


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
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
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MEDIAEVAL EUROPE

A TEXTBOOK OF EUROPEAN HISTORY

1095—1254

BY

KENNETH BELL


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INTRODUCTION

Character of Mediaeval Europe. United and Theocratic. Types of Mediaeval Society. Emperor, King, Baron, Monk, Townsman, Peasant, Scholar.

THE main interest of mediaeval history lies in the contrast which it affords with the present. The study of a period in which the whole structure and character of society was so different from our own cannot fail to be full of interest and value.

In nothing else is this contrast so telling as in the political form which mediaeval Europe took. Europe is now a patchwork of rival or allied nations, sharply distinct from one another in traditions, history, language, form of government, and a thousand other things. In spite of what modern means of communication have done to lessen the distance between one capital city of Europe and another, a modern traveller will find in a journey of the same number of miles far more local differences than he would have met with in the thirteenth century. The different countries of Europe, brought much closer together by the railway and the telegraph, have been separated by six centuries of national history. Each division of Europe has become different from its neighbours, just as the grown-up members of a family, each of whom has followed a different profession and led a different life, lose as they grow older much of the 'family likeness' of feature and habit. The real parallel to mediaeval Europe is not to be found in the mature civilization of the old world. In the thirteenth century Europe was, like America now, still a 'young country'.

Mediaeval Europe a unity.

There is more resemblance than would appear at first sight between the latest experiment of modern democracy and the mediaeval polity. A traveller in the United States is always struck by the uniformity of American life, and the sameness of American cities and villages. The whole of North America, broadly speaking, is swayed by the same motives, has the same public opinion, thinks, feels, and acts in the same way. The same language is understood and spoken from north to south and from east to west. A great part of the population is under the same government. So it was with thirteenth-century Europe. Greek and Slavonic were spoken by numbers of Europeans, just as French and Spanish are spoken in North America, but Latin, like English there, was the language of the vast majority of literature, though not, of course, as English is in America, the language of ordinary speech. Like Canada and Mexico, Constantinople and Moorish Spain stood outside the system of government under which lived the great mass of the people. Finally, like the sovereign power of the federal government of the United States, the sovereign power in the European polity wielded an authority which, though limited and curtailed by the rights of individual states and itself divided between rival organs of government, was everywhere within the federation acknowledged as supreme. The place of the federal authority of the United States was taken in mediaeval Europe by the Pope.

Mediaeval
Europe a
theocracy.

The European continent then in the mediaeval period was united as it has never been since. Secondly, it was united under the rule of an ecclesiastical head. Europe, as it has never been before or since, was a theocracy. Its proper name was 'Christendom'. Here is a contrast with modern North America as striking as is the resemblance in political structure. The key to the contrast

lies in the fact that while American civilization is victorious over nature, mediaeval society was engaged in a ceaseless struggle with nature, in which nature continued, broadly speaking, to be victorious. Thanks to help of machinery of every sort, the prairies, mines, forests and waterways of North America have been made use of to make it the most prosperous continent which history records. Mediaeval Europe was engaged in precisely the same process of opening up virgin soil and pushing forward the boundaries of cultivation into the wilds. Both suffered from the absence of that enforcement of law and order by an efficient police which it is impossible to maintain among pioneers. But in America the opportunities offered by the exploitation of nature have made wealth at least a possibility for every man of spirit. In mediaeval Europe the vast majority of the people had no prospect but a life of squalor and poverty. They were wretchedly equipped for the task of making a living out of the soil, utterly ignorant of the means to improve their lot. Thus the American citizen is filled with that sort of discontent which results in ceaseless endeavours after a better condition of life. The mediaeval peasant was on the other hand filled with that sort of discontent which is constantly liable to become despair. Hence the fact that in the Middle Ages the hope of another life was so strong, so vivid and so widespread—every bit as strong, vivid and widespread as the desire for wealth in America. Religion, with its promises of consolation to the poor and unfortunate, had a power over the imagination of mediaeval society which it could never have obtained but for the fact that the mediaeval world was not a pleasant place in which to live. Even the rich and powerful had constantly brought before them the in-

security of life. Private war was as common in mediaeval high life as solvency was rare. Moreover, the tendency to find a physical explanation for such occurrences as earthquakes, comets and pestilences was confined to a few scholars, otherwise they were generally accepted as signs of divine wrath. Even to-day it is only in the temperate zones, and even there only in towns, that men have ceased to be afraid of nature. Mediaeval Europe, with its ignorance of sanitation, its uncleared forests, and its scattered population, was as much at the mercy of tempests and disease as are the inhabitants of the tropics to-day. And in its superstition, its constant expectation of the miraculous, its simple respect for personal holiness combined with a very low practice of public and private morality, its unscientific outlook and its uneconomic social organization, mediaeval Europe was more akin to Buddhist East than to the materialistic West.

To explain the influence of the Church on mediaeval society, however, it is not enough to refer it all to popular superstition. The Church was influential also because it was the best organized and best staffed institution of the age. It remained, as the heir of the Roman Empire entrenched in the holy city of Rome. Its traditions were sacred, at once from their religious character and their antiquity. It not only cheered men by the prospect of eternal happiness, or cowed them by the prospect of eternal punishment, but it also offered to the ambitious a career and to the scholarly, a retreat. It could raise an English beggar boy to the highest office in Christendom. The civil servants who built up the institutions of the primitive European states, the diplomatists whose word could bring on war or introduce peace, were churchmen. All the professions, except the military, were in their hands. Medicine, teaching, the organization of

charity, architecture, literature—if a man were interested in any of these, let him become a clerk. Like ‘going into business’ in America, going into the Church meant the opening-up of boundless possibilities. Thus the mediaeval clergy were themselves worthy of the great influence which their calling gave them. They ruled Europe as the business men rule America, because they were the strongest men, and because they could work on the most popular and the strongest motive.

Lastly, it must not be forgotten that the mediaeval Church, if the superstition of its subjects and the ability of its rulers both did something to strengthen its hold on the people, was strong first and foremost because it embodied and upheld the highest type of religion and morality which the age was capable of conceiving. The Europe over which it ruled differed from the East of Buddhism in this one essential fact, that it had within it both the instinct and the means of progress. That progress was to come, in the Middle Ages at least, from the putting into practice of the elevating and civilizing forces which were contained in Christianity. The best and highest endeavours of the age were directed towards making Europe more truly and generally Christian. At the head of this movement stood the Church.

It is important however to realize that the rule of the Church over mediaeval Europe was by no means unchallenged. As always in history, the equilibrium of political and social organization was the product, not of a single irresistible force, but of the conflict of a number of forces. United Christendom remained united and Christian only as the result of a struggle of ideals and policies which had other means, and in some cases other ends, than those of the Pope and the Church. The leader of mediaeval Europe was the Pope, but he had

Rivals
of the
Church.

many_rivals. A brief review of the ideals and character of some of the most typical figures of mediaeval society will perhaps bring out some of the forces at work in mediaeval history.

The most obvious ally, and yet the most persistent enemy, of the Pope was the Emperor. It is not easy to say what was his precise relation to the Pope, for this was the very question in disputing over which mediaeval thinkers and politicians exhausted themselves. All were agreed that each was necessary to Europe. Broadly speaking, the Emperor was regarded as possessing the universal rule over men's bodies while the Pope possessed it over men's souls. But the Imperial claim was not simply to the rule of the State of Europe, while the Pope ruled the Church. For the Emperor, like the Pope, claimed to rule Europe in a twofold character, as the successor of the Roman Emperor and as the Vicegerent of God. Both regarded Europe as a theocracy. The question was, which was to exercise supreme rule over it. The Imperialists maintained that the true position of the Pope was, so to speak, that of a chaplain to the Emperor, that he had charge of men's souls and their welfare in the next world, but that the divine ruler of this world and the true successor of Augustus was the Emperor alone. The Papalists refused to have their leader's claims to supremacy relegated to the next world. The Pope, they maintained, was the head of the Church, and the Church must bear supreme rule over the world. The Emperor was a kind of chief constable of the Pope, whose business it was to see that his word was obeyed, and to exercise powers of discipline and punishment forbidden to such men of peace as were the clergy. Both sides quoted Biblical authority in support of their claims, both drew elaborate parallels with natural

The
Emperor.

objects, insisting that their own side was represented, for example, by the sun, while the other was figured by the moon. The question was complicated by the fact that the Emperor lived in Germany and the Pope in Italy. All history proved that Europe must be ruled from Rome; therefore, to make good his claims, the Emperor must be master of Rome. Thus he was forced to prevent the Pope from establishing himself, as he was soon forced to attempt, in a strong position in Italy. Hence the quarrel over who should rule the world, became eventually a quarrel over who should rule Italy.

In theory, the peoples of Europe were agreed that they were under a single ruler, members of a united Empire and a united Church. In practice, there was a strong tendency towards the break-up of Christendom. The strongest rival of both Papal and Imperial claims was the King. Setting strongly against the tendency to make more and more definite and explicit the claims of Pope and Emperor to universal dominion, was the current in favour of a Europe of nations. The Kings of England, Scotland, France, Poland, Bohemia, Aragon, Castile, and other parts of Europe were always ready to acknowledge the paramount position of Empire and Papacy. But they became steadily more and more determined to rule their own territories, not as vassals, but as sovereigns. Here was a force which was destined to struggle, from the Dark Ages to our own day, against the forces of cosmopolitanism. But from the first the cosmopolitan Empire and the cosmopolitan Papacy both felt the same influence. Many forces were at work to make the Emperor the national ruler of Germany and the Pope the national ruler of Italy. It was with difficulty that each succeeded, by the help of other allies, in preventing the national unification of Germany under the Emperor, or of Italy

under either Emperor or Pope. It was the struggle of the Empire and the Papacy which gave the kings their opportunity to build up independent powers round which national feelings could gather. At the same time, as the universal Church increased its claims and defined its position, so the conflicts between the kings and the clergy became more frequent. Though none of them could claim, as could the Emperor, to be the sole vicerent of God on earth, the kings tried to control the Church within their dominions and to make royal chaplains of archbishops and bishops, as the Emperor tried to make an Imperial chaplain of the Pope. So began the conflict, raging to this day, of Church and State.

The
Baron.

Besides the Imperial and Papal conceptions of Europe as a theocracy and the monarchical conception of Europe as a group of nations, there was a fourth conception, upheld by the baronage, which may be called a *feudal* Europe. The ideal of the kings was a practical one compared to that of the Pope and Emperor: it is easier to be the effective sovereign of a state than of a continent. But more practical still was the ideal of the great lords within the various states, for they aimed at independent rule over much smaller units; that is to say, their own estates. These estates they held by the only secure title in a lawless age, the power of defending them against all comers. They had built up their position in the anarchy of those Dark Ages when internal disorder and the Viking inroads had shattered every other political unit except the smallest of all, the village. And the villages had only held together by sacrificing their freedom in return for the protection of the strongest man in the district, of whom they became the serfs, or little better than serfs. So alone could they hope to cultivate the land from which they got their food. Once a local

fighting-man could gather round him a large enough force to make him a really efficient protector, he could soon induce or compel enough villagers to accept his lordship to become the master of his district. The King or Emperor in his turn was but too eager to recognize even such a defender of order as this; besides, he had neither strength nor leisure to combat his powerful subjects' claims. Thus Europe in the eleventh century, despite its impressive hierarchy of Royal and Imperial personages, was really ruled, in so far as it was ruled at all, by innumerable lords of districts varying from a few scattered villages to a territory as large as modern Switzerland. In some cases those who had acquired these vast domains had become as powerless as the kings themselves, on account of the local strength of the holders of smaller estates within their own territory. Thus William the Bastard of Normandy, who beat his own overlord, Henry of France, at the battle of Mortemer, had previously had hard work to defeat his own vassals at Val-è-dunes. Europe could never be built up into any stable form of political architecture until the anarchic claims of the local baronage to complete independence had been made to give way to a recognition of the effective supremacy of their superiors. The baronage, which alone had made head against the anarchy of the Dark Ages, was itself the bulwark of anarchy when the worst of the crisis of invasion and disruption was passed.

It is, perhaps, worth adding that these local magnates were not always laymen—in many cases the bishops had been able to build up large domains like their secular neighbours, and the Church, which included among its officers almost every other class and type, included also the notorious type of reckless and insubordinate fighting-men.

The strength of the baronage came from their hold on the land. The whole of early mediaeval society was based on the land, from which it was fed. The peasants tilled it as the serfs of the lord of their village. That lord had himself become the vassal of some greater man, who might himself be the vassal of the King. Each vassal was bound to his lord by the necessity of doing service either on the field of battle or on the land. The only man who had no subject was the serf. The one man who had no lord was the King, or, more strictly speaking, the Emperor. Such was the feudal system—a pyramid of part-owners of the land, which was tilled by the lowest tier of the structure. In theory the actual owner of the land came to be the King. In practice it was the man who could best prevent others from interfering with his exploitation of it. The weak point of the baronage was finance. War and the chase are both expensive amusements if practised on a grand scale. Mediaeval agriculture was not a very lucrative enterprise. The baronage was, therefore, always bankrupt. Hence, if the great lord's display and magnificence kept the labouring classes in perpetual misery, they made the fortune of the money-lender. Usury was forbidden to Christians by the Church, and this and their own genius left the career open to the Jews. It is as great a mistake to forget the Jew as to forget the peasant in a picture of the mediaeval baronage. Between them they were the foundations on which rested its power.

The kings and the Popes both did their best to control the baronage; the Church by civilizing them, the kings both by using and fighting them. The Church introduced the Truce of God—certain days of the week and yearly festivals set apart, when fighting was forbidden under pain of eternal punishment. It advocated death-bed

gifts of land to itself as a means of expiation of evil lives. It preached the Crusades—a sanctification of war. Later it lent its authority to the new code of honour and good manners known as chivalry. It neglected no means of convincing the great lord that he had a soul of which he was daily imperilling the eternal future. The kings, again, made alliances, military and matrimonial, with their great vassals, set them one against the other, championed their vassals against them, defended against them the Church and the poor. For the most difficult and vital of all the tasks of mediaeval Europe was the subjection and civilization of the baronage.

So much for the ruling classes, would-be or actual. The Monk. Two bodies of men remain, who, without aspiring to political supremacy, exercised an influence in the Middle Ages all the more powerful for that very fact. The most characteristic mediaeval figure is the monk. He is the living embodiment of the spirit which despises this world in comparison with the world to come, an object-lesson of the teaching of the Church. Hence the enormous influence which he exercised over the popular mind. He set out to live what all acknowledged to be the highest form of life. If he did it with obvious success, what an opportunity for hero-worship! If he proved a hypocrite or a traitor, what an opportunity for scandal! The monks, whose calling was retirement from the world, focused on themselves all the attention of a child-like public, eager to admire, and just as eager to laugh. The monk was the mediaeval butt, just because he was the mediaeval hero. It is a mistake to regard the monk as simply concerned with saving his own soul. It is very seldom that a man with intense convictions can restrain himself from preaching them to others. Inevitably, the monk most convinced of his own sin came to regard

himself as setting an example to others. And whatever the private convictions of individual monks, it is indisputable that the monastic ideal was of enormous importance in the Middle Ages in reinforcing the teaching and influence of the Church. Almost equally important was its influence on the Papacy. Just as a bishop found it easy to lapse into a baron, so the Popes were also liable to become involved in contemporary politics, and thus lose some of their spiritual influence. Again and again a monastic revival came to the rescue, and supplied from its ranks a reforming Pope. Monks were the surest allies and also the sternest critics of the Papacy.

Nor did the monks merely radiate spiritual influence. By an irresistible tendency they became an economic force as well. We have shown the precarious condition of baronial finance. The ups and downs of a baronial house inevitably disposed of its surplus wealth. But in monasteries, perpetual corporations with few expenses, wealth as inevitably accumulated. The baron had no admirers anxious to make legacies to him on their deathbeds, for he could offer no spiritual returns. Gifts were showered on the monasteries: however poverty-stricken at first, they always became wealthy. Hence if the prosperous monastic orders ceased to set examples of asceticism, they at any rate set an example of an ordered life, the best of them were patrons of art and letters, good landlords, refuges for scholars, oases of dignified leisure in a world of warfare, debauchery, and squalor. Even the poorer orders often did good work as agriculturists in opening up new lands. In fact, the influence of the monks was as wide as it was deep; they were missionaries both of faith and of culture.

The
Townsmen.

Early mediaeval society consisted of those who fought, those who prayed, and those who tilled the soil. The

moneylender and the monastery both helped to modify this primitive organization, which, as we have seen, was the bulwark of the feudal system. But the greatest innovator of all, the real mediaeval revolutionary spirit, was the man who was to combine the financial instincts of the Jew with the corporate strength of the monastery—the mediaeval merchant. Trade and industry in the Middle Ages could never play the part in society which they do now. Not that the Middle Ages did not care for money. They cared for it with the perpetual desire of the poor, to whom it means life itself, if not with the vulgar thirst of the rich, to whom it means luxury or power. But with roads and seas unpoliced, with a miserably low standard of comfort, with very little machinery, each village, even each household, had to make shift to provide for itself. But even so the lord of the manor could not supply all his wants from the agricultural community which lay round his castle. Gradually, as order was more or less restored in Europe, more and more demand arose for articles which could only be got from a distance, or made where abundant labour could be obtained. Rivers and roads became trade routes. Villages well posted on them, or with good harbours, became towns. Military strongholds became centres of industry or of markets and fairs. Their inhabitants ceased to be labourers or soldiers, and became traders. For mutual protection the merchants formed guilds or corporations, in which wealth accumulated. The towns began to buy privileges from needy lords or kings. So the baron, who had once regarded the trader as a guileless stranger to be robbed with impunity, discovered that he had become a power in the state. In fact, for Pope, Emperor, King, or Baron, the towns became useful allies and dangerous foes, strong enough to upset the equilibrium

of Europe. A prosperous city might become the seat of a university, and rival the wealthiest monastery as a centre of learning and a patron of art. And while the whole doctrine of the monk was renunciation of the world, the idea of the merchant was the more modern one—to make the best of present opportunities, and earn prosperity and comfort, not hereafter, but here.

The
Peasant.

The townsman was the only member of the 'lower classes' who won during the period a share of political influence. The peasant remained absolutely powerless. No one gave a thought to changing his lot: whatever architect might plan to rebuild Europe he always had as the foundation of his structure the serf, and the serf himself was not educated or articulate enough to be able to say what form his own plan would have taken. Socialism took root before the Middle Ages were over; but as yet the villagers, who suffered most from the chronic warfare and bankruptcy of the age, showed no signs of common revolt. Attempts were indeed made, as for instance in France, to win for a rural district the self-governing privileges of a chartered town. Without the town walls and the town purse it was a hopeless endeavour.

The
Scholar.

Another class of men played in the Middle Ages a part unexpectedly important. In the struggle of Empire and Papacy, and in the work of organizing Europe, legal and political theories played a curious and characteristic part. The arguments on which these theories were based were the work of students. Nowadays a theory, to be widely influential, must as a rule be based on an interpretation of actual facts, and must stand the test of practical conditions. Thus Free Trade is defended as being in accordance with the ascertainable working of economic laws, and as having resulted in prosperity to Great Britain. In the Middle Ages a theory, to be

influential, had merely to be based on authority or tradition: it might have no relation to actual facts, and be quite incapable of practical application, or of proof by a process of reasoning. Men were so completely under the spell of the great tradition of the Roman Empire and the authority of the Scriptures that it was enough that a theory should base itself on one or the other or both. Hence the influence of those who had made a special study of these irrefutable authorities. Again, it must be remembered that in the Middle Ages to hold heterodox views on religion was to be a political and social outlaw. It was the scholar who decided exactly what were the limits of orthodoxy, and some acute thinker might destroy the most exalted reputation by throwing over it a suspicion of heresy.

Finally, when the various ruling powers of Europe were consolidating their position, it became more and more essential for them to have behind them a definite body of codified law. Without law it is impossible to keep order, and the court of Pope or King must have an established code to enforce against the breakers of the peace. The Roman Law codified by Justinian was an inexhaustible source of legal rules and principles, which only needed adaptation to meet the new conditions. Hence the influence of the student who had mastered the law of Imperial Rome. His lectures or his textbooks, written primarily for his pupils, might well become themselves working codes, and judges might quote his opinions as verdicts from which there could be no appeal.

In the history of the period we shall see something of the working out, in conflict or in unison, of the ideals and policies represented by these leaders of mediaeval society.

CHAPTER I

THE AGE OF THE FIRST CRUSADE

1095-1122 A. D.

SECTION I. *The Preliminaries of the Crusade. Europe in the late Eleventh Century.* (1) The Normans. (2) The Papacy. (3) France and the Empire. (4) The Eastern Empire. (5) The Turks. (6) The Appeal of Alexius. (7) Reasons for its success. (8) The Council of Clermont. (9) Bohemund of Tarento.

SECTION II. *The First Crusade.* (1) Peter the Hermit. (2) The Leaders of the Crusade. (3) The Three Policies. (4) Nicaea and Doryleum. (5) Edessa. (6) The Siege of Antioch. (7) The Capture of Jerusalem. (8) Importance of the First Crusade.

SECTION III. *The Christian States in the East.* (1) The Situation in Syria. (2) The Organization of Jerusalem. (3) The Military Orders. (4) The Italian Cities. (5) The Eastern Empire. (6) Quarrels among the Franks. (7) Later Crusades.

SECTION IV. *Non-Crusading Europe.* (1) The Situation in Spain. (2) The Advance of the Almohades. (3) The Rise of Aragon. (4) The Slavonic Powers. (5) France. (6) The Enemies of Louis VI.

SECTION V. *Empire and Papacy.* (1) Failure of Henry IV. (2) Henry V and Paschal II. (3) Failure of Paschal's negotiations. (4) The Donation of Matilda.

I. THE PRELIMINARIES OF THE CRUSADE.

IN the ten years which preceded 1095 A.D. some of the greatest men of the day had disappeared. In 1085 died Hildebrand and Robert Guiscard, in 1087 William I of England, and in 1089 Lanfranc. With Pope Urban II, Bohemund, William Rufus, and Anselm, a new epoch was introduced. Those who lived on from the former age

were its less successful, less dominant figures—Philip I of France, Henry IV the Emperor of the West, and Alexius Comnenus the Emperor of the East. Doubtless each of these hoped for better days with the passing away of their most redoubtable enemies. For what Hildebrand had been to Henry IV, that William had been to Philip, and Robert to Alexius. The two emperors and the King of France had all three been champions of things as they were, opponents of the progressive ideals of the time typified by the reforming Pope and the Normans. For one hundred years after 1050 A.D. the Normans played a crucial part in the development of Europe. They were among the last of the Vikings to make a settlement in Europe, and when, in the tenth century, their Duke became the vassal of the King of France, the period of the Vikings' raids may be said to have come to an end. After this the aims of the northern pirates ceased altogether to be plunder, and became settlement. The Vikings ceased to be the scourges of Europe and began to turn themselves into citizens. As citizens the Vikings showed, besides the vigour which had made them formidable as pirates, a power of adapting themselves to new conditions and learning from their neighbours which at once made them a force. Thus in a single generation the Danes of northern England became English. Thus, too, the Normans in an incredibly short time became 'more French than the French', only to be in their turn absorbed by the Anglo-Saxons whom they conquered. What the Normans learnt from the French was of much greater value than what the Danes learnt from the English. England, like Norway and Denmark, was a Teutonic country cut off from the continent, whereas France still kept many of the traditions of the Gaul of the Romans and of the Empire of Charlemagne, and

(1) The Normans.

was in close touch with the European movements of the day.

The
Normans
and feuda-
ism.

In the eleventh century Europe was busy organizing herself on a feudal model. The Norman rulers kept out of feudalism all that made for the external independence and the internal centralization of their territory. The Duke of Normandy, for instance, did all he could to make a reality of the feudal obligations of his vassals to himself and of the feudal bond between them, and to make a shadow of his own obligations, and the tie which bound him, to his suzerain the King of France. In 1047 Duke William, the future King of England, defeated, as we have said, his rebellious vassals at Val-èdunes. In 1054 he defeated his lord, Henry I of France, at the battle of Mortemer. Under a line of great dukes, every one of them a thorough opportunist, Normandy became one of the strongest principalities of Europe. But it soon became apparent that the Normans were not to end as the founders of the French Duchy. They had proved their capacity for both plunder and settlement, they were now to prove it for what would nowadays be called Imperialism. First the children of a Norman baron, settled in Southern Italy and beginning, like the English in India or the French in Canada as participators in local factions, began to make themselves masters of the country. A stream of immigration began to flow from Normandy into Italy and Sicily, until what had once been a bone of contention between the Emperor of the East, the Saracens, and the Western Empire or the Papacy, became in reality a Norman kingdom. In 1055 they established the Duchy of Apulia, for which they obtained the valuable recognition of the Pope—the nearest of all the would-be possessors of what the Normans held. By 1090 they had completely mastered

The
Normans
in Sicily.

Sicily. Meanwhile the Emperor of the East naturally did not welcome the filching from him of what had once been a most valuable possession, by men who did not even pay him the compliment of becoming his nominal vassals. The Normans, in fact, became the aggressors in the inevitable quarrel. In 1082 Robert Guiscard defeated Alexius at Durazzo, and though next year the newcomers were beaten in their turn, it was obvious that so far from becoming the docile lieutenants of Byzantium, they were prepared to dispute with her the control, not alone of Italy, but of the western Mediterranean.

Meanwhile the vassals of Philip of France were showing even more alarming vivacity. In 1066 the Duke of Normandy became King of England. In 1073 he reconquered Maine. The efforts of Philip to raise up rebellion against him could not disguise the fact that, at a bound, he had become a far more powerful sovereign than the King of France, and that he was shutting off Philip from the sea, and circumscribing his kingdom even more effectively than the Southern Normans were throttling the Eastern Empire. Clearly it did not pay to have feudal rights or claims over Norman dukes. Neither, however, did it pay to do by the dukes as they did by their lords. Both in the north and in the south, the new states were organized with all the keen legal instinct, the vigour, and the sound business capacity, in which the Normans never failed. At once the conquerors of Apulia and Sicily set to work to make of their motley collection of subjects, a compact and docile whole. Meanwhile in 1086 William I carried through the greatest piece of administrative work which Europe had seen since the fall of the Roman Empire, the compilation of Domesday Book. The decentralization, the local anarchy, the royal impotence, for which feudalism has come to be synony-

The
Normans
in Eng-
land.

mous, had little chance of survival when the king was a Norman.

By a curious stroke of fortune, then, the inhabitants of a French duchy had made themselves masters of those two most important islands, one of which played in mediaeval history a part only less crucial than that played in modern history by the other. The sea power, the geographical position, the strong political organization of Great Britain has made her time and again what Sicily with similar advantages was in the Middle Ages—the pivot on which has turned the diplomacy and warfare of Europe.

Like the English, the Normans were a religious as well as a practical people. They had, if nothing else, too much common sense to turn their backs upon the support of the Church, which then as now could be as effective a political ally as a generator of civil war. William had his banner blessed by Pope Alexander II, and thus turned an adventurous raid into a holy war. In 1053 the Normans of Apulia, deserting for the moment peaceful means of winning Papal approval, defeated Leo IX in battle at Civitella—but only, prostrating themselves at his feet, to implore his forgiveness and the recognition of the Apulian dukedom. Later, Robert Guiscard became the staunch, if independent, soldier of Hildebrand in his struggle with the Emperor.

Just as the Normans were making felt all over feudal Europe their instinct for organization and expansion, so Hildebrand by his own individual force of character had worked a revolution in the Church. The Normans had begun to carve out in vigorous lines independent principalities with strong internal organization. Hildebrand aimed at doing the same work with the Church. He saw in fact that the Church must be, at once, strongly

(2) The
Papacy.

organized internally, and independent externally of the influence of the lay powers, at the head of whom stood the Emperor. Only so could she be a spiritual and a progressive force in Europe.

In the utter anarchy and confusion of the era of the Danish invasions two social groups had alone been able to hold together by their very smallness. These were the manor and the monastery. William I organized England as if it were one gigantic manor, Hildebrand wanted to make the Church one gigantic monastery. When he died in 1085 it was in the bitterness of defeat and failure. But he had really done his work. He had struggled to draw a sharp line between clergy and laity, to make the clergy a professional class, and thus to paint in vivid colours, which all could appreciate, the contrast between the higher life of self-sacrifice and refinement and the vulgar violence of a barbarous age. Henceforward, throughout the Middle Ages, the ideal of Hildebrand dominated the best minds of the day.

Meanwhile France and the two Empires were hard-hit by the energetic tactics of their progressive rivals. Philip, whose minority had given William the opportunity to invade England, proved when he came of age a weak and disreputable sovereign. He was for the most part powerless against his great feudatories, and he made besides the fatal error of alienating the Church. This he did by divorcing his lawful wife and marrying Bertrade de Montfort, who was already married to the Count of Anjou. For this he was excommunicated by Urban II. The house of Capet would never succeed in France till it learnt from the Normans to conciliate the Papacy. Though the Popes could not prevent Philip from exercising complete control over episcopal elections and over the French Church, Hildebrand could at any

The
ideal of
Hilde-
brand.

(3) France
and the
Empire.

rate encourage William of England. In the same way the Popes fomented the divisions of Germany. Here, too, the Emperor had a firm hand on the Church. But the Duchy of Saxony, like the Duchy of Normandy, was ambitious and insubordinate, and Henry IV was hampered at every turn by Saxon revolts. Like Philip, Henry was hampered too by domestic troubles; his second wife denounced him to Europe, and his son Conrad joined his enemies. Henry was able to drive Gregory VII from Rome and condemn him to a wretched death, but he could never make Germany or Italy anything but a chaos.

(4) The Eastern Empire.

Though the Eastern Empire was immune from the active hostility of the Popes, it had but just come through a terrible crisis. To the west it had been obliged to defend itself against the Normans. Up to 1078 Robert Guiscard was able to pose as the father-in-law of a dispossessed Emperor. Michael VII, whom Romanus IV was excluding from the throne, had married Robert's daughter. Only after 1081 with the death of Nicephorus III was the house of Comnenus without a rival. It was fortunate that the Comneni were a vigorous and warlike race, for they were surrounded on almost every side by aggressive enemies. Since Russia became a western power and Austria an empire stretching far east of Vienna, the position of Constantinople in Europe has completely changed. Now she is the centre of a non-Christian power surrounded by the territories of Christian nations. In the West she is an outpost of the East, in Christendom an outpost of Islam. In the eleventh century, on the contrary, when most of the Danube ran through the possessions of uncivilized and heathen powers, Constantinople maintained for Christendom a hold on Asia Minor, and again and again saved the West from waves of Eastern invasion.

Then, too, Constantinople was in many ways far in advance of the rest of Europe in civilization, art, and learning. Architecture, painting, and mosaic had continued to be practised there as under the Roman Empire before the barbarian invasions. The wealth of the city was considerable, a strong navy protected the large trade which flowed to and from the East, and, in spite of perpetual revolutions and murders in the palace of the Emperors, the government was in the hands of a body of trained officials, who, as a rule, continued undisturbed to administer it according to long-standing custom. The ceremonial of the Court and the customs of society were complicated to a degree, and based on carefully preserved tradition. The springs of Byzantine life were perhaps not really sound. Like the Italians of the Renaissance, the Greeks devoted too much ingenuity to the elaboration of poisons and tortures; they were capable, upon occasion, of a cruelty far more revolting, because more calculated and self-conscious, than the violence of the barbarian West. But, for all that, they held up to the West a model of organization and culture from which it might learn much. Like all new nations, those of the mediaeval West had yet to learn the value of tradition, and of continuous and patient effort for generations. Doubtless, like the young democracies of to-day, they often saw decadence and slackness where there was really a courageous grappling in a spirit of traditional patience with overwhelming problems. As crusaders the Eastern Emperors were far more methodical and persistent than the Western rulers. The latter were roused periodically by sensational means to a spasmodic effort, the former held for centuries the gate of Europe against a perpetual succession of sieges.

In 1071 one of the most dangerous of those sieges

(5) The
Turks.

reached a climax. It was in that year that the Seljuk Turks under Alp Arslan, their leader, defeated and captured Alexius's predecessor, Romanus IV, at the battle of Manzikert. In the same year Bari fell to the Normans. Simultaneously the hold of the Eastern Empire on Italy and on Asia Minor was completely lost. Between the Normans and the Turks the Empire was in a bad case. The Turks were almost as vigorous a race as the Normans. The Moslem world had now long been divided up between the orthodox Caliphs of Bagdad and the heterodox Caliphs of Cairo. The Seljuk Turks began to come into prominence as the mercenaries of the former—Seljuk, their leader, organized them into an independent force, and made himself the real ruler of the orthodox Mohammedan East. They easily swept as conquerors over the Caliph's domains, and the work of Seljuk was continued by a vigorous line of successors, the last of whom was Alp Arslan. There seemed little hope that Constantinople could hold out against the victor of Manzikert. Fortunately for Christendom, he died, on the morrow of his triumph, in 1072. Under his feeble successors, his territory fell apart into innumerable petty lordships, occupied by the military leaders of the Turkish army. Thus, in some respects, the Asia Minor of 1095 was not unlike the England of Domesday. Victorious military leaders of another race held rule over discontented citizens and tillers of the soil. But there were these important differences: firstly, that in the Turkish dominions, since the death of Alp Arslan, there was no one to correspond to the Norman kings. Secondly, that whereas almost at once the Normans lost their racial antipathy to the English, in Asia Minor the Turks made little effort to conciliate their Christian, and even their Moslem, subjects. The Christian kingdom of Armenia still remained as

a rallying-point for the former, the Egyptian caliphate was ready to take advantage of the discontent of the latter. Alexius, then, had some grounds for hope that Asia Minor might be recovered, if a vigorous effort could but be made at once.

Still the resources of the Eastern Empire were very low, and it occurred to Alexius that, fighting as he was the battles of Christendom, he might well appeal to Christendom for help. In 1095 he took the bold step of writing to Pope Urban II, asking for aid against the Turks. All history shows at once the temptation and the danger of this device. It was an evil hour for the Empire when Alexis asked Western Christendom to fight his battles for him. He could not have chosen his time better. To the Pope, the people, and the baronage of Europe his appeal was like a match to a train. The lull in the struggle of Empire and Papacy over the question of investitures made the Pope all the more eager to strengthen his hold on Europe, so as to force the Emperor to come to a settlement. Here was his opportunity. Already Hildebrand had proclaimed the duty of Europe to take up a Holy War against the Infidel. Just as Alexander II had blessed the attack of William of Normandy on the land of Harold and Stigand, the partisans of the anti-Pope, so Urban II threw himself eagerly into the project of an attack on the Turks. It would have been hard to find a more popular cause. Not that Europe was stirred by the troubles of Alexius. That would have required a political consciousness more sensitive than Europe had yet acquired. The cry which was raised was not 'Save Asia Minor for the Eastern Empire', but 'Save the Holy Sepulchre for Christendom'. Ever since the religious revival of the tenth century pilgrims had been flocking in greater and greater num-

(6) The appeal of Alexius.

(7) Reasons for its success.

bers to see for themselves the sacred places of Jerusalem. Not only did they feel, with child-like materialism, that such a visit made their religion more real, and actually brought them nearer to the Truth, but they were also encouraged to go by the fact that the Church had come to make the journey a means of penance for sins. Thus a wild figure in the feudal anarchy of France—Fulk of Anjou—actually journeyed several times to Jerusalem as the result of spasmodic attacks of terrified penitence. In these pilgrimages there was no doubt something of the spirit of adventure and the desire to see the world; there was also much real piety, and there was, as so often in the Middle Ages, a good deal of the business-like determination to avoid the consequences of ill deeds and the keenly realized horrors of Hell. Considering its dangers and difficulties, incredible numbers made the journey.

Of late, however, these dangers had been increased by the occupation of Jerusalem by the Seljuks, who were much less disposed than the Caliphs to allow to the Christians full freedom of movement and worship. This, added to the feeling that Christendom was disgraced by the Mohammedan occupation of her sacred places, made the project of reconquering Palestine a very popular one. In 1095 Urban II proposed the expedition at a council at Clermont in France. At once a common impulse moved the great body of those present to cry out 'Dieu le veut', 'Dieu le veut.' 'God wills it.'

(8) The Council of Clermont.

The aristocracy of Europe were touched to a certain extent by the same feeling. Mediaeval society was at once more cosmopolitan and more homogeneous than it has now become. In this sense feudal Europe may be said to have been intensely democratic. Like North America at the present time, mediaeval Europe had no

inherited or engrained class-distinctions of breeding and outlook, which could divide off the various strata of society into sharply defined groups with altogether different views and aims. There, as in the new democracy of the West, all men as regards intellect and standards of judgement were, broadly speaking, equal.

The Pope promised remission of sins to all the soldiers of Christ. It soon became a universal belief that Paradise awaited the man who died in the service of the Holy Sepulchre. All classes felt the appeal. Still the great barons of Europe did not contemplate going in search of purely spiritual benefits. The Crusade was taken up so eagerly partly because it offered to the great feudatories such prospects as those of which the Normans had already made such use. Especially does this apply to Bohemund of Tarento, son of Robert Guiscard, and nephew of Roger of Sicily.

Bohemund may be taken to stand for his age. He was the real leader of the first Crusade. He belongs to the type of his father and William the Conqueror, a strong and vigorous character, with a good deal of cynicism, the keenest eye to his own advantage, and all the Norman grasp of the possibilities of a situation. In the end, unlike many Normans, he failed. But in the meantime, beginning as a simple adventurer, he had founded a powerful state, exploited the crusade, and shaken the Eastern Empire to its foundations. He illustrates the rough material out of which the Church contrived to make the Army of Christ and the Holy Sepulchre. He illustrates, too, the energy and ambition of the baronage of the day, which kept twelfth-century Europe in a perpetual state of turmoil. Until such careers ceased to be open to such talents there was not much hope of a peaceful or an organic state of society.

(9) Bohemund of Tarento.

II. THE FIRST CRUSADE.

What with piety, ambition, and the love of adventure, the crusading movement soon stirred Europe from end to end. The exhortations of Urban II were followed by the ecstatic preaching of Peter the Hermit. Pope and Monk, here as so often again, worked by different methods for the same end. But it is idle to maintain that the initiative came from Peter. Monastic writers have a pardonable desire to exalt the work of a monk. But here, as elsewhere, injustice is done to the Papacy if it be represented as simply giving official sanction to the inspiration of a humble Christian. The credit of initiating the First Crusade belongs to Urban II.

(1) Peter
the
Hermit.

Peter, however, gathered a considerable following, chiefly among the poor. With these he actually set out for Palestine. The military leader of this helpless crowd was Walter the Penniless. Starving and unprotected themselves, they marked their way across Europe by massacres of Jews, and, when they at last reached Constantinople, must have given Alexius food for thought over his invocation to Western Christendom. Without ceremony he had them transported to Asia Minor. Here they fell in with the Turks, and the piles of their bones which marked the place remained to give an ill-omened greeting to later crusaders.

Meanwhile other bands, realizing the need of something more than enthusiasm, were slowly preparing. By 1097 a large force was collected on the shores of the Bosphorus. Coming by different routes from all over Europe, each band was alike led by the great feudatories. The Emperor and the King of France were excommunicated, the King of England deserved to be. Apart from these defects in their title to lead the Army of Christ, they were too much

preoccupied by difficulties at home. It was the same with Roger of Sicily. Spain was fully engaged with its own Moslem inhabitants. Bohemund the adventurer, Robert of Normandy, the feckless and irresponsible, and the great French feudatories, who were full of ambitions and restlessness, and tired of making war on each other at home, each brought a following whose enthusiasm was purer than their own. Raymond of Toulouse came with a band of Provençals and Italians across Dalmatia and Epirus. Godfrey and Baldwin de Bouillon, Baldwin of Hainault, and others with Northern French and German followers, came down the Danube. Another French force under Hugh of Vermandois and Robert of Normandy came by Brindisi and Epirus. Finally, the Normans of Italy and Sicily under Bohemund and his nephew Tancred took the familiar route to Constantinople—this time in a new capacity, as the Emperor's allies.

(2) The leaders of the Crusade.

Anna Comnena, the Emperor's accomplished daughter, has left a lively account of the advent of these redoubtable bands, whom Alexius was inclined to regard as unpaid mercenaries. Though susceptible to the rough charm of these vigorous chieftains, Anna represents them as the merest barbarians, insolent and overbearing, immensely impressed by the treasure-hoards of Alexius, but entirely without manners. It is easy to understand how the seeds of hostility to the Greeks came to be sown. With great difficulty Alexius prevailed on all the generals to swear allegiance to him. Having thus secured a nominal hold over them, he launched them and their armies at his enemies.

Their arrival at Constantinople.

The Crusaders had not been long in Moslem territories before it began to appear that they were involved in the pursuit of three incompatible policies. In the consequent conflict between the three their energy was soon absorbed.

(3) The three policies.

First, the policy of the Emperor, by whose guides they were to be shown the way to the Sepulchre and whose fleet might be of immense service to them, was that they should recover Asia Minor for him. As for Jerusalem, the strategic value of which was slight, he would probably be prepared to allow them to make what use of it they pleased. But the strategic points in the country must all, if possible, be kept under the Emperor's direct control.

Secondly, there was the policy of the generals. Anxious as they were to capture Jerusalem and fulfil the official object of the expedition, they were not prepared to spoil the infidels for another's benefit. Bohemund, especially, was on the look out for a principality, which he might hold of the Emperor by a nominal tenure, but which he was determined to rule for himself. Lastly, the general body of the host found an ally in the Papal legate, Adhemar of Puy, for their insistence on the fact that Jerusalem was the real object, and that it must be captured with all speed. Among the rank and file there was much keen partisanship in support of the various generals. But transcending this was a firm purpose to earn the promises of the Pope. The Crusaders were no ordinary soldiers. They were pilgrims first and soldiers afterwards.

(4) Nicaea
and Dory-
eum.

It was not long before the consequences of this division of purpose began to appear. When the Christians reached Nicaea they laid siege to it in due form. It was on the point of surrendering to them, when the envoys of Alexius arranged with the citizens a secret treaty by which the city was given up to the Greeks. The Crusaders, who had already driven off the forces of the Sultan of Nicaea and borne the whole burden of the siege, found it useless to protest. The gates were shut in their faces; there

was nothing for it but to press on to their goal. At Doryleum they at last involved the Turks in an open battle, having been badly harassed by the sharp-shooting of nimble Turkish mounted archers. The result was a great victory for the heavily armed Christians. They were learning nevertheless that the Turks, though infidels, could fight. It now became an object with the crusading forces to make a junction with the Christians of Armenia. But in crossing the central deserts of Asia Minor they endured terrible privations from the complete failure of their provisions. They had no commissariat and relied entirely on what the country could supply. At last, however, they reached the Cilician mountains.

Here a split occurred in the host. Godfrey de Bouillon's (5) Edessa. brother, Baldwin, turned aside from the main force and made his way east towards Armenia. When he reached the city of Edessa, he was warmly welcomed by its Christian ruler, who made him his heir. Baldwin, however, could not wait on events, he treacherously deposed his benefactor and early in 1098 declared himself Count of Edessa in his stead. No doubt a Christian state on the line between Armenia and Jerusalem was likely to prove a source of strength for the Christian hold on Syria. But Baldwin's methods were too drastic and his ambition too obvious to make his example a good one for the Crusaders. Within a year 'the Franks', as they were called in the East, had quarrelled with the Eastern Emperor and dispossessed a Christian prince.

Somewhat more respectable was the behaviour of the main army, which meanwhile took up the great task of the siege of Antioch. This fortress was the key of Asia Minor and Syria. Its possessor could control the seaboard of the Eastern Mediterranean and the communications between

Jerusalem and Constantinople as they could be controlled from nowhere else. Was it to be another Nicaea? If not, who was to be the Baldwin of this far more important county? It was Bohemund, with the business-eye of a true Norman, who secured and held the prize.

6) The
siege of
Antioch.

The siege of Antioch is one of the classic pages of mediaeval history. Though they called in all the scattered detachments which had separated from the main host in search of forage and plunder, the Christians were unable entirely to surround the city. The Moslem chiefs in the neighbourhood were divided by mutual rivalry, and the chief of them, Ridwan of Aleppo, refused to help Antioch. A fleet of English Crusaders had occupied Laodicea, and so made it possible for the besiegers to communicate with the sea. The Armenian Christians, both within Antioch and without, might be expected to be friendly to the Crusaders. On the other hand the capture of Antioch by storm was an enterprise for which the forces and the siege-train of the Christians were utterly inadequate; to starve the city out would have required an organized commissariat for the besiegers such as they could not possibly have obtained, several of the surrounding Moslem chiefs showed their intention of helping the besieged, and the Syrians and the Armenians, though they professed great friendliness for their fellow Christians, soon showed that they could not be relied on not to give at least equal assistance to the enemy. The capture of Antioch was essential for the success of the Crusade. But the Christians, who arrived before the city in October 1097, found themselves in February 1098 still as far from success as ever.

