonic wars and the War of 1812 caused wide fluctuations in exportations from year to year; but when these are averaged by five-year periods the steady decline is obvious. The full story of this decline is easily read in Table 4.

TABLE 4. TREND OF AMERICAN TOBACCO EXPORTS BEFORE AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION¹⁶

<i>Years</i>	<i>Average Yearly Exports in Pounds</i>	<i>Years</i>	<i>Average Yearly Exports in Pounds</i>
1767-1770	71,223,398	1805-1809	54,525,206
1771-1775	100,249,615	1810-1814	51,544,857
1790-1794	99,665,656	1815-1819	84,533,350
1795-1799	70,625,518	1820-1822	79,369,141
1800-1804	85,935,914		

The same countries of Europe that bought 96,727,147 pounds of American tobacco in 1772 bought only 68,327,550 pounds fifty years later. Holland was buying only 23,692,034 pounds as contrasted with 32,631,330 in 1772. France had taken 32,414,143 pounds in 1772 but was buying only 4,665,670 fifty years later. Flanders, that had bought 5,210,565 pounds in 1772 was not even mentioned in our exports for 1822. Exports to Germany remained essentially unchanged from what they had been in 1772.

Partially to compensate for the heavy losses in our export market for tobacco in northern Europe new outlets had been found for a little more than six million pounds in other portions of Europe, and additional exports of ten millions of pounds to other parts of the world. Thus there had been some development of direct new

¹⁵ Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States*, II.

¹⁶ Exports to 1775 are from *Customs* 17:1-3; those after 1790 are from Gray, *op. cit.*, II, 1035, and from *American State Papers*, X, XI.

markets, but the total market for American tobacco was millions of pounds short of our exports in 1772.¹⁷

Most of the loss was in drastic reductions in our exports to Scotland. Direct exports to England had shrunk from 51,367,470 pounds in 1772 to 26,740,000 in 1822, but in the same period exports to Scotland had fallen from 45,259,675 in 1772 to only 1,142,000 fifty years later.

The Revolution not only separated the American colonies from official control by the British government, it separated the tobacco planters from the great banking and marketing organizations that had developed their former world market. A very large proportion of the debts due British merchants and creditors after the Revolution were in the southern states. From what we know of the conditions of agriculture, a large percentage of these must have been advances to the tobacco planters. A total of nearly \$35,000,000 in such claims was filed before the claims commission created by the Jay Treaty and ultimately compromised in 1802 for \$2,664,000.¹⁸ The Scottish merchants seem to have been the chief losers, since they do not again appear prominently in the world tobacco trade. It was three-quarters of a century before the American tobacco industry could replace the great central marketing machinery that had been built up under enumeration.

RICE

Next to tobacco, rice was the most important commercially grown agricultural crop of the continental colonies. Like tobacco it was enumerated, but on the eve of the Revolution had a free market in Europe south of Cape Finesterre and in America south of Georgia. It was an important crop in the lowlands of South Carolina and Georgia.

It has been assumed by many writers that enumeration imposed a serious burden upon the rice planters. The ascertainable facts do not support this assumption. In the years preceding the Revolution the rice industry was prosperous and expanding. Rice exports

¹⁷ All references to exports in 1822 are based upon the official figures in *American State Papers*, X.

¹⁸ J. B. Moore, *International Arbitrations*, I, 298.

from Charleston, South Carolina increased from an average of 80,631 barrels per year for the five years, 1760 to 1764, to an annual average of 120,483 barrels for the years 1770 to 1773. The exports from Georgia, the other important producer of rice, rose from an annual average of 5,152 barrels for the years 1760 to 1764 to an average of 21,910 barrels during the years 1770 to 1773.¹⁹ Planters made fortunes during these years.

American rice growers, like American tobacco planters, were producing for a world market. Where was that market? In 1772 rice exports from America totaled 155,741 barrels; of which 97,563 went to Great Britain, 10,066 to South Europe, and 48,112 to the West Indies.²⁰ This shows that more than sixty per cent of all American rice exported was finding its world market by way of Great Britain and only about seven per cent was exported to that part of Europe that was free from enumeration.

Something other than mere enumeration was attracting rice to the British markets. In 1773 total British imports were 468,915 hundredweight, of which only 11,842 hundredweight were landed in Scotland.²¹ The latter can therefore be eliminated as of any importance as a market for rice, after 1770, although it had been a market of major importance ten years before. The world market centered in England and continued to do so for many years.

Analysis of re-exports of rice from Great Britain in 1773 reveals the ultimate market for American rice. A total of 365,325 hundredweight were exported. Of this amount, 242,693 went to Holland; 81,764 went to other parts of Europe north of Cape Finesterre;²² and 24,684 hundredweight to southern Europe, of which Spain imported 16,657 and Portugal 5,612.²³ Thus, even southern Europe imported more than half as much American rice by way of Eng-

¹⁹ Compiled from Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States*, II, 1022-23. See also Leila Sellers, *Charleston Business on the Eve of the American Revolution*, p. 157.

²⁰ *Customs* 16:1.

²¹ *Customs* 14:1A.

²² Sellers, *op. cit.*, estimates that 60 per cent of the rice went to northern Europe. This is approximately correct if one includes Great Britain with northern Europe. In 1773 only a little over 40 per cent went to the continent of Europe north of Cape Finesterre.

²³ *Customs* 17:2.

land as it did directly from the colonies by way of the open market.²⁴

What happened to America's world market for rice when the Revolution freed it from enumeration? In 1822, after the world had adjusted itself to peace, our exports of rice totaled 87,089 tierces. Of this amount 40,735 tierces went to Europe; 24,073 of which were imported by the British Isles; 15,526 went to Europe north of Cape Finesterre; and 1,136 tierces to southern Europe. Translating tierces into hundredweight we have the following results: 216,657 hundredweight exported to the British Isles in 1822, as contrasted with 468,915 in 1773; 139,734 hundredweight to continental northern Europe in 1822, as contrasted with 324,407 in 1773; and 10,224 to southern Europe in 1822, as contrasted with combined total direct exports from America and reexports from Great Britain of 69,981 in 1773. Our total European market for rice was only 366,615 hundredweight in 1822, as contrasted with 484,320 exported to the same area fifty years before.

Like the tobacco planters the rice planters faced changed conditions after the Revolution. While England remained their best market, total exports for the five years beginning in 1782 were less than half what they had been in the five-year period before the war. (The war had brought to an end a long period of prosperity for the rice industry.) Much of the advantage of the old central market in England was lost. Importations were burdened with new duties, although drawbacks on reexportation were permitted. Shipping regulations of other countries hampered our trade. Even our ally, France, would not admit our rice-laden ships to her ports in 1788, so that cargoes bound for that country had to be unloaded at Cowes on the Isle of Wight for transshipment to French vessels.²⁵

There is nothing in the evidence to support the theory that the rice planters were handicapped or oppressed by enumeration or that they benefited from the freedom to find markets where they could. The advantages of the one great central market still operated as the magnet to attract imports and exports. The planters not only lost a large part of their former markets, but what was

²⁴ The 10,066 barrels exported to southern Europe in 1772 are equivalent to 45,297 hundredweight according to the formula used by the customs service for converting barrels to hundredweight.

²⁵ The best study of conditions facing the rice growers after the Revolution is in Gray, *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States*, II, 593-610.

even more serious, they lost the financial help they had received from the British merchants. Freedom involved the necessity of finding their own financing as well as their own markets.)

INDIGO

Indigo was the third most important enumerated product of the continental provinces. Unlike rice and tobacco, indigo found its ultimate market in Great Britain. (It was not only enumerated but was also encouraged by a direct British bounty.)

On the eve of the Revolution the indigo planters were very prosperous and production was increasing rapidly, as shown by the tables of exports reported by Sellers²⁶ and by Gray.²⁷ Both reports are based upon fragmentary American sources. These show that exports nearly doubled between 1765 and 1773. These estimates are too low. Actual importation by Great Britain in 1773, all certified as produced in the British plantations, was 1,403,684 pounds,²⁸ or twice that reported by Gray. This is nearly three times the colonial exports reported by Macpherson for 1770,²⁹ and his reports seem to be based upon official records. Any industry that was so obviously prosperous cannot be called oppressed.

The Revolutionary War quickly brought to a close this period of prosperity for the indigo planters. They soon discovered that the industry could not exist without the former bounties. (British aid and encouragement were transferred to Jamaica, which was still within the Empire.) American production declined and just about disappeared. By 1822 the reported exports totaled only 3,283 pounds. In the meantime importations of foreign indigo had risen from zero to 1,126,928 pounds, or nearly as much as our exports were in 1773.

THE BALANCE OF TRADE

The relative values of imports from Great Britain into the colonies and exports from them to the home country are frequently cited as proof of economic exploitation. In the form they are usually given they are misleading. The American colonial empire was one

²⁶ *Charleston Business on the Eve of the Revolution*, pp. 165-77.

²⁷ *History of Agriculture in the Southern United States*, II, 1024.

²⁸ *Customs* 17:2.

²⁹ *Annals of Commerce*, III, 572-73.

economic whole. The products of the West Indies were used by all of the other colonies and their products in turn supplied the essential needs of the sugar colonies. A far larger number of ships, with a greater tonnage was used in the trade between the continental colonies and the West Indies, than between the former and the mother country, and nearly as great a tonnage as was used for trade between the various continental colonial ports.⁸⁰

The northern colonies with their rum trade were just as much involved in the sugar industry as were the local West India planters. The colonies that supplied the millions of staves to make the sugar and molasses containers were also as directly interested in the sugar industry as were the farmers who supplied meat, grain, beans, peas, and other essential food items. The New England fishermen who marketed their fish in the West Indies may have considered themselves only seamen and fisherfolk but they were actually producing sugar as much as if they worked on the sugar plantations.

To treat imports and exports from one part of the colonial empire as a trade that should balance is as unreal as to set up a similar bookkeeping record for the external trade from New York and California. No one expects the trade of a single state of the Union with the outside world, or with any one other state of the Union, to balance. It is the total trade of the United States that is important. Applying this principle to the trade between Great Britain and her American colonial Empire we get the results shown in the table below.

From the above table it is seen that total imports from the colonies exceeded total exports in two of the three years and show a small excess for the three years. It is obvious that imports from the West Indies were being paid for in part by exports to the continental colonies, who in turn supplied exports to the West Indies.

There are some items in the total trade picture that do not appear in the tables. One was the large exports of food and lumber products to southern Europe and the relatively small imports in return. This

⁸⁰ In 1770 a total of 685 ships with a combined tonnage of 83,300 cleared from the continental ports for Great Britain; 1,959 ships with a tonnage of 97,680 cleared from the same ports for the West Indies; and 3,868 vessels with a total tonnage of 117,692 cleared from the same ports to others on the continent. *Customs* 16:1.

TABLE 5. TRADE BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND THE AMERICAN COLONIES, 1769-71⁸¹

<i>Imported from</i>	1769	1770	1771
Continental Colonies	£1,170,015	£1,129,662	£1,468,941
West Indies	2,792,178	3,131,879	2,717,194
Totals	3,962,193	4,261,541	4,186,135
Grand Total for three years			12,409,869
<i>Exported to</i>			
Continental Colonies	£1,604,760	£2,343,892	£4,586,882
West Indies	1,274,951	1,269,469	1,151,357
Totals	2,879,711	3,613,361	5,738,239
Grand Total for three years			12,231,311

balance in 1769 amounted to £476,052.⁸² These balances helped cover the cost of British imports each year from that area and should be credited to the total colonial exports. Adding to the value of British exports was the steady migration of capital to the continental colonies. Thousands of immigrants were moving to America with their possessions. British capital was being invested in land and various business enterprises. The vast amount of credit extended to American merchants and especially the credits advanced to the planters engaged in producing the three principal enumerated products, tobacco, rice, and indigo, had to be covered at some time by physical exports of British goods. Finally there were the costs of the British standing army and the operations of the British fleet in American waters. These included costs not covered by ordinary exports and involved the actual shipment of bullion to New York, Canada, and the West Indies in 1769 to a total of £16,651.⁸³

LIMITATIONS ON MANUFACTURING

There were three acts that have been cited as hostile to colonial manufacturing. These are known as the woollens act, the hat act, and the iron bill. The first two applied wholly to shipments by water and the last forbade the creation of new steel furnaces, or forges equipped with tilt hammers or rolling devices for making

⁸¹ Compiled from *Customs* 3:69-71.

⁸² Johnson, *History of the Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*, I, 92.

⁸³ *Customs* 3:69.

that metal. The object of the iron bill was to encourage the colonial exportation of pig and bar iron to Britain so as to reduce the dependence upon foreign imports of these basic materials.

Did these laws materially impede the development of manufacturing in the continental colonies? Fortunately we have two thorough, objective studies on this point: one is by Victor S. Clark⁸⁴ covering the whole field of manufactures, the other is by Arthur C. Bining dealing specifically with the iron industry.⁸⁵ Both of these independent studies are in substantial agreement as to the basic facts. Both agree that British legislation had very little effect in retarding colonial manufacturing. We will discuss each measure separately.

WOOL AND WOOLEN GOODS

The prohibitions against exporting wool and American-made woollens has generally been referred to as oppressive. The impression given is that Englishmen in America were being treated less well than those in England.

There is no foundation for this inference. England had developed the wool-growing and wool-manufacturing industry far beyond that of other countries in western Europe. It was an economic advantage of first importance—a sort of atom bomb of the seventeenth century. Under no circumstances was England willing to permit her special advantage to get away. To this end there was enacted a long series of laws regulating wool and possible wool exports, commencing with the Restoration under Charles II and extending through the reign of William III. The American woollens act was a minor item in those regulations.

The restraints imposed upon Englishmen in America who engaged in wool growing or processing were mild in comparison with those faced by Englishmen in England.

There, in addition to provisions against the export or shipment of wool similar to those in the American law, the owners of sheep had to give notice of their plans to shear sheep. They also had to report the exact number of fleeces at shearing time and give official notice of any removal from their farms, as no wool could be moved

⁸⁴ *History of Manufacturing in the United States.* (Washington, D. C., 1916).

⁸⁵ *British Regulation of the Colonial Iron Industry* (Philadelphia, 1933).

from one place to another without a permit. Buyers in certain areas had to be licensed under bond, and no raw wool could be loaded on a horse cart to be moved by land except in the daytime and at hours fixed by law.⁸⁶ All of the above restrictions remained in force until the Revolution and are listed in the same customs manuals with the American regulations.

As has already been pointed out the prohibitions were not upon production or manufacture but upon water export of such goods. Consequently, household and neighborhood production went on unhampered, as did distribution of such products throughout the colonies and the rapidly expanding back country. Little can be added to the extensive studies of Clark. The back country clothed itself. There was very little cloth made for the market. Colonial newspapers, published in the larger port towns, printed very few advertisements of homespun cloth for sale.

There was no effort to compete commercially with imports from the home country. Textile production was still in the handicrafts stage. Weavers were not well paid and spinners very poorly paid. Working in such industries was associated with extreme poverty.⁸⁷ It just did not pay to produce cloth under American conditions when goods of as good or better quality could be had from abroad for less money. Where family labor had no commercial value and money and money-crops were scarce there was extensive production.

American conditions remained largely unchanged long after the Revolution. (In 1821 woolen goods of American production is not listed among our exports.) On the other hand there appears in the list of goods imported into the United States woolen goods of various kinds to a total value of \$11,971,933 out of total imports valued at \$41,955,134, or nearly thirty per cent of all our imports.⁸⁸

It is obvious that the failure of colonial America to develop a

⁸⁶ 12 Charles II, c. 32, secs. 1-3; 14 Charles II, c. 18, secs. 2, 3, 8, 9; 7-8 William III, c. 28, secs. 2, 3, 4; 9-10 William III, c. 40, secs. 1, 3, 22; 10-11 William III, c. 10, secs. 2, 6, 19.

⁸⁷ Clark, *History of Manufactures in the United States*, Chap. vii. Good spinners in Ulster earned forty cents a week, or seven cents a day, and fine weavers two dollars a week. *Ibid.*, p. 157. Colonial manufacturers could not compete with such cheap labor.

⁸⁸ *American State Papers*, XI, 686, 709.

large export of woolen goods and other textiles rested upon factors entirely separate from a parliamentary act of the seventeenth century.

HATS

The hat act did prevent the shipment of hats by water and may have had a temporary effect upon a developing export trade in New England hats. But the act had no effect upon the steady development of hat manufacturing in America. It was more advantageous for hatmakers to migrate with their skills to new neighborhoods than it was to live in one place and make hats for merchants who, in turn, sold them where they could find a market. Hat manufacture, especially of wool, became widely diffused and was so far advanced that Hamilton in his "Report on Manufactures" in 1791, in discussing the wool industry, stated: "Household manufactures of this material are carried on in different parts of the United States to a very interesting extent; but there is only one branch, which as a regular business can be said to have acquired maturity. This is the making of hats."³⁹ That statement could hardly have been justified concerning any other manufacturing business. (The industry was better developed than any other.) In 1810 Tench Coxe reported 842 hatteries operating in the United States, some of which were in the western territories of Indiana, Michigan, and Mississippi. The center of the industry was not in New England, but in Pennsylvania, where 532 operating hatteries were reported.⁴⁰

IRON AND STEEL

The law prohibiting new rolling and slitting mills, plating forges and steel furnaces, passed in 1750, is mentioned in all accounts. In some cases writers have expanded this into an instance of real oppression. Bining, who has made the most detailed study of the colonial iron industry, agrees with Clark that such legislation did not check the development of the iron industry. (He even insists that on the eve of the Revolution there were more iron furnaces in operation in America than there were in England and Wales com-

³⁹ *American State Papers*, I, 142.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, VI, 666 ff.

bined and that the total output was greater than that of the iron furnaces of Great Britain.⁴¹ Most of the pots, pans, and other hollow ware used in the colonies were made at local iron works. The growing farming, milling, and extensive wagon transportation demands for iron were absorbing most of the bar iron that could be produced. As a result the British bounties, which attracted increased colonial exports of bar iron from a bare 39 tons in 1761 to a total of 2,234 tons ten years later, proved ineffective after 1771 and exports rapidly declined.⁴² The reason was steadily growing demands for domestic use.

Most of the iron works were relatively small and were designed to supply a neighborhood market. In the main they represented personal investments. All of the large colonial iron works were erected by foreign capital and employed imported labor. All of the larger works proved financially unprofitable, largely because of the gradual exhaustion of the local supply of charcoal. That the law was not interfering with the growth of the iron industry is proved by its rapid expansion westward in Pennsylvania and by the fact that the great (American Iron Company) was set up in 1764 with London capital by Hasenclever, who quickly expended a total of more than a quarter million dollars on the project. It was the largest capital outlay in any colonial manufacturing venture.⁴³

Production of steel on a commercial scale came slowly. In 1810 Tench Coxe could report only four steel furnaces in the entire United States with a combined capacity of nine hundred seventeen tons, presumably per year.⁴⁴

Bining did not find a single case where any iron work was discontinued, a slitting mill or steel furnace destroyed, or even an attempted prosecution of an iron works operator. Clark also failed to find a single case in any of the other colonies. An extensive search of the Treasury papers in the Public Record Office in

⁴¹ Bining, *British Regulation of the Colonial Iron Industry*, pp. 26-31.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 133 and *Customs* 16:1. In the table of American exports in 1770 in Macpherson, *Annals of Commerce*, III, 572-73, reproduced in Johnson, *History of the Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*, pp. 118-19, the total export of bar iron, of 24,064, is erroneous. It is clearly a mistake in addition. *Customs* 16:1 gives the correct figure as 2,156 tons.

⁴³ Bining, *op. cit.*, p. 18.

⁴⁴ *American State Papers*, VI, 666 ff.

London by the author also failed to reveal a single such prosecution, although there is much material on other clauses of the trade and navigation laws. There is but one conclusion, and that is that the iron industry was not materially hampered by any British legislation and that its development was rapid and continuous.

OTHER MANUFACTURES

British legislation did not apply to other forms of colonial manufacture except to promote them. Naval stores were encouraged by direct British bounties. The Navigation Acts directly encouraged shipbuilding and all of the allied services such as rope-making, and manufacture of anchor chains, bolts, etc. American distilling of rum was on a large scale as was also sugar refining. Enormous quantities of forest products were worked up and exported to all parts of the empire and to South Europe. Millions of staves and shingles were exported annually. Much furniture shows in the list of exports coastwise and to the West Indies. Thousands of tons of bread and flour were manufactured and exported each year.

The major amount of manufactures, however, do not show in the list of exports as they were produced for domestic consumption and were sold within the colonies in the immediate vicinity where they were made.

While no case can be made for any charge that limitations on colonial manufacture were real, the measures discussed above were a part of the controversy. The iron bill carried a potential threat that real interference with domestic manufactures might be attempted. Thus it produced uneasiness in certain circles in America. The growth of colonial manufactures created a fear in England among workers, capitalists, and trading and shipping circles that unless this movement were checked in America they would lose their best markets and face a future of poverty and high taxes. This was the fear upon which the Americans played with their non-importation agreements.

BOUNTIES

The bounty system certainly was not an item of complaint on the part of American producers. As the bounty policy was one of the most important phases of the general mercantile system, it is

of course included in any general denunciation of the industrial and commercial relations of the colonies to the mother country.

The following industries were directly dependent upon such bounties: (1) naval stores, including tar, pitch, resin, turpentine, masts, spars, yards, bowsprits, and hemp; (2) lumber; (3) cooperage materials made of white oak; (4) indigo. The bounties were authorized over such periods that producers could plan production intelligently, and merchants in England could count on a continuous, artificially-attracted supply of such products over a period of years. By 1765 the policy of enacting bounty laws for periods of only a few years was abandoned, and laws were passed fixing bounties for periods as great as twenty years.⁴⁵ The total sums expended by the British government for bounties on colonial products were very large and extended over a period of nearly seventy years. They were at their highest point on the eve of the Revolution and were reported by the Comptroller General as amounting to £186,144 during the years 1761 to 1776.⁴⁶

(Of the four groups of articles that received bounties, all were produced in colonies that revolted; and the sums expended by the British government in behalf of these industries went wholly to the continental group. It was the southern colonies, rather than the northern, that benefited most from this policy. Naval stores other than masts and spars came largely from North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Indigo grew chiefly in South Carolina and Georgia, and the most desirable lumber and cooperage materials were the products of the colonies south of Pennsylvania.⁴⁷ New

⁴⁵ By 4 George III, c. 26, the import bounty on hemp and rough flax was arranged as follows: 1764-71, £8 per ton; 1771-78, £6 per ton; 1778-85, £4 per ton. By 5 George III, c. 45, the bounties on lumber were established to 1775. By 11 George III, c. 50, the bounties on white oak staves and headings were authorized to 1778. While it had been customary to reenact bounty laws when they expired and no important ones, in fact, were allowed to lapse, this plan of extending them for longer periods should have been beneficial to the favored industries, as it made investments of capital more secure and gave those who were embarking in such industries definite rewards upon which they could base calculations over a period of years.

⁴⁶ *Treasury* 38: Bundle 363, Public Record Office, London.

⁴⁷ See Sheffield's discussion of this industry. He says that the bounty of five shillings, sixpence per barrel on tar was frequently more than the original price. *Observations*, 2nd ed., pp. 77-88.

England supplied mainly masts and spars, and the bounty on these was relatively insignificant.

It should be noted that the policy of granting bounties continued until the close of the colonial period. (Those on lumber and cooperage materials were adopted in the reign of George III; in fact, the first bounty on such products was expected to soften the reception of the Stamp Act in America.) The framing of bounty laws in permanent form was also a characteristic feature of the legislation of his reign. No part of the commercial policy was more firmly established than that of bounties, and the sugar interests advocated them as more efficient in promoting their favorite industry than tariffs. Below is a very plausible contemporary argument for such a policy.

"Suppose the bounty (on sugar) should be two shillings six pence per hundredweight, and 12,000 hogsheads, at 12 hundredweight each, should be sent to foreign markets, one year with another the bounty will be no more per annum than £18,000. The value of these 12,000 hogsheads at twenty-five shillings per hundredweight will amount to £180,000 sterling, which will be returned to Great Britain; and according to the common course of the sugar trade may be computed as follows, viz:

It will pay,

For freight to British seamen and shipping	£ 30,000
To factors, insurers, and customs house officers for charges in marketing it	£ 18,000
Merchandise from Great Britain	£ 36,000
Negroes from Guinea, bought chiefly with British and East India goods	<u>£ 24,000</u>
	£108,000
Remains to the sugar planters and merchants	<u>£ 72,000</u>
	£180,000

"This sum of £180,000 that may be thus saved to this nation by the exportation of 12,000 hogsheads of sugar only, amounts to ten times the proposed bounty."⁴⁸ In these days of accumulating farm and other surpluses, this argument has a familiar ring.

The same author, while he favored confining the continental

⁴⁸ *Present State of the British and French Trade to Africa and America, etc.* (London, 1745), pp. 39-40.

colonies to the supply of sugar and molasses available in the British sugar islands, advocated compensatory bounties on the products of those colonies to make up for the losses incident to their exclusion from the direct trade with the foreign sugar islands.⁴⁹

If the bounty policy was a cause of the Revolution, it operated in a decidedly different way from what has been so confidently asserted by those who condemn the Navigation Acts. The bounty payments were a considerable burden upon the exchequer; and, when the load of taxes after 1763 became a matter of public complaint, the existence of the bounties, their continuance, and the impression made upon public opinion by the figures of total payments during the eighteenth century, became an added reason why the people in America, who apparently benefited from such bounties, should assume their fair share in the costs of Empire.

(To the extent that the bounties were a burden upon the British taxpayer and an excuse for taxation of the colonies by the home government, they were a cause of the Revolution.) They were certainly not a cause in the sense that such payments produced discontent in America.

Several industries practically disappeared at the end of the Revolution because they could not exist without the bounties. As the beneficiaries of the bounty system were essentially all in the thirteen continental colonies that revolted, it is highly probable that the bounty phases of the navigation system produced a conservative element of loyal supporters of the imperial system—at least so far as men permitted themselves to be influenced by their direct economic interests. (There may be a direct relation between the British financial encouragement of colonial industries and the loyalist movement in America.) It was definitely strongest in those colonies that benefited most directly from this practice.)

PREFERENTIAL TARIFFS

The policy of preferential tariffs and export bounties could not have been a cause of economic complaint on the part of Americans, who thus secured access to the best market in Europe on better conditions than other producers. There was no possible ground for complaint on the part of American consumers when

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 52-56.

the British government allowed drawbacks of its own import and inland duties upon goods exported from England to the colonies, or when it encouraged both production in England and colonial consumption by export bounties, as it did in many cases. These regulations gave the colonies especially favored treatment, and were causes of prosperity and not of complaint.

INFLUENCE ON GENERAL PROSPERITY

Were the navigation and trade laws so generally burdensome upon the colonies as to interfere with their development, and thus produce general poverty and distress? Again the answer must be negative; just the opposite condition existed. The colonies were prosperous and wages of labor were admittedly higher in the continental colonies than elsewhere in the world.

Population in continental America was doubling every twenty-five years, while in England it was scarcely doubling in a century. In fact the population of England seems to have doubled only once from 1066 to 1600, and again by about 1760, although a very marked increase in population was to characterize the reign of George III. In no other section of the world was there a white population expanding from natural increase so rapidly as in continental America. Marriages occurred early and families were large. The British colonies on the continent were attractive to emigrants, especially from the British Isles, and there are numerous references in the British periodicals, published in the decade, 1765 to 1775, to artisans of all kinds migrating to the new world.⁵⁰

(Another measure of their prosperity was the expansion of trade that had occurred during the eighteenth century. Other evidences of wealth were the multiplying educational institutions, churches, newspapers, magazines, and other publications. Many of the finest specimens of colonial church architecture date from the period just before the Revolution.

The wealth acquired by American merchants and planters was a real cause of jealousy on the part of residents in the mother country. There had grown up in America a new race of untitled nobility with estates and palaces that compared favorably with the possessions of the titled classes in England. Their houses were

⁵⁰ Dora Mae Clark, *British Opinion on the American Revolution*, pp. 26-28;

not only well, but even luxuriously, furnished. Their consumption of British and European goods was not limited to necessities, but included luxuries of all kinds. The best evidence of this is the elaborate offerings of goods, including finery of all kinds for both men and women, found in the extensive advertisements in the newspapers of the time. The population of the seaboard was no longer clothed in homespun. Many men wore silk and velvet regularly. Joseph Warren had on his usual silk waistcoat when he was killed at Bunker Hill.

(One of the best tests of real prosperity is the rapidity with which a population can sink its public debts following a war.) The French and Indian War had been a real world contest so far as the British Empire was concerned. Colonial exertion on the part of the northern colonists, especially, had been on a scale not unlike that of Canada and Australia in the last world war. Many of the colonies levied heavy taxes during the war, and came out with large debts. The total colonial debt according to Charles Lloyd, who prepared the statistical data for the Stamp Act, was £2,600,000. Yet this was sunk so rapidly that in 1765 it was estimated that only £767,000 remained, and the greater part of that would be sunk by 1767.⁵¹

⁵¹ *Conduct of the Late Administration Examined* (London, 1767), p. 63. This pamphlet was written for the British public, but has all the appearances of being based upon information secured from official sources. At the time of its publication it was popularly assumed that it was the work of Grenville. There is some discrepancy between the estimates in this pamphlet and the official compilation in the treasury papers; but the latter includes £150,000 for New York, which was supposed to have been paid off in 1763, and does not include any estimates for Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, or Georgia. It is possible that Lloyd's statement of the total debts and the amounts outstanding in 1765 may be more accurate than those in the earlier Treasury estimates. Below are the official data supplied for the information of Grenville on the eve of the enactment of the Stamp Act:

Colony	Debt at Close of War	Unpaid in 1765	Provisions for Sinking
New Hampshire	£ 67,000	£ 18,000	Taxes 1766-67-68.
Massachusetts	810,000	160,000	
Connecticut	280,000	All paid	
Rhode Island	Uncertain	70,000	
New York	290,000	150,000	Supposedly all in 1765.
New Jersey	210,000	150,000	In about 19 years.
Maryland	50,000	All paid	
Virginia	390,000	290,000	In 1769.
	<hr/> £2,097,000	<hr/> £838,000	

The estimate of the time within which the colonies could extinguish their remaining obligations was too optimistic; but past accomplishments made a profound impression upon people in England, who could not hope to reduce their own national debt to the level of 1754 in less than a generation.

(The ability of the colonies to sink their heavy war debts at the rate of about twenty per cent a year was a startling performance to thoughtful Englishmen.) The economic recovery of the American continental colonies was not unlike that of the United States during the first ten years after World War I. The soreness of many British taxpayers, as they looked forward to long years of heavy taxation of their own people, while their fellow citizens across the Atlantic would soon be free from all but the lightest taxes, especially in view of their belief that the war had been fought and the burdens incurred for the benefit of the Americans, was not unlike the feeling aroused over the war debts in the years immediately following World War I.)

A few extracts from the extensive contemporary discussion of this subject may give a better understanding of the way many Englishmen viewed America.

The taxes paid at present by Americans bear no proportion to the burdens of the English. In less than five years, most of their burdens will cease, as their debts will be discharged; there is no hope of relief here, as the total revenue pays only interest and ordinary expenses of government. A future war would increase the taxes to pay interest; Americans have no future wars to dread, as British fleets and armies are a protection against foreign invaders: They can look forward to plenty and security in a wholesome climate and extremely prolific soil. The people of England have to look forward to increasing debts and taxes, frequent wars waged against them because of their burdens, poverty and insecurity, an exhausted people and a deserted country.⁵²

England labours under a great load of debt, and heavy taxes: England has a very expensive government to maintain; the Americans have a government of very little expense; and consequently we must dwindle and decline every day in our trade, whilst they thrive and prosper exceedingly. The consequence of this will certainly be that the inhabitants will run away as fast as they can from this coun-

⁵² An unsigned article evidently contributed by an admirer of Pitt. *London Chronicle*, February 18, 1766.

try to that, and Old England will become a poor, deserted, deplorable Kingdom—like a farm that has been over-cropped.⁵³

It is something remarkable, that ever since the regulations were made last year, concerning the North-American trade, we hardly read a newspaper that does not mention manufacturers of one kind or another going from England, Scotland, or Ireland to settle in those colonies; which, if true, is certainly a matter that should to the last degree prove alarming to these kingdoms.⁵⁴

Your abilities even to share our burthens are unquestionable, seeing that when eight millions of us pay ten millions of taxes, which amounts to twenty-five shillings on each person, three millions of you pay only seventy-five thousand pounds, or six pence on each person, and this in a country where a labouring man gets three times the wages that he does in England, and yet may live on half the expense.

When you tell us that you are unable to pay taxes, pardon us for once in this Address, if we tell you that we do not believe you. . . . For you we submit to monopolies; for you lay restraints on our trade; for you we are taxed; and for you impose similar hardships upon other parts of our dominions.⁵⁵

British officers who served in America were struck by the vast real wealth here: the number of horses, cattle, hogs, farms, thriving cities, bountiful food supplies, and the lavish scale of living they found everywhere in the older parts of the country. Certainly they saw no evidences that the commercial system was reducing the Americans to poverty. On the contrary, they saw evidences of a people acquiring wealth and property more rapidly than elsewhere, with a vision of becoming the richest and most powerful nation in the world. The wealth and prosperity of the Americans was probably one of the causes of the Revolution. It excited both the envy and the fear of some British citizens, and led them to support the taxation policy. It also fired the imaginations of Americans, and led them to think and talk in terms of the vast empire that they conceived would develop here in the next century.

American and British writers prophesied that within half a century the population of the continental colonies and its resultant military and naval strength would exceed that of England. The

⁵³ Another unsigned article, probably contributed by an admirer of Pitt. *London Chronicle*, February 20, 1766.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, February 3, 1765. This was copied into the *Newport Mercury*, April 15, 1765.

⁵⁵ Sir Charles Dalrymple, *The Address of the People of Great Britain to the People of America* (London, 1775), p. 17.

realization of this fact was one of the reasons for the attempted imperial reorganization between 1763 and 1770, and was largely responsible for serious thinkers abandoning plans for a consolidated imperial legislature made up of representatives from the dependencies as well as the British Isles. Charles Lloyd, Grenville's chief financial lieutenant, urged in 1767 that force should be used to execute the taxation program because, if the Americans were not forced to submit to the authority of Parliament then, their growing strength would make any successful attempts in the future impossible.⁵⁶

No case can be made out for the Navigation Acts as a cause of the Revolution on the grounds that such laws were economically oppressive and were steadily reducing the Americans to a condition of hopeless poverty. It is true that evidences of hard times in the colonies may be found; but such conditions were periodic and were preceded and followed by other periods of over-trading, extravagance, and luxury.⁵⁷ There was unquestionably high taxation in some of the colonies during and after the French and Indian War. In places there were price readjustments due to deflation and the termination of large governmental activities. Such conditions were not evenly distributed. There were times when merchants and newspaper publishers complained of slow collections; but such conditions can be found in any region where credit is easy, and they can also be found at times in even the most prosperous coun-

⁵⁶ "To impose with success on the Americans that portion of the public burthen, which they ought to bear, seize the opportunity, while a general peace leaves you at liberty to employ in this service, whatever force may be necessary for it: and while the infirm and disjointed state of the provinces renders a small force equal to the work—if you suffer this important hour to pass unimproved, it is lost forever: The Americans will cease to be the Colonies of England, and we shall have more than doubled our national debt in a war—the successes of which were all to their advantage, to enable them to pour the benefits of their trade into the bosom of our commercial rivals. The declaratory law—will hold forth *only a delusive and nugatory affirmative of the right of the legislature of this Kingdom*, if not followed by some bill which shall exert it—if now, you neglect to pursue those measures—the whole new world ceases forever to be subject to your authority." *The Conduct of the Late Administration Examined* (London, 1767), pp. 157-59.

⁵⁷ In the debates over the repressive legislation in 1774, Mr. Glover pointed out that the distress in England was partly due to the collapse of the paper money in 1772, and that he could point out the exact time when the collapse happened.

tries. The evidence indicates far less depression in the colonies than in the home country in the same years.

It is true that after 1770 there was a serious depression in the tobacco business in a portion of Virginia, which is reflected in the newspapers. In accounting for their economic distress and suggesting possible remedies, the planters in no case charged their distress to the Navigation Acts. Their ideas of what was wrong and of proper remedies sound strangely modern. They charged their economic condition to the too easy credit supplied by the Scottish merchants, and to the organized monopoly of the buyers. One writer seriously proposed active coöperative organizations to handle their tobacco crops, with paid factors in Britain to care for their sales and arrange for their purchases.⁵⁸

Professor Andrews⁵⁹ and Professor Schlesinger⁶⁰ have assembled a good many items from the correspondence of merchants indicating some economic distress. Such data, however, are not convincing. The conditions complained of are local and periodic where they are not due to the chronic absence of an adequate medium of exchange. They should not be interpreted as indicating a general lack of prosperity for America as a whole, covering the period between 1763 and 1775. They more probably indicate that a tidal movement of prosperous and dull times was characteristic of American economic life long before the formation of the federal government.⁶¹

Conditions for the period as a whole must be considered. A country that was a Mecca for immigrants;⁶² that was importing

⁵⁸ Purdie's *Virginia Gazette*, October 21, November 25, 1773.

⁵⁹ *Boston Merchants and the Non Importation Movement* (Publications, Colonial Society of Massachusetts, XIX), pp. 180-91.

⁶⁰ *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution* (New York, 1918), p. 106.

⁶¹ This is practically conceded by Schlesinger in his account of the economic recovery after 1770. *Ibid.*, Chap. vi; Virginia D. Harrington, *New York Merchants on the Eve of the Revolution*, describes the periods of varying good and hard times in New York, but also advances a theory that merchants' letters are a better indication of business conditions than are the statistics of trade. She states that the bottom of the business depression in New York was in 1769, pp. 289-319.

⁶² Between August 3 and November 29, 1773, at the ports of New York, Philadelphia, Charleston, New Jersey, Halifax, and Newport there landed 6,222 immigrants from Ireland, 1,400 from England and Scotland, and 56 from the Isle of Man. *Pennsylvania Packet*, Sept. 5, 1774. Immigrants do not flock to a region where economic conditions are bad and the future unpromising.

slaves in large numbers;⁶³ that was rapidly expanding its settled area into the back country; that could order from overseas expensive marble statues of its favorite English politicians as did South Carolina⁶⁴ and New York;⁶⁵ that could squander large sums on the public funeral of a royal governor and bury him in a sepulcher as elaborate as was accorded to royalty in England;⁶⁶ that could find the funds for better church buildings than it ever had before in its history; that could sink public debts more rapidly than other countries; and whose population could live on a far better scale than similar classes in any other part of the world; was not suffering from economic ills that lead to permanent poverty.

⁶³ The importations of slaves at Charleston for twenty years, from 1753 to 1772, were:

1753	1,398	1758	3,177	1763	1,145	1768	178
1754	2,532	1759	1,879	1764	3,057	1769	4,612
1755	1,436	1760	3,449	1765	7,184	1770	149
1756	1,952	1761	1,395	1766	101	1771	3,079
1757	1,438	1762	602	1767	12	1772	4,865

South Carolina Gazette, June 14, 1773.

This makes an average of more than two thousand per year for twenty years. Other colonies were also importing in large numbers as is evidenced by the notices of arrivals and advertisements for sale of the slave cargoes in the current newspapers. Large numbers were also coming to the West Indies. Ragatz, *The Fall of the Planter Class in the British Caribbean*, pp. 81-90.

⁶⁴ John Wilkes.

⁶⁵ William Pitt.

⁶⁶ Governor Boutetourt of Virginia. This may still be seen in Williamsburg.

PART II

THE FOUNDATIONS
OF THE REPUBLIC

CARL BECKER

TO THOSE who consider history to be pedantic and dull, the writings of Carl Becker come as a pleasant surprise. In his most characteristic mood, Becker depended for his effectiveness neither upon an intimidating bulk of detail nor upon closely knit argumentation. Instead of offering a proof, he presented simply an artful selection of facts intended to lead the reader to proper conclusions rather than to form conclusions for him. Although his essays were never merely descriptive, neither were they dogmatic. Whatever insistence they contain comes from their charm and reasonableness.

Becker's style was well mated to his method. Avoiding both ponderousness and levity, Becker managed to combine informality with the dignity demanded by the seriousness of his themes. The quality of wit seems ever present below the surface of his writing, erupting only to serve the purpose of understanding rather than of comic relief. If Becker was far from typical as a prose stylist, he was also unorthodox in his departures from the traditional scholarly methods of presenting a historical analysis. In his *Eve of the Revolution* he confessed even to having invented speeches for some of the persons whose words the historical record did not contain.

Even more unconventional is "The Spirit of '76," an essay published in 1927 which illustrates most of Becker's personal characteristics. Its tone and method are not unlike those of John Marquand's *The Late George Apley*. Through the device of a fictional character, Jeremiah Wynkoop, Becker attempted to

reveal the mood in which the conservative patriot viewed the conflict with Great Britain and the establishment of independence. Instead of dealing directly with facts, Becker presented his impressions of how men felt about the events of the period. To heighten the sense of intimacy, he contrived to have the story told in the first person by Wynkoop's friend, whose manuscript he pretended to have found. Yet Becker's sense of good taste operated to keep even so informal a plan of presentation from ever becoming undignified or distracting.

Although Becker's description of the spirit with which the more "respectable" parts of the colonial population approached the Revolution was founded upon established facts, it was an analysis which did some violence to the traditional and popular view. Where nationalistic orators have found enthusiasm for independence, Becker told of reluctance; where the patriotic myth demanded unanimity, Becker detected a sharp division caused by the supplementary issue of democracy. However fervently Mr. Wynkoop believed in liberty, he had strong misgivings over popular rule; anarchy seemed to him a high price to pay even for the abolition of imperial dictatorship.

Few criticisms have been made of Carl Becker's work; the principal regret is that he was not more prolific. Yet it seems proper to suggest certain limitations which derive from his special attributes. For example, the urbanity and wit which contributed much to the attractiveness of his writing do not set exactly the right tone for a description of revolutionary activities. When Becker dealt with the intellectual background of the Revolution or with cosmopolites such as Benjamin Franklin, his sophistication was a distinct advantage. But when there was need to explain the avariciousness of merchants or the violence of a mob protesting the Stamp Tax, Becker was less than convincing. At times Mr. Wynkoop is more like a college professor than like the man of business he is supposed to be. In short, Becker is better expositing the rationale of the Revolution than the Revolution itself.

Yet these are limitations imposed by qualities which are much more significant as sources of Becker's effectiveness. *The Spirit of '76* is one of the best introductions to his writings and one of the pleasures of studying American history.

The Spirit of '76

(Last October Mr. Lyon asked me to come down to the Brookings School and tell you about the Spirit of '76. I suspected that he hadn't any clear notion of what was meant by the phrase "Spirit of '76," and I was positive I hadn't. I was therefore about to decline the invitation when, rummaging among my papers, I came upon an old and imperfect manuscript which seemed providentially designed to throw some light on this obscure subject. The manuscript bore the date of 1792, but who may have written it I was unable to determine. There are obviously some pages missing, and the tale ends suddenly as if never quite finished. But such as it is I have transcribed it, and I give it to you for what it may be worth. The title of the manuscript is "Jeremiah Wynkoop.")

JEREMIAH WYNKOOP

DURING the war of independence I not infrequently heard zealous patriots say that Mr. Wynkoop was not as warm in the cause as he should be. The charge has lately been revived by those who had no great liking for Mr. Wynkoop's Federalist principles. Mr. Wynkoop was of course not alone in being thus distinguished. It is now said of many men who were never suspected of being Tory that they look back with regret to the old days before the breach with Britain. It is said of them, to employ a phrase now be-

From *The Spirit of '76 and Other Essays* by Carl Becker et al., copyright, 1927, by the Robert Brookings Graduate School. Reprinted by permission of The Brookings Institution.

coming current, that they were never really inspired by the spirit of '76. For my part, I suspect that, in recalling the desperate days of the war, we are likely to invest the so-called spirit of '76 with a glamor which it did not have at the time. Be that as it may, I knew Jeremiah Wynkoop as an honest man and a genuine patriot. I was his closest friend, intimate enough to know better than most the difficulties that confronted him and the sentiments that determined his conduct. And so I think it worth while, now that the man is dead, to set down a plain tale of his activities and opinions from the beginning of the quarrel in 1763 to the final breach in 1776. This I do, not only for old friendship's sake and as a justification of Mr. Wynkoop, but as a contribution to the history of those troubled times; for Jeremiah Wynkoop was fairly representative, both in his station in life and in his opinions, of that considerable class of substantial men who did as much as any other class, and I think more than any other class, to enable these states to maintain their liberties against British tyranny.

Born of rich middle class parents of genuine Dutch-American stock, Jeremiah was educated at Kings College, then recently established. In fact we both entered the College the year it was founded, and graduated with the first class in 1758. Jeremiah then spent two years in the office of William Moore reading law, a profession which he nevertheless abandoned for the trade. Taking over a profitable business upon the sudden death of his father, he rapidly achieved a notable success in commerce, chiefly in West Indian ventures, and was already known, in 1765, as a leading merchant in New York, where he had offices near the wharves, and a town house, inherited from his father, on the Bowling Green. But Jeremiah, being much given to study and the reading of books, preferred to live away from the distractions of the city, and had in fact for some years resided in the country, out Greenwich Village way, where he possessed a fine estate which had come to him as part of the generous dowry of his wife, the daughter of old Nicholas Van Schoickendinck, a great landowner in the province.

Mr. Wynkoop was much given to the reading of books, as I have said; and it is necessary to dwell on this matter a little since it helps to explain his opinions and conduct. Of all books, histories of the ancient and the modern times were his favorite study. It was an

interest which he acquired in college, and never afterward lost. In college of course we all read the standard Greek and Roman writers, and acquired the usual knowledge of classical history. To admire the classical poets and essayists was nothing out of the way for young men in college, but the ancient civilization fascinated Jeremiah more than most of us, and I recall that he devoured every book on that subject which the college afforded, and many others which he bought or borrowed. The *Parallel Lives* of Plutarch he knew almost by heart, and was never weary of discanting on the austere morality and virtuous republicanism of those heroic times. For Jeremiah a kind of golden age was pictured there, a lost world which forever disappeared when Caesar crossed the Rubicon. The later Roman times never interested him much—"five hundred years," he used to say, "in which the civilized world groaned under the heavy hand of tyrants, relieved only by the reigns of five good emperors." Still less was he interested in the Dark Ages, when the light of learning and the spirit of liberty were submerged by feudal anarchy and ecclesiastical superstition. But the story of modern times fascinated Jeremiah as much as the story of the ancient world because all its significance seemed to lie in the slow and painful emergence from that long mediaeval night, through the recovery of the wisdom of the ancients, the progress of natural philosophy, and the struggle for political liberty.

All these matters I recall we used to discuss at great length, so that I was perfectly familiar with Jeremiah's reflections on history. At that time his ideas seemed to me wonderfully novel and interesting, but I have since thought them, in a vague general way at least, those of most cultivated Americans. Be that as it may, all the significance of history appeared to Mr. Wynkoop to lie in the age long conflict between Truth and Error, between Freedom and Oppression. And for this reason he opined that the central event of modern times was the struggle of the last century between the English people and the Stuart kings. With the history of that heroic time he was entirely familiar, and in a less degree I was too. Our heroes were Pym and Eliot, and John Hampden, imprisoned for refusing to pay a twenty shilling tax. Cromwell we admired as the man of iron who had forever laid the ghost of the Divine Right doctrine, and whose mistakes were later corrected by the liberal Whigs who called in Dutch Wil-

liam to replace the last of the Stuarts. We knew the great charters of liberty—the Magna Charta, the Petition of Right and the Bill of Rights. We knew our Milton, the man who defended the authority of elected magistrates, and erected an impregnable bulwark against the denial of free speech. We knew our Grotius, who had discovered in right reason the foundation of civil and international society. Above all we knew our Locke, and especially his second discourse on Civil Government, in which he so eloquently defended the Revolution of '88 as an act of reasonable men defending their natural rights against the usurping king who had broken the original compact.

~~—Much as Jeremiah admired England as the home of political liberty, he was thoroughly American, and it was always his idea that America had played a most notable part in the great modern struggle against the oppression of Church and State. He used to find great satisfaction in recalling that our ancestors, at the hazard of their lives and fortunes, had braved the terrors of the new world in pursuit of religious and political liberty; that they had persisted, often at the point of failure, in the desperate determination to transform the inhospitable wilderness into a land fit for human habitation; and he would point out that they had succeeded beyond any reasonable expectation, so much so that these thirteen colonies were now the most fortunate and the freest countries in the world—thirteen communities living in peace and content, happily without kings, neither burdened with an idle aristocracy nor menaced by a depraved populace, with a press uncensored, and many religious faiths deprived of the power of persecution and long habituated to the spirit of toleration. For my part I used to complain sometimes that after all we were only "provincials," remote from the center of things. I used to express the wish that fate had set us down in London, nearer Piccadilly and the Beefsteak Club. But Jeremiah would have none of such repining. Provincials we might be in a geographical sense, he would say, but spiritually we were at "the center of the world, in the direct line of those heroes and martyrs who since the beginning of time have done battle for the dignity and happiness of mankind against the leagued assailants of both."~~

"(Here some pages are missing in the manuscript. It goes on as follows.)"

. . . are become so populous and wealthy that we are as indis-

pensable to Britain as Britain is to us. The time is surely approaching when this vast country will be the center of the power and wealth of the Empire. We are now freed from the French menace. The peace will be an enduring one, and the two branches of the English race will continue in the future as in the past to exemplify to the world those incomparable blessings that are the prerogatives of free peoples."

Such was Jeremiah Wynkoop's conception of history in general and of the part which Britain and America had played in the story of human progress. With him it was a kind of philosophy, a religion indeed, the only religion really that he had. I don't mean that he was of the atheistical school of thought. He believed indeed in the existence of the Deity as the First Cause and Original Contriver of the universe; and this was in fact the very reason why he found so much delight in the study of history. History was God's revelation of the meaning of life and of human destiny on earth, making plain the gradual progress and the ultimate triumph of Truth and Freedom. And this I think was the secret of his profound loyalty to both Britain and America; these were in his view the promised lands, the homes of the chosen peoples whose mission it was to lead mankind toward the final goal.

Nothing at all events was farther from his thought in 1763 than that there could be any serious differences between the two peoples who were so bound together by ties of blood and affection, by mutual respect, and by the common tradition of

"(Another break in the manuscript here.)"

In the year 1765 Mr. Wynkoop shared the general feeling of apprehension which for two years had been steadily increasing on account of the measures, as unprecedented as they were unfortunate, of the king's minister, Mr. George Grenville. The chief of these measures were undoubtedly the Sugar Act of the last, and the Stamp Act of the then present year. On the nature and effects of these measures Mr. Wynkoop had read and reflected as much as a busy man well could do. The Sugar Act, obviously designed to placate the British West Indian sugar planters, was certain, as indeed it was intended, to put obstacles in the way of the island trade with New York and New England. In that trade Mr. Wynkoop was personally interested. It is true, as indeed he was careful to tell me, that his profits for the

last year were much as usual; but it had been abundantly demonstrated in pamphlets that the Sugar duties were bound to have a disastrous effect on American trade in general; would, for example, undermine the New England Rum industry and thereby depress the fisheries and the African trade; would diminish the exports of lumber and grain from New York and Pennsylvania; would above all, since the new duties were to be paid in silver, drain the colonies of their small store of hard money and thereby make it difficult for American merchants to settle their balances due in London on account of imported British manufactures.

No one doubted, at least no one in America, that the Sugar Act was unwise in point of policy, calculated to defeat the very end intended. Yet there it was, an act of Parliament imposing duties for the regulation of trade, and we could not deny that Parliament had long exercised without opposition the right to regulate trade. But I recall Mr. Wynkoop's pointing out to me one novel feature of the act, which was the declared purpose, expressed in the preamble, of raising a revenue in "his Majesty's dominions in America, for defraying the expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the same." For some reason Mr. Wynkoop disliked the term "dominions," always preferring the term "colonies." But he disliked still more the term "securing." For two years ministers had been prone to talk of laying restrictions on his Majesty's dominions for their better security. This idea Mr. Wynkoop disliked extremely. I remember his saying that the term "freeborn Englishmen" had always given him great satisfaction, that he had always supposed that Americans were possessed of all the rights of Englishmen born within the realm; and indeed I knew him well enough to know that he harbored the firm conviction that Americans were not only as free as Englishmen but even a little freer, a degree less subservient to aristocrats and kings, a degree more emancipated from custom and the dead hand of the past. I often heard him compare the Assembly of New York, chosen by the free suffrages of the people, with the British Parliament in which so often the members were chosen by irresponsible Peers and Boroughmongers—compare them of course to the disadvantage of the latter. To suppose that Parliament was now bent upon restricting the dearly bought and well deserved liberties of America was to

Jeremiah, as indeed it was to all of us, an alien and distressing thought.

We could scarcely therefore avoid asking the question: "What constitutional right has the British Parliament to legislate in restraint of American liberties?" We never doubted that we were possessed of liberties, and no American, certainly no American as well informed as Mr. Wynkoop, needed to be told that there was a British Constitution which guaranteed the rights of Englishmen. Yet, as I recall those early years, I must confess that we were somewhat perplexed, had a little the air of groping about in the dark for the precise provisions of the British Constitution. The spirit of the British Constitution we knew was to be found in the Magna Charta and the Bill of Rights. Rights were indeed of its very essence; and to Mr. Wynkoop at least it was incredible that there was not to be found in it an adequate guarantee of the rights which Americans ought to enjoy. I remember his reading to me certain passages from the pamphlets of Stephen Hopkins and Governor Hutchinson—pamphlets which he thought expressed the American view very adequately. "What motive," Mr. Hopkins asked, "can remain to induce the Parliament to hedge the principles and lessen the rights of the most dutiful and loyal subjects—subjects justly entitled to ample freedom, who have long enjoyed and not abused, their liberties?" This passage I think expressed Mr. Wynkoop's state of mind very well in the year of the Sugar Act. His state of mind was one of amazement, the state of mind of a man who is still at the point of asking questions—Why? For what reason?

Meantime the Stamp Act, presenting the question more clearly, did much to clarify our ideas on the matter of American taxation; and certainly Mr. Wynkoop was never in doubt as to the unconstitutionality of that famous measure. In those days I was much at Mr. Wynkoop's house, and I remember one day in November, 1765, sitting with him and his father-in-law, old Nicholas Van Schoickendinck, discussing the state of the nation. Even old Nicholas had been startled out of his customary complacency by the furious excitement occasioned by the Stamp Act.

"The Act is unconstitutional, sir," Mr. Wynkoop had just declared, somewhat dogmatically it must be confessed, and for perhaps the third time. "There can be no question about that I think. It is

not only contrary to precedent, but is destructive of British liberty, the fundamental principle of which is that Englishmen may not be taxed without their own consent. We certainly never gave our assent to the Stamp Act."

"I won't say no to that," old Nicholas remarked. "And if we had done no more than to protest the measure I should be well content."

"Little good protests would have done, sir. We protested before the bill was passed, and without effect. Mr. Grenville would not hear our protests, and now he finds the act virtually nullified. I can't say I regret it."

"Nullified!" Old Nicholas exclaimed with some asperity. "A soft word for a nasty business. Mr. Grenville finds his law 'nullified,' you say. But in getting the law nullified we get half the windows of the Broad Way smashed too, and Governor Colden gets his chariot burned. For my part I don't know what Mr. Colden's chariot had to do with the devilish stamps—it wasn't designed to carry them."

"Very true, sir, I admit. And regrettable enough, all this parading and disturbance. But if Ministers will play with oppression the people will play with violence. Similar incidents occurred in England itself in the last century. Let Mr. Grenville beware of playing the role of Strafford. God knows I am no friend of rioting. I have windows too. But a little rioting may be necessary on occasion to warn ministers that legislative lawlessness is likely to be met by popular violence."

Mr. Wynkoop had perhaps a little the air of talking to convince himself rather than old Nicholas. Old Nicholas at least was not convinced.

"Tush!" he exclaimed irritably. "That's a new word, 'popular.' You young fellows have picked up a lot of precious democratical phrases, I must say. Who are 'the people' you talk so loosely about? Another word for 'populace' or I miss my guess. Don't delude yourself by supposing that it was hatred of the Stamps that made them break Mr. Livingston's windows and burn Mr. Colden's chariot. They hate Mr. Livingston and Mr. Colden because they are men of substance and standing. It is not windows they aim at but class privileges, the privileges of my class and yours, the class that always has, and I trust always will, govern this province. The bald fact is that a mob of mechanics and ne'er-do-wells, led by obscure fellows

like John Lamb and Issac Sears who have hitherto doffed their caps and known their places, are now aiming to control the city through their self constituted committees. Sons of Liberty, they call themselves; sons of anarchy, in fact. I wish as much as you to preserve our liberties. But I warn you that liberty is a sword that cuts two ways, and if you can't defend your rights against ministerial oppression without stirring the 'people,' you will soon be confronted with the necessity of defending your privileges against the encroachments of the mob on the Bowling Green."

Old Nicholas stopped to light his pipe, and after a few puffs added:

"You don't associate with Mr. John Lamb, do you? You ain't one of the Liberty Boys who erect poles and break windows, I hope."

Mr. Wynkoop laughed off the sarcasm.

"Certainly not, sir. I don't know the fellow Lamb, never saw him in fact, although I am told, and believe, that he is an honest, worthy man. The danger you mention has of course occurred to me, but I think you probably exaggerate it. Let Britain repeal the Stamp Act, as she must do, and the populace will be quiet enough."

We sat until a late hour. I took but little part in the discussion, enjoying nothing better than to listen to the good natured wrangling of these two friends. During the course of the evening each repeated, many times over, his former argument, all without rancor, but all equally without effect. Except in opinion, they were not divided; and at last, pledging one another courteously in a glass of stiff toddy, we separated for the night.

During the following months Mr. Wynkoop continued firm in the defence of American rights. He agreed, as all the substantial merchants did, not to use the stamps, which was indeed not possible since none were to be had. Yet he would do no business without them. Let the courts close, he said. Let his ships stand idle in harbor, a year, two years, let them rot there rather than submit to an unconstitutional measure. So I often heard him declare roundly, sitting at dinner sipping his madeira. . . .

"(Again something missing from the manuscript.)"

. . . . secret misgivings, during the long cold winter, by the continued disturbances in the streets, and by the clamor of those, mostly of the common sort, who demanded that the courts should open

and denounced the merchants for timidly refusing to do business without stamps. The Sons of Liberty were saying that the stopping of business was all very well for gentlemen of fortune, but that it was ruining the people who must starve unless business went on as usual. The Sons of Liberty were grown more hostile to the merchants than they were to ministers, and they even hinted that the better sort were by their timidity betraying the cause. Meantime Old Nicholas appeared to enjoy the situation, and never lost an opportunity of asking him, Jeremiah Wynkoop, whether he hadn't yet joined the Liberty Boys, and why after all he didn't send his ships out, clearance papers or no clearance papers.

Mr. Wynkoop was therefore immensely relieved when the British Parliament finally repealed the hateful measure, thus at once justifying his conduct and restoring his confidence in the essential justice of Britain. He had now, I recall, rather the better of the argument with Old Nicholas (the two were forever disputing) and pointed out to him ever so often that a little firmness on America's part was all that was needful to the preservation of her liberties. For two years he went about his business and pleasure with immense content. I dare say he easily forgot, as men will do, the distasteful incidents of the Stamp Act struggle, and allowed his mind to dwell chiefly on its satisfactions. He often spoke of the principle, "No taxation without representation," as being now fully established; often expressed his gratification that, by taking a firm and sensible stand, he and his substantial friends had brought Britain to recognize this principle; so that by the mere passing of time as it were these ideas acquired for Jeremiah a certain axiomatic character. I was never so sure of all this, and sometimes called his attention to the Declaratory Act as evidence that Britain still claimed the right of binding the colonies in all matters whatsoever. Needless to say, Old Nicholas called his attention to the Declaratory Act oftener than I did. But Mr. Wynkoop would not take the Declaratory Act seriously. It was, he said, no more than a bravely flying banner designed to cover a dignified retreat from an untenable position; and he had no fear that Britain, having confessed its error by repealing the Stamp Act, would ever again repeat it. It presently appeared that the British government could commit errors without repeating itself. In 1767, following the mysterious retirement and delphic silences of Mr. Pitt,

Mr. Charles Townshend had come forward, no one knew on whose authority, and promised the House to obtain a revenue from America without doing violence to her alleged rights. The Americans, he said, had drawn a distinction between "internal" and "external" taxes, denying the former but admitting the latter. This distinction Mr. Townshend thought "perfect nonsense," but was willing to humor Americans in it; which he would do by laying an external tax on the importation of glass, lead, paper, and tea. These duties, which would bring into the Exchequer about £40,000, the Americans must on their own principles, Mr. Townshend thought, admit to be constitutional.

It may strike my readers as odd that any one could have been surprised by anything Mr. Townshend took a notion to; but we were indeed not then as well aware of the man's essential frivolity as we have since become. I recall at all events that Mr. Wynkoop followed the proceedings in the House with amazement; and when we learned, one day in 1768, that Mr. Townshend had actually blarneyed the House into passing the Tea Act, the whole business struck Jeremiah as preposterous—"doubtless one of those deplorable jokes," I remember his saying, "which Mr. Townshend is fond of perpetrating when half drunk." I had some recollection that in the time of the Stamp Act troubles certain writers had hinted at a distinction between "internal" and "external" taxes; and Mr. Wynkoop admitted that some such distinction may have been made. But he said that for his part he thought little of such subtle distinctions, agreeing rather with Mr. Pitt that the real question was whether Parliament could "take money out of our pockets without our consent" by any tax whatsoever. There was, however, a difficulty in taking so advanced a position at that time, and as usual it was old Nicholas, always quick to perceive difficulties, who pointed it out.

"I fancy," old Nicholas had said, "that every act in regulation of trade takes money out of our pockets, but I don't imagine you have yet become so ardent a Son of Liberty as to deny Parliament the right of regulating our trade."

At that time we were all reading Mr. Dickinson's *Letters of A Pennsylvania Farmer*, and Mr. Wynkoop, who read everything, was able to meet that objection.

"The essential question," he said, "is whether an act of Parliament

is laid primarily for the regulation of trade or for the raising of a revenue. If for the latter, it is a tax. The intention of the framers must decide, and there can be no question that the Tea Act is a tax since the framers expressly declare its purpose to be the raising of a revenue."

"A fine distinction, that! But it would be easy for the framers of an act to levy duties on imports with the real intention of raising a revenue, all the while professing loudly their intention of regulating trade. What then?"

"Americans would not be so easily deceived, sir. The nature of the Act would reveal the real intention clearly enough."

"Ha! You would determine the nature of an act by the intention of the framers, and the intention of the framers by the nature of the act. Excellent! That is the logic of your Pennsylvania Farmer. The New Englanders are still more advanced, I see. They are now saying that our rights are founded on a law of Nature, and God only knows what that is. God and Mr. Adams—it's the same thing, I dare say."

"The New Englanders are likely to be a little rash, sir, I think," Mr. Wynkoop admitted. "The argument of their Mr. Adams is complicated, and I fear too subtle to be easily followed. I'm not sure I understand it."

"Well, never mind. You will all understand it soon enough. First you say that Britain has no right to lay internal taxes. Then that she has no right to levy taxes of any sort. Next you will be saying that Parliament has no right of legislation for the colonies on any matter whatsoever. And as you can't derive that from precedent you will derive it from the law of nature."

Mr. Wynkoop smiled at this outburst.

"I have no fear of its coming to that," he said. "The Tea Act is not really an act of Britain; it is Mr. Townshend's foolish hobby. A firm and sensible resistance on our part will effect its repeal. But if one could conceive Britain to be so blind as to push matters to extremes—well, I don't know. If it were really a choice between admitting that Parliament has a right of making all laws for us or denying that she has a right of making any laws for us, it would be a hard choice, but should we not be forced to choose the latter alternative? What other answer could we make?"

"You may well ask! What answer will you make when your

precious Adams comes out with a declaration of independency from Great Britain?"

"Independence!" Mr. Wynkoop exclaimed. "Good God, sir, what an ideal!"

And indeed, at that time, the idea of separation from Great Britain struck us all as fantastic.

A firm and sensible resistance, Jeremiah had maintained, would bring a repeal of the Townshend duties, as it had formerly brought a repeal of the Stamp Act. When it was learned that Lord North, on March 5, 1770, had moved the repeal of all the Townshend duties save that on tea, Mr. Wynkoop could with some reason say, and did say, that events had proved the justice of his view. And Mr. Wynkoop felt, rightly enough, although he modestly refrained from boasting of it, that he had contributed to this happy result. With no more than the grudging consent of old Nicholas, he had taken a leading part in organizing the Merchant's Association—an agreement not to import any goods from Great Britain so long as the Townshend duties should be in force. That Association had been faithfully kept by the New York merchants of substance and standing. Mr. Wynkoop had himself kept it to the letter, and had sacrificed much in doing so. He told me that his enlarged stock of goods, ordered in anticipation of the agreement, had soon been sold out—at high prices indeed, but not sufficiently high to recoup him for his subsequent losses. For four months last past business had been dull beyond all precedent—scarcely a ship moving; debts not to be collected; money hardly to be had at any price; and the poorer sort of people in dire need for want of employment.

There were indeed plenty of unscrupulous men who had done well enough, who had even profited while pretending to defend their country's rights. The Boston and Philadelphia merchants, as was definitely known in New York, had observed the Association none too well; and even in New York men of no standing had done a thriving business in the smuggling way, especially in Holland tea. Obviously the longer the Association was maintained by honest merchants, the more unscrupulous smugglers would profit by it. We were therefore somewhat surprised to learn that the Boston merchants were in favor of maintaining the Association in full vigor, in spite of Lord North's concessions, so long as the 3d duty on tea

was retained. This policy was also advocated by the dishonest beneficiaries of the system in New York, who made use of agitators like Mr. MacDougall to stir up the Mechanics Association and the populace generally against the Merchants, their argument being that our liberties were as much endangered by the 3d duty on tea as they had been by all the Townshend duties.

I am not so sure now that they were wrong, but at that time all of the substantial merchants of New York were strong for a modification of the Association. Mr. Wynkoop, I recall, took a leading part in the affair. He was much irritated with the Boston merchants whom he described as being more active in "resolving what to do than in doing what they had resolved." His opinion was that the Association no longer served any "purpose other than to tie the hands of honest men to let rogues, smugglers, and men of no character plunder their country." Besides, he was much gratified, as all the merchants were, by the recent act of the British government permitting the issue in New York of a paper currency, which was so essential to business prosperity. And therefore, in view of the fact that Britain had taken the first step by repealing the major part of the Townshend duties, it seemed to him the part of wisdom for the colonies to make some concession on their part. The New York merchants of standing were I think generally of Mr. Wynkoop's opinion; and at all events, after taking a canvass of the city, they resolved to abandon the old Association, agreeing for the future to import all commodities, "except teas and other articles that are or may be subject to an importation duty." Some were apprehensive lest New York might find itself alone in this action, and thereby suffer the stigma of having deserted the cause. But in the event it proved otherwise, as Mr. Wynkoop had anticipated. In spite of protests from Boston and Philadelphia, the merchants of those cities followed the lead of New York. Demonstrations in the streets soon subsided, importation became general, business revived, and the controversy with Britain seemed definitely closed.

The years of '71 and '72 were quiet years—ominously so as it proved. But in those days we all nourished the conviction that the controversy with Britain was definitely closed. Nothing occurred to remind us of it even, unless it would be the annual celebrations of the repeal of the Stamp Act, or the faint reverberations, always to

we heard in any case, of political squabbles in the Massachusetts Bay. Then, out of a clear sky as it seemed, the storm burst—the landing of the tea ships, the destruction of the tea in Boston harbor, and the subsequent meeting of the Philadelphia Congress. These events, all occurring in rapid succession, seemed to fall like so many blows on Mr. Wynkoop's head, and I recall his saying to me . . .

“(Here the manuscript breaks off again, and there are evidently some pages missing.)”

. . . return from Philadelphia, I met him at his father's house where we were to take dinner, as often happened. Arriving early, we had a long talk while waiting for old Nicholas to come down. I found Mr. Wynkoop in low spirits, an unusual thing for him. It may have been no more than a natural weakness after the excitement of attending the Congress, but to my accustomed eyes his low spirits seemed rather due to the uncomfortable feeling that he had been elbowed by circumstances into a position which he never intended to occupy. I was eager for the details of the Congress, but he seemed unwilling to talk of that, preferring rather to dwell upon the events leading up to it—matters which we had threshed out many times before. It was as if Mr. Wynkoop wished to revive the events of the last year and his own part in them, as if, feeling that he might and perhaps should have followed a different line of conduct, his mind was eagerly engaged in finding some good reasons for the line of conduct which he had followed in fact. What first gave me this notion was his saying, *apropos* of nothing.

“I will confess to you, what I would not to another, that if I could twelve months ago have foreseen the present situation I should probably not have attended the Congress.”

The remark alarmed me. Mr. Wynkoop's admiration for Britain and his faith in her essential justice were always stronger than mine. For my part I doubted not, from the moment of the passing of the Coercive Acts, that we were in for it, that Britain would not back down again, and that we must either break with her or submit to her demands. My decision was made. I would go with America when the time came for the final breach, I knew that; and above all things I wished Mr. Wynkoop, who was my closest friend, to throw the weight of his powerful interest on the side of my country. But I

knew him well enough to be sure that if he now convinced himself that it would come to a breach with Britain he would probably wash his hands of the whole business. What I counted on was a certain capacity in the man, I won't say for deceiving himself, but for convincing himself that what he strongly desired would somehow come to pass. I therefore did what I could to convince him, or rather to help him convince himself, that his past and present conduct was that of a wise and prudent man.

"No man can foresee the future," I remarked, somewhat sentimentously.

"That is true," he said. "And even could I have foreseen the future, I fail to see how I could have acted differently, at least not honorably and with any satisfaction to myself. It is past a doubt that Britain, in authorizing the India Company to sell its teas in America, deliberately sought to raise the issue with America once more. It was a challenge, and so insidiously contrived that America had no choice but submission or a resort to a certain amount of violence. Once landed the teas were bound to be sold, since even with the 3d duty they were offered at a less price than the Holland teas. The issue could not be met by commercial agreements, still less by argument. Well, we sent the teas back to London. The Massachusetts people threw theirs into the harbor. Violence, undoubtedly. I had no part in it, but what could be done? Who after all was responsible for the violence? Let ministers who revived an issue happily settled answer that."

"There is no doubt in my mind," I said, "that Britain welcomed the violence in Boston harbor as a pretext for strong measures."

"It seems incredible," Mr. Wynkoop resumed, "but what else can we think? Hitherto it might be said of ministers that they blundered, that they did not know the consequences of their acts. But not on this occasion. They knew perfectly the temper of America; and in any case the destruction of a little tea was surely a mild offense compared with the abrogation of the Massachusetts Charter and the closing of Boston harbor. To subject a loyal province to military despotism, and then deliberately to set about starving the people into submission reveals a vindictiveness foreign to the British character. I can't think the Coercive Acts represent the will of the Eng-

lish people, and I am confident, always have been, that the sober second thought of the nation will repudiate these acts of ministerial despotism."

It was not the first time I had heard Mr. Wynkoop express that sentiment.

"I trust it may prove so," I said. "At least we have done our part. No one can say that the Congress has countenanced rash measures. It has merely adopted a commercial agreement, a measure which we have frequently resorted to before. I don't see how it could have done less."

Mr. Wynkoop seemed a little uncertain of that.

"Yes," he said. "I suppose we could not have done less; Heaven knows we have shown a proper restraint. And I may say that what little influence I have had has always been exerted to that end."

I knew well enough what he was thinking of. After the tea episode there were rash spirits who talked of resort to arms, and even hinted at independence. There were such men even in New York. They had formed the Committee of 25, but fortunately the more moderate minded had got the committee enlarged to 51; and Mr. Wynkoop, together with Mr. Jay and Mr. Alsop and other men of substance, had consented to serve on the Committee of 51 in order to prevent the firebrands from carrying the province into violent measures. Old Nicholas had advised against it.

"Beware of meddling with treason," I recall hearing him say to Mr. Wynkoop at that time.

"Precisely my idea," Mr. Wynkoop had replied, with the smile he always had for old Nicholas' penchant for using stronger terms than the occasion warranted. "I wish to steer clear of treason, or anything remotely approaching it. But it is plain to be seen that New York will support Boston in some fashion, plain to be seen that she will send delegates to Philadelphia. Suppose I and all moderate men follow your advice and wash our hands of the affair? What then? Then the Mechanics will take the lead and send MacDougall and Sears and men of their kidney to Philadelphia, with instructions for vigorous measures. Vigorous measures! God only knows what measures they may be for!"

It was to keep New York from violent measures of all sorts that Mr. Wynkoop had consented to serve on the Committee of 51; it was

for that reason he had gone to Philadelphia. I knew that better than most, and I knew that that was what he was now thinking of.

"I am very glad you went to Philadelphia," I said.

"What else could I have done?" he exclaimed. "I have asked myself that a dozen times without finding any answer. But about the Association I don't know. You say it is a moderate measure, but after all it was the measures of the New Englanders, and among the moderates of Philadelphia it was commonly thought to be perhaps too vigorous. I was opposed to it. I voted against it. And having done so perhaps I was ill advised to sign it. I don't know."

I was about to make some reply, when old Nicholas came into the room, and I fancied I could see Mr. Wynkoop stiffen to defend his conduct against inevitable sarcasms.

"Fine doings!" Old Nicholas growled. "The New Englanders had their way, as I expected. I warned you against meddling with treason."

"Treason's a strong word, sir."

"The Association smells of it."

"I cannot think so, sir. The Association is a voluntary agreement not to do certain things; not to import or to export certain goods after a certain date. No law that I know of compels me to import or to export."

"No law requires you to import or to export, very true. But does any law require *me not* to import or export? Certainly no law of the British Parliament or of New York Province obliges me. But suppose I exercise my lawful privilege of importing after the date fixed? What then? Will not your Association compel me not to import, or try to do so? Are not your committees pledged to inspect the customs, to seize my goods, and to sell them at public auction for the benefit of the starving mechanics of Boston? I tell you your Association erects a government unknown to the law; a government which aims to exert compulsion on all citizens. When I am given a coat of tar for violating the Association, will you still say it is a *voluntary* Association?"

"I think little compulsion will be necessary," Mr. Wynkoop replied. "The continent is united as never before; and when the British people realize that, and when British merchants find markets wanting, ministers will be made to see reason."

"You signed the Association, I hear."

"I did sir. I was opposed to it as Mr. Jay was, but when it finally carried we both signed it. Once adopted as expressing the policy of Congress, it seemed useless to advertise our divisions, and so weaken the effect of the measures taken. Congress has decided. The important thing now is not what policy Congress should have adopted; the important thing now is for all to unite in support of the policy which it has in fact adopted. If the Colonies present a united front to Britain, as they will do, Britain must yield."

"My advice," old Nicholas said as we went into dinner, "is to drop it. And don't say I didn't warn you."

Over our after dinner wine the matter was gone into at greater length. I said but little, no more than to throw in a remark now and then to keep the argument alive; for I felt that the opposition of old Nicholas would do more to keep Mr. Wynkoop in the right frame of mind than anything I could say. Be that as it may, I left the house well satisfied; for whether it was the dinner, or the wine, or the truculent arguments of old Nicholas, or all of these combined, I felt sure that the total effect of the evening had been to confirm Mr. Wynkoop in the conviction that the Association was a wise measure, well calculated to bring Britain to terms.

As Mr. Wynkoop had anticipated, little compulsion was necessary to secure the observance of the Association; the threat of confiscation, on the authority of the Committee of 60, of which Mr. Wynkoop was a member, was quite sufficient, save in the case of certain obstinate but negligible traders. And at first it seemed to many that the measures taken would produce the desired effect, for in February Lord North introduced his famous Resolution on Conciliation. I thought the Resolution signified little or nothing, and when in April the news came from Lexington I was not much surprised. It meant war to a certainty, and my first thought was to learn what Mr. Wynkoop would make of it. Curiously enough, with that faculty he had for moulding the world close to the heart's desire, Mr. Wynkoop found some satisfaction in this untoward event. War with Great Britain—no, he would not pronounce the word prematurely. He spoke of the Lexington affair as a repetition of the Boston Massacre, seemingly more seriously only because America was now prepared to defend its liberties with arms in its hands. I was de-

lighted that he could take it so; for it convinced me that we might still carry him along with us. The Assembly of New York was too lukewarm to be depended on, half the members or more being frankly Tory, so that we found it convenient to organize a Provincial Congress, composed of delegates elected under the supervision of the Committees, in order to take charge of affairs and keep New York in line with the continent. The most advanced party was already suspicious of Mr. Wynkoop's loyalty; but the moderate men saw the wisdom of winning his support if possible. Mr. Jay and Mr. Alsop were especially keen to have Mr. Wynkoop serve in the Provincial Congress, and they asked me to do what I could to obtain his consent to stand as a candidate.

I did what I could, and I flatter myself that my representations had some influence with him. Knowing his admiration for Mr. Jay, I put it to him as a thing strongly urged by that gentleman.

"Mr. Jay thinks it the more necessary," I said to Mr. Wynkoop, "for men of your sound and moderate views to serve, since the Mechanics are every day gaining headway, and at the same time many men of standing are withdrawing altogether. There is a two-fold danger to meet; we must keep the province loyal to the cause, and we must prevent the levelling ideas of the New Englanders from gaining the ascendancy here. If men of your standing refuse to direct the affairs of the colony in these crucial times we shall surely succumb to one or the other of these evils."

"I understand that very well," Mr. Wynkoop replied, "but the decision is not, as you know, an easy one for me."

"Your difficulties are appreciated, and by no one more than by Mr. Jay and all his friends. But it is precisely for that reason, as they point out, that we need your support. Old Nicholas is known to be Tory, and it is much commented on that the Van Schoickendinck Interest is largely lukewarm if not actually hostile. The family Interest is a powerful one, and if you are cordially with us it will do much to bring over many who are hesitating. Your responsibility is the greater, as Mr. Jay rightly says, because of the fact that you will carry with you, one way or another, a great number."

"It is very flattering of Mr. Jay to say so."

Mr. Wynkoop had a great respect for Mr. Jay's judgment—had always had. He consented to stand, and was elected. Throughout

the summer of 1775 he attended the sessions of the Provincial Congress faithfully, giving his support to those who were endeavoring to hold the province to a sane middle course—enforcing the Association; raising a militia for defense; keeping the door carefully open for conciliation. Old Nicholas charged him with being too much led about by Mr. Jay. Mr. Wynkoop naturally replied that the notion was ridiculous. What kept him to the mark I feel sure was the feeling that his views and his conduct had been hitherto justified by Lord North's Resolution on Conciliation. On this he placed all his hopes. Unacceptable Lord North's Resolution was, he told me on one occasion; but he regretted that the Congress at Philadelphia had seen fit to pronounce it "unseasonable and insidious." When bargains are to be struck, Mr. Wynkoop said, politicians do not offer everything at the first approach. The Resolution proved, he thought, that Lord North was preparing to retreat, as gracefully as possible no doubt. Meantime the policy adopted by the Philadelphia Congress Mr. Wynkoop thought eminently satisfactory; the Resolution on Taking up Arms was admirably phrased to convince Britain that America would defend her rights; the Petition to the King admirably phrased to prove her loyalty. Throughout the summer and autumn Mr. Wynkoop therefore held the same language to men of extreme views—to the over timid and to the over zealous: the Petition's the thing, he said; it will surely effect the end desired.

Hope delayed makes the heart sick, it has been said. But I think this was not the effect on Mr. Wynkoop. On the contrary, I am sure that for four months he found peace of mind by looking forward to the happy day when the king would graciously make concessions. I had little expectation of any concessions, and it was no great shock to me when the news arrived in November that the king had not even deigned to receive the Petition, much less to answer it. But I knew it would be a heavy blow to Mr. Wynkoop; and when the British government, placing an embargo on American trade, proclaimed America to be in a state of rebellion, it is not too much to say that Mr. Wynkoop's little world of opinion and conduct, held together by recollection of the past and hope for the future, was completely shattered. For a month I saw him scarcely at all. He rarely went abroad, even to attend the Provincial Congress. He must have sat at home in seclusion, endeavoring to adjust his thought to

the grim reality, gathering together as best he could the scattered fragments of a broken faith.

During the winter of '76 I saw him more frequently. We often discussed the situation at length. The time for discussion, for discussion of the past that is, seemed to me to be over. But Mr. Wynkoop was seemingly more interested in discussing what had happened than in discussing what ought now to be done. At first this puzzled me; but I soon found the explanation, which was that he knew very well what had to be done; or at least what he had to do, and was only engaged in convincing himself that it had been from the first inevitable, that the situation that now confronted him was not of his making. His one aim from the first, he said, and he said it many times, was to prevent the calamity now impending. I know not how many times he reviewed his past conduct. Short of tamely submitting to the domination of Parliament, he was forever asking, what other course could America have followed but the one she had followed? What other course could he have followed? If America had appealed, not to force but to reason, was this not due to the efforts of men of substance and standing, men of Mr. Wynkoop's class? If Mr. Wynkoop and all his kind had washed their hands of the affair, would not the populace and their hot headed leaders long since have rushed America into violence, and so have given Britain's measures the very justification which they now lacked?

In all this I quite agreed with Mr. Wynkoop. I assured him that his conduct had always been that of a wise and prudent man, and that if events had disappointed the expectations of prudent men, the fault was clearly not his. Responsibility lay with the British government, with those mad or unscrupulous ministers who, wittingly or unwittingly, were betraying the nation by doing the will of a stubborn king. Mr. Wynkoop found consolation in the thought that since ministers had appealed to the sword, the decision must be by the sword. Fight or submit, they had said. The alternative was not of America's choosing, nor of Mr. Wynkoop's choosing. Could America submit now? Could Mr. Wynkoop submit now? Whatever he might have done a year ago, two years ago, could he now tamely submit, bowing the head like a scared school boy, renouncing the convictions of a life-time, advising the friends with whom he had been associated on committees and congresses to eat their words. to

cry out for mercy, saying that they did not mean what they said, saying that it was only a game they were playing. "I have made commitments," Mr. Wynkoop often said to me. "I have given hostages." This was true, and this I think was the consideration of greatest weight with him; he could not deny his words and renounce his friends without losing his self respect.

War with Great Britain! Mr. Wynkoop was forced to pronounce the word at last. But independence! That was the hardest word of all. Yet the word was in the air, passing from mouth to mouth behind closed doors and in the open streets. I had long since accustomed myself to the idea, but Mr. Wynkoop hated the thought of it, said he had never desired it, did not now desire it—"unless," he admitted as a kind of after thought, "the Britain I have always been loyal to proves an illusion." It was this notion, I think, that enabled Mr. Wynkoop to reconcile himself to the policy of separation. The Britain of his dreams was an illusion. The Britain he had known did not exist. In those days we were all reading the fiery papers of Mr. Paine entitled (*Common Sense*.) I know that Mr. Wynkoop read them, and I fancy that they helped him to see Britain in her true colors.

"I like neither the impudence of the man's manner nor the uncompromising harshness of his matter," Mr. Wynkoop once said to me. "Yet it seems that events give only too much foundation for his assertion that we have deluded ourselves in proclaiming the advantages of the connection with Britain. I can't agree with him that the loyal and respectful tone of our pamphlets and petitions is no more than mawkish sentiment; but I do wonder if the alleged benefits of the union with Britain are but figments of the imagination. It is hard to think so. And yet what now are those benefits? We must surely ask that.")

Thus in the long winter of '76 Mr. Wynkoop repaired the illusions by which he lived, reconciling himself to the inevitable step. At this time he saw little of Mr. Van Schoickendinck—it was too painful for both of them, I dare say. At least their last conversation I know (it was by Jeremiah's express invitation that I was present) was a trying one. It was on the 30th of May that we found old Nicholas in the hall of his house, standing, leaning on his cane, evidently much moved.

"I asked you to come," old Nicholas said after greeting us a little stiffly, "because I must know what you purpose to do. General Howe is about to take New York. The Philadelphia Congress is about to declare a separation from Great Britain. The so-called Provincial Congress of New York will hesitate, but it will probably support the measure. Am I to understand that you will burn your bridges and side with the rebels?"

With great seriousness and gravity, Mr. Wynkoop replied:

"I wish you to believe, sir, that I have given the matter every consideration in my power; and it seems to me that I can't do other than go with America. America is my country, and yours too, sir."

"America is my country." The voice of old Nicholas was shrill. "I have no great love for Britishers, as you know. Damn them all, I say! But I am too old to meddle with treason. Especially when it can't come to any good. Either we shall be crushed, in which case our last state will be worse than our first; or we shall succeed, in which case we shall be ruled by the mob. Which is better, God knows. What I can't see is why you have allowed the fanatics to run away with the cart. Fight if you must, but why close the door to reconciliation by declaring an independency?"

"We can't fight without it, sir. That's the whole truth of the matter. I was much against it, and so were most. But the necessity is clear. First we refused to trade, hoping that Britain would make terms as she had formerly done. Instead of making terms, Britain closed our ports and prepared to make war. To fight we must have supplies and munitions. We must have money. We can get none of these things without reviving trade; and to revive trade we must have allies, we must have the support of France. But will France aid us so long as we profess our loyalty to Britain? France will give money and troops to disrupt the British empire, but none to consolidate it. The act of separation will be the price of a French alliance.)

"Am I to understand that the act of separation is not to be seriously made, except to buy French assistance? That you will let France go by the board as soon as Britain is willing to negotiate?"

Mr. Wynkoop did not at once reply. After a moment he said,

"No, I would not say that, sir. The act of separation is intended for Britain's benefit too. It will make it plain that we mean what we

say—that we mean to defend our liberties to the last ditch if necessary. Yet I hope, and believe, in spite of all, that it will not come to that.”

For a long moment old Nicholas stood stiff and silent. Suddenly extending his hand, but turning his face away, he said,

“Well, good by. Our ways part then.”

“Don’t say that, sir.”

“I must say it. I must remain as I began—a loyal British subject. You have ceased to be one. I am sorry to have seen this day. But I must submit to necessity, and you must too.”

Slowly old Nicholas ascended the stairs tapping each tread with his cane. Half way up, he cried out, as if in anger,

“Good bye, I say!”

“God keep you, sir,” was all Mr. Wynkoop could find to reply.

Mr. Wynkoop afterwards told me that he spent a sleepless night in his half-abandoned house. In anticipation of General Howe’s arrival he had already begun to move his effects out of the city, into Westchester County, near White Plains, where the Provincial Congress was adjourned to meet on July 2. With the business of settling his personal affairs to the best advantage he was so fully occupied that he did not attend the Congress on the opening days. But on the afternoon of the 9th of July he took his place, a little late. Slipping quietly into a vacant chair just in front of me, he was handed a copy of “A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress Assembled.” The chairman of a committee, appointed to report on the validity of the reasons given for separation from Great Britain, was reading the document. We listened to the felicitous and now familiar phrases—“hold these truths to be self-evident”—“just powers from the consent of the governed”—“right of the people to alter or abolish it”—

“Who are the people?” I heard Mr. Wynkoop murmur to his neighbor.

His neighbor, not hearing or not understanding him, whispered behind his hand,

“This is not an easy time for you, I dare say. Mr. Van Schoickendinck can’t be induced to join us.” The last a statement rather than a question.

