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# METAPHYSICS

OF

## JUNIOR AND SENIOR YEAR,

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## ERRATA.

Page 1, Ques. 2d, read *discursive*, instead of *discussion*.

Page 3, Ques. 18, read *it must not contain*, &c., instead of *it must*, &c.

Page 5, Ques. 35, read *illicit process*, instead of *undistributed middle*.

Page 21, Ques. 40, read *supersensual*, instead of *supersual*.

Page 22, Ques. 41, read *when fictitious works are read*, &c., instead of *when fictitious works are real*.

Page 22, Ques. 43, read *a more complete*, &c., instead of *complete*, &c.

# Metaphysics

OF

SECOND QUARTER OF JUNIOR YEAR.

## Thompson's Laws of Thought.

QUES. 1. Define Psychology, Metaphysics in its two senses, and Nomology of the Mind?

Ans. Psychology is the science of the phenomena, and the powers of the mind. Metaphysics, first in its broad sense, including Psychology, is the science of the non-physical, non-material. Second, narrow sense—is the science of the super-sensual truths which underlie all phenomena, whether of matter or of mind; a species co-ordinate with psychology. Nomology is the science of the laws by which the mind ought to be governed.

2. Give the distribution of the mental faculties, also of cognitive, and show with which of the latter logic is concerned. Also distinction between logic and psychology?

The mental faculties are (1) cognitive, (2) those of feeling, and (3) conative.

The cognitive are those which obtain and present matter of thought to the mind. 1. Presentative, or intuitive, or acquisitive—embracing sense, perception, self-consciousness, and intuitive truths or axioms. 2. Retentive—embracing the conservative faculty, reproductive, representative or simple imagination. 3. Discussion, elaborative or comparative—embracing abstraction, generalization, conception, judgment, reasoning and constructive imagination. Logic has to do with the discursive or elaborative faculties. Logic treats of the laws of the operations of the mind. Whereas psychology treats of the actual operations of the mind.

3. Define Logic, and show why it is a science why it is a science rather than an art? *πραξις* and *ποιησις*.

Logic is the science of the necessary and formal laws of thought. Pure Logic is a science, because it teaches us to know the right laws of thought and the end of all science is to know; of Art, to do. Here we find the distinction *art* and *practice*, the former (*πραξις*) denoting that kind of action which terminates in itself, the latter (*ποιησις*) that which leaves an enduring product.

4. What is meant by the necessary laws of thought?

Necessary is that, the opposite of which cannot be conceived of by the

mind. So the necessary laws of thought are those, the violation of which we cannot conceive of without mental suicide.

5. Define formal laws of thought, also formal sciences, and why is logic a formal or hypothetical science?

The formal laws of thought are those which refer to the very form of thinking irrespective of the subject matter of thought. Formal sciences are those the principles of which are true, irrespective of actual existence, or of any object to which they may be applied. Logic is a formal science because it is concerned with the very form of the thinking process, it is called a hypothetical science because it teaches us to know facts depending upon the existence of other facts as the condition of their own existence.

6. How is logic practical, or useful if it be not an art or a science of actual being?

Although logic, as a formal science, teaches no new material facts, still the object of the study is strictly practical: for it does not so much teach us to produce a good thought in one department, as to think accurately in all, so that in application it becomes practical.

7. Distinguish objective and subjective; first and second intentions, to which of the latter does logic belong?

The subjective is the mind—that which thinks; the objective that which it thinks about. First intentions are notions of things as they are. Second intentions are notions of things as they are understood. Logic has to do only with second intentions.

8. Define conception—distinguish it from imagination; subjective and objective conceptions; conception and concept?

Conception is that act or product of the mind expressed by a general word. Conception is common to a *multitude* of individuals. Simple imagination produces in the mind the image of an *individual*, associating with it properties not common to the class to which the individual belongs. Subjective conception denotes the operation of the mind forming the conception. Objective denotes the simple product of the mind thus formed as made an object of thought. Conception denotes subjective conception—concept objective conception.

9. By what mental processes are conceptions formed?

(1) By comparison—putting together two or more single objects to ascertain how far they resemble each other. (2) By reflection—the ascertainment of their points of resemblance and difference. (3) By abstraction—the separation of the points of resemblance from those of difference. (4) By Generalization—forming a class, the individuals of which are found to possess the abstracted marks. (5) By denomination—the imposition of a name.

10. Define clear, obscure; distinct, confused, adequate and inadequate; notative and symbolical, as applied to notions, cognitions and conceptions?

Clear conception is when an object is so presented that the mind discriminates it from other objects; obscure is the reverse of this. Distinct is when we not only distinguish the object, but also its properties; confused, when we distinguish the object not the properties. Adequate is when we can not only recognize the properties or marks, but also explain them, i. e., give the marks of the marks; inadequate when we recognize the marks, but cannot explain them. A notative conception is one in which the word denoting the conception presents the marks of the conception; a symbolical conception is one in which the mind has not the marks of the conception distinctly before it, even while it is engaged upon it.

11. Define genus, species, specific differentia, accident, essence, property, *summu* genus, and *infima* species.

Genus is a class—species one of the subordinate classes into which genus is divided—specific differentia, is that which distinguishes a species from any other species of the same genus—accident is that which pertains to part of a class—essence of any species means its genus and differentia, that without which species is wanting—property is that which is peculiar to a class belongs to all of it, but it is not a part of its essence—summm genus is the highest genus, ordinarily used in reference to a given department e. g. Being is the most absolute summm genus—infima species is the small class before we come to individuals.

12. What is meant by extension and what by intension, and what is their mutual ratio?

Extension relates to the number of *objects* which the conception contains—intension to the number of *qualities*. Their ratio is inverse, as extension increases, intension diminishes, and *vice versa*.

13. Define *a priori* and *a posteriori* in their three senses.

(1) Aristotle applied *a priori* to reasoning from cause to effect, and *a posteriori* to reasoning from effect to cause. (2) *A priori* was afterwards applied to knowledge derived from given conditions without waiting for experience, *a posteriori* to knowledge derived from experience. (3) *A priori* has also in a looser sense been applied to knowledge derived directly from conditions, which conditions, however, are themselves given by experience.

14. Illustrate the difference between syllogisms founded respectively on the extension and intension of conceptions.

The former is developed with reference to the number of *objects*, as “All men are mortal,” (i. e.) all the objects, men are contained in the class *mortal*. The intensive syllogism relates to the number of *qualities*, as “Peter is a man,” (i. e.) Peter possesses the marks of a man; here the qualities of Peter are declared to indicate the class *man*.

15. Explain Logical Division, and how contrasted with physical division?

Logical Division is the analysis or separation of conceptions or of terms denoting them according to their extension: i. e., stating the various co-ordinate species of which a proximate genus is composed. In logical division the genus divided is predicable of all the species into which it is divided—physical division, on the other hand, is the separation of an individual into its component parts.

16. State the rules for correct logical division.

I. The species or parts must be mutually exclusive. II. The species or parts must be together equal to the dividend, but any one must be less than the whole. III. The division must be according to one principle. IV. It must be from proxima genera to co-ordinate species.

17. What is Definition, and how do it, and Logical division stand related to each other, and to the intension of conceptions.

Definition is the bounding off of a word or notion from all other words or notions, or giving the marks of the conception, which the word denotes. Division ascertains the various classes of objects united under one conception; definition ascertains those common marks which all the objects of a class possess, and hence they are mutual helps to each other. Division respects extension, definition intension.

18. What is Logical Definition, and what are the rules for correct definition?

Logical Definition ascertains all the marks, which the objects contained in a conception possess. It is simply giving the genus and differentia. Rules. (I) It must recount the essential attributes of the thing defined. (II) It must contain the name of the thing defined. (III) It must be precisely ade-

quate to the species defined. (IV.) It must not be expressed in obscure, figurative, or ambiguous language. (V.) It must not be negative when it can be affirmative.

19. How may definitions too broad or too narrow be detected?

I. A definition too broad may be detected by simple conversion. II. A definition too narrow may be detected by conversion by contraposition.

20. What is meant by distributive, collective, substantive, attributive and relative nouns?

Distributives are applicable to each and every one of the objects they denote. Collectives, though denoting many objects, can only be applied to them when combined. Substantives are the names of things which in thought or fact have an independent existence. Attributives assign a mark to a substantive. Relatives are pairs of nouns each of which implies the existence of the other.

21. Explain positive, privative and negative conceptions?

A positive conception is where we affirm the presence of a mark—a privative conception is where we affirm the absence of a mark—a negative conception is one which affirms the absence of what neither does, nor can belong to an object.

22. Explain relative, abstract, and concrete conceptions?

Relative conceptions are those in which one cannot be thought of without the other, as debtor and creditor. Abstract denote a notion separate from an object. Concrete denote a notion as inherent in an object.

23. When conceptions are recalled to the mind under what respective forms may they appear?

I. Under the form of a bare word. II. Under the form of the marks abstracted from it. III as the representative of all others of a class.

24. Explain the ambiguous use of the word, conception, which has prevailed, and the evil of it.

By some its meaning has been confined to simple imagination, by others it has been made to comprise imagination as well as every act of cognition. This has led to much difficulty to attempts to explain certain metaphysical facts, since conception is entirely distinct from simple imagination and any of the acts of cognition.

25. In what must the elements of all conceptions be found?

In some inward or outward intuition.

26. How far can the mind go in forming new combinations of the materials given it by intuition?

To any extent which does not involve contradiction.

27. Within what limits is conceivability a test of possibility?

In the strict scientific sense of the word conception as now employed, nothing can be conceived which involves a contradiction, and as those things are possible which are not contradictions, conceivability in this sense is a test of possibility.

28. Distinguish logical from primitive judgments which precedes, and which to logical conceptions, pronouncing their agreement or disagreement?

A logical judgment affirms or denies of a conception that something else agrees with it. A primitive judgment is that which enters into every cognition; it precedes conceptions and logical follows them, pronouncing, &c.

29. What is judgment and of what three parts does it consist?

A judgement is an expression that two notions can, or cannot be reconciled. The three parts are subject, predicate and copula.