In that month, indeed, Bohemund won a useful victory over an attacking force of Moslems, now strengthened by the support of Ridwan, and this was followed up by the

building of two fortresses in the Christian lines as a means of making the investment of the city more complete. Bohemund, however, had already discovered a more effective means of capturing the prize. His prowess had by now given him, like Richard I in the Third Crusade, an unauthorized personal ascendancy in the leaderless host. He was able to prevail on the other chiefs to promise Antioch to the man who could capture it, and early in June he contrived to arrange for the betrayal of the city by a Syrian Christian within its walls. A small band under Bohemund were admitted at midnight on June 3, and by morning Bohemund's flag was flying over the finest prize of the Crusade.

As yet, however, Antioch was little more than a trap. Before the citadel had been captured the Christians were terrified by the arrival of a huge force under the Emir of Moussoul, Kerboga. Famine or slaughter seemed the only alternative before the Christians, many of whom fled from the city in despair. Instead came a miracle. Peter Bartholomew, a Provençal priest, announced that the Holy Lance which pierced Christ's side on the Cross was to be found buried by the altar of St. Peter's Church in Antioch. The lance was duly discovered. A party of the Crusaders led by Bohemund declared that it had been buried for the occasion, but this cynicism had no effect on the main body of the Crusaders, whose confidence was vastly increased by the evidence of Divine support. On June 28 in a mood of ecstatic enthusiasm the Christian host sallied out against Kerboga, who was quite unprepared for so spirited a movement.

The unwieldy levies of the infidels were seized with panic, their camp was captured, and Antioch was saved. Even among those who still refused to accept the vision of Peter Bartholomew, the result was so unexpected that

The
Holy
Lance.

Defeat of
Kerboga.

it could only be accounted for by miracles, and there is, in the most authentic accounts of eyewitnesses of the whole affair, an atmosphere of the supernatural which was soon developed into a wonderful legend. It is easy to understand from this episode the mood in which the Crusading host accomplished its pilgrimage. The strangeness of their infidel foes and of their Eastern surroundings made them inclined enormously to exaggerate the strength of the forces to which they were opposed. In spite of this, they had a faith in their cause and in the glorious rewards of death in its service, which made them dangerous enemies for the selfish, divided, and indifferent Turks, despite the latter's knowledge of the ground and familiarity with the conditions of warfare.

Bohemund now showed his hand. Antioch meant a great deal more to him than the Holy Sepulchre. He was determined to get rid of Raymond of Toulouse, who, with more than Bohemund's zeal as a Crusader, had also a desire to keep faith with Alexius, especially if it could be done at his rival's expense. Raymond declared that the city ought to be given up to the Greeks. In the end, however, he had to give way. Leaving a small force with Bohemund, he, with the rest of the host and many of the Normans, moved down towards Jerusalem. On reaching Tripoli, however, Raymond himself gave up the advance and settled down to found a rival county to Antioch. It seemed that Jerusalem would never be reached. The rank and file of the host were by now thoroughly weary of the selfish land-hunger of their leaders. They demanded to be led direct to Jerusalem. Already the Seljuks had been driven out of the Holy City by the Egyptian Caliph's troops. The Seljukian power was obviously crumbling. At last a much diminished band under Godfrey de

Bouillon reached the city, and captured it without much difficulty on July 15, 1099. A perfect orgy of mingled slaughter and pious rejoicings followed—it was said that the Christians waded up to their ankles in the blood of the infidels. Godfrey de Bouillon became ruler of Jerusalem, with the title of Defender of the Holy Sepulchre, and round his rather commonplace figure gathered a cloud of legend which made of him the leader of the Crusade from the very first. Urban II thus gives way in the Crusading epic to Peter the Hermit, and Bohemund and Raymond to Godfrey.

The object of the Crusade was now fulfilled, and thousands of the Crusaders returned home. Thus the defence of the Holy Places was left to just those of the host who had been least enthusiastic in its behalf and most inclined to look out for their own interests. It is the manner in which this fulfilment was attained which makes it true to say that the first was the only true Crusade. The First Crusade did actually, with enormous loss of life and ceaseless dispersion of energy, succeed in wresting the Holy Places from the hands of the degenerate and divided Moslems. Though no enemies could well have been weaker than those whom the Crusaders overcame; though treachery, cowardice, and division made the Turkish leaders contemptible foes, still the success of the Crusade remains a stupendous achievement. Without trustworthy guides, without sea-power, and without a commissariat, ignorant of the political conditions, the climate, and the methods of warfare of the East, distrusting and distrusted by the experienced Greeks, and alienating the Christian Armenians, with no single leader and no single policy, they yet succeeded where all other Crusaders failed. It is not the mere success, however, which makes their achievement so great. To what was

(7) The Capture of Jerusalem.

(8) Importance of the First Crusade.

that success due? Above all, to the sincerity and purpose of the rank and file. The enthusiasm which could make a harbinger of victory out of the dubious relic of the Holy Lance, and, in spite of unwilling leaders, could force its way on to Jerusalem—this was something which never again became a general inspiration in a Crusade. It reappears in the early voyages of the discoverers of the New World, and it still works at pushing forward the outposts of civilization. It makes the first Crusade something more than a piece of baronial land-hunting, something more than a move in the game of Pope and Emperor, or a suicidal effort of Byzantine scheming, something more even than the beginning of a long course of education which the West gained by a backward wave of movement towards the East. It makes it the first act of united Christendom. Under the banner of the Pope, the most selfish and anarchic element in Europe, the baronage, put itself at the head of a truly popular movement, which, for all its bloodthirstiness and fanaticism, pursued to the end a conscientious struggle for the common good. When such an enterprise could be undertaken, Europe must have begun to emerge from the Dark Ages. The mere struggle for existence—the perpetual state of war which had checked progress and absorbed all the energies of society for centuries, had at last given way to a beginning of social effort for a common cause. In its rough organization, its strong party spirit, combined with a general loyalty to the purpose of the whole, its religious faith and taste for bloodshed and adventure, the crusading host was a type in little of the Europe of its age.

III. THE CHRISTIAN STATES IN THE EAST

The Latin States in the East, once established, were surrounded by dangers. The very manner of their creation foretold that they would be only too liable to commit the most culpable blunder of all—to quarrel among themselves. Secondly, it was also clear that they would all, and especially the principality of Bohemund, have difficulties with the Eastern Empire. Thirdly, there was the effect of the climate and the new conditions on the physique and habits of the invaders. Fourthly, there was the difficulty of getting sea-power, or reinforcement from home, both necessary if they were to hold their own against the most obvious danger of all, the inevitable rise of some strong power in the East. An era of decay had always been followed in the Mohammedan world by the appearance of a vigorous despot, backed by a strong force. Every effort of the Christians should clearly be concentrated on the task of preparing to meet such a power. ^{(1) The situation in Syria.}

Three such efforts were certainly made—the organization of the Kingdom of Jerusalem under the Assizes of Jerusalem, the foundation of the Military Orders, and the alliance with the Italian cities. Under Godfrey and his successor Baldwin, who took the title of King and began a vigorous rule in 1100, the State of Jerusalem was gradually organized on a strict feudal model, the constitution of which was afterwards given final form in the famous Assizes of Jerusalem,¹ the most complete record of a strictly feudal system of society. Weak as was their hold on the coast-line of Syria, the Christians ^{(2) The organization of Jerusalem.}

¹ The Assizes of Jerusalem in their final form were drawn up late in the thirteenth century by a body of lawyers in Cyprus, who took as the basis for their work the laws of Godfrey and his successors.

set to work to reconstruct there the exact conditions of their European homes. Just as modern democracy has been developed in the British Colonies and in the United States with a logical completeness unknown in Europe, so the Assizes of Jerusalem represent the logical development of mediaeval feudalism. Syria was divided up into large fiefs, each held by the possessor of one of those great castles on which depended the Christian hold on the land, and the whole pyramid of feudal relationships was set up with the Syrian peasants as its base. One curious result of strict adherence to the feudal law was that women became exceedingly prominent in the politics of Palestine. Under the strict law of succession an heiress held precisely the same rights as an heir. In the East war and the climate killed off the men very fast, women suffered less from both, and therefore fief after fief fell into the hands of heiresses, who handed on their possessions to one husband after another. Physical geography made mediaeval Palestine the happy hunting-ground of the heiress and the widow. Still the feudal organization was better than none. The Kingdom of Jerusalem, which began from a tiny garrison with a precarious hold on four towns, Jerusalem, Caiaphas, Ramla, and Jaffa, gradually came to include the whole coast-line except Tyre and Ascalon, which were not taken till 1124 and 1142 respectively. Moreover, Baldwin began to claim suzerainty over the other principalities, and in 1109, when Raymond finally secured Tripoli, received homage from him as its Count.

(3) The
Military
Orders.

The Military Orders had scarcely begun to be powerful by 1122. But from the first an association had been begun to maintain a hospital for the Jerusalem pilgrims. Out of this grew the great order of Hospitallers, equally important as a charitable institution and as a fighting

force. The Templars did not begin till 1123 as a band of eight knights who bound themselves to protect the road to Jerusalem. Later these Orders were to prove the one stable element of the military situation in the Christian East. They have been compared to a lance lying right across Europe with its steel head in the Holy Land. That is to say, they had houses all over Christendom which acted as recruiting stations for the foundations in Palestine, which were kept constantly supplied with a stream of warriors. Both Orders were semi-monastic in character, and put their members under a vow of chastity.

If the new Orders were to provide something of a military garrison, other means were taken to secure sea-power. Perhaps no body of men got more positive benefit from the Crusade than the Burghers. All over Europe they saw their worst enemies setting off to meet an edifying death in the East, and leaving behind them safer roads and a more peaceful country-side. Moreover, the new contact with the East gave a great impulse to trade. As ^{(4) The Italian cities.} Spain, France, Holland, and England were to take advantage of the discovery of the New World, so the Italian cities, Pisa, Genoa, and Venice, were peculiarly well placed to reap the benefit of the conquest of the Syrian seaboard. The sea-power which the new states so urgently needed was already held by the Italian seaports, whose fleets soon made themselves useful to the resident Franks, deserted by the returned Crusaders. In each important city, as it was captured, a quarter was set apart as a factory for the Italians, with valuable privileges attached to it. Thus were founded depôts through which flowed a growing volume of trade, stimulated, on the one side by the wants of the Crusaders, and on the other by the demand for Eastern products which

(5) The
Eastern
Empire.

the returned pilgrims brought with them. Hitherto the only gateway of the East had been Constantinople. Now the Greek Empire was to discover that, besides the suspicious and turbulent Crusaders, her dangerous policy had introduced rivals in trade and maritime enterprise more dangerous even than the Normans. Alexius however hoped, by dividing the cities, to maintain his own position. He gave considerable privileges to the Venetians, which they rankly abused. War followed, under his successor John, in which the Venetians won many successes. In spite of an alliance with Genoa, the Emperor was forced to make peace, leaving the Venetian privileges untouched. Meanwhile, in 1111, Alexius gave the Pisans a privileged position at Constantinople. The fruits of Byzantine diplomacy seemed fated to go to the other parties. Alexius was more fortunate with Bohemund, who found the greatest difficulty in maintaining himself in Antioch. In 1101 he was captured by the Turks and remained in captivity till 1103; he then returned to Europe, where he hoped to raise a force against the Emperor, and so to vindicate the independence of Antioch, and secure a hold on Cicilia and Pamphylia. In 1107 he was defeated by the Greeks in the neighbourhood of Durazzo, and was obliged to promise to restore the lands in Asia Minor which he had seized, and to become the Emperor's vassal for Antioch. Eventually, Bohemund's successor, Tancred, repudiated this obligation and Antioch again became independent. Thus the Latin States continued to hamper themselves by their grasping and insulting attitude towards Constantinople. Both Franks and Greeks lost much by this unwise attitude. Only by the loyal co-operation of the Christian powers could Jerusalem be held for any time against the Moslems,

But if the Franks quarrelled with the Greeks, they were just as ready to fight one another. In this they resembled the Emirs of the cities which remained in Moslem hands. Thus some curious situations arose. Bohemund's nephew Tancred, one of the most turbulent spirits in the East, was for ever forming plans against the Christian princes. On one occasion he appears as the ally of Ridwan, Emir of Aleppo, against Baldwin of Edessa. Baldwin had been captured by the Turks, but set free by one of two rivals for the city of Moussoul whom he promised to help against the other. Thus two alliances of Christian and Mohammedan princes appeared one against the other. Again, when Bohemund was in captivity, Tancred took possession of his lands and refused to ransom him. Bohemund was eventually paid for by an Armenian prince. Tancred also captured Raymond of Tripoli in 1102. All through its history the Frankish tenure of power in the East was disgraced by similar episodes. Still, it might have been possible, by a consistent policy of friendliness towards Moslem princes, to build up a system of alliances which might have given a sound basis to the Christian kingdom. There remains another element in the situation which made this impracticable. It is the habit to speak as if there were merely seven or eight Crusades in the whole course of mediaeval history. But the numbers which are given to these Crusades are merely arbitrary. Between the First and the Second Crusade occurred a number of large and important expeditions. That of 1101 was a vast host, including, besides the usual number of French, many Italians and Germans. The Margrave of Austria and the Duke of Bavaria were among its leaders. The expedition failed utterly; the only person who benefited was Raymond of Toulouse, who was able to make good his

(6) Quarrels among the Franks.

(7) The later Crusades.

hold on Tripoli. The plan had been to rescue Bohemund and take Bagdad. But in truth the undisciplined hordes who threw themselves with slowly diminishing ardour on the road to Jerusalem did more harm than good. They were fanatics convinced of the personal merit to be acquired by the indiscriminate slaughter of Mussulmans. They were ignorant and careless of the diplomacy of the Franks, and always ready to accuse them of being traitors to Christendom. Thus each band of reinforcements from Europe tended to sever the relations of the two Faiths in the East. It also had the disastrous effect of stirring up religious sentiment among the Mohammedans. If the enemies of the Franks once caught the spirit of 'the Holy War' it would be an evil day for the Christians.

As yet, indeed, the Moslems showed but little of such spirit. The Egyptian Caliph's forces were driven out of Syria in 1099 with ridiculous ease. A single great defeat was inflicted on the Christians between 1100 and 1144. In 1104 Bohemund planned a great expedition into Mesopotamia against the city of Harran. He was defeated and his army ruined—a disaster from which he never recovered, and which lowered Antioch permanently to the position of a second-rate state. Such were the elements which contributed to maintain the perilous existence of the Latin States in the East.

IV. NON-CRUSADING EUROPE

Meanwhile the achievements of the great barons as the leaders of European enterprise in the East had affected in various ways the other leaders of European society. We have seen the advantages gained by the towns. It remains to discuss the achievements during

the period between 1095 and 1122 of the Emperor and the kings of Europe.

Spain played little part in the Crusade in Syria, for the reason that her own princes were themselves faced by a situation almost exactly similar to that of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. In 1085, the year of Gregory VII's death, Alfonso VI of Castile and Leon captured Toledo. This was a magnificent triumph for the Christians against the now decadent and over-civilized Moslem states. Alarmed by the prospect of a great career of conquest by the Christian states, the Moslem princes called in the leader of a fanatical Mohammedan sect in Africa, Yousouf the Almoravide, who, like Seljuk in the East, had made himself the dominant power in the Western Moslem world. Yousouf gladly responded, hurried into Spain, and in 1086 crushed Alfonso at the battle of Zallaca. Fortunately for Castile he had to return at once to Africa, where his power was threatened by the death of his son. Otherwise he might well have swept north to the Pyrenees. As it was, on his return, it was against the Moslem states that he directed his efforts. These had now long fallen from the Puritan ideals of the orthodox Moslem faith, their inhabitants drank wine and lived luxurious lives, surrounded by poets and musicians. In civilization and refinement of taste they were far ahead of their Christian neighbours. Yousouf set to work to sweep away what he regarded as mere impiety and decadence. King after king fell before him, leaving poets, musicians, and wives to their fate, and soon of all the principalities of Spain only Saragossa remained independent of the Almoravides. At last, in 1098, Yousouf turned again to deal with the Christian states. He began by overthrowing the famous Rodrigo Diaz of Bivar, known as the Cid Campeador. Like the

(1) The situation in Spain.

(2) Advance of the Almoravides.

Eastern Crusade, the adventurous wars of the Western Christians on the Mohammedan frontiers accumulated round themselves a wealth of legend. Just as Godfrey de Bouillon became the ideal Christian hero and the man who decapitated oxen by a stroke of his sword, so the Cid was made the model of all the virtues of Chivalry. In real life he was a fierce and energetic leader of an army which he created himself, and which he put up for sale, now to the Christians and now to the Moslems. Fighting with equal vigour for any one who would employ him, he eventually became himself the founder of a state—he conquered Valencia from its Moorish ruler and held this distant outpost for the Christians, but he was defeated by the Almoravides and his army destroyed in 1098. He was a kind of Western Tancred, more successful, but equally unscrupulous.

Fall of the
Cid.

(3) The
Rise of
Aragon.

This success was soon followed up by the Moslems. In 1108 they met and overthrew the army of Castile. But the defeat of Castile was followed by the emergence of Aragon. Under Alfonso the Battler, Aragon became the rallying-point of those who were opposed to the rule of the African Almoravides, both Christians and Moslems. He was favoured by the break-up of the African empire of Yousouf's successors, and the disgust which their intolerance and bigotry awoke among the Moors. By 1122 a rival sect, the Almohades, had followed in their footsteps as religious reformers, and had already begun to attack their power. They were in their turn to sweep over Spain, meet a great Crusading movement drawn from all over Europe under the leadership of Alfonso, and to overthrow him, and with him the position which he had won for Aragon, at the battle of Fraga in 1134.

Thus at either end of the Mediterranean somewhat similar conditions ruled. But the Spaniards, with the

mountains of Northern Spain behind them, were far better placed than the Syrian Christians. They had also a larger population to draw upon. But in both cases there was a tendency to establish relations with the Moslems not recognized by the strict spirit of the fanatical Crusader. In both cases there was much to fear from the awakening of religious fervour against the Christians. The Spanish kings, like those of the rest of Europe, held but a limited power. They had little control over their great nobles, who could, like the Cid, often carve out practically independent principalities for themselves, as did Raymond and Baldwin in the East. As in Palestine so in Spain, the towns were all important in defence, and had already begun to receive privileges as military posts. An interesting and important feature of Spanish organization was the Cortes or Parliaments of the various states, which however as yet had not developed the representation of the towns and the third estate. Still, like the *Magnum Concilium* of the Norman kings, they were already a check on royal absolutism. In the early Middle Ages, in fact, Spain gives curiously few indications of the direction which her development was to take. There were as yet few traces of that religious fanaticism which was to make Spain the home of bigotry, tyranny, and intolerance.

At the opposite end of Europe, the north-east of Germany, the cause of Christianity was also favoured by fortune. While Germany was absorbed in the Investiture struggle, the Slavs might well have made use of the occasion to push west of the Elbe. Instead, they remained indifferent to the future danger of a German reawakening, and the only Slav power in north-eastern Europe which had any policy directed it against the Slavs of Pomerania. The great Boleslas of Poland,

(4) The Slavonic Powers.

whose predecessor had been the champion of Hildebrand, forced his way north to secure an outlet to the Baltic for the vast kingdom which he had built up in the centre of Europe, and called in a German bishop to convert his new subjects to Christianity. Thus one who might have been a deadly enemy to German eastern expansion, actually prepared the way for it. Like Spain, Poland was to have a strange and unfortunate history, and never to hold in Europe the place to which it seemed entitled. The Emperors at any rate escaped the consequences of their neglect of German interests in the north-east.

The respite and diversion caused by the Crusades was of the greatest value to England and France. Just as Henry I of England owed his succession to the throne to the absorption of his brother Robert in the Crusade, so (5) France. Louis VI of France undoubtedly gained by the fact that most of the Crusading leaders came from France. Louis VI succeeded his father Philip in 1108. He had already begun the task which was to occupy his life, the conquest, bit by bit, castle by castle, of the royal domain. The Capetian house was itself only one among a host of feudal families between whom Northern France was divided up. Only by obtaining a basis in well-organized hereditary estates could it hope to secure any hold at all over its rivals. The work which William the Bastard did for Normandy by his victory of Val-è-dunes, Louis did for the Île de France by his long struggles with his insubordinate and turbulent vassals in the neighbourhood of Paris. The men with whom he had to deal belonged to the worst type of feudal anarchist, who feared neither God nor man, and were the scourges of the country-side. Louis soon realized how superior as landholders were his clerical feudatories, who, whatever their faults, were at

least as a rule on the side of order. The object of his life came to be to open up communications between these clerical fiefs, to defend them in their encounters with the lay powers, and to make them the nuclei of a reorganized domain. Only such a man could have undertaken and persevered in so petty and insignificant, and, at the same time, vital and difficult, a task.

Indeed if this had been all, Louis would have been comparatively well off. But his enemies within his own domain were consistently abetted by others without it. Normandy and England on the one side, Champagne and Blois on the other, were equally hostile to him. Theobald of Champagne and Blois was the ruler of broader lands than his own; Henry I of England and Normandy became one of the most powerful men in Europe. Fortunately, in Flanders, Louis found a staunch ally, against both Theobald and Henry. To the southwest of Normandy, too, the Duke of Anjou kept Henry busy by his defence of Touraine, which Henry claimed. Both Flanders and Anjou, moreover, were helped by the internal troubles of Normandy, where Henry's brother Robert and his nephew William Clito were disputing with him the possession of the duchy. Robert, it is true, had been badly defeated in 1106 at the battle of Tenchebrai. But Louis of Flanders and Fulk of Anjou became the allies of his son William Clito in a four years' struggle to recover the duchy. However, in 1119 Henry defeated Louis at Brémule, and next year a peace was agreed to between the two kings. It is easy to understand why Louis played no part in the Crusade. By coming forward steadily as the friend of the poor and the supporter of the Church, he was just able to hold his own. By going off to Palestine, he stood to lose much and to gain nothing. Under him the French monarchy begins that career of

(6) The enemies of Louis VI.

good fortune which gives the impression that nothing which affected it for the next two centuries could fail to turn to its advantage.

V. EMPIRE AND PAPACY

The abstention of the King of France from the Crusade, then, did him little harm. It was otherwise with the Emperor. According to the fitness of things, he should have been at the head of the movement of united Christendom. In 1101 Henry IV actually took the cross. But the situation in Italy and Germany made it impossible for the Emperor to set out for Asia Minor.

Failure of Henry IV. While Henry I and Louis VI were forming compact kingdoms within Great Britain and France, the Salian Emperors continued to lose the grip which Henry III had held on Germany. Besides the constant menace of Saxony, there was danger from Bavaria, where the house of Welf, Dukes of Swabia, as yet unhampered by the rivalry of the Hohenstaufens of Wibelin, were growing steadily stronger. The attempt of the Emperors to found a territorial domain in South Saxony, with its centre at Goslar, broke down utterly from Saxon hostility. In 1104 Henry's son Henry succeeded to the position of his brother Conrad (who died in 1101) as his father's enemy. Supported by the Pope, he made war on the old Emperor; next year he forced him to abdicate; finally Henry IV died in 1106, unfortunate to the end. Under such conditions there was little hope of Germany becoming the counterpart of England or France. In Italy things were worse still. Since 1097 Henry had

abandoned any attempt to make his power felt there, and since then had not even crossed the Alps.

Henry V had not made an auspicious start. He soon found that it was impossible for him to remain on good terms with the Pope. On the other hand, the prospect of following in his father's footsteps was not an attractive one. But he had the good fortune to be faced by milder Popes than Hildebrand had been. Urban II had indeed won a triumph with the Crusade. But his successor Paschal II was not so strong a figure. In 1110 Henry set out for Italy to be crowned at Rome. His journey was a brilliant success. He marched triumphantly through Lombardy, and when he approached Rome was met by a Papal legation offering terms for the settlement of the Investiture dispute. Paschal's proposal was that the Emperor should hand over to the Church all claim to the right of investiture. In return, the Church was to give up all the lands and temporal possessions which she and her members held of the lay powers. Here was a solution as simple as it was complete. The lay power could not quarrel with the investiture by the Church of men who were to exercise a purely spiritual dominion. Henry accepted the conditions. But at his coronation a terrible riot broke out, fomented by the clergy, who were indignant at the light-hearted sacrifice of the Church's possessions by the Pope. For the moment, however, Henry was master of the situation; his troops extinguished the riot and he had the Papal 'Privilegium', as it was called, duly confirmed. He returned in triumph to Germany.

(2) Henry V
and
Paschal II.

Paschal, however, discovered that he had promised more than he could carry out. At a synod in 1112 he solemnly revoked what his advisers declared was not a 'Privilegium' but a 'Pravilegium'. Next year a revolt

3) Failure
of Pas-
chal's
negotia-
tion.

broke out in Saxony, and in 1115 Henry was defeated by the rebels at the battle of Welfesholze. It was obviously impossible for him to enforce the Papal concession. On Paschal's death, Gelasius continued to oppose him, and by 1118 he was back again in his father's position as the champion of an anti-pope. Thus came to nought what might have been a revolution of almost unexampled extent in the history of Europe. It is impossible to say what would have been the result had the Church ceased, on the threshold of the twelfth century, to hold land. One thing is certain; if her influence might have become purer, it would have been far less extended. Without their allies, the rich bishops of France and Germany, the kings would have been sorely hampered in their attempts to make their authority felt. If the monasteries had ceased to be landlords, agriculture and colonization would have been kept back. The whole structure of society would have been different. But it is obvious that such a condition could never have been carried into practice. The Church could never have remained in a condition of 'apostolic poverty'. Either in open defiance of the law, or through some transparent subterfuge, land would still have passed into the hands of those who had such a hold over the minds and imaginations of men. Still Paschal II had a long line of successors in his advocacy of the renunciation of the Church's temporalities.

By a curious piece of irony, the rule of Paschal II saw the most important of all the acquisitions of Papal territory made. In 1114 the Countess Matilda died. All her great estates in Tuscany and elsewhere in Northern and Central Italy were left to the Pope. Matilda, who had been the staunchest supporter of Hildebrand, had married, at an advanced age in 1089, the eighteen-year-old son of Welf of Bavaria, thus joining forces with the

Emperor's enemies in Germany. By her will she left her lands to be fought for by the Pope, the Emperor, and the Guelphs. Henry at once disputed the right of his vassal to leave fiefs held from him to his enemy, the Pope. He invaded Italy and attempted to take possession of Matilda's estates.

The Emperors, still struggling against the Pope's right to appoint and control bishops in Germany and Italy, had now to struggle against the Pope's right to hold imperial fiefs in Italy. Just as the Norman kings had secured a firm hold on the castles, forests, and royal domains in England, just as Louis VI was slowly conquering the royal domain in France, so the Popes began to come forward as territorial rulers in their turn. In theory their claim to be such was based sometimes on the Donation of Constantine, a document, afterwards proved to be a forgery, by which Constantine was supposed to have given to the Popes the powers of the representatives of the Roman Empire in the West, when he retired to Constantinople; more often on the Privileges granted to the Papacy by Pepin, Charles the Great, and Otto I. In fact it was to rest upon the famous donation of Matilda. Apparently the Emperor was to be the only sovereign with nothing but shadowy rights, unsupported by the possession of a permanent territory.

Thus the effect of the years 1095 to 1122 A.D. on the main theme of European history, was to give a great advantage in prestige and also in actual power to the Popes as against the Emperors. In spite of steady progress in England, Sicily, and France, a brilliant experiment in Poland, and many successes in Spain and Jerusalem, the cause of nations and of their kings made very little obvious advance. As yet the leadership of Europe is divided between the Popes and the turbulent adventurers

(4) The
Donation
of Matilda.

like the Cid, Bohemund, Baldwin, Raymond, and Tancred, who might, as William the Conqueror had done, become the founders of nation-states, but who were just as likely to be, as was Theobald of Champagne, the champions of feudal independence and the abettors of anarchy.

CHAPTER II

THE AGE OF ST. BERNARD

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I. THE EMPIRE AND GERMANY, 1122-1153

THE Donation of Matilda, if it began a new phase in the Papal and Imperial rivalry, was followed by the closing of the disputes which since the days of Hildebrand had kept the two rulers of Europe at war. In 1122, by

the Concordat of Worms, a compromise was arrived at on the Investiture question very similar to that which, fifteen years before, had reconciled Henry I of England and Anselm. The Pope, Calixtus II, showed himself a considerable diplomatist. Henry V was obliged to give up the formal investiture of the Bishop Elect with the ring and staff—the symbols of his office. He had also to promise to restore to the Pope all the Papal domains which he held. The Pope on his side promised that the election of Bishops should be duly performed according to the Church Canons, but in the presence of the Emperor, and that in cases of dispute the Emperor should decide between the candidates. Finally the Bishop was to make a full acknowledgement of all his feudal obligations to the Emperor. The settlement was more favourable to the Church than was the Concordat of Bec. Anselm had agreed that the Bishop should himself take ring and staff from the altar. Thus the impressive ceremony of investiture was to be performed neither by a clerical nor a lay authority. In the end, however, such details made little difference. Henceforth, in the relations of Pope and Emperor, the investiture question ceased to hold first place. But the real subject of debate was left undecided. In cases of conflict between Pope and Emperor, were the Bishops, those great princes both of the Church and the Empire, to follow the one or the other? The answer was still ungiven by 1254. At the moment, however, the Emperor was satisfied that, by his informal influence over elections, he would be able to secure that only such men as were agreeable to him should be chosen to fill the Bishoprics of Germany. The Pope on his side, by keeping in his hands or those of the clergy the solemn symbolical act by which the Bishop was consecrated, hoped that he had the means of

impressing on men's minds (never so strongly influenced by outward symbols as in the Middle Ages) the fact that if the Bishops were the subjects and servants of the lay power, they were, first and foremost, Churchmen, and in allegiance bound to the Pope. In truth, for the spiritual power to give up investiture, as for the lay power to give up control of elections, would have been suicidal. The question was therefore left open, and, instead of fighting over Bishops, Pope and Emperor in future fought over land. The Emperor had maintained his hold on the German Church; he now began to wrestle with the Pope for the government of Italy.

Scarcely had the question, which had occupied them so much, dropped out of sight, when the line of Salian Emperors came to an end. In 1125 Henry V died. His career had been little less of a failure than that of his father, whom he had helped to degrade. With Saxony to the north and the Popes to the south as their inveterate enemies, the last two Franconians had failed both to maintain the high prestige of Henry III and to establish in Central Germany an imperial domain.

Henry was succeeded by Lothair of Supplinburg, the old and highly respectable Duke of Saxony. This election was due in part to the strong position which rebellious Saxony had held under the now extinct line of Franconia, but partly also, like so many imperial elections,² to the fact that his rival was too strong a man. The rival was Frederick of Hohenstaufen, Duke of Swabia, nephew of Henry V. Frederick's brother Conrad had succeeded the dead Emperor as Duke of Franconia. The other magnates of Germany feared to add to this powerful family the additional prestige of the Empire. Frederick acquiesced in the disappointment, but Conrad in 1127 got himself chosen King both in Germany and Italy, and

(2) Lothair.

was solemnly crowned in the great Church of St. Ambrogio at Milan. Lothair declared him an outlaw, and went on to arrange the marriage of his daughter Gertrude to Henry the Proud, Duke of Bavaria, one of the great Guelph rivals of the house of the Hohenstaufens in Southern Germany, the Guelphs. Thus Henry became heir to Saxony. In 1135 peace was restored, and Conrad gave up his claims. But already it was clear that the long struggle of the Franconian Henrys against rebellious Saxony and Bavaria had survived the change of dynasty. The Hohenstaufens in Swabia and Franconia had already come forward as the rivals of the Saxon house, strengthened by the alliance of the Guelphs of Bavaria. Apart from his powerlessness to root out this dangerous feud, Lothair's rule stands out as a rare period of prosperity and success in Germany. Since the days of Henry the Fowler, Saxony had been the bulwark of north-eastern Germany against the Slavs. Lothair took up again the policy of eastern expansion supported by the Emperor. In 1134 he gave the Nordmark, which had long been the eastern outpost of Saxony, to Albert the Bear, famous in history as the founder of the Ascanian house. Albert was extraordinarily successful in his first efforts to enlarge the narrow strip of territory to which the Nordmark had shrunk. Beside the support of the Emperor he had that of the Church. Two of the most famous Churchmen of the age, Norbert of Magdeburg and Bernard of Clairvaux, took service, so to speak, under Albert the Bear, the one as a colonizing and missionary organizer, the other as a recruiting sergeant. The Archbishop of Magdeburg spread Christianity among the Slavs, and by his fame as a saint attracted colonies of monks from all over Europe to help him in the work. The See of Magdeburg was given by the Pope supremacy over

The
House of
Hohen-
staufen.

(3) Lo-
thair and
Albert the
Bear.

the Polish Church, hitherto independent of any German See. St. Bernard, who roused the crusading enthusiasm of Europe in 1147, sanctioned the sending of an expedition as a branch of the main crusade to help Albert the Bear. The Crusaders, as usual a fanatical and undisciplined force, did, it is true, little good and considerable harm. Still, it was well that Europe should realize the importance of making head against the menace of the Slavs in the north-east. Lastly, the Wends themselves gave perhaps the greatest impetus to the fortunes of the Ascanian Margrave. The Wendish Duke of Brandenburg, converted to Christianity, made Albert the heir to his Duchy. Thus he became the founder of a new line of Brandenburg Dukes, destined in the end to become the equals of the Guelphs and the Hohenstaufens themselves.

Under Lothair, then, despite his two expeditions to Italy, Germany became, once again, true to herself. Her central government, instead of being the target of treason and insurrections, became the inspirer of territorial expansion. When the Emperor was fighting the Pope, and the Saxons the Emperor, it was only the fortunate apathy of the Slavs which saved Germany from the danger of dismemberment from without. That danger was now at an end. When Lothair died in 1137, Conrad of Hohenstaufen succeeded him. Here again the weaker man was chosen, for by this time the Guelphs had outstripped their rivals. Henry the Proud, Lothair's son-in-law, was incomparably the strongest man in Germany. The elective principle, which had been in abeyance under the Salian line, was taking firm root in the Empire. The inevitable result, that each Emperor in turn was more or less pledged to undermine his predecessor's work, showed itself under the first Hohenstaufen. He

was chosen as an anti-Papal candidate against the Papalist house of Guelph, and on any grounds he was bound to attempt to shatter the power of the Bavarian Duke. He began by giving Saxony to Albert the Bear, and followed this up by giving Bavaria to his half-brother, Leopold IV, Margrave of Austria. As a piece of Hohenstaufen policy this was excellent. Even if Albert and Leopold failed to dispossess Henry (and the Emperor could give them little help) they could always be thorns in his side, and checks on the expansion of his territory.

(4) Conrad
III and
the
Guelphs.

From the point of view of German national advance few acts could have been more fatal. Albert and Leopold, instead of pushing on beyond the Elbe and down the Danube, were invited to turn to the west and waste themselves in a futile endeavour to undermine a great German house. Saxony and Bavaria, which had been their supporters under Lothair, now became their rivals. Henry the Proud drove Albert out of Saxony, but died in 1139 before he could do the same to Leopold in Bavaria. In 1142 Conrad was reconciled to Henry's son, Henry the Lion, and gave him back Saxony. In regard to Bavaria there was an attempt at a compromise. Henry the Lion's mother married Leopold's brother and successor, Henry, called, from his favourite oath, Jasomirgott. Thus the Babenberg house of Austria, allied with the Guelphs, seemed likely to weld Bavaria and Austria into a single power. But Henry the Lion refused to be dispossessed by his step-father. In 1151, while Jasomirgott was away on crusade, he claimed Bavaria. When Conrad came back from Palestine after the disastrous failure of the second crusade, Henry and his brother Guelph were in open rebellion against the Emperor. They were still unsubdued when Conrad died in 1152.

Thus in the history of Germany, the rule of Lothair and of the first Hohenstaufen Emperor saw the beginning of what is known as the struggle of Guelph and Ghibelline—the latter being the name taken by the Hohenstaufens from their family castle of Wibelin in Swabia. Already, when the Franconian Emperors were struggling with rebellious Saxony, the Guelphic house of Bavaria had begun to oppose, in a bitter local rivalry, the Ghibelline house of Hohenstaufen. Then a Saxon became Emperor and married his heiress to a Guelph, while the last of the Franconians left a Hohenstaufen as the heir of his duchy. The death of the Saxon Emperor is followed by the election of the Hohenstaufen, who thereupon finds himself confronted, as his Franconian predecessors had been, by the opposition of Saxony, now more powerful than ever through its union with Bavaria under the Guelphs. Thus it is true to say that the twelfth-century rivalry of Guelph and Ghibelline is the direct lineal descendant of the eleventh-century struggle of Saxon and Salian.

(5) Guelphs and Ghibellines.

II. THE TWELFTH-CENTURY CHURCH

If the period 1122-1153 saw Germany become the battle-ground of the great Dukes, in Europe generally its character is given to it by the figure of a monk. The success of the Church at Worms, the extinction of the Salian Emperors and the absorption of the Emperors in Germany, favoured a movement which was already inevitable. By 1122 a monastic revival was already overdue. The last such revival had been that which had the monastery of Cluny as its source and centre, which had inspired Hildebrand, civilized the Normans, and typified the emergence of Europe from the Dark

(1) Cluny. Ages. Everywhere had been raised great round-arched monasteries and churches, modelled on that of Cluny, and built in that Romanesque style which the Normans may be said to have introduced into England. The reformed Benedictine rule of the Cluniacs seemed to the men of the tenth century to offer the best type of earthly life: it was embraced by many of the finest minds of the day, and thus came to include among its members at once the best and most cultured elements in contemporary Europe. The Norman abbey of Bec, which included among its priors the great statesman Lanfranc, and the great philosopher Anselm, is a type of the high standard maintained by the monasteries and the diversity of types included in them. A whole epoch in the history of European civilization dates from the foundation, in the early tenth century, of Cluny.

But by 1100 Cluny and the Benedictine houses of its type had almost done their work. Age and prosperity had made them, not reformers, but supporters of the existing order. Their organization, which left each house practically independent was not knit close enough for the ideals of the new age. Peter the Venerable, the kindly, wise, and tolerant Abbot of Cluny in the days of Lothair and Conrad, was typical of the condition of his order. It was like a modern aristocracy of birth, worldly-wise, public-spirited, hospitable and conservative, but apt to be treated unsympathetically in an age of rapid progress. It is characteristic that the monk who is handed down as the preacher of the first Crusade was not a Cluniac father, but an obscure and vagrant hermit.

The Cluniac monks, then, had ceased to lead society. It does not by any means follow that monasticism was out of date. It was still true of Europe that the career which had most attraction for the real leaders of public

opinion was retirement from the world. The Cluniacs had lost their influence on the world because they had lived in it too much. A new retreat must therefore be created from which those who were to mould their generation should work.

On the threshold of the twelfth century began ^{(2) The Monastic Revival.} a new movement of asceticism. In 1098 Robert of Molesme founded the order of Cîteaux, near Dijon. In the same year, at Grenoble, was founded the order of Chartreuse. In 1120 St. Norbert founded at Prémontré near Laon, that of the Premonstratensians. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of this monastic epidemic is the foundation in the early twelfth century of the two great military orders, the Hospitallers and the Templars. By these was carried one step further the work of the Church in civilizing the fighting-man. When St. Bernard, after some hesitation, became the champion of the Templars, he proclaimed with characteristic fervour the splendid contrast between the ordinary knight and these fasting and praying soldiers of Christ, who carefully eschewed not only the self-indulgence and the vices, but the gorgeous costumes and accoutrements of the secular warrior. That a section of the baronage should realize that they could fight more efficiently as well as lead better lives by forming themselves into a community under the shadow of the Church, illustrates in the most striking way the extent to which the mediaeval Church represented efficiency and organization.

Of the spirit which inspired this monastic revival, ^{St. Bernard.} St. Bernard, who became in 1115 abbot of Clairvaux, the latest colony of the Cistercians, is the finest example. All the new orders were ascetic. St. Bernard shattered his digestion for life by over-fasting as a young man, and seems scarcely ever to have changed his under-

clothing. Of conversation, of garments, of food, of sleep, all the monks were as sparing as was humanly possible. They eschewed secular learning and lost themselves in inward contemplation. It was one of the rules of the Cistercians that all should work in the fields to make the monastery as self-supporting as possible. St. Bernard nourished a most active and vigorous mind almost solely on the Bible and the Fathers. His sermons and works were many of them from end to end an ingenious mosaic of Biblical quotations. He so mortified fine powers of observation that he once travelled the whole length of the Lake of Lucerne without being so much as conscious of the magnificent scenery. He would return from interviews with Popes and Kings to take up again his spade and hoe in the laborious work of mediaeval agriculture. In spite of their vigorous life the vast majority of those who flocked to join the new orders had for their monastery and companions a strong and genuine love, and for their vocation the enthusiasm of men who felt that they had found the key to life. St. Bernard, who was himself of noble birth and saw Europe, its courts and cities, from end to end, always came back with joy to his 'children' at Clairvaux. Looked up to as they were universally as preachers and examples, the best of the monks knew the value of the advice, 'Physician, heal thyself.' Again and again St. Bernard was offered great positions, but much as he gave up for others, for no one and nothing would he give up being abbot of Clairvaux. Unlike many subsequent prophets and public men, when he was informal adviser to all Europe, he never ceased to believe that 'the first duty of the monk was to weep' over his own sins in retirement from the world. There was at least this amount of truth in the mediaeval monastic ideal, that it guarded against the dangers of ceaseless publicity,

and vindicated the fact that influence, to be lasting, must be founded on character.

The fiery energy, the strength of will, the purpose and devotion of St. Bernard, make it clear that, despite the atmosphere of miracle and legend which at once grew up around him, he was one of the great men of European history. Without a doubt he believed himself capable of curing the sick and even raising the dead. To understand that a man could hold such a conviction and remain humble, clear-sighted, and a statesman of genius, it is necessary to understand the utterly unscientific point of view and the vehement religious faith of mediaeval Europe. Among the primitive and uneducated of the twentieth century, miracles were still expected and performed. With the vehemence and the single mind which go with greatness, St. Bernard combined a power of making and keeping friends, and a broad charity which made him something more than great. His affections, which could not find the outlet of average men in marriage, concentrated themselves on his fellow monks. When his brother, also at Clairvaux, died, he broke down in the pulpit from grief. He kept up a long and warmly affectionate correspondence with Peter the Venerable, the representative of the ideal which he aimed at superseding. He stood out on more than one occasion as the protector of the Jews. That such a man should find his true sphere as a monk reveals the strength and meaning of monasticism in the Middle Ages.

Into a monastic revival, then, was absorbed much of the new energy which appeared in Europe after the first Crusade. The Crusade was itself a great religious movement, and with it came an awakening of the thoughtful and strenuous minds of Europe to the need of a new spirit to replace that of Cluny. But this moral reforma-

tion was paralleled, as was that of the sixteenth century, by a Renaissance of Learning and Art. As Luther is paralleled in Italy by Raphael, so Abelard appears alongside of St. Bernard. If the Crusade was a religious movement, it was also a voyage of discovery, in which the West had again come into contact with the East. This in itself was a great stimulus to thought and learning, and meanwhile in Europe, as life became more peaceful and better organized, there was more opportunity for the development of centres of learning—Universities and Schools. The study of Latin authors and even of Aristotle in translation became more systematic. The study of Roman and Canon Law had already been developed in the eleventh century by Ivo, Bishop of Chartres. The great philosophic argument between Realists and Nominalists had called out the works of the greatest of the Realists, St. Anselm of Bec. William of Champeaux began in the early years of the twelfth century to build up the reputation of Paris as a centre of realist teaching. Abelard, the former pupil of William, was himself the founder of a new school at Paris, that of St. Geneviève, where he attacked, in favour of a theory of his own, both the Realism of Anselm and the Nominalism of his opponents.

St. Bernard and Abelard are both types which have recurred again and again in the history of France. Like so many members of the most intellectual nation in Europe, Abelard was vain to absurdity, and in his private life, to say the least, unconventional. In the world of thought he produced a revolution. There was nothing very profound about his philosophical system. It was the novelty of his method rather than of his conclusions which drew disciples round him. As has been said, mediæval speculation and argument were based entirely

3) The
twelfth-
century
Renaissance.

