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Duke of Marlborough

MEMOIRS

OF THE

DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH,

WITH

HIS ORIGINAL CORRESPONDENCE :

COLLECTED FROM THE FAMILY RECORDS AT BLENHEIM,
AND OTHER AUTHENTIC SOURCES.

BY

WILLIAM COXE, M.A. F.R.S. F.S.A.

ARCHDEACON OF WILTS.

A NEW EDITION, REVISED

BY JOHN WADE,

Author of "British History Chronologically Arranged."

IN THREE VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:

HENRY G. BOHN, YORK STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

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TO

THE PRESENT EDITION.

THE "Memoirs" now republished comprise the history of one of the greatest of England's captains.

Marlborough, however, was not only a warrior of the highest class; he was a very eminent statesman, an accomplished courtier, and, above all his contemporaries, a successful and adroit diplomatist. Nature had made him for great affairs: to govern men, win their esteem, and sway their councils. His character had only one drawback; it was too concentrated in purpose, too exclusively intent on his own individual amplification by access of power, wealth, fame, and high connexions; but, contrary to what is usually observed in the self-engrossed, he was capable of a noble friendship*, and of a constancy of domestic affection, almost unparalleled, towards one † whose wayward spirit often disturbed, and ultimately shipwrecked, his career of grandeur.

The times in which the great Marlborough lived and acted a leading part were the most trying in our national progress. It was not a routine age, but a revolutionary era. Public men were placed in irksome dilemmas; dynasties had been changed, or were in transition; absolute and constitutional rule were at issue; Protestantism and Popery in conflict; and the great families of the realm had to make a painful election between the interests of the commonweal and hereditary rights, coupled with long-cherished personal ties and ancient associations. Amidst such perplexities of choice it was diffi-

* To Prince Eugene and Lord Godolphin.

† Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough.

cult to escape error and misdirection. The old landmarks had been swept away; and, in the general flood, statesmen had little that was fixed, tried, and accredited, to guide them.

To these distractions the Duke of Marlborough, under the influence of circumstances for which he was not wholly accountable, was more exposed than any of his contemporaries. By paternal example he was a Tory; the claims of gratitude and personal connexion bound him to King James; while religious convictions made him a firm member of the Church of England. The last determined his defection from his first royal patron, and his adherence to the Prince of Orange: the former was the source of his alleged duplicity and vacillation. Whether he was selfish and treacherous in his preferences the reader is left to form his own opinion. In text or editorial elucidations, the requisite evidence has been collected and faithfully submitted.

But it is less the political than the military history of the Duke of Marlborough that forms the lustrous portion of his annals. His administrative abilities were vast, and what he did in a civil capacity is both important and interesting; but it is as a general that the British hero stands proudly pre-eminent. He may have erred in his personal predilections, or in the intrigues of politicians; but as the leader of armies he made no mistakes. There he was unrivalled: always self-possessed, without weakness or oversight; indefatigable in effort, unerring in conception, prompt, resistless, and inexorable in execution.

For proof of Marlborough's extraordinary genius in war, it is only necessary to study his brilliant campaign in Germany in 1704. History hardly offers a parallel to it in originality of design, vigour and success in execution; unless it be Napoleon's first triumphant campaign in Italy: that, indeed, was a wonderful exhibition of skill and heroism, and displayed that rare union of civil and military science by which a great kingdom is suddenly overrun and organised. Marl-

borough's career would not have suffered in comparison, had he been left to the bent of his own daring and energetic combinations, unfettered by confederate councils, and the military usages of his time, that would only allow a country to be conquered by instalments.

It is not, however, our purpose to detain the reader with a general comment either on the exploits or diversified capabilities of Marlborough. All that is needful has been amply done by the biographer. Mr. Coxe is a clear, faithful, and pains-taking narrator; and in descriptive details of battles and military transactions he is particularly full, lucid, and illustrative: occasionally the reader may think he has been too lavish in the introduction of elucidatory correspondence; but the portion he has used forms only a selection from the immense mass of the Blenheim papers that was placed at his disposal.* During the influential and busy period of the Duke's career, he was a kind of universal letter-writer; and there was hardly an individual of note in Europe, with whom he was not in active epistolary communication. He had the eyes of Argus, and no movement in the field, in council, or in cabinet, however minute or important, escaped his ever-watchful vision. Full justice to his subject, in consequence, imposed on the Archdeacon the duty of giving considerable scope to this division of his labours; and though it has added to the bulk of his volumes, it has tended both to augment and diversify the topics of interest, as well as to give a more complete portraiture of the character and position of Marlborough. It must not be

* The publication of the correspondence in smaller type will enable the more cursory reader to pass it over, if he feel oppressed or too much delayed by Mr. Coxe's diffuseness of epistolary and documentary amplifications. But it is rarely without interest of some kind, tending either to elucidate the subject of the "Memoirs," the public transactions of his time, or the characters of his contemporaries; and to have omitted it would have been an infringement of the Publisher's compact with the Public.

forgotten that he was the great moving figure of his age, and, like Buonaparte, for a time entirely filled the European eye, not only as the generalissimo and leading statesman of the Grand Alliance, but as the virtual prime-minister of England, pending the brief but eventful and stirring period of Queen Anne's reign.

Although Mr. Coxe must needs have laboured under an embarrassment of riches, there has been a great accession of new materials since his time; and our own task of revision, beyond the correction of a few careless expressions, has mainly consisted in supplying omissions and elucidations from more recent sources of information. Besides the general histories of Hallam, Lord John Russell, and Lord Mahon, together with the voluminous remains of Horace Walpole, several works have lately appeared, especially devoted to the Duke of Marlborough, or his hardly less celebrated duchess.*

We have looked into all these; but though some of them claim to be original discoveries in the forgotten archives of Woodstock, we are convinced, from a careful collation, that they had not escaped the industry of Archdeacon Coxe, and of his chief assistant, the Rev. George May.

Nevertheless, we have, from these and other sources, gleaned some additional illustrations of public characters and events, that will help to render more accurate and complete the picture of the martial age in which the great general flourished.

J. W.

* The Letters and Dispatches of John Churchill, First Duke of Marlborough, from 1702 to 1712. Edited by the late Sir George Murray. 5 vols. 8vo.

Memoirs of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, and of the Court of Queen Anne. By Mrs. A. T. Thomson. .2 vols. 8vo.

Private Correspondence of Sarah, Duchess of Marlborough, illustrative of the Court and Times of Queen Anne. 2 vols. 8vo.

A series of articles, vigorously written, have also appeared in Blackwood's Magazine, ascribed to Professor Alison.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

It is a singular fact, that no authentic Life of John Duke of Marlborough has been given to the public, especially when we reflect on the abundance of original and interesting documents preserved in the family records.

Sarah Duchess of Marlborough, indeed, collected and compiled numerous materials for the Life of her illustrious husband, and consigned the task to Messrs. Glover and Mallet, who were then conspicuous in the literary world. She intrusted to their care her valuable papers, and assigned by will the sum of one thousand pounds, to the author or authors of a History of the Duke of Marlborough, but clogged the bequest with a condition, that the work should be approved by her executors, and even added the whimsical injunction, that it should not contain a single line of verse.

Glover declined the undertaking, and Mallet never commenced the work. On his death, therefore, the papers, which had been intrusted to him, were restored to the family, and being, with others of no less value, deposited at Blenheim, were regularly arranged by order of the late duke.

Although accident and caprice prevented the great actions of the Duke of Marlborough from being displayed in their proper light, he could not pass uncelebrated, either by his own or by subsequent ages. We have, accordingly, many narratives of his life, printed in the various languages of Europe, and differing in merit and authenticity.

The earliest of these productions is a biographical sketch, concluding with 1713, the year in which it was printed, and is accompanied with a Life of Prince Eugene. It is anonymous, but is dedicated to his son-in-law, the duke of Montague, and exhibits evident proofs that the author had served under the command of Marlborough, and shared his confidence.

The next is that of Lediard, in three volumes octavo, printed in 1736. The writer was patronised by the duke, attended him during his journey into Saxony, and appears to have been a diligent observer. This work, which is principally compiled from Gazettes and other periodical publications, is minute in military details, and as authentic as the means of the author permitted. But although Lediard has introduced a few original letters, he was unable to obtain access to more private documents; and therefore, is frequently mistaken in tracing the motives of action, even in the field, and still more in developing the secrets of the cabinet.

In 1738, a Life of the Duke of Marlborough, in the Dutch language, was given to the public, by Abraham de Vryer, which was principally drawn from Lediard, with some additions from the Dutch and French writers. It forms four volumes small octavo.

In 1742 appeared, in two volumes duodecimo, "The History of John Duke of Marlborough, and of Francis Eugene, Prince of Savoy," written with perspicuity and spirit, but containing few material facts, which had escaped the researches of preceding biographers.

Another Life, in one volume, was published by a German writer, which is only a brief compilation from the foregoing works.

We have, lastly, to mention a recent publication, which made a considerable sensation in France and England, because it was written by order of Bonaparte, and was supposed to contain several notes from his own pen. It is intituled "*Histoire de Jean Churchill, Duc de Marlborough,*" and printed at the *Imprimerie Imperiale*, in 1805.

This history is composed in a pleasing, lively, and perspicuous style, and the military operations are detailed with distinctness and precision. The author has drawn the substance of his narrative from Lediard. He has certainly spared no pains in consulting and comparing the writers of all countries, though he is not more fortunate than Lediard in tracing the motives of action, or in developing the intrigues of the cabinet; and for the same reason, namely, that he had access to no unpublished documents. He was fully sensible of this deficiency, and acknowledged it with laudable candour, when, in presenting a copy of his work to the late duke of Marlborough, he solicited information from the family papers.*

Another work, intimately connected with the subject of these memoirs, must be particularly noticed:—

"The Conduct of the Duchess of Marlborough;" written by Hooke, the historian, under her inspection, from her own draughts and communications, and published in 1742, when she had attained the advanced age of eighty-two. This work embraces the period, from her first introduction at court, to the year 1710, and contains a curious, though often a partial detail, of the state of the court and parties, as well as of her long and intimate connexion with her royal mistress.

A counter publication soon afterwards appeared, which was ascribed to Ralph, a violent Tory writer, under the title of "The other Side of the Question." But notwithstanding the acrimony with which he controverts the statements of the duchess, and the partiality with which

* The writer of the work was M. Madgett, interpreter for the marine and colonies, who was assisted in the composition, though he conceals the fact, by the Abbé Dutems, who died in 1811. In Madgett's letter of application to the Duke of Marlborough, he states that the history of his "illustrious ancestor" had been undertaken "by the express order of the Emperor Napoleon, a warm admirer of that great man;" and who was much surprised at the studied neglect with which "the hero of Blenheim had been hitherto treated by the French historians."—ED.

"The Conduct" is written, it has formed a text-book for subsequent historians.

Several works on the military operations of our distinguished commander have at different times been given to the public. Among them the most remarkable are, "Dumont's Military History of Eugene and Marlborough," with plans of battles and sieges; and "Brodrick's History of the late War in the Netherlands." Also, the "Conduct of the Duke of Marlborough in the present War;" published in 1712, originally written in our own language, and translated into French. Nor should I omit to notice a regular, though meagre Journal of his Campaigns, compiled by Serjeant Milner, who served in the confederate army; and which, though minute and explicit, with regard to the marches and military movements, exhibits no higher information than might have been expected from the rank of the writer.

Another work of superior merit contains much military intelligence on the operations of Marlborough. It was published in 1747, from the posthumous papers of Brigadier-general Kane, an experienced tactician, and an eye-witness; and has furnished much interesting matter on many transactions, particularly on the battle of Ramilies and the siege of Bouchain.*

While employed in writing my historical works, I not only sought in vain for an authentic account of the Duke of Marlborough, but I lamented, as an Englishman, that no biographical monument had been raised to the memory of so great a general and statesman; and that his reputation had been left to the malice of party writers, and to the misrepresentations of ignorant or prejudiced historians. Under this impression, an accidental conversation with Lord Charles Spencer led me to apply to the late Duke of Marlborough, for permission to examine the documents at Blenheim, some of which I had formerly seen, while attached to the family. The application was received with kindness and complacency; and a nearer view of this rich collection strengthened my wish to become the biographer of his distinguished ancestor.

Three successive visits to Blenheim enabled me to examine and methodise the numerous materials for a history, which may be considered as truly national. How far I have succeeded in rendering justice to the subject, must be left to the candid and unbiassed decision of the public.

I shall, therefore, without farther apology, describe the plan of the work, and specify the principal authorities on which it is founded.

My object was, not merely to exhibit the Duke of Marlborough as a general, but also as a statesman and negotiator. It was no less my wish to delineate his character as a man, and to exhibit those qualities of his

* The title of this rare and curious work, for which I am indebted to the kindness of Lieutenant-colonel Rooke, is, "Campaigns of King William and the Duke of Marlborough; with Remarks on the Stratagems by which each battle was lost or won, from 1689 to 1712. Also, a New System of Military Discipline for Foot in Action; with the most essential Exercise for Cavalry. By the late Brigadier-general Richard Kane, governor of Minorca."

mind and heart, which have either been misrepresented, or passed without notice.

In fulfilling my task I have endeavoured to avoid an error, too common with biographers, who often hold forth the subject of their memoirs as a perfect being, like a hero of romance, without frailty or blemish. On the contrary, I have not hesitated to notice those failings, with which the virtues and talents of the Duke of Marlborough were blended. In particular, I have not attempted to conceal or palliate his clandestine correspondence with his former sovereign and benefactor. This intercourse, although misrepresented and exaggerated in the garbled pages of Macpherson and Dalrymple, is an historical fact, too well authenticated, to be either controverted or denied. I have, however, scrutinised his views and motives, and I trust have shown that he never entertained a serious wish for the restoration of James II., or the Pretender; but that, in common with many other persons, of all ranks and conditions, he was merely anxious to secure a pardon, in case of a counter revolution.

In fact, it is no more than justice to the memory of this great man to declare, that amidst the papers in the archives of Blenheim, which have been submitted to my inspection, without reserve or limitation, not a single hint occurs of any correspondence with the exiled family. Even in the numerous letters to Lord Godolphin and the duchess, which are written in the full confidence of friendship and affection, and portray every feeling of his mind, not the most distant allusion can be traced, which malice itself could construe into an evidence of infidelity towards his sovereign and country.

This fact is a decisive proof that his overtures to the exiled family were never serious. Had he fostered a sincere, though latent attachment to the Stuart race, it must have displayed itself, either directly or indirectly, in his long and intimate correspondence with his friend and colleague Lord Treasurer Godolphin. On the contrary, we observe a perpetual anxiety for the maintenance of the Protestant succession, a steady attachment to the glory and welfare of England, and an undiminished zeal for the humiliation of the French monarch, on whom the de-throned family placed their sole hopes of restoration.

In the materials to which I have had recourse, I may deem myself particularly fortunate. Nothing, perhaps, shows the character of an individual, and his true motives of action, more than his confidential letters, which were neither expected nor intended to meet the public eye. Of this kind is the greater part of the duke's correspondence, consisting principally of his private communications with the duchess and the treasurer. To assimilate, therefore, these memoirs, as nearly as possible, with that species of biography which is at once the most interesting and instructive, I have endeavoured to render him his own historian, by adopting, on every important occasion, his unaffected and expressive language, and blending his correspondence with the narrative.

The papers preserved at Blenheim form the foundation of the work, and consist of so great a mass of materials, that it would require a volume merely to enumerate the titles. I shall, therefore, specify only the most remarkable.

1. The letters of the Duke of Marlborough, written in his own hand, to his duchess and to Lord Godolphin. This correspondence, for value, interest, and extent, is almost unparalleled; and it seems scarcely credible, that a general charged with such a variety of occupations, political and military, should have found leisure to give so minute and frequent a detail of his sentiments, plans, operations, and arrangements. The series commences with the year 1701, when he accompanied King William to Holland, and ends in 1711.

2. The official, and other letters of a confidential kind, to different persons, both at home and abroad.

3. His letters to foreign sovereigns and ministers.

4. His correspondence with the queen, which contains the most valuable information on the secrets of the cabinet, and throws a new light on their respective characters. It chiefly consists of copies and draughts, in his own hand, or in that of the duchess.

5. The letters of the prime minister, Lord Treasurer Godolphin, written also in his own hand, and equal in point of number and interest to those of his coadjutor.

6. Numerous letters from the different sovereigns of Europe, and their chief ministers, both of an official and private nature. Among these we may particularly point out to notice, those of the emperors Leopold, Joseph, and Charles, the king of Prussia, the duke of Savoy, the electoral family of Hanover, Prince Eugene, and the imperial, Prussian, Swedish, and Dutch ministers.

7. The diplomatic correspondence of Marlborough with the British ambassadors and agents in the different courts of Europe, containing an ample and original detail of public negotiations and private transactions.

8. Plans, projects, journals, and narratives relating to military affairs, too numerous to particularise. To those from which information has been drawn, a reference is usually given in the work.

9. The papers of the duchess are last specified, as deserving particular attention. Of her letters to the duke, Lord Godolphin, and other friends, only a few have been preserved, because she appears to have rigorously exacted their destruction; but we are enabled to trace the subjects and tone of her correspondence from the replies of the duke and the treasurer. She has, however, made amends for the loss of her own letters, by numerous narratives, remarks, and deductions, on many of the transactions in which she or her husband were interested. These compositions, although tinged with her prejudices and passions, yet contain information which we might elsewhere seek in vain. Many were written for her own vindication, and are condensed in the *Justification of her Conduct*, which she published towards the close of her life, and many for the information of her particular friends. Many, also, owe their existence to her solicitude for the fame of her husband, and were evidently intended for the use and information of the author to whom she consigned the task of writing his life. Besides these, there are two narratives on the domestic transactions of the family, which incidentally furnish several anecdotes relative to the Duke of Marlborough.

Her confidential correspondence with her royal mistress forms a valu-

able portion of her papers. The letters of the queen appear to have been preserved with peculiar care, and though the originals of the duchess are chiefly destroyed or lost, she made copies of many, which relate to the most intimate period of their intercourse. This correspondence has enabled us to trace the rise, progress, and decline of that singular favour, which she so long enjoyed. Although imperfect, it has also afforded the means of detecting many inaccurate, partial, and garbled accounts, in her own vindication, as well as in our national historians, both contemporary and subsequent.

10. The letters of Lord Godolphin to the duchess, though comparatively few, are yet highly valuable, as proving the influence which she exercised over his mind, and the share she took in the political transactions of the day.

The archives of Blenheim contain the collections of Charles earl of Sunderland, in whose posterity the title of Marlborough now remains. Their value may be estimated from the important part which he acted in the political drama, and his intimate connexion with the family of the duke. Other documents, which we have not room to specify, will be occasionally referred to in the course of the work.

Amidst this vast mass of materials it was not possible to interweave even the greater part of the letters and papers which I found interesting. It was necessary to set some bounds to selection; and I have therefore confined myself to those which exhibit some peculiar characteristic, or were necessary to elucidate the narrative. For the same reason I have inserted only a few extracts from those letters of the duke which have been already published by the duchess, Dalrymple, Macpherson, Lediard, and others.

I have now to fulfil the grateful task of acknowledging my obligations to those who have kindly promoted and facilitated my labours. In this enumeration I must again testify my gratitude to the late Duke of Marlborough, for the liberal manner in which his grace committed the family records to my use, without the slightest control or reserve. I have likewise to acknowledge a similar obligation to the present duke, for continuing this indulgence, and for the interest which his grace has been pleased to manifest in my undertaking. To Lord Churchill, for his unremitting attentions during my stay at Blenheim, for his zeal in promoting my researches, as well as for the communication of several papers, written by Sarah Duchess of Marlborough, which were consigned to him by his mother the late duchess. Among these I may particularly mention a manuscript volume in folio, written by a gentleman of the name of St. Priest, under the inspection of the duchess, while she remained abroad. It is an early draught of the work, afterwards published under the name of "The Conduct." To the honourable George Agar Ellis, for his aid on many occasions, in illustrating the history of the hero from whom he is descended. To Earl Spencer, for some interesting communications relative to his noble family. To her grace the duchess of Buccleugh, for granting access to the Shrewsbury Papers, containing many valuable documents, which either directly or indirectly throw a light on the subject of this work. Besides a few original letters from

the Duke of Marlborough, they consist of the interesting correspondence of the duke of Shrewsbury with King William, Robert earl of Sunderland, Lord Somers, and the Whig leaders, and comprise a series of letters from Mr. Secretary Vernon to his patron, the duke of Shrewsbury, between 1696 and 1706.

Having testified my obligations to the immediate descendants of John Duke of Marlborough, I cannot in sufficient terms acknowledge the condescension of their imperial highnesses the archdukes John and Louis. In their passage through Salisbury they honoured me with a visit, as the historian of the House of Austria; and not only testified the interest which they took in all my works, but offered me their powerful aid, in procuring transcripts of such documents as might be found in the archives of Vienna, or in other collections abroad. They graciously fulfilled their promise, by forwarding to me copies of numerous letters written by the Duke of Marlborough, to the emperors Leopold, Joseph, and Charles, as well as to Prince Eugene and to Counts Zinzendorf and Wratislaw. These communications have essentially elucidated and enriched my narrative.

To Lord Viscount Sidmouth, secretary of state for the home department, I have to express my thanks for granting me access to the valuable correspondence in the State Paper Office. From this collection I have drawn much information, particularly from the volumes containing the official correspondence of the Duke of Marlborough with the secretaries of state, and the despatches from the British ambassadors and envoys, in foreign courts, to their own government. I have thus been enabled to supply occasional chasms in the correspondence of the duke, and to explain many public transactions, which could have been elucidated from no other source.

Also, to the late Right Honourable John Hiley Addington, under secretary of state for the home department, for his obliging interposition, and for repeated proofs of friendship, on this and many other occasions.

I have again the satisfaction of repeating my obligations to my noble friend the Earl of Hardwicke, for the use of his valuable collection; and particularly for several letters from Mr. Secretary Harley, and the interesting diary of Lord Chancellor Cowper. To the Duke of Somerset, for some letters of Captain Bonnel, who served several campaigns under the Duke of Marlborough, and has given a specific account of the march through Germany, as well as some interesting facts relative to the battle of Oudenard. To Lord Dynevor, for favouring me with the inspection of the papers left by his lordship's ancestor, Adam de Cardonel, Esq., the confidential secretary to the Duke of Marlborough. As the duke was not in the habit of writing French, though he spoke it fluently, this intelligent gentleman was intrusted with the principal management of the foreign correspondence, under the direction of his grace. He also prepared many of the English despatches, and frequently wrote the rough draughts of others, which the duke had not leisure to compose: he was, besides, the channel of the most secret communications. Hence this collection contains numerous and interesting materials, which it is needless to particularise, because reference is made to such as have been consulted in the narrative.

I am indebted to the late Louis Montolicu, Esq., for the voluntary transmission of two journals, kept by his grandfather, Louis Baron de Montolicu, and his great uncle, the Baron de Montolieu St. Hippolite, who were both generals in the service of the duke of Savoy, and enjoyed his confidence. These documents have supplied me with some curious anecdotes relative to the campaigns in Italy, and the relief of Turin; as well as an interesting narrative from Count Maffei to the duke of Savoy, describing the battle of Oudenard.

To Hans Sloane, Esq., for obtaining the use of the papers and documents left by Lord Cadogan, quarter-master-general of the army, the favourite and confidant of Marlborough, who figured in all his campaigns, and was justly famous for activity and professional skill.

To the Rev. George May, chaplain to the late Duke of Marlborough, for selecting the papers from the archives at Blenheim, and for his continued and zealous aid, during the progress of the work.

To Sir George Nayler, York Herald, for his valuable assistance in tracing the genealogy of the Churchills; and for much information respecting the armorial bearings of the family, as well as for the copies of the three patents, which are printed in the Appendix.

To Charles Bowles, Esq., of Shaftesbury, for his laborious researches and valuable aid in tracing the genealogy of the Churchill family.

To the Bavarian minister at the British court, M. de Pfeffel, for obtaining considerable information on the subject of the principality of Mindelheim, and particularly for his interposition with the Count de Montgelas, principal minister of the king of Bavaria, who gave orders for various communications from the royal archives, in the heraldic and geographical departments.

To convey a just idea of military operations requires an acquaintance both with the practice and theory of war; and I should have scarcely ventured to enter minutely into a subject foreign to my profession, without the co-operation of an able officer. The acknowledgments due to such an assistant, I have to offer to Major Smith, late of the quarter-master-general's department, author of "The History of the Seven Years' War," and translator of the "Secret Stratagetical Instructions" of Frederick II.

To this intelligent officer I am indebted for much general information on subjects connected with his profession, and particularly for the communication of his elaborate memorials on the signal victories of Blenheim, Ramilies, Oudenard, and Malplaquet, from which I have principally drawn my descriptions. To his invaluable assistance I also owe the masterly accounts of the movements previous to the battle of Malplaquet, and of the military operations in the celebrated campaign of 1711.

As the plans of the battles and military movements were chiefly constructed under his inspection, I may, without incurring the imputation of vanity, venture to flatter myself that they will be found no way inferior to any thing of the kind yet given to the public. Professional men will best estimate their accuracy, and those who have no insight into military affairs need only compare them with the plans hitherto published to appreciate their value.

To Major Freeth, of the quarter-master-general's department, I am indebted for much useful assistance on military subjects, and for the plan of the operations on the Danube, during the splendid campaign of 1704, as well as for that of the attack on the French lines in 1705.

In enumerating a list of those who have contributed their aid it would be injustice not to repeat my grateful acknowledgments to Mr. Hatcher, my late secretary, now postmaster of Salisbury, for his able and indefatigable assistance in preparing these memoirs for the press.

I shall close this preface with a few explanatory remarks. Many of the letters are without date, and others are distinguished only by the name of the month or day of the week. The greater part of the correspondence between the duke, the duchess, and Lord Godolphin, is also mingled with ciphers, to which there is no key; and the ciphers were evidently changed several times. In all these cases I have endeavoured to ascertain the dates and names, and have generally succeeded. With regard to the ciphers, whenever I could appropriate them with certainty, I have omitted the figures; and where I was doubtful, I have either annexed the cipher to my explanation, or left it unexplained.

In regard to the dates, the difference between the old and new style has occasioned some perplexity. All the letters from the queen, Godolphin, and the duchess, are in the old style, to which I have occasionally added the new; but the two styles being frequently intermingled in those of the duke, I marked the new style, wherever I could ascertain that the old was used.

I deem it necessary to apprise the reader, that the principal part of the correspondence is taken from the records at Blenheim, to which specific references are omitted, as superfluous; but the papers from other collections are, in most instances, indicated. All the letters from foreign sovereigns and ministers are translated from the originals, which are chiefly written in the French language.

It may, perhaps, appear unnecessary to apologise for the adoption of the modern orthography, in the correspondence which is interwoven with the narrative. The Duke of Marlborough lived in an age when little attention was paid to the minor departments of grammar; and he, like his friend Eugene, wrote with the carelessness of a soldier, not with the precision of a man of letters. To have given literal transcripts of his epistles would have afforded little gratification to those who look rather to things than to words, and who are more anxious to be acquainted with his thoughts than with his orthography. Besides, in point of taste, it would be useless to urge how much the pages of an historical narrative would have been disfigured by variations in spelling, arising from haste and inattention, from the careless habit of the times, or from long residence abroad. This innovation is, however, merely literal; for the language of the letters, in all cases, is scrupulously preserved.

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MEMOIRS

OF

JOHN DUKE OF MARLBOROUGH.

CHAP. I.—EDUCATION AND MARRIAGE. — 1650–1678.

JOHN CHURCHILL, Duke of Marlborough, was the second son of Winston Churchill, the representative of a family of note, long settled in Devonshire, which had suffered on the royalist side in the war of Charles I. with his parliament. He was born at Ashe, the seat of his maternal grandfather, Sir John Drake, on the 24th of June, 1650.

Winston, the eldest son, dying in infancy, John became heir to the family name and declining fortunes. Of the education of a person afterwards so illustrious, we only know that he was brought up under the care of his father, who was himself a man of letters, and author of a political history of England, entitled *Divi Britannici*. He was also instructed in the rudiments of knowledge by a neighbouring clergyman of great learning and piety; and from him, doubtless, imbibed that deep sense of religion, and zealous attachment to the Church of England, which were never obliterated amidst the dissipation of a court, the cares of political business, or the din of arms.

Soon after the Restoration, when his father was established at court, we find him in the metropolis, and placed in the school of St. Paul's.* He did not, however, remain a sufficient

* This fact is thrice mentioned in the Life of Dean Collet, the founder of the school, by Dr. Knight, prebendary of Ely, who was himself a

time to reap the advantages afforded by this foundation ; for he was removed to the theatre of active life, at a period when the ordinary course of liberal education is scarcely more than half completed.

The interest of Sir Winston Churchill enabled him to secure establishments for his rising family. Arabella, his only daughter, was introduced at court, soon after the Restoration, as maid of honour to the first duchess of York ; and John was appointed page of honour to the duke.

The example and military spirit of the father was not without effect on the son. At an early period he manifested a decided inclination for the profession of arms, which did not escape the notice of the duke of York, in the frequent reviews of the two regiments of foot guards, which he was accustomed to exercise. On one of these occasions, being asked by his royal patron what profession he preferred, and in what manner he should provide for him, he threw himself on his knees, and warmly petitioned that he might be appointed to a pair of colours in one of those fine regiments whose discipline he had admired. The request was graciously received ; and the enterprising youth gratified with the pair of colours so earnestly desired.

Many idle stories have been detailed by the memoir writers,

scholar, and published his work soon after the death of the duke. The following anecdote connected with the education of this great man appears somewhat questionable. He is supposed to have imbibed his passion for a military life from the perusal of *Vegetius de re Militari*, which was then in the school library. The anecdote was thus recorded by the Rev. G. North, rector of Colyton, in his copy of *Vegetius*, p. 483, presented to the Bodleian Library, by the late Mr. Gough ; communicated by the head librarian, the Rev. Mr. Bandinel.

“ From this very book, John Churchill, scholar of this school, afterwards the celebrated Duke of Marlborough, first learnt the elements of the art of war, as was told to me, George North, on St. Paul’s Day, 1724-25, by an old clergyman, who said he was a contemporary scholar, was then well acquainted with him, and frequently saw him read it. This I testify to be true.

G. NORTH.”

It is not very probable that a boy should have read so difficult a book as *Vegetius*, at so early an age, particularly as we can trace no indication that he possessed such an intimate acquaintance with the Latin tongue, as the study of this author must have required. The restless curiosity of youth might however have prompted him to look into this book, which contains amusing prints, not unlikely to have attracted his attention.

or rather the novelists of later times, respecting his early rise. The origin of his fortune has been ascribed wholly to the influence of his sister, Arabella, afterwards mistress to the duke of York. But although it would be absurd to assert that he derived no advantage from the favour which she subsequently enjoyed, we may justly conclude that she did not contribute to his first promotion. He received his commission at the age of sixteen, before she had attracted the notice of the duke; and the personal qualifications, and bravery which he soon afterwards displayed at Tangier, together with the services of his father, render it scarcely necessary to seek any other cause for his rapid advancement than his ardour for a military life, his martial appearance, and rising merits.

The retailers of anecdotes have also sought romantic causes for his first military expedition. Some assert that his comely person attracted the notice of the duchess of York; others, that he captivated the duchess of Cleveland, the king's mistress; and that the jealousy of one of the royal brothers was the cause of his temporary banishment to Tangier, then a dependency of the British crown, and besieged by the Moors. The absurdity of this tale is sufficiently proved by the shortness of his absence, and his recall by the duke of York himself. Indeed, it was perfectly natural that a high-spirited youth, full of enthusiasm for his profession; should resign the pleasures of a court, to acquire renown on the only theatre which was then open to British valour. His conduct proved that he was actuated by a native spirit of enterprise. He eagerly engaged in the frequent sallies and skirmishes which occurred during the course of the siege; and in this desultory warfare gave the first indications of his active and daring character.

Returning to England from Tangier, he resumed his attendance on the duke of York, from whom, as well as from the king, he received daily proofs of favour. In 1672, when England united with France against Holland, he accompanied the detachment of 6000 men, which was sent abroad under the duke of Monmouth; and shortly after his arrival on the Continent, was appointed captain of grenadiers in the duke's regiment. This service was particularly calculated to call forth and improve his military talents.

The French army, though nominally under the command of Louis XIV., was directed by the two greatest generals of the age, Marshal Turenne and the Prince of Condé. With a boldness and rapidity till then almost unknown, they reduced, in the space of a few months, the fortresses on the Rhine to its separation from the Meuse, overran the province of Utrecht, and advanced to the vicinity of Amsterdam. In these operations Captain Churchill not only signalised himself in the regular course of military duty, but volunteered his service on every occasion of difficulty and danger. At the siege of Nimeguen he attracted the discerning eye of Turenne, who from that period spoke of him by the familiar title of his handsome Englishman, and shortly afterwards put his spirit to the test. A lieutenant-colonel having scandalously abandoned, without resistance, a station which he was enjoined to defend to the last extremity, Turenne exclaimed, "I will bet a supper and a dozen of claret, that my handsome Englishman will recover the post, with half the number of men that the officer commanded who has lost it!" The wager was instantly accepted, and the event justified the confidence of the general; for Captain Churchill, after a short but desperate struggle, expelled the enemy, and maintained the post.

In the ensuing year, he signalised himself at the siege of Maestricht. A lodgment having been made in the half-moon, he accompanied the storming party, which was led by the duke of Monmouth, and at the head of his own company planted the banner of France on the rampart. Before morning, however, the enemy sprang a mine, and rushing forward at the moment of the explosion, recovered the work. But the duke of Monmouth, with a party of only twelve, among whom was Captain Churchill, traversed the ditch, penetrated through a postern into the half-moon, and being seconded by the bravest of their soldiers, regained the lodgment. The captain was slightly wounded in the action.

For this service he received the thanks of Louis XIV. at the head of the army, and a strong recommendation to the notice of his own sovereign. The duke of Monmouth also generously conceded to him the whole honour of the exploit; and on presenting him to Charles II., after a warm eulogium on his

conduct and courage, added, "To the bravery of this gallant officer I owe my life."

The interest taken in his behalf was proved by his rapid advancement. Amidst the vacillations of Charles between the French and Dutch, he still continued to serve in the English forces left at the disposition of France; and on the 3d of April, 1674, was appointed by Louis colonel of the English regiment, which was vacant by the resignation of Lord Peterborough. In this rank he appears to have served during the German campaign of Turenne, and to have been present at the battle of Sinzheim, when the imperialists were worsted, and their defeat was followed by the memorable devastation of the Palatinate. There is little doubt also that he assisted in some of the military operations between 1675 and 1677, after the death of his patron Turenne. In these active campaigns, so intelligent an officer caught the spirit of his great commanders, matured and exercised his talents, and laid the foundation of that consummate skill which rendered him the wonder of his contemporaries, and the admiration of succeeding ages.

During this interval Colonel Churchill occasionally exchanged his military labours for attendance on his royal patron, the duke of York, who, in 1673, had appointed him gentleman of his bed-chamber, and afterwards raised him to the post of master of the robes.

So handsome and accomplished an officer could not fail to be entangled in the gallantries of a dissipated court. But we spare the reader the detail of these irregularities, which are doubtless exaggerated by the licentious pens of that and subsequent times. We shall barely advert to an anecdote which has obtained credit relative to a connexion with the duchess of Cleveland, whom he is accused of treating afterwards with the basest ingratitude. The falsity of this tale will be sufficiently shown by the observation that it is originally drawn from so impure and questionable a source as the *New Atalantis*.* Admitting, however, that Colonel Churchill

* Mrs. Manley, from whom the scandal-mongers of the time drew their information, was one of the most abandoned women of her age, She wrote the *New Atalantis* under the auspices of the Tories, and in her licentious romances laboured to vilify the characters of those who were politically adverse to her protectors. Among these she has singled out

might have experienced the liberality of the duchess, we need not seek for the cause in an intercourse of gallantry, since he had a strong claim to her protection from affinity, being nearly related to her on the side of his mother, who was her cousin.

Whatever may have been the conduct of Colonel Churchill during the fervour of youth, and amidst the temptations of a dissolute court, his irregularities soon yielded to the influence of a purer passion, which recalled him from licentious connexions, and gave a colour to his future life: we allude to his courtship and marriage with Miss Sarah Jennings, daughter of Richard Jennings, Esq., of Sandridge, near St. Alban's, a gentleman of an ancient and distinguished lineage.

The family of Jennings, like that of Churchill, was devoted to the royal cause, and consequently enjoyed considerable favour at court after the Restoration; for we find two daughters of Mr. Jennings at an early period filling honourable situations in the royal household. Frances, the eldest, one of the most lovely women of the age, was placed about the person of the duchess of York. She espoused Sir George Hamilton, grandson of James second earl of Abercorn, a *maréchal de camp* in the French service.* Sarah, the younger sister, was also introduced into the court of the duchess of York, at the early age of twelve. She grew up under the protection of her royal patroness, and became the companion of the Princess Anne. Though not so transcendently lovely as her sister, her animated countenance and commanding figure attracted numerous admirers; and even in the dawn of beauty she received advantageous offers of marriage from different persons of consideration, among the Duke of Marlborough, whom she designates under the name of Count Fortunatus; and makes him an agent in the most improbable and romantic adventures. This woman was imprisoned for some of her lampoons; but Swift, in the true spirit of party, did not blush to recommend her for a remuneration as having suffered in the Tory cause. She was also employed by that party in writing the *Examiner*, after Swift had relinquished it, and he allows that he supplied her with some of his venom to asperse Marlborough, and other eminent statesmen.

* For a particular account of this lady, see the entertaining memoirs of the Count Grammont, written by her brother-in-law, Anthony, Count Hamilton. [These "charming" memoirs, as the Edinburgh Review once termed them, have been reprinted as an extra volume of Bohn's Standard Library.] — ED.

whom we may reckon the earl of Lindsay, afterwards marquis of Ancaster. In the midst of a licentious court, she maintained an unspotted reputation, and was as much respected for her prudence and propriety of conduct, as she was admired for the charms of her person and the vivacity of her conversation. Of this young lady Colonel Churchill became enamoured when she had scarcely completed her sixteenth year; and his person, politeness, and amenity of manners, joined with his reputation for bravery, made an early and deep impression on her heart.

Nothing is perhaps more trivial than the general correspondence of lovers. Still however the minutest feelings of a great mind are not without interest, and it gratifies our natural curiosity to trace the sentiments of extraordinary characters in those situations into which they fall in common with the generality of mankind. The letters of the colonel and his future consort display the peculiar features of their respective characters; and show the origin and growth of that deep and ardent attachment to which he owed a higher degree both of happiness and disquietude than usually accompanies the nuptial union. His notes in particular breathe a romantic tenderness and keen sensibility, which appear foreign to the general sedateness of his character. Indeed this correspondence fully exemplifies the eulogium afterwards paid to him by King William, that to the coolest head he united the warmest heart. The letters of the lady evince, on the other hand, the vivacity and petulance of her temper; and display that alternate haughtiness and courtesy which gave her so powerful a command over the passions of those to whom she was attached.

The courtship passed through the usual forms of coyness and ardour, professions on the part of the lover, and reserve on the part of the lady; and was attended with numberless complaints and apologies, bickerings and reconciliations. Several obstacles also gave strength to their mutual passion, as well as retarded their union. The first difficulty arose from the want of a competent establishment. Colonel Churchill could not expect any fortune from his father, who had several children, and was embarrassed in circumstances; and his own actual income consisted in places and emoluments at court, with an annuity of 500*l.* which he had pur-

chased from Lord Halifax in 1674.* The family property of the lady was more ample than that of her lover, but was considerably encumbered, by the provision made for the establishment of her grandfather's numerous issue.† Her portion therefore at this period was small; and it was not till some time after the marriage that it was augmented, by the death of her brothers without issue. Some pecuniary arrangement appears to have been proposed in their favour by the duchess of York, but at first it was rejected by the lady, in a fit of spleen and dissatisfaction.

The next obstacle was derived from the opposition of Sir Winston and Lady Churchill, who were anxious to unite their son with a lady of considerable fortune, though less favoured with the gifts of nature than Miss Jennings. The report of this alliance being circulated, awakened her alarm and resentment, and she not only reproached him with selfishness and infidelity, but with affected disinterestedness urged him to renounce an attachment which militated against his worldly prospects. At the same time she declared that, to escape from his further importunities, she would accompany

* Among the Blenheim papers is the original agreement, dated in 1674, stating that Colonel Churchill had purchased from Lord Halifax an annuity of 500*l.* per annum, for the sum of 4500*l.*

[Archdeacon Coxe has rather slurred over this period of the duke's history. According to Lord Chesterfield, the gratuity Colonel Churchill received from the duchess of Cleveland, and which he so providently invested, was the foundation of his fortune; it certainly encouraged him to marry, and live virtuously afterwards. Touching on this pecuniary obligation to his patroness his lordship remarks, "He had most undoubtedly good plain understanding, with sound judgment. But these alone would probably have raised him but something higher than they found him, which was page to King James II.'s queen. Then the graces protected and promoted him; for while he was an ensign in the guards, the duchess of Cleveland, then favourite mistress of the king, struck by these very graces, gave him 5000*l.*, with which he immediately bought an annuity of 500*l.* a year of my grandfather, Halifax, which was the *foundation of his subsequent fortune.*" (*Chesterfield's Letters*, vol. i. p. 136.)

The purchase of the life annuity gave rise to the satirical remark of Swift, "that the same grain of caution which disposes a man to fill his coffers, will teach him how to preserve them at all events; and I dare hold a wager that the Duke of Marlborough, in all his campaigns, was never known to lose his baggage." — ED.

† He had twenty-four children. — ED.

her sister, the countess of Hamilton, on an intended journey to Paris. This reproach drew from the lover a warm remonstrance against her injustice and cruelty, and a pathetic appeal to her affection, which was not made in vain. The reconciliation was soon followed by their marriage, but at what precise time it took place we have not been able to ascertain, though it must have been in the beginning of 1678.* The ceremony was privately performed in the presence of the duchess of York, who honoured the bride with gifts of considerable value, and was not declared for some months. From the time of his marriage, till 1683, Colonel Churchill had no settled home, but submitted to frequent separations from his beloved wife. Being attached to the service of the duke of York, he was hurried from place to place; sometimes despatched on missions of importance abroad, and sometimes following the emigrations of his royal patron during his banishment from court.

Soon after his marriage, Colonel Churchill obtained a regiment of foot; his commission bears date February 17. 1677-78. This appointment was the prelude to a mission of peculiar delicacy. Charles and his brother being incensed against the king of France for refusing to increase the pensions by which he had purchased their connivance at his ambitious designs, affected a disposition to renew the triple alliance. Charles appealed to the parliament, made military preparations, and opened a communication with the Prince of Orange, who had recently espoused his niece the Princess Mary. Colonel Churchill was the agent selected on this

* The biographers of the duke, as well as historians in general, place his marriage as late as 1681, which cannot be correct, because Henrietta, the eldest daughter, was born July 20. 1681, which is proved by the entry of her baptism, in the register of St. Martin's in the Fields, communicated by the vicar, archdeacon Pott, as well as by an entry of the duchess in the family Bible, now in possession of Earl Spencer.

[It may be doubted whether the exact date of the marriage was known to any body, even to the bride herself. Secret the nuptials certainly were; and a letter from Colonel Churchill, dated Brussels, April 12. 1678, is directed to "Miss Jennings;" this epistle was carefully preserved by the present, or future, Mrs. Churchill, who left in her own handwriting these words, on the back: "I believe I was married when this letter was writ; but it was not known to any but the duchess" (of York.)—ED.]

occasion to concert measures with the prince; and is mentioned in the letters of the duke of York as possessing the full confidence both of his brother and himself.*

A letter from the colonel to his lady ascertains the period of this mission, which has hitherto escaped the notice of his biographers.

“ Brussels, April 12.

“ I writ to you from Antwerp, which I hope you have received before now; for I would be glad you should hear from me by every post. I met with some difficulties in my business with the Prince of Orange, so that I was forced to write to England, which will cause me to be two or three days longer abroad than I should have been. But because I would lose no time, I despatch all other things in the mean time, for I do with all my heart and soul long to be with you, you being dearer to me than my own life. On Sunday morning I shall leave this place, so that on Monday at night I shall be at Breda, where the Prince and Princess of Orange are; and from thence you shall be sure to hear from me again. Till when, my soul’s soul, farewell.”

On his return, the colonel found the English government actively employed in carrying his arrangements into effect, and was selected as one of the officers destined for this service. He spent part of the summer at Mintern with his parents, who were now reconciled to his lady. But, towards the beginning of August, he was suddenly summoned to join the expedition which was then ready to depart for the Continent. He quitted with regret the society of his beloved wife and family, and repairing to London, received from the duke of York the notice of his destination.

The forces being despatched from England, the allied armies prepared to act against the French. The duke of Monmouth, as British commander-in-chief, joined the Prince of Orange with a considerable reinforcement; while a large body of troops, under the earl of Ossory, acted with the Spanish army. Lord Feversham, with the remainder, was on the point of his departure, and Colonel Churchill was among the officers who embarked in this division, in virtue of a warrant from the duke of Monmouth, authorising him, as eldest brigadier of foot, to command a brigade in Flanders, consisting of two battalions of guards, one Dutch regi-

* Letters from the Duke of York to the Prince of Orange, April 2. and 7. 1678. — Dalrymple, vol. i. p. 208. 8vo.

ment, and the regiments of the prince and Colonel Legge. In his passage, being driven into Margate by contrary winds, he wrote to his wife at Mintern, announcing that he should not be called into the field, and predicting a speedy accommodation. This prediction was verified, for he had scarcely reached the Continent, before he heard that the Prince of Orange had signed a treaty with the French, which was the prelude to a general peace. The English troops were recalled, and the colonel hastened to England to rejoin the society in which all his affections were centered.

CHAP. II. — CONNEXIONS WITH THE DUKE OF YORK. —
1674-1684.

WE must refer the reader to the histories of the times, for an account of the religious and party feuds which agitated the parliament and nation during the remaining part of the reign of Charles, together with the attempts made, either to exclude the duke of York from the throne, as a Papist, or to limit his authority, in case of his accession. Nor shall we enter into the shameless cabals of the king, the duke of York, and many of the party in opposition with Louis XIV. Colonel Churchill took no public share in the struggle of parties; and it is probable that he did not accept a seat in the House of Commons, from a consciousness that the frankness of his temper would involve him in political broils. Yet, as he confided in the solemn promises of the duke of York not to interfere in the national religion, gratitude as well as interest prompted him to consider the conduct of the party in opposition as unjust, and unconstitutional. To a confidential friend, who has given the earliest account of his life, he observed, "Though I have an aversion to Popery, yet I am no less averse to persecution for conscience sake. I deem it the highest act of injustice to set any one aside from his inheritance, upon bare suppositions of intentional evils, when nothing that is actual appears to preclude him from the exercise of his just rights." But, although such were his sentiments, he was too firmly de-

voted to the Church of England to suffer his attachment and gratitude to outweigh the obligations of duty and conscience; and he continued to profess the Protestant religion, at a time when a real or pretended conversion was construed into an act of merit, by the prince on whom he depended.

His attachment to his religion did not, however, diminish the confidence reposed in him by his royal patron; for, in the continual negotiations of James with his brother and the king of France, we find him frequently charged with the most secret commissions. When the duke of York was compelled to quit England, in March 1679, he attended him to the Hague and to Brussels, and was accompanied by his wife, who then filled a place in the household of the duchess.

James being soon afterwards summoned to England, by a secret order from the king, who was seriously indisposed, was accompanied in his journey by the colonel. On their arrival at Windsor, they found the king recovered, but the presence of the duke of York produced a favourable effect; and though he could not obtain permission to remain at court, he was allowed to transfer his residence to Scotland. During the short interval of this visit, the colonel was despatched to Paris, to accelerate a treaty between Charles and Louis. He was charged with a letter of recommendation from James, who designates him as the master of his wardrobe, to whom entire credit might be given. He returned with the duke to Brussels; and when James established his residence in Scotland, he was, as on other occasions, his constant attendant. During the journey, as well as after his arrival at Edinburgh, on December 4. 1679, we find a few affectionate letters addressed to his wife, whom he had left in London.

James was too deeply interested in the succession to the crown to remain tranquil in Scotland; for in February, 1680, he returned to the capital. After a residence of a few months, during which the colonel was again employed in some honourable missions, he was driven back into Scotland by the efforts of the popular party; Churchill was again his attendant, and enjoyed the happiness of his wife's society, who was in the suite of the duchess of York.

In January, 1681, he was despatched by James to London.

The first object of this mission was, to press the king not to assemble the parliament, which, in the agitated state of the public mind, the duke was apprehensive might propose measures calculated for his exclusion from the throne, or at least might establish such restrictions, as would greatly limit his power, in case of his accession. The second object was to dissuade the king from forming such alliances with Spain and Holland, as would involve him in a war with France, and consequently, in the language of James, "render him a slave to his parliament." To this was added a third, namely, a direct alliance with France, which he was charged to represent as the only expedient for the support of the king, and the preservation of the prerogative, without which the country must again fall under the government of a commonwealth. The last point was to solicit permission for the duke to return, at least for a limited period; or, if this could not be effected, to obtain for him additional powers, and the command of the forces in Scotland.

The extreme delicacy of this commission is proved by the strict injunction given to Colonel Churchill not to communicate it to the ministers, especially to Lord Halifax. By additional directions he was enjoined to press the king to the adoption of resolute counsels, which, as James contended, the experience of the preceding year had proved to be safest.

Arriving at court, Colonel Churchill found the king too much alarmed to embrace the violent counsels of his brother; yet the dexterous negotiator acquired a new title to the confidence of his patron by the extreme address with which he executed his commission, and the impression which his representations made on the mind of the king. On his return he gave James a satisfactory account of the state of parties, and of the ministry; and prevailed on him not to re-appear at court, during the bustle of the new elections, lest his presence should awaken suspicion, and exasperate his enemies.

In the course of the year his lady was delivered in London of her first daughter, Henrietta, on the 19th of July, 1681. Several of his letters prove that the pleasing hopes of a parent beguiled the pain of his frequent absences. A single

extract will prove that the professions of the husband were scarcely less ardent than those of the lover :—

“ *Jan. 3. 1679.* — I writ to you last night by the express, and since that I have no good news to send you. The yachts are not yet come, nor do we know when they will, for the wind is directly against them, so that you may believe that I am not in a very good humour, since I desire nothing so much as being with you. The only comfort I had here was hearing from you, and now if we should be stopped by contrary winds, and not hear from you, you may guess with what satisfaction I shall then pass my time; therefore as you love me, you will pray for fair winds, so that we may not stay here, nor be long at sea. I hope all the red spots of our child will be gone, against I see her, and her nose strait, so that I may fancy it to be like the mother; for as she has your coloured hair, I would have her be like you in all things else. Till next post day farewell. By that time I hope we shall hear of the yachts, for till I do I shall have no kind of patience.”

We shall here insert another letter, though written after the birth of Anne, his second daughter, because it exhibits a picture equally pleasing, of parental and conjugal affection :—

“ *Tunbridge.* — You cannot imagine how I am pleased with the children; for they having nobody but their maid, they are so fond of me, that when I am at home they will be always with me, kissing and hugging me. Their heats are quite gone, so that against you come home they will be in beauty. If there be room I will come on Monday, so that you need not write on Sunday. Miss is pulling me by the arm, that she may write to her dear mamma; so that I shall say no more, only beg that you will love me always as well as I love you, and then we cannot but be happy.”

To gratify the playful importunities of the child, he concludes the letter with a postscript in her name :—

“ I kiss your hands, my dear mamma. — HARRIET.”

When the popular party, and those called the exclusionists were defeated, and Charles had attained the power of giving his brother a permanent establishment at court, Colonel Churchill accompanied his patron on his triumphant return, in 1682. He also attended him on board the Gloucester yacht, when that ship was wrecked near the Lemon and Ore in Yarmouth roads, and so many persons of consideration perished. The colonel was one among the fortunate few who escaped, being invited by James himself to take his place in the boat, which put off to shore, as soon as the loss of the vessel was found to be inevitable.

On this return of prosperity, James did not suffer the services of his faithful attendant to pass unrewarded. He was soon created Baron Churchill of Aymouth, in Scotland, and in 1683 was appointed colonel of the royal regiment of horse-guards, then about to be raised. It was at this period the intention of Lord Churchill that his wife should withdraw from the court; but the marriage of the Princess Anne afforded an opportunity of placing her in a post, which was no less honourable than gratifying to her feelings, that of lady of her royal highness's bed-chamber.

When Miss Jennings was first introduced into the household of the duchess of York, she was noticed by the Princess Anne, then about three years younger than herself. An affectionate disposition on the part of the princess, and on that of her youthful associate the most captivating vivacity, soon rendered them inseparable companions. Habitual intercourse ripened their mutual partiality into the most tender friendship, and at this early period we trace the rise of that romantic affection which long reigned between them. To her friend and confidant the princess recurred in all the momentous, as well as in the trifling incidents of her life; and at the time when the zeal of James for Popery spread the utmost alarm throughout the nation, the princess drew from the counsel and encouragement of her friend additional motives of attachment to that system of worship in which she was educated, and which she considered as endangered by the avowed principles of her father. The princess pressed the appointment of her favourite with affectionate zeal, and announced it to her in a letter full of satisfaction and tenderness. In this situation, and amidst the momentous incidents which marked the period, their intimacy gained new strength, until it rose to a degree of confidence and affection seldom witnessed. One of the many letters, written at this time, will show the style they reciprocally adopted, and the anxiety of the princess to set aside the restraints of high rank and etiquette:—

“ *Winchester, Sept. 20.* — I writ to you last Wednesday from on board the yacht, and left my letter on Thursday morning at Portsmouth, to go by the post, to be as good as my word in writing to my dear Lady Churchill by the first opportunity. I was in so great haste when I writ, that I fear what I said was nonsense, but I hope you have so much kindness for me as to forgive it * * *

“ If you will not let me have the satisfaction of hearing from you again before I see you, let me beg of you not to call me your highness at every word, but to be as free with me as one friend ought to be with another; and you can never give me any greater proof of your friendship than in telling me your mind freely in all things, which I do beg you to do; and if ever it were in my power to serve you, nobody would be more ready than myself. I am all impatient for Wednesday, till when farewell.”

This correspondence became daily more confidential, till at length, to set aside the restraints of rank and custom, the princess offered her friend the choice of two feigned names, under which she proposed to continue their intercourse: — “ I,” says the duchess, “ chose the name of *Freeman*, as more conformable to the frankness of my disposition, and the princess adopted that of *Morley*.” Their style soon assumed the tone which this expedient was calculated to give; and their letters displayed a degree of familiarity and tenderness which seldom exists, even between equals in the higher ranks of society.

CHAP. III.— ABDICATION OF KING JAMES. — 1684—1688.

FROM the marriage of the Princess Anne till the death of Charles II., Lord Churchill does not appear on the theatre of public affairs. The accession of James, by whose favour he had been so long distinguished, naturally opened to his view the prospect of higher honours and a more exalted fortune. Indeed, the first act of the new sovereign was to charge his tried and confidential servant with a mission to Paris, for the purpose of notifying his accession, and gratefully acknowledging the largesses which he had recently received from the French monarch.

Hitherto Lord Churchill had regarded with indulgence the failings of a prince, to whom he was bound by so many ties of respect and gratitude. But he was not so far biassed by gratitude or ambition as to forget his duty to his religion and country; and in a conversation with Lord Galway, during his embassy at Paris, he observed, “ If the king should attempt to change our religion and constitution, I will

instantly quit his service." Like many others, however, he at first gave credit to the solemn declarations of James, and waited with patience, though not without apprehension, to discover whether the conduct of the monarch would accord with his professions.

Lord Churchill attended at the coronation of James; and on the 14th of May he was raised to the English peerage, by the title of Baron Churchill, of Sandridge, in the county of Hertford.

Soon afterwards, the invasion of the duke of Monmouth gave him an opportunity to signalise both his loyalty and military talents. He was appointed to command the forces then assembled at Salisbury, consisting of six troops of horse and nine companies of foot; and to this charge was added the rank of brigadier. With this small corps he performed essential service by his vigilance and activity; he kept his troops in continual motion, scouring the country, collecting intelligence, and dispersing the scattered bands of the rebels, though superior in number. These frequent and well-timed expeditions spread dismay among the disaffected, awed the secret partisans of Monmouth, and repressed that zeal for his cause which was manifested by the lower classes in Somersetshire. During this short struggle he was promoted to the rank of major-general, by a commission dated July 1. 1685.

While Lord Churchill was at Chard, at the head of his own corps and the regiment of Dorsetshire militia, he received a summons from the duke of Monmouth, claiming his allegiance as king of England, and enjoining him to desist from hostilities. Lord Churchill dismissed the trumpeter, and sent the letter to James as a ridiculous bravado. The only answer which he gave was, to continue his exertions in harassing the rebels; and it is generally allowed that his skill and activity compelled Monmouth to concentrate his forces, and precipitate an engagement.

In the battle of Sedgemoor, which decided the fate of Monmouth, the vigilance of Lord Churchill prevented the mischiefs which were likely to result from the negligence of the commander-in-chief, Lord Feversham. He not only saved the royal army from a surprise, on the eve of that me-

morale engagement, but, by his courage and decision, greatly contributed to the success of the day. For his services in this battle he was appointed colonel of the third troop of horse-guards.

From the time of this expedition we find no particular mention of Lord Churchill, till the closing scene of James's reign; a remarkable circumstance, when we consider the favour and confidence he had hitherto enjoyed. Possibly the discordance of his principles, political and religious, with those of the sovereign, may have produced some coolness; and, at all events, he continued to profess his attachment to the Protestant church, at a time when James did not disdain to employ both persuasion and influence to make converts among those who were more immediately attached to his person. Whatever was the cause, Lord Churchill was not raised to any office of state; and the short reign of James offered no farther scope to military talents. Indeed, when we consider the bigoted and arbitrary character of the monarch, we ought rather to wonder that Churchill escaped disgrace, than that he was not distinguished by any accession of honour.

In proportion as the arbitrary designs of James were developed, we find his confidential adherents, and even the members of his own family, expressing their alarm at the consequences of his fanatic zeal for the Roman Catholic religion. A letter from the Princess Anne to Lady Churchill shows the impression made by the introduction of four Popish peers, lords Powis, Arundel, Bellasis, and Dover, into the privy council, in 1686. "I was very much surprised when I heard of the four new privy counsellors, and am very sorry for it; for it will give great countenance to those sort of people, and methinks it has a very dismal prospect. Whatever changes there are in the world, I hope you will never forsake me, and I shall be happy."

When such were the feelings of a daughter, we cannot be surprised to find Lord Churchill adhering to the resolution which he had announced to Lord Galway. The arbitrary declaration of indulgence seems at length to have awakened his alarm for the civil and religious liberties of his country; and the proceedings in favour of the Papists, which immediately followed, gave additional strength to his apprehen-

sions. He was therefore among the first who made overtures to the Prince of Orange: he conveyed assurances of his attachment to the Protestant cause, through Dykvelt, the agent of the prince, and Mr. Russel and Mr. Sidney, the two great movers of the subsequent revolution. At the same time he announced, in a letter to the Prince of Orange, the determination of the Princess Anne rather to abandon her misguided father than to sacrifice her religion, a resolution to which his exhortations, as well as those of his lady, had essentially contributed.

“*May 17. 1687.* — The princess of Denmark having ordered me to discourse with Monsieur Dykvelt, and to let him know her resolutions, so that he might let your highness and the princess her sister know that she was resolved, by the assistance of God, to suffer all extremities, even to death itself, rather than be brought to change her religion, I thought it my duty to your highness and the princess royal, by this opportunity of Monsieur Dykvelt, to give you assurances under my own hand, that my places and the king’s favour I set at nought, in comparison of being true to my religion. In all things but this the king may command me; and I call God to witness, that even with joy I should expose my life for his service, so sensible am I of his favours. I know the troubling you, sir, with thus much of myself, I being of so little use to your highness, is very impertinent, but I think it may be a great ease to your highness and the princess to be satisfied that the princess of Denmark is safe in the trusting of me; I being resolved, although I cannot live the life of a saint, if there be ever occasion for it, to show the resolution of a martyr. — I am, with all respect, sir,” &c.

Lord Churchill, however, was not among the number of those who dissembled their real sentiments, or flattered the bigotry and infatuation of the king. On the contrary, to the last moment, he laboured to rouse the inconsiderate monarch to a sense of his danger before it was too late, and seized every opportunity to remonstrate, in strong though respectful terms, against his attacks on the religious establishment, and the arbitrary system of government which he was endeavouring to introduce.

Lord Churchill waited on the king, in the progress which he made during the summer of 1687, with the view of reconciling the people to the recent innovations. At Winchester James touched in the cathedral several persons for the king’s evil, and two Roman Catholic priests officiated as chaplains. After the ceremony Lord Churchill attended his

majesty to the deanery, and being alone with him in the garden, before dinner, the king said, "Well, Churchill, what do my subjects say about this ceremony of touching in the church?" "Truly," replied Lord Churchill, "they do not approve it; and it is the general opinion that your majesty is paving the way for the introduction of Popery." "How!" exclaimed the king. "Have I not given my royal word, and will they not believe their king? I have given liberty of conscience to others; I was always of opinion that toleration was necessary for all Christian people; and most certainly I will not be abridged of that liberty myself, nor suffer those of my own religion to be prevented from paying their devotions to God in their own way." His majesty having uttered these words with great warmth, Lord Churchill ventured to observe, "What I spoke, sir, proceeded partly from my zeal for your majesty's service, which I prefer above all things next to that of God; and I humbly beseech your majesty to believe that no subject in the three kingdoms will venture farther than I will to purchase your favour and good liking. But as I have been bred a Protestant, and intend to live and die in that communion, as above nine parts in ten of the whole people are of that persuasion, and I fear (which I say from excess of duty) from the genius of the English, and their natural aversion to the Roman Catholic worship, some consequences, which I dare not so much as name, and which I cannot contemplate without horror ——" "I tell you, Churchill," said the king, interrupting him, "I will exercise my own religion in such a manner as I shall think fitting; I will show favour to my Catholic subjects, and be a common father to all my Protestants of what religion soever; but I am to remember that I am a king, and to be obeyed by them. As for the consequences, I shall leave them to Providence, and make use of the power God has put into my hands, to prevent any thing that shall be injurious to my honour, or derogatory to the duty that is owing to me."

At the conclusion of these words the king abruptly broke off the conversation, and returned to the deanery. During the dinner his manner proved how much he resented this freedom, for he principally addressed himself to the dean,

who stood behind his chair, and discoursed the whole time on passive obedience.

The communication which Lord Churchill had already opened with the Prince of Orange was doubtless maintained during the winter of 1687, when the violent acts of the king against the Protestant establishment excited daily new sentiments of alarm and indignation. At the moment when the prince was preparing that expedition, which was to deliver the country from Popery and arbitrary power, we find Lord Churchill conveying to him the most positive declarations of his zeal and attachment.

“*August 4. 1688.* — Mr. Sidney will let you know how I intend to behave myself: I think it is what I owe to God and my country. My honour I take leave to put into your highness's hands, in which I think it safe. If you think there is any thing else that I ought to do, you have but to command me; I shall pay an entire obedience to it, being resolved to die in that religion that it has pleased God to give you both the will and power to protect. I am, with all respect, sir,” &c.

This letter, with the foregoing messages and confidential communications, coming from a nobleman so closely attached to James, both by gratitude and interest, and so beloved by the army, must have greatly strengthened the resolution of the Prince of Orange, for it proved that the misguided zeal of the monarch had even alienated his devoted adherents.

The events of the Revolution are too well known to need recapitulation. It will be sufficient to observe, that after the landing of William, James did not withdraw his confidence from Lord Churchill, but intrusted him with the command of a brigade in the army, which he himself led as far as Salisbury, to repel the invasion, and even raised him to the rank of lieutenant-general. Some suspicion, however, seems to have been conceived against him; for Lord Feversham advised the king to arrest him, as an officer whose defection might produce the most alarming impression. James, from fear, policy, or affection, refused to listen to the proposal; but it could not be concealed from the person whom it so nearly regarded, and on the ensuing day Lord Churchill, went over to the prince with the duke of Grafton, Colonel Berkley, and other officers of his own regiment.

If we review the preceding conduct and declarations of Lord Churchill, we shall need no argument to be convinced

that a sense of patriotism and religion outweighed in his mind the obligations of gratitude and interest; and that he chose the party which he embraced, from a conviction that no other alternative remained to save the constitution and church establishment, and that the only design of William was, to fulfil his declaration of restraining the arbitrary spirit of James, and restoring the parliament to its functions and authority. In departing from Salisbury, he left a letter to the king, explaining and vindicating his conduct.

“ Sir,—Since men are seldom suspected of sincerity, when they act contrary to their interests; and though my dutiful behaviour to your majesty in the worst of times (for which I acknowledge my poor services much overpaid) may not be sufficient to incline you to a charitable interpretation of my actions; yet I hope the great advantage I enjoy under your majesty, which I can never expect in any other change of government, may reasonably convince your majesty and the world that I am actuated by a higher principle, when I offer that violence to my inclination and interest, as to desert your majesty at a time when your affairs seem to challenge the strictest obedience from all your subjects, much more from one who lies under the greatest obligations to your majesty. This, sir, could proceed from nothing but the inviolable dictates of my conscience, and a necessary concern for my religion (which no good man can oppose), and with which I am instructed nothing can come in competition. Heaven knows with what partiality my dutiful opinion of your majesty has hitherto represented those unhappy designs, which inconsiderate and self-interested men have framed against your majesty's true interest and the Protestant religion; but as I can no longer join with such to give a pretence by conquest to bring them to effect, so I will always, with the hazard of my life and fortune (so much your majesty's due) endeavour to preserve your royal person and lawful rights, with all the tender concern and dutiful respect that becomes,” &c.

In great revolutions it is common to find the most upright characters maligned, and the purest principles misrepresented. From this fate Lord Churchill did not escape; for he has been accused of a design to seize or assassinate the king at the time of his departure. Such tales may find a momentary credit when the passions of men are heated; but at present to mention is to refute it.

After retiring from the army of James, his lordship took his route towards the west, and joining the Prince of Orange at Axminster, was received with distinguished marks of attention and regard. His departure was the signal for a more general defection, not only of those who were openly hostile

to James, but even of those who were connected with him by blood. Prince George of Denmark quitted the king at Andover, and repaired to Sherborn, whither the prince had advanced. At nearly the same time, the Princess Anne secretly withdrew from the palace at midnight, in company with Lady Churchill and Mrs. Berkley, and repaired to the lodgings of the bishop of London, with whom her withdrawal was concerted. Then, directing her course to Northampton, she was escorted by a party of horse to Oxford, where she was met by the prince her husband, with a body of troops from the army of the Prince of Orange.

On the approach of William to the capital, and the flight of James to Feversham, Lord Churchill was sent forward to reassemble his own troop of horse-guards, and to bring over the soldiers quartered in and about the metropolis. He executed his commission with equal prudence and activity; and carried back so favourable a report concerning the dispositions of the people and army, as induced the prince to hasten to the capital.

After the departure of James, Lord Churchill assisted in the convention parliament. He was also one of the peers who associated in support of the prince's declaration, and in defence of his person. But when the design was disclosed of placing the prince on the throne, either alone, or in conjunction with his consort, Lord Churchill was among the peers who voted for a regency. At length, however, when the struggle of contending parties rose to such a height as to portend a counter-revolution, and there appeared no alternative but to recall James, or confer the crown on William; his lordship, from motives of delicacy, absented himself from the House of Peers during the discussion which terminated in the memorable vote declaring the vacancy of the throne. His absence, with that of some other peers, who likewise adhered to the rule of hereditary descent, contributed to the decision of this important question, by a majority of seven voices. The vacancy being thus legally declared, Lord Churchill took an active part in the subsequent arrangements. In conjunction with his lady, he persuaded the Princess Anne to postpone her own succession to the throne, and to consent to that of the Prince and Princess of Orange, and thus

removed one great obstacle to the settlement of the nation. The change of government was announced on the 6th of February, and William and Mary declared king and queen. The administration was solely vested in the king; while the princess of Denmark and her heirs were declared next in the succession, in preference to the issue of William by any future marriage.

On the 14th of February Lord Churchill was sworn a member of the privy council, and made a lord of the bed-chamber; and two days before the coronation was raised to the dignity of Earl of Marlborough.

As his paternal seat at Mintern was assigned to his brother Charles, he fixed his principal residence at Sandridge, near St. Albans, a manor belonging to the family of his wife. This estate, by the death of Richard Jennings, Esq., had devolved on his three sisters and coheiresses, Frances, Sarah, and Barbara. As Lady Marlborough was partial to her *birthplace*, her husband gratified her by purchasing the share of the two other sisters, and soon after built a mansion on the spot, which was called Holywell House. This residence and property gave him an interest in the borough of St. Albans, for which place, by his influence with James II., he obtained a new charter of incorporation. He was chosen the first high steward under the new charter; a post which had always been filled by persons of distinction.

The mansion of Holywell is described by local writers as a building of great magnificence; and was the favourite residence both of Lord Marlborough and his lady, till the construction of Blenheim gave him a new interest in a place which presented the most striking monuments both of his own and the national glory.*

* Although Mr. Coxe distinctly implies in the preceding paragraph that Sandridge was the birthplace of the future duchess, later inquiries throw some doubt on the correctness of this statement. It would appear from Mrs. Thomson's researches (Memoirs of Sarah Duchess of Marlborough) that the parish registers make no mention of that fact, nor indeed is the birth of any of the Jennings' family found in them; nor are there in the church, as it now stands, any monuments inscribed with that name. Sandridge is a straggling, and by no means picturesque, village in the vicinity of St. Albans, and the real birthplace is said to have been at Holywell, a suburb of St. Albans, and in a small house near the site of the spacious mansion afterwards erected there by her husband, the first

CHAP. IV.—WAVERING CONDUCT OF MARLBOROUGH.—
1688-1690.

AFTER the conclusion of the arrangements arising out of the Revolution, Marlborough appears to have taken little share in public business, except in the settlement of a revenue on the Princess Anne. The princess having announced her acquiescence in the new order of succession, expected that a permanent and independent revenue would have been secured to her for life, as the king had been allowed no less a sum than 600,000*l.* a year for the civil list. Instead, however, of gratifying her expectations, he even showed some reluctance to continue the allowance of 30,000*l.* a year, which she had enjoyed under her father. She was highly incensed at this disappointment, and testified her resolution to appeal to parliament; while the king and queen were no less offended by her wish to acquire an independent establishment. The

Duke of Marlborough. The house has been since pulled down, and its site was lately occupied by a summer-house between what is called Holywell-street and Sopwell-lane, in St. Albans, and within the space afterwards occupied by the pleasure-grounds of the great house at Holywell. It is a traditional fact corroborated by the testimony of the Rev. Henry Nicholson, rector of the Abbey of St. Albans, whose predecessor had a relative who distinctly recollected that it used to be the boast of her aunt, an old lady of eighty, not long since deceased, that she had herself been removed, when ill of the small-pox, to the very room in the house where the renowned Sarah Jennings first saw the light.

Whether this tradition is more trustworthy than the intimation of the text we shall not decide; but it is a curious biographical incident that a particle of doubt should exist either about the birthplace or deathplace of so celebrated an historical personage, comparatively so recently deceased. Yet such is the case. Neither the place where the first duchess of Marlborough was born nor where she died is beyond dispute. The present descendants appear to have no certain knowledge where the duchess died, but conjecture it to have been at Holywell. This is certainly erroneous, her death taking place in London, October 18th, 1744, at Marlborough House, or, as her early and till recently her only biographer expresses it, "at her house at the Friery, St. James's." Friery Passage was formerly close to Marlborough House.

The estate and mansion at Holywell, being left at the disposal of the Duchess of Marlborough, were by her bequeathed to her grandson John, second son of Charles earl of Sunderland. From him it descended to his son, the first Earl Spencer. — ED.

subject occasioned the most indecorous altercations between the two royal sisters, and became the source of the subsequent quarrel which divided the royal family. Irritated by these disputes, Anne pursued her purpose with redoubled zeal, and her cause was earnestly promoted by the Earl and Countess of Marlborough. Her pretensions were warmly supported by the Tories and disaffected, while the king would rely only on his own personal friends and the zealous Whigs. A considerable majority of the parliament was therefore enlisted on the side of the princess, and her claims became generally popular among the great body of the nation.

In this state of the public mind, her friends in the House of Commons proposed to grant her an independent revenue of 70,000*l.* a year. To prevent the decision of the question, the king adjourned the parliament. But the princess was of too tenacious a character to relinquish her object, particularly as her party was increased by many who were alienated by the reserve of the king. In this crisis lures and threats were alternately held forth to the Countess of Marlborough, with the hope of inducing the princess to desist through her influence. The countess continued firm, and the question was revived in the House of Commons soon after the commencement of the session. The court now found that opposition was fruitless. With the consent of both parties the debate was adjourned; and, in the interval, a compromise was effected, by which an annual allowance of 50,000*l.* was settled in parliament as the civil list of the princess.

The success of this measure being principally ascribed by Anne to the exertions of the Earl and Countess of Marlborough, contributed still more to endear them to her, while it rendered them in an equal degree obnoxious to the king and queen. Anne was not tardy in testifying her gratitude for so acceptable a service; and, in an affectionate letter, offered her favourite an additional salary of 1000*l.* a year. The countess at first declined the generous proposal from motives of delicacy, but her scruples were overruled by the representations of Lord Godolphin.

Though dissatisfied with Marlborough's conduct respecting the settlement of the princess, William was unwilling to lose the services of so able an officer. As his presence was deemed necessary in England for the regulation of public

business, Marlborough was intrusted with the command of the British forces acting against the French in the Netherlands. On the 27th of May he landed at Rotterdam, and, repairing to Maestricht, joined the confederate army, then commanded by the prince of Waldeck. Being inferior to the enemy, they were reduced to act on the defensive. But Marlborough soon found an opportunity to signalise his courage and skill. The hostile armies being separated only by the petty town of Walcourt, the French commander, Marshal d'Humieres, formed the design of surprising his antagonists by an unexpected attack. Fortunately the post of Walcourt was confided to Marlborough, with a force composed of British and foreign troops. He not only checked the advance of the enemy till the commander-in-chief could move with the main army, but by a vigorous and well-directed attack on the flank, discomfited the assailants, and forced them to retreat with a serious loss. To this action the army owed their safety; and the prince of Waldeck did ample justice to the skill and promptitude of his younger associate, by declaring that he had manifested greater military talents in a single battle than generals of longer experience had shown in many years.*

Returning to England at the close of the campaign, Marlborough was received with a degree of cordiality which was seldom shown by so reserved a monarch as William. It seemed natural to expect that he would have been again employed on the theatre where he had acquitted himself with such unqualified approbation; but from some cause, which we are unable to trace, he was not sent to the Continent the ensuing campaign. It is, indeed, surmised, and with great probability, that William pressed Marlborough to accompany

* In several letters, which are still extant, the king testified his satisfaction at the conduct of Marlborough. They also proved that he performed this exploit, not with troops in high spirit and order, but ill-disciplined, defective in zeal, and labouring under the usual maladies attendant on a long campaign. On the combat of Walcourt, in particular, the king observes: "I am very happy that my troops behaved so well in the affair of Walcourt. It is to you that this advantage is principally owing. You will please accordingly to accept my thanks, and rest assured that your conduct will induce me to confer on you still farther marks of my esteem and friendship, on which you may always rely."

him to Ireland, whither he was called to contend for the crown with the abdicated monarch himself; but that the earl frankly declined acting against his former sovereign and benefactor. Indeed this supposition is not improbable from his subsequent conduct; for, after the defeat at the Boyne had compelled James to retire to France, he voluntarily tendered his services to reduce Cork and Kinsale, at the time when the presence of William was become necessary in England.

Notwithstanding the obvious necessity of such a vigorous prosecution of the war, before the rebels could again obtain succours from France, it was warmly opposed by several of the ministers in England. Of these the most vehement was the marquis of Caermarthen, who endeavoured to alarm the queen with the prospect of an invasion, at the moment when so large a force as was required for this enterprise should be drawn out of the kingdom. A reference was made to William, who was still in Ireland; and the timid counsels of the minister being overruled, Marlborough, with a body of 5000 men, embarked at Portsmouth for the scene of action.

The departure of the king at this juncture created general exultation among the partisans of James in Ireland. They flattered themselves that it would enable them to regain the advantage they had lost; but their hopes were damped by the sudden appearance of Marlborough. They were still farther discouraged by the desertion of the duke de Lauzun, with the French auxiliaries, who, being panic-struck at the arrival of the reinforcement, abandoned Galway and returned to France.

Marlborough landed near Cork on the 21st of September, and united with the German and Danish troops, whom King William had left under the command of the duke of Wirtemberg. At this moment he experienced those vexatious squabbles, which often arise when high birth and military talents are brought into competition. But by the interposition of Brigadier La Mellonerie, a French refugee, a compromise was effected, and the two generals agreed to exercise the command alternately. The first day Marlborough gave *Wirtemberg* as the word; and the compliment was returned by his colleague. The vigour and enterprising spirit of the British general excited equal surprise and satisfaction. Dur-

ing his short stay in Ireland, which did not exceed thirty-seven days, he reduced Cork and Kinsale, straitened the communications of the insurgents with France, and confined them to the province of Ulster, where they could not subsist without the utmost difficulty.

After this short but brilliant expedition, Marlborough returned with his prisoners to England, in the latter end of October. He was welcomed with the most flattering reception by the king, who said of him, "I know no man who has served so few campaigns equally fit for command." The English nation also, long accustomed to see the execution of the most important enterprises confided to foreigners, exulted to find that a native officer had gained more advantages in a single month than many of the foreign generals in several campaigns.

As the services of Marlborough were still deemed necessary in Ireland, he made but a short stay in England. Having reported the state of affairs, he immediately returned, and resumed his command. Till the close of the year he kept the greater part of the island in perfect tranquillity; and conciliated the affections of the inhabitants by his moderation, as well as by the rigid discipline which he established in the army. He checked the incursions of the rebels, who still remained in arms, and secured the advantage he had gained, by constructing forts in several of the provinces. Having thus restored order, he was summoned to England, preparatory to his nomination to a new command on the Continent. The estimation in which he was now held by his sovereign is proved from a confidential correspondence, in which it appears that he was employed to soothe his friend Godolphin, who threatened to relinquish the management of the treasury. In this negotiation he at length succeeded, no less to his own gratification than to that of the king.

Nothing perhaps can be more singular, if there be any thing singular in times of revolution, than to find two noblemen who had so essentially contributed to the stability of William's throne, as Marlborough and Godolphin, at this very period engaged in a clandestine correspondence with the exiled monarch. But such is the inconsistency of human nature; and such is the fact which has been disclosed by the publication of papers from the pens of James and his confi-

dential adherents. This conduct, which it is impossible to justify, yet admits of some palliation, if we consider the circumstances of the times, and the influence of example. The minds of men were not yet become fixed, nor their affections attached to a government of recent origin, founded on principles which were far from being generally acknowledged. Besides, among the higher orders there were few who did not deem their services undervalued, their zeal ill rewarded, their hopes disappointed, or their pretensions overlooked; while among the great mass of the people, a vast number either became indifferent to the advantages attending the change of government, or were no less dissatisfied with the reigning sovereign than they had been with his predecessor. Hence we find an intercourse with the exiled family maintained by persons of all ranks and parties, not excepting even some of the active partisans of the Revolution.

In treachery so extensive, which is the prevailing vice of a revolutionary period, it is matter rather of regret than of surprise to find Marlborough implicated. For this conduct various causes may be assigned. Deeply indebted to the favour of James, it was not till after an anxious struggle between duty and gratitude, that he resolved to abandon his benefactor. The preceding pages will show his feelings at that interesting crisis; and prove that he was not actuated by personal interest or ambition. Though dissatisfied with the arrangements introduced at the Revolution, he yet acquiesced in the change when accomplished; and by accepting honours and employments under the new sovereign, he gave an unqualified assent to the established government. Soon afterwards, however, he, as well as many others of all denominations, was alienated by the endeavours of the king to break down the barriers devised for the security of the national church, and to facilitate the admission of dissenters into the offices of government; a measure scarcely less obnoxious to the Tories than the introduction of Catholics to the Whigs. He was also offended by the cold and repulsive deportment of William towards those who had assisted in the Revolution, and the imprudent preference which he uniformly displayed towards his foreign favourites. But the motive which seems more particularly to have actuated Marlborough, as well as many of those who entered into

communications with the court of St. Germain, was, the apprehension that a change of public sentiment might eventually restore King James to the throne of his ancestors.

Under the apparent influence of these considerations, Marlborough listened to the overtures of the exiled monarch as early as the commencement of 1691, and through Colonel Sackville and Mr. Bulkeley, two of the Jacobite agents, he testified in the most unqualified terms his contrition for his past conduct, and anxiety to make amends for his defection. From this period both he and his friend Godolphin occasionally maintained a clandestine intercourse with the court of St. Germain, and even made many communications on the state of public affairs and domestic transactions. On this intercourse we do not mean to throw the slightest doubt. Still, however, we can admit as the genuine language of Marlborough, only the few letters which he wrote to James, and which are either preserved or specifically mentioned, in the biographical narrative of that monarch; for the reports of spies naturally assume the tincture of their character and views; and such agents are invariably led to exaggeration, either to give interest to their intelligence, or to magnify their zeal and services. In fact, we have the candid avowal of James himself, that Marlborough, when pressed to fulfil the promises he was said to have made, constantly evaded compliance. We must therefore draw the obvious conclusion, not only that the Jacobite agents deceived their employer, but that these professions and communications were merely illusory, and intended to secure an indemnity in case of a counter-revolution. This inference has been so clearly drawn by the monarch himself, that we cannot better express our opinion than in the words of his biographer. After advert- ing to the very communication in question, he observes: "Nevertheless the king found no effects from these mighty promises, for his majesty insisting upon his offer of bringing over the English troops in Flanders, as the greatest service he could do him, he excused himself *under pretence that there was some mistake in the message*; that it would ruin all to make the troops come over by parcels; that his business was to gain an absolute power over them, then to do all the business at once."

Having related the mode in which Marlborough obtained

a promise of pardon for himself, his lady, Lord Godolphin, and others, he adds: "So that, in fine, they were to be pardoned and in security, in case the king returned, and yet to suffer nothing in the interim, nor to give any other proofs of their sincerity, than bare words and empty promises, which, under pretence of being suspected, or doing greater service afterwards, there was never found a suitable time to put the least of them in execution. However, the king thought fit to bear with this sort of double dealing," &c.*

This intercourse was either not suspected, or not regarded; for the success of Marlborough in Ireland was the prelude to his establishment in an honourable and confidential post under William himself. In May, 1691, he accompanied the king to the Continent; and was employed in accelerating the military preparations, and assembling the troops for the ensuing campaign. On this occasion he experienced that jealous opposition from the States General and their officers, which afterwards defeated his more important undertakings. Among other suggestions he strongly recommended measures for the security of Mons, the barrier of Flanders; but his advice was rejected, and the place was lost. During this campaign his merit attracted particular notice; and induced discerning judges to prognosticate his future celebrity. Among others, the prince of Vaudemont, being asked by the king to give his opinion on the characters of the English generals, replied, "Kirk has fire, Laneir thought, Mackay skill, and Colchester bravery; but there is something inexpressible in the Earl of Marlborough. All their virtues seem to be united in his single person. I have lost," he emphatically added, "my wonted skill in physiognomy, if any subject of your majesty can ever attain such a height of military glory, as that to which this combination of sublime perfections must raise him." William acknowledged the propriety of the observation by replying, with a smile, "Cousin, you have done your part in answering my question; and I believe the Earl of Marlborough will do his to verify your prediction."

At the conclusion of the campaign Marlborough returned to England, apparently high in the confidence and esteem of the sovereign, for he was one of the generals appointed to

* See Appendix, note A.

serve the ensuing year. Indeed, the manifest preference which he enjoyed, excited the envy of many among the ministers. We find the marquis of Caermarthen, in particular, designating him, even to the queen, as the "general of favour," and interfering so invidiously in military business as to draw from Marlborough an indignant appeal to the king. The countenance of the monarch, however, supported him amidst these petty vexations; and the year closed with the same flattering prospects which had marked its commencement.

CHAP. V.—CABALS AGAINST THE DUKE.—1692.

NOTWITHSTANDING this apparent favour, Marlborough soon felt the natural effects of his delicate connexion with the actual possessor, and the presumptive heiress to the crown. We have already traced the commencement of the contentions between the king and the Princess Anne, which successive incidents continued to increase. Among other causes of dissatisfaction, she was offended at the rejection of an offer made by the prince her husband, to serve on board of the fleet, and still more by the mode in which it was conveyed. Such bickerings could not have failed to recoil on Marlborough and his countess, even had he not rendered himself particularly obnoxious by his indiscreet remonstrances against the king's bounty to his foreign adherents, and by his contemptuous treatment of the earl of Portland, whom he publicly stigmatised as a wooden fellow.* The odium which he thus incurred was manifested by the refusal of the king to confer on him the order of the Garter, though it was earnestly solicited both by the prince and princess of Denmark.

Such mutual irritation could not long continue without producing an open rupture. Accordingly, on the evening of January 9th, 1692, an indecorous altercation took place

* In one of Lord Godolphin's letters to Marlborough, he designates Portland as "him whom you used to call 'un homme de bois.'" The duchess also, in one of her narratives, says, her husband used to call the earl of Portland "a wooden fellow."

between the two royal sisters, and the queen did not hesitate to threaten the princess with a reduction of her revenue to one half of the actual amount. Whether Marlborough and his lady were implicated in this uncourtly scene is uncertain; but he felt the first public effect of the royal displeasure. On the ensuing morning, after fulfilling his usual duties as lord of the bed-chamber, he received an order from the king, through Lord Nottingham, secretary of state, announcing his dismissal from all his offices, both civil and military, and prohibiting his appearance at court.

This affront towards a faithful servant rankled in the mind of the princess, and a gloomy reserve prevailed in the royal family, which portended a new commotion. At this moment, also, the enemies whom Marlborough had provoked by his remonstrances and sarcasms, omitted no effort to widen the breach. A powerful cabal was formed by the earl of Portland and the family of Villiers*, whose intrigues were rendered more dangerous by their intimate access to the king. To this cabal belonged Lady Fitzharding, a sister of the countess of Portland, who availed herself of her situation in the household of the princess, and the confidence of Lady Marlborough, to act as a spy on the conduct of the princess and her favourite; and to report, in aggravated terms, the indecorous and insulting language which they habitually used in speaking of the king.†

* Edward Villiers, afterwards successively created Baron Villiers, and earl of Jersey, was in high favour with King William, to whom his sister Elizabeth was mistress, and at the same time his lady enjoyed the confidence of Queen Mary. Viscountess Fitzharding was his third sister; and the fourth was married to the earl of Portland. During the whole reign of William this family exercised prodigious influence; a circumstance which was the more extraordinary because he himself was considered as a Jacobite, and his wife was a bigoted Catholic.

† In the indorsement of a letter from Lady Fitzharding, the duchess admits the indiscretion of her language, and says, it was reported to the king and queen. In similar indorsements to letters from Mrs. Elizabeth Villiers, afterwards Lady Orkney, she states, that this lady overheard much of this imprudent language, and that she was in the cabal against the Earl of Marlborough. In fact, when we find, even in the letters of the princess, such epithets applied to William as "the monster," "Caliban," and "the Dutch abortion," we cannot suppose that the style of her favourite was more decorous, or their ordinary conversation more guarded. These offensive terms the duchess has carefully expunged from all the

Early in January an anonymous letter was conveyed to the princess, indicating this cabal, and announcing that the disgrace of Marlborough would not terminate with his dismissal; but that, on the prorogation of parliament, he would be imprisoned. This correspondent also stated that the tears which she had been seen to shed since the disgrace of Marlborough had provoked the king and queen, and that the meeting which he held with Godolphin and Russel on the evening of his dismissal had excited great jealousy at court. It concluded with apprising the princess that she would be compelled to dismiss Lady Marlborough.

This informant was not widely mistaken. The countess, who had absented herself from court since the disgrace of her lord, was at length persuaded by her friends to attend the princess at the levée of the queen, on the 4th of February. Such an imprudent step, which was far from being prompted by motives of respect, was considered as a premeditated insult. On the ensuing morning a harsh letter was conveyed from the queen, commanding the princess to dismiss Lady Marlborough without delay. Instead, however, of complying, she still farther provoked the queen by a justification of her favourite, and an order was transmitted by the lord chamberlain, enjoining the countess to remove from the palace of Whitehall. The order was the prelude to an utter breach. Anne, disdainful to remain in a place from whence her friend and confidante was excluded, quitted her own apartments, and, after a temporary stay at Sion Hill, the seat of the duke of Somerset, established her residence at Berkley House.

Common resentment and common mortification gave new strength to the romantic affection which subsisted between the princess and her favourite. To an offer made by the countess, of withdrawing from her service, Anne replied with the most tender expostulations, asseverating that she was not the cause of the rupture which had occurred. In one of her notes she observes, "I really long to know how my dear Mrs. Freeman got home; and now I have this opportunity of writing, she must give me leave to tell her, if she should ever be so cruel to leave her faithful Mrs. Morley, she letters of the princess, which she has printed in her "Conduct." and has even erased them in the originals.

will rob her of the joy of her life ; for if that day should come, I should never enjoy another happy minute ; and I swear to you I would shut myself up and never see a creature."

Before the surprise occasioned by the preceding incidents had subsided, Marlborough was suddenly arrested on the 5th of May, on a charge of high treason. Warrants were likewise issued against the earls of Huntingdon and Scarsdale, and Dr. Spratt, bishop of Rochester. Several other persons were also taken into custody, particularly Lord Middleton, the Lords Griffin and Dunmore, Sir John Fenwick, and Colonels Slingsby and Sackville, all of whom were known partisans of the Stuart family.

The moment of these arrests was a crisis of peculiar danger and alarm ; for a French fleet was on the point of sailing, to convey the dethroned monarch with a large body of troops to the British shores. The avowed Jacobites were consequently seized by way of precaution, and not on any specific charge. With regard to the Earls of Marlborough and Scarsdale and the bishop of Rochester the case was different, though the time and mode of their detention seemed to involve them in the designs which popular opinion ascribed to the rest. In fact, they were arrested in consequence of an atrocious scheme formed by one Robert Young, then imprisoned in Newgate for the nonpayment of a fine. This wretch, who was expert in counterfeiting hands, drew up an engagement in favour of James II., to which he annexed the signatures of the Earls of Marlborough and Scarsdale, the bishop of Rochester, Lord Cornbury, and Sir Basil Firebrass. To give additional colour to his scheme, he also forged several letters from Marlborough. By the agency of Stephen Blackhead, a confederate equally infamous, he found means to secrete the fictitious document in the palace belonging to the bishop of Rochester, at Bromley, in Kent. On the information of Young the palace was searched, and the paper being found, measures were immediately adopted to secure the supposed delinquents.

As peers could not be arrested except on an affidavit, Young made the customary deposition for drawing up the several warrants. When that against Marlborough was presented to the cabinet council for approbation, three of the

members, the earls of Devonshire and Bradford, and Lord Montagu, appear to have been struck by the infamous character of the accuser; and, instead of affixing their signatures, contemptuously handed it to those sitting next. It was, however, sanctioned by the majority, and was carried into execution.

In the language of conscious innocence, Marlborough made an immediate appeal to those members of the administration in whose integrity he confided. To the earl of Devonshire, lord high steward, he wrote:—"I am so confident of my innocence, and so convinced, if there be any such letter, that it must appear to be forged and made use of only to keep me in prison, that I cannot doubt but your lordship will be so kind as to let me find your protection against such a proceeding, which will be a reproach to the government, as well as an injury to yours," &c.

He made a similar appeal to the marquis of Caermarthen, president of the council, whose judgment, he was convinced, would not be biassed by the remembrance of their former contentions.

"Having been informed that it is now publicly discoursed in Westminster Hall to-day, that a letter under my hand was to be produced to the grand jury, to induce them to find a bill against me, I beg leave to assure your lordship, upon my honour and credit, that, if any such letter be pretended, it must and will, upon examination, appear so plainly to have been forged, that as it can be of no credit or advantage to the government, so I doubt not but your lordship's justice will be ready to protect me from so injurious a proceeding, who am," &c.

The arrest of Marlborough, though not unforeseen, struck a panic into the court of Berkley House. We find a letter of condolence, written by the princess to her favourite, as soon as the news had transpired:

"I hear Lord Marlborough is sent to the Tower; and though I am certain they have nothing against him, and expected by your letter it would be so, yet I was struck when I was told it; for methinks it is a dismal thing to have one's friends sent to that place. I have a thousand melancholy thoughts, and cannot help fearing they should hinder you from coming to me; though how they can do that, without making you a prisoner, I cannot imagine. I am just told by pretty good hands, that as soon as the wind turns westerly there will be a guard set upon the

prince and me. If you hear there is any such thing designed, and that 'tis easy to you, pray let me see you before the wind changes; for afterwards one does not know whether they will let one have opportunities of speaking to one another. But let them do what they please, nothing shall ever vex me, so I can have the satisfaction of seeing dear Mrs. Freeman; and I swear I would live on bread and water, between four walls, with her, without repining; for as long as you continue kind nothing can ever be a real mortification to your faithful Mrs. Morley*, who wishes she may never enjoy a moment's happiness, in this world or the next, if ever she proves false to you."

Whether the hint which the princess conveys, of a design to place her and her consort under restraint, was an effect of mere rumour; or whether William was unwilling to hazard so decisive a measure, we cannot ascertain. But the princess suffered no other mortification than the imprisonment of her zealous adherent, and the loss of the honour attached to her high station.

In endeavouring to trace the causes of this mysterious transaction, we must distinguish between the disgrace and arrest, and the subsequent detention of Marlborough. Some who were well acquainted with his early history, especially the duchess, ascribe his disgrace to the zeal he displayed in promoting the grant of a permanent revenue to the princess of Denmark. Others have imputed his mortifications to the jealousy which his popularity and military talents raised in the mind of William; to an accusation that he attempted to sow divisions in the army; and to his disclosure of a design formed for the surprise of Dunkirk. Finally, the cause has been sought in the bickerings between the two courts, and the imprudent remonstrances which Marlborough presumed to make against the partiality of the king towards his Dutch adherents, and his reserve towards the English.

Of all these different conjectures, the last alone is sufficient to account for the dismissal of Marlborough: for the magnanimous character of William exempts him from the slightest imputation of personal jealousy; the charge of

* The origin of this nomenclature has been already explained, (at page 16.) as a suggestion of the kind-hearted princess, who thought by these familiar names to bring all parties into a more free and unreserved communion. Lord Godolphin, who formed another confidential member of the circle, was termed Mr. *Montgomery*. — Ed.

endeavouring to sow divisions in the army was a mere vague rumour of the day ; the design against Dunkirk did not take place till the ensuing August ; and the earl was confidentially employed by the king, more than two years after the discussion relative to the revenue of the princess.

For Marlborough's subsequent detention, we must seek another cause, namely, his clandestine intercourse with the exiled family. We have already adverted to the commencement of that intercourse : and whether the motive which induced him to listen to the overtures of the Stuart agents, arose from disgust with William, or the fear of a counter-revolution, we cannot doubt that it must have operated with double force, during the course of the preceding winter, when he was personally implicated in the dispute between the princess and the king ; and when a powerful expedition was preparing in the French ports, to restore the exiled monarch. So general was the panic felt on this occasion, that even the princess of Denmark herself made overtures to her father, towards the close of 1691. Such a correspondence could not have entirely escaped the vigilance of William ; and he might naturally have ascribed the overture of the princess to the advice of Marlborough and his countess, who possessed her full confidence. But whatever were his suspicions, the evidence on which they were founded was too slender to justify severer measures ; for otherwise the powerful cabal, whom Marlborough had so grievously offended, would scarcely have failed to push their vengeance farther than mere detention.

The atrocious forgery of Young was detected the instant he was confronted with the bishop of Rochester. Accordingly the prelate, and all those implicated in the same charge, except Marlborough, were released without delay. Even the arrested Jacobites were liberated, when the defeat of the French fleet off La Hogue had dissipated the alarm of invasion. But although the guilt of Young and his associate was legally substantiated*, and although they suffered a

* The duchess asserts that when Young was about to suffer death, for another crime, he confessed with great contrition that he had obtained the Earl of Marlborough's seal and signature by writing to him under the name of a country gentleman, requesting the character of a domestic who had lived in his service. Marlborough acknowledged, when the forged

severe punishment for their offence, Marlborough was detained in custody till the last day of the term. He was then admitted to bail in the court of King's Bench, on the surety of the earl of Shrewsbury, the marquis of Halifax, the earl of Carbury, and Mr. Boyle.

Still, however, some suspicion was entertained of his fidelity, or his enemies did not deem him sufficiently mortified; for on the 23d of June his own name, and those of his two sureties, the marquis of Halifax and the earl of Shrewsbury were erased from the list of privy counsellors. Such severe measures created much dissatisfaction. Admiral Russel in particular, who had acquired additional consideration from his recent victory off La Hogue, strongly remonstrated with the king on the harshness shown towards a nobleman who had contributed to place the crown on his head.

At the commencement of Michaelmas term, Marlborough, with his sureties, applied to be discharged from their recognisance. Their demand being rejected, they, on the meeting of Parliament, appealed to the House of Peers, as well against his detention without any specific charge, as against the subsequent refusal to release his bail. The appeal was warmly supported by Shrewsbury, who represented Marlborough as ungratefully and unjustly treated; and the question gave rise to several vehement debates. At length the king terminated the discussion by discharging the recognisance, and the House of Peers vindicated their privileges, by a declaration against such arrests and detention of their members in future. The ministers were exonerated by a bill of indemnity.

CHAP. VI.—MARLBOROUGH'S RESTORATION TO POWER.— 1692-1697.

AFTER his liberation, the Earl of Marlborough was estranged from the court. His income being reduced by the loss of his lucrative employments, he alternately resided at his mansion

papers were shown him, that the hand-writing was so exactly imitated as to have deceived even himself, had he not been conscious that he had never signed such instrument.

of Sandridge, and in the apartments which his lady occupied at Berkley House. The Princess Anne, indeed, considered him as the victim of her cause, and proposed to create in her household a new place in his favour, with a salary of 1000*l.* a year; but the offer was declined.

Soon after this period, attempts were made to soothe the resentment of the king. The duke of Shrewsbury, who had recently been appointed secretary of state, and placed at the head of a new administration, availed himself of the complaints, arising from the ill success of the war on the Continent, to recommend Marlborough to notice. But to his urgent representations in Marlborough's favour, William coldly replied, "I do not think it for the good of my service to intrust the command of my troops to him."

Towards the close of the year, a melancholy event occurred, which produced a change in the situation of the royal family. This was, the death of Queen Mary, which happened on the 28th of December, 1694. Since the unfortunate rupture, which followed the disgrace of Marlborough, various attempts had been made to mediate a reconciliation between the queen and princess, but without effect; because the offended dignity of Mary vanquished her affection as a sister, and in her last moments her disorder was too malignant, and her dissolution too sudden for her to receive the overtures made by the princess.

The death of the queen placed William in a new and critical situation. Many had begun to suggest doubts of his right to the crown, and some even argued, that as the parliament had been summoned in the joint names of the king and queen, it was dissolved by the death of either. Had the princess abetted these objections, she might doubtless have created much confusion in the state, and formed a party dangerous to the authority of the king. But instead of testifying the slightest wish to question his right, she made an affectionate appeal to his feelings, in a letter of condolence, expressing extreme concern at having incurred the displeasure of the deceased queen, and declaring her readiness to wait on him, and give proofs of respect for his person, and zeal for his interest.

At the moment when this spontaneous overture had produced its effect, Lord Somers, who had long regretted the

feuds in the royal family, repaired to the palace of Kensington. He found the king sitting at the end of his closet, in an agony of grief, more acute than seemed consonant to his phlegmatic temper. Absorbed in reflection, William took no notice of the intrusion, till Somers himself broke silence, by proposing to terminate the unhappy difference with the princess. The king replied, "My lord, do what you will; I can think of no business!" To a repetition of the proposal, the same answer was returned. By the agency of Somers an interview was accordingly arranged, in which the king received the princess with cordiality, and informed her that the palace of St. James's should be appropriated for her future residence.

During the interval between the liberation of Marlborough and the death of Queen Mary, we find him, in conjunction with Godolphin, and many others, continuing a clandestine intercourse with the exiled family. On the 2d of May, 1694, only a few days before he offered his services to King William through Lord Shrewsbury, he communicated to James, by Colonel Sackville, intelligence of an expedition, then fitted out, for the purpose of destroying the fleet in Brest harbour. Godolphin, though a minister, is even said to have made the same disclosure on the preceding day. We are far from attempting to palliate this act of infidelity; yet from the time and circumstances of the communication, we are inclined to regard it in no other light than as one of the various expedients adopted by Marlborough and others, to regain the good will of their former sovereign, that their demerits might be overlooked in the event of a restoration.

This inference may fairly be drawn from all the circumstances attending the expedition. The communication is said to have been made by Godolphin on the first of May; and on the second by Marlborough, through Colonel Sackville. This was only the day before the English fleet put to sea. Allowing for the time requisite to convey the information to St. Germain's, it evidently could not have been the cause that the Brest fleet escaped, and joined that of Toulon; for it had sailed even before Admiral Russel reached Portsmouth to assume the command. As little could it have been the cause of the ultimate failure; for the magnitude and nature of the preparations must have indicated to the enemy

the object of attack, long before such information could reach the French court. In fact, some letters which passed between Admiral Russel and Shrewsbury, prove that they considered the expedition as hopeless so early as the beginning of May. They concur in ascribing the failure to the delays which arose, and the inadequacy of the land force employed, and they admit that these delays gave the enemy ample time to mature all his measures of defence.

But whatever were the real motives of Marlborough, in this and similar communications to the exiled monarch, his intercourse with the Stuart agents could not be concealed; and a proof of the danger to which he exposed himself, was afforded in the case of Sir John Fenwick.*

* Fenwick was one of the most notorious Jacobites, and deeply implicated in the plot to assassinate King William. Being arrested in his attempt to escape, his guilt was proved by an intercepted letter, which he had addressed to his wife. After strongly denying the charges against him, in his examination before the lords justices, he was confounded by the production of this letter, and offered to purchase his pardon by an ample disclosure, provided he was excused from appearing as an evidence. His request being denied, he threw himself on the royal mercy.

To prove his contrition, he delivered to the duke of Devonshire, lord high steward, who, by the king's order, visited him in the Tower, a written confession, containing vague accounts of the plots and projects of the Jacobites, and obscure allusions to certain persons, who were stated to be intrusted with the management of King James's affairs in England. Being required to specify these persons, he delivered other papers, in which he named the duke of Shrewsbury, the Earls of Marlborough and Bath, Lord Godolphin, Admiral Russel, and others of less note. He also indicated the services which they were respectively to perform; stating in particular that King James deemed himself secure of the army by means of Lord Marlborough. He added, that Shrewsbury, Marlborough, and Russel had accepted pardons from their former sovereign.

As these accusations were too ill defined, and ill supported, to obtain credit, Fenwick was ordered for trial. But from the absence of the duke of Devonshire, in the country, and the expectation of the king's return from the Continent, the prosecution was deferred. The delay afforded his friends an opportunity of tampering with Goodman, a principal witness against him, who was bribed to escape beyond sea. Captain Porter, the second witness, affected to listen to similar proposals; but betrayed the attempt to government, and contrived that his conversation with Lady Mary Fenwick should be overheard, and the fact substantiated. Still, however, as Porter alone remained, Fenwick hoped to escape, because the law of treason requires the crime to be proved by two competent witnesses.

The accusations against persons so high in rank and confidence pro-

We have no document to prove the feelings of Marlborough during this investigation, except a single letter to

duced a great sensation. Godolphin, who was naturally timid, caught the alarm, and withdrew from office¹; and Shrewsbury was unable to appear in his own vindication, being detained in the country by the consequences of a fall from his horse. The resignation of one of these noblemen, and the absence of the other, gave rise to such injurious surmises that it was deemed proper to bring the matter before the cognisance of parliament.

Accordingly, on the 6th November, soon after the opening of the session, Admiral Russel, with the king's consent, submitted the papers and proceedings relative to Sir John Fenwick to the House of Commons. The prisoner was then brought to the bar, and publicly questioned on the charges which he had advanced against each individual. Colonel Godfrey, the brother-in-law of Marlborough, in particular, required him to declare whether since the beginning of the war the earl had held with him any communication whatever; what was the service on the performance of which King James promised a pardon: and lastly, whether he could prove, by any testimony beside his own, that the accused peer had sent Lloyd, one of the principal agents, to France. To these and other queries relating to the persons implicated, Fenwick declined replying, under the plea that his answers might criminate himself. In consequence of this evasion he was ordered to withdraw. Russel then vindicated himself in an animated speech, and was followed by several other members who were interested to justify their own conduct or that of their friends. The question was finally put to the vote, and the charges declared false and scandalous, without a division.

As the want of witnesses prevented a regular process in the ordinary courts of justice, a bill of attainder against Fenwick, for his design on the life of the king, was immediately brought into the House of Commons. Yet although little doubt was entertained of his guilt, such a measure was regarded as a dangerous precedent. After several warm discussions, in which it was evidently made a party question, it passed on the 25th of November by a majority of only twenty-three voices.

On the 1st of December the bill was transmitted to the Lords. After the papers of accusation, examined by the Commons, had been read, Marlborough rose and addressed the house: "I do not wonder," he

¹ It is singular that the resignation or rather dismission, of Lord Godolphin, from the office of first commissioner of the treasury, in October, 1696, is scarcely noticed by historians. Ralph mentions him as not being one of the lords justices in 1697, without appearing to be aware of his resignation. The fact is, that he was alarmed at Fenwick's accusation; and the distinction made by the king between Shrewsbury and Russel, and the Tories. As he was obnoxious to Sunderland, that artful statesman availed himself of these circumstances, and persuaded him to offer his resignation, which was accepted by the king. — *Shrewsbury Papers*.

the duke of Shrewsbury, in which he appears to regard it as rather affecting that nobleman than himself.

observed, "to find a man in danger willing to throw his guilt upon others. I feel great satisfaction in being named in such good company; but I assure your lordships, on my word and honour, that since the government of the present king I have never held any conversation with Sir John Fenwick, on any account whatsoever." Lords Godolphin and Bath vindicated themselves in a similar manner. The question was then taken into consideration; and, in a house unusually full, the peers accused were declared to have given a satisfactory justification, and the charges of Fenwick were stigmatised as calumnious.¹

In the House of Peers the bill of attainder was less treated as a party question than in the House of Commons; but it encountered still stronger opposition on the same grounds. Not only the adherents of the exiled family, and the high Tories, but even some of the warmest friends of government argued against it, particularly the duke of Devonshire, lord high steward, Lord Pembroke, privy seal, the duke of Leeds, lord president, and even Sunderland, confidential adviser of the king.² After a tedious investigation, and several debates of peculiar vehemence, it passed by a majority of only seven. A protest was entered against it, by no fewer than forty-one peers, among whom was the earl of Bath, though himself one of the accused.

In the course of the discussion, a new disclosure awakened equal disgust, astonishment, and horror. The wife of Sir John Fenwick delivered to the house a paper of instructions, which had been sent to her husband, through the duchess of Norfolk, by Lord Monmouth, afterwards earl of Peterborough, containing explicit directions to the criminal how to conduct his defence, so as to implicate those against whom he had advanced his charges. Godolphin was to be accused of corresponding with the exiled queen, and lords Portland and Romney were to be questioned relative to intercepted letters from him, which had been shown to the king. In regard to the duke of Shrewsbury, an appeal was to be made to the king himself, for the secret movements of his resignation in 1692, and his subsequent transactions. Marlborough was to be questioned on the causes of his dismissal, and the events which ensued. Admiral Russel was to be required to declare whether he had not seen David Lloyd, an agent of James, both in London and at Cadiz, and what had passed between them. Other hints were suggested, which it is needless to recapitulate. It appeared, also, that, on the refusal of Fenwick to

¹ It is remarkable that no trace of Marlborough's speech appears in any printed account. It is given from a letter of Lord Wharton to the duke of Shrewsbury, dated December 1. 1696. — *Shrewsbury Papers*.

² There is reason to believe that the king himself was against the bill of attainder. The prince of Denmark voted for it; but in a letter from Lord Somers to the duke of Shrewsbury, Dec. 24. 1696, it is said that he came late, and was brought with difficulty, *and that the difficulty did not proceed from himself*.

" *Wednesday night.* — Although I have not troubled your grace with my letters, I have not been wanting in inquiring constantly how you did.

frame his defence according to these directions, Monmouth did not scruple to speak and vote for the bill of attainder. This conduct induced the friends of Fenwick to make the disclosure.

Monmouth was immediately dismissed from all his places, and sent to the Tower. He was, however, screened from farther humiliation, by the interest of the king, through the agency of Bishop Burnet. It is also surmised that he was secretly remunerated by the government for the loss he incurred in consequence of his dismission. Whether this indulgence was owing to the service he had rendered at the Revolution, or to the dread which was entertained of his enterprising spirit, must be left among those mysterious questions which cannot be solved.¹

Fenwick was executed, in virtue of the bill of attainder. On the scaffold he presented a paper, avowing the principles for which he suffered, repeating all his former accusations, and declaring that he drew the information he had given to the duke of Devonshire from letters and messages which had been transmitted to France. He stated also, that, on repeating this information, the duke had assured him the king was acquainted with the facts long before.²

On reviewing the circumstances of this mysterious transaction we find nothing more specific charged on Marlborough than was charged on Shrewsbury and Russel; and that even these charges were not avowed by their accuser, when he was solemnly required to substantiate and confirm his assertions. We find, also, on comparing Fenwick's statements

¹ From the correspondence of Vernon with Shrewsbury, Nov. 30. 1696, it appears that some intimation was given of these insidious instructions early in November. The fact was intimated to Marlborough, who instantly designated Monmouth as the author, adding, they could be framed only by "the worst of men." Yet it is remarkable that this eccentric peer afterwards conciliated the confidence of Marlborough and his lady, and was regarded by both with an unusual degree of favour; and finally that he again betrayed their confidence, and became the most bitter and persevering enemy of Marlborough.

² The biographer of James II. corroborates the remark of the duke of Devonshire, that King William was acquainted with the correspondence carried on with the Stuart agents. "The Prince of Orange looking never the worse upon my *Lord Godolphin*¹ and *Admiral Russel*, was an argument he had been no stranger to their practices, but it was a check, however, upon others, who perhaps meant better; of which number, whether my *Lord Churchill* was to be counted or no, is still a mystery, and the veil is like to remain upon it." Vol. i. p. 558.

This is another proof of Macpherson's infidelity, as he has suppressed this clause in his extracts relative to the same transaction, p. 257.

¹ The words in italics inserted afterwards.

I did, about a fortnight ago, write a letter, to acquaint you with what I had observed of some people, in hopes Mr. Arden would have called upon me, as he promised; but I did not care to send it by the post, and so it was burnt. We had yesterday Sir John Fenwick at the house, and I think it all went as you could wish. I do not send you the particulars, knowing you must have it more exactly from others; but I should be wanting if I did not let you know that Lord Rochester has behaved himself on all this occasion like a friend. In a conversation he had with me, he expressed himself as a real servant of yours; and I think it would not be amiss if you took notice of it to him. If you think me capable of any commands, I shall endeavour to approve myself, what I am with much truth," &c.

Notwithstanding the strength of the prejudices which the king fostered against Marlborough, he had been frequently heard to express his concern that he could not employ a nobleman who was equally distinguished for political and military talents, and who appeared never to discover a difficulty, while other generals seemed to find every thing proposed to them impracticable. At length the merit of Marlborough, and the necessities of the times, outweighed all objections.

William seems to have discovered that the extensive correspondence which in the preceding period of his reign had been maintained with the exiled family, arose, in most instances, rather from fear, selfishness, or gratitude, than from disaffection; and that in proportion as his throne became more stable, his subjects appeared less hesitating in their allegiance. Hence at different times, he employed many of those whom he knew to have been implicated in such an

with the Stuart Papers, published by Macpherson, and the Life of James II., edited by Clarke, that Marlborough was fully justified in his declaration, that he had held no communication whatever with Fenwick after the commencement of the war. It is, however, remarkable, that not only the accusations of Fenwick, but also the suggestions of Lord Monmouth, were grounded on the information which was conveyed to the court of St. Germain's by the Stuart agents and spies. We may therefore conclude, that the substance was furnished by the loquacity of these agents; that in the moment of alarm these hints were thrown out by the criminal, with a view to avert or suspend his fate, by operating on the fears of those who had reason to dread farther disclosures; and that when put to the test he was either unable to substantiate them, for want of evidence, or was unwilling to injure the cause for which he suffered, by revealing the sources of his information.

intercourse, and found no cause to repent of his confidence. It was probably from the same motive that he at length consigned to Marlborough an employment of the highest trust.

As it was now deemed proper to form a separate establishment for the young duke of Gloucester, presumptive heir to the throne, the princess, his mother, was anxious that the charge of his person should be confided to a nobleman so high in her esteem, and so accomplished, as the Earl of Marlborough. Her inclinations were perfectly in unison with the public voice. But the king was at first averse to the appointment, and at one time purposed to fill the offices in the new establishment, without consulting her wishes. With a view of excluding Marlborough, he offered the post of governor to the duke of Shrewsbury, who, from ill health was then soliciting permission to relinquish the fatiguing office of secretary of state. The duke declining the appointment, William remained in suspense, from dislike of Marlborough, and the difficulty of selecting a person who, with equal merit, was less obnoxious. At length his repugnance was overcome by the representations of Lord Sunderland, the suggestions of the new favourite, Lord Albemarle, who had recently supplanted Portland, the recommendation of the Tories, who were rising in influence, and the dread of being obliged to consign the prince to a nobleman of so froward a temper as Lord Rochester, whose cause was espoused by the violent members of his party. Having taken his resolution, he conferred the office on Marlborough in the most gracious manner; and delivered the young prince into his care with a compliment of unusual warmth: "Teach him," he said, "to be like yourself, and he will not want accomplishments."

The coadjutor of Marlborough in the office of preceptor was the celebrated Dr. Burnet, bishop of Salisbury, whose learning, frankness, and integrity, entitled him to the confidence of the king. The governor and preceptor indeed differed widely in political principles, for the bishop was distinguished by his attachment to the Whig cause; but this diversity of sentiment created no discordance in the fulfilment of their important duties. Their esteem and respect were mutual, and their public connexion became the foundation of a friendship, which lasted through life.

After making so great a sacrifice in the choice of a governor, William became less scrupulous in inferior regulations. Except the nomination of Burnet, as the preceptor, against the wish of the princess, who disliked his political principles, the king seems to have left to her, or rather to Marlborough, the selection of the different attendants who were placed about the person of his nephew.

The very evening of his appointment, Marlborough was restored to his place in the privy council, and to his military rank and employments. In the course of the two succeeding years he was also named one of the lords justices, who were intrusted with the government during the absence of the king.

The appointment of Bishop Burnet gave great offence to the violent Tories, and they were little more satisfied with that of Marlborough, in whose post they were anxious to place the earl of Rochester, uncle of the young prince. Accordingly a motion was made in parliament, for an address to remove Bishop Burnet, in consequence of the censure passed by the House of Commons on his Country and Pastoral Letter, which had been ordered to be burnt by the common executioner. This invidious attack was, however, repelled by a great majority. Marlborough supported his colleague with all his interest, having even prevailed on his brother, George Churchill, who was a zealous Tory, to absent himself from the house on the day the motion was decided. Considering the known bias of the princess, and the diversity of their political sentiments, this conduct reflects honour on his candour and impartiality.

Trained up under a governor so accomplished, and under so learned and skilful a preceptor, the young prince rapidly improved in personal and mental acquirements; and gave the most promising indications of virtues and qualities, which were likely to adorn a crown. But like the Marcellus of Rome, he was shown to an anxious country, only to be admired and regretted. In the dawn of youth, amidst the vows and prayers of his destined subjects, he was hurried to a premature grave.

Lord and Lady Marlborough were at Althorpe when he was first seized; but the progress of the fatal disorder was so rapid, that the afflicted governor arrived at Windsor only

in time to receive the dying breath of his royal charge, who expired on the 30th of July, 1700, aged eleven years and five days.*

CHAP. VII.—CHARACTERS OF GODOLPHIN AND SUNDERLAND.
1698—1700.

AT this period the family of Marlborough consisted of one son, John, Marquis of Blandford, and four daughters, Henrietta, Anne, Elizabeth, and Mary. The two eldest daughters, Henrietta and Anne, being now marriageable, their beauty and accomplishments attracted many admirers of rank and fortune. But in the choice of an alliance, the parents did not lay the slightest restraint on the inclinations of their children; and preferred to every other advantage the ties of friendship, and the characters of the individuals to whom they confided their beloved pledges.

From an early period of the reign of Charles II. an intimate connexion had subsisted between Marlborough and Godolphin, which took its rise from their intercourse in public employments, and was afterwards cemented by similarity in political principles, both being Tories and high churchmen, but without the rancour and prejudice which marked the distinctions of party. Their union was rendered more cordial by the diversity of their talents and pursuits, Marlborough being attached to the profession of arms, and Godolphin to finance, of which he was a perfect master. In the Revolution, which was the test of so many public and private connexions, Godolphin acted a less prominent part than his noble friend. He did not forsake the interest of James, till the misguided monarch became wanting to himself; and he made a vigorous opposition to the breach of the hereditary succession, occasioned by the elevation of

* Marlborough announced this melancholy event to the king; and the answer, though brief, does honour to the feelings of the monarch:

“*Loo, 4th Oct. 1700.* — I do not think it necessary to employ many words in expressing my surprise and grief at the death of the duke of Gloucester. It is so great a loss to me, as well as to all England, that it pierces my heart with affliction.”

William to the throne. Still, however, he was continued in the commission of the treasury by the new monarch, who entertained a high opinion of his abilities and integrity. He held his situation at the head of the board, from 1690 to 1696; and resigned, as we have already observed, in consequence of the accusations of Sir John Fenwick. He remained out of office during the administration in which the Whigs were predominant.

No public change produced the slightest diminution in the cordial friendship which had long subsisted between the two statesmen; and amidst the various revolutions of fortune and trying incidents which afterwards befel them, their intercourse was invariably marked with the same esteem and confidence. Their connexion was consolidated by the respectful attachment of Godolphin to the Countess of Marlborough; of whose character and talents he appears to have entertained the highest admiration, and to whose opinions, and even caprice, he paid unlimited deference.*

The intercourse of the parents produced an intimacy between their children; and all parties witnessed with singular pleasure a growing attachment between Francis the only son of Lord Godolphin, and Lady Henrietta Churchill. Meeting with the full approbation of the parents, it soon terminated in a matrimonial union, which took place in 1698, when the young lady had attained her eighteenth year. The Princess Anne interested herself warmly in the match, and offered in the most delicate terms to endow the bride with a marriage portion of 10,000*l.* The Countess of Marlborough would not, however, accept more than 5000*l.*, though the establishment of the young couple was ill-adapted to their rank; for Godolphin in the management of the finances had added to the wealth of his country without increasing his own; and the fortune of Marlborough was not yet sufficiently ample to furnish a liberal portion to each of his four daughters. He added, however, 5000*l.* to the generous gift of the princess.

Of all their children, Lady Anne, the second daughter, was perhaps the most endeared to them, by personal and mental accomplishments, as well as by uncommon sweetness of disposition, and a maturity of judgment above her years.

* See Appendix, note B.

For the establishment of this darling child, the anxious parents felt peculiar solicitude; and in the choice of an alliance they were guided by the same sentiments of private friendship which they had consulted in the marriage of her sister.

Among the most intimate of Marlborough's early friends was Robert earl of Sunderland, who bore so important, but so mysterious a part in the Revolution. It would be foreign to the present purpose to scrutinise the actions of Sunderland, or attempt to vindicate his political character from the accusations with which it has been loaded. It is sufficient to state that he has encountered deeper obloquy than he deserved; and that the charge urged against him of instigating King James to violent measures, in order to accelerate his ruin, is without foundation. In fact, the moderation of his principles was one of the qualities which most strongly recommended him to the friendship of Marlborough. They were both of the party which was attached to the interest of the queen, in opposition to Hugh Peters, the king's favourite Jesuit, and they both hoped that means might be devised to restrain the imprudence of James; or in case of his death, that what they deemed a constitutional government, might be established under the regency of the queen.

After the Revolution, the good offices of Marlborough were effectually exerted in favour of Sunderland, then in exile and distress. He not only obtained his restoration to his country, but strongly recommended him to the friendship of the new king. Sunderland on his part was not unmindful of the obligation; and when Marlborough was involved in disgrace, repaid his kindness by soothing the resentment of William, and promoting his appointment as governor to the young duke of Gloucester.

Besides the intimacy which subsisted between the two noblemen, an attachment of the most romantic kind arose between the two countesses. Their letters breathe the same warmth of affection as those which passed between the princess and Lady Marlborough; and we find the former tenderly expressing her jealousy at the attentions which Lady Sunderland received from her favourite.* Besides

* "I cannot help," observed the princess in one of her letters to her favourite, "envying Lady Sunderland to-day, that she should have the

the regard arising from this attachment, the privileges of a god-daughter gave the young lady an additional title to the affection of a friend so intimately connected with her mother.

Lord Spencer, the only son of Lord Sunderland, having recently lost his wife, Lady Arabella Cavendish, daughter of the duke of Newcastle, his anxious parents within a few months proposed to unite him with Lady Anne Churchill, first through the agency of Lord Godolphin, and his sister Mrs. Boscawen, and subsequently by a direct application. In one of the letters written during this negotiation, Lord Sunderland artfully observes: "If I see him so settled, I shall desire nothing more in this world but to die in peace, if it please God. I must add this, that if he can be thus happy, he will be governed in every thing public and private by Lord Marlborough. I have particularly talked to him of that, and he is sensible how advantageous it will be to him to be so. I need not, I am sure, desire, that all this may be a secret to everybody but Lady Marlborough."

The proposal was not, however, received with equal warmth by the parents of the young lady. Lord Spencer in person was highly favoured by nature, and no less liberally gifted with intellectual endowments, which he had improved by assiduous study. He was remarkable for a sedateness above his years; but in him a bold and impetuous spirit was concealed under a cold and reserved exterior. Imbued with that ardent love of liberty, which the youthful mind generally draws from the writers of Greece and Rome, and educated amidst the effervescence which produced the Revolution, he was a zealous champion of the Whig doctrines, in their most enlarged sense. Associating with the remnant of republicans who had survived the Commonwealth, he caught their spirit. He was an animated speaker; and in the warmth of debate, disdained to spare the prejudices or failings even of those with whom he was most intimately connected. His political idol was Lord Somers, though he wanted both the prudence and temper of so distinguished a leader.

satisfaction of seeing you before me; for I am sure she cannot love you half so well as I do, though I know she has the art of saying a great deal."

The deportment of the young nobleman in private life was ill calculated to win the esteem of those who could not regard with indulgence the defects of his public character. Abhorring the very shadow of adulation, he carried his freedom of speech to a degree of bluntness which was often offensive. At this period the loss of a beloved wife threw a gloom over his mind, and gave the appearance of additional harshness to his manners and temper.

A man of so unaccommodating a disposition was not likely to conciliate the favour of the Countess of Marlborough, who was accustomed to adulation and fond of flattery. As little did his political principles accord with those of her lord, who was averse to party violence, and particularly hostile to those republican notions, which were fashionable among the ardent Whigs of the day. We are not therefore surprised to find the parents of the young lady receiving the proposal of a match with coldness, and starting numerous objections, notwithstanding the friendship which subsisted between the two families. Lord and Lady Sunderland, however, persisted in their solicitations, and extenuated the failings of their son with all the partiality of parental affection.