“No,” Mr. Wynkoop said. “He will go Tory. He will not oppose

us. His sympathies are with us really, I think. He is thoroughly American, with no great love for Britain. But he is old—he will go Tory.”

“The Declaration will carry, I think.”

“Yes.”

“It seems well phrased. Jefferson’s pen, I understand.”

Presently the chairman, having finished the reading of the Declaration, read the report of the committee. “While we lament the cruel necessity which has made that measure unavoidable, we approve the same, and will, at the risk of our lives and fortunes, join with the other colonies in supporting it.”

The report of the committee was carried, unanimously, a bare majority being present.

Whereupon a member begged leave, before proceeding to other routine business, to make a few remarks. Permission being granted, the member spoke of the decisive step which had just been taken; of the solemn crisis which confronted all America; of the duty of meeting that crisis with high courage, with the indomitable perseverance of freemen fighting for their liberties. “The time for discussion is over,” he said. “The time for action has come. Once thoroughly united, we cannot fail, and if we triumph, as we shall, a grateful posterity will recall these days, and do honor to the patriotic men whose conduct was inspired by the spirit of ’76!”

In the perfunctory applause which greeted these remarks, Mr. Wynkoop joined, as heartily I think, as

“(Here, most unfortunately, the manuscript ends. What the conclusion of the story may have been, if indeed it ever was concluded, will probably never be known.)”

CHARLES BEARD

AMONG AMERICA'S CONTRIBUTIONS to the development of democratic government, a successful written constitution takes first rank. If the Federal Constitution has been an inspiring model to the rest of the world, it has, understandably, been held in even greater reverence by Americans themselves throughout their national history. Even when the causes which sought its protection were extraordinarily diverse, it remained a symbol of unified purpose and national heritage. As early as the 1790's, when political parties first arose, the opposing groups were equally vociferous in proclaiming themselves the true defenders and interpreters of the Constitution. From that day to this, whatever differences have existed among political factions have not prevented a common veneration for the basic law of the land.

The first explanations of the origins of the Constitution, advanced by early national historians such as George Bancroft, harmonized perfectly with this universal approval. The document was described as a product of the whole people of the United States acting in a moment of crisis with a unity and inspiration born of divine guidance. Historians of the period which followed the Civil War, focusing on evolution from Germanic origins or attempting to apply the methods of physical science, found substitutes for the concept of divine intervention but did not suggest that the country had been anything but unanimous in its sponsorship and ratification of the Constitution.

Meanwhile, the proponents of economic determinism were

making little progress in persuading Americans in general—and historians in particular—that the dynamic ingredient in the evolution of a society was not to be found in political beliefs, moral principles, or racial characteristics. Especially repugnant were the teachings of Karl Marx, whose basic concept of class struggle had little appeal in a country where class lines were loosely drawn and class identities often temporary. But in the 1890's there arose around the figure of Frederick Jackson Turner a group which emphasized the economic basis of our political development without subscribing to a belief in revolutionary class struggle. Turner proceeded from an interest in the influence of the frontier on American democracy to a consideration of the ~~(importance of economic sectionalism)~~ These themes found more willing listeners than had the expositions of Marxian dialectics. In a sense, Turner made economic explanations somewhat more native and therefore more respectable. However, although his influence continued to grow, economic determinism was still considered a radical doctrine of sinister implications when Charles A. Beard's book was published, in 1913.

The storm of protest with which *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* was greeted had its roots in two strong American feelings: (a hatred of the Marxian implications of economic determinism and a traditional reverence for the Constitution as an expression of democratic feeling and an instrument of popular government. Although Beard was accused of more radical claims and greater dogmatism than he had actually asserted, he had broken sufficiently with the past to ensure a hostile reception.

(First, he suggested that, far from having unanimous support, the Constitution was conceived and ratified by a small group which, by adroit maneuvering, controlled elections and conventions in such a way that the majority opposition to ratification was defeated.) That the Constitution had so undemocratic a genesis was a shocking proposal in itself; but even more startling was that Beard's analysis of the nature of this aggressive minority

seemed clearly rooted not only in economic determinism but in the Marxist premise of class struggle. What had drawn this group together, he held, was their property interests, endangered by a weak central government and state governments too often controlled by the debtor classes. Neither the "big state vs. small state" controversy nor the economic conflict between northern mercantilism and southern agrarianism was as important as the creditor unity in the Constitutional Convention.

Beard attempted to place this assertion on a factual basis by analyzing the property, investments, and political beliefs of each of the delegates. He found especially useful the records of the Treasury Department, which, though fragmentary, revealed the delegates' holdings of state and federal bonds. Although it was difficult to compute the worth of these securities at the time the Constitutional Convention met, Beard estimated that their value increased by some \$40,000,000 when the credit of the new federal government was put behind them under the Hamiltonian program. He pointed out that other property interests contemplated similar gains from the political reorganization they were planning.

Finally, Beard asserted that the Constitution itself reflected this background and could be analyzed as an economic document designed for the (protection of property rights.) The most striking evidence in support of this view, he believed, could be found in the *Federalist Papers* of Madison, Jay, and Hamilton: contemporary arguments contrived to aid in the ratification process. These writings called attention not only to specific provisions guarding contracts and debts but also to such broad principles as the separation of powers and the strong judiciary, which could result in devices able to thwart the majority rule.

Since 1913, the attitude of most historians toward Beard's theses has altered perceptibly. If Beard himself came to believe that his case was drawn too broadly, others modified their complete disapproval to acknowledge economic factors in the calling of the Convention and the conservative character of most of the delegates. However, there remains sharp disagreement as to

whether the Constitution itself should be interpreted primarily as an economic document. A majority would probably assert that such a view is not so much wrong as it is incomplete. They would contend that to explain the Constitution purely in terms of economic determinism is as false as to equate James Madison's interest in the Constitution with his bond holdings. The founding fathers may have been ordinary mortals, but they were also remarkable statesmen.

The Constitution as an Economic Document

IT IS DIFFICULT for the superficial student of the Constitution, who has read only the commentaries of the legists, to conceive of that instrument as an economic document. It places no property qualifications on voters or officers; it gives no outward recognition of any economic groups in society; it mentions no special privileges to be conferred upon any class. It betrays no feeling, such as vibrates through the French constitution of 1791; its language is cold, formal, and severe.

The true inwardness of the Constitution is not revealed by an examination of its provisions as simple propositions of law; but by a long and careful study of the voluminous correspondence of the period,¹ contemporary newspapers and pamphlets, the records of

From *An Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States* by Charles M. Beard, copyright 1913, 1935, by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

¹ A great deal of this valuable material has been printed in the *Documentary History of the Constitution*, Vols. IV and V; a considerable amount has been published in the letters and papers of the eminent men of the period; but an enormous mass still remains in manuscript form. Fortunately, such important papers as those of Washington, Hamilton, Madison, and others are in the Library

the debates in the Convention at Philadelphia and in the several state conventions, and particularly, *The Federalist*, which was widely circulated during the struggle over ratification. The correspondence shows the exact character of the evils which the Constitution was intended to remedy; the records of the proceedings in the Philadelphia Convention reveal the successive steps in the building of the framework of the government under the pressure of economic interests; the pamphlets and newspapers disclose the ideas of the contestants over the ratification; and *The Federalist* presents the political science of the new system as conceived by three of the profoundest thinkers of the period, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay.

Doubtless, the most illuminating of these sources on the economic character of the Constitution are the records of the debates in the Convention, which have come down to us in fragmentary form; and a thorough treatment of material forces reflected in the several clauses of the instrument of government created by the grave assembly at Philadelphia would require a rewriting of the history of the proceedings in the light of the great interests represented there.³ But an entire volume would scarcely suffice to present the results of such a survey, and an undertaking of this character is accordingly impossible here.

The Federalist, on the other hand, presents in a relatively brief and systematic form an economic interpretation of the Constitution by the men best fitted, through an intimate knowledge of the ideals of the framers, to expound the political science of the new government. This wonderful piece of argumentation by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay is in fact the finest study in the economic interpretation of politics which exists in any language; and whoever would understand the Constitution as an economic document need hardly go beyond it. It is true that the tone of the writers is somewhat modified on account of the fact that they are appealing to the voters to ratify the Constitution, but at the same time they are, by the force of cir-

³ From this point of view, the old conception of the battle at Philadelphia as a contest between small and large states—as political entities—will have to be severely modified. See Professor Farrand's illuminating paper on the so-called compromises of the Constitution in the *Report of the American Historical Association, 1903*, Vol. I, pp. 73 ff. J. C. Welling, "States' Rights Conflict over the Public Lands," *ibid.* (1888), pp. 184 ff.

cumstances, compelled to convince large economic groups that safety and strength lie in the adoption of the new system.

Indeed, every fundamental appeal in it is to some material and substantial interest. Sometimes it is to the people at large in the name of protection against invading armies and European coalitions. Sometimes it is to the commercial classes whose business is represented as prostrate before the follies of the Confederation. Now it is to creditors seeking relief against paper money and the assaults of the agrarians in general; now it is to the holders of federal securities which are depreciating toward the vanishing point. (But above all, it is to the owners of personalty anxious to find a foil against the attacks of levelling democracy, that the authors of *The Federalist* address their most cogent arguments in favor of ratification.) It is true there is much discussion of the details of the new framework of government, to which even some friends of reform took exceptions; but Madison and Hamilton both knew that these were incidental matters when compared with the sound basis upon which the superstructure rested.

In reading the pages of this remarkable work as a study in political economy, it is important to bear in mind that the system, which the authors are describing, consisted of two fundamental parts—one positive, the other negative:

I. A government endowed with certain positive powers, but so constructed as to break the force of majority rule and prevent invasions of the property rights of minorities.

II. Restrictions on the state legislatures which had been so vigorous in their attacks on capital.

Under some circumstances, action is the immediate interest of the dominant party; and whenever it desires to make an economic gain through governmental functioning, it must have, of course, a system endowed with the requisite powers.

Examples of this are to be found in protective tariffs, in ship subsidies, in railway land grants, in river and harbor improvements, and so on through the catalogue of so-called "paternalistic" legislation. Of course it may be shown that the "general good" is the ostensible object of any particular act; but the general good is a passive force, and unless we know who are the several individuals that benefit in its name, it has no meaning. When it is so analyzed,

immediate and remote beneficiaries are discovered; and the former are usually found to have been the dynamic element in securing the legislation. Take for example, the economic interests of the advocates who appear in tariff hearings at Washington.

On the obverse side, dominant interests quite as often benefit from the prevention of governmental action as from positive assistance. They are able to take care of themselves if let alone within the circle of protection created by the law. Indeed, most owners of property have as much to fear from positive governmental action as from their inability to secure advantageous legislation. Particularly is this true where the field of private property is already extended to cover practically every form of tangible and intangible wealth. This was clearly set forth by Hamilton: "It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws includes that of preventing good ones. . . . But this objection will have little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of that inconstancy and mutability in the laws which form the greatest blemish in the character and genius of our governments. They will consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of law-making, and to keep things in the same state in which they happen to be at any given period, as more likely to do good than harm. . . . The injury which may possibly be done by defeating a few good laws will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of bad ones."³

THE UNDERLYING POLITICAL SCIENCE OF THE CONSTITUTION⁴

Before taking up the economic implications of the structure of the federal government, it is important to ascertain what, in the opinion of *The Federalist*, is the basis of all government. The most philosophical examination of the foundations of political science is made by Madison in the tenth number. Here he lays down, in no uncertain language, the principle that the first and elemental concern of every government is economic.

1. "The first object of government," he declares, is the protection of "the diversity in the faculties of men, from which the rights of property originate." The chief business of government, from which,

³ *The Federalist*, No. 73.

⁴ See J. A. Smith, *The Spirit of American Government*.

perform, its essential nature must be derived, consists in the control and adjustment of conflicting economic interests. After enumerating the various forms of property interests which spring up inevitably in modern society, he adds: "The regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of party and faction in the ordinary operations of the government."⁵

2. What are the chief causes of these conflicting political forces with which the government must concern itself? Madison answers. Of course fanciful and frivolous distinctions have sometimes been the cause of violent conflicts; "but the most common and durable source of factions has been the various and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society. Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into different classes actuated by different sentiments and views."

3. The theories of government which men entertain are emotional reactions to their property interests. "From the protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property, the possession of different degrees and kinds of property immediately results; and from the influence of these on the sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a division of society into different interests and parties." Legislatures reflect these interests. "What," he asks, "are the different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes which they determine." There is no help for it. "The causes of faction cannot be removed," and "we well know that neither moral nor religious motives can be relied on as an adequate control."

4. Unequal distribution of property is inevitable, and from it contending factions will rise in the state. The government will reflect them, for they will have their separate principles and "sentiments"; but the supreme danger will arise from the fusion of certain interests into an overbearing majority, which Madison, in another place,

⁵ See Noah Webster's consideration of the subject of government and property; Ford, *Pamphlets on the Constitution*, pp. 57 ff.

prophesied would be the landless proletariat,⁶—an overbearing majority which will make its “rights” paramount, and sacrifice the “rights” of the minority. “To secure the public good,” he declares, “and private rights against the danger of such a faction and at the same time preserve the spirit and the form of popular government is then the great object to which our inquiries are directed.”

5. How is this to be done? Since the contending classes cannot be eliminated and their interests are bound to be reflected in politics, the only way out lies in making it difficult for enough contending interests to fuse into a majority, and in balancing one over against another. The machinery for doing this is created by the new Constitution and by the Union. (a) Public views are to be refined and enlarged “by passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens.” (b) The very size of the Union will enable the inclusion of more interests so that the danger of an overbearing majority is not so great. “The smaller the society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same party. . . . Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their strength and to act in unison with each other.”

Q. E. D., “in the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to republican government.”⁷

⁶ Farrand, *Records*, Vol. II, p. 203.

⁷ This view was set forth by Madison in a letter to Jefferson in 1788. “Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Community, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the mere instrument of the major number of the constituents. This is a truth of great importance, but not yet sufficiently attended to, and is probably more strongly impressed upon my mind by facts, and reflections suggested by them, than on yours which has contemplated abuses of power issuing from a very different quarter. Wherever there is an interest and power to do wrong, wrong will generally be done, and not less readily by a powerful and interested party than by a powerful and interested prince.” *Documentary History of the Constitution*, Vol. V, p. 88.

L. THE STRUCTURE OF GOVERNMENT OR THE BALANCE OF POWERS

The fundamental theory of political economy thus stated by Madison was the basis of the original American conception of the balance of powers which is formulated at length in four numbers of *The Federalist* and consists of the following elements:

1. No mere parchment separation of departments of government will be effective. "The legislative department is everywhere extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its impetuous vortex. The founders of our republic . . . seem never for a moment to have turned their eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported and fortified by an hereditary branch of the legislative authority. They seem never to have recollected the danger from legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by executive usurpations."⁸

2. Some sure mode of checking usurpations in the government must be provided, other than frequent appeals to the people. "There appear to be insuperable objections against the proposed recurrence to the people as a provision in all cases for keeping the several departments of power within their constitutional limits."⁹ In a contest between the legislature and the other branches of the government, the former would doubtless be victorious on account of the ability of the legislators to plead their cause with the people.

3. What then can be depended upon to keep the government in close rein? "The only answer that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied by so contriving the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. . . . It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be

⁸ *The Federalist*, No. 48.

⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 49.

united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure."¹⁰ There are two ways of obviating this danger: one is by establishing a monarch independent of popular will, and the other is by reflecting these contending interests (so far as their representatives may be enfranchised) in the very structure of the government itself so that a majority cannot dominate the minority—which minority is of course composed of those who possess property that may be attacked. "Society itself will be broken into so many parts, interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority."¹¹

4. The structure of the government as devised at Philadelphia reflects these several interests and makes improbable any danger to the minority from the majority. "The House of Representatives being to be elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by the people, there would be little probability of a common interest to cement these different branches in a predilection for any particular class of electors."¹²

5. All of these diverse interests appear in the amending process but they are further reinforced against majorities. An amendment must receive a two-thirds vote in each of the two houses so constituted and the approval of three-fourths of the states.

6. The economic corollary of this system is as follows: Property interests may, through their superior weight in power and intelligence, secure advantageous legislation whenever necessary, and they may at the same time obtain immunity from control by parliamentary majorities.

If we examine carefully the delicate instrument by which the framers sought to check certain kinds of positive action that might be advocated to the detriment of established and acquired rights, we cannot help marvelling at their skill. Their leading idea was to break up the attacking forces at the starting point: the source of political authority for the several branches of the government. This

¹⁰ *The Federalist*, No. 51.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, No. 51.

¹² *Ibid.*, No. 60.

disintegration of positive action at the source was further facilitated by the differentiation in the terms given to the respective departments of the government. And the crowning counterweight to "an interested and over-bearing majority," as Madison phrased it, was secured in the peculiar position assigned to the judiciary, and the use of the sanctity and mystery of the law as a foil to democratic attacks.

It will be seen on examination that no two of the leading branches of the government are derived from the same source. The House of Representatives springs from the mass of the people whom the states may see fit to enfranchise. The Senate is elected by the legislatures of the states, which were, in 1787, almost uniformly based on property qualifications, sometimes with a differentiation between the sources of the upper and lower houses. The President is to be chosen by electors selected as the legislatures of the states may determine—at all events by an authority one degree removed from the voters at large. The judiciary is to be chosen by the President and the Senate, both removed from direct popular control and holding for longer terms than the House.

A sharp differentiation is made in the terms of the several authorities, so that a complete renewal of the government at one stroke is impossible. The House of Representatives is chosen for two years; the Senators for six, but not at one election, for one-third go out every two years. The President is chosen for four years. The judges of the Supreme Court hold for life. Thus "popular distempers," as eighteenth century publicists called them, are not only restrained from working their havoc through direct elections, but they are further checked by the requirement that they must last six years in order to make their effects felt in the political department of the government, providing they can break through the barriers imposed by the indirect election of the Senate and the President. Finally, there is the check of judicial control that can be overcome only through the manipulation of the appointing power which requires time, or through the operation of a cumbersome amending system.

[The keystone of the whole structure is, in fact, the system provided for judicial control—the most unique contribution to the science of government which has been made by American political

genius. It is claimed by some recent writers that it was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution to confer upon the Supreme Court the power of passing upon the constitutionality of statutes enacted by Congress; but in view of the evidence on the other side, it is incumbent upon those who make this assertion to bring forward positive evidence to the effect that judicial control was not a part of the Philadelphia programme.¹⁸ Certainly, the authors of *The Federalist* entertained no doubts on the point, and they conceived it to be such an excellent principle that they were careful to explain it to the electors to whom they addressed their arguments.

After elaborating fully the principle of judicial control over legislation under the Constitution, Hamilton enumerates the advantages to be derived from it. Speaking on the point of tenure during good behavior, he says: "In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the despotism of the prince; in a republic it is no less an excellent barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body. . . . If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty. . . . But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution only that the independence of the judges may be an essential safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner compelled, by the very motives of injustice they meditate, to qualify their attempts. This is a circumstance calculated to have

¹⁸ Beard, *The Supreme Court and the Constitution*. See also the criticisms of this work by Professor W. F. Dodd, in the *American Historical Review* for January, 1913.

CONSTITUTION AS AN ECONOMIC DOCUMENT 129

more influence upon the character of our governments than but few may be aware of."¹⁴

Nevertheless, it may be asked why, if the protection of property rights lay at the basis of the new system, there is in the Constitution no provision for property qualifications for voters or for elected officials and representatives. This is, indeed, peculiar when it is recalled that the constitutional history of England is in a large part a record of conflict over the weight in the government to be enjoyed by definite economic groups, and over the removal of the property qualifications early imposed on members of the House of Commons and on the voters at large. But the explanation of the absence of property qualifications from the Constitution is not difficult.

The members of the Convention were, in general, not opposed to property qualifications as such, either for officers or voters. "Several propositions," says Mr. S. H. Miller, "were made in the federal Convention in regard to property qualifications. A motion was carried instructing the committee to fix upon such qualifications for members of Congress. The committee could not agree upon the amount and reported in favor of leaving the matter to the legislature. Charles Pinckney objected to this plan as giving too much power to the first legislature. . . . Ellsworth objected to a property qualification on account of the difficulty of fixing the amount. If it was made high enough for the South, it would not be applicable to the Eastern States. Franklin was the only speaker who opposed the proposition to require property on principle, saying that 'some of the greatest rogues he was ever acquainted with were the richest rogues.' A resolution was also carried to require a property qualification for the Presidency. Hence it was evident that the lack of all property requirements for office in the United States Constitution was not owing to any opposition of the convention to such qualifications per se."¹⁵

Propositions to establish property restrictions were defeated, not because they were believed to be inherently opposed to the genius of American government, but for economic reasons—strange as it may seem. These economic reasons were clearly set forth by Madison in the debate over landed qualifications for legislators in July, when

¹⁴ Number 78.

¹⁵ *American Historical Association Report* (1899), Vol. I, p. 108.

he showed, first, that slight property qualifications would not keep out the small farmers whose paper money schemes had been so disastrous to personalty; and, secondly, that landed property qualifications would exclude from Congress the representatives of "those classes of citizens who were not landholders," i.e. the personalty interests. This was true, he thought, because the mercantile and manufacturing classes would hardly be willing to turn their personalty into sufficient quantities of landed property to make them eligible for a seat in Congress.¹⁶

The other members also knew that they had most to fear from the very electors who would be enfranchised under a slight freehold restriction,¹⁷ for the paper money party was everywhere bottomed on the small farming class. As Gorham remarked, the elections at Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, "where the merchants and mechanics vote, are at least as good as those made by freeholders only."¹⁸ The fact emerges, therefore, that the personalty interests reflected in the Convention could, in truth, see no safeguard at all in a freehold qualification against the assaults on vested personalty rights which had been made by the agrarians in every state. And it was obviously impossible to establish a personalty test, had they so desired, for there would have been no chance of securing a ratification of the Constitution at the hands of legislatures chosen by freeholders, or at the hands of conventions selected by them.

A very neat example of this antagonism between realty and personalty in the Convention came out on July 26, when Mason made, and Charles Pinckney supported, a motion imposing landed qualifications on members of Congress and excluding from that body "persons having unsettled accounts with or being indebted to the United States." In bringing up this motion Mason "observed that persons of the latter descriptions have frequently got into the state legislatures in order to promote laws that might shelter their delinquencies; and that this evil had crept into Congress if report was to be regarded."¹⁹

Gouverneur Morris was on his feet in an instant. If qualifications

¹⁶ Farrand, *Records*, Vol. II, pp. 123-124.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 201 ff.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 216.

¹⁹ Farrand, *Records*, Vol. II, p. 121.

were to be imposed, they should be laid on electors, not elected persons. The disqualification would fall upon creditors of the United States, for there were but few who owed the government anything. He knew that under this rule very few members of the Convention could get into the new government which they were establishing. "As to persons having unsettled accounts, he believed them to be pretty many. He thought, however, that such a discrimination would be both odious and useless and in many instances unjust and cruel. The delay of settlement had been more the fault of the public than of individuals. What will be done with those patriotic Citizens who have lent money or services or property to their country, without having been yet able to obtain a liquidation of their claims? Are they to be excluded?" On thinking it over, Morris added to his remarks on the subject, saying, "It was a precept of great antiquity as well as of high authority that we should not be righteous overmuch. He thought we ought to be equally on guard against being wise overmuch. . . . The parliamentary qualifications quoted by Colonel Mason had been disregarded in practice; and was but a scheme of the landed against the monied interest."²⁰

Gerry thought that the inconvenience of excluding some worthy creditors and debtors was of less importance than the advantages offered by the resolution, but, after some reflection, he added that "if property be one object of government, provisions for securing it cannot be improper." King sagely remarked that there might be a great danger in imposing a landed qualification, because "it would exclude the monied interest, whose aids may be essential in particular emergencies to the public safety."

Madison had no confidence in the effectiveness of the landed qualification and moved to strike it out, adding, "Landed possessions were no certain evidence of real wealth. Many enjoyed them to a great extent who were more in debt than they were worth. The unjust laws of the states had proceeded more from this class of men than any others. It had often happened that men who had acquired landed property on credit got into the Legislatures with a view of promoting an unjust protection against their Creditors. In the next place, if a small quantity of land should be made the standard, it would be no security; if a large one, it would exclude the proper

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 121-122.

representatives of those classes of Citizens who were not landholders." For these and other reasons he opposed the landed qualifications and suggested that property qualifications on the voters would be better.²¹

The motion to strike out the "landed" qualification for legislators was carried by a vote of ten to one; the proposition to strike out the disqualification of persons having unsettled accounts with the United States was carried by a vote of nine to two. Finally the proposition to exclude persons who were indebted to the United States was likewise defeated by a vote of nine to two, after Pinckney had called attention to the fact that "it would exclude persons who had purchased confiscated property or should purchase Western territory of the public and might be some obstacle to the sale of the latter."

Indeed, there was little risk to personalty in thus allowing the Constitution to go to the states for approval without any property qualifications on voters other than those which the state might see fit to impose. Only one branch of new government, the House of Representatives, was required to be elected by popular vote; and, in case popular choice of presidential electors might be established, a safeguard was secured by the indirect process. Two controlling bodies, the Senate and Supreme Court, were removed altogether from the possibility of popular election except by constitutional amendment. Finally, the conservative members of the Convention were doubly fortified in the fact that nearly all of the state constitutions then in force provided real or personal property qualifications for voters anyway, and radical democratic changes did not seem perilously near.²²

II. THE POWERS CONFERRED UPON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. The powers for positive action conferred upon the new government were few, but they were adequate to the purposes of the framers. They included, first, the power to lay and collect taxes; but here the rural interests were conciliated by the provision that direct

²¹ Debate in Farrand, *Records*, Vol. II, pp. 123-124.

²² The members of the Convention could not foresee the French Revolution which was to break out just as the new federal government was being put into operation in 1789.

taxes must be apportioned among the states according to population, counting three-fifths of the slaves. This, in the opinion of contemporaries eminently qualified to speak, was designed to prevent the populations of the manufacturing states from shifting the burdens of taxation to the sparsely settled agricultural regions.²³

In a letter to the governor of their state, three delegates from North Carolina, Blount, Spaight, and Williamson, explained the advantage of this safeguard on taxation to the southern planters and farmers: "We had many things to hope from a National Government and the chief thing we had to fear from such a Government was the risque of unequal or heavy Taxation, but we hope you will believe as we do that the Southern states in general and North Carolina in particular are well secured on that head by the proposed system. It is provided in the 9th section of article the first that no Capitation or direct Tax shall be laid except in proportion to the number of inhabitants, in which number five blacks are only counted as three. If a land tax is laid, we are to pay the same rate; for example, fifty citizens of North Carolina can be taxed no more for all their Lands than fifty Citizens in one of the Eastern States. This must be greatly in our favour, for as most of their farms are small and many of them live in Towns we certainly have, one with another, land of twice the value that they possess. When it is also considered that five Negroes are only to be charged the same Poll Tax as three whites, the advantage must be considerably increased under the proposed Form of Government. The Southern states have also a better security for the return of slaves who might endeavour to escape than they had under the original Confederation."²⁴

The taxing power was the basis of all other positive powers, and it afforded the revenues that were to discharge the public debt in full. Provision was made for this discharge in Article VI to the effect that "All debts contracted and engagements entered into before the adoption of this Constitution shall be valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the Confederation."

But the cautious student of public economy, remembering the

²³ It was a curious turn of fortune that this provision prevented the agrarians and populists in 1894 from shifting a part of the burden of taxes to the great cities of the East. Thus the *Zweck im Recht* is sometimes reversed.

²⁴ Clark, *The Records of North Carolina*, Vol. XX, p. 778.

difficulties which Congress encountered under the Articles of Confederation in its attempts to raise the money to meet the interest on the debt, may ask how the framers of the Constitution could expect to overcome the hostile economic forces which had hitherto blocked the payment of the requisitions. The answer is short. Under the Articles, Congress had no power to lay and collect taxes immediately; it could only make requisitions on the state legislatures. Inasmuch as most of the states relied largely on direct taxes for their revenues, the demands of Congress were keenly felt and stoutly resisted. Under the new system, however, Congress is authorized to lay taxes on its own account, but it is evident that the framers contemplated placing practically all of the national burden on the consumer. The provision requiring the apportionment of direct taxes on a basis of population obviously implied that such taxes were to be viewed as a last resort when indirect taxes failed to provide the required revenue.

With his usual acumen, Hamilton conciliates the freeholders and property owners in general by pointing out that they will not be called upon to support the national government by payments proportioned to their wealth.²⁵ Experience has demonstrated that it is impracticable to raise any considerable sums by direct taxation. Even where the government is strong, as in Great Britain, resort must be had chiefly to indirect taxation. The pockets of the farmers "will reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the unwelcome shape of impositions on their houses and lands; and personal property is too precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any other way than by the imperceptible agency of taxes on consumption." Real and personal property are thus assured a generous immunity from such burdens as Congress had attempted to impose under the Articles; taxes under the new system will, therefore, be less troublesome than under the old.

2. Congress was given, in the second place, plenary power to raise and support military and naval forces, for the defence of the country against foreign and domestic foes. These forces were to be at the disposal of the President in the execution of national laws; and to guard the states against renewed attempts of "desperate debtors" like Shays, the United States guaranteed to every commonwealth a

²⁵ *The Federalist*, No. 12.

republican form of government and promised to aid in quelling internal disorder on call of the proper authorities.

The army and navy are considered by the authors of *The Federalist* as genuine economic instrumentalities. As will be pointed out below, they regarded trade and commerce as the fundamental cause of wars between nations; and the source of domestic insurrection they traced to class conflicts within society. "Nations in general," says Jay, "will make war whenever they have a prospect of getting anything by it";²⁶ and it is obvious that the United States dissevered and discordant will be the easy prey to the commercial ambitions of their neighbors and rivals.

The material gains to be made by other nations at the expense of the United States are so apparent that the former cannot restrain themselves from aggression. France and Great Britain feel the pressure of our rivalry in the fisheries; they and other European nations are our competitors in navigation and the carrying trade; our independent voyages to China interfere with the monopolies enjoyed by other countries there; Spain would like to shut the Mississippi against us on one side and Great Britain fain would close the St. Lawrence on the other. The cheapness and excellence of our productions will excite their jealousy, and the enterprise and address of our merchants will not be consistent with the wishes or policy of the sovereigns of Europe. But, adds the commentator, by way of clinching the argument, "if they see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment."²⁷

All the powers of Europe could not prevail against us. "Under a vigorous national government the natural strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth. . . . An active commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would then be the offspring of moral and physical necessity. We might defy the little arts of the little politicians to control or vary

²⁶ *The Federalist*, No. 4.

²⁷ *Ibid.*

the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature."²⁸ In the present state of disunion the profits of trade are snatched from us; our commerce languishes; and poverty threatens to overspread a country which might out rival the world in riches.

The army and navy are to be not only instruments of defence in protecting the United States against the commercial and territorial ambitions of other countries; but they may be used also in forcing open foreign markets. What discriminatory tariffs and navigation laws may not accomplish the sword may achieve. The authors of *The Federalist* do not contemplate that policy of mild and innocuous isolation which was later made famous by Washington's farewell address.²⁹ On the contrary—they do not expect the United States to change human nature and make our commercial classes less ambitious than those of other countries to extend their spheres of trade. A strong navy will command the respect of European states. "There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union under an efficient government would put it within our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either of two contending parties. . . . A few ships of the line sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the event of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our position is, in this respect, a most commanding one. And if to this consideration we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West Indies, it will be readily perceived that a situation so favorable would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union, we may hope, ere long, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of the world as our interest may dictate."³⁰

As to dangers from class wars within particular states, the authors

²⁸ *The Federalist*, No. 11.

²⁹ Washington's farewell address which was partially written by Hamilton is one of the most ingenious partisan documents ever written. It, too, has its economic interpretation.

³⁰ *The Federalist*, No. 11.

of *The Federalist* did not deem it necessary to make extended remarks: the recent events in New England were only too vividly impressed upon the public mind. "The tempestuous situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged," says Hamilton, "evinces that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if the malcontents had been headed by a Cæsar or by a Cromwell."⁸¹ The strong arm of the Union must be available in such crises.

In considering the importance of defence against domestic insurrection, the authors of *The Federalist* do not overlook an appeal to the slave-holders' instinctive fear of a servile revolt. Naturally, it is Madison whose interest catches this point and drives it home, by appearing to discount it. In dealing with the dangers of insurrection, he says: "I take no notice of an unhappy species of population abounding in some of the states who, during the calm of regular government are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into human character and give a superiority of strength to any party with which they may associate themselves."⁸²

3. In addition to the power to lay and collect taxes and raise and maintain armed forces on land and sea, the Constitution vests in Congress plenary control over foreign and interstate commerce, and thus authorizes it to institute protective and discriminatory laws in favor of American interests,⁸³ and to create a wide sweep for free trade throughout the whole American empire. A single clause thus reflects the strong impulse of economic forces in the towns and young manufacturing centres. In a few simple words the mercantile and manufacturing interests wrote their *Zweck im Recht*; and they paid for their victory by large concessions to the slave-owning planters of the south.⁸⁴

While dealing with commerce in *The Federalist*⁸⁵ Hamilton does not neglect the subject of interstate traffic and intercourse. He shows how free trade over a wide range will be to reciprocal advantage, will give great diversity to commercial enterprise, and will render

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, No. 21.

⁸² *The Federalist*, No. 43.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, No. 35.

⁸⁴ See the entire letter of Blount, Spaight, and Williamson, cited above.

⁸⁵ No. 11.

stagnation less liable by offering more distant markets when local demands fall off. "The speculative trader," he concludes, "will at once perceive the force of these observations and will acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favorable than that of the thirteen states without union or with partial unions."

4. Another great economic antagonism found its expression in the clause conferring upon Congress the power to dispose of the territories and make rules and regulations for their government and admission to the Union. In this contest, the interests of the states which held territories came prominently to the front; and the ambiguity of the language used in the Constitution on this point may be attributed to the inability of the contestants to reach precise conclusions.³⁶ The leaders were willing to risk the proper management of the land problem after the new government was safely launched; and they were correct in their estimate of their future political prowess.

These are the great powers conferred on the new government: taxation, war, commercial control, and disposition of western lands. Through them public creditors may be paid in full, domestic peace maintained, advantages obtained in dealing with foreign nations, manufactures protected, and the development of the territories go forward with full swing. The remaining powers are minor and need not be examined here. What implied powers lay in the minds of the framers likewise need not be inquired into; they have long been the subject of juridical speculation.

None of the powers conferred by the Constitution on Congress permits a direct attack on property. The federal government is given no general authority to define property. It may tax, but indirect taxes must be uniform, and these are to fall upon consumers. Direct taxes may be laid, but resort to this form of taxation is rendered practically impossible, save on extraordinary occasions, by the provision that they must be apportioned according to population—so that numbers cannot transfer the burden to accumulated wealth. The slave trade may be destroyed, it is true, after the lapse of a few

³⁶ J. C. Welling, "States' Rights Conflict over the Public Lands," *Report of the American Historical Association* (1888), pp. 174 ff.

years; but slavery as a domestic institution is better safeguarded than before.

Even the destruction of the slave trade had an economic basis, although much was said at the time about the ethics of the clause. In the North where slavery, though widespread, was of little economic consequence, sympathy with the unfortunate negroes could readily prevail. Maryland and Virginia, already overstocked with slaves beyond the limits of land and capital, had prohibited the foreign trade in Negroes, because the slave-holders, who predominated in the legislatures, were not willing to see the value of their chattels reduced to a vanishing point by excessive importations. South Carolina and Georgia, where the death rate in the rice swamps and the opening of adjoining territories made a strong demand for the increase of slave property, on the other hand, demanded an open door for slave-dealers.

South Carolina was particularly determined,⁸⁷ and gave northern representatives to understand that if they wished to secure their commercial privileges, they must make concessions to the slave trade. And they were met half way. Ellsworth said: "As slaves multiply so fast in Virginia and Maryland that it is cheaper to raise than import them, whilst in the sickly rice swamps foreign supplies are necessary, if we go no farther than is urged, we shall be unjust towards South Carolina and Georgia. Let us not intermeddle. As population increases; poor laborers will be so plenty as to render slaves useless."⁸⁸

General Pinckney taunted the Virginia representatives in the Convention, some of whom were against slavery as well as importation, with disingenuous interestedness. "South Carolina and Georgia cannot do without slaves. As to Virginia she will gain by stopping the importations. Her slaves will rise in value and she has more than she wants. It would be unequal to require South Carolina and Georgia to confederate on such unequal terms."

III. RESTRICTIONS LAID UPON STATE LEGISLATURE

Equally important to personalty as the positive powers conferred upon Congress to tax, support armies, and regulate commerce were

⁸⁷ Farrand, *Records*, Vol. II, p. 371.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 371.

the restrictions imposed on the states.³⁹ Indeed, we have the high authority of Madison for the statement that of the forces which created the Constitution, those property interests seeking protection against omnipotent legislatures were the most active.

In a letter to Jefferson, written in October, 1787, Madison elaborates the principle of federal judicial control over state legislation, and explains the importance of this new institution in connection with the restrictions laid down in the Constitution on laws affecting private rights. "The mutability of the laws of the States," he says, "is found to be a serious evil. The injustice of them has been so frequent and so flagrant as to alarm the most steadfast friends of Republicanism. I am persuaded I do not err in saying that the evils issuing from these sources contributed more to that uneasiness which produced the Convention, and prepared the public mind for a general reform, than those which accrued to our national character and interest from the inadequacy of the Confederation to its immediate objects. A reform, therefore, which does not make provision for private rights must be materially defective."⁴⁰

Two small clauses embody the chief demands of personalty against agrarianism: the emission of paper money is prohibited and the states are forbidden to impair the obligation of contract. The first of these means a return to a specie basis—when coupled with the requirement that the gold and silver coin of the United States shall be the legal tender. The Shays and their paper money legions, who assaulted the vested rights of personalty by the process of legislative depreciation, are now subdued forever, and money lenders and security holders may be sure of their operations. Contracts are to be safe, and whoever engages in a financial operation, public or private, may know that state legislatures cannot destroy overnight the rules by which the game is played.

³⁹ There are, of course, some restrictions on Congress laid down in the Constitution; but the powers of the national legislature are limited and the restrictions are not of the same significance. Radical action on the part of the national legislature was anticipated in the structure of the government itself, but specific provision had to be made against the assaults of popular majorities in state legislatures on property rights.

⁴⁰ *Writings of James Madison* (1865), Vol. I, p. 350. This entire letter deserves careful study by anyone who would understand the Constitution as an economic document.

A principle of deep significance is written in these two brief sentences. The economic history of the states between the Revolution and the adoption of the Constitution is compressed in them. They appealed to every money lender, to every holder of public paper, to every man who had any personalty at stake. The intensity of the economic interests reflected in these two prohibitions can only be felt by one who has spent months in the study of American agrarianism after the Revolution. In them personalty won a significant battle in the conflict of 1787-1788.

The authors of *The Federalist* advance in support of these two clauses very substantial arguments which bear out the view here expressed. "The loss which America has sustained since the peace, from the pestilential effects of paper money on the necessary confidence between man and man, on the necessary confidence in the public councils, on the industry and morals of the people, and on the character of republican government, constitutes an enormous debt against the States chargeable with this unadvised measure, which must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an accumulation of guilt which can be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice on the altar of justice of the power which has been the instrument of it." Speaking on the contract clause—that "additional bulwark in favor of personal security and private rights"—Madison is sure that the "sober people of America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed the public councils," and will welcome a reform that will "inspire a general prudence and industry and give a regular course to the business of society."⁴¹

Hamilton on several occasions laid great stress on the contract clause as one of the features of the Constitution which had warmly commended it to its supporters. In a communication to Washington, dated May 29, 1790, he wrote: "This, to the more enlightened part of the community, was not one of the least recommendations of that Constitution. The too frequent intermeddlings of the state legislatures in relation to private contracts were extensively felt and seriously lamented; and a Constitution which promised a preventative was, by those who felt and thought in that manner, eagerly embraced."⁴²

⁴¹ *The Federalist*, No. 44.

⁴² Ms. Library of Congress: *Treasury Department Letters, 1789-1790* (Washing-

There was not a little discussion of the obligation of contract clause in the contemporary press during the period of ratification, and there can be no doubt that it was favorably viewed by the supporters of the Constitution as an added safeguard against paper money and stay laws. A writer in the *New Hampshire Spy*, on November 3, 1787, in commending the new frame of government to his fellow citizens, calls particular attention to this provision: "It also expressly prohibits those destructive laws in the several states which alter or impair the obligation of contracts; so that in future anyone may be certain of an exact fulfilment of any contract that may be entered into or the penalty that may be stipulated for in case of failure."

Another writer of the period approves the same principle with more vigor. "My countrymen, the devil is among you. Make paper as much as you please. Make it a tender in all *future* contracts, or let it rest on its own credit—but remember that *past* contracts are sacred things—and that legislatures have no right to interfere with them—they have no right to say, a debt shall be paid at a discount, or in any manner which the parties never intended. . . . To pay *bona fide* contracts for cash, in paper of little value, or in old horses, would be a dishonest attempt in an individual: but for legislatures to frame laws to support and encourage such detestable villainy, is like a judge who should inscribe the arms of a rogue over the seat of justice."⁴⁸

The full import of the obligation of contract clause was doubtless better understood by Chief Justice Marshall than by any man of that generation. He had taken an active part in the adoption of the Constitution in his state, and he had studied long and arduously the history of the period for his classic defence of Federalism, *The Life of Washington*. In more than one decision he applied the clause with great effect, and voiced the views of his Federalist contemporaries on this point, explaining the deep-seated social antagonism which is reflected in it. And when at length, in his declining years, he saw it attacked in the legislatures by Jacksonian democracy, and beheld the Supreme Court itself surrendering the position which he had earlier taken, he spread on record in a dissenting opinion a

⁴⁸ *The American Museum*, Vol. I, p. 118.

warning and a protest which for cogency and vigor equals any of his great dissertations delivered in the name of the Court.

In the case of *Ogden v. Saunders*, decided in the January term of 1827, the Supreme Court was compelled to pass upon the issue: "Does a bankrupt law which applies to contracts made *after* its passage impair the obligation of those contracts?" The newer school on the bench, Washington, Johnson, Trimble, and Thompson were of opinion that such a law did not impair the obligation of contract and was valid. Marshall, Duvall, and Story dissented. The Chief Justice took the high ground that the obligation of a contract inhered in the contract itself, and could not be changed by any external legislation whatever. Therefore, obviously, legislation affecting adversely the obligation of future contracts was just as unconstitutional as legislation attacking contracts already made. In other words, Marshall, who ought to have known what the framers of the Constitution intended better than any man on the supreme bench, believed that it was designed to bring under the ban substantially all legislation which affected personalty adversely—in other words that it was similar in character to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Speaking on the contract clause he said with great solemnity: "We cannot look back to the history of the times when the august spectacle was exhibited of the assemblage of the whole people by their representatives in convention, in order to unite thirteen independent sovereignties under one government, so far as might be necessary for the purposes of union, without being sensible of the great importance attached to the tenth section of the first article. The power of changing the relative situation of debtor and creditor, of interfering with contracts, a power which comes home to every man, touches the interest of all, and controls the conduct of every individual in those things which he supposes to be proper for his own exclusive management, had been used to such an excess by the state legislatures as to break in upon the ordinary intercourse of society, and destroy all confidence between man and man. The mischief had become so great, so alarming as not only to impair commercial intercourse, and threaten the existence of credit, but to sap the morals of the people, and destroy the sanctity of private faith. To guard against the continuance of the evil was an object of

deep interest with all the truly wise, as well as virtuous, of this great community, and was one of the important benefits expected from a reform of the government."⁴⁴

THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The authors of *The Federalist* carry over into the field of international politics the concept of economic antagonisms which lie at the basis of their system of domestic politics. Modern wars spring primarily out of commercial rivalry, although the ambitions of princes have often been a source of international conflict. "Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change the objects of war?" asks Hamilton. "Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives, since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other?"⁴⁵ Let history answer. Carthage, a commercial republic, was an aggressor in a war that ended in her destruction. The furious contests of Holland and England were over the dominion of the sea. Commerce has been for ages the predominant pursuit of England, and she has been constantly engaged in wars. Even the Hapsburg-Bourbon wars have in a large measure grown out of commercial considerations.

In this world-wide and age-long conflict of nations for commercial advantages, the United States cannot expect to become a non-resistant, an idle spectator. Even were pacific ideals to dominate American policy, she could not overcome the scruples of her ambitious rivals. In union, therefore, is strength against aggression and in support of offensive operations. Moreover, the Union will be better able to settle disputes amicably because of the greater show of power which it can make. "Acknowledgements, explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a state or a confederacy of little consideration or power."⁴⁶

⁴⁴ *Ogden v. Saunders*, 12 Wheaton, pp. 213 ff.

⁴⁵ *The Federalist*, No. 6.

⁴⁶ *The Federalist*, No. 3.

Turning from the material causes of foreign wars the authors of *The Federalist* examine the possible sources of danger from domestic discord among the states, regarded as independent sovereignties. And how may such domestic discord arise? The North will probably grow strong and formidable and be tempted to despoil the South: nor "does it appear to be a rash conjecture," says Jay, "that its young swarms might often be tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors."⁴⁷

Then the apple of discord may be thrown among the states by foreign countries if several confederacies take the place of union. And what is this apple of discord? Each of the proposed confederacies, says Jay, "would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different." Treaties are subject to the law of greatest economic pressure. "Different commercial concerns," he continues, "must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign nations."⁴⁸ The degrees of political attachment also follow the law of greatest economic pressure; and if foreign nations come to blows among themselves, their allies in America are likely to be drawn into the conflict. Thus domestic discord may arise among the states indirectly through their material connections with other countries.

But internecine warfare will more probably arise from causes operating within the states; and what may be the real sources of such conflict? asks Hamilton.⁴⁹ They are numerous: lust for power and dominion, the desire for equality and safety, the ambitions of leaders. Has it not invariably been found, he adds, "that momentary passions, and immediate interests have a more active and imperious control over human conduct than general and remote considerations of policy, utility, or justice? . . . Has commerce hitherto done any thing more than change the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and enterprizing a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial mo-

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 5.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 6.

tives since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion?"

Of course such acute observers as the authors of *The Federalist* do not omit to remark that the personal ambitions of monarchs have been a cause of wars, and the passions of men for leadership have been a source of domestic insurrections. But they are quick to add that the aggrandizement and support of their particular families are among the motives that have led monarchs to undertake wars of conquest;⁵⁰ and as to personal element in domestic insurrections, Hamilton expresses a doubt whether Massachusetts would recently have been plunged into civil war "if Shays had not been a *desperate debtor*."⁵¹

Turning from the question as to the extent of the economic motive in the personal element, Hamilton makes an inquiry into the more probable sources of wars among the states in case a firmer union, endowed with adequate powers, is not established. These he enumerates:⁵²

1. "Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations." The several states have an interest in the Western Territories, and "to reason from the past to the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of their differences."

2. "The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention." Each state will pursue a policy conducive to its own advantages, and "the spirit of enterprize, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those regulations of trade by which particular states might endeavor to secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens." The economic motive will thus probably override all considerations of interstate comity and all considerations of international law. But that is not all; says Hamilton, in italics, "*We should be ready to denominate injuries those things which were in reality the justifiable acts of independent sovereign*

⁵⁰ *The Federalist*, No. 4.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, No. 6.

⁵² *Ibid.*, No. 7.

ties consulting a distinct interest." Commerce will have little respect for the right of other peoples to protect their interests, and it will stigmatize as an "injury" anything which blocks its enterprise.

3. "The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of collision between the separate states or confederacies." Some states would oppose paying the debt. Why? Because they are "less impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question." But other states, "a numerous body of whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond the proportion of the state in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous for some equitable and effective provision." In other words, citizens who had nothing at stake would be indifferent, and those who had something to lose would clamor. Foreign powers also might intervene, and the "double contingency of external invasion and internal contention" would be hazarded.

4. "Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to aggressions on the rights of those states whose citizens are injured by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility." Had there not been plenty of evidence to show that state legislatures, if unrestrained by some higher authority, would attack private rights in property? And had there not been a spirit of retaliation also? "We reasonably infer that in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not of *parchment*, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious breaches of moral obligation and social justice."

These, then, are the four leading sources of probable conflict among the states if not united into a firm union: territory, commerce, the national debt, and violations of contractual rights in property—all as severely economic as could well be imagined.

To carry the theory of the economic interpretation of the Constitution out into its ultimate details would require a monumental commentary, such as lies completely beyond the scope of this volume. But enough has been said to show that the concept of the Constitution as a piece of abstract legislation reflecting no group interests and recognizing no economic antagonisms is entirely false. It was an economic document drawn with superb skill by men whose property interests were immediately at stake; and as such it appealed directly and unerringly to identical interests in the country at large.

HENRY ADAMS

ALTHOUGH THE ADAMS FAMILY was always notable for its independent political thinking, it was usually to be found supporting conservative views. Henry Adams' great-grandfather, President John Adams, was Jefferson's great opponent in an election which symbolized for the times the struggle between democratic and aristocratic tendencies in government. A similar contest twenty-eight years later pitted Henry's grandfather, President John Quincy Adams, against another democratic leader, Andrew Jackson. Henry Adams himself could remember the period spent in Great Britain with his father, Ambassador Charles Francis Adams, during the difficult days of a civil war which found the Democratic party of Jefferson and Jackson stigmatized as treasonable in the South and riddled with "copperheads" in the North.

It is easy, then, to see why a note of hostility might appear in a history of Jefferson's administration written by Henry Adams. The understanding and appreciation which Adams showed for Jefferson are more difficult to comprehend than his occasional petulance. Perhaps a clue to the answer lies in the fact that the Adams family was as unsympathetic to a commercial aristocracy ruling in its own interests as it was to a government dominated by the untutored masses. Conservatism as the Adams family conceived it had much more to do with disinterested zeal for public service than with the protection of property rights.

When the interests and program of their conservative allies appeared to depart from national needs, the Adamses seldom hesitated to change their allies, even if doing so meant joining

the camp of the Jeffersonian enemy. Henry Adams could remember that his great-grandfather, John, broke with the Hamiltonian faction of the Federalist party to bring about a peaceful solution to dangerous disagreement with France in 1798; it seemed to have mattered little to President Adams that he had thereby strengthened Jefferson's and perhaps killed his own political future. Only a few years later John Quincy Adams left the Federalist party, which had appointed him to the Senate, in order to disassociate himself completely from a conservative faction which contemplated disunion.

Henry Adams had even better reason than his grandfather and great-grandfather to observe and to regret that the conservative tradition in which he had been reared was being corrupted by infusions of a grossly materialistic philosophy. The Republican party, whose active ranks he thought momentarily of entering at the close of the Civil War, was the party of Grantism, affiliated more with Jay Gould and petty bribery than with ideals of public service. Such a political atmosphere Henry Adams found completely unappetizing, and he turned with some relief, even if with a sense of frustration, to a career of teaching and writing.

In many ways, the period covering the administrations of Jefferson and Madison was more congenial to Henry Adams than the years of industrial development during which he wrote his nine-volume study. American democracy was simpler and fundamentally less turbulent in 1801 than in 1886; in 1801 the Adams family could still make a major contribution to it. Yet Adams' history was not to be warm and intimate. The habit of intellectual detachment was strongly developed within him and was strengthened by the thought that an Adams writing about Jefferson had particular reasons for guarding against emotional judgments.

The tone of Adams' history, then, is one of impartiality and disassociation. If this leads to a sense of fairness and balance, it also contributes to a characteristic severity and frigidness which have deprived the work of strong popular appeal. The

portrait of Jefferson is carefully shaded, but hardly flattering. It appears to be a conscientious attempt to represent fairly Jefferson's ideas, by a man not fundamentally in sympathy with many of them. Adams saw two basic elements in Jefferson's thinking: a belief in social democracy and a political conception which was republican rather than democratic, stressing local control rather than rule by a national majority. Although Adams was careful to point out the inconsistencies between Jefferson's theories of limited national government and his practice of strong national government, he seemed less than anxious to explore fully the principles which gave unity and coherence to Jefferson's thinking.

What consistency Adams found in Jefferson's administration he related chiefly to a desire to substitute commercial sanctions for armed conflict as a means of meeting foreign aggression. This appreciation of Jefferson's basic foreign policy was especially fortunate for Adams because of the emphasis he gave in his work to diplomatic affairs. After an opening six chapters describing the social setting of the period, Adams devoted a substantial part of his nine volumes to politics and in particular to American participation in the wars and intrigues of the Napoleonic era.

Adams' failure to integrate political with social developments and his neglect of the economic aspects of the national scene constitute perhaps the chief failure of the work insofar as it pretends to offer a general history of the times. As a diplomatic history it stands alone. Yet subsequent scholars have found that even in this respect Adams' preoccupation with foreign entanglements betrayed him into a misinterpretation, or at least an oversimplification, in analyzing the motives for our second war with Great Britain. To the maritime grievances which he set forth in great detail he might have added a consideration of western complaints arising from depression, of American land hunger, and of frontier troubles with Indians believed to be precipitated by British agitation.

Yet these are small faults in a generously conceived and super-

bly executed classic. Few historians have written with such lucidity and insight. Leading his readers confidently through the tangled web of Napoleonic diplomacy, Adams offers an inspiring example of how the writing of history can be raised to the level of an art.

The Inauguration

THE MAN who mounted the steps of the Capitol, March 4, 1801, to claim the place of an equal between Pitt and Bonaparte, possessed a character which showed itself in acts; but person and manner can be known only by contemporaries, and the liveliest description was worth less than a moment of personal contact. Jefferson was very tall, six feet two-and-a-half inches in height; sandy-complexioned; shy in manner, seeming cold; awkward in attitude, and with little in his bearing that suggested command. Senator Maclay of Pennsylvania described him in 1790, when he had returned from France to become Secretary of State, and appeared before a Committee of the Senate to answer questions about foreign relations.

"Jefferson is a slender man," wrote the senator:¹ "has rather the air of stiffness in his manner. His clothes seem too small for him. He sits in a lounging manner, on one hip commonly, and with one of his shoulders elevated much above the other. His face has a sunny aspect. His whole figure has a loose, shackling air. He had a rambling, vacant look, and nothing of that firm collected deportment which I expected would dignify the presence of a secretary or minister. I looked for gravity, but a laxity of manner seemed shed about him. He spoke almost without ceasing; but even his discourse partook of his personal demeanor. It was loose and rambling; and yet he scattered informa-

From *History of the United States of America* by Henry Adams.

¹ Sketches of Debate in the First Senate, by William Maclay, p. 212.

tion wherever he went, and some even brilliant sentiments sparkled from him."

Maclay was one of the earliest members of the Republican party, and his description was not unfriendly. Augustus Foster, Secretary of the British Legation, described Jefferson as he appeared in 1804:²—

He was a tall man, with a very red freckled face, and gray neglected hair; his manners good-natured, frank, and rather friendly, though he had somewhat of a cynical expression of countenance. He wore a blue coat, a thick gray-colored hairy waistcoat, with a red under-waistcoat lapped over it, green velvet breeches with pearl buttons, yarn stockings, and slippers down at the heels,—his appearance being very much like that of a tall, large-boned farmer.

In the middle of the seventeenth century the celebrated Cardinal de Retz formed a judgment of the newly-elected Pope from his remark, at a moment when minds were absorbed in his election, that he had for two years used the same pen. "It is only a trifle," added De Retz, "but I have often observed that the smallest things are sometimes better marks than the greatest." Perhaps dress could never be considered a trifle. One of the greatest of modern writers first made himself famous by declaring that society was founded upon *cloth*; and Jefferson, at moments of some interest in his career as President, seemed to regard his peculiar style of dress as a matter of political importance, while the Federalist newspapers never ceased ridiculing the corduroy small-clothes, red-plush waistcoat, and sharp-toed boots with which he expressed his contempt for fashion.

For eight years this tall, loosely built, somewhat stiff figure, in red waistcoat and yarn stockings, slippers down at the heel, and clothes that seemed too small for him, may be imagined as Senator Maclay described him, sitting on one hip, with one shoulder high above the other, talking almost without ceasing to his visitors at the White House. His skin was thin, peeling from his face on exposure to the sun, and giving it a tettered appearance. This sandy face, with hazel eyes and sunny aspect; this loose, shackling person; this rambling and often brilliant conversation, belonged to the controlling influences of American history, more necessary to the story than three-fourths of the official papers, which only hid the truth. Jefferson's

² The Quarterly Review (London, 1841), p. 24.

personality during these eight years appeared to be the government, and impressed itself, like that of Bonaparte, although by a different process, on the mind of the nation. In the village simplicity of Washington he was more than a king, for he was alone in social as well as in political pre-eminence. Except the British Legation, no house in Washington was open to general society; the whole mass of politicians, even the Federalists, were dependent on Jefferson and "The Palace" for amusement; and if they refused to go there, they "lived like bears, brutalized and stupefied."³

Jefferson showed his powers at their best in his own house, where among friends as genial and cheerful as himself his ideas could flow freely, and could be discussed with sympathy. Such were the men with whom he surrounded himself by choice, and none but such were invited to enter his Cabinet. First and oldest of his political associates was James Madison, about to become Secretary of State, whose character also described itself, and whose personality was as distinct as that of his chief. A small man, quiet, somewhat precise in manner, pleasant, fond of conversation, with a certain mixture of ease and dignity in his address, Madison had not so much as Jefferson of the commanding attitude which imposed respect on the world. "He has much more the appearance of what I have imagined a Roman cardinal to be," wrote Senator Mills of Massachusetts in 1815.⁴ An imposing presence had much to do with political influence, and Madison labored under serious disadvantage in the dryness of his personality. Political opponents of course made fun of him. "As to Jemmy Madison,—oh, poor Jemmy!—he is but a withered little apple-john," wrote Washington Irving in 1812, instinctively applying the Knickerbocker view of history to national concerns.

"In his dress," said one who knew him,⁵ "he was not at all eccentric or given to dandyism, but always appeared neat and genteel, and in the costume of a well-bred and tasty old-school gentleman. I have heard in early life he sometimes wore light-colored clothes; but from the time I first knew him . . . never any other color than black, his coat being cut in what is termed dress-fashion; his breeches short, with buckles at the knees, black silk stockings, and shoes with strings, or long fair top-boots when out in cold weather, or when he

³ *The Quarterly Review* (London, 1841), p. 23.

⁴ *Massachusetts Historical Society's Proceedings*, vol. xix. 1881-1882.

⁵ *Grigsby's Convention of 1776*, p. 85.

rode on horseback, of which he was fond. . . . He wore powder on his hair, which was dressed full over the ears, tied behind, and brought to a point above the forehead, to cover in some degree his baldness, as may be noticed in all the likenesses taken of him."

Madison had a sense of humor, felt in his conversation, and detected in the demure cast of his flexile lips, but leaving no trace in his published writings. Small in stature, in deportment modest to the point of sensitive reserve, in address simple and pleasing, in feature rather thoughtful and benevolent than strong, he was such a man as Jefferson, who so much disliked contentious and self-asserting manners, loved to keep by his side. Sir Augustus Foster liked Mr. Madison, although in 1812 Madison sent him out of the country:—

I thought Mr. Jefferson more of a statesman and man of the world than Mr. Madison, who was rather too much the disputatious pleader; yet the latter was better informed, and moreover a social, jovial, and good-humored companion, full of anecdote, sometimes rather of a loose description, but oftener of a political and historical interest. He was a little man with small features, rather wizened when I saw him, but occasionally lit up with a good-natured smile. He wore a black coat, stockings with shoes buckled, and had his hair powdered, with a tail.

The third aristocrat in this democratic triumvirate was Albert Gallatin, marked by circumstances even more than by the President's choice for the post of Secretary of the Treasury. Like the President and the Secretary of State, Gallatin was born and bred a gentleman; in person and manners he was well fitted for the cabinet-table over which Jefferson presided. Gallatin possessed the personal force which was somewhat lacking in his two friends. His appearance impressed by-standers with a sense of strength. His complexion was dark; his eyes were hazel and full of expression; his hair black, and like Madison he was becoming bald. From long experience, at first among the democrats of western Pennsylvania, and afterward as a leader in the House of Representatives, he had lost all shyness in dealing with men. His long prominent nose and lofty forehead showed character, and his eyes expressed humor. A slight foreign accent betrayed his Genevan origin. Gallatin was also one of the best talkers in America, and perhaps the best-informed man in the country; for his laborious mind had studied America with infinite

care, and he retained so much knowledge of European affairs as to fit him equally for the State Department or the Treasury. Three more agreeable men than Jefferson, Madison, and Gallatin were never collected round the dinner-table of the White House; and their difference in age was enough to add zest to their friendship; for Jefferson was born in 1743, Madison in 1751, and Gallatin in 1761. While the President was nearly sixty years old, his Secretary of the Treasury had the energy and liberality of forty.

Jefferson was the first President inaugurated at Washington, and the ceremony, necessarily simple, was made still simpler for political reasons. The retiring President was not present at the installation of his successor. In Jefferson's eyes a revolution had taken place as vast as that of 1776; and if this was his belief, perhaps the late President was wise to retire from a stage where everything was arranged to point a censure upon his principles, and where he would have seemed, in his successor's opinion, as little in place as George III. would have appeared at the installation of President Washington. The collapse of government which marked the last weeks of February, 1801, had been such as to leave of the old Cabinet only Samuel Dexter of Massachusetts, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Benjamin Stoddert of Maryland, the Secretary of the Navy, still in office. John Marshall, the late Secretary of State, had been appointed, six weeks before, Chief-Justice of the Supreme Court.

In this first appearance of John Marshall as Chief-Justice, to administer the oath of office, lay the dramatic climax of the inauguration. The retiring President, acting for what he supposed to be the best interests of the country, by one of his last acts of power, deliberately intended to perpetuate the principles of his administration, placed at the head of the judiciary, for life, a man as obnoxious to Jefferson as the bitterest New England Calvinist could have been; for he belonged to that class of conservative Virginians whose devotion to President Washington, and whose education in the common law, caused them to hold Jefferson and his theories in antipathy. The new President and his two Secretaries were political philanthropists, bent on restricting the powers of the national government in the interests of human liberty. The Chief-Justice, a man who in grasp of mind and steadiness of purpose had no superior, perhaps no equal, was bent on enlarging the powers of government in the in-

terests of justice and nationality. As they stood face to face on this threshold of their power, each could foresee that the contest between them would end only with life.

If Jefferson and his two friends were the most aristocratic of democrats, John Marshall was of all aristocrats the most democratic in manners and appearance.

"A tall, slender figure," wrote Joseph Story in 1808,⁶ "not graceful or imposing, but erect and steady. His hair is black, his eyes small and twinkling, his forehead rather low; but his features are in general harmonious. His manners are plain yet dignified, and an unaffected modesty diffuses itself through all his actions. His dress is very simple yet neat; his language chaste, but hardly elegant; it does not flow rapidly, but it seldom wants precision. In conversation he is quite familiar, but is occasionally embarrassed by a hesitancy and drawing. . . . I love his laugh,—it is too hearty for an intriguer; and his good temper and unwearied patience are equally agreeable on the bench and in the study."

The unaffected simplicity of Marshall's life was delightful to all who knew him, for it sprang from the simplicity of his mind. Never self-conscious, his dignity was never affected by his situation. Bishop Meade,⁷ who was proud of the Chief-Justice as one of his flock, being in a street near Marshall's house one morning between daybreak and sunrise, met the Chief-Justice on horseback, with a bag of cloverseed lying before him, which he was carrying to his little farm at seed-time. Simple as American life was, his habits were remarkable for modest plainness; and only the character of his mind, which seemed to have no flaw, made his influence irresistible upon all who were brought within its reach.

Nevertheless this great man nourished one weakness. Pure in life; broad in mind, and the despair of bench and bar for the unswerving certainty of his legal method; almost idolized by those who stood nearest him, and loving warmly in return,—this excellent and amiable man clung to one rooted prejudice: he detested Thomas Jefferson. He regarded with quiet, unspoken, but immovable antipathy the character and doings of the philosopher standing before him, about to take the oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution. No argument or entreaty affected his conviction that Jefferson

⁶ *Life of Story*, i. 166.

⁷ *Old Churches of Virginia*, ii. 222.

was not an honest man. "By weakening the office of President he will increase his personal power," were Marshall's words, written at this time;⁸ "the morals of the author of the letter to Mazzei cannot be pure." Jefferson in return regarded Marshall with a repugnance tinged by a shade of some deeper feeling, almost akin to fear. "The judge's inveteracy is profound," he once wrote,⁹ "and his mind of that gloomy malignity which will never let him forego the opportunity of satiating it on a victim."

Another person, with individuality not less marked, took the oath of office the same day. When the Senate met at ten o'clock on the morning of March 4, 1801, Aaron Burr stood at the desk, and having duly sworn to support the Constitution, took his seat in the chair as Vice-President. This quiet, gentlemanly, and rather dignified figure, hardly taller than Madison, and dressed in much the same manner, impressed with favor all who first met him. An aristocrat imbued in the morality of Lord Chesterfield and Napoleon Bonaparte, Colonel Burr was the chosen head of Northern democracy, idol of the wards of New York city, and aspirant to the highest offices he could reach by means legal or beyond the law; for as he pleased himself with saying, after the manner of the First Consul of the French Republic, "Great souls care little for small morals." Among the other party leaders who have been mentioned,—Jefferson, Madison, Gallatin, Marshall,—not one was dishonest. The exaggerations or equivocations that Jefferson allowed himself, which led to the deep-rooted conviction of Marshall that he did not tell the truth and must therefore be dangerous, amounted to nothing when compared with the dishonesty of a corrupt man. Had the worst political charges against Jefferson been true, he would not have been necessarily corrupt. The self-deception inherent in every struggle for personal power was not the kind of immorality which characterized Colonel Burr. Jefferson, if his enemies were to be believed, might occasionally make misstatements of fact; yet he was true to the faith of his life, and would rather have abdicated his office and foregone his honors than have compassed even an imaginary wrong against the principles he professed. His life, both private and public, was pure. His associates, like Madison, Gallatin, and Monroe, were men

⁸ Marshall to Hamilton, Jan. 1, 1801; Hamilton's Works, vi. 502.

⁹ Jefferson to Gallatin, Sept. 27, 1810 Gallatin's Writings, i. 492.

upon whose reputations no breath of scandal rested. The standard of morality at Washington, both in private society and in politics, was respectable. For this reason Colonel Burr was a new power in the government; for being in public and in private life an adventurer of the same school as scores who were then seeking fortune in the antechambers of Bonaparte and Pitt, he became a loadstone for every other adventurer who frequented New York or whom the chances of politics might throw into office. The Vice-President wielded power, for he was the certain centre of corruption.

Thus when the doors of the Senate chamber were thrown open, and the new President of the United States appeared on the threshold; when the Vice-President rose from his chair, and Jefferson sat down in it, with Aaron Burr on his right hand and John Marshall on his left, the assembled senators looked up at three men who profoundly disliked and distrusted each other.

John Davis, one of many Englishmen who were allowed by Burr to attach themselves to him on the chance of some future benefit to be derived from them, asserted in a book of American travels published in London two years afterward, that he was present at the inauguration, and that Jefferson rode on horseback to the Capitol, and after hitching his horse to the palings, went in to take the oath. This story, being spread by the Federalist newspapers, was accepted by the Republicans and became a legend of the Capitol. In fact Davis was not then at Washington, and his story was untrue. Afterward as President, Jefferson was in the habit of going on horseback, rather than in a carriage, wherever business called him, and the Federalists found fault with him for doing so. "He makes it a point," they declared,¹⁰ "when he has occasion to visit the Capitol to meet the representatives of the nation on public business, to go on a single horse, which he leads into the shed and hitches to a peg." Davis wished to write a book that should amuse Englishmen, and in order to give an air of truth to invention, he added that he was himself present at the ceremony. Jefferson was then living as Vice-President at Conrad's boarding-house, within a stone's throw of the Capitol. He did not mount his horse only to ride across the square and dismount in a crowd of observers. Doubtless he wished to offer an example of republican simplicity, and he was not unwilling to annoy

¹⁰ Evening Post, April 20, 1802.

his opponents; but the ceremony was conducted with proper form.

Edward Thornton, then in charge of the British Legation at Washington, wrote to Lord Grenville, then Foreign Secretary in Pitt's administration, a despatch enclosing the new President's Inaugural Address, with comments upon its democratic tendencies; and after a few remarks on this subject, he added:¹¹—

The same republican spirit which runs through this performance, and which in many passages discovers some bitterness through all the sentiments of conciliation and philanthropy with which it is overcharged, Mr. Jefferson affected to display in performing the customary ceremonies. He came from his own lodgings to the House where the Congress convenes, and which goes by the name of the Capitol, on foot, in his ordinary dress, escorted by a body of militia artillery from the neighboring State, and accompanied by the Secretaries of the Navy and the Treasury, and a number of his political friends in the House of Representatives. He was received by Mr. Burr, the Vice-President of the United States, who arrived a day or two ago at the seat of government, and who was previously admitted this morning to the chair of the Senate; and was afterward complimented at his own lodgings by the very few foreign agents who reside at this place, by the members of Congress, and other public officials.

Only the north wing of the Capitol had then been so far completed as to be occupied by the Senate, the courts, and the small library of Congress. The centre rose not much above its foundations; and the south wing, some twenty feet in height, contained a temporary oval brick building, commonly called the "Oven," in which the House of Representatives sat in some peril of their lives, for had not the walls been strongly shored up from without, the structure would have crumbled to pieces. Into the north wing the new President went, accompanied by the only remaining secretaries, Dexter and Stoddert, and by his friends from the House. Received by Vice-President Burr, and seated in the chair between Burr and Marshall, after a short pause Jefferson rose, and in a somewhat inaudible voice began his Inaugural Address.

Time, which has laid its chastening hand on many reputations, and has given to many once famous formulas a meaning unsuspected by their authors, has not altogether spared Jefferson's first Inaugural Address, although it was for a long time almost as well known as the

11 Thornton to Grenville, March 4, 1801; MSS. British Archives.

Declaration of Independence; yet this Address was one of the few State Papers which should have lost little of its interest by age. As the starting-point of a powerful political party, the first Inaugural was a standard by which future movements were measured, and it went out of fashion only when its principles were universally accepted or thrown aside. Even as a literary work, it possessed a certain charm of style peculiar to Jefferson, a flavor of Virginia thought and manners, a Jeffersonian ideality calculated to please the ear of later generations forced to task their utmost powers in order to carry the complex trains of their thought.

The chief object of the Address was to quiet the passions which had been raised by the violent agitation of the past eight years. Every interest of the new Administration required that the extreme Federalists should be disarmed. Their temper was such as to endanger both Administration and Union; and their power was still formidable, for they controlled New England and contested New York. To them, Jefferson turned:—

“Let us unite with one heart and one mind,” he entreated; “let us restore to social intercourse that harmony and affection without which liberty and even life itself are but dreary things. And let us reflect, that, having banished from our land that religious intolerance under which mankind so long bled and suffered, we have yet gained little if we countenance a political intolerance as despotic, as wicked, and capable of as bitter and bloody persecutions. During the throes and convulsions of the ancient world, during the agonizing spasms of infuriated man, seeking through blood and slaughter his long-lost liberty, it was not wonderful that the agitation of the billows should reach even this distant and peaceful shore; that this should be more felt and feared by some than by others; that this should divide opinions as to measures of safety. But every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We are all Republicans, we are all Federalists.”

The Federalist newspapers never ceased laughing at the “spasms” so suddenly converted into “billows,” and at the orthodoxy of Jefferson’s Federalism; but perhaps his chief fault was to belittle the revolution which had taken place. In no party sense was it true that all were Republicans or all Federalists. As will appear, Jefferson himself was far from meaning what he seemed to say. He wished to soothe the great body of his opponents, and if possible to win them

over; but he had no idea of harmony or affection other than that which was to spring from his own further triumph; and in representing that he was in any sense a Federalist, he did himself a wrong.

"I know, indeed," he continued, "that some honest men fear that a republican government cannot be strong; that this government is not strong enough. But would the honest patriot, in the full tide of successful experiment, abandon a government which has so far kept us free and firm, on the theoretic and visionary fear that this government, the world's best hope, may by possibility want energy to preserve itself? I trust not. I believe this, on the contrary, the strongest government on earth. I believe it is the only one where every man, at the call of the laws, would fly to the standard of the law, and would meet invasions of the public order as his own personal concern. Sometimes it is said that man cannot be trusted with the government of himself. Can he then be trusted with the government of others? Or have we found angels in the forms of kings to govern him? Let history answer this question!"

That the government, the world's best hope, had hitherto kept the country free and firm, in the full tide of successful experiment, was a startling compliment to the Federalist party, coming as it did from a man who had not been used to compliment his political opponents; but Federalists, on the other hand, might doubt whether this government would continue to answer the same purpose when administered for no other avowed object than to curtail its powers. Clearly, Jefferson credited government with strength which belonged to society; and if he meant to practice upon this idea, by taking the tone of "the strongest government on earth" in the face of Bonaparte and Pitt, whose governments were strong in a different sense, he might properly have developed this idea at more length, for it was likely to prove deeply interesting. Moreover, history, if asked, must at that day have answered that no form of government, whether theocratic, autocratic, aristocratic, democratic, or mixed, had ever in Western civilization lasted long, without change or need of change. History was not the witness to which Republicans could with entire confidence appeal, even against kings.

The Address next enumerated the advantages which America enjoyed, and those which remained to be acquired:—

With all these blessings, what more is necessary to make us a happy and prosperous people? Still one thing more, fellow-citizens,—

a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, which shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned. This is the sum of good government, and this is necessary to close the circle of our felicities.

A government restricted to keeping the peace, which should raise no taxes except for that purpose, seemed to be simply a judicature and a police. Jefferson gave no development to the idea further than to define its essential principles, and those which were to guide his Administration. Except the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798, this short passage was the only official gloss ever given to the Constitution by the Republican party; and for this reason students of American history who would understand the course of American thought should constantly carry in mind not only the Constitutions of 1781 and of 1787, but also the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, and the following paragraph of Jefferson's first Inaugural Address:—

"I will compress them," said the President, "within the narrowest compass they will bear, stating the general principle, but not all its limitations. Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none; the support of the State governments in all their rights, as the most competent administrations for our domestic concerns and the surest bulwarks against anti-republican tendencies the preservation of the general government in its whole Constitutional vigor, as the sheet-anchor of our peace at home and safety abroad; a jealous care of the right of election by the People,—a mild and safe corrective of abuses which are lopped by the sword of revolution where peaceable remedies are unprovided; absolute acquiescence in the decisions of the majority,—the vital principle of republics, from which there is no appeal but to force, the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism; a well-disciplined militia,—our best reliance in peace and for the first moments of war, till regulars may relieve them; the supremacy of the civil over the military authority; economy in the public expense, that labor may be lightly burdened; the honest payment of our debts, and sacred preservation of the public faith; encouragement of agriculture, and of commerce as its handmaid; the diffusion of information, and arraignment of all abuses at the bar of public reason; freedom of religion, freedom of the press, and freedom of person under the protection of the *habeas corpus*; and trial by juries impartially selected;—these principles form the bright

constellation which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation. The wisdom of our sages and the blood of our heroes have been devoted to their attainment; they should be the creed of our political faith, the text of civic instruction, the touchstone by which to try the services of those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error or alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety."

From the metaphors in which these principles appeared as a constellation, a creed, a text, a touchstone, and a road, the world learned that they had already guided the American people through an age of revolution. In fact, they were mainly the principles of President Washington, and had they been announced by a Federalist President, would have created little remonstrance or surprise. In Jefferson's mouth they sounded less familiar, and certain phrases seemed even out of place.

Among the cardinal points of republicanism thus proclaimed to the world was one in particular, which as a maxim of government seemed to contradict cherished convictions and the fixed practice of the Republican party. "Absolute acquiescence" was required "in the decisions of the majority,—the vital principle of republics, from which there is no appeal but to force; the vital principle and immediate parent of despotism." No principle was so thoroughly entwined in the roots of Virginia republicanism as that which affirmed the worthlessness of decisions made by a majority of the United States, either as a nation or a confederacy, in matters which concerned the exercise of doubtful powers. Not three years had passed since Jefferson himself penned the draft of the Kentucky Resolutions, in which he declared¹² "that in cases of an abuse of the delegated powers, the members of the general government being chosen by the people, a change by the people would be the Constitutional remedy; but where powers are assumed which have not been delegated, a nullification of the act is the rightful remedy; that every State has a natural right, in cases not within the compact, to nullify of their own authority all assumptions of power by others within their limits; that without this right they would be under the dominion, absolute and unlimited, of whosoever might exercise this

¹² Jefferson's Works, ix. 469.

right of judgment for them." He went so far as to advise that every State should forbid, within its borders, the execution of any act of the general government "not plainly and intentionally authorized by the Constitution;" and although the legislatures of Kentucky and Virginia softened the language, they acted on the principle so far as to declare certain laws of the United States unconstitutional, with the additional understanding that whatever was unconstitutional was void. So far from accepting with "absolute acquiescence" the decisions of the majority, Jefferson and his followers held that freedom could be maintained only by preserving inviolate the right of every State to judge for itself what was, and what was not, lawful for a majority to decide.

What, too, was meant by the words which pledged the new Administration to preserve the general government "in its whole Constitutional vigor"? The two parties were divided by a bottomless gulf in their theories of Constitutional powers; but until the precedents established by the Federalists should be expressly reversed, no one could deny that those precedents, to be treated as acts of the majority with absolute acquiescence, were a measure of the vigor which the President pledged himself to preserve. Jefferson could not have intended such a conclusion; for how could he promise to "preserve" the powers assumed in the Alien and Sedition laws, which then represented the whole vigor of the general government in fact if not in theory, when he had himself often and bitterly denounced those powers, when he had been a party to their nullification, and when he and his friends had actually prepared to resist by arms their enforcement? Undoubtedly Jefferson meant no more than to preserve the general government in such vigor as in his opinion was Constitutional, without regard to Federalist precedents; but his words were equivocal, and unless they were to be defined by legislation, they identified him with the contrary legislation of his predecessors. In history and law they did so. Neither the Alien nor the Sedition Act, nor any other Federalist precedent, was ever declared unconstitutional by any department of the general government; and Jefferson's pledge to preserve that government in its full Constitutional vigor was actually redeemed with no exception or limitation on the precedents established. His intention seemed to be different; but the sweeping language of his pledge was never after-

ward restricted or even more exactly defined while he remained in power.

Hence arose a sense of disappointment for future students of the Inaugural Address. A revolution had taken place; but the new President seemed anxious to prove that there had been no revolution at all. A new experiment in government was to be tried, and the philosopher at its head began by pledging himself to follow in the footsteps of his predecessors. Americans ended by taking him at his word, and by assuming that there was no break of continuity between his ideas and those of President Washington; yet even at the moment of these assurances he was writing privately in an opposite sense. In his eyes the past was wrong, both in method and intention; its work must be undone and its example forgotten. His conviction of a radical difference between himself and his predecessors was expressed in the strongest language. His predecessors, in his opinion, had involved the government in difficulties in order to destroy it, and to build up a monarchy on its ruins. "The tough sides of our Argosie," he wrote two days after his inauguration,¹³ "have been thoroughly tried. Her strength has stood the waves into which she was steered with a view to sink her. We shall put her on her Republican tack, and she will now show by the beauty of her motion the skill of her builders." "The Federalists," said he at one moment,¹⁴ "wished for everything which would approach our new government to a monarchy; the Republicans, to preserve it essentially republican. . . . The real difference consisted in their different degrees of inclination to monarchy or republicanism." "The revolution of 1800," he wrote many years afterward,¹⁵ "was as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776 was in its form."

Not, therefore, in the Inaugural Address, with its amiable professions of harmony, could President Jefferson's full view of his own reforms be discovered. Judged by his inaugural addresses and annual messages, Jefferson's Administration seemed a colorless continuation of Washington's; but when seen in the light of private correspondence, the difference was complete. So strong was the new President's persuasion of the monarchical bent of his predecessors, that his joy

¹³ Jefferson to J. Dickinson, March 6, 1801; Works, iv. 365.

¹⁴ Jefferson's Works, ix. 480.

¹⁵ Jefferson to Roane, Sept. 6, 1819 Works, vii. 133.

at obtaining the government was mingled with a shade of surprise that his enemies should have handed to him, without question, the power they had so long held. He shared his fears of monarchy with politicians like William B. Giles, young John Randolph, and many Southern voters; and although neither Madison nor Gallatin seemed to think monarchists formidable, they gladly encouraged the President to pursue a conservative and conciliatory path. Jefferson and his Southern friends took power as republicans opposed to monarchists, not as democrats opposed to oligarchy. Jefferson himself was not in a social sense a democrat, and was called so only as a term of opprobrium. His Northern followers were in the main democrats; but he and most of his Southern partisans claimed to be republicans, opposed by secret monarchists.

The conflict of ideas between Southern republicanism, Northern democracy, and Federal monarchism marked much of Jefferson's writing; but especially when he began his career as President his mind was filled with the conviction that he had wrung power from monarchy, and that in this sense he was the founder of a new republic. Henceforward, as he hoped, republicanism was forever safe; he had but to conciliate the misguided, and give an example to the world, for centralization was only a monarchical principle. Nearly twenty years passed before he woke to a doubt on this subject; but even then he did not admit a mistake. In the tendency to centralization he still saw no democratic instinct, but only the influence of monarchical Federalists "under the pseudo-republican mask."¹⁶

The republic which Jefferson believed himself to be founding or securing in 1801 was an enlarged Virginia,—a society to be kept pure and free by the absence of complicated interests, by the encouragement of agriculture and of commerce as its handmaid, but not of industry in a larger sense. "The agricultural capacities of our country," he wrote long afterward,¹⁷ "constitute its distinguishing feature; and the adapting our policy and pursuits to that is more likely to make us a numerous and happy people than the mimicry of an Amsterdam, a Hamburg, or a city of London." He did not love mechanics or manufactures, or the capital without which they could

¹⁶ Jefferson to Judge Johnson, June 12, 1823; Works, vii. 295.

¹⁷ Jefferson to W. H. Crawford, June 20, 1816; Works, vii. 6.

not exist.¹⁸ "Banking establishments are more dangerous than standing armies," he said; and added, "that the principle of spending money to be paid by posterity, under the name of funding, is but swindling futurity on a large scale." Such theories were republican in the Virginia sense, but not democratic; they had nothing in common with the democracy of Pennsylvania and New England, except their love of freedom; and Virginia freedom was not the same conception as the democratic freedom of the North.

In 1801 this Virginia type was still the popular form of republicanism. Although the Northern democrat had already developed a tendency toward cities, manufactures, and "the mimicry of an Amsterdam, a Hamburg, or a city of London," while the republican of the South was distinguished by his dislike of every condition except that of agriculture, the two wings of the party had so much in common that they could afford to disregard for a time these divergencies of interest; and if the Virginians cared nothing for cities, banks, and manufactures, or if the Northern democrats troubled themselves little about the dangers of centralization, they could unite with one heart in overthrowing monarchy, and in effecting a social revolution.

Henceforward, as Jefferson conceived, government might act directly for the encouragement of agriculture and of commerce as its handmaid, for the diffusion of information and the arraignment of abuses; but there its positive functions stopped. Beyond that point only negative action remained,—respect for States' rights, preservation of constitutional powers, economy, and the maintenance of a pure and simple society such as already existed. With a political system which would not take from the mouth of labor the bread it had earned, and which should leave men free to follow whatever paths of industry or improvement they might find most profitable, "the circle of felicities" was closed.

The possibility of foreign war alone disturbed this dream. President Washington himself might have been glad to accept these ideas of domestic politics, had not France, England, and Spain shown an unequivocal wish to take advantage of American weakness in arms in order to withhold rights vital to national welfare. How did Jef-

¹⁸ Jefferson to John Taylor, May 28, 1816; Works, vi. 608.

person propose to convert a government of judiciary and police into the strongest government on earth? His answer to this question, omitted from the Inaugural Address, was to be found in his private correspondence and in the speeches of Gallatin and Madison as leaders of the opposition. He meant to prevent war. He was convinced that governments, like human beings, were on the whole controlled by their interests, and that the interests of Europe required peace and free commerce with America. Believing a union of European Powers to be impossible, he was willing to trust their jealousies of each other to secure their good treatment of the United States. Knowing that Congress could by a single act divert a stream of wealth from one European country to another, foreign Governments would hardly challenge the use of such a weapon, or long resist their own overpowering interests. The new President found in the Constitutional power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations" the machinery for doing away with navies, armies, and wars.

During eight years of opposition the Republican party had matured its doctrines on this subject. In 1797, in the midst of difficulties with France, Jefferson wrote:¹⁹—

If we weather the present storm, I hope we shall avail ourselves of the calm of peace to place our foreign connections under a new and different arrangement. We must make the interest of every nation stand surety for their justice, and their own loss to follow injury to us, as effect follows its cause. As to everything except commerce, we ought to divorce ourselves from them all.

A few months before the inauguration, he wrote in terms more general:²⁰—

The true theory of our Constitution is surely the wisest and best, that the States are independent as to everything within themselves, and united as to everything respecting foreign nations. Let the general government be reduced to foreign concerns only, and let our affairs be disentangled from those of all other nations, except as to commerce, which the merchants will manage the better the more they are left free to manage for themselves, and our general government may be reduced to a very simple organization and a very unexpensive one,—a few plain duties to be performed by a few servants.

¹⁹ Jefferson to Edward Rutledge, June 24, 1797; Works, iv. 189.

²⁰ Jefferson to Gideon Granger, Aug. 13, 1800; Works, iv. 330.

Immediately after the inauguration the new President explained his future foreign policy to correspondents, who, as he knew, would spread his views widely throughout both continents. In a famous letter to Thomas Paine,²¹—a letter which was in some respects a true inaugural address,—Jefferson told the thought he had but hinted in public. "Determined as we are to avoid, if possible, wasting the energies of our people in war and destruction, we shall avoid implicating ourselves with the Powers of Europe, even in support of principles which we mean to pursue. They have so many other interests different from ours that we must avoid being entangled in them. We believe we can enforce those principles as to ourselves by peaceable means, now that we are likely to have our public councils detached from foreign views." A few days later, he wrote to the well-known Pennsylvania peacemaker, Dr. Logan, and explained the process of enforcing against foreign nations "principles as to ourselves by peaceable means." "Our commerce," said he,²² "is so valuable to them, that they will be glad to purchase it, when the only price we ask is to do us justice. I believe we have in our own hands the means of peaceable coercion; and that the moment they see our government so united as that we can make use of it, they will for their own interest be disposed to do us justice."

To Chancellor Livingston, in September, 1801,²³ the President wrote his views of the principles which he meant to pursue: "Yet in the present state of things," he added, "they are not worth a war; nor do I believe war the most certain means of enforcing them. Those peaceable coercions which are in the power of every nation, if undertaken in concert and in time of peace, are more likely to produce the desired effect."

That these views were new as a system in government could not be denied. In later life Jefferson frequently asserted, and took pains to impress upon his friends, the difference between his opinions and those of his Federalist opponents. The radical distinction lay in their opposite conceptions of the national government. The Federalists wished to extend its functions; Jefferson wished to exclude its influence from domestic affairs:—

²¹ Jefferson to Thomas Paine, March 18, 1801; Works, iv. 370.

²² Jefferson's Writings (Ford), viii. 23.