30. Why may the genus and differentia be regarded as two overlapping genera?

Because that which is specific differentia in one case may become a genus in another; and even in the same species the genus may become the differentia and *vice versa*, hence they are concomitant genera

31. What is property and how distinguished from definition?

Every quality which belongs to all the subject and to no other is a property—it differs from definition inasmuch as it is not an *essential* quality.

32. Into what two great classes does the author divide predicables?

Into those taken distributively, which are capable of becoming subjects, and those having greater extension than the subject.

33. Define substitutive and attributive judgments

Substitutive are those in which the predicate is distributed, i. e., the whole of it is taken, and attributive those in which it is not.

34. State the six sources of definition—which of them is absolute, definition—and which furnishes the premises for inductive reasoning?

I. Resolution. II. Composition. III. Division. IV. Colligation. V. Change of Symbol. VI. Casual substitution. Resolution is absolute, and colligation gives the premiss for inductive reasoning.

35. Distinguish Induction from Deduction. Into what figure does the inductive Syllogism fall, and how is a substitutive judgment requisite to its validity?

Induction is reasoning from particular cases to general laws. Deduction is reasoning from general laws to particular cases. The inductive Syllogism falls in the third figure, and a substitutive judgment is necessary to avoid the vice of undistributed middle.

36. How do substitutive judgments amplify the sphere of validity in the three figures?

By avoiding the vices of illicit process and undistributed middle. Thus it enables us to have a negative minor, and hence negative conclusion in the *first* figure; affirmative premises and universal affirmative conclusion in the *second* figure; and a universal conclusion in the *third*.

37. Define relation of judgments, which in the author's view is most essential?

The common doctrine of relation divides judgments into categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive. The author considers that relation of judgments the most essential in which the subject stands to the predicate, as coextensive with it or not.

38. Define Categorical, Hypothetical, and Disjunctive judgments?

Categorical simply affirms that one conception does or does not belong to another—Hypothetical expresses seemingly a relation between two judgments as cause and effect, or condition and conditional. Disjunctive expresses the relation of two or more judgments which cannot be true together, but one or the other of which must be true.

39. How may Hypotheticals and Disjunctives be stated as Categoricals.

Hypotheticals by saying—*the case of, &c., is the case of, &c.* Disjunctives by saying—*the possible cases in this matter are either that . . . and that . . .*

40. When so stated are they substitutive or attributive judgments?

When Hypotheticals set forth the only cause which produces the given effect, they become substitutives when only one of many they are attributive. Disjunctives are always substitutives.

41. What is meant by plurative, and what by numerically definite judgments—what peculiarity in syllogisms is founded on them?

Pluratives are those which refer to more than half of their subject—numerically definites are those in which that part of the subject taken is deno-

ted by numbers. They give rise to valid Syllogisms *without* distribution of the middle term.

42. What is meant by the Quantity and what by the Quality of judgment?

Quantity refers to the extent in which its subject is taken, i. e., as to being universal or particular. Quality to its being affirmative or negative.

43. What is meant by Modality of Judgments—what by Problematic, Assertory, and Apodictic Judgments?

Modality is the relation between predicate and subject, as to the degree of certainty with which a proposition is stated. A Problematic Judgment is neither subjectively nor objectively certain, i. e., it is neither certain to him to whom it is held, nor is capable of being exhibited with certainty to another. Assertory is subjectively but not objectively certain. Apodictic is both subjectively and objectively certain.

44. Define the word species as used in Logic and Natural Science.

In Logic it means one of the most co-ordinate classes into which a proximate genus is divided. In Natural Science it is applied only to a class whose individuals have such identity of nature as indicates (1) an actual or possible descent from a single pair, (2) the power of permanent procreation and reproduction between its different varieties.

45. What are the Criteria of Natural, as distinguished from other species, and from varieties?

I. A general uniformity of external organization. II. A general resemblance in physiological, or internal structure. III. A psychological resemblance, i. e., as to conscious habits, acts or ways.

46. How does this go to prove the unity of our race as one species; and lend support to Revelation, and Redemption?

It has been argued that there is so much variety of race that we must be descended from different pairs: if this theory were true it would falsify the Bible, which speaks of us as descended from a single pair, and would invalidate the plan of Redemption, which proceeds from an analogy between the first and Second Adam. This theory, however, is shown to be false, since the criteria above referred to are found in all men.

47. In what three ways may all judgments be interpreted—give summary of the Analysis of judgments in quantity, quality and relation?

According to intension, extension and denomination, in the first we observe the marks, in the second we set apart a class, in the third we give the class a name.

The nature or form of judgments consists in their having (1) a certain quantity, (2) a certain quality, (3) a certain relation. (1) as to their Quantity they are either universal or particular, (2) as to their quality they are either affirmative or negative, (3) as to the relation they are either attributive or substitutive.

48. Define Analysis and Synthesis—also Analytic and Synthetic judgments and Syllogisms.

Analysis is separating into parts. Synthesis is the putting together so as to form a new or old whole. Analytic judgments are those in which the predicate is contained in the conception of the subject—Synthetic is when the predicate adds to the conception and requires proof. An Analytic Syllogism is one in which the conclusion is first stated, and afterwards the premises on which it is founded. A Synthetic Syllogism is one in which the premises are first stated and afterwards the conclusion.

49. State the class of judgments which are *a priori*, and which *a posteriori* and why?

*Analytics* are *a priori* because they contain their proof in the very concep-

tion of the subject.—Synthetic are *a posteriori* because the proof must be found outside by demonstration or experiment.

50. What class of sciences furnishes Synthetic Judgments *a priori*, and how do you prove them so?

The Formal Sciences give rise to such Judgments. They are such, because although they must be proved by a course of reasoning, yet all the steps in the proof are *a priori*, and hence the judgment is *a priori*.

51. How are Analysis and Synthesis related to Abstraction, Generalization, Induction, and Definition. Analysis must precede Abstraction and Generalization; Induction involves both Analysis and Synthesis; Definition is Analysis according to intension.

52. Explain KANT'S four triplets of Categories as related to the different logical of judgments.

#### I. QUANTITY.

- |   |            |                 |            |            |
|---|------------|-----------------|------------|------------|
| 1 | Unity—     | the property of | Singular   | Judgments. |
| 2 | Pleuralty— | “               | Particular | “          |
| 3 | Totality—  | “               | Universal  | “          |

#### II. QUALITY.

- |   |              |                 |             |            |
|---|--------------|-----------------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | Affirmation— | the property of | Affirmative | Judgments. |
| 2 | Negation—    | “               | Negative    | “          |
| 3 | Limitation—  | “               | Particular  | “          |

#### III. RELATION.

- |   |                         |                 |             |            |
|---|-------------------------|-----------------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | Substance and accident— | the property of | Categorical | Judgments. |
| 2 | Cause and Effect—       | “               | Conditional | “          |
| 3 | Action and Reaction—    | “               | Disjunctive | “          |

#### IV. MODALITY.

- |   |              |                 |             |            |
|---|--------------|-----------------|-------------|------------|
| 1 | Possibility— | the property of | Problematic | Judgments. |
| 2 | Existence—   | “               | Assertory   | “          |
| 3 | Necessity—   | “               | Apodictic   | “          |

53. Give a summation of the attributes of conceptions?

1. Nature of every higher attribute is found in the lower. 2. The name of the higher may always be applied to the lower. The higher includes the lower notion. 3. That set of marks which distinguishes species of the same genus is called specific differentia. 4. The whole of a species is contained and the definition given when the properties of the genus and those which make the specific differentia are brought together. 5. We ascend from lower conceptions to higher by throwing away specific differentia, i. e., by abstraction; we descend to lower by resuming the marks thrown away, i. e., by determination. 6. In a system of subordinate genera, each must contain the individuals included in the lowest. 7. Co-ordinate species cannot contain the same individuals. 8. The conception of an object consists of an aggregate of its marks, with the notion of existence superadded. 9. Single objects are invariably referred to and viewed through general conceptions. 10. A conception is complete and adequate when it can be resolved into its implied marks by definition and its contained species by division. 11. Two marks which stand to each other, as positive and privative, are called *contradictory*. Two marks are contrary when it is known *a posteriori* by experience, and not *a priori* by the form of expression that they cannot belong to the same object.

## THIRD QUARTER OF JUNIOR YEAR.

## Weyland's Intellectual Philosophy.

**Ques.** 1. Distinguish applied from pure logic—material from formal truth or science.

**Ans.** Pure Logic is the science of the necessary and formal laws of thought without reference to actual being. Applied Logic is the principles of logic applied to the investigation of actual truth, or of truth of actual being. Formal truths are principles true in and of themselves. Formal Science investigates such truths. Material truth relates to actual being. Material Sciences investigate these truths.

2. What are the four great criteria of truth—and how do the first and second stand related to the third and fourth?

I. The principle of Identity—conceptions agreeing may be united in thought or affirmed of the same subject at the same time. II. The principle of contradiction—the same attribute cannot be affirmed and denied of the same subject at the same time, or the attribute cannot be contradictory to the subject. III. of excluded middle—either a given judgment must be true or its contradictory—no middle course. IV. of sufficient reason—whatever exists or is true must have sufficient reason for being as it is and not otherwise. The third and fourth are respectively only other forms of the second and first.

3. In what way do the principles of identity and contradiction test the validity of reasonings by mediate and immediate inference of judgments and conceptions?

The principle of identity forms the basis of reasonings with affirmative conclusions, of affirmative judgments and positive conceptions. Privative conceptions, negative judgments and reasonings with negative conclusions are tested by the principle of contradiction.

4. Does Induction or Deduction apply to the wider field of inquiry?

Induction—for this is the method chiefly employed in the physical, as well as metaphysical sciences.

5. How does Formal Logic help us in inductive inquiry?

It furnishes the criteria to which inductive investigation should conform.

6. What is the cardinal point to be established in regard to the minor premiss of the inductive syllogism in order to a valid universal conclusion?

It is to determine under what circumstances the examples cited are fair samples or representatives of the whole class.

7. State and explain the three stages to progress in inductive science?

First. The stage of observation and experiment, in which facts are being collected, examined, registered and classified; but, as yet, there are no laws. Meteorology is a science in this stage. Second. Induction in which facts observed are made use of to prove certain laws which give rise to these facts, e. g., chemistry. Third. When the minor laws obtained by induction are resolved into a few all-comprehensive laws which furnish the basis for deducing all things relating to the subject, e. g., optics and astronomy.

