


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
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CONSTITUTIONALIST ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, DIVISION
OF THE NORTH

MANIFESTO

ADDRESSED BY GENERAL FRANCISCO
VILLA TO THE NATION, AND DOCUMENTS
JUSTIFYING THE DISAVOWAL
OF VENUSTIANO CARRANZA AS FIRST
CHIEF OF THE REVOLUTION



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MANIFESTO

ADDRESSED BY GENERAL FRANCISCO VILLA TO THE NATION,
AND DOCUMENTS JUSTIFYING THE DISAVOWAL OF VENUSTIANO CARRANZA AS FIRST CHIEF OF THE REVOLUTION.

HEADQUARTERS, DIVISION OF THE NORTH,
CHIHUAHUA, September 30, 1914.

MANIFESTO TO THE MEXICAN PEOPLE:

On the overthrow of the democratic government of Señor Madero, that far-reaching tragic outcome of the revolutionary movement of 1910, the Mexican people set forth anew on the conquest of their liberties, thus demonstrating to the nation and to the whole world that our country had turned its back forever on governments set up by violence, and that it would henceforth accept and obey only such as are the expression of the popular will.

The word "constitutionalism," stamped on the folds of our tricolor flag, embodies the whole political program of the revolution, and will solve on legal, and therefore stable, bases, those reforms which are aimed at the social and economic betterment of our people.

Although the plan of Guadalupe launched by Señor Venustiano Carranza, at the inception of the revolution against Huerta, offered only the re-establishment of constitutional government, it was nevertheless accepted by the revolutionary leaders, because they believed that the First Chief of the movement favored not only the establishment of a democratic government, but also the implanting of those

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economic-social reforms indispensable to the real uplifting of the downtrodden classes.

Unfortunately, the subsequent acts and statements of Señor Carranza awakened in the minds of many the fear that the pledges made by the revolution to the people would be brought to naught.

The Division of the North, which had been singled out as the victim of the political intrigues of Señor Carranza, fearing, more than any other, the frustration of the revolutionary ideals, proposed at the Torreón Conference, in conjunction with the Division of the Northeast, a Convention established on democratic bases, to compel the First Chief to fulfil the revolutionary program, guaranteeing the creation of a democratic government, and the carrying out of the reforms necessary for the welfare of the people.

Señor Carranza refused to accept the Convention, on the terms proposed at the Torreón Conference, and decided that, on entering the capital of the Republic, the Constitutionalist Army should summon a meeting of generals and state governors, to take up the study of the political and social problems of the revolution.

If the Division of the North had lost faith in the First Chief, it could not enter an assembly whose members were in fact designated by him, since in him lay the power of conferring the rank of general and appointing the governors, thus assuring to himself, under all conditions, a majority of votes.

When Señor Carranza took possession of the city of Mexico, thanks to the triumph of the revolutionary arms, in which public opinion today has already accorded, and history of tomorrow will accord, the Division of the North its true deserts, there was soon seen the purpose of Señor Carranza to remain in power for an indefinite time, and to govern with an absolutism unparalleled in our history.

¶ The First Chief declined to assume the title of President

ad interim, due him, according to the Plan of Guadalupe, and which would have placed him under certain constitutional restraints; he retained only that of First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, "in charge of the Executive Power." He changed the formula of the constitutional oath of office. He named no cabinet officers, as required by the constitution, leaving the various administrative departments in charge of subordinate officials. He assumed, in his own person, the three constitutional powers, suppressing all judicial authority and subjecting the lives and property of Mexican citizens to the whim of military chiefs who knew no legal restraint whatsoever. He decreed constitutional reforms pertaining to the exclusive province of the legislature, such as the suppression of the Territory of Quintana Roo; he authorized the infraction of guarantees granted by the constitution, among others that of religious toleration, countenancing many governors, who, exaggerating the justifiable resentment borne by the Constitutionalist Party against members of the Roman Catholic Clergy, who played an important part in the *coup d'état*, and later in sustaining the dictatorship, have suppressed all forms of worship, set penalties for the practice of religious exercises authorized by statute, and deeply hurt the religious instincts of the people with acts discountenanced by civilization and international law.

Lastly, to the anarchy already stalking in the capital of the Republic, and menacing the greater part of the governments of the different states, induced through the political blunders and supineness of Señor Carranza, there will soon be added famine, caused by disorder and insecurity in the cities and in the country, coupled with the ever-increasing depreciation of paper money, the last issue of which, amounting to \$130,000,000, decreed by him, without any guarantee whatsoever, will decrease its value to the very lowest limit, and thereby place the staples of life beyond the reach of the poorer classes.

Facing a situation which threatened to wreck the triumph of the revolution, won at such a great sacrifice, and in order to save the country from anarchy and famine, the Division of the North sent a delegation to the city of Mexico, to present to the First Chief a program of provisional government which would bring about the immediate re-establishment of constitutional government, by the exercise of the ballot and the implanting of agrarian reforms. This program was signed by General Obregón, on behalf of the Division of the Northwest, and by the undersigned, for the Division of the North.

Señor Carranza declined to summon elections forthwith, alleging that the assembly summoned by him for the first day of October, would set the time and manner of holding these elections. This meant that, in the long run, Señor Carranza would be the person to set the time and the form for holding these elections.

Inasmuch, therefore, as the assembly would be composed of all the generals in active command of troops, and of all the governors, it would be a foregone conclusion that at the time of casting the ballots, the majority of the members would share the views of Señor Carranza, since these delegates would attend in their military capacity, and not as representatives of any group of citizens, and would, hence, be subservient to the First Chief, and remain subject to his moral influence.

Notwithstanding this situation, and in spite of the grave reasons for believing that the assembly would only serve as an excuse for the indefinite continuance of the First Chief in power, the chiefs of the Division of the Northwest and of the Division of the North, giving proof of their conciliatory spirit, agreed to send delegates. The only condition they demanded, was that the assembly should give precedence to the three following questions: Ratification of the assumption of Señor Venustiano Carranza of the office of

President *ad interim* of the Republic, due him according to the Plan of Guadalupe; the re-establishment of constitutional government through a popular election, held at the earliest possible date; and lastly, the adoption of sufficiently practical means to insure the solving of the agrarian problem along lines really favoring the common people.

When General Obregón, commander of the Division of the Northwest, and certain delegates from the Division of the North were on the road to Mexico City, an unforeseen incident halted their advance. The First Chief, angered by the alarming and false news being circulated by the yellow press, suspended the traffic between the capital and the points occupied by the Division of the North, thus showing his determination to begin hostilities against such as were exercising pressure to compel him to carry out the pledges of the revolution, which had led the people to take up arms, not for the purpose of imposing on the country the will of any one individual, but in order that the people themselves might govern.

Brought face to face with the fact that every peaceful effort to compel the First Chief to deliver up the power to the candidate named by the popular will would be fruitless, and seeing that the salvation of the country and of the interests of the people, embodied in the revolutionary principles, are dependent on the immediate solution of these transcendental problems, the Division of the North has determined to disavow Señor Venustiano Carranza, as First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army in charge of the Executive Power.

This disavowal does not involve any act of ambition on my part, nor on that of any of the generals of the Division of the North, and I hereby solemnly declare, duly authorized thereto, that neither they nor I, will accept the offices of President *ad interim* or constitutional President of the Republic, nor those of Vice-President or governor of any of

the states, and that, in conjunction with the other generals, chiefs and officers of the constitutionalist army that may desire to lend us their aid, we shall struggle to establish a civil government which shall guarantee all rights and liberties to every citizen.

I, therefore, invite all Mexican citizens,

First, to disavow Señor Venustiano Carranza as First Chief, in charge of the Executive Power of the Nation.

Secondly, to join the Division of the North, co-operating in such form as best they may, to effect the withdrawal of Señor Venustiano Carranza from the leadership of the constitutionalist army and from the Executive Power.

So soon as this separation shall have been effected, the generals in command of troops will designate a civilian, as President *ad interim* of the Republic, who shall immediately issue a call for elections, in order to establish constitutional order, initiating at the same time the economic-social reforms demanded by the revolution.

In order that electoral agitation should not be renewed almost on the heels of the election, and in view of the constitutional provision at present in force, and in order, further, that the constitutionally elected president may carry out the program of the revolution, the President *ad interim* shall submit, for the approval of the Chamber of Deputies, a constitutional amendment whereby the presidential term of six years shall begin to run from the date on which the constitutionally elected president shall take office.

The Division of the North pledges itself to re-establish order and tranquility, in such places as it occupies, and to respect the lives and properties of peaceful inhabitants, whether Mexicans or foreigners.

Fellow-Citizens:

It is a matter of deep regret that I should be constrained to ask a new sacrifice from the Mexican people, in order that the revolution may fully realize its beloved ideals; but

I am sure that every honest citizen will believe that, without this last effort of the people, the whole revolutionary work will crumble, since we should have overthrown one dictatorship merely to set up another in its stead.

Every Mexican citizen who does not contribute toward realizing this freedom-bearing movement will feel remorse of conscience, in that he has not known how to love and how to serve his country.

FRANCISCO VILLA,
General in Chief.

DOCUMENTS.

Following is the memorandum presented to Señor Venustiano Carranza by General Alvaro Obregón, commanding the Division of the Northwest, and the delegation sent by General Villa; the reply thereto, given by the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army; the call issued by the latter for the meeting of generals to be held in Mexico City on the 1st day of October; the last memorandum, likewise signed by Generals Obregón and Villa, which should have been presented to Señor Carranza by Generals Obregón, Aguirre Benavides, Robles, Garcia, Ceniceros, and other distinguished chiefs of the Division of the North; the statements of General Felipe Angeles, justifying the Division of the North on the occasion of the Torreón incident; and lastly, the draft of a manifesto of the generals of the same division, which draft was never published, as the visit of General Alvaro Obregón awakened some hope of arriving at a settlement with Señor Carranza.

It should be noted that the last-mentioned memorandum was never presented because the unequalled intemperance of Señor Carranza in stopping the railroad traffic between Aguascalientes and Chihuahua, decided General Villa to dis-

avow him as First Chief in charge of the Executive Power of the Nation, and to send orders to the above-mentioned generals to return immediately to this city.

The similarity of views between the generals of the Division of the Northwest and those of the Division of the North in the re-establishment of constitutional order, and the organization of a civil government, shows beyond all doubt that the disavowal of the First Chief in charge of the Executive Power, is not an act of personal ambition, but follows the demand of the Mexican people that anarchy and disorder cease, and the reorganization of a strong, constitutional government which may assure the political and social reconstruction of the country, no less than that of its financial system.

MEMORANDUM PRESENTED IN MEXICO CITY THE 9TH DAY
OF SEPTEMBER TO SEÑOR VENUSTIANO CARRANZA BY
GENERAL ALVARO OBREGÓN AND THE DELEGATES OF
GENERAL VILLA.

The revolutionary movement of 1910 against the prolonged dictatorship of General Díaz and its resurrection in 1913 against the usurping government of Victoriano Huerta, by reason of its very vigorous and popular character, embodies the true aspirations of the downtrodden classes of Mexico to re-establish a democratic government, which shall guarantee their economic betterment and the real exercise of their rights.

The heroic tenacity with which the Mexican people have continued this prolonged struggle, surmounting and overcoming the powerful resistance offered by the privileged classes, shows, too, beyond all doubt that permanent peace in Mexico is only compatible with the establishment of a truly national government which shall be the genuine repre-

sentative of the people, and hence the safeguard of its liberties and rights.

Any government which is not the expression of the popular will would only prolong the struggle begun in 1910, and could know no other bound than the attainment of the ideals of the revolution or the total disruption of the country.

It is, therefore, necessary to staunch forever that flow of blood which for so many years has drenched our land. It is necessary to bring light to the darkened eyes of the Indian and the creole, not through the flash of arms, but through the light of the law. It is necessary to imbue these souls, where deceit and injustice have engendered so much distrust and so much hatred, with truth and faith which may direct and strengthen their will.

The revolution has assumed towards the people obligations which must be carried out; it has engraved on its flag the word "constitutionalism," and under this standard much property and many lives have been sacrificed.

The Mexican people have purchased, at the cost of blood, the right to be governed in conformity with the law, under whose protection alone liberty, order, and justice can co-exist.

It is, then, necessary that before the soldier has shaken off the dust of travel, and mopped the sweat of the battlefield from his brow, he should be already a citizen. It is indispensable that law should triumph over the still-smoking mausers.

The principal aims of the movement of 1910 have been crowned with success. After having overthrown the government of the usurper, the Supreme Chief of the constitutionalist revolution has occupied the capital of the Republic, and the work of pacification now seems but a short way off, inasmuch as the greater part of the ex-federal army has been destroyed and the rest disbanded.

It is, then, time to meditate on the reconstruction of the country, assuring the establishment of a constitutional government which shall take up the implanting of the politico-social reforms which constitute the ideals of the revolution, which shall re-establish our former cordial relations with foreign powers and our credit at home and abroad, and which shall reorganize our finances.

The circumstances under which the disavowal of the usurper by the government of Coahuila took place, undoubtedly prevented the Plan of Guadalupe from taking into account other considerations which did not then directly tend toward overthrowing the so-called Huerta government; and the citizens who later gave their approval to this movement, neither could, nor should, have discussed during the struggle that document which served them as their flag.

But now that victory has been assured, it is time to take up the consideration of the social and economic problems of the revolution. The First Chief has himself realized this fact, and has made very important statements on the subject.

It is the opinion of the generals of the Northwest and of the Division of the North that all those who have taken an active part in the armed movement should be consulted in solving the social and economic problems presented, and we, therefore, think that they should have a voice in the provisional government.

We are also of the opinion that the renewal at an early date of the electoral campaign for the election of a President of the Republic will keep the country in a state of excitement harmful to its complete pacification, and to the carrying out of the plans for economic reorganization. It has, then, seemed fitting that the next election of the First Magistrate of the Nation should be held after a constitutional amendment shall have been passed whereby the term of office shall begin to run from the day on which the constitutionally elected president shall take office.

