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SENATE, JAN. 9, 1865.—Referred to Committee on Military Affairs. FEB. 17, 1865.—Message and accompanying documents ordered to be printed, and injunction of secrecy removed.

MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT.

RICHMOND, VA., Jan. 4, 1865.

To the Senate of the Confederate States :

In response to your resolution of November 14th, 1864, I herewith transmit, for your information, a communication from the Secretary of War, covering a copy of the official report of General J. E. Johnston, relative to operations of the Army of Tennessee.

I invite your attention to the Secretary's remarks in reference to the delay which has occurred in responding to your resolution, and concur with him in suggesting that it is not advisable to publish this communication at present, or at a future time, without the correspondence which was contemporaneous, and which explains the events.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

COMMUNICATION FROM SECRETARY OF WAR.

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,
WAR DEPARTMENT,
Richmond, Va., Jan. 3, 1865.

To the President of the Confederate States :

SIR:

I herewith submit a copy of the report of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, called for by a resolution of the Senate. Some delay has occurred in forwarding this copy, because at first I doubted whether, from its tendency to induce controversy, it could be communicated without prejudice to the public service. When afterwards I determined to send it, without objection on that score, I thought it might be expedient to accompany it with copies of the contemporaneous correspondence and documents, which tended to elucidate it and give a fuller view of the circumstances connected with the campaign. This entailed further delay in having such correspondence and documents collected and copied. On examining them, I concluded they would probably only add to controversies, and be productive of more mischief than benefit, and have consequently contented my-

self with submitting, as I now do, the report alone, hoping that while it may afford information to Congress, its publication may be forborne, as, in my judgment, such publication would not be promotive of the public interest.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JAMES A. SEDDON,
Secretary of War.

OFFICIAL REPORT OF GEN. JOSEPH E. JOHNSTON.

VINEVILLE, GA., October 20, 1864.

GEN. S. COOPER, *Adj't and Insp't General:*

SIR:

I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the Army of Tennessee, while it was under my command. Want of the reports of the Lieutenant Generals, for which I have waited until now, prevents me from being circumstantial.

In obedience to the orders of the President, received by telegraph at Clinton, Mississippi, December 18th, 1863, I assumed command of the Army of Tennessee at Dalton, on the 27th of that month.

Letters from the President and Secretary of War, dated respectively 23d and 20th of December, impressed upon me the importance of soon commencing active operations against the enemy. The relative forces, including the moral effect of the affair of Missionary Ridge, condition of the artillery horses, and most of those of the cavalry, and want of field transportation, made it impracticable to effect the wishes of the Executive.

On the 31st of December the effective total of the infantry and artillery of the army, including two brigades belonging to the Department of Mississippi, was thirty-six thousand eight hundred and twenty-six; the effective total of the cavalry, including Roddy's command at Tusculumbia, was five thousand six hundred and thirteen. The federal force in our front, exclusive of cavalry, and the ninth and twenty-third corps at Knoxville, was estimated at eighty thousand.

The winter was mainly employed in improving the discipline and equipment of the army, and bringing back absentees to the ranks. At the end of April more than five thousand had rejoined their regiments.

The horses of the cavalry and artillery had been much reduced in condition by the previous campaign. As full supplies of forage could not be furnished them at Dalton, it was necessary to send about half of each of these arms of service far to the rear, where the country

could furnish food. On that account Brig. Gen. Roddy was ordered, with about three-fourths of his troops, from Tusculumbia to Dalton, and arrived at the end of February. On the 2d of April, however, he was sent back to his former position by the Secretary of War.

On the 15th and 16th of January Baldwin's and Quarles' brigades returned to the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, to which they belonged. His Excellency Joseph E. Brown added to the army two regiments of State troops; which were used to guard the rail road bridges between Dalton and Atlanta.

On the 17th of February the President ordered me, by telegraph, to detach Lieut. Gen. Hardee, with the infantry of his corps, "except Stevenson's division," to aid Lieut. Gen. Polk against Sherman in Mississippi. This order was obeyed as promptly as our means of transportation permitted.