4) Abe-
lard.

on authority. Certain assumptions, on which they were founded, were believed, not argued about. To the idea that belief was necessary before argument could begin, Abelard's answer was, not 'believe in order to reason', but 'reason in order to believe'. Among his works was one, the *Sic et Non*, which consisted of a collection of statements from the works of certain Fathers of the Church, each of which was contradicted by another. In this way he proved triumphantly that the authorities on which mediaeval philosophy and theology were based required testing and sifting before they could be used as such. To the greater minds of the century this conception was not new. But as put forward by Abelard in his brilliant, forceful method, it was a tremendous blow aimed at the authority of dogma and tradition over the thought of the age. Against that authority Abelard set up Reason, founded not on tradition, but on argument, not on inspired writing but on secular learning. Behind Abelard, as behind Bernard, there was a great movement. Alongside of the new asceticism went a new desire to learn, to know, and to understand.

Bernard and Abelard were both clerks, both came from (5) Suger. within the circle of the great institution which embraced all the leaders of European thought. A clerk too was a third type of the new spirit in Europe, and he was also, like the monk and the scholar, a Frenchman. Suger, Abbot of St. Denis, was the great friend and an almost exact contemporary of St. Bernard. But he represented a very different ideal. Abelard belonged to the great fraternity of European scholars who were beginning to flock from all over Europe to the schools of Paris. St. Bernard was the cosmopolitan monk. Suger on the other hand was a patriotic statesman who served two successive French kings, and whose administration puts him in the

first rank among the great clerical rulers of France. The form into which Europe was to be organized was the nation-state. But the debt of the young nation-states to the cosmopolitan Church was enormous. Not the least that they owed to her was the supply of loyal and able servants who could nearly always be found in her ranks. That Suger could be the real ruler of France and at the same time the loyal son of the Church, the devoted abbot of St. Denis, and the close friend of St. Bernard, shows clearly that the Catholic Church could include among her great figures the promoters of the new spirit of nationality as well as the upholders of the Papal supremacy. It would not be always possible for a man to serve King and Pope at the same time. While it was possible the position of the Church was strong indeed, and the gain to the King was enormous.

Euge-
us III.

The Papacy was further strengthened by the spreading to the Papacy of the spirit of Cîteaux. Hildebrand had filled the eleventh-century Papacy with the spirit of Cluny. From 1145 to 1153 Eugenius III, once a humble washer of dishes among Bernard's flock at Clairvaux, worthily filled the position of Pope. In Eugenius, the convictions of St. Bernard were tempered by the caution of a much tried statesman, and the inspired abbot was not always satisfied with his prudent pupil. But it was a great thing for Papal prestige when the Papacy was held by a man who maintained always the simplicity and purity of life which he had practised at Clairvaux. It was for Eugenius that St. Bernard wrote the best known of his works, the *De Consideratione*, the work of his mature age, and an exceedingly thoughtful exposition of the ideals of Papal policy.

III. THE PAPAL SCHISM

In each of the movements typified by Eugenius III,⁽¹⁾ Abelard, and Suger, St. Bernard played a decisive part. ^{(1) Origin of schism.} The leader of the monastic revival was also the healer of the Papal schism, the antagonist of the new rationalism, and the preacher of the Second Crusade. In 1130 Honorius II died. His successor, Innocent II, was elected under peculiar circumstances. Rome had long been divided by the struggles of two rival families of nobles, the Frangipani, and a wealthy Jewish house, the Pierleoni. The College of Cardinals, in whose hands lay the election, was almost equally divided between the two factions. The opponents of the Pierleoni, however, had a majority on the spot. They hastily met together and, in the absence of their rivals, chose a Pope who took the name of Innocent II. Indignant at being thus outwitted, the other party chose a member of the Pierleoni family, who took the name of Anacletus II. Just as Lothair and Conrad were disputing the Empire, so Innocent and Anacletus disputed the Papacy. Both institutions were in danger of grave loss of prestige. Anacletus at first carried all before him. He held the key to Italy and Rome. The influence of the family gave him a hold on the city and he easily drove out Innocent. Gerard, the Bishop of Angoulême, took up his cause in France and won over William X, Count of Poitou. Most important of all, he could count on Roger II of Sicily, to whom in 1130 he granted the title of King of Sicily.

Roger, with characteristic self-interest, plunged into the Papal Schism. Henry II of England, whose work was in many ways on the same lines as Roger's, was hampered at every turn by the hostility of Becket. Roger saw the advantage of having at hand a docile ^{(2) Roger and the schism.}

Pope who owed everything to him, and of making a Norman chaplain of the spiritual head of Europe.

Everything seemed to favour the scheme. The technical question of the validity of the elections was really insoluble. Both were irregular. But Anacletus held Rome, Innocent was a miserable fugitive. Unfortunately for Anacletus, however, the real decision between the rivals lay, not with the great Roger, but with the humble monk Bernard, who, now about forty years old, was already famous as a man of God and a worker of innumerable miracles. Particularly in France, Clairvaux had by now acquired an immense reputation. Louis VI, at a loss to decide between Innocent and Anacletus, appealed to Bernard. Without hesitation Bernard declared Innocent II to be the true Pope. His decision was based on characteristic grounds. About the technical question of the validity of the elections, he cared not a straw. Innocent, uninvolved in Italian and Roman factions and with a better record, was clearly the fitter man to be Pope. For this reason St. Bernard became the inveterate foe of Anacletus. Thus Innocent won a refuge in France. Not that Louis VI was inspired solely by respect for the word of St. Bernard. Against far heavier odds he was fighting in the same cause as Roger II. His father had been a disreputable and excommunicated man. He himself had done everything possible to secure the invaluable support of the Church. It was a signal triumph that he could now come forward as the champion of a Pope whose orthodoxy was vouched for by the most influential Churchman of the day. He at once got Innocent II to crown his son, the future Louis VII, as his successor.

Henry of England and the Emperor Lothair, thanks largely to the indefatigable energy of Bernard, followed the lead of Northern France. The independent South

(3) Inno-
cent II and
France.

was visited, and deluged with letters, by Bernard, who converted William of Poitiers for the moment, though he afterwards relapsed. Eventually, however, in 1134 Bernard again visited Poitiers, and there, in a magnificent effort of eloquence, terrified William with threats of eternal punishment, and destroyed the last traces of the schism in France. Meanwhile, in 1132 he prevailed on the Emperor to make a journey to Italy in support of Innocent. It is worth noting that while the kings of France and Sicily each made his profit out of the schism, the Emperor was for the moment diverted from his national task in Germany to intervene in Italy on behalf of the Church. Among the obstacles to German nationality is to be included, beside the contest of Emperor and Pope, the duty of the Emperor to maintain the unity of Christendom. Lothair's object was in part his coronation at Rome, in part, too, the vindication of his authority over Roger of Sicily. Still it was a calamity for Germany that, unlike his prototype Henry the Fowler, he could not remain at his North German task.

(4) Lothair in Italy.

In Italy he did nothing. He could not even get to St. Peter's for the Imperial Coronation, but had to be content with the Church of St. John Lateran, which was all he was able, with his small force, to wrest from Anacletus. Next year he was back in Germany.

One advantage, however, he had gained in return for his help to Innocent II. In 1133 a compromise was arrived at on the vexed question of Matilda's donation. All her late possessions which were imperial fiefs were to be recognized as belonging to the Emperor, the rest he was to hold for life in return for a payment. Thus the Emperor, besides his support to the expansion of Germany, vindicated the right to an Imperial foothold in Italy.

(5) Matilda's donation.

(6) Bernard and Roger.

Three years later Lothair returned in force. Meanwhile Italy had been the scene of a veritable duel between Roger II and Bernard. Secure in his own kingdom from clerical insubordination, Roger met his Becket as the opponent not of internal consolidation, but of his foreign policy. This he had now come to base on an endeavour to make use of the factions and wars of Northern Italy as a weapon against the commercial rivalry of Venice. What Spain and Holland were to be to the early prosperity of England, that Constantinople and Venice were to Roger's dreams of expansion. Roger followed up his conquests in Southern Italy, which already extended to the neighbourhood of Naples, by trying to form an alliance with Genoa and Pisa, the rivals of Venice. Pisa was the refuge of Innocent II, and Bernard at once came forward to reinforce its loyalty by vehement letters to both cities. Both refused to join Roger. In Milan Bernard won a splendid personal triumph. The Milanese, discontented with their bishop, like most Italian towns, expelled him as a heretic, because he supported Anacletus. Bernard hurried to the city to complete the good work and secure Milan finally for Innocent. He was greeted with an almost embarrassing outburst of popular enthusiasm, and only escaped with difficulty from the importunity of the citizens, who were determined to make him their bishop. The ascendancy he thus won proved useful later, when Milan, on the point of quarrelling with Innocent, was conciliated by another visit of Bernard. It was clear that the party of Roger and Anacletus had little prospect of success in North Italy.

Lothair's visit was made possible only by the cessation of the Hohenstaufen's attempt to maintain a schism in the Empire. Here again Bernard was active. All his eloquence was used to persuade Conrad and Frederick to

abandon the endeavour to expel the already aged Lothair. At last, in 1134, influenced to some extent at least by Bernard's appeals, Conrad and Frederick submitted. Lothair was now free to come to Italy. This time he was far better equipped. He advanced south with a large force, which Roger was unable to meet, captured Salerno, and drove the King into Sicily. The edifice of the Sicilian kingdom was apparently crumbling. Then, however, the inevitable happened. Lothair was rapidly occupying a large tract of land. The question naturally arose, who was to reap the benefit. Lothair, Innocent declared, was the soldier of the Pope, Apulia and Calabria had always been Papal fiefs. Outward agreement was with difficulty maintained. When the new Duke of Apulia was invested, the Pope and the Emperor handed him the ducal banner simultaneously, each holding one end. Soon afterwards Lothair in disgust turned back to Germany, and died on his way home (1137).

There was very soon little left to quarrel over. Roger quickly recovered the lost ground and in 1139 captured Innocent II, as his ancestors had captured Leo IX in 1053. Like Leo, Innocent had to pay for his liberty. He renewed to Roger the grant made by Anacletus of the crown of Sicily and southern Italy. It was at this price that Innocent won the recognition of the whole of Western Christendom. In 1138 Anacletus had died, to the delight of St. Bernard, expressed with all his usual vigour. A would-be successor to the antipope quickly submitted, and the schism was healed. St. Bernard had saved the Papacy from the possibility of two calamities, both of which were later to befall her. The schism might have continued indefinitely, till it required a remedy almost more dangerous than the disease. This occurred after the Great Schism of 1378. Or Anacletus

(7) Lothair and Roger.

(8) Healing of the schism.

might, as sole Pope, have made the Papacy the property of the Sicilian Crown, as in 1307 it was to become the property of the King of France. Instead, after a troublous era of contests with the Romans under Innocent II, Celestine II, and Victor II, the Papacy recovered its prestige under the high-principled rule of Eugenius III and its position under the vigorous statesmanship of Adrian IV. In 1147 it was already able to rouse Europe to a general Crusade.

(9) Roger
of Sicily.

But for all that, in spite of the help both of the secular head and of the spiritual dictator of Europe, the Papacy had still to fear the menace to its independence of the great Norman kingdom to the south. From 1127 to 1147 Roger, in spite of many difficulties, had steadily increased the power and prestige of his kingdom. In 1127 he had added Apulia to the dukedom of Sicily, and the grant of the title of King made by Anacletus in 1130 was only the recognition of an accomplished fact. There was no more capable ruler in the Europe of his day. It was under him that the fullest advantage was taken of the splendid position of Sicily in the Mediterranean. He followed up the policy of Robert Guiscard and Bohemund in his relations with Byzantium. In 1146 he made war on the Emperor Manuel (who had refused him the hand of a Byzantine princess), and took Corfu. This conquest was afterwards recovered by Manuel himself, but the Normans continued to make raids on Grecian territory—they sacked Thebes and gutted its silk factories, and carried off the image of St. Theodore from Corinth. Among the ring of enemies who kept the great warrior Manuel involved in a ceaseless round of contests by land and sea, the Normans, thanks to their efficient fleet, were some of the most dangerous. If Roger acquired no lasting hold on the

In the Balkan Peninsula, he established a flourishing colony in Africa. By means of the familiar device of intervening in the quarrels of the native Arabs, he was able in 1135 to capture the island of Djerba, and in 1146 took Tripoli. Two years later another expedition established Norman suzerainty over the most powerful chiefs of the districts: in the end the strip of coast between Tripoli and Tunis was all held by Roger. Meanwhile he was pushing north into Central Italy. In 1138 he occupied Naples.

His internal administration was equally vigorous. The problem here was the welding together of the extraordinary collection of peoples which had come together on 'the stepping-stone of East and West'. It is this which gives a peculiar interest to the political experiment of the new kingdom. Like Austria, Canada, and South Africa at the present time, Sicily had more than one official language. Greek, Latin, and Arabic were all used. In religion the government was equally broad-minded. No attempt was made to convert either the Mussulmans or the Orthodox Greek. Greek admirals and Saracen scientific men and philosophers were used equally in the service of the central government. Every means was employed to make that government efficient. Roger's exchequer was far the best organized of the day; it became the rival of that of England under Henry II. Few things are stranger than the creation in mediaeval Europe of a government at once so strong and so tolerant. Roger seemed-immune in his polyglot dominions from the two curses of the mediaeval statesman—the feudal opposition, and the problem of Church and State. Moreover, it would seem that his attempt to amalgamate the different races was more successful than modern experiments seem likely to be—at least if we may judge from the architecture which flourished under him. The style in which his

His internal organization of Sicily.

subjects built was one which borrowed elements from Byzantine, Saracenic, and Romanesque, to form a singularly impressive and distinctive whole. It is the best monument to the memory of one of the greatest paternal despotisms of history.

IV. FRANCE, 1122-1153

r) The
osition of
ouis VI.

The period covered by the career of St. Bernard is an important one in the history of France. Louis VI, by the peace of 1120 with Henry I of England, had for a time at least one danger the less to fear. But Henry I was always ready to come forward against his suzerain, and Theobald of Blois and Champagne never ceased to be Louis's open foe and the ally of the smallest baron of the royal domain who was prepared to defy the King. Louis, however, as the protector of the clergy and of the poor, continued to make headway. But this character, which marks him off so sharply from his father, was not always easy to maintain. Henry I and Anselm in England, with the best will in the world to agree, had yet been forced into a long quarrel. A struggling king like Louis could not afford to lose authority to the Church any more than he could to the baronage. In the second place, Louis was eager to listen to the complaint of burghers and peasants against their lords. By doing so he got both a pretext to intervene and allies in the resulting conflict. But the discontented vassals and serfs did not always consider the necessities of royal diplomacy. As often as not, the lord they wished to be rid of was a bishop. Nowhere did the Church welcome the beginnings of those struggles for municipal independence which were afterwards so openly encouraged by the Crown. Louis had to tread very warily in his relations with them. Thirdly, the monastic revival helped to

accentuate the problem of Louis's relations to the Church. The burning zeal and keen *esprit de corps* of the new monastic communities was as inconvenient to the harassed King as was the similar spirit of the new urban communities, and in addition they had far more influence behind them.

Louis, in fact, pious as he was, must several times have regretted the distinction which St. Bernard conferred on the French nation. The enthusiastic patron of Clairvaux was Louis's great enemy Theobald of Blois. Moreover, in those regrettable cases of difficulty between Louis and his clergy, the latter began to develop the disastrous habit of appealing to Clairvaux. Thus in 1128 Louis took the part of the canons of the Chapter of Notre-Dame of Paris who resisted, naturally enough, the endeavour of the Bishop, under the influence of Bernard, to replace them by partisans of the reform movement; he forbade the Bishop to disturb the Chapter. The Bishop resented this as derogatory to his position, refused to comply, and was deprived by Louis of his temporal possessions. Without more ado he put his diocese under an interdict. Louis expelled him and allowed his property to be rifled. The Bishop then threw himself on St. Bernard, who dispatched a vigorous letter to Louis, and when he proved obdurate, appears to have proclaimed to the King a vision in which he saw Louis punished by the death of his son. For this form of argument the best that can be said is that it was generally effective in the Middle Ages. But Louis, if momentarily affected by the threat of Divine vengeance, felt confidence in the support of the Pope at least. Honorius II, in fact, at his appeal, suspended the edict. Nothing daunted, Bernard dispatched another letter to the Pope, in which he bluntly declared that Honorius had betrayed the Church.

(2) Louis
and St.
Bernard.

Finally, Honorius, by sending an agent to arrange a compromise, managed to satisfy both parties, or at any rate to close the dispute. The episode illustrates the difficulties to practical men, both lay and clerical, of the reforming spirit in the Church.

(3) Success
of Louis.

On the whole, however, Louis made singularly good use of a complicated situation. Like his successors, he got along without a definite policy towards the communal movement in the towns. More out of piety than policy he emancipated villeins and encouraged the great churchmen to do the same. If occasion offered and the Church was not opposed to it, he would grant the request of a body of burghers for incorporation as a commune. More often he would be found on the side of the bishop against the burghers; sometimes he took money from both sides, and helped the highest bidder. To the end of his life he was the champion of the Church, whose lands he was always ready to defend against the baronage. Of Suger, and many other churchmen with a turn for affairs, he made the fullest use. It was under him that Suger served the apprenticeship which was to make him the real successor of the king whose life he wrote. As we have seen, after the schism of 1130 Louis was able to come forward as the champion of orthodoxy and the true Pope. Finally, on one occasion at least Louis appeared as the national leader of France. In 1124 Henry V, the Emperor, formed an alliance with his father-in-law Henry I, by which a simultaneous attack was to be directed against the royal domain from east and west. Louis made the greatest efforts to meet this danger, and collected so large a force that Henry V, surprised at the number who had rallied round the King, gave up the project. It was a great vindication of Louis's claim to be the sovereign of France.

Louis, indeed, was not a great statesman. He was too fat to be an impressive figure. But as a soldier and a king he did his duty by his kingdom and his subjects.

His reign ended with a brilliant piece of diplomacy, quite out of keeping with his life. In 1129 his great enemy, Henry I, won a triumph by the marriage of Matilda, the widow of the Emperor Henry V and the heiress of England, to Geoffrey of Anjou. Thus the position of the Norman duchy was vastly strengthened. The year before, William Clito had died. Flanders and Anjou, which had kept Normandy between two fires for so long, had both ceased to be a menace. There was every prospect that on Henry's death, England, Anjou, Touraine, Maine, and Normandy would be united into a solid kingdom. Eight years later Louis was able to redress the balance. In 1137 he married his son Louis to Eleanor, daughter of William of Poitou and Aquitaine, the heiress of lands stretching from the frontiers of Anjou to the Pyrenees. By a single stroke he had doubled the territories of the French Crown and made a ring round the domains of the English King. Furthermore, two years before Henry I had died, and this age of schisms saw another succession dispute arise, just as the Imperial and Papal rivals were settling their differences. Stephen, the brother of Louis's old enemy Theobald of Blois and Champagne, now became the evil genius of England as Theobald had been of France. When, in 1137, Louis VII succeeded his father, he might well seem to have the game in his hands.

But Louis had not the happy balance of qualities which had made the fortune of his father. Moreover, he was young, and consequently was regarded as being likely to benefit from good advice. Being well-meaning, hasty, superstitious, and weak, he was, like Henry III of

(4) The
Aquitaine
Marriage.

(5) Louis
VII.

(6) The quarrel with Theobald of Champagne.

England, not wise enough to accept such advice with gratitude and disregard it at will. He began by entering, with the support of his queen, Eleanor, on a violent quarrel with Theobald of Champagne, which brought him into conflict with Theobald's ardent champion, St. Bernard. Louis finally declared war on Theobald, besieged the town of Vitry, and burnt the city, castle, and church, the latter with over one thousand people inside it. This was at least vigorous. But Louis, apt like many weak-minded men to be sensitive after the event, was seized with horror at the sacrilegious deed and hastily made peace with Theobald. He could not, however, succeed in conciliating St. Bernard, till at last, in 1144, a general peace was made when the questions in dispute were finally cleared up. In this long struggle Louis had shown a good deal of vigour. He had held his own against Bernard, who had also had the support of the Pope, and his success against Theobald had made a laughing-stock of that patron of monastic reform, who had found his monks powerless to help him against his king. Unfortunately, however, Louis, still haunted by the memory of Vitry, vowed to expiate it by a Crusade. In 1147 then, when St. Bernard, ceasing to play an uncongenial part in the feudal rivalries of France, came forward as the preacher of the deliverance of Jerusalem, he was acting on the inspiration of Louis, who was the real inspirer of the new expedition to the East. Suger was left to battle with the great feudatories, unsupported by royal prestige. For four years Louis, who had no son to succeed him, remained away, and only Suger's sleepless vigilance kept the conquests of Louis VI intact and the royal finances in order. In the Middle Ages, at any rate, it often paid better to have a reprobate than a conscientious King. Suger had not only to keep Louis supplied with money,

(7) The Second Crusade.

he had also to meet a serious attempt to set up Louis's brother, the Count of Dreux, in the place of the discredited King.

Thirdly, in 1152, Louis, set free by the death of Suger, once again let his better feelings run away with him. Eleanor of Aquitaine was probably not a suitable wife for a sensitive man. Not only was she Louis's distant cousin; she had insisted on taking the cross, and in the East had not behaved well; nor did it seem likely as time passed that she would give birth to an heir to the throne. Louis insisted on divorcing her. It has been said that he acted on the advice of Bernard of Clairvaux. At any rate, the act was of a piece with the expedition to Jerusalem. Once again, for personal considerations Louis sacrificed France. The same year Eleanor and Henry were married, next year Henry was made heir to the English throne. In 1154 he succeeded to a territory which included a great deal more of France than Louis himself possessed.

(8) The
divorce of
Eleanor.

Still Louis and Bernard between them did something other than contrive to ruin France in the interests of Christendom and the royal conscience. By living down his early extravagances, Louis became famous as a Christian king. All over France bishops and abbots came to look more and more to the Crusading sovereign as a source of privileges and support. Louis VI had been so busy with the royal domain that he had no leisure to extend his influence elsewhere. His son, patronized by Bernard, once the champion of Christendom against the Turks, and an edifying example of royal penitence, was more and more looked up to by distant holders of ecclesiastical benefices, as a friend and ally. Moreover, Louis with his sensitive nature had a general sympathy for the poor and the oppressed which made him a more

consistent supporter than his father of the movement towards municipal independence. Similarly, it is unfair to St. Bernard to represent him as the insidious enemy of his native country. He was always the loyal friend of Suger. He was sincerely anxious that Louis should behave as a true Christian king; that the French monarchy should stand for justice in Europe. In the end his criticisms and strictures perhaps helped to prevent Louis from a course even more fatal than that which he took. If the King had continued the violent foe of the Papacy, the French monarchy would have lost far more than it did by his subservience.

Lastly, as the enemy of heresy, Bernard prepared the way for future successes of the French king. Already heretical sects were becoming a serious danger to the unity of the French race. Especially in the south, the followers of Peter de Bruys, who attacked the whole organization of the Church, were obtaining a great popularity. Bernard paid a long visit to the district between Bordeaux and Toulouse, where, as usual, he carried all before him by his eloquence. Not that he succeeded in checking for any time the spread of the new sects; but his uncompromising denunciation of their views helped to define the position of northern France towards the heretical south. This proved useful later.

V. THE SECOND CRUSADE

In the Crusade, as in the healing of the schism, St. Bernard was the moving spirit. Here again he was the enemy of Roger, here again he lured the Emperor from Germany, and here he comes into conflict with the ideals of Suger. The so-called Second Crusade differs

(9) Work
of Louis
VII.

(10) Influ-
ence of
Bernard.

(1) Leaders
of the
Crusade.

from the First for one thing in that it was led by an Emperor and a King. Conrad III and Louis VII both occupied firmer thrones than those held by Henry IV and Philip I. Touched by the enthusiasm which St. Bernard's teaching everywhere evoked, they both took the Cross. Like the Pope, the kings and the Emperor were strengthening their hold on Europe. The baronage had dropped to a secondary place in European leadership. But in taking the Cross, when and as they did, these national rulers of Europe showed that they were as yet national only in part. Neither had, as had Bohemund and Raymond, territorial ambitions. Conrad was only moved to go by the sheer emotional power of Bernard's preaching before him at Spiers. Suger begged Louis VII to remain. Both returned to find their difficulties immensely increased. Bernard, unlike Suger, thought first of Christendom, and only secondly of France.

The Christian situation in the Holy Land was indeed sufficiently desperate. The house of Seljuk, whose decay had made possible the success of the First Crusade, was now giving way before the rise of another great power in the East. The founder of this power was Imad-ed-din Zenghi, whose father had been made Emir of Aleppo by the Seljuk ruler, Malek Shah. Zenghi himself had to make his way by the sword, for his father died and his inheritance was usurped when he was only ten years old. In 1127 the Sultan of Bagdad made him Emir of Moussoul, with a sphere of rule which extended over Upper Mesopotamia. Between that date and 1144 Zenghi devoted all his great gifts as a soldier and a ruler to overthrowing his rivals among the Moslem powers, especially in Syria. Incidentally he came into conflict on several occasions with the Christians, but it was not till 1144 that it became clear how serious a menace to

the Christian states was the rise of this newly-organized principality to the North-East. In that year Zenghi attacked and took Edessa. The importance of this conquest was immense, for it destroyed the most formidable outpost of the Christian power which not only had held at bay the Moslem powers of Mesopotamia, but had also isolated from them the Moslem strongholds of Aleppo. Zenghi himself was murdered in 1146, but his successor Nouredin was thoroughly fitted to carry on his work. Clearly a great effort would be necessary if the whole of Syria were not to be added to the territory of Moussoul.

The effort took the form of what is known as the Second Crusade. Bernard, once convinced of the seriousness of the crisis, took up the cause with all his accustomed fervour, and preached through France and Germany with extraordinary success. At Vezelay he was obliged to tear up his own robes in order to supply crosses with which his hearers could pledge themselves to the Holy War. At Vezelay, too, Louis VII himself took the Cross, and a few months later Conrad III, the Emperor, followed his example. Early in 1147 Conrad, without waiting for Louis, started for Constantinople and Palestine.

After meeting near Adrianople with a disastrous flood in which many of his men were drowned, Conrad duly reached Constantinople, where the Emperor Manuel received him, and whence he hastened on into Asia Minor. As the march progressed, however, the difficulties thickened; Manuel's guides, so the Germans declared, were guilty of deliberate treachery, the light horse of the Turks, keeping out of reach of the heavily-armed Christians, inflicted great loss upon them, and at last it became clear that further advance without reinforcements was impos-

(2) The
Crusaders
in Asia
Minor.

sible. Conrad had to turn back with his steadily dwindling force and fight his way back again to Nicaea. Here he found Louis with the French host, and the two leaders, deciding that the route of the First Crusade across Asia Minor was impracticable, resolved to march round the coast of Asia Minor, where the Emperor Manuel could support them with his fleet. They had only reached Ephesus when Conrad, thoroughly broken-spirited, returned to Constantinople. But Louis pushed on into Pamphylia, and there succeeded in embarking a number of his knights on board Grecian vessels, of which, however, there were not enough to carry the bulk of what remained of his force. For these there was nothing to be done but to leave them to struggle on by land, and all but a very few eventually perished. Meanwhile Louis and his knights landed at Antioch, and on his way south met Conrad, who had come by sea from Constantinople. At last the Crusade had reached its goal.

Nothing, however, was accomplished in Palestine. Louis and Conrad, with little knowledge of the needs of the situation, decided to attack Damascus. But Damascus was held by a rival of Nouréddin's, and all that resulted from the Christians' advance was that the two Moslem powers united to repulse the Crusaders. The attack on the city completely failed, and with that failure the Second Crusade came to an end. ^{(3) Failure of the Crusade.}

Its failure was a great blow to Bernard's influence, and nothing but the greatness of that influence made it possible for his prestige to survive. It was a blow, too, to the simple faith of the Middle Ages, and all over Christendom men were troubled and confounded by the collapse of such confident hopes. In the Holy Land it was an event pregnant with disaster, for its effect had been at once to reveal the weakness of the Christians and to unite the

Moslem powers. There were abundant signs after the Second Crusade of a decline of crusading zeal in the West, and of what was even more serious for the Latin kingdoms, the rise among the Moslems of religious enthusiasm for the Holy War against the Christians. If this latter tendency should develop there would be little hope for the Christian hold on Jerusalem.

(4) Attempts to renew the Crusade.

One man alone could have made the Crusade a success. It was in the death-trap of Asia Minor that the two armies were destroyed. Mediaeval commissariat arrangements were utterly inadequate for what will always be a most difficult march. Roger of Sicily had the means of making an expedition by sea which would have foreshadowed that of Richard of England in the Third Crusade. Acting from a much more distant base, Richard, backed throughout by his fleet, reached Palestine with an intact force, marched the whole length of the Syrian coast-line with his ships in close attendance, and very nearly wrested Jerusalem from Saladin himself. But though Roger had actually offered his ships to the Crusaders, they had followed the advice of St. Bernard and refused to accept the terms, which would have excluded all who could not pay for their passage. After the failure of the Crusade, Roger himself tried to form an alliance of Louis, Conrad, and himself, against the Turks and the Eastern Empire. But the time had not yet come for such an expedition. Instead, Manuel was able to make an alliance with Conrad, and the project had to be abandoned. Bernard himself, however, continued to try to rouse Roger to a fresh attempt, backed by the support of France. Against this, Eugenius III, who could not get over his distrust of the King of Sicily, openly protested. Thus all attempts to retrieve the disaster failed. But the negotiations are characteristic of the period and the

men. St. Bernard appears willing to forgive even Roger if he could be turned into an ally in the great cause. There was little personal rancour about the most vigorous controversialist of his time. Eugenius, with less hopefulness, shows more prudence. Perhaps he remembered Bohemund, or foresaw the Crusade of 1204. Roger played the traditional part of his race. When negotiations collapsed he contented himself with urging on Henry the Lion and Welf to rebellion against Conrad. In sum, the chief interest of the Second Crusade lies in the evidence it supplies of the influence of Bernard and his cosmopolitan ideal over the nations of Europe.

VI. ST. BERNARD AND ABELARD

It was not only the moral and social heresies of Peter de Bruys which found an antagonist in St. Bernard. He also helped to define the attitude of the Church towards the movement headed by Abelard. The conflict of Science and Faith in which we are still involved reached in the early twelfth century a particularly acute and interesting stage. Under the form of the most pedantic and obsolete scholastic discussions, two of the greatest of twelfth-century figures debated a problem which will probably always be as insoluble as it is vital. How far is man bound to seek for his religion a basis of reason, how far should he accept instead those traditional beliefs which rest, not on the individual reason, but on faith? Can there be a religion which makes no appeal to reason, or, on the other hand, is anything susceptible of proof worthy to rank as a religious belief? The men of the Middle Ages, like the men of to-day, sometimes found these questions hard to answer.

(1) Conflict of Reason and Faith.

(2) Tolera-
tion and
Catho-
licism.

But there was this difference between mediaeval and modern conditions. At the present day the dogmatic theology of various Churches offers rough solutions of these questions, and declares certain things to be matters of faith, others to be matters of argument. So did the Mediaeval Church. But those who disagree with any one solution may to-day declare their adhesion to another, or, again, refuse to accept any. In the Middle Ages there was only one solution possible, that sanctioned by the Church. Thus the simple alternative before a man who did not agree with the Church was either to convert her, or be converted himself. In other words, modern toleration has been driven to accept the view that Truth is either infinitely many-sided, or simply undiscoverable. To the mediaeval mind such a view was at once cynical and blasphemous. The Truth must be one and it must be found within the Church. The Church might indeed discover and authorize a new truth—so making an addition to the sum of belief. But what the Church did not recognize was not truth.

Abelard, then, had no desire either to leave the Church or to set up another Church alongside of it. He aimed at being, not a schismatic or an infidel, but a missionary. Like the Emperors when they set up an anti-pope, he wanted, not to attack orthodoxy, but to prove that he was orthodox; he claimed to be teaching not Free Thought, but the Catholic Faith. Thus when St. Bernard attacked and denounced him, he was not only attacking the right of an individual to think for himself, he was also defending the citadel of Truth against a traitor who wished from within to betray it to the enemy.

At the same time it was difficult in the early twelfth century, as it is to-day, to say exactly what was included within the walls of this citadel of Truth. It was at this

period that Gratian was at work on his *Concordantia Discordantium Canonum*, a textbook of Canon Law in which he collected all the various elements of which that law was made up, showed that the statements of many of them were contradictory, and in such cases decided which was correct. This is precisely what Abelard had done in his *Sic et Non*, without, however, presuming to go on to make dogmatic decisions.

However that might be, St. Bernard about 1138⁽³⁾ became convinced that Abelard's works and teachings contained heresy. Not only did he denounce his specific views, but he attacked the whole spirit of his teaching as undermining the authority of the Church. In fact, he declared that the doctrine of the Church gave more scope to belief, less to reason, than Abelard was prepared to allow. Abelard, who loved an argument and a victory, was quite ready to take up the challenge. In 1140 he called Bernard to a public debate at a Council at Sens. When Bernard appeared it was not to argue but to accuse. Abelard, who had hoped for a dialectical triumph, found himself tried and condemned as a heretic. Just as St. Bernard had cut the knot of the schism, so he declined to be drawn into a scholastic argument with one who he had decided was a heretic. Convinced that the Church was in danger, he adopted the methods of revolution, and threw technicalities to the winds. Rome supported him, and Abelard, in spite of a valiant struggle and the loyal support of his pupils, was forced to submit. He fled to Cluny, where, with characteristic charity, Peter the Venerable gave him a refuge, and died in 1142, having become duly reconciled to the Church. Thus St. Bernard had apparently healed another schism more serious than that of Anacletus and Roger. Abelard had tried to erect

(3) The limits of toleration.

within the citadel of the Church a new and conspicuous temple to Reason. Bernard had declared this a traitorous scheme calculated to divide up the garrison. The result was a notable victory of character over intellect. St. Bernard, who composed sixty-eight sermons on the first half of the Song of Solomon, was a great orator and mystical theologian, but he had none of that training in logic and scholarship which made Abelard the acknowledged prince of the teachers of his day. Instead, he had a strong will, a power of swift decision, and unrivalled influence as a great and good man. Still, if the momentary victory was with Bernard, his attitude was, as often, too uncompromising to be permanently maintained. He had done his best to commit the Church to little short of deliberate obscurantism. In opposing Abelard he opposed all who sought for truth outside the Scriptures and the Fathers. By following his lead the Church would have alienated all the most vigorous minds of the day. When Bernard, having disposed of Abelard, went on to attack his pupil Gilbert de la Porée, he failed to secure another triumph. By a formal recantation, Gilbert secured acquittal, and became eventually recognized as an authoritative theologian.

The result was a compromise of a singularly curious kind. The citadel which St. Bernard had so vigorously defended was recognized as too narrow in its bounds. Its loyal defenders demanded more room to move. Accordingly it slowly became recognized that the authoritative Truth, which was still to be the basis of all theological and philosophical speculation, could be looked for outside the subjects of study to which St. Bernard devoted his leisure. The best example of the tendency is the fact that Aristotle (in an incomplete Latin translation) became recognized almost as one of the Fathers of

(4) Victory of Bernard.

(5) The beginnings of Scholasticism.

the Church. Abelard's temple to Reason became a temple to the Greek philosopher, who was carefully stripped of his Pagan robes and installed with canonical honours. Within these enlarged boundaries the busy thinkers of the Middle Ages set to work to create what is known as Scholasticism, a body of subtle reasoning founded on the commenting and interpreting of the orthodox authorities. Like the learning of a dead language, this work was more useful as an intellectual drill than in the advancement of Truth. But it prepared the way for the giants of the fifteenth-century Renaissance, who were to break out beyond its bounds. The twelfth-century Renaissance, in fact, produced a new learning which, thanks in part at least to the work of St. Bernard, remained orthodox and Christian. The fifteenth-century Renaissance, which met with no such champion of the Faith and was besides a far stronger and maturer movement, produced a new learning, much of which became heretic and a great proportion pagan.

St. Bernard, like Roger of Sicily, left an architectural monument to his memory. In a spirited attack which he once made on unreformed monasticism, together with much keen and witty comment on the very human frailties of the monks, is an exposure of the distracting results on thought and prayer of the weird and grotesque ornamentations of the late Romanesque style. Instead of this unedifying detail, he recommends a chaste, unadorned and workmanlike style of building which should leave the mind free for spiritual thoughts. The result was the adoption by the Cistercians of a singularly pure type of the new Gothic, which was already growing out of the use of the pointed arch. The hundreds of Cistercian abbeys built in the twelfth century all over Europe thus gave an opportunity for the development of

(6) St. Bernard and Architecture.

Gothic, and made what was partly an architectural improvement into a symbol of monastic reformation. What Romanesque is to Cluny, that is Gothic to Cîteaux. In spite of the Puritan spirit of St. Bernard—the spiritual ascetic who would have banished art altogether from places of worship—the Cistercians thus gave an impetus to the development of that exquisite architectural beauty of form which is one of the great glories of the mediaeval Church.

Thus, like all Puritan movements, that represented by St. Bernard was one-sided from its very strength. On the moral side he was a great influence for good. His ascendancy—that of a single-minded, devoted, and zealous character, eager to support the right, to reconcile enemies and to set a good example—proves the healthy tone of early twelfth-century Europe. Politically he was the bulwark of united Christendom. As such, he could scarcely be expected to be, like Suger, the champion of the already almost contrary ideal of nationality. Where he fell short was in his appreciation of art, literature, and learning, which he would have had the Church trammel and stunt rather than direct. Yet here too he stimulated, if he did not encourage. The intellectual and artistic awakening of the century was too strong for him. But he at least impressed it with the spirit of that other manifestation of the vigorous youth of mediaeval Europe—the revival of monasticism. If the new learning and the new art continued to work in the service of the Church, it was due in some degree to her intrepid champion.

CHAPTER III

THE AGE OF FREDERICK BARBAROSSA

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I. CHARACTER OF THE AGE

BETWEEN 1152 and 1154 died St. Bernard, Eugenius III, Roger II, Stephen of England, Suger, and Conrad III. The disappearance of this generation of rulers and statesmen made way for a new age. A monastic revival had found a great opportunity in the lull which came over the contest of Pope, and Emperor. Its leader had dominated Europe. The Church, defended by a man of genius, came through the danger of the Renaissance of Learning and considerably strengthened her position. But the Church of St. Bernard had had to compromise both with Abelard and with Roger of Sicily—with the new scholarship and with the new type of ruler. It is the latter which now comes forward into the place left vacant by the death of the great churchmen of the early twelfth century. By the third quarter of the twelfth century there had appeared four of the strongest men, outside the Church, produced by mediaeval Europe—Henry II of England, Philip Augustus of France, Henry the Lion, and the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. Meanwhile, Constantinople was in the hands of a ruler who was the equal of any man of his time in energy and prowess. It was an age of great kings, as the preceding age had been one of great churchmen. The first half of the century had seen the creation of a group of great monastic Orders, the second half was to see the building up in Western Europe of a group of young nations.

Henry II, Philip, Henry the Lion, and Frederick, all four attacked somewhat the same difficulties. Each was faced with an ecclesiastical, a feudal, and a municipal problem. How to deal with churchman, baron, and burgher was a question which each had to decide for himself. Moreover, the national consolidation of Germany, France, and England was made difficult not only by the champions of local independence. There was also the opposition to national independence of the claims put forward by the rulers of Europe as a whole—the Emperor and the Pope. Such questions formed the theme of the great lawyers and scholars of the day. It would appear, then, that the period is one in which all the great figures of mediaeval Europe play a part. There have been few generations more decisive than that of Frederick Barbarossa.

St. Bernard only reflects one side of his age. Frederick reflects two. Frederick was at once an emperor and a king—the would-be national ruler of Germany and the would-be cosmopolitan ruler of the world. He attempted far more than Henry II or Philip Augustus. Therefore he accomplished far less. But he was also more representative of his age—perhaps the most representative man in the Middle ages.

II. THE MUNICIPAL MOVEMENT

Of the problems with which Frederick and the other national rulers of this period dealt, the most novel and perhaps the most interesting was the municipal problem. By 1150 the mediaeval townsman had won a very different position to that which he occupied in 1095. We have seen what the Italian cities gained from the Crusades and how the French towns affected the policy of Louis VI

(1) Progress of the Towns.

and Louis VII. The expansion of trade made itself felt, not in Italy alone but all over Europe, and wherever prosperity came to the merchants there the towns became a factor in the political situation. In Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and England the municipal movement takes on different forms, but everywhere it is of paramount importance as affecting national development.

In general character this municipal movement was on something the same lines as the contemporary monastic revival. The latter had given a new position in European society to the monk. The new Orders were far more efficiently organized, and had a far stronger *esprit de corps* than those which they eclipsed. Each Order held great Councils at certain periods, when subjects of common interest were discussed and all the abbots were expected to attend. Internally each house was bound together firmly under its abbot by the stress laid on the duty of obedience and on strict discipline. This corporate unity it was which gave such power to the monastic orders and ensured their permanence and growing prosperity. Something the same process began to appear in the towns. The new opportunities which came to the merchants of Europe with the twelfth century gave an impetus to the long-felt desire of the townspeople to win for themselves both a better-defined position in society and a closer internal organization.

The monks owed their privileged position to their sacred character. Patronage of the new orders brought such reputation and prestige as Theobald of Champagne acquired by his support of St. Bernard, or Albert the Bear by his support of the Premonstratensians. The towns offered inducements to their backers of another sort. They were useful as military posts and as sources of wealth. Ever since the anarchy of the Dark Ages the

towns had been used as places of defence. In Spain they long kept their military character as outposts against the Moors, everywhere the burgesses were bound to military service, and especially to the defence of their town. As holders of fortified posts on exposed frontiers and in newly conquered lands, it was natural that the burghers should receive privileges which would raise them above the position of villeins. Secondly, their growing wealth and the importance of the associations of merchants in guilds made them able to buy more privileges from needy lords, and to prove to those who had foresight that it would pay to give such industrious subjects liberty to expand and develop. For these reasons the efforts of the townspeople towards independence were often encouraged by their lords. The kings had an additional motive in the fact that the rich and easily defended towns formed a counterpoise to the barons; feudal independence could be fought by grants of municipal independence. As they grew stronger, too, it sometimes became possible for the kings to establish the principle that a royal grant of independence could be made to a town no matter on whose lands it was situated. In many cases the towns became the weapons of the kings in their war against the great vassals.

The Church, on the other hand, found very little reason to support the new movement. Many of the largest and most prosperous towns had grown up 'under the Cross', on the lands of a great bishop or abbot, where anarchy was less prevalent than in secular lordships. As the master of such centres of wealth the bishop or abbot held a very strong position, and the turbulence and struggles for independence of the townsfolk threatened at once his income and his prestige. Just as the Pope struggled against the citizens of Rome, so all over Europe bishops

(2) The Origin of Municipal Privileges.

(3) Attitude of the Church.

and churchmen fought against the municipal movement. The townspeople often behaved with brutal violence, and carried their hatred of their illiberal ruler so far as to attack the very faith on which the whole social structure of mediaeval Europe depended. Anticlericalism and heresy found a home among the citizens; the Universities which some of the cities possessed became hot-beds of the new learning and of new doctrines—above all, the view that the Church should possess temporal power was naturally attacked, and the cry that it should revert to apostolic poverty became more and more insistent. It is easy to see why the Church showed such small favour to the cause of municipal emancipation. The cause itself, as has been said, shows itself in different forms in most of the countries of Europe. Its most characteristic developments occur in France and Italy. The successful Italian cities became autonomous city-states, the French cities became corporate members of the feudal aristocracy.

The French communes were only a small group among the leaders of the municipal movement in France. Many of the towns never won the privileges which would entitle them to the name of commune, much of the healthiest development of the lower orders never reached the end for which all were striving. Thus the communes in France differ from the privileged towns of England in that they belong to a class apart: they are not merely, as were London and Newcastle, the most advanced among a number of cities differing among themselves only in the degree of liberty which they had gained. They were a highly favoured group, sharply distinguished in character and constitution from all other towns whether privileged or not. What then was the exact status to which a city attained by becoming a commune? It was the position of equality with the members of the feudal

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baronage. The lord who granted a communal charter to a city on his land raised the city to a social and political level only one degree below his own. He gave it the privileges, and it assumed the obligations, of a feudal baron—it had the right to hold a court, to hold land, the obligation to perform military service, to swear on oath of fealty to its lord in return for an oath from him. Instead of the castle-keep of the feudal lord, it had a town belfry, which was often at once dungeon, town-hall, watch-tower, and fortress; like him it had, as the symbol of its authority, a seal. But instead of being an individual, it was an association—the united body of those who had sworn together to maintain it. This body would often include the whole number of the citizens, but it tended, in spite of reactions, to become narrowed down to the members of a privileged, hereditary class.