²³ Jefferson to R. R. Livingston, Sept. 9, 1801; Works, iv. 408.

"The people," he declared in 1821,²⁴ "to whom all authority belongs, have divided the powers of government into two distinct departments, the leading characters of which are foreign and domestic; and they have appointed for each a distinct set of functionaries. These they have made co-ordinate, checking and balancing each other, like the three cardinal departments in the individual States,—each equally supreme as to the powers delegated to itself, and neither authorized ultimately to decide what belongs to itself or to its copartner in government. As independent, in fact, as different nations, a spirit of forbearance and compromise, therefore, and not of encroachment and usurpation, is the healing balm of such a Constitution."

In the year 1824 Jefferson still maintained the same doctrine, and expressed it more concisely than ever:—

The federal is in truth our foreign government, which department alone is taken from the sovereignty of the separate States.²⁵ . . . I recollect no case where a question simply between citizens of the same State has been transferred to the foreign department, except that of inhibiting tenders but of metallic money, and *ex post facto* legislation.²⁶

These expressions, taken together, partly explain why Jefferson thought his assumption of power to be "as real a revolution in the principles of our government as that of 1776 was in its form." His view of governmental functions was simple and clearly expressed. The national government, as he conceived it, was a foreign department as independent from the domestic department, which belonged to the States, as though they were governments of different nations. He intended that the general government should "be reduced to foreign concerns only;" and his theory of foreign concerns was equally simple and clear. He meant to enforce against foreign nations such principles as national objects required, not by war, but by "peaceable coercion" through commercial restrictions. "Our commerce is so valuable to them that they will be glad to purchase it, when the only price we ask is to do us justice."

The history of his Administration will show how these principles were applied, and what success attended the experiment.

²⁴ Jefferson to Judge Roane, June 27, 1821; Works, vii. 212.

²⁵ Jefferson to Robert J. Garnett, Feb. 14, 1824; Works, vii. 336.

²⁶ Jefferson to Edward Livingston, April 4, 1824; Works, vii. 342.

WARREN H. GOODMAN

THE AMERICAN declaration of war in 1812 does not have many defenders among historians. None would dispute that the country was militarily unprepared, and harshly divided on the issue of the necessity of fighting. That the war was conducted with ineptness, that the peace treaty could scarcely be construed as a victory, are generalizations to which few would take exception.

Whatever controversy exists among scholars pertains largely to its causes. Indeed, the analysis of the causative factors in history almost inevitably calls forth disagreement. These disputes have many facets. Perhaps the fundamental one divides writers who are committed to a comprehensive philosophy of history from those who try to view each problem independently. Historians of the first group are apt to stress a single causative element—economic, political, social, or ideological. Most American historians, however, belong to the latter category; they assert that the origins of major historical events are usually diverse. Yet this belief does not preclude lively disagreement concerning the relative importance of each of several causes. Nor does a common acceptance of the theory of multiple causations prevent historians, in practice, from ascribing specific episodes to a single set of circumstances.

Although the War of 1812 was a relatively minor conflict, the study of its beginnings seems to attract increasing attention. The basic dispute divides historians into two coalitions. The traditional view, customarily associated with Henry Adams,

emphasizes national resentment of British policies on the high seas during the Napoleonic Wars. America's resort to arms was preceded by years of diplomatic protests to both Great Britain and France for their violations of what the United States considered to be its rights as a neutral. Congress finally declared war on Great Britain rather than France because the former had been guilty of the impressment of American seamen as well as of the ship seizures and confiscation of cargoes in which both belligerents had indulged.

The alternative explanation of America's action calls attention to disputes centering in the west. However, this group has within it a schism perhaps deeper than the one separating the school as a whole from the advocates of the maritime approach. One faction thinks that British agitation among the Indians, leading to attacks upon American settlers, was responsible for the war. Another fastens upon the view, much less complimentary to our national character, that the conflict resulted from an expansionist urge which beckoned our western settlers toward Canada. Thus, the war was undertaken for offensive rather than defensive reasons, the crucial element being "western land hunger."

In his article "The Origins of the War of 1812," Warren Goodman traces the evolution of this historiographic controversy with patience and perception. His analysis reveals much not only about patterns of historical thought but also about the War of 1812.

The Origins of the War of 1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations

THE CONCLUSION that the War of 1812 was essentially a struggle for the protection of national honor and neutral maritime rights was generally accepted throughout the nineteenth century. At the turn of the century, the advent of critical scholarship revealed the inadequacy of this explanation, and it was corrected by the addition of non-maritime factors as contributing causes. Lately the tendency has been to stress these non-maritime elements and to relegate British aggressions on the sea to a position of minor importance. One can no longer doubt that nineteenth century writers overestimated the significance of maritime matters, but contemporary historians are perhaps committing an equally serious error in the opposite direction.

James Madison, in his war message of June 1, 1812, argued that a declaration of war was forced upon the United States by the British practices of violating the American flag on the high seas, harassing the Atlantic coast, seizing American seamen, and plundering the commerce of neutrals with paper blockades as a pretext for legalization of the procedure.¹ This set the keynote and nineteenth century historians almost unanimously took up the tune; the maritime rights interpretation became the dogma of the century.²

From *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXVIII (1941), 171-186, by permission of the editor of the journal and of the author.

¹ James D. Richardson, ed., *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897* (Washington, 1899), I, 499-505.

² Members of Congress who had voted for the war used virtually the same arguments to justify their actions to their constituents. Israel Pickens' circular letter to the voters of Burke County, North Carolina, was typical. "A Political Broadside of the War of 1812," *North Carolina Historical and Genealogical Record* (Forest

Although Madison emphasized maritime matters, he did not base his arguments exclusively on them. He clearly insinuated that the British were responsible for "the warfare just renewed by the savages on one of our extensive frontiers."⁸ Many writers seem to have overlooked Madison's reference to the Indian problem. Those nineteenth century historians who did take cognizance of this factor considered it to be a minor matter, definitely subsidiary to the problem of neutral rights.⁴

The declaration of war was adopted by the House of Representatives on June 4, 1812 by a sharply sectional vote. New York, New Jersey, and New England cast only seventeen votes in favor of

City, N. C.), I, 1932, pp. 8-9. One early writer's treatment of the causes of the War of 1812 consisted entirely of a summary of Madison's message. John L. Thomson, *Historical Sketches of the Late War Between the United States and Great Britain* (Philadelphia, 1817), 13-17. The apologist for the Hartford Convention was also content with a strictly maritime interpretation. Theodore Dwight, *History of the Hartford Convention with a Review of the Policy of the United States Government Which Led to the War of 1812* (New York, 1833), 228 *et passim*. See also Henry M. Brackenridge, *History of the Late War Between the United States and Great Britain* (Baltimore, 1818), xiii-xx.

The first writer to recognize that the West enthusiastically supported the war explained that fact on the basis of the superior patriotism of that area. Joel Tyler Headley, *The Second War with England* (New York, 1853), I, 23-66. The first historian to emphasize the importance of the conquest of Canada as a war aim spoke of it as a method of carrying on the war—not as a contributing cause of it. Richard Hildreth, *History of the United States of America* (New York, 1880), VI, 313-314. Von Holst also subscribed to the maritime rights interpretation. Hermann von Holst, *The Constitutional and Political History of the United States* (Chicago, 1889), I, 225-232. Theodore Roosevelt was more interested in the naval events of the war, as an illustration of the dangers of unpreparedness, than he was in discovering its causes. He dealt with the maritime causes in a few pages and then proceeded to the main topic of his book, the sea battles of the war. Theodore Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812* (New York, 1901), 1-6.

See also Rossiter Johnson, *History of the War of 1812-15* (New York, 1882), 37, 24; James Schouler, *History of the United States of America* (Washington and New York, 1880-1913), II, 340, 353-357; and Nicholas Murray Butler, "The Effect of the War of 1812 upon the Consolidation of the Union," *Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science* (Baltimore), V, 1887, pp. 247-276.

⁸ Richardson, *Messages and Papers*, I, 503-504.

⁴ Among those who ignored the Indian factor were H. von Holst, *Constitutional History*, I, 225-232; Roosevelt, *Naval War*, 6; John Bach McMaster, *A History of the People of the United States* (New York, 1882-1913), III, 456-457; Alfred Thayer Mahan, *Sea Power in Its Relations to the War of 1812* (Boston, 1905), I, 2; Henry W. Elson, *History of the United States of America* (New York, 1905), III, 8-8.

the measure and thirty-five against it; the rest of the country mustered sixty-two votes for war and only fourteen for peace.⁵ At first, historians took no notice of the sectional character of the division.⁶ Towards the middle of the century, when writers began to realize that support for the war had come mainly from the West and South, they usually explained the phenomenon by asserting that those sections were more patriotic and more sensitive to insults to the national honor than the older sections of the country.⁷ This allegation no historian ever attempted to test.

Henry Adams seems to have been the first to recognize that an interpretation of the causes of the War of 1812 almost exclusively on the basis of maritime matters was an oversimplification and, consequently, a distortion. His own treatment of the subject was rather a modified acceptance of the orthodox thesis than an abandonment of it. He was sufficiently influenced by the traditional interpretation to declare that, had Great Britain revoked the Orders in Council in March 1812, "no war could have taken place, unless it were a war with France." However, Adams was the first to imply that the plan for the conquest of Canada had been a contributing cause of the war rather than a method of carrying on a struggle undertaken for other reasons.⁸

The two decades following the publication of Adams's work form a period of confusion in the history of the interpretation of the War of 1812. The maritime rights interpretation remained the conventional doctrine, but it was modified by intimations in some cases that the War Hawks had entertained aggressive designs upon Canada, and the sectional character of the war party was generally recognized.⁹ The main fruit of Adams's efforts was a feeling of insecurity on the part of those historians who took their stand on

⁵ *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 1811-12, p. 1637.

⁶ Thomson, *Historical Sketches*, 13-17; Dwight, *Hartford Convention*, *passim*.

⁷ Headley, *Second War*, I, 66; Hildreth, *History of the United States*, VI, 318.

⁸ Henry Adams, *History of the United States* (New York, 1891-1898), VI, 116-118, 123, 140, 189. Adams's work was first published in 1890. See also Francis A. Walker, *The Making of the Nation, 1783-1817* (New York, 1895), 222-226.

⁹ McMaster, *History of the People of the United States*, III, 430, 450-458; Woodrow Wilson, *A History of the American People* (New York, 1902), III, 212-218; Kendrick C. Babcock, *The Rise of American Nationality* (*American Nation Series*, XIII, New York, 1906), 50-71. Babcock leaned heavily on Henry Adams's work.

the maritime rights interpretation. As the writer of one general history published during this period remarked, "The grounds of the war were singularly uncertain."¹⁰

In 1911 historians came to a fork in the hitherto single road to an understanding of the causes of the War of 1812. Howard T. Lewis set out in a direction which had not been travelled before when he declared that the war had been fought mainly because the West coveted the agricultural land reserves of Canada.¹¹ Almost simultaneously D. R. Anderson broke ground for a second divergent route by presenting an interpretation which emphasized the West's belief that the Indian problem could be solved only by ousting the British from North America.¹²

At first few writers followed the trail-blazers; the majority continued to accept the maritime rights interpretation—modified by Henry Adams's work and further affected by the existence of the new routes opened by Lewis and Anderson.¹³ Later the main road was almost completely abandoned.¹⁴

Lewis pointed out that the maritime rights thesis failed to explain why the West should have been eager for war. He sought the reason for the bellicose attitude of that section, and came to the conclusion that the key to the situation was to be found in the "imperative demand for more territory into which the western

¹⁰ Wilson, *History of the American People*, III, 212.

¹¹ Howard T. Lewis, "A Re-analysis of the Causes of the War of 1812," *Americana*, New York, VI, 1911, pp. 506-516, 577-585 (hereinafter cited as Lewis, "Re-analysis").

¹² D. R. Anderson, "The Insurgents of 1811," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association, 1911* (Washington, 1913), I, 165-176 (hereinafter cited as Anderson, "Insurgents of 1811").

¹³ John Spencer Bassett, *A Short History of the United States* (New York, 1920), 315-321; Claude H. Van Tyne, "Why Did We Fight in 1812? The Causes and Significance of Our Last War With Great Britain," *Independent* (New York), LXXIV, 1913, pp. 1327-1331; Ralph D. Paine, *The Fight for a Free Sea* (*Chronicles of America*, XVII, New Haven, 1920), 2-4; David S. Muzzey, *The United States of America* (New York, 1922), I, 249-255; Harry Elmer Barnes, "The Second War for Independence," *American Mercury* (New York), IV, 1925, pp. 469-475.

¹⁴ Since 1932 only one general history and one popularized work have presented interpretations which can be classed as maritime rights explanations: Homer C. Hockett, *Political and Social Growth of the United States, 1492-1852* (New York, 1936), 392-400 (this work first appeared in 1933); and Fletcher Pratt, *The Heroic Years: Fourteen Years of the Republic, 1801-1815* (New York, 1934), *passim*.

immigrant might go and still be within the jurisdiction of the U. S."¹⁵

For over a decade, Lewis trod the land-hunger road alone. He was finally joined by Louis M. Hacker, who gave the thesis its most complete and best-documented presentation. Hacker's arguments were virtually the same as those of Lewis; his conclusions were practically identical.¹⁶

Hacker pointed out that the agrarian West had little reason for insisting upon the maintenance of a free sea. Its economy, he said, was unaffected by events on the high seas. Hacker labeled "untenable" what he called the "contention that the rural west, transcending material ends, aroused the American people to war because of national honor." There seemed to him to be neither an economic nor a patriotic connection between what Great Britain was doing on the ocean and the war spirit of the West. He started off on a new tack by adopting the working hypothesis "that the west as a sectional unit desired war for reasons peculiarly its own."¹⁷

Hacker examined the thesis "that it was the threat of a general Indian uprising coupled with British connivance from Canada that impelled the west into the war." He concluded that "the west could not have regarded the Indians with quite so much terror as it has sometimes been said to have done."¹⁸ He saw the true key to the western attitude in the desire for the conquest of Canada, chiefly "because Canada stood for great reserves of agricultural land."¹⁹

The West, Hacker argued, used agricultural methods which approached the primitive. Wasteful land practices made it impossible

¹⁵ Lewis, "Re-analysis," 511. Limitations of space prevent an examination of Lewis's reasoning here, but it may be said that his article fell far short of a definitive presentation of the land-hunger thesis.

¹⁶ Louis M. Hacker, "Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812: A Conjecture," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, X, 1924, pp. 365-395 (hereinafter cited as Hacker, "Land Hunger"). In a recent conversation with this writer, Professor Hacker said that he had come to his conclusions independently, never having seen nor heard of the article by Lewis.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 365-366.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 372, 374.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 366. Hacker's thesis, particularly his contention that the Indian problem was unimportant, has been vigorously assailed; see Julius W. Pratt, "Western Aims in the War of 1812," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XII, 1925, pp. 36-50 (hereinafter cited as Pratt, "Western Aims").

for the farmer to succeed, except on virgin soil. Therefore more and more land was needed. Hacker did not overlook (as had Lewis) the fact that a large portion of the United States was unsettled in 1812. He disposed of this objection to his contention that more land was sought by pointing out that, in 1812, the western prairies were considered to be unfit for cultivation. Thus Canada seemed to contain the only useful unsettled land.²⁰

Much of Hacker's reasoning was based upon the assumption that the War of 1812 was "advocated and fought by a section of the country that had no contact with or interest in the things of the sea." He confidently asserted that the West, "long before the call to arms, had decided upon its war, for reasons which it alone understood. That the rest of the country was openly hostile was of no moment."²¹

It cannot be denied that the War of 1812 was less popular in New York and New England than in the newer sections of the country. However, to consider the struggle solely a project of the West is laboring the point. That section alone could not have mustered the 79 votes cast in the House of Representatives in favor of the declaration of war; that section alone would have found it even more difficult to pass the measure through the Senate. Granted that Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, and South Carolina voted unanimously for war,²² granted that Connecticut and Rhode Island

²⁰ Hacker, "Land Hunger," 368-372, 388-395. Pratt has pointed out that the frontier line of settlement had not, in 1812, reached the prairies. There was still a large reserve of unsettled wooded land within the borders of the United States. "Western Aims," 48-50. See also Charles O. Paullin, *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States*, ed. by John K. Wright (Washington, 1932), plates 57 and 76; and Walter Prescott Webb, *The Great Plains* (Boston, 1931), map between pp. 4 and 5.

²¹ Hacker, "Land Hunger," 366, 395.

²² The importance of this fact has been exaggerated by maps of the distribution of the vote which attempt to show the division by coloring the constituencies of the members of the House according to the way they voted (e.g., green for affirmative and red for negative). On such maps Ohio, colored a solid green, seems to be almost as important as Pennsylvania, similarly colored (except for the Philadelphia area) and but slightly larger. However Ohio cast but 1 vote for war; Pennsylvania contributed 16. This distortion works uniformly to overemphasize the significance of the West, where constituencies were much larger in area than those in the East and South. See Paullin, *Atlas of Historical Geography*, plate 113; and Samuel F. Bemis, *A Diplomatic History of the United States* (New York, 1938), 157.

cast no votes for the war, the following features of the division in the House of Representatives should also be noted:

(1) The division in Massachusetts was only 8 to 6 against a declaration of war—and 5 of the 6 affirmative votes come from representatives of coastal areas.

(2) New Hampshire cast 3 of its 5 votes in favor of war, and Vermont 3 of its 4. In the latter state the lone vote for peace was cast by the member from the northwesternmost part of the state.

(3) Pennsylvania, only half of which could be included in any definition of the West (as of 1812), cast 16 of its 18 votes for war.

(4) Maryland, hardly to be classed as a western state, favored the war 6 to 3.

(5) All the representatives from coastal Virginia and North Carolina voted for war. All the opposition to the measure in those states came from the central portions.²³

Another fact casts doubt upon the statement that the West alone understood the reasons for war. Hacker said that "With the meeting of the twelfth congress in 1811 the demand for the invasion and acquisition of Canada spread and grew until the whole Ohio valley reverberated with the idea."²⁴ But the conquest of Canada was widely discussed and openly advocated in the South as early as the summer of 1807.²⁵ Thus it would seem that the South not only understood the aims of the war, but expressed them before the West did.

This does not rule out the possibility that the West, although neither the first nor the only section to desire war, furnished the

This distortion can be avoided by representing each vote by a dot in the center of the proper constituency. The numerous, although small, constituencies of the East and South then show up more clearly. For a map constructed on this principle see Warren H. Goodman, "The Origins of the War of 1812: A Critical Examination of Historical Interpretations," (Unpublished Master's Thesis in Duke University Library), 1.

²³ *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 1811-12, p. 1697; *Biographical Directory of the American Congress, 1774-1927* (Washington, 1928), *passim*.

²⁴ Hacker, "Land Hunger," 375.

²⁵ On July 4, 1807, Richmond drank the toast: "The memory of Gen. Montgomery; Who nobly perished under the walls of Quebec. Equal glory and better fortune to those Heroes, who may soon have to follow his footsteps." *Richmond Enquirer*, July 7, 1807. One editor went so far as to present a detailed plan for military operations against Canada. *Ibid.*, July 24, 1807. See also *ibid.*, July 31 and August 7, 1807; *Raleigh Minerva*, September 3, 1807; and *Virginia Argus* (Richmond), August 12, 1807.

necessary leadership and agitation to carry the day. But that is a far cry from Hacker's declaration that "the rest of the country was openly hostile."

Hacker's arguments to prove that the Indian problem was unimportant to the West and that the desire for land was the true cause of the War of 1812 have been ably criticized elsewhere²⁶ and need not be dealt with here. It is sufficient to note that he was unable to cite specific statements by proponents of the war that the conquest of Canada to get more land was to be the aim. He was forced to rest his case mainly upon the testimony of John Randolph, an inconsistent and unreliable witness.²⁷

A few recent histories deal with the desire for land as a contributing cause of the War of 1812,²⁸ but Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry Commager are unique among modern writers for their unqualified acceptance of the land-hunger interpretation.²⁹ On the whole, the land-hunger route surveyed by Lewis and roughly paved by Hacker is an unused by-path.

The road which D. R. Anderson opened in 1911 has borne a heavier traffic. Anderson also started with the assertion that the West was aroused neither by patriotic considerations nor by any interest it had in the effects of British Orders in Council. The main concern of the West, he said, was "the extension of territories for settlement." However—and here Anderson's reasoning diverges from that of the land-hunger interpretation—it was only in the light of its effect upon the Indian problem that he considered western expansionism significant. The British were to be warred upon because the Indian stood in the way of the advancing frontier and the British stood behind the Indian—not because the British themselves possessed lands which the West coveted.³⁰

Although he emphasized the influence of the West, Anderson did not ignore the support which the war received in the South.

²⁶ Pratt, "Western Aims."

²⁷ In December 1811, Calhoun said of Randolph, "the gentleman from Virginia attributes preparation for war to everything but its true cause." *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 1811-12, p. 482.

²⁸ Bassett, *Short History*, 318; Muzzey, *United States*, I, 255; Hockett, *Political and Social Growth*, 398.

²⁹ Samuel Eliot Morison and Henry S. Commager, *The Growth of the American Republic* (New York, 1937), I, 307-310.

³⁰ Anderson, "Insurgents of 1811," 170-171.

He explained that section's attitude on the basis of its imperialistic desire for the Floridas.⁸¹ Three other writers soon followed Anderson's lead in emphasizing the Indian problem as the determining factor in the attitude of the West.⁸² Edward Channing, the only one of the three to deal with the aims of the South as well as with those of the West, introduced a factor which Anderson had not mentioned. He implied that each section was opposed to the aims of the other; the South wanted the Floridas and "thought that the conquest of Canada would obviate some Northern opposition to this acquisition of slave territory."⁸³

The interpretations set forth by Anderson and Channing were more fully developed in Julius W. Pratt's detailed study of the aims of the War Hawks. Pratt's conclusions were, in brief:

The rise of Tecumseh, backed, as was universally believed, by the British, produced an urgent demand in the Northwest that the British be expelled from Canada.

The South was almost unanimous in its demand for the Floridas, for agrarian, commercial, and strategic reasons. . . .

There is good evidence that, before the declaration of war, northern and southern Republicans came to a definite understanding that the acquisition of Canada on the north was to be balanced by the annexation of the Floridas on the south.⁸⁴

The desire of the West to drive the British from Canada as a solution to the Indian problem and the South's yearning for Florida have been generally accepted as contributing causes of the War of 1812 since the appearance of Anderson's monograph.⁸⁵ Since the

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 171.

⁸² Edward Channing, *A History of the United States* (New York, 1916-1925), IV, 442-443, 456; Christopher B. Coleman, "The Ohio Valley in the Preliminaries of the War of 1812," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, VII, 1920, pp. 39-50; John F. Cady, "Western Opinion and the War of 1812," *Ohio Archaeological and Historical Quarterly* (Columbus), XXXIII, 1924, pp. 427-476.

⁸³ Channing, *History of the United States*, IV, 456.

⁸⁴ Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812* (New York, 1925), 12-13. Pratt also concluded that the expansionism of 1812 was the first general appearance of what has come to be known as manifest destiny, and that sectional antagonism was in large part responsible for the breakdown of the plans of the expansionists. *Ibid.*, 13-14.

⁸⁵ Bassett, *Short History*, 318-321; Paine, *Fight for a Free Sea*, 3-4; Muzzey, *United States*, I, 255; James Truslow Adams, *The Epic of America* (Boston, 1931), 142-143; Hockett, *Political and Social Growth*, 393-394.

publication of Pratt's work, these two factors have often been cited as the main causes of the conflict.³⁶

The widespread acceptance of Pratt's conclusions has obscured the fact that the work, to use his own words, "makes no effort to give a full account of the causes of the War of 1812, but deals with one set of causes only."³⁷ Granting the tenability of Pratt's conclusions in their entirety, the quest for a well-integrated presentation of the causes of the war is not ended. A long step in the right direction has been made, but the task of fitting Pratt's "one set of causes" into the whole picture remains to be done.

Moreover, some exception must be taken to certain parts of Pratt's thesis. One cannot deny that the belief that Canada would some day become a part of the United States "had a continuous existence from the early days of the War of Independence to the War of 1812." Nor can one doubt that by June 1812 the demand for Canada was urgent and open. Concerning the date when annexation ceased to be only "a matter for an indefinite future"³⁸ there is more room for argument. The question of when the change occurred is a matter of extreme importance because if it antedated the rise of Tecumseh the contention that his activities caused it becomes untenable.³⁹

Pratt's examination of the western press for the years 1807 and 1808 yielded "no evidence of any articulate desire to conquer Canada."⁴⁰ If the West had no aggressive plans at that time, the fact that the South was already planning an offensive against Canada

³⁶ Charles and Mary Beard, *The Rise of American Civilization* (New York, 1931), I, 409-414; Harry J. Carman and Samuel McKee, *A History of the United States* (New York, 1931), I, 491; Bemis, *Diplomatic History*, 156; James M. Callahan, *American Foreign Policy in Canadian Relations* (New York, 1937), 46, 61.

³⁷ Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*, 14.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 12.

³⁹ Although he emphasized it strongly, Pratt did not ascribe the change exclusively to this one factor. "The change was doubtless due to various causes—perhaps most of all to sheer exasperation at the long continued dilatory fashion of handling the nation's foreign affairs." *Expansionists of 1812*, 42. This statement has been too often overlooked by those who have, on the basis of Pratt's research, stressed the Indian problem, notably those writers cited in footnote 36 above.

⁴⁰ "This is true, at least, if the Democratic press of Kentucky is representative of opinion in the western country." *Expansionists of 1812*, 29-30. Members of Congress were more interested in the Indian problem than their constituents. "But that they thought of the conquest of Canada as a practicable remedy for the evil, there seems to be no evidence." *Ibid.*, 28.

in the summer of 1807 is significant.⁴¹ It leads one to doubt the validity of the contention that the South was reluctant to see the North increase its territory and population.

Pratt asserted that as early as 1812 the beginnings of the North-South sectional cleavage were evident. This cannot be denied. But the assertion that the antagonism was already strong enough to cause each section to oppose the expansion of the other involves the assumption that it transcended all other considerations. Before one can grant that Felix Grundy, for example, was opposed to the annexation of Canada, it would have to be proved that the sectional issue was more important to him than any of the other factors which might have influenced his attitude, such as his conviction that the Indians were a serious menace, his desire to retaliate against British maritime aggressions, his belief in the ideal of manifest destiny, and his share in the anti-British heritage of the American Revolution.

Only on the issue of reapportionment, where nothing but the sectional issue was at stake, was Pratt able to show that "a solid North faced a solid South."⁴² An examination of five Virginia and North Carolina newspapers⁴³ failed to show any strong objections from that quarter to the annexation of Canada. Attacks upon the plans to invade Canada can be found in the Federalist press,⁴⁴ but they can safely be regarded as expressions of minority opinion. The general tone of the papers examined was favorable to an attack on Canada; in fact, more interest was shown in that area than in the Floridas.

If one does not grant that each section was opposed to the aims

⁴¹ See footnote 25 above. It should be noted that in the South the conquest of Canada was usually advocated as a means of retaliating against British maritime aggressions (notably the attack on the *Chesapeake*) rather than as a solution to the Indian problem.

⁴² Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*, 137.

⁴³ Raleigh *Minerva*, 1807, 1808, 1812; Raleigh *Star*, 1809, 1810, 1812; Richmond *Enquirer*, 1807-1812; *Virginia Argus* (Richmond), 1807-1810, 1812; and *Virginia Patriot* (Richmond), 1809-1811. Pratt's bibliography contains no southern newspapers for the period prior to 1812. He used but three southern papers, and those only for the years 1812 and (in one of the three cases) 1813. *Expansionists of 1812*, 282-284.

⁴⁴ *Virginia Patriot*, April 27, and December 7, 1810; Raleigh *Minerva*, May 1, 1812.

of the other (and therefore a bargain between them was a prerequisite to a declaration of war), Pratt's evidence that a sectional bargain existed seems circumstantial. His belief that such an agreement was necessary, plus the fact that war *was* declared, was half the proof.⁴⁵

Pratt's interpretation of the attitude of the Northwest is more valid than his explanation of the aims of the South, but it too needs qualification. He was able to quote from speeches by Peter Porter, Felix Grundy, John Rhea, R. M. Johnson, and John Harper to support his assertion that in the House debate on the report of the foreign relations committee (November 29, 1811), "the war party frankly revealed their designs upon Canada."⁴⁶

All five of these men spoke of the conquest of Canada as desirable; the reasons they gave for favoring such a course are worth noting. Porter pointed out that the British possessions in North America were "immensely valuable in themselves" and that, were they obtained; "we should be able in a short time to remunerate ourselves tenfold for all the spoliations she had committed on our commerce." The Indian problem did not enter into Porter's argument.⁴⁷

Grundy, said Pratt, "dwelt upon the peculiar advantage to the Westerner to be derived from war." He quoted Grundy as saying: "We shall drive the British from our Continent—they will no longer have an opportunity of intriguing with our Indian neighbors. . . . That nation will lose her Canadian trade, and, by having no resting place in this country, her means of annoying us will be diminished."⁴⁸ The quotation is accurate, but it does not represent the dominant tone of Grundy's speech. Grundy declared that the "true question in controversy" between the United States and Great Britain "is the right of exporting the productions of our own soil and industry to foreign markets."⁴⁹

Pratt said that "Rhea of Tennessee was equally explicit upon the object of the war," and quoted him as saying that the prevention

⁴⁵ Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*, 140-152.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 50-52.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 50-51.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, 51.

⁴⁹ *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 1811-12, p. 424.

of British instigation of the Indians of the Northwest was the aim.⁵⁰ But an examination of Rhea's speech reveals that he did not speak of *an object* of the war; he listed a *number of objects* and placed no special emphasis on the Indian problem. He saw, as war aims, recovering impressed seamen "from British slavery," indemnity for property "wrongfully captured and condemned," a guarantee against impressments and seizures in the future, cessation of British measures designed to excite the Indians, and a desire to "secure and irrevocably fix that grand maritime principle, 'that free ships shall make free persons and free goods.'" ⁵¹

Johnson and Harper were less definite concerning the advantages to be gained from the conquest of Canada; as Pratt put it, they "expounded the doctrine of Manifest Destiny."⁵²

Pratt had sufficient proof for the contention that the West was vitally interested in the Indian problem and that some frontiersmen saw the expulsion of the British from Canada as the only solution. But the conclusion that the desire to settle the Indian question was the "overmastering" concern of the Northwest⁵³ was not justified by the evidence presented.

Recent historians have been much perturbed by the paradox of western support for the ostensibly commercial War of 1812. As Pratt stated: "If the real grievances which caused the war were interference by Great Britain with American commerce and the rights of American sailors, why was war to redress those grievances opposed by the maritime section of the nation and urged by the inland section, which they scarcely affected?"⁵⁴ Most recent writers have sought to resolve this paradox by finding reasons other than the actions of Great Britain on the seas to explain the western desire for war.⁵⁵ They have assumed, as did Pratt, that the West was "scarcely affected" by British policies; they have assumed that the West "was farthest removed from the scene of injury; its economic integrity was untouched because it was still in the early

⁵⁰ Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*, 51-52.

⁵¹ *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 1811-12, pp. 639-640.

⁵² Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*, 52.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 58-59.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

⁵⁵ Anderson, Lewis, Channing, Coleman, Cady, Hacker, and Pratt have already been cited.

stages of an agricultural society and it had therefore little to gain by the establishment of a free sea."⁵⁶

George Rogers Taylor has questioned the validity of this assumption. He has shown that the British orders and French decrees caused a contraction of the market for western staples and, consequently, a decline in prices and an economic depression. The westerner believed his economic hardship could be alleviated by forcing the repeal of the British Orders in Council—for they were usually blamed, rather than the French decrees—and thus supported Jefferson's policy of peaceful coercion. When embargoes and non-intercourse failed, "the hopeful settlers of earlier years became the War Hawks" of 1812.⁵⁷

Although but few historians have taken this factor into account,⁵⁸ there seems to be abundant evidence to show that the West was deeply concerned about the effect of British actions upon its foreign market. Although Taylor did not deal with the attitude of the South, that section seems to have been similarly concerned.

Grundy's declaration that "the right of exporting the productions of our own soil and industry to foreign markets"⁵⁹ was the real issue has already been noted. Calhoun told the House that farmers saw "in the low price of the produce, the hand of foreign injustice."⁶⁰ William Bibb of Georgia pointed out the interdependence of agriculture and commerce: "The annual surplus products of the planter and farmer are the foundation of commerce,

⁵⁶ Hacker, "Land Hunger," 365. Said Anderson: "The westerners seemed not deeply concerned about orders in council. . . ." "Insurgents of 1811," 170. See also Lewis, "Re-analysis," 507.

⁵⁷ George Rogers Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of 1812," *Journal of Political Economy* (Chicago), XXXIX, 1931, pp. 471-505 (hereinafter cited as Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent"). See also the same writer's "Prices in the Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of 1812," *Journal of Economic and Business History* (Cambridge, Mass.), III, 1930, pp. 148-163.

⁵⁸ "The West in the War of 1812 can better be understood as a section thwarted in its struggle for satisfactory markets and lodging the blame for failure against Great Britain, rather than as a region bent on expansion or drunk with patriotism." Avery O. Craven, "The Advance of Civilization into the Middle West in the Period of Settlement," in Dixon Ryan Fox, ed., *Sources of Culture in the Middle West* (New York, 1934), 48. See also Harold U. Faulkner, *American Political and Social History* (New York, 1937), 167; and Thomas A. Bailey, *A Diplomatic History of the American People* (New York, 1940), 132.

⁵⁹ *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 1811-12, p. 424.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 482.

and their value depends on the demand for them and the facility with which they may be conveyed to market."⁶¹ Nathaniel Macon of North Carolina told the House, "We must either prepare to maintain the right to carry our produce to what market we please, or to be content without a market."⁶²

Although Taylor saw the explanation of the attitude of the West in the effect of British Orders in Council, his thesis can hardly be classed as a maritime rights interpretation. The contention that the West was activated by considerations of patriotism was basic to the latter; Taylor insisted that economic self-interest most strongly influenced the mind of the frontiersman. Taylor's conclusions, like those of Pratt, must be considered in the light of his own statement that he was dealing with but one set of causes and that "factors other than those emphasized in this study undoubtedly played a part in bringing on the war."⁶³ His article is chiefly valuable as a criticism of the recent neglect of maritime events—a neglect based on the assumption that the bellicose West was not interested in what happened on the seas.

The foregoing survey of the literature on the causes of the War of 1812 demonstrates the need for a comprehensive work on the subject. The only histories of the war are those which appeared in the nineteenth century; their emphasis on military events rather than on the causes of the conflict and their defective scholarship render them entirely inadequate. In this century, only monographs on restricted phases of the topic have appeared; no recent writer has attempted to correlate and synthesize the various sets of causes.

Such a synthesis would necessarily entail a complete reexamination of the sources. An attempt to understand the War of 1812 by combining the conclusions of the various monographs would yield

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 977.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 493. Taylor quoted Governor W. C. C. Claiborne of Louisiana, Samuel McKee of Kentucky, Henry Clay, and many western editors on this point. "Agrarian Discontent," 499-503. See also remarks of the following men: Peter Porter of New York, Robert Wright of Maryland, Jonathan Roberts of Pennsylvania, William King of North Carolina, Israel Pickens of North Carolina, David R. Williams of South Carolina, and Langdon Cheves of South Carolina. *Annals of Congress*, 12 Cong., 1 Sess., 1811-12, pp. 414, 470-471, 503, 517-518, 647, 686, 805-806.

⁶³ Taylor specifically accepted Pratt's conclusions. Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent," 504.

only a list of contributing causes, with no indication as to the relative importance of the several factors. Such a list would include: the desire to defend the national honor; the hunger for agricultural land; the belief that the Indian problem could be settled only by removing the British from the continent; the competition between Americans and Canadians for the fur trade of the Northwest;⁶⁴ the South's lust for the Floridas; Anglophobia;⁶⁵ the anti-English propaganda activities of political exiles from England and Ireland;⁶⁶ the desire to end Spanish interference with the export trade of Mississippi and Alabama;⁶⁷ the ideal of manifest destiny; the desire to foster domestic manufacturing by excluding British products;⁶⁸ and the West's desire to improve its economic condition by forcing the repeal of the British Orders in Council.

The foregoing survey hardly explains the genesis of the War of 1812. Thus, until a definitive study of the sources is made, historians will have to be content with Wilson's statement that "The grounds of the war were singularly uncertain."

⁶⁴ Hacker, "Land Hunger," 386-387; Pratt, "Western Aims," 46; Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*, 58; Bailey, *Diplomatic History*, 133.

⁶⁵ Dwight, *Hartford Convention*, 228-229; Hildreth, *History of the United States*, VI, 315-316; Babcock, *Rise of American Nationality*, 51-52; Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent," 504; Bailey, *Diplomatic History*, 138.

⁶⁶ Hildreth, *History of the United States*, VI, 316-317; Lewis, "Re-analysis," 509.

⁶⁷ Taylor, "Agrarian Discontent," 504; Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812*, 64-66.

⁶⁸ Hildreth, *History of the United States*, VI, 318; Lewis, "Re-analysis," 510.

PART III

NATIONALISM AND
DEMOCRACY

FREDERICK JACKSON TURNER

IF THE IMPORTANCE of a writing is to be judged by the discussion and controversy it provokes, few would question the pre-eminence of Frederick Jackson Turner's essay on the American frontier. Delivered in 1893 as an address to a meeting of the American Historical Association, it continues today both to inspire enthusiastic admirers and to exasperate a furious opposition.

The war of articles and monographs touched off by the essay had its origin in the historical interpretations prevailing at the time of Turner's presentation. In search of an explanation for America's political growth, the resourcefulness of its citizens, and the excellence of its democratic institutions, historians of the period believed they had found a large part of the answer in lineal concepts which emphasized the peculiar genius of the Anglo-Saxon peoples for governmental and social organization. Projecting the theory back many centuries, they sought to explain the origin of American democracy in the practices of ancient Germanic tribes.

Born in Wisconsin in 1861, Turner was reared close to the frontier. As he probed more deeply into history—first in his home state and later at Johns Hopkins and Harvard Universities—he became increasingly convinced of the inadequacy of the Germanic theory of our national development. There seemed to him to be something peculiarly individualistic about the average American, something unique about our political

institutions that could not be analyzed in terms of Anglo-Saxonism.

What he had found lacking in Teutonic history, he discovered on the American frontier. As he grew older, he enlarged upon his theory, but its thesis remained substantially as it was when he presented it to a startled audience in his famous address. It would be fruitless to trace the sources of this new interpretation. There were doubtless many—and a special place would have to be made for the census report of 1892, which asserted that the frontier had just ceased to have an official existence. However numerous were Turner's antecedents, no one questions seriously the originality of his synthesis.

Turner's view of the frontier is complex and easily misunderstood. The most significant characteristic of the frontier, as he conceived it, was that it lay on "the hither edge of free land." It could not be identified with any one geographical area or with romantic visions of contests with Indians. The frontier was not so much a line as an evolution which was repeated again and again as America expanded. In this frontier development, the pathfinder's contacts with Indians were only a first phase; afterward there would follow, in reasonably consistent order, the hunter, the trader, the rancher, the subsistence farmer, and the settled farmer who produced for market. Turner viewed the frontier not as an edge of settlement but as a belt of various kinds of social organization. The fact which gave constant significance to the frontier was the repetition of this evolution as the frontier shifted westward, with a consequent renewal of frontier influences in each geographical area.

These continuing effects Turner believed to be more decisive than historic European backgrounds in three basic American developments: political democracy, a spirit of constructive nationalism, and the philosophy and practices of individualism. He considered the constant encouragement to political democracy to be the frontier's most important source of influence.

Turner's subsequent writings involved a more general appli-

cation of his frontier analysis. Just as the various steps in the frontier evolution were being enacted simultaneously, so the larger sections of the nation as a whole reflected, at any given moment, different stages of the same development. At the beginning lay the frontier; at the end, an industrial urban society. This unity in Turner's thought rested to a great extent upon his emphasis on economic factors. However many its cultural ramifications, Turner's frontier thesis had its roots in one basic economic fact—the existence of free land. Similarly, what distinguished one section of the country from another was not conflicting political or moral values so much as different levels of economic advance.

It has been explained elsewhere that at the close of the century any historical interpretation which stressed economic considerations was apt to be condemned for its seeming similarities to the teachings of Karl Marx. The reception given Turner's thesis was conditioned by this general atmosphere. But it is not strange that Turner came to be attacked by Marxists because of his emphasis upon frontier individualism and economic sectionalism rather than upon the concept of a revolutionary class struggle led by an industrial proletariat.

Few historians today would deny to Turner a front rank among the few who have made major contributions to an understanding of our national past. Even hostile critics acknowledge his importance in breaking through the cobwebs of Victorian thought. It is something of a tribute to him that most of his detractors concentrate their attack on an essentially minor point in his thesis—the idea that the West with its free land helped to avert labor strife in the East by draining excess population from industrial areas. They contend that factory workers did not move west in appreciable numbers and that the movement toward the frontier came in times of prosperity rather than of distress. Some historians have pointed to the many democratic reforms which had their genesis in the older sections of the country; others have concentrated on exposing the frontier's undemo-

cratic features, which Turner conveniently overlooked. Perhaps the most penetrating criticism, advanced by both conservative and liberal commentators, relates to Turner's tendency to make American development unique rather than to associate it with the main stream of western civilization taken as an interacting whole.

Yet even with these reservations, the majority report is favorable. Turner may have been dealing with a half-truth; but it is not difficult to understand why a half-truth as stimulating and penetrating as his has withstood assault so well.

The Significance of the Frontier in American History¹

IN A RECENT bulletin of the Superintendent of the Census for 1890 appear these significant words: "Up to and including 1880 the country had a frontier of settlement, but at present the unsettled area has been so broken into by isolated bodies of settlement that there can hardly be said to be a frontier line. In the discussion of its extent, its westward movement, etc., it can not, therefore, any longer have a place in the census reports." This brief official statement marks the closing of a great historic movement. Up to our own day American history has been in a large degree the history of the colonization of the Great West. The existence of an area of free land, its continuous recession, and the advance of American settlement westward, explain American development.

From *The Annual Report of the American Historical Association for 1893*.

¹ Since the meeting of the American Historical Association, this paper has also been given as an address to the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, December 14, 1893. I have to thank the secretary of the Society, Mr. Reuben G. Thwaites, for securing valuable material for my use in the preparation of the paper.

Behind institutions, behind constitutional forms and modifications, lie the vital forces that call these organs into life and shape them to meet changing conditions. The peculiarity of American institutions is the fact that they have been compelled to adapt themselves to the changes of an expanding people—to the changes involved in crossing a continent, in winning a wilderness, and in developing at each area of this progress out of the primitive economic and political conditions of the frontier into the complexity of city life. Said Calhoun in 1817, "We are great, and rapidly—I was about to say fearfully—growing!"² So saying, he touched the distinguishing feature of American life. All peoples show development; the germ theory of politics has been sufficiently emphasized. In the case of most nations, however, the development has occurred in a limited area; and if the nation has expanded, it has met other growing peoples whom it has conquered. But in the case of the United States we have a different phenomenon. Limiting our attention to the Atlantic coast, we have the familiar phenomenon of the evolution of institutions in a limited area, such as the rise of representative government; the differentiation of simple colonial governments into complex organs; the progress from primitive industrial society, without division of labor, up to manufacturing civilization. But we have in addition to this a recurrence of the process of evolution in each western area reached in the process of expansion. Thus American development has exhibited not merely advance along a single line, but a return to primitive conditions on a continually advancing frontier line, and a new development for that area. American social development has been continually beginning over again on the frontier. This perennial rebirth, this fluidity of American life, this expansion westward with its new opportunities, its continuous touch with the simplicity of primitive society, furnish the forces dominating American character. The true point of view in the history of this nation is not the Atlantic coast, it is the Great West. Even the slavery struggle, which is made so exclusive an object of attention by writers like Professor von Holst, occupies its important place in American history because of its relation to westward expansion.

In this advance, the frontier is the outer edge of the wave—the meeting point between savagery and civilization. Much has been

² *Abridgment of Debates of Congress*, v, p. 706.

written about the frontier from the point of view of border warfare and the chase, but as a field for the serious study of the economist and the historian it has been neglected.

The American frontier is sharply distinguished from the European frontier—a fortified boundary line running through dense populations. The most significant thing about the American frontier is, that it lies at the hither edge of free land. In the census reports it is treated as the margin of that settlement which has a density of two or more to the square mile. The term is an elastic one, and for our purposes does not need sharp definition. We shall consider the whole frontier belt, including the Indian country and the outer margin of the "settled area" of the census reports. This paper will make no attempt to treat the subject exhaustively; its aim is simply to call attention to the frontier as a fertile field for investigation, and to suggest some of the problems which arise in connection with it.

In the settlement of America we have to observe how European life entered the continent, and how America modified and developed that life and reacted on Europe. Our early history is the study of European germs developing in an American environment. Too exclusive attention has been paid by institutional students to the Germanic origins, too little to the American factors. The frontier is the line of most rapid and effective Americanization. The wilderness masters the colonist. It finds him a European in dress, industries, tools, modes of travel, and thought. It takes him from the railroad car and puts him in the birch canoe. It strips off the garments of civilization and arrays him in the hunting shirt and the moccasin. It puts him in the log cabin of the Cherokee and Iroquois and runs an Indian palisade around him. Before long he has gone to planting Indian corn and plowing with a sharp stick; he shouts the war cry and takes the scalp in orthodox Indian fashion. In short, at the frontier the environment is at first too strong for the man. He must accept the conditions which it furnishes, or perish, and so he fits himself into the Indian clearings and follows the Indian trails. Little by little he transforms the wilderness, but the outcome is not the old Europe, not simply the development of Germanic germs, any more than the first phenomenon was a case of reversion to the Germanic mark. The fact is, that here is a new product that is American. At first, the frontier was the Atlantic coast. It was the frontier of Europe

in a very real sense. Moving westward, the frontier became more and more American. As successive terminal moraines result from successive glaciations, so each frontier leaves its traces behind it, and when it becomes a settled area the region still partakes of the frontier characteristics. Thus the advance of the frontier has meant a steady movement away from the influence of Europe, a steady growth of independence on American lines. And to study this advance, the men who grew up under these conditions, and the political, economic, and social results of it, is to study the really American part of our history.

STAGES OF FRONTIER ADVANCE

In the course of the seventeenth century the frontier was advanced up the Atlantic river courses, just beyond the "fall line," and the tidewater region became the settled area. In the first half of the eighteenth century another advance occurred. Traders followed the Delaware and Shawnese Indians to the Ohio as early as the end of the first quarter of the century.³ Gov. Spotswood, of Virginia, made an expedition in 1714 across the Blue Ridge. The end of the first quarter of the century saw the advance of the Scotch-Irish and the Palatine Germans up the Shenandoah Valley into the western part of Virginia, and along the Piedmont region of the Carolinas.⁴ The Germans in New York pushed the frontier of settlement up the Mohawk to German Flats.⁵ In Pennsylvania the town of Bedford indicates the line of settlement. Settlements soon began on the New River, or the Great Kanawha, and on the sources of the Yadkin and French Broad.⁶ The King attempted to arrest the advance by his proclamation of 1763,⁷ forbidding settlements beyond the sources

³ Bancroft (1860 ed.), iii, pp. 344, 345, citing Logan MSS.; [Mitchell] *Contest in America*, etc. (1752), p. 237.

⁴ Kercheval, *History of the Valley*; Bernheim, *German Settlements in the Carolinas*; Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History of America*, v, p. 304; *Colonial Records of North Carolina*, iv, p. xx; Weston, *Documents Connected with the History of South Carolina*, p. 82; Ellis and Evans, *History of Lancaster County, Pa.*, chs. iii, xxvi.

⁵ Parkman, *Pontiac*, ii; Griffis, *Sir William Johnson*, p. 6; Simms, *Frontiersmen of New York*.

⁶ Monette, *Mississippi Valley*, i, p. 311.

⁷ *Wis. Hist. Coll.*, xi, p. 50; Hinsdale, *Old Northwest*, p. 121; Burke, "Oration on Conciliation," *Works* (1872 ed.), i, p. 473.

of the rivers flowing into the Atlantic; but in vain. In the period of the Revolution the frontier crossed the Alleghanias into Kentucky and Tennessee, and the upper waters of the Ohio were settled.⁸ When the first census was taken in 1790, the continuous settled area was bounded by a line which ran near the coast of Maine, and included New England except a portion of Vermont and New Hampshire, New York along the Hudson and up the Mohawk about Schenectady, eastern and southern Pennsylvania, Virginia well across the Shenandoah Valley, and the Carolinas and eastern Georgia.⁹ Beyond this region of continuous settlement were the small settled areas of Kentucky and Tennessee, and the Ohio, with the mountains intervening between them and the Atlantic area, thus giving a new and important character to the frontier. The isolation of the region increased its peculiarly American tendencies, and the need of transportation facilities to connect it with the East called out important schemes of internal improvement, which will be noted farther on. The "West," as a self-conscious section, began to evolve.

From decade to decade distinct advances of the frontier occurred. By the census of 1820¹⁰ the settled area included Ohio, southern Indiana and Illinois, southeastern Missouri, and about one-half of Louisiana. This settled area had surrounded Indian areas, and the management of these tribes became an object of political concern. The frontier region of the time lay along the Great Lakes, where Astor's American Fur Company operated in the Indian trade,¹¹ and beyond the Mississippi, where Indian traders extended

⁸ Roosevelt, *Winning of the West*, and citations there given; Cutler's *Life of Cutler*.

⁹ Scribner's *Statistical Atlas*, xxxviii, pl. 13; McMaster, *Hist. of People of U. S.*, i, pp. 4, 60, 61; Imlay and Filson, *Western Territory of America* (London, 1793); Rochefoucault-Liancourt, *Travels Through the United States of North America* (London, 1799); Michaux's "Journal," in *Proceedings American Philosophical Society*, xxvi, No. 129; Forman, *Narrative of a Journey Down the Ohio and Mississippi in 1780-'90* (Cincinnati, 1888); Bartram, *Travels Through North Carolina, etc.* (London, 1792); Pope, *Tour Through the Southern and Western Territories, etc.* (Richmond, 1792); Weld, *Travels Through the States of North America* (London, 1799); Baily, *Journal of a Tour in the Unsettled States of North America, 1796-'97* (London, 1856); *Pennsylvania Magazine of History*, July, 1886; Winsor, *Narrative and Critical History of America*, vii, pp. 491, 492, citations.

¹⁰ Scribner's *Statistical Atlas*, xxxix.

¹¹ Turner, *Character and Influence of the Indian Trade in Wisconsin* (Johns Hopkins University Studies. Series ix). pp. 61 ff.

their activity even to the Rocky Mountains; Florida also furnished frontier conditions. The Mississippi River region was the scene of typical frontier settlements.¹²

The rising steam navigation¹³ on western waters, the opening of the Erie Canal, and the westward extension of cotton¹⁴ culture added five frontier states to the Union in this period. Grund, writing in 1836, declares: "It appears then that the universal disposition of Americans to emigrate to the western wilderness, in order to enlarge their dominion over inanimate nature, is the actual result of an expansive power which is inherent in them, and which by continually agitating all classes of society is constantly throwing a large portion of the whole population on the extreme confines of the State, in order to gain space for its development. Hardly is a new State or Territory formed before the same principle manifests itself again and gives rise to a further emigration; and so is it destined to go on until a physical barrier must finally obstruct its progress."¹⁵

In the middle of this century the line indicated by the present eastern boundary of Indian Territory, Nebraska, and Kansas marked the frontier of the Indian country.¹⁶ Minnesota and Wisconsin still

¹² Monette, *History of the Mississippi Valley*, ii; Flint, *Travels and Residence in Mississippi*; Flint, *Geography and History of the Western States; Abridgment of Debates of Congress*, vii, pp. 397, 398, 404; Holmes, *Account of the U. S.; Kingdom, America and the British Colonies* (London, 1820); Grund, *Americans*, ii, chs. i, iii, vi (although writing in 1836, he treats of conditions that grew out of western advance from the era of 1820 to that time); Peck, *Guide for Emigrants* (Boston, 1831); Darby, *Emigrants' Guide to Western and Southwestern States and Territories*; Dana, *Geographical Sketches in the Western Country*; Kinzie, *Waubun*; Keating, *Narrative of Long's Expedition*; Schoolcraft, *Discovery of the Sources of the Mississippi River, Travels in the Central Portions of the Mississippi Valley*, and *Lead Mines of the Missouri*; Andreas, *History of Illinois*, i, 86-99; Hurlbut, *Chicago Antiquities*; McKenney, *Tour to the Lakes*; Thomas, *Travels Through the Western Country*, etc. (Auburn, N. Y., 1819).

¹³ Darby, *Emigrants' Guide*, pp. 272 ff; Benton, *Abridgment of Debates*, vii, p. 397.

¹⁴ De Bow's *Review*, iv, p. 254; xvii, p. 428.

¹⁵ Grund, *Americans*, ii, p. 8.

¹⁶ Peck, *New Guide to the West* (Cincinnati, 1848), ch. iv; Parkman, *Oregon Trail*; Hall, *The West* (Cincinnati, 1848); Pierce, *Incidents of Western Travel*; Murray, *Travels in North America*; Lloyd, *Steamboat Directory* (Cincinnati, 1856); "Forty Days in a Western Hotel" (Chicago), in *Putnam's Magazine*, December, 1894; Mackay, *The Western World*, ii, ch. ii, iii; Meeker, *Life in the West*; Bogen, *German in America* (Boston, 1851); Olmstead, *Texas Journey*; Greeley, *Recollections of a Busy Life*; Schouler, *History of the United States*, v, 261-267; Peyton, *Over the Alleghanies and Across the Prairies* (London, 1870);

exhibited frontier conditions,¹⁷ but the distinctive frontier of the period is found in California, where the gold discoveries had sent a sudden tide of adventurous miners, and in Oregon, and the settlements in Utah.¹⁸ As the frontier had leaped over the Alleghanies, so now it skipped the Great Plains and the Rocky Mountains; and in the same way that the advance of the frontiersmen beyond the Alleghanies had caused the rise of important questions of transportation and internal improvement, so now the settlers beyond the Rocky Mountains needed means of communication with the East, and in the furnishing of these arose the settlement of the Great Plains and the development of still another kind of frontier life. Railroads, fostered by land grants, sent an increasing tide of immigrants into the Far West. The United States Army fought a series of Indian wars in Minnesota, Dakota, and the Indian Territory.

By 1880 the settled area had been pushed into northern Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, along Dakota rivers, and in the Black Hills region, and was ascending the rivers of Kansas and Nebraska. The development of mines in Colorado had drawn isolated frontier settlements into that region, and Montana and Idaho were receiving settlers. The frontier was found in these mining camps and the ranches of the Great Plains. The superintendent of the census for 1890 reports, as previously stated, that the settlements of the West lie so scattered over the region that there can no longer be said to be a frontier line.

In these successive frontiers we find natural boundary lines which have served to mark and to affect the characteristics of the frontiers, namely: the "fall line"; the Alleghany Mountains; the Mississippi;

Loughborough, *The Pacific Telegraph and Railway* (St. Louis, 1849); Whitney, *Project for a Railroad to the Pacific* (New York, 1849; Peyton, *Suggestions on Railroad Communication with the Pacific, and the Trade of China and the Indian Islands*; Benton, *Highway to the Pacific* (a speech delivered in the U. S. Senate, December 16, 1850).

¹⁷ A writer in *The Home Missionary* (1850), p. 239, reporting Wisconsin conditions, exclaims: "Think of this, people of the enlightened East. What an example, to come from the very frontier of civilization!" But one of the missionaries writes: "In a few years Wisconsin will no longer be considered as the West, or as an outpost of civilization, any more than Western New York, or the Western Reserve."

¹⁸ Bancroft (H. H.), *History of California, History of Oregon, and Popular Tribunals*; Shinn, *Mining Camps*.

the Missouri where its direction approximates north and south; the line of the arid lands, approximately the ninety-ninth meridian; and the Rocky Mountains. The fall line marked the frontier of the seventeenth century; the Alleghanies that of the eighteenth; the Mississippi that of the first quarter of the nineteenth; the Missouri that of the middle of this century (omitting the California movement); and the belt of the Rocky Mountains and the arid tract, the present frontier. Each was won by a series of Indian wars.

THE FRONTIER FURNISHES A FIELD FOR COMPARATIVE STUDY OF SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

At the Atlantic frontier one can study the germs of processes repeated at each successive frontier. We have the complex European life sharply precipitated by the wilderness into the simplicity of primitive conditions. The first frontier had to meet its Indian question, its question of the disposition of the public domain, of the means of intercourse with older settlements, of the extension of political organization, of religious and educational activity. And the settlement of these and similar questions for one frontier served as a guide for the next. The American student needs not to go to the "prim little townships of Sleswick" for illustrations of the law of continuity and development. For example, he may study the origin of our land policies in the colonial land policy; he may see how the system grew by adapting the statutes to the customs of the successive frontiers.¹⁹ He may see how the mining experience in the lead regions of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Iowa was applied to the mining laws of the Sierras,²⁰ and how our Indian policy has been a series of experimentations on successive frontiers. Each tier of new States has found in the older ones material for its constitutions.²¹ Each frontier has made similar contributions to American character, as will be discussed farther on.

But with all these similarities there are essential differences, due to the place element and the time element. It is evident that the farming frontier of the Mississippi Valley presents different condi-

¹⁹ See the suggestive paper by Prof. Jesse Macy, "The Institutional Beginnings of a Western State."

²⁰ Shinn, *Mining Camps*.

²¹ Compare Thorpe, in *Annals American Academy of Political and Social Science*, September, 1891; Bryce, *American Commonwealth* (1888), ii, p. 689.

tions from the mining frontier of the Rocky Mountains. The frontier reached by the Pacific Railroad, surveyed into rectangles, guarded by the United States Army, and recruited by the daily immigrant ship, moves forward at a swifter pace and in a different way than the frontier reached by the birch canoe or the pack horse. The geologist traces patiently the shores of ancient seas, maps their areas, and compares the older and the newer. It would be a work worth the historian's labors to mark these various frontiers and in detail compare one with another. Not only would there result a more adequate conception of American development and characteristics, but invaluable additions would be made to the history of society.

Loria,²² the Italian economist, has urged the study of colonial life as an aid in understanding the stages of European development, affirming that colonial settlement is for economic science what the mountain is for geology, bringing to light primitive stratifications. "America," he says, "has the key to the historical enigma which Europe has sought for centuries in vain, and the land which has no history reveals luminously the course of universal history." There is much truth in this. The United States lies like a huge page in the history of society. Line by line as we read this continental page from West to East we find the record of social evolution. It begins with the Indian and the hunter; it goes on to tell of the disintegration of savagery by the entrance of the trader, the pathfinder of civilization; we read the annals of the pastoral stage in ranch life; the exploitation of the soil by the raising of unrotated crops of corn and wheat in sparsely settled farming communities; the intensive culture of the denser farm settlement; and finally the manufacturing organization with city and factory system.²³ This page is familiar to the student of census statistics, but how little of it has been used by our historians. Particularly in eastern States this page is a palimpsest. What is now a manufacturing State was in an earlier decade an area of intensive farming. Earlier yet it had been a wheat area, and still earlier the "range" had attracted the cattle-herder. Thus Wisconsin, now de-

²² Loria, *Analisi della Proprieta Capitalista*, ii, p. 15.

²³ Compare *Observations on the North American Land Company*, London, 1796, pp. xv, 144; Logan, *History of Upper South Carolina*, i, pp. 149-151; Turner, *Character and Influence of Indian Trade in Wisconsin*, p. 18; Peck, *New Guide for Emigrants* (Boston, 1837), ch. iv; *Compendium Eleventh Census*, i, p. xl.

veloping manufacture, is a State with varied agricultural interests. But earlier it was given over to almost exclusive grain-raising, like North Dakota at the present time.

Each of these areas has had an influence in our economic and political history; the evolution of each into a higher stage has worked political transformations. But what constitutional historian has made any adequate attempt to interpret political facts by the light of these social areas and changes?²⁴

The Atlantic frontier was compounded of fisherman, fur-trader, miner, cattle-raiser, and farmer. Excepting the fisherman, each type of industry was on the march toward the West, impelled by an irresistible attraction. Each passed in successive waves across the continent. Stand at Cumberland Gap and watch the procession of civilization, marching single file—the buffalo following the trail to the salt springs, the Indian, the fur-trader and hunter, the cattle-raiser, the pioneer farmer—and the frontier has passed by. Stand at South Pass in the Rockies a century later and see the same procession with wider intervals between. The unequal rate of advance compels us to distinguish the frontier into the trader's frontier, the rancher's frontier, or the miner's frontier, and the farmer's frontier. When the mines and the cow pens were still near the fall line the traders' pack trains were tinkling across the Alleghanies, and the French on the Great Lakes were fortifying their posts, alarmed by the British trader's birch canoe. When the trappers scaled the Rockies, the farmer was still near the mouth of the Missouri.

THE INDIAN TRADER'S FRONTIER

Why was it that the Indian trader passed so rapidly across the continent? What effects followed from the trader's frontier? The trade was coeval with American discovery. The Norsemen, Vespuccius, Verrazani, Hudson, John Smith, all trafficked for furs. The Plymouth pilgrims settled in Indian cornfields, and their first return cargo was of beaver and lumber. The records of the various New England colonies show how steadily exploration was carried into the wilderness by this trade. What is true for New England is, as would be expected, even plainer for the rest of the colonies. All along the coast

²⁴ See *post*, for illustrations of the political accompaniments of changed industrial conditions.

from Maine to Georgia the Indian trade opened up the river courses. Steadily the trader passed westward, utilizing the older lines of French trade. The Ohio, the Great Lakes, the Mississippi, the Missouri, and the Platte, the lines of western advance, were ascended by traders. They found the passes in the Rocky Mountains and guided Lewis and Clark,²⁵ Frémont, and Bidwell. The explanation of the rapidity of this advance is connected with the effects of the trader on the Indian. The trading post left the unarmed tribes at the mercy of those that had purchased fire-arms—a truth which the Iroquois Indians wrote in blood, and so the remote and unvisited tribes gave eager welcome to the trader. "The savages," wrote La Salle, "take better care of us French than of their own children; from us only can they get guns and goods." This accounts for the trader's power and the rapidity of his advance. Thus the disintegrating forces of civilization entered the wilderness. Every river valley and Indian trail became a fissure in Indian society, and so that society became honeycombed. Long before the pioneer farmer appeared on the scene, primitive Indian life had passed away. The farmers met Indians armed with guns. The trading frontier, while steadily undermining Indian power by making the tribes ultimately dependent on the whites, yet, through its sale of guns, gave to the Indian increased power of resistance to the farming frontier. French colonization was dominated by its trading frontier; English colonization by its farming frontier. There was an antagonism between the two frontiers as between the two nations. Said Duquesne to the Iroquois, "Are you ignorant of the difference between the king of England and the king of France? Go see the forts that our king has established and you will see that you can still hunt under their very walls. They have been placed for your advantage in places which you frequent. The English, on the contrary, are no sooner in possession of a place than the game is driven away. The forest falls before them as they advance, and the soil is laid bare so that you can scarce find the wherewithal to erect a shelter for the night."

And yet, in spite of this opposition of the interests of the trader and the farmer, the Indian trade pioneered the way for civilization. The buffalo trail became the Indian trail, and this became the

²⁵ But Lewis and Clark were the first to explore the route from the Missouri to the Columbia.

trader's "trace" the trails widened into roads, and the roads into turnpikes, and these in turn were transformed into railroads. The same origin can be shown for the railroads of the South, the Far West, and the Dominion of Canada.²⁶ The trading posts reached by these trails were on the sites of Indian villages which had been placed in positions suggested by nature; and these trading posts, situated so as to command the water systems of the country, have grown into such cities as Albany, Pittsburgh, Detroit, Chicago, St. Louis, Council Bluffs, and Kansas City. Thus civilization in America has followed the arteries made by geology, pouring an ever richer tide through them, until at last the slender paths of aboriginal intercourse have been broadened and interwoven into the complex mazes of modern commercial lines; the wilderness has been interpenetrated by lines of civilization growing ever more numerous. It is like the steady growth of a complex nervous system from the originally simple, inert continent. If one would understand why we are to-day one nation, rather than a collection of isolated states, he must study this economic and social consolidation of the country. In this progress from savage conditions lie topics for the evolutionist.²⁷

The effect of the Indian frontier as a consolidating agent in our history is important. From the close of the seventeenth century various intercolonial congresses have been called to treat with Indians and establish common measures of defense. Particularism was strongest in colonies with no Indian frontier. This frontier stretched along the western border like a cord of union. The Indian was a common danger, demanding united action. Most celebrated of these conferences was the Albany congress of 1754, called to treat with the Six Nations, and to consider plans of union. Even a cursory reading of the plan proposed by the congress reveals the importance of the frontier. The powers of the general council and the officers were, chiefly, the determination of peace and war with the Indians, the regulation of Indian trade, the purchase of Indian lands, and the creation and government of new settlements as a security against the Indians. It is evident that the unifying tendencies of the Revolution-

²⁶ *Narrative and Critical History of America*, viii, p. 10; Sparks, *Washington Works*, ix, pp. 303, 327; Logan, *History of Upper South Carolina*, i; McDonald, *Life of Kenton*, p. 72; *Cong. Record*, xxiii, p. 57.

²⁷ On the effect of the fur trade in opening the routes of migration, see the author's *Character and Influence of the Indian Trade in Wisconsin*.

ary period were facilitated by the previous coöperation in the regulation of the frontier. In this connection may be mentioned the importance of the frontier, from that day to this, as a military training school, keeping alive the power of resistance to aggression, and developing the stalwart and rugged qualities of the frontiersman.

THE RANCHER'S FRONTIER

It would not be possible in the limits of this paper to trace the other frontiers across the continent. Travelers of the eighteenth century found the "cowpens" among the canebrakes and peavine pastures of the South, and the "cow drivers" took their droves to Charleston, Philadelphia, and New York.²⁸ Travelers at the close of the War of 1812 met droves of more than a thousand cattle and swine from the interior of Ohio going to Pennsylvania to fatten for the Philadelphia market.²⁹ The ranges of the Great Plains, with ranch and cowboy and nomadic life, are things of yesterday and of to-day. The experience of the Carolina cowpens guided the ranchers of Texas. One element favoring the rapid extension of the rancher's frontier is the fact that in a remote country lacking transportation facilities the product must be in small bulk, or must be able to transport itself, and the cattle raiser could easily drive his product to market. The effect of these great ranches on the subsequent agrarian history of the localities in which they existed should be studied.

THE FARMER'S FRONTIER

The maps of the census reports show an uneven advance of the farmer's frontier, with tongues of settlement pushed forward and with indentations of wilderness. In part this is due to Indian resistance, in part to the location of river valleys and passes, in part to the unequal force of the centers of frontier attraction. Among the important centers of attraction may be mentioned the following: fertile and favorably situated soils, salt springs, mines, and army posts.

ARMY POSTS

The frontier army post, serving to protect the settlers from the Indians, has also acted as a wedge to open the Indian country, and

²⁸ Lodge, *English Colonies*, p. 152 and citations; Logan, *Hist. of Upper South Carolina*, 1, p. 151.

²⁹ Flint, *Recollections*, p. 9.

has been a nucleus for settlement.⁸⁰ In this connection mention should also be made of the government military and exploring expeditions in determining the lines of settlement. But all the more important expeditions were greatly indebted to the earliest path-makers, the Indian guides, the traders and trappers, and the French voyageurs, who were inevitable parts of governmental expeditions from the days of Lewis and Clark.⁸¹ Each expedition was an epitome of the previous factors in western advance.

SALT SPRINGS

In an interesting monograph, Victor Hehn⁸² has traced the effect of salt upon early European development, and has pointed out how it affected the lines of settlement and the form of administration. A similar study might be made for the salt springs of the United States. The early settlers were tied to the coast by the need of salt, without which they could not preserve their meats or live in comfort. Writing in 1752, Bishop Spangenburg says of a colony for which he was seeking lands in North Carolina, "They will require salt & other necessaries which they can neither manufacture nor raise. Either they must go to Charleston, which is 300 miles distant . . . Or else they must go to Boling's Point in Va on a branch of the James & is also 300 miles from here . . . Or else they must go down the Roanoke—I know not how many miles—where salt is brought up from the Cape Fear."⁸³ This may serve as a typical illustration. An annual pilgrimage to the coast for salt thus became essential. Taking flocks or furs and ginseng root, the early settlers sent their pack trains after seeding time each year to the coast.⁸⁴ This proved to be an important educational influence, since it was almost the only way in which the pioneer learned what was going on in the East. But when discovery was made of the salt springs of the Kanawha, and the Holston, and Kentucky, and central New York, the West began to be freed from

⁸⁰ See Monette, *Mississippi Valley*, i, p. 344.

⁸¹ Coues, *Lewis and Clark's Expedition*, i, pp. 2, 253-259; Benton, in *Cong. Record*, xxiii, p. 57.

⁸² Hehn, *Das Salz* (Berlin, 1873).

⁸³ *Col. Records of N. C.*, v, p. 3.

⁸⁴ Findley, *History of the Insurrection in the Four Western Counties of Pennsylvania in the Year 1794*. (Philadelphia, 1769), p. 35.

dependence on the coast. It was in part the effect of finding these salt springs that enabled settlement to cross the mountains.

From the time the mountains rose between the pioneer and the seaboard, a new order of Americanism arose. The West and the East began to get out of touch of each other. The settlements from the sea to the mountains kept connection with the rear and had a certain solidarity. But the over-mountain men grew more and more independent. The East took a narrow view of American advance, and nearly lost these men. Kentucky and Tennessee history bears abundant witness to the truth of this statement. The East began to try to hedge and limit westward expansion. Though Webster could declare that there were no Alleghanies in his politics, yet in politics in general they were a very solid factor.

LAND

The exploitation of the beasts took hunter and trader to the west, the exploitation of the grasses took the rancher west, and the exploitation of the virgin soil of the river valleys and prairies attracted the farmer. Good soils have been the most continuous attraction to the farmer's frontier. The land hunger of the Virginians drew them down the rivers into Carolina, in early colonial days; the search for soils took the Massachusetts men to Pennsylvania and to New York. As the eastern lands were taken up migration flowed across them to the west. Daniel Boone, the great backwoodsman, who combined the occupations of hunter, trader, cattle-raiser, farmer, and surveyor—learning, probably from the traders, of the fertility of the lands of the upper Yadkin, where the traders were wont to rest as they took their way to the Indians, left his Pennsylvania home with his father, and passed down the Great Valley road to that stream. Learning from a trader of the game and rich pastures of Kentucky, he pioneered the way for the farmers to that region. Thence he passed to the frontier of Missouri, where his settlement was long a landmark on the frontier. Here again he helped to open the way for civilization, finding salt licks, and trails, and land. His son was among the earliest trappers in the passes of the Rocky Mountains, and his party are said to have been the first to camp on the present site of Denver. His grandson, Col. A. J. Boone, of Colorado, was a power among the Indians of the Rocky Mountains, and was appointed an agent by

the government. Kit Carson's mother was a Boone.⁸⁵ Thus this family epitomizes the backwoodsman's advance across the continent.

The farmer's advance came in a distinct series of waves. In Peck's *New Guide to the West*, published in Boston in 1837, occurs this suggestive passage:

Generally, in all the western settlements, three classes, like the waves of the ocean, have rolled one after the other. First comes the pioneer, who depends for the subsistence of his family chiefly upon the natural growth of vegetation, called the "range," and the proceeds of hunting. His implements of agriculture are rude, chiefly of his own make, and his efforts directed mainly to a crop of corn and a "truck patch." The last is a rude garden for growing cabbage, beans, corn for roasting ears, cucumbers, and potatoes. A log cabin, and, occasionally, a stable and corn-crib, and a field of a dozen acres, the timber girdled or "deadened," and fenced, are enough for his occupancy. It is quite immaterial whether he ever becomes the owner of the soil. He is the occupant for the time being, pays no rent, and feels as independent as the "lord of the manor." With a horse, cow, and one or two breeders of swine, he strikes into the woods with his family, and becomes the founder of a new county, or perhaps state. He builds his cabin, gathers around him a few other families of similar tastes and habits, and occupies till the range is somewhat subdued, and hunting a little precarious, or, which is more frequently the case, till the neighbors crowd around, roads, bridges, and fields annoy him, and he lacks elbow room. The preëmption law enables him to dispose of his cabin and cornfield to the next class of emigrants; and, to employ his own figures, he "breaks for the high timber," "clears out for the New Purchase," or migrates to Arkansas or Texas, to work the same process over.

The next class of emigrants purchase the lands, add field to field, clear out the roads, throw rough bridges over the streams, put up hewn log houses with glass windows and brick or stone chimneys, occasionally plant orchards, build mills, school-houses, court-houses, etc., and exhibit the picture and forms of plain, frugal, civilized life.

Another wave rolls on. The men of capital and enterprise come. The settler is ready to sell out and take the advantage of the rise in property, push farther into the interior and become, himself, a man of capital and enterprise in turn. The small village rises to a spacious town or city; substantial edifices of brick, extensive fields, orchards, gardens, colleges, and churches are seen. Broadcloths, silks, leghorns, crapes, and all the refinements, luxuries, elegancies, frivolities, and

⁸⁵ Hale, "Daniel Boone" (pamphlet).

fashions are in vogue. Thus wave after wave is rolling westward; the real Eldorado is still farther on.

A portion of the two first classes remain stationary amidst the general movement, improve their habits and condition, and rise in the scale of society.

The writer has traveled much amongst the first class, the real pioneers. He has lived many years in connection with the second grade; and now the third wave is sweeping over large districts of Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri. Migration has become almost a habit in the West. Hundreds of men can be found, not over 50 years of age, who have settled for the fourth, fifth, or sixth time on a new spot. To sell out and remove only a few hundred miles makes up a portion of the variety of backwoods life and manners.⁸⁶

Omitting those of the pioneer farmers who move from the love of adventure, the advance of the more steady farmer is easy to understand. Obviously the immigrant was attracted by the cheap lands of the frontier, and even the native farmer felt their influence strongly. Year by year the farmers who lived on soil whose returns were diminished by unrotated crops were offered the virgin soil of the frontier at nominal prices. Their growing families demanded more lands, and these were dear. The competition of the unexhausted, cheap, and easily tilled prairie lands compelled the farmer either to go west and continue the exhaustion of the soil on a new frontier, or to adopt intensive culture. Thus the census of 1890 shows, in the Northwest, many counties in which there is an absolute or a relative decrease of population. These States have been sending farmers to advance the frontier on the plains, and have themselves begun to turn to intensive farming and to manufacture. A decade before this, Ohio had shown the same transition stage. Thus the demand for land and the love of wilderness freedom drew the frontier ever onward.

Having now roughly outlined the various kinds of frontiers, and their modes of advance, chiefly from the point of view of the frontier itself, we may next inquire what were the influences on the East and

⁸⁶ Compare Baily, *Tour in the Unsettled Parts of North America* (London, 1856), pp. 217-219, where a similar analysis is made for 1796. See also Collot, *Journey in North America* (Paris, 1826), p. 109; *Observations on the North American Land Company* (London, 1796), pp. xv, 144; Logan, *History of Upper South Carolina*.

on the Old World. A rapid enumeration of some of the more noteworthy effects is all that I have time for.

COMPOSITE NATIONALITY

First, we note that the frontier promoted the formation of a composite nationality for the American people. The coast was preponderantly English, but the later tides of continental immigration flowed across to the free lands. This was the case from the early colonial days. The Scotch-Irish and the Palatine Germans, or "Pennsylvania Dutch," furnished the dominant element in the stock of the colonial frontier. With these peoples were also the freed indented servants, or redemptioners, who at the expiration of their time of service passed to the frontier. Governor Spotswood of Virginia writes in 1717, "The inhabitants of our frontiers are composed generally of such as have been transported hither as servants, and, being out of their time, settle themselves where land is to be taken up and that will produce the necessaries of life with little labour."⁸⁷ Very generally these redemptioners were of non-English stock. In the crucible of the frontier the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed race, English in neither nationality nor characteristics. The process has gone on from the early days to our own. Burke and other writers in the middle of the eighteenth century believed that Pennsylvania⁸⁸ was "threatened with the danger of being wholly foreign in language, manners, and perhaps even inclinations." The German and Scotch-Irish elements in the frontier of the South were only less great. In the middle of the present century the German element in Wisconsin was already so considerable that leading publicists looked to the creation of a German state out of the commonwealth by concentrating their colonization.⁸⁹ Such examples teach us to beware of misinterpreting the fact that there is a common English speech in America into a belief that the stock is also English.

INDUSTRIAL INDEPENDENCE

In another way the advance of the frontier decreased our dependence on England. The coast, particularly of the South, lacked diversi-

⁸⁷ "Spotswood Papers," in *Collections of Virginia Historical Society*, i, ii.

⁸⁸ [Burke], *European Settlements* (1765 ed.), ii, p. 200.

⁸⁹ Everest, in *Wisconsin Historical Collections*, xii, pp. 7 ff.

fied industries, and was dependent on England for the bulk of its supplies. In the South there was even a dependence on the Northern colonies for articles of food. Governor Glenn, of South Carolina, writes in the middle of the eighteenth century: "Our trade with New York and Philadelphia was of this sort, draining us of all the little money and bills we could gather from other places for their bread, flour, beer, hams, bacon, and other things of their produce, all which, except beer, our new townships begin to supply us with, which are settled with very industrious and thriving Germans. This no doubt diminishes the number of shipping and the appearance of our trade, but it is far from being a detriment to us."⁴⁰ Before long the frontier created a demand for merchants. As it retreated from the coast it became less and less possible for England to bring her supplies directly to the consumer's wharfs, and carry away staple crops, and staple crops began to give way to diversified agriculture for a time. The effect of this phase of the frontier action upon the northern section is perceived when we realize how the advance of the frontier aroused seaboard cities like Boston, New York, and Baltimore, to engage in rivalry for what Washington called "the extensive and valuable trade of a rising empire."

EFFECTS ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION

The legislation which most developed the powers of the national government, and played the largest part in its activity, was conditioned on the frontier. Writers have discussed the subjects of tariff, land, and internal improvement, as subsidiary to the slavery question. But when American history comes to be rightly viewed it will be seen that the slavery question is an incident. In the period from the end of the first half of the present century to the close of the Civil War slavery rose to primary, but far from exclusive, importance. But this does not justify Dr. von Holst (to take an example) in treating our constitutional history in its formative period down to 1828 in a single volume, giving six volumes chiefly to the history of slavery from 1828 to 1861, under the title "Constitutional History of the United States." The growth of nationalism and the evolution of American political institutions were dependent on the advance of the frontier. Even so recent a writer as Rhodes, in his "History of the

⁴⁰ Weston, *Documents Connected with History of South Carolina*, p. 61.

United States since the Compromise of 1850," has treated the legislation called out by the western advance as incidental to the slavery struggle.

This is a wrong perspective. The pioneer needed the goods of the coast, and so the grand series of internal improvement and railroad legislation began, with potent nationalizing effects. Over internal improvements occurred great debates, in which grave constitutional questions were discussed. Sectional groupings appear in the votes, profoundly significant for the historian. Loose construction increased as the nation marched westward.⁴¹ But the West was not content with bringing the farm to the factory. Under the lead of Clay—"Harry of the West"—protective tariffs were passed, with the cry of bringing the factory to the farm. The disposition of the public lands was a third important subject of national legislation influenced by the frontier.

THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

The public domain has been a force of profound importance in the nationalization and development of the government. The effects of the struggle of the landed and the landless States, and of the Ordinance of 1787, need no discussion.⁴² Administratively the frontier called out some of the highest and most vitalizing activities of the general government. The purchase of Louisiana was perhaps the constitutional turning point in the history of the Republic, inasmuch as it afforded both a new area for national legislation and the occasion of the downfall of the policy of strict construction. But the purchase of Louisiana was called out by frontier needs and demands. As frontier States accrued to the Union the national power grew. In a speech on the dedication of the Calhoun monument Mr. Lamar explained: "In 1789 the States were the creators of the Federal Government; in 1861 the Federal Government was the creator of a large majority of the States."

When we consider the public domain from the point of view of the sale and disposal of the public lands we are again brought face

⁴¹ See, for example, the speech of Clay, in the House of Representatives, January 30, 1824.

⁴² See the admirable monograph by Prof. H. B. Adams, *Maryland's Influence on the Land Cessions*; and also Professor Welling, in *Papers of the American Historical Association*, iii, p. 411.

to face with the frontier. The policy of the United States in dealing with its lands is in sharp contrast with the European system of scientific administration. Efforts to make this domain a source of revenue, and to withhold it from emigrants in order that settlement might be compact, were in vain. The jealousy and the fears of the East were powerless in the face of the demands of the frontiersmen. John Quincy Adams was obliged to confess: "My own system of administration, which was to make the national domain the inexhaustible fund for progressive and unceasing internal improvement, has failed." The reason is obvious; a system of administration was not what the West demanded; it wanted land. Adams states the situation as follows: "The slaveholders of the South have bought the cooperation of the western country by the bribe of the western lands, abandoning to the new Western States their own proportion of the public property and aiding them in the design of grasping all the lands into their own hands. Thomas H. Benton was the author of this system, which he brought forward as a substitute for the American system of Mr. Clay, and to supplant him as the leading statesman of the West. Mr. Clay, by his tariff compromise with Mr. Calhoun, abandoned his own American system. At the same time he brought forward a plan for distributing among all the States of the Union the proceeds of the sales of the public lands. His bill for that purpose passed both Houses of Congress, but was vetoed by President Jackson, who, in his annual message of December, 1832, formally recommended that all public lands should be gratuitously given away to individual adventurers and to the States in which the lands are situated."⁴⁸

"No subject," said Henry Clay, "which has presented itself to the present, or perhaps any preceding, Congress, is of greater magnitude than that of the public lands." When we consider the far-reaching effects of the government's land policy upon political, economic, and social aspects of American life, we are disposed to agree with him. But this legislation was framed under frontier influences, and under the lead of Western statesmen like Benton and Jackson. Said Senator Scott of Indiana in 1841: "I consider the preëmption law merely declaratory of the custom or common law of the settlers."

⁴⁸ Adams, *Memoirs*, ix, pp. 247, 248.

NATIONAL TENDENCIES OF THE FRONTIER

It is safe to say that the legislation with regard to land, tariff, and internal improvements—the American system of the nationalizing Whig party—was conditioned on frontier ideas and needs. But it was not merely in legislative action that the frontier worked against the sectionalism of the coast. The economic and social characteristics of the frontier worked against sectionalism. The men of the frontier had closer resemblances to the Middle region than to either of the other sections. Pennsylvania had been the seed-plot of frontier emigration, and, although she passed on her settlers along the Great Valley into the west of Virginia and the Carolinas, yet the industrial society of these Southern frontiersmen was always more like that of the Middle region than like that of the tide-water portion of the South, which later came to spread its industrial type throughout the South.

The Middle region, entered by New York harbor, was an open door to all Europe. The tide-water part of the South represented typical Englishmen, modified by a warm climate and servile labor, and living in baronial fashion on great plantations; New England stood for a special English movement—Puritanism. The Middle region was less English than the other sections. It had a wide mixture of nationalities, a varied society, the mixed town and county system of local government, a varied economic life, many religious sects. In short, it was a region mediating between New England and the South, and the East and the West. It represented that composite nationality which the contemporary United States exhibits, that juxtaposition of non-English groups, occupying a valley or a little settlement, and presenting reflections of the map of Europe in their variety. It was democratic and nonsectional, if not national; "easy, tolerant, and contented"; rooted strongly in material prosperity. It was typical of the modern United States. It was least sectional, not only because it lay between North and South, but also because with no barriers to shut out its frontiers from its settled region, and with a system of connecting waterways, the Middle region mediated between East and West as well as between North and South. Thus it became the typically American region. Even the New Englander, who was shut out from the frontier by the Middle region, tarrying

in New York or Pennsylvania on his westward march, lost the acuteness of his sectionalism on the way.⁴⁴

The spread of cotton culture into the interior of the South finally broke down the contrast between the "tide-water" region and the rest of the State, and based Southern interests on slavery. Before this process revealed its results the western portion of the South, which was akin to Pennsylvania in stock, society, and industry, showed tendencies to fall away from the faith of the fathers into internal improvement legislation and nationalism. In the Virginia convention of 1829-30, called to revise the constitution, Mr. Leigh, of Chesterfield, one of the tide-water counties, declared:

One of the main causes of discontent which led to this convention, that which had the strongest influence in overcoming our veneration for the work of our fathers, which taught us to condemn the sentiments of Henry and Mason and Pendleton, which weaned us from our reverence for the constituted authorities of the State, was an overweening passion for internal improvement. I say this with perfect knowledge, for it has been avowed to me by gentlemen from the West over and over again. And let me tell the gentleman from Albemarle (Mr. Gordon) that it has been another principal object of those who set this ball of revolution in motion, to overturn the doctrine of State rights, of which Virginia has been the very pillar, and to remove the barrier she has interposed to the interference of the Federal Government in that same work of internal improvement, by so reorganizing the legislature that Virginia, too, may be hitched to the Federal car.

It was this nationalizing tendency of the West that transformed the democracy of Jefferson into the national republicanism of Monroe and the democracy of Andrew Jackson. The West of the War of 1812, the West of Clay, and Benton and Harrison, and Andrew Jackson, shut off by the Middle States and the mountains from the coast sections, had a solidarity of its own with national tendencies.⁴⁵ On the tide of the Father of Waters, North and South met and mingled into a nation. Interstate migration went steadily on—a process of cross-fertilization of ideas and institutions. The fierce struggle of the sections over slavery on the western frontier does not diminish the truth of this statement; it proves the truth of it. Slavery

⁴⁴ Author's article in *The Ægis* (Madison, Wis.), November 4, 1892.

⁴⁵ Compare Roosevelt, *Thomas Benton*, ch. 1.

was a sectional trait that would not down, but in the West it could not remain sectional. It was the greatest of frontiersmen who declared: "I believe this Government can not endure permanently half slave and half free. It will become all of one thing or all of the other." Nothing works for nationalism like intercourse within the nation. Mobility of population is death to localism, and the western frontier worked irresistibly in unsettling population. The effect reached back from the frontier and affected profoundly the Atlantic coast and even the Old World.

GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY

But the most important effect of the frontier has been in the promotion of democracy here and in Europe. As has been indicated, the frontier is productive of individualism. Complex society is precipitated by the wilderness into a kind of primitive organization based on the family. The tendency is anti-social. It produces antipathy to control, and particularly to any direct control. The tax-gatherer is viewed as a representative of oppression. Prof. Osgood, in an able article,⁴⁶ has pointed out that the frontier conditions prevalent in the colonies are important factors in the explanation of the American Revolution, where individual liberty was sometimes confused with absence of all effective government. The same conditions aid in explaining the difficulty of instituting a strong government in the period of the confederacy. The frontier individualism has from the beginning promoted democracy.