The force detached was probably exaggerated to Maj. Gen. Thomas; for on the 23d the federal army advanced to Ringgold; on the 24th drove in our outposts, and on the 25th skirmished at Mill creek gap, and in Crow valley, east of Rocky Face mountain. We were successful at both places. At the latter, Clayton's brigade, after a sharp action of half an hour, defeated double its number. At night it was reported that a U. S. brigade was occupying Dug gap, from which it had driven our troops. Granbury's Texan brigade, returning from Mississippi, had just arrived. It was ordered to march to the foot of the mountain immediately, and to retake the gap at sunrise, next morning; which was done. In the night of the 26th the enemy retired.

On the 27th of February I suggested to the Executive, by letter, through Gen. Bragg, that all preparations for a forward movement should be made without further delay. In a letter dated 4th of March, Gen. Bragg desired me to have all things ready at the earliest practicable moment, for the movement indicated. In replying on the 12th, I reminded him that "the regulations of the War Department do not leave such preparations to commanders of troops, but to officers, who receive their orders from Richmond." On the 18th a letter was received from Gen. Bragg, sketching a plan of offensive operations, and enumerating the troops to be used in them, under me. I was invited to express my views on the subject. In doing so, both by telegraph and mail, I suggested modifications, and urged that the additional troops named should be sent immediately, to enable us, should the enemy advance, to beat him, and then move forward; or should he not advance, do so ourselves. Gen. Bragg replied by telegraph on the 21st, "Your dispatch of 19th does not indicate acceptance of plan proposed. Troops can only be drawn from other points for advance. Upon your decision of that point, further action must depend." I replied by telegraph on the 22d, "In my dispatch of 19th, I expressly accept taking offensive; only differ with you as to details. I assume that the enemy will be prepared for advance before we will, and will make it to our advantage: therefore, I propose, both for offensive and defensive, to assemble our troops here immediately." This was not noticed. Therefore, on the

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25th I again urged the necessity of reinforcing the Army of Tennessee, because the enemy was collecting a larger force than that of the last campaign, while ours was less than it had been then.

On the 3d April Lt. Col. A. H. Cole arrived at Dalton, to direct the procuring of artillery horses and field transportation, to enable the army to advance.

On the 4th, under Orders 32, of 1864, I applied to the Chief of the Conscript Service for one thousand negro teamsters. None were received.

On the 5th of April Col. E. S. Ewell, A. A. General, was sent to Richmond to represent to the President my wish to take the offensive with proper means, and to learn his views. A few days after, Brig. Gen. Pendleton arrived from Richmond, to explain to me the President's wishes on the subject. I explained to him the modification of the plan communicated by Gen. Bragg, which seemed to me essential; which required that the intended reinforcements should be sent to Dalton. I urged that this should be done without delay, because our present force was not sufficient even for defence, and to enable us to take the offensive, if the enemy did not.

On the 1st of May I reported the enemy about to advance. On the 2d Brig. Gen. Mercer's command arrived—about fourteen hundred effective infantry. On the 14th I expressed myself satisfied that the enemy was about to attack with his united forces, and again urged that a part of Lieut. Gen. Polk's troops should be put at my disposal. I was informed by Gen. Bragg that orders to that effect were given.

Maj. Gen. Martin, whose division of cavalry, coming from East Tennessee, had been halted on the Etowah to recruit its horses, was ordered with it to observe the Oostanula, from Resaca to Rome; and Brig. Gen. Kelly was ordered with his command from the neighborhood of Resaca, to report to Maj. Gen. Wheeler.

The effective artillery and infantry of the Army of Tennessee, after the arrival of Mercer's brigade, amounted to forty thousand and nine hundred; the effective cavalry, to about four thousand. Maj. Gen. Sherman's army was composed of that of Missionary Ridge (then eighty thousand), increased by several thousand recruits; five thousand then under Hovey; the twenty-third corps (Schofield's), from Knoxville, and two divisions of the sixteenth, from North Alabama.

Major Gen. Wheeler estimated the cavalry of that army at fifteen thousand.

On the 5th of May this army was in line between Ringgold and Tunnel hill, and after skirmishing on that and the following day, on the 7th pressed back our advanced troops to Mill creek gap. On the same day Brig. Gen. Canty reached Resaca with his brigade, and was halted there.