The revolutionary party, and the country in general, are convinced that the creation of the Vice-Presidency of the Republic was a mere subterfuge of the reactionary party, particularly of the "científico" group, conceived for the purpose of coming into the inheritance of General Díaz; it further believes that this institution has serious political disadvantages. We, therefore, believe it indispensable that the Federal Congress and the State Legislatures, the genuine representatives of the national will in a democratic government, should determine what they consider advisable on this subject prior to the holding of the presidential elections.

It is a matter of common knowledge that the present organization of the Supreme Court of Justice is defective; and as we believe that a proper administration of justice is the basis of all social order, we do not consider it proper that the election of Justices of the Supreme Court should be held before submitting to the consideration of the Federal Congress and of the State Legislatures a matter of such vital importance.

Finally, we are of the opinion that the possible ambitions of military groups should be stifled once and for all, in order to avoid our retrograding to the days of *coups d'état*, and to prevent a repetition of the shameful acts of the Tragic Ten Days in Mexico City. For this reason, the Generals of the Division of the Northwest and of the Division of the North, who have fought patriotically and disinterestedly for the ideals of the people, believe that our constitution should contain a provision declaring all officers in active service ineligible for the office of President of the Republic.

The completion of this great work, incarnation of the welfare of the country, will make the First Chief of the Revolution worthy to receive the highest honors ever bestowed on great men: the gratitude of a people.

The Division of the Northwest and the Division of the North have unshaken faith in the patriotism of the First

Chief of the Constitutionalist Army in charge of the Executive Power, and hope that he will crystalize the great work of redemption initiated by him, and sustained with such heroism by all those who have taken part in this revolution. Under this belief, we respectfully submit to the consideration of the Supreme Chief of the Revolution the following propositions :

1. The First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army shall immediately assume the title of President *ad interim* of the Republic, and name a constitutional cabinet with Secretaries of the various administrative departments.

2. As soon as the cabinet of the President *ad interim* is organized, he, in conjunction with his ministers, shall proceed to name the person who shall provisionally take charge of the post of Justices of the Supreme Court. He shall also name the other federal judicial authorities pertaining to the Federal District and the territories.

3. The constitutional or military governors of the states, in conjunction with the city councils, acting in their respective capitals, shall designate the persons to form provisional supreme tribunals, as well as justices of the first instance and inferior judges.

4. The governors of the states, the governor of the Federal District, and the *jefes politicos* of the territories, shall call elections for city councilmen as soon as the judicial authorities have been named. The elections shall take place within one month after the call shall have been issued, and within one week from the date on which the elections were held the citizens chosen for the purpose shall meet as an electoral college to pass upon the election, and on the following day the respective city councils shall be installed.

5. As soon as the city councils have been installed, the President *ad interim* of the Republic and the constitutional or military governors of the states shall call elections, the former issuing the call for representatives in the Federal

Congress and the latter for constitutional governor, deputies to the state legislature and judges of the supreme tribunal, in such states where the state constitution provides for their election in this manner. This election shall take place exactly one month after the call has been issued, and the electoral divisions which prevailed in the last election, held prior to February 18, 1913, shall serve as the basis for this election.

6. Once the federal congress and the state legislatures have been installed, the former, in an extra session, shall preferably take up the study of the following constitutional amendments, to be submitted by the President *ad interim*:

(A) Suppression of the Vice-Presidency of the Republic, and the manner of supplying either permanent or temporary absences of the President.

(B) To modify the length of the term during which the President of the Republic shall hold office.

(C) The organization of a Supreme Court of Justice, and the manner of designating the members of said court.

(D) The declaration of the ineligibility of all chiefs forming part of the new national army, for the posts of President of the Republic, of Governors of States, as well as other offices designated by popular vote, unless they have been separated from the army at least six months prior to their nomination as candidates. Once these constitutional amendments have been approved by Congress, the State Legislatures shall also give preferential attention to the discussion of the aforesaid amendments, calling, if necessary, extra sessions.

7. As soon as the result of the discussion of the constitutional amendments is known, the President *ad interim* shall issue a call for elections for constitutional president and justices of the supreme court, in accordance with the provisions established by the federal constitution.

8. All citizens who may have occupied the position of

provisional president of the republic or provisional governors of states at the triumph of the revolution, shall be barred from being candidates for the presidency of the Republic or for the governorship of states, nor shall those who may occupy the aforesaid posts from the date of the call, to the date of election, be eligible.

9. The governors *ad interim* of the states, immediately on entering upon their duties, shall name a commission, with headquarters at the state capital, which shall be made up of one representative from each electoral district. This commission shall make a study of the agrarian problem and submit a draft of law to be sent to the state legislature for approval.

(Signed) ALVARO OBREGÓN, *General*.
FRANCISCO VILLA, *General*.

REPLY OF SEÑOR VENUSTIANO CARRANZA TO THE FOREGOING MEMORANDUM.

With the attention and care which the importance of the matter demands, I have acquainted myself with the proposals presented on behalf of the Division of the Northwest, and of the Division of the North, in view of the fact that you did me the honor, as Supreme Chief of the Revolution, of submitting them to my consideration.

In general, matters of such profound importance should not be discussed or approved, by a small number of persons, since they transcend all else in importance to the whole nation, and, therefore, pertain to the sovereign dominion of the people.

The establishment of a truly national government is a matter of great necessity; this government should be the genuine representative of the people, and, hence, the sure safeguard of their liberties and rights; that is to say, this

government should be the natural and legitimate outcome of the popular will.

If "the revolution has created obligations to the people which it must fulfil," it is just and necessary that the revolution should be inspired by the interest of the people, investigating and uprooting its ills, applying the necessary remedies, and guiding it definitely toward fixed and progressive aims. This goal, in my opinion, can only be attained by reforms, suitable and adequate to the transition period of our present political and economic situation, and by laws which should guarantee these reforms.

On the ideas, as set forth, I have founded my judgment—and I am sure that yours also is so founded—for proceeding to the reconstruction of the country, this reconstruction being the inevitable consequence of the revolutionary ideals. It is manifest that the Plan of Guadalupe, inspired as it was, in the abnormal and urgent circumstances of the moment, could not even outline each and every one of the problems to be solved. But in the wake of the initial movement, those problems have come up of their own accord and their solution is more or less urgent, now that we can say that the insurrection has accomplished its aims, destroying, as was its purpose, the obstacles set up in the path of regeneration and progress.

Of the nine proposals contained in the document to which I refer, the first may be considered as definitely approved. In the fourth a modification is necessary, so that elections for city councils and municipal judges shall be held in those places where the law provides for popular election to such posts, and in other places in conformity with their respective laws.

The other propositions which are of the most transcendental importance, can not be considered as matters for the discussion and approval of three or four persons, but they should be discussed and approved, in my opinion, by an assembly which represents the whole country.

Inspired in this democratic, and, moreover, practical, spirit, I have considered it in the highest degree fitting to convoke a convention in which there shall be discussed and approved, not only those proposals with which I am now dealing, but all those matters of general and transcendental interest as well. This convention is to meet in this city on October 1st, and it is certain that, from it, there will arise the definite amalgamation of the future political and economic policy of the country, in view of the fact that the ripest judgments and the strongest spirits of those who have known how to sustain the ideals of the revolution, will illuminate the proceedings.

It is my hope, therefore, that you will properly interpret my good intentions, and will know how to co-operate in the transcendental task committed to us, in a like spirit. This attitude besides working for the good of the country will redound to the benefit of its present directors, through the gratitude of all Mexicans.

Constitution and Reforms.

National Palace, Mexico, D. F., September 13, 1914.

(Signed) VENUSTIANO CARRANZA.

TO GENERALS ALVARO OBREGÓN and FRANCISCO VILLA.

The terms of the call for elections issued by Señor Venustiano Carranza, herewith given, show beyond all doubt that it was within the power of the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army to assure to himself an unconditional majority at the meeting, since he it was who conferred the rank of general, and made the appointments as governors of states.

It will, therefore, be seen that the Convention was not established on democratic principles, and it could not, hence, inspire confidence in those revolutionists who had taken up arms to further the ideals of the movement of 1910, begun by the martyred president, and which was now nearing its

successful termination by means of the re-establishment of constitutional order, and the assurance of agrarian reforms.

TELEGRAM.

NATIONAL PALACE, September 4, 1914.

GOVERNOR OF THE STATE, *Chihuahua, Chih.*

From the very beginning of the present struggle, I promised all those chiefs who had seconded the Plan of Guadalupe, that on the occupation of this Capital, and the assumption of executive power, I would summon all governors and chiefs, in active service, to a meeting, to be held in this Capital, at which there should be determined the reforms to be implanted, the program to be followed by the provisional government, the date for the holding of elections of federal officials, and other matters of general interest. Having now assumed the executive power of the nation, I have set October 1st as the day for the holding of the said meeting, and inasmuch as you are one of the chiefs entitled to attend, will you kindly proceed to this Capital, either personally or through some duly accredited representative, for the purpose indicated.

Constitution and Reforms.

V. CARRANZA,

*First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army,
in Charge of the Executive Power.*

SEÑOR DON VENUSTIANO CARRANZA,

First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army,

Mexico, D. F.

We have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note in reply to the memorandum sent you by us.

In order that the present document should embody the general opinion of the Division of the North, and the matter

receive the due consideration it merits, all the generals forming part of the said Division have been consulted, and have been shown the call for the meeting to be held in the city of Mexico on October 1st, next, as well as the text of the note mentioned hereinabove.

We are constrained to inform you that the general opinion of this Division is adverse to the holding of the meeting in question, not only because it is a departure from the Plan of Guadalupe, which at first served as our only standard, but because, in our opinion, the organization of the meeting does not conform to democratic principles. This latter objection is based on the fact that the generals and governors summoned are not the representatives of their respective troops, but their appointment is dependent on one and the same person.

We admit that, at the Torreón Conference, the Division of the North proposed the holding of a Convention, and that we might hence be subject to the charge of inconsistency in our present opposition to the holding of the meeting called by you, but it should be noted that it was proposed to organize that Convention on more democratic bases, and that it was, furthermore, intended thereby to overcome obstacles which happily no longer exist.

In view, then, of the fact that the holding of such a meeting was not provided for in the Plan of Guadalupe, it is our humble opinion that the said Plan is not followed in the immediate solution proposed; that is to say, in the reorganization of a constitutional government. Moreover, as the call does not specify what reforms shall be taken up, there is danger that the agrarian question, which may be called the very soul of the revolution, may be relegated to a secondary position, and its discussion even frustrated by the intrusion of other matters of lesser urgency.

Again, we have thought that the state of disorder, of economic and financial depression, now widespread through-

out the Republic, as the result of the prolonged civil warfare, demands, above all other considerations, the reestablishment of the national credit, at home and abroad, and this can only be attained by a government emanating from the popular will, and not one established as the result of a revolutionary movement. We have held out to the people the express promise of the immediate reestablishment of constitutional order, in lieu of the present state of unrest, which will certainly continue if we set up a long provisional government, lacking, as every provisional government must, the strength given by a direct endorsement by the people.

We can not forbear mentioning, that the call to this meeting, through its failure to specify an order of the day, and to indicate clearly the matters to be taken up, has greatly alarmed the whole country. It is urgent to set this feeling at rest, and this can only be accomplished by the assurance that the prime object of the meeting is the immediate call for federal and state elections, and the implanting of agrarian reforms.

Viewed, too, from the position of political expediency, it is of capital importance that the elections should be held at as early a date as possible, in order to prevent the reactionary elements, at present wholly disorganized, from once more obstructing the path of the new government, as was unfortunately the case with the administration of Señor Madero.

Lastly, as we are convinced that there can be no organic peace, without the establishment of a government of popular choice, no less than the division of lands, we are unable to attend the meeting called by you, until we are guaranteed that this latter question will be solved along lines really favorable to the common people.

Although, therefore, we oppose the holding of the meeting, on the terms named by you, and for the reasons above set forth, as a mark of discipline and out of respectful con-

sideration to the First Chief of the Constitutionalist movement, we shall proceed to the capital, with the understanding, however, that the following matters be given precedence: First, the ratification of the title of President *ad-interim* of the Republic, in favor of the First Chief; Secondly, the immediate calling of general elections; and Thirdly, the passing of measures which shall forthwith result in the division of lands, subject to the subsequent approval by Congress.

It is incumbent on us to advise you, that the Division of the North will not consider itself bound by any resolution taken at the meeting which shall cover questions not embraced in the three foregoing points.

We solemnly declare that our actions are directed only toward satisfying, honorably, the ideals of the revolution, so as to assure to our Republic a stable and lasting peace.

It is our opinion that the favorable adoption of the three foregoing proposals will bring peace to our country and will insure our national interests.

We renew the assurances of our very distinguished consideration.

Constitution and Reforms.

Chihuahua, September 21, 1914.

(Signed) ALVARO OBREGÓN, *General*.

“ FRANCISCO VILLA, *General*.

JUSTIFICATION OF THE ACT OF DISOBEDIENCE OF THE GENERALS OF THE DIVISION OF THE NORTH, IN TORREÓN, DURING THE MONTH OF JUNE, 1914.

On June 14, 1914, the generals of the Division of the North refused to obey the order of the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, providing that a provisional chief

of the Division be elected from among their number, until such time as Señor Carranza should designate the permanent chief to command the Division.

On this occasion, the Carrancista press heaped on our heads all kinds of insults, and the First Chief himself gave vent to the most intemperate language, stating, among other things, in a speech at Monterey, that General Angeles, being a federal officer, could not be other than a Judas.

It was our duty, at that time, to preserve silence, notwithstanding the attacks being directed against us, seeing that the Huertista enemy was still in the field, and that any definite split in our ranks would have constituted a serious mistake for our cause. Now, however, that no such reason exists for keeping silence, we owe an explanation of our conduct to all Mexican citizens, and to the world.