The frontier States that came into the Union in the first quarter of a century of its existence came in with democratic suffrage provisions, and had reactive effects of the highest importance upon the older States whose peoples were being attracted there. An extension of the franchise became essential. It was *western* New York that forced an extension of suffrage in the constitutional convention of that State in 1821; and it was *western* Virginia that compelled the tide-water region to put a more liberal suffrage provision in the constitution framed in 1830, and to give to the frontier region a more nearly proportionate representation with the tide-water aristocracy. The rise of democracy as an effective force in the nation

⁴⁶ *Political Science Quarterly*, ii, p. 457. Compare Sumner, *Alexander Hamilton*, chs. ii-vii.

came in with western preponderance under Jackson and William Henry Harrison, and it meant the triumph of the frontier—with all of its good and with all of its evil elements.⁴⁷ An interesting illustration of the tone of frontier democracy in 1830 comes from the same debates in the Virginia convention already referred to. A representative from western Virginia declared:

But, sir, it is not the increase of population in the West which this gentleman ought to fear. It is the energy which the mountain breeze and western habits impart to those emigrants. They are regenerated, politically I mean, sir. They soon become *working politicians*; and the difference, sir, between a *talking* and a *working* politician is immense. The Old Dominion has long been celebrated for producing great orators; the ablest metaphysicians in policy; men that can split hairs in all abstruse questions of political economy. But at home, or when they return from Congress, they have negroes to fan them asleep. But a Pennsylvania, a New York, an Ohio, or a western Virginia statesman, though far inferior in logic, metaphysics, and rhetoric to an old Virginia statesman, has this advantage, that when he returns home he takes off his coat and takes hold of the plow. This gives him bone and muscle, sir, and preserves his republican principles pure and uncontaminated.

So long as free land exists, the opportunity for a competency exists, and economic power secures political power. But the democracy born of free land, strong in selfishness and individualism, intolerant of administrative experience and education, and pressing individual liberty beyond its proper bounds, has its dangers as well as its benefits. Individualism in America has allowed a laxity in regard to governmental affairs which has rendered possible the spoils system and all the manifest evils that follow from the lack of a highly developed civic spirit. In this connection may be noted also the influence of frontier conditions in permitting lax business honor, inflated paper currency and wild-cat banking. The colonial and revolutionary frontier was the region whence emanated many of the worst forms of an evil currency.⁴⁸ The West in the War of 1812 repeated the phenomenon on the frontier of that day, while the speculation and wild-cat banking of the period of the crisis of 1837 occurred on the new

⁴⁷ Compare Wilson, *Division and Reunion*, pp. 15, 24.

⁴⁸ On the relation of frontier conditions to Revolutionary taxation, see Sumner, *Alexander Hamilton*, ch. iii.

frontier belt of the next tier of States. Thus each one of the periods of lax financial integrity coincides with periods when a new set of frontier communities had arisen, and coincides in area with these successive frontiers, for the most part. The recent Populist agitation is a case in point. Many a State that now declines any connection with the tenets of the Populists, itself adhered to such ideas in an earlier stage of the development of the State. A primitive society can hardly be expected to show the intelligent appreciation of the complexity of business interests in a developed society. The continual recurrence of these areas of paper-money agitation is another evidence that the frontier can be isolated and studied as a factor in American history of the highest importance.⁴⁹

ATTEMPTS TO CHECK AND REGULATE THE FRONTIER

The East has always feared the result of an unregulated advance of the frontier, and has tried to check and guide it. The English authorities would have checked settlement at the headwaters of the Atlantic tributaries and allowed the "savages to enjoy their deserts in quiet lest the peltry trade should decrease." This called out Burke's splendid protest:

If you stopped your grants, what would be the consequence? The people would occupy without grants. They have already so occupied in many places. You can not station garrisons in every part of these deserts. If you drive the people from one place, they will carry on their annual tillage and remove with their flocks and herds to another. Many of the people in the back settlements are already little attached to particular situations. Already they have topped the Appalachian Mountains. From thence they behold before them an immense plain, one vast, rich, level meadow; a square of five hundred miles. Over this they would wander without a possibility of restraint; they would change their manners with their habits of life; would soon forget a government by which they were disowned; would become hordes of

⁴⁹ I have refrained from dwelling on the lawless characteristics of the frontier, because they are sufficiently well known. The gambler and desperado, the regulators of the Carolinas and the vigilantes of California, are types of that line of scum that the waves of advancing civilization bore before them, and of the growth of spontaneous organs of authority where legal authority was absent. Compare Barrows, *United States of Yesterday and To-morrow*; Shinn, *Mining Camps*; and Bancroft, *Popular Tribunals*. The humor, bravery, and rude strength, as well as the vices of the frontier in its worst aspect, have left traces on American character, language, and literature, not soon to be effaced.

English Tartars; and, pouring down upon your unfortified frontiers a fierce and irresistible cavalry, become masters of your governors and your counselors, your collectors and comptrollers, and of all the slaves that adhered to them. Such would, and in no long time must, be the effect of attempting to forbid as a crime and to suppress as an evil the command and blessing of Providence, "Increase and multiply." Such would be the happy result of an endeavor to keep as a lair of wild beasts that earth which God, by an express charter, has given to the children of men.

But the English Government was not alone in its desire to limit the advance of the frontier and guide its destinies. Tide-water Virginia⁵⁰ and South Carolina⁵¹ gerrymandered those colonies to insure the dominance of the coast in their legislatures. Washington desired to settle a State at a time in the Northwest; Jefferson would reserve from settlement the territory of his Louisiana Purchase north of the thirty-second parallel, in order to offer it to the Indians in exchange for their settlements east of the Mississippi. "When we shall be full on this side," he writes, "we may lay off a range of States on the western bank from the head to the mouth, and so range after range, advancing compactly as we multiply." Madison went so far as to argue to the French minister that the United States had no interest in seeing population extend itself on the right bank of the Mississippi, but should rather fear it. When the Oregon question was under debate, in 1824, Smyth, of Virginia, would draw an unchangeable line for the limits of the United States at the outer limit of two tiers of States beyond the Mississippi, complaining that the seaboard States were being drained of the flower of their population by the bringing of too much land into market. Even Thomas Benton, the man of widest views of the destiny of the West, at this stage of his career declared that along the ridge of the Rocky mountains "the western limits of the Republic should be drawn, and the statue of the fabled god Terminus should be raised upon its highest peak, never to be thrown down."⁵² But the attempts to limit the boundaries, to restrict land sales and settlement, and to deprive the West of its share of political power were all in vain. Steadily the frontier

⁵⁰ *Debates in the Constitutional Convention, 1820-1830.*

⁵¹ [McCrary] *Eminent and Representative Men of the Carolinas*, i, p. 43; Calhoun, *Works*, i, pp. 401-406.

⁵² Speech in the Senate, March 1, 1825; *Register of Debates*, i, 721.

of settlement advanced and carried with it individualism, democracy, and nationalism, and powerfully affected the East and the Old World.

MISSIONARY ACTIVITY

The most effective efforts of the East to regulate the frontier came through its educational and religious activity, exerted by interstate migration and by organized societies. Speaking in 1835, Dr. Lyman Beecher declared: "It is equally plain that the religious and political destiny of our nation is to be decided in the West," and he pointed out that the population of the West "is assembled from all the States of the Union and from all the nations of Europe, and is rushing in like the waters of the flood, demanding for its moral preservation the immediate and universal action of those institutions which discipline the mind and arm the conscience and the heart. And so various are the opinions and habits, and so recent and imperfect is the acquaintance, and so sparse are the settlements of the West, that no homogeneous public sentiment can be formed to legislate immediately into being the requisite institutions. And yet they are all needed immediately in their utmost perfection and power. A nation is being 'born in a day.' . . . But what will become of the West if her prosperity rushes up to such a majesty of power, while those great institutions linger which are necessary to form the mind and the conscience and the heart of that vast world. It must not be permitted. . . . Let no man at the East quiet himself and dream of liberty, whatever may become of the West. . . . Her destiny is our destiny."⁵⁸

With the appeal to the conscience of New England, he adds appeals to her fears lest other religious sects anticipate her own. The New England preacher and school-teacher left their mark on the West. The dread of Western emancipation from New England's political and economic control was paralleled by her fears lest the West cut loose from her religion. Commenting in 1850 on reports that settlement was rapidly extending northward in Wisconsin, the editor of the *Home Missionary* writes: "We scarcely know whether to rejoice or mourn over this extension of our settlements. While we sympathize in whatever tends to increase the physical resources and prosperity of our country, we can not forget that with all these

⁵⁸ *Plea for the West* (Cincinnati, 1835), pp. 11 ff.

dispersions into remote and still remoter corners of the land the supply of the means of grace is becoming relatively less and less." Acting in accordance with such ideas, home missions were established and Western colleges were erected. As seaboard cities like Philadelphia, New York, and Baltimore strove for mastery of Western trade, so the various denominations strove for the possession of the West. Thus an intellectual stream from New England sources fertilized the West. Other sections sent their missionaries; but the real struggle was between sects. The contest for power and the expansive tendency furnished to the various sects by the existence of a moving frontier must have had important results on the character of religious organization in the United States. The multiplication of rival churches in the little frontier towns had deep and lasting social effects. The religious aspects of the frontier make a chapter in our history which needs study.

INTELLECTUAL TRAITS

From the conditions of frontier life came intellectual traits of profound importance. The works of travelers along each frontier from colonial days onward describe certain common traits, and these traits have, while softening down, still persisted as survivals in the place of their origin, even when a higher social organization succeeded. The result is that to the frontier the American intellect owes its striking characteristics. That coarseness and strength combined with acuteness and inquisitiveness; that practical, inventive turn of mind, quick to find expedients; that masterful grasp of material things, lacking in the artistic but powerful to effect great ends; that restless, nervous energy;⁵⁴ that dominant individualism, working for good and for evil, and withal that buoyancy and exuberance which comes with freedom—these are traits of the frontier, or traits called out elsewhere because of the existence of the frontier. Since the days when the fleet of Columbus sailed into the waters of the New World,

⁵⁴ Colonial travelers agree in remarking on the phlegmatic characteristics of the colonists. It has frequently been asked how such a people could have developed that strained nervous energy now characteristic of them. Compare Sumner, *Alexander Hamilton*, p. 98, and Adams, *History of the United States*, i, p. 60; ix, pp. 240, 241. The transition appears to become marked at the close of the War of 1812, a period when interest centered upon the development of the West, and the West was noted for restless energy. Grund, *Americans*, ii, ch. i.

America has been another name for opportunity, and the people of the United States have taken their tone from the incessant expansion which has not only been open but has even been forced upon them. He would be a rash prophet who should assert that the expansive character of American life has now entirely ceased. Movement has been its dominant fact, and, unless this training has no effect upon a people, the American energy will continually demand a wider field for its exercise. But never again will such gifts of free land offer themselves. For a moment, at the frontier, the bonds of custom are broken and unrestraint is triumphant. There is not *tabula rasa*. The stubborn American environment is there with its imperious summons to accept its conditions; the inherited ways of doing things are also there; and yet, in spite of environment, and in spite of custom, each frontier did indeed furnish a new field of opportunity, a gate of escape from the bondage of the past; and freshness, and confidence, and scorn of older society, impatience of its restraints and its ideas, and indifference to its lessons, have accompanied the frontier. What the Mediterranean Sea was to the Greeks, breaking the bond of custom, offering new experiences, calling out new institutions and activities, that, and more, the ever retreating frontier has been to the United States directly, and to the nations of Europe more remotely. And now, four centuries from the discovery of America, at the end of a hundred years of life under the Constitution, the frontier has gone, and with its going has closed the first period of American history.

GEORGE ROGERS TAYLOR

THE CONCENTRATION of historical interest in the causation of major events has often resulted in distorted conceptions of the years preceding them. For example, historians have only begun to emancipate the study of Confederation period after the Revolution from the domination of the Constitutional Convention of 1787.

This tendency is especially notable in the descriptions of the eras before major wars. In particular, historians have found it difficult to write of the United States between 1820 and 1860 without being unduly influenced by their knowledge that the Civil War lay ahead. Whatever pertains to slavery or the promotion of sectional tension has been emphasized. Many of the important developments of the prewar years which had nothing to do with the coming of the war have been either minimized or molded to conform to the theme of impending conflict.

The economic history of these decades has often suffered this disfigurement. Absorbed with the problem of the economic antagonisms between North and South, historians have neglected an adequate discussion of fundamental economic developments in terms of their own importance. George Rogers Taylor's *Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860*, fills this gap brilliantly. The index does not contain a single reference to the "Civil War."

The title of Taylor's work describes its most important theme but does less than justice to the full breadth of its subject matter.

The author regards the changes in transportation, especially the coming of the railroad, as the most essential factor in the changing national economy. Yet he does not minimize the formative influence of such factors as population changes and manufacturing technology. Detailed summaries are given of the rise of a factory system, of the impact of economic organization upon labor, of banking and finance, and of the relations between government and business. Taylor points out constantly the interrelations of these developments, but he wisely does not insist upon an integrated analysis based upon the single theme of a "transportation revolution."

Valuable in itself, the book has the added virtue of helping to dispel a number of serious misconceptions about other periods of economic history. For example, Taylor's description of the important growth of manufacturing before the Civil War will serve as an antidote to the historians who have claimed that war needs brought the industrial revolution to America. Perhaps even more important are the chapters devoted to disproving the common assumption that the theory and practice of the nineteenth century called for a vigorous separation of government and business. A number of monographs have called attention to limited areas of government intervention in the economy, but this more comprehensive survey of both state and federal activities will have a greater impact on the traditional view.

Best of all, Taylor's study represents the trend away from history conceived narrowly in terms of dramatic military and political events. It offers convincing evidence that any survey of the prewar years told simply in terms of the progressive bisection of country into warring camps is stunted and immature.

Domestic Trade

TURNPIKE VS. WATER AND RAIL TRANSPORTATION

EACH new method of transportation had to establish itself in a bitter competitive battle against previously existing devices, and each new traffic route had to meet competition from established ones. This competitive struggle provides one of the chief characteristics of the period, and it profoundly affected the rate and nature of American industrial development.

Turnpikes were chiefly built over routes where water transportation was not easily available, so that for the most part they served to supplement rather than to compete with water routes. Thus in New England they led inland in a generally east and west direction and avoided to a considerable extent paralleling the coast or the Connecticut River; in New York they radiated out from Hudson River towns, and in the Middle Atlantic states generally they ran at right angles to water routes or led westward over the mountains.

For travelers, stagecoaches were faster, although more expensive and much less comfortable for long journeys, than sailing packets. But where coastwise journeys were very roundabout, stagecoaches secured considerable patronage. Travelers between Boston and New York who wished to avoid the tedious voyage around Cape Cod brought a brisk business to the stages between Boston and Providence. But from Providence to New York such persons usually preferred the sailing packets and later the steamships. Similarly, those going from New York to Philadelphia increasingly avoided the time-consuming sea journey by taking coaches over the much more direct turnpike routes across New Jersey.

The steamboats on their advent quickly absorbed most of the parallel turnpike traffic which had survived previous river competition. Their competition actually hurt only a few stage lines and stimulated many others, which began running so-called "accom-

From *The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860*, by George Taylor, by permission of Rinehart & Company, Incorporated.

modation" stages timed to meet the steamboats at such ports as Hartford, Connecticut; Albany and Newburgh, New York; and Richmond, Virginia. But for the transportation of goods, turnpikes could compete successfully with carriage by sea or river only under very special conditions. The large number of heavy wagons on the Boston-Providence Turnpike indicates that, for valuable freight shipments between New York and Boston, merchants often used this turnpike in order to avoid the long sea journey around Cape Cod.¹ Appreciable quantities of valuable freight also moved by wagon over the mountains from Baltimore and Philadelphia to Ohio River points, thus saving not only the tedious coastwise trip to New Orleans, but also, before steamboat carriage became important, the expensive three or four months' passage from New Orleans to the upper Ohio River.

Lead from the Galena district in southwestern Wisconsin was sent down the Mississippi and thence by sea to a market on the Atlantic coast. Not only was this route exceedingly roundabout, but steam navigation on the river between Galena and St. Louis was expensive and undependable. Unusually low water in the summer of 1839 greatly curtailed the river trade, and the successful experiment was made of shipping lead across southern Wisconsin in wagons drawn by six or eight yoke of oxen. At Milwaukee the lead was sent on to an eastern market by lake, and the wagons returned loaded with merchandise for the mining district. Once established, the trade on this overland route remained substantial during the forties despite the competition of the river route.²

Most turnpikes, especially those in New England and the South, were not faced with important canal competition, but where such competition did appear, results varied. At least in the case of the Middlesex Canal, the waterway won the freight business away from the teamsters only after an extended struggle. Not until the late 1820's and after repeatedly lowering its rates did this canal succeed in overcoming important turnpike competition not only in carrying

¹ Taylor, "The Turnpike Era in New England," pp. 236-240, 254-256; Lane, *From Indian Trail to Iron Horse*, pp. 159-160; Kistler, "The Rise of Railroads in the Connecticut River Valley," p. 24.

² Orin Grant Libby, "Significance of the Lead and Shot Trade in Early Wisconsin History," *Collection of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin*, XIII, (1895), 313-325.

raw materials and manufactured goods for the textile mills of Lowell, Massachusetts, but also for transporting such bulky county produce as ashes and grain from tributary farming areas as far as 160 miles northward in New Hampshire.³ This struggle merits attention because it reveals the fundamental shortcomings of canals and emphasizes those factors in land transportation which later proved so advantageous for the railroads.

The one clear advantage of the canal was its lower ton-mile rates, but the superintendent of the Middlesex Canal in a report submitted in 1822 pointed out the following considerations which, unless rate differences were sufficiently great, led shippers to prefer wagon transportation:

1) Practically all goods had to be carried from the farms to the canal by wagon. The teamsters having a monopoly of this business charged very high rates. The same carriers greatly reduced their ton-mile rates when they carried goods all the way to Boston.

2) Through shipment by team permitted avoidance of truckage charges between the canal and the warehouse in Boston.

3) The country trader who personally accompanied his shipments, supervised the sale of his produce in Boston, and actually purchased his return load did not have "to wait in town after making his purchases nor at home for his goods" if he used turnpike transportation.

4) The trader who conducted his operations from his store in the country and shipped by turnpike dealt with a single teamster who made a round trip for him and who was held responsible for delays or damage to goods. If the merchant used the canal he dealt at a distance and often through intermediaries with canal agents, Boston teamsters, and merchants. This was inconvenient and frequently gave rise to difficulties in fixing responsibility for delays or damage to shipments.

5) The time of arrival of goods sent by canal was unpredictable, and country traders were often put to the expense of sending teams to secure freight at the nearest canal port only to find that their shipments had not arrived.⁴

Of course these difficulties arose in part from the lack of fast com-

³ Roberts, *The Middlesex Canal, 1793-1860*, pp. 148-154, 166-170.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 149-151.

munications and from the imperfect commercial organization of the time. But they illustrate the superior flexibility and convenience of road over canal shipment.

The canals of the Middle Atlantic states promptly took away from the turnpikes most of their long-distance freight. Thus, teamsters could not compete with the Morris Canal across New Jersey nor with the Erie and the Main Line of the Pennsylvania for shipments to the West. Nevertheless, they continued to do a large local business and, until the railroads came, to operate over their old routes in the winter when ice closed the canals. In middlewestern states the periods of canal and turnpike building coincided, and to a considerable extent roads were built to facilitate movement of goods to and from canals or rivers.

In the transportation of passengers, the turnpikes suffered little from canal competition. Most American canals did little or no passenger business. The Pennsylvania Main Line and the Erie were exceptional in that they carried many passengers, especially during early canal days, but this was largely new business which would not have existed but for the canals. In fact, the more successful canals like the Erie actually stimulated turnpike traffic. Impatient of the slowness of canalboats, many persons chose to travel by coach on New York turnpikes which paralleled the waterway. Turnpikes which led to the canal often became canal feeder lines, and their traffic increased with the growing population and wealth of the region.⁵

When the railroads appeared, they quickly captured the passenger business and thus took over the chief remaining turnpike traffic. Even less could the wagon lines compete effectively for freight with parallel railroad lines, though for a few years, until rail freight rates were considerably reduced, wagon routes offered occasional competition where rail lines were unusually roundabout and charges high. But for freight shipment of fifteen miles or less, railroads were at a disadvantage as compared to the more flexible wagon. In most

⁵ Durrenberger, *Turnpikes*, p. 142; Holmes, "The Turnpike Era," V, 270, 290-399; Lane, *From Indian Trail to Iron Horse*, pp. 161, 263; Leland D. Baldwin, *Pittsburgh: The Story of a City* (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press, 1937), p. 188; McKelvey, *Rochester: The Water-Power City, 1812-1854*, p. 94; Oliver W. Holmes, "The Stage-Coach Business in the Hudson Valley," *New York State Historical Association, Quarterly Journal*, XII, No. 3 (July, 1931), 246.

areas the railroads actually added to the business of the teamsters, for the increased demand for short haul movements more than made up for the long-distance traffic lost to the railroads.⁶

COMPETING WATER ROUTES

The phenomenal growth of overland commerce between the Atlantic states and the West during the decades preceding 1860 should not be permitted to deflect attention from what was in 1816 and remained in 1860 the most important trade route in the country, that along the Atlantic coast. This coastwise shipping lane was challenged by the development of an extensive inland waterway system paralleling the coast. Roughly following Gallatin's great plan, canals connecting bays and sounds made possible, by the 1830's, continuous shipment on this sheltered passage from New London, Connecticut, to Wilmington, North Carolina.

But long-distance shipments by this inland passage did not seriously rival those by sea. Naval stores from North Carolina and flour and tobacco from the Chesapeake region continued for the most part to move to New York and New England markets by coastwise vessels, the manufactured products of the northern states and Europe furnishing valuable return cargoes. Nevertheless, the canals were utilized for some long-distance shipments. Thus, barges laden with coal from Richmond, Virginia, arrived in New York Harbor via the James River, the Chesapeake Bay, the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal, the Delaware Bay and River, and the Delaware and Raritan Canal, and limited amounts of merchandise moved all the way back to the Chesapeake ports by this route. Even from far up the Susquehanna, barges descended to the Chesapeake and followed this inside route to New York, a journey of about seven hundred miles.

But it was over the shorter distances and primarily between Philadelphia and New York that the canal system so successfully challenged the sea route that only the bulkiest products were left for coastal vessels. Of course, a little later the railroads in turn took the most valuable freight away from the canals, and the inland and sea routes were left to divide the less valuable business between them. In the late twenties, anthracite rapidly became the great export

⁶ See Kistler, "The Rise of Railroads in the Connecticut River Valley," pp. 185-189; Kirkland, *Men, Cities and Transportation*, p. 202.

staple of Pennsylvania. Most of the Lackawanna coal from northeastern Pennsylvania moved directly to New York over the Delaware and Hudson Canal and that from the nearby Lehigh fields reached the same market over the Morris Canal. From this latter source large quantities of anthracite also went down the Delaware Division Canal and reached New York either by way of the Delaware and Raritan Canal or by sloop around Cape May. Anthracite from the great Schuylkill area arrived at tidewater on the Delaware River via the Schuylkill Navigation or the Reading Railroad and, although much was sent on to New York by sea, the Delaware and Raritan Canal, by adjusting its tolls to meet coastwise competition, managed to capture an appreciable part of this business.⁷

The prosperity of the western states depended upon their ability to exchange the products of their farms for needed manufactures and other outside products like salt, sugar, and coffee. At the beginning of this period the high cost of transportation erected a wall around the states west of the Alleghenies which seriously blocked the economic development of that area. In a sense, this barrier was overcome by the spirit of a pioneering people who, defying or ignoring difficulties, crowded into the broad western valley. Three great developments in the technique of transportation—steamboats, canals, and steam railroads—helped to raze this wall and to justify frontier optimism. The part played by steamboats and canals is here briefly summarized; the role of the railroad is examined in the following section.

At the beginning of this period the transportation to and from the Ohio River Valley moved counterclockwise in an irregular circle more than three thousand miles in circumference. Upcountry produce such as wheat, flour, butter, pork, and pork products from western Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Indiana; tobacco and hemp from Kentucky; cotton from Tennessee and lead from Missouri, Illinois, and Wisconsin—these moved southward by flatboat to New Orleans on the river arc of the circle. Transportation on this section was far from satisfactory. It was time consuming and expensive not only because the flatboats had to be sold for little or nothing at New

⁷ *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, VIII (1843), 546-549; Lane, *From Indian Trail to Iron Horse*, pp. 257-276; Albion, *The Rise of New York Port*, pp. 134-142; MacGill, *History of Transportation*, pp. 233-234.

Orleans,⁸ but also because the men who manned them had, at least before steamboat days, to return home as best they could, usually by foot over the Natchez Trace, which followed the old Indian trail from Natchez through the Chickasaw country to Nashville. Also, trade moved almost exclusively in one direction. Upriver shipments were almost prohibitively expensive even for the most light and valuable merchandise.

From New Orleans, some upriver products were exported to Europe and the West Indies, but in large part they flowed around the second and longest arc of the circle, i.e., by coastwise vessels to Atlantic ports, chiefly New York, Boston, and Philadelphia. Though much the longest of the three parts of this circular route, it presented the fewest problems. Costs of ocean transportation, even on this long sea route, were, despite the danger of gulf hurricanes and the peril of storms off Cape Hatteras, remarkably low. Also, trade could move as easily in one direction as the other.

In order to overcome the delays and costs of breaking cargo at New Orleans, in the first decade of the century a considerable number of seagoing vessels had been built on the Ohio River, loaded with produce for eastern or foreign markets, floated down the river to New Orleans, and then sailed to their destination. Despite many discouragements, attempts of this kind were still being made in the years immediately following the War of 1812. Thus, the fifty-ton schooner *Maria*, built at Marietta and carrying a cargo of pork, flour, and lard, arrived at Baltimore, Maryland, in July, 1816, in forty-six days.⁹ But the hazards of river navigation by seagoing vessels and the rapid development of the river steamboat soon gave the *coup de grâce* to this unique development.

Finally, the circle was closed by the routes across the Appalachian Highlands from Philadelphia and Baltimore over which the West received, in return for its downriver exports, textiles, hats, shoes, hardware, china, books, tea, and so on. This overland stretch of about three hundred miles proved the least satisfactory arc of the whole route for transportation by wagon over this short distance cost more than shipment by sea and river all the way from Pitts-

⁸ Baldwin, *The Keelboat Age on Western Waters*, p. 54.

⁹ *Niles' Weekly Register*, X (May 11, 1816), 184, and X (May 20, 1816), 346.

burgh to Philadelphia.¹⁰ Moreover, as on the river route, freight moved chiefly in one direction, for the cost of turnpike carriage eastward across the mountains effectively discouraged return loads made up of the bulky produce of the frontier.

Developments during the four and one half decades of this study greatly affected the flow of commerce on each of the three arcs of the circle described above. The introduction of fast, regularly sailing packets added materially to the speed and dependability of shipment on the coastwise sector. On the river, steamboats greatly reduced the time and cost of shipment and made upriver traffic little more expensive than downstream. And on the bottleneck arc across the Appalachians, canals and then railroads performed a similar miracle.

By making possible upriver trade and greatly reducing transport costs both up and down the river, the steamboat gave the first great impetus to western growth. An increasing flood of western products came down the rivers, while northward from New Orleans there began to move a growing stream of eastern and European merchandise—salt, sugar, coffee, and a hundred other needed items—which frontiersmen could now afford to purchase.

Chiefly because of this technological change in river transportation the terms of trade shifted sharply to the advantage of the westerners. This is strikingly shown in the behavior of prices of western exports as compared with imports. Because of the deflation of 1819-1820 the level of prices in all American markets was much lower in 1826-1830 than in 1816-1820, but the prices of western export staples declined less in the Ohio River Valley than at New Orleans and Atlantic ports, and the prices of imports into the West fell more drastically in the Ohio Valley than at seaport cities. Thus during 1816-1820 a barrel of flour averaged \$2.16 higher in New Orleans than in Cincinnati. By 1826-1830 New Orleans prices were only \$1.75 higher, a 19 per cent decline. For other major exports this differential was even greater. The difference between mess pork prices a barrel was \$7.57 in the first five-year period, while only \$2.41 in the second, a 68 per cent decline.¹¹

As would be expected from the fact that upriver freight rates

¹⁰ Berry, *Western Prices before 1861*, p. 81.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

declined much more than did those for downriver shipments, the price difference on imports shrank even more sharply between these two five-year periods. Coffee which cost 16 cents more a pound in Cincinnati than in New Orleans in the first period cost only 2.6 cents more in the second, a decline of about 84 per cent! On sugar the difference for a hundred pounds fell from \$10.33 to \$2.64, or 74 per cent.¹² Some notion of what these changes meant in terms of purchasing power to the inhabitants of the Ohio Valley may be easily illustrated. In 1816-1820 an Ohio farmer could exchange a barrel of flour in Cincinnati for 27 pounds of sugar; in 1826-1830 it would bring 39 pounds. Or taking a more favorable ratio, a barrel of pork which would have exchanged in the earlier period for 30 pounds of coffee would buy about 52 pounds of coffee in 1826-1830.¹³ These comparisons are, of course, in terms of wholesale prices, but there is no reason to believe the picture would be appreciably altered were retail quotations available.

No sooner had trade adjusted itself to changes wrought by the river steamboat, than canals, penetrating the barriers on the short Appalachian route, further stimulated western commerce and influenced the direction of its flow. It will be remembered that the Erie Canal was opened for through traffic in 1825, the Pennsylvania Main Line in 1834, the two canals across Ohio respectively in 1833 and 1845, and the Illinois and Michigan Canal in 1848. The first effect of these new waterways was greatly to stimulate traffic from the landlocked areas through which they passed, although before long the commerce of the whole Great Lakes area and the Ohio Valley began to feel their influence. The valuable manufactured products of the East moved in growing volume directly westward across New York and Pennsylvania. The merchants of Marietta, Cincinnati, Louisville, and even of Frankfort and Nashville secured an increasing portion of their merchandise over both northern Ohio routes and via the Pennsylvania canal system. By 1846 more than half of its manufactured imports reached the Ohio basin by this latter route. The value of goods shipped to the West by way of the Erie Canal was nearly \$10,000,000 in 1836; by 1853 it was

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹³ Computed from tables in Cole, *Wholesale Commodity Prices in the United States, Statistical Supplement*.

more than \$94,000,000. Chicago became an important receiving and distributing point for New York merchandise and, with the opening of the Illinois and Michigan Canal in 1848, St. Louis, which had been an important distributing center for goods imported via New Orleans, began to get increasing shipments by way of the Illinois and Michigan Canal.¹⁴

For the first time the bulky products of the West began to flow directly eastward. By connecting with the Great Lakes, the canal system of New York had tapped the finest inland waterway in the world. The immigrants who crowded the Erie canalboats and settled first in Ohio, Indiana, and Michigan, and later in the more western lake states, soon sent back over the route they had traveled an increasing flow of flour, wheat, and other frontier products. By 1835 flour and wheat, equal to 268,000 barrels of flour, were shipped from the West to tidewater via the Erie; by 1840 shipments exceeded 1,000,000 barrels. By 1860 they totaled 4,344,000 barrels. As early as 1838 receipts at Buffalo exceeded those at the Mississippi River port. After 1848 Buffalo received wheat and flour even from faraway St. Louis via the Illinois River, the Illinois and Michigan Canal, and the Lakes.¹⁵

In the Ohio Basin, produce, which from the first settlement of the West had gone down the river to market, now began to reverse its flow. Produce was carried to Lake Erie by either the Miami or the Ohio Canal and thence via the Erie Canal to the New York markets. Grain and flour from Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and southern Ohio and even some Kentucky tobacco moved to eastern markets by way of the Ohio Canal. As early as 1842 the value of farm products shipped from Cleveland at the head of the canal was about equal to the value of such products shipped from New Orleans. But most of these exports were the products of Ohio farmlands situated near the canals. Neither of the two canals across Ohio ever developed a large through traffic, despite the fact that

¹⁴ Switzler, *Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States*, p. 211; Emory R. Johnson and others, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of United States* (2 vols., Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1915), I, 232-235; Putnam, *The Illinois and Michigan Canal*, pp. 102-105.

¹⁵ *Monthly Summary of Commerce and Finance* (January, 1900), p. 1969; *Eighth Census: Agriculture*, pp. cxlviii and clvi; Putnam, *The Illinois and Michigan Canal*, pp. 102-105.

low rates were instituted in order to encourage long-distance traffic. Apparently through traffic was discouraged by the large number of locks and the slow rate of movement possible. Nevertheless, in 1846 James L. Barton asserted that flour was being shipped from St. Louis via river to Cincinnati and thence by canal and lake to New York City. Though the freight cost via Cincinnati was \$1.53 a barrel compared to \$1.40 via New Orleans, he claimed the northern route was to be preferred because of the danger of souring and other damage to the flour on the southern route.¹⁶

The alternative direct route eastward—up the Ohio and over the Pennsylvania Main Line Canal—also provided an outlet for a number of western products. About 20,000 hogsheads of tobacco annually passed eastward over the Main Line Canal, and by 1850-1852 total shipments of pork and pork products by this route were almost as large as those sent down the river. But the total volume of through traffic eastward via this Pennsylvania canal, though considerable, fell well below that on the Erie. In 1844 it amounted to less than 75,000 tons, while that on the Erie for the same year totaled over 350,000 tons.¹⁷

A third direct water route to the East—through British North America by way of the Welland Canal, Lake Ontario, and the St. Lawrence River—constituted another outlet for the bulky products of the West. In fact, in the late fifties a number of ships carried western products directly from Chicago to Liverpool over this route, but for the most part cargoes were transshipped at Quebec. Much money was spent on digging canals and in improving navigation on the St. Lawrence River. Hopes ran high that a good deal of American trade would be attracted to this northern route, but it was never able to compete effectively with the Erie Canal-Hudson River outlet. Although the cost of shipment from Chicago to Quebec was less than that to New York via the Erie Canal, the ocean freights

¹⁶ *Lake Commerce*, Letter to the Hon. Robert M'Clelland (Buffalo: Jewett, Thomas and Co., 2d ed., 1846), p. 18.

¹⁷ Ernest L. Bogart, "Early Canal Traffic and Railroad Competition in Ohio," *Journal of Political Economy*, XXI, No. 1 (January, 1913), 53-65; Johnson and others, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*, I, 230-237; Berry, *Western Prices before 1861*, pp. 89-90; Switzler, *Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States*, pp. 210-211; Louis Bernard Schmidt, "The Internal Grain Trade of the United States, 1850-1860," *Iowa Journal of History and Politics*, XVIII, No. 1 (January, 1920), 94-124.

from Quebec to Liverpool were much higher (nearly double in 1856) than from New York to the great English market. The port of Quebec was closed during the winter, lacked the excellent port facilities of its rival to the south, and held out scant promise for inbound cargoes.¹⁸

Despite the tremendous volume of commerce developed by the canal routes, the Mississippi trade showed no slackening in its growth. The rise in the value of receipts at New Orleans from the interior is shown in the accompanying table. For 1860 the value was the greatest in river history up to that time, and from 1820 to 1860 the total value of commerce at New Orleans from upriver had about doubled in each successive decade.

VALUE OF RECEIPTS AT NEW ORLEANS FROM THE
INTERIOR FOR SELECTED YEARS, 1816-1860

(In thousands of dollars)

Year	Value
1816	9,749
1820	12,637
1830	22,066
1840	49,764
1850	96,898
1860	185,211

Source: William F. Switzler, *Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States*, Part II of Commerce and Navigation, *Special Report on the Commerce of the Mississippi, Ohio, and Other Rivers, and of the Bridges Which Cross Them* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1888), pp. 199, 209.

But it should not be concluded that river traffic was unaffected by the competition of canals, beginning in the thirties, and of the railroads in the fifties. The whole West was growing so rapidly that for the time being there was more than enough business for all channels of trade. The tremendous tonnages reaching Buffalo from the Lake region consisted largely of new production made possible by the Erie Canal. At the same time that produce was being diverted eastward from the Ohio Valley, states tributary to the upper Mississippi—Illinois, Missouri, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Minnesota—were rapidly

¹⁸ Samuel McKee, Jr., "Canada's Bid for the Traffic of the Middle West: A Quarter-Century of the History of the St. Lawrence Waterway, 1849-1874," *Report of the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Historical Association* (May, 1940), pp. 26-35.

increasing their shipments down the river. Moreover, the lower Mississippi Valley was one of the most rapidly developing sections of the country, with the result that receipts of cotton and sugar at New Orleans tremendously increased.

Although the rate of growth of commerce on the Mississippi did not slacken, major changes in its nature were taking place. New Orleans became much less important as a distributing center for the manufactured products of the East. The value of eastern products reaching the interior in 1851 was about twice as great by the Hudson and canal as by coastwise shipment and the Mississippi. At the same time the upriver shipments of such products as West Indian coffee and Louisiana sugar and molasses grew greatly as western population increased and the canals of Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio opened up new markets for southern, Caribbean, and South American products.

Significant changes also took place in the character of the downriver trade. Though the total value of river commerce continued to increase, the major part of this growth was due to increased receipts of southern staples, chiefly cotton, sugar, and molasses. In 1819-1820 western products had constituted 58 per cent of the total value of receipts at New Orleans. By 1849-1850 they were about 41 per cent of the total. It is significant that even before 1852, when through railroad connections were made with the Ohio River at Cincinnati, shipments to New Orleans of most of the major Ohio Valley products had already begun to decline in volume. Thus tobacco receipts at New Orleans reached their peak in 1843, wheat and flour and corn in 1847, butter in 1848, and pork in 1849.¹⁹ Though up-country produce arriving in New Orleans increased during the fifties, it was largely consumed in local delta markets or exported to the West Indies. Coastwise shipments of western products to the East showed a marked decline. Hence by 1860 the canals and railroads had almost completely substituted direct trade across the Appalachians for the old indirect route via New Orleans and the sea.²⁰

¹⁹ Berry, *Western Prices before 1861*, pp. 580-581; Switzler, *Report on the Internal Commerce of the United States*, pp. 209-215; Dixon, *A Traffic History of the Mississippi River System*, pp. 16, 24-26.

²⁰ Berry, *Western Prices before 1861*, pp. 90-91, 107; Dixon, *A Traffic History of the Mississippi River System*, p. 34.

RAILWAYS VS. WATERWAYS

Before 1840 the amount of traffic carried by American railways was negligible as compared with that moving on all inland waterways. By 1860 the total volume carried by the two methods was probably about equal, and the value of goods transported by railroad greatly exceeded that carried on the internal waterways. As the railroads were opened over new routes, they almost without exception immediately took away from competing waterways most of the passenger and light freight business. Except for the Erie Canal, which long provided cheap water passage for impecunious immigrants, passenger traffic on canals collapsed as soon as rival railroads were completed. The decline was just as sharp for other water routes, though a few long coastwise passages or shorter overnight sailings, as those between Albany, Hartford, or New London and New York, long retained a part of the passenger business because of their convenience.

Before through rail lines were completed from New York City to Lake Erie at the beginning of the fifties, the Erie Canal had developed a tremendous business in transporting westward the manufactured goods of the East. This trade reached its peak in 1853, but as a result of railroad competition was more than cut in half by 1860.²¹ Even in the carriage of the heavier and bulkier commodities the railroad proved an unexpectedly successful competitor. Confronted by railroads, such weak canals as the Middlesex and the Blackstone had collapsed before 1850. The Pennsylvania Main Line Canal, with its excessive lockage and its portage railroad, ceased to operate as an important through route soon after the Pennsylvania Railroad reached Pittsburgh in 1852. Most of the western canals rapidly lost the cream of their traffic to the railroads during the fifties.

River traffic was also adversely affected. Most of the trade on the upper Connecticut simply disappeared soon after rails paralleled the river. After 1852 the volume of goods shipped down the Ohio River to New Orleans declined because of railroad competition, but, so far

²¹ S. P. Chase, "Foreign and Domestic Commerce of the United States," *Senate Document No. 55, 38 Cong., 1 Sess. (1864)*, p. 181. This document is hereinafter referred to as the *Chase Report on Foreign and Domestic Commerce, 1864*.

as Ohio River traffic was concerned, this loss was more than compensated for by increased upriver shipments to the railheads at Pittsburgh and Wheeling, a growing traffic with St. Louis and the upper Mississippi River area, and greatly increased coal shipments.²²

Railroads, which, beginning in 1853, were rapidly completed across Illinois and Wisconsin to the Mississippi River, had no trouble in getting all the business they could handle. The number of bushels of wheat arriving at Chicago jumped from 937,000 in 1852 to 8,768,000 in 1856, and corn from 2,999,000 bushels in the former year to 11,888,000 in the latter. But commerce on the upper Mississippi also continued to increase during this decade. At St. Louis, the great distributing center for the whole upper Mississippi area, goods were transferred from the steamboats of the lower Mississippi built to operate in four to six feet of water to steamboats of the Missouri and upper Mississippi which might navigate in thirty inches or even less. At this great center, steamboat arrivals grew from 1,721 in 1840 to 2,879 in 1850, and to 3,454 in 1860.

In the long run, the river could not retain much traffic in competition with the railroads. The difficulties of navigation on the upper Mississippi and the long journey via New Orleans on which goods were especially likely to damage and spoilage proved much more costly than that directly eastward by rail or rail and water. But during the fifties settlement was advancing so rapidly in Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, and Iowa that both the rivers and the railroads were taxed to carry the growing traffic. So both increased in absolute tonnage carried, but from about 1847 and especially after 1852 the rivers transported a decreasing proportion of the total trade of the upper Mississippi area.²³

Even some of the cotton trade of New Orleans was surrendered to railroads. The Western and Atlantic Railroad, pushing westward from Augusta, made connections with Chattanooga in 1849, Nash-

²² Cf. Berry, *Western Prices before 1861*, pp. 39, 90-93; Johnson and others, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*, I, 244-247; Hunter, *Steamboats on the Western Rivers*, pp. 484-488.

²³ John B. Appleton, "The Declining Significance of the Mississippi as a Commercial Highway in the Middle of the Nineteenth Century," *The Bulletin of the Geographical Society of Philadelphia*, XXVIII (October, 1930), 267-284; Isaac Lippincott, *Internal Trade of the United States, 1700-1860* (*Washington University Studies*, Vol. IV, Pt. 2, No. 1, Second Study, October, 1916), p. 136.

ville in 1854, and Memphis in 1857. As a result, thousands of bales of cotton, which would have gone down the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers and the Mississippi to the Crescent City, instead swelled the exports of Charleston and Savannah. Nevertheless, the whole West was developing so rapidly and cotton and sugar production in the delta region immediately tributary to New Orleans was advancing so tremendously that the river trade continued its rapid growth down to the war. Exports of cotton from New Orleans and the total volume of river trade both reached their peak for the ante-bellum period in 1860.²⁴

In tonnage terms, most of the domestic commerce still moved by water in 1860. The direct trade between the West and the north Atlantic seaboard expanded so rapidly during the fifties that the railroads, the lakes, and the Erie Canal were all needed to deliver western products to the East. The tonnage carried by the Erie Canal grew tremendously despite railroad competition and did not actually reach its peak until 1880. The Great Lakes served as a gigantic extension of the Erie Canal, and during the fifties railroads, pushing westward from Chicago and Milwaukee, acted as feeders to the Great Lakes trade so that its volume, swollen by the corn of Iowa and the wheat of Illinois, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, grew from year to year in almost geometric ratio. By the end of the decade western flour (and wheat equivalent) transported to tidewater via the Erie Canal exceeded 4,000,000 barrels; of this probably about two thirds came from ports on Lake Michigan.²⁵

The railroads also rapidly increased their eastward shipments. The tonnage of through freight carried eastward by the Pennsylvania, Erie, New York Central, and Baltimore and Ohio railroads was not yet quite equal to that transported by the Erie Canal. But it was much more valuable, for the rails transported practically all of the merchandise and livestock, most of the packing house products, and about two thirds of the flour. As a result, the heavier and

²⁴ Johnson and others, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce in the United States*, I, 240-246; Dixon, *A Traffic History of the Mississippi River System*, pp. 32-36; Van Deusen, *Economic Bases of Disunion in South Carolina*, pp. 238 ff.

²⁵ Johnson and others, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce in the United States*, I, 231-232; Internal Waterways Commission, *Preliminary Report*, 1908, p. 233; *Eighth Census of the United States: Agriculture*, p. cl.

bulkier products, such as grain and lumber, made up an increasingly large percentage of lake and canal traffic. This tendency is well illustrated by shipments from Chicago, a point from which commodities could be shipped eastward with equal facility by water or rail. Data available for 1859 show that heavy and bulky products, like corn, wheat, and lead, moved predominantly by water, whereas such items as hides, livestock, and general merchandise were carried chiefly by rail. Flour held an intermediate position, with 365,000 barrels being shipped eastward by lake and 307,000 by rail. But in terms of tons of western produce moved eastward to tidewater, the Erie Canal was still the predominant agency in 1860. In that year the tonnage reaching tidewater from the western states and Canada via the Erie Canal totaled 1,896,975. Through freight moving eastward by the New York Central, Erie, and Pennsylvania railroads appears to have been about half the canal tonnage.²⁶

Railroads had little effect on the coastal trade between New England and the southern Atlantic states. Manufactured goods, lumber, and ice moved to southern markets, and cotton, tobacco, and naval stores were received in exchange. But trade with the West was appreciably altered. Textiles and other merchandise destined for the Ohio Valley had formerly been sent by coastwise vessel to Philadelphia and Baltimore and thence overland to market. With the completion of the Western Railroad to Albany in 1841 these products began to move directly westward by rail and canal and later all the way by rail. Also, with the opening of the Erie Canal much flour had moved by sloop from Albany directly to New England coastal markets. The Western Railroad gradually secured this business so that little was left of this coastwise trade by 1860.²⁷

The coastwise trade between the South Atlantic and the Middle states was also largely unaffected by the coming of the railroads. Rail lines extended north from Washington, D.C., along the coast to Boston and beyond. But south from the capital city the only coastal railroad connecting with the east and west roads of the Carolinas

²⁶ Johnson and others, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce in the United States*, I, 238; Pierce, *A History of Chicago*, II, 494; and Schmidt, "The Internal Grain Trade of the United States," pp. 94-124; *Chase Report on Foreign and Domestic Commerce*, 1864, pp. 138, 140-141; *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, XLIII (December, 1860), 701.

²⁷ Albion, *The Rise of New York Port*, pp. 128-129.

and Georgia was the stem extending 325 miles from near Washington to Wilmington, North Carolina. Unfortunately this route was comprised of several independent railroad companies, and as late as the Civil War had three gaps, places where rolling stock could not pass from the rails of one road to those of another. One of these barriers occurred between Washington and Acquia Creek on the Potomac River in Virginia. The other two were short breaks at Petersburg, Virginia, and Weldon, North Carolina. Passengers were transported across these breaks in the line without great difficulty, and as a result the railroads were able to compete fairly effectively with the coastwise packets for the passenger business. But the cost of reshipping freight was prohibitive. Not until well after the Civil War did the railroads begin to offer important competition for seaboard shipments south of Washington.²⁸

Hope had run high that the line extending northward from Mobile and connecting with the Illinois Central at Cairo would promote intersectional rail traffic. In 1860 the lack of direct physical connection between these two rail routes still made necessary a twenty-mile shipment by ferry between Columbus, Kentucky, and Cairo, Illinois, and little through business had developed. The rail route connecting Cincinnati and New Orleans was opened in 1859 too late to permit much traffic to develop before war closed such intercourse. The overland movement of cotton to northern markets was inconsequential until the very end of the period. For the years 1852-1858 such shipments had averaged less than 10,000 bales a year. But in 1859 and 1860 they rose rapidly, so that in the final year they totaled nearly 109,000 bales, or one eighth of the total shipped northward in that year for domestic consumption. The railroad system of the South gave great assistance in moving staples to southern seaport markets, but not until the very end of the period were southern rail lines beginning to be sufficiently integrated with those of the North as to encourage long-distance rail shipments between the North and the South.²⁹

²⁸ Howard Douglas Dozier, "Trade and Transportation along the South Atlantic Seaboard before the Civil War," *South Atlantic Quarterly*, XVIII. No. 3 (July, 1919). pp. 232-234.

²⁹ Pierce, *A History of Chicago*, II. 45-46; *Nimmo Report*, 1879, pp. 122, 128.

THE PATTERN OF TRADE

The rapid settlement of the West, the great increase in population, and the phenomenal improvements in transportation which have been emphasized made possible the territorial specialization upon which rested the striking growth of American domestic commerce during the period of this study. The direction and magnitude of this commerce was largely determined by the growth of New York City as the great center for foreign importations, and the development of manufacturing in the Atlantic states lying north of Chesapeake Bay. The fundamental pattern of this trade was very similar to that which existed between Great Britain and this country in the colonial and early national period. The South, which in colonial days had sent its great staples directly to England and received manufactured products in return, after 1815 found a growing market for its raw materials—cotton, tobacco, and sugar—in the manufacturing East. The West, an exporter of grain and meat, carried on a similar direct trade with the manufacturing states, but it also provided the South with food products, receiving in exchange drafts on the East which were used to pay for manufactured imports. In similar manner before the Revolution, fish from New England and grain from the Middle Atlantic states had been exported to the West Indies to help permit payment for British imports. But this earlier trade had involved only the fringe of states along the Atlantic, whereas the domestic commerce rapidly developing during the nineteenth century presently involved a whole continent.

Though the essential pattern of American domestic trade was determined by this exchange between the agricultural West and South and the increasingly industrialized East, there were many special or subsidiary traffic movements of great importance. A few of these merit at least brief mention. As firewood grew scarce in the vicinity of the larger towns, a brisk trade in coal developed which, from a small start at the beginning of the century, grew to major importance as Virginia and Pennsylvania coal was moved northward by coastwise sloop, by canalboat, and even by rail to provide warmth for homes and fuel for factories and gas plants. Until 1827 most of this coal moved northward from the Richmond, Virginia, bituminous fields, but in the following year Pennsylvania anthracite went

into the lead. Although coal shipments from Richmond continued to the end of our period, they were increasingly overshadowed by the Pennsylvania trade. By the fifties coal had become the most important cargo for canalboats on all of the tidewater canals south of the Erie, for Atlantic coastwise sloops, and for Ohio River flats.⁸⁰ Even the railroads were entering largely into this business. Thus, in 1856 no less than 42 per cent of the total tonnage of the Pennsylvania Railroad consisted of coal.⁸¹

Resourceful Yankees developed a number of bulky products to fill the holds of coasters which brought coal, cotton, and flour to Boston and other New England ports. To fish and lumber, which had long been export staples, they added ice, which provided a back haul for many a returning Philadelphia coal schooner or for farther-ranging vessels to southern or even foreign ports. Other bulky items, like lime and granite blocks from Maine, and plaster of Paris, which had been imported from over the border at Passamaquoddy, moved southward in large quantities to coastal markets.⁸²

Equaling and at times exceeding coal as an important item of domestic trade was lumber, a commodity of greatest importance to an age which depended upon wood not only for building houses, barns, factories, and stores, but for transportation equipment such as wagons, canalboats, ships, and railroad cars; and for furniture, farm implements, and containers, including barrels, hogsheads, and pipes. South from Maine and New Hampshire, north from South Atlantic and Gulf ports, eastward via the Great Lakes and the Erie, and down the Susquehanna River, hundreds of millions of feet of lumber moved annually to eastern markets. As early as 1827 the

⁸⁰ Kathleen Bruce, *Virginia Iron Manufacture in the Slave Era* (New York: The Century Company, 1931), pp. 96-97; *Annual Report of the Delaware and Hudson Canal Company*, 1860, p. 10; *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, XLIII (December, 1860), 752-753. For elaborate statistical tables on coal production and trade see Howard N. Eavenson, *The First Century and a Quarter of the American Coal Industry* (Baltimore: Waverly Press, 1942), pp. 425 ff.

⁸¹ Richmond E. Myers, "The Story of Transportation on the Susquehanna River," *New York History*, XXIX, No. 2 (April, 1948), p. 163; H. Haupt, *The Coal Business on the Pennsylvania Railroad* (Philadelphia: T. K. and P. G. Collins, Printers, 1857), p. 9.

⁸² Johnson and others, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the United States*, I, 340-343; Richard O. Cummings, *The American Ice Harvests* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1949), *passim*.

lumber shipped on the Susquehanna was estimated at 40,000,000 feet. The receipts of boards and scantling at Albany, New York, in 1860 amounted to 301,000,000 feet valued at more than \$5,000,000.⁸³ As the loggers moved into the forests of Michigan and Wisconsin, lumber vied with grain as the leading item of trade on the Lakes. By 1857 vessels engaged in the lumber trade on the Lakes were valued at \$1,500,000, and Chicago became the greatest lumber port in the world. Down the upper Mississippi River, also, tremendous quantities of lumber moved southward from the pine forests of Wisconsin and Minnesota to the prairie farms.⁸⁴ In both the East and the West other building materials like stone, lime, bricks, sand, and gravel, usually destined for nearby markets, provided heavy cargoes for thousands of canal and river boats.

Finally, there was the trade with the Far West. Though at first a mere trickle over the Santa Fe Trail, it quickly became of considerable importance following the discovery of gold in California. This historic route, the Santa Fe Trail, connected Franklin, and later Independence, Missouri, with the Mexican frontier trading town of Santa Fe, nearly 800 miles to the southwest. Traders first essayed this difficult journey on a large scale with wagon trains in 1824. Despite Indian attacks and difficulties from suspicious Mexican customs officials, the trade continued, except for the years of strained relations with Mexico 1844-1848, until the appearance of railroad competition after the Civil War. Westward the slowly moving wagons carried chiefly cotton goods and hardware; returning, they brought specie, Mexican blankets, beaver skins, and buffalo robes. The total value of the merchandise sent westward over this route was small, averaging about \$130,000 annually before 1844. After 1848, following the annexation of Texas and the cession of Mexican territory, this trade, now for the first time strictly a domestic one, assumed really large proportions. The total value of merchandise carried westward totaled \$3,500,000 in 1860.

⁸³ *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, XLIV (March, 1861), 356; *Niles Weekly Register*, XXXII (June 30, 1827), 290.

⁸⁴ Pierce, *A History of Chicago*, I, 67, 103-105; Merk, *Economic History of Wisconsin during the Civil War Decade*, pp. 79-86; Agnes M. Larson, *History of the White Pine Industry in Minnesota* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1949), Chap. 6.

Following the Mormon settlement in Utah and accompanying the growing military and mining developments in the Rocky Mountain region during the fifties, a considerable trade grew up over a number of more northern routes. Thus by 1855, 304 wagons were engaged in hauling merchandise to Utah, and the traffic to this area increased tremendously with the so-called "Mormon War" of 1857. One of the most important of the wagon routes led from Nebraska City on the Missouri River up the Platte River Valley and on to Denver. A leading freighting concern at Nebraska City, that of Russell, Majors & Waddell, during the summer of 1860 employed 5,687 oxen, 515 wagons, and 602 men and transported nearly 3,000,000 pounds of goods. Though pony express lines carried small packages to the West coast and though postal service was developed, the great distance and the difficulties of mountain and desert travel prevented the development of an overland freight trade to the West coast. Even camels, introduced on the southern route by the United States Army during the latter part of the fifties, failed to solve the problem.³⁵

As a result, the exchange of goods with the Pacific coast, which grew rapidly after 1848, was chiefly carried on by coastwise vessels sailing all the way around Cape Horn, perhaps the longest domestic trade route in the world. Westward, these vessels were heavily loaded with a vast array of merchandise from steam engines to pins and needles. Returning, they largely sailed in ballast, though they often carried gold, passengers, and sometimes wool, hides, skins, and wheat. The shorter route, involving transfer across Panama or Nicaragua, was important chiefly for passengers, for specie, and, after the completion of the Panama Railway in 1855, for light and valuable freight. This was the fastest and safest route to the Far

³⁵ Lewis Burt Lesley, *Uncle Sam's Camels* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929); Le Roy R. Hafen and Carl Coke Rister, *Western America* (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1941), Chaps. 14 and 26; R. L. Duffus, *The Santa Fe Trail* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1930), pp. 85 ff.; Glenn Danford Bradley, *The Story of the Santa Fe* (Boston: Richard G. Badger, The Gorham Press, 1920), Chap. 1; Johnson and others, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce in the United States*, I, 248-250; Everett Dick, *Vanguards of the Frontier* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company, 1941), pp. 342-343, 367; Josiah Gregg, *The Commerce of the Prairies* (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley and Sons Company, 1926); Winther, *The Old Oregon Country*, especially Chap. 11.

West. Of the total emigrants to California from 1849 to 1859, about one fifth went via the Panama route.⁸⁶

THE VOLUME OF TRADE

Statistical treatment of the growth in the total volume or value of domestic commerce is most unsatisfactory. In the first place, detailed statistics such as are available for foreign trade do not exist; in the second place, the defining of domestic trade presents many pitfalls.⁸⁷ As a consequence, perhaps the best understanding of the growth of this commerce is to be obtained from the kind of description contained in the preceding pages. Nevertheless, it is worth while to note some comparisons of the total value of goods moved over particular routes; and to summarize the estimates of the total value of domestic trade which have been made for this period.

A number of rough statistical comparisons are possible between trade in the 1820's and 1850's. As the general level of prices for these two decades was roughly the same, value data are not appreciably influenced by price changes. The value of goods carried by wagon from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh in 1820 was estimated at \$18,000,000. This appears high, but it may be compared with the total receipts by river at New Orleans, 1821-1822, and the annual value of traffic on the Erie Canal, 1825-1830, each of which totaled about \$15,000,000.⁸⁸ The total value of downriver trade on the Susquehanna was estimated at \$4,500,000 in 1826.⁸⁹ In contrast to these totals, it should be noted that the annual value of foreign trade varied from \$109,000,000 to \$181,000,000 during the twenties.

The estimates for the last decade of the period covered by this volume are of a different order of magnitude. Through traffic westward on the Erie Canal was valued at \$94,000,000 when it reached its peak in 1853. Two years later the total value of all Erie Canal traffic was reported to be over \$204,000,000. Receipts from the in-

⁸⁶ John Haskell Kemble, *The Panama Route, 1848-1869* (Vol. XXIX of *University of California Publications in History*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1943), pp. 205-209.

⁸⁷ See, for example, *Chase Report on Foreign and Domestic Commerce*, 1864, pp. 118-122.

⁸⁸ Johnson and others, *History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce in the United States*, I, 218 and 220.

⁸⁹ Ringwalt, *Development of Transportation Systems in the United States*, p. 13. But compare *Niles' Weekly Register*, XXXI (December 30, 1826), 283.

terior at New Orleans were valued at \$185,000,000 in 1860.⁴⁰ Estimates of the value of trade on the Great Lakes for 1856 are \$450,000,000 and \$608,000,000. The latter sum is slightly larger than the total value of American foreign commerce in that year.⁴¹ Treasury computations for 1862, two years beyond the close of the period, evaluate the through freight passage westward over the Erie Canal and on four railroads, the New York Central, Erie, Pennsylvania, and Baltimore and Ohio, at \$522,500,000.⁴² The total value of American foreign trade was \$687,000,000 in 1860.

One of the earliest estimates of the total value of domestic commerce was made by a writer in *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine* in 1843, who placed it at \$900,000,000.⁴³ Secretary of the Treasury Robert J. Walker, making an estimate in 1846, reported that the value of American production exceeded \$3,000,000,000, of which that part "interchanged among the several States of the Union" was worth at least \$500,000,000.⁴⁴ A more elaborate estimate published in the *Andrews Report* of 1853 is reproduced in the following table:

TOTAL VALUE OF DOMESTIC COMMERCE

1851	NET		GROSS	
	Tons	Value	Tons	Value
Lake commerce	1,985,563	\$ 157,246,729	3,971,126	\$ 314,473,458
River commerce	2,033,400	169,751,372	4,066,800	339,502,744
Aggregate	4,018,963	\$ 326,988,101	8,037,926	\$ 653,976,202

Estimate of 1852

Coasting trade	20,397,490	\$1,659,519,686	40,794,980	\$3,319,039,372
Canal commerce	9,000,000	594,000,000	18,000,000	1,188,000,000
Railway commerce	5,407,500	540,750,000	10,815,000	1,081,500,000
Aggregate	34,804,990	\$2,794,269,686	69,609,980	\$5,588,539,372

⁴⁰ *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, XXXV (1856), 358; Dixon, *A Traffic History of the Mississippi River System*, p. 165; *Chase Report on Foreign and Domestic Commerce*, 1864, p. 181.

⁴¹ *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, XXXVI (1857), 89. An official Canadian estimate of the value of the lake commerce for this same year placed it at \$450,000,000. *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, XXXVII (1857), 223.

⁴² *Chase Report on Foreign and Domestic Commerce*, 1864, p. 136.

⁴³ *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, VIII (1843), 322.

⁴⁴ *Report of the Secretary of the Treasury*, December 9, 1847, *House Executive Document No. 6*, 30 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 22.

The values shown in this report were secured by multiplying tonnage data (partly estimated) for important routes of trade by the estimated value a ton over each route. In order to avoid duplication and thus secure the "net" figures shown in the table, the "gross" figures were merely divided by 2. The resulting totals were, as Andrews was careful to point out, computed in "a very unsatisfactory way," but they are the best we have.⁴⁵ The table points to two important generalizations: by the fifties domestic trade had become much greater than foreign; and coastwise commerce was much more important than that over any other domestic route. Both of these conclusions fit well with what other knowledge we have and appear sound enough. On the other hand, the exact figures presented by Andrews will have to be very carefully restudied before they can be taken very seriously. It must be borne in mind, moreover, that Andrews' data are for the early fifties. In the decade 1851-1860 domestic commerce, at least on rivers, on the Great Lakes, and by railroad, experienced extremely rapid growth.

It must not be supposed that the domestic commerce grew at a constant rate from year to year, unaffected by the great cyclical disturbances of the period. Each of the major commercial crises put a damper on the growth of internal commerce, but in each period of prosperity, trade expanded rapidly to totals much higher than their previous levels. In major depressions such as that following 1839, tonnage totals might actually decline for a year or more. Thus New York State canal traffic declined slightly over the previous year in 1837, 1840, and 1842, but tonnage which had reached a prosperity peak in 1836 had more than doubled by 1847. Similarly, the value of Mississippi River trade, although declining slightly in 1839, 1841, 1842, and 1845, very nearly doubled between 1836 and 1847. Ton-miles of traffic on New York railroads increased by more than 100 per cent between 1853 and 1860, but suffered a slight decline from the 1856 level in 1857-1859. Nevertheless, the irregularities in the growth of domestic commerce should not be overemphasized, for at least before the fifties, fluctuations were repeatedly much less extreme than those experienced by foreign commerce.⁴⁶

⁴⁵ *Andrews' Report* (Senate Executive Document No. 112, 32 Cong., 1 Sess., 1853), pp. 903-906.

⁴⁶ Dixon, *A Traffic History of the Mississippi River System*, pp. 199, 215; Smith and Cole, *Fluctuations in American Business, 1790-1860*, pp. 72-73, 104-105; *His-*

The tremendous growth of American internal trade during the forty-five years ending in 1860 was, of course, the result of many interacting factors. Fundamental was the adoption of the new instruments of transportation: canals, steamboats, and railroads. But many other influences played a part, especially the rapid settlement of the West, the growth of manufacturing, and the increase of foreign trade. Each was partly cause and partly effect; all were mutually interacting forces which taken together produced the transportation revolution and at least the beginnings in America of that whole series of rapid changes which has come to be termed the industrial revolution.

torical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945; A Supplement to the Statistical Abstract of the United States (Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 218; Albion, *The Rise of New York Port*, p. 411.

DEXTER PERKINS

THE DANGERS of nationalistic distortion, always present when a historian is dealing with his own country, are especially threatening in the field of diplomatic history. Some writers are so fearful of them that they lean over backwards to emphasize the faults and minimize the achievements of American foreign policy. At the other extreme are the historians who approach even remote international disputes with patriotic fervor. To follow the middle course has proved difficult for even the most conscientious.

Dexter Perkins is the foremost American authority on the Monroe Doctrine. Among his writings are three extensive monographs covering its evolution in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. *Hands Off*, a condensation and refinement of these specialized studies, traces the Doctrine from its beginning to the eve of the Second World War.

Although Latin American authors have often reached conclusions less flattering to our national dignity, most of Perkins' compatriots consider his books to be free of any considerable bias. Perkins' intentions are clearly neither to excuse aggression nor to exaggerate the importance of the Monroe Doctrine. His claims for the contribution which the policy has made to democratic government in other nations are conditioned by his assumption that the Doctrine was founded not in altruism but in the needs of America's defense. Although he maintains that action under the Roosevelt Corollary of 1904 benefited some countries in which the United States intervened in the

role of international policeman, he is not prepared to defend either the propriety or the wisdom of the methods by which the Caribbean became "an American lake." He acknowledges the role of economic forces but is unwilling to identify foreign policy with the wishes of business interests.

This same unwillingness to dramatize history by painting a black-and-white scene peopled with heroes and villains governs Perkins' description of the circumstances under which the Doctrine was announced in 1823. He is careful to point out that since no European nation seriously intended to help Spain reconquer her colonies, Monroe's bold declaration was directed against an imaginary menace. By noting the apathy with which the United States greeted the prospect of Pan-American Conferences during the same decade, Perkins refutes the claim that the Doctrine heralded an era of interhemispheric cooperation.

The judicious calm which governs most of Perkins' discussion seems all the more remarkable when one recalls that the book was published in 1941, during the excitement of the impending Second World War. There is, however, at least one point of emphasis which may be related to this background. The author appears somewhat overanxious to de-emphasize the isolationist element of thought within the Monroe Doctrine. In particular, he underlines rather heavily the limitations which Monroe placed upon America's willingness to forego involvement in Europe in return for the abstention which he demanded of the old world powers on this side of the Atlantic. "The fact must be stressed," he writes, "[that] the doctrine of the two spheres, though the basis of the Monroe Doctrine, is not the Monroe Doctrine itself."* Though the point is valid, it can easily be stressed too much.

Indeed, to record the changes which have taken place in the doctrine and in its implementation is one of Perkins' major tasks. If it had become by 1941 less legitimate as a rally cry of the isolationists, it was also, as the author takes care to establish,

* Dexter Perkins, *Hands Off*, p. 365.

no longer to be identified with a unilateral stand by the United States. Gradually modified in the 1920's, the corollary of Theodore Roosevelt was rejected in the 1930's in favor of a concept of cooperative efforts at hemispheric defense. The path from Monroe's message in 1823 to the Pan-American Conferences at Montevideo, Buenos Aires, Lima, and Havana is one which Perkins delineated with particular satisfaction as Hitler's armies marched to the Atlantic coast.

Certainly there is no concept more important in the history of American foreign relations than that of the Monroe Doctrine. More than a policy, it has become an article of national belief. What that faith has implied, and the actions which have resulted from it, have not always been evident to the most ardent believers. With Perkins' book at hand, the Monroe Doctrine need no longer be vague and mysterious.

The First Challenge

Monroe Hurls Defiance at Europe

These United States of America, which we have seen arise and grow, and which during their too short youth already meditated projects which they dared not then avow, have suddenly left a sphere too narrow for their ambition, and have astonished Europe by a new act of revolt, more unprovoked, fully as audacious, and no less dangerous than the former. They have distinctly and clearly announced their intention to set not only power against power, but, to express it more exactly, altar against altar. In their indecent declarations they have cast blame and scorn on the institutions of Europe most worthy of respect, on the principles of its greatest sovereigns, on the whole of those measures which a sacred duty no less than an evident necessity has forced our governments to adopt to frustrate plans most criminal. In permitting themselves these unprovoked attacks, in fostering revo-

lutions wherever they show themselves, in regretting those which have failed, in extending a helping hand to those which seem to prosper, they lend new strength to the apostles of sedition, and reanimate the courage of every conspirator. If this flood of evil doctrines and pernicious examples should extend over the whole of America, what would become of our religious and political institutions, of the moral force of our governments, and of that conservative system which has saved Europe from complete dissolution?

—METTERNICH to Nesselrode, January 19, 1824

THE FAMOUS message of December 2, 1823, with the possible exception of the Farewell Address the most significant of all American state papers, contains two widely separated passages which have come to be known as the Monroe Doctrine. In discussing American relations with Russia, the President laid down the principle that "the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subject for future colonization by any European power." This phrase occurs early in the document. In its closing paragraphs, on the other hand, Monroe turned to the subject of the Spanish colonies. In language no less significant than that just quoted, he declared that the political system of the allied powers, that is, of the Holy Alliance, was different from that of America. "We owe it, therefore, to candor, and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and those powers," he went on, "to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their political system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. With the existing colonies and dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere. But with the governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and just principles, acknowledged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition towards the United States."

From *Hands Off* by Dexter Perkins, by permission of Little, Brown & Company. Copyright 1941 by Dexter Perkins.

These pregnant phrases express in unmistakable terms the ideological cleavage between the New World and the Old. We have already seen how this cleavage had become sharper and sharper in the years after 1815. To Americans European absolutism, in 1823, was a system as odious, as devoid of moral sanction, as that of Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia seems to many citizens of the United States today. On the other hand, to many of the statesmen of Continental Europe, the buoyant republicanism and the democratic faith of the people of the United States were a vast dissolvent which threatened destruction to the existing order, and unknown and incalculable perils for the future. The message of Monroe had to do with specific situations which we must soon examine, but it was based on general principles which played an important part in the thinking of the President and his advisers.

That part of the message which was directed against Russia appears to have been the work of John Quincy Adams. There is, perhaps, no figure more remarkable in the lengthening list of the Secretaries of State. Acidulous, combative, suspicious, Adams was none the less a great personality, great in his unswerving and intense patriotism, great in his powerful and logical intelligence, great in his immense industry, great in his high integrity. No man who ever directed American foreign policy came to his post with a wider background of experience, with a better education, academic, linguistic, legal, with a broader conception of his task. Adams was hard-headed and practical; but he also recognized the importance of ideas and general principles. And this fact he was to make clear in his working out of the so-called noncolonization dogma. Long before 1823 the Secretary of State had begun to formulate his ideas with regard to the exclusion of European influence from the American continents. When he negotiated the Florida treaty in 1819, he took special satisfaction in the extension of American territory to the Pacific by Spain's renunciation of all rights north of 42 degrees. As early as November of 1819 he had declared in the cabinet that the world "must be familiarized with the idea of considering our proper dominion to be the *continent* of North America."¹ In a heated dispute with Stratford Canning,

¹ *John Quincy Adams, Memoirs of*. Edited by C. F. Adams. Philadelphia, 1874-77. 12 vols. IV, 438 f.

the British Minister, in January of 1821, over the title to the Columbia River region, Adams stated, "We certainly did suppose that the British government had come to the conclusion that there would be neither policy nor profit in cavilling with us about territory on this North American continent." "And in this," asked Canning, "you include our northern provinces on this continent?" "No," said Adams; "there the boundary is marked and we have no disposition to encroach upon it. Keep what is yours, but leave the rest of this continent to us."² These statements, compared with what followed, were remarkable only for their modesty. In July of 1822, in one of those Fourth of July addresses so dear to American national pride, the Secretary went on to attack the whole colonial principle, as applied to both North and South America. By November he was ready to confide to the British Minister that "the whole system of modern colonization was an abuse of government, and it was time that it should come to an end."³

In part, the position so boldly taken was a matter of political theory. The United States was not yet half a century from the Declaration of Independence, from its own shaking off of the chains of colonial tutelage. But, in part, Adams' doctrine had an economic basis. Adams disliked colonialism not alone because it was a reminder of political subordination, but because it was connected in his mind with commercial monopoly, and the exclusion of the United States from the markets of the New World. A New Englander of New Englanders, the representative of the great mercantile section of the Union, and that at a time when the American shipping interests were more important in relation to other interests than at any time in our history, the Secretary was to do battle for the trade of the American people no less than for more abstract notions of political righteousness. It was, indeed, a commercial controversy that sharpened his pen for the famous declaration with regard to colonization that we have quoted at the beginning of this page.

This controversy was one with Russia. In 1823 Russia still had colonial claims on the northwest coast of America. For more than a decade, indeed, there had been a Russian establishment, Fort

² *Ibid.*, V, 252 f.

³ *Ibid.*, VI, 104.

Ross, at Bodega Bay on the coast of California, whose existence, though it had occasioned no diplomatic discussion, had been noted with some mild apprehension. But more important, in September of 1821 the Tsar Alexander, acting at the instigation of a corporation known as the Russian American Company, had issued an imperial decree which conferred upon this concern exclusive trading rights down to the line of 51 degrees and forbade all foreign vessels to come within one hundred Italian miles of the shore on pain of confiscation.⁴

This imperial decree was, from the outset, challenged by the American government. In connection with it John Quincy Adams, with a boldness that excelled that of his cabinet colleagues, wished to deny the right of Russia to any American territory. And though he was overruled in a measure, since the instructions to Middleton at St. Petersburg, sent in July of 1823, were based on possible recognition of Russian claims north of *fifty-five*, the Secretary nevertheless would not give up his viewpoint in principle. To Tuyll, the Russian Minister at Washington, he declared on July 17, 1823, that "we should contest the right of Russia to *any* territorial establishment on this continent, and that we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for any new European colonial establishments."⁵ Five days later he set forth the same theory in a dispatch to Richard Rush, our minister at London, and set it forth in some detail.⁶ In December, when he came to draft for the President the customary sketch of foreign policy to be used in the preparation of the annual message, he used almost the identical words that had been used five months before in speaking to Tuyll, and Monroe took them over bodily and inserted them in his message of December 2.

This, in essentials, is the origin of the noncolonization clause, one of the two important elements in the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine.

It cannot be said that this clause was particularly important or particularly influential in its immediate effects. It was not enthu-

⁴ *Alaskan Boundary Tribunal Proceedings*, Senate Documents, 58th Congress, 2nd Session. Washington, 1904. 7 vols. II, 25.

⁵ *Adams, Memoirs*, VI, 163.

⁶ *Alaskan Boundary Proceedings*, II, 52-56.

siastically received by the general public. It was rarely commented upon in the newspapers. It occasioned no favorable word in Congress. The Tsar had already determined upon concession long before the message, as early as July 1822, and in the discussions at St. Petersburg Monroe's language was politely thrust aside by Alexander's Foreign Minister, who declared "it would be best for us to waive all discussions upon abstract principles of *right*."⁷ The President's declaration was without effect upon the actual compromise which was worked out between the two governments, limiting Russian rights to the line of 54 degrees 40 minutes, and conceding American trading privileges north of this line for a period of ten years.⁸ It was not favorably received by official opinion in any European country. In France Chateaubriand, the Foreign Minister, asserted on first reading it that Monroe's declaration "ought to be resisted by all the powers possessing either territory or commercial interests in that hemisphere."⁹ In Great Britain Canning flatly challenged the new doctrine in an interview with Rush, our minister at London, early in January of 1824. Monroe's thesis, said the British Foreign Secretary, "is laid down broadly, and generally, without qualification or distinction. We cannot acknowledge the right of any power to proclaim such a principle; much less to bind other countries to the observance of it." Six months later, when Richard Rush attempted to introduce the Adams theory into the negotiations over Oregon, he was met with an "utter denial" of its validity, and with the categorical statement that "the unoccupied parts of America" were "just as much open as heretofore to colonization by Great Britain . . . and that the United States would have no right whatever to take umbrage at the establishment of new colonies from Europe in any such parts of the American continent."¹⁰ In the immediate sense, the assertion of the noncolonization principle accomplished nothing positive, and aroused resentment rather than respect. There is room

⁷ *Ibid.*, 71 f.

⁸ For the text of this convention, see *Treaties and Conventions Concluded between the United States of America and other Powers since July 4, 1776*. Washington, 1889. Pp. 931 ff.

⁹ London. Public Record Office, F.O., France. Vol. 305, no. 8. Jan. 12, 1824.

¹⁰ Rush, Richard. *Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London*. Philadelphia, 1845. P. 629.

to doubt its wisdom as a diplomatic move, and a harsh critic might even go so far as to describe it as a barren gesture.

Nor is it easy to see on what logical basis Adams' declaration could rest. The Secretary of State attempted to found it upon the hypothesis that "the two continents" to which it referred "consisted of several sovereign and independent nations, whose territories covered their whole surface." But apart from the fact that in European eyes these "independent nations," as regarded Latin America, did not yet exist, it was certainly not true that all the continent of North America was in the possession of some civilized power. The very existence of the dispute between Russia and the United States was, indeed, eloquent testimony to the contrary. A vast hinterland in Alaska remained virtually unexplored, and this was equally true of much of what is now northwest Canada. Some kind of claim to exclude other powers from these territories Adams could succeed in making out, on the basis of the Florida treaty of 1819, and on the cession by Spain of her rights to the Northwest north of the line of 42 degrees. But these rights had always been rather shadowy and were very far from being clearly established, and to claim this whole Northwest on such a basis was hardly convincing. It is questionable, indeed, if Adams seriously believed his own argument. Certainly none of those to whom he presented it were in the slightest degree impressed. "The declaration of Monroe [declares one of the most acute students of the Monroe Doctrine] applied in part to territory discovered and claimed by Great Britain and Russia; in part, to territory presumed to be in the possession of insurgents whom the United States alone had recognized as independent; and in part, to any additional territory which the progress of exploration might reveal. In the view of public law, then, it was worthless. The United States could not by a declaration effect the international status of lands claimed, ruled, or discovered by other powers. They might proclaim in advance the policy which they would adopt when such questions should arise, but no unilateral act could change the Law of Nations. . . . The Law of Nations could be changed only by the renunciation, made tacitly or expressly, by every civilized power of its right to colonize any unoccupied part of the western hemisphere."¹¹ It is difficult

¹¹ Reddaway, W. F. *The Monroe Doctrine*, 2d ed. New York, 1905. Pp. 101 f.

to deny the justice of this reasoning. Often as the language of Adams has been cited since 1823, it rested upon an insecure foundation of logic and fact at the time.

More important, however, than the noncolonization clause are those resounding paragraphs of the message of 1823 which focused the attention of every European chancellery on the American attitude toward the new republics of the South. What was the origin and the occasion of these famous phrases? What was their reception? What was their effect? To answer the first of these questions we must go back to the events which were briefly described in the last chapter.

The march of reaction in the Old World was by no means checked at the Congress of Verona in the fall of 1822. On the contrary, the Continental powers decided upon a new intervention to put down revolt in Spain, with France as their agent. In January, after a struggle in the bosom of the cabinet, the French ministry of Villèle virtually determined upon war, and withdrew its ambassador from Madrid. In April, the French forces crossed the Pyrenees and marched upon the Spanish capital; in a few brief months they occupied almost the entire country, with the exception of Cádiz, whither the Spanish revolutionists had fled with King Ferdinand as their captive. Events such as these were bound to have their repercussion in the United States.

Despite the doctrine of isolation and American aversion to entanglement, there has, in fact, never been a time when Americans were indifferent to the general trend of events in Europe. A perfectly cynical foreign policy, a policy of stark and naked self-interest, may perhaps be possible for dictators who manufacture their own public opinion; but the diplomacy of a democratic nation will, in the very nature of the case, be shaped in some measure by general principles and by broad political ideals. The trend of the events in the Old World was not lost upon James Monroe or John Quincy Adams. In his annual message for 1822, indeed, the President already demonstrated a mild uneasiness—perhaps no more than a mild uneasiness—as to the future. Alluding to the European scene, he went on to say: "Faithful to first principles in regard to other powers, we might reasonably presume that we

should not be molested by them. This, however, ought not to be calculated on as certain. Unprovoked injuries are often inflicted, and even the peculiar felicity of our situation might be with some a cause for excitement and aggression."¹² Six months later, when the French armies had occupied Madrid, he penned a too-little-noticed letter to Thomas Jefferson. "Our relation to Europe," he wrote, "is pretty much the same, as it was in the commencement of the French Revolution. Can we, in any form, take a bolder attitude in regard to it, in favor of liberty, than we then did? Can we afford greater aid to that cause, by assuming any such attitude, than we do now, by the form of our example?"¹³ Language such as this suggests that a more positive attitude toward European reaction was ripening in the mind of the President.

Events, moreover, were strengthening his hand. For if the United States were to act in the cause of Spanish-American liberty, it was already at least likely, if not absolutely clear, that it would not take its stand alone. At the Congress of Verona Great Britain, through Lord Castlereagh as Foreign Secretary, had already made clear its increasing distaste for interventions in the interest of absolutism. It had made clear, too, a predilection even more vital. The Spanish-American revolutions had opened a whole continent to British trade. The commercial stake of Britain in the affairs of the New World no British government could afford to ignore. The recognition of the new republics by the United States in March had made it all the more necessary that London should seek their good will by a similar policy. Already, in May of the same year, the matter had been discussed with the government at Paris, in the hope of finding a common ground of action. At Verona the Duke of Wellington, the British plenipotentiary, was directed to bring the matter up in the most positive form. The question of Latin America was leading to the alienation of Great Britain from the powers of the Holy Alliance.

Moreover, the death of Castlereagh, shortly after the end of the Congress, brought to the Foreign Office George Canning, less attached than his predecessor to any highfalutin notions of Euro-

¹² Richardson, *Messages of the Presidents*. II, 193 f.

¹³ Monroe Manuscripts, Library of Congress, quoted in W. A. McCorkle, *The Personal Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine*. New York and London, 1923. P. 64.

pean solidarity, and who, as member for Liverpool in the Commons, directly represented British trading interests. Under such a leader it could have been predicted that a bolder and more positive policy with regard to the new republics would be put into operation. Nor did the world have to wait very long to be made aware of this fact. For, on the occasion of the French intervention in Spain, Canning made his position entirely clear. "With respect to the Provinces in America," he wrote to Sir Charles Stuart, British Ambassador at Paris, "time and the course of events appear to have substantially decided their separation from the mother-country; although the formal recognition of these provinces as Independent States, by His Majesty, may be hastened or retarded by various external circumstances, as well as by the more or less satisfactory progress, in each State, towards a regular and settled form of government. Disclaiming in the most solemn manner any intention of appropriating to himself the smallest portion of the *late* Spanish possessions in America, his Majesty is satisfied that no attempt will be made by France to bring under her dominion any of these possessions, either by conquest, or by cession from Spain."¹⁴ This declaration, while it did not entirely rule out the possible reconquest of Spain's former colonies in the interests of the worthless Ferdinand, at least made it wholly clear that there was to be no profit in the venture. The attitude of Canning was to have much to do with the message of 1823.

There were hints, indeed, in the spring and summer of 1823, that the two Anglo-Saxon powers were headed towards a political understanding. Canning's policy, his cousin Stratford Canning reported from Washington, had made the English "almost popular" in the United States, and even Adams "had caught a something of the soft infection."¹⁵ The American Secretary of State, in his conversations with the British Minister, seemed to grow positively mellow with the progress of events. He commented with satisfaction to Stratford on the "coincidence of principle" which seemed to exist between the two governments.¹⁶ In a tone far different from

¹⁴ London. P.R.O., F.O., France. Vol. 284, no. 29. March 31, 1823.

¹⁵ London. P.R.O., F.O., 352, vol. 8. Stratford Canning Papers. Stratford Canning to George Canning.

¹⁶ Adams, *Memoirs*, VI, 152.

any that he had previously employed, he spoke of Great Britain and the United States as "comparing their ideas and purposes together, with a view to the accommodation of great interests upon which they had hitherto differed."¹⁷ He seemed to suggest the possibility of a diplomatic rapprochement, and particularly of an agreement upon the question of Spanish America.

For a time, however, Canning hesitated. He had no romantic affection for the United States. No one had been more high-handed or arrogant than he in dealing with the American government at the time of the embargo. No Englishman could have been more superciliously confident of British superiority. And lurking always in his mind, as his correspondence shows, was the notion that the Americans might attempt a coup of their own in the New World, and possess themselves of Cuba. But with the month of August he decided to move forward. Might not diplomatic conversations with the United States result at one and the same time in American disclaimers of any acquisitive purposes, and American co-operation in a common opposition to the intervention of the Continental powers? So at least the British Foreign Secretary appears to have reasoned, and on the sixteenth of August, taking advantage of a "transient" observation of the American Minister, Canning began with Rush a series of important conferences that bulk large in the history of the Monroe Doctrine, and form an equally interesting chapter in the history of American political co-operation with European powers.

What Canning wished was a joint declaration on the part of the London and Washington governments. Its general outline was made clear in a note of August 20.

England [he wrote] had no disguise on the subject.

She conceived the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless.

That the question of their recognition as Independent States was one of time and of circumstances.

That England was not disposed, however, to throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between the colonies and the mother country, by amicable negotiation.

That she aimed at the possession of no portion of the colonies for herself.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

That she could not see the transfer of any portion of them to any other power, with indifference.¹⁸

Holding these views, Great Britain would be very ready to declare them in concert with the United States. Could Rush sign a convention on the subject or, if this were not possible, could he consent to an exchange of ministerial notes? Rarely has an American Minister been asked more interesting questions. Rarely, in the history of the first fifty years of American diplomacy, had a more flattering offer of diplomatic co-operation been made.

But Richard Rush was both a shrewd and a cautious man. In a matter so important it would be perilous to act without instructions. After all, there was as yet no evidence that the Spanish colonies were in any particular peril, and though on the twenty-third of August Canning told him he had heard from Paris that at the end of the Spanish war a Congress would be called on the colonial question, such an intimation did not point to the necessity of immediate action on the part of the American Minister. Moreover, as Rush perceived, there was a difference in the American and British positions. The United States had already recognized the colonies. Great Britain had not. The one country was irrevocably committed; the other might be free to alter its policy and bring it into harmony with that of the Continental powers. Were there not risks in hasty action that far outweighed the benefits? Was not the proper course to refer the whole matter to Washington?

Thus, at any rate, reasoned the American Minister. He took no absolute stand against co-operation. He was willing to make it clear to Canning, indeed he did make it clear, that his country desired "to see the Independence of the late Spanish Provinces in America permanently maintained," and that "it would view as unjust and improper any attempt on the part of the Powers of Europe to intrench upon that Independence."¹⁹ He even hinted that, should Canning assure him that the time had now arrived when Great Britain would recognize the colonies, he might be willing to consider more decisive action. But in default of such an assurance he could only refer the whole problem to his gov-

¹⁸ Rush, *Court of London*, pp. 412 ff. The text of Canning's note is to be found in T. B. Edgington, *The Monroe Doctrine*. Boston, 1905. Pp. 7 ff.

¹⁹ Rush, *Court of London*. Pp. 418 ff.

ernment. Nor, despite the importunities of the Foreign Secretary, would he budge from this point of view. Twice, after the note of August 20, Canning returned to the charge, once on the eighteenth of September, once again on the twenty-sixth. Twice Rush returned the same reply. Even Canning's suggestion that Great Britain might promise the *future* acknowledgment of the South American states failed to swerve him from his course. The possibility of a joint declaration months in advance of the famous message had thus to be discarded. The principal significance of the Canning-Rush interviews lies in the influence which they exerted upon the deliberations of President Monroe and his advisers.

Before we return to those deliberations, however, we should pause to underline once more the extraordinary nature of Canning's overtures. Today the United States is a great power, whose favor is a mighty matter. In 1823 conditions were far otherwise. In particular, our relations with Great Britain had for the most part been conducted on anything but a happy plane. Condescension commingled with arrogance had usually marked British policy, though there had been some improvement under Lord Castlereagh. Attentions as flattering as those that were paid to Rush might have turned the head of a less judicious representative of the United States. They must have been little less than thrilling to him.