On the 5th, at 4 P. M., a division of Hooker's corps assaulted Dug gap, which was bravely held by two regiments of Reynolds' Arkansas brigade, and Grigsby's brigade of Kentucky cavalry, fighting on foot, until the arrival of Lieut. Gen. Hardee with Granbury's brigade, when the enemy was put to flight.

On the 9th five assaults were made on Lieut. Gen. Hood's troops on Rocky Face mountain. All were repulsed. In the afternoon a report was received that Logan's and Dodge's corps were in Snake Creek gap. Three divisions, under Lieut. Gen. Hood were therefore sent to Resaca. On the 10th Lieut. Gen. Hood reported the enemy retiring. Skirmishing to our advantage continued all day near Dalton. Maj. Gen. Bate repulsed a vigorous attack at night.

On the 11th Brig. Gen. Canty reported that the enemy were again approaching Resaca. Lt. Gen. Polk arrived there in the evening, with Loring's division, and was instructed to defend the place with those troops and Canty's. The usual skirmishing continued near Dalton.

Rocky Face mountain and Snake Creek gap, at its south end completely covered, for the enemy, the operation of turning Dalton. On the 12th the federal army, covered by the mountain, moved by Snake Creek gap, towards Resaca. Major Gen. Wheeler, with twenty-two hundred of ours, attacked and defeated more than double that number of federal cavalry, near Varnell's station. At night our artillery and infantry marched for Resaca. The cavalry followed on the 13th. On that day the enemy approaching on the Snake Creek gap road, was checked by Loring's troops, which gave time for the formation of Hardee's and Hood's corps, just arriving. As the enemy was formed, the left of Polk's corps was on the Oostanaula, and the right of Hood's on the Conasauga. There was brisk skirmishing during the afternoon on Polk's front and Hardee's left.

On the 14th the enemy made several attacks—the most vigorous on Hindman's division (Hood's left.) All were handsomely repulsed. At 6 P. M. Hood advanced with Stevenson's and Stewart's divisions, supported by two of Walker's brigades, driving the enemy from his ground before night. He was instructed to be ready to continue the offensive next morning. At 9 P. M. I learned that Lieut. Gen. Polk's troops had lost a position commanding our bridges, and received from Maj. Gen. Martin a report that federal infantry was crossing the Oostanaula, near Calhoun, on a pontoon bridge. The instructions to Lt. Gen. Hood were revoked, and Walker's division sent to the point named by Major Gen. Martin.

On the 15th there was severe skirmishing on the whole front. Major Gen. Walker reported no movement near Calhoun. Lt. Gen. Hood was directed to prepare to move forward, his right leading, supported by two brigades from Polk's and Hardee's corps. When he was about to move, information came from Major Gen. Walker that the federal right was crossing the river. To meet this movement, Lieut. Gen. Hood's attack was countermanded. Stewart's division not receiving the order from Corps Head Quarters in time, attacked unsuccessfully. The army was ordered to cross the Oostanaula that night, destroying the bridges behind it.

On the 16th the enemy crossed the Oostanaula. Lieut. Gen. Hardee skirmished with them successfully near Calhoun.

The fact that a part of Polk's troops were still in the rear, and the great numerical superiority of the federal army, made it expe-

dient to risk battle only when position or some blunder of the enemy, might give us counterbalancing advantages. I therefore determined to fall back slowly until circumstances should put the chances of battle in our favor, keeping so near the U. S. army as to prevent its sending reinforcements to Grant; and hoping, by taking advantage of positions and opportunities, to reduce the odds against us, by partial engagements. I also expected it to be materially reduced before the end of June, by the expiration of the terms of service of many of the regiments which had not re-enlisted. In this way we fell back to Cassville, in two marches. At Adairsville, about midway, on the 17th Polk's cavalry, under Brig. Gen. Jackson, met the enemy, and Hardee, after severe skirmishing, checked them. At this point, on the 18th Polk's and Hood's corps took the direct road to Cassville; Hardee's, that by Kingston. About half the federal army took each road.