We do not wish to offer proof that Señor Carranza is jealous, (and he has been jealous ever since his stay in Sonora) of the ever-growing prestige of General Villa, as well as suspicious of the power of the Division of the North, which is, in point of effective reality, an army corps.

It is not our purpose to present this evidence for three reasons: First, because it is very extensive and if incorporated in this document, would make it too long for publication; Secondly, because its mere publication would produce a further break, and we are ready to do everything in our power to avoid this; and Thirdly, because this fact is within the knowledge of all men.

The Division of the North, at San Pedro de las Colonias, annihilated the strong reinforcements sent by Huerta to the aid of Torreón, and then returned to this city, to continue its operations along the Central Railroad, leading to the capital, through Zacatecas and Aguascalientes.

These Huerta reinforcements should never have passed Saltillo and Monterey, since General Pablo González had promised General Villa not to allow a single soldier of the

enemy to reach Torreón, while that city was being attacked by the Division of the North.

The fact that Señor Carranza was not interested in the fall of Torreón, while it was being attacked by General Villa, is likewise a matter of some interest. This was manifested in the answer given to Lázaro de la Garza [our financial agent in Ciudad Juárez] when he urged Carranza to take immediate steps to prevent the passage of the above-mentioned reinforcements. "I have not ordered an attack on Torreón," replied the First Chief quite coldly, as much as to say, "What do I care whether the Huerta reinforcements reach Torreón and the attack on this stronghold should fail, if I have not given orders for this attack?"

* * *

The line of operations, Zacatecas-Aguascalientes, was that naturally most advantageous to our advance, so that the three columns of constitutionalist troops, the Division of Pablo González, through Saltillo and San Luis Potosí, that of Villa, through Zacatecas and Aguascalientes, and that of Obregón, through Tepic and Guadalajara, might converge, and thus advance on Mexico City.

The advance along this route was indispensable, particularly for General Villa, who had exhibited, from the very beginning, absolute freedom of action, and who, in view of the fact that the First Chief was affording him no elements with which to carry on the struggle, had organized his own rear guard service, which encountered none of the obstacles which would have arisen through the intervention of any authority, not subservient to the orders of General Villa.

This independence of action had been extraordinarily efficient, and had given the Division of the North such power and importance, that it was the principal objective of the enemies' forces. It had forced the enemy, moreover, to concentrate its attacks on the line of operations of the Di-

vision of the North in order to hinder its advance. It was, therefore, essential if the Division was to maintain its efficiency, to preserve this independence and retain the exclusive control of its line of communications.

After the crushing defeat of the Hureta troops defending Torreón, as well as of the reinforcements at San Pedro de las Colonias, which General Pablo González had allowed to pass, the Division of the North returned to get a fresh supply of ammunition and provisions, while waiting for the railroad to be repaired, before continuing its advance on Zacatecas.

Such was the state of affairs when Señor Carranza gave orders for the Division of the North to advance and attack Saltillo, a task falling naturally to the Division of the Northeast, which had taken Monterey some time previously, after evacuation by the federal forces, under assaults by troops which they believed to be reinforcements of General Villa. Although compliance with this order of General Carranza would delay the operations along the natural line of the Division's advance and entail the expenditure of ammunition and provisions intended for other tasks, General Villa willingly proceeded to Saltillo, to render his aid to the Division of the Northeast which seemed powerless for this undertaking, and in order, also, to afford Señor Carranza the immediate gratification of reoccupying the capital of the state, of which he was constitutional governor.

As the result of a brilliant manœuvre, executed by the Division of the North, five thousand federal troops were wiped out at Paredón in a couple of hours, and three trains derailed at Certuche, thereby producing an indescribable panic among the garrison of Saltillo, and hastening the evacuation of that city. General Villa was thus able to place the capital of the State of Coahuila in the hands of the civil authorities named by Señor Carranza.

The Division of the North would unquestionably have

been able to advance at once on San Luis Potosí, following closely on the heels of the discouraged enemy; but this was not done because its line of communications might, in that event, have been intercepted by the forces of General Gonzalez, who, acting in conjunction with Señor Carranza, was in a position to render the provisioning of the division a difficult task.

General Villa accordingly returned to Torreón to the great displeasure of the First Chief, in order to keep intact the efficiency of his division.

While in Torreón General Villa learned that while he was engaged in reconquering the capital of the State of Coahuila for Señor Carranza, the latter was busy reenforcing the troops of General Natera and urging him to attack Zacatecas, in an effort to snatch away the laurels of victory and prestige from the Division of the North, by preventing it from capturing the city; it was also hoped, possibly, to block its further advance.

General Villa was, naturally, much put out on learning of this political intrigue, deeply regretting that it should have been carried out through the medium of General Natera for whom he had the best of good feeling, and for whose prestige and glory he was deeply interested, as is proved by the fact of his having been despatched to Ojinaga, in command of the veteran troops of Chihuahua, in order to assure him of certain victory.

On the other hand, General Villa foresaw immediately that this political manœuvre would be disastrous, because weighing duly the military elements of both sides, of Natera, and of Medina Barron, he predicted the defeat of the constitutionalist forces, thus later exhibiting, in more striking colors, the unquestionable triumph of the Division of the North, which, immediately, and with relative ease, broke up the resistance of the forces at Zacatecas, even though the ex-federal garrison had been reenforced from San Luis Potosí and Aguascalientes.

This political scheme was a coarse and foolish one, and involved, moreover, an unpardonable military blunder, in that it contravened an elementary principle of the art of war.

In every encounter all available troops should be brought into play, says the principle to which we refer.

In the famous Franco-German War, on the occasion of the battle of Saint Privat, the celebrated Marshal Von Moltke believed he had sufficient German troops in the vicinity of the French forces, and that he could do without the army which had just fought at Froeschiviller, under the orders of the Crown Prince of Prussia.

Von Moltke was stationed during the battle of Saint Privat on the right wing; he witnessed the repulse of every attack of the German troops, and finally left the field of battle under the impression that the engagement had been lost. On the following day he learned that the intrepid commander of the Twelfth Army Corps, by means of a flanking movement against the French right wing, had brought about the triumph of Prussian arms. On hearing the news, he exclaimed: "I have once again learned, this time on the field of battle, that one never has too many troops."

From that time, this principle has become one of general acceptance. General Villa is fully familiar with it, as his whole brilliant revolutionary campaign shows, it being remarkable that he is the only chief who did not divide his forces, and in every encounter, has presented a solid front with every available man. At Sacramento, he was convinced that not even in the case of apparently minor operations, if the principal aim is the defeat of the enemy, can you have an excess of troops. "You are right," he said to me, when I was exemplifying the above principle by other figures, "Even to crush a mosquito, one must use all his forces."

Besides being convinced of the absolute truth of this

principle, General Villa was on the lookout for the weakening effect of General Carranza's actions, who might easily and on any excuse whatsoever, order him to divide his forces, arranging later that these divided forces should fall to other chiefs, and so by this very simple process, be lost forever from his command.

Natera's attack on Zacatecas began on June 10th, and lasted till the 12th, on which day his troops were repulsed. At that time, owing to the backward state of repair of the railroad, General Villa was of the opinion that troops leaving Torreón could not arrive at Zacatecas in less than five days, and moreover that the forces of Natera could not stand a fight of this length of time. He accordingly considered useless the sending of the reinforcements ordered by General Carranza of 3,000 men on the 11th, and of 5,000, with some artillery, on the 12th.

By the 13th, the Constitutionalists, under Natera, had been defeated, and yet Señor Carranza insisted on the sending of the reinforcements, refusing to accept General Villa's proposal to advance on Zacatecas with his whole division.

It was evident that in a single day, the whole division could not entrain at Torreón, nor even all the reinforcements demanded. What reason was there, then, for refusing to allow the other troops to follow behind the reinforcements? Simply because, in this way, the intrigue would fail; the victory would be attributed to General Villa, and the Division of the North.

It will readily be seen from the above statements, that General Villa had four reasons for failing to obey General Carranza's order that reinforcements be sent to General Natera. These were as follows:

First, The reinforcements would be useless, because at the very earliest they could not reach Zacatecas before the 16th, and the forces of Natera could not hold out so long, as, in fact, they did not, beyond the 12th.

Secondly, In battle, in accordance with a fundamental principle of the art of war, all available forces should be employed; since the disregard of this principle leads to defeat, or at least to a wicked waste of human life, which every commander is in duty bound to avoid. On the shoulders, then, of Señor Carranza, must be laid the blame for the lives of the soldiers of Natera, uselessly sacrificed in a political intrigue.

Thirdly, The sending of the reenforcements could only result in withdrawing troops from the Division of the North. This was readily apparent from the long manifested desire of undermining the strength of the Division, and from the anxiety shown in having the reenforcements sent from the troops of Generals Robles and Urbina, who, according to Señor Carranza, did not belong to the Division.

Fourthly, General Villa disliked, extremely, contributing toward a political intrigue aimed against him, and the Division of the North.

General Villa reasoned as follows: "Should I propose to go to the assistance of Natera with the whole strength of my division, Señor Carranza will be unable to oppose this measure, as he will have no argument to present." In this he was mistaken, because Señor Carranza's "It is my order" is a sufficient reason in his own eyes for the most vital decisions, and even though thereby he sacrifice the patriots who came to his side, for the sole purpose of giving the revolution visible unity.

But this was not all. To his despotism he added insults, and showed contempt for the military ability of General Villa, everywhere recognized.

So we see, that when General Villa, on the 13th, inquired from General Carranza who had ordered Natera to attack Zacatecas without sufficient forces, the answer he received was that Villa had had the same experience, when he had failed to capture Chihuahua, through lack of troops, and

furthermore, that at Torreón, the same result would have happened had Señor Carranza not succeeded in getting reinforcements to him. Only ill-will or a total disregard of all military knowledge can compare the attack on Chihuahua, by General Villa, with that of Zacatecas, by General Natera. At Zacatecas, Natera had all available troops of the Division of the North ready to cooperate with him, and whoever failed to utilize them perpetrated a serious blunder. At Chihuahua, there were no troops to ask to join in the attack, and General Villa could only rely on such as he himself had. Again, at Zacatecas Natera failed through the fault of Carranza, while in the attack on Chihuahua, Villa began a series of strategical manoeuvres which constitute the most brilliant pages of his campaign, and attracted the attention of the whole world, giving him great military prestige.

With insufficient troops and ammunition, he attacked Chihuahua on the east, feinted a defeat, made a night march, and after a long detour took possession of the railroad on the north, seized a train; with great foresight and intelligence, in which no detail was lacking, deceived the enemy in Ciudad Juarez, who believed him in the neighborhood of Chihuahua, and reaching the very heart of the city on that train, completely surprised and overcame the garrison. Meanwhile, he ordered the rest of his forces to march overland, toward Ciudad Juarez, in order to delay the enemy, and so give him time to equip himself, and appropriate the stores of munitions and provisions.

On the approach of the enemy, he left Ciudad Juarez in order to avoid international complications. At Tierra Blanca, he inflicted a severe defeat on them, pursuing them as far as Chihuahua, from which place the panic-stricken enemy fled toward Ojinaga, along the Coahuila road; here Villa overtook them, held them in check, and defeated them, thus bringing his Chihuahua campaign to a finish.

Furthermore, it is mere vanity on the part of Señor Carranza to believe that the troops who coöperated with Villa, at Torreón, did so at his orders, and not through the invitation of General Villa. We leave it to the officers commanding these troops to say which of the two positions is the correct one.

As soon as General Villa realized that Señor Carranza was engaged not only in political intrigues, but in belittling his prestige as a strategist, he was bitterly disappointed in the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, and determined to place his resignation in his hands, although he had not derived his appointment from him, and who, moreover, had never given him the slightest aid. Only such as know the strong ties of affection binding General Villa to the officers and men of his division, ties strengthened by a common life of privation, and by the glory of a hundred victories, can understand the sacrifice he was making in tendering this resignation.

At this crucial moment, I intervened for the first time. It was the morning of the 13th; I was in the bed-room of Colonel Roque González Garza when some one came to me saying: "General Villa wants you," leading me forthwith to the quarters used as a telegraph office. The room was crowded with officers and employees whose flashing eyes and grave faces revealed immediately the seriousness of a situation of which I was quite ignorant. Every one was standing with the exception of the telegraph operator (whose small working table was tucked away in a corner) who was seated with his back turned toward the middle of the room. I must also except General Villa, who was seated next to the telegraph operator, but with his back to the table. Facing the General there was an empty chair which he beckoned me to take.

"See what you can do with these men, General," he said to me. "I am going."

As I did not understand the remark, I made no answer, but General Villa's attention seemed to be quite distracted, and he expected apparently no reply. The hum of conversation, suspended for a moment on my entrance, now broke out again, and I heard on all sides expressions of displeasure and protest.

"But come, what is the matter? Tell the General," said Roque González Garza who had followed me, and was now standing next to the telegraph operator, "What are the facts in the case? What telegrams have passed?"

No one paid any attention, and sentences showing disapproval with an occasional expression of hope, kept reaching me.

Little by little I gathered the threads of the story. I heard of the demand for reenforcements, of the refusal of General Villa to send them, of the recent exchange of telegrams, of Señor Carranza's appreciation regarding the attacks of Chihuahua and Torreón, and finally, of General Villa's resignation from his command.

This last fact held my whole attention, and I foresaw in a flash the answer that was being prepared by Señor Carranza in Saltillo.

"He will accept at once," I stated.

"Impossible" shouted some.

"He will accept," I repeated.

A few seconds later my words were borne out, when the news of his acceptance was flashed over the wires.

Words fail me with which to describe the scene which followed this acceptance, as I could not observe it closely owing to the gravity of the situation.

I remained seated, bending slightly toward General Villa with my left elbow resting on my left thigh, and my back turned on those who were talking and gesticulating in the room.

