

John M. Golder
July 1977
(Balding)

4
M A T E R I A L I S M

PHILOSOPHICALLY EXAMINED,

OR, THE

IMMATERIALITY OF THE SOUL
ASSERTED AND PROVED,

O N

PHILOSOPHICAL PRINCIPLES;

I N A N S W E R T O

DR. PRIESTLEY'S DISQUISITIONS ON
MATTER AND SPIRIT.

By JOHN WHITEHEAD,


AUTHOR OF AN ESSAY ON LIBERTY AND NECESSITY.

They who suppose every Being to be *Material* or Body, do in consequence make Matter *necessarily existent, eternal, infinite, and also necessarily endued with Motion and Intelligence*; which is prodigiously unphilosophical, and downright *Atheism*. JACKSON.

Animus post Mortem sentit et viget. CICERO.

L O N D O N :

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T O

JOHN COAKLEY LETTSOM,

M.D. F.R.S. and S.A.

MUCH ESTEEMED FRIEND,

WERE the sentiments held forth in the following sheets, as judiciously handled, as they are in themselves important to the interests of religion, and the well-being of mankind, I should think no apology necessary for thus publicly addressing them to thee: they would then be worthy of thy acceptance, and might at least afford pleasure to a virtuous and contemplative mind. In their present form,

A 2

however,

DEDICATION.

however, they only claim indulgence; which I persuade myself they will readily obtain, as I have always found my friend's candour equal to his discernment. I think also, that these philosophick and religious truths, will, like the sun through a breaking cloud, discover themselves through the veil which the mode of argumentation may have thrown upon them, and so be not altogether unentertaining to the philosophical reader.

It is true, there is considerable difficulty in opposing a writer of such established reputation and influence as Dr. Priestley has acquired. When the publick think favourably of a writer, from repeated proofs of his abilities and judgment, they are not easily induced to alter their opinion. When he has repeatedly succeeded in some line of physical investigation, forgetting the proverb, *Omnes non possumus omnia*, we are too apt to think him equally capable of every other.

But

DEDICATION

But when this publick confidence becomes the means of propagating sentiments subversive of our common faith, and destructive of future happiness, it is the more dangerous and alarming, and opposition becomes the more necessary; though for the very same reason it is also more difficult. We are not, however, to avoid our duty, nor decline our attempts to serve the publick, because it is attended with difficulty; we do, notwithstanding, need greater prudence and vigour of mind to perform it with success. How far this attempt may answer the end proposed, I cannot say; yet I fondly hope that the youth, and especially those with whom we are more immediately connected, who are fond of physical researches, may hereby be able to distinguish truth from falsehood, and be preserved from those dangerous tenets which the influence of a great name might naturally lead them into. Thus far, however, I am certain I shall have thy most hearty concurrence, in wishing that both they, and the more advanced in human studies,

DEDICATION.

studies, may be established in the soundest principles of religion and virtue.

I feel a real pleasure in offering thee these remarks, knowing that philosophical researches, and especially those connected with the principles of human nature, and which influence our morals, are agreeable to thy disposition, and afford thee just and rational pleasure; and we need no other proof of thy abilities, in the investigation of the powers of nature, than what thou discoverest in the theory and practice of the *healing art*, the *rationale* of which is inseparably connected with philosophical knowledge, and which thou cultivatest with an assiduity only equalled by thy success.

“ Illi, qui, castis veterum observationibus,
“ jungunt recentiorum inventa, videntur
“ habere optima medicinæ fundamenta^a.”

If Horace could say of the successful conqueror,

^a Van Swieten's Comment. Boerh. Aphorism. Tom. 1. pag. 6.

DEDICATION.

“ Res gerere et captos ostendere civibus hostes,
“ Attingit folium Jovis, et cœlestia tentat^r.”

Surely those who, from generous and christian principles, soften the afflictions, and obviate the destruction, of their fellow-creatures; who, by their great skill and unwearied assiduity in the healing art, frequently prevent a widow's tears, and snatch a numerous offspring from impending distress; are employed in more honourable services, and may be truly said,

To join with God^s in blessing human kind.

It seems a necessary memento, however, to all who are endued with talents for such extensive usefulness, that they possess nothing but what they have received; a due sense of which ought to inspire the mind with gratitude for the Divine Goodness, and with an humble dependence on Him, who is the giver of every good and perfect gift.

^r Lib. 1. Epist. 17. l. 33. ^s 1 Cor. iii. 9. 2 Cor. vi. 1.

Earnestly

D E D I C A T I O N.

Earnestly wishing thou mayest duly attend to this most important point, and enjoy a long course of that health thou art so successful an instrument of bestowing upon others; hoping also for a continuance of thy valuable friendship, which I have always highly esteemed, as no small addition to the happiness of my life;

I remain,

With the greatest respect,

Thy affectionate friend,

Wandsworth,
28th, 3mo. 1778.

JOHN WHITEHEAD.

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A D V E R -

A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

TH E reader is desired to remember, that the principal object of the following remarks, is to prove, that *intelligence* and *thought* are not, cannot be, the result of any modification of *matter*; and consequently, that there must be in man a principle distinct from his body. Whatever objections therefore may arise to the first, fifth, and sixth sections of this work, which, though connected with the theory of man, here maintained, are not *essential* to the present argument, they ought not to be considered as affecting the main object in view.

I would also farther observe, that I do not intend, by any thing I have said, to lessen the esteem and high publick character Dr. Priestley has so justly acquired, in the investigation of the powers of nature, by useful and curious experiments. Had the Doctor contented himself with the experimental part of natural philosophy (in which his abilities shine, and which affords ample scope for the most capacious mind) I had not been his opponent, but his admirer.

I N T R O-

INTRODUCTION,

Shewing the State of the Question
in the present Controversy.

AS it is of great consequence in every controversy, that writers should understand each other, and keep the points in debate constantly in view ; so it is likewise necessary that the reader should be acquainted with the true state of the dispute, that he may discern what force and propriety there is in the arguments on each side the question, and not be misled by plausible but false appearances of reason and truth. I shall therefore endeavour to state the subjects in debate, with as much conciseness and clearness as possible.

ii INTRODUCTION.

“ It has generally been supposed,” says Dr. Priestly^a, “ that there are two distinct
“ *kinds of substance* in human nature, and
“ they have been distinguished by the
“ terms, *Matter* and *Spirit*, or *Mind*. The
“ former of these has been said to be pos-
“ sessed of the property of *extension*, viz.
“ of length, breadth, and thickness, and
“ also of *solidity* or *impenetrability*, and
“ consequently of a *vis inertiae* ; but it is
“ said to be naturally destitute of all other
“ powers whatever. The latter has of late
“ been defined to be a substance intirely
“ destitute of all *extension*, or *relation* to
“ space, so as to have no property in com-
“ mon with matter ; and therefore to be
“ properly *immaterial*, but to be possessed
“ of the powers of *perception*, *intelligence*,
“ and *self-motion*.”

With this account of matter and spirit, the Dr. describes his controversy, as follows.

^a Introd. to the Disquisitions, &c.

I N T R O D U C T I O N. iii

“ It is maintained in this treatise, that
 “ neither *matter* nor *spirit* (meaning by the
 “ latter, the subject of sense and thought)
 “ correspond to the definitions above men-
 “ tioned. For that matter is not that
 “ *inert* substance that it has been supposed
 “ to be; that *powers* of *attraction* or *re-*
 “ *repulsion* are necessary to its very being,
 “ and that no part of it appears to be *im-*
 “ *penetrable* to other parts. I therefore
 “ define it to be a substance possessed of
 “ the property of *extension*, and of *powers*
 “ *of attraction or repulsion*. And since it
 “ has never yet been asserted that the
 “ powers of *sensation* and *thought* are in-
 “ compatible with these, (*solidity*, or *im-*
 “ *penetrability*, and consequently a *vis*
 “ *inertiæ*, only, having been thought to
 “ be repugnant to them) I therefore main-
 “ tain, that we have no reason to suppose
 “ there are in man two substances so dis-
 “ tinct from each other as have been re-
 “ presented.

“ It is likewise maintained in this treatise, that the notion of two substances, that have no *common property*, and yet are capable of *intimate connection* and *mutual action*, is both absurd and *modern*; a substance without extension or relation to place, being unknown both in the scriptures and to all antiquity; the human mind, for example, having till lately been thought to have a *proper presence in the body*, and a *proper motion* together with it; and the Divine Mind having been always represented as being truly and properly omnipresent.”

From the above quotations it appears, that our learned author objects to the received doctrine of a *vis inertiae* in matter, and imagines, that *attraction* and *repulsion* are necessary to its very being. He likewise supposes, that matter being endowed with these powers will be capable, under certain modifications, of producing *consciousness*, *intelligence*, and *thought*.

On the contrary it is maintained in the following papers, that the doctrine of the *solidity, impenetrability, and vis inertiae* of matter is well founded, and that these are the only properties *essential* to its being or existence. It is also farther proved, that allowing the *powers* of attraction and repulsion to be essential to the very being of matter, it would, notwithstanding, be utterly incapable of producing *sensation, reflection, and judgment*; it being just as impossible for *attraction and repulsion*, however modified, to produce these powers, as it is for a triangle or a square to become a circle, or for any one thing to produce another, with which it has no affinity.

As to the received notions concerning the nature of *spirit or mind*, they do not seem to me to belong to the present controversy, which relates only to the nature and powers of *matter, viz.* whether matter possesses any *powers* capable of becoming or producing *sensation, reflection, and judgment*. If the negative of this be clearly demonstrated

demonstrated and proved, it will undeniably follow that there is *something* in man which is *immaterial*, or *not matter*; and this being granted, it will give me very little concern, in the present dispute, what either the *ancients* or *moderns* have said concerning the nature of this *immaterial substance*.

I cannot conceive why Dr. Priestly has introduced the ancients as differing in opinion from the moderns, concerning the nature of the human soul. Does the Dr. think, that because they differed in some particulars from the moderns, respecting the origin and some particular properties of this *immaterial* substance, that therefore they believed with him, that it is *material* and *mortal*? Certainly this learned writer cannot be of this opinion. He must know, that, however they differed from the moderns in their definitions and manner of speaking of the *soul*, yet the whole tide of antiquity is fully against his doctrine, that man is composed of one *homogeneous substance*,

stance, that he is of one *uniform composition*, and that the whole man becomes extinct at death : and if he thought his reader would conclude, because of this difference of opinion, between the ancients and moderns, concerning the soul, that therefore the ancients thought with him that mere matter can think, he certainly paid no great compliment to his reader's judgment. And though there may be much art in thus introducing a subject foreign to the point in hand, and gaining a *seeming* victory, yet such a mode of argumentation is very far from being fair and ingenuous.

The above then is the state of the present controversy ; not what the nature of this *immaterial principle* in man is (any farther than as it is immaterial) nor what either the ancients or moderns have said concerning it ; but only, whether matter be possessed of any powers capable of *sensation* and *thought*.

M A T E R I A L I S M

PHILOSOPHICALLY EXAMINED.

S E C T. I.

Of the Nature and essential Properties of
Matter.

DR. Priestly enters upon his Disquisitions on matter and spirit, by calling philosophers back to Sir Isaac Newton's rules of philosophizing, from which he thinks they have unhappily deviated, and to which he himself professes a most uniform and rigorous adherence. What pity but the Doctor's practice had kept pace with his profession ; but he almost instantly acts in direct opposition to these very rules.

The better to conceal this striking contrast, he has given us Sir Isaac's rules

in a very mutilated form, contenting himself with only two of them ; -for had he proceeded one step farther to the third rule with Sir Isaac Newton's illustration of it, the principles on which he has modelled his Disquisitions had been entirely destroyed ; our author therefore has wisely kept this out of sight^a.

The

^aREGULÆ PHILOSOPHANDI.

Newton. Philos. natur. Princip. pag. 387.

R E G U L A I.

Causas rerum naturalium non plures admitti debere, quam quæ et veræ sint, et earum phænomenis explicandis sufficient.

More causes of natural things are not to be admitted than what are true, and sufficient to explain appearances.

The reason of this rule is, that nature, (as philosophers speak) does nothing in vain ; but if more causes were to take place than are sufficient to produce the effect, something would be done in vain ; whereas nature is simple, and doth not abound in superfluous causes.

R E G U L A II.

Ideoque effectuum naturalium ejusdem generis eadem assignandæ sunt causæ, quatenus fieri potest.

For

The first of these rules, says our author, as laid down by Sir Isaac Newton is, that
we

For this reason also, we must, as far as possible, to the same effects, assign the same causes.

“ Thus respiration in men and brutes must have the same cause; the descent of bodies to the earth, here in Europe and in America, must proceed from the same principle; light also, from a culinary fire and the sun, has the same manner of production; and the reflection of light on earth, and in the planets, is effected by the same power.”

R E G U L A III.

Qualitates corporum quæ intendi et remitti nequeant, quæque corporibus omnibus competunt, in quibus experimenta instituere licet, pro qualitatibus corporum universorum habendæ sunt.

Those qualities of bodies which can neither be diminished nor increased, and which are found to belong to all bodies within the reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal qualities of all bodies whatsoever.

Sir Isaac Newton illustrates and applies this important rule in the following manner. “ For since, says he, the qualities of bodies are only known to us by experiments, we must hold for universal, all such as universally agree with experiments; and such as are not liable to diminution, can
“ never

we are not to *admit more causes of things than are sufficient to explain appearances*; and the
second

“ never be wholly taken away. Now, certainly, hypotheses
 “ and the vain imaginations of men ought not to be admit-
 “ ted in preference to this procedure by experiments; and
 “ as nature is always simple and uniform in her operations,
 “ we ought, in philosophical researches, never to depart from
 “ the analogy of it. We no other ways know the extension
 “ of bodies than by our senses, nor do these discover it in
 “ all bodies; but because we perceive extension in all bodies
 “ of which our senses can judge, we therefore ascribe it uni-
 “ versally to all others also. That abundance of bodies are
 “ hard, we learn by experience. Now the hardness of the
 “ whole must arise from the hardness of the parts, and hence
 “ we rightly conclude, that the small undivided particles of
 “ all bodies are hard also. That all bodies are impenetra-
 “ ble, we learn by our senses, and not by reasoning. The
 “ bodies which we handle, we find impenetrable, and thence
 “ infer impenetrability to be a property of all bodies what-
 “ soever. That all bodies are moveable, and endowed with
 “ certain powers (which we call their *vires inertiae*) by which
 “ they persevere in their motion or rest, we also infer from
 “ the like properties observed in the bodies which we have
 “ seen. The extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility
 “ and *vires inertiae* of the whole, result from the extension,
 “ hardness, impenetrability, mobility and *vires inertiae* of
 “ the parts; and hence we conclude the least particles of all
 “ bodies to be also all extended and hard, and impenetrable
 “ and

second is that, *to the same effect we must, as far as possible, assign the same causes.*

But

“ and moveable, and endowed with their proper *vires inertiae*;
 “ *and this is the foundation of all philosophy.* Further, that
 “ the distinct and contiguous parts of bodies may be separated one from another, we know from experience; and
 “ that the parts which remain undivided may still be distinguished by our minds into less and less, is certain from
 “ mathematics; but whether those distinct and as yet undivided parts can actually be again divided and separated
 “ into parts still less and less by any powers in nature, is uncertain. But if it could be made appear by one experiment, that any hitherto undivided particle should suffer a
 “ division, by being broke off from any hard and solid body,
 “ we might conclude by the force of this rule, not only that those distinct parts might be separated, but also, that they
 “ might be divided into parts less and less *in infinitum.*”

“ Lastly, if it appears universally by experiments and astronomical observations, that all bodies on the surface
 “ of the earth, are heavy or gravitate towards the earth, in proportion to the quantity of matter in them; and that
 “ the moon gravitates towards the earth according to the quantity of matter contained in it; and on the other hand,
 “ that the sea gravitates towards the moon, and that all the planets gravitate towards each other; and also, that
 “ comets have a like gravitation towards the sun; we must affirm by this rule, that all bodies gravitate towards one
 “ another

But even here it seems our author has admitted more rules than will coincide with his

“ another : for the argument from appearances in favour of
 “ the gravitation of all bodies, will be stronger than for their
 “ impenetrability; because we can make no experiments
 “ upon the heavenly bodies concerning their impenetrability;
 “ however, I do not affirm gravity to be essential to bodies.
 “ By the *natural force* of bodies, I understand their *vis*
 “ *inertiæ*; and this is *immutable*; whereas, gravity may be
 “ continually *diminished*, as the body recedes farther and
 “ farther from the earth.”

R E G U L A IV.

In philosophia experimentalis, propositiones ex phænomenis per inductionem collectæ, non obstantibus contrariis hypothesisibus, pro veris aut accurate aut quamproxime haberi debent, donec alia occurrerint phænomena per quæ aut accuratiores reddantur, aut exceptionibus obnoxia.

In experimental philosophy, the propositions gained from the phænomena of nature by an induction of particulars, are to be esteemed as true, either exactly, or at least very nearly so, notwithstanding any hypotheses to the contrary, till we meet with other phænomena by which they may be rendered more accurate, or else become liable to some particular exceptions.

his doctrine of matter. We are not to admit more causes of things than are sufficient to explain appearances: but does not this learned philosopher assign more causes to the existence of the constituent particles of bodies than are sufficient? he tells us^b that *attraction* and *repulsion* are necessary to the very being of matter; now supposing a particle of matter to exist upon this hypothesis, there are two causes assigned for its existence, the one of which must act in opposition to the other; but these are more causes than are sufficient, for we may suppose the Deity to create one solid particle of matter, and that nothing more is neces-

Now it appears, that the third rule, with the application of it, leads to conclusions directly opposite to Dr. Priestley's doctrine of the properties of matter; how then can he be said to follow these rules in philosophizing? and what ought we to think of mere metaphysical theories, unsupported by any evidence, which stand in direct opposition to those principles which the great Sir Isaac Newton declares to be *the foundation of all philosophy*.

^b Sect. 1. Passim.

fary than folid extenſion to conſtitute it matter; and other ſimilar particles being put into motion by the Creator, according to certain ſtated laws, will answer every phænomenon of which material bodies are capable; which is certainly more agreeable to the rules of philoſophizing.

If it be ſaid, that the agency of the Deity to put matter into motion, will bring this theory upon a level with the other, with reſpect to the number of cauſes in the phænomena of bodies; I answer not at all: for the agency of the Deity will be equally neceſſary on the former ſuppoſition, as on the latter. For ſuppoſing the ultimate particles of matter (if ſuch could exiſt) to have in their nature a power of *attraction* and *repulſion*, yet they could never arrange and diſpoſe themſelves in that regular variety which we ſee in the ſtructure of bodies; this is abſolutely impoſſible, and to ſuppoſe it, would be to fall into Epicurus's notion of a concurrence of atoms, which is abſurd and ridiculous: the agency, therefore, of a ſuperintending

superintending intelligent cause, is on this supposition, equally necessary for the formation of bodies.

But farther, it is very incomprehensible, how attraction and repulsion can be necessary to the *very being* of matter; if so they must constitute its essence. But I have absolutely no idea of these properties, without supposing bodies already to exist; for attraction, if we have any idea to the word, means only, *the mutual approach of two bodies towards each other*^c. Take away the bodies, or suppose them not to exist, and we destroy the very possibility of the *existence of attraction*, in the same manner as motion can have no existence without some body to be moved. But that cannot constitute the *essence* or *being* of bodies, which necessarily *depends* on bodies for its own existence; this is absolutely impossible, and

^c Per vocem attractionis intelligo vim quamcunque quâ duo corpora ad se invicem tendunt, &c. S'Gravesandi. cap. 5. dif. 4.

so is our author's idea of *attraction* and *repulsion*.