French's division having joined Polk's corps on the 18th, on the morning of the 19th, when half the federal army was near Kingston, the two corps at Cassville were ordered to advance against the troops that had followed them from Adairsville, Hood's leading on the right. When this corps had advanced some two miles, one of his staff officers reported to Lieut. Gen. Hood that the enemy was approaching on the Canton road, in rear of the right of our original position. He drew back his troops, and formed them across that road. When it was discovered that the officer was mistaken, the opportunity had passed, by the near approach of the federal army. Expecting to be attacked, I drew up the troops in what seemed to me an excellent position, a bold ridge, immediately in rear of Cassville, with an open valley before it. The fire of the enemy's artillery commenced soon after the troops were formed, and continued until night. Soon after dark Lieut. Gens. Polk and Hood, together, expressed to me decidedly the opinion formed upon the observation of the afternoon, that the federal artillery would render their positions untenable the next day, and urged me to abandon the ground immediately and cross the Etowah. Lieut. Gen. Hardee, whose position I thought weakest, was confident that he could hold it. The other two officers, however, were so earnest and unwilling to depend on the ability of their corps to defend the ground, that I yielded, and the army crossed the Etowah on the 20th—a step which I have regretted ever since. Wheeler's cavalry was placed in observation, above and Jackson's below the rail road.

On the 22d Maj. Gen. Wheeler was sent, with all his troops not required for observation, to the enemy's rear; and on the 24th beat a brigade at Cassville, and took or burned 250 loaded wagons. In the mean time the enemy was reported by Jackson's troops, moving down the Etowah, as if to cross it near Stilesboro, and crossing on the 23d. On the 24th Polk's and Hardee's corps reached the road from Stilesboro to Atlanta, a few miles south of Dallas; and Hood's four miles from New Hope church, on the road from Alatoona. On the 25th the enemy was found to be entrenched near and east of Dallas. Hood's corps was placed with its centre at New Hope

church, and Polk's and Hardee's ordered between it and the Atlanta road, which Hardee's left was to cover. An hour before sunset Stewart's division at New Hope church was fiercely attacked by Hooker's corps, which it repulsed, after a hot engagement of two hours. Skirmishing was kept up on the 26th and 27th. At half past 5 P. M., on the 27th, Howard's corps assailed Cleburne's division, and was driven back about dark with great slaughter. In these two actions our troops were not entrenched. Our loss in each was about four hundred and fifty in killed and wounded. On the 27th the enemy's dead, except those borne off, were counted six hundred. We therefore estimate their loss at three thousand at least. It was probably greater on the 25th, as we had a larger force engaged then, both of artillery and infantry.

The usual skirmishing was kept up on the 28th. Lieut. Gen. Hood was instructed to put his corps in position during the night, to attack the enemy's left flank at dawn next morning—the rest of the army to join in the action, successively, from right to left.

On the 29th Lieut. Gen. Hood, finding the federal left covered by a division which had entrenched itself in the night, thought it inexpedient to attack, so reported and asked for instructions. As the resulting delay made the attack inexpedient, even if it had not been so before, by preventing the surprise, upon which success in a great degree depended, he was recalled.

Skirmishing continued until the 4th of June, the enemy gradually extending his entrenched line towards the rail road at Acworth. On the morning of the 5th the army was formed, with its left at Lost mountain, its centre near Gilgath church, and its right near the rail road. On the 7th the right, covered by Noonday creek, was extended across the Acworth and Marietta road. The enemy approached under cover of successive lines of entrenchments. There was brisk and incessant skirmishing until the 18th.

On the 14th the brave Lieut. Gen. Polk, distinguished in every battle in which this army had fought, fell by a cannon shot, at an advanced post. Maj. Gen. Loring succeeded to the command, which he held until the 7th of July, with great efficiency.

On the 4th of June a letter from Governor Brown informed me that he had organized a division of infantry, and placed it under my orders. These troops, when ready for service about the middle of the month, under Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith, were employed to defend the crossings of the Chattahoochee, to prevent the surprise of Atlanta by the federal cavalry.