I was trying to reason out what would be the significance

of the abandonment of the command of the Division of the North at this moment, disturbed every second by the exclamations of all my comrades in arms. Among the sentences I caught were: "I am going back to dig roots up in the mountains," from Trinidad Rodriguez, and others which I would not set down here. They all crystalized this idea: *The Division of the North is about to disband*, and in the presence of the injustice being done to its intrepid and beloved leader, it will probably mutiny.

The Generals of the Division of the North received telegraphic advice of the order of General Carranza to designate a provisional chief, until such time as the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army should name a permanent head to take command of the Division.

Some prophesied that the appointment would fall on Jesús Carranza, others on General Chao, while a few others, in jest, suggested the name of Jacinto Treviño.

As the Generals of the Division of the North could not meet at once, the 14th was selected as the day for the meeting. What was going on in the mind of each? No one could tell; but it must have been very similar, because an agreement was a very simple matter. To obey General Carranza would unquestionably bring about the breaking up of the division, and, possibly, even rebellion. The disbanding of this force would, moreover, deprive the Constitutionalist cause of its most efficient body of troops, would bring cheer to the spirit of the enemy, already much shaken by the events of Torreón and San Pedro de las Colonias, as was later proved at Paredón and Saltillo; it would allow the enemy to reorganize, and at this time of which we are speaking, we would still be contending with a foe, endowed with fresh courage, and supplied with abundant aid poured from the coffers of the real enemies of liberty and democracy. The disbanding of the division, accompanied by rebellion, would postpone for many years the triumph of our arms and the realization of our hopes.

Some solution had to be found; disobedience was necessary, and it had to be turned into one channel, so to speak; a small act of disobedience of no importance to the Constitutionalist cause, even though it hurt the pride of one man, and might contravene the egregious whim of a despot.

But before taking this step, it was our duty to attempt to change the determination of Señor Carranza, so that General Villa might retain his command and the crisis be averted. Some thought that Señor Carranza would revoke his order; others amongst us were sure no such a thing would happen, and we were only asking for the revocation of the order as an act necessary to justify our future conduct.

As soon as Señor Carranza replied refusing to revoke his order, and adding that he had fully weighed the significance of his decision, those who had harbored the vain hope of its revocation, were indignant and urged that a sharp reply be sent. The rest of us counselled moderation, tempered with firmness, and drafted a telegram phrased in polite terms, stating that we considered ourselves compelled to disobey; that we should ask General Villa to resume command, and that we would continue the campaign, *as if no unpleasant incident had occurred on that day*, that is to say, as if Señor Carranza had not issued such an absurd order.

This telegram, it seemed, closed the incident, and called for no reply; but a reply came in the least suspected form, pretending not to understand our decision which we had sent as irrevocable, and summoning those of us whom he regarded as most dangerous. It was only then that General Villa informed all the generals that the conflict between himself and Señor Carranza had not started on the 13th, but that it dated far back, and was replete with incidents and intrigues, all tending to eliminate, him, and to deprive him of the prestige, which, as he modestly said, had been won for him by fortune, the skill of his generals and the bravery and patriotism of his soldiers.

“This trying situation,” he said, deeply moved, “has been weighing on me for some time. I have kept silence because my wish was to share with you all the triumphs and victories; but I am now in duty bound to tell you all that has happened. He then laid bare everything, ending up by showing us the télégrams which revealed the very active campaign being carried on in Washington, with Rafael Zubaran at its head, against the Division of the North. One telegram in particular called forth a great outburst of indignation from all present. It was that in which the political intrigues to prevent the delivery of ammunition to the Division of the North were revealed. We then decided to tell Señor Carranza clearly our position, which was summarized in the following telegram:

“From Torreón to Saltillo.—June 15, 1914.—Señor Venustiano Carranza.—Your last telegram leads us to imagine that you either have not understood, or have not cared to understand, our two former telegrams. These state in their most important passage that we are paying no heed to your decision ordering General Villa to retire from his command of the Division of the North, as, indeed, we could assume no other attitude in the face of such an unwise, anti-constitutionalist and unpatriotic order. We have succeeded in convincing General Villa, that the pledges he has given to the nation, require his continuance in command of the Division of the North, just as if you had not come to the malicious determination to deprive our democratic cause of its most renowned leader, in whom all Mexican liberals and democrats have centered their fondest hopes. Were he to heed your order, the Mexican people who are praying for the triumph of our cause, would not only anathematize you for such a blundering order, but it would also blame the man who, about to free his country from the brutal oppression of our enemies, laid aside his arms, in order to subject himself, through a principle of obedience, to a chief who, by his dictatorial attitude, his policy of discord in the various states he

visits, and his blunders in handling our foreign affairs, is defrauding the people in their hopes. We are all aware that you were only seeking the chance to dim a sun that was out-shining your light, and thwarting your desire of having no man of influence in the revolution who was not an unconditional "Carrancista"; but, above your interests, are those of the Mexican people, who need the great and victorious sword of General Villa. In view of all the above, we inform you that the decision to advance southward is irrevocable, and that, therefore, the generals you mention in the telegram can not obey your summons to leave for that city."

(Signed by all the generals of the Division of the North).

In order to show Señor Carranza, and the whole world, that our disobedience would produce no ill effects to the struggle which we had undertaken against the common enemy, we left immediately for Zacatecas (16th); the troops were concentrated in the neighborhood of the city on the 22nd, and the battle opened on the following day. The result was telegraphed to Señor Carranza, so that he might perceive that our disobedience of the 14th, did not imply a disavowal of the leadership with which he had been invested by a majority of the revolutionists, for the sole purpose of giving the revolution visible unity.

(Signed) FELIPE ANGELES.

Chihuahua, August 12, 1914.

During the last ten days of the month of July, 1914, a repetition of the Carrancista attacks against the Division of the North was noted. As a result, a meeting was held in the city of Chihuahua, attended by certain military chiefs and various civil personages at which a resolution was passed to publish an explanation of the true situation in respect to

the Division of the North. A committee, composed of Messrs. Manuel Bonilla, Emilino Sarabia, Francisco Lagos Chazaro and José Quevedo, was named to determine what matters should be embodied in the respective manifesto, while to Mr. Federico González Garza, was entrusted the task of drafting it. As soon as the draft had been presented and carefully discussed in several sessions, word came of the early arrival of General Alvaro Obregón. As this indicated the possibility of arriving at a decorous and friendly settlement of the differences that daily caused the breach between the First Chief, and the Commander of the Division of the North, to be widened, it was considered advisable to suspend indefinitely, the discussion and publication of the manifesto herewith inserted, and which is now given publicity, owing to the necessity of informing the public on a matter of such moment.

DRAFT OF A MANIFESTO ADDRESSED TO THE NATION BY
THE CHIEFS OF THE DIVISION OF THE NORTH.

Viewed from its military standpoint we may well say that the Mexican revolution has attained its goal. Swept by the Constitutionalist Army, and through the sacrifice of thousands of lives, the audacious usurper and his accomplices have had to flee the country; the ex-federal army which in an evil hour, seconded the treachery of Victoriano Huerta, has been almost wholly exterminated, and the flag of the revolution now waves triumphant over the national palace.

Although this noteworthy event should have been the occasion for immense rejoicing throughout the country, it has nevertheless hardly stirred the people. Only in the capital of the Republic have there been a few more or less enthusiastic manifestations of rejoicing. This can be ascribed to the fact that something has dimmed the glory of victory, and instead of the legitimate joy of the conquerors, we perceive a feeling of disappointment and sadness. It is because

one problem has been followed by another, and until this fresh problem has been really solved, the people can not say that the victory has been truly theirs.

Allow us to develop this thought:

The Division of the North, thanks to the co-operation of important personal elements, as well as to others of an economic character, has been fortunate enough to contribute in no small measure to the campaign, and to the final triumph of the Constitutionalist Army and of revolutionary principles and ideals. This fact has been a constant source of suspicion, and has been exploited by all those who have erroneously believed that this revolution was undertaken solely for the personal advancement of certain individuals, and not to assure more solid and, therefore, more human, bases for our masses, on which the future welfare of the people may be definitely built. This suspicion, from the very first, took the shape of all kinds of obstacles thrown in the path of the Division of the North. By this means an effort was made to deprive the Division of its strength and to halt its victorious advance, which seemed to those whose aims were personal gain, a danger to the realization of their schemes; furthermore, around this Division, there have been grouped a large number of truly independent and democratic spirits.

Shortly after the triumph of our cause, and when the Republic was joyfully contemplating the final defeats inflicted by the Division of the North, on the army of the usurper, at Lerdo, Gómez Palacio, Torreón, San Pedro, Paredón and Zacatecas, at the very moment when we believed ourselves deserving of at least the sincere plaudits of our superiors, in view of the utter rout of the enemy as the immediate result of the above mentioned engagements, attacks were again directed against us by the personal group unfortunately existing in the revolutionary ranks, without weighing the effects or meditating on the justice or injustice of the charges, hurling the epithet of traitor at our

heads, through the columns of papers published in places directly under the control of the First Chief of the revolution.

The Division of the North maintaining an attitude of discretion, such as befits one who is sure that justice and reason are on his side, has up to now hardly defended itself, preferring to remain silent in the hope that a more unbiased consideration of these matters by its enemies would bring about a modification of their intemperance and put an end to their criticism. As these attacks have, however, continued, as shown by editorials published in certain newspapers friendly to Señor Carranza, among others *El Progreso* of Laredo, and *La Lucha* of San Luis Potosí, particularly the editorial of this latter appearing in its number of the 4th of August, of the present year, which transcends all bounds of prudence, the members of the Division feel compelled to break their silence and undertake their defense by an appeal to reason, publishing documents which it had heretofore been deemed wise not to make public, and relating events as these have occurred, in order that our countrymen may pronounce their judgment based on the dictates of justice.

By virtue of the same right by which General Alvaro Obregón, and his forces of the Division of the Northwest, in Sonora, and by which General Pablo Gonzales, with his troops in Tamaulipas, had marked out their respective routes by which to reach the capital, the former carrying on a vigorous campaign through Sinaloa, Tepic, Jalisco, Guanajuato and Querétaro, and the latter throwing his forces through the capitals of Nuevo León, Coahuila, San Luis Potosí, Guanajuato and Querétaro, General Villa, owing to the central position of his army, was entitled to select, and did select, as the natural and necessary route, by which to arrive at the same point, the direct line connecting Torreón with Zacatecas, Aguascalientes and other towns on the Mexican Central Railroad. A noble spirit of competition filled

the breast of every chief and every soldier fighting under the colors of the Division of the North, and fired them with enthusiasm and determination. A campaign of unbroken and brilliant victories in the State of Chihuahua and part of that of Coahuila, which had crushed the very flower of the usurper's army and struck terror to the hearts of the remainder, had granted them the right to advance on the capital of the Republic, so that they might have the supreme satisfaction of expelling the usurper, and wiping out the remainder of his troops in their victorious advance.

This was not to be, however. From the beginning, General Villa saw, to his sorrow, that the First Chief was thwarting these legitimate aspirations, and was lending his aid and approval to everything that tended to break up or divide the forces of the Division; that he was throwing obstacles in the way of every effort to develop its units of war, and increase its supplies of provisions and ammunition, by pretending to limit its natural sources of income, without which its extraordinary efficiency would have been diminished.

After the bloody battles of Torreón and San Pedro, the Division required not only rest, but it needed to restock its horses, bring its decimated ranks up to the regular quota, and replenish the supply of provisions and ammunition before beginning its campaign southward.

The First Chief did not bear all this in mind. Instead of allowing the Division a short respite, he ordered one of its parts, under the command of General Villa himself to undertake the capture of the capital of Coahuila, a task naturally pertaining to the Division of the Northeast, which had already seized Monterey, a position near Saltillo, without very great losses. To those familiar with the psychology of the First Chief, it is not a wild guess to suppose that, by this move, he hoped to divide the Division, thereby weakening it by separating it from its natural base of supplies. In this way he indicated a desire that General Villa should be turned away from his line of advance.

Thanks to the brilliant victory obtained at Paredón, the plans of the First Chief were on this occasion frustrated, and General Villa after seizing the city of Saltillo, and turning it over to the civil authorities named by Señor Carranza, returned to his base of operations, to the great displeasure of the First Chief.

Meanwhile the latter was planning in Durango a new scheme whereby General Villa's prestige would be undermined; and we all know how concerned he was over the growth of this affair. Hence the orders to Generals Natera, Arrieta, Triana and Carrillo to take Zacatecas. Although the First Chief was aware of the earnest wish of the Chief of the Division of the North, that he be allowed to take this fortified position, he informed General Villa of none of these orders. So when the insufficient forces of the above mentioned generals, had received a severe setback, and had been defeated with great loss of life, by the ex-federal garrison of Zacatecas, the First Chief was then compelled to appeal to General Villa, but not ordering him, as dictated by both disinterestedness and military science, to advance with the whole of his Division against the place, in order to make victory certain, but merely telling him to hold himself in readiness to assist General Natera, should circumstances make this necessary.

Here follows the order:

FIRST TELEGRAM.

“Saltillo to Torreón, June 10, 1914.—Received: 5:25 p.m. General Francisco Villa.—General Natera advises me that he is today beginning operations against the fortified town of Zacatecas, and is reasonably sure of success. You will nevertheless order the commander of the nearest troops belonging to your garrison to hold himself in readiness to reenforce the commands of Generals Natera, Arrieta, Triana and Carrillo, should it be necessary. Accept my greeting.—Venustiano Carranza.—First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army.”

The Chief of our Division was no longer deceived in regard to Señor Carranza's intentions; it was evident that he had made up his mind to relegate to a secondary position one of the revolutionary chiefs who had shown, and was showing, great military ability and strength. Although General Villa realized the mistakes of the First Chief, and was sure that the assault would fail, he nevertheless replied to Señor Carranza in the following terms, dictating immediately the necessary orders:

ANSWER TO THE ABOVE TELEGRAM.