This is not the case with our idea of *solidity*, or *solid extension*; for tho' we are accustomed to speak of it as a property, and are thence led into a notion of some unknown substance existing as a support of these properties of solidity and extension; yet if we attend to our ideas we shall find, that solid extension is a *self-subsisting substance*^d, that it needs no hidden *substratum* to support it, but exists *independent* of every other created being; which every one sees cannot be the case of attraction and repulsion, or of any other species of motion, which necessarily require some subject of inhesion.

It is a grand mistake to suppose, with Dr. Priestley and some other philosophers, that there is some *unknown substance* in material nature, distinct from the properties

^d Depending only on God the Creator, who is the only cause necessary for the existence and union of these properties.

of solidity and extension, which may be the subject of them and also of thought; at least, if we follow the rules of philosophizing above laid down, we shall be obliged to conclude, that such an unknown substance is a meer metaphysical idea, and in nature a non-entity: for if *we must not admit more causes than are sufficient to explain appearances*, and if *solid extension* be a sufficient support of all the properties and phenomena of bodies, then we are authorized by these rules, to deny the existence of any such unknown substance, and to conclude, that solid extension forms the essence of matter.

If any one should deny that solid extension is a sufficient support of all the properties of bodies, let him make trial if he can find any modes of a material being, which require any thing but solid extension for their support? think of figure, size, motion, rest, resistance, and situation, &c. they all plainly subsist in solid extension; so also, roundness, hardness, touch-

ing, colour, and all other bodily qualities, require only the same subject of inhesion; and therefore we ought to conclude, that solid extension forms the essence of matter, and especially as it has the other character of *substance*, viz. subsisting of itself, independent of any creature.

There are yet other reasons why we ought to conclude that *attraction* and *repulsion* do not form the essence of matter, but rather *solid extension*; for it is difficult, or rather impossible to conceive how *attraction* and *repulsion* can act as the essential properties of matter; for how can bodies both attract and repel one another at the *same time*, and in the *same circumstances*? is not this the same thing as if I should say, that a body may move backward and forward at the same time, and in the same respect? nay, farther, it is said that bodies attract one another at *considerable distances*, but as they approach one another, and come within a *certain distance*, they then repel each other, and absolutely prevent
any

any contact. But if these bodies acted by their own essential properties, their action would be uniform and constant, admitting neither intension nor remission of degrees; it would be found in all parts of matter, and they would act with equal force at the *greatest*, as at the least assignable distance. And for this reason only, Sir Isaac Newton declares^e he did not believe gravitation to be essential to matter; because all bodies do not gravitate towards each other in an equal degree at all distances, and in all circumstances, the quantity of matter being the same. He allows that the argument from phænomena is stronger for the universal gravitation of bodies, than for their impenetrability; but the *impenetrability*, or *vis inertię* of bodies is uniform and unchangeable, *hęc immutabilis est*, and therefore essential to matter; but gravitation admits of intension and remission of degrees, *gravitas recedendo à terrâ, diminuitur*, and therefore may be continually lessened, till it be wholly destroyed, and conse-

^e Princip. lib. 3. p. 389.

quently

quently cannot be *essential* to the being of matter. And much less indeed can we say that the essence of matter consists of opposite powers, acting in opposition to one another; for to say that two bodies may, by their own natural properties, attract one another at considerable distances, and by a nearer approach will have just an opposite repellant force, is the same as to say, that the sun is light at a considerable distance, but as we approach nearer to it, and come within a certain distance of it, it then has an opposite degree of darkness. I therefore think that attraction and repulsion cannot be the *natural properties* of matter, but are owing to the agency of the Deity on all parts of matter, according to certain fixed and stated laws.

That attraction and repulsion are not essential to the being of matter, is farther evident from this; that then, two *opposite causes* must concur to produce *one effect*, which is a manifest contradiction, for they would mutually destroy one another.

Having

Having thus shewn how little the Doctor's mode of philosophizing agrees with the rules he professes to adopt; and taken a general survey of his doctrine, respecting the properties of matter; let us now proceed to consider what he advances in support of his opinion.

“ It is asserted, and generally taken for granted, that matter is necessarily a *solid* or *impenetrable* substance, and naturally, or of itself destitute of all powers whatever, as those of attraction, or repulsion, &c. or, as it is commonly expressed, that matter is possessed of a certain *vis inertiae*, and is wholly indifferent to a state of rest or motion, but as it is acted upon by a foreign power.”

“ That the vulgar should have formed these opinions, and acquiesce in them, I do not wonder; because there are *common appearances* enough which necessarily lead them to form such a judgment^f.”

^f Page 3.

It seems almost impossible to read the latter part of this quotation, without feeling a mixture of *surprise* and *resentment*: are they to be classed among the vulgar then, in our author's esteem, who believe matter possessed of a *vis inertiae*? among those who form their opinions from *common superficial*^ε *appearances*?

Are Kepler, Keil, Wollaston, Baxter, Clarke, S'Gravesande, and innumerable others, both of our own and other countries; at the head of whom we may place the great, the renowned Sir Isaac Newton, who have all maintained^h the *vis inertiae* of

ε Page 4.

^h Sed inest, etiam, corporibus vis quædam passiva—quæ resistentiæ vis, significantissimo vocabulo a summo astronomo *Johan. Keplero*, *vis inertiae* dicta est. Herman.

Unde cum *vis inertiae* æqualibus mutationibus, æqualiter semper resistit. Keil *Introd. ad ver. Philos. lect. 4.*

Nor is there any thing in all *physics* better settled than that, which is called *vis inertiae*, or the *inertia* of matter. Wollaston *Relig. of nature*, page 139. Baxter *on the Soul*, vol. 1. sect. 1. passim.

A body

of matter; are these classed by our author among the vulgar, who form *superficial* and *false*

“ A body at rest resists motion, not only while it is at rest, but while it is agitated; and for this reason a body is inactive (*inertia*) or is said to have *inactivity*; which in all bodies is proportional to the quantity of matter in them; because every particle of the matter of which bodies consist, is endued with this property.” S’Gravesande’s Newton. Philos. cap. 2. n. 13.

“ The *vis inertiae* of matter, is that passive force, by which it always continues of itself in the state ’tis in; and never changes that state, but in proportion to a contrary power acting upon it; so that the very same force which is necessary to give any certain velocity to any certain quantity of matter at rest, is always exactly requisite to reduce the same quantity of matter from the same degree of velocity, to a state of rest again. This *vis inertiae* is always proportional to the *quantity* of matter; and therefore continues invariably the same in all possible states of matter, whether at rest or in motion; and is never transferred from one body to another. Without this *vis*, the *least force* would give any velocity to the *greatest quantity* of matter at rest; and the greatest quantity of matter in any velocity of motion, would be stopped by the least force, without any, the least shock at all. So that properly, and indeed, *all force* in matter, either at rest or in motion; all its *action* and *re-action*; all *impulse* and all *resistance*, is nothing but this *vis inertiae* in different circumstances.” Papers between Leibnitz and Dr. Clarke, page 343, note.

false judgments, from superficial appearances? How divine must that man be, in his own estimation, who can treat with such supreme contempt, the opinions of some of the greatest adepts in philosophical researches, that ever the world produced? This compendious method of getting rid of troublesome opponents, reminds one of the valorous knights of romance, who could cut half a dozen giants through the middle with a single back-stroke.

It is exceedingly evident that matter resists any change of the state it is in, whether of rest or motion. Common observation teaches us, that a certain force is necessary to put a body which is at rest

“*Vis inertiae, est principium passivum, quo corpora in motu suo vel quiete perstant, recipiunt motum vi moventi semper proportione respondentem, et resistunt tantum quantum sibi resistitur.*” Newton. Optice, Quæst. 31.

“Porro, videntur mihi hæ particulae primigeniæ non modo in se vim inertiae habere, motusque leges passivas illas quæ ex vi ista necessario oriuntur,” &c. Ibid.

into

into motion; and the same force is again necessary to bring it back from motion to rest. Hence it appears that matter makes a certain *resistance* in these cases to any change of its state, whether of motion or rest; for otherwise, if matter made no resistance, no force would be necessary either to move a body when at rest, or stop it when in motion. Now this resistance in matter, to any change of its state, is called it's *vis inertiae*, and has hitherto been attributed to the *solidity* or *impenetrability* of matter, it being absolutely impossible to conceive how matter should make any resistance, if it were not *solid* and *impenetrable*.

The resistance of matter has indeed been allowed on all hands; but whether this resistance be owing to solidity, or some other cause, is at present a subject of debate, and which Dr. Priestley has ventured to deny: Let us hear his reasons.

“ Resistance, says the Doctor, on which
 “ alone our opinion concerning the solidity

“ or impenetrability of matter is founded,
 “ is never occasioned by *solid matter*, but
 “ by something of a very different nature,
 “ viz. a *power of repulsion*, always acting at
 “ a real, and in general an assignable dis-
 “ tance from what we call the body itself.”
 And a little farther he observes, “ It will
 “ readily be allowed, that every body, as
 “ *solid and impenetrable*, must necessarily
 “ have some particular *form* or *shape*; but
 “ it is no less obvious, that no such figured
 “ thing can exist, unless the parts of which
 “ it consists have a *mutual attraction*, so as
 “ either to keep contiguous to, or preserve
 “ a certain distance from, each other. This
 “ power of attraction therefore must be
 “ essential to the actual existence of all mat-
 “ ter; since no substance can retain any
 “ form without it^k.”

One would almost be tempted to con-
 clude from this paragraph, that Dr. Priestley
 had never read that very Sir Isaac Newton,
 whose rules of philosophizing he professes

^k Page 5.

rigorously to follow; for a very slight attention to his writings would have informed him how matter may exist as a *solid substance*, without the power of attraction; at least he would have seen, that this great philosopher saw no inconsistency in such a supposition; for he supposes each ultimate particle of matter to have been created at first, *one, solid, and indivisible*. His words are: “It seems probable to me, that God
 “in the beginning formed matter in *solid,*
 “*hard, impenetrable, moveable particles*’¹.” Now if *each primary particle* of matter was at first created *solid* and *impenetrable*, as Sir Isaac here supposes, it stood in need of no powers of attraction and repulsion to make it what it was by its very creation; and therefore attraction can be no way necessary to the being of matter, at least in the judgment of this great mathematician and philosopher.

¹“*Illud mihi videtur denique simillimum veri, utique, Deum optimum maximum, in principio rerum, materiam ita formasse, ut primigeniæ ejus particulæ è quibus deinceps oritura esset corporea omnis natura, solidæ essent, firmæ, duræ, impenetrabiles, et mobiles,*” &c. Newtoni Optice, page 407.

Should

Should this learned writer reply, that matter is infinitely dividible, and consequently there can be no such thing as a particle of matter that is *one* and *solid*; I answer, that though this be the case in our abstract ideas, it is more than probable it cannot *actually* be so in nature. For if every particle of matter may be divided, and all the parts of this division can again be divided, and so on, *ad infinitum*, we should then never come at any such thing as matter; for upon this supposition no such thing would exist in the universe, but all that we see and feel must be a mere deception of the senses^m.

Mathametical

^m “ If there be *no perfectly solid particles*, then there is no matter in the universe. For, the further the division and sub-division of the parts of any body are carried, before you arrive at parts perfectly solid and without pores, the greater is the proportion of pores to solid matter in that body. If therefore, carrying on the division, *in infinitum*, you never arrive at parts perfectly solid and without pores, it will follow that all bodies consist of pores only, without any matter at all, which is a manifest absurdity.” Papers between Clarke and Leibnitz, page 154. Note.

Mathematical demonstrations, as well as physical experiments, have, very unhappily indeed for the progress of natural science, been misapplied, and by false methods of reasoning, have been adduced to prove positions to which they are inadequate and disproportioned. Of the truth of this observation, the case before us is a striking instance; there is no given quantity, say they, but we can suppose it possible to be made less; and no given extension, but we can demonstrate it possible to be divided into a less extension; and thus it may be continually lessened, *ad infinitum*; but it is obvious, that from *things possible* in idea, to things existing *de facto* in nature, *non valet consequentia*; for no one I suppose will pretend, that the bare possibility of a thing is a sufficient proof of its actual existence; nor can we infer, that, what may be done

“Progressum in infinitum ubique, ut contra naturæ institutum et impossibilem rejiciunt Peripatetici; ergo in divisione corporum, sistendum quoque videtur in atomis, quæ secari amplius non possunt.” Du Hamel *Philos. vet. et nova.* Tom. 4. page 53.

in idea, may also be done in nature; nay, if we give proper attention to the subject, and avoid confusion of ideas, we shall see that the supposition is impossible. For let us suppose certain *quantities* continually decreasing from a given quantity, and becoming less and less, *ad infinitum*; now if we suppose any of these quantities *actually to begin* to exist in nature, they must necessarily *begin* at some *finite quantity*, which may indeed be increased by adding one quantity to another; but cannot be diminished below this *terminus* of their existence, without annihilation. In like manner, if we suppose particles of matter (existing as yet in idea only) continually decreasing in size, *ad infinitum*; yet, whenever matter begins to exist, it must begin at *some determinate size*, or at a fixed point, for otherwise it could have no beginning, *i. e.* it would continue to exist in the divine ideas only, and could have no existence, *de facto*, in nature.

An instance will illustrate this; we can never fix on any point in *endless duration*, wherein the deity did not exist; he is strictly and properly infinite in duration, as well as power, and is the cause of all finite and created natures. Now we can never suppose any point in his *infinite* duration, in which this world began to exist, but we may suppose it might have been created sooner, and also sooner than that, and so on, *ad infinitum*; yet, whenever this world should actually be created or begin to exist, it must necessarily begin at some fixed determinate point of time, and cannot possibly be eternal; nor do I presume that any philosopher will contend for an earlier and earlier existence of this world, and the creatures in it, *ad infinitum*, because he can demonstrate this in his abstract ideas to be possible, and yet this conclusion, of an *eternal existence* of the world, would be supported with equal evidence as the *infinite divisibility* of matter.

F

Again,

Again, we can as well conceive how any quantity of matter may be increased in magnitude more and more, *ad infinitum*, as how it may be diminished after the same manner; but I know of no one who has ever concluded from hence, that there are bodies in nature which are actually of an *infinite bigness*, or even that such an aggregation is possible; and yet this conclusion would be equally good as the other.

These observations abundantly confirm the first conclusion, for if matter ever *began to have any existence*, it is not infinitely divisible.

We may observe by the way, that this argument will afford us a most irrefragable proof of the *immateriality* of the soul; for hence it appears, that the mind possesses *powers* beyond any possible existence or *powers* of matter; it has conceptions of *powers*, possible in its own ideas, which can have no existence in *material* nature, nay, which it would imply a contradiction to suppose
matter

matter to be possessed of; and consequently the *mind cannot be material*.

It appears then, that matter cannot be infinitely divisible in nature, the supposition destroying its very existence; and consequently attraction, which supposes parts separable beyond parts, *ad infinitum*, cannot be essential to the being of matter. In support of this strange position, however, this learned writer argues as follows.

“ This argument^a equally affects the
 “ *smallest* atoms, as the largest bodies that
 “ are composed of them. An atom, by
 “ which I mean an *ultimate* component
 “ part of any gross body, is necessarily sup-
 “ posed to be perfectly solid, wholly im-
 “ pervious to any other atom; and it must
 “ also be round or square, or of some other
 “ *determinate form*. But the parts of such
 “ a body as this solid atom must be *divi-*
 “ *sible*, and therefore have parts,” &c.

^a Page 5.

How! must the *smallest* particle still have parts that are *smaller* than the smallest? and must the ultimate particle be still divisible into particles beyond the last? Wonderful indeed °!

Our learned author, however, is so fond of this idea of attraction, that he seems unwilling to drop it, and a little below goes nearly the same ground over again, without observing the strange contradiction into which he falls. Into such inconsistencies, may a man of real abilities and knowledge be driven, when embarrassed, and determined at all hazards to defend an hypothesis.

It appears then, from what has been said, that the primary ultimate particles of

° Dr. Kenrick, who indeed is too great a master in criticism to omit inconsistencies of this kind, has made nearly the same observation on this part of Dr. Priestley's disquisitions; but as my remarks proceed on different principles, and are no way connected with his, I did not think it needful to go out of my way, because Dr. Kenrick happened to step into the same road.

matter

matter must be *solid* and *impenetrable* without attraction, it being absurd and contradictory to suppose attraction necessary to the being of an ultimate particle; attraction therefore is not necessary, as Dr. Priestley supposes, to the very being of matter. Let us now enquire whether he has succeeded any better in his account of repulsion.

The idea of repulsion, held forth in the disquisitions, as necessary to the being of matter, must necessarily stand or fall with the same idea of attraction. For repulsion supposes certain *parts* of matter repelling each other at certain distances; the body therefore possessed of the property of repulsion, must consist of parts; but it is manifest such a property cannot be applied to an ultimate particle of matter, for then it must consist of parts beyond the last; and thus we see, that whatever repulsion may be in large bodies, it implies a contradiction to suppose it necessary to the very being of matter.

But

But, says Dr. Priestley, “ If *resistance*,
 “ from which alone is derived the idea of
 “ impenetrability, is in most cases certainly
 “ caused by *powers*, and in no case certainly
 “ by any thing else; the rules of philoso-
 “ phizing oblige us to suppose, that the
 “ cause of *all* resistance is *repulsive power*,
 “ and in no case whatever the thing that
 “ we have hitherto improperly termed
 “ *solid* or *impenetrable matter* ^p. ”

I presume it has been fully proved, that an ultimate particle of matter must be *solid* and *impenetrable*; it will therefore follow, that *all resistance* depends on solidity, and that repulsion cannot be the cause of it; but must itself, if considered as a property of matter, be a certain species of resistance. Indeed, upon a close examination we shall find, that repulsion, according to our author's idea of it, as a property of matter, cannot possibly exist in nature.

He supposes attraction and repulsion to constitute the very essence of matter, for he says, when these are taken away, *nothing* at all remains^a; they therefore must be the very substance or thing itself; but if we have any idea at all to the word repulsion, it must mean a certain *force*, whereby the parts of something already existing repel each other, just as we have already observed in the case of attraction; it must then be a *property*, and Dr. Priestley himself speaks of it as a *power*, which must necessarily have some *subject*; repulsion therefore, according to this account of it, must be both a *property*, and the *subject* of that property at the same time. Very logical truly.

But there is something more extraordinary and inconceivable still. Repulsion, says the Doctor, acts at a *real distance* from what we call the body itself^r. What! does a body act beyond its terminating surface? then it must act where it is not; that is, an

^a Page 5 & 7. ^r Page 4.

effect would be produced without any cause, and thus the world might arise out of nothing, and all the reasoning in favour of a first cause be destroyed.

Perhaps this writer may be a little shy of owning this consequence as his offspring, though it certainly is legitimate.