On the 19th a new line was taken by the army. Hood's corps, with its right on the Marietta and Canton road, Loring's on the Kennesaw mountain, and Hardee's with its left extending across the Lost mountain and Marietta road. The enemy approached, as usual, under cover of entrenchments. In this position there was incessant fighting and skirmishing until July 3d, the enemy gradually extending his entrenched right towards Atlanta. On the 20th of June Wheeler, with eleven hundred men, routed Garrard's division of federal cavalry on our right. On the 21st Hood's corps was transferred from right

to left. Wheeler's cavalry taking charge of the position it had left. On the 22d Lieut. Gen. Hood reported that Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions of his corps, being attacked, drove back the enemy, taking a line of his breastworks, but were compelled to withdraw by the fire of fortified artillery. On the 24th Hardee's skirmishers formed a line of battle, as did Stevenson's of Hood's corps on the 25th. On the 27th, after a furious cannonade of several hours, the enemy made a general advance, but was every where repulsed with heavy loss. The assaults were most vigorous on Cheatham's and Cleburne's divisions of Hardee's corps, and French's and Featherston's, of Loring's. Lieut. Gen. Hardee reports that Cheatham's division lost in killed, wounded and missing, one hundred and ninety-five. The enemy opposed to it, by the statement of a staff officer, subsequently captured two thousand: the loss of Cleburne's division eleven; that of the enemy on his front, one thousand; and Maj. Gen. Loring reported two hundred and thirty-six of his corps killed, wounded and missing; and the loss of the enemy, by their own estimates, at between twenty-five hundred and three thousand; which he thinks very small.

On the 1st of July Major General Smith's division was ordered to support the cavalry on our left. Their effective total was about fifteen hundred. On the 2d, the enemy's right being nearer to Atlanta by several miles than our left, the army fell back during the night to Smyrna church. On the 4th Major General Smith reported that he should be compelled to withdraw, on the morning of the 5th, to the line of entrenchments covering the rail road bridge and Turner's ferry. The army was therefore ordered to retire at the same time to that line, to secure our bridges. The cavalry crossed the Chattahoochee—Wheeler observing it for some twenty miles above, and Jackson as far below. The enemy advanced, as usual, covered by entrenchments. Skirmishing continued until the 9th. Our infantry and artillery were brought to the southeast side of the river that night, because two federal corps had crossed it above Powers' ferry on the 8th and entrenched. Lieut. Gen. Stewart took command of the corps on the 7th.

The character of Peachtree creek, and the numerous fords in the Chattahoochee above its mouth, prevented my attempting to defend that part of the river. The broad and muddy channel of the creek would have separated the two parts of the army. It and the river below its mouth were therefore taken as our line. A position, on the high ground south of the creek, was selected for the army, from which to attack the enemy while crossing. The engineer officers, with a large force of negroes, were set to work to strengthen the fortifications of Atlanta, and to mount on them seven heavy rifles, borrowed from Major General Maury. The Chief Engineer was instructed to devote his attention first to the works between the Decatur and Marietta roads, to put them in such condition that they might be held by the State troops, so that the army might attack the enemy in flank when he approached the town—this, in the event that we should be unsuccessful in attacking the federal army in its passage of Peachtree creek.

After the armies were separated by the Chattahoochee, skirmishing became less severe. On the 14th a division of federal cavalry crossed the river by Moore's bridge, near Newman, but was driven back by Armstrong's brigade, sent by Brig. Gen. Jackson to meet it.

On the 15th Governor Brown informed me orally that he hoped to reinforce the army, before the end of the month, with near ten thousand State troops.

On the 17th the main body of the federal army crossed the Chattahoochee, between Roswell and Powers' ferry. At 10 o'clock P. M., while I was giving Lieut. Col. Prestman, Chief Engineer, instructions in regard to his work of the next day, on the fortifications of Atlanta, a telegram was received from General Cooper, informing me, by direction of the Secretary of War, that as I had failed to arrest the advance of the enemy to the vicinity of Atlanta, and expressed no confidence that I could defeat or repel him, I was relieved from the command of the Army and Department of Tennessee, which would be immediately turned over to Gen. Hood. This was done at once. On the morning of the 18th the enemy was reported to be advancing, and at Gen. Hood's request I continued to give orders until the afternoon, placing the troops in the position selected near Peachtree creek.