8. State and explain the four chief criteria of a valid minor premiss for a universal inductive conclusion.

(1.) The method of agreement—In all cases, when a given cause is present, a given effect will be produced. (2.) The method of difference, when a given cause is absent, the effect will not be produced. (3.) The indirect method of difference—This is applied to test the nature of residual forces; causes that remain after all those that originally entered into the calculation have spent their force. (4.) Concomitant variation—As the amount of the cause varies so the amount of the effect varies.

9. What are the three chief theories in regard to the meaning of general words—distinguish two philosophic senses of the word *realism*.

The three chief theories concerning universals are (1.) Realism, (2.) Nominalism, (3.) Conceptualism, sometimes called Nominalism. Realism is used in two philosophic senses, (1.) as opposed to Nominalism, (2.) as opposed to Idealism; that all external things are only ideas.

10. Define Platonic realism, and Mediæval realism, (*universalia ante rem*.) and (*universalia in re*.) What is common to both, and wherein do they differ?

According to Plato (*U. ante R.*) one pervading substance constituted a class, and this substance existed in the Divine mind before any individuals of the class were created. According to the Mediæval theory, (*U. in R.*), this all-pervading substance was created contemporaneously with the individuals that it made. The point of similarity is that both recognize that unity is constituted by this pervading substance. They differ, however, in the time of the existence of this substance. Plato—Manhood existed from all eternity. Mediæval—It began to exist with the first individuals of the class whose unity it constituted.

11. Define Nominalism—wherein does it make the unity denoted by a common term to consist? What other theory is it sometimes used to denote?

The Nominalists held that the oneness of a class consisted in the name imposed upon it—universals are mere words. The unity denoted by a general word is thus made to consist in a mere name. It is sometimes used to denote conceptualism. Names being connected with conceptions, nominal and conceptual become implicated.

12. What is the doctrine of the conceptualists—which of the three doctrines is true—what do abstract and concrete words denote?

The Conceptualists hold that universals denote mental conceptions—that is, not representatives of any substance numerically one, but representatives of the common marks according to which the class is formed. Conceptualism is true. Abstract general words denote a quality without even implying an object or existence. Concrete general words denote a quality, and, at the same time, imply an object and existence.

13. What disproves the extreme nominalistic and what the realistic theory—what gives plausibility to the latter, and what consequences flow from it?

Extreme Nominalism is disproved by the fact, that general words are formed by abstraction and generalization from actual beings, and when so formed denote *real* qualities in those actual beings. Truth lies in the existence of the qualities named, *not* in the name arbitrarily imposed. Realism is disproved by our consciousness, we know that object belonging to a class are in no sense numerically one. The facts giving plausibility to Realism are, I. We know that God had in His mind from all eternity the plan of every class and individual, which he subsequently created. II. Conceptions derived by abstraction and generalization—from actual beings—must denote real qualities. The consequences of this theory are, (1.) a false direction

given to scientific inquiry. Since it taught men to seek for the one hidden numerical substance pervading a class, instead of pursuing rational inductive investigations. (2.) It destroys personal identity and thus overthrows human responsibility. (3.) It leads to Pantheism, for if any class of objects be numerically one, that class can be reduced to the absolute summum genus, including all beings, which would then be pervaded by a substance numerically one.

14. Give the distinction between connotative and non-connotative words?

A connotative term, along with denoting an object, connotes a quality or *vice versa*. A non-connotative term marks an object without a quality or a quality without an object.

15. State the respective qualities which distinguish mind from matter, and which prove the one to be radically different from the other?

Mind has inherent powers by which it thinks, feels, knows, wills—matter has not. Matter has extension, form, weight, &c., none of which qualities belong to mind.

16. Define philosophy—State why the philosophy of the mind is called *philosophy eminenter*?

Philosophy is the study of facts in their causes and unity. The science of mind is called philosophy eminenter because the ultimate and real cause of all things is mind.

17. Define Metaphysics in its looser and stricter sense—also define psychology and show their mutual relation?

Metaphysics, in its looser sense, is the science of all not material, not physical, in this sense it includes psychology—in its stricter sense it is the science of the supersensual truths that underlie all phenomena of mind or of matter: in this sense it is co-ordinate with psychology, and is sometimes called the science of inferences from psychology, also the science of intuitive truths. These two sciences run into each other. In studying Metaphysics we are brought to the consideration of Psychological facts, and in the study of Psychology we come in contact with Metaphysical truths.

18. Define utility—Absolute and relative. Explain the uses of philosophical study—absolute and relative.

Subjectively—absolute use. It promotes mental culture, vigor and insight. Objectively—relative use. The character of the knowledge acquired by it is relatively useful. 1st. Important means to the study of other sciences. 2d. It sharpens the mind and fits it for occupation in business. This is the lowest view. Utility is that which is a means to some good outside of itself. Absolute utility is that which is useful as a means of promoting that which is good in itself. Thus, a church building promotes the cause of religion. Relative Utility is that which is useful because it is means of producing something that is a means to some absolute good—e. g., the study of the languages to one about to study for the ministry. It is then a means to a means of good.

19. With what dispositions should philosophy be studied—what do you say of emulation?

I. With candor, a fair state of mind open to conviction from evidence, and which will fairly appreciate evidence.

II. With earnestness or zeal for truth, which appreciates truth above all that competes with it, and which sacrifices to it ease, emolument and honor.

III. With humility, that state of mind which will lead us to subordinate ourselves and our pride to truth and lay them at its feet. In one respect emulation is noble, elevated and free from all baseness. It is when one desires to stand high in comparison to his fellows, to satisfy himself that he has

done justice to himself and the subject. But any desire to disparage—to detract from their merits, satisfaction at their failures and sorrow at their success—all this is base, ignoble and degraded.

20. Show the original and subsidiary sources of the knowledge of mind—define consciousness—what in regard to unconscious mental acts.

The original source is consciousness—the subsidiary sources are the consciousness of the human race, as ascertained from the actions and language of mankind, as seen in the history and literature of the race. Consciousness is that common quality of all the mental acts by which when any exercise of the mind occurs, we know of its occurrence. Strictly speaking there are no unconscious mental acts.

21. Show the relation of inductive reasoning to psychology and metaphysics?

Psychology is an inductive science. Since it is by observing the individual exercises of our own minds and those of others we arrive at the laws of these phenomena. Metaphysics, strictly speaking is beyond induction, since it deals with intuitive truths. It involves, however, a quasi inductive method, since it is by a comparison of the acts of single minds that we discover what truths are intuitive.

22. How should each one proceed to solve disputed questions in psychology?

By appealing to the testimony of his own consciousness.

23. Show the relation of attention and reflection to philosophy—explain reflection?

They are both essential to the study of philosophy, for attention is the obvious condition of all insight, knowledge and mental improvement, and reflection is one of the first steps in all study. Reflection is the exercise of the discernive faculties upon the knowledge obtained by the acquisitive faculties and kept by the retentive faculties.

24. Define attention—Show its three degrees, and its relation to intellectual power and responsibility for opinions?

Attention is consciousness considered as being under a certain law, viz. : that the intensity of consciousness or the force of our cognitions is inversely the number of objects before the mind, and directly as the time and energy of continuous application. Its three degrees are I. Attention against the will. II. Involuntary attention, i. e., the will does not act for or against. III. Voluntary attention. Attention is the measure of intellectual power, and it forms the basis for personal responsibility. It is true, that in our opinion we must be controlled by evidence, but the reception of evidence depends upon our attention to it, and this is under the control of the will.

25. Show the points involved in the cognition of self and self-consciousness.

I. Consciousness of self, as existent. II. As abiding, enduring, existing before and after and in order to the act of cognizing, but not as immutable or eterna. III. As existing independent of the act of cognition. IV. As having power, volition. V. As distinct from outward objects; the Ego as distinguished from the non-Ego. This must be observed to keep us from falling into Idealism. VI. As present in all acts of consciousness. VII. Self is the most original and suggestive instance of substance, of cause and of identity.

26. Show the relation of external perception to the organs of sense, the nerves and the brain?

In perception the object acts upon the organs of sense, the nerves connect

this organ with the brain, and the latter receives the Impression conveyed by them. The mind, however, is the thing that perceives.

27. State its relation to representative images of the objects perceived ?

In the perception of an object, the mind does not perceive a representative image of the object, but the object itself.

28. Define sensation, sensational, sensuous, sensism, supersensual and perception.

Sensation is an affection of the bodily organism as pervaded by the mind, and gives no knowledge beyond itself. Sensational Philosophy or Sensationalism is that which derives all knowledge exclusively from the senses; Sensuous, that sort of knowledge which comes through the senses; Supersensual, knowledge derived from sources above sense. Perception carries the mind to the immediate cognition of an external object—it goes beyond itself. Sensation is evidently subjective and Perception objective. The ratio is inverse; the stronger the sensation the weaker the perception, and the more distinct the perception the less obtrusive the sensation.

29. State the seven points involved in the immediate perception of body ?

Body is perceived I. as having existence, II. as being extramental, III. as abiding, IV. as external, V. as exercising power of resistance, VI. as extended, VII. as being *non ego*.

30. Distinguish the *sensus vagus* from the *sensus fixus*—what are the organs of sense ?

*Sensus Vagus* denotes those vague, indeterminate sensations diffused throughout the whole body, e. g., heat, cold, sickness. *Sensus fixus* are those sensations which have a definite form and are fixed in kind and locality, e. g., taste, smell, etc. The organs of sense are of sight, smell, taste, hearing, touch—a sixth is added by some—muscular energy, but this is a modified form of touch.

31. Distinguish perception in our own bodies from perception of external objects.

In the former case the part perceived, and the part perceiving are mutually percipient. In perception of external living bodies both are percipient, but not mutually so. In the perception of dead matter the act of perception is wholly on the part of the subject perceiving.

32. What consequence follows from the doctrine that all our knowledge is by Sensation ?

Then all our knowledge is subjective; we never could get out of ourselves. From this Monism, Egoism, and Pantheism result.