By degrees these instances produced an impression. Lady Marlborough, being less hostile to Whig principles than her husband, overlooked the political violence of her future son-in-law; but her maternal feelings suggested another difficulty. Judging from the natural reserve of Lord Spencer, and the additional gloom with which he was now depressed, she deemed him averse to a new marriage, and withheld her approbation, from a fear lest her beloved child should be made the sacrifice of a match without affection.

At length the charms and accomplishments of Lady Anne dissipated the grief of the young widower; and he felt the passion which her youth, beauty, and merit could not fail to inspire. The impression sunk deep in a reserved but ardent mind; and he testified no less anxiety for the alliance than his parents. The intelligence of this conquest was exultingly communicated by his mother to Lady Marlborough, and accompanied with the most pressing entreaties to hasten an union, which she hoped would equally ensure the felicity of both parties.

By the zealous interposition of Lady Marlborough, the

objections of her husband were gradually removed. But he did not give his consent without strong forebodings that his intended son-in-law would not long maintain the promised change in his political habits and principles; and his fears were fully realised; for it soon appeared that the father had overrated his son's docility, when he engaged that he should "be guided in every thing public and private by the Earl of Marlborough."

At length this negotiation, which had lasted a year and a half, was brought to a happy conclusion; and the ceremony took place at St. Alban's, in January 1699-1700. The princess of Denmark gave the same sum to Lady Anne as she had already bestowed on her sister, and the father equalised their portions, by adding another 5000*l*.

CHAP. VIII. — CHANGES OF MINISTRY.—1698-1701.

AFTER his restoration to favour, Marlborough had a difficult part to act. A series of parliamentary questions arose, in the highest degree delicate, which left him no alternative but to desert his party, or offend the king. These questions principally related to the reduction of the army and navy, after the peace of Ryswick; the dismissal of the Dutch guards; the liquidation of a debt, contracted with the prince of Denmark; and the resumption of the forfeited lands in Ireland, which William had profusely distributed among his favourites.

With regard to the celebrated discussion relative to the reduction of the army and navy, we cannot ascertain in what degree Marlborough abetted the views of his party. Indeed there is reason to infer, that as he considered the peace of Ryswick in the light of a mere temporary accommodation, he must have approved the wish of the king to maintain the country in a respectable state of defence, at a time when the French monarch was augmenting, instead of reducing, both his military and naval establishment.

We are convinced also that he disapproved the personal insult offered to William, by the compulsory dismissal of

his Dutch guards : for he was one of the few confidential persons to whom the king, in the anguish of his heart, imparted the design of renouncing a throne, which had exposed him to accumulated mortifications ; and of withdrawing from a country, where his patriotic designs were thwarted by party violence.

The question in which Marlborough was particularly interested, was that on the liquidation of the debt due to the prince of Denmark.

For the purpose of accelerating an accommodation between Sweden and Denmark, during the late war, the king had persuaded Prince George to surrender the isle of Yammeren, and the bailiwicks of Transbottel and Steinholst, on which he held a mortgage amounting to 85,000*l.* sterling, to the duke of Holstein. In return the king charged himself with the mortgage, and, till it was liquidated, engaged to pay the interest of six per cent. The prince being anxious for the repayment of the money, the king, in compliance with his repeated solicitations, at length imparted the matter to parliament, in his speech of November, 1699, when he recommended the discharge of the public debt. It was accordingly taken into consideration, and made the theme for reflections in the highest degree offensive to the king. In January, 1700, a supply was voted for the purpose ; but clogged with the condition that the money should be vested in the purchase of lands, which were to be settled on the prince and princess, and their issue, in conformity with their marriage contract. Other objections were afterwards advanced ; but the money was finally repaid, because the most violent of the opposition were desirous to gratify the prince at the expense of the king. The zeal which Marlborough and his lady had manifested in the promotion of this object, was gratefully acknowledged by the princess in a letter of thanks, written in the warmest style of regard, and ascribing the success of the measure solely to their interference.

Although Marlborough had not entered into the factious discussions which arose from this question, the king was too jealous of the slightest interference in behalf of the prince, to regard his conduct without dissatisfaction. The impression was, however, only transient ; for Vernon, in a letter to the duke of Shrewsbury, written in the same month, ob-

serves, "I think the cloud which has been hanging over my Lord Marlborough is clearing up."*

Except the dismissal of the Dutch guards, no parliamentary interference more deeply affected William than the resumption of the Irish grants. It created an almost unprecedented degree of ferment both in the parliament and nation. After long and acrimonious debates, a bill passed the Commons for resuming these grants, and appropriating the money arising from the sale of the property to the payment of the army. The execution of the act was intrusted to thirteen commissioners, who were armed with almost inquisitorial powers; and to extort the assent of the Peers, it was tacked to the land tax bill, as one of the sources of revenue.

To prevent it from passing, the king's friends in the House of Peers proposed various amendments, which, as it was identified with a money bill, would naturally be rejected by the Commons. This expedient was, however, highly resented by the lower house. The most violent resolutions were proposed, reflecting on the king and his foreign adherents; and every artifice was employed to excite the public alarm and indignation. Motions were even prepared for the banishment of the earls of Portland and Albemarle, as well as of all other foreigners in offices of honour or trust, except the prince of Denmark. Several conferences between the two houses only served to widen the breach, and to provoke new animosity. At the instances of his friends and adherents, the king himself prevailed on the Lords to recede from their amendments; but he was finally compelled to give a hasty assent to the bill, and prorogue the parliament, in order to avoid the mortification of receiving an address from the Commons, which had passed by acclamation, requiring the removal of all foreigners from the privy council.

Marlborough strongly disapproved the Irish grants, and therefore opposed the amendments; but observing that the violence of his own party threatened the very existence of the government, he retired from the house, that he might not be obliged to vote when the question was put, for adopting the bill without alteration. Notwithstanding this con-

* Vernon to the duke of Shrewsbury, January, 1700.

sistent and honourable conduct, he experienced the usual fate of such as attempt to steer between opposite extremes. The feelings of the king were too much wounded to regard with indulgence any one who had favoured the obnoxious bill; while the victorious party stigmatised all who had not fully entered into their measures as enemies to the country.*

The displeasure of the king was, however, speedily dissipated; and he appears to have rendered justice to the consistency of Marlborough, who had checked the violence of his party, without deserting his principles. William showed him new proofs of cordiality, by consulting him on the change which he meditated in the administration, as well as by employing him as the agent of a confidential communication with Lord Sunderland, on the actual state of affairs; and he was selected as one of the lords justices, to conduct the government during the king's absence abroad. In fact, Marlborough took so active a share in political transactions, that he incurred the jealousy of the Whigs; for in a letter to the duke of Shrewsbury we find him complaining of the ill humour manifested by the Lord Chancellor Somers, and attempting to justify himself against the peevish imputation of Lord Orford, that he was absolutely governed by Lord Sunderland.

Amidst the mortifications which William had undergone in the preceding session, it is no wonder that he adopted the resolution of dismissing the Whigs, who were either unable or unwilling to support his government. Indeed, a political dissolution had gradually taken place in the Whig part of the ministry. Since the affair of Fenwick, the duke of Shrewsbury had not only withdrawn from active business, but had so repeatedly solicited permission to resign, that William at length granted his request. The place of secretary of state, vacant by his resignation, was transferred to the earl of Jersey. The Whigs successively withdrew from their situations. Orford retired in disgust in June, 1699; and Mon-

* Accordingly we find Marlborough complaining of his unpleasant situation, in a letter written soon afterwards to his friend the duke of Shrewsbury: — "May 11. 1700. — The king's coldness to me still continues; so that I should have been glad to have had your friendly advice; for to have friends and acquaintance unreasonably jealous, and the king at the same time angry, is what I know not how to bear, nor do I know how to behave myself." — *Shrewsbury Papers.*

tagu quitted the treasury in November, with the promise of being called to the peerage. Somers was indignant at the timidity of his colleagues, and persisted in retaining the seals, till he received his formal dismissal in May, 1700.

During these transactions the king had entered into a secret negotiation with Lord Rochester, for the appointment of a Tory cabinet. Rochester was to be considered as the principal minister, with the lucrative post of lord-lieutenant of Ireland, though without the obligation of a continued residence. Sir Nathan Wright received the seals, as lord keeper; Lord Jersey was removed to the office of lord chamberlain, in the room of Shrewsbury; and, still more to gratify the Tories, the vacant secretaryship was given to Sir Charles Hedges. The treasury was offered to Lord Godolphin, which he at first refused, but through the persuasion of the king, accepted. Of the few persons in office, who were not identified with the Tory party, was Mr. Smith, chancellor of the exchequer, whose political heresy was overlooked in favour of his talents and integrity; and Vernon, secretary of state, who was personally acceptable to the king, and was too moderate and circumspect to excite the jealousy of either party.

Having thus remodelled the ministry, the king summoned a new parliament. The struggle in the elections was extremely violent; but the death of the duke of Gloucester, and the perfidious conduct of the French king, in usurping the Spanish monarchy, created such an alarm in the nation, that the number of Jacobite members was much diminished, and the preponderance thrown on the side of the Tories. Parliament assembled on the 17th of February; and the Tory candidate, Mr. Robert Harley, was chosen by a large majority, as the new speaker. He was the intimate friend of Marlborough, and as he afterwards bore so conspicuous a part in public affairs, we shall introduce a few remarks on his character and connexions.

Mr. Harley had imbibed from his father the Whig doctrines; and as he had been brought up in the principles of the low church, he was even suspected of a tendency to puritanism. At all events, his family adhered to the presbyterian form of worship, and he himself appears to have maintained an intimate connexion with the dissenters.

Being a decided enemy to Popery, he took so prominent a part in the Revolution, that he was selected by the gentry of Worcestershire to convey a tender of their services to the Prince of Orange. He was brought into Parliament after the accession of King William, and speedily became an active and useful member. He not only distinguished himself by his skill in finance, but in 1694 he was chosen to prepare the act which formed the groundwork of the celebrated triennial bill. About this time he changed his political tenets, and ranged himself with the Tories, though his principles were always regarded as moderate, and he maintained his connexion with many of different sentiments. His talents for business, conciliating manners, and dexterity in debate, gave him at an early period considerable influence in the House of Commons. A distant relationship with the Countess of Marlborough first introduced him to the notice of her husband. A conformity in political sentiments gave rise to a more intimate acquaintance, which was gradually matured into the highest degree of cordiality and friendship. From the interest which Marlborough afterwards took in the advancement of Harley, there is little doubt that he zealously promoted his views, and gave essential aid in his elevation to the speaker's chair. In transferring the powers of government to the Tories, the king appears to have widely miscalculated the strength of party prejudice. Relying, however, on the support of his new ministry, he had employed the interval since the dissolution in arranging measures calculated to secure domestic tranquillity, and to maintain the independence of Europe against the usurpations of Louis XIV.

The declining health of Charles II. of Spain, and the prospect of a contest for the succession to the crown, had long occupied his serious attention. He therefore concluded the first Partition Treaty, for the eventual division of the Spanish monarchy, by which he hoped to accommodate the jarring pretensions of the different claimants, and prevent the king of France from grasping the whole. This arrangement being frustrated by the death of the electoral prince of Bavaria, to whom Spain and the Indies had been assigned, he entered into a new engagement, which is called the Second Partition Treaty. Spain, the Indies, and the Low

Countries were to descend to the Archduke Charles, second son of the Emperor Leopold, who deduced his pretensions from Margaret, younger daughter of Philip IV. To meet the claims which Louis still advanced, notwithstanding the most solemn renunciation, the two Sicilies, with other provinces, depending on an eventual convention, were to be transferred to the dauphin, in right of his mother, Maria Theresa, eldest daughter of Philip. This treaty, however, satisfied neither party, and the momentous question was yet involved in doubt and hazard.

The death of Charles, which happened on November 1. 1700, proved the futility of all attempts to settle a question, which could be decided only by arms. The king of France having gained a strong party in the court of Madrid, induced the dying monarch to nominate as his universal heir, Philip, duke of Anjou, second son of the dauphin. Despising the restraints of treaties, he instantly accepted the bequest in the name of his grandson, and the young prince was tranquilly acknowledged by the whole nation, under the title of Philip V.

William had no other alternative than an appeal to his parliament, for aid to obviate the mischiefs which were justly apprehended from this enormous addition to the power of the French monarchy. His next object was, to complete the arrangements for the succession to the British crown; as, by the death of the duke of Gloucester, the continuance of a Protestant government depended on the single life of the Princess Anne. But many among the Tories who had strenuously opposed the breach of hereditary succession at the Revolution, were alarmed at the recurrence of circumstances, which rendered a similar expedient unavoidable; and unfortunately for the views of William, this party was now intrusted with the powers of government. The Whigs, who were interested to consolidate the Protestant establishment, were divided among themselves, dissatisfied with the king, and without that confidence and energy which they had manifested at the Revolution. Another series of embarrassments arose from the sentiments and prejudices of the Princess Anne. At the Revolution she had been induced to desert her father, by zeal for her religion, by popular enthusiasm, and by the persuasion that the

pretended prince of Wales was a supposititious child. But pique against William, and perhaps the secret remonstrances of her parents, produced a change in her feelings towards her unfortunate family; and since the death of her son, she had regarded with more scruple the proofs of her brother's illegitimacy. Still, however, the brilliant prospect of a crown was not without attractions; and she was not inclined to forego the preference given to her by the act of settlement, though she was far from being averse to the eventual restoration of the Stuart line.

These feelings operating on a weak and sensitive mind, we find her continually fluctuating between her wishes and her fears; her duty to her parents, and her own interest; her regard for her family, and her zeal for the Protestant religion. So far, indeed, had she been influenced by these considerations, that she communicated to her father the intelligence of her son's death; and when the declining health of William opened a nearer prospect of her succession, she privately solicited his sanction for her acceptance of the crown. She even declared her readiness to make a restitution, whenever an opportunity should occur.* The peremptory prohibition of James contributed still farther to increase her perplexity and agitate her feelings; and she contemplated with repugnance the entail of the crown on a collateral branch, even though it gave additional security to her own succession.

Aware of all these obstacles, William pursued his design with his customary policy and perseverance. He affected to take a deep interest in the character and conduct of the young pretender; and permitted his own agents to circulate rumours of a design to introduce him in the succession next to himself. He gave countenance, at the same time, to similar reports, respecting the house of Hanover. He even instigated, or suffered his friends to move a petition in Parliament, soliciting that he would tranquillise the apprehensions of the country, by engaging in a second marriage, which might afford the prospect of issue. Amidst the alarm and agitation into which Anne was thrown by these jarring rumours, she naturally recurred to the advice of Marlborough and his

* Macpherson's History, vol. ii. p. 130. — Life of James, by Clarke, vol. ii. p. 559.

countess; and we cannot doubt that they dissuaded her from any opposition, which might have proved fatal to her own claims, without benefiting her family.

The affair being thus matured, the king called the attention of parliament to the entail of the crown on the Protestant line, and to the danger arising from the accession of a Bourbon prince to the Spanish throne. After such a contest as was naturally to be expected from the discordant views and hopes of different parties, a bill was passed, entailing the British crown on the house of Hanover, with a series of limitations, some of which, though just in themselves, were yet introduced as much for the immediate purpose of mortifying the king, as from a fear of the mischiefs which might eventually arise from the influence of foreigners. With respect to the Spanish monarchy, the Tories were as little tractable as on other occasions. The House of Commons presented to the king a cold and discouraging address, merely announcing their willingness to support him in fulfilling the treaty of 1667 with the Dutch, by which England was limited to a succour of 10,000 men and twenty ships of war. The ministry, however, compelled him to acknowledge Philip, in order to prevent a specific application for that purpose, which was threatened by some of the violent leaders in the House of Commons. Amidst these contradictions and discouragements, William had only the faint consolation of receiving a more spirited address from the Peers.

On this occasion we cannot trace the conduct of Marlborough; though it is scarcely possible to suppose that he approved the impolitic prejudices of his party, convinced as he was of the danger to which the civilised world was exposed from the preponderance of France. We are, however, concerned to find him soon afterwards yielding to the baneful spirit of party, and concurring in the efforts of the Tories to throw odium on the king and ex-ministers, for their conduct in negotiating the last Treaty of Partition.

After the death of the king of Spain, this unfortunate treaty became public, and excited a general ferment of discontent. An impeachment was instituted by the Tory leaders against Portland, Orford, Halifax and Somers, as advisers of so dishonourable an engagement; though, with a shameful partiality, no complaint was adduced against Lord

Jersey, by whom it was arranged, in the quality of ambassador, or against Vernon, through whose hands it had passed as secretary of state; nor did the accusers turn their view to the conduct of the preceding parliament, which by an impolitic economy had reduced the king to submit to so humiliating a treaty.

In this crisis, the Peers proved themselves the champions of the constitution, and the friends of justice, by acquitting the persecuted ex-ministers in the most solemn and satisfactory manner. This verdict raised the indignation of the Tories in the commons. They were seconded by their friends in the upper house; and we regret to find the name of Marlborough in the protests, some of which were so violent, as to be expunged from the journals. It is difficult to assign a motive for a conduct so contrary to his usual moderation, and to his friendship for some of the persecuted lords.

The unjustifiable and flagrant proceedings of the Commons awakened the resentment of the nation. Petitions of the most threatening nature were voted against them, in different parts of the kingdom: they were accused of corruption by French gold, and assailed in various publications, which daily issued from the press. At length the Tories discovered that they had carried their hostilities beyond the bounds of prudence. They shrunk from the imputation of connivance at the usurpations of France, and heard, with shame and mortification, the urgent appeals for succour, which were made by the emperor and the Dutch. To compensate for their past misconduct, or at least to gain popularity, they closed this stormy session by voting liberal supplies to the king, against the contingencies which might occur; and conveyed the most solemn assurances of support, in all such alliances as he should think proper to conclude, for maintaining the peace of Europe and reducing the exorbitant power of France. To these laudable resolutions Marlborough contributed with all his influence.

On the 24th of June, William prorogued the parliament, and prepared for his journey to the Continent. Before his departure he was importuned by the Tories to dismiss the small remnant of Whigs, who yet were permitted to fill subordinate offices in the government; but he eluded the demand, and left the administration as it was then constituted.

Although the king had shown great attention to Marlborough, and invariably testified the estimation in which he held his talents and services ; yet he never entirely divested himself of that jealousy which sovereigns usually feel against the adherents of those who are destined to succeed them. At this period, however, he overlooked all inferior considerations, and placed Marlborough in a post of the highest consequence, next to his own person. His motives for this choice were laudably disinterested and patriotic. Sensible of his own approaching dissolution, foreseeing the inevitable necessity of a continental war, and anxious for the maintenance of that system, which it had been the labour and boast of his life to uphold, he was desirous that the political and military powers should be transferred to one, who, with abilities equal to the emergency, might possess the confidence of the country, and the good will of his successor. In no one were these requisites united except in Marlborough. Accordingly William selected him to command the forces in the Netherlands, and to negotiate the treaties, which were to be formed with foreign powers, for the renewal of the grand alliance. This choice, as judicious in itself as it was honourable to his feelings, was almost his last act before he quitted England, to organise the most formidable confederacy which had yet been marshalled against France.

Marlborough accompanied the king abroad, but saw with regret his rising displeasure against the Tories, though it was the natural consequence of their hostility towards his person, and factious opposition to his measures. He hoped, however, that the party with which he had identified himself had made reparation by their zeal in voting the supplies. He trusted, also, that the absence of the king from England would allow the feelings of resentment and mortification to subside. A change which had taken place among the Dutch adherents of William inspired him with additional confidence. The earl of Portland, his own personal enemy, who had been chiefly exposed to the attacks of the Tories, was now supplanted by Keppel, a young nobleman of good family, who from the post of private secretary was rapidly promoted to high honours, created earl of Albemarle, and distinguished with the Garter. This nobleman had manifested towards

Marlborough great respect and confidence, professed a favourable disposition towards the Tories, and promised to communicate such information as might enable him to ascertain the real sentiments of his royal master.

CHAP. IX. — DEATH OF KING WILLIAM.—1701, 1702.

MARLBOROUGH embarked with the king at Margate, on the 1st of July, and reached the Hague on the 3rd, prepared to fulfil his instructions.

He commenced his negotiations under inauspicious circumstances. Louis had no sooner accepted the will of Charles II., than he carried into execution the measures which had been previously matured, for securing tranquil possession of the Spanish throne. He directed his first attention to the Netherlands, whence he most dreaded an attack. He gained the elector of Bavaria, to whom the government had been confided by the deceased monarch, and not only secured the frontier fortresses, but detained 15,000 Dutch troops, who, in virtue of a convention with Spain, formed the garrisons of the barrier towns. The loss of so large a body, consisting of the flower of the army, and the sudden advance of a French force towards the frontier, intimidated the Dutch; and to obtain the liberation of their captive troops, they acknowledged Philip king of Spain. Their example induced the Tory ministry to extort a similar recognition from William.

At the same time, Louis affected great anxiety to dissipate the alarms conceived both in England and¹ Holland, by the transfer of Spain to a Bourbon prince, and despatched d'Avaux to the Hague to open a negotiation. On the arrival of Marlborough, the discussion was pending, and no expedient was neglected to alarm or lure the States. Indeed pensionary Heinsius himself, though zealously attached to William, was persuaded that an arrangement might yet be effected, and expressed his hopes that Louis would give satisfaction to the emperor rather than incur the risk of a war.

To prevent the invasion of Spain on the only accessible quarter; Louis had formed a treaty of alliance with Portugal.

He obtained also the recognition of Philip, in the Milanese and the two Sicilies. By a treaty with the duke of Savoy, he secured an entry into Italy; while the occupation of Mantua and the neighbouring fortresses, with the consent of the respective sovereigns, not only opened the principal passages into Lombardy, but afforded the means for a direct attack against the Austrian dominions.

Germany was at this time agitated by civil and religious feuds, which facilitated the intrigues of the French monarch, and many of the princes openly embraced his cause. The Emperor Leopold was the only sovereign from whom the slightest opposition to the encroachments of France could be expected; but he was embarrassed by the disorder of his finances, by a rising rebellion in Hungary, which was fomented by French intrigues, and by the prospect of new aggressions from the Turks. Yet, amidst these dangers and difficulties, he stood in the breach, with a spirit worthy of his magnanimous ancestry. He was indeed secretly instigated by William to maintain the interests of his house, and urged to make an immediate effort in Italy, with the hope that a momentary success would rouse the European states in defence of their independence. Accordingly Leopold publicly protested against the usurpation of the Spanish throne, and despatched an army across the Trentine Alps, under the command of Prince Eugene, with the design of making a prompt and effectual impression in a quarter where the nature of the country circumscribed the enemy in their means of defence. Already had the hero of Zenta displayed his characteristic spirit of enterprise by scaling the natural barriers of Italy, and establishing his army on the border of Lombardy; and all Europe waited, in anxious suspense, the result of the approaching conflict.

Hitherto William had himself directed his political, as well as military system. But on this occasion he confided the negotiations, arising from such new and critical circumstances, to Marlborough, being fully convinced of his judgment and abilities, and conscious of his influence over the English ministry. Negotiations were not confined to the states of Germany, but extended to those of Denmark, Sweden, and Muscovy, whose mutual jealousies might have raised obstacles to this extensive system of confederation.

In the arrangement of a plan, which embraced the varied interests of the greater part of Europe, Marlborough had to bring to unison the wishes of his own sovereign, the selfish timidity and political prejudices of the British ministry, the commercial cupidity of the Dutch, the captious and grasping spirit of the German states, and, above all, the lofty pretensions of the emperor, who strenuously asserted the rights of his family to the whole Spanish monarchy. In this delicate task his abilities were eminently conspicuous, and his consummate address was displayed in soothing mutual jealousies, and reconciling discordant views.

Among the negotiations committed to his management, one of the most difficult was that with Sweden. Charles XII. had excited general admiration, by heroism almost romantic, as well as by a series of enterprises distinguished no less for boldness of design than for promptitude and vigour of execution. Having humbled the Danes and Poles, he was engaged in wreaking his vengeance on the czar, Peter, whom he had recently defeated at Narva, with a great disparity of force. It was an object of high importance to conciliate a monarch who held the balance of the North; for besides an auxiliary force, which he was entitled to claim from England, in virtue of existing treaties, he might, by again embroiling himself with Denmark, have frustrated the engagement lately formed for drawing subsidiary troops from that kingdom, and its dependent duchy of Holstein. This object, however, was not of easy attainment. Although Charles was inclined to the alliance with England, and jealous of French preponderance, Louis spared no flattery to captivate his lofty spirit, and gratify his love of applause. He had applied with still more success to his venal ministry; and remittances to a vast amount, which were traced from Paris to Stockholm, proved that the French court would neglect neither bribes nor intrigues to secure the alliance of Sweden.

The knowledge of these circumstances prompted Marlborough to overstep his usual caution in hastening the arrangement. He pressed the English ministry to fulfil their promise of furnishing a considerable quantity of cloth and saltpetre, for the use of the Swedish army, and importuned Godolphin to obviate the difficulties which arose in the course of the negotiation. To counteract the influence of French

gold, he lavished presents on the Swedish ministry, and had the satisfaction to succeed in obtaining their support. At length he even ventured to conclude a highly favourable convention, without submitting it to the previous approbation of the lords' justices, from a conviction that the urgency of the case would justify a deviation from the regular forms of office.*

The object of this convention was twofold: the first to prevent Sweden from joining France, the second to bind Charles not to insist on the succours, in men and ships, stipulated by treaty. These objects were both attained, and England was exempted from the claim of succour, by paying 200,000 crowns, as an equivalent, and by becoming responsible for 300,000 more, which were to be advanced by the Dutch on the customs of Riga. Commissioners also were to be appointed to devise in what manner the confederates might best assist each other, should the contest with Russia continue, or should a war break out with Denmark. In a word, this was a tacit engagement, not only to obtain troops from Denmark and Holstein, but eventually from Russia, and even from Sweden itself.†

The negotiations with Frederick, king of Prussia, presented difficulties of another kind. The great objects of this sovereign were, to recruit his finances by a subsidiary treaty, and still more, to obtain the confirmation of the regal title, which he had recently assumed, and which many prudential reasons induced the emperor to delay.

These points he pressed with the utmost warmth and pertinacity, well aware that the allies were desirous of conciliating his friendship, no less from his influence as the first Protestant prince of the empire, than from his matrimonial connexion with the house of Hanover. Marlborough, however, was too sensible of the timidity or caution of his friends in the ministry, to implicate the government in a subsidiary treaty, without the consent of parliament; and therefore he found means to retard any definitive arrangement, yet without giving umbrage to a prince whose co-operation was deemed so necessary. Although an agreement was drawn out for

* Letter from Marlborough to Godolphin, Sept. 23. 1701.

† Letter to Lord Godolphin.

an auxiliary force of 5000 men, in the first instance, and eventually for 20,000 more, the treaty was not brought to a formal conclusion, till after the return of Marlborough to England*, and it had received the sanction of parliament.

The extravagant pretensions of the imperial court clogged the fundamental negotiation of the two maritime powers. Marlborough experienced no trifling difficulty in reconciling these lofty claims with the timid caution of the Dutch, and the commercial jealousy of the English. One of his letters to Godolphin, dated July 22. displays his embarrassments on a point so important to the whole confederacy, as well as the firmness and discretion which he displayed on this delicate occasion.

Relating the first of his conferences with the imperial envoys and the pensionary, he observes :—

“ A great deal of time was spent in the emperor’s ministers complaining of the Treaty of Partition, and when we came to the business for which we met, they would have the foundation of the treaty to be for lessening the power of France, and assisting the emperor in his just rights to the monarchy of Spain. But the pensionary would not consent to any thing further, than that the emperor ought to be satisfied with having Flanders, which would be a security to the Dutch, and Milan, as a fief of the empire. After four hours’ wrangling, the two envoys went away; and then I endeavoured to let the pensionary see that no treaty of this kind would be acceptable in England, if there were not care taken of the Mediterranean and the West Indies. When I gave the king an account, he was of my mind, so that the pensionary has promised to use his endeavours with the town of Amsterdam; for they are unwilling to consent to any thing more than Flanders and Milan.”

A negotiation commenced by the contracting parties on principles so discordant, promised no speedy issue; and the difficulty was increased by the necessity of consulting the lords justices in England. The zeal and address of Marlborough, however, triumphed over these obstacles, and by a letter dated in the commencement of September, we find the treaty reduced in form, and transmitted to Lord Godolphin for his approbation. Some trifling alterations were made at the suggestion of all parties, and it was finally signed on the 7th of September, for the sanction of parliament.

The maritime powers pledged themselves to obtain satisfaction for the emperor’s claims on the Spanish succession,

* Correspondence of Marlborough with Lord Godolphin.

and should their negotiations prove fruitless in two months, the contracting parties agreed to assist each other with their whole force. Considering the possession of the Netherlands of the utmost consequence, the confederates were to employ their efforts in recovering those provinces as a barrier to Holland; and similar exertions were to be made for securing Milan to the house of Austria, together with Naples and Sicily.

In the arrangement of the alliance with the emperor, Marlborough encountered considerable embarrassments with regard to the specification of what was called the *denombrement*, or relative proportion of troops to be supplied by each of the contracting parties. Ultimately it was settled by a separate convention, fixing 90,000 men for the quota of the emperor, 10,000 for that of the Dutch, leaving that of England, which was privately settled at 40,000 men, to be finally fixed by parliament.

Collaterally with these negotiations the attention of Marlborough was occupied by domestic politics, and the intrigues for a change of administration. When William intrusted the management of affairs to the Tories, he hoped that the change would give stability to his government. But the event did not accord with his expectations. He indeed gained his object in securing the establishment of the Protestant succession; yet in every other view he was grievously disappointed. The Whigs, though hated in power, became the favourites of the nation, when in disgrace; while the Tories, by indulging their party vengeance, excited general disgust, and no less offended the people than the king. As they were adverse to the very principles on which his government was founded, their opposition to his measures was regarded as the effect of antipathy to his person; nor was their conduct in foreign affairs calculated to redeem the errors and selfishness of their domestic policy: they displayed the most degrading servility towards France, as well as a lukewarmness, equally culpable, to the honour and permanent interests of their own country.

The king felt the irksomeness of his situation: but discouraged by repeated disappointments, he sunk into a state of irresolution. He found it impossible to conduct the government with a Tory ministry; yet he knew not how to regain

the confidence of the Whigs; and even if he recalled them to office, he was apprehensive that they would again prove themselves too weak to maintain the authority of the crown. Thus situated, he regarded the period of the Tory administration as the most perplexing of his whole life, and anxiously watched the current of popular opinion to liberate himself from their control. Such was the temper in which he took his departure for Holland. During his stay abroad, his impatience and anxiety hourly increased; and he frequently recurred to the advice of his confidential counsellor, Sunderland, who inflamed his resentment against the Tories, and strenuously recommended a reconciliation with the Whigs.

Marlborough was too zealously attached to his friends and party, to witness without interest the struggles which agitated the mind of his royal master. His correspondence strongly depicts his own feelings as well as the embarrassment and smothered indignation of the king. He was not unacquainted with the influence and suggestions of Sunderland; and notwithstanding their former friendship and recent family connexion, he indignantly dwells on his private machinations, and more than once refers to his name with expressions of abhorrence. He seems, however, to have confided in the friendship of the earl of Albemarle, who affected great zeal for the Tory cause, and promised to apprise him of the sentiments of the king; and to the latest moment he flattered himself that the resentment of the monarch would subside, or that the Tories would regain his confidence.

At this period Godolphin also caught the alarm, and announced his resolution to retire from office. Marlborough, however, earnestly deprecated this precipitate measure. In several letters he urges his friend to regulate his conduct by the advice of Lord Rochester, and the other chiefs of the party, and above all to wait his own return, hinting that he himself would follow the example, if the king should persist in the line of policy which he had apparently adopted.

The tone of Marlborough's correspondence at this crisis shows that he entertained little hope of any change favourable to the Tory cause. The antigallican party in Holland, which was extremely powerful, importuned the king to dissolve the parliament, and choose a ministry inclined to act vigorously against France; and their representations were

warmly seconded by pensionary Heinsius, who possessed the full confidence of the monarch. Several persons of consideration in England repaired to Holland for the same purpose. Among these we find the earl of Carlisle, the accredited agent of the Whigs, who was strongly recommended by Lord Sunderland, and hoped to supplant Godolphin at the treasury board. The king was thus beset by the enemies of the Tories, while his habitual reserve rendered him inaccessible to those of opposite sentiments. A temporary indisposition contributed to increase his seclusion, and gave ample scope to the representations of those who were labouring for a change.

Marlborough himself, though attached to his party, was perfectly conscious of their demerits, and anxiously endeavoured to instil into them such maxims of policy as would gratify the king, and promote the public cause. In several of his letters he expresses his conviction, that, if they did not support the system of continental connexions, and oppose a vigorous resistance to the power of France, they would not only be accessory to their own disgrace, but to the ruin of their country. These well-timed remonstrances produced little effect, and he had the mortification to observe the alienation of the king hourly increase.

In the midst of this political struggle, James II. died on the 16th of September, and the acknowledgment of his son as king by Louis roused general resentment in England. Addresses poured in from all quarters expressing the warmest attachment to the established government, as well as equal indignation at the unexampled perfidy and unwarrantable ambition of the French court. In consequence of this change in the public sentiment, the irresolution of William was changed into confidence, and he took the resolution of recurring to the Whigs, in whom alone he could confide. He acted with his characteristic reserve, not undeceiving Marlborough in the hope that his friends might yet continue in office; and, on the point of departure, gave him strict orders to remain in Holland, as well to evade his remonstrances, as to spare him the mortification of witnessing the intended change. Finally, he contrived to postpone his own journey, first under the plea of sickness, and afterwards of unfavourable winds, till he saw that the public opinion in England had taken a

decided turn. Having thus wrought upon the expectations of Marlborough and his friends, he suddenly embarked, and appeared in England before the least notice had transpired of his voyage.

In the interval, Marlborough remained in the most anxious suspense. His letters show that pretence after pretence was employed to detain him on the Continent; and that he watched the arrival of each successive post to confirm his hopes, or realise his fears. Having matured the negotiations with which he was charged, he obtained the long wished-for permission to return; but at the very moment of his embarkation, he was thunderstruck by the receipt of a letter from the secretary of state, announcing the dissolution of parliament, and the retirement of his friend Godolphin from office. Without a moment's delay he quitted the Hague, and on his arrival in England found his own party held in general detestation, for the mortifications they had heaped on the king; and the dishonour which they had brought upon the nation, by their timidity in foreign transactions, and violence in domestic policy. Nor were the circumstances of their disgrace calculated to alleviate his chagrin at the failure of his endeavours to rouse them to a more efficient discharge of their public duty. The king issued a proclamation for a new parliament, but, still doubtful whether the Whigs could combat that influence, which the landed property of the Tories enabled them to exercise in elections, he delayed the intended change of administration. This indecision operated to the disadvantage of the Whigs, by enabling the ministers to employ the interest of the crown in support of their own party. Accordingly the Whigs were not found to have gained in the new parliament that complete preponderance which was consonant to the wishes of the king and the state of public feeling. On the usual trial of strength in the choice of a speaker, Harley was re-elected by a majority of fourteen, in opposition to Sir Thomas Lyttleton, who was supported by the Whigs.

The speech from the throne, which was the composition of Somers, contained an animated appeal to the spirit and honour of the nation. The affront offered to the British crown, by the acknowledgment of the pretended prince of Wales, was described in terms of dignified resentment, and the parliament

was urged to adopt the most effectual means for securing the Protestant succession, and frustrating the hopes of those who meditated the overthrow of the established government. The manly eloquence of this speech excited a transport of enthusiasm. The peers announced their concurrence by a loyal address, which was laid on the table for signature, that it might appear no less the act of each individual than the determination of the whole body. It was signed by seventy peers, including those of every distinction and party. In the House of Commons, also, the moderate Tories vied with the Whigs in testifying their zeal and patriotism.

The concern of Marlborough for the resignation of Godolphin and the dissolution of the parliament, was considerably tempered by the countenance shown to that moderate class of Tories with whom he was identified, and particularly by the distinction conferred on his confidential friend Harley. The treaties which he had concluded were received with the most unqualified approbation, and liberal supplies voted for the prosecution of the war. Convinced that no system of policy could be stable, while the domestic establishment remained in uncertainty, the parliament passed several bills for securing the Protestant succession. An act of attainder against the pretended prince of Wales and the queen dowager was followed by another, for the security of his majesty's person and the succession to the crown in the Protestant line. This act also contained a clause enjoining all persons to abjure the pretended Prince of Wales; and a second making it equally criminal to imagine or compass the death of the princess of Denmark, as that of the king's eldest son and heir. Strenuous opposition was made to these measures by the high Tories, at the head of whom was Nottingham; but their efforts only served to show their general unpopularity.

The bill of abjuration was the last public act of our great deliverer. His health had been so long declining, and his infirmities were much increased by anxiety of mind, arising from the recent feuds at home and embarrassments abroad, that, during the preceding summer, he had repeatedly prognosticated to his friends his approaching dissolution. His death was accelerated by an accidental fall from his horse, while hunting in the park at Hampton Court. Supported by the energy of his mind, his constitution struggled for

several weeks against the progress of decay, and his dissolution was suspended by Providence, until he had completed the great edifice of civil and religious liberty. When the bill of abjuration was presented for his signature, his hand was too feeble to perform its office, and he stamped his name to this national legacy a few hours before he breathed his last. He expired on the 8th of March, 1702, in the fifty-second year of his age, and the fourteenth of his reign.

The zeal which Marlborough had manifested in promoting the grand designs of William, joined with the fullest conviction of his great talents as a general and statesman, obliterated the royal prejudices against his person, and the doubts entertained of his fidelity. Considering him as the most proper agent to consolidate the Protestant succession, and carry into effect the extensive system which had been formed for the preservation of civil and religious liberty, the last advice of William to his successor was, a strong recommendation of Marlborough, as the most proper person in her dominions to lead her armies and direct her counsels. Indeed the subsequent conduct of Marlborough verified the profound judgment of the dying monarch. Whatever may have been his errors in the preceding period of doubt and infidelity; whatever intercourse he had hitherto maintained with his former sovereign and benefactor, or which he afterwards held with the Stuart family, he religiously fulfilled the great trust reposed in him by his sovereign and his country, and, more than any individual, contributed to consolidate the great work of the Revolution, to baffle the hopes and machinations of the Stuarts and their adherents, and to smite that great colossus of power, which threatened the destruction of civil and religious liberty, and on which they placed their hopes of effecting a counter-revolution.

CHAP. X. — ACCESSION OF ANNE.—1702.

ON the death of William, the crown devolved on Anne, in conformity with the order of succession established at the Revolution. At the time of the queen's accession, the doubts which she had formerly entertained were suppressed by the

change of circumstances, or the brilliant prospect which opened to her view. The recent death of her father relieved her from the scruples which she had felt at his exclusion, and the disputed legitimacy of her brother induced her to acquiesce in the arrangements of the legislature; for even if he was not supposititious, she persuaded herself that he was disqualified by his religious principles, and considered her assumption of the crown as necessary to secure the existence of the established church.*

The first exercise of her power was the nomination of the prince, her husband, to the offices of generalissimo of the forces, and lord high admiral. Being regarded only as a subject, he still continued to occupy a seat in the house of peers, in the quality of duke of Cumberland.

The distinguished merits of the Earl of Marlborough, his former zeal and services, his disgrace on her account, and her own romantic affection to his countess, were powerful recommendations to her favour and confidence. Accordingly, the honours which his talents had extorted from William were but the prelude to higher distinctions and employments. Three days after her accession he was nominated knight of the Garter. On the ensuing day he was appointed captain-general of the English forces, at home and abroad, and soon afterwards master of the ordnance. His countess was also made groom of the stole and mistress of the robes, and intrusted with the management of the privy purse.

To the countess the queen also gave an additional and delicate proof of her regard. Recollecting that in their excursions through Windsor Park she had repeatedly admired the situation of the great lodge, the queen seized the earliest opportunity of offering her the rangership, to which that lodge was attached. In one of her familiar notes, after alluding to Lord Portland, who had been ranger under the late king, she added, "Mentioning this worthy person puts

* The duchess observes: — "When I saw she had such a partiality to those that I knew to be Jacobites, I asked her one day whether she had a mind to give up her crown; for if it had been her conscience not to wear it, I do solemnly protest I would not have disturbed her, or struggled as I did. But she told me she was not sure the prince of Wales was her brother; and that it was not practicable for him to come here, without ruin to the religion and country." — *Narrative upon Mrs. Morley's coming to the crown.* St. Alban's, Oct. 29. 1709.

me in mind to ask dear Mrs. Freeman a question which I would have done some time ago; and that is, if you would have the lodge for your life, because the warrant must be made accordingly; and any thing that is of so much satisfaction as this poor place seems to be to you, I would give dear Mrs. Freeman for all her days, which I pray God may be as many and as truly happy as this world can make you."* The countess gratefully accepted this offer, embellished the lodge at a great expense, and it became her favourite residence.

Similar proofs of favour flowed on those who were connected with Marlborough and his lady by blood or friendship. Lady Harriet Godolphin and Lady Spencer, their two daughters, were nominated ladies of the bedchamber. The Sunderland family also felt the beneficial effects of their powerful interest. At the particular intercession of the countess, Robert, earl of Sunderland, obtained the renewal of the annual pension of 2000*l.* which had been granted him by the late king, together with the payment of the arrears since its suspension. The exertion of the same interest, together with Marlborough's, obtained for Lord Godolphin the title and privileges of lord high treasurer. The principles of Marlborough and Godolphin indirectly influenced the character of the administration formed under their auspices. As they were both moderate Tories, and as the Whig partialities of the countess were either not yet developed, or not allowed to operate, the queen was left to consult her own private inclinations and private antipathies in the choice of a ministry, from which the Whigs were mostly excluded. Even the privy council was purged of the obnoxious party; for the names of the distinguished Whig leaders, Halifax, Somers, and Orford, found no place in the list announced by the new sovereign. Not satisfied with monopolising the higher posts of the state and the law, the Tories were anxious to exclude their political antagonists even from the subordinate office of justice of the peace. In this view, however, they were thwarted by the moderate counsels of Marlborough and Godolphin, who would not suffer them to indulge their party antipathies to the full extent.

* The queen to Lady Marlborough, May 19. 1702.

As Anne was deeply imbued with the prejudices of the Tories against foreign connexions, and as the natural timidity of her sex inclined her to peace, nothing but the dangers which encompassed her throne could have urged her to adopt the same vigorous policy and the same hostility against France which had marked the reign of her predecessor. Indeed, her situation admitted neither deliberation nor delay. The power of Louis, which had been rapidly augmented by a long and successful career of violence and craft, had now attained its utmost height. The occupation of the towns and countries on the Upper Rhine opened the way for the invasion of Southern Germany; while the vast preponderance which he had acquired by placing his grandson on the Spanish throne, with the possession of the Netherlands, the Milanese, and other dependencies, rendered him the arbiter of Europe. With such a formidable power to contend against, the Dutch, who yet trembled at the recollection of the recent invasion, and who had purchased the liberation of their captive troops by acknowledging Philip, had no hope of preserving their independence but by the succour and support of England. The emperor, notwithstanding the temporary success of his arms in Italy, was embarrassed by the rising rebellion in Hungary; and found himself engaged in a contest, manifestly unequal, and apparently hopeless, unless he was aided by the maritime powers. The duke of Savoy, hemmed in by the territories of the Bourbon princes, was reduced to a state of vassalage under France, and could entertain no hope of deliverance, unless Austria was enabled to extend its acquisitions in Italy.

Such being the circumstances of those powers, whose position or military force might enable them to make head against the aggressions of France, there seemed little prospect that the states of the Continent would succeed in repelling the common danger. It was obvious that if Louis could even for a short period attach the Dutch to his interest, or render them passive, and paralyse Austria, he would profit by his vast resources and commanding attitude, to restore the dependent family of Stuart to the British throne, and thus secure the only country which could arrest his career of ambition. Indeed, he had given an early proof that such

was his intention, by declining to acknowledge the title of the queen.

The death of William consequently spread the utmost consternation among all the continental powers, particularly among the Dutch, who were alternately cajoled and threatened by France, in order to detach them from the grand alliance, and break the only link which connected England with the Continent. Their suspense and alarm were, however, speedily dissipated. Anne had scarcely ascended the throne, before she despatched a letter to the States, through her envoy Mr. Stanhope, announcing her intention to maintain the alliances concluded by the late monarch. This letter was immediately circulated through the provinces, and received with general exultation. To give additional force to this declaration, the Earl of Marlborough was deputed to Holland, as ambassador extraordinary. He reached the Hague on the 28th of March, and his presence called forth a new transport of joy. He consoled the States for the loss of their beloved chief, assured them of a vigorous support on the part of the British government, and obtained in return a promise of their most zealous exertions. He agreed with the heads of the republic and the imperial minister, that war should be declared on the same day at London, the Hague, and Vienna. A plan of operations was also arranged under his direction; and the campaign was even opened, during his stay, by the siege of Kayserswerth, a strong fortress on the Lower Rhine, in the electorate of Cologne, which had been occupied by a French garrison in the preceding year.

Finally, to secure that unity of action, which cannot be obtained under divided authority, he endeavoured to persuade the States to confer on the prince of Denmark the chief command of their forces, a post which was coveted by the king of Prussia, the elector of Hanover, the duke of Zell, and the Archduke Charles. The Dutch, however, declined this proposal, not only because they placed no confidence in the military talents of the prince, but because they feared he would resist the control of the field deputies, whom they sent to the army, to inspect and regulate the conduct of their generals. No instances were spared to overcome their objections. The queen, anxious to gratify the prince, made

the most urgent representations, through the channel of the Dutch ambassador; and Marlborough was even authorised to announce that, unless the prince was appointed to the command, she would not issue the declaration of war against France. Nothing, however, could vanquish the firmness of the Dutch government; and Marlborough left this question in suspense, hoping that in his absence some expedient might be found to obviate the difficulty.

After remaining a few days at the Hague, he returned to England, to take a share in the great struggle of parties, which was expected to arise on the question of peace or war. He reached London on the 26th of March. Parliament was already assembled, and the requisite measures were promptly adopted, for supporting the Protestant succession, and prosecuting the war. The oath of abjuration was taken by the members of both houses, and the name of the Princess Sophia was introduced in the public prayers for the royal family, as next in succession to the throne. Within a few days the conventions which Marlborough had concluded at the Hague, for the supply of auxiliary troops, and the operations of the campaign, were sanctioned by parliament; and on the 4th of May, in conformity with the promise to the States and Austria, a declaration of hostilities was issued against France and Spain.

At this period may be noticed the commencement of a domestic annoyance, which Marlborough experienced from the captious temper and political bias of his consort. With a native frankness of character, and a spirit too domineering to consult the opinions even of those she loved and esteemed, the countess had imbibed an early partiality to the Whig party and principles, which was strengthened by the marriage of her daughter with lord Spencer. Before the accession of Anne, no incident had occurred to create a collision of sentiment between the princess and her favourite, notwithstanding their discordance on political questions; or rather their common antipathy to William absorbed every other consideration. But immediately after that event a change occurred; and in the petty bickerings which arose*, Marlborough and

* Swift observes, that the alienation of the queen from the duchess or Marlborough commenced at her accession. This opinion, which is cor-

Godolphin were often involved, either because they supported the opinions of their royal mistress, or endeavoured to restrain the antipathies and partialities of the countess. Another source of domestic embarrassment was derived from the conduct and principles of his brother George Churchill. Availing himself of his influence with the prince of Denmark, he arrogated a degree of superiority at the naval board, to which he was not entitled; and in particular endeavoured to obtain precedence over his colleague Sir David Mitchell. He was compelled to recede, by the remonstrances of his brother; but his high Tory partialities afterwards proved a perpetual source of contention.

Military operations having already commenced on the Dutch frontier, Marlborough, accompanied by his countess, departed on the 12th of May to Margate, where a vessel was waiting to convey him to the opposite shore. Contrary winds detained him for a few days, but in this short time his countess received several letters from the queen, describing the petty incidents which occurred at court.

A letter from the countess to Lord Godolphin, written during this temporary absence, will show the tone which she had already begun to assume in political transactions, her inveterate hostility to the Tories, and the opposition which she made, as well to the queen's partialities, as to the arrangements of her husband and the treasurer.

“ Margate, Tuesday, the 29th of May.

“ Since you have been so kind as to write so long a letter for my satisfaction, I hope it will hold out to read my answer, though I know my opinion is very insignificant upon most occasions. In the first place, I will begin without any compliment, and say that if any thing could give me a worse thought of the meetings of those gentlemen (the Tories) than I had before, it would be their desire to turn any man out of an employment to put in my lord Sandwiah. This looks to me as if every thing were to be governed by faction and nonsense; and 'tis no matter what look things have in the world, or what men are made use of, if they are but such creatures as will, right or wrong, be at the disposal of two or three arbitrary men that are at the head of them. How long they will be able to support that way of government I can't tell; but if they are strong enough to go on with it, I am apt to think it will not end in hardships only to the lords lieutenants of England.

rect, he evidently formed from the information of Mrs. Masham and Mr. Harley.

“ My Lord Lexington having a mind to quit his employment, shows he thinks it is better for him to depend upon the Whig party, considering his behaviour to the queen and prince formerly; for I am sure self-interest is his first consideration, and I do not think him very wrong in that choice. At least if I had any power to dispose of places, the first rule should be to have those that were proper for the business; the next those that had deserved upon any occasion; and whenever there was room without hurting the public, I think one would with pleasure give employments to those that were in so unhappy a condition as to want them. Whether any of these reasons will serve for my Lord Weymouth I am in some doubt; but I am sure he is one that will make a noise, and give dissatisfaction to many that I believe wish well, and could be useful to the government.

“ But that which is the greatest trouble to me is yet to answer, that is, what you say concerning the dispute between my brother George and Sir David Mitchell, whom I do not know, but I think I have heard a great character of him; and I have no sort of patience to think that a brother of Lord Marlborough should put the least difficulty or stop to any thing that is for the queen’s service and the good of the country, for any senseless pretension or interest of his own, which, without knowing any thing of the particulars, I am inclined to believe he has no just right to, and certainly he should not make use of the queen’s favour but to serve her in the first place.”

The impatience of Marlborough to depart for the scene of action was finally gratified; the wind, which had for several days been contrary, changing to a favourable quarter. At this moment, the prospect of a long separation from the tenderest connexions, and the anxieties attending his important commission, threw a gloom over his mind, and he saw the signal for departure with the keenest anguish. No lover ever quitted an adored mistress with more poignant sorrow, than he felt on taking leave of his countess. His agitation overcame him, and he hurried on board to hide the agony of his mind, and indulge his grief. A hasty note, which he wrote to her on this occasion, presents an interesting picture of his affection.

“ *May 15-26.* — “ It is impossible to express with what a heavy heart I parted with you when I was by the water’s side. I could have given my life to have come back, though I knew my own weakness so much that I durst not, for I knew I should have exposed myself to the company. I did for a great while, with a perspective glass, look upon the cliffs, in hopes I might have had one sight of you. We are now out of sight of Margate, and I have neither soul nor spirits, but I do at this minute suffer so much that nothing but being with you can recompense it. If you will be sensible of what I now feel, you will endeavour ever

to be easy to me, and then I shall be most happy; for it is you only that can give me true content. I pray God to make you and yours happy; and if I could contribute any thing to it with the utmost hazard of my life, I should be glad to do it."

CHAP. XI.—COMMENCEMENT OF THE WAR OF SUCCESSION.
1702.

ARRIVED at the Hague, Marlborough again laboured to obtain the nomination of the prince of Denmark to the chief command. But fortunately for the honour of England and the welfare of Europe, his instances were fruitless; and as the preliminary arrangements for the campaign were all matured, he acquiesced in the exclusion of the prince. Other obstacles, however, arose from the pretensions of the prince of Nassau Saarbruck and the earl of Athlone: the first a prince of the empire; the last a general of great experience and high reputation, and, as a native of Holland, warmly supported by such of his countrymen as were jealous of foreign influence, or averse to the extensive system of operation proposed by Marlborough. At length these obstacles were overcome by the patriotic exertions of pensionary Heinsius and the party attached to England. The prince and Athlone generously withdrew their pretensions, and Marlborough was raised to the important office, with a salary of 10,000*l.* a year.

Although his efforts in favour of the prince of Denmark were as sincere as they were fruitless, the prince, who was anxious to signalise himself in a military capacity, was highly chagrined at his exclusion, and suspected that his pretensions had not been supported with sufficient zeal and perseverance. His displeasure was inflamed by the malicious insinuations of Plessen, the Danish envoy, who possessed a great share of his confidence. Hence we observe several passages in the correspondence of Marlborough, indicating the vexation he underwent from this cause, and the difficulty he experienced in allaying the ill-founded suspicions and pacifying the disappointed ambition of the prince.

After a short stay at the Hague, he hastened to Nimeguen to assume the command and give vigour to the military system. Meanwhile negotiations had been continued in Germany, and many of the States were drawn into a cordial support of the grand alliance. The emperor gained Frederic, elector of Brandenburg, by acknowledging him as king of Prussia; and the queen, at the suggestion of Marlborough, still farther gratified a prince, whose ruling passion was vanity, by promising to grant him the ceremonial enjoyed by other crowned heads. The members of the house of Brunswick Luneburg were lured by the prospect of succeeding to the British throne. Ten thousand of their troops were in march for the scene of action, even before the subsidiary convention which Marlborough had concluded was formally signed. They even compelled the neighbouring princes of Saxe-Gotha and Wolfenbittel to renounce their connexion with the king of France, and to withhold a levy of 12,000 men who had been raised for his service. The minor princes and states were borne away by the example of the greater; even the electors of Cologne and Bavaria, the devoted partisans of France, testified their intention to observe a neutrality. On the same day, therefore, in which the emperor denounced hostilities against the Bourbon princes, as sovereign of Austria, the German diet issued a similar declaration, and engaged to supply the usual contingents of troops.

The plan of operations was formed according to the proportions of force which were to be respectively furnished by the different members of the alliance. A German army under Louis, margrave of Baden, was to be collected on the Upper Rhine. A second body, composed of Prussians, Palatines, and Dutch, and amounting to 25,000 men, under the prince of Saarbruck, was occupied in besieging Kayserwerth. The principal army had also assembled in the vicinity of Cleves, under the command of Athlone, to cover that part of the frontier which stretches from the Rhine to the Meuse, and to favour the operations of the prince of Saarbruck. A fourth body of 10,000 men, under the command of Cohorn, the celebrated engineer, was also collected near the mouth of the Scheldt, to secure that quarter, and threaten the district of Bruges.

The preparations and movements of the enemy indicated

the most vigorous operations on the side of Holland. On one hand, a force under Count de la Motte and the Marquis of Bedmar, who commanded in the name of Philip, covered the western frontier of the Netherlands against the aggressions of Cohorn. On the other, Marshal Tallard was detached from the Upper Rhine, with a corps of observation, amounting to 13,000 men, to interrupt the siege of Kayserswerth. But the principal and most numerous army was assembled on the Meuse, and possessed essential advantages by the occupation of the fortresses in the bishopric of Liege. The duke of Burgundy, assisted by Marshal Boufflers, was appointed to the command.

As it was evident that the presence of a French prince would be signalised by some decisive exploit, the earl of Athlone had thrown a garrison of 12,000 men into Maestricht, and taken post at Cranenburg, in the vicinity of Cleves; while the enemy advanced to Xanten, where the duke of Burgundy joined them in the beginning of May. While Marlborough was employed in settling with the ministers of the States the plan of the campaign, the French made an effort, which threatened to frustrate his grand designs, and confine his operations to the defence of the Dutch frontier. The army of the duke of Burgundy being joined by that of Tallard, suddenly pushed towards the Waal, with the view of surprising Nimeguen, which was without a garrison, and even without a single cannon mounted on the ramparts. The place was saved by the vigorous resistance of the burghers and the rapid march of Athlone, who entered at the very moment when the enemy had advanced within gunshot of the works. The joy which this deliverance awakened in the Dutch was succeeded by equal consternation at the danger they had escaped and the peril which still threatened their frontier. Marlborough, therefore, found it no easy task to vanquish the reluctance of the government to undertake offensive operations, which might expose them to new hazards. He laboured, however, to digest a plan which might at once calm their fears and further his own views for a distant and efficient effort. Three proposals were submitted to the consideration of the States. One, to attack the army of the duke of Burgundy in a position which it had recently occupied between Goch and Genep, on the right

bank of the Meuse. The second, after leaving a corps at Nimeguen, sufficient for the protection of the frontier, to advance up the Rhine, with the view of interrupting the communications of the enemy and laying the foundation of an offensive system by the reduction of Rheinberg. The third, which appears to have been suggested by Marlborough himself, was to leave a corps of observation at Nimeguen, to cross the Meuse, and, by an offensive movement towards Brabant, to divert the whole force and attention of the enemy to the Spanish Netherlands. No resolution was to be taken on these different plans till Marlborough had assumed the command, and the strength of the respective armies could be ascertained.

Having matured his arrangements, he quitted the Hague on the 2d of July, and repaired to the army, which, since the recent enterprise of Boufflers, had been posted along the Waal, between Nimeguen and Fort Schenk.

The acquiescence of Athlone and the prince of Saarbruck, in his appointment to the supreme command, was far from obviating all the difficulties incident to his situation. Instead of the advantages which king William derived from his exalted rank and authority as stadtholder, Marlborough, as a subject, was exposed to rivalry, and reduced to depend on his own personal interest. His means of directing or influencing the factions in the Dutch republic, depended chiefly on the credit of Heinsius* and the other partisans of the war, who themselves shrunk from responsibility. At the army he was subjected to the control of the field deputies, who, though vested with great powers, were yet ignorant of military affairs; and, consequently, were either led by the opinions of their own generals, or wasted the most decisive moments in fruitless deliberation, and in soliciting instructions from the Hague. Among the generals he found also more rivals than coadjutors. By them he was often thwarted from personal jealousy or prejudice; and at the time when vigour and promptitude were necessary, he found them as timid and indecisive as the deputies. From Athlone, in par-

* The pensionary of Holland and intimate friend and confidant of the late King William III. He was grandson of the accomplished Daniel Heinsius, and son of the excellent Latin poet, Nicholas Heinsius. (Marlborough's Despatches, vol. v. p. 617.) — ED.

ticular, he experienced constant opposition, though cloaked with the affectation of deference. Indeed, it would have been difficult to unite two commanders more discordant in character: Marlborough, active, enterprising, and decisive; Athlone, naturally cold and circumspect, and rendered still more unaccommodating and captious by the effects of age and jealousy. From these observations it will be easy to conceive the embarrassments which the generalissimo was destined to encounter, the mortifications he endured, the obstructions against which he sometimes struggled in vain, and the frequent and favourable opportunities of which he was unable to profit.

Kayserswerth having surrendered on the 15th of June, Marlborough drew to the Waal the 8000 German auxiliaries employed in the siege, summoned the English from Breda, collected reinforcements from other quarters, and in the course of a few days was at the head of 60,000 men. It was now necessary to decide on the plan of operations; and Marlborough was extremely anxious to cross the Meuse and make his intended movement towards Brabant. He had even fixed on the 8th of July as the day of the passage; but he was unable to obtain the concurrence of the Dutch generals, or indeed to extort from them an unanimous resolution on any of the proposed plans. He was, therefore, obliged to hold a council of war, in order to examine the three projects of operation. The proposed attack of the French army was immediately rejected on account of their strong position. The operation on the Rhine was referred to the decision of the States; and on the irruption into Brabant no resolution was taken. A new council was therefore assembled by Athlone in the afternoon, for the purpose of obtaining the opinions of such generals as had been absent in the morning. The question being put, whether a corps of twenty-four battalions and as many squadrons, to be left on the Waal, under the command of the baron de Heyden, was sufficient for the protection of the frontier, the majority decided in the affirmative, a few expressing their apprehensions, and one declining to give an opinion, as unacquainted with the country. This diversity of sentiment induced Athlone to appeal to the government for instructions, while Marlborough despatched Gueldermassen to the Hague, to

press the adoption of one of the two plans which had not been absolutely rejected. From his correspondence we find that he remained several days in this irksome uncertainty, and thus irretrievably lost a portion of valuable time.

While Marlborough was combating the timid objections of the Dutch government and the scruples of their generals, he was involved in one of the difficulties which are incident to a command over troops of different nations. At the moment when he had extorted the sanction of the States, the Hanoverian general arrived at the camp to announce that his men could not march without the orders of Bothmar, the minister at the Hague. This unexpected suspense was peculiarly mortifying; for without them the army was too weak to make the intended movement. Marlborough accordingly summoned Bothmar to the camp, and at length obtained his consent for the junction of the Hanoverian forces. A similar difficulty arose with regard to the Prussians; but Marlborough satisfied the king, by renewing the engagement that the queen should allow him the ceremonial usually enjoyed by crowned heads.

After a delay of fourteen days, he obtained permission to make a movement in advance; and the army accordingly traversed the Waal, on the 7th of July, and encamped on the Mookerheyde, the headquarters being established at Duckenburg. Three bridges were the same day thrown over the Meuse below Grave, and the commander crossed the river to reconnoitre the ground beyond. In a letter to Godolphin, dated Duckenburg, July 13th, he says:—

“ I am ashamed to write from this camp, for we ought to have marched from hence three or four days ago; but the fears the Dutch have for Nimeguen and the Rhine created such difficulties when we were to take a resolution, that we were forced to send to the Hague, and the States would not come to any resolution, but have made it more difficult, by leaving it to the general officers, at the same time recommending, in the first place, the safety of the Rhine and Nimeguen. However, we came last night to a resolution of marching to-morrow, and passing the Meuse a little below Grave. Accordingly we have this day made three bridges over the said river. The intention is, that we should keep ourselves masters of those bridges, and that as soon as the battering pieces can be got to Nimeguen, which we hope may be in eight days, then to pass the Meuse, and march to the siege of Rheinberg. The reason of our passing the Meuse to-morrow is, in hopes it may in some degree alarm the French, and hinder us from eating up that part of the country,

which must be our subsistence during the siege. It is hoped this might be a secret, but I am afraid they have too good intelligence, and then they may act so as that we may be obliged to take new measures. If the fear of Nimeguen and the Rhine had not hindered us from marching into Brabant, they must then have had the disadvantage of governing themselves by our motions, whereas we are now obliged to mind them.

“I am obliged to you for the compliment you make me for the station I am now in. It would have been a great deal more agreeable to me, if it could have been without disputes, and a little less trouble; but patience will overcome all things.”

Having surveyed the ground Marlborough returned to the camp, and on the 16th the army was posted between Homen and Wichem, with the Meuse in the rear, and the headquarters at Over-Asselt, within two leagues of the enemy, who still retained their position at Goch and Genep. Here he remained several days, as we find from his correspondence. To his countess he writes, July 17th:—

“We have now very hot weather, which I hope will ripen the fruit at St. Alban’s. When you are there, pray think how happy I should be walking alone with you. No ambition can make me amends for being from you. If it were not impertinent, I should desire you in every letter to give my humble duty to the queen, for I do serve her with all my heart and soul. I am on horseback or answering letters all day long; for besides the business of the army, I have letters from the Hague, and all places where her majesty has any ministers. So that if it were not for my zeal for her service, I should certainly desert, for you know of all things I do not love writing.”

To Lord Godolphin, July 20th:—

“I am afraid of giving you any trouble, knowing you have but little time to yourself. However, I cannot forbear sending you a copy of a letter I received last night from Gueldermassen, who went to the Hague to hasten every thing for the siege of Rheinberg, which by his letter I am afraid will not be made. And should we follow what he thinks to be best, I think the French may have it in their power to beat us. But to comply as far as I can, I have this night proposed to them the leaving twenty squadrons of horse, and eighteen battalions of foot, to entrench themselves before Nimeguen, and to pass the Meuse with the rest of the army, or to march with the whole towards Cleves, in order to get between Venloo and the French, if possible, so as to be able to attack them. The fear the States have of Nimeguen and the passage of the Rhine hinders the advantage of having the superiority.”

CHAP. XII. — CAPTURE OF VENLOO. — 1702.

At length Marlborough soothed the fears of the Dutch government, and obtained full powers to execute his own plan. To the Dutch deputies who attended him on a reconnoitring party, he pointed out the camp of the enemy, and exultingly exclaimed, "I shall soon deliver you from these troublesome neighbours!" Accordingly the confederate army crossed the Meuse on the 26th of July, and encamped with the right at Uden and the left at Zeeland. On the 27th they again advanced, establishing their right near Nunen and their left at Leyshout; the 28th they were posted between Geldorp and Mierle, and on the 30th approached Hamont.

These decisive operations, as Marlborough had predicted, drew the French from their position. On the first intelligence that he had crossed the Meuse, they suddenly decamped in the evening, traversed the river in several columns at Venloo and Ruremond, and hastened by forced marches in the direction of Peer and Bray.

Apprised of these movements, Marlborough announced to Godolphin his design of crossing the line of their march, and endeavouring to place himself between them and the Demer. He expressed also the fullest persuasion that he should draw them entirely from the Meuse, and not only be enabled to besiege Venloo, but to subsist in their territory during the remainder of the campaign. He adds, "Our marches have already had the desired effect, which was, their repassing the Meuse, which had we done sooner, would have been much better. If they would venture any thing this summer, it ought to be this day; for our march is upon an open heath, and we are weaker by sixteen regiments of foot than we shall be three days hence. I am just getting on horseback to begin the march. My letter is dated from the place where we are to camp this night. The French are nearer to it than we, but I do not think they will venture. But by this march they must own that we do not avoid meeting them."

At Hamont Marlborough was joined by three English regiments of dragoons, with the train of artillery and two battalions of Swiss. On the 31st a new reinforcement of nine battalions and six squadrons arrived from Nimeguen,

being part of the corps left under General Heukelom for the defence of the frontier. The same day Marlborough extended his right to St. Hubert's Lill, where he established his headquarters. He had scarcely entered his new position before reports arrived that the enemy were again in motion. With his characteristic vigilance he instantly mounted his horse, and spent twelve hours in reconnoitring the ground and obtaining intelligence of their march. While he remained in this position, the castle of Gravenbrock, which was held by a small French garrison, was compelled to surrender by a detachment under Lord Cutts.

On the 2d of August Marlborough again prolonged his march by bringing his left to St. Hubert's Lill, and stretching his right to Little Bruegel, where he established his headquarters. At the same time the enemy continued their hasty progress, and took post between Peer and Bray. As Marlborough calculated that they would direct their march through Sonhoven to Beringhen, he proposed to attack them, either in their passage over the heaths beyond Bray or in their camp at Sonhoven, which was so ill chosen as to render defeat inevitable. But according to the information of Berwick, who was present, they were saved by the timidity of the Dutch deputies, who refused their assent. Thus favoured, the French succeeded in reaching Beringhen unmolested, on the 5th of August, and the same day the confederate army established itself in the rear of Peer, with the right on the Dommel and the left at Ericum.

Marlborough had thus compelled the enemy to abandon the course of the Meuse, and leave him at liberty to prosecute his designs against the fortresses on that river. While preparations were making for the siege of Venloo, he employed detachments to destroy the fortifications of Peer and Bray, which lay in the line of his communications. Here he was joined by ten battalions and several squadrons, with a small train of artillery, from Maestricht, the garrison of which was disengaged by his advance.

With a view to ulterior operations, he prepared to pass the Dommel; but the French commanders, for the purpose of threatening his communications, broke up from Beringhen on the 9th, and marching by Moll and Bergueick to Rythoven, detached Berwick on the 12th to Eyndhoven, to cut

off a valuable convoy which had been long expected from Bois le Duc. This movement obliged Marlborough to make a retrograde march on the 12th to Everbeek, from whence he detached a strong corps, under Count Tilly, for the protection of the convoy. Here he remained several days in great anxiety, and his letters are filled with complaints of the want of concert among his subordinate officers, the obstacles raised to his designs, and the tardiness of the preparations for the siege of Venloo. As the movement of the enemy had prevented the attack on Weert, a second detachment was now charged with its reduction, and a body of ten battalions and seven squadrons was sent to commence operations against Venloo. Arrangements were also made to draw the supply of bread for the army from Maestricht.

At length the convoy, which had engrossed the attention of both armies, arrived from Bois le Duc. It traversed the heath near Geldorp, within sight of the French detachment; and, although the necessary precautions appear to have been neglected by the officers to whose care it was committed, the French commander was deterred by the main army from making any attempt to interrupt its march. It therefore proceeded behind the line of the Aa, halted on the 19th at Leen, or Linden, and on the 20th reached the camp in safety.

As the preparations for the siege of Venloo were not yet matured, Marlborough resolved to march towards Diest, with the view of interrupting the convoys of the enemy, or compelling them to withdraw from the district of Bois le Duc. He therefore advanced on the 22d to Great Bruegel, and the following day established his camp with the right in front of Helchteren and the left of Honthalen. This movement alarmed the French commanders; but they appear to have been unacquainted with his precise line of march, for he had scarcely taken up his ground before their army was descried emerging from the defiles before Hochtel. The disorder visible among their columns, particularly on the left, which was entangled amidst ponds and marshes, afforded the opportunity so long desired by Marlborough of risking an engagement. He instantly put his own troops in motion, and gave orders for the rest of the army to advance, and about three in the afternoon approached so near the enemy, that a cannonade was opened on both sides. But he was again disap-

pointed, his orders being so slowly and reluctantly obeyed, that evening prevented an attack. On the ensuing day the two armies still continued in presence; but in the night the French silently decamped. On the 28th they fell back to Moll and Balen, and on the 29th to Beverloo; and thus effected their retreat with no other detriment than a few casualties during the cannonade and a trifling loss by an attack on their rear guard. In relating this incident to Godolphin, Marlborough expresses the utmost chagrin and disappointment.

“*Helchteren, Aug. 16–27. 1702.*”

“The inclosed letter to the States will let you see the account I have given of the two days being in presence of the enemy. I have but too much reason to complain, that the ten thousand men upon our right did not march as soon as I sent the orders, which if they had, I believe we should have had a very easy victory, for their whole left was in disorder. However, I have thought it much for her majesty’s service to take no notice of it, as you see by my letter to the States. But my Lord Rivers, and almost all the general officers of the right were with me when I sent the orders, so that notwithstanding the care I take to hinder it, they do talk. I could not believe the French were so strong as we now know they are; for my lord Carr, one of my aides-de-camp, was taken, so that he marched with them the day they retreated, and the duke of Berwick showed him the whole army. He counted 72 battalions and 109 squadrons, but he says that our battalions are much stronger than theirs.

“Venloo will be invested to-morrow, and I have pressed the pensioner that if we have good success there, the States might give such timely order for the stores, that we might have it in our power to attack Ruremond, if the season be favourable.

“I am in so ill humour that I will not trouble you, nor dare I trust myself to write more; but believe this truth, that I honour and love you, my lady Marlborough, and my children, and would die for the queen.”

The disappointment which Marlborough so deeply lamented created considerable uneasiness. The troops having discovered that the marshes between the two armies were passable, expressed their dissatisfaction that the advice of the commander had not been adopted, and loudly clamoured against the conduct of the deputies; and it was not without difficulty that Marlborough restrained this spirit of discontent, which spread even to the officers. He did not, however, himself escape the censure of those who were ignorant, or affected to be ignorant of the restrictions under which he laboured. The discontented party in England complained

that the enemy had been suffered to escape, and now first raised the malicious clamour, which was afterwards propagated with such effect, that he was seeking to prolong the war for the gratification of his own personal interest. He bore these aspersions with patience, and from delicacy towards the States refrained from any public vindication of his conduct.

On the 29th of August, Marlborough decamped from Helchteren, crossed the heath of Donderslag, and took up a new position with his right at Asch, and his left at Gurk, to cover the intended sieges, and facilitate the passage of supplies from Maestricht. Venloo was first invested on the 5th of September, but he could not overcome the dilatory and negligent spirit of the Dutch government in providing the means of attack. He had also the additional mortification of being embarrassed by contentions which arose between Cohorn, the celebrated engineer, and some of the Dutch generals. Though unable to prevent the reduction of the fortresses, Boufflers made a movement, in hopes of some favourable opportunity to obstruct the confederates in their operations. On the 10th of September he marched to Beringhen, passed the Demer on the ensuing day, and on the 13th established his camp between Tongres and Borchloen, fixing his headquarters at Bedoe. As the rapid advance of Marlborough appeared to threaten the fortresses on the Rhine, Tallard was detached with seventeen battalions and twenty-five squadrons, to favour the retreat of the elector of Cologne from Bonn, and throw a garrison into the place. He also forced the city of Cologne to conclude a treaty of neutrality, and directing his march towards the Moselle, took measures for the security of Luxemburg, Treves, and Traerbach.

Meanwhile the requisite preparations being matured, the investment of Venloo was completed; thirty-two battalions, and thirty-six squadrons were detached for the siege, under the command of the prince of Nassau Saarbruck; and on the 7th of September the attacks were opened on both sides of the Meuse, under the direction of Cohorn. To cover the operation, as well as to facilitate the passage of the convoys, and to draw forage from Spanish Guelderland, Marlborough on the thirteenth took up a new position, with his right at Sutendal, and his left at Lonaken.

The trenches having been rapidly pushed forward, the first attack was directed on the 18th of September against Fort St. Michael, which was connected with the place by a bridge of boats across the Meuse, and formed its principal defence. The assault of this work was intrusted to a detachment under Lord Cutts, consisted principally of English troops, and was executed with unusual spirit and success. The commander led his men to the attack, accompanied by Lord Lorne, Mr. Dalrymple, Sir Richard Temple, and other distinguished volunteers. Mingling with the troops, they stormed the covert way, and carried the ravelin sword in hand, notwithstanding the explosion of a mine. The Earl of Huntingdon, unable, from a weak state of health, to make the same exertions as his gallant comrades, gave money to the soldiers to assist him in scaling the breastwork. Encouraged by their success, the victorious assailants forced their way over a bridge, connecting the ravelin with the interior works, and carried the fort itself by storm. Of the garrison two hundred were made prisoners, and the remainder, amounting to six hundred, were either killed in the conflict, or drowned in attempting to cross the Meuse.

The attack against the town was prosecuted with additional vigour and effect. Batteries were raised in the captured fort, and on the 23d of September, a tremendous fire of artillery was opened on the defences of the place. Before mid-day, an accessible breach being effected, the garrison were discouraged, and the burghers clamoured for a surrender. At this moment the news of the reduction of Landau reached the camp, and was announced by a volley of artillery. The first salute being considered by the enemy as the signal of assault, a flag of truce was instantly displayed, but remained unnoticed by the besiegers, whose attention was occupied with their own rejoicings. On the second discharge, the fears of the besieged being increased, white flags were hoisted on every part of the works. The signal was at length acknowledged, a capitulation arranged, and before the close of the day, the garrison quitting the breach with the honours of war, were conducted to Antwerp.

Stimulated to greater exertion by the capture of Venloo, and the unexpected declaration of Bavaria in favour of the Bourbon, the British commander ordered the troops who

had reduced the place to advance up the Meuse, and on the 29th of September, Stevenswaert and Ruremond, two fortresses between Venloo and Maestricht, were at once invested. The same difficulties and delays occurred as in the preceding siege; but the energy of Marlborough was not to be checked by the negligence of the Dutch officers, the misgivings of Athlone, or the scruples of Cohorn, which last Gueldermassen justly termed "the general of difficulties."

Stevenswaert, being provided with a garrison of only four hundred men, made a weak defence, and was surrendered after a siege of five days. The resistance of Ruremond was scarcely more obstinate. The attacks were opened on the 2d of October, by the Prussians on one side of the river, and the English on the other. The batteries began to play on the 6th, the besieged beat a parley the same afternoon, and on the ensuing day the garrison capitulated, and were conducted to Louvain.

In the midst of these operations the army of the empire, under the command of Joseph, the young king of the Romans, had resumed the offensive; and after an arduous struggle, on the 11th of September reduced Landau, which was regarded as an outwork of Alsace. This loss obliged the French still farther to reduce their army in the Netherlands, and encouraged Marlborough to prosecute his success. He extorted the consent of the States to attempt the reduction of Liege, which commanded the navigation of the Meuse above Maestricht. This enterprise he executed with his usual diligence. Apprised that Boufflers had examined the defences of the place, and was preparing to post himself under the walls, he suddenly broke up his camp, and marched with such celerity as to anticipate the enemy on the very ground which they intended to occupy. So secret and well combined was this movement, that the French commander approached within cannon-shot of the confederates, before he was conscious of his danger. His defeat would have been inevitable, had not the caution of the Dutch deputies saved him. Taking advantage of the night, he, on the thirteenth, made a precipitate retreat to Orp-le-petit, and placed his camp between Lannuye and Landen. The city having opened its gates on the approach of the confederate army, preparations were instantly made to reduce the citadel, into

which the French garrison had retired. On the 20th of October the batteries were opened, and on the twenty-third a breach was effected, and the approaches were sufficiently advanced for an attack on the covert way. It was promptly made, and the governor was taken in the breach by an English lieutenant, which shows that the queen's subjects were the first to enter. Preparations were next made to attack the Chartreuse, a detached work on the opposite bank of the Meuse. But the garrison, being too much discouraged by the fate of their companions in the citadel to abide the consequences of an assault, surrendered on the first fire from the batteries.

On this event the French retiring within their lines took up a position behind the Mehaigne, between Boneffe and the Josse. But as the season was too far advanced for further operations, after the fatigues of the campaign, Marlborough distributed his troops into winter quarters, and prepared to return to England.

CHAP. XIII. — CAPTURE OF MARLBOROUGH. — 1702.

WHILE the British people were anxiously expecting the close of the campaign, they were on the point of losing the great commander who had raised their hopes and spread the glory of their arms. On the 3d of November he quitted Maestricht for the Hague, and with the Dutch deputies descended the Meuse in a boat, accompanied by a guard of twenty-five men. At Ruremond he was joined on the following day by Cohorn, in a larger boat with sixty men, and an additional escort of fifty troopers attended them along the banks of the river. Such a force seemed fully sufficient to protect them against any enterprise from the French posts and garrisons in the vicinity; but in the night the horsemen lost their way, the larger boat outsailed the other, and Marlborough was left with only his slender guard of twenty-five men.

In this situation the boat was surprised by a French partisan from Guelder, who, with thirty-five men, was lurking among

the reeds and sedge. They suddenly seized the tow-rope, poured a volley into the boat, and rushing on board, overpowered the guard. The Dutch deputies were furnished with French passes, but Marlborough had thought it degrading to solicit such a safeguard. The coolness and presence of mind, which never deserted him in the field, were, however, no less conspicuous in this inglorious yet imminent peril. One of his attendants* who had fortunately preserved a French pass granted to his brother, General Churchill, when obliged to quit the army from ill health, slipped it unperceived into his hand. Though aware that the date had expired, and that the most trifling scrutiny would detect the deception, he presented it to his captors with undisturbed confidence. His unruffled deportment, the darkness of the night, and the confusion of the moment, prevented a discovery. The adventurers, after pillaging the vessel, and extorting the customary presents, retained the escort as prisoners, and suffered Marlborough and his fellow travellers to proceed.

In an instant the disastrous tidings were spread that the general had fallen into the hands of the enemy; and the governor of Venloo led his garrison to Guelder, whither he supposed the illustrious captive had been conveyed, determined to effect his rescue, or perish in the attempt. At the Hague also the intelligence excited the utmost consternation. The States, which were then assembled, passed a vote by acclamation, enjoining all their troops to march without delay, and constrain the garrison of Guelder to release their prisoner.

In the midst of the confusion and alarm, Marlborough himself appeared at the Hague. The transport of joy which burst forth on his arrival, proved the deep and general interest felt for his safety. The sedate and deliberate character of the natives was lost in the enthusiasm of exultation.

* Marlborough himself has enabled us to trace the name and circumstances of his attendant. In a letter to the duchess, dated Oct. 3. 1704, he observes, "Stephen Gell, whom you mention, is son to a man who was with me when I was taken. He was so far instrumental, as to give me a pass out of his pocket which I knew nothing of. The pass being for my brother, I passed for him. He has cost me 50*l.* a year ever since."

Surrounded by enraptured crowds, and overwhelmed by tumultuous proofs of popular applause, Marlborough with difficulty reached the hotel destined for his reception accompanied by a cavalcade less pompous indeed, but far more gratifying than any which perhaps had ever graced the triumph of a Roman general to the Capitol.

In closing our narrative of the campaign, we cannot neglect to render justice to the candour and liberality of Athlone. The veteran general, instead of indulging that jealousy, which too often rankles in less noble minds, seized an early opportunity to acknowledge his own errors, and applaud the merits of his illustrious colleague. "The success of this campaign," he said, "is solely due to this incomparable chief, since I confess that I, serving as second in command, opposed in all circumstances his opinion and proposals." No panegyric can equal this candid avowal. It is alike honourable to the general by whom it was made, and to him whom no obstructions could divert from the accomplishment of his beneficial designs.

A plan for the reduction of Cadiz had been formed by William, and the scheme was approved, and promoted by Marlborough among his friends in the ministry; but the enterprise failed from mismanagement, and the Spanish people, whom it was the interest of the allies to conciliate, were rendered inveterately hostile against the English and Dutch, by the excesses of the troops. After the ill success of this attempt, the commanders of the expedition were induced to undertake an attack against Vigo, where a rich flota from America had taken refuge. By accident, rather than skill, they succeeded in forcing their way into the harbour. But the plunder did not answer their expectations, or compensate for the charges of the armament; for the flota was destroyed in the conflict, and the principal part of the cargoes either sunk, or conveyed into the interior.

This partial success, therefore, did not weaken the sense of shame for the disgrace before Cadiz. The duke of Ormond and Sir George Rooke, commanders of the army and fleet, accused each other for their failure, and the animosity of both parties proved their resolution to make the conduct and result of the expedition a subject of parliamentary inquiry. Marlborough was aware that such an investigation could

neither remedy the past, nor produce advantage for the future ; while he was conscious that it would give rise to party feuds, which could not fail to prove highly detrimental to the common cause in general, and to England in particular. He therefore laboured to soothe the irritation of the respective chiefs, who appear to have been swayed by the prudent admonitions of Marlborough. They desisted from their mutual accusations ; and the public, overlooking their failure at Cadiz, acknowledged their unexpected success at Vigo, with higher applause than it deserved.

CHAP. XIV. — RETURNS TO ENGLAND. — 1702.

BEFORE the return of Marlborough to England, the queen had summoned a new parliament. The Tories, by the influence of the crown and their own exertions, secured a considerable majority ; Harley was re-chosen speaker without opposition, and the decisions of contested elections unequivocally manifested their ascendancy. It was natural that a parliament so constituted should not be sparing in its praise of a general, who had hitherto distinguished himself by attachment to Tory principles. Yet the intrinsic value of his exploits was not so much regarded, as the contrast they presented to the less fortunate operations of King William. In the address of the Commons this sentiment was shown by the expression, “ The wonderful success of your majesty’s arms, under the conduct of the Earl of Marlborough, has signally *retrieved* the ancient honour of this nation.” The Whigs made a vigorous effort to change this invidious term ; but after a warm debate, they lost their amendment by a majority of a hundred voices. The public joy was testified by a thanksgiving at St. Paul’s, which was attended by the queen and both houses of parliament.

It has been generally imagined that the ducal title, with which Marlborough was soon afterwards honoured, was obtained solely by the influence of his countess ; it was, however, on the contrary, the spontaneous act of the queen, suggested by the warmest sentiments of friendship and gratitude. Lady

Marlborough wrote in earnest terms to her husband, urging him to decline this accession of honour; and although it appears that he was not averse to so distinguished a mark of favour, her remonstrances at least suspended his decision.

“*Hague, Nov. 4.* — You know,” he observes, “I am very ill at compliments, but I have a heart full of gratitude: therefore pray say all you can to the queen for her extraordinary goodness to me. As you have let me have your thoughts as to the dukedom, you shall have mine in short, since I shall have the happiness of being with you so soon, when I may advise with you more at large on this matter. But be assured that I shall have a mind to nothing, but as it may be easy to you. I do agree with you that we ought not to wish for a greater title, till we have a better estate. Your other objection is also very just, that this promotion might bring great solicitations upon the queen, which I am sure I would not give occasion for. The queen’s goodness in being desirous to establish my family, answers the first, since that may be done this winter; for I agree with you, that it should be done before the title.”

The solicitations of the queen, and the importunities of Lord Godolphin, as well as the representations of Pensionary Heinsius, at length vanquished the reluctance of the countess. The earl was accordingly created Marquis of Blandford and Duke of Marlborough, by letters patent, dated December 14. 1702. The queen, fully sensible that his property was insufficient to maintain so high a dignity, sent a message to the House of Commons, stating that she had created him a duke, and conferred on him 5000*l.* per annum out of the post-office for her own life. She concluded with requesting the house to devise a proper mode for settling this grant on himself and his successors in the title. Contrary to her expectation, the proposal occasioned violent debates; and invidious insinuations were thrown out that Marlborough was endeavouring to monopolise the royal favour. Sir Christopher Musgrave, in particular, said, he did not wish to detract from the duke’s eminent services, but he must insist that they had been well rewarded. He concluded with expatiating on the profitable employments which he and his family enjoyed. In consequence of the spirit manifested by the Commons, the duke solicited the queen to recall her message, lest he should be the cause of obstruction to the public service. She accordingly communicated his request to the house, and withdrew her application; but the predominant party did not omit to make a strong remonstrance against

the proposed grant, fraught with the most acrimonious reflections on the memory of King William, and on his profusion towards his foreign favourites. This disappointment only rendered the queen more anxious to display her gratitude and esteem. The very day in which the remonstrance of the Commons was presented, she imparted to the duchess her design of adding 2000*l.* a year out of the privy purse, to the grant of the 5000*l.* already made during her own life, from the revenue of the post-office. Notwithstanding the earnest solicitations of the queen, this liberal offer was respectfully but firmly declined.*

From gratitude for the kindness of the queen, Marlborough and his friends zealously exerted themselves in parliament, to promote a measure in which she was personally interested. The first wish of Anne on her accession was, to associate her husband in the regal dignity; but her design being overruled, as unconstitutional, she became more anxious to secure to him a permanent revenue. The proposal was communicated to parliament by a message, requesting the settlement of a farther provision on the prince of Denmark, in case of his survival. Mr. Howe, member for Gloucestershire, a zealous Tory, moved, on the 21st of November, for a grant of 100,000*l.* yearly. As the Tories, who formed the majority, were decidedly favourable to this measure, no opposition was made to the grant itself; but objections were urged against a clause annexed to the bill, intended to continue to the prince the offices already conferred on him during the life of the queen, by exempting him from the effect of that clause in the act of settlement, by which foreigners were forbidden to hold offices of state, on the accession of the Hanover line.

After a trifling debate the bill passed the Commons, but in the House of Lords encountered the most violent opposition. The friends of the queen strenuously exerted themselves, though they did not prevail without extreme difficulty, and by a majority of only one voice. The grati-

* This disinterestedness would be entitled to high applause, if the duchess had consistently maintained the same spirit; but in a subsequent part of these memoirs (ch. 98.), we shall find that on her disgrace she claimed and received the whole pension for the preceding nine years.

tude of the queen for the exertions of Marlborough appears in one of her letters to the duchess.

“I am sure the prince’s bill passing after so much struggle, is wholly owing to the pains you and Mr. Freeman have taken, and I ought to say a great deal to both of you in return, but neither words nor actions can ever express the true sense Mr. Morley and I have of your sincere kindness on this and all other occasions; and therefore I will not say any more on this subject, but that to my last moment, your dear unfortunate faithful Morley will be most passionately and tenderly yours.”

The Duke and Duchess of Marlborough were deeply chagrined to find among the most zealous opponents of this measure their son-in-law, Lord Sunderland, who had recently taken his seat in the House of Peers, on the death of his father. He not only spoke against the grant, but signed the protests. The impetuous spirit of the duchess was peculiarly irritated by this mark of disrespect. In her zeal for the gratification of the queen, she forgot her attachment to Whig principles, and it was not without the utmost difficulty that her amiable daughter, Lady Sunderland, effected a reconciliation. This incident was among the earliest of that series of mortifications which Marlborough experienced from the party spirit of his son-in-law, and may be considered as one of the causes of the rooted antipathy which the queen fostered against Lord Sunderland.

During this session of parliament, Marlborough took an active share in promoting a bill, which in appearance was calculated to add to the security of the national church, but in reality to increase the strength of the Tories, by depriving the Whig party of the support drawn from the moderate dissenters. Since the passing of the corporation and test acts, the antipathy against the dissenters had gradually diminished. In consequence of the zeal which they had manifested at the Revolution, and the countenance they had received from William, many of the less rigid had obtained admission into corporations and offices under government, by receiving the communion, though without conforming regularly to the worship of the church of England. They naturally joined the Whigs, and were zealous supporters of the war, which they deemed necessary to consolidate the Revolution, and secure both civil and religious liberty. Hence they became obnoxious to the Tory or high

church party. Accordingly, soon after the accession of Anne, the adherents of the court evinced a strong inclination to revive the penal statutes against occasional conformity; and Marlborough interested himself so warmly in the measure, that the author of a violent pamphlet, entitled "The Case of Toleration Recognised," which was intended to prepare the public mind, dedicated it to him, as a person of unsuspected zeal for the principles of the high church.

At this period the partisans of the high church, deeming themselves sufficiently powerful to execute their design, a bill was introduced into the House of Commons for the purpose of preventing occasional conformity. It passed the commons by a large majority; but although supported in the upper house by the whole interest of the court and ministry, it was attacked with unusual vigour and perseverance. Even the bench of bishops treated it as a mere party measure, and several either spoke or voted against it. Many amendments were proposed, and some of the clauses were carried only by a single voice, though the queen so far interested herself in the measure as to induce her husband himself, an occasional conformist, to give it his personal support. Amended or modified in many essential points, the bill was returned to the Commons. But after a long conference between the two houses, it was finally lost, by the refusal of the Commons to agree in the alterations made by the Lords.*

CHAP. XV.—DEATH OF THE MARQUESS OF BLANDFORD.—
1702.

NOTWITHSTANDING the mortifications which Marlborough had endured from his Tory friends, he was gratified by their promptitude in granting the supplies, both for the army and navy, as well as the subsidies for the pay of the foreign auxiliaries. The parliament also voted a supply for an augmentation of 10,000 additional troops, under the condition that the States-general should prohibit all commerce and correspondence with France and Spain. The States were thus

* Burnet.—Tindal, vol. xv. p. 452.

compelled to relinquish an intercourse against which Marlborough had remonstrated in vain ; and the king of France was deprived of the facility, which he had hitherto enjoyed, of remitting money to the elector of Bavaria and the Italian army, as well as his subjects of the profitable commerce which they carried on under the protection of the Dutch flag.

While Marlborough was actively employed in maturing the military preparations, he was visited by a domestic calamity of the severest kind, the death of his only son, the marquis of Blandford. His wife had borne him two sons, John and Charles, and four daughters. The daughters all survived ; but the second son, Charles, died at an early age. The elder, a promising youth, still remained, and had now reached his seventeenth year. He was amiable in disposition, and united a solid understanding and lively parts with the most captivating mildness and docility.

After receiving a careful education at Eton, where he distinguished himself by his classical attainments, he was destined to fill the place of master of the horse to the young duke of Gloucester, that he might grow up in intimacy with the future sovereign. But on the death of the prince he was sent to King's College in the university of Cambridge, and placed under the tuition of Mr. Hare, afterwards well known as chaplain to the duke, and bishop of Chichester. Notwithstanding his high birth, splendid prospects, and courtly education, he set an example of affability, regularity, and steadiness, above his years ; and in one of his letters to Lord Godolphin, he expresses the warmest approbation both of the studies and discipline of the place. He was regular also in the performance of his religious duties, and a punctual attendant at the administration of the holy sacrament. The turn of his character was displayed by the choice of his associates. His steady, affectionate, and studious disposition, led him to form an intimate friendship with Horace, afterwards Lord Walpole, who was then a fellow of the same college, and who not only spoke of his qualities as singularly excellent and amiable, but at later times never mentioned his name without expressions of regret.

In this early period of his life, the fame of his illustrious father inspired the young nobleman with a strong passion for a military life, and in the midst of the campaign in 1702

we find him earnestly soliciting permission to serve in the Netherlands. Marlborough was too much gratified with this indication of youthful spirit to reject his request; but on referring the proposal to the decision of his lady, the anxious mother shrunk from the prospect of the danger and hardship to which her darling son must necessarily be exposed in a military life. The youth, however, was not discouraged by this repulse, for he persisted in his resolution to enter the army, and promised to procure for his friend, Horace Walpole, a commission in the cavalry, that they might both serve together.

On this promising youth the fond father placed his hopes of transmitting his name and honours to posterity, and the mother loved him with the enthusiastic warmth of her temper. Among the Blenheim Papers are several letters, which exhibit striking proofs of their parental solicitude. Two letters from Marlborough to the duchess display his bitter grief on this afflicting occasion.

“Thursday, 9 in the morning. — I have this minute received Mr. Godolphin’s letter, and have sent to Mr. Horto’s, and do hope for what is desired, which this messenger will bring. I hope Dr. Haines and Dr. Coladon got to you early this morning. I am so troubled at the sad condition this poor child seems to be in, that I know not what I do. I pray God to give you some comfort in this great affliction. If you think any thing under heaven can be done, pray let me know it, or if you think my coming can be of the least use, let me know it. I beg I may hear as often as possible, for I have no thought but what is at Cambridge. Medicines are sent by the doctors. I shall be impatient to the last degree till I hear from you.”

“Thursday night. — I writ to you this morning, and was in hopes I should have heard again before this time, for I hope the doctors were with you early this morning. If we must be so unhappy as to lose this poor child, I pray God to enable us both to behave ourselves with that resignation which we ought to do. If this uneasiness which I now lie under should last long, I think I could not live. For God’s sake, if there be any hope of recovery let me know it.”

The disorder, which was an attack of small-pox of the most malignant kind, rapidly increasing, the disconsolate father hurried to Cambridge, within a few hours after he had written this letter, and arrived only in time to close the eyes of his beloved son, who died on the morning of Saturday, the 20th of February. His remains were interred in the chapel of King’s College, where a monument is dedicated to his memory, with an appropriate inscription, expressive

of his amiable qualities, both of person and mind, and the inconsolable affliction of his parents.

No youth ever sunk into the grave amidst a more general expression of regret, or in circumstances more afflicting to his family. From the numerous letters of condolence which testify the sympathy of the queen and the sorrow of friends and connexions, we select the most interesting.

The Queen to the Duchess of Marlborough.

“*St. James’s.* — It would have been a great satisfaction to your poor unfortunate faithful Morley, if you would have given me leave to come to St. Alban’s, for the unfortunate ought to come to the unfortunate. But since you will not have me, I must content myself as well as I can, till I have the happiness of seeing you here. I know nothing worth writing; but if I did, I should not trouble you with it, being sure no sort of news can be agreeable to your dear heavy heart. God Almighty bless and comfort my dear Mrs. Freeman, and be assured, I will live and die sincerely yours.”

Mrs. Burnet to the Duchess of Marlborough.

“*Feb. 26.* — Since from the first moment’s fear of your present affliction, I have borne a very painful and sensible share in it, forgive me if I err in presuming too much on the liberties you have formerly allowed me. I can say nothing to lessen the misfortune. It was as great as it could well be, because the person was as excellent, and perhaps has therefore got an early dismissal from the certain infelicities and almost unavoidable irregularities of a long life. Why should we wish those we love to be long tossed in storms, and in danger of an eternal shipwreck, rather than that they should make a short, secure and pleasant voyage to an everlasting state of joy and satisfaction, where they want us not, and gain an advantage, though we suffer by a short absence? I know your grace wants not the feeble helps I am capable to bring, yet permit me to recommend one very reasonable reflection, and to beg you to recall it often, which is the many, very many blessings you have still remaining. To be yet one of the most fortunate persons in the world, is a subject for great thankfulness to God, though you were once possessed of a greater degree of happiness. To have not only the favour, but so far as the distance permits, the friendship of a most excellent queen; a husband you love, and worthy of it; children so remarkably good and amiable, and whose alliances and posterity give such just hopes of all that is desirable for the future, are such uncommon bounties of Providence, that great as your loss is, it will be a degree of ingratitude to God to let your thoughts so dwell on that, as not to take satisfaction in the large portion of blessings you still enjoy. I am persuaded you know how much submission to God is a duty, as well as the proper use of all afflictions. I have therefore only presumed to remind you of your remaining mercies, having generally observed that persons under present griefs are apt to slight and overlook their present advantages, which they would have found full satisfaction in, had they never possessed what they lament

when withdrawn. May God support you under this great trial, and preserve you from all future causes of sorrow, bless the remains of your gracious family, and give the duke the best success, and a safe and glorious return! This is the hope and constant prayer of your grace's," &c.

Lord Peterborough to the Duke of Marlborough.

"One cannot judge, my lord, what time is necessary to moderate so just a grief, or when one may venture to trouble your grace upon this occasion, but certainly interruption is necessary to melancholy thoughts; and that affliction which cannot be overcome, must be diverted by the necessity of affairs, or some other objects. Being alone, and not admitting friends, must necessarily increase and feed that affliction, which you are obliged to struggle with, since the misfortune is irreparable.

"I know not whether it be a mitigation that every body bears a share in your loss, and that the concern is universal. It shows the value of what you no more enjoy; but such is the state of human affairs, that what we possessed with much satisfaction, we are always in danger of losing with the greatest extremity of regret.

"I heartily wish your grace may find ease in this affliction. Give me leave to say you must seek it, and what satisfaction this world can afford on other occasions."

Lady Sunderland to the Duke of Marlborough.

"The share I have myself in this sad affliction makes it impossible for me to have a thought of comfort, which is the reason I do not trouble my dear mamma; and indeed the feeling I have for the dearest father and mother that ever was, is inexpressible. I am sure if wishing my life might be a ransom for your never having trouble would hinder it, my dear dear papa and mamma would never feel any. If you think I should not be a trouble to mamma, I should be glad to go down to her; though it will be a melancholy comfort, it will still be one to me, that am, with all passionate tenderness and duty, yours, A. S.

"Lord Sunderland does not write, because he thinks it would be only troublesome, but wishes at any rate he could give you ease in this affliction, in which he has a great share."

The death of so promising a youth was not merely a subject of sorrow to the friends and connexions of the family, but became the theme of public condolence, and awakened the genius of the contemporary poets. Among others, Congreve exercised his muse, in a pastoral called the "Tears of Amaryllis for Amyntas," which was presented to the Duchess of Marlborough by his patron Lord Halifax. A few days after Marlborough made a new disposition of his property, which was very considerable. He left his wife sole executrix, with all his plate, jewels, and furniture, and an additional jointure of 2000*l.* a year, and the estate of St. Alban's, with the manor of Sandridge, which belonged to her family,

to descend to one of her children or grand-children. Should he, to use his own expression, be blessed with a son, he left him the bulk of his fortune; but if not, he entreated the queen to create his son-in-law, Mr. Godolphin, earl of Marlborough, on the condition that he assumed the name and arms of Churchill. To him and to his heirs male by Lady Harriet, he bequeathed the greater part of his property, with remainder in tail male, to the second son of his second daughter by Lord Sunderland, and to the second son of his third daughter, Elizabeth, by the earl of Bridgewater, and finally to the second son of his fourth daughter, Mary, should she marry. He made some additions to the respective portions of his daughters, and assigned jointures to his daughters and grand-daughters, in failure of male issue to himself, or other contingencies which were specified.

The death of the marquess of Blandford suspended the duke's journey; but after the first paroxysm of grief had subsided, the important occupations in which he was engaged contributed to divert, though they could not soothe the agony of his mind. In the beginning of March he departed for the Continent, where his presence was anxiously expected, with a heavy heart, though with undiminished zeal for the public service.

During the progress of the campaign, the tender recollection of his lost son frequently intruded itself on his mind, and the feelings of a father continually break forth in his correspondence. In several of his letters he expresses the warmest exultation at the prospect of male issue. "I have just now," he writes, "received your letters of the 6th. What you say to me of yourself gave me so much joy, that if any company had been by, when I read your letter, they must have observed a great alteration in me." The uncertain state of the duchess's health, however, frustrated these expectations, and drew from him the tenderest expressions of sympathy and concern.

"*Val notre Dame.* — I am so very uneasy since I received yours of the 23d of the last month, that I shall have no rest till I hear again from you, for your health is much dearer to me than my own. It is impossible for me to express what I feel, having seen by my lord treasurer of the same post, that he thought you very far from being well. For God's sake let me know exactly how you are; and if you think my being with you can do you any good, you shall quickly see you are much dearer to

me than fame, or whatever the world can say ; for, should you do otherwise than well, I were the unhappiest man living."

"*Op-heeren, August 2.* — I have received yours of the 23d, which has given me, as you may easily believe, a good deal of trouble. I beg you will be so kind and just to me, as to believe the truth of my heart, that my greatest concern is for that of your own dear health. It was a great pleasure to me when I thought that we should be blessed with more children ; but as all my happiness centers in living quietly with you, I do conjure you, by all the kindness I have for you, which is as much as ever man had for woman, that you will take the best advice you can for your health, and then follow exactly what shall be prescribed for you, and I do hope you will be so good as to let me have an exact account of it, and what the physicians' opinions are. If I were with you I would endeavour to persuade you to think as little as is possible of worldly business, and to be very regular in your diet, which I should hope would set you right in a very little time, for you have naturally a very good constitution. You and I have great reason to bless God for all we have, so that we must not repine at his taking our poor child from us, but bless and praise him for what his goodness leaves us ; and I do beseech him, with all my heart and soul, that he would comfort and strengthen both you and me, not only to bear this, but any other correction that he shall think fit to lay on us. The use I think we should make of this his correction is, that our chiefest time should be spent in reconciling ourselves to him, and having in our minds always that we may not have long to live in this world. I do not mean by this that we should live retired from the world ; for I am persuaded that, by living in the world, one may do much more good than by being out of it, but at the same time to live so as that one should cheerfully die when it shall be his pleasure to call for us. I am very sensible of my own frailties ; but if I can be ever so happy as to be always with you, and that you comfort and assist me in these my thoughts, I am then persuaded I should be as happy and contented as it is possible to be in this world ; for I know we should both agree, next to our duty to God, to do what we ought for the queen's service."

Not long before the period of this domestic calamity, he had united his third daughter, Lady Elizabeth, then in her seventeenth year, with Scroop Egerton, earl of Bridgewater. This alliance gave the queen an opportunity of testifying her regard to the family ; and in a letter to the duchess, she offers to confer on the bride a portion of 10,000*l.*

"*Friday morning.* — My Lord Bridgewater being in haste to be married, I cannot any longer delay telling my dear Mrs. Freeman what I have intended a great while, that I hope she will now give me leave to do what I had a mind to do when dear Lady Harriet was married ; and let me speak to lord treasurer about it, when I see him, that your poor *unfortunate faithful Morley* may not be any occasion of delay to other people's happiness."

The only daughter remaining unmarried was Lady Mary, who had now reached her sixteenth year. She was exquisitely beautiful, lively in temper, and no less amiable in mind than elegant in person. She enjoyed, in a peculiar degree, the affection of her parents, to whom she was doubly endeared by their recent loss, and is frequently mentioned by the duke in his letters, in the warmest terms of parental tenderness. Already she had attracted many admirers, among the rest, the Earl of Huntingdon and Lord Tullybardine, son of the Earl of Cromartie; but their suit was fruitless. Her hand was also sought by the eccentric Earl of Peterborough, for his son Lord Mordaunt; but the duke objected to the licentious character and irregular habits of the young nobleman. Shortly after a similar proposal was made by the family of Montagu, in favour of Viscount Mounthermer, son of Ralph, Earl of Montagu. But although this connexion was not disapproved, yet, from the youth of the parties, and the hesitation of the lady herself, the match did not take place till the ensuing year. The queen endowed the bride with the same portion as her sister Elizabeth, and soon after the father was created Duke of Montagu, by the interest of Marlborough, and the son obtained the reversion of the place of great master of the wardrobe, held by his father.

CHAP. XVI. — OPENING OF THE CAMPAIGN.—1703.

BEFORE we commence the narrative of this campaign, it will be proper to advert to some events, which affected the interests and influenced the conduct of the allies.

The king of Portugal, after acknowledging Philip as king of Spain, had seized the first opportunity to resume his natural connexions, and secretly concluded a treaty with England, which was the groundwork of a general alliance with the confederate powers. He recognised the rights of the archduke Charles to the Spanish throne, and not only agreed to receive a combined army of English and Dutch, to support his pretensions, but concluded a subsidiary treaty, for bringing into the field 28,000 Portuguese. This alliance opened the most

vulnerable part of the frontier to an attack by land; and afforded the means of weakening the efforts of France in other quarters, by drawing off a considerable portion of her troops to maintain the contest for the Spanish crown on Spanish ground. This valuable acquisition to the confederacy, however, increased the difficulties and labours of Marlborough, by whom the military arrangements were principally directed, and who was charged with the vexatious office of obtaining troops from the Dutch, the emperor, and the German states, at the time when his own plans occupied so much of his attention, and the operations in the Netherlands required so great a proportion of force. It proved also the source of other embarrassments, because it furnished the discontented of both parties in England with new arguments for a defensive system in the Netherlands, and for a vigorous effort in the country which was the primary object of the war. Nor were the subordinate arrangements less perplexing; for he was exposed to endless importunities in the choice of generals and officers, and was perpetually harassed by the captious spirit of the Portuguese court. His correspondence during the whole campaign shows the extreme attention which he paid to the transactions with Portugal, the efforts he made to give energy to this distant branch of the war, and the odium he encountered in settling the appointment of officers. After long importunities from Lord Rivers and other claimants, the command of the British troops, at his recommendation, was conferred on the duke of Schomberg, whose military talents, knowledge of languages, and conciliating temper seemed to fit him for the office. Marlborough consented also to furnish a considerable detachment from the army in the Netherlands, to complete the expedition which was destined to act in Portugal.

Another event, of some moment to the allies, was an insurrection of the Protestants in the Cevennes, who were driven to desperation by the intolerance of the French government. The importance of this commotion, in a mountainous country, bordering on the frontier of Catalonia, and where regular troops could scarcely act, was duly appreciated, and Marlborough took an active share in devising means to foment and support the insurrection. He expe-

rienced, however, much opposition from Nottingham and the other partisans of passive obedience, who expatiated on the injustice and impolicy of assisting rebel subjects against their legitimate sovereign. This opposition was overruled by the more liberal part of the cabinet, and not only were supplies of arms and ammunition forwarded by a combined fleet, which was despatched to the Mediterranean, but measures were adopted for establishing a direct communication with these persecuted people, whose example appeared likely to spread, and whose efforts diverted a considerable body of the enemy's troops from the principal theatre of action.

The grand operations of the war now claim attention. We have already observed, that the elector of Bavaria had declared in favour of France, and by surprising Ulm, had opened a communication with the armies on the Upper Rhine. To favour his efforts, Marshal Villars, on the 14th of October, defeated the margrave of Baden at Friedlingen, and cleared the passages leading to the Black Forest; while, on the other hand, Tallard extended his force along the Rhine and Moselle, and in the course of a few days reduced Treves and Traerbach. The German troops were thus not only precluded from profiting by the reduction of Landau, but being circumscribed on both flanks, took up an exposed and dangerous position, behind the lines of Stolhoffen.

In Italy, the campaign of 1702 had also closed to the disadvantage of the allies. Eugene, after failing in an attempt to surprise Cremona, the headquarters of the French army, had blockaded Mantua. But at this moment the duke of Savoy, who had incurred the suspicion of the French monarch, was superseded in the supreme command by the duke of Vendome. The new general changed the character of the war. On the 26th of July he defeated a detachment of Austrians at Santa Vittoria, and foiled the efforts of Eugene to establish himself south of the Po. The dubious battle of Luzzara terminated to the disadvantage of the Austrians; for it led to the loss of Luzzara and Guastalla, and rendered the situation of Eugene scarcely less critical than that of the Margrave of Baden. Besides the difficulty and uncertainty of his communication with the Austrian territories, he was confined between the Secchia and the Po, a

narrow and broken tract of country, which was nearly exhausted by the preceding operations.

In 1703 the war accordingly assumed a new aspect and direction. The French monarch formed the design of repairing his losses in the preceding year, by offensive operations of the most vigorous kind in all quarters. Marshal Villeroy, who commanded in Flanders, was to open the campaign early in the spring by reducing the places on the Meuse, and again threatening the Dutch frontier. While the attention of the maritime powers was engaged by this aggression, a great and decisive effort was to be made against the emperor. As the Bourbon troops on one hand commanded the greater part of Italy, and on the other were supported by the co-operation of the electors of Cologne and Bavaria in the very heart of the empire, it was intended to penetrate from the Upper Rhine, through the defiles of the Black Forest, and to join the Bavarians; while the united forces of France and Savoy opened a way through the mountains of the Tyrol. These combined forces, thus collected between the Inn and the Danube, were to direct their march to Vienna, and being supported by the Hungarian insurgents, to obliterate by a single effort the glory of the Austrian name.

In pursuance of this great design, Villars drew the army of the Upper Rhine from their cantonments in winter, passed under the cannon of Friburg, broke up the quarters of the Germans, and on the 9th of March reduced Kehl, after a siege of thirteen days. Having secured this important passage, he returned across the Rhine to recruit and refresh his troops. On the approach of spring, the French in this quarter were divided into two bodies; one under Tallard threatened the lines of Stolhoffen, and kept the prince of Baden in check; while the other was led by Villars through the Black Forest, and descended into the plains of Bavaria. At the same time the elector defeated and drove the Austrian troops beyond the Inn and the Danube, reduced Neuburg and Ratisbon, and then drawing towards the mountains, which border his country on the west, effected on the 12th of May, a junction with Villars, at Dutlingen.

The enterprise against Austria was to be seconded by efforts no less bold and vigorous on the side of the Nether-

lands. Trusting in the usual dilatoriness of the Dutch, and calculating on the tardiness which generally marks the operations of an army collected from different countries, Villeroy had matured the requisite preparations, and hoped to reduce Liege before the allies could take the field. The recovery of the other fortresses on the Meuse was considered as the natural result of this primary advantage, and before the close of the campaign it was confidently expected that the commander, who in the preceding had compelled a French army to retrace its steps, would find his efforts limited to the protection of the Dutch frontier.

At the moment when the operations on the Upper Rhine announced the developement of this vast design, Marlborough departed from England and reached the Hague on the 17th of March. The death of the prince of Saarbruck and of the earl of Athlone, relieved him from the contentions of two rivals; but other competitors arose, though of inferior rank and influence. These were Overkirk, Opdam, and Slangenberg. In the first, age had tempered, but not extinguished the fire of youth; the second was distinguished neither by talents nor activity; and the third was brave and skilful, but of so captious and overbearing a spirit, that he remained unemployed during the latter part of William's reign. We may therefore ascribe the appointment of Overkirk as chief in command of the Dutch troops to the influence of Marlborough, who considered him not only as the most able, but as the most tractable coadjutor. To prevent the effects of rivalry, Slangenberg was to be left on the side of the Scheld, Opdam to be employed in the siege of Bonn, and Overkirk to act with the main army.

This necessary arrangement being accomplished, Marlborough visited the troops quartered in the different places of Dutch Brabant, to examine their condition, and accelerate their equipment. Returning to the Hague, he exerted himself in maturing the ulterior preparations, and successfully concluded a negotiation for retaining the Prussian auxiliaries in the service. By his advice Rheinberg had been reduced by the Prussians during the winter, and the capture of this fortress was followed by the blockade of Guelder, the only place still held by the enemy in Spanish Guelderland.

His arrival at the Hague infused activity into the Dutch

government. He had formed an extensive plan for the invasion of French Flanders and Brabant ; but in this, as in other designs, his genius was shackled by the timidity of the States. To soothe their alarms he reluctantly consented to open the campaign with the siege of Bonn. Having completed his arrangements he repaired to Nimeguen, to concert with Cohorn the plan and preparations for the intended siege. Then passing by Venloo, Ruremond, and Maestricht, to ascertain the state of the places on the Meuse, he inspected Liege, and held a conference with the imperial minister, Count Sinzendorf, on the affairs of Germany. Crossing the country to Cologne, he was bitterly disappointed at the backwardness of the preparations for the reduction of Bonn, and no less chagrined at the proposal of Cohorn to defer it till the close of the year.

Notwithstanding the obstructions with which he had to struggle, Marlborough drew his troops from their quarters with his usual diligence ; and, to the surprise of the enemy, before the 2d of April, he assembled an army, not only of sufficient force to protect Liege, but also to execute the intended enterprise on Bonn. Having consigned to Overkirk the command of a corps of observation distributed along the Meuse, between Liege and Maestricht, he proceeded towards Bonn, with a force of 40 battalions and 60 squadrons, and a train of 100 pieces of artillery. He himself arranged the quarters of the troops ; and to accelerate the reduction of the place by a vigorous effort, formed the plan of three different attacks. The first, under Cohorn, was to be directed against the fort on the other side of the Rhine, and the second and third against the city and outworks, under the hereditary prince of Hesse Cassel and General Fagel. The preparations were so rapidly matured, that the trenches were opened on the 3rd of May.

Meanwhile the French, unwilling to remain on the defensive, resorted to the usual expedients for obstructing the operations of the siege. They assembled their troops in the utmost haste, and advanced against the army of Overkirk. But they were not sufficiently prompt to effect their purpose ; for the approaches against Bonn were pushed with such rapidity, that the fort was taken on the 9th. The capture of this important work hastened the reduction of

the place. Although the Marquis d'Allegre, who was intrusted with the defence, made as vigorous a resistance as his means permitted, he was reduced to propose a capitulation on the 15th of May.

"I have this minute," writes the duke to Godolphin, "signed the capitulation of Bonn; and I think if we had not been so uneasy as we are at what is doing on the Meuse, we might in four or five days more have made this garrison prisoners of war; but as it is, we have only stopped a German regiment and two independent companies. I stay this afternoon to give such orders as are absolutely necessary, and hope to be early on Friday with the army on the Meuse. The garrison here is to march out on the same day, so that I shall not see them. Having been a good deal disturbed these two last nights, my head aches very much, so that you will excuse me if I say no more, but refer you to the capitulation sent to Mr. Secretary."

CHAP. XVII. — PROGRESS OF THE CAMPAIGN. — 1703.

LEAVING a detachment to take possession of Bonn, Marlborough hastened to the succour of Overkirk, threatened by a superior force. On the 17th of May he effected the junction, and established his headquarters at Hoechst, a monastery in the vicinity of Maestricht. He now resumed with redoubled zeal the plan he had formed, before he was compelled to undertake the siege of Bonn, which was, by a well-combined and rapid movement, to transfer the war into the heart of Brabant and West Flanders. Indeed, before the termination of the siege, the Dutch generals, Cohorn, Spaar, and Opdam, had been despatched to assume the command in the district of Bergen-op-Zoom, and accelerate the necessary preparations. Collaterally with this design a scheme was formed in England, and approved by the general, to alarm the French coast by a descent near Dicppe; for which purpose troops were collected at Portsmouth, and were to be joined by a reinforcement from Holland.

This was what the duke called the great design. Mean-

while, he endeavoured to engross the attention of the French commanders, and by offensive movements to prevent them from detaching succours to the intended point of attack. After reviewing and organising the army, which amounted to 59 battalions, and 129 squadrons, he broke up his camp, traversed the Yaar under the walls of Maestricht, and directing his march towards the heights of Hautain, which stretch between that river and the Meuse, he nearly surprised a considerable part of the enemy's army, who were foraging on the spot. His unexpected approach alarmed the French. Leaving two battalions to destroy the gates and works of Tongres, they made so precipitate a retreat, that when the confederates reached the camp of Thys, they had already gained an advance of two leagues.

His laudable zeal was not, however, seconded by those with whom he was obliged to act. Instead of fulfilling his orders for the invasion of West Flanders, Cohorn, to whom the superintendence of the previous arrangements was consigned, obtained the consent of the States to employ the troops on that frontier in making an irruption into the country of the Waes, where he hoped to levy large contributions. Marlborough, whose plan had embraced the reduction of Antwerp and Ostend, saw with regret that all his views would be frustrated, if this imprudent change was suffered to take effect.

“ *Camp of Thys, May 20—31.* I am afraid the diversion M. Cohorn is gone to make in Flanders, will not oblige them to make any great detachment; for his design is not on Ostend, as I desired, but to force their lines, by which he will settle a good deal of contribution, which these people like but too well, for it is certain if they had taken Ostend it would have been of great use to the common cause, and they might easily afterwards have settled the contributions: so that, had I been at the Hague, I am very confident they would have preferred the taking of Ostend before that of forcing the lines.

“It is no wonder that Cohorn is for forcing the lines, for as he is governor of West Flanders he has the tenths of all the contributions. He is also afraid that if we should besiege Huy, the French would take that opportunity of sending so many men as would hinder him from executing his design, so that he has begged of me to undertake nothing, but keeping as near to the French army as is possible till his expedition is over. After which we are to endeavour to take post, so as that we may have it in our power to make the siege of Antwerp.

“At this time the strength of the French army is 118 squadrons and

61 battalions; ours consists of 125 squadrons and 59 battalions: but our battalions are stronger than theirs, so that I think we have a good deal the superiority, which is very plainly the opinion of the French, since they always decamp when we come near them."

On the Upper Rhine, affairs were not in a more encouraging posture, as from the success of the French and Bavarians, the most pressing demands for succours were made both in England and Holland. Marlborough himself was too well acquainted with the inefficiency of the German troops, and the tardiness of German generals, to acquiesce in this application. He strongly remonstrated against any reduction of his own army, which he observed "would only answer the purpose of bringing things here into the same condition as they are there:" and he insisted with great warmth on the impolicy of granting any farther reinforcement than 20 battalions and eight squadrons, which had been already detached for that quarter.

Notwithstanding these discouragements he did not relax in his design; but directing his views to Antwerp and Ostend, he communicated new instructions to Cohorn.

Meanwhile the preparations for the grand attack had been matured, the troops which were to co-operate being collected at their respective posts. Besides the lines already described as extending from Antwerp south-eastward to the Mehaigne, the French had formed another series of fortifications on the verge of the frontier, stretching from Antwerp towards Ostend, and passing to the south of Hulst. To maintain these defences they had established two flying camps, one under the marquis of Bedmar near Antwerp, the other under the count de la Motte, in the vicinity of Bruges. According to the plan of attack, Spaar advanced into the district of Hulst, to occupy the attention of the enemy in that quarter, and hold la Motte in check. Cohorn was established near Stabroek, east of the Scheld, to maintain a communication on one hand with Spaar, and on the other to support a body of troops collected under Opdam at Bergen-op-Zoom, who were suddenly to advance and surprise Antwerp, or at least to take up a position within the line by which it was covered. Marlborough himself was to harass and detain the main army, and having gained the advance by a rapid movement, to enter the lines between Lierre and

Antwerp. He would thus have effected a junction with the Dutch, interposed his army between the different bodies of the enemy, and after the reduction of Antwerp would have crowned the enterprise by an attack on Ostend.

As he had announced in his letter from Hanef, he broke up his camp during the night of the 26th, passed the Yaar, near the castle of Oleye, and advanced to Opheer. This movement, which was no less rapid than secret, threw the enemy into the utmost consternation. In momentary expectation of an attack, they remained the whole night under arms, and having ascertained the direction of Marlborough's march, they drew in the utmost haste to the strong ground near Landen. On the 28th the confederates proceeded to Borchloen, and on the 29th to Hasselt; the enemy at the same time moving by Landen to Diest.

Meanwhile the troops destined to co-operate in the design against Antwerp hurried prematurely into action, contrary to their express orders, and the views of the generalissimo. In the afternoon of the 26th the troops of Cohorn traversed the Scheld to Liefkenshoek, and on the ensuing morning he and Spaar made a combined attack on the enemy's lines. Spaar penetrated to the village of Stecken and Steenbroek, though with considerable loss; and Cohorn, forcing the works at the point of Callo, reduced the fort of St. Antony. The same evening Opdam broke up from Bergen-op-Zoom, and on the 29th took up his position at the village of Ekeren, a little to the north of Antwerp.

As the most sanguine hopes had been excited by the extensive preparations for this enterprise, the petty successes of Spaar and Cohorn raised a general exultation in Holland; and the public eagerly expected that the next messenger would announce the fall of Antwerp. But the event proved that the most profound and accurate combinations are easily frustrated by the slightest want of concert in the subordinate agents; the enemy being too well supplied with intelligence to be ignorant of the force and movements of the Dutch.

Perceiving that the ill-judged irruptions of Cohorn and Spaar had broke the connexion between the different bodies, they seized the opportunity to form an enterprise against that of Opdam, which was left without support, and executed it with equal skill and promptitude. Bedmar, instead of

suffering himself to be diverted by incursions which he was aware could produce no permanent effect, maintained his position, while Boufflers was detached on the 29th from the camp at Diest, with a force of 20,000 men, principally cavalry, and marched in all haste to Antwerp.

In the interim Marlborough redoubled his exertions to gain the advance on the enemy. To accelerate his march, he had detached his artillery and baggage from Tongres through Borchloen with orders to rejoin him at Beringhen, and traversing the Hersch and the Demer over several bridges, he encamped on the 30th, between Beringhen and Coursel. Here he halted on the 1st of July, and his correspondence attests his anxiety and exertions.

Writing to the duchess during this pause, he observes :—

“ *Sunday, June 20 — July 1.* I have been in so perpetual a hurry, having marched five days together, and sometimes not coming into the camp till eleven or twelve at night, that I have not been able to answer so particularly your two last letters, as I shall always be desirous of doing. We have been obliged for many reasons to rest this day. However, it gives me very little rest, being obliged to have the general officers with me for regulating the next three days’ march, so that I am obliged to take this time of writing, although I have several officers in my room talking about me ; but as I love you above my life, so my greatest pleasure is writing to you, or hearing from you.”

As the enemy broke up to follow their detachments, he again marched on the 2d of July, and encamped between Moll and Balen. In the course of these movements he was apprised of the irruptions of Cohorn and Spaar, and the advance of Opdam to Ekeren. Chagrined at such imprudent attempts, and alarmed for the safety of Opdam, he sent him pressing orders to exert the utmost vigilance, and take up a more secure post till he could be sustained by the main army. From the camp of Moll and Balen, he writes to Godolphin :—

July 2. 1703. — You will find by my last and this, that we have been in continual motion, the duke of Villeroy having marched with his whole army towards Brabant, so that we are obliged to do the same. He being within his lines, has no want of forage, but our march being over the heaths we have not that plenty. Nor do I believe that when we shall come near the lines that go from Antwerp to Lierre we shall find forage for any long continuance.

“ I am afraid the lucre of having a little contribution from the País de Waes has spoiled the whole design ; for I am very sure if we do not

force the lines, which I am afraid will be pretty difficult, since all the French army will be there to defend it.* However, this must be done, or the siege of Antwerp will be no more thought on * * * If M. Opdam be not upon his guard, he may be beat before we can help him, which will always be the consequence when troops are divided, so as that the enemy can post themselves between them. But we have given him such timely notice, that if he has not taken a safe camp he will be very much to blame. The French are very cautious, and the Dutch will venture nothing; so that, unless it happens by chance, I think there will be no battle.

“ * * * Since I sealed my letter, we have a report come from Breda that Opdam is beaten. I pray God it be not so, for he is very capable of having it happen to him.”