There is no uniformity of type in the constitutions of the French communes. In some it would appear that the rulers of the city kept up the numbers of their body by appointing new members themselves. Thus the constitution of the city was essentially oligarchical. In others, on the contrary, the rulers were elected by the whole body of the citizens or by the guilds, but it is a mistake to assume that this method was by any means universal. The members of the governing body were called by various titles—*jurati*, *scabini*, or *pares*, and in their hands was every side of civic administration. At their head was the mayor. The method of election of the mayor was of course a most important point, on which depended to a great extent the character of the commune. In some cases the lord still exercised the right of appointment; in others the *scabini* themselves chose their chief; in those of the most democratic character he was elected by the citizens. As a rule his

office was annual, though he might be reappointed. The office of mayor, involving as it did supreme control over internal government and the duty of representing the commune in its external relations, was a very arduous and difficult one, and it was often hard to induce men to undertake it. Generally speaking, the constitutions of the French communes were much less democratic in character than they have often been said to be. The assembly of all the citizens, once thought to have the real power in its hand, is found in most cases to have met only for exceptional reasons.

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The communes, then, were self-made members of feudal society. As such they had all the difficulties and most of the faults of *parvenus*. We have shown that king and baronage had many reasons for looking on them with favour. Still, it was without enthusiasm and often only after strenuous opposition that they welcomed the new arrivals. It was impossible to forget that they had once been serfs, to be taxed at will and treated as inferior beings; it went against the grain to sanction the formation of another independent feudal unit. An English chronicler describes the commune as 'timor regni, tumor plebis, tepor sacerdotii', a source of peril to the kingdom, a piece of insubordination on the part of the people, and a sign of lukewarmness towards the clergy. The attitude of king, baron, and bishop could not have been more succinctly expressed.

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On the other hand the communes represent a not altogether healthy side of the development of the lower orders or 'third estate'. By being drawn into the feudal structure of society they acquired some of the vices of that society. They had all the pride and exclusiveness of the feudal baron, and as many temptations to extravagance. The description of the foolish display of a

secular knight, which St. Bernard gives in his recommendation of the Templars, would apply as well, with changes in detail, to the pomp, the festivities, and the reckless expenditure of the communes. Under a governing body subject to these faults, the common people grew impatient, discontented, and in the end could even be persuaded to vote themselves for the abrogation of their city's privileges. Still, the achievement of the communes in forcing their way into the rigid hereditary orders of the feudal aristocracy was a fine one. It foreshadowed the collapse of that aristocracy and compelled the recognition of the rights of the *tiers-état*.

In Italy feudalism had never become part of the structure of society: the holders of land were not the only recognized leaders. The cities had all the prestige of a history stretching back to the days of the Roman Empire. They were the first to feel the benefit of the expansion of Europe eastwards. Thus both nobles and clergy were powerless against the prosperous citizens, who became, with a vague recognition of Imperial suzerainty, practically independent communities. In France it is to some extent true that the feudal aristocracy absorbed the towns, in Italy it was the towns which absorbed the aristocracy. The nobles, finding commerce more profitable than agriculture and brigandage, crowded into the towns, became members of the trade guilds, and indulged their martial instincts in the city factions. Between the cities there were alternations of close alliance and bitter hostility. Immune from all superior control, the Italian republics showed their vigour and independence by ceaseless endeavours to cripple one another. Neither in Italy nor in France did the cities, as they did in Germany, show any permanent tendency towards co-operation. The South German and the Baltic towns were to

(7) The
Italian
Republics.

become great powers in international politics by virtue of their capacity for organization in leagues. The strongest of the Italian cities, though they showed at one time indications of this same capacity when they formed against the Emperor the great union known as the Lombard league, still developed normally into great powers, as individuals and from the greatness of their individual resources. The French cities, like the English, never emerged on to the stage of Europe, they were always subordinate to the national unity of the kingdom.

The constitutions of the Italian cities differed very widely, as did the French, from one another. As a general rule, however, the executive power was in the hands of two or more consuls. These were chosen by various processes from among the elected representatives of the people, known as the *boni homines*, and were assisted in their government by a *credentia*, or council of wise men, which fulfilled the functions of a senate. Thus the municipal authority had passed altogether into the hands of the burgesses, who had effectually excluded both the secular count and the bishop. The only means by which the cities could be controlled was by the appointment of a supreme magistrate known as a *podesta*. Such a dictator was sometimes adopted by the cities themselves from among the prominent men of some other city, as a means of securing an impartial authority to counteract the bitter factions of internal politics. An outside power which could control the *podesta* might hope thereby to dominate the cities.

Apart from minor distinctions, it is important to view the municipal movement of the twelfth century all over Europe as a whole. It will be shown in fuller detail later how the movement affected the political situation in each of the great continental states.

III. FREDERICK BARBAROSSA IN GERMANY

Germany has had only two national statesmen of the first rank—Frederick Barbarossa and Bismarck. Other great rulers she has produced in plenty, but they have been either, like Charlemagne or Charles V, rulers of European rather than German dominions, or like Henry the Fowler, Henry the Lion, or Frederick the Great, rulers not of Germany, but of German states. In her struggles during the nineteenth century for that national unity which Bismarck gave her, Germany often looked back to Barbarossa's day as the last time when she had a national existence.

At Frederick's election in 1152, Germany as a political unit was more like the British than the German Empire of to-day. Saxony, Bavaria, Brandenburg, and Bohemia were, like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa, really independent principalities with practically all the attributes of sovereignty, and with far more military power than any colony yet possesses. Within these states, again, like the Provinces of Canada and the other Federations within the Empire, were lesser powers—Margraves, Landgraves, and Counts Palatine, each jealous of their local independence and all disposed to limit as far as possible all claims to superior authority. The Emperor's power was effective only in his own family estates, which would correspond roughly, in the British Empire, to the United Kingdom and the Crown Colonies. The very strength of the Emperors in the territories under their immediate rule made against German unity, for as Dukes of Swabia, or Franconia, or Saxony, they were themselves the champions of that local independence which they attacked when exercised by the other dukes.

(1) Characteristics of Mediaeval Germany.

(2) Methods of Frederick.

Frederick, like the advocates of Imperial Federation, planned to make of this loosely-knit group of states a real political unity. On a larger scale it was the task which Philip Augustus was to begin in France and which Henry II was to attempt over a territory almost as large as Germany, and to carry out triumphantly in England. He had three means by which to work. First, he could strengthen his hold over his own family domain; secondly, he could make more real and effective his royal and imperial authority all over Germany; thirdly, he could bind more closely to himself the great dukes and margraves. By the first method he would strengthen the Imperial House, by the second he could work for the far-off ideal of a centralized German nation-state, by the third he might hope to attain the more practical end of an effective Federation under the recognized supremacy of the Emperor. Frederick was prepared to use all three, just as occasion served. But the situation when he came to the throne made it inevitable that he should depend largely upon the third. The great problem before Frederick was how to deal with the house of Guelph.

(3) The question of the Guelphs.

Frederick was himself the son of a Guelph. His mother was the daughter of Welf of Bavaria. Like Henry VIII of England, he could declare himself in his own person the symbol of the union of the two great houses. On the other hand, Frederick's uncle, Henry Jasomirgott, brother of Conrad III, was that Margrave of Austria to whom Conrad had given Bavaria. With him Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony and the most ambitious member of the house of Guelph, was disputing the possession of Bavaria. Everything depended on how this difficult situation was treated.

(4) Frederick and the Dukes.

In reality there was nothing for Frederick to do but to conciliate the Guelphs. Their strength in Germany

made them formidable enough. Moreover, Frederick was anxious at this time to clear the way for his expedition to Italy, which would have become impossible had he got involved in a contest in Germany. He therefore made lavish concessions to the rival house. In 1156 he invested Henry the Lion with Bavaria and compensated Henry Jasomirgott by making the Austrian March into a Dukedom. These two moves might well seem to point to the fact that at the very start of his reign Frederick gave up every chance of becoming the effective ruler of Germany. It is impossible to imagine Henry II partitioning England in this fashion. Not even in his French dominions would Henry ever consent to trust his sons as Frederick trusted Henry the Lion. But Germany had not undergone such discipline as was given to England by the Norman kings. Henry II was able to work at superseding altogether the feudal bond which held the great feudatories to their overlord the king, and putting in its place the common obligation of obedience to the sovereign, equally binding on all subjects. Frederick could not, as yet at least, hope to rule Saxony or Bavaria immediately, as Henry ruled Kent and Yorkshire; the most he could do was to exercise a friendly influence over their effective sovereign Henry the Lion. He was only a little better off than Louis VII who, in theory, ruled two-thirds of France only as the suzerain of Henry II.

The rule of Henry the Lion over his enormous territories is a famous episode of German history, and one which raises many of the most important questions of German mediaeval history. In Bavaria, Henry's lands lay between those of the Imperial house, in Swabia and Franconia to the west and, to the east, those of the Austrian house of Babenberg, whose representative

(5) Position of Henry the Lion.

Henry Jasomirgott had just been driven out of Bavaria. On his southern frontier he had access to the Alps, beyond which, in Italy, his cousin Welf now held the lands of the Countess Matilda, which Frederick had handed over to him in 1153. To the north-east was the duchy of Bohemia, whose duke, Boleslav, received in 1158 the title of King. In Bavaria, then, strong as Henry was, he was hemmed in by powerful rivals. It was otherwise in Saxony. Here Henry had only one serious rival, Albert the Bear, the head of the house of Ballenstädt, and Margrave of Brandenburg. To the north, indeed, his hold on the Baltic might be shaken by the sea-power of Slav pirate fleets, or by the enmity of the King of Denmark. Great bishops like those of Bremen and Magdeburg and Cologne, and ambitious nobles like Christian of Oldenburg or Lewis of Thuringia might be expected to give trouble. But Henry was young, vigorous, and strong in the support of the Emperor, who gave him full control over the Saxon and Bavarian Churches and full powers to extend his territories to the north and west. It was inevitable that Henry should take up again the work of the long line of Saxon dukes, which had begun under Henry the Fowler and had only been laid aside with the death of the Emperor Lothair.

(6) Henry
and Albert
the Bear.

Clearly, however, the work could not go forward till Albert the Bear and Henry the Lion had decided who was to lead it. We have seen that Albert had already proved himself a great colonizer. Allied with the Archbishop of Magdeburg he had pushed forward to the borders of Poland and made himself the heir to the policy of Lothair. From this position Henry was determined to oust him. For ten years the rivalry of the two paralysed the activity of both, till in 1166 they broke into open war. Two years later the Emperor

brought about a reconciliation, and in 1170 Albert died. It is the tragedy of his career that he wasted his energies in the struggle for Saxony, instead of concentrating on the Eastern expansion of Brandenburg. Of Frederick, Henry, and Albert it was said that here were three men capable of converting the world. Instead, they gave themselves up to thwarting one another.

With Albert's death, Henry saw the way clear before him. He had already done much. Frederick had made him in all but name an independent sovereign. His policy was that of the typical modern colonial government—the development by every means in his power of the resources of his inheritance. His means were mainly three: a vigorous foreign policy, the maintenance of a strong hand on the Church, and the development of trade and commerce. Both previous and subsequent history show the possibilities of a great state based on the Baltic. Canute of England and Adalbert of Bremen had already aimed at what the Hanseatic towns, Sweden under Gustavus Adolphus, and Russia under Peter the Great, were later to create. The project of 'opening up' Eastern Germany by sea and land was one which would appeal to the modern capitalist very much as it appealed to Henry the Lion. Of all the four great rulers of his day, he it was who best realized the possibilities of commercial expansion encouraged by the State. Philip Augustus, who persistently encouraged the French communes, comes nearest to him. Elsewhere in twelfth-century Europe commerce thrived in spite of, or thanks to the neglect of, the central governments, and the cities of Italy and Flanders and the Rhineland had only their own efforts to rely on for the encouragement of their trade. Henry believed in less individualistic methods. The first necessity was to secure the Baltic

(7) The expansion of Germany.

seaboard. In 1156 Henry annexed Bremen which had long regarded itself as independent under a long line of military archbishops. In 1158 he secured Lübeck from Adolph of Holstein. In 1160 he defeated the Abotrites and built Schwerin. All these and other cities of the Baltic seaboard he developed by commercial treaties with Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. Equally modern was his vigorous immigration policy: he invited settlers from Frisia and Flanders, whom he set to work at draining and clearing the country for farming. He established relations with England (then a non-industrial country which offered a large market for the produce of the Baltic) by marrying Henry II's daughter. He formed an alliance with Waldemar of Denmark in order to crush the independence of the Slav pirates, and to obtain control over their fleet. This control he afterwards, in 1168, used to defeat Waldemar himself, who had refused to Henry a share in their joint capture of the island of Rugen. Waldemar's son and successor married Henry's daughter, and the allies kept the Baltic policed as it had never been before. To the north and the east he thrust forward his frontiers with reckless haste. In 1160 he took possession of Nordalbingia, drove out its inhabitants and filled it with Flemish and German settlers. This brought him to the borders of Denmark and gave him complete security to the north. To the east he was equally successful; his daughter married the Slavonic ruler of Mecklenburg, and the Duke of Pomerania acknowledged his suzerainty. Wherever possible, his policy was the expulsion of the Slavs in favour of Germans; where they were too strong he aimed at establishing a protectorate reinforced by settlements of German traders. Thus his influence became supreme from Frisia to the Vistula.

To organize his conquests and secure his authority he needed a subservient Church. He could always pose as the champion of Christianity against the heathen Slavs. By the capture of the Holy Isle of Rugen his ally Waldemar of Denmark and he had overthrown the centre of the Slavonic faith and destroyed the most sacred of its temples. Like Albert the Bear, he called into the mission-fields which his conquests opened up the Cistercian and Premonstratensian monks, whose knowledge of agriculture was growing, if their piety was becoming less intense. It would be difficult to find more ideal agents for the work which Henry set them than these monks. They established communications, cleared forests, drained marshes, and set agriculture on foot with the most modern methods. They did invaluable educational work in removing the great bar to the mixing of the two races—the religious differences between them. Their vow of celibacy and close corporate life saved them from absorption among the Slavs. Almost as useful were the bishops. The settlement of the Investiture question, had, we have seen, left the real control over episcopal elections to the lay power, and this control, by the Emperor's grant, was unsparingly used by Henry in both his duchies. Bishoprics were created with their centres at Henry's towns—Schwerin, Mecklenburg, Oldenburg, and others—and filled with obedient nominees of the Duke. Thus he had ready to his hand a weapon to be used at need against the independence of the nobles or the turbulence of the towns: he used them, as he used the Slavonic pirates, the Baltic traders, the monks, and the rulers of Denmark, Mecklenburg, and Pomerania, simply as pawns in the game of his vast ambition. His independence, his wealth, and his strength on sea and land made him in everything

(8) Henry
and the
Church.

but name one of the greatest independent sovereigns of the age.

Thus it would appear that Frederick's policy of conciliating the Guelphs had carried him farther in granting away powers than has even the colonial policy of Great Britain. So far he had done nothing more than on one occasion to act as a mediator between Henry and Albert the Bear. Was it not clear that, as ruler of northern Germany, Frederick had virtually abdicated to Henry the Lion, and sacrificed the rights of the Ghibelline Emperors to the ambitions of the Guelphic Duke?

(9) Unpopularity of Henry the Lion.

Frederick, however, was to prove himself able to recall what he had given. Henry's position in reality depended to a great extent on Imperial support. Bavaria and Saxony were far apart, and Bavaria especially, as we have seen, was surrounded by rivals. Henry himself had already prejudiced the ultimate success of his work. He had all the hastiness and ruthlessness of the makers of new countries; in his commercial policy he had trampled recklessly on the rights and claims of others; in common with all but the most enlightened of mediaeval rulers (most of them Popes) he had no conception of how to treat a religious question in any spirit but that of the Crusader; he had gone out of his way to alienate the Slav. Worse still, he had made a host of enemies among his German subjects, the fruits of whose work he had gathered up—whom he had bullied and exploited with cynical selfishness. In 1176 he went on to add the Emperor to his other foes. He refused to respond to a summons from Frederick to serve with him in Italy. This was flat rebellion. But Frederick bided his time, and it was not till 1180 that he took decisive action. The year before, he summoned Henry and his enemies to appear before an Imperial Diet. in order that

he might judge the case between them. On Henry's failure to appear, he made war on him and declared his dominions forfeit. Those in the north were divided between Albert the Bear's son Bernard, and Philip, Bishop of Cologne,—Bavaria went to Otto of Wittelsbach. By 1181 Henry's position was hopeless, his friends all failed him, and at the Diet of Erfurt he submitted to Frederick. He was pardoned and allowed to keep his hereditary possessions exclusive of Saxony and Bavaria.

(10) Fall
of Henry
the Lion.

Thus with little difficulty Frederick had brought his most powerful subject to his knees. True that he had overthrown Henry, not by his own forces, but by encouraging Henry's enemies. Still he had shown the consequence of refusing to fulfil the obligations which bound the great dukes to the Emperor, and proved that the same causes which made the Emperor weak in Germany, weakened also his would-be rivals.

It has been maintained that the defeat of Henry the Lion was only another of the many disasters which the Empire inflicted on Germany. Henry's refusal to help Frederick in Italy was, it is said, a rare piece of German patriotism: Henry would not consent to drag Northern Germany into the ruinous Italian wars which were drawing Germany away from her true work—the expansion eastwards into Slavonic territory. Henry and not Frederick is the true German hero, for Henry looked East and North, while Frederick looked South. The implied reproach against Frederick is unfair. In attacking and overthrowing a rebellious duke, Frederick was making a great step forward in the direction of German unity. The collapse of Henry's power was a victory for the German kingship. Moreover, much as Henry did, it may be doubted whether he had the makings of a national statesman. He was too hasty and too selfish

(11) Rival
policies of
Henry and
Frederick.

to found a national policy, and his overthrow might well have come from within his duchies, without Frederick's intervention. There can be no doubt that Frederick's Italian difficulties helped to spoil him as a German king. But, even so, there was more hope for Germany in the sane statesmanship of the Emperor than in the brutal ambition of Henry the Lion.

(12) Frederick and the Land-peace.

The relations of the Emperor with the Duke of Saxony and Bavaria give the best example of Frederick's policy towards the dukes. But he did more than merely confide in or control the great feudatories: he aimed at making his own power felt over the whole of Germany. Unlike Henry II of England he had no itinerant justices, no regular machinery by which he could penetrate into any corner of his dominions. Still he had means of a sort. Of these some of the most important were the Land-peaces. During the disorder of the War of Investiture in the preceding century the custom had grown up among the people of forming local associations to keep the peace, governed by a series of rules, to observe which those who joined the peace were required to swear. Each Land-peace only applied to a small district and, being unenforced by the central government, was binding only on those who agreed to swear to it. It was a very rough attempt to create by local effort a sort of volunteer police force. The predecessors of Frederick, Henry IV, Henry V, Lothair, and Conrad, had seen in these Land-peaces an opportunity for the extension of Imperial influence. In 1152, the first year of his reign, Frederick continued their work by reissuing a general Peace Constitution for all Germany, which was designed to co-ordinate and supplement all the local Land-peaces. He wisely made no attempt to abolish them; he gave them universal application and Imperial support. > To break the

Landpeace was to have to do with the Emperor. The Peace Constitution was extended to the whole Empire; thus the Emperor came forward as the authority at the back of the penal code of Germany. In practice he could certainly do little to enforce it, this had still to be left largely to local effort. But by recognizing and unifying that local effort the Emperor did much to strengthen the conception that the Imperial authority was the safeguard of public order in Germany.

Again, the Imperial Diets were made a means of impressing Germany with a sense of the Emperor's power. As he judged the case of Henry the Lion at Würzburg and received his submission at Erfurt, so he was for ever deciding appeals and giving out decrees at solemn assemblies held all over Germany. Here, too, he would receive the ambassadors of foreign powers, Hungary, Denmark, and even England, over whom he claimed Imperial suzerainty. Like the Jubilee Celebrations of Queen Victoria, such gatherings were more than mere ceremonies. They proved to Germany and to the world that the Emperor was determined to maintain the highest claims of his position. Nor did Frederick rely solely on prestige. We have seen him making war on Henry the Lion. In 1157 he led an expedition into Poland, and forced its king, Boleslav, to swear fealty to him. He attacked and destroyed the walls of the rebellious city of Mainz. Wherever he was in Germany he was prepared to hurry to the scene of disorder or anarchy and to repress it with a strong hand.

Throughout he was strengthened by the loyalty of the Church. According to the Concordat of Worms, his control over elections should have been limited to the right of supervising them, and sharing in the arbitration of doubtful cases. As a matter of fact, Frederick was

(13) Frederick's Diets.

(14) Frederick and the German Church.

strong enough to make the Concordat a dead letter. All over Germany he could secure the election of any one he wished to those great bishoprics which were often principalities as well. The bishops themselves, often involved in struggles with the lesser nobility, the dukes, or the growing strength of the townsmen, were only too glad of the Emperor's support. It was the opposition of the bishops which did more than anything else to overthrow Henry the Lion, just as it was the Archbishop of Cologne who received a large part of Henry's territory. It was the rising of the citizens of Mainz against their archbishop, whom they assassinated, which brought on them the punishment of the Emperor. As Frederick became more deeply involved in his conflict with the Papacy, so the almost unfailing support of the German Church became more valuable to him. Of all the Churches of Europe the German was the least inclined to follow the dictation of Rome, the strongest in local feeling, and the most closely bound to the State. There was no parallel in Germany to the Thomas Becket of England, or the St. Bernard of France. Moreover, if the Emperor was loyal in his support of the bishops, he was unyielding in the enforcement of his rights over their temporalities. It was he who first made a reality of the *jus spoli*, the most irritating of all the claims of the lay power over the clergy. On the death of a bishop the Emperor seized and appropriated the whole contents of his palace. Considering the luxury and display of the lives of many of the bishops, this right was no small source of revenue to the Emperor, as it was no doubt a salutary reminder of the precept of apostolic poverty to the incoming prelate. It was of course intensely resented by the Church, but on the other hand it provided, together with the Imperial control over elections,

a safeguard against the piling up of hereditary rights or possessions by the ecclesiastical princes. In Germany, offices and lands both had a disastrous tendency to fall into the hands of powerful families, and among lay feudatories all Frederick's efforts were powerless to check it. All the more valuable then was the complete absence of hereditary succession in the Church.

If hereditary succession among the great landholders of Germany was a menace to the Emperor, an even greater danger was the elective principle in the succession to the Empire. All the advantages which the Emperor drew from the elective principle in the Church, the Great Dukes and Churchmen who chose the Emperor could draw from the elective principle in the Empire. Though Pope and Emperor were both elected, the Empire suffered far more than the Papacy. The College of Cardinals, who elected the Pope, had practically the same interests as the head of the Church. Though they usually wanted a Pope whom they could influence, it was essential for the Church that the Papacy should remain powerful. The Cardinals had few interests or concerns outside the Church, their whole position and influence depended on the maintenance of its strength and prestige. A strong man, therefore, had a reasonable chance of being elected to the Papacy. The Dukes and Archbishops, unlike the Cardinals, were great independent rulers of wide territories. To them it mattered little whether the Emperor was strong or weak, so long as he was not strong enough to interfere with them. The only way in which he could become strong enough was by founding an Imperial line with large hereditary estates, always being increased by Emperor after Emperor. Thus the Dukes were always tempted, as in the case of Lothair and Conrad III, to chose a new man, and let the

(15) Frederick and the Elective Principle.

would-be Emperor remain merely a powerful subject to be played off against his successful rival in the interests of his fellows.

(16) Fred-
erick and
his family
demesnes.

Frederick did everything in his power to increase the extent and strength of his hereditary demesnes. In Swabia and Franconia he made himself all-powerful. He created his brother Conrad Count Palatine of the Rhine. He himself married the heiress of Burgundy, and made every effort to extend his influence over the Burgundian territory, the control of which was claimed by the rulers both of Germany and France. Frederick's marriage seemed to settle the question in favour of Germany. The most impressive of all Frederick's German Diets, that of 1157, was held at Besançon, the Burgundian capital in the Rhine valley. While Henry the Lion was thrusting German influence eastward to the Vistula, the Emperor Frederick was pushing westward to the Rhone. In the south and west Frederick built up a Ghibelline power, which after the fall of the Guelphs left him without a rival as a territorial magnate in Germany. It was inevitable that he should go on to attempt to make these lands a permanent asset of the Empire. The Capetian kings of France owed all their success to the fact that, thanks to an extraordinary series of direct hereditary successions, the gains of each royal generation had been handed on to the next. In the same way the Hohenstaufen demesne must be allowed to crystallize round an Imperial succession. In 1169, therefore, Frederick had his son Henry crowned King of the Romans, a solemn guarantee of his succession at his father's death. Once this practice could become established, the Hohenstaufen Imperial house would take its place alongside of the Capetians and Plantagenets, and become fully a match for the German dukes, the German bishops, and the Pope.

In Germany, then, as Emperor and King, Frederick ranks with his contemporaries, Henry II and Philip Augustus, as the champion of the national ideal. Like them, he brought prosperity to national trade, order and justice into national life. Though he was no friend in Germany, any more than in Italy, to burghal independence, still the towns of the south and of the Rhineland prospered with the suppression of brigandage and of the robber knights whose castles dotted the shores of the great trade artery of Western Germany—the Rhine. Both in his own domains, and in those of the great dukes whom he favoured, the most lawless element in German life, the lesser nobility, was vigorously suppressed.

(17) Ger-
many
under
Frederick's
rule.

Art and Literature followed on prosperity. The Minnesingers, the troubadours of Germany, began to produce verses in the vernacular tongue. The great epic of the *Nibelungenlied* was formed out of a collection of older songs and legends. New legends grew up round the figure of Frederick Barbarossa, and more than Otto I, or even than Charlemagne, Frederick became the typical hero of German patriotism.

It would seem, indeed, to be correct to say that under Frederick mediaeval Germany had its last chance of becoming a nation. Frederick's policy was neither consistent nor homogeneous. Much of his energy was spent in Italy, he died in Asia Minor. He tried to rule two kingdoms, control the Papacy, and lead a Crusade. He was himself in his own person an Emperor, a King, and a Duke. As the last he was the champion of local autonomy, as the second of German nationality, as the first of cosmopolitan Imperialism. Still, in spite of these contradictions, his work in Germany might well, like that of Henry II in England, have survived the collapse of his imperial schemes, and his family estates, like those

of Philip Augustus in France, have given his successors the means of binding Northern and Southern Germany together into a centralized kingdom. But unfortunately Frederick's work was not solid enough to survive, as Henry II's survived Richard I and John, the continental ambitions of Henry VI and the disastrous minority of Frederick II. Frederick Barbarossa was fated to be the last of the Hohenstaufen who had leisure to deal with German problems or to work for German unity.

IV. FREDERICK BARBAROSSA IN ITALY

Yet Germany played a smaller part in the German Frederick's life than did England in that of the Angevin Henry II. Just as England had absorbed the attention of the Danish Canute, of the Norman William and Henry I, and of the great continental sovereign who ruled far more of France than the French King, so Italy fascinated the rulers of Germany. Henry II's life was a ceaseless struggle to hold together what the English Channel kept apart. Frederick tried to rule from the Baltic to Sicily, as if the Alps had not existed. In its early days, the Europe of nation-states defied geography as the young nations of North America defy it nowadays.

(1) Political character of the Italian peninsula.

Italy herself has never been an easy country to govern, quite apart from the attempt to rule her from across the Alps. Even to-day, when her population is but now recovering from a long period of decline in numbers and in civilization, when means of communication have been enormously developed and all the modern devices for linking a nation together can be applied, when there is no possible rival authority to be set up against her king, and no effective desire for local independency, she is split up by divisions as deep and

broad as those which split up the British Isles. In the Middle Ages, not only were her people alive with all the spirit and energy of those who are in the van of civilization, but she was the theatre of several dozen political rivalries. If Germany was like the British Empire, Italy was like Modern Europe, and the task of her would-be ruler was not much less than the task undertaken by Napoleon. It has been calculated that whereas mediaeval England had two million inhabitants, mediaeval Italy had eighteen. To come over the Alps and on to the Lombard plain must have been a revelation for the north European. In his own half-developed land, the alternations of village clearings, waste lands, and forests were only varied at rare intervals by a city or a town. Lombardy was already thick with cities and fertile with the cultivation of ages, rich in Universities and schools, and full of turbulent democratic spirit. Whereas in the North the efforts of the cities were still concentrated on the exclusion of their lay or ecclesiastical lord, in Italy there was incessant warfare between the cities themselves. The rivalry of Genoa and Pisa, and of Milan and Pavia, was paralleled by similar feuds all over Northern Italy. Such a condition did not make for order and must have seriously hampered trade, but it was a proof at once of the vitality and of the autonomy of the Lombard republics.

Central Italy, with fewer and less powerful cities, was equally masterless. The estates of Matilda, since Innocent II gave them to Lothair in 1133, had been nominally in Imperial hands. But it was becoming more and more definitely the aim of the Popes to weld together these and other territories to which the Papacy could lay some claim, into a compact territory with Rome as its centre. With such a territory the Papacy might hope

(2) Lombardy.

(3) The Centre.

to be independent of the Norman alliance, secure from Norman hostility, able to overawe Rome, and to hold its own against invasion from the north. It was likely that any other power which should try to establish itself in Central Italy would meet with resistance from the Pope. Nor would it be an easy task to make good a claim to effective control over the independent lordships, cities, and bishoprics of which Central Italy was a patchwork. Hardest of all, perhaps, would be the task of mastering Rome, which in 1152 was openly defying the Pope. In many ways Rome was itself a reflection of Italy as a whole. It was torn by the rivalries of the four powers who struggled throughout the Middle Ages for pre-eminence in Italy—the Pope, the Emperor, the noble houses, and the urban republics. The citizens were always hoping to be able to treat the Pope as the Lombard cities had treated their bishops, and to reduce his authority to a shadow. At the same time they were constantly reminded that the residence of the Popes meant pilgrimages, tourist patronage, prosperity, and excitement. The Pope must therefore at all costs be retained. If only he could be persuaded to give up all claim to temporal authority and to acquiesce in being, on occasion, dragged through the city by the hair, all would be well. Otherwise he might be, like Lucius II in 1145, knocked lifeless by a stone in an assault on the Capitol, or like Eugenius III, expelled and recalled alternately, as the citizens' animosity or avarice held the upper hand. The Emperors were only an intermittent danger. Most of them might be expected to come to the city, at least once, to be crowned; a spirited one would probably quarrel with the Pope or the citizens or both. In some cases he could be used against the Pope, in any events he and his Germans made a good

show, and soon either returned home or became victims of the Roman climate. The noble houses, more even than in the other cities of Italy, were the wire-pullers of the democracy. Rome bristled with their towers, perched on the top of the old Roman monuments and arches like eyries of birds of prey. Great families like the Pierleoni, the Frangipani, the Colonna, the Corsi, most of them backed by large estates in the country, could lead the mob this way and that, control the Cardinals and the Papal elections, and organize disastrous street-fights for the Imperial soldiery. Still, great as was their influence, it was liable to be upset, not only by their own persistent rivalry and feuds, but also by the rise of some eloquent demagogue or popular prophet. The revival of the glories of the great days of Rome, when 'Senatus Populusque Romanus' ruled the world from the Capitol, was a magnificent theme for such a man to elaborate before the disorderly rabble of mediaeval Rome, in the days when such a conception would strike no one as an anachronism. The result would be a brief dictatorship and the solemn re-establishment of a Republican constitution. No wonder that in the Middle Ages the dramatic possibilities of the Eternal City were well used.

But the real key to the Italian problem lay to the south. The Norman kingdom of Naples and Sicily had at once the most mixed population and the most stable government in the peninsula. Saracens, Greeks, Normans, and Italians had been welded together into a power which, if it could not unite Italy, could at least prevent any one else doing it. To dispossess or subdue the Normans was the obvious policy of the Emperor. Equally obvious was it that, once established in their place, he could at will put an end to the independence of the Papacy. Of this the Pope was as well aware as was

(4) The South.

the Emperor. Geography and History, then, had combined to make of Italy a fine problem for her would-be ruler. If an hereditary house, by making full use of its feudal suzerainty, could hope to make a nation-state of Germany, more than this would be needed for Italy. Italy required a ruler with resources enough to meet the losses due to the climate, a ruler who should be the equal in prestige, and the superior in power of the Pope, and strong enough to uproot, not only a forest of stripling cities, but also an established kingdom with colonies, sea-power, and a full exchequer.

In 1154 Frederick appeared in Italy. In some respects he had fortune on his side. Of late, though the Emperor had played but a small part in Italian affairs, or perhaps for this very reason, Imperial prestige had been growing. A contemporary movement did much to give it impetus. The twelfth-century forecast of the Renaissance and the Reformation had had other manifestations besides those discussed in the last chapter. Of two of these, Irnerius of Bologna and Arnold of Brescia are typical. Irnerius was the founder in the early twelfth century of the great law school of Bologna. Under him the study of the Roman Civil Law was taken up with all the vigour with which Abelard attacked questions of theology and philosophy. It was impossible to study the laws of Justinian and his predecessors as they were studied in the Middle Ages without being an Imperialist. Nowadays it would be easy to make a distinction between the Roman and Byzantine emperors of the first six centuries and the twelfth-century Germans who had inherited their title. But no such idea occurred to the lawyers of the Middle Ages. To them the Roman Empire was still as much of a reality as it had ever been. They might acknowledge that things had perhaps changed for the worse

(5) The Imperialist lawyers.

to some extent. But in no sense did they consider that they lived in a new age, the progress of which was bound to be away from the ancient ideals. They considered themselves to be still in the age of the Roman Empire, under the sway of its theories, and ruled, in spite of a number of exceptions, by its laws. Thus what they found in the Civil Codes, they applied without hesitation to the Emperor of the day. As the study of law spread over Italy, its imperialistic tendency found plenty of response among a people who always retained a vivid conception of the great part played by their race in the creation of the Roman Empire. On the other hand, if the study of civil law helped the Emperor, it must not be forgotten that the study of Canon Law did as much for the Pope. The *Concordantia Discordantium Canonum* of Gratian had just appeared (between 1140 and 1145). It was soon to form the basis of the Papal position. Gratian was the first to make a systematic collection of the laws of the Church, and to endeavour to reduce to order and consistency the chaos of traditions and decrees which had grown up in the Papal Court. The Canon Law was also based on the Roman Law of Justinian; but it represented and supported the claim of the Pope, rather than of the Emperor of the day, to be the representative of the Roman Empire in the West. The two schools who favoured Irnerius and Gratian respectively were destined to give a new character to the struggle of Pope and Emperor. But it is important to remember that if the Roman and Lombard citizens could talk of liberty and republican traditions, and the Pope could claim Divine authority and talk of the Donation of Constantine, the Emperor too had among the civilian lawyers supporters who could advance theory and tradition alike in his favour.

(6) The
Canonists.

(7) Arri-
val of
Frederick.

In 1154, then, Frederick crossed the Alps and descended into Lombardy. At Roncaglia he held a Diet and received the homage of many of the cities. Tortona, which refused to submit, was then attacked and completely destroyed. For a time at least, *Libertas* had to yield to *Imperium*, and Frederick on his way to Rome met with no further resistance.

(8) Arnold
of Brescia.

When he reached Rome, Frederick found a curious situation. For six years Rome had been ruled by one of the most remarkable men of the age. Of the three famous men who have revived the Roman Republic, Arnold of Brescia was probably the most gifted. He was as eloquent as Rienzi, as fine an idealist as Mazzini, and as a man of action superior to both. St. Bernard, who was his enemy, describes him as the man whose word is honey, but whose doctrine is poison, whom Brescia has spat out, Rome abhors, France drives out, Germany curses, Italy refuses to receive. Arnold, in fact, after a stormy youth among Brescian factions, went to Paris, where he became the enthusiastic supporter of Abelard. When he returned to Italy he was denounced as a heretic; he fled to France, whence he was driven to Zurich; at last in 1147 he found his way to Rome. Here, by the revolution of 1145, a Senate had been established on the Capitol, which ruled Rome in the interests of the citizens, to the exclusion both of the selfish nobles and of the Pope. Arnold rapidly took the lead in Rome. In spite of St. Bernard's violent attacks on him, there was a good deal in common between the two. Both were critics of the worldliness of the clergy, typified and led by the corruption of the Roman *Curia*, which both inclined to exaggerate. But Arnold went beyond the rigid line which enclosed the orthodoxy of St. Bernard, and advocated the heresy of apostolic poverty. He

maintained that only by eschewing altogether contact with the world, and by limiting themselves exclusively to the obtaining of spiritual influence, could the clergy justify their position. This was the Cistercian ideal of St. Bernard, but, as we have seen, it was one to which St. Bernard himself was false in practice. In fact, it may be doubted whether the clergy, by adopting Arnold's proposals, would not have thrown away a great source of influence for good in mediæval Europe. Europe was for ever appealing to the Church for direction and advice in every department of life. It was inevitable that the Popes and bishops should become not merely the spiritual pastors, but actual claimants for temporal rule. In Germany and France, at any rate, where the Papal claims were not over-much respected, bishops were the best allies of the sovereigns, whose position would have been weak indeed if their most trustworthy vassals had taken up with apostolic poverty. Thus, fine as was Arnold's conception, the temporal power of Pope and bishop was already too firmly welded into the political structure of Europe to make his ideal a practical one.

For all that, he contrived for several years to keep the Pope in a state of periodic exile and perennial discomfort in the very centre of his power. Not unnaturally, as the enemy of the Pope and the nobles, he hoped for the support of the Emperor to his experiment. In 1149 the Senate wrote to Conrad III, pointing out that, as revivers of the ancient glories of Rome, they were the loyal subjects of the Emperor, and prepared to welcome him as their head. The Emperor's enemies—Roger of Sicily, the Pope, the nobles—were all hostile to the Republic, which had maintained against them a long and difficult struggle. Conrad had taken no notice. But surely Frederick might be relied on to use against Papal pre-

(9) Arnold
and the
Empire.

tensions the convenient weapon put into his hands by Arnold of Brescia. In 1154 Adrian IV (Nicholas Breakspear) became Pope. No sooner was the Englishman elected than he cut at the root of the Roman Republic by excommunicating Arnold, and expelling him from Rome. When Frederick arrived at Rome the Republic was thus without its moving spirit. Frederick made his decision without delay. He was crowned by Adrian; the Romans showed their displeasure by a fierce riot against the German soldiery, and the Emperor, though he beat them off with loss on both sides, was unable to remain in Rome. Arnold soon afterwards was taken, brought to Rome, and burnt at the stake by the Prefect's order, backed by the Pope. His ashes, like those of a later advocate of apostolic poverty, John Huss, were scattered to the winds to prevent any relic of the martyr remaining to inspire his followers. Adrian made an agreement with the Senate by which the Pope's dignity was doubtless restored (though its exact terms are unknown), and Arnold's work was completely undone.

(10) Death
of Arnold
of Brescia.

It is perhaps idle to ask what would have been the result of an alliance between Arnold and Frederick. Arnold would probably have remained loyal to the Emperor. Though he professed to be the restorer of the Republic, it was to the great days of Imperial Rome that he looked back; to his mind there was nothing incompatible with Republican liberty in submission to the Emperor. Whether he would have been able to keep his followers in hand may be doubted. The people of Rome were too thoroughly accustomed to the practice of attacking the Emperor's Germans, and the Roman idea of liberty was too much identified with licence and disorder, to make it likely that even with Arnold's help Frederick could have maintained himself in Rome as a permanent station. As

to the project of apostolic poverty, its fulfilment would have cut at the root of Frederick's whole scheme of government. Rainald, Archbishop of Cologne, and Christian, Archbishop of Mainz, were to be the mainstay of Frederick's wars and government in Italy. How would they have combined with Arnold of Brescia? Yet, after all, to secure the support of the municipal governments of Italy, and to undermine the Papal claims to temporal power, were Frederick's two objects in the south. Arnold offered him support in both. Moreover, an Italian statesman like Frederick might have made great use of the Republic as a counterpoise to the Pope, and played off one against the other till the time came for stepping in and carrying off the fruits of victory. Frederick was too German and too straightforward for such a game of intrigue. Two results of this first Italian journey were for the Emperor the glitter of Roncaglia and his coronation, and for the Pope the lending of the Imperial authority to a signal act of revenge against rebellious Rome. The third result was more important still. Before Frederick left Italy, Pope and Emperor had definitely quarrelled. Partly this arose from the inevitable question of ceremonial precedence. Would Frederick hold the bridle of the Pope's horse? Great debates followed on a question perhaps not so idle as it seems. It was only the symbol of a real struggle for mastery between the two powers. At the root of the trouble lay the question of the temporal power of the Pope in Italy. Adrian declared that he was supreme in Rome, and raised once again the question of the Matildine Donation. Like another Hildebrand and another Henry IV, Pope and Emperor stood ready to engage.

(11) Results of Frederick's journey.

In fact, the great struggle in which the Middle Ages spent much of their best energy was entering on its second phase. Investitures no longer held the first place

(12) New character of Papal and Imperial conflict.

in the debate. This had been taken by the question of territorial sovereignty in Italy. At the same time, this contest differs from the third phase in that the Emperor continues his device of having anti-popes elected, to whom he professes to pay all the honour of which his enemy is unworthy. Thus the Emperor attacks not the Papacy but the Pope: he does not wish to abolish the office, but only to secure that its occupant shall behave as he wishes.

(13) Periods of Frederick's Italian policy.

Chronologically, Frederick's Italian administration groups itself round three periods—the Pontificates of Adrian IV (1154-9), of Alexander III (1159-81), and of Alexander's four successors (1181-91). Adrian defied Frederick at the Diet of Besançon, saw Frederick's first siege of Milan in 1158, and the destruction of the city in 1162 after the second siege. Alexander was opposed by three successive imperial anti-popes, Victor IV, Paschal III, and Calixtus III; under him was formed the Lombard League, 1167, and fought the great battle of Legnano, 1176. In 1177 he was reconciled to Frederick by the Treaty of Venice. Both Adrian and Alexander found support in the Eastern Empire and in Sicily. During the last period occurred the peace of Constance, 1183, the marriage of Henry, King of the Romans, with the heiress of Sicily, 1186, and Frederick's departure on the Third Crusade. The most formidable antagonist of Frederick was undoubtedly Alexander III. Adrian showed himself a dauntless champion of the rights of the Papacy. But under him the struggle was kept within bounds by the fact that he was the undoubted Pope and therefore could not be attacked with the same vigour as if he had opposed an Imperial candidate. Moreover, he was himself a prudent, humorous, and experienced man of the world, who had reformed the Church of Norway and played with great skill a difficult part in the turbulent

(14) Adrian IV and Frederick.

North, who had seen much life since he was turned away as a boy for begging at the doors of St. Alban's Abbey. On the other hand, Alexander III, before he became Pope, had already shown himself more extreme than Adrian. He was sent in 1158 to the Diet of Besançon as bearer of a letter from Adrian, in which the Pope referred complacently to all the *beneficia* which the Emperor had received from him. In a feudal assembly *beneficium* was a dangerous word—it was naturally taken to mean 'fief', and to imply a claim that the Emperor was the Pope's vassal. Adrian probably meant nothing more than 'benefits', but the Cardinal went out of his way to cry out in answer to the protest, 'Of whom then does the Emperor hold his power, if not of the Pope?' Otto of Wittelsbach, whose successor afterwards murdered a king of the Romans, was on the point of cutting short the career of a future Pope. But Frederick intervened, and Adrian afterwards disavowed his spirited ambassador and explained away the obnoxious word.

Frederick may probably have regretted, when next year Alexander III was elected Pope, that he had not let Otto of Wittelsbach have his way. To this direct insult against the Emperor, the Imperialist party in Rome replied by electing Victor IV. Frederick called a council at Pavia to decide between the two, but no other European power gave support to Victor IV. Alexander was chased about Italy by the armies of Frederick, and once driven into exile in France. Frederick was re-crowned at Rome by Victor, but the Emperor was no more successful than Roger of Sicily had been with Anacletus, in convincing Europe that he was not the promoter of a schism. As long as Frederick continued his efforts to make his power in Italy real, he had to meet the eloquent, ruthless, and unrelenting hostility of a brave fanatic.

(15) Elec-
tion of
Alexander
III and
Victor IV.

(16) The
Papal
position.