“Torreón to Saltillo, Coahuila.—June 10, 1914.—Despatched at 7 p.m.—Señor Venustiano Carranza.—Have taken note of your message of today, regarding the opening of operations against Zacatecas by General Natera. I beg to inform you that I am proceeding to carry out your superior orders, as given me. Accept my greetings.—Francisco Villa, General in Chief of the Division of the North.”

Before 24 hours had elapsed, and in total disregard of the foregoing answer, a second telegram was received couched in not very measured language, similar to that used on all occasions by the First Chief in giving orders, reminding the Chief of the Division of the North, that he had ordered something which in truth he had not, as there is a difference between holding himself “in readiness to reinforce, should it be necessary” and ordering that reinforcements should be forthwith sent. Surely, in the former case, General Villa would have had nothing to do but to prepare for the moment when reinforcements should be demanded. If to this, we add the fact that this new order showed clearly the design of Señor Carranza of disbanding the Division without giving it an opportunity of scoring a new success, it will readily be understood why General Villa did not hesitate in proposing respectfully to the First Chief, that “in order to make victory certain” and “to lessen the

sufferings of the troops" the whole Division should leave at once.

Here follow both telegrams.

SECOND TELEGRAM.

"Saltillo to Torreón.—June 11, 1914.—Señor General Francisco Villa.—Yesterday I gave orders that from the troops nearest Zacatecas you should send reinforcements to General Natera, who yesterday opened his attack on that city. If these reinforcements have not already left, you will order that at least 3,000 men be sent to reinforce General Natera, taking with them two batteries of artillery.—V. Carranza, First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army."

REPLY.

"Torreón, June 11, 1914.—Señor V. Carranza.—Saltillo, Coahuila.—Referring to your message regarding the mobilization of troops against Zacatecas to cooperate in the assault on that stronghold, I beg to suggest, subject to your superior approval, the advisability of my entire division moving at once, in order to make victory certain and lessen the sufferings of the troops. In making this general movement, I shall take with me all munitions and supplies necessary for the campaign. In the event of your considering my proposal warranted, it would be preferable to order General Natera to suspend his attack until my arrival, in order not to sacrifice lives needlessly, for my information is to the effect that they have been repulsed in their attempts to take the city. Be good enough to decide this point, so that your orders may be carried out.—Francisco Villa, General."

While this answer was on the way, definite orders were given to rush the work of repairing the railroad to Zacatecas. Although the road was badly torn up, and a certain feeling of unrest prevailed in our ranks, yet the Chief of the Division waited calmly, confident that his proposal would be accepted.

His disappointment, therefore, was great when instead of such a reply, a second message was received merely repeating the former order, modified only to the extent that the reinforcements now asked for were greater in number, and were to be placed under the orders of General Robles. This message is as follows:

THIRD TELEGRAM.

“Saltillo to Torreón, June 12, 1914.—General Francisco Villa.—Very urgent.—Yesterday I ordered you to send 3,000 men with artillery to reinforce the troops assaulting Zacatecas. Today General Arrieta informs me that they have occupied very advantageous positions in the city, and that he needs artillery and ammunition to complete its occupation. I presume you have already sent the forces to which I refer. If these have not started, have them leave immediately under the command of General Robles, as it would be unwise to abandon the portions of the city already occupied by our troops when a slight effort on our part would give us possession of the whole. Instead of 3,000 men you may send 5,000, and if you can, add some ammunition 30-30 and mausers for the use of the troops of Generals Natera and Arrieta in their attack on the city. Accept my greetings.—V. Carranza, First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army.”

What had happened to the proposal of General Villa? Is it imaginable that a superior officer, merely from his position as such, should be clothed with the extraordinary powers of totally disregarding the opinion of his subordinates, however mistaken he may be in his own views? Is it possible that even before the revolution has ended the First Chief had forgotten that the soldiers composing the Constitutionalist Army are above all *armed citizens* who have not abdicated either their personality or their views unconditionally in favor of any one? Why did the First Chief scorn the judgment of one of the generals, who,

through his many unbroken successes, has proven his military ability to a degree which admits of no question, and when his opinion tended to save the troops from hardships and avoid unnecessary loss of life?

Let every man judge of the prudence and subordination of General Villa, and of those under his military command, when in reply to this second message instead of repeating the former proposal to send the whole division, we disregarded the slight which had just been shown our Chief, and without showing the natural resentment we felt on this score, General Villa replied in measured and respectful terms in the telegram published below, giving his reasons why the orders of the First Chief had not been carried out immediately, and intimating with great tact his legitimate desire of going to the aid of Natera with the whole of his division.

REPLY.

“Torreón to Saltillo, June 12, 1914.—Night service.—Señor Venustiano Carranza, First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army.—Replying to your message of today ordering me to assist General Natera, I regret to tell you that it is at present impossible for Robles to go, as he has been sick for several days. I am extremely anxious to mobilize immediately the forces under my command, but am prevented by washouts along the line caused by the heavy rains. Am ordering that the necessary repairs be made at once, in order to carry out your superior orders. Accept my best greetings.—Francisco Villa, General.”

General Villa, however, did not fail to notice that there was hourly approaching a crisis between himself and Señor Carranza, in which the latter would endeavor to get rid of him, as his prestige, now grown to great proportions, was a cause of alarm to Carranza. General Villa then, in his anxiety to come to a settlement, endeavored to secure a satisfactory explanation, once for all, regarding this inci-

dent, and as a result the following telegraphic exchange took place between the two chiefs on the next day :

GENERAL VILLA : "Receive my affectionate greetings.—I can not send reinforcements to General Natera before five days, as the movement of troops can not be carried out before that time. Who ordered this man to try such an undertaking without being sure of success, when you and they knew we had everything ready for the undertaking? Your order places me in a predicament for the following reasons: First, because Robles is sick in bed; secondly, because if I send Urbina in command of the troops, he would not get along with Arrieta, and no good would come of it. Now, will you please inform me whether, if I leave with the Division, under my command, I am to be subject to the orders of Natera and Arrieta, and whether I am to take the town merely for them to enter? On capturing a place like this, if the forces of these generals should commit disorders while I am present, I would not tolerate it, and in this way we are, in my opinion, steadily going backward. Kindly inform me what is to be done. Now, if you should be of opinion that I am hindering your plans with regard to the Division formed by the above-mentioned generals, and you wish some one else to take over the forces under my command, I should like to know who this person is, so that, should I consider him fit to take care of my men, as I have done, I may accept. I am making this observation to you solely in the interest of my men, and as the most loyal soldiers on your side. Kindly decide what you think best on these points."

FIRST CHIEF : "I return your greetings, and trust you will advise me as to the purpose of the telegraphic conference you have just requested. I ordered you the day before yesterday to send reinforcements to General Natera in his attack on Zacatecas, as this was necessary to the success of operations, and because the reinforcements I ordered were, in my opinion, sufficient for the capture of the town. General Natera and his chiefs, while in Sombrerete, told me that with the assistance of the troops of General Arrieta, they could take Zacate-

cas, and this belief was strengthened when the united forces of these generals defeated the garrisons of the towns in the immediate neighborhood of Zacatecas, and forced the federals to concentrate there. As a result of the first attacks, the positions of Guadalupe, Las Mercedes and those next to El Grillo were taken, but they were repulsed in their effort to capture La Bufa and La Estación. This is not the time to censure these troops because they attack Zacatecas without being sure of success, seeing that they, no less than yourself, are animated by a desire to contribute to the triumph of the cause, and to get from the enemy war material which we are now able to introduce with such great difficulty. You yourself concurred in a similar error when you attacked Chihuahua, and had to retire after a few days' fighting. Nor would you have captured Torreón had I not ordered Generals Robles, Contreras, Urbina and the forces of General Arrieta, under the command of General Carrillo, together with some other troops under the command of lesser chiefs, to go to your aid. In this way, on that occasion, I ordered all the chiefs to co-operate with you in the attack on the enemy, and so assure the triumph you gained. I have only thought it advisable for a portion of the troops under your orders to go to the assistance of General Naterá in his attack on Zacatecas. You will accordingly understand that it is not my idea that you should place yourself under the orders of General Natera, but that a portion of your troops should act in conjunction with his, in taking the town, and opening up the road for your own advance southward. Your separation from the command of the forces now under your orders, is neither necessary, nor, in my opinion, advisable; but if I should be compelled to come to such a decision, I should not hesitate to act in the interest of the cause, and of the Constitutionalist Army, which I am honored in commanding as First Chief. I trust that setting aside any consideration of such great moment, you will overcome any obstacles in the way of your despatching reinforcements to Zacatecas, which, together with the first batch sent, and those that are now assaulting the town, should be sufficient to capture the

fortified positions. I suggested that General Robles be sent in command of the reinforcements, not only because he would experience no difficulty in acting with General Natera, but also because of his knowledge of the topography of the country; but as General Robles is sick in bed, General Benavides might go, or General Ortega, General Contreras or any other of the chiefs you think fit. General Natera tells me he can hold out two days more in his present position, by which time the reinforcements should be beginning to arrive, and what has already been won would not thus be lost. You will please send the reinforcements required to General Natera, advising him of their departure and probable time of arrival at Zacatecas.—Carranza.”

GENERAL VILLA: “I am determined to withdraw from the command of the Division. Kindly advise me to whom I should turn it over.”

FIRST CHIEF: “I am compelled to my deep regret to accept your resignation from the command of the Division of the North. Permit to thank you on behalf of the Nation for the important services you have rendered our cause, and to express the hope that you will take charge of the Governorship of the State of Chihuahua. Before I designate the chief to whom you should turn over the forces, please proceed immediately to the telegraph office of the station where you are at present, summoning generals Angeles, Robles, Urbina, Contreras, Aguirre Benavidez, Ceniceros, J. Rodríguez, M. Herrera, Ortega, Servín and Máximo García, and when these have all met kindly advise me, as I am waiting at the other end of the line.”

V. CARRANZA,
First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army.

It should be noted that the whole line of thought of General Villa during this exchange of telegrams may be summed up in this question: “Why, if I have demonstrated my ability to defeat the enemy, and if Zacatecas is in the line along which I should naturally pass, why, I repeat, not allow the

Division under my command, with its whole strength, to undertake this task?" The capital thought running through Señor Carranza's reply is simply this: "I am not bound to explain anything to you; the orders have been given; they are mine and are not subject to discussion. I know what I am doing."

In the face of this incomprehensible attitude of the First Chief, General Villa, before bringing about a breach, and thereby wrecking the cause of the revolution, laconically replied, "I am determined to withdraw from the command of the Division; kindly advise me to whom I should turn it over." Immediately, with the rapidity of the electric current operating the telegraphic apparatus, and as if fearing that a chance which might never again present itself should slip through his fingers, General Carranza replied to General Villa that he deeply regretted to be compelled to accept his resignation, thanked him on behalf of the Nation, and expressed the hope that he would accept the reins of Government of the State of Chihuahua.

A comrade in arms who was present during these events describes this crisis in the following terms: "This is not the time to depict the scene which took place in General Villa's quarters immediately after the conclusion of the telegraphic conference. That historic moment was so imposing that we are all moved when we call it to mind; suffice it to say that fullbearded man and mere lads were weeping, touched by the significance of the approaching conflict. Everyone realized the transcendence of the event, while one general knitting his eyebrows, and casting his eyes heavenward, as if in an effort to find an immediate solution for the crisis, was gesticulating in such a way that General Villa on noticing him, said: "Don't worry, you know we are all patriots, and our duty is to do what is right."

Summoned by General Villa, the undersigned met on the following day. He then acquainted us with the outcome of the telegraphic exchange, calling upon us to name another

chief in his stead. At the same time, we received a telegram from the First Chief to the same effect. We were now face to face with a difficult situation; we could not understand how General Carranza could accept General Villa's resignation, when such a step might produce so many ill effects. We considered it the result of a passing fit of anger, and instead of deciding, as some of our companions urged, that everybody should leave the Division, some of us did not lose heart, and finally wiser counsels prevailed. The following answer was then drafted to the telegram, the text of both of which follows:

FOURTH TELEGRAM.

"Saltillo to Torreón.—June 13, 1914.—Generals Angeles, Robles, Urbina, Contreras, Aguirre Benavidez, Ceniceros, T. Rodriguez, Orestes Pereyra, J. Rodriguez, Herrera Ortega, Servín, Almanza, Máximo García and Rosalio Hernández. Accept my best greetings. As the result of a telegraphic conference just held with General Villa, the latter has presented his resignation as First Chief of the Division of the North, and in view of my acceptance of this resignation, I have summoned you to designate the chief who should provisionally command your division. I am aware that General Urbina is absent, and that General Robles is sick; the latter may be informed of the object of this meeting in order that he may give his opinion in writing. Should there be any other general in that city, of whose presence I am not aware, kindly summon him, in my name, to the meeting. I presume that General Villa is present. Inform him of the contents of this message."

V. CARRANZA,

First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army.

REPLY.

"Torreón to Saltillo, June 13, 1914.—Señor Venustiano Carranza.—We respectfully beg you to reconsider your decision to accept the resignation of General Francisco Villa as Chief of the Division of the North,

since his separation from this post is the present juncture would be a matter of serious importance, and would give rise to complications, not only in the Republic but abroad also.—Toribio Ortega, E. Aguirre Benavidez, M. Herrera, R. Hernández, S. Ceniceros, M. Servín, José Rodríguez, T. Rodríguez, M. Almanza, F. Angeles, J. I. Robles, T. Urbina, C. Contreras, O. Pereyra, M. García, Manuel Medina Beitia, Raúl Madero.”

From this instant our minds which had been so disturbed were set at rest, since we never entertained the possibility of our request being rejected. In this we were mistaken; what we had thought to be a passing fit of anger, turned out to be characteristic of all the acts of Señor Carranza; an irritating idiosyncratic obstinacy, which, to attain its end, stops at no sacrifice, however great. This is the only thought that comes to one's mind on reading the reply sent to our respectful request. It follows:

FIFTH TELEGRAM.