That a body cannot act but where it is, or that a body must be where it acts, is one of the first principles of science; nor is there any thing more certain than this, in any case whatever from which we can reason. If once we give up this principle, we introduce uncertainty and confusion into all science, and deny the evidence both of sense and reason. Neither Dr. Priestley, therefore, nor any other philosopher, has authority to assert, that, because bodies repel each other at *apparent* distances, they must therefore *act*, by their natural properties, at *real* distances from all body or solid matter: and on the contrary, we are authorized by this one principle alone (whether

we

we can explain these appearances or no, makes no difference) to affirm that repulsion, if considered as an effect of matter, can only be caused by the *resistance* of solid bodies in *mutual contact* with each other.

It is really amazing how the same person (and such a person too as Dr. Priestley) on different occasions, will adopt different modes of argumentation which mutually destroy each other, when he has different ends to serve; I shall therefore close the present argument, by appealing to the authority of a certain celebrated philosopher, to whose decisions I am confident Dr. Priestley will have no objection. “ Let a
 “ man torture his imagination, says this
 “ writer, as much as he pleases, I will
 “ pronounce it to be impossible for him to
 “ conceive even the possibility of *mutual*
 “ *action*, without some *common property*, by
 “ means of which the things that *act* and
 “ *re-act* upon each other may have some
 “ connexion. It is certainly impossible
 “ that a substance should affect or be affect-

“ ed by a substance that can make no
 “ *resistance at all*, and especially a kind of
 “ substance that cannot, with any propriety
 “ of speech, be said to be even *in the same*
 “ *place* with it. If this be not an *impossi-*
 “ *bility*, I really do not know what is so’.”

One would not really suppose that this was the same learned gentleman who just now made repulsion the cause of *resistance*, and informed us, that matter might act upon matter at *real* distances; but we must remember, that when he wrote this, he was attempting to prove a very different proposition.

This learned author indeed thinks, that, in order to get clear of the above difficulty, he is at liberty to avail himself of the agency of the Deity’. But the divine agency cannot take place upon our author’s hypothesis, without destroying the very existence of matter. For he supposes *repulsion* to be

* Page 61. † Page 351.

essential to the being of matter^u, and that, if this and attraction be taken away, nothing at all remains; if then, that which constitutes the essence of matter, be nothing but the *agency of the Deity*, it directly follows that all corporeal phenomena are caused by the action of the Supreme Being, and of course real matter has no existence; a sentiment however, which this same writer treats, in other parts of the disquisitions, as a strange opinion; he is however at liberty to chuse which side of the dilemma he pleases.

It follows from the above observations, that attraction and repulsion must be ultimately resolved into the appointment or agency of the Deity on all parts of matter. For if we have recourse to the *Æther* of Sir Isaac Newton, which Dr. Cullen supposes may be the cause of the cohesion and repulsive force of bodies;^v or if we think with Dr. Hales^x, the late celebrated Haller^y, and Dr. Macbride^z, that air is

^u Page 7. ^v Vide Institutes of Medic. ^x Staticks, vol. 1.

^y Patholog. vol. 1. cap. 1. ^z Experim. Essays, Essay 2.

the cause of the cohesion and firmness of bodies, which experiments seem to make probable, if not certain; yet we must still enquire into the *attractive* and *repulsive force* of this æther or air; for if this æther be matter, it must consist of ultimate solid parts, and consequently has a *vis inertiae*, if it has any existence. Now the parts of this very æther could neither move, nor impel any substance, if they were not themselves moved and impelled in the same direction; and thus we shall want a more subtle æther for the purpose of moving the grosser; and this more subtle æther will want another still more subtle, for the same purpose, and so on *ad infinitum*, unless we stop somewhere, at an *immaterial immechanical* cause of attraction and repulsion, and all the motions of matter.

Having now reduced our author's arguments against the solidity and impenetrability of matter to a *reductio ad absurdum*, we may safely proceed to examine some parts of the fabrick which he has built upon on so falacious a foundation.

S E C T II.

Of the Seat of the Sentient Principle in
Man.

“**I**N the two preceding sections, says
“ Dr. Priestley, I have endeavoured to
“ rectify the notions which we have been
“ taught to entertain concerning matter.
“ I now proceed to enquire whether, when
“ the nature of matter is rightly under-
“ stood, there be any reason to think that
“ there is in man any substance essentially
“ different from it, that is, any thing pos-
“ sessed of other properties besides such as
“ may be superadded to those of *attraction*
“ and *repulsion*, which we have found to
“ belong to matter.”

I presume

I presume however, that it has been clearly shewn, that neither attraction nor repulsion can belong to matter, the supposition being contradictory and absurd. Nor can I well understand what our learned author means by a power of thinking being superadded to matter. For it seems to me that if matter can think, thought must either be essential to its very nature, or it must be the necessary result of some composition of it; for otherwise, if something is to be *added* to matter, as the subject of thought, which is *not matter*, this would be the very thing we contend for, and which this writer elsewhere denies; if therefore, matter can think, thought and sense must be essential to its nature, or to some composition of it, which few, I believe, will venture to assert. But he adds,

“ The reason of the conclusion above-
“ mentioned (that is, that sensation and
“ thought may belong to matter) is simply
“ this, that the powers of sensation or per-
“ ception

“ception and thought, as belonging to
 “man, have never been found but in con-
 “junction with a certain *organized system*
 “of *matter*; and therefore that those pow-
 “ers necessarily exist in, and depend upon
 “such a system. This at least, must be
 “our conclusion, till it can be shewn that
 “these powers are incompatible with other
 “known properties of the same substance;
 “and for this I see no sort of pretence^a.”

Could one really have thought, that the
 same learned gentleman, who has written so
 much on another occasion^b, against the evi-
 dence of *sense* and bare *appearances*, would
 have drawn such a weighty conclusion from
 sources which he himself has shewn to be
 so falacious? It affords us a farther proof,
 however, that Dr. Priestley is sometimes
 apt to say things on different occasions,
 which but ill agree together, a remarkable
 instance of which, we have seen above.

^a Page 26.

^b In Answer to the Doctors Reid, &c.

Notwithstanding

Notwithstanding this writer can see no pretence why sensation and thought may not belong to a *system of organized matter*, yet the following arguments seem to me little short of demonstration, that the thing is impossible.

I. We have already examined our idea of matter, and found it to be a *solid impenetrable* substance; but we did not find sensation and thought implied in its existence. But if these properties belonged to matter, we should find that the existence of matter would necessarily imply the existence of sensation and thought. Thus when we suppose matter to exist, we find it must necessarily be of some figure or form; in like manner, when we think on motion, the idea of *body* is necessarily implied; and the reason is, because the one is a property of the other, and cannot exist without it; but this is not the case in our ideas of matter and a thinking being. We can easily conceive matter to exist, though all created thinking beings were annihilated; and on
the

the contrary, we can suppose, without any contradiction, that thinking or intelligent beings might have been created without the creation of matter. As the existence of the one, therefore, does not imply the existence of the other, I fairly conclude that sensation and thought do not belong to matter.

II. Perhaps it may be said, “ We do not contend that thinking is essential to the being of matter, as extension or figure is; but only that it is the result of a certain modification or organical structure of matter.” But it seems inconceivable how sensation or thought can be the result of any *composition*, if they do not belong to all the component parts. For what is a system or composition of matter? Is it any thing but an apposition of parts? And can *this* be any thing but an apposition of the properties of each separate part? or produce any thing but the aggregate or sum total of such properties? For example, the apposition of the *parts* of a circle can produce

H duce

duce nothing but a circle; nor the apposition of units or numbers, any thing but the aggregate or sum total of them. No *new property* therefore can arise in a system or composition of matter *generically* different from what each part possesses in some degree; to maintain this would be to say, that the parts of a circle might by apposition become a triangle or a square, *i. e.* they would be parts of a circle, and not parts of it at the same time, which is a manifest contradiction.

Nor will the *organization* of a system or composition of matter in the least invalidate this conclusion; for organization is nothing more than an *apposition* of parts after a peculiar *mode* or form; but apposition under any modification whatever, is nothing but *mere apposition* still, and consequently can produce nothing but an aggregate of the properties of the same kind, which each part in some degree, or under *some modification*, possesses.

If

If it should be said that a circle, and every other *whole* or *aggregate* of parts, must have properties different from each of the parts; I answer, that they can only differ *numerically*, and in *degree*. But we are not here talking of a difference in *number* or *degree*, but in *kind*; and to say that any *whole* or *aggregate* of parts can have any properties different in *kind* from what the parts possess, is to say that the superficial concentrical convexities of the parts of a circle may, by apposition or putting together, become a triangle, a square, or any thing else *different* from a circle, which the imagination of a fanciful philosopher may please to bestow upon them.

The application of this argument is extremely easy.—If sensation and thought are the result of an organized system of matter, they must reside in all the parts of that system, *i. e.* every part must contain a piece of a sensation, and a piece of a thought, in the same manner as the parts of the superficies of a sphere contain a piece or some

degree of convexity of the whole; but how our modern philosophers can cut and slice sensation and thought into pieces and parts; or how we may with propriety talk of the piece of a thought, is a secret they have not yet discovered to the world.

But suppose we allow to our modern refiners such a degree of dexterity, as to be able to cut and chop sensations and *thoughts* into a fine kind of mince-meat, which every idiot may swallow without *thinking* at all; yet I do not see that this will answer the purpose; for by argument, first, we found, that *intelligence* did not belong to the nature of matter; nay, we did not find so much as a piece of a sensation or a thought to belong to it; consequently, if these properties arise out of any composition of matter, there will be an amazing *effect* produced without any thing in the *subject* to produce it, that is, it would arise out of nothing, which is a manifest impossibility.

Dr.

Dr. Priestley observes, on the *unity of consciousness* (which will fall under this argument) that before it can be admitted as an argument for the immateriality of the soul, it should be strictly defined what *unity of consciousness* means. “ I profess, says he, “ that, those who have hitherto written “ about it, have given me no clear ideas up- “ on the subject^c. The only meaning that “ I can annex to the words *unity of consci- “ ousness*, is, a feeling or perception of the “ *unity of my nature or being*; but all that “ can be inferred from this is, that I am “ only *one* person, *one sentient and thinking “ being*, and not two persons, or two senti- “ ent or thinking beings^d.”

^c Consciousness seems to differ from simple perception in this, that perception is generally understood of external objects, but consciousness is a recognition of the impressions the mind receives from external objects, and of the internal operations of the mind itself; whereby it becomes demonstratively assured of its own existence, in contradistinction to every other being.

^d Page 86.

And

And it seems to me that this is all we need to infer from it; for by the above reasoning it appears, that no *property* can reside in any system which does not reside in *every* part of it; if then this organized system were divided into parts, there would be a degree of consciousness residing in each part, and each would have “ a feeling or “ perception of the *unity of its own nature or being;*” and thus instead of *one sentient conscious being,* there might be *one hundred, one thousand,* or any other number, according to the number of parts into which the system should be divided^c, which renders the supposition of materialism extravagant and absurd.

• Quumque insuper, omne corpus fit ex partibus verè diversis conflatum; quumque omnis corporea affectio fit etiam divisibilis; ita ut singulis corporis partibus, pars etiam affectionis inhæreat; illæ vero quæ mentis ipsius affectiones, duce natura, putantur, sint indivisæ et simplices; quæ per varias corporis partes dispertiri nequeant, neque per spatii partes à corpore occupatas diffundi; merito hinc colligimus *Rem Cogitantem* esse naturam simplicem ab omni materia diversam. Hutcheson. Synopsis metaphysicæ, Pars Secund. Cap. 3. page. 175.

Against this mode of reasoning our author argues thus : “ For the same reason
 “ that *activity* and *perceptivity* cannot arise
 “ from joining together dead and inert
 “ parts, which is the language of Mr. Bax-
 “ ter, no powers whatever could be affirm-
 “ ed of any mass of matter, because matter
 “ being infinitely divisible, it is impossible
 “ that the *ultimate parts* of it can be possess-
 “ ed of any powers †.”

Is it not astonishing that this learned writer should tell us matter is *infinitely divisible*, and yet gravely talk of its *ultimate parts*? But he proceeds :

“ There is no more reason in nature, why
 “ perception may not belong to a *system of*
 “ *matter*, as such, and not to the *component*
 “ *parts of it*, than that *life* should be the
 “ property of an entire animal system, and
 “ not of the separate parts of it.”

Perhaps it may be too difficult a requisition to ask this writer to explain what he

† Page 88.

means by the word *life*, and how it is a property of an entire animal system; but till this be done, his argument can certainly be of no force.

But though this argument has failed in its executive power, this learned gentleman thinks the two following will be quite decisive, though in my opinion they are altogether unworthy of him, or of any other person of real philosophical knowledge.

“ It may also, says he, just as plausibly
 “ be said, that *sound* cannot consist of a vi-
 “ bration in the air, because no sound
 “ could result from the motion of a single
 “ particle of that elastick fluid; and yet
 “ the vibration of the whole mass of air,
 “ is nothing more than the vibrations of
 “ the separate particles of which it con-
 “ sists. It might also be said that no *har-*
 “ *mony* could result from a harpsichord,
 “ because the single notes, separately taken,
 “ can make no harmony ^z.”

^z Page 89.

But will Dr. Priestley, on second thoughts, say, that *sound* is a property *inhering* or *existing* in the air, as roundness is the property of a sphere? Sound, as a property of the air, is nothing more than a vibratory motion of its parts; in any other sense, it is a sensation in some percipient being. But I presume, that the vibrations of any mass or quantity of air are nothing but the aggregate or sum of all the vibrations which exist in every separate part. And the same also may be said of harmony.

We may here take notice of an observation Dr. Kenrick has made upon this argument. “ We might as well, says this keen
 “ critick, impute the transparency of *diaphanous* bodies, to the *transparency* of the
 “ materials of which they are compounded;
 “ though we know that glass and other
 “ transparent bodies are compounded of
 “ particles separately opaque^h.”

^h London Review for January, 1778. Page 60.

But surely these learned doctors talk much beneath their own dignity, as experienced philosophers, when they speak of sound and transparency being *real* properties of bodies. For transparency in bodies is nothing but such an arrangement of their component parts, as may transmit the rays of light; and this arrangement, I presume, every part of a diaphanous body, *as such* must possess, as well as the whole. And as to knowing that glass is compounded of particles separately opaque, we know just the contrary; for, it is obvious to remark, that particles which are opaque, cannot be parts of glass, *as glass*, but parts of matter *as such*, or of some other body *distinct* from glass.

If we have *certainty* in any thing at all, it seems to me that there is certainty in the above argument; and if so, there can, on the supposition of materialism, be no *unity of consciousness*, as explained by our learned author himself, seeing that, instead of *one*, I might be one thousand beings; which
is

is contrary to all experience and matter of fact, on which this writer rests so much of his argument; for I certainly have a consciousness of my own existence, as *one being*, separate and distinct from all other beings.

III. But independent of the former arguments, it seems to me that human phænomena can never be accounted for upon the supposition, that man is a compound of homogeneous principles. For hence it would undeniably follow, that all our *sensations, ideas, reasoning*, and every other *power* deemed *mental*, can only be a certain mode or species of motion; but if this be highly absurd, and utterly indefensible, we must then have recourse to an *immaterial* principle in human nature, which may be the *subject* of these properties.

According to the doctrine of vibrations, which our learned author has warmly espousedⁱ, it is supposed, that external

ⁱ See Introd. Essays to Hartley's Theory, Essay 1.

objects affect the nerves with a tremulous or vibratory *motion*; that this motion is propagated along the solid fibres of the nerves to the brain; and as the brain is a continuation of the same substance with the nerves, it is supposed to receive a similar affection, or a tremulous vibratory motion; in consequence of which, we receive sensations and ideas.

Now the brain, *ex hypothesi*, receives nothing but motion, and this motion, upon our author's system, is the true efficient cause of our sensations and simple ideas; and being variously compounded and modified, produces all the other ideas and operations of the mind; so that *motion*, under some modification or other, must be the *immediate, true, efficient cause* of all human phænomena.

But is it not extremely obvious, that motion can generate nothing but motion^k? Can any material cause whatever produce

^k Motus nihil generat præter motum. Hob. Leviath.

any thing beyond its own *genus*, as logicians speak? If then motion can produce nothing beyond the *genus* of motion, and yet is the cause of all our sensations, ideas, and mental operations, it will follow, that all these are some species of motion, and consequently we can have no knowledge of any thing different in *kind* from it.

According to this doctrine, motion in such an organical structure as the brain, must give existence to *perception* itself, *i. e.* it must be its true *efficient cause*, and perception be nothing more than an effect produced by it; for perception is not supposed to exist till motion exists; perception then can be nothing but motion likewise, and thus *perception*, and the *object* perceived, will be one and the same thing.

If our perceptions and ideas are nothing but species of motion, it will also follow, that *motion*, and the *thing moved*, are the same; for since, upon this hypothesis, we have nothing to represent body, (or indeed
any

any thing else) but motion; and motion being able to generate or represent nothing but itself, it must follow, that motion and the body moved are the same. But this is certainly contrary to all appearance and matter of fact; and if we have any certainty in any kind of reasoning, we may pronounce that this is impossible and contradictory.

This learned author indeed says^l, that “It is a gross mistake of the system of materialism to suppose, that the vibrations of the brain are themselves the perceptions. For it is easy to form an idea of their being vibrations, without any perceptions accompanying them.” But I presume, unless it can be pointed out, wherein the above arguments are defective, the mistake of the system of materialism will belong to our author; and as vibrations may exist without perceptions, it seems to me full proof, that perception cannot belong to a system of matter. He adds^m, “But

^l Page 91.

^m Ibid.

“ it is supposed that the brain, besides its
 “ *vibrating power*, has superadded to it a
 “ *percipient or sentient power* likewise;”
 and yet he tells us only two pages before
 this, that, “ judging by observation, a mass
 “ of matter, duly organized, and endued
 “ with *life*, which depends upon the due
 “ circulation of the fluids, and a proper
 “ tone of the solid parts, must *necessarily*
 “ have *sensation and perception*.” Now I
 have said above, that I do not rightly un-
 derstand what is meant by *superadding* a
 power of perception to matter, as it seems
 to me a denying what he is contending for.
 But if I should misunderstand my author in
 these passages, I hope I shall be forgiven; as
 it appears pretty clear, from collating the
 above quotations, that this learned gentle-
 man did not rightly understand himself.

That sensations and ideas are nothing
 but certain species of motion, is expressly
 asserted by this gentleman on another
 occasion: “ All *sensations and ideas*, says he,
 “ being *vibrations* in that substance (*i. e.*
 “ of

“ of the brain) all that is properly un-
 “ known in the business being the sim-
 “ ple power in the mind to perceive those
 “ vibrations ”.” Now this being the case,
 when we perceive a *circle*, or any other
 figure, we perceive nothing but motion:
 in like manner when we perceive *yellow*,
blue, *green*, &c. or any body that is *hard* or
soft, we see nothing but motion still; and
 what is yet more extraordinary, when we
 perceive a *body at rest*, we see nothing at all
 but *motion*. But let us view this paradoxical
 affair in another point of view; it is
 manifest that swift or slow may be predi-
 cated of motion in every direction, or under
 any modification whatever; because one
 body in motion may be compared with
 another body in motion, and hence arises
 our idea of swift and slow. According to
 this philosophy then, we may consistently
 talk of a swift circle, or a slow triangle, and
 must distinguish the properties of all beings
 by their degrees of motion. Nay, we may,

ⁿ Remarks on Dr. Reid, Page 32.

like men of science, and deep erudition contend, that the *rest* of *this* body is twice as swift as the *rest* of *that*; and if any one thinks he has an idea of *rest*, or the *possibility* of it, he is totally mistaken; for the truth is, he sees nothing at all but motion. If philosophers can seriously believe such positions as these, I think we must necessarily conclude, that their brain is in a strange agitation indeed.