33. What consequence results from distrusting the testimony of consciousness as to the reality of external object, or a non-Ego.

By consciousness we know the non-Ego as well as the Ego: now if consciousness be a false witness in regard to the non-Ego, it is not to be trusted in regard to the Ego—“*Falsum in uno, falsum in omnibus.*” Hence the basis of universal skepticism.

34. State HAMILTON'S doctrine of the relativity of knowledge and its consequences ?

He says that all our knowledge is relative to our faculties, also that there are many things for which we have no faculties. These statements are true, but here comes the objectional part:—he says that what we know is not known in its purity; e. g., we cognize an object, and this cognition may be supposed to be divisible in a certain number of parts—twelve for instance: three of which came from the object cognized, three from the surrounding media, three from the organ of sense and three from the mind which cognizes. Hence but a part comes from the object. But we may as well assume that

none comes from the object, and it will then follow that we do not know objects of all. This undermines the whole fabric in relation to sensation, which Hamilton strove so hard to build up.

35. State the office of object and subject in knowledge, and what perversions of this relation result respectively in Materialism and Idealism.

The office of the subject is to know; of the object to be known. The absorption of object in subject is Idealism; the loss of subject in object is Materialism.

36. What do you say of Phrenology as a Science of Mind?

It is worthless: because an external examination of the organs can never result in the knowledge of the phenomena and Laws of the Mind, much less in their classification.

37. Distinguish original and acquired—proper and improper—immediate and inferential perceptions.

Original, or as HAMILTON terms it proper, or as it is sometimes called immediate perception, is the immediate cognition of external objects of body and its properties. Acquired, improper or inferential perception is that cognition of external objects not immediate, but which is by inference from that which is immediate.

38. What is its importance in regard to apparent fallacies of sense and a valid doctrine of external perception?

Its value lies in enabling us to prove that these fallacies occur, not in the original perceptions, but in the region of inferences.

29. Explain Ventriloquism, Fresco illusions and other illusions of Sight and Sound, also the relation of Binocular Vision to the knowledge of Trinal Extension.

All these illusions are produced not by false impressions through the medium of the senses, but from false inferences drawn from the impressions received. Vision gives us a knowledge of surface, not of solidity, of length and breadth, not of depth. But the experiments that led to the discovery of the stereoscope go to prove that the union of both eyes gives us length, breadth and depth, which is Symbolical of Solidity, and thus we have a perception of Trinal development.

40. Explain the interchangeable use of the senses how it leads to acquired perception operating to supply the loss of the senses; its uses in Medicine and the Arts?

The senses are used interchangeably when the knowledge, originally gained by one sense is found out by another: e. g., ascertaining the solidity of an object of sight. It leads to acquired perceptions by enabling us to find out certain qualities of an object by inference:—hence the loss of one sense may be supplied by another. By this use of the senses, physicians discover diseases from the symptoms, and the character of drugs by their touch or smell. In the arts it leads to quickness, and delicacy of perception, accuracy of judgment, and exactness of execution.

41. Distinguish the primary, secondary and secondary—primary properties of matter.

The *primary* properties of matter arising from its occupying space, are extension, divisibility, size, density or rarity, figure, impenetrability or incompressibility; *absolute* from its being contained in space, situation and mobility. General characteristics: They are spatial, essential, analytic, *a priori* from the very nature of matter.

*Secondary* Properties—Flavor, savor, heat, cold, sound, color, (disputed); the galvanic, electric, chemical and physiological facts of matter.

\* *Secundo Primary* (of mechanical properties) are gravity, cohesion, repulsion and inertia.

42. What are the modes for knowing these respective properties of matter.

The primary are known by perception directly and clearly, as objective, by intelligence, as universals, as real and actual, known *a priori*. The secondary are known by sensation, inferentially, as occult, as subjective; by feeling as partial, as potentialities dependent for realization on their interaction with our organs. The secundo—primary are known as *a posteriori*, partly by perception and partly by sensation, as contingent modifications of primary, and in various respects like and unlike both secondary and primary.

43. Explain the bearing and importance of this distinction in maintaining a valid doctrine of perception?

Without this distinction we will not be able to maintain our ground against Idealism on the one hand and against Materialism on the other, and against Monism and Pantheism, the result of both. For if there were no properties of matter but the secondary, all knowledge would be by sensation; i. e., would be subjective. If, then, we obliterate this distinction, we can never get out of ourselves and never get to a valid doctrine of external Realism.

44. What class assail it, and why? What are the consequences of rejecting or ignoring it?

Skeptics assail this distinction, because by preventing a clear apprehension of it they cause confusion respecting the the valid doctrine of perception. Rejecting this leads to Material or Ideal Monism.

45. State HAMILTON'S four criteria of primary truths and cognitions.

I. They are incomprehensible. II. They are simple. III. They are necessary and universal. IV. They are so clear and obvious that nothing more so, can be conceived of, by which to prove them.

46. What are the twofold data of consciousness, and by what arguments may doubt as to the veracity of consciousness be dispelled?

( see *Wayland's Intellectual Philosophy*, pp. 98 and 99.)

47. What do you say of the locality of the mind in the body?

The mind has its chief seat in the brain; but as the nerves, which are the prolongation of the spinal marrow, which proceed from the brain are found in all parts of the body, so the mind is, to some extent, found throughout the entire organism.

48. How do you show that color is not a mere sensation in the eye, but a reality on the surface which displays it, or in the rays of light issuing from it?

I. Such a theory is contrary to the testimony of all normal consciousness, which cannot be invalidated without overthrowing its authority; and, if we do this, we undermine all foundation for a valid doctrine of external perception. II. Through sight we obtain our chief knowledge of space. Space involves distance; . . . sight involves distance, consequently color must be at some distance, i. e., in the object and perceived by the rays of light coming from it. III. Hamilton admits and proves that color gives us the knowledge of extension. If two colors join we have a line . . . color must come from something extended, which indicates extension. IV. The young of all animals, when food is presented to them, go to it, showing that they see the objects some distance off—“not in their eye.”

49. In what sense is color in the colored surface, or in the rays of light issuing from it—how far does it partake of the primary, and how far of the secondary properties of matter?

So far as color is a phenomenon actually perceived by the eye, so far it is in the colored surface, or in the rays, &c. So far also it is a primary pro-

erty, because known by perception, directly, objectively and intelligently. It is a secondary property when considered as something occult in the colored substance which has the power of retaining some rays of light and reflecting others. It is also not universal.

50. Show the difference between tangible and visible magnitude and distance?

Visible magnitude is apparent size of a body at any distance. Visible distance is that judged by the eye from the magnitude of the object, and the number of intervening objects. Tangible magnitude and distance is that known through the medium of touch.

51. Of what four Metaphysical ideas is self the most suggestive, and original type?

I. Cause. II Substance. III. Identity IV. Unity.

52. Define Substance—its relation to qualities—is it in every sense occult and unknowable?

Substance is that which has being, power, and permanence. It is that of which qualities are the manifestations. Considered as abstracted from its qualities substance is occult, and unknowable. But since *in fact*, it never is separate from its qualities, we know substance, so far as we know the qualities.

52. Explain KANT's *Noumena* and *Phenomena*, and his theory regarding our knowledge of them. Also HAMILTON's theory of the relativity of knowledge.

KANT's noumena corresponds to substance and was considered by him as an occult, external something, causing the phenomena. His phenomena corresponds to our qualities, but were considered by him as entirely subjective, hence he considered the first as unknowable and the second as affectious of the mind.

For HAMILTON's theory see question 34.

53. Give a brief account of modern Transcendentalism, and its successive stages of development by KANT, FICHTE, SCHELLING, and HEGEL.

The theory starts with KANT's notion of the noumena, and phenomena; FICHTE developed it by maintaining that there was as good a reason for making the noumenon subjective, as the phenomena, and hence he established that all is a mere manifestation of the mind. But as this led to gross inconsistencies, SCHELLING now took up this theory and laying down an absolute, infinite *Ego*, said that all things are manifestations of this *Ego*. Thus he makes a finite condition of the Infinite Mind. HEGEL finishes the theory by saying that since this ground of existence becomes finite by passing into consciousness, therefore thought is the only real existence, so that Thought and Being are identical. And he also held that pure Being is equal to nothing, since as pure it is not conditioned, i. e., without manifestations, but without it is as nothing.

54. What one doctrine is common to all these—what are its moral and religious and consequences?

The feature common to all is that they lead to Monism and Pantheism. They make one all and all one; remove the distinction between God and man and make all things God. This destroys all human accountability; for, if man be God, he is not answerable to the laws of a higher Being. It resolves all that happens into blind fate; leaves man no will, no freedom, no accountability; it undermines all morals, all religion and all knowledge. The only way in which we may escape this vortex is to hold fast to our belief that external objects appear as they are, because they are as they appear.

55. How, according to these philosophers, does the Infinite become finite?

(1.) By passing into consciousness. For, say they, consciousness involves knowledges, knowledge, discrimination, which involves limits. (2.) By coming under conditions, or assuming qualities which involve distinctive bounds.

## FOURTH QUARTER OF JUNIOR YEAR.

## Weyland's Intellectual Philosophy,

(CONTINUED)

1. Show the importance of Memory, and its three great elements ?

Without Memory our knowledge would be limited to consciousness of the present. It would be impossible to compare past and present—to compare anything ; to conduct any of the elaborate processes which work by comparison. It involves three elements, viz : Conservative, Reproductive and Representative.

2. Explain the three forms of latent mental modifications—and the respective offices of the reproductive faculty, as spontaneous and voluntary, also of the representative faculty !

1st. As they are evinced in all the dispositions and habits of the soul, both intellectual and moral, whether natural or acquired.

2d. As seen in ordinary and normal exercises of memory.

3d. As seen in certain preternatural exercises of memory induced by abnormal activity of the nervous system. The reproductive faculty has the power to reproduce into consciousness, past mental operations, after they have been laid up latent in the mind. It is either spontaneous or voluntary. As spontaneous it brings to the mind involuntarily a part of past experiences, and from this part we will to remember by voluntary reproduction other collateral facts. The representative faculty is of the nature of simple imagination. Its office is to bring into a state of consciousness a mental image of past cognitions.