Already Adrian had laid the foundations of an anti-Imperial coalition. Sicily and the Emperor Manuel could be counted on for a certain measure of support. But Manuel was busy elsewhere, and William a feeble ally at the best. The great need was a bulwark to the north to stop Frederick from marching on Rome. The obvious policy for the Popes was to come forward as the champions of the Lombard cities, whose independence was threatened by the Emperor. It was obvious for the moment, but it was to prove dangerous in the future. For in the end the Popes found that the municipal privileges of which they had been the champions were a final obstacle to the success of the temporal power, and the realization of the dream of a united Italy. For a time, however, success attended the unnatural alliance of Papal and municipal ideals. The man who had destroyed Arnold of Brescia made a close alliance with Milan, Piacenza, Crema, and Brescia. This was to meet the vigorous policy of Frederick, who was determined to overthrow Milan, the turbulent city which held and holds the strategic key to Italy. Already the rival cities, at the head of which was Pavia, had called in Frederick. In 1158 he again entered Italy.

(17)Frede-
rick and
the Italian
Republics.

Once again, too, he held a Diet at Roncaglia, where he repeated and outdid his success of four years before. Milan had already sent in a formal submission, and promised to allow the Emperor a final voice in the election of its consuls. Frederick, supported by all the greatest civilians of Italy from the famous law school of Bologna, determined to settle once for all the question of Imperial rights over the cities. It now appeared how valuable for Imperial purposes the studies and principles of civilian lawyers could become. Frederick laid it down as an axiom that the Imperial pleasure had the force of

Law, and that no prescriptive right could be set up against the Emperor's claims. Although, therefore, he was willing to recognize all the lawful rights of any lay or spiritual authority, he insisted that the *podestas*, the supreme authority in each city, should be appointed by himself. With such a representative, who would scarcely ever be a citizen of the town over which he ruled, to enforce Imperial claims, Frederick might well feel that the complete independence of the cities was impossible. The decrees of Roncaglia could not, for the same reason, fail to be vehemently resisted by the more independent cities. So precise and dogmatic an assertion of *Imperium* would inevitably call out a correspondingly clear defiance from *Libertas*. Milan put itself at the head of a number of other cities in a determined refusal to receive the Imperial *podesta*. Not that the *podestas* were resisted from the fact that many of them were Germans. The Italian citizen as a rule would vastly prefer as a ruler a foreigner to a neighbour, for Italian patriotism was still a thing of the future, and civic rivalry was bitter and intense. But resistance to the aggressive policy of the Emperor was perhaps the one cause in which all were prepared to unite. Milan made a heroic stand for three years, and proved a match for all its enemies but famine. At last, in 1162, the city submitted, and was razed to the ground. But it had shown that the full might of the great Emperor could be defied by a single city, and, extreme as was the punishment inflicted by Frederick, it was not enough to ensure the submission of Lombardy. Meanwhile, Adrian IV had been cut off in 1159 in the midst of vigorous preparations for an anti-Imperial coalition, and Alexander III continued his work. Against the persistence of the Italians and the Pope, Frederick could do nothing

He drove Alexander into France, but the Pope soon returned. He had destroyed Milan, but it was rapidly rebuilt. In 1166 Frederick was again compelled to devote his attention to Italy.

Frederick
in Rome.

The year which Frederick spent in Italy between 1167 and 1168 was full of disaster. He was successful indeed in driving Alexander once again out of Rome, this time to a refuge among the Normans of Italy, and he was once again crowned in the city by the Imperial anti-pope Victor IV. But the effect of this success was completely destroyed by the ravages of a terrible pestilence among his troops. The army with which he had taken Rome struggled north to Pavia, leaving thousands of its numbers and many of its greatest soldiers in Roman graves. More dangerous than this was the movement which now took shape among the cities of Lombardy. Already it has been seen that against the Emperor the cities were sometimes willing to forget their differences and form a more or less stable coalition. In 1164 the league of Verona had been formed with the support of Venice, and had been formidable enough to change Frederick's route into Italy in 1167. Now, in face of the Emperor's demoralized army was formed the larger and more definitely organized association known as the Lombard League.

(18) The
Lombard
League.

The Lombard League was at once an alliance and something more. Its members were bound together by a defensive alliance against a common enemy. But they were also united internally in what might have eventually become such a federation as that which afterwards developed among the Swiss cantons. Rectors were chosen from among the consuls of each of the cities, and the direction of federal concerns was put into their hands. Thus the League was given a genuine constitution which was enough to differentiate it sharply

from a mere military alliance. The future history of Italy might have been very different had this beginning been followed by a consistent development.

The League received so many adherents while Frederick was still at Pavia—indeed that city itself seemed inclined to desert him in its favour—that his position became untenable. Early in 1168 he returned to Germany. The League was left free to improve its position. No sooner was Frederick out of Italy than it set to work to build a new city which should be its central stronghold. A site was chosen to the south-west of Milan, and in due time an exceedingly strong fortress was built there, which was made by Alexander III the seat of a new bishop, and was called Alessandria in honour of the Pope. Frederick, busy in Germany, was obliged to leave Italy to herself for the next six years, and the time was well used by the League in extending its influence. At last, in 1174, the Emperor reappeared. His obvious task was to subdue Alessandria. Till April 1175, the siege went on, and Frederick was no nearer subduing the city. In that month a relieving force came to its aid; Frederick drew off to meet it, but a battle was averted at the last moment, though the subsequent peace negotiations came to nothing. It was clear that the two parties must soon come to a decisive meeting.

This meeting occurred in 1176, at the famous battle of ^{(19) Battle} Legnano. Frederick, in expectation of the struggle, ^{of Legnano.} summoned all available help from Germany, and it was now that Henry the Lion refused to help the Emperor. Still Frederick had a large and formidable force behind him when he opened the campaign against Milan. He had planned a double advance, from the north with his German troops and from the south with the forces of his ally the city of Pavia. But the League determined

to make an effort to save themselves by a sudden attack on Frederick's northern army, to be delivered before the southern force had reached Milan. The army of the League therefore hurried to the north and came into contact with Frederick at Legnano. Here was fought one of the most famous battles of history. The standard of the League, fixed to a wagon known as the *carroccio*, was the centre round which the fight raged. It was surrounded by a picked body known as the 'Company of Death'—all of whom vowed to be victorious or die. Frederick himself very nearly succeeded in cutting his way through to the *carroccio*. But he was unhorsed, and all the efforts of the German knights were powerless to break through the enemy's centre. The result of a day's fighting was to leave the Milanese completely victorious. Frederick fled, almost alone, to Pavia.

Legnano is a turning-point in the history of Europe. Another factor had entered into the eternal struggle of Pope and Emperor. In the days of Henry IV the Popes had had to rely for armed aid on the Normans. Robert Guiscard was a typical representative of the armed feudalism of the eleventh century, which really held the balance between Pope and Emperor, between King and Church. Odo of Bayeux had aimed at playing the same part between William I and Lanfranc in England, and only the good understanding of the two had prevented him. In the later twelfth century, feudalism had indeed still to be reckoned with. But it was fitting that in Italy, where feudalism had never taken deep root, there should first make itself felt the strength of the associated burghesses, who, all over Europe, were now fighting their way to independence. The Lombard League is particularly interesting, because it represents the carrying one step further of the principle of association to which the bur-

gresses owed their power. Like the monks and unlike the barons, they were communities, the champions not of individual independence but of common rights. If they could go on to develop out of the principle of community the principle of federation, they might well have a future before them as political architects of Europe, whose only serious rivals would be the kings. For the moment, at any rate, a municipal federation had laid low the greatest prince of the age.

Frederick showed his greatness by the spirit in which he yielded. But he tried first to make terms with the Pope, in the hope that he might persuade Alexander to support him against the cities. With this end in view he sent an embassy to Anagni to meet Alexander III. But Alexander resolutely refused to abandon his allies, and would only release Frederick from excommunication on condition that the Emperor made peace with the Lombard League. The negotiations were opened at Venice, whither the Pope went to meet the penitent Emperor, whom he had not seen since the Diet of Besançon. In July 1177—exactly a century since the date of Canossa, when Henry IV had humiliated himself before Pope Gregory VII—a solemn ceremony of reconciliation was held in the portico of St. Mark's, where Frederick actually threw himself at the feet of the Pope. It only remained to arrange the terms of the Imperial capitulation. The terms with the Pope were settled at Venice, the final treaty with the League was not completed till 1183 at Constance.

These two treaties together contained the final abandonment of Frederick's attempt to rule Italy as an Imperial kingdom. At Venice he gave up all claim to the patrimony of St. Peter, and promised to restore what he had usurped therefrom. At Constance he abandoned all effec-

(20) The Peace of Constance.

tive control over Lombardy. The League was allowed to become practically a sovereign state. The powers of which Henry the Lion had just been deprived in Saxony and Bavaria were conferred on the Italian counterparts of those citizens whom he had so triumphantly controlled and exploited. The citizens were allowed to administer their own laws, to make peace and war at will, to elect their own *podestas*. The Emperor retained investiture of the supreme magistrates, the right to collect a war tax, and to hear legal appeals. In fact, Frederick, who had hoped to found a kingdom, had to be content with a vague confederation. Both Pope and cities were apparently left free to found in Italy an *imperium in imperio*. All that can be said is that Frederick showed his good sense in recognizing the futility of further efforts, and his straightforwardness and honesty in the way in which he observed the conditions of peace.

As events turned, however, Frederick's concessions, like those of Henry II after Becket's murder (which occurred just six years before Legnano) were not as wide in practice as on paper. The Lombard League had no internal coherence. Milan herself deserted it to get an independent charter from the Emperor. Outside Lombardy and the Papal domains his officials had acquired a real grip of the country. He himself held loyally to the terms of the treaty. But would a powerful successor be equally scrupulous? In reality Frederick had only lost the first round of a long fight. In 1186 he opened the second round by a masterpiece of diplomacy. This was the marriage of Henry and Constance of Sicily. The significance of this move it would be difficult to exaggerate. At a stroke the greatest obstacle to a united Italy became an invaluable base of operations; the Pope's flank was turned, and the Empire compensated

(21) The
Sicilian
Marriage.

many times over for all the concessions made after Legnano. Garibaldi himself did not win the South as easily as did Henry VI. It was Henry VI, and not Frederick, who was to make use of this triumph. Three years after his son's marriage Frederick set out on the Third Crusade. Next year he was drowned while bathing in a Cilician river. He had done everything that could be expected of a mediaeval Emperor: battled with his dukes, held Diets innumerable, created anti-popes, wrestled with Italian anarchy, and finally gone on Crusade. Real success was impossible for any one with as lofty a conception of Imperial ideals as was his. He came as near making those ideals a reality as energy and high purpose could take him. And he was something more than an Emperor who held the stage of Europe for a generation. As the ruler of Germany, he left his successor on the threshold of what might have been the greatest achievement of the Middle Ages—the bringing into being of a German nation-state.

(22) Death
of the
Emperor.

V. THE EASTERN EMPIRE, 1153-1190

The period which saw the Hohenstaufen establish so firm a hold on the Empire of the West, saw the extinction in the East of the great house of Comnenus, the last of the dynasties to maintain Constantinople in anything approaching its ancient position. Alexius, who had introduced into Byzantine politics the fatal element of Western Crusades, had shown himself a vigorous monarch. His son John II was one of the best of the mediaeval rulers of the Eastern Empire. He made head against Servians, Hungarians, Seljuks; defeated the Armenians; and, as we have seen, made a great effort to shake off the commercial competition of Venice. In 1143 he was succeeded by his son Manuel, who reigned

(1) The
Emperor
Manuel.

till 1180. Under Manuel all the traditional enemies of the Empire were attacked with almost invariable success, frequently won by the personal courage of the Emperor himself. His life was full of the wildest adventures and the narrowest escapes. He met the danger of the Second Crusade with a great deal of judgement, gave Louis VII what help he could, and, though most insolently treated by Conrad III, avoided, as his grandfather had done, the scandal of open hostilities with the Christian host. He checked the persistent advance of both Normans and Venetians on the West and pursued the most vigorous policy in the East, where he not only fought a series of campaigns against the Seljuks but also kept a firm hand over his vassal state of Antioch and the other Frankish principalities. He compelled two successive rulers of Antioch to do homage to him, fought a campaign in collaboration with King Amauri of Jerusalem, and in fact did his best to weld together the defenders of Christendom against the Asiatic powers. He promoted a tendency which had already set in towards adopting a more sympathetic attitude towards Europe. He delighted in emulating the exploits of the knights of Western chivalry and himself fought in a tournament at Antioch. In the year of his death he betrothed his son Alexius to the daughter of Louis VII. He became the ally of Conrad. His great war of 1171 to 1174 with Venice involved the whole of Southern Europe except Spain. He was allied to Pisa, Genoa, Ancona, Montferrat, and Ferrara. Though Manuel was severely defeated by the Seljuks in Phrygia four years before his death, he had had a triumphant reign. It has been pointed out that the position of Byzantium, an ancient but unprogressive society with great commercial opportunities, was not unlike that of modern China. As the powers of Europe

(2) Im-
portance
of his
work.

dispute the right to exploit China, so the powers of Italy especially were eager to exploit Byzantium. Under Manuel it seemed probable that the Eastern Empire would vindicate its right to be considered a European power, to become a factor to be reckoned with, instead of falling into the position of a prize to be fought over.

But with Manuel's death, the signs of the disease of which the Empire was to die began to appear. In 1183 his successor Alexius II was overthrown by his father's cousin, Andronicus, who murdered the Emperor, poisoned his sister and brother-in-law, and married his betrothed bride. Manuel's natural son was blinded and his secretary burnt alive. Revolts were crushed out by the wholesale slaughter of the inhabitants of captured cities. After a reign of terror of two years Andronicus was overthrown by Isaac Angelus, whom he was just about to have executed. Andronicus was butchered by the populace after several days' endurance of exquisite tortures.

(3) Overthrow of the Comneni.

In these two years had been undone all the work of the Comneni. A long-established dynasty of energetic rulers had been brought to an end; their successors were utterly without their capacity for rule. In the anarchy of Andronicus's usurpation the Western merchants and others resident in Constantinople had been murdered in numbers by the mob, who thus repudiated the European policy of the Comneni and exasperated especially the Normans and Venetians. The old vices of murder, riot, and bloodshed, which had been the curse of Byzantine history, came back again to destroy the possibility of stable government—the rule of the Angelus family is simply a record of treacherous and bloody usurpations. Under such conditions as these it was impossible for the Eastern Empire to vindicate against its innumerable enemies its right to existence.

(4) Characteristics of the Angeli.

VI. FRANCE, 1153-1190

Between 1153 and 1190 France, like the British Isles, was dominated by the figure of Henry II of England. The house of Anjou had ceased to be the ally of the French Crown against the duchy of Normandy and had become the ruler, not only of Normandy, but of all the territories held by its Duke, the hereditary foe of the King of France. More than that, Eleanor of Aquitaine had ceased to be the wife of Louis and had added to the other titles of Henry of Anjou those of Duke of Aquitaine and Count of Poitou. Henry ruled three times as much of France as did Louis VII, and from the northern boundary of Normandy to the Pyrenees he shut off Louis from the sea. The Channel became an English Lake. Again, not only was Henry all powerful in France and England but he had diplomatic relations throughout Europe. Eleanor of Aquitaine, who had given Louis only two daughters, gave Henry a large family of sons and daughters, who, as they grew up, became pawns in his game. His eldest son was married to Louis's daughter; Richard was betrothed to another member of the French Royal house; Geoffrey was the means of Henry's securing what at the beginning of his reign was the one gap in his possession of the western coast-line of France, for he married the heiress of Conan of Brittany and so made good the long-standing claims of the Norman dukes to that duchy. One daughter married Henry the Lion of Saxony and Bavaria, and so took Henry's influence into the Baltic and Germany. Another married in 1170 the King of Castile and so gave him influence south of the Pyrenees, where he already had numbers of allies among the kings and dukes of Northern Spain. A few years later Joanna was married to William of

(1) Position of Henry of Anjou.

Sicily, and a few years before a third daughter had married the Count of Savoy. Henry's influence thus spread into the Mediterranean: he seemed likely to become a great power in Italy; with a hold on the Alpine Passes and the Sicilian fleet, he might lock up the southern seaboard of France as he had locked up the western. In fact, from the beginning of his reign he made efforts to obtain possession of Toulouse, and he actually secured the Vexin from Louis. If he could have mastered Toulouse and Flanders he would have held the whole seaboard of France.

But strong as was Henry in territory and allies he was stronger still in purpose and character. Frederick Barbarossa, Louis VII, and Henry II combine most of the representative qualities of all types of mediaeval kingship. Henry II had not a spark of the chivalry of Frederick. He was utterly without Frederick's dignity of demeanour. He had none of the idealism which made the great Emperor pursue, as his purpose in life and as his highest duty both to himself and to the world, the vindication of Imperial claims. Frederick with the genius of a great ruler had the temperament of a Crusader, and it was a fitting climax to the life of the hero that he should die in Asia Minor. Frederick was often violent, brutal, and overbearing, lacking in sympathy for the ideals of others and not over careful of the means he adopted to pursue his own. Nevertheless he represents the highest type of mediaeval soldier and politician. Materialistic as was the faith of the Middle Ages, it had at least this virtue that it could inspire men to give up their lives to the pursuit of an ideal cause and lift warfare and diplomacy into the sphere of religion. But if this spirit be distinctly mediaeval, then Henry II was not a man of his age.

(2) Character of Henry II.

Like Frederick he devoted his life to an impossible task. But the cause for which he fought was not one of those chimerical ideals of which the Middle Ages offer so many examples. While the Capetians were trying to make good their claim to be the successors of Charlemagne, and the Hohenstaufen to be the successors of Augustus, and the Popes to be the successors of St. Peter and of Constantine, Henry II was engaged in attempting to hold together lands which came to him by no more romantic title than the feudal law of succession. He fought for the house of Anjou and for that alone. Again, he was utterly contemptuous of the pageantry of royalty; he dressed carelessly, lived scandalously, was liable to wild outbursts of passion, and kept his court in a perpetual state of upheaval by his incessant journeyings to and fro over his dominions. No man had less of the mediæval hero about him—except that he attempted the impossible.

(3) Character of Louis VII.

But if Henry is an undignified and even disreputable figure beside Frederick, his greatness comes out in comparison with Louis VII. That lovable weakness of character which comes from an over-sensitive conscience and an over-tender heart was never more appreciated than in the Middle Ages. When Louis gave up being the headstrong lover of his queen, Eleanor of Aquitaine, and became the penitent devotee whom monastic chroniclers compare to a dove, he won prestige and popularity the value of which to the French monarchy it is difficult to over-estimate. Even to-day loyalty and sentiment are large factors in any political situation. In the Middle Ages, backed by the immense authority of the Church, they were a hundred times more important. Henry went out of his way to defy the Church on which Louis leaned. Louis became a

fanatic on the subject of fasting and had to be restrained in the interests of his health. Henry could not sit through the shortest mass without scribbling pictures, whispering, and yawning. Louis could only be roused to action in defence of some oppressed bishop or abbot. Henry's work was paralysed by the murder, on a hint from him, of Thomas Becket. The sanctity of Louis saved his reign from being a complete fiasco, the popular canonization of Becket shattered the political architecture of Henry II. It was on this attempt to build up a secular state that Henry had set his heart. He saw the danger to national unification of the privileges of the clergy. While the Hohenstaufen and the Capetians were relying on bishops and abbots with great temporalities behind them to preserve some semblance of order in their dominions, Henry felt himself able to attempt a direct frontal attack on clerical immunities. In this he failed. But the centralized machinery of government to which his victory would have given completion was so strongly made and so vigorously set working that in itself it was enough to give a new direction to the future of England as a nation-state. The originality of Henry's mind, the independence of his attitude towards the strongest force in the Middle Ages, make him, despite the squalor and violence of his life, an outstanding figure of real greatness beside the conventional, feeble, and virtuous Louis VII. The mediaeval era was an age of piety, of faith, and of idealism. But it was also an age of strong, vigorous, practical men, of few scruples and fewer illusions, without whom a young civilization could scarcely have been built up into order and stability.

(4) The Monarchies and the Church.

The career of Henry as a French duke, or rather as an aggregate of French dukes, divides itself into three periods—from 1154 to 1170, from 1170 to 1180, and

from 1180 to his death. The murder of Becket in 1170 and the death of Louis VII in 1180 are the dividing lines. At first it seemed that nothing could save Louis from destruction. In 1159 Henry attacked Toulouse. Louis hurried to the rescue, the citizens of Toulouse made a gallant resistance, but even so it is difficult to see why Henry did not complete the conquest. He seems for once to have held back out of respect for his titular sovereign the King of France, and in 1160 he made peace. But, meanwhile, he had shown his power by persuading Theobald of Blois, the Seneschal of France, to rebel in his interest and threaten Paris while he threatened Toulouse.

(5) Desperate position of Louis.

While such treachery as this was possible, Louis's position was practically untenable. Moreover, by the treaty of 1160, the marriage of Henry's son with Louis's daughter was carried out, and the nine-year-old bride's dowry, the province of Vexin, was handed over, to round off the duchy of Normandy. Lastly, Paris was threatened in the east by the growing ambition of Frederick Barbarossa, who was already master of the Arelate, and at the great Diet of Besançon in 1157 had made, in what was virtually a French city, a splendid demonstration of his power. He was known to be determined, if possible, to make a reality of his Imperial suzerainty over the monarchs of Europe. Two events, however, now occurred to improve Louis's situation. In 1159 the schism between Alexander III and Victor IV began, in 1163 the quarrel of Henry II and Becket. The result was that before long both the rightful Pope and the famous archbishop found themselves at Sens, within a few miles of Paris, under the protection of the "eldest son of the Church." Frederick did his best to compel Louis to recognize Victor IV, and Louis showed unwonted firmness and threatened to ally with Henry against Frederick. Neither England nor

France would accept the Imperial pope, and Victor IV's chances of being recognized by Christendom disappeared. For the rest of his life Frederick was fully occupied elsewhere than on the French border. The death of Adrian IV, which began a new phase of Papal and Imperial difficulties, was also a loss to Henry II. The only Englishman who has ever been Pope had shown himself a good friend to the King of England, to whom he had given the right to hold Ireland. Alexander III was also anxious to be conciliatory. But events made this impossible. Becket, with his usual vehemence, accused Alexander III of slackness in his cause, and declared that Rome, as always, had condemned Christ and released Barabbas. Becket himself was not a man whom the head of the Church might be expected to recognize at once as a saint. Louis, moreover, to his honour, made every effort to reconcile Henry and Becket. But it was inevitable that, as the quarrel with the English archbishop grew more bitter, Henry would become involved in a conflict with the Papacy. In 1167 war began again with Louis, a dreary struggle in which Henry was unable to make a decisive stroke. In 1166, indeed, the marriage of his son Geoffrey had given him a claim to Brittany. But Becket was worth a great deal more to Louis than was Brittany to Henry. Moreover, in 1165, Louis had at last had a son born to him, amidst the rejoicings of his subjects, and to the delight of many of those of Henry II. From all over France congratulations came to the father of the future Philip Augustus. Then in 1170 came an event which roused indignation even widespread than the satisfaction at Philip's birth. The murder of Becket made Henry virtually an outlaw in Europe.

(6) Louis's position improves.

But the consequences of this tragedy did not appear

at once. Henry performed a most edifying penance. His wide influence in Europe was made all the more impressive by the growing embarrassment of Frederick Barbarossa. And after all, Becket, the irrepressible, was dead. Unfortunately, however, Henry's sons were growing up. In 1173 Henry was eighteen, Richard sixteen, and Geoffrey fifteen years old. Henry had grossly ill-treated their mother, and refused to give even a semblance of power to any member of his family. It had been hard enough to hold together his inheritance; he was to find it impossible to control his household. In 1173 both household and inheritance broke out in revolt. It was then that the real weakness of Henry's position was revealed. His territories were so widespread between Northumberland and the Pyrenees, and so heterogeneous in character, that Louis was able to fight him with the great advantage of being on interior lines. In the days before organized navies and sea-power, the English Channel was a perpetual source of danger and difficulty, bisecting Henry's base of operations and hampering his freedom of movement. Louis found himself at the head of a great confederation which included all three of Henry's eldest sons, and was supported in Brittany, Flanders, Normandy, and the South, and by William the Lion of Scotland to the north. It might seem that he had only to advance along the Seine or the Loire to drive Henry into the sea and prepare for the invasion of England.

This, however, was just what Louis could not do. Mediæval warfare had a fatal tendency to take the form of a long, formal, and utterly futile siege. Just as Frederick Barbarossa wore himself out in front of Alexandria, and the Crusaders in front of Antioch, so Louis began the siege, first of Verneuil and then of Rouen. In 1173 Henry chased him from Verneuil while his justiciar

(7) The
Rebellion
of 1173.

crushed a rebellion in England. Next year Louis made a humiliating flight from Rouen which he had completely failed to invest: Henry had already recovered the South, and William the Lion had been captured in a fog before Alnwick Castle in Northumberland. The revolt was at an end—Henry had been saved, partly by the incompetence of Louis and partly by the strength of his hold on England, which had given splendid proof of the loyalty of its people and of the vigour of its administration. Still, a great source of weakness stood revealed in the Angevin empire. Nothing could satisfy the ambition of Henry's sons but his own abdication, and Henry was not the man to loose his hold on power. The peace of 1174 gave Henry, Richard, and Geoffrey a certain limited authority in Normandy, Poitou, and Brittany. Eleanor, however, was imprisoned, and none of the elder sons were satisfied.

But Louis was not the man to take advantage of the situation. Richard soon made himself all-powerful in Poitou and Aquitaine—as the nominal lieutenant of his father he took fortress after fortress, and established what was practically a kingdom of his own in the South. In 1177 Henry II was on the point of advancing on Paris, and Louis was only saved by the Pope's threat to put Henry under an interdict. In the same year the Treaty of Ivry closed the long contest between the two husbands of Eleanor of Aquitaine. Two years later Philip Augustus was crowned; in 1180 he succeeded to the throne.

(8) Succession of Philip Augustus.

The great episodes in the reign of Philip Augustus all occur after his return from the Third Crusade, which was as much an epoch in his life, though of a very different purpose, as was the Second Crusade in that of his father. But in the first ten years of his reign, Philip laid the foundations of his future success, and there is no more

characteristic period in his long career than the years when, from the age of fifteen to twenty-five, he held his own against the great feudatories and against the veteran Henry II.

(9) Character of Philip.

Philip Augustus, from the point of view of the progress of the French monarchy, was an ideal successor to Louis VII. Just as Louis's piety gave him a prestige which was denied to his soldierly father, so Philip's political genius helped him to make out of the 'sphere of influence' of Louis the beginnings of a nation-state. He exploited, insulted, and defied the Church on which Louis had leaned; he was as unprincipled in his private life as Louis had been scrupulous, he was as vigorous in the conduct of a campaign as Louis had been dilatory. If he succeeded to Louis's throne he was in many ways the heir to the policy of Henry II. But unlike Henry II he was successful to the end, he undertook almost nothing that was beyond his strength. And, as an architect of France, he did as much as did Henry for England.

The beginning of Philip's reign was eminently characteristic. During his father's life-time he had already, at the age of fourteen, shown impatience at the influence over the King of his mother, Adela of Champagne. His father's death had scarcely occurred before he set to work to shake off the would-be direction of his policy. He began by a bid for popularity—the expulsion of the Jews, whom his father had, with real courage, defended against their enemies, clerical and otherwise. He had now to deal with two great houses, either of whom might seem strong enough to control the kingdom. The Count of Champagne, brother of the Queen Dowager, was united with his brother the Archbishop of Rheims and with the Count of Blois. The house of Flanders was closely allied with those of Vermandois and of Hainault.

(10) Philip and his vassals.

Philip, on the eve of his father's death, married Elizabeth of Hainault, niece of Philip of Flanders, and Adela appealed to Henry II against her independent son. But Henry, from whatever motive, seemed unwilling to support the faction of Champagne; he and Philip had an interview, and the peace was renewed between the two crowns. Relying on this, Philip on the death of his father broke with both Flanders and Champagne. The two factions made a coalition, and for five years waged a desultory war against the King. In 1184 Philip decided to divorce his wife, as she was childless, and also had failed to detach her father the Count of Hainault from Flanders. The young Queen was popular. There was a general protest and Philip gave up the idea. But he soon contrived to detach Hainault by inserting the name of its Count as one of his partisans in a treaty he made with Flanders. Philip of Flanders imagined himself betrayed, and attacked the Count of Hainault, whom Philip made no effort to defend. Very soon afterwards the weakened coalition made peace, as the price of which Philip got Artois and part of Vermandois. By 1185, Philip at the age of twenty was supreme over all the territories of his father.

There remained the Angevin empire. Henry, who was (11) Philip growing prematurely old and weary, had certainly allowed and Henry II. Philip to become too strong. If he counted on the chivalry of the French King he was unwise. The young Henry had died in 1183, but Richard and Geoffrey remained, and John was growing up. Philip played his cards well. Geoffrey in 1186 became his friend, settled at Paris, and seemed likely to become Philip's ally against his father. But he died the same year. In 1187 Philip attacked Henry, but made an unexpected peace, in which Henry is said to have asked Philip to agree that Richard, whom

he distrusted, should be succeeded as Duke of Aquitaine by John. Philip at once sent a copy of the treaty to Richard, who promptly entered into a close alliance with the French King. In 1189 Philip, despite the fall of Jerusalem and the protests of the Church at his failure to go off at once on Crusade, was able to form another coalition against the King of England. Henry this time was in no condition to hold his own. Philip, in alliance with Richard, overran Maine and Touraine, and at Colombières, near Tours, Henry, who was already a dying man, made peace, did homage, and handed over the province of Berri. On the 6th of July, 1189, Henry II died. Just a year later, Philip, still the close ally of Richard, now King of England, set off for the Holy Land.

In the course of ten years Philip had repaired all the ground lost by Louis VII. He had not indeed yet won back the heritage of Eleanor, but he had made such good use of its ruler Richard that he could scarcely have done more with it in his hands. He had outwitted his mother, his uncles, and his father-in-law, the great Count of Flanders, and the King of England. It remained for him to make a dupe of Richard, and after that of John, and to exploit two Crusades. He might then come forward as Louis VI had done in 1124, but with far greater power as the national leader of France. Of the three great nation-makers of his age Philip was undoubtedly the cleverest.

CHAPTER IV

THE AGE OF INNOCENT III, 1190-1216

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I. THE THIRD CRUSADE

(1) Departure and Journey of Richard and Philip.

IN dramatic interest there are few periods to equal that which lies between 1190 and 1216. It is the central period of the career of Philip Augustus, in which his most conspicuous triumphs were won. It contains the reigns of two men of more brilliance and distinctive genius than perhaps any other mediaeval sovereigns, Richard Cœur de Lion and the Emperor Henry VI. Above all, it coincides with the active life of Innocent III, greatest of mediaeval Popes, under whom the Church made an advance of unequalled extent both in spiritual and temporal power. Two great Orders founded, three great Crusades organized, an Imperial schism in the West, the overthrow of the Empire of the East, and the destruction of the empire of the Angevins, the definite triumph of Christendom in Spain, and of orthodoxy in Southern France—all these events were crowded into twenty-five years.

The Third Crusade was caused by the rise of Saladin,

just as the Second had been by the rise of Zenghi. Under Zenghi, as we have seen, it had already seemed likely that a religious revival would occur in the Mohammedan world. Under his successor, Nouredin, who in 1154 had taken Damascus, this became a certainty. 'The Lamp of the Faith' (which is the literal translation of his name) was a religious zealot. Moreover, he took a step which was of fatal omen to the Christian hold on the East. Up till now the schism between the Caliphate of Bagdad and that of Egypt had been of the greatest service to the Christians. The indifference and decadence of the Egyptians made the Latin kingdoms practically secure on their southern frontier. The Caliph had now become a mere figure-head, and the quarrels of his rival generals kept his dominions in disorder. But the growing power of Nouredin led at last to an appeal for help from Shawir, the unsuccessful rival of the Caliph's favourite. Nouredin sent an army under a Kurdish general, Shirkuh, who set up Shawir. The latter, finding, as always happens in the East, that he was becoming his protector's puppet, appealed to the Christians, who drove out Shirkuh in 1164. Again Shawir encountered the inconvenience of over-powerful allies. In 1168 he appealed again, this time against the Christians to the Atabeh Nouredin. Shirkuh came back, executed the vacillating Shawir, became Grand Vizier of Egypt, and was succeeded by his nephew Saladin. The Egyptian Caliph conveniently died: Saladin abolished the office. In 1174 Nouredin died, and Saladin set to work to unite his dominions with Egypt. He soon had an overwhelming power at his disposal, ranged in a semi-circle round the Christian states. Both his ambition and his piety made it inevitable that he would attempt to expel them from Syria.

(2) The
Rise of
Saladin.

(3) Battle
of Hattin;
Fall of
Jerusalem.

The folly of a Christian baron, Renaud of Châtillon, gave him an excellent pretext. Renaud made a raid on a merchant caravan from his castle of Kerak and imprisoned the merchant. The King refused to intervene, and Saladin swore to slay Renaud with his own hand. Then followed the disastrous battle of Hattin, after which Saladin carried out his vow, and on October 3, 1187, occurred the fall of Jerusalem. Just as the First Crusade had conquered the Holy City by the inspiration of religious zeal from the indifferent and careless Moham-medans, so Saladin reconquered it with the enthusiasm of a Holy War from the indifferent and careless Franks. Discord and selfishness were now rampant among the Christian princes, the enthusiasm of Crusaders was filling the Moslem world.

Still the Crusading spirit was by no means dead in the western world. In spite of the experience of Conrad III and Louis VII, two kings and an emperor were ready to take the cross. Frederick Barbarossa, as we have seen, set out in 1189 for Asia Minor. Frederick's force was far better organized and his expedition better planned than that of Conrad III had been: he spent the winter in Adrianople, and then marched without serious loss across Asia Minor to Cilicia. There, however, the Christian host was completely disorganized by the unforeseen calamity of the old Emperor's death by drowning. Only a remnant of the army reached Antioch, and the fate of one expedition had already been sealed before the leaders of the others had made their plans.

The death of Barbarossa was closely followed by that of William of Sicily, as it had been preceded by that of Henry II of England. Europe was left to the guidance of three young men, Richard Cœur de Lion, Philip Augustus, and Frederick's son Henry VI, successor to

the Empire and heir to Sicily and Naples. To them was entrusted the vindication of the honour of Europe against Saladin. The situation was complicated. Henry VI was not able at once to make good his claim on his Sicilian inheritance, which fell into the hands of William's illegitimate son Tancred. William had been Richard's brother-in-law, Henry VI was betrothed to William's daughter Constance, and had been recognized by William as his successor. Here, in the rivalry of these three ambitious men, was likely to be a European danger spot. Again, Richard had been Philip's close ally in Philip's wars with Henry II: he was now Henry II's successor. Here was another danger spot. In 1190, however, the Crusade was in the forefront of practical politics. Richard and Philip were both under a vow to set off for the Holy Land. Already in the Angevin empire under Henry II a considerable sum had been collected from both clergy and laity by what was known as the Saladin tithe. Richard and Philip, however, did not complete their preparations till June 1190, when they met at Vezelay, went together to Marseilles, and agreed to meet again in Sicily. Philip made for Messina in a Genoese fleet. Richard's ships came from England and stopped on their way to give a helping hand to the King of Portugal in his struggles against the Moors. Late in September Richard reached Sicily. As the season was already advanced, both kings decided to winter there.

It was an unfortunate decision. Richard, on the ground that Tancred had defrauded him and Queen Joanna, behaved as if Sicily was a vassal kingdom of his own, insulted the Sicilians, and when they maltreated his troops, captured and sacked the city of Messina. Philip reminded him that they had agreed to share equally all conquests on the Crusade. Richard answered

that his exploit had no connexion with the Crusade, and refused to divide the spoil. Philip began to intrigue with Tancred against the English. Sicily seemed likely to absorb all the energy of the so-called Crusaders. Philip, however, with the spring, set out for Acre, whither Richard soon followed him. On the way, however, with characteristic energy and nonchalance, Richard conquered Cyprus from a Greek usurper, Isaac Comnenus, who held it. It might prove useful as a base of operations. At Acre the Christians had for two years been besieging the Mussulman garrison, and were now themselves besieged by Saladin. The arrival of the French and English fleets at once gave a great advantage to the Christians, who had previously been unable to maintain a blockade.

(4) Richard
as a Cru-
sader.

It soon appeared that Richard was the one man who had the combined ability and zeal needed to resist Saladin. He is the most complete type of Crusader in history. In him the qualities of leadership which gave Bohemund his supremacy were combined with a fiery enthusiasm which Bohemund lacked. On sea and land he was perhaps the greatest of mediaeval tacticians. He had nearly all the faults of the secular nobility of the Middle Ages, he was brutal, false, careless of human life, a spendthrift and a braggart. But the heroic perseverance and the disinterested chivalry of his efforts to recover Jerusalem show the value as an elevating influence on the fighting-men of Europe of that Crusading spirit by which the Church attempted to make a religious act of slaughter and warfare. The curse of all the Crusades hitherto had been divided leadership. The quarrels of Bohemund and Raymond, of Conrad III and Louis VII, were renewed in the quarrels of Richard and Philip. Richard's prodigies of valour round Acre not only terrified the Mohammedans ;

they disgusted the Christians, whose jealousy Richard went out of his way to win. If Philip promised a reward to a party of volunteers, Richard would offer double the sum. He made no effort to disguise his contempt for both Philip and Leopold of Austria, whom he was determined to outshine. Neither were prepared to dance attendance on the King of England.

In July, 1191, Acre fell. Philip, declaring that his health was giving way, decided to return to France. He promised not to attack Richard's territories at home, left some of his troops, and by the end of 1191 was back in France. Richard's position was practically hopeless, and his French and German allies were half-hearted. Acre was no sooner conquered than it became the centre of a dispute between Guy of Lusignan, King of Jerusalem, and Conrad of Montferrat, who had long claimed to rule in his stead and had remained entrenched in Tyre throughout the siege. Richard began by massacring 2,000 captives in revenge for Saladin's failure to pay the ransom agreed on by the terms of capitulation. He then marched south along the coast, supported by his fleet as far as Ascalon. The march was a fine achievement and Richard's handling of fleet and army was masterly, but he could do nothing in the interior away from his ships with his dwindling force. Early in 1192 he found himself within a few miles of Jerusalem, unable to advance. He refused to look at the city which God had not thought him worthy to enter, and returned to Acre, where he took up the cause of Guy against Conrad. At the end of 1192, hearing that John his brother had betrayed his lands to Philip, he set out for home. Cyprus he handed over to Guy of Lusignan, who thus began the Lusignan dynasty in the island. Guy, favoured by fortune, which brought the murder of Conrad in 1192 and the death of Saladin

(5) Departure of Philip.

(6) Exploits and return of Richard.

next year, contrived to keep a hold on Acre, now his capital. But Jerusalem was irrevocably lost to Christendom.

(7) Result
of the
Crusade.

The chief result, then, of the third Crusade was the precipitation of the inevitable rupture between Philip Augustus and Richard I, and the giving of a great advantage to Philip. The capture of Richard on his way home by Leopold, who handed him over to Henry VI, played into the hands of John and the King of France, who each offered large sums to have him kept in captivity. Once again, however, the core of the Angevin empire, England, remained true to its chief, and Eleanor of Aquitaine came forward to play a statesmanlike part in holding the kingdom for her second against her fourth son. The ransom was raised and Richard returned. John was treated with chivalrous generosity, but all the strength of Richard's nature drove him into bitter enmity to Philip. Richard was the most formidable of all Philip's enemies. He had to do here neither with a worn-out king like Henry II, nor a violent and reckless debauchee like John. It is true that Richard both neglected and exploited England, but he also very nearly cut short the career of Philip Augustus and avenged his father's disasters, to which he had himself largely contributed.

(8) Suc-
cesses of
Richard
against
Philip.

The five years' war, 1194 to 1199, was one of the most severe of mediæval times, scarcely broken by truces, and disfigured by the brutality of the large number of mercenaries employed on both sides. The adventurer Mercadier, Richard's chief captain, on the one side, and the fighting Bishop of Beauvais, Philip's cousin, on the other, were two of the chief figures. In 1194 Richard defeated Philip at Fréteval. Two years later he built the magnificent Château Gaillard on the Seine, so finely posted that he swore he could hold it though

its walls were of butter. In 1197, Richard, by a move which was to be often repeated by his successors, won the alliance of the Count of Flanders. Philip hurried north to crush his rebellious vassal, was caught in the flooded fields of Flanders and forced to give terms to the Count. In 1198 Philip was brought so low that he appealed to Innocent III for help. Two treaties, one with Richard and the other with Baldwin of Flanders, were arranged, by which Philip lost more territory than he had gained since he came to the throne. Then in the early months of 1199 Richard was killed in an attempt to capture the castle of Chaluz. Once again fortune smiled on the French monarchy. 'The Devil,' as Philip called Richard, was gone, and his successor was not the man to carry on the *tour de force* which held two-thirds of France bound to England. (9) Death of Richard.

II. HENRY VI

The period which was to see the Capets victorious over the Angevins began, then, with a great Angevin recovery under the brilliant Richard. Similarly the Papacy, which was to win an unparalleled position by 1215, was forced in the last years of the twelfth century to see the Mediaeval Empire become in the hands of a daring and resolute statesman a menace to every other power in Europe. Henry VI had in his nature a great deal more, of the devil than the impulsive Richard. He was cruel with a deliberate and ferocious cruelty which astonished his contemporaries. He was feverishly energetic and ambitious, he aimed at nothing less than the effective domination of Europe, and he elaborated his plans with such skill and carried them out with such electric force and such swiftness that it might well seem that his death (1) Character of Henry VI.

in 1197 saved Central and Eastern Europe, just as Richard's death saved France. In spite of his German ancestry, Henry, with his Italian wife, his absorption in Italian politics, and the peculiar concentration of force in his character, seems to belong to the type of Italian much more than of German genius. At any rate, it is with him that the Mediæval Empire becomes obviously and avowedly less German than Italian.

(2) Henry's
difficulties.

Like Richard, Henry did not gain control of the situation till 1194, and it was the lucky chance of the capture of Richard which did much to give him that control. For the first four years of his reign Henry was hampered both in Germany and Italy. Henry the Lion, the disgraced magnate of Frederick's reign, had already before 1190 begun his attempt to regain the duchy of Saxony. The new Emperor made a treaty with him by which he was to renounce the scheme. But Henry and, as he grew older, his son Henry of Brunswick, made little attempt to keep the treaty. The Guelphs remained at the head of the party of opposition to the Emperor, and, most dangerous of all, began to ally with Tancred of Sicily, and to support him in his refusal to accept the will of William the Good, by which Henry VI was to succeed to the Sicilian crown. It is true that the events which preceded the Third Crusade, and the ill-feeling between Richard and Tancred fomented by Philip, played into Henry's hand, to whom a close alliance of Tancred, the Guelphs, and the Angevins would have been very dangerous. Peculiarly fortunate, then, was it that Richard could be compelled to give up his crown to Henry and receive it back as his vassal. In the same year Henry of Brunswick made peace and married the Emperor's cousin, and in the very month that Richard was released Tancred died, leaving a child of three years old as his

successor. The alliance of Philip was no longer necessary, and Richard was urged to attack Philip forthwith. Enriched by Richard's ransom, Henry could watch with satisfaction his only two possible equals engaged in destroying one another's resources.

Already in 1191 he had come to Italy to be crowned, and had advanced south against the Sicilian kingdom. But he had been defeated before Naples. This time he was more successful, and before the end of 1194 he was crowned King of Sicily at Palermo. Southern Italy had been conquered in a few months. Resistance was met by flaying men alive, and slaughtering women and children; the country was pillaged from end to end. Henry was reproducing with more refinement the methods of William the Conqueror in North England. The country was given over entire to German rule. The donation of Matilda and all Tuscany were taken from the Papacy without more ado and handed over to Henry's brother, Philip of Swabia. The Papacy was powerless to resist, and only the Lombard cities remained. Henry formed a league of Imperialist cities to hold the league of Milan and its allies in check: he preferred to foment the rivalry of the communes rather than, as his father had done, to unite them in opposition to himself.

So much accomplished, Henry went on to prepare further conquests. A splendid field for ambition lay ready to his hand. The condition of the Eastern Empire invited attack, and it was a tradition with the kings of Sicily, whose heir Henry had become, to look to Constantinople for booty and expansion. Henry prepared to follow, with more complete preparations, in the steps of Robert Guiscard and Bohemund. Like Robert, he formed a marriage-tie with the Eastern Empire; he was able to capture in Palermo the Emperor's daughter

(3) His campaign in Italy.

(4) His schemes against Constantinople.