His worst apprehensions were confirmed. Boufflers reached Antwerp on the 30th, and immediately united with Bedmar. Their combined forces filed through the northern gates of the city, and advancing with equal silence and celerity towards Ekeren, they detached a corps to seize Stabroek, the post which Cohorn had imprudently quitted, and cut off the road to Lillo. Although the preceding day Opdam had received warning from Marlborough, and was apprised by his own spies, that a considerable detachment was on its march from the French army, he contented himself with sending his baggage to Bergen-op-Zoom, and preparing for the removal of his camp. He supinely remained till it was too late to obviate the effects of his negligence. Being apprised that the enemies were advancing in force, he mounted his horse, accompanied by a few attendants, and rode towards a cloud of dust, which was raised by the movement of the hostile columns. Discovering his danger, he endeavoured to regain his camp; but finding all the avenues occupied, he left his troops to their fate, and after wandering the whole day through remote and solitary paths, reached Breda, conveying the disastrous intelligence that his whole force was cut off, and that he himself and his companions had escaped only by accident.

The utmost panic was excited at the Hague by the news of this great and unexpected disaster, and an extraordinary meeting of the States was held at midnight, to deliberate on means for securing Bergen-op-Zoom, and the other places on the frontier. But before the deputies charged with this commission could reach their place of destination, intelligence arrived that after the disgraceful flight of Opdam general

* Something is omitted in the original.

Slangenberg had assumed the command; and, by availing himself of the dikes and natural defences of the country, had repulsed the enemy, and effected his retreat to Lillo, with a loss comparatively trifling.

This untoward accident frustrated the whole design, and the only plausible accusation which has ever been advanced against the well-grounded fame of Marlborough has been made on this occasion. Not only his enemies, but even his friends considered his line of operation too extensive, and that he ought either to have succoured Opdam, or to have attacked that part of the enemy's army to which he was opposed, while weakened by so considerable a detachment. It would appear, however, that the duke's plan of attack was formed with his characteristic ability and judgment; but the other generals acted in direct contradiction to his orders, and after their imprudence had disconcerted the design, Opdam himself neglected the most urgent injunctions to provide for his own safety till the main army could advance to give him support.

Marlborough was not discouraged by these disappointments, but resumed with new zeal his design of attacking the French lines and reducing Antwerp. With this view he moved his camp to Thielen on the 5th of July. From thence, accompanied by his principal officers, he repaired to Breda, to concert arrangements with the deputies of the States, and then proceeded to Bergen-op-Zoom, to hold a conference with Cohorn, who was indisposed. Here it was settled that an attack should be made on the lines, and a hundred pieces of artillery were to be furnished from the neighbouring fortresses of Holland. Meanwhile three engineers in disguise were to reconnoitre the state of the enemy's works, and procure information for making the proper dispositions.

Notwithstanding this arrangement, he anticipated new objections; for the deputies and generals belonging to the army which had failed, thought the enterprise too hazardous, and expatiated on the superior force of the enemy. To obviate the effects of these representations with the States, Marlborough wrote to his friend, the pensionary, indicating the intended plan of attack, and urging such arguments as were calculated to show the probability of complete success. He observed:—

“ I cannot but be of opinion, if we will venture, now that our armies

are so near as to be able to help each other, we should not fail of succeeding. My thoughts on this matter are that Baron Spaar should post himself so in Flanders as might be most advantageous for the carrying on this great design, and that Monsieur Cohorn, with such troops as can be spared from thence, should join the army at Lillo, and then both armies should approach each other, so as we might take just measures for the attacking the lines at the same time. If you have a mind to have Antwerp, and a speedy end of the war, you must venture something for it. I have not consulted the generals, so that you must consider this as my single opinion; but if this should be approved by others, and be thought fit to be put in execution, you must then act as the French do, by drawing out of your garrisons all the battalions that are possible; for those that can make the greatest fire will carry this matter. And I think all officers will agree with me, that if they opiniatre the defence of the lines between Antwerp and Lierre, and we should force them, they having a river behind them, it will be next to impossible for them to get off. On the other side, if they should take the resolution not to defend the lines, then the siege may be made with all the ease imaginable. Upon the whole matter, I take the good or bad success of this campaign depends upon the resolution that shall now be taken.

“We have resolved to stay in this camp two or three days, till measures can be taken, so that we may do our best to hinder the enemy from seeing our design till we are ready to act. I cannot end this letter without assuring you that I verily believe when the French shall see you are positively resolved to attack the lines they will not dare to defend them; for, should they be forced between Antwerp and Lierre, their army must be lost; and how fatal that must be to France you can best judge. I am confident if you miss this occasion you will repent it when it is too late.”*

New obstructions, however, resulted from the recent failure. A vehement dispute arose among the Dutch generals, who strove to throw on each other the blame of their ill success. Opdam laboured to extenuate his own culpable negligence and want of spirit; while Slangenberg, proud of his gallantry and good fortune, redoubled his invectives against all who had incurred his envy; and even presumed to accuse Marlborough of having exposed the Dutch troops to defeat, from the mean and selfish motive of jealousy. A quarrel equally violent arose also between Slangenberg and Cohorn, while employed in arrangements for the march of the troops from Lillo. Cohorn, in a fit of resentment, again quitted the army, and the command devolved on Slangenberg.

At this period Marlborough returned to his army, to watch the motions of Villeroy, who, being joined by Boufflers

* Camp at Thielen, July 4—15. 1703.

and a reinforcement under Bedmar, had quitted his lines, and advanced to Sandhofen. To maintain the communication with the forces about Lillo, which was in some degree affected by this movement, the British commander, on the 7th, transferred his camp to Vorstelar; and the French, drawing still nearer to Antwerp, established themselves in the strong position of St. Job.

While Marlborough was labouring to soothe the resentment of Cohorn, new difficulties arose in another quarter; for instead of the encouragement and support which he expected from the pensionary, he received from him a letter, testifying his fears respecting the intended attack on the lines, and his unwillingness to incur the responsibility attached to the attempt. On this epistle Marlborough observes, "The factions are so great in Holland that the pensionary dares not take any thing upon himself, so that I fear at last things will go wrong for want of a government."

He was too tenacious of his purpose to yield either to the alarms of his friends, or the contentions and jealousies of those on whom he was obliged to depend. By importunity, he at length extorted the consent of the Dutch government for the two armies to unite, and attack the enemy in the position of St. Job. With this view he moved on the 22d of July from Vorstelar to Brecht.

On the 23d of July at three in the morning, he advanced at the head of the cavalry, and reached the great heath of Antwerp, where signals were made for the junction of Slangenberg with the troops from Lillo. But at this moment a heavy smoke rising from the camp of the enemy, announced their retreat behind their lines. At ten, Slangenberg appeared, and Marlborough riding forward with an escort of six squadrons, held a conference with him, to settle the disposition of the forces. The junction being effected, the two armies encamped, that of Marlborough between Campthout and Westdown, and that of Slangenberg at Capelle.

As the enemy had declined a battle in the open ground, it was now necessary to adopt a resolution for an attack on their lines. For this purpose a council of war was held at Campthout, the headquarters: all the former objections and difficulties were revived and again discussed; and after a

warm debate of five hours, no conclusion was adopted. "I was forced to end it," says the commander, "by desiring that each of them would put their opinions in writing, against nine to-morrow morning. I see enough, I think, to be sure the lines will not be attacked, and that we shall return to the Meuse. I intend to go out to-morrow morning, with a body of horse, in hopes to get near enough to view the lines."

The result of all these deliberations and delays, when it was necessary to act, will be naturally anticipated. The timid and cautious spirits, who had terrified themselves with imaginary difficulties, were not tempted to encounter real obstacles, even by the prospect of decisive success. We describe the event of all these movements and deliberations, in his own words:—

"On Friday I went with 4000 horse to see the lines. They let us come so near, that we beat their out-guard home to their barrier, which gave us an opportunity of seeing the lines; which had a fosse of twenty-seven feet broad before them, and the water in it nine feet deep; so that it is resolved that the army return to the Meuse, and in the first place take Huy. Upon the whole matter, if we cannot bring the French to a battle we shall not do any thing worth being commended. My letter of the 8th, which began with Sir, and was directed by Cardonnel, was intended for you, but was writ by candle light, as this is; and my eyes are so bad that I do not see what I do, so that I hope you will excuse me, that I do not answer all in your two letters of the 9th and 13th. We shall begin to march from hence on Thursday."

Marlborough now measured back his steps to the Meuse, to effect the reduction of Huy, which, though small, was considered as a post of some importance, because it covered Liege, opened the navigation of the Meuse, and facilitated an attack on Namur. He returned nearly in the same direction as he had advanced, bewailing at every halt the disappointments which he had undergone, and forming new hopes of more decisive operations.

From Honthalen he wrote, July 26. to Godolphin:—

"I am but too much of your mind, that the going back to the Meuse is, as the French expression is, a *pis aller*. But as Cohorn has managed his business for these last six weeks, we had nothing else to do. I know that Huy will make very little noise in the world: however, if we will make the war in this country, it is very convenient for us to have that place. Our superiority is not so great, but that the French may reasonably expect to make us uneasy, when we shall be obliged to divide our

forces, as we must do when we make the siege. If they give occasion, I hope we shall venture, by which God may give us more success in three or four hours' time than we dare promise ourselves.

"That of Antwerp and Ostend have succeeded so ill, that I am afraid of promising, even for Huy; but I shall let you know my thoughts for the remaining part of the campaign, and desire you will let me have your opinion how far I ought to endeavour the executing it; for what I would do cannot be compassed without continuing the campaign as long as ever the season will permit, we have already lost so much time."

He then states his design, after the reduction of Huy, to force the enemy's lines, or pass the Mehaigne. If they should still decline a battle, he purposed to besiege Limburg, and finally to march with a sufficient number of men for the capture of Treves and Traerbach, preparatory to a campaign on the Moselle, which he designed to commence with the attack of Thionville. Pursuing his march towards the Meuse, Marlborough, on the 15th of August, took up his camp at Val-notre-Dame, while the enemy moving in a parallel direction behind their lines, established themselves in the position of Wasseige.

CHAP. XVIII. — PARTY STRUGGLES. — 1703.

WHILE the British commander was agitated by the contending factions in Holland and the endless jealousies of the Dutch generals, which, to use his own expression, "made his life a burden," his attention was no less distracted with the feuds in the cabinet of England, and the violence of the two hostile parties who divided the parliament and nation, and vied in their censure of his conduct and principles.

We have already shown that Marlborough and Godolphin, both from habit and principle, had hitherto identified themselves with the Tories, and had not cordially favoured the Whigs, notwithstanding the support given to the vigorous prosecution of the war. The two friends had indeed manifested a wish to act independently of all party connexions, and to intrust the offices of government to moderate, upright, and able men of both denominations; yet in every part of their conduct we trace a bias towards those with whom they

had so long been connected. To this tendency, as well as to the inclinations of the queen, we may attribute the formation of the ministry on a Tory basis, with the intermixture of a few Whigs, the least distinguished for party zeal and influence.

The majority of the Tories on their admission to power had warmly professed their attachment to the system of foreign policy adopted by Marlborough, and in particular had pledged themselves to support his vigorous efforts for the diminution of the French power. Their party principles, however, soon regained the ascendancy; and if they did not openly oppose, they secretly thwarted, or, at least, coldly supported his views. Even in the late session some of their zealous leaders began to manifest so refractory a spirit, that it was found impossible to carry on the public business without some alteration of the ministry.

During the preceding winter Marlborough and Godolphin had deliberated on the most advisable mode of effecting this change. Their principal object was to obtain the dismissal of the earl of Rochester, the great leader of the Tories, and the most strenuous opponent of offensive operations, who had assumed a tone of superiority over the other ministers, and attempted to supplant Godolphin at the head of the treasury. The plan which they devised to liberate themselves from so troublesome a colleague was carried into execution soon after Marlborough returned to the army.

As the near relationship of Rochester to the queen did not permit them to insist on his dismissal, they procured an order for him to repair to his government in Ireland. If he complied, his absence would naturally lessen his means of annoyance; if he disobeyed, they expected that the wounded pride of the queen would prompt her to remove him from his office.

The plan succeeded according to their wishes. Rochester at first haughtily refused to quit the political theatre of London, where he was so prominent a figure; and the order being peremptorily repeated, he resigned in disgust. The government of Ireland was conferred on the duke of Ormond, who to the advantage of high birth united great popularity, who was acceptable to the queen, and had gained the esteem of his Tory friends by compromising the dispute with Sir

George Rooke, on the failure of Cadiz. From this moment Rochester became the leader of the discontented Tories and the principal mover of opposition, though several of his adherents still retained their places, with a view more effectually to embroil the measures of government.

Notwithstanding the disgrace of Rochester, a similar spirit was manifested by the earl of Nottingham, secretary of state. He was a nobleman of high honour and unimpeached integrity, as well as of great diligence and capacity, but deeply imbued with Tory principles, both in religion and politics. He was at the same time aspiring, presumptuous, and overbearing. Conscious of his influence with the queen and his political credit, he hoped to become the leader of the administration, and secretly laboured for the removal of Godolphin. Though connected with Marlborough by the habits of long intimacy, Nottingham was no less hostile than Rochester to his grand system of foreign policy, and deprecated with equal zeal the connexions which were formed on the Continent, as well as the vigorous efforts to which those connexions gave rise. Hence, though he held the office of secretary of state, he became the head of an opposition in the ministry. His zeal was stimulated by Rochester, whose natural impetuosity of temper was heightened by a sense of mortified pride, and he found warm adherents in the duke of Buckingham and the earl of Jersey, who were actuated by congenial principles. The views of Nottingham were also warmly seconded by a strong phalanx in the house of commons, at the head of which were his friend and dependent, Secretary Hedges and Sir Edward Seymour, comptroller of the household, member for Somersetshire; a gentleman who, from family interest and landed property, as well as party zeal and vehemence in debate, had acquired an extraordinary share of influence.

A schism was thus imperceptibly formed in the administration. Clashing interests and discordant views embarrassed the measures of government; Marlborough became the object of invidious reflection or open censure, and a crisis was evidently approaching which must terminate in the exclusion or preponderance of Nottingham and his partisans. Indeed, at an early period in the spring, his conduct had

given such dissatisfaction that Marlborough, in a letter to Godolphin, strongly urges the necessity of his removal.

“If,” he observes, “Lord Nottingham continues being so impertinent as to join with Sir Edward Seymour and others to obstruct business, I think it were much better to be plain with him than to suffer him to go on in that way; for by that he will be much abler to do mischief than if he were out; and I am very much mistaken if he will care to part with this place.”

Other perplexities, however, arose from this unfortunate feud; Marlborough more deeply felt the defection of his former friends and associates, because it exposed him to the alternative, which he never contemplated without regret, of being thrown into the power of the opposite party. Nor were his apprehensions unfounded; for the Whigs, deeming the opportunity too favourable to be neglected, assailed him with importunities, and strongly resented the unwillingness which he manifested to admit more of them into power. Some even adopted the language of their political opponents, clamoured for a defensive system in the Netherlands, and accused him of purposely prolonging the war for the sake of his own advantage. He thus became the common mark for the obloquy of both parties; and while his measures were arraigned, and his exploits decried by the Tories, his name was associated with that of Harley in the Whig satires and lampoons of the day.

Even at the army he was not beyond the sphere of contention. Godolphin, his constant correspondent, incessantly expatiated on the divisions in the cabinet and the clamours of party, and overwhelmed his friend with complaints on his own irksome situation and his unpleasant intercourse with the queen, who assailed him with reproaches whenever he presumed to convey the slightest hint on the necessity of conciliating the Whigs. Wearied with censure and contradiction, he at length repeatedly declared his resolution of retiring from a situation in which he could not obtain the support, or even indulgence of either party.

Amidst such contentions it was impossible for the duchess to remain indifferent. She not only renewed her efforts to engage her husband in a more cordial union with the Whigs,

but importuned the queen with her censure of one party and praise of the other, and thus involved him in a new series of embarrassments. Availing herself of the peevish complaints which he incessantly made against the Tories, she revived the unpleasant discussion which had already arisen on this subject with the queen, by communicating extracts of his letters, accompanied with remarks of the most acrimonious kind. One letter in particular, in which he had announced his wish to resign, was made the subject of such a commentary, and accompanied with the hint of a similar resolution by Lord Godolphin and herself. The effect which these appeals produced on the queen appears from one of her answers to the duchess.

“*Windsor, Saturday.*—The thoughts that both my dear Mrs. Freeman and Mr. Freeman seem to have of retiring give me no small uneasiness, and therefore I must say something on that subject. It is no wonder at all that people in your posts should be weary of the world, who are so continually troubled with all the hurry and impertinences of it; but give me leave to say you should a little consider your faithful friends and poor country, which must be ruined if ever you put your melancholy thoughts in execution. As for your poor unfortunate faithful Morley, she could not bear it; for if ever you should forsake me, I would have nothing more to do with the world, but make another abdication; for what is a crown when the support of it is gone? I never will forsake your dear self, Mr. Freeman, nor Mr. Montgomery*, but always be your constant and faithful friend; and we four must never part till death mows us down with his impartial hand.”

The affectionate language of this letter produced very different effects on the minds of the duke and duchess. He expressed a grateful sense of the queen's goodness, and testified his resolution to encounter the vexations of public life as long as she deemed his services necessary. At the same time, in his correspondence with the duchess, he renewed his declaration that he would never submit to the entanglements of either party.

“*Camp at Hanef, June 3—14.* By my last I had not time to give any answer to your two letters of the 23d and 25th of this last month. There is nothing more certain than what you say, that either of the parties would be tyrants if they were let alone; and I am afraid it is as

* The familiar appellation, as before noticed, given to Godolphin in their private correspondence.

true that it will be very hard for the queen to prevent it. I think nothing should be omitted to do justice, and then God's will be done. What you say of Lord Nottingham concerning the park is very scandalous, but very natural to that person. I wish with all my heart the queen were rid of him, so that she had a good man in his place, which I am afraid is pretty difficult.

"We are bound not to wish for any body's death, but if 14 (Sir Edward Seymour) should die, I am convinced it would be no great loss to the queen nor the nation; and you may be sure the visit intended by 19 Lord Rochester) and his friend could be for no other end than to flatter 14 (Sir Edward Seymour) to do such mischief as they dare not openly own."

The sanguine temper of the duchess was much affected by this mark of the queen's affection, and she flattered herself that little exertion was now wanting to gain a complete victory over the political prejudices of her royal mistress. She therefore teased the queen with her eulogies of the Whigs and her censures of the Tories, whom she involved in one common accusation of Jacobitism. Deeming also the bias of her husband towards his former friends much lessened by their petulant opposition, she again urged him to coalesce with the Whigs, who alone concurred in his views, and to discard an ungrateful faction, equally enemies to his glory, and to his great designs for the good of his country. She even pointed out seven of the Tory chiefs, whose continuance in office she declared incompatible with the public welfare.*

* Six of the seven persons here designated were the earls of Nottingham (42) and Jersey (15), Sir Charles Hedges (10), Sir Edward Seymour (14), the duke of Buckingham, and Sir Natham Wright, the lord keeper.

[The necessity of using figures and other ciphers, as in this instance, in the epistolary communications of public characters, shows to what a detestable height had been carried the strife and jealousies of the political factions. Next to a man's private thoughts, his private letters ought to be held sacred from violation; the precincts of the General Post Office ought to be hermetically sealed against every intruder, beyond the official agency indispensable to the management of its business, and it evinced a good spirit in the House of Commons two or three sessions past, when it manifested a disposition to limit, if not entirely withdraw, from the home-secretary his privilege of opening letters in the service of the state. Under Queen Anne, the practice of rifling individual correspondence appears to have been an outrage of ordinary occurrence, and what a

Her attempts were, however, far from producing the expected effect. From the queen, though offended with the Tories, it drew a justification of their loyalty and a recrimination of the Whigs, whom she charged with holding tenets no less dangerous to the monarchy than to the church. The duke also combated her arguments with his usual tenderness, but testified a decided resolution not to abandon the independent principle on which he had hitherto acted. In a letter to the duchess from the camp of Hanef, June 10th, he dwells with peculiar emphasis on this determination.

“ I did yesterday receive yours of the 3d, and do agree with you that the seven persons you mention in that letter do not do the queen that service they ought to do; but I can't but be of the opinion, that if they were out of their places, they would be more capable of doing her hurt. Some of them might, in my opinion, be removed, as 15 (Lord Jersey) and 42 (Lord Nottingham); but who is there fit for their places? I do protest before God I know of none. I am of your mind, that if the queen spoke to Lord Rochester in the manner you mention in your letter, I believe it would make him very cautious; not that I think it would make him honest, but he would be afraid. The conversation that was between Lord Rochester and the speaker is no doubt the language that he entertains the whole party with; and if they can once be strong enough to declare which way the war shall be managed, they may ruin England and Holland at their pleasure, and I am afraid may do it in such a manner as may not at first be unpopular; so that the people may be undone before they can see it. I can't say a word for the excusing the Dutch for the backwardness of their sea preparations this year; but if that, or any thing else, should produce a coldness between England and Holland, France would then gain their point, which I hope in God I shall never live to see; for our poor country would then be the miserablest part of all Christendom; for we should not only lose our liberty, but our religion also must be forced, and those gentlemen that would be helping to this, would then be as miserable as others; for the French, when they are the masters, make no distinctions. I could say a great deal upon this subject, but I dare not, for fear of accidents. In short, I think the two parties are so angry, that, to ruin each other, they will make no scruple of venturing the whole.”

shameful state of espionage and corruption does this imply in the servants and others connected with the Post Office, who could thus become accessory to such a scandalous betrayal of their public duties! Mr. Coxe has rendered a useful service, as he promised in his preface, by giving, when able to do so, the real *name* or *expression*, in lieu of troubling his readers with unintelligible symbols. — ED.]

The officious zeal of the duchess was not, however, discouraged by this repulse. She renewed her importunities with her husband, offered her mediation with the Whigs, and urged that their petulance would easily be restrained by popular representations. But Marlborough disdained an appeal which he knew would be construed into an application for support, and followed by counter demands. In reply, he testified his concern with unusual feeling, renewed his former declarations with greater warmth, and concluded with expatiating on the fatal consequences which must result from the factious attempts of both parties to thwart and frustrate his military designs.

“*Alderbeesten, Sept. 30. 1703.* I see by this last letter, that you have mistaken my meaning in some of my letters; for though I may have complained of some you call your friends, yet it never entered into my thoughts that they should be spoke to in order to have a better thought of me; for I know they would be as unreasonable as the others in their expectations, if I should seek their friendship: *for all parties are alike.* And as I have taken my resolution of never doing any hardship to any man whatsoever, I shall by it have a quiet in my own mind; not valuing nor desiring to be a favourite to either of them. For, in the humour I am now in, and that I hope in God I shall ever be of, I think both parties unreasonable and unjust. I am very sensible of several errors I have committed; but I must not endeavour to mend them by running into greater: so that I shall make complaints to neither, but endeavour to recommend myself to the world by my sincere intentions of governing all my actions by what I shall think is for the interest of my queen and country. I hope in God this will agree with what you desire, and then I can have no uneasiness.”

In addition to the information conveyed by Godolphin and the duchess, Marlborough received private intelligence from Harley, whose sentiments were congenial to his own. Equally trusted by the moderate Whigs and Tories, he was enabled to develope their views and wishes. He communicated to the duke the result of his conversations with Nottingham on one side, and with some of the Whigs on the other. He stated their respective complaints to turn principally on the mismanagement of the fleet and on the impolicy of an offensive war in Flanders, and conveyed an intimation which equally marks the spleen and resentment of both, namely, that they concurred in accusing Marlborough and Godolphin of fostering designs hostile to the interests of the house of Hanover. To the opinion of Harley, which bore the appearance of can-

dour and impartiality, Marlborough paid the utmost deference, and by his representations was encouraged to persist in the resolution of yielding to the Whigs as little as to the Tories.

The intelligence, however, made a deep impression; for in sending the letter of Harley to the duchess, he observes, "If both parties agree that the war must not be offensive in this country, I am very much afraid the Dutch will not think themselves very safe in our friendship. However, I cannot but be much concerned; for if this country is ruined, we are undone, and then 10 (Sir Charles Hedges) and his friends may succeed, which otherwise is next to impossible. There are a thousand reasons for preserving our friendship with the Dutch; for as we save them, so they must preserve us from the arbitrary power of 19 and 1, which must be entirely governed by 3 (Lord Rochester).* "*May God preserve me and my dearest love from seeing this come to pass!* † but if we should quarrel with 24 (the Dutch) I fear it might happen."

The party feuds which agitated the British parliament and nation spread with a still more detrimental effect into Scotland. Soon after the accession of Anne, overtures had been made for an union between the two kingdoms, and commissioners had been finally named to carry the design into execution. But an arrangement which was so likely to produce domestic tranquillity and public benefit was violently opposed by the Jacobites and many of the discontented, because Tories, it tended to weaken the interest of the Stuart family; and their opposition was fomented by the declamations of the same party in the English parliament. Among the various expedients to which the enemies of the Revolution resorted for the purpose of embroiling the two kingdoms, was the proposal of a bill in the legislature of Scotland, which, under the title of the Act of Security, was calculated to abridge the established prerogatives of the crown, to limit the choice of a successor, and to throw a vast additional

* These ciphers cannot all be discovered, but they evidently convey the meaning that the ascendancy of the violent Tories would lead to the restoration of the Pretender, and consequently to a dependence on France.

† The lines in italics are scratched out with the pen.

power into the hands of the parliament. The discussions which took place on this act were marked by the utmost virulence; and when the royal assent was withheld by the queen's commissioner, the commotion almost rose to open rebellion. An act for settling the succession in the House of Hanover was rejected with contempt, and some of the more violent even threatened to move for committing the earl of Marchmont, who had proposed it, to the castle. The instigators of these feuds appeared resolved to extort the assent of the crown to the act of security, by withholding the supplies, and the commissioner with difficulty succeeded in pacifying them, by relinquishing the right of the crown to make peace or war, and promising that they should resume the question in the ensuing session.

These feuds contributed to aggravate the embarrassments which the treasurer and Marlborough encountered from the machinations of contending parties in England; and their correspondence is filled not only with complaints of the difficulties which consequently occurred in the management of domestic affairs, but of the injurious effects which resulted to the confederacy abroad, and particularly of the alarm, jealousy, and lukewarmness which were produced in Holland.

CHAP. XIX. — MILITARY OPERATIONS. — THE DUKE
RETURNS TO ENGLAND. — 1703.

AFTER this detail of the political feuds in which Marlborough was involved during the labours of an arduous campaign, we resume the narrative of military operations.

On the failure of his brilliant designs to accelerate the termination of the war, nothing remained but the comparatively inglorious task of reducing the petty garrisons which clogged the navigation of the Meuse. Accordingly Huy was invested on the 16th of August, and the trenches opened the ensuing night. In a few days, the forts surrounding the place were reduced; and batteries being raised against the

castle, the governor was constrained to surrender, on condition that the garrison should be exchanged.

After the capture of Huy, some hesitation prevailed in regard to ulterior operations. In a grand counsel of war held at the confederate camp of Val notre Dame, the commander-in-chief resumed his plan, and urged the policy of profiting by the superiority of the allies, to force the weakest part of the French lines, consisting of an accessible space of ground, two leagues and a half in extent, between the source of the Mehaigne and the Meuse. His opinion was warmly supported by the English generals, and those commanding the auxiliary troops of Denmark, Luneburg and Hesse. But he was again opposed by the Dutch deputies and generals, who expatiated on the risk and danger of an enterprise, which they termed dubious and desperate; as well as on the little advantage which could be derived even from success; they contended that the enemy would still find ample resources for defence in the nature of the ground, particularly by occupying the strong position of Ramilies.* Finally, they dwelt with peculiar emphasis on the utility which would arise from the possession of Limburg. In this conflict of opinions, an appeal was made to the States; but their decision only produced new deliberations, which ended in the usual result.

These vexations were only a portion of what Marlborough had to endure at this period. Writing to Godolphin he says, "My eyes are so extremely sore with the dust and the want of rest for these two days, that it is a very great trouble to me to write." In another letter he adds, "I am going to the siege of Limburg; so that I believe I shall be a fortnight from this army, in which time I hope to recover my health; for the unreasonable opposition I have met with has so heated my blood, that I am almost mad with the head-ache."

Notwithstanding a series of heavy rains which deluged the ground, the army was set in motion on the 5th of September, and on the 10th, Limburg was invested. The trenches were opened with all diligence, the batteries began to play on the 25th, and a wide breach being soon effected, on the 27th, the governor, with a garrison of 1400 men, surrendered at discretion. With this success the active operations of the

* The very position on which the French were defeated in 1706.

year were closed. Guelder, which had sustained a blockade since the spring, speedily followed the example of Limburg. Thus the campaign, though less brilliant than Marlborough had expected from the spirit and condition of his army, and the grand designs which he had formed, was not without advantage; for the territories of Cologne and Liege were secured; and by the reduction of all Spanish Guelderland, the States were relieved from that dread of invasion which had so long held them in suspense. By these acquisitions the way was prepared for more important and extensive enterprises.

By the correspondence, it appears that Marlborough was impatient to hasten from this scene of mortification and chicanery, that he might divert his chagrin in the society of his family and friends, and assist at the opening of the parliament, which was summoned to meet on the 4th of November. But a new and unexpected change of affairs rendered his presence still necessary on the continent.

The grand plan of the French to unite their Italian and German armies, and penetrate into the Austrian dominions, was obstructed by the disputes between Villars and the elector of Bavaria, the patriotic resistance of the Tyrolese, and finally frustrated by the sudden defection of the duke of Savoy.

Victor Amadeus had apparently embraced the Bourbon cause with zeal and sincerity, and had been rewarded for his attachment by the marriage of his daughters, one with the duke of Burgundy, presumptive heir to the French crown, and the other with the duke of Anjou, the successful pretender to that of Spain. He was, however, too sagacious a statesman not to perceive, that in contributing to the ruin of Austria, he was facilitating his own reduction to a state of dependence on France.

Urged by this motive, and stimulated by the hope of selling his assistance to advantage, he made several overtures to the court of Vienna as early as the month of May. To facilitate the negotiation, Count Auersperg was deputed on the part of the emperor, and reached Turin on the 14th of July. A treaty was commenced the same day with the duke in person, the secret being confided only to the marquis de Prié, his first minister. To evade the suspicious eyes of

the French party, the imperial agent was clandestinely conveyed to Castiglio, a royal seat about two leagues from Turin, where the duke occasionally visited him under the pretence of hunting. But the difficulty of reconciling the jarring pretensions of the two parties; the demand made by the duke, of a guaranty from the maritime powers; and, above all, his dread of France, kept the arrangement in suspense, though such hopes were entertained of its conclusion, that Mr. Hill, a confidential agent of Marlborough, was appointed envoy to Turin, on the part of England, and reached the frontier of Italy as early as August. With a mixture of mystery and duplicity, the duke of Savoy declined receiving the English envoy, and remanded the imperial agent to the capital, where he was lodged, to use his own expression, like a political hermit, in an apartment of the palace. The difficulties and objections successively advanced by the duke irritated the emperor; and to secure a Proteus, who assumed every shape to elude his grasp, a hint of the negotiation was suffered to transpire through the German papers. Still, however, Count Auersperg was allowed to remain; for the duke of Savoy was unwilling to relinquish the negotiation, though his fears were awakened by the reverses which attended the imperial cause, and the inefficiency of the Italian army, to which he could alone look for support. The courts of England and Holland at length interfered to bring the discussion to a successful issue: and Marlborough, in particular, endeavoured to hasten an arrangement, which appeared likely to produce such advantage to the cause of the allies. But Victor Amadeus yet fluctuated between hope and fear, and might perhaps have delayed his final resolution till it was too late to be effectual, had not the French court precipitated his defection by an impolitic act of severity. Acquainted with the secret intrigue, no less by the artful disclosure of the court of Vienna, than by the discoveries of their own agents, they hoped to terrify the wily prince by a decisive blow. Vendome, who was then advanced to the borders of the Tyrol, arrested and disarmed 5000 Piemontese, who formed part of his army. This unexpected and public affront roused the indignation of a prince who prided himself on his cunning; and on this occasion his promptitude was strongly contrasted with his former indecision. The news

reached him on the 3d of October, and the following day, indignantly throwing off the mask, he rejected the offer of the Milanese, in exchange for Savoy and Nice, which was made through the channel of the French commander, acceded to the grand alliance, and concluded subsidiary treaties with the Maritime Powers. In return for his co-operation he was to be assisted by the emperor with a force of 20,000 men, to enjoy the supreme command in Italy, and to receive, in addition to that part of the Montferrat, which belonged to the house of Mantua, Alessandria, Valenza, and Lumellina, with the Val de Sesia, and other districts. These terms were guaranteed by the Maritime Powers, who agreed to aid him with a monthly subsidy of 80,000 crowns.

In consequence of this change in Italy, the grand attack on Austria was suspended. The elector of Bavaria, after again defeating general Stirum at Hochstedt, employed himself in reducing the frontier fortresses, in order to resume the design with more certain effect in the ensuing year. The military movements on the Upper Rhine were influenced by the same cause. After Villars had penetrated into Bavaria, the army of Tallard was reinforced, and the duke of Burgundy nominated to the command. In September he reduced Old Brisach, and closed the campaign with the recovery of Landau, which secured the communication with the forces collected beyond the Black Forest.

The revolution in Italy, and the accession of Portugal to the grand alliance having opened new scenes of action, an important change took place in the system of the allies. In consequence of the discontent which was manifested towards the Bourbon government in many parts of Spain, Leopold hesitated no longer in announcing and enforcing the rights of his family. To obviate the objection against uniting under one head the extensive dominions of Charles V., he and his son Joseph solemnly relinquished their claims on the Spanish succession, in favour of his second son the Archduke Charles. The young prince was accordingly proclaimed king of Spain at Vienna, and formally acknowledged by all the allied powers. He was treated at the imperial court with the formalities of a crowned head, and exercised his authority by creating several grandees of Spain. On the 19th of September he quitted Vienna, and traversed Germany in his

way to England, where he was to join the armament prepared to realise his pretensions.

Marlborough was employed in arranging the winter quarters of his troops, when Charles arrived at Dusseldorf on the 16th of October. He therefore hastened to pay his respects, and convey to the young monarch the congratulations of the queen. Reaching Dusseldorf the same evening, he was admitted to a private audience, and treated with marks of the highest gratitude and regard. He concluded his address with observing, "I have just had the honour of putting your majesty in possession of Limburg." The king replied, "I hope to be yet more indebted to your valour for the reduction of other places to my obedience." An animated conversation ensued, and Charles finally taking from his side a sword richly set with diamonds, said, "I am not ashamed to own that I am a poor prince, having no other inheritance than my cloak and my sword. My sword may be serviceable to your grace, and I hope you will not esteem it the less because I have worn it a day. I hoped to present it to you at the head of that gallant army with which you have performed such great actions." The duke respectfully kissed the hilt, and rejoined, "It acquires an additional value in my eyes, because your majesty has condescended to wear it; for it will always remind me of your just right to the Spanish crown, and of my obligation to hazard my life and all that is dear to me, in rendering you the greatest prince of Christendom."

As the duke had settled the disposition of winter quarters, and left the command of the troops to his brother General Churchill, he accompanied Charles to the Hague. Arriving on the 2d of November, he shared the honours which were paid to the young monarch, and was welcomed by every class with respect and applause. During his short stay he presented letters of congratulation from the queen; and in his audience of leave received from the king his portrait richly set in diamonds, accompanied with the most flattering expressions of kindness and regard.

These honours and distinctions were, however, far from being without alloy. The weakness and inconsistency of the Dutch government, which had shackled his enterprising spirit, proved the source of new mortifications. Opdam,

instead of being punished for his negligence, was, by private influence, reinstated in his command, and again sent to serve with the army, which had suffered by his misconduct. Slangenberg also renewed his clamours with redoubled violence, and found a party ready to second his cause, and re-echo his complaints.

The multiplied embarrassments which Marlborough had encountered in the course of the campaign, the malicious imputations with which he was assailed in Holland, the increasing violence of both parties in England, and the prospect of still greater contentions, seem at length to have exhausted his patience. At this moment he had the additional mortification to find his army diminished by a draught of 2000 men for the war in Portugal, which was ordered without his knowledge at the instigation of Nottingham. This measure drew on him a strong remonstrance from the Dutch government, who considered such a breach of treaties as preparatory to a larger draught, if not the adoption of a defensive system in the Netherlands. The incident made a deep impression on his mind, from the mischiefs it was calculated to produce. In a letter to Godolphin he observes, "I cannot but say that the Dutch argue very justly. If the queen can without their consent take these men, she may by the same reason recall the rest; and by the same reasoning they are at liberty to reduce as many as they please of their army."

In the midst of this perplexity he found, to his surprise and vexation, that his friend Godolphin was alarmed by the incessant clamours against the system of war in the Netherlands, and became an advocate for defensive operations. These multiplied causes of disgust, confirmed him in a resolution, which he had before announced, of retiring from the command. Quitting Holland, he landed in England on the 10th of November. He had scarcely time to receive the welcome of his family, before he was despatched to Portsmouth to compliment the king of Spain, and conduct him to Windsor, where he was to be introduced to the queen. Two days only were dedicated to courtly ceremonies, during which Marlborough had twice the honour to receive the future monarch as his guest, and the entertainment was graced with the presence of his royal mistress. On these occasions Charles

treated the duchess with the same distinctions which he had already shown to her husband. When she offered him the basin and ewer, he took it from her hand and held it for the queen. On returning it to the duchess, he presented her with a ring of great value, which he had worn on his own finger. Having concluded these formalities, Charles returned to Portsmouth, accompanied by the duke of Somerset, and without delay embarked on board the Royal Catherine, which was to convey him to Lisbon.

Marlborough had scarcely reached England before the discontented Tories resorted to one of the usual machinations of party, which was calculated to sow dissension in the court and shackle the operations of government. This was the revival of the bill against occasional conformity. As the queen was known to be zealously inclined to the measure, and as both Marlborough and Godolphin had hitherto given it their strenuous support, their enemies naturally concluded that they could not oppose it without sacrificing their own principles, or offending their royal mistress; nor permit it to pass without depriving themselves of the aid which they drew from the Whigs and moderate dissenters. Another mischief which this measure was likely to produce, had also probably not escaped the penetration of the movers; for as the Whig zeal of the duchess was well known, a discussion, which must infallibly excite all the acrimony of party, could scarcely take place without creating irritation between her and the queen.

The situation and influence of the Tories enabled them to revive this obnoxious act with peculiar effect. By the connivance of Nottingham, it was announced in the Gazette without the knowledge of Godolphin. Under this apparent sanction of the government, it was received in the House of Commons at the motion of Mr. Bromley. Being zealously supported, not only by the Tories, but by the Non-jurors and Jacobites, it was carried by a large majority, and transmitted to the Lords.

The correspondence which occurred while the bill was pending, sufficiently shows the delicate predicament in which Marlborough and the treasurer were placed. Although the queen had been induced in her speech at the opening of parliament, to deprecate discussions which were likely to

excite divisions and animosity, she was not the less favourably disposed towards a measure which appeared to give additional strength and security to the church. The duchess tried to combat the secret inclinations of the queen, and did not spare the feelings of her husband, but importuned him to make an open and direct opposition to a bill which would weaken the interest of the party on whom the perverseness of the Tories had compelled him to rely. He was himself fully sensible of the injurious consequences which it would produce; yet he too highly respected the prejudices of his sovereign, and was too anxious to preserve his own consistency, to follow her advice. He adopted, however, the most prudent resolution which circumstances would permit, and thus apprised her of his design:—

“I do own a great deal of what you say is right; but I can by no means allow that all the Tory party are for King James, and consequently against the queen, but the contrary; I think it is in her power to make use of almost all, but some of the heads, to the true interests of England, which I take to be the Protestant succession, to the supporting of which, by the help of Almighty God, I will venture my last drop of blood. As you are the only body that could have given me happiness, I am the more concerned we should differ so much in opinion. But as I am firmly resolved never to assist any Jacobite whatsoever, or any Tory that is for persecution, I must be careful not to do the thing in the world which my Lord Rochester would most desire to have me do, which is to give my vote against this bill: but I do most solemnly promise that I will speak to nobody living to be for it; and to show you that I would do any thing that were not a ruin to the queen, and an absolute destruction to myself to make you easy, at this time by what has been told me, the bill will certainly be thrown out, unless my lord treasurer and I will both speak to people and speak in the House, which I do assure you for myself I will not do.”

In consequence of the lukewarmness manifested by the two ministers, and the example of the prince of Denmark, to whom the queen gave leave to absent himself from the House rather than vote for a measure to which he was opposed, the party against the bill in the House of Peers exerted themselves with a decisive effect. The attack was commenced by Dr. Burnet, bishop of Salisbury, in an able speech, and he was zealously seconded by the Whig chiefs. After a long and warm debate, it was lost by a majority of only twelve voices. Twenty-three peers of the Tory party signed a protest, and among them we find the names of Marlborough

and Godolphin, who evidently made this sacrifice of their feelings for the sake of preserving their consistency, and conciliating their former friends. They did not, however, gain their object; for in the pamphlets of the day we find them accused of duplicity, and charged with defeating the measure by their lukewarmness and indirect solicitations.

CHAP. XX. — GRAND PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN, 1704.

IN the preceding chapter we have seen that Marlborough quitted the Continent with a determination to withdraw from the command; but on a calm and dispassionate consideration, the temporary ebullitions of spleen and vexation gave way to nobler sentiments; and the full conviction that his own presence and exertions could alone obviate the dangers which threatened the civilised world, induced him to sacrifice all personal feelings to the public cause.

Marlborough saw the year close with the most gloomy aspect. The change, occasioned by the accession of Portugal and Savoy, had suspended, not averted, the peril. The French monarch looked eagerly forward to the return of the season, in the full confidence that a single campaign would reduce the emperor to submission, and break the bonds of that confederacy which had presumed to set bounds to his domination. In Hungary the insurrection assumed strength and consistency. Prince Ragotski, the leader of the malcontents, was joined by several powerful magnates, forced the imperial general, Sehlick, to retire to Presburg, and pouring his desultory hordes beyond the Mark, levied contributions in Moravia and Silesia, and spread alarm to the very gates of Vienna. By the possession of Landau and Brisach, the French had opened a passage over the Rhine, and secured the means of pushing an army through the Black Forest into the heart of the empire. The elector of Bavaria was master of Ratisbon, Kempten, Kaufleuren, and Gravenbach, which commanded the country between the Iller and the Inn; and of Augsburg, which afforded a

passage over the Leck. He also occupied Ulm with a strong garrison, took Passau and Lintz, the keys of Upper Austria, and was prevented from reducing Nordlingen and Nuremberg, only by the advance of winter. He thus held the course of the Danube from its source to the frontier of Austria, established a communication with the French armies on the Rhine, and the rebels in Hungary, and by these advantages, joined to his central position, was enabled to awe the princes of the empire, and to penetrate almost without obstruction to the walls of Vienna. With an army of 45,000 men, he fixed his quarters in the vicinity of Ulm; from whence he could readily effect a junction with the French reinforcement, which early in the spring was to penetrate through the rugged country bordering the sources of the Danube.

The French court had exerted their customary activity in collecting means for the accomplishment of this decisive enterprise. Besides the army in the Netherlands under Villeroy, Tallard with 45,000 men was posted on the Upper Rhine, in a situation which enabled him at once to menace the circles of Swabia, Franconia, and the Rhine, and open a passage into Bavaria. The Tyrol was exposed to the aggressions of the Italian army; and the most vigorous efforts were made to terminate the contest with the duke of Savoy, and clear the whole country between the frontier of Dauphinè and the Trentine Alps.

On the eve of so awful a crisis, the defensive system of Germany was in the most deplorable state. Every exertion had been made to raise levies, and prepare Vienna for a siege; but with an impoverished country and an exhausted treasury every exertion was fruitless. Means and time were equally wanting to collect an army for the security of the Austrian frontier; while the force which could be opposed to the elector of Bavaria scarcely amounted to 20,000 men; and the army of the empire, which, under the command of the Margrave of Baden, was employed to guard the lines of Stollhoffen, was equally incompetent to maintain so important a barrier of the empire. The avenues of the Black Forest were principally confided to militia and peasantry, supported by a few regulars under General Stirum. A small body of Dutch troops, amounting only to twelve battalions, was quartered at Rothweil, to cover Wirtemberg, and a few

Hessians and Prussians were posted on the borders of the Rhine below Philipsburg.

Scarcely any hope remained of opposing the designs of France and Bavaria, and the fate of Europe appeared to depend on the first movement of their combined forces. Indeed we may with confidence assert, that if our great commander had executed his resolution of retiring from his irksome situation, the subversion of public and private liberty was inevitable.

Marlborough had duly appreciated the peril of the time, and before the close of the preceding campaign, had entered into a secret correspondence with Eugene, for the purpose of devising a remedy. He considered this as a crisis, which equally baffled the combinations of regular warfare, and the calculations of ordinary prudence; he was convinced that nothing but an effort bordering on rashness could save the emperor, and with him the members of the grand alliance, from inevitable ruin. Sensible that all which is dear to man was at stake, he not only vanquished his own irritated feelings, but infused a bolder spirit into the timid mind of Godolphin, and awakened the Whigs to the dangerous consequences of their impolitic clamours for a defensive system. Having thus weakened the vexatious opposition with which he had been so long harassed, he formed the bold design of trusting the protection of Holland and Flanders to the Dutch army, and leaving in his rear the numerous fortresses and forces of the enemy, to hasten with all the disposable troops he could collect, to the quarter where the most pressing dangers were hourly accumulating.

In executing this extensive plan he had difficulties of no ordinary magnitude to encounter. He had not only to baffle the penetration of a vigilant enemy, who by a vigorous effort might have arrested his course, but to extort the consent of a divided cabinet to an enterprise of imminent peril and indefinite extent. He had also to vanquish the opposition of the Dutch, and persuade them to confide in their own resources; while so large a part of the army, which had hitherto formed their protection, was detached on a perilous, a distant, and perhaps a fatal expedition.

His plan, however, was matured and carried into effect with astonishing celerity, address, and secrecy. Having

completed his arrangements with Eugene, he persuaded Godolphin to forward his views without disclosing their whole extent, and trusted to the chance of events for the sanction of the queen, and the acquiescence of the cabinet. The primary object was, to obtain from parliament the aids which would enable him to profit by the recent changes in Italy and Portugal, and above all to procure an augmentation of forces sufficient for the relief of Austria and the empire. In this object, by his own exertions and those of his friends, he fully succeeded. The Commons, in compliance with the recommendation of the queen, not only granted subsidies to carry the alliances with Portugal and Savoy into effect, but also consented to an augmentation of 10,000 men in the Netherlands, thus raising the force under the immediate command of Marlborough to 50,000. Adequate supplies were furnished for equipment, and to accelerate recruiting, the magistrates were armed with unusual powers.

It was next necessary to give a similar impulse to the most sluggish member of the confederacy. Accordingly, at the instigation of Pensionary Hiensius, Marlborough was invited to Holland in the name of the States, that they might have the advantage of his advice in deliberating on the means of averting the dangers which threatened the common cause. He therefore quitted England on the 15th January, in a season of such intense cold and tempestuous weather, that his yacht was the first vessel, which for six weeks had ventured to navigate the German sea. He landed at Rotterdam on the evening of the 18th, and profiting by the earliest tide, reached the Hague the ensuing day. To the pensionary he perhaps made the same communication as to Godolphin; but to the States he suggested a plan equally calculated to conceal and promote his design, by proposing to open a campaign on the Moselle, with the British troops, and part of the foreign auxiliaries; while General Overkirk, with the Dutch and the remainder of the auxiliaries, maintained a defensive system in the Netherlands. He did not at first succeed in obtaining their sanction, even to this modified proposal, but he was ably seconded by the pensionary, who promised to employ his own influence and that of his confidential friends in procuring the concurrence of the government, as soon as the intended plan should be

developed. At the same time Marlborough induced the States to grant a subsidy of 200,000 crowns for enabling the margrave of Baden to keep the field, and a similar supply to the circle of Suabia, which was about to become the scene of hostilities. He induced them also to take into their pay 4000 Wirtemberg troops, in the place of those who had been detached for the service of Portugal. Sensible also of the critical situation to which the duke of Savoy was reduced, he obtained a promise for the payment of the arrears due under the subsidiary treaty, and conveyed to him the assurance of so early and vigorous a campaign in Germany, as should prevent the French from increasing their forces in Italy.

Similar encouragement was held forth to the Elector Palatine, who claimed large arrears from the Dutch; and no expedient was neglected to satisfy the punctilious and grasping spirit of the king of Prussia, who seized every opportunity to enhance the price of his assistance. Marlborough warmly commended the zeal which his majesty had displayed for the common cause, flattered him with the title of deliverer of the empire, obtained an increase of his troops, and adroitly engaged him in a negotiation to detach the elector of Bavaria. He even affected to make a confidential communication of his designs, by specifying the intended disposition of the forces on the Moselle and the Meuse, and indicating the mode and time of operation.

Marlborough next hastened his return to England, where his presence was necessary to give motion to the whole machine of state. Arriving at Rotterdam on the 22d of February, he embarked early the next morning with the first tide. But before he descended to the Brill, the yacht ran aground, and was left by the ebb. Being, however, unwilling to lose the favourable wind, he leaped into the first boat which appeared, and made to the Brill. He there re-embarked in the Dolphin, and after lying to at the mouth of the Meuse, to observe the transports, which were setting sail from Helvoet with the troops for Portugal, he continued his course to the English shore, landed at Gravesend about eight in the evening, and reached London early in the morning. He immediately waited on the queen, to communicate his arrangements. He not only obtained her approbation,

but persuaded her to remit, without delay, 100,000 crowns, as the proportion of England to the circle of Suabia, and from the privy purse to advance the amount of the contingent which he had promised the margrave of Baden, and which was not comprised in the provisions of parliament.

His attention was also directed to the domestic arrangements which the state of affairs required. It was not merely necessary to collect the means of action, but also to obviate the embarrassments which could not fail to arise, from the divided state of the cabinet, and the opposition of the high Tories. Although Nottingham and his adherents did not openly join Rochester in his violent measures, and although they suffered the supplies to pass, they yet manifested their hostility by thwarting the bill for recruiting the army, and announced their dissatisfaction by a vehement protest. In consequence of this proceeding, and the refractory spirit they had shown in the preceding year, a resolution was taken to remove the obnoxious secretary and some of his immediate dependants. By adroit management Nottingham was got out, and replaced in his office of secretary by Mr. Harley, the speaker. The duke was influenced in this promotion by a knowledge of Harley's financial talents, by the confidence derived from long habits of intimacy, and similarity of political principle; and, finally, by a sense of gratitude for disclosing the secret cabals of Nottingham. Another motive for his introduction to so important an office, was derived from numerous adherents in the House of Commons, who professed to act on the principles of moderation and independence, as well as to regard no other object than the public service; and who from patriotism, pique, or love of change, withdrew from the two great contending parties. Such indeed was the address of Harley in making proselytes, that although he was himself connected with the dissenters, yet he acquired the confidence of churchmen; and frequently united at his hospitable board the ministers and members of both persuasions. Though a man so industrious in acquiring influence could not regard the honours of office with an indifferent eye, he at first declined the offer of the secretaryship, declaring that he was unwilling to fill a place, to the duties of which he had not been accustomed. With difficulty he even accepted a situation in the privy council. After

some hesitation, either real or affected, he yielded to the importunities of Marlborough and Godolphin, and the solicitations of the queen; and on the 18th of May, his promotion was announced in the "Gazette."*

During this negotiation the other vacant places were filled. The earl of Kent, who ranked as a moderate Whig, was appointed lord chamberlain; and Sir Thomas Mansell, an ardent Tory, as well as the friend of the speaker, was made comptroller of the household. Another promotion which took place at the same time was, the transfer of the secretaryship of war from Blathwayte to Henry St. John. This youthful statesman, who now commenced his public career, was the friend of Harley, and by him appears to have been introduced to the notice of the duke. His splendid and premature talents soon strengthened the impression made by his captivating amenity of manners, and he rapidly ingratiated himself with his noble patron, by an affectation of the most zealous attachment. Marlborough took the warmest interest in his promotion, and recommended him to Godolphin as one on whose integrity he might securely rely. "I am very glad," he says, "you are so well pleased with Mr. St. John's diligence, and I am very confident he will never deceive you."

Many of the zealous Whigs were highly offended at these appointments, which they regarded as a slight to their party; and their complaints were imparted to Marlborough by his son-in-law, Lord Sunderland. But he had still more vehement expostulations to encounter from his duchess. She depicted the attachment and zeal professed by Harley, as mere artifices to clothe his consummate subtlety; and her keen sagacity equally discovered the insatiable ambition and party zeal, which in St. John were cloaked with the appearance of unaffected candour, and careless vivacity. She conjured her husband to moderate his confidence towards two persons, whom she regarded as doubtful friends, if not dangerous enemies. Marlborough, however, neglected these warnings, from the honourable motive of regarding merit and abilities in the choice of his confidants, and from a native

* Godolphin's private letters to the duchess. — Marlborough's private correspondence. — Conduct, p. 144. — Other side of the question, p. 215.

magnanimity of character, above suspicion. He thus unconsciously prepared the way for his subsequent mortification and final disgrace.

CHAP. XXI. — OPENING OF THE GRAND CAMPAIGN, 1704.

DURING his short stay in England, Marlborough exerted himself in despatching the recruits and reinforcements to the Continent, and maturing the military arrangements. Conscious how much his future success depended on secrecy, he professed in England, as in Holland, his design of acting on the Moselle; and even to the queen and Lord Godolphin, he appears to have made only a partial disclosure of his views.

Through the agency of Prince Eugene, with whom he had secretly arranged the whole plan of the campaign, he induced the emperor to write a confidential letter to the queen, claiming assistance proportionate to the magnitude of his danger; and on the 2d of April the imperial minister privately made a similar appeal in the name of his master. On this ground Marlborough procured a general instruction from the cabinet, empowering him to repair to Holland, and concert with the States such measures as should be deemed proper for relieving the emperor, and reducing the elector of Bavaria.

On the 19th of April he embarked at Harwich with his brother, General Churchill, the earl of Orkney, and other officers; landed at Maeslandsluys, and reached the Hague on the 21st. His first care was to combat the constitutional tardiness of the margrave of Baden. He affected to adopt a plan, which that prince had furnished for a campaign on the Moselle, communicated the arrangements which were then pending with the States, and urged the necessity of an early and vigorous effort against the elector of Bavaria, because he should himself be obliged to return to the Netherlands towards the end of July. The next object was, to complete the dispositions which he had left unfinished in his recent

visit to the Hague. Still, however, he found extreme difficulty in prompting a timid and commercial people, whose whole views were confined to temporary safety, to engage even in the modified plan which he had hitherto suggested for an expedition to the Moselle. After passing several days in combating the alarms of some, and the factious opposition of others, he resolved to extort that aid from their fears which he could not obtain from their public spirit, by declaring his intention to lead the English troops alone to the Moselle. The event answered his expectations. His declaration silenced the clamours of faction, and operated on the fears of the timid; and in a formal conference with the States-general, on the 4th of May, he obtained powers which he deemed sufficient for the accomplishment of his design. At the same time he had successfully negotiated with the court of Prussia, and procured the necessary facilities for transporting his magazines to Coblenz. With that indefatigable activity of mind, which can pursue the most extensive combinations without neglecting subordinate details, he superintended in person the collection and embarkation of these necessary requisites. He saw also there reinforcements which had recently arrived from England commence their march for the general rendezvous, under the command of his brother, General Churchill.

Thus did this able negotiator and profound statesman, as well as great commander, wield all the jarring interests of a heterogeneous confederacy: thus did he turn even the alarms of the timid, the clamours of the factious, and the views of the interested, to the accomplishment of the boldest and most adventurous project, which in modern times had ever been conceived by a general who was responsible for his actions, and limited in his authority. He had departed from England under the pressure of domestic chagrin, derived from some petty bickerings with the duchess. At this period a reconciliation not only seems to have taken place, but in the warmth of returning tenderness, she even testified a wish to accompany him during the campaign, and to soothe his anxiety by her presence. His reply shows how intimately the affections of the man were, in his bosom, blended with the virtues of the hero.

“Hague, April 24.—May 5.—Your dear letter of the 15th came to me

but this minute. My lord treasurer's letter in which it was inclosed, by some mistake was sent to Amsterdam. I would not for any thing in my power it had been lost; for it is so very kind, that I would in return lose a thousand lives if I had them to make you happy. Before I sat down to write this letter, I took yours that you wrote at Harwich out of my strong box and have burnt it; and if you will give me leave it will be a great pleasure to me to have it in my power to read this dear dear letter often, and that it may be found in my strong box when I am dead. I do this minute love you better than ever I did before. This letter of yours has made me so happy, that I do from my soul wish we could retire and not be blamed. What you propose as to coming over, I should be extremely pleased with; for your letter has so transported me, that I think you would be happier in being here than where you are; although I should not be able to see you often. But you will see by my last letter, as well as this, that what you desire is impossible; for I am going up into Germany, where it would be impossible for you to follow me; but love me as you now do, and no hurt can come to me. You have by this kindness preserved my quiet, and I believe my life; for till I had this letter, I have been very indifferent of what should become of myself. I have pressed this business of carrying an army into Germany, in order to leave a good name behind me, wishing for nothing else but good success. I shall now add, that of having a long life, that I may be happy with you."

To prevent the restraints derived from the presence of the field deputies, Marlborough had confined his demand of reinforcements to the auxiliaries in the pay of the States. To obviate also the obstructions which might arise from the pretensions of foreign officers, he obtained for his brother the rank of general, with the command of the British infantry; and Overkirk, who had been involved in some dispute with General Churchill, relative to precedence, was left with the Dutch troops, and the remainder of the auxiliaries, to guard the frontier, and secure the conquests of the former campaign.

Having completed all his preparations, he quitted the Hague in the evening of the 5th of May, and proceeded in a yacht to Utrecht. In his progress to the army, he spent a social day at Vorst, the seat of the earl of Albemarle. Here we find that while the fate of Europe hung on his projected expedition, the internal politics of England did not the less occupy his attention. We observe also that the spleen and querulousness which had hitherto marked his correspondence, began to give way to elevated hopes and renewed confidence. He quitted this hospitable mansion at break of day,

on the 7th of May, and hastening his journey by Ruremond, reached Maestricht on the 10th. Here he continued till the 14th, actively employed in assembling and organising the army, superintending the formation of magazines, and pressing the march of the troops to the place of rendezvous. The labours of a single day will suffice to show his activity, both of body and mind. At Ruremond he inspected the construction of a bridge for the passage of the troops over the Meuse; in the morning he reviewed the first line of his army, and the second in the afternoon; in the intervals he not only gave the necessary orders for the troops under his immediate command, but despatched instructions directing the generals posted at Mentz, Rothweil, and the distant parts of Germany, to hold themselves in readiness for taking the field.

Having set the different columns in motion, and left a garrison of six regiments of British infantry and four squadrons of cavalry to secure Maestricht, Marlborough departed on the 16th, and on the 18th reached Bedburg, which had been fixed as the place of rendezvous. Here he found the army assembled under General Churchill, amounting to fifty-one battalions and ninety-two squadrons, including 16,000 English. To these were to be united, in the course of the march, the troops of Prussia, Luneburg, and Hesse, quartered on the Rhine, and the eleven Dutch battalions stationed at Rothweil.*

On the 19th he commenced that celebrated expedition, which was pregnant with such stupendous events. Encamping on the 20th at Kerpen, he received an express from Overkirk, pressing him to halt, because Villeroy, with thirty-six battalions and forty-five squadrons, had quitted the line; crossed the Meuse on the preceding day at Namur, and threatened Huy. At the same moment letters arrived from

* In addition to the letters of the duke, and the printed authorities, we have been aided in describing the operations of this campaign by a very interesting journal, kept by the duke's chaplain, Mr. Hare, afterwards bishop of Chichester. This journal was compiled from personal observations and official documents, and submitted to the inspection of the duke himself, as we learn from a letter written towards the close of the campaign by his secretary, Mr. Cardonel, to secretary Harley, which is preserved in the State Paper Office.

the margrave of Baden and Count Wratislaw, stating that Tallard had made a movement, as if intending to cross the Rhine, and urging him to hasten his march towards the lines of Stolhoffen. Marlborough was not diverted by these applications from the prosecution of his grand design. Conscious that the army of Villeroy would be too much reduced to undertake offensive operations, by the detachments which had already been made towards the Rhine, and those which must follow his own march, he halted only a day to quiet the alarms of Overkirk. To satisfy also the margrave, he ordered the troops of Hompesch and Bulow to draw towards Philipsburg, though with private injunctions not to proceed beyond a certain distance. He even exacted a promise to the same effect from Count Wratislaw, who at this juncture arrived at the camp to attend him during the whole campaign.

On the following day he reached Kalsecken, and began to develop a part of his plan. He wrote to the States expressing his conviction that no danger was to be apprehended on the side of the Netherlands, while his own march so strongly engaged the attention of the enemy. Drawing an argument from the strength of Villeroy, and the probability of his advance to the Moselle, he also pressed for further reinforcements, to save his own army from being overwhelmed by superior numbers, and represented that Overkirk could readily supply the deficiency by drafts from the neighbouring garrisons. The troops having proceeded in their march through Merkheim to Sinzig, where they arrived on the 23d, Marlborough departed to inspect the fortifications of Bonn, as if he designed to establish a place of arms for a campaign on the Moselle. Here he received intelligence that Tallard had passed the Rhine near Brisach on the 12th of May, and after pushing a reinforcement of 10,000 men with a considerable supply of ammunition and stores, through the defiles near Freyburg to join the elector of Bavaria, had resumed his former position in the vicinity of Strasburg. He was apprised also that Villeroy, with the best of his troops, was hastening towards the Moselle.

This intelligence induced Marlborough to renew his appeal to the States for succour, and to accelerate his march to the Danube. On the 25th he advanced with the cavalry,

in the direction of Coblantz, leaving his brother to follow with the infantry and artillery. In his letters we trace the promptitude of his intelligence and the rapidity and combination of his movements. We find him also confidently anticipating success, and testifying the utmost satisfaction, in having already suspended the advance of the elector of Bavaria to Vienna.

At Coblantz his army traversed the Moselle and the Rhine on the 26th of May, while he paid a visit to the elector of Treves at Ehrenbreitstein. Here, as elsewhere, he was received with respect and admiration; every class, from the subject to the sovereign, vied in expressions of gratitude and joy, and his march resembled rather a triumphal procession, than the movement of an army to the conflict. From Coblantz he sent his baggage and artillery up the Rhine to Mentz, and again led the advance with his cavalry. His arrangements were equally adapted to gain time and spare his troops. He moved at the first dawn of the morning, and reached his intended camp before the heat became oppressive, so that the men were as much refreshed by a rest of several hours as by the halt of a day.

From Broubach on the 27th of May he acquainted the king of Prussia with his progress, announced the junction of the French reinforcement with the elector of Bavaria, and earnestly requested a further aid of Prussian troops, to whose bravery he paid a distinguished compliment. He had here the satisfaction of receiving the warmest testimony of gratitude from the imperial court, and of finding that his appeal to the States was zealously seconded by the Dutch generals.

Reaching Cassel, a suburb of Mentz, on the 29th, he halted a day to refresh the cavalry, who were much fatigued by their constant march. In this interval, he was hospitably received at Mentz by the elector, in whose presence the troops were reviewed. The elector was particularly struck with their cleanly and neat appearance, and alluding to an entertainment which was to be given to the officers, observed, "these gentlemen seem to be all dressed for the ball."

Before he marched, Marlborough received information that the States had consented to reinforce his army with

twenty squadrons and eight battalions of Danish auxiliaries. But his satisfaction at this news was counterbalanced by intelligence, that the margrave of Baden had not only suffered the French succours to join the elector of Bavaria without obstruction, but had also neglected a favourable opportunity of defeating the enemy even after the junction.

The elector and Marsin had broken up from their camp at Ulm with 35,000 men, and on the 17th of May drew towards the head of the Danube to receive the expected succours. On their approach, General Thungen, who commanded the German troops between the Danube and the Lake of Constance, withdrew towards Rothweil, where he was joined by the Dutch and a body of Wirtemberg cavalry. On the 14th he was reinforced by the margrave of Bareith and General Stirum, with 14,000 men, from the circle of Franconia.

These generals being thus at the head of 30,000 men, proposed to attack the elector, who was then posted behind Villingen, and would doubtless have prevented the junction of the reinforcements which were then filing through the defiles to the east of Freyburg. At this moment, however, their design was suspended by an order from the margrave of Baden, enjoining them to wait his arrival. Apprised of the enemy's motions, he quitted the lines of Stolhoffen on the 17th, and hastening to the camp at Rothweil, was followed by seven regiments of infantry and one of cavalry. The junction being effected, he on the evening of the 19th approached the electoral camp at Villingen. Unfortunately, the time which had been lost in waiting his arrival, had enabled the French reinforcements to accomplish their passage; and on the 20th the enemy, hastily decamping, withdrew through Huffingen towards Engen.

The enemy being burdened with a long line of carriages, an active general might yet have remedied the mischief of the delay, by seizing the pass of Stochach, which would have cut off their retreat; and as they were totally in want of bread, would have left them no resource except to surrender at discretion. The margrave, indeed, wanted not skill and vigilance to perceive, but activity to seize the advantage. He crossed the Danube at Dutlingen, and advanced to Lepzingen at the same time that the enemy reached Engen, yet in this situation he suffered them to anticipate him at the

pass of Stochach, and after a brisk cannonade they filed off without obstruction to Saulgen. Having thus permitted his prey to escape, the margrave fell back to Mosskirk, and on the 28th of May took up his position at Rietlingen.*

While he remained at Mentz, Marlborough acquainted the landgrave of Hesse with his intention of proceeding farther into Germany to the relief of the emperor, and persuaded that prince to send the artillery which he had provided for the expected operations on the Moselle to Mannheim, that it might be ready for the siege of Landau, or any other enterprise of advantage to the common cause. He also summoned the prince of Hesse, Bulow, and Hompesch to Mentz, to receive the necessary directions for the junction of the forces under their command with the main army. He took measures also for the regular payment of his troops. "I send to-morrow to Francfort," he writes to Godolphin, "to see if I can take up a month's pay for the English, and shall draw the bills on Mr. Sweet; for notwithstanding the continual marching, the men are extremely pleased with this expedition, so that I am sure you will take all the care possible that they may not want."

CHAP. XXII. — COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS, 1704.

THE next point to which Marlborough directed his march was Ladenburg, where he had previously ordered bridges to be constructed for the passage of the Neckar. Here he arrived on the 3d of June. Notwithstanding all the cares which weighed on his mind, and the pomp with which he was surrounded, his thoughts still dwelt on the endearments of home and the society of his family and friends. The duchess having earnestly repeated her request to join him, he replied:—

"*Weinheim, May 22.—June 2.*—I take it extreme kindly that you persist in desiring to come to me; but I am sure when you consider that three days hence will be a month that the troops have been in a continual

* Hare's Journal. — Mémoires de Tallard, *passim*.

march to get hither ; and we shall be a fortnight longer before we shall be able to get to the Danube, so that you could hardly get to me and back again to Holland, before it would be time to return into England. Besides, my dear soul, how could I be at any ease? for if we should not have good success, I could not put you into any place where you would be safe.

“ I am now in a house of the elector palatine, that has a prospect over the finest country that is possible to be seen. I see out of my chamber window the Rhine and the Neckar, and his two principal towns of Mannheim and Heidelberg ; but would be much better pleased with the prospect of St. Alban's, which is not very famous for seeing far.”

To Godolphin he briefly communicates his situation and ulterior views ; in a letter also written from Ladendurg on the 4th of June : —

“ The cannon and infantry being six days' march behind me, and the troops of Luneburg, Holland, and Hesse being in several quarters, I shall halt here to-morrow, to give the necessary orders, and then shall advance towards the Danube, with what troops I have here, leaving the English and cannon to be brought up by my brother, and the Danes by the duke of Wirtemberg. I hope in eight days to meet with Prince Louis and Prince Eugene. I am afraid the first will not go to the Rhine, he being, as I am told, desirous to stay on the Danube. When I see them, you shall be sure to know what we have concerted.

Hitherto his progress had held all Europe in awful anxiety, and had not only suspended the movements of the elector of Bavaria, but had perplexed and confounded the French commanders. As his arrival at Coblenz had spread apprehension of an attack by the Moselle, so his advance to Mentz had seemed to threaten Alsace. His subsequent progress afforded no precise indication of his design ; while the construction of a bridge over the Rhine at Philipsburg, and the advance of the Hessian artillery to Mannheim, seemed preparatory to the siege of Landau. Villeroy, who had followed him from the Meuse, drew an additional reinforcement from Flanders ; while Tallard descended to the Lauter, that they might readily unite their forces to protect Alsace, or create a diversion by an offensive movement into the empire. Their penetration was however baffled, and Tallard, hitherto fertile in projects, was bewildered amidst doubt, difficulty, and conjecture.

With such skill and science had this enterprise been concerted, that at the very moment when it assumed a specific direction, the enemy was no longer enabled to render it abor-

tive. As the march was now to be bent towards the Danube, notice was given for the Prussians, Palatines, and Hessians, who were stationed on the Rhine, to order their march so as to join the main body in its progress. At the same time directions were sent to accelerate the advance of the Danish auxiliaries, who were marching from the Netherlands.

After traversing the Neckar, Marlborough again moved on the 6th of June, and passing through Wisloch, encamped on the 7th at Erpingen, having been joined in the route by several bodies of auxiliaries. At this, as at other periods, he was particularly solicitous to spare the people whom he came to defend. Contrary to the custom of the French and Germans, who subsisted their armies at the expense of the country, he took effectual care that the troops should be regularly paid, and enjoined the treasurer to secure a month's subsistence, and establish ample credit in advance. Similar orders were forwarded to the Danes, who were more likely to commit excesses than the forces under his own immediate inspection. By these precautions he conciliated the inhabitants, and obtained a more regular supply of provisions than could have been extorted by any measure of severity. Sensible also how deeply the soldier feels the attention and sympathy of his general, he wrote to his brother, who had then reached Heidelberg, expressing his concern for the sufferings which the infantry had undergone; and directing the commanding officers of each regiment to make an early provision of shoes and other necessaries, which could not be readily obtained in a hostile country.

With that consummate vigilance which is equally attentive to every point within the sphere of action, he omitted no precaution to baffle the efforts which the French commanders might be prompted to make on the disclosure of his real design. To Godolphin he writes:—

“*May 28.—June 8.*—Having received intelligence yesterday that in three or four days the duke of Villeroy, with his army, would join that of the marshal de Tallard about Landau, in order to force the passage of the Rhine, I prevailed with Count Wratislaw to make all the haste he could to Prince Louis of Baden's army, where he will be this night, that he might make him sensible of the great consequence it is to hinder the French from passing that river, while we are acting against the elector of Bavaria. I have also desired him to press, and not to be refused, that either Prince Louis or Prince Eugene go immediately to the Rhine. I

am in hopes to know to-morrow what resolution they have taken. If I could decide it by my wishes, Prince Eugene should stay on the Danube, although Prince Louis has assured me, by the count de Frise, that he will not make the least motion with his army but as we shall concert. At this time it is agreed that Prince Louis shall act on the Iller, and I on the Danube. If the marshal de Villeroy can be kept on the other side of the Rhine, we must be contented to suffer him to do what he pleases there, whilst we are acting in Bavaria. If we can hinder the junction of more troops to the elector, I hope six weeks after we begin may be sufficient for the reducing of him, or the entire ruining of his country. It will be the 10th of June our style, before the English foot and cannon can join me on the Danube; and if the cannon, which Prince Louis has promised, can be ready, which I much doubt, I shall in two days after the junction march directly to Donawerth. If I can take that place I shall there settle a magazine for the army, at the same time that the other army is to force their passage over the Iller, which Prince Louis thinks himself sure of, that river having several fords."

On the 8th Marlborough moved to Gross Gartach, and the 9th passing the Neckar a second time at Lauffen, advanced the next day to Mondelsheim, where he had the satisfaction to find that Prince Eugene and Count Wratislaw were on their way to visit him. Here these two great generals met for the first time, and conceived for each other that esteem and confidence which afterwards rendered them partners in glory. The next day they marched to Hippach, where Marlborough reviewed his cavalry, in the presence of Eugene. The prince expressed his surprise to find the troops in so excellent a condition, after their long and harassing march. "I have heard much," he said, "of the English cavalry, and find it indeed to be the best appointed and finest I have ever seen. Money, of which you have no want in England, can buy clothes and accoutrements, but nothing can purchase the spirit which I see in the looks of your men. It is an earnest of victory." To so judicious a compliment, Marlborough made a no less flattering reply. "My troops," he observed, "are always animated with zeal for the common cause, but they are now inspired by your presence. To you we owe that spirit which awakens your admiration."

In this camp they halted three days, to give time for the infantry to approach, and settle the future operations.

The Margrave of Baden having detached 9000 Prussians, and three regiments of cavalry, to secure the passage of the

Rhine, joined them on the 13th. On his arrival he said to Marlborough, with perhaps more courtesy than sincerity, "I am come to meet the deliverer of the empire." Alluding to his own recent failure, he added, "You will assist me in vindicating my honour, which has been lowered in the public opinion." Marlborough, on his part, was not deficient in attention to so proud and punctilious a prince: he replied, "I am come to learn of your highness how to save the empire. None but those who are deficient in judgment, can depreciate the merits of the prince of Baden, who has not only preserved the empire, but enlarged its boundaries."

Many conferences were held by the three generals, to settle their respective commands and future plans. In vain Marlborough laboured, both directly and indirectly, to induce the margrave to head the army on the Rhine, and leave Eugene as his colleague on the Danube. The margrave, unwilling to be removed from the most brilliant scene of operation, insisted on the privilege of choice as elder in rank; and it was not without the utmost difficulty, that he consented to share the command by alternate days with the English general. To the mortification both of Eugene and Marlborough, this arrangement was adopted, and the command on the Rhine assigned to Eugene.

The troops again moved early on the 14th, to the small village of Ebersbach; and the three generals, after partaking of an hospitable repast at Great Gartach, repaired to their respective commands. On reaching his camp in the evening, Marlborough found the prince of Hesse, with generals Bulow and Hompesch, attending to apprise him that their respective corps were in the neighbourhood, and ready to march to the appointed rendezvous.

During the course of this arduous expedition, the failures which occurred in distant quarters were sufficient to have diverted a commander less decisive and persevering than Marlborough from his purpose. Scarcely had he ceased to regret the tardiness of the margrave of Baden, in suffering the French reinforcements to join the elector of Bavaria, before intelligence equally unpleasant arrived from the army on the Meuse.

On the departure of the last detachment for Germany, Overkirk was ambitious to signalise his command by an im-

portant enterprise. Being informed that the enemy were moving to Tongres, he broke up from Loon, and gaining the advance by a rapid march, effected an entrance into their deserted lines, on the side of Mierdorp and Wasseige. The enemy were utterly disconcerted by this unexpected movement; but the same opposition which had already defeated the laudable designs of Marlborough, proved no less fatal to those of the Dutch commander. After losing a considerable part of the day in fruitless deliberation, the appearance of a small French detachment was sufficient to alarm his timid colleagues; and he was compelled to relinquish his advantage, at the very moment when his enterprise was likely to be crowned with complete success.

However deeply Marlborough felt this disappointment, he could not but be gratified on comparing his actual situation with that of the preceding year, when he was shackled by the control of Dutch deputies, and harassed by the jealousies of Dutch generals. He, however, announced the failure in terms of regret to secretary Harley, in a few hasty lines dated from Ebersbach, June 15. "I send now to my lord treasurer a relation I have received of the proceedings of our army on the Meuse, by which you will see our friends there have lost a very great opportunity. If they had made a good use of it, we might have found the effects in these parts, and every where else. They are sensible of their error, and I hope will be the more intent to retrieve it."

Measures had been taken to form an army of 30,000 men on the Upper Rhine; but Marlborough was far from being satisfied with the dispositions in that quarter; for, by some mismanagement of Prince Louis, the Prussians, who were to compose part of that force, had been drawn to the Danube, and the Suabian troops, who were destined for the Danube, had been left on the Rhine. Accordingly no less than ten days were wasted in counter-marching at a most critical period of time.

From Ebersbach, which was his headquarters on the 14th and 15th of June, we find an interesting letter to the duchess. He acquaints her with the flattering marks of attention which he had received from the emperor, and communicates an offer, which was now first made, of investing him with a principality of the empire.

“June 4—15. — Since my last,” he observes to the duchess, “I have had Prince Louis with me, so that we have taken the necessary measures for our first motions. Prince Eugene was with me from Monday till Friday, and has in his conversation a great deal of my Lord Shrewsbury; with the advantage of seeming franker. He has been very free with me, in giving me the character of the prince of Baden, by which I find I must be much more on my guard than if I was to act with Prince Eugene.

* * * * *

“When I had writ thus far, Count Wratislaw came to me, having just received an express from his master. After very great expressions it ended in saying that his master was desirous to write to the queen, that he might have her consent to makeme a prince of the empire, which he would do by creating some land he has in the empire into a principality, which would give me the privilege of being in the college, or diet, with the sovereign princes of the empire. You know I am not good at compliments; however, I did assure him that I was very sensible of the honour his master intended me, but in my opinion nothing of this ought to be thought on till we saw what would be the fate of the war. He replied, that what already had been done, had laid obligations on his master above what he could express, and that if the queen would not allow him to do this, he must appear ungrateful to the world, for he had nothing else in his power worth giving, or my taking. What is offered will in history for ever remain an honour to my family. But I wish myself so well that I hope I shall never want the income of the land, which no doubt will be but little, nor enjoy the privilege of German assemblies. However, this is the utmost expression that they can make, and therefore ought to be taken as it is meant.

“I know you wish the queen and me so well, that you would be glad that nothing should be done that might do either of us hurt. Therefore my opinion of this matter is, that there can be no inconvenience in allowing Count Wratislaw’s master to write to the queen to ask her consent for the doing this, and then to bring the letter to the cabinet council. In the mean time I shall take care with Count Wratislaw, that no further step be made till I know the queen’s pleasure, and the opinion of lord treasurer.”

He had now reached the most critical point, as well as the most anxious period, of his long and difficult march. Before him stretched the range of mountains skirting the country watered by the Danube, which was intersected by the narrow pass of Gieslingen. This defile, which extended two miles in length, could scarcely be traversed by a large body of troops in less than a day, during the most favourable season of the year. At this moment the operation was rendered still more difficult by a series of heavy rains, which had broken up the roads and swollen the rivulets into torrents. New cares and more extensive combinations were

required on entering the real scene of action, and measures were to be taken for securing the junction with Prince Louis, as soon as the army should descend into the plains. To add to the disquietude of the commander, the States-general were alarmed by reports that Villeroy was returning to the Netherlands, and earnestly reclaimed a part of the auxiliary forces. News also arrived that Villeroy and Tallard had held a conference at Landau, on the 13th, which seemed to portend some enterprise of moment, and that the elector of Bavaria, after sending his baggage to Ulm, was pushing his army across the Danube, as if meditating an attack on Prince Louis.

But the powerful mind of Marlborough seemed to gather strength and resources even from difficulty and peril. To tranquillise the States, he sent orders for the collection of a sufficient number of boats to facilitate the return of a large body of troops down the Rhine. He employed the interval of his halt in directing the formation of magazines at Heidelberg and Nordlingen. He also enjoined the Danish foot, who had reached Frankfort, to direct their march towards Stolhoffen, and place themselves at the disposition of Eugene; and having pressed his brother, who had arrived with the infantry at Blockingen, to hasten his progress, he prepared to lead forward the cavalry and auxiliaries to the aid of Prince Louis.

On the 20th he received the long-expected intelligence that the German army was on the point of advancing to Westerstetten. The heavy baggage was instantly directed to move, under a strong escort, that it might not embarrass the passage of the troops. The whole army gradually traversed the defile without obstruction, and on the 22d the camp was established, between Launsheim and Ursprung, the right joining the left of prince Louis, who, in the interim, had taken his position near Westerstetten.

The following day was spent in reviewing the troops and forming a new line of battle. On the 24th, the confederates advancing to Elchingen and Langenau, in the vicinity of the Danube, the elector of Bavaria withdrew from his post at Ulm, and retired to the strong intrenched camp between Lawingen and Dillingen. The 25th the headquarters of Marlborough were established at Langenau. On the 26th

the confederates again moved and took post between Herbrechten and Giengen, with the Brentz in front, two leagues from the enemy. On the following day General Churchill arrived with the foot and artillery, and two battalions of Prussian infantry, who had joined him in his march. Marlborough reviewed them as they passed to take their post in the lines, and was highly gratified to observe that their recent fatigues had not affected their gallant air and healthy appearance. The junction of all the forces being now complete, except that of the Danish horse, under the duke of Wirtemberg, the combined army amounted to 96 battalions and 202 squadrons, with a train of 48 pieces of artillery, and 24 pontoons.

We here insert a letter to his wife, which not only displays the feelings of our great commander at this trying crisis, but indicates that ardent conjugal affection, and keen sensibility to public censure, which pervades his correspondence. It shows also that singular facility with which he could bend his attention to trifles even in the midst of the most serious occupations.

“*Giengen, June 18–29.* — Since my last, I have had the happiness of receiving yours of the 30th of the last month, and the 1st and 2d of this. It is not only by yours, but by others, that I find that there are several people, who would be glad of my not having success in this undertaking. I am very confident, without flattering myself, that it is the only thing that was capable of saving us from ruin, so that whatever the success may be, I shall have the inward satisfaction to know that I have done all that was in my power, and that none can be angry with me for the undertaking, but such as wish ill to their country and their religion, and with such I am not desirous of their friendship.

“The English foot and cannon joined me two days ago, but I do not expect the Danish horse till six or seven days hence, till which time we shall not be able to act against the elector of Bavaria, as I could wish. You will easily believe that I act with all my heart and soul, since good success will in all likelihood give me the happiness of ending my days with you. The queen’s allowing you to say something from her is very obliging. I shall endeavour to deserve it; for I serve her with all my heart, and I am very confident she will always have the prayers and good wishes of this country.

“You have forgot to order Hodges to send me a draught of a stable, as I directed him, for the lodge; for it ought not to be made use of till the year after it is built; and as I see you set your heart on that place, I should be glad all conveniences were about it.”

CHAP. XXIII.—BATTLE OF THE SCHELLENBERG.—1704.

THE advance of the confederates towards the camp of the enemy indicated the development of the plan to secure Donawerth as a place of arms for the invasion of Bavaria. The Gallo-Bavarian army occupied a formidable position between Lawingen and Dillingen, with the Danube in the rear, and the front strongly fortified and covered with inundations. To secure the passage leading through Donawerth, the elector detached General d'Arco, with 10,000 infantry and 2500 cavalry, to occupy the Schellenberg, a commanding height north of the Danube. By this skilful disposition, he hoped to cover his own dominions, and hold the confederates in check, till he could receive the additional reinforcements which he expected from France.

Marlborough penetrated the design, and became doubly anxious to realise his plan. After a conference with the margrave, he extorted his consent to advance with the army, and resolved to profit by the alternation of the command on the ensuing day, to attack the troops on the Schellenberg, before they could be still farther strengthened. On the first of July, therefore, the whole army, under the direction of the margrave, defiled before the electoral camp, the avenues of which were watched by General Bulow, with a body of cavalry. Directing their march towards Donawerth, the confederates encamped in the evening, between Amerdingen and Onderingen, about fourteen miles from the foot of the Schellenberg.

So bold an enterprise as that which Marlborough prepared to execute might have daunted a spirit less determined and persevering. He had yet a long march to make, encumbered with a heavy train of artillery, and over roads drenched by incessant rains. With these disadvantages, he was to attack a position of formidable strength, and defended by an ample force. He was conscious, however, that if he failed to accomplish his purpose, while invested with the temporary command, the ensuing day would be wasted by his colleague in deliberation, and that a delay of twenty-four hours would enable the enemy to receive reinforcements and mature

their measures of defence. To those who suggested their fears or doubts, he replied, "Either the enemy will escape or will have time to finish their works. In the latter case, the delay of every single hour will cost the loss of a thousand men."

After another conference with the margrave, Marlborough with his usual humanity gave orders to establish an hospital for the wounded at Nordlingen. He also selected a detachment of 130 men from each battalion, amounting to 6000 foot and thirty squadrons of horse, to which were added three regiments of imperial grenadiers, furnished by Prince Louis. This detachment was to precede the army, and commence the attack. Measures were also taken for opening the roads and throwing bridges across the Wernitz, a deep and rapid stream which flows into the Danube about a mile from the foot of the Schellenberg.

Such being the preparatory arrangements of the evening, the detachment moved at three in the morning on the 2d of July, under the direction of the duke himself, and at five was followed by the army, which filed by the left in two columns along the main road, leading through Roerbach towards a height between Obermorgen and Weinstein. At the same time the baggage and artillery, in two columns, took the route through Monachdeckingen to Harburg on the Wernitz, where it was to wait for farther orders.

About eight the advance with the quarter-master-general came in sight of the Schellenberg. They halted at Obermorgen, and immediately began to mark out a camp for the army on the left bank of the Wernitz.

At nine Marlborough himself reached the spot; accompanied by the officers who were to command in the attack, he proceeded to reconnoitre the enemy's position, and being observed, was saluted with a heavy cannonade from different points of their works.

The Schellenberg is a height overhanging Donawerth and the left bank of the Danube. It rises in a gradual though unequal ascent, which at the intended point of attack was about a quarter of a mile. The summit forms a flat space, half a mile wide, on which the enemy were encamped in several lines. Their left was supported on the covert way of Donawerth, and their order being adapted to the figure of

the ground, their right was thrown back on one of the channels into which the Danube is divided. Along the front was an intrenchment, which ran from the covert way of Donawerth, was connected with an old fort on the brow of the hill above, and embracing the summit descended on the opposite flank to the very bank of the river. Of this work the central part alone was in a state of defence, but the remainder was in a rapid progress of advancement. In front of the position to the right and left was open ground, that on the side of Donawerth being mostly uneven, broken by a ravine, and washed by a rivulet, which after skirting the foot of the hill, flows through the exterior works of Donawerth into the Danube. Opposite the centre, the Boschberg, a thick wood stretched from the verge of the intrenchment, and gradually expanded itself to the border of a stream rising above Monheim. To the west of the Schellenberg ran the great road leading from Nordlingen, through Donawerth, to Augsburg.

The enemy had planted two batteries, one near the old fort, the other near the point of the Boschberg. On the approach of the allied detachment, their out-posts set fire to the hamlet of Berg, situated on a gentle elevation beyond the rivulet, and drew back towards the main body.

Marlborough attentively noted the disposition of the enemy as well as the local peculiarities, and directing his view across the Danube, descried a camp marked out, with tents pitched on each wing.

It was occupied by a detachment of cavalry from the electoral army, and he afterwards found that the interval was reserved for a body of foot then on their march. Their object was to support and reinforce the troops on the Schellenberg.

Having completed his survey, he returned to meet the advanced detachment, which from the bad state of the roads did not reach the Wernitz till mid-day. After a short halt, to give rest to the troops and allow the army to approach, the detachment crossed the Wernitz at three, over the stone bridge at Obermorgen. Pontoon bridges were at the same time thrown across the stream below, and some squadrons of cavalry were sent into the Boschberg to form fascines, for the purpose of facilitating an entrance into the enemy's works:

In the midst of these preparations a messenger arrived from Eugene with the news that Villeroi and Tallard were then at Strasburg, making arrangements for detaching a powerful reinforcement to the elector. Incited by this intelligence, Marlborough did not even wait for the arrival of the imperialists, who were yet in the rear, but issued orders for the attack. The infantry destined for the enterprise being instantly in motion, Marlborough himself led them to the verge of the Boschberg, ranged them in four lines, and drew from the main body eight new battalions, who were either to act as a reserve, or prolong the attack to the right, if the first detachment did not embrace a sufficient extent of the enemy's line. Eight other battalions were ordered forward to sustain them, and the cavalry formed two lines in the rear. A battery was opened by the English beyond the houses of Berg; and soon afterwards the fire was increased by several pieces of German artillery.

The command of the attack was consigned to the Dutch general Goor, and the first line was led by Brigadier Ferguson. The whole was preceded by a forlorn hope of fifty chosen grenadiers under Lord Mordaunt, whose chivalrous spirit panted for distinction in so perilous an encounter.

The promptitude and decision of Marlborough confounded the Gallo-Bavarian commanders. On the first appearance of the allies, d'Arco, and Maffei his colleague, advanced beyond their outposts to reconnoitre; and despying only some scattered parties of cavalry on the heights beyond the Wernitz, they at first considered them as mere detachments sent out to explore the country. Perceiving, however, fresh squadrons emerge from the woods, and the body increase without advancing, they concluded that a camp was forming on the spot, and returned to Donawerth to dine, without the slightest prognostic of the impending attack. Scarcely had they sat down to table, before intelligence arrived which indicated the approach of the allied army. The two generals remounted their horses, and riding to the heights, were surprised to observe the opposite hills covered with troops, and columns filing over the Wernitz, or ascending the foot of the Schellenberg. Still they did not imagine that an army, fatigued by a tedious and difficult march, would hazard an attack towards the close of the day. Supposing that the

allies would spend the remainder of the evening in preparation, they hastened the progress of the works, hoping in the night to complete their defences, and draw in the expected reinforcements.

General d'Arco, however, did not contemplate his situation with confidence or tranquillity. He surveyed the increasing mass of the allies in anxious silence, and for a considerable period seemed absorbed in doubt and perturbation. It is the opinion of Maffei that he was alarmed by the imperfect state of his intrenchments, and hesitated whether he should defend or abandon the post committed to his care. At length the advance and development of the allied columns, and the thunder of the artillery, roused him from his reflections. He ordered his troops to desist from work, and resume their arms, and made dispositions for a vigorous resistance.

Within a few minutes the conflict began. Marlborough at first intended to penetrate through the Boschberg, and form a double attack against both faces of the intrenchment; but this design being frustrated by the thickness of the wood, the principal effort was made on the portion stretching from the fort to the point of the Boschberg. At six in the evening the signal was given, and the assailants advanced with a firm and deliberate step under a heavy fire from every point of the enemy's works commanding the line of their approach. When they arrived within the range of grape, the carnage became dreadful: General Goor, and many brave officers fell, and a momentary pause ensued. Order was speedily restored: other leaders supplied the places of the killed and disabled, and the assailants again moved forward with incredible firmness. On reaching the ravine, the foremost troops mistook it for the ditch of the intrenchment, and threw in their fascines; but being unable to pass, and the fire of the enemy increasing in vivacity and effect, they began to give way. The Gallo-Bavarians took advantage of the confusion, rushed from their works, and charged the broken ranks with the bayonet. They were repulsed principally by a battalion of English guards, who had almost singly maintained their ground, although most of the officers were either killed or wounded.

The assailants, however, continued to draw near the foot of the works; but the enemy, who had at first distributed

their force along their whole front, recalled their troops from the right and left to the principal point of attack. By this combined effort their resistance was vigorous and obstinate, and sallying forth from the trenches they more than once became the assailants. Exhausted by repeated struggles, and thinned by a destructive fire, the allied infantry began once more to give way, when General Lumley, with equal gallantry and decision, led forward the horse, closed up his ranks to sustain the discouraged and suffering troops, and by his example and support prevented a repulse.

However heavy the loss of the allies, the strength of the enemy was equally shaken by this protracted conflict. The accidental explosion of some powder which had been brought forward for distribution, spread a sudden panic; and though the troops were led back to their posts, their numbers were rapidly diminished, and their spirits sunk under an assault which was continually renewed. At length the English and Dutch were on the point of breaking into the intrenchment, when they were cheered by the advance of the imperialists, led forward by the margrave in person. These troops, passing the Wernitz below Berg, to prolong the attack on the right, drew up under the walls of Donawerth, with little annoyance from the scattered fire of two Bavarian battalions, who were unskilfully posted on the ramparts, instead of lining the covert way. Advancing against the unfinished portion of the works between the fort and the town, they easily dispersed two French battalions left on the spot. The infantry experienced a trifling check from a charge of French cavalry; but the horse rushing forward repulsed the assailants, while the foot wheeling to the left, bore on the flank of the troops engaged with the English and Dutch.

While the attention of the enemy was thus called to another quarter, the final effort was made at the principal attack. The regiment of dragoons, commanded by Lord John Hay, dismounted to aid the infantry, but before they could scale the intrenchment, the Gallo-Bavarians disbanding, fled in the utmost disorder, some towards the village of Zirichsheim, some towards the bridge on the Danube, and others towards Donawerth.

Marlborough, who had greatly exposed his person in the conflict, and given his orders with his usual calmness, en-

tered the works at the head of the first squadrons. He recalled the foot, who were in pursuit of the fugitives, and ordered the horse to charge and complete the victory. The route and carnage which ensued may be more easily conceived than described. Many were intercepted in their way to Donawerth, while many, hurrying to the bridge, broke it down by their weight, and were lost in the Danube. Others, dispersing on every side, came in as deserters to the victorious army. D'Arco himself escaped with difficulty, and his son was among those who perished in the river. Of the whole body only 3000 men rejoined the elector; sixteen pieces of artillery and all the tents were taken; the equipage and plate of the commander fell into the hands of the victorious soldiery.

In this desperate conflict the allies had no less than 1500 killed, and 4000 wounded, and their loss was particularly heavy in officers; the killed amounting to eight generals, eleven colonels, and twenty-six captains. Besides General Goor, the Dutch general Beinheim was among the slain; the prince of Bevern and Count Stirum were mortally wounded, and the margrave of Baden himself received a contusion in his foot. Marlborough particularly regretted the fate of Goor, who to great military talents and bravery added equal zeal and integrity, and had rendered himself eminently useful during the preceding operations.

Scarcely was the conflict terminated before the night set in with a heavy rain. The duke paid particular attention to the state of the wounded, whose sufferings were greatly aggravated by this unfavourable change of weather. He then left a considerable body of troops to maintain possession of the intrenchments, and withdrawing with the remainder to the camp on the Wernitz, took up his quarters at Obermorgen.

At the close of the engagement he despatched an official account to Secretary Harley, and in a short letter respectfully notified his victory to the queen.

“I most humbly presume to inform your majesty, that the success of our first attack of the enemy has been equal to the justice of the cause your majesty has so graciously and zealously espoused. Mr. Secretary Harley will have the honour to lay the relation of yesterday's action before you. To which I shall crave leave to add, that our success is in a

great measure owing to the particular blessing of God, and the unparalleled bravery of your troops. I shall endeavour to improve the happy beginning to your majesty's glory, and the benefit of your allies."

But it is his private correspondence with Lord Godolphin and the duchess, written on the day after the victory, which best exhibits his views and feelings in the moment of victory. "You will see," he writes to Godolphin, "by Mr. Secretary Harley's letter, that in our last camp I took the resolution of attacking the Bavarians that were posted on the Schellenberg, which I did yesterday. It is a hill that commands the town of Donawerth, which passage on the Danube is what would be very advantageous to us, for I would make the magazine for our army there. If we had the cannon ready, we could not fail of taking it; but our misfortune is, that all things are wanting here; but Prince Louis assures me that we shall have twenty pieces of battery here in four days, which I am afraid is impossible. Our English foot have lost a great many, the heat of the action being on our left. I must refer you to Mr. Secretary's letter for such particulars as I am unable to write at this time. I am not able to do more than to thank you for three of yours, which I have received since my last letter, being so tired that I can hardly hold my pen; so that till the next post I must take my leave."

To the duchess he feelingly observes:—"I think myself so happy in my dearest soul's love, that I know she will be better pleased with two lines that I am well after the action we had yesterday, than with whole volumes on another occasion. It has pleased God, after a very obstinate defence, to have given us the victory, by which we have ruined the best of the elector's foot, for there was very little horse. My lord treasurer will let you see Mr. Secretary Harley's letter, if you care to see what the action was. The English foot have suffered a good deal; but none of your acquaintance are hurt, except Mr. Meredith and Major-general Wood, neither in danger. Now that I have told you the good, I must tell you the ill news, which is, that the marshal de Villeroy has promised the elector of Bavaria that he will send him, by way of the Black Forest, 50 battalions of foot, and 60 squadrons of horse, as he tells him in his letter, the best troops of France, which would make him

stronger than we. But I rely very much on the assurances Prince Eugene gave me yesterday by his adjutant-general; that he would venture the whole, rather than suffer them to pass quietly, as the last did. Let my dear children know I am well."

The successful result of this action contributed to aggravate the misunderstanding which had already arisen from the discordant characters of the two commanders. Although the plan had been formed by Marlborough, and although it would never have been executed by his colleague, yet as the margrave first entered the intrenchment, his partisans ascribed to him the chief honour of the victory. From the army this feud spread into Holland, where the faction which had already laboured to depreciate the talents of Marlborough, seized this plea to diminish the merit of his services, by striking a medal, representing on one side the head of the margrave, and on the other the lines of Schellenberg, with the motto "*Hoste cæso, fugato, castris direptis,*" &c., without any allusion to the skill and energy of the British commander. On the other hand, Marlborough in all his letters speaks with dislike, if not contempt, of his colleague; and the official gazette only mentions him incidentally among the superior officers who were wounded.

The dissatisfaction between the two chiefs hourly gained strength. In many of Marlborough's letters we find heavy accusations against the inertness of the margrave, and complaints that he was shackled in all his designs by the captious and jealous spirit of his colleague. The German commander was doubtless not wanting in recriminations; and his adherents depicted Marlborough as arrogant, suspicious, repulsive, and as boasting that "he had marched into Germany, to give spirit to the natives and spurs to the French."

The British general, however, was consoled for these petty efforts of impotent malice by the general applause of the public. The terror of his arms was not merely felt in France, but extended to those states who favoured the Bourbon cause in Italy. In a congratulatory letter, written on this occasion, the duke of Shrewsbury, who was then at home, observes:— "I will not suspend your time with politic reflections, which you can make much better than I, but must tell you that in this holy, ignorant city they have an idea of you as of a

Tamerlane; and had I a picture of old Colonel Birch with his whiskers, I could put it off for yours; and change it for one done by Raphael."

At Vienna the benefit of his services was acknowledged with transports of gratitude. The victory of Schellenberg was hailed as the token of deliverance from the ruin which impended over the house of Austria. Every tongue was lavish in praising the bravery of the English troops, the generous aid of the queen, and the zeal and conduct of the illustrious commander. "The whole court," to use the language of Mr. Stepney, "is quite changed, and the young king of the Romans, even on his way to chapel, broke through the severe rules of Austrian etiquette, to testify his exultation to the British minister."

The cold and phlegmatic Leopold, also, who had scrupled to lay aside the formalities of state in thanking the gallant Sobieski for the deliverance of Vienna, was roused to an unusual transport, and wrote to the victorious chief a letter of congratulation in his own hand, an honour rarely conferred except on sovereign princes. After thanking him for his care and diligence in bringing forward the succours furnished by the queen, he continues:—"Nothing can be more glorious than the celerity and vigour with which, after the junction of your army and mine, you forced the camp of the enemy at Donawerth; since my generals and ministers declare that the success of the enterprise, which is most acceptable and opportune to me, was chiefly owing to your counsel, prudence, and conduct, as well as to the bravery of the troops who fought under your command." Having declared that he would omit no opportunity of rewarding his merits, and testified his hopes of farther success, he concludes:—"This will be an eternal trophy to your most serene queen in Upper Germany, whither the victorious arms of the English nation have never penetrated since the memory of man."

CHAP. XXIV.—TREATMENT OF BAVARIA.—1704.

MARLBOROUGH expected that the enemy would defend Donawerth to the last extremity, but his apprehensions

proved groundless. For the elector, after witnessing the defeat of his troops from the farther bank of the Lech, hastily rejoined the army, and commenced his retreat towards Augsburg, in which position he hoped to impede the operations of the confederates, at the same time that he preserved the communications which would enable him to receive succours from France. As the possession of Donawerth was inconsistent with this system of defence, he directed the garrison to withdraw, after setting fire to the magazines and bridge. But they were not sufficiently prompt in the execution of this order; for the confederates entered the town at the moment of their retreat, and extinguished the conflagration before it had produced the intended effect.

Bridges having been prepared, the army traversed the Danube in five columns on the 5th of July, and seized the greater part of the pontoons belonging to the enemy, together with a considerable quantity of meal, which had been abandoned in the confusion of the retreat. On the following day the confederates advanced as far as Heischeim, and took post between the Zusam and the Schmutter. At the same time the Danish horse arriving, were incorporated in the line of battle; and thus the whole army, which had marched in so many different divisions, was united without the loss of a single corps. Preparations were made to cross the Lech, which would bring them into the heart of the elector's country. The marshals de Villeroy and Tallard had separated; the latter to join the elector of Bavaria, and the duke de Villeroy to act on the Rhine.

As the Lech was deep, broad, and rapid, and the enemy had taken the precaution of destroying the bridges, considerable attention was necessary to secure a passage. Colonel Cadogan having selected a proper point near Gunderkingen, was supported by a detachment of 4000 men and 12 pieces of cannon, while laying the pontoons. This operation was effected on the 7th; and the same evening the sustaining corps, with an additional force of 6000 men, took post on the opposite bank. The views of the confederates being thus developed, the Bavarian garrison of Neuburg retired to Ingoldstadt: the place was immediately occupied by a body of horse; and a detachment of 3000 men, which had been left on the other side of the Danube, under the imperial general

d'Herbeville, was ordered to advance and secure so important a point of communication.

As the elector, by halting at Augsburg, had now evinced his design of sacrificing all other considerations, for the sake of the succour expected from France, a resolution was taken to turn the tide of war into his unfortunate country. The confederates accordingly moved on the 8th to Gunderkingen, and passing the Lech during the following day, encamped on the 10th between Stauda and Mittelstetten. According to the order of battle, their force amounted to 73 battalions and 174 squadrons.

Information of these proceedings was transmitted to Godolphin.

“*July 9.* — You will see by my letter to Mr. Secretary Harley, that the enemy has not recovered the great blow they received at the Schellenberg; for their consternation is yet such, that as soon as they knew our bridges were made over the Lech, they immediately quitted Neuburg, so that yesterday we sent dragoons for securing the town, till M. d'Herbeville advances with 3000 men under his command; for this place is of very great consequence, since this town will make it easy for us to have all our provisions for the subsistence of the army from the circle of Franconia.

“We shall to-morrow have all the army in the elector's country, so that if he will ever think of terms it must be now, for we shall do our utmost to ruin his country. The only hope the enemy seem to have, is the reinforcement the marshal de Villeroy has promised them: and that they may gain time for the junction, they are strongly encamped at Augsburg, by which they abandon the greatest part of the elector's country.

“We have heard nothing of Prince Eugene since the 5th, so that we take it for granted that the marshal de Tallard has not pursued his march, which he began the 2d of this month; and I cannot but be of the opinion, that if he has a true account of what has passed at the Schellenberg, he will be desirous of having fresh orders from court before he advances farther.”

Though unable to oppose, the elector endeavoured to retard the progress of the confederates, by throwing a garrison of 400 men into Rain. It therefore became necessary to reduce a place, which in their farther advance would intercept their line of communication. With this view the army made a short march to Purkheim; and the heavy artillery being brought up, an attack was opened in form on the 13th by the count de Frise, who had been previously detached with a force of nine battalions and fifteen squadrons. Dur-

ing the halt occasioned by this operation, the most strenuous exertions were made in collecting magazines, and establishing communications across the Danube and Lech. A reinforcement of thirty squadrons was also despatched to Eugene, with the hope of impeding the advance of the French reinforcements.

Neither labours nor anxiety could, however, divert the cares of Marlborough from those who shared his tenderness. From Purkheim, we find him conveying consolation to the duchess, for the loss of their son, in a style of peculiar delicacy and affection.

“*July 13.* — Since my last I have had the happiness of yours of the 13th and 16th of last month, and am very sorry to see that you have had a return of the illness that I saw you have once at St. Alban’s. I conjure you not to neglect taking advice and doing what may be proper for preventing it in future; for if you will make me happy now, you must live long, and not have melancholy thoughts of what is passed; for I do assure you I place all my hopes in ending my days quietly with you, and to be contented with the children that it has pleased God to continue to us.

“My blood is so heated, that I have had for the last three days a violent head-ache; but not having stirred out of my chamber this day, I find myself much easier, so that I hope to-morrow morning to be very well. Lord Treasurer will let you know all the news that I have writ to Mr. Secretary Harley. Pray tell my dear children, that I hope in ten days’ time to have so much leisure as to write to them. I hope in God my next will tell you I am quite well.”

The garrison of Rain having surrendered on the 16th, the army resumed its march on the following day, encamping with the right at Holtz, and the left at Oesterhausen. The 18th they advanced to Aicha, where after some hesitation they were admitted by the inhabitants. On the 19th they proceeded towards Friedberg, of which the garrison did not venture to wait their nearer approach, retiring with great precipitation to their camp, on the other side of the Lech, close to Augsburg.

Rapid as these movements may appear, the progress of the confederates was not sufficiently rapid to satisfy the aspiring views of the British commander. With that promptitude of decision which marked his conduct, he entertained sanguine hopes of reducing Munich before the elector could recover from his consternation, and with the capital to secure

the conquest of all Bavaria. But here, as elsewhere, it was his misfortune to be restrained in his extensive designs by the want of means ; for he was unable to obtain the artillery and stores which had been promised by the margrave of Baden for the siege.

The consternation which the victory of Schellenberg produced in the Bavarian army was deep and universal ; but on the elector himself, though a prince of the highest spirit and bravery, the blow fell with accumulated effect. He lost that gaiety and affability which had hitherto given animation to his troops ; and in discoursing on the catastrophe, the tears ran down his cheeks as he adverted to the fate of his favourite regiments. In this disposition, hope was entertained that he would submit to such terms as might save his country from the horrors of military execution. Accordingly a negotiation, which was commenced before the engagement by Marlborough, and broken off in consequence of the exorbitant demands made by the elector, was resumed. The consent of the emperor was with difficulty extorted, and the necessary powers and instructions were confided to Count Wratislaw, while the interests of the elector were managed by M. Reichardt, one of his secretaries. During the recent movements of the army, several communications had taken place ; and the conditions were at length so far arranged, that the elector promised to meet the Austrian plenipotentiary on the 25th of July, and ratify the articles which had been concluded by his agent. The terms were neither dishonourable to his character, nor insulting to his feelings : he was to obtain the restoration of his dominions, and a subsidy of 200,000 crowns, to furnish 12,000 men for the service of the emperor.

The hope of a satisfactory arrangement was, however, of short duration. The elector, who had yielded to the first shock, was encouraged to persevere, by the advance of the reinforcements under Tallard. Instead, therefore, of fulfilling his promise to meet the Austrian plenipotentiary, and conclude the treaty, he sent his secretary to the appointed place with a message, announcing that since the French general was approaching to his succour with an army of 35,000 men, it was neither in his power, nor consistent with his honour, to desert an ally who made such efforts in his

behalf. The confederates had now no other alternative, than to visit the offences of the prince on his unfortunate subjects. Numerous villages were burnt or destroyed, and the whole country was given up to military execution, as far as the vicinity of Munich. But although Marlborough was thus compelled to fulfil the most unwelcome duty which can fall to a general, his private correspondence shows that he felt as a man, and deplored the sad necessity to which he was reduced. In one of his letters to the duchess, he observes:—

“*July 30.* — The succours which the elector expects on Sunday, have given him so much resolution, that he has no thoughts of peace. However, we are in his country, and he will find it difficult to persuade us to quit it. We sent this morning 3000 horse to his chief city of Munich, with orders to burn and destroy all the country about it. This is so contrary to my nature, that nothing but absolute necessity could have obliged me to consent to it, for these poor people suffer for their master’s ambition. There having been no war in this country for above sixty years, these towns and villages are so clean, that you would be pleased with them.”

In another he says,—

“You will, I hope, believe me, that my nature suffers when I see so many fine places burnt, and that must be burnt, if the elector will not hinder it. I shall never be easy and happy till I am quiet with you.”

At this period Count Wratislaw renewed the offer of the emperor to reward the services of Marlborough with a principality of the empire; but he made no other answer, than that he was very sensible of the honour the emperor intended him, but that the queen’s pleasure must govern him in this, as in all things else. Before, however, the answer of the queen could reach the army, Marlborough had acquired a new and higher title to this honourable distinction.

CHAP. XXV. — PASSAGE OF THE DANUBE. — 1704.

MEANWHILE the movements of the enemy created new embarrassments, and called forth the vigilance and resources of the British commander. Marshal Tallard, after losing five

days in a fruitless attempt on Villingen, forded the Danube at Mosskirk, and emerged into the plains between Ulm, Biberach, and Memmingen. Leaving Ulm to the north-west, he made a rapid march through Weissenhorn towards the Schmutter; and at Biberbach came in communication with the electoral army, which had continued to maintain the position of Augsburg.

Prince Eugene, who had made a parallel march from the Rhine with a force of 18,000 men, reached the plains of Hochstadt about the same time that the enemy effected their junction. The two confederate armies were thus too distant to afford mutual assistance; and might have been overwhelmed by superior numbers, had the enemy united and made a rapid movement against either before they could come in contact. Their union was, however, by no means easy to be accomplished. If Eugene attempted to join the confederates in Bavaria, the Gallo-Bavarians, by a retrograde march, might have crossed the Danube, and interrupted the communication with Franconia and Wirtemberg. If Marlborough and the margrave retraced their steps, to unite with Eugene, the enemy, by traversing the Lech, might have regained possession of Bavaria, and perhaps have forced them to abandon all the country south of the Danube.

So critical a situation required the most accurate combinations, and no less decision than activity; for at the same time that the confederate generals were to guard against the enterprises of an enemy occupying a central position, it was necessary to take measures for a speedy junction of the two armies on either bank of the Danube.

Marlborough and the margrave accordingly broke up from Friedberg, moved by Aicha towards Neuburg, and on the 6th of August encamped on the Paar, near Schrobenshausen. At this awful crisis Eugene himself repaired to the quarters of Marlborough, to concert their future operations. As they could not maintain their footing in Bavaria, without the possession of Ingoldstadt, the margrave was readily persuaded to undertake the siege of a fortress which had hitherto never opened its gates to a conqueror. A double object was thus gained; for besides the advantage to be derived from the reduction of so valuable a post, Marlborough

and Eugene would be delivered from the presence of a colleague, whose captious and unaccommodating temper was likely to clog their movements. The 7th was spent in reconnoitring the ground between the Paar and the Lech, for a strong defensive position, and in making arrangements with the margrave for the intended siege. On the ensuing day the army proceeded to Sandizel and Pottiness, from whence they could anticipate the expected movements of the enemy, either by advancing to Neuburg, or approaching the bridges laid near the conflux of the Lech and the Danube. On the 9th, the margrave, with twenty-three battalions and thirty-one squadrons, departed for Ingoldstadt; and reports that the Gallo-Bavarians had united and were marching towards the Danube, induced Marlborough to advance to Exheim. Here Prince Eugene took his leave, to rejoin his own army; but scarcely had two hours elapsed, before he hurried back to apprise his colleague that the enemy were in full march towards Dillingen. This movement left no doubt of their intention to pass to the farther bank of the Danube, and overwhelm the small force left in the plains of Hochstadt. The troops of Eugene accordingly fell back to the Kessel, and the whole activity of Marlborough was employed to gain the other side of the Danube before the enemy could effect their purpose.

This, however, was an arduous operation; for, besides the length of the march, the troops had to traverse the Aicha, the Lech, the Danube, and the Wernitz, all of which had been swollen by the late rains. It was, nevertheless, effected with his usual rapidity and success. At midnight of the 9th the duke of Wirtemberg was detached at the head of twenty-eight squadrons, with orders to traverse a pontoon bridge over the Danube, at Merxheim, and join the cavalry of Eugene. Soon afterwards General Churchill was sent with twenty battalions, accompanied by the artillery and baggage, to pass at the same point, and wait on the left bank for further directions. The 10th, in the morning, Marlborough broke up with the main body, and at sunset pitched his camp between Middlestadt and Peuchingen, with Rain in the front, and took up his quarters in the abbey of Nieder Schonfeldt, near the bridge leading to Merxheim. To quiet the alarms of the margrave, he promised to cover the siege of Ingoldstadt; and at the same time requested him to

relieve a brigade posted at Neuburg, that it might rejoin the army.

While waiting for intelligence, he beguiled the anxious hours by writing an affectionate letter to the duchess, and imparting his situation and designs to Godolphin and Harley. We shall not advert to the despatch addressed to the secretary, which has been already published, but shall introduce his confidential communication to Godolphin.

“*Nieder Schönfeldt, August 10.*—By this post you will know that the elector and the two marshals are marched with their whole army towards Lawingen, where they intend to pass the Danube, by which they abandon the whole country of Bavaria to Prince Louis, having left only garrisons in Munich and Augsburg.

“I have this day ordered twenty-eight squadrons and twenty battalions of foot to pass the Danube, for reinforcing Prince Eugene’s army at Donawerth, and have given the necessary orders that I may follow with the whole army, as soon as I shall be certain that the elector and the marshals have passed the Danube with their whole army. By this march they intend to draw more troops from the marshal de Villeroy’s army; but we hope the situation of the country is such, that they will not be able to hinder us from going on with the siege, though they should be something stronger than we. When Prince Eugene and I are joined, our army will consist of 160 squadrons and 65 battalions. Prince Louis has with him, for the siege of Ingoldstadt, 31 squadrons and 24 battalions. The French make their boasts of having a great superiority, but I am very confident they will not venture a battle. Yet if we find a fair occasion we shall be glad to embrace it, being persuaded that the ill condition of our affairs in most parts requires it. As we are now marching from the magazines we had at Aicha and Schrobenhausen, for our bread, I am afraid I shall be much put to it to get bread for the first ten days, notwithstanding the 200 waggons I am obliged to keep, without which we could not march till we had our magazines first made.”

Marlborough had scarcely retired to enjoy a short interval of rest, before an express arrived from Eugene, announcing that the enemy had crossed the Danube, and pressing for immediate succour. Indeed, on returning to his camp, he found that the officers left in command had taken the alarm, and were preparing to fall back to the Schellenberg. As he was already joined by the duke of Wirtemberg, and as General Churchill was in a situation to support him, he maintained the line of the Kessel with the cavalry, while he sent his baggage to Donawerth, and his infantry to the Schellenberg, with orders to prepare the intrenchments for defence. By repeated messengers he urged Marlborough to accelerate

his march, from a conviction that the enemy would advance on the ensuing day, because their detachments had already appeared near Steinheim.

The exertions of Marlborough were commensurate with the peril of the crisis. At midnight General Churchill received orders to advance and join Eugene; and within two hours the main army was in motion. For the sake of expedition, the second line, with the rear guard, passed the Danube over the bridge at Merxheim, while the first traversed the Lech, opposite Rain, and the Danube, at Donawerth; and at four in the afternoon the different columns filed over the Wernitz, under the eye of the commander himself. At six a communication was opened with Eugene, and the junction being completed at ten*, the combined armies encamped between Erlingshofen and Kessel-Ostheim, with the Kessel in their front, and the Danube on the left. The brigade of General Rowe, reinforced by a battalion of English guards, was pushed across the rivulet, to take post in front of Munster. At the dawn of the 12th, the generals were gratified by the arrival of the baggage and artillery, which had marched no less than twenty-four English miles on the preceding day.

It was the intention of Marlborough and Eugene to advance beyond the Nebel, and take up a position in the vicinity of Hochstadt. For this purpose, during the morning of the 12th, they proceeded at the head of the grand guards to survey the ground in their front, and procure intelligence. On approaching Schweningen, they observed several hostile squadrons at a distance; but being unable to form an accurate judgment of their force, they ascended the tower of Dapfheim church, from whence they descried the quartermasters of the Gallo-Bavarian army, marking out a camp beyond the Nebel, between Blenheim and Lutzingen.

This discovery fulfilled the warmest wishes of the enterprising commanders. Aware that the confusion which is almost inseparable from the change of camps, presents the most favourable opportunity for an attack, they determined

* This account of the movements for the junction of the two armies is drawn from the private correspondence of Marlborough, and the printed despatches, compared with Hare's Journal of the Campaign, Milner, and the different biographers of Marlborough.

to give battle before the enemy could strengthen themselves in their new position. With this view they despatched 400 pioneers, to level a ravine formed beyond Dapfheim by the Reichen, and the picket-guards were called out to protect the work. Returning from their survey, they had scarcely sat down to their repast, before intelligence arrived that the squadrons seen in the morning near Schweningen were engaged with the pickets. The alarm was instantly spread; the two commanders remounted their horses, and directed the brigade of Rowe to file through Dapfheim, in support of the troops attacked. Several squadrons of cavalry, and twelve battalions of Marlborough's first line, commanded by Lord Cutts, moved forward; and the Prussian infantry, which formed part of the right wing, advanced towards the scene of conflict, along the skirt of the wooded eminences bordering the plain. The whole of the allied cavalry were ordered to hold themselves in readiness, and the infantry prepared for action. But the alarm proved false; for the enemy being detached only for the purpose of gaining intelligence, retired after making a few prisoners. Two brigades, under the command of General Wilkes and Brigadier Rowe, were accordingly left for the defence of the pass, and the rest of the troops returned to camp.

Meanwhile the Gallo-Bavarians entered the position marked out, and extended their lines along the elevated ground, stretching from Blenheim to Lutzingen. Marshal Tallard took up his quarters at Blenheim, Marsin at Oberglauh, and the elector at Lutzingen.

As the preparations of the confederate generals indicated an approaching engagement, some officers, who were well acquainted with the superiority of the hostile forces, and the strength of their position, ventured to remonstrate with Marlborough on the temerity of the attempt. He heard them with calmness and attention; but conscious that the enemy would speedily fortify their position, while Villeroy advancing into Wirtemberg, would cut off the communication with Franconia, from whence the army drew the principal supplies, he answered, "I know the danger, yet a battle is absolutely necessary, and I rely on the bravery and discipline of the troops, which will make amends for our disadvantages." In the evening orders were issued for a general

engagement, and received by the army with an alacrity which justified his confidence.

At this solemn crisis Marlborough felt a deep and awful sense of his own responsibility, as well as of the impending peril. He devoted part of the night to prayer, and towards morning received the sacrament from the hands of his chaplain, Mr. Hare, with marks of the warmest devotion. He then took a short repose, and employed the remaining interval in concerting with Eugene the various arrangements for a battle, which appeared to involve the fate of the Christian world.

It is here proper to cast our view over the ground which was to become the theatre of conflict. The valley of the Danube, which stretches from the Kessel north-west to Dillingen, is seven English miles in length, and irregular in breadth. The widest part is from the sources to the mouth of the Nebel, a distance of nearly three miles, the narrowest near Dapfheim, where the wooded eminences advance within half a mile of one branch of the Danube. On one side, the Danube winds in a tortuous bed, 300 feet broad, in no point fordable, and between banks either precipitous or swampy. On the opposite side, the valley is bounded by a series of wooded eminences, which vary its outline, by spreading into different ramifications. From these flow numerous rivulets, which descend into the Danube; and the whole space is intersected by ravines, and dotted with towns, villages, and dwellings.

In reference to the events of this memorable day, the whole valley may be divided into three parts. The first from the Kessel to the Nebel, the second to the Schwanbach, the third to Dillingen. For the features of the first and last we shall refer to the plan, only calling the attention of the reader to the defile of Dapfheim, where a narrow pass might have enabled the enemy to oppose considerable obstructions to the advance of the allies, had they been sufficiently prompt in seizing the advantage.

The middle portion, which was the scene of conflict, merits a more particular description. Here the valley is not only more capacious, but more thickly dotted with villages and dwellings. Nearly in the middle runs the Nebel, or Hasel, which derives its waters from several sources rising

in the heights above Schwenenbach and Lutzingen, and from Oberglauh flows into the Danube in a single channel. At the mouth the breadth is no more than twelve feet. Near the confluence is Blenheim, which is divided from the Nebel by a narrow slip of swelling ground; while behind the village commences a flat eminence or table land, which, expanding as it bends towards Oberglauh, slopes gently on the right, and is bounded on the north-west by the range of woody hills above Lutzingen. In the lower, or south-eastern part of this eminence, rises a streamlet called the Meulweyer, which, flowing through Blenheim in a double channel, is soon lost in the Danube.

Nearly two miles above Blenheim is Oberglauh, seated on the acclivity, about musket shot from the Nebel, and on the opposite side is Unterglauh, standing on the very brink of the stream. The ground bordering the Nebel, particularly between Oberglauh and Blenheim, is generally marshy, and in many places impassable. Below Unterglauh the morass expands to a considerable breadth, and nearer Blenheim is a species of islet, formed by a channel cut into the boggy soil, for the purpose of receiving the superfluous water from a spring which rises near the foot of the acclivity. On the main stream, a little above Blenheim, are two water-mills, which were well adapted to serve as redoubts for impeding the passage. Between Unterglauh and Blenheim, near the point of the islet, is a stone bridge, over which runs the great road from Donawerth to Dillingen.

Higher up, in the gorge of the mountains, about a mile to the east of Oberglauh, is Lutzingen, bordered on the north and east, within musket shot, by woods and ravines.

On the left of the Nebel the plain is uneven, and partly covered with brush-wood. In the vicinity of Schwenenbach and Berghausen the ground becomes more undulating. Near Weilheim it rises into a gentle elevation, and consists of arable land as far as the village of Krenheim, which borders on the Danube.

CHAP. XXVI.—BATTLE OF BLENHEIM.* — 1704.

ON the memorable 13th of August, at two in the morning, the allied generals, having detached their baggage to Reitingen, broke up their camp, leaving the tents standing; and at three the united troops, consisting of 64 battalions and 166 squadrons, passed the Kessel in eight columns. The right wing was commanded by Eugene, the left by Marlborough, and the aggregate force amounted to 52,000 men, with fifty-two pieces of artillery, and a train of pontoons.† The army of Eugene, filing by the right, was

* In this engagement it is as difficult to discover the respective numbers of the two armies as in most others, which in some degree arises from the uncertain mode of computation by battalions and squadrons.

The order of battle which is preserved in the king's library states the confederate army at 66 battalions and 166 squadrons; but of these some are admitted to have been absent, and others unaccounted for.

Tallard computes the army of Marlborough at 49 battalions of 500 men each, and 88 squadrons of 160; and that of Eugene at 18 battalions and 78 squadrons; in all 67 battalions and 166 squadrons, or 38,000 infantry and 26,560 cavalry, a total of 64,560 men. This exaggeration is evidently intended to extenuate his defeat.

Marlborough, in his letter to the States, computed the combined troops at 64 battalions and 166 squadrons, of which 1500 horse were not present at the battle, making 32,000 infantry and 18,420 cavalry, allowing 500 for each battalion, and 120 for each squadron; to which number we may add about 1500 men, in consequence of the superior strength of the German squadrons. This statement justifies us in estimating the whole confederate force at 52,000 men.

† According to Hare's Journal, the component parts of the two confederate armies, were:

ARMY OF MARLBOROUGH.		ARMY OF EUGENE.	
Battalions.	Squadrons.	Battalions.	Squadrons.
British	14	Danes	7 ... Prussians
Dutch	14	Prussians 11 ...	Imperial
Hessian.....	7 Suabian
Hanoverian-Zell	13 Franconian
Danes 22 and Wirtemberg.
—	—	—	—
48	86	18	74
—	—	—	—

This estimate agrees with the computation of the duke in his letter to the States, in the number of the battalions; and of the squadrons herein mentioned, some were absent.

divided into two columns of infantry and two of cavalry, the artillery following the infantry, and the cavalry closing the march. The army of Marlborough, filing by the left, broke also into two columns of infantry and two of cavalry, the cavalry being on the left, and the artillery following the infantry. On reaching the bank of the Reichin, they came into parallel order and halted. Here the out-posts joined their respective corps. The two brigades of Wilkes and Rowe, which on the preceding evening had been stationed in advance, at Dapfheim, were formed into a ninth column, and reinforced with eleven battalions from the first line, and fifteen squadrons of cavalry. This column was designed to cover the march of the English and Dutch artillery along the great road, and to attack the village of Blenheim, the possession of which would facilitate the passage of the main army over the Nebel, and open the right flank of the enemy.