3. Show the relation of Memory to the association of ideas ?

Memory is not identical with the association of the ideas. The operation of the conservative faculty is the precondition of this association ; when thus linked together the reproductive faculty employs this to recall collateral ideas to consciousness.

4. Show the meaning and comparative importance of Memory by permanent and casual principles of association.

Permanent principles of association enable us to remember things through their logical relations, their causes and effects and the principles which bind them together. The casual principle of association recalls things connected by the lowest bonds of community, or only isolated facts. The former is most important, but the latter is useful as a foundation for the other.

5. State some methods for invigorating memory.

I. By *exercise*, as with all the faculties.

II. Having a *thorough knowledge*—“What is worth doing at all is worth doing well.”

III. Storing up our knowledge in an *orderly, systematic, and logical* manner.

IV. *Punctilious veracity*.

6. How is the exercise of memory requisite to the development of some principal intuitive truths ?

Memory is indispensable to the very conception of those intuitive truths involving succession ; e. g. Time, Personal Identity, and Development of Numbers.

7. How is Memory involved in our observation of motion—Does Time seem longer as our ideas seem quick or slow?

When a body is in motion, we only perceive by our senses its present situation, and by memory we remember the successive advances it has made. By these two states joined together we have the idea of motion. Time seems longest when our ideas are slow.

8. Give HAMILTON'S four criteria of intuitive truths and explain their incomprehensibility and simplicity? Within what limits is Catholicity an actual test of these?

Incomprehensibility, simplicity, necessity and universality, comparative evidence and certainty—self-evidence. Incomprehensibility means that they cannot be resolved by and explained under other truths. Simplicity—all truths are simple or compound; if compound, they could be seen in the light of other truths, and thus their originality would be destroyed. Catholicity is a test of intuitive truths that they are received by all men of sane mind who are unbiassed by interest or prejudice.

9. Give some of the titles used to denote intuitive truths with the reasons of their use?

I. Regulative truths or faculties—so called because they regulate all men's thoughts, even though they be not formally recognized. II. Instinctive truths—because they are received by the mind immediately without any process of reasoning, but not without the exercise of reason. III. Truths of Common Sense. IV. *A Priori* truths, because received as true without the evidence of experience. V. Super-sensual—because not discerned by the senses. VI. Metaphysical—because underlying all phenomena. VII. Truths of reason, in distinction from those of understanding.

10. What is REID'S Classification of them?

I. Grammatical. II. Logical. III. Mathematical. IV. Moral. V. Metaphysical. These, however, are all subdivisions of the genus *metaphysical*.

11. In what sense are they regulative and are they merely so?

They are regulative in that all men are governed by them: but they are also absolutely and necessarily true.

12. Give the four meanings for the term *common sense*?

First—Subjectively; it is the faculty for cognising intuitive first truths.

Second—Objectively; it is the sum of the truths known by mankind.

Third—To indicate a good degree of natural shrewdness.

Fourth—It denotes that, the absence of which shows a man to be *non compos mentis*.

13. State the modern German distinction between *reason* and *understanding*, and the true view of it?

The Germans apply the term *reason*, to the intuitive faculty; and *understanding* to the discursive faculty. This distinction does not hold, because understanding is used as a generic term covering all the faculties, while reason is considered not only the faculty of intuitive truths, but also the discursive faculty which proceeds from truths already established to others founded on them.

14. Why are intuitive truths sometimes called *a priori*, and Transcendental?

They are known originally from the conditions given and not from experience. They are called transcendental, because they transcend all knowledge derived from the senses.

15. State LOCKE'S doctrine in regard to *a priori* truths, and innate ideas—what are the moral and religious consequences of his system? State also how far we have innate ideas?

This doctrine is that our ideas are obtained from what we know through *sensation* and *reflection*, and that there are no supersensual truths, beyond these; no innate ideas. By sensation he meant both sensation and perception; by reflection such inferences as the mind can make from the matter gained through the senses. This system tends to materialism, and has been carried so far, as to attempt to turn Christianity into an imposture. Ideas are innate not in the sense that they are fully developed into consciousness at birth; but that they are in the mind potentially, ready to be developed just as reason itself.

16. State the difference between the chronological and logical order of ideas, and its bearing on the refutation of LOCKE's system?

The chronological order is that in which a matter of fact first arises in the mind in point of Time. Logical order is that in which the first is the prerequisite condition of the existence of the other. They are generally in the inverse order. Space is logically before body; body is chronologically before space. Time is logically before succession. This distinction disposes of Locke's argument by showing that the intuitive truths are necessary preconditions of those gained by sensation and reflection.

17. Are Time and Space original or derivative ideas—what as to their being, substances, qualities or relations?

They are original ideas. They are not to be classified as *substances*, for they have not power or action; as *qualities*, for we have no intuitive knowledge of any substance in which they inhere. They are more than *relations*, for we know of no two or more things which by their relations could yield space and time.

18. How do the ideas of Space and Time first enter the mind, and what five points are intuitively seen to belong to each?

The idea of Space and Time first arises in the mind, in connection with body; abstract from body the idea of extension and we have *a priori* pure Space. Time is involved in the successive states of consciousness given by memory. These involve duration; abstract all consciousness and we have pure duration.

First—We know *a priori* that Space and Time are unlimited. Time is so in one direction only.

Second—They are known as realities, independent of our cognition of them.

Third—Space is the void receptacle of all actual beings; Time of all changes or successions, and it is the logical condition of their existence.

Fourth—They are known as necessary.

Fifth—They are known as continuous:

19. What is KANT's doctrine in regard to Space and Time—its refutation and its consequences?

It is that Space and Time are mere mental forms of the phenomena presented through the senses. But if the receptacles (Space and Time) are mere mental forms, then their contents (bodies, succession, &c.) are so also. If this were true, Idealism would be the consequence, which refutes this.

20. What is the contrast between our knowledge of Space and Body—of time and succession?

We know body as limited, and as contingent and as a sensuous presentation. We know Space as unlimited, necessary, and by a rational conception. We know Succession, as limited, as contingent, and as an experience in consciousness. We know Time, as unlimited, as necessary, and through a rational conception.

21. What truths and ideas above the senses are suggested on occasion of perceiving one or several objects?

Space, Substance, Quality, Number, Position and Duration.

22. Give some account of the manner in which these ideas arise in the mind.

In the perception of an external object, we cognize only the qualities, but we know that these qualities must belong to something, and this something is called substance. Perception of a single object gives us the idea of unity: Several objects being perceived, the comparison of their aggregate with unity, gives us our first idea of number. From the perception of objects, not in contact, arises the idea of position. (For Space and Duration, see Question 18.)

23. State under what circumstances the idea of identity first arises in the mind?

When, by means of memory, we compare an object as it existed at one time with it as existent at another time and find the relation to be that of numerical oneness.

24. In what consists the identity of organized bodies, and how does this answer relieve difficulties in regard to the resurrection?

It consists in the vital, organic principle which makes it an individual as distinguished from all others, no matter what changes it may undergo. This principle may remain in the custody of the Redeemer, and at the Resurrection may assimilate itself to the future body.

25. State the marks of personality, and their relation to difficulties connected with the doctrine of the Trinity and the Incarnation?

First—Personality is that distinct, and individuating principle in a moral and intelligent being, which is indicated by the term *self*, and which makes him the proper subject of the pronouns I, thou, he, &c.

Second—It is the intelligent source and object of rational, voluntary and moral action.

Third—It makes the subject possessing it an end to be regarded for its own sake, and which cannot be sacrificed as a means to some other end outside of itself. We cannot tell whether three or thirty of these may not be found in one being: therefore, we cannot deny the possibility of a *Trinity* or of the *Incarnation*.

26. State the bearing of personal identity on accountability?

Personal identity is the precondition of accountability.

27. State KANT's doctrine of substance and identity, and its consequences?

He says that the notion of Substance and Identity is inconsistent with the idea of change. This leads to the doctrine that there is no substance but God; who is the only unchangeable being.

28. Give KANT's four couplets of categories, also ARISTOTLE's and those of the positive philosophers?

(For KANT's, see Question 52, Second Quarter.)

Aristotle's are:

ποσόν—Quantity. ποιεῖν—Action. ποτε—When.

ποιόν—Quality. πασχεῖν—Passion. χεῖσθαι—Situation:

πρὸς τι—Relation. πού—Where. ἔχειν—Habit.

Categories of positive philosophy are Simultaneity, and Succession; Similarity and Dissimilarity.

29. Give the cardinal principles of the positive philosophy, and your view of it?

Positive philosophy ignores everything except the phenomena of Matter as presented to the Mind in the two aspects of time and resemblance. They

assert that the mind in the process of development passes through three stages, 1st, the theological in which all phenomena are referred to superior, invisible agencies—Fetichism, Polytheism and Theism.

2d. Metaphysical stage, in which invisible agencies are ignored, and all phenomena are referred to Metaphysical entities as Nature, the social principle, &c.

3d. The positive in which both invisible agencies and Metaphysical entities are thrown aside, and phenomena of matter alone are recognized as above stated, this philosophy is the purest Atheism.

30. What is said of the doctrine that all Matter is mere force; and all Substances continuous, divine acts.

Force is the activity of something; if matter is nothing but mere force, it must be the activity of the divine mind. First—this is refuted by testimony of our own consciousness. Second—By the Scriptures which declare that God is the Creator and Upholder of all things; showing that things do exist distinct from God himself.

31. State the true doctrine of cause and effect; how it first arises in the mind, and whether it is a *priori* or a *posteriori*?

The doctrine is that every *event* or *change* must have a cause; it first arises in the mind from the perception of a concrete example of it; e. g., A change in ourselves produced by an act of the will. It is a *priori*.

32. Give the theories of BROWN and HAMILTON and your views of them?

The theory of Brown and the positive school is that all we know of cause is that it is a mere succession of antecedents and consequents. We do not know the former to be the *cause* of the latter. *Objection* 1. This is not what is meant by causal judgment. Night precedes day, but we do not say it is the *cause* of day. 2. A causal judgment is not that one kind of phenomenon is always followed by the same, but that effect must have a cause. 3. It undermines doctrines founded on causality; for if the idea of *power* is excluded, we cannot argue God's authorship and existence from His works.