It is farther absolutely inconceivable, how motion (or indeed any affection of the brain) can be the very ideas which we perceive. For is it possible that motion, or any other affection of *one composition* of matter, can represent all the objects of which the human mind can have any ideas? Have we not a knowledge of many things which have not the least affinity to motion, but differ *toto cælo* from it? How is it possible for motion to become an idea of magnitude? Is motion the same as magnitude? Again, How can motion in the brain answer to all our ideas of figure? Is motion

K

capable

capable of that variety in the brain, which will answer all the variety of figures of which we can have any idea? What affinity is there between motion and our idea of colour, smell, taste, and a thousand other things? And can any person possibly conceive how *motion* in the brain can be love, or hatred, joy or grief, hope or despair, and the other affections of the mind? May not a man as well say, that a circle is a triangle or a square; or that any one thing may become any other, which his fancy shall please to call it?

If vibratory motions in the brain could thus become, or produce, all the ideas of which the human mind is capable, motion must be the most *universal genus* of *being* in nature (though itself is only a *mode of being*) comprehending under it all the species of beings in the creation, with all their modes of existence and action; which it is most extravagant and absurd to suppose.

According

According to this mode of argumentation, we might with propriety say, that nothing but motion exists in nature, because motion can neither beget nor represent any thing but motion; and yet some philosophers, perhaps equally wise, are said to have believed that there is no motion in the world.

I might say many more things upon this argument; but I presume what has been said is sufficiently conclusive and convincing; I shall however, as a corroborating evidence, subjoin some observations of that truly philosophical writer, Dr. Clark, on the same subject.

“ All modes of motion are nothing else
 “ but *merely* particular motions, and cannot
 “ contain any thing in their idea, beyond
 “ the *genus* of *motion*. Now if simple
 “ ideas be the foundation of all our know-
 “ ledge, and clear and distinct perception
 “ of the agreement or disagreement of those
 “ ideas, be the best and greatest criterion

“ of truth that our faculties enable us to
 “ attain unto; then it is as evident as any
 “ truth in the world, that *consciousness*
 “ cannot possibly be a mode of motion.
 “ For I have as clear and distinct a percep-
 “ tion, that the idea of *consciousness* con-
 “ tains something in it besides and beyond
 “ the *genus* of *motion*, as I have that it con-
 “ tains something in it beyond the *genus*
 “ of *figure*. The idea of *consciousness* is
 “ as totally and *generically* different from a
 “ *circular motion*, or an *elliptical motion*, or
 “ any other *mode of motion* whatsoever, as
 “ it is from the idea of a *circle* or a *cube*,
 “ or any other *mode of figure* whatsoever.
 “ I have therefore exactly the same *intuitive*
 “ *certainty*, that *consciousness* cannot be a
 “ *mode of motion*, as I have that a *circle* or a
 “ *cube* is not a *thought*, or that an *acute*
 “ *sound* is not a *purple colour*; or that any
 “ one thing in the world is not another,
 “ whose idea is the remotest and most
 “ different from it that can be imagined.
 “ To suppose *consciousness* to be a *mode of*
 “ *motion*, is really a greater absurdity (if
 “ possible)

“ possible) than to suppose *roundness* to be
 “ a property of a *square*; because the idea
 “ of *local motion*, and the idea of *thinking*,
 “ having no *common genus*, nothing where-
 “ in they agree or can be compared toge-
 “ ther, are evidently *more different* one
 “ from another, than the ideas of *any two*
 “ *plain figures* can be, which have a *com-*
 “ *mon genus*. If thinking was any *mode*
 “ or *species of motion*, it would follow that
 “ all motion would be some degree or kind
 “ of thinking; for motion, in the thing
 “ moved, excepting only the difference of
 “ degrees of its swiftness or slowness, is a
 “ similar quality, and has no variety in it;
 “ all its different determinations being
 “ nothing really in the body itself that is
 “ moved; but mere abstract notions, or
 “ external denominations, conceived only
 “ in our imagination: for the determina-
 “ tion of any body that moves in a circle,
 “ is nothing else, at any given point of
 “ time, but a determination to move in a
 “ certain straight line; and, at another
 “ given point of time, to move in another
 straight

“ straight line, and so on; so that there is
 “ no such thing as a circular motion of any
 “ particle of matter, coexistent at once;
 “ but all motion is, strictly and properly
 “ speaking, a similar and uniform quality,
 “ viz. a body’s going on according to its
 “ determination; which determination is
 “ always in a straight line, and causes the
 “ body to go on actually in a straight line
 “ where it meets with no resistance; and
 “ where it meets with resistance by inter-
 “ vals, there to go on into new straight
 “ lines successively, into which it is divert-
 “ ed by such resistance; and, where it
 “ meets with continual resistance, there to
 “ go on in a curve line, into which it is
 “ continually diverted; and every such cur-
 “ vilinear motion, whether circular, or of
 “ any other species whatsoever, is but the
 “ idea of a number of successive motions of
 “ a body, never existent together; a pure
 “ *Ens Rationis*, or operation of the mind;
 “ which considering past motion and fu-
 “ ture, and recollecting the whole by the
 “ memory and fancy, calls that whole
 “ sometimes

“ sometimes by one denomination and
 “ sometimes by another. How then can
 “ any of those modes of motion be the ef-
 “ ficient of thought, or be themselves
 “ thought; when they are evidently no-
 “ thing but the effect and product of it, viz.
 “ ideas framed merely by the imagination
 “ and memory °.”

IV. No corporeal system whatever can possibly be the seat of sensation; for *all matter* has extension, and must be of some figure or form. If matter then, were the seat of the sentient principle in man, we could have no sensation or ideas but what must necessarily include in them extension and figure; for being properties of an extended substance, they could not be separated from its extension. If sensation and thought resided in an extended substance, and were caused by some mode or affection of that extended substance, they would as constantly be connected with extension, as

† Third Defence of the Immort. of the Soul. Page 272.
 et seq.

the touching or feeling of an extended body is. But our sensations and thoughts are not thus connected with extension and figure; they do not bear any the least conceivable affinity to it^p. Let any man try if he can find any likeness between the passions of the mind, and extension or figure; whether he can find out the peculiar *form* of love, joy, admiration and hope, with their opposites, or even of any of our natural appetites, thoughts of the mind, reasonings or designs. What! can we have a square love, a triangular hope, and a thought with ten or twelve sides to it? certainly such doctrines as these are more fit to be laughed at, than seriously reasoned upon; and yet they are the natural

^p Si tamen quis dicat, ideas esse divisibiles; et se concipere ideam extensionis talem esse: Respondeo, rem cum idea confundi; sed qui habet ideam, se habere hanc ideam, sibi conscius est; et nemo affirmabit conscientiam hanc divisibilem esse et extensam; hæc tamen ab ipsa idea separari non potest, et cum hac dividi deberet, si cogitatio extensa esset. Non ergo ejusdem subjecti attributa sunt cogitare et extensum esse. S'Gravesandi Introd. ad philosophiam, lib. 1. par. 2. cap. 13. page 68.

consequences

consequences of our author's hypothesis; for if these passions and thoughts reside in a system of matter as their subject, they must necessarily partake of extension and figure.

For it is supposed that sensation and thought may reside in such an organized system as the brain; and that, when the substance of the brain is put into a vibratory motion, it feels a sensation, and that these motions being variously modified, may give the brain all the variety of human passions. Now here I would ask, whether the whole substance of the brain vibrates when these passions are excited? If so, then the passion of the mind will be spread through all the parts of it, and therefore will have the same length, breadth, and thickness as the brain which is thus moved; and if only a part of the brain vibrates, yet still the sensation will have the same figure as that part of the brain which is thus affected, and consequently will be of some figure or form.

Now any man who impartially considers these consequences, thus fairly deduced from the doctrine of *materialism*, must certainly see it is utterly indefensible; but as it is a doctrine which may easily be applied to favour the most immoral purposes, I shall not wonder if it meets with abettors.

These arguments will apply with equal force against our author's hypothesis, if we even suppose with him, that attraction and repulsion form the essence of matter. Nor can I perceive that *these powers* would approach nearer to the nature of *thought*, by forming the essence of matter, than if they arise from the agency of the Deity upon it.

V. In examining into the nature and properties of *matter* we found, that, if matter has any existence, it must be *solid* and *impenetrable*, and in consequence of this, it is possessed of a *vis inertiae*, and therefore cannot move till it is acted upon by some
being,

being *ab extra*; if then the sentient and intelligent principle in man be material, it must be totally *inert* and *passive*; which is inconsistent both with our natural feelings, and with reason, and absolutely destroys moral agency, and a state of rewards and punishments.

Were the mind thus *inert* and *passive*, it could have no ideas but what are transmitted to it from without by the senses, even in the *very form* in which they are found to exist in the mind: for being *inactive*, it could have no power to compare, add, separate, or any way alter its ideas; it could only perceive them in *that form* in which they are transmitted to it, and first lie in the brain, and thus our knowledge and intellectual pleasures would be confined within a very narrow compass.

That this however is not a just account of our mental powers is very certain; for we find ourselves possessed of many ideas which have no archetypes or patterns with-

out us, from which they may receive their form, and consequently, they cannot be produced by the same means as our simple ideas and sensations are. For instance, how can we, upon this supposition, have any idea of the specific difference of things; there is nothing existing in nature which can impress the senses, and give a representation of the differences of all beings. To gain a knowledge of the difference of one thing from another, we must compare their ideas together, and collect into one view all the circumstances and properties wherein they differ, and thus gain a precise idea of their difference; but this idea arises from the *active intelligent* power of the mind, judging of the properties of each object separately, comparing them together, and then uniting the circumstances, wherein they differ, in one view: the mind must therefore necessarily be active, and distinct from matter.

An attempt indeed has been made to account for our *ideas of reflection* (which make
up

up the greatest and most refined part of our knowledge) upon the principle of association; but this is a vain attempt. For though association will account for many of our ideas and particular feelings, yet there are a great number which arise from a quite different source; and when this writer endeavours to account for *ideas of reflection*, upon this principle^a, he evidently proceeds upon a supposition of the mind's activity, in adding one part of an idea, and dropping another, in order to get a conception of a *general nature*, or a *specific difference* in things; nor can he account for such ideas upon any other supposition. To say, that vibrations being excited in the brain, *ab extra*, may there become so very complex, compounded, and various (while yet the substance of the brain must have a *vis inertiae*) as to become the very *ideas* of reflection, in all the possible varieties of which the mind is capable, seems to me a most extraordinary position, and altogether similar to the old atheistical notion of a

^a Essay 3d to Hartley's Theory.

concourse of atoms, which flying about in all directions, at last formed themselves into the regular organized bodies which we see in the world.

VI. To the former considerations and arguments we may add the following, that every man has within himself a consciousness of something distinct from his body, and indeed from all extension; for his body is subject to his mind, and under its direction and government; he feels what is useful or hurtful to it; when he enters within himself by reflection and consciousness, he feels, as it were, two opposite interests within him; he is conscious of *feelings* which arise from very different and seemingly opposite sources, and they often oppose one another at the very same time; and in this struggle (between a virtuous and vicious disposition suppose) he is conscious that he has something within him which can increase the force and influence of either of them, by turning itself that way, and yielding to them. Now to say that

that, *that substance* within us, which thus directs, governs, restrains or encourages, is the very same with the governed, directed, &c. seems contrary to our natural feelings, and also to reason.

Each of these arguments might have been drawn out to a much greater length, but it seems needless; the reasoning appears to me strong and unanswerable; and the attentive unbiaſſed reader will find many arguments arise in his mind not here mentioned; all uniting to convince him, that there is in man an immaterial principle, more excellent in its nature, and more extensive in its powers, than the sluggish inactive body.

§ E C T.

S E C T III.

Shewing that Personal Identity, and a Resurrection of the same Being, is impossible on the System of Materialism.

TH E doctrine of personal identity, or what it is which makes a man the same person to day, that he was a month or a year ago, has occasioned considerable difficulty to philosophers, and few have been able to define it on true philosophical principles. We must, however, acknowledge, that a true personal identity, in the most strict and philosophical sense, has a real existence in nature; for otherwise, there could be no foundation for distributive justice, and consequently no moral government of the world.

Our

Our learned author, indeed, has a section on the subject of personal identity; and from the character he has justly acquired, as a philosopher, I expected to have found it treated with propriety, on true philosophical principles; but how was I disappointed and disgusted at the perusal of it! and I think it will shew no want of candour to say, that nothing was ever more *unphilosophical*, than our author's mode of treating the subject of personal identity. I shall not on this occasion treat Dr. Priestley, as he has chosen to treat others who differ in sentiment from him, in saying he wants *strength of mind* ^r to enter into the subject; but I will say, that neither his abilities nor opinions merit that commendation and applause, in this line of *physical investigation*, which they seem to have deserved on some other occasions.

Is it not unheard of in philosophical investigations, that words should be used in their *popular* and *metaphorical sense*, or

^r Appendix, page 1.

even in a *forensic* meaning? Ought they not to be divested of this garb, and be reduced to their most proper and *literal* signification? For otherwise, how are we to come at a knowledge of the real properties of things? Yet this has been the practice of our learned doctor, while investigating a subject that could least of all admit of such a conduct. Let us hear him. “ If I may
“ be allowed, says he, for the sake of distinction, to introduce a new term, I
“ would say, that *the identity of the man* is
“ different from the *identity of the person*;
“ and it is the latter, and not the former,
“ that we ought to consider in a disquisition
“ of this kind: the distinction I have mentioned may appear a paradox; but in fact,
“ similar distinctions are not uncommon,
“ and they may illustrate one another.
“ Ask any person to shew you the *river*
“ *Thames*, and he will point to water flowing in a certain channel, and you will
“ find, that he does not consider the banks
“ or the bed of the river to be any part of
“ it. And yet, though the water be continually

“tinually and visibly changing, so as not
 “to be the same any one day with the
 “preceding, the use of language proves,
 “that there is a sense in which it may be
 “called, to every real purpose, the *same*
 “*river* that it was a thousand years ago.”

Now as to our author's *new term*, I am really at a loss to know, whether he means by it, the *identity of the man*, or the *identity of the person*, for I can see no newness in either of them; and as to the *distinction* between them, which he seems rather to *intend*, by the word *term*, I would not willingly suppose this learned gentleman to be *ignorant* that the famous Lock made use of it long ago^s; so that I think this paragraph needs a little explanation.

But let us ask the person, who gives our author his information concerning the *sameness* of the *river*, whether he ever saw the *river dry*, he will probably say, that he has seen it almost *dry*; and that he has sometimes been able to *walk over it*. Now

^s Essay on Understand. vol. 2. page 293.

this unlucky answer would spoil our learned author's whole argument.

This writer's conclusion is as lame as his premises; " If, says he^t, the water of
 " a river, the trees of a forest, or the par-
 " ticles that constitute the man, should
 " change *every moment*, and we were all ac-
 " quainted with it, it would make no more
 " difference in our conduct, than if the
 " same change had been considered as tak-
 " ing place more slowly. Supposing that
 " this change should constantly take place
 " during sleep, our behaviour to each other
 " in the morning would still be regulated
 " by a regard to the transactions of the pre-
 " ceding day. In this case, were any per-
 " son fully persuaded that every particle of
 " which he consisted should be changed,
 " he would nevertheless consider himself
 " as being the *same person* to-morrow as he
 " was yesterday, and the same twenty years
 " hence that he was twenty years ago; and
 " I doubt not, he would feel himself con-

“cerned as for a *future self*, and regulate
“his conduct accordingly.”

But this learned writer here supposes, that there may be a *sameness and continuity of consciousness*, while the *subject* of it is totally changed; but, had he recollected that this would be quite impossible, he would have perceived the futility of his argument.

That a *sameness* of consciousness cannot subsist where the subject of it is changed, is manifest, for then, *two or two hundred* persons might have the *same consciousness*; and according to this author, they would then become only *one person*, which seems an evident contradiction.

Though our learned doctor endeavours to take shelter under a loose and popular signification of words, yet no succour can arise from this quarter; for every man who feels a consciousness that he is the *same person* to day that he was yesterday, very naturally concludes that he has the *same substance*; and it would be difficult, if not impossible,

impossible, to persuade a man that his *whole substance* was entirely changed, while he felt a consciousness that he still continued the *same individual being*.

“ As far as the idea of identity, says this
 “ writer, is requisite, as a foundation for
 “ rewards and punishments, the *sameness*
 “ *and continuity of consciousness* seems to be
 “ the only circumstance attended to by us.”
 But is it not obvious, that a *sameness and*
continuity of consciousness cannot subsist,
 without a *sameness and continuity of the*
thinking intelligent substance; for the *same*
consciousness cannot be transferred from one
 subject to another, and therefore cannot
 subsist in the flux and changeable particles
 of any system of matter? But supposing
 consciousness might be transferred from
 one subject to another, yet the *continuity* of
 it must be destroyed. For the two subjects
 cannot penetrate each other, for then they
 would be but one; nor can two particles of
 matter come into contact, by our author’s
 own principles; there must therefore be an
intermediate

intermediate space between them. But consciousness cannot subsist in this *intermediate space*, in passing from the one subject to the other, for there is nothing to support it; the continuity of it therefore must necessarily be destroyed.

That consciousness, considered without any regard to a *sameness* of the thinking intelligent *substance*, cannot constitute *personal identity*, neither in a true *philosophical*, nor even in a *forensic* sense, will appear manifest from the following considerations.

Upon this supposition, a disordered imagination might make *one man* become *two*, or even *twenty persons*, whose actions he should imagine himself to have performed; and thus *Domitian* would become the very *same person* with *Romulus*, if his pride and madness should persuade him that he had built Rome; and even *Nero*, by the same means, might become *Socrates*, *Plato*, or any other person.

In like manner, if any person in *Bedlam* should have it strongly impressed on his fancy, that he taught *Plato* philosophy, then he would be *Socrates*; or that he had passed over the Alps with an army, and struck terror into all Italy, then he would be *Annibal*; or that he had pleaded in the Roman senate against *Mark Antony*, and then he would be *Cicero*; that he began the reformation from popery, then he is *Martin Luther*; or that he caused many men to be burned in Smithfield for heresy, then he is *Queen Mary*".

By the same doctrine also it follows, that if a man forgets and loses all consciousness of having done certain actions, he will then not be the *same person* who did them. Thus if *Paul* should forget the labours and sufferings that he underwent for the sake of the gospel, he would not be the same person who finished his apostleship so gloriously; and if *Judas* should never more remember that he had betrayed

" Vid. Watt's Philo. Essays, Page 306.

the Saviour of the world, he would not be the person who committed that horrible wickedness; and therefore the *one* could neither be justly rewarded, nor the *other* punished for his actions.

Now if these things are manifestly absurd and contrary to all reason, we must then have recourse to a *sameness* of *substance* in our definition of *personal identity*; and as it is most obvious that the human body is no one day together the *same*, *i. e.* composed of the same particles; so it will follow, that if matter is supposed to think, there can be no personal identity, or a man cannot continue the same individual being for one whole day together, and consequently there can be no just foundation for rewards and punishments.