“Saltillo to Torreón, June 13, 1914.—Generals Toribio Ortega, Aguirre Benavidez, M. Herrera, R. Hernández, S. Ceniceros, M. Servín, José Rodríguez, M. Almanza, F. Angeles, J. I. Robles, T. Urbina, C. Contreras, O. Pereyra and M. García. In accepting General Villa's resignation, from the command of the Division of the North I have duly weighed the consequences which his withdrawal may occasion to our cause. You will accordingly proceed to select, without loss of time, the chief I have ordered should provisionally substitute General Francisco Villa in his command of the Division of the North, so that no time may be lost in sending the reenforcements to Zacatecas, which I ordered him to furnish.

V. CARRANZA,

First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army.”

In spite of the above telegram, our duty was not to despair, although there already existed grave reasons for

our misgivings; but it was also none the less our duty to prevent any such egregious mistake from being committed. After due deliberation, we thought we might gain our point by giving a new turn to our request, as may be seen from the following reply:

“Torreón to Saltillo.—June 13, 1914.—Señor Venustiano Carranza.—We might, following General Villa in his determination, abandon the command of our troops, and thereby disband the Division of the North; but we should not deprive our cause of such an invaluable element. We shall accordingly endeavor to convince the Chief of this Division to continue his struggle against the Huerta Government, as if no unpleasant incident had occurred, and we urge you to act in the same spirit, in order that the common enemy may be defeated.” (Same signatures.)

A vain hope; Señor Carranza was not concerned in the defeat of the enemy at Zacatecas by any means within our power, so that we might arrive as soon as possible at the gates of the capital; rather was he striving, in his personal interest, to prevent the Division of the North from obtaining this victory. Furthermore, in his eyes, all dangers decrease in magnitude before the bare possibility of his authority, which he believes sacred, infallible and absolute, being restricted in the slightest degree.

His sixth telegram confirms our views, as is seen from the emphatic language employed, going even to the extent of forbidding us to come to any decision in the presence of General Villa. In acting in this way, he only invokes our duty as soldiers, and scorns our duty as revolutionary citizens. Let public opinion judge it by its terms.

SIXTH TELEGRAM.

“Saltillo to Torreón, June 13, 1914.—Generals (as above).—I regret to inform you that it is impossible to alter my decision to accept the resignation of the com-

mand of the Division of the North, tendered by General Villa, as this is in the interest of the discipline of the army, without which there could exist no coherence in our ranks. Three days ago I ordered General Villa to send reinforcements to General Natera, and he has so far failed to do so; he might easily have sent troops not belonging to the Division of the North under his immediate command, but those of Generals Contreras, Robles, Pereyra, Aguirre Benavidez and Garcia, as well as those of General Carrillo, not belonging to the Division of the North, and which, added to those sent by my order, have contributed to the recent successes. I trust that both you and General Villa will do your duty as soldiers, and will obey the orders I have dictated by reason of the resignation of General Villa. I presume your decisions have been arrived at in the absence of the said general, and if this has not been the case, you will do so after the receipt of this telegram.

V. CARRANZA,
First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army."

We maintain that we continued to exercise moderation in the premises, as is evidenced by the fact that we devised a settlement which conciliated the principle of authority sustained by the First Chief with the important interests of the revolution, on behalf of which the people have been making such great sacrifices.

Here follows our reply:

"Torreón to Saltillo, June 14, 1914.—Señor don Venustiano Carranza.—The irrevocable decision at which we have arrived to continue the struggle under the command of General Villa, as if no unpleasant incident had occurred yesterday, has been carefully considered, without the attendance of the Chief of the Division of the North. Our negotiations with this chief have been successful, and we shall soon advance southward. All those subscribing this document are members of the Division of the North."

We do not deny that we were guilty of an act of disobedience, but it was a necessary step whose results would soon be justified and for which we are ready to answer to history.

Señor Carranza insisted in his determination, finding no other reason whereby to justify his unwarranted step, than "It is my order," as in the days of Porfirio Diaz, and basing his action on the provisions of a Plan which, unfortunately, is turning out most propitious for the establishment in our Republic of another dictatorship.

No other inference can be drawn from the following :

SEVENTH TELEGRAM.

"Saltillo to Torreón.—June 14, 1914.—General's Felipe Angeles, T. Urbina, Maclovio Herrera, C. Contreras, Maximo Garcia, Almanza, T. Rodríguez, J. Rodríguez, Robles, Servín and Pereyra.—Your message of today received. When I ordered you to meet and submit to me the name of the chief who, in your opinion, should take command of the Division of the North, in place of General Villa, who has just tendered his resignation thereof, my sole purpose was to avoid as far as possible any difficulties which might have arisen amongst you, in the event of my appointee not being the best suited to fill this position; You should be aware that the First Chief is entitled to make such an appointment. In view of the contents of your message of today, it is within my power to designate the chief to substitute General Villa in his command. Before taking this step, however, it is my wish to act in conformity with your wishes, and for this purpose I consider it advisable that Generals Angeles, Urbina, M. Herrera, Ortega, Aguirre Benavidez and R. Hernandez should come here tomorrow to talk over the matter.—V. CARRANZA, First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army." Note of the telegraph operator: Transmit this message to Generals Angeles, Urbina, Herrera, Ortega, Aguirre Benavidez and Hernández, to be communicated in turn to the other generals.

This strange obsession ended by wounding our dignity as men, and our susceptibility as an ever victorious army. We accordingly decided to show the First Chief, in no unmistakable way, our disapproval, so soon as we were convinced that the revolution had as its chief, not a broad-minded man who could understand the regenerating aspiration of the movement, but a spirit, recalling by anachronism the days of Louis XIV, rather than the recent times of the Apostle Madero.

Our reply was as follows:

REPLY.

“Torreón to Saltillo.—June 14, 1914.—Señor Venustiano Carranza.—Your last telegram leads us to believe that you either have not understood, or do not care to understand, our two former messages. They state in their most important paragraphs that we are paying no heed to your order that General Villa should relinquish the command of the Division of the North. No other step was, indeed, open to us, in view of this unwise, anti-constitutionalist and unpatriotic order. We have convinced General Villa that the pledges given to the Nation compel him to continue in command of the Division of the North, as if you had never come to the mischievous determination to deprive our democratic cause of its most renowned leader, in whom Mexican liberals and democrats have centered their most fond hopes. Were he to heed your order, the Mexican people, which anxiously awaits the triumph of our cause, would not only anathematize you for such a blundering decision, but would also blame the man who, about to free his country from the brutal oppression of our enemies, laid aside his arms in order to subject himself, through a principle of obedience, to a chief, who, through his dictatorial attitude, his lack of tact in every state he visits, and his blunders in managing our foreign affairs, is frustrating the hope of the people.

We are well aware that you were only looking for the chance to dim a sun whose light was outshining

yours, and thwarting your desire, that no man who is not an unconditional follower of you should arise; but above your interests are those of the Mexican people, who need the great and victorious sword of General Villa. In view of all the above we inform you that the decision to advance southward is irrevocable, and that, therefore, the generals you mention in your telegram, can not obey your summons to leave for that city. (Signed) Calixto Contreras for himself and for General Tomas Urbina. Mateo Almanza, T. Rodriguez, Severiano Cenicerros, E. Aguirre Benavidez, José E. Rodriguez, Orestes Pereyra, Martiniano Servin, J. Isabel Robles, Felipe Angeles, Rosalio G. Hernandez, Toribio Ortega, Maclovio Herrera and M. Garcia."

No one need wonder, we are sure, that our first thought when don Venustiano accepted immediately General Villa's resignation, was to disband the Division, each going anywhere or to the mountains, as a mark of protest. Less still should the public wonder that this idea was uppermost in our minds, when it is recalled that at this critical juncture, convincing evidence was given us that the agents of Señor Carranza in Washington, were actively urging the American Administration to prevent a shipment of ammunition from reaching General Villa.

The same night our comrade in arms, General Manuel Chao, arrived at Torreón. With a force of 300 men he was on his road to Saltillo, under orders from the First Chief, to assume command of the latter's body-guard. General Chao, on learning of the attitude of Señor Carranza, and calling to mind how he had tried to make trouble between himself and General Villa, with the deliberate purpose of causing a split, and thereby weakening the strength of the revolutionary army of Chihuahua, determined to address the First Chief the following message, which proves his good sense and spirit of solidarity with the Division of the North.

“Torreón to Saltillo, June 15, 1914.—Señor don Venustiano Carranza.—I hereby ratify in all its parts the message addressed to you last night by the generals of this Division, and have forthwith incorporated my forces with those of the same.—Respectfully, (signed) Manuel Chao.”

The decision of the First Chief placed us most unwisely on the horns of this dilemma: we had either to declare ourselves in open mutiny, disbanding and withdrawing to the mountains, or we had to disobey the First Chief in this order.

The former alternative was indeed terrible; our imagination pictured the anarchy, havoc and bloodshed into which our country would soon be plunged, at the very moment when victory was smiling on the constitutionalist arms. The second alternative was less serious, since we might, later, by our actions, fully justify that reason was on our side. Between these two evils brought about by the attitude of Sr. Carranza, we could not fail to decide in favor of the lesser. In one way or another, we should be encircled in the fatal dilemma, and we were in duty bound to break through along the line of least resistance.

These are the reasons which, much to our regret, forced us to disobey the First Chief and begin our advance southward. Had this step not been taken, Zacatecas would not have fallen into the hands of the Constitutionalists; both the reinforcements of 5,000 men asked by the First Chief, as well as the forces of Natera, Arrieta, Triana and Carrillo would have been annihilated, and the Division of the North would itself, later, have been decimated, and, possibly, even wiped out within a short while, a victim of the jealousy of Sr. Carranza.

The victory of the constitutionalists at Zacatecas cost the federals 15,000 men, and occasioned the immediate evacuation of the cities of Aguascalientes and San Luis Potosí, to say nothing of the flight of the usurper, permitting the

concentration of numerous garrisons around the capital of the republic, and facilitating the advance of General Obregon's forces toward the center of the republic.

We trust our comrades in arms will believe that our conduct in this unpleasant incident with the First Chief was justified. We are confident, moreover, that just as General Villa preferred to relinquish his command of the Division, rather than bring on a conflict between the two leaders, or expose his division to defeat, and as the chiefs under him decided, after fruitless conciliatory efforts to dissuade Señor Carranza, to disobey his order, which, from every point of view was unwise, so, too, our companions, under similar circumstances, would have come to the same decision without anyone considering it treacherous, as a result of which, in great measure, has been due the safe entrance of Señor Carranza into the capital of the republic.

The report sent by our chief to Señor Carranza, regarding the capture of Zacatecas, proves that, in advancing southward, he had no intention of rebelling, nor, indeed, has he ever subsequently entertained such an idea.

We have confined ourselves to showing, by an array of evidence, that we were justified in opposing the disruption of our forces. A telegram signed by General Natera, and filed in the records of this Division, shows that even had the reinforcements of 5,000 men left, at the time they were ordered to start by Señor Carranza, they would have arrived at Zacatecas after Natera and his companions had been repulsed and driven to San José de Fresnillo.

The nature and gravity of this incident convinced us all of the necessity of explaining our situation and of outlining our views as revolutionists, so that our relations toward the First Chief should be defined. The bald provisions of the Plan of Guadalupe contain no message to the people regarding the purposes of the revolution, while on the other hand General Carranza, by his constant declarations and general conduct, openly antagonistic to those democrats call-

ing themselves "maderistas," gives us good ground for fearing that the economic and social reforms which are today the supreme aspiration of the Mexican people, will never be fulfilled.

For this reason we welcomed with the greatest pleasure and good-will, Generals Villarreal, Caballero and Castro, who came as delegates from the Division of the Northeast, for the purpose of settling our differences with the First Chief. Together with the delegates of our Division, certain conferences were held in the city of Torreón, from the 4th to the 8th of July last, on the initiative of that Division, an action redounding greatly to its credit.

Herein are given the minutes of the different sessions held at the said conference, a faithful record (Annex No. 1) of the honest purposes animating our actions, and clearly showing our firm determination to incorporate into the Plan of Guadalupe such reforms as are absolutely essential to guarantee the people that the government set up by the revolution will strictly follow the democratic principles which have been the soul of this great national upheaval; and, furthermore, that this same government will bend every effort toward the immediate establishment of those economic reforms without which no lasting peace can come to this republic.

As the Plan of Guadalupe is silent as to what rule or principles should govern the next constitutional government, it was indispensable to propose at the Torreón Conference that, on the triumph of the revolution, a Convention should be called to draft a programme to be followed by the future government; and, in order that the said programme should be the true expression of the will of the people in arms, and not merely of the chiefs of higher rank of the Constitutionalist Army, the most democratic basis for the election of their respective representatives was advanced, providing for one delegate for each 1,000 men under arms. This proposal was so advantageous that the dele-

gates accepted it at once, as may be seen from the record of the proceeding.

Bearing in mind the incalculable ills which pretorianism has ever caused to Mexico, we authorized our delegates to propose that the following eighth clause be added to the Plan of Guadalupe:

“No Constitutionalist Chief shall be a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency of the republic, in the elections referred to in the sixth clause hereof.”

Can a more convincing proof than the foregoing clause be given that none of us has any personal ambition to be President of the Republic? If, then, we have no such ambition, what reasons exist for Señor Carranza's fears? Why does he antagonize us? It is a pity, and we deeply regret it, that circumstances should have prevented our delegates from securing the adoption not only of this proposition, but others, of almost equal import.

Another proposal advanced by our delegates, which removes all doubt as to our sincere purpose to guarantee that our future rulers shall not govern despotically, is shown by our suggesting to the First Chief the advisability of his appointing cabinet ministers responsible for their acts. Only a constitutional reason such as that existing in the above-mentioned case prevented the delegates from giving their acceptance to such a wise provision.