Hamilton's Doctrines is that the idea of causation results from the impotence of the human mind to conceive of any addition to the sum of being. Change is but a development of what before existed in some other form. We call the old form *cause*; the new, *effect*. *Objection* 1. The causal judgment does not result from mental impotence, but is the highest form of mental energy. 2. The theory does not explain what it professes to explain. It does not account for things being which once were not. 3. If nothing can exist but what always has existed, then all things are God, and we come at once to Pantheism. 4. Every man is conscious in his own mind of an efficient cause to produce changes.

33. Define Material, Formal, Final and Efficient causes; also Positive, Negative or Positive, Instrumental, Occasional, Meritorious, Second Causes and *Causa Sine qua non*?

Material and formal stand related, as genus and differentia. Material is the bare matter or substance of a things, irrespective of the qualities distinguishing it from others. Formal cause corresponds to the differentia which distinguishes this bare substance from other Substance of the same kind. Efficient cause is cause in the literal, strict and proper sense of the term. Final cause is the end for which any effect is produced. It is called *teleological*.

Positive cause is when the effect is produced by the presence and agency of the cause; privative, when by its absence. First is that which is absolute and independent: second, that which is dependent on first causes. Occasional is that which is the occasion of the effect produced. Meritorious,

that which deserves the effect, though not efficiently producing it. *Causa sine qua non* is anything without the existence of which the effect could not have been produced. Instrumental is the instrument through which the efficient cause operates.

34. Show why an infinite series of causes need not be sought ?

That every change or event must have a cause, does not imply that an *Unchangeable* and Infinite Being must have a cause.

35. How does the doctrine of Causality underlie Philosophy and Science and the argument from the works of Nature for the Being of a God ?

It underlies Philosophy since Philosophy investigates the laws of phenomena, i. e., their causes. It underlies the arguments from Nature since Nature proves that there must have been a first cause.

36. Give the various meanings of the word *Idea*.

1st. An idea is a mental image or similitude of a past cognition or object of knowledge—the product of simple imagination. 2d. A conception subjectively viewed. 3d. The definition or essential marks of a conception, subjectively viewed. 4th. That which objectively considered is a law; Subjectively viewed is an *idea*. 5th. It is used vaguely to denote any apprehension or cognition of the mind.

37. What is Association of Ideas—Its three laws as formally accepted by Philosophers—Its one great law set forth by HAMILTON ?

It is that mental property by which one idea suggests another. It has been resolved into (1.) Relation of cause and effect; (2.) Resemblance and contrast; (3.) Contiguity in time or space. Hamilton resolves the whole into the law of reintegration; i. e., a tendency in the mind from a fragment of a past thought or mental state to reconstruct the whole.

38. Show the relation of Association of Ideas to Memory—Compare Voluntary with Spontaneous Association of Ideas ?

The conservative element of Memory is the condition of this Association, and the latter is the instrument of the Reproductive Faculty. Spontaneous association is casual or accidental, and has no rational aim; Voluntary Association is that which is controlled by the will for a rational and worthy end.

39. Define Simple and Constructive Imaginative; also Fancy; also the functions of imagination with regard to Truth and Beauty; the world of Sense and Spirit.

Simple Imagination is the power of producing mental images of any past mental state or object of cognition. Constructive Imagination is that power which connects objects or parts of objects and forms new combinations, having no precise counterpart in actual being. Fancy is imagination in its feebler form, it forms combinations for the sake of a momentary pleasure instead of for a lofty and noble end.

Constructive Imagination mediates Truth to the mind through the representations of Beauty, it mediates between the world of Sense and Spirit by representing the spiritual phenomena through things of sense which they resemble.

40. What is Philosophical Imagination—Its two kinds and uses as respects Physics and Metaphysics.

Philosophical Imagination is the kind employed in Philosophy. First—In Physical Science it frames hypotheses which facilitate scientific investigations. Second—In Metaphysics it represents Supersensual truths by Sensible presentations.

41. What are the uses and abuses of Imagination ?

First—Within due bounds, works of Imagination elevate and ennoble the

mind by setting before it high high ideals and stimulating it to imitate them. Second—They afford innocent and salutary recreation. Third—Imagination is an instrument of refined culture and scientific progress. Fourth—It is an instrument for powerfully enforcing truth. It is abused First—When prostituted for forming vicious and trifling combinations. Second—When used for propagating error and exalting vice by arraying it in the garb of virtue. Third—When fictitious works are real for the purpose of exciting our sensibilities; since when the feelings are thus excited without being brought into exercise we are unfitted for action, or for works of active benevolence.

42. How are *σωμα*, *φύσις*, *ψυχή*, *πνεύμα*, compounded in plants animals, and men.

*Σωμα* is mere body—*φύσις* body and vitality—*ψυχή* is the addition of consciousness—*πνεύμα* is the addition of reason.

43. Distinguish organized from unorganized substances—animals from plants?

The unorganized are the lowest. There are two grades: First—Mechanical; where masses of matter act upon each other without change of particles or any interaction of atoms which change the substance. Second—Chemical; where particles interact and change the substance.

Criteria of organized substances:

First—There is a change, by an inward vital force, working according to a certain law and for a certain end; evolution from within. Second—Assimilation from without. Third—Continuous growth. Fourth—Action upon external substances for its own ends. Fifth—It act by organs. Sixth—Kant says all the parts are mutually means and ends.

Animals have—1. Complete and distinct organism in all their parts. 2. Consciousness or sensibility. 3. Self-motion other than growth.

44. Distinguish human from brute intelligence?

Brutes have—1. Sensation. 2. Perception of external objects. 3. Instinct, or the power of executing rational works without the exercise of reason yet with conscious activity. 4. Memory.

Man has additionally—1. Reason and knowledge of intuitive or supersensual truths. 2. Substantial possession of the discursive faculties. 3. Accountability. 4. Progressiveness. Animals never progress in powers. They lack articulate speech, without which there can be no exercise of the high intellectual faculties.

# Moral Science.

## FIRST QUARTER OF SENIOR YEAR.

QUES. 1. Give proofs of the influence of body on mind, and mind on body ?

ANS. Body on mind—(1.) Through our bodily organs of sense we have all our knowledge of the external world, so that if we are deprived of these organs we lose the faculty of cognition. (2.) As the vigor of the body increases so does that of the mind. (3.) The effect of disease often is a prae-ternatural elevation, or depression of the mind. (4.) Narcotics, alcoholic, and all stimulants bewilder, shatter, craze and finally destroy the mind. (5.) Blood letting has removed mental hallucination and other mental distempers. (6.) Every man's experience teaches him the advantage of the union of an elastic body and mind.

Mind on body—(1.) We imagine that the body will be affected in a certain way, and it is often thus affected. Epidemic diseases are fed in this way. (2.) Melancholy begets loss of appetite, and tends to sickness. (3.) Violent emotions of grief, fear, joy, produce disease, and sometimes even death. (4.) Excessive mental labor causes premature decay. (5.) Mental characteristics appear in the physiognomy and development of the body.

2. What is Conscience, or the moral faculty, and the evidence that it is original and universal ?

Conscience is that faculty of the human mind, which discerns a quality in certain actions which are termed moral. It is an *original* faculty because moral ideas are simple, and to acquire simple ideas we must have an original faculty. It is universal because all possess it without instruction or education, and all men agree as to the morality of certain acts.

3. How do you explain the conflicting moral judgments among men ?

The principles on which men act are correct, but through ignorance or error the application is different.

4. How far does this disagreement on moral subjects go ?

It only extends to the first Truths in Morals. On those questions which regard good or evil there is no difference. In most cases is only in the application of the principles of morality.

5. Is conscience an intellectual or emotional faculty, and how does it compare with Taste ?

It is partly intellectual, and partly emotional. *Intellectual*, as far as it is a judgment respecting a moral subject. *Emotional* as much as this judgment is always accompanied by an emotion. Conscience and Taste are alike in that both, in addition to their appropriate judgment, invariably have an emotion accompanying the judgment.

6. What is the true idea of moral obligation ? Give PALEY'S definition, and your views of it ?

When we know an act to be right, we are bound to do it aside from all considerations of interests. Paley's definition was that man is said to be obliged when "urged by a violent motive, resulting from the will of another." This destroys the intrinsic difference between virtue and vice, making everything virtuous which tends to promote happiness.

7. State the true doctrine relative to the supremacy of conscience ?

The judgment that conscience should be obeyed is intuitive, and when we know any act to be right, we are bound aside from self interest to perform it.

8. How far do we do right by obeying conscience,—What is necessary to make an action materially and formally right ?

We do right so far as our judgment respecting duty is correct ; but as no man's knowledge is perfect or infallible, his judgment may sometimes err, and then he sins in obeying conscience. How then can a man be responsible for doing wrong ? Because he is responsible for being brought into such a state. For an action to be right requires, (1.) that the state of mind of the agent be such as it ought to be. (2.) The action must be in conformity with the law, under which we are placed.

9. Give the Ancient, the Scotch, the Modern Popular, and the Hamiltonian distribution of the powers of the mind ?

I. The Ancient, into understanding and will. II. The Scotch, into intellectual, moral and active. III. The Modern Popular, into understanding, sensibility and will. IV. The Hamiltonian, into cognitive, sensitive and conative ; in which the will is ranked under the conative, thus making will and desire rank under the same head.

10. Show the mutual relation of the cognitive and conative powers, and the formal object of each respectively ?

The conative faculty must have the light of the cognitive, or else they would spring up haphazard, and would work distraction. In the powers of cognition, there is the cognition of something beyond itself. In feeling when we know the mental act of feeling, we know all that is to be known of it. The object of the conative faculties is to produce action—they seek good. The object of the cognitive is to know—they seek truth.

11. Define Motion, Objective and Subjective—Disposition—Habit—Principle, Subjective and Objective—Instinct—Appetite—Desire—Affection—Emotion—Emotional—Passion and Will ?