In transferring the command to Gen. Hood, I explained my plans to him, first, to attack the federal army while crossing Peachtree creek. If we were successful, great results might be hoped for, as the enemy would have both the creek and the river to interrupt his retreat. Second, if unsuccessful, to keep back the enemy by entrenching, to give time for the assembling of the State troops promised by Governor Brown; to garrison Atlanta with those troops; and when the federal army approached the town, attack it, on its most exposed flank, with all the Confederate troops.

These troops, who had been for seventy-four days in the immediate presence of the enemy, laboring and fighting daily, enduring toil, exposure and danger with equal cheerfulness, more confident and high spirited than when the federal army presented itself near Dalton, were then inferior to none who ever served the Confederacy.

Under the excellent administration of Brig. Gen. Macakll, Chief of Staff, the troops were well equipped, and abundantly supplied. The draught animals of the artillery and Quartermaster's Department were in better condition on the 18th of July than on the 5th of May. We lost no material in the retreat, except the four field pieces mentioned in the accompanying report of Gen. Hood.

I commenced the campaign with Gen. Bragg's army of Missionary Ridge, with one brigade added (Mercer's, and two taken away), Baldwin's and Quarles'. That opposed to us was Grant's army of Missionary Ridge, then estimated at eighty thousand by our principal officers, increased, as I have stated, by two corps, a division and several thousand recruits, in all, at least thirty thousand men. The cavalry of that army was estimated by Maj. Gen. Wheeler at fifteen thousand.

The reinforcements which joined our army amounted to fifteen

thousand infantry and artillery, and four thousand cavalry. Our scouts reported much greater numbers joining the U. S. army—garrisons and bridge guards from Tennessee and Kentucky, relieved by “one hundred days’ men,” and the seventeenth corps, with two thousand cavalry.

The loss of our infantry and artillery, from the 5th of May, had been about ten thousand in killed and wounded, and four thousand seven hundred from all other causes—mainly slight sickness produced by heavy cold rains, which prevailed in the latter half of June. These and the slightly wounded were beginning to rejoin their regiments. For want of reports, I am unable to give the loss or the services of the cavalry, which was less under my eye than the rest of the army. The effective strength was increased by about two thousand during the campaign.

The effective force transferred to Gen. Hood was about forty-one thousand infantry and artillery, and ten thousand cavalry.

According to the opinions of our most experienced officers, daily reports of prisoners, and statements of northern papers, the enemy’s loss in action could not have been less than five times as great as ours. In the cases in which we had the means of estimating it, it ranged from seven to one, to ninety-one to one, compared with ours, and averaged thirteen to one. The federal prisoners concurred in saying that their heaviest loss occurred in the daily attacks made in line of battle upon our skirmishers in their rifle pits. Whether they succeeded in dislodging our skirmishers or not, their loss was heavy, and ours almost nothing.

At Dalton the great numerical superiority of the enemy made the chances of battle much against us; and even if beaten, they had a safe refuge behind the fortified pass of Ringgold, and in the fortress of Chattanooga. Our refuge in case of defeat was in Atlanta, one hundred miles off, with three rivers intervening. Therefore, victory for us could have been decisive, while defeat would have been utterly disastrous. Between Dalton and the Chattahoochee we could have given battle only by attacking the enemy entrenched, or so near entrenchments that the only result of success to us would have been his falling back into them, while defeat would have been our ruin. In the course pursued, our troops, always fighting under cover, had very trifling losses compared with those they inflicted: so that the enemy’s numerical superiority was reduced daily and rapidly, and we could reasonably have expected to cope with the federal army on equal ground by the time the Chattahoochee was passed. Defeat on this side of the river would have been its destruction. We, if beaten, had a place of refuge in Atlanta, too strong to be assaulted and too extensive to be invested. I had hoped also that by the breaking of the rail road in its rear, the federal army might be compelled to attack us in a position of our own choosing, or to a retreat easily converted into a rout. After we crossed the Etowah five detachments of cavalry were successively sent, with instructions to destroy as much as they could of the rail road between Dalton and the Etowah. All failed, because too weak. We could never spare a sufficient body of cavalry for