The troops of Marlborough were directed to form on the ground stretching from Welheim to Kremheim, while those of Eugene, passing along the skirts of the hills in the rear of Wolperstetten, Berghausen, and Schwenenbach, were to prolong the line to the extremity of the valley, as far as Eichberg. From these general arrangements, it appears that the allied commanders intended to make their first efforts against Blenheim and Lutzingen, which covered the flanks of the enemy. The subsequent changes arose from the locality of the ground, and the order adopted by their antagonists. After these preliminary dispositions the troops resumed their march in silence. Meanwhile Marlborough and Eugene, escorted by forty squadrons, rode forward to observe the situation of the enemy; they were accompanied by the Prussian general, Natzmer, who had been made prisoner in the battle fought here between Stirum and Villars, in the preceding year, and was acquainted with the local peculiarities. About six they descried the advanced posts of the enemy, falling back on their approach, and at seven, reaching the higher ground near Wolperstetten, they came in full view of the hostile camp. From hence they could trace the course of the Nebel, and learned that it might be traversed at the houses and water-mills, near the right of the enemy; but that the islet, and the banks towards Ober-

glauh, were deemed too swampy to be passable. They observed also, that the ground on the hither side, as far as Unterglauh, was sufficiently high to protect the passage of the rivulet, but that the plain beyond the farther bank, on which the troops must form for the attack, was commanded by the eminence occupied by the enemy. To these peculiarities they adapted their plan.

The morning being hitherto partially hazy, the Gallo-Bavarians did not even suspect the approach of the enemy.* Deceived by the intelligence which they had obtained from the prisoners taken on the preceding evening, they detached their cavalry to forage; and being persuaded that the allies were falling back on Nordlingen, they considered the guard which attended Marlborough and Eugene as a body of cavalry pushed forward to cover this retrograde movement. But at seven, the fog dispersing, the heads of Eugene's columns were descried behind Berghausen, and the alarm was instantly given. Signal guns were fired to recall the foragers, and the advanced corps, committing Berghausen, Schwenenbach, and Weilheim to the flames, fell back to the main body. Confusion pervaded the lines, the artillery was hurried forward, and the troops were observed hastening to form at the head of the camp.

The Gallo-Bavarian army consisted of 56,000 men †, and

* If any doubt should remain, that the Gallo-Bavarian commanders were completely surprised, it will be removed by the avowal of Tallard himself, in a postscript to a letter, dated Camp de Leitzheim (the very morning of the battle). "Ce 13, au point du jour les ennemis ont battu la générale à 2 heures, à 3 l'assemblée. On les voit en bataille à la tête de leur camp, et suivant les apparences ils marcheront aujourd'hui. Le bruit du pays est qu'ils vont à Nordlingen. Si cela est, ils nous laissent entre le Danube et eux; et par conséquent ils auront de la peine à soutenir les établissements qu'ils ont pris en Bavière." — *Campagnes de Tallard*, t. ii. p. 140. From this letter, who could have supposed that in a few hours his whole army would have been defeated, and himself a prisoner?

† Tallard admits that his own force consisted of 36 battalions and 44 squadrons, and that of Marsin of 41 battalions and 85 squadrons, besides 5 Bavarian battalions and 23 squadrons posted on the extreme left; in all, 82 battalions and 152 squadrons. Marlborough states them at 82 battalions and 147 squadrons.

We have, therefore, perhaps rather under-rated the number by com-

was drawn up in front of the tents, according to the order of encampment. The united troops of the elector and Marsin formed on the left with the cavalry on their right; the army of Tallard on the right with the cavalry on the left, so that the centre consisted of horse, and the wings of foot. This order was adopted on the supposition that the Nebel was impassable from Oberglauh to the mills. The lines extended from the commencement of the acclivity behind Blenheim, along the crest of the eminence to the rear of Oberglauh, and from thence, crossing a branch of the Nebel, to the woods above Lutzingen.

As every moment afforded fresh indications of the approaching contest, Tallard proceeded to make ulterior arrangements. Hastening to Blenheim, he ordered a brigade of dragoons, under the count de Hautefeuille to dismount, and form between the village and the Danube, behind a barricade of waggons. He then directed all the infantry of the first line, and part of the second, to enter the village, and placed the three brigades of Navarre, Artois, and Gueder, with their right joining the left of the dismounted dragoons, behind the pallisades which enclosed the gardens. The openings between the houses and gardens were closed with boards, carts, and gates. Behind the hedges, to the left of the village, he posted the brigade of Zurlauben; in the centre, among the houses, that of Languedoc, to the right; in the rear the royal brigade; and behind the Meulweyer that of Montroux, to act as a reserve. Two hundred men were also thrown into the castle and churchyard, and small bridges formed across the Meulweyer, to facilitate the communications. The mills on the Nebel and adjacent houses, which were likely to favour the approach of an enemy, were set on fire. A battalion of artillery was distributed on different points; and lieutenant-general de Clerambault was enjoined to maintain the village to the last extremity.

Eight squadrons of gens d'armes drew up to the left of Blenheim, and from thence the line, including the right wing of the electoral army, amounting to about fifty squadrons,

putting the Gallo-Bavarians at 56,000 men, which gives a superiority of 4000 over the confederates. — *Letters of Tallard and Marsin*, already referred to in the first note of the present chapter.

was prolonged to near Oberglauh. Behind this village was the infantry of Marsin, consisting of the brigades of Champagne and Bourbonnois, and the Irish brigade, in all about thirty battalions. Beyond were more battalions extending to the left, and covering the flank of the cavalry, who were drawn up in front of Lutzingen. Strong pickets of infantry occupied Oberglauh, and eighteen French and Bavarian battalions, who had at first been posted in Lutzingen, were drawn out to form an oblique flank among the woods, on the extreme left of the cavalry. The second line of the united troops, under the elector and Marsin, was formed in the same order as the first, but in that of Tallard were stationed three brigades of infantry in the centre of the cavalry. Behind was a reserve of horse, which could not find a place in the lines. Tallard, observing the increasing mass of the allies in the centre, sent an aide-de-camp to his colleague, requesting that his reserve might likewise be posted behind the centre, to resist the attack which he foresaw was meditated on that point; but this proposal was declined by Marsin, from an apprehension that his whole force would be required to withstand the attack of Eugene.

The artillery was distributed with judgment. Four twenty-four pounders were planted on the high ground above Blenheim, to sweep the plain of Schweningen. Four eight-pounders were also pointed against the columns of Marlborough, as soon as they appeared about the high road leading towards Unterglauh. Before the *gens d'armes* was another battery of twenty-four pounders, and the other pieces were disposed along the front of the different brigades. Zurlauben, who commanded the right wing of Tallard's cavalry, was directed to charge the allies whenever a certain number should have crossed the *Nebel*. Tallard rode along his lines to the left, and communicated his arrangements to the elector and Marsin. The three generals then visited the other points of their position, to mature the preparations against the attack of Eugene, whose columns continued to stretch along the elevated ground behind Berghausen.

About seven the troops of Marlborough reached their respective points of formation, and began to deploy. Officers were detached to sound the *Nebel*, and indicate the spot

which were most passable; and the different generals assembled round the commanders to receive their orders.

Two defects in the position of the enemy did not escape the vigilant eyes of the confederate generals. Blenheim and Oberglauch were too distant from each other to sweep the intervening space with a cross fire, and the lines of cavalry on the elevated ground were too remote from the rivulet to obstruct the passage. Of these defects they prepared to take advantage. While Eugene bore on the front and left flank of the troops under the elector and Marsin, Marlborough was to push his cavalry across the Nebel, under the protection of his foot, and to charge the hostile cavalry, at the same time that the effort was made to carry Blenheim. With this view he ordered General Churchill to draw up the infantry in two lines, the first of seventeen, and the second of eleven battalions, in the direction of Weilheim, and between them an interval was left for the two lines of cavalry, the first of thirty-six, and the second of thirty-five squadrons. Novel as this disposition may appear, it was skilfully adapted to the nature of the ground, and the situation of the enemy; for the first line of infantry, by traversing the Nebel, would cover the passage of the cavalry, while the second, acting as a reserve, would support the manœuvre from the hither bank. The pontoons being brought forward, the construction of five bridges was begun, one above Unterglauch, and four between that village and the mills, while the stone bridge, which had been damaged by the enemy, was repaired.

As a short interval of time was yet left, each squadron of the second line was ordered to collect twenty fascines, to facilitate the passage of the fords.

During these preparations, the ninth column, destined for the attack of Blenheim, had filed through Schweningen, and inclining to the left, above Kremheim, drew up in four lines of infantry and two of cavalry. The first line consisted of Rowe's brigade, the second of Hessians, the third of Ferguson's, and the fourth of Hanoverians. The first line of cavalry was formed by the dragoons of Ross, and the second by part of Wood's brigade.

At eight a heavy cannonade was opened from every part of the enemy's right wing. Marlborough therefore ordered

Colonel Blood, who had just arrived with the artillery, to plant counter-batteries on the most advantageous spots, particularly on the high ground below Unterglauch. He himself visited each battery as it opened, to mark the effect.

Meanwhile the imperialists had continued filing to the right, and the presence of Eugene became necessary to direct his attack. On taking leave of his colleague, he promised to give notice as soon as his lines were formed, that the battle might begin on both wings at the same instant.

While Marlborough waited for this communication, he ordered the chaplains to perform the usual service at the head of each regiment, and implore the favour of heaven; and he was observed to join with peculiar fervour in this solemn appeal to the giver of victory. After this act of devotion, he showed his usual humanity in pointing out to the surgeons the proper posts for the care of the wounded. He then rode along the lines, and was gratified to find both officers and men full of the most elevated hopes, and impatient for the signal. As he passed along the front, a ball from one of the opposite batteries glanced under his horse, and covered him with earth. A momentary feeling of alarm for the safety of their beloved chief, thrilled in the bosoms of all who witnessed the danger; but he coolly continued his survey, and finding his dispositions perfect, sat down to take refreshment, while he waited for the reports of Eugene.

At this period the cannonade grew warm and general. On the left the fire of the enemy was answered with spirit and effect; but on the right great difficulty occurred in bringing up the artillery; for the ground being extremely broken, covered with brush-wood, and intersected by ravines and rivulets, the troops of Eugene were obliged to make a considerable circuit before they could gain their intended position; and during their formation were exposed to a long and destructive fire. Unaware of these obstacles, and impatient of delay, Marlborough sent repeated messengers to learn the situation of his colleague. He was apprised that Eugene had formed his lines with the infantry on the right and the cavalry on the left; but as the enemy presented a more extensive front, he had found it necessary to fill up the interval with the reserve. This change of disposition was not only difficult in itself, but to the regret of Marlborough,

retarded the attack at the moment when the arrangements on the left were completed, and the troops were anxiously expecting the signal to engage.

About mid-day, an aide-de-camp arrived with the joyful intelligence that Eugene was ready. Marlborough instantly mounted his horse and ordered Lord Cutts to begin the attack on Blenheim, while he led the main body towards the Nebel, where the bridges were nearly completed.

At one the attack on Blenheim commenced. The troops selected for this service inclined to the right, and descending to the bank of the Nebel, took possession of the two mills under a heavy fire of grape. Having effected their purpose, they drew up on the farther bank, where they were covered by the rising slip of ground. They then deliberately advanced towards the enclosures, and at the distance of thirty paces received the first discharge of the enemy. Many brave officers and soldiers fell; but the gallant General Rowe, who commanded the leading brigade, stuck his sword into the pallisades before he gave the word to fire. In a few minutes, one-third of the troops composing the first line were either killed or wounded, and all efforts to force their way against an enemy superior in number and advantageously posted, were ineffectual. General Rowe himself was mortally wounded by a musket-ball. His own lieutenant-colonel and major were killed in attempting to remove the body, and the line, discouraged and broken, fell back on the Hessians, who were advancing. At this moment three squadrons of gens d'armes charged the right flank of the disordered troops, and seized their colours, but were repelled by the Hessians, who, after recovering the colours, drove the assailants back to their line. Lord Cutts, observing new squadrons preparing to advance, sent an aide-de-camp for a reinforcement of cavalry to cover his exposed flank; and General Lumley, who commanded nearest the spot, detached five squadrons under Colonels Palm and Sybourg, across the Nebel.

Having cleared the swamp with difficulty, they had scarcely formed, before five squadrons of gens d'armes saluted them with a fire of musquetoons. The allied horse instantly charging sword in hand, drove them back through the intervals of the brigade of Silly, which was in the second

line. They, however, suffered severely ; for being galled in flank by the musketry from Blenheim, and assailed by the brigades in front, they were repulsed in disorder, and must have recrossed the Nebel, had not the brave Hessians a second time repelled the French horse.

The enemy having placed four additional pieces of artillery upon the height near Blenheim, swept the fords of the Nebel with grape shot. But notwithstanding this destructive fire, the brigades of Ferguson and Hulsén crossed near the lower water-mill, and advanced in front of the village. The enemy therefore withdrew the guns within their defences, and met the attack with such vigour, that after three successive repulses, the assailants halted under cover of the rising ground.

From the border of the Nebel Marlborough anxiously surveyed this unequal conflict. Finding that Blenheim was occupied by a powerful body, instead of a detachment of infantry, and observing that the enemy were drawing down towards the Nebel, to prevent his cavalry from forming on the farther bank, he ordered the troops of Lord Cutts to keep up a feigned attack, by firing in platoons over the crest of the rising ground, while he himself hastened the dispositions for the execution of his grand design.

During this interval the passage of the Nebel was already begun by General Churchill, who had pushed a part of the infantry over the bridges in the vicinity of Unterglauch, which was still in flames. As soon as they began to form on the farther bank, the first line of cavalry broke into columns and descended to the fords. Some threw fascines into the stream or formed bridges with the planks of the pontoons, while others plunged into the water, and waded through the swamp towards the point of the islet. The enemy observed them struggling for a passage, and removing a part of the guns from Blenheim, enfiladed their crowded columns.

Scarcely had the confederate horse disengaged themselves, and begun to advance their right beyond the front of the infantry, before they were attacked by Zurlauben with the first line of cavalry, supported by the fire of artillery and musketry from Blenheim. Exhausted by their preceding efforts, and unable to present a connected line, they were borne down by the weight of the charge, and several squadrons on

the left were driven to the very brink of the rivulet. Fortunately a part of the infantry was now sufficiently formed to check the pursuit of the enemy by a heavy fire as soon as the broken troops had cleared their front ; while the second line of cavalry advancing, several squadrons wheeled on the right of the French, and drove them behind the sources of the Meulweyer. These were incorporated with the first line ; five additional squadrons were instantly led up to prolong the left ; and the whole body in compact order halted on the hither bank of the Meulweyer, with the left flank stretching towards the outer hedges of Blenheim. They did not, however, long maintain their advantage ; for two battalions of the royal brigade filing along the inclosures to the left of the village, opened a galling fire on their flank. The nearest squadrons gave way, and the hostile cavalry, except the gens d'armes, resumed their original position.

Meanwhile the passage of the Nebel was nearly completed in the centre. The broken squadrons again rallied, notwithstanding the concentrated fire of the enemy on the fords ; and by the exertions of General Lumley the whole left was drawn up beyond the Nebel.

Hompesch, with the Dutch cavalry, was likewise in line, and the duke of Wirtemberg began to extend the Danes and Hanoverians in the direction of Oberglauh. The remaining battalions of infantry were also rapidly moving into the assigned position.

In proportion as the lines extended, the conflict which had commenced in the vicinity of Blenheim spread towards Oberglauh. The Danish and Hanoverian cavalry being charged by the right wing of Marsin, many squadrons were driven across the Nebel ; and though they resumed the attack, yet being out-flanked and enfiladed by the fire of the troops in and near Oberglauh, they were again repulsed. While the battle fluctuated on this point, the prince of Holstein Beek, who had cannonaded the enemy from the elevation near Weilheim, descended to the Nebel, and began to pass with eleven battalions above Oberglauh. Scarcely, however, did the head of this column appear beyond the rivulet before it was charged by nine battalions, including the Irish brigade, which particularly distinguished itself. Application was made for support to the contiguous squadrons of imperial

horse, which were drawn up within musket-shot; but the demand being refused, the two foremost battalions were nearly cut to pieces, and the duke of Holstein Beck himself mortally wounded and made prisoner.

Marlborough observed the disaster, and was conscious that not a moment was to be lost in gaining a point on which the success of his plan depended. He galloped to the spot, led the brigade of Bernsdorf across the rivulet below Oberglauh, and posted them himself. He then ordered the artillery to be brought down from Weilheim for their support, and directed some squadrons of Danes and Hanoverians to cover their left. As the cavalry of Marsin evinced an intention to charge, he led forward several squadrons of the imperialists, and finally compelled the enemy to retire into Oberglauh or to fall back beyond. By this prompt and masterly movement, he established a connection with the army of Eugene; for while this small body of infantry divided the attention of the enemy and protected the left of the imperialists, who were forming above Oberglauh, they covered the right of the great line of cavalry, and masked the offensive movement which Marlborough meditated against Tallard.

It was now three in the afternoon, and Marlborough returned to the centre, after despatching Lord Tunbridge to announce his success, and learn the situation of his colleague.

Having described the progress of the battle on the left, we turn our attention to the army of Eugene. About one the first onset commenced. The prince of Anhalt, who commanded the infantry, prolonged his line towards the gorge of the mountains, to take the enemy in flank, and traversed the main stream of the Nebel. Being, however, obliged to halt for the arrival of the artillery, his troops were exposed to the destructive fire of a battery in front of Lutzingen. At length a counter-battery being placed near the verge of the wood, the troops again moved forward in columns, filing across the stream, and forming as they advanced. The Danes attacked the enemy posted near the skirt of the wood, and the Prussians, driving back the hostile infantry, after a sanguinary conflict carried the battery, which had spread destruction through their ranks. At this moment the imperial horse, breaking into columns, forded the stream and drove the first line of the Bavarian cavalry through the intervals of the

second. Being, however, broken in their turn by the second, they were pursued across the Nebel to their original position on the border of the wood. Some of the hostile squadrons then wheeled to the left, fell on the flank of the Prussian infantry, recovered the battery, and forced them to retreat. At the distance of two hundred paces the broken infantry made a stand, but, being assailed by increasing numbers, were driven back with a heavy loss. The Danes, discouraged by the fate of their companions, relinquished the ground which they had gained, and a total rout might have ensued, had not the prince of Anhalt rushed into the thickest of the combat, animated the drooping spirits of the men, and drawn them back to the point where they were covered by the wood.

Meanwhile, Eugene rallying the cavalry, led them again to the charge. They were at first successful; but being unsupported by the infantry, and enfiladed both from Oberglauh and the battery in front of Lutzingen, were a second time broken, and fell back in disorder across the Nebel. Fortunately the Dutch brigade of Heidenbrecht, which formed part of Marlborough's right, had now taken a position above Oberglauh. As these troops masked the movements of the imperialists, Eugene, after restoring order among his cavalry, again led them across the Nebel, and advanced towards the enemy.

Both parties being equally exhausted, they paused before they came in contact, at such a small distance, as enabled every individual to mark the countenance of his opponent. In this awful suspense, the elector was seen emulating the conduct of Eugene, riding from rank to rank, encouraging the brave, and rousing the timid by his voice and example. At the same time, the prince of Anhalt, after changing the front of the infantry, advanced obliquely, stretching the right of his line towards the wood, to take the enemy in flank. As soon as he had reached the proper point, the signal for a new charge was given. But the imperial cavalry were discouraged by the double repulse: their onset was feeble, momentary, and indecisive; their line was again broken, and they fled in utter confusion a third time beyond the Nebel. In a transport of despair, Eugene left the prince of Hanover and the duke of Wirtemberg to rally the horse,

and flew to the infantry, who still maintained the attack with incredible resolution. Stung by the prospect of defeat, he rashly exposed his person, and was in danger of being shot by a Bavarian dragoon, but was saved by one of his own men, who sabred the trooper at the very moment he was taking the fatal aim. The daring example of the chief exciting the emulation of his troops, they at length turned the left flank of the enemy, and after a sanguinary struggle drove them back through the wood, and across the ravine, beyond Lutzingen. Still, however, their situation was perilous in the extreme. Unsupported by the horse, their very success had placed them in a position, from which it was difficult to retreat, and dangerous to advance, had the enemy been enabled to resume the attack.

In the midst of this protracted contest, the battle drew to a crisis on the left. The troops of Marlborough had finally effected the passage of the Nebel, and at five his dispositions were completed. The cavalry were formed in two strong lines, fronting the enemy, and the infantry ranged in their rear towards the left, with intervals between the battalions, to favour the retreat of such squadrons as should experience a repulse. In the course of the successive efforts made by one party to maintain their ground, and by the other to advance, Tallard had interlaced the cavalry with nine battalions of infantry, originally posted in the second line. This skilful disposition being instantly perceived by the officers commanding on the correspondent point of the allied front; to counteract it, three battalions of Hanoverians were brought forward, and placed in a similar manner, supported by several pieces of artillery. Amidst a tremendous fire of cannon and musketry, the allies moving up the ascent made a charge, but were unable to break the firm order of the enemy, and fell back sixty paces, though they still maintained themselves on the brow of the acclivity. After another awful pause, the conflict was renewed with artillery and small arms; the fire of the enemy was gradually overpowered; and their infantry, after displaying the most heroic valour, began to shrink from the tempest of balls which rapidly thinned their ranks. Marlborough seized this moment to make a new charge, and the troops pressed forward with so much bravery and success, that the French horse were

again broken ; and the nine battalions being abandoned, were cut to pieces or made prisoners. The consequence of this shock was fatal, for the right wing of Marsin's cavalry fell back to avoid a flank attack, and left an interval in the centre of the line.

Tallard, perceiving his situation hopeless, made a desperate effort, not for victory, but for safety. He drew up the remainder of his cavalry and the nearest squadrons of Marsin behind the tents, in a single line, with their right extended towards Blenheim, to extricate the infantry posted in the village, and despatched an officer with orders for its immediate evacuation. At the same time he sent messengers to the left, pressing his colleague either to support him with a reinforcement, or make an offensive movement to divide the attention of his antagonists. But the mischief was irreparable. The elector and Marsin were too closely pressed to comply with his request ; and Marlborough observing the weakness of his line, and the exposed situation of his right flank, saw that the decisive moment of victory was arrived. The trumpets sounded the charge, and the allied horse rushed forward with tremendous force. The hostile cavalry did not await the shock ; but, after a scattered volley, fled in the utmost dismay, the left towards Hochstadt, and the right, reduced to thirty squadrons, in the direction of Sonderheim. Marlborough instantly detached Hompesch, with thirty squadrons, in pursuit of the first, and himself with the rest of the cavalry following the remainder, drove many down the declivity near Blenheim into the Danube and the Schwanbach. Numbers were killed or taken in the rout, and many perished in the attempt to swim across the Danube.

A crowd of fugitives slipped under cover of the bank and crossed the Schwanbach, hoping to reach Hochstadt ; but being entangled in the morass bordering the Brunnen, and cut off from the high road by the dragoons of Bothmar, they took refuge in a coppice. In the terror of the moment, some forced their way through the dragoons, and others, plunging into the Danube, perished in the sight of their terrified companions. Among those who escaped was the Marquis de Hantefort. Joining the brigade of Grignan, which still remained in a body on the bank of the Brunnen, he advanced against the dragoons of Bothmar, and extricated the remnant

of the gens d'armes, who were yet mounted. But fresh squadrons of the allies advancing, the French fell back to the height beyond Hochstadt and withdrew the wounded, who had been carried thither in the heat of the engagement.

Still, however, Marshal Tallard and several of his principal officers, with a body of cavalry, who had followed them in the rout, remained near Sonderheim. Cut off on one side by the allied horse, and on the other, unwilling to encounter almost certain death, by plunging into the Danube, they had no alternative but to submit to the fate of war. Tallard delivered his sword to the aide-de-camp of the prince of Hesse, and with him surrendered many officers of distinction. They were immediately conducted to the victorious commander, and received with all the attention which was due to their character and misfortune.

During these events, Hompesch had continued to press on the broken squadrons of the retreating enemy. They attempted to rally after crossing the Brunnen near Diessenhofen; but on the approach of their pursuers, were seized with a panic, and fled towards Morselingen. At the same time two battalions of infantry, who had formed with them, purchased their safety by yielding up their arms.

From the verge of the wood above Lutzingen, where Eugene had halted after his last attack, he witnessed the advance of his colleague, and the final charge, which ended in the wreck of Tallard's army. Observing the right of Marsin filing towards the rear, and the Bavarian infantry pouring into Lutzingen, he rightly judged that his opponents were preparing to retreat. He instantly renewed the conflict with the infantry, though supported only by two squadrons, and forced his way through the woods and ravines towards Lutzingen. After an arduous struggle, his troops emerged into the plain, and he halted for the approach of the cavalry, who had pressed on the Bavarian horse in their retreat. The flames, which burst forth at Oberglauh and Lutzingen, proved that the enemy had abandoned those places, and were hastening to withdraw from their perilous situation.

The attention of Marlborough was now turned to the movements of the elector and Marsin. Perceiving the advance of Eugene, and the conflagration of Oberglauh and Lutzingen, he recalled the cavalry of Hompesch, and joining

them with additional squadrons, prepared to charge the enemy, who were rapidly filing in good order along the skirt of the wood towards Morselingen. Such an attack would probably have terminated in the utter ruin of their whole army; but it was prevented by one of those accidents which often occur in the confusion of battles. The troops of Eugene appeared behind those of the enemy, in a situation to bear on the flank of the victorious cavalry; and as the fall of night and the clouds of smoke which hung over the field, rendered the view indistinct, they were mistaken for a part of the electoral army. Marlborough, therefore, countermanded the order for harassing the Gallo-Bavarians in their retreat; and, although closely pursued by the cavalry of Eugene, they drew up under cover of the wood between Lutzingen and Morselingen. Having collected the remnant of the defeated wing, they fell back on the approach of night in the direction of Dillingen.

The fate of the day was no sooner decided, than Marlborough, taking from a pocket-book a slip of paper, wrote a hasty note to the duchess, announcing his victory.

August 13. 1704. — I have not time to say more, but to beg you will give my duty to the queen, and let her know her army has had a glorious victory. M. Tallard and two other generals are in my coach, and I am following the rest. The bearer, my aide-de-camp, Colonel Parke, will give her an account of what has passed. I shall do it in a day or two, by another more at large. — MARLBOROUGH.*

The fate of the troops posted in Blenheim still remained undecided. They had witnessed the event of the battle, without making any attempt to escape, because the officer despatched

* This note is preserved in the family archives at Blenheim, as one of the most curious memorials which perhaps exists. It was written on a slip of paper, which was evidently torn from a memorandum book, and contains on the back a bill of tavern expenses. The book may probably have belonged to some commissary, as there is an entry relative to bread furnished to the troops.

Colonel Parke, the aide-de-camp who was the bearer of this intelligence, requested to have the queen's picture, instead of the usual gratification of £00L; and the request was granted. His portrait, painted by Sir Godfrey Kneller, is still in the possession of William Dillon, Esq., whose late wife was great niece to Colonel Parke. He is represented with the queen's picture in miniature pendant from his neck by a red ribbon, the dispatch in his right hand, and the battle in the background.

with the order had been prevented from reaching the village by the last fatal charge. Finding themselves insulated by the defeat of the cavalry, they used the utmost exertion to maintain their post to the last extremity. The commander, Monsieur de Clerambault, being lost in the Danube, they were left without a chief, and without orders, but awaited their destiny with a firmness which merited a better fate.

As soon as the plain was cleared, General Churchill led his infantry towards the rear of the village, and extended his right flank to the Danube; while General Meredith, with the queen's regiment, took possession of a small barrier which had been formed to preserve a communication along the bank with Hochstadt. These movements roused the enemy from a state of sullen desperation. They first attempted to escape by the rear of the village, and being repulsed, rushed towards the road leading to Sonderheim. Here they were again checked by the Scotch Greys, who were led forward to the crest of the acclivity by General Lumley. They finally attempted to emerge by the opening towards Oberglauh, when eight squadrons of horse, under General Ross, compelled them again to take refuge behind the houses and inclosures.

Though encompassed by inevitable perils, they obstinately maintained their post, and it became necessary to recur to a general attack on every accessible point of the village. Lord Cutts was ordered to occupy their attention on the side of the Nebel, while Lord Orkney, with eight battalions, attacked the churchyard, and General Ingoldsby, with four more, supported by the dragoons of Ross, endeavoured to penetrate on the side of the opening towards Oberglauh. Several batteries, planted within musket-shot, co-operated in these attacks, and one of the howitzers set fire to several houses and barns.

A vigorous conflict appeared likely to ensue. But on one side the prospect of a sanguinary though successful attack, and on the other, of a fruitless though destructive defence, induced the contending parties to spare the effusion of blood. A parley took place, and the French proposed a capitulation; but General Churchill, riding forward, insisted on an unconditional surrender. No resource remained: to resist was hopeless, to escape impossible. With despair and indigna-

tion, the troops submitted to their fate, and the regiment of Navarre, in particular, burnt their colours and buried their arms, that such trophies might not remain to grace the triumph of an enemy. Twenty-four battalions and twelve squadrons, with all their officers, surrendered themselves prisoners of war, and thus closed the mighty struggle of this eventful day.

The field being cleared of the enemy, and night approaching, the duke ordered the army to be drawn up, with the left extending to Sonderen, the right towards Morselingen, and the soldiers to lie all night under arms on the field of battle. They quickly possessed themselves of the enemy's tents, with great quantities of vegetables. Nearer the Danube lay about a hundred oxen, which were to have been distributed to the hostile troops. These were no unwelcome booty to the victorious soldiers after their long and hard service.

After this, his grace gave orders for dressing the wounded and putting them under cover. Then he made a repartition of the prisoners, who amounted to eleven or twelve thousand men. The enemy had at least as many more killed and wounded. These prisoners, with their generals, being divided and disarmed, were ordered to the adjacent villages, in the rear of our army, guarded by several squadrons of horse and dragoons.

During the whole of this tremendous conflict the Duke of Marlborough exerted himself with his characteristic coolness, vigilance, and energy, superintending the manœuvres in every part, and appearing in every point where the presence of the general was necessary, to revive the courage, to restore the order, or to direct the attacks of his troops. The author of the Campaign has caught the spirit of his hero and described the effect of his superintending direction in language equal to the subject : * —

* For the account of the battle we have consulted the private letters of the duke, in the Blenheim Collection and State Paper Office—Hare's Journal of the Campaign, MS. — and the official documents and correspondence in the Gazette—the History of Europe — and Lamberti — also the different Lives of Marlborough in English, French, German, and Dutch — as well as the Lives of Eugene and Marlborough, and the *Histoire du Prince Eugene* — Dumont's Military History — *Campagnes de Tallard et de Marsin* — Quincy — Milner's Journal of Marlborough's

'Twas then great Marlborough's mighty soul was prov'd,
 That in the shock of charging hosts unmov'd,
 Amidst confusion, horror, and despair,
 Examin'd all the dreadful scenes of war :
 In peaceful thought the field of death survey'd,
 To fainting squadrons sent the timely aid ;
 Inspir'd repuls'd battalions to engage,
 And taught the doubtful battle where to rage.
 So when an angel by divine command,
 With rising tempests shakes a guilty land ;
 Such as of late o'er pale Britannia past,
 Calm and serene he drives the furious blast ;
 And, pleas'd the Almighty's orders to perform,
 Rides in the whirlwind, and directs the storm.

ADDISON'S Campaign.

A List of the principal Generals and Officers of the Confederate Army, who were engaged in the Battle of Blenheim. — (From the Order of Battle.)

ARMY OF MARLBOROUGH.

His Grace the DUKE of MARLBOROUGH, *Captain-General* of the QUEEN
 of GREAT BRITAIN'S FORCES, &c. &c.

Generals : —

Cavalry of the right wing ; PRINCE MAXIMILIAN of HANOVER.
 Infantry ; ANHALT, DESSAU, and CHURCHILL.
 Cavalry of the left ; PRINCE of HESSE.

Lieutenant Generals : —

Cavalry of the right wing ; PRINCE of DURLACH.
 Infantry ; HOORN, INGOLDSBY, LORD CUTTS.
 Cavalry of the left ; DUKE of WIRTEMBERG, HOMPESCH, and LUMLEY.

Major Generals : —

Cavalry of the right wing ; FUGGER, and NATZMER.
 Infantry ; FINK, HOLSTENBECK, WITHERS, HERBEVILLE, and WILKS.
 Cavalry of the left ; RANTZAU, NOYELLES, ERBACH, SCHULEMBERG,
 AUROCHS, and WOOD.

Brigadier Generals : —

Infantry ; BIELK, HEIDENBRECHT, WULFEN, HULSEN, ROWE, and
 FERGUSON.
 Cavalry of the left wing ; RANTZAU, BALDWIN, and ROSS.

Campaigns — Boyer's History of Queen Anne — Cunningham — Tindal
 — and Daniel's Histoire de France — Historical Account of some British
 Regiments, published by Grose, and improved in the British Military
 Library — Grimoard and Feuquieres — with the Dictionnaire des Bat-
 tailles, &c.

For the plan of the battle of Blenheim, the reader is referred to the
 Atlas, published separately, as an accompaniment to this edition of
 Coxe's *Memoirs of Marlborough*. — ED.

ARMY OF PRINCE EUGENE.

PRINCE EUGENE, *Field Marshal* of the EMPEROR.

Generals :—

Cavalry of the right wing; his Highness the reigning DUKE of WURTEMBERG.

Cavalry of the left; COUNT de la TOUR.

Lieutenant Generals :—

Cavalry of the right wing; MARQUIS de CUZANI, and PRINCE of BAREUTH.

Infantry; SCHOLTEN, and LORD ORKNEY.

Cavalry of the left; COUNT OOST FRIEZE, and BULOW.

Major Generals :—

Cavalry of the right wing; CARAFFA, and BIBRA.

Infantry; RANTZAU, ST. PAUL, and LUC.

Cavalry of the left; VITTINGHOFF, PRINCE of HESSE HOMBURG, and VILLIERS.

Brigadier Generals :—

Infantry; REBSDORFF, CANITZ, BERNSDORFF, STECKENDORFF, HULSEN, and WEBB.

Cavalry of the left; BROCKDORFF, GRÆVENDORFF, and BOTHMAR.

CHAP. XXVII.—RESULTS OF THE BATTLE OF BLENHEIM.—
1704.

AT the conclusion of the battle, the Duke of Marlborough took up his head-quarters in a little water-mill near Hochstadt, and snatched a short interval of repose. The garrison of Hochstadt having surrendered, he entered that town at the dawn, in company with his illustrious colleague, and after visiting the stores and magazines, issued the necessary orders for the day.

We cannot terminate our description of this memorable event without introducing some incidents from the Journal of Hare, who was present on the occasion.

“Afterwards the two commanders, accompanied by counts Wratislaw and Maffei, and several general officers, visited Marshal Tallard, at the quarters of the prince of Hesse. In their way, they ordered all the standards, colours, cannon, &c. taken from the enemy to be committed to the care of Colonel Blood. Reaching the marshal's quarters, they found him very much dejected, and wounded in one of his hands. His grace humanely inquired how far it was in his power to make him easy under

his misfortune, offering him the convenience of his quarters, and the use of his coach. The marshal thankfully declined the offer, saying, he did not desire to move, till he could have his own equipage. His grace accordingly despatched one of his own trumpets to the electoral army, with a passport for bringing it to the marshal. During the interview the marshal directed the conversation to the events of the preceding day, which Marlborough would fain have avoided from motives of delicacy. He told the duke, that if his grace had deferred his visit, meaning his attack, a day longer, the elector and he would have waited on him first.

“The duke asking why they did it not on the 12th, when they were expected, the marshal answered, they would have done it before, had they not been informed that Prince Louis of Baden had joined his grace, with his army from Ingoldstadt; and that four prisoners, whom their squadrons had taken that day from our army, had given the information, and had agreed in their intelligence, though questioned separately.*

“At this interview many of the French generals crowded about his grace, admiring his person, as well as his tender and generous behaviour. Each had something to say for himself, which his grace and Prince Eugene heard with the greatest modesty and compassion. Prince Eugene much commended the conduct of the elector of Bavaria, as well as the behaviour of his troops, and frankly told how often and how bravely he had been repulsed by them. When he spoke of his own troops, he said, ‘I have not a squadron or battalion, which did not charge four times at least.’”

After staying with the marshal above an hour, the duke and all his company returned to the army, which he ordered to march beyond Hochstadt, as far as Steinheim, while he rode over the field of battle, from the right to the left, the dead of both armies lying stripped on the ground, and sympathised for the loss of so many brave companions in arms.

About noon he came to the camp, the left of which stretched towards Lawingen, through which the remainder of the elector's army had retreated to Borselingen, near Ulm, burning the bridge to check the pursuit. As soon as his grace reached his quarters at Steinheim, he commanded two detachments to take possession of Lawingen and Dillengen, and ordered the bridges to be repaired. Here he remained to take an account and dispose of the prisoners, who amounted to 15,000 men, and 1200 officers, exclusive of generals.

We may add, that from the subsequent letters of Marlborough, we find the total loss of the enemy to have been no less than 40,000 men, including deserters and those who were

* It has been supposed that these four prisoners had instructions to suffer themselves to be taken, in order to make this report.

killed in the retreat. The loss on the side of the confederates was also very considerable, being 4500 killed, and 7500 wounded, but few officers of note, except the prince of Holstein-Beck and Brigadier Rowe, who were killed; and Lord North and Grey, and Lord Mordaunt, wounded. The void which these casualties left in the ranks of the confederates was not ill supplied by the number of deserters and prisoners who enlisted under the banners of victory. Among these were the two German regiments of Gueder and Zurlauben, amounting to 3000 men.

The harmony and union of the two illustrious chiefs in this memorable engagement, were no less remarkable than advantageous to the common cause. Marlborough, in his private letters, dwells with peculiar pleasure on the frankness and liberality of Eugene, and praises his candour and conciliating manners with no less warmth than his military talents. In his official letter to Secretary Harley, he also bore public testimony to his merits, by declaring, that he could not sufficiently praise his conduct; and in a private letter to Lord Godolphin he expresses the same sentiment in still stronger terms. "If Prince Eugene," says he, "could have succeeded equal to his great merit, we should in that day have gone a great way in making an end of the war; but the elector was so posted, that it was seven o'clock at night before he could break into his line, which gave the elector time to draw off the greater part of his army." Eugene rendered equal justice to the temper and talents of his colleague; and by ascribing to him the principal share of the victory, contributed to exalt and diffuse his fame.

In vain, perhaps, may we seek in the pages of military history for a similar example of two generals, united in opinion as in views, emulous without rivalry, equal in command and in honours, yet not contending for pre-eminence. Contemporary writers justly describe them as two bodies animated by one soul; and a Dutch medallist commemorated their union with peculiar felicity of thought, by exhibiting on one side of a medal the busts of the two heroes in profile, and on the other the field of Blenheim, with the figure of Fame floating in the air and sounding their praises. Above is the motto, —

"Heroum concordia victrix."

In the bottom of the exergue, on each side, is a Latin distich, more consonant to truth than poetry, comparing them to Castor and Pollux, the two demi-gods of antiquity, who were no less distinguished for their fraternal affection than for their love of glory. This singular concord was equally conspicuous amidst all the trying events of the war, and may be reckoned as one of the principal causes which produced such astonishing success.*

The candour and liberality of Marlborough in this instance are more laudable, because he was highly dissatisfied with the misconduct of the imperial cavalry, whose want of spirit not only rendered the victory less decisive, but might have occasioned the ruin of the whole army had not his own attack been eminently successful. But he carefully discriminated between the merits of the general and the faults of the troops; and though he prudently refrained from giving publicly the least hint which might have been construed into a reflection on Eugene, or have offended the imperial court, he did not suppress his complaints in his private correspondence. He even avoided giving a written reply to the compliments which he received from the Emperor and the king of the Romans, because he would not bestow on the imperial troops the praise which they had ill deserved.

We shall not introduce any of the official letters from the duke, which have been already published, but shall confine our extracts to his private correspondence in the hour of triumph, and during his march from the field of battle to the camp of Sefelingen, in the vicinity of Ulm, where he remained stationary till the latter end of August.

To the Duchess.

“Aug. 14. — Before the battle was quite done yesterday, I writ to my dearest soul to let her know that I was well, and that God had blessed her majesty’s arms with as great a victory as has ever been known; for prisoners I have the Marshal de Tallard, and the greatest part of his general officers, above 8000 men, and near 1500 officers. In short, the army of M. de Tallard, which was that which I fought with, is quite ruined; that of the elector of Bavaria and the Marshal de Marsin, which Prince Eugene fought against, I am afraid, has not had much loss, for I cannot find that he has many prisoners. As soon as the elector knew that Monsieur de Tallard was like to be beaten, he marched off, so that I came only time enough to see him retire. As all these prisoners are taken by the troops I command, it is in my power to send as many of them to Eng-

* See Appendix, C.

land as her majesty shall think for her honour and service. My own opinion in this matter is, that the Marshal de Tallard, and the general officers, should be sent or brought to her majesty when I come to England; but should all the officers be brought, it would be a very great expense, and I think the honour is in having the marshal and such other officers as her majesty pleases. But I shall do in this, as in all things, that which shall be most agreeable to her. I am so very much out of order with having been seventeen hours on horseback yesterday, and not having been able to sleep above three hours last night, that I can write to none of my friends. However I am so pleased with this action, that I can't end my letter without being so vain as to tell my dearest soul, that within the memory of man there has been no victory so great as this; and as I am sure you love me entirely well, you will be infinitely pleased with what has been done, upon my account as well as the great benefit the public will have. For had the success of Prince Eugene been equal to his merit, we should in that day's action have made an end of the war."

"*Steinheim, August 18.*—I have been so very much out of order for these four or five days, that I have been obliged this morning to be let blood, which I hope will set me right; for I should be very much troubled not to be able to follow the blow we have given, which appears greater every day than another, for we have now above 11,000 prisoners. I have also this day a deputation from the town of Augsburg, to let me know that the French were marched out of it yesterday morning, by which they have abandoned the country of Bavaria, so that the orders are already given for the putting a garrison into it. If we can be so lucky as to force them from Ulm, where they are now altogether, we shall certainly then drive them to the other side of the Rhine. After which we flatter ourselves that the world will think we have done all that could have been expected from us. This day the whole army has returned their thanks to Almighty God for the late success, and I have done it with all my heart; for never victory was so complete, notwithstanding that they were stronger than we, and very advantageously posted. But believe me, my dear soul, there was an absolute necessity for the good of the common cause to make this venture, which God has so blessed. I am told the elector has sent for his wife and children to come to Ulm. If it be true, he will not then quit the French interest, which I had much rather he should do, if it might be upon reasonable terms; but the Imperialists are for his entire ruin. My dearest life, if we could have another such a day as Wednesday last, I should then hope we might have such a peace as that I might enjoy the remaining part of my life with you. The elector has this minute sent a gentleman to me, I think only to amuse us; we shall see the truth in a day or two, for we march to-morrow. The blood they have taken from me has done me a great deal of good, which is very necessary, for I have not time to be sick."

To Lord Godolphin.

"*Sefelingen, Aug. 28.*—The troops under my command are advanced three days on their march towards the Rhine, but I have been obliged to stay here to finish, if possible, the treaty with the electress, who has

assured me by letter that one of her ministers shall be here this day with full powers. If he comes before I am obliged to seal this letter, you shall have an account of it. By the letters we have intercepted of the enemy's, going to Paris from their camp at Dutlingen, they all own to have lost above 40,000 men. If we have not Ulm by treaty, we shall leave Monsieur Thungen with the troops that should have had the siege of Ingoldstadt. We are endeavouring all we can to get sixty pieces of cannon for the siege of Landau, which place would be of great advantage to our winter quarters. Although we have had a very great loss of officers and soldiers, our army is in so good heart, and so entirely united, that if the enemy gives us an occasion, I do not doubt but God will bless us with a farther success."

The good effects of this victory were speedily experienced. The first and most important was the dissipation of that alarm which the French arms had long inspired. From the complete development of the vast military system, which principally owed its splendour and consistency to Louis XIV., his troops had suffered no considerable defeat; and not only regarded themselves, but had taught other countries to regard them, as invincible. But this victory over the flower of those armies, who had hitherto marched from conquest to conquest, broke the charm, and transferred the wreath of fame from the French standard to that of the allies. The court of Versailles indeed attempted to palliate the defeat, by ascribing it to the incapacity of the generals, and by publishing false and partial accounts of the battle; but although they found even in England factious partisans to repeat and exaggerate their misrepresentations, the impression was deep and permanent. In France despondency succeeded presumption: while the other nations of Europe reflected on their former alarms with shame and indignation. The recollection of the field of Blenheim depressed the courage of the French soldiery, as much as it warmed the bosoms and roused the zeal of the troops, who were inspired by the guidance of the successful commanders. The name of Marlborough became in France a watchword of fear; and, like the appellations of those beings whom fancy has invested with imaginary terrors, was even employed by parents to operate on the apprehensions of their children.

The shock produced by so tremendous a conflict was evident in all the operations of the war. Encumbered with crowds of prisoners and wounded, and at a distance from their supplies, the confederate generals could not pursue the

broken army under the immediate impulse of defeat, but they omitted no exertion to render their victory effectual. By the intervention of Count Wratislaw, the margrave of Baden was induced to desist from the siege of Ingoldstadt, in which he had made a considerable progress; and leaving a sufficient force for the blockade, he marched with the rest of his army to concur in more important and active operations.

The day after the battle, Marlborough and Eugene made a short march, and encamped between Wittisling and Steinheim. Here they remained four days, to rest and refresh the troops, and make a division of their prisoners. The British commander generously yielded to his illustrious colleague an equal share in all the honours of victory, and reserved no other distinction for his sovereign than the disposal of Marshal Tallard and a few of the superior officers. Accordingly on the 18th, Tallard and most of the other generals were sent from Hochstadt towards Hanau and Frankfort, under an escort of English horse. Of those who were taken on the field of battle, 5678 were assigned to Marlborough and 5514 to Eugene, making a total of 11,192 men, besides the two German regiments who enlisted in the confederate army.

On the 19th the confederates, again moving, advanced in the direction of Ulm, where the elector had halted to collect his scattered forces and withdraw his garrisons. Proceeding by Gundelfingen and Languenau, they reached Sefelingen on the 21st, finding in every village fresh indications of the loss which the enemy had sustained by the hostilities of the peasantry and the harassing pursuit of the light troops, as we learn from the duke's own correspondence.

“*August, 1704.* — The French own that of their whole army they have not 250 officers but what are killed, wounded, or taken prisoners; we reckon they could not have less than 4500 officers.”

“*Camp of Sefelingen, August 21.* — On Tuesday we marched from Steinheim to Gundelfingen, yesterday we came to Ober-Elkingen, and to-day advanced to this place, within an English mile of Ulm. We heard of many French officers that had been buried in the several villages we marched through; and by letters from one of the burghers at Ulm, we are told that when the enemy marched from thence they carried with them upwards of 7000 wounded, whereof near 1000 were officers; that they burnt many of their waggons to make use of their horses for brancards, for more easily conveying the wounded officers.”

“*August 28.* — We have intercepted several letters of the 19th, going

from Dutlingen to the French court, by which the enemy own to have lost 40,000 men killed, taken prisoners, and deserted, since the battle.

At Sefelingen Marlborough remained till the latter end of August. From fatigue and want of rest he appears to have become unwell, but he speedily recovered. His attention was directed to the forlorn situation of the electress of Bavaria. He was too susceptible of domestic affections not to sympathise in the distress of this unfortunate princess, who, after proceeding beyond Memmingen to console her husband by her presence, had found the roads beset by the allied troops, and returned in despair to Munich. He readily listened to an overture made by her confessor, and prevailed on Eugene and Wratislaw to offer her and her family a safe residence at Munich, with a certain guard and regular allowance from the revenues of her husband, on the condition of surrendering Ulm and the other fortresses held by the Gallo-bavarian garrisons.

In his correspondence with the duchess, we discover many gratifying proofs of the interest which he took in her fate, as well as in that of her husband.

“Sefelingen, August 21.—The poor electress has taken five of her children with her, and is following her husband, who seems to be abandoned to the French interest. Prince Eugene and I have offered him by a gentleman that is not yet returned, that if he will join in the common cause against France, he shall be put in possession of his whole country, and receive from the queen and Holland 400,000 crowns yearly, for which he should only furnish the allies with 8000 men; but I take it for granted he is determined to go for France and abandon his own country to the rage of the Germans.”

“August 25.—The elector of Bavaria has sent his wife and children back to Munich, and this morning by a trumpet has writ to me, and in it a letter to the electress open. It has made my heart ache, being very sensible how cruel it is to be separated from what one loves. I have sent it to her by a trumpet of my own, with assurances that her answer shall be carefully delivered to the elector, for I take pleasure in being easy when the service does not suffer by it.”

“August 28.—Although the troops be marched I shall stay here a day or two longer, to finish a treaty with the electress of Bavaria, which I own would be a great satisfaction to me; for when the public are served I should be glad the family were not quite ruined.”

During the halt of five days at Sefelingen, the margrave of Baden repaired to the camp, to confer with Marlborough and Eugene on the plan of future operations. As the elector.

and Marsin had already effected their retreat through the passes leading from Donaschingen to Friburg, a resolution was taken to leave the troops drawn from Ingoldstadt under the command of General Thungen, for the reduction of Ulm; while the remainder of the forces hastened to carry the war into the country beyond the Rhine.

CHAP. XXVIII. — ALLIES PASS THE RHINE. — 1704.

ON the 28th the army broke up and marched in different columns through the circle of Suabia, towards the general rendezvous in the vicinity of Philipsburg. The troops of Marlborough, divided into three columns, returned by their former route through Launsheim, Gross Seinssen, Ebersbach, Great Hippach, and Mondelsheim, and in six days approached the Rhine.

After waiting three days for an answer from the electress of Bavaria, Marlborough left Count Wratislaw to continue the negotiation, and on the evening of August 31. rejoined his troops at Mondelsheim. During a halt of one day he repaired to Stutgard, at the invitation of the duke of Wirtemberg, and was received with all the honours which a grateful people could pay to their deliverer. The next morning he passed the Neckar at Lauffen, and on the 3rd advanced to Eppingen.

As the views of the confederate generals were directed to Landau, they so calculated their march as to anticipate the enemy in the position of Spirebach. Eugene hastened to Rastadt, to collect the forces left in the lines of Stollhoffen, and in the beginning of September the different columns were all concentrated in the vicinity of Philipsburg.

Having pushed forward the English and Danes to Steffeld and Odenheim, Marlborough on the 5th repaired to Philipsburg, and went to the head-quarters of Eugene at Waghaus. In the afternoon they passed the Rhine to survey the country; and on the next morning the palatine troops, who were nearest at hand, were sent across by Eugene to occupy the position of Spirebach. In the interval Marlborough returned

to his camp; and being apprised that the advance of the enemy's cavalry had appeared on the high ground near Philipsburg, he detached the English and Danish horse to support the palatines. On the 7th the English and Danish foot, with the Dutch, Luneburgers, and Hessians, successively filed over; and the ensuing day the reunion of the whole army was completed by the junction of the imperial horse. At the same time the margrave, who had taken the route of Aschaffenburg, arrived at the camp.

Writing to Godolphin from Spire, September 8th, Marlborough details these operations, and declares his resolution to give the enemy battle if they should venture to oppose his advance: —

“Fearing the French might take this camp, we were obliged to pass the Rhine and take it yesterday, although we had not above half our troops with us, which made us be all the day on horseback, as also the greatest part of this day, the French being within three leagues of us. But this afternoon we are joined by the rest of our troops, so that we shall march to-morrow, in hopes to pass the river Queich the next day. If the enemy will let us pass that river, we have it in our power to besiege Landau. I hope and think they will not defend it, though they have drawn all their forces together, in order to hinder our passage. We shall have 92 battalions and 181 squadrons; but above one-half of our battalions are extremely weak, so that if we come to action I intend to make the 14 English battalions but 7, and to do the same thing to the Danes and Hessians, which will bring our battalions to 78.”

As Villeroy, with the remains of the Gallo-bavarian army, had established himself on the Queich, and was actively employed in fortifying a position so advantageous for the defence of Landau, the allied generals concluded that he had taken the resolution of opposing their progress. They therefore broke up on the 9th, and advanced towards the pass of Belheim. The enemy were, however, too discouraged to await an attack, and hastily fell back to Langencandel. The bridges which they had partly broken down, were repaired for the passage of the infantry, and the horse traversing the stream by the fords, the confederates encamped the same evening between Offenbach and Belheim, on the very ground previously occupied by Villeroy.

Marlborough and Eugene resuming their march on the 10th, the enemy, who had lain all night under arms, withdrew in confusion behind the Lauter, and finally continued

their retreat to the Motter, where they deemed themselves secure from aggression during the expected siege of Landau. After halting on the 11th at Langencandel, the confederates advanced on the 12th to the camp of Cron-Weissemburg.

In the correspondence of Marlborough we find him expressing his surprise at the timidity of the French commander. To Godolphin he observes, in a letter from Weissemburg, September 12th: — “When I writ last, I was of opinion that M. de Villeroy would have defended the river Queich; but he no sooner knew of our march, than he quitted in very great haste and marched to the camp of Langencandel, which has been in all times famous for being a strong post, it being covered with thick woods and marshy grounds. However, upon our approach he retired, and passed that day the Lauter, so that now we are not only masters of making the siege of Landau, but also of taking what post we please for covering it. If they had not been the most frightened people in the world, they would never have quitted these two posts. Prince Louis is this morning marched to invest Landau, and Prince Eugene and your humble servant are to cover the siege.”

The splendid events of the campaign, as well as the fatigues which the troops had undergone, induced many of the officers to flatter themselves that the operations of the year would have closed as soon as the enemy were expelled from Germany. But Marlborough and Eugene were too enterprising to confine their views to mere present advantages. On the contrary, contemplating the prospect of opening the ensuing campaign on the French territory, they not only deemed it necessary to reduce Landau, but also to secure the principal posts on the line of the Moselle. Such long and strenuous exertions were, however, disapproved by many, and even Godolphin himself remonstrated against the continuance of the army in the field at the time when the presence of the general was deemed necessary in England. To his objections Marlborough thus replied: —

“*Sept.* 19. — I find by yours of the 22d it is necessary that I should give you my reason why I was for attacking Landau; and if it had not been in my opinion absolutely necessary, I should have complied with the greatest part of the army, who thought they had done enough in clearing the Rhine on that side, and so were desirous we should take up our quar-

ters in Wirtemberg, and part of the Palatinate, and the imperialists in Bavaria and Suabia. This would have rendered it very easy for the troops, but would have been very prejudicial to the common cause; for we should have made it impossible for Suabia to have furnished their quota, which is 10,000 men, which they have promised to do if they are not charged with winter quarters. By the taking of Landau we shall not only quarter the greatest part of the army on this side of the Rhine, but we shall do that now which would have spent half our campaign the next year. Besides, if this siege ends in any reasonable time, I hope to take quarters at Treves, and all along the Moselle to Coblenz, which will oblige the French to leave the greatest part of their troops on the frontier, which will be chargeable, and a great hindrance to their recruiting. But hitherto every thing goes on very slowly at Landau, and forage is so very difficult to be got for this army that I have a good deal of spleen. However, we are assured, by this time in October we shall be masters of the place."

Although the siege of Landau had been approved by the imperial court; yet either from negligence or poverty, or both, artillery, ammunition, and money were wanting, as well as proper officers to direct the attack. But the foresight and activity of Marlborough supplied all deficiencies. The artillery which he had obtained at the commencement of the campaign from the landgrave of Hesse was brought up from Manheim, the necessary requisites were provided, and the margrave of Baden was enabled to open the trenches within the space of a few days after the passage of the Rhine. Prompt and effectual measures were adopted for the subsistence of the army, by throwing a garrison into Lauterburg and bringing up one of the floating bridges from Philipsburg, to maintain a communication with the country bordering the opposite bank of the Rhine. Care was also taken for the security of the numerous prisoners, by detaching General Ferguson with five English battalions to embark with them on the Rhine at Mentz, and escort them into Holland.

At this period the confederate generals were gratified by the news of the capture of Ulm, which surrendered on the 11th. Their disposable force was thus not only increased, but the stores and artillery found in the place proved a valuable supply for the siege of Landau.

During his march from the banks of the Danube to those of the Rhine, Marlborough received the first indications of the effect produced by his victory at the court of Vienna.

Mr. Stepney having congratulated the emperor in the name of his grace, his imperial majesty very heartily testified the obligations of his family and the empire to the queen for her extensive care, to the duke for his readiness and conduct, and to the English troops for their bravery; nor did these expressions convey a mere diplomatic compliment. Since the former negotiation on the subject of the principality, Leopold had made a new application to the queen through his agent, Baron Hoffman, and had obtained her consent to the grant of this distinguished honour. Without farther delay he announced to Marlborough his elevation to the princely dignity, in a letter full of admiration and gratitude.

“To the most illustrious Prince of Us, and the Holy Roman Empire, John Duke of Marlborough, &c.—I salute with pleasure your dilection by these titles, who so justly deserve a place among the princes of the empire, as well from your own merits as the honour of your noble family, and for your signal services to me and my august house, and the holy Roman empire, being desirous to give you this public monument of honour, the greatest there is in Germany, and which is so justly conferred on you. And to make still more public the great obligations I have to her Britanic majesty, for sending so great a succour so far to assist me, and the empire, when our affairs were in so ill a posture, by the base revolt of Bavaria to France, and to your dilection, to whose prudence and courage, and the bravery of the English and other troops under your command, my own generals, as well as fame, ascribe chiefly under God, our late successes; I shall use my endeavours to procure your dilection a place and vote in the diet, among the princes of the empire. These victories are so great, especially that near Hochstadt, over the French, which no ages can parallel, that we may not only congratulate you on having broken the pride of France, defeated their pernicious attempts, and settled again the affairs of Germany, or rather of all Europe, after so great a shock; but have hopes of seeing the full and entire liberty of Europe in a short time happily restored from the power of France. To which end as I am sure nothing will be wanting on the part of your dilection, nothing remains but to wish you farther successes, and give you fresh assurances of my readiness to embrace any opportunity of showing you with how much affection I am,

LEOPOLD.

*“Given in my city of Vienna, 28th August, 1704.”**

In consequence, however, of some objections raised by Godolphin and Harley, and the unwillingness of Marlborough himself to accept a mere empty title, the grant was suspended at his own request. His motives for declining the proffered honour are thus stated in his correspondence.

* Official translation from the original Latin preserved in the archives of Blenheim.

To the Duchess.

“ *Sefelingen*, August 25. 1704. — I find by Mr. Secretary Harley’s and Lord Treasurer’s letters that they think it might be best to keep the emperor from doing any thing in what he proposes, till towards the end of the campaign. I should have done my part in that, and farther, that it might have remained as it now is, without any thing more being done in it; but I find by the answer of the queen, sent by M. de Hoffman to the emperor, they think it is no more in my power to refuse. I send the copy of it to lord treasurer, as the Count de Wratislaw has given it me. However, I shall do what I can to have it delayed, since you think that is best; for I think the only consideration now is, that the emperor may not take it ill.”

To Lord Godolphin.

“ *Weissenberg*, September 22. — Two days ago the Count de Wratislaw gave me a letter from the emperor, in which he acquaints me with having made me a prince of the empire. I am very much surprised, and so I told him, that such a step should be taken before I had the least notice. Besides this was not the method in which it ought to be done, for the notice ought to be sent to the several princes of the empire; and the lands from whence I was to take my title to be named to them; for that I could not have a seat in the diet till I was master of an imperial fief in the empire. He said it was right, and that he would write to the emperor, and not own to any body that he has given me the letter. However, I send you a copy, but desire nobody may see it but Mr. Secretary; for I believe the emperor must write another to me.”

As the splendid victory of Blenheim produced an unusual sentiment of joy and gratitude in the cold and phlegmatic bosom of Leopold, we cannot wonder that it excited a transport of enthusiasm in his ardent and generous son, the king of the Romans. When the English minister conveyed to him the compliments of the duke, Joseph testified the utmost eagerness to contract a personal acquaintance with so illustrious a commander, and, above all, to enjoy the advantage of his counsel and conduct during the remainder of the campaign. Indeed, during his progress in Bavaria, Marlborough had received a confidential letter from one of the imperial ministers, testifying the earnest desire of the king of the Romans to repair to the army and serve under his auspices. Some objections which were made to the proposal by the margrave of Baden, were overruled, and Joseph was accelerating the preparations for his departure, when the news of the victory reached Vienna. The intelligence rendered him doubly anxious to join the army; and in a letter which

reached Marlborough at Sefelingen, the young monarch notified his intention. Not satisfied, however, with the formal language of the chancery, he added a postscript in the French tongue in his own hand, of which we present a translation to the reader, as indicative of his character, and as a proof of his gratitude to the general who had rescued his family from ruin.

“ I cannot refrain from expressing my joy at the desire you testify to see me at the head of the army, which I hope will soon be fulfilled; and I shall feel the more satisfaction, because I shall have the pleasure of knowing you personally, and of showing you the estimation in which I hold your merit.”

In conformity with this resolution, Joseph arrived at the camp before Landau on the 21st of September, and assumed the command. The next day Marlborough paid his respects to the young monarch, in company with Eugene and other superior officers, and was received with the most flattering marks of cordiality and regard. After the interview, Joseph accompanied the British commander to inspect the approaches against the place, and on the 2d of October, he returned his visit in great state. The army was drawn up in two lines, and General Cadogan had the honour to conduct his majesty to the left. Marlborough received him at the head of Lord John Hay's regiment of dragoons, and accompanied him along the lines, under a triple discharge of artillery and small arms. Joseph expressed extreme satisfaction at the warlike appearance of the troops and the regularity of their movements, honoured Marlborough with his company at dinner, and in the evening returned to his own quarters before Landau, where he retained the nominal command, till the reduction of the fortress.

CHAP. XXIX. — EXPEDITION TO THE MOSELLE. — 1704.

REFLECTING on the magnitude and variety of the events which had occurred since the commencement of the campaign, we should naturally conclude that such stupendous operations had been directed by a general in the possession

of perfect health and spirits. It is therefore surprising to find such activity of body and energy of mind exerted under the pressure of indisposition. Though naturally robust, Marlborough was subject at an early period to fits of headache and fever, which were rendered more frequent by the fatigues of a military life, the labour of an extensive and incessant correspondence, and the anxiety of a mind harassed by the party feuds and intrigues both in England and abroad.

By a complaint of this kind he was affected soon after his passage of the Danube, and the disorder was greatly increased by the care and labour he underwent, before and during the battle of Blenheim, in which he was no less than seventeen hours on horseback. The sense of pain was for a moment banished by the exultation of victory; but during his march towards the Rhine, we find in his correspondence repeated indications of his bodily sufferings.

To Lord Godolphin.

“*Camp at Steinheim, Aug. 17. 1704.* — Ever since the battle I have been so employed about our own wounded men and the prisoners, that I have not one hour’s quiet, which has so disordered me, that if I were in London I should be in my bed in a high fever.”

“*August 23.* — I am suffered to have so little time to myself, that I have a continual fever on my spirits, which makes me very weak; but when I go from hence, I am resolved to go in my coach till I come to the Rhine, which I do not doubt will restore me to perfect health. Nothing but my zeal for her majesty’s service could have enabled me to have gone through the fatigues I have had for the last three months; and I am but too sure when I shall have the happiness of seeing you, you will find me ten years older than when I left England. I do not say this to complain, for I esteem myself very happy if I can make any return for her majesty’s goodness to me and mine.”

Arriving thus debilitated in the low marshy country bordering the Rhine, he was attacked with an ague, which for several days suspended his attention to military duties. Writing to Godolphin, Sept. 19., he observes:—

“I had the favour of yours of the 22d and of the 25th of last month, when I came last Monday from Landau; but I was so uneasy with a cold fit of an ague, that I could neither read yours nor write to you by the post.”

The usual remedies produced the desired effect; but left him for some time in a state of languor and weakness,

which discovers itself in his correspondence with the duchess.

“ *October 10.*—I came this afternoon from Landau, where I have been ever since Tuesday. That siege goes on so very slowly, that I can give no guess when it is likely to end. I am glad you have poor Lady Sunderland with you, for I am very sure you will persuade her to take every thing that may do her good. For thousands of reasons I wish myself with you. Besides, I think if I were with you quietly at the lodge, I should have more health, for I am at this time so very lean, that it is extremely uneasy to me, so that your care must nurse me this winter, or I shall certainly be in a consumption. I am very sorry to hear you have so often returns of your illness, and I do with all my heart thank you for the resolution you have taken of letting the physicians try to cure you, which I hope in God they will, and that you may live many years after me, which both by my age and constitution you must do.”

The duchess was alarmed at these unfavourable accounts of his health, and urged him to withdraw from his irksome situation. But the hope of recovery, and the consciousness of the important consequences which depended on his exertions, inspired him with new energy. In his reply he observes :—

“ What you say of St. Alban’s is what from my soul I wish, that there or somewhere else we might end our days in quietness together ; and if I considered only myself, I agree with you, I can never quit the world in a better time ; but I have too many obligations to the queen to take any resolution, but such as her service must be first considered. I hope, however, in a little time all this business may be so well settled, as I may be very easily spared, and then I shall retire with great satisfaction, and with you and my children end my days most happily ; for I would not quit the world, but be eased of business, in order to enjoy your dear company.”

Indeed no bodily indisposition nor mental chagrin could damp his zeal, or divert his attention from the public cause ; and he had scarcely recovered his wonted health before he prepared for fresh exertions. Wearied with the siege of Landau, which had lasted nearly a month, and entertaining no hope of a speedy reduction, he was unwilling to remain inactive. While the enemy yet laboured under the effects of their defeat, he was impatient to forward the design of opening the next campaign on the Moselle, which was the most vulnerable part of the French frontier. In this operation he expected to reap considerable advantage from the assistance of the duke of Lorraine, whom he represents in

one of his letters as "heart and soul with the allies." He hoped also that the German princes would zealously cooperate in an attack, which was intended for their speedy deliverance from the danger of French oppression.

With anxiety and impatience he marked the preparations of the enemy to collect a body of troops on the Moselle, by drawing detachments both from the Netherlands and the Upper Rhine.

Perceiving, therefore, that the siege of Landau was not likely to be brought to a speedy conclusion, he resolved to leave the command of the covering army to Eugene, and secure the posts of Treves and Traerbach, which were necessary for his future operations, by a rapid and daring enterprise. This scheme, however, required the same resources and activity as he had displayed in his march through Germany. The country which he had to traverse was a mere desert, wild and mountainous; and the roads, even in the most favourable season, scarcely practicable for baggage and artillery. The troops, as well as the requisites for the enterprise, were to be collected from distant quarters; as a sufficient force could not be spared from the covering army; and the utmost celerity, combination, and secrecy, were necessary to prevent a vigilant enemy from availing themselves of the natural obstacles which their situation presented.

The great commander accomplished his purpose with his usual skill and felicity. He justly calculated that the French would be rendered more remiss by the persuasion that he would not venture to move before the reduction of Landau, and that the force which he could draw from the besieging army was inadequate to the execution of the design. He accordingly ordered fourteen battalions, which the Dutch had engaged to furnish from the army in the Netherlands, to direct their march on the 14th towards Traerbach. At the same time he obtained from the elector of Treves, the elector palatine, and the landgrave of Hesse, the necessary supplies of artillery and ammunition for a siege, which were to be transported to such points as were privately indicated. On the 13th he sent a small body of horse and foot to fortify Homburg, a place which commanded the passes through the woody country, north of Weissemburg. This detachment

was followed in a few days by two others, making a total of 12,000 men, and on the 24th, Marlborough himself reached Homburg. Accelerating his march through the woody country towards the Moselle, he arrived on the 26th at the camp of St. Wendel, within a short distance of Treves, where he received information that a garrison of 300 men in the fort of St. Martin overawed and threatened to burn the town, which he was anxious to save. The difficulties of this bold and perilous enterprise are best described in his own words from a confidential letter to Lord Godolphin, bearing date Camp at St. Wendel, October 26.*

“ Since my last, I have gone through the terriblest country that can be imagined for the march of an army with cannon. Had it rained, we must have left our baggage and cannon behind us.

“ The intelligence I have from the Saar is, that Monsieur Laumarie expects to be joined by a detachment of 10,000 men from the army at Hagenau. If it proves true, I shall be obliged to take a strong camp, by which I may be able to give the necessary orders for attacking Traerbach and to be reinforced for attempting Treves; for the twenty-seven battalions and forty-eight squadrons which are with me make about 12,000 men; and I should be very unwilling to be beaten at the end of this campaign. However, I am advanced to this place with the horse, in hopes to get to Treves before this detachment can join Monsieur Laumarie, the foot being only one day behind me. Another reason which makes me press my march is, that if they will not venture to put themselves between me and the town, they may have thoughts of burning it, which I would, if possible, prevent; for my intentions are, to leave sixteen battalions and ten squadrons in garrison there all this winter, it being much the best place on the Moselle for our magazines. Another thing which gives me great trouble is, that I can get no meal to make bread but what I brought with me; but if I can make myself master of Treves, I shall then want for nothing.

“ If the siege of Landau had been ended, I should then have marched with all the troops under my command; so that I might have been almost sure of success in this expedition. But as I have been obliged to leave one half of the Hessians, all the Hanoverians, and the English with Prince Eugene, I am now exposed to the enemy if they will venture, which I hope they will not. I should not have ventured to march with these troops, but I think the taking our winter quarters on the Moselle is as necessary for the good of the common cause as any thing that has been done this campaign; and I am persuaded that if I had stayed till the siege was ended, the season would have been so far advanced, that it would have been impossible to attempt it. These difficulties make me sensible that if I did not consider the good of the whole,

* Correspondence, in the State Paper Office.

before my private concern, I ought not to be here. This might be better said by another than myself, but it is truth; and I am very sensible that if I should have ill success, the greatest part of mankind will censure me for it. However, I shall have the satisfaction to know that I have acted for the best."

Similar reflections occur in a letter of the same date to the duchess.

"I am got thus far in my way to the Moselle, after having marched through very terrible mountains. Had we any rain it would have been impossible to have got forward the cannon; and it is certain if the enemy are able to hinder us from taking winter quarters in this country, we must throw our cannon into some river, for to carry them back is impossible. I have been so desirous to make use of this fair weather, that I am here only with the horse; but as my march to-morrow will bring me within eight leagues of Treves, and the enemy's troops being but five leagues from me, I must be obliged to stay for the foot, which will join me the next day.

"This march and my own spleen have given me occasion to think how very unaccountable a creature man is, to be seeking for honour in so barren a country as this, when he is very sure that the greater part of mankind, and may justly fear, that even his best friends, would be apt to think ill of him should he have ill success. But I am endeavouring all I can to persuade myself that my happiness ought to depend upon my knowledge, that I do what I think is for the best. If I can succeed in the taking of Treves, I shall not then stay above ten days longer in this country; for when I shall have given the necessary orders for the siege of Traerbach, I shall leave the execution of it to the prince of Hesse, having promised the king of the Romans to be with him before the siege of Landau is ended."

Marlborough obtained the success which he so much merited by his vigilance, skill, and activity. We continue to relate, in his own words, the result of these masterly operations, in two letters to Secretary Harley, from the Camp at St. Wendel.

"October 26. — Since my last I quitted the camp of Weisseburg on Thursday at break of day. I am advancing with twenty-seven battalions, forty-nine squadrons, fourteen cannon, and four howitzers, towards the Moselle, to settle the winter quarters, and order the attack against Traerbach. I am favoured by good weather, and not without apprehensions that the enemy may pre-occupy Treves; but I will endeavour to arrive there before the French detachment."

"Camp at Treves, October 29. — I thank God we have prevented them. Last night three deputies from Treves came to the camp at Hermenskel, six leagues off, to acquaint me that the French garrison of 300 men were still in the fort, who might insult the town on our approach, if not prevented. Whereupon I marched before break of day this morning,

with all the horse and four battalions; and as soon as our vanguard appeared the enemy quitted the fort, and retired over the Moselle, after throwing much provisions and ammunition into the river. An advanced corps took some prisoners, and prevented any mischief which they intended to execute, had they not been surprised by the celerity of this march."

From a letter of Cardonnel we learn also that the enemy were not inattentive to this movement, and would undoubtedly have baffled a less active and vigilant commander.*

"October 31. — It was very lucky that my lord duke hastened his march, for on the same day Monsieur D'Allegre came with a detachment of horse within two leagues of Treves, having ordered a good body of troops to follow him, but on notice of our being here, he immediately retired."

Possessed of so important a place as Treves, the duke collected 6000 of the neighbouring peasantry to repair and strengthen the fortifications, and posted the cavalry at Consaarbruck to cover the operation. Having settled the distribution of winter quarters in the vicinity, he proceeded towards Traerbach, which was occupied by a French garrison of 600 men. Arriving at Berncastel the 3d of November, he was joined by the twelve Dutch battalions drawn from the Meuse. After surveying the environs of Traerbach, and giving the necessary directions to the prince of Hesse for the siege of the place, he returned with equal expedition to the camp at Cron Weissemburg. Thus, in the short space of twenty-one days, he accomplished an arduous and highly important undertaking, the result of which may be best described in his own simple though expressive language: "I reckon," he writes to Godolphin, "this campaign is well over, since the winter quarters are settled on the Moselle, which I think will give France as much uneasiness as any thing that has been done this summer."

In fact, the original view of Marlborough was to have besieged Saar Louis, which would have materially facilitated his intended invasion of France; but as the protracted defence of Landau frustrated this design, he adopted the most efficient measures to secure the advantages he had gained. He placed a garrison in Treves, under the command of the Count de Noyalles, occupied Saarbruck, and

* These three last letters are extracted from the originals in the State Paper Office.

after the surrender of Traerbach, quartered a strong corps of auxiliary troops near the confluence of the Saar and the Moselle.

CHAP. XXX. — INFLUENCE IN ENGLAND OF THE VICTORY OF BLENHEIM. — 1704.

HAVING traced the grand events of this extraordinary campaign and their effects abroad, we turn our attention to the impression which they produced in England. It would be difficult to describe the burst of exultation which arose on the first news of the glorious victory in the field of Blenheim. The Queen repaired to St. Paul's in state, to offer up a solemn thanksgiving for the success of her arms; and every class of her subjects seemed to vie with each other in the expression of their homage to the Lord God of Hosts, and gratitude to the commander who had been the instrument of the divine blessing. Addresses and letters of congratulation flowed in from all quarters, of which we shall select only two, one from the queen, as indicative of her own feelings, and another from Mrs. Burnett, wife of the bishop of Salisbury, as equally indicative of the public sentiment.

Answer to the note announcing the victory.

The Queen to the Duchess.

“Windsor, August 21. — Since I sent my letter away by the messenger, I have had the happiness of receiving my dear Mrs. Freeman's, by Colonel Parke, with the good news of this glorious victory, which, next to God Almighty, is wholly owing to dear Mr. Freeman, on whose safety I congratulate you with all my soul. May the same Providence that has hitherto preserved, still watch over, and send him well home to you. We can never thank God Almighty enough for these great blessings, but must make it our endeavour to deserve them; and I hope he will continue his goodness to us, in delivering us from the attempts of all our other enemies. I have nothing to add at present, but my being sincerely,” &c.

Mrs. Burnett to the Duchess.

“August 12. o. s. — Though your grace's moments are so valuable that I should fear to trouble you with my most humble thanks, till you had more leisure to receive such worthless tributes, yet I cannot defer letting your grace know the joy I see in every one I meet. The common people, who I feared were grown stupid, have and do now show greater

signs of satisfaction and triumph, than I think I ever saw before on any good success whatever; and after the first tribute of praise to God, the first cause of all that is good, every one studies who shall most exalt the Duke of Marlborough's fame, by admiring the great secrecy, excellent conduct in the design, and wonderful resolution and courage in the execution. The emperor can give no title * half so glorious as such an action. How much blood and treasure has been spent to reduce the exorbitant power of France, and to give a balance to Europe; and when, after so long a struggle, the event remained under great uncertainty, to have the glory to break the chain, give the greatest blow to that tyranny that it ever had, have an emperor to owe his empire to the queen's armies, as conducted by his grace, are splendours that outshine any reward they can receive.

“ I do not wonder you are all joy. You have just cause for it, and to recount every day with the utmost thankfulness the amazing blessings God has heaped upon you. The bishop heartily prays for the continuance of the duke's success, so that the queen may have the greatest glory that is possible, that is, the restoring peace and liberty to Europe, and, what is greater, the free profession of the Protestant religion, wherever it has been persecuted or oppressed; and that after her, her ministers, who are the instruments, may share in the lasting blessings and glory due to such benefactors to mankind. Sure no honest man can refuse to unite in such noble designs. I am really giddy with joy, and, if I rave, you must forgive me. I can lament for no private loss, since God has given such a general mercy. In death it would be a matter of joy to me to have lived so long as to hear it.

“ The bishop said he could not sleep, his heart was so charged with joy. He desires your grace would carefully lay up that little letter †, as a relie that cannot be valued enough. Some wiser people than myself think the nation is in so good a humour with this great success, and the plentiful harvest, that better circumstances can hardly meet for a new parliament; and, with a little care, it may be as good a one as the depraved manners of this nation is capable of. I pray God direct and prosper all her majesty's counsels and resolutions in this, and every thing else, and make her the universal protectress of truth and charity. And may your grace be ever a happy favourite, happy in all your advices and services, and happy in her majesty's kind approbation and esteem; and may every honest heart love you as well, and endeavour to serve you as faithfully, as does your grace's most obedient,” &c.

While Marlborough was thus raising the glory of his country to a height greater than it had ever before reached, while its victories were fixing the religion and constitution on a firm basis, he was exposed to the petty cavils of the discontented among both parties in England, whom he equally offended by his desire of preserving himself in a state of independence.

* Alluding to the title of Prince.

† Private letter from the duke, antè, p. 206.

During the march through Germany, and while the plans of Marlborough were not yet developed, the violent Tories, as well as the enemies to the Protestant establishment, had openly declared that they would attack him in parliament. They complained that the troops were led on a distant and perilous expedition; that the territory of the Dutch was left exposed to the superior forces of the enemy; and that the general had exceeded the limits of his instructions, and the responsibility of a subject, with a view to promote his own private interest. Rochester and Nottingham in the Lords, and Sir Edward Seymour in the Commons, gave the signal to their party. Sir Edward Seymour even declared, in the language of a sportsman, that he and his friends would pounce upon the adventurous commander at his return, as hounds pounce on a hare; and threats were even thrown out, that his rash expedition, if unsuccessful, would probably bring his head to the block.

But when a decisive victory was gained, when the empire and England were rescued from the impending peril, and the glory of Marlborough shone forth with transcendant lustre, his enemies were confounded, though not silenced. The shame of their frustrated prophecies rankled in their memory; their pride was wounded by the downfall of that colossus which had so long been the subject of their eulogy; and they saw that the same hand which had disproved the invincibility of France, had sealed their own exclusion from power. In the heartfelt agony of disappointed ambition and mortified vanity, they had no alternative but to decry that success which they had declared to be unattainable, and to hold forth the yet inexhaustible resources and unconquered spirit of the enemy. They represented the victory as an useless waste of blood, and the first of an endless series of conflicts, with a power which rose, like the hydra, with new vigour from every defeat. These clamours and invectives were transmitted in exaggerated terms by the duchess to her husband. Though her letters are lost, some written by her correspondent, Mrs. Burnett, still remain, which were communicated to the duke, and furnish a new proof of the implacable spirit of party.

“*August 5.* — I know that the people you mention generally lessen the victory, and, what is more strange to me, they will hardly ever believe any news that lessens France, but swallow up any to its advantage. This

is true of my own knowledge, and that of some who are not of the worst sort of Tories, but give credit to what others set about."

"September 9. — I am very much of your grace's mind about the lady's discovery; for though I know these people are full of hopes on slight grounds, and can hardly keep in what lies uppermost on their heart, yet from many observations, I am persuaded their expectations have not been higher of a long time, than before the late glorious victory; and, indeed, they had a great foundation from abroad, though nothing had been designed at home. One of these said, not long ago, it was true a great many men were killed and taken, but that to the French king was no more than to take a bucket of water out of a river; and they seem so possessed with what his flatterers say of his greatness, that they almost deem him omnipotent."

We feel regret in observing frequent proofs in the correspondence of Marlborough, that these bitter effusions of party rancour made a deep impression on his sensitive mind.

To the Duchess.

"Sefeligen, August 25. — Since my last I have received four letters of my dearest soul's, of the 16th, 21st, and 28th, for which I return her a thousand thanks. I find by some of your's that I am very much obliged to 22*, and some of his friends, that take the action of Donawerth not to be a victory. I wish that and our last battle could have been obtained without the hazard of any but myself; his lordship then would not have complained; for this last action I will be answerable his friend, the king of France, will own the victory. It is not to be imagined with what precipitation they have quitted this country.

"Camp at Gross-Gartach, Sept. 2. 1704. — I must beg, my dearest soul, to make my acknowledgments to the queen for her very obliging letter, believing it much easier than to trouble her with a letter of mine. I hope the elector of Bavaria and the remainder of the French army (who, notwithstanding they were joined by the duke of Villeroy and his army, did not think themselves strong enough to stay for us, but are glad to put the Rhine between us), will be able to convince 17 that the French think themselves beaten. I am sure we can never bless God enough for the success he has given us, it being much above our own expectations. But if those sort of gentlemen think there has not been enough done, I hope he will bless us with a farther success, which at last must bring us to happiness in spite of them, which shall be the prayers and endeavours of him that loves you dearly."

Alluding to the reflection mentioned in the letter of Mrs. Burnett, he afterwards observes:—

"What 92 says of a bucket of water, if they will allow us to draw one or two such buckets more, I should think we might then let the river run quietly, and not much apprehend its overflowing and destroying its

* Probably Lord Rochester.

neighbours, or be much concerned whether 17 and 21 were in or out of humour."

However vexed with the machinations and malicious clamours of the Tories, Marlborough was not less indignant at the censures of the violent Whigs, who endeavoured to avenge his coldness towards their party by re-echoing the declamations of their political antagonists. His disgust was increased by the incessant importunities of the duchess, who exclaimed against his neglect of such meritorious supporters, and his attachment to an ungrateful faction.

He frequently gives vent to these feelings in his correspondence.

* * * " *October 20th, 1704.* — I have just now received your's of the 23d from the Lodge, and am a good deal concerned to find by it that 87* is still of the opinion that 16 and 86 play a game that must be fatal, if the designs of 92 do not prove successful. I was in hopes that 86 had done so much towards the hindering 92 succeeding, that his greatest enemies would not deem him so weak and foolish as to think they could ever forgive him. I do assure you as for myself, my pretending to be of no party, is not designed to get favour, or to deceive any body, for I am very little concerned what any party thinks of me; I know them both so well, that if my quiet depended upon either of them I should be most miserable, as I find happiness is not to be had in this world, which I did flatter myself might have been enjoyed in a retired life. I will endeavour to leave a good name behind me in countries that have hardly any blessing but that of not knowing the detested names of Whig and Tory."

We have already observed, that when Lord Nottingham retired, he left a strong party of his adherents in the offices of government, whose continuance was tolerated by the minister, from respect to the partialities of the Queen. The principal of these were the duke of Buckingham, privy seal, and Sir Nathan Wright, lord keeper. These ministers imitated the example of their disgraced leader, in caballing against the general and treasurer, joining in the clamours of their party, and obstructing the measures of government. In the correspondence of the year, we find some vague hints thrown out relative to the removal of the lord keeper; but the chief battery was levelled against the duke of Bucking-

* The ciphers in this and the following letters to the duchess are difficult to explain; and the difficulty is increased by several mistakes in the originals, which were evidently written in haste. It is certain, however, that 17 means the earl of Nottingham, and 19 and 25 the dukes of Buckingham and Newcastle.

ham, whose high rank and favour with the queen rendered him an object of more serious apprehension. The duchess took an active share in this political feud, and not only importuned her husband to discard such insidious colleagues, but vehemently reproached Lord Godolphin for his impolicey and pusillanimity in suffering them to continue in a situation where they could thwart his views. One of the few letters written by this singular woman, which have escaped destruction, will display the high tone she assumed in political transactions.

The Duchess to Lord Godolphin.

“ I am glad you don't think me in the wrong as to what I wrote concerning 43 ; and I find I might have won a good wager, when I said 17 would keep his winter quarters in the queen's house, to cabal with all her enemies. Indeed, it is a very certain case that these gentlemen who have been so much favoured, will never serve the queen thoroughly, though they will be very unwilling to part with their employments. And why the queen should accept of such services from people that have no reputation, Lord Marlborough and you will find it a pretty hard thing to give a good reason, when the whole world knows that there has not been upon the throne a person with more virtue and good qualities for the public, nor more surely in their interest.”

In this predicament Godolphin appealed to the duke for advice and consolation. The duchess also did not omit an opportunity of inveighing against the misconduct of a Tory ; and, yielding to her usual bias, recommended the duke of Newcastle, a zealous Whig, as a fit person to supply the place of Buckingham. These applications reached Marlborough in his toilsome march through Germany ; but he declined interfering, on the plea that his military business required his whole attention, and left the decision to Lord Godolphin, who, being on the spot, was more competent to form an accurate judgment.

So petty a cabal was forgotten amidst the grand events which ensued ; but in his progress from Landau to Treves he was assailed with new importunities. During his stay before Landau, and in his march to Treves, we find him venting his spleen against all parties.

To the Duchess.

“ *Camp at St. Wendel, October 20.* — That you may never feel the uneasiness I endure, and that every thing may go to your own heart's desire, is the earnest wishes of him that is much yours. In return I hope

I shall never be desired to recommend any body into a place of trust, being what I have resolved positively never to do. I shall serve the queen with all my soul, even to the hazard of a thousand lives if I had them. But while I live I will meddle with no business but what belongs to the army. And this I shall beg of the queen on my knees, if there be any occasion for it; and from henceforward shall never more use the expression of being of no party, but shall certainly not care what any party thinks of me, being resolved to recommend myself to the people of England, by being to the best of my understanding, in the true interest of my country."

To Lord Godolphin.

"*Camp near Traerbach, Nov. 3.* — If I do not succeed at Berlin, it will not be necessary for me to stay at either of these courts above two or three days. However, it will make my coming into England very late this year, so that I can't forbear writing to you about 19, for I have it from other letters as well as your's, that he is in measures with 17 (probably Nottingham) and 18*, to give all the obstruction that is in their power to the carrying on of the public business with vigour this sessions, on which I think not only the queen's honour, but her safety depends; for France is now in that condition, that if her majesty's arms have good success this next year, she will have it in her power to make such a peace as may make Christendom quiet as long as it may please God to bless us with her life. I do not think that 19 has any personal interest; but should he be left in the employment he is now in, it would be a great encouragement to others to do like him, which might be very prejudicial. I write very freely to you on this occasion, knowing his natural to be such, that his whole malice will be employed against yourself and me. I know not what her majesty's thoughts may be as to filling of that place; but I must put you in mind of what Mr. Guidot has many times said to me, that 55 (the duke of Newcastle) was the most desirous in the world of coming into her majesty's service. My objection was, he was too much a party man; he always replied, that he was sure that he would be every thing that the queen would have him. If her majesty could be assured of this, and that he would live at court, his estate is so very great that he would certainly be of use. You on the place are much more capable of judging what is right in this matter than I can possibly be at this distance; but I shall venture to say positively, that after the success of this summer, the more her majesty takes upon her to discountenance such as are not zealous in the common cause, the more her glory will increase both at home and abroad. I shall be at Landau on Thursday, from whence you shall have an account of that siege, which has lasted much longer than it ought to have done. I am ever yours."

But he was unable to repel their repeated instances, and at length yielded to new solicitations, though with unfeigned reluctance. In a letter to Godolphin, from the camp

* Probably Rochester.

near Traerbach, Nov. 3., he states, that as he was likely to be detained abroad longer than he expected, he could not avoid recommending the dismissal of the duke of Buckingham, and the transfer of the privy seal to the duke of Newcastle. He also acknowledges that his former hesitation on this point rose from his objections to Newcastle as a party man. In a letter of the same date to the duchess, he confesses that he had yielded to her importunities.

“ I did in a former letter tell you I did desire I might never have any hand in recommending any body to a place of trust; I am still of the same opinion, and I shall take it as a great mark of your kindness your indulging me in this. And unless you resolve not to ask me, I find I can't keep my resolution. I have writ to my lord treasurer as you desired concerning 19 and 55. I can refuse you nothing; and I beg you will give me that quiet of mind, as to tell me you approve of my resolution, and then I am sure I shall keep it. My troublesome journey to Berlin will be much easier to me by your thinking I ought to do it, because it may prove of service to the public. But I almost despair of success, though I do serve the queen and common cause with all my heart; but it is you only can give me much trouble, or make me very happy.”

CHAP. XXXI. — JOURNEY TO BERLIN. — 1704.

DURING his continuance before Landau, Marlborough had the satisfaction of promoting the conclusion of the treaty which had been pending with the electress of Bavaria since the battle of Blenheim. By arguments and remonstrances he conquered the repugnance of the emperor, whose inveteracy against the Bavarian family was extreme, and who was strongly inclined to visit on the electress and her children the political delinquency of her husband. After an arduous struggle between resentment on one hand, and wounded pride on the other, the electress agreed to surrender all the fortresses and magazines in Bavaria, to disband the army and militia, and to restore the conquests of her husband in the Tyrol. In return she was permitted to reside at Munich with a guard of 400 men, and to receive an adequate revenue for her support. The states of Bavaria were to retain their

privileges, but the whole country was placed under an Austrian administration.*

From the time of his arrival on the Rhine, Marlborough, though occupied with the military operations immediately under his direction, anxiously looked to the more distant scenes of the war, which, though extending to the remotest parts of Europe, yet rested on his decision and superintendence.

He had been long and seriously occupied in mediating a reconciliation between the court of Vienna and the Hungarian insurgents, an arrangement which was rendered extremely difficult by the jarring pretensions of the contending parties. The insurgents endeavoured to extort, not only a full confirmation of the religious liberties, but also of all the civil rights which their ancestors had ever enjoyed; while the emperor was equally averse to concessions which he deemed no less contrary to the interests of the Catholic church, than to the prerogatives of his crown. New difficulties also arose from the existing circumstances. The victory of Blenheim having removed the imminent danger which threatened the house of Austria, the emperor felt less anxiety for reconciliation with his contumacious subjects; while the Hungarians, considering the influence of Marlborough as rendered paramount by his late success, endeavoured to avail themselves of the anxiety which he had uniformly testified for an accommodation.

Indeed he had already employed his mediation, through the agency of Mr. Stepney, British envoy at Vienna, but without effect. Finding, however, that no progress could be made by an indirect correspondence, he summoned Mr. Stepney to the camp at Weissemburg, that he might obtain a more accurate knowledge of the question, and accelerate an arrangement by his personal instances with the king of the Romans, Prince Eugene, and the ministers who had attended the heir apparent to the army. Repeated conferences were held in vain; the affair was prolonged by continual appeals to the court of Vienna; and the dispute was aggravated by new persecutions at the instigation of the Jesuits, against which the insurgents indignantly appealed to the feelings of Marlborough. After a long discussion, no specific arrange-

* Falkenstein, p. 813.

ment could be adjusted, and he with regret was obliged to defer the accomplishment of this important negotiation to an indefinite period.

He experienced great difficulty also in arranging the complicated affairs of Portugal; and from his correspondence we trace the germ of those unfortunate disputes which afterwards contributed to dissipate the well-founded hopes formed of the war in the Peninsula.

The British fleet under the command of Sir George Rooke, which had conveyed Charles to Lisbon, had transported also a considerable auxiliary force of English and Dutch. The king of Portugal had pledged himself to hold in readiness a subsidiary army of 28,000 men, and it was proposed to open the campaign early in May, before the Spaniards could be prepared for defence. But these expectations were far from being realised. A long peace had enervated the Portuguese; their fortresses were dilapidated, their magazines unprovided; their troops, without pay or clothing, deserted in great numbers; horses were wanting for the conveyance of stores and baggage; the generals were inexperienced, and the captious spirit of Das Minas, the commander-in-chief, added continual obstructions to all active operations. The king himself, afflicted with a hypochondriac malady, had lost his wonted vigour of mind and body; the tardy forms of the government were a source of continual obstruction; the chief ministers were in the interest of France, and the indisposition of the sovereign furnished continual pretexts or occasions for delay.

Under such disadvantages the projected invasion of Spain could not be carried into effect; but Portugal itself became the first scene of this long and sanguinary war. An army of 40,000 Spaniards, assisted by a body of 12,000 French, under the command of the duke of Berwick, burst over the frontiers early in April, captured several petty fortresses, and reduced Castel Branco, the key of the Tagus.

In this alarming state of affairs, the disputes which arose between Schomberg and Fagel, the English and Dutch commanders, increased the confusion, and a similar spirit of contention broke forth with the Portuguese. After a repose of a few weeks, during the summer heats, a new arrangement of the command was found necessary. By the advice of

Marlborough, the earl of Galway was chosen to supersede Schomberg, and landed at Lisbon on the 3d of July, with a reinforcement of 4000 men. The army being refreshed and reorganised, Charles and the king of Portugal, who had partially recovered from his malady, took the field in person, with the design of penetrating to Madrid; but the usual bickerings and discordance arising, they were unable to contend with the skill and ability of Berwick, and deemed themselves sufficiently fortunate in delivering the country from the insults of a hostile army.

On the eastern coast of Spain an attempt by the prince of Hesse Darmstadt, assisted with the English fleet, to surprise Barcelona, failed of success. A compensation was, however, made for the disappointment by the capture of Gibraltar, which being ill guarded, was surprised by a small body of English sailors, as the fleet was returning to Lisbon, discouraged and discontented. This valuable acquisition, though afterwards of such essential advantage in the operations of the war, and of such permanent utility to England, was now rather a burden than a benefit; because the cares required for its security divided the attention of the commanders, diverted the fleet from other services, and weakened an army already too reduced for a vigorous effort.

From this brief survey of the campaign, we may readily conceive the anxiety which agitated the mind of Marlborough, who was made arbiter and mediator of every dispute, and the director of every operation, and whose attention was incessantly employed in soothing the captious spirit of the Portuguese, in modifying the contending pretensions of the English and Dutch, and in combating the importunities of all parties in England for appointments and commands.

Marlborough also interested himself with the greatest zeal in the arrangement for granting relief to the duke of Savoy. In Italy the superiority of the French forces had overborne all opposition. Victor Amadeus, unable to withstand the enemy in the field, had witnessed the reduction of Vercelli and Ivrea, and the investment of Verrua, the key of his capital; and posting his little army at Crescentino, had confined his efforts to the supply of troops and provisions, in order to protract as long as possible the crisis of his fate. He bore his reverses with the most laudable magnanimity,

and on the zeal and activity of the British commander placed his only hopes of relief. Mr. Hill, who was an eye-witness of his distress, spoke his sentiments in a letter to Marlborough; and after enumerating a long catalogue of disasters, added, "We expect salvation from no side but from your grace, but from thence we do expect it."

On this subject Leopold also interested himself with unusual warmth. Anxious to expel the French from Italy, he sent a letter to the British commander, apprising him that the Marquis de Prie, minister of the duke of Savoy, had solicited assistance, and was deputed to make a similar appeal to him and Eugene. After stating the deplorable situation of the duke of Savoy, the emperor strongly supported his demand, and urged that the reduction of Ivrea would involve the loss of the capital, and leave the unfortunate prince no alternative but to submit to the terms dictated by France. He argued that the conquest of Piedmont would be followed by a more strenuous effort in Spain, whither the enemy would then turn their victorious arms. After stating that he would himself have furnished the succours required, had not his whole disposable force been employed, and Hungary in an unsettled state, he concludes by requesting that Marlborough would not dismiss the minister, at least without consolation; but that he would devise with his colleagues the means of detaching a powerful succour. He then expatiated on the impolicy of suffering so useful an ally to be overwhelmed; and added, that his son and his generals were authorised to confer on the subject with the minister of Savoy.*

Marlborough did not need such pressing instances to stimulate his zeal. In the course of his correspondence we find that his thoughts had been long and seriously employed in discovering a remedy. Such a remedy was however by no means easily devised. The auxiliary troops, in the pay of the maritime powers, could not be drafted for a winter campaign into Italy, because it was expressly stipulated that they should not serve out of Germany. It was equally impracticable to make a draft from the army in the Netherlands, and even money could elicit no farther aid from the petty princes in Germany. As little could he rely on any assistance from the imperial court, notwithstanding their magnifi-

* Letter from the Emperor Leopold to the Duke of Marlborough.

cent promises; for he observes, in a letter to Godolphin, "Should the emperor send into Italy all the troops he can supply, they would not amount to more than 3000 men." Even for so small a detachment no magazines were provided; and it was the observation of Eugene, that if sent, they must perish for want of subsistence.

In this predicament, no resource was left but to apply to the king of Prussia for a subsidiary corps of 8000 men, and endeavour to obtain his consent by a new appeal to his vanity. On this subject Marlborough secretly disclosed his views to the lord treasurer, and offered, though with undisguised reluctance, to solicit the aid in person. He found, however, great objections to the proposal, from the anxiety of Godolphin and the queen for his speedy return to England, as well as from the importunities of the duchess, who dreaded the effects of so toilsome a journey in the heart of winter, after his late severe indisposition.* His own letters also announce his extreme aversion to this fatiguing expedition; but he could not withstand the instances of the emperor, the heartfelt appeals of the duke of Savoy, the solicitations of the king of the Romans, and above all the conviction of its necessity. October 3d, he observes to the duchess:—

"After I have disposed of every thing for the taking such winter quarters as I wish to have, I shall not stay a day longer with the troops than what is absolutely necessary; for if the service should require my going to Berlin, that will cost me at least a fortnight. I am very much afraid that my going may do no good; but if I should not go, the emperor and the States may think the eight thousand men might have been had, if I could have taken the pains of going: so that you see if they insist upon it, I must undertake that trouble."

Finding the siege of Landau still prolonged beyond his expectations, he left the command of the covering army to Eugene, and took his departure for Berlin on the 15th of November, with a heavy heart, and expresses his chagrin at the prospect of his irksome journey. "I think," says he, "to begin my journey on Friday or Saturday next. I own that my heart aches at the thought of it, since I shall be forced to go above eight hundred miles before I get to the Hague, in the very worst time of the year; and that which

* Letters from Marlborough to Godolphin and the Duchess, in September and October.

is worst of all, with very little hopes of succeeding." During his journey he had the satisfaction of hearing that Landau had surrendered. The intelligence was communicated from the royal camp at Ibbesville, November 23d, by Joseph himself. The notification was written, as is usual, in the diplomatic style, and in the Latin tongue, and signed "Benevolus Consanguineus Josephus." But the young monarch, instead of confining himself to the mere form of the chancery, added in his own hand expressions of his gratitude: — "To you I owe the success of this enterprise. I hope it will not be the last we shall obtain together. I shall never forget the services which you have rendered to the common cause, as well as to my house; and I shall always derive great pleasure in giving you marks of my esteem and affection."

Marlborough reached Berlin in the evening of the 22d of November, and without a moment's delay waited on the king and queen, who received him with great kindness, and testified their gratitude to his sovereign. He superseded the formalities of a punctilious court, and after two audiences of the king, entered into the details of the negotiation with the ministers. The greatest difficulty which he had to combat was derived from the dread of the king lest the conflict between Sweden and Poland would spread into his own dominions, during the absence of his troops. The difficulty was increased by the arrival of the grand treasurer of Poland, who was despatched by Augustus for the purpose of forming a common cause with Prussia against the attacks of Sweden. This envoy even recurred to the duke for the support of the queen and States. But Marlborough dexterously eluded the application; and carefully abstaining from extraneous discussions, he directed his whole efforts to allay the fears which the king felt at the designs of Sweden. At length he succeeded in gaining his assent, by pledging his sovereign and the States, not only to secure the tranquillity of the Prussian territories during the absence of the troops, but also to employ their concurrence in preventing the extension of the troubles which threatened the German empire. He thus not only obtained the auxiliary succour, but he also performed great service to the common cause, by prevailing on the capricious monarch to suspend his claims to the inheritance of King William, which had already produced a serious

misunderstanding with the Dutch. We close this subject by the insertion of some letters to the duchess from Berlin and Hanover.

“*Nov. 23.* — I writ to you from Cassel, and since have had no opportunity of writing till now. The ways have been so bad I have been obliged to be every day fourteen or fifteen hours on the road, which has made my side very sore; but the three or four days I shall stay here will make me able to go on. Besides, I intend remaining two days at Hanover, and after that shall make all the haste I can to the Hague, when I hope to despatch every thing, so as to embark in eight days if the wind prove fair. I have not time to open the letters that are come from England, and must answer them by the next post. I am with heart and soul yours.”

“*Nov. 25.* — I am very sorry that poor Lady Sunderland’s boy is not well, for I am sensible how great a trouble such a loss would be. As to what she writes concerning the city, I shall like whatever you and 16 shall think proper. I have been invited by the burgomaster of Amsterdam; and if that town continues to be of the opinion to see me there when I come into Holland, I intend to go for one day, as I shall do at London, if my friends think proper, without considering what party governs; for by the help of God I shall endeavour to govern myself by what I think is right, and not because it may be desired by a party; for I am so little fond of any party that I no ways envy what is done to 64. Were the affairs of the queen and Europe in such a condition that one might sleep quietly and safely in his own house, I had much rather any body were at the head of the army than myself; for parties are grown so very unreasonable that one ought not to expect any other than hardships, though without faults, when success is not with us.”

“*Nov. 27.* — I have been forced to stay here three days longer than I intended; but at last I have finished so far that they have promised to sign the treaty for 8000 men, for the duke of Savoy, at twelve o’clock this day, at which time I shall have my coach ready; but shall not be able to get to Hanover till Monday night, and hope to finish what I have to do there by Wednesday night, so that I may set forward to Holland on Thursday. I am very well contented at the pains I have taken in coming hither, since it has obtained 8000 men for the speedy relief of the duke of Savoy, this being the only prince of the empire in condition to send any men. I hope Holland, as well as her majesty, will approve of what I have done, it being the only thing that in probability can save Savoy. It is not to be expressed the civilities and honours they have done me here, the ministers assuring me that no other body could have prevailed with the king. My next will be from Hanover, and then you must not expect to hear from me till I come to Holland. I am with all my heart entirely yours. My most humble duty to the queen.”

At his last audience, the king of Prussia, after having testified great satisfaction for the kind visit, and after many warm expressions of esteem and friendship, honoured him

with presents of considerable value. In his way from Berlin to the Hague, he made a short stay at Hanover to pay his respects to the elector, and was received with those demonstrations of respect and esteem which were due to the glorious commander who had secured the liberties of Germany.

“*Hanover, Dec. 2.* — On my arrival here I found two of your dear letters; and could you know the true satisfaction I have when they are kind, you will ever make me happy. I shall go from hence on Thursday, so that on this day se’nnight I hope to write from the Hague, where I will make as little stay as the business will allow of. I have so much respect shown me here that I have hardly time to write. The king of Prussia did me all the honour he could; and indeed I have met with more kindness and respect everywhere than I could have imagined. But by my letters from England I find that zeal and success is only capable of protecting me from the malice of villanous faction; so that if it were not for the great obligation I owe to the queen, nothing should persuade me evermore to stir out of England. We have the news here that Landau and Traerbach are taken, so that thanks be to God this campaign is ended, to the greatest advantage for the allies that has been for a great while. I long extremely to be with you and the children, so that you may be sure I shall lose no time when the wind is fair.”

Having attained the object for which he took this tedious journey in so late a season, Marlborough returned to the Hague in order to embark for England with the first fair wind, as soon as he had arranged the measures for opening the next campaign as early and as vigorously as possible.*

CHAP. XXXII. — MARLBOROUGH ARRIVES IN ENGLAND. —
1704.

DURING the continuance of Marlborough at the Hague, he received many communications from his correspondents in England, on the proceedings in parliament and the state and temper of parties. In the speech from the throne, the queen noticed the unanimous joy and satisfaction of all her good subjects at the great and remarkable success with which God had blessed her arms; and observed, that a timely improvement of the present advantages would enable her to establish a lasting foundation of peace for England, and a

* See Appendix, note D.

firm support for the liberty of Europe. After requiring the necessary supplies from the Commons, and urging a speedy despatch of business, she concluded with recommending unanimity at home as the surest means of baffling the hopes of her enemies, who placed their principal reliance on the feuds and divisions of her people.

Congratulatory addresses were voted by both houses, though in a different style. The Commons, among whom the Tory interest predominated, expressed their satisfaction at the glorious success of her arms under the command of the Duke of Marlborough; but still, with a bias to their principles and party, they did not hesitate to bestow similar praise on the indecisive engagement of Sir George Rooke with the French fleet off Malaga, thus depreciating the great event which had given liberty to Germany, to a level with an action which produced neither honour nor advantage. The Lords, on the contrary, expressed the national sentiment by passing over in silence an engagement unworthy of public thanks, and confining their praises to the exploits of the illustrious commander. In a strain of spirited eulogium, they added, "We can never enough admire your majesty's wisdom and courage in sending that reasonable and necessary assistance to the empire, and we cannot too much commend the secrecy and bravery with which your orders were executed."*

But whatever were the feelings of party, or the prejudices of individuals, the splendid successes of the campaign overbore all opposition, and confounded all attempts to prevent the vigorous prosecution of the war. The queen was requested by the legislature to bestow her bounty on the soldiers and sailors who had deserved so well of their country; the supplies were voted without a dissenting voice; the ways and means were settled without difficulty; and the land-tax bill, which formed the principal branch, received the royal assent on the 9th of December, only six weeks after the commencement of the session.

But though unable to withstand the current of popular opinion, the violent Tories seized the earliest opportunity to thwart the measures of government, by reviving the bill

* Journals of both houses, and Chandler's Debates of Lords and Commons.

against Occasional Conformity. Notwithstanding their defeat in the preceding year, they were too desirous of reducing the influence of their political opponents to relinquish this favourite scheme. By adopting such changes as were calculated to obviate the former objections, they hoped to render it more palatable; and therefore they now again brought it forward with some amendments in the preamble, and similar modifications in the penalties.

But since the last struggle a considerable change had taken place on this subject in the mind of the queen and in the sentiments of the ministry. However inclined to the high-church doctrines, she was not ignorant of the selfish and interested motives which actuated the movers of this obnoxious law. Both Marlborough and the lord treasurer, though imbued with the same opinions, were still more conscious that the bill was not intended as a security to the church, but as a covert attack against themselves and the Whigs by whom they were supported.

Nothing, however, could restrain the animosity of the zealous Tories; and knowing the secret inclinations of the queen to be at variance with her public declaration, they persisted more strenuously in their design, the more it was deprecated by the ministers. To give strength and consistency to their efforts, they formed clubs and societies, and appeared determined to sacrifice the principles of the constitution and the honour of the country, rather than relinquish their darling object. As they expected the most vigorous opposition in the House of Lords, they resolved to make the grant of the supply depend on the fate of the bill.

After these preparatory measures, the act was again brought into the House of Commons by Mr. Bromley, and was ordered for a second reading. To vanquish the opposition of the peers, the authors of the measure proposed to tack it to the bill for the land tax, the only branch of the supply which had not been voted; although on the credit of that grant, Marlborough had concluded the treaty with Prussia, for a succour of 8000 men, who were now marching to relieve the duke of Savoy.

This unconstitutional attempt furnished still stronger objections against the measure than even its undisguised spirit of persecution. The moderate Tories, with Harley at

their head, were deeply offended by the factious conduct of those with whom they were hitherto identified, and heartily joined with the Whigs and court-party to thwart the obnoxious act. Lord Cutts and Sir Charles Hedges, though Tories, dwelt with peculiar energy on the discouragement which any division between the two houses on this contested point would spread through the whole confederacy, as well as on the mischief which must ensue to the common cause, if the treaty with the king of Prussia, which the Duke of Marlborough had concluded on the faith of parliament, should be suspended. To the honour of a large body among the Tories, these cogent arguments outweighed the prejudices of party. The movers of the bill were deserted by 120 of their friends, and the tack was negatived by a majority of 251 against 134, among whom we distinguish Harley and his adherents.*

Although foiled in this effort, the bill without the tack was carried through the house by the Tory interest, and transmitted to the Lords. In the upper house it would have been negatived almost without a division, had not the queen herself appeared in the gallery, with the view of allaying dissensions by her presence. The expedient, however, produced a contrary effect; for the hope of making an impression on the mind of the sovereign called forth all the eloquence of the contending parties. It was at length rejected by a majority of twenty-one voices more than on the last occasion. Lord Godolphin and the Duke of Marlborough, who had just returned from abroad, gave each a silent vote

* The Duke of Marlborough was abroad when this effort was made in the House of Commons; but we are acquainted with his sentiments by a letter which he wrote from the Hague to Harley, to whom he principally ascribed the defeat of the bill.

“Dec. 16. — I must confess by what was sent the former post I could not help being under some apprehensions from the proceedings of the House of Commons, with relation to the Occasional Bill; so that the account you now send me was so much the more welcome. And when I reflect on the dangerous consequences the obstinacy of some people might have produced, I cannot but think this happy turn is as great a victory with reference to England as any advantages we have had since I saw you; and I hope every body will do you the justice to attribute the greatest share of it to your prudent management and zeal for the public.”

against the bill. The protest was signed only by Nottingham, Rochester, and the most zealous Tories.*

The violence of the high Tories produced the deepest injury to their cause. Their defeat increased the schism in the party, and contributed to alienate still more the treasurer and the commander. In adverting to this subject, the language of Marlborough assumes an unwonted tone of hostility, which proves his increasing aversion to a party with whom he had once cordially acted. In a letter afterwards addressed to Lord Godolphin, dated April 14., he observes, "As to what you say of the tackers, I think the answer and method that should be taken is what is practised in all armies, that is, if the enemy give no quarter, they should have none given to them." Godolphin also adopted a similar tone in his correspondence with the duchess. "Although," he says, "there must be no present resentment shown, nor so much as threatened, yet I assure you, when the session is over, I shall never think any man fit to continue in his employment who gave his vote for the tack."

In the midst of this political struggle, Marlborough arrived in England. He quitted the Hague on the 11th of December, and embarked on board one of the royal yachts, in company with Marshal Tallard and other prisoners of distinction, bringing with him the standards and other trophies of his victory. He landed on the 14th, and the same morning experienced a cordial reception from the queen, to whom he paid his respects at the palace of St. James. On the following day he took his seat in the House of Peers, and was welcomed by the lord keeper with an address of congratulation, and the same day a committee of the Commons attended him to express their thanks for his great and glorious services. His answers to both evinced the modest dignity of a great mind; for, next to the blessing of God, he ascribed his success to the extraordinary courage of the officers and soldiers under his command.

Every honour and reward which could be conferred on a subject was lavished on the able and fortunate commander. On the 3d of January the trophies of the victory were removed from the Tower, where they were first deposited,

* Journals of the Lords and Commons—Chandler's Debates—Tindal—Oldmixon—Mrs. Burnet's Letters to the Duchess of Marlborough.

to Westminster Hall. The cavalcade consisted of companies of horse and foot guards, intermixed with persons of distinction, who attended to do honour to the occasion, and was closed by one hundred and twenty-eight pike men, each bearing an uplifted standard. Amidst the thunder of artillery, and the shouts of an exulting multitude, the procession moved through the streets of London and Westminster in solemn pomp, and traversing the Green Park, was viewed by the queen from one of the windows of the palace. Since the defeat of the Spanish Armada, so triumphant a spectacle had never gladdened the eyes of a British public; nor was the effect unworthy of the occasion; the pulse of the nation beat high with joy, and the names of Anne and Marlborough were mingled amidst the testimonies of tumultuous exultation, which burst from all ranks and orders.*

On the 6th the duke attended a grand entertainment, which was given in Goldsmiths' Hall, by the lord mayor and heads of the city. He was conveyed in one of the royal carriages, and accompanied by the lord treasurer, the duke of Somerset, master of the horse, and the prince of Hesse, who had so well distinguished himself in the same field of honour; and attended by a numerous cavalcade of carriages, filled with foreign ministers, generals, and persons of the most exalted rank. At Temple Bar he was received in the usual state by the city marshals; and the multitude, who thronged the streets, and crowded the roofs and windows of every house, to catch a glance of their illustrious countryman, evinced the general interest taken in his success, and the heartfelt gratitude which it awakened in every bosom.†

The queen was eager to testify her regard to the fortunate commander; but recollecting the disappointment of her proposal the preceding year, it was thought more proper, that the usual recompence attached to great actions should be given by the spontaneous voice of the national representatives. In her speech to parliament, she therefore simply alluded to the late glorious victory, without even mentioning the name of the duke, or alluding to any remuneration. Indeed any appeal to public feeling was needless; for the party who had so contemptuously rejected the former

* History of Europe, January 1705—Tindal—Lediard.

† History of Europe, for January 1705.

proposal, was silenced by the national voice. The Commons accordingly presented an address, soliciting her majesty to consider of proper means for perpetuating the memory of the great services performed by the Duke of Marlborough.

Anne rejoiced that she could at length indulge the sentiments of her gratitude towards the duke and affection towards the duchess. On the 17th of February she informed the house, that in conformity with their application, she purposed to convey to the Duke of Marlborough and his heirs the interest of the crown in the manor and honour of Woodstock, with the hundred of Wootton, and requested supplies for clearing off the incumbrances on that domain. A bill for the purpose being immediately introduced, passed both houses without opposition, and received the royal sanction on the 14th of March. The preamble contained a recapitulation of the unparalleled services performed by Marlborough, not only to his own sovereign and fellow-subjects, but to all Europe; and that the gift itself should remain as a perpetual memorial, it was made a condition of the tenure, that the possessor should present to the queen and her successors, on the anniversary of the victory, a standard emblazoned with three fleurs-de-lis on a field argent, the achievement of France.

Not satisfied that the nation alone should testify its gratitude, the queen accompanied the grant with an order to the Board of Works to erect, at the royal expense, a splendid palace, which, in memory of the victory, was to be called the Castle of Blenheim. A model was immediately constructed for the approbation of the queen, and the work was commenced without delay, under the direction of Mr. (afterwards Sir John) Vanbrugh, who was then regarded as one of the first architects of the age.*

* Of the affable manner and personal appearance of the duke at this brilliant epoch of his history we have the testimony of Evelyn. In his Diary, for February 9. 1705, he gives the following account of an accidental meeting he had with the great general: — “I went to wait on my lord treasurer, where was the victorious Duke of Marlborough, who came to me and took me by the hand with extraordinary familiarity and civility, as formerly he used to do, without any alteration of his good nature. He had a most rich George in a sardonyx, set with diamonds of very great value; for the rest very plain. I had not seen him for some years, and believed he might have forgotten me.” — ED.

CHAP. XXXIII. — CHARACTERS OF THE WHIG JUNTA. —
1705.

THE factious conduct of the high Tories in general, and particularly their recent attempt to extort the acquiescence of the peers in the bill against occasional conformity, by means of the tack, produced an essential change in the sentiments and political system of Marlborough and Godolphin.

Notwithstanding repeated insults and mortifications, they had hitherto adhered to the party with whom they had been long identified; and even when compelled to break with the more violent, they still preserved their connexion with the moderate, and laboured to retain, in the offices of government, a majority of those who professed congenial sentiments. But they now felt from experience that nothing would conciliate the spirit of faction; and they saw in the example of Buckingham and his adherents the impossibility of continuing to act on the same independent system. The unpopularity of the violent Tories, who became notorious under the name of tackers, gave an additional bias to their sentiments, and furnished new motives for a change of domestic policy.

During the winter, Marlborough and Godolphin had seriously deliberated on their future conduct towards the two contending parties, and on the measures to be pursued in the elections for the new parliament, which, according to the triennial act, was to meet in the ensuing April. They concurred in a resolution to conciliate the confidence of the moderate and liberal on both sides. Hence Marlborough had introduced Harley and St. John into the ministry, tolerated Secretary Hedges, and though he contributed to the exclusion of Rochester, Nottingham, Sir E. Seymour, and Jersey, yet he was unwilling to reduce the strength of his own party by admitting the Whigs to a greater share of power. But even his discerning mind was deceived in his opinion on party politics; or rather he miscalculated when he supposed that the leaders of the Whigs would continue to support the government while they were held in a state of proscription, and excluded from all offices of trust; and he as little estimated their strength and resources. For

while the Tories were divided, the great body of the Whigs formed a complete phalanx, impelled by the same spirit, and directed to the same end. As the constant supporters of the war, and increasing in consequence from its success, they looked forward to an augmentation of their numbers in the approaching election, and a gradual introduction of their chiefs into power. The leaders of this body were five peers, who are distinguished in the histories of the times by the name of the Junta, and who were all men of superior talents, and had performed essential services to the nation, by their exertions in promoting the Protestant succession, and their public services during the reign of William. These five peers were Somers, Wharton, Halifax, Orford, and Sunderland.

In his public capacity, Lord Somers was a true patriot, if a true patriot ever existed. Hitherto he had not swerved a tittle from the principles of that revolution of which he was one of the great movers, and to which he sacrificed his private interests and that honourable ambition of which no one is devoid. Of the real Whigs, he was the only one who possessed the favour and affection of William, as was proved by the extreme reluctance with which the king consented to his removal. He highly deserved this confidence by an attachment to the royal person peculiarly disinterested, an unshaken probity, and a devotion to the true principles of the constitution. In the great struggle which agitated the last year of William's reign, he proved his firmness and patriotism by assisting the king with his zealous advice and support; though he refused to accept an ostensible office, because he would not associate himself with the Tories who were retained in the administration. On the accession of Anne, the mortification of being excluded from the privy council, and the unmerited slights which would have driven a man of less firmness and integrity into petulant opposition, produced no effect on his magnanimous mind; and he gave his zealous support to the measures which he deemed necessary for the welfare and independence of England. Though constitutionally impetuous and irritable, he had so far conquered the frailties of nature, as to master the movements of his ardent spirit at the time that his mind was agitated with contending passions. But while he repressed the ebullitions

of his natural temper, he retained all its warmth in his attachments to his friends and country; and he commanded the respect and esteem even of those who were most hostile to his principles. His elocution was flowing, perspicuous, and manly; his reasoning close and powerful. As a lawyer, he attentively studied the principles of the constitution; not with the confined views of professional research, but with the extensive comprehension and accurate discernment of a statesman. Nor were his acquirements confined to internal regulations; he was a master of foreign affairs, and profoundly versed in diplomatic business, as well as in the political interests of Europe. The respectable traits of his character were blended and softened down with those amiable propensities and pursuits which are calculated to adorn life and illustrate high station. He possessed an exquisite taste for polite literature and the fine arts; and for his attachment to science he was chosen president of the Royal Society. He carried his humility and reserve almost to an extreme; for he was easy and flexible, and too often suffered his own better judgment to be biassed by the violent counsels of his colleagues, who were far his inferiors in patriotism, disinterestedness, and information.

Somers entertained the highest respect for the great talents and services of Marlborough, whose military plans he supported with all his eloquence and interest. He rendered justice also to the financial talents and tried integrity of Godolphin; but regarded his want of firmness and decision with a feeling almost bordering on contempt. He was disgusted also with the domineering and captious spirit of the duchess, and while he approved her zeal in the Whig cause, he lamented her imprudent and intemperate conduct towards her royal mistress, of which he foresaw the fatal effects.*

* The late Lord Eldon once remarked that he was a "Whig," upon the model of this eminent statesman and patron of literature. In the public history of both was this defect, that the love of power made them too compliant to the predilections of their respective sovereigns. However, Lord Somers was greatly superior to the favourite Lord Chancellor of George III. in his public services, varied attainments, and intellectual grasp. He had been the steady opponent of the mistaken course of the Stuarts, and the chief organiser and director of the Revolution of 1688. Another great national measure of his time was projected and mainly consummated by him, namely, the legislative union

Charles Montagu, Lord Halifax, being descended in a direct line from the earl of Manchester, the distinction of his family brought him first into notice, and he increased this distinction by his literary talents, amiable manners, and social qualities. With these he united an accurate knowledge of finance, to which he directed his studies as a source of advancement, after he had obtained a seat in the House of Commons. To his labours the country was indebted for the stability of paper credit, and the improvement of the coin.

Having raised himself to the office of first commissioner of the treasury, he was exposed to the incessant hostilities of the Tories, and persecuted by them in the House of Commons with unrelenting severity; but he was the Samson of his party, and repelled with unabated vigour the multiplied attacks of his political adversaries. Though firm and manly in debate, he was interested, timid, and versatile as a politician; and was not without reason accused of occasionally sacrificing his political tenets to selfishness or fear. From this motive he exchanged his place at the treasury board for the lucrative and permanent office of auditor of the exchequer, and he accepted a peerage to escape from the perpetual warfare of the House of Commons. But in this hope he was disappointed, for he was impeached as a peer; and though he parried the attack, he was still exposed to incessant warfare. In the Upper House he found a more congenial situation, and a fitter theatre for the brilliance and elegance of his oratory. After relinquishing a responsible office for the sake of tranquillity or gain, his restless spirit was not satisfied. He was incessantly caballing with those who possessed the private favour of the queen; he was always craving for some situation which he could hold with his post in the exchequer, and particularly anxious to obtain a diplomatic mission abroad. He carried his importunities to such a degree as to disgust Marlborough, who in his private letters complains of his restless and captious temper. This occasioned frequent bickerings, and indeed laid the

with Scotland. Somers was born in 1652, and was the son of a respectable attorney of Worcester. He was never married; but, according to the testimony of the Duchess of Marlborough, who at a later period had quarrelled with him, he "lived with another man's wife as publicly as if she had been his own."—ED.

foundation of a secret dislike in the mind of Halifax, which afterwards instigated the versatile peer to injure him by insidious accusations at the court of Hanover. He courted with unceasing assiduity the Duchess of Marlborough, and regaled her with concerts and entertainments; but although his attentions were grateful to her vanity, and although he at first was admitted to her confidence, he soon irritated her jealous temper, and lost her esteem.*

Lord Wharton has shared the fate of the most illustrious characters who have identified themselves with a particular party. He is eulogised by the Whigs as one of the principal instruments of the Revolution, and the paragon of political perfection. By the Tories he is decried as a turbulent and restless demagogue, imbued with republicanism and infidelity; as hostile to the true principles of the monarchy, and no less hostile to the established church. Descended from an illustrious family in the north, he was eldest son and heir to Philip Lord Wharton. He was born and bred a dissenter, but conformed to the national worship, although he was still friendly to his former sect, and partial to its principles. His wife continued a rigid presbyterian, and a disciple of the celebrated Mr. Howe, a dissenting minister, who was distinguished for his eloquence, enthusiasm, and piety.