Our learned author indeed affects to disbelieve the continual flux of the particles of the human body; but this I presume no one will seriously deny, who has a compe-

N

petent

petent knowledge of its structure and œconomy^w.

Were

^w That this learned writer should entertain any doubt concerning the change of every part of our bodies, *per vim vitæ*, seems a little strange, and must be owing to a want of due attention to what Physiologists have said on this head, and the facts they have adduced in proof of it. For the satisfaction of the curious reader, I shall therefore subjoin a few quotations from some of the most eminent writers in this line of *physical* knowledge.

It is indeed easy and natural to suppose, that the *fluids* and *softer parts*, suffer a continual waste by the actions of the various parts of the body, and want a constant supply; and the excretions from different emunctories sufficiently demonstrate it: our enquiry therefore must be, whether the *bone*, and hardest parts of the body suffer this waste, as well as the fluids.

The learned Boerhaave, after having given some account of the process, by which he supposed this waste of our *solids* does actually take place in the body, adds, “ *Qui verò omnem hanc historiam considerat; dein ea, quæ corpori accidunt simul cum illâ comparat, videt reverâ omnia hæc ita fieri: namque totâ cuticula ubique, perpetuo desquamatur, perit, renascitur; pili, ungues, dentes, assiduo rasi, abscissi, detriti renascuntur; ablatæ vasorum, ossiumque partes, brevi recrescunt, ab omni parte; sordes ab extremis vasculis in toto corpore, deterendo, vel exhalando, collectæ, microscopiis spectatæ, exhalando, vel dilucendo, in aqua examinatæ, docent ex solidis et fluidis has fieri; eædem lotu, tritu, razione, paratæ, similes sunt prioribus.*” “That whoever considers

Were I to define *personal identity*, or what it is that constitutes a man the same being

considers this whole account, and compares what happens to the body with it, will clearly see that such a change of our solids does actually take place. For the whole cuticle every where perpetually scales off, perishes and renews again; the *hair, nails, and teeth* being cut, pared, or wore, grow afresh; and parts of the *vessels and bones* being taken away, presently return on every side; and if the *sordes*, in the extremities of the vessels throughout the body, either worn off by friction, or collected by exhalation, be viewed in water by a microscope, after being evaporated or diluted, they appear to consist of solids and fluids; and the same, when obtained by washing, rubbing or abrasion, exhibit the like appearance." (a)

"*Si os aliquod, &c. &c.* If any of the long bones should become fistulous, or be so shattered and broken that a part of it perish, so that a space of even two inches be left between the ends of the broken parts (a case which Boerhaave once saw in a youth, whose leg had been broken by a wheel) we observe a kind of mucilage exude from every point of the surface of each end of the broken bone. If this mucilage be wiped off, no *callus* will succeed; but if it be defended from the air by the powder of frankincense, sarcocolla, or some such application, the mucilage will harden into a membrane; from thence it will pass into a *callus*, or glutinous substance, which becoming coriaceous, will afterwards harden

(a) Boerhaav. Institutiones Med. 476.

being at any one time, which he was a month or a year before, I would say it consisted

into a bone. Now if in the bones that are solid and hard, the elementary bony matter (if they are broken) be thus pushed forward by the force of nature, from the internal, towards the external parts, and thus form a new bone; it is manifest the same process takes place also in an healthy body; and if the bones are continually thus gaining an accession of new matter, why may we not suppose that the same increase happens also to the other and softer parts of the body?" (b)

These cases seem to prove, that the small elementary parts of the solids and fluids of the human body, are in a constant motion and change; some, either unfit for farther service, or worn off from the rest by constant friction, are discharged and carried into certain cavities, and from thence thrown out of the body; whilst others, by a wonderful process, are continually prepared to supply their places; whereby the body is preserved in health and strength.—The consumption and waste of the parts of the body, will still further appear by what the celebrated Haller has said upon this subject.

(c) "*Corpus humanum componitur ex fluidis partibus firmisque.—Fluida perpetuo consumi facile demonstratur. Quæ aquea sunt, promptissime de corpore decedunt. Perspiratio sancto-*

(b) Boerhaav. Prælect. acad. edit. Haller. tom. 3. pag. 715.

(c) Prim. Lin. cap. 8. p. 130. et seq.

fisted in the *same thinking intelligent substance, united to the same human body; by the same*

riana, perspiratio pulmonalis, trium et quatuor in singulos dies librarum est," &c.

"Sed etiam firmæ partes corporis ipsa vi vitæ consumuntur. Id per ipsas causas facile demonstratur; sanguis enim impetu magno cordis projectus in convexitates flexicnum vasorum, ea extendit, in reëitudinem exporrigit, deinde paulo post vasa elastica contracta in flexionem sibi innatam redeunt, id fit centies millies intra singulos dies, eo impetu ipsa adteruntur ligna, metalla: Ea ergo fricitione æquum est consumi partes corporis nostri, ex terra friabili, parum coherente et glutine compositas," &c.

"Ipsorum ossium firmitatem a resolutione lenta ea non defendere, eaque perpetuo mutari, novaque stamina in durissimis ossibus nasci, demonstrat dentium in scorbuticis morbosa turgescentia: fibrarum dentium circa glandes plumbeas (d) inflexio; dentium, quibus nullus opponitur, mira productio in homine brutisque animalibus observata. Deinde succum osseum mutari, novumque succedere veteri demonstrant sani durique ossis in carneam mollitiem degeneratio: topi venerci, a corrupto succo osseo nati: lordosis superveniens ex vitio humorum: eadem sanata per interna medicamenta: color ruber ossium animalium rubia pastorum: eorumdem color ad naturam ex mutato victu redeuns. Tandem vere decrescere ossa senum, magnorum virorum experimenta confirmant."

(d) Vide Pralect. Boerhaav. edit. Haller, tom. 3. page 715. in Not,

“Quare

same body however, I do not mean a body composed of the same particles of matter, but

“ *Quare totum corpus vivum in perpetuo statu consumptionis est. Liquidæ partes exhalant, expelluntur. Solidæ, adtritæ, in minima ramenta resolutæ, in vasorum majorum caveam, inhalentium oscula receptæ, sanguini reditæ, efficiunt terram urinæ, calculi materiem, et ossium præter naturam formatorum. Hæc consumptio maxima est in juventute, ubi omnia mollia, aquæ et glutinis plurimum, terræ parum est. Minuitur cum ætate, semper tamen aliqua superest.*”

“ The human body is composed partly of fluids, and partly of solids. That the fluids suffer a *continual waste* and change, is easily demonstrated; for their watry parts most readily and speedily pass off from the body; and the sanctorian perspiration, and the *halitus* from the lungs, amount to three or four pounds every day,” &c.

“ That the solid parts of our bodies are also *wasted and changed, vi vitæ*, is exceedingly manifest. For the blood, by the great force of the heart, is thrown into the various windings and turnings of the vessels through the whole body, which are hereby both lengthened and dilated; now these vessels, by their elastic force, immediately contract themselves, and return again to their natural state; and this action and re-action takes place near an hundred thousand times every day; which is a force sufficient to wear away the *hardest* woods or even metals; and consequently, the parts of our bodies, which are composed of friable earth and *gluten*, with a small degree of cohesion, must necessarily, by such a friction, be wasted, and *without a supply would soon be destroyed.*”

“ Even

but being of the same *human structure* and form. If any one however can give a better

“ Even the firmness of the bones does not defend them from a slow waste and change of *their component parts*; for new *stamina* arise, and grow up, in the very hardest bones, as evidently appears by the swelling of the teeth in scorbutic persons; by the shooting of the fibres of the teeth, round a leaden bullet (a specimen of which, my friend Dr. Lettsom has preserved in a large collection of valuable curiosities) and by the wonderful increase of those teeth, which have no opposites, which is sometimes observed in men and brutes.”

“ But farther, the *degeneration* of an healthy bone into a kind of fleshy softness; the venereal *tophi*; and the *lordosis*, or distortion of the bones, which are cured by internal medicines, sufficiently shew, that the nutritive juice of the bones is changed, and new bony matter succeeds in the place of the old. This is farther evident by the red colour of the bones of those animals which have been fed upon madder; whose bones, upon changing their food, return to their natural colour: and experiments also discover, that the bones of old men waste and become less.”

“ Therefore the whole living body is in a state of constant consumption and waste. The liquid parts exhale and are thrown out of the body. The solids are rubbed together, and resolved into exceeding fine *ramenta* or filaments, which are received into the cavities of the large absorbent vessels, and returned into the blood; from thence they supply the *earthy sediment* in the urine; they afford the matter of the *calculus*,

ter definition of *personal identity*, which will apply in more cases, and better avoid the difficulties of the common definition of it, I shall have no objection to receive it.

Upon the hypothesis that matter can think, man, as a *thinking intelligent being*, *calculus*, and of the bony substances sometimes formed out of the regular course of nature. This waste of the body, *and want of constant supply of nourishment*, is greatest in youth, when all the parts of the body are soft, and contain much water and *gluten*, and but little of an earthy matter. It becomes less with age, yet always continues in some degree, through the whole course of life."

"Certum est, per ipsas sanitatis actiones quotidie perire de corpore nostro liquidorum copiam, et deteri partes solidas nostri corporis."—Van Swieten. Comment. in Boerhaav. Aphorism. tom. 3. pag. 637.

After duly considering the above observations, and the authorities from whence they are taken (to which might be added many instances and experiments of a more modern date, strongly corroborating the same doctrine) I presume no one can reasonably disbelieve the change of every particle of matter in the human body, by the vital actions and motions of the system.

consists

consists only in the structure and organization of the brain and nervous system, which being dissolved at death, the man becomes extinct, and as a thinking intelligent being, has no existence. Now it is natural to be alarmed at the consequences of such a doctrine, with respect to a future life, and the *obligations* and *moral feelings* which arise from an expectation of it. To obviate these alarms, this writer lays great stress upon a *resurrection of the same man*, which he supposes will supply every defect of his hypothesis; but if it be found, that upon his principles, a resurrection of the *same man* is impossible, then all the dreaded consequences will flow in with a full tide, and totally deluge our learned author's imaginary system.

Let us proceed then for the present, *ad hominem*, that is, admitting his own principles concerning the human composition, and a resurrection of the *same body*, and enquire whether this same body would be the *same man* on these principles. “ Death,

O

“ says

“ says this writer^w, with its concomi-
 “ tant putrefaction, and dispersion of parts,
 “ is only a *decomposition*, and whatever is
 “ *decomposed*, may be *recomposed* by the
 “ being who first composed it^x, with
 “ whatever change in its constitution, ad-
 “ vantageous or disadvantageous he shall
 “ think proper; and then the powers of
 “ thinking, and whatever depended upon
 “ them, will *return of course*^y, and the
 “ man will be, in the most proper sense,
 “ *the same being that he was before.*”

We will define man at present, a *sentient thinking being, of a certain external form, and a peculiar organization and structure of parts*. I cannot think that Dr. Priestley will object to this definition, as it leaves the seat of the sentient principle wholly undetermined. But we shall find by this definition, that the *whole man* becomes absolutely *extinct* by death, and its conse-

^w Page 161.

^x Page 165.

^y It is here enquired what would be the natural result of this new raised body, without supposing any interposition of divine power.

quences; his *structure* and *external* form are *entirely destroyed*, and *sensation* and *thought*, as depending upon them, are allowed to be destroyed also; the *man* therefore *ceases to exist*; he is absolutely in the fullest sense of the word *annihilated*. If it be said that the particles of matter, of which his body was composed, have still an existence; I answer, that man is not supposed to consist of particles of matter *as such*, but of a *peculiar organization and structure*, &c. of them; but these cease to have any existence after death and putrefaction; *the man* therefore has no more existence than he had a thousand years before he was born; for though the matter exist, the man is entirely annihilated.

Let us suppose the body of Adam *decomposed* by death and putrefaction; *i. e.* all the parts of it are dissolved, and all the particles of matter of which his body was *composed*, are of course reduced to their primitive state; for nothing made these particles the body of Adam, but their structure and

organization, and this *ex hypothesi* is dissolved; they are therefore *now* no more the body of Adam (as a body) than they were before he was created; and Adam, according to our author's hypothesis, consisting of nothing but these particles thus organized, has now no more existence than he had before God said, "Let us make man after our image;" now I appeal to any man of common understanding, whether the *recomposing* these *same particles*, and making the whole man out of them, will not be as much a new creation as it was at the first; and whether this second man will not be as *distinct a being* from the first, as the first was from any other; and consequently the first Adam can have no more existence. It seems to me nothing needs be said to prove that these two creations cannot produce the *same individual being*, and especially as the *one* may exist six thousand years or more before the *other* is created.

But this will appear yet more evident; because these two persons cannot have the
same

same consciousness; and if *sameness and continuity of consciousness* constitute *personal identity*, as our author seems to suppose^z, then it will appear impossible that these two can be *one and the same being*. Now this learned writer imagines (very consistently indeed with his opinion of the materiality of the soul) that all our ideas, with every modification of thought and consciousness, are derived *ab extra*, and consequently, our ideas, our mode of thinking, and consciousness resulting from it, must depend upon external circumstances, and the objects that impress the senses. Memory likewise is nothing but a recurrence of *former* vibrations of the brain^a, whereby we perceive ideas, and feel sensations which we are *conscious* we have *before* perceived and felt. But this new constructed brain of Adam can have no disposition to vibrate as it vibrated six thousand years before, having been dissolved and dispersed all the intermediate time; this would be most extra-

^z Page 159.

^a Introd. Essays to Hartley, Essay 1st. and 2d.

vagant and unreasonable to suppose, and our daily forgetfulness of frequent occurrences fully confute it; there can therefore be no recurrence of former ideas, and of course no remembrance of them, or consciousness that they ever existed, unless he was placed in the same situation as before; and former objects should again make the same impressions upon him, which no body supposes possible: he will therefore be, on our author's own principles, just as ignorant and unconscious of former occurrences and former existence, as he was when first created and placed in paradise; and will be in his own apprehension, what I suppose him to be in reality, a quite *distinct being* from our first parent Adam.

From these considerations it appears, that if man consist only of an organized system of matter, there can be no resurrection of the same being, and consequently we have no hope, because we can have no existence after this life; a dreadful consequence indeed, and quite sufficient, in my opinion,

opinion, to overturn our learned author's whole hypothesis.

That this is a fair consequence, is extremely evident, from our author's own definition of identity: he supposes ^b a *same-ness and continuity of consciousness* necessary to constitute the *same person*. But he himself will not say, that there is a *continuity* of consciousness between the death of Adam and the general resurrection, for he everywhere supposes, that the percipient and sentient powers cease at death, and the *continuity* of *consciousness* must of course cease also; therefore Adam at the resurrection will be quite another and different person from Adam at the creation, our author himself being judge.

The doctrine of *materialism* must therefore be attended with the most destructive and fatal consequences; it supposes that this life is our only place of existence, and by this means takes away all confidence

^b Page 159.

in God, all hopes of future rewards and fear of punishment; it tears up all religion by the very roots, and renders all our moral powers and faculties wholly uselefs, or supposes them to be the mere creatures of education and human policy; in short, its language is, *Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die.*

I do not say that Dr. Priestley will directly defend these principles, or that he altogether believes them to be consequences of his doctrine; he may not see them as such; and having moral feelings, the creatures of his education, which have hitherto stood the attack of his philosophy, they may still preserve him from those dreadful consequences which his doctrine is too likely to have on the minds of those who are destitute of such a defence. Let none therefore trust to a vain philosophy; and vain indeed is that philosophy which runs counter to the sacred scriptures and the feelings of the mind; he that trusts in the vain reasoning of human wisdom; in the
airy

airy schemes of modern philosophers, will certainly be very unhappily deceived, when he finds in himself an immortal part, strong and vigorous after death.

S E C T. IV.

Of the Principles of Human Nature, according to the Scriptures.

HITHERTO our learned author has appeared as a philosopher, endeavouring, on physical principles, to overturn the common opinion of an *immaterial principle* in man, and to prove him only a *material being*; in this attempt, however, he hath sadly failed, having sometimes assumed false premises, and sometimes reasoned badly from them, so that his conclusions have been found absurd and contradictory: Let us now view him as a theologist and commentator on the sacred scriptures, so far at least, as they relate to the *constituent principles* of human nature.

Though

Though this department may appear to some more congenial to the disposition of our author, yet I doubt whether he has succeeded any better in it; so far at least as I am able to judge, he appears to me much more a stranger to the true spirit of the scriptures, than to the true mode of physical investigation; in some branches of which he has certainly merited considerable applause.

“ The history of the creation of man,
 “ says this writer, is succinctly delivered in
 “ Gen. ii. 7. *And the Lord God formed man*
 “ *of the dust of the ground, and breathed into*
 “ *his nostrils the breath of life, and man be-*
 “ *came a living soul.* We see here, that the
 “ whole man (for nothing is said of his
 “ body in particular) was made of the dust
 “ of the ground. No part of him is said to
 “ have had a higher or different original;
 “ and surely so very important a circum-
 “ stance as that of an *immaterial principle,*
 “ which could not be from the *dust,* would
 “ not have been omitted, if there had been
 “ any such a thing in the composition.

“ When the whole man was completely
 “ formed, and not before, we are next in-
 “ formed, that God made this man, who
 “ was *lifeless* at first, to *breathe* and *live*.
 “ For it evidently follows from the text,
 “ that nothing but the *circumstance* of
 “ *breathing* made the difference between
 “ the *unanimated earth* and the *living soul*.
 “ Only that substance, which was formed
 “ of *the dust of the earth*, became a *living*
 “ *soul*, that is, became *alive* by being made
 “ to *breathe*^d.”

Now supposing this text, or any other, were altogether as silent in this point, as our learned author supposes; yet it seems to me an amazing leap to the conclusion, that *organized matter* is capable of sensation and thought. What! must we from non affirmative, or even *negative premises*, proceed immediately to an *affirmative* conclusion. Surely Doctor Priestley will not seriously defend such a mode of argumentation. Nay, I will venture to say, that any per-

^d Page 114, 115.

son, the least acquainted with the rules of logic, would be ashamed of such a procedure.

But this text is not so silent as our learned author imagines; it seems to me strongly to militate against his hypothesis. If there be in man no principle of intelligence and thought distinct from matter; if there be no difference between a learned doctor and his horse, save only the organization and structure of their bodies, one would be led to suppose, that the account of their creation would have been similar. But this is far from being the case. Of the beast and living creatures, *God said, let the earth bring forth the living creatures*; here it seems the *whole* of the living creature, both *body* and *life*, came from *the earth*; but the creation of man is not thus described; here we have *two distinct sources*, from which man proceeded, and these *essentially different* from each other; his *body* from the *dust*, but his *soul* and *life* came *immediately from God*; he *breathed into his nostrils the breath of life*.

Now

Now I think we may fairly conclude, that man is composed of two principles, as *essentially different*, as the sources from whence they thus proceeded.

Our author indeed says^c, “that nothing but the circumstance of *breathing* made the difference between the *unmated earth*, and the living soul.”—That is, nothing but the motion of the lungs, or breathing the external air, came from the Almighty; but this is supposing what he ought to prove; nay, it seems much worse; it is supposing the Deity to be a man like himself, *breathing* the air, and that he breathed into the body of Adam, as a member of some humane society would puff and blow into the lungs of some unfortunate person, apparently drowned or suffocated, to bring him to *life*. A very learned commentary truly! which however, from the words of our author, seems to have been his very idea,

“Let us now, says our author, proceed to the account which the scrip-

^c Page 118.