this service, as its assistance was absolutely necessary in the defence of every position we occupied. Capt. Harvey, an officer of great courage and sagacity, was detached on this service with one hundred men on the 11th of June, and remained for several weeks near the rail road, frequently interrupting, although not strong enough to prevent its use. Early in the campaign the statements of the strength of the cavalry in the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana, given me by Lt. Gen. Polk, just from the command of that Department, and my telegraphic correspondence with his successor, Lt. Gen. S. D. Lee, gave me reason to hope that a competent force could be sent from Mississippi and Alabama to prevent the use of the rail road by the U. S. army. I therefore suggested it to the President directly, on the 13th June and 16th July, and through General Bragg, on the 30th, 12th, 13th, 16th and 26th of June; and also to Lt. Gen. Lee, on the 10th May, and 3d, 11th and 16th of June. I did so, in the belief that this cavalry would serve the Confederacy better, by causing the defeat of Major Gen. Sherman's army, than by repelling a raid in Mississippi.

Besides the causes of my removal, alleged in the telegram announcing it, various other accusations have been made against me—some published in newspapers, in such a manner as to appear to have official authority, and others circulated orally in Georgia and Alabama, and imputed to Gen. Bragg.

The principal are, that I persistently disregarded the instructions of the President; that I would not fight the enemy; that I refused to defend Atlanta; that I refused to communicate with Gen. Bragg in relation to the operations of the army; that I disregarded his entreaties to change my course and attack the enemy; and gross exaggerations of the losses of the army.

I had not the advantage of receiving the President's instructions in relation to the manner of conducting the campaign. But as the conduct of my predecessor in retreating before odds less than those confronting me, had apparently been approved, and as Gen. Lee, in keeping on the defensive and retreating towards Grant's objective point, under circumstances like mine, was adding to his great fame, both in the estimation of the administration and people, I supposed that my course would not be censured. I believed then, as I do now, that it was the only one at my command which promised success.

I think that the foregoing narrative shows that the Army of Tennessee did fight, and with at least as much effect as it had ever done before.

The proofs that I intended to hold Atlanta, are, the fact that under my orders the work of strengthening its defences was going on vigorously, the communication on the subject made by me to Gen. Hood, and the fact that my family was in the town. That the public work shops were removed, and no large supplies deposited in the town, as alleged by Gen. Bragg, were measures of common prudence, and no more indicated the intention to abandon the place than the sending the wagons of an army to the rear on a day of battle, proves a foregone determination to abandon the field.

While General Bragg was at Atlanta, about the middle of July, we had no other conversation concerning the army there, than such as I introduced. He asked me no questions regarding its operations, past or future; made no comments upon them, nor suggestions, and had not the slightest reason to suppose that Atlanta would not be defended. He told me that the object of his journey was to confer with Lt. Gen. Lee, and communicate with Gen. E. K. Smith, in relation to reinforcements for me. He talked much more of affairs in Virginia than in Georgia, asserting, what I believed, that Sherman's army outnumbered Grant's, and impressed me with the belief that his visits to me were unofficial.

A copy of a brief report by Gen. Hood, accompanies this.

Most respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

J. E. JOHNSTON, *General.*

Official:

_____,
Lt. Col. & A. A. General.

REPORT OF GENERAL HOOD.

HEAD QUARTERS, HOOD'S CORPS,
In the field, — 1864.