In his early career Wharton was a companion of Charles II., and was led by the royal example and influence to share in the orgies of a licentious court. Still, however, his political principles remained uncontaminated, and amidst all the blandishments of pleasure, he evinced such a decided attachment to constitutional freedom, that in 1677 he was sent with Buckingham and Shaftesbury to the Tower, for questioning the legality of the sitting parliament. Under James II. he

* Like Lord Somers, Lord Halifax took a leading part in effecting the union with Scotland, and was, like him, an active patron of letters. He was the first public man to call attention to the state of the national records in the Tower, which were then in great disorder and visible decay; he also interested himself in preserving the Cottonian manuscripts, and in making them accessible to the public. He pleaded strongly for a public library, upon the plan of that we now possess in the British Museum. Pope has left a well-known quotation to commemorate his grateful recollections of him as his first patron, in the translation of the Iliad. On the accession of George I., Halifax again became a lord of the Treasury, but died a few months after, in 1715.—ED.

became a still more strenuous opponent of Popery and arbitrary power, and was one of the first gentlemen who joined the Prince of Orange.

Next to Somers, he was the most distinguished of that party which placed William and Mary on the throne. He was rewarded by the new sovereign with the place of comptroller of the household, but was never advanced to any political office; because William, however grateful for his services, and however conscious of his talents and consistency, was yet disgusted with his overbearing temper, and offended by his uniform antipathy to Robert earl of Sunderland, whom he persecuted with unceasing acrimony, till he forced him from office. Wharton was disappointed in various attempts to obtain the seals of secretary of state; but in spite of repeated slights and mortifications, he still retained his office in the household.

He was a bold, fluent, and manly debater, yet better calculated for the meridian of the lower, than for that of the upper house. His eloquence was coarse and popular; his attacks merciless, and his wit ready and poignant, but often degenerating into ribaldry, which induced Bolingbroke, in language equally coarse, to call him the scavenger of his party.* In his aversion to high-church principles, he went beyond the free-thinkers of the age; for he scoffed at religion itself, and made no concealment of his infidelity. Though bold, ardent, and overbearing, he was skilled in the management of the passions, and calculated to shine in the tumult of elections and popular assemblies. On such occasions he could control or conceal his natural impetuosity, and with a wonderful address accommodate himself to the interests, feelings, and prejudices of those whom he wished to command.

At the accession of Anne, being ejected from his office as head of the household, and his place in the privy council, he did not imitate the disinterestedness of Somers, but sought to satisfy his disappointed ambition and avidity, by an opposition of the most violent kind. Indeed, it is difficult to judge to what extremities his disgust and vengeance might have prompted him, had he not been restrained by the advice and representations of Somers, and the more consider-

* Correspondence.

able members of the party. Still, however, his natural temper continually broke forth; and we find him depicted in the letters of Marlborough, as well as in those from Maynwaring to the duchess, as insatiable in his demands, irascible in temper, turbulent and unmanageable in his political capacity, and even secretly caballing with the new favourites of the queen. These defects were more dangerous, because he possessed the confidence of the Whigs, for his strenuous exertions in favour of the Protestant succession, and his uniform opposition to the restoration of the Stuarts. He was now looking forward to the rank of an earl; but no increase of honours could sate his avidity, and he was no less craving for an office of profit and dignity. Knowing the queen's aversion to him in particular, and the reluctance of Marlborough and Godolphin to his promotion, he was determined to extort by force what he could not obtain by persuasion; he was anxious to break through the barriers of the cabinet, by obtruding some less obnoxious Whig into office, that he with the other leaders might secure an opening for themselves.*

Edward Russel, earl of Orford, the brother of the celebrated John Lord Russel, was originally groom of the chamber to the duke of York, and in that situation seems to have formed an early friendship with Marlborough. He owed his rise and reputation more to the sufferings and merits of his illustrious family, to his professional skill, and to the share he took in the Revolution, than to his superior talents as an orator or statesman. In private life he was irritable and impetuous, blunt and overbearing; in public he was interested, and ambitious of distinction. Disgusted with the king for his neglect of the Whigs, his resentment threw him into the opposite extreme. He remonstrated with William for his severe treatment of Marlborough, and, like him, he entered into a correspondence with the exiled family, which proved a source of perpetual embarrassment. Notwithstanding this secret infidelity, he exalted his character

* The character of this member of the junta calls to mind the first Richard Brinsley Sheridan, exhibiting a singular union of cleverness and laxity of private conduct, with great firmness and integrity in public life. Lord Wharton died in 1715, leaving a son more remarkable than himself for talent, eccentricity and dissipation. — ED.

by the victory off La Hogue ; and was justly regarded as the person who most contributed to effect and maintain the Revolution. For this and subsequent services he was created earl of Orford. As he offended and alienated all parties by his grasping and impetuous spirit, he had been repeatedly raised to office and as repeatedly dismissed ; but these partial possessions of power only contributed to increase his appetite for rule, and to give new force to his disgust with the government. Of all the junta, Orford was perhaps at this time the most obnoxious to the queen ; because, in common with her aversion to his party, she regarded with peculiar jealousy a nobleman whose professional talents, popularity, and personal views, rendered him the rival, and often the censor of the prince of Denmark in the management of the admiralty. Notwithstanding his friendship and connexions with Marlborough, his roughness and impetuosity occasionally alienated a nobleman who was distinguished by contrary qualities ; and in the correspondence between the two ministers, he is often depicted in the same unfavourable colours as Halifax and Wharton.

The character of Sunderland, the youngest of the junta, has been sufficiently delineated. We shall therefore only observe, that he was zealously attached to Somers, whose opinions he regarded as the dictates of an oracle.

These were the five chiefs who wielded the strength of the Whig party. They were supported by the dukes of Devonshire, Somerset, and Newcastle, in the upper house, where they possessed a considerable majority ; and in the lower house they found zealous advocates in Boyle, chancellor of the exchequer, Cowper, attorney-general, Smith, whom they afterwards raised to the office of speaker, and Walpole, who now began his long public career.

Indignant at the political anathema under which they had long laboured, the Whigs now began to exact that attention which they considered as due to their influence and services, and by dexterously availing themselves of the schism which had taken place among the Tories, and the necessity which the ministers felt for their support, they at length forced the general and treasurer into a change of system. Accordingly, at the very moment when addresses were heaped on Sir George Rooke, equalling him with the Duke of Marlborough,

his disfavour with the court was announced by his removal from his post at the head of the fleet. He was succeeded by Sir Cloudesley Shovel, a popular officer and a Whig, and Sir John Leake, with Sir George Byng, who had both distinguished themselves, as well in the Whig cause as by their professional talents, were promoted to commands. Several Whigs were introduced into the subordinate offices of government: among them we notice Mr. Walpole, who was appointed one of the council to Prince George of Denmark, at the particular recommendation of Marlborough. Soon afterwards more of the party were nominated lord-lieutenants of counties, and others were admitted into the privy council. But the greatest triumph was the removal of Buckingham, which had been approved by Marlborough in the preceding year, and had been retarded only by the resistance of the queen. The Whigs had even extorted from the ministers a promise of dismissing Sir Nathan Wright from the office of lord keeper, and transferring the great seal to Mr. Cowper, a lawyer of tried integrity, and one of the ablest champions in the House of Commons.

Inspired with new confidence by this success, they looked forward to the gradual introduction of their leaders into the higher offices of government. They did not therefore fail to take advantage of the troubled state of affairs in Scotland, and the anxiety which Godolphin felt to effect an union of the two countries as the only expedient which could obviate the dangers likely to arise from the act of security. This measure, being naturally opposed by the numerous adherents of the exiled family, as well as by the high Tories, its accomplishment could not be effected by the efforts of the moderate party alone, in whom Marlborough and Godolphin had hitherto placed their chief confidence. Godolphin therefore had no alternative but to purchase the support of the Whigs by yielding to their demands, or to relinquish a measure on which the welfare of the country depended. They exulted in the critical predicament to which he was reduced, and Wharton coarsely declared that they held the head of the lord treasurer in a bag.*

The peer whose advancement they were most anxious to promote was Lord Sunderland, whose connexion with Marl-

* Boyer's Reign of Queen Anne, p. 177.

borough they considered as a peculiar claim to favour. They placed great reliance on the support of the duchess, whose zeal for her son-in-law was well known. With this view they had proposed him for the place of comptroller of the household* in the preceding year; and failing in their application, from the antipathy which the queen fostered against his person, they eagerly seized the first opportunity to bring him forward as a candidate for some other department.

They soon however discovered that they had calculated erroneously on the effect which they expected the ties of relationship and the importunities of the duchess would produce on the mind of Marlborough; for he was not only unwilling to shock the prejudices of the queen, but was fully convinced that his son-in-law would prove an unfit member for that moderate system of government on which he and Godolphin were anxious to act. Hence he firmly opposed his appointment to any high office of state, though assailed by the reproaches of the duchess, and pressed by the importunities of a party whom he was so much interested to conciliate.

In this determination he quitted England. But soon after his departure the death of the Emperor Leopold rendered it necessary to depute an ambassador of rank and consequence to Vienna, to cement the political relations of the two countries. The Whigs instantly redoubled their efforts to procure an office for Sunderland, which, though no way connected with the home administration, they hoped to render a preparatory step to the secretaryship of state. They were warmly seconded by the duchess, and at length even by Godolphin, who considered such a concession as a proper recompence for their support; and Marlborough was finally obliged to yield to a claim which he could no longer combat.

* Mrs. Burnet, who on this as on other occasions, was the interpreter of their wishes, thus wrote to the duchess:—"Nov. 10.—I cannot forbear to wish Lord Sunderland was remembered, and wonder why it is thought a wise conduct to gain men who have been enemies to government all along, and neglect to gain others, of ten times their sense and honesty; and allowing them to have been a little warm, it is more pardonable in a good cause than a bad, and when it is done for the sake of the public, and not for private interests or resentments."

without incurring the imputation of an ill-founded and unnatural prejudice.

These feuds of the contending parties and the cabals of their agents continued to perplex the duke in the midst of his military operations; for to him an appeal was made, generally and individually, from the sovereign herself to the meanest candidate for office. The moderate Tories, through the medium of Harley, deprecated the gradual encroachments of the Whigs; while the latter recriminated through the agency of Sunderland and the duchess. Godolphin also resorted to Marlborough for consolation and advice in his contentions with the rival chiefs, as well as in his frequent struggles against the antipathies of the sovereign. The queen herself also resorted to him as to a servant of congenial sentiments and approved fidelity, and solicited his interposition to defend her prerogative and rescue her from what she deemed personal degradation. Above all, the duchess expatiated on the ill-rewarded zeal and steady patriotism of the Whigs, and lavished her sarcastic reflections on his political infatuation and imprudent partiality to his Tory friends.

In these circumstances we find him constantly employed in parrying the suggestions of Sunderland, soothing the complaints of Harley, encouraging and tranquillising Godolphin, exhorting the queen to submit to the necessity of her affairs, and, above all, in combating the arguments and repelling the acrimonious taunts of the duchess.

In fact, the sarcastic reflections of his wife made a deeper impression on his sensitive mind than all his other embarrassments; and in his correspondence with her we trace a perpetual struggle between his irritability and conjugal tenderness. Two extracts will sufficiently indicate the tone which occasionally prevailed in their epistolary intercourse.

“*Meldert, August 3.*—I received yours of the 17th, yesterday, in which you complain of my having writ a cold letter, which you think may be occasioned by one I had then received from you. It is most certain that upon many occasions I have the spleen, and am weary of my life; for my friends give me much more uneasiness than my enemies, as you may guess by a copy of a letter I have sent to my lord treasurer. But for you, my dearest life, I love you so well, and have placed all my happiness in ending my days with you, that I would venture ten thousand lives to preserve your good opinion. You sometimes use the expression of my Tory friends. As I never will enter into party and faction, I beg

you will be so kind and just to me, as to believe that I will have no friends but such as will support the queen and government. Yours of the 13th, which had the draught of the house and gardens, I received but this day, the French having taken the postilion, but they sent the letters back unopened. I hope some time this summer you will go down to Woodstock for three or four days, and that you will let me know if Mr. Wise be still of the opinion that he shall be able to make all the plantations this next season, which would be a great pleasure to me at my return, if I could see the walks in the park planted."

"*Corbais, August 24.* — I have this day received yours of the 5th and 6th from Tunbridge, as also one from Lady Sunderland, which tells me that you are in good health, which I am extremely glad of; for I wish you all the happiness this world is capable of giving. I have received the *Observator*, and am of your mind. When I differ from you, it is not that I think those are in the right whom you say are always in the wrong; but it is that I would be glad not to enter into the unreasonable reasoning of either party, for I have trouble enough for my little head, in the business which of necessity I must do here. I thank you for the piece of a letter you sent me, for I own to you that I have a very great desire to have that work of Woodstock finished; and if I can be so happy as to live some years in quietness there with my dear soul, I shall think myself fully recompensed for all the vexations and troubles I am now obliged to undergo. I can never regret too much the last disappointment; since I am every day more and more persuaded that we should have had good success, which must have put a good and speedy end to this war. I hope the Spa waters, which I intend to take the beginning of this next month, will do my eyes good, since I am persuaded it is the heat of my blood which has occasioned their being sore."

These letters lead us to notice an erroneous opinion which has been sanctioned by history. It has been generally asserted that Marlborough evinced the same weakness as Belisarius, in submitting to the government of his wife. It cannot indeed be denied that in domestic life he indulged her caprices, and that in conferring offices of more emolument than trust he occasionally listened to her recommendation. But the whole series of his correspondence shows that she possessed no influence in political affairs of importance, and was suffered to take no share in those arrangements which give character to the administration of government. The Whigs, whose interest she particularly claims the merit of promoting, were little indebted to her importunities, and owed their introduction to power to the fears of the treasurer, to their strength in parliament, and, above all, to the conviction of Marlborough that the war could not be vigorously prosecuted without their support.

CHAP. XXXIV.—MARCH OF THE TROOPS TO THE MOSELLE.
1705.

NOTHING now remained to detain Marlborough in England; for the supplies had been granted at an early period of the session, and the military preparations were matured. He therefore embarked at Harwich on the 31st of March, in one of the royal yachts, under the protection of a squadron commanded by the Marquis of Caermarthen, and after a troublesome and dangerous passage entered the mouth of the Meuse. He experienced considerable difficulty in ascending the river, several of the yachts falling among the sands. At length he entered an open boat, and after four hours' labour against wind and tide, he reached the Brill towards midnight. Impatient to arrive at the Hague, he re-embarked at five in the morning, and soon effected the passage of the Meuse. He was, however, so fatigued by his exertions that Cardonel was commissioned to announce his arrival to Secretary Harley, and he wrote only a few hasty lines to the duchess*, dated Hague, April 3-14.

“I have been so very sick at sea, that my blood is as hot as if I were in a fever, which makes my head ache extremely, so that I beg you will make my excuse to lord treasurer, for I can write to nobody but my dear soul, whom I love above my life. I am now just going to bed, although I know I cannot sleep, yet I know that it will do me good, so that you will excuse me for saying no more till next post.”

His first business was to communicate to the States the plan for the ensuing campaign, which had been secretly concerted with Prince Eugene at the siege of Landau and approved by the cabinet in England. It was to invade France on the side of the Moselle, which was the least defensible part of the frontier, and to penetrate into Lorraine, the sovereign of which duchy was, to use Marlborough's own words, “heart and soul with the allies,” and the inhabitants eager to take arms in behalf of the house of Austria. The final operations of the last campaign had been preparatory to this object.† As Treves and Traerbaeh afforded secure places of arms, the magazines were to be there collected; and early in the spring the combined army, amounting to no less than

* State Paper Office.

† See Chapter 29.

90,000 men, was to assemble between the Saar and the Moselle, and to commence the siege of Saar Louis, before the French could take the field. Marlborough, with the native and auxiliary troops in the pay of the maritime powers, was to penetrate along the Moselle, while the margrave of Baden, with an Austrian force and the contingents of the circles, was to act on the side of the Saar and co-operate in the grand attack. The imperial ministers had solemnly engaged that their forces should be ready to take the field early in the spring, and similar promises were made by the German princes to furnish the requisite horses and artillery.*

From his recent success, Marlborough naturally conceived hopes of obtaining the immediate acquiescence of the Dutch. But he found at this time the same weakness of government, the same discordance of views, and the same factious opposition as he had before experienced from the parties in Holland. Although eager to repair to the theatre of action, he was detained at the Hague in combating the timid or frivolous objections of the government, and his impatience breaks forth in his correspondence.

To Lord Godolphin he observes : —

“*April 21.* — I cannot but say that almost all their business here is in great disorder, and their generals’ desire of keeping 50 battalions and 90 squadrons on the Meuse is very unreasonable ; for if this should be complied with, I should have on the Moselle but 60 battalions and 79 squadrons, to act offensively ; and at the same time they do not so much as pretend to act otherwise than on the defensive. I am sure I shall never consent to what they desire ; but how I shall be able to get the troops

* There appears to have been feebleness and want of enterprise in the conception of the plan of the campaign of 1705. If the enemy were unprepared, one would have thought that this was the favourable opportunity for the Confederates to strike a decisive blow by penetrating into the heart of France, in lieu of wasting time in a siege till he was in a better state to receive them. There might be the spirit of chivalry in this delay, but it lacked the spirit of the strategy of a more recent style of warfare. Indeed, it is manifest from this scheme of commencing with the investment of Saar Louis, that neither Eugene nor Marlborough, though undoubtedly the greatest warriors modern Europe had known, had obtained a glimpse of the art of subjugating kingdoms introduced in the French revolutionary conflicts. Napoleon never lost time in the siege of frontier or intermediate places, but dashed at the capital at once ; and the allied armies, which conquered him at Leipsic, and rescued Germany from his grasp, followed his example. — Ed.

out of their country is the difficulty. I am of your opinion, that the face of every thing is much better this year than it was at this time last year, so that you may be sure I shall be very cautious; but by what I can observe, the French will endeavour, by putting themselves on the defensive in this country and in Alsace, to make themselves able to attack us on the Moselle. Our Scotch recruits are come, so that we want now nothing but our two lieutenant-generals and my brother, who can have no excuse but a convoy, so that I beg you will get the prince's council to lose no time in letting them have ten men of war."

Harassed with this opposition, he at the same time feelingly describes to the duchess the uneasiness of his situation:—

"I am like a sick body that turns from one part of the bed to the other: for I would fain be gone from hence, in hopes to find more quiet in the army. God only knows what ease I may have when I come there."

At length he announces with satisfaction the consent of the Dutch government to his plan of operations and his departure for the army.

To the Duchess.

"April 23—May 4.—Since the last post I have had two of my dear soul's letters, which I believe is the reason that I have none by my brother, whom I have not seen, but he came yesterday to Rotterdam, and is to follow me to Maestricht, where I shall be on Friday, being now going in a boat to Utrecht. These people here have at last consented to most things I wished for. If I can have the same success with Prince Louis, I hope, with the blessing of God, we may have a good campaign, which you think so necessary to prevent the malice of the tackers."

To Lord Godolphin.

"May 4.—I am now in a boat going for Utrecht, having at last, I think, persuaded almost every body that it were to be wished that the English were at this time on the Moselle. However, to please M. Overkirk, I have consented that the English shall take their march by Maestricht, by which we shall lose three days. I shall be at Maestricht myself on Friday morning, which will be five days before the English can be there; and if that army will attempt any thing, I shall be very much pleased to stay five or six days and help them with the English. The enclosed from Prince Louis of Baden I received by estaffette yesterday; I send it that you may see what a miserable thing a German army is! By the care you took to have a convoy, my brother and all the officers are come over."

Marlborough had still greater obstacles to surmount in combating the tardy and interested policy of the court of Vienna. With an aged monarch in the close of life, the government itself was verging to decrepitude; the business was principally conducted by superannuated ministers, whose sole merit was a mechanical acquaintance with the routine

of office, and whose combined efforts and chief attention were employed in combating the interest and counteracting the grand schemes of Prince Eugene. Too limited in their ideas to comprehend the military policy which he and Marlborough adopted, their views were confined to the affairs of Hungary. They wished to reserve the principal resources of the monarchy for the suppression of a rebellion which they considered as affecting its very vitals; and, consequently, not only laboured to diminish the force required for Germany, but proposed to send Eugene into Italy with an army inefficient in strength, and destitute of the means of aggression. These weak and impolitic schemes roused the indignation of a general who was anxious to introduce a system of action commensurate with the public danger, and he refused to take a share in civil or military business, unless more decisive measures were adopted. The aged emperor was confounded by this spirited determination; his feeble ministers shrunk from responsibility, and after a short but awful suspense the counsels of Eugene prevailed. The power of directing the political arrangements was consigned to the king of the Romans. Some of the ministers were dismissed, or their influence diminished, and the prince was placed at the head of the council of war, with such powers as gave him the control of all military operations.*

This salutary change was, however, too late to be felt at the opening of the campaign; and Marlborough soon experienced the fatal effect of that lethargy which prevailed in the cabinet of Vienna, as well as of the jealousy which the princes of the empire now began to foster against the house of Austria.

An additional cause of disquietude was derived from a misunderstanding between Count Wratislaw and Mr. Stepney, which rose to so great a height, that the former withdrew his confidential communications from the duke, whom he suspected of betraying the secret of their private correspondence. Eugene, who was the friend of Wratislaw, warmly interfered in the dispute. During the frequent conferences at the siege of Landau, he repeatedly urged the propriety of recalling a minister so unwelcome at the court of Vienna,

* Letters from Mr. Stepney to Secretary Harley; State Paper Office, February and March; and letter from Count Wratislaw to the duke, March 18.

and now renewed the demand, accompanied with a formal complaint from the emperor, against his supposed partiality to the cause of the Hungarian insurgents. As Marlborough placed the fullest confidence in Mr. Stepney, and as he was at the same time desirous to conciliate Wratislaw, from whose communications he had drawn the utmost advantage, he laboured anxiously to soothe both parties; and though he could not effect a perfect reconciliation, he succeeded in softening their mutual jealousies, and prevailed on Eugene to withdraw his demand for the immediate recall of the obnoxious envoy.

A more difficult task yet remained, namely to conciliate the margrave of Baden, on whose zealous co-operation so much depended. But the anguish of wounded pride still rankled in the mind of this high-spirited and captious prince, who was indignant at the superior confidence which was placed in Eugene, and deemed his fame eclipsed by the lustre which attended the successful career of Marlborough; and who conceived that he should himself incur the blame of failure, while his more fortunate colleague would monopolise the honour of success.

In consequence of the unequivocal reluctance which he manifested in forwarding the projected plan, Marlborough sent General Dopf, an officer high in the estimation of the States, to communicate his views, and obtain a specific promise of co-operation. The margrave, however, objecting to act with Marlborough, and proposing to head a separate army on the Rhine, Count Lecheraine, the minister of the elector palatine, undertook the office of mediator; but his mission proved equally fruitless. On this disappointment Marlborough applied to the court of Vienna for a specific order, requiring the margrave to co-operate in the intended invasion of France, and at the same time brigadier Cadogan was employed on the delicate mission. In consequence of the injunctions given by the imperial court, Cadogan so far succeeded, that he brought back a promise from the margrave to act on the Saar or the Moselle, to bring with him

* Letter from Prince Eugene to Marlborough, January 11. 1705.— Also, letters from Count Wratislaw to the duke, in one of which he candidly confesses that his unusual reserve proceeded from the duke's partiality to the British envoy.

17 battalions and 34 squadrons, and a proposal for an interview at Creutznach to settle the operations of the campaign.

Meanwhile the British commander had proceeded on his route to Maestricht, and after assisting to organise the Dutch army which had taken the field, he sent forward the troops who were to act on the Moselle, and himself took the route to Coblentz. Here he employed a short interval, in accelerating the preparations for the intended campaign, and in stimulating the zeal of the German princes.

While he was magnificently entertained by the elector of Cologne, at Ehrenbreitstein, Baron Forstner, counsellor of state to the margrave of Baden, arrived to announce that in consequence of inflammation, derived from the wound in his leg, which he had received at the battle of Schellenberg, his master could not attend the promised interview. He was at the same time charged with heavy complaints on the imperfect state of the military preparations, and the delay of the succours from Vienna.

The duke was too well acquainted with the temper of the margrave to mistake the nature of this message, and testifies his disappointment with a heavy heart to the duchess and Godolphin, in his correspondence from Coblentz, dated May 6-17.

“My dearest soul, till I come to live with you I shall have nothing but vexation; for at my coming here, I received a letter from Prince Louis that he is not well, so that he is afraid he shall not be able to meet me so soon as the 20th, and that it will be impossible for his troops to march so soon as he had promised me. This and other things make me wish myself a much privater man than I am, so that I might depend upon myself, without being plagued with other people’s humours. I have neither time nor words to express how tenderly I love you.”

“I have but just time,” he says to Lord Godolphin, “to acknowledge the favour of yours of the 27th of the last month, and to return you thanks for your friendly and kind expression for the forwarding the building of Woodstock; for I own my heart is very much set upon the ending my days quietly in that place. I was to have met Prince Louis the 20th, at Creutznach, but at my arrival here, I received a letter to let me know he was not very well, and to beg that I would not come to Creutznach till I heard from him, which makes me very uneasy; for I intended to have been at Treves by the 24th at farthest. I shall stay here till the 19th, in hopes by that time to hear from Prince Louis, who I am afraid is angry at some orders he has received from Vienna. If there be no other way of speaking with him, I shall be necessitated

to go to his house at Rastadt; for let it cost me what pains it will, he must be put in humour if possible."

In this perplexity he received intelligence from Vienna of the death of Leopold, on the 5th of May, which was announced to him by Joseph, his son and successor. After mentioning his concern at the loss of his father, he alludes to his great esteem for the merits, and his affection for the person of Marlborough; and in the anxiety which he testified to give his deliverer a proof of his gratitude, he adds, "whatever your excellency has lost by his death, you will find fully compensated by me, for you have a double title to my regard; first, from your services; and secondly, I succeed by hereditary right to his throne and his regard for you."

To this letter, written in the language and style of the chancery, a flattering postscript in the French tongue was added by the emperor, in his own hand: — "If my affairs permitted me, I would do myself the pleasure of joining you at the army, to testify in person the sentiments of my esteem and friendship. I have, nevertheless, ordered the prince of Baden to act in concert with you on the Moselle, and I wish you a campaign as glorious as that of last year. Moreover I recommend to you my interests and those of the king of Spain, my brother, not doubting but you will always show that zeal for the welfare of my house, which you have hitherto displayed."*

The death of the emperor appeared likely to relieve the duke from much difficulty in his transactions with the court of Vienna. The change from an aged, phlegmatic, and formal emperor, to a young and high-spirited prince, who had appreciated the merits of the duke at the siege of Landau, was naturally felt in every department of the state. The superannuated and formal ministers of the deceased monarch lost their influence, and the interest of Prince Eugene became predominant.

The hopes which Marlborough drew from this change were, however, damped by the lukewarmness of the German princes, and by the froward spirit of his intended colleague the margrave. On visiting him he received, indeed, the

* Original letter of the Emperor Joseph, dated Vienna, 9th May, 1705 and signed Josephus. Letter also from Prince Eugene.

duke with outward marks of esteem and respect, and with all the honours due to his rank and celebrity. At the same time his behaviour proved that the complaint of his indisposition was much exaggerated; for the inflammation of his wound did not prevent him from attending his guest in a survey of the new palace and gardens, which he was preparing for his future residence, and he was gratified with the praises which Marlborough did not fail to bestow on the architecture of the building, and the disposition of the grounds. In a private conference, which they held to settle their military arrangements, the margrave promised the British commander to join him on the Saar, with the whole of his disposable force, and to begin his march without delay. But in a letter to Godolphin, Marlborough augured ill of the result, from his repeated and heavy complaints of the deficiency of his army, and the anxiety which he manifested to devise pretexts for delay.

Rastadt, May 11-22. — The prince of Baden not being well has given me the trouble of coming to this place. I am very much disappointed by the very little number of troops they can from hence send to the Moselle. All that Prince Louis will promise is 20 battalions and 40 squadrons. But even of those I must expect for some time only 12 battalions and 28 squadrons, which are to be at Treves by the 10th of the next month. This is so great a disappointment, that I have writ very pressingly to the emperor upon it. I think the less noise this makes is best, for it would too much encourage the French. When I come to Treves, where I shall be in four days, you shall know what posture we shall be in there. Having been on horseback all day, I am so tired that I can say no more. By the inclosed letter from the emperor, I hope he intends me more troops. You will be pleased to give the letter to Lady Marlborough to keep for me."

Marlborough had also the mortification to learn that the Austrian regiments were incomplete, because the most efficient corps had been despatched to Italy or Hungary, and those destined to act on the Moselle wanted more than one-third of their complement, though represented as complete on the musters. Having, however, made the best arrangements which circumstances would permit, and extorted from the margrave a new promise to begin his march on the 27th, he made an excursion to examine the lines of Stolhoffen. On

* Letter from Cardonel to Mr. Secretary Harley, May 22. — State Paper Office.

his return he took his departure from Rastadt, and hastened to meet his troops, who were on their march to Treves.

These forces encountered in their progress unusual hardships. An eye-witness observes: "After we had quitted Juliers, you never saw so wretched a country. The soil barren, mountainous, fruitful in nothing but iron, and the air strangely cold, as if it had been in the midst of winter. The towns have all the marks of poverty that French oppression or government can give; and to make the little accommodation an army could meet with in so wretched a country; still less, there was not a soul to be seen in the villages, the peasants flying as we came, either into places of defence or to the woods, and conveying what they could, of the little they had, along with them; which left us in want of every thing, and made both officers and soldiers pass their time ill enough. I will only add, that the Scots think an army in their highlands could shift better."*

CHAP. XXXV.—INVESTMENT OF LIEGE.—1705.

AFTER the unsatisfactory interview with the margrave, Marlborough repaired to Treves, where he expected to receive intelligence of the artillery, draught horses, and part of the contingents, which were to be furnished by the German states. He arrived on the 26th, at the moment when his troops were filing into their destined camp near Triersweiler. He found the auxiliaries who had wintered on the Moselle posted in the vicinity of Consaarbrück; and after spending two days in reviewing the different corps, he ordered the troops who had marched from the Netherlands to advance to Igel. His army was there collected in two divisions, which were separated by the Moselle.

To his chagrin and mortification, however, even the limited hopes which he had conceived of the co-operation of the German princes and states were totally frustrated. Not a single draught horse appeared; and instead of an army amounting at least to 80,000 men, he could scarcely muster

* Hare's MS. Account of the Campaign in a series of Letters.

30,000, and these only British troops, or subsidiaries in the pay of the maritime powers. As the season was extremely backward, and the scanty resources of the country had been exhausted by the enemy, he caused an accurate scrutiny to be made into the state of the magazines; but to his additional mortification, the superintendant, instead of rendering an account, fled to the enemy, and he discovered that not half the quantity of the expected supplies had been collected.

His letters written during this period of suspense and anxiety need no comment.

To Lord Godolphin.

“*Tuesday, May 16-27. 1705.*—At my arrival here yesterday, I had the favour of two of yours. I am to be on horseback all this day, so that I shall not be able to answer by this post the particulars of yours, believing you will be more desirous to know the posture our army is in. I gave you an account from Manheim, that the army of Prince Louis was in so miserable a condition that he could not spare more troops to act on the Moselle than 12 battalions and 28 squadrons at this time, and that they could not march till the 28th, so that they cannot join me until the 10th or 12th of next month. The troops of Prussia cannot be here much sooner, and the 7000 Palatines in the English and Dutch pay are to be here by the 6th. By all this you will see we want a third of our foot, and almost half our horse, which makes it impossible for me as yet to march. However, for want of forage and provisions, I shall be necessitated to march before all these troops can join me, so that I have sent orders to the several commanders to hasten their march all that is possible.

“The unreasonable heats of the parties make me pity you with all my heart; but you must, as I do, in spite of all the vexations we meet, serve her majesty, and when this war is well ended, we then may think of enjoying some quiet. In all conditions I shall be ever most sincerely yours,” &c.

“*Treves, May 22.—June 2. 1705.*—The detachment that is on its march from Alsace will make the Marshal de Villars have a great many more battalions and squadrons than I shall have. However, I do not apprehend his venturing a battle; but it will put him in a condition to act in such a manuer as may make us want all sorts of provisions, which we ought to be more afraid of than fighting; for our men are in great heart, so that with the blessing of God we might expect good success. We have another *contre-temps*, for upon my giving orders to Vanderkaa, who is marched with the English from Holland, to take care of all that concerns Machado, to inform himself of the strength of our magazines for bread and forage, one sentry, who has had the care of it all this winter, instead of giving him an account, is run away last Sunday, and we fear he is gone to the enemy. But I am but too sure that there is not near half the quantity in the stores that should have been, so that we are

much more afraid of starving than of the enemy. But we have yesterday sent away expresses both to Coblenz and Mentz, to hasten with all speed corn or flour for one month, which we hope will give us time to replenish our magazines."

"I shall be obliged to-morrow to pass the Saar, notwithstanding the number of troops that are not yet come to me; for we have no more hay, and on this side the river there is very little corn in the fields, and the season here is so backward that we can cut no grass. All these misfortunes make me very uneasy, but we must struggle as long as we can. This condition of ours is fit to be known but by very few; but in a short time it would be very happy for us if the Marshal de Villars would venture a battle, for in all likelihood that would put us at ease."

Unfortunately the preparations of the enemy were as mature and prompt as those of the allies were tardy and imperfect. The king of France, instead of being astounded by the fatal blow which he received in the field of Blenheim, made unusual efforts to repair the disaster. During the close of the preceding year no means of redress or rigour had been neglected to tranquillise the Cevennes, and to suppress a commotion which not only threatened to spread into the very heart of the kingdom, but afforded an opening to favour the aggressions of its foreign enemies. The agent employed on this occasion was no less a person than Marshal Villars. Such measures were also adopted to intercept the communication with the sea-coast, that the endeavours of the English fleet to furnish succours to the insurgents from the shore of the Mediterranean were frustrated: and even Marlborough, who was highly anxious to foment a commotion which diverted so large a portion of the enemy's force, considered all farther attempts as hopeless. The insurgents, thus left to their fate, were unable to resist disciplined troops, led by so able a general; and partly by force, partly by address, the desultory hordes were dissipated, and the chiefs either reduced to accept the pardon of their sovereign, or to seek an asylum in foreign countries.

Relieved from these internal commotions, the king was enabled to redouble his efforts against his external enemies and to bring efficient armies into the field, in every quarter of the theatre of war. The elector of Bavaria, assisted by Villeroy, was to act offensively in the Low Countries, with 75,000 men, as soon as Marlborough had marched to the Moselle; and in case of a reverse, the country was intersected

with formidable lines, to check an invasion between the Scheldt and the Mehaigne. On the Upper Rhine, Marsin, with 30,000 men, was stationed to maintain the defensive, and to aid the efforts of the other armies, as either might be exposed to a superior force.

As the operations of the allies at the close of the preceding campaign, and the formation of magazines at Treves, indicated that the principal effort would be made on the Moselle, Villars, after his successful career in the Cevennes, was appointed to cover the frontier on that side, and to obstruct the siege of Saar Louis; but with positive orders not to risk an engagement, as a defeat would open so defenceless a part of the kingdom to an invading army. He had already taken the field, and engaged in some active skirmishes with the allied troops quartered near Treves; particularly in an attempt to obtain possession of Saarbruck; but failing in this object, he collected his troops at Sirk, as a strong defensive position for covering the broken country between the Moselle and the Saar.

Accordingly, on the 3d of July, at two in the morning, the English and Dutch troops moved without beat of drum, and traversed the Moselle, on bridges already prepared at Igel. Having effected a junction with the auxiliaries, the whole combined army passed the Saar at Consaarbruck, in two columns, the infantry leading the march. Marlborough himself advanced at the head of the right wing, which was principally composed of British troops. With this column he rapidly cleared the defiles of Tavernen and Onsdorf, following the course of the Roman causeway over the heights; while the second column passed through the valley watered by the Appach. Contrary, however, to his expectation, the enemy made no attempt to obstruct his advance, and on emerging into the more open ground towards Tettingen, he learned that a corps, which had been pushed in front of Sirk, was rapidly retreating. He reached his intended position about six in the evening, after an arduous march of eighteen miles, and drew up the advance of his cavalry behind the Appach, the enemy having some dismounted dragoons in the neighbouring village, and Villars himself, with a considerable corps, being posted in the plain on the opposite side near Kirsch. While the French detachment fell back to their

main army, the allies took up their position, with their right at Perle, and their left at Ellendorff, where they bivouacked during the night, the duke establishing his quarters at Perle. The ensuing morning they made a slight advance in pitching their camp, the British troops being moved more to the right, in an oblique line facing the Moselle; and the duke changing his quarters to Elft, as a less exposed and more convenient situation. The army now occupied the same position which the French general had reconnoitred two days before, and with his characteristic presumption had observed to his generals, "Here is a fine place to meet an enemy; the best ground in the world to fight on a good opportunity."

The movements of Marlborough leaving no doubt of his resolution to risk an engagement, even with his inferior force, Villars withdrew to the celebrated position formed by the heights of Sirk* on the right of the Moselle, where his front was covered by a hollow-way, and the abrupt banks of the rivulet which there falls into the Moselle. His centre was placed on the heights of Konigsberg; his left extended to the abbey of Rhetel, on the bank of the Moselle, and his right was flanked by an almost impervious wood. In his rear was broken ground, intersected by ravines and rivulets. Here he made such preparations, and formed such a division of his force, as seemed calculated to protect Luxembourg, Thionville, and Saar Louis. While by his position he covered Thionville, he opened communications through the broken country beyond the Moselle, to prevent an attempt on Luxembourg; and to secure Saar Louis, he formed abbatis and cut roads through the woods of Haute Sirk, and detached advanced corps to Bourgesche and Bouzonville. He made also arrangements for taking up a position behind the Nied, where the woods had been cleared, and an intrenched camp formed during the preceding winter, and he

* The camp of Villars is well known in military history, by the appellation of the position of Sirk, from the neighbouring town. Marlborough calls it the camp of Rhetel, from the abbey of that name, near the Moselle, towards the left flank, and Villars that of Fronisberg or Konisberg, from the eminence of that name, which formed the centre. It lies on the south-west of Sirk, and its strength may be estimated from the plan. However impregnable this position is in itself, the movements of Marlborough proved that it would not cover Saar Louis without the risk of a battle.

threw a garrison of 6000 men into Saar Louis, which was the principal object of attack.

But these dispositions, however able, would not have sufficed to prevent the siege of Saar Louis, had Marlborough been promptly seconded by his German allies. For his last bold and masterly movement had placed him in a position to anticipate the enemy on the Nied, as soon as the reinforcements and draught horses should arrive for the siege. In this situation he was joined by 4000 horse, under the duke of Wirtemberg, and 7000 palatines, in the British and Dutch pay, making his army amount to 42,000 men. But as Villars had at the same time been strengthened by detachments of horse and foot, the French troops amounted to 55,000 men, and the relative proportion of both armies remained the same.*

Between his departure from Rastadt and his arrival on the Moselle, the duke daily received letters from the margrave, concerning the proposed march of the German auxiliaries, and his resolution to join the army without delay. But every letter contradicted the former: some troops had not quitted their cantonments; others had not taken the field; and his own departure was always suspended, in consequence of indisposition or other unavoidable causes. At length he

* Nothing can be more false and exaggerated than the accounts of this part of the campaign given by the French writers. Nor is this extraordinary, when we consider that their information is principally drawn from the Memoirs of Marshal Villars, whose letters abound in extravagant representations and empty vaunts. If it were necessary to enter into a refutation of the numerous falsities and gasconades of this able, though vain-glorious general, we should find ample materials in this part of his narrative. We shall, therefore, only notice a few of the most glaring misrepresentations. He estimates the army of Marlborough at 95,000 instead of 42,000 men; and states, with the most perfect confidence, that it was composed of English, and Dutch, and Germans, of *all the provinces*, commanded by their princes *in person, and in chief by the Duke of Marlborough and PRINCE LOUIS*. He declares that he threw up no intrenchments; and after leaving us to suppose that *he repeatedly offered battle, which was declined by his antagonist*, he dwells with the utmost complacency on the silence with which the allies decamped, as if fearing his pursuit. He concludes these gasconades with a remark in his customary style, to which no language can render justice but his own: "Ces gens là ont voulu m'avalier comme un grain de sel. Ils ont fini par nous croire de trop dure digestion."—*Mémoires de Villars*, tom. i. p. 372.; *Histoire de Marlborough*, tom. ii. p. 83.

announced his intention to march, and stated that he should reach Birkenfield on the 13th. Brigadier Cadogan was accordingly despatched to meet him on the road; but on reaching Birkenfield, information arrived that the margrave had consigned the command to the Count de Frise, and departed to Schlangenbad only a few hours before, for the purpose of drinking the waters. A similar disappointment arose from the neglect of the neighbouring princes to furnish the draught horses. They indeed sent commissaries to Coblenz, to regulate the number and conditions; but after a long discussion the business was still left in suspense. To use the words of the journalist, "two things, on which all depended, were the artillery horses, and the junction of Prince Louis, things that were continually coming, but never came, and after a fortnight's expectation, seemed to be as far off, as if they never had been thought of."* The correspondence of Marlborough will spare the necessity of a less animated and interesting narrative.

To Lord Godolphin.

"*Camp at Elft, June 4.*—I marched so early yesterday morning that the right of the army camped that night in less than a quarter of a mile of Sirk. I believe our march was a surprise to the French; for upon our first appearing they drew their troops that were camped near Sirk, to their camp of Rhétel. If they would have made use of their superiority, they should have had all their troops together, and opposed us at our first coming out of the mountains. But I believe they did not expect the march, believing I would stay at Treves till I should be joined by more troops, which was so reasonable, that if there had been forage I should have stayed for the 7000 palatines that are to join me to-morrow. I don't expect Prince Louis, with the 9000 men he brings, till about ten days hence, and I have no certainty when the Prussians will be with us. The French retiring upon our appearing has given great heart to our soldiers; but I think it would have been much happier for us if they had taken the resolution of venturing a battle, for we struggle here under many difficulties."

To the Duchess.

"*June 1-12.*—We have two posts due from England, which makes me very impatient to hear from my dear soul, it being the greatest pleasure I have. Since my last I have not been very well, but I thank God I am better, so that I shall go on horseback to-day. I own to you that my sickness comes from fretting; for I have been disappointed in every thing that was promised me. I have had letters from all the children;

* Hare's Letters from Treves, on the Campaign of 1705.

but till I am in a little better humour I cannot write to them, so that you will be so good as to say something to them that are with you very kind from me, and that you will excuse me that I write no more this time, and I do from my heart and soul assure you that I am entirely yours."

To Prince Eugene.

"June 11.—I have received the letter which your highness did me the honour to write to me on the 22d, and am much afflicted on finding that troops and other preparations are wanting for the commencement of your operations. We, I am concerned to say, are scarcely in a better state. I took all the precautions in my power that the troops should be assembled at the end of May; yet I am here without a single soldier, except those who are in the pay of England and the States-general. The few troops to be supplied by the prince of Baden, who do not exceed ten battalions, will not arrive here in less than ten days, and some of the Prussians will be still later. Nevertheless I was constrained for want of forage to decamp from Treves on the 3d. As soon as the greater part of the troops had crossed the Moselle and Saar, I made a forced march of seven leagues, and offered battle to Marshal Villars on the same day. Not being inclined to engage, he retired between Sirk and Thionville, where he was joined in the ensuing morning by the cavalry, and the 5th by the infantry of Alsace, and has since continued to intrench himself in his camp. I am so posted that by a slight movement, and without difficulty, I can place myself between the enemy and Saar Louis, the siege of which we propose to make as soon as we shall be ready. But I am in the same embarrassments as your highness for want of waggons, and horses to draw the heavy artillery and ammunition from Traerbach; the neighbouring princes and states, who are most interested to supply them, making many difficulties. From this disappointment the enemy have leisure to commence their operations on the Meuse. They accordingly are attacking Huy, and they will be soon before Liege. These movements have spread such a panic in Holland, that I am apprehensive lest the States should adopt resolutions that will mar our designs on this side, *which must* be attributed to the delays in the arrival of the German troops. Had they joined me in time, the enemy must have made a considerable detachment from the Netherlands to secure their army."*

While the duke was detained in his intended operations by the tardiness of the Germans, and the want of means to besiege Saar Louis, the French army, under Villeroy, made a sudden effort on the Meuse, captured Huy on the 1st of June, took Liege and invested the citadel. A general panic prevailed throughout the United Provinces: the French

* The original of this letter, which is principally in cipher, is preserved in the archives at Vienna, and was communicated by his imperial highness the Archduke John.

partisans began to clamour for peace, and the friends of England despatched the most pressing instances, requesting Marlborough immediately to quit the Moselle, and prevent the enemy from recovering the places on the Meuse. The clamour was instantly re-echoed by the disaffected in England; and there was ample cause to fear that so weak and popular a government as Holland, pressed on one side by the enemy, and on the other alarmed by the prospect of desertion, should be driven into an accommodation with France. In consequence of this application, he took the immediate resolution of pushing towards the scene of action in the Netherlands.

His presence indeed was highly necessary; for the situation of Overkirk was perilous in the extreme. Cooped up in the intrenched camp of St. Peter's Hill, near Maestricht, with a force more than tripled by the enemy, he was reduced to witness the reduction of Huy, and the investment of the citadel of Liege, which was slenderly garrisoned, and in a weak state of defence. If the enemy succeeded in their enterprise, he had no alternative but to risk the consequences of an attack, which might have proved fatal to his little army, or abandon the line of the Meuse, and leave them at liberty to extend their conquests.

The delicate predicament in which his colleague was placed only served to give energy to the resolutions of the British commander, and to call into action the resources of his vigorous and fertile genius. He therefore prepared to decamp from Sirk, with such precautions that the enemy should neither be enabled to obstruct his march, or anticipate his design by pushing reinforcements to the Netherlands. He announces his intention to the duchess and Godolphin, at the moment of his departure from Elft.

“*June 16.* — I think every minute that I have a thousand things to say, but I am so disturbed by being disappointed of every thing that has been promised me, and that I should have, before I am able to do any thing considerable, that my head turns, so that when I sit down to write, the business of the army hinders me. But you may be assured that you are dearer to me than all the world besides. You will see, by my letter to lord treasurer, the reasons I have for undertaking the march I shall begin to-morrow. I want sleep and quiet; for till I have that, I cannot say I am well, nor do I believe I ever shall be at ease till I am with my dear life. If I had known beforehand what I must have endured by

relying on the people of this country, no reasons should have persuaded me to have undertaken this campaign. I will, by the help of God, do my best, and then I must submit to what may happen. But it is impossible to be quiet and not complain, when there is all the probability imaginable for a glorious campaign, to see it all put in doubt by the negligence of princes whose interest it is to help us with all they have.

“This moment is come Lieutenant-general Hompesch, from Monsicur d’Overkirk, to let me know, that if I do not immediately help them they are undone, which only serves to show the great apprehensions they are in; for it is impossible for me to send troops to them sooner than I have already resolved; but since they have so much fear at the army, I dread the consequences of it at the Hague. I wish my letters that I writ yesterday were with them, for I then assured them I would venture every thing for their security. My dearest soul, pity me and love me.”

To Lord Godolphin.

“June 16. — The post does not go away till to-morrow, but my head and heart are so full, that I would ease myself by letting you know what is resolved. The deputies of the States in the army on the Meuse have sent an express to me to desire that 30 battalions of theirs may be immediately sent to them. This joined with the want of forage, and no hopes of having the horses and carts in less than six weeks, for the drawing every thing to the siege, we have taken the resolution of leaving a sufficient number of troops at Treves, and marching with the rest to assist them on the Meuse. We shall leave the cannon and all other ammunition at Traerbach and Coblentz; so that if the German princes will enable us to make a siege, we may return after we have put our friends on the Meuse at ease. I think this resolution was the only thing left for us to take, both for the saving of this army, as well as for the hindering the Dutch from being frightened into a negotiation for peace. The true reasons of the whole matter cannot appear to the public, so that I do not doubt but there will be great numbers of eensurers. I do intend to send to Vienna to acquaint the emperor with the truth of this whole matter. I shall also write to the king of Prussia, in hopes he will not make a difficulty of letting his troops serve with Princee Louis.

“I have for these last ten days been so troubled by the many disappointments I have had, that I think if it were possible to vex me so for a fortnight longer, it would make an end of me. In short, I am weary of my life.”*

* For the account of the military operations on the Moselle, and the march to the Meuse, I have consulted the Duke’s Letters; Hare’s Epistolary Narrative, May 13. June 5. and July 30.; Relation des Raisons du Duc de Marlborough pour quitter la Moselle et retourner à la Meuse, Lamberti, t. iii. p. 469.; Milner’s Journal of the Campaigns of Marlborough; Gazette; History of Europe, for May and June, 1705; Lediard, vol. i., and the other biographers of Marlborough; Mémoires de Villars, t. i. pp. 336. 375.

On the 17th of June, at midnight, the allied army decamped from Elft, without beat of drum, in the midst of heavy rain. A strong guard of cavalry was posted to protect the rear; but the enemy made no movement to molest their march, and at ten in the morning, after a night of excessive exertion, they reached their former position, near Consaarbruck. Here the commander halted a day to concert measures for the future operations with the Count de Frise, who, like his master, the margrave of Baden, moved in a contrary direction, and declined an interview.

On the following day, Marlborough again broke up his camp, leaving eleven battalions and eleven squadrons of Palatines and Westphalians, under the Palatine general D'Aubach, to protect Treves and Saarbruck. He at the same time despatched orders for the German contingents to join Prince Louis. To relieve the anxiety of Overkirk, he sent General Hompesch express, to announce his approach, and prepare the arrangements for their junction. To facilitate the march, he formed his army into three columns. The first consisted of the artillery, with a strong escort; the second, of the foot, under his brother, General Churchill, which marched through Steffeld and Aln; and the third, of horse, which was led by himself through Bibrich, Pruyne, and Dryborn. The whole were to re-unite in the vicinity of Duren, a town in the duchy of Juliers.

On the second day, being apprised that Villars had sent a considerable detachment to the Netherlands, he slackened his march, to alarm the French commander with the apprehension of his return to the Moselle, and ordered his brother to detach Lord Orkney with 12,000 men to watch the movements of the enemy. Having thus succeeded in suspending the progress of the French detachment, he was no sooner apprised that Villeroy had been retarded in pushing the attack of Liege for want of artillery, than he hastened his own progress to save the place, and ordered Lord Orkney to push forward with the utmost celerity. By this expedition his different columns united in the vicinity of Duren on the 25th. Here he had the satisfaction to learn, that his rapid advance had struck a panic into the enemy, who had relinquished their design on the citadel of Liege, withdrawn their artillery, and were falling back to Tongres. He therefore

quitted his army early in the morning of the 26th, and reached Maestricht at noon, to concert with Overkirk an offensive movement against the enemy in their retreat. Efficient arrangements were instantly made for a speedy advance and junction of all the confederate forces. On the 2d of July, while the troops of Marlborough traversed the Meuse near Viset, Overkirk decamped, and both armies directing their route to the same point, united in the vicinity of Hanef. But the presence of one man had changed the scene. The enemy, so recently elate with the hopes of conquest, were no sooner apprised of the arrival of Marlborough at Maestricht, than they broke up from Tongres; and though superior in numbers, withdrew towards Montenacken, north of the Mehaigne. On the 4th, therefore, the confederates advanced from Hanef; but the enemy, instead of awaiting their approach, again precipitately retreated, and sought the protection of their lines, Villeroy establishing his head-quarters at Mierdrop, and the elector drawing farther to the left, in the direction of Tirlmont. Accordingly, Marlborough posted his army between Fresin and Lens les Beguines, where he fixed his head-quarters, and Overkirk encamped near Brett, on the northern bank of the Mehaigne.

After this unavailing attempt to bring his antagonists to an engagement, the first object of the British commander was to recover Huy, which interrupted the navigation of the Meuse. On the 6th, therefore, as soon as the artillery was ready, he detached General Schultz with a sufficient force for the siege; and to cover the operation, Overkirk the same day removed his camp to Vignamont.*

During the siege, Marlborough had time to reflect on his various disappointments. Indeed, to complete the series, he received the intelligence that d'Aubach had been terrified by the approach of a small French detachment, and retired from Treves and Saarbruck, without the slightest opposition. He thus abandoned the conquests, of which the capture formed so brilliant a feature at the close of the last campaign, and the magazines which had been collected with so much anxiety. We cannot, therefore, wonder that from the time of Marlborough's departure from the Moselle to the present

* Correspondence—Hare's Narrative—Milner—Lediard—Brodrick—and the different biographers.

moment, his correspondence still breathes a tone of anguish and despondency. His letters to the lord treasurer and the duchess prove the acuteness of his feelings, and announce his resolution to withdraw from a command, in which his great services were marred by envy, cowardice, or treachery, and where he saw no other prospect than fruitless care and unmerited disgrace. To add to his chagrin, he felt more deeply than they deserved the censures which both parties in England lavished on the conduct of the campaign.

To the Duchess.

“*Treves, June 7-18. 1705.*—I would not let this express go to Holland without writing two words to my dearest soul, though I am fitter to go to bed than to write. The foot begin their march to-morrow, and I shall follow with the horse the next day. The alarm is so great in Holland, that I am apprehensive they may be frightened, so as to hearken to a proposition of peace before I get thither, so that I make all the diligence imaginable. I received two days ago a letter from Prince Louis, to excuse his not coming to the army, his health not permitting it, so that he is gone to the waters. If we could have had what was absolutely necessary, I could have borne this disappointment. Pray press on my house and gardens; for I think I shall never stir from my own home, being very sensible that it is impossible to serve with any satisfaction, where it is in so many people’s power to do mischief.”

“*Bibrich, June 21.*—My head and heart are so full of the disappointments I have met with in this country, that I do from my soul wish to be out of this troublesome business; for I see but too plainly that the jealousy of Prince Louis, and the backwardness of the German princes, will always hinder us from succeeding here, which is the most sensible part in which we might do the most hurt to France.”

To Lord Godolphin.

“*Dryborn, June 13-24.*—* * * I beg you will give my humble duty to the queen, and assure her that nothing but my gratitude to her could oblige me to serve her after the disappointments I have met with in Germany, for nothing has been performed that was promised; and to add to this, they write to me from England, that the tackers and all their friends are glad of the disappointments I meet with, saying that if I had success this year like the last, the constitution of England would be ruined. As I have no other ambition but that of serving well her majesty, and being thought what I am, a good Englishman, this vile, enormous faction of theirs vexes me so much, that I hope the queen will after this campaign give me leave to retire, and end my days in praying for her prosperity, and making my own peace with God. At the same time, I beg you will assure her majesty, that if she should ever have occasion for my service, I should, even at a moment’s warning, not only sacrifice my own quiet, but all that I have in this world. I beg you will not oppose this, thinking it may proceed at this time from the spleen:”

I do assure you it does not, but is from the base ingratitude of my countrymen. I am doing all I can to get time enough to save the citadel of Liege, having marched 9 leagues this day.

To the Duchess.

“*Maestricht, June 18-29.* — I had the happiness this morning of receiving your kind letter of the 8th, and in return would venture my life with pleasure to make you happy. For myself I am extremely uneasy at the disappointments I have met with; for it is most certain the Moselle is the place where we might have done the French most hurt. I could wish, with all my heart, that 205 (Prince Eugene) were in 206 (Prince Louis's) employment, but not by any act of mine. I am at this moment so resigned, I leave all punishment to God; and I shall, as soon as I can, retire, assuring you I have no ambition so great as that of deserving your love, and that the queen would be persuaded no other consideration should make me desire her leave to retire, but that I see very plainly the negligence here abroad, and the malice of parties at home, make me incapable of doing her any service. I am sure you are so just and kind to me as to believe, that during this campaign I shall take all occasion of doing service to the queen and public, and after that you will not blame me if I am desirous to live in quiet; for if I shall be obliged to continue as I am, my days must be very short. I am wasted to nothing, having perpetual vexations, fearing the world may blame me for other people's faults.”

“*Maestricht, July 1.* — * * * I march to-morrow, and hope the cannon will go from hence the next day. When we have Huy, the Lord knows what we shall do next; for I am afraid the French will avoid all occasions of letting us be of the same side of the lines with them.”

His friends in England, who knew that his influence could alone preserve the confederacy against France, that his efforts alone could produce a stable peace, and that his high reputation could alone overawe the contending factions at home, urged him to struggle with his difficulties, and not, from a momentary disgust or disappointment, to mar the great work of which he had already laid the foundations, for establishing the independence of Europe and the Protestant succession in England.

From every court of Europe the duke received sincere testimonies of condolence for his numerous disappointments, accompanied with marks of indignation against the margrave of Baden, to whose supineness or jealousy the failure was principally attributed. But from none was he greeted with stronger expressions of regret, and higher confidence in his skill, zeal, and abilities, than from the court of Vienna. His friends in England were not wanting in offices of consolation,

and the queen in particular testified her sympathy and concern, in a manner no less gracious than affectionate.

“*Windsor, June 12-21. 1705.*—I am very sorry to find by your three last letters to my lord treasurer, that you have met with so much vexation and uneasiness; but I hope by this time it is all over. I believe the last resolution you have taken is best, and if you should not succeed in what you are now going about, I do not doubt but something or other will happen to make you very well satisfied with yourself before this campaign is at an end, and I fancy all reasonable people will be so too. Whatever fortune may attend you, at least I shall, being very sure nothing will be wanting on your part. I do not doubt but you will have an account of all the disagreeable things that happen every day in Scotland, and therefore will not mention any particulars, only complain of my misfortune to be obliged, by the circumstances of the times we live in, to do all the unjust, unreasonable things those strange people desire, which gives me more uncasiness than you can imagine. As for what passes I will not give you an account, knowing you have it from other hands. I wish you may find the restless spirits of both parties quiet when you come back, but I mightily fear it; every thing, in my opinion, having a melancholy prospect. I pray God send you good success, make you easy in every thing, and continue you under his gracious protection, as he has hitherto done, that your friends may have the satisfaction of seeing you in England again in health, which nobody I am sure will desire more sincerely than your humble servant.

“The prince desires me to give his service to you, and assure you that he is extremely concerned that you have been in so much uneasiness.

“I am ashamed to send such a strange scrawl, but I have not time to write it over again, which I hope will make my excuse.”

Even this consolatory letter made but little impression; and he still maintained the resolution, which he so often expressed, of withdrawing from the embarrassments of his great, but uneasy situation.

Reply to the Queen.

“*Lens les Beguines, July 16-27.*—Madam, your majesty's letter of the 12th is a fresh instance of your goodness and partiality for your dutiful servant, who would with pleasure venture ten thousand lives, if he had them, to make you easy and happy.

“Your majesty will have known my desire by lord treasurer, that after this campaign I might, with your good liking, end my days with some quiet. I beg your majesty will believe that in what condition soever I may be, I shall be ready at all times to sacrifice all that is dear to me for your service; but I think this retirement of mine is not only necessary for me, but also good for you; for as my principle is, that I would not have your majesty in either of the parties' hands, so I have them both my enemies, which must be a weight to your business. When I shall live under your protection and not meddle, neither party will then have

envy or malice to me, so that I shall be able to serve you in parliament, which I shall do with all my heart. Since I left England, I have had no account of the affairs of Scotland; but by what I know of those people, I can easily believe they are very unreasonable.

“I had by the last post from lord treasurer, a list of the new parliament; by which I find there are enough of the tackers and their adherents to stir every thing that may be uneasy to your majesty and government. To prevent which, I think your majesty should advise with lord treasurer what encouragement may be proper to give the Whigs, that they may look upon it as their own concern early to beat down and oppose all proposals of that sort before they come to any height; for I am afraid your nearest allies on this side are so desirous of getting out of this war, that if they can have any handle to say that the sessions is like to meet with any difficulties, they will be sure to make use of that argument to oblige England to such a peace as may be desirable for them, though it will be inconvenient or unsafe for your majesty.

“By the vexation and trouble I undergo, I find a daily decay, which may deprive me of the honour of seeing your majesty any more, which thought makes me take the liberty to beg of your majesty, that for your own sake and the happiness of your kingdoms, you will never suffer any body to do lord treasurer an ill office. For besides his integrity for your service, his temper and abilities are such, that he is the only man in England capable of giving such advice as may keep you out of the hands of both parties, which may at last make you happy, if quietness can be had in a country where there is so much faction. I am, with the greatest respect,” &c.

His concern and vexation, however, did not, in the end, damp his ardent zeal for the cause of England and of Europe, nor repress his wonted energies. On the contrary, he redoubled his efforts to restore the lustre of the confederate arms, which had been sullied by the faults and misconduct of others. He found the greatest consolation, as well in the bustle of action, as in the arrangement of his great designs, and in the hope that he should vindicate his military fame from unmerited obloquy.

CHAP. XXXVI. — ATTACK OF THE FRENCH LINES.—1705.

ON the 11th Huy capitulated, and on the ensuing day the garrison surrendering prisoners of war, were conducted to Maestricht. The troops of General Schultz were immediately employed in levelling the approaches and repairing the works

of the place, under the direction of Overkirk. Conscious that the enemy would not venture to risk an engagement, and disdaining to spend the season of action in defensive warfare, Marlborough formed the design of forcing the lines, on which they confidently placed their reliance, and carrying the war into the heart of the Brabant.

The construction of this formidable barrier, which was partly natural and partly artificial, had employed the space of no less than three years. It commenced at Marché aux Dames, on the Meuse, to the east of Namur, passed by Gerbise to Wasseigue on the Mehaigne, and from thence stretching to the Little Gheet, followed the left bank to Leuwe, leaving Hanut on the east and Tirlemont on the west. Between Leuwe and Aerschot, the Great Gheet and the Demer formed a natural defence, and from Aerschot ran a new series of intrenchments to Antwerp. On the flanks were the two fortresses of Namur and Antwerp, and in the interval were numerous fortified posts, particularly Leuwe, Diest, Sichein, Aerschot, and Lierre. The French army, amounting to 70,000 men, was posted in such a manner as to draw the utmost advantage from this extraordinary effort of skill and labour. Villeroy, with the main body, continued his headquarters at Mierdorp, and the rest of the troops were disposed on different parts of the line, between the Great and Little Gheet, in situations from which they could most readily assemble in force on the points threatened with an attack.

To pass a barrier, strengthened with all the resources of art, covered by rivers and marshes, and defended by an army superior in numbers, was an enterprise of the boldest and most critical kind; and Marlborough, therefore, employed all the powers of his inventive genius to distract the attention and baffle the combinations of the enemy.

The point which he selected for his intended attack was between Leuwe and Heilisheim, where the abrupt and slippery banks of the Little Gheet, combined with the artificial defences, seemed to present a double obstacle to the enterprises of an enemy. During the short siege of Huy, he employed the most effectual means to ascertain the state of the lines, and the disposition of the hostile army. But though superior to the military prejudices of the age, which regarded

these defences as impregnable, his enterprising spirit was shackled by the nature of his command and the perverseness of those with whom he was associated. He was to preserve that secrecy which is the soul of action, and yet to obtain the consent of a jealous and timid government, to an enterprise of which he could not disclose the circumstances or extent. But the confidence placed in his military skill obviated the difficulties which would have frustrated the designs of a general less able to command respect. As early as the 1st of July, he sent Baron Hompesch to the Hague, and obtained such powers as he deemed necessary for the execution of the enterprise. Having thus succeeded in his application to the government, he imparted his plan in confidence to Overkirk alone, and entreated him to concur in the design, by leading the Dutch across the Mehaigne.* The object of this movement was twofold, to relieve himself from the cavils of the factious generals till the blow was struck, and to draw the attention of the enemy to the south of the Mehaigne, which being the weakest part of the lines was supposed to be most liable to attack. Overkirk, however desirous to follow these instructions, could not venture to take upon himself the responsibility of so dangerous a movement as the passage of the Mehaigne, which might have exposed him to the attack of a superior force before Marlborough could advance to his aid. Hence a council of war was held, and the proposal was submitted to the generals. It was, however, violently censured by Slangenberg and his party; but being as warmly supported by Overkirk, Noyelles, and others, all objections were overruled, and a resolution taken to hazard the attempt.

During these arrangements the solicitude of the commander was remarked by the troops; but though all anticipated some great design, none could divine the object. Rumours were circulated of a march to the Rhine or the Moselle, and the troops employed at the siege of Huy were not ordered to join till the last moment.

The preparations being matured, Overkirk, early in the morning of the 17th, crossed the Mehaigne, and advanced on Bourdine; and while he sent forth detachments to the very trench of the lines between the Meffle and Namur, Marlborough made a slight movement to the left, as if to co-operate

* Propositions sent to Overkirk, July 13th, with his replies.

in the threatened attack. This feint produced a due effect ; Villeroy drew the troops from the other parts of the lines towards his head-quarters, and no less than 40,000 men were collected in the vicinity of Mierdorp and round the sources of the Little Gheet.

At the moment when these different movements baffled conjecture, the troops who had been employed in the siege of Huy rejoined the army. To these others were added, forming a vanguard of twenty battalions and thirty-eight squadrons, which were privately ordered to assemble before the cavalry of the right wing, and placed under the command of the Count de Noyelles, whose local knowledge and enterprising spirit rendered him the fittest instrument for so daring a design. With him were associated Generals Schultz and Ingoldsby, and the cavalry was commanded by General Lumley, who had signalised his skill and bravery at the battle of Blenheim. In this disposition the same precautions were observed as in all the preceding. The troops were acquainted with their march only a few hours beforehand. The different corps composing the detachment were unknown to each other ; and as the collection of fascines would have pointed out the object of attack, every trooper was ordered to provide himself with a small truss of forage, as if the design was merely a rapid march. The tools and other instruments were provided, and the heavy baggage sent to the rear. All the preparations being matured, the signal was given at eight, and the detachment began its march, leaving Cortes, Montnachen, and Tron on the right, and Avernas, Ratshoven, and Neer-Winden to the left, towards the villages of Helixem and Neer-Hespen, on the Little Gheet, which the vigilant commander had found to be most weakly guarded, and where the angle, formed by the Great and Little Gheet, afforded an excellent defensive position subsequent to the passage. An hour afterwards the army of Marlborough followed in two columns. At the same instant Overkirk re-passed the Mehaigne over twelve pontoon bridges, which had been prepared in the interval, and connected his vanguard with the rear of Marlborough's army.

During the darkness a momentary confusion prevailed ; but on the approach of dawn the troops regained their order, and at four the heads of the columns approached the French

works. At this moment a thick fog arose and concealed their movements. Favoured by this temporary obscurity, General Schultz cleared the two villages of Neer-Winden and Neer-Hespen; another body of three battalions obtained possession of the bridge and village of Elixheim; and a third carried the castle of Wange, which commanded a passage over the Little Gheet. They instantly began to construct bridges across the stream; but the ardour of advancing troops could not brook this necessary delay. Rushing through the enclosures and marshy grounds, they traversed the Gheet in spite of its steep and slippery banks, and traversed across the line, though covered by a deep trench. In a few minutes their numbers so rapidly increased, that a French detachment of dragoons posted at Oostmal, were struck with a panic and retired.

The alarm was now spread, and while the allied troops were forcing their way over all obstacles, a detachment of the enemy, commanded by the Marquis d'Allegre, consisting of twenty battalions and fifty squadrons, appeared on the higher grounds near Oostmal, and stretching into order of battle, opened a heavy cannonade from eight pieces of artillery. Fortunately the hollow way leading from Elixheim to Tirlemont lay in their front, and retarded their advance. Marlborough, who had passed with the first squadrons, saw the necessity of an immediate effort, and with his characteristic decision led forward a part of the horse, and broke the enemy by an impetuous charge. They, however, again rallied, and renewing the contest with increasing ardour, drove back the allied cavalry. In this momentous struggle the duke himself was exposed to the utmost danger. Being on the flank, he was separated from his troops with only a trumpeter and a servant, and surrounded by the enemy. A French or Bavarian officer struck at him with his sword, but in the effort fell from his horse, and was instantly seized by the trumpeter. The allied forces were exasperated by this momentary repulse; but still more animated by the peril of their beloved chief, they recovered their order, and returned to the charge with irresistible force. The French cavalry were routed and dispersed; the infantry made a hasty retreat, and the allies were left undisputed masters of the lines. Meanwhile the Dutch troops approached and united with

those of Marlborough, though too late to take a share in the enterprise.

Villeroy and the elector were disconcerted by the retrograde movement of Overkirk, and spent an anxious night in momentary expectation of an attack. Apprised in the morning that the storm had burst on the very point which they had almost denuded of troops, from a confidence in its strength and distance, they mounted on horseback, and giving orders for the foot to move, hurried forward with all the cavalry they could collect. Arriving near the scene of conflict, they saw that the fatal blow was struck, and no resource remained but a precipitate retreat. They availed themselves of the defiles with which the country is intersected to withdraw their scattered troops, traversed the Great Gheet in confusion, near Judoigne, and making a forced march, their vanguard reached the suburbs of Louvain at eight in the evening. Unwilling to expose themselves to the attacks of an antagonist whose enterprising spirit they had learnt to dread, they gave no repose to their harassed troops, but spent the whole night in passing the Dyle, and did not deem themselves in safety till they had broken down the bridges and established themselves behind that river, with their left protected by the cannon of Louvain.

The duke was anxious to press on the enemy, to profit by their confusion and dismay, and by anticipating them in the position of Parc near Louvain, to frustrate their design of taking refuge behind the Dyle. To those who complimented him on his exploit he replied, with a smile, "All is well, but much is yet to be done." He was however thwarted by the opposition of the Dutch generals, who expatiated on the fatigue of the troops after so long and toilsome a march. At length, with much reluctance, he yielded to their instances, and established his camp in the vicinity of Tirlemont, which being garrisoned by no more than a single regiment, surrendered on the first summons, and the example was followed by Diest and Aerschot. The next day Marlborough approached Louvain, and encamped between Corbeck Overloo and the abbey of Vlierbeck, where he fixed his head-quarters.

As this conflict was rather a skirmish than a regular battle, the loss of the enemy in killed and wounded was inconsiderable; but many officers of distinction were captured,

and 1200 prisoners surprised the ensuing day. Many trophies fell into the hands of the confederates, among which were several standards belonging to the troops of Bavaria and Cologne, inscribed with the most pompous mottoes.* Success brought with it the usual attendants, exultation, health, and confidence; and the gratifying attachment which the veterans, whom the British general had before led to victory, manifested to his person in the very heat of battle, appears to have made a deep impression on his feeling and magnanimous mind. We cannot express his change of sentiment in warmer language than his own.

To Secretary Harley.

“*Camp at Tirlmont, July 18. 1705.* — Ever since I found myself obliged to quit the Moselle, I have spared no pains to lay a scheme for attacking the lines.

“Being informed that the posts of Hesper and Helixem were the most neglected, I ordered M. Overkirk to pass the Mehaigne yesterday with his army, and to advance towards the lines, to give the enemy some jealousy, that they might draw their troops that way; and as soon as the day began to shut in, I ordered a detachment of twenty battalions and thirty squadrons, under the command of Monsieur Schultz and Lieutenant-general Ingolsby, to advance towards those parts, which were three great leagues from our camp. At ten at night I followed with the army, having given orders to Overkirk to march likewise in order to join us. By break of day the detachment forced the passage with little opposition, and advanced with so much diligence that three regiments of dragoons, who were not encamped, were not in time to oppose them. Immediately Monsieur d’Allegre appearing with a great army of horse, computed at fifty squadrons and twenty battalions, advanced with great resolution, but¹ * * * * * we attacked them, and after a short dispute of ten hours, he was obliged to retire.”

To the Duchess.

“*Tirlmont, July 7–18. 1705.* — My dearest soul, this bearer, Durel, will acquaint you with the blessing God has been pleased to give me; for I have this morning forced the enemy’s lines, and beaten a good part of their army, taken their cannon, two lieutenant-generals, and two major-generals, and a great many of their officers, besides standards and colours, of all which I shall have a perfect account to-morrow. It is impossible to say too much good of the troops that were with me, for never men fought better. Having marched all night, and taken a good deal of pains

* On this subject the French biographer justly remarks: “It is easier to invent fine mottoes than to perform great actions; to mark inscriptions on banners than to defend them.”—T. ii. p. 106.

¹ Erased or torn off in the original.

this day, my blood is so hot that I can hardly hold my pen; so that you will, my dearest life, excuse me if I say no more, but that I would not let you know my design of attacking the lines by the last post, fearing it might give you uneasiness; and now, my dearest soul, my heart is so full of joy for this good success, that should I write more I should say a great many follies."

After congratulating him on the successful attack against the French lines, he proceeds:—

To Lord Godolphin.

"Tirlemont, July 7-18. 1705.—As I had in this action no troops with me but such as I brought from the Moselle, I believe the French will not care to fight with them again. This bearer will tell you that Monsieur Overkirk's army was not in the lines till the whole action was over, and that I was forced to cheat them into this action; for they did not believe I would attack the lines, they being positive that the enemy were stronger than they were. But this is what must not be spoke of, for it would anger the Dutch, with whom, I think, at this time, I am very well, for their deputies made me the compliment this afternoon, that if I had not been here the lines would not have been forced. I intend to march to-morrow towards Louvain, by which march I shall see what Monsieur de Villeroy will do. This day has given me a great deal of pleasure; however, I think 500 pounds is enough for the bearer.

"I beg you will make my compliments to the queen, and assure her that I have infinite pleasure in thinking this action may do good to her service."

"Camp near Louvain, July 9-20.—Before this comes, I hope Colonel Durel is got safe to you with the good news of the success we had last Saturday. The French made such haste to get over this river yesterday that I took above 1000 prisoners, which I have this day sent towards Maestricht. I have no account as yet what number M. d'Overkirk's army has taken, they coming very late into their camp. I think it is for the service to continue in two armies; for mine, that is much the biggest, does whatever I will have them; and the others have got the ill custom of doing nothing but by a council of war.

"The Marshal de Villeroy is camped on the other side of Louvain, so that till we can make him march from thence we cannot have the conveniency of this town, which we must have to make our magazines; for we are yet obliged to have all our bread from Liege, which is fourteen leagues from hence. This action will certainly oblige the French to send more troops hither from Alsace; so that if Prince Louis can be persuaded to act offensively he has a very fair opportunity. We hope to have our bread to-morrow, and then the next day attempt the passage of this river; and if we get on the same side with the enemy, I do not doubt but we shall oblige them to quit this place, where we must make our magazines for bread. Our affairs here are so changed that we now talk of nothing but forcing the enemy wherever we meet them.

“ I have this minute received the inclosed.* By the superscription you will see he owns her majesty: it is the first time he has done it, which makes me think he would be glad of any occasion to make his court.”

To the Duchess.

“ *Camp near Louvain, July 9–20.* — My Lord Sunderland intended to have left the Hague as this day, but our advancing into this country as we do I believe will make him stay some days longer, to know where he may join us. I was so pleased when I writ my last, that if I had writ on I should have used expressions which afterwards I should have been ashamed of. The kindness of the troops to me had transported me, for I had none in this last action but such as were with me last year; for M. Overkirk’s army did not come till an hour after all was over. This was not their fault, for they could not come sooner; but this gave occasion to the troops with me to make me very kind expressions, even in the heat of the action, which I own to you gives me great pleasure, and makes me resolve to endure any thing for their sakes. One great good of this action is, that I am very confident it will encourage the Dutch to that degree that they will go on cheerfully with the war, now that they see the lines are no bar to them, and that they may hope for farther conquests. You may be sure, my dearest soul, that I shall endeavour to carry this as far as it is possible, in hopes to make a speedy end of the war, so that I might enjoy your dear company in quietness.”

We present another letter written to the queen, in reply to one from her majesty, deprecating his resolution of retiring. It displays the same tone of reviving confidence, and the warmest expressions of gratitude for her kindness and condescension.

“ *July 23. 1705.* — Madam, I have had the honour of your majesty’s letter of the 3d, in which you are so extremely good that I want words to express the sense I have of it; and as I am sure I would not only venture my life, but also sacrifice my quiet for you, so I beg you will believe that I shall never think myself master of taking any resolution till I have first obtained your majesty’s leave. By my letters I have had from Holland I find the Dutch are so pleased with the success we have had that I believe they will not now hearken to any proposals of peace without first acquainting your majesty. I do also hope that it may have some effect on the parties in England, for the advantage of your affairs, which I pray God may prosper as your own heart can desire, and then I am sure England must be happy.”

Like Cæsar, and all other illustrious commanders, Marlborough disdained to spare his own person while he exposed the lives of his troops. His recent escape had awakened

* This refers to a letter from the king of France, or from his minister, Torcy.

the alarms of the duchess ; and we give his manly reply to one of her letters, in which she had manifested the natural feeling of a wife.

“ *Meldert, August 6. 1705.* — My dearest soul, I love you so well, and have set my heart so entirely on ending my days in quiet with you, that you may be so far at ease as to be assured that I never venture myself but when I think the service of my queen and country requires it. Besides, I am now at an age when I find no heat in my blood that gives me temptation to expose myself out of vanity ; but as I would deserve and keep the kindness of this army I must let them see that when I expose them I would not exempt myself.

“ I have heard what you write, that Prince Louis had some thoughts of putting out a manifesto for justifying his proceedings, but I think he will not do it. If he should by his letters to me, as well as in justice, he will not be able, nor will he endeavour to lay any fault on me ; for he is very desirous I should not be angry with him.”

Among the correspondence on this occasion, we find a letter from Harley which merits attention, as coming from a minister who could afterwards sanction the base insinuations of Swift and Mrs. Manley, the authoress of the *New Atlantis*, against Marlborough's want of courage.* We present it with no other comment than the infamous passage of Swift.

“ *July 28. 1705.* — My Lord, Saturday Colonel Durel brought the good news of your grace's glorious action ; the same night I received another by the post, and yesterday a third letter from your grace.

“ You have, my lord, exceeded our very hopes or expectations, and no person could have done it but yourself. What I took the liberty to say to the queen upon this occasion is, what I believe in my soul, that no subjects in the world have such a prince as the queen, and that no prince in the world hath such a subject as your grace.

“ Your friends and servants here cannot be without concern upon your grace's account, when we hear *how much you expose that precious life of yours upon all occasions*, and that you are not contented to do the part of a great general, but you condescend to take your share as a common

* “ I shall say nothing of his military accomplishments, which the opposite reports of his friends and enemies among the soldiers have rendered problematical ; but if he be among those who delight in war, it is agreed to be, not for the reasons common with other generals. Those maligners who deny him personal valour seem not to consider that this accusation is charged at a venture, since the person of a wise general is too seldom exposed to form any judgment in the matter : and that fear, which is said to have sometimes disconcerted him before an action, might probably be more for his army than for himself.” — *Four last Years of Queen Anne.*

soldier. I hope your lordship's unwearied care and unparalleled merit will in due time procure a lasting and sure peace for Europe, with repose and eternal renown to your grace. I am afraid there are some on this side who have with great industry given encouragement to their friends in Holland to expect and promote the old partition treaty. This success of your grace will destroy that and some other projects of those magicians.*

CHAP. XXXVII. — OPPOSITION OF THE DUTCH. — 1705.

THE factious adherents of the generals who had checked the advance of the duke seized the opportunity to reproach him with the delay of which they were the cause. They accused him of negligence in not intercepting the retreat of the enemy, and in not anticipating them in the strong camp of Parc, under the walls of Louvain, which would have ensured the conquest of Brabant. But these malicious detractions were silenced by the general exultation. General Overkirk, in his official letter, observes: — “It is a justice I owe to the Duke of Marlborough to state that the whole honour of the enterprise, executed with so much skill and courage, is solely due to him.” The States also in their letter of thanks to his Grace declare, “our generals agree that this victory is entirely due to your excellency's care, prudence, and valour, who have overcome obstacles and difficulties hitherto deemed insurmountable and invincible.”

A congratulatory letter from the king of Prussia testified

* The character and conduct of Harley will fully appear in the course of these Memoirs. He was descended from an old Whig family of Herefordshire, and began his public life as a very decided Whig. After several perplexing vacillations he went fairly over to the Tory party, and soon became one of its most ardent and able defenders in the House of Commons. For several years he professed great submission and devotion to Marlborough and Godolphin, but, aided by St. John and Mrs. Masham, finally destroyed their administration. He is well known in history by his connexions with literature; but as a statesman he was mean, intriguing, deceitful, and treacherous. The discoveries made by the late Sir James Macintosh in the archives of the Foreign Office at Paris no longer leave any doubt that both he and Bolingbroke carried on a treasonable correspondence with the French court several years before the treaty of Utrecht. (*Marlborough's Despatches*, vol. v. p. 617.) — ED.

in stronger terms the satisfaction with which he had witnessed his success in forcing the lines behind which the French had taken refuge at the mere news of his march.* But it was from the court of Vienna, and from the new emperor, that he received the most flattering marks of satisfaction and regard. To his adjutant, Colonel Richards, who conveyed the news of the victory, Joseph publicly testified his gratitude for the services of the duke to the common cause in general, and to his family in particular, declaring that they were such as should never be forgotten by himself or his posterity. On the ensuing day an official letter of congratulation issued from the chancery, to which Joseph added a postscript in his usual style of cordiality and attachment. "I cannot refrain from testifying to you myself the joy I felt at the fortunate success of your arms, not doubting its good effects for the common cause. I am much concerned that I am not able to place myself at the head of the army, to show in person the particular esteem I have for you, and the confidence which I repose in you."†

In England the news of this almost bloodless success excited the most lively satisfaction. It was celebrated by a public Te Deum, like the battle of Blenheim, and the queen herself went in person to St. Paul's, to return thanksgiving for the victory.

Since the passage of the lines, no material change had taken place in the respective positions of the contending armies. The troops of Marlborough remained between Vlierbeck and Corbeck Overloo, and the Dutch, who formed the left, extending from Corbeck to the skirts of the wood of Murdael. On the other hand, the enemy distributed their force along the Dyle, from the Ische to Rosslaer, near the Demer, retaining Louvain as a central point, from whence they might succour either wing which might be threatened with an attack. Marlborough burned with impatience to follow up his success by an immediate attempt against the French position; but his design was retarded by a succession of heavy rains, which fell for eight or nine days, and not only broke up the roads, but swelled into torrents the numerous streams with which the country is intersected.

* King of Prussia to the Duke, July 27. 1705.

† From the original in the Marlborough Papers.

To Lord Godolphin he observes on this occasion : —

“*July 12-23.* — The great rains we have had all Tuesday and Wednesday night have drowned all the meadows, by which we were to have marched to have gone over the Dyle. The French were then in such a consternation that if we could have marched yesterday morning, as was intended, I believe they would not have opposed our passage, nor do I think they really intend it. But most of our Dutch generals are of another opinion upon the French camping this day part of their troops over-against the place where we should pass, when the waters will give us leave, though I think they are only come there to try if that may hinder us.”

This suspense was attended with the most mischievous effects ; for it gave the French time to recover from their panic, and to fortify the points which were most exposed, while it allowed the enthusiasm of the Dutch to cool, and damped the ardour with which the troops were inspired by their recent success against the lines. It also again exposed the duke to unmerited obloquy, although his active mind was employed night and day in devising plans of offensive operation, to regain the advantage which he had been constrained to forego, and to drive the enemy from the Dyle.

This unfortunate inactivity again called into action the malicious spirit of the discontented generals, and enabled Slangenberg to use, with a sinister effect, his influence over the field deputies. But notwithstanding these maclinations, and the multiplied obstacles which Marlborough had already encountered, he still persisted in his project, and hoped to accomplish it by the same secrecy and the same combinations which he had employed in the passage of the lines. He accordingly again sent Baron Hompesch to the Hague, and obtained the acquiescence of the States, provided the design was approved by the generals and deputies. By this impolitic restriction he was compelled to recur to several councils of war, and to communicate a part of his plan to those by whom he had been constantly thwarted. The disclosure not only occasioned an injurious delay ; but, according to the opinion of Hare, and even of Marlborough himself, his design was betrayed to the enemy ; for notwithstanding the feints which he repeatedly made, to call the attention of Villeroy to the north of Louvain, the French commander was so far from being deceived, that he actually drew his troops from

that quarter, to strengthen his right, which he well knew to be the real point of attack.

After a suspense of several days, Marlborough extorted the acquiescence of the Dutch deputies and generals in the attempt to pass the river, though it was clogged with the absurd proviso that no risk should be incurred. He hoped, however, as before, "to cheat them into success;" though unfortunately the troops who formed his left, and on whom he was principally forced to rely, were Dutch, and consequently subject to the immediate control of their own officers. He therefore selected, for the leading detachment, a body of five battalions and nine squadrons of Dutch, under General Heukelom, and another, from his own army, of twelve battalions and thirty-seven squadrons, under the duke of Wirtemberg and Count Oxenstiern.* The first was to pass the Dyle at Neer Ische, and the last at Corbeck; and the two armies were to march to their support, as soon as night should conceal the movement from the knowledge of the enemy.

These corps assembled in front of the lines, with the necessary implements and train of pontoons; and, as in the passage of the lines, each horseman was provided with a truss of forage, instead of a fascine. At five in the afternoon they moved in silence, reached their destined points at ten, and remained during the night under arms, to commence their operations before the dawn, which was considered as the most favourable moment for a surprise. About midnight the two armies also broke up and followed, marching without fires, and with the utmost precaution. Two of the columns were bewildered in the darkness; but notwithstanding the accident, the Dutch, at three in the morning, were sufficiently near to sustain the detachments, and the English were rapidly advancing.

The detachments now received notice to commence the passage. At Corbeck 500 grenadiers, forming the advance of the duke of Wirtemberg's corps, constructed a temporary bridge, and traversed the Dyle with little opposition; and at Neer Ische, Heukelom not only led over the whole of his foot, but drove three brigades of the enemy from the village. The point was now gained, had the detachments

* According to Milner, this detachment was commanded by Lord Orkney.

been promptly and effectually supported; for, although the enemy had moved the moment they discovered the march of the allies, they were yet at too great a distance to obstruct the passage of the main army. At this crisis, however, a sudden suspense took place: for the Dutch, though on the spot, not only refused to sustain the detachment at Corbeck, but even hesitated in maintaining the advantage which Heukelom had bravely obtained.

As Marlborough was advancing at the head of his own troops, he was apprised of the unexpected demur on the left. He instantly despatched an aide-de-camp, urging the necessity of immediately succouring or recalling Heukelom, and soon followed himself, with all speed, in the hope that his presence would vanquish the indecision of the Dutch commanders. Riding up to the spot where they were holding a species of council, he was about to exhort them to support their detachment, when Slangenberg exclaiming "For God's sake, my lord duke, don't—" took him aside, and continued for some time to address him with much gesticulation, as if dissuading him from so hazardous an enterprise. During this colloquy, the Dutch generals sent orders to Heukelom to retire without delay; and the duke had the mortification to see his plan frustrated, at the moment when, in his opinion, promptitude and vigour would have ensured success. For the French, instead of advancing with intrepidity and order, suffered severely from the artillery of the detachments, and kept at a cautious distance; and Heukelom was so little pressed, that he withdrew without the loss of a single man, or even of a single pontoon. The other detachment was consequently recalled, and the army resumed its camp with a loss not exceeding fifty men.*

We have been thus minute in giving an account of this attempt, because it had been falsely or partially related, and because the true cause of the failure was never divulged.

No letter from the duke appeared in the Gazette; while

* Hare's Narrative of the Campaign—Milner. It is remarkable that in the Gazette no mention is made of the Dutch, from a delicacy not to offend the States. The only public document which traces the true cause of the failure is an anonymous letter from an English artillery officer, who was engaged in laying the bridges. — *History of Europe*, p. 258.

one which he wrote to the States, with a view of sparing the feelings of the Dutch, ascribed the failure to the sudden advance of the enemy in force. This account was confirmed by a letter from Overkirk, as well as by the brief narrative, which was given under the authority of the English government. The deputies also still farther exonerated themselves, and cast an indirect censure on the conduct of the commander-in-chief, by attributing the failure to the advantage of the enemy, in point of strength and position, and to the impossibility of combining the efforts of the troops employed in the enterprise.

As the silence of Marlborough gave countenance to these erroneous statements, the enemy exulted in the skill of their generals, and the courage of their troops, and claimed the merit of foiling the designs of the great commander who had repeatedly humbled their pride. The same tone was adopted by the envious and disaffected, both in England and abroad : the military character of Marlborough was bitterly arraigned and his disappointment attributed to a want of skill, and presumptuous confidence in his past success.

After a short halt the army again moved, and took up a position with the right at Meldert, and the left at Bossut. Here they remained several days.

Although, in his official correspondence, Marlborough dwells on this unfortunate failure in terms of the keenest regret, yet he gives no particulars, but in two of his private letters to Godolphin, he is more circumstantial, and ascribes the failure to its real cause.

“ *Near Louvain, July 29. 1705.* — You will have here inclosed her majesty’s letter, which by mistake was forgot in my last. I am now almost in despair of having that advantage we ought to expect from our last success; for we have now been here nine days in sight of the enemy, the river Dyle only between us. On Wednesday last it was unanimously resolved we should pass it the next morning; but that afternoon there fell so much rain that made it impracticable; but the fair weather has made it as it was, so that I resolved to have passed it this morning. Upon which the deputies held a council with all the generals of Monsieur Overkirk’s army, who have unanimously retracted their opinion, and declared the passage of the river to be of too dangerous a consequence, which resolution, in my opinion, will spoil the whole campaign. They have, at the same time, proposed to me to attack the French on their left, but I know they will let that fall also as soon as they shall see the ground; for that has much more difficulties in it than what I was desirous they

should do. In short, these generals are so cautious that we shall be able to do nothing, unless an occasion offers, which must be put in execution before they can have a council of war. It is very mortifying to find much more obstructions from friends than from enemies; but that is now the case with me, and yet I dare not show my resentment for fear of too much alarming the Dutch, and indeed encouraging the enemy."

The ministry in England, and the friends of the Duke of Marlborough in particular, took a warm interest in the disappointments which he experienced. No one appeared more deeply affected than his dependent and friend, Mr. St. John, secretary at war, who owed his post to the confidence and esteem of the duke. We introduce a letter from his correspondence of this year, less for its real importance, than for its singular contrast to the subsequent conduct and principles of the writer. In perusing this letter, which appears to be dictated by feelings of gratitude and patriotism, no one could imagine that it proceeded from the hand of one who hastened the fall of Marlborough, and hurried the nation into that *ILL PEACE*, which he so earnestly deprecates.

"*Whitehall, August 18. 1705.* — My lord, I acknowledge the favour of your grace's letter from the camp at Meldert of the 6th instant, and return you my humble thanks for thinking me so zealous for the public, and so faithful a servant to you. Whatever situation of life I am in, your grace will never be deceived in this opinion. I have all the force of inclination, as well as the strongest ties of gratitude, to bind me to you. It was very melancholy to find the malice of Slangenberg, the fears of Dopf, and the ignorance of the deputies, to mention no more, prevail so as to disappoint your grace to their prejudice as well as ours. We hope the Dutch have agreed to what your grace desires of them, without which the war becomes a jest to our enemies, and can end in nothing but an ill peace, which is certain ruin to us. I attribute the quelling of that spirit of faction which appeared at Nimeguen, and is in other parts of Holland, to nothing so much as your grace's return and glorious success, and hope this will keep down the ferment here which rises apace, and promises a stormy winter. I am, my lord, with all imaginable respect and truth," &c. *

* The writer of this adulatory condolence became the celebrated Viscount Bolingbroke, and the St. John of Pope's "Essay on Man." At a later period he was the rival and bitter political enemy of Mr. Harley, who had introduced him to the notice of Marlborough. In subtle craft he outdid his first patron, and in concert with Mrs. Masham, supplanted him in the favour of Queen Anne. For a few days he exercised the functions of prime minister, but the unexpected death of the queen frustrated all his ambitious schemes. He next joined the Pretender, but soon

Though depressed by chagrin, and shackled by the perverseness of those who acted under him, Marlborough did not yield to despair, but formed the resolution of forcing the enemy to an engagement, in the hope of distinguishing the close of this campaign by a victory no less splendid than that of Ramilies. He sent Hompesch to the Hague, with a letter reprobating the conduct of Slangenberg and his adherents, and expatiating on the folly of subjecting all military operations to the decision of councils of war.

But notwithstanding his eminent services, and the just estimation in which he was held by the Dutch, it was no easy task, to supersede the formalities of a weak and captious government, influenced by French intrigue. The only effect of his representations was a species of compromise, which he himself in letters to Godolphin considers as little better than nugatory.

“ *Meldert, August 3. 1705.* — I have sent Lieutenant-general Hompesch once more to the Hague. The inclosed is a copy of my letter I sent by him to the pensioner. By it you will see that I have a mind to serve them if they please; but if they should not allow of what I propose it is impossible to act offensively; for besides the danger of resolving every thing that is to be done in a council of war, which cannot be kept so secret, but that the enemy must know it time enough to prevent it, as we had the experience of in our last undertaking, so Monsieur Slangenberg, though he is a brave man, his temper is such that there is no taking measures with him. I am so tired that I cannot answer yours at this time.”

“ *Meldert, August 13. 1705.* — Lieutenant-general Hompesch is come back with the resolution of the States, in which they desire their deputies not to call a council of war but when they shall think it absolutely necessary. At the same time it is expected that I should not only communicate to the deputies and Monsieur Overkirk, but that I must have their concurrence, so that I am afraid the matter is not at all mended by this resolution; for whatever I shall propose of consequence, the deputies, that have no knowledge of the matter, can

abandoned the Jacobite court, either from jealousy of the ascendancy of the duke of Ormond, or from his better sense and education making him ashamed of the mean qualities of his new master, and the folly of his adherents. His character and history were remarkable and eventful, and would far exceed the limits of a note to delineate. He was a fine speaker and highly accomplished man; of great energy and decision of character; but unscrupulous, and lacked the integrity of principle and singleness of purpose that inspire confidence and lead to unquestioned excellence. He lived till 1751, and died at Battersea, where he was born. — Ed.

have no opinion till they have advised with somebody, which must be with their generals.

“The waggons loaded with six days’ bread, I am assured, shall be here to-morrow, so that on Saturday I shall begin to march. I wish, with all my heart, this march may give an opportunity for action, for our men are very desirous of engaging the enemy.”

With even this modified permission, Marlborough did not hesitate to resume offensive operations. Sensible, however, that he could not induce the Dutch again to attempt the passage of the Dyle, or baffle the vigilance of the enemy, who had considerably strengthened their position, he formed the plan of an expedition which would render their natural and artificial defences unavailing, by moving round the sources of the river. As this movement would deprive him of all direct communication with his magazines, he remained at Meldert to procure a sufficient supply of bread and provisions, for the time which it was likely to last. The interval was employed in commencing the demolition of the lines. On the 13th of August the bread arrived; and as this day was the anniversary of the battle of Blenheim, it was spent in acts of thanksgiving, and in those elevated hopes, which the recollection of past success, and the actual preparations, were calculated to inspire.

At this juncture Baron Sparre, who commanded a detached force on the side of Bergen-op-zoom, broke through the lines between Ghent and Bruges, and made an irruption into Brabant; and though compelled to retire before superior numbers, he fully succeeded in his object, which was, to distract the attention of the enemy.

At the moment when this irruption had produced its effect, Marlborough left detachments to secure Diest and Tirlemont, and broke up his camp. On the 15th of August he directed his march from Meldert to the abbey of Corbais, while Overkirk made a parallel movement to Nill St. Martin. Being apprised that a strong detachment from the French army in Alsace would reach Philippeville on the 18th, the British commander accelerated his march, with the hope of reaching the enemy before the junction could take place. The next day the confederates continued their progress, and arriving at Genappe, near the sources of the Dyle, were united in one line of battle, and under one command. On the 17th they

again moved, and approaching the borders of the forest of Soignies, encamped between Hulpen and Braine l'Allieu, the head-quarters being at Fischermont. In the interim the enemy took the alarm, and withdrawing from the Dyle, established themselves behind the Ische, their front being protected by the stream, and their right and rear by a part of the forest. In this situation they hoped to cover Brussels, without relinquishing their advantageous position on the Dyle.

Anxious to attack the enemy, at the moment of changing their camp, Marlborough resolved to force the passage of the Ische. With this view he made a particular inquiry, from the people of the country, into the nature of the ground bordering the stream; and procured guides, who were intimately acquainted with the situation of the fords, and the condition of the banks. The same evening he selected a detachment of twenty battalions and as many squadrons, which were placed under the command of his brother, General Churchill, and posted in front of the lines, to commence the attack, by skirting the borders of the forest, and turning the right flank of the enemy.

A report being now brought that a French detachment had occupied Waterloo, a post on the high road between Nivelles and Brussels, at the entrance of the forest, the pickets were called out, and forced the enemy to retire into the wood. They, however, re-appeared in the evening, and an alarm was suddenly spread that their whole army was advancing in that direction. The duke was thus called from his quarters, where he had retired to repose, after his great exertions both of body and mind. On riding to the spot, he found the alarm to be false, but it deprived him of three hours' rest, at a time when rest was doubly necessary.

As the next movement would bring the army in presence of the enemy, preparations were made for action. At day-break the heavy baggage was sent to Lower Wavre, and the army marched by the right in two columns, the artillery forming a third. The first column traversed the river Lane above Hulpen, and defiled to the left, through a long and narrow pass, leading by an ascent into the forest. On approaching, the troops were delighted to observe that this vast mass of wood, which appeared almost impervious at a

distance, consisted of open plantations, intersected by good roads, and unencumbered with thickets. They also found the soil firm and dry; and having traversed half a league of forest, emerged into the plain between the Ische and the Lane. The second column, which crossed the plain farther to the right, found a passage still more easy. During the march, a sudden shower seemed to portend a rainy day; but the atmosphere speedily cleared up, and at nine the troops first descried the enemy.

Meanwhile the commander in chief was actively employed in examining the hostile position. He discovered four practicable points of attack, at Over-Ische, between that village and Holberg, near Holberg, and at Neer-Ische. In his survey he advanced so closely to the enemy, that he was exposed to the fire of their artillery, and being saluted with several cannon shot, from a point which was peculiarly weak, he smilingly observed to his attendants, "These gentlemen do not choose to have this spot too narrowly inspected."

While the army was in march, the detachment, under General Churchill, took the route towards the left, and traversed a causeway leading to the convent of Groenendale. But on approaching the convent, their march was interrupted by an abbatis, and they learnt that a corps of twenty French battalions was strongly posted at the opposite opening of the wood. In consequence of this unexpected obstacle, they were unable to fulfil their instructions, and made a short halt, to wait for new orders from the commander-in-chief.

The main body was now completing its formation, as fast as the troops arrived, and Marlborough anxiously expected the appearance of the artillery, which he had ordered to march with the utmost expedition. But its progress was obstructed by the insolence, if not the malice, of Slangenberg, who, notwithstanding the strictest injunctions, that the baggage should not be suffered to intermingle with the column, overbore the commanding officer, and compelled him to admit his own baggage into the train.

As the duke returned from his survey, full of hope and confidence, he met Overkirk, and immediately went back with him to show the peculiarities of the ground at Over-Ische, which was selected as his point of attack. The Dutch commander perfectly coincided in his opinion, and approved

his intended dispositions. As they proceeded towards Holberg, Marlborough observed the opposite point of the hostile position to be slenderly guarded. He considered the juncture as too favourable to be lost, and immediately ordered the nearest troops to advance and occupy it without delay, while the cavalry moved to Ncer-Ische; but he was obliged to countermand these orders, by the information that the artillery was still in the rear, and the whole army not yet arrived. The design was soon perceived by the enemy, who hurried to the point several pieces of artillery.

At mid-day, intelligence being brought that the troops were in line, and the artillery arrived, the duke again rode along the front of the hostile position, to issue his final instructions. Meeting the deputies in his way, he cheerfully congratulated them on the prospect of success, and pressed them to give orders for the advance of the troops. Far from receiving the proposal with the same alacrity, they replied, "Your highness will doubtless allow us to request the opinion of our generals." Accordingly the superior officers were collected, about three, on the height of Over-Ische, and Marlborough, impatient of delay, thus addressed them: "Gentlemen, I have reconnoitred the ground, and made dispositions for an attack. I am convinced, that conscientiously, and as men of honour, we cannot now retire without an action. Should we neglect this opportunity, we must be responsible before God and man. You see the confusion which pervades the ranks of the enemy, and their embarrassment at our manœuvres. I leave you to judge whether we should attack to-day, or wait till to-morrow. It is indeed late, but you must consider that by throwing up intrenchments during the night, the enemy will render their position far more difficult to force."

A murmur of disapprobation was heard in the circle; but Slangenberg, without waiting for the decision of his colleagues, abruptly exclaimed, "Since I have been led to this place without any previous communication of the design, I will give no other opinion than that the passage at Over-Ische is impracticable. However, I am ready to obey the orders which I may receive." The duke, affecting not to notice this insulting speech, turned to him, and mildly observed, "I am happy to have under my command an officer

of your courage and skill, and I flatter myself, that in a situation which requires instant decision, you will start no difficulties." He concluded with proposing to him the direction of the attack at Over-Ische ; but Slangenberg made no other reply than "Murder and massacre!" To remove objections supposed to be derived from an unwillingness to risk the Dutch troops, Marlborough then offered him two English for every Dutch battalion ; and on his sneering rejoinder, that he did not understand English, proposed to consign to him the German regiments. But this offer was also rejected, on the plea that the attack was impracticable.

Marlborough was roused by these cavils, and observed with warmth, "I disdain to send troops to dangers which I will not myself encounter ; and therefore I will lead them where the peril is most imminent." He then apostrophised the deputies, adjuring them by God and their country not to neglect so favourable an opportunity. Of this exhortation they took no notice, but resumed their deliberation, forming a circle where they stood. The consultation continued two hours, new difficulties being perpetually started, while Marlborough was observed standing by in an agony of impatience. At this moment the news being brought that his brother, General Churchill, was prevented from advancing, he querulously exclaimed, "Let him then retire. His retreat will not be far, and if the attack is made, he may return."

After another hour's deliberation, the opinion of Slangenberg prevailed, and it was unanimously decided that the enemy were too advantageously posted to be attacked, particularly at Over-Ische. Some, however, candidly owned that they could form no judgment on the other points, which they had not examined. To remove this objection, three generals, Tilly, Slangenberg, and Salisch, were sent to reconnoitre ; and were accompanied by brigadier Bothmar and quarter-master general Stark, who, at the desire of the duke, attended to show the ground. This survey proved a new source of cavils and objections. Every post occupied by the enemy was deemed too strong to be forced ; the river was declared not fordable ; and the most trifling elevation was considered as inaccessible to cavalry. All the arguments of Bothmar and Stark were unavailing. Salisch demanded of Bothmar, who was present at Blenheim, whether the position

of the Ische was not the most formidable. Instead of listening to the reply, he indulged himself in a long digression, and concluded with censuring that engagement as a rash and imprudent attempt. Some dispute next arising on the force of the enemy, Slangenberg drew from his pocket an order of battle, and computed the number of their battalions and squadrons to be far greater than those of the confederates. The time was thus spent till the approach of darkness compelled them to return to their respective quarters.

Without waiting for the result of this survey, Marlborough had indignantly retired to Lane, where he was apprised by Bothmar that the three generals had seen nothing but obstructions and impossibilities. Mortified with this information, even though it was not unexpected, he exclaimed, in a tone which marked his feelings, "I am at this moment *ten* years older than I was four days ago."

On the following morning Overkirk sent him an official report, stating the opinion of the three generals, and adding, that the attack was still more hopeless than on the preceding day, because the enemy had profited by the night to increase their means of defence.* Convinced that the case was now irremediable, Marlborough quitted a spot which he had confidently hoped to illustrate by a victory no less splendid than that of Blenheim; and withdrawing to Lower Wavre, where he rejoined his baggage, concluded with a brief, though pathetic, postscript; a letter which he had written two days before to the duchess, in the full expectation of success.

"August 17. — We shall march again to-morrow, for we cannot stay longer in this country than the bread we bring with us will give us leave. I hope in a week or ten days I shall have more leisure than I have now,

* The account of this transaction is drawn from Hare's Narrative, from the letter of an officer who received his information from Slangenberg himself, and from a curious and minute relation, written by Bothmar, in the Marlborough Papers. We have also consulted all the printed authorities, particularly Slangenberg's Apologetic Letter to the States, printed in Lamberti.

It is impossible to close our remarks without reminding the reader that this spot has been recently distinguished by an event of a far different character, in which our second Marlborough vindicated the honour of his country, and reaped those laurels which the hero of Blenheim was prevented from gathering by malice, timidity, ignorance, and treachery.

and then I am resolved to drink the Spa waters. I wish with all my heart those of Tunbridge may do you good; and then I am sure the first summer I am with you I shall desire to go thither with you, and then I believe the waters will do me good; for till I am pleased and at ease with you no waters nor any thing else will do me good."

"August 19.—When I had writ this far I took the resolution of not letting the post go, believing I should have engaged the enemy as yesterday, which I certainly had done if it had been in my power. But all the Dutch generals, except M. Overkirk, were against it, so that the deputies would not consent to our engaging, notwithstanding we were in battle, within cannon shot of the enemy; and I do assure you that our army were at least one third stronger than theirs. We are now returning, for we cannot stay longer than the bread we have brought with us will give us leave. It is impossible to make the war with advantage at this rate. I have sent a copy of my letter to the States to lord treasurer. I should have writ in a very angry style, but I was afraid it might have given the French an advantage."

To give additional poignancy to the grief which Marlborough felt at this unfortunate failure, he had soon afterwards the mortification to learn that the enemy, instead of risking an engagement, would have fallen back on Brussels, had he advanced against them with his whole force.

On his arrival at Corbais, he strongly expresses to Godolphin his feelings of regret and indignation.

"August 24.—I did in my last send you a copy of my letter to the States, in which I was careful not to use any expression that might give advantage to the French. Several prisoners whom we have taken since, as well as the deserters, assure us that they should have made no other defence but such as might have given them time to have drawn the army towards Brussels, where all their baggage was already gone. By this you may imagine how I am vexed, seeing very plainly that the people I am joined with will never do any thing."

CHAP. XXXVIII.—COUNTER REPRESENTATIONS AND INTRIGUES.—1705.

ON retiring to his quarters at Lower Wavre, the duke wrote an official letter to the States, which displays the struggle in his mind, between his fear of injuring the common cause, by an incautious remonstrance, and his indignation at the disappointment he had undergone. After observing, that from the goodness of the troops he had flattered himself with the prospect of a glorious victory, and confident that the deputies would impart the arguments on both sides of the

question, he added, "they will at the same time do M. Overkirk justice, by informing you that he coincided with me in opinion, and thought the opportunity too fair to be lost. However I submitted, though with extreme reluctance." In a postscript, giving farther scope to his feelings, he observes, "My heart is so full, that I cannot forbear representing to your high mightinesses on this occasion, that I find my authority here to be much less than when I had the honour to command your troops in Germany."

On the same evening in which he wrote his letter to the States-general, and from the same place, the deputies issued what may be called a counter manifesto. In this document they justified their opposition to the proposed attack, by declaring that, according to the unanimous opinion of all the Dutch generals, except Overkirk, the nature of the ground and the superior force of the enemy, presented insurmountable obstacles to so desperate an enterprise as the attempt to force the passage of the Ische. They even extended their objections to such petty cavils, as the difficulty of establishing hospitals, or forwarding convoys of bread; and concluded their justification by an indirect censure on the commander-in-chief, for concealing from them the real object of his movements.

"And we hoping that we have fully satisfied the intentions of your high mightinesses, contained in your resolution of the 5th instant, to permit the Duke of Marlborough, without holding a council of war, to make two or three marches, for the execution of some design formed by his grace; we therefore, for the future, shall regulate our conduct according to our instructions and your high mightinesses' resolution of the 26th of June last, except your high mightinesses should be pleased to send us farther orders. And we cannot conceal from your high mightinesses that all the generals of our army *think it very strange that they should not have the least notice of the said marches.*"

As on the former occasion, the French also naturally availed themselves of this official report, to laud the skill of their own generals, to magnify the valour of their own troops, and to reflect on the military talents of the British commander, as if he had been hurried by presumption into an enterprise which was impracticable, or had been baffled by the superior tactics and activity of his opponents. In England, the enemies of Marlborough, as well as the advocates for peace, adopted the language and sentiments of this document, although it was known to be both partial and false; and

bitter censures were again lavished on the military conduct of the illustrious chief.

The letter of Marlborough being surreptitiously printed before it was communicated to the States, produced a deep sensation in Holland. The English partisans, who had long deplored the timid policy of their government, were roused to indignation; and at the Hague, in particular, the burghers held an assembly to remonstrate against the misconduct of their deputies and generals.

From Holland, the same feeling spread into England: a deep sentiment of indignation was diffused through all ranks; the people warmly espoused the cause of their general; and, in numerous publications hawked about the streets, the severest reflections were cast on the Dutch nation, and in particular on the deputies of the States, for not suffering the duke to engage the enemy. In the British cabinet the impulse derived from public opinion was strengthened by the indignant complaints of the commander himself, in his correspondence with Godolphin and Harley.

To Lord Godolphin.

“*August 19.* — You will see by the inclosed to the States, that after four days’ march, I found the enemy encamped as I expected, so that I thought we should have had a very glorious day. But as the deputies would not consent without first consulting the generals, who were all against it, except M. Overkirk, we have been obliged to retire from the enemy, notwithstanding we were at least one-third stronger than they, which I take to be very prejudicial to the common cause, and scandalous for the army. I think this will show very plainly, that it is next to impossible to act offensively with this army, so governed as they are; for when their general and I agree, as we did in this, that it shall be in the power of subaltern generals to hinder the execution, is against all discipline. This last action of the Dutch generals has given us great mortification; for the enemy will see very plainly that they have nothing to fear on this side, nor can I ever serve with them without losing the little reputation I have; for in most countries they think I have power in this army to do what I please. I beg you will give my duty to the queen, and assure her, that if I had had the same power I had the last year, I should have had a greater victory than that of Blenheim, in my opinion, for the French were so posted, that if we had beat them, they could not have got to Brussels.”

Convinced, indeed, from bitter experience, that the evil was irremediable, Marlborough seems to have formed the resolution of suffering the Dutch to remain on the defensive, as more congenial to their character and constitution, and

renewing offensive operations in Germany and Italy. This design he communicated to Godolphin, in a letter dated Ramey, August 27.

“By yours of the 10th, from Windsor, I see you thought I should find much less difficulty in the execution of what I projected, than you will find by mine of the 19th. Since that I have reason to believe that Slangenberg has resolved to give all the hindrance he could to whatever should be proposed, so that you may see how the common cause is like to thrive, when it is in the power of a Roman Catholic of his temper to hinder whatever may be designed. This makes it impossible for me to serve with these people; for I take it for granted, their constitution will not allow them to give us such power as for the good of the service I ought to have; so that the next year's project ought to be so made, as that the Dutch army in this country may be on the defensive, by which all the other armies may be put in a condition to act offensively.”

These appeals drew from the British cabinet a resolution of despatching lord Pembroke, president of the council, to the Hague, to remonstrate against the misconduct of Slangenberg and the deputies, and to insist on a more efficient arrangement with regard to the command of the army. Harley, as secretary, imparted the decision to the duke, in a tone of devoted attachment to his patron and benefactor.*

“August 18–29. — My lord, this day we received two mails from Holland, and about four hours after a third packet arrived; and I had the honour, by these three posts, to receive two letters from your grace, one of August 19., the other of August 24.: your grace's expression in your postscript to the States is so just, it sets every honest man's heart higher; for I must own my heart is too full to speak upon this subject; and Mr. Vryberge, after all his artifice to colour the misbehaviour at the Dyle, now is struck dumb, and hangs his head. What shall one say? Your grace's superior talents prepared a glorious victory for them, and they dared not, or would not, take hold of it. I know not what name to call this by; I cannot trust myself to reason upon it. The root it springs from, I fear, will produce worse fruit it cannot, but more I doubt of the same kind, unless a speedy remedy can be applied. The queen, upon reading your grace's letter, ordered the lords immediately to be summoned; they were all of opinion to advise the queen to take notice of this to the States, in regard not only to the public service, but also what is due to your grace's great merit, to which such usage is very inconsistent. Besides, this sort of conduct will put vast difficulties upon the queen, in obtaining supplies for another year; and it is a very great hardship that those who set themselves at home to oppose the queen's measures and

* State Paper Office.

every thing she shall do for the public good, should be furnished with such plausible, fatal arguments, by our friends in Holland.

“ The queen being advised to represent this to the States, from many other reasons which would be needless to suggest to your grace, the next consideration was, the method of doing it; and it seemed to be agreed that some person of figure and activity should be sent over to the States, upon this and any other particular which may occur. This went no farther than a proposal, it being determined first to send to your grace an express messenger for your opinion upon this subject. To that purpose I send Nicholas Hill, who hath been formerly in Flanders. He is commanded, if possible, to bring your grace’s answer to Windsor by to-morrow se’nnight, or as soon as you can despatch him.

“ The knowledge your grace has of the government of that country, of their humours, their factions, and the particular inclinations and dispositions of the several great men there, with their respective interests and attachments; with that clearness of understanding and penetration, of which your grace is so great a master, makes every body here justly depend upon your direction in this critical affair. My lord treasurer writes largely to your grace upon this and other heads, and therefore I will say no more, but desire your grace to be assured I will take any part you shall think proper for me. I am, with the greatest duty,” &c.

This proposal was congenial to the duke’s own sentiments, for in the first transport of resentment, he had imparted to his friends in Holland a resolution of quitting the army and returning to England. Fortunately however for the public, his irritated feelings were soothed by the earl of Portland and his friends in Holland, who not only deprecated a step so fatal to the confederacy, but made an earnest appeal to Godolphin against the mission of Lord Pembroke, as likely to increase the general ferment, and produce an alienation, if not a breach, between the two countries.* Mature reflection, and the arguments of this nobleman, produced their due effect on the mind of the commander, and we soon find him seconding the remonstrance against the intended mission, in his reply to the secretary.

“ *Tirlemont, Sept. 2.* † — I received last night the favour of a letter from you of the 18th. I could not refuse giving you my humble opinion, as you desire, upon what has been proposed to her majesty in council, of sending some person of distinction to the Hague, with relation to our late disappointment, and the more absolute command of the

* Letter from Lord Portland to the Lord Treasurer, Hague, 18th Sept. 1705.

† The Duke of Marlborough to Secretary Harley. — State Paper Office.

army, whereupon I shall venture to tell you my thoughts freely. From the knowledge and experience I have of these people, that while they are in such a ferment on this very occasion, and that there are such divisions reigning amongst them, I can in no ways think it for the public good or her majesty's service, as believing it might rather give an advantage to the French, as those that wish them well, or at least that are over-forward for a peace, of which I must own there are many amongst the States themselves, than effect the end you propose; and, therefore, I would humbly offer that it might be deferred till I had advised with such of our friends as, I am sure, are in the true interest, and by that means will be obliged to pursue such methods as are, or may be thought more proper for the public good. One chief reason that makes me to be of this opinion is, that I am persuaded, if an opportunity should now offer before our leaving the field, the greatest part of the generals who were against engaging the enemy, are so sensible of their error that they would not obstruct any thing that might be for our advantage. Another reason is, that the sending such a person at this time would undoubtedly create great jealousies at the court of Vienna, and with our other allies, whatever we might allege to the contrary, that it had some tendency towards peace, many of them being too ready to receive such impressions, which might prove of dangerous consequence.

“ You will please to lay this with submission before her majesty, and believe me to be with truth,” &c.

Meanwhile the army of Marlborough retraced their steps by retrograde marches to Corbais, and afterwards proceeding in two bodies by Ramey and Pervez-le-marché, took up their former position between Bossut and Meldert, in which latter place the head-quarters were fixed on the 30th of August. During this march, Marlborough sent General Demer to invest Leuwe, the only fortress on the southern part of the lines which was yet held by the French. On the 2d he advanced to Tirlemont, and having received the surrender of Leuwe, ordered the demolition of the lines from that place to the Mehaigne. He beheld with exulting satisfaction the rasure of this formidable barrier, which opened a way to his future progress.

While he directed these operations, he profited by the vicinity of the Spa, to drink the waters, with the hope of recovering his health. During his short residence at Tirlemont, he also retired from the bustle of company, and as much as possible avoided the transaction of business. But when the mind is deeply affected, neither the skill of the physician nor the salutary powers of nature can restore health and serenity; and we again trace in his letters that

tone of dejection and irritability which had reigned in his correspondence since his disappointment on the Moselle, though we observe his active genius still conceiving grand projects, and anticipating future victories.

To the Duchess.

“ *Tirlemont, Aug. 31. 1705.* — I have so many things that vex me, that I am afraid the waters, which I think to begin to-morrow, will not do me much good. That I may be the more quiet during the siege of Leuwe, I have taken my quarters in this town, and will trouble myself with business as little as possible. My letters from the Hague tell me that the factious there are divided concerning the last disappointment I had. Those that are for a peace think their generals acted prudently; but the others are angry with them and their deputies, so that it is with them as with us in England, they judge by parties. I wish the French may make no advantage of these unhappy divisions; for it is most certain that the French are so desirous of a peace, that the Dutch may have whatever they will ask; but should we be so unfortunate as to have a peace concluded as things now are, it is most certain it could not last long, and I fear that at last it would be their ruin. But, if it be possible, they have more faction than we have, by which we may fear every thing.

“ It is impossible for me to express how much I long for the end of this campaign, for I have no prospect of any thing considerable that can be done, unless the French will take heart and offer at something.”

To Lord Godolphin.

“ *Aug. 31. 1705.* — You do in yours complain of some things at home; but if you could know all I suffer here abroad, you would agree with me in begging of the queen that I might never more go out of England; for in Holland they have not only taken care that my letter should not be printed, but there is another printed, and my name put to it, of which there is not one word of it mine. I have complained to the pensioner of this, and should have done it to the States, but then it must have been public, which might have caused some disorders among the people there, for they are of my side against their generals. By this you may see how difficult a part I have to act, being obliged to take care that neither the French nor Dutch common people know how I am used; for it is most certain I have not the tenth part of the authority I had last year; and it is as certain that if I had the power of fighting, with the blessing of God, the French must have been beaten. By all this, you will easily believe me that I shall make it my endeavour to be in England early. But if any misfortune should happen to the army after I were gone, I should never forgive myself; for though I am used ill, the public must not suffer; and should I think of putting this army into winter quarters before the end of October, it would give an opportunity to the French of sending troops to Germany; but be assured my heart is with you. My vexing has put me so much out of order, that I am obliged to take a vomit this night, and to-morrow I shall begin the

Spa waters, and shall drink them during the time we shall stay in this camp."

To the Duchess.

"*Tirlemont, Sept. 2. 1705.* — I received last night yours of the 17th and 18th, o. s., of the last month. It is impossible for me to express the trouble the last disappointment has given. However, I must be careful not to speak all the truth, for fear of offending the Dutch, which would give a great advantage to the common enemy.

"It is a pleasure to me when I find by yours that you are easier with 79 (the queen). I think, for the good of every thing, you should make it your business to have it so; for I am very confident by 72 (Lord Godolphin's) letters, it would be of great use to him. I wish 79 (the queen) and 72 (Lord Godolphin) all the happiness imaginable. But really my spirit is so broke, that whenever I can get from this employment I must live quietly or die."

When the mortified general was just beginning to moderate his chagrin, and to recover from his disappointment, he was exposed to another insult, which fell the heavier because it came from his own associates. Interested as both the Dutch and Germans were to repel the torrent of French invasion, and to maintain their independence, it awakens our surprise to observe the plans of our great commander thwarted by national prejudice and personal jealousy. But it excites still stronger indignation to find him exposed to the obloquy of his own countrymen, and the petty intrigues of men intrusted with official situations. His public report of the operations of the Ische was drawn up by his secretary, Cardonel, in such a manner as to spare the honour and feelings of the Dutch government, and at the same time to vindicate his own conduct, and furnish a plea for a remonstrance. This account was, however, garbled in its way to the press, and the report as published in the Gazette* was calculated to convey a censure on Marlborough himself, as if he had only exhibited his troops to the enemy, and then retreated as

* London Gazette of August 16. to August 20. 1705. — "The 18th the army decamped at three in the morning from Fischermont, and having passed several defiles, came through the wood of Soignies into a spacious plain, with only the Ische between us and the enemy, whom we found, according to expectation, between Neder Ische and Over Ische. In the afternoon the army encamped at Laue, from whence we marched the 19th to the camp at Basse Wavre." — Such was the partial, garbled, and spiritless account which was given by the organ of government to the British public!

hastily as he advanced. He would not be so indifferent to his own reputation as not to complain of this unpardonable negligence, or secret animosity. In the postscript of a letter to Godolphin, from Tirlmont, dated Sept. 9. he observes :—

“ After I had sealed this letter, Mr. Cardonel showed me the Gazette, in which I think I am used very hardly. I send you the paper he wrote by that post, by which you will see what was left out, which I think the writer of the Gazette would not have ventured to have done if he had not had orders for it. If I had not had more regard for the public than for myself, I should have writ more plainly the truth of the unreasonable disappointment I met with on that day, which, if I had, I am very confident the common people of Holland would have done me justice; but that would have given great advantage to the French, which was reason enough for me to avoid doing it. But I am much mortified to see that an English gazette has more care not to offend Monsieur Vryberg than to do me justice. They have but to see this gazette in Holland, and they will have reason to lay aside any farther thoughts of making new regulations for the giving more authority to the general that shall command, which I hope her majesty will have so much goodness for me as to let it be some other person; for I am very sure I must be madder than any body in Bedlam, if I should be desirous of serving, when I am sure that my enemies seek my destruction, and that my friends sacrifice my honour to their wisdom.”

Marlborough did not however suffer his private feelings to supersede his sense of public duty, and he accepted an apology* from the two secretaries of state. Sir Charles Hedges excused himself on the plea of absence from town; and Mr. Harley asserted that he had no control over the gazetteer. Both laid the blame on the negligence or venality of the editor, and promised to remove him from a charge for which he had proved his incompetence. Such indeed was the forbearance of the general, that, although the insult to his military character was public, he exacted no public refutation, and would receive no public apology, from the apprehensions which he still felt, that any formal contradiction of this statement might excite a dispute between England and Holland, on whose union depended the success of the grand alliance.

It is with pleasure that we suspend the narrative of military operations and political intrigues, to present the duke in one of those situations in which the hero is lost in the man.

* Letters from Secretary Harley to the Duke, Sept. 4-15. and 7-18. 1705.— State Paper Office.

From the amiable and humane tone of the following letter to Lord Godolphin, we should hardly conceive that it was written amidst the din of arms, in the anguish of chagrin, and at the moment when his mind was employed in superintending and influencing the great affairs of Europe.

“*Tirlemont, Sept. 10.* — I reckon this will find you at Winchester, where I wish myself with all my heart. I wish the air may do the queen and prince good, and yourself, if you want it, that you may be the better able to endure this next winter, which is likely to be troublesome, especially if it should prove true what Dr. Hare told me this morning, that, by his letters, Mr. Smith was likely not to be chosen.

“The inclosed is a letter from a young woman of quality that is in love with the Comte de Lyon. He is at Litchfield. I am assured that it is a very virtuous love, and that when they can get their parents' consent, they are to be married. As I do from my heart wish that nobody were unhappy, I own to you that this letter has made me wish him in France, so that if he might have leave for four months, without prejudice to her majesty's service, I should be glad of it; but if you think it should not be done, you will then be pleased not to speak to the queen of it.”

During his residence at Tirlemont, the paroxysm of his grief and indignation gradually subsided, and he recovered his wonted health and serenity. But this recovery was less owing to the salutary effects of the Spa waters, or to his temporary abstraction from business, than to the general sentiment in his favour, which prevailed in every country of Europe, and to the no less general censures which were lavished on those who had wrested from his grasp a great victory at the moment of execution. Numerous letters of regret and condolence again reached him from all quarters; and he beheld with satisfaction his military character exalted, rather than depressed by the malicious machinations of his jealous and disaffected rivals. Not only the duchess and his friends in England vied in administering consolation, but the queen again addressed to him one of those condescending proofs of attention, which are highly flattering from the pen of a sovereign.