Motive is whatever excites the will to choice ; it is both outward and inward ; objective and subjective. Desire is the real force which moves the will to choice, and this is subjective ; the objective motives are those which arise from things outside of ourselves. Disposition is an inward faculty, aptitude or tendency toward any given class of exercises. Habit is much the same thing as disposition, but refers to that which is acquired by repeated action. Principle, subjectively viewed, is the same as disposition or habit ; but objectively viewed, it means the maxims by which a man guides his conduct. Instinct is that faculty by which a conscious being performs a voluntary, rational act without any exercise of reason. Appetite is an uneasy feeling which demands gratification, but when allayed it returns periodically, and it also arises blindly. Desire is the reaching forth of soul after something, which seems to be a good. (Desire and expectation are equal to Hope. Desire and Possession—Joy. Aversion and Expectation—Fear. Aversion and Possession—Sorrow.) Affection has conscious beings for its objects—it is a desire—and a desire to do them good, if it be benevolent, evil if malevolent. Emotion is a general term to denote a temporary or vivid feeling excited by objects or truths, or apprehended by the intellect. Emotional has a wider range, and equals the whole sensibility. Passion is a vehement state of desire or affection, transient or habitual. Will is the executive, which carries into effect, by determined choice, the preponderating wish, arising from the varied inward motives above defined.

12. State the theories as to the nature of virtue of HOBES, MANDEVILLE, EPICURUS, PALEY, CUMBERLAND, ARISTOTLE, CLARKE, WOLLASTON, and ADAM SMITH ? and your views of them ?

Hobbes says there is no difference between Virtue and Vice. Every man's consciousness of the difference is the refutation of this doctrine.

Mandeville.—“All pretensions to virtue are mere hypocrisy.” But hypocrisy assumes that which is counterfeited is an object of approbation among men.

Epicurus.—That Virtue consists in the mere pursuit of pleasure, or our own interests. By this theory man can pursue his own ends no matter what the consequences to others. Selfishness. In many cases virtue requires us to deny ourselves for the sake of others.

Paley.—Virtue is the doing good to mankind in obedience to the will of God, for the sake of everlasting happiness. This destroys all intrinsic distinction between virtue and vice, making everything virtuous which will promote happiness.

Cumberland.—That all virtue consists in a regard to the public good. This is *virtuous*, but it is not right to confine all virtuous action to the exercise of benevolence. Prudence in seeking our personal happiness is undoubtedly a virtue.

Aristotle.—Virtue consists in the moderate and just exercise of all the affections and passions. This theory gives no idea of virtue; is not complete and precludes many things not of a moral nature.

Clarke.—Virtue is acting according to the fitness of things. Everything which is fit is not necessarily virtuous.

Wallaston.—Virtue is conformity to truth. This definition like Clarke's, is not logically correct. Truth presupposes virtue.

Adam Smith makes it consist in sympathy of feeling with the agent. Objection: It takes for granted the existence of those moral feelings which are supposed to flow from sympathy.

13. Is the idea of Virtue derivative and compound, or simple and original, and why can it not be logically defined?

It is original and simple. It is undefinable because it is indivisible . . . it has no differentia, and we can only state the circumstances in which it appears.

14. How does Conscience stand related to the law of God, as the arbiter of right, and the guide of conduct?

Belief in the existence of God, although not necessary to the exercise of the moral faculty, yet adds much to its force. If we had no moral faculty, the obligation to be conformed to His will, would not be felt. All duty and virtuous actions may be referred to the will of God, as the standard by which they will be tried.

15. State the Sentimental Scheme, and your views of it?

This scheme makes all moral ideas or judgments to be based upon feeling. This makes feeling precede moral judgments; but the truth is that when we perceive anything to be morally good, or evil, a feeling of pleasure or displeasure afterwards arises.

16. Define Happiness, and state the conditions of its attainment?

Happiness is the harmony existing between the susceptibilities and desires on the one hand, and the objects with which they are made to conform, on the other. Duty and happiness must be consistent when we strive to obtain the latter.

17. State some of the false issues in regard to the question, as to whether Virtue is an intrinsic quality, intuitively seen, or a mere means of happiness?

I. It is not whether virtue leads to happiness. II. It is not whether we see intuitively what is duty. III. It is not whether we are to consider hap-

ness an utility, as subordinate to right. IV. It is whether this intuitive perception assures us against error in the application of principles.

18. How does the author compare the moral with the outward eye, in accounting for its mistakes and defects of insight?

As through the eye we are able to see things which give us simple ideas, and as we must have an original faculty for perceiving moral truths, which are simple, and inasmuch as we sometimes err in the use of our bodily faculties, so we may err in the use of the moral faculty.

19. What do you say of the argument for the Epicurean scheme, from our "willing as we please"?

The argument is that men choose what pleases them. Virtue brings pleasure . . . they choose that which is virtuous. This abolishes all distinction between right and wrong. Choosing does not make a thing right, but the right is in the thing itself.

20. Define and disprove Specific as distinguished from Generic Utilitarianism and Epicurianism?

Specific Utilitarianism make virtue a means of good to our own selves. Generic Utilitarianism makes it a means of happiness or good to all the universe ourselves included. It is not to be denied that virtue is coincident with happiness. Epicurianism is the means of promoting the agent's happiness. Refutation—I. Many acts are right and binding which have no such tendency. II. If actions are not good or evil as such, but in view of their tendencies, then the standards of right and wrong are as variable as the views of men in regard to these tendencies. III. It involves the selfish or Epicurean System. If the moral good of all actions is in the happiness they produce, then the best man is he who is the most happy. IV. To say an action is useful and that it is virtuous are different things.

21. Define and refute the scheme of association, and the Pantheistic theory.

The association scheme is that in the first dawn of intellect certain actions are seen to be useful, and conducive to happiness; afterwards by association the mind comes to regard classes of actions as virtuous or vicious, without any conscious reference to their utility; still the idea of right is originally, and by association derived from that of happiness. Refutation—I. Nothing is gained by it. II. It is based upon acts supposed to have taken place before memory, and hence it cannot be proved. III. All the arguments that the idea of right and wrong could never have been deduced from happiness are against it. IV. They presuppose the thing they attempt to explain. The Pantheistic theory consists in the deference which every one owes to his own excellency of spirit. What is this excellency of spirit unless the deference he owes to virtue. Unless man is the highest moral being this view is false.

22. Define Expediency—show its true sphere as rule of conduct.

Expediency is adaptation to produce moral good. It applies only to actions indifferent, and here it is a safe rule of conduct.

23. State the distinction between moral and positive laws, and how far the latter are binding?

Moral laws are in themselves binding, whether explicitly exacted, or not. Positive laws prescribe things morally indifferent, but made binding, because required by competent authority. Positive inasmuch as they subserve moral ends have somewhat of the obligation of moral laws; but if they come into conflict with a moral law, the positive must yield.

24. What in regard to a moral law, or rule of action in the mind?

There is no law of which we are conscious in the mind; but the mind in-

tuitively perceives the quality of a moral action, if it be simple and is conscious of no other mental process. It may be true that the moral faculty has the rule in itself.

25. What feeling arises in the mind, in view of the good and evil actions of the agent and others?

Our own actions, if good, excite an emotion of pleasure; if bad, they excite the feeling known as remorse. Good actions of others elicit our approbation and desire to reward. Bad actions call forth disapprobation, and the desire of punishing the agent.

26. State the four requisites to moral agency.

In order to be a moral agent man must have, I. Sound reason. II. Voluntary action. III. Original action. IV. He must possess the moral faculty.

27. What constitutes the highest conceivable liberty of a free agent? What is the summary answer to all arguments against its existence?

It is freedom of action in conformity with our desire and will. The answer to objections is by an appeal to consciousness.

28. State the respective relations of necessity, of an antecedent certainty to freedom of action?

Moral or philosophical necessity is not incompatible with liberty, for it is nothing more than the certain operation of moral causes producing moral effects, according to the power they possess. Such necessity belongs to God; but certainty is not necessity, which some have confounded with it; and yet certainty is not inconsistent with perfect freedom, while strict necessity is.

29. State the two extremes of opinion in regard to self-determination, or contrary choice in the will.

I. That which considers man the passive recipient of influences from without. II. That the will possesses a self-determining power in itself independent of motives, and uninfluenced by any inclination. The first makes man to be governed by outward influences, but he is really governed by the inward.

30. What are the two chief objections to uniform influence of actions, and the answers to them?

I. When a person has done what he regrets he feels that he could have done otherwise. But if motives are uniform, no one could, with the same motives, have possibly acted otherwise than he did. An analysis of the feeling shows, not that he might have acted differently with the same feelings but that had his feelings been different he would have acted properly. II. That when two equal things are presented, there can be no choice. Of what use is the self-determining power, if limited to such cases: when the things are known to be equal there is no limitation, but is only when we are not satisfied, that there is any difference, that we hesitate.

31. What is, and what is not the question at issue, between the disputants about contrary choice?

I. It is not, whether the will may choose, contrary things at the same time. II. Nor is it that men may choose which of two objects they please. III. Nor whether the will has the liberty of choice. IV. Nor whether the mind is controlled by external or internal motives. The true question is, whether the will is such a faculty that at the moment of any given choice under precisely the same circumstances and inclinations it would turn either way.

32. Give the true view and its proof negative and positive?

The true view is that a man chooses as he pleases and is not a self-determining power. I. There is no evidence of such a power from the *exercisæ*

*of the mind.* II. The intuitive conviction of man is, that he has the power of choosing as he pleases. Either this choice is made, or it is not; if it is not, there is something wanting which was requisite to such choice. Such power implies indifference in choice, which is impossible, also choice from positive aversion which is absurd.

33. What kind of indifference is, and what is not compatible with choice?

Subjective indifference is not compatible with liberty, because a man never chooses a thing with which he has no interest. Objective indifference is compatible with liberty, as in choosing a suit of clothes.

34. Compare animal and rational motives in their nature and influence.

Animal motives are such as appetite passion, desire of happiness, and to escape pain, and arise by a blind impulse. Rational motives arise from intellectual apprehension, and operate on the will by reasonable considerations.

Their influence can be compared and such trials of strength constantly occur; either the one or the other gaining the ascendancy according to its power, e. g., hunger impels a man to eat food, which reason tells him will injure.

35. Reconcile the popular maxim that nothing is moral which is not voluntary, with moral quality in the desires, feelings and dispositions.