Lastly, the most palpable proof that those composing the Division of the Northeast are revolutionists at heart, with no semblance of hypocrisy or doubt as to plans for the future, is the addition to the Plan of Guadalupe of the eighth clause, proposed by the delegates from the Division of the Northeast, and enthusiastically seconded by us, an addition which condensed in a masterly manner, the aspirations of this great Mexican revolution.

It seems needless to repeat, that there never was an occasion during all these conferences when the authority of

the First Chief was not recognized, as may be seen from the clauses relating to his express recognition and his authority to appoint federal employees. Statements, however, were freely made regarding the necessity for justifying this authority by don Venustiano Carranza, and that it should not be exercised on his sole judgment inasmuch there exists grave reasons for believing that most of his acts have always shown a marked tendency toward resorting to means not in keeping with our democratic institutions, and which do not respond to the demand for liberty and social betterment, found at the roots of our revolution.

Inasmuch as two classes of resolutions were adopted at the Torreón Conference, one of which was immediately made public, and is herewith given as Annex No. 1, and the other of a confidential character published as Annex N.o. 2, let us see how the First Chief received both, and then decide whether the Division of the North was not justified in fearing that the ideals of the revolution would be frustrated, and that don Venustiano Carranza was not the most fitting man to realize them.

When General Pablo Gonzalez forwarded to the First Chief the copy of the proceedings of the Conference, together with the document containing the confidential resolutions, Señor Carranza made certain observations which appear in the answer he addressed to General Gonzalez, who in turn communicated them to our delegates in the following telegram :

REMARKS ON THE RESOLUTIONS SET FORTH IN THE GENERAL MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS.

“5.50 p.m.—Saltillo, July 13, 1914.—Mr. Manuel Bonilla, Dr. Miguel Silva, and General Isabel Robles, Delegates from the Division of the North. The three delegates of this Division have delivered me the protocol of the Conference, together with the document containing the confidential resolutions adopted at the said Conference. As I have informed you, copies of the

said documents were sent to the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, who in a communication, dated to-day, and of which the following is a true copy, says: 'I have the honor to refer to your communication, dated yesterday, enclosing a certified copy of the protocol of the Conference held at the city of Torreón, from the 4th to the 8th of the present month, inclusive, for the purpose of coming to an agreement regarding the incident which had arisen between the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army and the Generals of the Division of the North of the said army. Having carefully noted the contents of the minutes of the proceedings of the Torreón Conference, held between Generals Antonio I. Villarreal, Cesareo Castro and Luis Caballero, as delegates of the Division of the Northeast, and Mr. Ernesto Meade Fierro, as Secretary, and Dr. Miguel Silva, Mr. Manuel Bonilla and General José Isabel Robles, as delegates of the Division of the North, with Colonel Roque Gonzales Garza, as their Secretary, and having also noted the resolution adopted by the said delegates to be submitted to these headquarters, I beg to reply as follows, in order that you may communicate its contents to the Generals of the Division under your distinguished command, and to the Generals of the Division of the North: Approval is hereby given, in general terms, to the resolutions adopted at the Torreón Conference by the representatives of the Division of the Northeast and of the Division of the North, regarding the incident which has arisen between the First Chief and the said Division, as a result of the exchange of messages during the days 13th, 14th and 15th of last June. Coming now to each of the clauses approved at the Torreón Conference, I refer particularly to those to which objections have been raised, on the understanding that the remaining clauses will be approved or modified, as the case may be, by these headquarters. On the motion of the representatives of the Division of the Northeast, seconded by the Division of the North, a resolution was passed whereby, as soon as the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army should enter the capital, and in accordance with the Plan of Guadalupe, assume the title of President *ad interim* of the Republic, a Con-

vention should be called to consider and set the date for holding elections, and the programme of government to be followed by such as are elected, together with other matters of national interest. It was further agreed that the Convention was to be formed by delegates of the Constitutionalist Army designated at meetings of military chiefs, on the ratio of one delegate for each 1,000 men; each delegate to the Convention to present credentials countersigned by the chief of his respective division. These headquarters, after duly considering the clause in question, has reached the decision that on taking charge of the presidency *ad interim* of the republic, in accordance with the Plan of Guadalupe, the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army will summon a meeting of all the Generals of the said Army in active command, to be attended also by governors of the states, who may be represented either in person or by proxy. This meeting will take up and determine all matters pertaining to the different reforms to be established and carried into effect during the term of the Provisional Presidency; it will also set the date for holding general and local elections throughout the Republic. This decision shall not be held to restrict the adoption of any measures by the First Chief, which, in his opinion, will tend to the present economic betterment of the people. Regarding the 8th clause, approved at the above mentioned Conference, I may say that the matters therein considered are foreign to the incident which gave rise to the Conference.' In as brief a form as possible and under registered cover, I shall send you other matters of no less importance than the foregoing. I trust that in lending your attention to the proposals of the First Chief you will act with the same patriotism you showed during the conferences, seeing that these matters affect the welfare of the country, in which, as good sons, we are all vitally interested. Accept my greetings. Signed: P. Gonzalez, General in Chief."

REMARKS TOUCHING THE CONFIDENTIAL RESOLUTIONS.

— "Delegates of the Division of the North: As stated in my message of yesterday, I have the honor to trans-

mit the reply sent by the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army relative to the confidential resolutions held at the Torreón conferences. This communication is dated yesterday and reads as follows:

‘Referring to the confidential resolutions adopted at the said Conference, I beg to inform you, so that you may communicate it to all parties concerned, that regarding section number 1, in which a request is made to elevate the present Division of the North to the category of an army corps, it is impossible for me to accede to this request owing to the fact that the said Division is comprised in the Army Corps of the Northwest; it will continue, however, to operate independently of the said corps, under its present name and character.

In coming to this decision, I have considered that inasmuch as the triumph of our cause is now not far distant, no good reason can be advanced for creating a new army corps, all the more so as, at the end of the campaign, a complete reorganization of the constitutionalist forces will be undertaken.

Regarding Section 2, I do not consider it advisable to promote Gen. Francisco Villa from general of brigade, to general of division, excusing myself from giving the reasons which have determined this decision: I may add that at the proper time this promotion may be granted.

In reply to your request contained in the second clause, in which the delegates from both Divisions request the reinstatement of General Felipe Angeles as Sub-Secretary of War, on the understanding that he would forthwith tender his resignation, I beg to say that it is not possible to grant this request.

Inclosed in the communication to which I am now replying, I received the copies of the messages exchanged during the 13th, 14th and 15th of last June, between the generals of the Division of the North and yourself, together with a copy of the letters which, under separate cover, were addressed to Generals José Isabel Robles and Doctor Miguel Silva, by the Generals of the Division of the North, in which said letters a full apology is tendered by the said generals, and withdrawal made of the expressions contained in

their messages of June 14th last, and in their note of the 15th of the same month.

You are hereby authorized to refer to this letter, and to inform the generals of the Division of the North whose signatures are affixed thereto, that I accept the full apology tendered me for the messages and note of the 14th of June ultimo.

Please make known to the representatives of the Division of the Northeast, to the generals of the Division of the North, and to all the generals of both Divisions, that these headquarters are highly gratified that the incident with the Division of the North has been satisfactorily concluded, since this action will rebound to the benefit of the Constitutionalist cause, in whose interest we are all fighting. I renew the assurances of my high consideration. Constitution and Reforms. (Signed) V. Carranza, First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army. To General Pablo Gonzalez, Commander of the Army Corps of the Northeast.' In transmitting this document to you I renew the assurances of my most distinguished consideration. Constitution and Reforms. Headquarters, Saltillo, Coahuila, June 14, 1914. Signed: Pablo Gonzalez, Commander of the Division of the Northeast."

Referring to the former of these documents, we call the attention of the public to the fact that although approving in principle the resolutions adopted at the Torreón Conference, the First Chief nevertheless *decides* that with regard to the resolution for the holding of a Convention on his assuming the Provisional Presidency of the Republic, he will call a meeting to be composed of all generals in active command of troops, and of the governors of the states, to take up the study of the reforms to be set in practice during the term of the Provisional Government; and with regard to the resolution in which both Divisions solemnly bind themselves to carry out the reforms demanded by the people, the First Chief dodges the question, declaring that such matters are foreign to the incident which gave rise to the Torreón Conference.

Such decisions are undoubtedly calculated, now that we have been compelled to give them publicity, to stifle the little enthusiasm that may still be left in the people regarding the personality of Señor Carranza, from the point of view of his ability to satisfy popular demands.

It is evident that anyone sincerely anxious that the government to be set up by the revolution should fulfil its pledges, will see that the method proposed by the First Chief for organizing the Convention to consider the reforms, constitutes a serious menace to the exercise of the will of the people, since as the creation of as many generals as may be necessary, is dependent on the will of the First Chief, and since he might also name as governors persons entirely subservient to his wishes, the meeting would, in fact, be constituted by military chiefs representing, not the will of the armed citizens under their respective commands, which is the substance of our proposal, but the will of Señor Carranza, to whom the majority of the chiefs would be indebted for their appointments. By this process, the hopes of the people would be frustrated from the very start, merely for the personal advancement of one man. If the First Chief truly desires to merit this title, he must show a more democratic spirit and a better realization of the needs of the revolution, like all his subordinates; and that he is therefore bound to accept the resolutions of the Torreón Conference, provided no other basis of representation, more liberal than that proposed by us, is adopted.

Furthermore, Señor Carranza proposes to depart from the methods in vogue in every democratic country, in which the principles of government are guaranteed, when he decides that the meeting to be called, on his arrival in the capital, should not take up the consideration of any programme of government, as every revolutionist has a right to demand, but that it should merely consider and decide what reforms are to be introduced.

From the manner in which Señor Carranza dodges the

most important resolution adopted at the Conference, namely, that relating to the fundamental principles of the revolution which both divisions solemnly bound themselves to uphold, we see the little interest which these very principles awake in him, and how great an effort he has made to wave them aside.

If, indeed, the only reason for not taking into account these resolutions, is the fact that they are foreign to the incident which gave rise to the Conference, that same reason would have been sufficient to reject the clauses bearing on the question of Sonora, the Convention, the advisory board of government, et cetera. Whatever be the true reason for Señor Carranza's refusal to give his approval to this most important resolution, we face the extraordinary spectacle of a leader of a revolution refusing to accept the principles of the revolution itself, and who goes even farther in attempting to rescind an agreement solemnly entered into by the Division of the Northeast and the Division of the North, and which these two divisions will unquestionably fulfil as a matter of honor and in which the First Chief is not necessarily obliged to intervene. As to his observations concerning the confidential resolutions, their mere reading will have produced a more unfavorable impression and caused greater disappointment than any commentary could do.

Neither a sense of justice, nor mature reflection, is revealed in these observations; on the other hand, there is evident a desire to humiliate those who have nobly given him evidence that, in the interest of the revolution, they can let bygones be bygones, and apologize for acts inspired solely in a spirit of true revolutionary zeal.

The Division of the North has never asked for more than its due; events have shown whether it is right that this division should occupy a subordinate place to others in the Constitutionalist Army, a position it has been forced to occupy through the attitude of the First Chief; but this can only prejudice the First Chief himself, revealing as it

does his intellectual scope and his moral qualities, when he gives as a reason for not raising the Division of the North to the category of an army corps, his former act of injustice in compelling the division to form part of, and be dependent on, that of the Northwest, knowing all the while that the former has a greater effectiveness and possesses more elements than the latter, and that their operations have always been conducted independently of each other.

The same spirit of hostility and injustice is shown when, after a rapid succession of military triumphs won by General Villa, only temporarily halted after the capture of Zacatecas for reasons which will later be given, the First Chief promotes the distinguished Generals Pablo Gonzalez and Alvaro Obregon to the rank of General of Division, leaving General Villa as a General of Brigade, even though, as a matter of fact, he is Chief of a division which is in reality an army corps in every sense of the word.

The First Chief shows once more that he is not inspired by the same conciliatory spirit of which we have given evidence, when he refuses, giving no reasons for his refusal, to make amends for the act of injustice committed by him in dismissing General Felipe Angeles from the post of Assistant Secretary of War, even though the latter was no longer performing the duties of the position, having been assigned, by order of the First Chief, to an active command.

Furthermore, from the text of the reply given by Señor Carranza, it may be seen that while General Carranza accepts the apology we tendered him, which amounts to closing the incident, he on his side does not feel compelled to make any concessions, and continues to adopt an antagonistic attitude towards us, notwithstanding the fact that he expresses his satisfaction that "the Torreón incident has been brought to a satisfactory conclusion." We can not understand wherein lies the satisfaction from our point of view, when the acts of injustice above referred to remain unredressed.

If we have heretofore brought to the attention of the public facts admitting of no contradiction, if these show the fallacy of the premises from which the partisans of Señor Carranza start in their charges referred to at the beginning of this statement, if notwithstanding all this, that group continues to libel us with the tacit or express approval of the First Chief, then we hold we are authorized to draw the inference that these attacks are intended deliberately to influence public opinion to such an extent that it will end by forming an erroneous judgment on the facts and persons involved.

To state, as our enemies do, that we are a danger to the future of the revolution, when it is a well-known fact that the border zone is that in which the revolutionary ideals have been maintained purest and strongest, those very ideals which the First Chief of the revolution has not dared to profess; to catch public opinion unawares, subjecting us to a judgment diametrically opposed to the true state of things, in the face of the Torreón Conference, embodying our professional faith in its cardinal revolutionary principles; to continue attacking us, when in the opening clause of the protocol of the said Conference we declared our adherence to Don Venustiano Carranza as First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army; all the above merely confirm the presumption already existing, that there is a firm intention to resort to any means to diminish the prestige of this division, merely because it has faithfully interpreted, we make bold to say, the true revolutionary ideals.