Rush's first accounts of his interviews with Canning arrived in Washington early in October. Despite the French intervention in Spain the summer had, on this side of the water, been a tranquil one. In May Albert Gallatin, our minister at Paris, had talked with the Vicomte de Chateaubriand, the literary genius and diplomatic ineffectuality who conducted the foreign affairs of France. The American had stated frankly that the United States, in his judgment, "would not suffer others to interfere against the emancipation of America."²⁰ He received an answer "in the most explicit manner . . . that France would not make any attempt whatever of that kind, or in any manner interfere in the American question."²¹ Speaking also to Pozzo di Borgo, the militant friend of

²⁰ *Albert Gallatin, Writings of*. Edited by Henry Adams. Philadelphia, 1879. 3 vols. II, 271.

²¹ *Ibid.*

repressive policies, and the Russian Ambassador at the court of Louis XVIII, Gallatin had made the American position clear, and had reported that the representative of the Tsar "seemed to coincide with me in opinion."²² With these assurances, it is not strange that John Quincy Adams had fled the heat of Washington and spent the summer with his family at Quincy, his ancestral seat.

But the Rush dispatches suggested that the tempo of the diplomatic drama might conceivably be quickening. Nor did they stand entirely alone. A letter of George W. Erving, a former Minister of the United States to Spain, written to Crawford, the Secretary of the Treasury, September 25, 1823, struck an alarmist note with regard to French and Russian intentions in Latin America.²³ And the language of the Tsar Alexander, on at least two occasions in this momentous fall, suggested that, whether or not there was to be a clash of arms, there was at least a sharpening of the issues between Old World doctrines of repression and New World doctrines of liberty. On the sixteenth of October, to make the point clear, Baron Tuyll called on Secretary Adams, and told him that his August Master would not receive any minister or agent from any one of the states just formed in the New World. He added, rather significantly as it appeared, that Alexander was highly pleased at the attitude of neutrality adopted by the United States in the war of the colonies with Spain, and still more pleased at its declared intention to continue to maintain that neutrality. The views thus expressed were embodied in an official note transmitted on the same day.²⁴ A month later came another communication written in much the same spirit. It did not utter any specific menace, unless such a menace could be read into the Tsar's general assertion that his "only object" was "to guarantee the tranquillity of all the states of which the civilized world is composed."²⁵ But in doctrine it could hardly fail to be offensive. To Adams, always suspicious and touchy, it appeared nothing less than "an 'Io Triumphe' over the fallen cause of revolution, with sturdy promises of determination to keep it down; disclaimers of all intention of

²² *Ibid.*, p. 272.

²³ Monroe Manuscripts, Library of Congress.

²⁴ Ford, W. C. "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine," I, in *American Historical Review* (July 1902). VII, 685 f.

²⁵ *Op. cit.*, II, in *American Historical Review* (Oct. 1902). VIII, 30 ff.

making conquests; bitter complaints of being calumniated, and one paragraph of compunctions, acknowledging that an apology is yet due to mankind for the invasion of Spain, which it is in the power only of Ferdinand to furnish, by making his people happy."²⁶

All in all, then, we can understand why it was that in November of 1823 Monroe and his advisers were ready to join issue on what appeared to be, and in truth was, a fundamental divergence of viewpoint between the New World and the Old. The discussions that preceded the enunciation of the famous message of 1823 form one of the most interesting chapters in the history of the Monroe Doctrine. They involved, as we shall see, not only the drafting of the President's message, but also the drafting of a suitable reply to Canning's overtures, and an answer to the ideological pronunciamento of the Tsar. Fortunately we have a most remarkable record of them. For the Secretary of State of the United States kept a diary, rising often in the wee small hours to fill in the narrative of events of high significance to posterity. And that diary, despite its egocentric character, is a precious memorial of the discussions on the Latin-American question between the President and his advisers.

The story of these discussions begins with the seventh of November. Very early it becomes clear that the President and John C. Calhoun, the Secretary of War, were seriously concerned lest the Holy Alliance should act in the New World to restore to Spain her ancient dominions. The President, Adams reported on the thirteenth, was "alarmed far beyond anything that I could have conceived possible," and "the news that Cadiz has surrendered to the French has so affected him that he appeared entirely to despair of the cause of South America."²⁷ Calhoun, in the language so characteristic of the Secretary of State, was "perfectly moonstruck" at the danger.²⁸ In later cabinet meetings the panic of the President, if panic it was, seems somewhat to have abated. But in these later meetings he seems still to have believed in the peril, and in this

²⁶ *Adams, Memoirs*, VI, 190.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 185. In the quotation the pronoun "him" has been substituted for Adams's "the President" to avoid repetition of the latter phrase in the same sentence.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

conviction he was, apparently, still supported not only by Calhoun, but by Wirt, the Attorney General.

John Quincy Adams, on the other hand, took a very different view. He was by no means averse to some ringing declaration of policy; he positively yearned to try epistolary conclusions with Baron Tnyll. But the peril he thought was much exaggerated. Again and again, in the course of the cabinet discussions, he expressed skepticism as to the danger of intervention. Canning's alarm, as indicated in his interviews with Rush, he believed to be affected; the real purpose of the British Minister, he suspected (and the suspicion, we have seen, was partly justified), was to obtain a self-denying pledge from the United States, and was only "ostensibly" directed against the forcible interference of the Holy Alliance against South America.²⁹ Judging, and, as the upshot was to prove, correctly judging, that self-interest and not romantic attachment to principle would be the real mainspring of the action of the Continental powers, he found it difficult to imagine that these powers would act at all. They would have no reason to restore the old commercial monopolies. Why should they seek to maintain the power of the decrepit Spanish monarchy across thousands of miles of ocean? "Was it in human absurdity to imagine that they should waste their blood and treasure to prohibit their own subjects upon pain of death to set foot upon those territories?"³⁰ No, if they took action at all, their object would be to partition the colonies among themselves. But how could they agree upon the spoils? And how could they induce Great Britain to acquiesce? "The only possible bait they could offer . . . was Cuba, which neither they nor Spain would consent to give her."³¹ "I no more believe that the Holy Allies will restore the Spanish dominion upon the American continent," he stated in the cabinet meeting of November 15, "than that Chimborazo will sink beneath the ocean."³² This view he reiterated on the eighteenth, and again on the twenty-first.³³

But if Adams was inclined to minimize the actual danger, he

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 177.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 207.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*, p. 186.

³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 190 and 196.

was not, as we have said, inclined to let the situation pass without action. Like the President himself, like all the other members of the cabinet, he believed that the time was ripe for a state paper which would, if it did nothing else, thrill American pride and—even an Adams may have thought of this—tickle the ears of the groundlings. As early as November 7 he stated this view in the cabinet. The communications received from Baron Tuvill in October would, he believed, afford “a very suitable and convenient opportunity for us to take our stand against the Holy Alliance, and at the same time to decline the overture from Great Britain. It would be more candid as well as more dignified to avow our principles explicitly to Russia and France, than to come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war.”⁸⁴

In making this assertion, the Secretary of State was thinking in terms not of a Presidential message, but of diplomatic correspondence, correspondence which might, of course, be released for publication to the greater glory of the United States and of John Quincy Adams. It was the President and the President alone who decided that at least one of the methods of replying to the homilies of the Tsar and the overtures of Canning, and of making the American position clear, should be a straightforward declaration in the forthcoming message to Congress. In the message's sketch on foreign affairs, prepared by Adams for his chief, there is no mention of the Latin-American problem. In the famous diary there is no intimation of the Secretary's suggesting that the forthcoming communication to the national legislature deal with the matter of the former colonies. It was Monroe, who, on his own initiative, brought into the cabinet meeting of November 21 the first draft of what was to become the very heart of the Monroe Doctrine. This draft was certainly not marked by timidity. It was, indeed, too strong for John Quincy Adams. It was, if our diarist is to be believed, a ringing pronouncement in favor of liberal principles in both the Old World and the New. It “alluded to the recent events in Spain and Portugal, speaking in terms of the most pointed reprobation of the late invasion of Spain by France, and of the principles upon which it was undertaken by the open avowal of the King of France. It also contained a broad acknowledgement of the Greeks as an in-

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 179.

dependent nation, and a recommendation to Congress to make an appropriation for sending a minister to them."⁸⁵

Never loath to express himself with vigor, Adams, both in the cabinet meeting and in private conversation with his chief, deprecated a line of thought and action which drew no distinction between republicanism in Europe and republicanism in America. The message, in the form in which the President had written it, "would," he declared, "be a summons to arms—to arms against all Europe, and for objects of policy exclusively European—Greece and Spain. It would be as new . . . in our policy as it would be surprising."⁸⁶ It was not for America to bid defiance in the heart of Europe. "The ground that I wish to take," he declared, "is that of earnest remonstrance against the European powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to make an American cause, and to adhere inflexibly to that."⁸⁷ The President saw and accepted the point of view so cogently stated; on November 24 he showed Adams a new draft which was "entirely conformable to the system of policy" which he had recommended.⁸⁸

On the twenty-fifth and twenty-sixth of November came further and final discussion on the famous message. William Wirt, the Attorney General, quite properly, as Adams admitted, remarked "upon the danger of assuming the attitude of menace without meaning to strike, and asked, if the Holy Allies should act in direct hostility against South America, whether this country would oppose them by war?"⁸⁹ Such a war he did not believe the American people would support. "There had never been much general excitement" in favor of the Spanish revolutionists.⁴⁰ To these objections the Secretary of State had a ready reply. He did not believe the danger of war to be great. But "if it were brought to our doors, we could not too soon take our stand to repel it." Were the Holy Allies to attack Latin America, "we must not let Great Britain get the sole credit for withstanding them." Such action "would throw them [the colonies] completely into her arms, and in the result

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 195.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 197 f.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 199.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 202.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

make them her Colonies instead of those of Spain. My opinion was, therefore, that we must act promptly and decisively."⁴¹ So, too, thought Calhoun, faithful to his persuasion that the reconquest of South America would be followed by action against the United States. So too, of course, thought the President. At the meeting on the twenty-sixth the die was cast in favor of the great pronouncement of 1823. It may be, however, that at the very last Monroe wavered. According to the journal of William Plumer, Jr., a few days before the actual sending of the message, the President expressed some "doubts about that part of it which related to the interference of the Holy Alliance with Spanish America," and "said he believed it had better be omitted, and asked him [that is, Adams] if he did not think so, too. Adams replied, 'You have my sentiments on the subject already, & I see no reason to alter them.' 'Well,' said the President, 'it is written, & I will not change it now.'"⁴² Perhaps this story, which must have come through Adams, is somewhat embroidered. Whether embroidered or not, at any rate the decision of the cabinet meeting stood, and on December 2, 1823, the members of Congress had an opportunity to read the great declaration.

That declaration, as we have already seen, proclaimed the superiority of American institutions, and the peril to the United States of any attempt on the part of European powers to extend their political system to the New World. It was, of course, the expression of a faith rather than a closely reasoned justification of American opposition to the reconquest of the colonies. Monroe assumed these propositions rather than debated them; and perhaps the strength of the message lies in the unwavering firmness of its tone, and the complete confidence of the President in the postulates which he put forward. Yet there is, I think, much more than this to be said for it. Monroe rested his opposition to European intermeddling in Spanish America on the danger to "the peace and safety" of the United States. In so doing he took a strong position from both a legal and a moral point of view. He was basing American policy on the right of self-preservation, a right that is and always has been recognized as fundamental in international law. If in very truth the interposition of the Holy Alliance in the New

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 207 f.

⁴² *Pennsylvania Magazine of History*, VI (1882), 358.

World imperiled the peace and safety of the United States, then the right to protest against it was obvious. And of this who should be the judge if not the chief magistrate of the republic? How, at any rate, could any European challenge him? Did he not stand secure on his own ground?

The practical wisdom and the immediate effectiveness of the message are matters that will become clearer as this narrative proceeds. But before we examine in some detail the full significance of Monroe's pronouncement, we should turn aside for a moment to follow the evolution of two collateral state papers, the instructions to Rush concerning the overtures of Canning, and the answer to the "Io Triumphe" of the Tsar. In particular the first of these may well claim our interest, for what was therein involved was the propriety of joint action with a European power to protect American interests. Was such action a violation of our tradition? Was it therefore to be avoided at all hazards? Or might it be both expedient and necessary?

The question, after all, was a very important one. So significant indeed did the President consider it that, shortly after the receipt of the first dispatches from Rush, he took the extraordinary step of sending them to two Virginians and ex-Presidents, to Jefferson and Madison. "If a case can exist, in which a sound maxim may, and ought to be departed from is not the present instance precisely that case?" he wrote to the sage of Monticello. "My own impression is that we ought to meet the proposal of the British government."⁴⁸ From both his famous confidants, Monroe received encouragement to go forward. "Great Britain," wrote Jefferson, in language which has a curious tincture on his pen, "is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all on earth; and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. . . . Not that I would purchase even her amity at the price of taking part in her wars. But the war in which the present proposition might engage us, should that be its consequence, is not her war, but ours. Its object is to introduce and establish the American system, of keeping out of our land all foreign powers, of never permitting those of Europe to interfere with the affairs of our nations. It is to maintain our

⁴⁸ This letter is quoted in full in W. C. Ford's article, *A.H.R.* (July 1902), VII, 685 f. See also *Monroe, Writings*, VI, 323 ff.

principle, not to depart from it."⁴⁴ "There ought not to be any backwardness," wrote Madison, "in meeting her in the way she has proposed. Our co-operation is due to ourselves and to the world; and whilst it must ensure success in the event of an appeal to force, it doubles the chance of success without that appeal."⁴⁵

Nor was this viewpoint without support when Monroe brought the question before the members of the cabinet. Calhoun, from the beginning of the discussions, was in favor of giving Rush a discretionary power to act with Britain. So was Southard, the Secretary of the Navy. Not so, however, John Quincy Adams. Strongly distrusting the motives of Canning, always ruggedly independent both in the expression of his personal views and in his conceptions of American foreign policy, the Secretary of State wished not only to decline the overtures of Britain, but explicitly to state that without British recognition of Spanish-American independence "we can see no foundation upon which the concurrent action of the two Governments can be harmonized."⁴⁶ And Adams it was, in the main, who prevailed. The instructions which he drafted for Rush contained more than one sentence that reflected the isolationist temper. "As a member of the European community," he wrote, "Great Britain has relations with all the other powers of Europe, which the United States have not, and with which it is their unaltered determination not to interfere." Not having recognized the Spanish colonies, moreover, she might, "negotiating at once with the European Alliance and with us, concerning America, without being bound by any permanent community of principle," "still be free to accommodate her policy to any of those distributions of power, and partitions of Territory which have for the last century been the ultima ratio of all European political arrangements." In the circumstances it was difficult to perceive the "foundation upon which the concurrent action of the two governments could be harmonized." "For the effectual accomplishment of the object common to both governments, a perfect understanding with regard

⁴⁴ For Jefferson's letter, see *Writings of Thomas Jefferson* (Memorial ed.), Washington, 1903. 20 vols. XV, 479-80.

⁴⁵ *Monroe, Writings*, VI, 394.

⁴⁶ See original and revised text of his instructions to Rush in W. C. Ford's article, "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine," II. *A.H.R.* (Oct. 1902), VIII, 33-38.

to it being established between them, it will be most advisable that they should act separately, each making such representations to the Continental European Allies, or either of them, as circumstances may render proper, and mutually communicating to each other the purport of such representation."⁴⁷ This was certainly the language of independence; and it undoubtedly represented the Adams cast of mind. The sentences thus penned, moreover, were to stand in the draft which was finally sent to London; the Secretary had his way with regard to them. Yet some concession to the contrary viewpoint had to be made, and, yielding perhaps to the solicitations of the President, Adams closed his dispatch by declaring that "should an emergency occur in which a joint manifestation of opinion by the two Governments may tend to influence the Councils of the European Allies, either in the aspect of persuasion or of admonition you will make it known to us without delay, and we shall according to the principles of our Government and in the forms prescribed by our Constitution, cheerfully join in any act, by which we may contribute to support the cause of human freedom and the Independence of the South American Nations."⁴⁸ Thus the door was left open to *eventual* common action as a possibility—eventual common action, however, to be decided upon not by Richard Rush, but by the administration in Washington. Adams had, in the main, won his point as to an independent course; but the stand which he took was not an absolute one, but one which might be modified by time and circumstance.

There is much food for reflection in this decision, in this year 1941. Does it justify the isolationists of our own day, or is it rather an argument for a policy of co-operation with Great Britain? The temptation, of course, for both schools of thought is to claim the unequivocal support of the men of 1823. But perhaps the fairest judgment takes a middle ground. Men like Adams clearly realized that American foreign policy must remain *American*; and so long as nations continue, as they doubtless will, to consult their own interests there must be a watchful regard and a prudent reserve as to the conditions of co-operation with any other power. Adams' reference to "those distributions of power, and partions of Terri-

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

tory which have for the last century been the *ultima ratio* of all European political arrangements" is not to be forgotten. But, on the other hand, for those Americans to whom the doctrine of nontanglement is a fixed and abiding principle, never to be violated, perhaps never to be debated, there is no great comfort in the position taken by Monroe and his advisers. Blind dogmatism was not the quality of mind most conspicuous in the men who made the great decisions of that far-off November one hundred and seventeen years ago. Neither Jefferson, nor Madison, nor Monroe, nor even Adams, closed the door to the possibility of co-operation with a European power where they were convinced that the interests of the United States would be advanced by such action. They took their stand not on formulas, but on facts. To the extent that they recognized a peril to exist, they were willing to join hands with Great Britain to avert it. In this, as in previous crises we have examined, the pure gospel of isolationism was accepted with some qualifications and exceptions.

But if Adams made a slight concession to the idea of co-operation with Great Britain in his dispatch to Rush, he preached the pure milk of the isolationist word in his answer to the communications of the Tsar. His purpose, as he described it, was, "in a moderate and conciliatory manner, but with a firm and determined spirit, to declare our dissent from the principles avowed in those communications; to assert those upon which our own Government is founded, and while disclaiming all intention of attempting to propagate them by force, and all interference with the political affairs of Europe, to declare our expectation and hope that the European powers will equally abstain from the attempt to spread their principles in the American hemisphere, or to subjugate by force any part of these continents to their will."⁴⁹ The "firm and determined spirit" of the Secretary of State could be taken for granted; his gifts of moderation and conciliation were less obvious. The dispatch which he penned began with a ringing declaration of the principle of government with the consent of the governed; its language was on occasion sarcastic, if not provocative; its tone something less than urbane. In the cabinet Calhoun was opposed to its being sent at all; and though no one supported the Secretary of War in this

⁴⁹ *Adams, Memoirs*, VI, 194.

view, Wirt, the Attorney General, objected to the first paragraph as "a hornet of a paragraph,"⁵⁰ and the President expressed the fear that the republicanism of the dispatch might "indispose the British Government to a cordial concert of operations with us."⁵¹ The Secretary, as his diary shows, bore with no very good grace the criticisms directed toward him; the first paragraph was "the cream of his paper"; a "distinct avowal of principle" was "absolutely required."⁵² But Monroe, with the tact which distinguished him (no one knew better how to handle the prickly New Englander), secured the deletion of the most offensive passages; and a modified and somewhat softened note was finally sent to Baron Tuyll. Yet the closing paragraphs of this note were unequivocal. "The United States of America," Adams wrote, "and their government could not see with indifference the forcible interposition of any European power, other than Spain, either to restore the dominion of Spain over her emancipated Colonies in America, or to establish Monarchical Government in those Countries, or to transfer any of the possessions heretofore or yet subject to Spain in the American Hemisphere, to any other European Power."⁵³ Such language left no doubt as to the point of view of the United States. At the close of 1823, the American government had in the dispatch to Rush, in the note to Tuyll, as in the famous message of December 2, taken a definite stand against the reconquest of the New World. Having analyzed these two collateral documents we may now once more fix our attention upon the declaration of Monroe itself, and seek to assess its wisdom, its influence, and its historical significance.

Perhaps the first question that we should ask ourselves is as to the extent of the danger against which the message was directed. There can be little question as to how the average American would respond. For at least half a century it has been persistently asserted that the President's action saved the New World from deadly peril, that it frustrated the wicked designs of the members of the Holy Alliance, and established the liberties of Latin America upon a

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 201.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 203.

⁵² *Ibid.*, p. 209.

⁵³ This note is published in full in W. C. Ford's "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine," II, in *A.H.R.* (Oct. 1902), VII, 43 f.

basis secure and irrefragible. Unfortunately this notion is purely legend; and if we survey the facts candidly we must admit that the message of 1823 was directed against an imaginary menace. Not one of the Continental powers cherished any designs of reconquest in the New World in November or December of 1823.

As the Continental power with the most formidable navy and the most important merchant marine, France might have seemed to be the probable agent of the Holy Alliance in restoring the colonies to Spain, all the more so as she had just intervened victoriously in the Peninsula. But in reality she had no stomach for any such venture. French policy was subject to contradictory influences which rendered it both hesitating and ineffective. On the one hand were France's increasingly important trading and mercantile interests, which desired, not the reconquest, but the recognition of the colonies. On the other were the Ultras, the proponents of the Spanish intervention, the apostles of reaction in general. Caught between these two groups, the French Prime Minister, Jean de Villèle, with Chateaubriand, his Foreign Minister, attempted a policy of compromise. This compromise was based upon an idea that had cropped up again and again in the preceding few years, and had, for a little, seemed to make substantial headway in the Argentine. It was the idea of independent Bourbon monarchies in the New World, under the governance of one or another of the Spanish Infantes. In June and July of 1823 it was seriously discussed in the bosom of the cabinet, and may be regarded, for a little while at any rate, as the aim of French policy. It implied the possibility of a measure of armed aid to Spain.

But it was very far from a project of reconquest. Jauntily disregarding the facts of the case, Villèle spoke of "a few troops and a little money" as sufficient for its realization.⁵⁴ In another of his letters, he alludes to "detachments," not great expeditions.⁵⁵ Sacrifices on a grand scale he obviously did not intend. He thought of the scheme as involving a minimum of effort, and furthermore he wished to make it contingent on Ferdinand's pursuing what France

⁵⁴ Jean, Comte de Villèle, *Mémoires et correspondance*. Paris, 1889-90. 5 vols. IV, 201.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 188.

would regard as a reasonable policy in Spain.⁵⁶ To count on Ferdinand VII being reasonable as a condition of any course of action was almost to foredoom it.

But were we to take the Bourbon monarchy idea more seriously than it deserves to be taken, and to identify it with a broad policy of intervention, we should find any such judgment soon reduced to nullity by the events of the month of October, 1823. In the early days of that month there took place a series of conferences between George Canning and the French Ambassador at London, the Prince de Polignac. The results of these conversations were embodied in the famous Polignac memorandum of October 9. "The junction of any Foreign Power in an enterprise of Spain against the Colonies, would be viewed" by Britain, stated Canning, "as constituting an entirely new question; and one upon which they must take such decision as the interests of Great Britain might require." To this clear intimation of British opposition to intervention there came the following reply, dictated by René de Chateaubriand, the Foreign Minister of France. The French government "believed it to be utterly hopeless to reduce Spanish America to the state of its former relation to Spain. France disclaimed, on her part, any intention or desire to avail herself of the present state of the Colonies, or of the present situation of France towards Spain, to appropriate to herself any part of the Spanish possessions in America. . . . She abjured, in any case, any design of acting against the Colonies by force of arms."⁵⁷ Thus, two months before the Monroe message, France had given a pledge against an interventionist policy, in answer to a British warning. She did not, on that account, abandon all interest in the question of Latin America. Indeed, shortly after the events just described, she began urging the Spanish government to appeal to the powers for a Congress on the colonial question. But there is no evidence whatever that either Chateaubriand or Villèle thought of such a Congress as an introduction to any policy of coercion. Indeed, the events of the fall of 1823 point clearly in the opposite direction. The French squadron in the West Indies

⁵⁶ Paris. Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Correspondance Politique. Espagne. Vol. 722, fol. 56. June 9, 1823.

⁵⁷ *British and Foreign State Papers*, XI. 1823-24, 49-54. Reprinted in *Monroe's Writings*, VI, 416-19.

was weakened, not strengthened;⁵⁸ so, too, were the squadrons at home, several vessels of which were put out of commission.⁵⁹ "From whom," wrote Chateaubriand to Talaru, the French Minister in Spain, October 30, 1823, "can Spain expect aid to reconquer her colonies? Surely she cannot think that France would furnish her money, vessels, or troops for such an enterprise?"⁶⁰ Nor is the slackening of naval activity all that we have to go by as to French intentions. At the very time when Monroe was issuing his warning against the nefarious designs of the Alliance the French cabinet was preparing to send agents to the New World who should reassure the new states as to the views of France. The instructions to these agents directed them to do their utmost to remove the impression that France had ever promised military or naval aid to Spain.⁶¹ France, it is declared, cannot wait indefinitely on the good pleasure of Ferdinand before recognizing the new states. She is willing to mediate between the new republics and the former mother country on the basis of independence, with special commercial privileges for Spain. Such language makes it crystal-clear that the pledges given to Canning were given in good faith, and that, if Villèle and Chateaubriand had flirted with the idea of using force in June or July, they had ceased to flirt with it in November.

But what of the Tsar Alexander? What lay behind the note of October 16, of which we have already spoken? What lay behind the declamatory phrases of the "Io Triumphe over the fallen cause of revolution" which so disturbed the tranquillity of John Quincy Adams? The answer is, very little indeed of a concrete character. Russian policy towards Latin America can hardly be said to have crystallized at all in those last months of 1823. There is reason to

⁵⁸ Paris. Aff. Etr., Corr. Pol., Angleterre. Vol. 617, fol. 145. Oct. 5, 1823. "Nous avons rapellé le seul vaisseau de guerre, le *Jean Bart*, que nous eussions dans les Antilles."

⁵⁹ Washington, State Department. Dispatches, France. Vol. 22, no. 16. Nov. 29, 1823. "The French government is putting out of commission several of their ships of war, and have already discharged and are discharging numbers of their seamen."

⁶⁰ Paris. Aff. Etr., Corr. Pol., Espagne. Vol. 724, fol. 147. Oct. 30, 1823.

⁶¹ Paris. Aff. Etr. Méms. et Docs., Amérique. Vol. 39 and Paris. Archives Nationales, Minist. de la Marine, BB⁴ 405 bis. These instructions are published almost in full in C. A. Villaneuva, *La Santa Alianza*. Paris, 1912. Pp. 44-50.

suspect—at least the French Minister suspected—that the brilliant Corsican, Pozzo di Borgo, who represented the Russian government at Paris, was coquetting with the idea of the resubjugation of the colonies. In October he paid a visit to Madrid. There he appears to have encouraged, rather than discouraged, the ridiculous ambitions of Ferdinand, and even to have urged the King to appeal to his allies for aid.⁶² But if he took such action, he took it on his own authority. No instructions which dealt with the colonial question came from St. Petersburg, to him or to any other Russian representative, until November 26, 1823, only six days before the American President sent his message to Congress. And when indeed they did come, they were phrased in mellifluous generalities, declaring only that the colonial question concerned “the interest of all the Allies, and that it is between them and with the King of Spain that this important question ought to be treated and decided by common accord.”⁶³ Still opposed to the recognition of the hydra of revolution, Alexander yet realized, and clearly indicated, that the fate of Latin America could only be decided after an understanding with Great Britain. Very specifically he declared that preliminary conferences with the Court of St. James’s were the indispensable prelude to that Congress to which he, in common with the French Court, looked forward as a forum for the consideration of the affairs of Latin America.⁶⁴

If Alexander thus pursued a policy of caution, what was to be said of Metternich, the Austrian Chancellor, and Count von Bernstorff, who directed Prussian policy? With regard to the first of these two men, the answer is given in a series of long and able dispatches designed to make their impression upon the Tsar. Metternich was, it is true, a reactionary, in some respects the arch-priest of reaction; but he was no romantic, and no crusader in causes that had nothing to do with the interests of Austria. He recognized that the Spanish-American revolutions had already largely succeeded. “It appears to us,” he wrote, “that all that wisdom should dictate at this time is to keep open the question of legal right. It is certainly not over

⁶² Paris. *Aff. Etr., Corr. Pol., Espagne*. Vol. 724. Dec. 6, 1823.

⁶³ St. Petersburg. *F.O., Expédiés*, no. 8829. Nov. 25, 1823.

⁶⁴ St. Petersburg. *F.O., Expédiés*, no. 9044. Jan. 9, 1824.

this immense part of the American continent which Spain formerly^{Met.} possessed as colonies that the efforts of the mother-country can now be directed with any chance of success whatsoever. In deeming it possible to regain all, she would be practically sure to lose all."⁶⁵ His views were echoed by his Prussian colleague. As for the allied powers, wrote Bernstorff, they "lack arms to reach America, or even a voice to make themselves heard there."⁶⁶

It is possible, then, to state with definiteness and with assurance that the powers of the Holy Alliance had no designs against the liberties of the New World at the moment when Monroe launched his famous declaration. The story that the President prevented a terrible danger is legend and nothing more; as legend it deserves to be recorded. It assumes a material strength on the part of the United States which closer examination reveals not to have existed; it assumes that the United States was a great power, in the modern sense of the word, in 1823. It assumes that this country was listened to then with the same respect which it commands today.

One of the striking facts, indeed, about the events we have been examining is the attitude of the Continental powers toward the American government. With one exception, that of Russia, they proposed entirely to ignore it in their projected Congress on the colonial question. When, for example, Canning suggested in the course of the Polignac conversations that the administration at Washington ought to be represented at any Congress on Latin-American affairs, Chateaubriand and Villèle were nothing less than shocked. To the former the British proposal seemed "malevolent" and "short-sighted";⁶⁷ to the latter it seemed better to have no Congress at all than to admit a country "whose political principles are directly at variance with those of every other Power."⁶⁸ In a later pronouncement Chateaubriand went even further; the exclusion of the United States from European gatherings "might serve in case of need as a supplementary article of the public law of Europe."⁶⁹ Views such as these were welcomed in Vienna and

⁶⁵ St. Petersburg. F.O., Reçus, no. 21,221 (Encl.).

⁶⁶ Berlin. Staats-Archiv, Russland. Rep. I, 82. Dec. 19, 1823.

⁶⁷ St. Petersburg. F.O., Reçus, no. 21,224 (Encl.). Dec. 25, 1823.

⁶⁸ London. P.R.O., F.O., France. Vol. 296, desp. 568. Nov. 4, 1823.

⁶⁹ St. Petersburg. F.O., Reçus, no. 21,224 (Encl.). Dec. 25, 1823.

Berlin. When Adams, in one of his dispatches to Rush, indicated that his government would refuse to participate in a Congress if invited to do so, his resolution was superfluous; it was a certainty from the beginning that no invitation would be extended.

It would be pleasant if with these last sentences we could terminate the deflation of the message of 1823, from the standpoint of its contemporary effect; but candor compels us to press on still further before turning to the more agreeable task of indicating the many strong points of Monroe's declaration. We shall have to examine its reception in the Old World and the New; we shall have to ask what were its effects upon the policy of Old World monarchies or New World republics.

First of all, then, how was it received by Europeans? How were its resounding periods judged by European statesmen?

On the continent of Europe, there were here and there individuals, the friends of liberty, who hailed it with delight. The venerable Lafayette thought it "the best little bit of paper that God had ever permitted any man to give to the World,"⁷⁰ and Barbé-Marbois, always well-disposed to the United States, thought it "not only the best but the best-timed state paper which he had ever read."⁷¹ But to most Continentals, the message came as a most unpleasant surprise. They knew, of course, nothing whatever of its background; innocent of nefarious designs, they could hardly be otherwise than resentful of the imputations of the President. Without any preliminary warning or exchange of views, without any effort to establish the facts, in a document intended only for the American national legislature, Monroe and Adams had laid down the principles on which they expected the policy of the Old World to be governed in relation to the New. These doctrines were nothing more nor less than a challenge to the monarchies of Europe; they were as odious to a Metternich or a Chateaubriand as the diatribes of Hitler or Mussolini are to a convinced friend of liberty today. "Blustering," "monstrous," "arrogant," "haughty," "peremptory"—these were some of the terms applied to the message. And

⁷⁰ Washington. State Department. Special Agents' Series, McRae Papers. Nov. 3, 1824.

⁷¹ *Monroe, Writings*, VI, 435.

veritably vitriolic criticism came from the pen of the great Metternich.

These United States of America [wrote the Austrian Chancellor], which we have seen arise and grow, and which during their short youth already meditated projects which they dared not then avow, have suddenly left a sphere too narrow for their ambition, and have astonished Europe by a new act of revolt, more unprovoked, fully as audacious, and no less dangerous than the former. They have distinctly and clearly announced their intention to set not only power against power, but, to express it more exactly, altar against altar. In their indecent declarations they have cast blame and scorn on the institutions of Europe most worthy of respect, on the principles of its greatest sovereigns, on the whole of those measures which a sacred duty no less than an evident necessity has forced our governments to adopt to frustrate plans most criminal. In permitting themselves these unprovoked [*sic*] attacks, in fostering revolutions wherever they show themselves, in regretting those which have failed, in extending a helping hand to those which seem to prosper, they lend new strength to the apostles of sedition, and reanimate the courage of every conspirator. If this flood of evil doctrines and pernicious examples should extend over the whole of America, what would become of our religious and political institutions, of the moral force of our governments, and of that conservative system which has saved Europe from complete dissolution?⁷²

Yet though there was widespread irritation at the message of 1823, there was not, on the part of any Continental power, any protest against it. It may be that Chateaubriand considered such action; he had, as we have seen, told Stuart that the noncolonization clause "ought to be resisted by all the powers possessing either territory or commercial interests in that hemisphere."⁷³ But the idea, if held, was soon abandoned. It would not have been strange if the Tsar, with his passion for dialectic and high-sounding principles, had wished to answer the philippic of Monroe; but when Tuyll proposed such action to his August Master, he was answered that "the document in question enunciates views and pretensions so exaggerated, it establishes principles so contrary to the rights of the European powers, that it merits only the most profound contempt. His Majesty therefore invites you to preserve the passive attitude which you have deemed proper to adopt, and to continue

⁷² St. Petersburg. F.O., Reçus, no. 21,224. Jan. 19, 1824.

⁷³ London. P.R.O., F.O., France. Vol. 305, no. 8. Jan. 12, 1824.

to maintain the silence which you have imposed upon yourself."⁷⁴ Alexander evidently believed that further discussion would serve only to dignify the American manifesto. And the cabinets of Madrid, of Vienna and Berlin, despite their irritation, emulated his silence.

This silence is not to be regarded as flattering to the United States. It proceeded from a sense of American weakness, rather than American strength. Following a habit which European ministers seem early to have developed in evaluating American foreign policies, there was a distinct disposition to set the message down to the exigencies of domestic politics. Menou, the French chargé at Washington, believed it was part of John Quincy Adams' campaign for the Presidential succession in 1824.⁷⁵ Stoughton, his Spanish colleague, took a similar view, and thought the pronouncement a mere *brutum fulmen*.⁷⁶ And on every hand, in the diplomatic correspondence of the time, one becomes painfully aware of the low estimate in which the physical power of the United States was held. The charge of materialism, a hoary weapon in the European arsenal of criticism of the United States, was reiterated again and again. The Americans would not fight, because they were too much interested in making money. They could not be brought to any real sacrifices. Such was the judgment of Menou, of Stoughton, of Tuyl. And if, perchance, they did take up the sword, their power would be anything but formidable. Financially, Tuyl reported, the Union "would . . . find itself a prey to considerable embarrassment." Its army was small, nor was it possible to raise forces to cope with a powerful expedition. "The sluggishness inherent in the forms of a federal republic [mark well these words, reader of today], the scanty powers and means of which this government disposes, the lack of inclination of the inhabitants of this country to make pecuniary sacrifices which offer them no

⁷⁴ St. Petersburg, F.O., Expédiés, no. 9241. Mar. 5, 1824. The original text read, in place of "that it merits only the most profound contempt," "that it would hardly be possible to mention it to the Government of the United States without haughtily reproving language so strange. However, such action not being for the moment within the pretensions of His Majesty, he invites you to preserve," etc., as above.

⁷⁵ Paris. Aff. Etr., Corr. Pol., Etats-Unis. Vol. 80. Dec. 11, 1823.

⁷⁶ Seville. Archivo General de Indias. Estado, América en General. Legajo 5. Jan. 2, 1824.

bait of considerable and direct gain, the irritation which would be aroused among the merchants by the cessation of their commercial relations with France, Spain and the North . . . will tend to make such a war . . . rather a demonstration which circumstances have rendered indispensable and which is entered upon reluctantly with the secret desire of seeing it ended as soon as possible, than one of those truly national enterprises sustained by every means, and with every bit of energy, which might make it a very embarrassing obstacle. The attitude which the government of the United States has assumed," the minister concluded, "is undoubtedly of such a nature as to demand in an American expedition undertaken by Spain and her Allies a considerable development of means and of military force. But once the decision is taken to attempt it, I should not think that the course taken by the United States, unsupported by Great Britain, would be of a nature to change such a decision."⁷⁷

One might set down remarks such as these, remarks which have their parallel in the language of Chateaubriand and many others, as nothing more nor less than wishful thinking. Yet one can but admit that an analysis of the naval strength of the United States in 1823 does something to sustain the view frequently expressed. In 1823 this country had a naval establishment which, numerically, was about a quarter that of France in ships and men, and less than an eighth that of Russia. These are crude figures, it is true; and even were we to accept them at face value, we should have to remember that, even with Havana and the French Antilles as bases, the Continental powers would have been at a severe disadvantage in waging war on this side of the Atlantic. We have to take account, too, of the numerous American privateers which might have been unleashed had war come. But even making such allowances it still remains true that in all human probability a combined French and Russian intervention in American affairs would have constituted a considerable menace, and that the forces of the Allied powers would have outnumbered those of the United States. We shall be making a gross error if we attribute to the United States of 1823 the material strength of a later age.

We shall be making an error, also, if we imagine that the *policies*

⁷⁷ St. Petersburg. F.O. Recus, no. 21,341. Feb. 2, 1824.

of the European powers were much influenced by the solemn warnings of Monroe. The plans for a Congress on the colonial question went forward none the less rapidly because of the message of the President; indeed, Chateaubriand and Metternich and many others were led to hope that the flaming republicanism of the American pronouncement would operate to bring Great Britain into line with the Continental powers. The idea of Bourbon monarchies in the New World, dissociated from the use of force, was fully as vital in 1824 as it had been in 1823; and in St. Petersburg the Tsar Alexander seems to have played with the idea of intervention for the first time after, and not before, December of 1823.⁷⁸ If his thoughts on this subject never got beyond the point of nebulous conversation, the reason lay not in the attitude of the United States, but in the frigid indifference of the other Continental courts, and in the obvious and vigorous opposition of Great Britain. That opposition was underlined by Canning's refusal, at the end of January, to attend a Congress on the colonial question. Never really seriously entertained, the whole idea of intervention in the New World became little less than an absurdity by the spring of 1824.

Yet it will not do, because the peril to the independence of the new states was in large degree illusory, to depreciate unduly the significance of Monroe's message. To say nothing of its long-time importance, of its epoch-making character in the perspective of more than a century, there is still much to be said for it from the viewpoint of 1823. We should not assess the President's action in the light of the knowledge of today. We must obviously assess it in the light of its own time. Viewed from this angle, it must first of all be said that the Presidential declaration took a considerable amount of courage. The cabinet discussions make it clear that whether or not a serious danger existed, Monroe *thought* it existed. So, too, with the exception of Adams, did his advisers. It needed, therefore, a certain audacity for the young republic of the West to throw down the gauntlet to the great states of Europe. True, there seemed some reason to believe that if emergency arose the United States would be supported by the power of the British navy. But there could be no real confidence that this would be the case. There was always the possibility, as Adams and Wirt had

⁷⁸ See my work, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823-26*. Cambridge, 1927. Pp. 228-35.

both pointed out, that Great Britain was playing a double game.⁷⁹ There was, indeed, something suspicious in the way in which Canning had handled the whole matter. The President himself and Richard Rush, as well as Adams, were quick to question his motives. They could not but remark that in September the overtures of the British Minister had suddenly ceased. The silence that followed might be easily interpreted as the sign of a shift in British policy. In such circumstances, to speak out boldly was no mere cheap and easy gesture, no mere *brutum fulmen*, launched in the secure knowledge that the step taken would be made good by the armed might of Britain. It was an act, if not of unmitigated audacity, at least of calculated courage.

Moreover, from one angle, at any rate, it was an exceedingly skillful piece of diplomacy. Great Britain and the United States were inevitably rivals for the favor of the young republics of Latin America, rivals for their favor and their commerce. By the declaration of December 2, 1823, Monroe anticipated Canning in giving open expression to opposition to the reconquest of the new states, and in the public assurance of the will of another power to protect them. And the records of the time clearly indicate the chagrin of the British Minister at having been thus outplayed in the diplomatic game. True, it strengthened his hand in refusing the invitation to the projected Congress on the Latin-American question. "The Congress," he wrote joyfully to A'Court, British Minister to Spain, "was broken in all its limbs before, but the President's speech gives it the *coup de grâce*."⁸⁰ But this pleasurable reaction to Monroe's pronouncement was short-lived. From exultation Canning soon changed to suspicion and jealousy. Hard on the reception of the message, he communicated the Polignac correspondence to the agents of Great Britain in the New World, and labored to show (with some accuracy, it must be confessed) that his own country had been first in assuming the protection of the new states.⁸¹ There are clear signs, too, that he dreaded the extension of the American political system in the New World, and

⁷⁹ Antea, p. 41.

⁸⁰ Stapleton, A. G. *George Canning and his Times*. London, 1859. P. 395.

⁸¹ London. P.R.O., F.O., Buenos Aires and Mexico, Confidential. Dec. 30, 1823, and Feb. 6, 1824, respectively.

labored to circumvent it. "The great danger of the time," he wrote to one of his friends in 1825, "a danger which the policy of the European System would have fostered, was a division of the World into European and American, Republican and Monarchical; a league of worn-out Govts. on the one hand, and of youthful and strong Nations, with the U. States at their head, on the other."⁸² With this thesis in mind, Canning himself seems to have flirted with the idea of Bourbon monarchy in the winter of 1824.⁸³ He bent his every effort to settle the dispute between Portugal and its revolted colony, Brazil, with a view to preserving the monarchical system in the latter country. And at the same time, never the doctrinaire, always the ardent servant of British commercial interests, he pressed harder than ever before in the cabinet and at Madrid for the recognition of the colonies. Indeed, he even went so far as to offer King Ferdinand the guarantee of the island of Cuba if that obdurate prince would come to some kind of understanding with his former subjects on the mainland.⁸⁴ He sought to persuade his colleagues that "the ambition and ascendancy" of the United States made forthright action imperative. And at more than one American capital he sought to undermine the prestige and throw doubt upon the motives of the American government. The message of Monroe had struck home; and the activity of British diplomacy in seeking to counteract it demonstrates clearly enough with what shrewdness Monroe had acted in proclaiming independently, and in anticipation of the Court of St. James's, the opposition of the New World to invasion or penetration from the Old. From this angle alone, despite its false assumptions, the message was a brilliant diplomatic document.

Nor is this by any means all that ought to be said. The *method* of the warning to Europe is no less interesting than the matter. Monroe and his advisers might have confined themselves in 1823 to the ordinary courses of diplomatic correspondence. They might have contented themselves with an answer to Tuyl, perhaps with a similar communication to France. They chose instead the course

⁸² Festing, Gabrielle. *John Hookham Frère and his Friends*. London, 1899. Pp. 267 f.

⁸³ See my work, *op. cit.*, pp. 238 f.

⁸⁴ London. P.R.O., F.O., Spain. Vol. 284, no. 14 (secret). April 2, 1824.

of open diplomacy. And how, indeed, could they have chosen better? Granted the premises upon which they acted, what could have been more skillful? How much more effective the declaration to Congress than an unostentatious diplomatic protest; how much more gratifying to the national pride, how much more productive of prestige in South America, how much more disconcerting to Europe! No wonder that the British chargé, Addington, could write as follows of its reception in the United States.

The message seems to have been received with acclamation throughout the United States. . . . The explicit and manly tone, especially, with which the President has treated the subject of European interference in the affairs of this Hemisphere with a view to the subjugation of those territories which have emancipated themselves from European domination, has evidently found in every bosom a chord which vibrates in strict unison with the sentiments so conveyed. They have been echoed from one end of the union to the other. It would indeed be difficult, in a country composed of elements so various, and liable on all subjects to opinions so conflicting, to find more perfect unanimity than has been displayed on every side on this particular point.⁸⁵

Whatever else the President had or had not done, he had certainly interpreted the sentiments of his countrymen, and aroused their enthusiasm and their loyalty.

And, indeed, he had done more. He had stated with remarkable force and clarity the divergence in the political ideals of the Europe and the United States of 1823. Absolutism and democracy, these were the opposing principles which the President made clear. To Alexander, to Pozzo, to Metternich, whatever practical obstacles might stand in the way of the reconquest of the colonies, the fundamental postulates of the situation were perfectly clear. Sovereigns held their power by the will of God. No revolution could divest them of these rights. In theory, then, they could naturally assist one another in the putting down of their rebellious subjects. In theory, the republics of Latin America were outside the pale, and their success the symptoms of the dissolution of world order itself. "The Christian World," wrote Pozzo di Borgo, "tends to divide into two parts, distinct from, and I fear, hostile to, one another; we must work to prevent or defer this terrible revolution, and above all to

⁸⁵ London. P.R.O., F.O., America. Vol. 185, no. 1. Jan. 5, 1824.

save and fortify the portion which may escape the contagion and the invasion of vicious principles."⁸⁶ Against this Old World order, based on the doctrines of absolutism, Monroe opposed a new one, based on the right of the peoples of the world to determine their own destiny, and to govern themselves. The principles which he expressed were more than the principles of his own government; they were the principles of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They were the principles that, in the main, were to triumph, in the years that lay ahead, to triumph not only in the New World, but in a large part of the Old. Framed only for the continents of the West, they were to have an ecumenical significance for several generations of men. The liberty which Monroe desired and defended for the republics of Latin America was, in the course of the century, to be diffused throughout no small part of Europe as well. The President of the United States spoke not only for his people, but for his age. He spoke, indeed, for more than his age. It is a measure of the significance of the declaration of 1823 that it has today, in this year of grace 1941, a relevancy no less great than when it was framed nearly a century and a quarter ago.

⁸⁶ St. Petersburg. F.O., Reçus, no. 21,298. Jan. 30, 1824.

JAMES PARTON

THE DIFFICULTY which historians often have in reconciling varying conclusions on the same subject is well illustrated by the lack of a generally accepted interpretation of the meaning of Jacksonian democracy. Apparently the disagreement is almost as old as Jackson himself. When James Parton set out to write his biography only a little more than ten years after the President's death in 1845, he found contemporary evaluations so extreme in their praise or condemnation that he felt obliged to summarize them by writing:

Andrew Jackson . . . was a patriot and a traitor. He was one of the greatest of generals, and wholly ignorant of the art of war. A writer brilliant, elegant, without being able to compose a correct sentence, or spell words of four syllables. The first of statesmen, he never devised, he never framed a measure. He was the most candid of men, and was capable of the profoundest dissimulation. A most law-defying, law-obeying citizen. A stickler for discipline, he never hesitated to disobey his superior. A democratic autocrat. An urbane savage. An atrocious saint.

Most historians would agree that this hyperbole contains more than a kernel of truth. The complexity of Jackson's character helps to explain why he has been interpreted so variously. If it is ambiguous to describe him as a "democratic autocrat," it is equally inadequate to label him either a "democrat" or an "autocrat." He was varied enough so that the historian has a range within which his own preconceptions, rather than Jackson's, may be the decisive factor.

Parton approached his task with a desire to be objective, but with a loyalty to what he conceived to be Jeffersonian principles—a loyalty that set somewhat rigid standards by which Jackson was to be judged. Basically, Parton felt that there were two political theories contending for power in America: the first sought a strong, “paternal” government with a great scope of activities, the second was Jefferson’s the “world-is-governed-too-much” philosophy, which led to “free government.” Although Parton’s preference was for the latter, he did not relish “King Mob.” Like Jefferson, he believed universal suffrage to be no blessing unless the people were prepared for it. He looked back with a certain fondness upon John Quincy Adams’ presidency: “It was a decent administration. A large proportion of those who served it were gentlemen: *i.e.*, educated men of principle; men who had had mothers that taught them to be kind, and fathers who compelled them to do right.” Parton had no quarrel with democratic principles, but he considered the great failure of American political life to derive from the fact that the educated class had neither the sense nor the decency to be democratic leaders. The “untutored” Jackson was hardly the ideal leader, despite the general excellence of his beliefs.

It is difficult to judge what Parton’s stand would be in today’s controversy concerning the source of Jackson’s principles and his political support. Would he side with those who emphasize, as Turner did, the western origin of his strength and ideas, or would he find that Jackson represented the eastern workingmen? Although Parton described Jackson’s first inaugural as a scene in which the South and West overwhelmed the North, it is clear that Parton believed Jackson’s party to represent the common man in all sections. Yet his frequent references to “workingmen” among Jackson’s supporters do not imply an industrial or an urban emphasis; anyone who worked with his hands was meant to be included in the term.

With his Jeffersonian sympathies, it is apparent that Parton would back Jackson’s bank policy. But his agreement was not

dependent upon a sweeping condemnation of Nicholas Biddle and an endorsement of all the charges made against the Bank of the United States. Indeed, the accusations of mismanagement and bribery seemed to him exaggerated, even frivolous. It was rather the monopolistic extension of government and the unwise, even if honest, association of government and business which disturbed him and led him to applaud Jackson's veto of the bank bill. Yet he was equally quick to censure the inadequacy of the "pet bank" solution, to which the President's willfulness had led him.

The merits and defects of Parton's works can be related to his journalistic background. His lack of formal training reveals itself in an oversimplified and generally inadequate treatment of the historical setting of his biography. Even his portrait of Jackson has something of a caricature about it. Later writers have showed that the President was neither as well intentioned nor as ignorant as Parton assumed he was. Other historians of the day, such as Prescott and Motley, produced works of far greater literary merit.

Although many today would question Parton's identification of the Jacksonites with the laboring classes and of their opponents with business interests, they would also disapprove of his conclusion that Jackson's introduction of the "spoils system" was so vicious as to outweigh all the democratic gains of his administration. Indeed, Parton's final estimate—that Jackson's election was a mistake because of the permanence of the "spoils" evil and the impermanence of his achievements—is surprisingly harsh and essentially invalid. A recent poll of historians placed Jackson among the six presidents entitled to the adjective "great."

Yet Parton must be considered not only among the important critics of Jackson, but in any listing of significant American biographers. His studies of Aaron Burr, Horace Greeley, and Andrew Jackson set a standard of lively and intelligent analysis which subsequent writers found it profitable to emulate. If he

was unable to cope with political and economic intricacies, he helped to establish the duty of a biographer to supply the intimate details which convert a remote public figure into an understandable human being. Although he was given to quick and sometimes fallacious generalizations about events, he was patient in gathering revealing anecdotes about the personalities concerned.

Published in 1860, Parton's *Life of Andrew Jackson* is the oldest book represented in this collection. It is sufficient to say that, although innumerable scholars have drawn upon it, it has retained a great deal that is unique and continues to shed its own light in the world of historical scholarship.

Re-election of General Jackson

A STRANGE, sad, exciting, eventful summer was that of 1832. It opened gayly enough. The country had never been under such headway before. In looking over the newspapers for May of that year, the eye is arrested by the incident of Washington Irving's triumphal return home after an absence from his native land of seventeen years. He had gone away an unknown youth, or little known beyond his own circle, and came back a renowned author who had won as much honor for his country as for himself. The little speech which he delivered at the banquet given him in the city of New York, delightfully reveals the innocent astonishment which the young Republic, once so fearful of its future, felt at the mighty pace at which it seemed to be going toward greatness. The modest Irving, unused to speak in public, spoke with faltering voice of his warm and unexpected welcome. But when he came to describe the changes he observed in his native city, the marvelous prosperity

From Life of Andrew Jackson by James Parton.

that every where met his eyes, his tongue was loosened, and he burst into momentary eloquence.

"From the time," said he, "that I approached the coast, I saw indications of the growing greatness of my native city. We had scarce descried the land, when a thousand sails of all descriptions gleaming along the horizon, and all standing to or from one point, showed that we were in the neighborhood of a vast commercial emporium. As I sailed up our beautiful bay, with a heart swelling with old recollections and delightful associations, I was astonished to see its once wild features brightening with populous villages and noble piles, and a teeming city extending itself over heights which I had left covered with groves and forests. But how shall I describe my emotion when our city itself rose to sight, seated in the midst of its watery domain, stretching away to a vast extent; when I beheld a glorious sunshine brightening up the spires and domes, some familiar to memory, others new and unknown, and beaming on a forest of masts of every nation, extending as far as the eye could reach. I have gazed with admiration upon many a fair city and stately harbor, but my admiration was cold and ineffectual, for I was a stranger, and had no property in the soil. Here, however, my heart throbbd with pride and joy as I admired. I had birthright in the brilliant scene before me—

"This was my own, my native land."

"It has been asked, 'Can I be content to live in this country?' Whoever asks that question must have but an inadequate idea of its blessings and delights. What sacrifice of enjoyments have I to reconcile myself to? I come from gloomier climates to one of brilliant sunshine and inspiring purity. I come from countries lowering with doubt and danger, where the rich man trembles and the poor man frowns—where all repine at the present and dread the future. I come from these, to a country where all is life and animation; where I hear on every side the sound of exultation; where every one speaks of the past with triumph, the present with delight, the future with growing and confident anticipation. Is this not a community in which one may rejoice to live? Is this not a city by which one may be proud to be received as a son? Is this not a land in which every one may be happy to fix his destiny and ambition, if possible to found a name?

I am asked how long I mean to remain here. They know but little of my heart or my feelings who can ask me this question!—As long as I live.”

Just so the country felt as it read Mr. Irving's glowing sentences in the month of May, 1832.

Before the next month had run its course, a great terror pervaded the continent. The cholera, that had ravaged Europe last year, and spread over America a vague alarm, broke out in Quebec on the ninth of June. An emigrant ship lost forty-two of her passengers from the disease while crossing the ocean, and seemed to communicate it to the city as soon as she arrived. Swiftly the disease made its southward progress—swiftly, but capriciously—leaping here a region, diverging there, sparing some unhealthful localities, and desolating others supposed to be peculiarly salubrious. It reached New York fifteen days after its appearance in Quebec. There was no parade on the fourth of July. Hospitals were hastily prepared in every ward. The cases increased in number for just one month; at the expiration of which three hundred persons daily sickened, and nearly one hundred died, of cholera alone. Grass grew in some of the thoroughfares usually thronged, and whole blocks of stores were closed. By the middle of August, when 2,565 persons had died of the disease, it had so far subsided that the people who had fled began to return, and the city to regain its wonted aspect.¹

As the epidemic subsided in New York, it gained further South. It raged in Philadelphia, terrified Baltimore, threatened Washington, and darted malignant influences into the far West. Cincinnati was attacked, and the troops stationed at unknown Chicago did not escape. New Orleans had it, instead of the yellow fever.

As a vulture, brooding in the air, invisible, discerns its prey afar off, and swooping downward seizes it in its horrid talons, unex-

¹ The following paragraph is from the *New York Journal of Commerce* of July 26th, 1832: "There never was a more delightful exhibition of Christian benevolence than is now witnessed in this city. The generous donations which have been recorded, and which still continue to flow in, form but an item in the general aggregate. Numbers of our most accomplished ladies are engaged, day after day, in making garments for the poor and distressed, while committees of gentlemen, who at home sit on elegant sofas and walk on Brussels carpets, are searching out the abode of poverty, filth, and disease, and administering personally to the wants of the wretched inmates. There is no telling the misery which they often meet with and relieve."

pected, irresistible, and then, having torn the blood out of its heart, ascends again to the upper air, and surveying once more the outspread land, espies another helpless victim, and rushes down upon it, so did this wayward and terrible cholera seem to select, from day to day, for no reasons that science could penetrate, a fresh town to suddenly affright and desolate.

About the middle of August, the President, accompanied by Mr. Blair and other friends, left Washington for a visit to the Hermitage, and did not return until the nineteenth of October. On this journey it was remarked the President paid his expenses in gold. "No more paper-money, you see, fellow-citizens, if I can only put down this Nicholas Biddle and his monster bank." A telling maneuver in a country of doubtful banks and counterfeit-detectors, distressing to all women, and puzzling to most men. "Ninety-five counterfeits of the bills of the bank of the United States alone," Col. Benton had kept the country in mind of during the late debates. Gold, long since gone out of circulation, was held up to the people as the currency which the administration of General Jackson was struggling to restore. A golden piece of money, as most of us remember, was a curiosity at that time. It was a distinction in country places to possess one. Clay and eternal rag-money, Jackson and speedy gold, was diligently represented to be the issue between the two candidates. Storekeepers responded by announcing themselves as anti-bank haters, and hard-money bakers. The administration had given the politicians a "good cry" to go before the country with, and it was not allowed to fall to the ground.

Amid the terrors of the cholera, one would have expected to find the presidential campaign carried on with less than the usual spirit. There was a lull in midsummer. But, upon the whole, no contest of the kind was ever conducted with so much energy and so much labor. The pamphlets of the campaign still astonish collectors by their number, their ability, and their size. Against the administration seem to have been arrayed the talent of the country, the great capitalists, the leading men of business, and even the smaller banks, making common cause with the great bank, doomed to quick extinction if General Jackson were reelected. Let us note briefly a few instructive incidents of the contest.

At the last moment, it appears, there was some reason to fear that

the machinery devised to secure the nomination of Mr. Van Buren would fail to effect its purpose. Among those who objected to place him upon the ticket with General Jackson was that very Major Eaton for whom he had done and risked so much. Eaton was a delegate from Tennessee to the nominating convention. Major Lewis writes to me: "Mr. Eaton objected to the nomination of Mr. Van Buren, alleging that it would endanger the election of General Jackson. I had not seen Mr. Eaton for five or six months; but learning, only the day before the convention was to meet, that he would oppose the nomination of Mr. Van Buren, I immediately wrote him in strong and decided terms, warning him of the danger of such a course, *unless he was prepared to quarrel with the General!* He was sent as a delegate from Tennessee, and went directly to Baltimore, where the convention was to sit, the evening before it was to meet, without passing through Washington as was expected; but fortunately he received my letter in time to save both himself and Mr. Van Buren, perhaps."

The convention met, as Messrs. Lewis, Hill, Blair, and Kendall had decreed it should meet, at Baltimore on the 21st of May. Three hundred and twenty-six delegates were present. The General's old friend, Judge Overton, of Tennessee, was to have presided over the assembly, but was prevented from doing so by sickness. The convention soon came to a vote upon the candidates for the second office. Mr. Van Buren received two hundred and sixty votes; Mr. P. P. Barbour, of Virginia, forty; Col. Richard M. Johnston, twenty-six. The opposition noticed, with comment, that this convention adjourned without deigning to issue the usual address to the people.

The plan of the Calhoun wing of the democratic party, if wing it could be called, and if it had a plan, was explained, at the time, by General Duff Green to one of the friends of Mr. Clay, and by Mr. Clay to his nearest friend, Judge Brooke, of Maryland. It was a wild scheme, or seems such to us who coolly scan it at this distance of time. "Duff explained fully the views and wishes of the Calhoun party. These are, that his name shall, in the course of the ensuing summer (say August), be presented as a candidate; that, if no ticket is run in Virginia by our friends, and if they will coöperate with his, he can obtain the vote of that State; that, with a fair prospect of receiving the vote of Virginia, he will obtain those also of North

Carolina, Georgia, and South Carolina, and probably of Alabama and Mississippi; that the result would be to defeat the reëlection of General Jackson, and to devolve the election on the House; that there they suppose I would be elected; and that they would be satisfied with my election. I have neither said nor done any thing in reply to all this, to commit my friends or myself. I could not, without dishonor, have ventured upon any sort of commitment of them. They are, in fact, free, and so I wish them to remain, to act according to their own sense of propriety."

A coalition between the leader of the nullifying freetraders and the champion of the protective system would have been an astonishing conjunction, indeed. And Mr. Clay does not appear to object to it on the ground of its incongruity. He proceeds to ask Judge Brooke whether the thing could be done, and if done, whether it would achieve the end desired of ousting Jackson and finishing the public career of Van Buren. The two factions, so irreconcilably opposed in principle, had already coalesced to reject the nomination of Mr. Van Buren; and the well-informed Dr. Hammond, in his "Political History of New York," intimates that, at the same time, the subsequent compromise between nullification and protection was substantially agreed upon. Let us not, however, get beyond our depth. Suffice it here to say that the scheme of running Mr. Calhoun, so as to throw the election into the House, was not attempted, and that the forces of the opposition, except the anti-masonry party, were concentrated upon Messrs. Clay and Sergeant.

The anti-masonry party, which had nominated Mr. Wirt for the presidency, and Mr. William Ellmaker, of Pennsylvania, for the vice-presidency, was a noisy and earnest party, but proved to have little power except in two localities, western New York and Vermont.

The grounds upon which the opposition rested their case against the administration need not be repeated here. Most of them will occur to the reader.

We support General Jackson, said the friends of the administration, because he has restored the government to the principles of Jefferson; because he has stayed the corrupt and unconstitutional expenditure of the public money for internal improvements designed for the benefit of localities; because he has waged war upon that gigantic and overshadowing monopoly, the bank of the United

States; because on the tariff he stands between the two dangerous extremes of free trade and prohibition, and counsels moderation and compromise; because, in less than two years from the beginning of his administration, the trade to the West Indies, which had been lost by the mismanagement of that which preceded it, was again opened to the United States, on terms of reciprocity; because, within the same period, treaties of the utmost importance and difficulty have been negotiated with Denmark, Turkey, and France; because the dispute on the subject of boundaries on our eastern frontier has been brought to an issue by an award advantageous to the United States; because our relations with every portion of the world are harmonious, and the United States never stood higher in the respect of the world than at this moment; because Andrew Jackson, himself sprung from the people, and in heart-felt sympathy with them, is the champion and defender of the people against monopolies, bank aristocrats, gambling stockholders, and all others who prey upon the earnings of the farmer and mechanic.

The opposition, in waging this important contest, relied chiefly upon banquets, speeches, pamphlets, newspapers, and caricatures. Caricatures, poorly designed and worse executed, were published in great numbers in the course of the season. A favorite idea of the caricaturists was to depict Mr. Van Buren as an infant in the arms of General Jackson, receiving sustenance from a spoon in the hand of the General. One popular picture represented the President receiving a crown from Mr. Van Buren and a scepter from the devil. Another showed the President raving at a delegation. Another gave Clay and Jackson in the guise of jockeys, riding a race toward the White House—Clay half a length ahead. Another represented Jackson, Van Buren, Benton, Blair, Kendall, and others, attired as burglars, aiming a huge battering-ram at the bank's impregnable front door. Another portrayed General Jackson as Don Quixote, tilting at one of the huge pillars of the same marble edifice, and breaking his puny lance against it.

The other party made great use of transparencies, processions, and hickory poles. M. Chevalier, a French gentleman then traveling in the United States, gives an amusing account of the Jackson processions. They were so frequent that the traveler was led to suppose them one of the institutions of the country. "Besides the camp-meetings," he says, "the political processions are the only things in

this country which bear any resemblance to festivals. The party dinners, with their speeches and deluge of toasts, are frigid, if not repulsive; and I have never seen a more miserable affair than the dinner given by the Opposition; that is to say, by the middle class, at Powelton, in the neighborhood of Philadelphia. But I stopped involuntarily at the sight of the gigantic hickory poles which made their solemn entry on eight wheels, for the purpose of being planted by the democracy on the eve of the election. I remember one of these poles, with its top still crowned with green foliage, which came on to the sound of fifes and drums, and was preceded by ranks of democrats, bearing no other badge than a twig of the sacred tree in their hats. It was drawn by eight horses, decorated with ribbons and mottoes. Astride on the tree itself were a dozen Jackson men of the first water, waving flags with an air of anticipated triumph, and shouting '*Hurra for Jackson!*'

"But this entry of the hickory was but a by-matter compared with the procession I witnessed in New York. It was nearly a mile long. The democrats marched in good order, to the glare of torches; the banners were more numerous than I had ever seen them in any religious festival; all were in transparency, on account of the darkness. On some were inscribed the names of the democratic societies or sections: *Democratic young men of the ninth or eleventh ward*; others bore imprecations against the Bank of the United States; *Nick Biddle* and *Old Nick* here figured largely. Then came portraits of General Jackson afoot and on horseback; there was one in the uniform of a general, and another in the person of the Tennessee farmer, with the famous hickory cane in his hand. Those of Washington and Jefferson, surrounded with democratic mottoes, were mingled with emblems in all tastes and of all colors. Among these figured an eagle, not a painting, but a real, live eagle, tied by the legs, surrounded by a wreath of leaves, and hoisted upon a pole, after the manner of the Roman standards. The imperial bird was carried by a stout sailor, more pleased than ever was a sergent permitted to hold one of the strings of the canopy, in a Catholic ceremony. From further than the eye could reach, came marching on the democrats. I was struck with the resemblance of their air to the train that escorts the *viaticum* in Mexico or Puebla. The American standard-bearers were as grave as the Mexican Indians who bore the sacred tapers. The democratic procession, also, like the Catholic

procession, had its halting-places; it stopped before the houses of the Jackson men to fill the air with cheers, and halted at the doors of the leaders of the Opposition, to give three, six, or nine groans. If these scenes were to find a painter, they would be admired at a distance, not less than the triumphs and sacrificial pomps which the ancients have left us delineated in marble and brass; for they are not mere grotesques after the manner of Rembrandt—they belong to history, they partake of the grand; they are the episodes of a wondrous epic which will bequeath a lasting memory to posterity, that of the coming of democracy.”²

Betting upon the result of the elections was in great vogue this

² The following may seem, and is, a very nonsensical anecdote. Those who can remember the excitement of 1832, will not consider it altogether misplaced here. It is, moreover, an illustration of “universal suffrage:” “During General Jackson’s second presidential campaign there flourished at the Quarantine Ground, Staten Island, an honest old fellow, a baker by trade, and a staunch democrat withal. One evening a political meeting was held at a small tavern which then stood on the shore road, a short distance east of the present Pavilion at New Brighton. Our good friend, and several other residents at the Quarantine, attended the meeting. Among them was old Dr. H., who was a noted wag, and it occurred to him that if a speech could be got out of the old baker it would be exceedingly amusing. Accordingly, he called on him for an address.

“No, no,” said the baker; “I can make bread, but I can’t make speeches.”

“The suggestion, however, had excited the audience, and the old man was at length compelled to make the effort. So, rising in his seat, he said:

“Feller-citizens: it is well known to you all that when John Quincy Adams was President, the Emperor of Brazil seized several of our ships, and wouldn’t let ‘em come home. So President Adams wrote him a letter, and a very *purty* letter it was, too—for to give him his due, he knew how to write, if he didn’t know any thing else. So the Emperor he got the letter, and, after he had read it, he asked who this Adams was? and his head men told him he was President of the United States. “Well, well,” says the Emperor, “he wants me to send them ships home, but I won’t do it; for it is quite plain to me that a man who can write so beautiful, don’t know any thing about fighting; so the ships must stay where they are.” Well,’ continued the baker, ‘by-and-by Ginral Jackson got to be President, and he wrote a letter to the Emperor, and it was something like this:

““You Emperor, send them ships home right away.

““ANDREW JACKSON.”

“Well, the Emperor got that letter too, and after he had read it, he laughed, and said, “This is a mighty queer letter! Who is this Jackson? ‘Pears to me I’ve heard of him before.” “We’ll tell you,” said his head men, “who he is. He is the New Orleans Jackson.” “What!” said the Emperor, “the New Orleans Jackson: That’s quite another matter. If this man don’t write so beautiful, he knows how to fight; so send them ships home right away.” And it was done.’

“This was regarded as a very effective political speech, and was received with thunders of applause.”—*Harper’s Magazine*.

year, and for several years after. We have seen Mr. Clay and Mr. Van Buren amicably betting a suit of clothes upon an election. Members of Congress were generally given to the practice. The minor office-holders sought to show their confidence in the success of their party, and to intimidate the opposition, by the extravagance of their bets. Isaac Hill writes to Jesse Hoyt in October: "To meet the braggarts of the opposition I advise my friends that any sum will be safe on the electoral vote of Pennsylvania and New York." Mr. William L. Mackenzie computed, from the evidence of letters, that Jesse Hoyt's election bets amounted in nine years to one hundred and twenty thousand dollars. The letters of Mr. John Van Buren, published a few years ago by Mr. Mackenzie, give us a curious insight into the mysteries of election betting. Note these sentences:

Can you get any bets on Governor, even? We shall lick the dogs so in this State that the "Great West" will hear the howling. . . . Can you get bets on three, four, and five thousand majority for Marcy, two hundred dollars on each?—if not, I will bet five hundred dollars on four thousand—perhaps, if we lose New Jersey, you can get this. If you can't do better, I should like a bet of three hundred dollars on five thousand majority for Marcy—unless we lose New Jersey: in that event I will wait to get better terms. . . . I should be most particularly obliged to you, if you can get me an even bet against Marcy to any amount less than five thousand dollars. I think I would bet one hundred dollars on each one thousand majority up to five thousand. I would bet fifteen hundred dollars against one thousand dollars on an even election. I consider Marcy's election, by from seven thousand five hundred to fifteen thousand majority, as sure as God. . . . P.S. I don't care to bet on five thousand majority for Marcy just now: if it is not too late to back out. . . . In this State our majority will range from fifteen thousand to twenty-five thousand. Bets on fifteen are perfectly safe. . . . By the looks of Webb's paper (although it is intended no doubt to operate on New Jersey) the opposition gain confidence. Can you tempt them with a wager on three, four, and five thousand majorities—two hundred dollars on each—or five hundred dollars on four thousand? If neither of these can be got to-morrow, bet them five hundred dollars on five thousand majority. There will be no betting after to-morrow. . . . They say "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church," and heaven knows I have been freely tapped in the good cause.

One other feature of this campaign remains to be noticed. Both parties were confident of victory; but if one party was more confident than the other, it was the opposition. The reason of this was, that

the printed matter relating to the controversy, with which the country was inundated, was mostly on the side of the opposition. Reading people, themselves under the domination of the printing press, could not but attach great importance to this circumstance. Reading people are not now all aware that not more than one half of the voters of this Union can be reached by print, and that no party that chiefly relies upon the press can carry a general election. A striking pamphlet can influence voters, and so does a well-conducted newspaper; but a hickory pole, a taking cry, a transparency, a burst of sky rockets and Roman candles (alas! that it should be so!) have a potency over a large third of our voters that printed eloquence can not exert.

An event occurred at the close of the month of August that served to complete the infatuation of the party opposed to General Jackson. The *Courier and Enquirer*, so long the sturdy and influential champion of the administration, turned against it, removed the names of Jackson and Van Buren from the head of its editorial columns, and openly joined the opposition. "Since 1823," said Col. Webb, in the course of an explanatory article of three columns, "I have been the firm, undeviating friend of Andrew Jackson, through good and through evil report. I have defended his reputation and advocated his cause; and for the last five years my exertions in his behalf, as the conductor of a public journal, have been known to this community. But the time has now arrived when I owe it to the people, to the institutions of the country, and to myself, to declare my deliberate conviction that he has not realized the high hopes which his reputation and previously written and declared opinions promised, nor redeemed the sacred pledges which he voluntarily gave on his elevation to the first station in the world. Let me not be misunderstood. I do not—I never will—impeach his patriotism or his integrity; but as a sentinel at my post, true to the duty which I voluntarily assumed when I became the editor of a public journal, I feel called upon to proclaim to the people that Andrew Jackson is not their president; that, enfeebled by age, and the toils, cares, and anxieties of an active and laborious life, he no longer possesses his former energy of character or independence of mind; but confiding in those who have wormed themselves into his confidence, he has intrusted the affairs of this great nation, and the happiness of thirteen millions of freemen, to the hands of political gamblers, money-

changing, time-serving politicians, who, in the pursuit of their unhallowed purposes, threaten ruin to the country and to that sacred charter of our liberties which was matured by the wisdom of our fathers, after having been purchased with their blood, and the sacrifice of every selfish motive on the altar of public good. The events of the past three years, the occurrences which are almost daily transpiring, the high-handed infringements of the Constitution, and the tone of the official paper at Washington, all but too clearly prove that a few mercenary and unprincipled officers of government, possessing the confidence of the Executive, and leagued with a band of reckless money-changers at Albany, are bringing disgrace and distress upon the country, and destroying the fairest fabric of liberty which an all-wise and beneficent Providence ever bestowed upon man."

Colonel Webb soon had an opportunity of learning whether or not General Jackson possessed his "former energy of character." He was mistaken in attributing General Jackson's late anti-bank measures to the influence of others. General Jackson's animosity to the bank had supplanted in his mind, for the time, all his other animosities. Only four of his confidential counselors, Messrs. Benton, Taney, Blair, and Kendall, were prepared to sustain him in all the measures he had taken, and all the measures he contemplated, against it. Major Lewis held back. A majority of the Cabinet gave him but a cold and hesitating support, and one important member thereof was known to be a friend of the bank. The President needed no stimulant in his warfare against an institution, to destroy which was as much his ruling passion in 1832, as it had been, in 1815, his ruling passion to drive the British army into the sea. The bank had defied him in 1829. The bank had ignored him in 1831. Perish the bank! The United States was not a country large enough to contain two such presidents as Andrew Jackson and Nicholas Biddle.

The defection of the great newspaper had its influence upon the press. Eight papers, if we may believe the opposition editors, soon followed its example.

A few weeks later, the *American* dolorously exclaimed: "The city is lost! The returns from the country come in all one way! There is no doubt that Jackson and Van Buren are elected!"

The result of the election astonished every body. Not the wildest Jackson man in his wildest moment had anticipated a victory quite so overwhelming. Two hundred and eighty-eight was the whole

number of electoral votes in 1832. General Jackson received two hundred and nineteen—seventy-four more than a majority. Mr. Van Buren, for the vice-presidency, received one hundred and eighty-nine electoral votes—forty-four more than a majority. Clay and Sergeant obtained FORTY-NINE! William Wirt, of Maryland, and William Ellmaker, of Pennsylvania, the candidates of the anti-masonry party, received the electoral vote of one State, Vermont—a result to which the vehement denunciations of a printer's boy, named Horace Greeley, may have contributed a few votes. South Carolina threw her vote away upon John Floyd, of Virginia, and Henry Lee, of Massachusetts, neither of whom were nullifiers.

The States that voted for General Jackson were these: Maine, New Hampshire, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, Tennessee, Ohio, Louisiana, Mississippi, Indiana, Illinois, Alabama, and Missouri—sixteen. All of these States but one gave their electoral vote to Mr. Van Buren for the vice-presidency. Pennsylvania preferred William Wilkins for that office, one of her own citizens, who received accordingly thirty votes, and caused Mr. Van Buren to fall thirty votes behind his chief. The States that gave a majority for Clay and Sergeant were: Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, and Kentucky—six.

How can we explain a result so unexpected? First, General Jackson, in his leading public measures (always excepting his appointment-and-removal policy) was RIGHT. Secondly, Society, in all countries and all ages, by the nature of things, is divided into three classes, Top, Bottom, and Middle—kings, lords and commons—the three estates—Office-Holders, Capitalists, and Workingmen—call them what you will. Any two of these is more than a match for any one of them. In Europe, the despot unites with the masses, and sways the scepter in safety. Or, he unites with the nobles, and the people must submit. The nobles and the people together can put down the despot. In the election of 1832, the President of the United States supported by the masses of the people, repeated, on this republican theater, a triumph supposed to belong only to the history of the Old World.

The Bank of the United States was doomed. The *Globe* had the audacity to say, soon after the election, that members of the defeated party were prompting the "minions of the bank" to save the institu-

tion by the only expedient that could save it—the assassination of the President! It further stated, that two members of the Opposition had been overheard to declare, that the man who should do the deed would render his country a signal service, which the bank would gladly reward with a gift of fifty thousand dollars. There was one man then living in the United States who believed that there was truth in these stories. Andrew Jackson was his name. When, a little later, a lunatic aimed a pistol at him, he thought for days that the “minions of the bank” had set him on.

The present Emperor of France witnessed part of this contest between the President of the Republic and the President of the Bank. From an allusion to it in the “*Idées Napoléoniennes*,” we must infer that Napoleon III. was a Jackson man at that day. “The United States,” observes the imperial author, “offer us a striking example of the inconveniences which attend the weakness of a civil authority. Although, in that country, there are none of the fermentations of discord, which for a long time yet will trouble Europe, the central power, being weak, is alarmed at every independent organization; for every independent organization threatens it. It is not military power alone which is feared; but money power—the bank: hence a division of parties. The president of the bank might have more power than the President of the country; for a much stronger reason, a successful general would eclipse the civil power.”

Well, the clamor of the election, the shouts of triumph, the groans of the defeated, died away in the month of November, and were forgotten. The President, it will be admitted, was a very popular man just then. But who could have foreseen that, within one little month, he was to win over to his side, the very class and the only class that had opposed his reëlection, and attain a popularity more fervid and universal than has been incurred by a citizen of the United States since the first term of General Washington’s presidency? Who could have expected to see all New England, headed by New England’s favorite, Daniel Webster, joining with all the North and most of the South, in one burst of enthusiastic praise of Andrew Jackson?

Indeed, some of the newspapers went so far as to nominate General Jackson for a third term. “My opinion is,” wrote Mr. Wirt, “that he may be President for life if he chooses.”

ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR.

THE LATEST but hardly the last of the historians to make a major contribution toward an understanding of Jacksonian democracy is Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. Whereas Jackson himself dominated the political scene during James Parton's youth, Franklin Roosevelt was president while Schlesinger grew to maturity. The strengths and weaknesses of this newest interpretation can most easily be appreciated by remembering that it came after the New Deal rather than before it.

The principal theme of *The Age of Jackson* is contained in Schlesinger's assertion that insofar as Jacksonian democracy was a liberal, progressive movement it owed its strength to eastern labor elements rather than to the influence of the western frontier. Schlesinger attempts to establish this conception in several ways. First, he believes it is justified by his analysis of the political support which Jackson received from the workingmen of the period who either were organized into independent parties or asserted their views through the traditional two-party framework. He notes a similarity between the platforms of these workingmen's groups and the principles expressed by Jackson himself. The banking issue provides the best evidence. Whereas Jackson's western supporters opposed the government-chartered Bank of the United States in the interests of inflation, Jackson and the workingmen denounced it as a financial monopoly which stood in the way of the deflationary, hard-money policy they wished to see established. As a final proof, Schlesinger points to Van Buren's adoption of the independent treasury system

advocated by the labor wing, or "loco-focos," of the Democratic party.

Schlesinger considered the opinions of John C. Calhoun to offer substantial weight to his thesis. As the "loco-foco" influence increased in the Democratic party, it seemed to Calhoun that the South was standing on the side lines of a gigantic struggle between finance capital, represented by the Whigs, and industrial labor, expressing itself through the Democrats. The Southern political dilemma was to decide which of these groups, northern business or its employees, should be chosen as the uncertain ally of the South in the defense of the plantation system. In a superficial sense at least, Calhoun's analysis of the predominating force within Jackson's party is in harmony with Schlesinger's.

This labor interpretation runs counter not only to traditional analyses of Jacksonian democracy, but also to the frontier thesis of Frederick Jackson Turner, who asserted that America's democratic impulse had come out of the West. Schlesinger's view that liberalism in America has traditionally taken the form of opposition to the power of the business community not only de-emphasizes the role of the frontiersman but suggests that a contest among economic groups rather than among geographic sections offered the key to national political developments.

The total effect of Schlesinger's presentation was to suggest that Jackson's administration was a kind of early New Deal and Jackson himself an early Franklin Roosevelt. Both presidents represented a social protest against the methods of business, both drew the loyalty of labor and pursued policies designed to implement workingmen's ideas of government. If they enjoyed the support of agrarian groups, it was not because they drew their inspiration from them, but rather because their liberalism was expansive enough to encompass the interests of the common man everywhere.

Critics of Schlesinger emphasize the distortion which results

from pushing this parallel too far. It has been observed that the typical worker of the Jacksonian period was very far from being the factory hand of the 1930's. Instead of belonging to a system of huge industrial organizations, he was apt to be a craftsman in a small shop, anticipating the day when he could be the owner of his own business. Others contend that the "workingmen's parties" of Jackson's day did not represent labor so much as they did a general reforming group in which laborers were joined by small capitalists, assorted intellectuals, and free-lance politicians with varied aims not necessarily reflecting workmen's interests. Closer analysis has revealed also that urban labor, however it may be defined, often opposed Jackson's Democratic party, and in some areas even refused to support his re-election in 1832.

Criticism has also been levied at Schlesinger's analysis of Jackson himself. Many historians feel that, instead of being considered a labor leader intent upon opposing and controlling the business community, he should be seen as a fervent supporter of capitalism, whose efforts were designed to free economic enterprise from government participation rather than to regulate it. The problems faced by Franklin Roosevelt were of a very different sort and required a different solution.

The other principal complaints may be summarized briefly. Students of Turner have risen to reaffirm Jackson's connections with the West, emphasizing his nationalism and antipathy to eastern bankers. Financial historians have lamented Schlesinger's low appraisal of Nicholas Biddle and of the contribution made by the Bank of the United States. Conversely, they regard his endorsement of Jackson's banking policies to be more sweeping than the facts justify.

It is difficult to determine what the final estimate of Schlesinger's work will be. The controversy which it has already caused and the added interest which it has stimulated in the Jacksonian period would appear sufficient in themselves to justify its appearance. Its intrinsic merit seems to lie not in its sweeping conclusions and its somewhat limited definition of American liberal-

ism but rather in its exploration of the early political efforts of eastern labor and their connection with other reforms of the same years. If Schlesinger veered too far toward the East in his search for Jacksonian democracy, he provided a useful corrective to others who identified the movement too exclusively with the West.

The Southern Dilemma

JOHAN C. CALHOUN was facing a major decision. As he rode north from Pendleton in the Indian summer of 1837, his lips compressed, his face drawn with concentration, his manner absent and taciturn, he weighed his future course with infinite exactness. Before him lay the special session of Congress and the battle over the independent treasury. On his decision—on every decision till the insoluble question was solved—might tremble the future of the South.

1

Calhoun was no longer merely the aspiring politician who had feuded with Jackson in 1830. Personal ambition was now increasingly submerged in a cold monomania for South Carolina and slavery. Many, like Harriet Martineau, found they could no longer communicate with him. He felt so deeply that he rarely heard argument, so passionately that he never forgot his responsibility. "There is no *relaxation* with him," cried his devoted friend Dixon H. Lewis of Alabama (who weighed three hundred and fifty pounds, and spoke with feeling). "On the contrary, when I seek relaxation in him, he screws me only the higher in some sort of excitement." He appeared to subsist in an unimaginable intellectual solitude, his mind committed to his interminable obligation, focusing forever on

From *The Age of Jackson* by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., by permission of Little, Brown & Company. Copyright 1945, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.

a single shining point, which for him was the center of the universe. He was becoming "the cast-iron man," as Miss Martineau saw him, "who looks as if he had never been born, and never could be extinguished."¹

But he became a startling figure when he rose to speak in the Senate, eyes burning like live coals in his pale face, hair bristling and erect, skin loose over his prominent bones, words pouring out in an abrupt, condensed, closely reasoned flow. His voice was metallic and harsh, his gestures monotonous, and his ventriloquist's tones came from nowhere and sounded equally in all corners of the chamber. Yet the commanding eye, the grim earnestness of manner, the utter integrity of sentiment held the galleries in anxious attention. Standing in the narrow aisle of the Senate, bracing himself on the desks beside him, he averaged perhaps one hundred and eighty words a minute of terse and unconquerable argument.²

His was the supreme intelligence among the statesmen of the day. Where Clay relied on a richness and audacity of feeling, Webster on a certain massiveness of rhetoric, Benton on the sheer weight of facts, and all indulged in orgies of shameless verbiage, Calhoun's speeches were stripped bare, arguing the facts with an iron logic drawn to the highest pitch of tension. Nourished on Aristotle, Machiavelli and Burke, he possessed an uncanny ability to cut through to the substance of problems.³ His processes of thought were intricate, merciless and unsentimental in a day when none of these qualities was in demand.

More than any of the others, he understood that he was living in one of the critical periods of history. It was, for him, a revolutionary age—"a period of transition, which must always necessarily be one of uncertainty, confusion, error, and wild and fierce fanaticism"—and he looked with anxiety on what was plainly a "great approach-

¹ Lewis to R. K. Crallé, March 20, 1840, F. W. Moore, ed., "Calhoun by His Political Friends," *Publications of the Southern History Association*, VII, 355. Harriet Martineau, *Retrospect*, I, 243-244.

² For sketches of Calhoun in action, see *New York Evening Post*, February 19, 1838; *Boston Post*, December 16, 1833; Millburn, *Ten Years of Preacher-Life*, 152-153; Willis, *Hurry-Graphs: or Sketches of Scenery, Celebrities and Society*, 180-181; Ingersoll, *Historical Sketch*, II, 258.

³ Meigs, *Calhoun*, II, 100; Calhoun to A. D. Wallace, December 17, 1840, Calhoun, *Correspondence*, J. F. Jameson, ed., 468-469.

ing change in the political and social condition of the country," "Modern society," he exclaimed, almost with horror, "seems to be rushing to some new and untried condition." The "great question" of the future would be that of "the distribution of wealth—a question least explored, and the most important of any in the whole range of political economy."⁴

The emerging outlines of industrial society filled him with foreboding. The new economy, he felt, was enriching a small group of capitalists at the expense of the great mass of the people. The "tendency of Capital to destroy and absorb the property of society and produce a collision between itself and operatives" was a source of deep alarm. "In the North you are running into anarchy," he told Albert Brisbane. ". . . The capitalist owns the instruments of labor, and he seeks to draw out of labor all of the profits, leaving the laborer to shift for himself in age and disease. This can only engender antagonism; the result will be hostility and conflict, ending in civil war, and the North may fall into a state of social dissolution." Both the growing power of the capitalists and the growing frustration of the masses seemed to threaten the fabric of society.⁵ X

And the consequences for the South? The business party placed a premium on conservatism and stability; yet no group was more concerned to expand the power of the central government and whittle away the rights of the states. If, as Calhoun believed, the union of bank and state would "inevitably draw all the powers of the system into the vortex of the general government," what safeguards would remain for the South?⁶ And a second danger lay in the inescapable economic clash between Northern finance and Southern cotton. As Francis W. Pickens candidly stated the hard facts which underwrote Calhoun's logic, the South must decide "whether cotton shall control exchanges and importations, or whether the banks and the stock in-

⁴ Calhoun, "A Disquisition on Government," *Works*, I, 90; Calhoun to J. H. Hammond, February 18, 1837, *Correspondence*, 367; Calhoun in the Senate, January 13, 1834, *Register of Debates*, 23 Congress 1 Session, 218.

⁵ Memorandum of a conversation with Calhoun, December 4, 1831, Calhoun, *Correspondence*, 305; Redelia Brisbane, *Albert Brisbane: a Mental Biography*, 222.

⁶ Calhoun to R. H. Goodwyn, *et al.*, September 1, 1838, *Niles' Register*, September 29, 1838.

terests shall do it. . . . Break down the swindling of bankers, . . . and cotton will do the exchanges of the commercial world."⁷

On the other hand, the party which opposed the business class contained in itself ominous threats to Southern security. Equalitarian and radical, thriving on agitation and forever fomenting new projects of reform, it must prove an ever-flowing fount of libertarian dogma. Yet, for all its excesses, it was primarily interested in limiting the power of the business community, and in so doing it was employing the State-rights doctrine so vital to the South.