Irene, whom he promptly married to his brother, the ruler of Central Italy, Philip. Like Bohemund, he prepared to take Constantinople in the rear by obtaining a hold on Asia Minor. The kingdom of Armenia was growing in strength and extending its boundaries over Cilicia and Pamphylia: Henry persuaded King Leo to recognize his Imperial supremacy rather than that of Constantinople. Amauri, the King of Cyprus, did the same. Supported by these allies, Henry proclaimed a Crusade, which was generally recognized as a mere expedient for an attack on Isaac Angelus.

It only remained to secure the Imperial power in Germany and Italy. Henry, who had himself been crowned in his father's lifetime, determined to set up as a principle the hereditary succession of the Empire. At the Diet of Würzburg in 1196 he forced the German princes to accept the principle and later its immediate application by the election of his little son Frederick as King of the Romans. Next year, however, the Crusade was deferred by a great outbreak against the Emperor. A popular conspiracy was formed in Sicily, in which the Empress herself was said to be implicated. The German nobles repudiated their promise given at Würzburg. The Pope and the Lombard cities supported the Sicilian revolt. But Henry had garrisoned Italy too effectually with German officials, and the movement was easily repressed. Henry celebrated his success and avenged the attempt to upset his plans by diabolical penalties inflicted on the rebels. He had them sawn in two, burnt in lime, or buried alive, and crowned the pretender they had wished to set up in his stead with a crown of red-hot iron. Meanwhile he hurried forward the Crusade. As the expedition was setting out from Apulia, Henry fell sick and died (September, 1197).

(5) Sup-
pression of
the Italian
rebellion.

Thus within a year the Angevin and the Roman empires were both deprived of rulers of great brilliance and force of character, and both abandoned to the dangers of a disputed succession. Richard left a brother, John, and a nephew, Arthur of Brittany. Henry left a brother, Philip of Swabia, and an infant son, Frederick, both threatened by the rivalry of a third candidate of the house of Guelph. It is idle to speculate on what would have happened had Frederick succeeded his father as a grown man, or Richard left his throne to an equally vigorous son. At any rate the turn of events made it inevitable that both empires should collapse before the advance of their enemies. The real heirs of Richard and Henry were not the candidates for their thrones, but Philip Augustus and Innocent III. England returns to insular isolation. Germany is dismembered. Italy becomes the scene of the territorial expansion of the Papacy. The Eastern Empire is overthrown, not by an Imperial Crusade, but by an Italian city and by French adventurers. France is united. Such are the characteristics of the movement which now definitely sets in over the Western Empire. The thirteenth century opened brilliantly both for France and the Papacy.

(6) Death of Henry.

(7) The fate of the two Empires.

III. FRANCE AND THE PAPACY

The conflict of France and the Papacy beginning in the last years of the nineteenth century has raised into great prominence most of the essential questions of the day. The ideas which underlie the socialist movement, modern education, nationality, the racial question, the trend of modern democracy and of modern science—these ideas and their mutual antagonisms have been emphasized as never before by the latest phase of the eternal conflict

of Church and State. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Papacy as a religious organization was even stronger than it is to-day, and the intellectual supremacy in Europe of the French had already been established. We have seen that France had already produced an Abelard; and how another Frenchman, St. Bernard, had, in the conflict with him, raised the whole question of the attitude of the Church towards the new learning. The resulting compromise between Reason and Faith which formed the starting-point for Scholasticism was nowhere worked out in practice more zealously than at Paris, where Abelard had collected round him the youth of Europe. The University in Abelard's day had no official existence: it had consisted merely of a collection of groups of students round some great teacher. By 1200 this loose confederation had already been organized under a single head and in that year Philip Augustus gave to the University its earliest known charter of privilege. By this charter its members were given the right to be judged in civil matters by a court presided over by one of their professors. As a school of theology, Paris was now without an equal in Europe. Peter Lombard, who died in 1160, and the universal Doctor, Alan of Lille, though neither escaped the suspicion of heresy, were recognized as the greatest theologians of the day. At the same time the study of Canon, and to some extent of Civil, Law became commoner as these subjects came more and more to open up careers for those who mastered them. The work which prepared the way for that great architect of dogmatic Christianity, St. Thomas Aquinas, was most of it done at Paris. The University gained steadily in favour with the Papacy.

The artistic work of France was even more important than her scholarship in shaping the development of the

(1) The University of Paris.

(2) Gothic Architecture.

Mediaeval Church and of mediaeval civilization. Exactly what was the starting-point of the new style of building known as Gothic architecture it is impossible to say. The pointed arch was bound in time to displace the round-arch because of its greater convenience in construction. The monastic revival, and new ideas gathered in the East, pushed on the development of the style. But the artistic impulse which made Gothic architecture not merely a more economical way of building or a puritan protest against the style of Cluny, but the incarnation of mediaeval Christianity, came from France.

The reign of Philip Augustus saw the building, especially in Northern France, of a whole series of cathedrals. In these, at a single impulse, Gothic architecture reached its highest level of achievement and stamped itself on the imagination of Europe as *par excellence* the architecture of Christianity. It has been contended that these cathedrals were the work, not of the clergy, but of the communes, and the paradox has been advanced that the supreme monument of mystical Christianity was the work of popular anti-clericalism. The paradox is inexact. It was the bishops who encouraged the buildings and raised the funds, though the city guilds found plenty of employment in the work. In spite of the struggles of the communes against the bishops, it was clergy and people together who built the great cathedrals.

If in scholarship and architecture France was raising the most enduring of monuments to the Catholic Faith, she was also becoming the home of secular culture. The poetry of the Troubadours, the *Chansons de Geste*, and the Romances of Chivalry between them made French pre-eminently the language of the new Lyric and Epic Poetry which was growing up alongside of the Latin

(3) Vernacular Literature.

writings of the more learned poets and scholars. This vernacular verse flourished, especially among the speakers of the *Langue d'oc*, after which Southern France was called. The ancestors of Eleanor of Aquitaine had been its patrons, and her son Richard Cœur de Lion had himself written songs in it. Southern France was more like Italy than any other part of Europe. It was full of prosperous towns and intellectual activity. We have seen it already visited as a centre of heresy by St. Bernard. Its nobles were more enlightened and more intellectual than anywhere else in feudal Europe; they were vicious, irreligious, and self-indulgent, but they had more instinct of chivalry and generosity, and more artistic sensibility, than was to be found elsewhere among the great feudatories. It was here that the Lyric and the Romance first began to supersede the *Chansons de Geste*. The latter are the literary monument of the brutal feudalism of the tenth century. They are endless tales of the prowess in bloodshed and rapine of the anarchic baronage, in which pitched battle, plundering raid, and tournament follow one another in a perpetual succession. The Romances which, beginning in the South, became the fashion all over France, belong on the other hand to the literature of chivalry, of which the spirit is also expressed in the songs of the troubadours.

(4)
Chivalry.

Chivalry may be defined as an aristocratic code of good breeding. It laid down certain rules of conduct towards men and women in peace and war, enjoining fair-play and respect for weakness, and though as it developed it tended to become fantastic and artificial, in its earlier phases it was undoubtedly a civilizing agency. The code had no more a definite origin than it had a definite sanction, it grew up as the baronage emerged from the Dark Ages, and developed as order became better estab-

lished. It is most important perhaps as a sign of that strong cosmopolitan unity of feeling which tended to bind together the aristocracies of all Europe into a single knighthood, bitterly hostile internally, but externally united against both the class above and that below them in the social order. Its effect was sometimes almost that of a code of international law, and the rules of the game which it laid down had a considerable effect in civilizing warfare itself.

The movement which was systematizing Canon and Civil Law worked too to systematize the law of honour, and the poems of troubadours and romancers, like the textbook of Gratian and the lectures of Irnerius, became recognized as authorities of usage. The story that Richard I on his deathbed ordered the release of the man who had wounded him, the courtesy of Richard and Saladin to one another in the Crusade, are instances of the new spirit. Again, though marriage still remained a mere bargain by which alliances could be formed or territories rounded off, it became a recognized custom that a knight should declare himself the servant of a lady, whether married or not, and profess a romantic desire to do her pleasure. This did not always make for morality, nor did it elevate the conception of marriage. But at least it expressed an increase of that respect for women without which civilization is impossible. Catholicism respected women only as nuns; Feudalism respected them only as heiresses; Chivalry began to respect them, as the primitive Germans had done, as women. Still it must not be forgotten that chivalry was the code of a class. Men and women of noble birth must 'play the game' with one another. No rules applied to the lower orders.

If we add that it was under Philip Augustus that the

(5) Im- portance of French influence in Europe. communal movement reached its height and the French burghers, favoured by the King and by a vigorous royal administration, seemed more advantageously placed than any other citizens of Europe, it will appear that the social, intellectual, and artistic leadership of Europe, at the beginning of the thirteenth century was already in the hands of the French. It was this people which under Philip Augustus at last attained national excellence in a united kingdom of France.

Hitherto the development of the French had, for better or worse, gone on independently of territorial unity. Of late the Plantagenets had done at least as much to control it as had the Capetians, and this union under no more than two effective sovereigns had been as yet the nearest approach to such unity as France had attained. In the same way that the French monarchy had hitherto exercised a sort of moral influence over France, so the Papacy had exercised an influence over Europe. And as Philip Augustus aimed at making a solid unity of France, so Innocent III aimed at making a united kingdom in Italy. The civilization of France was probably never so varied or so diffused as it was before French centralization began. Italy would have lost much by a similar concentration. But centralization was the only means by which order could be maintained and organization have time to become solid.

(7) Char- acter of Innocent III. Innocent III was as clear-sighted a statesman as Philip Augustus. He was as ambitious in his projects as Henry VI. But, unlike either, he could say with Hildebrand that 'he loved righteousness and hated iniquity'. He was elected Pope before he was forty. He had already made a reputation as a lawyer, and had studied at Bologna and Paris. He belonged to a noble Italian family, the Counts of Legni. The keen practical common sense of

the lawyer, and his resourcefulness in argument, were combined in him with the high spirit of a noble; but the inspiration of his life was his belief in the mission of the Papacy to exercise over Christendom the rule of a supreme spiritual authority, and to promote the cause of the Crusade. So far did Innocent push his claims to authority that he has often been accused of aiming at temporal as well as spiritual supremacy over Europe. But Innocent was a trained lawyer, who was far too well versed in legal theory to claim what was recognized as belonging theoretically to the Emperor, the temporal sovereign of the world. What Innocent claimed was supremacy in all spiritual matters. But in his interpretation the word 'spiritual' came to embrace a great deal, and he even went so far as to declare that in the case of a disputed election to the Empire the decision between the candidates lay with the Pope. In fact, the Papacy in the hands of a great canonist became more and more a court of appeal for all Europe, where a decision could always be obtained on any case of conscience however subtle or obscure. More and more common among both laymen and clerks became the custom of appealing to Rome as the central authority of Christendom. Similarly, in the hands of a great statesman, the Papal estates, which were scattered all over Central Italy, and the Papal claims which had never been definitely put forward or vigorously enforced, were used to build up a real kingdom with its centre at Rome. Thus, both in its spiritual and in its temporal sphere, the Papacy was busy carrying out that task of centralization on which Philip Augustus was engaged in France. While England and Germany both seemed doomed to become baronial oligarchies, France and the Papacy, to the first of which belonged the intellectual and

(8) The nature of his claims.

(9) Centralization. artistic, and to the second the moral and religious headship of Europe, were forming a new type of monarchy on the lines laid down by Henry of Anjou and Frederick Barbarossa.

IV. PHILIP AUGUSTUS

(1) Achievement of Philip. A chronicler of Philip Augustus's reign compares him to Alexander the Great and to Caesar, to both of whom he proclaims Philip superior, for Alexander's successes only lasted twelve years and Caesar's eighteen, whereas Philip had been victorious for thirty-two years without a break. If this is a little more than the truth, it is still easy to see why the title Augustus was explained as derived from *augere*, because of the vast increase made in the royal territories between 1180 and 1222. The royal domain, which under Louis VII included little more than the Île-de-France, under Philip grew till it included Artois, Amiens, Valois, Vermandois, Normandy, Maine, Anjou, and Touraine, much of Poitou and of Saintonge. Nor was this all: besides large acquisitions of this sort, Philip added vastly to the sphere of direct royal influence by becoming the patron of individual cities, or forming connexions with isolated lords. At a bound, the King of France became incomparably the greatest landowner in France. This meant much more freedom in dealings with the great feudatories, and Philip found himself able to intervene as effective suzerain in such great fiefs as Champagne and Burgundy. Most important of all, he was able to bring about the disappearance of the two most formidable of his nominal vassals, the King of England and the Count of Toulouse, in place of whom he had only to deal with much smaller men. It was the ruin of the house of Anjou and of the house of Toulouse which made the extraordinary advance of the Capetians possible.

In both cases Philip was favoured by events. John, though not without ability, was no such antagonist as Richard, and, as Philip had used John against Richard, so he was able to use Arthur of Brittany against John. John was accepted as king in England, but Arthur, ^{(2) Arthur of Brittany.} acknowledged by Philip, was well received in Anjou and Maine. Inconvenient, however, as John's nephew was to him, Philip's wife was equally so to his enemies. In 1193 Philip, hoping to make use of the Danish sea-power against Richard, had married a Danish princess, Ingeburga. Philip, for some unexplained reason, on first seeing his ^{(3) Ingeburga of Denmark.} betrothed, took a dislike to her so violent that he was no sooner married than he discovered a remote relationship with his wife and declared the marriage null. For once Philip, like his father, let his personal feelings get the better of him. The Pope, Celestine III, naturally refused to accept Philip's position, which was supported by a doubtful genealogical tree. Philip, however, after some difficulty and three point-blank refusals from cautious ladies, succeeded in persuading a Bavarian, Agnes of Meran, to marry him. But his hopes of thus extinguishing Ingeburga were dissipated with the succession of Innocent III, who at once put France under an interdict. By this most redoubtable of all Papal weapons (for excommunication had of late lost weight through its frequent use), the whole kingdom was deprived of religious services. The result was open war with a number of the bishops and other clergy, though many of them refused to carry out the Pope's order. So difficult did the position of Philip become that he was obliged to make peace with John, who in 1200 came to visit him at Paris. However, in 1201 Agnes died, Philip made an appearance of reconciliation with Ingeburga, and Innocent, eager for peace, declared Agnes's two children legitimate. Philip

(4) Philip,
John, and
Innocent
III.

promptly got up a quarrel with John, ordered him as his vassal to give up Anjou, Maine, and Touraine to Arthur, and in 1202 summoned John to appear in Paris at his lord's court. John refused, and Philip, to punish his contumacy, declared all his lands confiscated, and invaded Normandy. The English King made a vigorous resistance, but was unable to hold Philip in check. Meanwhile Innocent III not only severely reprimanded Philip for his continued ill-treatment of Ingeburga, but attempted to make peace between him and John. Philip declared that in a question of feudal obligation Innocent had no right to interfere, but the astute Pope had his answer ready. It was true that in a matter of law between lord and vassal the spiritual power had no jurisdiction. But the question whether Philip was committing a sin in impugning John's rights was well within the competence of the ecclesiastical tribunal. It was hard to see whither such reasoning as this might lead. Philip, at any rate, took no notice, and John, in despair, left northern France to its fate, and returned to England. Before he went he put himself finally in the wrong by the murder of Arthur. Philip laid siege to Château Gaillard, the key to Normandy, and in spite of Richard's boast at its building, took it, and in two months overran Normandy (1204). Next year Anjou, Touraine, and most of Poitou either deserted to Philip or were conquered. All over the South clergy and baronage forsook the cause of the murderer of Arthur. Brittany, invaded by Philip, was still able to maintain its independence; in Gascony, Guyenne, and southern Poitou, John retained an unstable rule, threatened by Castile and Toulouse. Otherwise by 1208 the end of the Angevin rule in France was definitely recognized by treaty.

(5) Con-
quest of
Angevin
empire.

This was not the end of the conflict of Philip with John.

In 1212, when John was at the worst of his quarrel with Innocent III on the question of Stephen Langton, Philip decided to invade England. He took back Ingeburga into favour, renewed the alliance with Denmark, entered into a plot with the English baronage, and hoped for the support of the Pope. This time, however, John was victorious. He made complete submission to the Pope and endless promises to his barons; and Philip, whom both the Pope and his English allies deserted in the confidence that John had become a new man, was obliged to give up the expedition. In 1213 John took his revenge. In that year the position of Philip was threatened, as that of Henry II had been in 1173, by a great coalition of enemies within and without the kingdom. Philip had made use of the schism in the Empire to secure that the power which lay to the east of his realm should be kept as weak as possible. Thus he had supported Philip of Swabia, the anti-papal candidate, till he had become too powerful, and was on the eve of war with him when Philip was assassinated. Thus, too, he had opposed Philip's successor, Otto, so soon as, with the death of Philip, he became all powerful; and had supported Frederick of Hohenstaufen, the candidate whom Innocent put forward against Otto, once the ally and now the enemy of the Papacy.

(6) The
Invasion of
England.

Otto was therefore eager to attack one who was becoming the chief bulwark of Papal policy. He proposed to attack France from the north while his ally John landed in Aquitaine and made a diversion in the west, like the attack on Northern England made by William the Lion in 1174. Otto could count, as Louis VII had done in his struggle with Henry II, on substantial support among the baronage of Philip. The King of France was now so strong in Normandy, and so

(7) The
coalition
of 1213.

influential in Champagne, that he had been able to do very much what he pleased among the great fiefs between the Île de France and the Scheldt. In 1202 Baldwin of Flanders had taken the Cross, and was now Emperor of Constantinople. Philip, to whom such an opportunity never came amiss, proceeded to treat Flanders as he had treated the Angevin empire in Richard's absence in Palestine. He induced the Regent of Flanders to marry Baldwin's little daughter to Ferrand of Portugal, who had himself a claim on Flanders, and in return for this induced Ferrand to hand over Artois to his son Louis, who had already invaded it. Philip had thus hoped to kill two birds with one stone: to secure a subservient Count in Flanders, and to partition that Count's domains. But the Flemish cities, the most prosperous and powerful in Northern Europe, were indignant at the high-handed methods of the King. Ferrand found himself bitterly unpopular with his subjects: he was also by no means pleased with the conduct of his suzerain. Already Ghent, Bruges, Lille, and other cities had entered into negotiations with John of England. Ferrand took their lead and joined the confederacy of John and Otto. The Counts of Boulogne, of Holland, and of Lorraine had already promised aid. In the early days of 1213 Philip, seeing his danger, invaded Flanders. Ferrand held his own, however, and though Lille was razed to the ground, the Flemish were only the more exasperated. Next year the coalition took the field. In February John landed at La Rochelle. His success was brilliant. The fickle nobility of the South, who cared for neither John nor Philip, joined the invader because he would be a more distant suzerain than the King of France, and because he had with him a strong force. John moved north, crossed the Loire and took Angers. This was in

(8) The quarrel with Flanders.

(9) John's Campaign in the West.

June. At the end of July, Otto and his allies had reached Valenciennes. But meanwhile the plan of campaign, the best laid that John ever had a hand in, had, like all his enterprises, broken down from his own fault. Instead of making a rapid advance on Paris, John dawdled in Anjou over the siege of La Roche-au-Moine. Louis, the King's son, came up to relieve it in the early days of July, and he had no sooner appeared than the army of John began to melt away. It finally dissolved in utter rout. There was not even a battle; but the western diversion was ruined. However, the prospects of Otto in the north were still bright. On the 27th of July he met the army of Philip at Bouvines, in one of the decisive battles of history. Otto's hold on the Empire, John's position in England, and the future of France were all at stake. Philip won a complete victory.

(10) Battle
of Bou-
vines.

With Bouvines began the national existence of France. The popular enthusiasm which it evoked showed how much Philip had done to add to the strength of the monarchy. In a very real sense he had made his cause the cause of France. The gain in power was as great as the gain in prestige. The Count of Flanders and the Count of Boulogne each remained imprisoned for thirteen years, and Philip in their absence was able to do much as he wished in their dominions. The other rebels had either to make humiliating terms with Philip or to marry into his family. Artois, of course, became part of the royal demesne. Outside France the results were far-reaching: Frederick II was able to make good his title to the Empire on the ruin of the cause of Otto, and the way was prepared for Philip's invasion of England by the forcing of the Great Charter on John by the baronage.

(11) Its
results.

One thing the battle of Bouvines was not—it was not

(12) The
Communes
at Bou-
vines.

a victory of the communal militia. It has been claimed that this victory of the French King was, like the defeat of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa, a triumph for the burghers, and that the bulk of Philip's army was drawn from the towns. But the civic militia of Northern Europe was not like that of Italy, capable of fighting a pitched battle; they were adepts at standing a siege, but in the open they were no match for the heavily-armed knights. In accounts of the battle the communal forces are mentioned as being present, but it is a modern contribution to history which represents them as playing a decisive part. In fact, the share in the revolt of the Flemish cities was far more important than the share in the victory of the French communes, and Bouvines was a serious check to the development of municipal independence in Flanders.

Bouvines was the last appearance in the field of Philip 'le Conquérant'. His son Louis became the military leader of France, and Philip gave himself up to the organization of his conquests and to diplomacy.

(13)
Philip's
organiza-
tion.

In military strength and in finance Philip was of course able to add enormously to the resources of the crown. The extension of the royal demesne vastly increased the royal revenues. Moreover, Philip's supremacy over the great feudatories was so well established that he was able to exact from them feudal dues which they had never paid in the past. From the clergy and from the towns Philip also made considerable profit; he had begun by expelling the Jews, but he soon recalled those useful means, and victims, of royal extortion. With this revenue Philip was able to maintain the nucleus of a standing army which made it possible to dispense with the untrustworthy levies of the feudal host. The most notable contribution of Philip to the organization of

France was the establishment of *baillis* in the royal domain. These officials were designed to supplement the old *prévôts* who had hitherto been the king's local representatives, but whose independence made them very difficult to control. The *baillis* were officials bound as closely as possible to the king and charged with looking after his interests; they exercised a general control over the *prévôts*, though they were not yet given definite districts as *baillages*. Rather, like the English Itinerant Justices, they had a general commission to supervise large districts in the royal interest. But their institution was an important step forward in centralization. In Southern France, Philip was not strong enough to give commissions to officials of the central government. But he made an effort to prepare the way for such officials by conferring the title of 'seneschal' on certain members of the local baronage, giving each of them powers of control over a district similar to those of the *baillis*. But there was little resemblance as yet between the feudal lord who held a *sénéchaussée* by hereditary title, and the royal *baillis*, salaried and revocable officials of the central government. With these improvements in local administration went the more effective organization of the central government. Here the most important steps were the suppression in 1185 of the office of Chancellor and in 1191 of that of Seneschal, two great hereditary posts, the holders of which had long given trouble to the Crown. Philip was always eager to supersede these hereditary officials by more amenable servants, chosen from the clergy or from the burgess class. In this he was following the lead of the Normans and Angevins in England.

Equally characteristic was Philip's treatment of the communes. He had every reason to favour the com-

(14) The
Baillis.

(15) The
Communes.

munal movement. In his relation to the Church he was hampered neither by weakness, as Louis VI had been, nor by the sensitive conscience of Louis VII. It suited him to patronize the enemies of the clergy, if only to show them the danger of offending him. In a few cases, indeed, he supported the Church against the communes. But, on the other hand, no king was more lavish than he of communal charters, or more consistently loyal to the cause of the townsmen. The districts recovered from the Angevins needed to be conciliated, and Philip was glad to pose as the source of municipal privileges. Moreover, he was able to lay it down as a principle that all communal charters should be confirmed by him, and that a commune, no matter by whom it was established, should become the vassal, not of its previous lord, but of the king. All communes, in fact, were to be under the special protection of the king. This claim gave an admirable pretext for intervention in the great fiefs, and secured allies for the monarchy all over France. Not, indeed, that Philip was the champion of complete municipal independence. He dealt firmly with townsmen on his own demesne who tried to arrogate to themselves without leave the privileges of a commune. And he was careful, whenever possible, to grant a charter which safeguarded the royal supremacy, such as that of the city of Rouen, which reserved the lord's control over the appointment of the communal officials. The alliance of king and commune, then, was based on their mutual interests, and Philip lost nothing by his generosity.

(16) The attempt on England.

Philip's good fortune followed him to the end of his reign. The expedition of Louis to England, undertaken just before John's death, was indeed foiled by the national resistance of the English, and in 1217 Louis gave up his claim to the English throne. Few things would have

been more fatal to France than this attempt on the part of Philip to do what he had himself so clearly proved impossible. Just as he had destroyed the prestige of the Angevin house by expelling them from France, so he would have undermined the Capetian hold on France if he had succeeded in establishing it in England. Meanwhile, however, a much more hopeful opening had been made for French expansion, not across the Channel, but down to the Mediterranean. Philip had already made his profit out of two Crusades. He was now to be given a new opportunity by a third.

V. THE ALBIGENSIAN CRUSADE

The Albigensian Crusade was as decisive in the history of Europe as the battle of Bouvines. Southern France, in 1208, had few links, except those of literature and sentiment, with the north. The house of Toulouse had indeed been able to invoke the aid of Louis VII against Henry II. The Catholic clergy had many ties with the French crown, and had been glad to call in St. Bernard in defence of orthodoxy. As far north as Flanders, the lyrics of the troubadours of Languedoc were read and imitated. The communes of the south in some cases enjoyed the patronage of the Capets. Otherwise, the Raymonds of Toulouse, the Raymond Berengars of Béziers, the Counts of Foix, and the other lords of the Pyrenean frontier were virtually independent. Gascony was still held by John. But the strongest influence over the nobility of Languedoc came from across the Pyrenees. Philip Augustus had just vindicated the right of France to the English Channel as her northern boundary. But to the south, the Pyrenees were made as light of by the Kings of Aragon and Castile as the Channel had been

(1) Royal
Influence
in the
South.

by the first two Angevins. Since 1122 the Christian kingdoms of Spain had profited greatly by Moslem divisions and by the crusading zeal of Europe. In 1147 the Kingdom of Portugal had been helped by a division of the Crusade of St. Bernard. Another African invasion, under the leadership of the Almohades, had indeed swept away the decadent Almoravides, driven the Christians out of Andalusia and attacked Portugal. But the Portuguese not only drove them off from Santarem, but slew their leader in a surprise in 1184. Next year the Moors defeated the King of Castile and took Calatrava. But this was the end of their advance, and in spite of his defeat Alfonso VIII of Castile was able to make large preparations for a great advance to the south. He was at present engaged, however, in a long struggle with the Kings of Leon and Navarre, both of whom were determined to remain independent. Zealously supported by Innocent III, and allied with King Peter of Aragon, he only waited an opportunity to put himself at the head of a Crusade. But if southern expansion was the first object of the Spaniards, they were bound by many ties to the north. Peter of Aragon was the brother-in-law of Raymond of Toulouse. The nobility of Languedoc held fiefs in Spain, as did Spanish nobles in Languedoc. Their language was more similar than was that of Northern France. Like the Southern French, the Spaniards were cultured and tolerant, owing much to Moslem civilization, and with none of the passionate and narrow orthodoxy of the north. For some one strong enough to overcome the selfish individualism of her petty kings and great counts, there seemed a great empire ready to be set up astride of the Pyrenees.

(2) The situation in Spain.

(3) Spanish influence in Languedoc.

(4) Heresy in Languedoc.

If Languedoc was a menace to the unity and centralization of France, it was equally so to the unity and

centralization of Christendom. Innocent III had as little cause as had Philip to look with favour on its independence. The efforts of St. Bernard to check the heresy of the South had little result. From Bordeaux to the Mediterranean it was a hotbed of unorthodox sects. Some were indeed merely the manifestations of that impulse towards reform which it is always dangerous for an orthodox Church either to disregard or to repress. Such was the movement begun by Peter Valdes, a merchant who renounced wealth to preach the sanctity of poverty, and had a translation of the Bible made. His followers called themselves 'the poor men of Lyons', and he received some encouragement from Alexander III, though the jealousy of the local clergy eventually led to his condemnation. Much more serious were those heretical sects which aimed not at reforming, but at superseding the Catholic Church. Peter de Bruys, whom St. Bernard attacked, had already begun to burn crosses and attack the whole fabric of the Church. By 1200 a great anti-Catholic movement, favoured or winked at by the nobility, had made such progress that the clergy, deprived of their congregations, were in despair. The Cathari or Albigensians, as they were called, would seem to have got some of their doctrines from the East, and an embassy had already been sent from a heretical sect of the Greek Church with a view of establishing a definite connexion with the heretics of Languedoc. There was at any rate an Oriental extravagance about their views which made them a strange community in Western Europe. The Albigensians laid stress above all on the special position of 'the Perfect', though their sect had also numbers of lay members called Credentes. The Perfect were bound by the strictest rules, initiated by a solemn ceremonial, and sworn to eat no meat, to

(5) Character of the Albigensians.

touch no women, not to swear, and to keep three yearly fasts. Suicide, as the logical working out of the doctrine that the soul was corrupted by contact with matter, was not uncommon among the Perfect. Both women and men were capable of initiation. In doctrine the heretics seem to have lost themselves in vague Apocalyptic conceptions, some of them allied to the Manichaeism, which regarded the universe as given over to the conflict of two equal principles, one good and the other bad. According to some the New Testament was the work of one and the Old of the other. Both this mysticism and this asceticism were of a piece with the mediaeval mind, and with the busy speculations of the twelfth century. In Italy men were already looking for the Kingdom of the Holy Ghost which should succeed that of the Son, as Christianity had succeeded the worship of the Father in Judaism. The Church, by her exaltation of celibacy and chastity, gave occasion within her borders to extravagances of asceticism as violent as those of the Perfect. The mediaeval belief in the Devil was so vivid and intense that it brought men to something very like Manichaeism. But there was a logical consistency about the Albigensians which pushed their doctrines so far as to make them what mediaeval religion scarcely ever became, radically anti-social. The comparative neglect of all but 'the Perfect', and the insistence on complete isolation of the latter from the world, was a direct encouragement to vice and self-indulgence, and a certain check to the moral progress of the race.

(6) Evils of the heresy.

Already, before 1200, the idea of a crusade against the heretics had been mooted. Henry II and Louis VII had discussed, but abandoned, the project of a common expedition. In 1194 Raymond VI succeeded to the county of Toulouse, and showed himself, unlike his

father, favourable to the heretics. Innocent decided on action, and, egged on by local enthusiasts, urged Philip to take the Cross. Philip was busy. But in 1208 an event brought things to a crisis. Raymond gave vent to an outburst against the Papal legate in Languedoc, Peter of Castelnau, which, like Henry II's words against Becket, led to Peter's assassination. Raymond made a humiliating submission to the Pope, Philip himself wrote to express his anger at the deed. Raymond was duly absolved, but already the nobles of Northern France had made preparations for a Crusade. In 1209 they set out for Languedoc. One of the leaders was Simon de Montfort, Earl of Leicester in England, and holder of a small French fief, one of the most remarkable men of the day. Like his prototype, Bohemund, Simon was on the look-out for territory. But he was also full of a burning zeal against the heretics, which quickly gave him pre-eminence in the army. Raymond Berengar, Viscount of Béziers, was the first to be attacked. Béziers was taken after a brief siege, and a massacre followed which for ruthless completeness is unsurpassed in history. This was the beginning of a progress up to the very gates of Toulouse, which extinguished in blood the brilliant civilization of Languedoc. Soon after the fall of Béziers the more moderate Crusaders had gone home. Those who remained stayed from intensity of zeal or of self-interest, or both. The Papal legate became Bishop of Narbonne. A converted troubadour became Bishop of Toulouse. Most successful of all was Simon, who was lucky enough to become the heir of Raymond Berengar of Béziers, who disappeared mysteriously while in prison. Between 1209 and 1211 Simon captured city after city in Toulouse. In 1212 he prepared to lay siege to the city of Toulouse itself.

(7) Origin
of the
Crusade.

(8) Ex-
ploits of
Simon de
Montfort.

Meanwhile the Kings of Castile and Aragon had at last encountered in a pitched battle the forces of the Moors. At Las Navas da Tolosa in the early days of 1212 they won a victory so decisive that thenceforward the cause of Mohammedanism in Spain was condemned continuously to recede. Peter II of Aragon turned from this magnificent achievement in the cause of Christendom to look after his interests in the north, which were being compromised by another soldier of Christ. The Count of Béziers owed feudal service to Aragon. Simon had shown no intention of paying it. Moreover, he was beginning to encroach on the domains of Peter's other vassals, the Counts of Foix, of Toulouse, and of Comminges. Peter was supported by Innocent III. The wise and just Pope had never wished to let loose on Languedoc that 'tempest of universal fire' which was the idea of Simon and the Legate of the way to deal with heretics. He had done his best to temper the zeal of his agents. He now recommended to Simon the further use of his Crusading zeal against the Saracens of Spain, and informed him of the complaints of Peter. But Innocent's hand was forced by the extremists, and next year he was obliged to recall the patronage which he had given to Peter. Nevertheless Peter crossed the Pyrenees and advanced to the neighbourhood of Toulouse to lay siege to Muret, captured by Simon. The opposition to the Crusaders, the cause which Raymond had defended so weakly, at last had a worthy leader. Not for long, however. In 1213, in a battle outside Muret, Simon, fighting with his usual fury, utterly routed his enemies. Peter II was slain. The scourge of the heretics had overthrown the scourge of the infidels. Nothing remained for Innocent but to recognize the accomplished fact. At the great Lateran Council of 1215, when Innocent's position was in many respects so

(9) Las Navas da Tolosa.

(10) Peter of Aragon and Simon de Montfort.

(11) Battle of Muret.

triumphant, he did his best on behalf of Raymond. All Simon's conquests were recognized as his possessions, but Raymond's son was promised all of his inheritance east of the Rhone.

So far the Crusade had seemed little else than a brilliant piece of fortune-hunting by Simon de Montfort, who had forced the hand of the Pope, slain a king, and disinherited two counts. But in 1218 Simon was killed by a stone from a machine worked by women of the city of Toulouse, which had gone over to Raymond. His son was by no means his equal in ability, and could not even defend himself against Raymond. Who, then, was to gather the fruits of the Crusade? The question had already been answered. Already Simon had done homage to Philip for his fiefs. In 1215 Philip's son Louis appeared in Languedoc and took part in a campaign of Simon's. Four years after Simon's death, his son, powerless against Raymond, made the King of France his heir. Philip was already near his death, but his son was to take full advantage of the situation. The Crusade gave the French monarchy a footing in Southern France from which it was never to recede.

To sum up, then, Philip in warfare, in diplomacy, and in administration had done a great work for France. Moreover, he ended as he had begun, as the favoured son of the Church, who had maintained the alliance with the Pope which had now become the corner-stone of Capetian policy. But there is no better witness to Philip's strength than the extent to which he was able to act independently of Papal interests and contrary to Papal demands. Innocent, a man to whom compromise was abhorrent, had to compromise with Philip in the matter of Ingeburga, whom, as long as he lived, Philip never restored to her position as his wife. Philip had supported Philip of

(12) Death of Simon.

(13) Intervention of Capetians.

(14) Philip and the Church.

Swabia, and attacked John in defiance of the Pope's advice; he had refused to be drawn into the Albigensian Crusade; he had attacked his clergy who accepted the Papal Interdict, and had become the ally and patron of the communal movement, despite its anti-clericalism. He was himself a pious man so long as politics were not concerned. But he put himself out very little in order to maintain the position which he held as the eldest son of the Church. He was, however, too strong a man to be safely alienated even by so strong a man as Innocent III. In Philip's reign we see beginning that close alliance of the Papacy with France in which the Papacy—not, as before, the Capetians—are the weaker party, who pay with concessions and privileges for invaluable support.

VI. THE FOURTH CRUSADE

In one other episode of this period the French and the Papacy encountered one another again in a characteristic fashion. This was the Fourth Crusade. Few events are more characteristic of early thirteenth-century France. The most zealous worker for the Fourth Crusade was Innocent III. No sooner was he established as Pope than he began negotiations for another Western Crusade. He made every attempt to get from the Patriarch of Jerusalem, from the Templars and the Hospitallers, exact information as to the situation in the East. He negotiated with the princes of Antioch, with the King of Armenia, and even with Moslem princes themselves. He was of course involved in much diplomacy with the Emperor Alexius III of Constantinople. But it was not thanks to Papal initiative that the Fourth Crusade eventually became a reality. It was the barons themselves who decided to take up the cause. The Crusade

began with the preaching of a new prophet, Fulk de Neuilly, who appealed, as of old, to the religious impulses, fears, and desires of the baronage. The baronage of Champagne, famous for their chivalry, were caught in an adventurous mood, and when the Counts of Blois and Champagne and numbers of their vassals had taken the Cross, the nobility of Picardy and Flanders, their rivals in knightly prowess, were not to be outdone. But besides their piety and chivalry, these Northern French Crusaders had a shrewd sense of the requirements of the situation. A Crusade without a fleet had now been shown to be impossible: the Holy Land could only be reached with any safety by sea. They therefore had recourse to the Venetians. The nobility of Northern Italy joined in, and Boniface of Montferrat became leader of the expedition. But the terms of the Venetians were high, and the Crusaders were unable to pay the full sum. Hence the suggestion of the Doge, Dandolo, that they should undertake, in part payment, an expedition against the Dalmatian town of Zara, a trade rival of Venice. Innocent, in righteous indignation, threatened them all with excommunication, but these singular Crusaders were not to be deterred. Zara was taken, and Innocent, most unwilling to anathematize the whole expedition, only excommunicated the Venetians, and forbade the Crusaders to have further dealings with them. At the beginning of 1203, however, an event had occurred which further cemented the unhallowed alliance of the Crusaders and Venice. Constantinople in 1195 went through one of those palace revolutions which had become almost normal occurrences under the disastrous rule of the house of Angelus. Isaac Angelus, the reigning Emperor, had been deposed, and his son now came to Zara to appeal for help against the usurper,

(1) Preaching of Crusade.

(2) Relations with Venice.

(3) The situation in Constantinople.

Alexius III. No better example could be needed of the hopeless case of the Eastern Empire which under John II and Manuel had fought so hard against Italian rivalry. The Byzantine appeal was eagerly backed by Philip of Swabia. Philip had not forgotten the schemes of his brother Henry VI, and had already laid plans for reviving them. He could count too on Venetian aid. Dandolo, half-blind and ninety years old, joined with him in influencing the Crusaders, and prevailed on them to defer the attack on Egypt or the Holy Land in favour of an expedition to Constantinople. The leaders of the Crusade were indeed by no means averse to such an expedition. Ever since 1097 avarice and distrust had combined to make the idea of an attack on the Greeks a cherished dream of the Crusaders. No wonder that Philip of Swabia was eager to encourage them, and that Venice too had hopes of making capital out of the expedition.

(4) Fall of Constantinople.

In June, 1203, the fleet reached Constantinople. There was a thirteen days' siege, and the city, so long inviolate, fell with scarcely any effort at resistance. Alexius III fled, and Alexius IV took his place. Then the inevitable occurred. Under the pretext that it was too late in the year to go on to Syria, the Venetians persuaded the Crusaders to stay. Alexius found himself unable to fulfil the lavish promises he had made to his patrons. On the other hand he was hated by patriotic Greeks for his subservience to the Latins. He was murdered, and an attempt was made to defend the city against the

(5) Second capture of Constantinople.

Crusaders. On April 12, 1204, it was taken by assault a second time, and sacked and gutted. Innumerable treasures of art were destroyed, bronze statues melted down and coined into money: it is impossible to calculate the loss to civilization caused by this orgy of vandalism. Incidentally, the Crusade came to an end,

for the Crusaders had to organize their conquests. Philip's behaviour in the Third Crusade found many emulators among his countrymen of the Fourth. The French baronage of the thirteenth century showed no more statesmanship in the organization of the Balkan Peninsula than had those of the eleventh in the organization of the Syrian coast-line. Their own idea, now as then, was to set up a feudal superstructure on a basis of conquered natives. Baldwin of Flanders became Emperor of Constantinople. Boniface of Montferrat was compensated with the title of King of Thessalonica, and the other chiefs of the expedition were given fiefs scattered over the whole of the Morea, Attica, Boeotia, and parts of Asia Minor. There was a Duke of Athens and a Prince of Achaia. Baldwin's authority was a shadow. He had no means of controlling even the lesser fief-holders, and his position was bitterly resented by Boniface of Thessalonica, who refused to recognize him. Not even in Constantinople was he supreme: the greater part of the sea-frontage of the city had been handed over to Venice, together with a number of the islands and a good deal of territory on the mainland. The Doge, Dandolo, was at least as strong as the Emperor. Moreover, the Patriarch, the head of the Greek Church, was succeeded by a Venetian, Morosini, who did all he could to fill the best positions with his countrymen.

It was Venice in fact which alone gained permanently by the conquest. The overthrow of the Eastern Emperor, like the defeat of the Western Emperor at Legnano, meant a great step forward of those vigorous communities which were already preparing the Renaissance of Art and Learning. Venice now became what Constantinople had been, the great emporium of Eastern trade with the West. Like Constantinople, she became herself half an

(6) Organization of the Conquest.

(7) Gains of Venice.

Oriental city, and she was afterwards to introduce into Italian art much of the spirit of the East.

(8) Danger
of the
Latin
Empire.

Otherwise, although the Latin Empire outlasted the period, and the house of Angelus was not restored till 1261, it was obvious from the beginning that Greece could never become permanently another France in the East. The new principalities were not only divided by internal rivalries; they were surrounded by enemies. Asia Minor became the scene of incessant risings by various Greek claimants to the Empire, and a rival emperor set himself up at Nicaea; to the North the Bulgarian empire was a perpetual danger. All along the northern frontier was a series of Slavonic and Greek principalities eager to invade the Latin States. The Greeks at any rate could rely on the sympathy of the subjects of their blood, whom the handful of ex-Crusaders could only with difficulty keep under control. The religious question alone would have been enough to keep the two races apart. The Pope was anxious to close the long schism of the Greek and Roman Churches, but the only result of the endeavours of the Papal legate was to cause dangerous popular risings in Constantinople. Moreover, neither the Emperor nor the Venetians cared to encourage Papal pretensions to control over what had begun as a Crusading enterprise. For a few years, indeed, a certain amount of vigour was given to the policy of the Empire by Baldwin's brother and successor, Henry of Flanders. Baldwin mysteriously disappeared in 1205 in a disastrous battle against the Bulgarians. Henry did his best to conciliate the Greeks, and married a daughter of Boniface of Thessalonica. Favoured by the death of the great Bulgarian Tzar, Johannitza, in 1207, he made peace with his successor, and married, on the death of his first wife, the daughter of Johannitza. He signed a treaty

(9) Work
of the
Emperor
Henry.

with the Emperor of Nicaea, and made some attempt to arrange a concordat between the two religions. But on his death in 1216 the Empire broke up in confusion; the nationalist movement among the Greeks gained steadily in strength as the divisions of the Latins became more numerous, and their numbers, thanks to many returns to France, decreased. It became clear that the experiment was doomed.

It has been said that the French have conquered and lost more lands than any other people, and Greece is one of the first of the long series of French colonial adventures. But its failure was due rather to the defects of mediaeval civilization than to the peculiarities of the French character. There were in this period four attempts at colonization of a distant country, as distinct from the pushing forward of frontiers, such as went on in Eastern Germany, in Spain, and in Southern France. These were the result of the conquest of England by the Normans, and the conquest of Southern Italy and Sicily, also by the Normans, the conquest of the Syrian coast-line by the First Crusade, and the conquest of the Eastern Empire by the Fourth Crusade. The main reason for the success of the first two would seem to be that the succession of Norman kings in England and of Norman dukes in Sicily produced men of exceptional force of character and organizing ability. Under their direction the work of consolidating the conquest and amalgamating conquerors with conquered was carried through with a wisdom and thoroughness, with an amount of respect for native customs, and, particularly in Sicily, of tolerance and broadmindedness, which is modern enough in spirit to be compared, for instance, to the British experiment in India. In Syria and Greece, on the other hand, there was a complete absence of central control, or even of a

(10) Mediaeval
coloniza-
tion.

common policy; the feudal system, out of which Western Europe was rapidly growing, was merely transplanted bodily into the uncongenial soil of the East.

Still the Latin Empire, like the First Crusade, is at least a testimony to the vigour of the French noblesse. French place-names and Gothic buildings still remain in the Morea. Villehardouin, one of the leaders of the Crusade, wrote in terse and picturesque French an account of the Crusade which is one of the landmarks in the history of French literature. The Fourth Crusade was neither a genuine holy war, nor a successful experiment, but it was a splendid adventure.

VII. INNOCENT III

Widespread and intense as was the activity of the French and their King between 1190 and 1215, it is not from Paris but from Rome that the strongest influence was wielded over contemporary events. Even more widespread and intense was the activity of Innocent III.