We hoped that an unbiased reading of this document would show that there never has been any intention on our part to disavow Señor Carranza, that the chiefs signing this manifesto are not inspired by personal ambition, and that their earnest wish is to defend the interests of the revolution and the principles it embodies, with the same zeal as that shown by our companions in arms throughout the

republic, and with no other purpose in view than to prevent the sacrifices undergone by the Mexican people in their struggle for liberty and economic redemption from being rendered fruitless.

The evil has, however, not disappeared, and it is for this reason that whatever may be the aim and purposes guiding the conduct of the enemies of the Division of the North, the latter has been compelled to explain his attitude by means of the present manifesto, publishing, as already stated, all documents antedating the Torreón Conference, faithfully relating the events leading up to it, and informing the public of the resolutions there adopted, and of their reception by Señor Carranza.

We should be happy in the thought that the foregoing explanation had dissipated all fear and doubt, that a certain interested group may have been able to awaken in the minds of our fellow countrymen regarding our attitude, which we have ever endeavored should conform to the true ideals of the revolution.

When once the public has learned the truth of these events, we may rest tranquil. It already knows the circumstances under which an order of the First Chief was disobeyed, what was the purpose and what was the result; the phantom of mutiny and treason has disappeared, inasmuch as to disobey an order is one thing, and to disavow the authority dictating it is another. We consider that the term traitor can only be applied, when a revolution is in full progress, to those who persuade the people to accept them as their champions, when in reality, they are only seeking the chance to grind them under their heel.

Our gratuitous enemies forget that had our purpose been to rebel against the First Chief and disavow his authority, we would have seized the opportunity presented after the fall of Zacatecas. With the same ease with which the Army Corps of the Northeast and of the Northwest, with-

out any resistance being offered them, so, too, our brigades might have reached the gates of the capital in triumph. General Villa had in mind a different course of action. In his anxiety to avoid all friction he preferred to return with his entire division to Torreón, although already on the road to Aguascalientes, thus affording the First Chief an opportunity to enter the capital and receive the honors of the victor.

We are not, then rebels: we stand ready to end the task committed to the revolution, and to quicken the weak-minded in the fulfilment of their duty.

We declare that it is a high honor to us to be reckoned among those representing the most progressive ideals of the revolution; on the other hand, we consider Señor Carranza and his small circle, as typifying views very similar to those prevailing during the old régime. To entertain different views is not criminal; we are justified in seeking the most efficient means to avoid the loss of the fruits of the revolution.

We may well say that the armed struggle against the common enemy has ended. Today marks the opening of the struggle of ideals between the two tendencies inspiring the conquerors. But let us not blind ourselves to the truth; let us not think ourselves alone entitled to serve our country; let us afford the people the opportunity to manifest their will, and above all let us not deceive them. Such is our duty; to proceed otherwise, is to wreck the revolutionary ideals at the very outset.

As a part of the people, we declare that we do not agree that the meeting to be called by the First Chief should be composed exclusively of generals in active command, and of governors of states; nor that its purpose should be limited to what Señor Carranza proposes; rather is it our wish that the said Convention, as a democratic safeguard, should be constituted in the form and for the ends established by the proper clause of the Torreón Conference.

It is not our intention to analyze the personality of the First Chief in acts other than those bearing on the Torreón incident. What we have here set forth, however, regarding his conduct on that occasion, is sufficient to create the belief that we are justified in doubting his capacity to carry to a successful end the demands of the revolution.

For this reason, and also because the Plan of Guadalupe only proposes to establish the *modus operandi* of substituting one head of the government for another, since its clauses contain nothing about the great problems to be solved by the government to be established by the revolution, we declare that it is urgent that the said Convention should assume the obligation of giving shape to the principles contained in the last clause of the Torreón Conference, and by which the next government is to be guided.

The above considerations summarize our unbiased opinion. We have laid it before our fellow-workers in the legitimate hope, we might almost say, the certainty, that they will accept it, and thereby lend us their moral aid, so that no one may in the years to come reproach us for having, at the hour of victory, failed to do our duty by permitting the purposes of the revolution to go for naught.

We are firmly convinced that in assuming this determined attitude, while there is still time to prevent the evil from spreading, we are working in the interests of the people, since without the counter weight of our opinion, the ideals of the people would be shipwrecked, and we would soon see set up in the republic, over the still warm bodies of our brothers whose last thought was to assure liberty and democracy to Mexico, a despotic government with the same tendencies toward absolutism as characterized that of the old dictator, and moved the soul of a pure and good man to right the wrongs of the Mexican people, even to the extent of offering up his life in the cause of DEMOCRACY and LIBERTY.

ANNEX NUMBER 1.

MINUTES OF THE PROCEEDINGS AT THE TORREÓN CONFERENCE AND OF THE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BETWEEN THE DELEGATES OF THE DIVISION OF THE NORTH AND THOSE OF THE DIVISION OF THE NORTHEAST.
Bancroft Library

In the city of Torreón, State of Coahuila de Zaragoza, at ten o'clock in the morning of the fourth day of July, nineteen hundred and fourteen, on the invitation of the Chiefs of the Division of the North, there met in the upper floor of the Building of the Bank of Coahuila, located at number four hundred and twenty-three Zamora Street, General José Isabel Robles, Doctor Miguel Silva, Mr. Manuel Bonilla, and Colonel Roque Gonzalez Garza, the three first named as delegates of the Division of the North and the last named as Secretary of the same, and Generals Antonio I. Villarreal, Cesareo Castro and Luís Caballero, as representatives of the Division of the Northeast, with Señor Ernesto Meade Fierró as Secretary of this delegation, for the purpose of settling the differences which had arisen between the Chiefs of the Division of the North and the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army. After the approval of the credentials issued by the generals of the aforementioned divisions, a chairman of the meeting was elected, the result favoring Doctor Miguel Silva. On the meeting being called to order, the chairman addressed the delegates, exhorting them to bear in mind in all their resolutions the welfare of the country. Mr. Manuel Bonilla then invited the representatives of the Division of the Northeast to disclose the powers with which they were invested, and whether their presence there was with the approval of Señor Carranza. General Antonio I. Villarreal replied that, as might be seen from the credentials presented, they only represented the chiefs of the Division of the Northeast. A resolution

was then passed limiting the power of the secretaries to furnish information as requested. Mr. Manuel Bonilla then addressed the meeting, stating that the Division of the North has neither disavowed, nor does it intend to disavow, Señor Venustiano Carranza as First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army; that the said division only desires that the First Chief should exercise his authority inspired in the dictates of justice, and should place no obstacle in the way of carrying out military operations. Delegate José Isabel Robles spoke in support of this, adding the advisability that General Villa remain as Chief of the Division of the North. As a result of this discussion, the following resolutions were adopted: First, the Division of the North recognizes Señor Carranza as First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, and hereby solemnly ratifies its adherence to him. Secondly, General Villa shall continue as commander of the Division of the North. For the guidance of the delegates, the chair ordered the secretary to read the messages and note exchanged between the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army and the Generals of the Division of the North. The meeting was then adjourned until 4 p.m. of the same day. At the aforementioned hour the delegates met again, at which time the chairman asked the meeting whether there was any objection to the discussion of the following propositions: "That the Division of the North be supplied with everything necessary for the free and unrestricted continuance of its military operations." After a long discussion, at which no agreement was reached, the meeting adjourned to the following day. At ten o'clock on the following morning the proposition above referred to was again submitted to the meeting. After a discussion in which all the delegates took part, the following resolution was unanimously adopted: "The Divisions of the Constitutionalist Army shall receive from the General Headquarters everything necessary for the prompt and efficient conduct of military

operations, absolute freedom in military and administrative matters being given to the respective chiefs, whenever circumstances shall so require; they shall, however, be bound to report to the First Chief as soon as possible, in order that these decisions may be ratified or modified." After this resolution had been adopted, the morning session of the fifth of July adjourned to the following day. At ten o'clock in the morning the session opened, whereupon the Division of the North, through its delegates, presented the following concrete proposition: "That the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army shall name a Cabinet for the administration of affairs, with ministers invested with full authority, whose names shall be suggested by the governors of states." The delegates of the Division of the Northeast advanced several objections to the foregoing proposition, arguing among other things that the Constitution grants absolute freedom to the Executive of the Republic in the naming of his Cabinet. In view of the reasons advanced the Division of the North through its representatives modified its proposition as follows: "The Divisions of the North and of the Northeast respectfully submit to the consideration of the First Chief the following list of persons as fitted, in their opinion, to form the Advisory Board of Government: Messrs. Fernando Iglesias Calderon, Mr. Luís Cabrera, General Antonio I. Vallarreal, Doctor Miguel Silva, Mr. Manuel Bonilla, Mr. Alberto Pani, General Eduardo Hay, General Ignacio L. Pesqueira, Mr. Miguel Diaz Lombardo, Mr. José Vasconcelos, Mr. Miguel Alesio Robles and Mr. Federico Gonzalez Garza." Messrs. Villarreal, Bonilla and Silva requested that their names be withdrawn, adducing therefor different reasons. The other delegates replied that inasmuch as the designation had been made by the Generals of the Division of the North and not by the interested parties themselves, their request could not be granted. For this reason the list of candidates to form part of the Cabinet

of the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army was approved, as at first submitted.

The following amendments to the Plan of Guadalupe were then proposed by the delegates of the Division of the North and discussed:

Secondly. The Plan of Guadalupe shall be amended in clauses six and seven as follows:

Sixth. The Provisional President of the Republic shall call general elections as soon as the triumph of the revolution shall have been assured, and shall turn over the office to the constitutionally elected President.

Seventh. Similarly, the first military chief of every state which shall have recognized the Huerta government, shall call local elections, so soon as the revolution shall have triumphed.

The delegates of the said Division of the North also requested that the following addition be made to said Plan:

Eighth. No constitutionalist chief shall be a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency of the republic at the elections referred to in the foregoing clause.

Ninth. Without prejudice to the call mentioned in article six, on the triumph of the revolution, a Convention shall be summoned to formulate the program to be followed by the government which may be elected.

The soldiers of the revolution shall be represented by delegates to be named by the troops, on the ratio of one delegate for each 1,000 men.

As soon as the first proposition was brought up for discussion, the delegates made several observations of constitutional, military and political character, as a result of which the following resolution was adopted:

“On the assumption by the First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army, in accordance with the Plan of Guadalupe, of the office of President *ad interim* of the Republic, he shall call a Convention whose object shall

be to consider and set the date for the holding of elections, the program of government for state and federal administrations, and other matters of national interest. The Convention shall be composed of delegates from the Constitutionalist Army to be named at meetings of military chiefs, on the ratio of one delegate for each 1,000 men. Each delegate to the Convention shall present credentials countersigned by the chief of his respective division."

The session then adjourned till four o'clock in the afternoon, when the following proposition, presented by the delegates of the Division of the North, was put to the vote: "The conflict in the State of Sonora should be settled by the First Chief without violating the sovereignty of the state, respecting at the same time the person of the constitutional governor, José Maria Maytorena." After a thorough and prolonged discussion by the delegates, the proposition was unanimously approved in the following terms:

"Sixth. In the interest of the revolutionary arms, and in order to quiet the state of unrest prevailing in the State of Sonora, the First Chief is hereby respectfully requested to take such steps as he may deem most advisable in settling the conflict existing in the said state, without, however, violating its sovereignty, or attacking the person of the constitutionally elected governor, José Maria Maytorena. An appeal shall likewise be made to the patriotism of Señor Maytorena to urge him to resign the governorship of the state if, in his opinion, the conflict may thereby be averted, proposing an impartial person of standing in the state affiliated with the constitutionalist cause to take charge of the governorship of Sonora, and to afford guarantees to the people, whose sacred interests are in jeopardy."

The meeting then adjourned.

At the session held on Tuesday the 7th, at 10 o'clock in the morning, the delegates of the Division of the Northeast presented the following propositions to the consideration of the meeting:

“Seventh. The appointment and removal of federal employes in the states and territories controlled by the constitutionalist forces, pertain to the exclusive province of the First Chief, who may assign the newly named employes such jurisdiction and powers as he may see fit.”

As in the case of the former proposal, this was discussed at great length, and finally passed as submitted. The same delegates then presented another proposition, reading as follows:

“The Divisions of the North and of the Northeast, in the belief that the present struggle is that of the downtrodden against the privileged classes, hereby pledge themselves to continue the struggle until the ex-federal army shall have completely disappeared, substituting in its place the constitutionalist army; to set up a democratic régime in the republic; to bring under the subjection of federal and state authorities and to punish the members of the Roman Catholic Clergy who openly aligned themselves with Huerta; to free the proletariat from its present economic slavery, distributing, on equitable bases, the lands of the republic, and working in all things for the welfare of the laboring classes.”

When put to the vote, the delegates of the Division of the North accepted this proposal in principle, which was finally passed with the following additions and corrections:

“Eighth. Inasmuch as the present struggle is that of the downtrodden classes against the abuses of the privi-

leged caste, and in the conviction that the present ills afflicting our land have their source in pretorianism, plutocracy and church domination, the divisions of the North and of the Northeast hereby solemnly pledge themselves to keep up the fight until the ex-federal army shall have completely disappeared, substituting in its stead the constitutionalist army; to set up a democratic government in our country; to work for the welfare of the laboring classes; to free the proletariat from its present economic slavery, distributing, on equitable bases, the lands, and by such other measures as may tend to solve the agrarian problem, and to admonish, punish and call to account the members of the Roman Catholic Church who may have rendered either material or moral aid to the usurper, Victoriano Huerta."

The delegates of the Division of the North brought the Conference to a close at this point, after having approved unanimously the clauses set forth in the present minutes, which were signed, in quadruple, by all the attending delegates and their respective secretaries.—Constitution and Reforms.—Torreón, Coahuila, July 8, 1914.—(Signed) Antonio I. Villarreal.—Miguel Silva.—Manuel Bonilla.—Cesareo Castro.—Luís Caballero.—José Isabel Robles.—F. Meade Fierro.—R. Gonzalez Garza."