The Southern dilemma was this: which was the greater menace to the plantation system—radical democracy or finance capital? Should the ruling class of the South ally itself to the upper class of the North, and thus to broad construction, capitalism and conservatism, or to the lower classes of the North, and thus to State rights, agrarianism and reform? Should the South join the Whigs in their fight against radicalism, or should it join the Democrats in their fight against business rule?

2

Many Southerners had already made their choice. Thomas Cooper voiced a profound planting conviction when he observed, in 1830, that universal suffrage was the root of political evil. Political power must fall thereby "into the hands of the operatives, mechanics and labouring classes, the men of no property." The consequence? "We say, without hesitation, the wealth of the wealthy is in danger."⁸ This was clearly no sectional problem, and Cooper himself by 1837 was turning to Nicholas Biddle, the very embodiment of finance capital, as the best hope for the South.

George McDuffie similarly managed to be a champion both of nullification and the United States Bank. In 1834 he declared that "the wealth and intelligence of the northern and middle States" provided the South its best security against abolitionism as it would

⁷ Pickens to J. H. Hammond, July 13, 1837, R. C. McGrane, *Panic of 1837*, 159. See also Calhoun to J. E. Calhoun, September 7, 1837, *Correspondence*, 377; Calhoun in the Senate, October 3, 1837, *Register of Debates*, 25 Congress 1 Session, 475-476; Calhoun to Calvin Graves, et al., September 6, 1838, *Washington Globe*, October 13, 1838.

⁸ [Thomas Cooper], "Agrarian and Education Systems," *Southern Review*, VI, 29-30, 31 (August, 1830).

emerge from "unbalanced democracy."⁹ Northern Whigs responded to such sentiments with feeling. We shall "appeal to our brethren of the south for their generous coöperation," said one group rather explicitly, "and promise them that those who believe that the possession of property is an evidence of merit, will be the last to interfere with the rights of property of any kind."¹⁰ The Southern support for White in 1836 showed the strength of the belief in an alliance with Northern conservatism. In Virginia even strict State-rights men backed the Whig ticket, and John Tyler, who had cast the single vote against the force bill in nullification days, now stood as Whig candidate for Vice-President.¹¹

Yet Calhoun knew that the business community would in the end exact a price for its protection, and the price would be Southern acquiescence in the American System and broad construction. Could the South afford to pay it? Calhoun was skeptical. If the South surrendered its economic and constitutional bastions, it would exist only on the sufferance of the North.

And the alternative? In 1836 Calhoun could not bring himself to support the Democrats any more than the Whigs. But the panic of 1837 transformed the situation. If Van Buren remained faithful to the hard-money policy, he must come out for the divorce of bank and state. Should not the South seize this opportunity to strengthen its economic position, fortify its constitutional bulwarks and check Northern capitalism, even at the cost of giving more power to Northern radicals?

John Taylor had already endorsed the alliance with radicalism as the best strategy against finance capital. "The question is," he had written, "whether the landed interest . . . had not better unite with the other popular interests, to strangle in its cradle any infant visibly resembling this terrible giant."¹² In the end, Calhoun could not but see the struggle in Jeffersonian terms, between landed capital and business capital—not, as the Southern Whigs saw it, in Federalist terms, between property, whether in land or business, and the prop-

⁹ McDuffie's inaugural address as Governor of South Carolina, *Washington Globe*, December 25, 1834.

¹⁰ Report of the Committee of Fifty, *Plaindealer*, May 13, 1837.

¹¹ H. H. Simms, *Rise of the Whigs in Virginia, 1824-1840*, 67-81; O. P. Chitwood, *John Tyler: Champion of the Old South*, 115, 155.

¹² John Taylor, *Inquiry*, 551-552; see also *Tyranny Unmasked*, 197-199.

ertyless. His decision showed how profoundly he inherited the Jeffersonian tradition.

Van Buren's message sealed his intention. "We have now a fair opportunity to break the last of our commercial Shackles," Calhoun declared with delight.¹³ With a sense of vast relief, now restored to a position "much more congenial to my feelings," he broke his partnership with the Whigs, throwing his influence to what he had called not many months before the "more filthy" portion of the Democratic party, "under Benton, Kendal, Blair and Johnson," and backing the personal measure of his ancient enemy, Martin Van Buren.¹⁴ But he was a man of principle, and he would follow where principle led.

3

The issues between Calhoun and the Southern Whigs were clearly expressed in a straggling but bitter debate in the House in September and October. A few weeks after the message Caleb Cushing, the fluent Whig Congressman from Massachusetts, made an able bid for Southern support. The attack on the state banks, he said, was first an attack on State rights, and then an attack on property in general. "By destroying the banks, then, you will revolutionize the property of the country. . . . you revolutionize society." With dramatic emphasis Cushing appealed to the South. "Will not the same desperado spirit, which strikes at one form of property strike at another? If it ravages the North, will it spare the South? Can law, order, property, be torn down at one end of the country, and stand untouched and unshaken at the other? Will not anarchy in half be anarchy in the whole? It seems to me," he concluded, "to become every part of the country, North as well [as] South, and not least of all, the South, to guard well the conservative elements in the social organization of these United States."¹⁵

This powerful statement impressed many planters. But Calhoun

¹³ Calhoun to J. E. Calhoun, September 7, 1837, Calhoun, *Correspondence*, 377. See also Calhoun to J. Bauskett, *et al.*, November 3, 1837, *Niles' Register*, December 2, 1837.

¹⁴ Calhoun to Anna Marie Calhoun, September 8, 1837, to J. H. Hammond, February 18, 1837, Calhoun, *Correspondence*, 379, 367.

¹⁵ Cushing in the House, September 25, 1837, *Register of Debates*, 25 Congress 1 Session, 885-887.

thought differently, and Francis W. Pickens, his spokesman in the House, delivered the South Carolina retort. It might be to the advantage of Northern capital to rob labor of its full product, Pickens observed, but it was to the advantage of the South that labor receive its full product, for in the South labor and capital were identical. "When we contend for the undivided profits and proceeds of our labor," he cried, "do you not see that we stand precisely in the same situation as the laborer of the North? We are, to all intents and purposes, in the place of laborers. We are the only class of capitalists, as far as pecuniary interest is concerned, which, as a class, are identified with the laborers of the country." We must therefore join with Northern labor in its resistance to Northern capital.¹⁶ . . . When, later in the debate, Ely Moore rose to denounce some Northern Whigs who had lashed into Pickens, the alliance appeared complete.¹⁷

The axis between Moore and Pickens, between Martin Van Buren and John C. Calhoun, was firm, but brittle. Agreement was perfect up to a point, and thereafter disagreement was infinite. "I am an aristocrat," John Randolph once remarked in a brilliant summary of the Southern position; "I love liberty, I hate equality."¹⁸ Calhoun's political line was the median between love of liberty and hatred of equality. Indeed, his fear of radical democracy, with its equalitarian and majoritarian tendencies, remained second only to his fear of capitalism itself. He flinched even from the name. "The word democrat better applies to the north than the South," he said in 1838, "and as usually understood means those who are in favour of the government of the absolute numerical majority to which I am utterly

¹⁶ Pickens in the House, October 10, 1837, *Register of Debates*, 25 Congress 1 Session, 1393-1395. John Quincy Adams was infuriated by Pickens, "a coarse sample of the South Carolina school of orator statesmen—pompous, flashy, and shallow," and by his speech, "delivered with an air of authority and a tone of dogmatism as if he was speaking to his slaves." Adams, *Memoirs*, IX, 399.

¹⁷ After half an hour of thunder, Moore broke down as he had before and was carried home to be bled. His collapse came rather to the relief of Adams, who had been impressed by his "prepossessing countenance, a rather courteous deportment, . . . a good command of language," and appalled by his "whole system of insurrection against the rich." "If his strength were equal to his will," Adams decided, "he would be a very dangerous man. As it is, he is a very unsafe one." *Memoirs*, IX, 405-406. For Moore in the House, October 13, 1837, see *Register of Debates*, 25 Congress 1 Session, 1470, 1588.

¹⁸ Bruce, *Randolph*, II, 203.

opposed and the prevalence of which would destroy our system and destroy the South."¹⁹ In leisure moments, he worked out an elaborate system of minority rule which promised to come into sharp conflict with the majoritarianism of his Northern allies.²⁰

The reasoning which justified this alliance with radicalism was indeed too subtle for most planters. Calhoun carried his own circle of bright young men—Pickens, J. H. Hammond, Dixon H. Lewis, R. B. Rhett—and a select group of politicians, including W. F. Gordon of Virginia, and William P. Taylor, the son of John Taylor of Caroline. But he failed to move the planting class as a whole, neither the Virginia school, with its real if less radical concern for State rights, nor the Southern Whigs, with their scorn for "abstractions." The Virginians dissented sharply on the subtreasury, and in 1840 Abel P. Upshur published *A Brief Enquiry into the True Nature and Character of Our Federal Government*, the classic attempt to reconcile the State-rights position with Whiggery—and thereby to rationalize the Harrisburg convention, which had just nominated William Henry Harrison and John Tyler.

But the illusion of Tyler, Upshur, Henry A. Wise and their associates that they could be Whigs for Jeffersonian reasons was quickly dispelled after 1840. Calhoun had observed correctly that the North would demand its price; and, when Clay unveiled the Whig economic program, the Virginia school, led by Tyler, woke to realities and left the party. Their confession of error was signaled when, after Upshur's death, Calhoun, a better logician, succeeded him as Secretary of State.

Even after the Tyler defection, however, the wealthy planters remained predominantly Whig. Two thirds to three quarters of the

¹⁹ Calhoun to R. B. Rhett, September 13, 1838, Calhoun, *Correspondence*, 399. Cf. J. H. Hammond's remark: "Circumstances had placed us in alliance (connection rather) with the Democratic party of the country, tho' we professed at the same time to be of a higher school of democracy, one of fixed principles and incompatible faith." Hammond to Calhoun, May 4, 1840, *Correspondence Addressed to John C. Calhoun, 1837-1849*, C. S. Boucher and R. P. Brooks, eds., 82g.

²⁰ The administration was equally aware of the underlying differences. Frank Blair laid down the terms of the alliance in a series of editorials in the *Washington Globe*, September 7, 8, 10, 11, 1838. Taking as much care as Calhoun himself not to call the Southerners "democrats," Blair emphasized that this union between "the Democracy of the North and the planters of the South" was for mutual safety against a common enemy.

slaves were in Whig hands. And, as Calhoun had foreseen, those who threw themselves on the protection of Northern conservatism were steadily obliged to accept the Whig economic program. They had rejected Calhoun as a "metaphysician" and Tyler as an "abstractionist," and, being practical men, they bartered away their economic and constitutional advantages for the uncertain patronage of Northern business. They came, in the fifties, to decide that Calhoun had been right. But it was too late, the game was lost.²¹

²¹ A. C. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South*; U. B. Phillips, "The Southern Whigs, 1834-1854," *Turner Essays in American History*; Simms, *Rise of the Whigs in Virginia*.

PART IV

THE FAILURE OF
COMPROMISE

U. B. PHILLIPS

ALTHOUGH THE TYPICAL SOUTHERNER of the ante-bellum period was not a slaveholder, there is little question that Negro slavery conditioned most of the South's institutions and lay close to the roots of her political sectionalism. An understanding of much of our early national history is dependent upon seeing slavery as objectively as possible. Yet historians have had difficulty in striking a balance between indignation and apology. In a sense, the disputes of 1865 still continue in the field of scholarship.

The present majority view of slavery has had an interesting evolution. In the immediate postwar period, northern historians, like many northern politicians, found it impossible to write sympathetically about any of the South's institutions, least of all slavery. But the turn of the century witnessed a change of heart which has proved durable. Whether this continuing benignity has resulted from a patriotic impulse, from a distorted sense of fairness, or simply from the persuasiveness of revealed truth is difficult to determine. Whatever the cause, the effect has been to soften the earlier condemnation and to emphasize the difficulties of the southern position in general rather than the injustices to the slaves.

Some recent writers, for example, have noted the deleterious effects of slavery upon the "poor whites." Others describe the manner in which it restricted the uses of capital in such a way as to make the South dependent on expensive northern or European credit facilities. Those who criticize the system in behalf of the slaves are apt to concentrate their attack on the inflexible

determination of the South to retain slavery rather than on slavery itself. In general, the prevailing view today treats slavery as an institution wrong in theory but often benevolent in practice, as a paternalism which resulted in the economic undoing of the entire South but which clothed and fed a backward people more in need of guidance than liberty.

This reconciliation of northern and southern interpretations of slavery has been brought about largely by the extensive work of southern scholars, some of whose sincere efforts to be objective may have been tempered by a sectional point of view. Among the historians of slavery, none is more respected than U. B. Phillips. Valuable in themselves for both their insight and their factual detail, his works are a necessary point of departure for scholars embarking on original research as well as for students who wish to acquaint themselves with the best of the already existing work.

If a natural sympathy for the South is a valuable asset for a scholar devoted to southern history in general and plantation life in particular, Phillips had the good fortune to be twice blessed. Born in Georgia in the year which saw the end of "radical" Reconstruction, his earliest home was the white, porticoed "big house" of the cotton belt. Given the name "Ulysses," Phillips had the sectional pride at the age of twelve to discard even so remote a connection with General Grant in favor of the less sinister "Ulrich."

Although his academic career took him to the universities of Columbia, Michigan, and Yale as well as to Tulane and Georgia, his scholarly interests did not wander far from the field of southern history. When his *American Negro Slavery* was published, in 1918, he could truthfully say that for twenty years he had "panned the sands of the stream of Southern life and garnered their golden treasure." The result of this sustained interest was the most comprehensive study yet made of the South's "peculiar institution." The vivid accounts of plantation life revealed both the planters and their slaves at work and play. Source materials

were combed to uncover the economic effects of slavery on individual owners and on the South as a whole.

Phillips' writing tends to be descriptive rather than analytical, but this factual treatment is supported by a limited number of generalizations which clarify his over-all conception of slavery. Perhaps this one best summarizes his position: "On the whole the plantations were the best schools yet invented for the mass training of that sort of inert and backward people which the bulk of the American negroes represented." Probably Phillips is in no small way responsible for the now commonly held view that the slaves took kindly to their school and that the schoolmasters were as often fatherly as avaricious and more often indulgent than cruel.

Although Phillips is respected for his scholarship, even favorable critics are apt to point out that his sectional background may have led him to an overly sympathetic interpretation of plantation society. Others observe that, even though he acknowledged that the schools found it unnecessary to make any provision for graduation exercises, he made no real effort to examine the ramifications of this deficiency. Unless one postulates racial inadequacies which took generations to remedy, one can hardly explain why the great majority of pupils, during two hundred and fifty years, never got beyond the first grade. Recently, Phillips' assumption that the Negroes arrived in America in a state of savagery has been challenged by evidence that their assimilation to the plantation economy was rapid because they were the products of a developed agrarian culture in Africa. Finally, it has been suggested that Phillips was not aware of, or minimized, the slaves' suffering and discontent. Perhaps more emphasis on the testimony of slaves themselves rather than on that of white observers or participants would have led Phillips to different conclusions.

Up to now, however, Phillips' shortcomings have been more a subject of speculation than of proof. Conclusive evidence to contradict his views is rather thin and will probably never be

plentiful, if for no other reason than that literate slaves were few and illiterate ones have been forever silenced.

Whatever the discoveries of the future, it seems likely that much of Phillips' work will remain essentially valid. If his sectionalism limited his perspective, it also provided him with the insight and enthusiasm which underlie lasting scholarly achievement.

Plantation Life

WHEN Hakluyt wrote in 1584 his *Discourse of Western Planting*, his theme was the project of American colonization; and when a settlement was planted at Jamestown, at Boston, or at Providence as the case might be, it was called, regardless of the type, a plantation. This usage of the word in the sense of a colony ended only upon the rise of a new institution to which the original name was applied. The colonies at large came then to be known as provinces or dominions, while the sub-colonies, the privately owned village estates which prevailed in the South, were alone called plantations. In the Creole colonies, however, these were known as *habitations*—dwelling places. This etymology of the name suggests the nature of the thing—an isolated place where people in somewhat peculiar groups settled and worked and had their being. The standard community comprised a white household in the midst of several or many negro families. The one was master, the many were slaves; the one was head, the many were members; the one was teacher, the many were pupils.

The scheme of the buildings reflected the character of the group. The "big house," as the darkies loved to call it, might be of any type

From *American Negro Slavery* by Ulrich B. Phillips. Copyright, 1918, D. Appleton & Company. Reprinted by permission of the publishers, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.

from a double log cabin to a colonnaded mansion of many handsome rooms, and its setting might range from a bit of primeval forest to an elaborate formal garden. Most commonly the house was commodious in a rambling way, with no pretense to distinction without nor to luxury within. The two fairly constant features were the hall running the full depth of the house, and the verandah spanning the front. The former by day and the latter at evening served in all temperate seasons as the receiving place for guests and the gathering place for the household at all its leisure times. The house was likely to have a quiet dignity of its own; but most of such beauty as the homestead possessed was contributed by the canopy of live-oaks if on the rice or sugar coasts, or of oaks, hickories or cedars, if in the uplands. Flanking the main house in many cases were an office and a lodge, containing between them the administrative headquarters, the schoolroom, and the apartments for any bachelor overflow whether tutor, sons or guests. Behind the house and at a distance of a rod or two for the sake of isolating its noise and odors, was the kitchen. Near this, unless a spring were available, stood the well with its two buckets dangling from the pulley; and near this in turn the dairy and the group of pots and tubs which constituted an open air laundry. Bounding the back yard there were the smoke-house where bacon hams were cured, the sweet potato pit, the ice pit except in the southernmost latitudes where no ice of local origin was to be had, the carriage house, the poultry house, the pigeon cote, and the lodgings of the domestic servants. On plantations of small or medium scale the cabins of the field hands generally stood at the border of the master's own premises; but on great estates particularly in the lowlands, they were likely to be somewhat removed, with the overseer's house, the smithy, and the stables, corn cribs and wagon sheds nearby. At other convenient spots were the buildings for working up the crops—the tobacco house, the threshing and pounding mills, the gin and press, or the sugar house as the respective staples required. The climate conduced so strongly to out of door life that as a rule each roof covered but a single unit of residence, industry or storage.

The fields as well as the buildings commonly radiated from the planter's house. Close at hand were the garden, the orchards and the horse lot; and behind them the sweet potato field, the watermelon patch and the forage plots of millet, sorghum and the like.

Thence there stretched the fields of the main crops in a more or less solid expanse according to the local conditions. Where ditches or embankments were necessary, as for sugar and rice fields, the high cost of reclamation promoted compactness; elsewhere the prevailing cheapness of land promoted dispersion. Throughout the uplands, accordingly, the area in crops was likely to be broken by wood lots and long-term fallows. The scale of tillage might range from a few score acres to a thousand or two; the expanse of unused land need have no limit but those of the proprietor's purse and his speculative proclivity.

The scale of the orchards was in some degree a measure of the domesticity. On the rice coast the unfavorable character of the soil and the absenteeism of the planter's families in summer conspired to keep the fruit trees few. In the sugar district oranges and figs were fairly plentiful. But as to both quantity and variety in fruits the Piedmont was unequalled. Figs, plums, apples, pears and quinces were abundant, but the peaches excelled all the rest. The many varieties of these were in two main groups, those of clear stones and soft, luscious flesh for eating raw, and those of clinging stones and firm flesh for drying, preserving, and making pies. From June to September every creature, hogs included, commonly had as many peaches as he cared to eat; and in addition great quantities might be carried to the stills. The abandoned fields, furthermore, contributed dewberries, blackberries, wild strawberries and wild plums in summer, and persimmons in autumn when the forest also yielded its muscadines, fox grapes, hickory nuts, walnuts, chestnuts and chinquapins, and along the Gulf coast pecans.

The resources for edible game were likewise abundant with squirrels, opossums and wild turkeys, and even deer and bears in the woods, rabbits, doves and quail in the fields, woodcock and snipe in the swamps and marshes, and ducks and geese on the streams. Still further, the creeks and rivers yielded fish to be taken with hook, net or trap, as well as terrapin and turtles, and the coastal waters added shrimp, crabs and oysters. In most localities it required little time for a household, slave or free, to lay forest, field or stream under tribute.

The planter's own dietary, while mostly home grown, was elaborate. Beef and mutton were infrequent because the pastures were

poor; Irish potatoes were used only when new, for they did not keep well in the Southern climate; and wheaten loaves were seldom seen because hot breads were universally preferred. The standard meats were chicken in its many guises, ham and bacon. Wheat flour furnished relays of biscuit and waffles, while corn yielded lye hominy, grits, muffins, batter cake, spoon bread, hoe cake and pone. The gardens provided in season lettuce, cucumbers, radishes and beets, mustard greens and turnip greens, string beans, snap beans and butter beans, asparagus and artichokes, Irish potatoes, squashes, onions, carrots, turnips, okra, cabbages and collards. The fields added green corn for boiling, roasting, stewing and frying, cowpeas and black-eyed peas, pumpkins and sweet potatoes, which last were roasted, fried or candied for variation. The people of the rice coast, furthermore, had a special fondness for their own pearly staple; and in the sugar district *sirop de batterie* was deservedly popular. The pickles, preserves and jellies were in variety and quantity limited only by the almost boundless resources and industry of the housewife and her kitchen corps. Several meats and breads and relishes would crowd the table simultaneously, and, unless unexpected guests swelled the company, less would be eaten during the meal than would be taken away at the end, never to return. If ever tables had a habit of groaning it was those of the planters. Frugality, indeed, was reckoned a vice to be shunned, and somewhat justly so since the vegetables and eggs were perishable, the bread and meat of little cost, and the surplus from the table found sure disposal in the kitchen or the quarters. Lucky was the man whose wife was the "big house" cook, for the cook carried a basket, and the basket was full when she was homeward bound.

The fare of the field hands was, of course, far more simple. Hoe-cake and bacon were its basis and often its whole content. But in summer fruit and vegetables were frequent; there was occasional game and fish at all seasons; and the first heavy frost of winter brought the festival of hog-killing time. While the shoulders, sides, hams and lard were saved, all other parts of the porkers were distributed for prompt consumption. Spare ribs and backbone, jowl and feet, souse and sausage, liver and chitterlings greased every mouth on the plantation; and the cracklingbread, made of corn

carried fullness to repletion. Christmas and the summer lay-by brought recreation, but the hog-killing brought fat satisfaction.¹

The warmth of the climate produced some distinctive customs. One was the high seasoning of food to stimulate the appetite; another was the afternoon siesta of summer; a third the well-nigh constant leaving of doors ajar even in winter when the roaring logs in the chimney merely took the chill from the draughts. Indeed a door was not often closed on the plantation except those of the negro cabins, whose inmates were hostile to night air, and those of the storerooms. As a rule, it was only in the locks of the latter that keys were ever turned by day or night.

The lives of the whites and the blacks were partly segregate, partly intertwined. If any special link were needed, the children supplied it. The white ones, hardly knowing their mothers from their mammies or their uncles by blood from their "uncles" by courtesy, had the freedom of the kitchen and the cabins, and the black ones were their playmates in the shaded sandy yard the live-long day. Together they were regaled with folklore in the quarters, with Bible and fairy stories in the "big house," with pastry in the kitchen, with grapes at the scuppernong arbor, with melons at the spring house and with peaches in the orchard. The half-grown boys were likewise almost as indiscriminating among themselves as the dogs with which they chased rabbits by day and 'possums by night. Indeed, when the fork in the road of life was reached, the white youths found something to envy in the freedom of their fellows' feet from the cramping weight of shoes and the freedom of their minds from the restraints of school. With the approach of maturity came routine and responsibility for the whites, routine alone for the generality of the blacks. Some of the males of each race grew into ruffians, others into gentlemen in the literal sense, some of the females into viragoes, others into gentlewomen; but most of both races and

¹ This account of plantation homesteads and dietary is drawn mainly from the writer's own observations in post-bellum times in which, despite the shifting of industrial arrangements and the decrease of wealth, these phases have remained apparent. Confirmation may be had in *Phillip Fithian Journal* (Princeton, 1900); A. de Puy Van Buren, *Jottings of a Year's Sojourn in the South* (Battle Creek, Mich., 1859); Susan D. Smedes, *Memorials of a Southern Planter* (Baltimore, 1887); Mary B. Chestnutt, *A Diary from Dixie* (New York, 1905); and many other memoirs and traveller's accounts.

sexes merely became plain, wholesome folk of a somewhat distinctive plantation type.

In amusements and in religion the activities of the whites and blacks were both mingled and separate. Fox hunts when occurring by day were as a rule diversions only for the planters and their sons and guests, but when they occurred by moonlight the chase was joined by the negroes on foot with halloos which rivalled the music of the hounds. By night also the blacks, with the whites occasionally joining in, sought the canny 'possum and the embattled 'coon; in spare times by day they hied their curs after the fleeing Brer Rabbit, or built and baited seductive traps for turkeys and quail; and fishing was available both by day and by night. At the horse races of the whites the jockeys and many of the spectators were negroes; while from the cock fights and even the "crap" games of the blacks, white men and boys were not always absent.

Festivities were somewhat more separate than sports, though by no means wholly so. In the gayeties of Christmas the members of each race were spectators of the dances and diversions of the other. Likewise marriage merriment in the great house would have its echo in the quarters; and sometimes marriages among the slaves were grouped so as to give occasion for a general frolic. Thus Daniel R. Tucker in 1858 sent a general invitation over the countryside in central Georgia to a sextuple wedding among his slaves, with dinner and dancing to follow.² On the whole, the fiddle, the banjo and the bones were not seldom in requisition.

It was a matter of discomfort that in the evangelical churches dancing and religion were held to be incompatible. At one time on Thomas Dabney's plantation in Mississippi, for instance, the whole negro force fell captive in a Baptist "revival" and foreswore the double shuffle. "I done buss' my fiddle an' my banjo, and done fling 'em away," the most music-loving fellow on the place said to the preacher when asked for his religious experiences.³ Such a condition might be tolerable so long as it was voluntary; but the planters were likely to take precautions against its becoming coercive. James H. Hammond, for instance, penciled a memorandum in his plantation manual: "Church members are privileged to dance on all holyday

² *Federal Union* (Milledgeville, Ga.), April 20, 1858.

³ S. D. Smedes, *Memorials of a Southern Planter*, pp. 161, 162.

occasions; and the class-leader or deacon who may report them shall be reprimanded or punished at the discretion of the master."⁴ The logic with which sin and sanctity were often reconciled is illustrated in Irwin Russell's remarkably faithful "Christmas in the Quarters." "Brudder Brown" has advanced upon the crowded floor to "beg a blessin' on dis dance:"

O Mashr! let dis gath'rin' fin, a blessin' in yo' sight!
 Don't jedge us hard fur what we does—you knows it's Chrismus night;
 An' all de balance ob de yeah we does as right's we kin.
 Ef dancin's wrong, O Mashr! let de time excuse de sin!

We labors in de vineya'd, wukin' hard and wukin' true;
 Now, shorely you won't notus, ef we eats a grape or two,
 An, takes a leetle holiday,—a leetle restin' spell,—
 Bekase, nex' week we'll start in fresh, an' labor twicet as well.

Remember, Mashr,—min' dis, now,—de sinfulness ob sin
 Is 'pendin' 'pon de sperrit what we goes an' does it in;
 An' in a righchis frame ob min' we's gwine to dance an' sing,
 A-feelin' like King David, when he cut de pigeon-wing.

It seems to me—indeed it do—I mebbe mout be wrong—
 That people raly *ought* to dance, when Chrismus comes along;
 Des dance bekase dey's happy—like de birds hops in de trees,
 De pine-top fiddle soundin' to de blowin' ob de breeze.

We has no ark to dance afore, like Isrul's prophet king;
 We has no harp to soun' de chords, to help us out to sing;
 But 'cordin' to de gif's we has we does de bes' we knows,
 An' folks don't 'spise de vi'let-flower bekase it ain't de rose.

You bless us, please, sah, eben ef we's doin' wrong tonight:
 Kase den we'll need de blessin' more'n ef we's doin' right;
 An' let de blessin' stay wid us, untel we comes to die,
 An' goes to keep our Chrismus wid dem sheriffs in de skyl!

Yes, tell dem preshis anjuls we's a-gwine to jine 'em soon:
 Our voices we's a-trainin' fur to sing de glory tune;
 We's ready when you wants us, an' it ain't no matter when—
 O Mashr! call yo' chillen soon, an' take 'em home! Amen.⁵

The churches which had the greatest influence upon the negroes were those which relied least upon ritual and most upon exhilara-

⁴ MS. among the Hammond papers in the Library of Congress.

⁵ Irwin Russell, *Poems* (New York [1888]), pp. 5-7.

tion. The Baptist and Methodist were foremost, and the latter had the special advantage of the chain of camp meetings which extended throughout the inland regions. At each chosen spot the planters and farmers of the countryside would jointly erect a great shed or "stand" in the midst of a grove, and would severally build wooden shelters or "tents" in a great square surrounding it. When the crops were laid by in August, the households would remove thither, their wagons piled high with bedding, chairs and utensils to keep "open house" with heavy-laden tables for all who might come to the meeting. With less elaborate equipment the negroes also would camp in the neighborhood and attend the same service as the whites, sitting generally in a section of the stand set apart for them. The camp meeting, in short, was the chief social and religious event of the year for all the Methodist whites and blacks within reach of the ground and for such non-Methodists as cared to attend. For some of the whites this occasion was highly festive, for others, intensely religious; but for any negro it might easily be both at once. Preachers in relays delivered sermons at brief intervals from sunrise until after nightfall; and most of the sermons were followed by exhortations for sinners to advance to the mourners' benches to receive the more intimate and individual suasion of the clergy and their corps of assisting brethren and sisters. The condition was highly hypnotic, and the professions of conversions were often quite as ecstatic as the most fervid ministrant could wish. The negroes were particularly welcome to the preachers, for they were likely to give the promptest response to the pulpit's challenge and set the frenzy going. A Georgia preacher, for instance, in reporting from one of these camps in 1807, wrote: "The first day of the meeting we had a gentle and comfortable moving of the spirit of the Lord among us; and at night it was much more powerful than before, and the meeting was kept up all night without intermission. However, before day the white people retired, and the meeting was continued by the black people." It is easy to see who led the way to the mourners' bench. "Next day," the preacher continued, "at ten o'clock the meeting was remarkably lively, and many souls were deeply wrought upon; and at the close of the sermon there was a general cry for mercy, and before night there were a good many persons who professed to get converted. That night meeting continued all night, both by the

white and black people, and many souls were converted before day." The next day the stir was still more general. Finally, "Friday was the greatest day of all. We had the Lord's Supper at night, . . . and such a solemn time I have seldom seen on the like occasion. Three of the preachers fell helpless within the altar, and one lay a considerable time before he came to himself. From that the work of convictions and conversions spread, and a large number were converted during the night, and there was no intermission until the break of day. At that time many stout hearted sinners were conquered. On Saturday we had preaching at the rising of the sun; and then with many tears we took leave of each other."⁶

The tone of the Baptist "protracted meetings" was much like that of the Methodist camps. In either case the rampant emotionalism, effective enough among the whites, was with the negroes a perfect contagion. With some of these the conversion brought lasting change; with others it provided a garment of piety to be donned with "Sunday-go-to-meeting clothes" and doffed as irksome on week days. With yet more it merely added to the joys of life. The thrill of exaltation would be followed by pleasurable "sin," to give place to fresh conversion when the furor season recurred. The rivalry of the Baptist and Methodist churches, each striving by similar methods to excel the other, tempted many to become oscillating proselytes, yielding to the allurements first of the one and then of the other, and on each occasion holding the center of the stage as a brand snatched from the burning, a lost sheep restored to the fold, a cause and participant of rapture.

In these manifestations the negroes merely followed and enlarged upon the example of some of the whites. The similarity of practices, however, did not promote a permanent mingling of the two races in the same congregations, for either would feel some restraint upon its rhapsody imposed by the presence of the other. To relieve this there developed in greater or less degree a separation of the races for purposes of worship, white ministers preaching to the blacks from time to time in plantation missions, and home talent among the negroes filling the intervals. While some of the black exhorters were viewed with suspicion by the whites, others were highly es-

⁶ *Farmer's Gazette* (Sparta, Ga.), Aug. 8, 1807, reprinted in *Plantation and Frontier*, II, 285, 286.

teemed and unusually privileged. One of these at Lexington, Kentucky, for example, was given the following pass duly signed by his master: "Tom is my slave, and has permission to go to Louisville for two or three weeks and return here after he has made his visit. Tom is a preacher of the reformed Baptist church, and has always been a faithful servant."⁷ As a rule the greater the proportion of negroes in a district or a church connection, the greater the segregation in worship. If the whites were many and the negroes few, the latter would be given the gallery or some other group of pews; but if the whites were few and the negroes many, the two elements would probably worship in separate buildings. Even in such a case, however, it was very common for a parcel of black domestics to flock with their masters rather than with their fellows.

The general régime in the fairly typical state of South Carolina was described in 1845 in a set of reports procured preliminary to a convention on the state of religion among the negroes and the means of its betterment. Some of these accounts were from the clergy of several denominations, others from the laity; some treated of general conditions in the several districts, others in detail of systems on the writers' own plantations. In the latter group, N. W. Middleton, an Episcopalian of St. Andrew's parish, wrote that he and his wife and sons were the only religious teachers of his slaves, aside from the rector of the parish. He read the service and taught the catechism to all every Sunday afternoon, and taught such as came voluntarily to be instructed after family prayers on Wednesday nights. His wife and sons taught the children "constantly during the week," chiefly in the catechism. On the other hand R. F. W. Allston, a fellow Episcopalian of Prince George, Winyaw, had on his plantation a place of worship open to all denominations. A Methodist missionary preached there on alternate Sundays, and the Baptists were less regularly cared for. Both of these sects, furthermore, had prayer meetings, according to the rules of the plantation, on two nights of each week. Thus while Middleton endeavored to school his slaves in his own faith, Allston encouraged them to seek salvation by such creed as they might choose.

An Episcopal clergyman in the same parish with Allston wrote

⁷ Dated Aug. 6, 1856, and signed E. McCallister. MS. in the New York Public Library.

that he held fortnightly services among the negroes on ten plantations, and enlisted some of the literate slaves as lay readers. His restriction of these to the text of the prayer book, however, seems to have shorn them of power. The bulk of the slaves flocked to the more spontaneous exercises elsewhere; and the clergyman could find ground for satisfaction only in saying that frequently as many as two hundred slaves attended services at one of the parish churches in the district.

The Episcopal failure was the "evangelical" opportunity. Of the thirteen thousand slaves in Allston's parish some 3200 were Methodists and 1500 Baptists, as compared with 300 Episcopalians. In St. Peter's parish a Methodist reported that in a total of 6600 slaves, 1335 adhered to his faith, about half of whom were in mixed congregations of whites and blacks under the care of two circuit-riders, and the rest were in charge of two missionaries who ministered to negroes alone. Every large plantation, furthermore, had one or more "so-called negro preachers, but more properly exhorters." In St. Helena parish the Baptists led with 2132 communicants; the Methodists followed with 314 to whom a missionary holding services on twenty plantations devoted the whole of his time; and the Episcopalians as usual brought up the rear with fifty-two negro members of the church at Beaufort and a solitary additional one in the chapel on St. Helena island.

Of the progress and effects of religion in the lowlands Allston and Middleton thought well. The latter said, "In every respect I feel encouraged to go on." The former wrote: "Of my own negroes and those of my immediate neighborhood I may speak with confidence. They are attentive to religious instruction and greatly improved in intelligence and morals, in domestic relations, etc. Those who have grown up under religious training are more intelligent and generally, though not always, more improved than those who have received religious instruction as adults. Indeed the degree of intelligence which as a class they are acquiring is worthy of deep consideration." Thomas Fuller, the reporter from the Beaufort neighborhood, however, was as much apprehensive as hopeful. While the negroes had greatly improved in manners and appearance as a result of coming to worship in town every Sunday, said he, the freedom which they were allowed for the purpose was often mis-

used in ways which led to demoralization. He strongly advised the planters to keep the slaves at home and provide instruction there.

From the upland cotton belt a Presbyterian minister in the Chester district wrote: "You are all aware, gentlemen, that the relation and intercourse between the whites and the blacks in the up-country are very different from what they are in the low-country. With us they are neither so numerous nor kept so entirely separate, but constitute a part of our households, and are daily either with their masters or some member of the white family. From this circumstance they feel themselves more identified with their owners than they can with you. I minister steadily to two different congregations. More than one hundred blacks attend. . . . The gallery, or a quarter of the house, is appropriated to them in all our churches, and they enjoy the preached gospel in common with the whites." Finally, from the Greenville district, on the upper edge of the Piedmont, where the Methodists and Baptists were completely dominant among whites and blacks alike, it was reported: "About one fourth of the members in the churches are negroes. In the years 1832, '3 and '4 great numbers of negroes joined the churches during a period of revival. Many, I am sorry to say, have since been excommunicated. As the general zeal in religion declined, they backslid." There were a few licensed negro preachers, this writer continued, who were thought to do some good; but the general improvement in negro character, he thought, was mainly due to the religious and moral training given by their masters, and still more largely by their mistresses. From all quarters the expression was common that the promotion of religion among the slaves was not only the duty of masters but was to their interest as well in that it elevated the morals of the workmen and improved the quality of the service they rendered.⁸

⁸ *Proceedings of the Meeting in Charleston, S. C., May 13-15, 1845, on the Religious Instruction of the Negroes, together with the Report of the Committee and the Address to the Public* (Charleston, 1845). The reports of the Association for the Religious Instruction of Negroes in Liberty County, Georgia, printed annually for a dozen years or more in the 'thirties and 'forties, relate the career of a particularly interesting missionary work in that county on the rice coast, under the charge of the Reverend C. C. Jones. The tenth report in the series (1845) summarizes the work of the first decade, and the twelfth (1847) surveys the conditions then prevalent. In C. F. Deems ed., *Annals of Southern Methodism for 1856* (Nashville, [1857]) the ninth chapter is made up of reports on the mission activities of that church among the negroes in various quarters of the South.

In general, the less the cleavage of creed between master and man, the better for both, since every factor conducing to solidarity of sentiment was of advantage in promoting harmony and progress. When the planter went to sit under his rector while the slave stayed at home to hear an exhorter, just so much was lost in the sense of fellowship. It was particularly unfortunate that on the rice coast the bulk of the blacks had no co-religionists except among the non-slaveholding whites with whom they had more conflict than community of economic and sentimental interest. On the whole, however, in spite of the contrary suggestion of irresponsible religious preachments and manifestations, the generality of the negroes everywhere realized, like the whites, that virtue was to be acquired by consistent self-control in the performance of duty rather than by the alternation of spasmodic reforms and relapses.

Occasionally some hard-headed negro would resist the hypnotic suggestion of his preacher, and even repudiate glorification on his death-bed. A Louisiana physician recounts the final episode in the career of "Old Uncle Caleb," who had long been a-dying. "Before his departure, Jeff, the negro preacher of the place, gathered his sable flock of saints and sinners around the bed. He read a chapter and prayed, after which they sang a hymn. . . . Uncle Caleb lay motionless with closed eyes, and gave no sign. Jeff approached and took his hand. 'Uncle Caleb,' said he earnestly, 'de doctor says you are dying; and all de bredderin has come in for to see you de last time. And now, Uncle Caleb, dey wants to hear from your own mouf de precious words, dat you feels prepared to meet your God, and is ready and willin' to go.' Old Caleb opened his eyes suddenly, and in a very peevish, irritable tone, rebuffed the pious functionary in the following unexpected manner: 'Jeff, don't talk your nonsense to me! You jest knows dat I an't ready to go, nor willin' neder; and dat I an't prepared to meet nobody.' Jeff expatiated largely not only on the mercy of God, but on the glories of the heavenly kingdom, as a land flowing with milk and honey, etc. 'Dis ole cabin suits me mon'sus well!' was the only reply he could elicit from the old reprobate. And so he died."⁹

The slaves not only had their own functionaries in mystic matters, including a remnant of witchcraft, but in various temporal

⁹ William H. Holcombe, "Sketches of Plantation Life," in the *Knickerbocker Magazine*, LVII, 631 (June, 1861).

concerns also. Foremen, chosen by masters with the necessary sanction of the slaves, had industrial and police authority; nurses were minor despots in sick rooms and plantation hospitals; many an Uncle Remus was an oracle in folklore; and many an Aunt Dinah was arbitress of style in turbans and of elegancies in general. Even in the practice of medicine a negro here and there gained a sage's reputation. The governor of Virginia reported in 1729 that he had "met with a negro, a very old man, who has performed many wonderful cures of diseases. For the sake of his freedom he has revealed the medicine, a concoction of roots and barks. . . . There is no room to doubt of its being a certain remedy here, and of singular use among the negroes—it is well worth the price (£60) of the negro's freedom, since it is now known how to cure slaves without mercury."¹⁰ And in colonial South Carolina a slave named Caesar was particularly famed for his cure for poison, which was a decoction of plantain, hoarhound and golden rod roots compounded with rum and lye, together with an application of tobacco leaves soaked in rum in case of rattlesnake bite. In 1750 the legislature ordered his prescription published for the benefit of the public, and the Charleston journal which printed it found copies exhausted by the demand.¹¹ An example of more common episodes appears in a letter from William Dawson, a Potomac planter, to Robert Carter of Nomoni Hall, asking that "Brother Tom," Carter's coachman, be sent to see a sick child in his quarter. Dawson continued: "The black people at this place hath more faith in him as a doctor than any white doctor; and as I wrote you in a former letter I cannot expect you to lose your man's time, etc., for nothing, but am quite willing to pay for same."¹²

Each plantation had a double head in the master and the mistress. The latter, mother of a romping brood of her own and over-mother of the pickaninny throng, was the chatelaine of the whole establishment. Working with a never flagging constancy, she carried the indoor keys, directed the household routine and the various domestic industries, served as head nurse for the sick, and taught morals and religion by precept and example. Her hours were long, her diver-

¹⁰ J. H. Russell, *The Free Negro in Virginia* (Baltimore, 1913), p. 53, note.

¹¹ *South Carolina Gazette*, Feb. 25, 1751.

¹² MS. in the Carter papers, Virginia Historical Society.

sions few, her voice quiet, her influence firm.¹³ Her presence made the plantation a home; her absence would have made it a factory. The master's concern was mainly with the able-bodied in the routine of the crops. He laid the plans, guessed the weather, ordered the work, and saw to its performance. He was out early and in late, directing, teaching, encouraging, and on occasion punishing. Yet he found time for going to town and for visits here and there, time for politics, and time for sports. If his duty as he saw it was sometimes grim, and his disappointments keen, hearty diversions were at hand to restore his equanimity. His horn hung near and his hounds made quick response on Reynard's trail, and his neighbors were ready to accept his invitations and give theirs lavishly in return, whether to their houses or to their fields. When their absences from home were long, as they might well be in the public service, they were not unlikely upon return to meet such a reception as Henry Laurens described: "I found nobody there but three of our old domestics—Stepney, Exeter and big Hagar. These drew tears from me by their humble and affectionate salutes. My knees were clasped, my hands kissed, my very feet embraced, and nothing less than a very—I can't say fair, but full—buss of my lips would satisfy the old man weeping and sobbing in my face. . . . They . . . held my hands, hung upon me; I could scarce get from them. 'Ah,' said the old man, 'I never thought to see you again; now I am happy; Ah, I never thought to see you again.' "¹⁴

Among the clearest views of plantation life extant are those of two Northern tutors who wrote of their Southern sojourns. One was Philip Fithian who went from Princeton in 1773 to teach the children of Colonel Robert Carter of Nomoni Hall in the "Northern Neck" of Virginia, probably the most aristocratic community of the whole South: the other was A. de Puy Van Buren who left Battle Creek in the eighteen-fifties to seek health and employment in Mississippi and found them both, and happiness too, amid the freshly settled folk on the banks of the Yazoo River. Each of these made jottings now and then of the work and play of the negroes, but both of them were mainly impressed by the social régime in which they found themselves among the whites. Fithian

¹³ Emily J. Putnam, *The Lady* (New York, 1910), pp. 282-283.

¹⁴ D. D. Wallace, *Life of Henry Laurens*, p. 436.

one sees of a planter's life the greater is the conviction that its charms come from a particular turn of mind, which is separated by a wide interval from modern ideas in Europe. The planter is a denomadized Arab;—he has fixed himself with horses and slaves in a fertile spot, where he guards his women with Oriental care, exercises patriarchal sway, and is at once fierce, tender and hospitable. The inner life of his household is exceedingly charming, because one is astonished to find the graces and accomplishments of womanhood displayed in a scene which has a certain sort of savage rudeness about it after all, and where all kinds of incongruous accidents are visible in the service of the table, in the furniture of the house, in its decorations, menials, and surrounding scenery."¹⁸ The Southerners themselves took its incongruities much as a matter of course. The régime was to their minds so clearly the best attainable under the circumstances that its roughnesses chafed little. The plantations were homes to which, as they were fond of singing, their hearts turned ever; and the negroes, exasperating as they often were to visiting strangers, were an element in the home itself. The problem of accommodation, which was the central problem of the life, was on the whole happily solved.

The separate integration of the slaves was no more than rudimentary. They were always within the social mind and conscience of the whites, as the whites in turn were within the mind and conscience of the blacks. The adjustments and readjustments were mutually made, for although the masters had by far the major power of control, the slaves themselves were by no means devoid of influence. A sagacious employer has well said, after long experience, "a negro understands a white man better than the white man understands the negro."¹⁹ This knowledge gave a power all its own. The general régime was in fact shaped by mutual requirements, concessions and understandings, producing reciprocal codes of conventional morality. Masters of the standard type promoted Christianity and the customs of marriage and parental care, and they instructed as much by example as by precept; they gave occasional holidays, rewards and indulgences, and permitted as large a degree of liberty as they thought the slaves could be trusted not to abuse; they refrained from selling slaves

¹⁸ William H. Russell, *My Diary North and South* (Boston, 1863), p. 285.

¹⁹ Captain L. V. Cooley, *Address Before the Tulane Society of Economics* [New

except under the stress of circumstances; they avoided cruel, vindictive and captious punishments, and endeavored to inspire effort through affection rather than through fear; and they were content with achieving quite moderate industrial results. In short their despotism, so far as it might properly be called, was benevolent in intent and on the whole beneficial in effect.

Some planters there were who inflicted severe punishments for disobedience and particularly for the offense of running away; and the community condoned and even sanctioned a certain degree of this. Otherwise no planter would have printed such descriptions of scars and brands as were fairly common in the newspaper advertisements offering rewards for the recapture of absconders.²⁰ When severity went to an excess that was reckoned as positive cruelty, however, the law might be invoked if white witnesses could be had; or the white neighbors or the slaves themselves might apply extra-legal retribution. The former were fain to be content with inflicting social ostracism or with expelling the offender from the district;²¹ the latter sometimes went so far as to set fire to the oppressor's house or to accomplish his death by poison, cudgel, knife or bullet.²²

In the typical group there was occasion for terrorism on neither side. The master was ruled by a sense of dignity, duty and moderation, and the slaves by a moral code of their own. This embraced a somewhat obsequious obedience, the avoidance of open indolence and vice, the attainment of moderate skill in industry, and the cultivation of the master's good will and affection. It winked at petty theft, loitering and other little laxities, while it stressed good manners and a fine faithfulness in major concerns. While the majority were notoriously easy-going, very many made their master's interests thoroughly their own; and many of the masters had perfect confidence in the loyalty of the bulk of their servitors. When on the eve of secession Edmund Ruffin foretold²³ the fidelity which the slaves actually showed when the war ensued, he merely voiced the faith of the planter class.

In general the relations on both sides were felt to be based on pleasurable responsibility. The masters occasionally expressed this

²⁰ Examples are reprinted in *Plantation and Frontier*, II, 79-91.

²¹ An instance is given in H. M. Henry, *Police Control of the Slave in South Carolina* (Emory, Va., [1914]), p. 75.

²² For instances see *Plantation and Frontier*, II, 117-121.

²³ *Debow's Review*, XXX, 118-120 (January, 1861).

in their letters. William Allason, for example, who after a long career as a merchant at Falmouth, Virginia, had retired to plantation life, declined his niece's proposal in 1787 that he return to Scotland to spend his declining years. In enumerating his reasons he concluded: "And there is another thing which in your country you can have no trial of: that is, of selling faithful slaves, which perhaps we have raised from their earliest breath. Even this, however, some can do, as with horses, etc., but I must own that it is not in my disposition."²⁴

Others were yet more expressive when they came to write their wills. Thus²⁵ Howell Cobb of Houston County, Georgia, when framing his testament in 1817 which made his body-servant "to be what he is really deserving, a free man," and gave an annuity along with virtual freedom to another slave, of an advanced age, said that the liberation of the rest of his slaves was prevented by a belief that the care of generous and humane masters would be much better for them than a state of freedom. Accordingly he bequeathed these to his wife who he knew from her goodness of temper would treat them with unflagging kindness. But should the widow remarry, thereby putting her property under the control of a stranger, the slaves and the plantation were at once to revert to the testator's brother who was recommended to bequeath them in turn to his son Howell if he were deemed worthy of the trust. "It is my most ardent desire that in whatsoever hands fortune may place said negroes," the will enjoined, "that all the justice and indulgence may be shown them that is consistent with a state of slavery. I flatter myself with the hope that none of my relations or connections will be so ungrateful to my memory as to treat or use them otherwise." Surely upon the death of such a master the slaves might, with even more than usual unction, raise their melodious refrain:

Down in de cawn fiel'
Hear dat mo'nful soun';
All de darkies am aweepin',
Massa's in de col', col' ground.

²⁴ Letter dated Jan. 22, 1787, in the Allason MS. mercantile books, Virginia State Library.

²⁵ MS. copy in the possession of Mrs. A. S. Erwin, Athens, Ga. The nephew mentioned in the will was Howell Cobb of Confederate prominence.

Plantation Tendencies

EVERY typical settlement in English America was in its first place a bit of the frontier. Commerce was rudimentary, capital scant, and industry primitive. Each family had to suffice itself in the main with its own direct produce. No one could afford to specialize his calling, for the versatility of the individual was well-nigh a necessity of life. This phase lasted only until some staple of export was found which permitted the rise of external trade. Then the fruit of such energy as could be spared from the works of bodily sustenance was exchanged for the goods of the outer world; and finally in districts of special favor for staples, the bulk of the community became absorbed in the special industry and procured most of its consumption goods from without.

In the hidden coves of the Southern Alleghanies the primitive régime has proved permanent. In New England where it was but gradually replaced through the influence first of the fisheries and then of manufacturing, it survived long enough to leave an enduring spirit of versatile enterprise, evidenced in the plenitude of "Yankee notions." In the Southern lowlands and Piedmont, however, the pristine advantages of self-sufficing industry were so soon eclipsed by the profits to be had from tobacco, rice, indigo, sugar or cotton, that in large degree the whole community adopted a stereotyped economy with staple production as its cardinal feature. The earnings obtained by the more efficient producers brought an early accumulation of capital, and at the same time the peculiar adaptability of all the Southern staples to production on a large scale by unfree labor prompted the devotion of most of the capital to the purchase of servants and slaves. Thus in every district suited to any of these staples, the growth of an industrial and social system like that of Europe and the Northern States was cut short and the distinctive Southern scheme of things developed instead.

This régime was conditioned by its habitat, its products and the

racial quality of its labor supply, as well as by the institution of slavery and the traditional predilections of the masters. The climate of the South was generally favorable to one or another of the staples except in the elevated tracts in and about the mountain ranges. The soil also was favorable except in the pine barrens which skirted the seaboard. Everywhere but in the alluvial districts, however, the land had only a surface fertility, and all the staples, as well as their great auxiliary Indian corn, required the fields to be kept clean and exposed to the weather; and the heavy rainfall of the region was prone to wash off the soil from the hillsides and to leach the fertile ingredients through the sands of the plains. But so spacious was the Southern area that the people never lacked fresh fields when their old ones were outworn. Hence, while public economy for the long run might well have suggested a conservation of soil at the expense of immediate crops, private economy for the time being dictated the opposite policy; and its dictation prevailed, as it has done in virtually all countries and all ages. Slaves working in squads might spread manure and sow soiling crops if so directed, as well as freemen working individually; and their failure to do so was fully paralleled by similar neglect at the North in the same period. New England, indeed, was only less noted than the South for exhausted fields and abandoned farms. The newness of the country, the sparseness of population and the cheapness of land conspired with crops, climate and geological conditions to promote exploitive methods. The planters were by no means alone in shaping their program to fit these circumstances.¹ The heightened speed of the consequences was in a sense merely an unwelcome proof of their system's efficiency. Their laborers, by reason of being slaves, must at word of command set forth on a trek of a hundred or a thousand miles. No racial inertia could hinder nor local attachments hold them. In the knowledge of this the masters were even more alert than other men of the time for advantageous new locations; and they were accordingly fain to be content with rude houses and flimsy fences in any place of sojourn, and to let their hills remain studded with stumps as well as to take the exhaustion of the soil as a matter of course.²

¹ Edmund Ruffin, *Address on the opposite results of exhausting and fertilizing systems of agriculture. Read before the South Carolina Institute, November 18, 1852* (Charleston, 1853), pp. 12, 13.

² W. L. Trenholm, "The Southern States, their social and industrial history, conditions and needs," in the *Journal of Social Science*, no. IX (January, 1878).

Migration produced a more or less thorough segregation of types, for planters and farmers respectively tended to enter and remain in the districts most favorable to them.³ The monopolization of the rice and sugar industries by the planters, has been described in previous chapters. At the other extreme the farming régime was without a rival throughout the mountain regions, in the Shenandoah and East Tennessee Valleys and in large parts of Kentucky and Missouri where the Southern staples would not flourish, and in great tracts of the pine barrens where the quality of the soil repelled all but the unambitious. The tobacco and cotton belts remained as the debatable ground in which the two systems might compete on more nearly even terms, though in some cotton districts the planters had always an overwhelming advantage. In the Mississippi bottoms, for example, the solid spread of the fields facilitated the supervision of large gangs at work, and the requirement of building and maintaining great levees on the river front virtually debarred operations by small proprietors. The extreme effects of this are illustrated in Issaquena County, Mississippi, and Concordia Parish, Louisiana, where in 1860 the slaveholdings averaged thirty and fifty slaves each, and where except for plantation overseers and their families there were virtually no non-slaveholders present. The Alabama prairies, furthermore, showed a plantation predominance almost as complete. In the six counties of Dallas, Greene, Lowndes, Macon, Perry, Sumter and Wilcox, for example, the average slaveholdings ranged from seventeen to twenty-one each, and the slaveholding families were from twice to six times as numerous as the non-slaveholding ones. Even in the more rugged parts of the cotton belt and in the tobacco zone as well, the same tendency toward the engrossment of estates prevailed, though in milder degree and with lesser effects.

This widespread phenomenon did not escape the notice of contemporaries. Two members of the South Carolina legislature described it as early as 1805 in substance as follows: "As one man grows wealthy and thereby increases his stock of negroes, he wants more land to employ them on; and being fully able, he bids a large price for his less opulent neighbor's plantation, who by selling advantageously here can raise money enough to go into the back country, where he can be more on a level with the most forehanded, can get

³ F. V. Emerson, "Geographical Influences in American Slavery," in the *American Geographical Society Bulletin*, XLIII (1911), 13-26, 106-118, 170-181.

lands cheaper, and speculate or grow rich by industry as he pleases."⁴ Some three decades afterward another South Carolinian spoke sadly "on the incompatibleness of large plantations with neighboring farms, and their uniform tendency to destroy the yeoman."⁵ Similarly Dr. Basil Manly,⁶ president of the University of Alabama, spoke in 1841 of the inveterate habit of Southern farmers to buy more land and slaves and plod on captive to the customs of their ancestors; and C. C. Clay, Senator from Alabama, said in 1855 of his native county of Madison, which lay on the Tennessee border: "I can show you . . . the sad memorials of the artless and exhausting culture of cotton. Our small planters, after taking the cream off their lands, unable to restore them by rest, manures or otherwise, are going further west and south in search of other virgin lands which they may and will despoil and impoverish in like manner. Our wealthier planters, with greater means and no more skill, are buying out their poorer neighbors, extending their plantations and adding to their slave force. The wealthy few, who are able to live on smaller profits and to give their blasted fields some rest, are thus pushing off the many who are merely independent. . . . In traversing that county one will discover numerous farm houses, once the abode of industrious and intelligent freemen, now occupied by slaves, or tenantless, deserted and dilapidated; he will observe fields, once fertile, now unfenced, abandoned, and covered with those evil harbingers fox-tail and broomsedge; he will see the moss growing on the mouldering walls of once thrifty villages; and will find 'one only master grasps the whole domain' that once furnished happy homes for a dozen white families. Indeed, a country in its infancy, where fifty years ago scarce a forest tree had been felled by the axe of the pioneer, is already exhibiting the painful signs of senility and decay apparent in Virginia and the Carolinas; the freshness of its agricultural glory is gone, the vigor of its youth is extinct, and the spirit of desolation seems brooding over it."⁷

The census returns for Madison County show that in 1830 when the gross population was at its maximum the whites and slaves were

⁴ "Diary of Edward Hooker," in the *American Historical Association Report* for 1896, p. 878.

⁵ Quoted in Francis Lieber, *Slavery, Plantations and the Yeomanry* (Loyal Publication Society, no. 29, New York, 1863), p. 5.

⁶ *Tuscaloosa Monitor*, April 13, 1842.

⁷ *DeBow's Review*, XIX, 727.

equally numerous, and that by 1860 while the whites had diminished by a fourth the slaves had increased only by a twentieth. This suggests that the farmers were drawn, not driven, away.

The same trend may be better studied in the uplands of eastern Georgia where earlier settlements gave a longer experience and where fuller statistics permit a more adequate analysis. In the county of Oglethorpe, typical of that area, the whites in the year 1800 were more than twice as many as the slaves, the non-slaveholding families were to the slaveholders in the ratio of 8 to 5, and slaveholders on the average had but 5 slaves each. In 1820 the county attained its maximum population for the ante-bellum period, and competition between the industrial types was already exerting its full effect. The whites were of the same number as twenty years before, but the slaves now exceeded them; the slaveholding families also slightly exceeded those who had none, and the scale of the average slaveholding had risen to 8.5. Then in the following forty years while the whites diminished and the number of slaves remained virtually constant, the scale of the average slaveholding rose to 12.2; the number of slaveholders shrank by a third and the non-slaveholders by two thirds.⁸ The smaller slaveholders, those we will say with less than ten slaves each, ought of course to be classed among the farmers. When this is done the farmers of Oglethorpe appear to have been twice as many as the planters even in 1860. But this is properly offset by rating the average plantation there at four or five times the industrial scale of the average farm, which makes it clear that the plantation régime had grown dominant.

In such a district virtually everyone was growing cotton to the top of his ability. When the price of the staple was high, both planters and farmers prospered in proportion to their scales. Those whose earnings were greatest would be eager to enlarge their fields, and would make offers for adjoining lands too tempting for some farmers to withstand. These would sell out and move west to resume cotton culture to better advantage than before. When cotton prices were low, however, the farmers, feeling the stress most keenly, would be inclined to forsake staple production. But in such case there was no occasion for them to continue cultivating lands best fit for cotton.

⁸ U. B. Phillips, "The Origin and Growth of the Southern Black Belts," in the *American Historical Review*, XI, 810-813 (July, 1906).

The obvious policy would be to sell their homesteads to neighboring planters and move to cheaper fields beyond the range of planters' competition. Thus the farmers were constantly pioneering in districts of all sorts, while the plantation régime, whether by the prosperity and enlargement of the farms or by the immigration of planters, or both, was constantly replacing the farming scale in most of the staple areas.

In the oldest district of all, however, the lowlands about the Chesapeake, the process went on to a final stage in which the bulk of the planters, after exhausting the soil for staple purposes, departed westward and were succeeded in their turn by farmers, partly native whites and free negroes and partly Northerners trickling in, who raised melons, peanuts, potatoes, and garden truck for the Northern city markets.

Throughout the Southern staple areas the plantations waxed and waned in a territorial progression. The régime was a broad billow moving irresistibly westward and leaving a trough behind. At the middle of the nineteenth century it was entering Texas, its last available province, whose cotton area it would have duly filled had its career escaped its catastrophic interruption. What would have occurred after that completion, without the war, it is interesting to surmise. Probably the crest of the billow would have subsided through the effect of an undertow setting eastward again. Belated immigrants, finding the good lands all engrossed, would have returned to their earlier homes, to hold their partially exhausted soils in higher esteem than before and to remedy the depletion by reformed cultivation. That the billow did not earlier give place to a level flood was partly due to the shortage of slaves; for the African trade was closed too soon for the stock to fill the country in these decades. To the same shortage was owing such opportunity as the white yeomanry had in staple production. The world offered a market, though not at high prices, for a greater volume of the crops than the plantation slaves could furnish; the farmers supplied the deficit.

Free workingmen in general, whether farmers, artisans or unskilled wage earners, merely filled the interstices in and about the slave plantations. One year in the eighteen-forties a planter near New Orleans, attempting to dispense with slave labor, assembled a

force of about a hundred Irish and German immigrants for his crop routine. Things went smoothly until the midst of the grinding season, when with one accord the gang struck for double pay. Rejecting the demand the planter was unable to proceed with his harvest and lost some ten thousand dollars worth of his crop.⁹ The generality of the planters realized, without such a demonstration, that each year must bring its crop crisis during which an overindulgence by the laborers in the privileges of liberty might bring ruin to the employers. To secure immunity from this they were the more fully reconciled to the limitations of their peculiar labor supply. Freemen white or black might be convenient as auxiliaries, and were indeed employed in many instances whether on annual contract as blacksmiths and the like or temporarily as emergency helpers in the fields; but negro slaves were the standard composition of the gangs. This brought it about that whithersoever the planters went they carried with them crowds of negro slaves and all the problems and influences to which the presence of negroes and the prevalence of slavery gave rise.

One of the consequences was to keep foreign immigration small. In the colonial period the trade in indentured servants recruited the white population, and most of those who came in that status remained as permanent citizens of the South; but such Europeans as came during the nineteenth century were free to follow their own reactions without submitting to a compulsory adjustment. Many of them found the wage-earning opportunity scant, for the slaves were given preference by their masters when steady occupations were to be filled, and odd jobs were often the only recourse for outsiders. This was an effect of the slavery system. Still more important, however, was the repugnance which the newcomers felt at working and living alongside the blacks; and this was a consequence not of the negroes being slaves so much as of the slaves being negroes. It was a racial antipathy which when added to the experience of industrial disadvantage pressed the bulk of the newcomers northwestward beyond the confines of the Southern staple belts, and pressed even many of the native whites in the same direction.

This intrenched the slave plantations yet more strongly in their

⁹ Sir Charles Lyell, *Second Visit to the United States*, 2d ed. (London, 1850), II, 162, 163.

local domination, and by that very fact it hampered industrial development. Great landed proprietors, it is true, have oftentimes been essential for making beneficial innovations. Thus the remodeling of English agriculture which Jethro Tull and Lord Townsend instituted in the eighteenth century could not have been set in progress by any who did not possess their combination of talent and capital.¹⁰ In the ante-bellum South, likewise, it was the planters, and necessarily so, who introduced the new staples of sea-island cotton and sugar, the new devices of horizontal plowing and hillside terracing, the new practice of seed selection, and the new resource of commercial fertilizers. Yet their constant bondage to the staples debarred the whole community in large degree from agricultural diversification, and their dependence upon gangs of negro slaves kept the average of skill and assiduity at a low level.

The negroes furnished inertly obeying minds and muscles; slavery provided a police; and the plantation system contributed the machinery of direction. The assignment of special functions to slaves of special aptitudes would enhance the general efficiency; the coördination of tasks would prevent waste of effort; and the conduct of a steady routine would lessen the mischiefs of irresponsibility. But in the work of a plantation squad no delicate implements could be employed, for they would be broken; and no discriminating care in the handling of crops could be had except at a cost of supervision which was generally prohibitive. The whole establishment would work with success only when the management fully recognized and allowed for the crudity of the labor.

The planters faced this fact with mingled resolution and resignation. The sluggishness of the bulk of their slaves they took as a racial trait to be conquered by discipline, even though their ineptitude was not to be eradicated; the talents and vigor of their exceptional negroes and mulattoes, on the other hand, they sought to foster by special training and rewards. But the prevalence of slavery which aided them in the one policy hampered them in the other, for it made the rewards arbitrary instead of automatic and it restricted the scope of the laborers' employments and of their ambitions as well. The device of hiring slaves to themselves, which had an invigorating effect here and there in the towns, could find little application in

¹⁰ R. E. Prothero, *English Farming, past and present* (London, 1912), chap. 7.

the country; and the paternalism of the planters could provide no fully effective substitute. Hence the achievements of the exceptional workmen were limited by the status of slavery as surely as the progress of the generality was restricted by the fact of their being negroes.

A further influence of the plantation system was to hamper the growth of towns. This worked in several ways. As for manufactures, the chronic demand of the planters for means with which to enlarge their scales of operations absorbed most of the capital which might otherwise have been available for factory promotion. A few cotton mills were built in the Piedmont where water power was abundant, and a few small ironworks and other industries; but the supremacy of agriculture was nowhere challenged. As for commerce, the planters plied the bulk of their trade with distant wholesale dealers, patronizing the local shopkeepers only for petty articles or in emergencies when transport could not be awaited; and the slaves for their part, while willing enough to buy of any merchant within reach, rarely had either money or credit.

Towns grew, of course, at points on the seaboard where harbors were good, and where rivers or railways brought commerce from the interior. Others rose where the fall line marked the heads of river navigation, and on the occasional bluffs of the Mississippi, and finally a few more at railroad junctions. All of these together numbered barely three score, some of which counted their population by hundreds rather than by thousands; and in the wide intervals between there was nothing but farms, plantations and thinly scattered villages. In the Piedmont, country towns of fairly respectable dimensions rose here and there, though many a Southern county-seat could boast little more than a court house and a hitching rack. Even as regards the seaports, the currents of trade were too thin and divergent to permit of large urban concentration, for the Appalachian watershed shut off the Atlantic ports from the commerce of the central basin; and even the ambitious construction of railroads to the northwest, fostered by the seaboard cities, merely enabled the Piedmont planters to get their provisions overland, and barely affected the volume of the seaboard trade. New Orleans alone had a location promising commercial greatness; but her prospects were heavily diminished by the building of the far away Erie Canal and the

Northern trunk line railroads which diverted the bulk of North-western trade from the Gulf outlet.

As conditions were, the slaveholding South could have realized a metropolitan life only through absentee proprietorships. In the Roman *latifundia*, which overspread central and southern Italy after the Hannibalic war, absenteeism was a chronic feature and a curse. The overseers there were commonly not helpers in the proprietors' daily routine, but sole managers charged with a paramount duty of procuring the greatest possible revenues and transmitting them to meet the urban expenditures of their patrician employers. The owners, having no more personal touch with their great gangs of slaves than modern stockholders have with the operatives in their mills, exploited them accordingly. Where humanity and profits were incompatible, business considerations were likely to prevail. Illustrations of the policy may be drawn from Cato the Elder's treatise on agriculture. Heavy work by day, he reasoned, would not only increase the crops but would cause deep slumber by night, valuable as a safeguard against conspiracy; discord was to be sown instead of harmony among the slaves, for the same purpose of hindering plots; capital sentences when imposed by law were to be administered in the presence of the whole corps for the sake of their terrorizing effect; while rations for the able-bodied were not to exceed a fixed rate, those for the sick were to be still more frugally stinted; and the old and sick slaves were to be sold along with other superfluities.¹¹ Now, Cato was a moralist of wide repute, a stoic it is true, but even so a man who had a strong sense of duty. If such were his maxims, the oppressions inflicted by his fellow proprietors and their slave drivers must have been stringent indeed.

The heartlessness of the Roman *latifundiarum* was the product partly of their absenteeism, partly of the cheapness of their slaves which were poured into the markets by conquests and raids in all quarters of the Mediterranean world, and partly of the lack of difference between masters and slaves in racial traits. In the ante-bellum South all these conditions were reversed: the planters were commonly resident; the slaves were costly; and the slaves were

¹¹ A. H. J. Greenidge, *History of Rome during the later Republic and the early Principate* (New York, 1905), I, 64-85; M. Porcius Cato, *De Agri Cultura*, Kell ed. (Leipzig, 1882).

negroes, who for the most part were by racial quality submissive rather than defiant, light-hearted instead of gloomy, amiable and ingratiating instead of sullen, and whose very defects invited paternalism rather than repression. Many a city slave in Rome was the boon companion of his master, sharing his intellectual pleasures and his revels, while most of those on the *latifundia* were driven cattle. It was hard to maintain a middle adjustment for them. In the South, on the other hand, the medium course was the obvious thing. The bulk of the slaves, because they were negroes, because they were costly, and because they were in personal touch, were pupils and working wards, while the planters were teachers and guardians as well as masters and owners. There was plenty of coercion in the South; but in comparison with the harshness of the Roman system the American régime was essentially mild.

Every plantation of the standard Southern type was, in fact, a school constantly training and controlling pupils who were in a backward state of civilization. Slave youths of special promise, or when special purposes were in view, might be bound as apprentices to craftsmen at a distance. Thus James H. Hammond in 1859 apprenticed a fourteen-year-old mulatto boy, named Henderson, for four years to Charles Axt, of Crawfordville, Georgia, that he might be taught vine culture. Axt agreed in the indenture to feed and clothe the boy, pay for any necessary medical attention, teach him his trade, and treat him with proper kindness. Before six months were ended Alexander H. Stephens, who was a neighbor of Axt and a friend of Hammond, wrote the latter that Henderson had run away and that Axt was unfit to have the care of slaves, especially when on hire, and advised Hammond to take the boy home. Soon afterward Stephens reported that Henderson had returned and had been whipped, though not cruelly, by Axt.¹² The further history of this episode is not ascertainable. Enough of it is on record, however, to suggest reasons why for the generality of slaves home training was thought best.

This, rudimentary as it necessarily was, was in fact just what the bulk of the negroes most needed. They were in an alien land, in an essentially slow process of transition from barbarism to civilization. New industrial methods of a simple sort they might learn from

¹² MSS. among the Hammond papers in the Library of Congress.

precepts and occasional demonstrations; the habits and standards of civilized life they could only acquire in the main through examples reinforced with discipline. These the plantation régime supplied. Each white family served very much the function of a modern social settlement, setting patterns of orderly, well bred conduct which the negroes were encouraged to emulate; and the planters furthermore were vested with a coercive power, salutary in the premises, of which settlement workers are deprived. The very aristocratic nature of the system permitted a vigor of discipline which democracy cannot possess. On the whole the plantations were the best schools yet invented for the mass training of that sort of inert and backward people which the bulk of the American negroes represented. The lack of any regular provision for the discharge of pupils upon the completion of their training was, of course, a cardinal shortcoming which the laws of slavery imposed; but even in view of this, the slave plantation régime, after having wrought the initial and irreparable misfortune of causing the negroes to be imported, did at least as much as any system possible in the period could have done toward adapting the bulk of them to life in a civilized community.

VAN WYCK BROOKS

UNLIKE MOST of their nineteenth-century predecessors, modern historians believe that their subject matter properly includes all aspects of the past. Yet it has proved easier to form a broad definition of history than to apply it. Not only has it been difficult for historians to master vast quantities of unfamiliar source material; they have also become dependent upon secondary works in disciplines of which they ordinarily have only a preliminary understanding. Finally, there is the problem, even if such works are properly comprehended, of transposing accurately their meaning from its limited context into a more general historical synthesis.

The historical usefulness of books written by students of literature varies greatly. Historians' judgments are conditioned by a frame of reference different from that of imaginative writers and literary critics. Their evaluations of literary works are correspondingly dissimilar. A study of the prosody or literary ancestry of an American poet is usually less helpful to historians than is his biography. Similarly, creative works with obvious sociological implications are more valued than novels or poems which appear to be suspended in time. The naturalistic fiction of a Frank Norris is given more attention than the supernatural tales of Edgar Allan Poe.

Van Wyck Brooks' history of literature in the United States has been subject to both great praise and scathing abuse. Perhaps the most extreme of his detractors are the "new critics," whose preoccupation with textual matters Brooks does not

share. In *The Flowering of New England* he seems concerned less with literature than with the lives of the people who produced it. Neither has Brooks appealed greatly to the school of sociological critics. His contempt for abstractly esthetic standards is not matched by a willingness to explore systematically the relationship between life and art. His working definition of "culture" is neither broad enough nor deep enough to explain the backgrounds of the authors about whom he writes.

Most historians find it easy to accept these limitations. Like Brooks, they scorn the precious and minimize the importance of internal criticism. They are undisturbed by his deficiencies as a social historian, partly because they do not expect a literary critic to be one.

If Brooks deals with a limited segment of American culture, he has crowded it with a mass of rich detail. One may get an impression rather than analysis, but it is an impression which touches all the senses. *The Flowering of New England* is filled with smells, sounds, and sights as well as with minds and thoughts. The historian is especially grateful that a writer with so affirmative a view of the American heritage should choose to describe a period which shared his enthusiasm and faith in man's ability to improve himself. The world of William Ellery Channing and Margaret Fuller is not one which a debunker could view with sympathy, let alone insight.

It must be acknowledged that the gold shines too brightly through Brooks' pages. The same pride and affection which enables him to describe so vividly the achievements of this society makes him a poor guide to its weaknesses. Idyllic, even if energetic, Brooks' New England is shrunken and homogenized. One is led quickly through the better streets of Boston, and made to linger in Cambridge and Concord. The "West" consists of a lawn in the Berkshire town of Lenox.

Yet an author has every right to choose his subject, and it is less than fair to accuse Brooks of not having picked a broader one. He is not concerned with buds, still less with roots. His

preference for the full bloom is proper, and his rhapsodic response is clearly justified by his subject matter. *The Flowering of New England* is a book from which historians can gain much.

Alcott, Margaret Fuller, Brook Farm

JUST at this moment, the Peabodys moved to Boston. They rented a house at 19 West Street, which soon became a rendezvous for the younger intellectuals, those who were conscious of the "new day." In one of the rooms on the ground-floor, Dr. Peabody opened a shop for the sale of homeopathic remedies. In the front room overlooking the street, Elizabeth and her mother sold foreign books. Mrs. Peabody was herself at work translating Goethe's *Hermann und Dorothea*. "God takes care of us" was her constant motto. She saw no reason not to be high-minded "even in selling a book."

Along with *Blackwoods* and the *Edinburgh*, which everyone read religiously at the Athenæum, they sold the German and French reviews and the writings of the continental authors whose thoughts were in the air. Miss Peabody, with her multifarious interests, chiefly in the "gardening" of children, who, she felt, should be "artists from the beginning," was publishing juvenile books on her own account, among them the three little volumes of *Grandfather's Chair*, which Hawthorne contrived to write in the intervals of measuring coal at the customhouse. There Margaret Fuller was giving her Conversations; and there, on occasion, Jones Very read his sonnets aloud to a chosen few. Eager school-girls flocked into the shop and bought more pencils than they could use for a chance

From *The Flowering of New England*, Copyright, 1936, 1952, by Van Wyck Brooks. New American Edition, Everyman's Library, published by E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc.

to see Miss Peabody or Miss Fuller. And there, on almost any afternoon, one saw some of the new illuminati, Emerson, Alcott, Frederick Hedge, who had studied in Germany with Bancroft and had settled as a minister at Bangor, John Sullivan Dwight or George Ripley. Hawthorne came often to see Sophia.

This shop, so called, though most of its frequenters were bent on "reforming out" the principle of commercial enterprise, this intellectual caravansary was the liveliest spot in Boston. As a matter of course, the literary Tories, George Ticknor's circle, for example, called it the Hospital for Incapables. It was, in fact, a nest or kindergarten where newly-born thoughts were received and fostered. Thence they merged as books or social movements. Miss Peabody's second Bible was Gerando's essay, *On Moral Perfection and Self-Culture*, and no one was admitted to the circle who did not accept its teachings,—that life was a process of education, of which perfection was the proper aim. Miss Peabody exemplified this faith. Her sister Mary had founded a kindergarten in the very year when the German Froebel opened the first school that bore this name; and she herself wrote text-books and lectured on the history of religions. In her paper, *The Dorian Measure*, she urged the importance of dancing, not the sort that one learned from Signor Papanti but the mystical Grecian ballet, the folk-dance, the rhythmical allegory. This dancing would give the Bostonians a feeling for the customs of other nations. The Dorians had a message for enlightened Boston: severe without austerity, simple and dignified in their private relations, they yet dressed the festival of life, worshipping Apollo in the sunshine, with garlands of flowers and leaves. Perfection in all its forms was Miss Peabody's vision, and at present she busied herself in supplying wants that seemed to indicate a desire for it. The want might be Kraitsir's Lectures on Language, or Bern's Historical Chart, some of the artist's materials that she kept in stock, at Washington Allston's suggestion, a book on the new philosophy, or something more conclusive,—a plan for a desirable social system; for this was a magical shop, the kind one read about in the fairy-tales, where in the guise of a book or a lecture-ticket, they sold Aladdin's lamps and rings of Gyges. James Freeman Clarke, another frequenter, a Unitarian minister in Louisville, who had come back to Boston for a summer visit, was aston-

ished at the "state of fermentation" he found among his friends. "New ideas," he wrote, "are flying high and low." The centre of the whirl was the shop in West Street.

Miss Peabody was Channing's Eckermann. As a child she had heard the doctor preach, and she had never forgotten her mother's words, "It takes genius to reach children," words she had pondered for years until she learned their meaning from Froebel's writings. She had applied for a post as Channing's secretary; and the doctor, in order to test her, read to her aloud from Plato, raising his devouring eyes to make quite sure that she understood it. All had gone well after this. She dined at Channing's table every evening; she copied his sermons for the press. He had been greatly struck by Emerson's lectures, which seemed to set the young men on fire; and almost every morning he appeared at the book-shop, sometimes bringing Washington Allston with him. He wished to keep in touch with the new ideas, although he had his doubts about socialism, the Fourieristic notions that flourished there; the trend of life, he thought, was towards individuality of expression, and individual property expressed this law,—it was the "lowest expression," but still an expression. The doctor was solicitous about the future, and the West Street shop represented the future. As for Miss Peabody's future, one could see it already. One pictured her, forty years hence, drowsing in her chair on the lecture-platform or plodding through the slush of a Boston winter, her bonnet askew, her white hair falling loose, bearing still, amid the snow and ice, the banner of education.¹ If, perchance, you lifted her out of a snow-drift, into which she had stumbled absent-mindedly, she would exclaim, between her gasps, "I am so glad to see you! Can you tell me which is the best Chinese grammar?" Or she would give you the news about Sarah Winnemucka. "Now Sarah Winnemucka"—this was the maligned Indian princess who was collecting money to educate her tribe. Or she would ask if you had read your Stallo. She took down every lecture she heard, although she seldom wrote what

¹ "Miss Peabody is the most dissolute woman in Boston," William James remarked in his sprightly youth. Henry James denied that he had the "grand-mother of Boston" in mind in drawing Miss Birdseye in *The Bostonians*, but the likeness was unmistakable.

people said: most of her reports were "impressions."² She was known to have lived in Europe for two years on \$200, passed on with the utmost dignity from one enlightened household to another, invariably losing the railway ticket that found itself, by a miracle, in her hands. She had mislaid the ticket in somebody's *Reminiscences*, but what conductor or purser could disbelieve her?

This was a generation later, but already Miss Peabody was the salt of Boston. With Margaret Fuller as a fellow-worker, she had been assisting Bronson Alcott, another leader of the West Street circle, the Socrates of the Temple School. Alcott, for calling in question the gods of the city, for corrupting the minds of the young with the "new ideas," had had to drink his hemlock. A tall, mild, milky, passionless man, with a singular gift for understanding children, he had had five years for his ministrations. Then

straight a barbarous noise environed him
Of owls and cuckoos.

The red-faced sheriff knocked at the Temple door. In vain Alcott's daughter, little Louisa, striding across the room, assailed the Vandal: "Go away, bad man, you are making my father unhappy!" Down from the walls came the pictures, the maps and the blackboard, Guido's "Flight into Egypt" and the portrait of Channing; the busts came down from their pedestals, Plato, Socrates, Milton; the comely desks, the charming cast of Silence, the dozen or more of Johnson's dictionaries, all these appropriate emblems, so carefully chosen to stir and elevate the dawning mind,—down they came and vanished. And Alcott, leading a child in either hand, followed them down, with mournful steps and slow.

He might have been crushed, if anything could crush him. But the school, that Academe for nascent Boston, was only one of Alcott's paradises. Sheriffs with flaming swords might drive him forth, but who can expel a man from the Garden of Eden that blooms behind his own brow? Not for nothing had he schooled himself as "one of the last of the philosophers." One of the last! He meant to be one of the first. He had, indeed, a philosophic mission, to restore the fabled innocence of man and root it in the soil

² "I saw it," Miss Peabody said, when she walked into a tree and bruised her nose. "I saw it, but I did not realize it."

of Massachusetts. He had never doubted the doctrine of pre-existence, the lapse of the soul from its primordial state, with its native creative powers, never since the days when he had first read Plato and found that Plato's cloud-land was, for him, far more solid than the United States. Coleridge had shown him clearly that the elements of the human consciousness were not to be sought in impressions of external nature, but rather in the self-existent spirit, spontaneous and outside of time and space. "Before time was, I am"; and birth was but a sleep and a forgetting. Then wherefore not awaken and remember? Why not recover what the race had lost, fatuously exiled in the realms of sense? Such were the views upon which his school was founded; such was the faith that he had cultivated, watching over the growth of his little daughters. They had a natural pleasure in beautiful things, a happy trust and affection, free and direct as they were. In them the avenues to the Over-soul were all wide open. How dim were the perceptions of most of their elders! How cold their sympathies were, spoiled and spotted by their mundane interests! How had they fallen from their high estate! They could not become as little children. And Alcott meant to see that the little children did not become like them.

Such was Alcott's theory of education. Every great man of Greece and Rome had had a philosopher as a teacher, and his own purpose in teaching had always been, not to inculcate knowledge,—at least by the method of the pump and bucket,—but to develop genius. Was not every well-born child a genius? By the Socratic method, as it seemed to Alcott, by posing the proper questions, one could elicit from a group of children all the thoughts of Plato. He tried to reach his pupils from within. No forcing, no cramming, no rod or ferule. He had made the schoolroom gracious and attractive and devised recreations and amusements, plays, physical exercises, even a system of self-government. He encouraged the keeping of journals. Children must know themselves to become themselves and escape from the tyranny of custom. With his own little Anna, aged four, he had held intellectual conversations that seemed to him not unworthy of Plato's disciples; and Louisa had been writing her daily journal before she was able to join her letters. He had begun himself when he was twelve, making his own ink out of maple and

oak-bark, steeped in alum and indigo; but he had had to fight for his education. A poor farmer's son, like Horace Mann, he had learned to write in a copy-book, forming his letters after the master's phrase, "Avoid alluring company." He had spent his youth as a pedlar, travelling through Virginia with his horse and wagon, with his tin trunk full of Yankee notions, pins, scissors, combs, thimbles, puzzles, with a self-respect presumably unknown to the silken sons of pride and dissipation,—always on the lookout for a school where he could exercise his theories. He had learned his best lessons along the road, from some of the Southern planters, who had taken him into their houses and taught him manners. He had fallen in with the Philadelphia Quakers, whose "inner light" he soon identified with the Brahma of the Oriental Scriptures. Among them, for a while, at Germantown, where his daughter Louisa was born, he had conducted a school, before he opened his great campaign in Boston.

What matter if the Temple School had failed? He had other careers ahead, this Indra of the seven incarnations. He knew that future times would vindicate him. There were plenty of closet-philosophers: Alcott was a philosopher in action for whom the object of life was to be oneself. Be what you were meant to be! If you were a crooked stick, go through the world as an oddity, to your own merriment, at least, if not to that of your contemporaries. Character was a fact, and that was much in a world of pretence and concession. If Boston was not ready for such a teacher, so much the worse for Boston. Was he going to repine and hedge and distrust the powers that always upheld the virtuous and the wise? When a confidence-man asked him for five dollars, and Alcott gave him ten, the groundlings laughed at his simplicity; but the confidence-man, stricken with remorse, sent the money back. One could trust the law of compensation.

The school was a misadventure, though more for the children than for Alcott. So was the fate of his book, the enlightened *Conversations on the Gospels*, most of the copies of which had been sold to be used for trunk-linings. This book had largely caused the trouble. It was a record of Alcott's dialogues with the little sons and daughters of patrician Boston, in which, in connection with the sacred story, he had tried to replace with clear ideas the fabric

of traditional association. The parents were alarmed, but the children, most of them eight or nine years old, were entranced with these religious dialectics. Little Josiah Quincy spoke like an infant prophet. Rapt attention had reigned in the beautiful class-room, as the master sat in his pulpit, his pupils gathered in an arc before him, in the soft light that streamed through the Gothic windows. There were special classes for Latin, for sums and spelling, and the children of three and four had desks in the corners. They drew on their slates and learned the art of silence. Sometimes the poet Dana appeared and gave a quiet reading from Coleridge or Wordsworth, for an audience of children pleased him best. If the day was cold, the master read aloud Thomson's *Winter* and analyzed the poem on the blackboard. A dialogue might ensue on winter sports, on the nature of coasting and skating, or the master divided the words he had just been reading into their various classes, as the names of objects, qualities and relations. Or perhaps he would read one of Northcote's *Fables*, or a chapter of *The Pilgrim's Progress*, or a passage from *The Castle of Indolence*. What did it represent? There were passages that excited the moral feelings, fear, pity, courage; others called into play the intellectual faculties, reason, perception, judgment. The master followed his readings with suitable questions. Language had to be picturesque and lively to clothe these thoughts in words. What was the purpose of going to school? To learn good behaviour? What was behaviour, what was the purpose of manners? What was the purpose of the imagination? What was the meaning of a definition? One had to use one's wits at the Temple School.

Boston, hitherto so cold and formal, had begun to receive the gospel of Conversation. This was the message of the Temple School. It was the message also of Margaret Fuller, who, with Elizabeth Peabody, assisted Alcott. Miss Peabody kept the log-book of the school, reporting its operations word by word, while she was reading Greek with Dr. Channing. Margaret Fuller also assisted Channing: she spent one evening of every week reading aloud to him in German. But the doctor was too restricted to suit the impetuous Margaret. He was always looking for the moral in works of creative genius. She preferred the abandon of the poet. She liked to duck, dive and fly for truth. Besides, as an impassioned feminist, she

wished to minister to the minds of women. What woman ever had a chance, among the few men who enjoyed this fortune? What were the legitimate hopes of women? Why should they all be constrained to follow employments for which only some of them were fitted? While men were called upon, from their earliest youth, to reproduce everything they learned, women never reproduced their learning except for the sake of display. It was partly the fault of society, and partly their own, because they were so unconscious, victims of domestic preoccupations. Better to have one's curtains and carpets soiled than to soil one's mind with such paltry thoughts and feelings! Better, the fragrant herb of wit, and a little cream of affability, than all the pretty teacups in the world! As for American men, they were tame enough, with their everlasting business, their little games of local politics, with only two or three tunes in their music-boxes. One wound them up, and they tinkled about "the office," they tinkled again about the next election, and that was the end of their music. They never added a new tune after five-and-twenty. No spirit, no variety of depth and tone! Why should American men and especially women be satisfied with the common routines of living? Why should they not be capable of such relations as those of Landor's Pericles and Aspasia? They should look for their hidden gifts. They should be satisfied with nothing less than Goethe's "extraordinary generous seeking." Genius, Margaret thought, would be as common as light if men and women trusted their higher selves. She had never questioned her own vocation, and she was just on the verge of thirty when, towards the end of 1839, she opened her Conversations in the West Street house. It was on a Saturday, at noon, her regular weekly hour. She appeared, with a regal air, with various books of reference on her arm and a huge bouquet of chrysanthemums. The lorgnette was much in evidence.