“*Winchester, Sept. 6-17.* — I am very sorry to find, by your letters to lord treasurer, you are so very much in the spleen. I own all the disagreeable things you have met with this summer are a very just cause for it, and I am very much concerned for the uncasiness you are under; but yet I cannot help hoping, that for the good of your country and the sake of your friends, who cannot support themselves without you, you will be persuaded to banish your melancholy thoughts. My lord treasurer I

know gives you an account of every thing that passes here, therefore I shall say no more at this time, only wish the business abroad may give you leave to be soon at home, which all your friends are desirous of, but none, I am sure, more than your humble servant."

Lord Godolphin also administered to his wounded feelings the balm of friendship. He likewise gratified him with the information that the queen had been induced, by his arguments, to suspend the mission of Lord Pembroke, and to leave to the Dutch government the power, as they appeared to possess the inclination, of remedying, in their own constitutional way, the grievances under which he laboured.

With the anxiety of a friend, and the sympathy of a commander of congenial spirit, Eugene testified the concern he felt for the disappointment of his illustrious colleague:—

"I profit," he observed, "by this opportunity, of assuring your highness of the interest I take in the success of your arms. It is extremely cruel that opinions so weak and discordant should have obstructed the progress of your operations, when you had every reason to expect so glorious a result. I speak to you as a sincere friend. You will never be able to perform any thing considerable with your army unless you are absolute, and I trust your highness will use your utmost efforts to gain that power in future. I am not less desirous than yourself to be once more united with you in command."*

From Holland he also received the most gratifying intelligence. The Pensionary Heinsius, Slingelandt, and other leading members of the government, expressed their disapprobation of the malicious conduct pursued by their deputies, and the jealous spirit of their generals; promised full redress to his complaints; and only requested that he would show his usual forbearance in waiting till they could fulfil his wishes, according to the established forms of their constitution.

Marlborough accordingly imparts this information to the minister of finance.

"*Tirlemont, Sept. 14.* — I am extremely glad to find by yours of the 27th, that 74 (Lord Pembroke) would not go from London till my letters came, for I hope upon them you will stop his journey, for it might do him hurt, and can do no good at this time. I send you the inclosed, that you may see what the pensionary writes. I will send you

* Translation of a letter from Prince Eugene to the Duke of Marlborough, Treviglio, Sept. 13.

a copy of the States' letter by the next post. They have writ one to their deputies and generals, in which they have expressed themselves so that their generals are not pleased, for they would now have their army fight. I am afraid there will not be an opportunity for it; but should an occasion offer, I do verily believe every body would consent to it, now that we have the happiness of not having Slangenberg, he being gone to Maestricht; and I do, with all my heart, pray to God that I may never be in an army with him. The waters have made my head ache so, that I can write no more, and after to-morrow I intend to leave them off, though I had resolved to have drunk them all this week."

"*Tirlemont, Sept. 17.* — We march to-morrow for Diest, and the next day to Aerschot, where we shall employ three or four days in levelling the lines on that side of which we are masters. At the same time I shall inform myself, as much as I can, of the enemy's line from Wechteren to Antwerp, for in all probability they will keep behind that line for the remaining part of this campaign, so that if we cannot find a way of getting into that line, we must not expect any other action this year.

"I send you a copy of the letter I have received from the States, by which you will see they are desirous we should venture; and I do verily believe, if an occasion should offer, all their generals would readily consent, now that M. Slangenberg is gone. It would have been happy for the common cause had he been sick two months ago."

In Holland the public indignation and the private remonstrances of the duke, seconded by the leading men in the republic, gradually outweighed the efforts of faction and French interest. Even the advocates of the opposite party at length rendered justice to his moderation and forbearance. Vryberg, the Dutch minister in England, was commissioned to make an apology to the British cabinet; and Buys, pensionary of Amsterdam, met Marlborough at Turnhout on the 21st of September, to conclude a satisfactory arrangement. The result of this interview is described in a letter to Godolphin.

"*Aerschot, Sept. 24. 1705.* — I have had the favour of yours of the 6th and 7th, from Winchester, by which I find you think my Lord Pembroke's not coming may make some noise in England. I think it is much wiser and honester to let such as do not mean well be angry, than to do what must prejudice the public, as this journey of Lord Pembroke's would certainly do; for Pensioner Buys has confirmed me in my opinion, that the constitution of the States is such that they cannot take away the power the deputies have had at all times in the army; for in the king's time they had the same authority, but he took care to choose such men as always agreed to whatever he had a mind to. Now this may, if they please, be put in practice. I have also underhand assurances that they will never employ Slangenberg in the army where I may be. By the whole I find they would be very glad to content me, but I

am afraid would be glad also to have it in their power to hinder a battle, for they do seem to apprehend very much the consequences of such a venture."

Slangenberg was not only removed from the army, but all his attempts to obtain an official situation were frustrated; and we shall find in the succeeding campaign the most gratifying proofs that the Dutch government were not insincere in their professions, as well as that their confidence in the commander was not ill bestowed.

While the mind of Marlborough was distracted by these contending feelings, and he was striving to adopt measures which might vindicate his military character, without offending the friends of the grand alliance in Holland, he was at the same time embarrassed with an event which called into action all his discretion and address. This was no less than an offer of peace, secretly made by France to the Dutch government, which the partisans of the war could not venture openly to oppose, and which those who were the advocates of an immediate reconciliation warmly applauded and seconded.

The terms were imparted to him confidentially by Pensionary Heinsius, as he was marching from the Ische. Though highly captious, and subversive of the principles which formed the basis of the grand alliance, the proffered conditions were admirably calculated to sway the timid character, and gratify the interested views of the Dutch. The republic was lured by the prospect of commercial advantages, and the erection of the Netherlands into an independent state, under such conditions as seemed to afford a barrier against future aggression. In return, the pretensions of Austria to Spain were to be sacrificed for the cession of Naples and Sicily to the archduke Charles; and the duke of Anjou was to be left in tranquil possession of Spain and the Indies, together with the Milanese. England was to be gratified by the acknowledgment of Anne, and the guaranty of the Protestant succession; and an indemnity was promised in general terms to the duke of Savoy and the king of Portugal.*

This artful overture impressed the timid mind of Godolphin with the deepest alarm, and excited the dissatisfaction of the confederates in general, and the court of Vienna in

* Letter from the Pensionary, August 15.

particular. Marlborough, however, on this as on other occasions, acted with equal magnanimity and discretion. On one side he allayed unreasonable jealousies and fears, and on the other, by a generous confidence, conciliated the leading members of the republic, and inspired even the opposite party with a warmer sense of public spirit, and a higher regard for their national honour. Some extracts from his letters will show the empire which he maintained over his own feelings as well as over those of others.

To Lord Godolphin.

“ *Ramey, August 27. 1705.* — I send you a letter I have received since my last to you. You will observe that he * reasons much more than formerly. The business itself is so very difficult, that let them have never so much mind, they will not be able to bring it to perfection, for the people will never consent to what the French desire; so that I believe neither side dares speak plainly; for should the French offer what they have a mind to give, it might disgust the Spaniards, and the Dutch cannot make proposals, but they will inevitably disoblige their allies; so that I think we may depend upon another year's war.

“ I see you have a mind I should be in England, if possible, before the meeting of the parliament. It will be uneasy to me as things are to be here; but some of my officers, already fearing I would take measures to leave the army as soon as possible, have represented to me, that they fear, when I am gone, the French, knowing how little respect would be paid to any officer that shall be left to command, may not only attempt but succeed. However, be assured I shall turn my thoughts to be able to do what may be an ease to you. I am very sorry for what you tell me of 79 (the queen); but I am confident she esteems you more than all the rest that talk to her, and you may imagine she is pressed by people that do not judge so well as you; so that I pity her extremely. However, I hope and am sure she will always be directed by you in every thing that is good for her service.”

After repeating his objections to the mission of Lord Pembroke, he adds:—

“ *Tirlemont, Sept. 2. 1705.* — I shall proceed to give you my farther thoughts on what I lately sent you from the pensioner. It is true he seems, by his letter, to lean too much to the proposals or preliminaries for a peace; but I dare answer for him that he is as averse from having it on those terms as we can wish, and that he is entirely in the interest of England, being persuaded that he barely relates to me in secret what he has from M. Wellandt and the pensioner of Amsterdam, who are at the head of the faction, and would willingly draw him in, without any other design than to prepare and arm me, against my coming to the Hague, to join with him and our other friends in opposing what they

* The pensionary.

may offer on this subject. Now, if any person should be sent to Holland, besides the jealousy it would give abroad, and which many would be glad to improve upon the first mention he makes of this matter, he would no longer trust me with the secret; and as soon as the party come to know that it is got into England, which cannot in that case be long concealed from them, they would most certainly ruin him, as being well assured it could come from no other hand but his. This would be such a blow as might go near to stagger most of our friends. Therefore I am of opinion that we take no manner of notice of it, till we have discovered more of the secret; and then, when I come to the Hague, I hope, with the assistance of our friends, I may be able entirely to break their measures, or at least so far to weaken their interest, as that it may not be in their power to carry on their designs. I shall send your letter to-morrow to the pensioner, and press him to be very exact in letting me know what farther steps these gentlemen are taking, of which I will give you an account by the soonest; but must beg none may know it but her majesty, the prince, and Mr. Harley."

"*Frankfort, Nov. 1. 1705.* — At my arrival here yesterday I had the happiness of yours of the 12th. What you mention to be in the speech may do good, but at the same time I hope Mr. Secretary Harley will use such arguments to the pensioner of Amsterdam, as may convince him that this is a very improper time, as well as that England can never consent that the Indies and Spain should remain in the hands of the duke of Anjou."

CHAP. XXXIX. — WAR IN SPAIN AND PORTUGAL. — 1705.

IN the midst of these negotiations Marlborough had moved from Tirlemont, as soon as it was dismantled, and crossing the Demer, advanced to Aerschot. Here he remained about ten days, continuing the demolition of the lines, and giving orders for perfecting the works of Diest, Hasselt and Tongres, which were intended to cover the winter quarters. He then marched to Herenthals, where he pitched his camp on the 28th of September.

It was not only in the operations of the field that the genius of Marlborough shone with peculiar lustre: his counsels were as successful in the cabinet; and the confederates looked, with that confidence which superior abilities inspire, to his influence or advice. From the numerous failures of the last campaign, and the dangers which were apprehended in the ensuing year, the different members of the grand

alliance felt that no other hand could govern the jarring motions of this extensive and complicated machinery, or direct its future operations with harmony and effect. Accordingly the camp of Herenthals became the scene of those diplomatic negotiations which influenced the fortune of the war and the fate of Europe. Of all the cabinets with which he maintained an intercourse, that of Vienna was the most difficult to be directed or controlled, as well from the danger which threatened on the side of Hungary, as from its inability to maintain at once the war in the Low Countries, Germany, Italy, and Spain.

The great services of Marlborough in forcing the lines awakened a proper feeling in the breast of the sovereign, by whom their effects were particularly felt. But this satisfaction was not unmixed with jealousy, lest the duke should be induced by the Dutch to pursue his success in the Netherlands, instead of resuming the attack on the Moselle, recovering the Austrian possessions on the Rhine, and liberating Lorraine. Numerous applications from the imperial court were therefore made, both to Marlborough and the queen, pressing his return to the Moselle, promising their zealous assistance, and announcing that positive orders had been issued, both to the margrave of Baden and the German princes, to co-operate in his military plans.

In several of the letters which Marlborough wrote during his retrograde march from Treves, he had indeed evinced a resolution of returning to the Moselle as soon as he had restored the affairs in the Netherlands; but his short though bitter experience of the little dependence to be placed on the aid of the German princes and the promises of the Austrian cabinet sufficed to convince him that any further attempt in that quarter would prove hopeless.

In fact, the captious conduct of the margrave of Baden was alone sufficient to discourage a more sanguine general from relying on his co-operation. We spare the reader the long correspondence which passed on this subject between the margrave, the duke, and the imperial ministers, because two letters from the agents who were employed at the court of Rastadt will place the character of the German commander in its true light.

Colonel Browne to the Duke of Marlborough.

“*Creutznach, June 23.* — I would have taken the liberty to write to your highness before I left Rastadt, but for the apprehension I was in of my letter’s miscarriage. I well saw by the discourses of those that have most access near this prince (Louis of Baden), that the eagle would not clap but with one wing upon the Moselle. They said publicly that all the glory of any success was for your highness, but that if any miscarriage should happen it would be for their master. Though all, even here itself, believe his distemper a bespoken sickness, yet I can assure your grace he is very ill; for I did contrive it so that I was by at his dressing the day he turned back, saw his wound or hurt, and the inflammation of his leg, and it is very bad. The courier that brought his orders here last night says he is worse at the waters near Mentz, and that his princess and son are come to him there, but he will mend sooner by being upon the Rhine than had we stayed upon the Moselle; at least it is my belief.”

The second letter is from Colonel Durel, who had been despatched to Vienna to complain of the lukewarmness manifested by the German commander, and on his return was charged with orders enjoining that prince to co-operate in the plans of Marlborough with all his disposable force.

“*Frankfort, June 22. 1705.* — Yesterday, at three o’clock, I waited on the prince of Baden with your grace’s letter. I stayed almost three hours, by my watch, before I could be admitted, which delay lost me the whole night’s riding, being obliged to wait the opening of the gates of this place. I acquainted the prince with all the particulars your grace commanded me, namely, with the disposition of the troops you left. I desired him to correspond often with you, and to give your grace from time to time an account of matters. He did already know his troops had received bread and oats at Traerbach. He says he has very great pains in his leg; I believe it, because he tells me so. I desired, after having assured him of your grace’s services, that he would, as much as in him lay, prepare all things, to be in readiness to act within four or five weeks towards Saar Louis, in case the principles of war would so allow it. He said he would. I pressed him farther to acquaint your grace, as I was commanded to let you know exactly what number of troops he should be able to act with, and by what time they might be depended upon; also what number of them he would leave behind. He gave me a general answer, that he would always act for the best, and hoped you would always believe he was your friend and servant; and that when things were once again settled, and a new disposition made, he would be wanting in nothing. I desired him, when that disposition should be made, that then, if the case required it, he would march directly from where he then should be, towards Homburg and St. Wendel, to which he said neither yes nor no; for he pretends that if he had done it sixteen days ago the enemy was so posted as to have cut him off. Your grace is judge of this matter. As for the rest, he is resolved to facilitate all things relating to the common good. God send it!”

As it was evident that the margrave of Baden would never submit to associate with a colleague whose merit was likely to eclipse his own, attempts were privately made by the British cabinet to supersede him in the command. Lord Sunderland was accordingly ordered, on his arrival at Vienna, to insist on his immediate dismissal, as the only measure which could afford the prospect of success in Germany. But in this attempt they had ill calculated on the situation and views of the German court, the protection which the margrave derived from his relative, the prince of Salme, the prime minister, and the countenance of the Jesuits. Much justification and recrimination passed on both sides; but in the midst of this cabinet intrigue he vindicated his reputation by his operations in Alsace. After suffering the French to seize Homburg, and evading every proposal of co-operation with the duke in any quarter, or for any object, he suddenly roused himself from his apathy in the beginning of September, and displayed his wonted skill and enterprise by surprising Drusenheim, forcing the lines of Haguenau, and blockading Fort Louis. This exploit, as brilliant as it was unexpected, was instantly made the theme of applause by his adherents at Vienna, and removed the prejudice which his past misconduct had inspired. Marlborough saw the consequence of this change of sentiment in the court, and not only desisted from his representations, but also prevailed on the British cabinet to relinquish a hopeless attempt; and, concentrating his principal attention on the Netherlands, left the management of the military affairs in Germany to the court of Vienna, the empire, and its generals.

He found, indeed, sufficient occupation in directing his own military arrangements, and superintending the conduct of the war and the political business in other parts of Europe. In Spain and Portugal the confederate arms were eminently successful. Gibraltar, after a long and arduous siege, had been relieved by an English fleet, and the Spanish troops under Marshal Tessé disgracefully retired from the blockade.* In Portugal the campaign had opened with more than usual activity, arising chiefly from Lord Galway, whose spirit seemed to infuse energy into the Portuguese. Towards the beginning of May a combined army of 24,000 men, under

* *Memoirs of the Kings of Spain of the House of Bourbon*, chap. xii.

the nominal command of the Portuguese general, Don Miguel de Cardona, but under the real direction of Galway, assembled in the vicinity of Estremos, burst over the frontier of Alemtejo, and meeting with no enemy in the field, carried Valencia de Alcantara by storm, and forced Albuquerque to surrender. During this successful irruption, Das Minas, the Portuguese commander in Beira, took Salvaterra and plundered Secca; but being awed by the advance of a superior force, retired to Penamacos.

The approach of the summer heats, however, soon reduced the troops of both provinces to their wonted inactivity; and a letter from Lord Galway, which was transmitted by Godolphin to Marlborough, convinced both the general and treasurer that no farther efforts were to be expected in Portugal, till the return of a more temperate season.

“ My lord,

Lisbon, July 13. 1705.

“ I ought to apprise you, that in the last conference they warmly maintained that it was not possible to take the field in this country, either this summer or autumn. This was openly the advice of the duke of Cadaval; the count of Alvar spoke in the same manner, but in general M. Fagell supported the opinion, by finding difficulties in all the projects which could be proposed. The marquis of Alagrete himself appeared uncertain. They have deferred examining any proposition till the Marquis das Minas and the Count d'Atalaya are here. They have been ordered to come. I see very well that they expressly delay entering on business, in order that when it shall be time to take the field nothing shall be ready, and that the rains may serve as an excuse to prevent the troops from marching. However, I will lose no time; I will press so much that I will force them to do something, or to declare that they will not do it. I send you a copy of the memorial, which I am resolved to send to-morrow to the king, if I cannot deliver it to him myself. The departure of the king of Spain disturbs them. The illness of the king of Portugal augments, and gives occasion to many intrigues. If this misfortune (meaning his death) arrives, there is great appearance that the duke of Cadaval will be master; then nothing will keep the Portuguese in our interests but fear, and nothing terrifies them so much as our fleet. Besides the other reasons which I have taken the liberty to allege to you to have it winter, at least the greater part, this last is not to be despised.”

In these circumstances Marlborough strongly recommended that an expedition, composed of the troops which remained useless in Portugal, should sail from Lisbon and assist the duke of Savoy by a diversion in the vicinity of Nice, carry the war into Andalusia by an attack on Cadiz, or effect a

debarkation on the eastern coast of the Peninsula, where the natives were ripe for a revolution.

During this season of inactivity, the Dutch and English fleets had arrived at Lisbon with considerable reinforcements. That of England conveyed 5000 men, under the eccentric, but gallant, earl of Peterborough, who had been recommended by Marlborough. By a singular mark of confidence in the government, he was associated in the command of the fleet with the admiral, Sir Cloudesley Shovel, and thus was enabled to infuse his undaunted spirit into the sailors as well as soldiers, and to excite both to deeds of chivalrous warfare.

After several councils of war and numerous consultations, private intelligence from Catalonia induced the Austrian prince, who was anxious to realise his pretensions to the crown of Spain, to make an attempt against Barcelona, in which city he was apprised that his partisans were bold and numerous. To the 5000 troops recently arrived, Lord Galway added two regiments from his own force, and the fleet sailed from Lisbon with Charles on board.

Touching at Gibraltar, three more regiments were embarked, together with the guards, who had recently distinguished themselves in the defence of the place; and the prince of Hesse d'Armstadt, who possessed extensive connexions in Catalonia, joined the expedition as a volunteer. While the squadron lay off Valencia, the inhabitants of Altea raised the Austrian standard. The neighbouring town of Denia followed the example; and the royal garrison, surrendering without opposition, Charles was acknowledged king of Spain with the usual formalities. Emboldened by this success, the fleet sailed onwards, and on the 22d the armament disembarked in the bay of Barcelona, and set down before the capital, though without the smallest hopes of surprising or taking a city strongly fortified, and defended by a garrison more numerous than the assailants. But what could not be effected by regular approaches was accomplished by the chivalrous spirit of the earl of Peterborough. With unparalleled address and secrecy he arranged a plan of attack. Affecting to be discouraged by insurmountable difficulties, he began to re-embark his troops; but having lulled the enemy into security, he, in the middle of the night, with a chosen band of 800 men, assaulted the fort of Montjuich, which

commanded Barcelona, and carried it by storm, to the surprise both of those who attacked and of those who defended the place. We give the account of this singular exploit in the characteristic language of the hero himself, in two letters, one to his wife, and the other to the duchess of Marlborough,

Lord Peterborough to his Lady.

“Oct. 6. — I can now give you joy upon taking Barcelona, which is effected. I can modestly say such an attempt was never made by such a handful of men. We have taken, in three days, the castle of Montjuich, sword in hand, that resisted 30,000 men three months. There were five hundred men in it. We marched with a thousand men thirteen hours, and with scaling ladders took a place upon a rock, much stronger than Portsmouth, and had but eight hundred men, two having lost us in the night. This enterprise, which some people would reckon impossible or rash, will save many thousand lives. I was forced to lead them on with the Prince of Hesse, who was killed; I escaped without hurt, though both my aide-de-camps were much wounded. I would rather you should hear of this earlier from others than myself.”

Lord Peterborough to the Duchess of Marlborough.

“Oct. 29. — If some few I esteem and respect are as much pleased as our enemies are surprised and made uneasy, I would desire no more. I know the good nature of England, especially towards the month of November; but I hope at least they will find no fault.

“The ceremony is now over, and we have two kings acknowledged in Spain. Give me leave to say, if I had now two hundred thousand pounds I would be answerable for our being, madam, possessed, in a month’s time, of the better part of all Catalonia, Valencia, and Aragon; but our coarse English proverb is too true — ‘there is no making brick without straw.’

“Had it not been for the impatience I am under to justify to the world the countenance and good opinion you were pleased to honour me with, I never durst have entered into those measures which brought the king hither. But knowing the ill state of things in Portugal, and the prospect not answering elsewhere, I thought a retrieve was necessary for resolutions out of the common road. I have met with great difficulties, but expect greater. This letter goes by Italy, only to assure your grace of my eternal gratitude and respect, and to recommend the whole to your care and protection. I lay this enterprise at your door, my lady duchess: if we are sustained in time, and as we ought, I hope you will not be ashamed to own it. But, madam, we are far off (though I hope not forgotten). I can now assure your grace I am of the side of the church: no doubt Sir Edward Seymour will make haste to help me, and I think we have met with miracles in our favour. But we are poorer than church rats; and miracles cannot save us long, without money, and a quick and vigorous assistance.”

The capture of Montjuich was the prelude to the surrender of Barcelona itself. On the 9th of October King Charles entered the city in triumph, and was hailed by the inhabitants as their legitimate sovereign, and as their deliverer from the detested yoke of the Bourbons. Every measure was adopted to maintain this conquest, and spread the revolution through the neighbouring kingdoms of Murcia, Valencia, and Aragon. Barcelona was placed in a state of defence; the inhabitants enrolled and disciplined; six native regiments were embodied; and numerous flying corps, composed of the enterprising mountaineers, at once maintained the tranquillity of the conquered district, and contributed to foment the spirit of insurrection in the adjoining countries. Thus the war was, at length, established on Spanish ground, and the example of one of those kingdoms into which the Peninsula was divided, portended a new and successful revolution in favour of the Austrian dynasty, under which Spain had attained such a height of glory.

This success, though as brilliant as unexpected, seemed to create new sources of difficulty and want. The maritime powers, who had strained their efforts to an unusual pitch in the attempt, could not supply resources to prosecute it with the same spirit; while the emperor, whose zealous co-operation all parties expected, was too much exhausted by his own struggles on one hand against the Hungarian insurgents, and on the other against the common enemy, to make those exertions and furnish those supplies which the urgency of the case required. Thus another burden was thrown upon the maritime powers; Marlborough was involved in new embarrassments, and beheld with regret fresh causes of incessant disputes with the cabinet of Vienna.

But it was in Italy that the foresight of Marlborough had to encounter the greatest and most complicated difficulties. Perpetual contests subsisted between the courts of Vienna and Turin. The new emperor, Joseph, was no less averse than his predecessor to increase the power of the duke of Savoy by any promise, even of eventual dismemberments from the Milanese; while Victor Amadeus was equally watchful to enlarge his territorial possessions, and to extort from the fears of the house of Austria what he could not obtain from their gratitude.

The emperor, occupied in quelling the rebellion in Hungary, could not easily find sufficient resources to conduct the war in Italy on that scale which Marlborough thought necessary to ensure success, and consequently the duke of Savoy was almost left to his own means to struggle against the attacks of the Bourbon armies. He indeed had been assisted by a force of 13,000 men, but these were gradually diminished to half their number; and though harmony and unanimity were doubly requisite in this trying crisis, perpetual disputes arose between the duke and the imperial general. Their contentions even spread with a disastrous effect among their respective troops.

During the winter of 1704 the brave defence of Verrua had checked the progress of the French, and delayed the meditated attack on Turin, the reduction of which would have ensured the subjugation of Italy, and left the duke of Savoy nothing but an empty title. The important interval had been employed by Marlborough in endeavouring to draw from other quarters that aid which the court of Vienna could not supply. With this view he had obtained from Prussia an auxiliary force of 8000 men, whose junction had enabled Eugene to maintain his advantages. But as the treaty was now on the point of expiring, and as the king of Prussia, from resentment against the court of Vienna for repelling his claims, had declared his resolution of withdrawing his troops, the affairs of Italy seemed likely to relapse into the same dangerous state as at the termination of the last campaign.

At length the manly defence of Verrua drew to a close, after an investment of eight months. On the 10th of April the garrison blew up the fortifications and surrendered to the French. The duke of Savoy fell back to Chivasso, to retard as long as possible the advance of the enemy; but could not long defend that small yet important post with a discouraged and diminished army. The peril of his situation is well depicted by Mr. Hill in one of his letters to the Duke of Marlborough.

“ His royal highness and Count Stahremberg are uneasy to each other in their present condition. I do not reckon that Stahremberg hath above 1500 foot, and as many horse left; the duke has not many more of his own men fit for service. Count Stahremberg is contriving to be gone to Vienna: they are not more satisfied with Prince Eugene, who makes

war in his own way, and communicates nothing here, as we see, for the defence of Piedmont, where we are at the mercy of forty French battalions and fifty squadrons. When Chivasso falls, if La Feuillade is not obliged, by Prince Eugene's successes in Lombardy, to send a detachment to the duke of Vendome, we are capable here of taking some desperate resolution; for we cannot garrison Turin."

Amidst these accumulated misfortunes the duke of Savoy had placed his last hope on the co-operation of the British armament under the command of Lord Peterborough, which he was led to believe was now on its way towards the coast of the Mediterranean. This descent he contemplated as the only chance of salvation, as it would compel the French to drain their forces in Italy, for the protection of Dauphiné and Provence. Despairing, however, at length, of the long-expected succours, which, unknown to him, had been diverted to another quarter, his wonted firmness forsook him, and he appeared to listen unto the repeated overtures of the enemy. The British envoy, Mr. Hill, who watched all the movements of his mind, thus expressed his apprehensions:—

"I was under great disquiet for fifteen days, for the wonderful inoffensiveness of the enemy, the anxiety of the duke of Savoy, the inaction of Prince Eugene, the solicitations of the French, the violence of our situation, and the tenderness of a wife and children, with many other appearances which I have observed, made me fear that we were taking measures for the safety of Turin."

Before he closed the letter, he added a remark, which indicated his extreme uncertainty.

"I am a little more at ease to-day. We are convinced that La Feuillade can do us no harm, and we begin to hope that your grace or Prince Eugene will not leave the enemy at liberty to besiege us at the end of the campaign."

Fortunately, at this crisis of despondency and alarm, the advance of Prince Eugene afforded a momentary gleam of hope. After long hovering on the frontiers of Lombardy, he was joined by the 8000 Prussians, whom Marlborough had subsidised. With this accession of force, he suddenly descended from the Trentine Alps, opened a passage along the eastern shore of the Lago di Garda, traversed the Oglio, and advanced towards the Adda, with a view of forcing the passage, and forming a junction with the duke of Savoy; but his efforts were foiled by the arrival of Vendome with considerable reinforcements. The movements of Eugene to

cross the Adda or the Po, and the counter movements of the French general to retard the junction, brought on the short, but desperate, battle of Cassano, in which both parties elaimed the victory. Marlborough, who received an account of the engagement from Prince Eugene, augured little of the result, as we find from his letter to Godolphin.

“ *August 27.* — I send Mr. Secretary Harley a letter and relation I received last night from Prince Eugene. I wish the advantages were more considerable; however, I have ordered the army to be in battle-array to-morrow, and shall fire all our cannon and small shot three times.”*

As little did it raise the hopes of the duke of Savoy, who, in a letter to the British general, thus describes his feelings and situation.

After congratulating his grace on his success in forcing the French lines, he continues: —

“ *Turin, August 26. 1705.* — I expected, as you did, at least a powerful diversion, in consequence of the battle of the Imperialists in Lombardy; but the action, though advantageous, has not facilitated our junction.

“ The sole resource which remains to me is, in the arrival of the fleet at Nice, which I confidently expected, in consequence of the assurances from her Britannic majesty. I have not, however, any intelligence from the earl of Peterborough, although I have several times written to him. There are no other means to deliver me from my present danger than the arrival of this fleet, the debarkation of the troops, and their advance into Piedmont, where they must stay the winter, in order to be re-equipped in the spring, and may save this country, which I have so long sacrificed for the public good, and for the glory of her majesty’s arms. I have warmly supplicated the queen, and I may depend on her powerful support, which alone can preserve me from ruin, and enable me to continue my exertions for the advantage of the common cause, and for her glorious designs.

“ Your friendship for me, and your zeal for the glory of her majesty’s arms, and the good of the league, induce me to believe that you will readily use your efforts in procuring me this assistance.”†

But although the French had foiled the desperate attempt of Eugene, the result of the engagement proved more advantageous than the parties most interested in its success had at first presumed to hope. Eugene continued to maintain himself in that part of Italy; and establishing his troops at the foot of the mountains, between the Lago di Garda and

* The letter and relation to which he refers are printed in the History of Europe for 1705.

† Translation from the original in the French tongue.

the Adda, he held the French army in check, and suspended the fate of Piedmont. He thus gave time to Marlborough to allay the jealousy between the courts of Turin and Vienna, and to devise means for a more vigorous exertion in Italy the ensuing campaign. Indeed, it required all the influence and zeal of the British commander, and the full force of his conciliating manners and knowledge of character, to allay the mutual dissatisfaction of two princes, whose very safety depended on their union. At this moment the jealousy between the duke of Savoy and Stahremberg burst into an open rupture, which almost terminated in their separation; and it was not without extreme difficulty that Mr. Hill succeeded in suspending the dispute till reference could be made to the court of Vienna.

From a view of the preceding transactions it was evident that no other power except Austria was in a situation to save the duke of Savoy; but Austria itself was wanting in means to make an efficient effort, and both Eugene and the imperial ministers earnestly pressed for immediate succours, in men and money, to prevent the subjugation of Italy. In the general dismay and embarrassment every eye was turned to Marlborough, as the person who could alone devise resources to obviate the pressing difficulties, and restore that spirit and unanimity without which success was unattainable. From all quarters he was entreated to repair to Vienna, with the hope that his interposition at the imperial court would produce the same happy effects as on other occasions.

No one, however, better appreciated the necessity of his presence than the emperor himself, from whom we find two pressing letters of invitation, written with his usual courtesy and condescension.

“ Vienna, Sept. 6. 1705.

“ Most illustrious cousin and dearest prince,

“ You have given so many proofs of zeal for my august house and the common good, that I very easily persuade myself you will readily embrace whatever may conduce to the prosecution of the present difficult but necessary war. You will understand that nothing can contribute more to this end than to ascertain the sentiments of the confederates, as early as possible this winter, in order to resolve with secrecy what is to be undertaken by their united forces against the common enemy next spring; and from the many proofs I have received of your good affection, I promise myself, that though the journey hither be long, you will gladly under-

take it for the common good. In the mean time I will use all possible endeavours to get all that is necessary for the war in readiness. Recruits are already raising in my hereditary kingdoms and provinces; and I expect from my states a sum of money proportionate to their abilities; the necessary generals shall be also ready to assist at this council. I persuade myself, your most serene queen and the States-general will be in no way wanting to this good end, since there is great hope that matters being thus disposed, the next expedition may be as fortunate to the arms of the allies as the last, by the influence of the queen and States, and by your conduct, was glorious, and fatal to the enemy.

“And so I do again repeat my assurances of my most kind affection to you.” *

Vienna, September 27. 1705.

“Most illustrious cousin and dearest princee,

“Although I do not doubt but you have fully understood from my last letter, the desire I had to deliberate with you here in person, and particularly to confer with you on the operations of the next campaign; yet such is the weight and consequence of this affair, that I cannot conceal from you, that as your presence is the chief hinge on which the main stress of the war now turns, so the greatest part of my consolation, as well as the life and hopes of the confederates, depend thereon. I cannot deny that your most serene queen will very soon have occasion for the presence of so great a man; yet I have no reason to doubt that her generosity will readily spare so little a time as this journey will take up, to me and the common cause. The delay will be amply recompensed by the advantage of the counsels, which, from your great prudence and experience, you will be able to give. I do therefore again kindly entreat you to undertake this journey, notwithstanding it may seem somewhat troublesome; and to embrace this opportunity of adding new lustre to your name, already so renowned through the world, and augmenting the many and great obligations you have laid on my august family and the common cause of the allies.

“I conclude with constant assurances of my most kind affection.

“P. S. — I refer you, for the rest, to what Count Wratislaw will communicate to you on my part, not deeming it expedient to insert it in this letter. I merely intend by these lines to renew my sentiments of friendship and esteem, and to notify to you the great obligation you will confer on me, if you will repair to this place; as without your presence, nothing that may be concerted for the approaching campaign can be good.” †

The letter from Count Wratislaw, to which the emperor alludes, stated that the Duke of Marlborough was invited to Vienna to settle the arrangements for the ensuing campaign, as for want of proper concert the fruits of the preceding ope-

* Official translation in the Marlborough Papers.

† Translation from the original document in the Marlborough Papers, in Latin, and the postscript in French.

rations had been lost. He added that application had been made to the queen and the States-general, not only for permission to undertake the journey, but to confide to him such powers as would suffice for the conclusion and execution of whatever should be arranged.

Another motive for his journey was derived from the captious spirit of the king of Prussia, and his dissatisfaction with the court of Vienna, which he accused of treating him with contempt, and not paying due attention to his claims. On this account he had already notified his intention of recalling the 8000 troops, whom he had sent to the confederate army in Italy. His Prussian majesty likewise complained of the Dutch, for not paying the arrears, due as their share in the subsidies, for the service of the Prussian auxiliaries. Indeed he had already earnestly pressed the duke to revisit Berlin, with the hope of profiting by his advice, and had testified to Lord Raby his anxiety to receive again as his guest the illustrious general, whom he declared to be the most agreeable man he ever knew. A letter written to Godolphin during his journey will spare any farther explanation.

Frankfort, Nov. 2d.

“Since my last I have received the inclosed paper from Berlin, as also a great many more demands which that court makes at the Hague, an account of which I do not doubt but you have from Mr. Stanhope. The king has desired me to press the emperor, that he might have satisfaction on his last demands. I know the emperor is not in a condition to give him satisfaction, nor do I think his demands reasonable; but I shall endeavour that they may give him a great many good words. On the other side, I do not think the Dutch are willing to pay those arrears he insists upon from them, so that I am jealous of his making these demands to give him some colour for not signing the treaty, as he promised me; for they have at this time great projects of private advantage, by the disorders that may happen in the North. However, I have writ to Mr. Stanhope, to press all he can the signature of the treaty at the Hague. But for fear that I should not succeed, I should be glad the queen would write an obliging letter to him, in which she will acquaint him that she has ordered me to return by Berlin, to give him assurances of her friendship, and to sign the treaty for the 8000 men in Italy. I desire this letter, by the next post, may be sent to Lord Raby, to give me at my arrival there; for the king writes me word that he had ordered his ambassador to ask of her majesty, that I may return by Berlin, as also I am sure the emperor will be very anxious I should return that way, he having many disputes with that court.”

Marlborough was likewise earnestly solicited by Pensionary Heinsius and his friends in Holland to visit the two courts, for the purpose of allaying the subsisting feuds and justifying the proceedings of the Dutch government.

Several minor considerations also rendered his presence necessary at Vienna. We have already noticed the jealousy of the imperial court at the interference of the British cabinet in the affairs of Hungary, notwithstanding an appeal had been made to their mediation. This jealousy was increased by the avowed attachment of Lord Sunderland to the principles of freedom, which excited a strong suspicion lest he should favour the republican spirit of the Hungarian insurgents, and press the guarantee of the maritime powers to such an accommodation as was inconsistent with the honour of the crown and the tranquillity of the country.

On these subjects Count Wratislaw feelingly describes the apprehensions of the imperial cabinet, and at the same time avows his own personal and political antipathy to Mr. Stepney.

Vienna, July 19.—We daily expect the arrival of Lord Sunderland, and I flatter myself that as he is gone to your army, you will give him the necessary information on the affairs of Hungary. I will render him all the service in my power, as well from the friendship I feel for him, as from his connexions with you. But I cannot conceal my apprehensions from your highness; for when you compare the language of Mr. Stepney at the army last year, with the principles and character of Lord Sunderland, I must dread his inclinations to establish a species of republic in Hungary. You know that such an arrangement would not accord with the government here, still less with the temper of our master; and since we must consider Hungary as one of our most valuable possessions, we shall never be inclined to accept conditions of a nature more calculated to breed new troubles than to restore the tranquillity of the kingdom. The acceptance of the mediation of the two powers plainly proves our sincerity, and the conclusion of the treaty will display our moderation. But, in truth, it is a matter of the utmost alarm, should our allies force us to accept a guarantee, which, considered merely as a point of honour, is an affair of the greatest consequence, though not sufficiently appreciated in England; since no sovereign has ever admitted the guarantee of a foreign power between him and his subjects. As it is likewise to be feared that this revolt will not be the last among a people so volatile as the Hungarians, and a guarantee being once established, is it not possible that on some future occasion, that of the Ottoman Porte, or some other dangerous neighbour, may be required? I entreat you then, my lord, to reflect on this, and to soften by your influence the republican zeal of Lord Sunderland,

hoping your remonstrances will have a greater effect upon him in the affairs of Hungary than they have sometimes had in those of England.

“ P. S. I again repeat my apprehensions on the subject of Lord Sunderland, for Mr. Stepney will inflame him as much as possible; and as his lordship is naturally devoted to the liberty of the people, he will perhaps act with more warmth than he ought. I will serve him to the utmost of my power; but if I find him too much swayed by the influence of Mr. Stepney, I will give myself no farther trouble.”

“ *July 30.* — The departure of Mr. Richards gives me an opportunity of renewing my respects to you, and of informing you that Baron de Sirmay is sent to apprise the Hungarians that his imperial majesty has ordered his generals to publish an armistice for eight days, and to keep his troops on this side of the Danube, provided the insurgents will remain on the other side of the Waag. He has also announced his intention of agreeing to a congress, to ascertain whether they are really disposed to conclude a peace. We expect an answer with great impatience. Doubtless Mr. Stepney will give you an ample detail of all proceedings, and you will also have received intelligence that this court has acquiesced in all the proposals of the mediators.”

In a postscript he adds, with his own hand: —

“ If we proceed to a congress, probably my master will employ me, although I shall endeavour to excuse myself, for many reasons. Should I be appointed, I will strive to pacify the troubles, and there is no reasonable condition which I will not press this court to accept. I say reasonable, but I frankly declare to you that I dread the republican principles of Lord Sunderland, and the malicious spirit of Mr. Stepney, whom England has, by an unfortunate fatality, associated with Lord Sunderland in the mediation. I cannot readily forgive you for this nomination, for you were too well acquainted with his opinions not to be convinced that he is not calculated to mediate to our advantage; and it is a mistake to suppose that we can be forced to yield to unreasonable propositions. I beg leave to give you previous notice of an intention, on the part of the mediators, to propose a continuation of the armistice on the termination of the eight days. Moreover, I will serve Lord Sunderland to the utmost of my power for promoting the military operations; and I believe that we shall agree more readily in that point than in the negotiation with the Hungarians; since if he hopes to establish a republic in Hungary he will not succeed; and he will not find me a Whig to that degree. But I must tell you at the same time, that we will do nothing unless all the fortresses, with Waradin and Transylvania, are included in the armistice; because we yielded to the pressing solicitations of the mediators for an armistice, merely with a view to provision the fortresses and save both.”

The confidence which the known integrity and discretion of Marlborough inspired, could alone remove the suspicions of the imperial court and soothe the irritated feelings of Count Wratislaw, on whose cordiality so much depended;

and we find even Lord Sunderland himself joining in the common request for his immediate presence at Vienna.

“ I hope her majesty has by this time given her leave that Lord Marlborough may come hither ; for if we are to continue the war (as every honest man that is in his wits in England and Holland, I believe thinks we must), I am sure his coming is absolutely necessary ; for without it, every thing will be in greater confusion than this year. And I am confident that if he does come, there is nothing in the power of this court that he will not persuade them to.”*

Though anxious to terminate his laborious pilgrimage on the Continent, and to return to England, he could not resist these pressing instances, and he transmitted the emperor's letters to the queen and Godolphin, frankly stating his doubts and reluctance, yet testifying his acquiescence in their decision. He at the same time declared his resolution not to undertake the journey unless he could obtain, as well from the States as from England, full powers to conclude the arrangements which he might deem advantageous to the common cause.

“ At my arrival here, I found the inclosed letters from Vienna. Her majesty's pleasure is what shall govern me in this as well as in every thing else. My opinion is, that if I should go, and I have not power from the States that what I concert shall be performed, the journey would only be troublesome to me, and of no use to the public. If it should be thought necessary for me to go, you must reckon that I cannot go in less than eleven days, and I must have as many to come back, and I believe three days there, so that the whole will bring me one month later into England. Besides, I do really think I shall not have resolution enough to serve the next year.

“ This request of the emperor's is very opposite to your kind desire of having me early in England this year. Whilst I am fit for any thing, the queen and you shall dispose of me, in hopes that when you shall see that I am worn to nothing, you will allow of my being quiet ; for at this time I am so extremely lean, that it is uneasy to me when I am in bed.”

On mature reflection the British cabinet saw the pressing necessity of the case, and the treasurer, though with reluctance, conveyed to Marlborough the sanction of the queen and the approbation of the cabinet. He had yet, however, to obviate many difficulties arising from the cold calculations of the minister of finance and the no less parsimonious spirit of the Dutch republic. The primary object which it was

* Lord Sunderland to Lord Godolphin, Vienna, Sept. 26.—Oct. 7. 1705.

necessary to attain, preparatory to his journey, was a positive assurance that the court of Vienna should be promptly gratified with the loan required for the equipment of the Italian army. Godolphin, however, regarded this point with the scruples of a financier rather than with the eye of a statesman; and, instead of meeting the difficulty, employed himself in starting objections to the mode of obtaining the supply, and required the imperial court, which was evidently impracticable, to send forward their troops before the money was advanced.

“*Windsor, Sept. 11-20.* — I find by the letter of the States to you, they think it necessary something should be done to set them right again in the opinion of their people; and the vigour they have lately shown in their letters and resolution upon the duke of Savoy’s instances, seems to be a great confirmation of this reflection. I hope, however, that Savoy will be relieved entirely by Prince Eugene’s efforts, or by the diversion, which I think the enterprise upon Barcelona must give the enemy, without the troops from our fleet, which can neither possibly be spared from their other affairs, nor come so soon to their relief as the succour expected even from the emperor. But this consideration makes it still more necessary that all possible endeavours should be used to hasten that succour; yet if the troops designed for that service cannot march till they have money from England and Holland, upon the loan proposed from Germany, it is not possible to think such a loan can be adjusted without sending backwards and forwards between us and Holland; and yet it is certain if the troops do not march *incessamment*, they can never come in time. The most effectual way, therefore, to compass this loan, would be to send away the troops which are to be supported by it immediately: and the hearing they were actually upon their march might perhaps prevail for this loan; whereas otherwise, both England and Holland will be under the discouragement of thinking that if they should lend their money, it will come too late to give effectual assistance to the duke of Savoy.”

“*St. James’s, 13th Sept. 1705.* — As to the loan desired by the court of Vienna for enabling the emperor to send more troops to Prince Eugene, I believe the queen will not decline to bear her part in it, for so necessary a service, in case the States approve and are desirous; though, considering what was done last year for the empire, and how great her majesty’s expense has been this year for the interests of the House of Austria, it does not seem extremely reasonable to expect it from her, especially when Count Wratislaw knows as well as we that all the funds given by the parliament are appropriated to particular uses, and if they were not, these are always all assigned away before this time of year.”

Nor did the minister of finance content himself with starting objections to the proposal. Habitually prejudiced against the house of Austria, he was highly indignant at the delays

and negligence which, in his opinion, the cabinet of Vienna had manifested in the course of the campaign. In this spirit he received the formal application of the imperial court for succours in men and money with studied coldness, and when at length a reply was extorted, it was written in terms of unusual acrimony. This irritating document roused the resentment of the emperor; and Count Wratislaw complained to Marlborough that the minister of finance appeared to conceive the rescue of the duke of Savoy might be effected by invectives against the court of Vienna. The emperor himself did not condescend to give a written reply, but stated, through his ministers, that his care and attention had rather deserved praise than reproach from the allies; and requested that in future such replies should not be given in writing, because they would remain as public documents in the archives.

Marlborough felt that decision was as necessary in this political arrangement as in the operations of the field. Instead of listening to the petty scruples of his friend the treasurer, or contemplating the more serious obstacles which arose in his way, he steadily persisted in his purpose, and not only extorted from the British cabinet such powers as were necessary for the perfect accomplishment of his project, but exacted a promise that they would consent to the loan, and advance the first payment in October.* He was equally pressing for a similar engagement from the States. "If I have not assurances from the Dutch," he writes to the duchess, "that what I promise shall be made good, my journey can only be a trouble to myself, and of no use to the public. But if they would trust me, I think I could then take such measures with the emperor that the next year's campaign might be much the better for my going. I will, however, have no opinion in this matter, but pay obedience to what is directed."

To attain this object he did not rely on distant negotiation, which he was conscious could only produce delay; but repaired to the Hague, that, by his personal exertions, he might overrule the formalities of the Dutch government. He immediately held conferences with the pensionary, the president of the week, and other leading members of the republic,

* Secretary Harley to the Duke of Marlborough, September.

and obtained their consent to extend his powers, as far as their constitution would permit, without the usual tedious appeal to the decision of the different provinces. He also extorted a similar acquiescence in the proposed loan, of which the Dutch were to guaranty one third.

He was equally successful in combating the fallacious overtures of France, and appealed with effect to the feelings of shame and disappointment which the patriotic party felt for the late misconduct of their deputies and generals, and their anxiety to make amends for the former failures. By his skilful management of the passions of those with whom he had to negotiate, he thus attained all his objects, and departed with the full assurance that he should be supported by all the energy of the Dutch government.

During this short interval of his stay, his departure from the army was no less deeply felt than his appearance at the Hague. "In his absence," says an eye-witness, "we were a body without a soul. The French having thrown down a little of their line, and laid bridges over the Nethe for convenience of forage, we were in perpetual alarms, as if an inferior dispirited army would leave their lines, because the duke had left us."

Returning to the camp, he again moved on the 20th of October, and marched through Vlimmen to Campthout, where the army took up a position to cover the siege of Sandvliet, a fort on the Scheldt, the garrison of which had harassed the inhabitants of Zealand with frequent incursions. From hence the duke repaired to examine the preparations, and give directions for the attack; and at the same time the place was invested by a detachment under the Count de Noyelles. Campthout was the last camp which he occupied this campaign; for on the 22d of October he finally quitted the army, leaving the command to Overkirk, to finish the siege and distribute the troops into quarters.

CHAP. XL.—ENGLISH POLITICS.—1705.

HAVING closed the military operations, settled his journey to Vienna, and finished his negotiations at the Hague, the duke

was employed, during his continuance at Herenthals, in completing the new arrangements in the British cabinet, and in giving consistency to that system which he and Godolphin had adopted.

On his departure from England, the intention of Godolphin and himself was, to suffer the two parties to struggle for the new elections, without any interference from the court, concluding that when thus left to their own strength, they would be nearly balanced, and the queen would be enabled to turn the scale to either side. In reply to one of the importunate letters from the duchess, pressing him to support the Whigs, he observes:—

“Hague, April.—You nor any body living can wish more for the having a good parliament than I do; but we may differ in our notions. I will own to you very freely mine, which is, that I think at this time it is for the queen’s service, and the good of England, that the choice might be such as that neither party might have a great majority, so that her majesty might be able to influence what might be good for the common interest.”

He gives the same advice, and employs the same arguments, in a letter to Godolphin, and appears to calculate confidently on the success of this scheme.

“July 6–17.—The composition of the parliament seems to be such, that neither party can carry any point against the other by their own strength. One sort of gentlemen have behaved themselves so, that there remains very little room for debate which the queen should make hers. The care seems to be only, that she may not be in the power of a party; for there are indifferent and unlisted men enough, who will be content and zealous to promote the queen’s affairs, though they see persons of a different party from themselves employed; but though they will be content to see the queen govern, it will be uneasy to them to see a party govern. But I doubt not care will be taken to satisfy every person that deserves it.”

He found, however, to his surprise, that he had been mistaken in his calculations, and that the unpopularity of the Tories enabled the Whigs to gain a considerable superiority. Thus circumstanced, he and Godolphin were compelled to incline still more to that party, whose ascendancy they had hitherto promoted, less from inclination, than from necessity.

The struggle for the removal of Sir Nathan Wright, which had continued in suspense since the spring, was now

renewed with redoubled warmth, and Lord Godolphin promoted it with a degree of zeal, which could only have been prompted by the embarrassments of his situation. Continued difficulties, however, arose, from the aversion of the queen to confide to a zealous Whig an office which exercised such patronage in the church, and such extensive influence over the civil administration. All the representations of Godolphin proving fruitless, the Duchess of Marlborough was next induced to interfere. With persuasion and argument, she blended the most bitter invectives and reproaches for the queen's aversion to the Whigs, and her infatuation in favour of the Tories. These letters, many of which are printed in the "Conduct," show the vehement tone of remonstrance which the favourite assumed; and we shall scarcely be surprised to find that this dispute increased the alienation which had already taken place in the mind of her royal mistress. Indeed the duchess herself, in one of her manuscript narratives, remarked that the first peevish letter she ever received from the queen was on this occasion.

Marlborough could not remain an indifferent spectator of the struggle. Though convinced that the meditated change was indispensable, he knew the difficulty of conquering prejudices which education and habit had inspired, and sincerely sympathised in the anxiety of his royal mistress. To Godolphin he writes on this occasion:—

"*Aug. 27.*—I am very sorry for what you tell me of the queen; but I am confident she esteems you more than all the rest that talk to her, and you may imagine she is pressed by people that do not judge so well as you, and I pity her extremely. However, I hope, and am sure she will always be directed by you in every thing that is good for her service."

Still, however, the objections of the queen were rather silenced than overcome; and as a last resource she appealed to Marlborough, without the knowledge of the treasurer or the duchess, hoping from his congenial sentiments and attachment, that he would save her from so heartfelt a mortification. Her letter has not been preserved; but his answer will show the strength and nature of her appeal, and will prove that he himself now found it necessary to combat her sentiments, and to resist the views of the Tories, as the only expedient for continuing the contest against

France, and rescuing England and the Continent from dependence.

“ Madam,

Sept. 29. o. s.

“ Your majesty has too much goodness for your servant, in but thinking of an excuse for your not writing. My obligations, as well as zealous inclinations for your service, are such, as that you have but to command, and your majesty shall always find in me obedience.” * * *

After adverting to his intended journey to Vienna, he proceeds:—

“ Not knowing when I may have the honour of seeing your majesty, I cannot end this letter without lamenting your condition; for I am afraid I see too plainly that you will be obliged, by the heat and malice of some that would not stay in your service, to do more than otherwise would be necessary. What I say is from my heart and soul for your service; and if I had the honour of being with you, I should beg on my knees that you would lose no time in knowing of my lord treasurer what is fit to be done, that you might be in a condition of carrying on the war, and of opposing the extravaganees of these mad people. If your majesty should have difficulty of doing this, I see no remedy under heaven, but that of sending for Lord Rochester and Lord Nottingham, and let them take your business into their hands, the consequences of which are very much to be feared; for I think they have neither courage nor temper enough to serve your majesty and the nation in this difficult time, nor have they any support in England, but what they have from being thought violently at the head of a party, which will have the consequence of the other party's opposing them with all their strength. As I am sure your majesty has no thoughts but what are for the good of England, so I have no doubt but God will bless and direct you to do what may be best for yourself and for Europe.”

This letter produced its due effect. The queen made no farther objection; and as the new parliament was on the point of meeting, the Whigs were at length gratified with the removal of Sir Nathan Wright, and the transfer of the seals to Mr. Cowper, which took place on the 11th of October.

Soon after this change, the new parliament assembled. The primary question on the choice of a Speaker evinced the decreasing strength of the Tories. Mr. Smith, one of the most able, zealous, and honest of the other party, who was assisted by the influence of the crown, the interest of Marlborough, and the warm support of Harley, was elected by a majority of 43 votes, in preference to Mr. Bromley, to the great mortification of the moderate Tories; who, though, in concurrence with the crown, they opposed Bromley, yet

wished for a more moderate party-man than Smith, as we find from a letter of St. John to the duke.

“ My lord,

Whitehall, July 27. o. s., 1705.

“ It is a sin to give your grace any trouble in this manner, when you have so many of all kinds to torment you abroad ; but your grace is so indulgent a master, that your servants are apt to presume. Her majesty having been pleased to direct her servants to promote all they can Mr. Smith's advancement to the chair of the House of Commons makes it too late to wish for another. It had been happy if that man could have been found, whom the Whigs would have voted for, and who might have reconciled a great many of those people to him, that may cease to be Tories, but can never become Whigs. I am afraid there is a prospect of much struggle in the winter ; and I should be infinitely more so, if I did not live by faith in your grace. I depend upon your working some more miracles, to save us abroad and help support us at home.”

Harley, however, did not participate, or, at least, did not appear to participate, in the sentiments of his adherents ; and he acquired fresh confidence by the zeal with which he espoused the new system of his patron.

“ My lord,

October 6.

“ Yesterday the parliament met, and a very full House of Commons. Mr. Smith and Mr. Bromley candidates, the former carried it by 43 ; viz. 248 to 205 : the zeal of gentlemen was greater than their knowledge which brought them up with so much heat, and to be headed by people whose chief excellence was Billingsgate language, which had no other effect than to expose them to the scorn of the rest of mankind. I do not question but with care and application several of the misled gentlemen, who acted not out of malice but ignorance, will be reduced to a better sense and opinion of the queen's government.”

On this choice Marlborough makes a few observations to Lord Godolphin.

“ *Vienna, Nov. 14.* — I am sorry to see that there is so great a struggle for the Speaker ; I hope it will be carried to your heart's desire, by such a superiority as may for the rest of this session make the queen's business easy ; for I think Europe must be saved by England, and her majesty's steady resolution of carrying on the war against France.”

The speech of the queen expressed the sentiments of the Whigs, and reprobated in the strongest terms the principles and conduct of the opposite party. After urging the necessity of timely preparations, for prosecuting the just war, in which the nation was engaged, she added, “ if the French king continues master of the Spanish monarchy, the balance of power is destroyed, and he will engross the trade and wealth of the world.”

Adverting to malicious rumours raised by the Tories, particularly that the church was in danger, the queen inveighed against the propagators of such reports, as enemies to herself and the kingdom, and observed, "that they would best show their zeal for the church, by prosecuting the war against an enemy, whose object was the destruction of the national establishment, both in church and state." After exhorting them to lay aside divisions, she announced her resolution to favour those only who should zealously concur in carrying on her good designs.

The addresses of both houses echoed these sentiments, announced their readiness to grant the necessary supplies, and testified their conviction that no peace could be solid and permanent, till the Spanish monarchy was fixed in the house of Austria, and France reduced to such a degree, that the balance of Europe should be again restored. The news of these events gave Marlborough the highest satisfaction, and he announces with great exultation the effect which he expected the queen's speech would produce abroad.

Notwithstanding the sentiments contained in the speech from the throne, and the preponderance of the Whigs, the Tories were not abashed. During the short recess of Parliament, they had laboured to raise a cry that the Protestant succession was in danger, and on the resumption of the session, a memorable question was brought forward, which was calculated to embarrass the Whigs as well as the two ministers. This was a motion made by Lord Haversham, on the 15th of November, to consider the state of the nation. In the course of his speech, he first adverted to the events of the campaign, and, after speaking with affected slight of the passage of the lines, as a mixture of victory and misfortune, he magnified the subsequent conduct of the duke, with a view to throw odium on the Dutch by the contrast. But the prominent object of his speech was the danger which threatened the Protestant succession. After expatiating on this topic, he concluded his harangue by a motion for an address to invite the electress Sophia, the presumptive heir to the crown, to England. In his illustrations, he introduced a remark, which must have been deeply offensive to the queen, who was present at the debate, by recalling recollections which were calculated to excite the most poignant regret.

“Is there any man,” he unfeelingly observed, “who doubts that if the Duke of Gloucester had been now alive, the queen had been more secure than she now is? We cannot think of that misfortune without the greatest grief; but yet we are not to neglect our own safety; and a successor, though not a child of the prince, is the child of the queen and the people.” Buckingham, who took a share in the debate, did not hesitate to adopt the insulting remark, that the queen might survive her faculties, and become a child in the hands of others.

This question reduced the Whigs to a delicate predicament. If they gave it their support, they would wound the feelings of the queen, and increase her antipathy; if they opposed it, they might not only offend the house of Hanover, but proclaim to the nation a departure from their own principles. They, however, met the question with manly firmness, and, after an animated debate, it was rejected by a powerful majority.

But the Tories were not deceived in the effect which they expected the discussion to produce. It created a deep sensation; and the electress Sophia not only complained to the archbishop of Canterbury of the lukewarmness of his party, but indirectly announced her readiness to accept an invitation to England.

To counteract the effects of this insidious proposal, and to allay the displeasure of the Hanover family, the ministers and the Whigs felt themselves bound to give a substantial proof of their attachment to the Protestant succession. On the motion of Bishop Burnet, which was seconded by Lord Godolphin, bills were brought into the House of Peers, to naturalise such members of the Hanover family as professed the Protestant religion, and to appoint a commission of regency, to act in case of the queen's death, for the security of their succession. The queen readily sanctioned a measure which was calculated to spare her feelings.

The regency was to consist of the archbishop of Canterbury, the lord treasurer, the chancellor, the high admiral, the president, the privy seal, and the chief justice of the Queen's Bench. The successor was to be proclaimed without delay, on the vacancy of the throne, and other members were to be added to the commission, by the nomination of

the successor, according to a sealed list, which was to be deposited with the archbishop of Canterbury, the chancellor, and the resident minister of Hanover. The regency was empowered to conduct the administration till the arrival of the new sovereign; and the last parliament was to re-assemble for six months.

As this measure was really and effectually calculated to secure the succession of the house of Hanover, those who are ill acquainted with party feuds may perhaps be surprised to find it opposed by such as, a few days before, had displayed unusual zeal for the Protestant establishment. It was, however, carried in the House of Peers, though not without a protest, signed by the violent Tories. In the House of Commons also, a captious objection was started against the meeting of the last parliament, on the ground that the act of succession disqualified certain persons, who then held offices, from sitting after the accession of the new sovereign. This objection was supported, not only by the whole disaffected party, but even by many among the Whigs, from a conscientious apprehension, that a connivance in such a measure would be considered as a dereliction of their principles. Several conferences were accordingly held between the two houses, and the bill did not finally pass without some disqualifying clauses.*

Three letters from Secretary Harley will indicate the effect produced by this discussion in the cabinet, and the zeal with which the Whigs supported the treasurer, by committing to the Tower a member who reflected on his supposed correspondence with the exiled family.

“ My lord,

Nov. 16-27. 1705.

“ I will not pretend to give your grace an account of what passed yesterday in the House of Lords, nor of the great storm raised by fifteen against the whole house, for sending for the next successor. I suppose we shall have the same attempt in our house, by gentlemen who would wash themselves clean by so impracticable a proposition. I doubt not but it will meet with the like fate in our house.”

“ My lord,

Dec. 22.—Jan. 1.

“ Tho’ we want your grace to a great degree here, yet this last week hath been so great a week of storms, that nobody who loves England could be easy under the thoughts of your grace’s being within the danger

* Journals, and Chandler.—Burnet.—History of Europe for 1705.—Tindal.

of the tempest. At last we hope for fair weather and your safe arrival. I do not believe enough in astrology to think the stars create hurricanes in men's minds; but this is certain, that we have had much blustering in the House of Commons, attended with the foulest Billingsgate language I ever heard. It was grown so common and so frequent, that it was necessary to put an end to it by a just animadversion, and this fell to the lot of Mr. Cesar, who in a long tedious speech of railing, had the words your grace sees in the printed votes* taken notice of, and he committed to the Tower, where he is like to keep his Christmas, the house having adjourned this day to Monday fortnight, after the queen had passed the bill of four shillings in the pound, and the repeal of the Scotch prohibitory clauses. The queen made a speech, which your grace will see."

" My lord,

December 4-15.

" When I consider the great services your grace hath performed to the queen and to the nation, the vast hazards you have run of your own person, and the prodigious fatigues you continually undergo, to serve the queen, to secure every particular man in the nation, and to exalt the name of Englishmen, and carry that higher than ever it was before; these thoughts fill me with amazement at the great things your grace hath done, and at the same time give me the utmost pleasure, when I think how much I am honoured in being your servant. The long sitting we had this day quickens my sense of the much vaster fatigues wherewith your grace's journey hath exercised you; and yet I find myself scarce capable of writing a letter, or to tell your grace that this day a proposition was made in a committee of the whole house (tho' it was designed for the house, in order to have the vote printed), to address the queen to bring over the next successor. It was suffered to pass off without a negative, and only leaving the chair. God forgive those who would not take a negative when there would not have been 90 affirmatives. * * *

" But these are common incidents; we must make the most of every body, even of those who think themselves cunning enough to drive a bargain.

" I hear the ill-intentioned in those parts (Holland) give a very wrong turn to the part of the queen's speech which relates to the monarchy of Spain, as if that was to eternise the war; when there cannot be a clearer proposition, than that it is the only way to a secure peace. If the honest people of Holland will not give way, they may have it quickly, instead of a rotten, whimsical barrier; and they ought to know that England has a way of being secure, without giving so much attention to those projects. Your grace will forgive me this impertinence, and permit me to assure you that I am with the greatest duty," &c.

Although the attacks of the Tories were thus turned on themselves, they soon renewed their attempts. On the 22d

* " There is a noble lord, without whose advice the queen does nothing, who in the late reign was known to keep a constant correspondence with the court of St. Germain's."—Chandler's Debates, v. iii. p. 449.

of November, Lord Haversham proposed an inquiry into the causes of the miscarriages during the last campaign, with the hope of easting an indirect censure on the Duke of Marlborough, or of provoking divisions among the allies. But this insidious attack was repelled with becoming energy, and advantage was taken of the discussion to vote an address to the queen, requesting her to employ her influence in promoting a good correspondence among the allies, and exciting the confederates to use their utmost exertions in prosecuting the war against France. This timely address produced a beneficial effect in Holland, where the partisans of France were active in disseminating reports calculated to inspire jealousy between the two maritime powers, as if each was anxious to sacrifice the other, by concluding a separate peace.

Not to interrupt the thread of the narrative, we have carried our account of the parliamentary transactions, to the period immediately preceding the arrival of Marlborough, who, while these discussions agitated the public mind in England, was employed in giving an impulse to the negotiations, for the support of the Grand Alliance, at Berlin, Vienna, and the Hague.

CHAP. XLI. — VISITS THE GERMAN COURTS. — 1705.

TAKING his departure from the army on the 26th of October, Marlborough passed through Dusseldorf, Frankfort, and Ratisbon. He was hailed by all ranks, with the admiration due to his talents and services; and his journey, as in the preceding year, resembled the triumphal cavalcade of a hero, whose path was strewed with laurels. But ceremonies and honours did not retard his progress, anxious as he was to fulfil the objects of his mission, and to return to England, where his presence was ardently desired. Passing from Dusseldorf he and his suite were splendidly entertained at Bernsberg, by the elector palatine. This repast, however, was not a mere matter of ceremony; for during the visit of a few hours, Marlborough privately negotiated with his

illustrious host, for the augmentation of his subsidiary troops, and obtained his consent that they should march into Italy, to reinforce Eugene, leaving the treaty to be concluded on his arrival at the Hague.

At Frankfort he had a delicate part to perform, in a meeting with the margrave of Baden, who came from Rastadt to arrange the measures for the ensuing campaign. When we consider the jealous spirit of the veteran general, who had seen his fame eclipsed by the exploits of a younger and foreign commander, and the keen sensibility of Marlborough at his recent disappointment on the Moselle, it might have been expected that some symptom of dissatisfaction would have marked their interview. Two meetings, however, took place in the presence of Gueldermassen; and the vigilant deputy, who watched them narrowly, could not discover in either any sign of displeasure, or even the slightest difference of opinion. The margrave was gracious and condescending, and Marlborough too prudent to give even the most remote plea of offence to a prince who bore so high a character as general of the empire. But a more intimate acquaintance did not inspire him with greater confidence in the promises of the German commander, whom, in his correspondence, he designates as one who is never true to his engagements, but always postponing his co-operation to "*la semaine à venir*;" and of whom he says, in still stronger language, "I do not intend to oppose his project, but I cannot rely on what he says."

At Ratisbon he embarked on the Danube, and was conveyed in a splendid yacht to Vienna, admiring, as he passed, the picturesque scenery which enlivens the banks of that noble river, and frequently calling to mind the milder beauties of his own country, which he again longed to enjoy. On the 12th of November, he reached Vienna, and was complimented with the offer of a magnificent palace for his residence; but declining the honour, he repaired to the hotel of the British embassy, and took up his abode with his son-in-law, Lord Sunderland.

At the Austrian capital he expected to meet his friend and colleague, who had shared with him the glories of Blenheim; but to his regret, Eugene was detained at the army by the critical situation of affairs in Italy. He, however,

imparted his opinions and views, in a letter which contains much interesting information.*

“I am delighted that you have undertaken a journey to Vienna, however inconvenient at this season. Your highness proves your zeal, and I doubt not but your presence will be very serviceable for the projects of the ensuing campaign. It is much to be wished that Prince Louis could meet you there; but Count Frise informs me that he is afraid his health will not permit him. I believe that he is inclined to act on the Upper Rhine. Whatever is resolved should be kept secret, and it is necessary now to arrange the operations, and to decide on the strength of the respective armies, the time of their taking the field, the recruits and reinforcements, and the establishment of magazines. The chief point is to settle, that none should proceed according to their own whim, but to resolve which army shall act offensively, and which continue on the defensive. These remarks relate to the empire and the Netherlands; as to this country, the measures which your highness has adopted with the king of Prussia, and those which you will take in your journey, with the elector palatine, are highly advantageous.

“The first object is money, so necessary to carry on the war with vigour and effect. You will, my lord duke, judge on your arrival at Vienna, from your own experience, that a sovereign who is troubled with an intestine war, and has large armies to maintain, cannot supply all without extreme difficulty. The loan, therefore, is of the greatest consequence; and to compel by the fleet Genoa and Florence to advance large sums, is what I have repeatedly recommended. It only requires positive orders to the admiral. In this country it is absolutely necessary to form two corps, without which we can do nothing, and to use the utmost efforts in assisting his royal highness the duke of Savoy, and extricating him from his imminent peril. The general who commands in Lombardy should be able to act according to circumstances; for had I not been so warmly pressed to forward succours on the side of Piedmont, I should have profited by my success, to secure the necessary posts for maintaining my footing in Italy. The troops would thus have suffered less, and at this moment I should have been in a situation to do what I deemed most eligible. But when we receive daily letters on letters, stating that all is lost if succours do not arrive, and that Italy resounds with clamours for peace, we must hazard much to effect a junction, or draw the enemy to an engagement. The latter expedient succeeded. At this advanced season, however, my army is ruined, the horses worn out with past fatigues, no sure footing in the country, and the enemy re-assembling their forces in my front. Besides, the Venetians threaten to declare against us, if we do not quit their territory; the princes of Italy join in this declaration, and are inclined to form a league for their common defence. The remedy is difficult, but must be found. If Barcelona is taken, surely the fleet with a corps of troops for disembarkation, may

* This letter is without date, but was evidently written in October, during the journey of the duke to Vienna.

support the duke of Savoy, draw contributions from Genoa and Tuscany, and keep Italy in check, while the ministers of England and Holland strongly remonstrate with Venice, for the other princes of Italy are not worthy of a moment's consideration. At the same time, succours of men and money should be prepared for this army, so that it be enabled to take the field, at the latest, towards the end of March; for which purpose the magazines should be established, the recruits and horses for remounting the cavalry at hand, and the fleet ready to co-operate in the spring, either on the coast of Spain, or to invade Naples, which is without troops. I am much concerned that I cannot have the honour of joining your highness at Vienna."

About this period Marlborough received a querulous letter from the king of Prussia, urging his pretensions, complaining of the imperial court, and throwing out threats of his intention to secede from the Grand Alliance.

"My cousin,

Berlin, Oct. 27. 1705.

"I hope this will find you safely arrived at Vienna, and that you are apprised from my minister of state, Baron de Bartholde, of the conditions on which I am willing to leave my troops in Italy another year. But since the ministers of the emperor do not seem inclined to accede to my demands, I must frankly declare, that however well disposed to continue the assistance which I have given to the allies in Italy, and to give that proof of my zeal and attachment to the good cause, it will be impossible to do it, unless the emperor will satisfy my pretensions, which are so just and reasonable that they cannot be rejected without great injustice. And as without that satisfaction I am resolved to recall my troops, whatever may be the consequence, I thought it right to give you this notice, that you may take your measures accordingly; for I should be much concerned that as you propose to pass this way, for the purpose of concluding a new treaty, you should take an useless journey. Although it is well known to all, that I have to the present moment showed an evident zeal for the interests of the house of Austria, and that the late emperor testified his gratitude to me on many occasions; yet I do not know whether since his death the court of Vienna continues in the same sentiments, but true it is, that I have been treated by that court with great harshness in all my transactions.

"I hope, however, that your influence and representations will enable me, not only to carry into effect my resolution of continuing my troops in Italy, but also that the union and good intelligence which have always subsisted between the house of Austria and my family will be renewed.

"In referring you for farther information to Baron de Bartholde, I pray God, my cousin, to have you always in his good keeping."

At the same time the king artfully availed himself of the troubles in the North, occasioned by the disputes of Sweden, with Poland and Russia on one side, and with Denmark on the other. By his order, Baron Schmettau represented the

injuries which the Prussian states suffered by the excesses of the irregular troops and predatory hordes from Poland, and appealed to the allies, in virtue of the secret article of the treaty of 1704, to interpose in preventing such disorders. He was ordered to declare, that if these grievances were not speedily remedied, the king would recall the greater part of his troops from the service of the confederates.

To obviate these and other difficulties, was the object of Marlborough's strenuous exertions, and he succeeded beyond his most sanguine hopes.

Marlborough was received with all the honours and distinctions which could be conferred on a subject. The emperor sent him his portrait richly set in precious stones, and with his own hands presented him a diamond ring of considerable value: but the homage which he paid to his merit and services was more flattering and honourable. Besides his public audiences, Joseph condescended to meet him, when he went to view the cabinet of rarities, and profited by that opportunity to express his sentiments with greater cordiality and warmth than the etiquette of court ceremony permitted. "Heir," he said, "of my father's throne, I inherit also his gratitude towards the conqueror of Blenheim. Your highness's services to the common cause in general, and to my family in particular, can never be erased from my memory, nor ever be forgotten by my family or my posterity."*

Joseph proved the sincerity of his professions, by creating him a prince of the Roman empire, and conferring on him the lordship of Mindelheim, which he had recently erected into a principality, for the express purpose of fulfilling the formalities required by the Germanic constitution.†

During the short stay of Marlborough at Vienna, where he was detained a few days by a slight fit of the gout, he arranged the conditions of a new alliance between the Maritime Powers and the house of Austria, which had ceased on the death of Leopold; he likewise obtained assurances from the emperor, that he would grant fair and honourable terms to the Hungarian insurgents, and omit no concession in his power to extinguish a civil war, which had hitherto crippled

* Lediard, v. i. p. 525.

† For the account of Mindelheim and his investiture, see chap. xliii.

his efforts, to the detriment of the common cause. He allayed the bickerings which had arisen with the court of Berlin, and persuaded the emperor to offer such terms as were likely to satisfy the interested and punctilious monarch. He was equally fortunate in soothing the jealousy which had arisen between the States-general and the court of Vienna. He convinced the emperor that they would not listen to the fallacious overtures of France; and as a proof of their zeal, he announced their ready concurrence with England, in the promised loan, and the intended reinforcements for Italy. He briefly, but exultingly, announces his success, in a letter to Godolphin, dated Vienna, November 14.

“ Their only hopes are solely on the queen, they being very much dissatisfied with the negotiations this summer in Holland. My journey hither has been of some use, in letting the emperor see that his affairs will not allow of his quarrelling with Holland, for that would only end in giving advantage to France.”

He also listened to the insinuations of Count Wratislaw, and privately engaged to remove Mr. Stepney from the embassy. He afterwards effected this change in such a manner as to conciliate the imperial ministers, and at the same time not to wound the feelings of the British envoy, who was removed to the Hague, in the room of Mr. Stanhope.

Conscious that an immediate supply was necessary, to equip and forward the troops destined for Italy, Marlborough did not suffer himself to be shackled by financial considerations. In virtue of the authority with which he was invested, he not only pledged himself for the loan, but on his own credit, and in the name of Holland and England, he induced the bankers of Vienna to make an immediate advance of 100,000 crowns for the more pressing exigencies of the service. He likewise promised to exert his influence in providing another loan of 250,000*l.* at 7 per cent. on the mortgage of the mines in Silesia, which, on his arrival in England, he accomplished.*

* The French biographer of Marlborough has made a ludicrous mistake in speaking of this loan. He says that it amounted to three millions sterling, and that the duke subscribed 16,000*l.* even after he had given 100,000*l.* as a portion to one of his daughters, v. ii. p. 135.

The list of the subscribers to this loan has been printed, and may be

During this visit, Marlborough secured the friendship of Counts Wratislaw and Zinzendorf, the active ministers of the emperor, whose good-will he had previously gained; he also conciliated the confidence of the prime minister, the prince of Salm, with whom he subsequently maintained a frequent and interesting correspondence.

Having fulfilled his mission at Vienna, he departed, in company with his son-in-law, Lord Sunderland, and hastened to Berlin, where his diplomatic skill and persuasive powers were equally necessary. In his way, an appeal reached him from the States, complaining that the king of Prussia had recalled three of his regiments from the Upper Rhine, on the plea that the arrears due for their service were not liquidated. They acknowledged the cause, but alleged their multiplied expenses, in excuse for the failure. As it might prove an injurious example to the German princes, and had already produced a serious disappointment, in preventing an attack on Homburg, they besought him to interpose his good offices; and if he could not prevail on the king to revoke his orders, at least to induce him to let his troops return in the spring.

On the very evening of his arrival at Berlin, Marlborough held a private conference with the king; and so completely accommodated himself to his capricious temper, that he entirely conciliated his esteem. He availed himself of the concessions which he had obtained from the emperor, to soothe the interested monarch, and persuaded him to renew the treaty for the continuance of the 8000 men in Italy, and to replace the losses which they had incurred by the casualties of the preceding campaign. This concession, to use the words of the prime minister himself, was granted "as a mark of respect to the queen, and of particular friendship to the duke."

He was welcomed with the same ceremonies and compliments as on the former occasion. The king, who was far from prodigal of gifts, presented him with a sword enriched with diamonds, and Lord Sunderland with a diamond ring of considerable value.

Marlborough found the Prussian monarch so displeased found in all our histories and the periodical publications of the time, which a biographer of Marlborough ought to have consulted.

with the States for the nonpayment of his arrears, and so averse to suffer his troops to remain under the command of the margrave of Baden, that no arrangement could be concluded, with regard to the regiments which had been recalled from the Upper Rhine. But though he could not soothe the indignation of the king, he at least suspended its effects, and did not quit Berlin without sanguine hopes that he should accomplish by letters, what he had failed to effect in person. This expectation was afterwards realised, though not without great difficulty.

His next visit was to Hanover, where he had to encounter new obstacles and new difficulties, and to struggle with prejudices of a different kind.

The house of Hanover, as presumptive successors to the throne, were naturally courted by the contending parties in England, and both sides strove to conciliate their favour, by mutual accusations and suggestions of lukewarmness in the cause of the Protestant succession. These party machinations produced great effect at the court of Hanover; for the electress Sophia became a partisan of the Tories, and the elector a friend to the Whigs. In this temper of the court, Marlborough reached Hanover, at the moment when intelligence arrived of the discussion on the proposal made by Lord Haversham, for inviting the electress to England. As might have been expected, he found the court indignant against the members of administration who had joined the Whigs in their opposition. It was therefore among the first and most essential objects of his care to soothe this irritation, and his zeal was quickened by a feeling letter from the queen, which reached him on his arrival.

“*Nov. 13-24.*—The disagreeable proposal of bringing some of the house of Hanover into England, which I have been afraid of so long, is now very near being brought into both Houses of Parliament, which gives me a great deal of uneasiness, for I am of a temper always to fear the worst. There has been assurance given, that Mr. Schultz should have instructions to discourage the propositions; but as yet he has said nothing of them, which makes me fear there may be some alterations in this resolution at the court of Hanover. I shall depend upon your kindness and friendship to set them right, in notions of things here, and if they will be quiet I may be so too; or else I must expect to meet with a great many mortifications.”

Besides the prejudices entertained by the electoral court

against the English administration, Marlborough had to remove a personal jealousy against himself, occasioned by the cautious reserve which, from delicacy to the queen, he had hitherto maintained.

To give effect to his negotiations, and to conquer the prejudice which the Tories had inspired, the first care of the British cabinet was, to transmit to Marlborough an official notice of the intended bill for the naturalisation of the electoral family, and the regulations for securing their succession. The importance of this regulation was duly appreciated, and the notice itself essentially contributed to restore the members of administration and the Whigs to the confidence of the electoral family. The rest was accomplished by the address and fascinating manners of the commander, who as seldom negotiated as fought in vain.

Knowing the discordant principles of the electress and her son, Marlborough directed his principal efforts to conciliate the elector, not only for the sake of restoring harmony, but for the advantage which was expected from his influence in the empire. His representations were so far attended with effect, that he soon after announced his success in a letter to Godolphin.

“Hanover, Dec. 8. 1705. — The day after I came, I had a very long conversation with this elector, who did not want many arguments to convince him that his and the queen’s interest were the same. He has commanded me to assure her majesty that he will never have any thoughts but what may be agreeable to hers.”

Even the prejudice of the electress herself seems to have been weakened if not conquered; for we find proofs of an epistolary correspondence, and an interchange of presents between her and the duchess. The warm terms in which she speaks of the duke, though savouring of the courtly style, yet show that at least the appearance of cordiality was restored.

“I think that after all the kindness you have had the goodness to show me, you will be pleased with my acquainting you with the joy we felt in having had my lord duke here in person, and in having known that his manners are as obliging and polished as his actions are glorious and admirable. I have testified to him the esteem I feel for the present you have made me of the queen’s portrait, which I prize much more than it is possible to prize that of the whole universe, which I send you in tapestry ;

and for that reason I desire other opportunities of giving proofs of my gratitude and the passion with which I am," &c. *

Indeed soon afterwards we find the purpose of the British cabinet accomplished ; for the electress herself not only disavowed an impolitic complaint, which had been made by Sir Rowland Gwynne † against the lukewarmness of the Whigs, but testified her perfect confidence in the sincerity of the queen, and her grateful acknowledgments for the care which had been taken to secure her succession.

After these successful negotiations, Marlborough flattered himself with sanguine hopes that he should meet with no obstructions at the Hague, where he arrived on the 11th of December.

Notwithstanding, however, the great and successful exertions of the duke in healing the disputes between the cabinets of Vienna and the Hague ; notwithstanding his precautions to ensure the advance of the loan, and to obtain the fulfilment of the promises made by the cabinets of London and the Hague, for the proposed augmentation of troops ; yet their lukewarmness, tardiness, and jealousy suspended the execution of these arrangements, and he was assailed with messages of disappointment from the emperor, and reproaches from Eugene and Wratislaw. ‡

Prince Eugene to the Duke of Marlborough.

" Dec. 2. — I received your highness's letter of the 20th from Vienna, and I hope that you are recovered from your indisposition, and that this will find you at the Hague. His imperial majesty has, through Count Wratislaw, communicated to me what passed during your continuance at Vienna, and has ordered me to send this courier to your highness with my sentiments on the war in Italy. All Europe knows its great importance, as well from the diversion it occasions to the French, as from the prodigious expenses it requires, without reckoning the 12,000 men which they have already lost in that country, since the commencement

* Translation from the French original in the Marlborough Papers.

† Sir Rowland Gwynne, who was resident at Hanover, wrote on the 1st of January an imprudent letter to the earl of Stamford, in which he bitterly inveighed against the Whigs for opposing the invitation, and not only justified the proposition itself, but conveyed a strong hint that the electress was desirous to repair to England. This letter being published, was declared a libel by the two houses, and the printer fined. — Tindal, v. xvi. p. 200.

‡ A principal minister of the emperor, and formerly envoy extraordinary at the British court. — ED.

of hostilities. It is evident France maintains 112 battalions and 118 squadrons, in the territory between Piedmont and Lombardy, without including the Spanish troops, and those that are stationed in Provence, Dauphiné, and the neighbouring provinces.

“ It is an axiom that no breach can be made in France, except through Italy. This fact is evident, from the efforts of the king of France to support this war, and his comparative indifference in other quarters ; for this army has never been diminished ; but on the contrary, this moment is increasing with considerable reinforcements. The conduct of the French is sufficient to induce the emperor and the allies to follow their example, for the purpose of obtaining a solid and permanent peace, which may secure the repose of Europe ; because France will never offer any reasonable conditions as long as she is in possession of Italy. Your highness will not, I trust, ascribe these arguments entirely to a zeal for the interest of the emperor, and of the duke of Savoy, as the head of my family ; but rather to my anxiety for the advantage of all the confederates, and the safety of Europe, for which so much blood has been shed during thirty years in general, and during this war in particular.

“ What, however, grieves me is, that in my opinion his imperial majesty is incapable of alone supporting this war any longer, as he has hitherto done, by exhausting his territories of men and money ; although all these sacrifices have not been sufficient to attain that superiority, without which, war must be unsuccessful in a country wherein the enemies are in possession of all the fortified places, rivers, and magazines.

“ It is only then by a superiority of force that we can take sure posts, necessary for establishing magazines, and afterwards by pushing into the interior, act offensively with less expense, and form a junction with the duke of Savoy, to gain that superiority which will be the ruin of the French arms in Italy, because France cannot without that advantage maintain a communication with her own territories. Nevertheless, should not the maritime powers act in concert with his imperial majesty, I must advise the emperor not to lose a moment in withdrawing his troops, before they are quite ruined, and in recommending his royal highness to make the best accommodation in his power. I candidly allow that this advice seems extraordinary, but on considering the state of affairs, it appears the only means not to lose the whole. As to myself, I trust that on many occasions I have proved my zeal for the service of my master ; yet I must declare, that no consideration shall induce me to make another campaign like the last, in which I wanted every thing. I know at the same time that the emperor employs every exertion in his power to preserve his army ; but your highness cannot have failed to judge during your stay at Vienna, whether it be possible for a sovereign, who is embarrassed with a war in every part of his dominions, to supply the necessary expenses, here and elsewhere, and furnish the requisite number of troops, without which hostilities cannot be carried on with any prospect of advantage. I therefore repeat my opinion, that as the only means of supporting this war, the maritime powers must grant a loan of 250,000*l.* on some secure funds, and reinforce this army with 10,000 men ; his im-

perial majesty binding himself to recruit his infantry, and remount his cavalry.

“As I trust the business of Catalonia is now completed, it is also necessary that a squadron and troops should threaten the coast of Nice or those of Italy, as well to save Nice as to cover Naples, and keep open the communications with Catalonia, as opportunity may serve, and also to exact contributions from Genoa, Florence, and other states. By this method, I trust this war may be finished promptly and successfully, otherwise the emperor ought not to lose a moment in withdrawing his troops, and concerting with his allies where he may employ them to the best advantage. These are my sentiments relating to the war of Italy; but a prompt resolution must be taken to enable me to form my plans, and save the remains of an army which has for five years maintained, with so much courage and firmness, such an arduous war, and which has infused terror into the enemy, notwithstanding their superiority and other advantages.

“In regard to the Rhine, Prince Louis cannot act more successfully for the allies than by besieging Saar Louis, and advancing on the side of the Moselle; but his army is not sufficiently strong to cover the lines of Bicl and Haguenau, and to make that siege.

“Here the campaign is as warm as in the month of June; the troops from the two camps not only cannonade each other, but even the infantry maintain a mutual fire from one camp to the other. The enemy attempted three days ago to force this fort; but I saved it by rapidly advancing with my dragoons, followed by the infantry. On dismounting, the enemy suspended their attack, and are now only parted from us the distance of half a musket shot, while we are encamped as we were.

“I entreat your highness to continue your friendship, and to accept the sentiments of veneration with which I am,” &c.

Count Wratislaw to the Duke of Marlborough.

“Vienna, Dec. 12.—I learned from yours of the 3d, that the treaty with the king of Prussia for the troops of Italy was concluded, and that they will be in Bavaria at the end of February; but I am much displeased in hearing at the same time, that no arrangement has been made for those of the empire, which will not only retard our intended project towards the Saar, but will likewise alarm the powers of the North: and who can tell whether the king of Prussia may not take a fancy to interfere in the war of Poland, as we have certain information that he has opened a negotiation with Sweden, as well as with the czar and the king of Poland?

“This messenger is despatched to Holland to quicken the resolution of the maritime powers, in forwarding the succours of money and troops for Italy. Prince Eugene, I know, has notified to your highness the state of his troops, their sufferings, and the absolute necessity of succouring him, or withdrawing from Italy. This being done by Prince Eugene, his imperial majesty ordered me to refer you to his statement, and to conjure you to write to him without delay, as a man of honour, and in virtue of your promise, on which we confidently rely. For after the

relation given by Count Guido Stahremberg, who is just arrived here, it is true that we require realities, and not merely hopes, without which, in conformity with the opinion of all the generals, we must recall the troops, to prevent their future destruction.

“ You cannot imagine the concern of his imperial majesty at finding that the first 300,000 crowns are not yet supplied either by England or Holland, on the confidence of which payment we wholly relied. We marched our troops from the empire during winter, when they could not be supported without magazines. This delay alarms us much, and fills us with apprehensions, that the negotiations for peace are in forwardness, and proves what little reliance we can place on the succours promised by the two powers, when the advance of such a trifling sum, which has been so often promised, and which ought to have been already transmitted to Frankfort, is not made.

“ These alarms so well founded, and the absolute impossibility of maintaining the war in Italy without your aid, compel the emperor and Prince Eugene to draw the army towards the Tyrol, and to suspend, till we receive your answer, the march of the recruits; for to speak frankly to you, we foresee that we shall be obliged by misery to recall our troops. I well know the inconveniences which must result from such a measure; but what can we do, when we have no other resource than to trust to Providence, and to bear the cruel fate, to which our own inability, and the negligence of our friends condemn us.

“ The conduct of the Hungarian chiefs in pillaging Austria, and delaying to give an answer to the proposal of either an armistice or of peace, sufficiently proves that they have no thoughts of peace; but are only intent to unite themselves by continuing the war, and to retire from that country as soon as they can no longer pillage. We have positive assurances that our troops have defeated them on the frontiers of Transylvania, and have effected a junction with Rabutin; and in my opinion, in the ensuing campaign, either by force or by an accommodation, we shall pacify the troubles if we can but hold out till the spring; for as soon as the troops arrive from Transylvania, and the fortresses, particularly Great Waradin, are supplied with provisions, we shall direct our attacks against them in a more vulnerable point.

“ Do not judge by what I have said that we are not inclined to peace; for I pledge my honour, that we are sincerely desirous of it, and on conditions highly advantageous to the Hungarians; and I would only infer from what I have said, that if we are supported one year longer in Italy, we shall be in a situation to support ourselves. To return to the negotiation in Holland, I cannot sufficiently express our concern and surprise in observing, that the emissaries of France are freely permitted to appear at the Hague. Your highness will recollect that you assured us they would be dismissed, and we gave full credit to your assertion, on which account we have not made any pressing remonstrances. But now, when we see them appearing in public, and that they no longer are concealed as before, what other opinion can we form, except that the negotiations are far advanced? We are not surprised at the silence of England; and what the queen said to her parliament may be as much intended to

press France to finish the treaty, as to induce the States-general to continue the war, and terminate the unfortunate negotiation which alarms the prince's allies, because each of them deems himself in a situation to imitate Holland in opening the door to negotiation; and we already are acquainted with various intrigues of the German princes, who have followed the example of the Dutch. Permit me then to observe, that if England is not admitted into the secret, and does not connive at the negotiation, I must hope that the queen will take some public steps against those measures which will be so injurious to us, will alienate all the minor princes of the empire, and will be followed by repentance when too late.

“Our alliances declare, and our reciprocal interests require, that we should do nothing without general participation; nevertheless nothing is communicated to us. Certainly this period is not fit for negotiation; but if it must be entered into right or wrong, why are we not permitted to bring forward our own interests, as each person is better acquainted with his own particular interest, than with those of others? and if we do not combine particular interests with the general system of Europe, the great power of France will swallow us up one after the other.

“The abominable Treaty of Partition has sufficiently proved how much the Dutch politicians were deceived, and how dearly Europe has suffered for their false principles. That private negotiation is the cause of all our present inconveniences. The house of Austria was thrown into a fatal despondency, and she will fall into a still greater, if the same conduct is pursued. I will say no more on this subject, because your highness is fully sensible of its injurious consequences.

“I will only add, that his imperial majesty has enjoined me to assure you of his esteem and friendship, solely relying on you to relieve us, by your communications, from this state of doubt and uncertainty.”

After mentioning the refusal of the margrave of Baden to repair to Vienna, at the emperor's request, and expressing the concern of his imperial majesty and the prince of Salm at this disrespectful conduct, he adds in a postscript:—

“I cannot conclude without frankly observing to your highness, that a prompt succour in men and money is necessary for Italy, or at least we must entreat you to be so kind as to tell us plainly that it cannot be granted; for we are in that case reduced to the necessity of withdrawing our troops from Italy.”

These letters from Eugene and Wratislaw deeply affected the honour and verity of the Duke of Marlborough, because they contained reflections on the conduct of the maritime powers, as if they had failed in the performance of what he had solemnly pledged himself to obtain, and as if the Dutch were still engaged in open negotiations with France.

Marlborough accordingly exerted himself with more than

his usual energy, in carrying into effect the arrangements which he had concluded at Vienna and Berlin, and in counteracting the insidious overtures of France.

Fortunately for the honour of England, and the credit of the duke, the queen and parliament had given evident proofs of their zeal and sincerity in the cause of the emperor. Besides liberal grants for the war in the Low Countries, supplies were voted for the augmentation of 10,000 men to be employed in Italy; for the same number in Portugal, and for 5000 in Catalonia. In the course of a few days, additional succours in men and money were also voted, as the proportion of England for prosecuting the successes of King Charles in the eastern parts of Spain. The addresses of both houses also breathed the most ardent zeal for the prosecution of the war, and expressed a hope that the allies would follow the great and noble example set by the queen.

Notwithstanding the animating effect of this example, the British negotiator had, as usual, to struggle against numerous obstacles, arising from the tardiness and complicated forms of the Dutch government, as well as from the machinations of the French party. He had also experienced great difficulty in arranging with the States the measures for augmenting the confederate army, in obtaining the payment of the loan to the court of Vienna, and in raising funds for the troops in Catalonia. We refer to his correspondence for an account of his embarrassments, and the means by which they were overcome.

To Lord Godolphin.

“*Hague, Dec. 15. 1705.* — I came here last night, and do assure you that I have not been idle one minute, so that I might be ready to take the first opportunity of a fair wind, which makes me very much wish for the convoy. It is a great pleasure to me to see by your letters the good resolutions the parliament takes for carrying on the war with vigour. But I am sorry at the same time to tell you, that these people are so far from advancing their proportion of the 250,000 crowns for Catalonia, that they say it will be impossible for them to comply with what they are already engaged for. I have very much of the spleen upon this subject, so that I could say a great deal, but shall not trouble you till I have the happiness of seeing you, which I hope will be by the middle of next week.

“I send you the inclosed letter, that you may see Prince Eugene's opinion as to the war in Italy. If we cannot help them, that army will certainly return, which I think would be a very fatal thing.”

“ *Hague, Dec. 22.* — You will see by the letters from Vienna, that the Hungarians are far from being inclined to a peace; and I am assured that the elector of Bavaria has received a letter from Ragotski that assures him they will never make peace, but at the same time he shall have his country restored to him. I am also very much afraid of ill news from Prince Eugene; so that if we should not be able to support the success in Catalonia, the hearts of the people in this country would be broke. At this time I think they are convinced they have been abused, and that France had no intentions of giving them such a peace as they thought themselves masters of, so that this year I reckon we may depend on their going on with the war.”

“ *Dec. 25.*—The States of Holland, seeing that there was no likelihood of my having the convoy before the next week at soonest, the wind being at east, they are separated till Tuesday, without coming to such resolutions as are absolutely necessary to be done before I leave this place, among which is that of the state of the war, which for the good of the service should have been done above a month ago. But the truth is, that every thing here is in that distraction, that there is no government. However, you may be assured they will go on with the war for this year; but as they pretend to want every thing, it will not be with that vigour it ought. I am assured that at their meeting on Tuesday they will adopt a resolution of taking some pretext for the sending one of their members to the queen; but the true business of h’s embassy will be, to represent to her majesty their sad condition. If I should have no news of the convoy by this day se’nnight, I shall be obliged to come in the packet-boat, or be frozen up in this country, for at this time it freezes very hard; but of this I say nothing, fearing they might hear it at Dunkirk.”

“ *Hague, Dec. 25.* — I have received yours of the 4th and 7th, and you may believe ’tis the only satisfaction I have in my confinement here, for want of the convoy, to hear that her majesty’s affairs go on well in parliament.

“ The States will pay their quota of the 300,000 crowns, which is very seasonable, as Prince Eugene’s army are much in want of every necessary.”

“ *Jan. 4. 1706.* — They have at last agreed to my proposal, for sending 10,000 men to Prince Eugene into Italy, so that there remains now only the consent of the elector palatine, they having found money for their part of the augmentation; so that I sent last night Count Lechteraine to Dusseldorp. A copy of his instructions I have sent for Mr. Secretary Harley; I have also acquainted the emperor of it, by express, that he might lose no time in sending the news to Italy.

“ Count Lechteraine is this minute come from Dusseldorp. I send you enclosed a copy of the elector’s letter to me, by which you may see that I am in hopes to finish the treaty by Thursday; for on Friday I will embark if the wind be fair, and leave instructions with Mr. Stanhope for finishing what I may leave undone.”

Marlborough then prevailed on the States to advance their share of the funds furnished for the service in Catalonia, and

to augment the forces in Portugal, that Lord Galway might detach 5000 or 6000 men into that country.

“I am of your opinion,” he writes to Godolphin, “that our first trouble must be for supplying King Charles in Catalonia, and Prince Eugene in Italy, for which I am pressing the States to send more than 4000 men into Italy, which I do not despair of obtaining. I am afraid it will be impossible to get the Prussian troops to march back for Germany this winter. I have written to Vienna, that they would lose no time in sending some person of consideration to settle what may be necessary with the king, so that those troops may be sure to return in time.”

He arranged the treaty with the elector palatine with his usual address and secrecy. Convinced that if he demanded the 10,000 men promised for the augmentation of the Italian army, he should not succeed, he first prevailed on the Dutch to consent to the march of 3000 Palatines, in the joint pay of the maritime powers. He next obtained from the elector an engagement for the service of 7000 men then employed in Germany and the Netherlands. To these were to be joined 3000 troops of Saxe Gotha, in the pay of the maritime powers, making a total of 10,000 men, of whom 4000 were to march without delay. At the same time, however, to prevent a diminution of the army in the Netherlands, he secretly prevailed on the elector to supply an additional body of 3000 men; and the arrangement was embodied in a treaty concluded on the 6th of May. These forces were to be paid by the maritime powers, in the same proportion as the other auxiliaries; namely, two thirds by England and one by Holland.

Marlborough also not only parried the pressing instances of Buys for peace, but induced the Dutch government to depute him to England, for the purpose of disavowing the acceptance of any overture from France, and for maturing the preparations and arrangements which were necessary before the opening of the campaign.*

* Lamberti, t. iii. p. 762. 767. ; and t. iv. p. 60. 62.

CHAP. XLII. — RETURNS TO ENGLAND. — 1705, 1706.

WHILE Marlborough continued at the Hague, maturing the preparations for the ensuing campaign, he, with his friend Godolphin, was exposed to the most malicious invectives, in consequence of the inclination which they had recently manifested to coalesce with the Whigs. This coalition was regarded by the Tories as a dereliction of their principles; and with a view to operate equally on the fears of the queen, and of a large body among the people, who considered the Whigs as enemies to the religious establishment, a clamour was raised that the church was in danger. This plea was advanced in numerous libels of the most virulent kind, in which Marlborough and Godolphin were severely arraigned, for deserting their former friends, for combining with the enemies of the church, and for assisting to defeat the bill against occasional conformity.

Among the rest, "The Memorial of the Church of England" attracted particular notice, and made a deep impression. A single extract will suffice to display the tone assumed in this inflammatory production. "All attempts," observes the author, "to settle the church on a perpetual foundation have been opposed and rendered ineffectual, by ministers who owe their present grandeur to its protection, and who, with a prevarication as shameful as their ingratitude, pretend to vote and speak for it themselves, and bribe others with pensions and places to vote against it." Nor was this accusation confined to the ministers: less pointed though not less injurious reflections were cast on the queen herself, for consenting to the removal of the Tory chiefs, from the disgrace of Rochester, to the recent dismissal of Buckingham, who were held forth as the patrons and assertors of the church.

This libel was transmitted to Marlborough, in the midst of his operations on the Ische, but was laid aside till he reached the camp of Corbais. Notwithstanding the heavy chagrin which weighed on his mind, the perusal drew from him some remarks, in a more jocund style than his correspondence generally assumes.

To Lord Godolphin.

"August 24. — In this camp I have had time to read the pamphlet called 'The Memorial of the Church of England.' I think it the most

impudent and scurrilous thing I ever read. If the author can be found I do not doubt but he will be punished; for if such liberties may be taken, of writing scandalous lies without being punished, no government can stand long. Notwithstanding what I have said, I cannot forbear laughing, when I think they would have you and I pass for fanatics, and the duke of Buckingham and Lord Jersey for pillars of the church; the one being a Roman Catholic in King James's reign, and the other would have been a Quaker, or any other religion that would have pleased the late king. All these proceedings make me weary of being in this world; but as long as I can be of any use to her majesty, I will undergo any difficulties to show her my duty and gratitude; and as I am sure you will never let any of these violent proceedings make you weary of serving the queen, be assured that I will not only venture my life, but my quiet, which is far dearer to me, to show the world the esteem and friendship I have for you."

To the duchess, whose irritable temper could ill brook the lash of public censure, and who on this, as on other occasions, importuned him with her complaints, he gave advice no less judicious than manly.

"*Tirlemont, Sept. 7.* — I received last night a letter from you without a date, by which I see there is another scurrilous pamphlet come out. The best way of putting an end to that villany is not to appear concerned. The best of men and women in all ages have been ill used. If we can be so happy as to behave ourselves, so as to have no reason to reproach ourselves, we may then despise what rage and faction do."

The cabinet at length found it necessary to check the licentiousness of the press. David Evans, the printer of the Memorial, was brought to trial, and being convicted of the offence, was fined and sentenced to the pillory, but fled from the hands of justice. By the same motive which suggested this prosecution, the Whigs were prompted to submit the question, which created such clamour, to the decision of parliament; and they found a ready acquiescence on the part of the queen, who was offended at the disrespectful reproaches with which she had been assailed by the Tories. With the concurrence of the ministers, Lord Halifax made a motion in the House of Peers, to appoint a day for inquiring into the dangers of the church "about which so many terrible stories had been recently published;" and the 6th of January was fixed for the discussion of the momentous question.

Lord Rochester opened the debate, and marshalled the charges advanced by his party under three heads. He

argued that the church was exposed to danger, from the act of security passed in Scotland, from the failure of the bill against occasional conformity, and finally from the rejection of the motion to invite the presumptive heir of the crown to England. He was supported by others of congenial sentiments, in the same strain of argument. On the opposite side, Halifax and Wharton as bitterly reprobated the unfounded alarms which had been propagated; and Somers, the great orator of the Whigs, after censuring the authors of such reports, as actuated by the basest motives, to embroil the nation at home, and defeat the glorious designs of the queen abroad, concluded a manly and impressive speech, with an animated eulogium on the conduct of the existing administration. The motion was not only negatived by a large majority, but a vote was passed that the church had been rescued from extreme danger by William III., and was safe and flourishing under the happy government of the queen. It was farther declared, that such as should insinuate to the contrary were enemies to the queen, the church, and the country.

On the ensuing day the Lords acquainted the Commons with these proceedings, desiring their concurrence; and both houses joined in an address to the queen, soliciting her majesty to punish the authors and disseminators of the malicious reports which had agitated the public mind.

A letter from Harley to Marlborough proves that the moderate Tories on this occasion entered with zeal into the views of the Whigs.

“*Dec. 11-22.* — On Saturday the Commons entered upon the consideration of the Lords' vote, that the church was in danger. The debate was very long, managed with as much impotent impertinent malice as ever I saw. They were not spared by the other side, but were dared and defied to produce an instance, in any of her majesty's ministers, which was contrary to the public good and interest of the kingdom. They did not dare to divide, but upon the latter clause, of declaring the reporters of such things enemies to her majesty, &c., and that was carried against them by above fifty votes.”

The reply from the throne was in perfect unison with the voice of parliament, and a proclamation was immediately issued for discovering the author of the Memorial, and the apprehension of Evans the printer. The proceedings which

followed, it would be tedious to recapitulate. We shall only observe, that this celebrated production was traced to the hand of the Rev. Doctor Drake, and the prosecution instituted against him failed for want of attention to legal formalities.

The victory thus gained over the Tories was rendered doubly gratifying by the arrival of Marlborough. He made his first appearance in the House of Peers on the 7th of January, and the same day received in person the thanks of the Commons for his great services in the last campaign, and for his prudent negotiations with her majesty's allies. To the committee appointed to convey these thanks, the duke replied: "I am so sensible of this honour, that I cannot have the least concern at the reflection of any private malice, while I enjoy the satisfaction of finding my faithful endeavours to serve the queen and the kingdom so favourably accepted by the House of Commons."

He alludes in these words to a libel, published by Mr. Stephens, rector of Sutton, under the title of "A Letter to the Author of the Memorial of the Church of England," severely arraiging his conduct during the last campaign.

Although the author of the Memorial was not visited with the punishment due to his offence, the writer of this letter was not suffered to escape with the same impunity. He was arrested by order of the secretary of state, and after conviction in the Queen's Bench, was sentenced to a fine of 100 marks, and to stand twice in the pillory. The prospect of this degrading punishment overcame his zeal; and besides a public recantation, which has been already printed*, he appealed to the compassion of the Duchess of Marlborough, through the agency of a friend.

"Pardon me that I am troublesome to solicit your assistance in my afflicted condition, which I should make a shift to go through well enough, if the corporal punishment did affect nobody besides myself. But I have a wife, who loves me with a most hearty affection, and is as well beloved by me, and she told me when I was coming last from home to London, that if she should hear that I were pillored, she was sure it would kill her. And if that should so fall out, I know not how I could possibly bear it; and God knows what would become of six poor children.

* Methinks if you could prevail upon the archbishop of Canterbury

* History of Europe for 1706.

to intercede with the queen, to remit the standing in the pillory, for the sake of the character which I bear (that is of a clergyman), it would be an argument of that nature which would not be opposed by any one about the court. Though the libel which I published was judged to be malicious in the construction and eye of the law, and therefore my punishment is so great; yet, God knows my heart, that I never bore the least ill will to the queen or the Duke of Marlborough in all my life. I am confined to the Horu alehouse, over against the Queen's Bench prison in Southwark, where I should be glad to hear from you, in my uncomfortable condition, being your afflicted obliged servant,

"Friday noon.

WM. STEPHENS."

The duchess was moved by this appeal, and earnestly interceded with the queen for a remission of the degrading part of his punishment. The answer of Anne proves how warm an interest she took in the reputation of the duke, and the reluctance with which she exercised the royal mercy.

"Wednesday noon.— I have, upon my dear Mrs. Freeman's pressing letter about Mr. Stephens, ordered Mr. Secretary Harley to put a stop to his standing in the pillory till farther orders, which is in effect the same thing as if he was pardoned. Nothing but your desire could have inclined me to it, for in my poor opinion it is not right. My reason I will tell you when I have the happiness of seeing you; till then, my dear Mrs. Freeman, farewell."

The duke, though so deeply wounded by the scurrilous attack, was too magnanimous to cherish feelings of vengeance against the author; and left the vindication of his character to the offended laws of his country. Before the conviction, he observes to his wife:—

"Borchloen, May 9-20. 1706.— It is impossible for my dearest soul to imagine the uneasy thoughts I have every day, in thinking that I have the curse at my age of being in a foreign country from you, and at the same time very little prospect of being able to do any considerable service for my country or the common cause. * * * * *

"I agree entirely with you, that Stephens ought not to be forgiven before sentence. But after he is in the queen's power, if her majesty has no objection to it, I should be glad he were forgiven: but I submit it to her majesty's pleasure and the opinion of my friends. I do not know who the author of the review is, but I do not love to see my name in print; for I am persuaded that an honest man must be justified by his own actions, and not by the pen of a writer, though he should be a zealous friend."

On the remission of the corporal punishment, he thus expresses his satisfaction:—

"May 20. — I am very glad you have prevailed with the queen for

pardoning Stephens. I should have been very uneasy if the law had not found him guilty, but much more uneasy if he had suffered the punishment on my account."

From his arrival in London to his departure, Marlborough was, as usual, employed in making the military preparations for the ensuing campaign. On this occasion, he found himself far differently situated than in the preceding session, when he was exposed to the factious opposition of both parties. The high Tories had wholly lost their political consequence; the moderate of the party cordially joined in supporting the measures of government; while the Whigs seemed to possess the favour of the queen, the friendship of Godolphin, and the confidence of the nation, and had obtained a considerable ascendancy in the new parliament.

Already had Godolphin expressed his satisfaction at the conduct of the Whigs, both in his public and private capacity, and he earnestly requested his friend to overcome his political bias, and coalesce with those who so justly merited his confidence. Marlborough accordingly announced his willingness to accede to this request. In reply he observes:—

"*Hague, Dec. 25.* — I have had the happiness of two of yours since my last, and I beg that you will do me the justice to believe that at my arrival you shall govern me entirely as to my behaviour; for I shall with all my heart live friendly with those that have shown so much friendship to you and service to the queen."

The queen was highly gratified with the conduct of the Whigs during this stormy session, and in particular with their manly opposition to the proposal of inviting the electress Sophia, at which she was greatly offended. Her gratitude for their support produced a temporary suspension of her political antipathy, and she expressed this change of sentiment in terms of unusual cordiality to the duchess.

"I believe, dear Mrs. Freeman, we shall not disagree as we have formerly done; for I am sensible of the services those people have done me, that you have a good opinion of, and will countenance them; and I am thoroughly convinced of the malice and insolence of others that you have been always speaking against."

These expressions from one who seldom retracted her opinion indicate her high indignation against the Tories; and she also authorised the lord treasurer to assure the leaders of the Whigs, that she would place her affairs in such hands as

they should approve, and would do every thing in her power for promoting the Protestant succession.*

On their part the Whigs exulted in this sudden change of favour, and appeared disposed to merit the countenance which was shown them by the queen and ministers. A letter from Lord Sunderland to the duchess speaks the sentiments of the party.

Hague, Dec. 11-22. — We have met with so much good news from England since our coming hither, that I can't help, dear madam, congratulating you upon it; for I am sure nobody has contributed more towards it than you; nor nobody, I am confident, is better pleased with it. It is certain that the zeal and warmth the queen and parliament show for carrying on the war, have put a new life into all those that wish well in this country, and have as much damped all the others, who were very high before. We expect with great impatience two posts that are due from England, in hopes that they will bring us the good news of some more defeats of the French in both houses; for I think they are of as great consequence as victories abroad. Our convoy is not yet come, but expected.

“ Lord Marlborough both is, and looks as well as ever I saw him, notwithstanding all his fatigue, which has been no small one, to go to Vienna and come back, after a long and tedious campaign; and it is very fortunate for us that he can bear what he does; for, without any compliment to him, he is the life and soul of every thing here abroad, and without him the whole confederacy would be in confusion.”

Marlborough and Godolphin seized this opportunity for realising their favourite scheme of combining all parties, by effecting a reconciliation between their new adherents and the moderate Tories. The great services which Harley had performed in persuading the queen to transfer the office of lord keeper to Mr. Cowper, his zeal in supporting the nomination of the speaker, and his exertions against the motion for the invitation of the electress Sophia, had softened the antipathy of the Whigs, and they seemed no less anxious than the general and treasurer for a more intimate union with those who appeared to be actuated by the same views, and to differ only in a shade of sentiment, too slight to be discriminated.

A dinner was accordingly arranged by the two ministers, for this purpose, at the house of Harley. The company consisted, on one side, of Harley and St. John, and on the other of Halifax, Sunderland, and Boyle, together with Godolphin

* “ Vindication of her Conduct.”

and Marlborough. Somers was also invited, but going to his country-house, sent an excuse in terms which proved that he concurred in sentiment with those who were present. The entertainment passed with great spirit, and apparent cordiality, though the Whigs could not refrain from indicating the suspicions which they still fostered of Harley's subtle and trimming character. The anecdote will be best related in the words of Lord Cowper, who was himself one of the actors. "On the departure of Lord Godolphin, Harley took a glass, and drank to love and friendship, and everlasting union, and wished he had more Tokay to drink it in; we had drank two bottles good, but thick. I replied, his white Lisbon was best to drink it in, being very clear. I suppose he apprehended it (as I observed most of the company did) to relate to that humour of his, which was never to deal clearly or openly; but always with reserve, if not dissimulation, or rather simulation; and to love tricks when not necessary, but from an inward satisfaction in applauding his own cunning."*

Still, however, this slight indication of political rivalry escaped the public observation: and all parties were considered as actuated by equal cordiality and harmony. The political atmosphere appeared for the first time serene, and the prospect of domestic tranquillity seemed at last to dawn on a country long torn by faction. The Whig historians expatiated on this happy state of public affairs, in the same exulting tone as is employed to celebrate the return of peace after an anxious period of war; and even the Tories caught the same language. Smollet, after speaking of the thanks given to the Duke of Marlborough, by the House of Commons, continues:—

"This nobleman was in such credit with the people, that when he proposed a loan of 500,000*l.* to the emperor, upon a branch of his revenue in Silesia, the money was advanced immediately by the merchants of London. The kingdom was blessed with plenty; the queen was universally beloved; the people in general were zealous for the prosecution of the war; the forces were well paid; the treasury was punctual; and though a great quantity of coin was exported for the maintenance of the war, the paper currency supplied the deficiency so well, that no murmurs were heard; and the public credit flourished both at home and abroad."

* Lord Cowper's Diary. — Hardwicke Papers

On the 19th of March, the session was closed by a speech from the throne, in which the queen lauded the zeal of her subjects, and testified her satisfaction at the perfect union of sentiment which had reigned between her and the parliament.

Marlborough quitted England with the highest gratification he had ever yet experienced. The collision of political sentiments between the queen and the duchess had subsided; the majority of the parliament and nation appeared to be inspired with his own ardour for the prosecution of the war; Godolphin and the Whigs were for the first time in unison; his immediate dependants and friends had vanquished their fears and jealousies; and all parties looked up to him, as the moderator of their feuds, and the depositary of their confidence, who had equally subdued the factions at home, and vanquished the enemy abroad.

CHAP. XLIII. — GRANT OF A PRINCIPALITY. — 1705, 1706.

WE have already mentioned the offer of a principality, made to Marlborough by the emperor Leopold, during his march to the Danube, and renewed after the victories of Schellenberg and Blenheim. We have also stated his reasons for declining the proffered honour, till it was identified with the grant of an imperial fief, in conformity with the principles of the Germanic constitution.

After much difficulty, the town of Munderkingen, in Suabia, was selected, as the territorial property which was to entitle the British general to a seat and vote in the College of Princes. But this choice was neither conformable to the greatness of his military services, nor to his own personal merits. The place itself was old and dilapidated, and the revenues extremely scanty; for on an estimate made by the imperial referendary, the annual income was found not to exceed 100*l.* in time of peace; and in time of war, was burdened with the heavy charge of 2000*l.*, for the contingent. The fees of office, investiture, and introduction to the diet, also would amount to no less than 6000*l.* As a gift shackled with such conditions was a burden instead of a benefit, it

was proposed to reduce the fees of office, and to obtain the consent of the circles of Suabia and Franconia to a special exemption in favour of the duke, from all charges and taxes. This expedient, however, was not deemed eligible.

The court of Vienna seem to have felt ashamed of an offer which conveyed a stigma on their want of liberality. Accordingly Wratislaw was ordered to represent to Marlborough, as an apology, that it was customary to grant the dignity of prince without any regard to territory or revenue; that the emperor held no property in the empire of which he could dispose; and as head of the house of Austria, only the limited domains derived from his ancestors, which were considered as inalienable. An offer of part of the Bavarian territory, which was soon afterwards conquered, and about to be confiscated, was declined, as an invidious and precarious possession.*

In consequence of these objections, the affair was suspended during the reign of Leopold. Joseph seized the earliest opportunity of gratifying Marlborough, in a manner more proportionate to his services, as well as more conformable to his own feelings and dignity. For this purpose he selected the lordship of Mindelheim, a part of the inheritance of Maximilian, landgrave of Leuchtenberg, uncle to the elector of Bavaria, which had been appropriated the preceding year, by the emperor Leopold, in virtue of an expectancy, to the house of Austria. This demesne he offered to erect into a principality, in favour of the successful commander.

The proposal being accepted, Joseph, by a patent, dated Nov. 14. 1705, conferred the dignity of prince on the Duke of Marlborough, and all his heirs and descendants, male and female. This was accompanied with the permission to bear his arms on the breast of the imperial eagle, surmounted with a ducal coronet, "as a memorial to the latest posterity, of imperial gratitude and meritorious services."†

* Letters from Mr. Stepney and Count Wratislaw to the duke, in January and February, 1705.

† As some misapprehension has arisen concerning the nature of these grants, and as the grant of the princely dignity has been confounded with that of the territory, we shall insert those parts of the patents which relate to the extension of the princely dignity to the female line; and the limitation of the territorial possession, and privileges of the diet, to the male line only.

On the 17th, by another patent, he created the lordship of Mindelheim a principality of the empire, to be conferred on the Duke of Marlborough, and made it revertible to his legitimate male heirs. By a third patent, of the 18th, he, as head of the house of Austria, transferred the new principality to Marlborough.

It may, perhaps, be gratifying to the reader, to subjoin a brief account of the history and possessors of this territory, and of the ceremonies of investiture, possession, and introduction, which followed the grant.

The principality of Mindelheim derived its appellation from a castle and town of the same name, situated on the river Mündel or Mindel. It forms part of the circle of Suabia, and the district of Algow.

In the early periods of German history, the lordship of Mindelheim belonged to the family of Schwigger, who were called knights of Mindelberg, a castle built on a hill, to the north of the present town. By this family the town of Mindelheim, if not founded, was enlarged and beautified, and endowed with a monastery, which in later times was appropriated by the Jesuits.

The male issue of the Schwiggers failing in the third generation, Walter of Hochschlitz, lord of Kilheim in the Halde, and bishop of Augsburg, obtained possession of the territory, though by what right is not ascertained. Soon afterwards the inhabitants of Augsburg raising the standard of rebellion against their bishop, chose for their captain Frederic, duke of Teck*, who in 1372 conquered the lord-

Extract of the Patent of Nov. 14. 1705.—“*Nos te Johannes Dux de Marlborough * * * omnesque tuos liberos, hæredes, posteros, ac descendentes legitimos masculos, et fæminas, utriusque sexus, in veros Sacri Romani Imperii Principes, fecimus, creavimus et extitimus, atque ad titulum et dignitatem principatus Imperii ereximus.*”

The German Imperial Patent of Nov. 17., after announcing the erection of the lordship of Mindelheim into a principality, declares that “the Duke of Marlborough and his legitimate *male heirs*, on account of the possession of the same, shall be admitted to a place at the assemblies of the diet and circle, either by themselves or their plenipotentiaries, in the same manner as other princes of the empire, with the right of voting and other privileges and prerogatives enjoyed by the princes of the holy Roman empire.”

* The name of Teck was derived from a castle in the duchy of Wirtemberg, which gives the same title to the present sovereigns. The con-

ship of Mindelheim. The prelate, in attempting to recover the town, was killed by a poisoned arrow, and Frederic retained possession without disturbance from his relatives. He built a castle on the neighbouring heights, to which he gave his own name of Teck. He resided here twenty years, and continued to enlarge and improve the town. His son, Ulric, founded the cathedral, in which his ashes are deposited, as well as those of the succeeding lords.

Frederic left eight sons, who all died without male issue, and on the decease of the last survivor, Louis, patriarch of Aquileia, the inheritance was conveyed by his sister, Irme-gand, to George and Bernard, her two sons, by Vitus, count of Rechtberg. George died unmarried, and the male issue again failing to the seven sons of Bernard, a new dynasty commenced in the family of Ulric of Freudsberg, who had espoused their sister, Barbara. He was a distinguished warrior, and promoter of the Suabian league, in the reign of Frederic III. His son George is styled lord of Mindelheim, Petrisberg, and Mertzingen, knight and captain-general of the emperor in Italy.

In 1554 the inheritance fell between the two sisters of George, Catherine, wife of Henry Otho, count of Schwartzenberg, and Paulina, who espoused William Kreut, a Bohemian nobleman. By the marriage of Maria, only child and heiress of Otho, with Christopher, Count Fugger, that nobleman obtained a share of the inheritance, and having purchased the remainder from the other sister, united the whole in his own person. A dispute, however, arising between him and the persons who had advanced the purchase-money, a compromise was effected. The lordship of Mindelheim, with all the other possessions of the house of Freudsberg, was sold to Maximilian Emanuel, duke, and afterwards elector of Bavaria. He was confirmed in the possession by the emperor Matthias; but in consequence of an obsolete claim advanced by the house of Austria, the investiture was coupled with an expectative, revertible to the Austrian family in failure of issue. It was afterwards conveyed in the same manner to his second son Maximilian, landgrave of Leuchtenberg.

sequence of this ancient family is proved by its matrimonial connexions, as we find two of the sons espoused Bertha, of the illustrious house of Este, and Anne, daughter of Casimir king of Poland.

During the dreadful war of thirty years, the possession of the town and castle was warmly contested, and they were alternately occupied by the two hostile armies. The town was thrice taken and pillaged, and the castle burnt. The lordship was, however, restored at the peace of Westphalia to the house of Bavaria. On the death of Maximilian, landgrave of Leuchtenberg, without issue, in 1704, the emperor Leopold considered the pretensions of his nephew, the elector of Bavaria, as superseded; and appropriated this portion of the inheritance, in virtue of the expectative.*

From this deduction it is evident that the lordship of Mindelheim was held as an immediate fief, descendible to the female line, at least till it was transferred to the Bavarian family. Hence attempts were made by the friends of Marlborough, both before and after the investiture, to procure an extension of the grant to the female line; but although the emperor had rendered the princely dignity heritable by females, he could not be persuaded to relinquish the chance of eventual possession, which he reserved to his own family, by the limitation of the patent.

The grant having passed the chancery, the ceremony of investiture was performed at Innspruch, the capital of Ulterior Austria, in the latter end of April, Count Fieghers acting as the proxy of the duke.

With the permission of the queen, Mr. Stepney was then authorised by Marlborough to take possession of the territory, and receive the homage of the inhabitants. We here present his description of the formalities, as transmitted to his principal, soon after the event.

“ *Lintz, 30th May, 1706.* — By a courier returning to the Elector Palatine, I give your grace notice of my being got to Mindelheim on the 20th, where Dr. Haag, secretary of the feudal court in Tyrol, arrived the day following, with the patent and instructions for the imperial commissioners appointed to put me in possession; and on the 22d Count Konigsegg (the first of them) arrived likewise, who by his easy dispatch, and by the good grace wherewith he performed his part, sufficiently

* This account is taken from several original documents in the Marlborough Papers, particularly an Historical Deduction, and a Genealogical Table of the possessors of Mindelheim, accompanied with biographical explanations. We have also consulted Busching and the German historians.

made amends for not being exactly punctual in point of the time when he ought to have met me. As soon as he gave me notice of his arrival I waited upon him, and the same evening he not only returned my visit, but regulated with his colleagues the methods of immission, after I had sent them the full power, whereby your grace authorised me to receive possession in your name.

“Next day orders were issued throughout the country, giving notice that the ceremony of homage was to begin on Whitsun Monday (the 24th instant), in the town-hall of Mindelheim, where, after divine service, the imperial commissioners (Count Konigsegg, Baron Volmar, and Baron Imhoff) seated themselves in arm-chairs, at a table on the right hand of the hall, assisted by Dr. Haag, and then gave notice that they were ready to receive me; who placed likewise for me an arm-chair before another table to the left, and I took Dr. Heyland by me for my assistant.

“The ceremony begun by calling in the *beampte*, or the four chief officers belonging to the principality, who have administered the revenues and the like, to whom Count Konigsegg made a very handsome speech, — ‘signifying to them the weighty reasons which had induced his imperial majesty to erect the lordship of Mindelheim into a principality of the empire, and to confer it on your grace and your heirs male, as an acknowledgment of the important services you have done his family, and the whole Roman empire, at Hochstedt, and elsewhere. And for the better proof thereof, he ordered the secretary to read to them the emperor’s commission, as also the letter of investiture, and the *gehorsam brieff*, or patent, discharging all the subjects of Mindelheim from the obedience and vassalage which they swore to his imperial majesty a year ago, upon the death of Maximilian, late duke of Bavaria; and afterwards directing them to take a new oath of homage to your grace, as prince of Mindelheim, and to comport themselves hereafter in all respects, according to the injunctions they should receive from me, in quality of your grace’s plenipotentiary; adding therewith a word or two of admonition, to be as true and faithful subjects to your grace as they had been to his imperial majesty.’

“After this overture, Dr. Heyland, by my direction, first made a compliment to the imperial commission, ‘acknowledging the emperor’s extraordinary bounty and favour, in bestowing on your grace so signal a mark of his beneficence, and thanked the commissioners for having so well discharged their part.’ He then turned to the four officers, and signified to them, ‘that your grace, having been duly informed of their honest and prudent administration, was disposed to continue them in the same, if they desired it.’ Whereupon they presented to me a petition, signed by all four of them, humbly begging that their respective offices might be preserved to them, and giving assurances of their inviolable allegiance and fidelity. Then Dr. Heyland read to them a paper containing the duty expected from them: to which they having given their assent, he read to them likewise the usual oath, which they repeated after him, holding up their thumbs and the two fore-fingers of their right hands. After which, I told them in a few words, ‘that I did not ques-

tion but they would duly observe what they had sworn to your grace; and upon those assurances I promised them, in your name, all the justice and protection they could hope and expect from a good and gracious sovereign. In confirmation whereof I gave each of them my hand, a custom used in these countries when homage is paid.'