Hitherto we have seen Innocent only in relations with Philip Augustus, with the Albigensian, and with the Fourth, Crusade. In Philip, Simon de Montfort and the Venetians, Innocent had to deal with perhaps the most difficult material in the whole field of European diplomacy. He failed to secure the vindication of Queen Ingeburga, to save Raymond of Toulouse, or to direct the Fourth Crusade to Palestine. Innocent was clearly anything but all-powerful in Europe. Still, that he attempted with persistence to do these three things proves him to have been a genuine lover of justice, never afraid to speak his mind, and eager to do what was possible in defence of the oppressed. That he acquiesced in his failure surely shows that he knew when circum-

(1) Failures
of Inno-
cent.

stances were too strong for him, and could look facts in the face.

But Innocent had not to do only with Philips, Simons, or Dandolos. In England, Italy, Germany, and Spain, the great Pope exercised an influence on both State and Church which came nearer to the putting into practice of the ideals of Papal policy than the achievements of any other Pope in history.

Even in France the Papacy made headway under Innocent. So great and energetic a Pope could not fail to influence the Church of France, and Innocent, in one case at least, was able to carry out a piece of Papal centralization which stands out in clear contrast to the royal centralizing work of Philip. It was under him that the University of Paris was drawn so much closer to the Papacy, as practically to pass out of the control of the King who had given it its first charter. Innocent kept the closest watch over the University, and gave it many privileges, in return for which the University became more and more a school of Papalist theology and law, bound in the closest relations to the head of the Church. Thus while the French nation was becoming, as we have seen, the intellectual leader of Europe, its greatest seat of learning passed under the direction of the cosmopolitan authority of Rome.

(2) The University of Paris.

Similarly, the Albigensian Crusade, though in one aspect it was a victory of the ambition of Simon de Montfort over the statesmanship of Innocent, in another gave occasion for a great advance in Papal power. One result of the Crusade was the occupation by the French monarchy of Southern France. But another was the foundation of the Dominican Order of Friars.

Dominic Guzman was a Spaniard, born in 1170, who crossed to Southern France in 1206, and began to preach

(3) St. Dominic.

among the Albigensian heretics. His methods of persuasion were soon swamped by the outbreak of the terrible Crusade ; but he retained his belief in the value of reasoning and preaching as a weapon for the conversion of heretics, and in 1215 went to Rome to secure the support of Innocent III. Innocent readily agreed to his project of founding an order of preachers, who should do the work of the secular clergy, and also live, like the monks, under a common Rule. By this organization Dominic hoped to get into closer touch with the people, and at the same time avoid the temptations to worldliness and inefficiency to which the scattered and isolated parish priests were liable. The friars, or brothers, of the Order, inspired by a common obedience, and yet wandering broadcast over the land, would, he hoped, constitute a kind of flying-squadron against the forces of heresy which could reinforce the regular garrisons whenever they were too closely pressed. To meet the arguments of the heterodox, the friars must, of course, be learned in their own faith. From the beginning, the Order of St. Dominic, unlike that of St. Francis, had a strongly marked intellectual character.

The effect of a monastic revival has always been to increase the strength of the Papacy as against the secular powers, and the Dominicans, with their intellectual vigour and their popular appeal, carried their enthusiasm among just those classes who were most liable to dissatisfaction with the orthodox faith—the poor who believed that the clergy should also be poor, and the learned who found the bounds of orthodoxy too narrow for them. As combatants of heresy they were more effective than any number of Crusades.

(4) The
Inquisition.

If the Albigensian Crusade saw the rise of the Dominicans, it saw also the inception of what was soon to become

the most formidable of their weapons—the Inquisition, In 1184 a Papal bull had ordered bishops to send commissioners into districts suspected of heresy to make inquiries. The legates whom Innocent sent to Languedoc before the Crusade were in reality the first Papal inquisitors. In 1215 the jurisdiction of bishops and delegates over heretics was defined, but it was not till 1233 that the Dominicans were given the position of Papal Inquisitors. But both Inquisition and Dominicans may be said to have begun their existence in 1215. The tribunal which was to do so much in defence of orthodoxy, and the Order which was to preside over it, were both given definite recognition by the great canon lawyer, Innocent III.

Meanwhile in Italy an even more important religious revival came ready to the hand of Innocent III. This was the work of Francis of Assisi, perhaps the best-known figure in the Middle Ages. Francis was a young man of good birth and high spirits, who, as the result of a sudden conversion, threw aside all his worldly advantages and declared himself wedded to Poverty. He became an ecstatic preacher of a Christ-like life, who wandered all over Italy and even journeyed to the East, devoting himself to the care of lepers and to the consolation of the poor. He soon gathered round him a small band of disciples, men of his own simplicity of soul and joyous faith—one of whom, Brother Juniper, was indeed so simple and childlike that he became the object of much homely ridicule from the others. The bond between the early companies, as described in the early stories and Lives of St. Francis, was in fact one of ideal good-fellowship and mutual affection, with all the charm which still flourishes among the happy, irresponsible poor of Italy. Francis himself had all the instincts of a poet, with an

(5) St.
Francis.

intense love of nature and of life. Both his life and his songs are hymns in praise of the unity of all created things in the love of God.

It is this side of St. Francis's nature which has led some modern historians to regard him as a unique figure in the Middle Ages, with their dreary succession of ascetic monks and ambitious Popes. Much has been made of the contrast between St. Bernard, who journeyed in a blind ecstasy by the Lake of Lucerne, and the natural delight of Francis in the beauties of his sunny native land. Much has been made, too, of the contrast between the great Pope, endlessly involved in worldly concerns, excommunicating kings, directing Crusades, building up a centralized court of appeal for all Europe, and striving to make a Papal kingdom of Italy, and the wandering Brother wedded to Poverty and with thoughts not of wielding a bureaucracy, but of loving his neighbour. Just as picturesque Lives of Christ have given occasion for attacks on organized Christianity, so picturesque Lives of St. Francis have been made to reflect upon the attitude of the contemporary Papacy. Again, it has been said that with the Friars a new spirit appears in mediaeval monasticism, for whereas the old monks had preached the gospel 'Save thyself', the new brothers preached the saving of others.

(6) St.
Francis
and the
Papacy.

There is a certain measure of truth in the view that the aims of St. Francis were not those of the contemporary Papacy. There will always be a divergence between the outlook on life of the poet and that of the man of affairs, however high may be the aims and ideals of both. In the beginning, however, the relations of Innocent and Francis were thoroughly cordial. Like St. Dominic, St. Francis soon found his followers increasing enormously in number; it became necessary to

lay down definite rules for the government of the community. St. Francis drew up a Rule and went to Rome to obtain the recognition of Innocent III for it. This first Rule was of the simplest nature, consisting merely of a few Biblical phrases. Innocent, though at first a little doubtful of the claims of St. Francis to found a new Order, was finally convinced, and the Franciscans were duly authorized. Innocent III showed here, as often elsewhere, the sanity and wisdom which made him a great statesman. The 'Poor Men of Lyons', in many ways precursors of the Franciscans, had been very differently treated by Alexander III.

It was not till five years after Innocent's death that difficulties of any seriousness arose between St. Francis and the Pope. In 1221 a more regular and definite Rule was drawn up for his Order by St. Francis. The Rule was divided into three sections, one dealing with the Brothers, another with the Order of Sisters, the foundation of which by St. Claire of Assisi had been inspired by St. Francis, and the third with the Order of Lay Brothers which could be joined by laymen, and was therefore peculiarly fitted to help on the great object of Franciscan endeavour, the diffusion among the poor of true Christianity. The drawing-up of the Rule led to an immediate and rapid development of the Order. But it also brought to a head the divergence between the spirit of the more ambitious party among the brothers and that of the founder. St. Francis, having drawn up the Rule, was anxious to make it, and it alone, the authority to which all questions should be referred. The other party in the Order, which was supported by the Papacy, wished to give the heads of the Orders discretionary power to modify the Rule when necessary. The matter came to a head over the question whether

the Franciscans should, or should not, hold to their founder's view that the brothers were to hold rigorously aloof from both worldly possessions and learning. To many it seemed that this attitude would greatly restrict the sphere of usefulness of the Order, which indeed soon became of great importance in University towns. To St. Francis, on the other hand, such concessions to the spirit of this world seemed to deprive his Order of all its meaning. But these were later developments. There was in fact no real divergence between the Christianity of Innocent and that of Francis, nor had the latter the monopoly of the Christian virtues. All through history there has been room in the Christian Church for the organizer as well as for the idealist, and the work of the statesmen who directed the politics of Europe in the interests of righteousness was as Christian as that of the brother of the Poor. Later, it is true, the Papal bureaucracy became corrupt and lost sight of its mission in the pursuit of worldly interests. But the Papacy of the early thirteenth century, for all its insistence on the legal aspect and its bureaucratic character, was worthy of its Faith.

Again, the conception of St. Francis was not so sharply distinct, as has been represented, from mediaeval monasticism. We have seen that, despite his insistence on the necessity of retirement from the world, St. Bernard had never shirked his obligations to his generation. He had indeed insisted with equal vehemence on the duty of every monk to preach. By giving up the fixed habitation and resident corporate-life of the regular Orders, the Friars certainly made a great departure and enormously increased their efficiency as missionaries. But they were only making a general practice of what had been the rule of St. Bernard's life, than whom no mendicant friar ever wandered more widely over Europe.

(7) St.
Francis
and
Monasti-
cism.

Both Dominicans and Franciscans prove, at any rate, the extraordinary vitality of religious life in the early thirteenth century. Both Orders increased with amazing rapidity. Both spread almost at once far beyond the bounds of their lands of origin, Italy and Spain. Soon they were in every country of Europe, busy above all in the cities and towns, equally active in the slums and in the Universities. For the Franciscans soon followed the Dominicans in developing intellectual as well as social activities. Here was another cosmopolitan force, fighting for and testifying to the Universal Church. While that Church could produce simultaneously a St. Francis, an Innocent, and a St. Dominic, it was clearly full of the most vigorous life. (8) Influence of the Orders.

The pontificate of Innocent was fortunate in the coincidence of this religious revival. The claims of the great Pope were favoured too by political events all over Europe. The deaths of Henry VI and of Richard of England left most of Europe, except France, in the hands of weak rulers. In Spain, where the tide was beginning to flow in favour of the Christians against the Moors, the kings had every reason to conciliate the Pope, who could give useful support to their Crusade. Peter of Aragon laid his crown on the altar of St. Peter's in 1204 and received it back as the Pope's vassal, with the promise of an annual tribute to the Holy See. Sancho of Portugal also promised tribute. The kings of Poland, Armenia, and Bulgaria made submission to Papal sovereignty at various times. As Richard I had given up his crown to Henry VI, so John gave up his to the real heir of the ambitious schemes of the Emperor, and Innocent III was able to humiliate John far more completely than Henry had humiliated Richard. Henry had exacted a ransom, which once paid might be forgotten, but a (9) Innocent and the political situation.

large annual tribute remained as a reminder of the vassalage of England to the Pope. It may seem curious that the commission by a king of a spiritual offence should be made the pretext of the loss of political independence by his kingdom. To be sure, kings are not exempt from sins. But why should their subjects be mulcted to pay for them? Such, however, was not the reasoning of Innocent III. The sins of the rulers were to him only opportunities for strengthening his influence over their subjects, by extending to the utmost the recognized spiritual jurisdiction of the Papacy over laymen. Though he was careful to disclaim any such intention, the practical outcome of his policy would have been the political supremacy of the Pope in Europe.

(10) Inno-
cent and
England.

(11) Situa-
tion in
Germany.

The submission of England, Bulgaria, Denmark, Aragon, was valuable and impressive, but the power of Innocent would have been little without a hold on Germany and Italy. In Germany, as we have seen, Innocent's opportunity came with the death of Henry VI. No more disastrous event for the cause of German nationality could have occurred than this; it shattered at a stroke both the national and the Imperial position to the acquiring of which Frederick Barbarossa and his son had devoted all their energy. It was then that the full evil of the electoral system in the Empire was revealed. The electors themselves, the spiritual power, and the foreign rivals of Germany, all three gained enormously at the expense of German order and unity. Henry VI left an infant son, scarcely three years old, by his wife Constance of Sicily, and a brother, Philip of Swabia, more than ten years younger than himself. Philip, already trusted by his brother with great possessions in Italy, was the obvious successor. But, as so often before, a party of the electors, for that very reason, preferred

a member of the rival house. A Guelph party formed itself and chose Henry the Lion's son, Otto of Brunswick, himself a youth of twenty-three, to oppose the party which favoured Philip. An Imperial schism, with its certain consequences of anarchy and civil war, appeared for the confusion of Germany.

What was to be the action of the Pope? Was he to stand aside and allow the horrors of civil war and the scandal of the schism to tear Germany and Christendom asunder? Whatever the exact nature of his relations to his great fellow sovereign, it might well seem to be his duty to do what he could to save his office from degradation at such a crisis. Innocent, at any rate, was not the man to let pass such an opportunity for exercising his influence, as spiritual head of Europe, over the Empire. He declared that a disputed election was a case which should be submitted to his arbitration, both as Head of the Church and as the consecrator of the Emperor. He took the case under consideration and in 1201 decided for Otto. His motives were not purely disinterested. Otto made large offers to secure that support to which indeed the hereditary policy of his house in some degree entitled him. While Philip showed himself determined to maintain that strong grip on Italy which the brilliant campaigns of his brother had secured, Otto promised to maintain 'the possessions, honours, and rights' of the Holy See, above all to uphold the title of the Papacy to the Donation of the Countess Matilda. Once again the lands of the patroness of Hildebrand came into prominence in the eternal struggle of Papacy and Empire. Matilda, Imperial vassal, Papal ally, and married into the house of Guelph, seemed to have drawn together into her own person all the great interests involved in that struggle, only in order to involve them in a triangular struggle

(12) Decision of Innocent.

(13) Reasons for his support of Otto.

over her grave. Innocent, then, felt that much might be done with the alliance of a Guelphic Emperor.

Philip, on the other hand, had a strong case. He utterly denied the Papal right to intervene in Imperial elections. He maintained that, on the contrary, it was the Emperor's right to intervene in those of the Papacy. He threw himself on German patriotism, and took the field against Otto. Innocent found that his candidate, having damaged his cause in Germany by his subservience to the Pope, was powerless against Philip, who drove him from his one strong base, the city of Cologne. He was only powerful enough to prevent Philip from re-establishing order in Germany. The Pope had made himself the champion of a public nuisance against which German feeling rebelled. It would seem that the contention of Philip of Swabia was borne out by events, and that Papal interference in Imperial elections could only bring disaster to the Papacy and Empire. No doubt Innocent was sincere in thinking that Otto was the better candidate, and no doubt he meant to make the best use in his power of the concessions granted by his candidate. But he had chosen the wrong man and put himself in a false position. There was nothing for it but to face the fact and negotiate with Philip, as Innocent was to be forced to negotiate with the Crusaders in 1204 and with Philip Augustus again and again. Unsupported by adequate force what could the spiritual power do but compromise, and grasp at a little in default of more? By 1208 Philip was almost in a position to set about recovering the ground lost since Henry's death. Innocent was compelled to throw over Otto and make overtures to his rival. Then occurred the second of that long succession of tragedies which finally overwhelmed the house of Hohenstaufen. Philip had refused his daughter

(14) Success of Philip.

in marriage to Otto, the Count Palatine of the Bavarian house of Wittelsbach, which had benefited by the overthrow of Henry the Lion. But he still kept up friendly relations with Otto, and made a habit of practising fencing with him. One day, at Bamberg, Otto presented himself, carrying his drawn sword. Philip said he did not care to fence that day, and Otto, answering that he did not mean to do so either, ran Philip through the body. To gratify his family pride, Otto of Wittelsbach changed the whole future of his country. Otto of Brunswick suddenly became the only serious competitor for the Empire. Apparently a political assassination was about to introduce the millennium of harmonious co-operation between Emperor and Pope.

(15) Murder of Philip.

It was not easy, however, for Innocent to reappear as the warm partisan and patron of the man whom he had already arranged to abandon. It would have improved his position greatly had Philip's death come a year earlier. Still, Otto, who could not afford to lose allies, was prepared to be conciliatory. He proclaimed himself Emperor 'by the grace of God and the Pope'. This would have been a difficult formula for a Hohenstaufen, to accept.

(16) Attitude of Otto.

After all, however, it was only a formula. One of the first acts of Otto IV was to marry Philip of Swabia's daughter. He set to work to conciliate the leaderless party of the Hohenstaufen, and no sooner felt strong enough than he threw aside all his promises to Innocent, occupied the dominions of Matilda and threatened to invade Sicily, where Innocent had recognized the young Frederick as king. Innocent III's despair was as intense as it was voluble. He poured out anathemas against the man who had betrayed him, apparently unconscious of the fact that he himself had prepared to abandon Otto

(17) He betrays Innocent.

to Philip. Only the obvious sincerity of his desire to act for the best can make the Pope's plight anything but ridiculous and humiliating at once. With a zest which he did not attempt to disguise, Philip Augustus answered the Pope's appeals for help with a sententious harangue on the misguided policy of Innocent. It was a welcome opportunity for the disreputable husband of Ingeburga to point out that his spiritual mentor had brought his own misfortunes on himself. Innocent, honest as always, frankly owned that he should have taken Philip's advice.

There was nothing to be done but that the Pope should come forward once again as the promoter of a schism. The enemies of Otto, who had all his father's want of tact, began to look to the son of Henry VI, now growing up to maturity, as a possible weapon against him. Frederick, ever since the death of his mother in 1198, had been under the guardianship of Innocent III, to whom she had confided him. In 1211 a group of anti-Guelphic princes, the King of Bohemia, the Duke of Austria, the Duke of Bavaria, and others, elected Frederick emperor. It is easy to guess their motives. They were simply interested in keeping up the swing of the pendulum between Guelph and Ghibelline, for the sake of the opportunities it gave them to secure their own independence. Bohemia, which had been made a kingdom by Frederick Barbarossa, was already virtually cut off from Germany. The other princes and dukes only desired to win the same position.

By giving his countenance to this latest move, Innocent doubtless satisfied his feelings towards Otto, and continued with consistency his policy of upholding the Papal position as against Imperial pretensions. Beyond this there was very little to be said for his action. Not only did he once again go out of his way to foment the

(18) Elec-
tion of
Frede-
rick II.

disorder and hasten the disintegration of Germany, but he also uprooted the corner-stone of his Italian policy. Frederick had now for twelve years been recognized as King of Sicily. To make him Emperor was to put the Papal States in the most perilous plight, and to abandon the position taken up by the Popes when Henry VI had married Constance of Sicily. Otto's offence had been that he had tried to unite Sicily to Germany. Innocent now proposed to abet Frederick in uniting Germany to Sicily. Frederick was of course required to give guarantees that he would never allow the union of the two crowns. Had Innocent not yet learnt the value of guarantees?

(19) Un-
wisdom of
Innocent.

Otto IV, at any rate, was soon ruined. In 1212 Frederick, still only fifteen years old, made a bold dash into Germany, and soon got a great following. Philip Augustus was naturally his warm ally, for Otto, whose mother was Henry II's daughter, relied above all on a close alliance with the Plantagenets. The Guelphs lost ground steadily till 1214, when, as we have seen, the two parties met in the crucial battle of Bouvines. Here Philip Augustus not only made himself the founder of French nationality, but also won for the house of Hohenstaufen another spell of Imperial power. The final outcome of all the efforts of Innocent was to establish on the Imperial throne the son of the terrible Henry VI.

(20) Ruin
of Otto IV.

Active as Innocent showed himself in the politics of the Imperial succession, this was but one side of his work in Germany. He was determined to secure a docile Emperor. He was also determined to reform the German Church. Nowhere, it has been said, was there less ultramontanism—more open disregard of Papal direction—than among the German clergy. Nowhere were laymen more powerful in influencing episcopal elec-

(21) Inno-
cent and
the German
Church.

tion. Nowhere were the clergy more national in feeling. Innocent set himself to overthrow both the lay influence over the Church and the local independence of the clergy. He was striking at the very roots of German national life. But he was also promoting the centralization of the Church and championing the reform of obvious abuses. To secure more regular elections of the bishops, he aimed at filling the chapters of the cathedrals (for it was the chapters who, by the Concordat of Worms, chose the bishops) with supporters of his own, on whom he could rely to resist the exertion of lay pressure at election-time. He maintained that no bishop could be translated from one see to another without his leave, and that disputed elections must be referred to him. In practice he intervened, as he did in the English case of Stephen Langton, to force on the chapters bishops whom he chose himself. All his ingenuity as a great and subtle canon lawyer, and all his energy as a vigorous ruler, he brought to bear on the task of breaking down the barrier which shut off the German Church from the Pope and confined it in the circle of lay and national influence. What was the result? It must be owned that Innocent laboured in vain to make the German clergy professionally correct and obediently ultramontane. A certain impression he did make, but it was altogether outweighed by the opposition, both lay and clerical, aroused by his interference in both State and Church. The German prince-bishops and the German princes united in protesting against the Papal claims and the Papal reforms. More ominous still, a deep popular resentment showed itself against one whom the people regarded as a fomenter of anarchy. The Minnesingers, in their verses, curse the name of the interfering Pope. Here, as in England, Innocent, whose intention was to uphold the cause of the righteous and

the poor, was forced by the vicissitudes of politics, into arousing bitter popular antagonism. To protect John and doubly to betray Otto was not what Innocent desired: that he was driven to do these things is the tragedy of his career.

The briefest account of the great Pope must include a mention of one other side of Innocent's activity. We have seen his endeavours to secure from Otto of Brunswick the possession of the estates of Matilda. This was in pursuance of one of the great objects of Innocent's life, that creation of a Papal State in Italy which we have compared to Philip's expansion of the royal domain in France. In 1192 had been published the *Liber Censuum* of Cencius, which contains a list of all the demesnes to which the Papacy had a claim. Like the work of Gratian, this book helped to formulate and define what had long been a Papal ambition. The codification of the canon law brought a great extension of the Papal claims to jurisdiction. The tabulation of the Papal estates made a reality of the territorial policy of the Popes. The domains given in the *Liber Censuum* were scattered all over Italy and claimed by the most various titles—some by virtue of the Donation of Constantine, some of gifts more recent than that of Matilda. Together they made up a solid territory in Central Italy, with ramifications over the whole peninsula. Innocent set himself to translate into fact the paper domain of Cencius.

This meant plunging into the whirlpool of Italian politics. But Innocent was never afraid of political complications. The minority of Frederick secured him to the south. In the centre his two great enemies were Henry VI's brother Conrad in Tuscany, and two typical servants of Henry's, Markwald of Anweiler at Ravenna,

(22) Innocent and the Papal States.

(23) Success of Innocent.

and Conrad of Urslingen at Spoleto, on whom the Emperor had relied to maintain his hold on Italy. Here, however, he was helped by the disorder following on Henry's death. Tuscany and Spoleto rose against the Germans. Innocent lent his authority, and as a result he was able to recover and make defensible the Matildine Donation and a large territory to the south. For the rest of his life he never let slip an opportunity to vindicate the territorial rights of the Papacy. He secured the recognition of the Papal States both from Otto IV and Frederick II. Moreover, to strengthen his hold, he set a dubious precedent by giving the administration of a large district to his brother, the Count of Legni. He was the real creator of the Papal States.

(24) The
Lateran
Council.

The crowning episode of Innocent's life was the great Lateran Council of 1215. This vast assemblage of over 400 bishops and 800 abbots, numbers of laymen, and ambassadors from all the great powers of Europe, was a pageant far more impressive even than the splendid Diets of Frederick Barbarossa. It was more than a pageant. Its object was twofold, the inception of a Crusade, and the reformation of the Church. The first, a perennial subject of debate, was duly discussed, and on behalf of the second no less than seventy new canons were promulgated; heresies were condemned, monastic and episcopal reforms enjoined, and the use of the ordeal and of duelling was condemned in favour of more equitable methods of deciding disputes. The whole episode was marked with the broadminded wisdom of the great statesman who presided over it, and the Council emphasizes a side of Innocent's work which his political preoccupations must not be allowed to obscure. More than any of his predecessors Innocent made himself in the truest sense the spiritual adviser of Europe. His court

was not only the centre of a world-wide diplomacy, it was also a tribunal besieged by an army of litigants and petitioners from all over the known world. Cases of conscience of the most trivial kind, which might easily have been submitted to a local confessional, were for ever being referred to the Supreme Pontiff. Innocent groaned under the burden, and often urged the rule that only cases of appeal from the bishops should be submitted to him. But he could not stem the tide, and his replies were invariably marked by that combination of a high moral tone with shrewd common sense which distinguished the man. Thirteenth-century Europe was rapidly growing up into a vigorous and independent youth as a group of sturdy nation-states. As such it was disposed to resent not a little the claim of the Papacy to supervise its morals. On the other hand, it was still intensely mediaeval in the hold over its imagination exercised by the hope of Heaven and the fear of Hell. As such it could not be restrained from besieging the successor of St. Peter with questions relative to its spiritual condition. In a very real sense the nations were determined to be self-governing. In an equally real sense the peoples, and even on occasion the rulers, were more and more disposed to make use of the increased efficiency of the Papal Court.

It is partly true, then, to say that Innocent's life was a failure. He tried to enforce a cosmopolitan authority in defiance of national feeling. To do this he was driven to stretch points of canon law, and visit on the people the sins of their rulers, to plunge into the tangles of diplomacy and the land-grabbing of an Italian princeling. It is much truer that Innocent's life was the crowning episode of the Middle Ages, the triumphant vindication of the mediaeval theory of Church and State. In Innocent's day there was

(25) Nature of Innocent's influence.

for once a United States of Europe, with a ruler, or at any rate a president, who could make his influence felt everywhere, and who steadily exerted that influence in defence of the right. Success is never possible for any one who aims so high as did Innocent. Nor is it easy at this distance of time to estimate the real value of his life. The work of Philip Augustus is tangible enough to be reckoned on a map, but the work of Innocent was one not of conquest but of influence.

CHAPTER V

THE AGE OF FREDERICK II, 1215-1254

SECTION I. *France, 1215-1254.* (1) Louis VIII. (2) The western campaign. (3) Advance into Toulouse. (4) Death of Louis VIII; his will. (5) Creation of the appanages. (6) Blanche of Castile. (7) Treaty of Meaux. (8) Strong rule of Blanche. (9) Louis IX and Henry III. (10) Peace of Lorris. (11) The Sixth Crusade. (12) Louis's administrative reforms.

SECTION II. *Louis IX and Frederick II.* (1) Character of St. Louis. (2) His European prestige. (3) His character as a King. (4) Frederick II. (5) His relation to his age. (6) His genius. (7) His versatility. (8) The contrast with his predecessors. (9) His grasp.

SECTION III. *Frederick II and Germany.* (1) Temper of Germany. (2) Frederick in Germany. (3) Frederick and Austria. (4) Slightness of Frederick's influence. (5) Henry VII. (6) Frederick sacrifices the towns. (7) He capitulates to the Princes. (8) German expansion. (9) The Teutonic Knights. (10) The Mongol invasion. (11) Attitude of Pope and Emperor. (12) Anti-Imperial influence of the Pope.

SECTION IV. *Frederick II and Italy.* (1) The situation in Italy. (2) Honorius III. (3) Successes of Frederick. (4) Gregory IX. (5) Frederick's Crusade. (6) Peace with the Pope. (7) The reorganization of Sicily. (8) Conquest and organization of Italy. (9) Papal hostility. (10) Battle of Meloria. (11) Innocent IV. (12) The Council of Lyons, 1245. (13) Frederick's extravagances. (14) Death of Frederick. (15) Conrad IV.

THE next period, 1215 to 1254, is one of the most tragic of European history. It saw the overthrow, in a mutual conflict, of the Empire and the Papacy of the Middle Ages. The heir of Frederick Barbarossa and

the heir of Innocent III, each with a savage vehemence of which their predecessors were incapable, united to destroy the two institutions on which the whole fabric of the Middle Ages was reared. It is true that signs had not been wanting of the approaching calamity. The anarchy in Germany which Innocent had fomented between 1197 and 1211, the sudden, treacherous, transformation of Otto IV into the bitterest opponent of his former patron, the incessant thwarting of Innocent's schemes by the secular ambition of men like Philip Augustus, Simon de Montfort, and the Doge Dandolo, all seemed to show that, despite the growing definiteness of their claims to universal dominion, and the high character and abilities of their chiefs, both Papacy and Empire were building on sand. Not that either had yet lost that hold over men's imagination which indeed lives on into our own day. But as political forces, grappling with the problems of rule in Italy and Germany and exercising all over Europe a distinctly unifying and mediatorial influence, both, by 1254, had ceased to exist. It was not till the sixteenth century that the counter-Reformation and the Hapsburgs were to restore to them something of the opportunity which Innocent III and Frederick Barbarossa had employed to direct the mediæval polity.

I. FRANCE, 1215-1254

By a dramatic contrast, the years which saw the defeat of the Hohenstaufen and the exhaustion of the Papal power which destroyed them, saw also the mediæval French monarchy reach the apex of its strength and prestige. The leadership of Europe, which we have seen held by Innocent III despite the vigorous rule of

Philip Augustus and his sturdy independence, passed after Innocent's death into the hands of Louis IX.

Philip Augustus on his death in 1223 was succeeded ⁽¹⁾ Louis VIII. by his son Louis VIII, who had already become the military leader of France in succession to his father. It was he who had carried on that unsuccessful campaign in England which was Philip's one quixotic attempt to emulate the imperialism of the Angevins: it was he who had already made a military expedition in Languedoc by way of a demonstration by the Capetian sovereign in a territory which he could not yet claim to rule. He was an ideal successor of Philip, thoroughly in sympathy with his policy and experienced in his methods, and moreover, promising, by the purity of his private life, a welcome respite from scandals such as that of Ingeburga.

But Louis's premature death in 1226 prevented him from doing more than round off his father's achievements, and only by his death did he leave his mark on the Capetian monarchy. The final conquest of Poitou, the expedition into Toulouse, and the King's settlement of the kingdom by will, are the three points of importance in this three years' reign.

Philip had not been able finally to limit the English ⁽²⁾ The western campaign. possessions in France to Gascony and Guyenne south of the Garonne. But there was no reason why the French frontier to the south-east should not be indefinitely extended, for the England of Henry III was incapable of defending so isolated and distant a province. Louis began in 1224 by an advance through Poitou, and took La Rochelle; next year he threatened Bordeaux. Only one thing saved Gascony, the cession in 1224 by Amaury, the feeble son of Simon de Montfort, of claims over the inheritance which he was unable to defend. Louis

turned aside from Bordeaux and advanced into Toulouse. At last the French monarchy was prepared to advance as a conqueror into the masterless South.

(3) Advance into Toulouse.

Louis, however, found unexpected difficulties. There was indeed little resistance in the South, where the unfortunate Raymond VII was freely deserted by all classes of his subjects. Northern French barons flocked to join Louis in what was still regarded as a Crusade, and in the open country he met with no obstacle whatever as he marched through the county of Toulouse. But the city of Avignon, to which he laid siege, made a determined resistance. Louis fell back from it and besieged Toulouse, which in its turn proved impregnable. Still their submission could be only a question of time. Louis found ample compensation for his campaign in the foothold which he acquired in the South, much of which, as a result of Amaury's resignation, was now added to the royal demesne. He determined to return to Northern France, from which he had been absent so long. On his way he died of fever in Auvergne.

(4) Death of Louis VIII; his will.

He left four young sons, Louis, Robert, Alphonse, and Charles, the eldest of whom was twelve years old. His wife, Blanche of Castile, was made regent during Louis's minority, and the royal demesne was divided up to make portions or 'appanages' for each of the boys. Robert became Count of Artois, Alphonse Count of Poitou and Auvergne, Charles Count of Anjou and Maine. Thus

(5) Creation of the appanages.

Louis left the French Crown in a crucial position. It was the first minority in the royal house in the whole course of our period, and was peculiarly dangerous, coming after the strong rule of Philip Augustus, which was certain to provoke a reaction among the nobility. Secondly, it was the first instance of a division on a large scale of the royal demesne. This division among heirs was in the

hereditary monarchies (for so they were for all practical purposes) of France and England what the elective principle was in Papacy and Empire. The drawbacks of both were obvious. The wars of Henry I with Robert of Normandy, and of Henry II with his sons, are examples of the results in English history. The junior branches of the royal house in France were to be an even more dangerous feature in French politics than were those who benefited by the family policy of Edward III, notorious as the chief cause of the Wars of the Roses. It is not enough, however, to condemn the policy unreservedly as a gross political blunder. It must be remembered that the enormous increase made in the royal demesne since 1150 could not be assimilated at once. Like the vast inheritance of Henry II of Anjou, it was too diverse in character, too little homogeneous, to be ruled from one centre and by one system. Like the appointment by Edward I of a Prince of Wales, the appointment of a separate member of the royal house as ruler of a once independent district was a concession to local feeling often statesmanlike if not entirely necessary. Louis, moreover, did his best to keep in the royal hands the control of the appanages by decreeing that they should escheat to the Crown in default of direct heirs. In fact, it is easy to exaggerate the strength of both French and English national unity in the Middle Ages. Nations are not built in a single epoch, and the process which was to differentiate England and France so sharply from Germany and Italy was in the thirteenth century only in its earliest stages. The concessions of Frederick to the great dukes may be paralleled in the position of the brothers of Louis XI and of the sons of Edward III.

The French monarchy, which had already prospered under so many different types of ruler, was now to fall

(6) Blanche
of Castile.

into the hands successively of a woman and a saint, and yet to prosper still. Blanche of Castile had many difficulties before her. She was herself despised as a foreigner. She had to make good her position as regent against the claims of Louis VIII's brother, Philip Hurepel. She had to face the full strength of that feudal reaction which found its opportunity in Louis's death. At the head of that reaction she had to meet a man of wide influence and great activity, Peter Mauclerc, a member of the royal house and Duke of Brittany. In the South the incomplete campaigns of Louis VIII left Raymond VII with hopes of yet recovering his inheritance, and Henry III with schemes of vengeance. Against this array of dangers the Regent could only set the loyalty of Theobald of Champagne, a man of the feeblest character, and that of the clergy and the Church, which was the fruit of French policy since Louis VI.

This, however, used with real statesmanship by Blanche, proved sufficient to meet the crisis. As is the habit of coalitions, that of 1226 had neither real community of interests nor a common policy. Blanche, on the other hand, soon acquired such an ascendancy over Theobald of Champagne as to make him a really effective ally. Henry III, the great hope of the French baronage, did nothing. The Duke of Brittany invaded Theobald's lands, and, failing to make ground against him, offered him his daughter, but Theobald survived both the attack and the temptation. Finally, in 1229, Blanche set the seal to her triumph by arranging with the Count of Toulouse the Treaty of Meaux.

(7) Treaty
of Meaux.

This most important peace settled the long dispute begun by the Albigensian Crusade. Raymond made a humiliating submission. He promised to raze the walls of his principal towns, to hand over Toulouse to the

French crown for ten years, to go himself for five years as a Crusader to Palestine, and to persecute heresy with vigour. Most important of all, he promised his daughter and heiress in marriage to Alphonse of Poitiers, and thus made the French royal house next in succession to his duchy. The Capetians had now secured in their grasp the whole fruits of the terrible war. Simon de Montfort and Raymond of Toulouse both gave way to Louis IX.

The French monarchy, then, had cause to be grateful to Blanche of Castile. Without doing more than meet the rebels with firmness, she had staved off the most dangerous crisis of the realm since the days of Louis VII. Her triumph had raised even higher the prestige of the royal house. Blanche herself was a born ruler, erring indeed through too much vigour. She kept over the Church an even stronger hand than that of Philip Augustus. With the Archbishop of Rouen and the Bishop of Beauvais she so vehemently enforced the royal claims, that the French episcopacy, the monarchy's strongest ally, threatened revolt. In 1229, in consequence of a dispute with the royal police, the whole University of Paris broke up and scattered, as a protest against the Queen's refusal to listen to their complaints, and would only consent to return after the intervention of the Pope. Lastly, the Queen exercised over her son, and her daughter-in-law Margaret of Provence, an authority so great that for years after 1236, when Louis reached his majority, she continued to be the real ruler, and something of a tyrant, of the royal household. The ten years of her regency had certainly allowed her to reveal a personality of unexpected strength. It was due to her strong handling of the situation at her husband's death, more than to anything else, that her son succeeded to so secure a throne.

(8) Strong
rule of
Blanche.

Blanche of Castile died in 1253, the year before our

(9) Louis IX and Henry III. period ends, and it was after her death and his return in 1254 from his first Crusade that the most important part of Louis's long reign begins. Several events of interest, however, occurred between 1236 and 1254 in the internal history of France. The chief was Louis's expedition in 1241 to Poitou to oppose the claims of Henry III. In 1242 Louis won two battles, at Taillebourg and Saintes, established his brother Alphonse as governor of Poitou, and received the submission of the turbulent nobility. It was this success which eventually enabled Louis to win from Henry III in the famous Treaty of Paris (1259) the practical renunciation of all claims over French territory except Gascony and Guienne.

(10) Peace of Lorris. A year later, in 1243, the peace of Lorris with the Counts of Toulouse and Foix, who had joined to attack the royal district of Carcassonne, further secured the royal position in the South. Both Counts made complete submission. Here again Louis was later to complete his work by another treaty. In 1258, by the Treaty of Corbeil, James of Aragon agreed to give up all claims of suzerainty over Southern France. In 1247 Raymond of Toulouse died, and Alphonse of Poitiers succeeded as his heir. The next year Louis set out on Crusade.

(11) The Sixth Crusade. The Crusade of 1248-54, known as the Sixth Crusade, was like the First and the Fourth Crusades, almost entirely a French enterprise. Louis IX was the only prince to take the Cross in 1248. Yet the position in the Holy Land was absolutely desperate. In 1244 Jerusalem had again fallen into infidel hands, and its conqueror, Ayoub, had practically destroyed the Latin kingdom and ruled the Syrian coastline from Egypt. Egypt was therefore chosen as the objective of Louis's expedition. In 1249 he landed at Damietta, which was

captured. This was the solitary success of the expedition. The Christians plunged into the Delta of the Nile and made for Mansourah, which they tried to carry by assault. It soon appeared that their position was untenable: the King's brother, Robert of Artois, was slain, an epidemic broke out, and Louis at last decided to return to Damietta. On the way the army was attacked by the Saracens. Louis himself was captured, and the whole host surrendered, and, with the exception of the chief lords and the King, was massacred forthwith. To ransom the survivors, Damietta had to be given up and a large sum handed over to the enemy. Louis had gained nothing and lost an army. The next three years he spent in the Holy Land, doing what he could to strengthen the few remaining Christian positions and performing pious works. He came back to France in June 1254.

It was not till his return that he began seriously to work at those administrative reforms which make his reign so vital, though already in 1247 he had organized a vast inquiry into all branches of local royal administration, which was carried out by Dominican and Franciscan friars charged to collect local complaints and publish reports. Most of the judicial, financial, and administrative reforms of the reign lie outside our scope. But Louis had already showed himself to be what he appears in the pages of his *Life* by the *Sieur de Joinville*, which indeed only deals with his career up to 1254. More important than the increase in royal territory and influence, or the greater efficiency of the royal machinery of government which he introduced, was the effect produced by the personal character of the King. It is this which gives its unique interest in European history to the reign of St. Louis.

(12) Louis's administrative reforms.

II. LOUIS IX AND FREDERICK II

We have already examined the contrast between the character and career of Philip Augustus and Innocent III, between the adroit and successful champion of French nationality and the zealous Pope whose high ideals were for ever being sacrificed to the policy of compromise by which alone he could hope to maintain his cosmopolitan authority. Even more suggestive is the contrast between St. Louis and the Emperor Frederick II, the 'wonder of the world'.

(1) Character of St. Louis.

St. Louis was admirably fitted to be either an Emperor or a Pope. He had that strict piety of religious observance without which the Head of the Church could not hope to fill his position. He wearied out his own spiritual advisers by the length and fervour of his devotions. He found his best friends and advisers among the Mendicant Orders which were now the strongest bulwarks of the Papacy. His life was pure to the point of asceticism. He did all he could to exert a good influence over his Court. Joinville, who had no high official position with his sovereign, and was merely an important member of the Crusading force and a personal friend of the King, shows Louis again and again trying to make more real to him the truths of Christianity, and half amused and half disappointed when Joinville confessed that he objected to washing the feet of beggars, and would far rather commit a deadly sin than become a leper. Above all, he was just with all the justice of Innocent III, almost pedantic in his respect for the rights of others, and an unfailing champion of peace. He could defend his own rights with all the vigour which he showed in defence of those of others; in a cause which he considered righteous he could be firm and even ruthless. He would

give up nothing which was justly his, but nothing would induce him to snatch what was not.

With all the dignity and firmness of an ideal Pope he had the personal bravery, the love of ceremony, the manly vigorous endowments which would have befitted the temporal ruler of the world. He had the clear mind of a lawyer, coupled with the zeal of a Crusader, his one fault was that with all his courage he was no strategist. Otherwise there have been few men in history more fitted to fill worthily a great and responsible position. For Louis had none of the daring or recklessness of genius; his was not in any sense an original mind, and he was in his outlook on affairs rather behind than before his age. Hence he earned all the prestige which belongs to men of great talent who possess in their fullest development the characteristics of their age, and in him the average man could see in a realized form what he himself desired to be. Thus where Innocent III had to force his European arbitration, Louis found his spontaneously sought. In a later phase of that quarrel in which Innocent III had, a generation earlier, alienated the national feeling of the English by his persistent intervention, Louis was invited to arbitrate between the baronial party and Henry III. And this is only a supreme instance of the power in Europe won by the mere respect of men for the personal qualities of Louis IX. The culmination of dignity and disinterestedness, of piety and strength of will, which men found in him, was to them the fulfilment of an ideal.

(2) His European prestige.

In fact, his very fitness for cosmopolitan authority made Louis perhaps something less than an ideal king. Like Edward I, he had the greatest respect for legal technicalities, but his use of them was different to that of the Englishman, whose motto was *Pactum serva*.

(3) His character as a King.

Edward belonged to that type of lawyer who is too prone to force the letter of the law into contradiction with the spirit. He was not above using a legal quibble to cloak an obvious violation of justice. Louis, on the other hand, was so tender of the rights of Henry III over Southern France that he missed a clear opportunity of ridding his country of the curse of divided rule. He was equally scrupulous in dealing with the rights of his barons as against himself. It may be maintained that no king has a right to follow his private conscience against the interests of his country. Such is at any rate the justification of Philip Augustus. Still, it is equally arguable that, after the unscrupulous aggression of Philip, the impartiality and justice of Louis was more valuable as a means of consolidating the realm than a more ambitious policy could have been. At any rate, no nation ever lost less by the rule of a saint than France by that of Louis. His two Crusades are the one serious blot on the record of his reign in France. The second called down a protest even from Joinville, and Louis's zeal, which put Pope and Emperor to shame, did little for France except to round off the character of her King as the complete mediaeval hero.

Louis was so pious in his private life, and so delighted in the company of the clergy, that he sometimes provoked protests from the upholders of that popular anticlericalism which found much support in mediaeval France. He was even taunted with being worse than a friar by outspoken members of the third estate. But it was the very absence of this piety which ruined the life of the Emperor Frederick II. For if Louis, in the whole-heartedness of his faith, belonged to the twelfth rather than to the thirteenth century, Frederick was an exaggerated expression of the most advanced tendencies of the age.

(4) Frederick II.

With the death of Innocent may be said to have come to an end the most characteristic period of the Middle Ages, in the restricted sense in which that term is used in this book. If the period of Renaissance be considered as mediaeval, as it sometimes is, and modern history be dated from the era of Luther and Charles V, it cannot be said that mediaeval civilization reached its apex in the early thirteenth century. The fourteenth century may, however, be taken as a dividing line between mediaeval history proper and the period of the Renaissance and the Reformation which lead on to modern history. If this plan be adopted, it would appear true to say that mediaeval civilization began to fall into decay as the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries developed, till with the Great Schism, the Hundred Years' War, and the failure of the Conciliar movement, it collapsed altogether. By 1450 there was little to remind one of the Europe of Innocent III, of St. Francis, of Philip Augustus, Richard I, and Henry VI.

Still, already in 1215 there were symptoms of the Europe of 1450, and it is these elements of revolution which are concentrated in Frederick II. He is mediaeval only in the sense in which the Renaissance itself is mediaeval. As emperor he should have been the guardian of the traditions of the age. As it was, he was the harbinger of their overthrow. It has been pointed out that in Napoleon Bonapartè reappeared some of the most dominant traits of the type of character developed in fifteenth-century Italy—he is a reincarnation of the Italian soldier of fortune. In something the same sense it is true that Frederick II in the thirteenth century is a premature development of that civilization which Napoleon carried with him into the nineteenth.