An electrical apparition was this "queen of Cambridge." She had seen men "bristle," as she said,—the foolish little creatures, youths of untouched heart, shallow, as yet, in all things,—when she crossed the threshold of an evening party. She frightened them with her magnetic powers, the depth of her eye, the powerful onward motion that announced the presence of the mysterious fluid. So, at least, she felt. But most of these men had nothing to fear,—the dry, cold, sordid money-getters,—for Margaret knew at a glance the

minds that belonged to her, and she was "sagacious of her quarry." So she wrote in her journal. As the daughter of Timothy Fuller, member of Congress, who had surrendered his income and profession in order to write a history of his country, she had lived in a great house in Cambridge, surrounded by the cleverest Harvard students, who had never seen a girl of her complexion. Her father had taught her Latin as soon as she could speak, and her infant prayers had begun, "O God, if thou art Jupiter!" Occasionally, she had prayed to Bacchus for a bunch of grapes. She thought of herself as a princess, who had been left by mistake on a Cambridge door-step. At boarding-school, at Groton, she had first revealed her insatiable will-to-power. Unable to rule by affection, she had ruled as the demon of discord, swooning at tactical moments, setting the girls by one another's ears, striking her head against an iron hearth, falling into fits of melancholy, until, by one method or another, she had reduced the school to servitude. The girls raved about her. She was the "bandit's bride" of the trashy novels they read behind their desks. No one had such hair as hers, dressed with a tropical flower, such wild, strange, lively ways, such flashes of the eye. There was always something odd in the way she wore a sash or a necklace. Her simplest frock had an air of fancy dress. The girls delighted in paying her homage. They placed wild flowers beside her plate, and they felt that she was born to be misunderstood by everyone but her lover. As for the unhappy teachers, not one of them, as Margaret said, had ever asked herself an intelligent question about the nature of her earthly mission. Margaret's own mission was to "grow." She felt that her impulses were disproportioned to the persons and occasions she encountered and rightly carried her beyond the reserves that marked the appointed lot of women. She looked with envy at Flaxman's picture of Hesiod sitting at the feet of the Muse. Where could she find an intellectual guide? At fifteen, she rose at five, walked for an hour and practised on the piano; then she read philosophy and French. From half past nine till noon, she studied Greek, practised again, lounged for half an hour, read for two hours in Italian, then went for a walk or a drive; in the evening, she played or sang and wrote in her journal. As between Madame de Staël and the useful Miss Edgeworth, patterns that one might follow, she had no difficulty in choosing. Over her head, as

over Madame de Staël's, had risen the sun of Goethe. She, too, would have liked to provoke an emperor's wrath.

She had passed through dreams of romance, hours of yearning and passion. She threw herself into Goethe's life. Should he have given up his Lili? She lived through the rapturous days of the heroines of mythology and drama, Iphigenia, Antigone, the Scandinavian world-mother Frigga, George Sand's Consuelo and Corinne, invoking them in her diary: "Antigone, Iphigenia, you were worthy to live! . . . Iphigenia, I was not born in vain, if only for the tears I have shed with thee." She saw herself as the goddess Isis, dazzling the eyes of her votaries. She might have been the Countess Emily Platen, the Polish Joan of Arc. Among her chosen men were Alfieri, the Countess of Albany's lover, and George Sand's Count de Rudolstadt, aristocratic democrats who shared the culture of the fortunate classes but longed for the welfare of all. Carlyle's was the grand method of education!—idolatrous hero-worship of genius and power. She did not expect to be happy. How could a woman of genius conform to the world about her, or find her mysterious impulses understood? She remembered how as a child she had stood at a window from which she could see an eagle chained, on one of the neighbouring balconies. She had seen people poking it with sticks, and her heart had swollen with indignation. The eagle's eye was dull, and its plumage was soiled and shabby, yet with what a mien the monarch-bird endured these paltry insults. In its form and attitude, all the king was visible, even though degraded and dethroned. Such was the fate of genius in a world of pygmies. They censured her in Boston because she filled the girls, who flocked about her, with her own romantic nonsense. She made them wish to marry Alfieris, as if State Street lawyers were not good enough,—not to mention cotton-merchants and codfish-packers with an eye on the Legislature. They laughed at her superstitions, her faith in demonology, omens, foresight. They smiled when she said that "Margaret" meant "Pearl," the gem that is cradled in slime, in disease and decay, like all that is noblest in the human soul. Only the experienced diver knows the pearl.

Who could comprehend her aspirations, the demands she made upon life, her struggles and conflicts? She would lie all day on the shore at Nahant, with the waves washing about her, looking up

at the turrets and jagged cliffs bathed in prismatic light. Prometheus, or Promethea, among the rocks, or perhaps Andromeda chained, waiting for her unknown Perseus. Beethoven, at least, would have understood her. She wrote him a midnight letter. With the Boston girls, her pupils,—for she was obliged to teach, to pay for the education of her brothers and sisters, the father's death having left them in distress,—she read her beloved Goethe, Schiller and Lessing, together with Petrarch and Tasso in Italian. With her chosen friends, meanwhile, James Freeman Clarke, with whom she had first studied German, Frederick Henry Hedge, Samuel Gray Ward, and Emerson, her last and greatest conquest, to whom Harriet Martineau had introduced her as the most brilliant talker she had known, she gathered the spoils of culture,—a little meagre still in frosty Boston, but amplified by her enthusiasm,—portfolios of drawings and engravings, designs from Raphael, architectural sketches, the Athenæum casts, the Brimmer collection. In each of her friends she seemed to divine the law of his own interior growth. She gave them to themselves, or so they felt, drew out their unsuspected faculties. Many of these friends, in later years, traced to some conversation with her the moment when they had seen their way before them, when they had formed some resolution from which their careers had sprung. It was true that she had an influence in hundreds of lives. Long after her death, the painter William Morris Hunt saw on a table in Florence a copy of Mrs. Jameson's *Italian Painters*. Margaret had written on the margin, beside a passage on Correggio, "And yet all might be such." Hunt said, "These words struck out a new strength in me. They made me set my face like a flint."

She aspired to write, dry as writing seemed beside the excitement of conversation. The six historical tragedies she had planned had all come to nothing, and she could not afford the time to finish the life of Goethe for which she had gathered a mass of notes and sketches. Meanwhile, she translated the *Conversations with Eckermann*, Bettina von Arnim's *Günderode* and hundreds of pages of Uhland, Novalis and Körner, with poems of her own as commentaries. But conversation was her medium. She liked to see the effects of her mental efforts, and the Saturday classes in West Street were responsive. Half the feminine *élite* were there, Elizabeth Hoar

from Concord, Lydia Maria Child, the three Peabody sisters, Mrs. Emerson, Mrs. George Bancroft, Mrs. Theodore Parker, Maria White, who was engaged to James Russell Lowell. The subjects were Greek mythology, "What is Life?", the history of art, the meaning of the various dances. Margaret had the true Boston passion for pigeon-holes and categories, for putting everything in its proper place. Wordsworth was the "poet of reflection," Jupiter stood for "the will," Bacchus for the "terrene inspiration." It was all sharp and clear, like so many definitions from a legal treatise, ready to be gathered in a note-book. Margaret's ideas had good square corners, like building-blocks that fitted at the edges. Set side by side, in just the right arrangement, they formed a solid architectural structure, a true temple of culture, as unmistakable as a Boston bank. One of the ladies kept the class in order with her unswerving eye for Christian morals, which might have been lost in aesthetic divagations. Sometimes the Gothic genius seized the reins of Margaret's fancy, and she would ride like a Valkyrie over the clouds of German metaphysics. Then, before the eyes of her worshipping hearers, the cold New England landscape melted into a dreamland of romance. One dwelt for a moment in Valhalla, among the Scandinavian gods and heroes, as erstwhile in Athens of the violet crown.

In West Street, one could buy over the counter, in exchange for a little good will,—or a thousand dollars, in case one happened to have it,—a share in the Utopian community that was rapidly taking shape at Brook Farm. This was George Ripley's contribution to the educational movement of Massachusetts. For fourteen years, with no great zeal for the Unitarian cause, Ripley had been preaching in a Boston pulpit; and now, having resigned, he was already living at the farm, at West Roxbury, nine miles out of town. He was a cheerful, hearty, faithful soul, ready for any task, for whom the opinion of the world was but a "puff of empty air." He had always expected to be poor and rather preferred obscurity to fame. "Give me philosophy!" was all he asked. He had heard the call of "association," of the communists and Christian socialists, the Owenites and the Fourierists, followed by the Icarians and Cabet, who were establishing their communities in every corner of the young republic. Almost every month the port of New York welcomed some new boatload of Europeans who had come to found a "Harmony" or a

"North American Phalanx." Ripley, while planning the farm, was editing a work in fourteen volumes, *Specimens of Standard Foreign Literature*, translations of Cousin, Jouffroy, Goethe, Menzel, Benjamin Constant and others. He had recruited many of his translators from the West Street circle. In the winter of 1840-41, the whole group discussed Ripley's project.

It came into existence in the spring, and building was added to building, the Hive, in the shade of an ancient sycamore, the Eyrie, the Nest, the Cottage, the Pilgrim House, and member was added to member, until, at the end of six years, there were more than a hundred and forty associates. Of the circle of the Transcendentalists, most of the ablest members remained aloof, as benevolent neutrals and visitors. "Doing things in crowds" seemed to them too youthful; they were self-sufficient. As Margaret Fuller put it, in her somewhat airy dialect, "Why bind oneself to a central or any doctrine? How much nobler stands a man entirely unpledged, unbound?" This was Emerson's feeling. For Alcott, the plan was not austere enough. All three dissented from the idea behind the association, "As the institutions, so are the men," preferring to think, with Goethe, "As the men, so are the institutions." But Hawthorne, who had no theories, hoped to find at the farm a practical basis for his married life. John Sullivan Dwight, who had translated for Ripley the *Minor Poems of Goethe and Schiller*, and Charles A. Dana, fresh from Harvard, later known as Dana of *The Sun*, were members for a longer period. So was Isaac Hecker, of the "Hecker's Flour" family of New York, the German-American priest of the future, who founded the order of the Paulist Fathers. George William Curtis and his brother Burrill and George P. Bradford were other members. Bradford, whose *Selections from Fénelon* was another volume of Ripley's series, later moved to Plymouth to realize his dreams of the simple life. In the intervals of teaching Greek, he carried on a market-garden, selling his own vegetables from the cart. This was the charming and sensitive Bradford whose New England conscience was such a nuisance. Once, during one of Webster's out-of-door speeches, he was swept up to the front of the crowd. "I have no ticket," he exclaimed, "I have no right to be here"; and, much to the discomfort of the crowd, but much to the comfort of his conscience, he shoved his way back to the outermost rim. Charles

King Newcomb, another member, was an individualist of a different sort. In his high room with the French window, this young Providence mystic kept a wooden crucifix on his table, between portraits of Xavier and Loyola, with freshly gathered flowers at the foot. One often heard his voice, in the midnight hours, chanting the litany or reading Greek. Newcomb lived a strange, secret life, prolonged for half a century in Paris, devoted to the writing of a private journal, as long as Amiel's journal, or even longer, that lay unpublished in a Rhode Island attic fifty years after his death. There were farmers and artists among the members, working-men and Brahmins, girls with hazel eyes and extravagant moods, several Harvard students, an English baronet's son, a Spaniard, two Filipinos, the son of a Louisiana planter, "Omniarch" Ryckman, "Camilla" and "Sybilla,"—for nicknames were in vogue,—"Chrysalis" List and "Old Solidarity" Eaton.

In the broad entry of the Hive, Ripley's library filled the shelves until, to raise more money for the venture, the master sold his books to Theodore Parker. Ripley, the ever-faithful "Archon," steered the unsteady ship with unwavering eye. He was up before the dawn, dressed in his blue tunic and cow-hide boots, milking, cleaning the stalls, blacking the shoes of some member who was going to town, carting off the vegetables to market, directing the field-operations, writing diplomatic letters, giving a Sunday lecture on Kant or Spinoza, or, on a winter evening, when the stars were bright, gathering the members about him in the snow, while he discoursed on the constellations. His wife, Sophia Ripley, Richard Henry Dana's younger sister, who was soon to join the Catholic Church, cheerfully toiled beside him, ten hours a day in the muslin-room, washing, scrubbing the floors, much to the annoyance of her kindred. The school was more than admirable. Ripley taught philosophy and mathematics. Mrs. Ripley had a class in history and a class for Dante in Italian. Charles A. Dana had classes in Greek and German. The bashful, slender, beaming little Dwight, the dictator of musical Boston in later years, carried on the classes in music. He, too, had once occupied a Unitarian pulpit, though he had a way of forgetting to write his sermons. He had a "want of fluency in prayer," for his mind was entirely filled with Mozart and Haydn. He started his "mass clubs" at the farm. There were

classes in botany and geology, carried on among the rocks and trees. All the studies were elective; the rule was to "follow one's attractions." The young men wore blouses and hunters' frocks, belted at the waist, of plain brown holland or a gayer chintz, with little tasselled caps; the girls wore muslin dresses, with flowers and ribbons. The single men lived in Attica, the garret of the Hive; and the vegetarians had a Graham table. George William Curtis trimmed the lamps; Charles A. Dana was the griddle-master. There was much sitting about on stairs and floors, and the conversation,—analytical often, bristling with the new philosophy, with "intuition" and "the analogous," the objective, the creative, the receptive,—sometimes assumed those painful forms of wit that flourish among the intelligentsia. There were many jokes about "affinities," puns of the frostier kind that make one feel so sorry for the punster, animadversions on "morbid familism," *clichés* of a dire facetiousness: "Is the butter within the sphere of your influence?" But there were merry dances every night, picnics on Cow Island or in the grove, boating parties on the Charles, close by, Shakespeare readings, Elizabethan pageants, tableaux, charades, plays, scenes from Byron's *Corsair* and Sheridan's *Pizarro*. Occasionally, in the evening, little groups walked or drove to Boston, to a Beethoven concert or an Emerson lecture,—the interest in Beethoven seemed to flourish in minds that had been quickened by Emerson,—or an anti-slavery meeting at Faneuil Hall. They filled the big farm-wagon, or Jonas Gerrish's stage, which, twice a day, plied between the Hive and Scollay Square. Their favourite rendezvous in the afternoon was Elizabeth Peabody's book-shop. At night, they gathered in Mrs. Harrington's cake-shop, and the younger men and the girls walked home under the stars.

The stage from Scollay Square brought visitors, a few, at first, those of the inner circle, then hundreds and even thousands of "civilisees," as the farmers called the rest of the population. Margaret Fuller came to conduct a Conversation on Education, on "What can we do for ourselves and others?" Impulse was the subject on one occasion, an appropriate theme at the farm, where spontaneity was so much in order. Throwing oneself on the floor was not so bad, but yawning, as Margaret said, was a little too impulsive. Georgiana Bruce burned pastilles to perfume Margaret's

room and brought the morning coffee to her bedside. For Margaret had become another Pauline Wiesel, the heroine of the German Romantics, whom Humboldt walked thirty miles to see.³ Emerson often came to lead the talk; sometimes Bronson Alcott. Theodore Parker, who lived close by,—he had a church at West Roxbury,—walked over often for a chat about philosophy or farming. Orestes Brownson dropped in, shouted and pounded on the table and strolled with Isaac Hecker in the grove. They were both on the road to Rome, like Mrs. Ripley; and Brownson's coming always occasioned a talk on Catholicism, Pascal or Port Royal. This was a theme that pleased Charles Newcomb, whose favourite author was Saint Augustine. Brownson, the rustic giant from Vermont, who had passed through so many religious phases, was not a welcome guest. That there was method in his truculence, no one had any reason to suppose; and he had taken up his Greek and Latin, to satisfy his Catholic advisers, at a time when his mental bones had set. He made sad work of his spondees and dactyls, which the patient George Ripley would not have minded if Brownson had not appeared to be showing off, but George Bradford, the ever-gentle, who had learned his Greek and Latin in the cradle, could not sleep for the misery that Brownson caused him. False vowels and wrong measures were as painful to him as a saxophone would have been. He dreamed one night that he was a Catholic convert and that Brownson, appointed his confessor, obliged him to repeat, after himself, a Latin psalm from the Vulgate. Bradford awoke in agony.

This was a pity, for Brownson, who was honest as the day, was a man of really imposing gifts. He appeared to be unstable enough. He had passed from sect to sect, changing his ministerial coat as many times as the Vicar of Bray, although always in response to a new conviction. Every thinker he read, Lamennais, Jouffroy, Comte, Saint-Simon, Owen, overthrew all his previous views, and he rushed from one position to another, with a headlong, headstrong vehemence, telling the world each time how right he was. With a

³ One of Pauline Wiesel's friends wrote of her, in the vein of Margaret's friends, "I look upon her in the light of a phenomenon of Greek mythology." She herself had written, much in Margaret's vein, "Every means, every possible preparation for living, and yet one must never live; I never shall, and those who dare to do so have the wretched world, the whole world, against them."—George Brandes, *The Romantic School in Germany*.

vigorous, enquiring mind that was anything but sensitive or subtle, he had a warm and generous imagination. He had founded the "Society of Union and Progress," chiefly for the advancement of the workers, and he had preached class-warfare, the death-struggle of rich and poor, as a step towards the "Church of the Future," after the Comtian pattern, of which he saw himself as a John the Baptist. He longed for a new Catholicity until he found a home in the old one. To further his ideas and reflect their changes, he carried on a quarterly review, first the *Boston Quarterly*, afterwards *Brownson's Quarterly*. In this he "aimed to startle," as he said, taking pains to be paradoxical and even as extravagant as he could be; and this method was rather accentuated after he had joined the Catholic Church. The Bishop of Boston lamented the timidity of the Catholic population, most of whom were recent immigrants, of the depressed classes, in a society that was hostile to them. The Bishop urged Brownson not to hide his light under a bushel. As well urge a bull not to pretend to be a lamb. The rugged, fiery Brownson was happy to learn that truculence had an apostolic value. On ferry-boats between Chelsea and Boston, in barber-shops, in butcher-shops, wherever he happened to find himself, he engaged all and sundry in religious discussions. Once at an inn at Andover, where he was giving a lecture, he loudly commanded the waiter to send for the landlord. "Landlord," he exclaimed, in a voice that was meant for all the guests, "why don't you have something in your house that a Christian can eat? Why don't you have fish? No Christian eats meat on Friday."

This was one of the little things that people seldom did at Andover. They kept a special corner of hell-fire there for travellers with Brownson's views. But Brownson was a courageous man, in the Church as well as out of it, whom the Brook Farmers learned to respect in the end; for, having been too Catholic for the Yankees, he was too Yankee for the Catholics, at least for the Church as he found it, and he stormed against the Irish domination. He wished to make the Church an American Church, to counteract the powerful influence that tended to make it Irish; and no one spoke more forcefully than he against the corruptions of Tammany. He was under a cloud in Dublin as well as in Boston, and Cardinal Newman was forced to withdraw the invitation he had sent to Brownson

to lecture at his new university there. He was the first lecturer that Newman invited, and he was asked to choose his own subject, geography or "opossums," if it suited him best; for Brownson's multifarious writings on history, sociology, religion, on politics, art and philosophy had given him a world-name. His standing was high in the Catholic world,⁴ and his gifts, from the point of view of any school, his versatility and his breadth of knowledge, his energy and lucidity, were those of a first-rate publicist. Something more than a journalist, something less than a sage, Brownson was a Catholic Theodore Parker. In one book, *The Convent*, the history of his religious life, he left the best account that has ever been written of the spiritual cross-currents of the forties and fifties.

Of the other guests at Brook Farm, two were especially welcome, William Henry Channing, the doctor's nephew, a minister, albeit with many scruples, better known as a Christian socialist, and the tall, slight, graceful Christopher Cranch, with the picturesque head and curling hair, the son of a judge in Washington, who, having ample means and mundane tastes, had gradually "sunk the minister in the man" and followed the call of the muses. He was a landscape painter and a poet; he sang and played the flute and violin; he was a clever actor on occasion and the cleverest caricaturist in New England. In fact, he was the victim of too many gifts, no mere Janus with a double head but a sort of accomplished Hydra. He had taken Emerson at his word and planted himself on his instincts, wherever they led him. They had led him into the pulpit and out again; they led him to Louisville, Kentucky, where he took the place of James Freeman Clarke as editor of *The Western Messenger*. With his flute as his constant companion he had drawn there his comic illustrations for some of Emerson's essays, such as the "Man expanding like a Melon." These drawings, suggesting Thackeray's, shocked some of the Transcendentalists. In years to come, he was to use his talent in the pictures for his charming books for children, *The Last of the Huggermuggers* and *Kobboltozo*,—years during which he lived as a wandering artist, in London, New York, Paris, Rome and Cambridge. What could an artist do, he would write from

⁴ "You alone can prepare us for the great controversies by founding among us a school and arming it with the principles of a sound philosophy."—Letter of Lord Acton to Brownson, 1854. See also the long correspondence with Montalembert in the *Life of Brownson* by his son.

New York, in a money-getting world? People rushed in from the streets and stopped for a moment in his studio, only to hurry-scurry out again, eternally driving, driving. In Cambridge, he found a congenial circle, and there he translated the *Ænid*; but whenever he came back from Italy he was struck by the look in people's faces, the hard, weary expression about the mouth, the quick, shrewd eye, the anxious air. Everyone seemed to be worried; and back he would go to Rome, to join the circle of William Wetmore Story, write a few more poems and paint from the costume-models.

His painting was nothing out of the way, but some of his poems had a firmer touch. There are poets who survive in a single line. Cranch was destined to survive in two, from the poem called *Enosis*,—

We are columns left alone
Of a temple once complete,—

which hundreds of men have quoted in their later years. At Brook Farm, where he came to visit his friend and fellow-lover of music and German, his Harvard classmate Dwight, he was the all-attractive entertainer. He drew amusing pictures of the Harvard mill grinding its grist of ministers. He performed astonishing feats of ventriloquism. William Henry Channing was more austere. He was a self-tormented creature, earnest, hypersensitive, torn by doubts, a "concave man" who was always retreating, as Henry Thoreau remarked, like a fair mask swaying from a bough. For the rest, he was a man of the world, as all the Channings were, and a preacher unexcelled when the spirit moved him. In later years, he was to live in England, where his daughter married the author of *The Light of Asia*. At the moment, he was editing in New York a magazine called *The Present*, to propagate his socialistic views. What to do for the race? was his constant question; but he was involved in metaphysics, of a sadly tenuous kind, and he was convinced, as a friend remarked, that "Christ did not understand his own religion." He had spent a season in Rome, vainly hoping to get himself converted, and the engravings on his study wall were arranged in the form of a cross. He wrote an occasional poem and various tracts and had recently translated Jouffroy's *Ethics*; but the great project of his life was a work on Vittoria Colonna, a study of the Italian

Renaissance. He meditated this for many years, enthralled as he gathered his memoranda, until the enormous task of preparation became a life-work in itself. He never began the book. A mystical enthusiast, like Dr. Channing, but without his uncle's will, irresolute, introspective, the victim of innumerable intentions, a talker and taker of notes who longed to be "useful,"—such was the "evil times' sole patriot," as Emerson called him in a well-known poem. Of all the Brook Farmers, guests or members, William Henry Channing was the symbol, as later times recalled the enterprise. Whatever the facts might be, whatever happened, he could never persuade himself that the world's salvation did not lie just around the corner. He always felt, when he rose from his bed, that the "one far-off divine event" might well occur before he sat down to breakfast.

MARCUS LEE HANSEN

WHEN, IN 1924, Congress established the first comprehensive restrictions against immigration, a great international epoch came to a close. During the previous century and a half, more than thirty-five million people had left their homelands to add their labor and aspirations to the American culture. That every phase of the nation's life was profoundly affected by this influx cannot be doubted. Yet the scholarly investigation of this vital part of our history has only just begun to assume the proportions it warrants.

Like other aspects of history whose significance is primarily sociological, immigration was for a long time neglected by historians because of their preoccupation with political matters. Moreover, during the first hundred or more years of our national past, and of our historical literature as well, there was an intense concentration on domestic expansion, accompanied by a desire to assert the nation's independence of the rest of the world and to establish its uniqueness. Such a mood was hardly conducive to a proper appreciation of the interrelation of European and American development. When it is recalled that even colonial history was not released from its isolation until Osgood, Andrews, and Beer rescued it in the 1890's, there can be small wonder that Europe's continuing gift of her emigrants was not appreciated until recently.

Hansen's contribution to the study of immigration in American history was considerable. His book, published in 1940, encompassed a conception broad enough to include both the

American scene and the European background which produced the emigrants. To obtain an intimate knowledge of why people came to this country and how they were able to get here, Hansen spent several years doing research in the countries of origin. By gaining an understanding of national cultures in their original state, he was able to trace with greater clarity their persistence and modification in the American scene.

Too often books concerning immigrants have stemmed from an emotional impulse to glorify the contribution of a particular nationality. Even when scholarly restraints are present, the study of a single group may result in an inaccurate emphasis upon its importance. Similarly, an analysis of immigration to one state or to a selected region may obscure the larger implications of a movement. Hansen was saved from such possible distortions by an Olympian view which encompassed not only all nationalities but an extremely broad geographic area.

Much of Hansen's work was of an exploratory nature. Perhaps no one recognized better than he that the study of immigration was still in its initial phases. Fortunately, he shared with students of history not only the knowledge which was revealed in his completed projects but also a provocative analysis of the research which would have to be undertaken before work in this field could reach its maturity. The problems which he formulated express as succinctly as anything he wrote the creative insight which was a distinguishing mark of his thinking. For example, he saw a need for explaining more adequately the distribution of immigrants after their arrival in America. This led him to speculation concerning the relation of dispersion of population to prosperity both here and in Europe, to the land policies of railroads, and to the persuasiveness of religious leaders. What caused certain groups to move to one area rather than another would also affect their economic status once they arrived there; but how? Merely by posing questions, Hansen did much to indicate the breadth of the subject and the importance which it should assume in historical writing.

The obstacles faced by any social historian apply with particular severity in the specialized field of immigration. If it is difficult to gather and appraise materials dealing with the average anonymous citizen, how much more complex a task it is to distinguish the characteristics and changing attitudes of particular groups within a heterogeneous mass. Even if it is possible to identify the cultural traits of the newly arrived immigrants, the harder task remains of tracing the gradual process of assimilation into the American society. The point at which a person ceases to be guided by old ideas and acts in response to his new environment may be unidentifiable. The techniques of related sciences such as anthropology and social psychology may have to be added to those of the historian before a meaningful analysis can be made.

Few were as well qualified to search for the answers to these problems as Hansen himself. Unfortunately, he died in 1938 with his life's work far from completion. But he had already earned the lasting gratitude of students of history for the light which he had shed upon the vital subject of what the newcomers gained from America and what they, in turn, contributed to her.

The Flight from Hunger

THE SUCCESSION of events beginning in the autumn of 1845 settled the issue between those who argued that the social condition of western Europe was improving and those who regarded it with apprehension. The summer had been encouraging to the optimists. More land than ever before had been planted with potatoes, and the luxuriant fields promised a bountiful harvest. July and

From *The Atlantic Migration 1607-1860* by Marcus Lee Hansen, by permission of the Harvard University Press.

August produced the usual seasonal rumors of the presence of the potato disease; but even when trustworthy information confirmed the reports of crop failures along the lower Rhine and in parts of England and Scotland, hope still predominated over fear. As long as Ireland escaped a visitation, no feeling of alarm could be general.¹ October, however, brought news that the dreaded rot was ravaging Ireland and in a most virulent form. Not only potatoes in the ground but those already stored exhibited a mysterious degeneration.² In the judgment of later years Ireland suffered a loss of from a third to a half its normal crop.³ In England and Scotland the yield fell off about a sixth.⁴ Though no accurate estimate can be made for the Continent, complaints of a shortage came all the way from Holland and Belgium to the mountains of Switzerland.⁵

Ireland endured a winter of deep distress. In many instances neighborly kindness and British philanthropy prevented outright starvation.⁶ The government also lent a helping hand. The legislation for poor relief, adopted in 1837, had made provision for public works in hard times, but only after application by local officers and an investigation of the utility of the proposed improvements.⁷ To speed up the process a new act was hastily passed early in 1846.⁸ The immediate results proved disappointing, however, for only a few communities and a few thousand persons were benefited. More effective was the action of the ministry in London in permitting the importation of maize or Indian corn duty free.⁹ Since the wheat harvest had been normal and in the north the supplies of oatmeal were large,¹⁰ the purpose of the act was to enable the farmers to sell

¹ *Irish Farmer's Gazette*, July 19, Sept. 13, Oct. 4, 1845.

² *Ibid.*, Oct. 11, 25, 1845; Feb. 14, 1846; *Mark Lane Express* (London), Oct. 27, 1845.

³ *Irish Farmer's Gazette*, May 29, 1847; *Mark Lane Express*, Jan. 12, 1846.

⁴ *Journal of Agriculture* (Edinburgh), n. s., II (1845-1847), 309; *Mark Lane Express*, Nov. 3, 1845.

⁵ *Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser* (Stuttgart), Dec. 3, 1845; *Allgemeine Zeitung* (Augsburg), Sept. 19, 1845; *Landwirthschaftliche Zeitschrift* (Dresden), II (1846), 179.

⁶ *Limerick Chronicle*, Nov. 19, 1845; *Irish Farmer's Gazette*, Dec. 20, 1845.

⁷ 7 Will. IV and 1 Vict., ch. 21.

⁸ 9 and 10 Vict., ch. 1.

⁹ Select Committee of the House of Lords, *Report on Consolidated Annuities of Ireland* (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1852, VI), v-vi.

¹⁰ *Mark Lane Express*, April 20, 1846.

these foodstuffs at high prices in the markets of Europe while buying for their own consumption a larger quantity of cheap food.¹¹ This explains the paradox—which agitators were not slow in pointing out—that, while Ireland was starving, its quays were thronged with ships bearing its products to the docks of London and Liverpool.

The approach of spring brought further relief in the form of emigration. The size of the movement, however, was not remarkable. Observers agreed that, if means had not been wanting, the volume would have been considerably larger.¹² The people departing consisted mainly of small farmers whose resources had not been exhausted by the struggle of the preceding months and who, fearing for the future, resolved to leave before inevitable poverty engulfed them. Young, active and industrious, they struck out to save themselves while time permitted.¹³

In Germany the winter passed with relatively little suffering. The supplies of grain proved sufficient for the needs; and although high prices at first threatened to cause distress in the factory regions, organized charity succeeded in handling the emergency. Nevertheless, savings were exhausted and reserves of capital expended which were essential to help society weather a second similar crisis.¹⁴ In England, also, the immediate outcome was more favorable than had been expected. The construction of railroads continued, and the demand for laborers provided employment. The agricultural regions complained of a shortage of hands.¹⁵

That emigration from the German countries should be proportionately greater than that from Ireland was natural. Apprehension regarding the future was as widespread, and private resources were greater. So extensive was the demand for accommodations that the shipping houses at the Continental ports, which had previously devoted their efforts to securing passengers, now found difficulty in securing an adequate fleet. Bremen bookers published warnings ad-

¹¹ *Leinster Express* (Maryborough), April 25, 1846; *Scarcity in Ireland* (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1846, XXXVII), 293.

¹² *Farmer's Gazette* (Dublin), Oct. 3, 1846.

¹³ *Ibid.*, Oct. 10, 1846; *Leinster Express*, May 9, 1846; *Dublin Mercantile Advertiser*, April 24, 1846.

¹⁴ *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Jan. 5, 1846.

¹⁵ *Mark Lane Express*, June 9, Sept. 29, Dec. 29, 1845.

vising no one to come to the city who did not already have a contract in his pocket.¹⁶ Hamburg merchants were also active in the trade.¹⁷ At Rotterdam and Amsterdam the congestion was so great that no attempt was made to find freight cargoes. Coastal steamers, packed with Swiss and Germans, discharged their passengers at Le Havre where many of them had to camp a good part of the summer until they could obtain passage.¹⁸ In Norway and Sweden similar incidents occurred. Even the southern provinces of Denmark displayed a growing interest in emigration.

But during the summer of 1846 popular interest did not center in the troubles of ship brokers, nor did it concern itself much with the delays and hardships of emigrants. One question overshadowed all others: what would be the fate of Ireland? In May and June the country seemed completely exhausted. Those who were not in debt for food owed the landlord a year's rent and faced the likelihood of eviction. Many could not secure seeds for planting; others lacked the physical vigor to perform the needed tasks, or were listless in the hope that government aid, having been once extended, would continue and increase.¹⁹ Most discouraging of all was the ever present fear that the disaster of the preceding season might be repeated. Oftentimes in the past the people had survived a year of shortage; never had they been obliged to endure two in succession. "If the next crop fails us," declared a peasant, "it will be the end of the world with us."²⁰ Despite favorable conditions early in the season the crop did fail, and it was the end of that world which they and their forefathers had known and loved.

The destruction was the work of a few days, some said of a single night.²¹ An article in the *Irish Farmer's Gazette* on July 12, announcing the failure of the crop, may be taken as dating the beginning of the new catastrophe. A letter of Father Mathew records the swiftness of the disaster. Traveling one day from Cork to Dublin, he saw the potato patches in bloom and rejoiced at the abundance of the coming harvest. Returning a week later, he saw the same fields

¹⁶ *Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 22, 1846.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Jan. 4, 1847.

¹⁸ *Journal du Havre*, April 1, 1846.

¹⁹ *Farmer's Gazette*, June 20, Aug. 22, 1846; *Scarcity in Ireland*, 128, 211.

²⁰ *Scarcity in Ireland*, 142.

²¹ *Irish Farmer's Gazette*, May 27, 1848.

"one wide waste of putrifying vegetation. In many places the wretched people were seated on the fences of their decaying gardens, wringing their hands and wailing bitterly the destruction that had left them foodless."²² For a while a certain calmness prevailed among the people at large, then came panic and terror, and finally a sullen resignation.

The popular attitude reflected political despair as well as economic tragedy.²³ The repeal movement had raised the hopes of the Irish. Even in the trying times of the previous winter communities on the verge of starvation had sent contributions to the cause. But now their inspiring leader, Daniel O'Connell, lingered at the door of death. The battle had been lost on two fronts. The feeling was inescapable that Ireland would never again be able to feed its people. The usual agricultural labors of the autumn were neglected; fields were deserted. The only hope now lay in that government from whose rule the Irish had so persistently tried to free themselves.²⁴

If Ireland had been alone in its misery, an immediate mobilization of all the humanitarian forces of Europe might have instilled new confidence. But no country had at first much concern for what was happening beyond the national boundaries, for there was trouble at home. Germany had passed through a cycle of hope and disappointment not unlike that which the Irish had experienced. A hot summer had covered the fields with a rich verdure. Speculative grain merchants who had kept supplies in storage were so confident of an ample harvest that they threw their wares upon the market.²⁵ But such expectations proved premature. The fruit withered on the trees; the early potatoes were afflicted with rot; the rye had suffered from the heat; the yield of grain was small. All hopes then centered upon the late potatoes, but they also proved disappointing.²⁶

These German communities had progressed beyond the stage

²² *Correspondence Relating to the Measures Adopted for the Relief of the Distress in Ireland (Parliamentary Papers, 1847, LI), 4.*

²³ *Ibid.*, 104; *Liverpool Mercury*, Nov. 20, 1846; Jan. 15, 1847.

²⁴ *Farmer's Gazette*, Oct. 10, 1846.

²⁵ *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Aug. 14, 1846.

²⁶ *Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser*, Sept. 15, 1846; *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Aug. 29, 1846; Sept. 10, 1847; *Staats- und Gelehrte Zeitung des Hamburgischen unpartheyischen Correspondenten*, Feb. 3, 1847.

where the failure of a particular agricultural product spelled starvation. They sold and bought and had some capital upon which to draw; local financial institutions were willing to extend credit for adequate security. The principal hardship was the high price of food. These high prices resulted partly from the local shortage and partly from the activities of town and country officials in buying up grain for storage in the medieval magazines.²⁷ The upward trend was increased by the lively demand in France, which caused German produce to be exported whenever the Germans would not pay what the dealers asked.²⁸

In the fall and winter that followed there developed an international grain panic that greatly hampered relief in the stricken countries. Crop failures had not been universal. On the plains of northern and eastern Germany the yield was about normal. Though no one knew the exact situation in the Baltic or Black Sea provinces of Russia, there came no reports of a shortage. Agricultural America, which always produced a surplus, could ultimately deliver an unknown quantity; but statesmen were concerned with immediacies. Countries like France, Spain and Portugal, which traditionally had encouraged the export of grain, now suddenly prohibited sales to foreign houses.²⁹ Great Britain repealed its century-old corn laws partly in an effort to meet the Irish crisis.³⁰

Irish grain had not been affected, but the authorities hoped that the high prices which it would bring in foreign markets would make possible the importation of sufficient quantities of maize to feed the people.³¹ This hope, however, overlooked two facts: less wheat had been planted; and maize could not reach Ireland until the canals in the interior of America opened for transportation in the spring. It would thus be summer before it would be available for food. With autumn the rail famine began. Though the potato failure had probably not exceeded that of the previous year, there were now no other resources on which to draw. A few pigs had survived the slaughter of 1845-1846, but the blighted fields foretold their doom.

²⁷ *Agronomische Zeitung* (Leipzig), Sept. 11, 1846; March 17, 1848.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Sept. 25, Dec. 18, 1846.

²⁹ *Journal of Agriculture*, n. s., III (1847-1849), 291-292.

³⁰ 9 and 10 Vict., ch. 22.

³¹ *Farmer's Gazette*, Nov. 21, 1846; *Liverpool Mercury*, Sept. 18, Oct. 2, 23, 1846; *Correspondence Relating to Relief of Distress in Ireland*, 464.

The swine were driven half-fed to market—a pathetic reminder of the six or seven hundred thousand which were usually sent across the Irish Channel to England. Nor did dug patches now supply forage for the farmyard hen. Consequently it also disappeared and, with it, the supply of eggs that had varied the peasant's diet, or contributed to his meager cash income.³²

No Englishman has ever written the history of those famine months, and no Irishman has ever thought it necessary. They were vividly recalled at every Irish fireside in the decades that followed; they became part of the tradition of British misgovernment that nourished the growing sense of nationalism. A description of one famine presents a description of all, whether in India, China or Ireland. Some, when they realized the inevitable, withdrew to their cottages to die in patient resignation. Whole families took to the road, straying from parish to parish and leaving the enfeebled old or young to perish by the wayside. Many who escaped actual starvation died of "famine fever," a form of typhus induced by undernourishment and spread by the wandering population. The dead were buried unrecorded in pits.³³

As the winter progressed, the system of relief, too tardily organized, became more effective. Also by January cargoes of maize from the United States appeared in the harbors.³⁴ Other supplies arrived from the Mediterranean and the lower valley of the Danube.³⁵ Wheat which had been shipped from Ireland a few months before came back to be distributed by the government to the starving.³⁶ By February there was ample food in the country. The emergency was not over, however, for the food had to be quickly distributed in a land of still primitive communications. The rivers were frozen, and horses and carts were too few for adequate conveyance by land.³⁷ Even when meal and flour reached their destination difficulties remained. Many of the inhabitants had never tasted bread; their

³² *Mark Lane Express*, Nov. 9, 1846; Jan. 4, 11, 1847; William Bennett, *Narrative of a Recent Journey of Six Weeks in Ireland* (London, 1847), 6, 122.

³³ Committee of the House of Lords on Colonization from Ireland, *Report* (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1847, VI), 243; *World* (Dublin), June 12, 1847.

³⁴ *Mark Lane Express*, Jan. 4, 11, Feb. 1, 8, 15, 22, 1847.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Dec. 6, 1847.

³⁶ *Irish Farmer's Gazette*, Sept. 4, 1847.

³⁷ *Mark Lane Express*, Feb. 1, 8, 15, 22, 1847; Royal Agricultural Improvement Society of Ireland, *Reports and Transactions for 1848 and 1849*, 222, 223 n.

kitchens had no ovens; the housewives did not know how to bake the loaves.³⁸ These disadvantages were in time overcome; and by March the imports swelled to unimagined proportions. In one week a hundred vessels laden with corn and breadstuffs arrived at the port of Cork.³⁹ In "anything that could float"—small coastal schooners that had never ventured away from the American shore and vessels hastily launched in the shipyards—the New York commission agents sent the surplus of the *New World* to the starving Irishman.⁴⁰ In so doing they fed not only his body but also his imagination, for he learned convincingly of a land where there was an abundance of food to spare.⁴¹

This distribution of food represented the more successful aspect of British policy. A new piece of legislation, commonly called the "labour-rate act," provided the basis for emergency employment.⁴² It did away with local initiative, and empowered the lord lieutenant or his subordinates to decide when and where public works should be undertaken. The cost should be jointly borne by the owners and occupiers of the land in that district. The law was well-intentioned, but its effects proved disastrous. The improvements consisted chiefly of roads which were little used. Property acquired no profit while saddled with the charge. Since the wages were too small to support the worker and his family, charity continued to be necessary. At one time approximately a tenth of the people were nominally engaged in this labor, neglecting the farm tasks of the winter and spring, and heaping new financial burdens on a society already breaking beneath the strain.⁴³ Perhaps most unfortunate of all were the physical consequences. Many of the workers were already weakened by hunger and exposure; the work was heavy; sanitary arrangements in the camps were primitive. Fever soon appeared and found a fertile breeding ground.⁴⁴

Probably few of those who decided on emigration in 1847 reas-

³⁸ *Mark Lane Express*, Feb. 1, 1847.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, March 29, 1847.

⁴⁰ *Liverpool Mercury*, Jan. 22, 1847; *Mark Lane Express*, March 15, 22, 1847.

⁴¹ J. K. Ingram, "Considerations on the State of Ireland," *Statistical and Social Inquiry Soc. of Ireland (Dublin), Jour.*, IV (1864), 15.

⁴² 9 and 10 Vict., ch. 107.

⁴³ *Irish Ecclesiastical Journal (Dublin)*, IV (1847), 141.

⁴⁴ Committee of House of Lords, *Report on Consolidated Annuities*, vii, xi, xxv-xxvi; Bennett, *Narrative of a Recent Journey*, 9-10, 38.

oned consciously regarding their state. Their impulse was merely to get away. A curse rested upon the land. Misfortunes had been great; they might become greater. "Poor Ireland's done," "The country's gone forever," "It can never again recover"—these were the expressions heard wherever emigrants congregated. Even in parts of the country which had escaped the severest blows the sentiment prevailed, for they feared their turn might come next.

A great impetus to the movement was given by the abundance of shipping in the Irish ports. This was due to the forehandedness of the commercial houses of Liverpool, which anticipated a throng of passengers and, in this belief, raised their rates from three pounds to five. When the increase proved no deterrent, the brokers asked for seven, and the amount was readily paid.⁴⁵ Only the activity of government agents prevented them from canceling contracts made at the lower figure and offering the accommodations to the highest bidders.⁴⁶ But seven pounds, or even five, exceeded the resources of the departing laborer. Only the "more respectable" emigrants, those who had planned some time in advance, went via Liverpool.⁴⁷ For the poorer sort, however, opportunities abounded in almost Irish harbor. Wherever an American or Canadian schooner landed its cargo of grain, a bargain might be made; and on such vessels they set out from home.⁴⁸

Throughout the spring and early summer the village streets and country roads bustled with activity. A few carts, probably lent by philanthropic neighbors, helped to transport the baggage from home to the sea. Most of the wayfarers found no difficulty in carrying their meager belongings on their shoulders. On every hand crowds of neighbors, often totaling hundreds, streamed toward the ports where they camped in confusion upon the quays, contested for passage and finally embarked on the great adventure.⁴⁹ Newspaper

⁴⁵ *Freeman's Journal* (Dublin), April 15, 1847; letters of Lieutenant Hodder, Feb. 7, 1847, and T. F. Elliot, April 19, 1847, C. O. 384/80.

⁴⁶ Letter of T. F. Elliot, April 22, 1847, C. O. 384/78; Committee on Settlement, and Poor Removal, *First Report* (*Parliamentary Papers*, 1847, XI), 59.

⁴⁷ *Freeman's Journal*, April 24, 1847; *Liverpool Mercury*, March 19, 1847; letter of A. Dudley Mann, Sept. 13, 1847, Special Agents (Department of State, Washington, D. C.), German States, Hungary, 1846-1852.

⁴⁸ *Freeman's Journal*, April 2, 1847; *Mark Lane Express*, March 15, 1847; letter of A. Dudley Mann, Sept. 13, 1847.

⁴⁹ Bennett, *Narrative of a Recent Journey*, 5, 53.

editors, little dreaming this was but the vanguard of the mighty army that would depart in the next decade, declared the land was being depopulated.⁵⁰

But how could people on the ragged edge of starvation finance such a migration? The sources of their funds were many. Hidden in the thatch of many a poor cottage in Munster and Connaught were a few sovereigns, put aside for an emergency; and the emergency had now come. The sale of furniture netted a few pounds more.⁵¹ Landlords complained that out of pity for the obvious distress of their tenants they had not pressed them for the last year's rent, and now this rent was taking them forever out of their reach. Others did not hesitate to beg, and those who contributed believed they were giving to the most worthy of causes.⁵²

Another important source of money consisted of drafts sent from Canada and the United States by relatives who were aroused to action by the news of the disaster. Though such funds may have been intended for relief, the recipient hastened to buy passage—the most effective relief of which he could conceive.⁵³ Landlords did their part, often sending tenants at their own expense. In many such cases the motive was self-interest, not charity, for in a few months the tenants might become paupers and thus a perpetual charge upon the estate.⁵⁴ Some landlords organized a migration *en masse*, chartering a ship, hiring an agent to supervise the transportation, buying supplies for the journey, and giving to each a few shillings with which to start the new life.⁵⁵

Not all the emigrants of 1847 crossed the Atlantic. When the difficulties grew acute, many laborers recalled a prosperous land, distant only a day's sail. Familiar with England from having visited it annually during the harvest season, they decided to take wife and

⁵⁰ *Irish Farmer's Gazette*, Aug. 7, 1847.

⁵¹ *Freeman's Journal*, April 19, 1847; *Agricultural Review* (Dublin), I (1858), 354.

⁵² Committee on Colonization from Ireland, *Report*, 537, *Emigrant and Colonial Gazette*, July 29, 1849.

⁵³ Committee on Colonization from Ireland, *Report*, 249-250; letter of Charles Franks, Feb. 19, 1847, C. O. 384/74.

⁵⁴ *Leinster Express*, March 6, June 19, July 3, 1847; *Mark Lane Express*, March 8, 1847.

⁵⁵ *Freeman's Journal*, April 2, 26, 1847; letter of C. H. Wandesforde, Nov. 21, 1847, C. O. 384/75.

children there and make it their permanent home. Five or six shillings paid the fare, and they landed in uncounted numbers at Bristol and Liverpool and at the villages on the Welsh coast. Here they at once fell a burden upon charity. Some of the parishes considered sending them back to Ireland, but under the conditions that seemed like returning them to inevitable starvation. So the newcomers were encouraged to move inland and beg their way from city to city until they found work or a kindly disposed community.⁵⁶ During 1847 more than a quarter of a million reached Liverpool alone.⁵⁷ Some of these ultimately went to Canada or the United States; but the majority settled in the great factory cities of the north where they became the ancestors of a large proportion of their present-day inhabitants.

The stagnation of trade and the high prices induced by the scarcity aroused fears in England during the winter of 1846-1847 that ultimately the distress would equal that of Ireland. But the spring brought improvement. Railroads were still being built; farmers, as yet unaware of the threat to them involved in the repeal of the corn laws, continued to ditch and drain; and Canada and the United States, enriched by the pounds secured from selling their food products, became such good customers that the manufacturing plants of Lancashire enjoyed a spirited revival.⁵⁸

Although the German emigration reflected no such social crisis as that which afflicted Ireland, nevertheless the prevailing hunger swelled it to a new height, and an almost accidental circumstance gave to it the character of a flight. The winter of 1846-1847 was one of suffering, with food supplies short and speculators busy. Many factory districts were obliged to depend upon charity, and almost all but the most prosperous farmers felt the pinch of high prices when buying the food their fields had failed to yield. A vague fear that current troubles portended greater difficulties gained ground; and in the autumn the American consul at Amsterdam, reporting the sentiments of German emigrants passing through his port, declared, "All well-informed persons express the belief that the present crisis

⁵⁶ *Liverpool Mercury*, Jan. 1, 15, Nov. 30, 1847; *Leinster Express*, March 20, 1847; letter of Lieutenant Hodder, Feb. 4, 1847, C. O. 384/80.

⁵⁷ *Liverpool Mercury*, Oct. 22, 1847.

⁵⁸ *Mark Lane Express*, Jan. 25, March 15, Nov. 15, 1847.

is so deeply interwoven in the events of the present period, that 'it' is but the commencement of that great Revolution, which they consider sooner or later is to dissolve the present constitution of things . . ."59 Many persons testified to the intensity of the eagerness to leave. George Bancroft, the minister at Berlin, wrote that "all Germany is alive on the subject"; that the movement would be "enormous, and limited only by the amount of the transports . . ."60 One consul told of villagers preparing to depart in a body;61 another described the public as "seized with a Panic."62 Newspapers added their testimony, not only in news items, but also in the official declarations of intention required by the laws of many of the states.

The evidence is conflicting, however, as to the economic status of the emigrants, the class to which they belonged, and the material resources they took with them. Some accounts bewailed the departure of the most desirable: farm families of the middle class with many sons and daughters and comfortable means.63 The indications of poverty, however, were more pointed. The city of Cologne found it necessary to provide cheap lodgings for those who could afford no others;64 and the Belgium authorities forbade emigrants to enter the kingdom who could not show a sum sufficient for support and passage.65 Many communes sent their beggars and their chronic poor to America.66

As early as the first of February, 1847, Bremen was filled with waiting persons fearful lest the demand for transportation exceed the supply. Many vessels normally employed in the passenger trade were out searching for cargoes of grain, and the time of their re-

59 Letter of Charles Nicholls, Oct. 14, 1847, Consular Dispatches (Department of State, Washington, D. C.), Amsterdam, IV (1844-1850).

60 Letters of George Bancroft, Feb. 3, March 29, 1847, Diplomatic Correspondence (Department of State, Washington, D. C.), England, LVII (1846-1847).

61 Letter of Charles Graebe, April 12, 1847, Consular Letters (Department of State, Washington, D. C.), Hesse-Cassel, I (1835-1850).

62 Report of Charles Nicholls, March 31, 1847, Consular Dispatches, Amsterdam, IV.

63 *Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 18, 1847; *Kölnische Zeitung*, Feb. 10, 1847; *Allgemeine Auswanderungs Zeitung* (Rudolstadt), Feb. 3, 1847.

64 *Kölnische Zeitung*, April 28, 1847.

65 A. A. III, R. I, Aus. Eur. 11, Vol. III, no. 1980 (letter from Belgian minister of foreign affairs, Feb. 23, 1847).

66 *Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung*, April 1, 1847; *Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser*, Jan. 13, 1847; *Allgemeine Kirchen Zeitung* (Darmstadt), Nov. 23, 1847.

turn was uncertain.⁶⁷ This fact contributed to the chaos into which the entire business was soon thrown; but the most important factor was one beyond the shippers' control, one injected into the situation from a source which they had always felt it safe to ignore.

Hitherto the law of 1819 had been the only American federal regulation governing immigration. When Congress gathered in December, 1846, petitions from officials of the state and city of New York and from charitable organizations urged a more effective control in view of the conditions abroad. The outcome was the act of February, 1847, supported by all political factions and evidently actuated by humanitarian considerations. This law left unchanged the principle established in 1819; but in view of the great changes in marine architecture since that time it specified that on the lower fourteen "clear superficial feet" must be allowed for each person, and on the bottom or orlop deck thirty.⁶⁸ It also prescribed the length and width of beds and continued the food requirements of the older law. Vessels arriving in the United States after May 31 with more passengers than the new system permitted should be subject to confiscation.⁶⁹

Though this date allowed sufficient time for the information to reach Europe before such ships sailed, it ignored the system of contracts under which most of the Continental trade was conducted. The German and Dutch merchants hardly knew what to do. If they should dispatch a ship with all the passengers they had agreed to take, it would be confiscated upon arriving in the United States; if they should refuse to transport all the persons with whom they had entered contracts, German laws carried penalties so heavy as to ruin them.⁷⁰ The obvious way out was to hire more ships, but in the mercantile world in the spring of 1847 no more vessels were to be had.

Confronted with this situation someone started a rumor. Its origin was never traced, but circumstances suggest that it came from an interested source in Bremen. A circular, widely spread through-

⁶⁷ *Weser Zeitung* (Bremen), Sept. 16, 1847; *Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung*, March 7, 1847; *Staats- und Gelehrte Zeitung des Hamburgischen unpartheyischen Correspondenten*, Jan. 29, 1847.

⁶⁸ *U. S. Statutes at Large*, IX, 127-128.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 149.

⁷⁰ *Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 6, 19, 25, 1847.

out those regions in Germany where the emigration fever raged, deliberately gave the impression that the new American law amounted to a prohibition of immigration.⁷¹ If, as seems likely, the object was to influence holders of tickets to annul their passage, it had no such effect. On the contrary, it seems to have encouraged many to make a sudden resolve to emigrate in the belief that only by hastening could they reach America before the door was finally shut. Learning it was useless to seek accommodations at Bremen and Hamburg, they flocked down the Rhine to the Dutch and Belgian ports. Because of the stiffer price of passage there, many were obliged to return to their homes.⁷²

In the meantime the shippers of northern Germany discovered a way round the American law. Hitherto they had avoided trade with Canada because of the difficulty of obtaining return cargoes; but the emergency rendered this a minor consideration. Accordingly the advertised vessels sailed to Quebec, carrying their full compliment of passengers, and accompanied by agents who conducted the emigrants upon arrival overland to New York, or directed them by the shortest route to the American West.⁷³ This diversion of the immigrant trade occasioned alarm among the various American interests concerned with the traffic and also among European shippers. In response to the flood of protests the government took action. The law could not be repealed in a moment, but it could be construed. To this end the Secretary of the Treasury issued a circular which allowed the space occupied by the berths to be included among the "clear superficial feet" assigned to each passenger. Although such an interpretation lay within the letter, it certainly did not comply with the intention of the law. Its adoption made inevitable further legislation.⁷⁴

Despite the effort to improve the conditions of ocean passage the

⁷¹ A. A. III, R. I, Aus. Eur. 11, Vol. III, no. 3767 (*Weser Zeitung*, May 5, 1847); *Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 12, 1847; *Kölnische Zeitung*, May 10, 1847.

⁷² *Allgemeine Auswanderungs Zeitung*, May 11, June 7, 1847; *Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 19, 1847.

⁷³ *Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 2, 1847; *Allgemeine Auswanderungs Zeitung*, June 14, 1847; *Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 17, 1847; *Weser Zeitung*, Sept. 16, 1847; *Deutsche Auswanderer* (Darmstadt), II (1848), no. 30, 467.

⁷⁴ *Allgemeine Zeitung*, May 23, 1847; *Kölnische Zeitung*, June 24, 1848; *Leipziger Allgemeine Zeitung*, June 22, 1847. The Treasury circular is published in *Hunt's Merchants' Magazine*, XVII (1847), 99.

emigrants encountered dreadful suffering on the congested vessels. The crowds of Irishmen, sailing hopefully from their stricken island, believed that they were leaving misery behind; but in the six or eight weeks of their voyage the pestilence which they were fleeing broke out again with a lethal fury and shocked even those who had witnessed the scenes of the preceding winter. Physicians called it "ship fever," though it was probably a modified form of "famine fever" or hunger typhus, a fact indicated by its absence from vessels coming from the Continent.⁷⁵ The disease in some cases originated among passengers already suffering from a mild form of it when they boarded the ship; oftentimes the germs were carried by lice in clothing that had been salvaged from persons who had died.⁷⁶

Ships sailing from Liverpool usually discovered the plague before leaving the shores of Ireland, and were able to place the patients in the fever hospitals of Cork.⁷⁷ But vessels departing directly from Ireland could not do this. Once out upon the Atlantic they continued their course whether the passengers were sick or well. Carrying the poorest peasants, those who had had the closest contact with the pestilence, they exhibited gruesome scenes. The worst were enacted on the boats bound for the British provinces. Of the 89,738 emigrants who embarked in 1847 for the St. Lawrence ports of Canada 5293 died during the voyage. Of the 17,074 headed for New Brunswick 823 perished.⁷⁸ The mortality at sea amounted to approximately six per cent.

Though the toll of death was heavy, the disease had not yet run its course when a vessel reached port. Sick and dying passengers were brought on shore at quarantine. The first lot were admitted to the hospital at Grosse Isle, thirty miles below Quebec, on May 14. By the end of the month 1200 were accommodated in beds and tents, and thirty-five vessels were waiting to discharge their sick. Though new buildings were hastily constructed and an attempt was made to separate the dying from the less infected and to reserve a part of the

⁷⁵ Letter of A. Dudley Mann, Sept. 13, 1847.

⁷⁶ Letters of C. Alexander Wood, Aug. 4, 1848, and F. W. C. Murdock, June 3, 1848, C. O. 384/81.

⁷⁷ Letters of S. W. French, Dec. 28, 1847, and Lieutenant Friend, Dec. 28, 1847, C. O. 384/81.

⁷⁸ Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners, *Eighth General Report (Parliamentary Papers, 1847-1848, XXVI)*, 15.

island for convalescents, 10,037 died in the ships at quarantine or in the hospitals at Grosse Isle.⁷⁹ The total mortality among those embarking for Canada was therefore approximately sixteen per cent. Even this figure is conservative, for many families, detained in Quebec because one of their number was kept at Grosse Isle, readily fell prey, if not to ship fever, to other diseases induced by temporary housing and undernourishment. At St. John and St. Andrews the mortality was also great, 1292 recorded deaths taking place at quarantine and in the hospitals.⁸⁰

American officials stationed along the inland frontier tried to prevent those whom they suspected of having participated in this migration from crossing Upper Canada into the United States.⁸¹ In the absence of similar vigilance along the seacoast many of the unfortunates who landed in New Brunswick entered the New England states. Usually the husband and father went ahead, while the wife and children waited until he found work.⁸² When the family arrived in tatters and rags, the effects of starvation still visible on their gaunt faces, the Bostonians believed that all the misery of Ireland had been emptied on their shores.

The advent of these refugees together with a greater number who came directly from Ireland caused Massachusetts to revise her legislation against pauper newcomers. Though a bonding system had been established in 1837, it had not worked well.⁸³ Sick and aged had been allowed to land without the required guarantee being given; the officer in charge justified his laxness by declaring: "My only plea is humanity." A legislative committee early in 1847 discovered that not a single prosecution for breaches of the law had been pressed to a final judgment.⁸⁴ The events of the summer dramatized the need for more effective legislation. So great was the influx of human wrecks that a receiving room for invalids just off the ships was constructed at Boston Long Wharf, and a carriage

⁷⁹ Letter of C. Alexander Wood, Aug. 4, 1848. C. O. 386/83; Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners, *Report*, 15.

⁸⁰ Colonial Land and Emigration Commissioners, *Report*, 15.

⁸¹ *The Emigrant's Manual. British America and United States of America* (Edinburgh, 1851), 35.

⁸² Letters of F. W. C. Murdock, Dec. 8, 1847, Jan. 18, 1848, C. O. 386/83.

⁸³ *Laws of Massachusetts for 1837*, ch. 238.

⁸⁴ *Massachusetts Senate Documents for 1847*, no. 109.

was kept constantly busy conveying them to the boat for transportation to the hospitals on Deer Island.⁸⁵ In the face of a flood of petitions the legislature delayed action no longer when it met in January, 1848. The new law made no change in the capitation tax, nor did it increase the amount of the bond; but the bond was no longer limited to ten years, heavier penalties were attached, and more effective methods of enforcement provided.⁸⁶

Although New York City witnessed less appalling scenes, the people were keenly aware of the dangers to which their geographic position exposed them. The neighboring coast of New Jersey offered convenient opportunities for disembarkment. Shipmasters anchored off these ports went through the form of bonding and then left the emigrants to find their way across the Hudson as best they could.⁸⁷ Even honest skippers, with no intention of violating the New York requirements, patronized a class of professional bondsmen who for a per-capita charge relieved the captains of all the petty details and assumed financial obligation for pauper immigrants. Though the bonds were legally drawn, in time these men became responsible for fabulous sums which rested upon security of dubious value.⁸⁸ This general situation, strengthened by popular opinion expressed in public meetings, led the legislature on May 5, 1847, to create an administrative body of six commissioners or emigration, appointed by the governor, who served together, with the mayors of New York and Brooklyn and the presidents of the German and Irish emigrant societies. The act required the master of a vessel to pay a fee of one dollar for every passenger he landed in the harbor. The distribution of the funds so acquired was left to the commissioners, who were also given extensive powers in appointing and removing the administrative officers.⁸⁹ The New Yorkers believed they had made adequate provisions against any evils the future might bring forth.

The people of Baltimore also felt the necessity for protective measures. The traditional immigration into that port had consisted almost entirely of Germans who passed on to the agricul-

⁸⁵ *Massachusetts Senate Documents for 1848*, no. 46.

⁸⁶ *Ibid.*, nos. 14-15, 46; *Boston Courier*, Jan. 18, 20, 22, 25, 29, Feb. 8, 1848; *Laws of Massachusetts for 1848*, ch. 313.

⁸⁷ Board of Aldermen of New York City, *Documents for 1837*, IV, nos. 10, 12.

⁸⁸ Comptroller of the City of New York, *Report for 1845*, 32.

⁸⁹ *Laws of New York for 1847*, ch. 195.

tural West; but now the famine sent over its hordes of Irishmen. Though the local Hibernian Society collected funds to relieve the distress, the newcomers brought with them disease that quickly spread through the city.⁹⁰ Existing laws proving inadequate, the mayor urged prompt action on the city government. An ordinance, hastily adopted, designated a quarantine ground, and directed the health officer to inspect all arrivals and send those who were sick to the hospital, the cost of treatment to be borne by the master or owner of the vessel.⁹¹ Evidently this municipal regulation proved effective, for the newspapers of the summer and autumn, although noting the arrival of numerous immigrant ships, made no further complaint of disease-spreading paupers.⁹²

Louisiana, also prompted to action, used a combination of state and municipal legislation in dealing with the problem. Laws of 1842 and 1843 had authorized a head tax on each passenger arriving from foreign ports or on coastal vessels from the Atlantic seaboard. These funds were administered by the charity hospital of the city of New Orleans.⁹³ Such was the situation when the fateful spring of 1847 brought its deluge of stricken Europeans. On one April day nearly a hundred starving people were admitted to the charity hospital. Fifty new arrivals, discovered lodging in a small house, were so diseased that they were unable to work; some of them were living on straw gathered in the streets.⁹⁴ To make matters worse, an epidemic of yellow fever was raging in New Orleans, the worst it had ever known. Against this new terror the immigrants had no powers of resistance.⁹⁵ Public officials did what they could in the distribution of relief, and buildings were hired as temporary shelters for the sick. The chief burden, however, fell on private charity.

Since existing legislation fell short of the need, city ordinances gave the mayor discretionary power over the landing of immigrants and imposed a flat fee of ten dollars upon every vessel which had

⁹⁰ *Baltimore American*, April 24, May 5, 12, 15, 27, 1847.

⁹¹ The mayor's message is printed in the *Baltimore American*, May 27, 1847. The ordinance which was passed on May 27, 1847, is published in the issue for June 14, 1847.

⁹² *Ibid.*, July 13, 20, 26, Oct. 23, 1847; May 31, June 17, 1848.

⁹³ *Laws of Louisiana for 1842*, no 158; for 1843, no. 81.

⁹⁴ *Daily Picayune* (New Orleans), April 30, 1847.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, June 8, Sept. 2, 1847.

sickness on board.⁹⁶ Because the legal right of municipal officials to control matters of quarantine was questioned, the legislature created a state board for the purpose. Unfortunately it was given insufficient power, and in disgust the municipality of New Orleans passed an ordinance taxing all incoming passengers. Only the veto of the mayor prevented its application.⁹⁷

Such was the harvest of legislation produced by the crisis. The people in four states had been aroused to action and had set up barriers which, though not prohibitive, indicated their belief that no longer should all classes of Europeans pass unrestricted through their gates. This legislation formed the basis of immigration regulation until the federal government in 1882 assumed control. In one respect, however, the legislation ran into immediate difficulties. Shipping interests objected strenuously to the requirement of a flat fee. Though small in the case of each individual passenger, it amounted to thousands of dollars in the course of the year, and shipowners could not shift the tax to the emigrant by increasing the price of passage because conditions of competition rendered this inexpedient. As a result, the shippers in Massachusetts and New York brought action in the courts to test the constitutionality of the laws in those states. In due course the cases reached the federal Supreme Court, which in 1848 sustained the litigants. The decision in the "Passenger Cases" held that the legislation in question involved a regulation of foreign commerce and hence invaded the domain of action reserved to Congress.⁹⁸ In the face of this decision the states reverted to the system which an earlier judgment had declared to be within their competence. They required masters of vessels to give a bond to indemnify them for any expenses incurred by an immigrant who became a public charge, and specified further that this bond might be commuted by the payment of a cash fee for each passenger. In every-day operation therefore the practice remained the same.⁹⁹

As a result of the bad consequences of the interpretation placed

⁹⁶ Messages from the mayor in the *Daily Picayune*, May 5, 13, June 19, 24-25, 1847; reports of committees, May 19, June 24, 1847; report of the secretary of the charity hospital, June 30, 1847.

⁹⁷ *Daily Picayune*, Sept. 5, Nov. 10, 1847; Jan. 19, March 3, 9, May 17, 23, 1848.

⁹⁸ *Smith v. Turner, Norris v. City of Boston*, 48 U. S., 282.

⁹⁹ *Laws of Louisiana for 1850*, no. 295; *Laws of Maryland for 1849-1850*, ch. 46; *Laws of Massachusetts for 1850*, ch. 105; *Laws of New York for 1849*, ch. 350.

by the Secretary of the Treasury upon the act of 1847, the federal government took additional action regarding the carriage of passengers at sea. The law of 1848 repealed the old "two-passengers-to-five-tons" provision, and provided that the number of "clear superficial feet" allowed each passenger should be determined by the height between decks. It also prescribed a diet of greater variety, including wheat, potatoes and rice, and held the captain responsible for the general cleanliness and discipline on board the ship.¹⁰⁰

Meanwhile the peasant farmers in Europe who had not joined the emigration of 1847 anxiously watched the prospects of the coming season. "The very life of the country," wrote an Irish observer in June, "seems to be bound up in the results of the coming harvest."¹⁰¹ The people of the island set out only a small quantity of potatoes. Seeds were lacking and, in any case, faith in the treacherous root was wanting. Instead, they planted green crops, especially turnips, and the more substantial farmers, encouraged by the prevailing prices, extended their acreage of wheat and oats.¹⁰² The potato planting fared well, however. The fields did not wither, and the potatoes when taken from the soil were sound. Optimism returned, and a cheerfulness unknown for many months reappeared in the countryside. It was clear, however, that until another year could bring its yield from the ground the food supply would be deficient.¹⁰³ In Germany the outcome was essentially the same. The crop of grain was abundant though that of potatoes was short. Prices remained high and a food scarcity still threatened.¹⁰⁴ But elsewhere in Europe and America the granaries were full, and the fleets of the world were ready to bring those in want the surplus of the fortunate.¹⁰⁵

Thus ended the year 1847. The great disaster, long feared, had come and had gone. Hunger had written a chapter of death and suffering into the history of western Europe. It had sent tens of thousands fleeing across the sea. But the future promised to be different. Mankind looked forward with renewed hope.

¹⁰⁰ *U. S. Statutes at Large*, IX, 220-223.

¹⁰¹ *Irish Ecclesiastical Journal*, IV (1847), 157.

¹⁰² *Mark Lane Express*, March 8, 1847; *World*, May 1, 1847.

¹⁰³ *Mark Lane Express*, Oct. 4, 1847; *Irish Poor Law: Past, Present and Future* (London, 1849), 16.

¹⁰⁴ *Morgenblatt für gebildete Leser*, June 14, 1847; *Allgemeine Zeitung*, Sept. 12, 1847; letter of Charles Graebe, Aug. 12, 1847, Consular Letters, Hesse-Cassel, I.

¹⁰⁵ *Mark Lane Express*, Feb. 21, 1848.

JOHN R. COMMONS

ALTHOUGH JOHN R. COMMONS did not produce his major work until 1910, he is generally considered to be the pioneer historian of American labor. The reasons for the previous neglect of labor history are related to the general trends of American thought as well as to the limited vision of the historical profession.

Historians have been conditioned by the reluctance of most Americans to view their society in terms of economic classes. This attitude has been founded not only in the mobility of individuals within the class structure but also in the emphasis which democracy has given to the ideal of equality. Further, the continual expansion of economic opportunities, dramatically reflected in millions of acres of unoccupied land, made it difficult for laborers to consider themselves part of a permanent wage-earning group. That the American dream of successful self-improvement was also a reality is amply demonstrated in the careers of countless notable individuals from Benjamin Franklin to Alfred E. Smith and in statistics which are perhaps even more meaningful. If 43 percent of the members of the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1663 began their lives in America as indentured servants, a similar proportion of the important business leaders of the post-Civil-War industrial boom came from "lower middle" or "lower" class origins. In this country, then, it is not surprising that class consciousness had a slow development and class concepts a limited appeal.

It was natural for historians to reflect these attitudes. Whether the writer was a Whig like Francis Parkman or a Democrat like George Bancroft, he celebrated such themes as national freedom

and individual liberties, not the formation and rise of economic groups. But there were also circumstances associated specifically with historical writing which delayed a scholarly analysis of labor's development. The people who wrote history in the nineteenth century came generally from conservative backgrounds which were apt to produce more alarm than interest in the collective efforts of wage earners. Even if such an interest existed, the traditions which linked history with wars and past politics would have thwarted it.

By the turn of the century, most of the factors which had underlain the neglect of labor history had given way to conditions conducive to Commons' task. The problems created by the enormous increase in the number of industrial workers could be counted on ultimately to generate a scholarly interest in the past of both industry and labor. This stimulus was aided by the general movement already under way to broaden the definition of historical analysis so as to include sociological and economic materials. Finally, it must be remembered that a concern for labor was one of the distinguishing marks of the Progressive movement preceding the First World War.

Like others whose writings are represented in this collection, Commons began his teaching career in the early years of this reform era. Because he was so concerned with current economic and social problems his connection with the period seems especially intimate. In the breadth of his interests, he resembled Horace Greeley, around whom he centered his introduction to those volumes of his documentary history which dealt with the labor movement between 1840 and 1860.

Although Commons' analysis of labor during the pre-Civil-War years was limited in its scope and depth, it remains a stimulating point of departure for labor historians. Instead of considering labor to be concerned solely with conditions of employment, Commons attempted to relate it to the progress of humanitarian ideas and to the multitude of contemporary social reforms. He believed that Greeley's thinking represented the

fusion of a "lower idealism," arising from working-class demands, and a "higher idealism," contained in transcendental philosophy. Although such utopian communities as Brook Farm provided no practical solution to labor problems, the transcendentalists furnished labor with the philosophic concepts necessary for its success in politics. Commons believed that the platform of the Republican party of the 1850's reflected this persuasive union of economic need and moral justification. For example, the plea for a homestead law arose from a material desire for free land, but could be clothed in the idealistic assertion that land should be granted as a natural right rather than as a favor to a special group.

Subsequent writers have succeeded in providing more penetrating analyses of labor history. However, Commons' importance rests not upon his specific opinions but upon the manner in which he stimulated interest in a neglected field. By having the insight to explain and emphasize what other historians had long ignored and by editing a generous selection of the scattered documents necessary for further study in labor's past, he left for future scholars an endowment which will long be remembered.

Introduction "Labor Movement, 1840-60"¹

THERE have been in American history three great periods of philosophizing: the period prior to the presidency of Thomas Jefferson, the decade of the forties, and today.

The forties far outran the other periods in its unbounded loquacity. The columns of advertisements in a newspaper might announce for Monday night a meeting of the antislavery society; Tuesday night, the temperance society; Wednesday night, the graham bread society; Thursday night, a phrenological lecture; Friday night, an address against capital punishment; Saturday night, the "Association for Universal Reform." Then there were all the missionary societies, the woman's rights societies, the society for the diffusion of bloomers, the séances of spiritualists, the "associationists," the land reformers—a medley of movements that found the week too short. A dozen colonies of idealists, like the Brook Farm philosophers, went off by themselves to solve the problem of social existence in a big family called a phalanx. The Mormons gathered themselves together to reconstitute the ten lost tribes. Robert Owen called a "world's convention" on short notice, where a dozen different "plans" of social reorganization—individualistic, communistic, incomprehensible—were submitted in all solemnity. It was the golden age of the talk-fest, the lyceum, the brotherhood of man—the "hot air" period of American history.

Fifty years before had been an age of talk. Thomas Jefferson and

Reprinted by permission of the publishers, The Arthur H. Clark Company, from Vols. VII and VIII, *A Documentary History of American Industrial Society*, edited by John R. Commons and others.

¹I am indebted to the editors of the *Political Science Quarterly* for permission to use in this place my article on "Horace Greeley and the Working Class Origins of the Republican Party," vol. xxiv, no. 3. In selecting and editing the documents, I have been assisted by Mr. Wm. M. Leiserson.

Thomas Paine had filled the young nation's brain with the inalienable rights of "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness." This second era—the forties—had also its prophet. Horace Greeley was to the social revolution of the forties what Thomas Jefferson was to the political revolution of 1800. He was the *Tribune* of the People, the spokesman of their discontent, the champion of their nostrums. He drew the line only at spirit rappings and free love.

This national palaver was partially checked by the Fugitive Slave Law of 1850. The spectacle of slave-drivers, slave rescues, and federal marshals at men's doors turned discussion into amazement. The palaver stopped short in 1854 with the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. That law marked off those territories for a free fight for land between slave-owners and small farmers. On this land issue the Republican Party suddenly appeared. Its members came together by a magic attraction, as crystals appear in a chilled solution. Not one man nor one set of men formed the party, though there are many claimants for the honor of first suggesting the name or calling the first meeting that used the name. It was the fifteen years of revolutionary talk that made the party possible. Men's minds had been unsettled. Visions of a new moral world had come down upon them. Tradition had lost its hold and transition its terrors.

We hear much nowadays of the "economic interpretation of history." Human life is viewed as a struggle to get a living and to get rich. The selfishness of men hustling for food, clothing, shelter, and wealth determines their religion, their politics, their form of government, their family life, their ideals. Thus economic evolution produces religious, political, domestic, philosophical evolution. All this we may partly concede. But certainly there is something more in history than a blind surge. Men act together because they see together and believe together. An inspiring idea, as well as the next meal, makes history. It is when such an idea coincides with a stage in economic evolution, and the two corroborate each other, that the mass of men begins to move. The crystals then begin to form; evolution quickens into revolution; history reaches one of its crises.

For ideas, like methods of getting a living, have their evolution. The struggle for existence, the elimination of the unfit, the survival of the fit, control these airy exhalations from the mind of man as they control the more substantial framework of his existence. The next man is the man in whose brain the struggling ideas of the age

fight for supremacy until the survivors come out adapted to the economic struggle of the time. Judged by this test, Horace Greeley was the prophet of our most momentous period. The evolution of his ideas is the idealistic interpretation of our history.

Greeley's life was itself a struggle through all the economic oppressions of his time. In his boyhood his father had been reduced by the panic of 1819 from the position of small farmer to that of day laborer. The son became an apprentice in a printing office, then a tramp printer; and when he drifted into New York in 1831, he found himself in the midst of the first working men's political party, with its first conscious struggle in America for the rights of labor. Pushing upward as publisher and editor, the panic of 1837 brought him down near to bankruptcy, but the poverty of the wage-earners about him oppressed him more than his own. "We do not want alms," he heard them say; "we are not beggars; we hate to sit here day by day idle and useless; help us to work—we want no other help; why is it that we can have nothing to do?"² Revolting against this social anarchy, as he called it, he espoused socialism and preached protectionism. This was the beginning of his "isms." Not that he had been immune before to cranky notions. When only a boy of thirteen he broke away from the unanimous custom of all classes, ages, and both sexes by resolving never again to drink whisky. When "Doctor" Graham proclaimed vegetarianism in 1831, he forthwith became an inmate of a Graham boarding-house. But these were personal "isms." They bothered nobody else. Not until the long years of industrial suffering that began in 1837 did his "isms" become gospels and his panaceas propaganda. His total abstinence of 1824 became prohibitory legislation in 1850. His vegetarianism of the thirties became abolition of capital punishment in the forties. The crank became the reformer, when once the misery and helplessness of the workers cried aloud to him.

Greeley's "isms" are usually looked upon as the amiable weaknesses of genius. They were really the necessary inquiries and experiments in the beginnings of constructive democracy. Political democracy theretofore had been negative. Thomas Jefferson and Andrew Jackson needed no creative genius to assert equal rights. They needed only to break down special privilege by widening the rights

² Greeley, H. *Recollections of a Busy Life* (New York, 1868), 145.

that already existed. Jefferson could frame a bill of rights—he could not construct a constitution. Jackson could kill a “monster” bank—he could not invent a people’s control of the currency. Negative democracy of Jefferson and Jackson had triumphed. It had done its needful work, but its day was ended when a thousand wild-cat banks scrambled into the bed of the departed monster. Political democracy went bankrupt when the industrial bankruptcy of 1837 exposed its incapacity. It had vindicated equal rights, but where was the bread and butter? The call of the time was for a new democracy—one that should be social and economic rather than political; constructive rather than negative; whose motto should be reform, not repeal; take hold, not *laissez faire*.

But there were no examples or precedents for such a democracy. The inventor of a sewing-machine or the discoverer of a useful chemical compound endures hundreds of failures before his idea works. But his failures are suffered at home. The world does not see them. Only his success is patented. But the social inventor must publish his ideas before he knows whether they will work. He must bring others to his way of thinking before he can even start his experiment. The world is taken into his secret while he is feeling his way. They see his ideas in the “ism” stage. To the negative democrat this brings no discredit; he has no device to offer. To the constructive democrat it brings the stigma of faddism. The conservatives see in him not only the radical, but also the crank with a machine that might possibly work.

Greeley’s *Tribune*, prior to 1854, was the first and only great vehicle this country has known for the ideas and experiments of constructive democracy. The fact that the circulation of the newspaper doubled and redoubled beyond anything then known in journalism, and in the fact of virulence heaped on ridicule, proves that the nation, too, was feeling its way toward this new democracy.

Naturally enough, Greeley was a puzzle both to the radicals and to the standpats of his day. The *Working Man’s Advocate*³ said of him:

If ever there was a nondescript, it is Horace Greeley. One night you may hear him make a patriotic speech at a Repeal⁴ meeting.

³ *Working Man’s Advocate*, June 29, 1844, p. 3, col. 4.

⁴ Repeal of the Act uniting Ireland with England.—Ed.

The next day, he will uphold a labor-swindling, paper-money system. . . . We should be sorry to be driven to the conclusion that such a man could be actuated only by paltry partyism.

The Abolitionists were incensed when he wrote to the Antislavery Convention at Cincinnati that white slavery in the North claimed his first efforts. The Whigs and protectionists used him, but dreaded him. The New York *Express* charged him with

Attempting incessantly . . . to excite the prejudices of the poor against the rich, and in the general, to array one class of society against the other. . . . We charge the *Tribune* . . . with representing constantly that there is a large amount of suffering arising from want of employment, and that this employment the rich might give. We charge the *Tribune* with over-rating entirely the suffering of the poor . . . all of which tallies with, and is a portion of the very material, which our opponents use to prejudice the poor against the Whigs as a party.⁵

Two years after this attack by the *Express*, the *Courier* read him out of the party:

There can be no peace in the Whig ranks while the New York *Tribune* is continued to be called Whig. . . . The principles of the Whig party are well defined; they are conservative, and inculcate a regard for the laws and support of all the established institutions of the country. They eschew radicalism in every form; they sustain the constitution and the laws; they foster a spirit of patriotism. . . . The better way for the *Tribune* would be at once to admit that it is only Whig on the subject of the Tariff . . . and then devote itself to the advocacy of Anti-rent, Abolition, Fourierite and Vote-yourself-a-farm doctrines.⁶

These quotations give us the ground of Greeley's "isms"—the elevation of labor by protecting and reorganizing industry. Even the protective tariff, favored by the Whigs, was something different in his hands. The tariff arguments of his boyhood had been capitalistic arguments. Protect capital, their spokesmen said, because wages are too high in this country. Eventually wages will come toward the European level and we shall not need protection. Greeley reversed the plea: protect the wage-earner, he said, in order that he may rise

⁵ Quoted in New York *Tribune*, Aug. 5, 1845, p. 2, col. 2.

⁶ New York *Courier and Enquirer*, Aug. 14, 1847; quoted in *Weekly Tribune*, Aug. 21, 1847, p. 3, col. 5.

above his present condition of wages slavery. The only way to protect him against the foreign pauper is to protect the price of his product. But, since capital owns and sells his product, we needs must first protect capital. This is unfortunate, and we must help the laborer as soon as possible to own and sell his product himself. "We know right well," he says,⁷ "that a protective tariff cannot redress all wrongs. . . . The extent of its power to benefit the Laborer is limited by the force and pressure of domestic competition, for which Political Economy has as yet devised no remedy. . . ."

Here was a field for his socialism. It would do for domestic competition what protection would do for foreign competition. Protectionism and socialism were the two wheels of Greeley's bicycle. He had not learned to ride on one.

But the socialism which Greeley espoused would not be recognized today. It is now condescendingly spelled "utopism." He felt that the employers were victims of domestic competition just as were the laborers, and he assumed that they would be just as glad as the laborers to take something else. What he offered to both was a socialism of class harmony, not one of class struggle.

In the idealistic interpretation of history there are two kinds of idealism—a higher and a lower. Greeley's significance is the struggle of the two in his mind, the elimination of the unfit from each, and the survival and coalescence of the fit in the Republican Party. The higher idealism came to him through the transcendental philosophers of his time. The lower came from the working classes. The higher idealism was humanitarian, harmonizing, persuasive. The lower was class-conscious, aggressive, coercive. The higher was a plea for justice; the lower a demand for rights. In 1840, Greeley was a higher idealist. In 1847, he had shaved down the higher and dove-tailed in the lower. In 1854, the Republican Party built both into a platform.

Let us see the origins of these two levels of idealism before they came to Greeley.

Boston we are told, is not a place—it is a state of mind. But every place has its state of mind. The American pioneer, in his frontier cabin, in the rare moments which his battle with gigantic Nature leaves free for reflection, contemplates himself as a trifle in a suc-

⁷ *Tribune*, March 27, 1845, p. 2, col. 2.

cession of accidents. To him comes the revivalist, with his faith in a God of power and justice, and the pioneer enters upon a state of mind that constructs order out of accident and unites him with the almighty Ruler of Nature. This was the state of mind of Boston when Boston was Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth Colony.

But Massachusetts grew in wealth. Wealth is merely Nature subdued to man. Capital is the forces of Nature taking orders from property-owners. God is no longer appreciated as an ally for helpless man. The revivalist becomes the priest and the protector of capital.

Now a new contest begins. Capital requires labor to utilize it. Labor depends on capital for a living. The contest is not between man and Nature, but between man and the owner of capitalized Nature. Boston saw the first outbreaks of the struggle in 1825 and 1832. In the former year the house-carpenters, in the latter year the ship-carpenters, determined that no longer would they work from sunrise to sunset. They conspired together and quit in a body. In the former year the capitalists, with Harrison Gray Otis at their head, in the latter year the merchant princes whose ships traversed the globe, took counsel together and published in the papers their ultimatum requiring their workmen to continue as before from dawn to dark.⁸ Losing their contention, the workmen again in 1835 began a general strike for the ten-hour day throughout the Boston district, only again to lose. Meanwhile the factory system had grown up at Lowell and other places, with its women and children on duty thirteen and fourteen hours a day, living in company houses, eating at the company table, and required to attend the company church. While some of the ten-hour strikes of 1835 had been successful in Philadelphia and in New York, the working people of New England were doomed for the most part to the long day for another fifteen years.

It was in the midst of this economic struggle that unitarianism and transcendentalism took hold of the clergy. These movements were a revolt against the predicament in which the God of Nature had unwittingly been made the God of Capital. They were a secession back to the God of Man. At first the ideas were transcendental, metaphysical, allegorical, harmless. This was while the working men were aggressive and defiant in their demands and strikes. But, after

⁸ See vol. v, chap. vii.

1837 and during the seven years of industrial depression and helplessness of the working men following that year of panic, transcendentalism became pragmatic. Its younger spokesmen allied themselves with labor. They tried to get the same experience as manual workers, and to think and feel like them. Brook Farm was the zealous expression in 1842 of this struggle for reality and for actual unity; and after 1843 the Brook Farm representatives began to show up at the newly-organized New England and New York conventions of working men, calling themselves also by the lofty name of "working men" delegates.

But this was not enough. Reality demanded more than unity of sentiment. It demanded reconstruction of society on the principle of unity. At this juncture, 1840, Albert Brisbane came forward with his americanization of Charles Fourier's scheme of social reorganization. Here was a definite plan, patterned on what seemed to be a scientific study of society and of psychology. Brook Farm welcomed it and tried it. Greeley clothed himself with it as gladly as Pilgrim put on the armor after the slough of despond. He opened the columns of the *Tribune* to Brisbane. He became a director of the North American Phalanx, president of the American Union of Associationists, editorial propagandist and platform expounder. Total reorganization of society based on harmony of interest; brotherhood of capital, labor, and ability; substitute for competition which enslaved labor in spite of the natural sympathy of the capitalist for his oppressed workmen; faith in the goodness of human nature if scientifically directed—these were the exalted ideas and naïve assumptions that elicited the devotion of Greeley and his fellow-disciples of the gospel of transcendentalism.

Two things disabused his mind. One was the actual failure and bankruptcy of his beloved phalanxes; the other was the logic and agitation of the working men. The higher idealism dissolved like a pillar of cloud, but it had led the way to the solid ground of the lower idealism. What were the origins of this lower idealism?

Three years ago, in England at Newcastle-on-Tyne, in the company of a working man official of a trade union, I visited the thousand acres of moorland belonging to the medieval city and now kept open as a great playground within the modern city. My trade-union official showed me the thousands of working men and their

families enjoying themselves in the open air. I asked him about the fifty or a hundred cows that I saw calmly eating grass in the midst of this public park. He explained that these cattle belonged to the descendants of the ancient freemen of Newcastle, who, in return for defending the town against the Scots, had been granted rights of pasturage outside the town. He said there had recently been a great struggle in Newcastle, when these freemen wanted to enclose the moor, to lease it for cultivation, and to divide the rents among themselves. The working men of the city rose up as one man and stopped this undertaking. But they could not get rid of the cows.