The maxim applies primarily to actions which have the character of morality. Again, the word *voluntary* as used in the maxim, comprehends all the spontaneous exercises of the mind.

36. Give the proofs that the moral dispositions are praise or blameworthy?

1. As we know of the soul by its acts, so in regard to these dispositions.

2. The judgment of mankind. Evil acts are sure to be considered as such omission of duty, as saving the life of a person, when it is in our power to do so, is blamed by mankind. Our notion of character gives rise to our judgment of mans disposition, as good or bad.

37. Define Truth, objective and subjective.

Truth objective, (1.) is the reality of things, facts as they are; (2.) Such a representation of things by word or other signs as corresponds to reality.

38. State what duties are involved in the love of the Truth.

A desire to know, and to be governed by truth, together with earnestness, candor, and charity.

39. What is consistency and how far obligatory upon us?

Consistency is mutual harmony of principles, professions, and conduct; on one hand we are not to continue stubbornly in a doubtful cause in order to be consistent; and on the other hand, not to be continually changing our opinions. We ought always to be consistent with truth, and to follow the evidence thereof. Opinions should be founded slowly and with due consideration, and these not be abandoned for trifling reasons.

40. Define Veracity: also a lie. In what sense ought our communications truly to represent our thoughts? How far ought we to go in protecting secrets?

Veracity is adherence to truth in communications with fellow men. A lie (genus) is a false representation, (diff) made with intent to deceive. In the sense in which we believe they will be understood. In protecting secrets, we may state irrelevant, evasive, or inconclusive truth: Only we must never speak falsely.

41. Define a promise—state why it is especially binding, and what circumstances release its obligation.

A promise, is any communication by word or other signs, whereby one voluntarily excites in another an expectation, that he will do, or refrain from doing something. The obligation to keep a promise is the same as that to

speak the truth, augmented by two considerations, viz. : that it is possible to make good every lawful promise ; and that creating the expectations, gives the *promisee* the right to have it fulfilled. The obligation is dissolved in case, 1. The promisee releases from it, or he himself fails in his part of the conditions of fulfillment. 2. Fulfillment is in the nature of things impossible. 3. The promise is sinful and unlawful in its own nature.

42. What do you say of the obligation of extorted promises and of pledges of honor to keep your word ?

The fact of extortion does not dissolve the obligation of a promise. If such a promise ceases to bind, it does so from one of the previous considerations. A moral man must consider such a promise as most obligatory. But the man who on ordinary occasions gives such a pledge, acts most rashly. And if he does so without it being required, he gives proof of his want of confidence in *his own* word. Vows are especially binding, as made to God.

43. What arguments for them arise from the existence of conscience and the sense of moral obligation ?

Conscience and the sense of moral obligation constitute a moral law within. But where there is a law, there must be a law giver, and governor, and the law must partake of the character of the law giver ; conscience and the sense of obligation, testify then to the existence and character of God. They furnish an independent argument on this point.

44. State the three principal forms of Atheism and their refutation ?

I. All things in which design is manifested, have existed from *eternity*. II. The universe has in *itself* causes of power and intelligence to produce these effects. III. Individual organism are parts of an *eternal* succession. Refutation. If all things are eternal, they must be immutable : but this is contrary to daily experience. If we are eternal we must have remembrance of former existence ; but we have not. The second theory admits causes of power and intelligence—now every effect manifesting design must have such a cause, and therefore according to this theory there must be as many intelligent and powerful causes as effects. But the relations and adaptations of entirely different effects, show they must have had the same cause, and all things one cause. That this cause is not material is shown by its possessing intelligence, choice and will, which do not belong to matter. It is therefore spiritual. If design in one effect requires an adequate and intelligent cause, so must it in all effects : e. g., a cham. Again the power must be applied where the effect is produced. But in case of an animal, no one would say its progenitors had wisdom and power to create and adapt.

45. Show why the evidence for the Being of God is quite as strong as constant miracles, a visible glory, and an audible voice from God could make it.

God must make himself known by some work for he is a spirit, and we cannot know a spirit immediately. He has done so in the Universe, and no clearer evidence can be conceived of. Constant miracles would cease to be remarkable, and would then give no more proofs than do natural events. It requires no more power to work a miracle than to produce common events ; moreover a miracle in itself only gives proof of power, while nature exhibits power, wisdom and benevolence. We could not know that an audible voice or a visible glory was from the Great First Cause ; if they came seldom men would doubt their reality ; if often, they would become unmindful of them.

46. Distinguish theoretical and practical ethics : also personal and relative duties, and point out from what great axiom they may all be deduced.

1. Theoretical Ethics has reference to the psychological and metaphysical powers ; e. g., the nature of virtue, &c., practical ethics has reference to practical duties in detail.

2. Personal duties are those one owes to himself. Relative, the duties one owes to others.

3. They may all be deduced from the maxim: "Do unto others as you would have others do unto you," where there is a mutual change of circumstances.

47. Enumerate our personal duties and show the limits of self-defence and self respect.

Personal duties are self-preservation, temperance, purity and chastity, industry, prudence, self-respect, improvement and control. In self defence we are to use so much force and no more, and do so much injury and no more, than is necessary to our preservation, being at the same time not actuated by malignity or revenge. Self respect must be equally removed from vanity and pride, and from resentment and revenge of every injury. It manifests itself in conduct deserving respect—does not consent to insult.

48. Point out the general duties to others, especially in the family.

The general duties are, Justice, Benevolence, Truth, Fidelity, and generous co-operation in worthy and noble objects. Duties in the family are affection, parental filial, fraternal and conjugal.

49. Show our duty to the state and its limitation.

Duties to the state are obedience and support. There are two limitations to obedience. 1. When the power is usurped. 2. When a law conflicts with God's law, and enjoins something sinful. This last has two qualifications. 1. The rebellion against God's law, and the sin must be plain clear and distinct. 2. Disobeying for conscience, we must patiently suffer the penalty of so doing.

50. When does the right of revolution arise, and what are its limitations.

When the government is unsuited to the people, or is so incurably and intolerably apprehensive and corrupt that their best interests call for a change. The cause must be adequate and there must be a fair prospect of success.

51. Show the origin and importance of the right of private property.

All good governments secure its subjects in the right of holding private property. Its origin arises from the necessity which men are under to have property protected. For without this no man would be secure in reaping the fruits of his labor, hence the cultivation of the soil would be neglected—barbarism would result and society relapse into barbarism. Hence the schemes of Communism, Aggrarianism and Fourierism should be abhorred as an assault on civilization.

52. How do the works of nature prove infinite wisdom, power and benevolence in God?

He has created all things from nothing which omnipotence alone could do, and nature moves on in a regular course, showing that God's wisdom chose a perfect plan at first and need not to change. Benevolence is shown in the adaptedness of animals for enjoyment, their design, and mutual relation of plants and animals.

53. How is the existence of suffering in men and animals to be reconciled with benevolence in God?

Animals are only intended for a brief existence—have no anxiety regarding the future, and suffer but little pain in comparison with their enjoyment. And it is hard to see how animals can be made susceptible to pleasure without liability to pain, for this pain in many cases arises from pleasure. Man's pains are not due to God, for he was made holy and happy: but on account of his sin man is fallen.

54. How does the constitution of man evince the moral perfection of God?

The law interwoven in man's constitution proves that his Maker approves

of moral excellence. It would be absurd to suppose that the creature possesses an excellence of which there is no prototype in the Great First Cause.

55. Specify the duties we owe to God as shown by the light of nature : also man's original and present state as shown thereby.

Our duties are Adoration, Reverence, Gratitude, Love, Submission, Trust and Prayer. The light of nature shows that man's original condition was one of purity, but which is now lost, and he needs a Saviour to regenerate him.

56. State the two great extremes towards which philosophy has historically tended.

Idealism and Materialism—The absorption of object in subject, gives the former : the absorption of subject in object the latter.

57. Show the positions respectively of PLATO, ARISTOTLE, THE STOICS, THE EPICUREANS, MODERN SCHOOL, DES CARTES, SPINOZA, LOCKE, his French followers, KANT and his followers, REID and the Scotch School in reference thereto.

PLATO leaned to Idealism, and held that individuals form a class by virtue of an idea impressed on the class. Animals are such by being pervaded by the idea, animality.

ARISTOTLE, the father of logic, resisted Plato's idealism, in one respect, and accepted it in another, and adopted what he calls, forms as constituting the essence of a class, and this form begins to exist with the first individual of the class.

PLATO held *universalia ante rem*. Aristotle *universalia in re*. Aristotle was the oracle of the Mediaeval school.

THE STOICS held the doctrine of the world's soul : all things are God . . . pantheism.

THE EPICUREANS held that pleasure is the supreme good—its tendency materialism—to absorb subject in object. Stoicism is ideal, while this is sensual.

With the MODERN SCHOOL the controversy was between Nominalism and Realism—Realists, contended that a class was made by one pervading numerical substance : Nominalists that unity is merely in the name given to a class. Aristotle was the oracle, and thought freer. Bacon in his *Organon* unfolded the laws of nature from the study of the facts of nature. Aristotle in his *Organon*, makes deduction from truths already known. Bacon makes experience the basis of conclusions.

The theorists following were those of the Inductive Method.

DES CARTES considered all as doubtful except the mental act of doubting. I doubt, I think . . . I am. He argued that the conception of a perfect Being was evidence of His existence. This is a synthetic proposition, and if true, any fancy would be truthful.

SPINOZA resolved all things into one substance and its determination. He said by affixing attributes we limit the infinite. The infinite is the evolution of the finite : "*Omnis determinatio est negatio*." They agree with modern Pantheists that consciousness implies discrimination . . . limitation.

JOHN LOCKE took ground against Idealism. But held (1.) We have no innate ideas. (2.) All our knowledge is derived from sensation, including perception and reflection. We hold that ideas are innate—as is reason. Locke held that the perception of external objects was through the medium of representative images. HUME from thence founded his doctrine of materialistic-idealism. The French Atheists ran into absolute skepticism, called heaven a myth, death an eternal sleep.

KANT had a noumena objective, but not known ; and a phenomena, subjective. Dr. REID established the veracity of our senses, and held the golden mean between subject and object.