Like Napoleon, he was one of the few European

(5) His relation to his age.
(6) His genius.

statesmen who really deserve the title of genius. He was a diplomatist of modern methods and consummate skill. He was an administrator with that passion for efficiency, and that enlightened science, which makes the most ruthless tyranny a benefit to those whom it drills and protects. He knew the political value of religious persecution, and used it with a vigour worthy of the most zealous orthodoxy, from no other motive than reasons of state. He was himself a sceptic, with just that streak of vulgar superstition in his nature which inspired Napoleon with his ambition and ended by making him ridiculous. He had Napoleon's grasp of the value of education in the State, he founded a University, and surrounded himself with learned men.

(7) His
versatility.

On the other hand, Frederick, throughout his career, showed scarcely a trace of the concentration of purpose, the irresistible will to dominate mankind, which made Napoleon a terror to his generation. He was, in fact, dominated by just that side of life, as represented in Renaissance culture, to which Napoleon was absolutely blind. He was versatile with the versatility of a sympathetic nature, interested in anything and everything for its own sake. Not that he was a dilettante, for he became an expert in whatever he took in hand. He was deeply interested in astrology. He wrote a book on hawking and the care of hawks which long remained the chief authority on the subject. He was a profound student of Aristotle, and had the *De Anima* translated for him by the Scotchman, Michael Scot. He was versed, too, in the Arabic and Moorish commentators on Aristotle by whom Aristotle's philosophy had been developed into a pantheistic form of belief which tried to reconcile the religions of East and West. He was influenced by the mysticism which had developed in

Italy into a belief in the coming Religion of the Holy Ghost, prophesied in the precedent century by the Abbot Joachim da Flore, and reflected to some degree in the life of St. Francis. Sicily, which was admirably suited by geographical position to be the meeting-place of East and West, became under Frederick, even more than under his Norman predecessors, the home of all the restless and extravagant speculations developed by the clash of two civilizations. As the orthodoxy of the Church grew more and more rigid, and the philosophy of scholasticism more and more stereotyped, so the beliefs and theories of the unorthodox became more daring and more complex. In Frederick they found a leader whose mind was daring and complex enough to include them all. Not that speculation and mysticism filled the Emperor's life. He was himself a graceful and original lyric poet and the founder of a school of Italian vernacular poetry which prepared the way for Dante. It was thanks largely to him that Sicily became the home of a literature worthy to compare with that of the *Langue d'oc*.

Frederick's versatility, then, meant the power of adapt-
 ing himself to whatever seemed of interest to him; that
 of Napoleon, the power of adapting to his own central
 purpose whatever he touched. The adaptability of the
 one was as Italian as the assimilating power of the other.
 It is this adaptability, too, which distinguishes Frederick
 so sharply from the other men of his age. Those charac-
 teristic figures whom we have noted in the preceding 150
 years are all men of that simplicity and straightfor-
 wardness of character which is to be expected in a young
 civilization. The ambition of Bohemund, the religion of
 St. Bernard, the imperialism of Frederick Barbarossa,
 the papalism of Innocent III ruled their lives and mono-

(8) The
 contrast
 with his
 prede-
 cessors.

polized their interest. The same unity of purpose and character reappears in St. Louis. Hitherto, since the fall of the Roman Empire, only a few scholars had shown a trace of that passionate interest in all forms of human activity which in Frederick astonished and terrified his contemporaries. They could not understand how a man could be a religious persecutor and himself maintain a harem, how an Emperor could encourage free thought, and threaten to found a new religion with himself as its Mohammed. †Frederick was too full of life and genius to be consistent or single-minded. /

(9) His
grasp.

Thus it was St. Louis, with his sublimely commonplace character, his intense pre-occupation with his duty as a Christian, who was the real heir to the European authority of the Emperor. Yet Frederick, if he outraged its public opinion, understood his age far better than Louis. His Sicilian government showed just that constructive genius which Louis lacked. His conduct of his Crusade was a masterpiece of diplomacy, where Louis's campaign was nothing but a failure in generalship. In his conflict with the Papacy he went to the root of the question with a logical completeness to which no other Emperor had attained. He was always resourceful, unscrupulous, and clever, with the sure instinct of one who thoroughly grasps the situation. Unfortunately, however, the situation which he had to face was complex enough to require all his versatility and difficult enough to need more concentration of effort to meet it than he was capable of giving.

III. FREDERICK II AND GERMANY

(1) Temper
of Ger-
many.

It was in Germany that Frederick had to meet the most difficult of all his problems. Ever since the contest of Pope and Emperor had begun, the position of the

Emperor had depended, more than anything else, upon his hold on Germany. The Popes had long been able to count upon the support of a party in Germany. The Saxon revolts which had so hampered the Salian Emperors had their root in the national feeling of Saxony, but they were fomented by the Pope. Under the Hohenstaufen their place was taken by the insubordination of the Guelphs, also favoured by Papal policy. But the real feeling of Germany was more with the Emperor than with the Pope, if it was more with local separation than with the Emperor. We have seen what feeling the intervention of Innocent had aroused among both people and princes. The Pope might do what he liked to foment local insurrections, especially in Northern Germany, but if he tried to substitute his own authority for that of the Emperor, to curtail the elective rights of the electoral princes or of the German episcopate, he found little support. Since the death of Henry VI, however, the Emperor had become almost as powerless. Otto bidding against Philip, and Frederick against Otto for German support, had given the princes every chance to take advantage of the Imperial schism. Even before the death of Henry causes had been at work to undermine the strong position of Frederick—the Hohenstaufen were becoming more and more involved in Italian politics, and Germany was growing contemptuous of her absentee emperor. Frederick, King of Sicily since 1198—the fourth year of his age—was even more Italian than his father had been. How could Frederick secure the loyalty of Germany, if, as was virtually a certainty from the beginning, he, too, became involved in a quarrel with the Pope?

Frederick only visited Germany three times. But he ⁽²⁾ Frederick in Germany. thoroughly understood the situation of the country, and, present or absent, was vigorous in the assertion of his

Imperial claims. At the end of his first visit, which saw the discomfiture of Otto IV, he was crowned with due solemnity at Aachen. In 1220 his son Henry was elected King of the Romans. His second visit, in 1235, was marked by what has been called 'the most important legislative monument bequeathed by the Hohenstaufen Emperors to Germany'—the Peace of Mainz. This was a continuation of Frederick Barbarossa's work in unifying and enforcing the local Landpeaces. But it was far more ambitious in scope than the legislation of Barbarossa. Frederick II, who was a born legislator, definitely states that his object is to supplement the unwritten customs of the Germans by a series of Imperial decrees. These ordain penalties for certain offences in accordance with the rules of Roman law, threaten the wielders of ecclesiastical jurisdiction with imperial penalties for misconduct, lay down general rules for the good conduct of lay justice, and include a number of minute regulations for the police of the public roads. It is a most impressive and comprehensive document.

(3) Frederick and Austria.

Even more impressive was Frederick's third visit. The house of Babenberg, one of whom had had the good fortune to capture Richard Cœur de Lion, had long ruled as independent sovereigns in the Austrian territory which they steadily extended down the Danube. Leopold VI became the father-in-law of Frederick's eldest son Henry, and was universally respected as a pious ruler and a patron of learning. A lamentable contrast was his successor, Frederick the Quarrelsome, who lived in a welter of conflicts with all his neighbours and his subjects. He soon roused against him a formidable mass of opposition. Here was an opportunity for the Emperor Frederick to emulate his grandfather's dealings with Henry the Lion. In 1236 he again crossed

the Alps, entered Austria, and, in a vigorous campaign, completely discomfited Frederick the Quarrelsome, occupied Vienna, and enforced the Imperial authority in the archduchy. In the winter of 1237 he held a great court at Vienna and published a series of decrees to hold good in the duchy. It was a most effective demonstration of Imperial rights over one of the most independent of the great principalities.

So much for Frederick's three visits. At least they (4) Slightness of Frederick's influence. prove that he realized the possibilities of his Imperial position. But there is another side to Frederick's reign in his northern kingdom. What happened in Germany during the many years of his absence? Briefly it may be said that only that happened in which the princes acquiesced. Take the Emperor's work during his visits. The fruits of the last were very soon lost. Frederick the Quarrelsome recaptured Vienna, calmly disregarded the Emperor's decrees, and within three years was as strong and as quarrelsome as ever. And so he remained till his death in 1246. Again, the Imperial legislation of 1235, for all its impressive and comprehensive character, remained a dead letter. The greatest legislator of his age left no mark on the law of Germany, for it remained after him as it had been before, scarcely affected by the influence of Roman law. It was during Frederick's reign that Eike von Reppgau, the Gratian of Northern Germany, wrote a textbook of North German law, the 'Sachsenspiegel', which soon became regarded as authoritative. It bears no trace of Frederick's influence; in many points its rules run counter to the Emperor's law, but it was incomparably more influential in Germany than the work of the great lawmaker.

Again, the coronation of Henry as King of the (5) Henry VII. Romans had the most unfortunate results. Great con-

cessions were made to the electors to persuade them to do what was vehemently resisted by the Pope. For a time, however, all went well. Engelbert, the wise Archbishop of Cologne, who acted in some degree as Frederick's representative, continued to keep a certain amount of order. But in 1225 he was murdered, and Germany was left without a guiding hand. Henry soon showed himself not only rash but disloyal to his father. By way of making a party he took up a policy for which there was indeed much to be said. He made himself the patron and protector of the German towns. Frederick, already involved in difficulties with the Italian communes, was by no means disposed to endorse his son's action. In 1231 Louis of Bavaria was assassinated and much feeling was roused against the Emperor, who was charged with instigating the crime. Henry appeared among the malcontents, and Frederick determined, at a single stroke, to checkmate his son and conciliate the real rulers of Germany—the princes. As a result, the year 1231 saw a series of Imperial decrees which are the most conspicuous indication of the real trend of Frederick's German policy. The Emperor did not hesitate to sacrifice the towns. All leagues between cities were forbidden. All elected magistrates were declared deposed. All communes were dissolved. Frederick seemed determined to have done with municipal independence both in Germany and Italy. The towns were ordered to hand back to the princes all the territory which they had won from them.

(6) Frederick sacrifices the towns.

(7) He capitulates to the Princes.

By a special statute, the famous 'Statutum in favorem principum', Frederick may truly be said to have 'legalized anarchy'. He explicitly guaranteed to the princes undisturbed enjoyment of all their rights and privileges, gave up all attempt at Imperial control over

their territories, and promised no more to receive the men of the great feudatories into the royal towns. Nor was this an isolated instance in Frederick's reign. Again and again he gave away the rights of the Emperor over Germany. This series of concessions was moreover the one side of Frederick's policy which was really effective. In one sense he was doing little more than recognizing the accomplished fact—making a virtue of necessity. Still, by the openness of the recognition, Frederick sacrificed Imperial prestige and prepared the way for the final break-up of the German kingdom after his death. It is probable that he did not mean his concessions to be permanent—that he was only endeavouring to gain time for a great effort to recover the Imperial position in Germany. But the opportunity for such an effort never came and the concessions remained to show the powerlessness of Frederick. The ablest of the Emperors did less than nothing for the home of his race.

Yet the period was at once a crisis and a great opportunity in German history. To the West, indeed, there was no danger, in spite of complete powerlessness, for Louis IX made no attempt to take advantage of German anarchy to recover that influence in the valley of the Rhone which Frederick Barbarossa had captured by his marriage to the heiress of Burgundy. Here was another instance of the moderation of the King of France. To the North and to the East, on the other hand, Germany was threatened by grave perils. In 1214, Frederick, once again sacrificing German interests, had handed over Nordalbingia and Lübeck to Waldemar of Denmark. There seemed a prospect that the hold of the Baltic, which Henry the Lion had won, would be lost to a very unstable ally. Fortunately, however, Waldemar was captured by Count Henry of Schwerin. He was driven

(8) Ger-
man ex-
pansion.

to promise the abandonment of all he had obtained from Frederick, and, after repudiating the terms, was finally severely defeated in battle in 1227. Thus North Germany recovered by her own efforts what her Emperor had given away. Her princes were ready to take full advantage of the opportunity they had made. The Margraves of Brandenburg got an Imperial grant of suzerainty over Pomerania, and made a reality of their power up to the River Oder by a persistent policy of eastward expansion. Further south it was the Teutonic Knights who took advantage of the weakness of the Slavonic peoples. Already, in 1200, the Knights of the Sword had been established there by Bishop Albert of Riga, but they were unable to make head against the Prussians, and had to appeal for help. They were fortunate enough to get the support of the Teutonic Order, which had been founded in 1128 to work, like the Templars and Hospitallers, in defence of the Holy Land. Early in the thirteenth century the then Grand Master, Hermann of Salza, had come to the conclusion that there was nothing more to be done for the defence of Syria, and began to look out for another sphere of activity. By 1230 he had settled down on the Prussian frontier and joined forces with the Knights of the Sword.

(9) The
Teutonic
Knights.

Hermann of Salza was, perhaps, next to St. Louis, the most influential man of his day. He did his best to reconcile Henry to his father, Frederick II. He arranged the terms of Waldemar's capitulations to Henry of Schwerin. Such was the respect for his character that he was in request all over the Empire as a mediator. His Order obtained from both Emperor and Pope authorization to conquer and hold all the territory they could from the Prussians. They were supported by the Poles, and, despite their small numbers, pushed slowly

forward, converting or slaughtering the Prussians, and colonizing their country. The King of Bohemia gave them assistance to the south. Along the whole eastern frontier the work of German expansion went forward with an irresistible impulse. Never had there been a more homogeneous effort.

In 1241 all this activity was threatened with terrible disaster. For the moment it seemed likely that Germans and Slavs would together be overwhelmed by a Mongol invasion. Never has Western civilization been in greater peril. The empire founded by Zenghis Khan, the Mongol conqueror, had already subdued China, when, in 1217, he turned towards the West. In a marvellous career of victory he swept across Asia; before his death, in 1227, a flying force of Mongols had traversed Russia, and already threatened the West. Zenghis Khan's death brought a respite, but in 1241 the invaders pressed forward again. This time they reached the shores of the Adriatic, and seemed likely to overwhelm Western Europe, as they had Russia, which now ceased for many centuries to be a European state. Only in one quarter did they meet with any effective resistance. The Teutonic Knights were defeated, but the newly converted Poles were able to check for the moment their advance. Whether they could have done more was never tested, for their leader was recalled by a dynastic question; he returned to the East, and his troops ceased to advance. By 1245 the danger was over.

Its chief result, east of the Oder, was, in fact, to give another proof of the impotence of both Pope and Emperor. Both could not fail to realize the crisis; neither did anything, except on paper, to meet it. Frederick drew up military instructions for repelling the invasion, and the Pope made diplomatic advances to

(10) The
Mongol
Invasion.

(11) Atti-
tude of
Pope and
Emperor.

the Mongols. Otherwise, both were too deeply absorbed in the conflict which was tearing Italy to pieces to do more than leave Germany to save herself.

Little as Frederick did to defend his position in Germany, he had still some influence left for the Papacy to undermine. In 1245 Innocent IV declared the Emperor excommunicated, and deposed. This, like the earlier action of Innocent III in opposing Philip of Swabia, was an interference with the rights of the electors. They made a strong protest. Still, it could not be denied that the deposition gave a convenient opening for that most efficacious of all the sources of anarchy and Imperial schism. Next year three electors, all churchmen, chose Henry Raspe of Thuringia as anti-Caesar. On his death in 1247 William of Holland was elected. Frederick's policy of concession and bribery had clearly done nothing but foment that desire of the princes for anarchy, as a safeguard of independence, which was to retard for centuries the political progress of Germany. The succession of Conrad IV in 1250 did nothing to improve matters; his death in 1254 prepared the way for the Interregnum of seventeen years, during which there was no one who could boast even the name of Emperor.

(12) Anti-Imperial influence of the Pope.

IV. FREDERICK II AND ITALY

It was in Italy that Frederick showed the true Napoleonic quality of his genius. From the death of Innocent III in 1216 dates the beginning of his effective rule in the Peninsula. Italy still contained as of old three main divisions: the municipal North, the Papal Centre, and the monarchical South. In the North the independence of the Communes was menaced by the

(1) The situation in Italy.

ambition of powerful tyrants like the house of Este who ruled a large district round the city of Ferrara. In the Centre, the Pope had still to fear the turbulence of the city of Rome. In the South, ever since the death of Henry VI, anarchy had been supreme, and the noble houses and the rebellious and marauding Saracens between them were tearing the ancient Norman kingdom to pieces. The one great change in the situation since the preceding century was the fact that the Emperor was now established in Sicily. Here was indeed a revolution. Innocent had done all he could to prevent the union of the Empire and the southern kingdom, and Frederick had solemnly promised to resign it to his son. Instead, as we have seen, he made Henry his deputy in Germany and gave himself up heart and soul to the conquest of Italy.

Italian history during the period 1215-54 falls naturally in three periods. The first is covered by the Pontificate of Honorius III 1216-27, the second by that of Gregory IX 1227-41. The third includes the eighteen days' pontificate of Celestine IV, the twenty months' vacancy which followed his death, and the pontificate of Innocent IV 1243-54.

The first period was the most peaceful of Frederick's life. Honorius III was a mild and learned man who had been Frederick's tutor, and the Emperor found it easy to keep on friendly terms with him. In 1220 Frederick was crowned at Rome with a rare lack of the usual turbulence, and here he contrived to persuade Honorius to consent that he should keep the kingdom of Sicily during his lifetime. He gave large privileges to the Inquisition and to the jurisdiction of the Church Courts. The eternal question of the Crusade threatened to cause trouble, and he was threatened with the now vulgar

(2) Honorius III.

penalty of excommunication for not leaving Italy a prey to anarchy and embarking for the Holy Land. Instead, however, on the death of his first wife, he married in 1225 Iolanthe, the heiress of Jerusalem, and assumed the title of King of Jerusalem. He also supported Hermann of Salza in preaching the Crusade in Germany.

(3) Suc-
cesses of
Frederick

Meanwhile, he was making good use of his time. Between 1220 and 1225 he was able to reduce the independent Saracens in the west of Sicily, which kept the kingdom in continual disorder. Instead of exterminating them, he carried them off to the mainland and established them in a colony at Lucera. He was afterwards to find them of the greatest use as a military power. It was as simple and effective a manœuvre as the formation of the Highland regiments by the British Government in the eighteenth century, though the Emperor's patronage of his colonists scandalized public opinion. Measures were also undertaken against the baronage. In 1224 Frederick went on to attempt to restore order in Northern Italy. He marched north with a Sicilian force. The cities took alarm and renewed the Lombard League, while the Pope complained that Frederick, who had exacted military service from Papal territory, was guilty of ingratitude. Frederick saw that war was impossible. Reinforcements from Germany found the passes barred; there was nothing to be done but to make the Pope the mediator between the Emperor and the rebellious cities. Peace was restored the same year. But when Honorius died in 1227 there were plenty of open questions between Pope and Emperor: it was clear that the Papacy and the Lombard League were again drawing closer together against an Emperor who preferred attempts to subdue Italy to fulfilling his vow as a Crusader.

The next fourteen years are extraordinarily full of activity and incident—Frederick's Crusade, his reorganization of Sicily, the establishment of an ordered administration for all Italy, his defeat of the Lombard League, his three excommunications by the Pope. With Gregory IX's accession, the quarrel, now obviously inevitable, between Emperor and Pope, broke out with unnecessary violence, thanks to the Pope's uncompromising character. Gregory was determined not to be fooled as Honorius had been. He drove Frederick into actually starting for the Crusade from Brindisi. But the Emperor fell ill after a day or two at sea and came back. He was promptly excommunicated. Frederick, to put the Papacy in the wrong, determined at last to become a Crusader. By September, 1228, he was in the Holy Land. The Pope, to meet this clever piece of tactics, had renewed the excommunication. But he could not prevent Frederick from posing as the bulwark of Christendom, betrayed by the Head of the Church. It was a situation which the Emperor thoroughly appreciated. Already he had promoted a rising in Rome which had driven Gregory a fugitive from the city. If the Emperor must be a Crusader, there was something to be said for this method of conducting the Holy War.

Frederick was equally unconventional in Palestine. He was absolutely without the intolerance of the orthodox mediaeval Christian. The situation in Syria had never been handled by one so fitted to make the most of its diplomatic possibilities. Backed by Hermann of Salza (who had not yet transferred his order to Prussia) and a substantial force, he was able to make a treaty with Malek-el-Kamel, the sultan of Cairo, which conceded to the Christians the possession of Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Nazareth, and the necessary communications with the sea-coast. A campaign could not possibly have

(4) Gregory IX.

(5) Frederick's Crusade.

produced a more advantageous settlement, but though Hermann of Salza declared himself satisfied, the Papal party utterly repudiated the acts of a Crusader who was excommunicated and did not fight. Frederick, however, crowned himself as King in Jerusalem, and, exasperated by the refusal of the Templars to accept his settlement, attacked the Order. Meanwhile he wrote in conciliatory style to the Pope. Eventually, in 1231, Gregory was driven to accept the achievements of Frederick, and to order the treaty to be respected. His successor was less wise, hostilities were renewed with Egypt, and by 1244 Jerusalem was again lost.

(6) Peace
with the
Pope.

Meanwhile the Pope played the part of Philip Augustus during Richard Cœur de Lion's Crusade. All Italy was stirred up against Frederick, and his Sicilian work undone. His troops invaded Ancona, and in return a Papal army, backed by the turbulent nobles, invaded Southern Italy. Frederick came back, drove out the Papalists, and in 1230, by the mediation of Hermann of Salza, made peace with the Pope. He was relieved of excommunication, many good words were exchanged, and once again the two powers prepared to make the experiment of dwelling together in unity. As a result, Frederick found himself for the next six years more or less free to organize in Italy. In 1231 he issued the famous Constitutions of Melfi, which are the most important landmark in his Sicilian government.

(7) The
Reorgani-
zation of
Sicily.

The kingdom of Sicily, where was Frederick's birth-place, was at once his favourite home and the scene of the one piece of constructive statesmanship which circumstances allowed him to create. We have seen how Roger II had made his kingdom the best-organized state of the day, had established toleration and vigorously maintained the control of the State over the Church.

But Roger, like Henry I of England, had been succeeded by a period of political dissolution. Sicily was waiting for her Henry II. But Frederick aimed higher than Henry of Anjou. In the Middle Ages there was no more complete scheme of government than that which he propounded for Sicily. He was one of the few mediæval rulers who put his heart as well as his head into the work of government. He loved his Sicilian kingdom and was determined to make it a model state. With this in view he was not content with legislation and administrative reforms. Science, he said, should go hand in hand with laws and arms. Hence the foundation of the University of Naples and of the famous medical school of Salerno. Hence too, in part, the formation of a brilliant intellectual circle at the Imperial court at Palermo. Hence the encouragement of Sicilian verse.

The Sicilian government was to be a pure autocracy. Frederick allowed elected assemblies to meet on occasion. Nor could he do away entirely with the customary law which the Normans and other settlers had brought with them. But he so strengthened and organized the central government and created so efficient a central court that he was able to eradicate altogether baronial, ecclesiastical, and municipal independence, and to create a unified state. In 1232 a group of cities rebelled against his refusal to allow them any more than the right to send delegates to an occasional assembly, and to elect notables to advise the *podesta*—always an Imperial appointment. The nobles, too, refused to submit to the loss of their freedom—they were deprived of their private jurisdictions and even of their right to bear arms. Both movements were crushed. Frederick was equally severe with the Church, gifts of land were forbidden, nearly all the jurisdiction over laymen was taken away—the clergy were

taxed. By his legislation Frederick remodelled the penal code, and put its enforcement into the hands of a hierarchy of expert judges, at the head of which was the royal Court. Procedure was carefully regulated—ordeal and trial by battle were forbidden as unjust and absurd.

(8) The
Conquest
and
Organi-
zation of
Italy.

In Sicily Frederick's work was greatly facilitated by that of his Norman predecessors. When he attempted to extend the same principles of order, enlightenment, and centralization to the rest of Italy, he found innumerable difficulties in the way. He had first to conquer the kingdom. He had no sooner created order in Sicily than he turned to the North. Between 1232 and 1238 he was busy, amongst other things, with Italian wars. Like Frederick Barbarossa, he found allies among the factions of Northern Italy. The house of Este was Guelph in sympathy, and no help could be expected from it. But the great power and wealth of its head Azzo, roused bitter jealousy among the lesser nobility of the North-East. Among these was the house of Romano, a town near Verona, whose head Eccelin began life as a member of the Lombard League. He soon, however, discovered that there was little hope of advancement there, so he offered his support to the Emperor. In 1232 Eccelin da Romano stirred up the citizens of Verona to desert the League and join the Emperor. This gave Frederick a lever by which at once to subdue Lombardy and cut off his Italian from his German enemies, for Verona controlled the important pass over the Brenner. Thus he was able to crush his son Henry in 1235 and gradually to reduce the members of the League. In 1237, after capturing a string of individual cities, he met the Milanese at Cortenuova. The result was a splendid victory, wiping out the disgrace of Legnano and making the reduction of the whole North only the matter of

another campaign. By 1239 Frederick was able to begin to organize his conquests. His methods were not those of Henry VI. His father had relied on Germans, like Markwald of Anweiler, to hold down Italy. Frederick determined to govern it not from the North, but from the South. It was now that the results of a Sicilian Emperor's accession were seen. Frederick had Sicily and Southern Italy well in hand. He therefore used Sicilian and Apulian *podestas*, judges, and vicars to knit together Northern Italy under him. Out of his Sicilian court of justice he made an Imperial court for all Italy which travelled with the Emperor over his dominions. There was no bar of language, and no real bar of race between governors and governed, and Frederick might well hope that the work he had done in Sicily would soon spread over the whole peninsula. In one respect Frederick followed his father, who had used his brothers Philip and Conrad as Frederick used his sons, Enzo, who was made legate of all Italy and put at the head of the whole hierarchy of Italian administration, and Frederick and Richard, supreme in Tuscany and Romagna respectively. But Frederick's sons were as Italian as he was himself.

There was but one flaw in the whole scheme—peace was impossible. The inveterate hostility of the Pope and his partisans kept Italy in perpetual war and made Frederick's rule in Sicily a grinding and extortionate tyranny. In 1239 Frederick was once again excommunicated. It was Gregory's only hope of saving the States of the Church. Hermann of Salza was dead, and the Pope, now well over eighty years old, was left face to face with the ablest of the Emperors. Now began the final contest between the Papacy and the Hohenstaufen Empire. Innocent III, the creator of the Papal States,

(9) Papal hostility.

had left his successors pledged to defend to the last the territorial heritage of the Papacy in Italy. Frederick Barbarossa, who had married his son to the heiress of Sicily, had made the German Hohenstaufen into a race which regarded Italy as its home, and which was ready to pledge all its resources to unite Italy into a kingdom. No retirements across the Alps diverted the Emperor's attention and gave the Papacy a breathing-space. It was a hand-to-hand contest which could leave but one survivor.

Both sides tried to draw all Europe into the *mêlée*. Gregory did all he could to detach Germany from Frederick, but Frederick's government was still too strong. The Pope then offered the Empire to Louis IX's brother, Robert of Artois. Louis, with his usual good sense, refused to intervene. Frederick wrote to the sovereigns of Europe pointing out that his cause was theirs. It is significant that he created no anti-pope to oppose Gregory. It was the office of the Pope, the whole position of the Church which he was attacking. The Pope stood for a Church which claimed to be above the State. Let there then be no Pope at all!

(10) The
Battle of
Meloria.

Into the thick of the struggle came the thunderbolt of the Mongol invasion of 1241. It scarcely gave a respite. In the same year the Sicilian fleet captured twenty-two Genoese vessels at Meloria. The Genoese were in the act of conveying to Rome a large number of bishops and cardinals from all over Europe, summoned by Gregory to assist at a solemn condemnation of Frederick. The Emperor could not but regard this as a windfall, and in spite of a protest from St. Louis, kept them all imprisoned. Still he had not been able to prevent Gregory's return to Rome after twelve years' exile. All over Italy friars and other wandering preachers stirred up public opinion

against the infidel Emperor. Then, at last, towards the end of 1241, Gregory IX died.

This brought a short interlude, for the next Pope was no sooner elected than he died, and it was some time before his successor was chosen. When at last Cardinal Fieschi became Pope as Innocent IV, it seemed indeed as if Frederick II might hope for a reconciliation with the Papacy, for Fieschi had been known as a great jurist who was disposed to be friendly towards Imperial claims. Frederick, however, seems to have seen that this would not be likely to change the trend of Papal policy, and he is reported to have said, when he heard of the election, that he had lost a good friend, for no Pope could be a Ghibelline. Indeed, Innocent IV, like Otto IV on the other side, was to illustrate how thoroughly the Papal and Imperial contest had become a matter of principle. Innocent IV was in many ways akin in his position and his record to Innocent III. He, too, was an Italian nobleman and a great lawyer. But Innocent IV partook to the full of the bitterness which had now found its way into the Papal campaign against the Empire, and was to show himself far more ruthless and unscrupulous than his predecessor. It is under Innocent IV that the financial and political needs of the Papacy led to wholesale extortion and to the exploitation of papal revenues to an extent which was gravely disapproved by the greatest Catholic minds of the day.

Various attempts were made in 1243 and 1244 to arrange terms between Innocent and Frederick. But the Emperor, though he first accepted the terms of the Pope, continued an attempt to get a footing in Rome, and actually conferred investiture on the Prefect of the City—a rite which had been confirmed to the Pope by Innocent III. In 1244 Innocent IV fled to Genoa, his

native city, where he could count on the protection of the Genoese fleet. Here Innocent showed his superiority as a tactician to Gregory IX, for instead of overwhelming the Emperor with inflamed denunciations, he took up the attitude of a martyr to the violence of Frederick. In 1245 he went on to Lyons.

(12) The
Council
of Lyons,
1245.

Here Innocent determined to take the most extreme course. He summoned a great council to meet at Lyons, and there excommunicated the Emperor and declared him deposed. Not content with this, he stirred up Germany to choose an anti-Caesar, Henry Raspe, and finally declared a Crusade against the heretical Emperor. Innocent, in fact, had determined on the actual extermination of the house of Hohenstaufen, which, under its unorthodox head, represented an attempt to exterminate the Papacy.

Thus in the last ten years of our period we have to watch what is really the suicide of the Mediaeval Polity. Pope and Emperor had often quarrelled before, but it had always been for the predominance of one power over the other, not for the destruction of each other. The year of the Council of Lyons was also the year of St. Louis's departure on his ill-fated Crusade, and it is significant that the most violent phase of the contest developed in the absence from Europe of the sage mediator who had already rebuked the Pope for his violence.

Frederick was as ready as Innocent to go to extremes. Italy became during the last five years of his life the scene of a hideous conflict. Frederick's lieutenant, Eccelin da Romano, carried on the war in the North with a ruthless barbarity which has given him so terrible a reputation in history. Frederick in the South was threatened with a Sicilian rebellion fomented by Inno-

cent, but a fortunate campaign crushed the movement almost at once. In 1247, however, Parma deserted to the Pope, and Frederick hurried north to recover it. He settled down to a regular siege, and actually built another city which he called Vittoria, by means of which to invest Parma. But the Parmesans, after a long siege, made a sortie, burnt Vittoria, and utterly routed the forces of the Emperor. Even his crown was captured. This was really the death-blow to Frederick's cause. The Emperor became more and more extravagant in his acts and in his pretensions. He at last became suspicious even of his most trusted councillor, Peter de la Vigne. Peter was accused of treachery, blinded, and driven to suicide.

Even more extravagant was Frederick's attempt to shatter the Pope by attacking Christianity. He had long ago said, in almost the same words as those to be used by Napoleon, that Asia was happy in that her rulers had not to fear the intrigues of popes. He envied the Mohammedan Caliphs their control over Church and State, he encouraged his followers to grant him the semi-divine honours of the Roman Emperor of old. He proclaimed his birthplace Jesi sacred, and allowed it to be said that Peter de la Vigne was the Rock on which the Imperial Church was founded. Little could be hoped from such revolutionary proceedings as this.

In 1249 the Bolognese defeated Enzo in battle and captured him. Frederick hurried north to the rescue of the Legate of all Italy. But he was to remain a prisoner till his death in 1272, for on December 13, 1250, Frederick II himself died. With him went the last hope of Hohenstaufen domination in Italy. Conrad IV, his son who succeeded him, had already done good work in Germany, where he maintained the Imperial cause by

(13) Frederick's extravagances.

(14) Death of Frederick.

(15) Conrad IV.

abandoning the Imperial policy and patronizing the towns. Manfred, Frederick's bastard son, continued to rule Italy, and there seemed a flicker of hope that the Ghibellines might hold their ground. But Conrad first quarrelled with his half-brother, and then died, still only twenty-six years old. Twelve years later Manfred was slain in battle with the new Papal ally, Charles of Anjou, brother of Louis IX. Finally, in 1268, Conradin, the young son of Conrad IV, was captured after an attempt at a rising and beheaded by order of Charles of Anjou. This was the end of the house of Hohenstaufen. It was the end, too, of the most determined effort to realize that imperialism which was the inspiration of mediæval thought, political and religious. The fruits of the Papal victory went not to the Papacy, but to France, and before the century came to an end the Papacy had been compelled to transfer its seat to Avignon, to leave Italy to anarchy, and to become the tool of French policy.

The period, then, which begins with that great act of United Christendom, the First Crusade, ends with the collapse of the pillars of the mediæval polity. Nevertheless it is not a period of retrogression, but of steady and rapid progress. It is a great mistake to regard the Middle Ages as an era when Europe stood still. We have perhaps seen enough of them to realize that the social and political reconstruction of Europe proceeded during their course at least as rapidly as did that development of the Gothic from the Romanesque style of architecture, which was itself one of the strongest testimonies to the progress of the age. St. Bernard, Frederick Barbarossa, and Innocent III did not live in vain, though the causes for which they fought waned with the period to which they belonged. The result of the struggle of

Empire and Papacy was not only to prevent the unification of Italy and Germany. For, like all struggles for a worthy ideal, it raised the tone of morality, strengthened men's convictions and enlarged their minds. Europe in 1254 was incomparably more civilized and advanced than Europe in 1095. The study of law which arose out of the Papal-Imperial conflict, the impetus to learning, self-devotion, and social work given by the religious revivals, the heightened standard of living due to the expansion of commerce and the development of town life—these are but a few of the elements of progress evolved by the age. From the rough barbarism of the First Crusade to the scientific statesmanship of Frederick II is a long step forward in the direction of a Europe in which more than the smallest minority of mankind could live worthily and independently.

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

I. PERIOD OF FIRST CRUSADE, 1095-1122

DATE		
1095	Urban II holds Council of Clermont	<i>France</i>
	Alexius II asks help from the West	<i>East</i>
1097	Foundation of Edessa	<i>East</i>
1098	Siege of Antioch	<i>East</i>
1099	Fall of Jerusalem	<i>East</i>
1100	Death of William Rufus	<i>England</i>
	Accession of Louis VI	<i>France</i>
1104	Henry IV's son Henry rebels	<i>Germany</i>
	Alfonso I, King of Aragon	<i>Spain</i>
1106	Battle of Tenchebrai	<i>England</i>
1107	Alexius defeats Bohemund	<i>East</i>
1111	Paschal grants, and in 1112 repudiates, the 'privilegium' to Henry V	<i>Italy</i>
1113	Treaty between Louis VI and Henry I	<i>France</i>
1114	Matilda of England marries Emperor Henry V	<i>England</i>
	Death of Countess Matilda	<i>Italy</i>
1115	Henry beaten at Wolfeshohe by Saxons	<i>Germany</i>
1116	William Clito first attempts to get Normandy	<i>England</i>
1118	Accession of Emperor John II	<i>East</i>
	Order of Templars founded	<i>Spain</i>
1119	Henry I beats Louis VI at Brémule	<i>France</i>
1120	Sailing of White Ship	<i>England</i>

II. PERIOD OF ST. BERNARD, 1122-1153

1122	Concordat of Worms	<i>Germany</i>
1124	Threat of invasion from Henry V, the Emperor	<i>France</i>
1125	Death of Henry V. Accession of Lothair	<i>Germany</i>
1127	Roger of Sicily becomes Duke of Apulia	<i>Italy</i>

DATE

1130	Outbreak of Papal Schism	<i>Italy</i>
	Louis VI recognizes Innocent II	<i>France</i>
1132	First visit of Lothair	<i>Italy</i>
1134	Conrad and Frederick of Hohenstaufen submit	<i>Germany</i>
	Death of Alfonso the 'Battler'	<i>Spain</i>
1135	Death of Henry I	<i>England</i>
1136	Second visit of Lothair	<i>Italy</i>
1137	Death of Lothair	<i>Germany</i>
	Marriage and succession of Louis VII	<i>France</i>
1138	Albert the Bear given Saxony	<i>Germany</i>
	Roger II occupies Naples	<i>Italy</i>
	St. Bernard attacks Abélard	<i>France</i>
1142	Henry the Lion recovers Saxony	<i>Germany</i>
	Louis quarrels with Theobald of Champagne	<i>France</i>
1143	Accession of Manuel	<i>East</i>
1146	Conrad III goes on Crusade	<i>Germany</i>
1147	Louis VII goes on Crusade	<i>France</i>
	The Second Crusade	<i>East</i>
1150	Albert the Bear obtains Brandenburg	<i>Germany</i>
1152	Death of Conrad III	<i>Germany</i>
	Death of Suger	<i>France</i>
1153	Death of Eugenius III	<i>Italy</i>
	Death of St. Bernard	<i>France</i>
1154	Death of Stephen	<i>England</i>
	Death of Roger II	<i>Italy</i>

III. PERIOD OF FREDERICK BARBAROSSA, 1153-1190

1152	Accession of Frederick Barbarossa	<i>Germany</i>
1153	Accession of Adrian IV	<i>Italy</i>
1154	Accession of Henry II	<i>England</i>
	Accession of William the Bad, of Sicily	<i>Italy</i>
1155	Frederick leaves for Italy	<i>Germany</i>
	Death of Arnold of Brescia	<i>Italy</i>
1156	Austria made a Duchy	<i>Germany</i>
1157	Diet of Besançon	<i>Germany</i>
1158	Henry of England attacks Toulouse	<i>France</i>
1159	Election of Alexander III	<i>Italy</i>
1162	Destruction of Milan	<i>Italy</i>

DATE

1167	Formation of Lombard League	<i>Italy</i>
1168	Henry the Lion marries daughter of Henry of England. Frederick mediates between Albert and Henry	<i>Germany</i>
	Foundation of Alessandria	<i>Italy</i>
1170	Death of Albert the Bear	<i>Germany</i>
1171	Geoffrey of Anjou secures Brittany	<i>France</i>
1172	Accession of Saladin	<i>East</i>
1173	Louis heads rebellion against Henry of Eng- land	<i>France</i>
1176	Refusal of Henry the Lion to go to Italy	<i>Germany</i>
	Battle of Legnano	<i>Italy</i>
1180	Accession of Philip Augustus	<i>France</i>
	Death of Manuel	<i>East</i>
1181	Submission of Henry the Lion	<i>Germany</i>
	Death of Alexander III	<i>Italy</i>
1183	Peace of Constance	<i>Italy</i>
	Murder of Alexius II	<i>East</i>
1185	Overthrow of Andronicus I	<i>East</i>
1186	Frederick's son Henry married Constance of Sicily	<i>Italy</i>
1187	Saladin takes Jerusalem	<i>East</i>
1189	Death of Henry II	<i>England</i>
	Death of William the Good	<i>Italy</i>
1190	Death of Frederick Barbarossa	<i>Germany</i>
	Philip goes on Crusade	<i>France</i>
	The Third Crusade	<i>East</i>

IV. PERIOD OF INNOCENT III, 1190-1216

1189	Accession of Richard I	<i>England</i>
1190	Accession of Henry VI	<i>Germany</i>
	Richard I and Philip II in Sicily	<i>Italy</i>
1191	Henry VI checked at Naples	<i>Italy</i>
	Philip leaves Palestine	<i>East</i>
1193	Capture of Richard of England	<i>Germany</i>
	Philip attacks Normandy	<i>France</i>
1194	Henry VI conquers Italy. Death of Tancred	<i>Italy</i>
1195	Birth of Frederick II	<i>Italy</i>


DATE		
1196	Henry declares Empire hereditary	<i>Germany</i>
1197	Death of Henry VI	<i>Italy</i>
1198	Philip of Swabia and Otto of Brunswick elected	<i>Germany</i>
	Innocent III becomes Pope	<i>Italy</i>
1199	Death of Richard I	<i>England</i>
1202	Fall of Zara	<i>East</i>
1204	Fall of Constantinople	<i>East</i>
1205	Henry succeeds Baldwin as Emperor	<i>East</i>
1206	Accession of Zinghis Khan	<i>East</i>
1207	Innocent III joins Philip	<i>Germany</i>
1208	Murder of Philip of Swabia	<i>Germany</i>
	Albigensian Crusade begins	<i>France</i>
1210	Innocent excommunicates Otto IV	<i>Germany</i>
1211	Frederick II enters Germany	<i>Germany</i>
1212	Battle of Las Navas da Tolosa	<i>Spain</i>
1213	Battle of Muret	<i>France</i>
1214	Collapse of Otto IV	<i>Germany</i>
	Battle of Bouvines	<i>France</i>
1215	Coronation of Frederick II	<i>Germany</i>
	Lateran Council	<i>Italy</i>
	Simon de Montfort gains Languedoc	<i>France</i>
1216	Death of John	<i>England</i>
	Death of Innocent III	<i>Italy</i>

V. PERIOD OF FREDERICK II, 1216-1254

1218	Death of Simon de Montfort	<i>France</i>
1220	Coronation of Henry	<i>Germany</i>
1223	Henry of Schwerin captures Waldemar of Denmark	<i>Germany</i>
	Death of Philip Augustus	<i>France</i>
1224	Amaury de Montfort resigns	<i>France</i>
1225	Lombard League renewed. Saracens of Sicily crushed	<i>Italy</i>
1226	Frederick makes peace with Lombard League	<i>Italy</i>
	Death of Louis VIII	<i>France</i>
1227	Defeat of Denmark	<i>Germany</i>

DATE		
1227	Death of Honorius III	<i>Italy</i>
1228	Frederick II in Palestine	<i>East</i>
1229	Pope attacks Sicilian kingdom	<i>Italy</i>
	Treaty of Meaux	<i>France</i>
	Treaty between Sultan of Egypt and Frederick	<i>East</i>
1230	Teutonic Knights settle in Prussia	<i>Germany</i>
1231	Constitutions <i>in favorem principum</i> . Sub-	
	mission of Henry VII	<i>Germany</i>
	Constitutions of Melfi	<i>Italy</i>
1234	Gregory IX expelled from Rome	<i>Italy</i>
1235	Frederick in Germany. The Peace of Mainz	<i>Germany</i>
1236	Frederick reduces Austria	<i>Germany</i>
	Louis IX begins to reign	<i>France</i>
1239	Gregory IX excommunicates Frederick	<i>Italy</i>
	Robert of Artois offered the Imperial crown	<i>France</i>
1241	Mongol invasion	<i>Germany</i>
	Battle of Meloria. Death of Gregory IX	<i>Italy</i>
1242	Battles of Taillebourg and Saintes	<i>France</i>
1243	Peace of Lorris	<i>France</i>
1245	Innocent IV declares Frederick deposed	<i>Italy</i>
1246	Election of Henry of Thuringia as King of	
	Germany	<i>Germany</i>
	Charles of Anjou marries heiress of Provence	<i>France</i>
1247	Election of William of Holland	<i>Germany</i>
	Siege of Parma	<i>Italy</i>
1248	Louis IX leaves on Crusade	<i>France</i>
1250	Death of Frederick II	<i>Italy</i>
	Accession of Conrad IV	<i>Germany</i>
1250-4	Louis IX in Palestine	<i>East</i>
1254	Henry III accepts Sicilian crown for his son	
	Edmund : the result is the baronial rebel-	
	lion	<i>England</i>
	Death of Conrad IV and Innocent IV	<i>Italy</i>

KINGS OF JERUSALEM.



CAPETIAN KINGS OF FRANCE.

Philip I, = (1) Bertha of Holland.
1060-1108. (2) Bertrada of Montfort.

Louis VI, the Fat, = Adelaide of Maurienne.
1108-37.


Louis VII, 1137-80 = (1)

Philip II, Augustus = (1) Isabella of Hainault.
1180-1223. (2) Ingeburga of Denmark.
(3) Agnes of Meran.

Louis VIII, = Blanche of Castile,
1223-6.



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
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
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2nd Crusade


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
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




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



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



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



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