"Then the burgermasters, common council, and citizens (to the number of about 250), were called in, with whom the same ceremony was repeated, in the presence of the four officers above mentioned, who were ordered to sit on the bench apart, to give them more countenance and authority. The like ceremony was performed a third time, with part of the *amanners*, or chief persons of the village, with some peasants, who being in all above 1500, the rest were admitted the day following, at two several times. All of them seemed very cheerful upon their being assigned to your grace's protection. I have had the good fortune to meet with no manner of dispute or contradiction in the whole course of this business, though some people expected the bishop of Augsburg would have entered a protest in behalf of his chapter, who pretend to this lordship, by a claim of about 300 years standing, which, however, nobody from them thought fit to assert. And the little surmises which had been scattered among the ordinary people, upon account of religion, were soon removed upon my appearance among them, particularly by the civilities I affected to show towards the English nuns, and to the Jesuits, both of whom have their settlements near the quarters which were appointed me.

"All the time I stayed at Mindelheim the imperial commissioners were entertained by me at my own lodgings; and the first day of our solemnity, the four officers, with the burgermasters, and *sindic*, were admitted to dine with us; while the director of Count Konigsegg's chancery (as he is called), and my steward, did the honours at the town-hall, where the other magistrates and council celebrated the festival. It was fitting they should have a share of it, since they consented to bear the expense. The rest of my time was spent in drawing up commissions, instructions, and rules of government, for the respective officers to whom I have entrusted the administration, by particular acts I signed for each of them, bearing date the 25th May, 1706, and confirmed under your grace's broad seal, whercof I formerly sent Mr. Cardonel an impression. In those papers are specified the salaries and benefits which each of them are to enjoy, wherein I exactly observed the regulation made by Maximilian, late duke of Bavaria, a frugal and wise prince, who, from his residence at Turckeim, within three hours of Mindelheim, frequently inspected their accounts; and thereby bred up most of them to be as honest, sober, and careful men as are to be found in any part of Germany.

"To keep to order and dignity, I am to speak first of John Joseph, Baron D'Imhoff; to whom I administered the same oath which the other subjects had taken, but privately in my chamber, in the presence only of Dr. Heyland. He is the same gentleman who was recommended to your grace by Prince Eugene and Count Zinzendorff, and who, for a year last past, has had the joint administration of the country with

Baron Volmar; which office he has discharged so prudently, that both the magistrates and common people seemed very desirous to have him continued, and a petition was presented to me to that purpose, subscribed by a good number of them.

“Your grace will farther be pleased to observe, by the letter here inclosed from Baron Hallden, chancellor of Tyrol, that he likewise is of opinion your grace can hardly find a person more proper for your business. He is a man of an active spirit, has an estate within four hours of Mindelheim, and I find he is in good esteem, both with the magistrates of Augsburg, and with the gentry in the neighbourhood. For all these reasons I have established him with the title of counsellor and *oberpleger*, or grand bailiff, and lodged with him your grace's seal, above mentioned, to be applied to all public aets of authority and jurisdiction. At present I shall only mention some few heads of his instructions. A particular article is inserted, which enjoins him to reside for the most part at Mindelheim, for the better administration. He is not to dispose of any of the four *beampte* (or chief offices) without your grace's approbation, nor issue any sums of money exceeding fifty florins, without your particular direction. And in observance of what your grace formerly recommended to me (that a faculty might be reserved for removing him or any other officer from your service as you see cause), I have worded that condition reciprocally; viz. that if your grace shall judge any change necessary, you will allow two months' warning, expecting a like term, if any of them have a mind to resign.”

Here follows an account of the salaries and perquisites of the different officers, which it is needless to introduce. He then proceeds:—

“According to this establishment, the whole expense of the administration, both in money and other benefits, amounts to 3564 florins, which (reckoning eight to a pound sterling) makes 445*l.* 10*s.* Whereas, by the best guesses I can make, after having viewed their books of accounts (which are in as good method as ever I saw), your grace may expect a clear yearly revenue of two thousand pounds sterling*, excluding the appointments here specified, and likewise the quota to be paid to the empire, wherein your grace is in no manner concerned, the subjects being obliged to bear that burthen by a repartition among themselves. This being rightly considered, my lord, I believe your grace will think the emperor's present rather more valuable than what it was at first computed. Upon which account I cannot forbear suggesting to your grace once more, what I hinted to you at Vienna, that you should take your measures in time, towards getting this fief changed from a masculine to a promiseous one, whereby the possession of this benefit may be secured to your female issue in all events; and I presume it may not be extremely difficult to bring this matter to bear, when I reflect what new merits your grace acquires daily, by your zeal and services to the house of Austria. But this and other considerations, which tend towards im-

* This sum was rather exaggerated.

proving this grant, and rendering it more beneficial, will be more fully represented hereafter to your grace, both by me and Dr. Heyland, whose sagacity and experience in these matters deserve to be encouraged. And I entreat your grace to signify to Baron Staffhorst, and even to the duke of Wirtemberg himself (if any proper occasion offers), that his services have been acceptable to your grace; he being an able man, and just in the neighbourhood, and may step over thither sometimes, to rectify any thing that shall chance to be amiss.

“ For future years Baron Imhoff will send your grace an abstract of accounts every quarter, and remit the ready cash by such methods as you shall please to direct. But I fear your grace will hardly receive any benefit before January next, the whole product of this year being to be cast into a mass together, and then divided, one third for the emperor's use, and the other two parts for your grace's, which is all that can be expected, by reason that your possession does not commence till May, which month I shall endeavour to procure entire, though that proposal may meet with contradiction, because the act of immission was not performed till the 24th.

“ Mr. Cardonel will have presented to your grace a letter from the English nuns, begging that a pension of 500 florins, settled on them five years ago by the duke and duchess of Bavaria, and continued to them ever since by the late emperor, should still be preserved to them under your grace's government. They offered me a petition likewise to the same purpose, which was also recommended very affectionately to me by the said duchess; and I am indeed of opinion that your grace cannot handsomely avoid allowing them that pension, since any disposition to the contrary, in the beginning of your regency, may raise more clamour and reflection than the thing is worth. Besides, their institution is very charitable and useful, and they have several other establishments in these countries, which are much esteemed.

“ The college of Jesuits is founded upon a better bottom, having sufficient possessions of their own to maintain them, without recourse to your grace or others, for charitable contributions.

“ The duchess has lately made them a present of her husband's library, which, by the collection of Italian books, is pretty valuable. They entertained us with a sort of opera in Latin, celebrating your grace's heroic virtues, which a young Count Fugger represented, with others of quality. This circumstance, with the letter your grace has received from the father rector, are proofs that the society are not sparing of their compliments, when they judge it to be for their interest.

“ I have acquainted your grace in the former part of this letter, that Count Konigsegg discharged his commission very much to your grace's satisfaction. He is of the emperor's privy council, and a person of distinguished quality; therefore, in my humble opinion (besides the present I made him in plate), your grace may very properly honour him with a good copy of your picture, which I in a manner have promised him, having perceived in him a laudable ambition of transmitting to his family, by such a token, the remembrance of his having been employed in conveying to your grace this mark of the emperor's beneficence. It may

be sent to Mr. Behagel at Frankfort, who will find means to forward it to some of his correspondents at Augsburg. And I must farther venture to propose, that another copy may be sent to Baron Imhoff, to be set up in the town-hall, which I am certain will be received there with some degree of adoration. For I must do justice to the officers and magistrates, in acknowledging that no people upon earth could show a greater zeal and goodwill than they did in regard to your grace, and upon that account to me likewise, and to my family.

“ I was something at a loss how to deal with Baron Volmar, who mightily solicited to have a share with Baron Imhoff in the administration. But that notion not agreeing either with economy or good government, I had recourse to Count Konigsegg, who privately disposed him to desist, particularly considering that your grace’s interest, as well as the advantage of your subjects, required your grand bailiff should reside upon the spot, which condition Baron Volmar could not comply with, by reason of his other employment at Guntzbourg. However, I promised him to promote his interest and pretensions at Vienna and elsewhere, as I see occasion; and I am persuaded your grace will do the like, if he has any thing reasonable to propose.

“ I shall not trouble your grace with a description of the city, otherwise than that it consists chiefly of a long, clean, well-built street, with fresh water running in the middle of it. The grand-bailiff’s house is convenient enough, having been newly repaired by the duke. Within half an English mile of the town there is an old castle upon an eminence; but the building is run to decay, and at present serves only as a granary. However, the situation is such, as might deserve useful improvement hereafter, if your grace shall farther obtain the benefit above mentioned.

“ This, my lord, is all I have at present to relate to your grace. At least, if I have omitted any material circumstance (such as the homage which Count Muggedall should have paid, or the like), I don’t question but they will be represented to your grace by Doctor Heyland, whom I have obliged to give a separate account in French, and not to leave Mindelheim till he has both finished that, and settled some small affairs which I had not time to regulate, being much pressed to return, because of the negotiation now carrying on at Presburgh.

“ I must not omit acquainting your grace that the magistrates, when they presented me the keys of the city, surprised me with a very handsome basin and ewer (worth 600 florins). This was contrary both to my expectation and desire, having no other prospect than the honour which I enjoy in serving your grace; and that I hope I have done to your good liking, having, as I conceive, omitted nothing which might tend to your glory and advantage.

“ I frequently offered to wave this present, but they urged it on me with so good a grace as rendered the gift much more valuable to me, because I was convinced, by this assurance of their goodwill, that they were perfectly satisfied with my behaviour towards them, particularly for the service I did them, by hindering Count d’Offeren from being too oppressive, which he would have been, if I had not arrived in a lucky hour, to put a stop to those exorbitant contributions.

“ The magistrates paid their civilities likewise, in proportion, to five of my domestics, and continued their respects to the last moment, by accompanying me out of town on horseback, together with your grace’s chief officers, about an English mile on my way.

“ I thought I was obliged in decency to pay my respects to the duchess dowager of Bavaria, who is your next neighbour. She is a lady of extraordinary prudence and merit, about fifty-five years of age, of the house of Bouillon, and (like the rest of that family) not much addicted to the French interest. She took my compliment very kindly, and desired me to assure your grace, that since his imperial majesty had resolved to take away from her this lordship of Mindelheim (which the duke had settled as a part of her dowry), it was a particular satisfaction to her to understand that it was fallen to the share of a person of such distinction, with whom she promises to cultivate a perfect friendship and good neighbourhood, not doubting but your grace will do the like.

“ Perhaps it may be agreeable to her highness, if your grace should think fit to take notice of this civility, in your discourses with Count d’Auvergne, who, I suppose, is with you in the army. He is one of her relations, with whom, I believe, she entertains a correspondence, and I should be glad she might know I faithfully performed the commission with which she honoured me.

“ In my return to Vienna I called at Ratisbon, to inquire what advance was made there towards introducing your grace into the college of princes, and I had the satisfaction to find Cardinal Lamberg had not only received the emperor’s requisitorial letter to that purpose, but had formed it into what they call a *commissions decret*, and ordered the same to be dictated to the diet on the 20th instant, by the director of Mentz; so that matter is likewise in its natural course. And M. de Schrader (whom I introduced to his eminence, as the person authorised by your grace to solicit and perform that part) has promised duly to inform your grace in what manner it proceeds. I am, &c.”

The next and most important part of the ceremonial was the admission of the duke to a voice and seat in the German diet, and the formalities attending the introduction of his proxy. When the question was submitted to the diet, the representative of the king of Prussia, by all his votes in the college of princes, proposed that the grant should be made hereditary in the male and female line; but this was seconded only by the prince of Anhalt. The other princes contented themselves with a mere approval of the imperial grant, and it was remarked that the minister of the margrave of Baden gave no opinion, under the plea that he wanted instructions.* The circle of Suabia seems also to have made some attempt

* Letter from Baron Schrader to the Duke of Marlborough — Ratisbon, August 23. 1706.

to procure an entail on the female as well as on the male branches; for in the protocol of the circle, dated July 22d, 1706, is the following paragraph:—

“It is the general opinion of the assembly that there are no members who would not willingly allow the imperial favour bestowed on this war-like hero, and deliverer of our country, and freely consent to his reception, with hearty desires that the principality of Mindelheim may long continue in the duke’s family, and not fall again after his decease into other hands.”

But the proposition being discountenanced by Austria, and not favoured by the German princes in general, the suggestion proved fruitless, as well as the attempts of the duke’s friends to procure an extension of the tenure at the time of the grant.

The account of the ceremonial is extracted from a letter of his representative, Baron Schrader, minister of the elector of Hanover.

“Nov. 22. 1706. — The count of Pappenheim, marshal of the diet, having received the imperial commission, arrived on the 19th, with a suite of 20 followers and 13 horses. On the 21st the cardinal of Lambert, principal commissioner of the emperor at the diet, sent to the representative of the new prince the decree of admission. The quarter-master of the empire, Heberer, went the same evening to Baron Schrader, to invite him to the congress and solemnity of the morrow. On the 21st, at ten in the morning, the ministers of the electors repaired to council, in carriages drawn by six horses; and the deputies of the princes in their best equipages. The guards were doubled at the town-house, and each entrance guarded by six centinels. A dispute arising about precedence, the ceremony did not begin till after mid-day; when the different members being assembled in the college, the director of Austria proposed to call Count Pappenheim, the bearer of the imperial commission.

“He came with the accustomed suite; and all the ministers rising on his entrance, he took his place, in a white habit, embroidered with gold, and a red mantle. After farther ceremonies, the director of Austria ordered the sub-marshal to introduce the envoy of Mindelheim. He rose, and, attended by the quarter-master and other officers, went to the commission chamber, where he complimented the envoy, and invited him to take his place.

“The envoy appearing in the college, the marshal assigned him his seat on the bench of princes. The ministers, who had hitherto stood, resumed their places; and the director of Austria addressed a compliment of congratulation to the envoy, in which he commemorated the heroic valour and meritorious services of the duke, and testified his hopes that he would continue to pursue his glorious career, for the advantage of the common cause, and the benefit of that empire of which he was now become a member. The representative of the new prince having made an

appropriate reply, was then complimented by the other ministers individually. He afterwards regaled them with a splendid entertainment, and the ceremony was concluded by a ball."*

It is not unworthy of remark that the first public act in which Marlborough assisted, by his proxy, was the confirmation of the electoral dignity, granted to the house of Brunswick Luneburg.

The customary fees attending the creation of a principality, and the introduction to the diet of the empire, did not amount to less than 8500*l.* sterling. But, from regard to the Duke of Marlborough, the emperor remitted his own claims, and promised to pay those of the two chancellors of the empire, if not voluntarily relinquished. The ministers of the Austrian cabinet also followed the example of their sovereign. The charges attending the Austrian investiture at Inspruch amounted to nearly 2000*l.* †, but were diminished by favour to 250*l.* With all these deductions, however, the expenses attending this accession of honour, including fees, presents, and travelling charges, exceeded 1500*l.*; as the duke, in leaving the payments to Mr. Stepney, expressly enjoined that due regard should be shown to his own credit and honour. ‡

In transmitting a seal of the arms which Marlborough was to bear as prince of Mindelheim, Mr. Stepney introduced the bell, the armorial ensign of the principality, on an escutcheon of pretence. He at the same time apologised for the omission of the family bearing of the duchess. But she was not of a temper to submit to this exclusion, and accordingly we

* From the Protocol of Proceedings, and the report of Count Schrader himself.

† We find from the documents communicated to the Duke of Marlborough, by his agents and proxies, that the ordinary fees for the creation of a prince of the empire amounted to - - - - 16,310 florins.
For the erection of a lordship into a principality - - - - 31,512

47,822

Exclusive of the fees for the investiture at Inspruch, and admission to the diet, which may be estimated at - 20,000

67,822

Or - - - - - £8477

‡ Letter from Mr. Cardonel to Mr. Stepney, Hague.

find the ensign of Mindelheim supplanted by her own, in the public and private seals afterwards used by her husband.*

We close our account with a description of the territory of Mindelheim, transmitted to the duke by Dr. Heyland, who assisted Mr. Stepney in the ceremonial of taking possession.

“ The territory of Mindelheim is agreeably situated ; the air is healthy, and the soil fertile. It consists of arable, pasture, and forest, is rich in all sorts of corn, well stocked with cattle, and abounds with deer and wild boars. The length is six leagues, and the breadth from three to four. It borders on the bishopric of Augsburg, on several lordships and counties of the empire, and on the imperial town of Memmingen. The clear yearly revenue may be estimated at 15 or 20,000 German florins, though the precise amount cannot be ascertained, on account of the uncertainty of the crops, and the fluctuation to which the price of corn is subject. To this may be added certain seigniorial rights, particularly tolls and customs, which the princes of Germany levy on their people. The country also produces a small quantity of saltpetre, which yields a trifling tax to the sovereign.

“ The natives are industrious, and would be in good circumstances had they not been exhausted by frequent wars. The greater part are labourers, or breeders of cattle ; others are employed in making linen, which manufacture would improve, if they were better provided with hands ; but for want of weavers the poorer farmers are obliged to sell their thread, of which they spin large quantities, to foreign manufacturers. The wood which abounds, is rendered less valuable by the want of water conveyance.”

The title of prince and admission into the diet which was thus conferred on Marlborough gave him no additional rank or precedence in England ; but abroad it proved of essential advantage, in increasing his influence and obviating those jealousies to which he had been exposed in his command, from the prejudice of foreigners in favour of high birth and sovereign power.

* On the plate in the accompanying Atlas are facsimiles of the seals and arms used by the Duke of Marlborough as Prince of Mindelheim. That which exhibits the bell, on an escutcheon of pretence, was taken from the original seal, ordered by Mr. Stepney, in the possession of the present duke. The facsimiles of the arms of Mindelheim, the impression of the seal on a letter from the duke to the elector Palatine, and the grand seal with the mantle, were kindly communicated by Messrs. Stuertzer and Samet of Munich, the first archivist, and the last herald to the king of Bavaria.

CHAP. XLIV. — PROSPECTS OF THE ALLIES. — 1706.

ON the 25th of April, Marlborough arrived at the Hague, where he was welcomed with the usual testimonies of respect. To counterbalance, however, the satisfaction which he derived from the tranquil and prosperous state of England, the affairs of the continent bore the most gloomy aspect. In the eastern provinces of Spain, the capture of Barcelona was the prelude to a counter-revolution, which extended through the kingdoms of Valencia and Mercia. The little town of Denia first declared itself for Charles, and the example was immediately followed by the capital. In the course of a few weeks the only places in the two kingdoms which remained in the possession of the Bourbon troops were the small but strong fortresses of Alicante and Peñíscola. The ferment extended even into Aragon, and it was with difficulty that Saragossa was prevented from imitating the defection of the sister capitals.

But these rapid successes proved the proximate cause of misfortune; for the victorious troops, though sufficient to give an impulse to public opinion, were yet too few to maintain their conquests; and being scattered over an extensive surface, presented on every side vulnerable points to the aggressions of an organised and regular force. Private feuds contributed to aggravate the mischief. The Earl of Peterborough, to whom this brilliant success was principally owing, was involved in a serious misunderstanding, not only with Charles and his dependents, but with Lord Galway and Das Minas, who commanded the combined army on the Portuguese frontier. He, in fact, rendered himself so obnoxious by his violent and overbearing temper, that his meritorious services were forgotten; and every post brought remonstrances and appeals against his continuance in Spain, both from Charles himself and the court of Vienna.

On the other hand, the most strenuous efforts had been made by the French monarch to turn the tide of invasion. A numerous army of French and Spaniards, headed by Philip himself, appeared at this moment before the walls of Barcelona; while the fleet from Toulon blockaded the place by sea. Philip confidently hoped, not merely to reduce the

capital of Catalonia and crush the insurrection in its focus, but even to terminate the war by the capture of his rival.

While the principal force of Spain was directed towards the north-eastern quarter, the Portuguese army on the western frontier was kept in awe by a Spanish force under the Duke of Berwick, so celebrated for his skill in defensive warfare; and there was not the slightest cause to hope that the operations on this side would tend to divert or lessen the danger which threatened the other. In these circumstances the only chance of preserving the eastern part of the peninsula depended on naval succours; and therefore the British government had made strenuous exertions to fit out a powerful fleet, to sail from Lisbon with all the land forces which could be drawn from the army in Portugal. It was, however, much doubted whether the usual hazards of a long voyage, the uncertainty of naval operations, and the superior strength of the enemy would not frustrate the attempt to carry relief to Barcelona.

In Italy the prospect was equally discouraging. Count Maffei, the minister of the Duke of Savoy, who was despatched from England early in the spring, to convey to his sovereign the assurance of prompt and effectual aid, reached Vienna in the midst of the preparations for opening the campaign. In his correspondence with Marlborough, he conveys a melancholy picture of the disorder and tardiness which reigned in the military system of the confederates. The unfavourable auguries which he drew from the state of affairs were too soon realised. Before Eugene could reach the Italian frontier, the small remains of the imperialists were surprised in their quarters by Vendome, and with the loss of 3000 men, killed, wounded, and prisoners, were driven into the mountainous recesses behind the lake of Como. The passages of Italy thus seemed to be totally closed against the allies, and the foundation on which the Duke of Savoy had long built his hopes to be destroyed. Indeed, the sudden appearance of Eugene alone prevented the entire dispersion of the army; and all his activity, skill, and resources were called forth to maintain a position on the frontier until Marlborough could collect and forward the succours, which he had laboured to obtain from every quarter.

On the Upper Rhine the margrave of Baden displayed his

usual frowardness and procrastination. Instead of adopting effectual measures for opening the campaign, he cavilled at every project which was submitted to his judgment, and in his turn persisted in proposing schemes which were inefficient or impracticable. Messengers after messengers were continually on the road between Vienna and Rastadt ; and the season for action advanced without adequate preparations, either offensive or defensive, and even without the arrangement of any consistent plan of conduct. To use an expression of Marlborough in one of his letters to Godolphin, it seemed as if the German commander had no other object in view than to preserve his own capital and residence.

The state of affairs in the Netherlands was far from compensating for the gloomy prospects which opened in more distant quarters. No efficient force could apparently be collected in time for offensive operations ; and, even could the means of aggression be provided, the situation of the country, and the jealous spirit of the Dutch government seemed to present insuperable obstacles to such enterprises as might speedily accomplish the object of the grand alliance.

We have already shown the obstructions which Marlborough experienced during the two first campaigns of the war from the Dutch deputies and generals ; obstructions which frustrated his skilful combinations, and more than once arrested his victorious career. In 1704, however, he was fortunately delivered from these shackles, and the splendid success of the campaign was the natural consequence. But in 1705 the same pernicious system of control was revived, and attended with the same fatal effects. In the present campaign he therefore determined no longer to remain the sport of ignorance, timidity, or treachery, and formed the design of leading an army into Italy, where he hoped to act without restraint, and to be again associated with Eugene, whose temper and spirit were congenial with his own.

Collaterally with this project, a plan was formed for a descent on the coast of France, which was expected to divert a considerable portion of the enemy's force, or to produce a serious impression, while their attention was attracted to other quarters. This plan was suggested by the Marquis of Guiscard, a French nobleman, who had first embraced the ecclesiastical profession, and was appointed abbot of La

Bourlay. From some family disgust he quitted his abbey, and being of an ardent and enterprising temper, formed a correspondence with the Camisards, who had risen in the Cevennes. Being compelled to retire from France, he repaired to the different courts of the allied powers, and obtained the protection of the Duke of Savoy and Eugene. He also attracted the notice of Pensionary Heinsius, was patronised by Mr. St. John, Secretary at War*, and finally ingratiated himself with Marlborough.

A distinct account of the plan appears in the Marlborough papers. The disembarkation was to take place between Blaye and the mouth of the Charente; Xantes was to be occupied and fortified, and from thence the refugee officers, who had accompanied the expedition, were to be detached into Quercy and the Cevennes to rouse the people. The troops were to act according to the effect which this alarm might produce among the malcontents. If no commotion was excited, they were to burn the ships at Rochfort and retire; but if the people could be induced to revolt, they were to maintain themselves in Guienne; and during the winter a sufficient force was to be sent to undertake active operations. For this design twelve regiments of infantry and some dragoons were ready for embarkation at Portsmouth, with a sufficient number of refugee officers to form six regiments of infantry and a body of cavalry, and Guiscard was appointed lieutenant-colonel. Nine battalions of infantry and three regiments of dragoons were encamped at Kingsale

* In a letter to the duke, in which the secretary encloses some plans of Guiscard for two descents on the coast of France, he observes:—"I cannot omit doing him the justice to say, his conduct has been full of zeal, very discreet, and very moderate."

It is singular sometimes to observe how the wisest persons are deceived in judging of characters and tempers, particularly when political motives influence their decision. We here see that St. John was as much mistaken in his opinion of Guiscard, as Marlborough in his opinion of St. John, when he assured Godolphin, "you may rely on him, he will never deceive you."

Guiscard, after many intrigues with parties in England, became a spy of France. He appears to have been a man of some ability, but restless, scheming, and unprincipled. It is the same political adventurer who attempted to stab Secretary Harley at the council-board in revenge for the loss of a pension. St. John and others present fell upon him with their swords with such fury that he died of his wounds in Newgate.—Ed.

for the same purpose, and a body of Dutch troops was marched to places of embarkation, in order to co-operate in the enterprise. After much deliberation, Marlborough recommended Lord Rivers to command the land forces, and Sir Cloudesley Shovel was appointed to head the fleet. The preparations were in forwardness, and the hopes which he conceived from this enterprise will appear in many parts of his correspondence.

Marlborough quitted England with the full expectation of leading an effective army into* Italy; but, soon after he reached the Continent, he received the most pressing instances from the emperor himself to resume the design which had been foiled the preceding year on the Moselle.

“*March 10.* — In forwarding this courier to inform you of my resolution for the ensuing campaign on the Upper Rhine, as well as on the Saar and the Moselle, of which you will receive the details from Zinzendorf and Wratislaw, I cannot avoid expressing my impatience to witness the commencement of those operations, which I hope will complete the work you put in so good a train the last campaign. Your zeal for my service and for the common cause is so well known to me that I cannot but expect the most happy results, and at the same time take this opportunity to give you farther proofs of my particular esteem and friendship.”

From a communication of Wratislaw, to which reference is here made, we find that, after repeated but fruitless invitations to the margrave to repair to Vienna, or send his plan for the ensuing campaign, a council, consisting of the prince of Salm, Eugene, Counts Zinzendorf and Wratislaw, was held in the presence of the emperor. The principal subjects of their deliberations were the intended operations of the German army, and the measures to be pursued towards the margrave. Convinced that he would either not act on the Moselle, or, if associated in the command, would display his usual frowardness, it was decided to leave him on the Upper Rhine with a defensive army, and to consign to Marlborough the command of an offensive force, which was to be assembled on the Moselle. For this purpose he was to be joined by 2000 German troops and 2000 imperial horse, under the count of Staremberg, in addition to the troops which he might lead from the Low Countries, and those already stationed in the empire. This

* Instructions for the Duke of Marlborough, &c. in the hand-writing of Harley.

design was not to be communicated to the margrave, but he was to be amused with discussions till the season arrived for opening the campaign. In the interim, count Schlick was to make arrangements with the elector of Mentz for providing the means of transport, and to settle for the supply of artillery, as soon as the resolution of the duke was known. The time and mode of commencing the operations were to be left also to Marlborough, and the utmost secrecy to be observed towards the German princes.

After imparting this communication, Wratislaw concluded with an observation intended to prove the sincerity and earnestness of the imperial court.

“ To conclude this matter, I ought to inform you that the prince of Salm was the first who gave his opinion on this subject to our master, with all necessary firmness. And knowing him as you do, you ought to be persuaded that the friendship which he formerly had for the prince of Baden has not prevented him from acting on this occasion in a manner becoming the service of the emperor; and that we cannot doubt of his continuing to do the same on future occasions.”*

However, convinced that the country watered by the Moselle and Saar, was the most vulnerable part of France, Marlborough had learnt by experience to despair of any design which depended on the co-operation of the German princes, or the promises of the imperial court. He was also conscious that it was equally impossible to deceive or conciliate the prince of Baden. We cannot, therefore, wonder that he declined this proposal, and persisted in his design of carrying the war into Italy. This was a favourite project of his; and he flattered himself that, acting without restraint, and in conjunction with that colleague, with whom he had gained the victory of Blenheim, he should at once illustrate his own reputation and promote the public cause. In conformity with this design he carried instructions from the British cabinet to obtain the acquiescence of the States for detaching 40 battalions and 40 squadrons into Italy; and to make such augmentations as the necessity of the service required. So forcibly was he determined to execute this project, that he was authorised, by additional instructions, on the refusal or delay of the States, to send forward to Italy the troops in British pay to that amount, and to assume the command in

* Translation from the original in the French tongue.

person. He was likewise empowered to make all necessary arrangements relative to the expedition. The news of this design raised the most elevated hopes in Italy; and the duke of Savoy, in particular, testified his gratitude and impatience for so timely and powerful a succour.

“*Turin, May 8th.*—Count Maffei has communicated to me the very kind manner in which you interest yourself in the unfortunate situation of my affairs, and of your plan to give the most fatal blow to France. It is, in truth, worthy of you. To you is reserved the glory of rescuing Europe from slavery, and of carrying to the greatest possible height the arms of the queen, by rendering them triumphant even in Italy, which, as well as Germany, will owe her liberty to you. I entreat you, therefore, to give to that enterprise all the attention which it deserves, accelerating your speedy arrival, in which I take a double interest; for I am expecting the commencement of this siege, for which the enemy will employ 60 battalions, as many squadrons, and 110 pieces of artillery, with a considerable number of mortars.

“The imperialists have experienced a check in the Bressano, and will not be soon in readiness to act: consequently you will see that the smallest time is precious, and how much it imports the confederates to save with this capital the remnant of my troops; for you cannot fail of reflecting, that should this capital be lost, the enemy will have it in their power to turn all their force against Prince Eugene, and compel him to abandon Italy.”

From the moment of his arrival at the Hague, Marlborough had employed all his activity and influence to collect the means of accomplishing his enterprise; but he encountered insuperable obstacles. In vain he attempted to extort the acquiescence of the Dutch in the march of their native troops to such a distance; nor was he more successful in his attempts to remedy the deficiency by the aid of the kings of Prussia and Denmark, and the princes and states of Germany. The nonpayment of the arrears which had induced the Danish monarch to suspend the progress of his troops toward the Netherlands, was a still more powerful motive to prevent them from marching to so distant a country as Italy.

Notwithstanding the apparently favourable result of Marlborough's journey to Berlin, and the consent of the king to the continuance of his troops in Italy, the arrangement was far from being complete or satisfactory. The acrimonious complaints against the court of Vienna and the Dutch were revived; enormous demands were again brought forward for the arrears of subsidies and various military allowances; and

an application was even made, peremptorily requesting the queen's support for the liquidation of the debts which were owing by the Austrian sovereigns of Spain. In addition to the difficulties derived from this source, other embarrassments arose from the intrigues and factions of the Prussian court. Count Wartemberg, the great chamberlain and prime minister, who had long enjoyed the confidence of his sovereign, was assailed by a numerous cabal, at the head of which we particularly distinguish Count Ilgen and General Grumbkow. They found a plausible pretext to injure him in the mind of his royal master, by expatiating on the imperious and interested character of his wife, who had offended the nobility, and even the princesses of the blood, by her claims for precedence. They even accused her of an illicit connexion with the British ambassador, Lord Raby; and, from her influence over the mind of her husband, they argued that she had induced him to sacrifice the interests of his own country to those of the Maritime Powers. So deep, indeed, was the impression produced by these insinuations, that the king peremptorily insisted on the recal of Lord Raby, suspended the march of his auxiliary troops, and threatened in unequivocal terms to secede from the grand alliance.

The Duke of Marlborough maintained a secret correspondence with all the contending parties; and, while he laboured to soothe the jealousy of the king, he endeavoured to turn their jarring views to the advantage of the common cause. In this delicate task his letters display his usual address and discretion; and before the season for action commenced, we find his efforts crowned with success. In his transactions with Hanover, Marlborough experienced similar difficulties. The attempts recently made to conciliate the electoral family had not produced the expected harmony; for his presence had no sooner ceased to operate than the insinuations of the Tories excited new bickerings. The jealousy fostered against the British court revived; and the offer of the garter, as well as the different regulations to secure the Protestant succession, were contemptuously treated as the effects of fear and self-interest.

This captious conduct provoked reciprocal dissatisfaction in England, and the queen was readily persuaded to write with her own hand an expostulatory letter, which was trans-

mitted to Marlborough to be delivered to the elector. It was also to be apprehended that the resentment which she fostered against the electoral family might easily be inflamed into open enmity, which could only terminate in a breach between the two courts. Marlborough foresaw all the injurious consequences which must result from this feud, as well to England in particular, as to the grand alliance in general. He therefore, of his own authority, withheld the ill-timed remonstrance, and omitted no effort to soothe and satisfy both parties. Fortunately his representations, sanctioned and enforced by the treasurer, outweighed the hasty advice given by the other part of the cabinet. The queen was induced to sacrifice her own feelings; and Secretary Harley reluctantly announced her change of sentiments. "I received," he observes, "the honour of your grace's letter. The queen very much approves of your grace's not sending her majesty's letter to Hanover, though I cannot but think that court does not know this country, or else they have very little value for our good opinion."*

On the other hand, the interference of Marlborough, aided by the influence of the Whigs, was so far successful, that the court of Hanover manifested a more amicable temper; and a compromise was effected by the mission of Lord Halifax, who was charged by the queen to convey a public declaration of her friendship and esteem for her successor, and her zeal for the Protestant settlement.

The letters of Marlborough in this interesting period will show the magnitude of these embarrassments and the effect of his negotiations.

To Lord Godolphin.

"Hague, April 16-27. — The inclosed letter from the elector of Hanover has given me very melancholy thoughts; for if he persists it will be an argument for these people not to agree to the sending a detachment to Italy, and will make it impracticable for me to make use of the queen's last instruction, since there will be no other troops but those of her majesty's subjects which can be obliged to march. That nothing might be wanting on my side, I have this afternoon sent Colonel Cadogan to Hanover, that the elector may be made sensible, if possible, of the consequence of this matter, which, I think, will be the making of a good or bad campaign, which in its consequence is that of a good or bad peace.

* May 10. 21. 1706. — S. P. O.

I desire you will let her majesty know this, but it must be kept a secret, for I do not let any body know the reason of Cadogan's journey.

"You will see by the copy of my letter to the king of Prussia, which I have sent to Mr. Secretary, the fears I have of the French doing something considerable in Germany; for they have sent so many troops from hence that they now begin to believe here that the French have no thoughts but of being on the defensive in this country. However, they will not be persuaded as yet to part with any more troops than those of Hanover and Hesse, which are ordered to be assistant to the prince of Baden till farther orders. These two bodies of men are 19,000."

"*Hague, April 19-30.* — I am to have a meeting next Sunday with some of the chief burgomasters of Amsterdam, for those I have consulted here dare not agree to what I propose, unless I can persuade them to approve of it. I hope by the next post to let you know what I shall be able to do, for by that time I expect Cadogan. For if the elector of Hanover does persist in not letting his troops march, it will be impossible to have the number, though these people should consent; for they are very positive that they dare not consent to the letting their own countrymen go. In short, they are very much afraid of the king of Prussia, and their own people. By all that I can hear, there is but too much reason to fear that the king of Prussia's intentions are that his troops shall not be of much use to us this year. The letters from Paris say nothing of their fleet, but that they hope to be masters of Barcelona by the end of this month."

"*Hague, April 23-May 4.* — The wind continuing in the east, I have no hopes of receiving any letters from England, which adds a good deal of uneasiness to other disappointments I meet with; amongst which the inclosed letter from the king of Denmark is one; for by it you will see that I cannot make use of any of his troops in the project I have so much at heart. And if Cadogan should not prevail with the elector of Hanover, nor the messenger I have sent to the landgrave of Hesse, it will be almost impossible to find the number of troops, though this state should be as desirous of the project as your humble servant.

"The little zeal that the king of Prussia, the king of Denmark, and almost all the other princes show, gives me so dismal thoughts that I almost despair of good success. However, I have the satisfaction of being sure that you do me the justice to believe, and that you will assure her majesty that nothing shall be omitted that I am capable of, that this campaign may tend to her glory.

"M. Buys* went yesterday for Amsterdam, and is to be back on Thursday, so that by the next post I shall be able to let you know the opinion of that town as to the business of Italy. Before the next post, I hope Cadogan, as well as the answer from the landgrave of Hesse,

* A distinguished member of the States-general. He was pensionary after Heinsius. After the overthrow of the Godolphin ministry Buys was Dutch envoy at London, and laboured hard to bring about its restoration, and keep the queen steady to the allies. He was one of the Dutch negotiators at Utrecht. (Dispatches, v. 601.)—ED.

will be here. The letters from Paris this day speak of a second action in Italy, where Prince Eugene was in person, and that he was beaten; but till we have our letters from Italy we shall not believe it so bad as they write it. The good news from Alcantara gives us hope that Lord Galway will advance towards Madrid. I forgot to send you by the last post the inclosed from Prince Eugene. I shall send you what letters I receive from him, and desire you will keep them for me."

"*April 28-May 9.* — I am so tired, that you will excuse my not giving you any other account of Cadogan's voyage to Hanover, but what you will see by the elector's inclosed letter*, his obstinately persisting in letting none of his troops march, notwithstanding he very much approves of the project. The Danes and Hessians having also excused themselves upon their treaties, so that though the pensioner and the town of Amsterdam had approved of sending the forty squadrons and forty battalions, now that they must of necessity be of the English and Dutch only, they dare not consent, since it must leave them in the hands of the strangers, for so they call the Danes, the Hanoverians, and the Hessians. So that I believe to-morrow the resolution will be taken for the sending immediately ten thousand men more to Prince Eugene, which, if they come in time, I hope will be sufficient not only to hinder the siege of Turin, but to give such a superiority as to make him capable of acting offensively with two armies. We having now 19,000 men in Germany, and these 10,000 for Italy has made it so hard matter for me to convince them that nothing of consequence can be done in this country, upon which I have pressed them for a greater number of troops for the descent than what we first asked. They made me many compliments, and told me, that if they might assure the States that I would continue at the head of the army on their frontier, there should be nothing I could think reasonable to propose, but they would readily comply withal." * * *

While Marlborough was in vain labouring to overcome the objections of the kings of Prussia and Denmark, as well as of the elector of Hanover and landgrave of Hesse; and while he was concerting with Overkirk the means of maintaining a defensive campaign in the Netherlands during his absence, his plans were suddenly disconcerted by disastrous intelligence from the Upper Rhine. Villars, who had not, like the margrave, spent the season in suspense and inactivity, suddenly took the field, and being reinforced with a corps from the Netherlands, under Marsin, forced the German lines on the Motter, drove the margrave back to the Lauter, reduced Drusenheim and Haguenau, which contained the principal magazines, and was preparing to overrun the Palatinate.

The intelligence of this reverse infused an alarm into the

* This letter, which is dated April 23d, is printed in Macpherson, vol. ii. p. 39.

Dutch, and they became doubly anxious for the protection of Marlborough and the British forces. Their constitutional jealousies and petty objections were instantly overcome by their fears; and they offered to relieve the British commander from the shackles under which he had hitherto laboured, by secretly giving him the choice of the field deputies, or by privately enjoining them to conform implicitly to his orders. This concession, joined with the impossibility of obtaining an efficient army for any other quarter, induced him to abandon his design on Italy, though with unfeigned reluctance. The same motive rendered him anxious to give greater efficiency to the intended descent on the French coast.

This change of plan, though a severe disappointment to himself, was hailed with satisfaction by Godolphin, who, besides the anxiety of friendship, was of too cautious a character to enter with equal spirit into distant and perilous enterprises.

"Yesterday," observes the treasurer, in a letter, dated Sunday, April 23., "I received the favour of yours of the 25th, from the Hague, with the inclosed letters from Prince Eugene, and the elector of Hanover. I am very sorry the last has so little regard to what would so much please this country, and in particular be so useful to the common cause. But I take it now for granted there's an end of the project of Italy, which I must own to you does not give me so much uneasiness as it seems to give you. For besides that I could never swallow so well the thoughts of your being so far out of our reach, and for so long a time; if we can have the good fortune to succeed in Spain, I think it may be almost as well for the allies to have the balance kept up in Italy, as to drive the French quite out of it, which would enable them to contract both their troops and their expense, and more expose us on this side to their force.

"I am glad to find by yours that you have hopes of increasing the number of troops for the descent. I cannot help thinking that if that design be rightly pursued and executed, it may prove of the greatest advantage imaginable to us. I should be glad to hear how it advances from time to time in Holland, and what measures they have already taken towards it."

Full of chagrin and uncertainty respecting the plan and nature of his future operations, Marlborough departed from the Hague on the 9th of May, in order to assume the command of the army which had been directed to assemble between Borchloen and Tongres. Accompanied by Overkirk,

he passed through Ruremont, and arrived at Maestricht on the 12th. From hence he proceeded without delay to review the Dutch troops, who, being quartered on the Meuse, had already reached the point of rendezvous. The enemy, however, appeared determined to maintain their position behind the lines which had been formed on the Dyle, and the British commander looked forward to a campaign more inefficient than the last.

To Lord Godolphin.

“*May 4-15.* — When I left the Hague on Sunday last I was assured that I should find the army in a condition to march. But as yet neither the artillery horses nor the bread waggons are come, so that we shall be obliged to stay for the English, which will join us on Wednesday, and then we shall advance towards Louvain. God knows I go with a heavy heart, for I have no prospect of doing any thing considerable, unless the French would do what I am very confident they will not, unless the marshal de Marsin should return, as it is reported, with thirty battalions and forty squadrons; for that would give to them such a superiority as might tempt them to march out of their lines, which if they do, I will most certainly attack them, not doubting, with the blessing of God, to beat them, though the foreign troops I have seen are not so good as they were last year; but I hope the English are better. If the French should neglect the affairs in Germany, in order to have a superiority here, these people will then not let their troops go for the descent. But I think that project is so very necessary, that if you provide transport ships for five regiments of foot, and one of dragoons, you may depend upon having them out of the English; and I will press them all that in me lies to get some of theirs, so that the project of the descent might be the more considerable.”

To the Duchess.

“*May 4-15.* — You will see by my letters to lord treasurer, that in all likelihood I shall make the whole campaign in this country, and consequently not such a one as will please me. But as I infinitely value your esteem, for without that you cannot love me, let me say for myself that there is some credit in doing rather what is good for the public than in preferring our private satisfaction and interest; for by my being here in a condition of doing nothing that shall make a noise has made me able to send ten thousand men to Italy, and to leave nineteen thousand more on the Rhine, till the marshal de Marsin shall bring his detachment to this country.”

To Lord Godolphin.

“*Tongres, May 6-17.* — I must beg you will make my excuse to her majesty, that I take upon me not to send her letter to the elector of Hanover, for before it came to me I had received the second refusal; and besides, if he should consent, it would, as every thing is now, be of no use.

“ If every thing goes well, as I hope in God it will, in Catalonia, by all I hear, the king of Spain will be easy in letting some troops go to the duke of Savoy, if Lord Peterborough should have a mind to go with them.

“ By the time the English can join us, I hope we shall have the artillery and every thing that is necessary for our march, which I hope shall be upon Thursday. I go to-morrow to see the new works at the citadel of Liege, which I am told are very much improved since I was there.

“ The minute you are sure that Barcelona is safe, I should think it might be of service to let the duke of Savoy know what care her majesty has taken that troops may come to his relief; for I believe we may take it for granted that the French will besiege Turin. The loss of that town would end the war in Italy, which is what we ought to prevent by all the means possible.

“ You will see by the inclosed the unreasonable proceedings at the court of Berlin.”

At this moment, however, brighter prospects appeared to open. Early in the year the British commander had established a secret correspondence with one Pasquier, an inhabitant of Namur, and conceived the design of surprising that fortress through his agency. In this design he combined two objects. If he secured Namur he rendered the defensive system of the enemy inefficient by turning the right flank of their lines; and if they endeavoured to prevent the attempt, he hoped to find an opportunity of forcing them to an engagement. With these views he adopted the resolution of advancing towards Tirlemont, which would at once favour the enterprise on Namur, and enable him to take a prompt and effectual advantage of the enemy's movements.*

The plan succeeded to his most sanguine wishes. Villeroy received positive orders even to risk a battle for the safety of Namur, and the cavalry of the detachment under Marsin was recalled by hasty marches to take a share in the expected conflict. The English troops had, therefore, no sooner approached the intended point of junction with the Dutch than Villeroy and the elector of Bavaria, with their united forces, passed the Dyle, and directed their march on Tirlemont. They were influenced in this movement by the knowledge that the Hanoverians were yet at a distance, and that the Danish cavalry had refused to march till they had received

* For an account of this project, see *Relation du Ressort Secret qui a donné lieu à la bataille de Ramillies*, in *Lamberti*, t. iv. p. 51. *House of Austria*, chap. 73.

the arrears of their pay, a deficiency which rendered the allied army much inferior in force. Marlborough was rejoiced at the disposition evinced by the enemy to meet him in the open field. He obtained a promise from the Danes to advance by engaging for the discharge of their arrears, and sent the most pressing orders for the immediate junction of all his forces. He communicated the news with exultation to Lord Godolphin.

“ *Borchloen, May 9–20.* — The French knowing that it is not in our power, in less than three weeks, to have the Hanoverians or Hessians from the Rhine, they have taken the resolution of drawing as many of their troops out of their garrisons as is possible, and marched yesterday out of their lines, and are now camped at Tirlmont. The English join the army this day, and the Danes two days hence. We shall be 122 squadrons, and 74 battalions.* They pretend to be stronger both in foot and horse; but, with the blessing of God, I hope for success, being resolved to venture; for as yet they have but twenty squadrons of the marshal de Marsin's detachment. With my humble duty, assure her majesty, that with all my heart and soul I pray to God I may be able to send her good news, so that your faithful friend and servant might have some quiet before he dies.”

CHAP. XLV. — BATTLE OF RAMILIES. — 1706.

FULL of these pleasing forebodings, Marlborough witnessed the junction of the English forces with the Dutch at Bilsen, on the 20th of May. He instantly despatched orders for the advance of the provision waggons; and, by engaging with the Dutch deputies for the payment of the arrears due to the Danes, prevailed on the duke of Wirtemberg, their leader, to advance without delay. On the 22d, drawing towards the

* We are spared the trouble of an investigation to ascertain the strength of the contending parties, because we learn their amount from the authority of Marlborough himself. According to his latest statement, written after the engagement, the confederates were 73 battalions, and 123 squadrons; and the enemy 74 battalions, and 128 squadrons. The numerical force cannot be accurately ascertained; but as it was at the opening of the campaign, and the battalions and squadrons at their full complement, we may estimate the force of the allies at about 60,000, and that of the French at 62,000 men.

Little Gheet, he enamped with his right at Borehloen, and his left at Corswaren. Here he had the satisfaction to receive intelligence that the Danes, by forced marches, were arrived within the distance of a league. By this accession he calculated that his army would consist of 73 battalions and 123 squadrons, making a numerical total of about 60,000 men, which so nearly approached the force of the enemy as to leave little cause for apprehending the result of a battle. At the same time he was apprised that the enemy had crossed the Great Gheet and were moving on Judoigne. Resolving to attack them in this position, he gave orders to march by the left, in eight columns, intending to pass round the sources of the little Gheet, and come in contact with the enemy in a situation where they could draw no advantage from nature or art.

The army was again in motion in the morning, but a violent rain which fell during the night retarded the advance of the infantry. While the heads of the columns halted to close the march, the duke, who led the way, accompanied by the Dutch generals and deputies, was informed that the enemy had anticipated his design, and were moving towards the position of Mont St. André, between the two Gheets and the Mehaigne. To gain certain intelligence, Cadogan was despatched at one in the morning with 600 horse, the ordinary guard of the day. He advanced in a thick fog; but on reaching the uplands near Mierdorp at eight, he descried the enemy traversing the plain of St. André, and stretching their right by Ramilies, towards the Mehaigne, on the very ground which the confederates hoped to occupy.

On receiving this information the allied commanders proceeded about ten to reconnoitre; but could not decide whether the squadrons in sight were pushed forward to cover the advance of the main body, or to protect a lateral movement towards their new lines. Meanwhile, the allied forces continued their march; and the duke, as yet uncertain of the enemy's designs, ordered the cavalry to push forward, resolving, should the troops seen by Cadogan be merely a rear guard, to charge them with the cavalry only. But the heads of the columns had no sooner passed the demolished lines than the fog dispersed; the two armies appeared in sight of each other; and the enemy made dispositions to receive the

attack in the strong camp of Mont St. André. As this ground is rendered memorable by a battle which decided the fate of the Netherlands, we shall delineate its features, and illustrate our description by a plan drawn from authentic materials.

The most elevated part in the plains of Brabant is the tract of land between the sources of the two Gheets, the Mehaigne, and the Dyle. These streams, finding at first but little descent, render the ground marshy towards their rise, partially swampy along their whole course, and in some places even impassable. The banks of the Great Gheet are steep; those of the Mehaigne and Little Gheet less abrupt. The ground, rising suddenly above them, forms a plain, the surface of which is varied with gentle undulations, and dotted with coppices. That portion which was the scene of conflict is divided into two parts by the Little Gheet: the eastern is called the plain of Jandrinœuil; the western, the position of Mont St. André, from a village on the Gheet, which forms nearly an equilateral triangle with Autreglise, or Anderkirk, and the tomb of Ottomond. From this tomb, or barrow, which crowns the highest point of the plain and overlooks the marshes bordering the Mehaigne, the position extends as far as Ramilies, near the head of the Little Gheet; and then, following the marshy course of the rivulet, is continued to the rising ground on which Offuz is situated. From Offuz, bending forward on the left bank of the stream, it proceeds along the verge of the eminence to Autreglise, where it terminates in the fork made by the confluence of the Jauche and the Little Gheet.*

When the heads of the allied columns had cleared the village of Mierdorp, they diverged into the open plain of

* It appears that the disadvantages of this locality had not escaped the French engineers when they constructed the lines of the Gheet; for observing that the plain of Jandrinœuil offered a counter position, convex in shape, and of which the right and centre were as well defended as the opposite points across the Little Gheet; and remarking, that should an assailant take this position, the wings being refused, it would be in his power to reinforce either flank with greater celerity than his opponents, they wisely resolved to include both the plains within their defences, and to carry the lines across the Gheet at Orp le Petit, and from thence direct to the Mehaigne at Wasseige. These lines were demolished by the allies, in August, 1705. See chapter xxxvi.

Jandrinœuil, preparatory to formation. The first and second marched along the Chaussée de Brunehault; the third and fourth towards the heights of Ottomond; the fifth and sixth upon the steeple of Offuz; and the seventh and eighth kept those of Foulz and Autreglise in a direct line. They then formed in order of battle between Boneffe and Foulz in two lines, the infantry in the centre and the cavalry on the wings, except twenty squadrons of Danes, who were posted behind the left centre as they arrived. This formation began at ten in the morning, and was completed at one.

The enemy's light troops having gradually fallen back before the advancing columns, the allied commanders proceeded to reconnoitre more closely the hostile position, and found them posted in two lines. The left, consisting of infantry, stretched nearly from Autreglise to Offuz, between the two branches which form the Little Gheet; the centre, in similar order, extended from the inclosures of Offuz to the high ground behind Ramilies; and the right, comprising almost the whole cavalry, in number 100 squadrons, in two lines, with intervals between, occupied the open space in front of the tomb of Ottomond, between Ramilies and the Mehaigne. The first line was composed of gardes du corps, gens d'armes, mousquetaires, and horse grenadiers, with the Bavarian cuirassiers on the left extremity; the second entirely of French horse. Into Ramilies, which is surrounded by a drain and inclosures, were thrown twenty battalions; and Offuz and Autreglise were likewise occupied. To protect their right the enemy posted a brigade of infantry at the bridge of Tavieres, situated about a quarter of a mile in front, amidst marshes and inclosures; and scattered parties of light infantry lined the hedges about Franquinay, the march of the Mehaigne being everywhere impassable excepting at the bridge.

Although this order of battle was formidable, the defects of the position were too obvious to escape the penetrating eye of the British commander. From its concave shape it afforded great advantages to an assailant, who, performing his manœuvres on the chord, while the enemy must traverse the arc, could bring a superior force into action on a given spot and in a given time. He saw also that the left wing would be cramped in its movements by the nature of its situation,

and prevented from attacking by the morass which protected it from aggression. He perceived likewise that the tomb of Ottomond was the key of the field, and that Tavieres was too far in advance either to give or receive protection. He judged, therefore, that to facilitate an attack upon the hostile right, it would be requisite to induce the enemy to derange their dispositions, by making a feint against their left: a manœuvre which would compel them to strengthen the point menaced, and weaken that which was the real object of attack. Finally, by carrying Tavieres, he should uncover the flank of the horse, and by gaining the commanding point, which is crowned by the tomb of Ottomond, enfilade the whole position.

With these objects in view he formed his plan. He ordered the British, Dutch, and German infantry composing the right to march down from the heights of Foulz in two lines, sustained by the cavalry, and form a demonstration of attack against the villages of Autreglise and Offuz. The stratagem produced the desired effect; for no sooner did Villeroy discover his left to be menaced, than he drew a very considerable corps of infantry from his centre, which marched with the greatest celerity to reinforce the detached troops about Autreglise. While these were replacing by part of his infantry of the right, and the hasty movement had somewhat disordered the hostile lines, Marlborough directed his own right to face about and reascend the high elevation, from whence the first line alone would be visible to the enemy. As soon as the second, now foremost in retiring to the first position, had passed the crest of the ground and was no longer in view, he directed most of the battalions to march rapidly to the left, and to form in rear of the left centre.* The twenty squadrons of Danes were placed in a third line, behind the cavalry of the left wing. Four battalions, including the Dutch guards, with two pieces of cannon, were detached from the left of the infantry, and formed near Boneffe, with orders to march parallel to the cavalry and dislodge the

* This masterly manœuvre is mentioned only in General Kane's Memoirs; but as he was stationed in one of the regiments of the first line, and was himself an excellent tactician, there is no doubt of the fact. It may be regarded as the primary cause of the victory. — Kane's Campaigns, p. 65.

enemy from Franquinay and Tavieres; and twelve battalions, under General Schultz, were also selected from the infantry on the left, to form an attack on Ramilies.

About half-past one the artillery of the confederate army opened its fire, and was immediately answered by that of the enemy. Colonel Wertmuller, who commanded the detachment against Tavieres, dislodged the hostile parties of infantry lining the hedges near Franquinay; and, as he advanced along the valley of the Mehaigne, the horse of the left wing, headed by Overkirk, moved gradually and perpendicularly upon the right of the enemy. On approaching Tavieres, the Dutch guards encountered considerable resistance, the enemy being covered by the inclosures, and encouraged by the prospect of a reinforcement.

The vigour of the assault on Tavieres having now convinced Villeroy that the real design of the allies was to gain his right flank, he ordered fourteen squadrons of dragoons to dismount, and leaving their horses on the rise, behind a streamlet opposite the tomb of Ottomond, to hasten to the support of the troops in the village. To these were joined two battalions of Swiss infantry. But before they could arrive, the confederates carried Tavieres by storm, and the Danish horse, wheeling round, intercepted the reinforcement on the borders of the village, and either cut them in pieces or drove them into the Mehaigne.

In the midst of this masterly movement, which frustrated the enemy's reliance on the protection of a flank fire from Tavieres, Overkirk charged their cavalry. His troops, pressed into compact order by their advance, overbore the first line of the enemy, which was weakened by the intervals between the squadrons. But being assailed in his turn by the second line, the foremost ranks were driven back on those behind, and the whole body thrown into confusion. The Bavarian cuirassiers profited by the disorder to bear on their right under the protection of the battery at Ramilies; but the duke in person coming up with seventeen squadrons from the right, and the Danes who returned from the defeat of the reinforcement prolonging the left, the efforts of the enemy were checked by the danger which menaced both their flanks.

In the height of this conflict, the twelve battalions under

General Schultz, supported by the contiguous lines of infantry, commenced the attack on Ramilies, the fire from which had hitherto impeded the movements of the left wing. Advancing his troops in four columns on the front and flank of the village, he drew the concentrated fire from the batteries on his own corps, and thus enabled the left wing to regain their order.

Marlborough perceiving the confusion of the horse, ordered up from the right wing every remaining squadron except the British, to give efficiency to the attack, which still continued in suspense, and hurried forward himself to encourage his soldiery. In this effort he was exposed to the most imminent danger. His person being recognised, some of the French dragoons, advancing from their ranks, closed round him while he was entangled with his own recoiling troops. Attempting to disengage himself by leaping a ditch, he was thrown to the ground, and in danger of being made prisoner. At this moment his aide-de-camp, Captain Molesworth, dismounted and supplied him with his own horse. On this, as on many other occasions, it seemed as if Providence specially protected the days of this extraordinary man; for while he was remounting, a cannon-ball struck off the head of Colonel Bingfield, his equerry, who held the stirrup. He, however, succeeded in escaping, and regained his own lines in safety, though severely bruised. His danger redoubled the energy of his troops, and in full gallop they returned with new spirit to the charge.

At this crisis twenty squadrons arrived in full speed from the right, and formed a fourth line on the right flank in the rear. The view of so powerful a reinforcement rushing across the plain, produced an evident pause in the hostile lines, and gave new advantage to the assailants. Before this reinforcement could come into action, the Danish squadrons, led on by their undaunted leader, the duke of Wirtemberg, penetrated between the morass of the Mehaigne and the right flank of the household troops; while the prince of Hesse Cassel, with the Dutch guards and Opdam and Dopff dragoons pressing upon their rear, drove them round Ramilies towards Geest à Gerompont, although Villeroy and the elector exposed their persons, and used their utmost exertions to rally the fugitives.

After this successful onset the allied horse crowned the height of Ottomond, and the success of the day was no longer doubtful. General Schultz, meantime, had advanced with his columns under the protection of a heavy fire of shot and shells. He first forced back some battalions of Swiss, and gained the skirts of the houses. He then took the Bavarian grenadiers, who were on the right, in flank, and drove them together with their foot-guards through the centre of the village; yet the two battalions of Cologne guards still stood firm, and the Marquis de Maffei, who commanded the Bavarians stationed in the valley, ordered them to occupy the reverse of the hollow road which leads out of Ramilies towards Ottomond, in hopes that the Gallo-bavarian cavalry was still in possession of the high plain behind him. By this manœuvre he regained part of the village; but the allied infantry, reinforced with twenty battalions of their centre, pressed with redoubled vigour upon the disordered troops, and the whole took to flight. Coming on the plain, Maffei mistook the allied horse for his own, and was taken prisoner.* At the same time his infantry was intercepted, and cut to pieces or captured, except the French and Swiss guards, who, being posted more towards the left, escaped the general destruction.

The battle had now lasted three hours and a half, and it became necessary for the victorious cavalry of the left wing to pause and restore order. Of this interval the enemy availed themselves. The elector and Villeroy, with part of the cavalry of their left, endeavoured to make a movement between Geest à Gerompont and Offuz, to cover the formation of the broken troops; but were impeded by their train and baggage, which had been suffered to remain too near the rear of their first position.

The British commander saw the confusion and dismay which pervaded their ranks, and with that promptitude which marked his actions, seized the moment to strike the final and decisive blow. By his direction the troops who had made or sustained the attack on Ramilies, penetrated through the swamp towards Offuz, and were supported by General Wood, who had been ordered up from the right, with part of the British horse. The enemy, however, gave way without

* *Memoirs du Marquis Maffei.*

waiting their approach ; and Wood, finding Offuz evacuated, advanced upon the rising ground behind the village at the head of his own regiment and that of Wyndham.

In the midst of this rout, the infantry regiments of Churchill and Mordaunt, who, with five squadrons of Lumley, Hay, and Ross had hitherto continued on the heights of Foulz, did not remain idle spectators of the conflict. With that boldness which characterised all the movements of the day, they forced their way through the morass, ascended the acclivity between the Jauche and the Gheet, and, coming in the rear of Autreglise, charged and defeated the troops which remained on the left flank of the enemy.* The five squadrons who accompanied them now joined in the pursuit, and overtaking the regiment du Roi, compelled them to throw down their arms, and surrender themselves prisoners of war.

Meanwhile the regiments of Wyndham, with General Wood at their head, continued to press the retreating army. Approaching the farm of Chantrain, they came in view of the Spanish and Bavarian horse guards, who, being animated by the elector in person, preserved a firm countenance, and were endeavouring to cover the retreat of the artillery belonging to the left wing. With his own regiment, General Wood instantly charged the Bavarians, who formed the left, while that of Wyndham attacked the Spaniards. The shock was fatal ; numbers were killed or made prisoners ; the standard and kettle drums became the trophies of the victors, and even the elector himself escaped with difficulty.

The fate of the regiment struck such consternation in the waving mass of the French army, which was retiring with some vestiges of order, that, regardless of the security which they derived from the depth of their front, and the protection of the Great Gheet, they suddenly burst from all control. Throwing themselves headlong down the descent leading to the river, they strove to gain Judoigne, or spread in all directions like a scattered swarm. As the baggage waggons, broken down, overturned, and locked into each other obstructed the roads, the crowd could not escape along the

* This spirited attack, according to Lediard, was led by Colonel Churchill, a natural son of General Churchill, who headed his father's regiment.

direct way to the rear, and the British cavalry, being quite fresh, overtook and captured vast numbers. Almost all the cannon, and the whole of the baggage, fell into the hands of the victors, who continued the pursuit with unabated vigour, through Judoigne, till two in the morning. At this time the duke and Overkirk, with the main army, halted at Meldert, five leagues from the field of battle and two from Louvain.

Lord Orkney, however, with some squadrons of light horse, continued the pursuit to the vicinity of Louvain, the enemy flying in the greatest confusion, dropping their heavy baggage, flinging away their arms, and not deeming themselves safe though they were covered by the Dyle.

This surprising victory was principally owing to the skilful dispositions of the duke, to his presence and activity in every quarter where danger threatened or disorder began to take place, and to the firmness and perseverance of the Dutch infantry and cavalry, who bore the brunt of the first onset. The German infantry also sustained their national character in the attack of Ramilies; and the horse of the right, who came late into the action, are entitled to the merit of having rendered the victory complete and decisive.*

The gallant Marshal Overkirk vied with his illustrious colleague in deeds of skill and valour, and the success of the first and principal attack was due to his exertions. He fought at the head of the Dutch troops, and continued on horseback till one in the morning, when he narrowly escaped from the treachery of a Bavarian captain of horse, whom he had taken prisoner. Having kindly returned his sword, saying, "You are a gentleman, and may keep it," the villain abused his mercy by an attempt to stab his benefactor in the

* Our principal authorities are the letters of Marlborough; Relation de la Bataille de Ramillies, MS.; the official accounts in the Gazette; the different letters in the complete History of Europe, and in Lamberti; Dumont's Military History of Eugene and Marlborough. Also Kane, Milner, Lediard, the Dutch and French biographers, Brodriek, Cunningham, and Conduet of the Duke of Marlborough; and among the French authors, Quiney, Grimoard, Feuquieres, Reveries of Marshal Saxe.

The plan which illustrates this description was constructed by Major Smith, from a personal inspection of the ground, and a comparison of the different relations; as well as from an original plan preserved in the king's library. See *Atlas*, accompanying this work.

back, and was only prevented from perpetrating the infamous deed by the marshal's groom, who rode up and shot him dead on the spot.

The event of the day cost the enemy 13,000 in killed, wounded, and prisoners, among whom were several officers of distinction, particularly the princes of Soubise and Rohan, a nephew of Lord Clare, who fell in the action, and a son of Marshal Tallard, who was mortally wounded. The desertion which followed the engagement swelled their loss to 15,000 men. The spoils of this memorable day amounted to eighty colours and standards and almost the whole French artillery, with the baggage which had not been sent to the rear. The allies acknowledged 1066 killed and 2567 wounded. Of these, eighty-two officers were killed and 283 wounded; but none of distinction fell, except the prince of Hesse Cassel and five colonels.

The elector and Villeroy, after escaping from the perils of the field, fled to Louvain. Holding a council in the market-place by torch-light, they hastily resolved to abandon the fortified towns and open country, and to save their discomfited army by a rapid retreat behind the canal of Brussels.

The humanity displayed by the victorious general towards his prisoners deserves to be recorded for the applause of an impartial posterity. The sick and wounded were lodged in hospitals and treated with the same care and attention as the troops of the allies. The prisoners were conveyed into Holland with the sympathy due to their misfortune; and supplied with all the comforts which their situation required. To the beneficent example which he displayed on this, as on other occasions, we are indebted for the refined tenderness which has taken place in the intercourse of hostile armies. This virtue extorted the admiration even of the enemy; and a French writer pays a just eulogium to our great commander, for a quality which could not be said to distinguish the chiefs of his own and preceding ages. "The duke of Marlborough always showed the utmost attention to his prisoners, and set the example of that humanity which has since soothed the horrors and calamities of war."*

From the field of battle the victorious general sent

* Duclos, v. i. p. 9. — Somerville's Queen Anne, p. 134.

couriers with the joyful news to London, and to the Hague. Colonel Richards conveyed the despatch to England, with an official account in a letter to Secretary Harley, which is given in the Gazette. On the ensuing morning the duke expressed his feelings to the duchess and Godolphin.

“Monday, May 24th, 11 o'clock. — I did not tell my dearest soul in my last the design I had of engaging the enemy if possible to a battle, fearing the concern she has for me, might make her uneasy; but I can now give her the satisfaction of letting her know, that on Sunday last we fought, and that God Almighty has been pleased to give us a victory. I must leave the particulars to this bearer, Colonel Richards, for having been on horseback all Sunday, and after the battle marching all night, my head aches to that degree, that it is very uneasy to me to write. Poor Bingfield, holding my stirrup for me, and helping me on horseback, was killed. I am told that he leaves his wife and mother in a poor condition. I can't write to any of my children, so that you will let them know I am well, and that I desire they will thank God for preserving me. And pray give my duty to the queen, and let her know the truth of my heart, that the greatest pleasure I have in this success is, that it may be a great service to her affairs; for I am sincerely sensible of all her goodness to me and mine. Pray believe me when I assure you that I love you more than I can express.”

To Lord Godolphin.

“Monday, May 24. n. s. — I believe my last might give you expectation of an action. We have been in perpetual motion ever since; and on Sunday last we came in presence with the enemy, who came with the same intentions I had, of fighting. We began to make our lines of battle about eleven o'clock, but we had not all our troops till two in the afternoon, at which time I gave orders for attacking them. The first half hour was very doubtful, but I thank God after that we had success in our attacks, which were on a village in the centre; and on the left we pursued them three leagues, and the night obliged us to give it over. Having been all Sunday, as well as last night, on horseback, my head aches to that degree that I must refer you to the bearer. I shall only add, that we beat them into so great a consternation, that they abandoned all their cannon; their baggage they had sent away in the morning, being resolved to fight. They had 128 squadrons, and 74 battalions. We had 123 squadrons, and 73 battalions; so that you see the armies were near of a strength; but the general officers which are taken, tell us that they thought themselves sure of victory, by having all the king of France's household, and with them the best troops of France. You will easily believe this victory has lost us a good many men and officers; but I thank God we have but three English regiments that have much suffered; the Dutch horse and foot have suffered more than we. I am going to get a little rest, for if our bread comes by six this evening, I will then march to Louvain this night, in hopes to find them in such disorder, as that we may be encouraged to attack them behind their lines,

for they can have no cannon but what they can take out of Louvain. I beg you will assure the queen, that I act with all my heart, and you know how necessary it is for her affairs that we should have good success.

“ Poor Bingfield is killed, and I am told he leaves his wife and mother in a bad condition.”

Consulting the feelings which he testifies in both his letters, towards the relations of his unfortunate equerry, he induced Godolphin to make a particular application to the queen in their behalf, and had the satisfaction to find, from the answer of the treasurer, that his appeal had been crowned with success.

“ *May 17-28.* — God be thanked for the good news you sent us by Richards, who arrived here yesterday evening, and more particularly for the great escape you have had in your own person. I am very sensible you could not avoid exposing yourself upon this occasion; but where so much consequence turns upon one single life, you must allow your friends the liberty to think and say it ought not to be done without an absolute necessity.

“ I have not had an opportunity of talking enough with Richards to know many particulars, or to be able to judge of the consequences of this great victory, any otherwise than as your letter leads me to hope the enemy will not withstand your army anywhere.

“ But this great blow to the French, coming so immediately upon their misfortune at Barcelona and in Spain, makes me presently return to my usual apprehensions, that France will lose no time in sending *carte blanche* to Holland, nor omit any arguments to obtain a favourable reception of their proposals. I don't question but you will have a watchful eye upon this danger.

“ You may depend that her Majesty will not fail to take care of poor Mr. Bingfield's widow.”

The queen, in her wonted style of gracious condescension, congratulated her victorious general on this signal success. “ I want words,” she said, “ to express my true sense of the great service you have done to your country, and I hope it will be a means to confirm all good and honest men in their principles, and frighten others from being troublesome.” After kindly mentioning the alloy it was to her satisfaction, to consider the dangers to which he exposed himself, she obligingly concluded, “ I must repeat my earnest request that you would be careful of yourself.”*

From the mass of congratulatory letters to which this victory gave birth, we shall select only two; one as the pro-

* *Conduct*, p. 174.

duction of an eminent statesman, and the other of a no less eminent poet.

From Mr. St. John.

“*May 17–28. 1706.* — My lord, every man that wishes well to the common good of Europe must be transported with the glorious action of Sunday last; but those who are particularly devoted to the service may pretend to a greater degree of joy. The vast addition of renown which your grace has acquired, and the wonderful preservation of your life, are subjects upon which I can never express the thousandth part of what I feel. France and faction are the only enemies England has reason to fear, and your grace will conquer both; at least while you beat the French, you give a strength to the government which the other dares not contend with.”

From Matthew Prior.

“*Cockpit, May 24. o. s., 1706.* — My lord, if I did not write sooner to your grace, upon the mighty success with which God has been pleased to bless your arms in the glorious days of Ramilies, it was that I thought you as yet too busy in pursuing the sad remains of the troops you there defeated, and in receiving the acknowledgments of the cities you delivered that you would hardly find time to read my letter. And now I do write, my lord, it is rather to express my own particular joy and satisfaction, that your grace is preserved from those dangers, to which your person was exposed in the battle, than to endeavour to describe the glory of the victory, the defeat of sixty thousand the best men that France ever saw, and the restitution of Brabant and Flanders, projected and achieved by the council and conduct of one English subject. My wishes for the continuance of all good to my patron and protector, may properly be the contents of a private man's letter; the conquests and honours of the Duke of Marlborough, must be the subject of our historians, and the theme of our orators and poets. Learning and gratitude must conspire to set his actions above oblivion and envy, and all parties and degrees of men, who wish well to their country, are obliged to praise the success of that general, who has carried the glory of the English arms beyond what our chronicles can parallel, or our own imagination could have expected. In one word, my lord, without aiming at any flattery to your grace, I think all honest men join heartily in this justice to your merit; though I must tell you, that amongst us some there are that are so bad as to do it, only because they are ashamed or afraid to do otherwise, and that there are more Stevens's than one.

“But of this I will not trouble your grace at present, though it may give me occasion of speaking or writing to you on that subject hereafter. For my own part, I must confess in honest prose, as I did two years since in indifferent verse*, that I did not see how the honour of Blenheim

* Prior had already testified his admiration and gratitude in his poetical effusions on the brilliant campaign of 1704; and soon after he had written this letter, he gave another proof of his devotion in his ode to the queen on the success of her arms in 1706, which is printed in his

field could be improved; and as matters now stand, I see your grace at such a pitch of glory, that I can wish no farther for you in that behalf."

"Since I dare not trouble your grace often by letter, I take this occasion to thank you most humbly for having mentioned to my lord treasurer an affair so small as my fortune. I have, as your goodness advised me, assured his lordship of my continued obedience to his commands and zeal for his service; and I think I have all the reason in the world to hope his favour and protection. I must yet detain your grace one moment from the great affairs in which all Europe is concerned, whilst I repeat my being ever," &c.

The intelligence of the victory and its immediate consequences excited as much enthusiasm in England as that of Blenheim. A proclamation was instantly issued for a public thanksgiving, which on the 29th of June was celebrated with the usual solemnity, the queen repairing to the cathedral of St. Paul's in the same state, and amidst the same acclamations as upon similar occasions. Addresses were poured in from all quarters; envy and malignity seemed to be silenced; and the name of the undaunted and renowned general was mingled with that of his royal mistress in shouts of national exultation. No one felt higher delight than the treasurer, but a brief, though affectionate letter, expressing works. This production he sent to his patron, with the following letter, which is equally adulatory.

"*Westminster, July 5. 1706.* — My lord, the inclosed contains the best answer I can make to your grace's letter from Arzele, and to all your favours while you were last in England. I own to your grace, that 'tis time for me to quit poetry, but my zeal for her majesty's glory, and my obligations to you, my lord, are eternal. I assure myself, that your grace will find this *written from the heart*, and I tell every body in my preface when I intend to write again in verse. As to *prose*, I *always attend your grace's order*. In the mean time, that you may continue victorious and happy, is my constant prayer, as it is my endeavour and ambition to approve myself," &c.

The fashion of the age must extenuate these adulatory epistles from a courtier and a poet. Addison had preceded Prior by the publication of "The Campaign," though it was hardly possible in either prose or verse to extol in a too laudatory strain the military glories of Blenheim. But the ties have been dissolved, which in queen Anne's reign bound together the patronising great and servile man of letters. It was a species of literary feudality, in which there was vassalage on one side, and protection on the other. Both, however, have ceased, to the mutual benefit of the parties. There are few authors, we suspect, of the present day who would condescend to use the fulsome style of Prior; and, we will add, to the equal honour of the patrician class, that there are just as few persons of rank to whom such a style would be acceptable.—ED.

his joy, is mingled with the usual querulous complaints of the factious spirit, which these victories repressed, but could not subdue.

“ *Windsor, Monday 24.* — The queen is come to town to give God thanks next Thursday for your victory. I assure you I shall do it from every vein within me, having scarce any thing else to support either my heart or my head. The animosity and inveteracy one has to struggle with is unimaginable, not to mention the difficulty of obtaining things to be done that are reasonable, or of satisfying people with reason when they are done.”

CHAP. XLVI. — SUCCESSFUL CAREER. — 1706.

No commander ever displayed more promptitude and activity in prosecuting his success, and no victory, perhaps, produced more important consequences than that of Ramilies. Marlborough, to use his own simple, but energetic expression, “pressed the enemy while confusion remained among them.” After a short repose at Meldert, he prepared to advance against Louvain; but hearing that it was already evacuated, he sent forward a corps of 500 men to take possession, and soon afterwards entering the place, was received with those enthusiastic acclamations, which announced the rapid progress of the subsequent revolution.

After crossing the Dyle with his whole army, he encamped on the heights of Bethlehem, in the vicinity of Louvain, and on the 26th moved to Dieghem, taking up his head-quarters at the castle of Beaulieu, midway between Mechlin and Brussels. The advance of the victorious army produced the expected effect. In this camp he received a deputation from the governor and magistrates of Brussels, as well as from the states of Brabant, expressing their satisfaction at their delivery from the oppression of the French, their obligation to England and Holland, and their readiness to recognise king Charles as their legitimate sovereign. In consequence of this notification, the duke and the Dutch deputies sent a joint declaration, testifying the intention of the queen and the States-general to maintain the just rights of his Catholic majesty, king Charles III. to the kingdom of Spain and all

its dependencies. They likewise guaranteed the entire enjoyment of all their liberties and privileges, both ecclesiastical and secular; and promised that Charles should confirm all the grants and concessions which are contained in the well-known charter, called *La Joyeuse Entrée*, in the same manner as they were granted by the late king of Spain and his royal predecessors. This declaration had its due effect upon a loyal and free people.

On the 28th the deputies from Brussels presented letters from the sovereign council, from the states of Brabant, and from the magistrates of the capital, testifying their allegiance to their legitimate sovereign, and their gratitude to the victorious general.

The duke did not delay availing himself of this effusion of public sentiment. He despatched his brother, General Churchill, from Grimberg, whither he had moved his camp, to take possession of Brussels; and on the 28th, himself made his public entry in great pomp. At the gates, being met by a procession of magistrates and nobles, accompanied by a vast concourse of people, he received the keys which were presented to him. He returned them with assurances of her majesty's protection, and after being splendidly entertained, repaired to the camp.

The victory of Ramilies produced no less effect among the members of the grand alliance than among the enemy. The king of Prussia, who had hitherto kept aloof, and suspended the march of his troops, now listened to the mediation of Marlborough, and effected a reconciliation with the Dutch and the Court of Vienna. He even ceased from pressing the immediate recal of Lord Raby, and afterwards desisted entirely from his demand. The same motives operated on the elector of Hanover, who evinced his usual cordiality for the success of the common cause. "This," Marlborough observes in a letter to Secretary Harley, "I take to be owing to our late successes."*

Marlborough likewise successfully combated the selfish demands of the Dutch, who were eager to levy contributions on the recovered provinces. He opposed with no less zeal the limited views of Godolphin, who, with a laudable, but ill-timed economy, was desirous to claim a share in these ex-

* Letter to Secretary Harley, June 14.— State Paper Office.

actions, for the interest of England. On these, as well as on other subjects, his correspondence obviates the necessity of any farther comment.

To Lord Godolphin.

“*Brussels, May 16-27.* — Since my last we have not only passed the Dyle, but are masters of Louvain, Mallines, and Brussels; you will see, by what I send to Mr. Secretary Harley, what has passed between me and the states of Brabant, which I found assembled at Brussels. As there could not be time for orders from England, I hope her majesty will approve of what I have done. It is not to be expressed the great success it has pleased God to give us, by putting a consternation in the enemy’s army; for they had not only a greater number than we, but all the best troops of France. The consequence of this battle is likely to be of greater advantage than that of Blenheim; for we have now the whole summer before us, and with the *blessing of God*, I will make the best use of it. For as we had no council of war before this battle, so I hope to have none this whole campaign; and I think we may make such a campaign as may give the queen the glory of making an honourable and safe peace; for the *blessing of God* is certainly with us.

“I send you a copy of the treaty signed by M. Gilder-Massen, with the landgrave of Hesse, as also his and the landgrave’s letters to me, with my answers. If I venture to take too much upon me, pray assure the queen that it is my zeal for her service and the public good that makes me do it, for there ought to be no time lost in sending those troops to Italy. I do not doubt but you have had the demands of the king of Prussia, on which he is contented to let his troops serve in this country. This will cost some money to England and Holland. He is certainly very unreasonable; but we should be more, if we should let those troops continue at Wesel all this summer, which is what France expects and desires.”

To the Duchess.

“*Brussels, May 16-27.* — I have been in so continued a hurry ever since the battle of Ramilies, by which my blood is so heated, that when I go to bed I sleep so unquietly that I cannot get rid of my head-ache, so that I have not as yet all the pleasure I shall enjoy, of the blessing God has been pleased to give us by this great victory. My lord treasurer will let you see what I send by this express to Mr. Secretary Harley, by which you will see that we have done in four days, what we should have thought ourselves happy if we could have been sure of it in four years. I bless God that he has been pleased to make me the instrument of doing so much service to the queen, England, and all Europe, for it is most certain that we have destroyed the greatest part of the best troops of France. My dearest soul, I have now that great pleasure of thinking that I may have the happiness of ending my days in quiet with you.

“I have appointed next Sunday for the army to return thanks to God, for the protection he has been pleased to give us. For on this occasion it has been very visible, for the French had not only greater numbers

than we, but also all their best troops. I hope the queen will appoint a speedy thanksgiving day at St. Paul's, for the goodness of God is so very great, that if he had suffered us to have been beaten, the liberties of all the allies had been lost. The consequences of this battle are likely to be greater than that of Blenheim, for I have now the whole summer before me. Pray make my excuse to Lord Sunderland that I am not able to write, but he may, if he pleases, see what I write to lord treasurer. My dearest life, I am ever yours.

“Brussels has submitted to King Charles the Third, and I am promised that in eight days the states of Brabant will also proclaim him.”

The submission of the capital, as Marlborough foresaw, had a natural effect on all the other cities of Brabant which were not restrained by French garrisons. Among others, Mechlin, Alost, and Lierre, made a formal recognition of Charles the Third, and admitted the confederate troops.

On the 30th the duke of Wirtemberg was detached with the pontoons, to throw bridges over the Scheldt, and the army, again moving to interrupt the retreat of the enemy towards their own frontier, took post at Alost. The discomfited troops did not, however, wait the approach of the victors; and the duke continuing to advance, encamped at Merlebeck, five leagues south of Ghent. Here he remained several days, spreading detachments over the country, and receiving hourly fresh indications of the happy revolution in the public sentiment.

The transport of joy and enthusiasm produced by this sudden and momentous change extended rapidly from Brabant into Flanders. When Cadogan, at the head of a strong detachment, approached Ghent, the inhabitants scarcely waited the retreat of the French garrison, before they crowded to the walls, and with shouts of welcome invited the allied troops to enter the place. Indeed, Marlborough himself seems to have been no less surprised than gratified, by this overwhelming tide of success, and his feelings are strikingly depicted in his correspondence.

To Lord Godolphin.

“*Merlebeck, near Ghent. May 20-31.* — We did this day design the passing the Scheldt at Gavre, by which we should have cut the French army from their old lines; but they rather chose to abandon Ghent, which they did this morning at break of day, so that I have camped the left of the army at Gavre, and the right at this place. I shall send to-morrow a detachment to Bruges, they having also abandoned that town. As soon as we can have the cannon, and what is necessary, we

shall attack Antwerp; after which I should be glad the next place might be Ostend; for unless they draw the greatest part of their army from Germany, they will not be able to hinder us from doing what we please on this side their lines. I tell you my thoughts, but if you think there is any thing better for the queen's interest, I shall endeavour to do it, having that more at heart than my own life."

To the Duchess.

"*Merlebeck, near Ghent, May 20-31.* — We are now masters of Ghent, and to-morrow I shall send some troops to Bruges. So many towns have submitted since the battle, that it really looks more like a dream than truth. My thoughts are now turning to the getting every thing ready for the siege of Antwerp, which place alone, in former years, would have been thought good success for a whole campaign; but we have the blessing of God with us, and I hope we shall do more in this campaign than was done in the last ten years' war in this country, which is a great pleasure, since it is the likeliest way to bring me to my happiness of ending my days quietly."

"*Merlebeck, June 3.* — Every day gives us fresh marks of the great victory; for since my last, which was but two days ago, we have taken possession of Bruges and Damme, as also Oudenard, which was besieged the last war by the king with sixty thousand men, and he was at last forced to raise the siege. In short, there is so great a panic in the French army as is not to be expressed. Every place we take declares for King Charles. To-morrow the Marshal de Marsin joins their army with 18 battalions of foot and 14 squadrons, which will be very little assistance to them; so that if they will oppose us they must draw more troops from their other armies.

"You are very kind in desiring I would not expose myself. Be assured I love you so well, and am so desirous of ending my days quietly with you, that I shall not venture myself but when it is absolutely necessary; and I am sure you are so kind to me, and wish so well to the common cause, that you had rather see me dead than not to do my duty. I am so persuaded that this campaign will bring us a good peace, that I beg of you to do all you can that the house at Woodstock may be carried up as much as possible, that I may have a prospect of living in it. I do not trouble the queen with thanking her for her obliging letter, but beg you will, with the most dutiful expressions, do it, as also for the letter she writ to lord treasurer before the battle, which I will endeavour to deserve by venturing at all times my life with pleasure for her service.

"Make my excuse to Lord Sunderland, and that I desire he would do it to the rest of our friends that I have not time by this post to thank them for their obliging letters."

In consequence of these successes, the duke ordered a public thanksgiving on the 1st of June, and it was celebrated with those marks of serious devotion, which the soldiery appeared to have imbibed from the example of their commander. On the ensuing day, he made his public entry

into Ghent, a small body of Spaniards left in the citadel having previously surrendered as prisoners of war. We detail his farther successes in his own words.

To Lord Godolphin.

Merlebeck, June 3. — I have three of your letters to answer, but must beg you to allow me to do it by the next post, for I have hardly one minute to spare to myself. We have every day marks of the consternation the enemy is in, for they have this day surrendered Oudenard, a very strong place, and we in no condition of taking it for want of cannon. They had three regiments in the town, two of this country and one French. The two first had declared for King Charles, as also Bruges and Damme, which we have taken since my last letter. I have sent Brigadier Cadogan, with six squadrons of horse, to offer terms to the town and citadel of Antwerp. If I can have that place without a siege it will gain us a month. I am doing all I can to gain the governor of Dendermond, which place would be of great consequence. They have let out the waters so that we cannot attack it. As soon as we have Antwerp and can get our artillery to Ostend we shall attack that place, at which time it would be necessary that the Dunkirk squadron should help us. You see that I make use of the consternation.

“ Marsin will join them to-morrow with eighteen battalions and fourteen squadrons, and I am assured that orders are gone to the Marshal de Villars to send 30 battalions more, and 40 squadrons; so that Prince Louis may act if he pleases. I have ordered the Hanover troops to join me, and we hope to have the Prussians, which will enable me to make the detachment for the descent. If Prince Louis makes use of this occasion to press the French in Alsace, as I will, with the blessing of God, in this country, the king of France will be obliged to draw some troops from Italy, by which Turin may be saved. We have nothing now that stops us but the want of cannon; for the French cannot have their troops from Germany in less than three weeks. We march to-morrow to Deynse, and the French are retired behind Menin, by which you see we are at liberty to attack Ostend and Nieuport, if we had our artillery. My service to Mr. Godolphin, and all with you.”

In this disastrous state of their affairs, the French made no effort to maintain themselves in Brabant, but separated their army into two bodies, one of which was posted at Mortagne, on the Scheldt, and the other at Armentieres, on the Lys. The elector of Bavaria threw himself into Mons, and reinforcements were detached to Tournay, Lille, Ypres, Menin, and other points of the frontier, which were more directly menaced. The principal towns in Brabant having announced their submission, except Antwerp and Dendermond, the duke sent a summons to both, and receiving a defiance, made preparations to attack Antwerp.

On the 4th of June he traversed the Scheldt, and having

accepted the surrender of Oudenard, pitched his camp between Arsele and Caneghem. While he was detained by the want of artillery, he had the satisfaction to receive intelligence confirming the news of the relief of Barcelona.

The campaign in Spain had opened with the most melancholy prospects to Charles. Hemmed in by a powerful army, and surrounded by a turbulent populace and burghers, who were alienated by the exactions of his German partisans, it seemed impossible to maintain so extensive a city as Barcelona. Lord Peterborough and the count of Cifuentes, who gave energy to the flying corps scattered in the mountainous districts, had indeed thrown in reinforcements and supplies; interrupted the operations of the besiegers; and protracted the crisis. But though they prolonged the siege, their efforts could not counterbalance a vast superiority of numbers and resources, and the young monarch was left to depend on his own energy, and the enthusiasm with which he inspired his Catalan subjects, whose aversion to the Castilian government absorbed all other feelings. He braved every danger and fatigue, animated his troops by his presence and example, and seemed determined to verify the resolution, which he had announced, of burying himself under the ruins of Barcelona.

All efforts were, however, unavailing. The garrison were exhausted with fatigue, and thinned by the sword; breaches were formed in the ramparts; and Peterborough, as well as the adherents of the Austrian prince, concurred in conjuring him to withdraw from a situation, in which he had no other prospect than captivity or death.

In this awful moment of mingled hope and despair, the long-expected relief approached. The combined fleets of England and Holland, under the command of Sir John Leake, departed from the rendezvous at Lisbon, in April; and after taking on board additional reinforcements at Gibraltar, skirted the eastern coasts of Spain, anxiously inquiring into the state and forces of the enemy. The exaggerated and contradictory intelligence, which was artfully circulated, alarmed the admiral, and a momentary doubt prevailed, whether it were more prudent to retire, or risk the safety of the fleet against superior numbers. In this situation, an officer despatched by General Stanhope, to the flying camp of Lord Peterborough, returned with more

cheering intelligence. By the decision of Stanhope, the fleet proceeded to its destination, the hostile squadron retired on their approach, and on the 9th of May the British flag was descried with joy and exultation from the ramparts of Barcelona.*

To guard against a desperate effort of the enemy, troops were instantly landed, and spent the night in arms behind the breaches. But the precaution was needless; for the Bourbon prince no sooner learnt the approach of the allied squadron, than he abandoned an enterprise, which he deemed hopeless, broke up his camp in the greatest disorder, left his sick, artillery, and stores, and directed his hasty march towards the frontier of Rousillon, to shelter his discouraged army behind the barrier of the Pyrenees. Lord Peterborough and the Count of Cifuentes harassed their toilsome progress through Catalonia, and swelled the losses of their precipitate retreat. This event seemed to augur the speedy triumph of the Austrian cause in Spain; and even Marlborough himself expressed his hopes and satisfaction, in a congratulatory letter to Peterborough.

“ I have no doubt that your lordship has already escorted the king to Madrid, and take this opportunity to felicitate you on this glorious exploit, which is every where attributed to your valour and conduct. All the allies exult in the advantages which are likely to result from this splendid success, and I particularly rejoice in the new lustre which it will shed on your glory. After such astonishing actions, there is nothing which we may not expect from you; so that I flatter myself you will not consider our hopes as ill founded, if we reckon upon the speedy reduction of Spain to the obedience of its legitimate sovereign, since it seems as if Providence had chosen you to be the happy instrument. I heartily wish you all success till you have completed the great work.”

In the midst of the exultation inspired by this event, the British general was gratified with intelligence no less satisfactory.

A schism having broken forth between the Walloon and French regiments, who composed the garrison of Antwerp, the former with the marquis of Terracina, governor of the citadel, were naturally anxious to imitate the example of their countrymen in acknowledging the legitimate sovereign.

* Journal of the Proceedings for the Relief of Barcelona, by an officer who attended General Stanhope; Conduct of Lord Peterborough; Memoirs of the Kings of Spain, chapter xiv.

The consequence of this feud was, a secret correspondence, which within a few days terminated in the surrender of the place. An arrangement was made by the garrison, in virtue of which the French troops were permitted to retire with all the honours of war, and marched to Quesnoy and Landreci, leaving the Spaniards in possession of the town and citadel, and waiting for an opportunity to deliver up the place to the orders of the commander-in-chief. Marlborough thus, without the loss of a single man, became master of a fortress, which was sufficiently garrisoned to have detained his career a month.

These wonderful successes inspired all parties with the most sanguine hopes, and no enterprise was deemed too hazardous for the skill of the victorious commander. Even the sedate temper of Godolphin was warmed into enthusiasm. Knowing the shock which it would prove to France, to gain possession of so important a post as Dunkirk, he earnestly pressed the general in one of his letters to direct his force against that place.

“*May 31.—June 11.* — Not hoping for the Holland letters before this goes out, I shall only add to the hint I gave you in my last.

“If you find any room to attack Dunkirk, and will promise to demolish it, the advantage of that conquest will be perpetual to England. I do not see why Holland should not be as desirous as we, and I must own the greatest prospect I have from the French expedition, is the hope I have it may give us an opportunity of destroying Rochfort. Any thing we can do at that place, Toulon, or Dunkirk, will prove a real good to us after the peace; but whenever peace comes, I don't much expect that any great advantages will be stipulated in it for England; and, therefore I think it concerns us the more to endeavour to obtain some security for ourselves before the war is ended.”

But the duke well knew that such an attack could not succeed while Ostend and Ypres were held by the enemy; and in his replies exhibits the difficulty of the enterprise.

“*June 14.* — If we take Ostend,” says he, “in any seasonable time, it will be much the best place for the transports to come to, and I will take care to have the troops there. The efforts the French are making to have a strong army I am afraid will make it impossible for us to take Dunkirk this year; but whenever we can have it, I agree with you, that the best thing we can do is to spoil the harbour.”

“*Rousselaer, June 21.* — I see by yours that you do not expect any great advantages for England, when the treaty of peace is once begun. I ask your pardon on being of another opinion, for I think you may

expect every thing that is for the safety and good of England. I do not mean by that, any places in this country, for I am persuaded that it is much more for her majesty's service and England, not to be master of any towns in this country, since it would create a jealousy both at home and abroad. I know this should not be the language of a general, but I do it as a faithful subject. M. Overkirk has found so many difficulties for the siege of Nieuport, that he has taken the resolution of attacking Ostend, which was to have been done after the taking of Nieuport. We can never think of going to Dunkirk till we are masters of Nieuport and Ypres, which is not to be attempted, unless we could have troops sufficient for two armies."

"*Rousselaer, June 24.*—I had the favour of yours of the 4th, o. s., yesterday, and find you are very desirous of having Dunkirk. I am as sensible as any body of the mischief that place does England, so that you may be sure I shall do my utmost, that we might have it in our power to destroy that harbour. But I must own to you, I see so many difficulties, that I dare not flatter you with the hopes of having it this year; and I am also of the opinion, that I think France will find itself in such a condition this next winter, that rather than venture the next campaign, they will consent to any reasonable terms for a peace; but as God has blessed the beginning of this campaign beyond what the thoughts of man could reasonably suppose, so it must be our duty to improve it as far as occasion shall offer." * * *

For these reasons, Marlborough was doubly anxious to hasten the descent, which he considered as more practicable, and more likely to create a diversion, and spread alarm into the interior of France. To promote this enterprise, as well as to settle a plan of operations for the remainder of the campaign, he profited by the short interval, which elapsed before the arrival of the artillery, to make a journey to the Hague. His objects are best described in his own words, written before the preceding letters to Godolphin.

"*Arsele, June 7.*—* * * * I am extremely obliged to you for your kind concern for my safety. I am now at an age not to take pleasure in exposing myself, but when I think it absolutely necessary. You can never say enough to the queen for her goodness to me in the letter you sent me. Though I take myself to be a good Englishman, and wish well to the common cause, yet my great joy in this success is, that it hath pleased God to make me the instrument of doing that, which must be of great consequence to her service.

"I received this morning yours of the 21st, and in my next, which will be from the Hague, you shall be sure to have an account of the number of troops you will have from this country for the descent. I take this time of going to the Hague, we being at a full stand for want of cannon; for the French being retreated into their own country behind their strong towns, have put the greatest part of their foot into

Ostend, Nieuport, Ypres, Menin, Tournay, and Lille. The Marshal de Villeroy is camped with the rest of the French at St. Amand, and the elector of Bavaria is at Lille. The capitulations for the surrender of the town and citadel of Antwerp were signed yesterday; so that we are now in possession of all Brabant. Our next thoughts will be for the attacking Nieuport and Ostend, which I see you have a great mind we should; so that I beg there may be no time lost in sending such ships as are ready to cruise before those two places, which will be of great use to us. By the letters from Paris, we see they would have us believe that they are taking the necessary measures to have a superiority in this country, which I think they will never be able to do, unless they put themselves on the defensive in Italy, as well as in Germany. For the good of the common cause, I wish they may endeavour it, for the men they have here will very unwillingly be brought to fight again this campaign.

“The reason of my going to the Hague is, to settle what shall go for the descent, and to acquaint them with my thoughts for the farther operations of this campaign, so that they may take care for every thing that will be necessary; as also to persuade them to draw more troops out of their garrisons, and to let them see that if this campaign be pushed on with vigour, with the blessing of God we may expect to bring France to what conditions we please.”

To the Duchess.

“*Hague, June 10.*—I came to this place last night, and to-morrow morning I return to the army, having settled the troops for the descent, which was my chief business; for what concerned us in Flanders might have been done by letter. But they were so unwilling to part with their troops, that I think nothing but my coming hither would have prevailed with them, since they are very apprehensive that the king of Prussia will not let his troops join us. I have all the reason imaginable to be satisfied with the expressions these people have made.”

Returning from the Hague on the 11th of June, Marlborough passed the night at Moerdyk, and on his way to the camp was met at Merxheim by the bishop and clergy of Antwerp, who came to announce their recognition of King Charles. Approaching the city, he received a similar communication from the burghers, conveyed by the margrave of Antwerp; and the magistrates and the first Pensionary delivered the keys, with an appropriate harangue, declaring that they had never been surrendered to any person since the great duke of Parma.

To his correspondence we shall again refer for his farther views and operations against Ostend.

To Lord Godolphin.

“*Arsele, June 17.*—The troops designed for the siege of Ostend marched that way two days ago, and I shall march with what remains of

the army, to cover the siege to-morrow ; I have with me 50 battalions of foot, and 99 squadrons of horse. I hope to have the Prussians and Hanoverians with me, before the enemy can have their detachment from Germany."

Notwithstanding the accession of force occasioned by the detachments drawn from different quarters, which nearly replaced the losses sustained by the French army, Marlborough pursued the design mentioned in the preceding letters with his usual energy and decision. Ostend being selected as the object of attack, it was necessary to obviate difficulties which would have startled a less enterprising commander. The environs were intersected with dikes, canals, and water-courses, which afforded innumerable means of resistance; and the defence could be increased by inundations. The avenues were commanded, on one hand, by the small, though strong fortress of Nieupoort; and, on the other, by the fort of Plassendael, and the intrenched bridge of Sandwort. The enemy, by the possession of Furnes and Dunkirk, could pour reinforcements into Nieupoort, or interrupt the communications of the covering army. Finally, the place itself was difficult of access, and the surrounding soil a mixture of marsh and sand, where no excavations could be made a foot below the surface without encountering water. The garrison, consisting of about 5000 men, were encouraged by the recollection, that in the preceding century, Ostend had sustained a siege of uncommon duration, and was not reduced by Spinola, the first warrior of the age, till after a lapse of three years, and the loss of 80,000 men.

Marlborough appreciated these difficulties; but at the same time, he was not unacquainted with circumstances which afforded a prospect of success. The burghers were influenced by the example of the other towns in Flanders; the garrison was partly composed of Walloons, who participated in the sentiments of their fellow-soldiers at Antwerp; and the governor himself was not partial to the Bourbon cause. The works of the place had suffered considerable dilapidation from long neglect; and the army, to which it must ultimately look for succour, was not yet sufficiently recovered from its panic, to contend a second time with a victorious enemy.

At the same time every precaution was taken to ensure

success. A squadron of nine ships of the line, besides smaller vessels, was hovering on the coast, to assail the sea-defences, and favour the efforts of the besieging army. As the possession of Nieuport and Plassendael was deemed necessary to facilitate the operations against Ostend, Marlborough, as we have already seen, prevailed on Overkirk to move with 28 battalions, and 10 regiments of horse against Nieuport. He also detached General Fagel with a sufficient force to reduce Plassendael and Sandwort. With the main army Marlborough, on the 18th, took post at Rousselaer, where he at once threatened Menin and Ypres, and covered the operations of the siege. Fagel succeeded in securing Plassendael, and the bridge of Sandwort, by which he obtained possession of the sluices, and deprived the enemy of the advantages which they might have derived from their inundations. Overkirk attacked the outworks of Nieuport, and captured the detached fort of Nieuendeim; but finding the place too well defended to be taken by storm, he masked it, and advanced along the coast to Mariekirk, south of Ostend. The trenches would have been immediately opened; but it was found that the loose and swampy nature of the ground did not afford sufficient cover for the troops without the aid of fascines and gabions; and it was necessary to wait the arrival of the artillery, and the co-operation of the fleet.

Meanwhile, the commander in chief was not inattentive to the movements of the enemy; and at once, to prevent them from interrupting his designs, by harassing his rear, he detached General Pollant, on the 23rd of June, to strengthen Courtray and Oudenard, which operated as a check on the enterprises of their garrisons on the Haine, the Lys, and the Scheldt.

The preparations for the intended siege being at length matured, the trenches were opened on the night of the 28th, on the south-west front of the place. A heavy and incessant fire from the besieged did not obstruct the progress of the assailants, and on the 1st of July, the batteries were completed, and mounted with artillery. Arrangements being made with the admiral, a fire was opened on the 3rd, both by land and sea, and before the following morning, flames burst forth in several quarters of the town, and the sea-defences were reduced to ruin. The progress of the besiegers

not being sufficiently rapid to satisfy the impatience of Marlborough, he repaired from Rouselaer, to confer with Overkirk and the admiral, and to hasten the progress of the works. His presence produced an immediate effect; the counterscarp was carried on the 6th, and the besieged, after a fruitless sally, to recover their loss, were discouraged by the construction of the breaching batteries on the glacis, and beat a parley. According to the capitulation, they quitted the place without military honours, under promise not to bear arms against the allies for six months. Two Walloon battalions, and four troops of dragoons, the greater part of the garrison, entered into the service of the allies. In the harbour were found two men of war, one of 80, and the other of 50 guns, with 45 smaller vessels. This valuable conquest was achieved with the loss of only 500 men.*

CHAP. XLVII. — GOVERNMENT OF THE NETHERLANDS. —
1706.

NOTWITHSTANDING the difficulties which the victorious general had overcome, he found it easier to effect the conquest of the Netherlands, than to arrange the internal government to the satisfaction of all the parties interested; to quiet the jealousies between the Dutch and the house of Austria; and at the same time to allay the umbrage conceived against England, with regard to the settlement of the barrier and commercial interests.

On the conquest of Spanish Guelderland, the administration had been consigned by Leopold, in the name of king Charles, to Count Zinzendorf, who was then imperial resident at the Hague. This appointment was afterwards transferred to his successor, the Count de Goes; and the elector palatine, brother-in-law of the emperor, was joined in the commission. Under this arrangement the administration had been conducted, until the battle of Ramilies, and no material difficulty

* History of Europe for 1706; Gazette; Brodrick; Lediard; Correspondence of Overkirk with Marlborough during the siege.

had occurred, as the exercise of this delegated power was confined to the countries bordering on the Lower Meuse. But the decisive victory, which produced a revolution in the Netherlands, opened a new scene, by awakening the cupidity of the Austrian and Dutch governments, which had slumbered while the recovery of these rich provinces was deemed uncertain. A violent contest now arose who should appoint, or rather who should exercise, the powers of government. Under the dukes of Brabant and counts of Flanders, the administration and finances had been managed by a council of state, composed of the most considerable natives. Its functions had, however, been gradually abridged by the Austrian sovereigns of Spain, till it had become little better than an empty name; and on the usurpation of the French, it was superseded by an intendant, while the internal government was assimilated to that of France.

This change was, however, far from being grateful to a people jealous of their privileges, and the discontent it excited was among the prominent causes which occasioned the sudden declaration in favour of Charles. Of this disposition the Dutch readily availed themselves; and on the expulsion of the French, they laboured for the restoration of the council of state, with the hope of acquiring a paramount influence over a government similar to their own, and appointed under their auspices.

The views of the Dutch, however, had not escaped the penetration of the imperial court, and, on the reduction of Louvain, the Count de Goes demanded an audience of the States, to require their recognition of his authority as administrator. His demand being eluded, under the plea of consulting the queen, he despatched a messenger for the instructions of his court, and in the interim repaired secretly to Dusseldorf, to advise with the elector palatine, to whom he was directed to refer in cases of difficulty. On his return he endeavoured to effect a species of compromise, by requiring that the police should be consigned to his direction, and offering to enter into a treaty for the management of the financial and military administration.* His instances were, however, again eluded under the same plea, and all the ingenuity of the Dutch government was called forth to secure

* Lamberti, tome iv. p. 312.

their point, either by implicating the Duke of Marlborough in some arrangement, or by consigning the regency to a Spaniard till the pleasure of Charles could be known. The person who appears to have been selected for this purpose, was Don Bernardo de Quiros, who had acted as ambassador, first of Charles II., and afterwards of Philip, and had declared for the Austrian sovereign soon after the victory of Ramilies.

In this state of affairs an unexpected resolution on the part of the emperor gave a new turn to the views of the Dutch government. By a singular coincidence of circumstances, the very day which gladdened the court of Vienna with news of the relief of Barcelona, brought intelligence of the triumphant victory at Ramilies. In a transport of joy and gratitude, Joseph filled up a blank power which had been left by his brother, for any occurrence of emergency, with a decree, consigning to Marlborough the administration of the Netherlands; although the elector palatine, brother of the empress dowager, seems to have expected the offer of the government, and was entitled to great consideration, as well from his relationship to the imperial family, and his services to the grand alliance, as for having been already associated in the office. This patent Joseph transmitted with a gracious letter*, in the Latin tongue, stating that the government of the Belgic provinces could not be better confided than to the hand which had recovered them; and expressing a strong desire that neither the duke himself, nor the queen and states, would object to a disposition so just and so advantageous to the common cause.

Marlborough was himself not merely gratified by these spontaneous and unexpected proofs of favour and confidence, but appreciated all the advantages to England, and the confederacy in general, from such an authority confided to his hands. He therefore instantly imparted the news with the utmost secrecy to the treasurer for the decision of the queen and cabinet; and, in particular, requested his friend to convey the welcome intelligence to the Whig leaders for their approbation.

“*June 28.* — I received last night an express from Vienna, with the enclosed letter in Latin, from the emperor, and the powers from the king of Spain, in Spanish; that of the king of Spain was a blank signed by

* Dated Vienna, June 13.

him, and left in the emperor's hand. As I have not been able to have the Spanish translated, I do not know exactly the powers. I shall keep it here a secret, till I know from you what her majesty's pleasure is, as also I shall take measures with my friends in Holland to know how they will like it; for I must take care that they take no jealousy, whatever the queen's resolution may be. I beg no notice may be taken till the emperor's minister shall apply to her majesty. I beg you to assure the queen, that I have in this matter, nor never shall have in any other, any desire of my own, but with all the submission in the world, be pleased with what she shall think is for her interest."

The minister was no less gratified than his friend, and the queen and cabinet participated in his satisfaction. The Whig leaders also were unanimous in their approbation. Lord Godolphin, in reply, expressed their common sentiment.

"*Windsor, June 24.—July 5.*— Since I had written this far, I have the favour of yours of the 28th, with the several papers enclosed. I do not return you the Spanish paper, not having had time to get it translated for you, as I intend to do; but I have been able to read it in English to the queen, who likes the thing very well, and leaves it to you to do as you shall judge best for her service, and the good of the common cause. I have not communicated this to any body yet, but Lord Somers and Lord Sunderland, who are both much pleased with it, as what they think is like to keep every thing in those countries upon a right foot, at least during the operations of this summer. They seemed to think there was no reason for the Dutch not to like it as well as we do, and both concluded with myself, that it was one of the rightest thoughts that ever came from the emperor's counsel. The queen has not yet had any notice of it from the imperial minister."

But although Marlborough had calculated on some trifling objections from the States, he was far from foreseeing the violent opposition which he was to encounter from the partial views and interested policy of the republic. While the confederates were employed in recovering the Low Countries, their union with the Dutch was in general cordial and sincere; but no sooner had the victory of Ramilies secured their object, than national interest began to operate. The Dutch were now only anxious to obtain an effectual barrier against France, and with that view were desirous to extend their territorial possessions at the expense of the Spanish monarchy. To this single object they sacrificed every other consideration, and made it the principle of all their negotiations and arrangements. Eager to appropriate the government, or, at least, the resources of the Low Countries, they even issued orders and established regulations by their own

authority; and it was with difficulty that Marlborough succeeded in persuading them to relinquish a system which must alienate Austria, England, and Spain.

At the moment when they had reluctantly consented to resign this darling object, the offer of the administration to Marlborough awakened their jealousies with double force. This feeling operated with peculiar effect, even on Pensionary Heinsius and the warmest friends of the British commander, and they did not disguise their sentiments of disapprobation. If the adherents of England were thus warm and decisive in their opposition, the friends of France and the independent party were still more indignant, and fears were justly entertained lest the Dutch should be induced by pique to accept the overtures of peace to which they had already listened.

This opposition alarmed the Austrian cabinet and perplexed the ministry in England. But Marlborough was too prudent, as well as too disinterested, to accept an appointment, however lucrative and honourable, in such invidious circumstances; and, therefore, after a short deliberation, he declined the proffered grant in terms which do credit to his sentiments and feelings.

To Lord Godolphin.

*“Rousselaer, July 1.—*M. Hope is come this day from Brussels, and I have communicated to him the emperor's letter, and the powers from the king of Spain. He made me great compliments, but I find by him that he thinks this may give uneasiness in Holland by thinking that the court of Vienna has a mind to put the power of this country into the queen's hands, in order that they may have nothing to do with it. If I should find the same thing by the pensioner, and that nothing can cure this jealousy but my desiring to be excused from accepting this commission, I hope the queen will allow of it; for the advantage and honour I might have by this commission is very insignificant, in comparison of the fatal consequences that might be, if it should cause a jealousy between the two nations.”

The reply of the pensionary to the communication is not extant; but the answer of Marlborough enables us to trace the sentiments of his friend, and to estimate the warmth with which he opposed the appointment.

*“Rousselaer, July 3.—*Sir, by yours of the 30th of the last month, which I received last night, I find you had not received mine, in which I sent you the copies of what I had received from Vienna, but that the Count de Goes had acquainted you with his despatch. I write this to beg of you to do me the justice to be firmly persuaded that I shall take

no step in this matter, but what shall be by the advice of the States; for I prefer infinitely their friendship before any particular interest to myself; for I thank God and the queen I have no need nor desire of being richer, but have a very great ambition of doing every thing that can be for the public good; and as for the frontier, which is absolutely necessary for your security, you know my opinion of it. In short, I beg you to assure yourself, and every body else, that I shall with pleasure behave myself in this matter, and all things else, that you may think for the good of the republic, as you would have me; for next to serving the queen and my country, I have nothing more at heart, than to have your good opinions. And let me, on this occasion, assure the States, that I serve them with the same affection and zeal that I do my own country, so that they need be under no difficulty; for if they think it for their service, I shall with pleasure excuse myself from accepting this commission."

He enclosed this letter in one to Lord Godolphin, in which he expressed his earnest wish that the queen would permit him to decline the offer.

"*Harlebeck, July 6.* — I came so late last night to the army from Ostend, and was obliged to march so early this morning, that I must beg pardon that I cannot answer yours of the 13th and 14th by this post. I sent you by last post, a letter from the pensioner, and I now enclose the answer I thought it was for her majesty's service I should make to it.

"The enclosed letter of the same date confirms me, that if I should accept of the honour the emperor and the king of Spain do me, it would create a great jealousy, which might prejudice the common cause, so that I hope her majesty will approve of what I have done. And I beg you to be so just and kind to me as to assure the queen, that though the appointments of this government are threescore thousand pounds a year, I shall with pleasure excuse myself, since I am convinced it is for her service, unless the States should make it their request, which they are very far from doing; for they have told me that they think it not reasonable that the king of Spain should have possession of the Low Countries till they had assurances of what barrier they should have for their security. I hope this compliance of mine will give me so much credit as to be able to hinder them from hurting themselves; for it is certain, if they follow their own inclinations, they will make such demands upon this country, as will very much dissatisfy the house of Austria, and be thought unreasonable by all the allies, of which the French would be sure to make their advantage."

Godolphin, however, did not bear this disappointment with equal complacency, but in his answer inveighs bitterly against the selfishness and ingratitude of the Dutch.

"*July 4.-15.* — I have received the avour of yours of the 6th, by Captain Stanhope, and I must not disown to you that it both surprised and troubled me very much. It is amazing, that after so much done for

their advantage, and even for their safety, the States can have been capable of such a behaviour. Those of the French faction must have seen their advantage upon this occasion, to fill them with jealousy of your having, and consequently of England's having, too much power; and if this be at the bottom, we shall soon see that argument made use of on other occasions, as well as this. But your prudence and good temper will get the better, I hope, of all this folly and perverseness. The first steps you have made towards it, in your letter, of which you have sent me a copy, cannot, in my opinion, be mended. But I wish very much that Mr. Stepney were at the Hague, to second your letters to the pensioner upon all occasions that may arise, by his instances to the States."

Marlborough had no sooner received the sanction of the queen than he announced to the States his decisive resolution not to accept the appointment. But notwithstanding the readiness with which he yielded to the prejudices of the Dutch, they became more anxious not only to exclude England from all share in the government of the Low Countries, but even to appropriate the whole authority to themselves. The remonstrance which he made on this subject to the pensionary obviates the necessity of any farther explanation.

"*Camp of Harlebeck, July 10. 1706.*—Sir, I have learnt by the honour of your letter of the 3d instant, that M. Hope was to come to me on the part of the States-general, as in fact he came, Thursday night; and he has probably written to their high mightinesses, that, with the permission of the queen, I was firmly resolved not to charge myself in any manner with the commission with which his Catholic majesty has been pleased to honour me. This you will have the goodness to confirm to them on my part. This new instance ought to convince their high mightinesses how much I have their interest and particular satisfaction at heart, as well as that of the common cause.

"On this occasion I take the liberty of reminding their high mightinesses that when the army came to Louvain, and in the farther progress which we have made with the advice of the army deputies, we jointly gave assurances, in writing, to all the towns and people of the country, in the name of the queen, of their high mightinesses, and of his Catholic majesty, that those who should submit to their legitimate sovereign should regain the same rights, privileges, and advantages which they enjoyed in the time of King Charles II.; and to these assurances, with the help of God, I am persuaded we must partly attribute the facility with which we entered into possession of so many strong places, where every one testified universal joy.

"However, by the resolution of the States of the 19th of last month, which M. Hope sent me, translated into French, it seems as if their high mightinesses are of opinion that their deputies should sign alone the authorisation for the council of state, the chambers of finance, and other judicatures, who ought not to conclude any thing without having pre-

viously consulted, and with the approbation of the said deputies to the exclusion even of the queen.

“However, according to what I have learnt, or have been able to comprehend hitherto, it has always appeared that the States had nothing else in view but a good barrier and a reasonable security for their country. I beg, then, you will, with all submission to their high mightinesses, entreat them to reflect maturely on such a step, which is perhaps the true means of attaining those objects. I am persuaded that when the States shall come to deliberate thereon with their usual prudence and wisdom, their high mightinesses will find many reasons beyond what I can suggest to them to bring them to take those measures in this government which may be most useful to the country.

I am more than gratified personally with the friendship and kindness their high mightinesses have at all times shown me, and this obliges me to give them my thoughts without disguise in every thing which I think concerns their interests. I persuade myself also, that they do me the justice to believe that I wish them as much happiness and prosperity as they can themselves desire; and I shall continue always to entertain the same sentiments of respect towards them.”

Too deeply interested on this point to rely on his own influence, he earnestly pressed the lord treasurer to combat the mischievous proposal of the States with all the authority of England.

“*Helchin, July 12th, 1706.* — By my last letter, which I sent by way of Ostend, you will see the measures that the Dutch are desirous to take concerning the management of this country, which would certainly set this whole country against them; so that I hope you will find some way of not letting them play the fool. You know that I am always very ready to speak freely to them when I think it for their service. But in this matter I am not at liberty, fearing they might mistake me, and think it might proceed from self-interest. I am sure in this matter I have with pleasure sacrificed my own interest in order to make them reasonable, which I hope will be approved by my friends; for should I have acted otherwise, the party that is for peace would have made a very ill use of it. For the favourers of the French faction endeavour all they can to persuade the people in Holland that the king of Spain will be governed by the queen, and that this success will all turn to the advantage of England, so that they must not rely upon any body, but secure their frontier now that they have it in their power. This is so plausible in Holland, that I am afraid the honest people, though they see the dangerous consequences this must have, yet dare not speak against it; and I can assure you these great towns had rather be under any nation than the Dutch.”

“*Harlebeck, July 14.* — You will see by three or four letters that I have lately writ to you the care I have taken not to give any occasion of jealousy in Holland, and that I was in hopes that my declining the honour the king of Spain had done me would give me so much power with the States as that I might be able to hinder them from doing themselves and the common cause hurt. But such is their temper, that when

they have misfortunes they are desirous of peace upon any terms, and when we are blessed by God with success, they are for turning it to their own advantage, without any consideration how it may be liked by their friends and allies. You will see, by the enclosed copy of a letter I have this day writ to the pensioner, that if they cannot be brought to change their resolution of the 19th of the last month, they will create so great a jealousy in this country, that they shall be under the absolute government of the Dutch, that it would turn very much to the advantage of the French. Besides that, the king of Spain will have just reason to complain. M. Hope tells me the States have directed M. Vryberg to acquaint her majesty, and her ministers, with their reasons and proceedings. In my poor opinion, her majesty cannot give too kind an answer; but she must be careful that the king of Spain and the house of Austria have no reason given them to be angry.

“ Now the States have applied to her majesty, I cannot act with safety, but by her majesty’s directions by one of the secretaries of state. I must beg of her majesty, for her own service and the public good, that she will be pleased to allow of my declining the honour of the king of Spain’s commission; otherwise the party in Holland that are for peace, rather upon ill terms than good, would make a very ill use of it, though, in my opinion, the States might have avoided many inconveniences and irregularities, that must now happen, if they had approved of my acting; for I should have done nothing but what must have turned to their safety. And at the same time they might have treated with the king of Spain concerning their barrier; but by this step of theirs, they will very quickly be obliged to declare not only to the queen, but to every body else, that till they have their *surety*, as they call it, by having such a barrier as they shall think reasonable* I dread the consequences of this matter, for I cannot write so freely to the States as I should otherwise if I were not personally concerned. You may be sure the French have too many partisans in Holland not to be informed of this proceeding, so that they will be sure to make their advantage of it.”

The remonstrances of the British cabinet, the private representations of Marlborough, and above all, the magnanimous sacrifice which he had so cheerfully made, seem at length to have weighed with the Dutch. At their instance, a provisional government was proposed for the Low Countries, by which the administration was to be shared by the two maritime powers; though, to satisfy the natives, it was to be conducted in the name and under the authority of Charles III. Marlborough was not willing to suffer their favourable inclinations to cool, but closed with the proposal, and hastened to communicate this arrangement to Godolphin, earnestly soliciting the approbation of the queen.

* Some words omitted in the original.

“ *Helchin, July 19.* — Notwithstanding the wind has been fair, we have no letters from England, I suppose for want of packet-boats.

“ The English are embarked at Ostend, and I hope to hear this day, or to-morrow, that the Dutch are so also, the wind having been favourable these three days, to bring their transports from the Texel to Ostend. I think I have convinced the States-general that their resolution of the 19th of the last month, in which they reserved to themselves the signing all the powers, and consequently governing this country in their names, was excluding her majesty and England from being able to perform to these people what I promised in her majesty’s name, which, if they had persisted, must have produced a very ill effect; for the great towns depend much more upon the queen’s protection than upon that of the States.

“ I shall by the next post send a copy of the commission, and powers, and instructions I shall be obliged to sign for the settling the council of state that must govern this country, till the king of Spain can give his directions. I am obliged to do this, for the public good, before I am authorised by her majesty; so that I beg you will move the queen that I may have powers sent me, as her ambassador and general, to act, in conjunction with the States-general, what shall be thought proper for the public good. For my security, I beg the date of this power may be some few days after you had the news of my being at Brussels.

“ You will be pleased to communicate, and take the advice of Mr. Secretary Harley in this matter.”

The Dutch were no sooner pacified, than a difficulty of a similar kind arose in another quarter. Although the court of Vienna had sufficient confidence in the British general, to confide the administration to his hands, they were too well acquainted with the grasping spirit of the Dutch, and their views of extending their territorial possessions on the side of the Netherlands, to acquiesce in any arrangement which gave the republic so large a share of power. Anxious to check this encroaching spirit, they still fostered the hope that Marlborough might be induced to depart from his resolution, and looked to his appointment as the only means of securing the rights and dignity of the Spanish crown. From the correspondence which took place on this occasion with the Imperial Court, we select a letter from Count Wratislaw to the duke, which best exhibits the feeling and apprehensions of the emperor.

“ *Vienna, Aug. 1706.* — My lord duke, we yesterday held a conference on the letter written by your highness to his imperial majesty, on the 11th past, by which you thank the emperor, touching the government he has confided to you, and excuse yourself on the plea, that for the good of

the common cause you cannot yet accept it, notwithstanding the consent of the queen. This word *yet* gave me an opportunity of keeping the thing in suspense, believing that it would be proper to ask you for a more positive explanation; or, in case you thought it in no way right to charge yourself with the said government, what you advise us to do, in the present conjuncture, and in what manner we ought to treat with the Dutch on this subject, as it is impossible that we can permit the States to act as they do in the Low Countries, without suffering the provinces, and even the towns, to do homage to the king of Spain. Your highness, who is on the spot, will see better than any one the unfortunate impressions of this conduct; and our letters from that country are so full of it, that it seems as if the nobility and people begin to repent of having changed their master, and fear that, under the pretence of the barrier, they may remain always dependent on the States-general. This matter, so delicate in the present conjuncture, particularly in the very middle of a glorious campaign, is more likely than any thing else to cause a collision among the allies, to the great prejudice of the common cause. Hence, notwithstanding the impetuosity of some, I have endeavoured so to direct the business, that without having a previous answer from you, the court will do nothing on this subject either in England or Holland, except that Count Goes will tell the pensionary that, notwithstanding the permission of the queen, you yet make a difficulty of accepting this government, under the plea of not injuring the common cause. At this answer we have been much surprised here, not believing that a government given to a person who commands the armies of the allies, and who is of the same religion as the States, can occasion any prejudice to the common cause, particularly as the pensionary must judge that this business cannot remain long on the present footing.

“The Count de Gallas will not be ordered to take any step in England; for the emperor confides in you to tell him both when and how we ought to act; but you will easily judge, that if England does not interfere, the impertinence of the Dutch will daily become greater, and at last be insupportable. If your highness makes any difficulty of explaining yourself freely in the letter to his imperial majesty, from a desire that your name should not appear in the advice you may suggest to us, you have only to explain yourself in a private letter to whom you will, and I assure you that the secret will be strictly kept.”

This letter was followed by one from the emperor, expressing his reluctant acquiescence in the decision of Marlborough.

“Most illustrious cousin and dearest prince,

“I am very glad to find by your letters of the 12th of July, from Helchin, that the queen had consented to my brother’s provisional appointment of you for the government of the Low Countries, which I take very kindly, as a fresh proof of the queen’s friendship to my family, and of her zeal for the common cause. And since it is your opinion, that to take openly upon you the commission, through the uneasiness it will give the States,

will neither be for the king's interest nor for the service of the public; yet as you generously offer all the assistance which so great a man can give, that nothing be done to the prejudice of the king's authority or interest, or the good of those provinces; so I doubt not but you will persist in the same resolution, and impart to me from time to time your opinion of the affairs in the Low Countries, and especially of the council at Brussels. I will send my brother a particular account of all the proceedings in this affair; and what I have writ to Count Goes upon this subject you will see by the enclosed. I see by the happy reduction of Ostend, which has hardly held out against you so many days as it formerly did years, that the progress of your arms is not yet stopped. I hope the good God, who by his wonderful providence has raised you up, to be an avenger of a righteous cause, will preserve you long for farther successes for the common good; and herewith I renew the assurances of my great affection to you.*

“Given at Vienna, August 5. 1706.”

All parties continued in this state of irritation and suspense till the commencement of September; the court of Vienna still pressing the Duke of Marlborough to retract his resolution, and still murmuring against the arrangement which had been adopted for the provisional government. At this period an incident occurred, which contributed to increase the dissatisfaction already subsisting, as well as to involve the British general in new difficulties. Marlborough had not only hastened to announce to the king of Spain the victory which restored these valuable provinces to his crown, but on receiving the offer of the administration, he had despatched Count Lecheraine, minister of the elector palatine, to signify his acceptance, and to describe the situation, of the Netherlands. The news produced the same effect on Charles as on his brother; and, notwithstanding the numerous interests which he was obliged to conciliate, and the pretenders to so honourable an office among his own adherents, he sanctioned the appointment, with a degree of cordiality, which evinced his gratitude and esteem.