“ tures give us of the *mortality of man*, to
 “ see whether we can find in any passage,
 “ relating to this subject, some trace of an
 “ immortal soul.”

“ Death is first threatened to man in
 “ these terms, Gen. ii. 17. *Of the tree of*
 “ *knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not*
 “ *eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest of*
 “ *it, thou shalt surely die.* Here is no ex-
 “ ception made of any part of the man that
 “ was not to die. The natural construction
 “ of the sentence imports, that whenever
 “ the decree should take place, whatever
 “ was alive belonging to man, would
 “ wholly cease to live, and become *lifeless*
 “ *earth*, as it had been originally.”

The natural import of the sentence, how-
 ever, is quite different from any thing our
 learned author seems to have an idea of.
 The truth is, the death here threatened to
 Adam had an immediate reference to a *life*
 of holy communion and fellowship with
 his maker, and of peace and harmony in
 himself.

himself. That the death here threatened was a loss of this blessed and happy state, is most evident from the consequences of his disobedience. It was said, *In the day that thou eatest of it, thou shalt surely die.* We ought here to enquire from the sacred text, what it was which *did actually die*, in the day that he did eat of the forbidden tree; now we find that nothing actually died, or ceased to live, in man, but this happy fellowship with God, and peace and purity in himself. This indeed he lost, and various *irregularities* took place in him; in consequence of which, the body tended to diseases and death.

It is also said, *Dust thou art, and to dust thou shalt return*; but that this relates only to his body tending to dissolution, as above-mentioned, is plain; for nothing could return to dust, but what had been taken from the dust, and this we have seen above was only the body; this text therefore has nothing to do with the *natural mortality*, or *immortality* of the soul.

I shall

I shall not enter into a particular discussion of all the texts of scripture which our author has quoted; it is not necessary. We have already seen, from the best authority, in the account of the creation of man, that he consists of two *distinct* and *essentially different* principles; all the scriptures of the Old Testament, therefore, must be interpreted in harmony with this account, and conformably to the *latter* and *more express* declarations of the New Testament; and this interpretation they will also easily bear: I shall therefore, for the sake of brevity, proceed to consider how our author manages the express declarations of Jesus Christ and his apostles upon this head.

“ Our Saviour indeed, says he, seems to use
 “ the term soul, as expressive of something
 “ distinct from the body; but if he did
 “ (which however is not certain) he might
 “ do it in compliance with the prevailing
 “ opinion of the times; in the same man-
 “ ner as he applies the term *possessed of dæ-*
 “ *mons* to madmen, and even speaks to mad-
 “ men as if they were actuated by evil
 Q spirits,

“ spirits, though he certainly did not believe the existence of such dæmons. He says however, Mat. x. 28. *Fear not them who kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him who is able to destroy both soul and body in hell.*”

I cannot indeed help owning that I read the introduction to this passage of sacred scripture, with much astonishment and some emotion of mind; I was really shocked at the boldness (I might give it a much more proper name) of this writer; but when I considered that there are men who, with all the impotence of human reasoning, dare deprive the Lord of life, of his most essential titles, and reduce him to the state of a feeble man like themselves; I did not so much wonder, that these same persons should represent him as *disguising* the truth, and teaching falsehood in compliance with the *opinions of the times*: nay, I should not wonder, after the above declaration, to hear this learned gentleman,

armed cap-à-pié with logic and philosophy, represent his Lord and Saviour as a greater deceiver than Mahomet. To such miserable and profane shifts may vain reasoning bring an unguarded man. Our Lord's declaration, however, so strongly implies that there is a soul in man *distinct from the body*, that no art of man will ever be able to overturn it; and the words themselves are so express and clear, that nothing needs be added to them.

Our author is not more ceremonious to Paul, than he has been to his master; on whom he comments thus. “Also when
 “ the Apostle Paul, 1 Theff. v. 23. says,
 “ *I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and*
 “ *body be preserved blameless, until the coming*
 “ *of our Lord Jesus Christ*; he only uses
 “ these terms as denoting, in the philosophy
 “ of his time (which had spread even
 “ among the Jews) all that constituted a
 “ *complete man*, without hinting at a possi-
 “ bility of any separation of the several
 “ parts^f.”

^f Page 130.

It must be owned that our author shews no great delicacy respecting the characters of the sacred pen-men; he very freely, though indirectly, bespatters them with dirt, from whence one might naturally suspect that he owes them no very good will. However, not to indulge suspicions, we may observe, it is no great compliment to represent writings, received as dictated by the spirit of *truth*, as teaching the vain philosophy and uncertain doctrines of men. But our author is not very consistent with himself in this matter; in *one place* he tells us, that the philosophy of the heathens was diametrically opposite to *revelation*; in *another*, that Paul teaching the doctrines of *christianity*, conveyed them in the language and sentiments of this philosophy; and yet in another place he tells us, that this same Paul must certainly be allowed to have understood christianity, and would not slightly under-value any proper support of its doctrines^z: now to make these things

^z Page 131.

properly agree with one another, I think, requires the abilities of Doctor Priestley.

But our author's suggestion, that Paul used terms according to the sense of the vain philosophy of his time, and thus adulterated christianity, is without any foundation of truth; for this same Paul writes thus, 1 Cor. i. 19, 20. *It is written, I will destroy the wisdom of the wise, and will bring to nothing the understanding of the prudent. Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?* And again, Col. ii. 8. *Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.* Now is there the least degree of probability, that Paul, after these very express declarations of the vanity of their philosophy, after he had warned others not to meddle with it, is it probable that he should, in a most solemn christian prayer, make use of this philosophy so displeasing to God, and knowing it too to be false? It seems to me that no man, who believes the apostle Paul had

had the least degree of sincerity, can possibly admit of such a supposition. And indeed suggestions of this kind, from one who professes to believe the gospel, looks so much like a feigned friendship, in order to deliver it more securely into the hands of deists, that it will not fail to recall to memory the treatment of our Lord, by one of his professed disciples ; to which, with respect to the gospel revelation, it bears a striking resemblance.—We ought therefore to conclude, that this servant of Christ both believed, and in this passage was directed by the spirit of truth to teach, that there is in man a principle *essentially different* from his body.

“ A passage, says this writer, in the book
 “ of revelation, may also be interpreted in
 “ a manner equally favourable to this doc-
 “ trine: We read, Rev. xx. 4. *I saw under*
 “ *the altar the souls of them that were behead-*
 “ *ed for the witness of Jesus, and for the word*
 “ *of God, &c. and they lived and reigned*
 “ *with Christ a thousand years. But the*
 “ rest

“ *rest of the dead lived not again till the thousand years were ended.* It is plain therefore, that he saw them not as *unembodied souls*, but as *living men* after a real resurrection, and therefore he did not see the *rest of the dead souls* at all; for being *dead*, they had no *souls* or *lives*.^h”

Truly I should have wondered if he had seen *dead souls*; this would have been very extraordinary indeed.—Nor is this writer’s mode of interpreting the scripture much less so. Our author, it seems, did not know how to dispose of the souls said to be under the altar; their situation did not well suit with his hypothesis. He therefore takes the liberty to remove the account of them from Rev. vi. 9. to chapter 20. and there connects them with a very different context, and then tells us they were not seen as “*unembodied souls*, but as *living men* after a real resurrection.” Now by such a mode of interpretation, we may strain

^h Page 131.

and force the scripture to speak whatever we please. Nor is there the least hint any where to be found, that these souls under the altar were then seen, as Dr. Priestley pretends, after a resurrection of their bodies. And I cannot think but the Doctor himself, upon reviewing the matter, will acknowledge that some apology is necessary for the great injury done the sacred writings, and for the imposition put upon his reader, by taking such an unprecedented liberty of removing a passage of scripture fourteen chapters forward, to make it favour an unscriptural hypothesis. And if this be the method wherein this, and other passages of scripture, must be interpreted to favour the doctrine of the *materiality* and *mortality* of the soul, I think it sufficiently proves the doctrine to be anti-scriptural and false: or if such a liberty of interpretation be allowed, there is an end of all scripture authority at once; which, perhaps, would not be very disagreeable to this writer.

There

There are many other passages in the New Testament, which are full in point against our learned author's doctrine, and which he has not chosen to encounter; these I shall now lay before the reader, who will easily judge from them, what credit he ought to give to the doctrine of the *natural mortality* of the soul.

We have already found, that both our Lord and the apostles spake of the soul as something *separate* and *distinct* from the body, nay, even as existing independent of it; now if it shall appear from other texts to be the uniform doctrine of scripture, that man has an existence as a conscious intelligent being, in a state of separation from the body, and that the dissolution of the body makes no interruption in this state of conscious existence; I presume no one will hesitate to condemn our author's doctrine as anti-scriptural (which supposes the soul to be only the result of the organization of the body, and so dies with it) and this I think is very evident, from the following

R lowing

lowing passages. Phil. i. 23, 24. *I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ, which is far better. Nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you.* It is very clear from these words, that the apostle Paul had not the least idea of Dr. Priestley's doctrine of the soul; he expected to be with Christ as soon as he departed out of this world; his soul must therefore live and be happy in a separate state from the body. Had he believed that consciousness, thought, and every sensation of his mind, depended on the structure of his body, and that when this was dissolved by death, he could have no more existence in any part of the creation, as an intelligent conscious being, than he had before he was born, he would not have called *this* a being with Christ; nor could he have thought it more desirable than labouring in the church of God. Nay, he speaks of being with Christ as a distinct mode of existence from living in the body, and opposes it to being in the flesh. He seems to consider the body therefore,

therefore, only as a *medium*, whereby some *distinct intelligent substance* lives and acts in this world, and converses with objects suitable to that medium; and that when this medium is dropt, or becomes unfit for its designed use, we shall then still live and act, and have knowledge, only after a different manner, which was much more desirable to him.

2 Cor. v. 8. *We are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord.*

Is it possible for any words more strongly to set forth a separate state of existence from the body than these do? And is it not undeniable from hence, that the whole man does not die with the body, or become extinct at death? And consequently, man is not composed of one homogeneous substance.

Rev. xix. 10. *And I fell at his feet to worship him; and he said unto me, See thou do it not; I am thy fellow servant, and of thy*

brethren that have the testimony of Jesus: worship God.

2 Cor. xii. 2. *I knew a man in Christ, above fourteen years ago (whether in the body, I cannot tell, or whether out of the body, I cannot tell, God knoweth) such an one caught up to the third heaven.*

Our Saviour also, speaking to the thief on the cross, says, Luke xxiii. 43. *Verily I say unto thee, to-day shalt thou be with me in paradise.*

The greek word Παράδεισος occurs only three times throughout the New Testament, viz. in the place here cited, 2 Cor. xii. 4, and Rev. ii. 7. In comparing these places it appears, that the word properly signifies the place or state of faithful souls, into which they immediately enter on the dissolution of the body; where, like Adam in *Eden*, they enjoy *immediate communion* with God through Christ; and in this happy place, the thief was to be with Christ on

on the day their bodies died, and consequently their souls did not die with their bodies.

Our blessed Lord likewise tells us, Luke xvi. 23, *et seq.* in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, that Dives in hell saw Lazarus in Abraham's bosom; now this must certainly imply, that both the one and the other existed in a state of separation from the body, which was dissolved and corrupted; which totally overthrows our author's doctrine.

If it be said that this is only a parable, and therefore can give no proof of any such thing; I answer, we can never suppose that our Lord would draw his parables from principles that were *false* and *impossible* in nature, and which would tend to mislead his hearers in points of importance such as this: he who can think Christ capable of doing this, may suppose him capable of doing any thing else, which the ignorance and folly of men may impute unto him.

Again,

Again, Mark xii. 26, 27. *Have ye not read in the book of Moses, how in the bush God spake unto him, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? He is not the God of the dead, but of the living.* It appears then, that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are *actually* alive, though their bodies are not raised from the grave; and therefore, man's soul does not die with his body.

Acts vii. 59. *And they stoned Stephen, calling upon God, and saying, Lord Jesus receive my spirit.*

This holy martyr earnestly prays that the Lord Jesus would receive his spirit *immediately*, when set at liberty from the body. He does not pray to be brought into being again at some very distant period, but evidently prays and expects to be with his Lord and Master immediately on the death of his body; which is the true characteristic of a pious mind, and fully confutes the imagination of a death of soul and body together.

S E C T.

S E C T. V.

Of the Union of Soul and Body, and of
their Mutual Affections.

P A R T I.

Of the Relation which an immaterial
Spirit may be said to have to Place
and Body.

IT appears from the preceding considerations and arguments, that matter is possessed of no properties whereby it is capable of sensation and thought; nay, the very supposition that matter may think, involves in it many contradictions and absurdities; we must therefore have recourse to an *immaterial principle* in human nature, as a subject of these powers and properties we deem mental.

Having

Having arrived at this very important conclusion, I might, agreeable to my first intention, conclude my observations on Dr. Priestley's *Disquisitions on matter and spirit*; but as he, with other materialists, seems to triumph in the difficulties of conceiving how a being can exist, which has no relation to place and body, and how it can act upon body, with which it can have no contact; I thought it might not be amiss to offer a few considerations on these subjects, which, though in themselves difficult, may probably be made to appear more rational and easy, than the opinions our author is obliged to adopt on the supposition of materialism.

“ A spirit then, says this writer¹, or
 “ an *immaterial substance*, in the modern
 “ strict use of the term, signifies a sub-
 “ stance that has no *extension* of any kind, nor
 “ any thing of the *vis inertiae* that belongs to
 “ matter. It has neither *length*, *breadth*, nor
 “ *thickness*, so that it occupies no portion of
 “ space. In fact, therefore, *spirit* and *space*

¹ Page 54.

“ have nothing to do with one another; and
 “ it is even improper to say, that an imma-
 “ terial being *exists* in *space*, or that it *resides*
 “ in one place more than in another; for,
 “ properly speaking, it is *no where*^k. It
 “ follows from this view of the subject, that
 “ the *divine mind* can only be said to be
 “ *omnipresent* by way of figure; for, strictly
 “ speaking, this term implies *extension*, of
 “ which all immaterial substances are ut-
 “ terly incapable. By the omnipresence
 “ of the Deity therefore, they mean his
 “ power of *acting* every *where*, though he
 “ *exists no where*.”

“ Appearances (continues this writer)
 “ cannot be said to favour the doctrine of
 “ these very abstract metaphysicians; for
 “ certainly, judging by what appears to
 “ us, we should naturally say that the soul
 “ *accompanies the body*, and is contained in
 “ it, and therefore changes place together
 “ with the body.”

^k We shall see below in what sense this may be admitted as true.

This learned writer, by playing on the words, “*is no where,*” and “*exists no where,*” seems desirous of conveying an idea, that if a spirit have not proximity to body, in the manner that one body has to another, it can have no existence in any sense whatever. But this is taking for granted (what indeed will not be granted him) the thing which he ought to prove. It is supposing that nothing but matter or body can have any existence; for whatever has proximity to any body, may have a nearer and nearer proximity, till at last it will come into *actual contact*; but nothing, except body, can come into contact with body; and as *spirit* is not body, it may consequently exist without any proximity or relation to body, in any *sense* wherein that term is applied to bodies. It is indeed a very antient maxim, *quod nullibi est, non est*, viz. That which is no where has no being. But this axiom cannot be admitted, till it has been proved by some sufficient argument, that *immaterial beings* can have no existence; for as it is taken from the world
of

of sense and matter, it can only be true of material bodies; an immaterial spirit, therefore, may have a real existence, and yet have no *proper place*, i. e. *be no where*, or take up no dimensions of space, as body does.

It is certain that our words and forms of speech are only adapted, in a literal sense, to corporeal and sensible objects, which exist round about us, and which require a *proper place* to exist in; and this indeed must be the case, while our thoughts and ideas are connected with corporeal organs, as in our present mode of existence. And having in our infancy been accustomed to conceive and talk of spirits in the language and phrases belonging to bodies, when we grow up and become learned, we are ready to imagine that they must *exist* and *act* in the same corporeal manner in which we have been childishly used to speak of them: but this is certainly a very improper mode of *philosophizing*, and would not be admitted in any other case whatever.

To say that a separate spirit, or thinking substance, which has no vehicle, must take up a certain portion or dimension of space, as a body does, is to say in fact that it is a body, and that it has *length*, *breadth* and *thickness*; for whatever has dimensions, must have some figure or form: but can any one conceive how extension and figure can make thought? Besides, if a spirit have length and breadth, commensurate with the compound body it may occupy, it may be divided into parts, together with it, and then I would ask whether as many distinct spirits would arise from this division, as there are divisible parts? and if a spirit should be split into one hundred pieces, I would be glad to know whether each separate piece would retain a separate consciousness of its own existence; or whether the consciousness of the whole spirit would be retained by any one part, and to which part it would belong; or, lastly, whether the consciousness of the whole would be hereby destroyed; and then I would ask what it is which still remains?

Again,

Again, if a *spirit* be said to be *in a place*, as a body is, and to bear relation to other bodies, then it might be brought nearer and nearer, till it touch them; and this contact would produce collision and resistance, and thus a spirit might receive jogs and interruptions from matter, which is contrary to the most vulgar idea of a spirit.

But though a spirit cannot be said to be *in a place*, as body is, nor have relation to bodies in the *manner* above explained, yet there is a sense, in which it may properly be said that a spirit is *in one place* rather than another, and in which it may bear a relation to some bodies, though it do not to others. For example; a *spirit* may be said to be, even among bodies, where it *exerts* an immediate *active force*; or where it receives a *consciousness* of the motions and other affections of any body. Thus my soul or spirit may be said to be *in my body*, because it exerts an active force upon it; and can move various parts of it, or the whole at pleasure; it likewise is *conscious*
of

of the many changes that happen in it, and of the impressions that other bodies make upon it. By means of the body, my spirit *becomes acquainted* with the situation, condition, and circumstances of other surrounding bodies; and in short, by this one body, it converses with this world, and becomes an active important agent, capable of doing much good or much harm, among corporeal beings.

Hence it appears, that my soul may be said to *move* when my body moves, and to *dwell* where my body dwells, because the same *consciousness* and *active power accompany* the body in all its changes.

Hence also we may learn what credit we ought to give to what this learned writer has jocosely said upon this point, where, speaking of spirit not occupying, nor bearing any relation to, space, he adds, “ infomuch that my mind, on this supposition, is no more *in my body*, than it “ is in the moon.¹”

¹ Introd. to Hartley, pag. xx.

Now I am afraid the doctor has here made a mistake, otherwise we shall certainly have some very curious astronomical observations from so able a philosopher, in so elevated a situation. For, doubtless, the doctor's mind may be *in his body* (even on the supposition of two distinct substances in man) in the manner above described, viz. by a power of *consciousness*, whereby he feels and knows what happens to many parts of it; and likewise becomes acquainted by this presence in it, with the situation and state of surrounding bodies; it may likewise very properly be said, that his mind is *in his body*, by an active authoritative power, whereby he moves any of its members, or the whole body, as he pleases; but I can hardly think that our learned author has so intimate a knowledge as this, of what passes in the moon; or so extensive an authority on that watry planet; at least did the world believe this, I am persuaded they would have considerable expectations from his acknowledged abilities and inclination, to make the best use of every opportunity for the improvement of knowledge.