One hundred and thirty years before this time, in the year 1775, Newcastle had seen a similar struggle. At that time the freemen were successful; they succeeded in having the rentals from a part of the moor, which had been enclosed and leased, paid over in equal parts to each of them. Thomas Spence, netmaker, thereupon conceived an idea. He read a paper before the Philosophical Society of Newcastle, proposing that all the land of England should be leased and the proceeds divided equally among all the people of England. He was promptly expelled from the Philosophical Society. He went to London and published his scheme in a book.⁹ In 1829, the book came to New York and furnished the platform for the first working men's political party. This party americanized Spence by amending the Declaration of Independence. They made it read: "All men are equal, and have an inalienable right to life, liberty and property."

George Henry Evans, also Englishman by birth but American by childhood and by apprenticeship in a printing-office at Ithaca, started a paper, the *Working Man's Advocate*, in 1829, and became the thinker of the working men's party. But before he began to think he adopted the motto of the party as the motto of his paper: "All children are entitled to equal education; all adults to equal property; and all mankind to equal privileges." He soon saw his mistake, as did most of the other working men. Every individual has a right to an unlimited amount of that kind of property which he produces by his own labor and without aid from the coerced labor of others. Such an unlimited right is inconsistent with equality, and therefore equal right to property can be asserted only as regards that which is not the product of his own or another's labor, namely,

⁹ Davidson, J. M. *Four Precursors of Henry George* (London, 1899), 26.

land. But the holders of the existing private property in land could not be displaced without a violent revolution. This Evans saw from the violent attacks made on him and the working men's party. But there was an immense area still belonging to the people and not yet divided. This was the public domain. There man's equal right to land could be asserted. He sent marked copies of his paper to Andrew Jackson in 1832, before Jackson's message on the sale of the public lands. The working men's party disappeared and was followed by the trades' unions of 1835 and 1836. The sudden rise of prices and the increased cost of living compelled labor to organize and strike throughout the eastern cities, from Washington to Boston. These strikes were for the most part successful; but the workmen saw prices and rents go up and swallow more than the gains achieved by striking. Evans pointed out the reason why their efforts were futile. The working men were bottled up in the cities. Land speculation kept them from taking up vacant land near by or in the west. If they could only get away and take up land, then they would not need to strike. Labor would become scarce. Employers would advance wages and landlords would reduce rents. Not for the sake of those who moved west did Evans advocate freedom of the public lands, but for the sake of those who remained east. This was the idea that he added to the idea of Andrew Jackson and Andrew Johnson. Theirs was the squatter's idea of the public domain—territory to be occupied and defended with a gun, because the occupant was on the ground. His was the idealistic view of the public domain—the natural right of all men to land, just as to sunlight, air, and water. The working men of the east were slaves because their right to land was denied. They were slaves, not to individual masters like the negroes, but to a master class which owned their means of livelihood. Freedom of the public lands would be freedom for the white slave. Even the chattel slave would not be free if slavery were abolished without providing first that each freedman should have land of his own. Freedom of the public lands should be established before slavery is abolished.

These views were not original with Evans. They were the common property of his fellows, born of their common experience, formulated in their mutual intercourse and expressed in the platforms of their party and the resolutions of their trades' unions. Thus at

the first convention of the National Trades' Union, in 1834, one of the resolutions recited, as clearly as Evans did later, the connection between surplus labor and land speculation. But it was Evans, mainly, who gathered these ideas together and framed them into a system. He and his disciple, Lewis Masquerier, worked out the three cardinal points of a natural right: equality, inalienability, individuality. Men have equal rights to land because each man is a unit. This right is inalienable; a man can not sell nor mortgage his natural right to land, nor have it taken away from him for debt, any more than he can sell himself or be imprisoned for debt. This right belongs to the individual as such, not to corporations or associations. Here was his criticism of communism and Fourierism. Establish the individual right to the soil, and then men will be free to go into, or stay out of, communities as they please. "Association" will then be voluntary, not coercive, as Fourierism would make it. Thus did the communistic agrarianism of Thomas Spence and of the Working Men's Party of 1829 filter down into the individualistic idealism of American labor reform in 1844.

When the labor movement broke down with the panic of 1837, Evans retired to a farm in New Jersey, but kept his printing-press. When the labor movement started up again in 1844, he returned to New York and again started his paper, the *Working Man's Advocate*, later changing the name to *Young America*. He and his friends organized a party known as National Reformers, and asked the candidates of all other parties to sign a pledge to vote for a homestead law. If no candidate signed, they placed their own tickets in the field. They printed pamphlets, one of which, *Vote Yourself a Farm*, was circulated by the hundred thousand. In 1845, they united with the New England Working Men's Association to call a national convention, which, under the name of the Industrial Congress, held sessions from 1845 to 1856. The main plank in the platform of the New England Working Men's Association had been a demand for a ten-hour law; and the two planks, land reform and ten hours for labor, were the platform of the Industrial Congress. Through the New England Association the Brook Farmers and other Fourierists came into the land-reform movement.

It was in the latter part of 1845 that Greeley began to notice the homestead agitation. For the *Tribune* he wrote an editorial begin-

ning with his recollections of the working men's party which he had found fourteen years before when he came to New York. Now, he said, there had come into existence "a new party styled 'National Reformers' composed of like materials and in good part of the same men with the old Working Men's Party." He then describes their scheme of a homestead law and adds his qualified approval.

Evans, in his *Young America*, commented on this editorial, and especially on Greeley's assertion that the reason why the working men's measures had not sooner attracted attention was that they had been put forth under what he called "unpopular auspices." Evans said:

All reforms are presented under "unpopular auspices," because they are presented by a minority who have wisdom to see and courage to avow the right in the face of unpopularity; and all reforms are pushed ahead by popularity-hunters as soon as the pioneers have cleared the way. I do not mean to class the editor of the *Tribune* amongst the popularity-hunters, but simply to express a truth called forth by his rather equivocal designation of that enlightened and patriotic body of men who, if the history of this State and Union be ever truly written, will be prominent in it as the "Working Men's Party."¹⁰

Five months later Greeley definitely committed himself to the working men's platform, and to the reasoning with which they supported it.

The freedom of the Public Lands to actual settlers, and the limitation of future acquisitions of land to some reasonable amount, are also measures which seem to us vitally necessary to the ultimate emancipation of labor from thralldom and misery. What is mainly wanted is that each man should have an assured chance to earn, and then an assurance of the just fruits of his labors. We must achieve these results yet; we can do it. Every new labor-saving invention is a new argument, an added necessity for it. And, so long as the laboring class must live by working for others, while others are striving to live luxuriously and amass wealth out of the fruits of such labor, so long the abuses and sufferings now complained of must continue to exist or frequently reappear. We must go to the root of the evil.¹¹

From the date when Greeley took up the measure it advanced

¹⁰ *Young America* (New York), Nov. 29, 1845.

¹¹ *Weekly Tribune*, May 2, 1846, p. 3, col. 3.

throughout the northern states by rapid bounds. He used precisely the language and arguments of the *Working Man's Advocate*.

The National Reformers and the Industrial Congress had worked out logically three kinds of legislation corresponding to Evans's three cardinal points of man's natural right to the soil. These were land limitation, based on equality; homestead exemption, based on inalienability; freedom of the public lands, based on individuality.

In order that the rights of all might be equal, the right of each must be limited. For the older states it was proposed that land limitation should take effect only on the death of the owner. Land was not to be inherited in larger quantities than one hundred and sixty or three hundred and twenty acres. Wisconsin was the only state in which this measure got as far as a vote in the legislature, that of 1851, where it was carried in the lower house by majorities on two votes but was defeated on a final vote. The struggle was exciting and Greeley watched it eagerly. Then he wrote:

Well, this was the first earnest trial to establish a great and salutary principle; it will not be the last. It will yet be carried, and Wisconsin will not need half so many poor houses in 1900 as she would have required if land limitation had never been thought of.¹²

The measure was brought up in the New York legislature and was vigorously advocated by Greeley, but without decisive action.

The second kind of legislation, based on man's natural right to the soil, was homestead exemption. Projects of this class were far more successful than those looking to the limitation of holdings. Exemption legislation swept over all the states, beginning with Wisconsin in 1847,¹³ but in mutilated form. The working men demanded absolute inalienability for each homestead, as complete as that of the nobility of Europe for each estate. But the laws actually enacted have not prohibited sale or mortgage of the homestead, as Evans proposed. They have merely prohibited levy and execution on account of debts not secured by mortgage. Voluntary alienation is allowed. Coercive alienation is denied. Greeley and the working men would have disallowed both.

¹² *Tribune*, March 27, 1851.

¹³ The legislation of Texas in 1829 and 1837 was entirely different in character and motive. Somewhat similar laws had been adopted in Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, and Florida prior to 1845, as a result of the panic of 1837.

Freedom of the public lands was the third sort of legislation demanded. Every individual not possessed of one hundred and sixty acres of land should be free to get his equal share in fee-simple out of the public domain, without cost. The public domain, it was argued, belongs, not to the states nor to the collective people of all the states, nor to the landowners and taxpayers of the states, but to each individual whose natural right has not as yet been satisfied. America is fortunate in having this vast domain unoccupied. Here all the cardinal points of a natural right can be legalized without damaging vested rights: individuality, by private property without cost; equality, by limitation to one hundred and sixty acres; inalienability, by homestead exemption. The universally accepted notion, based on the then rate of migration, that it would require several hundred years to occupy the public domain, gives color to their optimistic expectations of the effect of free land on wages. This was the idealistic vision in 1844 of the Republican Party's first great act in 1862.

Greeley espoused all of these measures. He himself introduced a homestead bill in Congress in 1848. He urged land limitation and homestead exemption upon the state legislatures. The *Tribune* carried his message throughout the north and prepared the mind of the people for the constructive work of the future.

I might speak of others who helped to carry the working men's idealism into republican reality. I will mention only Galusha A. Grow, the "father of the Republican Party," and Alvan E. Bovay, the disciple of Evans.

Galusha Grow's first great speech in Congress, in 1852, on Andrew Johnson's Homestead Bill, was printed by him under the title "Man's Right to the Soil," and was merely an oratorical transcript from the *Working Man's Advocate*.

The other less distinguished father was Alvan E. Bovay. For him has been claimed the credit of first suggesting to Greeley the name Republican Party, and of bringing together under the name the first little group of men from the Whig, Democratic, and Free Soil Parties at Ripon, Wisconsin, in 1854.¹⁴ Bovay had moved to Wisconsin in

¹⁴ Curtis, F. *History of the Republican Party* (New York, 1904), vol. i, 173. There were doubtless other spots of independent origin. See A. J. Turner's *Genesis of the Republican Party* (Portage, Wis., 1898), pamphlet.

1850. Before that time, as our documents for the first time bring to light, he had been associated with Evans and with the Working Men's Party in New York, almost from its beginning in 1844. He was secretary, treasurer and delegate to the Industrial Congress. It was in New York that he became acquainted with Greeley. Bovay's speeches were reported at length in the *Working Man's Advocate* and *Young America*, and his letters frequently appeared in the *Tribune*. Whether he was the only father of the party or not, it is significant that it was these early views on the natural right to land, derived from Evans and the working men, that appeared in the Republican Party wherever that party sprang into being. It is also an interesting fact that the working men were accustomed to speak of theirs as the true Republican Party; and that Evans, in his paper in 1846, predicts that the National Reformers mark the beginning of the period when there "will be but two parties, the great Republican Party of Progress and the little Tory Party of Holdbacks."¹⁵

Greeley also took up the ten-hour plank of the Working Men's Party. Prior to 1845, under the influence of Fourierism, he had opposed labor legislation. In 1844 he wrote:

The relations of Labor and Capital present a vast theme, . . . Government cannot intermeddle with them without doing great mischief. They are too delicate, complex and vitally important to be trusted to the clumsy handling of raw and shallow legislators. . . . The evils . . . are Social, not Political, and are to be reached and corrected by Social remedies. . . . Legislation to correct such abuses can seldom do much good and will often do great harm. . . .¹⁶

His idea of the harmony of interests is seen in his hope that employers would reduce the hours of labor by agreement. "We do hope to see this year," he wrote in 1844, "a general convention of those interested in Factory Labor to fix and declare the proper hours of labor, which all shall respect and abide by. . . ."¹⁷ And when the first Industrial Congress was about to assemble he wrote:

An Industrial Congress, composed of representatives of Employers and Workmen, in equal numbers, ought to be assembled, to regulate generally the conditions of Labor. . . . A general provision, to operate

¹⁵ *Young America*, March 21, 1846, p. 2, col. 3.

¹⁶ *Tribune*, Jan. 25, 1844, p. 2, col. 1; Feb. 16, 1844, p. 2, col. 2.

¹⁷ *Tribune*, Feb. 16, 1844, p. 2, col. 1.

co-extensively with the Union, that ten hours shall constitute a day's work, might be adopted without injury to any and with signal benefit to all. . . .¹⁸

After the Congress he wrote again:

We should, indeed, greatly prefer that a satisfactory adjustment were arrived at without invoking the aid of the law-making power, except possibly in behalf of minors. We believe if the matter is only approached in the right way by those interested, discussed in the proper spirit, and pursued with reasonable earnestness and perseverance that legislation will be found superfluous. . . . How many hours shall constitute a day's or a week's work should be settled in each department by a general Council or Congress of all interested therein, whose decision should be morally binding on all and respected by our Courts of Justice.¹⁹

But, with the failure of the Industrial Congress to bring in the employers, Greeley aggressively adopted the legislative program of the working men and harmonized it with his theory of the protective tariff. Before this he had written:

If it be possible to interpose the power of the State beneficently in the adjustment of the relations of Rich and Poor, it must be evident that internal and not external measures like the Tariff would be requisite. A Tariff affects the relation of Country with Country and cannot reasonably be expected to make itself potently felt in the relations of class with class or individual with individuals.²⁰

Two years afterward, when New Hampshire had adopted the first Ten-hour Law and the employers were violating it, he wrote:

That the owners and agents of factories should see this whole matter in a different light from that it wears to us, we deem unfortunate but not unnatural. It is hard work to convince most men that a change which they think will take five hundred or a thousand dollars out of their pockets respectively is necessary or desirable. We must exercise charity for the infirmities of poor human nature. But we have regretted to see in two or three of the Whig journals of New Hampshire indications of hostility to the Ten-hour regulation, which we can hardly believe dictated by the unbiased judgment of their conductors. . . . What show of argument they contain is of the regular Free Trade stripe, and quite out of place in journals favorable

¹⁸ *Tribune*, Sept. 30, 1845, p. 2, col. 1.

¹⁹ *Weekly Tribune*, Dec. 27, 1845, p. 4, col. 4.

²⁰ *Weekly Tribune*, Aug. 2, 1845, p. 3, col. 1.

to Protection. Complaints of legislative intermeddling with private concerns and engagements, vociferations that Labor can take care of itself and needs no help from legislation—that the law of Supply and Demand will adjust this matter, &c.—properly belong to journals of the opposite school. We protest against their unnatural and ill-omened appearance in journals of the true faith. . . . To talk of the Freedom of Labor, the policy of leaving it to make its own bargains, &c. when the fact is that a man who has a family to support and a house hired for the year is told, 'If you will work thirteen hours per day, or as many as we think fit, you can stay, if not, you can have your walking papers; and well you know that no one else hereabout will hire you'—is it not the most egregious flummery?²¹

These and other quotations from Greeley in volumes vii and viii depict the evolution of the theory of the protective tariff out of the Whig theory into the Republican theory. The Whig idea was protection for the sake of capital. Greeley's idea was protection for the sake of labor. The Whigs did not approve of Greeley, but his theory was useful in 1840, and in that year they hired him to get out campaign literature. At that time he was a higher idealist, a transcendentalist, a zealot for harmony of interests, and believed that capitalists would voluntarily coöperate with labor and need not be coerced by legislation. He was disabused of this notion when he saw the way in which employers treated the ten-hour movement. Whatever the working men had gained on this point they had gained against the Whigs, through Jackson, Van Buren, and the Democrats. Modifying his faith in harmony of interests, he took up legislation in behalf of class interests and rounded out a theory of labor legislation by the states to supplement protective tariff legislation by Congress. This became the Republican theory of protection in place of the dying Whig theory.

Thus have I sketched the origin and evolution of the two species of idealism as they appear here in our documents and as they struggled for existence in this epoch of American history. This biology of ideas exhibits both an adaptation to and a rejection of the contemporaneous economic development. The transcendentalism of New England, with its humanized God and its deified man, was rather a protest against the new economic conditions than a product of them. As the years advanced and industrial anarchy

²¹ *Weekly Tribune*, Sept. 18, 1847. p. 5, col. 2.

deepened, the protest turned to reconstruction. But the tools and materials for the new structure were not politics and legislation, but an idealized, transcendental working man. Transcendentalism resurrected man, but not the real man. It remained for the latter, the man in the struggle, to find his own way out. By failure and success, by defeat, by victory often fruitless, he felt along the line of obstacles for the point of least resistance. But he, too, needed a philosophy—not one that would idealize him, but one that would help him to win a victory. Shorter hours of labor, freedom to escape from economic oppression, these were the needs that he felt. His inalienable "natural right" to life, liberty, land, and the products of his own labor—this was his philosophy. Politics and legislation were his instruments.

It is easy to show that "natural rights" are a myth, but they are, nevertheless, a fact of history. It was the working men's doctrine of natural rights that enabled the squatter to find an idealistic justification for seizing land and holding it in defiance of law. "Natural right," here as elsewhere, was the effective assailant of legal right. Had it not been for this theoretic setting, our land legislation might have been piecemeal and opportunist like the English—merely a temporizing concession to the squatters on account of the difficulty of subduing them by armed force. Such an opportunist view, without the justification of natural rights, could not have aroused enthusiasm nor created a popular movement nor furnished a platform for a political party. The Republican Party was not an anti-slavery party. It was a homestead party. On this point its position was identical with that of the working men. Just because slavery could not live on one-hundred-sixty-acre farms did the Republican Party come into conflict with slavery.

Thus has the idealism of American history both issued from and counteracted its materialism. The editorial columns of the *Tribune* from 1841 to 1854 are its documentary records. There we see the two main currents of idealism passing through the mind of Greeley and coming out a constructive program for the reorganization of society.

But, from the standpoint of the actual laborer, in his need of leisure and wages, idealism, whether high or low, is too remote. Even legislation shortening the hours of labor proved hopeless in

face of the trickery of politics and the crudity of bill-drafting. Not until another generation had passed did labor legislation begin appreciably to affect the condition of labor. But the wage-earners of the forties, like the wage-earners before and since, could not wait upon the deliberations of philosophy or the windings of politics. Wages, hours of labor, and cost of living are immediate facts and require urgent attention. It could not be expected, even were such facts appreciated, that such attention would be devoted, by humanitarians and politicians. The working men perforce resorted to measures independent of reliance on others. The strikes of 1843, at the brief revival of business, attest their unphilosophical mode of reform. Afterward, when business sagged and strikes failed, they resorted to coöperation. At first criticized as partial and superficial by associationists and by land reformers, the remarkable coöperative movement in New England, under the name of Protective Unions, ultimately secured their endorsement. In fact, to Greeley's eager and practical mind, coöperation, initiated and managed by workmen themselves, was the finest fruit of Fourierism. It seemed to assure the independence of labor without hostility to capital. And this was true even when coöperation advanced from the distributive form, designed to supplant the retail merchant, to the productive form, designed to displace the employer. This curious transition in the labor movement reached its height in 1850, in the industrial councils and working men's congresses of New York, Boston, and Pittsburgh. The labor organizations of that date combined productive coöperation and strikes as the two equally effective modes of attack on employers. If not successful by means of strikes they would become their own employers by means of coöperation. Utterly unsuccessful in this distracting program, the movement disappeared in 1851, and it was not until 1853 that trade unionism took on its modern form and policies. Forced again by a rise of prices and cost of living to get immediate results, the working men broke away from the beneficial and coöperative side-shows of the preceding ten years. In order to get and retain an advance in wages they now began also to demand the recognition of their unions, and for the first time we find as much importance attached to the minimum wage, the "closed shop," the ratio of apprentices, the secrecy of proceedings, as was attached to shorter hours and higher pay.

Fugitive Slave Law and the Kansas-Nebraska Bill marked the turning-point of the political movement. The era of talk gave way to the era of action. The struggle of the small farmer against the plantation slave-owner was parallel with the struggle of organized labor against organized capital. In the one case it was an "irrepressible conflict" ending only in the arbitrament of war. In the other, it is the rising menace of western civilization. In both cases the philosophizing of the forties prepared the minds of men for a new level of action. The right of labor to organize for defense or aggression came finally to be as fully accepted in 1853 as it has been at any time thereafter. And this has deep significance. For, social struggle is not precipitated by the fundamental economic or moral issue at stake, but rather by the methods and strategic positions that opposing social classes adopt and occupy in order afterward to dominate the fundamental issue. Thus it was that the political crisis and the Civil War occurred, not on the question of the existence or non-existence of slavery nor on that of the enactment of a homestead law, but on the right of the slave power to extend and strengthen its organization. So the struggle of capital and labor since the decade of the forties has not occurred on the right to organize and strike, but on the right to use the weapons of struggle and to extend the control of organization. Prior to that time labor organizations trusted to the moral effect of a strike and an appeal to the public to preserve the victory. Since that time they more and more rely on the preservation of the union with its weapons of limited apprenticeship, closed shop, minimum wage, and the like.

Horace Greeley was as truly the prophet of this higher labor movement as he was the prophet of the political movement. His crude idea of an Industrial Congress in 1844, to be composed equally of employers and workmen, had evolved in 1853 into the modern idea of the joint trade-agreement of the trade union and the employers' association. Not the domination of one class and the submission of another, but the equilibrium of two classes through their own representative government and rules of procedure, was the burden of his message to both employer and laborer. And may it not be that the struggle of capital and labor, unlike that of plantation and homestead, shall avoid the irrepressible conflict by accepting this high ideal of the joint trade-agreement as it emerged from

HOWARD K. BEALE

ONE OF THE most enduring controversies in American historical writing concerns the causes of the Civil War. When consideration is given to the number of interpretations which have appeared during the last ninety years, one is not only surprised at their variety but dismayed that well-informed historians have not come closer to agreement.

Although the background of any war is complex enough to justify considerable difference of opinion, here the primary sources of disagreement appear to have been related to the preconceptions of historians as well as to the intricacies of the subject matter. More often than not, analyses of the causes of the Civil War have depended largely upon the sectional loyalties of their authors. With the passing of time increasingly subtle and less violent expressions of these sympathies are recorded, yet no one would deny that they continue to permeate historical writing. Along with the geographic origin of the writer, perhaps a book's date of publication gives the broadest suggestion of what the reader may expect. For example, a book written after the influence of Charles Beard and Frederick Jackson Turner had been established would be likely to call attention to economic factors whereas an earlier treatise would not.

This observation about differences of opinion among historians does less than justice to the steady growth of understanding which has resulted from the historians' successful search for objective truth. Although there are still controversies, the area of agreement becomes increasingly large. Many northern writers

have succeeded, for example, in premising their work upon a sympathy for the South's legitimate needs; similarly, southern historians have progressed from defending their section's position to explaining it.

Since no single writer has produced an analysis which even begins to suggest the variety of manners in which the Civil War has been explained, a departure has been made from the general scheme of this collection to permit the inclusion of a study of historical writings on the subject. Historians have felt an increasing need to arrive at some agreement concerning the methods and terminology used in historical analysis. Several years ago this desire expressed itself in a committee organized under the auspices of the Social Science Research Council for the purpose of helping to "clarify thought about history." As a part of the committee's program Howard K. Beale prepared a summary of what historians had said about the causes of the Civil War from the time of its inception to the present. For the uninitiated the mass of names which Beale includes does not have great meaning. However, the primary reason for reproducing the article here lies not in its identification of specific historians but in the variety of explanations which it suggests for the war itself. Even a beginning student should obtain some sense of the complexity of historical problems and the danger of oversimplified solutions. Beale's analysis is well designed to serve as a warning against the easy dogmatism that sometimes accompanies the first glimmers of understanding.

For the more serious student, Beale's article offers a review of the development of historical thought and even some indication of general ideological patterns in American culture during the last three quarters of a century. At one or more of the levels at which it may be appreciated, the analysis should provide useful insight into the background of the Civil War and the historians who have written about it.

What Historians Have Said about the Causes of the Civil War

ANALYSIS of historians' efforts to explain the coming of the American Civil War reveals a surprising variety of attitudes toward that conflict and toward causation in general. In their methods of dealing with causes, historians fall into three groups. Some explicitly raise and answer questions of "why" and "how." Others, without actually dealing with causes, order their material in sequences in which causation is implicit. Still others eschew all effort at interpretation, perhaps because interpretation is to them wrong, impossible, or perilous; they present the Civil War and its antecedents as "merely chaos floating into chaos," as Charles Beard once described the result of refusal to attempt interpretation of historical facts—in itself an interpretation. One can read, for example, eighteen hundred pages of John B. McMaster's cataloguing of information about the three ante-bellum decades without discovering therein any hint or implication of causality.

Even as they begin their work historians differ widely in their predispositions. Some exhibit a cocksureness that brooks no questioning of their possession of all the answers; others display tentativeness and modesty sprung from experience with the difficulty of diagnosing human motives and values. Some authors have attained an impartiality and detachment that make their frames of reference difficult to determine; others, while professing "objectivity," write with patent though unavowed bias; still others frankly confess their own philosophy and then, within its limits, exhibit fairmindedness that approaches the objectivity of the more exact sciences.

Historians, whatever their predispositions, assign to the Civil War

From *Social Science Research Bulletin* 54, "Theory and Practice in Historical Study: A Report of the Committee on Historiography," by permission of the Social Science Research Council, New York.

causes ranging from one simple force or phenomenon to patterns so complex and manifold that they include, intricately interwoven, all the important movements, thoughts, and actions of the decades before 1861. One writer finds in events of the immediately preceding years an adequate explanation of the War; another feels he must begin his story with 1831 or even 1820; still another goes back to the importation of the first slaves, to descriptions of geographic differences before white men appeared, or to differentiation in Europe between those who settled North and South. For instance, John W. Draper treated at length such subjects as geography, the Negro in Africa, colonization of America, the white man in Europe, the Saxon and Norman invasions of England, and the shift from Roman to Gothic architecture; out of 634 pages of his *American Civil War* devoted to the coming of war, 350 pages dealt with these comparatively remote influences. Moral, ideological, political, economic, social, psychological explanations of the War have been offered. Responsibility has been ascribed both to actions of men and to forces beyond human control. Conspiracy, constitutional interpretation, human wickedness, economic interest, divine will, political ambition, climate, "irrepressible conflict," emotion, rival cultures, high moral principles, and chance have severally been accredited with bringing on the War. There is a Marxian interpretation; also a racist theory.

Certain questions confront every historian of the Civil War who does not merely accept and repeat conventional explanations. First, which facts shall he include? Granted that the Civil War was in a broad sense the consequence of forces and events and experiences that include most of American life and thought prior to 1861 and much of antecedent European and human development, still, if one is to interpret at all, he must choose out of all historical data certain facts that he thinks explain or help to explain the coming of the Civil War. This selection, like all interpretation, necessitates making difficult and sometimes arbitrary decisions. It requires drawing chronological lines back of which the influence is too remote to merit inclusion. It means, too, separating out from the immediate past whatever is necessary to understanding the reasons for the War and distinguishing this material from the nonessential, too meagerly pertinent remainder. One must somewhere break the chain in which A

is caused by B which is caused by C which is caused by D into infinity and the equally endless sequence whereby A is interrelated with B which affects C which influences D which modifies E among contemporaneous forces or men.

This process of selection and emphasis involves evaluation and thought, which are more difficult than fact-collecting. It requires a realization that synthesis often proves merely tentative and hence frequently demands modification as times and techniques and horizons change. Any one author's selection may be questioned by scholars of differing backgrounds. Interpretation is challenging to undertake but full of hazard for the historian's reputation; inherent difficulties make some men avoid it. Unfortunately the men best equipped to interpret adequately are sometimes so appalled by human incapacity to interpret satisfactorily that they deliberately seek to avoid interpreting, and the men who do it with assurance sometimes so little comprehend the perils that they are unsuited to do it at all.

Through their selection of facts, even recent historians, on some subjects, have maintained interpretations as opposite as those of their Northern and Southern ancestors of eighty years ago. For example, in 1939 two books on the slavery controversy appeared simultaneously, one by Dwight L. Dumond, born in Ohio, educated in the North, and professor in Ohio and Michigan, and the other by Arthur Y. Lloyd, born in Kentucky, educated in the South, and professor in a Kentucky teachers' college. Dumond wrote with a sympathy for the anti-slavery cause that might have pleased an abolitionist, and Lloyd with an animosity toward it that would have done credit to a pro-slavery Southerner of 1861. Similarly in their 1930 debate over Lincoln's election, Arthur C. Cole, born in Michigan, educated entirely in the North, and professor in Northern universities, and J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton, born in North Carolina, educated in the South except for his Ph.D. training at Columbia, and long-time professor at the University of North Carolina, looked at the same facts and reached the same diverse conclusions as their fellow-sectionalists in 1861. Cole maintained that Lincoln was moderate and the South had nothing to fear from his election so far as slavery in the states was concerned, whereas Hamilton insisted that Lincoln was radical on the slavery issue and there was "every indi-

cation" that overt "aggression against slavery" was forestalled only by secession. Implicit in Cole's discussion was a belief that slavery was wrong, and he explicitly stated that the "doom of slavery . . . was sealed . . . by the social and economic forces" of nineteenth century America. Implicit in Hamilton's reply was condemnation of Northerners who opposed slavery. Cole made obvious his disapproval of ante-bellum Southern institutions and Hamilton his dislike of ante-bellum Northern critics of the South.

Secondly arises the problem of relating the underlying forces to specific events. Are the series of dramatic episodes, sometimes labeled "immediate causes," that preceded the Civil War "causes," or are they merely surface manifestations of underlying forces? Did they in themselves affect history or are they merely incidents in the unfolding of more significant phenomena that did?

Thirdly, what is the relationship of the sectional conflict to the War? Can the two be separated? If war need not have arisen from sectional conflict, then which forces were the causes of the conflict and which of the War, and what bearing does one set of causes have on the other?

Fourthly, what influence did the actors who dominated the ante-bellum scene exert upon these historic forces and events?

The answers to these questions in histories of the Civil War, whether implicit or expressed, depend upon the background and training of the writers, upon the time and place in which they lived and wrote, and upon their philosophies of history and of life or their lack of any conscious philosophies.

I

Conspiracy of selfish or wicked men—under what one might call the "devil theory" of history—was once widely accredited, particularly in the period from 1861 to 1900, as a cause of the Civil War. Indeed, some writers have called it "*the cause.*" But there are Southern "devils" and Northern "devils," and this conspiracy hypothesis has two faces.

Southern writers describe an aggressive North determined to destroy the South and its institutions. Chief among the offenders, of course, were the abolitionists bent on stirring up servile insurrection and encouraging slaves to escape. The peace of the Union was dis-

turbed by the fanaticism of the abolition attack; forces in the South that might require apology are explained as part of the South's reaction to the unreasoning outburst against it, and may therefore be blamed upon the abolitionists. Important factors that brought on the War were: the *Liberator*; anti-slavery societies; irritating activities of the anti-slavery forces in Congress led by John Quincy Adams and Joshua Giddings in the 'thirties and 'forties; the organized flood of abolition petitions; formation of the Free-Soil Party; efforts to deprive the South of its just gains in the settling of Texas and winning the Mexican War; the persistent reappearance of the Wilmot Proviso; machinations of the New England Emigrant Aid Society; John Brown's activities in Kansas including the "Pottawatomie massacre"; Northern refusal to admit Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution; free-state men's refusal to obey the Fugitive Slave Act; successful work of the Underground Railway; personal liberty laws and slave rescues; attacks on the slave trade and slavery in the District of Columbia; anti-Southern activities of anti-slavery clergy, speakers, and press; charges that Southern institutions and Southerners themselves were evil; organization of the Republicans as a sectional party bent on ruining and then ruling the South; Republicans' espousal of the anti-slavery cause; their circulation of *Uncle Tom's Cabin* and Helper's *Impending Crisis*; attacks of Chase, Seward, and Sumner in Congress; Northern refusal to accept the Dred Scott Decision; reputed Republican intention to destroy slavery in the states; the North's greed for power and determination to aggrandize itself; Lincoln's "radical" anti-slavery, anti-Southern attitudes; Lincoln's election with all it implied in Southern minds; Republican defeat of compromise efforts; attempts to provision Sumter; and Republican determination to "coerce" Southern states. According to this theory, Northerners were persistently aggressive against a South that loved the Union and merely wished to be let alone with proper respect, under the Constitution, for its local institutions. Repeatedly the North violated the Constitution, broke its promises, and repudiated compromise agreements. Northerners were guilty of hypocrisy and sophistry. The phrases "Black Republicans" and "abolitionists," loosely applied, symbolize the attitude of this school of writers. Unprovoked Northern attack, they maintain, forced the South first to secede, and later to fight, purely in self-defense.

A Northern counterpart of this explanation portrays a conspiracy of slaveholders determined to rule the Union or break it. The plot had been laid long before the War and the conspirators included men in high national offices who used those offices to further their schemes of overthrowing the Constitution they were sworn to serve. The conspirators' aim was, of course, to force the nation to accept slavery and to protect slavery by national power, not only in Southern states but in all territories, and ultimately in Northern states as well. According to the "slaveholders' conspiracy" theory the factors that brought war were much like those named above but with a reverse emphasis. They included: constant attacks on anti-slavery men; the gag resolution by which Congress for a time refused to receive petitions; the effort to censure venerable John Quincy Adams because of his "courageous stand" for "democratic principles"; pro-slavery agitation in Congress; exclusion of free discussion of slavery in the South, violence or threats of violence against anti-slavery advocates in the South, and acts like driving Judge Hoar, official representative of Massachusetts, from South Carolina; plotting to add to slave area by annexation of Texas and by war with Mexico, coupled with failure to insist upon American claims in Oregon, which would be free territory; later efforts to extend slavery by acquisition of tropical possessions; use of the nation's foreign service for pro-slavery ends; attempts to win the national territories for slavery, exemplified in Calhoun's stand on the constitutional position of slavery in the territories; the plotting of Douglas and pro-slavery senators to pass the Kansas-Nebraska Act and repeal the Missouri Compromise, activities of Missourians in Kansas, Buford's organized effort to capture Kansas for slavery, and acts of violence like the "sack of Lawrence"; Buchanan's pro-Southern policy in Kansas and elsewhere including his effort to foist the Lecompton Constitution upon free Kansas; the Dred Scott Decision, described as a conspiracy of slaveholders, Supreme Court, and President; imposition of the obnoxious Fugitive Slave Act upon an unwilling North; kidnaping of free Negroes; smuggling slaves into America and efforts to legalize the foreign slave trade; propagation of pro-slavery arguments and attacks on "free" institutions by Southern clergy, speakers, and press; substitution of a pro-slavery bloc for the old national parties; determination to entrench slavery and federal protection for it in the Constitution;

the position of Davis, Atchison, and other pro-slavery men in Congress; the Nashville Convention of 1850 and repeated efforts of Rhett, Ruffin, Yancey, and others to break up the Union; the slavery-bred habituation of Southerners to the use of violence, their brandishing of weapons and threats of duels in Congress, and the attack upon Sumner with subsequent lionizing of Brooks for it; Southerners' scheming to split the Democratic Party at Charleston in 1860 in order to insure Lincoln's election so as to force secession on unwilling Southern Unionists; long-continued control of the federal government by Southerners with the aid of their Northern allies and use of that power to settle issues in their own favor to the injury of the North; the slavocracy's determination to hold on to this power or to destroy the Union when they could no longer control it—in short, to rule or ruin; desire of Southern leaders to secede rather than compromise in 1860-1861 and extremists' clever demands intended to defeat compromise while pretending to support it; attack on the Union through secession; seizing of federal properties; and, finally, the firing on Sumter. The attitude of upholders of this view is indicated by their frequent use of "fire-eaters," "slavocracy," "rebels," and, for Northern accomplices, "doughfaces." They charge Southerners with cant and hypocrisy. The North went to war, they say, to defend the Union and the Constitution against unprovoked attack, after repeated violations of the Constitution, breaking of promises, and repudiation of compromise agreements.

Both North and South were flooded with this type of history for years after the War. James G. Blaine, Horace Greeley, John A. Logan, and Henry Wilson were good examples of Northern writers of this type. In 1886 Theodore Roosevelt wrote of the "reckless ambition" of Southern leaders and classed Jefferson Davis with Benedict Arnold. As late as 1904 he still condemned Davis as a traitor. One of the earliest and perhaps the most effective of Southern exponents of the conspiracy view was Edward A. Pollard who put out the first version of his history in 1862. Subsequently, he softened his asperity, but he continued to deny that slavery caused the War and he repeated the charges of Northern aggression in each re-writing. Among numerous Southerners appeared in 1866 one vigorous Northern expounder of the "Northern conspiracy" view. He was Rushmore G. Horton, campaign biographer of Buchanan in 1856, ardent

Democrat, and wartime Copperhead. His history, which sold 75,000 copies, was published by Van Evrie, Horton and Company of New York, who also sponsored "anti-abolition tracts."

A second generation finally dropped the sectional bitterness and partisanship sufficiently to produce from about 1890 to 1920 a number of histories in which the authors attempted to see the points of view of both regions. This period saw the appearance of the works of James Schouler, James Ford Rhodes, John B. McMaster, and Southerners of the Dunning school. These writers were still influenced by their parents' feelings sufficiently to understand their own section better than the rival one. They still exhibited unconscious biases, but they were trying hard to ferret out and overcome them. They did abandon the terms "rebel" and "Black Republican" and ceased to talk about abolitionists' and slaveholders' conspiracies. Northerners stopped speaking of the "War of the Rebellion" and some Southerners began dropping "War between the States." Northerners commenced to pay tribute to the character of Lee, Stephens, and Davis. The Southern picture of Lincoln was redrawn.

Contrary to the general trend, occasional recent examples of reversion to the early "devil theory" have appeared. In 1925 two Texans republished Rushmore G. Horton's work of 1866 with its vigorous expounding of Northern aggression and added a dedication to "Copperheads of the North . . . who refused to bow the knee to the *Baal* of commercial and imperialized aggression." And as late as 1941 Frank L. Owsley described as the cause of the War "the egocentric, the destructive, the evil, the malignant type of sectionalism" of the North and "the abuse and vilification" with which "the moral and intellectual leaders of the North" attacked "slavery and the entire structure of southern society." "Indeed," Owsley averred, ". . . neither Dr. Goebbels nor Virginio Gayda nor Stalin's propaganda agents have as yet been able to plumb the depths of vulgarity and obscenity reached . . . by . . . abolitionists of note."

Yet many of the new generation of historians of the nineteen-twenties and nineteen-thirties in both North and South have produced histories nearly free from even unconscious sectional patriotism. It required a world war, the passage of sixty years, and the rise of a third generation that for the most part had not known veterans of either army to escape the war-bred conviction that war came

through opponents' conspiracy and wickedness. Occasional telltale phrases or inherited attitudes that unmistakably reveal a Northern or a Southern upbringing do crop out. The greater part of this new generation, however, in both sections, have ceased to concern themselves with "blame" for the War and justification of their ancestors and have turned instead to other approaches.

II

As the years passed an increasing number of historians saw the War not as a conspiracy of one group but as a struggle between two groups with irreconcilable interests. It was not until the eighteenthies that Frederick Jackson Turner popularized the word "sectional." Yet much earlier than that the War was interpreted as a quarrel between two rival regions. The terms, however, in which the clash of sections is described have changed time after time.

In the first generation, Southerners interpreted the controversy in terms of constitutional theory and Northerners in terms of conflicting moral standards. Between 1861 and 1900, Southerners, particularly leaders in the losing cause, wrote histories and memoirs seeking to justify their own course by maintaining that they fought to protect constitutional principles. The War as described by these men was a contest over types of government. Republicans sought to establish a highly centralized national regime exercising vast powers. Southerners stood firmly on a retention of power in the states where they insisted the framers had meant it to be and where it was the more safely and wisely exercised. A parallel was drawn between the eleven Southern states in 1861 and the thirteen colonies in 1776, both acting on the motive of protecting themselves against oppression. This view denied slavery as a major cause of war and stressed instead the menace of concentration of power in the central government. In his *Constitutional View of the Late War between the States* in 1868 Alexander H. Stephens, while admitting that "slavery, so called," was the "occasion" or "main exciting proximate cause" of the War, insisted it was "not the real cause." In two huge works, he sought to prove that Northern violation of Southern constitutional rights brought on the War and to establish the soundness of the Southern view on state rights and the compact theory of the Constitution. In his *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government* in 1881

and his *Short History of the Confederate States of America* in 1890, Jefferson Davis, too, argued that slavery was "in no wise the cause of the conflict, but only an incident." It was Northern destruction of the Union as established by the fathers, he contended, and Northern violation of constitutional guarantees that forced Southerners reluctantly to withdraw from a compact, already broken, in which there was no longer safety for them. Both Stephens and Davis defended the right of secession.

Then, as a profession of trained historians arose in the 'eighties and 'nineties, a generation of scholars interested in political and constitutional problems assumed leadership and further emphasized constitutional issues. For example, Hermann E. von Holst, though primarily concerned with the slavery issue, called his work a "constitutional" history and devoted considerable space to discussion of the constitutional aspect of the conflict. Of this group, however, John W. Burgess was the dean. His *Middle Period* in 1897 and his *Civil War and the Constitution* in 1901 constituted a masterly attack on the position so painstakingly presented by Stephens and Davis. Burgess maintained that the Southern doctrines of state sovereignty and secession were supported neither by sound constitutional theory nor by "sound political science" and he blamed Southern leaders for the War. Burgess's Tennessee birth and background might have led one to expect him to agree with Stephens and Davis, but he had happened to come from the strongly Unionist portion of Tennessee and he had served in the Union Army. Subsequent training in a German university then had intensified and given scholarly backing for his youthful devotion to nationalism.

In Northern histories during this period from 1861 to 1900, slavery as a moral issue played the role that loyalty to the compact theory and state rights did among Southerners as an explanation of the sectional clash. For a generation or two after the War most Northern writers talked of the "irrepressible conflict" between freedom and slavery. Slavery had been planted in the Constitution, so this version ran, but Northerners came to realize that it was contrary to the principles of American democracy and had to be extirpated. First the abolitionists and then more moderate men became aroused over the evil nature of the institution and the wickedness of men who would profit by slavery. *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, contact with fugitive slaves,

political agitation of the subject, and clerical denunciation of human bondage finally aroused the Northern conscience to a determination to prevent its extension and as speedily as possible to destroy slavery itself. Only thus could the national conscience be cleared. Southern defense of slavery as a positive good with supporting Biblical authority for it merely intensified the North's conviction of its own righteousness. Just as early Southern historians condemned abolitionists as fanatics, so these Northern writers praised them as moral crusaders. The great exponents of the moral conflict view were men like Blaine, Greeley, Giddings, and Wilson, who had participated in the conflict, and late nineteenth century historians like Draper, von Holst, Alexander Johnston, Rhodes, and Schouler; Albert Bushnell Hart, Henry W. Elson, and numerous other later men long accepted their interpretation and continued to expound it. These men pointed to the stressing of slavery in resolutions of secession conventions as Southern proof of their contention that slavery caused the War.

About the turn of the century, the emphasis began to change. Nearly everyone in every period had stressed the importance of the abolition campaign if only as an irritant to Southerners and conservative Northerners; but following World War I a generation of historians impressed with the importance of economic motivation came to deny that slavery as a moral issue was an important cause of the War. Charles and Mary Beard led the way. Others accepted this rejection of moral motivation until, in the nineteen-thirties, Gilbert H. Barnes and Dwight L. Dumond restudied the anti-slavery movement and came to the conclusion that the moral issue of slavery and the abolitionist propaganda were after all important. Barnes abandoned the narrow focus of William Lloyd Garrison, but he showed how objection to slavery on moral grounds, as part of a larger religious movement, reached thousands of Northerners and exerted greater influence than his immediate predecessors had admitted. He described the steps by which the religious impulse of the day was translated into the anti-slavery movement and then was broadened into a general crusade against the South. Though Owsley has quarreled with Dumond's restatement of the old thesis, Charles W. Ramsdell, Avery O. Craven, and other recent writers have acknowledged the anti-slavery impulse, in this broader religious enthusiasm

that Barnes described, as one facet of a complexity of causes of the War.

Slavery described in terms other than morality has continued important in historical interpretation. Thus the slavery controversy has been variously pictured as a rivalry of political systems and of men aspiring to public office, as a struggle of political philosophies for supremacy in the nation, as a conflict of competing social systems each endangering the other, and as a clash of economic interests. Some have stressed the mutual jealousy of two labor systems and have said the quarrel arose because both the slaveowner on the one hand and the nonslaveholding farmer and wage-earner on the other feared the effect of the rival labor system upon his own. In 1939 Roger W. Shugg insisted that Louisianians did fight to defend slavery as a necessary police system that "assured social and political dominance to all white people" and as a provider of "cheap labor for planters" that "exempted them from manual work, and afforded a comfortable way of living."

However they have interpreted slavery, most historians have agreed that westward expansion precipitated a crisis in the sectional conflict. Over the status of slavery on the trans-Missouri frontier and in foreign territory that Americans annexed or coveted came the clash. There compromise proved impossible. So most histories have described as important in the coming of war the acquisition of Louisiana, Texas, California, and New Mexico and subsequent efforts to acquire tropical lands, and also the Missouri Compromise, the Compromise of 1850, Douglas's popular sovereignty campaign, the struggle over Kansas, the Dred Scott Decision, Douglas's Freeport Doctrine, and the inability of compromisers who could settle everything else to agree upon what to do about slavery in the territories. Some have felt the compromises were futile. Others have believed that the Kansas-Nebraska Act's abandonment of the old compromise solutions made war inevitable. Some have denounced Calhoun for precipitating the issue in irreconcilable form. Others have blamed later Southern extremists, or anti-slavery Republicans like Chase, Seward, and Sumner, or Douglas's ambition, or Buchanan's ineptitude, or Taney, or Lincoln, or Davis for setting in motion forces that made the territorial problem insoluble. Still others have said the conflict in the territories had been irreconcilable from the first acqui-

sition of land in Louisiana. Many Northern writers have agreed with Lincoln that the struggle would have gone on until the land was all free or all slave and that the trend until 1860 was toward the country's becoming all slave, and have felt that this tendency made war necessary. Southern writers who have denounced Lincoln because his "house divided" speech indicated a determination to destroy slavery everywhere have still justified Southern secession, either on the ground that slavery to exist required federal protection as a right in all the territories, or else because slavery had to expand to survive. Indeed, Calhoun in the debates of 1836 and 1837 had said about what Lincoln did in his "house divided" speech.

Frederick Jackson Turner and followers of his, such as Walter P. Webb, might really be set apart from Northern and Southern historians alike in their stressing of frontier influences upon the slavery issue. Turner thought it was the Western "area for expansion which gave the slavery issue its significance in American history." By 1840, Western settlers had occupied most of the best land east of the ninety-eight degree meridian. West of that line inadequate rainfall rendered agriculture difficult as practiced by either slaveholders or nonslaveholding farmers. Scarcity of adequately watered, unoccupied land, consequently forced both free-soil and slave states into a competitive struggle over room for expansion elsewhere. Thus, Western conditions, historians of the West have urged, intensified the sectional controversy back East.

All agree it was over the quarrel about territories and new possessions that efforts at peaceful solution within the Union broke down in 1860-1861.

III

Since World War I, historians have tended to shift emphasis from conspiracy, state rights arguments, and slavery, all three, and to talk in terms of broader political, economic, or social conflict. This does not mean that earlier writers failed to see economic and social issues or that recent writers have discarded slavery, as causes of war. Simply the emphasis has changed.

In a period when courses in civilization and histories of civilization and studies of cultures have become popular, some writers talk of the Civil War as a collision of civilizations or cultures. Historians as

different as Frank L. Owsley in 1930 and Thomas C. Cochran in 1942 have portrayed the clash in cultural patterns. But culture and civilization are large terms. There are more specific explanations.

One is a stressing of the spirit of nationalism. This historic force, powerful all over the western world, took possession of North and South in different degrees. Western development and Northern economic interest and growth created practical conditions that gave many Northerners a sense of American nationality lacking in the South. Hence Webster's appeal, itself influenced by these forces, struck response in the North but left the South cold. The South, for its part, was divided among men like the mountain Unionists loyal to an American nationality, other men like Davis himself strongly influenced by nationalism but in whom it assumed an aggressively Southern form, and still others untouched by and opposed to this nineteenth century phenomenon in either its American or its Southern form. On the whole, in spite of particularists who dissented in both North and South, the War became a contest of nationalisms, a Southern and an American variety. Pollard emphasized this in 1867. Channing tried to express it in his title, "The War for Southern Independence." Harry J. Carman, Jesse T. Carpenter, Robert S. Cotterill, Benjamin B. Kendrick and Alex M. Arnett, Samuel E. Morison and Henry S. Commager, Henry T. Shanks, and Nathaniel W. Stephenson have pointed to this fact of separate Southern nationality.

Some writers have found seeds of war in the wide differences between the social systems of North and South. To them slavery was essentially a manner of organizing society. Southerners felt that a social order based on a slave class at the bottom provided the greatest stability and happiness for workers and upper classes alike. It created leisure that permitted development of leadership and culture. Southerners blessed with this "superior" social system were contemptuous of democratic Northerners and Northerners in turn were jealous of the "superiority" of Southerners they encountered in the national capital. Consequently clashes occurred. Northern historians have emphasized rather the merits of social democracy and the evils that an aristocratic system entailed for the vast majority who were not great planters. In any case, here was a struggle between aristocracy and democracy, with ante-bellum Southerners convinced of the social

idealism of the slave system and a youthful social democracy in the North belligerently proclaiming a new day for the common man. Even had Southerners become convinced that slavery was undesirable as a social system—or economically unprofitable—still, under any system but slavery, the social problem of handling Negroes who were not only slaves but members of another race and densely ignorant would have been stupendous. Harvey Wish has analyzed George Fitzhugh's conviction that "the universal paternalism of an ordered society" provided by slavery was "the only practical alternative to world-wide communism." The world had to choose, Fitzhugh believed, between "the security of the feudal ideal and the chaos of liberalism." Herbert Aptheker, after a detailed study of slave revolts, concluded that fear of slave insurrection influenced most phases of ante-bellum Southern history and that rebelliousness among Negro slaves was "exceedingly common" and did play a part in bringing on emancipation. Many historians have felt it was the social dread of free Negroes and the inability to see how blacks could be controlled socially or made to do labor effectively, if free, that created the insurmountable obstacle to all consideration of emancipation. Economics had little to do with defense of slavery, Morison and Commager have told us in a passage that did not appear in 1927 in the original *Oxford History* by Morison alone; "slavery was simply a social necessity for keeping the negro population in its proper place." Ulrich B. Phillips, indeed, called determination that the South should remain "a white man's country" the "central theme" of Southern history.

Then there was the political phase of the conflict. Politics was important per se. Initially the national parties, strong in both sections, had helped bind the Union together. Each party had sought issues that would elect candidates dependent upon votes in both sections and had avoided issues that would weaken either its Northern or Southern wing. The break-up of these old national parties and the emergence of a purely sectional Republican Party were ominous. Republican gains in 1856 and 1858 and the split in the Democratic Party paved the way for war. Some writers, as has been pointed out, have believed the final cleavage of the Democratic Party was engineered by Southern extremists who hoped in this way to insure Douglas's defeat and thereby to acquire, in Lincoln's election, a

weapon with which they could coerce reluctant fellow-Southerners into secession. In any case, the Lincoln election is accredited by most historians as the immediate cause of secession, sometimes because of what it really implied for the South, sometimes because of what Southerners believed it implied.

Maintenance of the balance of power in the United States Senate, now hopelessly destroyed, had long been deemed essential by Southern leaders. Northerners, on the other hand, had always resented the extra power and "rotten boroughs" created for Southern white men by the three-fifths rule.

Political ambition of individuals has been described as a cause of dissension. For instance, an aggregation of disappointed office-seekers united to form the Republican Party; repudiated Southerners used extremist doctrines to stage comebacks. Rivalry of Buchanan and Douglas, neither of them anti-slavery men, contributed to the disruption of the Democratic Party. Some have seen in secession a brave plunge to attain freedom from political oppression that awaited Southerners within the Union; but others have adjudged it bad sportsmanship in defeat, revealing determination to retain the power and emoluments outside the Union that Southerners had now lost within it. Unhappiness over seeing patronage within Southern states taken away from those long accustomed to dispense favors played its part—and some writers feel that Douglas's election was as much feared on this score as Lincoln's.

The slavery issue itself, other historians have maintained, was mainly a focus for attack on political enemies. Northern politicians employed it to overthrow and Southerners to sustain Southern political power. Cotterill believed Southern secessionists used "the anti-slavery menace as a bogie man" to frighten Southerners into accepting an already arranged program. Some historians have contended that the issue of slavery in the territories was not really of practical importance to either North or South: climate barred slavery anyway; Kansas never had any slaves to speak of; and, when they had the power just before the War to frame territorial acts as they pleased, Northerners imposed no Wilmot Proviso on Colorado, Nevada, or Dakota. Indeed, Ramsdell in 1929 contended that by 1860 slavery had reached its natural frontiers. "There was . . . no further place for it to go." Hence "there was no longer any basis for excited sec-

tional controversy over slavery extension." If these views are correct, mere prestige and "sectional honor," on the one hand, and desire of politicians to make political capital, on the other, stirred up the dispute over territories. According to one view, settlement of the conflict in Kansas and unsuitability of the remaining territories to slavery embarrassed the Republicans by depriving them of their only issue and forced them to seek issues in more radical stands. Then again the Republican refusal to accept compromise in 1860, which many writers have felt plunged the nation into war, was necessitated by purely political considerations. Yielding on the territorial issue, however wise it might have been, would, this thesis runs, have destroyed the Republican Party by violating its chief campaign pledge and destroying its *raison d'être*.

Several historians have pointed out that the election of 1860 failed to register the wishes of the people, who in both sections were overwhelmingly opposed to extreme measures. Shugg has described how in Louisiana the minority of slaveholders that did favor secession were able to overrule a majority that were opposed or indifferent, not through conspiracy, but by exercise of powers they had always possessed in a planter and commercial oligarchy. The Beards called attention, too, to the balance of power that a small group of extreme anti-slavery men held at given times and places in crucial Northern elections. In Louisiana Shugg found politics confused in 1860 by the tendency of influential men to follow national leaders on the basis of old loyalties that had little to do with current issues. Recently, Craven has maintained that the election was fought within each section on local issues irrelevant to the major national problem.

Rival political theories, too, have been suggested as a cause. The North represented political democracy and the South an aristocracy in which a small group of large slaveholders held the power. Stephenson emphasized this rivalry of democracy and aristocracy. Dodd pictured a struggle for "the rights of men" represented by Lincoln "as against the rights of property" represented by Davis. War came, Dodd felt, out of an irritating disparity between "healthy moral, even radical, forces" of Northern democracy and a South that "no longer believed in democracy." Here was the old fight between popular rights and political privilege for the "rich and well born." Burgess in 1897 wrote of a conflict between the Northern ideals of

progress and the perfectibility of man and a pessimistic Southern view that only a few men are intelligent or good and hence all others must be subjected to rule by the few. Historians friendly to the South have argued that the South stood for the principle of protection of a minority against tyranny of the majority, for which Calhoun tried to provide a philosophy and a formula. When this protection became impossible inside the Union, the discontented minority, exercising its basic political right of self-determination, separated from the majority.

Several recent writers have spoken of the Civil War as revolution. To some this term means an unsuccessful effort of Southerners to change our political system into one where the minority rules. The Beards and like-minded writers since the 'twenties have seen, rather, a successful revolution in which a Northern industrial group seized power from an agrarian group that had long held it. The Beards have pointed out that this is none the less political revolution because the opposed economic interest groups were separated by geographic instead of class lines.

IV

Certainly one of the most fundamental revisions of Civil War history was made in the 'twenties by historians who followed the Beards' lead in interpreting the Civil War as an economic conflict. The period subsequent to the appearance of Charles Beard's revolutionary *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution* in 1913 saw a whole school of economic interpretation arise, dominate the scene for a decade or two, and then recede from its ascendancy to a place along side other schools of interpretation, not, however, without leaving an indelible mark on Civil War historiography and on most other areas of historical research. To be sure, this emphasis on economic motivation was not new. Madison in the *Federalist* gave classic expression to it years before Marx was born, and Marx with a different slant and greater stress upon dogma long antedated Beard. Indeed, Jefferson Davis in Senate debate had very nearly stated the Beardian thesis. Others had pointed out the economic conflict without employing the Beards' concept of a revolution: James Spence in 1862, Edward A. Pollard in 1862 and 1867, Jefferson Davis in 1881, Alexander Johnston in 1885, John A. Logan in 1886, John M. Har-

rell in 1899, Henry W. Elson in 1904, W. Birkbeck Wood and J. E. Edmonds in 1905, George S. Merriam in 1906, John H. Latané in 1910, and Emerson D. Fite in 1911.

In his significant but often overlooked *Social Forces in American History* in 1911, Algie M. Simons had presented a well developed economic interpretation of history two years before Beard's more famous book appeared. As early as 1903, moreover, in an almost unknown essay, *Class Struggles in America*, Simons had published a brief and oversimplified interpretation of the Civil War that suggested the conflict of economic groups later described by the Beards and the economic interpretationists of the 'twenties. Simons said the War resulted from class antagonisms between North and South. The Emancipation Proclamation was "simply a war measure." Abolitionism was important chiefly because it made Western farmers and Eastern wage-earners believe they had an interest in the struggle between capitalists and slaveholders. "In any society the exploiting class must control the government if its exploitation is to continue." Hence the Southerner was right in assuming that, if he lost control of the government, there "was no hope for him except in secession and the formation of a government which he could control." "The Civil War," Simons concluded, "was simply a struggle by the capitalist class of the North to maintain the ruling position not only over the North but over the South as well."

Nevertheless, it was under the influence of Charles and Mary Beard that economic interpretation burst into full flower. According to this school, the Civil War arose from a new phase of the old conflict between business and agriculture. With the coming of the industrial revolution to America a new industrialism arose beside the older commercial interest and finally superseded it as the rival of agrarianism. The new industrialism sought from the federal government aid that planter interests and Western farm interests opposed. So long as West and South stood together the new industrialism was powerless, though growing in strength. But, partly through the new economic ties created by railroad building of the 'fifties between Northeast and Northwest and partly by a political bargain Republican managers engineered between the elections of 1856 and 1860, a majority of Northwestern farmers were won to an alliance with Northeastern industrialists against their former allies in the agricultural

South. In return for Western backing of a protective tariff, the Northeast agreed to support Western land policies that it had previously joined the Southeast in opposing. Both tariff and free homestead planks appeared in the Republican platform of 1860. The West had sought free homesteads on the frontier and internal improvements. Also, for years Northern business men had favored and Southern Democrats had opposed a national bank, "sound" money, federal support of business enterprise and New England fishing interests, ship subsidies, federal grants to railroads and other internal improvement projects, and tariff protection for American manufacturers. A Democratic Party dominated by able Southerners had for many years controlled the federal government and had thereby prevented enactment of these measures. The Census returns of 1850 showed the South foredoomed to ultimate defeat, convinced Southern leaders that they could not long continue their control within the Union, and made Northern leaders in turn exultant and uncompromising. Northern business was anxious to gain control of the government as soon as possible to enact laws supporting its ventures. Slavery was used as a point of attack with popular appeal, but the real basis for opposition to the slave power was economic. Secession and war came and, when the strife was over, Southern and Democratic power had been broken and Northern industrialism was in the saddle. The United States had entered upon a long period of control of government by business with the industrialists' wishes enacted into law in place of the old planter views that had dominated ante-bellum legislation. This was revolution.

It is interesting to find Southerners before the Civil War, on the one hand, and Blaine in 1884, on the other, pointing out economic motivation represented in the North's tariff aims long before men of the nineteen-twenties were to stress it. Blaine, indeed, wrote in his *Twenty Years in Congress* that "large consideration must be given to the influence of the movement for Protection" in "reviewing the agencies" that "precipitated the political revolution of 1860." Interestingly, too, in 1944 in their *Basic History of the United States*, the Beards omitted all mention of their "Second American Revolution" hypothesis of 1927 that had given them such far-reaching influence on Civil War historiography. In describing the 'fifties they gave other than economic factors somewhat more relative importance than they

and in 1927. Charles Beard wrote in 1933 a critical review of a book that avoided interpretation and attacked the author for believing that "impressionistic eclecticism is the only resort of contemporary scholarship." Yet writing in 1944 he and Mrs. Beard avoided all explicit interpretation of the coming of the Civil War. In spite of his reticence, the selection and arrangement of their facts make it obvious what they thought were the causes.

Economic forces were given added strength in the North, some historians have contended, by the Panic of 1857, which Northerners could attribute to the recently enacted lower tariff rates. Carman in 1934 and Hicks in 1937 pointed out that the Panic strengthened Southern extremists and left the North more hurt than the South. Channing writing in 1925 believed that the effects of the Panic injured the Democratic Party in the North. Hacker in 1940 and Hicks found that its effects made government aid to industry seem imperative. Craven has shown how Northerners blamed the South for Northern economic ills.

On the other hand, historians like the Beards, Channing, Cole, Cotterill, Craven, Phillips, Russel, Shanks, Sitterson, and Van Deusen have described the Southern side of the economic picture. Apparently and in comparison with its own past, the South was well off in the 'fifties, and yet Southerners were troubled. The North was growing alarmingly and, in population, wealth, and economic power, was far outstripping the South. Through the one-crop system and failure to do their own carrying and manufacturing, Southerners were paying Yankees for these services a disproportionate share of the returns on Southern agriculture. Forgetting that the actual tariff had been enacted by Southern votes and was lower than duties had been in three decades, the South's political spokesmen complained that the tariff drained Southern profits into Northern pockets. In reality, the South was worried less by existing conditions than by fear of what Republican control might do to the tariff in the future. Southern dependence on Northern capital led to a continuance of the old creditor-debtor controversy. The distribution of the nation's wealth between North and South was inequitable. In popular parlance, the South was tired of living in vassalage to the North; it was determined to cease being a colony of the Northern business empire. From the Civil War to the present this factor has been discussed,

and as late as 1937 and 1942 has been particularly stressed by Walter P. Webb and Benjamin B. Kendrick respectively. Besides, much of the older South was suffering from soil exhaustion and competition with the virgin soil of Western plantations. Many Southerners felt that expansion of slavery into new regions was essential, and some favored reopening of the slave trade as a further remedy. Commercial conventions frequently met to study remedies but did little to follow up plentiful proposals made by convention speakers. The South tended to attribute its economic ills to Northerners, and extremists urged economic independence, obtainable, they said, only after secession.

There was also a conflict in labor systems. Northern wage-earners were afraid of the competition of slave labor. Many Northerners felt that the South was blocking national, meaning Northern, progress; that it was impeding the operation of Manifest Destiny, that is, the spread of Northern democracy and nonslaveholding farmers. Southern slaveholders, on the other hand, were afraid of the effect upon their slaves of contact with free workers and free-state farmers.

Besides the Beard school of economic interpretationists, there are the Marxists, James S. Allen, Herbert Aptheker, and Richard Enmale, and a onetime editor of the *Marxist Quarterly*, Louis M. Hacker. In the little they have written on causes of the Civil War, none of them has distorted historical reality to shape it to a preconceived Marxian mold as Du Bois did with the facts of Reconstruction. Allen and Hacker, both writing in 1937, presented about the same picture that the Beardians painted except that Allen and Hacker used somewhat different terms. For instance, they, like Simons a generation earlier, spoke of a conflict between the slavocracy and *capitalists*. Aptheker insisted that "the anti-slavery struggle broadened into a battle for democratic rights of white people" and that slaves frequently "received aid from white people, generally in the lower economic groups." Enmale in 1937 attempted to show the rudiments of a class struggle involving labor by pointing out that American labor played a part in the struggle against the slavocracy. He pictured the slavocracy as conducting a "counter-revolution" and talked of a coalition of farmers and wage-earners organized to crush it. He also pointed out that the First International and British labor supported the North. Charles Wesley, on the other hand, has shown that American

labor was hostile toward free Negroes in the North as well as in the South. Morison in 1927 and Stephenson in 1918 also called attention to participation of the American working class in overthrowing slavery but without seeing in this a "class struggle." Shugg contended that in Louisiana, in spite of many confusing factors, slaveholders tended to urge, and small farmers and city workers to oppose, secession. Enmale suggested an alliance between merchants and financiers in the North and slaveholders in the South. He was troubled because anti-war feeling had been strong among workers who should have supported the class struggle of the Civil War. He felt, however, that labor pacifism had not been spontaneous. It had been manufactured by pro-slavery mercantile interests who played on fears of workers that war would bring unemployment. Allen declared the War was "a revolution of a bourgeois democratic character, in which the bourgeoisie was fighting for power against the landed aristocracy." Long before these recent Marxists, Benjamin E. Green, a Southerner writing in 1872, had maintained that slavery elevated the common people of the South, had accused Northerners of monarchism, and had listed as a cause of the Civil War "the irrepressible desire of capital to cheapen labor."

In spite of the vogue of the economic interpretationists, Andrew C. McLaughlin of an older generation still believed in 1935 that slavery was the *chief* cause of the War. Morison alone in 1927 and together with Commager in 1942 maintained that it was the cause of secession. While not neglecting the economic conflict, Henry H. Simms felt in 1942 that "political and psychological rather than economic factors played the paramount role." And James G. Randall in 1937 and 1940 seriously questioned the validity of the whole economic interpretation.

V

The Negro's views on the Civil War would be interesting, but in their preoccupation with the history of their race, Negroes have written little on the larger aspects of American history. Frederick Douglass's autobiography published in 1882 puts him in the group that sees the War as a conspiracy of slaveholders. It is rabidly pro-Northern. George W. Williams in his *History of the Negro Race in America*, appearing the same year, wrote from a pro-abolition

point of view and treated the War as a struggle over the moral issue of slavery. He tried to explain why there were not more slave insurrections and included an interesting chapter on the role of the Northern free Negro in the anti-slavery movement. Charles Wesley in *Negro Labor in the United States* found slavery the major issue of the War, but pointed out that neither Northern labor nor Northern soldiers nor Southern slaves realized what "the real issue" was. In a detailed study of the failure of the Senate Committee to agree upon a compromise that might have prevented war in 1860-1861, Clinton E. Knox decided in 1932 that responsibility for failure had to be shared jointly by Lincoln and the Republican Party. He came also to the conclusion that the real grievance of the South was not such concrete matters as loss of fugitive slaves or failure to obtain protection for slavery in the territories but "the hostile sentiment of the North toward slavery." He offered the comment that compromise was impossible because such a grievance could not be settled by "any human concessions" and since "popular sentiment" would eventually have risen again to overthrow any compromise made.

Unless one includes incidental material in Charles Wesley's *Collapse of the Confederacy*, the present author has found, even among works touching only briefly on the period, only one study by a Negro that is not focused entirely on the Negro. In an interpretive article of 1933, George W. Brown showed that some of the South's ablest leaders were secessionists, that a "rising sense of [Southern] nationalism" stimulated the South to dislike of Republican attacks on it, that the South was far from united and extremists had to work hard to "precipitate a revolution," and, finally, that only in the Gulf states was the opposition of a slave-based economic system to commercialization strong enough to persuade states to secession as a remedy. Both Wesley and Brown, when they do turn to general topics, so detach themselves from race bias that no one unacquainted with them would guess they are Negroes.

VI

Writers who feel that free choices of men were important have analyzed the part various leaders played in bringing on armed conflict, and old judgments of these leaders have been modified as war

feeling has died out and scholarly researches have provided new understanding. Even Rhodes, in spite of his anti-slavery background and preponderant use of Northern sources, dealt more sympathetically with men whose cause he thought wrong than had earlier Northerners.

Decreasing sectional feeling and greater perspective have gradually won for John Quincy Adams, doggedly fighting for the cause of liberty in Congress, a rather more enviable reputation than either friends or foes gave him earlier. Calhoun, always great to Southern writers, has grown in stature with the years. Northern writers have ceased denouncing him as the leader of a conspiracy. Historians of whatever point of view have come to recognize the greatness of his mind, his prophetic vision, the importance of his political philosophy. He is now usually pictured as a man devoted to the Union but also to the interests of his state and region, trying desperately to reconcile these conflicting loyalties by safeguarding slavery within the Union and by solving the problem of protection of minorities against majority tyranny. In short, he was trying not to destroy but to save the Union by removing the conflict that would otherwise destroy it. Recent writers like Craven still make him share responsibility for bringing on war. But his motives and abilities are no longer questioned. Webster, too, has been exonerated, at least from the bitter charges of the *Ichabod* view of him, by restudy of his relation to the Compromise of 1850.

Fire-eaters and abolition leaders have lately been more critically treated than they were in earlier years by admiring fellow-enthusiasts, but yet more understandingly than early writers of the opposition found possible. Of all leaders of the period, the most unsympathetic handling by current writers has been reserved for these two groups and for certain anti-slavery political leaders like Chandler, Chase, Sumner, and Wade. Few historians have liked Sumner, but some have respected him for his ability and sincerity. In recent years Northerners have ceased praising Sumner's "courageous" verbal attack on the South, and denouncing Brooks's "cowardly" assault on him, and Southerners have stopped damning Sumner and lauding Brooks. Most historians, like some contemporaries in both North and South, have come pretty generally to regret the

action of both men and to feel that both should bear heavy responsibility for making peaceful agreement more difficult. Yet, even today, most Southerners find it easier to understand Brooks and Northerners Sumner, so strong are cultural influences. The debate as to whether Sumner was really seriously injured or was shamming to get sympathy will have to await Laura A. White's biography for a possibly definite answer.

Republican leaders were once all lumped together, but recent re-examination of their motives has tended to separate them into various categories of conservatism and radicalism. Attention to economic factors has revealed that, of Republican extremists, some were essentially conservative except for radical views on slavery based on a desire to serve their own economic aims, whereas others like Stevens and Julian were thoroughgoing social and economic radicals.

Davis long suffered at the hands of Northern historians and of Southern protagonists of his rivals and enemies. Gradually, however, scholarly research has made of him a not always wise and rarely lovable but still responsible statesman. He is pictured, not as a promoter of secession, but rather as a representative, in the late 'fifties at least, of a conservative group in the South. Strongly pro-Southern, he none the less hoped, until almost the last, to avert secession by winning concessions within the Union.

Buchanan's indecision and ineptitude have generally been blamed for failure to stem in time the rising tide of secessionism, and some writers have felt that if Lincoln or Douglas could have entered the White House in November, 1860, the Union might have been saved without war. Yet George T. Curtis as early as 1883, Horatio King in 1895, and John Bassett Moore in 1908 defended Buchanan. More recently Philip G. Auchampaugh in 1926, James G. Randall in 1937 and 1940, Frank W. Klingberg in 1943, and Roy F. Nichols, as a result of yet unpublished researches, have carried his rehabilitation further. They have suggested that he was following a consistent and definite policy that might have succeeded and that, in any case, he more nearly represented the will of the people North and South than did Southern extremists or radical Republicans who criticized him. In 1942 David M. Potter restudied Seward

and credited him, during Lincoln's "perilous silence" of November to March, with able leadership in efforts to save the Union by conciliation.

Some students of the period have blamed Douglas for breaking the peace and loosing in the Kansas-Nebraska Act the forces that led to war. Rhodes in 1892 judged him severely. Historians have debated at length whether ambition for the presidency, concern for a Pacific railway to promote his own and his constituents' economic interests, use of him by Southerners cleverer than he, an honest desire to produce a formula for a permanent peace in the slavery feud, or just moral and political obtuseness explain his opening of Pandora's box. As men have attained greater freedom from war-time prejudices that led Confederates and Republicans alike to hate middle-of-the-road statesmanship, and as the evidence has been thoroughly examined and sifted, Douglas has been given new character credentials and a more significant place in history. Fiske and McMaster in 1902 and Burgess in 1897 partially defended him. So did Channing in 1925. The major task of rehabilitation, however, was performed by Frank H. Hodder from 1899 to 1936, by George Fort Milton in his *Eve of Conflict* in 1934, and by Avery O. Craven in several works published in the last six years.

Lincoln is still an enigma, subject to strong disagreement. The hatred expressed by early Southern writers is gone. So, too, among most serious historians, is the peculiar brand of hero-worship sponsored for political reasons by generations of Republican political writers. His claims to greatness after the War began seem little questioned today but do not concern us here. About his part in the coming of war, there is still controversy. Some see in Lincoln a statesman who perceived and gave popular voice to the fundamental issues of his day, a leader whose abilities brought the nation through crisis to preservation of the Union and elimination of slavery. Others, however, picture him in the ante-bellum years as a skilful politician whose cleverness turned every situation to his own and his party's advantage. Milton, Craven, Mary Scrugham in 1921, and William E. Baringer in 1937 have stressed his shrewdness as a politician. Did his "house divided" speech call to the nation's attention a fundamental truth and set in motion a series of events that ultimately resolved the conflict in favor of union and freedom

instead of disunion and extension of slavery over the whole nation? Or did the speech merely call Abraham Lincoln to public attention in such a way as to put him finally in the White House and make war inevitable? Did his debates with Douglas clarify a great public issue that Douglas was beclouding and thereby lead to saving the Union? Or did Lincoln in these debates merely win for himself the presidency at the expense of precipitating a bloody war that Douglas as president might have avoided without loss to the nation? Did Lincoln's refusal to sanction compromise in December, 1860, save the country from further conflict over slavery in new territories to be acquired and preserve the Union from ultimate disruption or subjection to the rule of slaveholders made powerful through expansion? Or did it merely precipitate a war that could otherwise have been avoided without destruction of the Union? And what of Lincoln's attitude on Sumter? Answers to most of these questions has differed according to each author's point of view and his judgment of basic human values.

VII

Yet a few other reasons given for the coming of war need mentioning. One is conflict between a romanticism that characterized the South and a practicality or materialism of the North. Differences in manners, even failure to understand each other's conception of a "gentleman," led to misunderstanding. In 1862 William Taylor, a Californian living in London, ascribed the War to Divine intervention. In his *Cause and Probable Results of the Civil War in America*, Taylor declared that the War was brought by God as "a severe chastisement of the American nation for national sins," as discipline "in the school of adversity" so that the nation might attain "humble permanent greatness," and as a means to the "providential end" of overthrowing slavery.

A number of writers have pointed to the suppression of civil liberties in the South as a cause of the War. The threat to civil liberties aroused many Northerners who themselves disliked anti-slavery men but were alarmed at the attack on fundamental American rights. Important, too, these authors have felt, was the effect upon the South of shutting off the possibility of criticizing slavery, since only through criticism and discussion of the merits and evils

Ingle spoke of the ante-bellum fear of "the populating of the South by a no-property class from the North." Ann E. Snyder in 1890 found part of the trouble in an ante-bellum North's jealousy of the "broad, liberal, free . . . noble civilization" of the South, which, "narrow and lacking in breadth of judgment" as they were, Northerners "could not appreciate." Numerous writers have suggested that the North's humanitarian reform impulse made Northerners difficult fellow-countrymen. Some have indicated that "gentlemen" found it hard to cope with Northerners' bad manners and their failure to respond to the requirements of a gentleman's code of honor. Others have felt that the large foreign immigration to the North considerably increased Northern anti-slavery sentiment and Eckenrode said it increased sectional differences by weakening the Nordic strain in Northerners.

On the other hand, historians have pointed out qualities that made Southerners difficult. One was extreme sensitiveness to criticism. Von Holst spoke of the South's "consciousness of weakness"; Cole and James Truslow Adams saw a Southern "inferiority complex"; Morison and Commager noted "a strong, emotional sense of insecurity." Cotterill in 1936 maintained that, while many Northerners came to America to escape from persecution or oppression, most Southerners fled from nothing and consequently had no inferiority complex and therefore were aggressive. Eckenrode is proud of the aggressiveness they showed. Occasional writers through the years have called attention to Southerners' economic jealousy of the North. Dodd said the politicians and "to an extent, too, the South generally" were jealous of everything Northern. Intellectual backwardness, lack of education, illiteracy, and absence of the habit of reading or thinking have been severally credited to ante-bellum Southerners. Some writers have felt that Southerners' ideas about "chivalry" and their tendency to settle arguments by force were sources of trouble in relations with Northerners. More than one writer has spoken of the "madness" of Southern extremists. Gay and the poet Bryant in 1881 in their *Popular History of the United States* revealed perhaps more of their own sectional bias than of the character of Southerners when they described the North's dread of "the supremacy of an ill-born, ill-bred, uneducated, and brutal handful of slaveholders over a [Northern] people of a higher strain

of blood, with centuries of gentle breeding, and a high degree of moral and intellectual cultivation behind them."

VIII

Historians have been baffled trying to decide why Southerners wanted to withdraw or thought they could succeed in leaving the Union. Southerners believed in the right of secession. They felt aggrieved. But why did they choose to exercise the right and why did they feel that secession would remove the grievance? Some writers point out a series of illusions that made chances of success seem more likely than they were. Thus Southerners believed that Northerners were unwilling to fight and would prove weak in warfare; they thought the Northwest needed the South as a market for its products and was dependent on whoever held the mouth of the Mississippi; they counted on Northwesterners of Southern origin to swing that contested section to the South's side or keep it neutral; and they were certain that Cotton was King and could command aid from European countries subject to its rule. Some historians have felt that the South was bluffing to gain concessions; others that she expected to remake a more happy union with abolitionists eliminated; still others that she thought she would have greater bargaining power outside than in the Union. Besides, there were the fears she entertained as to what would happen if she did not secede: that Southern Unionists would be controlled against former leaders of the South by Lincoln's or Douglas's patronage; that support of nonslaveholders would gradually be lost; that the Border States would abandon slavery; that her own sons would become free-soilers if they migrated into territories where there were no slaves. Too, she feared slave insurrection, injury from Republican rule, and uncertainty of her future if she stayed in the Union. Some have maintained she seceded to safeguard her property, or to protect her social system, or to defend her liberties threatened by oppression. Others have insisted she left because only in that way could she retain actual prosperity—or avert serious decline in it. Southern extremists dreamed of riches of a great slave empire when, freed from the North, the South could absorb territories to the southward. Obviously, motives varied. Lincoln's election signalled secession for some states. Other states left and many individuals

took a stand for the Confederacy only after the firing on Sumter and Lincoln's call to arms forced them to side with South or North in an already existent war. Large numbers of Confederates went along only because, after war came, there was nothing else to do. Thus a majority of people, who loved the Union, were led by a minority to leave it.

IX

Secession would not have led to war except for the North. Northerners denied the right of secession. But why did they wish to prevent secession? Even when these questions are answered some historians feel they must still ask how and why war came. Under Buchanan, states had already announced their secession, had seized federal property, and had joined in creating a new Confederacy. Yet there was no war. And most people of both sections wanted peace and believed there would be no war. How then did attempted secession and Northern denial of its validity lead under Lincoln to war that had not come under Buchanan?

The outbreak of fighting over Sumter, it has been generally agreed, consolidated behind their respective governments a Northern and a Southern people hitherto badly divided. Northern writers have tended even into recent times to say that the South precipitated this final break by ordering the firing on Sumter and have proceeded to debate whether this was the deliberate choice of responsible leaders or a rash decision of extremist subordinates who misinterpreted or deliberately exceeded their powers. Southerners have generally accredited Lincoln's attempt to provision Sumter with responsibility, and some have concluded that this action resulted rather from undue influence upon him by radicals in his party than from his independent initiative. Recently, however, two other hypotheses have been championed.

The older one lays armed conflict at Sumter to Lincoln's own deliberate decision. Edward A. Pollard even as early as 1862, Samuel W. Crawford in 1887, Percy Greg in 1892, Clement A. Evans and James Schouler in 1899, and Mary Scrugham in 1921 suggested that Lincoln had calculatingly manoeuvred the South into striking the first blow. Channing worked out the hypothesis more elaborately but, with his usual caution, omitted this, like so many of

his interesting spoken intuitions, from his printed volume. Edgar Lee Masters in 1931, Craven in 1936 and 1942, Carl Russell Fish in 1937, Milton in 1941, and Simms in 1942 have also stated this view in one form or another. But it was Charles W. Ramsdell, entirely independently of Channing, who worked out a detailed statement and, with the added support of Browning's diary, which was unavailable to Channing, dared publish it. Though Randall, one of Lincoln's current biographers, has rejected it, many have accepted the Ramsdell interpretation. Ramsdell's thesis was briefly this: Lincoln felt bound by solemn oath to preserve the Union. He was convinced that this could be done only by armed victory over the South. If he did nothing the nation would disintegrate. If he took the initiative in using force, Northerners would not support him. He must somehow manoeuvre the South into armed attack that could be dramatized. So, against the judgment of most of his official advisers, he planned the provisioning of Sumter, conscious that whatever the outcome, he would gain his point. He kept the secret of his intent so well that only after seventy-five years did sufficient evidence come to light to justify a careful historian in charging Lincoln with deliberate provocation of war. The provisioning "failed," but Lincoln rejoiced to intimates that, as he foresaw, it had "succeeded"—in its larger object of outmanoeuvring the Confederates into striking the first blow and thereby consolidating for him Northern opinion behind a war most Northerners did not want.

Potter, after thorough searching of contemporaneous materials, offered a new explanation. Lincoln, Seward, and other responsible Republicans were eager, he maintained, to avoid war. Lincoln's failure to assume leadership between election and inauguration he considered unfortunate. As president, however, Lincoln pursued a definite policy. His "rejection of compromise did not mean the rejection of peace." If the Upper South could be kept in the Union, if both coercion and admission of the right of secession could be avoided, and if meantime the Republicans could demonstrate in practice that their administration did not endanger Southern institutions, then powerful Unionist forces in all the slave states would bring a voluntary reconstruction of the Union without compromising the question of slavery in the territories and without war. Some one symbol of federal authority must be maintained for the sake of

national and Republican prestige. Pickens, however, would do as well as Sumter with less risk of precipitating war. Lincoln was ready therefore to yield Sumter if he could by evacuation keep Virginia in the Union, or he was ready to evacuate Sumter just to ease tension if he could keep Pickens. The unexpected exhaustion of Anderson's supplies and unanticipated failure to establish federal authority at Pickens before a decision had to be made at Sumter forced Lincoln's decision to provision Sumter. Even then, his notification of South Carolina and his promise not to re-enforce were meant to prevent, not to provoke, hostilities. According to Potter, aside from certain faults of loose administration, the "policy was executed with great skill." Lincoln failed to preserve the Union short of war without compromise chiefly because he and other Republicans overestimated Southern Unionism and failed from the first to take Southern secessionism seriously.

X

In the last two decades a series of questionings of the inevitability of war have led to a new revision. Indeed, as early as 1887 Percy Greg, an Englishman, doubted whether war need have come out of the sectional conflict, and in 1897 and 1901, while voicing his reprobation of the Kansas-Nebraska Act and John Brown's activities, Burgess expressed the same doubt. Except for these two, however, every writer the present author has found questioning the inevitability of the Civil War has written between the two twentieth century world wars. This timing may be accidental, but it seems to indicate that the feeling of disillusionment and futility after World War I may have affected attitudes toward wars in general. When Channing in 1925 raised the issue of needlessness of war, he restated the old view that slavery would have disappeared and that the South would have met economic ruin even without war. Ramsdell pointed out in 1929 that slavery, "a cumbersome and expensive system," must shortly have begun to decline and would, from its own unprofitableness, have disappeared in a generation without the "frightful cost" of war. In 1932 Dodd pointed to the suppression of all "authoritative objection to the dangerous trend of the plantation system" by denying to "teachers and scholars the function of free criticism," and asserted that, except for this silencing of dis-

cussion, "one of the most cruel and most needless of wars" might have been avoided. Dumond, Max Farrand, Hicks, Milton, Russel, and Henry T. Schnittkind have also questioned whether war need have come.

It is, however, Avery O. Craven and James G. Randall who have developed a new revision out of this questioning. They began by asking: Was war inevitable? Was the conflict irrepressible? If war was needless, why did it come? If inevitable, at what point and for what reasons did it become so? Craven in an article of 1936, then Randall in a book of 1937, then Craven in books of 1939 and 1942 and Randall in three articles of 1940 answered elaborately that war was unnecessary. In support of this view they presented what might be called a psychological interpretation that ranks in importance with the earlier economic interpretation.

Neither Craven nor Randall ignores or neglects the various conflicts, cultural, social, economic, political, constitutional, philosophical, moral, that divided North and South in the eighteen-fifties. Both are familiar with the influences that made the sections so different. Neither offers a blanket cause for the War. Indeed, both men, profiting by the work of the many historians who have gone before, give able syntheses of all of these forces. To be sure, earlier writers, too, have recognized and described the excitements, passions, and fears of the period. Craven and Randall depart from previous explanations in ceasing to assume that because the two sections employed different labor systems and have developed different cultures, social systems, economic interests, political aims, constitutional theories, philosophies of life, and codes of morality along geographical lines they had necessarily to settle the resulting conflicts through war. They wonder why other serious and similar disputes between nations and between sections of the American nation were resolved short of war while the one of 1861 required four years of fighting to settle.

These new revisionists hold that, among the complex and manifold factors dividing North and South, it was psychological forces and not the nature of the issues themselves that brought on war. Emotional considerations such as hatred and other passions, reformers' zeal, fanaticism, intolerance of things distasteful or different, pride, sectional "honor," crimination and recrimination,

religious enthusiasm, and a sense of mission controlled both sections. Lack of proper means of intercommunication intensified ignorance. Southerners failed to distinguish mild anti-slavery men from abolitionists. Northerners took isolated episodes and conditions and generalized them into exaggerated pictures of the slave system. Each section misunderstood the other. Increasing excitement prevented rational processes from functioning. A majority of sane men in both sections were swept aside and silenced. Agitators in both regions, clergymen, editors, speakers, politicians seeking personal advantage, all joined to whip up emotions. Overbold leaders went further than they originally intended. In Congress, fire-eaters' threats and vituperation of Sumner and his anti-slavery fellows, boasts, insults, fisticuffs, calls to duels, brandished pistols, a caning and language so insulting as to provoke a caning, were not conducive to calm solutions of social and economic differences. Sectional honor and pride often required actions that carried no concrete advantage to either rival, sometimes injury to both. For instance, there was no real issue in the "irreconcilable conflict" in the territories, for, with all the victories over anti-slavery men the South could imagine, slavery would not have been profitable in the territories that remained to be settled, and the North needed no Wilmot provisos to exclude it.

Slavery was used as a point of attack or defense by every demagogue. Under its cloak, tariff, internal improvements, ship subsidies, banking policies could be fought over. The words "slavery" and "anti-slavery" became symbols. "Slave power," "Bully Brooks," "Uncle Tom," "Black Republicans," "Bleeding Kansas" became slogans of high emotional power. Craven shows how these phrases were used as abstractions that gave moral value to local material needs of both sections, and how slavery was used as an arouser of passions that made all issues hard to settle. "All contests became part of the eternal struggle between right and wrong." Citizens with social or economic grievances of a local nature sublimated those grievances into hatred, not of the local forces responsible, but of the rival section of the country, which was blamed for all these ills. So a "blundering generation" stumbled over its emotions into needless war about a "repressible conflict."

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY



107 719

UNIVERSAL
LIBRARY