“*Camp of Peral, Sept. 23. 1706.*”

“My lord duke, and prince;

“The Count of Lecheraine having lately delivered to me your letters of June, and given me an ample relation of the present state of the Netherlands, as well as of your plan for the conclusion of this campaign, I was unwilling to delay sending him to you, to announce my gratitude for your zeal and attention to my service, and particularly for your acceptance of the commission for the administration of the Netherlands,

* Official translation from the original Latin.

which the emperor, my brother, has conferred on you in my behalf. As I have always placed implicit confidence in you, you will be easily persuaded that this step of his serene majesty was highly agreeable to me, particularly as those countries cannot be better governed than by the wisdom and experience of him whose valour has conquered them. Nor do I doubt but that until I can make another disposition, my beloved and faithful subjects of my Netherlands will consider themselves as fortunate in being governed by the same hand to which they owe the recovery of their liberty, and their restoration to me and to my house.

“Having also observed in one of your letters to Prince Lichtenstein, a remark on the necessity of conciliating the States-general, and the conduct you propose to adopt, not to excite their jealousy; I am anxious at the same time to applaud your prudence, and to discover some expedient for enabling you to execute my commission, without exposing you to embarrassment.

“With this view I enclose two patents, one of which is for you alone, and the other for Don Bernardo de Quiros, who is appointed your co-adjutor, and whom I have nominated my counsellor of state, leaving it to your discretion to make use of one or the other, as may be most beneficial for my service and the common cause. I refer you for farther information to the Count de Lecheraine, who will explain to you my intentions in detail, with the same exactness as he has brought yours. Moreover, I pray God, my lord duke and prince, to have you in his sacred keeping, assuring you, at the same time, of my perfect esteem and gratitude.”*

Notwithstanding the solemn and explicit manner in which Marlborough had already declined the government, the Dutch were so much alarmed, that the mere intelligence of this confirmation created a new ferment greater than the first. The duke being absent in England when the rumour was divulged, received from the British envoy, Mr. Stepney, a description of the effect it produced at the Hague.

“Hague, January 4. 1707. — I hope your grace will have received by Count Lecheraine my letter of the 21st, which will have prepared your grace for the contradiction which these people make of admitting the patent which was lately brought from Spain: this report has occasioned a very great clamour here of late, as I presume your grace will understand by this post, from the pensionary himself, who attacked me very vigorously yesterday at the congress on that subject, so far as to exclaim, *Mon Dieu, est-il possible qu'on voudroit faire ce pas sans notre participation?* He added, that the best excuse he could find to appease the tumult which this news had raised in their assembly was, by supposing this patent was only a bare confirmation of what had been issued by the imperial court, under a blank; and that the king of Spain had not received your grace's refusal when this patent was despatched. By

* Translation from the French original.

which suggestion your grace may infer, that he expects no less than that your grace should again decline the offer. I took the liberty of arguing with him that this unreasonable jealousy was hardly to be conceived, and that I was at a loss to imagine from whence it could proceed; that the States-general in their letter to the emperor objected only that the barrier was not yet settled, which I had orders to treat of, whenever they would come to reasonable methods. To this he answered short, that there were no thoughts of proceeding here to that treaty as long as there was any probability of your grace's accepting the said patent. And Count Rechteren afterwards told me they would never allow the emperor and the king of Spain, without their approbation and consent, to dispose of the government of a country wherein their barrier and security was so nearly concerned. All I could do was to desire them to forbear that clamour and censure till your grace thought fit to explain your own mind, and thereby either leave your grace the merit of declining once more this offer, by your own free act, or to hear in what methods you thought fit to avail yourself of what the king of Spain might have generously proposed to you, and not to come to such warm discourses before the matter of fact was certain, and rightly stated. I added, it might appear very strange in the world that the States-general, who had been so near witnesses of your grace's zeal, conduct, and success, should be the chief opposers of any advantage which was proposed to you, by a prince who could not but acknowledge your grace, under God, to have been the main instrument of his recovering those provinces. But all that can be said makes no impression at present, and it may require your grace's serious attention in what manner these people are to be brought to other thoughts, which I scarce think any thing but your own presence will effect. I beg leave to congratulate your grace on the juster sense which her majesty and the parliament have of your important services, and I heartily wish that generous example may be imitated here. When you shall be pleased to direct me what I shall do for your service, I shall endeavour to approve myself with all duty."

CHAP. XLVIII.—CLOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN.—1706.

ON the reduction of Ostend, Marlborough prepared to carry into execution the design he had already announced, of turning his efforts against Menin, which would secure the line of the Lys, protect his conquests, and afford the means of pushing his attacks with effect the next campaign. To this object all his movements were directed, and he confidently anticipates success in a letter to Lord Godolphin.

“*Rousselaer, June 28.*—The method the king of France has taken to make good his word to the elector of Bavaria, of putting him at the head of an army of 80,000 men, are the 18 battalions and 14 squadrons which came with the Marshal de Marsin; the detachment that is now marching from Alsace, of 30 battalions and 40 squadrons; and 14 battalions which the Comte de Gassy commanded in the lines, which were not at the battle. These, joined with the troops that were at the battle, would make above a hundred thousand men; but as, of necessity, they must put garrisons into several towns, I flatter myself that they will find it very difficult to form such an army as will be able to hinder me from making the siege of Menin as soon as that of Ostend is over. Menin is one of their strongest towns; but there is a necessity of attacking that in the first place, for that will let us into their *pays conquis*. I do hope the descent will oblige them to make a detachment from this country, or force them to raise the siege of Turin.”

He was, however, detained by the tardiness of the Dutch in making the necessary preparations, and strongly expresses his disappointment.

“*Helchin, July 15.*—* * * * M. de Gelder Massen came here last night from Ghent, and I find we must not expect all our cannon till the end of this month; but on the 22d I think to invest Menin, and employ the first six or seven days in covering some of the quarters; for we cannot spare above thirty-two battalions for the siege. There will remain with me seventy-two, which I hope will be a sufficient strength to oppose whatever they can bring, though the elector of Bavaria says he is promised a hundred and ten battalions. They have certainly more horse than we; but if they had greater numbers, I neither think it their interest nor their inclinations to venture a battle, for our men are in heart, and theirs are cowed. If the duke of Vendome should be obliged to stay in Italy, we are told we are then to have the prince of Conti.”

Before he quitted the camp at Rousselaer, where he had remained during the siege of Ostend, the prince of Holstein Beck, with eight battalions, took possession of Courtrai. On

the 5th of July a detachment, which had encamped at Oudenard, marched to Harlebeck; and the Prussian and Hanoverian troops, who were also on their way to join the army, were directed to advance to Ninove, in order to cover the country between the Scheldt and the Dender from any irruption on the side of Mons. The duke then moved with the main army from Rousselacr, and encamped between Courtrai and Harlebeck, having the Lys in his rear.

At this period, the three regiments destined to join the expedition in England marched to Ostend, where they were to embark. On the following day the army again moved to Helchin, where bridges had been prepared for the passage of the Scheldt, the army of Overkirk at the same time occupying the post of St. Eloi Vive, near Harlebeck. As the French had endeavoured to prevent the navigation of the Scheldt, by means of sluices and drains, which lowered the water, General Salisch was despatched with a proper force, to destroy all such works between Lille, Armentieres, Menin, and Courtrai.

Menin, the object of attack, was considered as one of the master-pieces of the celebrated Vauban. The defences were low, without being commanded, the approaches rendered difficult by inundations, and the garrison sufficiently numerous, and well provided with means of resistance. The marquis of Bully was governor, but the military command was intrusted to the marquis of Caraman, who was versed in the defence of fortresses, and was assisted by able engineers. On the 23d the place was invested by General Salisch, who was charged to conduct the siege with 32 battalions and 25 squadrons. He took post from Werwick to Wevelghem, and a competent number of pioneers were employed in forming lines of circumvallation.

The heavy artillery having arrived from Ghent on the 30th of July, the attacks were opened on the night of the 4th of August against the bastion of Capucins and that of Ypres, on the west front; and pushed with a vigour which proved the determination of the allies to profit by the remains of the season for action. On the 18th, the works being advanced to a state proper for an attack on the covert way, Marlborough drew his army nearer to Menin, by taking post between Belleghem and Pont d'Espierre, and himself

repaired to the trenches, to superintend the important operation. At seven the same evening the signal was given, by the explosion of two mines, which had been formed on the salient angles of the work called the Half Moon of Ypres. The assailants instantly advanced to the pallisades, threw grenades into the covert way, and entering amidst the confusion, swept every thing before them. For two hours they withstood a heavy fire from the ravelins, and other works commanding their position; but at length the establishment was effected, and stretched to the pallisades of the four angles. The loss in this terrible combat amounted to no less than 1400 men.

The success of this operation, although not immediately effectual, was decisive; for on the following night signals of distress were made by the besieged: their artillery was dismounted, and their whole strength scarcely sufficed to occupy the three half moons fronting the attacks. At this juncture, however, the duke of Vendome arrived at Valenciennes, to assume the command of the French army; and it was natural to expect, that as soon as he had collected his troops he would make an effort for the deliverance of Menin. Marlborough, therefore, changed his position, by stretching his right to Lauwe, though his head-quarters still continued at Helchin, from whence he wrote to Godolphin.

“*Helchin, August 9.* — The duke of Vendome having strengthened the garrison of Menin, and ordered several troops to march that way, he is to be at Ypres this night, so that I have sent this day twelve battalions to strengthen those of the siege. Our cannon began to fire this morning. Three or four days we hope will dismount so many of their cannon that we may with security carry on our trenches. M. de Vendome has given orders to all the troops to be in readiness to march at twenty-four hours warning, so that in three or four days he may draw them together. By his language we ought to expect another battle, but I cannot think the king of France will venture it; if he should, I hope and pray that the blessing of God may continue with us.”

During this interval, Cadogan, his confidential friend, was surprised and made prisoner, in protecting a foraging party. Before his fate was ascertained, Marlborough testified to the duchess his keen regret for the loss of so faithful an adherent, in terms which do honour to his feelings.

“*Helchin, August 16.* — An officer is just come to me to give me an account of the forage we have made this day, and he tells me that poor

Cadogan is taken prisoner or killed, which gives me a great deal of uneasiness, for he loved me, and I could rely on him. I am now sending a trumpet to the governor of Tournay, to know if he be alive; for the horse that beat him came from that garrison. I have ordered the trumpet to return this night, for I shall not be quiet till I know his fate."

He had soon the satisfaction to find his apprehensions unfounded, Cadogan being sent back on his parole, two days afterwards, by the French commander. This act of courtesy was immediately repaid by the liberation of the baron de Pallavicini, who had been made prisoner in the late battle.

We cannot refrain from adding another letter to Lord Godolphin, written before the close of the campaign, which exhibits the affectionate character of the British general in a no less amiable light.

"*Cambron, Oct. 24. 1706.*—I find by your last letter that applications are made, by Mr. Mordaunt and others, for my brother's place in the Tower. I beg you will not be engaged, and that the queen will gratify me on this occasion. I would not have this place disposed of as yet; but when I shall think it a proper time, I would then beg the queen would be pleased to let Brigadier Cadogan have it, since it will be provision for him in time of peace. As I would put my life in his hands, so I will be answerable for his faithfulness and duty to the queen. I have for the queen's service obliged him this war to expose his life very often, so that in justice I owe him this good office."

The breaching batteries being now opened against Menin, the duke again went to hasten the progress of the attack. Within a few hours he had the satisfaction to observe the last defences of the place in a state of ruin, and the garrison reduced to propose a capitulation. After some trifling discussion, the terms were arranged, and on the 25th of August the gates were opened to the allies, the garrison retiring with warlike honours to Douay. This success was immediately announced to the treasurer.

"*Helchin, August 23.*—Yesterday morning the enemy at Menin planted a white flag on their breach, and as I was there, I immediately ordered an exchange of hostages. We have this morning possession of one of their gates, and on Wednesday, being St. Louis's Day, they are to march out with the usual marks of honour. We must have eight or ten days for the levelling our lines and putting the place in a posture of defence. In the mean time, I am taking measures for the siege of Dendermond. If the weather continues dry, we shall take it; but if it should rain, we cannot continue before it. The duke of Vendome continues to talk more than I believe he intends to perform; however, he strengthens himself every day with all the troops he can possibly get."

Among the cannon of the place were four English pieces taken at the battle of Landen, which being considered as a trophy of victory, were sent back to England. The injury which the works had suffered in the attack was speedily repaired. The loss which the allies incurred in the reduction of so strong and valuable a fortress amounted to no less than 3000 killed and wounded; that of the garrison to 1500.

On the surrender of Menin, Vendome collected his troops, and occupied a strong position behind the Lys and the Dyle, to prevent any enterprise against Lille: but the views of Marlborough were directed to another quarter. Dendermond, though not a place of magnitude, was yet so strong by its marshy situation, and so advantageously situated for securing the winter quarters which he intended to occupy, that he resolved to wrest it from the possession of the enemy. The requisite arrangements were no sooner completed at Menin than the blockade it had undergone was turned into a siege, and troops detached for the attack, the main army still occupying the camp of Helchin. The views of the British general will best appear from his correspondence.

To Lord Godolphin.

“*August 26.*—I have not had the happiness of any of yours since my last, and am very impatient to hear of the descent, so that I beg you will constantly let me have all the particulars you receive of that matter. I saw the garrison of Menin march out yesterday; they were near 4,500 men. The fear they had of being made prisoners of war made them give up the place five or six days sooner than, in decency, they ought to have done.

“My brother will be to-morrow before Dendermond, and I hope the cannon may fire by Monday; and if we have no rain, five or six days may make us masters of that place, which has always been thought unattackable; and in truth we should not have thought of it, but the extraordinary drought makes us venture. If we succeed at Dendermond, and can in time have more ammunition from Holland, we shall then make the siege of Ath, which will be a security to our winter quarters, notwithstanding the duke of Vendome’s army. If we could have been sure of having the necessaries for the siege of Ypres, I believe we should have undertaken it, for that place is very difficult to be relieved when the posts are once taken; but we can’t expect the stores that are sent for in less than three weeks, so that we should have consumed all the forage before we could have been able to have begun the attack. I give you the trouble of all this that you may see that I should have preferred Ypres before Ath; but the Dutch like Dendermond and Ath much the best, so that I hope they will not let us want ammunition for them.”

“*Helchin, August 30.*—The engineer sends me word that he finds much more water at Dendermond than he expected. I go there in three or four days, and then I shall be able to send you the certainty of what we may expect.”

“*Sept. 1.*—I go there to-morrow, and hope by my next to let you know that they have overcome the difficulty; for that place would be very troublesome, it being in the midst of the winter quarters.”

The attack against Dendermond was confided to General Churchill. The attention of the garrison being diverted by a skilful feint, the trenches were opened on the left bank of the Scheldt, without loss, and the approaches pushed with such unusual celerity, that the place was reduced to surrender unconditionally on the 5th of September. To Godolphin the British commander thus writes, in the exultation of success.

“*Sept. 9.*—In yours of the 23d, you were afraid that if there were any good news from this country, it would find the way over, whereas you had three packets due. When they come to you, you will find every thing you could expect from hence. That of Dendermond, making them prisoners of war, was more than was reasonable; but I saw them in a consternation. That place could never have been taken but by the hand of God, which gave us seven weeks without any rain. The rain began the next day after we had possession, and continued till this evening. * * * * The express that carried the good news to the States of our being masters of Dendermond, was despatched in such haste that I could not write to you. I believe the king of France will be a good deal surprised when he shall hear that the garrison has been obliged to surrender themselves prisoners of war; for upon his being told that preparations were making for the siege of Dendermond, he said, ‘they must have an army of ducks to take it.’ The truth is, God has blessed us with a very extraordinary season.

“I do not give myself the honour of troubling the queen with a letter, so that you will give my duty to her and to the prince, and acquaint them with this good success. What makes them the more remarkable is, that this place was never before taken, though once besieged by the French, and the king himself with the army. I hope in seven or eight days we shall have in this town all the cannon and ammunition that is necessary for the siege of Ath.

“I should think, if you have not already, you should now acquaint the Dutch envoy that her majesty has directed Mr. Stepney to come to the army, so that he may act with their deputies at Brussels in what may be for the public good, she having commanded me to return to England as soon as the campaign shall be at an end. As Mr. Stepney is to be joined to me in that commission, so he will have orders to follow the directions I shall leave with him. You must also let him see that this was absolutely necessary in my absence; so that there might be no opportunity lost for the settling of the barrier with King Charles III. I am the

more tedious on this subject, being very sure that the Dutch will not like his coming."

Notwithstanding the advance of the season, Marlborough would not close this long and active campaign without some new and signal enterprise. The various detachments being recalled, the army passed the Scheldt; and Overkirk, with a competent force, on the 16th invested Ath, a small but important place on the Dender. Marlborough himself occupied the position of Leuze, and established his head-quarters at Grametz. On the 22d the trenches were opened, the covert way was carried on the 29th, and the batteries played with decisive effect on the interior defences. The garrison in consternation forced the governor to beat a parley, on the 1st of October. The terms offered by the assailants being deemed too severe, the attack recommenced; but the renewal served only to convince the besieged of their hopeless situation. On the 4th they submitted to their fate, and 800 men, the only effective remains of a garrison of 2000, marched out as prisoners of war to Berghen-op-Zoom.

During this operation, Vendome had taken post on the Scheldt, between Condé and Mortagne. With a discouraged and unequal force, he could not risk the chance of an engagement; and now, justly dreading an attempt on Mons, or Charleroy, he strengthened those garrisons. Indeed his fears were not without foundation; for Marlborough intended to close the campaign with the capture of Mons, had he not been restrained by the timid counsels of the Dutch. He thus expresses his regret to his correspondents in England:—

To Lord Godolphin.

"Grametz, Sept. 27. 1706. — We have nothing new in this country. The enemy continue in their camp, as you see I do in mine. I believe they have no thoughts of disturbing the siege of Ath, so that if I march before the siege is ended, it will be for the conveniency of forage. This last success at Turin has so disheartened their army in this country that if the Dutch can furnish ammunition enough for the siege of Mons, I shall endeavour to persuade them to undertake it; for I am persuaded, if the weather continues fair, we shall have it much cheaper this year than the next, when they will have had time to recruit their army. But the backwardness I have found in some, even for this siege of Ath, makes me fear that they may create so many difficulties that we shall be obliged to do nothing more after this siege is over; so that I desire you will not speak of Mons till you hear more from me. If we shall do nothing after the siege of Ath, but the putting of Courtrai in such a condition as that we

may leave eight battalions in it this winter, you may then depend upon my being at the Hague by the end of the next month. Considering the humour those people are in at this time, I believe there will be a necessity, for the queen's service, that I stay at least ten days, unless you shall order it otherwise."

"Sept. 30. — We have had at this time too much rain; however, I continue of opinion we ought to make the siege of Mons if we can have a sufficient quantity of stores; for the taking of that town would be a very great advantage to us for the opening of next campaign, which we must make if we will bring France to such a peace as will give us quiet hereafter."

After the reduction of Ath, Marlborough broke up from Grametz on the 12th of October, passed the Dender at Leuze, and being rejoined by Overkirk, pitched his camp between Chievre and Lens, establishing his head-quarters in the abbey of Cambron. Vendome boasted, that during this movement he would attack the rear guard of the allies; but he disappointed the hopes of the British commander, who really felt all the eagerness which his antagonist affected to feel for an engagement.

To Lord Godolphin.

"Cambron, Oct. 14. 1706. — After having had very bad weather, we have now the finest that is possible; I hope you have the same at Newmarket. I send you one sheet of the Paris Gazette, that you may see what they say of the affairs of Spain. I hope you will have better news from that country by the way of Portugal. M. de Vendome tells his officers that he has it in his power of strengthening his army to 140 battalions and 180 squadrons; and that if my lord Marlborough gives him an opportunity, he will make him a visit before the campaign ends. I believe he has neither will nor power to do it, which we shall see very quickly; for we are now camped in so open a country, that if he marches to us, we cannot refuse fighting. What I most apprehend is that he will have it in his power to give us trouble about Courtrai."

Alluding to the disputes which then reigned in the cabinet respecting the appointment of Sunderland, he continues: —

"You will have seen by my last how uneasy I was at some news I have heard from England. I shall continue so till I have your thoughts on that matter; for my trouble proceeds from my friendship to you and my duty to the queen. For the consequences of what may happen to the rest of Europe, mankind must and will struggle for their own safety; and, for myself, I shall be much happier in a retired life, when I have the queen's and your leave for it."

The opinion which Marlborough expressed in the preceding letter was verified by the event; for although Ven-

dome advanced from Mons on the 18th and 20th, at the head of a strong reconnoitring party, and made demonstrations of an attack, he did not venture to carry his threat into execution, but retired as soon as his able antagonist took precautions to oppose him.

Having relinquished all farther operations, Marlborough broke up from Cambron on the 26th, fell back to Ghieslingen, between Enghien and Grammont. Here he left the command to Overkirk, and departed for Brussels, to regulate the government of the conquered provinces. He made his public entry into the capital of Brabant in the most splendid manner, amidst the joyful acclamations of the inhabitants; was presented with the keys of the town, and received with all the honours usually paid to the ancient dukes of Burgundy. The magistrates offered, on this occasion, what was called the wine of honour. It was contained in a tun, gilt and painted with the arms of his highness, on a carriage adorned with streamers, and drawn by six horses, preceded by trumpets and kettle drums. The procession was led by a cavalcade of students, richly habited, who presented to the hero of Ramilies devices indicating the great events of this extraordinary campaign.

On the 31st he joined the army, and in the beginning of November distributed his troops into quarters, the English at Ghent, the Danes at Bruges, and the troops of Prussia and Luneburgh along the Demer. Overkirk was left commandant in the Low Countries, Tilly was sent to Louvain, General Salisch to Mechlin, and General Churchill was intrusted with the government of Brussels. The duke himself quitted Antwerp on the 7th, repaired on the 9th to the Hague, to complete the arrangements which were rendered necessary, by the recent occurrences on the Rhine, in Italy, and in Spain; to concert the plan of operations for the ensuing campaign, and to take a share in the negotiations which the Dutch government had now opened with the court of France.

CHAP. XLIX.—ITALY AND SPAIN.—1706, 1707.

DURING the siege of Ath, Marlborough had the satisfaction to learn that his indefatigable efforts in procuring succours of men and money, for the relief of the duke of Savoy, were crowned with the most gratifying success. Anxious to compensate for the disasters in the Netherlands and Spain, the French king redoubled his efforts in Italy, where the strength of his army, and the magnitude of his preparations, seemed likely to insure a favourable issue. Since the surprise of the imperialists in their quarters, unusual exertions had been made to complete the ruin of the duke of Savoy, by the reduction of his capital, which was the last rampart of the allies in Italy. He was compelled to seek a retreat in the recesses of the Alps; and while a covering army, under Vendome, seemed to command every avenue by which relief could approach, La Feuillade, the son-in-law of Chamillard, minister of war, was intrusted with the direction of the besieging force, in the full confidence that success would entitle him to the highest military honours.

Fortunately no common obstacles could baffle the enterprising spirit of so skilful and active a general as Eugene; for he no sooner received the promised reinforcements than he resumed the offensive, at the moment when the cause of the allies appeared most desperate. Descending from the Alps, by passages scarcely deemed pervious, he suddenly appeared in the plains of the Veronese, baffled the combinations of his opponents, and traversing the rivers and canals, with which the country is intersected, compelled the enemy to fall back behind the river Parmegiana.

At this moment Vendome was recalled to recover the fortune of the French arms in the Netherlands, and the command was transferred to the duke of Orleans, under the direction of the Count de Marsin. But the new generals were less able to withstand the progress of their enterprising antagonist than their skilful predecessor. Driven behind the Po, they had the mortification to witness the rapid advance of the imperial general, and his junction with the duke of

Savoy; and they had no other means of prosecuting the siege of Turin than by taking post behind the lines of circumvallation, which they considered impregnable.

The momentous enterprise of Victor Amadeus and Eugene was conducted with consummate skill and promptitude. They met, for the first time, in a meadow near Carmagnola, and having settled their dispositions, effected the junction of their troops on the ensuing day. Ascending the heights of Superga, which command the plain surrounding the capital, they surveyed the dispositions and works of the enemy, and arranged the plan of attack. Inspired by a succour so unexpected, the confidence of the duke of Savoy equalled his former depression. To the master of his household, who inquired where he intended to dine on the following day, he replied, with impatience and enthusiasm, "At Turin! at Turin!"* Nor did the event disappoint his sanguine hopes. The ensuing morning the hostile lines were attacked, between the Doria and the Stura, and the advantage of superior numbers being rendered unavailing, by the skilful combinations of the assailants, the enemy was forced, after a bloody resistance; and the victorious commanders carried relief to the capital, at the moment when breaches were opened in the rampart, and the garrison was reduced to the last charge of powder.† Marsin was mortally wounded, and made prisoner, 9000 men were either killed or taken, and the army which had so long given law to Italy was driven in confusion and disgrace towards the borders of Dauphiné. Eugene imparted the joyful intelligence to his friend and colleague, with his characteristic brevity.

"Your highness will not, I am sure, be displeased to hear by the Baron de Hondorff of the signal advantage which the arms of his imperial majesty and his allies have gained over the enemy. You have had so great a share in it by the succours you have procured, that you must permit me to thank you again. Marshal Marsin is taken prisoner and mortally wounded. The troops have greatly signalised themselves. In a few days I will send you a correct account; and in the mean time refer you to that which you will hear from the bearer of this letter, who is well-informed, has seen every thing, and is competent to give an accurate rela-

* Journal du Baron de Montolieu St. Hippolit.

† History of the House of Austria, chap. lxx.

tion. Your highness will excuse the shortness of this letter, as I have not a moment of time."*

This victory inspired the British commander with no less joy than if it had been his own achievement, and he expressed to the duchess his satisfaction in the warmest language.

"Sept. 26. — I have now received the confirmation of the success in Italy from the duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene; and it is impossible for me to express the joy it has given me, for I do not only esteem, but I really love that prince. This glorious action must bring France so low, that if our friends can be persuaded to carry on the war one year longer with vigour, we could not fail, with the blessing of God, to have such a peace as would give us quiet in our days; but the Dutch are at this time unaccountable."

It was natural to hope that this important victory would not only liberate Italy, but be followed by such decisive operations against France as might realise the expectations of Marlborough, by bringing the war to a speedy conclusion. The defeat of the French before Turin, however, produced the same effects in Italy as their discomfiture in the Netherlands. The jealousies of the duke of Savoy and the emperor, which had with difficulty been suspended in adversity, were revived by success; and the maritime powers, in their turn, had just reason to complain that the emperor profited by this revolution of affairs to gratify his own interests, at the expense of the common cause. The most obvious plan of operations was, to leave the force which still remained in the Milanese to melt away, and by a vigorous attack on the retreating army, to draw the attention and strength of the enemy from other quarters. To this wise plan of operations the British cabinet looked with impatience and hope. Godolphin, in several letters to Marlborough, speaks both his own feelings and the expectations of his colleagues.

"Sept. 17." After congratulating him on the victory at Turin, he adds, "I shall be impatient to hear the next steps of the duke of Savoy and Prince Eugene. I am apprehensive the orders of the latter may direct him to the Milanese. But I hope the duke of Savoy will rather incline to push the French from Pignerol, where, as I am informed, they cannot protect themselves against a superior army. You will best judge what can be properly said to them upon this subject from their allies on

* Eugene modestly omits to allege, in excuse for the abruptness of this letter, the pain of a dangerous wound in the head, which he received during the attack of the lines.

this side; and whatever is said by yourself will have more weight with them than from any body else."

"Sept. 18. * * * *—Nor is it less necessary, on the other hand, to press the duke of Savoy and the Prince Eugene to follow the remainder of the French army which retired to Pignerol, and from thence perhaps into Dauphiné; for if those should be at liberty to be employed elsewhere, we shall soon feel the weight of them upon us in Spain. I have spoken very earnestly to the Comte de Briançon * upon this subject, and perhaps a word to you from Count Maffei, and a letter to Prince Eugene, and also to the duke of Savoy himself, may be very useful. Or otherwise, the consequence of this great victory, to which England has so much contributed, will not only serve to make the war of Spain so much more difficult and expensive to us; and considering how ready the queen has been to do every thing that could be desired for the support of the duke of Savoy, she may reasonably expect so much regard from him as this comes to. Besides this, I have gone so far as to let the Comte de Briançon hope that whenever peace comes to be adjusted, we would use our best endeavours to keep France on this side of the Alps."

These pertinent remarks do honour to the penetration of Godolphin, and were perfectly in unison with the sentiments of the general, who urged this suggestion to the imperial cabinet and Eugene with his usual zeal. But their forebodings were too fully realised; for they had soon the mortification to learn that the enemy had been suffered to continue their retreat to Pignerol unmolested, while the views of the imperial court were carried into effect, by operations for the recovery of the Austrian possessions in Lombardy. Within a few days after the battle the combined army turned their attacks against a French corps left in the Milanese, under the command of Medavi, passed the Tesino, recovered the city of Milan, and finished the operations of the campaign, by penetrating into the Mantuan and Cremonese, and confining the French forces to the citadels of Milan, Mantua, and the other strong-holds which they were unprepared to besiege.

The military operations on the Upper Rhine were far from exhibiting the splendid character which marked the campaign in the Netherlands, and in Italy. The successes of Marlborough had indeed checked the enterprising spirit of Villars, who, instead of restoring the honour of the French arms in Germany, as he had boasted at the commencement of the campaign, saw his forces diminished by continual draughts to the quarter where the victorious army threatened

* Minister of the duke of Savoy.

to break through the iron frontier of France. The margrave of Baden, however, was unable, even if inclined, to profit by the favourable turn of affairs; for his army was also fluctuating by the repeated draughts which the emperor made from his own forces, to feed the war in Hungary; and he was himself gradually sinking under a mortal disorder, which rendered him incapable of exertion, but irritable and impetuous, and impatient of advice or remonstrance.

Marlborough interfered to mediate an arrangement with the Hungarian insurgents, which might prevent this perpetual drain, but without effect; for both the emperor and the insurgents were too elevated in their expectations, and too exorbitant in their demands, to enter into any serious accommodation.

During the whole course of the campaign, therefore, an active, though fruitless correspondence, took place, in which appeals were made to Marlborough on every side. From the imperial ministers, against the inactivity of the margrave of Baden; from the margrave, against the imperial cabinet; and from the members of the British administration, who equally censured the want of zeal and concert manifested by both. The confidence which was placed in his integrity and conciliating manners also drew on him a series of appeals and counter appeals on one side from the imperial cabinet, and on the other, from Prince Ragotski, and the chiefs of the Hungarian insurrection.

In Spain, the close of the campaign was as disastrous as the commencement was brilliant and successful. Instead of prosecuting their advantages, and profiting by the confusion of a discomfited enemy, the allies displayed that want of concert which generally attends the operations of powers actuated by discordant interests, and directed by different heads.

On the western frontier, the united troops of Portugal, England, and Holland were long held in suspense respecting the fate of Barcelona. Although they advanced without obstruction as far as the pass of Almaraz, on the Tagus, Lord Galway* in vain urged Das Minas to proceed to Madrid,

* *Lord Galway to Lord Godolphin.*

“ *Camp of Nuestra Senora de Oega, 12-23. 1706.*—* * * * * The king of Portugal has sent his positive orders to the M. das Minas to

where no force remained to oppose them. Under the pretence of securing the frontier, the Portuguese general compelled his colleague to assist in reducing the fortresses of Alcantara, Ciudad Rodrigo, and Salamanca; and he could not be induced to direct his tardy march towards the Spanish capital, until the intelligence from Catalonia removed all pretence for delay.

On the other hand, the feuds which agitated the petty court of Charles produced a still more fatal effect. A council of war was indeed held at Barcelona on the 18th of May, and it was decided that the young monarch should immediately take his departure for Madrid. In furtherance of this plan, Peterborough was despatched into Valencia with 4000 men, to collect and organise an army, and open the way through the mountains which skirt the frontier of New Castile. Instead, however, of displaying the promptitude and decision which the case required, Charles lingered yet a month at Barcelona, importuning the British envoy and generals for pecuniary supplies, that he might appear in his capital with the splendour becoming a monarch.* Finally, at the very moment when he was anxiously expected in Valencia, he suddenly changed his resolution. Availing himself of a revolution which took place at Saragosa, he directed his course through Aragon, under the pretence of receiving the homage of that kingdom, though in reality to obtain contributions from the States, as well as to escape from the control of Lord Peterborough.

Meanwhile Galway and Das Minas had commenced their march directly towards Madrid, so we have now a fair game to play, except these people will openly betray their king and the common cause. But, at the same time, M. das Minas has so set his mind on the siege of Badajos, that he does not show the satisfaction one might expect upon such great successes as we've had in a few days. He daily makes new difficulties and doubts, and expresses much unwillingness to go on. I give my lord ambassador notice of it, that he may get the king's positive orders repeated to him, which I hope we may receive at Plaencia, to which place I reckon I may persuade him to march, tho' not without difficulty."

* While he was importuning for supplies of money, and excusing his delay by alleging his want of an equipage, Mr. Stanhope replied—"Sir, the Prince of Orange entered London in a coach and four, with a cloak bag behind it, and was made king not many weeks after."—*Memoirs of Lord Walpole*, chap. i.

march to Madrid, in the full confidence that Charles, with the army of Lord Peterborough, would anticipate their arrival. Reaching the capital on the 26th of June, they observed no symptom of welcome or exultation on the part of the people, and received no intelligence of the monarch, or the army on whose junction they had fondly calculated. Even Peterborough, whose aid would, at this moment, have been of the highest advantage, imitated the example of Charles, in delaying his march towards the scene of action. The disappointment was rendered more grievous, by reports which were artfully circulated, of the death of Charles, and which deterred many even of his zealous partisans from manifesting their devotion to his cause. The confederate generals, however, proclaimed his accession, amidst the gloomy silence of an almost deserted capital, and pushed a corps to Toledo, where a commotion was excited in his favour, by the intrigues of the widowed queen, and Cardinal Portocarrero.*

By these delays and divisions the Bourbon prince was enabled to recover from his disasters and perilous situation. Hastening back into Spain, by the road of Pampeluna, he appeared in the capital, at the very moment when his cause was considered as hopeless, and by this proof of firmness and attachment, gave an impulse to the loyalty of his people. At the same time Berwick conducted the army, on which the fate of the monarchy depended, with a skill and circumspection equal to the magnitude of the danger. Without exposing himself to an attack, he hung on the movements of the Anglo-Portuguese, and skirting the borders of Castile, protected the person of Philip; while he superintended the removal of the queen, the court and tribunals, towards Burgos. No effort was omitted to collect reinforcements, and rouse the public enthusiasm. Philip not only joined the army of Berwick with full reliance on the devotion of his subjects, but had soon the satisfaction to see the two Castiles and Andalusia swarm with new levies; while hordes of armed peasantry, and enterprising partisans, straitened the communications of the allies in every direction.

At this juncture the allied generals received intelligence that Charles was at length advancing, and Galway leaving

* *Memoirs of the Kings of Spain, &c., ch. xiv.*

Madrid under the protection of Das Minas, pushed forward to Alcala with a considerable force to facilitate his junction. But it was now too late to remedy the mischiefs occasioned by their procrastination. Berwick still skilfully avoided an engagement; and retreating as his antagonists advanced through Guadalaxara to Xadraca, was hourly joined by reinforcements, not only of new levies, but of the troops who had retreated from Barcelona.

Meanwhile Das Minas quitted Madrid on the 11th July, and the whole force of the allies was directed against the army of Berwick, which they expected to overwhelm; but approaching his position on the 1st of August, they were confounded to find themselves in the presence of a superior force. Their whole attention was now directed to secure their junction with Charles, of whose movements they at length received certain intelligence. After lingering a month at Saragosa, he took a circuitous route, with a small escort, through the borders of Valencia, and was joined by Peterborough, at Pastraña; but the confederate generals had no sooner directed their views to this quarter, than Berwick sent a detachment which recovered Madrid, and expelled their garrisons from Segovia and Toledo.

In this alarming predicament Charles reached the camp of Guadalaxara, on the 6th of August, accompanied by Peterborough, Count Noyelles, General Stanhope, and the prince of Lichtenstein; but brought with him, instead of an army, which was expected, not more than 700 horse, and 1500 foot. Within a few days he was followed by the rest of the force, which together did not exceed 5000 men.

Amidst the public rejoicings for the long-expected arrival of a prince, whose presence was expected to ensure the conquest of Spain, the camp became a scene of altercation; and the person against whom all parties directed their enmity was the earl of Peterborough. Finding himself censured for his delays in Valencia, and mortified by the unwelcome reception which he experienced from Charles, the eccentric peer anticipated his recall, by soliciting permission to fulfil the instructions which he had previously received from the queen, to raise money and succours for the relief of the duke of Savoy.

In a council of war, held in the palace at Guadalaxara,

his proposal was warmly recommended, and he was still farther authorised, after he had relieved the duke, to return with the fleet for the conquest of Minorca. That nothing might be wanting to facilitate his departure, the Portuguese general and ambassador consigned to him bills of exchange to negotiate at Genoa, and the king gave him full power to mortgage any part of his dominions to the republic. Thus loaded with vain promises and impracticable commissions, he took his departure the same evening, to the gratification of all parties, whose private piques and jealousies were absorbed in their common aversion to a general, to whose forward and overbearing temper they all ascribed the disasters with which they were menaced.

The combined generals, to whom the load of responsibility was now transferred, found themselves in a situation of imminent peril and perplexity. They were dissatisfied with the tardiness of the king, disgusted with the interference of his German ministers, without magazines and without money, in the midst of a hostile country, and opposed by an enemy superior in force. Behind, their communications were cut off by the loss of Madrid, Toledo, and Segovia, and around them swarmed innumerable enemies, while continual reinforcements swelled the army of Philip. They had therefore no alternative but to take the only road which now remained open to Valencia, and on the 11th commenced their retreat. Proceeding by hasty marches towards the mountains bordering New Castile, they suffered many hardships from the attacks of the enemy, the want of shelter, and the scantiness of provisions. They closed their long and harassing march at Requena, the last town in New Castile, on the 29th of September, and distributed their exhausted troops into quarters of refreshment.

On the 27th, the king quitted his army during their retreat, and passing through Requena, repaired to Valencia, where his reception seemed for a moment to suspend the recollection of his recent reverse. He could not, however, reflect on this dishonourable retreat, without the deepest regret; and in the course of the march despatched Count Zinzerling, one of his confidential counsellors, to communicate his complaints to Marlborough, and to request that he might be relieved from similar mortifications in future. The letter which he sent

by the same messenger, though written with the utmost caution, will show the poignancy of his feelings.

“*Camp of Peral, Sept. 22.* — My lord prince, and Duke of Marlborough, — You will have seen from my other letters, which you received by the count of Lecheraine, how much I interest myself in every thing that can contribute to your glory and advantage, and the reward of your merits.* Doubting not that you will continue in the inclination you express of advancing my interests, as well as those of the common cause, I am persuaded you will be sensibly affected by the misfortunes I have experienced this campaign, since I joined the army of my allies from Portugal. Of these who will be apprised by my counsellor, Zinzerling, the bearer, who will impart to you my most secret thoughts and projects. After what has happened, you will be aware that my honour, authority, and reputation do not allow me any longer to expose myself to the same accidents and prejudices; and that we cannot hope for a prompt and glorious conclusion of the present war in Spain, unless we adopt other measures; and unless I am enabled to obtain the necessary succours, and act vigorously with my own troops on the points most sensible to France.”

He then solicits the advice and support of Marlborough, and having requested subsidies and other assistance from the queen and the States, he adds: —

“ They may be assured that I will neither spare my person, nor omit any exertion, to perform what may be expected from me. You will believe, my dear lord, that I entertain no other views than such as are the most useful to the common cause, and most advantageous to the liberty of Europe, and the strict union with the crown of England. This I will always maintain, as a proof of the perfect gratitude I feel for benefits so essential as those I have just experienced from the queen, your mistress.

“ It is necessary also that I should make known to you the great satisfaction I feel in the prudent and zealous conduct of Mr. Stanhope, a gentleman who is endowed with every good quality, and possesses my entire confidence and satisfaction. As he has shown himself equally able in the cabinet and the field, you will give me great pleasure by confiding to him such powers as will enable me to profit by his assistance the ensuing year. On this subject, as well as on other important and secret points, I have ordered my counsellor, Zinzerling, to communicate with you in the fullest confidence, and beg you to impart your sentiments with similar freedom.

“ The services you have rendered to the public and to me, and those which I expect in future, will ever be so deeply impressed on my me-

* Alluding to his confirmation of the grant conferring on Marlborough the administration of the Netherlands.

mory, that I shall neglect no opportunity of giving you convincing proofs of my gratitude and esteem for your merit.”*

After the departure of the king, Galway and Das Minas remained with the army, to re-organise the troops, and settle the disposition of their quarters. Peterborough, who had not been permitted to share in the disgrace of the retreat, found on his arrival at Valencia an order from the British government to despatch a squadron to the West Indies. The intelligence which arrived at the same time from Turin superseded his intended expedition to Piedmont, so that after a short stay to press the siege of Alicante, he departed for Genoa, to exchange his military command for the equally difficult, though less honourable occupation of collecting pecuniary supplies.†

By this fatal reverse Marlborough was not only mortified and disappointed, but placed in a predicament equally critical and unexpected. Admiring the chivalrous spirit, fascinating manners, and courtly address of Peterborough, he had recommended him to the command, and bestowed unqualified praise on his splendid achievements. He was therefore deeply chagrined to find that success had rendered him impatient of control, ambitious of pre-eminence, and no less vain and visionary in his designs, than petulant in his manners, and unaccommodating in his disposition. Peterborough had also not only treated with contempt and levity the young monarch under whom he was commissioned to act, and whom he was interested to conciliate; but from pique and revenge he was suspected of having so far swerved from his duty as to make private overtures, proposing to assist in raising the duke of Savoy to the Spanish throne.‡

In addition to the uneasiness arising from these causes, the intemperate effusions and acrimonious complaints of Peterborough evinced an envious and vindictive spirit, which it was dangerous to provoke, and impossible to gratify. It

* Translation from the original, in French.

† Mémoires de Berwick; Narrative of Lord Galway; Conduct of the Earl of Peterborough; MS. Letters from Peterborough to the Duke and Duchess of Marlborough, and to Lord Sunderland; Journal des Operations en Espagne, in a Letter dated Lisbon, Oct. 25., by an Officer in the service of the Allies.

‡ Letter from Godolphin to Marlborough.

appeared that he had already prepared documents to perplex and embroil the administration at home, and had even begun to manifest the hostility to which he afterwards gave full scope, by distributing them, through his agents in England, among the chiefs of the disaffected, and the leaders of opposition.

The correspondence of Marlborough is therefore filled with complaints against the misconduct and perverseness of all who were intrusted with the direction of the war in Spain, more especially of Peterborough, to whose froward and arrogant spirit he and Godolphin principally ascribed the unfortunate result. A few extracts will suffice to display their sentiments and opinions on a subject in which they took so deep an interest.

From Lord Godolphin.

“*June 11-22.* — I have had other notices agreeing with Count Wratislaw’s letter, which you sent me concerning Lord Peterborough; but I reckon they come all from the complaints of the prince of Lichtenstein. And though I can easily believe occasion enough may have been given for them, yet I certainly know, by several letters from Mr. Crowe and others, that the conduct of him who complains has been worthless and contemptible to the last degree. Count Noyelle’s letter is very modest, and does not pretend to decide between the two noblemen.”

To Lord Godolphin.

“*June 18.* — The duke of Savoy has desired that Lord Peterborough may go with the succours. That part is left to the king of Spain, who, I suppose, will not be sorry to part with him, and his lordship will be naturally willing enough to go, if he does not suspect that it will make the king of Spain easy.”

From Lord Godolphin.

“*Windsor, July 18.* — Mr. Montague, a nephew of my Lord Halifax, and one of my Lord Galway’s aides-de-camps, arrived here with eight letters from his lordship, dated from the camp of Madrid, of the 16-27 of June; but this gentleman did not leave him till the 29th. I will not trouble you with particulars, because I send you the letters which he brought, desiring they may be sent to me again at your convenience.

“The same packet brought me a letter from my Lord Peterborough of a very old date, from Barcelona. It is full of extraordinary flights and artificial turns. But one may see by it that there is room for every thing that has been thought or said of his conduct there; and, at the same time, by that and other letters of more credit, nothing ever was so weak, so shameful, and so unaccountable, in every point, as the conduct of the prince de Lichtenstein, and the rest of the king of Spain’s German followers. If Mr. Crowe calls upon you in his return, as I hope he will, I shall not need to trouble you with any more of it now. But it looks as

if the king of Spain would never have come to Madrid, if my Lord Galway had not sent to him from thence, though there was no enemy in the field to hinder them.

“In short, as we have had good luck in what has passed, we shall want it no less in what is to come, except the king of Spain keeps my Lord Galway near him, at least for some time, as I have most humbly desired him to do, in a letter to himself, purely for that purpose.”

“*Windsor, July 19–30.* — Since my letter of yesterday, from this place, I have the favour of yours of the 22d, with the inclosed from Count Noyelles, whose complaints I believe truly are as just as the matter of them is unjustifiable; but vanity and passion are capable of carrying people, who have no principle, to do strange things.

“Upon the joining of our Portugal and Catalonian troops with the king of Spain at Madrid, it has been thought proper, for preventing disputes, to settle in whom the superior command of all the queen’s troops should be lodged. The lords here have been unanimously of opinion that it ought to be in my Lord Galway, as having the elder commission from the queen, and that the king of Spain’s commission to my Lord Peterborough ought not to interfere in this case. I think this is right for the service, but how it may make him fly out I cannot answer.”

To Lord Godolphin.

“*Helchin, Aug. 5.* — I had yesterday yours of the 13th. I send you back Lord Galway’s letter. You will have seen, by my former letter, the fears I have that the duke of Anjou, being joined by M. Legale, may be in a condition to oblige Lord Galway and the Portuguese to retire from Madrid, which will make it very difficult for King Charles or Lord Peterborough to join them. I do with all my heart wish Lord Galway with King Charles; for it is certain, since the relief of Barcelona, he has done every thing as the French ought to have wished. For had he made use of the time, and marched to Madrid, every thing must have gone well in that country. The cabinet council are certainly right in advising the queen to give the command to Lord Galway, but I am afraid the character of our ambassador is what will be very uneasy to King Charles.”

“*Helchin, Aug. 16.* — I agree with you that the Germans that are with King Charles are good for nothing; but I believe the anger and aversion he has for Lord Peterborough is the greatest cause of taking the resolution of going to Saragosa, which I am afraid will prove fatal; for Mr. Crowe told me, that he once said to him, that he would never have any thing to do with Lord Peterborough — that he would not accept of health from him: I suppose this expression is better in Spanish than English. The king of Spain was not to be at Saragosa till the 15th of last month; and, by our letters from France, Lord Peterborough had not joined Lord Galway the 1st of this month, nor have we any account where he is; but I am afraid the troops are so divided in that country, that the duke of Anjou may be encouraged to attempt the Portuguese. Mr. Richards and Mr. Crowe will give you so full an account of what passes in that country, that I have already troubled you too much.

However, I must repeat to you what I have already said to Mr. Richards, that I thought the end of June a very wrong time to send on so long a message the man that has the sole care of the train of artillery; for Lord Peterborough could not expect him back till the month of October."

From Lord Godolphin.

"*St. James's, Aug. 13-24.*—Lord Peterborough has written a volume to Mr. Secretary Hedges. It is a sort of remonstrance against the king of Spain and his ministers, in the first place; and, secondly, a complaint against all the orders and directions sent from hence, and as if he had not authority enough given him, either at sea or land. In a word, he is both useless and grievous there, and is preparing to be as troublesome here, whenever he is called home."

"*Windsor, Aug. 15-26.*—Mr. Secretary Hedges tells me he is causing Lord Peterborough's long letter to be copied, that he might send it to you. It is a sort of two-edged sword; first, a remonstrance against King Charles, in terms as unmanly as unjust; and, secondly, it is prepared to fall on any body here that shall be in his displeasure."

To the Duchess.

"*Sept. 13-24.*—In the letter from Lord Rivers, which I sent to the lord treasurer, he proposes to send Mr. Richards immediately to the king of Spain, to concert every thing for their operations. I hope he will also advise with Lord Galway; but I must confess, if my opinion were to be taken, Lord Peterborough should not be consulted. I do not think much ceremony ought to be used in removing him from a place where he has hazarded the loss of the whole country."

From Lord Godolphin.

"*Windsor, Sept. 2-13.*—I trouble you with a long letter from the king of Spain. In my answer to it I have not been able to forbear complaining of his inexcusable delays, in not advancing sooner towards Madrid; though I can agree with you that Lord Peterborough's humour may have given a handle to his ministers to prevail with him against his own interest, from a hope they had of squeezing the people of Aragon, as they had before done those of Catalonia. But they have missed their aim in it, as I find by Colonel Stanhope's letter, which I send you; and in a word, Lord Peterborough's extravagances could not have hurt us, if those Germans had not outdone him, both in folly and every thing that is worse."

"*Newmarket, Sept. 30.-Oct. 11.*—You will receive from me by this post a letter dated from St. Alban's, and I should not have troubled you from hence, but to tell you that Colonel Hamilton has brought me a letter from Lord Peterborough, of the 4th September, old style, in which, the only matter of fact he tells is, that he had left the army and court, upon a council of war held at Guadalaxara, pretending he had orders from the queen to go to Italy. The whole council agreed to it, by which we may conclude they were as well content to be rid of him, as he was to go.

"Colonel Hamilton tells me they had the news at Alicant before he

left, of the victory at Turin. I don't find he can give any other account of my lord's journey to the duke of Savoy, than to get some dismounted German troopers, and to carry them back to Spain and mount them. This seem so slight an occasion for a general, that I cannot help thinking it might be worth your pains to engage Count Maffei to let you know what he says to the duke of Savoy; for my opinion is it fully deserves your curiosity."

To Lord Godolphin.

"*Cambron, Oct. 18.* — I am obliged to Sir Charles Hedges for sending me copies of all that is come from Portugal and Lord Peterborough, but the bulk is so great, that I shall have not time to read them till I am on my way to the Hague. I have, however, given them to Mr. Cardonnel, that he may see if there be any thing required of me, so that the queen's service might not suffer by my not reading them."

From Lord Godolphin.

"*Nov. 1-12.* — I take it for granted Mr. Secretary Hedges sends you extracts of the letters we had yesterday from Spain. I will not trouble you with repeating them, but I find by Colonel Stanhope's letter to me, that the Comte de Noyelles is very well with the king of Spain, and of a temper to make them all very uneasy there. His aim seems to be, that the king shall act by himself, with a separate body, and the Portuguese by themselves. At the same time they allow that all their troops joined are not sufficient to oppose the enemy at present.

"My poor Lord Galway continues so very pressing to retire and come home, that I really think it would be too great a barbarity to refuse it him; but what amazes me is, that he recommends Lord Peterborough as the properest person to succeed him in the care of the whole.

"They press very much for recruits, but seem to think themselves there is no having them in time, unless whole regiments be sent them from hence or from Ireland. I should hope the force gone with Lord Rivers might be a reinforcement sufficient for them; but how the command shall be settled when my Lord Galway comes away, is a matter which I hope you will turn your thoughts to, against your coming over."

Meanwhile Lord Peterborough continued to importune the ministers with letters and memorials, vindicating his own conduct, and bitterly reflecting on King Charles and his ministers, as well as on the generals commanding in Spain. He hoped also to secure an interest with the Duchess of Marlborough, on whose mind his fascinating conversation and adulatory letters had already produced a considerable effect. One of these will be sufficient to show his design, and display his character and address.

"*On board the Resolution, in Alicante Road, Sept. 4. 1706.* — Madam, — The favour of your grace's letter, and the honour of those brought

from my lord the Duke of Marlborough, by the count of Lecheraine, I received at the same time. I wish I could have answered both from Madrid, and then my next wish would have been the satisfaction of seeing your grace at the Lodge.

“ You were pleased, madam, to allow me to be fortunate, till I had nothing to wish. Remember, my lady duchess, one of my first wishes is, that I may never lose your good opinion and favour, and yet I am content to suffer the punishment, whenever I deserve it, by failing in my duty to my queen or country, or my private respects due to my lord duke or yourself; for your public merits, and particular favours to me and my family.

“ The most disagreeable country in the world is Spain; the most pleasing England; our German ministry and Spanish statesmen much alike; their officers the greatest robbers, and their soldiers the greatest cowards; the only tolerable thing your sex, and that attended with the greatest dangers. Judge, then, madam, of my joy and disappointment, when I soon expected the honour of seeing your grace, after a war ended in a year, and a treaty finished in two months.

“ These pleasing thoughts I had, but I submit to the faults and misfortunes of others, not my own. Hitherto I have been only acquainted with success, but attended with inconceivable fatigues. Perhaps I may now have a reprieve, or at least the satisfaction of submitting to whatever the queen shall desire or command.

“ I have troubled the ministers with the tedious particulars, but hope my Lord Marlborough's success and conduct have made our follies less fatal and recoverable.”

Marlborough saw the danger to be apprehended from a confidential intercourse with a nobleman of so captious and imperious a temper, in the actual state of affairs; and therefore he not only deferred answering the letters with which he was himself assailed, but cautioned the duchess to discontinue a correspondence, which would eventually implicate her in endless squabbles and cabals. He observes, “ What you say concerning Lord Peterborough and his fair lady is certainly very just, for there is nothing that may not be expected from them. I have observed, since I have been in the world, that the next misfortune to that of having friendship with such people is, that of having any dispute with them, and that care should be taken to have as little to do with them as possible.”

From this statement we may judge of the embarrassments created by the affairs in Spain, and in particular we may anticipate the mischiefs which were afterwards raised by so restless a nobleman as Peterborough, when irritated by pique

and disappointed ambition, and foiled in all his schemes of aggrandisement and distinction.*

The perplexity of Marlborough did not, however, arise from the eccentric and perverse conduct of Peterborough alone; for the situation of the army, as well as the rivalry and disputes which reigned among the generals, and in the court of Charles, daily furnished new causes of disquietude. In consequence of the losses sustained during the retreat, the army was scarcely sufficiently strong to defend even the eastern provinces. Hence both Charles and Lord Galway sent repeated expresses to England for immediate reinforcements. The only succours, however, which could be furnished with sufficient promptitude were the troops intended for the descent on the French coast, which were now become useless for their original destination. This expedition had been so long detained by contrary winds and other obstacles, that the fleet did not reach Plymouth till the 13th of August. At the moment of its intended departure, the Marquis de Guiscard, the projector of the expedition, was examined, and his information being found vague and exaggerated, the design was abandoned, much to the disappointment of Marlborough. Orders were accordingly despatched for the fleet to proceed to Lisbon, with the view of conveying relief to the Peninsula. After farther delays, occasioned by the opposition of the elements, the fleet at length sailed, and reached Lisbon the latter end of October, the land forces being commanded by Earl Rivers, an officer who owed his situation to the interest of the Whigs.

Soon after his arrival, the king of Portugal died, and was succeeded by his son John, aged seventeen, a young prince of great spirit and promise, but deficient in experience. The change of government creating considerable confusion, the fleet was again detained, and did not reach Alicante till the 28th of January. About this period Lord Peterborough arriving from Genoa, there were no less than three commanders at the head of the British army in Spain. This division of power created great confusion and jealousy, and the embarrassment was increased by the change which had taken place in the disposition of the Spanish court; for Galway was, in his turn, become the object of odium, and

* Appendix, E. Earl of Peterborough.

Peterborough had partially succeeded in reconciling himself to the young monarch and his courtiers. At the same time the Count de Noyelles was endeavouring to form a separate party, and by his engaging address had conciliated the good will of Charles; but the person highest in the confidence of the young monarch, was Lord Rivers, who laboured to throw equal discredit on his two predecessors, Galway and Peterborough. In the midst of these clashing interests, the three British generals affected a desire to concede to each other the principal command, and all applied for an immediate recall. As it was impossible for all to remain in their actual situation, Peterborough was remanded to Italy; and Lord Rivers, unwilling to incur the responsibility of so dangerous a pre-eminence as the command in Spain, announced his determination to return to England, without waiting for orders. Previous to their separation, a council of war was held at Valencia, to decide on their future operations. The succour brought by Lord Rivers, which amounted to above 10,000 men, inspired the generals with a desire to retrieve their recent disasters, and it was decided to clear the frontier of Valencia, and after destroying the magazines of the enemy, to take the route through Catalonia to Madrid. This opinion was sanctioned by all except Peterborough, who, as usual, proposed a different plan of his own.

In the midst of the preparations for carrying the design into execution, when the junction of the whole army was necessary, and the presence of Charles required to stimulate the zeal of the Austrian partisans, he declared his intention to proceed to Catalonia, for the purpose of repelling an expected invasion on the side of Roussillon. His minister, Prince Lichtenstein, indeed, apologised for this sudden change of conduct, by declaring that his majesty would be ready to join the army in person, whenever he saw it in a condition to undertake the proposed operations. The real cause was, however, a desire to escape from the control of the British generals.

Charles himself was fully conscious that his sudden departure at so critical a time, might justly expose him to censure. He therefore sent to Marlborough a long and laboured vindication of his conduct, which conveys a striking proof of his impatience to liberate himself from restraint, and shows

the impracticability of the system hitherto pursued, in giving only the nominal authority to a young and high-spirited prince, and confiding the real power to British officers.

After repeating his former protestations against the disrespect and indifference with which he was treated, and complaining that his presence was made only an excuse to cover the faults of others, he continues :—

“ I give you this little detail, because you are interested in whatever concerns me ; and, consequently, in my reputation. I leave you to judge whether I can again expose myself to similar mortifications, and whether I am not justified in declaring, that I will not make another campaign in the same manner. I may add also, that these generals, who think only of advancing, do not condescend to reflect on the necessity of securing what we have already gained, particularly so important a province as Catalonia, when we know that the force of the enemy is augmented in Roussillon. From these considerations, from the conviction that other measures are necessary in the army, and from the fear that the Portuguese, as heretofore, have no inclination to act, I have firmly resolved to pass some time in Catalonia, till I can receive your advice and opinion. My reasons are, first, that the generals may act more gloriously, since I have observed that my presence alone incommoded them, that they paid no attention to me, and that if they do nothing, my reputation at least may be saved. Secondly, that I may place Catalonia in a state of defence, and show to all my allies, and to the world, that I wish to act for the good of the common cause, where I am able to do something. I can relinquish my interests, but for no consideration in the world will I sacrifice my reputation. Lastly, the loss of my kingdom is a fatality which my allies and the maternal bounty of the queen cannot absolutely prevent ; but I should deserve it, were I capable of sacrificing my honour ; for even if I should lose my crown, my sword will always find fortune as long as I preserve my character. I hope that no one will censure these, my true sentiments, and that you, as my friend, will render justice to my determination, and explain and support my motives with the queen. I am far from refusing to act in any quarter whatever, and will even rejoin the army, when I see that I can be useful, without risking my reputation. You, as well as the queen, will hear much against this expedition ; but you will, I trust, see that I cannot do otherwise, and I place my character in your hands.

“ From the particular confidence I repose in you, I have explained myself thus freely, and I leave it to your discretion, either to conceal or to impart to the queen the reasons which have compelled me to pass into Catalonia.”*

Charles had no sooner adopted this resolution than he summoned Lord Rivers to Valencia, for the purpose of obtaining his sanction. He indeed not only succeeded in

* Abridged from the French original.

his object; but even seems to have conceived hopes, that if he could procure the transfer of the command to a nobleman who appeared anxious to conciliate his good will, he should be relieved from the control under which he had been held by the other generals. The effect of this interview was, therefore, a letter from Lord Rivers, vindicating the intended journey to Catalonia; and conveying, by implication, a bitter censure on the conduct of his colleagues; and another from Charles himself, praising the demeanour and judgment of Lord Rivers, and warmly soliciting his return to the command. At the same time the appearance of this new candidate for favour produced a total change in the language and conduct of Peterborough. After having censured the proposed expedition of Charles, as the act of a madman, and suggested a series of plans for the conduct of the war in Spain, which were no less absurd than impracticable, he suddenly assumed a different tone and strain of argument, and, in imitation of his colleague, justified the departure of Charles, as the only expedient which he could adopt, to deliver himself from the degrading tutelage in which he was held by Lord Galway.*

Amidst these petty intrigues, Marlborough and Godolphin laboured to bring Charles to a sense of his own interest, as well by their remonstrances, as by private applications to the court of Vienna. They even employed the intervention of the queen, who wrote to the young prince, dissuading him from his ill-timed journey, and recommending him to restore Lord Galway to his confidence. But no representation could obliterate the deep sense which Charles entertained of his dependence, or counteract the insidious advice of those who were caballing for his favour. A letter from Lord Galway to the treasurer from Valencia, dated Feb. 22., will show the inefficiency of these remonstrances, and the froward temper of the young monarch. After expressing his gratitude for the gracious orders of the queen to continue in her service, and the new commission by which he was appointed commander-in-chief of all the British forces in Spain, he adds:

“When I was so pressing for leave to retire, it was not so much on account of my own infirmities, and the disquiets of the service, as of so

* Letters from Lord Peterborough to the duke, Casale, Nov. 10. 1706; Valencia, Feb. 23. 1707; from King Charles, Valencia, March 7. 1707.

many difficulties that made it impossible for me to serve the queen as I ought; but seeing her majesty, the ministry, and my friends, believe I can still be serviceable, I submit to their better judgment. But they must answer to the public for the faults I may commit, though I'll do my utmost to save them from any reproach, if fidelity, application, and vigilance can do it; but I cannot answer for my capacity in affairs so very difficult to manage. * * * *

“ I am extremely sensible of the encouragements her majesty is pleased to give me. I wish her letter to the king, so much to my advantage, may produce a good effect. He has taken no notice yet of it to me. It would not be easy to represent to you that prince's character. He cannot but have so much respect for the queen, that he will always outwardly show me a great regard. He always outwardly agrees with me when I represent any thing to him; but never does what I advise him to. He has now lately made a German chamberlain of his household, which is one of the greatest offices in Spain, and has shown very little countenance to the Spaniards he is most obliged to. I have already had the honour to tell your lordship how necessary it would be, that Prince Eugene came hither to prevent the disorders of the court, as well as those of the field. The king sends Don Pedro Moraes to him. I inclose the copy of the letter I sent him, believing his presence here of absolute necessity.”

Notwithstanding the opposition of the British cabinet, Charles departed for Catalonia. He was accompanied by Count Noyelles, and took with him two regiments of foot, and five squadrons of horse; a force which could ill be spared in the actual condition of the army, particularly in the weak and defective state of the cavalry.

CHAP. L. — ATTEMPTS AT PEACE. — 1706.

IN the course of his negotiations abroad, Marlborough experienced the commencement of those interminable disputes, relative to the Belgic provinces, which deeply affected the vital interests of the grand alliance, and for a century proved a germ of contention to Europe.

From the accession of Anne, when the reins of government were transferred to the hands of Godolphin and Marlborough, they had been incessantly accused of a latent inclination towards the family of their former sovereign, and a culpa-

ble lukewarmness towards the Protestant succession. They were anxious, therefore, as well to exonerate themselves from this odious imputation, as to complete the system on which they had invariably acted. The liberties of Europe had been in a great degree secured by the recent victories, and the juncture now seemed favourable for establishing on a stable basis the liberties of England, which depended on the security of the Protestant succession. The natural and obvious means were, the union with Scotland, which appeared likely to avert internal dangers, and the guarantee of the succession by foreign powers, which was equally calculated to prevent such as might arise from abroad.

The arrangements for the union with Scotland were wholly consigned to Godolphin, as domestic minister; while those for the guarantee of foreign powers were intrusted to Marlborough, in virtue of his great interest abroad, and the diplomatic authority with which he was invested. As the foundation of this system of guarantee, a treaty with Holland was formed, with the concurrence of the Whigs. It comprised an offensive and defensive alliance, in the usual terms, for the security of the Protestant succession; and to remedy the imperfect stipulations in the peace of Ryswick, a clause was introduced, binding the contracting powers to extort from France, as a preliminary to any future negotiation, the recognition of the Protestant establishment.

It was expected that the example of the Dutch would influence other powers; and to secure their acquiescence in the proposed guarantee of the Protestant succession, Lord Halifax, on his return from Hanover, passed some time at the Hague. His efforts, however, proved fruitless; the States declining to give a distinct or positive answer, and he took his departure for England.

The negotiation being thus wholly assigned to Marlborough, he submitted the question to the States in July, the day before he repaired to the army; and to obtain their consent, he offered, on the part of the queen, to secure to the republic such a barrier as justice and safety should require.*

To bring the question of the barrier into discussion, was to touch a chord which vibrated in every nerve of the republic.

* Lamberti, tom. iv. pp. 77, 78.

Perceiving the anxiety of the British cabinet to obtain their guarantee, the Dutch hoped to procure a considerable accession both of trade and territory, under the plea of strengthening their frontier. Instead of the right to garrison a chain of fortresses, which had hitherto limited their demands, they now claimed a portion of the adjoining provinces, and their views extended according to the success of the confederate arms. New difficulties therefore continually arose, and every negotiation was entangled with the question of the barrier. Marlborough himself, though so warm a partisan of the alliance with Holland, was offended by their insatiable cupidity; and in his correspondence we find numerous complaints, that instead of confining their views to a rational system of security, they were labouring for the acquisition of a considerable kingdom.

These jarring interests not only excited irritation between the two maritime powers, but even affected the more distant members of the alliance. In particular the Austrian princes were indignant at this attempt to rob them of the richest prize which they expected to derive from this dangerous and expensive war. The opportunity also was too favourable to be neglected by the enemy. The king of France saw with pleasure, an inexhaustible source of contention between the principal members of the grand alliance, and renewed his offers of negotiation, with the hope of luring the cupidity of the Dutch, by the promise of a more extensive barrier than they could expect from the gratitude or policy of their allies. Accordingly, before the return of Marlborough to England, he witnessed a new and insidious attempt to sow divisions among the confederates, and arrest his career of conquest.

Soon after the battle of Ramilies, an overture was made to the British commander, by the elector of Bavaria, declaring his indignation at the neglect with which he had been treated by France, and announcing his readiness to join the grand alliance. As a proof of his sincerity, he even offered to surrender the fortresses of Mons, Charleroy, and Namur, which were intrusted to his custody as governor of the Netherlands. The opportunity appeared advantageous, and a long correspondence ensued. As on a former occasion, the earnest professions, and pressing instances of the elector, weighed with the unsuspecting mind of Marlborough. He

obtained full powers from the queen to complete the arrangement, and conceived hopes of a satisfactory result. Continual difficulties were, however, started, and the negotiation began to languish. After a short interval, it was renewed with additional warmth, through the agency of the king of Prussia, but with as little effect as before; for the elector rose in his demands, and his offers became more vague and unsatisfactory, in proportion as the allies appeared anxious to purchase his defection.* At length, Marlborough discovered the insidiousness of the proposal, and broke off a correspondence which could only tend to create umbrage among the allies.

Meanwhile Louis employed the agency of Count Bergeick, intendant of the Netherlands, to convey private overtures to the Dutch government. The communication was made through Vanderdussen, then chief magistrate of Ter-gow, and by him imparted to Pensionary Heinsius. The offer comprised the relinquishment of Spain and the Indies, a barrier for the republic, the recognition of the queen's title, and considerable commercial advantages to both the maritime powers, on the condition that the Two Sicilies and Milan should be ceded to Philip. Such a proposal made a deep sensation in Holland, where the national jealousy against the house of Bourbon had so much declined, that Marlborough had reason to observe, "It is publicly said at the Hague, that France is reduced to what it ought to be, and that if the war should be carried farther, it would serve only to make England greater than it ought to be. In short, I am afraid our best allies are very fond of a peace, and that they would engage England to quarrel with the emperor, to have a pretext to come at a peace."† The overture did not escape the notice of the British commander, and he succeeded in convincing the pensionary and the partisans of the grand alliance, that it was merely intended to lure the republic into a separate negotiation. It was, therefore, declined, though it long occupied the attention of the two governments, and influenced the discussion pending with the

* Correspondence of Marlborough and Godolphin, and letters from the Prussian ministers, Wartensleben and Grumbkow, to the duke.

† To Godolphin, Helchin, August 30. 1706.

Dutch, relative to the barrier. The progress and effects of this transaction are well detailed in the correspondence.

To Lord Godolphin.

“*July 14.* — Now that the siege of Ostend is over, I was in hopes we might have lost no time in attacking Menin; but M. Gilder-Massen sends me word that they have not the necessary preparations ready. But as soon as they come to Ghent he will let me know it. I am afraid we shall find at last that some of our friends are of opinion that we have *already done too much*; for notwithstanding what I said when I was at Ostend, that two regiments would be enough to leave in that place, they have left six. But I have writ to the Hague, and if they do not give orders that some of them be sent to the army, they do not intend to have much more done this year. This will appear strange to you, but we have so many of these refined politics, that it is high time we had a good peace. At the same time that I say this to you, the greatest part of the people are very honest, and wish well to the common cause; but those that are of the contrary faction are more active and diligent. Every thing goes so well in Spain, that if we have success with the descent, France must submit to a reasonable peace. The wind has continued so long westerly, that I am afraid several of my letters are at the Brill, which makes me desire Sir Stafford Fairburn to send this. The Dutch have ordered their transports to Ostend, so that you will have their troops and the English together.”

“*July 15–26.* — I hope the treaty at the Hague, about the succession, as it is now settled by Lord Halifax, cannot fail to succeed, since the queen will make no difficulty of warranting the barrier for the States, if they will not be unreasonable.”

“*July 19–30.* — I am sorry to find by yours, that the siege of Menin is like to go on so slowly; but I see it is unavoidable. I hope your impatience to make an end of the war in this year will not prevail with you to make any unreasonable attempt, nor to push any thing too fast; for I cannot find that taking that place, and perhaps one or two more, which is the most to be expected, would put an end to the war this year. Success in Italy, perhaps, would do it, or making a lucky use of the powers sent you from Mr. Secretary Harley, might possibly have the same effect.

“I don't think the Dutch are very reasonable, to be so much in pain about their barrier, as things stand; but it is a plain argument to me, they think of joining their interest to that of France, whenever a peace comes; and for that very reason the longer we can keep it off the better.”

“*Helchin, Aug. 23.* — I send you inclosed a letter from the pensionary and my answer. I do not doubt Mr. Secretary Harley or yourself will hear from M. Buys, as the French are making applications, I believe, at Vienna, as well as at the Hague. You must be careful what answer you make, for be assured they will not continue the war much longer; and I am afraid, in a very little time, we shall find that the court of Vienna and the Dutch are more desirous of quarrelling with each other than with France.”

From the Duke to the Pensionary.

“*Helchin, Aug. 21.* — I have had the favour of yours of the 13th, and shall obey your commands as far as I dare; for, as a good Englishman, I must be of the opinion of my country, *that both by treaty and interest we are obliged to preserve the monarchy of Spain entire.* At the same time, as a friend, I must acknowledge that I believe France can hardly be brought to a peace, unless something be given to the duke of Anjou, so that he may preserve the title of king. I think that of Milan is unreasonable, since it would make France master of the duke of Savoy and all Italy. As to what they pretend on the Rhine, I can’t think they would insist on that. The explication of the queen’s title is certainly very impertinent; for the last peace, in which they take no notice of the successor, was contrary to custom and the laws of the land. You see that in few words I let you know my thoughts. But I durst not advise what answer you should give; but I should think it were very natural for M. Buys to give an account of this proposal to Mr. Secretary Harley and lord treasurer, who will acquaint her majesty; by which means you will have the opinion of the queen.”

From Lord Godolphin.

“*Windsor, Sept. 2-13.* — I now send you a copy of the answer to M. Buys from Mr. Secretary Harley and myself. I hope it will have your approbation, and I am pretty sure it is what the generality that one can speak with here will think very reasonable for us to insist upon. If the very first point be agreed to, that before any formal step be made towards peace, both England and Holland shall engage to warrant whatsoever shall be concluded upon that occasion, I shall not doubt but the rest will follow to our satisfaction.

“I beg leave only to add, that I don’t see how this first point can be refused with any tolerable honesty or sincerity, or indeed unless the Dutch be absolutely resolved to throw off the mask, declare themselves open friends to France, and not under any obligations to keep farther measures with the queen. This I take to be no easy task, and therefore I am humbly of opinion, that to speak plain to them now is the best way to divert them from attempting it; for the more complaisance is shown them, and the more we give way to them, it is both their nature and their practice to be the more assuming.”

Reply of Marlborough.

“*Grametz, Sept. 20.* — At my return this day from the camp before Ath, I had the favour of yours of the 2d, from Windsor, and that of the 3d, from London. Your answer to Buys’ letter is certainly very right; and if they had no view but their true interest they would think so; but I am afraid you will find they will make reply to it; for the success with which it has pleased God to bless the arms of the allies this campaign, has made them very jealous of the great power, as they term it, that England has in the greatest part of the courts in Christendom. It is certain that the Dutch carry every thing with so high a hand, that they are not beloved any where. I am very much of your opinion, that before any step be made towards peace, we ought to have a treaty with

Holland for the guarantee of any treaty of peace we may hereafter make with France; and that there be room left for the allies to come into it, that if I have her majesty's commands, I hope it might meet with no opposition at my coming to the Hague."

From Lord Godolphin.

"*Windsor, Sept. 18-29.* — I had time but just to thank you by yesterday's post, for six letters I received at once from you. The news they brought at last was good enough to make amends for our long expectation.

"I hope before this comes to your hands you will have taken Ath, and turned your thoughts, not to any new expedition, but to end the campaign as soon as the French will give you leave to do it. I don't think their misfortune at Turin will prevail with them to make any detachments from M. de Vendome's army as long as you are in the field; but rather I am not out of pain, lest they may yet venture something to redeem the blow at Turin, on this side, when they think the season so far advanced as that you could not be able to prosecute any advantage you might have upon them. And this seems the more reasonable, because it would be a great help to their negotiation with the Dutch this winter, upon which, I believe, *they place their greatest hope.*

"Upon this head I cannot help saying, that, though some of the leading men of Holland may be blind, or worse; yet surely the generality cannot be imposed upon so far, as to be blown up with a jealousy of the queen's power, when all that power, be it great or little, has been, and is still, exerted for their safety, without the least view or desire of any extent of conquest or dominion for England; and when it is plain, that in two or three years' time France, with the comfort and assistance of peace, will be just where she was before, if the nicest care be not taken to put it out of her power, now there is an opportunity in our hands.

"But, whereas you say in one of your letters, we may now be sure of a solid and lasting peace, if *the Dutch do not play the fool*: that position is certainly right, if we can agree to carry on the war *with vigour*, as you call it, another year. But the difficulty is in that *agreement*, for I very much doubt whether Holland will make so much as a show of doing it. * * * *"

"*The 19th.* — Since I had written the former part of this letter, I have the favour of yours of the 23d, by which, as also by the letters from Paris to the Venetian ambassador here, I perceive Holland is running very fast towards peace, and therefore I think nothing must be left unattempted of any kind, to let them see that the queen will not be compelled in that matter. On the other side, I am of opinion it would be right to humour them the more in all reasonable things, and particularly in the affair of Munster. I cannot help repeating, that now the election is over by a fair majority, I think the emperor pushes that matter too far; and since he has not done, nor can do any thing considerable but as he is helped by England and Holland, it seems to be an unreasonable assuming; and I doubt you will not do yourself a good office with Holland, by leaving too much to the imperial court in this matter.

“ My Paris intelligencer, says M. Rouillé and the elector of Bavaria carry on the affairs of Spain with great vigour and success.”

To Lord Godolphin.

“ *Grametz, Sept. 23.*—I have forborne writing till this evening in hopes of having the English letters, or an express from Italy, but neither is come. The Germans have at length passed the Rhine, but it is so late in the year that we must not expect much from them. The 27th of the last month was the post by which you sent me the copy of M. Buys' letter. We hear that packet boat was carried into Calais. I hope they had time to fling the packet overboard, for I should be sorry to have his letter go to Versailles, though I am afraid they are there too well informed of the inclinations of the Dutch; for what has passed in Italy, I am afraid will make them neglect what is fit to be done for the support of the war, being not only fond, but, as they think, sure of enjoying peace before the next summer, which thought can only end in hurting themselves and friends. For as our affairs are in Spain, how is it possible that the king of France can resolve to send for the duke of Anjou back?—so that there is an absolute necessity of supporting the war some time longer, which is what you will find them very averse to. They are so angry with the emperor about the election at Munster, that they very freely say that if France were in a worse condition, they might expect from the emperor to be used by him as he does his own subjects. This, joined with the jealousy they begin to have of England, may give such advantage to the king of France, that he may, in a few years, recover so much strength as to be able to punish them for their folly.”

“ *Grametz, Sept. 26. n.s. 1706.*—The Baron Hondorff, who gives you this, is sent by his master, the duke of Savoy, and Prince Eugene, to give her majesty a relation of the glorious action at Turin. Thinking this opportunity safer than my letters that go through Holland, you shall have my thoughts concerning the Dutch. They are positively resolved to have peace, being very angry with the emperor, and jealous of England. They cannot agree among themselves concerning their barrier; but the most reasonable are extravagant, so that if that matter be not settled before we come to a formal treaty of peace, the French will certainly make a great advantage of it. They are very positive that the duke of Anjou must have something given him. In short, they think that by supporting that, they make their court to France at the expense of England. I am afraid the management of the war in Spain will afford them some reasons; so that the only cure I can see is, if it be possible, to persuade them to support the war one year longer.

“ You know I have great indulgence for what the States-general may wish, but they are so very unreasonable in this dispute of Munster, that I hope the queen will not be persuaded by M. Vryberg to enter into that quarrel.”

From Lord Godolphin.

“ *Windsor, Oct. 4.*—I have received the favour of yours of the 23d, with the inclosed from the pensionary to you, about peace, in which he is pleased to lay weight upon two arguments, which seem to me to have

so little, that I cannot help saying something upon them to you, because my answer to M. Buys' second letter, of which I send you a copy, is not so strong upon those particulars as it might have been.

“ His two arguments are: —

“ First, that I take no notice in my letter of the low condition of their finances.

“ Secondly, that France may not be so well disposed to treat at another time as now.

“ I took no notice in my letter of the state of their finances, because I thought it unnecessary, the answer to it being so very obvious, for all arguments of that kind must be taken comparatively. And though the land and trade both of England and Holland have excessive burdens upon them, yet the credit continues good both with us and with them; and we can either of us borrow money at 4 or 5 per cent.; whereas the finances of France are so much more exhausted, that they are forced to give 20 and 25 per cent. for every penny of money they send out of the kingdom, unless they send it in specie, by which means they have neither money nor credit. The result of this first argument is only that it absolutely destroys the second, since it is plain the condition of France is in all respects so low, that the greatest support they have at present comes from the *greediness*, if I may use that word, of Holland, to encourage and entertain all projects of peace: whereas, if the allies would agree not to receive or hearken to any proposals of peace till the state of war for the next year was settled, I durst venture my little fortune upon it, that France would agree to every point mentioned in my former letter to M. Buys.

“ As to the project brought over by my Lord Halifax, he will send you his thoughts by this post, as he did by the last to M. Heinsius. Mine you will see in the copy of my answer to M. Buys, which goes herewith.”

This letter was accompanied with a reply to Buys, of which the draught has been preserved.

“ I am very glad that you approve of the proposition of making a preliminary treaty among the allies for maintaining the peace that shall be made. I hope my Lord Marlborough will agree that with you, when he comes to the Hague. But this cannot properly be done in the treaty for the guarantee of our succession and your barrier; for it would not be convenient to ask some of our allies to guarantee the succession in the house of Hanover, who are too considerable to be left out of the treaty for the guarantee of the peace.

“ I have seen that project of a treaty which my Lord Halifax brought over, and I believe there must be great alterations made in that before it can be agreed to. I think that part which relates to your barrier is so worded, that it may be interpreted to extend farther than you yourselves mean it should.

“ I am also glad that you agree, that if all the essential points are not settled before we enter upon a public negotiation, we give the enemy too great an advantage. I am so much of that opinion, that I shall despair

of obtaining any condition of consequence, after the treaty is begun, that is not agreed to before. The time of beginning these private transactions is much less material than the manner of managing them. If the design of them be clearly to let France know upon what terms we think it safe and honourable to make peace, and this be expressed with great firmness and resolution, and with a general view to the interest of the allies, the sooner they know our minds, and we theirs, the better. But if some of our demands are faintly made, only to save appearances with our friends, and France can suspect that we have not equal concern for all the parts of them, and the like resolution to insist upon them, we ought to be very cautious how we begin a transaction that may create distrust and jealousy among the allies, and give France an opportunity of dividing them.

“ It is very reasonable that Holland and England, who have borne the burden of the war, should be the arbiters of such disputes as may arise upon the interpretation of our treaties. But would you make use of this authority to lessen any advantage that the allies might have from the success of their arms? Would it be a sufficient excuse for giving the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily to the French, to say they were not expressly secured to the house of Austria in the grand alliance? And, perhaps, the apprehension the Neapolitans may have of our being too easy in delivering them up to France, may hinder their attempts to free themselves, which the French will not fail to let them know.

“ For my own part, I think the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily would make the French such entire masters of the Mediterranean, would give them such an authority over all the princes of Italy, and lay open Milan and Piedmont so much to the attempts that may be made against them on both sides, that the duke of Savoy, after all he has done and suffered, would be exposed to their revenge and ambition. The qualifications and restrictions which you would put upon this article, are the same that were mentioned in the treaty of partition, and were there thought elusive, and of no effect. This was the article most censured in that treaty, and after all our success, I hope we shall not come back to it again.

“ I don't see how the queen can, with honour or decency, enter upon a treaty with France, while they receive and treat another as king of England; and the case now is very different from what it was in the last war. The monarchy of Spain is now the matter in dispute, as the king's title was in that; and though the king of France should send the prince of Wales to Rome, he would thereby yield nothing of his pretensions to the crown of Spain, and only remove the offence he has given to the queen and the nation, in setting up another pretender after he had owned the king's right to the crown. To put this off till the public treaty, is to leave it to have the same effect. And as you see the queen would never consent to a cartel, as was done in the former war, neither will she be willing to have her right and dignity lessened in any treaty.

“ You say I have taken no notice of the state of your finances in my letter. I cannot apprehend there can be any argument drawn from thence to induce you to accept a disadvantageous peace, and a good one we all desire. The debts of England are very great, and the burdens on our land and trade excessive. But we see your credit is good, and we hear

they are not at their ease in France, and that their finances are exhausted; and it would be no more relief to your circumstances to make such a peace as might draw on another war than it would be a strength to your government to take such conditions as your allies may complain of, and your own people dislike.

“Now the duke of Savoy has recovered his dominions, there is not the same occasion to have such regard for the elector of Bavaria; and, perhaps, if he were made sensible that you are not so easy in that matter, he might do something to reconcile himself to you, and not stick so firmly to France.”

This reply, though at once judicious, firm, and conciliatory, does not appear to have restrained the inclination of the Dutch government for peace.

To Lord Godolphin.

“*Grametz, Oct. 4.* — Every post gives me an account of the great desire some in Holland have to end the war before the next campaign. The knowledge France has of this, is, no doubt, the reason of their having made no new offers since their misfortune in Italy. If Holland can be persuaded to go on with the war the next year, we have reason to expect an honourable, safe, and lasting peace; so that I beg of you that the pensionary and M. Buys, against my coming to the Hague, may be prepared, by letters from yourself and Mr. Secretary Harley, to take with me the necessary measures for carrying on the war the next campaign.

“I shall not care to stay longer at the Hague than is absolutely necessary for the service, being sure they will be very troublesome concerning the peace. Their notions of that matter, in my opinion, are very wrong; so that, with the queen’s leave, I must speak plainly to them; for they argue as if they alone were the only people concerned in this war, and consequently in the peace.”

“*Grametz, Oct. 9.* — I am very far from being of your opinion that the French will venture any thing on this side, for they knew of their loss at Turin before we began the siege of Ath; so that if they could have had any temptation to venture a battle, it ought to have been when we of necessity must have been divided. But I believe they have set up their rest in the hopes they have that their negotiations with the Dutch may succeed, so that there will be a necessity of the queen’s giving me leave to oppose it in her name, unless they should offer much better conditions than I have yet heard of. I have writ concerning the preliminary treaty you mentioned; but I think it would forward it very much, if Mr. Secretary Harley would let me have the heads of such a one as you desire.

“The business of Munster is like to be very troublesome. The queen can certainly meddle with it no otherwise than by doing good offices.

“I had a letter last night from the pensioner. He complains that the treaty for the guarantee for the succession stands still, for his want of hearing from Lord Halifax. If you have any difficulty in England concerning that treaty, I should know it; if not, it should be pressed, so that I might sign it before I leave that country.”

“ *Grametz, Oct. 11.* — Since my last we have no letters from England, nor any news from France. I expect the Comte de Zinzendorff about a fortnight hence, and then I shall be able to let you know what the emperor’s intentions are for the operations of the next campaign on the Rhine; for if they can be brought to act offensively, that will very much help the allies in all other parts.

“ It has always been, and is still my opinion, that M. Slingelandt is the best inclined for carrying on the war of any at the Hague. This opinion makes me send you the inclosed letter, that you may see how the humour runs in that place. This letter should be seen by none besides the queen and prince, but such as you would advise with, to know how I ought to carry myself when I come to the Hague. The Comte de Maffei has shown me a letter he has from Paris, in which he is assured that the French are resolved to make no new offers till I am gone for England; and then they will offer whatever they think will be agreeable to the Dutch. When I have been at Brussels some few days with Mr. Stepney, I think it will be for her majesty’s service that I take Mr. Stepney with me to the Hague, to try, if possible, to cure their jealousies, and then send him back to Brussels.

“ Having written thus far, I have received yours of the 23d of the last month, and a copy from Mr. Secretary Harley of yours to M. Buys, which is so reasonable and just that it will be impossible for him to give an answer, so that the effect of your letter will be that they will be angry. For by all that I can learn they are resolved to have a peace; but in my opinion, when they shall endeavour to put it in practice, they will find it very difficult, for I do not think their people will be pleased with any propositions that are not liked by the queen.”

“ *Cambren, Oct. 14.* — By my letter from the Hague, I see they are preparing a great deal of business for me, as to their disputes with the emperor, their barrier, and the peace. But I hope the queen will allow me to speak my mind freely, and then come to England; for in my opinion, they will be so extravagant in their barrier, that it will hinder the treaty for the succession.”

From Lord Godolphin, in reply.

“ *Newmarket, Oct. 10–21.* — Since my last, I have received your letter of the 14th. To that of the 11th I made some answer by the last post, and sent you at the same time the last letter I had from M. Buys, as also the substance of my answer, which was very short.

“ I believe, as you seem to do, that notwithstanding the violent passion for peace which appears in Holland, they will have a good deal of difficulty to compass their inclinations against the opinion of England, especially if they will force us to make public upon what terms the queen is willing to approve of peace; since I cannot but think those will not appear unreasonable, either to the rest of the allies, or to their own people.

“ The chief point in my opinion is, that Holland should, upon your arrival at the Hague, proceed to settle their state of war for the next year; and though France should then make new offers after you were come for England, they could not fail of communicating them here, before any

resolutions were taken upon the whole matter. Therefore, it seems best on all accounts, that you should come over as soon as you can, since you are wanted here as much as there; and what you are wanted for here cannot be supplied by another, as the business on that side may, for aught I know, upon any extraordinary occasion, which shall happen to occur when you are here.

“I am apprehensive Count Zinzendorff’s coming to the Hague will rather increase than appease the differences between the emperor and the States.”

From Lord Godolphin.

“*St. James’s, Oct. 13–24.* — The necessity of the parliament meeting so late here, may, I fear, furnish a handle to the States to put off fixing their state of war for next year, which, if they do, it will be the greatest encouragement imaginable to the partisans of France. They have no ground to take any pretext of delay from thence; since it is necessity, and not choice, which retards the sitting of our parliament.

“As to the letter you sent me yesterday from the Hague concerning peace, I can easily believe that and more. The inclinations of the Dutch are so violent and plain, that I am of opinion nothing will be able to prevent their taking effect, but our being as plain with them upon the same subject, and threatening them to publish and expose to the whole world the terms for which they solicit, and the terms to which we are willing to consent, if they think fit to insist upon them, in conjunction with those allies, without whose assistance they could not have been able to support themselves. I hope their own people would think this reasonable; I am very sure the generality of people in England would not be satisfied with less.

“Lord Somers has shown me a long letter which he has had from the pensionary, very intent upon settling the *barrier*. He says he sent you a copy of it. I have desired him also to send you a copy of his answer, and I hope he will do it by this post, since I think it may be of use to you when you come to discourse with them upon this affair at the Hague. I am of opinion they will think it reasonable to specify the particular towns which they propose to have for their barrier, and are pretty well cured of the folly of affecting the sovereignty to themselves, which, however, they had to a great degree swallowed from the offers made to them by France last winter, before you had conquered the country.

“I am afraid we shall have another difficulty, though of the same nature, with the court of Vienna, about the duchy of Milan. Italy will be all up in arms, if the emperor thinks to keep possession of it in his own right; but that is not all. None of the allies will like it any better than the princes of Italy. For this reason, the queen being about to despatch Mr. Crowe to the king of Spain, will cause him to be particularly instructed to desire that his Catholic majesty would be pleased to appoint a governor there in his own right, and let him see that the emperor’s pretensions, in that particular, will not be borne by the rest of the allies.

“Directions will be sent for putting all the queen’s forces in Spain and Portugal under the orders of my Lord Galway.”

To Lord Godolphin.

“*Cambron, Oct. 18.* — The inclosed French letter is what I received last post from the duke of Lorraine’s minister at the Hague. He is a very honest man. I send it that you may see what he writes concerning the peace. He must not be known to have writ such a letter. You may observe that the French are trying in all courts but that of England, to have a negotiation for peace, by which they hope to slacken the preparations for the next campaign, whilst they are making their utmost efforts.”

“*Cambron, Oct. 21.*— I forgot to send by the last post the inclosed letter from the pensioner. You will see by it the necessity there is of sending me such instructions as I may communicate to him and M. Buys, who penned the blank for the barrier; so that you must be the more careful in the objections you make to the wording of that clause. By all I hear from the Hague, we must not expect one step to be made to the succession, but as the barrier goes with it. They are so flattered from France, that whatever is easy to themselves, they think both just and reasonable; but when I come to the Hague I shall use my endeavours to let the honest men see that the project of France is to make them fall out with their best friends, which is the only method they have left for disturbing of the confederacy.”

While Marlborough was combating the inclination manifested by the Dutch to accept the secret overtures of France, he was assailed by a diplomatic artifice of another kind. Louis XIV. being foiled in the attempt to open a separate negotiation with Holland, disclaimed the view imputed to him of dividing the maritime powers by a private negotiation: and as a proof of his sincerity, offered to hold public conferences in any place between the two armies, during the continuance of the campaign, and afterwards in some town between Mons and Brussels. The proposal was made at the same time to the deputies of the States, and to the duke himself, in a letter from the elector of Bavaria. Although the quarter from which this double proposal emanated, and the vague terms of the overture itself sufficiently proved it to be delusive; yet, as it bore a plausible appearance, and was likely to find a grateful reception in Holland, he could not venture to give a specific opinion, much less to reject it. He therefore referred it to the decision of the cabinet.

To Lord Godolphin.

“*Cambron, Oct. 24.* — I send by this express copies of the elector’s letter to me and the deputies of the army. I am of opinion that this matter has been settled by some in Holland, so that the queen must be the more careful of the directions she shall think fit to give; for should

you show a backwardness to a good peace, they would make an ill use of it; and I believe one of the designs that France has in this proposal is, that it may make the Dutch less zealous in their preparations for the next campaign, whilst they are doing their utmost. Another is, to let the world see that they have been managing a treaty these last twelve months. If it were possible to have their proposals without entering into a treaty, I should think that were best; for I am very sure they would not be liked by the confederates; and if they have not an opportunity given them to make a proposal, they will endeavour to induce every country to believe that they should have offered what would have been most agreeable to them.

“I beg I may not be employed in this first step: Mr. Stepney will be very proper. The deputies are very desirous of having my opinion, that they might have sent it to the Hague; but I desired to be excused, by telling them that my opinion in this matter must be governed by her majesty’s commands, and that I was sure the States would give no answer, till they had consulted with her. I shall go to Brussels on Wednesday next, being the 27th, and begin my journey to the Hague on the 2d of the next month. By the inclosed letter from the pensionary you will see what he desires of me. Whatever the queen would have me do at the Hague, I beg I may have her commands by the next post; for I shall be very uneasy till I come to England; for I have never been so uneasy as I am at this time, since her majesty’s coming to the crown. I thought to have sent this last night, but was disappointed, so that you will have no other by this night’s post. Being to march to-morrow, I have chose this day for seeing the army under their arms, which is a sort of taking leave, though I do not intend to quit them till the second of the next month, at which time I design to send them to their several garrisons.”

“*Brussels, Oct. 29.* — I have been in such a hurry since I came to this town, that I have but just time to tell you I have had the favour of two of yours, and I beg you will make my excuse to Lord Halifax, for my not having time by this post to acknowledge the favour of his, and thank him for the copy of his letter to the pensioner, which will be of use to me when I come to the Hague. This will be about the end of the next week, for I shall leave this place on Sunday, and separate the army on the 3d of the next month, and the same day begin my journey to the Hague, where my inclinations will lead me to make as little stay as possible, though the pensionary tells me I must stay to finish the treaty of succession and their barrier, which, should I stay the whole winter, I am very confident would not be brought to perfection. For they are of so many minds, and all so very extravagant concerning their barrier, that I despair of doing any good till they are more reasonable, which they will not be till they see that they have it not in their power to dispose of the Low Countries at their will and pleasure, in which the French flatter them. Mr. Stepney has his powers for Holland, but not for this country; but I hope he will meet them at the Hague, where I think it is for the queen’s service he should be, till I come for England; so that I may be the better able to inform him of all that shall pass.”

A matter of such importance was taken into immediate consideration, and the decision of the queen was imparted to the duke by Secretary Hedges, and inclosed in a letter from Lord Godolphin, dated October 21. o. s.

“I can never thank you enough for all your kind letters which I have received, particularly those by this messenger, who goes back to you with her majesty’s opinion and orders upon the letters you sent by him, from the elector of Bavaria. I shall add nothing to the particulars which you will receive by Mr. Secretary Hedges, but that they have been considered by all our friends here, as the shortness of the time would allow, and upon the whole we think them so reasonable and so fair, as that you will do yourself but right in insisting upon them there. And I think you may depend upon being supported in it here. Besides what is mentioned in Mr. Secretary’s letter, the conferences proposed, if they should be admitted, could not fail of giving an immediate ease and support to all France, which lies almost gasping at this time, under an excessive want both of money and credit. I shall long, therefore, very impatiently, for the return of this messenger, and to hear that this blow has been avoided.

“There needs not, I think, any other answer to the letters you have sent me from the pensioner, than what you will find in my Lord Halifax’s letters to him, and to yourself, concerning our remarks upon the treaty for the barrier and the succession, which is, in one word, that it is too general; and when they please to particularise the plans they propose for their barrier, and the troops necessary to maintain them, we shall agree.

“As to the preliminary treaty for the guarantee of the future peace, which the pensioner mentions in his letter to you, I think that must, for the present, be only in general terms, except this treaty for the barrier and succession should be first concluded, in which case it might be particularly warranted in the preliminary treaty.”

From Sir Charles Hedges.

“*Whitehall, Oct. 21.—Nov. 1.*—Having laid before the queen copies of the letters sent by your grace from the elector of Bavaria, to yourself and the deputies of the States, relating to a peace, her majesty has judged it for her service that your grace should, upon this occasion, explain very particularly to the States-general her majesty’s thoughts concerning that matter.

“The queen did find herself obliged last winter to express her sense of a peace in general, in a very public and solemn manner. Her majesty is now pleased farther to declare, that she entered at first into this war, in conjunction with her allies, and for their support, and has ever since continued it at an extraordinary expense to her subjects, with no other view or design, than to procure for herself and her allies an honourable and durable peace.

“Her majesty hopes it must be evident to all the world, that the great successes with which it has pleased God to bless the arms of the allies,

have given them a fair and reasonable prospect of obtaining such a peace. In order, therefore, to adjust the particular terms of it, so as that the same good friendship and correspondence in which her majesty has lived with the States-general, ever since her accession to the crown, and which she desires to cultivate and improve with the greatest care, may continue as firm and immovable after the peace as it has been during the war; her majesty is of opinion, that the first proper step would be, for herself and the States-general to concert and agree, betwixt themselves, upon such a scheme of a peace as may be honourable and safe both for themselves and for the rest of the allies. And her majesty cannot but look upon this method as more honourable for the allies, and more effectual for the end desired, than the conferences proposed by the elector of Bavaria in the name of France, for the foundation of a treaty, without so much as knowing what particulars are to be considered in that treaty. Of which conferences, therefore, her majesty cannot see any other use than to distract the allies with jealousy, and to divert them from making in time their necessary preparations for continuing the war. These are her majesty's thoughts and apprehensions of this matter; and in case they meet with the approbation of the States, as her majesty hopes they will, she thinks it proper to add, that she is willing to enter upon the adjustment of particulars betwixt herself and the States, in such manner, and at such time, as they shall think fit. In which case also, her majesty thinks it proper that your answer to the elector of Bavaria should be concerted with the States, and agree with the answer from their deputies, that so England and Holland may appear to France to be uniform and of one mind in the transaction of this great affair, by which means it cannot fail of having a happy conclusion."*

The decisive opinion manifested by the British government, and the judicious reasons on which it was founded, weighed with the more patriotic members of the States, and silenced the clamours of the rest. To prevent the repetition of a similar artifice, a resolution was taken to form a series of preliminaries, which were not merely to be offered to France as the common claims of the confederates, but were to be understood as a mutual pledge among themselves, to support the terms on which the future peace was to be founded. This important document was drawn up by Marlborough, in conjunction with the members of the States; and being transmitted to England for consideration, was returned with the sanction of the queen, accompanied by some remarks of the treasurer.

From Lord Godolphin.

" Oct. 22. — Nov. 2. — The messenger arrived this morning, and brought me the favour of yours of the 12th and 14th, with the papers inclosed.

* Draught in the Marlborough Papers.

I have also seen your letter to Mr. Secretary Hedges, with the paper of preliminaries, of which he sends you, by this post, the queen's approbation, provided we keep strictly to every one of them.

“ I observe the form of these preliminary articles, which you have sent over, is a little different from what was proposed by the queen. Her majesty's proposal was, that we should concert and agree to the preliminary articles of a peace to be offered to France, whereas the title of this paper runs thus: ‘ Preliminaries for a treaty of peace, in case France can be induced to make the offers in the name both of the king of France, and the duke of Anjou.’ I don't know that there is any thing essential in this observation; but I had a mind to take notice of it to you, that you might judge whether this difference in the form were only casual, or whether it were affected.

“ I find my letter of the 25th of October has been thrown into the sea. You have escaped a good deal of trouble by it, for it was very long, and full of complaints of the emperor's taking possession of the duchy of Milan in his own name, though obtained by our money; but if these preliminaries take place, that complaint will be pretty well cured. Now if Holland will hold firm to them, I am of opinion, that first or last they will take place; for, besides all the successes of France, they will have a ruin increasing every day upon them in the point of their money, which they are not sensible of themselves, nor cannot be able to have a right notion of it, from any thing that has happened of that kind within the memory of man in that kingdom. I agree with you that France will not at first receive these proposals; but I incline to think they will not absolutely reject them, but endeavour to moderate some articles, and graft something upon others; so as to keep on foot a negotiation upon them, and by that means hope to slacken the preparations of the allies, and gain time to hearten and encourage their friends in Holland.

“ It may, therefore, deserve your consideration, whether there should not be a time prefixed and limited to them, within which they should be obliged to declare their final resolution of accepting or refusing them.

“ I don't trouble you with one word about the barrier; because having communicated the whole to Lord Somers and Lord Sunderland, I send you a letter unsealed from my Lord Halifax, with whose thoughts upon that subject I entirely concur; and if they can agree to their own demands, I don't see why any scruples on our part should take up two hours' time.

“ The powers are sent as you desired for Mr. Stepney, so I hope you will have nothing to hinder you from leaving the Hague soon after you have received these letters.”

The intended answer to the elector of Bavaria was then taken into consideration, in an assembly of the States, which was held on the 10th of November, and a reply, conformable to the opinion of the British government, received a public sanction. An answer was accordingly transmitted to the elector by Marlborough, in the name of the queen, and

by the deputies in behalf of the States. This letter will display the motives which actuated the allies.

“ Sir;—Having communicated to the queen, my mistress, what your electoral highness did me the honour to write to me in your letter of the 21st of last month, of the intentions of the most christian king to endeavour to re-establish the tranquillity of Europe, by conferences to be held for that purpose, between deputies on both sides, her majesty has commanded me to answer your electoral highness, that as she has received with pleasure this notice of the king's inclination to agree to making a solid and lasting peace with all the allies, being the sole end that obliged her majesty to continue this war till now, so she will be very glad to conclude it, in concert with all her allies, on such conditions as may secure them from all apprehensions of being forced to take up arms again after a short interval, as has so lately happened. Her majesty is also willing I should declare, that she is ready to enter, jointly with all the high allies, into just and necessary measures for attaining such a peace, her majesty being resolved not to enter upon any negotiation without the participation of her said allies. But the way of conferences that is proposed, without more particular declarations on the part of his most christian majesty, does not seem to her to be proper for obtaining a truly solid and lasting peace. The States-general are of the same opinion. Wherefore your electoral highness will rightly judge, that other more solid means must be thought of to obtain so great an end, to which her majesty will contribute, with all the sincerity that can be wished, having nothing so much at heart as the relief of her subjects, and the tranquillity of Europe.”*

To give publicity to these proceedings, and to obviate all jealousy on the part of the confederates, an extraordinary congress was held at the desire of the States, to which the foreign ministers were invited. The deputies for foreign affairs then detailed the different overtures, both private and public, which had been made by France, to open a negotiation for peace, communicating the proposals from the elector of Bavaria, and the answers of the maritime powers. They concluded by professing the determination of the republic to abide by their engagements with their allies, and to accept no overtures for peace without their concurrence and approbation. This declaration seemed to give great satisfaction to the foreign ministers, and was approved with apparent cordiality.

Marlborough was no less gratified with this resolution than with the spirit which it seemed to infuse; and in his final letter to Lord Godolphin, from the Hague, he expresses

* Hague, Nov. 20. — Printed in Lediard, tom. ii. p. 123.

his hope that the allies will continue to prosecute their success, till France was reduced to more reasonable terms.

“ *Hague, Nov. 16.* — This country, like others, is vexed with different opinions, of which the French must take advantage. I shall not now trouble you with particulars, but I hope all will agree that the war must be carried on till the French be more reasonable; for as yet nothing has been proposed but a partition treaty, which is not more dishonourable to the allies, but in length of time destruction, as I have fully declared to be her majesty’s opinion.”

During his continuance at the Hague, he also employed his mediation in allaying the disputes which had arisen between the emperor and the States, relative to the bishopric of Munster, and the delicate negotiation for the barrier. An arrangement was, indeed, considerably facilitated by the condescension of the emperor, who ordered his minister, Count Zinzendorf, to conform himself to the directions of Marlborough; but the views of the respective parties were yet too much at variance to permit a perfect accommodation.

The question of the barrier also partook of the same difficulties as before; and, therefore, though with unfeigned reluctance, Marlborough referred it to a future negotiation.

A P P E N D I X

OF

NOTES AND ILLUSTRATIONS.

By the Editor.

(A. p. 32.) ALLEGED DUPLICITY OF MARLBOROUGH.

THE reputation of the Duke of Marlborough has suffered very considerably from the duplicity associated with his name, in connexion with the ejected Stuart, and the Prince of Orange. A hero and a double dealer exhibit inconsistencies at which the mind recoils; yet it rests on undeniable proofs, that the duke enacted these conflictive parts — that he first deported himself treacherously towards King James, and next towards his son-in-law and successor, King William, whom he had effectively assisted in ascending the English throne. But Mr. Coxe has failed to present this portion of his subject with the force and distinctness which its great importance demands: he has neither brought out in strong relief those circumstances which undoubtedly extenuate the infamy of the duke's conduct; nor, on the other hand, those which as unquestionably increase its ignominy.

The Duke of York had been the early and steady patron both of Marlborough and his sister Arabella; and it was natural and grateful in him that he should cherish kindly feelings towards their benefactor. But these feelings did not impose on Marlborough any obligation to sacrifice his religious and political predilections to the weak and mistaken course which King James was obviously bent on pursuing. Personally he might feel grateful and pity the king, but he was not bound to sacrifice both his conscientious impressions and public duties to his fatal errors. He freely remonstrated with the misguided prince, and this proving unavailing, and destructive to their previous confidential intercourse, Marlborough opened a private communication with the Prince of Orange. In this proceeding we think he was justifiable; also in concealing this new connexion from his former friend and master. King James was insidiously trying his utmost to deceive both Marlborough and the English nation; and under the guise of establishing universal toleration and other dissembling pretences, doing all he could to supplant the church of England by the clandestine introduction of popery. In dealing with a detected dissembler, dissimulation is allowable; and this was precisely the position

in which the duke was placed by the underhand practices of James. Therefore, up to the time of the king's abdication, Marlborough's relations with him appear to have been entirely free from blame. When he could not stop the king in his mad career, he was justified in seeking aid elsewhere, in opening an intercourse with the Prince of Orange, in concealing that intercourse from the king, in deserting him in the way he did, and in joining King William with the troops under his command at Salisbury. He sought only, by timely precautions and in his own defence, to counteract by treachery that treachery which had been manifestly intended to be practised by the Stuart, both towards himself and all England.

But enough on the first period of the duke's alleged duplicity, in which he appears to be fairly entitled to an honourable acquittal. We come next to the *second* charge of duplicity, namely, that practised towards King William, in which we have arrived at a very different conclusion.

It was natural, for the reasons already assigned, that Marlborough should resume a friendly correspondence with the abdicated monarch, though he had become the liege subject of his successor; for the duke was capable of affection, and so far as personal feeling, and a sense of right was concerned, he was undoubtedly inclined to the cause of King James. Upon this point we have the testimony of his Whig duchess, in her last will made twenty-three years after the death of her husband, who she says "left King James with great regret." Consequently there was nothing unnatural or very reprehensible in this *liaison*; it was even creditable to Marlborough's character, had it continued restricted to past personal recollections. But when it went beyond this — when to these private reminiscences, or other personal or selfish motive, public duties were offered to be sacrificed — when Marlborough began clandestinely to form plans for the restoration of the prince by the betrayal of his present sovereign, to whom he had sworn allegiance — by whom he had been honoured, promoted to high offices, and implicitly trusted; then we cannot hesitate to brand his conduct as basely false and treasonable. This is what Marlborough did, and it is an ineffaceable blot on his public reputation. King William had not, like his predecessor, given to the duke just cause of umbrage and fair pretexts for duplicity. All that the king can be accused of, or alleged in Marlborough's defence, is, that he had shown an undue, though natural, preference for his Dutch followers; and the duke had not obtained so large a share as they had in royal gifts, titles, trust, and promotion. Even the defence which Mr. Coxe has offered for his hero only heightens the infamy of his proceeding. It is said or implied, forsooth, that the duke, by his clandestine intercourse with James, sought not directly to betray his present master, but only to provide beforehand impunity and security for himself and possessions, in the event of the prince's restoration — a contingency at one juncture not unlikely to happen. But this kind of defence makes matters worse. For merely selfish considerations no person can be justified in violating his sworn fidelity to another party, but this was certainly what the duke attempted with King William. We think, indeed, that the duke sought more; that by a very reprehensible species of double-dealing, he

sought to deceive both princes, William and James, at the same time ; and this from no higher motive than that excess of self-prudence which, in truth, was the chief and almost only blemish of an otherwise unspotted and illustrious name.

(B. p. 51.) SIDNEY, EARL OF GODOLPHIN.

A leading public character, during the brilliant period of the duke's history, and whose name most frequently occurs in the Memoirs, is the minister Godolphin. He was an eminent statesman, remarkable for his love of truth, amiability of disposition, and disinterestedness of conduct. Like Marlborough, he had been bred in courts, but had not in an equal degree been corrupted by them. His financial government was subjected to a severe parliamentary scrutiny, after the accession of Harley to the premiership ; but nothing could be established against him, tending to impeach the integrity of his administration. After an anxious and toilsome official life he died poor, leaving hardly enough money to defray the expenses of his funeral.

Godolphin was descended from a Cornish family of repute, distinguished for its valour in the civil war, and which, it is likely, had recommended him to his first promotion, as a page in the court of Charles II. From this humble position he rose rapidly into political consequence ; for he sat in the first parliament after the Restoration, was shortly afterwards employed in various high offices, until appointed to the commissionership of the Treasury, at the same time that he was called to the House of Lords. During the reign of King James Godolphin engaged the favour of queen Mary, to whom he was chamberlain, and of James, who re-appointed him one of the lords of the Treasury. A Tory and high churchman by education, like his illustrious friend he became a Whig when the Protestant succession was in danger. On the flight of the Stuart he voted for a regency ; and in the perplexing juncture of affairs that ensued, he evinced such a spirit of moderation and wisdom as to retain the favourable opinions both of the outgoing and incoming sovereign. Personally attached to James II., he was amongst the few courtiers who never deserted him while he remained in the kingdom ; and this proof of affection so little compromised him with his successor, that the Prince of Orange continued him in his office of treasury lord. He accompanied the abdicated monarch to the sea-side when he quitted England, and maintained a correspondence with him till his death.

On the accession of queen Anne and the ascendancy of the Marlboroughs, Godolphin rose to the head of his department as lord high treasurer. During the first six years of the queen's reign the government was virtually a triumvirate ; the Duchess of Marlborough ruling the court and the queen, her husband controlling foreign affairs, and Godolphin the sovereign's councils and parliament. The last was an intelligent and prudent counsellor, but his extreme caution often bordered on waver-

ing or timidity. Marlborough was hardly less wise and circumspect in council than his friend; but he had more energy of will, and the minister frequently resorted to his aid to crush factions at home, as he had external enemies abroad.

The greatest characters are never wholly free from vice or weakness; or, at least, the imputation of them. Vanity and a love of play have been imputed to the minister by an unscrupulous contemporary accuser. "Physiognomists," says Dean Swift, "would hardly discover by consulting the aspect of this lord that his predominant passions were love and play; that he could sometimes scratch out a song in praise of his mistress with his pencil and card; or that he hath tears at command, like a woman, to be used either in an intrigue of gallantry or politics."—(*Four Last Years of Queen Anne.*) Despite of the infallibility of his judgment, gravity of demeanour, and of personal drawbacks—for he was much disfigured by the small-pox—Godolphin's idolatry of women was undoubted, constant, and almost romantic and sentimental. Conformably to this devotion was his lordship's admiration of the beautiful exiled queen, Mary of Modena, whom he used to address in letters in which love was ambiguously mingled with respect; "whilst little presents," according to Swift, "of such things as ladies like," accompanied these epistles.

Amidst such follies and demonstrations, one can hardly wonder at the scandalous rumours abroad on the nature of his intercourse with the Duchess of Marlborough. The minister was not only the confidential adviser of the crown and the duke, but also of the duchess during the absence of her husband in the wars. There is, however, not a particle of proof that the gallantries of the lord treasurer extended to the wife of his friend, and all circumstantial evidence is against the presumption. Amorous intrigues were not the foible of the haughty Sarah; if she loved any body it was the duke, though he was ten years older. Marlborough had implicit reliance on the honour of his spouse; he never appears for a moment to have suspected such a *liaison*, and the best proof of its non-existence is that the confidential friendship of all three continued undiminished to the last.

However, we leave the matter to be disposed of by Mrs. Thomson, in her own spirited manner:—

"It would be a libel on human nature to imagine that the cherished wife of John Duke of Marlborough could be fascinated by the lesser constellation of virtues displayed in the character of the minister Godolphin. The impure and, consequently, illiberal judges of conduct, who pride themselves in what is called a knowledge of the world, may decree that a cordial and confidential friendship, in the simple acceptance of the word, cannot exist between the two sexes, where similarity of age is joined to congeniality of temper and taste. But, happily for society, some men are honourable, some men high-minded: actions may gratify one party, and approbation and esteem secure the kindly feelings of the other. A friendship firm, generous, and delicate may exist between parties of different sexes; and when it has this pure source, it will ever be found beneficial, permanent, and delightful." (*Memoirs of the Duchess of Marlborough*, p. 162.)

(C. p. 213.) PRINCE EUGENE AND MARLBOROUGH.

Mr. Coxe has done no more than justice to the merits of the two famous warriors. One of the noblest traits in the character of Marlborough is the generous friendship that subsisted between him and Eugene. The prince was worthy of his love. Brave as a lion, frank, candid, and conciliatory, he was above all disguise, meanness, or circuitry. They were both as eminent in civil affairs as in war, and the same ascendancy which the duke held in the government of England, Eugene maintained in that of Austria. Between them, apart from the sway of the grand monarch, they directed the destinies of Europe. Despite of these correspondences, in temperament and martial gifts the two generals exhibited marked points of contrast and dissimilarity. Carried away by the heat of battle, or doubtful concerning its issue, Eugene would rush into the thickest of the *melee*; but Marlborough, though a leader of undoubted courage, was always too self-possessed to be guilty of such imprudences. In planning promptly, and energetically directing the grand movements of armies Marlborough was superior to the prince of Savoy. None of the campaigns of Eugene present such a wide grasp of conceptive design and strategic combinations as that of Marlborough in 1704. Had the duke been left to the impulse of his own enterprising genius, unchecked by Dutch field-deputies, or the more cautious spirit of Eugene, he would have certainly conquered France either in that memorable year of his glory or the next, or at a later period in 1708, when he proposed to mask the strong towns of Flanders and march direct to Paris, but which the prince opposed as too hazardous an enterprise. But if not so enterprising, and less of a tactician, Eugene was superior to the duke in partisan warfare. The history of Marlborough presents nothing equal in subtlety of contrivance and dexterity of execution to the surprise of Cremona by the prince—the ambuscade he laid for the French behind the Adige—and his artifice in directing the French retreat to be beat amidst the confusion and darkness that followed the battle of Oudenarde. In the *finesse* and stratagems of war Eugene was as fertile in resource as Hannibal himself. He made splendid campaigns too, especially against the Turks and against the French in Italy. They were both remarkable men, as well in camps as in civil affairs, but in nothing more admirable than in their mutual respect and confidence in each other, and in the art of governing men, and advantageously using them.

(D. p. 246.) CAMPAIGN AND VICTORY OF BLENHEIM.

The year 1704 forms the most memorable in the duke's memoirs. Mr. Coxe has detailed in the preceding chapters, with elaborate competence, its many and diversified incidents, and has been eminently

successful, aided by the explanations of Major Smith, in his descriptions of military occurrences; but he has concluded this portion of his work without any distinct *resumé* or forcible grouping of that wonderful combination of action and events which signalised this animated period of European history. In consequence the reader is left without that vivid and concentrated impression, essential to a full appreciation of the vast toils and heroic exploits which Marlborough compressed into this eventful year of his life. Excepting during the Crusades, Europe had never before been so generally excited, so expanded in force and movement; and the omnipresent soul and arm of the British general was felt and acknowledged in every vibration. Where Marlborough was not, the machine stopped or went wrong—whether it was among the jealous cabals of the court of St. James's—among the wavering and calculating Dutch states—among the sluggish and mercenary princes of Germany, or among his own generals—for even in his own camp Marlborough had those who felt oppressed by the lustre of his renown, and reluctantly yielded to the superiority of his genius. Over all these jarring or counteracting interests the duke triumphed with marvellous address; he harmonised them into energetic action for the accomplishment of the one great object of thwarting the restless ambition of *Louis le Grand*, and humbling his pride by the overthrow of his legions, and the propelling them in confusion and dismay from the Danube to the Rhine, and from the Rhine almost to the gates of Antwerp.

Marlborough was past the middle life when he entered on this eventful year of his history. He was still robust and indefatigable, but the martyr to painful, distracting, and exhausting diseases. From dimness of sight, head-ache, fever, or ague, he was hardly ever free; and these disorders were doubtless aggravated, if not produced, from extreme fatigue and want of rest, and the anxious spirit that had to keep watch over the vast and complicated machinery he had in motion. Despite of these afflictive and disturbing physical ills, how much he did and endured! What clouds of letters he despatched to every court in Europe—what treaties he signed or negotiated—what toilsome overland journeys he performed in the frozen month of January, or no less cold and cheerless November—what forced marches he accomplished amidst the heats of summer—what splendid victories he won—and what grand schemes of military combination he organised and successfully executed! Contemporary with these open and more active services, must be borne in mind the many private and domestic transactions that incessantly demanded his attention. He was at the head of the moderate Tory party in England; upon his fiat, support, and organisation mainly depended its direction and ascendancy. At home as abroad, almost every thing rested on his own Atlantean shoulders. His private friend and public colleague, the lord treasurer Godolphin, formed only a feeble and precarious confederate; his son-in-law Sunderland, with the fickleness or perfidy natural to his character, was openly or covertly against him; while his ever restless, intriguing, and opinionated countess, with the best intentions to serve her lord, was constantly sowing for him a fresh crop of vexations and perplexities.

Those who contemplate the immortals of the earth—who admire, perhaps sometimes begrudge, the vast honours and rewards that have been heaped on their memories,—would do well to bear in mind the hard and weary life of danger, toil, anxiety, and self-sacrifice by which they have been won.

The only year of military achievements that can be fitly compared with the famous one of Marlborough, is the first glorious campaign of General Buonaparte in Italy. In both were displayed the same untiring activity,—the same varied and masterly abilities in the field, the council, and the cabinet,—and both were distinguished by almost equally splendid military triumphs. The attack on the Schellenberg by the Confederates was as daring an exploit as the storming of the bridge of Lodi by the Republicans. Both enterprises savoured of recklessness of human life, if not rashness. Had they failed, mankind would have condemned them for temerity; but they succeeded, the audacity of the generals being seconded by good fortune and the excited and resistless valour of their troops. But it may be doubted whether Napoleon, in this his first burst on the world, gained any victory so complete and overwhelming as that of Blenheim. He destroyed five armies, it is true, in this one campaign, with a single band of followers, whom he had found shoeless and destitute on the rocks of Genoa. But every soldier was a hero, all animated by one soul, enthusiastic in the cause, and each bearing on his crest *Liberty or Death*. Comparatively with these, Marlborough had only a cold and miscellaneous host. His British troops were invincible; but their prowess was partly neutralised by phlegmatic Dutchmen, Hanoverians, and the mercenary contingents of Germany. Prince Eugene was undoubtedly a tower of strength; but as a set off to this fearless and able leader, Buonaparte had devoted and obedient to his will Massena, Angereau, Victor, Junot, and other rising chiefs, each a god in war. Besides, Napoleon, if he gained a battle, he could follow it up without check, and reap the full fruits of success. In this consisted the great advantage he possessed over the English commander. Marlborough was not inferior to him in daring and boldness of enterprise; in the promptitude and energy with which he would plan and achieve a victory; nor in the scientific conception and masterly direction of a campaign. All these great gifts of a successful general are fully displayed in the events of 1704—in the consummate skill and originality of intellect with which he formed his scheme for carrying the war into Germany—in the prudent reserve with which he revealed his daring undertaking—in the admirable and secret manner that he directed his march to the Rhine—his dexterity in confounding the French generals, and concealing from them his real purpose—and then the able preliminary tactics, by which he opened the way to victory, ere he winged the thunderbolt on the heights of the Schellenberg, and the battlements of Blenheim.

After winning a battle like that of Blenheim in August, Napoleon would doubtless have spent his Christmas at Brussels. So would Marlborough had he been left to the bent and ardour of his genius. But though Buonaparte had the Directory to manage, the duke had a much more heterogeneous and intractable mass of materials to humour and

harmonise — Dutch deputies, German princes, and British ministers— whose impotent misgivings and disagreements often clogged and impeded the march of victory.

(E. p. 474.) EARL OF PETERBOROUGH.

The earl of Peterborough's reputation, as a *Marplot*, was European. At home or abroad he was in constant motion, and it is manifest from the narrative, that it required the utmost vigilance of Marlborough and Godolphin to counteract his unceasing wiles and restlessness. The character of so singular a man merits a more specific illustration than Mr. Coxe has given. Peterborough possessed uncommon gifts, any one of which, if steadily directed, would have been sufficient to distinguish an ordinary person. But this was the capital defect of his organisation; he was incapable of concentration of purpose, not only individually, but in co-operation. He must move alone and originally, without sharing with others, either in effort or celebrity. This, however, is not always the mode in which great affairs can be consummated; hence few traces survive of Lord Peterborough's existence, and his life forms only a brilliant episode in the general history of the country. He was a kind of Admirable Crichton, that dazzled for a time by the variety of his accomplishments and exploits, but his fame was theatrical, and hardly outlived the actor.

Peterborough was of high ancestry; an earl by birth, and afterwards by creation. At the age of eighteen he distinguished himself in the cause of patriotism, by attending Algernon Sidney to the scaffold. He began his warlike career in the naval service; and whilst cultivating the Muses, appeared emulous only to mix with the "rough and untutored tars of the ocean." Disgusted with a maritime life, he became a land officer; yet alternately assisted in the council, or dazzled the senate with his oratory. The astonishment he excited was heightened by those personal advantages, which the imagination is often disposed to associate with heroism, wit, and eloquence. His early deeds in Spain were of the most chivalrous description, and the result of masterly skill, aided by romantic daring. His success at one period seemed to have ensured the great object of the Grand Alliance, by transferring the throne of Spain from the Bourbon to the Austrian family.

His subsequent waywardness embroiled every thing, and more than neutralised the benefits of his gallant enterprise in raising the siege of Barcelona. From being an object of general admiration, he became, from his arrogance and caprice, one of general dislike and suspicion. Disunion and insubordination were the consequences in the Peninsula, and the recall of his Lordship became indispensable to save the affairs of King Charles, whom it was thought he had saved, from irretrievable ruin.

His lordship appears next to have occupied himself in visiting the


courts of Germany, and the head-quarters of Prince Eugene, and at last of Charles XII. of Sweden. Ever on the wing, he excelled even Lord Sunderland in the rapidity of his flights; and is said "to have seen more kings and postilions than any man in Europe." Wherever he went, he gave his own version of the state of affairs both in Spain and England; and this, with the resources afforded by his varied descriptive powers, made his representations a matter of no small importance. Hence the anxiety felt about his continental movements, and the activity with which Marlborough sought to track him in his gossiping peregrinations.

Pope observes of Peterborough, that he was "resolved neither to live nor die like other men." The great weaknesses of his character were fickleness, vanity, and inordinate thirst of notoriety, no matter of what quality or origin. The "observed of all observers," the friend of Swift and Pope, and the associate of Marlborough, delighted to declaim in a coffee-house, and be the centre of any admiring throng, however mean or disreputable. Horace Walpole said that "he lived a romance, and was capable of making it a history."

Lord Peterborough, though at first an enthusiastic admirer of Marlborough, became, in the sequel, conspicuous for his enmity towards him. This alienation is supposed to have had its origin in the duke declining a family alliance with the eccentric peer, and refusing to affiance his youngest daughter, Lady Mary Churchill, with the eldest son and heir of Peterborough, John Lord Mordaunt.

END OF THE FIRST VOLUME.

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