Upon

Upon the same principles we may explain the *omnipresence* of God; (not by extension, though all bodies, as this writer seems to believe, which, is an idea so gross, that it deserves a name, which, for the sake of its author, I shall not bestow upon it). For, “ In the same sense, says Doctor “ Watts^m, in which we say, *my soul or* “ *my spirit is in my body*, we may say also “ concerning the great God, the Infinite “ Spirit, that he is present *every where*, i. e. “ he is immediately conscious of every pro- “ perty, figure and motion, of every part “ of matter in the universe, and of every “ thought of every created mind. His “ will hath an actual agency on every “ created being, at least so far as to main- “ tain and support them in their nature “ and existence, and he has an immediate “ and unlimited power of acting upon “ every part of matter, and upon every “ created spirit; and therefore God is said “ to be *omnipresent*, or *present with all* “ *things*, even as my soul, which hath a

^m Philosophical Essays, Page 168.

“ limited

“ limited consciousness of several of the
 “ motions and impressions caused in this
 “ my animal body, and a limited power
 “ of agency upon it, is said to be *present*
 “ *with my body.*”

Can we have a more noble and striking idea of a general and particular Providence than this? That the Deity should be more conscious, and have a more perfect knowledge of the thoughts of every spirit, and of the motions and situations of every particle of matter than we can have of what happens to our own bodies: What confidence ought this to give to a pious mind? and how awfully ought it to affect the profane and thoughtless?

P A R T II.

Of the Union of Soul and Body, and of their mutual Actions and Affections.

IT will readily be granted that this immaterial spirit, such as the thinking conscious part of man must be, has not in his own nature, or merely of itself, any power to affect matter, or to be affected by it; they are so essentially different from one another, that no fellowship or mutual communication can take place from any natural powers that either of them separately possesseth. We have already seen that spirit cannot come into contact with body; the voluntary actions therefore, which take place in an animal body, at the pleasure of the mind or soul, are not performed by mutual contact, but arise in consequence

consequence of *one great law* of our nature, to which these two particular substances are, in certain circumstances, subjected.

By this *same law of our nature*, or *positive appointment* of the Deity, the spirit becomes conscious of certain motions of the body, of the impressions surrounding bodies make upon it, and receives sensations and ideas in consequence of them. It is the great Creator who, of his own pleasure and will, has given my soul this animal machine, from which to receive sensations, ideas, and a knowledge of this world; and in which to excite motions and perform actions. The mutual influences and affections, therefore, of body and soul, can only take place in consequence of a law of our nature, which the Deity established in the creation of man^k.

Though

^k That these mutual affections and corresponding motions take place in the human composition, by means of the *nervous system*, is universally allowed; the study of this curious and wonderful part of the human body, must therefore afford both instruction and pleasure to the diligent enquirer into

Though this doctrine of the union of soul and body seems to me both rational and easy of conception, yet this writer sees such difficulties in it, that he does not scruple to declare it impossible to be true. “ Let a man, says he, torture his
 “ imagination as much as he pleases, I will
 “ pronounce it to be impossible for him to
 “ conceive, even the possibility of *mutual*
 “ *action*, without some *common property*, by
 “ means of which, things that *act* and
 “ *re-act* upon each other, may have some
 “ *connection*. A substance that is hard may
 “ act upon, and be acted upon by another

nature. It is even particularly necessary to the physician, who, without a knowledge of the *laws and powers* which obtain in the nerves and brain, in respect of the other parts of the body, will have but a very imperfect knowledge of the animal œconomy, the proximate causes of diseases, and the operation of medicines. In a medical view however, the celebrated Dr. Cullen has opened the way to a knowledge of this very important part of the human body, in his lectures to his medical students, which, if they should be published, either by the Doctor himself, or by any prudent and skilful person, posterity will not fail to give him that tribute of praise, which his genius and labours undoubtedly merit,

“ hard

“ hard substance; or even one that is *soft*,
 “ which, in fact, is only relatively less
 “ hard; but it is certainly impossible that
 “ it should affect, or be affected by a sub-
 “ stance that can make *no resistance at all*,
 “ and especially a kind of substance that
 “ cannot, with any propriety of speech, be
 “ said to be even in the same place with it.
 “ If this be not an *impossibility*, I really do
 “ not know what is so.”

Our author here seems very confident; his confidence however is but ill founded. His argument indeed is of force, when applied to bodies which cannot act without connection and *contact*; but when applied to spirits, it can have no more effect, than (as Dr. Watt's speaks) a cannon ball among an army of angels.

This argument is a mere *petitio principii*; for it supposes throughout, that an *immaterial being*, even the Deity himself, can have no mode of acting upon other beings, different from the action of matter, viz. by
local

local existence and *contact*; but this our author ought to have proved, *before* he had reasoned from it as true, in the real nature of things. And is it not most extraordinary, that this writer should talk in this peremptory authoritative manner, against a mode of action in immaterial beings, even the Deity himself, which in other places he allows even to matter? He supposes *repulsion* to be an essential property of matter, which he describes as acting thus.

“ Resistance is never occasioned by solid
 “ matter, but by *a power of repulsion*, al-
 “ ways ACTING AT A REAL DISTANCE
 “ from what we call the body itself¹.
 “ When I press my hand against the table,
 “ I naturally imagine, that the obstacle to
 “ its going through the table, is the solid
 “ matter of which it consists; but a variety
 “ of philosophical considerations demon-
 “ strate, that it generally requires a much
 “ greater power of pressure than I can ex-
 “ ert, to bring my fingers into actual con-

¹ Page 4.

“ tact with the table. Philosophers know,
 “ that notwithstanding their seeming con-
 “ tact, they are actually kept at a *real dif-*
 “ *tance* from each other, by *powers* of re-
 “ pulsion common to them both. Also
 “ electrical appearances shew, that a con-
 “ siderable weight is requisite to bring into
 “ contact, even links of a chain hanging
 “ freely in the air; they being kept *asunder*
 “ by a repulsive power belonging to a very
 “ small surface, so that they do *not actually*
 “ *touch*, though they are supported by each
 “ other^m.”

“ It has been demonstrated by Sir Isaac
 “ Newton, that the rays of light are al-
 “ ways reflected by a *power of repulsion*,
 “ *acting at some distance* from the bodyⁿ.”

Now this writer, by supposing this
 power of repulsion to be essential to the
 nature of matter, manifestly supposes it to
act even where it is not, and also to influ-
 ence another body, without any *connection*

^m Page 12.

ⁿ Page 14.

or *contact*. But I must leave others to find out the reason why Doctor Priestley ascribes a power to *matter*, which he denies even the Deity, or any *immaterial being* to be possessed of.

For my own part, I freely confess, that I can see no more difficulty in conceiving how an organized body may follow the motions of an immaterial spirit *without any contact*; than how certain portions of matter may follow each other's motions *without contact*, by a power of attraction and the adhesion of parts; and it seems to me quite as difficult also to explain, how rays of light should reflect regularly from a surface, which they never touch. Nay, I think that the existence of the one, is an undeniable proof that the other *may* exist also. Now the facts themselves, no philosopher (Doctor Priestley observes) will pretend to deny; but no one has yet been able to account for these phænomena, by any known essential properties of matter, they must therefore arise from the agency
of

of the Deity, acting according to some fixed and stated law, which he himself has appointed at the creation; but if a law or *positive appointment* of the Deity can effect this in the one case, it may be much better supposed to do it in the other; and thus the very phænomena of nature will establish the *mutual influences* of soul and body, without any *corporeal connection* or *contact*.

S E C T. VI.

Of the Opinion of the Antients, respecting the Nature of the Soul.

I DID not intend to have entered into an enquiry concerning the opinion of the antient fathers, respecting the nature of the soul; but as it appeared to me, upon slightly considering the subject, that this learned writer has done great injustice, both to the Christian fathers, and also to his reader, in representing their opinions on this head, I thought it would not be disagreeable nor improper to give a very brief, but more impartial representation of the matter.

The reader, however, will do well to remember, that neither the present nor foregoing

going section do *immediately* affect the point in debate, viz. whether matter can think? I shall therefore not look upon any objections or difficulties, which may arise from any thing said in either of them, of sufficient importance to deserve any reply.

Yet nothing would be more easy than to shew, that the Christian fathers had not the least idea of our author's notion of an human soul; for they uniformly assert the existence of the soul, separate and independent of the body; but had they believed, with our learned author, that all our mental powers are the result of an organized system of matter, or that man is composed of one homogeneous substance, they must unavoidably have seen, that such an independent state of existence would be impossible.

This writer seems to me, in his history of antient opinions concerning the soul, to have kept the subject in debate altogether out of sight, and to have amused his reader

with subjects totally foreign to his professed design. For the thing he proposes to prove is, that the *Christian fathers* believed with him, that the *soul* can have no existence separate from the body; that thought and consciousness may be the result of an organized system of *matter*. Now to prove this, he ought to have produced passages from their writings *directly asserting this doctrine*; but instead of this, he amuses the reader with some different opinions concerning the *origin* of the soul, and its manner of existing in the body, &c. which quotations are so far from being to his purpose, that they prove just the contrary of what he intended; for these very controversies sufficiently evince, that they believed the soul and body to be two distinct and independent principles.

It has already been observed, that our language and forms of speech are literally adapted to *corporeal objects*; we have therefore no words, which, in their literal signification, can be applied to the nature or
mode

mode of an *immaterial spirit*, and of course we can only speak of them by way of *metaphor* or *analogy*; it is therefore very unjustifiable to apply words in their literal meaning, which were intended only in a metaphorical or analogical sense; for by the same mode of criticism we might pretend to prove that all the moderns, as well as the ancients, believe both the Deity and human souls to be *material*, which, however, would be a most unjust conclusion.

But to set this matter in a just light, let us first consider what our author intends to prove from the writings of the fathers; and secondly, whether his quotations are sufficient to prove it.

The thing to be proved is, that the fathers believed that the soul of man is not a distinct principle from his body, but that when the body dies, the soul ceases to live also; the whole man being composed of one homogeneous *substance*.

“ A substance,

“ A substance, says he °, without exten-
 “ sion or relation to place, being un-
 “ known both in the scriptures, and to *all*
 “ *antiquity*.—The opinion of the mortality
 “ of the thinking part of man is thought
 “ by some to be unfavourable to morality
 “ and religion, but without the least reason.”
 For^p “ the common opinion of the soul
 “ of man *surviving the body* was introduced
 “ into Christianity from the Oriental and
 “ Greek philosophy; it was discarded by
 “ Luther, and many other reformers in
 “ England and abroad.—Now, can it be
 “ supposed that the apostles, the primitive
 “ fathers, and modern reformers, *should all*
 “ *adopt an opinion* unfavourable to mora-
 “ lity?” And again^q, “ It was unques-
 “ tionably the opinion of the apostles and
 “ early Christians, that whatever be the
 “ nature of the soul, *its percipient and think-*
 “ *ing powers* cease at death.”

To make good these assertions, our author first gives us the opinions of the Chris-

° Introduction, pag. 38.

p Page 156.

q Page 224.

tian fathers concerning the soul to the sixth century^r; when he tells us, that “ We find nothing said by any Christian “ writer concerning the soul before Justin “ Martyr, who had been a Platonic philo- “ sopher, and who, using their language, “ spake of souls as emanations from the “ Deity.”

Perhaps the fathers before Justin Martyr did not believe that Christians had any souls, as they said nothing about them; but, lest any one should draw this very natural inference from this account of their silence, I must inform the reader, that our learned author is quite mistaken in his account of them. For Polycarp, Clemens Romanus, and Ignatius, are more antient writers than Justin, the two latter being cotemporary^s with the apostles Peter and Paul,

^r Page 104.

^s Clemens Romanus was Bishop of Rome, and about the year 98, was condemned by Trajan to dig in the mines in *Taurica Chersonesus*. He suffered about the year of our Lord 100.

Paul, and the former with the apostle John, and they all mention the soul; nay, they mention it in such a manner, as totally overthrows our author's doctrine; thus they speak of the *place* and *state* of the souls of the righteous after death^t. Paul and the rest of the apostles, saith^u Polycarp, are in the place appointed for them, *παρεστω Κυριω* with the Lord. Now we see that these

Ignatius was Bishop of Antioch; he was torn to pieces by lions at Rome, by the order of Trajan, about the year 107.

Polycarp was Bishop of Smyrna; he wrote his epistle to the Philippians in the year 108, about five years after Justin Martyr was born, and was burnt at Smyrna in the year of our Lord 166, under the reign of Marcus Aurelius.

^t Locuti sunt beati martyres Polycarpus Clemens Romanus, Ignatius, de loco et statu sanctorum ex hac vita exeuntium; non mox in summum cœlum et visionem beatificam recipiendos esse, aiunt, sed *εις τόπον αυτοῖς ὀφειλομενον*, ita Polycarpus, *in locum iis debitum vel proprium*: vel *εις τον ἅγιον τόπον* ut de Paulo Clemens Romanus, &c. Burnet. de Statu Mortuorum, pag. 66.

^u *Εἰς το ὀφειλόμενον αυτοῖς τόπον εἰσι παρεστω Κυριω* Epist. ad Philip. Sect. 9. See Whitby on the New Test. vol. 2. pag. 219.

antient fathers, who were cotemporary with the apostles, not only mention the soul, but speak of it as existing in a state of happiness, separate and independent of the body, in direct contradiction to what this writer has so confidently, but erroneously asserted concerning them.

After Irenæus, says this author, “ We find that the doctrine of a direct *materialism* crept into the church.” So now we find that *materialism* was not got into the church before Irenæus’s time, though we have been told before, that the very apostles themselves held it; nay, it was only creeping into the church after the time of Irenæus, and its motion has been so very slow, that I believe it has never got fairly in, to this very day: how far Doctor Priestley’s authority may now prevail, I cannot say.

“ The most determined materialist in Christian antiquity, is Tertullian, who

” Page 205.

X

“ wrote

“ wrote his treatise *De Anima*, on purpose,
 “ to explode the philosophical opinion of
 “ the *descent of the soul from heaven*.”

It must indeed be owned, that Tertullian supposed the soul to be *material*, and the present state of philosophical knowledge clearly shews, that if *material*, it must be mortal; but Tertullian did not see, nor hold this consequence of his doctrine; he believed the soul to be immortal, and that it might exist *independent* of the body. He^x classes the doctrine of the *mortality* of the soul among the opinions of those who gave rise to heresies: he denied the soul to have any increase or decrease in its substance, lest it should be supposed liable to perish^y: for the same reason he denied that the soul receives any nourishment^z.

^x Lib. de anim. cap. 5.

^y Cæterum animam substantia crescere negandum est, ne etiam decrescere substantia dicatur, atq; ita et defectura credatur. cap. 37.

^z Auferenda est Argumentatoris occasio, qui, quod anima desiderare videatur alimenta, hinc quoq; mortalem eam intelligi cupit, &c. cap. 38.

How unjust then is it to represent a man to the world, as the greatest champion for a doctrine which he so fully denies?

“ Origen says it was not determined by
 “ the church, whether a soul was produced
 “ by another soul; whether it be eternal,
 “ or created for a certain time; whether
 “ it animates the body, or is only confined
 “ in it. But himself being a Platonist, held
 “ that souls had been *from eternity*; that
 “ they are sent into bodies as into a prison,
 “ for the punishment of their sins^a.”—But
 if Origen believed that souls had been *from
 eternity*, and were sent into bodies as a
 punishment for sins before committed,
 how could he believe “ that its *percipient*
 “ and *thinking* powers *cease* at death, and
 “ so depend on the life of the body?”

“ Among the latter fathers, we find
 “ three opinions relating to the origin of
 “ the soul. First, that souls were created
 “ when the body was ready to receive them;

^a Page 206.

“ another, that they came from God, and
 “ are inclosed in the male seed; another,
 “ that the first soul, viz. that of Adam,
 “ was made of nothing, and that all the
 “ rest came from this by ordinary genera-
 “ tion. It was to this opinion that Austin
 “ inclined^b.” This, however, will not ap-
 ply in favour of our author’s doctrine.

“ Claudianus Mamertus, a priest of the
 “ church of Vienne, says, that every thing
 “ that is *incorporeal*, is not uncreated; that
 “ the volitions of the soul have their *effect*
 “ in place, but are not *made* in place; that
 “ it has neither length, breadth, nor
 “ height; that it is not moved upwards
 “ nor downwards, or in a circle; that it
 “ has neither inward nor outward parts;
 “ that it thinks, perceives, and imagines in
 “ *all its substance*; that we may speak of the
 “ *quality* of the soul, but no man knows
 “ how to express the *quantity* of it. It is
 “ neither *extended* nor *in place*.”—These
 seem to me most extraordinary assertions,

^b Page 207.

to prove that the soul is *material*, and dies with the body; it requires more skill in logic, than I am master of, to find this conclusion in either of the premises.

Such is the substance of our author's history of opinions to the sixth century; from whence he proceeds to the time of Descartes, who flourished in the beginning of the last century. Now here he confesses^c, that the nearer he approaches to the age of the school-men, the less he finds of *materialism*. If then we recollect, that after the time of Irenæus it was only able to creep, and that in the intermediate time, between Irenæus and the school-men, we have not been able to find the least trace of a strict and proper materialism, we may very confidently conclude, that it has never yet been able to stand up and walk; and consequently our author's grand boast, that the apostles and primitive fathers thought, with him, that the soul is material and mortal, vanishes into air, where perhaps this experienced

^c Page 213.

philosopher may be able to make more of it than we can do in these lower regions.

To be serious: I can attribute our author's positive assertions without any evidence, to nothing more innocent than an overfondness for a favourite and novel opinion, which has so intoxicated him, that he has not given himself time duly to consider the doctrine of materialism in all its parts; nor attentively examined what others have said upon it; but as this learned writer neither wants abilities natural or acquired, I persuade myself, that upon reflection, he will enter into a more full enquiry concerning it, and proceed upon better grounds than hitherto he appears to have done.

Nothing would be more easy than to bring large evidence from the writings of the antients against our author's positive assertions. This, however, the prescribed limits of my work will not admit of; I shall, notwithstanding, produce a few passages

passages from *Lactantius*, an approved Christian writer, who lived in the latter end of the third, and beginning of the fourth century, which will be sufficient to inform us what the more antient fathers believed, respecting the immortality of the soul.

It appears, says he, that the soul does not perish, nor is dissolved, but endureth for ever^d. He therefore could not believe that the soul perishes with the dissolution of the body.

That part of us, *which came from the earth, returns to the earth; but that which God breathed into us, remains and lives strong and vigorous for ever, because the Divine Spirit, from whence it proceeded, is eternal*^e.

^d Apparet animam non interire, neque dissolvi, sed manere in sempiternum. Lib. 7. Sect. 8.

^e Quod ex terra fuit, in terram resolvitur; quod ex cœlesti spiritu; id constat ac viget semper, quoniam divinus spiritus sempiternus est. lib. 7. sect. 12.

Therefore

Therefore the soul, which is not corruptible, endures for ever, because the origin of it is eternal^f.

Here he supposes man to be composed of two distinct and different substances; that these proceeded from two very different sources, and consequently, that the one (the soul) can exist independent of the body.