GEN. J. E. JOHNSTON, *Macon, Ga.:*

Agreeable to the directions of the General commanding, I have the honor herewith to submit the operations of the troops under my command, since the 7th of May. On that day Maj. Gen. Stewart, with his division, took position at Mill creek gap in Rocky Face mountain, three miles northeast of Dalton, the enemy appearing in his immediate front. In the afternoon Maj. Gen. Bate, with his division, reported to me, and was placed in position on the left of Stewart and west of rail road. On the 8th Maj. Gen. Cheatham, with his division, reported to me, one brigade of which was placed in position on the right of Stewart and along the crest of Rocky Face. On the right, the division of Maj. Gen. Stevenson was in position and extending across Crow valley, Gen. Hindman occupying the right of my line. Some skirmishing took place along the line on the 8th, and on the 9th the enemy made five different attempts to gain the mountain, but were, each time, driven back and foiled in all their attempts. After this nothing of very great importance occurred up to the time the army marched for Resaca. On arriving there I took position on the right of the army—Hindman's division on my left, Stevenson in the centre, and Stewart on the right. On the 14th the enemy made repeated assaults on Hindman's left, but not in very heavy lines. Walthall's brigade occupying the left of Hindman, suffered severely from an enfilade fire of the enemy's artillery, himself and men displaying conspicuous valor throughout, under very adverse circumstances. Brig. Gen. Tucker, commanding brigade in reserve, was severely wounded. About the middle of the day on the 15th the enemy made assaults upon Stevenson's front and the right of Hindman in several lines of battle, each successive line being repulsed with loss. At 4 o'clock P. M. Gen. Stewart moved forward from the right with his division, driving the enemy before him, but was subsequently forced to resume his original position before largely superior numbers. During the attack on Gen. Stevenson, a four gun battery in position thirty paces in front of his line, the gunners being driven away from it and the battery left in dispute, the army withdrew that night, and the guns, without caissons or limber boxes, were abandoned to the enemy, the loss of life it would have cost to withdraw these being considered worth more than the guns. After this, the march was continued to the south side of the Etowah, via Adairsville and Cassville—some slight skirmishing at the latter place. On the morning of the 24th the march was resumed in the direction of Dallas, and on the morning of the 25th, with my entire command, I arrived at New Hope church, four miles east of Dallas. About midday the enemy were reported advancing, when my line was

formed. Hindman on the left, Stewart in the centre, and Stevenson on the right. At 5 o'clock P. M. a very determined attack was made upon Stewart, extending along a very small portion of Brown's brigade of Stevenson's division. The engagement continued actively until night closed in, the enemy being repeatedly and handsomely repulsed at all points. Thus Hooker's entire corps was driven back by three brigades of Stewart's division. Prisoners taken were of that corps. Too much praise cannot be awarded to the artillery, under the immediate direction of Col. Beckham, which did great execution in the enemy's ranks, and added much to their discomfiture. On the morning of the 26th the enemy were found to be extending their left. Hindman's division was withdrawn from my left and placed in position on the right, the enemy continuing to extend his left. Maj. Gen. Cleburne, with his division, was ordered to report to me, and was massed on Hindman's right.

On the morning of the 27th the enemy were known to be extending rapidly to their left, attempting to turn my right as they extended. Cleburne was deployed to meet them, and at half past five P. M. a very stubborn attack was made on his division, extending to the right, where Maj. Gen. Wheeler, with his cavalry dismounted, was engaging them. The assault was continued with great determination upon both Cleburne and Wheeler until after night, but every attempt to break their lines was gallantly repulsed. About ten o'clock at night, Brig. Gen. Granbury, with his brigade of Texans, made a dashing charge on the enemy, driving them from the field, their killed and wounded being left in our hands. During this engagement two or three hundred prisoners were captured, all belonging to Howard's corps. After the engagements around New Hope church, nothing of very great importance transpired whilst occupying that line. The army changed position to Lost mountain, my corps in the centre. Afterwards I moved to the right near Kennesaw mountain; subsequently changed position to the extreme left of the army; however nothing of importance occurred on my line whilst in this position, save that on the 22d of June the divisions of Stevenson and Hindman attacked the enemy, driving him from two lines of works, and capturing some prisoners belonging to Schofield and Hooker. From here the army changed position to vicinity of Nickajack creek, my corps on the left. We subsequently withdrew from this position, and took up a line on the immediate north bank of the Chattahoochee river. After remaining here for several days, the army crossed the river, and went into bivouac.

For further particulars, I refer you to reports of Generals of divisions. I enclose Maj. Gen. Cleburne's report, and will forward others as soon as received.

Respectfully,

(Signed)

J. B. HOOD, *Lt. Gen.*

Official:

Lieut. Col. & A. A. General.

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