He did not believe that the soul could be destroyed by torments : *For, says he, the soul cannot wholly perish, because it has its origin from the spirit of God*^g. And for this reason he believed the punishments of the wicked would be eternal. *For as the life of the soul is eternal, in which it enjoys divine and unspeakable happiness; so also the death of it, (meaning the punishment of the wick-*

^f Ergo anima, quæ fragilis non est, in æternum manet; quoniam origo ejus æterna est. *ibid.*

^g Nam interire profus anima non potest; quoniam ex Dei Spiritu, qui est æternus, originem cepit. *lib. 7. sect. 12.*

ed, which is called a death or deprivation of divine life) *must also be eternal, in which it suffers eternal torments* ^h.

I presume I need not proceed any farther in this enquiry, it being no difficult matter to judge, from what has already been said, what credit we ought to give to Dr. Priestley's account of this matter.

^h Sicut vita animæ sempiterna est, in qua divinos et ineloquibiles immortalitatis suæ fructus capit: ita et mors ejus perpetua sit necesse est, in qua perennes pœnas et infinita tormenta pro peccatis suis pendet, lib. 7. sect. 11.

S E C T. VII.

The Deity not a Material Being.—Space not the Immensity of God.—The Divine Nature does not penetrate Bodies; nor is it extended. General Observations.—Conclusion.

TH E R E are many parts of our author's disquisitions which I have designedly passed over; for though they afford ample matter for observation and criticism, yet I thought it better to comprise my remarks in a small volume, than to become tedious, by enlarging on every inaccuracy in sentiment, which did not immediately affect the question, *whether matter can think.*

It may not, however, be amiss to subjoin a few remarks on some other parts of these
extraordinary

extraordinary disquisitions, which have not immediately come under our view, and in which, it appears to me, this philosopher is extremely confused and indeterminate in his ideas and opinions.

Upon Dr. Priestley's hypothesis of materialism, it is natural to suppose that he must be considerably embarrassed in speaking of the divine nature or essence: and this is actually the case; for in reading over his sections on this head, I have not been able to gain the least certainty of what he believes, or indeed meant to say upon the subject. All that I can do therefore is, to give the reader a few of his assertions, and offer a few remarks which naturally arise on perusing them.

Speaking of the term *immaterial*, he says,
 “ If with modern metaphysicians, we in-
 “ tend to denote by it a substance that has
 “ no property whatever *in common with*
 “ *matter*, and that even bears no relation
 “ to space; I must deny, that *any such sub-*

“ *stance exists*; because according to such a
 “ definition, the Divine Being is *necessarily*
 “ *cut off from all communication with*, and
 “ *all action or influence upon*, his own
 “ *creation* ^h. ”

“ Many passages in the books of scrip-
 “ ture, and especially in the psalms, give
 “ us the most exalted ideas of the *universal*
 “ *power and presence* of God. But still
 “ this is so far from suggesting the idea of
 “ proper *immateriality*, which bears no re-
 “ lation to space ⁱ, that they naturally give
 “ us the idea of a being that is *locally present*
 “ *every where*, but invisible, and *penetrating*
 “ *all things* ^k. ”

Now by thus supposing the divine nature
 or essence to have some properties *in common*

^h Page 108.

ⁱ It has been explained above, in what sense I suppose
 spirits or *immaterial beings* bear no relation to space, viz. as
 bodies do, by occupying a certain portion of it. For if they
 occupy certain dimensions of space, as length, breadth and
 thickness, as bodies do, they must be bodies, and so not im-
 material.

^k Page 143.

with

with matter, to be locally present every where, and to penetrate all things, it seems natural to infer, that Dr. Priestley believes the Deity to be material as well as man; only he seems to suppose him to be possessed of attributes and perfections infinitely superior to what any other being can possess. This inference seems to me natural and just; for how any being can have *properties in common with matter*, and not be itself material, I know not: and how a being can be *locally present*, as bodies are, and not be body, is to me utterly unintelligible. I must therefore conclude (at least till some explicit and consistent declaration appears to the contrary) that this writer believes the Deity himself to be strictly and properly *material*; and I am the more confirmed in this sentiment, as he frequently endeavours to persuade us, that this very opinion is harmless.

Now it seems to me, that such an opinion of the divine essence is so unphilosophical, as well as irreligious, that, to a philosophical
cal

cal reader, it needs no confutation; I shall, however, say a few things upon it, chiefly for the sake of those who may not be well versed in these subjects.

1. It is universally agreed that the Deity is *infinite and omnipresent*; there being no possible bounds to his presence and power of action: but *infinity* cannot be predicated of matter; for philosophers know, and can easily demonstrate, that there is a *vacuum*; matter therefore has bounds, and indeed fills but a very small part of the immense and boundless space; and from this one consideration alone it appears, that the Deity cannot, in any sense whatever, be *material*.

2. Because we know that something does actually exist, we infer there must be some cause of its existence, and this leads us to the consideration of a first cause of all finite natures. Now this first intelligent active cause must have a *necessary existence*, i. e. it implies a contradiction to suppose it

it not to exist; for take away this first cause, and you take away all other beings also, viz. nothing at all could then exist; which is contrary to all we see, feel, and know. It implies a contradiction therefore to suppose an intelligent first cause not to exist; but this cannot be said of matter; it implies no contradiction to suppose matter not to exist; nay, we can suppose it possible, though highly improbable, that every thing might be just as it is, if no such thing as matter had any being. It undeniably follows therefore, that this *first necessary cause* is *not material*.

This, by the way, might afford us another proof of the immateriality of the soul (if we stood in need of any more). For I cannot conceive that the annihilation of matter would any more affect the existence of intelligent beings, than the destruction of all *actually existing circles* would affect the being of *triangles*; and let any man examine his ideas, if he can find any more
 connection

connection in the one case than in the other; and if not, then we must infer that intelligence and matter have no more necessary dependence on each other, than a circle and a triangle; which every body knows are independent of each other, and *generically* different.

3. The Deity being omnipresent, or present every where, he cannot be said to *move*, or have any *motion*; for being omnipresent, there is no place to which he can *move* where he was not before; motion therefore cannot be predicated of an infinite omnipresent being: but that motion may be predicated of matter, I presume no one will deny, and therefore he must allow that this infinite omnipresent being cannot be material.

4. But though matter be capable of motion, yet motion is not essential to its being. This is certain from the *vis inertiae* of bodies, which has been shewn to be a property owing to solidity, and essential
to

to matter. If motion were essential to matter, then rest would be impossible, even in idea, which is contrary to experience. And that this cannot be the case, is still farther evident, because if motion were essential to matter, whenever a body should exist, it would necessarily move; but such necessary motion of bodies is impossible, for no reason can be assigned why it should move in one direction rather than another; it must therefore have a tendency to move in all directions at once, which would not produce motion but rest, so that motion, on this supposition, would be impossible.

If then an *immaterial* being, capable of moving matter, can have no existence, there can be no motion in the world; but as motion is allowed to exist, so an *immaterial being* possessed of a *self-motive power*, must necessarily exist also.

5. If the substance or essence of the Deity were the same with matter, then, being infinite, it must exclude the exist-

ence of all other matter, i. e. all matter whatever, or matter in every form, must be the essence of the Deity; for God being infinite, no matter can exist on this supposition that is not included in his essence. But the *finiteness*, *divisibility*, *composition*, *mobility*, and *passiveness* of matter, demonstratively shew, that it cannot be the essence of the Deity; which is necessarily *infinite*, *indivisible*, *uncompounded*, and *immutable*, to which we may also add, *necessarily intelligent*, which nobody will say belongs to every part of matter.

This learned writer indeed says¹, that “ the arguments for the being and attributes of a God, stand precisely upon the same footing, on the material or the immaterial system.” But this is a bare assertion, made without proper attention to the subject, and totally inconsistent with the truth; for if there be any certainty in the world, it is then certain, that the attributes of the Deity cannot be predicated of matter in any

¹ Page 147.

sense whatever, as the foregoing arguments fully demonstrate. If then we suppose no substance to exist but matter, we take away all arguments for the being and attributes of a God, which are totally incompatible with all the known properties of matter; and consequently *materialism* must ultimately terminate in *atheism*.

Let it be observed, however, that I do not charge Dr. Priestley with believing that the Deity is material; I have only pursued this tract of reasoning from the natural and easy construction of his words, and which I think can bear no other consistent meaning; but what other construction he may affix to them, I cannot pretend to say.

Dr. Priestley asserts, that if the Deity has no property in common with matter (i. e. the same as matter) he cannot act or have any influence upon his own creation; that is, if he has no property in common with his creatures, he cannot act upon them^m;

^m Vid. pag. 108. et al.

and this is frequently repeated in different places. But this appears to me very strange philosophy, and argues either a want of proper knowledge of the nature of *finites* and *infinites*, or at least great inattention to them. The Deity is *infinite*, and the creation *finite*. But can *finites* have any thing *the same*, or in common with *infinites*? Are they not, *toto cælo*, different? “ *Finites* “ and *infinites*, says a learned writerⁿ, are “ *disparata*, or things of a quite different “ nature, like *light and sound, colours and* “ *music, extension and thought*; they have “ *no common qualities*, and very many quite “ contrary ones. No *finite* addition, nor “ multiplication of *finites*, can produce “ an *infinite*; nor has *finite* to *infinite* any “ assignable proportion; for these only “ have a proportion to one another, which, “ by finite multiplications, can mutually “ exceed one another. From whence it is “ evident, that *finite* is *no part of infinite*, “ and that *finite* can neither be added to, “ nor subtracted from, *infinite*, for only

ⁿ Dr. Cheyne. *Philos. Prin. of Relig.* Chap. iv. Sect. 9.

“ *those*

“ *those* things that are of the *same kind* are
 “ capable of addition and subtraction; you
 “ cannot add *cows* to *horses*, because no
 “ number, nor part of the one, can make
 “ the other: so you cannot add finites to,
 “ nor subtract them from, infinities, be-
 “ cause no finite number of *finities* can
 “ make an *infinite*, nor any *finite* part of an
 “ *infinite* make a *finite*.”

Now this reasoning will hold still more strongly, respecting the attributes of the Deity, and the properties of his creatures. The one, being infinite and *uncreated*, can have nothing *in common* with the *creature*, which is finite; for surely the *Creator* has nothing in him that is *created* and finite; nor can the *creature* possess any thing as a property of its own nature, that is *uncreated* and infinite, the very supposition being a contradiction in terms, and utterly impossible.

Hence we may judge, how unphilosophically it was spoken, that “ If the Divine
 “ Being

“ Being hath no property *the same*, or in
 “ common with his creation, he can have
 “ no influence upon it.” And as Dr.
 Priestley will not deny the being of a
 God, and that he has some influence upon
 his creation, so he must disown this grand
 principle, with which alone he expected
 to have destroyed the belief of all spiritual
 and *immaterial beings*; and thus, happily
 indeed for religion, and the belief of an
 universal Providence, this chief pillar, and
 almost only support of our author’s specious
 gilded structure, molders into dust, and
 the whole fabrick comes tumbling to the
 ground.

It has indeed been the opinion of some
 philosophers of considerable note, that *space*,
 which is infinite and without bounds, is
 the *immensity* of God. And those who have
 conceived of the Deity as an extended
 being, who is present every where by a
 real and proper extension, have very natu-
 rally fallen into this opinion, as not being
 able to conceive any thing to be infinitely
 extended

extended but space. But even on this supposition, the Deity cannot be material, nor by his substance penetrate all things; for where *body* exists, space is necessarily excluded; which shews by the way, that space itself is not *infinitely extended* as one *continuum*; for though body exists in space, yet space cannot exist through every part of body; there must be some part of body where space is not, otherwise all would be space, and body could have no existence; and hence it demonstratively appears, that space is not the *immensity* of God.

Hence also it appears, that if the substance of the ever blessed God be actually extended, no other substance can have any existence; for being *infinite*, no other substance can have any extra-existence, and to say that one extended substance can co-exist in the same place with another, is a palpable contradiction, as we have seen in the case of space and body. It must therefore follow, that the *divine substance* is not extended,

tended, or if it be, no other substance can have any being.

If space were the divine immensity, it must be the divine substance itself; for it is *space* that we speak of as infinitely *capacious* and *comprehensive*, *immutable*, and *unannihilable*; if it be any thing therefore, it must be the Divine Substance. But there are many unanswerable arguments against this opinion, a few of which I shall offer, chiefly taken from the learned and pious Isaac Watts.

It is hardly possible indeed to enter into the consequences of this opinion, with that due reverence of language, which a pious mind would always wish to preserve in speaking of the Deity; and yet if we will manifest its absurdities, we must mention them.

1. If space be the very substance of God, then all bodies are situated in God, as in their proper place, in the grossest sense, and
occupy

occupy so much of the *dimensions* of Godhead as they fill of *space*; and thus an *elephant* or a *mountain*, a *whale* or a *wicked giant*, have more of the *essence*, or *presence* and *goodness* of God, than the holiest man in the world, unless he be of an equal size.

2. If space were God, then the Divine Being hath millions of parts, measurable by feet, inches and yards, according to the situations and dimensions of the bodies contained in it. And thus it might be said, that twenty-five inches of the Divine Nature, long, broad, and deep, will contain above two feet of solid body, which predications found very harsh, and seem impossible and inconsistent with the unity and purity of the Divine Nature.

3. If space be God, then one might ask (were it not indeed profane) whether every part of space, an inch or a mile, contains all the divine perfections complete, such as wisdom, power, and goodness, or

A a

only

only in some degree; if the latter, then every part of space, whether an inch or a mile, has some degree of divine wisdom, and power, and goodness, which I think will not be allowed; and if we suppose the former, then every inch of space will contain completely these divine perfections, and there will be so many *complete wisdoms* and *powers*, i. e. so many *all wise*, and *Almighty Beings*, as there are inches or minutest parts of space; and thus instead of one God, we shall have many millions.

4. Supposing God to be infinite space, yet what can this space do toward his creation or government of the universe? Does *proximity* enable him to know or move the corporeal world? He is supposed to *penetrate* all bodies, but this very penetration does nothing toward his knowledge or his movement of them. His knowledge does not depend on his penetration of bodies; this is evident, because God knew the world before he created it, or is supposed to penetrate it; and he caused it at
first

first to arise into being in all its motions, without any prior penetration of it. Nor do human spirits acquire their knowledge of bodies, or their power to move them by this supposed penetration. The power of God to know and move bodies, therefore, arises from some superior property of his Divine Nature, independent of penetration or extension.

Upon considering the whole of these Disquisitions, I cannot help lamenting and disapproving both the consequences that may arise from them, and the very motive from which they were undertaken. The grand object in view, it seems, in contriving and modelling these enquiries into matter and spirit, was, to lay a foundation for the better support of Arianism^o; it was, it seems, to be better able to undermine the grand doctrine of the divinity of our blessed Lord and Saviour; to prove that Jesus Christ was nothing more than a mere philosophizing man, carried away with the opinions

^o Dedication, pag. 7.

of the times^p. What zeal is here for the very worst and most destructive purposes! Our author is not confined to sea and land to make profelytes, he ransacks the very world of spirits to gain advocates for his opinion. But we need be at no loss to guess, whether he applied to the upper or lower world for relief; and we may rest satisfied in our Lord's declaration, that his church and truth are so established, that the gates of *hell* shall not prevail against them.

The apostle Paul seems to have foreseen that a certain thing, called philosophy and worldly wisdom, would start up and set all its engines to work to destroy the belief of Christ's divinity; he therefore says, *Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ; for in him dwelleth all the*
 FULNESS OF THE GODHEAD BODILY.

^p Page 129.

If we admit the divine authority of the scriptures (which no Christian can deny) this great and fundamental doctrine of the Christian religion may be easily and speedily determined. For if scripture be compared with scripture, or one text with another, and thus fairly drawn up into an argument, the conclusion may indeed be denied, and so may the whole Bible, or any thing else, but it cannot be answered. Thus Isaiah viii. xiii, xiv. It is said the LORD OF HOSTS HIMSELF shall be for a stone of *stumbling*, and *rock* of offence to both houses of Israel.—Now I believe it is universally granted, that the LORD OF HOSTS is a name characteristick of the Deity himself, and cannot belong to any other; and he who is thus called, is said to be a stone of stumbling, and rock of offence. But this is directly applied, 1 Pet. ii, 7, 8. to Jesus Christ, and consequently Christ is the LORD OF HOSTS HIMSELF, or the true and living God.

I shall

I shall add a few more passages of scripture, which either expressly, or, compared with other texts, undeniably teach the same doctrine, without any possibility of mistake.

I.

Isa. vi. 5. *Mine eyes have seen the KING, the LORD OF HOSTS.*

John xii. 41. *These things said Isaias, when he SAW HIS (viz. CHRIST'S) GLORY, and spake of HIM.*

When Isaias saw the King, the Lord of Hosts, he is said by the evangelist to have seen the *Glory of Christ*: therefore Christ is the LORD OF HOSTS.

II.

Isa. xliv. 6. Thus saith the Lord, the *King* of Israel, and his Redeemer the LORD OF HOSTS, I am THE FIRST, and I am THE
LAST,

LAST, and BESIDES ME there is NO GOD.
 Rev. xxii. 13. I (*Jesus*) am *Alpha* and
Omega, the beginning and the end, the
 FIRST AND THE LAST.

Hence again it evidently appears, that he,
 who is the first and the last, is the Lord of
 Hosts, or the only living and true God; but
 Jesus Christ is the first and the last, *ergo*,
 &c.

III.

Rev. xxii. 6. The Lord God of the
 holy prophets SENT HIS ANGEL to shew
 unto his servants, &c.

Ibid. ver. 16. I Jesus have SENT MINE
 angel to testify unto you these things in
 the *churches*.

IV.

Psa. lxxviii. 56. They TEMPTED *and*
provoked the most HIGH GOD.

I Cor.

1 Cor. x. 9. *Neither let us TEMPT CHRIST, as some of them also tempted.*

V.

John xx. 28. *And Thomas answered and said, MY LORD and MY GOD.*

VI.

Rom. ix. 5. *Of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ came, who is over all, GOD blessed for ever. Amen.*

VII.

2 Peter. i. 1. *Through the righteousness of OUR GOD and Saviour JESUS CHRIST.*

VIII.

1 John v. 20. *We are in him that is true, even in his Son JESUS CHRIST; this is the TRUE GOD AND ETERNAL LIFE.*

IX.

IX.

John i. 1. *The WORD WAS GOD.*

X.

Isa. ix. 6. *For unto us a Child is born, and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, the MIGHTY GOD, the EVERLASTING FATHER.*

XI.

2 Pet. i. 4. *Exceeding great and precious promises, that by these you might be PARTAKERS of the DIVINE NATURE.*

Heb. iii. 14. *For we are made PARTAKERS OF CHRIST.*

Many more passages of scripture might be added, fully in point, were it necessary; but if we pay any regard to the scriptures of *truth*, we must believe Jesus Christ to be God over all, blessed for ever.

Though I am rather inclined to think that *mere speculative* opinions are not to *all persons*, and in *all circumstances*, of so much importance as many have supposed; yet I think they may, without care, do harm, by drawing the mind from more important considerations. I therefore wish, both for my reader and myself, that we may earnestly seek after that holy humble state of mind, which only the spirit of Christ can give, and by which alone we are fitted for a right and acceptable service and worship of God upon earth, and to a fruition and contemplation of the glorious perfections of the Supreme Being in heaven.

F I N I S.

